

DHARMAPALA'S YOGACARA
CRITIQUE OF
BHAVAVIVEKA'S MADHYAMIKA
EXPLANATION OF EMPTINESS

THE TENTH CHAPTER OF TA-CH'ENG
KUANG PAI-LUN SHIH COMMENTING ON ARYADEVA'S
CATUHSATAKA CHAPTER 16
BY JOHN P. KEENAN

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*The Tenth Chapter of
Ta-ch'eng Kuang Pai-lun Shih
Commenting on Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka
Chapter Sixteen*

John P. Keenan

Studies in Asian Thought and Religion
Volume 20

The Edwin Mellen Press
Lewiston/Queenston/Lampeter

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

ISBN 0-7734-8615-1

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| <p>This is volume 20 in the continuing series Studies in Asian Thought and Religion Volume 20 ISBN 0-7734-8615-1 SATR Series ISBN 0-88946-050-7</p> |
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A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.

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The Edwin Mellen Press
Box 450
Lewiston, New York
USA 14092-0450

The Edwin Mellen Press
Box 67
Queenston, Ontario
CANADA L0S 1L0

The Edwin Mellen Press, Ltd.
Lampeter, Ceredigion, Wales
UNITED KINGDOM SA48 8LT

Printed in the United States of America




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The Being of Emptiness:

Catuḥśataka 16 of Āryadeva

with the

Śataka Commentary 10 of Dharmapāla

Reconstructing Ancient Arguments The Dharmapāla-Bhāvaviveka Dispute

I offer below an English translation of the text of chapter ten of Dharmapāla's Śataka Commentary, entitled in Chinese *Ta-ch'eng Kuang Pai-lun Shih lun* (T. 1569). But as no text and no single issue has meaning outside its own context, I would first like to discuss something of what was happening within this text's world of discourse. Issues and texts form parts of a larger stream of tradition and take their interest from their role within that tradition. So, I would like to sketch the tradition that lies behind Dharmapāla's *Śataka Commentary* on Āryadeva's Hundred Stanzas (*Śataka*). This task is difficult, not only because of the meagerness of my abilities, but also because of the absence of any adequate Indian account of the Buddhist doctrinal development. No one in India sketched for us the players or their struggles over the implications of Buddhist doctrine. Indeed, Indian culture, for all of its glories, did not much engage itself with the writing of history. We are left with the extant texts, and must follow the clues they afford in cross referencing their concerns. We do have later histories, the Tibetan Tāranātha's (b. 1575) *History of Buddhism*, Bu-ston's (1290-1364) *History of Buddhism*, and Chinese pilgrim accounts like Fa-hsien's (ca 400 CE) *Buddhist Records*, Hsüan-tsang's (596-664 CE) *Journey to the West*, and I-tsing's (635-715 CE) *Records of the Buddhist Religion in India and the Malay Archipelago*. But these, valued as they be, are later accounts which filter history through their varying doctrinal and cultural concerns.¹ They must be treated with critical care, comparing them to what can be gleaned from Indian sūtras and śāstras about the configuration of doctrinal developments.

Later accounts do indeed report that in Indian Mahāyāna thought two schools hold center stage: Mādhyamika and Yogācāra. They are often seen as competing schools, mutually exclusive options, or as developmental stages along a path that culminates in one or the other. In China, the Mādhyamika San-lun sect stressed its doctrine of emptiness as the pinnacle of Buddhist thought, while the traditions of Yogācāra, especially the dominant Fa-hsiang

¹See Snellgrove, *Indo-Tibetan Buddhism*, 2:305-323.

sect, saw itself as the full expressions of Mahāyāna philosophy. In China, these traditions were locked in sectarian competition, sharing little in common and calling for mutual repudiation. In Tibetan scholastic thought, Yogācāra was seen as a stage for those not yet able to understand the profundities of normative Mādhyamika thinking. The trajectories of Mahāyāna thought present these two schools as different Indian options and view them within the patterns of either Chinese or Tibetan understandings.

The problem, however, is that there has been little Indian textual evidence to demonstrate whether in India these schools did in fact view themselves as mutually exclusive.² Indeed, they do appeal to different sets of foundational sūtras and śāstras, and they look to different masters as their founders. The Mādhyamikas revere Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, while the Yogācāras revere Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu. And they certainly do teach different doctrines. The Mādhyamikas focus on emptiness and dependent co-arising, the two truths of ultimate meaning and conventional truth, while the Yogācāras turn toward a critical understanding of consciousness, its underlying structure of the storehouse consciousness functioning in synergy with the active consciousnesses, and the three patterns in which consciousness so understood functions. It is in this framework that they interpret the notions of emptiness, dependent co-arising, and the two truths. There is no question that Mādhyamika and Yogācāra represent two diverging trajectories of reflection on emptiness and the nature of awakening, for the Yogācāra constructed an elaborate theory of mind and then reread the doctrines of Mādhyamika within that theory.

Yet the Yogācāra thinker Asaṅga wrote a straightforward and approving commentary on the opening stanzas of Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamādhyamakakārikāḥ* and the later commentator Sthiramati (470-550 CE) commented on Mādhyamika in his *Ta-ch'eng Chung-lun Shih-lun* (T. 1569) without evincing any direct sectarian critique at all. The earliest Yogācāras evidently did not see themselves as competitors with Nāgārjuna or Āryadeva. Rather they apparently saw themselves as faithful developers of Mādhyamika, furthering its teachings by grounding them within their own theory of

²Note T.R.V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, "Mādhyamika is used both for the system and its advocates. Non-Buddhist writers invariably refer to the system as well as the adherents of it as Mādhyamika. Nāgārjuna or even Āryadeva do not seem to have used either of these terms."

consciousness. That theory of consciousness, however, was not accepted by all Mādhyamika thinkers, and controversy and repudiation did occur. This book is aimed at presenting the Yogācāra textual evidence of that divergence in the thought of Dharmapāla, who in his *Śataka Commentary* argues for the superiority of Yogācāra understandings of emptiness over those of Mādhyamika, especially the Mādhyamika thought of Bhāvaviveka. This commentary represents the hardening of the lines between the two traditions and perhaps their initial establishment as competing schools within Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism. Dharmapāla's argument occurs in the process of commenting upon chapter 10 of Āryadeva's *Śataka*, and it finds its response in chapter 5 of Bhāvaviveka's *Madhyamakahr̥daya Tarkajvālā*.

In this introductory essay I would like to offer a reconstruction of the shifting lines of doctrinal development that resulted in the dispute between Dharmapāla and Bhāvaviveka. To grasp the import of these disputes, some notion of Yogācāra thought is required. But Yogācāra takes as its starting point the Prajñāpāramitā scriptures and Mādhyamika thought. Thus, one must examine the Mādhyamika teaching of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva to show how they attempted to refute the previous Abhidharma realism through the doctrine of emptiness and the issues that were thereby engendered. One must also understand why that Abhidharma scholasticism arose and how it established a separate context of Buddhist theory upon the earliest layer of Buddhist scriptures, the Nikāyas and Āgamas.

The schema for such an exposition comes from the conviction that meanings do not occur within a context agreed upon by all thinkers, as if one simply had to adjudicate truth and falsity within a single, all-encompassing context of meaning. Rather, Asaṅga teaches, the meaning of reality (*tattvārtha*) is fourfold:

First, what is universally accepted by ordinary beings. Second, what is universally accepted by logical reasoning. Third, what is the sphere of wisdom completely purified from the obstacle of passion. And fourth, that which is the sphere of wisdom completely purified from the obstacles to the knowable.³

³Translation slightly altered from J. D. Willis, *On Knowing Reality: The Tattvārtha Chapter of Asaṅga's Bodhisattvabhūmi*, p. 70. I find this schema of contexts of meaning to be parallel to that of Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, pp. 81-99.

This schema assumes that meanings are not univocal, but differ in accord with the manner in which one understands. The first is the shared clusters of meaning of ordinary persons—the common sense context of meaning in which meanings are apprehended as they affect concrete living. The second is an analytic knowing wherein one logically demonstrates one's thesis—the context of theory. The third is wisdom freed from all passions and defilements, quiescent and without fabrication—the context of apophatic meaning, in which meaning is apprehended only through negation. The fourth is a critical context in which meanings are grounded within a conscious understanding of understanding itself, the source for the previous three modes of understanding meaning. I think what Asaṅga has in mind is a typology of meaning as it occurs within the progression of doctrinal developments and thus each context of meaning corresponds to specific stages within that progression.

The Shifting Movement of Buddhist Thinking

Early Buddhism and the Rise of Abhidharma Theory

The early layer of Buddhist scriptures, the Nikāyas and Āgamas, presents a context in which common sense meaning dominates. Theoretical questions as to the nature of suffering or of defiled samsaric consciousness are often dismissed as unprofitable, for theory does not help one to engage in practice or to realize awakening. From its earliest stages the Dharma teaching of Śākyamuni focused on the practice of meditation, and its goal was the attainment of yogic concentration (*samādhi*), which entailed the cessation of all mental activity. Involvement in speculative questions was seen as an obstacle to that mindless concentration.⁴ Indeed, Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ*

⁴*Samyutta-nikāya*, V. 418. F.L. Woodward, trans., *The Book of the Kindred Sayings*, v, 354: "Monks, reason not ill, unprofitable reasonings, such as: Eternal is the world, or Not eternal is the world; Life is the same as body, or Life and body are different; the Tathāgata exists after death, or the Tathāgata exists not after death, or the Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist after death. Why do I say this? Because, monks, these reasonings are not concerned with profit, they are not the rudiments of the holy life, they conduce not to revulsion [from the deluded world], to tranquillity, to full understanding, to the perfect wisdom, they conduce not to Nibbāna."

will urge this point later in its attempt to banish views and ideas specifically in favor of yogic concentration.⁵

Yet questions do not go away. Indeed, if the only proper concern of Śākyamuni's followers were the attainment of mental cessation, then how could they embody this doctrine in human language, how could Buddhism itself be preached?⁶ Furthermore, as in any extensive body of writings, the Nikāyas sometimes seem to contradict themselves. How is one to explain these apparent divergences? The Abhidharma enterprise arises to answer such questions as these, articulating explicit theories on the nature of mind and wisdom, of concentration and cessation. Buddhist thought now becomes bifurcated into common sense and theory. The central concern for concentration and awakening remain constant, but no longer are abstract, theoretical questions rejected as unprofitable. Rather Abhidharma attempts to construct a fully systematic and formulated understanding of doctrine. The Abhidharma theory attempts to express doctrines not only as they aid practitioners in their quest, but also as they relate to one another. And that is a movement from a common sense context, in which teachings are meaningful only as they relate to the concrete concerns of practitioners, to a theoretical context, in which teachings are meaningful as they coherently interrelate. Thus, the progression from early Buddhism to Abhidharma is a movement from the common sense to the theoretical context of meaning.⁷

⁵For the sūtras, see e.g. *Samādhirāja* 9.26 (quoted *Catuhśatakavṛtti* XII, § 13, Tillemans, I: 117: "As the Illustrious One stated [in the *Samādhirājasūtra*]: 'In extinction dharmas are without dharmas (nirvṛtti dharmāṇa na asti dharmā). Whatever is inexistent in this [state] does not exist at all. For those who imagine 'existence' and 'inexistence' and practice accordingly, suffering will not cease.').

⁶Consult Griffiths, *On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation and the Mind-Body Problem*, which deals insightfully with the attainment of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*) in Theravāda, Vaibhāṣika, and Yogācāra. Eckel, *To See the Buddha*, p. 74, writes: "If all of the Buddha's conceptual activity has ceased, not only at the moment of parinirvāṇa but also at the moment of enlightenment, how can he get up from the seat of enlightenment and teach?"

⁷Loneragan, *Method in Theology*, 81-82, writes: "Different exigencies give rise to different modes of conscious . . . operations, and different realms of meaning. There is a systematic exigency that separates the realm of common sense from the realm of theory. Both of these realms, by and large, regard the same real objects. But the objects are regarded from such different standpoints that they can be related only by shifting from one standpoint to another. The realm of common sense is the realm of persons and things in their relation to us. It is the visible universe peopled by relatives, friends, acquaintances, fellow citizens, and the rest of humanity. We come to know it, not by applying some scientific method, but by a self-correcting process of learning, in which insights gradually accumulate, coalesce, qualify, and correct one another, until a point is reached where we are able to meet situations as they arise, size them up by adding a few more insights to the acquired store, and so deal with them in an appropriate fashion. Of objects in this realm we speak in everyday language, in words that have the function, not of naming the intrinsic properties of

In the early common sense context of the Nikāyas, meaningful answers are referred to the particular people asking about them, and no universal, coherent system is envisaged.⁸ This does not mean that the Buddha's original teaching is as a pedestrian, common sort of insight into life, for the Buddha's awakening is constantly reported as a truly transcendent realization of wisdom. But it does mean that the understanding of teaching in the earliest texts functions within a common sense context of meaning. The criterion for truth is the personal embodiment of that truth in practical experiences, of the authenticity of practice. One follows a path, without bothering about any theory at all.

things, but of completing the focusing of our conscious intentionality on the things, of crystallizing our attitudes, expectations, intentions, of guiding all our actions. The intrusion of the systematic exigency into the realm of common sense is beautifully illustrated by Plato's early dialogues. Socrates would ask for the definition of this or that virtue. No one could afford to admit that he had no idea of what was meant by courage, or temperance, or justice. No one could deny that such common names must possess some common meaning found in each instance of courage, or temperance, or justice. And no one, not even Socrates, was able to pin down just what that common meaning was. If from Plato's dialogues one shifts to Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*; one can find definitions worked out both for virtue and vice in general and for a series of virtues flanked by two opposite vices, one sinning by excess, and the other by defect. But these answers to Socrates' questions have now ceased to be the single objective. The systematic exigency not merely raises questions that common sense cannot answer but also demands a context for its answer, a context that common sense cannot supply or comprehend. This context is theory, and the objects to which it refers are in the realm of theory. To these objects one can ascend starting from common sense starting points, but they are properly known, not by this ascent, but by their internal relations, their congruences and differences, the functions they fulfill in their interactions If a biologist takes his young son to the zoo and both pause to look at a giraffe, the boy will wonder whether it bites or kicks, but the father (sic) will see another manner in which skeletal, locomotive, digestive, vascular, and nervous systems combine and interlock. There are then a realm of common sense and a realm of theory. We use different languages to speak of them. The differences in languages involves social differences: specialists can speak to their wives (sic) about many things but not about their specialties."

⁸See I. B. Horner, *Middle Length Sayings*, II, 361, which describes the process whereby a seeker comes to know and practice the teaching: "Suppose a monk is living, depending upon a village or market town. A householder or a householder's son, having approached him, examines him concerning three states: greed, aversion, and confusion. . . . After examining him, and seeing that he is purified from [these states], he then reposes faith in him. With faith born, he draws close. Drawing close, he sits down nearby. Sitting sown nearby, he lends ear. Lending ear, he hears doctrine. Having heard doctrine, he remembers it. He tests the meaning of the things he remembers. While testing the meaning, the things are approved of. If there is an approval of the things, desire is born. With desire born, he makes an effort. Having made an effort, he weighs it up. Having weighed it up, he strives. Being self-resolute, he realizes with his person the highest truth itself, and penetrating it by means of intuitive wisdom, he sees."

Abhidharma originates in the effort to systematize the scriptures and to present them in a philosophic manner.⁹ A new technical language is evolved, the matrix (*mātikā*), for one cannot function philosophically within the common sense, everyday language of the early scriptures. The modern Abhidharma master Ñyanatiloka explains that the Abhidharma is not a distortion of the Buddha's doctrine but rather its furtherance, explaining:

Regarding the difference between the Sutta and the Abhidhamma, the 'Higher Doctrine,' it does not really so much concern the subject, but rather its arrangement or treatment. The subject in both is practically the same. Its main difference in treatment, briefly stated, may be said to consist in the fact that in the Sutta the doctrines are more or less explained in the world of the philosophically incorrect 'conventional' everyday language (*voḥāra-vacana*) understood by anyone, whilst the Abhidhamma, on the other hand, makes use of purely philosophical terms in the absolute sense (*paramattha-vacana*).¹⁰

The same understanding is presented by the pre-Mahāyāna Vasubandh. In his *Abhidharmakośa Bhāṣyam*, he describes Abhidharma as "pure wisdom with its accompanying elements. Wisdom is the discernment of the elements of existence (*dharmas*)."¹¹ Wisdom is precipitated into the analytical understanding of all the elements of reality, the knowledge of which enables one to sever the passions and defilements. The content of this wisdom, however, has now become identified as the discernment of the elements of reality. The Abhidharmika Vasubandhu presents the claim that by proper analyses one can reach beyond the false conventional ideas to an absolute truth, expressed in clear concepts.¹²

⁹On the developmental stages in Abhidharma thinking, see T. Kimura, *Abhidatsumaron no kenkyū*.

¹⁰Ñyanatiloka Mahathera, *Guide Through the Abhidhammapitaka*, p. 9.

¹¹de la Vallée Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa*, I.3. Confer Pruden's translation, *Abhidharmakośa Bhāṣyam*, I: 56.

¹²de la Vallée Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa*, VI, 139, Proudén, 3: 910-11. The passage reads: "The Blessed One proclaimed the Four Noble Truths, but he also declared Two Truths, relative truth (*saṃvṛtīsatya*) and absolute truth (*paramārthasatya*). What are these Two Truths? The idea of a jug ends when the jug is broken; the idea of water ends when, in the mind, one analyzes the water. The jug and the water, and all that resembles them, exist relatively. The rest exists absolutely. If the idea of a thing disappears when this thing is broken down into pieces, then this thing has relative existence (*saṃvṛtīsat*); for example, a jug. If the idea of a thing disappears when

When one correctly discerns things and analyzes them into their basic realities, one discovers the absolute truth of their unique natures, their essences (*svabhāva*). For example, the self (*ātman*) does not exist, for it can be reduced to the five aggregates (*skandha*), but they, being irreducible, do represent actually and absolutely existent realities. Thus Abhidharma objectifies in a systematic manner the content of wisdom itself. Its theories are the unfolding of this content in philosophically accurate terms. They are based on discerning the true essences of things, in light of which one can proceed to practice the path of purification and attain awakened wisdom. But the Abhidharma theoretizing assumes as its framework a philosophy of realism, for properly adjudicated ideas correspond to the realities of things (*dharma*s). The path wherein one practices meditation is grounded on a previous attainment of the correct view (*samagdr̥ṣṭi*) of reality.¹³ Once that correct view has been attained, the only obstacle throughout all the stages of the path are the passions (*kleśa*). This is an approach far removed from the practical concerns of ordinary practitioners, for it is crafted to appeal to intellectual monks who have the leisure and capacity to engage in such theoretical studies. Ñyanatiloka catches the shift between common sense and theory in a parable:

A soaring royal swan spied a lowland crane puddling in a mud pool. Of compassion he descended and told this inglorious feathered kinsman of the Himalayan heights, of cool mountain streams, and their shining jewels. "But I live on mudfish. Are there any mudfish there?" asked the crane. "No. There are no mudfish there, nor mud," replied the swan. "Then I don't want your mountains and your jewels," said the crane.¹⁴

To common-sense perspectives, the heights of theoretical understanding are lifeless and meaningless. But to the theoretician, they constitute the highest

this thing is dissipated, or broken to pieces, by the mind, then this thing should be regarded as having relative existence; for example, water. . . . That which differs [from such relative existence] is absolute truth. If, when a thing is broken to pieces or dissipated by the mind, the idea of the thing continues, then this thing has absolute existence (*paramārthasat*); for example, physical matter: one can reduce physical matter into atoms, one can remember smell and other *dharma*s in the mind, but the idea of the unique nature of physical matter persists. . . . And as this absolutely exists, it is absolutely true."

¹³de la Vallée Poussin, VI, 163 sq. See Lamotte, *Historie*, pp. 677-686, for a synopsis of the path structure of Abhidharma.

¹⁴Ñyanatiloka, *Guide*, xiv.

meaning. Perhaps this scholastic approach engendered its own reversal by overlooking the needs of less theoretical lay practitioners, for the Mahāyāna arose to contest the idea that anyone could ever reach any correct view of reality. Its teaching of emptiness directly negated the essences thought in Abhidharma to support any correct views.

The Rise of Mahāyāna and the Mādhyamika School

The appearance of the Perfection of Wisdom Scriptures (*Prajñāpāramitāsūtra*) (ca. 50 BCE–CE 150) marks a new shift in the context of meaning. The early scriptures functioned in a common sense context of practical engagement in practice.¹⁵ The Abhidharma bifurcated meaning into common sense and theory, but, in so doing, presented a realistic epistemology in which a subjective mind confronted really-existent essences. The Perfection of Wisdom texts now came forward to negate and counter this Abhidharma assumption. Meaning now functions within an apophatic context of signless immediacy, rather than in common sense or theory. Long before western philosophers began to overcome metaphysics, the Mahāyāna thinkers engaged in a parallel endeavor. They recommend that one abandon any analytic examination of reality, for in their apophatic context, all things are empty of any intrinsic nature. Even the four noble truths that constitute the core of the Buddha's teaching are emptied of any core content.¹⁶

The entire program of Abhidharma is denied any validity, for it takes the four noble truths to be the central structure of meditation. The point is not to reject the teachings of the Buddha but to negate the claim that any knowing, however theoretical, can circumscribe the ultimate, for the principal character of an apophatic context of meaning is the denial that the ultimate can ever be grasped in ideas or attained in thought or word. The basic thrust of the Perfection of Wisdom scriptures is to repudiate the confrontational understanding of understanding itself, which assumes that theory can issue in absolute truth (*paramārthasatya*). The analytic discernment of realities is

¹⁵See A. Hirakawa, *Shoki daijō no kenkyū*, pp. 617-43 on the lay origins of Mahāyāna. Also his "Prajñāpāramitā and the Rise of Mahāyāna," *Buddhist Spirituality 1*, ed. Y. Takeuchi, pp. 137-54.

¹⁶Conze, *Buddhist Texts Through the Ages*, p. 7: The *Prajñāpāramitā-hṛdāya* proclaims: "Here, Śāriputra, all things are marked with emptiness. . . . There is no suffering, no origination [of suffering], no cessation [of suffering], nor path [that leads to cessation]. There is no cognition, no attainment, and no non-attainment."

replaced by the practice of the perfection of wisdom, a wisdom made perfect precisely through insight into the emptiness of all things, even the teachings of the Buddha.¹⁷

The very apprehending of the Buddha's teaching can be false, and, as such, an obstacle to awakening, because by grasping at anything, one presupposes that apprehension corresponds to some external, objectifiable content of meaning. In such a case, the ultimate would no longer be ultimate, but merely a correct philosophical position. It is precisely such an external, objectifiable content (*svabhāva*) that things are empty of. With this radical understanding of emptiness, the Perfection of Wisdom writers reject the Abhidharma understanding of meaning. No confrontational theory avails for anything. Rather, such grasping apprehension occludes the very possibility of experiencing the immediacy of awakened wisdom. The model Mahāyāna practitioner, the bodhisattva, is grounded in emptiness and realizes that "words are artificial. . . . They express [things] conventionally by means of an adventitious designation."¹⁸ Even the so-called absolute words of Abhidharma reasoning, far from presenting absolute truth, are merely conventional designations, skillfully employed as a means to lead suffering sentient beings onto a path of not grasping onto any path at all!

Mādhyamika thought is developed by Nāgārjuna (ca 150-250 CE) on the basis of the Perfection of Wisdom Scriptures. Its position in Mahāyāna doctrinal development is central, for it sets the basic pattern for all further developments as an apophatic understanding of meaning. No subsequent doctrinal thought could proceed without taking its stance squarely upon the doctrine of emptiness. Nāgārjuna sets out to refute all views whatsoever. He concludes his most important work, the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ*, by proclaiming:

¹⁷*Vajracchedika*, Verse 21a. Conze, *Buddhist Wisdom Books*, p. 61: -The *Vajracchedika* explains: "The Blessed One said: What do you think, Subhūti, does it ever occur to the Tathāgata that 'By me is the teaching shown?' Subhūti replied, 'Not so, Blessed One, it does not occur to the Tathāgata, 'By me is the teaching shown.'" The Blessed One said, 'Whoever, Subhūti, would say, 'By the Tathāgata is the teaching shown,' he would speak falsely and calumniate me, Subhūti, by grasping what is not. Why? The teaching is called the teaching, but there is no teaching to be apprehended as the teaching."

¹⁸Conze, *The Larger Sutra*, p. 57.

I bow reverently to Gautama who, taking compassion, taught the true teaching, in order to cut off all views.¹⁹

Jacques May pointed out that Mādhyamika presents itself not as a dogmatic system, and it does not function by means of an exposition of speculative principles but rather is a "discourse on method."²⁰ That method is one of dialectically uncovering the false assertions of selfhood that underlie any constructed view of reality. Since the intent of Nāgārjuna is to cut off all views, emptiness must not be understood as yet another view. Rather, emptiness is the expeller of all views, however correct they are deemed to be.²¹

This is strange language, for emptiness is the central Mādhyamika doctrine, and yet here it is clearly said not to be any view at all. If it is not a view, what is it? It would appear that the term "view" has a specific meaning, as that which presents any set of terms that purport to explain the structure or nature of reality. By contrast, emptiness is a teaching about how to avoid such views, whatever they may be, for views entangle people in confusion and dissuade them from practice.²² Emptiness is a demand that one shift to the context of apophatic meaning when presenting the Buddha's teaching. To make emptiness yet another view is to confine this teaching to the Abhidharma context of views, a context that differentiates real entities through correct analyses. Emptiness is not simply non-being but is meant to negate the

¹⁹Nāgārjuna, *Mūlamadhyamakārikāḥ*, ed. J. W. de Jong, 27:30, p. 43. The text reads: sarvadṛṣṭiprahāṇāya yaḥ saddharmam adeśayat/anukampām upādāya taṃ namasyāmi gautamam.

²⁰Jacques May, *Chandrakīrti: Prasannapadā Madhyamikavṛtti. Douze chapitres traduits du Sanskrit et du Tibétain, accompagnés d'une introduction de notes et d'une édition critique de la version Tibétain*, p. 15.

²¹de Jong, *Mūlamadhyamakārikāḥ*, 13: 7-8: yadyaśūnyam bhavet kiṃcit syācchūnyam apikiṃ cana/na kiṃcid astyaśūnyam ca kutaḥ śūnyam bhaviṣyati// śūnyatā sarvadṛṣṭinām proktā niḥsaraṇam jinaiḥ/yeṣām tu śūnyatādṛṣṭis tān asādhyān babbhāṣire. See Taisho 30, p. 18c. "If there were something not empty, there might be something termed empty. But there is no not empty something, and so where might there be an empty something? The Victors have declared emptiness to be the expeller of all views, but those who hold emptiness as a view, they have pronounced incurable."

²²Chandrakīrti (ca 560–640), *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* 298–99, explains: "For example: A position may set out to refute the singularity, plurality, length, circularity, or blackness—whatever the qualities might be ascribed to the hair apprehended by a person with ophthalmia, but such a position is of no possible consequence to those not infected with ophthalmia. Likewise, the refutation developed by you who apprehend both [cause and effect as intrinsically existent] is of no possible consequence to one who analyzes cause and effect as being without any intrinsic being." Translation from Huntington, *The Emptiness of Emptiness*, p. 98.

framework in which being and non-being are differentiated through language. Emptiness is the counteragent to all discriminative thinking.²³

Emptiness is the expeller of all views because it is the negation of any inner essence, that is, of any *svabhāva* in things. Literally *svabhāva* means own-being, self-being, substance (*sub-stans*, that which stands under), that which supports things in their being and makes them accessible to cognition. But any such underlying essence is rejected by Nāgārjuna, and so no such views are allowed in the realm of emptiness.

Yet the question remains: If emptiness is not a view, what is it? What does it mean to say that emptiness is a teaching of Buddha, if it has no content? How can there be any conscious act without any content at all? It seems slippery in the extreme, for whenever one attributes any determined content to emptiness, one is accused of making it into a view and declared incurable! Nāgārjuna was attacked by an Indian school of logicians, the Nyāya school, who held that words indeed have inherent meanings and that there are four valid means of knowing: direct perception, inference, authority, and analogy. Based on these ideas they attacked the teaching of emptiness, for they argued that, if words are empty of intrinsic meaning they cannot refute anything:

If all things are entirely empty without any essence, then words have no essence. In that case you cannot negate the essence [of things by means of words].²⁴

The problem is that there are differing contexts of meaning. Whereas the objector is functioning within a realistic theory of knowledge, Nāgārjuna shifts to an apophatic context. He cannot do otherwise, for no argumentation within a realistic theory of knowledge will be to any avail. If he were to allow the objector to choose the language for dispute—and thus the context of meaning—there would be no possibility at all of challenging that context, and this is precisely the point of emptiness: that the entire context of realistic theory is invalid. All words are nothing but constructs without any inherent

²³Chandrakīrti comments: "Emptiness is taught in order to lay to rest all differentiation without exception. Thus the intent of emptiness is the laying to rest of differentiation in its entirety. But you, in [attributing] to emptiness the sense of non-being, hypostatize it." See Jacques May, *Chandrakīrti*, p. 223-24.

²⁴*Vigrahavyāvartānī*, E.H. Johnson and A. Kunst ed., *Mélanges Chinois et Bouddiques*, 9 (1948-51), p. 24.

meaning. Even emptiness is a conventional term, itself arising from human speech. The thrust of emptiness is pervasively negative, aimed at refuting the entire realistic, theoretical framework in which questions are argued. The Abhidharma thinkers took the earlier common sense teachings of the Nikāyas toward a theoretical sophistication. Nāgārjuna now empties that theory of any validity and takes us back toward the earlier practical meanings of the Nikāyas, now bolstered by a dialectical method that refutes any realistic account of knowledge. Where the Abhidharma scholars developed the systematic impulse of the early scriptures toward a full blown philosophy. Nāgārjuna now develops the mystic élan of those same scriptures toward an apophatic abandonment of all theory. Thus he can claim:

If I formulate any proposition (*pratijñā*), then there would be error [in my reasoning]. But I do not formulate any proposition. . . .²⁵

He does not move within the same horizon of meaning as his realistic opponents and so his claims are not claims within their context of realistic meaning. No means of knowing (*pramāṇa*) offers a bridge between a knowing subject and a known object, for the only way to validate the means of knowing is to appeal to the same means of knowing.

What then is the content of emptiness? Some would have it that since Nāgārjuna identifies emptiness with dependent co-arising, the content of emptiness itself is dependent co-arising. In this reading, emptiness negates false views in order to enable one to gain insight into dependent co-arising as the inter-being of all beings. But then anyone who held a philosophy of organism in which all things are interrelated and nothing is ever independently stable would by definition have realized awakening! This clearly will not do, for the simple fact that Nāgārjuna does not employ the teaching of emptiness as the basis of any grand view of the interdependence of all beings. Rather, the *Madhyamakakārikāḥ* states that dependent co-arising is not a view:

As realness (*sattā*) does not occur for existents that lack essence (*svabhāva*), 'this being, that becomes' is not a fact either.²⁶

²⁵Johnston, p. 127.

²⁶*Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ*, 1:10, de Jong ed., p. 2: bhāvānāṃ niḥsvabhāvānāṃ na sattā vidyate yataḥ/safīdam asmin bhavatiṭy etan naivopapadyate.

The phrase, "this being, that becomes" is a traditional statement of the law of causality, the notion that Nāgārjuna is criticizing in this first chapter of his *Madhyamakakārikāḥ*. Dependent co-arising is not an explanatory view that states the causal interdependence of all things. That is quite good Hua-yen philosophy but it is not Nāgārjuna, who rejects the notion of any causal power between phenomena arising together in a real continuum. Indeed, in the introductory stanza to his *Madhyamakakārikāḥ*, he writes:

I offer salutation to the Best of Preachers, the Buddha, who has taught that dependent co-arising has no ceasing, no arising, no nullification, no eternity, no unity, no plurality, no arriving, and no departing, that it is quiescent of all fabrications (*prapañca*), that it is blissful.²⁷

This passage makes it clear that for Nāgārjuna dependent co-arising is not an explanation of the mutual relatedness of all things, for the eight negations mean that it is quiescent of all fabricated views. Nāgārjuna is not offering an alternate theory to the Abhidharma thinkers, but undercutting all attempts at theory. For him the dependent co-arising taught by the Buddha is the immediacy of awareness of things before and beyond any view that rests upon definitions of their essential characteristics. In his *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* Nāgārjuna writes:

I give salutation to the Prince of Sages who, in negating the arising and ceasing [of all things] by the principle of the way, deigned to explain dependent co-arising.²⁸

And again in what is perhaps the most quoted stanza of his *Stanzas on the Middle* he writes:

²⁷Inada, *Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, 38: anirodhamanutpādam-anucchedamaśāscatam/ anekārthamanānārthamanāgamamanirgamam/ yaḥ prafitya-samutpādam prapañcōpaśamam śivam/ deśayārnāsa sambuddhastam vande vadatām varam.

²⁸Scherrer-Schaub, *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti, Commentaire à la soixantaine sur le raisonnement ou Du vrai enseignement de la causalité par le Maître indien Candrakīrti*, 20 and 106-07. See Nagao, *The Foundational Standpoint*, pp. 8-14. See also S. Yamaguchi, *Chūkan bukkyō ronkō (Research On Mādhyamika Buddhism)*, pp. 37-38.

It is dependent co-arising that I term emptiness. Taking on [this meaning], this [emptiness] is established. This alone is the middle path."²⁹

In the early scriptures the Buddha taught a middle path between harsh asceticism and indulgent living, but here Nāgārjuna interprets that middle path in terms of a non-theoretical awareness of dependent co-arising. He is dragging us back to the concrete, practical world of the early scriptures, now suffused with an apophatic awareness of the inadequacy of all theoretical views and defended by the logic of an insistently negative reasoning. Both emptiness and dependent co-arising are conventional doctrines intended to negate realistic theories based upon a view of essences. By means of this insistently negative reasoning, refuting first one alternative and then another, Nāgārjuna leaves one with a bare awareness that abandons all views. All explanations lack any final validity. They are all conventional truth, valid for the purposes at hand: the freeing of the mind from the grasp of theoretical views in favor of engagement in the practices of *samādhi*, in which there is no mental activity at all.

The doctrine of the two truths of ultimate meaning and worldly convention appears in early Buddhism, and the Abhidharma Vasubandhu used it to distinguish between the false, misleading conventional viewpoint and the well-analyzed and absolute viewpoint. But for Mahāyāna it was Nāgārjuna who first explicated the significance of these two truths in terms of emptiness. The truth of ultimate meaning (*paramārtha-satya*) is ineffable (*avācya*) and silent (*tūṣṇībhāva*); it has no content and cannot be identified in language. In contrast to the Abhidharma belief in the ability to attain absolute truth in concepts, this truth cannot be circumscribed or defined in any manner whatsoever. Yet, in order to teach, one has no alternative but to employ conventional words and to express conventional truth. Thus one has to rely upon language.³⁰

²⁹*Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ*, 14:18, de Jong ed., p. 35: yaḥ praṭītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatām tām pracakṣmahe/sā prañāptir upādāya pratīpat saive madhyamā.

³⁰*Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ*, 24:8-10, de Jong, ed., pp. 34-35: dve satye samupāśrītya buddhānām dharmadeśanā/ lokasamvṛtisatyam ca satyam ca Paramārthataḥ//ye'nayor na vijānanti vibhāgam satyayor dvayoh/te tattvam na vijānanti gambhīram buddhaśāśane// vyavahāram anāśrītya paramārtho na deśyate/paramārtham anāgamya nirvāṇam nādhigamya. The Buddha's exposition of teaching relies on the two truths: the worldly, conventional truth and the ultimate truth. Those who are unaware of the differentiation between these two truths are unaware of the profound reality

Nāgārjuna was quite aware of the paradox (*Vigrahavyāvartanī*, etc.) and so is Āryadeva (*Catuḥśataka* 16)—and therefore Nāgārjuna says that he merely avails himself of "designations" (*prajñāpti*) (*Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 24.18) to express his message. He thus adopts the doctrine of two truths, one that can be expressed in language and one that can only be experienced beyond the level of language and communication.³¹ This, he proclaims, is the orthodox "Middle Path" between affirmation and negation.

The distinction between these truths is that while the conventional differs totally from the ultimate and can never grasp that ultimate in any view, yet it is necessary for the proclamation of the teaching that leads one to that ultimate. What is recommended is a minimalist approach to knowledge, for the point is not to know any supposed true view, but by the practice of *samādhi* to realize cessation. Indeed, the entire effort of Nāgārjuna is to clear the path for practice by liberating people from clinging to views as if they had true religion and all was simply a matter of time until awakening.³²

But Nāgārjuna does not say very much about conventional truth. He has to use language, and warns against taking that language as corresponding to reality. The deep reality in the Buddha's teaching is not accessible to language, but only to the yogic concentration that severs all mental activity. Questions will remain about the status of conventional truth. If it is merely language-formed and conventional, is it not always misleading? How does it lead to the ultimate? Is it indeed really truth at all? Or simply a temporary concession to the needs of communication? Does it have any positive value?³³

Āryadeva (3rd century) was an immediate follower of Nāgārjuna, and may have known him personally.³⁴ He not only continues Nāgārjuna's thought but perforce had to respond to objections against it. The world of Āryadeva is the world of a yogin. His book, *Catuḥśataka*, like the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ*, is addressed to a practitioner of Yoga, i.e., Yogācāra (as indicated by

in the Buddha's teaching. Without reliance on language, the ultimate is not taught, and without arriving at the ultimate, cessation is not reached."

³¹For all this see, Malcolm David Eckel, *Jñānagarbha's Commentary on the Distinction Between the Two Truths*, and Gadgin Nagao, *The Foundational Standpoint of Mādhyamika Philosophy*.

³²See Nagao, *The Foundational Standpoint*, pp. 73-80.

³³Indeed this seems to be the central issue for Jay L. Garfield *The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, pp. 293-321 on the Four Noble Truths chapter, and the disputes surrounding its interpretation. His comments are illuminating.

³⁴Robinson, *Early Mādhyamika*, p. 23.

Chandrakīrti's commentary on it, which he entitled *Yogācārya-Catuḥśataka*),³⁵ The final chapter of his *Catuḥśataka* --like Nāgārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, is addressed to students who have some objections to the doctrine of emptiness, echoing the mistaken views of those who have not yet understood the doctrine of emptiness.

In his *Catuśataka*, Āryadeva is accused of being a negativist, because in teaching emptiness he is satisfied with negating the views of other people. But Āryadeva, not to be outdone in dispute, answers that he in fact has no view to recommend and thus is not at all negative since he is not confined within the argumentative framework of clinging to views.³⁶

One can well imagine the frustration of arguing with Āryadeva, or Nāgārjuna. To their opponents they must have seemed like Alice in Wonderland, making words mean anything they wanted. But again the shifting of meaning context is apparent. The Mādhyamikans devote the bulk of their efforts to refuting the views of others, but, when asked for their own views, answer that, as all things are empty, they really have no statement to make.³⁷ The point, however, is that the Mādhyamikans shift the context of meaning, and thus see the alternative views, whether affirmative or negative, as clinging to fabrications. Emptiness is not the negation of any particular view within the content of theoretical realism, but the negation of the meaningfulness of that entire context. Conventional truth is granted only a functional validity here, for, as Āryadeva explains to an opponent who argues that if conventional truth is real then it becomes ultimate:

Not so, because they are interdependent, just as the great and the small.
The conventional truth is considered to be real by people of the world,

³⁵See Karen Lang, *Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka*, p. 14, note 31, where she points out that Ruegg, *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School*, pp. 52-53, says that such a use of the term Yogācārya suggests that it is used "as a general term to denote practitioners of Buddhist spiritual and intellectual disciplines without reference to a particular school."

³⁶Tucci, *Pre-Dinnaga Texts*, 84-85. T. 30, p. 181a-b: [Objector:] "Because you negate others' teachings, you are [just] negative. You exult in demolishing the teachings of others and try your best to point out their errors. You have nothing to maintain and are thus simply negative. [Āryadeva:] "You are the negative ones. Those who teach emptiness do have nothing to maintain, and so they are not negative at all. But you, because you cling to your own teaching and [from that viewpoint] demolish what others cling to, you are negative."

³⁷See stanza 5 of Āryadeva's text in the following translation: "In order to refute opinions about unity and so forth we provisionally take refutations as our thesis. Once these three opinions of others [for unity, differentiation, and neither] are eradicated, then our thesis is also refuted."

but is considered not to be real by the saints. It is just as an apple is bigger than a date, but is smaller than a cucumber. These two [statements about the apple] are both true. But if one were to say that the date is small and the cucumber big, this would be false speech. . . .³⁸

One can speak truly in relative terms, but no absolute statements are valid. Yet just how the conventional truth attains its relative validity remains unclear. It would seem that here the two truths are in some sense continuous, as the big and the small are both expressions of quantity. Yet ultimate meaning remains ineffable and incomprehensible, while the conventional is expressible in words and comprehensible. How can they form any continuum at all?

What emerges is a problem that engaged later thinkers, including both Bhāvaviveka and Dharmapāla, for many years: If the conventional is continuous and interdependent with the ultimate, then how can the ultimacy of that ultimate meaning be maintained? But if it is not related to ultimate meaning, then how can it enjoy the title of truth? The underlying issue concerns the validity of human understanding itself. What is the value of ideas? What is the validity of logic? The subsequent disputes within Mādhyamika between the Prāsāṅgika option of Chandrakīrti and the Svātantrika approach of Bhāvaviveka center directly upon this latter question.³⁹ And the entire Yogācāra endeavor can be seen as an attempt to answer the issue of the validity of human understanding by grounding the Mādhyamika themes of emptiness and dependent co-arising within a new theory of understanding. That is to say, the classical Yogācāra thinkers attempt to evolve yet another context for meaning, a critical context wherein claims are meaningful only inasmuch as they are grounded in an understanding of what it means to understand. But this development does not occur immediately. Rather, the first Mahāyāna reaction to Mādhyamika is found in the Tathāgatagarbha tradition.

³⁸Tucci, *Pre-Dinnaga Texts*, 88; T. 30, p. 182a.

³⁹See N. Katz, "Bhāvaviveka," *The Encyclopedia of Religion*, 2:134-35, and N. Katz, "An Appraisal of the Svātantrika-Prāsāṅgika Debates," *Philosophy East and West* 26 (1976): 253-67. Also the other references in the Katz encyclopedia article, and Huntington, *The Emptiness of Emptiness*, pp. 32-36.

The Tathāgatabarbha Endeavor

Doctrinal thinking does not function within a univocal understanding of what constitutes meaning. The critical context of meaning of the Yogācāra masters derives not only from their response to Mādhyamika themes, but develops from within the Tathāgatagarbha tradition, itself a response to the perceived negativism of Mādhyamika.⁴⁰ Nāgārjuna taught that the conditioned world of human experience is but an illusory dream.⁴¹ The *Ratnagotravibhāga*, a fifth century text devoted to Tathāgatagarbha teaching, objects:

It has been said here and there that all things are to be known everywhere as being "unreal," like clouds, [visions in] a dream, and illusions. Whereas, why has the Buddha declared here that the Buddha essence (*buddhadhātu*) exists in every living being?⁴²

The problem is the perceived negativism of Mādhyamika thinking, for this text lists depression and arrogance as defects caused by regarding everything as empty. Thus the Tathāgatagarbha proponents teach that only defilements are empty while the Buddha essence is real.⁴³ This tradition is expressed in a number of famed Mahāyāna texts—the *Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśasūtra*, the *Tathāgatagarbhasūtra*, the *Śrīmālādevīsīmaṇādasūtra*, The *Ratnagotravibhāga* and finds its way as well into a number of Yogācāra writings—the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*, Vasubandhu's *Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya*, and the entire tradition of Paramārtha's translations and writings. Its objection to an all-inclusive emptiness is not, however, theoretical, and its affirmation of the non-empty, really existent Tathāgata seed (*garbha*), essence, or nature (*dhātu*) is not meant as a philosophic alternative to emptiness. Rather, the Tathāgatagarbha tradition stresses the reality of Buddha nature within all beings in order to encourage practice. Faith is demanded rather than analysis or logic, faith in the existence of the inner seed

⁴⁰See Griffiths, *The Realm of Awakening*, pp. 20-27.

⁴¹*Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ* 7: 34. de Jong ed., p. 11: yathā māyā yathā svapno gandharvanagaraṃ yathā/tathotpādas tathā sthānaṃ tathā bahṅga udāhṛtam. [The conditioned world] is like an illusion, a dream, or an imaginary city in the sky. In such fashion, the origination, duration, and cessation [of conditioned things] been explained."

⁴²See J. Takasaki, *A Study of the Ratnagotravibhāga (Uttaratantra)*, p. 305.

⁴³Takasaki, *Ratnagotravibhāga*, 305-06.

that germinates through practice into Buddhahood.⁴⁴ After all, if the point is to refute theory, then a strong metaphorical affirmation of faith in Buddha-nature might as well do the job! The Tathāgatagarbha context of meaning is a common sense, suffused by mystic, apophatic faith. The meaning of the Buddha's teachings are realized directly through faith embodied in everyday practice. Even though these texts quantitatively limit the scope of emptiness to defilements and defects and thus run counter to Nāgārjuna's emptying of everything, they do not draw the criticism of later Mādhyamika thinkers. In his *Madhyamakāvatāra*, Chandrakīrti refers to Tathāgatagarbha doctrine as a skillful means to lead people to practice (*upāya*), and offers no critique of its realistic notion of Buddha nature. The point, perhaps, is that he understands these notions of Buddha nature as metaphorical, conventional means to turn people toward practice and away from theory.⁴⁵

The Tathāgatagarbha writings teach that originally the mind is pure and undefiled, and only later does it become defiled adventitiously, accidentally. The *Śrīmālādevīsīṃhanādasūtra* teaches:

Lord, the intrinsic purity of the Tathāgata seed stained by adventitious, secondary defilements is the domain of the Tathāgata.⁴⁶

And the short *Tathāgatagarbhasūtra* echoes the theme:

All sentient beings, although they are in defiled bodies in all the destinies, have the seed of a Tathāgata, which is always undefiled.⁴⁷

This is indeed an optimistic message, that within each and every person there exists the pure, unsullied seed of Buddha consciousness. All that is needed is practice to eliminate the adventitious defilements, and pure awakening will

⁴⁴Takasaki, *Ratnagotravibhāga*, 296: "The [Buddha] essence is not accessible to imagination nor to discrimination. It is accessible only by faith. . . . The highest truth of the Buddhas can be understood only by faith. Indeed the blind cannot see the blazing disk of the sun."

⁴⁵The *Lankāvatārasūtra* 22, teaches that the Tathāgatagarbha was taught by the Buddhas "so as to mitigate the object of terror of those naive people [who are afraid of] selflessness." See Huntington, *The Emptiness of Emptiness*, pp. 249-50.

⁴⁶Alex and Hideko Wayman, *The Lion's Roar of Queen Śrīmālā*, p. 106.

⁴⁷T. 16, p. 457c.

shine through.⁴⁸ Emptiness is restricted quantitatively to defilements, for the pure seed is empty of the defilements, but not empty of the Buddha qualities that are one with the originally pure mind.⁴⁹ But, as always, contexts of meaning differ. The Tathāgatagarbha teachings do seem to have listened carefully to the Prajñāpāramitā texts and Mādhyamika philosophy, for they reject realistic theory in favor of an engagement in concrete practice, albeit under the metaphor of an originally pure mind. Yet, if the mind is originally pure, how do defilements occur? It is hardly enough to claim they are accidental or adventitious, for defilement characterizes the entirety of human living. Where do they come from? And what is the value of the Buddha's teaching? Did he speak only in metaphor? How does one arrive at truth? Simply by faith in a pure mind that is not at all evident in everyday life? From within the same Tathāgatagarbha circles, it would appear, now emerge more intellectual thinkers who attempt to sketch the nature of everyday consciousness, its structure and functioning, and the way in which one converts from a defiled consciousness to Buddha wisdom. These are the Yogācāra thinkers and their goal is to develop a critical context for meaning. To them the affirmation of an existent essence or inner seed of Buddhahood seems to reaffirm the existence of a substantial entity beyond the sphere of emptiness.⁵⁰ And this is unacceptable indeed. They venture to sketch a critical theory of consciousness, with the assertion that the very consciousness that engenders the notion of emptiness does indeed exist, not independently but in an other-dependent fashion.⁵¹ That which is real is the other-dependent pattern of consciousness (*paratantrasvabhāva*); that which is unreal is the imagined pattern of consciousness (*parikalpitasvabhāva*). Indeed, in the history of Mahāyāna thinking, the most crucial arguments occur not over issues within a shared context of meaning, but precisely over shifts in that context itself. (As one paradigm said to another: shift happens!)

⁴⁸See Nagao, "What Remains in Sūnyatā: A Yogācāra Interpretation of Emptiness," in *Mādhyamika and Yogācāra*, pp. 51-60. See also Hookham, *The Buddha Within*, for the interplay between Tathāgatagarbha and emptiness from the perspective of the Tibetan Shentong tradition.

⁴⁹See Wayman, *The Lion's Roar*, p. 99.

⁵⁰See Matsumoto, "Lankāvatāra on itaretarāsūnyatā," and "Shōmangyō no ichijō ni suite—ichijō shisō no kenkyū III" and Takasaki, "Hōshin no ichigenron nyoraizō shisō no hō kanren."

⁵¹See Griffiths et al. *The Realm of Awakening*, Introduction, and Keenan, "Original Purity and the Focus of Early Yogācāra," as well as "The Intent and Structure of Yogācāra Philosophy."

The Yogācāra Project

A critical context of meaning is one wherein meanings are not established through common sense insight, or by careful theoretical analysis, nor by apophatic negation, or by encouraging metaphor. Rather, this context is established through an understanding of the genesis of meaning and truth from within consciousness itself. Thus the program for Yogācāra was to develop an adequate account of the everyday mind, both as defiled and as open to awakening. Meaning is seen as a function of conscious activity: it is something we do, not something to be found "out there" in a world of discrete essences, nor in the one true essence of Buddha nature. And if this task can be completed, then one might explain insight into truth, even the conventional truth of teaching, as the activity of an awakened mind.

Abhidharma concerns for analysis are clearly evident in the earliest Yogācāra texts such as the Basic Section of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. But theory is now understood not as the realistic theory of Abhidharma but in the context of emptiness, not restricted quantitatively but qualitatively—for the deluded mental pattern that holds to essences is emptied, while an awakened mind functions through language to enunciate true teachings. The Yogācāra masters devote themselves to an understanding of the Mādhyamika themes of emptiness, dependent co-arising, and the two truths, while attempting to reinterpret them within a critical understanding of consciousness.⁵²

The foundational *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* offers a scriptural basis for the shift from the early scriptures through the Prajñāpāramitā scriptures to the Yogācāra scriptures with their distinct understanding of the meaning of doctrine. It presents an interpretation of the scriptural authorities that undergird the Abhidharma, the Mādhyamika, and the Yogācāra options. Through the mouth of the transcendent Bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata, it presents the three turnings of the wheel of doctrine.

In the country of Benares at R̥ṣipatana in the Deer Park, the Blessed One first turned the wheel of doctrine, demonstrating the four noble truths for the followers of the Hearers' vehicle. This turning of the

⁵²See Takasaki, *Study*, 59: "In its methodology, the Vijñānavāda was really a successor to the Abhidharma Buddhism, but it was the Abhidharma based upon the Sūnyatāvāda of the Prajñāpāramitā, and hence deserves to be called 'mahāyānābhidharma,' as shown in the title of one scripture."

wheel was marvelous and wonderful, such as nobody, divine or human, had ever turned in the world before. Nevertheless there were superior teachings. This [first teaching] gave rise to criticism, had to be interpreted, and became an object of controversy.

This first teaching includes the Nikāyas and Āgamas, and the Abhidharma analyses which rely upon them, all of which take the four noble truths as their central theme. But these teachings engender criticism, as witnessed in the many Abhidharma disputes. They have to be interpreted, for their meaning (*artha*) must be drawn out (*neya*), inasmuch as they do not render explicit the grounds for their teachings. The controversies thereby occasioned call forth the apophatic negations of the Prajñāpāramitā scriptures that all things are empty of essence (*svabhāva*) and inaccessible to theory. Thus came the second turning of the wheel of teaching.

Then the Blessed One with an implicit intention (*samdhyaṅkāreṇa*), turned the wheel of doctrine for a second time for the sake of the followers of the Great Vehicle, explaining that all things are without essence, do not arise, are not destroyed, are quiescent from the beginning, and are originally at rest (*prakṛtinirvāṇa*). Nevertheless there are teachings superior to this, for it also gave rise to criticism, had to be interpreted, and became an object of controversy.

This second teaching, embodied in the Prajñāpāramitā scriptures and the Mādhyamika thought based upon them, undercuts the naive realism of the Abhidharma interpretations of the early Nikāyas and proclaims an apophatic emptiness. Yet this also requires interpretation, for it does not make explicit the grounds within consciousness that can render it critically valid. It is no longer enough to appeal to apophatic negation, for in the Yogācāra context meanings are to be critically validated only within an understanding of conscious understanding. Indeed, the Tathāgatagarbha rejected the Mādhyamika notion of emptiness because it was perceived as nihilistic and depressing. It is only the third turning of the wheel, i.e., Yogācāra itself, that can be termed explicit, for it does make explicit (*nita*) the meaning (*artha*) of doctrine.

Then the Blessed One, with an explicit intention (*vibhatākāreṇa*) turned the wheel a third time for the sake of the followers of all the vehicles, explaining that all things are without essence, do not arise, are not destroyed, are quiescent from the beginning, and are originally at rest. This turning of the wheel is absolutely marvelous and wonderful. It is unsurpassed, does not give rise to criticism, is explicit (*nitārtha*), and does not become an object of controversy.⁵³

The difference between Yogācāra and the Prajñāpāramitā and Mādhyamika teachings is not described in terms of content, which is identical in both—the emptiness of all things. Yogācāra does not then set out to offer any new teaching and does not directly criticize the notion of emptiness. Rather it sets out to render explicit (*nirmocana*), as the very title of this scripture suggests, the implicit (*saṃdhi*) foundation of those teachings by grounding them within a critical context of meaning. Thus its interpretation of emptiness is explicitly validated, while the Mādhyamika teachings are not.

I would like to trace here the broad outline of the Yogācāra development of this issue, employing three texts that serve as milestones in the process. The foundational *Samḍhinirmocana* presents a version of Yogācāra that carries strong Prajñāpāramitā influence. Asaṅga's classic *Mahāyānasamgraha* argues for a reclamation of language as dependently co-arisen and sets the guidelines for subsequent Yogācāra thinkers. Then Dharmapāla's *Śataka Commentary* levels the first Yogācāra critique at Mādhyamika, arguing against the Mādhyamika thinker Bhāvaviveka and for the Yogācāra interpretation of the two truths. These three texts encapsulate, I think, the Yogācāra effort to enunciate the very value of enunciation. The role of language shifts in these texts from an apophatic negation of its validity in the *Samḍhinirmocana*, to a retrieval of its function in other-dependent consciousness by Asaṅga in the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, and finally to a full defense of the validity of "language essences" by Dharmapāla in his *Śataka Commentary*.

The issue at stake is the value of language. The Yogācāra thinkers wish to distinguish between a fabricated, deluded usage of language versus a wise,

⁵³T. 16, p. 697a-b. Lamotte, *Samḍhinirmocanasūtra, L'explication des mystères*, pp. 206-07.

awakened, and thus valid, usage.⁵⁴ Underlying all of the arguments is the consensus in all Yogācāra texts, indeed all Mahāyāna texts, that the wisdom of awakening (*buddhatva*) is itself beyond language, beyond all mental operations. The classical definition of the *Yogasūtras*, that Yoga is the cessation of the churning of the mind (*yogaś cittavṛttinirodha*),⁵⁵ remains true for the Mahāyāna and is variously expressed—as the ineffability (*anabhilāpya*) and the non-discriminative character (*nirvikalpa*) of awakening. The *Āṣṭasāhaśrikaprajñāpāramitāsūtra* presents a universal Mahāyāna theme when it says that "words are artificial."⁵⁶ This shared belief is the engine pulling in its train all the conundrums about the value of such "artificial" speech.

The issue is still relevant today. Some scholars of religion deny that any cessation of mental activity ever occurs. Under the impact of various Western philosophies, it is claimed that there are simply no non-verbal experiences at all. The modern Phenomenological or Deconstructionist critique of the Husserlian notion of a "pure" experience is extended to the Mahāyāna textual corpus.⁵⁷ Analytic philosophy regards any claim for non-verbal experience as invalid or, at the least, uninteresting.⁵⁸ For some, Kantian perspectives

⁵⁴That this is the main theme of Āryadeva's *Catūṣataka* is argued by Yamaguchi, *Chūkan bukkyō ronkō*, p. 199.

⁵⁵*Yogasūtras*, 1.2. See James Haughton Woods, *The Yoga-System of Patañjali, or the Ancient Hindu Doctrine of Concentration of Mind*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1914. Motilal Banarsidass reprint, 1988, pp. xxx and 8.

⁵⁶*The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom, with the Divisions of the Abhisamayālaṅkāra*, trans. Edward Conze, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p. 57.

⁵⁷Joseph S. O'Leary, Review of *The Meaning of Christ*, *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 19/1 (1992), 97, writes that "Consciousness, the element and medium of philosophical truth in Hegel and Husserl, has been a primary target of those who would overcome metaphysics (Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Derrida). What is special about Yogācāra notions of consciousness that could make it immune to these attacks?" It seems to me that what is different is that non-discriminative consciousness is neither an element nor a medium of philosophical truth, but merely silent. By contrast, conventional consciousness, even in the awakened, has no immunity against any attack from whatever quarter.

⁵⁸See Paul Griffiths, "On the Possible Future of the Buddhist-Christian Interaction," *Japanese Buddhism: Its Tradition, New Religions and Interaction with Christianity*. (Tokyo and Los Angeles: Buddhist Books International, 1987), pp. 153-54, where he incorrectly describes immediate experience, as in Nishitani Keiji, as an "esotericist option." Griffiths again takes up his cudgel in "Philosophizing Across Cultures: Or, How to Argue with a Buddhist," *Criterion* (Winter 1987), p. 15, claiming that "as far as Indian Buddhism and Anglo-American analytical philosophy are concerned, they are close to identical." Yet, Mahāyāna begins not with the analysis of propositional truth claims at all, but with a claim for the language-free experience of awakening, only thereafter engaging, passionately indeed, in adjudicating truth claims. In fact, Griffiths has introduced his own metalanguage of realism as an interpretive grid for reading Mahāyāna texts, a starkly obtuse choice in light of the Mahāyāna rejection of realism! Even his engaging and

disallow any experience unmediated by language.⁵⁹ These efforts are driven by philosophical tenets foreign to the Mahāyāna text themselves, forcing them into notional frameworks they explicitly reject.

The Mahāyāna texts do insist on the ineffability of the perfection of wisdom and do focus on the attainment of mental cessation, but they are not unaware of the problematic involved. If awakened wisdom is ineffable, the question spontaneously arises: how is one to engage in the world of language? What is the function of language? What its validity? In the classical Yoga system the highest attainment is described as a state of *samādhi*, described as total cessation in which no remnant of language or thinking occurs. Yet Mahāyāna scriptures such as the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* or the *Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya* present the Buddha or the Bodhisattva as teaching doctrine while in a state of *samādhi*. If *samādhi* is apart from all mental activity and thus from language, then how can one speak while in *samādhi*?

But Mahāyāna treatments of these issues about silence and language are quite distinct from Western philosophical understandings, precisely because they begin with and stress direct experience that is unmediated by word or image. After the Prajñāpāramitā declaration that everything is empty,

insightful *On Being Mindless* shifts his argument from Buddhist exegesis on p. 92 to this overarching issue, maintaining that the doctrine of emptiness ill serves the needs of cogent philosophical discussion. In *On Being Buddha*, pp. 54-55, he is led by the force of his philosophic choices to state that "the fourth and final rule of interpretation mentioned in the classical fourfold formula [from the *Abhidarmakośa*] is that one should pay attention finally not to one's discursive understanding of one's doctrine-expressing sentences, but rather to one's direct nondiscursive awareness of what these sentences mean. . . . But taking this fourth rule seriously would require moving altogether outside the sphere in which language operates, and so also outside the sphere of scholarly activity. It is an ancient and standard Buddhist claim that the attainment of true wisdom somehow transcends language, and that the sphere of discursive understanding in which doctrine-expressing sentences necessarily have their being, although essential, is significant primarily because the claims made in that sphere are instrumentally effective in producing nondiscursive awareness (*jñāna*). . . . I do not consider this fourth rule of interpretation to place what Buddhists do with their doctrine-expressing sentences outside the scope of discursive analyses." It would, I think, be preferable to read Mahāyāna texts according to their own hermeneutical directions: in the context of emptiness, through the doctrine of the three patterns, or in light of the two truths. One may indeed disagree with these metalanguages, but then the discussion should move away from specific Mahāyāna assertions, always conventional, and toward a comparative study of hermeneutical metalanguages. The doctrinal issues Griffiths raises presuppose the adoption of an interpretive strategy from which Griffiths disassociates himself. In fact, he argues for and against what Buddhists would have meant if they too adopted his realistic model of interpretation. See my forthcoming review of *On Being Buddha* in *The Journal of the American Oriental Society* (Fall 1997).

⁵⁹For example, see Steven T. Katz, "Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism," *Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis*. (London: Sheldon, 1976).

all Mahāyāna texts share a mystic thrust. Thus the Yogācāras must ground not only everyday language within their theory of consciousness, but also the enunciation of doctrine that flows from awakening. They focus not merely on philosophic investigation, but also on the implications of yogic cessation. In the West, mystic experience has always been valued as going beyond the capacity of words and ideas. Yet almost always one begins with a firm grasp of the validity of words and then moves beyond—with hesitancy and tentativeness. Mahāyāna by contrast starts with an affirmation that awakening is not a language-formed experience, and then moves back to reclaim, if possible, a valid role for language.

Samdhinirmocanasūtra, the Foundational Yogācāra Scripture

After setting the scene for the Buddha's presentation, the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* in Section Two takes up a discourse on nonduality, much in the Prajñāpāramitā fashion, presenting an explanation of the characteristics of the truth of ultimate meaning and taking aim at the Abhidharma distinction between conditioned and unconditioned states:

Good son, the term conditioned is a provisional word invented by the First Teacher. Now, if it is a provisional word invented by the First Teacher, then it is a verbal expression apprehended by imagination. And if it is a verbal expression apprehended by imagination, then, in the final analysis, such an imagined description does not validate a real thing. Therefore, the conditioned does not exist. Good son, the term unconditioned is also invented from language, [and it also validates nothing real]. Furthermore, besides the conditioned and the unconditioned, any other expression that exists in language is the same.

But, [it may be objected,] is there no reality to expressions at all? What then is reality?

I reply that reality is apart from language and realized in the perfect awakening of the saints through their holy wisdom insight apart from all names and words. It is because they desire to lead others to realize perfect awakening that they provisionally establish [language expressions], such as the conditioned, as verbal descriptions.⁶⁰

⁶⁰Lamotte, *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra: L'Explication des Mystères*, Paris: Maison-neuve, 1935, sections 3-4. Although the references to the *Samdhinirmocana* refer to Lamotte's translations, the

Language here has no valid function in expressing the reality of things. Not only can it not express awakening as an unconditioned event, but it cannot even designate the conditioned reality of unawakened living. Because language is apprehended by imagination (*kun tu rtog pa las byung ba tha shyad du brjod pa, parikalpita-vyavahārābhilāpa*), it is incapable of validating anything at all. The only function of language is provisional (*aupacārikapada*), leading one to become "freed from language through holy wisdom and insight."⁶¹ Words are descriptions engendered from imagination, and cannot validate anything at all. In fact, true reality is apart from language altogether.⁶² Wisdom denotes a complete separation from language, for it bears upon a reality apart from language. The text continues to offer a totally negative assessment of the ability of language in regard to ultimate meaning, which does not function through images (*animittagocara*), is ineffable (*anabhilāpya*), severs all language (*vyavahāravyyucchadaka*), and severs all disputation (*vivādavyucchadaka*),⁶³ for ultimate meaning is characterized by the non-discriminative "one, universal taste of truth." In this text, the hallmark Yogācāra theory of the three patterns of consciousness explains that the other-dependent serves only for the genesis of verbal delusion:

Furthermore, Guṇākara, the imagined pattern can be understood as caused by the interplay between images and words (*nimitta-saṃbaddhanāmāniniśritya*). The other-dependent pattern can be understood as caused by the grasping of those images upon that other-dependent pattern. The pattern of full perfection can be understood as caused by the absence of grasping the imagined pattern upon the other-dependent pattern.⁶⁴

English translations above are mine, from manuscripts submitted to the Bukkyō Dendō Kyōkai. I have kept Lamotte's section divisions in order to facilitate cross-references.

⁶¹Lamotte, *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, p. 171 (1: 5): "Other sentient beings, not foolish, who have gained insight into the holy truth, who have attained the transcendent insight of the saints, do truly understand that in all things reality is apart from language."

⁶²Lamotte, *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, p. 172 (1:5).

⁶³Lamotte, *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, p. 173 (2:2).

⁶⁴Lamotte, *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, p. 190 ((6:9). See John Keenan, "Original Purity and the Focus of Early Yogācāra," *Journal of the International Society of Buddhist Studies* (1982) 5/1: 7-18.

The other-dependent pattern serves exclusively as the locus for the imagined pattern. To understand the other-dependent pattern as the mutual arising of the various consciousnesses is to understand defilement, manifesting itself in the propensity of language of the imagined pattern.

Section Five on the Absence of Essence takes up the theme. It begins by setting the question. In countless sermons, it says, the Buddha has taught numerous doctrines, yet he has also explained that "all things have no essence, no arising, no passing away, are originally quiescent and essentially in cessation."⁶⁵ This is a fair summary of the opening verse of Nāgārjuna's *Mādhymakakārikāh*., and the question is obviously what the many Buddha teachings mean if all is indeed empty and essenceless. Our text maintains its thesis that language signals a deluded understanding.⁶⁶ In contrast, the text recommends a wisdom not permeated by language, not formed by language, and freed from inclinations toward language.⁶⁷ The aim is to abandon all language and take refuge in the ineffable experience of awakening. But, it is not that simple, for the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* is devoted to explicating the underlying meaning of the Buddha doctrine—as its title signifies. It is in fact a text on Mahāyāna hermeneutics, offering a method for interpreting the scriptures. It recommends that one study and attend to the entire corpus of the scriptures, the discipline, and the analytical matrix, i.e., the Abhidharma technical analysis of texts in the context of the doctrine of emptiness of all things.⁶⁸ Emptiness does not mean that all the descriptive marks of things are to be entirely negated. That is said to be the mistaken view of nihilism. One is to abandon only the imagined pattern, lest one fall into a useless nihilism. The point is further emphasized that the discourse about no-essence is directed only toward clinging to the imagined pattern.⁶⁹ When reading the scriptures, one must

⁶⁵Lamotte, *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, p. 193 (7:1).

⁶⁶Lamotte, *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, p. 196 (7:10): "Those sentient beings, because they imagine there are essences and characteristics to be clung to in the other-dependent and fully perfected patterns, elicit language about this and that. Inasmuch as they elicit language, to that same degree they cling to images of essences in the other-dependent and fully perfected patterns, because their minds are permeated with language, their understanding follows upon language, and their inclinations are toward language."

⁶⁷Lamotte, *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, p. 197 (7:13).

⁶⁸Lamotte, *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, p. 210 (8:3).

⁶⁹Lamotte, *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, p. 203 (7:25): "The Blessed One has designed [the teaching] that the marks of all things are essentially a no-essence in reference to the basic modality of clinging to marks imagined through discrimination, which in its basic modality clings to imagined descriptions."

employ—as a normative metalanguage—the teaching of emptiness that all things have no essence, no arising, no passing away, are originally quiescent and essentially in cessation. The doctrine of emptiness becomes the hermeneutic key for interpreting the scriptures. It is the flavor of the teachings. Just as one places dry ginger into medicinal powders, just so the fragrance of this explicit teaching of emptiness must permeate all scriptures of implicit intention, for it "is able to show the implicit meaning of those scriptures."⁷⁰ In scriptural study, language serves merely as the vehicle for non-verbal awareness. Having understood the explicit intention of the Blessed One that all scripture is to be interpreted in terms of the metadoctrine of emptiness, one is then capable of understanding scriptural language itself, without being led astray by the propensity of the imagined pattern toward language. To do this one must realize through concentration that images refer to no real things, but are only constructions of consciousness. Language does not refer to real things "out there" in a real world, but to conscious constructs, either unrecognized and imagined to be objectively "out there," or recognized as empty of any essential referent. What then is the reference of scriptural discourse? The text recommends both a discursive consideration of "each point of the doctrine of the scriptures," and a unified understanding of the doctrine of all the scriptures as one whole.⁷¹ The words of the scriptures seem to have clear referents, until one gets the point that all is empty and passes beyond words altogether. And so the text presents a précis on hermeneutics:

The Buddha . . . said: Good son, [in the case of] the wisdom gained from hearing [doctrine], one relies on the literal meaning of a text without really understanding its intent or making it clear. Such a person moves toward liberation without being able to realize the meaning that brings about that liberation. [In the case of] the meaning gained from thinking, one also relies on the text, but not just on the letter, for he is able really to understand its intent. But such a person is not yet able to make [that intent] clear and, although he turns toward liberation, he too is unable to realize the meaning that brings about that liberation. [In the case of] the wisdom gained from cultivation, the bodhisattva both relies on the text and does not rely on the text, both follows the letter and does not follow

⁷⁰Lamotte, *Samḍhinirmocana-sūtra*, pp. 205-06 (7.28).

⁷¹Lamotte, *Samḍhinirmocana-sūtra*, p. 215 (8.13).

the letter, for he is able really to understand its intent. He does make [that intent] clear by means of images wrought in concentration that conform to the matters to be understood. He turns toward liberation well and is able to realize the meaning that brings that liberation about. Good son, these are what is termed the three kinds of differences in knowing meaning.⁷²

It is only the third example that provides the paradigm for scriptural hermeneutics. The first person reads and learns the scriptures, but remains bound by the letter. The second no longer is literal in interpreting, yet fails to understand the intent, for he or she does not interpret the content of the text through the metalanguage of emptiness. Only the third is a correct interpreter, freed now to play with the text in light of the metalanguage of emptiness, to see the text as embodying language as a conscious construct of wisdom. Such an interpreter may then change the images as needed to conform to the requirements of the moment.

The *Samḍhinirmocanasūtra* rejects all language as an expression of the imagined pattern, for no word ever refers to a real entity in a supposed outer world. Yet, it recommends that, once emptiness is discerned, one not reject language, for language has been the means whereby the Buddha taught the doctrine in the scriptures. Rather, the task is precisely to develop a hermeneutic of emptiness whereby his deep meaning may be understood, and that task is accomplished by constructing a metalanguage of emptiness in terms of which any scripture, even those that do not explicitly mention emptiness, can be interpreted. If one ignores the expressed teaching of emptiness, one is left in the nihilistic position of having no clue on how to interpret the scriptures, for one cannot discern their underlying intent. The task is to explain how insight into that emptiness is blocked by the imagined pattern of consciousness with its propensity toward language and verbal fabrication. And so it outlines the characteristics of consciousness in order to uncover the "innate" attachment to language-driven illusion. It takes a step toward a critical theory of consciousness, but makes this secondary to a prior Prajñāpāramitā mystic awareness.

⁷²Lamotte, *Samḍhinirmocana-sūtra*, p. 223 (8.24).

The three patterns in which consciousness functions, and in terms of which the *Sam̐dhinirmocana* couches its advice, are based upon its theory of the structure of consciousness. The basic issue is how fabrication (*prapañca*) and delusion (*māyā*) arise. In answer to this question the *Sam̐dhinirmocana* develops its notion of the seed consciousness (*sarvabījakavijñāna*) or the storehouse consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*).⁷³ The earlier Abhidharma texts find sufficient a schema of five sense consciousnesses and a mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) that is aware of these sense perceptions. That is sufficient for Abhidharma's realistic approach to essences. But the *Sam̐dhinirmocana* expands this schema by introducing the seed consciousness as the basic continuity of all samsaric experience.

The seed consciousness matures, evolves, becomes unified, grows, and reaches its development, because it makes its own two things: the physical body with its sense organs and the habitual proclivities (*vāsanā*) of discriminately and verbally fabricating images and names.⁷⁴

There is then a basic, underlying consciousness that not only is the linkage between one life and another in the cycle of transmigration,⁷⁵ but is the driving force behind the delusions that impute solid reality to imagined entities. It is permeated by language and takes language to be the measure of reality, thus functioning in the imagined pattern. In point of fact, the *Sam̐dhinirmocana's* account of these three patterns of conscious functioning is aimed at explaining the genesis of samsaric suffering, thus alerting practitioners as to what they must abandon.

Reality (*dharma*) is of three patterns: the pattern of that which is totally imagined (*parikalpita*), the pattern of that which arises in dependence on others (*paratantra*), and the pattern of full perfection (*pari-niṣpanna*). The pattern of that which is totally imagined signifies the discrimination whereby all realities are conventionally held to have their own essence, and the verbal expression that arises consequent

⁷³On the structure of *ālaya* in cross-cultural perspective, see Waldron, "A Comparison of the *ālayavijñāna* with Freud's and Jung's Theories of the Unconscious."

⁷⁴T. 16, p. 692a, Lamotte, *Sam̐dhinirmocana-sūtra*, p. 184 (5.2).

⁷⁵See Schmithausen, *Ālayavijñāna*, for the doctrinal development of this central Yogācāra notion.

upon that discrimination. The pattern of that which arises in dependence on others signifies the structure whereby all realities conditionally arise, for, if this exists, then that exists; if this arises, then that arises—from the first [cause in the twelvefold chain [of primal ignorance to the last of this grand mass of suffering. The pattern of full perfection is the true nature of the equality of all realities (*dharmasamatāthatā*). It is this true nature which bodhisattvas come to realize because of their zeal, their fundamental mental apprehension, and their unflinching reflection. By gradual practices until they reach this realization they finally attain to full and complete wisdom.⁷⁶

The text has simply internalized the twelvefold chain of causes (*nidāna*) that Śākyamuni preached as the engendering of transmigratory suffering. And, just as release is achieved through reversing that causal process by the practice of the path, so one not only abandons the imagined pattern, but also must "destroy the pattern of other-dependence."⁷⁷

Yet, there are tensions and problems. If language is located exclusively in the imagined pattern, then how can it not be totally abandoned when that pattern is abandoned? If language is transformed somehow, then how? The text would have it both ways, that all language is to be abandoned, except the language of emptiness. How can it make such a distinction and still be consistent? Its relatively brief treatment of the other-dependent pattern hints at a solution but does not develop it clearly. This task is left to later Yogācāra thinkers.

Furthermore, is the hermeneutic recommended by this text an adequate one? If the final stage of discernment allows one either to rely on the text or not to rely on the text, then does not the task of interpretation begin to float free, in abeyance of any textual discourse? If one already knows what texts mean, then why bother with them at all?

Mahāyānasamgraha, Classical Yogācāra

In contrast to the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* and its initial Prajñāpāramitā discourse, the *Mahāyānasamgraha* begins with an analysis of the structure of

⁷⁶T. 16, p. 693a-b, Lamotte, *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, p. 188-89 (6.3-6).

⁷⁷T. 16, p. 695a, Lamotte, *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, p. 197 (7.13).

consciousness, and it maintains a critical focus on consciousness throughout its ten chapters. It too attempts to interpret the scriptures, as stated in the very first verse. In terms of critical theory, this sūtra makes a number of moves that are quite different from the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*. Language is explained as a permeation (*vāsanā*) of the storehouse consciousness, which itself remains morally neutral and undetermined. After having explain the storehouse consciousness as the foundational container (storehouse) of all the latent, seed energies that result in samsaric existence, it turns to the question of the structural characteristics of the storehouse consciousness and just what the permeation of these seeds signifies. Such seed permeations are not structurally inherent in consciousness, but modal alterations in its functioning. There are, the text explains, three kinds of permeation of the storehouse consciousness: "those of language, those of belief in selfhood, and of the members of [the chain of] being."⁷⁸

Language arises from the permeation of the latent seeds in the storehouse consciousness. Although that consciousness itself is morally neutral and undefined, yet the karmic seeds planted through previous actions engender samsaric existence, which comprise language, the false notion of a permanent self, and the repeated entry into the chain of samsaric existence. This seems parallel to the negative role of language in the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*. Yet when the text goes on to treat the three patterns of consciousness, the *Mahāyānasamgraha* focuses emphatically on the other-dependent pattern as the basic structure of consciousness, within which the permeations, either defiled or purified, will be located. Following a no longer extant text called the *Mahāyānābhīdharmasūtra*, Asaṅga explains the pivotal role of the other-dependent pattern as "the defiled and the pure aspect" of consciousness."⁷⁹

⁷⁸Keenan, *The Summary of the Great Vehicle*, 35 (1.58). This is an English translation of Paramārtha's Chinese translation, and differs somewhat from the above renderings. Again I have kept the section headings from Lamotte, Etienne, trans. *La Somme du Grand Véhicule d'Asaṅga (Mahāyānasamgraha). Traduction et Commentaire*.

⁷⁹Keenan, *The Summary of the Great Vehicle*, p. 53 (2.29). The relevant passage from the *Mahāyānābhīdharmasūtra*, found also in the *Vijñaptimatratāsiddhi (Ch'eng Wei-shih lun)* (de la Vallée Poussin, 169), reads: anādikāliko dhātuḥ sarvadharmasamāśrayaḥ tasmin sati gatiḥ sarvā nirvāṇādhigamo'pi ca, which translates: "The beginningless realm (*anādikāliko dhātuḥ*) is the common support of all dharmas. Because of this, there exist all the destinies and also the access to cessation." Yet again, it states: "There are three dharmas: that which consists in the defiled aspect (*saṃkleśabhāga*), that which consists in the pure aspect (*vyavadānabhāga*), and that which consists in both at the same time (*tadubhayabhāga*)."^{Asaṅga's text equates these three aspects with the three natures. R. Yuki, however, considers that the identification is made not by Asaṅga, but that the entire passage is a citation from the sūtra. See his *Yuishikishisōshi*, p. 249.}

This other-dependent pattern is no longer merely the support for the delusions of the imagined pattern, but the very structure of consciousness as a synergy of latent and active consciousnesses, and of insight and image. It indeed supports the imagined clinging to words and images as if they reflected real essences. Yet, it is also open to the purification of awakening through a conversion of this support (*āśraya-parivṛtti*) from the imagined to the perfected pattern. Most of the permeations of consciousness are permeations of language. They are conscious constructs (*vijñapti*) because they are formed as ideas in a mind imbued with language. We conceive the notions of time, number, and place. We conceive the notions of an embodied self that experiences objects. We indeed conceive the very notion of language. And it is in virtue of these notions that we are caught in the web of delusion, enmeshed in samsaric existence. Language itself constitutes the boundaries, and thus the bonds, of samsaric existence.

In a phrase that figures centrally in the later dispute between Dharmapāla and Bhāvaviveka, the *Mahāyānasamgraha* of Asaṅga highlights the pivotal role of the other-dependent pattern as the act of unreal imagining that results in the imagined pattern:

... the conscious construction which has the storehouse consciousness as seed and which is comprised in unreal imagining (*abhūtaparikalpa*).⁸⁰

The phrase "unreal imagining" is crucial for our present purposes because Āryadeva's use of the term in his *Śataka* apparently was the trigger that propelled Dharmapāla to attack the Mādhyamika position. The term becomes a central Yogācāra usage. The *Madhyāntavibhāga*, written probably by Asaṅga under the inspiration of his heavenly mentor Maitreya, uses it as a definition of the other-dependent pattern, and teaches that it does indeed exist, although the dichotomy into a really existent subject knowing really existent objects does not.

⁸⁰Keenan, *The Summary of the Great Vehicle*, p. 39 (2.2).

Unreal imagining (*abhūtaparikalpa*) exists, but in it the two do not exist. However, herein, emptiness does exist. But in that [emptiness] these [unreal imaginings] do exist.⁸¹

This rather enigmatic passage is explained by the commentator Sthiramati as follows:

Unreal imagining is the imagining of the apprehended and the apprehender (*grāhyagrāhakavikalpaḥ*). The word "two" refers to the apprehended and the apprehender. . . . Emptiness, however, is apart from this condition of the apprehended and the apprehender of unreal imagining. . . . Thus unreal imagining exists in emptiness.⁸²

The other-dependent pattern itself is the act of unreal imagining that bifurcates experience into an apparently real subject who apprehends an apparently real object. That bifurcation validates no reality whatsoever, yet the act whereby the dichotomy is engendered does indeed exist. It is the everyday functioning of verbal consciousness, attached to images as if they represented realities. In fact such functioning is purely imagined. The *Mahāyānasamgraha* defines the imagined pattern as:

that which is manifested under the appearance of an object (*arthābāsa*), even though there is no such object, for there is nothing but conscious construction (*vijñaptimātra*).⁸³

The problem is not simply that language permeations appear within a bifurcation of subject and object, and thus the recommendation is not that one

⁸¹See G. Nagao, *Madhyāntavibhāga-Bhāṣya*, p. 17. See Nagao, "From Mādhyamika to Yogācāra: An Analysis of MMK, XXIV.18 and MV, I.1-2," in *Mādhyamika and Yogācāra*, pp. 189-99. For a comparison of the various texts and a Japanese translation and exegesis, see Yeh A-yüeh, *Yuishiki shisō no kenkyū*, appendix, p. 1.

⁸²S. Yamugichi, *Sthiramati, Madhyāntavibhāgaṣṭkā, Exposition systématique du Yogācāravijñaptivāda*, I:13-20, 2:17-26.

⁸³Keenan, *The Summary of the Great Vehicle*, p. 40 (2.3). Vasubandhu in his *Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya* comments: "The phrase 'is manifested under the appearance of an object' means that [the imagined pattern] is manifested under the appearance of an object that is apprehended (*grāhyārtha*), or under the appearance of a self that apprehends." See. Lamotte, *La Somme*, p. 90, note 3.

simply reject such constructed notions. Rather, the problem is that words are mistakenly assumed to attain to the reality of things, to which people become attached. Yet, without descriptions of time and place, one could not function in any culture. Without some notion of an experiencing self one can hardly reflect upon the very experience of being conscious.⁸⁴ Asaṅga is not arguing that one reject such language-formed notions, for that would render human living impossible. Rather, he recommends that they be emptied of all essential referents, that one realize they are constructs of consciousness only and thus not become attached to delusions.

Once the other-dependent pattern is converted, these notions become conventionally valid understandings of the dependently co-arisen world, no longer referring to essences or pretending to have captured the reality of things. That reality, here as in all Mahāyāna, is not represented by any notion, however intelligently constructed. It is beyond constructs, for it is not a saṃsāric entity at all. Yet an awakened person, no less than a deluded person, has the same structure of consciousness, functioning through the interplay of image and insight in language, and through the mutual conditioning of the levels of consciousness. An awakened person sees that that processing is indeed a processing, and not a simple apprehension and grasping of reality. In awakening, the defiling permeations of language of the other-dependent pattern are transformed into wisdom, which includes not only a silent, non-imaginative wisdom (*nirvikalpajñāna*), but also a conventionally effective and verbally expressed subsequently attained wisdom (*prṣṭalabdḥājñāna*). Language then parallels the two modes of the other-dependent pattern. It can support false imaginings and thus is to be abandoned. But, once the conversion of the support is attained, supported upon the full perfection of wisdom, not only is it not to be abandoned but it must be employed to carry out the compassionate tasks of that Buddha wisdom. And the difference, as far as language is concerned, is that in awakened wisdom, one understands that all language is empty and refers only to the insights we construct upon the images presented from perception.

This analysis of the other-dependent pattern of consciousness allows the *Mahāyānasamgraha* to recast its hermeneutical paradigm. Rather than

⁸⁴See Nagao, "Buddhist Subjectivity," *Mādhyamika and Yogācāra*, pp. 7-12.

simply insisting that scripture must be interpreted through the metalanguage of emptiness, it offers the following advice:

If one desires to interpret the overall doctrine of the Great Vehicle in summary, he should treat three themes: 1) he should elucidate the character of dependent co-arising, 2) he should elucidate the true character of dependently co-arisen states of being, and 3) he should elucidate the meaning of what has been taught [in the scriptures in the light of the above two].⁸⁵

The character of dependent co-arising refers to the structure of consciousness, whereby the maturing storehouse consciousness and the active evolving consciousnesses are causes one of the other. The character of dependently co-arisen states refers to the conscious constructs (*vijñapti*) of the active consciousnesses, endowed with image and insight; herein the imagined pattern that takes other-dependent images to represent reality is in fact without any reality, while the perfected pattern does exist in the other-dependent pattern. And, as the text explains,

The elucidation of what has been taught consists in explaining and analyzing texts that have previously been taught in the light of later commentaries.⁸⁶

The hermeneutical agenda has become a program of interpreting texts against the template of a theory of conscious interiority. One first understands the interplay between the different levels of consciousness, how the permeations of language function both to mislead people into the deluded imagined pattern, and how, through a conversion of its patterned functioning, language can serve to express the wisdom of the perfected pattern. Then one attends to the presence of image and insight within notions we construct to express reality, realizing all the while that such constructions do not capture that reality, but are limited, yet valid, conventional designations of reality. Texts are then seen not as verbally exact representations of truth, but as themselves constructs,

⁸⁵Keenan, *The Summary of the Great Vehicle*, p. 56 (2.32).

⁸⁶Keenan, *The Summary of the Great Vehicle*, 57 (2.32).

functioning through wisdom insight into particular images for particular audiences. Their reference is through insights bounded by particular images, and they stand in need of constant elucidation by later commentaries in an unending play of mutual referencing and conditioning.

The basic structure of consciousness remains. The awakened bodhisattva examines language, its words and their referents in full awareness that in the final analysis they do not represent an "extra-verted" reality, but are insights constructed by the mind of wisdom. Yet it is important to note that that examination does bear upon language. They do examine essences (*svabhāva*), not as realities "out there" in the external world, but as correctly formed ideas and definitions.⁸⁷ In fact, although the classical Yogācāra thinkers do not employ the term "language essences," they often do use such terms as "essence" (*svabhāva*), leading some to think they have not understood the Mādhyamika teaching of emptiness and no-essence. Yet the Yogācāra texts are explicit in also teaching that all things have no essence, i.e., that notions of the essences of things are but mental constructs. That, however, does not in the least prevent them from employing the notion in the service of elucidating the scriptures and developing their philosophy, for "essences," no less than any other dharmas, are conscious constructs.

If one reads the scriptures through the metalanguage of Yogācāra theory on the three patterns, then some teachings are understood to negate the imagined pattern, while others affirm the perfected pattern. Yet, both are grounded in the same structure of consciousness. It is not that samsaric existence and cessation are somehow mystically identified, but that both are constructs generated from the same other-dependent consciousness. That is why one must not only negate samsaric existence, but affirm it as dependently co-arisen. And that is why one must not only affirm cessation, but also negate it as the essence of liberation. The awakened person abides then in a non-abiding cessation, for even that last of all refuges is but another construct that must be left behind in the awareness of wisdom. The same strategy applies throughout

⁸⁷This in some aspects parallels Bernard Lonergan's thesis. In *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, he too insists that one must have insight into image, and for him the criterion for objectivity is not any grasp of an external reality, but the adequacy of raising and answering all relevant questions (which attains a virtual certitude). Yet, the Yogācāra explanation differs in that it does not issue in a repeatable metaphysical vision, because it is always grounded in a concrete, indeed interpersonal, situation in which the Dharma is to be skillfully preached to sentient beings.

the scriptures and the notion of the three patterns becomes the template for all interpretive endeavors.

This paradigm applies across the scriptures and was employed to ground the doctrine of emptiness within a theory about consciousness. It is not enough simply to say that all things are empty, for that would neglect the purified aspect of other-dependent understanding. So one must also proclaim that they are not empty, for things do have a dependently co-arisen validity, known through the mutual processing of awakened intelligence. More directly to the question of a Yogācāra hermeneutic, the text reinterprets the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* paradigm in its own terms. That *Sūtra* had taught that all must be interpreted in terms of no-arising, no-passing away, original quiescence, and essential cessation. But Asaṅga, applying his more critical template of the three patterns, demurs, recommending that even that most hallowed of Prajñāpāramitā summaries stands in need of a further hermeneutical analysis in terms of this Yogācāra metalanguage about the three patterns.⁸⁸ The *Mahāyānasamgraha* has more consistently applied critical theory to the question of language and the task of hermeneutics.

This Yogācāra hermeneutic thematically differs from that evolved in the Mādhyamika school. Chandrakīrti constructed his analysis on the model of the two truths (*satyadvaya*), but that is never mentioned in the *Mahāyānasamgraha*. The only reference to conventional truth is found in 2.31, where one of the aims of the Buddha entails the teaching of "conventional truth (*saṃvṛti-satya*) that identifies the general and specific characteristics of persons and things." The term "the truth of ultimate meaning" (*paramārtha-satya*) is not mentioned at all, the only references being to the ultimate (*paramārtha*) in stanzas quoted in 1.22 and 10. 27. These differences in presenting an understanding of language and a model for hermeneutics could not but lead to dispute between the two schools of Mahāyāna thinking, as becomes apparent in the subsequent argumentation between Chandrakīrti, Bhāvaviveka, and Dharmapāla.

⁸⁸The three patterns or natures (*svabhāvatraya*) is also treated in the *Madhyāntavibhāga*. Of course the Yogācāra philosophers did not invent these concepts. They are already to be found in earlier texts, and they are mentioned by Nāgārjuna, in his *Acintyastava* and *Bodhicittavivarāṇa*, referring to the *Lankāvatārasūtra*. Cf. Chr. Lindtner, "Lankāvatārasūtra in Early Indian Madhyamaka," pp. 244-279.

The Dharmapāla-Bhāvaviveka Dispute

We do not know much about Bhāvaviveka (ca 490-570 CE) or Dharmapāla (530-561 CE). Both were respected Mahāyāna scholars, lauded for their scholarly attainments. Bhāvaviveka so excelled in scholarly debate against both fellow Buddhists and Hindu apologists, he is said to have been abbot of some fifty monasteries in South India: not a mean feat!⁸⁹ Dharmapāla studied at and later became head of the famed monastic university of Nālandā. He too defended Mahāyāna doctrine against non-Buddhist critics. But, at age 29, perhaps sensing he was not long for this world, he retired from his post to live in retirement and devote himself to writing. The specific issue that engaged these two thinkers has often been mentioned above: how to gain a hearing for Mahāyāna among their contemporaries by explicating the doctrine of emptiness.

And they set about to do it in a very systematic way. Bhāvaviveka is "the forerunner of the literary style known as *siddhānta* (Tib., *grub-mtha*'), which became enormously popular within Tibetan scholarly circles. A *siddhānta* text devotes ordered chapters to analyzing the philosophic positions (*siddhānta* s) of rival schools, both Buddhist and Hindu.⁹⁰ His *Tarkajvālā* contains systematic critiques of the positions held by the Hīnayāna and the Yogācāra, both Buddhist schools, and the Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Vedānta, and Mīmāṃsā schools of Hindu philosophy."⁹¹ Dharmapāla also critiques unacceptable positions in his commentarial *Śataka Commenatry*, but he also wrote a systematic compendium of rival positions and critiques, the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiratnasamḥava* (T. 1491), a work as yet little studied.⁹²

Furthermore, both men shared a concern with conventional argumentation. Bhāvaviveka asserted an independent reasoning (*svatantra-*

⁸⁹Reported by Tāranātha, cited in Iida, *Reason and Emptiness*, p. 10.

⁹⁰See Jose Cabezon, "The Canonization of Philosophy and the Rhetoric of Siddhānta in Tibetan Buddhism," *Buddha Nature*, pp. 7-26.

⁹¹Katz, "Bhāvaviveka," 134.

⁹²Extant only in Chinese, T. 1591: *Ch'eng Wei-shih Pao-sheng lun*. Treated only by H. Ui, *Daijō butten no kenkyū*, pp. 706-813. The text is a commentary on Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikavijñaptimatratāsiddhi*, but in fact is more of a scholastic apologetic against mistaken opinions. Ui characterizes it as "scholastic verbosity," but I suspect the fact that it was translated into Chinese not by Hsuan-tsang, but by I-ching makes its vocabulary difficult to control.

anumāna) that could attain the conventional truth, for he wanted to resurrect argumentation from the systematic negation (*prasaṅga*) of Nāgārjuna's and Chandrakīrti's Mādhyamika, for to him that left one bereft of any means of validly asserting anything. Thus he creatively reinterpreted the two truths as presented by Nāgārjuna, stressing that reasoning can validly attain a truth in full accord and harmony with ultimate meaning. In his short essay, *Madhyamakārthasamgraha* , he propounds two levels of ultimate meaning.

Non-analogical (*aparyāya*) ultimate meaning does not come to appear and is not fabricated in concepts (*prapañca*), while (*pariyāya*) analogical ultimate meaning does come to appear and is fabricated in concepts.⁹³

He takes this to mean knowledge in accordance with ultimate meaning,⁹⁴ for the state of yogic cessation has no object and is no cognition whatsoever. Thus he affirms "a highest ultimate that is beyond all predication and specification (*aparyāya-paramārtha*), in conformity with all Mādhyamika teachings, and an ultimate that can be inferred logically and specified meaningfully (*pariyāya-pararmārtha*); this latter level was a bold innovation within Mādhyamika thought."⁹⁵ Dharmapāla also was concerned with validating a conventional truth and tried to explicate its nature by interpreting the two truths through the Yogācāra theory of the three natures and the structure of consciousness.⁹⁶ In their goals they were more alike than different. But

⁹³Nagao, *The Foundational Standpoint* , p. 63.

⁹⁴Iida, *Reason and Emptiness* , p. 83, from chapter 3 of *Madhyamakahrdaya* , see Yamaguchi, *Tairon* , 58-59. Also on the term *pariyāya* see Nagao, "I-mon (*pariyāya*) to iu kotoba," in *Chūkan to yuishiki* , pp. 406-412.

⁹⁵Katz, "Bhāvaviveka," p. 134. Nagao, *The Foundational Standpoint* , 58: "Bhāvaviveka teaches that the true understanding of worldly convention is the subsequent attainment of purified understanding in the world. He holds that worldly convention is grounded on and flows from the pure Dharma realm of ultimate meaning. Of course, it remains enclosed within worldly and conventional language, but at the same time it is an outflow from ultimate meaning. This may be related to the fact that Bhāvaviveka defends the essential character of worldly convention against the Yogācāra philosophers, while Candrakīrti holds that worldly convention is lacking in all essential being. Bhāvaviveka, who is identified as a Svātrāntrika thinker (one who holds that reasoning is independent and self-sufficient), recognizes the authority of verbal reasoning and maintains that the intent of Mādhyamika requires the establishment of an independent form of argumentation."

⁹⁶For the most comprehensive study of Dharmapāla's thought, see S. Katsumata, *Bukkyō ni okeru shinshikisetsu no kenkyū* , the first part of which (pp. 1-318) is devoted to recovering the original form of Dharmapāla's thought before Hsüan-tsang changed it into the *Ch'eng Wei-shih lun* . Also see S. Matsumoto, "Dharmapāla no nitai setsu," *Indogaku bukkyōgaku* 27/2 (1979): 184-85.

precisely because they took different paths toward an identical goal—reasoned apologetic, they differed sharply. Once Bhāvaviveka came to visit Dharmapāla. Hearing that Dharmapāla was attracting scads of students, he went apparently to confront this young upstart,⁹⁷ to try him in debate. When he asked Dharmapāla for a meeting, Dharmapāla replied "The lives of men . . . are like a phantom; the body is as a bubble. The whole day I exert myself. I have no time for controversy. You may therefore depart—there can be no meeting."⁹⁸

None of their writings have survived in Sanskrit. Bhāvaviveka's works are preserved only in Tibetan translation, while Dharmapāla's remains only in Chinese. Although the main lines of their bitter dispute are sufficiently clear, it is difficult to reconstruct the exact form of the argumentation. It is certain that Dharmapāla in the last chapter of his *Śataka Commentary* criticized the Mādhyamika position. He could have been driven to so do by the appearance in Āryadeva's text of the Yogācāra technical term, "unreal imagining." He could also have been directly replying to Bhāvaviveka's dismissal of Yogācāra thought in chapter 5 of his *Madhyamakahr̥daya Tarkajvālā*, entitled *Yogācāratattvaviniścaya*, which contains a presentation of the Yogācāra position (verses 1-7) and a refutation (8-114) of that system as advocated by Maitreya, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Dignāga, and others.⁹⁹ Bhāvaviveka also critiques Yogācāra in the appendix to his *Prajñāpradīpa*, his commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārika* 25.¹⁰⁰ The main documents are *Tarkajvālā* 5, and Dharmapāla's *Śataka Commentary* 10.

But first it must be clear that there are certain philological difficulties. Bhāvaviveka's text is preserved in Tibetan and, as with most Tibetan translations, is a good witness to the original Sanskrit. Furthermore, it specifies the Yogācāra position it refutes. But Dharmapāla does not provide us with any

⁹⁷This abortive meeting was supposed to have taken place ca. 559 CE. See Y. Kajiyama, *Studies in Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 183 for all this. Consult Tillemans, *Materials for the Study of Āryadeva, Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti*, 1: 1-36 for an account of the lives and works of these thinkers. The source is Hsüan-tsang's travel journal, for which see Beal, *Si-Yu Ki*, 2: 223-34.

⁹⁸See Eckel, *To See the Buddha*, 12.

⁹⁹The entire text of chapter five, both basic verses of the *Madhyamakahr̥daya* and its commentarial *Tarkajvālā*, is presented in Japanese translation by S. Yamaguchi, *Bukkyō ni okeru mu to u to no taironi*, together with an introductory essay on Bhāvaviveka and a running exposition of the stanzas. See also Lindtner, "Bhavya's Critique of Yogācāra in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, Chapter IV," in B. K. Motilal and R. D. Evans (eds.), *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology*, pp. 239-263.

¹⁰⁰Tibetan text edited by Chr. Lindtner, "Bhavya's Controversy with Yogācāra in the Appendix to *Prajñāpradīpa*, Chapter XXV," pp. 77-97.

direct references to Bhāvaviveka or his text. Moreover, Hsüan-tsang's Chinese version is not a literal translation of the now lost Sanskrit. Rather it is an interpretive translation of the original. There may be omissions and additions that are not easy to detect. When he translated Dharmapāla and Āryadeva into Chinese, Hsüan-tsang knew, as would any Chinese translator, that Chinese readers would not be able to consult the original texts. Indeed, the absence of any Sanskrit texts found in China would suggest that, once translated into Chinese, they were discarded. The result for our purposes is that, in the absence of a Sanskrit or Tibetan text to serve as a comparative control, the faithfulness of the Chinese will always be in doubt.¹⁰¹ A further problem is that the various positions in the back and forth of the argument are not identified in the text. Thus, even given a faithful Chinese translation, one is required to reconstruct an argumentation that would have been clear to its intended readers. One must identify the various opinions with their respective holders, and offer an intelligent English rendering of flow of the argument.

The first doctrinal departure from the classical texts of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu is Dharmapāla's emphasis in his *Śataka Commentary* on the perspective of the two truths. He was perhaps following the example of the *Shung-chung lun* attributed to Asaṅga, or of the *Samḍhinirmocanasūtra* itself. This perspective would seem to be fundamental to his understanding of the implications of *samādhi* and its relationship to doctrinal discourse, for he, like Bhāvaviveka, was concerned with validating conventional truth. Most of his commentary—at least on the first twenty verses—could in principle have been written by a Mādhyamika. Being and nonbeing pertain to conventional truth, whereas ultimate truth transcends these as well as all other kinds of duality.

The main issue in the argumentation between Bhāvaviveka and Dharmapāla centered on the value of language and its grounding in consciousness. Dharmapāla insists that the validity of language-formed truth must be understood within the critical Yogācāra context of meaning, i.e., that reasoning must be grounded within an existent other-dependent consciousness, structured by the presence of both insight and image. Bhāvaviveka saw that theory of consciousness as another form of subtle clinging to an essentialistic viewpoint, and rejected it in favor of an apophatic Mādhyamika understanding

¹⁰¹On the faithfulness of Hsüan-tsang, and of Paramārtha, see Keenan, "Introduction," *The Realm of Awakening*, pp. 39-45, as well as, "The Doctrine of Buddha Nature in Chinese Buddhism: Hui-k'ai on Paramārtha."

of yogic cessation. To him the validity of reasoning needed no critical underpinning, for he focused on the logical validity of verbal judgment instead of the Yogācāra focus on the prior occurrence of insight into image. In his *Madhayamakahr̥daya-kārikā Tarkajvāla*, Bhāvaviveka criticizes Yogācāra notions, specifically the Yogācāra discourse on the absence of duality as taught by the classical Yogācāra thinkers, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. Bhāvaviveka's critique of Yogācāra characterizes the Yogācārins as clever thinkers who are proud of their own interpretation and who claim that the Yogācāra account is the best description of reality. The commentary states:

Other Mahāyāna teachers, such as Asaṅga and Vasubandhu misinterpret it (i.e., the meaning of Mahāyāna). They have no sense of shame, do not understand the ultimate (*paramārtha*), even though they think they do, and are proud of their own interpretation. They say, "As an introduction to the essence of reality, our introduction is best, not [the introduction] of the Mādhyamikas."¹⁰²

This suggests that Bhāvaviveka held that Asaṅga and Vasubandhu explicitly championed Yogācāra over Mādhyamika. These two brothers did indeed teach the absence of duality within an existent other-dependent pattern of consciousness. Yet there is no extant textual evidence to support the view that they ever explicitly denigrated Mādhyamika thought. Quite the contrary, Asaṅga himself composed a commentary on the introductory stanza of Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamakakārikāḥ*, extant now only in Chinese. Nowhere in this brief text is there any critique of Mādhyamika ideas. Indeed, Asaṅga tries to explicate the significance of emptiness in a thoroughly Mādhyamika fashion.¹⁰³ He also wrote a commentary on the *Vajracchedika*, which mentions no specific Yogācāra themes, confining itself to the exposition of the emptiness of all things.¹⁰⁴ The practice was followed by later Yogācāra commentators:

¹⁰²*Madhayamakahr̥daya-kārikā Tarkajvāla*, 5.1. Yamaguchi, *Bukkyō ni okeru mu to u to no tairon*, 72. See Malcolm D. Eckel, "Bhāvaviveka and the Early Mādhyamika Theories of Language," *Philosophy East and West* 28/3 (1978): 323-37, for a good treatment of Bhāvaviveka's attempt to adapt Nāgārjuna to his intellectual milieu.

¹⁰³See Keenan, "Asaṅga's Understanding of Mādhyamika: Notes on the Shung-chung-lun," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*, 12:1 (1989), pp. 93-108.

¹⁰⁴See Tucci, "The Trīṣatikāyāh. Prajñāpāramitāyāh Kārikāsaptaiḥ by Asaṅga," in *Minor Buddhist Texts*, pp. 3-192, and G. Nagao, "Kongōhanyakyō ni taisuru Muchaku no shakuge" (Asaṅga's Commentarial Stanzas on the Diamond Wisdom Sūtra), *Chūkan to yuishiki*, pp. 561-83.

Sthiramati wrote a commentary entitled *Mūlamadhyamakasaṃdhi-nirmocanavyākhyā*. Although he does filter Mādhyamika think-ing through the theory of the three patterns of consciousness, there is no direct criticism of Mādhyamika at all.¹⁰⁵

But the critique does apply to Dharmapāla, who in his *Śataka Commentary* does argue for the superiority of the Yogācāra position over Mādhyamika, the last stanza of which directly counters and is perhaps the source for Bhāvaviveka's title, *Tarkajvālā* (The Flame of Reasoning). Dharmapāla writes:

In order to consume in fire unorthodox viewpoints, I wash in the ghee of the Tathāgata's true doctrine and fan a great wind of reasoning (*tarka*). Who would venture, moth-like, to jump into this fierce blaze (*jvālā*)?¹⁰⁶

This section of Dharmapāla's *Commentary* is the very first explicit Yogācāra critique of Mādhyamika thought. The relevant passage occurs in Chapter 10, Section 8, "Instructions and Cautions to Disciples," in the context of an interpretation of a stanza from Āryadeva's *Śataka* which answers the question of what value ensues from insight into emptiness. It states: "Insight gained through insight into emptiness eradicates the bondage of unreal imagining."¹⁰⁷ If language constitutes the boundaries and bounds of samsaric existence, then Āryadeva's stanza about "the bondage of unreal imagining" (*abhūtaparikalpabandha*), much in the spirit of the *Samdhinirmocana*, merely locates the source of deluded language formation in that other-dependent and unreal imagining which engenders the delusions of clinging to the imagined pattern.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵T. 30, Number 1567: *Ta-ch'eng Chung-kan Shih-lun*.

¹⁰⁶*Ta-ch'eng Kuang Pai-lun Shih-lun*, T. 1571: 250a.

¹⁰⁷*Ta-ch'eng Kuang Pai-lun Shih-lun*, T. 1571: 246a.

¹⁰⁸For the original passage, see Karen Lang, *Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka: On the Bodhisattva's Cultivation of Merit and Knowledge*. Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1986, 150. 23: gal te rañ bzin gyis dnos yod/ stoñ mthoñ yon tan ci zig yod/ rtog pas mthoñ ba 'chiñ ba ste/ de ni 'di ru dgag par bya/ Dharmapāla takes the phrase *abhūtaparikalpa* in the sense of the famous passage from the *Madhyāntavibhāga* I.1: *abhūta-parikalpo 'sti dvyan tatra na vidyate/ śūnyatā vidyate tv atra tasyām api sa vidyate//* (Nagao, *Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya: A Buddhist Philosophical Treatise Edited for the First Time from a Sanskrit Manuscript*. Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1964, p. 17). The passage did play an important role in Yogācāra readings of Mādhyamika texts, for which see Nagao, "From Mādhyamika to Yogācāra: An Analysis of MMK, XXXIV.18 and MV, I.1-2," *Mādhyamika and Yogācāra*, pp.189-99.

But the term "unreal imagining" had become a technical Yogācāra term, used in the *Madhyāntavibhāga* to affirm the existence of the other-dependent pattern of consciousness. Dharmapāla could hardly have resisted claiming the term, and he sets out clearly to affirm the existence of unreal imagining, i.e., of other-dependent consciousness, indeed seeing therein the source for the nonbeing of the passions and delusions of *samsāra*. Although empty, yet such imagining does "engender suffering and anguish for sentient beings."¹⁰⁹ Yet he also affirms the existence of this unreal-imagining other-dependent pattern of consciousness, for it is also present within an awakened mind. Dharmapāla's questioner, here to be identified with Bhāvaviveka, objects that unreal imagining, and thus the other-dependent pattern, does not really exist at all. He describes the Yogācāra position :

Dependent nature is thought to exist [by the Yogācāras] because ideas have a cause, because otherwise neither [defilement nor purification] would exist, and because defilements are apprehended.¹¹⁰

His description of the Yogācāra position is accurate, for that position holds that the other-dependent pattern of consciousness must exist because all ideas, however mistaken or however awakened, must be grounded in something that engenders them—for otherwise neither defilement nor purification would exist—and because awakened buddhas actually do apprehend the defilements of sentient beings. In other words, our ideas and words must be based upon some form of consciousness, for they are conscious activities. Moreover, consciousness must be existent, otherwise it could not be purified from its normal defilements. There must be something that is purified. Mental purification must be a purification of mind.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹Ta-ch'eng Kuang Pai-lun Shih-lun, T. 1571: 246b.

¹¹⁰Translation from Eckel, "Bhāvaviveka's Critique," p. 52. The Sanskrit is: prajñāpteh sanimittatvād anyathā dvayanāśataḥ / saṃkleśasyopalabdheś ca paratantrāstitā matā. See Lindtner, "Bhavya's Controversy," note 26.

¹¹¹See J. Takasaki, "Buddha, the Compassionate," *Contacts Between Cultures*, p. 144, outlines the problematic: "From the standpoint of the ultimate truth, in which no mental activity is operative (*cittasamskāropaśama*), there must be no room for compassion, because it is also a kind of mental disposition, even if it be without defilement. In this sense it belongs to the sphere of conventional truth (*samvṛtisatya*). How then does compassion of no basis arise out of the Buddha or in the mind of a Bodhisattva? In order words, how can emptiness be the basis for the origination of compassion?"

Normally mind appears as subject versus object, and its activity appears to be defiled by ignorance, as reported in the *Madhyāntavibhāga*. But this mode of appearance is only its imagined nature. Mind, however, need not remain affixed to the dichotomy between subject and object, nor need it be defiled by any mental impurity. Therefore, mind as affixed to the imagined realities of things is deluded and thus can be pronounced nonexistent, while in its other-dependent pattern it does exist. The point for Dharmapāla is that the structure of consciousness, even in an awakened state, remains characterized by the two aspects of insight and image, for that is its existent other-dependent pattern. Indeed, how can one reason to true judgments without first having gained insight into images perceived through the senses? What would one be judging true or false? In a critical context, only when one sees those images as corresponding to the essences of things, does the mind function in the imagined pattern, which has no reality whatsoever. In his *Vijñaptimatratāsiddhi* Dharmapāla explains:

All the evolutions [of consciousness between the storehouse and the active consciousnesses] appear in the two aspects of insight (*darśana*) and image (*nimitta*), and therefore they are termed evolutions.¹¹²

These two aspects, however, are structurally constitutive of consciousness and not eliminated, even upon the attainment of Buddha awakening. They become the basis for the Buddha's discernment and compassion. The problem is that insight becomes frozen in the presence of an image and imagines that image itself to be reality. Such imagined realities then occlude realization into the emptiness of all things and prevent progress along the middle path.

Mind and its mental states, because of the force of the permeations [of language] evolve into two aspects. Because these evolved aspects arise from causes, they are other-dependent. . . . But because of illusory clinging people universally imagine set [ideas] of being, nonbeing, identity, difference, both [being and nonbeing, identity and difference],

¹¹²de la Vallée Poussin, *Vijñaptimatratāsiddhi*, p. 417.

neither [being nor nonbeing, identity nor difference], and so forth. It is thus that these two aspects are termed the imagined nature.¹¹³

Bhāvaviveka argues that it is unreasonable to assert that in a sense mind exists, and in a sense it does not exist. One cannot have it both ways. Both the imagined illusions and their basis in other-dependent consciousness have no reality and completely disappear in the mind of an awakened buddha. Ultimately neither exists at all. Dharmapāla of course objects, arguing that while the other-dependent pattern of consciousness really exists, it itself is not the ultimate. Rather, Dharmapāla contents, his affirmation of the existence of the other-dependent nature is the result of a critical understanding of the evolutions of consciousness (*vijñāna-pariṇāma*) and he grounds all conscious activities within a critical context of meaning. This point is hard to overstress: the underlying difference between Dharmapāla and Bhāvaviveka is a difference in contexts of meaning. For Bhāvaviveka all conventional affirmations of truth are grounded only in reasoning, but fall away completely upon realization of yogic *samādhi*, while for Dharmapāla the other-dependent pattern of awakened consciousness perdures into awakening, and is the basis whereby buddhas are able to reengage in the world of language and teaching. The Mādhyamika yogin engages in the practices of meditation in order to rest in yogic emptiness. So does the Yogācāra practitioner, adding only that this tranquil state of concentration must be understood to be the emptiness of the dichotomy of the imagined pattern within the underlying other-dependent pattern.

They agree about yogic cessation--after all what is there left to disagree about when that state has no cognition (*upalabhi*) whatsoever?¹¹⁴ But they disagree about its interpretation and rational consequences. Since both parties, being adherents of Mahāyāna, call upon the authority of the same scriptures, the controversy between the two schools becomes a hermeneutical

¹¹³de la Vallée Poussin, *Vijñaptimatratāsiddhi*, p. 523.

¹¹⁴For example, Bhāvaviveka sees the reality of Buddha as the no-arising of any cognition. He writes in his *Madhyamakahr̥daya* 3.267: "The no-arising of cognition that is called 'Buddha' because it is the understanding of this [reality] is the primary [Buddha] because it is the understanding that is no-understanding and because it dispels the sleep of concepts." Translation from Malcolm David Eckel, *To See the Buddha*, 41. See Lopez, *A Study of Svātantrika*, which presents Jang-gya's *Presentation of Tenets (Grub mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa)*, chapter 8 of which treats Bhāvaviveka's critique of Yogācāra.

disagreement over the proper interpretation (*naya*) of the scriptures, and the commentaries are filled with exegeses of scriptural passages shared as authoritative.¹¹⁵ One party simply accuses the other of giving a misinterpretation of the scriptures. Mostly the controversy focuses on the interpretation of certain passages in the *Prajñāpāramitā*, the *Lankāvatāra*, and the *Bhavasamkrānti*.

Bhāvaviveka again accurately summarizes the Yogācāra position in *Madhyamakahrdaya* 5.5:

The [Buddhas who] see reality [only], see perfected nature when they do not apprehend the imagined nature, and do not grasp other-dependent nature.¹¹⁶

Here Buddhas in attainment of yogic wisdom do not apprehend (*anupalabdha*) the imagined pattern at all, and they do not grasp (*agrāhya*) the other-dependent pattern, i.e., they do not grasp its dichotomy of insight and image to correspond to reality. And Bhāvaviveka goes on to explain the Yogācāra position in his *Tarkajvālā*:

Here, the three natures of the imagined (*parikalpita*), the other-dependent (*paratantra*), and the perfected (*pariniṣpanna*) are contained in the storehouse con-sciousness.¹¹⁷

Among these [three], the things [including everything] from form to awakening that we imagine (*vikalpa*) in our various ideas about an inner [subject] and an outer [object], do not exist as they are imagined. This is because we imagine [them] by superimposing the error that they really

¹¹⁵On the whole issue of hermeneutics, see *Buddhist Hermeneutics*, ed. Donald Lopez. Eleven insightful essays by scholars on various aspects of how Buddhists have interpreted and intend to interpret the teachings.

¹¹⁶Yamaguchi, *Tairon*, 112.

¹¹⁷According to the Yogācāras this is not quite accurate, for the three natures function within the interplay of the latent, storehouse consciousness and the other seven active consciousnesses. Indeed, the structure of the other-dependent is that of image and insight, which become imagined because of the defiled thinking of the *manas* consciousness, in its processing of sense images from the other consciousnesses. See Keenan, *The Summary of the Great Vehicle*, pp. 40-41 (2. 6-7); Nagao, *Shōdaijōron*, pp. 89-107. Nagao's Japanese translation also follows the section headings of Lamotte.

do exist. Such imagined things are the imagined nature [of consciousness].

Unreal imagining (*abhūtaparikalpa*)—consisting in the various mind and mental states in their varieties of beneficial, non-beneficial, and morally neutral states that arise in the three realm—is the other-dependent [nature] (*paratantra*), because it arises and exists in virtue of something other than itself. Or it is other-dependent because it arises in virtue of the development of something else. That is to say, it is dependent on others because the other two natures of the imagined and the perfected are imagined and perfected on the basis of this [other-dependent nature]. Other-dependence signifies that on the basis of which these other two come about. When the dependent nature is freed from imagined essences of subject and object, it is the perfected nature (*pariniṣpanna-svabhāva*).

This [perfected nature] is neither identical (*ekatva*) to nor different (*anyatva*) from the other-dependent [nature]. If it were different, the nature of reality would be diverse. If it were identical, then other-dependent [nature] could not be the cause for purification, because that other-dependent [nature] would be defiled in its essential being (*samkleśa-ātmatva*).¹¹⁸

Although Bhāvaviveka's critique is conducted in the perspective of the two truths, as is Dharmapāla's, both have to accept the three natures and *cittamātra*, for these have scriptural warrant. In Bhāvaviveka's critique, the imagined nature does not exist as it is imagined, and the other-dependent nature only exists in a relative sense, scarcely different from the early descriptions of dependent co-arising as the genesis of defiled transmigration.¹¹⁹ Furthermore, he continues to argue, from a relative point of view the Yogācāra notion of the perfected pattern (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*) is absurd since it is said both to exist and not to exist, i.e., it is purified other-dependent nature. For Bhāvaviveka, in the truth of ultimate meaning (*aparyāyaparamārtha*) there is no origination, therefore also no three natures.

¹¹⁸Yamaguchi, *Tairon*, pp. 112-114, and 118.

¹¹⁹On Nāgārjuna's reinterpretation of dependent co-arising not only as the genesis of transmigration, but also as dependently co-arisen suchness, see Nagao, *The Foundational Standpoint*, pp. 3-19.

Mind is real in a relative sense, but not in an ultimate sense. The awakening of a buddha is without any mental object whatsoever, and there is no room for any purified other-dependence. In stanza 16 *Bhāvaviveka* argues that the awakening of a buddha has no attainment of any nature at all (*svabhāva-upalabdhi*), no other-dependent nature and no perfected nature, for if its object is the perfected pattern, then it must be a conceptual knowledge. But that is precisely what it is not.¹²⁰

To all of this, Dharmapāla retorts that even in the *Mādhyamika* interpretation worldly convention, i.e., unreal imagining, is not nonexistent.¹²¹ To develop his argument on the limited validity of verbal statements of truth, as long as they are seen as conventional, Dharmapāla introduces the notion of direct perception.

From of old the model masters [have taught] that we establish the two truths because of the different situations of sentient beings. The truth of worldly convention approaches and communicates with conventional dispositions through language. The truth of ultimate meaning is far from language and manifests the really real. Although all conventional things accord with these conventional dispositions, in fact they are falsifiable and thus not truly real.

Moreover, the dependently co-arisen forms and ideas attained in direct perception cannot be described in language and thus are not the truth of convention.¹²²

Following *Dignāga*, Dharmapāla holds that there does occur a direct perception (*pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*) prior to and apart from language, but this cannot be adjudicated to be the truth of worldly convention, simply because such direct perception has not yet been filtered through insight into image and expressed in language. Direct perception is not the truth of worldly convention, but neither is it to be included in ultimate meaning. Rather, it is simply an initial worldly experience that, because permeated by karmic seeds within the storehouse consciousness through the activity of defiled thinking, supports the

¹²⁰Yamaguchi, *Tairon*, 208-09.

¹²¹*Ta-ch'eng Kuang Pai-lun Shih-lun*, T. 1571: 246b.

¹²²*Ta-ch'eng Kuang Pai-lun Shih-lun*, T. 1571: 247a.

genesis of unreal imagining and worldly convention. For a deluded being, such experience devolves into the false imagined pattern. But for an awakened buddha, who sees reality by not grasping those images as if they were pictures of a real world, such perceptions have a limited, conventional validity. Yogic cessation has removed the karmic seeds in the storehouse consciousness and transformed it into the mirror wisdom of Buddha.¹²³ Images do not represent an externally real world clung to by imagination. Rather a buddha becomes aware that the entire world of our experience is conscious construction-only (*vijñaptimatra*).

This does raise a problem, for it would seem that although the objective world is unreal, the mind that seems to grasp it is real. But how can something real grasp something unreal, and how did the unreal come about in the first place? This became the central issue between the Sākārajñānavāda and the Nirākārajñānavāda branches of Yogācāra. That issue was whether in the awakened mind an image (*akāra*) is present or not. We must look into the works of Dignāga and later Dharmakīrti on *pramāṇa* for the full debate.¹²⁴ But Dharmapāla clearly belongs to the Sākārajñānavāda branch and does follow Dignāga, who in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* teaches that direct perception is unmediated through any idea or judgment.¹²⁵

Direct perception is devoid of any conceptual construction (*kapanāpodha*). The cognition in which there is no conceptual construction is direct perception.¹²⁶

¹²³*Mahāyānasamgraha* 10: 5.5. See Griffiths, *The Realm*, p. 104: "As a result of the conversion of the aggregate of consciousness [Dharma body obtains] dominion over [the four] wisdoms, which are the wisdoms of mirror, equality, differentiation, and duty-fulfillment." And commenting upon the Buddha factor of purification, Asvabhāva's *Mahāyānasamgrahopaniśandhana* (*The Realm*, p. 116) explains: "To those who ask what has been purified or what has been converted, it is stated [that when purification takes place] 'upon the conversion of the container consciousness.' When [the container or storehouse consciousness], abounding in all the seeds of all defilements, is cleansed by its antidote, then it is compatible with all the many irreproachable virtues. The term 'converted' is to be understood as in the case where a poison itself becomes an antidote, when its toxicity is removed by another [medical] antidote."

¹²⁴See Chr. Lindtner, "The Yogācāra Philosophy of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti," pp. 27-52.

¹²⁵See Keenan, *A Study of the Buddhabhūmyūpadeśa*, 273-335, on the influence of Dignāga on Dharmapāla's development of the Fa-hsiang notion of the four aspects (*bhāga*) of consciousness.

¹²⁶Hattori, Masaaki, trans. *Dignāga on Perception*, p. 25. Dignāga also speaks of *yogi-pratyakṣa* although he does not develop the theme.

By contrast, conceptual construction is the function of inference (*anumāna-pramāṇa*), which, when correctly and logically carried through, attains a conventionally valid truth. Not being characterized by conceptual construction, direct perception seems to suggest that the initial consciousness of humans is itself a pure, unmediated awareness, and indeed in his *Prajñāpāramitā-piṇḍārthā* Dignāga does claim that "the awareness of ordinary people is originally pure" (*prthagjanānām vajjñānam prakṛtivyavadānikam*).¹²⁷ Dharmapāla accepts such a notion only in the sense of an immediately experienced direct perception, an initial awareness that develops into language.

The truth of worldly convention means that conditionally arisen form and ideas, whether world-transcendent or worldly, are immediately experienced apart from language, but subsequently do develop the ability to express themselves. Immediate experience is prior, followed then by the generation of language. The truths of worldly convention both do exist and do arise. Provisionally they bring about demonstrations, like illusory tricks. Arising from imagination, their status is dream-like. These truths of worldly convention are described as having identifiable characteristics and being enunciable in language. The truth of ultimate meaning indicates that which cannot be reached by any saintly knowledge, imagination, or name, but which is internally realized. Ultimate meaning is described as unconditioned by anything else, without identifying characteristics, and disjunctive from language.¹²⁸

Here, direct perception is included within worldly convention, as its yet unmediated source. Dharmapāla's argument, however, is directed not against Dignāga, but against Bhāvaviveka's critique of the Yogācāra position, for Bhāvaviveka claims that for the Yogācāra thinkers, the ultimate, being "the existence of the absence of duality, it is the object (*viśaya*) of a cognition of

¹²⁷Tucci, "Minor Sanskrit Texts on the Prajñāpāramitā I. The Prajñā-pāramitā-piṇḍārthā of Dinnaga," p. 58. Uj Hakuju, *Jinna Chosaku no kenkyū*, 246 and 304.

¹²⁸Ta-ch'eng Kuang Pai-lun Shih-lun, T. 1571: 247a.

existence, and because it is an absence, it is the cognition of an absence."¹²⁹ By contrast, Bhāvaviveka's thesis is that Buddha has no cognition at all. Before him, Nāgārjuna had said that: "All acquisitions and fabrications blissfully cease."¹³⁰ Bhāvaviveka also has this verse in mind in his *Madhyamakahr̥daya* 3.284cd: "The Dharma body of buddhas consists in the blissful cessation of fabrication."¹³¹ Again and again Bhāvaviveka urges the point. Emptiness is realized in a *jñāna* that is neither accompanied with discrimination (*svikalpa*) nor bereft of discrimination (*avikalpa*), he says with an allusion to the two *pramāṇas* admitted by Dignāga, and others. (3.285).¹³² It is not the object of argument (3.286), it is supreme spirit (*paramaṃ brahma*; 3.289), it is achieved by yogic concentration without focusing [on an object] (*anupāsanayoga*; 3.290), it is a question of dwelling in no perception (*anupalambha*; 3.292). Bhāvaviveka often calls this state of "blissful cessation of fabrication" (*prapañcopaśamaḥ śivaḥ*) the nectar of suchness (*tattvāmṛta*; 3.300). Nāgārjuna too had used *amṛta* (nectar) to suggest the most satisfactory state of *samādhi*. Most informative, perhaps, is *Madhyamakahr̥daya* 3.266:

¹²⁹*Madhyamakahr̥daya Tarkajavāḷā*, 5.2. Yamaguchi, *Tairon*, 79. Asvabhāva, commenting again on the *Mahāyānasamgraha* 10.3.a, observes: "The line '[Dharma body is] characterized by the non-duality of existence and non-existence' means that [Dharma body] is not characterized by existence because it has the non-existence of things as its nature. Neither is [Dharma body] characterized by non-existence, because it has emptiness as its essence." Hsüan-tsang translates the same comment as: "It is not existent because all the things clung to by imagination (*parikalpitasarvadharmāḥ*) do not exist, but it is not non-existent because that nature (i.e., *pariniṣpannasvabhāva*) revealed by emptiness does exist." (See *The Realm*, 82-83.)

¹³⁰*Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 25.24ab: sarvopalambhopaśamaḥ prapañcopaśamaḥ śivaḥ /

¹³¹The Third Chapter of *Madhyamakahr̥daya*, ed. Y. Ejima, *Chūkan shisō no tenkai—Bhāvaviveka kenkyū*: buddhānām dharmakāyo 'yaṃ prapañcopaśamaḥ śivaḥ //

¹³²It seems that it was a similar point at issue between the two factions of Yogācāra. As Y. Kajiyama, notes: "All the Yogācārins must be *sākāravādins* so far as the cognition of common people is concerned. A problem, however, appears in regard to the emancipated person, who is supposed to have acquired *nirvikalpa-jñāna* or non-conceptual, supermundane knowledge. Some Yogācārins thought that knowledge of an emancipated person is freed from the fetter of cognitum and cognizer, and accordingly is clear like a clear crystal without specks. And they held that this clear imageless knowledge is the essence of cognition, regarding images as false, unreal stains born due to our *vāsanā*. This is the essential [point] of the *nirākārajñānavāda*. But others from the same school criticized this theory, saying that what is not real can never be manifested, since otherwise it would entail the unfavorable doctrine of *asatkyāti* (i.e., the non-existence of any cause). Every cognition, inasmuch as it is knowledge, must have an image, and yet there is no harm in that an emancipated person's knowledge is with an image, if he is freed from conceptual thinking, the fundamental [nature] of which is the bifurcation of cognitum and cognizer. This is the essential point of *sākārajñānavāda* of the Yogācārins." The issue here is whether a buddha's awakening is accompanied by an image. The issue between Bhāvaviveka and Dharmapāla is whether it can be called a cognition at all.

No object of knowledge exists at all. So [the Buddhas] who know reality say that the reality that has no equal is [the object] about which not even a nonconceptual cognition arises.¹³³

Bhāvaviveka calls upon canonical passages that had already served as authorities for Nāgārjuna. This includes the definition of the highest truth given in the *Akṣayamatīnirdeśa* :

What is the truth of ultimate meaning? It does not appear even in wisdom, much less is it expressible in words.¹³⁴

But Dharmapāla rejects Bhāvaviveka's attack and agrees that ultimate meaning is no kind of cognition at all, despite the dependently co-arisen validity of other-dependent consciousness. Consequently, all reasoning and all language-formed propositions enjoy only a status of worldly convention-only. Apparently against Bhāvaviveka's notion of an "independent reasoning from emptiness" Dharmapāla argues that:

In the final analysis ultimate meaning lacks these forms and these ideas. There is no such thing as a reasoning from [ultimate] reality, because the occurrence of [such reasoning] is an existent thing. There is nothing that is not included in the two truths. Thus if you say that that which is realized in direct perception, far removed from worldly [description and language] exists apart from the two truths, then you must establish a third [category] that is neither ultimate nor conventional truth. If you claim that, although dependently co-arisen forms and ideas do exist, that they are attained through direct perception in the world and are not comprised finally in the truth of ultimate meaning, but, being spoken provisionally, are included in conventional truth, that they are established in conventional language according to the dispositions [of

¹³³*Madhyamakahrdaya* 3.266: jñeyasya sarvathāsiddher nirvikalpāpi yatra dhīḥ / notpadyate tad atulyaṃ tattvaṃ tattvaviduḥ viduḥ // Translation from Eckel, *To See the Buddha*, p. 158.

¹³⁴See Lindtner, *Nāgārjuniana*, Acintyastava, p. 149, where it is noted that the *Prasannapadā* also presents the same citation from the *Akṣayamatīnirdeśasūtra*: paramārthasatyam katamat? yatra jñānasyāpy apracārah, kaḥ punar vādo 'kṣarāṇām . . . Also see Eckel, *To See the Buddha*, p. 232.13.

sentient beings], that this is the existent reality of these forms and ideas, then we will not disagree.¹³⁵

When Dharmapāla takes the phrase "unreal imagining" (*abhūtaparikalpa*), which is the central theme of *Madhyānta-vibhāga*, as a synonym for the other-dependent pattern,¹³⁶ and focuses on its dependently co-arisen existence and activity, it is because, he argues, without the existence of consciousness no practice is possible. The other-dependent pattern exists as the cause of names and concepts, and as the basis for defilement and purification. Dharmapāla here also rejects Bhāvaviveka's qualification of his arguments as arguments "in an ultimate sense," because for him all arguments take place in a relative sense. (Later on Chandrakīrti would also reject Bhāvaviveka's fondness for reasoning (*priyānumānatā*). Indeed, the central concern of Dharmapāla's argument hovers constantly around the issue of the value of language. If language constitutes the boundaries and bounds of samsaric existence, then the issue is one of boundaries and borders. If Āryadeva's stanza about "the bondage of unreal imagining" (*abhūtaparikalpa-bandha*) merely locates the source of deluded language formation in other-dependent unreal imagining which engenders the delusions of clinging to the imagined pattern, then that does not move much beyond the *Samdhinirmocana*.¹³⁷

A similar notion is repeated by Vasubandhu, who in his *Triṃśikavijñaptimatratāsiddhi* teaches that "The storehouse consciousness is abandoned at the stage of arhat."¹³⁸ But Dharmapāla, following Asaṅga, has a different interpretation. In his *Vijñaptimatratāsiddhi* he states:

¹³⁵Ta-ch'eng Kuang Pai-lun Shih-lun, T. 1571 247a.

¹³⁶The term *abhūtaparikalpa* is found already in *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* and in the *Bodhisattvapīṭaka*. It must therefore have been known to Nāgārjuna though he never mentions the term.

¹³⁷For the original passage, see Karen Lang, *Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka: On the Bodhisattva's Cultivation of Merit and Knowledge*, p. 150. 23: gal te rañ bzin gyis dños yod / stoñ mthon yon tan ci zig yod/ rtog pas mthon ba 'chiñ ba ste / de ni 'di ru dgag par bya / Dharmapāla takes the phrase *abhūtaparikalpa* in the sense of the famous passage from the *Madhyāntavibhāga* I.1: *abhūta-parikalpo 'sti dvayan tatra na vidyate/ śūnyatā vidyate tv atra tasyām api sa vidyate//* (Nagao, *Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya*, p. 17). The passage did play an important role in Yogācāra readings of Mādhyamika texts, for which see Nagao, "From Mādhyamika to Yogācāra," pp. 189-99.

¹³⁸de la Vallée Poussin, *Vijñaptimatratāsiddhi*, p. 163. The same contrast is found in the commentaries to Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasamgraha*. Asaṅga writes that: "Dharma Body is comprised by] the Buddha factor of purification because Dharma Body is attained upon the conversion of the container consciousness." Vasubandhu's *Bhāṣya* comments that "this means that, turning away from and destroying that container consciousness, one attains the purification of Dharma Body." In contrast, Asvabhāva's *Upānibandhana* states that "when the [container consciousness], abounding

purification, for these two states would become entirely nonexistent. This is emptiness ineptly apprehended and brings harm both to oneself and to others. [If there is nothing anywhere,] then who could ever reject a mistaken idea?¹⁴⁴

Dharmapāla summarizes his understanding of the two truths by stressing a correct understanding of conventional language:

This is a summary account of the two truths. True students of doctrine will accordingly engage in no disputation. In the light of the first, worldly convention, the states of defilement and purification do arise. In the light of the second, ultimate meaning, one realizes cessation. Therefore the saints say that there are three kinds of mental orientations. The first mental orientation has both an [understanding of] language and its characteristics. The second mental orientation has no [understanding] of language but does [apprehend] its characteristics. The third mental orientation has neither language nor its characteristics. The first is capable both of awakened understanding of language and of delusion about language. The second is deluded and without enlightened understanding of language. The third is that wherein both delusion and understanding about language is altogether and forever absent. The first two take as their object worldly convention, [either understood or deluded], while the last takes as its object ultimate meaning.¹⁴⁵

It is such an understanding of the implications of emptiness in regard to language-formed truths that underlies Dharmapāla's commentary on Āryadeva's text. He has synthesized the three-pattern hermeneutic of the *Mahāyānasamgraha* with the two-truths hermeneutic of Mādhyamika to present his reading grid for the earlier commentary on Āryadeva's stanzas.

Indeed, Dharmapāla announces his initial intent to "again elucidate the true viewpoint, in order to purify both reasoning and doctrine."¹⁴⁶ There are then true viewpoints, expressed and reasoned in language. All language,

¹⁴⁴ *Ta-ch'eng Kuang Pai-lun Shih-lun*, T. 1571: 248c.

¹⁴⁵ *Ta-ch'eng Kuang Pai-lun Shih-lun*, T. 1571: 249c.

¹⁴⁶ *Ta-ch'eng Kuang Pai-lun Shih-lun*, T. 1571: 242a.

however, is "worldly convention-only" (*saṃvṛti-mātra*),¹⁴⁷ for "in the truth of no essence, there is no duality and no language."¹⁴⁸ But that in no way renders conventional truth inane or invalid. Dharmapāla stresses the need for conventional reasoning and expression:

You cannot conclude that because in the truth of ultimate meaning there is no demonstration or refutation, conventional arguments are bereft of reasoned argument.¹⁴⁹

Conventional language must indeed be employed in all reasoning, either to present the teaching of emptiness or to argue for the validity of dependently co-arisen judgments. Indeed, there are no other kind of arguments. He refutes the opponent by stating:

You are unable to present an argument for the negation of conventional being, and in the truth of ultimate meaning there is no proposing or refuting [argument]. . . . The language of emptiness is refutative: it is established in order to refute others. The language of being is demonstrative: it demonstrates by establishing its own thesis.¹⁵⁰

All language is provisional and conventional, used alternately either to empty incorrect views through the critique of emptiness or to establish its own correct, conventional arguments. Verbal naming and reasoning are able both to refute being and to establish arguments for being.

We talk validly about worldly and conventional issues, for, although the truth of worldly convention is totally disjunctive from the truth of ultimate meaning, whose "true reasoning" (*yukti*) can be characterized neither as being nor as nonbeing, yet conventional discourse does exist in the varied meanings.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁷ *Ta-ch'eng Kuang Pai-lun Shih-lun*, T. 1571: 243a19.

¹⁴⁸ *Ta-ch'eng Kuang Pai-lun Shih-lun*, T. 1571: 243a9.

¹⁴⁹ *Ta-ch'eng Kuang Pai-lun Shih-lun*, T. 1571: 244c.

¹⁵⁰ *Ta-ch'eng Kuang Pai-lun Shih-lun*, T. 1571: 244c15-20. There is an obvious parallel with Bhāvaviveka's defense of *svatantra anumāna*, although the entire context remains always conventional. See Nagao, *The Foundational Standpoint of Mādhyamika Philosophy*, pp. 123-24. Also see Lopez, *A Study of Svātrantika*, pp. 218-27.

¹⁵¹ *Ta-ch'eng Kuang Pai-lun Shih-lun*, T. 1571: 244b.

Worldly convention does exist, because of which we establish transmigration through births and deaths. But the essences and characteristics of things are neither existent nor non-existent, because they are empty in ultimate meaning, being totally disjunctive from ways of thinking and speaking.¹⁵²

Therefore, both refutation and affirmation are conventional language activities and the provisional demonstrations of theses are established in accord with the demands of conventional thinking, for "there must be a balance between the two tasks of demonstration and refutation."¹⁵³ The emptiness of all things does not preclude the conventional truth of language: "although reality is empty, we do differentiate conventional beings."¹⁵⁴ Nevertheless, the validity language enjoys cannot surpass its conventional nature.

The intent of making [our] statement is that being is convention-only. The nonbeing of reality is itself being. This is why we talk about the nonbeing of reality.¹⁵⁵

Denials of being then are nothing more than conventional descriptions, and to speak of the nonbeing of reality remains within the conventional horizon of talking about being. There is no ultimate statement and no ultimate validity to argumentation. This is why Dharmapāla can follow Āryadeva in stating that:

We provisionally demonstrate our thesis in order to refute the false opinions of others. Once these opinions are eradicated, our thesis is also to be rejected.¹⁵⁶

Argumentation over opinions functions as worldly and conventional, aimed at communicating true judgments to sentient beings. Everything expressed in words remains worldly and conventional, for all descriptions of things as

¹⁵² *Ta-ch'eng Kuang Pai-lun Shih-lun*, T. 1571: 244b.

¹⁵³ *Ta-ch'eng Kuang Pai-lun Shih-lun*, T. 1571: 243b.

¹⁵⁴ *Ta-ch'eng Kuang Pai-lun Shih-lun*, T. 1571: 244c.

¹⁵⁵ *Ta-ch'eng Kuang Pai-lun Shih-lun*, T. 1571: 245b.

¹⁵⁶ *Ta-ch'eng Kuang Pai-lun Shih-lun*, T. 1571: 243b.

existent or empty, as being or as nonbeing, are only provisional language, engendered by the unreal imagining of other-dependent consciousness. When asked how something that is unreal can engender defilement and lead to purification, that is, how consciousness can become defiled by clinging to what are empty words and how it can become purified by following the path, Dharmapāla adopts explicit Yogācāra terms:

Other masters [i.e., Yogācāra] answer this objection by saying that the reality of that which is imagined is nonexistent, while the reality of things that arise co-dependently does exist.¹⁵⁷

The argument does not end here, of course. Bhāvaviveka replies in his *Prajñāpradīpa*, his commentary on chapter 25 of Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikāh*.¹⁵⁸ But for our purposes, the track of the Yogācāra development of doctrine becomes clear: From the denigration of language in the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, to Asaṅga's more positive evaluation in his *Mahāyānasamgraha*, and on to Dharmapāla's rigorous defense of the validity of worldly convention in his *Śataka Commentary*. The movement is toward a greater reclamation of the limited, but valid, employment of language in the service of the Dharma.

This, in turn, reflects a broader issue within Mahāyāna itself. With the universal Mahāyāna insistence on the ineffability of the perfection of wisdom and its focus on the attainment of mental cessation, how is one to engage in the world of language? What is its function? What its validity? This issue is far from a dead letter, hardly an example of archaic dispute. If all experience is bounded and molded by language, then no non-discriminative ineffable experience ever occurs. If no ineffable experience ever occurs, then there is no cessation to the turnings of the mind. If there is no such cessation, then the entire problematic of reclaiming a valid role for language is based on a mistaken view of the experience of awakening.

In Mahāyāna thinking, however, such is not the case, and the various texts, despite their different approaches to language, are in agreement that

¹⁵⁷ *Ta-ch'eng Kuang Pai-lun Shih-lun*, T. 1571: 247b.

¹⁵⁸ See Christian Lindtner, "Bhavya's Controversy with Yogācāra in the Appendix to *Prajñāpradīpa*, Chapter XXV," *Tibetan and Buddhist Studies Commemorating the 200th Anniversary of the Birth of Alexander Csoma de Korös*, ed. L. Ligeti. Budapest, 1984, pp. 77-97.

awakening does occur as an ineffable, non-discriminative experience.¹⁵⁹ It is from this base consensus that they diverge in their particular explanations. The *Samḍhinirmocanasūtra* adopts as its template the doctrine of emptiness. The *Mahāyānasamgraha* recommends the three patterns of consciousness as its interpretive model. The *Śataka Commentary* rereads the three patterns within the Mādhyamika context of the two truths and enters into a direct dialogue and argument with the Mādhyamika tradition. In like fashion, it is for us to relate Mahāyāna philosophy to the various traditions of the west. Yet, in this endeavor, it would be well to keep in mind that throughout the Mahāyāna texts, the central focus remains on an experience of awakening that is beyond all image and mediated in no language whatsoever.

In the foregoing reconstruction of the dispute between Bhāvaviveka and Dharmapāla, I have tried to contextualize Dharmapāla's *Śataka Commentary*, following his line of argumentation against that of Bhāvaviveka. Of course, Bhāvaviveka and Chandrakīrti did not accept his innovations. Nor did the next generations, represented by Jñānagarbha and his commentator, the celebrated Śāntarakṣita.¹⁶⁰ After Śāntarakṣita we find no further references to Dharmapāla in India,¹⁶¹ perhaps because he had constructed an unacceptable synthesis of the two schools of Mahāyāna. But that is another story for another time, and another storyteller.

¹⁵⁹See the argument in Pyysiäinen, *Beyond Language and Reason*, which stresses the ineffability of Mahāyāna teachings.

¹⁶⁰See Eckel, *Jñānagarbha's Commentary on the Distinction Between the Two Truths*, p. 71, where Jñānagarbha's Commentary notes: "The Lord knew what would benefit others, and he distinguished the two truths in various ways to help those of lesser intelligence. Others, including Nāgārjuna, have explained them further. But great Buddhists have misunderstood, to say nothing of the others who follow them." Śāntarakṣita's *Subcommentary* identifies the great Buddhists as "Dharmapāla and others."

¹⁶¹On the chronology of these developments, see Y. Kajiyama, *Studies in Buddhist Philosophy*, pp. 177-87, and Lindtner, "On the Date of Dharmakīrti etc."

Dharmapāla's
Ta-ch'eng Kuang Pai-lun Shih Lun
Chapter 10
English Translation

An Extensive Mahāyāna Commentary on the Śataka

Chapter Ten

Basic Text by Āryadeva

Commentary by Dharmapāla

Translated into Chinese by Tripitaka Master Hsüan Tsang

Section Eight: Instructions and Cautions to Disciples

Taishō 30, No. 1571

PART I: The Mādhyamika Perspective¹

(242c21) Now that the true discourse has been established, heterodox views have been soundly refuted, but there remain some subtle confusion about its underlying meaning. We will once more clarify the true viewpoint by purified reason and doctrine (*yukti-āgama*) in order to banish these remaining doubts. [Āryadeva] presented the next stanza.

1. Some doubt emptiness and [instead] speak of non-emptiness

For even the most insignificant reasons.

Employing the reasonings and doctrines in the previous chapters

We must again dispel [such doubts]. (376)

(242c26) Commentary: Although in their original nature all things are entirely empty, yet, since novices are not able to understand, they become attached to illusory [concepts about] being and fear to fathom the depths of emptiness.² Or

¹The headings do not occur in the Chinese text, but have been added for the sake of clarification. Indeed, the back and forth of the argument is not indicated in the Chinese text, so the separation and contrasts, entitled *Reply* and *Objection* are also added. They constitute in large part the reconstruction of the argument as understood by this translator.

²See Tillemans, *Materials for the Study of Āryadeva, Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti*, 1: 92, and 99-101 for Dharmapāla's treatment in chapter four (217a2-217b1) of emptiness and the fear of cessation (218b18-219a22).

for some other reason they are yet unable definitively to understand. We will then once more explain our previous assertions [that all things are empty] through true reasoning and doctrine so that they might eradicate their doubts and abandon their erroneous (*viparīta*) opinions.

Objection : (242c29) In their original nature all things are empty [of inherent existence], but how should one who has not yet realized this emptiness regard the nature [of things]?

Reply : (242c29) That all things are selfless. What does that mean? It means the absence of inherent existence.

Objection : (243a1) But if you must clearly and correctly explain this, how can you speak provisionally in an ever-changing discourse?

Reply : (243a2) Inasmuch as the correct explanation has no core essence, it has no [essential] argument, yet we can speak provisionally. It is because all things have no self or essence that can be apprehended that we term them empty. As the scriptures teach: Emptiness means that all things are selfless, essence-free, unattached, and unapprehended. In the truth of ultimate meaning (*paramārtha-satya*) there is not the least thing that has any self or existence that might be termed empty.

Objection : (243a5) In that case, the name of emptiness cannot even be spoken!

Reply : (243a5) In fact, it cannot be spoken! But we do provisionally establish names. Just as we provisionally establish a name for empty space, although it has no essence and cannot be described.

Objection : (243a7) If emptiness is apart from language, you must be speaking about being.

Reply : (243a7) [Being] too cannot be spoken about because it [too] really has no core essence. This is like saying that the real essence of all things is

entirely nonexistent, for in the truth of no-essence there is no duality [between being and nonbeing] and no speaking.

Objection : (2443a9) If this is so, then since the speaker's words and what he is speaking about are all empty, there is a complete absence of any speech. But precisely because what he is speaking about does exist, all things cannot be empty.

Reply : (243a10) In order to treat this doubt [Āryadeva] presents the next stanza:

2a. *Objection* : If the speaker and what he is speaking
about do exist,
Then there is no [valid] argument for emptiness. (377a)

(243a13) Commentary: "The speaker" refers to a person who speaks. His words and the content of those words are included in the phrase "what he is speaking about." Together these three [phenomena] include all conditioned and unconditioned things, the [subjective] sense organs of the eye, etc., and the objects of form, etc. [The objection urges that] if these things really do exist, then how could things be empty? In order to dispel this doubt [Āryadeva] presents a stanza:

2b. *Reply* : All things come about through
conventional causes.
Therefore these three do not exist. (377b)

(24317) Commentary: These three phenomena of the speaker, his words, and their content are empty of essential existence because they are established provisionally in synergy with a cluster of causes.

(243a18) Here another interpretation [i.e., Yogācāra], that the language that names all things comes entirely from one's own mind and is established by convention, is also admissible. In this manner the speaker, his words, and their

content are all nonexistent in ultimate meaning, and only exist by worldly convention.³ How can you say that these three phenomena are not empty!

Objection : (243a20) How are you so sure that these three phenomena are nonexistent?

Reply : (243a21) Because, like the appearance of a mirage, they are established in dependence on others. Anything that does not come about in dependence on others is [entirely nonexistent], like horns on a hare. Therefore, these three phenomena are entirely empty of essence and we speak of their being [only] provisionally to benefit the world. Moreover, why do you raise doubts about true emptiness?

Objection : (243a23) I had hoped to establish the old viewpoint of being.

Reply : (243a23) You must abandon this ideal! Why? Because it is not by refuting the theses of others that you demonstrate your own view. For example, when you refute the statement of others that things are eternal because they are unobstructed (*apratihata*), you do not thereby demonstrate their transience. If this is how you reason, you cannot demonstrate anything. Why is this so? [Āryadeva] presents the next stanza:

3. If merely by explaining errors about emptiness
The meaning of non-emptiness is demonstrated,
Then, since the errors of non-emptiness have been
clarified,
The meaning of emptiness must have already been
established.⁴

³This is the first reference in Chapter 10 to Yogācāra. Note that it is made in order to interpret a rather standard Mādhyamika claim.

⁴Lang, *Aryadeva's Catuḥśataka*, 143, explains: "If, as the opponent (or the student assuming his role, as the chapter title suggests) claims, the refutation of the *parapakṣa* entails the affirmation of the *svapakṣa*, the Mādhyamakas' refutation of *asūnya* would establish *sūnya*. Nevertheless, *sūnyatā* is not a real *pakṣa* nor are any of the theses—identity, difference, or indeterminability—of the Mādhyamakas' opponents. Cf. **Sataka*, 180a-181a (*Sataśāstra*, pp. 82-83; MK, XXIV, 13; VV, 18-19, 68." The issue comes up repeatedly in the following discussions, with the opponent insisting that any refutation of the other thesis (*parapakṣa*) must imply the assertion of one's own thesis (*svapakṣa*), for the opponent remains within an epistemological framework in which words refer to the existent being of things. i.e., he is some kind of a naive realist.

(243a29) Commentary: If you think that you prove non-emptiness simply by refuting emptiness, then, since non-emptiness has already been refuted, the meaning of emptiness has already been demonstrated. In the previous chapters we have explained that all attempts to establish non-emptiness are logically defective. If you want to demonstrate this thesis of non-emptiness, you must first find a way to eliminate these logical defects. Simply by speaking about fallacies of emptiness without removing these errors, you can never prove your notion of non-emptiness. It is not true that an elucidation of the logical defects and failures of others in and by itself enables one to demonstrate the validity of one's own excellence and one's own faultlessness. To prove a view one must both demonstrate one's own view and refute those of others. This is why [Āryadeva] presents the next stanza:

4. All who want to repudiate the theses of others
 Must prove their own view.
 What pleasure do you get in expounding on
 others' errors,
 While not proving your own thesis?⁵ (379)

(243b8) Commentary: In order to prove one's own view one must employ both demonstration and refutation, because [only] by demonstration and refutation can one understand the basis [of an argument]. If you only disclose the errors of others, without making clear one's own thesis, then you can never logically prove your own view. Why do you people delight in merely refuting emptiness,

⁵In Dharmapāla's *Śataka Commentary*, this stanza is taken as the thought of Āryadeva. In Tucci version of the *Śatasāstra*, the stanza is taken as an objection against Āryadeva:

(Objection): Because you negate others' teachings, you are (just) negative. You get a kick out of demolishing the teachings of others and try your utmost to point out their errors. You have nothing to maintain and are thus simply negative.

(Āryadeva's response): You are the negative ones. Those who teach emptiness do have nothing to maintain. But you, because you cling to your own teaching and (from that standpoint) demolish what others cling to, you are negative (T.30, p. 181a; Tucci, *Pre-Dinnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources*, p. 85).

The original passage in Āryadeva seems to take the stanza as an objection against Āryadeva, for it was a common critique that Mādhyamika took an inordinate amount of pleasure in demolishing the assertions of others, without ever asserting anything at all. See Lang ed., p. 145. I suspect the commentaries have misconstrued the passage. Indeed, the correct reading of these scholastic arguments often turns upon just how one identifies who is saying what and when, for the texts, Sanskrit, Tibetan, or Chinese, do not identify which sections represent which opinions.

with no thought or desire to prove your own idea of being? There must be a balance between the two tasks of demonstration and refutation. Only then can you prove your own view of being. You want to establish being, but in the end you are unable to do so. Therefore, this reasoning that all things are empty is established as certain.

Objection : (243b12) But surely this error is pervasive in your discourse about emptiness? You are merely disclosing other errors without elucidating your own thesis.

Reply : (243b13) Such an accusation is unreasonable since our thesis of emptiness and no-self has been extensively elucidated in the previous chapters. Since emptiness and no self have refuted any demonstration of being or selfhood already, we have refuted your thesis and our thesis is already established.

Objection : (243b15) If this is the case, then discourse on emptiness is descriptive, for the terms "emptiness" and "no-self" have no real content.

Reply : (243b16) So it is, so it is! Assuredly, that is just what we have been saying. The terms emptiness and no-self are provisional, not real. We provisionally establish our thesis in order to refute the false opinions of others. Once these opinions are eradicated, our thesis is also to be rejected. [Āryadeva] presents the next stanza to show this:

5. In order to refute opinions about unity and so forth
We provisionally take refutations as our thesis.
Once these three opinions of others are eradicated,
Then our thesis is also untenable. (380)

(243b21) Commentary: The three opinions refer to unity, differentiation, and neither [unity nor differentiation]. We do not treat them separately because they are all variations of unity and differentiation. When truly understood and examined, these three theses of unity, etc., all revert to no-essence and there is not the least thing that can exist. These essences are originally empty, not because of our present refutation. This is why a scripture teaches: "Kāśyapa,

you should recognize that the original emptiness of what you see is not due to this present refutation. All those who meditate on emptiness realize this original emptiness and therefore that all words of refutation are spoken provisionally.⁶ The same holds true for affirmation, which is also temporary and conditional, not real.

Objection : (243b25) What then is the basis for your thesis that all things are entirely empty?

Reply : (243b26) We propose our thesis by basing ourselves on your opinions. Once your opinions are no longer [urged], then our thesis too need not be held. It is because of your assertion of being that our thesis negates being. In order to maintain our thesis, we must accept [as the starting point] the being that others affirm, because we establish our thesis in order to refute your opinion. Once your opinion is no longer present, our thesis has finished with its proposal.⁷

Objection : (243b29) Even if this is the case, you still cannot demonstrate emptiness as a thesis, because such things as pots, which are directly perceived in the world, do exist. Even though inferences (*anumāna*) about emptiness and no-self are frequently [asserted], nevertheless they too must be subject to the compelling criterion of direct perception (*pratyakṣapramāṇa*) [which shows that things do indeed exist].

Reply : (243c2) But this is not true. Such things as pots are not known through direct perception. Why? [Āryadeva] presents his next stanza to this point:

6. *Objection* : If you grant that pots are directly perceived,

⁶A free version of *Kāśyapaṭīkā* 63. Thanks to Christian Lindtner for this and many of the identifications of scriptural citations made in the following discourse.

⁷Here the need to prove one's own thesis, although necessary, remains conventional and valid only in light of the other's opinion, i.e., one must argue against the other's thesis correctly and reasonably. On the affirmation of the conventional validity of inference, Nagao, *The Foundational Standpoint of Mādhyamika Philosophy*, pp. 121 ff, especially pp. 128-132. It seems to echo the Prāsaṅgika position, and perhaps accounts for the absence of any critique of Dharmapāla in CandraKīrti's commentary.

Arguments for emptiness are inefficacious.

Reply : But the arguments about direct perception of
some other schools

Are not granted in our school. (381)

(243c6) Commentary: If we were to grant that pots are known through direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), then indeed our inferential argument (*anumāna*) for emptiness would be inefficacious. But since we hold that pots are not known through direct perception, why is our inferential argument for emptiness inefficacious? Concrete, external objects, such as pots, are not directly perceived; we have treated these [claims] in the previous chapters, "The Refutation of the Sense Organs" and so forth.⁸ It is not possible to claim that pots are directly perceived, as other schools do claim, and in tandem to develop arguments to demonstrate being. One could draw such a demonstration [of being from direct perception] only if what is seen were [all] the same, but since what is seen is indeed differentiated, who would be willing to consent to this?⁹ Therefore, the argument for emptiness does not contradict the criterion of direct perception and we are able to demonstrate that the essences of all things are totally empty.

Objection : (243c11) All concrete, external objects such as pots are directly perceived in a worldly fashion. If through inference all are demonstrated to be empty, then there is nothing in the world that is nonexistent. But if emptiness has nothing with which to contrast, then it cannot be demonstrated.¹⁰

⁸This is chapter four of the text, translated by Tillemans, *Materials for the Study of Āryadeva, Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti*. See I: 135 where Dharmapāla refutes Sāṃkhya views on perception.

⁹Here Dharmapāla follows Dignāga, for whom direct perception is bereft of any conceptual content at all. See *Pramāṇasamuccaya* : "Perception (*pratyakṣa*) is free from conceptual construction (*kalpanā*). Hattori, *Dignāga, On Perception*, p. 23. The point is that direct perception, being bereft of any conceptual content, experiences only a bare sensory givenness, and thus has no differentiations. But one can talk about seeing things only through conceptual differentiations, and not through a non-differentiated unity of experience.

¹⁰Tillemans, *Materials*, I: 42-43, explains that the Svātantrika "did hold that conventionally there must be something which appears similarly (*mthun snañ ba*) to both parties in a discussion, and without which logical discussion and communication would be impossible. . . . At any rate, the essential point for us, as we find it in the Indian Svātantrika texts, is that what appears in non-conceptual direct perception is some type of an entity, a phenomena about which we are undecieved so long as we do not give it anything more than a conventional status: our mistake is to grasp it

Reply : In order to raise this objection, [Āryadeva] presents the next stanza:

7a. *Objection* : Even if there is no argument for non-emptiness

By what argument is emptiness established? (382a)

(243c16) Commentary: The objection is that one presents an argument for emptiness in contrast to non-emptiness. If non-emptiness is nonexistent, emptiness also does not exist. How then can you maintain that all things are totally empty? In order to allay this quandary, [Āryadeva] continues:

7b. *Reply* : If you do not establish emptiness, then

Non-emptiness cannot be established either. (382b)

(243c20) Commentary: One who would establish non-emptiness contrasts it with and refers it back to emptiness. Without relying on emptiness, how can non-emptiness be established? How can you maintain that all things are not empty? Without relying on emptiness, you attempt to demonstrate being, but since we do not cling to an opinion about being, how then can you dispense with the emptiness we do establish? If the non-emptiness of which you speak does also contrast with being, and that implies that both being and nonbeing are certainly empty, then we are in agreement, for our notion of emptiness contrasts with conventional being and we establish true emptiness by refuting mistaken notions of being.¹¹

(243c24) However, the emptiness we demonstrate serves solely to negate false opinions. One does not necessarily have to contrast it with [real

as having a real nature." Similarly, Lopez, *A Study of Svātantrika*, 16: "That which distinguishes the Svātantrikas from the other branch of Mādhyamika, the Prāsāngika, is their assertion that phenomena exist in and of themselves conventionally. For the Svātantrika, if things did not exist by way of their own character (*svalakṣaṇa*, *rang mtshan*) conventionally, they would not exist at all: The Svātantrikas insist on the objective autonomy of phenomena on the conventional level although they refute that phenomena exist by way of their own character ultimately." It would appear that Dharmapāla places such Svātantrika ideas in the mouth of an objector to the teaching of Āryadeva.

¹¹The argument in the second half of this chapter turns on the status of *paratantra*, whether it exists or not. Dharmapāla's argument here, looks forward toward that discussion.

being to establish [a teaching] about emptiness. [Our advocacy of emptiness] is parallel to the teaching on impermanence which is presented in order to refute [the idea of] eternalism: although the eternal does not exist, yet we do establish [a teaching about] impermanence. Moreover, you should harbor no doubts in this regard. Contrasts are found in being, not in emptiness. Even though the phenomenon of being is not nonexistent, but refers back to and contrasts with being, yet since the [ultimate] truth of emptiness is nonexistent, to what would it refer back? With what would it contrast? If this is not the case, then, inasmuch as emptiness, because it is a thesis, is parallel to the thesis that establishes the impermanence of form and so forth, [if one holds that], if this thesis of the impermanence of these [things] surely exists, then the thesis of emptiness [must also exist], and cannot negate being, this is untrue, because its argument is inconclusive. [Rather], the nonbeing [of things] directly perceived in the world is quite consonant with [our] thesis [for emptiness]. Thus [Āryadeva] presents the next stanza:

8. *Objection* : If one grants¹² that there is a thesis of the
nonbeing [of things],
Then the thesis of being can be established.

Reply : But if there is no thesis of nonbeing,
Then the thesis of being cannot be demonstrated.

(383)

(244a5) Commentary: If there is a thesis of nonbeing, it stands in contrast to the thesis of being. But if there is no thesis of nonbeing, with what would the thesis of being contrast? If you claim that the thesis of being is established in contrast with nonbeing, this contradicts your own previous requisite that emptiness and being stand in contrast. If the nonexistence of all things is not entirely empty, then such a selfless, true emptiness would issue in a single, identical experience.

Objection : (244a7) Why then are things directly perceived not all identical?

¹²Tucci translates: "Se si imagine," evidently taking *hsü* 許 | to be *chi* 計 |.

Reply : (244a8) They are not [identical] because they do exist conventionally, while in ultimate meaning they are nonexistent. [Our] reasoning is not contradictory. [Āryadeva] presents the next stanza to clarify this point:

9. *Objection* : If all things are entirely empty,
How can fire be said to be hot?

Reply : As above¹³ we have refuted both fire and its
heat,

Both are conventional, not real. (384)

(244212) Commentary: If originally all things are empty of essence, how can such things as fire differ in their worldly being? In their worldly and conventional occurrences all things are not identical, but in the truth of ultimate meaning they are empty and there are no differentiations between fire and other things. Therefore your objection is not reasonable. Phenomena like fire have already been investigated above in the refutation of sense objects.¹⁴ They are conventional, not real. Why does [the objector] again raise the [same] objection here?

Objection : (244a15) If things had no being at all, what is it that emptiness refutes? Emptiness is a refutation of being and therefore things must exist.

¹³See Chapter 14, stanzas 16-17, Lang, pp. 131-132.

¹⁴In chapter 5 Dharmapāla has already refuted the Vaiśeṣika theory of the substantial existence of what is directly perceived. Tillemans, *Materials*, 146, translates: "When vases and the like are heated there arise qualitative characters such as red colours and so forth, and one perceives them as being other than before. Except for those [qualities], in the category of substances there are no vase-entities which become different from [what they were in] the non-heated state. If things belonging to the category of substances, such as vases and so forth, were separately existing entities, they would have to have different characters which would arise [during heating], just like the category of qualities. In states such as that of contact between a heating [object] and something being heated, no different characters of [things belonging to] the category of substances arise, and thus, just like space, etc., they would not be really existent. Also [these supposed substances] are not objects apprehended by the physical senses, but are cognized by conceptualizing mental consciousness. They are accepted as conventional truths, are designations, but they are not real."

Reply: (244a16) If this is the case, then each of the mutually exclusive four alternatives must be true, [since that which is negated is also affirmed]. Thus runs counter your own interpretation.¹⁵ To treat this [objection] [Āryadeva] presents the next stanza:

10. If one claims that things really exist and then
Refutes that [claim] by describing them as
empty,
Then the four alternatives are each true!
What error can one see to reject [any alternative].
(385)

(244a21) Commentary: [The objector urges that] one establishes a refutation by refuting something. There could be no refutation if there is nothing to be refuted. It is like saying that there is no rain, because it is winter: the rainy season, excluded by the winter, must then exist. Likewise, [it is argued], since being is excluded by emptiness, being is certainly not nonexistent. But this is not so because its argument is inconclusive. The four alternatives that everything is one, [that everything is not one, that everything is both one and not one, and that everything is neither one nor not one], although mutually exclusive, would then all be really true, because that which they refute would then be error-free and all could be [validly] affirmed as theses. [If what is refuted is by implication affirmed to be true,] what logical defect do you see that [leads you] to reject three [alternatives] and hold to one? Therefore, you cannot claim that that which is refuted really exists.

(244a26) If all that is to be refuted did really exist, then words of themselves would be free from logical error. Then your errors would have to be really truths and, if you negate emptiness, that would mean that emptiness would have to be really true.

¹⁵In Mādhyamaka all four are negated. For the various interpretations of this claim, see Tillemans, *Materials*, Appendix II: Remarks on the Catuskoṭi, I: 72-76. Ruegg and Matilal think that the force of this negation of all possible claims is a refusal to make assertions on this or that, while Tillemans comments that it is a refusal to make assertions that presuppose the existence of substantially real beings.

Objection : (246a27) If the existential character¹⁶ of all things is totally nonexistent, then the entire world would be annihilated.

Reply : (244a28) Indeed one must not be attached to ideas about being, but even more one should not be attached to ideas about nonbeing, because attachment to either being or to nonbeing is erroneous. To clarify this [Āryadeva] presents the next stanza:

11. *Objection* : If all things are entirely non-existent,
Birth and death would also not exist.

Reply : When have the Buddhas affirmed the idea that
Things definitively do not exist? (386)

(244b4) Commentary: If things were entirely nonexistent, then the continuous cycle that develops as the causes and results of transmigration would certainly not exist. But as long as one does not cling to nonbeing in fixation, what difficulty is there? We propose that conventional causes and results are not nonexistent. The wisdom insight of all Blessed Buddhas is unobstructed; and they never affirmed either fixed being or fixed nonbeing. In a scripture, the Buddha addressed Kāśyapa: "The existential character of all things is neither existent nor nonexistent. Being is one extreme, nonbeing is another: the one is eternalism and the other annihilationism. The absence of form, insight, abode, and image that lie between these two extremes can neither be asserted nor located."¹⁷ The intent [of the [Buddha's statement and of Āryadeva's stanza] is that worldly convention does exist, because of which we establish the cycle of transmigration. But the existential character of things is neither existent nor

¹⁶See Tillemans, *Materials*, endnote 47 on p. 211-212, on "existential character" as a rendering of *xìng xiāng* 性相.

¹⁷A free version of *Kāśyapaparivarta* 60, which is quoted in *Prasannapadā*, 270. Sprung, *Lucid Exposition*, p. 159 translates: "To quote: 'To say, Kāśyapa, 'Something is,' is one extreme; to say, 'Something is not,' is one extreme. What avoids these two extremes is said to be without a specific nature, beyond proof, not related, invisible, without an abode, not to be known conceptually. It is, Kāśyapa, the middle way (*madhyamā pratipad*); it is the right way of regarding the true nature of things.'" Sprung identifies the source as the *Ratnakūṭa Sūtra*, without providing the reference.

nonexistent because they are empty in ultimate meaning, being totally disjunctive from the ways of thinking and speaking.¹⁸

Objection : (244b11) If the reality of all things is really apart from being and does not exist, then why do you even talk about conventional being?

Reply : (244b12) Even though reality is non-dual [in regard to being and nonbeing], why would we denigrate conventional being?

Objection : (344b13) If there were a separately existing convention apart from reality, even though there be no split [between worldly convention and reality], yet [conventional] objects would still be special.

Reply : (344b14) Convention accords with [ordinary] sentient beings, while discussions on reality [proceed by] true reasonings. Therefore, while reality is non-dual [in regard to being and nonbeing], conventional [discourse] has its many descriptions.¹⁹

¹⁸See Tillemans, *Materials*, 93: "(217a21) In this vein, the sūtra states the following: 'The true nature . . . of all dharmas is indescribable . . . , without resistance . . . and completely one in character; it is said to be without characters.' The existential character (*xìng xiāng* - 性相, *bhāvalakṣaṇa*) of all dharmas is not an object of words, and words do not express it. Thus it is said to be 'indescribable.' Since it is not an object of minds and mental factors . . . and since we do not perceive that it is either resisted by or is a resistor of objects which [themselves] have resistance . . . , it is said to be 'without resistance.' [Also,] [the true nature of dharmas] does not, in addition, have a different character over and above the characters of the two types of objects (viz. those of consciousness and those of words). Thus one says that [the true nature of dharmas] is 'without characters'. Because voidness and characters are non-dual, it is said to be one in character. When [people] are not afflicted by the poisoned arrows of erroneous grasping . . . , desire and other such [passions], then voidness, which is to be realized by the correct view, can be clearly perceived; thus we say that it is 'the [true] character.'

¹⁹Same notion as in Dharmakīrti and Jñānagarbha about suchness (*tattva*). Jñānagarbha writes: "Therefore everything is true [in a relative sense], and nothing is true in an ultimate sense." See Eckel, *Jñānagarbha's Commentary on the Distinction Between the Two Truths*, p. 85. 15cd. Eckel, p. 134.89, notes that Bhāvaviveka concurs: "[The Lord] says that everything is true, since the sense media (*āyatana*), such as the eye and so forth, and objects, such as form (*rūpa*) and so forth, do not contradict conventional truth. He also says that everything is untrue, since ultimately [everything] is like magic, in that it has no own-being and is not as it seems." See Eckel, "A Question of Nihilism," p. 230, and Nagao's distinction between *yukti* as ultimately meaningful and deconstructive and *pramāṇa* as conventionally constructive and valid. *Foundational Standpoint of Mādhyamika Philosophy*, chapter 10.

(244b15) Moreover, all [our] theses hold to nonduality [in regard to being and nonbeing], and yet the varieties of these many arguments about being are not identical. Therefore you should not hastily engender doubts. To clarify this [Āryadeva] presents the next stanza:

12. *Objection* : If reality neither exists nor does not exist,
Why do you talk about conventional being?

Reply : If your basic thesis agrees with this,
Why do you bring up new difficulties? (387)

(244b19) Commentary: [The objector, a Saṃkhya-Vaiśeṣika, urges that], if the reality of things such as form and so forth neither exists nor does not exist, then why do we still talk about conventional being. [We reply that] in the cycle of transmigration wherein causes and results are uninterrupted, the conventional follows upon the causal relationships among sentient beings and does exist provisionally, while the true reasonings in discussions on reality [state] that things neither exist nor do not exist. You own (i.e., Saṃkhya-Vaiśeṣika) basic thesis clearly holds to nonduality and yet you talk about the being of things. Why do you so blithely adduce objections? Why do [we say] this? [Because], as [in your thesis] all existent objects do not exist, and yet that precisely means that they do exist, and still you refuse to hold that the core reality of all things is entirely identical and you deny that they do not exist,²⁰ or that the core reality of all things is entirely nonexistent. Although the absence of either being or nonbeing pervades all things, yet you establish the differentiations of your various categories of existents.²¹ Our teaching is similar. Why be so bothered with adducing difficulties? The other objections are also covered by this reasoning. Why? [Āryadeva] presents the next stanza:

13. *Objection* : If all things were simply nonexistent,
Then differentiating would not exist.

Reply : It is when one clings to things as existent
That differentiation is rendered invalid. (388)

²⁰Endo in the Issaikyō translation has omitted the preceding phrase.

²¹See Tillemans, *Materials*, p. 210, endnote 44 on *padārtha*.

(244b29) Commentary: [An Abhidharma person urges that] if the real natures of all things were entirely nonexistent, then all the distinctions about causal relationships in the existent world—that is to say, those engendered by the senses and the consciousnesses—would be nonexistent, since that nonbeing [of things] would be undifferentiated. [We reply that] our commentary here is the same as above, i.e., you should not cling to nonbeing, for clinging to either being or to nonbeing is unreasonable.

(244c2) The same mistake also occurs when one clings to being. Why? If all things whatsoever have an identical essence, then distinctions about causal relationships in the existent world—those engendered by the senses and the consciousness—would be nonexistent, because being would be undifferentiated. [Since] the secondary characteristics (*anulakṣaṇa*) that you attribute to being are not identical, you do establish differentiations among things in the world.²² We are in accord with this, for we establish the differentiations within conventional being, although reality is empty. Therefore, your objections are rash and to be rejected.

(244c7) Persons of little intelligence repeatedly engender doubts and difficulties, [saying that] if things do not exist, there cannot exist any argument capable of refuting being. But their objection is unreasonable because worldly convention does exist.

Objection: (244c8) But since your opinion is negative in that there is no argument capable of establishing being, why then do you negate being?

Reply: To clarify this issue, [Āryadeva] presents the next stanza:

14. *Objection*: If [a Mādhyamika] claims that things are nonexistent,
Then there is no argument whereby he might refute being.

²²The *Abhidharmakośabhaṣyam* (Pruden translation, pp. 239-240) speaks of these as "arising, old age, duration, and impermanence."

Reply : As the argument for the refutation of being
have already been made clear,
How then can your thesis [that being exists] not be
invalidated? (389)

(244c12) Commentary: If one claims that, since the existential character of all things is entirely nonexistent, then there is no argument able to refute being, this is an extremely shallow understanding, because it is unable to cognize the concrete appearances of objects directly present. The arguments for refuting being, themselves included within the conventional, have already been extensively explained above. Why do you say that we negate being? You are unable to present an argument for the negation of conventional being, and in the truth of ultimate meaning there is no proposing or refuting [argument].

(244c16) If you do not accept an argument that refutes being, then why do you not establish an argument to demonstrate your thesis of being? For we have explained in detail our arguments against being, but we have not seen the arguments for the being you propose! How then can you still cling to the idea that all things are not empty! The language of emptiness is refutative: it establishes in order to refute others. The language of being is demonstrative: it demonstrates by establishing its own [thesis].²³ Therefore we do not take the trouble to establish any specific notion of emptiness, but you do have to establish specific arguments for your idea of being. It is specifically this argument that is lacking! How is it that you know about being?

Objection : (244c21) Refutative arguments are easy, but demonstrative arguments are difficult to prove. Thus, it is no marvel that you [Mādhyamikas] refute arguments for being.

Reply : (244c22) If this is the case, then how is it that your thesis fails to refute emptiness? [Āryadeva] presents the next stanza in order to refute this claim.

²³This passage perhaps relates to Bhāvaviveka's notion of an independent reasoning for emptiness: 空言是破破他便立，有言是立自立方成。| Even the deconstructive language of emptiness entails the affirmation of a thesis, i.e., of the standpoint of emptiness.

15. When it is said that a refutation [of emptiness] is
facile,

This is the deceptive speech of worldly convention.
By no argument can you refute
The meaning of emptiness. (390)

(244c26) Commentary: The claim that it is facile to refute [the teaching of emptiness] is deceptive conventional speech (*mithyāsamvṛti*) because it has never happened that an argument for being has refuted true emptiness. Adherents of Hinayāna and Outsiders hold true emptiness in disdain, but even they have no argument to refute the meaning of true emptiness. How can they say that it is facile to develop such a refutation? The essential emptiness of all things is easily demonstrated but refuted with difficulty. The essential being of things is difficult to demonstrate but easily overthrown. The true and the false shine forth. Why do you obstinately cling to your opinions?

(244c29) In your pretense, unable to escape from being entrapped in a web of argumentation about the demonstration and refutation of being, you say: Hearing testimony (*śruti*) is a sure and valid criterion of knowledge and does make assertions about the being and nonbeing of things. This is to say, since one does hear testimony about being, things must assuredly exist. If things had no being, then there would be no hearing about being.²⁴ In order to refute these ideas, [Āryadeva] presents the next stanza:

16. *Objection* : Since the term "being" refers to the being
of things,

²⁴Confer Tillemans' translation of chapter 5, *Materials*, 162-163: "(227c3) Now, sounds heard by the ear make it so that names . . . and phrases . . . refer to (*quán biāo* 詮表) states of affairs . . . and objects such as particular forms. Consequently, here again we should analyze [things] so that we understand that reference conventionally exists but ultimately does not exist. Do the sounds we hear refer to entities or not? To show that the first [hypothesis] is absurd [Āryadeva] states in the next verse: *If what is heard did refer, then why wouldn't it be a non-sound?* (k.318ab) Commentary: *Suǒ wén* 所聞 ('what is heard') and *yīn* 音, ('sound') are synonyms of *shēng* 聲 ('— *śabdha*; 'sound'); they both describe entities. *Biāo* 表 ('state'; 'describe'; 'show') is the same as *quán* 詮; here it is shown that a sound does not refer [to anything]. Suppose that it did refer, then it would lose its nature of being a sound, for the particular character . . . , sound, could not possibly refer, as it is cognized by a non-conceptual consciousness, just as other particular characters [are also cognized by non-conceptual consciousnesses]." See also pp. 23-35 on "The Problem of Scriptural Authority," i.e., testimony.

This signifies that things cannot really be
nonexistent!

Reply : Since the term "nothing" asserts the nonbeing
of things, [with equal force]
Things must not really exist. (391)

(245a6) Commentary: In all the names these people establish they take the very enunciation (*śabda*) of the name to correspond to its essence. Thus, [for them] the names established are not just verbal sounds [but do correspond to reality].²⁵ Therefore, we can simply adduce names to refute their opinion. If the verbal sounding of [the name] "being" referred to being, showing that things as described in your thesis cannot really be nonexistent, then the verbal sounding of [the name] "nonbeing" would assert nonbeing, and you must then accept that the things so described really do not exist. And since the verbal sounding of [the name] "nonbeing" is a valid criterion, you contradict your own thesis. Therefore, what you claim is not a validation of being. People of meager intelligence desire to be free from their confusion, but they labor in vain and in the end are unable to escape [that confusion].

Objection : (245a10) Having established the names of real beings in correspondence with really existent things, we engender an understanding of real beings by arguing from the names of real beings. If things did not exist, then the name "being" could not exist either. If the name "being" did not exist, then we could have no understanding of being. But because we do have an understanding of being, things are not nonexistent.

Reply : (245a13) This is not the case, because we establish names provisionally [and not because they correspond with being].²⁶ In order to clarify this notion, [Āryadeva] presents the next stanza:

²⁵Tillemans, *Materials*, 140, translates Dharmapāla as follows: "(223b6) The minute parts of words (i.e., *śabda*) do not form a sequence of previous and subsequent states; their nature is not composite, they do not really refer (*quán biāo* 詮表, - *pratyāyaka*) nor are they really audible. . . ."

²⁶After refuting the idea that sounds refer to entities, Dharmapāla proceeds to refute the idea that they do not refer to anything. Tillemans, *Materials*, 163: "(227c15) The later [alternative

17. *Objection* : Because of a name it is understood that things do exist,
And thus it is said that things are not nonexistent.

Reply : Arguing from a name we know that things do not exist.

Therefore one should recognize that things are not existent.²⁷ (392)

(245a17) Commentary: If when one hears the name "being," one engenders the notion of being and thus states that all things do exist and are not nonexistent, then when one hears the term "nothing," one will engender the notion of nonbeing and should accept that all things do not exist and are nonexistent. If this [second conclusion] is not true, how can that [the first conclusion] be true? If we engender understanding in correspondence to names, then this implies that arguments that demonstrate emptiness are equivalent to arguments for being [since both rely upon names]. But this is clearly unreasonable. If the core reality of things did exist, why need one depend upon the name "being"? Indeed, it is precisely because we [first] rely upon the name "being" to engender an understanding of being that the reality of all known things is nonexistent. However, we do provisionally establish names in our common communication in this world. The name "being" most definitely has no real referent for it is established by conceptualization, just as the name of a man's cow. An ability of

mentioned above, viz. that sounds do not refer,] is also absurd. Thus Āryadeva says in the following verse: *If sound did not refer, then why would it produce knowledge?* (k.318cd) Commentary: If the sounds which are heard did not refer, then understanding could not arise on account of these names and phrases. It is because only names and phrases refer to states of affairs that in this context we do not mention the collection of letters. Now if sentences (*yū* 語 - *vākya*) and sounds [i.e., words] did not refer, then, just as [any] other noises, we would not listen to sounds to understand states of affairs, but since hearing does lead to understanding states, [sounds] must refer." The present commentary clarifies these passages by drawing the distinction between what is provisionally spoken and what is beyond any speech, i.e., between conventional and ultimate truth.

²⁷ Nāgārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanī* begins with the same objection. Article 1 states: "If the essential nature (*svabhāva*) of all things (*bhāva*) does not exist at all, then words (*vākya*) [themselves] have no essential nature. Then you are unable to clarify (*nivartayitum*) the essential nature [through words which have no essential nature]." Article 2 continues: "But then, if a word (*vākya*) is possessed of an essential nature (*svabhāvika*), the preceding proposition (*pratijñā*) [i.e., that the essential nature of all things is their non-substantiality] is refuted, and you fall into error. . ." (See Yamaguchi, *Vigrahavyāvartanī: Pour écarter les vaines discussions*, pp. 5-7 on verse 1, and Lindtner, *Nagarjuniana*, pp. 72-86.)

names both to refute and to establish being is parallel to a person who takes the light to be the darkness. If being can be articulated, this is provisional and not real. Why? [Āryadeva] presents the next stanza:

18. Everything that can be articulated in the world is
Provisional and not real.
That which is apart from worldly and
conventional names and words
Is real and not provisional. (393)

(245a28) Commentary: Worldly discourse flows from one's own mind and is constituted by provisional thinking formed by custom. If things can be articulated, they are provisional and not real. That which is not provisional but real is definitely ineffable. All that can be articulated is conventional and not real, as we have demonstrated at length in the preceding chapters.²⁸ Therefore, the being expressed in opinions is provisional and not real, like cottages or carts, because it can be articulated.

Objection: (245b2) Above you have refuted the four alternative opinions of unity, etc., and they cannot again establish any other really existent things. However, this way of arguing must fall into the extreme view of nihilism.

Reply: (245b4) To allay this doubt, [Āryadeva] presents the next stanza:

19. *Objection*: To affirm that all things are nonexistent
in a denigrating manner
Risks falling into the viewpoint of nihilism.

Reply: But we are only removing false opinions.
How can you say that we fall into nihilism? (394)

(245b7) Commentary: By denigrating existent things one might fall into the extreme view of nihilism. But since we merely refute false dispositions, how could we fall into this view of nihilism? We establish nonbeing in order to

²⁸See Tillemans, *Materials*, pp. 140 ff.

refute opinions about being. When opinions about being are eradicated, then nonbeing too shall be refuted.²⁹ Furthermore, we have frequently treated conventional being above. Therefore, you must not claim that we fall into a nihilistic view.

Objection : (245b9) Since you allow only conventional being, then reality must be nonexistent. But if you do not grant the nonbeing of reality, then you have to grant the being of reality.

Reply : (245b10) But this is unreasonable. Therefore, [Āryadeva] presents the next stanza:

20. *Objection* : Since being does not really exist,
Nonbeing also could not really exist.

Reply : Since both being and nonbeing do not really
exist,
What being is present in real being? (395)

(245b14) Commentary: If being really existed, then nonbeing could really exist. But since real being is itself nonexistent, how could nonbeing really exist? Because nonbeing really is nonexistent, real being is also nonexistent. As we have frequently explained above, reality is neither being nor nonbeing. How can you still cling to views that the real is either being or nonbeing?

Objection : (245b16) If reality is entirely absent and nonexistent, with what intent do you so incessantly state that the existential character of all things exist conventionally but not really?

²⁹The *Prasannapadā* similarly reads: yadi kācana pratijñā syān me tata eva me bhaved doṣaḥ, nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmān naivāsti me doṣaḥ: If I had any proposition, then I could be in error, but I do not have a proposition, and thus cannot be in error. See May, *Candrakīrti Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti*, 6. Chapter 18 is devoted to the issue of emptiness and nihilism, for which see Sprung, *Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way*, pp. 223-46. Nāgārjuna also states the same in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 29: If I formulate any proposition (*pratijñā*), I would have, by that very fact, committed an error in my [reasoning]. But as I abstain from formulating any proposition, I definitely cannot have committed any error. See Yamaguchi, *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, p. 31, verse 29.

Reply : (245b17) Our intent in this statement is that being is convention-only (*saṃvṛti-mātra*). Because the being of reality is nonexistent, we talk about the nonbeing of reality.³⁰

Objection : (245b18) If this is the case, then reality has as its core essence the nonbeing of convention. If it is not the case, then there exists a separate reality, and if there is a separate, existent reality, being is not convention only. [Futhermore], if being is convention-only, then the core essence of reality must be nonexistent. And if the core essence of reality is nonexistent, then why should we delight in cultivating realization?

Reply : (245b20) Herein one interpretation of this objection states: Our statement that reality is nonexistent is aimed at refutation, not at assertion. If a mistaken worldly view clings to being as real, we refute the reality of [such] being without asserting any core reality to nonbeing. The core reality of the real is precisely its conventional nonbeing and not a separately existing real core reality apart from conventional nonbeing. The phrase "the nonbeing of reality" refers to the reality of conventional nonbeing. This refutes any assertion of a separate real nonbeing.

(245b24) You have not yet plumbed to the basic intent of these words. Who claims that the nonbeing of reality is asserted as existing separately?³¹ If in refuting an alternate claim, one maintains a separate assertion, then one's statement is indeed an refutative assertion, and then, after having refuted that alternate claim, one would still have to assert the common characteristics of

³⁰The text reads: 此說意言，唯俗是有。真無此有故說真無。

Compare with Tsong-kha-pa's notion of *sattā-mātra* and Nagao on *saṃvṛtimātra* . (Nagao, *Foundational Standpoint*, Chapter 9.) This also seems to be Dharmapāla's response to the *Madhyamakahr̥daya* of Bhāvaviveka, 5.2, which says: "Because it is the nonbeing of duality (*dvayabhāvabhva*) and because it is the existence of nonbeing of duality (*dvayabhāvābhāvasya astivam*), [the Yogācāras] think that the ultimate is the object of a cognition of being and [nonbeing]." (See Yamaguchi, *Tairon* , 79).

³¹Compare to *Madhyāntavibhāga*, I.2: na śūnyam nāpi cāśūnyam tasmāt sarvaṃ vidhīyate/ satvād asatvāt ca madhyamā pratipac ca sā// which means "Therefore it is taught that all things are neither empty nor not empty. It is because there is being and nonbeing and being that there is the middle path." See Nagao, *Madhyāntavibhāga-Bhāṣya: A Buddhist Philosophical Treatise* , p. 18 on verse I.2, and *The Foundational Standpoint* , p. 92. Here, the point seems to be that, even though one makes conventional and independently reasoned statements, and refutes naive affirmations of being, this does not entail another affirmation within that same naive context of being. Rather it entails an awareness of the disappearance of the entire horizon in which conventional affirmations and negations occur.

the contrary alternative, as when one [says that someone] is not a sentient being, or not a eunuch, [one still has to describe the common characteristics of a non-sentient being or a non-eunuch]. But if in refuting an alternate claim, we have no separate assertion, then we engage only in refutation. When we have performed the needed refutation, the force [of our refutation] comes to an end, just like one finishes the meat he was eating or the wine he was drinking. Here, the phrase "the nonbeing of reality" refutes only this [idea of] the nonbeing of reality [as a separate entity] and no separate assertion can be made at all. As it is indescribable in terms of being, we refute only this idea of being without describing the being negated and without asserting its contrary alternative. If we were to describe this nonbeing or assert its contrary claim, then indeed we would be not be speaking words that negate being. If words that negate did make descriptions of that being, then the negating words about nonbeing would indeed make assertions about that nonbeing. To speak of refutation like this is to understand it in foolishness.³² Why is it that, even when their doubts and objections have come to nothing, they still continue to speak?³³ The basic point of their objection is that if being is convention only, then reality does not exist. Why then, they say, should we cultivate realization? But when we speak about the nonbeing of reality, this is a refutation and not an assertion. We have amply explained in detail now. What problem is there in our interpretation?

(245c6) Another interpretation holds that by cultivating insight into no-self, at the term of that skillful method, one finally gains insight into the truth of reality and then conventional being never again appears. This is why one speaks about the nonbeing of reality. But this interpretation is not valid because its meaning is opaque. If in speaking about the nonbeing of convention, one is making reference to reality, then indeed there is nothing to be realized [because it is already present in words]. If a separately existent reality is what is to be realized, then one cannot say that being is convention-only. Moreover, this contradicts all the scriptures which teach that there is no insight to be seen, and that even if there is a glimpse of insight called "insight

³²Endo, *Issaikyo*, takes *yú zhì* 愚智 as contrastive, i.e. both stupid and intelligent," but the phrase seems to parallel *āryajñāna* in line 14. Thus I interpret it as *mūrkhajñāna*, foolish wisdom, or, simply, foolishness.

³³Perhaps Dharmapāla has *Bhāvaviveka* in mind, for he accused the *Yogācāras* of affirming that consciousness itself is a substantial existent reality.

into reality" [in the scriptures], that certainly is not insight into reality.³⁴ Therefore, this explanation is not the correct interpretation.

(245c11) If someone interprets [the objection] in this way, we must say that reality is neither [characterized as] being nor nonbeing because it severs mental words: We provisionally speak about nonbeing in order to demolish opinions about being, while we provisionally speak about being in order to demolish opinions about nonbeing. Both discourses about being and about nonbeing are worldly and conventional speech. In the truth of ultimate meaning both being and nonbeing are to be rejected and that which is to be realized by sage wisdom (*āryajñāna*) is neither being nor nonbeing and is both being and nonbeing. We shall treat this in detail in due course.

Objection : (245c15) There is a further objection. The argument that demonstrates the emptiness of things employs both being and nonbeing. When it employs being, then the contrary case [of nonbeing] must also exist, and when it employs nonbeing, then one cannot demonstrate the emptiness of things.

Reply : (245c17) [Āryadeva] presents the next stanza to treat this objection:

21a. *Objection* : If one demonstrates the emptiness of things through an argument about being,
Then the emptiness of things cannot be established.
(396a)

(245c19) Commentary: [The objection states that] emptiness must be established through an argument. If not, then anything at all could be valid. But, since the argument itself is not empty, then its contrary must also [be not empty, and some things must exist]. If only certain things, such as the brilliance

³⁴The *Dharmasaṃgīti* has: adarśanam bhagavan sarvadharmāṇām darśanam samyagdarśanam, that is, "O Lord, not to see is to see all *dharma*s : this is true seeing." See Lindtner, "Atiśa's Introduction to the two Truths, and its Sources," p. 194 and p. 197. Also see Eckel, *Jñānagarbha's Commentary on the Distinction Between the Two Truths*, p. 155.15. Bhāvaviveka often refers to the same passage. Also see Eckel's translation of the *Prajñāpradīpa* 25 on p. 72, where a similar citation occurs: "What is ultimate truth? Whatever gives no opportunity for thought, let alone for words. Not to see is to see Reality."

of the sun or water, were empty, then the thesis to be established is not validated. In order to answer this objection [Āryadeva] continues:

21b. *Reply* : Since a thesis and argument are not different
(i.e., both are empty),
A basis for [our] argument really is nonexistent. (396b)

(245c23) Commentary: If the arguments so laboriously and uninterruptedly elaborated by the Sāṃkhya teachers and others about the non-differentiation of the synthesis (*samadāya*) [of the three elements] and the particulars (*viśeṣa*, i.e., the three elements) are verbally expressed, then like the essence of verbal sound itself, because they do not pervade others, the basis of their argument is not valid. The Vaiśeṣika masters and others conceive categories of the universal (*sāmānya*) and the particular (*viśeṣa*) or differentiation and non-differentiation. But their [idea of] non-differentiation is just as erroneous as the above masters. [These ideas] of differentiation have already been refuted in preceding chapters.³⁵ Therefore these ideas of differentiation and non-differentiation cannot validate an argument, and because of this we state that there is no difference between our thesis and argument and that the basis of our argument is really nonexistent.

(245c27) Moreover, if a basis in a proposed argument were in fact present, it would have to be either identical with or different from the basis of the thesis. But we cannot say whether the basis of our arguments and thesis is identical or different, and, since it is neither identical nor different, being provisional like armies or forests and not real, it is included in the conventional. In accord with worldly unreal imagining we construct various, dissimilar theses and arguments to refute all heterodox views, and when those heterodox views are rejected, our theses and arguments are to be forgotten. Therefore, just as in regard to things, we cannot say that our arguments are existent, for our theses and arguments are provisionally established and, as conventional, they are not real.

Objection : (246a4) There is another objection. The example in a demonstration of the emptiness of things either is nonexistent or existent. If it

³⁵See Tillemans, *Materials*, p. 167, on Dharmapāla's arguments against the reality of sounds. For arguments against Sāṃkhya, see 96-97 and 135-138, against Vaiśeṣika, 94-96 and 139-141.

is nonexistent, then one cannot prove that all things are empty. If it is existent, then things, like the example, must exist.

Reply : (246a5) But this is not the case. Thus [Āryadeva] presents the next stanza:

22. *Objection* : The example for emptiness does exist
separately,
Accordingly all things are not empty,

Reply : If the mere presence of an example were
adequate,
Then an inner self could be proven to be black just
like a crow. (397)

(246a9) Commentary: An example is included as one part of the argument and, since the argument exists conventionally, so does the example. If you say that the example exists as an entity separate from the argument, and that in virtue of such a simile, all things exist and are not empty, this most certainly is not true. Any example separate from its argument is necessarily incapable of demonstrating its proposed thesis, because it would not be included in the argument as proposed. If by negating an argument's example, one could establish a meaningful thesis, then indeed the blackness of an inner self could be established on analogy with a [black] crow. Indeed, in this case, everything proposed would be validated because things without reasonable arguments would be equally and easily proved [by adducing an extraneous example]. This is why the basic sense of an example must not be separate from its argument. Therefore, it must be the same as its argument and cannot be opposed to it.

PART II: The Yogācāra Perspective

Objection : (246a15) If the essence of all things is entirely empty, what value ensues from demonstrating and gaining insight into this emptiness?³⁶

Reply : (246a16) [Āryadeva] presents the next stanza to discuss this objection:

23a. *Objection* : Even if the basic nature of things is empty,
What value ensues from insight into emptiness?³⁷
(398a)

(246a18) Commentary: [The objector urges that] there is no value whatsoever in gaining insight into self-emptiness in regard to conditioned things other than the self, and this applies to all teachings. Even if originally essences are empty, what benefit is there in realizing this emptiness? If there is no benefit, then why toil away and put forth unlimited intensified effort in cultivating the realization of emptiness? In order to clarify this question [Āryadeva] continues:

23b. *Reply* : Insight gained through meditation on
emptiness can eradicate
The bondage of unreal imagining.³⁸ (398b)

³⁶ Candrakīrti treats the purpose of emptiness in chapter 18 of his *Prasannapadā*, for which see Sprung, *Lucid Exposition*, pp. 228-46.

³⁷ Note that the Chinese differs from the Tibetan text, which says: "If everything exists by its own nature, what would be the benefit of perceiving the emptiness [of things]?" (Lang ed., p. 151.) Hsüan-tsang's text appears to say that, even if things be empty, is that not a useless bit of scholastic information to one engaged in the practice of the path of no-self.

³⁸ Dharmapāla (Hsüan-tsang) identifies Āryadeva's *rtog pa*, i.e., *kalpanā*, with the *Madhyāntavibhāga* use of the term *abhūtaparikalpa*, unreal imagining: *abhūta-parikalpo'sti dvayan tatra na vidyate/ śūnyatā vidyate tv atra tasyām api sa vidyate*// I.I., which means: "Unreal imagining exists, but in it the two (i.e., subject and object) do not exist. However, herein (i.e., in unreal imagining) emptiness exists, and in it that [unreal imagining] exists." See Nagao, *Madhyāntavibhāga-Bhāṣya*, p. 17; *The Foundational Standpoint*, p. 91. The term *abhūtaparikalpa* already is found, for example, in the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*, and is thus canonical, but it is identified with *paratantra-svabhāva* only in the Yogācāra tradition.

(246a23) Commentary: Although all things and all activities are empty and without selfhood, yet ignorant worldlings vainly imagine and cling to ideas about unity, difference, etc. Due to the force of their unreal imagining, then engender and augment their passions and propensities, like covetousness and so forth. Accordingly, they give rise to good and evil actions, dying and continually transmigrating in the ocean of the triple world. They are plagued by the three sufferings, unable to escape. But if they diligently intensify their effort, then they will realize no-self and emptiness, and they will gradually sever their unreal imaginings. Accordingly they will realize wisdom and the merits whereby their self benefit benefits others will be inexhaustible.

Unreal Imagining (abhūtaparikalpa)

Objection: (246a28) What is the nature of this unreal imagining?

Reply: (246a29) This refers to all things that exist as mind and mental states in the triple world.³⁹

Objection: (246a29) But surely these states are also originally empty? How then can they, like form and so forth to which foolish worldlings are attached, engender suffering and anguish for sentient beings? If they are empty and still engender suffering, then form and so forth have this capability. Why then do you make this claim only for "unreal imagining"?⁴⁰

Reply: (246b3) Although everything—form and mind—is originally empty, yet supported on their unreal imagining, [worldlings] inevitably imagine and infer things to be either being or nonbeing, and because of this engender sundry states of defilement or purification. Because of these [imaginings] there are differences between the defilement or purification of living beings. This is why we speak about "unreal imagining."⁴¹

³⁹See the discussion in Eckel, *To See the Buddha*, pp. 70-72.

⁴⁰The basic issue is about whether the dependently co-arisen mind and mental states, i.e., paratantra, is existent or nonexistent.

⁴¹Note that Dharmapāla does not claim that mind exists while things do not exist. Rather, he will in due course apply the interpretative framework of the three patterns of consciousness to both consciousness and things.

Objection : (246b6) If these [mind and mental states] really did exist, then it could be as you describe. But, since they really are nonexistent, how then can [worldlings] imagine and infer [things] to be either being or nonbeing, and [how can that result] in the different states of defilement or purification?

Reply : (246b7) As in dreams, although there are no material forms, yet the appearances of various images are imagined.

Objection : (246b8) But this example does not apply because the imagined [images] in dream states have no activity whatsoever.

Reply : (246b9) But that is quite possible, for, supported on imagining, the images of apparent objects do engender defilement and purification, because their support is imagining.

Objection : (246b9) Well, if everything is empty, there really is no unreal imagining!

Reply : (246b9) What then is capable of engendering these differences in activity?

Objection : (246b11) There is no case where an activity is present without its core reality! If something without a core reality has an effective capacity, then the horns on a hare or the hair on a turtle have their functions, too! Moreover, if passion is nonexistent and good roots are nonexistent, and nevertheless sentient beings are defiled or purified, then they would have already severed their passions and yet would still transmigrate. And those who had not planted any good roots would all have attained eternal repose.⁴²

Reply : (246b14) One [Svātantrika] interpretation responds to this objection by saying that worldly convention is not nonexistent and therefore there is no error [in our statement]. One might ask if worldly convention does not negate the reality of truth in this case, and we would answer that no, it

⁴²The objection here appears to be that against which Bhāvaviveka in his *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā-Tarkajvālā* 5.30 responds by saying that dream consciousness excludes the reality only of imagined objects, not of real objects.

does not. We speak about the reality of truth since, inasmuch as it follows conventional criteria, it in fact does exist.⁴³

Objection : (246b17) How can you claim that the mutual opposition between being and nonbeing in the same state [of unreal imagining] at the same moment is termed the reality of truth? The same applies to arising and so forth: One and the same thing at the same time is born and is not born, passes away and does not pass away, is annihilated and is not annihilated, is eternal and is not eternal, comes and does not come, goes and does not go, and so forth.⁴⁴ All these [contrasts] are mutually contradictory. How can you say that both [alternatives] are the reality of truth?

Reply : (246b20) This [Svātantrika] interpretation would respond by saying that that one thing at one time is real when it has no object (*nisarthikā*) and conventional when it has an object (*arthikā*). These are not contradictory because they are differentiated in regard to objects. A parallel case is found in the good mental states of worldly giving, etc., which, because their nature is contaminated, are said not to be good, but because they are associated with good roots, are also said to be good. Both descriptions are truly real and are not contradictory.

⁴³ Here, if I have interpreted correctly, Dharmapāla is presenting the Mādhyamika position of Bhāvaviveka, as "one interpretation," later to be superseded by the Yogācāra understanding when he adopts his more usual Yogācāra philosophy, on 247b15. This is the passage (from here to the end of the chapter) that directly challenges Bhāvaviveka's critique in the *Tarkajvālā*. Briefly Dharmapāla takes on the role of the objector, until he can switch back to that of the main commentator in the replies in 247b25 after citing a Yogācāra text.

⁴⁴ See the opening stanza of the *Mūlamādhyamakārikāḥ*. Dharmapāla has in mind the treatment in the *Mahāyānasamgraha* 2: 29-30: "Therefore the consciousness of unreal imagination, that is, the other-dependent pattern, has two aspects. It is like the primal matter that contains gold covered over by dirt. Furthermore, in certain passages the World-Honored One taught that all things are eternal; in other passages that all things are transient; and in yet other passages, that they are neither eternal nor transient. This was his intention in teaching the eternal, transient, and neither eternal nor transient natures of all things. This same interpretation holds for suffering, pleasure, and the absence of either; for good, evil, and the absence of either; for self, non-self, and the absence of either; for quiescence, non-quiescence, and the absence of either; for essence, non-essence, and the absence of either; for arising, non-arising, and the absence of either; for passing away, no passing away, and the absence of either; for original quiescence, no original quiescence, and the absence of either, for the birth-death cycle, cessation, and the absence of either. One should interpret the underlying intent of all the distinctions taught by all Buddhas Tathāgatas by following the structure of the three patterns as above." The point of this hermeneutic is that our interpretations are to be made in the context of an understanding of the three aspects of other-dependent consciousness: pure, defiled, and defiled and pure.

Objection : (246b24) Your argument is invalid. [You claim that] it is because good states of giving and so forth envisage differences [in their objects] that they are free from contradiction. But since the two truths of being and nonbeing of the one state at the same time are not different in [the object] they envisage, how can you avoid contradiction? What argument can you offer?

Reply : (246b26) Goodness refers to harmony, but there are two varieties: the worldly and the world-transcendent. World-transcendent good states are definitively able to destroy all the ensnarements of passion. This final harmony is called the good of ultimate meaning. Worldly good states are able [to destroy the ensnarements of passion] for a time but in the end are unable to do so because they can suppress those ensnarements only temporarily and not definitively. This is why they are said to be conventionally good. But, since they are unable to suppress the ensnarements of passion permanently, they are also said not to be good in the ultimate sense.

Objection : (246c1) But, these states of goodness and non-goodness are not contradictory because the duration of their effectiveness or ineffectiveness differs. We say they have such capability inasmuch as the good of giving, etc., abides for an instant, but immediately afterwards when that capability no longer remains, we say they do not have such capability. Although the presence or absence of this capability applies to the same state, they are not contradictory because the time periods differ.

Reply : (246c5) If a subsequent moment giving, etc., does not abide, since it has no core reality, who would say that it lacks capability?

Objection : (246c5) Because its core reality is nonexistent, its capacity certainly does not exist, and because its capacity does not exist, we do say that it lacks capability.⁴⁵

⁴⁵See Dharmapāla's commentary on Dignāga's *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, which treats the effectiveness of the seed impressions.

Reply : (246c6) Perhaps when the time period of its capability or incapability is not different, these states are not contradictory because their intended objects differ. Why? We say that they have capability because they are capable of temporarily suppressing the ensnarements of covetousness, and so forth, but we also say that they lack capability they are unable to destroy the seeds of those ensnarements. Just as one takes a dose of ghee to get rid of a cold, but cannot [thereby] cure a congestive heart problem, so, although the time period of capability and incapability be identical, their intended objects are different and thus there is no contradiction.

Objection : (246c11) But there is no such difference between the objects of the two truths of being and nonbeing in regard to a single state at the same time. How then can you not be contradictory?

Reply : (246c12) Again he (i.e., Bhāvaviveka) tries to save his assertion: It is just as, supported upon attachment to self in one moment of consciousness, we conventionally speak of self, while because of ultimate meaning we also speak of no-self. Now self and no self are different, but without contradiction they are present in the one state at the same time. It is the same with being and nonbeing, for, even if they have no differentiation in object, still they are not contradictory.

Objection : (246c15) This is not the case, because the reason why the meaning of self and no-self is not contradictory is due to the fact that we use the term no-self because the momentary mind is not self-abiding, while we use the term self because it is based on a false view of self. As a scripture teaches: "If consciousness were a self, it must be self-abiding and unchanging. Yet ignorant worldlings call [their changing consciousness] a self because they rely on and engender attachment to selfhood."⁴⁶

⁴⁶This recalls the passage from the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* 3.7: "The appropriating consciousness is deep and subtle, all its seeds are like a rushing torrent. Fearing that they would imagine and cling to it as to a self, I have not revealed it to the foolish." The verse is quoted in the *Mahāyānaśaṅgraha*, for which see Keenan, *The Summary of the Great Vehicle*, p. 5.

Reply : (246c18) But the meanings of no self-abiding and of reliance on attachment to selfhood , although applicable to the same consciousness, are not contradictory.

Objection : (246c19) How can there be no contradiction involved in saying that the opposition between being and nonbeing in regard to the same thing at the same time is to be termed the reality of truth? You are trying to demonstrate that the two truths of being and nonbeing in regard to the same thing are not contradictory, but although you adduce many worldly examples and various cases, you will never be able to demonstrate it!

Reply : (246c22) Again he tries to save his assertion: It is just as the color blue exists because it relies on itself, but it does not exist because it depends on others. All things are like this. The essences of each and every thing exist because they depend on convention, but are nonexistent in relationship with reality.⁴⁷

Objection : (246c24) But this does not hold either. Even if the core realities of blue and yellow were different and existed because they rely on themselves and do not exist because they depend on others, still there would be no essential difference between [their] conventionality and reality. If they existed in reliance on themselves, in regard to what would they not exist? When you examine the reality of convention, indeed it is real, but when you examine the reality of blueness you cannot demonstrate its yellowness. Therefore the major thesis and its example in your proposal are inconsistent.

(246c27) Moreover, as the core reality of the conventional and of the real are not contradictory, how could you regard the core essence of the conventional to be nonexistent because it depends on the real? It is in the scripture when the Buddha addressed Subhūti: "Worldly convention and ultimate meaning each are without any separate core reality. The suchness of worldly convention itself is ultimate meaning. Apart from [conventional] form there is no separate being to emptiness. The same applies to [to other

⁴⁷ Bhāvaviveka's *Madhyamakahr̥daya Tarkajvālā* 5.65, Yamaguchi, *Tairon*, (stanza 64, p. 491-92. Dharmapāla is trying to show that all attempts to speak of reality (*tattva*) in terms of the mutually contradictory terms of emptiness and being are inconsistent, unless one adopts the Yogācāra perspective of the three patterns, wherein the imagined is empty and nonexistent, while the other-dependent does exist as the unreal constructor of delusion.

aggregates] up to consciousness."⁴⁸ But how can one thing without separate objects or times, have two contradictory meanings and still be called true reality?

(247a3) From of old the model masters [have taught] that we establish the two truths because of the different situations of sentient beings.⁴⁹ The truth of worldly convention approaches and communicates with conventional beings through language. The truth of ultimate meaning is far from language and manifests real actuality. Although all conventional teachings appeal to these conventional beings, in fact, because they are deceptive, they are not the reality of truth.

(247a6) Moreover, the dependently co-arisen forms and thoughts experienced in direct perception cannot be described in language and thus are not conventional truth. Thus a scripture teaches that: "That which is described in names and phrases within this existing world are termed conventional truth."⁵⁰ What this scripture intends to say is that names—the meanings of teachings (*dharmārtha*) associated with subject and object that are commonly known in the world and the scriptural writings of the meaning of those teachings that express things not commonly known—are conventional truth. But, the dependently co-arisen forms and thoughts experienced in direct perception are not described in language and are not conventional truths.⁵¹

(247a10) If one claims that even these forms and thoughts, because described in conventionally established language, are included in conventional

⁴⁸The same passage appears in *Jñānagarbha*. See M. D. Eckel, *Jñānagarbha's Commentary*, p. 88; Tibetan text p. 174. Also see Lindtner, "Atiśa's Introduction," p. 169, for a similar citation quoted in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*.

⁴⁹From here Dharmapāla begins to present his own interpretation, attempting to answer the inadequacies in the previously presented Mādhyamika position. *Jñānagarbha*, who follows in Bhāvaviveka's Svātantrika lineage, in his *Satyadvayavibhāga* proclaims that he writes to promote a correct understanding of the two truths: "The two truths have already been distinguished, but because my great predecessors have misunderstood, to say nothing of others, I am distinguishing them again." He goes on to comment that "great Buddhists have misunderstood," among whom the Subcommentary attributed to Śāntarakṣita identifies "Dharmapāla and so forth." See Eckel, *Jñānagarbha's Commentary*, p. 70 and p. 110.4.

⁵⁰The *Acintyastava* has: "Therefore You have said that phenomena (*dharmā*) are beyond the four categories (*koṭi*). They are not knowable to consciousness, much less within the sphere of words." See Lindtner, *Nagarjuniana*, p. 149. Also see The *Satyadvayavibhāga*, which explains: "What is relative truth? All ordinary designations, syllables, utterances, and words. Ultimate truth cannot even be known, let alone conveyed in syllables." See Eckel, *Jñānagarbha's Commentary*, p. 74.

⁵¹See the citation from Dharmapāla in Lindtner, "Atiśa's Introduction," p. 199. Dharmapāla may have read Kumāri. It appears that Dharmapāla follows Dignāga on direct perception (*pratyakṣa*). The point seems to be that other-dependent consciousness (*paratantrasvabhāva*), i.e., *vastumātra*, is the object of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), and thus always non-discriminative (*nirvikalpa*).

truth, then in the end ultimate meaning is also not real because it too is expressed in conventionally established language. But ultimate meaning never has these forms and thoughts, for therein no reasoning ever occurs, because its occurrence is an existent thing.⁵²

Reply : (247a13) If these states, not being included in the two truths, are entirely nonexistent, they are far removed from what is experienced by direct perception in the world. And if you claim that these [states] do exist but are not encompassed in the two truths, then you must establish a third category that is neither real or conventional.

Objection : (247a15) But if you say that existent dependently co-arisen forms and thoughts, attained in direct perception but, as names provisionally spoken, are included not in the truth of ultimate meaning but in the truth of worldly convention, that we with [certain] intentions provisionally establish these forms and thoughts which, as worldly and conventional, really do exist, we have no dispute. [As we said above], this is the support upon which the significance of defilement and purification is validated.⁵³

(247a18) If you claim that because worldly and conventional, form and thought exists, but because in ultimate meaning they do not exist and do not arise, then what meaning does such a statement [that conventionally existent form and thought are the support for defilement and purification] have?

Reply : (247a20) If you are saying that [form and thought] do not exist because, just as the sphere of activity of that non-imaginative wisdom is completely empty and nonexistent, so they likewise do not exist, then, were this

⁵²The text has 究竟勝義無此色心真理都無，事有法故。

Again an affirmation of the conventional nature of all reasoning and thus of the need to present an affirmative stance. Again see *Foundational Standpoint*, Chapter 10. This passage seems to be aimed at Bhāvaviveka's *svatantā-anumāna* argument, which are always qualified by *tattvataḥ*, in reality. See the Tibetan in "Atiśa's Introduction," p. 201: slob dpon *chos skyong* gis "don dam pas ma skyes zhes bya ba 'di la/ don dam pa zhes bya ba'i sgra'i don ci yin' zhes bya ba la sogs pas gnod pa smras pa.

⁵³The issue is whether and how *paratantrasvabhāva* exists. Confer Matsumoto Shirō, 'Dharmapāla no nitai setsu,' who argues that the distinction between *Yogācāra* and *Madhyamaka* is not over the existence of *trisvabhāva*, but over whether *paratantra* is *paramārtha-sat* or not. The *Yogācārins* argue that it is and recognized it solely as an existing *locus*, which was taken by the *Mādhyamikas* as affirming the existence of *saṃvṛti*. Observe that *Asaṅga's Mahāyānasamgraha* entitles the chapter on *ālayavijñāna* the support for the knowable (*jñeyāśraya*).

true, non-imaginative wisdom could never arise, because its activity would never exist at all. Even if you were to grant that it does arise, still it would not be the wisdom of reality because its object would be nonexistent. Just as we have understood nonbeing elsewhere, since wisdom is not real, its object must be conventional. Although we say that form and thought do not exist in this [real] manner, nevertheless they do manifest the real being of sundry forms and thoughts. When we speak about their nonbeing, that is because in the end they do not exist, because they have no differentiating characteristics, but most certainly they do exist. And if indeed they do exist, then you must grant that these forms and thoughts really do arise and do exist.⁵⁴

Objection : (247a26) If you intend to claim that although form and thought do exist and do arise, yet they are not ultimately true (*paramārthika*), then you must have previously determined just what ultimate truth is, for only later can you say that these [forms and thoughts] are not ultimately true.

Reply : (247a28) If you say that, inasmuch as they are the activity of non-imaginative wisdom, their ultimate truth is entirely empty and nonexistent, we have just refuted this above, stating that if its activity is entirely nonexistent, then non-imaginative wisdom could never arise, etc. Moreover, the activity [of mind and thought] is not really and ultimately true, because like horns on a hare it is nonexistent or like sky flowers it has no being.

Objection : (247b3) If you say one can investigate ultimate truth, this is not true because its object is undifferentiated. The ordinary investigator never departs from worldly convention. Moreover, worldly and conventional things cannot be investigated thoroughly. If their [ultimate truth] could be investigated thoroughly, then they must be different from worldly convention. But there is no separately existing ultimate meaning apart from the conventional. Therefore, you cannot claim that their [ultimate truth] can thoroughly be investigated. Consequently, your words do not characterize ultimate meaning.

⁵⁴If I have interpreted the flow of the argumentation correctly, Bhāvaviveka is trying to draw from Dharmapāla's contention that what is directly perceived is not included in worldly convention the implication that it must then be included in the truth of ultimate meaning, but that is impossible, he argues, because then it would have no activity whatsoever since the ultimate wisdom of awakening is beyond conventional objects. Bhāvaviveka would by contrast hold that since the conventional does exist as it appears, his position does not entail such a logical conundrum.

Reply : (247b7) If you are talking about the view of ultimate meaning as held by other schools, as entirely nonexistent, [we reply] that their characterization of ultimate meaning is not true. They take ultimate meaning to be the universal nature of dependently co-arisen and temporally abiding [things].⁵⁵

Objection : (247b9) Now, in dispensing with both being and nonbeing, you contradict both their your thesis and [what is experienced in] direct perception. If you say that the reality of truth is the character of ultimate meaning, then there is no reality of truth in worldly convention. Why then did you say above that convention is the reality of truth? Grant, if you would, that what you termed the reality of truth is only the discourse on nonbeing and non-arising, for the being and arising [of worldly convention] is only provisional language, being established by unreal imagining, it is not reality of truth.

Reply : (247b12) But if it is only established by unreal imagining through provisional language, how then can it engender the activities of defilement and purification? The argument in your response to this objection is invalid. We are not talking about [something entirely nonexistent like] turtle's hair, but about an existent reality that has the capability to bind [us] to the world.

Objection : (247b15) Other [Yogācāra] teachers respond to those objection by saying that the reality of that which is imagined (*parikalpita*) is nonexistent, while the reality of things that arise dependently (*paratantra*) does exist. This is how the passions and propensities come about and how we are entangled in the three realms of transmigrating through the world. Yet, by practicing [the path of] intensified effort one realizes no-self and emptiness, attains full wisdom, and is liberated from the sufferings of transmigration.

⁵⁵On the character of ultimate meaning, compare the treatment of the character, use, and content of emptiness in the *Madhyāntavibhāga*. See Nagao, *The Foundational Standpoint*, pp. 88-91. Here, the opponent becomes a Mādhyamika thinker, while the opinion of the "other school" is that of Yogācāra. Note also that the objection is that Yogācāra takes ultimate meaning to be the equality of things dependently co-arisen and temporarily abiding, 彼謂緣生暫住等性，名為勝義。 This seems to imply that Dharmapāla had already been criticized for his Yogācāra notion of ultimate meaning, i.e., by Bhāvaviveka's critique. Dharmapāla's teacher Śīlabhadra in his *Buddhabhūmivivākhyāna* does express the content of *samatājñāna* as insight into the equality of all things.

attains full wisdom, and is liberated from the sufferings of transmigration. Although these dependently co-arisen states are coextensive with form and mind, their source is the mind. Therefore we make the broad claim that unreal imagining (i.e., the other-dependent activity of conjuring up false images, not the images clung to in delusion) is able to bind [sentient beings] to the world. In suppressing this, one is enabled to practice [the path of] intensified effort to realize emptiness. If there were no mind, then, although there did exist an objective world, ratiocinations would never bind one [to the world], one would be unable to suppress them, or to meditate on no-self and emptiness, realize full wisdom, or escape from birth and death. In order to demonstrate this, I quote a passage from the a scripture:

"That which is totally imagined does not exist,

But that which arises in dependence on others does
exist.

If unreal imagining is neglected,

One falls into the two extremes either of reification
or of denial.⁵⁶

(247b25) We offer a [Yogācāra] interpretation of this significant passage. The imagined pattern refers to names, while the other dependent pattern refers to objects [so named]. Because names are not present in objects, they are nonexistent; but since objects accord with world and are not absent, they do exist.⁵⁷

⁵⁶The *Acintyastava*, 45, has: "Convention (*saṃvṛti*) arises from causes and conditions and is relative (*paratantra*). Thus the relative has been spoken of [by you]. The ultimate meaning, however, is absolute (*akṛtrima*); it is also termed (*iti*) own-being, nature, truth, substance, the real [and the] true. [Conventionally] an imagined thing does not exist but a relative is found [to exist]." The *Laṅkāvatāra* 2.189 has: *nāsti vai kalpiṭo bhāvaḥ paratantraś ca vidyate/ samāropāpavādam hi vikalpanto vinaśyati//*, which Eckel translates as: "There is nothing imagined, but there is [something] dependent; for to conceive of reification (*samāropa*) or denial (*apavāda*) is to be destroyed." See Eckel, "Bhāvaviveka's Critique of Yogācāra Philosophy in Chapter XXV of the *Prajñāpradīpa*," p. 56. The same passage also occurs in Jñānagarbha's *Satyadvayavibhāga*, for which see Eckel, *Jñānagarbha's Commentary*, p. 96. The interpretation of this verse was to become the starting-point of a long controversy between Mādhyamikas who held that *paratantrasvabhāva* only exists *saṃvṛtitaḥ*, not *paramārthataḥ*, and Yogācāras who held that *paratantra*, as *Laṅkāvatāra* itself states, exists. See Lindtner, *Nagarjuniana*, p. 155.45.

⁵⁷Dharmapāla once again takes on the role of the principal commentator, who replies to objections leveled by his critics, especially Bhāvaviveka. The Svātantrika is then reduced to raising objections to Dharmapāla's interpretation of the Mādhyamika Āryadeva's text!

Objection : (247b27) But your interpretation [of the scriptural passage] does not hold, because one cannot adduce this [interpretation] to prove an existent other dependent pattern, since its meaning is contradictory in that, if, because names are not present in relation to objects and thus are nonexistent, then likewise because objects are not present in relation to names, they too are nonexistent.⁵⁸

(247b29) Moreover, if names and words established in relation to objects arise from causes and conditions, then like objects they too must exist. If the nature of describing false opinions (i.e., names) does not exist, then how can the nature of the false opinions described (i.e., objects) exist? Names are capable of assertions in accord with worldly and conventional being, but you do not grant that this is other-dependent arising! Objects are able to be provisionally spoken in accord with convention. Why do you not grant that they are clung to as imagined? If the describing [that is naming] and the [objects] so described as provisionally established in worldly convention are nonexistent, then both do not exist and if they both do exist, they both equally do exist. Why in [interpreting] this scripture do you say that one exists, while the other does not exist? Therefore, your words do not tally with the meaning of this scripture.

Reply : (247c5) You must hold that the imagined does not exist, because it is constructed by worldly deception. But you must hold that the other dependent does exist, because it arises from causes and conditions and is not activated by deception. The above teachers do demonstrate what they mean by citing another scripture:

*We describe various things
Through the various names we establish.
But the nature of things is such
That these [names] essentially do not exist.*⁵⁹

⁵⁸ A summary statement of Bhāvaviveka's argument in *Madhyamakahrdaya-Tarkajvālā*, chapter 5. Note that the objector has now become Bhāvaviveka, for the main thesis has become Dharmapāla's presentation of *Yogācāra*.

⁵⁹ From the *Bhavasamkrānti*, which appears in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (Dutt ed., p. 33). It also appears in Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa* 25 (Eckel, p. 56, also in *Tarkajvālā* 5.75). Eckel gives the Sanskrit: *yena yena hi nāmnā vai yo yo dharmo 'bhilapyate/ na sa samvidyate tatra dharmānām sā hi dharmatā*, and translates: "The nature of *dharmas* (*dharmatā*) is such that when a word is used to designate a *dharma*, it does not actually apply." The Chinese of Hsuan-tsang obviously differs,

(Objector's reading: That those [objects] do not exist.)

Objection : (247c11) This stanza cannot validate objects [as other dependent], for the intent of the scriptural passage is not to say that the names are nonexistent in relation to objects. It only says that the nature of the things so described does not exist.

Reply : (247c12) Upon examining all such realities no descriptions are possible. That to which names and words refer are the common characteristics of things, while the individual characteristics of things are disjunctive from naming and speaking. Individual characteristics are not nonexistent, while common characteristics are not existent.⁶⁰ In summary in this [scripture] it does not say that the nature of that which is described (i.e., names) is nonexistent, while the nature of the act of describing (i.e., objects) is existent. Rather the stanza only says that *these* [names] are nonexistent. If this is not so, it would have said that *those* [objects] does not exist.

Objection : (247c16) In order to demonstrate the nonexistence of the other-dependent pattern, we will cite a stanza that summarizes what is in this previous stanza:

"There is not the slightest thing that arises;
Neither does the slightest thing pass away.
Pure insight sees that all things
Neither exist nor do they not exist."⁶¹

Reply : (247c20) This passage also cannot demonstrate that the other-dependent pattern does not exist. Why? The intent of this stanza is to clarify that the core reality of the act of referring and that which is referred to by

and he reads the text to refute the existence of parikalpita (i.e., names), not just the non-applicability of names.

⁶⁰ Again the influence of Dignāga is clear. See *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, chapter 1.

⁶¹ From the *Laṅkāvatāra* 3.14, quoted by Bhāvaviveka in the appendix to *Prajñāpradīpa* : yasya notpadyate kiṃ cin na ca kiṃ cin nirudhyate/ tasyāsti nāsti nopaiti viviktaṃ paśyato jagat//. See Lindtner, "Bhavvy's Controversy," p. 84.42. Also confer Bhāvaviveka's *Madhyamakahrdaya/Tarkajvālā* 3.29, in Eckel, *To See the Buddha*, p. 160, and p. 225,19, where he refers one to Nāgārjuna's *Lokāṭīstava*, in Lindtner, *Nagarjuniana*, p. 136.

discrimination within the pattern of the totally imagined really is entirely empty, and does not arise or pass away. But pure insight apart from such an attachment sees that everything that arises from causes and conditions in the world is neither existent nor nonexistent. Therefore, this passage cannot demonstrate the nonbeing of what arises in other-dependence.

Objection : (247c23) If the other-dependent [nature of consciousness] exists, then how can the scriptures declare that the essences of all things are nonexistent.⁶² Is not everything empty? Again in another scripture the Buddha addressed Subhūti and said: "The essences of all things such as form and so forth are entirely nonexistent."⁶³ And in yet another scripture the Buddha addressed Mahāmati and said: "The essences of all things have no being and arising whatsoever. Because, whether they previously existed or not, they cannot arise."⁶⁴

Reply : (247c27) These [passages] have an underlying meaning (*neyārtha*). What is that underlying meaning? That all of these scriptural passages refute only the imagined pattern but do not mean that everything is nonexistent. It is heterodox to hold that everything is nonexistent!

Objection : (247c28) How can you be sure that this is their underlying meaning?

Reply : (247c29) Because in other scriptures this meaning is presented explicitly (*nitārtha*) by the Blessed One: "I have taught that the essences of all things are entirely nonexistent only inasmuch as they are essences associated

⁶²This is Bhāvaviveka's position against the Yogācāra assertion of the existence of the other-dependent nature of consciousness.

⁶³A similar passage is cited in *Jñānagarbha's Commentary*, p. 96: "O Subhūti, form has the nature of no-form." The idea is that of the *Heart Sūtra*, on which the eleventh century Mahāyāna comments in a manner that reflects the debate between Dharmapāla and Bhavya: "It is said that emptiness is not other than form because dependent natures (*paratantrasvabhāva*), which are wrongly imagined [to be independent], are empty of the duality that is imputed [by ignorance]. The nature of form is the emptiness of duality in the manner of an affirming negative (*pariyudāsapratiśedha*)." See Lopez, *The Heart Sūtra Explained*, p. 59.

⁶⁴The citation appears to be from the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*. A similar passage instructs Mahāmati: "Those who believe in the birth of something that has never been in existence and, coming to exist, finally vanishes away—which leads them to assert that things come to exist, things pass away, according to causation—such people have no foothold in my teaching." See Suzuki, *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, p. 127.

with mind and mental states (*samprakukta-svabhāva*).⁶⁵ If they did exist as enunciated and thus engender attachment, then if you hold that the essences of the states of defilement and purification are entirely nonexistent, you have apprehended emptiness ineptly and are professing a heterodox viewpoint. Essences associated with mind and thought are those clung to by worldly imagination. Because of the evolutions of the mind, they appear as concrete external things, and supported upon all these concrete things, we engender perverse attachments. Because of these perverse attachments we imagine the existence of self and others. But all states of defilement and purification, whose essences are associated with expressing things and things so expressed are in fact other-dependent. Therefore, we are sure about the underlying meaning of the above scriptural passages.

(248a7) Furthermore, in *The Scripture of Wisdom That Reaches That Far Shore* (i.e., *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra*) it says that the Buddha himself clearly differentiates the meaning of being and nonbeing (*bhāvābhāvārtha*). All constant, unchanging things, amassed, increased, and grasped by clinging to what is totally imagined, are said to be entirely nonexistent, while all that arises from causes and conditions is said to be existent.⁶⁶ In another scripture it says: "Essences clung to as imagined do not arise, while everything included among those things that arise in other-dependence do in fact arise from causes and conditions."⁶⁷

(248a11) Moreover, *The [Perfection of] Wisdom Scripture* similarly says: "The practitioner of the perfection of wisdom well understands the nature of form, well understands the arising of form, well understands the suchness of

⁶⁵ Again the argument seems to concern the *Lankāvatāra* and its interpretation. A passage states: "Again, Mahāmati, what is meant by the emptiness of all things in the sense that they are unpredictable? It is that the nature of the false imagination is not expressible, hence the emptiness of all things in the sense of their unpredictability." See Suzuki, *The Lankāvatāra Sūtra*, p. 66. The text immediately goes on to treat emptiness as the absence of one thing from another (*itaretara-sūnyatā*), on which see Matsumoto, "Lankāvatāra on itaretara-sūnyatā," who reports that Kamalaśīla in his *Madhyamakāloka* critiques the Yogācāra notion of emptiness: "The statement [of the Yogācāras] is not true that, after having perceived by perception some place etc. devoid of other objects, one will understand by perception that the place etc. are void of other objects. This opinion advocates *itaretara-sūnyatā*, and not *lakṣaṇa-sūnyatā*. According to *lakṣaṇa-sūnyatā*, all properties are considered to have no essence from the viewpoint of *paramārtha*, because they are devoid of the special and universal characteristics, which are established, from the viewpoint of *paramārtha*. The *itaretara-sūnyatā* of objects is founded not on *paramārtha-satya*, but on *vyavahāra-satya*."

⁶⁶ For references, see under being, non-existence, entity, non-entity in Conze, *The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom*.

⁶⁷ See the passage from the *Acintyastava* 45, quoted in note 36.

form. . . ."⁶⁸ When all the scriptures teach that all things are essence-free, do not arise, do not pass away, and so forth, then the exegesis needed in all these [passages] is not a literal apprehension of their explicit meaning. [One must rather interpret them by uncovering the underlying intent of the Buddha].⁶⁹ It is not the case that all things conventionally true are nonexistent. This is an emptiness ineptly apprehended and constitutes a gravely heterodox view.

Objection : (248a15) These words of yours are unreasonable. Why? Because this exegesis differs from what is found in the scriptures of explicit meaning. If the Blessed One himself said in all the scriptures: "I teach emptiness, the unmarked, the desireless, the unmoving, the unborn, the undying; the absence of existent essence, the absence of existent sentient beings, liberation from a person who governs one's life, and so forth,"⁷⁰ and these are scriptures of explicit meaning [not needing to be interpreted], then they agree with the argument I am presenting.

⁶⁸The *Byams shus kyi lehu* , which is the seventy-second chapter of the Tibetan version of the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā* has: "By this method, Maitreya, you should know that also form in its dharmic nature (*dharmatā*) is neither form nor no-form; and what is neither form nor no-form, that is non-dual. It is with this hidden intent that I have taught that to speak of 'form', etc. is to make a count of what is not-two." See Conze, *The Large Sutra* , p. 649. A similar text is referred to by Bhāvaviveka in his *Tarkajvālā* 5.7, for which see Yamaguchi, *Bukkyō ni okeru mu to u to no tairon* , pp. 148-61. Shōtarō Iida, "Āgama (Scripture) and Yukti (Reason) in Bhāvaviveka," traces the citations in the *Tarkajvālā* to the *Byams shus kyi lehu* . See also Hakamaya, "A Consideration of the *Byams shus kyi lehu* from the Historical Point of View."

⁶⁹Indeed that is the title of the foundational *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* , i.e., *Scripture on Explicating Underlying Meaning* .

⁷⁰From the *Akṣayamatīsūtra* , quoted in *Prasannapadā* , ed. Louis de la Vallée Poussin, p. 43. Sprung, *Lucid Exposition* , p. 45 translates: "And in the *Akṣayamati Sūtra* it is said: 'Which are the *sūtras* for mankind at large and which are for initiates? Those spoken for the sake of entering the path are said to be for mankind at large; those spoken for the sake of attaining the final goal are said to be for initiates. Whichever *sūtras* are concerned primarily with liberation characterized by the absence of being in particular things, by the absence of external objects and bigoted views, of willed actions, of birth, origination, existent things, inherent natures, by the absence of individual beings, of personal spirits, of the person and of the self—such *sūtras* are for wise initiates. This, venerable Śāriputra, is called cleaving to the *sūtras* which are for initiates, not to those for mankind at large.' Alluded to in *Samdhinirmocana* 7.30, where the three turnings of the Dharma Wheel is treated, and the Yogācāra hermeneutic presented, viz., that all scriptures are to be interpreted in terms of the Yogācāra critical understanding of consciousness, not in accord with literal content, for the second and third turnings of the wheel have identical content. *Samdhinirmocana* 7.24 also states: 'At that time the Blessed One recited these verses to emphasize his meaning: 'All things have no essence, no arising, no passing away, are originally quiescent and essentially in cessation. What wise man speaks thus without an underlying intent? I have taught the no-essence of marks, arising, and ultimate meaning, but one who does not know the underlying intent of the Buddha will lose the true path and be unable to travel thereon.' See Keenan, "The Intent and Structure of Yogācāra Philosophy."

Reply : (248a19) Whereas in some scriptures the Buddha himself in the context of the imagined pattern had admitted a self, in other scriptures he preached that all things are entirely essence-free, do not arise, do not pass away, are originally quiescent and essentially in cessation. In the context of the other-dependent pattern he taught that the minds of all sentient beings are born, do pass away, do transmigrate, and so forth. Yet in another scriptural passage the Buddha addressed the Elder Śāriputra and said: "The essence of form is empty and because empty of essence, it does not arise nor pass away. Neither arising nor passing away, it is not subject to change. [Just as with form], so the other aggregates of perception, conceptualization, volition, and consciousness are to be similarly understood."⁷¹ Here he teaches about the emptiness of essence, no-arising, no-passing away, etc. because people cling to imagined essences. The Blessed One preached that the essence of things, such as form and so forth, are empty, do not arise, do not pass away and so forth because deluded worldlings are carried away by all things such as form and so forth which are [only] the evolutions of their own minds, and they imagine, infer, and cling to discriminative ideas of essences as existent realities. Because the pattern of other-dependence has no imagined clinging, it also may be described as empty. But this does not mean that its essence is empty or that it has no arising, passing away, and so forth. In various places the Tathāgata has presented these three patterns. He taught that the pattern of clinging to the imagined is empty, while the two patterns of other-dependence and full perfection do exist. Therefore, you should know that the teaching of emptiness has a specific intent [within this context of the three patterns]. One cannot literally dispense with and annihilate everything! Literal readings slander the Great Vehicle. Thus, *The Scripture [on the Explication of Underlying Meaning]* teaches that: "A bodhisattva who takes the literal meaning and does not seek out the intent of what the Tathāgata has taught attends unreasonable to doctrine and is inappropriately committed to the Great Vehicle. But a bodhisattva who does not take the meaning literally and does

⁷¹The same passage is cited in Jñānagarbha's *Satyadvayavibhāga*, for which see Eckel, *Jñānagarbha's Commentary*, p. 96. It would indeed appear that Jñānagarbha has read Dharmapāla's *Sataka Commentary*.

seek out the intent of what the Tathāgata has taught attends reasonable to doctrine and is appropriately committed to the Great Vehicle.⁷²

Objection : (248b6) If this is the case, then how do you interpret the words of the [following] scriptural passage: "The Buddha addressed the gods and said: 'You must be aware that the Buddha has absolutely nothing to attain in awakening and that there is not the least thing that can arise or pass away. Why? Because things neither arise nor pass away. This is why the Tathāgata appears in the world.'⁷³

Reply : (248b11) One interpretation would explain that when all Buddhas realize supreme awakening, they are far removed from all imaginative fabrication (*prapañca*). Although they do appear in the world, yet they cannot be described as having realized anything.

(248b12) Another interpretation would hold that the Buddha has nothing to attain because he takes awakening as his essence. As the scriptures teach, awakening is identical with buddha and buddha with awakening. This is why there is nothing to attain. Because such is his nature and his awakening, in arising it is not as if he had previously not existed, and in passing away it is not as if he had previously existed, for all things are by nature apart from fabrication, and do not arise or pass away. We say that a Tathāgata has appeared in the world because supreme awakening becomes present.

⁷²The *Samdhinirmocana* 8.24 states: "Good son, [in the case of] the wisdom gained from hearing [doctrine, bodhisattvas] rely upon the literal meaning of a text without really understanding its intent or making it clear. They move toward liberation without being able to realize the meaning that brings about that liberation. [In the case of] the wisdom gained from thinking, [bodhisattvas] also rely upon the text, but not just the letter, for they are able really to understand its intent. But they are not yet able to make [its intent] clear and, although they turn toward liberation, they are yet unable to realize the meaning that brings about that liberation. [In the case of] the wisdom gained from cultivation, the bodhisattvas both rely upon the text and do not rely upon the text, they both follow the letter and do not follow the letter, for they are able really to understand its intent. They make [that intent] clear by means of images wrought in trance that conform to the matters to be known: They turn toward liberation well and are able to realize the meaning that brings that liberation about." See also Powers, *Wisdom of Buddha: The Samdhinirmocana Mahāyāna Sūtra*, 183-84. The *Lankāvatāra* has: "Those who, following words, discriminate and assert various notions, are bound for hell because of their assertions." See Suzuki, *The Lankāvatāra Sūtra*, p. 135.

⁷³Many Mahāyāna scriptures have similar passages. The *Prajñāpāramitā* texts abound with parallels, and the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra* has a similar passage, at the end of "The Goddess" Chapter: "Just so, there is perfect enlightenment because there is no attainment of perfect enlightenment."

(248b17) Let us take another scriptural passage: "Subhūti, you should be aware that form is described as having the essence of no-essence of all forms. This applies likewise to the other aggregates of perception, conceptualization, volition, and so forth."⁷⁴ Let us then explicate the sense of this passage. The other-dependent pattern has as its essence the true nature (*dharmatā*), apart from language and manifested as the non-essence of imagined form. But if everything were lacking in being altogether, then how could we still talk about that essence of no-essence? If you say that forms and so forth have no worldly and conventional essence, then this is logically inconsistent with the nature of the ultimate meaning of form and so forth. Why? Because ultimate meaning cannot be reached by imaginative fabrication, how could you know their essence by means of nonbeing?⁷⁵ And if you take non-essence as their essence, then you would have to make another category for this kind of nonbeing and not describe it as ultimate meaning, and then one would be unable to realize supreme awakening, but this contradicts your own thesis and constitutes a serious error.

Objection : (248b25) But if other-dependence really existed, this again contradicts the teachings of the scriptures. The scriptures teach:

All things arise from causes
 But both causes and things are entirely nonexistent.
 One who can correctly understand this
 Is said to have penetrated dependent co-arising.

If things arise from causes, then
 These things are entirely essence-free.
 [But] if things are entirely essence-free,
 Then things do not arise from causes.⁷⁶

⁷⁴For references to the *Prajñāpāramitā* teachings, see Conze, *The Large Sūtra*, index.

⁷⁵Against Bhāvaviveka's view of *pariyāya-paramārtha* known in language.

⁷⁶The first verse is similar to the *Anavataptahradāpasamkramaṇasūtra*, quoted in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* (239): "What is born of conditions is not truly born; and it does not arise as self-existent; what depends on conditions is said to lack own-being. Whoever comprehends the absence of being in things is free of delusion." See Sprung, *Lucid Exposition*, pp. 145-46. Also see *Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra*, ed. Lamotte, p. 41. The second verse is reminiscent of *Lankāvatāra*, 2.40 (10. 85): "Nothing whatever is born or ceases to exist by reason of causation; when causation is discriminated there is birth and cessation." See Suzuki, *The Lankāvatāra Sūtra*, p. 75.

Reply : (248c2) Although this is how these two scriptural passages do speak of the no-essence of dependently co-arisen things, yet there is no contradiction, because the things that arise from causes are of two kinds: the imagined and the other-dependent. We clarify the intent [of the scriptures] by explaining that essences clung to in imagination do not exist and are not said to be other-dependent. But if one says that other-dependence is entirely without essence, then one has to discard the two states of defilement and purification as totally nonexistent. But that is emptiness ineptly apprehended and brings harm both to oneself and to others. Would that you could eliminate such a falsely discriminated idea? When you have attained the true understanding, you yourself will be able to abandon [such mistaken ideas].

The Being of Other-Dependent Arising

Objection : (248c7) Now I have a further question. What wisdom has the other-dependent [pattern] as its object?

Reply : (248c8) We hold that it is purified worldly wisdom engendered by non-imaginative wisdom. Indeed, it [also] is non-imaginative [since it does not imagine external essences].⁷⁷

Objection : (248c9) Then why do you describe it as worldly? Who says that this [subsequent, worldly] wisdom is non-imaginative?⁷⁸

⁷⁷ In his *Mahāyānasamgrahopanibandana* (416c28) Asvabhāva comments upon the subsequent wisdom of a bodhisattva which both knows all sorts of ideas (*nānāvijñapti*) and yet is free from error: "This subsequently attained wisdom is also non-imaginative (*nirvikalpa*) and undefiled (*akliṣṭa*)." That is to say, just as a magician is not deceived by his own tricks, so the bodhisattva who has realized *vijñaptimātratā* does not cling to ideas as representing imagined essences, and is thus without imaginative discrimination.

⁷⁸ In his *Tarkajvālā* *Bhāvaviveka*, in Lopez's translation, writes: "The ultimate is of two kinds. One is supramundane non-contaminated [consciousness] free from elaboration which operates without activity. The second, possessing conceptual elaboration, is called a pure mundane wisdom which accords with the collection of merit and wisdom and operates with activity." Lopez, *A Study of Svātantrika* 137, explains that the first supramundane consciousness is non-conceptual, while the second "is a conventional wisdom of subsequent attainment which is a conventional mundane subject but which is pure in the sense that it does not come under the power of mistaken appearances. Such a consciousness accords with the trainings in the collection of merit and wisdom and operates with conceptual activity; it is involved with objects of thought. When Bhāvaviveka says that earth does not exist as the entity of the elements ultimately, 'does not exist ultimately' in

Reply : (248c9) If it did have imaginative discrimination of [external essences], then it would be without effective activity (*kriyā*) in regard to the true character of all things. Furthermore, if you were to say that it does have such effective activity in regard to the true character of things even though it has imaginative discrimination, because it has as its object what which is imagined (*parikalpita*), then even deceptive imaginings would have such an effective activity in regard to the true character of all things.⁷⁹

(248c12) Moreover, how could a wisdom of the true character of things that is not attained subsequent to non-imaginative [wisdom that understands the emptiness of all things] ever know conclusively an existent arising in other-dependence?

Objection : (248c13) [But] if this pattern of arising in other-dependence is not supported on that [pattern of imagined] apprehension just as it appears,⁸⁰

that thesis means not to exist for this latter type of ultimate consciousness. Since the entityness of phenomena does not exist in the face of such a wisdom consciousness, Bhāvaviveka is justified in saying that they do not ultimately exist, and the fault raised by the opponent is not incurred." Similarly the objector here refuses to admit that a subsequently attained wisdom can be non-imaginative, non-conceptual, and that it can know the real existence of the other-dependent pattern, which ultimately does not exist, for him.

⁷⁹See Tillemans, *Materials*, I: 45-46: "The Svātantrika's given is perhaps best brought out by Jñānagarbha's famous dictum that 'conventional truth is just as it appears' (*ji ltar snañ ba 'di kho ba kun rdzob*). This is interpreted to show that conventional objects do not have any existence apart from the appearance to mind, typically to direct perception—thus our depiction of the Svātantrika's conventional object as being a seeming-object, a reified appearance. When confronted with the problem that there would be no difference, *qua* appearance, between illusions and conventional truth, Jñānagarbha agrees, but says that the difference comes out in their practical consequences, their possessing or lacking practical efficacy, i.e., *arthakriyā*. Thus, for Jñānagarbha *et al.* the seeming-object which is given in itself is no different in the case of error or conventional truth: that difference is discovered *a posteriori* by *praxis*. Nor was Jñānagarbha the first or only Svātantrika to hold such a theory: Bhāvaviveka, in his *Prajñāpradīpa* and *Madhyamakārthasamgraha*, had already similarly classified conventional truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*) into correct (*tathyasamvṛti*) and false (*mithyasamvṛti*). For the Svātantrikas, then, the given is a phenomenon, 'something appearing to consciousness' (*śes pa la snañ ba'i cha*). For Jñānagarbha and Bhāvaviveka, who accept conventionally existing conventional objects, a conventional external object 'conforms to the appearance' (*śes pa la snañ ba dañ mthun par dños po gñas pa*) if the latter passes the tests of practical efficacy, otherwise there is only *mere* appearance, like a hallucination." It would appear to be this view that Dharmapāla is attacking here.

⁸⁰In contrast with the notion that conventional truth is the appearance of things (last note), Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasamgraha* teaches that the appearance of the other-dependent pattern is the falsely imagined pattern, and answers objections that state: "Since the other-dependent pattern does not really exist as it appears, how does one know that it is not entirely nonexistent?" and "Since the other-dependent pattern does not really exist as it appears, how does one know that it is not

they how can you say conclusively that there really exists a [pattern of] arising in dependence on others?

(248c14) [You claim that] only the purified worldly wisdom elicited from non-imaginative wisdom knows the other-dependent pattern, but this is inconsistent with [your own Yogācāra] śāstras. As those śāstras say: "The pattern of that which is totally imagined is the object of what wisdom: Is it an ordinary understanding? Or a sage understanding? It is not the object (*gocara*) of either, because it has no [real] character [that could serve as the objective cause of knowing]. But what wisdom has the other-dependent pattern as its object? It is the object of both [ordinary and sage understanding], but not the object of world-transcendent sage wisdom."⁸¹ [Therefore, since it is the object of these two understandings, it cannot be, as you claim, only the object of a purified worldly wisdom.]

(248c18) Moreover, when these [Yogācāra texts] discuss the issue of how many of the five [all-inclusive] categories⁸² pertain to the apprehended (*grāhaka*) and how many to the apprehended (*grāhya*), they say that (i.e., names (*nāman*), characteristics (*nimitta*), and suchness (*tathatā*) pertain to the apprehended, while discrimination (*vikalpa*) and true wisdom (*samyagjñāna*) pertain to both the apprehender and the apprehended. Names, characteristics, and discriminations are that which is apprehended by discriminating. But true wisdom has two varieties. The first takes suchness as its object, but the second, being engendered by that [first wisdom of suchness] does not yet know

entirely nonexistent?" His answer is that if there were no arising in dependence on others, one would fall into nihilism. (See Keenan, *The Summary of the Great Vehicle*, 50-51.)

⁸¹ I cannot locate the passage in question, although many Yogācāra texts treat these issues. Perhaps it is a summary statement, but I suspect otherwise, for the force of the objection is much stronger if a specific śāstra passage is cited. Probably it comes from the *Yogācārabhūmīśāstra*, for that is the text envisaged evidently in the subsequent discussion.

⁸² See Bhāvaviveka's discussion in *Prajñāpradīpa* 25, Eckel, *Bhāvaviveka's Critique*, p. 49 and note 2, where he describes the various versions of the five dharmas. Observe that the present listing of these five dharmas does not accord with the listings given there. The five all-encompassing categories of reality (*samgrahatattva pañcavastūni*) are treated in various different way in a host of Yogācāra texts. See for the *Madhyāntavibhāga*, see G. Nagao, *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya*, 42 and *Daijō Butten*, 280-81; Anacker, *Seven Works*, 238-39; O'Brien, "A Chapter on Reality," 234-35. The *Ch'eng Wei-shih lun* gives a summary of the various opinions. Its first opinion, for which Kuei Ch'i alludes to the *Yogācārabhūmīśāstra* 72, and the *Vikhyāpana* 6 and 16, is that contained in the above objection. See Wei Tat, trans., *Ch'eng Wei-shih lun*, 641-42, and de La Vallée Poussin, *La Siddhi*, 537-38. de la Vallée Poussin translates: D'après Yogasāstra, 72, Vikhyāpana, 6 et 16 (p. 507, col.1, 552 col.2), aucun des cinq Dharmas n'est Parikalpita; les Nimitta, Nāman (*abhidhāna*), Vikalpa (*cittacaittadarśanabhāgādi*) et Samyagjñāna sont Paratantra; la tathatā est Parinīṣpanna."

characteristics, and so forth, [and thus cannot be the wisdom that knows the existence of the other-dependent pattern].

(248c21) Moreover, since these categories] are by nature other-dependent, these śāstras say that "the totally imagined pattern is not included within the five categories, while the other-dependent is included in four categories, [excluding suchness which pertains only to the pattern of full perfection]. Yet, if the other-dependent is the object of a worldly wisdom and still you say that it is not empty, you are being ridiculous, for the true character of all things is not an object of such a worldly mind or wisdom. As we have by now repeatedly defended [our position], you must not claim an other-dependence that really exists.⁸³

Reply : (248c25) But there is no inconsistency between what those śāstras say and objects of either ordinary or wise understanding, because they rely on self-awareness (*svasamvitti*). Arising in other-dependence means precisely that mind and mental states arise from causes and conditions. When that occurs through the evolutions [of consciousness] we become self-aware of the various characteristics, names, and so forth as if they were external, concrete objects and arrogantly think we have apprehended such concrete, external objects. Nevertheless, such concrete, external objects are totally imagined and, having no core essence or character, they are not the objective cause of knowing (*ālambana-pratyaya*). Therefore they are not objects of either saintly or ordinary understanding.

(249a1) All defiled minds and mental states are only able to perceive objects as they appear to them.⁸⁴ They are unable truly to realize other mental objects as they really are. The mental states associated with undefiled worldly wisdom, because by nature apart from stain, have this realization both for oneself and for others. This is why we say other-dependence is understood by purified wisdom. There is no opposition with the reasoning presented in these [Yogācāra] śāstras. You speak of being ridiculous, but your accusations smack of delusion! You have not shown that our explanations run counter to reason.

Objection : (249a5) If the mind and mental states that arise from conditions were identical with the imagined, and if everything is empty of

⁸³Bhāvaviveka's position against the existence of *paratantrasvabhāva*.

⁸⁴Against the Svātantrika position that the object of conventional knowing is "just as it appears."

essence, like sky flowers, then how could they ensnare sentient beings in the three realms within the cycle of transmigration. Therefore, the other-dependent pattern is to be negated as lacking any reality whatsoever.

Reply : (249a7) The basic intent of the author [i.e., Āryadeva] of [this] śāstra is certainly in accord [with our argument for the existence of other-dependent arising]. If that were not so, then why would he have said [in the last stanza] that "insight gained through realization of emptiness can eradicate the bondage [of unreal imagining]"? No one can observe hair on a turtle, but we can imagine it and become entangled in [our mistaken ideas]. Nobody sees horns on a hare, but we can understand [the image] and again can reject [that image]. Thus, you should recognize that the mind and the mental states do exist, but that all concrete objects apprehended as external to the mind do not exist.

Conscious Construction Only (Vijñaptimātrata)

Objection : (249a11) How can you know with certainty that all things are only conscious constructs?

Reply : (249a11) The scriptures teach this in many places. What doubt can there be about it? In one scriptural passage, Buddha addressed Subhūti: "There is nothing solid—not even the tip of a hair—that one can rely on, yet deluded worldlings engender all their actions. But what they take as a refuge is only an erroneous view of being." This erroneous view refers to unreal imagining, for that unreal imagining is identical with the mind and its mental states.

(249a14) Another scripture states: "Not the slightest essence of anything can be found. There is only a capability to construct [them]." This ability to construct refers to the mind and its mental states. Yet another scripture says that: "The three realms are mind only."⁸⁵ Scriptural passages like these can be cited endlessly. Thus our statement that all things are only constructs of consciousness is logically validated.

⁸⁵ *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, ed. Vaidya, p. 32: cittamātram idaṃ taidhātukam.

Objection: (249a17) Surely, without an iota of doubt, your opinion that all things exist only as conscious constructs is itself an view! Then, since all things, such as form and so forth, are erroneously [perceived] objects, so the core reality [of consciousness] is really nonexistent. (249a19) And then, if objects are indeed nonexistent, how could conscious construction exist? And then the one consciousness would not be composed of the two aspects [of image and insight], for have you not completely eliminated one of the defining characteristics of mind, [i.e., the reality of the image corresponding to objects]?

(249a20) If you were to say that, even though the core reality of consciousness really lacks these two aspects [of image and insight] because its modalities (*akāra*) of subject and object are empty, you still can assert [the theory of] conscious construction-only, because there does exist a mind that has as its object (*ā lambana*) that which is to be understood simply as worldly convention, then you would be forced to admit that the realm of objects is entirely nonexistent, since worldly convention similarly knows its existent mental objects. If you allow that in some small aspect there really exists some core reality of consciousness, you must explain this core reality. What are its characteristics? And if you are unable to describe the subjective and objective aspects of consciousness [because they are said to be empty], how can you claim conclusively that only conscious construction exists?

Reply: (249a25) When all the scriptures say that only conscious construction exists, this is intended to elicit insight into consciousness and the abandonment of external objects, for upon abandoning external objects, mistaken mental states will be put to rest. And, because mistaken mental states have been put to rest, one encounters the middle path. Thus a scriptural passage states:

Without penetrating objects as mind only,
One engenders the two imaginings [of self and others],
By penetrating objects as mind only.
Imaginings cease to arise.

Know that all things are mind only,
Then abandon the characteristics of external objects.
Thereby one puts to rest imaginings

And is enlightened to universal and true emptiness."⁸⁶

(249b3) Foolish worldlings covet the taste of objects. They take hold of all their desires and have no thought of abandoning [them]. In the cycle of transmigration they sink into the ocean of the triple world, experiencing all manner of misery and suffering, without cause for liberation. The Tathāgata's compassion employs skillful means to teach that all things are only conscious constructs in order to lead them to abandon external objects. Having abandoned external objects, mistaken conscious constructs are destroyed. When mistaken constructs are destroyed, they realize cessation. Thus another scriptural passage states:

Like a good physician in the world
With wondrous drugs cures all illnesses,
So all Buddhas for the sake of beings
Teach mind only."⁸⁷

(249b19) Although the explanation [of these scriptures] is difficult, they can be analyzed as long as we rely on the method [of the three patterns], just as one would [rely on a method in] making cottages or pottery. The difficulties in demonstrating the many aspects of its subtlety are not absent, for [our interpretation] is provisional and not real. But if this [interpretation] is not true, then mind and thought would also be nonexistent, because the composite of the [four] aspects [of consciousness] in one instant would be parallel to such a

⁸⁶The *Lankāvatārasūtra* 10. 256-57 (ed. Vaidya, 124), has: cittamātram samārūhya bāhyam artham na kalpayet/ tathātālabane sthitvā cittamātram atikramet// cittamātram atikramya nirābhāsam atikramet/ nirābhāsasthito yogī mahāyānaṃ sa paśyati, which in Suzuki's translation, pp. 246-47, is: "When the [Yogin] enters upon Mind-only, he will cease discriminating an external world; establishing himself where suchness has its asylum he will pass on to Mind-only. By passing on to Mind-only, he passes on to the state of imagelessness; when he establishes himself in the state of imagelessness, he sees not [even] the Mahāyāna." The last phrase, however, should be: "he sees, i.e., really understands, the Mahāyāna." Suzuki wrongly reads *ma* for *sa*. See Lindner, *Lankāvatārasūtra*, p. 273, verse 55. The *Buddhabhūmisūtra* has a similar passage: "The Buddha addressed those wondrously born persons: Those bodhisattvas who have realized the patience that dharmas do not arise (*anupattikadharmakṣānti*), because they dwell in this teaching of no-birth, when they attain the understanding of this patience, they will gain mastery over the two [discriminative] thoughts. And because they have banished these two thoughts of self and others, they will attain the mind of equality (*samatācitta*). From this point the differentiating thought of self and others will never again occur to those bodhisattvas, and they will experience the phenomenal wisdom all of one unified taste." (T. 25, 723a3-7)

⁸⁷Often quoted, in various versions. See *Lankāvatāra*, 10. 406.

composite of many parts like the [calendar] of years and months, [which are merely fabricated names]. And that would be a grave error.⁸⁸

(249b13) In this fashion, when we see that the various kinds [of the Buddha's teachings] are not the same, we divide his sacred words into sections and among ourselves engender disputes, each clinging to one extreme or the other, thus being unable to eradicate the gross stains of our evil opinions. But who could equal the pure and wondrous import of the Great Vehicle preached by all Blessed Buddhas? Anyone who follows his own felt opinion without engaging in true reasoning and from his own perspective refutes others is greatly to be feared. We must abandon our attachments to either extreme of emptiness or being and gain insight into the middle path of the nonduality in the Great Vehicle.

(249b18) As a scripture teaches: "Bodhisattvas must be aware that all the views that arise from the root view of selfhood mature in the activity of defective doctrine and bind people to the world. Recklessly they take the heterodox view that denigrates and annihilates all things and from this perspective commend and circulate [their ideas]. Because the actions thereby engendered are influenced by defective doctrine, they pass through endless eons and fall into the evil destinies of the hells. They experience intense sufferings throughout their transmigrations. When due to some small power of previous goodness they come to the human realm, they are dull-witted, blind and deaf, and variously afflicted. Their bodily appearances are ugly and vulgar and people find them unpleasant to look upon. Rustic and backward in speech, there is no pleasure in listening to them. Perhaps in the past they have planted some dominating root of goodness and in coming to be born among humans have received the excellent result [of that past good root]. But because

⁸⁸Bandhuprabha's *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa*, which is in the lineage of Dharmapāla, treats the structure of the luminous mind: "Each and every defiled consciousness and conscious states has the two aspects of image (*nimittabhāga*) and insight (*darśanabhāga*). The *Pramāṇasamuccayaśāstra* further explains that consciousness and conscious states have three aspects. The first is that which is apprehended (*grāhyabhāga*). The second is that which apprehends (*grēhakabhāga*). And the third is the self-awareness (*svasamvittibhāga*) [of the first two]. These three aspects are neither identical nor different. The first is that which is known (*prameya*). The second is the act of knowing (*pramāṇa*). And the third is the result of that knowing (*pramāṇaphala*). If one analyzes very carefully, there must also be a fourth aspect to complete this explanation. The first three are as above, and the fourth is an awareness of the awareness of the very fact of being aware (*svasamvittisamvittibhāga*). (T. 26: 303b9-14)" The first three aspects follow Dignāga's schema, but the fourth aspect is peculiar to Dharmapāla and represents for him a critical consciousness that becomes aware of its own awareness of image and insight. See Keenan, *A Study of the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa*, 573-74.

of their previous actions of slandering the doctrine they have received, they now one-sidedly cling to the Tathāgata's teachings about emptiness in its refutative aspect and dismiss the true teaching approaches manifested by what he did teach. In the world this leads them always to identify what is not doctrine with doctrine and doctrine with what is not doctrine; what is not meaning with meaning and meaning with what is not meaning. Thus their own injury causes injury to others and they are deeply to be pitied."⁸⁹

(249b28) But what the Buddha taught is not so shallow. The doctrinal approach of the two truths is exceedingly difficult to fathom. But let us be encouraged. Basing ourselves on scriptures of explicit meaning, we will analyze its significance in summary and will terminate all disputation. The truth of worldly convention signifies that states of conditionally arisen form-and-mind, whether transcendent or worldly, are directly experienced apart from language, but as they do develop they can be expressed in words. Immediate experience is prior, followed then by the generation of language. The truths of worldly convention both do exist and do arise. Provisionally they bring about demonstrations, like illusory tricks. Although they arise from imagining just as occurs in dreams, they do have enunciative characteristics which we call worldly and conventional truth. The truth of ultimate meaning signifies all that which cannot be reached by any saintly knowledge, imagining, or naming, but which is internally realized. Because without any other cause, it has no identifying characteristics and is disjunctive from language, we call it the truth of ultimate meaning.

(249c6) This is a summary account of the doctrinal approach to the two truths. Students of true doctrine will accordingly engage in no disputation. In

⁸⁹The *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, 7.23, has a similar passage: "Good son, there are other sentient beings, who have not yet planted roots of goodness, who have not yet been purified from all obstacles, who have not yet matured their continuities [of consciousness], who have not repeated their commitments, who have not yet accumulated the requisites of merit and wisdom, and whose lineage is not of an upright disposition or character. Even though they are able thoughtfully to judge [doctrinal] propositions, yet they always maintain their own views. Even if they hear this doctrine, they will be unable truly to understand the underlying intent of my words or have deep faith in this doctrine. They would form the concept that this doctrine is not doctrine and this meaning is not meaning. Clinging to the idea that this doctrine is not doctrine and that this meaning is not meaning, they publicize their evaluation, saying: 'This is not the teaching of Buddha, but of the demon.' With such an understanding they slander, reject, curse, and revile this scripture as useless and mistaken, and in untold ways they attack, criticize, and dispense with this scripture. They regard all those who have faith in this scripture as a rival faction. . . ." The subsequent descriptions echo the themes of the *Samdhinirmocana* on the ineffability of ultimate meaning and the language-formed status of conventional meaning.

reliance on the former worldly convention, the states of defilement and purification do arise. In reliance on the latter ultimate meaning, one realizes cessation. Therefore, the sages say that there are three kinds of mental objects: mental objects that can be enunciated and that do have characteristics, mental objects that are ineffable but do have characteristics, and mental objects that are ineffable and do not have characteristics. The first is both cognizant of and has a propensity toward language. The next, although it has a propensity toward language, has no cognizance of language [because it is direct perception bereft of all conceptualization]. In the last both the propensity toward and cognizance of language are entirely absent forever. The first two have as their content worldly conventions, while the last has as its content ultimate meaning.⁹⁰

(249c13) Furthermore, when one is definitively apart from propensities toward language, the subsequently attained mind penetratingly focuses on the two truths. But if one engenders fixed ideas about worldly conventions and brings about disharmonious viewpoints about worldly convention, then these two [activities] are both described as unreal imagining. This [unreal imagining] open up the door to everything meaningless and unprofitable, ensnaring sentient beings and causing them not to be liberated. Insight into emptiness and no-self can cut off [these imaginings] entirely, lead sentient beings to sever the fetters of the triple world, personally realize that final and quiescent cessation, and then they will convert others and lead them to attain liberation by uprooting the roots of the hindrances to true practice. But if one engenders opinions that do not harmonize with worldly convention, then one indeed turns away from ultimate meaning. In order to show this insight, [Āryadeva] presents a stanza:

⁹⁰See de La Vallée Poussin, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, pp. 534-61, on various speculations concerning the two truths, three natures, and so forth, and their mutual correlations. We cannot, however, find any exact correspondence to our passage, which is also reminiscent of the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*. A classic passage in the *Mahāyānasamgrha* is perhaps germane. In describing the other-dependent pattern, Asaṅga lists the constructed differentiations that germinate from the storehouse consciousness and that are comprised within unreal imagining, i.e., paratantra. He goes on to say: "The conscious construction of the body, the embodied, and the experiencer, the experienced content, valid experiencing, time, number, place, and language are all engendered from the seminal permeations of language. . . . These conscious constructs are comprised in unreal imagining, for they exist only as conscious constructs. The other-dependent pattern is the support whereby these nonexistent, unreal objects appear. The imagined pattern is the appearance of nonexistent objects, which are only conscious constructs, as real. The reality pattern is the eternal nonexistence in the other-dependent pattern of such objects and objective properties, for they have no existent reality. (2:2)" See Keenan, trans., *The Summary of the Great Vehicle*, 39-40.

24. Demonstrations of unity or nonbeing in regard to
things

Contradict both the ultimate and the conventional.
Therefore, neither unity nor differentiation
Can be predicated of being.⁹¹ (399)

(249c23) If one clings to the opinion that all things in their essence certainly constitute a unity, then things are demonstrated to be one. If they are constituted as differentiated, then things are proved to be nonexistent. [But] these conclusions contradict both the ultimate and the conventional, because if all things in their essences are a unity, then form equals sound and sound equals form, while in fact form is not sound and sound is not form. Yet because of this essence, things must be concluded to be a unity. [On the other hand], if all things in their essences are differentiated, then form, sound, etc., would in their core reality be shown to be nonexistent, because they would have no [common] essential being, like sky flowers. If one clings to things in their essences and concludes to either unity or differentiation, he should recognize that he is mistaken. Therefore, these two mistaken opinions about the unity and differentiation in regard to the reality of being, and so forth contradict both [ultimate] reality and conventional. Because the fabricated errors that set such affirmation and negation in opposition against each other apply identically to [both theses of unity and differentiation], [Āryadeva] does not discuss them separately. In ultimate meaning [views about] being and nonbeing are put to rest and no objections can be demonstrated. In order to show this [Āryadeva] presents a stanza:

25. All theses about being, nonbeing, both [being and
nonbeing], and neither [being nor nonbeing]
We have put to rest.
If you want to raise difficulties in this regard,
You will never be able to prevail. (400)

⁹¹Note that the Chinese differs substantially from the Tibetan text, which does not treat the issue of unity and differentiation. See Lang, ed., p. 150, and Candrakīrti's commentary above.

(250a6) In the truth of ultimate meaning there is not the slightest existent thing, because all things are originally essence-free. Therefore, theses on the viewpoint of being are thereby laid to rest. The viewpoint of nonbeing comes about because one relies on the viewpoint of being. When the latter viewpoint vanishes, then the former viewpoint is also destroyed. If then reality is nonexistent, then saintly wisdom has no effective activity, for that activity of saintly wisdom negates the negation of being. Therefore, the viewpoint that negates being does not realize its reality. When saintly wisdom gains insight into reality, it does not recognize any nonbeing. Because it examines conventional being, we say that reality is nonexistent. [Our] discourse on the nonbeing of reality refers back to these discussions about the conventional. The teaching of the nonbeing of reality harmonizes with reality and that is why all the scriptures often teach its nonbeing. We must eradicate the viewpoints of both nonbeing and of being, for neither alternative is acceptable, because these [four alternatives of] being, [nonbeing, both being and nonbeing, and neither being nor nonbeing] are able to be asserted. But reality is none [of these alternative theses] because it is apart from assertions. All evil viewpoints disturb and trouble one's mind, raising a host of perverse difficulties to true reasoning. All these [difficulties] come from the genesis of viewpoints about [the four alternative theses of] being and so forth. When these viewpoints are eradicated, then those [difficulties and objections] too will be eliminated. Although one might desire to offer an incisive rebuttal of true emptiness, where would one find an applicable rhetoric, since it has nothing by way of support, for emptiness is without grounding and offers no supporting foothold. All the great minds who elicit broad vows and desire to benefit and gladden sentient beings without limit must correctly sever the gross dross of mistaken viewpoints and wondrously enter into the Sugata's true emptiness to fulfill their desire and to encourage students in their practice.

Having eradicated the bondage of viewing being,
One then rejects the dross of clinging to nothingness.
Well opening the wondrous middle way,
One vows that the world return to quiescence.

(250a22) This treatise composed by Bodhisattva Āryadeva is now completed. Repeatedly he explained how to eliminate heterodoxy. Again, we give a stanza:

In order to burn back the fire of unorthodox view points
[Āryadeva] has covered himself with the balm (*turuṣka*) of the
Tathāgata's true doctrine
And fanned a great wind of reasoning.
Who would venture, moth-like, to jump into this fierce blaze?⁹²

This Tripitaka Master (i.e., Dharmapāla) heard this śāstra on the north side of Vulture Peak. I (i.e., Hsüan-tsang) have translated it just as I heard it. May my blessings be effective. I offer these stanzas:

Āryadeva and Dharmapāla rely on wisdom and compassion.
They have composed these discourses to grind down all
heterodoxy.
The negations of these four hundred stanzas⁹³ all eliminate
[heterodoxy];
Like the conflagration at the end of a world age, they burn away
even the most insignificant [heterodox opinion].

Therefore, I would give up my life for you to inquire into its
assertions about reality,
Gladly to engage in it to the end,
following its text and interpretations.
I desire this [śāstra] speedily to be available to sentient beings
That they may rise toward supreme Buddha awakening.

⁹²This verse echoes the title of Bhāvaviveka's *Tarkajvālā*, Flame of Reasoning. Dharmapāla is enlisting Āryadeva himself in refuting Bhāvaviveka's critique. Note that *Tarkajvālā* 3.10 states: "Wisdom is the lamp whose light cannot be obscured and the fire that [burns] the fuel of the defilements." See Eckel, *To See the Buddha*, p. 141. It seems clear that Dharmapāla felt himself attacked and burned by Bhayva's attack, for he employs a balm (olibanum or ghee) to inure himself against his opponent and develops his own fire of Yogācāra reasoning. Thus, Dharmapāla is responding to a previous critique of Bhāvaviveka.

⁹³The Chinese translations of the basic verses, T. 1570, and Dharmapāla's commentary, T. 1571, only have one hundred verses. This last verse suggests the Chinese were acquainted with the full text of Āryadeva's *Catuhśataka*.

Chinese Text of Dharmapāla's
Ta-ch'eng Kuang Pai-lun Shih-lun
Chapter 10

from

Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō

Number 1571

Volume 30, pp. 242-250

起一切世現相遠是則世間現因果。生滅作起。自皆無。世現所知。汝向詳因。況能信受。深隱義耶。如是觀生都非實有。生無實故。滅亦實無。但隨世間說有生滅。隨世所說。是俗非真。勝義理中無生無滅。一切法性非斷非常。生滅既無。法應常住。如前廣破。常性實無。若爾應無一切法性。不爾。我說俗法非無。豈不我宗說一自性。轉變力故。無所不為。雖有所為。而無生滅斷常等過。所以者何。果起不生性變成故。果謝不滅歸本性故。果性非常。前起滅故。果性非斷後起生故。轉變非恒。故非定有。自性不身。故非定無。此亦不然。諸法生滅理既不立。汝宗所執轉變豈存。又轉變言及自性等。前已廣破。無宜重執。故汝所說理必不然。有作是言。我經部等。因緣和合。無間果生。果起。因復能生。後如是。脫轉無始時來。因果連綿相續不絕。無有生滅斷常等過。所以者何。相續無始。故無有生。未得對治相續不盡。故無有滅。相續改轉。所以非常。相續連綿。所以非斷。非一性。故亦非轉變。此亦不然。若有生滅。可有相續。生滅既無。相續何有。無生滅義。前已廣論。相續有終。即是轉變。故立相續過失。彌多有作是言。我說諸法常有部等。一切有為。從本。以來。性相實有。嗣前起後。三世遷流。無有斷常生滅等過。所以者何。證恒有故。無生無滅。有為相合。所以非常。果起。嗣因。所以非斷。念念別故。非變非續。此亦不然。說常有宗。先已破故。色等諸

法體者。恒有。應似無為。難有為相。便同數論。一切皆常。不可說用。有生滅。用不離體。應同體。常體。不離用。應非恒有。若用本有。應有名生。若用本無。應非可起。用未生位。生用未。有。不可名生。用已生位。生用已息。亦不名生。除此二位。無別生時。前已廣說。故不可執。諸法用生。生既無。滅亦非有。又若色等有為相合。故是無常。此有為相無餘相合。應非無常。若言此相與餘相合。是則無窮。若言有為有大小相。展轉相相非無窮者。此亦不然。如色等法。餘相合。不名能相。生等亦然。與餘相合。應非能相。又如大相。不以其所相色等諸法。為其能相。小相亦爾。不應所相大生等法。以為能相。若別有相應至無窮。若別無相。應成常住。又有為相。定非實有。若實有者。與理相違。所以者何。如無為法。有無為相。離法。實無。此亦應然。同三相。故無為實有。前已廣述。一切有為。亦非實有。以惡分折。便歸空。故又對無為。立有為法。無為無故。有為亦無。有為無為。若從緣起。即同幻事。若不藉緣。便似空花。故不應執。以為實有。如契經言。有為無為。皆是世俗。分別假立。其體俱空。除為無為。更無別法。說復說。但是虛言。有為無為。攝一切法。此二空。故諸法皆空。空中都無分別。戲論。應通無礙。即聖明。故契經言。一切諸法。從本皆空。空即無性。由無性故。即是放。若波羅蜜多。其中都無少法。可說。為生為滅。為斷為常。為一為異。為來為去。天帝當知。若有淨信。諸善男子。或善女人。能如是說。不謬

般若波羅蜜多。異此說者。皆名為謬。若說常空。應斷斷滅。遠常有故。不隨此邊。執常皆空。應斷斷滅。常無因果。斷滅故。我諸所說。皆是遮言。遮謂遮他。生滅等。執無生非滅。唯為遮生。無滅非生。但為遮滅。非斷常等。類此。應知。雖涅槃時。生死斷滅。此方便說。是假非真。如說天中有常樂等。是隨俗說。非稱實言。應以前說諸句文。同隨其所。應破諸妄執。我等皆妄。雖復為真。謂畢竟空。言路絕。分別戲論。皆不能行。唯諸聖賢。內智所證。是故智者。應正勤修。證此真空。捨彼妄執。
 *大乘廣百論釋卷第九

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 *大乘廣百論釋卷第九

大乘廣百論釋卷第十

聖天菩薩本 護法菩薩釋
 *三藏法師玄奘奉 詔譯
 敬誠弟子品第八

復次正論已立邪道伏膺。於密義中。尚餘微澗。以淨理教。重顯真宗。遣彼餘疑。故說頌曰

由少因緣故 疑空謂不空
 依前諸品中 理教應重遣
 論曰。雖一切法。本性皆空。而初學徒。未能見。故。追愛妄有。怖達深空。或為餘緣。未能決了。以正理教。重顯前宗。令彼疑疑。捨諸倒執。既一切法。本性皆空。未達此空。以何為性。諸

◎以二已◎ ◎因一四◎ ◎契一疑◎ ◎見故一明見◎ ◎梅達深一迷悟真◎

法無我此復云何謂無自性應正顯示何假轉言正示無由以無體故但可假說諸法無我無性可取故名爲空如契經言空名諸法無我無性無執無取勝義理中都不說少法有我無性可說名空若爾空名應不可說實不可說但假立名如說太虛雖無自性實不可說而假立名空既難言有應可說亦不可說實無體故如說諸法實性都無無性理中無二無說若爾說者言及所言一切皆空今應無說既有所說應不皆空爲顯此疑故次頌曰

論曰能說所說若有 空理則爲無

論曰言能說者謂能說人言及所言俱名所說此三總攝有爲無爲謂眼等根及色等境此若實有何法爲空爲遣此疑故復頌曰 諸法假緣成 故三事非有

論曰能說言義三事性空假託衆緣而成立故餘宗亦許諸法名言皆是自心隨俗安立如是說者言及所言皆勝義無唯世俗有如何謂此三事不空云何定知三事非有謂依他立如幻所爲不依他成皆如鬼角是故三事自性皆空爲益世間假有言說又汝何爲疑難真空我意猶望成昔有見應捨此意所以者何非破他宗能成已見如破他說無礙故常非即能成自無常性設有此理汝亦不成所以者何故次頌曰

3. 若唯說空過 不空義即成 不空過已明 空義應先立

論曰若唯破空不空成者不空已破空義應

成前諸品中已說一切立不空義所有過失若汝欲成不空義者先當方便除前過失不除前失但說空過汝不空義終不得成非顯他人有失無礙即能成已有有礙要具二能方成已見謂立與破故次頌曰

4. 諸欲壞他宗 必應成已義

論曰要具立破自見方成立破二能見所依故唯彰他失不顯己宗自義得成終無是理何緣汝毀唯樂破空不念欲成己之有義故於立破二事應均方可得成自宗有義汝欲立有畢竟無能故諸法空其理決定豈不空論此過亦齊不顯己宗唯彰他失此實非理空無我宗前諸品中已廣顯故然空無我遺有我成故破汝宗我宗已立若爾空論但有虛言空無我名無實義故如是如是誠如所言空無我名是假非實爲破他執假立自宗他執既除自宗隨遣爲顯此義復頌曰

5. 爲破一等執 假立違爲宗

論曰一異及非名爲三執俱同一異故不別論一等三宗若正觀察皆隨無性無少可存彼性本空非由今破故交經說迦葉當知所見本空非由今破諸執者證本性空故諸破言皆是假說立亦應爾權證非真諸法皆空宗依何立依汝所執故我立宗所執既無宗應不立汝謂爲有故宗非無爲存自宗應許他有爲違汝執我立我宗汝所執無我宗彌立雖爾不可立空爲宗現見世間瓶等

有故雖空無我比量多端而被強成現量所伏不爾瓶等非現量知所以者何故次頌曰

6. 許瓶爲現見 空因非有能

論曰我若許瓶現量所得空因比量何量無能然我說瓶非現量得空因比量何量無能瓶等諸塵皆非現見破根境等諸品已論不可除宗謂瓶現見對此安立爲證有因所見若同可引爲證所見既異雖有順從是故空因不遠現量能立諸法性相皆空瓶等諸塵世間現見若以此量皆立爲空是則世間無不空法空無翻對應不得成爲舉此疑故說頌曰

7. 若無不空理 空理如何成

論曰夫立空理翻對不空不空若無空亦非有如何可立諸法皆空爲決此疑故復頌曰

汝既不立空 不空應不立

論曰立不空者翻對於空既不信空不空焉立如何可立諸法不空汝不信空而得立有我無執有何廢立空若言不空亦有所對爾互有無及定無空我空亦然對世俗有違彼妄有故立其空又所立空專爲違執不必對有方立於空如爲違常說無常教雖常有而立無常又汝此中不應疑難翻對在不在於空有事非無有期有對空理非有何對何翻若謂不然空是宗故如立色等無常爲宗此無常宗既定是有空宗亦爾應必非

◎有無二無有◎ ◎成二立◎ ◎一既一◎

無。此說非真。因不定故。世間現見。無亦是宗。理亦應然。故次頌曰

8. 若許有無宗 有宗方可立 無宗若非有 有宗應不成

論曰。無宗若有。對立有宗。無宗若無。有宗何對。若言無對而立有宗。即自違前資空有對。若一切法無不皆空。無我真空感同一味。如何現見諸法不同。此亦不然。世俗有故。勝義無故。理不相違。為顯此義。故說頌曰

9. 若諸法皆空 如何火名燧 此如前具造 火煖俗非真

論曰。若一切法本性皆空。如何世間有火等異。世俗事有。諸法不同。勝義理空。無火等異。故汝疑難於理不然。火等如前破根境等。已具觀。然俗非真。如何此中復為疑難。若法非有。空何所遮。空有所遮。故法應有。若爾四論展轉相違。皆應是真。便違自意。為顯此義。故說頌曰

10. 若謂法實有 遮彼說為空 應四論皆真 見何過而捨

論曰。遮所遮故。建立能遮。所遮若無。能遮豈有。如有言非雨。故說名冬。冬時所遮雨時必有。空遮有故。有定非無。此亦不然。因不定故。一等四論展轉相違。皆應是真。是所遮故。真。即無過。皆應可宗。汝見何惑。捨三執一。故不可說實有所遮。若諸所遮皆實有者。自言無過。汝過應真。汝投無空。此空應實。若一切法性相都無。是則世間皆應斷滅。尚不執有。況復執無。執有執無。皆成過故。為顯此義。故說頌曰

11. 若諸法都無 生死應非有 諸佛何曾許 執法定為無

論曰。若法全無。應無生死。因果展轉相續。輪迴。非定執無。何得為疑。我說世俗因果。非無。諸佛世尊。智見無礙。亦未曾許。定有定無。如契經中。佛告迦葉。諸法性相。非有非無。有是一邊。無是第二。謂當與斷。此二中間。無色無見。無任無儂。不可表示。不可施設。此意說言。世俗有故。依之建立。生死輪迴。勝義空故。

12. 若真離有無 何緣言俗有 汝本宗亦爾 致難復何為

論曰。若色等法。真離有無。復有何緣。而言俗有。因果不生。死輪迴。俗理人情。因緣假有。真該實理。非有非無。汝等本宗。皆許無二。而言法有。疑難何為。所以者何。如諸句義。非即是。勿一切法。其體皆同。亦非非有。勿一切法。其體皆無。非有非無。雖違諸法。而立種種。句義不同。我法亦然。何煩致難。由此道理。餘難亦通。所以者何。故次頌曰

13. 諸法若都無 差別應非有 執諸法皆有 差別亦應無

論曰。若一切法。實性都無。所有世間。因果差別。謂從眼等眼識等。生此皆應無。無無別故。此同上釋。謂不執無。執有。執無。皆非理。故。又若執有其過。亦同。所以者何。若一切法。皆同有性。所有世間。因果差別。謂從眼等眼識等。生此皆應無。無無別故。定於上有。上隨相不同。建立世間。諸法差別。我亦如是。真故。雖空於俗。有中建立差別。故汝所難。即為唐捐。有劣。慧人。復生疑難。若法非有。則定應無。能破有。因此難。非理。世俗有故。汝執非無。能立有。因何故。非有。為顯此義。復說頌曰

14. 若謂法非有 無能破有因 破有因已明 汝宗何不立

論曰。若謂諸法。性相皆無。能破有因。亦非有者。此懸極劣。以於現前。顯顯事中。不能了故。世俗所攝。能破有因。前已廣明。何謂非有。汝不可說。俗有非因。勝義理中。無立破故。若不忍許。能破有因。何不立。因證自宗有。如我廣說。能破有因。汝立有因。一未曾見。如何可執。諸法非空。空言是破。破他。便立有言。是立。自立方成。是故我空。無勞別立。汝所執有。須別立。因。別因。既無。何緣知有。破。因。易得。立。因。難成。故破。有因。未為奇妙。若爾汝。宗。何不。破。空。為破。彼言。故說頌曰

15. 說破因易得 是世俗虛言 汝何緣不能 遮破其空義

論曰。破。因。易得。是俗虛言。未見有因。破其空。故。小乘外道。雖惡其空。而未有因。破其空。義。如何可說。易得。破。因。諸法。性。空。立。立。難。破。諸。法。性。有。難。立。易。傾。真。偽。較。然。如。何。因。執。有。破。

◎立因一因成◎ ◎宗一宗◎

立破。固網所自出無能。矯作是說。聲為
 有聲應無。為破此言故說頌曰
 16 有名詮法有 謂法實非無
 無名表法無 法實應非有

論曰。彼立諸名以聲為性。此立名等。非即是
 聲故。但舉名以破彼執。有聲詮有。汝執所詮
 法實非無。無聲表無。應信所詮。法實非有。無
 聲非量。便自違宗。故汝所言非為證有。此劣
 聲者欲脫已。徒設巧勢終不能免。依實有
 法立實有名。因實有名生實有解法。若非有
 應無有名。有名若無。應無有解。既有有解故
 法非無。此亦不然。假立名故。為顯此義。故說
 頌曰

17 由名解法有 遂謂法非無
 因名知法無 應信法非有

論曰。若問有名生於有解。遂謂諸法是有非
 無。既聞無名生於無解。應信諸法非有。是無
 此。既不然。彼云何爾。依名生解。是證空。因謂
 為有名。必不應理。法體若有何待有名。既待
 有名。方生有解。故知諸法體實為無。但假立
 名世共流布。有名決定無實所詮。如人號牛
 依想立故。名能造有而立有因。不異有人以
 明為聞者。若可說是假非真。所以者何。故次
 頌曰

18 諸世間可說 皆是假非真
 離世俗名言 乃是其非假

論曰。世間言說皆隨自心。為共流傳假想安
 立法。若可說是假非真。非假是真。定不可說。

諸可說者皆俗非真。前諸品中已廣成立。故
 所執有是假非真。如舍如軍。可言說故。一等
 四執前已具述。更不立餘實有法。是則此
 論應無遺。為釋此疑。故說頌曰
 14 諍語法為無 可墮於無見
 唯詞語妄執 如何說證無

論曰。諍語有法可證無邊。唯遺妄情豈證無
 執。為破有執且立為無。有執若除無亦隨遣。
 又世俗有前已數論。故不應言。此證無執。唯
 許俗有真應是無。不許真無。應許真有此言
 非理。故次頌曰

20 有非真有故 無亦非真無
 既無有真無 何有於真有

論曰。若有真有可有真無。真有既無。真無豈
 有無真無故。真有亦無。真非有無。如前屢
 辯。如何復執真有無若真非無。何意頻說
 諸法性相俗有真無。此說意言。唯俗是有。真
 無此有。故說真無。若爾此真俗無為體。若
 爾者。應別有真若別有真有非唯俗。有既唯
 俗。真體應無真體。若無何欣修證。此中一類
 釋此難言。我說真無是遮非表。世間妄見執
 為真真。遮此有真有非真體。然其真體即是
 俗無。非離俗無別有真體。言真無者。謂俗
 無真。此遮其真無別所表。此於言義未究其
 源。誰謂真無別有所表。若遮除法別有所詮。
 是遮表言。遮除法已表餘共相。如非衆生非
 黃門等。若遮除法無別所詮。是唯遮言。遮所
 遮已其力斯竭。如勿食肉勿飲酒等。此真無
 言唯遮其真無別所表。不可言悉。如非有言。

唯遮其有不詮非有。亦不表餘。若詮其無或
 表餘法。則不應說此非有言。若有言詮於
 有者。非無之說應表其無。如是遮言。愚智同
 了。彼無疑難。重說何為。彼難意言。若有唯俗。
 真即非有何所修證。但說真無。是遮非表。乃
 至廣說。豈釋難耶。復有釋言。修無我觀。方便
 究竟。見其理時。一切俗有皆不顯現。故說真
 無。此亦不然。意難了。故若俗非有說名為真。
 應無所證。若別有真有。是所證者。則不應言有
 唯是俗。又這經說都無所見。乃名見其少有
 所見。即非見真。是故此言亦非正釋。如是釋
 者。應作是言。真非有無。此言絕故。為破有執
 假說為無。為破無執。假說為有。有無二說皆
 世俗言。勝義理中有無俱遣。聖智所證。非有
 非無。而有而無。後當廣說。有作是難。證法空
 因為有為無。有則餘法亦應是有。無則不能
 證諸法空。為舉此難。故說頌曰

21 有因證法空 法空應不立
 論曰。空必依因方可得立。若不爾者。一切應
 成。因既不空。餘亦應爾。唯陽焰等水性性空。
 則所立宗皆不成。故為釋此難。復說頌曰

宗因無異故 因體實為無
 論曰。教論師等總別無異。動無無間所發等
 因。皆即是聲。應如聲體。不通除故。因體不
 成。勝論師等計總與別或異不異。其不異者
 過同前師。異即如前諸品已破。故異不異皆
 不成。因由此故說。宗因無異。因體實無。又所
 立因體若實有。應與宗體或一或異。然不可
 說因與宗體或一或異。非一異故。猶若軍林。

是假非其世俗所攝。隨順世間虛妄分別。建立種種宗因不同。遂諸邪執。邪執既違宗因亦亡。故不可言法同因有。宗因假立皆非。其復有難言。證法空喻為無為。有無則不能證諸法空。有則諸法如喻應有。此亦不然。故次頌曰

22. 謂空喻別有 例諸法非空
唯有喻應成 內我同鳥黑

論曰。喻則是因一分所攝。因既俗有。喻亦應然。若謂難因別有喻證。以例諸法是有非空。此定不然。難因之喻必不能證所立義宗。如所立宗非因攝故。若非因喻能立義宗。內我如鳥黑性應立。又應一切所立皆成。無因事同易可得故。由是喻證必不離因。故應同因不可為難。若一切法本性皆空。證見此空有何勝處。為叙此難。故說頌曰

23. 若法本性空 見空有何益

論曰。非於難我諸行法中證見我空少有勝處。諸法亦爾。若本性空。證見此空。何所饒益。若無所益何用助勞。修能證空無量加行。為釋此難。復說頌曰

虛妄分別轉 證空見能除

論曰。諸法諸行難空無我。而諸愚夫虛妄分別執一異等。由此虛妄分別勢力。生長貪等煩惱隨眠。隨緣發生諸善惡業。沒三有海相續輪迴。三苦所煎不能自出。勤修加行證無我空。漸次斷除虛妄分別。隨其所應證三菩提。自利他功德無量。虛妄分別其體是何。謂三界心所有法。豈不此法亦本性空。如

諸愚夫所執色等。何能引苦苦迫有情。若此雖空而能引苦。是則色等亦有此能。何故但言虛妄分別。雖色心等皆本性空。而要依於虛妄分別。計度諸法為有為無。因是發生難染清淨。由斯含融染淨不同。是故但言虛妄分別。法若實有。是事可然。法既實無。如何計度。為有無等。染淨不同。如夢等中。雖無色等。而有種種相現分明。此喻不然。於夢等位有分別故。作用非無。分別為依。現諸境像起諸染淨。是事可然。今既皆空。無實分別。誰能起此作用。不同。無體有能。曾所未見。若無有體而有功能。兎角龜毛。應皆有用。又無煩惱更輪迴。未種善根。應獲常樂。此中一類釋此難言。世俗非無。故無此失。應問世俗非歸實耶。彼答不然。隨世俗置。是有有故。亦名歸實。如何可說一法一時。有無相違。俱名歸實。生等亦爾。一法一時。有生無生。有滅無滅。有斷無斷。有常無常。有來無來。有去無去。乃至廣說。更互相違。如何可言。是謂實。彼作是說。一法一時。無義為真有義為俗。義差別故。互不相違。猶如世間施等善法。性有漏故。得不善名。善根相應。故亦名善。俱名歸實。而不相違。此理不然。施等善法。親待異故。可不相違。一法一時。有無二語無別種。所得無違。所以者何。安和有善。善有二種。所謂世間及出世間。出世善法。畢竟能害煩惱諸礙。究竟安和名勝義善。世間善法。暫時有能畢竟無能。暫時能伏煩惱。故名世俗善。非永能斷煩

惱。故亦得名為勝義不善。此善不善互不相違。有能無能。時分異故。如施等善。任一刹那。說名有能。過此已後。必不能住。說名無能。有能無能。雖在一法。時分異故。而不相違。第二刹那施等不住。既無有體。誰名無能。由彼體無能定非有。能非有故。即名無能。或能無能。時分無異。所望境別。故不相違。所以者何。暫時能伏實等。經故。名為有能。不能斷滅貪等。種故。名曰無能。如服。酥膏能除風。不違。痰癘。有能無能。時分雖同。而所望境有差別。故。互不相違。一法一時。有無二語。境無差別。何得無違。彼復教言。如一念。識我執。故世俗名我。由勝義故。亦名無我。我無我別。而不相違。一法一時。有無亦爾。雖無境別。而不相違。此亦不然。我無我。義不相違。故。所以者何。一刹那心不自在。故。名為無我。我執所依。亦名為我。如契經言。若識是我。應得自在。不應轉變。而諸愚夫。依我執。說我。不自在。我執。依我。雖同一識。而不相違。一法一時。有無相。及。俱名歸實。豈得無違。故。今為成。有無二語。同在一法。互不相違。雖。引眾多世間。譬喻。種種方便。終不能成。彼重教言。如一齊色。據自故。有。望他故。無諸法。亦然。一法性。據俗故。有。望其故。無此。亦不然。青黃體異。可據自有。望他為無。俗之與異。其體不別。據自有。望他為無。尋究其俗。實即是異。非者。彼青黃成黃色。故。故。所立法。喻不同。又俗與真體。相離。如何俗體。望真為無。如契經中。佛告。善現。世俗勝義。無各別體。世俗真

○內一阿○ ○麻一蘇○ ○及一反○ ○引一別○

如即是勝義，非離其色別有於空，乃至證空亦復如是。如何一法無別境時，二義相連俱名諦實，由是古昔執範諸師，情事不同安立二諦。世俗諦語近顯俗情，勝義諦言遠表實事。世俗諦法雖稱俗情，而事是處故非諦實，又現量證緣起色心言不能證應非俗諦。故契經說：所有世間名句所詮，名為俗諦。此經意說世共所知，能詮所詮相應法義，及為詮表非共所知，法義經書，名為俗諦。現量所證緣起色心，非言所詮，亦非俗諦。若言假立名言所詮，故此色心亦俗諦攝，究竟勝義應亦非其。假立名言所詮表故，究竟勝義無此色心，異理都無，事有法故，非二諦攝。此法應無則逐世間現量所。證若言是有非二諦收應立第三，非真俗諦。若言雖有緣起色心，是諸世間現量所得，而非究竟勝義諦收，假說名為世俗諦攝。隨意假立世俗名言，有實色心則無諦論，此為依故染淨義成，若謂色心世俗故，有由勝義故非有非生，如是所言，為有何義。若言如彼無分別智，所行境界究竟空無，不如是有，故說非有。若爾所行究竟智故，無分別智應不得生，設許得生亦非真智。緣無境故，如了餘無，智既非真，境應是俗，雖言色心不如是有，而復顯顯色心實有，由說非有究竟無故，無異相故，定應是有，既定是有，由是亦應許此色心實有生等。若汝意謂雖復色心亦有亦生，而非勝義，應先審定，勝義是何然後可言，此非勝義。若言勝義是無分別智慧所行究竟空無，此先已破，謂彼所

行究竟無故，無分別智應不得生，乃至廣說。又此所行非真勝義，以是無故，猶如兔角，或非有故，如彼空花。若言勝義是可研窮，此亦不然。境無異故，夫研窮者不捨世俗，又世俗法不可研窮，此可研窮應離世俗，然非離俗別有勝義，故不可說此可研窮，是故汝言非勝義相，若謂餘宗所執勝義都非有故，是勝義相，此亦不然。彼謂緣生習性等性，名為勝義，今殺非有，便逐自宗及現量等。若言諦實是勝義相，是則世俗應非諦實，何故前言俗為諦實，設許唯說非有非生，名為諦實，是有是生唯假言說，妄分別立既非諦實，唯假言說妄分別立，如何能起染淨作用，故彼釋難。其理不成，非說龜毛名為有體，即有作用能縛世間，復有除師釋此難曰：分別所執法體是無，因緣所生法體是有，由斯發起煩惱隨眠，繫縛世間輪迴三有，或修加行證無我空，得三菩提脫生死苦，因緣生法雖通色心，而心是源所以，偏說虛妄分別能縛世間，厥此能修證空加行，雖有境界若無有心，虛妄尋思終不繫縛，不能取厭修無我空。證三菩提出離生死為證此義，依他起性。

遍計所執無 依他起性有
妄分別失壞 隨增減二邊
此中一類釋此義言，名是遍計所執，義是依他起性，名於其義非有故無，隨隨世間非無故有，不可引此證有依他，此釋不然。義相遠故，若名於義非有故無，義亦於名是無何有，又於其義所立名言，既因緣生如義應有，若妄所執能詮性無，妄執所詮其性豈有，名隨世俗有詮表能，故不許為依他起性；義亦隨俗假說有能，何不許為遍計所執。世俗假立能詮所詮，無應並無有應齊有，如何經說一有一無，故汝所言，不符經義。應信遍計所執性無，是諸世間妄情立故，依他起性從因緣生，非妄指為應信是有，彼證已義，復引經言

由立此此名 詮於彼彼法
彼皆性非有 由法性皆然
此頌不能證成彼義，經意不說，名於義無但說所詮，法性非有，辨諸法性，皆不可詮，名言所詮，皆是共相諸法自相皆絕名言，自相非無共相非有，此中略說，所詮性無非謂能詮，其性實有故，但說彼非有言，不爾應言此性非有，彼為證此依他性無復引經中所說略頌

無有少法生 亦無少法滅
淨見觀諸法 非有亦非無
此亦不能證依他起性非有，所以者何，此頌顯明遍計所執自性差別，能詮所詮，其體皆空，無生無滅離執淨見，觀諸世間，因緣所生非無非有，故此非證依他起無，若有依他何緣經說，一切法性無不皆空，又契經言，佛告善現，色等諸法自性皆無，復有經言，佛告大慧，一切法性皆無有生，先有先無不可生，故此有密意密意如何，謂此諸經唯破遍計所執自性，非一切無若一切無便成邪見，云何知有此密意，耶。除契經中顯了說故，謂薄

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◎一◎二◎三◎四◎五◎六◎七◎八◎九◎十◎十一◎十二◎十三◎十四◎十五◎

伽梵說如是言。我唯依於相應自性說一切法自性皆無。若有如言而生執著。謂染淨法自性皆無。彼惡取空名為邪見。相應自性即是世間遍計所執由心轉轉。以外諸處依此諸塵起諸倒執。因此倒執計有自他。能詮所詮相應自性染淨諸法。即是依他。故知諸經有此密意。又到他岸般若經中。佛自分明有無義。遍計所執所集所增。所取常恒無變異法。如是一切皆名為無。因緣所生皆說為有。又餘經說。遍計所執自性無生。依他起性所攝諸法從因緣生。又慈度經作如是說。行態度者善知色性。善知色生善知色如乃至廣說。又諸經說諸法無性無生滅等。皆應分別不可如言執為了義勿世俗論。諸法亦無便惡取空成大邪見。此言非理。所以者何。於了義經異分別故。世尊自說。若諸經中說空無相無願無行無生無滅。無有自性無有情命者主宰補特伽羅解脫門等名了義經。我言合理。以於餘經佛自決判我依遍計所執自性。於餘經中說一切法皆無自性無生無滅本來寂靜自性涅槃。依依他起自性說言諸有情心生滅流轉。乃至廣說。又餘經中。佛告具壽舍利子言。色自性空。自性空故無生無滅。無生滅故無有變易。受想行識亦復如是。此依遍計所執自性。說自性空無生滅等。以諸愚夫隨自心變色等諸法周遍計自性皆空。無生滅等依他起性。由無遍計所執性故。亦說為空非自性空。無生滅等。如來

處處說三自性。皆言遍計所執性空。依他圓成二性是有。故知空教別有。不可如言撥無諸法。如言取義名勝大乘。故契經言。若有善哉。如言取義不求如來所說意趣。是名於法非理作意。亦名非處信解大乘。若有善哉。不如其言而取於義。思求如來所說意趣。是名於法如理作意。亦名是處信解大乘。若爾云何釋此經句。佛告天子。汝等當知。佛於菩提都無所得。亦無少法。可生可滅。所以者何以一切法無生無滅。是故如來出現世間。有作是釋。諸佛證得大菩提時。遠離一切分別戲論。雖出世間而不可說。有證得等。復有釋言。佛以菩提為其自性。故無所得。如契經言。菩提即佛。佛即菩提。故無所得。如其法性而覺知故。不生先無不滅。先有。以諸法性離戲論故。無生無滅。無上菩提。現在前故。說名如來出現世間。又契經說。善現。當知。色名諸色無性之性。受想行等。廣說亦爾。此經意明。依他起性。以其遍計所執色等無性所顯離言法性為其自性。若一切法都無所有。如何無性而復言性。若言色等世俗無性。即是色等勝義之性。與理相違。所以者何。夫勝義者。分別戲論所不能及。豈得以無為其自性。若以無性為自性者。應願餘無名勝義。應不能證無上菩提。則遂自成大過失。依他起性。若實有者。便違經說。故契經言。

若法都無性 此法非緣生 如是二經說緣生法。雖無自性而不相違。以從緣生法有二種。一者遍計所執。二者依他起性。此中意明。遍計所執自性非有不說依他。若說依他都無自性。便撥染淨二法皆無。名惡取空。自他俱損。此妄分別。雖復能遮。得正見時。自當能遮。今且隨問。依他起性。何智所知。謂無分別智。所知生世間淨智。既無分別。何名世間。謂言此智是無分別。若有分別。應不能行。諸法實相。但應緣彼遍計所執。亦能行諸法實相。又今未得無分別後。法實相智。如何定知有依他起。此依他起。非如現見。此執所依。如何定言實有此性。唯無分別智。所引生世間淨智。智依他起。與論相違。如彼論言。遍計執性。何智所行。為凡智耶。為聖智耶。俱非所行。以無相故。依他起性。何智所行。俱是所行。然非出世聖智所行。又言五事。幾是所取。幾是能取。三是所取。分別正智。通能所取。名相分別。分別所取。正智有二。一緣真如。第二是彼所引生。今猶未得相。等。又是依他起性。故彼論言。遍計所執五事。不攝依他起性。四事所攝。若依他起。世智所緣。而說非空。甚可嗤笑。諸法實相。非是世間。心智所行。如前屢。辨。故不應說。實有依他論說。依他。亦凡智。境。自證受。故不相違。依他起性。即心法。從緣起時。變似種種相。名等。虛實。自證受。而增上。慢。謂取外塵。然諸外。遍計所執。無體相。故非所緣。故非聖凡智所

○一五七 ○一五八 ○一五九 ○一六〇 ○一六一 ○一六二 ○一六三 ○一六四 ○一六五 ○一六六 ○一六七 ○一六八 ○一六九 ○一七〇 ○一七一 ○一七二 ○一七三 ○一七四 ○一七五 ○一七六 ○一七七 ○一七八 ○一七九 ○一八〇 ○一八一 ○一八二 ○一八三 ○一八四 ○一八五 ○一八六 ○一八七 ○一八八 ○一八九 ○一九〇 ○一九一 ○一九二 ○一九三 ○一九四 ○一九五 ○一九六 ○一九七 ○一九八 ○一九九 ○二〇〇

行境一切有漏心及心法。唯能證受自所現
塵未能如實證餘心境。無漏世智相應心品。
由性離染自他俱證。故說依他淨智所了。與
論所說理不相乖。汝嗤笑言。自呈愚昧非願
我說與理相違。若從緣生心及心法。同還計
執皆自性空。便似空花何能繫縛。三有含識
生死輪迴。是故依他非無體質。論者本意決
定應然若不爾者。何緣故說。妄分別縛證空
能除。誰觀龜毛能計能縛。誰見兔角能證能
除。由是應知。有心心法。但無心外所執諸塵。
云何定知諸法唯識。處處經說。於此何疑。故
契經言。佛告善現。無毛端量貨物可依。愚夫
異生造諸業行。唯有顛倒與彼為依。顛倒即
是虛妄分別。虛妄分別即心法。又契經言。
無有少法自性可得。唯有能造。能造即是心
及心法。又契經說三界唯心。如是等經共數
無量。是故諸法唯識理成。豈不決定執一切
法實唯有識亦成顛倒。是則應如色等諸法
顛倒境故其體實無。又境既無識三何有。不
應一識二分合成。勿當失於自心一相。若言
識體實無二分。能緣所緣行相空故。但隨世
俗同所了知有能緣心故說唯識。則應亦說
境界非無。世俗同知有心境故。若許實有少
分識體。應說此體其相如何。既不可言能識
所識。如何定說唯有識耶。諸契經言。唯有識
者。為今觀識捨彼外塵。既捨外塵妄心隨息。
妄心息故證會中道。故契經言。

未達境唯心 起二種分別
達境唯心已 分別亦不生

知諸法唯心 便捨外塵相
由此息分別 悟平等真空
愚夫異生貪著境味。受諸欲樂無捨離心。生
死輪迴沒三有海。受諸劇苦解脫無因。如來
慈悲。方便為說諸法唯識。令捨外塵。捨外塵
已妄識隨滅。妄識滅故便證涅槃。故契經
言

如世有良醫 妙藥。按衆病
諸佛亦如是 為物說唯心
雖說極微亦可分析。據方所故。如舍如瓶。此
難極微可成多分。是假非實不可全無。若不
爾者。心及心法。一刹那中時分攝故。如歲月
等衆分合成亦可全無。成大過失。如是等類
隨見不同。分隔聖言。令成多分。互與評論各
執一邊。既不能除惡見塵垢。誰能契當諸佛
世尊所說大乘清。深妙旨。未會真理。隨已執
情。自是非他。深可怖異。應捨執著。空有兩邊。
領悟大乘不二中道。如契經說。菩薩當知。
身見為根所生諸見。成置法業繫縛世間。經
後發無諸法邪見。及於此見稱讚流通。因是
所生成置法業。經無量劫墜那落迦。惡趣輪
迴受大憂苦。昔做善力來至人中。愚鈍盲聵
多諸憂苦。身形卑陋。人不喜觀。鄙拙言辭。聞
皆不悅。或宿有種種上善根。來生人間受殊
勝報。由昔播受謗法業因。偏執如來破相
空教。非毀所說顯實法門。令諸世間非法謂
法。法謂非法。非義謂義。義謂非義。自損損他
深可悲愴。然佛所說無不甚深。二論法門最
為難測。今且自勵依了義經。略辨指歸息諸

評論。世俗諸者。謂從緣生世出世間色等
法親證說展轉可言。親證為先後方起說。
此世俗語亦有亦生假。令所成猶諸幻事。從
分別起如夢所為。有相可言名世俗語。勝義
論者。謂聖所知分別名言。皆所不及自內所
證。不由他緣無相絕言。名勝義語。如是略說。
二論法門。正法學徒向無所評。依前世俗染
淨法生。依後勝義證於寂滅。是故審說心境
有三。一者有言有相心境。二者無言有覺心
境。三者無言無相心境。初於名言。無言有覺心
亦有隨眠。次於名言雖有隨眠而無覺悟。後
於名言隨眠覺悟一向永無。初二緣世俗。後
一緣勝義。復有永離言說隨眠。後所得心通
緣二諦。若於世俗起堅執見。及於世俗起不
順見。此二俱名虛妄分別。是生一切無義利
門繫縛有情。令不解脫。空無我見能悉斷除。
令諸有情離三有縛。自證究竟寂滅涅槃。亦
轉化他令得解脫。拔除正習障根本故。若於
世俗起不順見。此於勝義定有乖違。為明此
見故說頌曰

24. 法成一成無 違異亦違俗
故與有一異 二俱不可言
論曰。若執諸法與共有性定為一者。法則成
一。定為異者。法則成無。是即違異。亦復違
俗。所以者何。若一切法與有性一。色應如髮
是髮非色。聲應如色。是色非聲。即有性故法
應成一。若一切法與有性異。即色聲等。體悉
成無。非有性故。如空花等。若執諸法與一
性等定一異過。如應當知。是故有等與法一

◎法一非◎ ◎一非◎ ◎法一非◎ ◎一非◎ ◎法一非◎ ◎一非◎ ◎法一非◎ ◎一非◎

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