

Manu and the Buddha for Kumāriila and Dharmakīrti*

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Introduction

It is inferred that the Buddha, motivated by compassion (*karuṇā*), must have attained knowledge (*jñāna*) of truths through practice (*abhyāsa*), because his teachings (*upadeśa*) are correct insofar as the ascertainable ones (*śakyapariccheda*) are concerned, in particular the four noble truths.

Dharmakīrti's scheme presupposes the epithets of the Buddha that Dignāga used, the causal relationship of which is viewed by Dharmakīrti as follows:¹

karuṇā → *abhyāsa* → *jñāna* → *upadeśa*

Focusing attention on the logical chain of this proof, that is, between the Buddha's teaching (*upadeśa*) as the premise and his knowledge (*jñāna*) and compassion (*karuṇā*) as the conclusion² – his teaching presents itself to us as a form of scripture, while his knowledge and compassion are concealed in the black box of an ancient person's mind and are therefore only to be inferred. We can simplify the proof as follows:³

The Buddha must be compassionate and a cognizer of the truth because he teaches it correctly.

But this reasoning, which is based on a causal relationship,⁴ applies only to the teachings which deal with ascertainable matters, such as the four noble truths, and not to the totally impercepti-

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¹ For this scheme, see Inami and Tillemans 1986, Franco 1997:19–20.

² *abhyāsa* offers us another interesting case to be investigated with regard to Dharmakīrti's relationship with Kumāriila, but I would like to postpone discussion of that until another occasion.

³ Cf. Tillemans 1993:18.

⁴ According to Dharmakīrti's understanding of speech in general, he must first admit that the Buddha's teaching, inasmuch as it is a kind of speech (*śabda*), could essentially indicate only the speaker's intention (*vaktr-abhiprāyasūcaka*) and could not be necessarily connected (*nāntariyakatābhāva*) with external objects. Dharmakīrti has to proceed from this "given" and then go on to show how the Buddha's teaching is ontologically based on his direct experience of objects. He emphasizes this aspect of speech throughout his explanation on scripture. See PVSV 107.20–21 (PV I v. 213), 109.22, 168.2, 173.28.

ble (*atyantaparokṣa*) matters that are in the domain of scripture (*āgama*).⁵ Thus, there is still an unbridgeable gap between the ‘seen’ (*dr̥ṣṭa*) and the ‘unseen’ (*adr̥ṣṭa*) domains. And this is problematic for Dharmakīrti, because a leap from the observable to the unobservable entails the fault of inexact reasoning called *śeṣavad-anumāna*: for example, one infers, on the grounds of one part, that a whole pot of rice is cooked. Partial verification (*ekadeśasaṃvāda*) does not hold for everything.⁶ Unless this gap is filled, Dharmakīrti can neither say that the Buddha’s teachings are solely motivated by compassion, nor can he claim that the Buddha correctly knows everything, i.e. not only ascertainable objects but also those that are totally imperceptible. But how can this jump be made?⁷

Dharmakīrti introduces the device of *agatyā* (<*agati*) to solve this problem.

PVSV 109.16–20 (ad PV I v. 217): *tasyāśya puruṣārthopayogino ’bhiyogārhasyāvisaṃvādād viṣayāntare ’pi tathātvopagamaḥ, na *vipralambhāya, anuparodhāt; niṣprayanavitathābhīdhānavaiḥalyāc ca vaktuḥ. tad etad agatyobhayathāpy anumānatvam āgamasyopavarṇitam.*

**vipralambhāya, anuparodhāt*] corr.; *vipralambhāyanuparodhāt* ed.

Because this [set of the four noble truths that the Buddha taught],⁸ which is useful for the human goal, [and] which is worth practising, is reliable, [we] accept that [his teaching] must be similarly [reliable] also with respect to the other domain [that is totally imperceptible, i.e. the purely scriptural domain]. [His teaching can]not [be] for the sake of deceiving [others], because [his teaching] is not stopped [i.e. invalidated];⁹ and because it is pointless for the speaker to say something wrong without a [particular] aim. Thus, in both cases, that the scripture is a valid inference¹⁰ is explained because there is no [other] way.¹¹

⁵ Cf. Tillemans 1993:16–17; Tillemans 1999:44: “And a limited number of observations on perceptible and inferable matters would not *imply or guarantee* anything about what is radically inaccessible.”

⁶ Cf. PVSV 173.14–174.6. See also Tillemans 1999:50, n.9.

⁷ Cf. Tillemans 1993:20: “One could perhaps view authoritativeness of the teaching as being only *a necessary condition*, so that the proofs of the epithets, and from them *pramāṇabhūta*, would indeed be an indispensable step to arrive at the conclusion that the teacher is authoritative. I leave the matter open, as I do not see a ready solution in Dharmakīrti’s writings.”

⁸ I interpret the pronouns *tasyāśya* as referring to *heyopādeyatattvasya sopāyasya* in the verse (cf. PVSV 395.16–17: *tasyāśyēti ... asya satyacatuṣṭayalakṣaṇasya*). This interpretation might be regarded as doubtful because these pronouns are connected with *avisamvādāt*, which one expects to be connected with *pramāṇasya*. But it is clear from Dharmakīrti’s own usage that not only the Buddha or his teaching, but also the object of his teaching can be connected with *avisamvāda*. See the immediately preceding passage: *heyopādeyatadupāyānām tadupadiṣṭānām avaiḥparītyam avisamvādaḥ* (PVSV 109.15–16). Thus *tasyāśya ... avisamvādāt* paraphrases the first half of the verse: *heyopādeyatattvasya sopāyasya prasiddhitaḥ*.

⁹ The meaning of *uparodha* is clear from Dharmakīrti’s own usage, e.g. in PVSV 174.2: *dr̥ṣṭapramāṇoparodha* (see the next note for translation).

¹⁰ The present passage of the definition of scripture (*āgamalakṣaṇa*) that contains *agatyā* is referred to later in PVSV. PVSV 167.25–168.3: *na, apratyayāt. na hi kvacid askhalita iti sarvaṃ tathā, vyabhiḥcāradarśanāt, tat-pravṛtter avisamvādena vyāptyasiddheś ca. agatyā cedam āgamalakṣaṇam iṣṭam. nāto niścayaḥ. tan na pramāṇam āgama ity apy uktam.* “No. For we have no confidence [in a Vedic commentator with regard to totally imperceptible matters that the Veda teaches]. To explain, [we can]not [conclude] that everything [he says] is all right just because he has not failed in some cases. For deviation is experienced; and it is not established that his activity [of teaching] is pervaded by reliability. And this definition of scripture [as an inference] is accepted [by us] because there is no other way. But it is not the case that determination [arises] from the [scripture]. That is why it is also stated [in PVSV 109.21–22] that scripture is not a *pramāṇa* [with reference to totally

The main reasoning here is as follows:

1. The Buddha's teaching is correct with regard to the four noble truths (as will be shown in PV II).
2. Therefore it cannot be wrong with regard to totally imperceptible matters.¹²
3. For there is no [other] way (*agatyā*).¹³

imperceptible matters because speech is not necessarily connected with external objects].” (Cf. translation by Tillemans 1999:43.)

Clearly both instances of *agatyā* have a similar connotation. One may think that the meaning of *agatyā* is as follows: because one has ‘no [other] way’ to access totally imperceptible matters, one has no choice but to accept the authority of scripture, which is the last resort.

But this interpretation, if it were correct, would surely undermine Dharmakīrti's reasoning (cf. Tillemans 1999:43–44). This is the case because practicality or necessity would supersede rationality. And Mīmāṃsā opponents could similarly insist that they have to accept the Veda because it is the sole means to know dharma. The point that Dharmakīrti makes is different. He says that the Veda is not a *pramāṇa* because it has a lot of problems even within the ascertainable domain; thus the fallible Veda, also with regard to unascertainable matters, can be dismissively explained in another way.

Cf. PVSV 173.26–174.2: *uktaṃ cedam āgamalakṣaṇam asmābhīḥ, tat tu sarvasya śakyavicārasya viṣayasya yathāsvaṃ pramāṇena vidhipratīṣedhaviśuddhau. nāntarīyakatvābhāve 'pi śabdānām artheṣu varam samśayitasya vṛttīḥ, tatra kadācid avisaṃvādasaṃbhavāt. na tv anyatra drṣṭapramāṇoparodhasya puruṣasya pravṛttir iti.* “And we stated this definition of scripture. But this [applies only] when all the ascertainable matter [that it states] is purified, either positively or negatively, each individually by a [corresponding] *pramāṇa*. Although speech is not necessarily connected with [external] objects, it is better that a man [, though he is] with doubt, takes action. For the [speech in question] can be reliable in some cases. But, in the case of another [scripture], people do not take action because they have seen that it is invalidated by [another] *pramāṇa*.”

Furthermore, in both instances, *agatyā* is stated in contrast to another possible ‘way’, which is expressed in the second case as ‘deviation’ (*vyabhicāra*).

Also the practical interpretation, which seems to mix up the rational process of *agatyā* with the practical reasoning expressed with *varam*, is incompatible with Dharmakīrti's passage that follows: *varam āgamāt pravṛttāv evaṃ pravṛttir iti.* This passage, if we followed the practical interpretation, should have been rather: **varam parokṣe pravṛttāv āgamāt pravṛttir iti* (“It is better to act on the basis of scripture when it comes to acting on imperceptible matters.”).

As the second instance confirms, *evaṃ* here refers to the process of determining the authoritativeness of scripture with regard to imperceptible matters (cf. PVSV 108.5–6: *tat sati pravartitavye varam evaṃ pravṛtta iti parīkṣayā prāmāṇyam āha*). Therefore this passage means: if one acts based on hearing scripture about imperceptible matters, it is better to do so after examining and accepting its authoritativeness as a valid inference.

¹¹ There are translations by Yaita 1987:9–10, Franco 1997:36, Dunne 2004:365–366. Cf. also PVSVT 395.16–25.

¹² Cf. Tillemans 1990:28.

¹³ The interpretation of *agatyā* by Karṇakagomin (*anyena prakāreṇātyantaparokṣe pravṛtṭyasambhavāt*) and Vibhūticandra (*ato 'nyathā parokṣe pravṛtṭyasambhavāt*) may hold a slightly different emphasis. See Yaita 1987:16, n.70, Tillemans 1990:25, n.65, Tillemans 1993:11, n.17, Tillemans 1999:43. They seem to view the matter from a practical point of view. This is not totally baseless, because Dharmakīrti states in the following passage: *varam āgamāt pravṛttāv evaṃ pravṛttir iti* (PVSV 109.20–21; cf. translation by Tillemans 1999:42). But this is the explanation of *varam* and not *agatyā*. Furthermore, what exactly are the ‘[other] ways’ excluded by *agatyā*? It is clear that one should take the preceding passages into consideration, in which Dharmakīrti excludes evil causes.

Here Dharmakīrti reframes Dignāga's reasoning of scripture (*āgama*), which, as Dharmakīrti probably noticed,¹⁴ is in fact a type of inexact reasoning based on partial verification (*ekadeśa-saṃvāda*).¹⁵ Dharmakīrti is well aware that one cannot simply rely on a mere analogy, in which one moves from the observable to the unobservable.¹⁶ Kumāriḷa in his *Ślokavārttika* severely criticizes this kind of view, in which one's logic jumps from something seen (*dr̥ṣṭa*) to something unseen (*adr̥ṣṭa*).¹⁷ For Kumāriḷa, and Dharmakīrti as well, the partial verification of a scripture does not guarantee the validity of the whole, in particular with respect to totally imperceptible matters, such as heaven (*svarga*) as the fruit of a ritual action¹⁸ and the effect of worshipping a *caitya* (*caityavandana*).¹⁹

Apparently, Dharmakīrti's introducing *agatyā* aims at solving this problem. Similar is the following passage in PV II, which also clarifies his intention in the passage cited above.

PV II vv. 145–146ab (Vetter 1990:52):
tāyaḥ svadr̥ṣṭamārgoktir, vaiphalyād vakti nānṛtam /
dayālutvāt, parārtham ca sarvārambhābhiyogataḥ //
tataḥ pramāṇam, tāyo vā catuḥsatyaprakāśanam /

Ngag dbang bstan dar's explanation fits my interpretation. Tillemans 1993:20 summarizes: "In sum, it is possible to think that the Buddhist religious doctrine is correct *per se*, but that the actual Buddhist teacher, Śākyamuni, may have sometimes led us astray because he personally failed to attain the spiritual insights described in that doctrine or was disinterested in his auditors, or perhaps even consciously sought to mislead them for personal gain. It is precisely here that the homage verse's proof of *tshad ma'i skyes bu* is said to be important to show that, given the compassion and insight of Buddha Śākyamuni, **this type of deception is excluded.**" (My emphasis)

- ¹⁴ This may be one of the reasons that Dharmakīrti (PVSV 173.22–25) forcedly attributes the criticism of *naiyāyika-śeṣavadanumāna* to Dignāga, a criticism that Dignāga himself never intends. Rather, as Tillemans 1990:32 explains, Dignāga's reasoning is akin to the Naiyāyikas'.
- ¹⁵ Āryadeva, Dignāga (AD 480–540) and Dharmapāla (AD 530–561) resort to the same reasoning of *ekadeśa-saṃvāda*. See Tillemans 1990:24–31, 1993:16.
- ¹⁶ The intention of a possible criticism from an opponent is well captured in Śākyabuddhi's commentary. See Dunne 2004:366, n.14.
- ¹⁷ *Ślokavārttika codanā*, vv. 121–132. Cf. Kataoka 2003a:187–185.
- ¹⁸ Bhartṛhari refers to *apūrvadevatāsvarga* in contradistinction to *gavādi* in Vākyapadīya II v. 119. (The verse is quoted by many scholars, e.g. by Kumāriḷa in *Tantravārttika* ad 1.3.30, A 297.) Dignāga (*Pramāṇa-samuccayavṛtti* ad II v. 4) refers to the dichotomy of **dr̥ṣṭa* and **adr̥ṣṭa* with examples, i.e. **vṛkṣādi* and **svargādi* (Kitagawa 1965:89–92). Bhāvivēka refers to *svargāpūrvādi* as *atyantākṣaparokṣa* in *Madhyamakahrdaya-kārikā* IX v. 5. Uddyotakara refers to the set as *svargāpūrvadevatādi* in several places (NV 54.17–19, 247.15). Kumāriḷa (*Ślokavārttika śabda* vv. 23b–24), in criticizing *Pramāṇasamuccaya* II 5ab, refers to the same scheme with examples, i.e. *apūrvādiśabda* and *aśvādiśabda*. For Kumāriḷa, at least, it is clear that Dignāga refers to the set with the word *svargādi*. Kumāriḷa also refers to the set as *svargadevatāpūrva* in the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* (quoted in *Tattvasaṅgraha* v. 3166 and *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī* 8.19–20). Dharmakīrti (in PVSV 169.25) mentions *svargorvaśyādiśabda* as referring to *atīndriya* (= *atyakṣa*).
- ¹⁹ Cf. *Tantravārttika* ad 1.3.4, A 195.25–26: *caityakaraṇatadvandanaśūdrasaṃpradānakādānādīnām saṃvādaḥ*. In discussing scriptural authority, Dharmakīrti has in mind as *atyantaparokṣa* only matters that are relevant to human beings. PVSV 108.3–5: *atyakṣaphalānām keṣāmcit pravṛttinivṛtṭyor mahānuśaṃsāpāpaśravaṇāt*. "For one hears that the undertaking and stopping of some [actions aimed at] imperceptible fruits are [respectively] highly praiseworthy and sinful." These two kinds of action that aim at imperceptible fruits, either desirable or undesirable, correspond to dharma and adharma as defined in the Mīmāṃsā system.

‘Protection’ [, i.e. causing people to cross the ocean of *saṃsāra*,] is stating the path seen by himself. **He does not tell a lie; 1. because it is pointless, 2. because he is compassionate, 3. and because he is intent on all his undertakings for the sake of others.** Therefore [he is] a *pramāṇa*. Or ‘protection’ is illuminating the four truths.²⁰

The main reasoning here is as follows:

1. Because the Buddha teaches the truths, he is reliable.
2. There is no possibility that he is unreliable.

The reasoning of *agatyā* presupposes other possibilities to be denied, which an opponent might raise as equally possible. In the first case, in the PVSV, Dharmakīrti denies the possibility of a false teaching aiming at deception (*vipralambha*) or aiming at nothing (*niṣprayojana*). As is clear from PV II, what motivates the Buddha to teach is nothing but compassion. Thus, Dharmakīrti establishes that the sole motivation of the Buddha to teach is nothing other than compassion; at the same time, he denies other motivations or causes for teaching, such as deception.

As I already mentioned, Dharmakīrti has introduced the reasoning of *agatyā* to fill the gap between the observable and the unobservable. Otherwise he would himself fall into the fault of inexact reasoning called *śeṣavadanumāna*.

But is this all that is behind the scenes? Is it really the case that Dharmakīrti, as an eminent, unique logician, spontaneously noticed the logical problem and thus modified Dignāga’s view, just for fear of inexact reasoning? Is it the case that Dharmakīrti, as a rational philosopher, independently developed a Buddhist logic uninfluenced by the historical circumstances of that time outside his monastery?

This view is doubtful if we observe the paradigm shift going on in this period. Kumāriḷa, in his earlier work *Ślokavārttika*, criticized the *ekadeśasaṃvāda* type of inexact reasoning with regard to scriptural authority. He also criticized the notion of ‘the teaching of the omniscient Buddha.’²¹ We already have good evidence that Dharmakīrti, especially in his earlier works, has a quite close relationship to opponent schools such as Mīmāṃsā.²² Otherwise how could we understand the last verse of PVSV (176.13–16), according to which Dharmakīrti believes that he has proven in his work the stupidity (*jāḍya*) of conservative, Vedic brahmins? Isn’t it more sensible for us to place Dharmakīrti’s view of the authoritativeness of the Buddha and scripture in the context of the wider historical scene? Does it not make better sense that Dharmakīrti’s view on the *pramāṇabhūta Bhagavān*, as Dharmakīrti himself explains,²³ is in contrast to the eternal Veda, etc. as understood, for example, in the Mīmāṃsā system?

In the following, I shall attempt to shed light on Dharmakīrti’s introduction of the argument *agatyā* by investigating the historical context in which Dharmakīrti seems to be responding to his opponent(s).

²⁰ Cf. the translations by Vetter 1990:52, Franco 1997:26.

²¹ Cf. Kataoka 2003b.

²² Cf. Steinkellner 1997, Kellner 2003, Kataoka 2003b.

²³ PV II v. 7bc (Miyasaka’s edition): *abhūtavinivṛttaye bhūtoktiḥ*.

anyathānupapatti applied to Manu (ad 1.3.1–4)

It is clear that what Dharmakīrti tries to exclude are evil causes and motivations of a teaching, such as deception (*vipralambha*). Before Dharmakīrti, starting from the *Jaiminisūtra*, the Mīmāṃsā tradition discussed this matter in detail.

Jaiminisūtra 1.3.3–4: *virodhe tv anapekṣyaṃ syād asati hy anumānam / hetudarśanāc ca /*

But, when [a Smṛti passage] contradicts [a Śruti passage], it is not to be considered. For, [only] when there is no [contradiction], is [it] an inferential mark [of a source Śruti]. Also, [it is not to be considered] because a [particular] **cause** [of a Smṛti passage] is seen.

A Smṛti passage, if it is not contradictory to the Veda, is regarded as an inferential ground (*anumāna-pramāṇa*) that enables us to infer a Vedic source. On the contrary, if it is contradictory to the Veda, or if it has another cause (*hetu*), it should be ignored as being unauthoritative. Śābara calls such a recollection (*smṛti /smaraṇa*)²⁴ or recollected object²⁵ ‘delusion’ (*vyāmoha*). The cause or *mūla* of this erroneous Smṛti, and a Smṛti author’s erroneous recollection as well, can be mishearing (*duḥśruta*), a dream or the like (*svapnādi*), according to *Śābarabhāṣya* ad 1.3.3,²⁶ and, according to *Śābarabhāṣya* ad 1.3.4, ‘greed’ (*lobha*) or the like.²⁷

<i>mūla /hetu /bīja</i>		<i>upadeśa</i>
Veda	→	Smṛti (<i>anumāna-pramāṇa</i>)
<i>lobhād</i>	→	Smṛti (<i>apramāṇa</i>)

Kumārila, in *Tantravārttika* ad 1.3.2, enumerates possible sources of the Smṛti, presupposing the process of *arthāpatti*. There he establishes that the postulation of a Vedic source is better than other sources.

Tantravārttika ad 1.3.2, A 163.21–22:
*bhrānter anubhavād vāpi puṇvākyaḍ vipralambhanāt /
 drṣṭānugūnyasādhyatvāc codanaiva laghīyasī //*

[As the source of Manu’s Smṛti,] only Vedic injunction, inasmuch as it can be established in accordance with a seen fact, is less complicated [than any other cause:] 1. [Manu’s] error, 2. [his own] experience, 3. someone else’s sentence, or 4. [Manu’s] deceit.

Here we have an elaborate list of what is to be excluded as the source of Manu’s Smṛti: 1. Manu has cognized dharma erroneously (*bhrānti*); 2. he has directly experienced it (*anubhava*); 3. he has learned it from another person’s sentence (*puṇvākya*); 4. he is aiming at deception (*vipralambhana*). Kumārila denies in the following commentary each possibility because of undesirable consequences of *drṣṭabādha*, i.e. setting aside the seen facts, and too many *adrṣṭa-*

²⁴ See, e.g. *Śābarabhāṣya* ad 1.3.1, A 162.4: *aṣṭakādiṣu tv adrṣṭārtheṣu pūrvavijñānakāraṇābhāvād vyāmoha-smṛtir eva gamyate*; ad 1.3.3, A 174.1: *nirmūlatvād vyāmohas tatsmaraṇam*; A 174.4–5: *kathaṃ tarhi sarvaveṣṭanasmaraṇam? vyāmohaḥ. kathaṃ vyāmohakalpanā? śrautavijñānavirodhāt*; A 182.2: *nāsati vyāmohavijñāne vikalpo bhavati*; A 182.3: *smṛtir vyāmohaḥ*; A 183.14: *smṛtir vyāmohaḥ*; A 185.3–4: *vrihisādhanatva-vijñānasyāpy avyāmohāt*.

²⁵ See, e.g. *Śābarabhāṣya* ad 1.3.3: A 174.2: *bhaved vaidikaṃ vacanaṃ mūlaṃ yadi sparśanaṃ vyāmohaḥ*; A 182.3: *sparśanaṃ vyāmohaḥ*; A 183.14: *sparśanaṃ vyāmohaḥ*; A 185.2: *sparśanaṃ na vyāmohaḥ*.

²⁶ A 183.9: *duḥśrutasvapnādivijñānamūlatvaṃ tu sarvaveṣṭanasya*.

²⁷ A 186.2–187.1.

kalpanās, i.e. over-postulating something unseen. Instead of postulating these undesirable causes, it is theoretically preferable to postulate a Vedic injunction (*codanā*) as the source of Manu's Smṛti.

1. It is postulated that Manu's Smṛti is based on nothing other than a Vedic injunction.
2. This is theoretically the best choice; other possibilities would entail faults.

***anyathānupapatti* applied to any dharma teacher (ad 1.1.2)**

This basic scheme established in *Jaiminisūtra* 1.3.1–4 is referred to by Śābara in his commentary on *Jaiminisūtra* 1.1.2, in which Śābara, distinguishing human statements from Vedic injunctions, dismisses the independent authoritativeness of them with regard to dharma.

Śābarabhāṣya ad 1.1.2, F 18.8–12: *nanv aviduṣām upadeśo nāvakalpate. upadiṣṭavantaś ca manvādayaḥ. tasmāt puruṣāḥ santo viditavantaś ca. ... ucyate. upadeśo hi vyāmohād api bhavati, asati vyāmohe vedād api bhavati.*

[Objection:] **Surely people who do not have knowledge cannot teach [dharma]. But Manu and others taught [dharma].** Therefore, being human beings, they must have known [dharma]. ... [Reply:] One replies: [No, it is not necessary that Manu, etc. must have known.] For a teaching is possible also out of delusion, and if there is no delusion, it can be based on the Veda, too.

Śābara's conclusion is the same as we have seen in *Jaiminisūtra* 1.3.3–4: human statements regarding dharma can be either reliable or unreliable. Reliable statements are based on the Veda, whereas unreliable ones are caused by error.

The more interesting part is the opponent's reasoning. The opponent claims that human beings such as Manu must have directly seen dharma because they taught dharma. This is a formulation of logical consequence (*arthāpatti* < *arthād āpadyate*), which operates because of *anyathānupapatti*, i.e. something seen or heard would be otherwise inexplicable.²⁸ First we see that Manu, etc. actually teach imperceptible dharma. But how is this possible? We ordinary people have no direct way to prove that Manu, etc. have actually seen the object in question. Therefore we postulate their experience, though unseen, in order to explain the seen fact that they teach: "Manu, etc. must have seen the imperceptible objects that they teach."

(*jñāna*) → *upadeśa*

Kumāṛila, in the *Ślokaṅgīkā*, first formulates Śābara's reasoning accurately as a kind of logical consequence (*arthāpatti*) and then, alternatively, as a kind of inference (*anumāna*).

Ślokaṅgīkā codanā, vv. 156–157:
upadeśo 'nyathā na syād atīndriyanibandhanaḥ |
tasya kartrā na ced dṛṣṭaḥ so 'rtha ity arthakalpanā ||
yad vānumānam evedam upadeśītvam ucyate |
dṛṣṭārthapūrvatāvvyāptam vyatireko 'sya nanv iti ||

[Objection:] **There could not be** a teaching based on an imperceptible object **other** than if the object has been seen by the agent of the [teaching]. Therefore, **the object is postulated** [as described].
 Or this 'being a teacher' is stated as nothing but **an inferential reason**, which is pervaded by [the probandum] 'being based on an experienced object.' Its invariable negative concomitance is [here expressed with the words beginning with] 'Surely.'

²⁸ Cf. *Śābarabhāṣya* ad 1.1.3–5 (Vṛttikāra), F 32.6–7: *dṛṣṭaḥ śruto vārtho 'nyathā nopapadyata ity arthakalpanā.*

A teaching of an imperceptible object would be inexplicable if the teacher had not seen the object. Thus, starting from the seen teaching, a hearer postulates the unseen object that must have been directly experienced by the teacher.

Or, according to the second, alternative view, Śabara's reasoning is explained as follows: a person who teaches (*upadeśin*) a thing necessarily knows it beforehand. A person who does not know a thing cannot teach it. Here Śabara's passage "Surely the people who do not have knowledge cannot teach" (*nanv aviduṣām upadeśo nāvakalpate*) is interpreted as stating negative invariable concomitance (*vyatireka*) and not the process of inexplicability otherwise (*anyathānupapatti*).²⁹ The main reasoning of this opponent is as follows:

1. A human statement of an imperceptible object, such as Manu's teaching of dharma, must be based on the direct experience of the teacher.
2. Otherwise his teaching would be inexplicable; or this is because of the invariable concomitance that a person who does not know a thing cannot teach it.

anyathānupapatti applied to the Buddha

Most interestingly, Kumāriḷa in the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* (as quoted in the *Tattvasaṅgraha*) applies exactly the same reasoning, both logical consequence (*arthāpatti*) and inference (*anumāna*), to the Buddha, who, like Manu, teaches imperceptible objects.³⁰ The opponent there claims that the Buddha's teaching of dharma would be inexplicable if he were not omniscient and thus had not experienced it directly. Furthermore, it is alternatively reformulated into an inference that the Buddha's teaching is necessarily preceded by his direct experience.³¹

²⁹ Kumāriḷa presupposes the following *anvaya* and *vyatireka*.

<i>anvaya:</i>	<i>upadeśitva</i>	→	<i>dr̥ṣṭārthapūrvatā</i>
<i>vyatireka:</i>	<i>dr̥ṣṭārthapūrvatābhāva</i>	→	<i>upadeśitvābhāva</i>
	<i>(aviduṣām)</i>		<i>(upadeśo nāvakalpate)</i>

³⁰ As I have shown elsewhere in a chart (Kataoka 2003b) that compares the section of *sarvajñavāda* in the *Ślo-kavārttika* and the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* (as quoted in the *Tattvasaṅgraha*), Kumāriḷa in the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* takes *arthāpatti* into consideration as possible evidence of the omniscience of the Buddha, etc., along with *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *śabda* and *upamāna*.

³¹ *Tattvasaṅgraha* vv. 3216–20:

upadeśo hi buddhāder dharmādharmādīgocaraḥ | anyathā nopapadyeta sarvajño yadi no bhavet ||
pratyakṣādaḥ niṣiddhe 'pi sarvajñapratipādake | arthāpattyaiva sarvajñam itthaṃ yaḥ pratipadyate ||
yad vā sāmānyatodṛṣṭam pravṛttam iha sādhanam | sarvajñasyocyate 'nyatra jñānapūrvatvadarśanāt ||
yaḥ kaścīd upadeśo hi sa sarvo jñānapūrvakaḥ | yathābhayādīśaktīnām upadeśas tathāvidhaḥ ||
dharmādharmopadeśo 'yam upadeśaś ca tatkr̥taḥ | tadīyajñānapūrvatvaṃ tasmād asyānumīyate ||

"For the teaching of the Buddha or some other [teacher] that communicates dharma and adharma **would be otherwise inexplicable** if he were not omniscient.

Although perception, etc., which attest to an omniscient being, have been denied, some [opponent] understands in this way an omniscient being **merely by arthāpatti**.

Or an **inference based on similarity**, which operates as a proof of an omniscient being is stated here. For [a teaching] has been seen elsewhere as [necessarily] preceded by a cognition.

To explain, any teaching is preceded by a cognition, like a similar teaching on the capacity of the Abhayā tree, etc.

The contexts of the *Ślokavārttika* and the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* passages are different:³² the *Ślokavārttika* passage deals with Manu, etc., while the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* deals with the Buddha, etc. Nonetheless, these two forms of reasoning are logically identical: both prove the human experience of dharma on the grounds that it would be otherwise inexplicable (*anyathānupapatti*); or both prove it alternatively by analogical inference (*sāmānyatodṛṣṭam anumānam*), as Kumāriḷa modifies the argument to fit the opponent's *pramāṇa*-epistemological framework.

Naturally, Kumāriḷa's way of replying to the opponent is the same in both texts: The Buddha's teaching of dharma is not necessarily based on his direct experience, because his teaching might be based on delusion (*vyāmoha*) or aim at deception (*vyāmohana*). Therefore, the alleged *anyathānupapatti* does not work, precisely because his teaching 'is explicable in another way, too.'³³

In contradistinction to the Buddha, Manu's teaching can be solely based on the Veda. Kumāriḷa does not forget to mention this Mīmāṃsā view in both the *Ślokavārttika*³⁴ and the *Bṛhaṭṭikā*.³⁵ Thus, the reasoning found in the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* can be summed up as follows:

And this teaching of dharma and adharma is a teaching delivered by him. Therefore, this is inferred as being preceded by his cognition."

³² That is, Śābara's passages on which Kumāriḷa is commenting are different.

³³ *Ślokavārttika codanā*, v. 158:

anyathāpy upapannatvaṃ vyāmohād iti kathyate / liṅgasya vyabhicāro vā bālavākye 'pi darśanāt //

"[Reply:] It is stated [by Śābara] that [a teaching] is **explicable even otherwise** [i.e. even if it is not based on a really experienced object], when [he says] 'out of delusion [too].' Or [Śābara states] a deviation of the inferential reason ['being a teacher'], because [the inferential reason] is seen even in an infant's sentence."

Tattvasaṅgraha vv. 3221–24:

anyathāpy upapannatvān nārthāpattir iyaṃ kṣamā / ata evānumāpy eṣā na sādhvī vyavatiṣṭhate //
upadeśo hi buddhāder anyathāpy upapadyate / svapnādidṛṣṭavyāmohād vedād vā vitathāśrutāt //
ye hi tāvad avedajñās teṣāṃ vedād asaṃbhavaḥ / upadeśaḥ kṛto yas tair vyāmohād eva kevalāt //
śiṣyavyāmohanārthaṃ vā vyāmohād vātadāśrayāt / loke duṣṭopadeṣṭṛṇāṃ upadeśaḥ pravartate //

"This *arthāpatti* is incapable [of proving the Buddha's knowledge], because [his teaching] is **explicable in another way, too**. Because of the same reason, this inference, too, does not stand as a correct one.

For the teaching of the Buddha or the like is **explicable in another way, too**: out of delusion experienced in dream, etc.; or from the Veda which is learned incorrectly.

To explain, first, it is impossible that [the teaching of] those who do not know the Veda is based on the Veda. The teaching delivered by them is solely based on delusion alone.

Or in order to delude disciples; or out of delusion which is not based on the Veda [i.e. delusion not out of false Vedic learning]. [For these reasons,] teaching of evil teachers takes place in the world."

³⁴ *Ślokavārttika codanā*, v. 159:

vedāj jñātvopadiṣṭaṃ ced ity evaṃ siddhasādhanam / vedād apīty anenoktaṃ manvādeś caitad iṣyate //

"If [the opponent] says that it is taught after being known from the Veda, then he [tries to] prove what is already established [for us]. This is said [by Śābara] with the [statement] 'from the Veda, too.' And [we] accept that this is the case with Manu and so on."

³⁵ *Tattvasaṅgraha* vv. 3227–28:

ye tu manvādayaḥ siddhāḥ prādhānyena trayīvidāṃ / trayīvidāśṛitagranthās te vedaprabhavoktayaḥ //
nādrṣtvā vedavākyāni śiṣyebhyaś cāpradarśya vā / granthapraṇayanaṃ teṣāṃ arpaṇaṃ copapadyate //

1. Objection: The Buddha's teaching of dharma must be based on his direct experience, because it would be otherwise inexplicable.
2. Reply: No, there are other possibilities, too. The Buddha's teaching of dharma might be based on error or aim at deception. But this is not the case with Manu, who teaches dharma on the basis of the Veda.

The Buddha in comparison to Manu, etc.

As is already clear, Manu and the Buddha are comparable figures as both are equally teachers of dharma. That is why the same reasoning of *anyathānupapatti* together with *hetudarśanāt* applies to both. In fact, Kumārila, in his alternative and final interpretation of *Jaiminisūtra* 1.3.4 (*hetudarśanāc ca*), which, before Kumārila, had been traditionally interpreted as dealing with controversial Smṛti passages, changes the teacher in question from Manu to the Buddha and other heterodox teachers.

He is well aware of the possibility that the Buddha can be compared to the three Vedic authorities, i.e. 1. the Veda, 2. Manu and other Smṛti authors, and 3. *Kalpasūtra* authors. This is why he inserts new arguments in each relevant part of his subcommentaries on the entire *Jaiminisūtra*:³⁶ the first is his criticism of an omniscient being (*sarvajña*) in the *Ślokavārttika*, *codanā* section;³⁷ the second is *Tantravārttika* on *Jaiminisūtra* 1.3.4, which deals with controversial Smṛtis; the third is again *Tantravārttika*, but on *Jaiminisūtra* 1.3.11–12, which deals with *dharmaprayogaśāstra*, i.e. *Kalpasūtras*.³⁸

In the second, i.e. the comparison of Manu with the Buddha, departing from the traditional understanding, Kumārila forcedly reinterprets *Jaiminisūtra* 1.3.4 as stating that the teachings of

“On the other hand, Manu and others are established, for those [brahmins] conversant with the three Vedas, as being prominent, and those [of their] texts that are relied on by Vedic scholars are teachings based on the Veda.

It is inexplicable that they compose the texts and offer [them to others] without having looked at the Vedic sentences and shown [them] to disciples.”

³⁶ Harikai 1985, investigating ‘Kumārila’s view on Śākyamuni Buddha’, explains, with a Japanese translation, the relevant portion of the *Ślokavārttika* in detail (pp. 50–61) and the *Tantravārttika* in brief (pp. 61–63). There he says nothing about the strategic difference among the three comparisons that I claim Kumārila himself intends.

Harikai concludes (p. 63) by recording his impression that there is ‘sharp contrast’ between the two texts: Kumārila’s discussion in the *Ślokavārttika* is ‘consistently logical and epistemological’ while in the *Tantravārttika* it is ‘so to speak an emotional utterance merely from the standpoint of Brahmanical conservatism’ (quotations have been translated from Harikai’s words in Japanese). But, as I show in this article, there is a logical continuity that one should not overlook. Objectively speaking, one can observe in the *Ślokavārttika*, the *Tantravārttika* and even also the *Brhāṭṭikā* the change of Kumārila’s view in his application of the same reasoning, in particular concerning *anyathānupapatti* and *hetudarśanāt*.

³⁷ *Ślokavārttika codanā* vv. 116, 152–153ab. See Kataoka 2003b:39–42.

³⁸ *Tantravārttika* ad 1.3.11, A 234.25–26:

śākyādinirmite dharmasāstrābhāse nirākṛte / dharmaprayogaśāstratvaṃ tasya vedam ihocyate //

“Alternatively, having rejected a pseudo **Dharma-teaching** [i.e. Smṛti] composed by the Buddha or some other [teacher], here is stated its being a **Dharma-performing-manual** [i.e. *Kalpasūtra*].”

the Buddha and other teachers are wrong, because they are seen to have other, evil causes (*hetudarśanāt*) and thus are not based on the Veda. He states that the Buddha's teachings are motivated by greed and so on.

Tantravārttika ad 1.3.4, A 195.27–30:

*lobhādi kāraṇaṃ cātra bahv evānyat pratīyate /
yasmīn sannihite dr̥ṣṭe nāsti mūlāntarānumā //
śākyaḍayaś ca sarvatra kurvāṇā dharmadeśanām /
hetujālavinirmuktām na kadācana kurvate //*

And many other causes **such as greed** are known here. These being seen as present, there is no inferring another source [such as the Veda].

And the Buddha and such [teachers], whenever they teach dharmas, never do it without a net of [evil] **motives**.

Thus, according to Kumārila, the brahmanical Smṛtis are authoritative, because they are based on the Veda. On the other hand, the non-Vedic traditions³⁹ are not authoritative, because they are not Veda-based. Rather, they are motivated by faulty causes such as greed, as the sūtra *hetudarśanāc ca*, properly reinterpreted, intends. In this way, there is a simple contrast between orthodox and heterodox traditions.

Text	Tradition	Cause	Authoritativeness
<i>mānavādismṛti</i>	<i>trayīvitparigrhīta</i>	<i>vedamūlatvāt</i>	<i>pramāṇa</i>
<i>śākyaḍivacana</i>	<i>trayībāhya</i>	<i>hetudarśanāt</i>	<i>apramāṇa</i>

Kumārila's view on Manu and the Buddha can be summed up as follows: Manu's teaching is otherwise inexplicable, i.e. cannot be explained as having any other cause. It is solely based on the Veda. It can neither be based on nor motivated by evil causes such as deception (*vipralambhana*). On the other hand, the Buddha's teaching is otherwise explicable, i.e. can be explained as having another cause. It is based, for example, on greed (*lobha*). Therefore, *hetudarśanāc ca* (*Jaiminisūtra* 1.3.4) applies to the Buddha's teaching of dharma. Thus it is *apramāṇa*.

On the basis of this view, we can fabricate a Buddhist view: The Buddha's teaching is otherwise inexplicable, i.e. cannot be explained as having any other cause. He cannot aim at deception (*vipralambhana*) or the like. The alleged *hetu* is not seen. He is motivated solely by compassion. He cannot be but a cognizer of the objects that he teaches. Therefore he is reliable even with regard to totally imperceptible matters. Thus, applying the same reasoning of *anyathānupapatti*, one can show that the Buddha and his teaching are authoritative, just as Manu and his teaching are for Mīmāṃsakas.

Historical development of the Mīmāṃsā reasoning

We can probably recapitulate the Mīmāṃsā arguments from the historical point of view as the follows.⁴⁰

³⁹ He refers to them as *sāṃkhya-yoga-pāñcarātra-pāśupata-śākya-[nir]grantha-parigrhītadharmādharmanibandhanāni* (A 194.10–11).

⁴⁰ Textual sources are arranged in chronological order as follows:

JS 1.3.3–4	... <i>asati [virodhe] hy anumānam / hetudarśanāc ca</i>
ŚBh 1.3.1–4	<i>vyāmoha /lobha</i>
ŚBh 1.1.2 (<i>pūrva</i>)	<i>nanv aviduṣām upadeśo nāvakalpate</i>

Jaiminisūtra 1.3.1–4 establishes the framework that a Smṛti passage is *pramāṇa* if it is Veda-based and if not, i.e. if it is based on other causes, it is *apramāṇa*.

JS 1.3.1–4

Veda → Smṛti (*pramāṇa*)
hetu → Smṛti (*apramāṇa*)

Śabara describes these ‘causes’ as delusion (*vyāmoha*) and greed (*lobha*) or the like. In *Śābarabhāṣya* ad 1.1.2, he generalizes the argument in the form of *anyathānupapatti* and applies it not only to Manu but also to any human teaching of dharma.

ŚBh 1.1.2, 1.3.1–4

Veda → *upadeśa* (*pramāṇa*)
vyāmoha / *lobhādi* → *upadeśa* (*apramāṇa*)
(*jñāna*) → *upadeśa*

In the *Ślokavārttika*, Kumārila refines the *Śābarabhāṣya* reasoning and formulates it into a logical consequence (*arthāpatti*) and, alternatively, inference (*anumāna*). The argument, as Śabara intends, deals with any human being who teaches dharma, such as Manu, and not specifically heterodox teachers such as the Buddha.

In the *Tantravārttika* and the *Bṛhaṭṭikā*, however, he applies the reasoning of *anyathānupapatti* together with *hetudarśanāt*, even departing from the tradition, specifically to the Buddha and other heterodox teachers. Thus, the Buddha’s teaching, according to Kumārila, is not based on his direct experience of dharma. It is rather caused by delusion and motivated by greed. He also points out, already in the *Ślokavārttika*, that the Buddha’s action of teaching requires passion (*rāga*).⁴¹

TV, Bṛ

(*jñāna*) → *upadeśa*
vyāmoha / *lobhādi* → *upadeśa*
(*rāga*) → *upadeśa*

ŚBh 1.1.2 (<i>uttara</i>)	<i>upadeśo hi vyāmohād api bhavati asati vyāmohe vedād api bhavati</i>
ŚV 156	<i>upadeśo ’nyathā na syād atīndriyanibandhanaḥ tasya kartrā na ced dṛṣṭaḥ so ’riha ity arthakalpanā</i>
ŚV 158ab	<i>anyathāpy upapannatvaṃ vyāmohād iti kathyate</i>
TV 1.3.4	<i>lobhādi kāraṇaṃ cātra bahv evānyat pratīyate yasmin sannihite dṛṣṭe nāsti mūlāntarānumā śākyādayas ca sarvatra kurvāṇā dharmadeśanām hetujālavinirmuktāṃ na kadācana kurvate</i>
Bṛ (=TS 3216)	<i>upadeśo hi buddhāder dharmādharmādigocaraḥ anyathā nopapadyeta sarvajño yadi no bhavet</i>
Bṛ (=TS 3222ab)	<i>upadeśo hi buddhāder anyathāpy upapadyate</i>

⁴¹ *Ślokavārttika codanā* v. 137. See Kataoka 2003b:55–60.

Dharmakīrti's theory reconsidered

Taking into consideration the Mīmāṃsā reasoning of Manu and the Buddha, we can probably better reframe Dharmakīrti's idea.

Dharmakīrti, in the PVSV, replying to the criticism that the Buddha's teaching is motivated by passion (*rāga*), establishes that it is motivated rather by compassion.⁴² In establishing that the Buddha's teaching is valid, he denies other causes such as deception. Thus, for Dharmakīrti, the Buddha's teaching is solely motivated by compassion. There is no other cause. Therefore, by the force of *agatyā*, it is accepted as being reliable even with regard to totally imperceptible matters.⁴³

In PV II, Dharmakīrti connects all the relata and puts them into a single chain of causal relationship. The Buddha's teaching, which is alleged by Kumāriḷa as not being based on proper source knowledge and as being motivated by greed or the like, rather proves for Dharmakīrti the Buddha's cognition and compassion.

PV II

karuṇā → abhyāsa → jñāna → upadeśa

Here, we can see that Dharmakīrti can reply to any of Kumāriḷa's criticism against the Buddha: The Buddha's teaching cannot be a 'delusion' (*vyāmoḥa*), because, insofar as the ascertainable domains are concerned, there is no discrepancy.⁴⁴ Nor is it a lie (*anṛta*) aiming at 'deceiving' (*vipralambha[na]*) or 'deluding' (*vyāmohana*) disciples, because his teaching has not been invalidated so far (*anuparodhāt*) and therefore is not revealed to be a lie. Also it is pointless (*vaiphalya*) for the Buddha to tell a lie. It is also not the case that the Buddha tells a falsehood without aiming at a particular goal (*niṣprayojana*) as does a child (*bāla*) for it would be pointless (*vaiphalya*) for him to do so. That the Buddha is motivated by 'greed' (*lobha*) and other evil causes does not apply to him, because he is compassionate (*dayālutvāt*) and all of his actions are just 'for the sake of others' (*parārthaṃ sarvārambhābhiyogataḥ*). The reasoning of *anyathānupapatti* and *hetudarśanāt*, which originally applies to Manu, is now utilized by Dharmakīrti, as Kumāriḷa apprehends it, to prove the Buddha's authoritativeness. Dharmakīrti's use

⁴² PVSV 8.22–10.12. See Dunne 1996, Kataoka 2003b.

⁴³ In PV I 217 and the PVSV thereon, Dharmakīrti does not emphasize the causal relationship between *jñāna* and *upadeśa*. But he must have the scheme in mind. This is indicated by the argument that immediately follows, in which he refers to someone's reasoning based on an *āpta*. There *āpta* is described as *yathārthadarśanādiguṇayuktaḥ puruṣaḥ* (PVSV 109.24). Dharmakīrti probably refers to the view represented, e.g. by *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.7 (*āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ*) and the *Nyāyabhāṣya* thereon. He reframes the scheme from the viewpoint of the causal relationship between an *āpta*'s experience (*darśana*) and his teaching (*upadeśa*). There Dharmakīrti is cautious about internal, hidden properties such as a teacher's former experience. This is probably why Dharmakīrti does not bother to mention the causal relationship explicitly in his own proof. And this fits his using the indirect *agatyā*-reasoning instead of direct verification of the Buddha's experience of imperceptible matters.

⁴⁴ According to *Śābarabhāṣya* ad 1.3.3, the reason for regarding a controversial Smṛti passage as 'delusion' (*vyāmoḥa*) is its contradiction (*virodha*) to a Vedic passage. Similarly, if Dharmakīrti wants to say that the Buddha's teaching is not a 'delusion', it is enough for him just to show that it does not contradict other *pramāṇas*.

of the word *agatyā*⁴⁵ and his denying other causes of dharmic teachings are strong enough to evoke in the Mīmāṃsakas' minds the long-established arguments and the framework concerning Manu's Smṛti. They must have immediately understood Dharmakīrti's intention:

The Buddha is a *pramāṇa*, because otherwise his teaching would be inexplicable (*agatyā=anyathānupapattyā*), while the Veda or the like is not, because it can be explained away in another way, too (*anyathāpy upapadyate*).

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⁴⁵ *Agatyā* is logically equivalent to *anyathānupapattyā*. In this connection, it is also interesting to see a remark by Tillemans 1990:67: “Indeed, the Buddhist logicians' rational orientation finally leads him to the position that most of our ‘knowledge’, which inevitably depends on testimony, books, etc., is mere true **presumption** (*vid dpyod*), to use the category of the Tibetan scholastic.” (My emphasis.) If the authoritativeness of scripture is preceded by *anyathānupapatti*, it is naturally hypothetical, as is clear from the Mīmāṃsā definition of *arthāpatti* as *adṛṣṭakalpanā*, i.e. postulation of something unseen.

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