

Jñānaśrīmitra on the *Ratnagoṭravibhāga*

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Jñānaśrīmitra (ca. 980–1030)¹ contributed significantly not only to developing Nirākārajñānavāda theories but also to the resurrection of the *Ratnagoṭravibhāga* (abbr. RGV) in early-11th-century India. The *Ratnagoṭravibhāga* was very likely composed sometime around the 4th or 5th century in India. The work fell into obscurity towards the late 6th century, only to slowly regain recognition starting from the early 11th century (see Appendix A).

The earliest masters of this period who quote or refer to the RGV are Maitrīpa (1007/1010-?), Jñānaśrīmitra (ca. 980–1030), and Ratnākaraśānti (late 10th to early 11th century).² Maitrīpa was the common disciple of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnākaraśānti, and, according to a story in Tibetan documents, rediscovered a Sanskrit manuscript of the RGV in a stūpa in Magadha.

If this rediscovery story is a historical event, Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnākaraśānti would have received the teaching of the RGV from their common disciple Maitrīpa; but we have no concrete witness to corroborate it.

Maitrīpa's knowledge of the RGV is attested by a quotation of RGV II. 61b in his *Pañcatathāgatamudrāvivarāṇa*; he introduces a Nirākārajñānavādin's propounding of the arising of the Dharmakāya from the Saṃbhogakāya and Nirmāṇakāya, but does not discuss Buddha-nature.³

In contrast to Maitrīpa, who does not discuss Buddha-nature, we find extensive discussions of the topic in compositions of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnākaraśānti.⁴

¹ KAJIYAMA 1966: 2–7 (I follow the 1998 reprint version).

² On these dates, see MIMAKI 1992: 297 n. 1 and ISAACSON 2001: 457 n. 2.

³ KANO 2006: 31 (Chapter 1), 2014: 224.

⁴ For Ratnākaraśānti's understanding of Buddha-nature, see KANO 2006 (Chapter 1)

In the present paper, I shall focus on quotations from the RGV in Jñānaśrīmitra's *Sākārasiddhiśāstra* and *Sākārasaṃgrahasūtra*, and on his understanding of the RGV, so as to shed light on the reception of the RGV in the early 11th century.

1. Jñānaśrīmitra

Tāranātha says of Jñānaśrīmitra of Gauḍa that he was at first a learned master of the *Saindhava (*sendha pa*) school of *śrāvakayāna*—according to Skilling, possibly the Sāmmatīyas.⁵ After converting to Mahāyāna, he mastered the whole works of Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga, along with many tantras. He possessed clairvoyance (*mngon shes*), thanks to which he once prophesied a fire in the temple of Vajrāsana in Bodhagayā.⁶ He was a teacher of Ratnakīrti (ca. 1000–1050).⁷ Atiśa and 'Brog-mi Lo-tsā-ba Shākya-ye-shes (993–1077?) are also said to have studied under Jñānaśrīmitra.⁸ At the Vikramaśīla monastery, Jñānaśrīmitra was active as one of the six “gatekeeper” paṇḍitas.⁹

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⁵ SKILLING (1987: 16) states: “Tāranātha refers several times to large numbers of ‘Sendha-pa’ Śrāvakas residing at Vajrāsana and Odantapurī, from the time of King Dharmapāla (c. 800 A. D.) up to the Sena period, when as many as 10,000 assembled for the rains-retreat (*varṣāvāsa*) at Vajrāsana. Although the significance of ‘Sendha-pa’ is not clear, the most probable derivation is from the Sanskrit *saindhava*, ‘residents of Sindh’: since both Hsüan-tsang and I-ching state that Sāmmatīyas were predominant in that area, the Saindhava-śrāvakas could possibly have been Sāmmatīyas.” See also ISAACSON & SFERRA 2014: 65 n. 26.

⁶ Tāranātha, *rGya gar chos 'byung*, 183.11–17.

⁷ KAJIYAMA 1999: 5.

⁸ Jñānaśrīmitra gave 'Brog-mi tantric instruction in 'byang ba lus 'khrugs bsrung ba'i man ngag. See STEARNS 2001: 209, DAVIDSON 2005: 172, and SOBISCH 2008: 110. Jñānaśrīmitra's works are quoted, for instance, in the *Sekaniṛdeśapañjikā* of Rāmapāla (11th cent.) and the *Laṭakamelaka* of Śaṅkadhara (first half of the 12th century), who worked under the king Govindacandra (1104/1109?-1151) of the Gāhaḍavāla dynasty (references supplied by Prof. Isaacson and Prof. Somdev, respectively; See ISAACSON & SFERRA 2014: 171).

⁹ The other five are Ratnākaraśānti, Vāgīśvarakīrti, Prajñākaramati, Nāro, and Ratnavajra. See, for instance, gZhon-nu-dpal, *Deb ther sngon po*, 257 (*bi kra ma śī lā'i mkhas pa drug po | shar na shānti ba | lho na ngag gi dbang phyug grags pa | nub na shes rab 'byung gnas blo gros | byang na nā ro paṅ chen | dbus na rin chen rdo rje dang | dznyā na shrī rnamś bzhugs pa*); ROERICH 1949/53: 206; STEARNS 2001: 85ff., nn. 20–22; DAVIDSON 2006: 171–172, etc. For the time being we cannot be absolutely certain of the Indian origin of the notion of the “six gatekeeper paṇḍitas.”

One of the earliest sources which alludes to it is the colophon of Prajñākaramati's

2. Quotations from the *Ratnagotravibhāga* in the *Sākārasiddhiśāstra*

In the *Sākārasiddhiśāstra* and *Sākārasaṃgraha* (a versified summary of the *Sākārasiddhiśāstra*), which establish his own philosophical position with regard to the Sākāravāda,¹⁰ Jñānaśrīmitra repeatedly quotes the RGV, the relevant passages of which, in the *Sākārasiddhiśāstra*, I shall now review.¹¹

Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛttipiṇḍārtha (D 3795, 275a6–7, P 5193, 315a5–7: **nub kyi sgo glegs dpal mkhas pa chen po shes rab 'byung gnas blo gros kyis mdzad pa mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi bshad pa bsdsu don rdzogs so || || paṇḍi ta chen po su ma ti kī rti dang | lo tsīsha ba blo ldan shes rab kyis bsgyur ba'o ||**) (reference supplied by Prof. Izumi Miyazaki). The translators' (i.e. Śāntibhadra and Shākya 'od) colophon of the *Madhyamakālamkāropadeśa* refers to Ratnākaraśānti as “the chief among the contemporary **four great gatekeepers**” (D 4085, 231a2–3, P 558, 266b3: *dus mtshungs pa'i sgo srung chen po bzhi las kyang gtso bor gyur ba*).

Another early source is the *Chos 'byung me tog snying po sbrang rts'i bcud* of Nyang-ral Nyi-ma-'od zer (ca. 1124–1192), pp. 437–438. This religious chronicle mentions 'Brog-mi Lo-tśā-ba's visit to the Vajrāsana (*rdo rje gdan*) of Bodhgayā and his study under Ratnākaraśānti, who is called one of the “six gate[keeper] paṇḍitas of Magadha” (*ma ga dha'i mkhas pa sgo drug*). This suggests that the six kept watch at the monastery in Bodhgayā, not in the Vikramaśīla monastery.

¹⁰The Sākāravāda is one sub-school of the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda, and opposed to another sub-school the Nirākāravāda. The Vijñānavāda teaches that “the external reality is not existent at all, the world being nothing but our ideas which are the sole reality” (KAJIYAMA 1965: 426), and that the images (or mental representations, *ākāra*) we are cognizing are inside our minds (i.e. *svasaṃvedana*). Regarding the perception (*vijñāna*) accompanied by the images of cognition, the Sākāravādin asserts, according to the *Tarkabhāṣā* of Mokṣākaragupta (11th or 12th century), that “the truth consists in the knowledge which, though having [various] images (*ākāra*), is freed from the imaginary relation of cognition and cognizer” (*parikalpitagrāhyagrāhakabhāvarahitaṃ vijñānaṃ sākāraṃ satyam iti*); while the Nirākāravādin criticizes it by claiming that “those images of cognition (*ākāra*) are indeed not real, and become perceptible (or shine forth) being shown by nescience (*avidyā*)” (*ākārās tv amī vitathā evāvīdyayā darśitāḥ prakāśante*) (the text and translation by KAJIYAMA 1965: 424f.).

The Sākāravādin further asserts that when a person is emancipated his knowledge is accompanied by *ākāras* (blue, etc.), though these do not enter into conceptual constructions (see KAJIYAMA 1999: 7). To the Sākāravādin, thus, the image (*ākāra*) is ultimately existent (Jñānaśrīmitra equates the *ākāra* with Buddha's *sambhogakāya*; see below). To the Nirākāravādin, on the other hand, the image is merely a product of the false imagination, and only the innate illuminating function of cognition (*prakāśa*) is of the ultimate (Ratnākaraśānti equates the *prakāśa* with Buddha's *dharma-kāya*).

In his *Sākārasiddhi*, Jñānaśrīmitra cites Ratnākaraśānti's *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* and criticizes the latter's stance, namely the opposed Nirākāravāda (KAJIYAMA 1965). For the doctrinal outline of the two sub-schools, see KAJIYAMA 1965 and OKI 1982 etc.

¹¹The locations of the quotations from the RGV in the *Sākārasiddhi* are listed in Appendix A (see below).

These passages are summarized in his previously mentioned *Sākārasaṃgraha*. I shall deal with eight passages of the *Sākārasiddhiśāstra* along with their summaries of the *Sākārasaṃgraha* (locations are indicated by Thakur's edition):

- (1) *Sākārasiddhi* 431.19–432.5 (cf. *Sākārasaṃgraha* II.65–75): The Buddha illustrated by the simile of the sky (on RGV IV.73–74).
- (2) *Sākārasiddhi* 434.11–24 (cf. *Sākārasaṃgraha* III.1–7): On the identity of the *sambhogakāya* and the *dharmakāya*.
- (3) *Sākārasiddhi* 478.10–12: On the *pratyātmavedanīya*.
- (4) *Sākārasiddhi* 487.11–488.2 (cf. *Sākārasaṃgraha* II.53–57): On RGV I.154.
- (5) *Sākārasiddhi* 493.11–14 (cf. *Sākārasaṃgraha* II.143–148ab): On RGV I.145.
- (6) *Sākārasiddhi* 495.13–497.1 (cf. *Sākārasaṃgraha* II.128–142): Critiques to Nirākāravāda's views on eternity and all-pervasion.
- (7) *Sākārasiddhi* 499.1–500.9 (cf. *Sākārasaṃgraha* II.98–103): The relation between the *dharmakāya* and the *sambhogakāya*.
- (8) *Sākārasiddhi* 502.8–504.6 (cf. *Sākārasaṃgraha* II.85–97): On RGV III.1–3.

For the Sanskrit text, I have used Anantalal Thakur's edition of the *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvalī*, correcting it against the plates of the original Sanskrit manuscript (a *codex unicus*) on which Thakur's edition based (photographed by Sāṅkrtyāyana at Zhwa-lu monastery; positive prints are preserved at Göttingen under shelf-mark Xc14/25). A critical edition of selected passages along with an annotated translation (passages [1] to [4]) is included in Appendix B of this paper.¹²

3. Survey and Analysis of the *Sākārasiddhi* passages

Sākārasiddhi (1): 431.19–432.5 (cf. *Sākārasaṃgraha* II.65–75)

¹²The translation and Sanskrit edition presented in Appendix B are an improved version of those included in KANO 2006 (Appendix D: Translations of Relevant Passages from Jñānaśrīmitra's *Sākārasiddhiśāstra* and *Sākārasaṃgraha*). A critical edition along with annotated translation of passages (5) to (8) are under preparation for publication.

No complete translation of the *Sākārasiddhiśāstra* and *Sākārasaṃgraha* has so far been published; KAKEI (1970) has translated the beginning portion of *Sākārasiddhiśāstra* chapter 5 (Thakur ed., pp. 483. 1–488. 2) into Japanese, and Arai is preparing an annotated Japanese translation of *Sākārasiddhiśāstra* chapter 4.

Jñānaśrīmitra claims that the similarity between Buddhahood (or awakened mind) and the sky (or the space) is only in regard to its freedom from adventitious stains; he quotes RG V II.29 (“like the sky, Buddhahood is free from conceptualization”)¹³ in support of this.

He then quotes RG V IV.73–74, which he interprets in a subtle way. These verses teach that the sky appears, through the influence of dust and fog, as if it had low and high regions, but in reality the sky has no such sub-divisions; likewise, the Buddhas are not divided into similar classes, any such appearance being the result of superimposition or misguided exclusion.¹⁴ The problem here is that the adjectives used to describe the sky (*arūpin*, *nirābhāsa*, *akiñcana*, etc.), if taken as adjectives to describe the Buddhas, are inconsistent with Jñānaśrīmitra’s doctrinal Sākāravāda position (which maintains that the Buddha-body is represented by an *ākāra*). Faced with this problem, Jñānaśrīmitra claims that the group of adjectives (*arūpin* etc.) in RG V IV.73, all grammatically singular, qualifies “sky” (*vyomni*, sg.) alone and not “the Buddhas” (*buddheṣu*, pl.).

Jñānaśrīmitra continues that even if the adjectives do relate to the Buddhas, they still do not mean that the Buddhas lack form (*rūpa*) and appearance (*ābhāsa*). Rather, the adjectives *nirābhāsa* and *arūpin* should be interpreted in the same way that Vasubandhu interprets them in his commentary on the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga*¹⁵ (in his gloss on *nirvikalpajñāna* “non-conceptual wisdom”), namely *arūpin* in the sense of “ineffable”

¹³ *Sākārasiddhi*, 431.19–21: *āgantūmalaprapañcaviḡamenaiva hi viḡayaḡsādrśyam iti darśitaḡ prāk | ata eva mahāyānottaratantre nirāḡṡṡenaiva sādharmaḡyeḡa sarvatra vyomopamā, yathā vyapagatavikalpaḡ gaganavad ityādi |* (^a*āgantū*] Ms; *āgantuka* ° Ed.).

¹⁴ *Sākārasiddhi*, 431.22–25 (= RG V IV.73–74): *akiñcane^a nirābhāse nirālambe nirāśraye | cakṡuṡpatha^bvyatikrānte ’py arūpiḡy anidarśane^c || yathā nimnonnataḡ vyomni drśyate na ca tat tathā | buddheṡv api tathā sarvaḡdrśyate na ca tat tathā ||* (^a *akiñcane* Ms. /Ed. ; *niṡkiñcane* RG V; ^b *cakṡuṡpatha* ° Ms. =RGV; *cakṡuṡy atha* Ed.; ^c *anidarśane* Ed; *anidarśene* Ms.).

¹⁵ Jñānaśrīmitra calls the work *Dharmadharmatāprāvibhāga* instead of *Dharmadharmatāvibhaḡavṡṡṡti* (the title transliterated in the Tanjurs) . Although the authorship of this work is doubted by modern scholars, the Indian tradition known to Jñānaśrīmitra clearly ascribed it to Vasubandhu (*ācāryavasubandhupādair dharmadharmatāprāvibhāge*, see below). Cf. JNA, intro., p. 25, MATSUDA 1996: 158–159.

Although *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga* is the widely known title in modern publications, *Dharmadharmatāprāvibhāga* is the attested title in Sanskrit manuscripts: The colophon of a 14th-century paper manuscript of the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga* (fol. 13r5) reads: *dharmmadharmmatāsūtrāḡy āryamaitreyapādasya || dharmmadharmmatāprāvibhāgasūtraḡ samāptam |* (the manuscript is yet to be found, but the colophon was transcribed and published by SĀḡKṚTYĀYANA 1938: 163 n.1); and Jñānaśrīmitra’s *Sākārasiddhi* passage in question (see above).

(*nirūpayitum aśakya*), and *anābhāsa* (i.e. *nirābhāsa*) in the sense of “without object” (*aviṣaya*).¹⁶ As for *akiñcana* (“having nothing”), it could be understood as “being free from *rāga* and so forth. “The remaining adjectives are, according to Jñānaśrīmitra, unproblematic.¹⁷

Jñānaśrīmitra’s aim is to show that the RGV is an authoritative text that supports the *sākāra* view, that is, that the Buddha-body is to be represented by *ākāras* that exist ultimately.¹⁸ Jñānaśrīmitra is arguing against an assumed opponent (i.e. Nirākāravādin) who takes RGV IV. 73–74 to mean that the Buddhas do no such thing.¹⁹

Sākārasiddhi (2): 434.11–24 (cf. *Sākārasaṃgraha* III.1–7)

Jñānaśrīmitra claims that the relationship between the Buddha (here equated with his *saṃbhogakāya*) and the *dharmakāya* is *tādātmya* (identity), whereas the relation between the Buddha and the *nirmāṇakāya* is *tadutpatti* (causality).²⁰ Quoting RGV III. 37ab (“The [Buddha-]qualities are pro-

¹⁶ Here he makes use of Vasubandhu’s interpretation of the word *nirābhāsa* (*aviṣayatvād anābhāsam*), for the literal meaning (“without appearance”) of the word is incompatible with his doctrinal position, Sākāravāda, according to which the Buddha-body does appear.

¹⁷ *Sākārasiddhi*, 432.5–8: *yathā tv ācāryavasubandhupādair dharmadharmatā^apraviḥbhāge nirvikalpañjānalakṣanaprastāve dvayena grāhyagrāhakabhāvena nirūpayitum aśakya tvād arūpi, aviṣayatvād^b anābhāsam iti vibhaktam, tatheha buddha iti prayukte ‘py astu | akiñcanatvam apy āgantukarāgādiviḥgamāḥ jñeyam | śeṣam aviruddham |* (^a °*dharmatā*°] Ms.; °*dharmitā*° Ed.; ^b *aviṣayatvād*] Ms. (cf. *Sākārasaṃgraha*, 534.16: *agocaratvena*); *saviṣayatvād* Ed.). Cf. *Sākārasaṃgraha* II.65–66 and DhDhVV (Mathes ed.) Skt. 103.105 (*dvayena grāhyagrāhakabhāvena nirūpayitum aśakya tvāt*) = Tib. 85.444–445; Tib. 85.446.

He quotes here two sentences from Vasubandhu’s *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga* commentary (one of which is not available in the Sanskrit original), i.e. the phrase *aviṣayatvād anābhāsam*; this corresponds to DhDhVV (Mathes ed.) 85.446f.: *yul ma yin pa’i phyir snang ba med pa ste*. The passage Jñānaśrīmitra quotes here parallels, according to MATSUDA (1996: 155, 158, 160 n.11), a passage in the *Nirvikalpa-praveśadhāraṇī*, which, in turn, is based on one in the *Kāśyapaparivarta*.

¹⁸ *Sākārasiddhi*, 432.3: *sugate tu bhagavati yathoktākāra^a eva* (^a °*ākāra* em. ; °*ākāre* Ms/Ed.).

¹⁹ For instance, Ratnākaraśānti (who is a Nirākāravāda) takes all three Buddha-bodies to be *nirākāra*, like space (*khasama*). See Ratnākaraśānti, *Khasamatantṛāṅikā* (Jagannāth Upādhyāya ed.), pp. 231–232.

²⁰ *Sākārasiddhi*, 434.12: *tad asya bhagavati tādātmyaṃ saṃbandho, nirmāṇasya tu tadutpattiḥ*. Jñānaśrīmitra returns to the same argument in a later passage. See *ibid.* 495.6–15.

Jñānaśrīmitra here makes use of the terms *tādātmya* and *tadutpatti*, assigning a key role to these two core notions that underpin *pramāṇa* in the *buddhakāya* context.

duced from the *dharmakāya*”), he (or an opponent) says that the relationship between the *dharmakāya* and *saṃbhogakāya* can also be defined as *tadutpatti*.²¹ However, one should revere the *dharmakāya* not only for its functioning as a means (*sādhana*, i.e. meditation that realizes the Buddha-qualities) but also for its being *tattva* (that is, “reality” and “identity”).²² Replying to the question of how the goal and the means (*sādhyaśādhana*) can be identical, Jñānaśrīmitra explains that they are so because the goal is to directly perceive the *dharmakāya/tattva*, while the means is meditation on the same *dharmakāya/tattva*.²³ The *dharmakāya/tattva* fulfils its own purpose (i.e. to make a Buddha appear) only through the Buddha’s primal body (i.e. the *saṃbhogakāya*), which is the possessor (*dharmīn*) of its qualities (*dharma*, i.e., the *dharmakāya*).²⁴ And then, Jñānaśrīmitra goes on to claim that the *dharmakāya* is nothing other than a quality, called “the Buddha,” just as a king is called Heroic Energy (i.e. the quality of a king) (*pratāpa eva rājetyādivat*). Reinforcing the inseparability of the property (*dharma*) and its possessor (*dharmīn*) from one another, against the wrong view that the two might be different (*arthāntara*), is a passage from the RGV he quotes that teaches that “the universal ruler (i.e. *dharmīn*) has a manifoldness [in the form of] the [32] major marks and the like (i.e. *dharma*).”²⁵ He suggests that the *dharmakāya* cannot fulfil any purpose without the *saṃbhogakāya*,²⁶ and states: “Therefore, the designation of the *dharmakāya*, too, is [merely] a ‘borrowed ornament’ (*yācitakamaṇḍana*) for the [*saṃbhogakāya*]” (*tato dharmakāyasamjñāpy asya yācitakamaṇḍanam*); that is, the *dharmakāya* is merely a quality of the Buddha. He then concludes that this notion of the dual body of the Buddha does not at all agree with the *nirākāra* view.²⁷

Jñānaśrīmitra here clearly raises the *saṃbhogakāya* above the *dharmakāya*. Indeed, he states in his *Sākārasaṃgraha* II.109: “If the *saṃbhogakāya* ceases, its properties, [constituting] the *dharmakāya*, no [longer] exist, and its result, the *nirmāṇakāya* does not [exist], either” (*saṃbhogabhāṅge*

²¹ *Sākārasiddhi*, 434.13–16: *yadā tu sadātanaṃ tadrūpaṃ sakalaśukladharmākāratayā vivakṣitam, tadā tatrāpi tadutpattir eva | yathoktam, dharmakāyaprabhāvitā guṇā iti |*.

²² *Sākārasiddhi*, 434.17–18: *evaṃ ca satī yady api sādhanam api tat, tathāpi na tanmātreṇa tatrādaraḥ, kiṃ tu tattvam ity eva |*.

²³ *Sākārasiddhi*, 434.18–20: *sādhyasādhanayor anyabhāvo^a 'pi kuta iti cet? tatasākṣātkārasyaiva sādhyatvāt, tadbhāvanāyā eva ca sādhanatvāt, tadabhāve 'nis-caye vā tayor eva lopāsakteḥ^b | (^a anyabhāvo em. ; anantabhāvo Ms/Ed. ^b lopāsakteḥ Ms. ; lopāsakteḥ Ed.)*

²⁴ *Sākārasiddhi*, 434.19: *tasya ca pratibhāsinaiva dharmīnā caritārthatvāt.*

²⁵ *Sākārasiddhi*, 434.21–22: *lakṣaṇādicitratā hi cakravartinīty uttaratantram*. This is a summary of RGVV 84.4–5 (on II. 29; see TAKASAKI 1984: 346).

²⁶ *Sākārasiddhi*, 434.24: *na caivam arthāntarasya kathañcit sattve 'pi kaścid upayogaḥ.*

²⁷ *Sākārasiddhi*, 434.25: *na nirākāradarśanānurodhaḥ kaścit.*

taddharmo dharmakāyo na vidyate | tatkāryaṃna ca nirmāṇaṃ).²⁸ He further defines the *saṃbhogakāya* as the Buddha himself and the *dharmakāya* as emptiness²⁹; and asserts that the *saṃbhogakāya* really is existent (*paramārthasat*), whereas the *dharmakāya* is only nominally so (*prajñāptisat*).³⁰

Sākārasiddhi (3): 478.10–14

Jñānaśrīmitra summarizes RGV I.9,³¹ which teaches that the Jewel of the Dharma is the object of individual self-awareness (*pratyātmavedya*), and equates it with self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*), an epistemological term (here used, however, not within an epistemological discourse but rather in a soteriological one).

Sākārasiddhi (4): 487.11–488.2 (cf. *Sākārasaṃgraha* II.53–57)³²

At the beginning of the sixth chapter, Jñānaśrīmitra writes: “I can accept neither the superimposition of even a jot of non-manifestation nor the denial of a tittle of manifestation within the mass of *citraprakāśa* (multifarious manifestation).”³³ In support of this stance, Jñānaśrīmitra quotes, among Maitreya’s works, the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, *Madhyāntavibhāga*, *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, and RGV,³⁴ and in particular *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* V.21 and RGV I.154 (two almost parallel verses): “There is nothing to be removed

²⁸The verse continues: this is a peaceful end of Buddhism (*sādhvī buddhākṛtāntatā*: II.109d). The next verse (II.110) is an objection from the Nirākāravāda position: “If the *saṃbhogakāya* will cease, then, the *dharmakāya* should be without image. And precisely from this reason, the *nirmāṇakāya* and also the *saṃbhogakāya* are based on this (i.e. *dharmakāya*).” (*nanu astam etu saṃbhogo dharmakāyo ’stv anākṛtīḥ | tata eva ca nirmāṇaṃ saṃbhogo ’pi tadāśritāḥ*).

²⁹See *Sākārasaṃgraha* II.134ab: *svabhāvaḥ śūnyatā dharmāḥ saṃbhogaḥ sugataḥ svayam*. It is on the combined authority of RGV I.145 and *Madhyāntavibhāga* I.12 that he equates the *dharmakāya* with emptiness. See *Sākārasaṃgraha* II.145–148 and *Sākārasiddhi*, 493.13–20.

³⁰See *Sākārasiddhi*, 494.20–21: *tasmāt prajñāptisan dharmakāya iti*, and 500.4–9, etc. See below. Cf. also *Sākārasaṃgraha* III.4: *tasmāt svalakṣaṇaṃ buddho dharmāḥ sāmānyalakṣaṇam*.

³¹*Sākārasiddhi*, 478.10–13: *uttaratantre ca, pratyātmavedyo dharmā ity evākṣaram*.

³²KAKEI (1970) translates this portion into Japanese, but his translation often differs from mine at crucial points.

³³*Sākārasiddhi*, 483.12–13: *atra hi citraprakāśarāśau nāprakāśakaṇasyāropāḥ sahyo, nāpi prakāśalesasyāpavadaḥ*.

³⁴Jñānaśrīmitra quotes *Madhyāntavibhāga* (Nagao ed.) I.1 and I.8ab; *Mahā-*

from it³⁵ and absolutely nothing to be added. The real should be seen as real, and seeing the real, one becomes released. “After explaining *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* V.21 within its context, Jñānaśrīmitra goes on to explain RGV I.154, in turn, within the context of the RGV.³⁶

Jñānaśrīmitra quotes the RGVV ad RGV I.154 as teaching two mistaken positions with regard to the mode of emptiness of Buddha-nature, namely (a) those who wrongly deny existent *dharmas*, and (b) those who superimpose non-existent *dharmas*. He then applies these two mistaken positions to cover (a') those who wrongly deny existent images (or mental representation, *ākāra*) and (b') those who superimpose non-existent perception that lacks images.³⁷

An opponent then quotes the RGVV: “From this, Buddha-element (*tathāgatadhātu*), there is nothing to be removed, namely defiling factors, and there is nothing to be added to it, namely purifying factors, “thereby suggesting that the subject of RGV I.154 is Buddha-nature, not image (*ākāra*).

Jñānaśrīmitra replies that even as a property (*dharma*) implies its possessor (*dharmīn*), so too Buddha-element or Buddha-nature (*tathāgatadhātu*), i.e., emptiness, implies a possessor of it, namely “[the image] that is grasped in the process of the development of a thought (*cittavivartagrāhya*)”³⁸; “this is because no one could even think of the possibility of superimposing and misguided exclusion with regard to pure emptiness, which is not involved in mental construction” (*kalpanā-aniveśin*).³⁹ He contends here that both Buddha-nature and emptiness are properties of the image, and that the mis-

yānasūtrālaṃkāra XI.15-23; *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* V.20–21; and RGV I.154 (see *Sākārasiddhi*, 483.18–488.5).

³⁵ *Sākārasiddhi*, 486.21: *ataḥ [= prakāśamānāt] . . . citrāt*.

³⁶ *Sākārasiddhi*, 487.16–17: *nāpaneyam ataḥ kiñcid upaneyam na kiñcana | draṣṭavyam bhūtatobhūtam bhūtadarśī vimucyate || (=RGV I.154)*.

³⁷ *Sākārasiddhi*, 487.19–20: *tatra sata evākārasyālikatām āsthāya paścād ucchedānupagamān na prathamō vipralambhaḥ sūnyatārthe | nāpi dvitīyaḥ, nirākāravedanādivadyatīrīktānupagamāt** | (* °ānupagamāt em.; °ānugamāt Ms/Ed).

³⁸ This suggests that *tathāgatadhātu* is nothing but *sūnyatā*, both being properties of the *ākāra*.

³⁹ *Sākārasiddhi*, 487.22–24: *kiṃ tu dharmeṇa dharmīnirdeśāt tathāgatadhātuśabdena sūnyatādharmā cittavivartagrāhya eva grāhyaḥ, kalpanāniveśīni sūnyatāmātre kasya-cit prakṣepādīśaṅkāvirahāt*.

Emending *cittavivartagrāhya eva grāhyaḥ* to *cittavivarta eva grāhyaḥ* (taking the first *grāhya* as a dittography) is a possible conjecture, but the result does not further his argumentation that emptiness (or the *dharmakāya*) is a property of the image (or the *saṃbhogakāya*). This sentence must mean: “However, because a property (*dharma*) points toward its possessor (*dharmīn*), one should understand (*grāhya*) that the word “Buddha-nature” (*tathāgatadhātu*) [has reference] only to [the image] that is

guided exclusion and superimposition taught in the RGV relate to the image rather than to Buddha-nature. To back up this assertion, he quotes another passage from the RGVV (p. 75.9–11), and concludes: “Therefore, there is no negation of the luminous form (*prakāśarūpa*). And this is precisely the meaning of the “Middle Way.”⁴⁰ These same passages of Jñānaśrīmitra were summarized, later, by Yamāri, who also attempts to refute the *alīkākāra* position.⁴¹

Here it is notable that Jñānaśrīmitra suggests that Buddha-nature is nothing but emptiness. His purpose in mentioning emptiness is not, of course, to equate it with Buddha-nature but merely to associate the characteristics of emptiness and Buddha-nature with one another, both of which are impervious to misguided exclusion and superimposition; in the process, he shifts the subject of RGV I.154 from Buddha-nature to the image (as justified by its property of emptiness).⁴²

Sākārasiddhi (5): 493.11–18 (cf. *Sākārasaṃgraha* II.143–148ab)

In a discussion of the *dharmakāya*, an opponent asks: “Who then is this *dharmakāya* that you are demonstrating, who is in the *Uttaratantra* called as *sattvadhātu*, *bodhisattva*, and *buddha* according to accumulation, diminution, and complete diminution of defilements, [respectively] ?”⁴³ In reply, Jñānaśrīmitra quotes RGV I. 145, which teaches that the *dharmakāya* is twofold, namely, both (a) the completely immaculate *dharmadhātu* (i.e. ul-

grasped as the process of the development of a thought (*cittavivartagrāhya*), which (i.e. the image) has emptiness as its property.”

The term *cittavivarta* denotes either mundane thought in all its variety or, from the viewpoint of the Mind-only theory, the whole gamut of mundane phenomena, and both are characterized by emptiness. For the expression *cittavivarta*, see Jñānaśrīmitra’s *Vyāpticarcā* (JNA 174.23: *na tu cittavivartaḥ pramāṇāpramāṇadvārāyātah*);

LASIC (2000: 32.7; 122) renders *cittavivarta* as “eine Umformung des Denkens” (I owe this reference to Prof. Kyuma).

⁴⁰ Near the end of the sixth chapter, Jñānaśrīmitra places the positions of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka on an equal footing, asserting that the teaching of Yogācāra is for those who have succumbed to misguided exclusion, while the teaching of Madhyamaka is for those who have succumbed to superimposition (*Sākārasiddhi*, 511.8–11).

⁴¹ Yamāri, *Supariśuddhā*, D 4266, Me, 2a4–3b5; See HAYASHI 2002.

⁴² This association of Buddha-nature and emptiness is the main argument discussed by rNgog Blo-ldan-shes-rab (1059–1109), who, for instance, states: “the [mental] continuum which is characterized by emptiness is the *dhātu* (i.e. Buddha-nature).” rNgog, *rGyud bla don bsdu*, A 3b3; B 5b3: *’di ltar stong pa nyid kyi rang bzhin du gyur pa’i sems kyi rgyud ni kham yin no* ||. See also KANO 2010: 271 n. 70 and 2014: 224–225.

⁴³ *Sākārasiddhi*, 493.11–12: *kas tarhi uttaratantrre kleśopacayāpacayātyantāpacayāt sa evāyaṃ dharmakāyaḥ sattvadhātur bodhisattvo buddha iti cocyate iti darśitah?* Cf.

timate reality itself) and (b) its natural outflow, that is, the profound and manifold teachings (i.e. scriptures derived from ultimate reality).⁴⁴ Jñānaśrīmitra accepts only the first (a) of these (i.e. *dharmakāya* = *dharmadhātu*), and, quoting *Madhyāntavibhāga* I.14, takes this *dharmadhātu* to be synonymous with emptiness.

According to the present passage (5) and above passage (4), Jñānaśrīmitra treats *dharmakāya*, *dharmadhātu*, *śūnyatā*, and Buddha-nature as synonymous.

Sākārasiddhi (6): 495.13–497.1 (cf. *Sākārasaṃgraha* II.128–142)

Jñānaśrīmitra claims that only *ākāra* has the ability to produce everything, including both pure and impure *dharmas*, while the realization of true reality (*tattvāmukhikāra*) is just an attendant condition (*sahakārin*) for the production of pure *dharmas*.⁴⁵ A Nirākāravāda objects that everything can arise from precisely the same realization (or true reality) in which no image takes place.⁴⁶ Jñānaśrīmitra replies: “I have already shown you that there is no authoritative teaching (*āgama*), and neither is there any logical reasoning (*yukti*), [to support your *nirākāra* position].”⁴⁷ Furthermore, he insists that Maitreya has already criticized the Nirākāravāda position in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* VI.4, which teaches that although everything is produced in accordance with dependent origination, some people mistakenly think that everything is produced from “some other [unique] cause”; they see the unreal but fail to see the real.⁴⁸

The Nirākāravādin then says that *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* VI.4 is directed against Ātmavāda, not Nirākāravāda, whereupon Jñānaśrīmitra replies:

RGV I.47: *aśuddho’śuddhaśuddho ’tha suviśuddho yathākramam | sattvadhātur iti prokto bodhisattvas tathāgataḥ |*

⁴⁴*Sākārasiddhi*, 493.13–14: *dharmakāyo dvidhā jñeyo dharmadhātuḥ sunirmalaḥ | tanniṣyandaś^a ca gāmbhīryavaicitryanayadeśanā ||* (^a *tanniṣyandaś* RGV/Ed (em.); *tanniṣyaś* Ms).

⁴⁵*Sākārasiddhi*, 495.13–15: *na cākāram antareṇa kvacid arthakriyopālabhaḥ | samastaśukletaradharmotpattaḥ tasyaiva sāmāthyadrṣṭeḥ | tattvāmukhikāranasya śukladharmajanmani sahakāritvam |*. This last sentence (the realization of true reality is an attendant condition for the rise of the pure *dharmas*) suggests that the *ākāra* is a core cause (*upādāna*) for it.

⁴⁶*Sākārasiddhi*, 495.15: *tata eva nirākārāt sarvasaṃbhava iti cet |*. This expresses the notion that the universal cause from which everything arises is *nirākāra*.

⁴⁷*Sākārasiddhi*, 495.15–16: *nātrāgama iti darśitam, nāpi yuktīḥ kācit |*

⁴⁸*Sākārasiddhi*, 495.17–22: *pratītyabhāvaprabhava ’py ayaṃ janaḥ samaḥsvartī śrayate ’nyakāritam | tamaḥprakāraḥ katamo ’yam idr̥śo yato ’vipaśyan sad asan nirīkṣate ||* (= MSA VI.4).

“Is there any other Ātmavāda apart from this [i.e. Nirākāravāda] ?”⁴⁹ The Nirākāravādin comes back: “This is not so, inasmuch as [we] do not accept [the Ātmavāda concepts of] eternity (*nityatā*) and all-pervasion (*vibhūtā/vyāpitva*).”⁵⁰ Jñānaśrīmitra quotes a verse intimating that not only eternity and all-pervasion but also other characteristics of the *ātman* are in line with the teaching of Nirākāravāda.⁵¹ As for eternity, Jñānaśrīmitra continues, without acceptance of the true manifestation of *ākāra* there can be no efficacy (*arthakriyā*); and something which has no efficacy cannot be momentary; that is, it is eternal, like the *ātman*. *Pramāṇavārttika* III.50 is cited in support.⁵²

The Nirākāravādin then sets out to defend his own position by appealing to the same *āgamas*, namely, *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IX.66⁵³ and *RGV* I. 49–50,⁵⁴ which teach the eternity of the *dharmakāya* and the all-pervasion

⁴⁹ *Sākārasiddhi*, 495.22–23: *nanv ayam ātmavādādhikāreṇa sūtrālaṅkāraslokaḥ | kim ato 'py anyā ātmavādo nāma |*

⁵⁰ *Sākārasiddhi*, 495.23–24: *nityavibhūtaḥ anāṅgikārāṇaḥ neti cet |* (^a °*kārān* Ms.; *kāran* Ed.).

⁵¹ *Sākārasiddhi*, 495.24–26: *na, citratvād ātmavādinām | yataḥ, kartā bhoktā ca drṣṭe-bhyo bhinno 'haikāragocaraḥ | nirañjanas tadekāvaśeṣā muktis ca yoginām |* (^a °*kartā* Ed. [em.]; *kartā* ca Ms. [unmetric]).

⁵² *Sākārasiddhi*, 496.1–3: *kiṃ ca pṛthaksvarūpanirbhāsābhāve 'rthakriyāyām kvacid up-ayogānanubhavād bhavān naiva kṣaṇikatām asya svikuryāt | tad ayaṃ niṣkalātmavat jñānamātrārthakaraṇe 'py ayogyam ityāder viśayaḥ |* Cf. *Pramāṇavārttika* III.50 (Miyasaka ed.): *jñānamātrārthakaraṇe 'py ayogyam āta eva tat | tad ayogyatayā rūpam tad dhy avastuṣu lakṣaṇam ||*. See KYUMA 2005: 75–76 n.95. The expression *niṣkalātmavat* (“like partless *ātman*”) probably suggests that *ātman* does not produce the result, perception.

⁵³ *Sākārasiddhi*, 496.4–8: *yadā tu nityavibhūtaḥ api dharmakāyasya pratipādanam āgame, tadā kim uttaram? na ca pravāhanityatā, prakṛtinityatāyā eva nirdeśāt | tathā ca tatraiva, prakṛtyāśraṃsanenāpi prabandhena ca nityatā (=MSA IX.66cd) | iti | atra ca bhāṣyam, prakṛtinityatā svabhāvikaṣya, svabhāvenaiva nityavāt | aśraṃsanena^a sāmbhogikaṣya, dharmasāmbhogāvicchedāt | prabandhena nairmāṇikaṣya, antardhāpya^b punaḥ punar nirmāṇasaṃdarśanād iti (=MSABh 46.13–15) (^a *aśraṃsanena* MSABh; *aśraṃsane* Ms/Ed; ^b *antardhāpya* Ms/Ed; *antardhāya* MSABh).*

⁵⁴ *Sākārasiddhi*, 496.8–19: *vibhūtā cokaiva yathottaratantram, sarvatānugatam yadvan nīrvikalpatayā nabhaḥ | cittaprakṛtivaimalyadhātuḥ sarvatragas tathā || (=RGV I.49) anena kiṃ darśayati? taddoṣaḥṣaṇiṣṭhāsu vyāpi sāmānyalakṣaṇam | hīnamadhyaviśiṣṭeṣu vyoma rūpagateṣu iva (=RGV I.50) || iti | rūpagateṣu ity atra mīdrājasu-varnabhāḥjaneṣu iti bhāṣyam | gataśabdaś ca prakārārtho veditavyaḥ | yathā^a harater gatatācchīlya^b ity atra patañjalir gatavidhāprakārā ekārthā iti | gata^ctācchīlya iti rūḍhīḥ | nīrvikalpatayetiṭhambhūte ṛṣṭiyā | cittasya prakṛtivaimalyam^d eva dhātus tathatā | tasmān nityavyāpitvaṃ mukhyaṃ evoktam | (^a *yathā* Ms; n.e. Ed. ^b *gatatācchīlya* Ed; *gatitācchīlya* Ms. Cf. *Mahābhāṣya* on *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.3.21: *harateḥ gatatācchīlye*; cf. also MIKOGAMI 1978. ^c *gata*^o Ed; *gati*^oMs. ^d °*vaimalyam* Ms; °*vaimanasyam* Ed.).*

of Buddha-nature, respectively.⁵⁵ As for the eternity of the *dharmakāya*, *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IX.66 teaches that the *svābhāvika-kāya* (i.e. *dharmakāya*) is eternal by its intrinsic nature (*prakṛtinityatā*). The Nirākāravādin distinguishes this intrinsic eternity from “eternity by succession” (*pravāhanityatā*), which relates to the *ātman*. As to all-pervasiveness, RGV I.49 teaches that Buddha-nature pervades everything, just as space does, while RGV I.50 declares that Buddha-nature pervades sentient beings regardless of their states, just as space promiscuously pervades all forms. The Nirākāravādin implies here that Buddha-nature is identical with the *dharmakāya*.

Jñānaśrīmitra states in rebuttal: “Well then, if the *dharmakāya* is nothing but an entity, how can you avoid *ātmavāda*?” and claims that the expressions “eternity, all-pervasiveness etc.” as features of the *dharmakāya* apply only to the conventional level (*sāmvṛta*).⁵⁶

Jñānaśrīmitra continues to state the following three points: (1) the characteristics taught in RGV I.49 refer to a *dharmīn*⁵⁷; (2) even if one does not accept all-pervasion, one can, like Digambara, be regarded as an *Ātmavādin*⁵⁸; (3) and even if one is not an *Ātmavādin*, one cannot avoid the fault criticized in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* VI.4d (“seeing the unreal and failing to see the real”) that Jñānaśrīmitra highlighted at the beginning of the disputation.⁵⁹

This disputation is testimony to the fact that Indian Buddhists hotly debated the similarity between the *dharmakāya* and *ātman*. A similar discussion is found in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, in which Mahāmāti wonders whether Buddha-nature is indeed identical with the *ātman*.⁶⁰ Related issues were later tackled by Tibetan scholars, including Sa-pan and Bu-ston.

It is true that the RGV itself retains Brahmanic elements: for instance,

⁵⁵From this we know that the opponent of Jñānaśrīmitra (very likely Ratnākaraśānti) regarded the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* and RGV as *āgamas*, just as Jñānaśrīmitra does.

⁵⁶*Sākārasiddhi*, 496.18–21: *tato yadi dravyam eva dharmakāyaḥ katham ātmavādaparihārah, dharmatāyās tu nityatvavyāpakatvādi sāmvṛtam | svābhāvye 'pi yathākālpaṃ prasiddhaṃ kṣaṇitādivat ||*.

⁵⁷This implies that RGV I.49 does not teach the all-pervasiveness of the *dharmakāya* (which is a property [*dharma*] of the *sambhogakāya*, which in turn is its possessor [*dharmīn*]).

⁵⁸Digambara evidently accepted that the *ātman* is not all-pervasive.

⁵⁹*Sākārasiddhi*, 496.22–497.1: *atrāpi hi^a hīnamadhyaviśiṣṭeṣv iti dharminirdeśaḥ | nāpi vyāpītvābhāvād anātmavādo digambaravat, na cātmavādatve 'pi nirbandhaḥ, avipaśyan sad asan nirīkṣata (= Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra VI.6d) iti doṣasya tadvad evāparihārasiddher iti | (^a hi Ms; n.e. Ed.)*

⁶⁰*Laṅkāvatārasūtra* 78.1–4. See also ZIMMERMANN 2002: 83 n. 175.

RGV I.52 and *Bhagavadgītā* XIII.32 are parallel verses and only differ in their grammatical subject, namely *ayam* (i.e. the innate mind or Buddha-nature) as opposed to the *ātman*: “Just as all-pervasive space cannot be perceived because of its subtlety, so too this (*ayam*) [innate mind], which abides everywhere in sentient beings (*Bhagavadgītā* reads: *ātman* which abides everywhere in the body), cannot be perceived.”⁶¹

Sākārasiddhi (7): 499.1–500.9 (cf. *Sākārasaṃgraha* II.98cd-105)

The opponent (a Nirākāravādin) claims that the *dharmakāya* and the *saṃbhogakāya* are different states (*avasthāntara*).⁶² Jñānaśrīmitra comes back that the *saṃbhogakāya* is inseparable from the *dharmakāya*, and quotes RGV II.53 and IV.53–54, which teach that the Buddha (i.e. the *saṃbhogakāya*) makes his activities perceptible to living beings by means of the *nirmāṇakāya* without abandoning the *dharmakāya*.⁶³ The Buddha, Jñānaśrīmitra continues, is completely pure, not in virtue of its natural purity (*prakṛtiviśuddhi*) but in virtue of its immaculate purity (*vaimalyaviśuddhi*); otherwise the Buddha would enjoy no superiority to ordinary beings,⁶⁴ since every being has innate purity (because they are pervaded by the *dharmakāya*). Jñānaśrīmitra clearly rejects any notion of there being impure aspects of the *saṃbhogakāya*; he defines the *saṃbhogakāya* as completely

⁶¹ See GOKHALE 1955. RGV I.52: *yathā sarvagataṃ sauksmyād ākāśaṃ nopalipyate | sarvatrāvasthītaḥ sattve tathāyaṃ nopalipyate* ||. *Bhagavadgītā* XIII.32: *yathā sarvagataṃ sauksmyād ākāśaṃ nopalipyate | sarvatrāvasthīto dehe tathātmā nopalipyate* ||. For details, see TAKASAKI 1989: 283–284 n. 3. *Sauksmya* (“subtlety, fineness”) is mentioned as an attribute of the *dharmakāya* in RGV II.60 and 72. The later Tibetan scholar gZhon-nu-dpal taught that the *dhātu* is not empty of the Buddha-qualities in their “subtle form” (*rGyud bla me long*, 441.9; cf. MATHES 2002), and this, in my opinion, is relevant to the understanding of RGV I.52 (see *rGyud bla me long*, 342.14–22).

⁶² *Sākārasiddhi*, 499.2.

⁶³ *Sākārasiddhi*, 499.3–14: *dharmakāyavirahitāś caivaṃ jagadarthakārī bhagavān ity āyātam | tac ca virudhyate, yad āha uttaratantram, mahākaraṇayā kṛtsnaṃ lokam ālokyā lokavit | dharmakāyād avicalan nirmāṇaiś citrarūpiḥ | (= RGV II.53) || iti | jātakādīni nirvāṇaparāntāni darśayātīti vistareṇa saṃbandhaḥ | punaś ca, sarvatra devabhavane^a brāhmyād avicalan padāt | pratibhāsaṃ yathā brahmā darśayaty aprayānataḥ || tadvaṃ munir anābhogān nirmāṇaiḥ sattvadhātūsu | dharmakāyād avicalan bhavyānām eti darśanam (= RGV IV.53–54) || ityādi punar vistareṇa | (^a°bhavane Ed/RGV; °bhavana Ms) .*

⁶⁴ *Sākārasiddhi*, 499.14–16: *atha prakṛtipariśuddhyapekṣayā dharmakāyāvicalanam ucyate, tadā sarvasyaiva prāṇinas tulyam etad iti ko ’iśayo bhāgavata evam ukto bhavati prabandhena | tasmād vaimalyaviśuddhyapekṣayaivāyaṃ viśeṣaḥ, kevalaṃ dharmakāyasākṣātkriyākāle |*

pure as a consequence of its immaculate purity.⁶⁵

Citing the teaching that “the *dharmā* is the Buddha,” Jñānaśrīmitra pairs the *dharmakāya* with the word “*dharmā*,” and the *saṃbhogakāya* with the word “Buddha,” and repeats that these two bodies are inseparable.⁶⁶

Furthermore, Jñānaśrīmitra understands the above-cited passage RG V IV. 54cd (“[The Buddha] does not move from the *dharmakāya* etc.”) in the sense that “the Buddha does not move from the state of a Buddha (*buddhatva*, i.e., buddhahood),” comparing it with the statement “Brahmā does not move from the Brahmic state (*brāhmya-pada*)” (RGV IV.54ab). In this case, the Buddha (i.e. the *saṃbhogakāya*) or Brahmā really is existent (*paramārthasat*), whereas their states (i.e. the *dharmakāya* or *brāhmya-pada*) are only nominally so (*prajñaptisat*); but despite this difference, the Buddha (i.e. the *saṃbhogakāya*) and its state (i.e. the *dharmakāya*) are inseparable.⁶⁷

Sākārasiddhi (8): 502.3–504.6 (cf. *Sākārasaṃgraha* II.85–97)

The opponent quotes RG V III.1 (which teaches the supreme Buddha-qualities of the two kinds of Buddha-bodies) and interprets the compound “the ultimate body [of Buddhas]” (*paramārthakāya*) and “the conventional body [of Buddhas]” (*saṃvṛtikāya*) as applying to the *dharmakāya* and the *saṃbhogakāya*, respectively; he refers to RG V III.2–3 (commentarial verses on RG V III. 1) in support.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Cf. *Sākārasiddhi*, 493.11–14.

⁶⁶ *Sākārasiddhi*, 500.2–4: *yac cōktam, dharmā eva buddhā iti, tatra kalpitasyāpi bhedasyābhāvād bhinnapravṛttinimittatve 'pi paryāyatvāḥ jīnamunīndrādivat, kutaḥ kāyāntaravyavasthā?*

⁶⁷ *Sākārasiddhi*, 500.4–9: *kiṃ ca paryāyatvavirodhi dharmajīnaḥ tad vākyam, dharmakāyād avicalam ityādi | na hi buddhād avicalan sugata iti yuktam, buddhatvād iti tu yuktam eva | ekasya ca prajñaptisthitim āha, tac ca vākyam, yathā brahmā brāhmyād avicalan padād iti nidarśanāt | tatra hi brahmaiva paramārthasan | tat-padam tu prajñaptisat eva, na hi tad vastvantarām kiñcana, āśrayopakaraṇāt-mabhāvaviśeṣe padaprajñaptēḥ |^a paryāyatvavirodhi dharmajīnaḥ Ms; paryāyatvavirodhidharmajīnaḥ Ed) . Cf. also KANO 2006 (Chapter 1) and ARAI 2013.*

⁶⁸ *Sākārasiddhi*, 502.8–13: *nanūttaratantre 'nuttaram buddhaguṇam ārabhya ślokaḥ, svārthaḥ parārthaḥ paramārthakāyatā tadāśrītā saṃvṛtikāyatā ca | phalam viśaṃyogavipākabhāvād etac catuḥṣaṣṭiguṇaprabhedam (= RG V III.1) || iti | tatra ca svārthaparārthau dharmasaṃbhogakāyāv anūdyā paramārthakāyatā saṃvṛtikāyatā ca yathākramaṃ vihite, viśaṃyogavipākaphalātve ca | tatra saṃbhogakāyasya saṃvṛtatvapratipādanam anākāraṃ paramārtham upasthāpayaṭīti katham ucyate nirākāravāda^avārtāpi^b nāstīti? tathā ca tatraiva vivṛtīḥ, ātmasampattiyadhiṣṭhānam śarīraṃ pāramārthikam | parasampattiyadhiṣṭhānam rṣeḥ sāmketikam vapuḥ || viśaṃyogaguṇair yuktam vapur ādyaṃ balādibhiḥ | vaipākikair dvitīyaṃ tu mahāpu-*

To refute this, Jñānaśrīmitra quotes RGV I.151–152, claiming on the basis of these verses that the compound in RGV III.1 “the ultimate body” covers the *sambhogakāya* as well as the *dharmakāya*, whereas the compound “the conventional body” is reserved for the *nirmāṇakāya*.⁶⁹

RGV III.1	Opponent (acc. to RGV III.2–3)	Jñānaśrīmitra (acc. to RGV I.151–152)
<i>paramārthakāya:</i>	<i>dharmakāya</i>	<i>sambhogakāya</i> & <i>dharmakāya</i>
<i>saṃvṛtikāya:</i>	<i>sambhogakāya</i>	<i>nirmāṇakāya</i>

Jñānaśrīmitra then brings in a verse of Nāgārjuna’s *Trikāyastotra* which, with RGV III.1, would tend to confirm that the *sambhogakāya* is the basis upon which the *dharmakāya* depends.⁷⁰ In this way, he convincingly places the two bodies within the ambit of the ultimate, explaining the *dharmakāya* as the perceptual object of the ultimate wisdom (*paramajñānaviśaya*), and the *sambhogakāya* as the ultimate goal to be reached (*paramasādhya*).⁷¹ This difference is derived from the compound analysis of *paramārtha*⁷²; of the three well-known kinds of compounds (*tatpuruṣa*, *karmadhāraya*, *bahuvrīhi*), Jñānaśrīmitra categorizes *dharmakāya* and *sambhogakāya* as respectively the first and second.

ruśalakṣaṇaiḥ (= RGV III.2–3) | *iti* | (°vāda°conj. according to JNA 502.8 “*tasmān na nirākāravādavārtāpi*,” not in Ms/Ed. °vārtāpi Ms. ; °vārtāpi Ed).

⁶⁹ *Sākārasiddhi*, 502.13–503.7: *tad etad dhitakāmatāmātraprayuktaṃ vyākhyānamātram, apāstaṃ ca prāg dharmakāyasya dravyadharmarūpatānirūpaṇe | kathaṃ ca bud-dhaguṇam ārabdho vaktuṃ nāthaḥ parārthasādhanam asādhāraṇaṃ nirmāṇakāyam anabhidhāya nirvṛtā? kathaṃ vā tatraiva, ratnavigrahavaj jñeyahkāyaḥ svābhāvikaḥ śubhaḥ | akṛtrimatvāt prakṛter guṇaratnāśrayatvataḥ || mahādharmādhirājatvāt saṃbhogaś cakravartivat | pratibimbopamatvāc ca° nirmāṇaṃ hemabimbavat* (=RGV I. 151–152) | *ity anena nirmāṇasya sāmṃvṛtatvaṃ vyaktam uktaṃ vismrtya dharmakāyād apy āyasthānīkṛtān mahādharmādhīpatyena cakravartitulayotkarṣite sambhogakāye yojayet?* (°pratibimbopamatvāc ca Ms/Ed; *pratibimbasvabhāvātvan* RGV [= *Sākāra-saṃgraha* II.97ab]) . See also *Sākārasiddhi*, 503.11–15.

⁷⁰ *Sākārasiddhi*, 503.8–20, especially *ibid.* 503.19–20: *tasyāḥ sambhogakāyo dhīṣṭhānam āśraya iti vyaktam | dharmakāyas tu tadāśrayo darśita eva |*

⁷¹ *Sākārasiddhi*, 503.11–12: *svārthaparārthau dharmasambhogāv anūcya paramārthakāyavyavahāra eva vidhīyate, paramajñānaviśayatvāt paramasādhayatvāc ca tayoḥ |*

⁷² Cf. *Madhyāntavibhāga*, III.1.1ab: *arthaprāptiprapattyā hi paramārthas tridhā mataḥ; and its Bhāṣya: arthaparamārthas tathatā paramasya jñānasārtha iti kṛtvā | prāptiparamārtho nirvāṇaṃ paramo rtha iti kṛtvā | pratipattiparamārtho mārgaḥ paramo śyārtha iti kṛtvā.*

4. Conclusion

In sum, the verses Jñānaśrīmitra quotes from the RGV (III.37, I.145, I.49–50, II.53, IV.53–54, III.1–3, I.151–152) and the passages from the RGVV for the most part appear to establish his own doctrinal position concerning the teaching of the *dharmakāya* and *saṃbhogakāya*. He takes both the *dharmakāya* and the *saṃbhogakāya* as mutually inseparable (see *Sākārasiddhi* [7]). According to him, it is not the case that the *dharmakāya* produces the *saṃbhogakāya*; rather, the *dharmakāya* is merely a quality of the *saṃbhogakāya*, which in turn is the primal body (see *ibid.* [2]). The *dharmakāya* has a conventional status⁷³; the *saṃbhogakāya* is the ultimate, being accompanied by the true image (*ākāra*), with the *dharmakāya* dependent on it (see *ibid.* [8]). This goes counter to the stance taken by the opponent in these passages of the *Sākārasiddhi*, according to whom it is the *dharmakāya* that produces the *saṃbhogakāya* as its outflow (*niṣyanda*). We can justifiably identify this opponent with Ratnākaraśānti⁷⁴ or a certain Nirākāravādin introduced in Maitrīpaś *Pañcatathāgatamudrāvivarāṇa* (*rūpakāyau tadudbhūtau* [tat referring to *dharmakāya*], *ibid.* 46.19) and in his *Tattvaratnāvalī* (verse 19).⁷⁵

As for the Buddha-nature doctrine, Jñānaśrīmitra implies that Buddha-nature shares features (or coincides) with emptiness and is a property (*dharmā*) of the image (*ākāra*), which in turn is its possessor (*dharmin*) [see *ibid.* (4)]. Furthermore, following *Madhyāntavibhāga* I.14, he takes the

⁷³ See Jñānaśrīmitra, *Sākārasiddhi*, 494.20–21: *tasmāt prajñaptisan dharmakāya iti and ibid.* 500.4–9. Jñānaśrīmitra, on the other hand, defines the *dharmakāya* as *paramajñānaviṣaya* “perceptual object of the ultimate wisdom” in *Sākārasiddhi* (8).

⁷⁴ For instance, we can trace to Ratnākaraśānti the opponent’s view that the *saṃbhogakāya* is without *ākāra*; see *Sākārasiddhi* (8) in Ratnākaraśānti’s *Khasamatantraṭīkā* (Jagannāth Upādhyāya ed., p. 232): *tathā buddhānām ajalpako ’pi saṃbhogakāyaḥ svam ākāram asattayaiva paricchinatti | sa eva paricchedaḥ pratibhāsaśabdenātra vivakṣitaḥ*). Furthermore, the opponent’s view reported in *Sākārasiddhi* (6) —taking the *dharmakāya* as eternal by its own nature (*Sākārasiddhi*, p. 496.5–8) —is found in Ratnākaraśānti’s *Muktāvalī* (Tripathi ed., p. 14.17–18: *ata eva ca dharmakāyaḥ prakṛtinityatayā nitya ucyate*). Finally, we also find the opponent’s view of the *saṃbhogakāya* as confined to the conventional level and as an outflow of the *dharmakāya* in the *Muktāvalī* (Tripathi ed., p. 145.10–11: *ata eva śuddhalaukikavikalpaḥ saṃbhogakāyo dharmakāyaniṣyandaś ca iti*).

⁷⁵ Maitrīpaś disciple Sahajavajra introduces a buddha-body model (similar to this Nirākāravādin’s view) as a Sākāravāda position (*sākārayogācārasthitisamāsa*). See Sahajavajra, *Sthitisamāsa* verse 53: *sākāravāropetaḥ saṃbhogakāyaḥ | dharmakāyaṃ sphuṭaṃ kṛtvā saṃbhoganirmītī spharet* (IWATA 2014: 43). This is not consistent with Jñānaśrīmitra’s view.

terms emptiness, *dharmakāya*, and *dharmadhātu* as synonymous, (see *ibid.* [5]).

From the precise way in which Jñānaśrīmitra quotes from the RGV/V, as seen above, we know that he was steeped in these texts and took them to be authoritative. His own position helps explain the fact that he attributes the authorship of the RGV/V to Maitreya, who is, according to him, the founder of the Sākāravāda tradition.⁷⁶

As for the RGV's transmission lineage, the question arises: from whom did Jñānaśrīmitra receive the teaching of the RGV? Unfortunately, no historical source clarifies this. But if we accept Maitrīpa's rediscovery story of the RGV as a historical event, this master would have received the text from his own disciple, Maitrīpa (b. 1007/1010, according to TATZ 1987: 697). If this hypothesis is accepted, the date of composition of the *Sākārasiddhi* can be assigned to after Maitrīpa's rediscovery of the RGV, to the first half of the 11th century (but this depends on Maitrīpa's dates, which have yet to be confirmed).⁷⁷

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⁷⁶ Jñānaśrīmitra puts Maitreya at the top of his list—as the founder—of the transmission lineage of Sākāravāda: Maitreya→Asaṅga→Vasubandhu→Dignāga→Dharmakīrti→Prajñākara Gupta. Cf. *Sākārasiddhi*, 506.5–8: *āryasaṅgam anaṅgaḥ jñānaśrīmitraḥ | yad bhūpatiśo 'nvaśād ācāryo vasubandhur uddhuramatī tasyājñayādīdyutā | dignāgo 'tha kumāranāthavihitāsāmānyasāhāyakaś tasmīn vārtikabhāṣyakārakṛtīnor adyānāvadyā sthītīḥ* ||. See JNA, intro., p. 4, SEYFORTH RUEGG 1969: 433–434, KATSURA 1969: 12, KAKEI 1970: 5–6, KAKEI 1981, SCHMITHAUSEN 1973: 150, ARAI 2012.

⁷⁷ When dating the *Sākārasiddhi*'s composition, we should also consider the chronology of Jñānaśrīmitra's works. According to Thakur (JNA, intro., pp. 12–13), the *Sākārasiddhi* refers to the *Bhedābhedaparīkṣā*, the *Īśvaravāda*, and the *Advaitabind-uprakaraṇa*, while the *Aphaprakaraṇa* and the *Kṣaṇabhāṅgādhyāya* mention the *Sākārasiddhi*; but see also KYUMA 2005: LXXII n. 57, who points out problems in Thakur's chronology that arise from conflicting cross-references.

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Abbreviations

AA	<i>Abhisamayālaṃkāra</i>
ATBS	Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien
conj.	conjecture(s)
CIHTS	Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies
CSS	<i>Catuḥstavasamāsārtha</i>
DhDhV/V	<i>Dharmadharmatāvibhāga/vṛtti</i>
D	Derge Kanjur and Tanjur
Ed.	Edition/Edited by
em.	emendation(s)
IBK	Indogaku bukkyōgaku kenkyū 印度学仏教学研究.
JNA	<i>Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvalī</i>
Ms.	manuscript
Ms ^{ac}	manuscript (before the scribal correction[s])
Ms ^{pc}	manuscript (after the scribal correction[s])
MSA/Bh	<i>Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra/bhāṣya</i>
n.e.	no equivalent(s)
P	Peking Kanjur and Tanjur
RGV	<i>Ratnagotravibhāga Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra</i>
RGVV	<i>Ratnagotravibhāga-vyākhyā</i>
Taishō	Taishō shinshū daizōkyō. Ed. J. TAKAKUSU & K. WATANABE. Tokyo: The Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō Kankō Kai, 1924–1929.
WSTB	Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde

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APPENDIX A

Quotations from the *Ratnagotravibhāga* in Indic Works

Author	Quoted verses/passages of the RGV/RGVV (abbr. Vy)	Texts
Jñānaśrīmitra	IV.73–74; III.37ab; Vy 84.4–5; I.9; Vy 75.13–18; I.154; Vy 76.9–11; I.145; I.49–50; II.53; IV.53–54; III.1; III.2–3, I.154; IV.73–4; III.1; I.1–152; II.53; IV.53–54; I.49; I.145	<i>Sākārasiddhiśāstra</i> 431.22–25, 434.15, 434.22–23, 478.11, 487.11–14, 487.16–17, 487.25–488.1, 493.13–14, 496.9–14, 499.5–6, 499.9–12, 502.9–12, 502.18–21. <i>Sākārasaṃgrahasūtra</i> II.53; II.69–70; II.89; II.95cd-97ab; II.98cd-99ab II.100cd-102ab; II.136; II.145
Ratnākaraśānti	I.96–97; Vy 67.9–68.6; Vy 6.9–10; I.28	<i>Sūtrasamuccayabhāṣyaratnālokāḡkāra</i> D (3935) 325a5–7, P (5331) 378b3–6; D 325b3, P 379a1–2; D 296b6–297a2, P 346a2–6.
Atiśa	I.86	<i>Dharmadhātudarśanaḡī</i> verse 23, LOBSANG DORJEE 1999: 89.
Maitrīpa	II.61b	<i>Pañcātathāḡatamudrāvīvaraṇa</i> 23.14
Prajñākaramati	VI.8	<i>Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā</i> 205.19–22
Yamāri	I.154	<i>Pramāṇavārttikāḡkārasupariśuddhā</i>

Vairocanarakṣita	VI.8	D (4226) Me, 3b1, P (5723) Me, 1b–4a <i>Bodhisattvacaryāvatārapañjikā</i> D (3875) 144b6–7; P (5277) 170a5–7. <i>Tattvadaśakaṭikā</i> D (2254) 170a3–4; P (3099) 185b8–186a1 <i>Sekanirdeśapañjikā</i> ISAACSON & SFERRA 2014: 169. <i>Prajñāpāramitāhṛdayārthaparījñāna</i> D (3822) 312a3–5; P (5223) 249a3–6 <i>Munimatālamkāra</i> D (3909) 149a4–6, P (5299) 184b5–185a1; D 150a6–7, P 186b; D 212b2–3, P 277b3–4; D 212b4, P 277b4–5; D 212b3–4, P 277b7–8; D 212b4–5, P 277b9–278a1 D 212b5–7; P 278a1–6; D 213a1, P 278a6–7; D 215b7–216a1. <i>Bhagavatyaṁnāyānusārīṇī</i> D (3811) 307b5–7, P (5209) 356a8–b3; D 312b6–313a4, P 362a5–b4 <i>Śaṁskṛtāsaṁskṛtaviniścaya</i> D (3897) 289a2–3, P (5865) 234b6–235a3 <i>Padminī</i> , Skt Ms (Takaoka CA17) 3r8–9 (=D 4b6–7, P 6a5–6); Skt Ms 4v1 (=D 7b4–5, P 8b3–4) <i>Madhyamakāvatāraṭikā</i> D (3870) 358a6–7, P (5271) 434a8–b1; D 354b2–3, P 429b6–8 <i>Catuḥstavasamāsārtha</i> , fol. 1r2–3, 2r10–v1 (CSS 242.17–18), 2v3–4 (CSS 243.16–25) <i>Bodhicaryāvatāratātparyapañjikāvīṣeṣa-dyotanī</i> D (2880) 194a6–7, P (5282) 231a7–8; D 196a2–3, P 233a8–b1; D 196b4, P 234a4–5; D 197a2–3, P 234b4–5.
Sahajavajra	I.154 (=AA V.21)	
Rāmapāla	II.61b	
Mahājāna	I.68	
Abhayākaragupta	Vy 33.8–9 & 13–14; Vy 71.1–4; Vy 1.6–7; I.1; Vy 10.15 & 13.21; I.23; Vy 25.11–15; I.3 Vy 52.13–53.6 (summary)	
Zhi ba 'byung gnas	IV.90–91; I.153; VI–2	
Daśabalaśrīmitra	Vy 52.13–53.8	
Ratnarakṣita	I.28 I.153	
Jayānanda	Vy 33.8–9; Vy 71.1–4	
Amṛtākara	I.68–78	
Vibhūticandra	VI.8; I.153; I.154; I.34	

I. 34; I. 63; I. 55; III. 8

*Amṛtakaṇīkodyotanibandha*136.26–28; 154.11–13; 155.17–20; 212.
15–16

APPENDIX B

Translations of Relevant Passages
from Jñānaśrīmitra's *Sākārasiddhi* and *Sākārasaṃgraha*

*In the following passages, bold-faced words indicate quotations from the RGV/RGVV.

(1) *THE BUDDHA ILLUSTRATED BY THE SIMILE OF THE SKY* (on RGV IV.73–74):
Sākārasiddhi 431.19–432.5 (cf. *Sākārasaṃgraha* II.65–75)*Text of Sākārasiddhi* (1)⁷⁸ [431. 19–432. 8; Ms. fol. 93v6–94r2]

āgantū⁷⁹ malaprapaṇcavigamenaiḥ hi vihāyaḥsādrśyam iti darśitaṃ prāk |
ata eva mahāyānottaratantre⁸⁰ nirdiṣṭenaiva sādharmaṇa sarvatra vyomopamā,
yathā **vyapagatavikalpaṃ gaganavad** ityādi | tasmān nākāraviraheṇa |
yat tu —

akiñcane⁸¹ **nirābhāse nirālambe nirāśraye** |
caḥṣuṣpatha⁸² **vyatikrānte** 'py arūpiṇy anidarśane⁸³ ||
yathā **nimnonnataṃ vyomni dṛśyate na ca tat tathā** |
buddheṣv api tathā sarvaṃ dṛśyate na ca tat tathā || (RGV IV.73–74)

iti tatrā**kiñcanā**diviṣeṣaṇaṃ vyomna eva, rajonīhārādīkṛtasya⁸⁴ nimno-^(94r)
nnatasya darśane 'py abhāvavibhāvanāyeti vyaktam etat saṃbuddhe 'pīty
anuktvā **buddheṣv** iti sāmānādhikaraṇya⁸⁵ bādhakabahuvacananirdeśayat-
nāt | sugate tu bhagavati yathoktākāra⁸⁶ evāpavādasamāropalakṣaṇasya nim-
nonnatasya darśane 'pi na bhāva itīyad eva vivakṣitam | astu vā vacana-

⁷⁸ From chap. 3: Madhyamāvatārapariccheda.⁷⁹ āgantū°] Ms; āgantuka° Ed.⁸⁰ °yānottara°] Ms; °yānotara° Ed.⁸¹ akiñcane] Ms/Ed.; niṣkiñcane RGV.⁸² caḥṣuṣpatha°] Ms. = RGV; caḥṣuṣy atha Ed.⁸³ anidarśane] Ed; anidarśane Ms.⁸⁴ °nīhārādīkṛtasya] em.; °nīhārādīkṛtasya Ms/Ed.⁸⁵ °karaṇya°] em.; °karaṇyaṃ Ms/Ed.⁸⁶ °ākāra] em.; °ākāre Ms/Ed.

pariñāmena bhagavaty api yojanam | yathā tv ācāryava⁸⁷subandhupādair
 dharmadharmatā⁸⁸pravibhāge nirvikalpajñānalakṣaṇaprastāve
 dvayena grāhyagrāhakabhāvena nirūpayitum aśakyatvād arūpi,
 aviśayatvād⁸⁹ anābhāsam
 iti vibhaktam, tatheha buddha iti prayukte 'py astu | akiñcanatvam apy āgan-
 tukurāgādivigamāj jñeyam | śeṣam aviruddham |

Translation of Sākārasiddhi (1)

Alone in view of the disappearance of conceptual proliferation (*prapañca*) which is [a type of adventitious stains], [the mind] is similar to the sky.⁹⁰ That has been taught previously.⁹¹ For precisely this reason, the comparison with the sky is total exactly because of the similarity that has [just] been explained in the *Mahāyānottaratantra*,⁹² for instance—“[the Buddhahood] is completely free from conceptualization like the sky...” (RGV II.29).⁹³ Therefore, it is not because of the deficiency of forms (*ākāra*) [that the mind is similar to the sky].⁹⁴ As regards (*tatra*), on the other hand (*tu*), [verses]—

Although it (i.e. the sky) has nothing (*akiñcana*), there is no appearance to it, and although it is without support (*nirālambha*),⁹⁵ without foundation, beyond the scope of eye, formless, and incapable of being shown, nevertheless we see low and high [parts] in the

⁸⁷ °va°] in the bottom margin of the Ms.

⁸⁸ °dharmatā°] Ms. (cf. *Sākārasaṃgraha*, 534.13: *dharmadharmatayoṛ naye* [Thakur reads °dharmatayonnaye]); °dharmitā° Ed.

⁸⁹ *aviśayatvād*] Ms. (cf. *Sākārasaṃgraha*, 534.16: *agocaratvena*); *saviśayatvād* Ed.

⁹⁰ The particle *hi* indicates the shift of speaker. I take the previous verse as an objection by a Nirākāravādin (cf. *Sākārasiddhi*, 431.15–18: *iṣṭaṃ khadṛṣṭāntatayā niraṅgaṃ mano 'ha sūnyaṃ nanu sarvathāstu | na sarvathā ced upamā niraṅgatayāgo 'pi kiṃ na praṇayī priyasya* ||), and the passage from here onward as Jñānaśrīmitra's reply.

⁹¹ *Sākārasiddhi*, 405.8–9 (= *Sākārasaṃgraha* II.23): *tadāgantumaladhvaṃsāt tad ākāśatalopamam | jñeyenābhitulā jñeyanirviśiṣṭatayā sphuṭā* ||. Cf. also *Sākārasiddhi*, 411.12–13: *saṃbhārābhyāsaṅgamā niratīśayarucer gocarasvaikavittisthityāgantuprapaṅcāpacayaparicitākāśakakṣaprabhābhūḥ* |.

⁹² I.e., in the *Uttaratantra* it is only because of the disappearance of *āgantumala* that the enlightened mind is compared to sky in various places.

⁹³ RGV II.29: *acintyaṃ niṭyaṃ ca dhruvam atha śivaṃ śāśvatam atha praśāntaṃ ca vyāpi vyapaṅgātavikalpaṃ gaganavat | asaktaṃ sarvatrāpratighaparūṣasparśavigatam na dṛśyaṃ na grāhyaṃ śubham api ca buddhatvam amalam* ||.

⁹⁴ Jñānaśrīmitra does not accept the absence of *ākāra* with regard to the Buddha.

⁹⁵ For the meaning of *nirālambha*, see MATSUMOTO 2004: 125–126.

sky. But in reality it is not like that⁹⁶. Similarly, we also see all [manner of supposed properties] in buddhas. But in reality it is not like that (RGV IV.73–74).⁹⁷

“having nothing” etc. are the qualifications (*viśeṣaṇa*) of [the phrase] “the sky” alone, [and not of *buddheṣu*]—[this] in order to point out the non-existence of low and high [parts] caused by dust and fog etc. [in the sky], even if they are seen.⁹⁸ This (i.e. *akiñcana* etc. qualifying only “the sky”) is clear because, in saying *buddheṣu* instead of *saṃbuddhe ’pi*, he (i.e. the author of the RGV) was making a special effort to use a plural form which removes the possibility that [*akiñcana* etc.] correlates [with buddha(s)].⁹⁹ Rather,¹⁰⁰ in the case of the Sugata, the Illustrious One, who has the very forms (*ākāra*) described before,¹⁰¹ the low and high parts as characterized by misguided exclusion and superimposition (*apavādasamāropa*) do not exist, although one may perceive them: Only this much is intended.

It may be granted that, by changing of grammatical number (*vacana-pariṇāma*) [of the word *buddheṣu* into a singular form], [the series of adjectives] can [be made to] relate to the Buddha, too. However, just as venerable Ācārya Vasubandhu narrowed down [the meaning of *arūpin* and *nirābhāsa*] in the [section] heading of the characteristics of the *nirvikalpajñāna* in the *Dharmadharmatāpravibhāga*:

[The *nirvikalpajñāna* is] without form (*arūpin*) in the sense that it cannot be described (*nirūpayitum aśakya*) by the duality consisting in the relationship between the grasped and the grasper¹⁰²; and it is without

⁹⁶ I.e. the fact of the appearance of the sky is not that way.

⁹⁷ The basic idea of the verses stems from the **Tathāgatotpattinirdeśa* (Taishō, vol. 10, p. 598b22–26, etc.). Jñānaśrīmitra seems to presuppose that these verses RGV IV. 73–74 may also work as a counter argument (against *sākāravāda*?) if one relates the series of adjectives (*akiñcana* etc.) to the word *buddheṣu*. He correctly differentiates the similarity shared by the sky/space and Buddhas in RGV II.29 (which teaches the lack of adventitious stains) from that in IV.73–74 (which teaches the lack of high and low parts).

⁹⁸ Jñānaśrīmitra claims here that the attributes in the verse, such as *akiñcana* “being nothing,” do not grammatically modify buddhas.

⁹⁹ Instead of *buddheṣv api*, *saṃbuddhe ’pi* is also fitting metrically; but would be misleading, because it could be mistakenly taken as *sāmānādhikaraṇya* with adjectives in the locative singular.

¹⁰⁰ I.e. this means rather than that every words expressed by adjectives qualify buddhas.

¹⁰¹ It might be descriptions on Buddha’s Thirty-two marks etc. taught in RGV III.

¹⁰² See DhDhVV (Mathes ed.) 85.444f.: *de la gzung ba dang ’dzin pa’i dngos po las gñis su brtag tu med pa’i phyir brtag tu med pa’o* ||; Skt. 103. 108: *dvayena grāhyagrāha-kabhāvena nirūpayitum aśakyatvād arūpi*. This is a commentary on a passage of Dh-

appearances (*anābhāsa*) in the sense that it does not have any object¹⁰³;

here [in the RGV] too, if [RGV IV. 74c] had used the word *buddhe* [in a singular form], [the words *arūpin* and *nirābhāsa*] would have had to be explained in the same way.¹⁰⁴ We should also understand that *akiñcanatva* (“the state of having nothing”) depends on the disappearance of *rāga* etc., which are adventitious.¹⁰⁵ The remaining [adjectives, i.e., *nirālamba*, *nirāśraya*, *caḥṣuṣpathavyatikrānta*, and *anidarśana*] do not stand in contradiction [to the characteristics of the Buddha] .

Text of Sākārasaṃgraha (1) [II.65–75; Ms. 127r3–7]

*tathā ca*¹⁰⁶ *tadbhāṣyakṛtā dharmadharmatayor naye*¹⁰⁷ |
avikalpakavijñānalakṣaṇaprakrame svayam ||65||
arūpīti padaṃ grāhyagrāhitvenānirūpaṇāt |
anābhāsam itīdaṃ cāgocaratvena varṇitam ||66||
*nanv*¹⁰⁸ *ābhāsaviyogena grāhyābhāvena*¹⁰⁹ *cet tathā* |
kim anena prayāseṇa mukhyam evocitaṃ vacaḥ ||67||
nāsminn ābhāsate kiñcid gocaratvena saṃmatam |
iti vyutpattir iṣṭeḥa tasmāt tantre 'pi cottare ||68||
akiñcane nirābhāse nirālambe nirāśraye |
caḥṣuṣpathavyatikrānte 'py arūpiṇy anidarśane ||69|| (= RGV IV.73)
yathā nimnonnataṃ vyomni dṛśyate na ca tat tathā |
buddhesv api tathā sarvaṃ dṛśyate na ca tat tathā ||70|| (= RGV IV.74)
atrāpi yadi dṛṣṭāntaviśeṣaṇagaṇo vibhau |
avaśyayojyo 'nābhāsarūpīve tadvad eva hi ||71||
ālambāśrayayor hānir ūrdhvādhopekṣayā samā |
akiñcanatvam āgantvaśeṣadoṣaviyogataḥ ||72||

DhV 103.105–107: *tad anenārūpy anidarśanam apratiṣṭham anābhāsam avijñaptikam aniketam iti nirvikalpaṣya jñānaṣya yathāsūtraṃ lakṣaṇam abhidyotitaṃ bhavati* |.

¹⁰³ See DhDhVV (Mathes ed.) 85. 446f.: *yul ma yin pa'i phyir snang ba med pa ste* (Skt. text unavailable).

¹⁰⁴ When one literary takes the meanings of the words *arūpin* and *nirābhāsa* (“without form” “without appearance”), the verse (RGV IV.73–74) will support the Nirākāravāda position, which claims Buddha-body as free from form etc.

¹⁰⁵ Jñānaśrīmitra limits the meaning of *akiñcana*, for *akiñcana* “having nothing” in the literal sense can contradict to the Sākāravāda position, which claims Buddha-body is represented by the *ākāra*.

¹⁰⁶ *ca* | em. (by Thakur); n.e. Ms.

¹⁰⁷ *yor naye* | em. ; °*yonnaye* Ms/Ed.

¹⁰⁸ *nanv* | conj. ; *na tv* Ms/Ed.

¹⁰⁹ °*bhāvena* Ms^{pc}/Ed.; °*bhāvene* Ms^{ac}.

*kha*¹¹⁰*viśeṣaṇamātrāt tu kṛtārthaṃ padyam ādimam |*
buddheṣv *iti tathā cedam bahutvaṃ bhedakaṃ tataḥ ||73||*
*khasāmyān na ca*¹¹¹*nairūpyaṃ naiḥsvarūpyaṃ yathaiva na |*
ropāpavādasthānoccāvacaḥānyā tu tulyatā ||74||
vasturūpeṣu nīcoccabhāvasaṃbhāvanā bhavet |
avasturūpe śaṅkāpi nāstīti kham udāhṛtam ||75||

Translation of Sākārasaṃgraha (1)

To explain (*tathā ca*), in the introduction of [the section on] the characteristics of the *avikalpaviññāna* in the *Method [of Explaining] of Dharma and Dharmatā* (i.e. the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga*), the commentator of that text (i.e. Vasubandhu) himself explained (*varṇita*) the word “without form” (*arūpin*) on the basis of the impossibility of being described in terms of a grasped and a grasper, and this [word] “without appearance” (*anābhāsa*) as [meaning] not offering a filed [of perception].¹¹² [65–66]

[Objection:] [One should simply take the words *anābhāsa* and *arūpin*] in the sense of “being free from appearance” and “being devoid of [what can be] grasped”; and (*tathā*) what is the use of this effort [of Vasubandhu]? Only the primary meaning of words is appropriate. [67]

[Reply:] This grammatical analysis—[namely,] in it nothing appears that is commonly held to be an object¹¹³—is what is intended in this (*iha*) (i.e. *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga*).¹¹⁴ Therefore,¹¹⁵ in the *Uttaratantra*, too, [we have to understand the meaning of *nirābhāsa* in the same way] [68] :

[69–70] = Citation from RGV IV.73–74 (for the translation, see above.)

Here [in these verses] , too, if the series of qualifiers (i.e. *akiñcane* etc.) of the simile (i.e. the sky) necessarily relates to buddhas (*vibhu*), then the meanings of the words *anābhāsa* and *arūpin* [in RGV IV.73] are exactly like that [same contents taught by Vasubandhu in his *Dharmadharmatāvibhā-*

¹¹⁰*kha*^o] Ms; *sva*^o Ed.

¹¹¹*ca*] Ed; *ve* (?) Ms.

¹¹²“The *Method of [Explaining] Dharma and Dharmatā*” (*dharmadharmatayor naye*, verse 65b) indicates the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga* together with its commentary ascribed to Vasubandhu. This explanation in verse 66 is from Vasubandhu’s *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga* commentary (DhDhVV, Mathes ed., 85.444ff.). For the literal quotation from this work, see above, *Sākārasiddhi*, 432.6–7.

¹¹³I.e. *anābhāsa* is taken here a locative *bahuvrīhi*.

¹¹⁴Jñānaśrīmitra suggests that Vasubandhu’s interpretation of *arūpin* and *anābhāsa* accords with the primary meaning (*mukhya*) of the words.

¹¹⁵This *tasmāt* means: because the author of the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga* and the *Uttaratantra* is the one and the same individual, Maitreya.

ga]. [71]¹¹⁶

The non-existence of a support and foundation [in the sky] is equivalent [to that in buddhas] with regard to [parts] above and below (*ūrdhvādhopekṣayā*).¹¹⁷ [And the Buddha would] have nothing (*akiñcana*), [like the sky,] in the sense that [he] is dissociated from all adventitious faults. [72]¹¹⁸

On the other hand, if they (i.e. the whole group of adjectives) only qualify the sky,¹¹⁹ the first verse (*padya*) [= RGV IV.73] completely serves the purpose (i.e. fulfils syntactical expectancy). And also, this plurality, i.e., *buddhesu* [in RGV IV.74c], is the differentiating element [that distinguishes buddhas] from this [singularity of the sky]. [73]

Again, it is not the case that, because of the similarity to the sky, [buddhas] are without form, just as it is not the case that [buddhas, because of their similarity to the sky,] are without characteristics of their own. On the other hand, [buddhas] bear a similarity [with the sky] in that they lack high and low parts that stand for superimposition and misguided exclusion. [74]¹²⁰

With regard to substantial entities (*vasturūpa*), one may imagine that they have low and high parts; whereas, regarding a non-entity, the doubt [that they have low and high parts] does not even exist. That is why he (i.e. the author of the RGV) gives the sky as the example. [75]¹²¹

(2) ON THE IDENTITY OF THE SAMBHOGAKĀYA AND THE DHARMAKĀYA:
Sākārasiddhi 434.11–24.

¹¹⁶See above, *Sākārasaṃgraha* II.66. RGV IV. 73a has *nirābhāsa* instead of *anābhāsa*.

¹¹⁷“The non-existence of the support and foundation” (*ālambāśrayayor hāniḥ*) is an explanation for *nirālaṃbe* and *nirāśraye* in RGV IV. 73b. “With regard to the above and below” (*ūrdhvādhopekṣayā*) paraphrases “lower and higher parts” (*nimnonnatam*) in RGV IV. 74a. The absence of any other foundation is equally seen both in the sky and buddhas, and, in the two, the above and below parts are seen but not existent in reality (cf. RGV IV. 74ab). This line (verse 72ab) has no equivalence in the corresponding passage of the *Sākārasiddhi*.

¹¹⁸Verses 71–72 explain how the group of adjectives of the sky (*nirābhāse*, *arūpiṇi*, *nirālaṃbe* *nirāśraye*, *akiñcane*) relates to buddhas, if these adjectives necessarily qualify buddhas.

¹¹⁹This interpretation in verse 73 contrasts to that shown above in verses 71–72, in which the series of adjectives were taken as the qualifiers of both the sky and buddhas.

¹²⁰Verses 73–74 explain that the group of adjectives of the sky does not qualify buddhas. This is what Jñānaśrīmitra really asserts. He also explains the difference (verse 74ab: whether or not they have a form) and the similarity (verse 74cd: they are free from low and high parts) of the characteristics of the sky and buddhas.

¹²¹Verse 75 is an additional explanation with regard to what is taught by verse 74cd. This discussion was not taught in the corresponding portion of the *Sākārasiddhi*.

Text of Sākārasiddhi (2) [434. 11–24; Ms. 94v4–7]

tasmād dharmadharmibhāvena bhittvā kāyadvayavyavastheyam | tad asya bhagavati tādātmyaṃ saṃbandho, nirmāṇasya tu tadutpattiḥ | yadā tu sadātanam tadrūpaṃ sakalaśukladharmākāratayā vivakṣitam, tadā tatrāpi tadutpattir eva | yathoktam — dharmakāyaprabhāvitā guṇāḥ iti | evaṃ ca satī yady api sādhanam api tat, tathāpi na tanmātrena tatrādarah, kiṃ tu tattvam ity eva¹²² | sādhyasādhanayor anyabhāvo¹²³ 'pi kuta iti cet? tattvasākṣātkārasyaiva sādhyatvāt, tadbhāvanāyā eva ca sādhanatvāt, tad-abhāve 'niścaye vā tayor eva lopāsakteḥ¹²⁴ | tasya ca pratibhāsinaiva dharmiṇā caritārthatvān niścāyakaḥpramāṇaparyeṣaṇaiva param avaśiṣyata iti samāptaḥ¹²⁵ puruṣārthaḥ | tac ca sāmānyarūpam eva bhāvyaṃ, kṣaṇikatvādivad iti svabhāvāntaram avasthāpyate | tadadhigamādhīnaś ca buddhadhvanir iti tad eva pradhānam bud-dharūpam, sa eva vā buddha ucyate, pratāpa eva rājetyādivat | lakṣaṇādicitratā hi cakravartinīty uttaratantram | na caivam arthāntarasya kathañcit sattve 'pi kaścid upayogaḥ | tato dharmakāyasamjñāpy asya yācītakamaṇḍanam iti na nirākāradarśanānurodhaḥ kaścit |

Translation of Sākārasiddhi (2)

[...] Therefore,¹²⁶ this differentiation into two bodies is based on the distinction between *dharmā* and *dharmīn*.¹²⁷ The relationship of this [*dharmakāya*] to the Illustrious One (i.e. the *saṃbhogakāya*), then, is [defined as one of] identity (*tādātmya*),¹²⁸ whereas that of the *nirmāṇakāya* [to the Illustrious One] is [defined in terms of] causality (*tadutpatti*).

¹²² *tattvam ity eva*] Ms^{pc}/Ed.; *tattvam ivaty eva* (?) Ms^{ac}.

¹²³ *ananyabhāvo*] em.; *anantabhāvo* Ms/Ed. Another possible conjecture is *anantarabhāvo*

¹²⁴ *lopāsakteḥ*] Ms. ; *lopāsakteḥ* Ed.

¹²⁵ *samāstapṭaḥ*] Ms^{pc}/Ed; *samāstapṭaḥ* Ms^{ac}.

¹²⁶ The argument immediately before discusses the enumeration of the *saṃbhogakāya* which is counted as separate from other buddha-bodies (*Sākārasiddhi*, 434.10–11).

¹²⁷ This sentence probably implies that the differentiation of the *dharmakāya* and the *saṃbhogakāya* is not ultimately real, since for Buddhists the *dharmā-dharmīn* distinction is not ultimately real, objective (cf. e.g. *Sākārasiddhi*, 494.26–495.1: *tena dharmadharmiṇoḥ — kalpitaṃ bhedaṃ āśrītya buddho dharmāś ca tāv ubhau*).

Jñānaśrīmitra understands the *saṃbhogakāya* as the possessor of property (*dharmīn*) and the *dharmakāya* as its property (*dharmā*). See Jñānaśrīmitra, *Sākārasaṃgraha* II. 109ab: *saṃbhogabhaṅge taddharmo dharmakāyo na vidyate*.

¹²⁸ See Jñānaśrīmitra, *Sākārasaṃgraha* II.134b: *saṃbhogaḥ sugataḥ svayam*.

(Objection:) When, however, one wants to express the permanent (*sadātana*) nature/shape of the [Buddha] as something which has all whole-qualities as its form, then, even in that case (i.e. the *dharmakāya*), only “causality” (*tadutpatti*) [is the relationship],¹²⁹ as was taught — “**The [Buddha]-qualities are produced from the *dharmakāya***” (RGV III.37ab).¹³⁰

(Answer:) In this case, even if it (i.e. the *dharmakāya*) is also a means (*sādhana*), still we hardly value it because of that (i.e. its being a *sādhana*),¹³¹ but only inasmuch as it is reality (*tattva*).¹³²

(Objection:) How can the goal and the means (*sādhya*/*sādhana*, i.e., direct perception of the Buddha and meditation on the Buddha) be identical?

(Answer:) Because only realization of reality (i.e. the *dharmakāya*) is the goal, and because only the meditation on this [same reality] is the means; therefore, if [reality] is absent or has not been ascertained, these very two things (i.e. realization and meditation) will end up disappearing.¹³³

And because this [reality] fulfils its own purpose (i.e. the Buddha’s appearing), only through the *dharmīn* (i.e. *saṃbhogakāya*)¹³⁴ that appears, there still (*param*) remains [the effort of] alone seeking the validity (*pramāṇa*) that determines/assertains [reality].¹³⁵ In this way, the purpose of human beings (i.e. practitioners) would be soundly achieved (*samāpta*).

And this [reality/*dharmakāya*] can be cultivated only as [something] having a general form (*sāmānyarūpa*),¹³⁶ just like momentariness, and so on. Therefore [the reality/*dharmakāya*] is established as having a different nature [distinguished from the buddha/*saṃbhogakāya*].¹³⁷ And [understand-

¹²⁹I.e., the relationship of the *dharmakāya* (or the quality of the Buddha) to the Buddha (i.e. *saṃbhogakāya*).

¹³⁰In the original context of the RGV, the word *prabhāvita* does not mean “produced from” but probably “constitute of,” for the Buddha-qualities (*guṇa*) are not produced (*asamskrta*), and thus, have no causality.

¹³¹Lit. there is no respect only by it.

¹³²The word *tattva* can mean both “the reality” and “identity [of the *dharmakāya* and the buddha/*saṃbhogakāya*].”

¹³³Jñānaśrīmitra explains that *sādhya* and *sādhana* are identical because *sādhya* is direct perception of the *dharmakāya*/*tattva*, and *sādhana* is meditation on the same *dharmakāya*/*tattva*.

¹³⁴For Jñānaśrīmitra, the Buddha’s primary body is the *saṃbhogakāya* which is the possessor (*dharmīn*) of its property (*dharma*) that is the *dharmakāya*.

¹³⁵This *pramāṇa* is, according to *Sākārasaṃgraha* III.3cd (*tat smṛtis tāyinām pūjā tan-niścayaphale prame*), *smṛti* and *pūjā* for Buddhas.

¹³⁶I.e. the reality/*dharmakāya* is only a property. Cf. *Sākārasaṃgraha*, III.4ab: *tasmāt svalakṣaṇam buddho dharmah samānyalakṣaṇam*.

¹³⁷The expression *svabhāvāntaram* “having a different nature” sounds obscure, for the

ing] the expression “Buddha” depends on the realization of that [reality]. Thus, it is nothing but [this reality/*dharmakāya*] which is the primary nature of the Buddha, or it is just [this reality/*dharmakāya*] which is called the Buddha, just as a king (i.e. *dharmīn*) is called Prātāpa (lit. Heroic Energy) (i.e. *dharma*) (*prātāpa eva rājetiādivat*),¹³⁸ for the *Uttaratantra* [teaches] that **there is a manifoldness such as the [thirty-two] major marks, in a universal ruler.**¹³⁹ In this way, even if there were a different object [separated from the buddha/*saṃbhogakāya*], it would be useless.¹⁴⁰ Therefore, the designation of the *dharmakāya*, too, is [merely] a “borrowed ornament” (*yācītakamaṇḍana*) for the [Buddha, i.e., the *saṃbhogakāya*], and thus there is no agreeing with the *nirākāra* view at all.¹⁴¹

Text of Sākārasaṃgraha (2) [III.1–7; Ms. 128v7–129r2]

*yady evaṃ dharmatāmātraṃ pṛthakkr̥tya kim ucyate*¹⁴² |
*buddho vā dharma eveti dvayābhāve*¹⁴³ *svavit*¹⁴⁴ *katham* ||1||
*tadbodhā*_(129v) *d ucyate buddho nojjvalair lakṣaṇādibhiḥ* |
na tadālabanaṃ hitvā sarvaśuklaguṇapriyaḥ ||2||
tadbodhaḥ sarvabuddhānāṃ sāmānyo nāparasya saḥ |
tatsmṛtiḥ tāyināṃ pūjā tanniścayaphale prame ||3||
tasmāt svalakṣaṇaṃ buddho dharmah sāmānyalakṣaṇam |
*tatprādhānyena*¹⁴⁵ *buddhatvaṃ bhinno rāsir atah kutah* ||4||
ata evocyate buddho dharma eveti tad yathā |
prātāpa eva rājeti tādātmyaṃ tattvatas tayoḥ ||5||

relationship of reality/*dharmakāya* to the buddha/*saṃbhogakāya* is identity. A possible conjecture is to read *svabhāvānantaraṃ*.

¹³⁸ Cf. *Sākārasaṃgraha* III.5: *ata evocyate buddho dharma eveti tad yathā | prātāpa eva rājeti tādātmyaṃ tattvatas tayoḥ* |.

¹³⁹ This is a summary of RGVV 84.4–5. That is, the thirty-two major marks (*dharma*) refer to the universal ruler (*dharmīn*).

¹⁴⁰ This presupposes the opponent’s opinion that takes the *dharmakāya* as separated from the buddha.

¹⁴¹ In this passage, Jñānaśrīmitra discusses: *dharma* (the reality or *dharmakāya*) can refer to *dharmīn* (the Buddha or *saṃbhogakāya*), just like heroic energy refers to king; and *saṃbhogakāya* is the main body of the Buddha, whereas, *dharmakāya* is just a property of the Buddha, and thus, a “borrowed ornament,” that is, not essential to the Buddha.

¹⁴² *kim ucyate* Ms.; *vimucyate* Ed.

¹⁴³ *dvayābhāve* | conj. . *dvayābhāvah* Ms/Ed.

¹⁴⁴ *svavit* | Ed.; *svavin* Ms.(?)

¹⁴⁵ °*nyena* | em. ; °*nye na* Ed.

yac cōktaṃ ādyācāryeṇa¹⁴⁶ buddhaśabdasya gocaraḥ |
 viśuddhaś cittasantāno dharmākhyāpi mahāmuneḥ ||6||
 tatrāpi dharmakāyasya sākṣātkāreṇa sa dhvaniḥ |
 dharmā eva jino yadvaj jina eva tathā sa ca¹⁴⁷ ||7||

Translation of *Sākārasaṃgraha* (2)

[Objection:] If it is so,¹⁴⁸ what would the isolated, bare true reality (*dharma*) be? If the Buddha, then he is the same as Dharma; and since therefore there is no duality, how could a [reflexive] self-cognition be possible.¹⁴⁹

[Answer:] He is defined as the Buddha because he realizes it (i.e. Dharma), and not because he is accompanied by the shining characteristic marks [of the *mahāpuruṣa*] and so on. [He] could not be fond of utterly pure virtues¹⁵⁰ if you removed the foundation which it is (i.e. Dharma).

The awakening of it (i.e. Dharma) is common to all buddhas, but not to others. Mindfulness of it (i.e. Dharma) and the worship of buddhas are the two kinds of valid knowledge which result in the determining of those (i.e. the Buddha and Dharma).¹⁵¹

Therefore, the Buddha is the particular characteristic, whereas Dharma is the general characteristic.¹⁵² It is in virtue of the predominance of this latter (i.e. Dharma) that Buddhahood occurs.¹⁵³ How could the mass [of *ākāras*] be separate from it (i.e. Buddhahood)?¹⁵⁴

Precisely because of this, it is taught that the Buddha is nothing but Dha-

¹⁴⁶ *ādyācāryeṇa* | Ed. ; *ādyāc cāryeṇa* Ms.

¹⁴⁷ *sa ca* | Ed. (em. Thakur); *sac ca* Ms.

¹⁴⁸ I.e. the *dharmakāya* and *saṃbhogakāya* is ultimately inseparable, but they are nominally called as separate. Cf. *Sākārasaṃgraha* II.155: *bhogapraṭiṣṭhākārau (bhogaḥ pra° Ed.) ca tato bhinnau na yady api | anyavadvyavahāras tu saṃvṛtaḥ puruṣād bhidā ||*.

¹⁴⁹ A cognition in general needs the duality, i.e., perceiver and object.

¹⁵⁰ The Buddha is often called a *guṇapriya* (“he who loves virtues”). See, for instance, *Buddhacarita* 8.75.

¹⁵¹ *Smṛti* and *pūjā* is two kinds of true knowledge (*pramā*) for soteriological effect. Cf. *Sākārasiddhi*, 434. 20–21: *asya ca pratibhāsinaiva dharmiṇā caritārthatvān niścāyākapramāṇaparyeṣaṇaiva param avaśiṣyata iti samāptaḥ puruṣārthaḥ*.

¹⁵² The Buddha and Dharma respectively indicate the *saṃbhogakāya* (that is *paramārthasat*) and *dharmakāya* (that is *prajñaptisat*). Cf. *Sākārasiddhi*, 494. 20–21: *tasmāt prajñaptisan dharmakāya iti*, and 500.4–9.

¹⁵³ It is also possible to separate the compound of verse 4c: *tat prādhānyena* instead of *tatprādhānyena* “[Buddhahood is] predominantly it (i.e. *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*).”

¹⁵⁴ The last half of verse 4 suggests that the *saṃbhogakāya* cannot be isolated from the *dharmakāya*.

rma,¹⁵⁵ just as a king is called Heroic Energy. In reality, the two (i.e. the Buddha and Dharma) are identical.

And, the first Ācārya¹⁵⁶ taught that the object of the word “Buddha” is (i.e. the word indicates) the pure stream of the mind, as is also [the case with] the designation “Dharma” given to the Great Sage.¹⁵⁷

In this regard, too, such linguistic usage [arises] from the direct realization of the *dharmakāya*. Just as the Buddha is nothing but Dharma, so it (i.e. Dharma) is nothing but the Buddha.

(3) *ON THE PRATYĀTMAVEDANĪYA*

Text of Sākārasiddhi (3) [478.10–12; Ms. 109v5]
uttaratantra ca — pratyātmavedyo dharmā ity evākṣaram |

Translation of Sākārasiddhi (3)

Also, the precise description in the *Uttaratantra* is as follows: “[the Jewel of] Dharma should be individually perceived” (≈ RG V I.9).¹⁵⁸

(4) *ON RG V I.154:*

Sākārasiddhi 487.11–488.2 (cf. *Sākārasaṃgraha* II.53–57)¹⁵⁹

Text of Sākārasiddhi (4) [487.11–488.2; Ms. 113r2–7]

yathottaratantram, tatra śūnyatāvīkṣiptacittā ucyante nava¹⁶⁰yānaśaṃprasthitā bodhisattvās tathāgatagarbhaśūnyatānavipralabdḥāḥ¹⁶¹ | ye bhāvavināśāya śūnyatāvimokṣamukham¹⁶² icchanti sata eva dharmasyottarakālam ucchedo vināśaḥ parinirvāṇam iti, ye vā punaḥ

¹⁵⁵This is an answer to the question in verse 1.

¹⁵⁶The source is yet to be identified. “The first Ācārya” is possibly Aśaṅga. Cf. *Sākārasaṃgraha* III.13, *kvāpi vyavasthā katham apy āgame kriyatām jinaiḥ | ādyācāryeṇa vā sarvam idānīm prastutaṃ na tat.*

¹⁵⁷I.e. the Buddha refers to Dharma, and Dharma refers to the Buddha.

¹⁵⁸*ity eva akṣaram.* Cf. *Sākārasaṃgraha* III. 1d. Note that the actual wording in RG V I. 9 is different from that quoted by Jñānaśrīmitra here. Cf. RG V I. 9:

yo nāsan na ca san na cāpi sadasan nānyaḥ sato nāsato 'śakyas tarkayituṃ niruktyapaṅgataḥ pratyātmavedyaḥ śivaḥ | tasmai dharmadivākarāya vimalajñānāvabhāsatviṣe sarvārambaṇarāgadoṣatimiravyāghātakartre namaḥ ||

¹⁵⁹Cf. also Yamāri, D 4266, Me, 2a4–3b5.

¹⁶⁰*nava*^o | Ms/RGVV; *na ca* Ed.

¹⁶¹RGVV reads: *vipranaṣṭāḥ.*

¹⁶²^o *mukham* Ms/RGVV; ^o *sukham* Ed.

*śūnyatopalambhena śūnyatām pratisaranti, śūnyatā nāma rūpādīvyatire-
keṇa kaścīd dharmo 'sti yam adhigamiṣyāmo bhāvayiṣyāma iti | tatra ka-
tamaḥ sa tathāgatagarbhaśūnyatānaya ucyate?*

*nāpaneyam ataḥ kiñcid upaneyam na kiñcana |
draṣṭavyam bhūtato bhūtaḥ bhūtadarśi vimucyate || (RGV I.154)*

*ityādivistarāḥ | tatra sata evākārasyalīkatām āsthāya paścāducchedānupa-
gamān na prathamō vipralambhaḥ śūnyatārthe | nāpi dvitīyaḥ, nirākāra-
vedanādivad vyatiriktānupagamāt¹⁶³ | nanv atra | **atas tathāgatadhātor na
kiñcid apaneyam saṃkleśanimittam, nātra kiñcid upaneyam vyavadāna-
nimittam** iti vyākhyātam | satyam | kiṃ tu dharmeṇa dharminirdeśāt tathāga-
tadhātuśabdena śūnyatādharma cittavivartagrāhya¹⁶⁴ eva grāhyaḥ,
kalpanāniveśini śūnyatāmātre kasyacit prakṣepādīśaṅkāvirahāt | tataś ca
saṃkleśavyavadānanimittayoḥ sadasator nirodhotpādapratīṣedhena yatho-
ktāpavādasamāropaniṣedha eva vivakṣitaḥ, yato 'nantaram āha, **evam yad
yatra nāsti tat tena śūnyam iti paśyati | yat punar atrāvaśiṣṭam bhavati, tat
sad ihāstīti yathābhūtam prajānāti, samāropāpavādānta¹⁶⁵ parivarjanād
aviparītaśūnyatālakṣaṇam anena¹⁶⁶ paridīpitam** iti | tan na prakāsarūpaniṣe-
dhaḥ | ayam eva ca madhyamārthaḥ |*

Translation of Sākārasiddhi (4)

The *Uttaratantra* states¹⁶⁷: **Among the [four types of people¹⁶⁸], the
Bodhisattvas who have newly set out on the [Mahā]yāna and who have**

¹⁶³ ° ānupagamāt] em. ; ° ānugamāt Ms/Ed.

¹⁶⁴ cittavivartagrāhya Ms/Ed. (A possible conjecture is to read: cittavivarta [without grāhya]).

¹⁶⁵ ° āpavādānta°] Ms/RGVV; ° apavādānta° Ed.

¹⁶⁶ In place of *anena*, RGVV reads *anena ślokadvyayena*.

¹⁶⁷ The sentences immediately before discuss two kinds of persons with wrong views: *saṃāropa* and *apavāda*. See *Sākārasiddhi*, 487.8–10: *ye tv atrāpi pratibhāsamānam api pudgalanirākāravedanādi grāhyatādi cāropayanti, ye cāpratibhāsamānam apy apavadanti sarvataḥ aṃśato [= sarvato 'mśato] vā, tadubhayapurūṣāśrayo virodhaḥ parasparapratikṣepahetur anarthāya | tasmād ayam eva śūnyatānayaḥ |* “On the other hand, (a) some superimposes both the perception without images relating to person etc. and the grasped etc. upon it (i.e. a real image) although it is manifesting, and (b) others [wrongly] exclude [the real image] either entirely or partly, although it is not manifesting. The basis for those two kinds of persons is contradictory and it has the cause of mutual dispute for the sake of meaninglessness. Therefore, only this (i.e. the *sākāravāda* view) is the correct view of emptiness.”

¹⁶⁸ Cf. RGVV 74. 3–6: *samāsata ime catvāraḥ pudgalās tathāgatagarbhadarśanaḥ praty*

strayed from¹⁶⁹ the correct view of what emptiness means as it relates to Buddha nature¹⁷⁰ are called “those whose minds are confused with regard to emptiness”¹⁷¹: [Bodhisattvas] (a) who assert that the deliverance-door consisting of emptiness leads to the destruction of something existing, saying that *parinirvāṇa* is an annihilation (*uccheda*) or destruction throughout future time only of an existing dharma, (b) or, again, who rely on emptiness by cognizing emptiness, saying: ‘We will realize and meditate on¹⁷² a certain entity called emptiness that exists differently from visible matter (*rūpa*) etc.’ Among those [two types], which one [could possibly] be said to be the correct view of emptiness as it relates to Buddha-nature?”¹⁷³ [The RGV states:]

There is nothing at all to be removed from it and nothing at all to be added. The real should be seen as real, and seeing the real, one becomes released. (RGV I.154) etc.¹⁷⁴

Concerning this, the first mistaken [view] cannot convey the meaning of

acakṣuṣmanto vyavasthitāḥ | katame catvāraḥ | yad uta prthagjanaḥ śrāvakaḥ pratyekabuddho navayānasamprasthitaś ca bodhisattvaḥ yad uta prthagjanaḥ śrāvakaḥ pratyekabuddho navayānasamprasthitaś ca bodhisattvaḥ | yathokitam | agocarō 'yaṃ bhāgavams tathāgatagarbhaḥ satkāyadrṣṭiparirānāṃ viparyāsābhiratānāṃ śūnyatāvīkṣiptacittānām iti.

¹⁶⁹ *vipralabdha*. It can also mean “mistaken about.”

¹⁷⁰ *tathāgatagarbhaśūnyatānaya vipralabdḥāḥ*. RGVV reads °*vipranaṣṭāḥ* instead of °*vipralabdḥāḥ*. The *tathāgatagarbhaśūnyatānaya* indicates a correct view about emptiness of external defilements. SCHMITHAUSEN (1973: 133) rendered the phrase *tathāgatagarbhaśūnyatārthanayavipranaṣṭāḥ*: “diejenigen, welche von der [richtigen] Weise [der Erklärung] dessen, was ‘Leerheit’ im Falle des Tathāgatagarbhaḥ besagt, abgekommen sind” oder noch präziser als: “diejenigen, welche abgekommen sind von der [rechten Erklärungs]weise der Bedeutung [des Wortes] ‘Leerheit’ [als ‘Leerheit’ des Tathāgatagarbhaḥ [von den äußerlichen Verunreinigungen].”

¹⁷¹ *śūnyatāvīkṣiptacittā*. Cf. RGVV 74. 6: *śūnyatāvīkṣiptacittānām*.

¹⁷² *adhigamiṣyāma bhāvayīṣyāmaḥ*. I.e. cognize epistemically and non-epistemically.

¹⁷³ RGVV 75.13–18.

¹⁷⁴ Jñānaśrīmitra quotes an almost same verse from the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* (V. 21) and puts forward his interpretation: Regarding the phrase “**there is nothing to be removed from it,**” the word “**it**” refers to *prakāśamāna citra* which is expressed as *abhūtaparikalpa* with regard to its defiled state, whereas, regarding the phrase “**absolutely nothing to be added,**” the word “**nothing**” refers to no mind or no *ātman* etc. that has no *prakāśa*, that is accompanied by *grāhyagrāhaka*, or that has no image. See *Sākārasiddhi*, 486.21–26: *tatrāta iti prakāśamānāt citrāt saṃkleśakālāpekṣayā 'bhūtaparikalpaśabdavācyāt svasamvedyatayā na kiñcid apaneyam | ... na kiñcit prakṣeptavyam aprakāśaṃ grāhyagrāhakam anākāram ātmādi vā ...* This verse is again quoted and discussed in *Sākārasaṃgraha* II.53ff. and III.34ff.

emptiness, inasmuch as we do not accept [a form of] annihilation which is consequent upon an assertion that an image which [supposedly] really exists is false.¹⁷⁵ Nor can the second [mistaken position convey the meaning of emptiness], inasmuch as we do not accept anything different, such as a perception without images (*nirākāra*).¹⁷⁶

(Objection:) But has it not been explained in this text (= RGV) that: **“From this, i.e., Buddha nature (*tathāgatadhātu*), there is nothing to be removed, i.e., defiling factor, and there is nothing to be added to this, i.e. purifying factor?”**¹⁷⁷

(Answer:) You are right. However, because a property (*dharma*) points toward its possessor (*dharmīn*), one should understand (*grāhya*) that the word “Buddha-nature” (*tathāgatadhātu*) [bears reference] only to [an image] that is grasped in the process of the development of a thought (*cittavivartagrāhya*)¹⁷⁸ which has emptiness as its property¹⁷⁹; for no one could even think of the possibility of [misguidedly] superimposing and [excluding] with regard to pure emptiness, which is not involved in mental construction (*kalpanā-aniveśin*).¹⁸⁰

Therefore, what is meant to be taught (*vivakṣita*) is only the negation of the just mentioned exclusion and superimposition by rejecting [the wrong notion] that the existent defiling factors cease and that non-existent purifying factors arise, for it is taught immediately afterwards: **“Thus one sees that something is empty of what does not exist in it, while one correct-**

¹⁷⁵I.e. one should not accept the cessation of the *sadākāra* (“real image”) after taking it as false (*alīka*). This is the *apavāda* position that completely negates the existence of the *ākāra*.

¹⁷⁶This is the *samāropa* position that, apart from the *sadākāra*, wrongly superimposes an existence of something which does not exist at all. Jñānaśrīmitra in his position accepts the existence of *sadākāra* in the sense of *prakāśarūpa* and equates it with the Buddha-nature. On *nirākāra* *vedanā*, cf. *Sākārasiddhi*, 487.8–10.

¹⁷⁷≈ RGVV 76.5–7. The opponent points out that Jñānaśrīmitra shifts the subject of the verse (RGV I.154) from Buddha-nature into the image and that the subject in the original context (RGVV) is Buddhanature (*tathāgatadhātu*).

¹⁷⁸The word *cittavivarta* “the process of development of thought” is concerned with mundane things.

¹⁷⁹Jñānaśrīmitra takes both *śūnyatā* and *tathāgatadhātu* as properties (*dharma*), while *cittavivartagrāhya* (= *ākāra*) as their possessor (*dharmīn*), and claims that the possessor can also be the subject of the verse, since, in general, the property indicates its possessor (*dharmeṇa dharmīnirdeśāt*). In this regard, both the opponent and Jñānaśrīmitra obviously presuppose that *śūnyatā* and *tathāgatadhātu* are synonyms.

¹⁸⁰Jñānaśrīmitra justifies here that both the property (i.e. emptiness or Buddha-nature) and its possessor (i.e. image) are free from *samāropa* and *apavāda*, and thus, are appropriate as the subject of the verse.

ly realizes that what remains here is present here. It is by removing the extremes of [misguided] superimposition and exclusion that this [verse] elucidates the defining characteristic of emptiness.¹⁸¹ Therefore, there is no negation of the luminous form (*prakāśarūpa*).¹⁸² And precisely this is the meaning of the Middle [Way].¹⁸³

Text of Sākārasaṃgraha (4) [II.53–57; Ms. 126v6–127r1]

*nāpaneyam ataḥ kiñcid upaneyam na kiñcana |
 draṣṭavyam bhūtato bhūtaṃ bhūtaadarśi vimucyate* ||53|| (RGV I.154≈AA V. 21)
*pratyakṣavastuviśayo vimarśo*¹⁸⁴ 'yaṃ yaśiṣyate |
na citrād anyad adhyakṣaṃ yatnaḥ sāstradvaye 'py ayam ||54||
*dharmadhātuvimarśoktau dharmī dharmagiroditaḥ |
 tathā cānantaragirā vyaktam etad itīritam* ||55||
*ata eva ca dharmasya paścācchedo hi nirvṛtiḥ |
 doṣo 'yaṃ svīkṛto 'likānāmnākā*_(127r) *rakṣayaspr̥hāiḥ* ||56||
*śūnyatā nāma dharmo 'sti rūpādivyatirekataḥ |
 yo bhāvya ity upālabhalābho 'nākāravādinām* ||57||

Translation of Sākārasaṃgraha (4)

[53] = Citation from RGV I.154 (for the translation, see above.)

If you claim that this consideration (*vimarśa*, or “process of ascertainment”) [in RGV I.154] must refer to an object that can be directly perceived, then [we reply that] a thing that is perceivable is not different from its manifold (*citra*) [image]. And thus in the two texts (i.e. the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* and *Ratnagotravibhāga*¹⁸⁵) we see the following effort: [54]

In the statement about consideration of the *dharmadhātu* [in RGV I.154], a possessor of a property (*dharmīn*) (i.e. the mind) is implied by the expression of its property (*dharmā*) (i.e. emptiness = Buddha-nature).¹⁸⁶ And similarly, it is stated (*īritam*) [by me] that this is obvious from the succeeding

¹⁸¹RGVV 75.9–11.

¹⁸²Jñānaśrīmitra holds the Sākāravāda position, in which the luminous image is a real existence.

¹⁸³Cf. *Sākārasiddhi*, 478.6: *sanāropāpavādavīnirmuktā ca madhyamā sthitiḥ | tad eva ca yogācāradarśanam iti na vastubhedāḥ*.

¹⁸⁴*vimarśo* (*vimarśo* Ms.)

¹⁸⁵See *Sākārasiddhi*, 486.18–19 (= *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* V.21) and 487.16–17 (RGV I. 154).

¹⁸⁶See *Sākārasiddhi*, 487.22–23: *kiṃ tu dharmeṇa dharmīnirdeśāt tathāgatadhātuśabdena śūnyatādharmā cittavivarta eva grāhyaḥ* (for the translation, see above).

statement¹⁸⁷ [in the RGVV]. [55]

And for the same reason, the erroneous view that the bliss (i.e. *nirvāṇa*) means a subsequent destruction of the [real] *dharma* is accepted (i.e. defended) under the designation “unreal” (*alīka*), by those who desire to destroy [the real] image (*ākāra*).¹⁸⁸ [56]

There is an entity called emptiness, which can be cultivated as something other than visible matter (*rūpa*) etc. This assertion [of a superimposition] brings reproach to the Anākāravādins. [57]

(Texts and translations of passages (5)–(8) will be published in a separate publication.)

¹⁸⁷ See *Sākārasiddhi*, 487.26–488.1 (for the translation, see above).

¹⁸⁸ I.e. The Nirākāravādins mistakenly reject the real image (*ākāra*) by taking it as untrue (*alīka*) image; and Jñānaśrīmitra identifies this position with the position that mistakenly takes a cessation as revelation, as taught in the RGVV. This is an *apavāda* position. This verse is based on the passage in the *Sākārasiddhi* (p. 487.13–15) that in turn quotes a RGVV passage.