Studia in honorem Linnart Mäll

Humanistic Base Texts and the Mahāyāna Sūtras

LINNART MÄLL is a senior scholar in oriental studies in Estonia. Having been active as researcher and translator for over 40 years, he has become internationally known for his studies in the Mahäyāna Sūtras, particularly the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra*. Mäll is the author of the *Studies in the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā and Other Essays*, (Motilal Banarsidass, 2005). He has translated into Estonian over a dozen sacred texts of Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucianism and Taoism, as well as Indian classical novels. His translations include the *Diamond Sutra, Dhammapada, Bhagavadgītā*, Confucius' *Analects*, Laozi's *Daodejing*, *Śukasaptati* etc. In 2003 Linnart Mäll launched the translation series *Sacred Books of Buddhism* in Estonian. He is the author of the theory of the Humanistic Base Texts.

As a political figure, Linnart Mäll was active in the re-establishment of the independence of the Republic of Estonia in the early 1990s as a member of the Estonian Congress and its executive body – the Estonian Committee – and thereafter a member of the Constitutional Assembly. Mäll was one of the founders and the first Chairman of the *Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization*. He was the main author of the *Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples* adopted by the 6th General Assembly of the *UNPO* in 2001.

At present, Linnart Mäll is a senior researcher at the University of Tartu and head of the Centre for Oriental Studies. He is also director of the Institute of the Rights of Peoples.

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Linnart Mäll

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LINNART MÄLL

Humanistic Base Texts and the Mahāyāna Sūtras

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Preface

Academic, translator and public figure Linnart Mäll will celebrate his 70th birthday on 7 June 2008.

It is difficult to name all of the numerous activities and undertakings in which Linnart Mäll has participated as initiator or promoter. He is the Head of the Centre for Oriental Studies at the University of Tartu, a highly appreciated and loved professor, an internationally known and recognised researcher of Buddhism, as well as the translator of many of the base texts of India, Tibet and China into Estonian. As a member of the Constitutional Assembly, he is also one of the authors of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia. Linnart Mäll is also the founder and first chairman of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation and an advocate of human rights, one of the main authors of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples and the main organiser of H.H. the Dalai Lama's Estonian visits.

Apparently even less would have sufficed to earn the decorations bestowed upon him by the Republic of Estonia and the 2008 Estonian Research Award. Above all, however, he is a teacher and scholar whose views are authoritative and valued.

This work, which is volume 3 in the University of Tartu Centre for Oriental Studies *Studia Orientalia Tartuensia, Series Nova* series, contains academic articles and commented translations from colleagues from around the world and from Estonia, to give thanks for and express respect to a scholar who has broadened respect for the great Asian cultures and teachings and whose activities have developed certain Estonian intellectuals' transient interest in the East into Estonian Oriental studies. In his primary role as a researcher of the Mahāyāna Sūtras, Linnart Mäll has also made a significant contribution to international scholarship in the field.

The book's authors are from several countries – Brazil, Buryatia (Russia), Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, India, the Peo-

ple's Republic of China, Taiwan and the United States. The authors' enthusiastic willingness to support this work with their contributions is recognition for the work of Linnart Mäll. As Editor-in-Chief, I would like to express my heartfelt thanks to all of the authors.

The publication was initially intended as an examination of two large areas that Linnart Mäll has researched most intensively – the texts of Mahāyāna Buddhism and the concept of Humanistic Base Texts. The fact that many of the contributions received deal with the history of Buddhism and contemporary possibilities for the interpretation of Buddhism, however, created the need for a third sub-topic.

Since the authors represent different areas of research and the traditions of academic writing that exist therein, the editors have not sought to harmonise the texts' format. In most cases we have also not modified the system for footnoting used by the authors in their articles. Since the majority of contributions are in English, articles written in other languages have summaries in English.

Finally, I would like to take the opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to all of my colleagues who have devoted their knowledge, skills and time to the compilation of this publication, the editing of the texts and the completion of this book – to editor Märt Läänemets, Alexander Harding for the editing of the English texts, Meelis Friedenthal for layout and design, and to many others who have in one way or another assisted towards the completion of the publication.

Tarmo Kulmar

Linnart Mäll: Creator and Translator

Märt Läänemets

> Even in a later and foreign context, so-called base texts of different cultures can unexpectedly come to life and stimulate thought in areas whose development the authors had perhaps not dreamed of. Thus I believe that such base texts should participate in every contemporary culture as generators of ideas. The more of these the better.
>
> (From a 1988 interview with Linnart Mäll)

The interview quoted above was published 20 years ago, just before Linnart Mäll's 50th birthday. By that time, his translations of Buddhist base texts the *Diamond Sutra* and the *Dhammapada*, the Hindu holy book, the *Bhagavadgītā*, as well as eternal classics of Taoism and Confucianism, Lao Zi's *Daodejing* and Confucius' *Analects* were published in Estonian. If one adds to this list the translation of the masterpiece of Indian Mahāyanā – Śāntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, as well as numerous excepts from the Mahāyanā sūtras and other Buddhist texts that have appeared in particular articles and in the press, and Mäll's translations of jewels of Indian classical Sanskrit literature, *Twenty Five Tales of Vetāla* and the *Śukasaptati* or *Parrot-Book*, which have been published as separate books, the list of the works translated by him is indeed very impressive. What is more important than the number of translations, however, is the type of texts involved. Looking at this list one can see that translations of very base texts of cultures and religions predominate among Mäll's translations.

Base texts should be a key word in any overview of Linnart Mäll's half-century of translation and research work. As demonstrated by the above list, he has intermediated into Estonian language and culture four teachings that have significantly influenced and shaped the history and fate of humankind – Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucianism and Taoism; that is an achievement that very few, if any, Oriental studies scholars can claim. In a certain sense,

Linnart Mäll's own works could be considered to be base texts too, but more will be said about that below.

In the Estonian cultural context, these translations of base texts of Eastern thought filled a real gap in the scholarship. Apart from translations of the Bible, no text of a world culture at the same level had reached Estonian before Mäll's translations (for instance, the first translation of the Koran into Estonian was published only in 2007 in the translation of Haljand Udam, who recently passed away and never saw the completed form of the fruit of his many years of hard work). It is not an exaggeration to say that before Linnart Mäll there was practically no such thing as classical Oriental studies in Estonia and in the Estonian language.

Although a very respectable group of Sanskrit researchers (Leo Meyer, Leopold von Schroeder and Dmitri Kudryavski) developed during the 19th century and in the early 20th century at the Imperial University of Tartu in the heyday of comparative linguistics, and the first steps towards Sinology were taken by a jurist Leo Leesment at the independent Republic of Estonia's University of Tartu before the Second World War, these did not lead to the formation of a national school of Oriental studies. The Imperial University was, after all, German-speaking and had a Germanic bias, and in its last decades Russian-speaking and with a Russian bias. The Estonian language was only taught as a minor subject. In such a foreign academic environment, it was impossible even for the idea of the translation of Sanskrit or other classical Eastern languages into the 'barbarian' Estonian language to arise.

The two decades of the Estonian Republic between the two world wars was in itself too short a period for there to develop a noteworthy direction or school of thought in an area like classical Oriental studies, which is based on the investigation and translation from classical Eastern languages and the transmission of the traditions of generations. Something of that sort only began to develop in the second half of the 1930s, when a group of young humanitarians with an interest in the Orient founded the *Academic Oriental Society* at the University of Tartu. In addition to the above-mentioned Leo Leesment, who was one of the society's main founders, several well-known names in Estonian cultural history – theologian and philosopher Uku Masing, linguists Pent Nurmekund and Villem

Ernits, and several others – were members of the society. The activities of this honourable society were, however, very short-lived.[1]

The main achievement of the pre-war Academic Oriental Society was the preparation of the first volume of the society's *Publications*, which, however, was not published because of the socialist "coup" in 1940.[2] The *Studia Orientalia Tartuensia* series can to a certain extent be considered to be an attempt to preserve the society's continuity. The Soviet occupation and the subsequent world war completely destroyed life in Estonia, including academic life. After the war, the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic found itself a peripheral province in the USSR, and the University of Tartu became a provincial university under strict control from Moscow, which permitted no independent academic developments. The pre-war Orientalists had either emigrated or remained in Soviet Estonia, where they were largely outsiders; Leesment and Nurmekund also spent years in Soviet prison camps.

Having returned to Tartu at the end of the 1950s, these two men laid the foundations for Oriental studies and the teaching of Eastern languages at the University of Tartu. Pent Nurmekund began to teach Chinese in the so called Cabinet for Oriental Studies he founded; Soviet-Chinese relations, which at that time were still warm, favoured this. In 1959 Leesment published the first ever direct Chinese-Estonian translation – the novel *The Oil Vendor and Flower Fairy*, by an anonymous Ming era author. Of the events that took place in Oriental studies in Estonia in the early 1960s, one should also definitely mention Uku Masing's lecture series on Buddhism held at the EELK Theological Institute; typewritten copies of the manuscript circulated among students for decades and generated lively interest, until in 1995 it was finally printed in book form by *Ilmamaa publishers*.

It was at about the same time, between the 1950s and 1960s, that Linnart Mäll's academic journey to becoming a scholar in Oriental studies began. Having studied history at the University of Tartu

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[1] For a brief historical overview of Oriental and Buddhist Studies in Estonia see Belka, Luboš. Oriental and Buddhist Studies in Estonia. – *Archiv Orientální*, no. 64 (1996), pp. 399–404.

[2] Only the printer's copy of the introductory text of *Kirjutised* in Estonian and French is still extant (see http://www.eao.ee/02eao/eao_kirjutised.pdf; http://www.eao.ee/02eao/aux_lecteurs.pdf).

and beginning studies in Sanskrit and Chinese in the Cabinet for Oriental Studies of the University of Tartu, as a student he studied Mahatma Gandhi (in 1969 his translation of a selection of Gandhi's thoughts was published bearing the title *The world is tired of hating*). Having received inspiration from Russian academic Nikolai Konrad's 1961 article *On the meaning of history*,[3] he went to Moscow, where he met Konrad, with whose influence and assistance him was later accepted into an internship and then doctoral studies at the Institute of Asian Studies in Moscow. The said article, the main position of which is that the moving force in the history of humankind has been the rise and development of the idea of humanism in different cultures, also had a great influence on Mäll's own development, and the origins of the theory of humanistic base texts that he himself formulated 40 years later should also perhaps be sought there.

In Moscow Mäll's main spiritual benefactors and teachers were Buddhist scholar and philosopher Alexander Piatigorski, Sanskrit researcher Oktiabrina Volkova, Tibetologist Yuri Parfionovich and of course the great Buryatian tantrist and scholar Bidia Dandaron, who had only recently been freed from a nearly 20-year imprisonment in Stalinist prison camps and was a student of and spiritual heir to Lubsan Sandan Tsydenov,[4] early 20th century reformer of Buddhism and founder of renewal movement.

Primarily as a result of the influence of Piatigorski and Dandaron, Mäll became a Buddhist and a researcher of Buddhism (he has, nevertheless, also always named Uku Masing as the person who directed him towards Buddhism). His main topic of research and favourite text among the texts of Eastern thought became the famous Mahāyāna base text the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra* – the *Sutra of the Transcendent Understanding in Eight Thousand Lines*. It is on that text that he has published his most substantial academic works, and this has deeply influenced Linnart Mäll's own thinking

[3] This article first appeared in 1961 in the journal *Вестник истории мировой культуры* [*Herald of the History of World Culture*], no. 2; in revised form it was printed in Nikolai Konrad's collection of selected works: Н. И. Конрад. *Избранные труды* [Nikolai Konrad, *Selected Works*]. Moscow, 1974, pp. 290–322.

[4] On Tsydenov's life and work see the article by Sergey Nesterkin in this volume (pp. 249–268).

and worldview.[5] (Thus it seems quite paradoxical that the Estonian translation of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* has not yet been published by him.) The formulation of and the search for solutions to the fundamental problems of the interdependence of text and consciousness as the recurring topic of Mäll's academic research has undoubtedly been inspired by the synergy of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* and then quite fresh and new semiotic ideas.

It was at precisely the same time, i.e. the beginning of the 1960s, that relations between some top humanitarian scholars in Moscow, the capital of the Soviet Empire, and in little old university town Tartu, created a kind of international workshop which lasted for about two decades and which is known by the name of the *Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics*. In Tartu the most important member of it was the legendary Juri Lotman, from Moscow Vladimir Toporov, Vyacheslav Ivanov, Boris Uspenski and many other renowned humanitarian scholars, including researchers of Eastern texts. Linnart Mäll also found himself in this workshop. Summer schools in semiotics were held in resort Kääriku, near Tartu, and the series *Sign Systems Studies* was started to publish (this series continues to be published), in which several of the works of Linnart Mäll first appeared.[6]

Mäll came to academia with the intensity and fresh ideas that have always been characteristic of him. He has from the very beginning wished to change something, and create something new even as a researcher of ancient texts. This is best and most directly expressed in the opening sentence of the programmatic article *A Possible Approach Towards Understanding Śūnyavāda*, first published in 1967:

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[5] An English-language selection of Mäll's works on Transcendent Understanding can be found in the title: Mäll, Linnart. *Studies in the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā and Other Essays*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2005.

[6] For an overview of the activities of the Tartu-Moscow school of semiotics, see the book *Московско-тартуская семиотическая школа. История, воспоминания, размышления* (под ред. С. Ю. Неклюдова). Москва: Школа "Языки русской культуры", 1998; on the Eastern topic in semiotics collections, see the article Ковал А. Н. *Востоковедческая тематика в "Трудах по знаковым системам"*, *ibid.*, pp. 341–378.

> The dialogue between East and West that has reached synthesis leads us to understand what it is that the Orient can tell us, so that we can use its achievements as an important component of our own culture.[7]

And a little farther on:

> Oriental studies should therefore attempt to create models enabling a new approach to the understanding of Western phenomena.[8]

As an Oriental studies researcher, Mäll has thus not merely sought to serve as an intermediary and take traditional beaten paths, but instead immerse himself in ancient wisdom, thereby creating new knowledge and wisdom that could be a vibrant influence in our contemporary cultural context. Semiotics provided the key for this purpose, and Eastern thought, especially Buddhism, provided the material.[9] It was in that same *śūnyavāda* article that he offered a new term – *lysiology*[10] – the way of liberation – as a possible contemporary equivalent of ancient Indian term *mokṣadharma*, and directly attempted to explain several phenomena on the basis of that concept:

> There are a number of lysiological teachings both in the East and in the West. Lysiological teachings may include fields such as medicine, psychoanalysis, different social sciences as well as mystical teachings and yoga. As far as lysiological persons are concerned, Easterners often tend to take the role of an individual lysiological person and Westerners become a collective lysiological person. This difference may be explained by the fact that Easterners have better developed aspirations regarding realization. Westerners, on the contrary, are quite happy with a pleasantly presented theory.[11]

Mäll himself has not very often used the term *lysiology*, which could be considered the leitmotif of his academic pursuits and discoveries, in his later works, or further developed the topic. His attention instead later focused on the possibilities of this application in the context of semiotics – problems of texts and consciousness in

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[7] *Studies in the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, p. 16.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[9] Linnart Mäll himself wrote about this in the article Semiotics as a Possibility for the Study of Religious Texts Under Communist Dictatorship. – *Studies in the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, pp. 170–174.

[10] Greek λυσιολογία.

[11] *Studies in the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, p. 17.

the context of Transcendent Understanding (*prajñāpāramitā*) and the analysis of the main concept of Buddhism – *dharma*. In the series of articles entitled *Studies in the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*[12] that appeared at the beginning of the 1970s, he analyses terms referring to the highest states of consciousness in the *Transcendent Understanding* texts, and reaches the conclusion that the text and state of consciousness are identical:

> First, the *Prajñāpāramitā* is a text generated by following special rules. This text can appear as inner speech, oral speech or a written text called *Prajñāpāramitā*, the purpose of which is to create the ultimate state of the human mind.
>
> Second, the *Prajñāpāramitā* is one of the names of the ultimate state of mind reflecting the ability of a person to fully understand the *Prajñāpāramitā* text and create new texts of the same type.[13]

These conclusions have only been drawn on the basis of and concerning the texts on Transcendent Understanding, above all the *Sutra of the Transcendent Understanding in Eight Thousand Lines*, yet also apply more generally. As stated above, Mäll reached the understanding of the mutual description and inseparability of consciousness and text primarily through the investigation of Buddhist texts. From this he derives the second fundamental idea of dharma as *text generating mechanism*, which he formulated in the 1980s in his article *Dharma as text and text generating mechanism*, in which he states:

> It is the interpretation of *dharma* as a *text* and as a *text generating mechanism* that enables us to integrate all the meanings of *dharma* that, until now, have been viewed separately (an element of existence – *nirvāṇa* – Buddha, etc.).[14]

Developing this idea, Mäll finds that dharma can be understood more broadly, interpreting it through the concept of *culture*. This does not conflict with the earlier interpretation, but incorporates it, because "*culture* can also be considered as a *text* in its broadest sense."[15] Buddhists, the creators of the so-called dharma theory, apparently understood this well; the 'dharmaness' (textuality) of

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[12] In English: *Ibid.*, pp. 62–88.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 66.

[14] English version: *Ibid.*, p. 9.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

all phenomena was one of the fundamental positions of the Buddhist concept of liberation. In contemporary humanitarian studies, the recognition that culture consists of texts should be no surprise. Culture lives as long as texts live. Every text lives as long as it is read, and as long as new texts are created about it or on its basis. Culture changes to the extent that the texts that function therein change. Culture itself is, however, a text generation mechanism, the main element of which is human consciousness. Consciousness, however, can itself only be defined through the texts it receives and re-generates. Every text is the expression of a state of consciousness or a sequence of states of consciousness. More precisely: a text is a state of consciousness and a state of consciousness is a text. One cannot be defined without the other. Humans are only humans to the extent that they are conscious beings living in a particular culture and have actualised a certain number of texts with which and through which they operate and exist in that culture.

From here we reach one of Linnart Mäll's freshest discoveries – the theory of *Humanistic Base Texts*.[16] He considers humanistic base texts to include the following:

> From the Chinese tradition, the *Lunyu*, from the Indian tradition, the *Bhagavadgītā* and many Buddhist texts belonging to the *Suttapiṭaka*, and from the Near East traditions the Gospels of Matthew, Mark and Luke.[17]

These texts that have developed in different cultural traditions are united by one common feature, which Mäll formulates as follows:

> A humanistic base text has a specific tendency, expressed by the word 'humanist'. In English the semantic range of this word has mainly been conveyed by two equivalents: 'humane' and 'human', in the sense of being 'characteristic of man'. The semantic range of these two is, as is generally known, rather vague. Thus, to be more specific, a 'humanistic base text' is a base text that is on the one hand characterized by elevating man as such (in other words, as a species and an individual) to the central and determining phenomenon of existence, and on the other hand by an emphasis on such 'humane' qualities as dignity, philanthropy, compassion, non-violence, responsibility, sense of duty, respect, etc., in human relations.[18]

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[16] Mäll, Linnart. The Concept of Humanistic Base Texts, *Ibid.*, pp. 175–192.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 176.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 177.

The concept of humanism has arisen in the consciousness of certain persons (teachers) at a particular level of maturity of a culture, who have then passed it on in the form of texts that appeared to others to be divine revelations, as a result of which Confucius, Buddha, Krishna and Jesus were all deified in one form or another, and their teachings developed into religions with their ceremonies and institutions. The latter tendency can be considered to be a residual phenomenon dating from the culture that preceded the humanistic base texts. The original message of the humanistic base texts was, however, very simple, and was apparently so shockingly deep and innovative due to its simplicity and clarity: people are human only due to culture and in culture; in addition, all persons, regardless of origin, have equal opportunities to participate in culture and become free from the existential anxiety through culture. Culture has been denoted with different words in different cultures; in the Indian tradition it is *dharma*, in China *wen* and, in a broader sense, *li* (rites). More important than differences in wording, however, is the existence of a similar approach, i.e. in Mäll's words:

> This means that man is culture-centric from the point of view of humanistic base texts: not only does he depend on the current state of culture, and recreates the culture, but he also possesses an ability to create and bring to culture utterly new phenomena, and even a completely new cultural whole, something that the Masters themselves have quite clearly accomplished.[19]

This has been and is being done by Master and Teacher Linnart Mäll too. As the person who developed, formulated and distributed these ideas and thoughts, he is also a creator of base texts, which in our culture create new textual situations and states of consciousness, giving deeper meaning to what takes place around us and our role therein. Like ancient teachers, the creators of humanistic base texts, who often conceded about their own teachings that they had not created anything new, but simply revived old teachings, thus one can say that Mäll has also revived a neglected aspect of the Buddhist dharma theory and brought it to life in our age, thus influencing our cultural situation. Yet as a Buddhist Mäll has never been narrow-mindedly biased, nor has he forgotten or rebuffed other teachings. Thus he has translated the base texts of different

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 185.

teachings, and by commenting on and researching them he has brought them to life in a new era and allowed them to participate in contemporary cultural ferment.

At least in the Estonian-language cultural space, he has created a sort of new culture (subculture, if you like) or in Indian terms – a dharma –, which has deeply influenced not only the minds of his closest students, but also Estonian culture as a whole, both on the one hand opening it to the world and on the other hand introducing of the lysiological teachings communicated by the ancient texts in the present cultural situation, which differs completely from that in which the texts were created. It is difficult to say whether the authors of the texts translated by Mäll foresaw or at least dreamed this. It is certain, however, that Linnart Mäll has added a great deal of momentum to the machinery for the generation of humanistic and lysiological texts (dharma). Thereafter the texts may function independently.

I
Mahāyāna Sūtras

Suvarṇabhāsottama and the Defence of Serindic Khotan

Lokesh Chandra

Suvarṇabhāsottama, *sovereignty and security*

The *Suvarṇabhāsottama* (henceforth *Suv.*, see Nobel 1937) is an important Buddhist sutra that has the aim of ensuring sovereignty, the dynamics of governance inherent in the nexus of the king, his people, and their deities that symbolize values, ensuring the security of the economy, and preempting natural calamities, diseases, and wars. Lord Buddha was of royal descent, and his Dharma grew under the eyes of Kings Bimbisāra and Prasenajit. Thus the sutras naturally became the embodied mind of the regnum and provided ceremonies for the protection of the state in Serindia and in East Asia. In addition to the *Suv.*, the Lotus Sutra, *Avataṃsaka-sūtras*, *Candragarbha-sūtra* and *Mahāmāyūrī* give lists of protectors of the state and the ceremonies therefore that purpose. The *Candragarbha-sūtra* was translated into Chinese in 566 by Narendrayaśas of Udyāna. It shows an unusual knowledge of Serindia, and Soper (1959: 229) comments: "It is likely to have been composed in some such center as Khotan." The protective goddess of Udyāna was Hārītī and also from Khotan. The route of transmission seems to have been from Northwest India to Khotan and other Serindian kingdoms, and thence to China, Korea and Japan. For example Kapila, the protector of Varṇu (present-day Bannu in Pakistan), was the special protector of Dharmamitra, who installed his cult in 435 on Mount Zhong in China. Kapila is also mentioned in the annals, prophesies and *Vimalaprabhā-paripṛcchā* as a protective deity of Khotan. Khotan played a crucial role in the transmission of sacred texts, deities and ceremonies for the protection of the state.

The *Suv.* is one of the four texts read in the four directions of the mandala in the *Mañjuśrī-mūla-kalpa* 38.136 *(evam adhīta-catuḥ-*

sutrāntikam). The four sutras are: the *Prajñāpāramitā,* which is read in the south, the *Candrapradīpa-samādhi* in the west, the *Gaṇḍavyūha* in the north, and the *Suvarṇaprabhāsottama-sūtra* in the east. The *Suv.* follows the *Gaṇḍavyūha,* perhaps in an intentional sequence. The supreme Buddha of the *Gaṇḍavyūha* is Rocana, who is also called Abhyucca-deva 'The Colossal Deity', and as such is related to the state. I have dealt with the *Avataṃsaka* and the State in 'Buddhist colossi and the *Avataṃsaka* Sutras' in volume 6 of the *Cultural Horizons of India.* The *Suv.* is referred to as a *sutrendrarāja* in the colophons of the chapters. The term *indrarāja* is reminiscent of the *aindra mahābhiṣeka* in the *Aitareya-brāhmaṇa,* the great coronation ceremony of Indra for kingship, suzerainty, supremacy and preeminence. This applied to all Kṣatriya Kings: "If he who knows thus should desire of a Kṣatriya 'May he win all victories, find all worlds, attain superiority, pre-eminence and supremacy over all kings, and overlordship, paramount rule, self-rule, sovereignty, supreme authority, kingship, great kingship and suzerainty; may he be all encompassing, possessed of all the earth, possessed of all life, from the one end up to the further side of the earth bounded by the ocean, sole ruler', he should anoint him with this great anointing of Indra." (Keith 1920: 336f). The *Suv.* is the only *sūtr-endrarāja.*

The Chinese translation of the *Suv.* by Dharmakṣema made in 414–421, and three earlier translations compiled by Baogui and Jñānagupta in 597 omit *indrarāja* in the title. Yijing's translation of 703 has the word *wang* 王 or *rāja* in the title. The sutra also speaks of its relationship with the state. In the chapter on laws, the sutra links governance with Dharma or the Buddhist value-system. The *Suv.* stresses the political aspect of Buddhism, and was highly regarded by the rulers of Japan, who founded their policy on it during the Nara period (8th century). Natalia D. Gummer points out its role in protecting and sustaining the kingdom of the ruler who accords it appropriate respect. In both China and Japan it was the central text in imperial rituals *(Encyclopedia of Buddhism,* ed. Robert E. Buswell, New York, 2004 2.812).

Transmission of sutras from Khotan to China

The Sino-Kharoṣṭhi coins of the first centuries CE have been found in the ancient capital of Yotqan. They bear Chinese legends on the

obverse and Prakrit ones in Kharoṣṭhi script on the reverse. They are an indication of the coexistence of Indians and Chinese in Khotan. Thus Khotan became an important factor in the transmission of Buddhist sutras and their political concepts to China.

Khotan and China had intimate economic, matrimonial and cultural relations. China depended on Khotan for its jade. Khotan is called Ratna-janapada or the Kingdom of Jade in the panegyric of King Vijayasaṅgrāma (P 2787). The name Go-stana (transcribed by Xuanzang as Ku-sa-tan-na) is translated in Chinese as 地乳 *diru* "Earth breast". In fact, it is a Sino-Indian compound, where *go* is the Chinese 玉 *yu*, which is pronounced *gyoku* in Japanese and *ngok* in Vietnamese. Jade was of prime importance in the state ceremonies of China over the centuries, and even today the Chinese character 国 *guo* for country has the character for jade 玉 inside the radical 口 *wei* for enclosure. *Stana* is the Sanskrit *sthāna* or Iranian *stan* as the suffix for country. Thus Gostana means the "Land of Jade".

China used to get its original Sanskrit sutras from Khotan. Mokṣala of Khotan translated the *Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā* into Chinese in 291, and Gītamitra came to Chang'an in 296 with another Sanskrit manuscript of the same name. Zhi Faling found the smaller version of the *Avataṃsaka* (T 278) here. Dharmarakṣa had a Khotanese collaborator. Empress Wu Zetian sent a special envoy to get the Sanskrit text of the *Avataṃsaka* from Khotan. It was translated by Śikṣānanda, a monk of Khotan, in five years (695–699, K 80). This was to consecrate the proclamation of her new Zhou dynasty in October 690, when she assumed the title of Divine August Emperor after depriving Emperor Ruizong of his authority. The Chinese translation of the *Suv.* was completed by Yijing on 17 November 703 at the Ximing monastery (K 127). His collaborators Faming and Degan were from the Nine Bhadantas who helped the Empress realize the dream of a Buddhist State. The colophon of a manuscript of the *Suv.* discovered at Dunhuang says: "Newly translated, bound, and corrected at the Ximing Monastery in Chang'an, *in obedience to the Imperial order*", by the Tripiṭaka Master Yijing ...." (Forte 1976: 81, 87, 88) The sutras were the heavenly mandate for the Kings or Cakravartins of the Golden Wheel (Forte 1976: 125).

The earliest fragments of the Sanskrit text of the *Suv.* came from Khotan. It was translated into Khotanese directly from Sanskrit, and yet a second time, indicating its popularity. The oldest man-

uscript fragments of the Khotanese *Suv.* date from the fifth/sixth centuries. The Earlier Khotanese version agrees more closely with the Cambridge palm-leaf manuscript (G of Nobel). It has two verses missing from the present Sanskrit text, but they are found in the Chinese translation of Dharmakṣema. The Late Khotanese version agrees with Yijing. The version of Yijing may have been translated from a manuscript obtained in Khotan.

Buddhism as the palladium of Khotan

The *Prophecy of Khotan* (henceforth *Prophecy)* states that there are 21 *vimānas* on the whole earth and Khotan (*Li*) is the twenty-first *vimana* of Śākyamuni. Khotan had long been a lake when the Buddha came, made it into a country by drying out the lake, blessed it, and when he was appointing protectors of various lands, he commissioned the following for the security of Khotan: eight Mahāsattva Bodhisattvas (Mañjuśrī, Avalokiteśvara, Maitreya, Ākāśagarbha, Kṣitigarbha, Samantabhadra, Mahāsthāma, Bhaiṣajyarāja); twenty-eight Protectors; Vaiśravaṇa and Saṃjñāya, the General of the Yakṣas; King Ajātaśatru's daughter Vimalaprabhā and his son Prince Vajrasena; Devakanyā Susthiramati, Devī Hāritī, Devī Aparājitā; Ākāśacakṣus, Devaputra Suvarṇamāla, Nāgarāja Gṛhāvatapta; Devī Aṅkuśavatī, Devī Sthānavatī. They made a vow (*samaya*) to guard Khotan (Emmerick 1967: 3, 9, 13; Emmerick translates *adhiṣṭhāna* as 'controlled', but it means 'blessed').

After the lake dried up, the country was still vacant. The chief consort of king Dharmāśoka gave birth to a son. The king cast away his son lest he seize his sovereignty. A breast *(stand)* arose from the earth, and by sucking it, he did not die. Later he was named Sa.nu 'Earth-breast' *(Go-stana).* This legend is provided by (i) the folk etymology of Go-stana or Khotan, (ii) takes back the origin of the Khotanese kingdom to Dharmāśoka to invest it with a Buddhist aura, (iii) and goes on to connect the kingdom to China, with which it had economic and cultural relations. Vaiśravaṇa placed the meritorious child Sa.nu in the position of the son of the Chinese king. Later the Chinese king sent him with an army to seek a country in the west. He reached Me.skar in Khotan. There he met Minister Yaśa of king Dharmāśoka, who had been banished for his mutiny.

Prince Sa.nu and Minister Yaśa met and established the country of Khotan (Emmerick 1967: 19). The Indians and Chinese fought, but they stopped when Vaiśravaṇa and Śrī Devī appeared in the air. They became allies. Prince Sa.nu became the king and Yaśa his minister. The *Prophecy* says that Khotan was "a country where Indians and Chinese met" (Emmerick 1967: 21, 23).

The legend of Sanu tells of Māndātā, the son of Yuvanāśva: "According to the Purāṇas, Yuvanāśva had no son, so the rishis, led by the sage Bhṛgu, instituted a rite to secure progeny for him. They placed upon the altar a vessel of water which they had magically endowed with great potency, and which they intended to give to his queen to drink. Yuvanāśva awoke at night feeling very thirsty, and inadvertently drank the water himself, and after one hundred years a child came forth from his right side. Indra gave the miraculous infant his finger to suckle; saying, *Māndhātā* (he shall suckle me), and from these words the boy's name was derived." (Walker 1968: 22)

The *Prophecy* (Emmerick 1967: 5) states that pestilence subsides and foreign foes are averted or vanquished by reading the *Mahāsannipāta* and *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka*. Further on it says that Śākyamuni preached the Candragarbha on Mount Gṛdhrakūṭa to appoint the protectors of various lands (ib. 9) The *Prophecy of Khotan* (Thomas 1935: 30) recommends the recitation of the *Prajñāpāramitā*, *Mahāsannipāta*, *Avataṃsaka*, *Ratnakūṭa*, etc. The *Vimalaprabhā-paripṛcchā* (ib. 185) lays down the recitation of the dhāraṇīs (i) to quell foreign enemies, (ii) to attain full merit, (iii) to be free from famine and poverty and (iv) to alleviate all diseases.

Multipolarity characterised the polity of Khotan in its intermediation between India and China for a millennium. The Buddhist sutras, their world-view, and their transmission to China gave Khotan primacy in the Serindian region. The other confluences were religion and politics, sanctity and power, values and economy. The charisma of the sutras and the transmission of this charisma to successors gave the Khotanese Empire an uninterrupted continuity of 1,256 years, according to the *Prophecy of Khotan* (Emmerick 1967: 75). This reckoning starts from the time of King Vijayasambhava, the grandson of King Sa.nu, when Dharma first arose in the country. This chronology gives an average of 23 years of rule for each king. This is a realistic statement of the time span of the dynasty

(1,256 years ÷ 55 kings = 22.8 years). The millenarian continuity of the state was vested in the divinisation of the sacral and secular aspects of life by the sutras, which functioned to legitimise the kings, and consolidated the social hierarchies in the flamonium of the Dharma. The Buddhist concept of the relationship of the king and his people lies in the duality of the well-being of the people as effected by the ruler and his constant attention to their perceptions of their happiness. The *bahu-jana-hita* or 'the well-being of the people' was dependent on the *bahu-jana-sukha* 'the happiness of the people'. The conceptions and the consciousness of this interrelationship were interwoven in the ideal expression of the sutras. The material and social structures were founded on value systems that rendered unsurpassable benefits of *theiotes* or 'divinity' in a shared paradigm of the ruler and the ruled. His Majesty the King of Bhutan has made a unique contribution to 21st century thought by mooting the concept of Gross National Happiness as the guiding principle of a State, an idea that he derives from his deep Buddhist background. Gross National Product is enriched by Gross National Happiness. Likewise, in ancient times, the web of power, the symbolism of cults, the symbiosis of well-being and happiness, *hita* and *sukha*, formed the fabric of Serindian society. This order travelled to the East Asian lands of China, Korea, and Japan, to the Trans-Himalayan Tibetans and Mongolians, and finally to the Uigurs.

The Five Great Goddesses (Suv. *preamble)*

The introductory chapter of the *Suv.* lays out the theme *(nidāna)* of the sutra. The Tathāgata dwells on Mount Gṛdhrakūṭa surrounded by five Great Goddesses *(mahādevatā)*. Each of them has a protective function as: the tutelary goddess of the royal family of Śākyamuni (his *kula-devatā)*, the protective goddess of the territorial state *(pṛthivī-devatā)*, and the three others are linked to learning, prosperity, and defence. They are:

1. Bodhisattva-samuccayā mahākuladevatā – Family Goddess;
2. Sarasvatī mahādevatā (ch. 7) – Earth Goddess of the State;
3. Śrī mahādevatā (ch. 8) – Goddess of Learning;
4. Dṛḍhā mahā-pṛthivī-devatā (ch. lo) – Goddess of Economy;

5. Hārītī mahādevatā – Goddess of Defence, with her 500 sons.

The first goddess is translated as the 'deity of the bodhi tree' in Chinese (*Suv.* 1937.247 n. 2). She is called *Nairañjanā-vāsinī* 'one who dwells on the Nairañjanā river' in the gāthās of the introductory chapter (*Suv.* p. 3). As Bodhisattva-samuccayā she is the essence of Enlightenment and the foundation of Dharma. As the family deity *(kula-devatā)* of Śākyamuni she plays an important role in four chapters. She is addressed by Śākyamuni in ch. 4 on King Kamalākara (p. 45). She is the interlocutor with him in ch. 15 on Ten Thousand Devaputras (p. 167). He speaks to her in ch. 17 on Jalavāhana, the son of a rich merchant (p. 199). She ends the sutra by singing a hymn of praise to Śākyamuni (ch. 19, p. 247). Śākyamuni practised austerities on the banks of the Nairañjanā river for six (ten or twelve) years. Eventually he became aware that austerities would not lead to Enlightenment. He bathed in this river, accepted the milk offered by Sujātā, sat under the nearby Bodhi tree, meditated and entered Enlightenment. He must have chosen the banks of the Nairañjanā, as the goddess of this river was his guardian deity.

While Bodhisattva-samuccayā plays a role in a number of chapters, separate chapters are devoted to the three other goddesses: ch. 7 – Sarasvatī; ch. 8 – Śrī; ch. 10 – Dṛḍhā Pṛthivī. Hārītī occurs in ch. 6 on the Catur-mahārāja, and in ch. 14 on yakṣas as a protectress. The yakṣas are called Hārītī-putra 'Sons of Hārītī' in the *Lalita-vistara* 202.10.

The induction of these secular goddesses into Dharma or their *dharma-vinaya*, in the terminology of the *Suv.*, takes place with our sutra. It is a potent sutra, as it is blessed by four Buddhas in the four directions: Akṣobhya (East), Ratnaketu (South), Amitābha (West), and Dundubhisvara (North). This blessing destroys all evil, poverty and other severe misfortunes. The *Suv.* ensures that the Four Lokapālas come with their armies, along with Sarasvatī, Nairañjanā-vāsinī (family deity), Hārītī, and Dṛḍha Pṛthivī, as well as the kings of the eight beings with their forces, to provide protection to the devotees.

The deities of the *Suv.* play a prominent protective role in the annals and murals of Khotan. Bodhisattva-samuccayā means the aggregation *(samuccaya)* of bodhisattvas, and as such she represents the assemblage of bodhisattvas. The Eight Great Bodhisattvas along with Vaiśravaṇa, Saṃjñin, and others were appointed

by the Tathāgata to be tutelaries of Khotan at all times, according to the *Annals of Khotan* (Thomas 1.96). *The Religious Annals of Khotan* specify that the Eight Bodhisattvas reside in different locales in Khotan (Thomas 1935: 1.311).

The drum of deśanā *(Suv. ch. 3)*

Stein (1907: 227) mentions a mound known as *Naghara-khanah*, which local tradition assumes to have formed part of the ramparts enclosing the old city of Yotkan. Naghara-khanah means 'the house of the Kettle-drum'. Stein connects it to the legend of the Nāginī and the minister related by Xuanzang (Beal 1884: 2.321). It is a mound, which on excavation may reveal remains of a monastery. Stein says that its general appearance is reminiscent of a vihāra that rises behind the Mauri-Tim Stupa. It is only two miles from the excavated area of Yotkan. This sacred spot continues to be worshipped to the present day (1907) as the tomb of Three Ghazis. It is a popular pilgrimage site for all of Khotan. It must have been a symbolic referent of political power, an expression of individual and social values, and the strength of its convictions made it a unique force for the identity of Khotan. Hence it has survived in an Islamic transformation. The Naghara-khanah represents the third chapter of the *Suv.* on *deśanā* which means 'preaching, instructions, as well as confession'. The Bodhisattva Ruciraketu saw a drum *(bherī)*, made of gold, shining all around like the orb of the Sun. He saw innumerable Buddhas in all directions. He saw a brahmin beating the drum. He heard verses on *deśanā* from the sound of the drum. The drum is called *dundubhi* (p. 21), but later on *dundubha* (p. 22) to indicate its immense size. A *naghara* is about six feet high and can only be carried on a bullock-cart on the occasion of a major festival, and nowadays in a procession to celebrate victory in elections. Ruciraketu uttered the gathas to Lord Buddha. The gāthās begin with a *double entendre* on the title of the sutra:

suvarṇa-bhāsottama-dundubhena
śamyantu duḥkhās trisahasra-loke.

By the drum of excellent golden light, let the woes of the 3000 worlds be ended. The sound of the drum suppresses the woes of Yama, of poverty, and also grants freedom from fear and other

worldly troubles. It endows men with all noble virtues. By the resounding sound of the drum, beings are endowed with the Logos of Brahman. They destroy impurities such as hatred and folly. Those beings who dwell in hell, thin limbs ablaze with fire, attain the nobility of the hymn "Homage to the Buddha". The merits that accrue from the sound of the drum are narrated in a long excursus of 102 verses, to deliver from woes of all kinds, to gain profound merits, and to touch the supreme flawless Enlightenment. Emmerick has translated *deśanā* in the caption of this chapter as 'confession' but it should be translated as 'teaching'. The Three Ghazis of today appear to substitute the triad of this chapter: Bhagavan (Lord Buddha), bodhisattva Ruciraketu, and the brāhmaṇa. When it was a full-fledged vihāra, the three would have been depicted in the round, with brahmin beating the drum.

Four Lokapālas / Catur-mahārāja (Suv. *ch. 6)*

The preamble began with the induction of the Five Protective Goddesses of the State into Buddhism, and chapter 6 on the Four Mahārāja is a clear politicisation of the sutra. It is the longest chapter in the sutra, and the length itself is an indication of its political aroma and its conception as the source of power. The *Soka Gakkai Dictionary of Buddhism* (2002: 257) points out in unambiguous terms: "that those who embrace this sutra will obtain the protection of the four heavenly kings and other benevolent deities, and that, if a ruler takes faith in the correct teaching, these deities will protect his country. On the other hand, if he fails to protect the correct teaching, the benevolent deities will abandon the nation, and calamities and disasters will occur. In Japan, this sutra was revered as one of the three sutras for the protection of the nation, the other two being the Lotus Sutra and the Benevolent Kings Sutra".

Williams (1973: 132–135) describes the fragments of three panels and one paper drawing of Vaiśravaṇa from Khotan. The drawing (Kha. i. 50) in the National Museum of India in Delhi is inscribed "this picture be a protection at all times, by night and by day". The term *surade* has been translated 'a patron' by Emmerick (*JRAS* 1968: 140) but it is the Arabic *surat* 'form, appearance, face, picture'. Vaiśravana wears a tunic, boots, armour, holds a lance and

stupa, and is thus represented in his protective attributes. He is one of the eight demigods guarding Khotan in the *Candragarbha-sūtra*. Williams has missed the most outstanding representation of Vaiśravaṇa painted on a wall of Buddhist shrine D II at Dandan-uiliq. We will discuss this at the end.

The Buddha commits the protection of Khotan to Vaiśravana in *The Prophecy of Khotan* (Thomas 1935: 19, 21, 28). In the *Annals of Khotan* he undertakes the protection of monasteries (ib. 110). The *Vimalaprabhā-paripṛcchā* cites the *Candragarbha-sūtra*, wherein Lord Buddha assigns the protection of Khotan to Vaiśravana, Saṃjñāya, Nāgarāja Anavatapta, and Devaputra Susthiramati (ib. 179). Later on Vaiśravaṇa and others receive Khotan from the Buddha as a trust to be safeguarded (ib. 189). The Buddha says: "Again and again I commit the country [of Khotan] into your hands for protection" (ib.203). He is called Nātha as the chief divinity of Khotan in Tibetan roll P 254 in the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris (ib. 308 n. 8). The same roll also repeats that Lord Buddha committed the stability and defense of Khotan to Vaiśravaṇa and others (ib. 317).

The sixth chapter of the *Suv.* on the Catur-Mahārāja says that a king should exercise sovereignty by the science of polity in accord with the tenets of Devendra *(anena devendra-samayena rāja-śāstreṇa rājatvaṃ kārayet, Suv.* 69–70). The *Suv.* is called *sūtr-endrarāja* and this passage characterises it as a text of political practice. The Four Great Kings give protection, defence, peace and welfare to a king who rules according to the *Suv.* (ib. 68, 96). The Lord has expounded all of the royal duties, textbooks on politics, and royal functions in this *(iha)* supreme sutra of *Suv.* (ib. 97). Jambudvīpa belongs to the Four Great Kings with their armies and retinues who ensure plenty, peace and prosperity (ib. 74, 67). They repel all foreign armies, and remove hunger and illness (ib. 65). They watch over, guard and protect Jambudvīpa (ib. 66, 67, 71, 77, 82, 92, 99) by ensuring the destruction of enemies (ib. 65, 69, 71, 77, 94, 100), the suppression of internal revolt (ib. 71) and preemptive strategies (ib. 72). They are assisted by Twenty-eight Yakṣa Generals *(mahāyakṣa-senāpati,* ib. 66). Imprecation ends the chapter. If men do not respect the excellent *Suv.*, the Four Great Kings will neglect the region, which will lead to disturbances, conflicts and meteoric disasters, and foreign powers will destroy the region. *Suv.* emphasises the political function of the Four Great Kings led by Vaiśravaṇa, and thus we see the

overwhelming role of Vaiśravaṇa in the six historical texts of Khotan preserved in Tibetan and translated by F. W. Thomas.

There is a special Sino-Japanese term for the 'Protection of the State' (Jap. 鎮護國家 *chingō-kokka).* This was to secure the defence of the State, the sovereign and the people against internal troubles, wars, natural calamities and epidemics, by constructing temples, reciting sutras and performing specific rites. Buddhism affirmed the solidarity between the Law of the Buddha and the Law of the sovereign. This is embodied in the very person of the Buddha, who is of royal descent. The rites of Protection of the State are based on the chapter on the Catur-mahārāja, who played a key role. Shotoku Taishi, who laid the foundations of Buddhism in Japan, constructed the first Buddhist temple to the Catur-mahārāja to ensure the stability of his state and Buddhism. The four ensure in the *Suv.* that if a king honours this text, "we shall protect this king and his people. We shall do everything to ensure their well-being, and keep dissatisfaction and sorrow away from them... We shall completely rout their enemies from other countries".

"If, when there is a king who listens to this Text, the enemy from a neighbouring country shall think of crushing his territory with four armies: then, O, Blessed One, thanks to the imposing power of this King of Texts, this neighbouring enemy, in turn, will have other enemies who will trouble him; in his frontiers, scourges shall multiply, epidemics shall spread. Seeing this, the king will prepare his four armies and move towards this country in order to cut it into pieces. Then, with our escort of Yakṣas and divine beings, unlimited and innumerable, we shall give him help and protection, each of us making ourselves invisible, and we shall cause the enemy to submit of his own will, not daring to advance even to the frontier: all armed engagement will thenceforth become quite impossible".

Japan had special temples for the protection of the state, beginning with the Shitennōji of Osaka founded in 593 by Shotoku Taishi, based on the Catur-mahārāja chapter of the *Suv.* In 741 Emperor Shomu of Japan decided to construct "temples for the protection of the country by the Catur-mahārāja of the *Suvarṇabhāsa*" in all of the provinces of the empire. They were called *Konkōmyo shitennō gōkokuji* in Japanese.

Śrī Mahādevī (Suv. *ch. 8)*

Chapter 8 on Śrī Mahādevī says that when one mutters the name of the excellent *Suv.* the goddess will direct her attention to him and create a great fortune *(mahātīṃ śriyaṃ kariṣyati, Suv.* 115). By the power of this sutra she will watch over his residence, increase the provision of food grains, endow him with gold, jewels, wealth, and provide all blessings (ib. 119). A painting inscribed in Khotanese and Chinese for the donor Hvam Sam Khina shows Vaiśravaṇa accompanied by Śrī. This was ordered by the donor for the enjoyment of long life (Williams 1973: 134). In *The Prophecy of Khotan*, Vaiśravaṇa and Śrī-devī give a solemn feast to the Saṅghas, and Śrī-devī presents them with a bag of gold coins (Thomas 1935: 81).

The Earth Goddess (Suv. *ch. 10)*

Dṛḍhā Pṛthivī-devatā is the topic of chapter 10 of the *Suv.* She speaks to the Lord that wherever the sutra shall go forth, she will be there, and all the flowers, fruits and crops will be more luxuriant. Beings will enjoy food and drink, and increase their longevity, stamina, and so on. Wherever this sutra is expounded, it will produce great power, strength, and glory. Wherever the sutra is propounded, the region will become stronger (*ojasvi-tara*) and wetter (*Suv.* 126). Williams (1973: 135) describes her only painting, though she is common in other Khotanese media. She arises between the feet of King Visa Sambhava in a tenth century painting in Dunhuang. She is mentioned only in the *Suv.* and nowhere else in Buddhist literature.

General Saṃjñāya (Suv. *ch. 11)*

Chapter 11 of the *Suv.* is devoted to Saṃjñāya, whose name is also spelt Sañjaya in the manuscripts. The sutra says that he is so called because he knows all things, knows them fully, and perceives them well. His name occurs only in the *Suv.* (Edgerton cites no reference to any text in his *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary*). Thus the references to him in the historic texts on Khotan are clearly based on the *Suv.* Sañjaya occurs in Buddhist texts

(see my *Dictionary of Buddhist Iconography* 11.3118), but he must be distinguished from Saṃjñāya.

Twenty-eight Yakṣa Generals (Suv. *ch. 11)*

In the *Suv.* Saṃjñāya is accompanied by Twenty-eight Generals of the Yakṣas. He assures Lord Buddha that wherever the *Suv.* will go forth, he will approach that city, district, forest, mountain-cavern or royal palace, and provide protection, assistance, escape from punishment, peace and welfare. To anyone who preaches the Dharma, he will grant energy, strength and prowess. He will give him great zeal so that he is indefatigable (*Suv.* 128f.).

Golden light and Saṃjñāya (suvarṇa-bhāsa 金光明)

The *Suv.* says that golden lights will illumine the dwellings (*suvarṇa-mayāś cāvabhāsā bhavanāntareṣu prādurbhūtā bhaviṣyanti*) of Brahma, Indra, Sarasvatī, Dṛḍha, Śrī, Saṃjñāya, the Twenty-eight Yakṣa Generals and others (*Suv.* 85, 87, 88). These golden lights conditioned the heavy gilding of the statues in Khotan, so that centuries later Stein witnessed people straining gold from the river that flowed past the walls and statues of the ancient ruins.

The *Annals of Khotan* (Thomas 1935: 108) refer to King Vijayavīrya who beheld from his palace a light of gold and silver outside the city. Following the light, he saw a stag who became Saṃjñāya. Saṃjñāya said to the King: build a monastery here. The King built the monastery of Hgum.stir. This episode is repeated in the *Religious Annals of Khotan* (ib. 306). Further on, in the same text, he is one of the Eight Great Tutelaries of Khotan: Sa.ñe (Saṃjñāya), Vaiśravaṇa, Aparājita, Gaganeśvara, Suvarṇamāla, Aṅkuśavatī, Sthānavatī, and Nāgarāja Ḥgra.ha.bad.ta (correct to Gṛhāvatapta) (Thomas 1935: 310). Williams (1973: 136) describes four representations, of which the first suggests an animal, the second a deer, and the third a stag's head. In the *Candragarbha-sūtra*, Saṃjñāya is listed as one of the great guardians of Khotan (Levi 1905: 268).

Devendra-samaya *as a textbook on polity* (Suv. *ch. 12)*

Chapter 12, entitled *Devendra-samaya*, has instructions concerning divine kings. It begins with homage to Śrī with grains and blessings, and to Sarasvatī, who is endowed with wisdom and virtues. *Devendra-samaya* is the name of a textbook on polity *(rāja-śāstra).* This is expounded in detail. The Lokapālas ask king Brahmā: why is a king called *devaputra* or son of the gods? Brahmā responds: He is first blessed by the gods and then enters the womb of his mother. His duty is to destroy evil deeds, establish beings in meritorious activities, and to send them to the abode of the gods. When he overlooks evil deeds, lawlessness grows, and the gods are wrathful in heaven. His kingdom is destroyed on the arrival of a foreign army, famine rages, strategic animals such as horses and camels perish, civil war and social strife arise. People lose energy and prowess. A kingdom must be governed according to Dharma, so that the realm is endowed with plenty, and duly protected. The value-system inculcated in this chapter had a deep impact on the Kings of Khotan, who did all in their power to keep their enemies at bay, and to enrich the land with Buddhist monasteries, the bastions of Dharma. The six historical texts on Khotan provide extensive information on the promotion of Dharma by the kings.

Yakṣas (Suv. *ch. 14)*

Chapter 14 on refuge in the yakṣas (*yakṣāśraya*, Nobel 1937: 160f) says that those who are devoted to the sutra, divine beings possessed of supernatural powers, might and prowess will protect them unwearied by day and by night. Several deities are named. They are listed below in the order of the Latin alphabet, with the number in parentheses of the stanza in which the name occurs: Anavatapta the nāgendra (47) (Bailey 1942: 913; Thomas 1935: 320 n. 6) *aṣṭāviṃśati* or 28 generals (37), Āṭavaka (40), Bali (49), Caṇḍī (52), Caṇḍālikā yakṣiṇī (52), Candana (45), Caṇḍikā (52), Chagalapāda (43), Citrasena the gandharva (42), Dharmapāla (44), Elāpatra (47) (Bailey 1942: 915; Thomas 1935: 63, 64, 84–85), Haimavata (45), Hārītī (51) (Bailey 1942: 916, Thomas 1935: 94, 97, etc.), Hutāśana (35), Indra (35) (Bailey 1942: 914 – Sakra), Kāmaśreṣṭha

(45), Kapila (40) (Thomas 1935: 117–8, 121, 131–3), Kharaskandha (49), Kumbhīra (40), Kuntī (52), Kūṭadanī (52), Four Lokapālas (36) (Bailey 1942: 915), Mahābhāga (43), Mahāgrāsa (43), Maḥākāla (43), Mahāpraṇālī (45), Maheśvara the yakṣendra (37) (Bailey 1942: 914; Thomas 1935: 253), Maṇibhadra the yakṣendra (40) (Bailey 1942: 911), Maṇikaṇṭha (42), Markaṭa (44), Mucilinda (47) (Bailey 1942: 915), Nāgāyana (45), Nakula (45), Namuci (49), Nanda (47) (Bailey 1942: 915), Nārāyaṇa the yakṣendra (37) (Bailey 1942: 909, 914), Nikaṇṭha (42), Pañcika (43), Piṅgala (40), Prahlāda (49), Prajāpati (35), Praṇāli (44), Pṛthivī devatā (55) (Bailey 1942: 917), Pūrṇabhadra (40), Rāhu (49), Ratnakeśa (44), Sāgara (47) (Bailey 1942: 915) Saṃjñāya (37) (Bailey 1942: 912), Saṃvara (49), Sarasvatī (35, 54) *(pramukha devatā)*, Sarvasattvojahāriṇī (52), Sātagiri (45), Skanda (35) (Bailey 1942: 94), Soma (35), Śrī (54) (Thomas 1935: 58–59, 308–9 et passim), Sūciroma (44), Sūryamitra (44), Suvarṇakeśa (43), Upananda (47) (Bailey 1942: 915), Vajrapāṇi the yakṣendra (39) (Bailey 1942: 911), Vālī (44), Varṣādhipati (42), Varuṇa (35) (Bailey 1942: 915, Thomas 1935: 114), Vāyu (35), Vemacitra (49), Viṣṇu (35).

Some of them occur in the Khotanese texts discussed by H. W. Bailey in *Hvatanica* IV (BSOAS 1942: 10.886–924). These have been indicated above. The two yakṣendra Maheśvara and Nārāyaṇa in the Khotanese text deserve special mention, as they can be seen as two colossal gate-keepers in Japanese monasteries, as Nio 'The Two Kings'.

Hārītī (Suv. *1.8, 3.12, 85.4, 162.16)*

The *Suv.* opens (p. 1) with the Buddha sitting on the Gṛdhrakūṭa Hill accompanied by Five Great Goddesses (*mahādevatā*) and several other beings. Among them is Hārītī mahādevatā, who possesses an honoured position as a guardian of the faith. The preamble states that the most fierce calamities of those who listen to this sutra will end, and the Four Lokapālas will protect them with multitudes of their yakṣas. So too Sarasvatī, Hārītī bhūtamātā and others will ensure their protection, day and night, with due indulgence. In the 14th chapter, entitled *Yakṣāśraya-parivarta*, several yakṣas, Hārītī bhūtamātā (p. 162.16) with her five hundred sons will protect the devotees of the sutra at all times, while they sleep,

sit or stand. The outstanding representation of Hārītī is the mural in Shrine DII at Dandan-uiliq. This was discovered by Sir Aurel Stein in 1900–1. Dandan-uiliq refers to the Turkish *dandatt oylik* 'the houses with ivory' in the Khotan area, belonging to the seventh or eighth century. Stein described the woman in the mural standing in an oblong tank of water filled with lotuses. She is youthful and of exquisite charm. In front of the tank is a horse. Further on is the Buddha and a bodhisattva (?). In the SE corner of the shrine is a clay statue of Vaiśravaṇa standing on a gigantic being. Stein and Andrews believe that the Buddha, bodhisattva and Vaiśravaṇa figures are not related to the charming lady. Stein (1907: 1.227–228) raised the probability that she represented the Nāginī residing in a stream east of Khotan, whose legend is narrated by Xuanzang. This is ruled out as (i) she has no nāga emblem, (ii) the naked infant cannot be the minister who disappeared in the water, and (iii) the crucial drum on the horse of the minister who returned from the water is missing. Andrews (110 pl. xxxii) found in her a close parallel to the Western Venus. Coomaraswamy (1927: 181) described her as a water nymph. The latest identification is by P. Banerjee (1992: 46–54), who rightly considers her Hārītī, partaking of the attributes of Lakṣmī.

The Khotanese mural emphasizes her unique youthful charm in graceful outlines, the astounding coiffure of a royal personage, the simple elegance of her jewellery (necklet, armlet, bracelet and girdle) that heightens the contours of her body, all fleshed and every inch a beauty. In Amoghavajra's *Mahāyakṣī-Hārītī-priyaṅkara-sādhana* (T 1260), she is called Abhirati, as she is endowed with unparalleled loveliness and beauty (Péri 1917: 83-96). At the end of this sādhana the Buddha enjoins that she will zealously protect the monasteries, monks and all men, she will not allow evil spirits to cause any trouble, and will provide tranquillity to all. This she will do in the future in Jambudvīpa. In the 18th century Tibetan pantheon *Rin 'byung*, based on Tāranātha (1575–1634), Mahāyakṣinī Hārītī is described as "beautiful and graceful and adorned with all ornaments" (Willson/Brauen 2005: 314 no. 270).

The naked son is standing to the right of Hārītī in the Khotanese depiction, and is conspicuously shown as a child of four to five years. In all descriptions, Hārītī is inevitably accompanied by her son. She was so dedicated to him that she propounded a *hṛdaya-*

dhāraṇī and *sādhana* of "her well-beloved son Priyaṅkara" and prostrating on the earth with her five limbs and adoring the feet of the Buddha she said: "O Bhagavan, by means of this dhāraṇī and these sādhanas, I now procure now advantages to all beings" (Péri 1917: 95).

The horse in the foreground symbolizes the Twenty-Eight Yakṣa Generals, who are mentioned along with Hārītī and her sons in *Suv.* 85.4. The *Lalitavistara* 202.9–12 mentions that the Twenty-Eight Yakṣa Generals are led by Pañcika and the five hundred sons of Hārītī (*aṣṭāviṃśati-mahāyakṣa-senāpatayaḥ pañcika-yakṣasenāpati-pūrvaṅgamāni ca pañca-hārītī-putra-śatāni*). Pañcika is the husband of Hārītī. Hārītī herself is one of the Twenty-Eight Generals in the train of Thousand-Armed Avalokiteśvara in the dhāraṇī and ritual, translated into Chinese by Amoghavajra (AD 705–774). The first translation of this dhāraṇī was done by Bhagavaddharma between 650–661 at Khotan. Khotan had a well-established tradition of the Twenty-Eight Generals. Her statue as one of the Twenty-Eight (Jap. *nijūhachibu-shu)* at the monasteries of Sanjusangendo, Kiyomizudera, Ninnaji and elsewhere are famous in Japan. Hārītī is often enthroned with Pañcika, who is a warrior holding a lance and surrounded by many children in Gandhara sculptures. The "Horse-stall dhāraṇī in the ensuing paragraph is also represented by the horse in the mural.

The right foot of Vaiśravaṇa stands on a red demon. The red demon is very prominent under the sculpture and refers to the Red-faces (=Tibetans). The *Prophecy of Khotan* (Thomas 1935: 1.78) speaks of frequent strife in Khotan created by the Red-faces. The *Inquiry of Vimalaprabhā* speaks of restoring stupas and monasteries burnt down by the Red-faces (ib. 1. 202, 203, 233).

Various annals of Khotan point out that the Buddha appointed protectors of various lands and also of Khotan. The Prophecy of Khotan states that he appointed Vaiśravaṇa, Saṃjñāya the mahāyakṣa-senāpati, Vimalaprabhā the daughter of Ajātaśatru and her brother Prince Vajrasena, Devakanya Susthiramati, Devī Hārītī and others as protectors of Khotan (Emmerick 1967: 9, Thomas 1935: 1.94), and that they made a promise in the presence of the Buddha to guard Khotan (ib. p. 15, Thomas 1935: 1.97).

The *Vimalaprabhā-paripṛcchā* says that Vaiśravaṇa, Hārītī and others assure that when Devī Vimalaprabhā gives birth in Kho-

tan, they will act as tutelaries, because the Lotus Sutra and the kingdom of Khotan was received by us as a trust from the Buddha (Thomas 1935: 1.189–190). When Khotan was threatened by the armies of the Red-faces, then Vaiśravaṇa and Devī Hārītī with her son petitioned the Buddha to receive protection for Khotan (ib. p. 202). The Buddhas give the "Horse-stall" dhāraṇī to Vimalaprabhā and Vajrasena, whereby all enemies shall be cleared away, and Vajrasena will comprehend the "business of royalty" (ib. p. 213). Tathāgata Vajradhvaja (correct to Vajraketu) pronounced a dhāraṇī to Kumāra Vajrasena, Vaiśravaṇa, Maheśvara, Saṃjñāya and Hārītī with her son that his enemies will not be able to harm him (ib. p. 253). The *Vimalaprabhā-paripṛccha* concludes that Vajrapāṇi commits this sutra to Vaiśravaṇa, Hārītī with her child and others so that Khotan shall be saved by my religion (ib. p. 257).

Further on, above the head of the demon being crushed by Vaiśravaṇa, sits a bodhisattva, namely Ruciraketu bodhisattva mahāsattva (Suv. 6.4), who was residing at Rājagṛha at the time the *Suv.* was enunciated and had been honoured by several past buddhas.

The monk sitting next to Śākyamuni in the mural and holding a book in his left hand is Ānanda holding the *Suv.* The *Suv.* opens with the chapter *nidāna-parivarta*, which relates that the Thatāgata was on the Gṛdhrakūṭa as the dharmadhātu, the transcendent plane of the Enlightened One. He was accompanied by Five Great Goddesses: Bodhisattva-samuccayā Kuladevatā, Sarasvatī, Śrī, Dṛḍhā Pṛthivī, Hārītī, in addition to other beings. Then Ānanda asked the Lord: "What will be their induction into dharma *(dharma-vinaya)*". The Lord proclaimed the *Suv.*, the essence of transcendent samādhi *(samādhi-dharma-sāra)*. Thus Ānanda is the chief interlocutor of the *Suv.*, and as such he holds the book in the mural. He was a cousin of the Buddha and one of his most important disciples, as well as his personal attendant. His expositions of the sutras were the basis for the codification of the *Sūtrapiṭaka* at the First Synod. He is extolled in canonical writings for his devotion to the Buddha. Due to his exceptional position he sits to the right of the Buddha in the mural. The right hand of Ānanda is in the *jñāna-mudrā*. It is illustrated in the *Susiddhi-kalpa-mudrā*, a manuscript of the T'ang period, dated 864, that was brought from China in 865 by Shui, and is now preserved at the Toji monastery in Kyoto.

The enlargement of the photograph clearly shows that Hārītī has the almond eyes of a Chinese, and her hairdo is in a regal Chinese style. She is of Sino-Khotanese parentage. Her hand cupping the right unbound breast may hint at *Ku-stana*, a Sanskritization of the frequent form *Khotaṃna*. The Kharoṣṭhi documents of the third century discovered by Stein at the Niya site actually employ the forms Kustana or Kustanaka: *ku* 'earth', *sterna* 'breast'.

The lilies in the pond can be traced back to the Annals of Khotan, which state that when the Buddha visited the country with his disciples he enveloped the lake with rays of light, which became 353 illuminated water-lilies. The figure 353 was the number of monasteries that were to be built in the country. The lilies around Hārītī emphasise the blessings of Lord Buddha. She wears a short and explosive undergarment which is gathered in front with overlapping strings of the girdle. The eyes and hairdo of Yakṣiṇī Hārītī are an underpinning of the need to have diplomatic relations with China against Tibetan incursions. She is the guardian deity of Khotan, and as such she is pictured as a ravishing 'Jade Beauty', with jade representing Khotan. Her prosperous body is a poem of hope, her Sinic eyes symbolise defence, and she is a corporeal translation of strategic cooperation with China to defend her Buddhakṣetra Khotan, entrusted to her by Lord Buddha himself.

While Vaiśravaṇa is in the north near Hārītī, Stein (1907: 253) rightly pointed out "that the pedestals in the other three corners (compare plate LXVI) once bore images of the remaining three Lokapalas".

The D. II shrine with the elegant mural of Hārītī, Vaiśravaṇa and three other Lokapālas, which is now lost, was a Temple of the Catur-mahārāja based on the *Suv.* for the protection of the kingdom of Khotan.

The protective function of the icons is reinforced by four inscriptions recorded by Pelliot from cave 108 of Dunhuang which declare that Vaiśravaṇa protects the Khotan Kingdom, and so do Mahākāla, ... (name lost), and Shayemoli (Ning Qiang, Diplomatic Icons: social and political meanings of Khotanese images in Dunhuang Cave 220, *Oriental Art* 1999: 44, 13).

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Притча о блудном сыне (Из сутры *Л*отоса Благой *Д*хармы)

Борис Огибенин

Притча

Известной притче из четвертой главы Сутры *Л*отоса Благой *Д*хармы (*Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtram, IV. Adhimuktiparivarta* – «Глава о понимании») по давней традиции трактуемой как аналог евангельской притчи о блудном сыне, предшествует довольно пространная преамбула, которая часто остается вне внимания при истолковании. Мне же кажется, что для понимания буддийского повествования стоит обратиться к преамбуле, в которой уже высказаны мысли, определяющие махаянский буддизм и представленные в нарративной структуре притчи. Основная цель учения—путь к просветлению – находит свое выражение и в преамбуле и в тексте притчи. Буддийская притча заслуживает самого пристального анализа: она относится к тем виртуозным миниатюрам буддийской словесности, которые представляют буддийское учение в манере, доступной и мирянину и знающему буддисту.

Ниже предлагается перевод притчи, насколько мне известно еще не появлявшийся в русских источниках по истории буддизма. За переводом следует опыт прочтения притчи.

> И вот благой Субхути, и благой Махакатьяяна, и благой Махакашьяпа, и благой Махамаудгальяяна, услыхав эту никогда доселе неслыханную дхарму, предстали перед ликом Блаженного, услыхав также и о предсказанном судьбою непревзойденном и совершенном просветлении благого Шарипутры, стали обладателями чуда, говоря иначе, вошли в чудесное состояние, вошли в состояние сладостного возбуждения. И восстали тогда они с сидений своих, и пошли туда, где пребывал Блаженный, и прийдя

к Нему, и, откинув одежды свои на одно плечо, правое колено преклонив, почтительно ладони сложив, взоры свои к лику Его устремив, головы свои склонивши, сами долу склонившись, перед ликом Его преклонившись, говорили Ему в ту пору так:

"Мы, Блаженный, пожили, стары мы, изможднены мы, старшими почитаемся мы в общине, дожили мы до весьма преклонных лет, умиротворены мы, Блаженный, и нет уж у нас нужных сил, нет уж у нас нужной готовности, чтобы обрести непревзойденное и совершенное Просветление. Но ведь учит же Блаженный дхарме, много же сидит с нами Блаженный, и внимаем мы учению дхарме, а теперь, Блаженный, у нас, много сидевших подле Блаженного, много почитавших Блаженного, руки да ноги болью исходят, все жилы да суставы болят. И хоть, Блаженный, было же учение о дхарме Блаженного, хоть и открылись нашему взору пустотность, беспричинность и бессообразность всего сущего, нет уж у нас стремления к дхармам Будды, к сверхъестественным проявлениям буддийских миров, да и к игровым проявлениям бодхисаттв и татхагат, Блаженный. Почему же? Мы, Блаженный, бежали от тройственного мира, изможднённые старостью пришли мы к умиротворенному состоянию. Да, мы наставляли даже и других бодхисаттв в том, как достичь непревзойденного и совершенного Просветления, поучали мы их, но и тогда, Блаженный, не явилась нам хотя бы одна-единственная мысль о пагубных желаниях. А теперь вот мы, какие есть, услышав от Блаженного, что и ученикам предсказывается судьбою, что и они достигнут непревзойденного и совершенною Просветления, владеем мы, Блаженный, сверхьестесгвенным чудом, огромным богатством. Сейчас, как услышали мы тот никогда доселе неслыханный глас Татхагаты, обрели мы великое сокровище, стали мы, Блаженный, владеть неизмеримым сокровищем. Сокровища того великого, что мы обрели, не искали мы, не алкали, не ждали, не просили. Предстало это нам со всею ясностью, Блаженный, со всею ясностью, Сугата.

А всё что подобно тому, Блаженный, как если бы некто ушёл от отца своего и, ушедши, отправился в чужую страну. И провёл он там многие годы – двадцать, тридцать, сорок или пятьдесят лет. Отец его становится богатеем, сын же – бедняком. И в поисках того, как прожить, в поисках еды, в поисках одежды, бродит бедняк там и сям и попадает в некую чужую страну. И отец его тем временем оказывается в некой чужой стране. Богатства его несметны – у него горы золота, хлебные закрома, много, много золота, серебра,

перламутра, берилла, раковин, драгоценных камней, кораллов и сияющих ярким блеском серебряных изделий. В услужении у него множество рабынь и рабов, в работе – мастера и подёнщики, богат он стадами слонов, табунами лошадей, колесницами, коровами и овцами, окружён он обширной свитой, деньги его отданы в рост во многих царствах, богат он развитием своих дел, вложением своего состояния, ведением сельских работ и торговли.

Бедняк же, Блаженный, в поисках еды и одежды, побывав во многих деревнях, городах, поселениях, странах, царствах и столицах, в должное времени оказывается в том самом городе, где живёт тот богатей, владелец несметного состояния, золота, сокровищ и хлебных закромов, отец его. А отец бедняка, Блаженный, владелец несметного состояния, золота, сокровищ и хлебных закромов, живший в том городе, неотступно вспоминал о своём сыне, потерянном пятьдесят лет назад, но вспоминая о нём, никому о том не говорил, муки же свои переживая наедине с собой, думал так: "Пожил я, стар я, изможден, видимо-невидимо у меня золота, много у меня золота, полны золотых монет мои сундуки, полнятся зерном мои закрома, а наследника у меня нет. Вот придёт моя смерть и пойдёт всё ненужным прахом, Как бы покоен был я, коли б был у меня сын, которому все мои богатства пошли бы впрок!"

Тем временем бедняк тот, ища пропитания и одежды, появляется у жилища богатея, у которого видимо-невидимо золота, горы золота, чьи сундуки полны золотых монет, чьи хлебные закрома полнятся зерном. Отец же бедняка в ту пору оказался у входа своего жилища. Восседал он на роскошном троне с опорой для ног, убранном золотом и серебром, окруженный несметной толпой брахманов, воинов, вайшьев и шудр, и, овеваемый опахалом, под сенью навеса, украшенного бисером, цветами и гирляндами из драгоценностей, был занят тем, что перебирал сотни тысяч золотых монет. Так сидел он в блеске великолепия. Увидел, Блаженный, бедняк отца своего сидящим у входа своего жилища в блеске великолепия, окруженным огромной толпой и занятым делом, подобающим домохозяину, и увидев его, оробел, испугался, устрашился, так что волоски на его теле восстали, разум его пошатнулся. И подумал он так: "Нежданно-негаданно оказался я у царя или у царского министра, но делать мне тут нечего. Пойду-ка я прочь, туда, где живут бедняки, там с меньшим трудом добуду себе еды и одежды, не стоит мне тут медлить, как бы меня не схватили и не отправили в работы, как бы мне не попасть в худшую беду." И бедняк, мучимый

страхом, оробел, испугался, устрашился, так что волоски на его теле восстали, разум его пошатнулся. И, убоявшись воображённых им бед, тотчас бежал, унёс ноги, не стал медлить. Однако, Блаженный, богатей, сидевший у входа своего жилища на роскошном троне, с первого же взгляда узнал сына, а узнав, возрадовался, возликовал, пришёл в превосходное расположение духа, возвеселился, исполнился радости, довольства и тут же подумал: "Вот и чудесно, вот и нашёлся тот, кому принадлежит право с пользой употребить всё моё золото, деньги, сокровища и хлеб в закромах! Вот он, тот, кого я так часто вспоминал, вот он и пришёл сам собой. Я же уже пожил своё, стар я, изможден." И, Блаженный, гонимый жаждой увидеть сына, в ту же минуту, в тот же миг, в то же мгновенье спешит он отрядить своих людей: "Идите, милые, да приведите его поскорее!"

Те, Блаженный, бегут следом и схватывают бедняка. А бедняк, Блаженный, устрашившись, оробев, испугавшись, так что восстали волоски на его теле и пошатнулся разум его, испускает страшные вопли, кричит, что есть мочи: "Не сделал я вам никакого худа!" – кричит. Его, несмотря на жалобные крики, ведут силой, он же, устрашившсь, оробев, испугавшись, теряя разум, думает: "Что, как будут меня бить или убьют? Пропал я!" Тут чувства оставляют его, и падает он наземь. Удручённый отец его, случившийся рядом, приказывает своим людям не вести его силой, кропит его холодной водой и уж больше не говорит ни слова. А отчего? Оттого, что знает он убогость бедняка, знает он и своё высокое положение, знает он и то, что перед ним его сын и что по своей воле тот пришёл к нему. Богатей, будучи сведущим в средствах спасения, не открывает никому, что перед ним сын его. И, Блаженный, богатей тот шлёт одного из своих людей, чтобы нашёл он сына и сказал ему так: "Иди, человече, куда хочешь, отпущен ты." Тот, повинуясь хозяину своему, нашёл бедняка и сказал ему: "Иди, человече, куда хочешь, отпущен ты." Бедняк же, услышав такие слова, немало изумился, вскочил со своего места и отправился туда, где живут бедняки, чтобы добыть еды и одежды. И тут домохозяин употребил одно средство спасения с тем, чтобы вернуть себе сына. Шлёт он двух малосильных слуг из низшей касты: "Идите, найдите человека, который только что был тут, и наймите его от себя за двойную подённую плату, пусть работает работу у меня. Если же спросит, какую работу, скажете – будешь вместе с нами убирать отбросы. Оба находят бедняка и нанимают его, как сказано. И вот те оба вместе с бедняком, получая двойную подённую плату от богатея, убирают отбросы у жилища

его. Жильё же им устроено в соломенной хижине у самого дома богатея. Тот наблюдает из окна, как сын его убирает отбросы, и премного дивится. И выходит он из дома своего, и сняв с себя ожерелья и украшения, свои чистые, удобные и богатые одежды, надевает грязные одежды, берёт в правую руку корзину, обильно посыпает себя пылью и, издали подавая знаки сыну, идёт к нему и говорит так: "Вот, возьмите-ка корзины и немедля принимайтесь счищать всю грязь."[1] Так удаётся ему найти способ обратиться и к сыну. И говорит он сыну тогда так: "Работай, человече, работу, что тебе дана, не ходи никуда, а я уж заплачу тебе щедро. Коли будет тебе чего надобно, проси у меня, не робея, будь то большой сосуд или малый сосуд, котелок для варки, деревянная мера, деньги на соль, еда или одежда. Вот моя изношенная одежда, буде она тебе годится, проси, я тебе отдам. Какая утварь тебе ни нужна, я дам тебе. Будь покоен, человече, будь со мной, как со своим отцом. Почему? Стар я, ты же молод, много ты уже сделал мне добра, убирая отбросы, да сколько ты у меня на службе, не видел и не вижу я у тебя ни злобы, ни хитрости, ни изворотливости, ни гордыни, ни лживости. И не видел я у тебя вовсе, человече, никаких пороков, какие вижу я у других своих людей. С сегодняшнего дня будешь ты мне как родной сын."

С тех пор, Блаженный, домохозяин называет бедняка своим сыном, а бедняк, живя с ним, знает отныне, что такое отец. Так вот сын, о котором домохозяин тосковал и которого он мучительно ждал, вынужден им работать у него работу, убирать отбросы целых двадцать лет, и все двадцать лет живёт он там в покое и доверии, уходит и приходит, когда угодно, хотя жильё ему устроено в соломенной хижине.

Проходит, Блаженный, какое-то время и домохозяин чувствует, что подступает к нему болезнь, видит, что близка его смерть, и говорит он бедняку: "Побудь со мной, человече. Вот, у меня видимо-невидимо золота, горы золота, сундуки мои полны золотых монет, хлебные закрома мои полнятся зерном, я же болен смертельно, и хочется мне, чтобы знал ты, кому те богатства пойдут, откуда они, куда употребить их. В чём тут дело? Как я владелец всех богатств, так и ты их хозяин, и не погубишь ты и малой доли их."

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[1] Видимо, отец обращается не только к сыну, но и ко всем работникам, так как в тексте употреблено множественное число: *vahantu bhavantaḥ piṭakāni mā tiṣṭhata harata pāṃsūni.*

Так, Блаженный, узнал бедняк об обилии золота, о горах золота, о сундуках полных золотых монет, о хлебных закромах, полнящихся зерном, принадлежащих домохозяину, но не взалкал он отцовых богатств, не вознамерился он завладеть ими, будь то хоть щепотка муки, а продолжал ютиться в соломенной хижине и думать думы, какие думают бедняки. Домохозяин видит бедняка способным сберечь его богатства, зрелым, развитым, понимает, что тот, видя ею великолепие, был подавлен, мучался сознанием своей прежней бедности, стыдился её, отвращался ею. Зная близость своей смерти, призывает он своего сына, созывает он большое собрание своих родственников и говорит при царе, царских министрах, жителях города и страны так: "Слушайте же, почтенные! Вот мой родной сын, и рождён он мною. Пятьдесят лет тому, как ушёл он из такого-то города. Зовут его так-то, а меня зовут так-то. Чтобы отыскать его, пришёл я сюда. Он мой сын, а я его отец. Всё, чем я владею, отдаю ему, всё, что кровное моё, будет он считать своим." И, слыша такую речь, бедняк подивился и подумал: "Вот, нежданно-негаданно, отныне я – владелец всего – и золота, и золотых монет, и хлебных закромов полных зерном."

Мы, Блаженный, подобны сыновьям Татхагаты и так же говорит он нам, подобно домохозяину: "Вы дети мне." Мы же, Блаженный, мучимы страданием трёх видов. Каких же трёх? А вот каких: страданием от страдания; страданием, вызываемым преходящими впечатлениями; и страданием, вызываемым переменчивостью в существовании. К тому же в круговороте бытия связаны мы низкими устремлениями. Вот почему наставляет нас Блаженный на размышления о дхармах, столь же презренных, как и груда отбросов. Будучи наставленными, усиливаемся мы, не стремимся мы к ни к чему, кроме нирваны, как, если бы, Блаженный, то было ожидание нашей подённой платы. Обретя же нирвану, Блаженный, довольны мы весьма, ибо, думается нам, получили мы от Татхагаты много согласно нашим усилиям и устремлениям ради дхармических установлений Татхагаты. Знает ведь Татхагата о приверженности нашей к низким устремлениям, а зная о них, взирает он на нас бесстрастно, не навязывает ничего, не говорит нам: "Вот сокровищница знания Татхагаты и будет она ваша,"[2] и,

[2] Данные строки трудны для чтения и понимания (их проблематика обсуждается в словаре F. Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*, New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1972, s.v. *saṃbhinnatti*. Ср. чтение в издании H. Toda, *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra Central Asian Manuscripts: Romanized Text*, Tokushima: Kyoiku Shuppan Center, 1983 (SPK 112b7–113a1–2): *jānāti*

будучи сведущим в средствах спасения, Блаженный определяет нас наследниками в сокровищнице знания Татхагаты. Мы же не алчем этой сокровищницы знания Татхагаты, ибо знаем, что получили мы от Татхагаты много, и была то нирвана, подобная подённой плате. Мы, Блаженный, толкуем великосущностным бодхисаттвам благородное учение о дхарме, раскрываем его, показываем его и поясняем, но, Блаженный, не алчем его сами. Отчего же так? Оттого, что Татхагата искусом своим в средствах спасения знает наши устремления, мы же их не знаем, не понимаем, а Он как раз и утверждает, что мы дети Ему и тем самым Блаженный напоминает нам, о том, что мы наследники Его мудрости. Как же? Мы Ему дети, Блаженный, хоть и низки наши устремления. Когда Блаженный видит, как сильны наши низкие устремления, называет Он нас бодхисаттвами и тогда следует нам поступать, зная о двух должных вещах: наши устремления, как известно, низки, но мы перед ликом бодхисаттв, и нам должно возвысить их на путь к благородному просветлению. Ибо, зная силу наших низких устремлений, Блаженный изрёк учение и потому и мы сами говорим так: "Получено нами нежданно драгоценное всезнание, хотя и не алкали мы его, не жаждали, не стремились к нему, не искали приобщения к нему, не требовали его, а всё потому, что мы дети Татхагаты!""

В начале притчи – ученики Будды в той ситуации, когда они стали обладателями чуда – учения о дхарме –, но ещё не достигли полного просветления. В нарративной стратегии так осуществляется реминисценция неназываемых прямо размышлений, сопровождающих обрегение знания об учении.

Если ученики упоминают, впрочем достаточно противоречиво, о своей старости и немощи, следует, видимо, понимать, что достигнутое ими состояние умиротворения не исключает их неудовлетворения, связанного с их пребыванием вне сферы

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ca bhagavams tathā(gā)to 'smākaṃ hīnādhimukti(ka)nāṃ jñātvā cāsmakāṃ tatas tathāgata upekṣati na saṃbhindati na cākṣati yo 'yam tathāgatasya jñānarathakośa eṣaiva yuṣmākaṃ bhaviṣyatīti и ср. SPK 119a7–119b *tāñ cāsma lokacāriyo māhārsi upekṣati kālam avekṣamāna nā bhāṣate bhūtapadārthasandhim adhimuktim asmāka gameṣamāna* (последнее следует читать как KN 118.2 *gaveṣamāna*): "Учитель Вселенский, великий мудрец взирает на них бесстрастно, ожидая (должного) времени; не поясняет он связей в существующем, (ибо прежде) стремится он узнать нашу способность к пониманию."

желаний, в частности, желания обладать богатством, какое дается им вне ожиданий и просьб. Особо усилена тема обладания учением, но и тогда упоминается об инертном состоянии учеников, не стремящихся получить что бы то ни было от Учителя, о состоянии оцепенения и бездействия в отношении к дхарме и к тем сферам, где плод разнообразных "игр" бодхисатв и татхагат – их сверхчувственное явление. Всё же ученики наделены сознанием о предсказании их несравнимого ни с чем и совершенного Просветления в будущем – оно и составляет то бесценное богатство и то неизмеримое сокровище, какое, говорится на данном этапе повествования, равно факту доступною слуху гласа Будды (заметим, что еще ничего не сказано о природе богатства, которая будет раскрыта в притче несколько дальше). Состояние учеников предвосхищает состояние блудного сына, оказывающегося беспомощным в сходной ситуации. Такова преамбула притчи, гармонирующая с последующим изложением.[3]

Прозаическая версия тем более заслуживает внимания, что она содержит нарративные мотивы и дискурсивные фигуры, истолковывающие первые, которые снова используют сказанное в преамбуле. Слушателю (читателю) предлагается представить себе, что некий сын покидает отца и отправляется в далекие страны, где проводит годы: двадцать, тридцать, сорок, пятьдесят; неопределенность срока намеренна, так как она отвечает предположительной модальности всего повествования.[4]

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[3] Известны две версии притчи: тексту в прозе следует версифицированная версия (гатхи). Вопрос о первичности той или другой версии достаточно сложен, чтобы осуждаться в данной статье. Стоит заметить, что принятие именно версифицированной версии как исходной и более архаичной небесспорно, что однако принято в статье: H. Kruse, "The Return of the Prodigal Son. Fortunes of a Parable on its Way to the Far East", *Orientalia*, N.S., vol. 47, 1, 1978, pp. 163–214. Мной используется издание: H. Kern, B. Nanjio, Saddharmapuṇḍārīkasūtra (*Bibliotheca Buddhica*), Nachdruck der Ausgabe 1908–1912, Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970 (KN). Добавлю, что в свете последних работ немецких и японских исследователей приходится считать, что издание Керна и Нандзё небезупречно; однако именно оно общедоступно и потому здесь цитируется.

[4] Всё повествование представляет события в оптативе, хотя используются также индикатив и императив (два последних наклонения употребляются в прямой речи участников). Использование предположительного на-

Первый важный контраст положений состоит в том, что блудный сын беднеет, тогда как его отец богатеет. Притча подробно сообщает о золоте, серебре, ценных металлах, о рабах и рабочих в услужении отца; он тем более богат, что он отдаёт в рост в другие страны нажитое им. Его богатство неинертно, рост его прямо связан с усилиями и трудом: подобные мотивы будут неоднократно развиты и дальше.

Другой контраст отчётливо представлен в тот момент, когда отец и сын оказываются в одном городе. Важно, что отца все годы отсутствия сына занимала мысль о наследнике его состояния и что сын, появляясь у него, застаёт его окруженным брахманами, воинами, вайшьями и шудрами, и занятым подсчётом своих золотых монет: употреблено выражение KN 103.3 *vyavahāraṃ kurvan* «занятый делом, [подобающим] к человеку дела» (*vyavahārika*): тут следует видеть указание на отца, заботящегося о своём состоянии, и, согласно нарративному коду притчи, – о сохранении мудрости-знания-учения. Страх же сына перед богатством увиденного им двора[5] и ещё недогадывающегося о неотвратимости обладания этим богатством, желание его вернуться среди бедных и не быть посланным в работы, суть выражение конфликта между знающим отцом и незнающим сыном (как, к тому же, только отец *знает*, что перед ним именно его сын, тогда как последний не *знает* подлинного положения). Если сын, по требованию отца, радующегося

клонения, служащего для описания возможных в любом месте и в любое время ситуаций, вполне соответствует буддийской доктрине, как и другие средства, подчёркивающие универсальность наставления, выраженного в притче о сыне. Небезынтересно, что в двух буддийских традициях (в согдийской и хорезмийской) наблюдается переход от одного повествовательного времени к другому в пределах притч: настоящее время используется в их начале, но передача событий, имевших место вне фабулы притчи, ведётся в прошедшем времени (N. Sims-Williams, "On the Historic Present and Injunctive in Sogdian and Choresmian", *Münchener Studien zur Sprachwissenschaft*, 56, 1996, p. 174, n. 6).

[5] В статье Н. Квеллы (P. Kwella, "Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra, Kap. IV. Ein kulturübergreifendes Erzählmotiv", *XIX. Deutscher Orientalistentag*, hrsg. W. Voigt, Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1977, pp. 893, 896) великолепие отцовского жилища толкуется как свидетельство гностического источника буддийской притчи: речь идёт, по предположению автора, об одном из гимнов в деяниях апостола Фомы, в котором упоминается мотив посвящения царя, что должно позволить сближение между двором отца и царским дворцом.

наследнику своих владений, силою возвращён ко двору, то сын, сопротивляющийся посланникам, назван *mūrcchita* «омрачённый мирскими [вещами, ценностями, мешающими достижению духовных целей]»; если сын находится в жалком состоянии, названном *hīnādhimuktikatā* «состояние слабого понимания»,[6] то отец, опять-таки по логике контрастов, знает о своём высоком положении, описанном термином *udārasthāmatā* (*hīna* «низкий, слабый, малый» vs. *udāra* «высокий, сильный»).

Ещё из контрастов, отчётливо выраженных в притче следует отметить, что сын, занятый чёрной работой и оказывающийся в низком положении бедняка, противоположен богатому отцу в той мере, в какой он избегает ответственности войти во владение богатством буддийского знания, сопряжённого с обретением пути к нирване.

Важные вехи притчи иллюстрируются таким развитием повествования, в котором выявляется полярность положений отца и сына, уподобленная противоположности Будды и непросветленных учеников, из которых первый занимает высокое, а вторые – низкое положение. Насыщенное повторами изложение (при том, что повторы, выполняют свою изначальную функцию замедления повествования, известную во всякой устной традиции) утверждает концептуальную их ценность: они, как кажется, настоятельно преследуют цель установить серию тождеств, на которых основывается притча – тождество богатства и знания, бедности и губительного упрямства пребыть в невежестве.

Если читать притчу в ключе уподоблений, то слова учеников о их немощи и бегстве от эмпирического мира найдут эхо в уходе сына; молчание отца и нежелание открыть сыну и другим своё отцовство, его решение дать свободу своему уже опознанному сыну и связанные с этим мысли о невозможности передать свои богатства наследнику, – в бесстрастности Будды в отношении наследования своего мудрого знания и в его ненавязчивой позиции. Если сын испытывает страх, оказавшись у жилища богатея, – следует заключить, что несведущие испы-

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[6] О термине *adhimukti* см. статью Y. Kurumiya, "Adhimukti in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra", *Indological and Buddhist Studies in Honour of Professor J. W. de Jong*, Canberra: Faculty of Asian Studies, 1982, pp. 337–351.

тывают страх перед содержательным и трудноприемлемым для них богатством знания, каким располагает Будда, так же, как узнавая о потере чувств (KN 104.7–8 *sa mūrcchito dharaṇyām prapatet* «омрачённый, он, представим, падает наземь»), то есть о потере *сознания* сыном, схваченным погоней, слушатель притчи должен был понимать, что сопротивляться в ситуации, когда предлагается новое знание – удел тех, кто опасается перемен в своих привычках и навыках, как и поступает сын, разгребающий отбросы и пользующийся доверием отца, но продолжающий ночлежить в соломенной хижине.

Доктринальные основы притчи и нарративный материал

Аналогии, сравнения[7] и повторы, как и контрасты, составляют приёмы представления учения в притче.

Так, преамбуле симметрично соответствуют заключительные размышления учеников, где Будда уподоблен рачительному домохозяину.

Ученики в состоянии инерции и общей вялости сопоставляются с сыном, устрашенным сознанием необратимости положения сына, в итоге вынуждаемого принять отцовское наследство. Годы молчания в отсутствие сына и безразличие отца, отпускающего сына до найма на работу находят параллель в состоянии Будды, знающего о неразвитости понимания у учеников и при том взирающего на них с равнодушием, ничего ненавязывающего им и до времени неоткрывающего, что им уготовано сокровище, которое и составляет буддийское учение.

Если нирвана сравнивается с подневной платой сыну, то очевидна и роль заключительных рассуждений притчи: ученики, говорящие о своей инертности и отсутствии всяких желаний, нестремящиеся овладеть учением и в то же время получающие его и называющие себя при том детьми Татхагаты (т.е. просто-

[7] Из сравнений особенно важно в доктринальном смысле сравнение, завершающее диалог отца и сына: бедняку следует рассматривать хозяина *как если бы то был его отец* (KN 106.14 *yādṛśas te pitā tādṛśas te 'ham mantavyah*), сравнение, которое будет повторено учениками в приложении к самому Будде.

душными и незнающими), должны быть уподоблены блудному сыну.

Прагматическая цель повторов состоит в настойчивом выявлении полярности основных персонажей повествования: богатый отец и бедный сын; отец, обогащающийся благодаря своему труду[8] и вложениям своих доходов, и сын, остающийся бедным в своей скитальческой жизни. Повторы, как мне кажется, небесцельны и едва ли обязаны своим происхождением интерполяциям и прерванной традиции, порождающей текст на основе уцелевших гетерогенных фрагментов. Косвенным аргументом в пользу такого вывода является факт, что притча завершается прямым отождествлением материальных богатств и учения, усиленным в утверждениях учеников.

Следует особенно подчеркнуть последнее. Если в преамбуле говорится, что ученики, хотя и обладая знанием о ценности учения и его познания, первоначально полагают, что они вне сферы желаний, то в их самоописании это представлено их немощью, а в тексте притчи – нежеланием блудного сына войти во владение богатствами отца и его стремлением остаться в состоянии бедности, т.е. незнания учения и пассивности в отношении к нему. Весь нарративный материал и условная риторика притчи сконцентрированы на представлении учения, подлинного богатства, которого одновременно жаждут и опасаются. Основной чертой такого кодирования содержания притчи является конкретность в изображении состояния отца, что отчётливо согласуется, но и контрастирует с характеристиками учения и пользы его знания и приложения. Быть может, единственным интерполированным фрагментом (или позднейшим дополнением?) надо считать заключительные слова учеников, формулирующие буддийские истины вне всякой условности (см. о страданиях трёх видов в тексте притчи).

Если богатства отца трактуются в перспективе наследования, то необходимо вспомнить, что перенос и дарование благ в буддизме (от одного лица другому, от мирян Будде или мона-

[8] Вряд ли разумно видеть в мотивах обогащения отца "буржуазную" или "профанную" ноту, как то хотел бы П. Квелла (p. 895). В перспективе притчи скорее стоит отметить, что обогащение связано именно с помещением вовне, т.е. с распространением, богатств, иначе говоря, учения, подлинного богатства отца.

шеской общине) не сводятся к обычному перемещению благ, но наделяются религиозным смыслом, состоящим в том, что даятель, получатель и возможное в этой конфигурации третье лицо (посредник) обретают кармические заслуги.[9] Отец, хотя и ненавязывающий своё состояние сыну, заботится о его наследовании (иначе говоря, об использовании накопленных благ); в то же время он предлагает сыну помощь и благодетельное присутствие (что кодировано и отсылкой к *подобию* отцовства, но, замечу, не к факту биологического отцовства): такое развитие притчи имеет целью, надо думать, утверждения двух параметров буддийской доктрины: необходимость раздела благ в пользу второго лица, что обещает сохранение и перенос позитивной кармы, с одной стороны, и требование обеспечить передачу учения во времени, с другой стороны. Так сочетаются и взаимно поддерживаются конкретный план повествования и его доктринальный смысл.

Опасения и страх сына как модус отношения к отцовскому наследству неслучайны в ходе повествования. Оба состояния упоминаются в различных конфигурациях: в момент первого появления возвратившегося сына, ещё отчётливее при его поимке служителями отца, когда он опасается быть отданным в работы, и, наконец, в ослабленном виде, в факте отказа сына ночлежить в доме отца, несмотря на утверждение отцовства и поиск доверия (*śraddhā*, см. выше) со стороны отца. Поучительны следующие разночтения: KN 107.7–8 *daridrapuruṣas tasya gṛhapater niveśane viśrabdho*[10] *bhaven niṣkramaṇapraveśe tatraiva ca kaṭapalikuṇcikāyāṃ vāsaṃ kalpayet* отмечает негативную позицию

[9] Более обширный материал, включая ведийские истоки буддийского ритуализма, представлен в моей статье, "La dakṣiṇā dans le Ṛgveda et le transfert de mérite dans le bouddhisme", *Indological and Buddhist Studies in Honour of Professor J. W. de Jong*, Canberra: Faculty of Asian Studies, 1982, pp. 393–414. См. более недавнюю работу, в которой автор ссылается на мои наблюдения: G. Schopen, "Bones, Stones, and Buddhist Monks", *Collected Papers on the Archeology, Epigraphy, and Texts of Monastic Buddhism in India*, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997, ch. X "On Avoiding Ghosts and Social Censure: Monastic Funerals in the Mūlasarvāstivāda-Vinaya", n. 43, pp. 229–230.

[10] Термин *viśrabdha* предполагается относящимся к этимологическому гнезду *śraddhā* (M. Mayrhofer, *Kurzgefasstes etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindischen*, II, Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1976, p. 388).

сына: "(хотя) бедняку в жилище домохозяина будет (уготовано) доверие, (касающееся) входа и выхода, он будет устраивать себе ночлег в соломенной хижине;" версифицированный вариант притчи более ясно выражает доктринальный смысл доверия: KN 117.3–4 *śāntāḥ kila sarv'imi dharma nāsravā nirodhautpādavivarjitāś ca / na cātra kaścid bhavatīha dharmo evaṃ tu cintetva na bhoti śraddhā* "Все эти дхармы в состоянии покоя, они ничем незапятнаны, они не исчезают и не возрождаются; тут по существу и нет никакой дхармы; (не) постигнув этого, нет и доверия."[11]

Обращают на себя внимание и два вида представления мотива передачи богатства отцом: одно связано с желанием отца утвердить сына наследником, второе осуществляет это желание в присутствии родственников, царя и его министров,[12] но при знаменательной смене наименований: с одной стороны, гатхи словами отца уточняют, что отныне «сын (...) во владении высокого знания» (KN 115.3 *udārasaṃjñābhigato... putraḥ*), тогда как речь идёт именно о богатстве; с другой стороны, это знание-богатство передаётся отцом, называющим себя «Таким-то», как и сын назван «Таким-то» (KN 108.9–10 *amuko nāmaiṣa nāmnāham apy amuko nāma*) – можно думать, что именно посредством указательных местоимений, относящихся к любому денотату, достигается анонимность персонажей и универсальность положений, как и всеобщность буддийских истин (что должно подразумеваться, в частности, и неопределённостью времени отсутствия сына, см. выше). Уместно напомнить в этой связи о поразительно близких мотивах анонимности и универсальности, проницательно вскрытых В. Н. Топоровым в картине Рембрандта «Возвращение блудного сына» (мне известна их передача из выступления Т. В. Цивьян, напечатанном в сборнике *Текст и комментарий. Круглый стол к 75-летию Вячеслава Всеволодовича Иванова*, Москва:

[11] Перевод, предлагаемый в издании H. Kern, *The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka or the Lotus of the True Law*, Delhi–Varanasi–Patna: Motilal Banarsidass, 1965, p. 11, существенно отличен от моего: "All these laws are faultless, unshaken, exempt from destruction and commencement; but there is no law in them. When we hear this, however, we cannot believe." Было бы интересно знать, каковы веские аргументы в пользу перевода Керна, который мне представляется произвольным.

[12] Что и даёт ещё один повод видеть тут окаменевшие следы посвящения на царство согласно гипотезе, высказанной в статье П. Квеллы (p. 895).

Наука, 2006, стр. 41–42): "в картине Рембрандта [...] история блудного сына продолжает оставаться незаконченной, открытой, о чём и оповещает нас взгляд свидетеля, направленный на сына [...]. Сама открытость истории блудного сына допускает думать, что, может быть, эта история не только о том имяреке, который сейчас припал к груди отца, но и о *каждом*, кто может очутиться в подобной ситуации, о каждом *отце*, даже если этот каждый отец не подозревает, что эта история о нём самом."[13]

Наконец, несколько слов о последних строчках притчи, предшествующих её верифицированному варианту. Как и начальные строки, они полностью отвечают фигуративной риторике всего текста. Так, ученики Будды называют себя «подобными сыновьям Татхагаты» (KN 108.16 *putrapratirūpakās tathāgatasya*), что соответствует словам отца, представляющего своё биологическое отцовство в виде условного отцовства. Вслед тенденции мены наименований конечная цель учеников – нирвана – уподобляется ежедневной плате (KN 109.3–4, 9 *divasamudra*), составляющей очевидную аналогию плате, получаемой сыном, занятым работой в доме отца. Кажется несомненным, что заключение притчи в концептуальном отношении обладает тем же весом, что и основной её текст.

Надо думать, что противоречия, которыми отмечены слова учеников о их нежелании обрести знание, их утверждения о незнании и непонимании учения оправданы только необходимостью, подтвердить, в согласии с общей конфигурацией нарративного материала об отце и сыне, то, что составляет сущность и общее смысловое задание притчи: духовное отцовство Будды в отношении к ученикам.[14]

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[13] Т.В. Цивьян ссылается на недоступную мне статью В. Н. Топорова "Фигура-функция 'свидетеля' у Рембрандта" в сб. *Введение в храм*, М., 1997, стр. 344–365.

[14] Интересно что кашгарская версия текста содержит уточнение, касающееся усилий с целью сохранения сокровища, какое составляет дхарма, и состояния бедности, в котором находятся ученики. Даже допуская лакунарность текста, ссылка на основное противопоставление притчи довольно очевидна: см. SPK 18b 4–5 *daridracintā(m) ca vi(ci)ntayāma viśrāmyantā ima buddhakośam* «отдаваясь своим мыслям бедных, усиливаемся мы (обрести) сокровище Просветления»; к лексическому составу строки ср. сказанное о сыне KN 108.6 *paurvikayā daridracintayārtiyantah* «мучимый мыслью о своей бедности.»

Евангельская параллель или исторический источник?

В мою задачу не входит решение вопроса об источнике буддийской притчи, который некоторые авторы хотели бы видеть в Евангелии от Луки (15.11–32). Представляется более важным указать специфическое содержание буддийскою повествования, в своём развитии полностью отвечающее буддийскому менталитету.

Основные черты евангельской притчи таковы (я ссылаюсь на текст синодального издания Нового Завета).

Младший сын некоторого отца получает следующую ему часть отцовского имения, уходит в дальнюю сторону; живя распутно, расточает своё имение; оказываясь в нужде, решает пойти к отцу и признать, что согрешил против неба и перед ним и тем самым недостоин называться его сыном, а должен быть принят в число наёмников; увидел его отец и сжалился: "(…) принесите лучшую одежду (…), приведите откормленного телёнка и заколите: станем есть и веселиться. Ибо этот сын мой был мёртв и ожил, пропадал и нашёлся" (15.20–24). Ответ отца на гнев старшего сына, никогда непреступавшего его приказаний, повторяет эту мотивировку (15.32), тогда как мораль притчи выражена следующими словами: "на небесах более радости будет об одном грешнике кающемся, нежели о девяноста девяти праведниках, не имеющих нужды в покаянии" (15.7).

По существу только мотивы ухода и возвращения сына в дополнение к мотиву расточаемого богатства оказываются общими для буддийской и евангельской притчи. Функции же каждого мотива, сходных лишь поверхностно, в обоих текстах достаточно различны.

Возвращение сына в буддийском тексте случайно и имеет место в итоге его бесцельных странствий (в известном противоречии с этим оказывается мысль отца о добровольном возвращении сына, что, возможно, было необходимо для утверждения свободного выбора в судьбе). Возвращение блудного сына в евангельской притче продиктовано необходимостью выживания.

Если в буддийской версии отцовское богатство – предмет опасений сына, блудный сын возвращается именно в поисках благосостояния.

Отец, метафорически представляющий Будду, передаёт сыну в наследство всё своё состояние, тогда как в Евангелии сыну достаётся лишь часть отцовских богатств.

Наконец, если в буддийском тексте сын избегает овладения богатством и стремится к бедности, в евангельском тексте блудный сын возвращается с тем, чтобы стать наёмником у отца и избежать голодной смерти.

Последнее замечание касается хронологии, справедливо утверждаемой Бешемом, который считает, что Сутра Благого Лотоса существовала задолго до христианской эры и что, следовательно, евангельская притча не может быть признана источником буддийской притчи. Согласно этому автору речь идёт об общем развитии религиозной мысли и о тождественном опыте в двух различных культурах. Расхождения и поверхностные сходства обеих версий поучительны, полагает Бешем: именно последнее заставило меня заново проанализировать буддийское повествование. Лишь одно замечание Бешема вызывает возражение: он допускает, что ошибка сына в буддийской притче в его отказе воспользоваться положением, которое позволяет обрести духовные заслуги (spiritual merit, p. 162). Мне же думается, что нельзя забывать, что в притче речь идёт прежде всего о конкретных материальных благах, которые представляют на правах знаковой ипостаси сокровище учения.

The Parable of the Lost Son (From the Sutra of the Lotus of True Dharma)

Boris Oguibénine

Abstract

The paper deals with a tale found in the fourth chapter of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra*, known as the Parable of the Lost Son. The Sanskrit text is translated in Russian (this appeared to be useful, since no Russian translation has been made until now) and fol-

lowed by a commentary uncovering the profound meaning of the parable. Some considerations are given regarding the presumably analogous tale found in the New Testament (Luke 15.11–32): it is argued that the Buddhist tale could not have been inspired by the Christian tale, nor could the reverse be true, as both texts belong to two different traditions and use the wandering adventures of the son in two quite distinct perspectives.

The *Dam pa'i chos pad ma dkar po'i mdo* and its Central Asian Manuscript Fragments: A Reappraisal

Sunitikumar Pathak

Dam pa'i chos pad ma dkar pa'i mdo (PDM)

According to the *Ka tan dkar chag*, the *PDM* (Toh. 113), its commentary *Dam pa'i chos pu nda ri kar 'grel pa* (Toh. 4017) have been rendered into Tibetan during the *snga dar* (7–9th centuries CE). In collaboration with Kashmirian Surendrabodhi, Sna nam ye shes sde, translated the root text, and its commentary was translated by an anonymous translator. The commentator of the sutra was Pṛthvībandhu (T. Sa'i rtsa lag). Tārānātha in his *Rgya gar chos 'byung*[1] referred to Sa'i rtsa lag as a contemporary of Śīlabhadra at Nālanda.

The *PDM* (*Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra* in its Indian original) in the *Bka' 'gyur* is preserved in the general section of *mdo sde*, while Nepalese traditions count the *PDM* as a *Vaipulya-sūtra* class (T. *shin tu rgyas pa'i mdo sde*).[2] The Chinese catalogue preserves this sutra under the Nirvāṇa class of the Mahāyāna-sūtras (大乘經的涅盤部 *da sheng jing de nie pan bu*).[3]

Academics involved in Buddhist studies have varying opinions about the *PDM* due to its confusing contents and structure.[4] An attempt reappraises the *PDM* in spite of numerous published works since the nineteenth century. In this regard no adequate study of its

[1] *Taranatha's History of Buddhism in India*. Eng. tr. Lama Chimpa & Alaka Chattapadhya (1993: 261).

[2] Winternitz 1993: 283.

[3] Nanjio, B. *A Catalogue of the Chinese Tanslation of the Buddhist Tripitaka* (1989: 44–46; Serial Nos. 134, 136, 137, 138, 139).

[4] Dutt 1986: 1f.

Tibetan materials in the *Ka tan* has yet been undertaken. The finds of manuscript fragments of the *PDM* from Central Asia are important, although those finds belong to a later date than the early Chinese versions of the sutra.

Chinese versions of the PDM

(i) 265–376 CE.
Two renderings of the *PDM* had been attempted; i.e. the 薩曇分陀利經 *Sa tan fen tuo li jing*, by the translator, whose name has been lost; this appears to be an earlier translation than the 正法華經 *Zheng fa hua jing* by Fahu (Dharmarakṣa) belonging to the Tunguan (the Western region adjacent to the Great Wall of China).

(ii) 384–417, the later Jin Dynasty.
The third rendering of the *PDM* was made by Kumārajīva of Karashar under the title 妙法蓮華經 *Miao fa lian hua jing*, which became an important source in the growth of the *Tiantai* Lotus School of Chinese Buddhism.

(iii) 589–618, the Sui Dynasty.
Jñānagupta of Gāndhāra and Dharmagupta from a state of Southern India translated the *PDM* with its additional chapters and passages in the 添品妙法蓮華經 *Tian pin miao fa lian hua jing*. This was completed in 601. The introductory note of the said version in Chinese examines the growth of the *PDM* during several stages. (See Appendix A.)

Its Chinese versions show that the *PDM* was compiled using multiple ideas that arose in different Buddhist seats inside India and abroad since the Vaiśalī council area in the 4th century BCE.

Diverse Contents of the Compilation

The contents of the *PDM* may appear in successive order, although the sutra manual opens in the same tone as 'Thus I heard' (Chapter I). The sutra is arranged as follows:

(i) The scope of the *PDM* was to elucidate the expedience of the Buddha, using illustrations and analogies (Chapters II, III, Appendix A for chapter divisions).

(ii) The categories of recluses for spiritual advancement fall under two headings: (a) un-equipped and (b) equipped for 'becoming' a bodhisattva, 'elect being' towards the enlightenment or 'bodhi' (Chapters I, IV, and VI). Instances of the individual recluses were cited for objectivity, referring to their previous conduct with strong determination (Chapters VII to IX).

(iii) After being equipped with requisite efficiency, an elect being bodhisattva would undergo to offer succour to those who had been floating on the ocean of suffering. Thereby these efficient ones would possess the status of Tathāgata (Chapters XIII, XIV & XX).

(iv) As a physician becomes capable of diagnosing illnesses, the Tathāgata Buddha achieves that power of expedience by dint of antecedents, including donations, moral precepts, tolerance, vigour, mental concentration and wisdom par excellence (Chapters V, XX, XXII to XXV). Thereby the scope of becoming innumerable Bodhisattvas and Buddhas can be revealed (Chapters XVI and XIX). Thus the ideal of selfless altruistic service becomes the objective of human life, with the goal of achieving the status of Buddhahood for all individuals (XXVI). The *Dhāraṇī-mantra* (Chapt. XXI) is included herein.

(v) It is thus that the highest status of Buddhahood, *samyaksaṃbodhī* (T. *yang dag par rtog pa am yang dag par khan du chub pa*), comes within reach. The sutra is entitled 'the Lotus of the True Law', and it aims to cleanse the individual who is in a muddy state of ignorance. The last chapter (XXVII) concludes what is contained in the second chapter on the Buddha's expedience. The objective of the sutra is clearly expressed as the declaration that Buddhism is one; its plurality is apparent in order to accommodate the multitude.[5] This requires popular dissemination (Chapters X–XII & XVIII).

[5] Tibetan *theg pa* equivalent to Skt. *yāna* has more than one meaning in contextual variations.

The *DPM* may be regarded as a mirror that reflects the historical growth of Buddhism in the millennium since its inception. Buddhism becomes a faith of the multitude with no discrimination on the basis of colour and sex. Such a broad diaspora came into being when the Buddhists of the Pātaliputra Council welcomed the missionary spirit of the Buddha for the welfare of the many. Buddhist missionaries thereafter made efforts to spread the Buddha's sayings outside the then India into the neighbouring countries belonging to the Ionians, an ethnic branch of the Greco-Bactrians of Asia Minor[6] and the Scythians, who were regarded as '*Yona*' in Pāli, corresponding to the Sanskrit *Yavana*. This was *Yonarattha* (in Pāli), the kingdom of the Ionians and Bactrian Greeks.[7]

The Mahāyāna developed in Yonarattha

Historically speaking, Alexander's invasion (327–325 BCE) up to the northwest *Bhārata-varśa*, along with his expansion of military power in what was then West Asia, had an impact on cultural synergy among the local peoples. The Buddhist missionaries who had been entrusted to spread the teachings of the Buddha among the inhabitants of the northwestern neighbouring countries faced new environs as and when they came in touch with the neighbouring peoples of *Yonarattha*.[8]

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[6] A. L. Basham (1954) in *The Wonder That Was India* pointed out that the Bactrian Greeks belonged to the Asiatic Greeks. They invaded the Iranian Governor of Parthia by the middle of the 3rd century BCE.

[7] Dareios in his Naqs-e-Rustom inscription referred to multiple provinces belonging to different peoples in the adjoining West Asia: Mada (Media), Sasiana, Paroava (Parthia), Haraiva (Areia), Baxtris (Bactria), Sugada (Sogdiana), Xuvarazmis (Chorasmia), Zranka (Drangiana), Haraxuvatis (Arachosia), Oattagus (The Suttagyde), Saka-haumavarka (Hauma-preparing Saka), Saka tigra Xauda (Saka with pointed caps), 13. Saka tyaity taradariya (Sakas resided on the other side of the Ocean, i.e. the Caspian Sea, which was the natural boundary separating Asia from Europe in ancient times); see Ghosh 1957: 169f.

[8] *Yonarattha* or *Yonaloka* in Pāli may be the area where the Greeks (Hellenic and Ionian) settled following Alexander's invasion, including Alexandria of Caucacus (Kapisa). *Dīpavaṃsa* VIII, 9; *Mahāvaṃsa* XII, 5, 39, *Saṃta-pasadika* (Nālanda edu.) I, 55, 58, 59, record that Yonaka Dhamma-rakkhita was deputed to Aparantaka, and Mahārakkhita was dispatched to Yonaloka. They are

The Iranians also, who might have had some link to the ancient Vedic people since the third millennium BCE,[9] developed a different cultural tradition as professed by Zarathustra (circa 1000 BCE). Zarathustra innovated six moral values called *amesha spenta*, like 1. *vahumana*, broad thought for the welfare of many; 2. *asha*, ethical integrity; 3. *khshathra*, divine transcendental power showered from above; 4. *arsmiti*, faith in divinity; 5. *haurvatal*, surrounding totality; 6. *amerelot*, the quest for immortality.[10]

The inhabitants of Ionia and the Seleucid Hellenic Greeks, who inherited and continued their regime up to the Christian era, inherited the legacy of the ancient peoples of Crete, the Greek mainland, Macedonia and adjoining areas. The Ionians and the Greco-Bactrians used to pay regards to the physical items in nature around humans, such as trees, rocks, rivers, etc., and they used to worship the symbolic manifestations of deities like Zeus, Apollo, Athena, etc. in religious ceremonies.[11]

The Buddhist missionaries explained their rational ethics to them with the Buddhist principle of cause(s) and effect(s) to determine the changeable reality in phenomena surrounding humans. A tendency of accommodating the flexibility of the Buddhist missionaries with the heterogeneous people having a respective strong cultural background gave Buddhism an unprecedented status for a greater number of people – *Mahāyāna*.[12] The *PDM* presents this in several chapters, and it is generally epitheted as popular Buddhism,[13] in contrast to early monastic Buddhism. The sutra represents the compilation of Arhathood, Bodhisattvahood and Buddhahood with a tendency towards compromise and adjustment. Multiethnic peoples obtained a unique forum to be under a common banner that is named *Mahāyāna*, the Great Vehicle to accommodate a larger number of peoples. A focus on the Mahāyānic

said to have succeeded in disseminating Buddhism among a large number of people there.

[9] The Mittani War (c. 1400 BCE) may have been the cause of the split between the orthodox Iranians and liberal Vedic people.

[10] *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, Hastings; see the relevant sections.

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] Nāgārjuna in his *Mahāyānavimśaka*, ed. Vidhushekhar Bhattacharya, Visva Bharati, 1929, mentioned the significant characteristics of Mahāyāna.

[13] Dutt 1930: 44.

trend in compromise with the least sectarian and ethnic divergences may be traced in the Bamiyan images and paintings.[14]

Arrival of Buddhism in Central Asia

The finds of multiple fragments of Sanskrit and Prakrit manuscripts from Central Asia has opened a new dimension in Buddhism for about a century. The fragments of the *PDM* become significant here. The Buddhist missionaries crossed the Gobi desert of Central Asia along two caravan routes together with multiethnic traders. The *PDM* manuscript fragments have already been studied by their European exponents, as stated in brief.

(i) Three separate fragments of the *PDM* had been excavated by Sir Aurel Stein at the Khadalik site, not far from Lau Lan.[15] They had been identified by Rudolf Hoernle[16] of Calcutta. Later, H. Luders[17] and F. W. Thomas[18] examined them critically. The presumed date of the calligraphic writings may be the 5th–6th centuries CE.

(ii) The fragments of the *PDM* collected by the Russian explorers have been examined by N. Theodre Petrovski.[19] In comparison with the *PDM* Nepali manuscripts preserved in Europe he remarked poignantly that the fragments appeared 'more Prakritisms and expressions incorrectly translated into Sanskrit'.[20] Critically speaking, those fragments preserved the earlier stage of the *PDM* than that recorded in the Nepalese *PDM* edition from the 11th century.[21]

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[14] Bagchi 1955: 94; Litvinsky 1956: 88–89.

[15] Stein 1932.

[16] Hoernle 1899, 1901; Hoernle 1914: 132f, 138f.

[17] Luders 1912.

[18] Thomas 1952.

[19] Kern 1884.

[20] H. Luders, A. R. Hoemle and N. D. Mironov examined the patterns of their calligraphic scripts in relation to the Prākrit language of the fragments of manuscripts, to determine the probable dates of each bundle of manuscripts.

[21] Same as note no. 4 above; see Dutt 1986.

(iii) Turkish-Uighur version of the *PDM*

The Kuan-ši-im Puskar[22] edited by W. Radloff from St Petersburg (1911) speaks of the popularity of the *PDM* among the Central Asians. Prior to that, Khotan[23] had became an important Buddhist seat when the caravan trade routes had flourished in and since pre-Christian days. Mahāyāna Buddhism had been practiced there, and it later reached China through Buddhist missionaries. The monograph preserves some fragments of the *PDM* on Avalokiteshvara, the *Rājavavāda-sūtra*. The finds discovered by Zakov from Turfan became significant materials.

Buddhism had reached Central Asia before Christ, and flourished through centuries in spite of repeated interference by the Nestorians and Manicheans, Jews, Zoroastrians, and later by the Muslims.

Gilgit Manuscripts of the PDM

Under the patronage of Maharaja Hari Singh, about 45 leaves of the *PDM* have been discovered. Some of them are both broken and unreadable.[24] Gilgit in Kashmir (now in Pok) had been an important Buddhist centre, where a large portion of the *Mūla-sarvāstivāda-vinaya* was found.

Again, a few leaves (3) have also been collected by W. Baruch, who has studied them in connection with their calligraphic importance. He also compares the relevant Chinese versions in *Beitrage zum Saddharma pundarika Sutra*.[25]

Prior to that, a portion of the *PDM* had been noticed by La Vallee Poussain in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, London (1911). Nalinaksha Dutt elaborated this in his edition of the *PDM* (the Asiatic Society Calcutta, 1953). N. D. Mironov of Russia made efforts to edit a fragmentary portion of the *PDM* belonging to the Aurel Stein collection from Central Asia. The revised edition of the *PDM*

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[22] B. Nanjio referred to the Chinese version of the *PDM* for Avalokiteshvara.

[23] Stein 1903.

[24] Same as note no. 4 above introd. Gilgit Manuscript; see Dutt 1986: XI.

[25] Baruch 1938.

published in 1953 was more revealing than the *Bibliotheca Buddhica* edition prepared by H. Kern and B. Nanjio (1904).

Nucleus and extensions

(i) The Indian Buddhist traditions claim that the Buddha delivered the nucleus of the *PDM* while in a cave on Vulture Peak adjacent to Rājagṛha.[26]

(ii) Divergent source materials of the *PDM* already discussed leave room to hold that the sutra had been changed a number of times, and those were incorporated, as mentioned by Jñānagupta of Gandhāra and Dharmagupta of South India.

For instance, the metrical verses or *gātha* in chapters excepting XXIII, XXVI and XXVII should be referred. It has been suggested that those *gāthas* were occasionally used for recitations among the Buddhist communities. Luders opined that the *PDM* was originally in Prākrit. In contrast to the Sarvāstivādins, the Mahāsaṅghikas preferred Prākrit to preserve the Buddha's sayings as they deemed fit. Chapters XXI, XXII, XXV, however, have few *gāthas,* and these may be counted on the fingers. (Appendix)

(iii) Some divergence between the Nepalese manuscripts and the Tibetan version can be found. Again, the commentary by Pṛthvībandhu available in the Tibetan version does not appear to be convergent with the Tibetan version in the Kanjur (Toh. 113). In his revised edition of the *PDM* published by the Asiatic Society in Calcutta (1953), Nalinaksha Dutt referred to some variant portions.

(iv) A chapter on the *Dhāraṇī-mantra,* as usual, represents the sūtra-manual. The Sūtra and the Tantra in Mahāyāna have been supplementary, and there is no demarcation between them.[27]

From the above, the following deductions may be made:

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[26] Thomas Walters expressed doubt and remarked: "For pilgrims the *Saddharmapuṇḍarika-sūtra* and *Śūraṅgama-samādhi-sūtra,* composed long after the Buddha's decease, were his genuine utterance delivered in the circumstances set forth in their opening paragraph; Walters 1905, II, 152ff.

[27] Doboom Tulku 1984.

(i) The sutra form of the *PDM*, as the traditions corroborated by Xuanzang, might be in *gātha*, and the language was probably in mixed Sanskrit, having Prākrit usages to make it understandable to as many people as possible.

(ii) The *PDM* in its earlier phase might have been short enough in *gātha* metrical verses relating to the chapter III on comparison with similes. That portion might have relevance to the *Vatthūpama-sutta* in Pāli *Majjhima-nikāya*.

(iii) In order to elaborate the expedience (Chapter III, verses 111–112) as adoptable for the preservation of the Doctrine after the demise the Buddha, the *PDM* laid emphasis on the One Vehicle Buddhayāna. In the spirit of the integration of three yānas – Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna and Mahāyāna, an attempt was made during the sequel of schisms.

(iv) The structure of the sutra in dialogue form, *dri lan pa'i lugs*, appears to be an old practice in the monastic order that prevailed among the Indians. Again, the practice of recital of the Doctrine *dharmabhāṇa* was popular among community members at gatherings. Here chapters X and XVIII are referred.

Resultantly, the *PDM* becomes important to provide requisite materials to introduce unalterable faith and devotion under any circumstances. An optimistic view of human life up to becoming Bodhisattvas and becoming Buddhas. In that respect, developed irrespective of sex and colour, the title of the sutra – the *White Lotus of the Good Law* becomes justified. A human being takes form from genetic mud, but excels like a white lotus due to his merit.

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Appendix

Variations in chapter title in the Chinese source materials available of the *Dam pa'i chos pad ma dkar po'i mdo* & *Puṇḍarīka 'brel pa* in Tibetan

SI No.	Title of Chapters	Remarks
1.	*nidāna-parivarta* (*p*) Introductory Chapter (K) about the occasion of deliverating the sutra *gleng gzhi le'u dang po*	No variation in name, though the contents are in different readings in *CV* I, II, III, IV, V. Sanskrit ms. fragment finds edited by N. D. Mironov (=M) differ from the Nepali mss. edited by Kern & N. Dutt. The Tibetan Commentary *CTV* elaborates this chapter in three *bam po*(s).
2.	*upāyakauśalya-parivarta* Expedient Skilfulness *thabs mkhas pa'i le'u*	*CTV* 4th & 5th *bam po.*
3.	*aupamya-parivarta* A Parable (K) *dpe'u le'u*	*CTV* 6th *bam po* *CV*(s) agree
4.	*adhimukti-parivarta* Disposition to the Liberation *mos pa'i le'u*	*CV*s agree *CTV* title *dad pa'i le'u*
5.	*oṣadhi-parivarta* *sman gyi le'u*	*CV*(s) agree *CTV sman gyi ci shing las dpe bstan pa'i le'u*
6.	*vyākaraṇa-parivarta* Announcement of Future Destiny (of the Buddha's teachings) *nyan thos lung bstan pa'i le'u*	*CV*(s) agree *CTV sman gyi ci shing las dpe bstan pa'i le'u*
7.	*pūrvayoga-parivarta* Ancient Devotion *sngon gyi sbyor ba*	*CV*(s) agree *CTV sngon byung ba'i le'u 'chad*

Sl No.	Title of Chapters	Remarks
8.	*pañcabhikṣuśata-vyākaraṇa-parivarta* Announcement of the Future Destiny of Five Hundred Monks *dge slong lnga brgya lung bstan pa'i le'u*	*CV*(s) agree *CTV* examines differently in brief
9.	*ānandarāhulādi-dvisahasra-bhikṣu-vyākaraṇa-parivarta* Announcement of Future Destiny of Ānanda, Rāhula and Other Two Thousand Monks *kun dga' bo dang sgra gtsan zin dang dge slong nyi ston lung bstan pa'i le'u*	*CV*(s) agree *CTV* agrees but in brief CTV dge slong nyis stong pa'i le'u
10.	*dharmabhāṇaka-parivarta* The Preacher *chos smra ba*	*CV*(s) agree *CTV* agrees
11.	*stūpasaṃdarśana-parivarta* Apparition of a Stupa *mchod rten bstan pa* *CTV rin po che'i mchod rten bstan pa'i le'u*	A. *CV* II, III, IV assembled in chapters *CV* 11 and 12 B. *CV* V keeps the 11th chapter separate C. Mss. fragment finds in Central Asia (Hoernle Ms. Nos. 148 and 253) cp. The Asiatic Society edn. 171–173
12.	*utsāha-parivarta* Exertion *spro bar bya ba*	A. *CV* II, III, IV chapter 13 B. *CV* V, chapter 12 C. Hoernle noted a difference in reading *CTV* omits the chapter
13.	*sukhavihāra-parivarta* Peaceful Life *bde bar gnas pa*	A. *CV* II, III, IV chapter 14 B. Nepali version of Chapter 13 is the same as the Sanskrit title reads D. *CTV* omits the chapter

Sl No.	Title of Chapters	Remarks
14.	*bodhisattva-pṛthivi-vivara-samudgama-parivarta* Emergence of Bodhisattva from the Gaps of the Earth (K) *byang chub sems dpa' sa ru gnas thon so*	A. Chapter 14 B. Same as Sanskrit title D. *CTV* omits the chapter
15.	*tathāgatasyāyus-pramāna-parivarta* Duration of Life of the Tathāgata *de bzhin gshegs pa'i slar tshe'i tshad*	A. Chapter 16 B. Same as Sanskrit title *CTV* omits
16.	*puṇyaparyāya-parivarta* (Exposition Merits) *rjes su yi rang ba'i bsod names bstan pa*	A. Chapter 17 B. Same as Sanskrit title C. Hoernle notes different reading *CTV* omits
17.	*anumodana-puṇya-nirdeśa-parivarta* Indication of Merits *rjes su yi rang ba'i bsod nams bstan pa*	A. Chapter 18 B. Same as Sanskrit title *CTV* omits
18.	*dharmabhāṇakānusaṃśā-parivarta* Advantage of the Preacher	A. Chapter 19 B. Same as Sanskrit title *CTV* omits Tibetan version (Toh. 113) translated by Surendrabodhi and Sna nam Yeshe sde reads the title *skye mched drug rnam par dag pa'i phan yon*
19.	*sadāparābhūta-parivarta* Account of Bodhisattva Sadāparābhūta *rtag tu brnyas pa*	A. Chapter 20 B. Same as Sanskrit title *CTV* omits
20.	*tathāgatarddhyābhisaṃskāra-parivarta* Conception of the Transcendent Power of the Tathāgatas (Kern) *de bzhin gshegs pa'i rdzu 'phrul mngon par 'du byed pa*	A. Chapter 21 B. Same as Sanskrit title *CTV* omits

Sl No.	Title of Chapters	Remarks
21.	*dhāraṇī-parivarta* Spells (Kern) *gzungs sngags*	A. *CV* III and IV chapter 26 B. *CV* II chapter 25 C. *CV* V chapter 21 *CTV* omits
22.	*bhaiṣajyarāja-pūrvayoga-parivarta* Ancient Devotion of Bodhisattva Bhaishajyarāja *sman gyi rgyal po'i sngon gyi sbyor ba*	A. *CV* III and IV chapter 23 B. *CV* IV and V agree in title *CTV* omits
23.	*gadgadsvara-parivarta / maṅgalasvara-parivarta* Kern omits its English rendering *sang sang po'i dbyangs* (The Voice of Submission)	A. *CV* III and IV chapter 24 B. and C. *CV* II and V agree in title *CTV* omits
24.	*samantamukha-parivarta* All Sided One *spyan ras gzigs dbang phyug gi rnam par 'phrul pa bstan pa*	A. *CV* II chapter 25 *CV* III chapter 25 (*gāthā* portions) additional in 4 fasc. B. *CV* V agree *CTV* omits
25.	*śubhavyūharāja-pūrvayoga-parivarta* Ancient Devotion Shubhavyuharāja (K) *rgyal po dge ba bkod pa'i sngon gi sbyor ba*	A. *CV* III and II chapter 27 B. *CV* IV chapter 26 *CV* V chapter 25 D. *CTV* omits
26.	*samantabhadrotsaha-parivarta* Encouragement of Samantabhadra *kun tu bzang spro bar bya ba*	A. *CV* III and IV chapter 28 B. *CV* II chapter 27 V chapter 26 *CTV* omits
27.	*anuparindana-parivarta* The Period (K) *yongs su gtan pa* (I leave for the period ahead)	A. *CV* III and IV chapter 22 B. *CV* II chapter 28 *CV* V chapter 27 *CTV* omits

Abbreviations:

CV I (Njio 134) 薩曇分陀利經 *Sa tan fen tuo li jing* (translator not mentioned), (Western) Jin Dynasty 265–316.

CV II (Njio. 138) 正法華經 *Zheng fa hua jing* (tr. Dharmarakṣa Zhu Fahu), Western Jin Dynasty 265–316; Sanskrit Mss. might have been from Khotan.

CV III (Njio 134) 妙法蓮華經 *Miao fa lian hua jing* (tr. Kumārajīva), Later Jin Dynasty 384–417.

CV IV (Njio 137) 妙法蓮華經觀世音菩薩普滿品 *Miao fa lian hua jing guan shi yin pu sa pu man pin* (Gāthās trn. Chapt. XXIV by Jñānagupta) Northen Zhou Dynasty 567–589.

CV V (Njio. 139) 添品妙法蓮華經 *Tian pin miao fa lian hua jing* (tr. Jñānagupta II and Dharmagupta); Sui Dynasty 585–618.

CTV Tibetan version of commentary ascribed to Sa'i rtsa lag (Toh. 4017) *dam pa'i chos pu ṇḍa ri ka'i 'grel pa*. The translator was from Sinhala (Sri Lanka).

Hoernle mss. *Manuscript Remains of Buddhist Literature found in Eastern Turkestan*. London, 1914.

Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra: A Discourse on Open-mindedness and Shock Treatment

Siddharth Singh

The *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra* is a masterpiece of the Mahāyāna Sūtras and, in various ways, unique also in the whole of the Buddha's teachings. The *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra* was produced sometime between the first century BCE and the first century CE. The time of the Chinese translation of the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra* has already been ascertained during 222 to 229 and Nāgārjuna, noted master of Buddhist philosophy, has also mentioned certain passages of the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra* in his *Sūtra-samuccaya*. In this case it can be said that the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra* had been created long before these two treatises, because it would have taken a long time for this Sanskrit text to become popular in India and, thenceforth, to arrive in China and be presented there in the form of a Chinese rendition.

Although the *Uggradattaparipṛcchā*, an early Discipline Sūtra composed before Nāgārjuna sets forth the five conditions for a layman to practice the way of Mahāyāna, the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra* deserves credit for laying the foundation of Laymen Buddhism for the first time in the history of Buddhism in an organized form, applying the philosophy of *śūnya* at the level of social thinking. It established an entire tradition of Laymen Buddhist texts in Mahāyāna. We find another text entitled the *Mahāvaipulya-mūrdharāja-sūtra* of the 2–3 century CE, which is an extension of the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra*, and in it a son of Vimalakīrti is substantially extolled. In the *Candrottarādārikā-vyākaraṇa-sūtra*, a daughter of Vimalakīrti named Candrottarā is a chief character who propounds Buddhist thoughts endorsed by the Buddha himself. *Śrīmālādevī-siṃhanāda-sūtra*, a treatise extremely revered in the Chinese and Japanese Buddhism, is a discourse delivered by a queen, a lay woman. Texts such as *Sumatidārikā-paripṛcchā* and

Upāsakapañcaśīlarūpa-sūtra may also be treated as an adherent of this tradition of Laymen Buddhism.

The central character of the text is a householder named Vimalakīrti, who belongs to the Licchavi clan of Vaiśālī. He is introduced in these words:

> "He wore the white clothes of the layman, yet lived impeccably like a religious devotee. He lived at home, but remained aloof from the realm of desire, pure matter and the immaterial. He had a son, a wife and female attendants, yet always maintained continence. He appeared to be surrounded by servants, yet lived in solitude. He appeared to be adorned with ornaments, yet was always endowed with the auspicious signs and marks. He seemed to eat and drink, yet always took nourishment from the taste of meditation."[1]

The Mahākāśyapa eulogizes him before the Buddha after having interaction with him:

> "Lord, when I heard this teaching, I was astonished and thought: 'Reverence to all Bodhisattvas! If a lay Bodhisattva may be endowed with such eloquence, who is there who would not conceive the spirit of unexcelled, perfect enlightenment? From that time forth, I no longer recommend the vehicles of the disciples and the solitary sages, but recommend the Mahāyāna."[2]

Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra is not a book that can be comprehended in terms of the meaning of lines, paragraphs or chapters. Such a reading of the text would be a futile effort. *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra* can only be understood in its entirety, through its central message, which is – *"Untie the knots of your mind"*. This is neither Hīnayāna, nor Mahāyāna. Both are also relative terms. Every object, every adjective, every thing is relative. Whatever is describable and worthy of being spoken of is relative. Even terms such as *śūnyatā* and *tathatā* are not sufficiently appropriate. The true and non-dual Dharma is free of syllables, sounds or ideas. The only expression of non-duality can be none other than silence. When Vimalakīrti asked different Bodhisattvas sent by the Lord about the nature of the non-dual Dharma, they elaborated it in their own way. Now,

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[1] Thurman, Robert A. F. (Tr.) *The Holy Teaching of Vimalakīrti*. Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass, 1991, pp. 20–21.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 27.

while it was the turn of Vimalakīrti himself, he remained silent, saying nothing at all. Mañjuśrī, at that very moment, exclaimed:

> "Excellent! Excellent, noble sir! This is indeed the entrance into the non-duality of the Bodhisattvas. Here there is no use for syllables, sounds, and ideas."[3]

The episode of the Vimalakīrti's exchange of ideas with the disciples of the Buddha is undoubtedly the most striking feature of the text. The *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra* presents an illustration of the meetings of the historically most eminent disciples and several other bodhisattvas with Vimalakīrti prior to Buddha's instruction to them to inquire into the health of the sick Vimalakīrti. None of them was eager to go to him, on the grounds of their previous account of their meeting with Vimalakīrti. The Buddha's disciples, including Śāriputra, Mahāmaudgalyāyana, Mahākāśyapa, Subhūti, Pūrṇamaitrāyaṇīputra, Mahākātyāyana, Aniruddha, Upāli, Rāhula, Ānanda, and others, as well as bodhisattvas like Maitreya and Jagatīmdhara, received direction from the Buddha one by one. They narrated the story of their previous meeting with Vimalakīrti. These narratives not only depict the extraordinary verbal skill and tremendous understanding of the heart of the Buddhist doctrines possessed by Vimalakīrti but are also a brilliant example of the shock treatment applied by Vimalakīrti in order to explain the true essence of Buddhism to them. At a glance, the words of Vimalakīrti seem to be disparaging towards them, but as a means of education, this method of Vimalakīrti's proves to be more striking than that of long discourses. One must keep in mind that, historically, the time of creation of the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra* was the period when there were numerous Buddhist sects and schools of thought in India. Each of these had interpreted Buddhism in its own way and, resultantly, this period would have been the time of pre-conceived notions, mental tangles and confusion on the part of the common people whom these different sects were seeking to attract. *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra*, probably, makes an attempt to clarify such ambiguity of the Buddhist doctrines using the method of shock treatment. A few examples of such therapy can be seen in the following conversations.

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[3] *Ibid.*, p. 77.

Vimalakīrti and Mahākāśyapa

Once Mahākāśyapa was begging for food in a street inhabited by poor people. Vimalakīrti came along and said to him:

> "Reverend Mahākāśyapa, to avoid the houses of the wealthy, and to favour the houses of the poor – this is partiality from benevolence. Reverend Mahākāśyapa, you should dwell on the fact of the equality of things, and you should seek alms with consideration for all living beings at all times.... When you enter a town, you should keep in mind its actual emptiness, yet you should proceed through it in order to develop men and women .... You should see shapes like a man who has been blind from birth, hear sounds as if they were echoes, smell scents as if they were winds, and experience tastes without any discrimination."[4]

Vimalakīrti and Subhūti

On one occasion, Subhūti arrived at Vimalakīrti's house begging for food, Vimalakırti took his bowl and filled it with some excellent food and said to him:

> "Reverend Subhūti, take this food if you understand the equality of all things, by means of the equality of material objects, and if you understand the equality of all the attributes of the Buddha, by means of the equality of all things."[5]

Vimalakīrti and Pūrṇamaitrāyaṇīputra

When once Pūrṇa was expounding the Dharma under a tree to a group of newly initiated monks, Vimalakīrti came to him and said:

> "Reverend Pūrṇa, first concentrate yourself with the minds of these young bhikṣus, and then teach them the Dharma! Do not put rotten food into a bejewelled bowl! First understand the inclinations of these monks, and do not confuse priceless sapphires with glass beads."[6]

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[4] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 27.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

These statements definitely emphasise the purity and unbiased nature of the mind in order to realize truth and also show the resemblance to the *kōans* of Zen Buddhism. D. T. Suzuki, erudite scholar of Zen Buddhism, writes:

> "Zen has no aversion to book-learning *per se*, but in point of fact Zen can perhaps be more readily grasped by the simple-minded and those who are not stuffed with intellectual accomplishments."[7]

Likewise Linnart Mäll, a noted authority on the Mahāyāna Sūtras, remarks:

> "In Zen Buddhism the teacher tries with the help of paradoxes to lead his students to mental shock, which should accelerate reaching of the *satori* state, and is a kind of threshold for Awakening."[8]

However, this method of shock-treatment is actually not completely unique to the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra* or Zen Buddhism. We have the example of Channa, charioteer of Gautama, while Gautama was still a bodhisattva. It was because of his affection for Gautama, and then because of his pride in "our Buddha, our Dhamma", that he was unable to carry out the duties of a true recluse, until he had received the emotional shock (*saṃvega*) of the imposition of the supreme penalty on him. The description of Buddha's method of instruction as found in the Pāli Literature also speaks of two methods in the form of counter question and by keeping absolute silence, which was perhaps promulgated by the Buddha in order to shock the questioner.[9]

Vimalakīrti advocates the view of *śūnyatā* to be developed for all conditioned things and lay emphasis on the necessity of remaining an active member of society in this world. Neither is escaping

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[7] Suzuki, D. T. *Studies in the Laṅkavatāra Sūtra*. Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass, 1999, p. 61.

[8] Mäll , Linnart. *Studies in the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā and Other Essays*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2005, p. 89.

[9] In order to guide his disciples to realize the Dhamma, the Buddha would answer their questions in four ways:
(a) By giving a categorical answer (*ekaṃsa vyākaraṇa*);
(b) By asking a counter-question (*paṅipucchā vyākaraṇa*);
(c) By keeping complete silence (*jhāpanīya vyakaraṇa*);
(d) With an analytical answer (*vibhajja vyakaraṇa*).
Woodward, F. L.(Tr.). *The Book of the Gradual Sayings (Anguttara Nikāya)*. Vol. II. London: Pali Text Society, 1973, p. 54.

from the world or indulging in the ocean of desires a solution. He is opposed to any kind of escapism from society and considers it inevitable to live in the world in order to become free from impurities such as desires, hatred, greed etc., because that victory over our impurity would be a conquest in the real sense of the term. Parinirvāṇa, i.e. ultimate liberation or the obtaining of freedom from the cycle of rebirth after this life is not a goal for Vimalakīrti and so is the case with his stand towards monastic life being an appropriate channel to attain liberation.

"Do not escape, change the world" is a famous novel by an Indian Buddhist stalwart known as Mahāpaṇḍita Rahula Sānkṛtyāyana. This title's message truly seems to be rooted in the quintessence of the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra*. Escaping is easy, but living in the world of desire and denying desire is difficult – it is one of the major points of the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra*. *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra* contains several instances in the form of communication between Vimalakīrti and others where he declares that believing the path of monasticism as only path of liberation is an erroneous view. Such beliefs fall into the category of an extremist view. To realize the importance of brightness, one must pass through darkness. A few dialogues between Vimalakīrti and others describing such reflections are cited below.

Vimalakīrti to Śāriputra

> "You should absorb yourself in contemplation in such a way that you are released in liberation without abandoning the passions that are the province of the world."[10]

Vimalakīrti to Subhūti

> "Take this food if, without abandoning desire, hatred, and folly, you can avoid association with them; if you can follow the path of the single way without ever disturbing the egoistic views."

[10] Thurman, Robert A. F. *Op. cit.*, p. 24.

"'Take this food, reverend Subhūti if those who offer you food, reverend, still fall into the three bad migrations; if you associate with all Māra's; if you entertain all passions; if the nature of passions is the nature of a reverend; if you have hostile feelings toward all living beings; if you despise all the Buddhas; if you criticize all the teachings of the Buddha; if you do not rely on the Saṃgha; and finally, if you never enter ultimate liberation."[11]

Vimalakīrti to Upāli

On one occasion Upāli was delivering a religious discourse to two monks who had broken some commandments and were too ashamed to appear before the Lord, and therefore had come to Upāli so that he could teach them the rules of repentance. Vimalakīrti approached and stated:

"Reverend Upāli, do not aggravate further the sins of these two monks. Without perplexing them, relieve their remorse."[12]

Such a reaction by Vimalakīrti is not understandable at this location, but it becomes comprehensible in the next chapter, where he expounds his own perspective:

"As for these living beings, there is nothing to be applied, and there is nothing to be removed; one has only to teach them the Dharma for them to realize the basis from which sicknesses arise. What is this basis? It is object-perception. Insofar as apparent objects are perceived, they are the basis of sickness."[13]

A disease can only be treated if its nature and root is identified. To participate in liberation from the world without employing expedient methods (*upāya*) is bondage, even for a Bodhisattva. Wisdom not integrated with expedient methods is bondage, but wisdom integrated with expedient methods is liberation, and the expedient method of a Bodhisattva does not lie in seeking cessation of body, mind or sickness. His expedient method consists of not exhausting himself by trying to avoid all physical sickness, and of apply-

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 27.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 30.
[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 45–46.

ing himself to accomplish; this is the standpoint of the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra*.

The *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra* shows a path that encourages one to disentangle the tangles of the world through the world and by remaining in this world. Vimalakīrti says:

> "Noble sir, flowers like the blue lotus, the red lotus, the white lotus, the water lily and the moon lily do not grow on the dry ground in the wilderness, but do grow in the swamps and mud banks. Similarly, the Buddha qualities do not grow in living beings certainly destined for the uncreated, but do grow in those living beings who are like swamps and mud banks of passions. Likewise, as seeds do not grow in the sky but do grow in the earth, thus the Buddha-qualities do not grow in those determined for the absolute, but do grow in those who conceive the spirit of enlightenment, after having produced a Sumeru-like mountain of egoistic views.
>
> "Noble sir, through these considerations one can understand that all passions constitute the family of the Tathāgatas. For example, noble sir, without going out into the great ocean, it is impossible to find precious, priceless pearls. Likewise, without going into the ocean of passions, it is impossible to obtain the mind of omniscience."[14]

Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra does not encourage any kind of social discrimination regarding the attainment of knowledge. Each and every part of Vimalakīrti 's message is addressed to both *kulaputras* (noble men) and *kulaputrīs* (noble women), as reflected in one dialogue between Vimalakīrti and Mahākāśyapa shown previously in this paper. Vimalakīrti would even visit the brothels so that he could reveal them the evils of desires. He was honoured as a eunuch in the royal harem because he taught the young ladies of the inner palaces according to the Dharma.[15] Buddhist nuns and lay women devotees are assigned the same status of member as those of monks and lay men devotees in the *Catuśpariśada* (Council of Four) in the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra*, which would gather to hear the Buddha's discourses.[16] The *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra* renders an account in which Māra, surrounded by twelve thousand heavenly maidens, approached a bodhisattva named Jagatīmdhara and

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 66.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

pleaded him to accept those maidens as servants. Jagatīmdhara answered:

> "Do not offer me, who am religious and a son of the Śākya, things which are not appropriate."[17]

As is evident from his reply, he considered those maidens to be impure and an obstacle in his spiritual path. Vimalakīrti, observing his response to Māra, moved forward to accept them and after doing so, exhorted them with discourse suitable for their development towards supreme enlightenment *(anuttarā-samyaksaṃbodhi)*, and soon they conceived the spirit of enlightenment, abandoning the pleasure in desires.[18]

Another account elaborating the dialogue between Goddess and Śāriputra portrays a refutation of the Śrāvakayānistic position of placing women a step below men in the texts. Śāriputra, witnessing the eight splendid and astonishing qualities of the house of the Goddess, asked her:

> Śāriputra: "Goddess, what prevents you from transforming yourself out of your female state?"
>
> Goddess: "Although I have sought my "female state" for these twelve years, I have not yet found it. Reverend Śāriputra, if a magician were to incarnate a woman by magic, would you ask her, "What prevents you from transforming yourself out of your female state? ""
>
> Śāriputra: "No! Such a woman would not really exist, so what would there be to transform?"
>
> Goddess: "Just so, reverend Śāriputra, all things do not really exist. Now, would you think, "What prevents one whose nature is that of a magical incarnation from transforming herself out of her female state? ""

Thereupon, the goddess employed her magical power to cause the elder Śāriputra to appear in her form and to cause herself to appear in his form. Then the goddess, transformed into Śāriputra, said to Śāriputra, transformed into a goddess:

> "Reverend Śāriputra, what prevents you from transforming yourself out of your female state?"

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[17] *Ibid.*, p. 37.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

And Śāriputra, transformed into the goddess, replied:

> "I no longer appear in the form of a male! My body has changed into the body of a woman! I do not know what to transform! "

The goddess continued:

> "If the elder could again change out of the female state, then all women could also change out of their female states. All women appear in the form of women in just the same way as the elder appears in the form of a woman. While they are not women in reality, they appear in the form of women. With this in mind, the Buddha said, "In all things, there is neither male nor female.""[19]

Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra directly focuses on the heart of Buddha's teachings throughout the text, not on its external structure, which entered into Buddhism in the due course of time during its historical development. Despite rejecting *śrāvakayāna* as a wrongly understood teaching of the Buddha and considering the followers of the *śrāvakayāna* as blind from birth, *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra* does not stray far from the rationalistic and open-minded spirit of the authentic teachings of the Buddha, and thus ideologically and philosophically, it can be considered to be a magnificent synthesis of early and later Buddhist thought. The *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra* claims to be a Mahāyānistic text, and glorification of the Mahāyāna can be seen in several places therein, but when it comes to the question of the common belief that the term *śraddhā*, which once meant, 'confidence based on knowledge' in the Pāli canon gradually changed its meaning to 'faith' and 'devotion' with the emergence of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra* does not seem to accept this concept anywhere in its descriptions. The text emphasizes intuitive knowledge of the Dharma by one's own wisdom rather than insisting on the faith on the Buddha for the realization of the truth. In an early Pāli sutta named *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta*, we find a dialogue between Buddha and Ānanda held just before the death of the former, where Buddha declares:

> "The truths, and the Rules of the order that I have set forth and laid down for you all, let them, after I am gone, be your teacher."[20]

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[19] *Ibid.*, p. 61–62.

[20] Rhys Davids, T. W. & C. A. F. (Tr.). *Dialogues of the Buddha*. Vol. II. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2000, p. 171.

A similar expression can be found here in the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra* in the words addressed by the Tathāgata to the Prince of Gods (Indra):

> "Prince of Gods, the enlightenment of the Buddhas of the past, present and future is expressed in this discourse of the Dharma. Therefore, Prince of Gods, when noble sons and daughters accept it, repeat it, understand it deeply, write it completely and, making it into a book, honour it, those sons and daughters thereby pay homage to the Buddhas of the past, present and future."[21]

The Lord further says:

> "Prince of gods, the enlightenment of the Buddhas arises from the Dharma, and one honours them by Dharma worship, and not by material worship. Thus it is taught, Prince of Gods, and thus you must understand it."[22]

On the basis of this very spirit, the Buddha has established a classification of Bodhisattvas in the following manner in his teaching to Maitreya:

> "Maitreya, there are two gestures of the Bodhisattvas. What are they? The first gesture is to believe in all sorts of phrases and words, and the second gesture is to penetrate exactly the profound principle of the Dharma without being afraid. Such are the two gestures of the Bodhisattvas. Maitreya, it must be known that the Bodhisattvas who believe in all sorts of words and phrases, and apply themselves accordingly, are beginners and not experienced in religious practice. In contrast, the Bodhisattvas who read, hear, believe and teach this profound teaching with its impeccable expressions reconciling dichotomies and its analyses of the stages of development, these are veterans in religious practice."[23]

The author of this paper wishes to answer the question of how we can read the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra* and the significance of the philosophy of the text in the contemporary context. What are the causes of most of the major problems in the world today? Some countries are suffering political crises and others from social problems. Many countries are shaken because of conflicts among different religious groups. Mutual misunderstandings between reli-

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[21] Thurman, Robert A. F. *Op. cit.*, p. 96.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 97.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 101.

gions and societies are constantly increasing. Various priests and religious leaders are trying to establish in their adherents the belief that their religion and social structure is superior to others, their God is the supreme God and all other existing religions and communities are a danger to their own religion, culture and society in one way or another. The greatest question, however, is where the danger actually lies? Where actually does this disbelief in others exist? What factor is responsible for all of these religious, social and political problems? It is the mind and only our mind that has the capacity to make this earth a heaven if it is pure and a hell, if polluted. Victory and defeat are mental notions. Love and hatred also exist in our mind. The greatest gift to humanity has always been offered by the mind, and all of the ghastly destructions of the world are also the contribution of the mind. When the United Nations was formed after the horrors of the Second World War, the heads of the nations that gathered to sign the charter agreed that it should begin with the following preamble:

> "Since it is in the minds of men that wars begin, it is in the minds of men that the ramparts of peace should be erected."[24]

This very same sentiment seems to be embedded in the first verse of the *Dhammapada*, which states:

> "All [mental] states have mind as their forerunner, mind is their chief, and they are mind-made. If one speaks or acts with a defiled mind, suffering follows one even as the wheel follows the hoof of the draught-ox."[25]

Everyone's mind has its own categories to understand things, its own preconceived notions towards others and its own prejudices regarding everything. What we claim to know about others is, generally, by and large based on our preconceived notions. Regarding our neighbours, inhabitants of our neighbouring cities countries and continents, we have preconceived notions. Similarly, we have nationalistic and religious taboos and mental conceptions that make us feel that our nation or religion is supreme over all, and this tendency prevents us from considering other cultures or reli-

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[24] Dhammananda, K. Sri. *What Buddhists Believe*. Taipei: The Corporate Body of the Buddha Educational Foundation, 1993, p. 285.

[25] Mahathera, Narada (Ed. and Tr.). *Dhammapada*. Calcutta: Mahabodhi Society of India, 1971, p. 2.

gions with the same respect as we have for our own. Every individual has his own preconceived notions about other individuals and every other group of human beings also has their own for other communities. When we are alone, we judge others from our own personal definition of ethical or unethical, civilized or uncivilized behaviour. When we are with our family members, we make remarks towards our neighbours and try to find any reason to criticize them just because that they are not as we want them to be. When we sit with our own citizens or neighbours, we discuss those differences between us and the inhabitants of other cities and, eventually we come to the conclusion that we are far better than the people of other cities. And we hold the same kinds of discussions in the company of our own countrymen regarding other countries. We evaluate their eating habits, lifestyles, dress, religious beliefs etc., and find a huge difference from ours own. Lastly, of course, we consider ourselves to be better than them. Similarly, we have our mind-set regarding other factors such as caste, creed, colour and religion.

These differences are actually differences between mental conceptions that lead us towards our preconceived notions. The more we know about others, we realize that the differences are not as great as we had believed. These differences appear as a difference because we have created a multitude of personal, social, religious and national taboos concerning every aspect of life, either everyday lifestyle or moral values. Whatever society does not appear to us to be in accordance with own definition of what is right or good, we immediately declare it wrong and inferior to our own. Even if one knot in our heap of preconceived notions is untied, several other knots of the mind are built up day after day.

The *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra* is virtually a repudiation of all kinds of knots, taboos and preconceived mental notions. It affirms that the realization of the true Dharma leads us beyond the sense of all differentiations. As soon as one's mental tangles are untangled, one sees no difference between others and oneself. It is the very objective of ultimate knowledge in Buddhism, and has been in the spirit of Buddha's discourses ever since its commencement. The Dharma has never been taught by Buddha as something which should be carried on all the time. The Dharma itself is an instrument for self-liberation, and as soon as one has done this, all of the

spoken words of different discourses are mere words for him, and all of the written words of the scriptures have no value for him, because the issue of Dharma and Adharma no longer exists for him. The Buddha himself has explained the Dharma through the parable of the raft in his famous discourse, by saying:

> "I have taught the Dhamma (the Pāli word for Dharma) by comparing it to a raft – it is for crossing over, and not for carrying. You, O Monks, who understand that the Dhamma is similar to a raft, should give up even the Dhamma; so what is the question of giving up Adhamma?"[26]

"Dharma is a means, not a goal" – Vimalakīrti renders this message to Śāriputra in other words:

> "Revered Śāriputra, one who is interested in the Dharma, is not interested in attachment to the Buddha, attachment to the Dharma or attachment to the Saṅgha."[27]

In conclusion we can say that the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra* is a perfect example of the synthesis of early and later Buddhist thought. On the social front it denies the necessity of monastic life to attain liberation as suggested by Theravāda, and commends the Mahāyānistic way of life. On the other hand, it apparently endorses the Theravādistic standpoint regarding wisdom as manifested in the earliest Pāli texts. The text also contains the seeds of Pure Land Buddhism, Madhyamaka and, of course, of Zen philosophies of Buddhism. Therefore the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra* is the text that crosses over the domain of sectarianism in spirit and advocates the kind of pure and original Buddhism that is against every kind of 'ism' and taboos and, due to this spirit, the author of the text would not like his writing to be treated even as "Buddhist" thought, as this approach might also seem to him to be a production of "a category of mind". The *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra* does not even cling to the Buddha, Dharma or Saṅgha, and expounds the path towards that knowledge of non-duality where our minds cease to perceive any distinction between a sinner and the Buddha. If, after the realization of the Dharma, one's mind attains the stage where one no longer perceives any difference between external and internal, male and female, rich and poor, friend and enemy and sinner and meri-

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[26] Horner, I. B. (Tr.). *Middle Length Sayings (Majjhima Nikāya).* Vol. I. London: Pali Text Society, 1977, p. 174.

[27] Thurman, Robert A. F. *Op. cit.*, p. 50.

torious person, this is true liberation, as the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra* asserts. The *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra* is a philosophy of rationality as well as open-mindedness, and may be considered to be a revolutionary text against all kind of pre-conceived notions, taboos, distinctions and mental tangles. Moreover, the author of the text occasionally uses a hunter to explain this truth to his readers.

The Doctrine of Seeing the Tathāgata in the *Diamond Sutra*

Yao-ming Tsai

I. Introduction

In order to clearly present the key points and concisely offer a general understanding of the present paper, topics are listed in the categories "Thesis," "Literary Review," "Method," and "Outline" at the very beginning.

A. Thesis

Starting with an analysis of seeing, the present paper intends to discuss the functioning of seeing, including seeing through ordinary bodies and that of the Tathāgata.[1] The aim is to develop the Buddhist doctrine of seeing, to unfold the wisdom of seeing, and thus to lead an open path of life.

B. Literary Review

The inquiry into the Buddhist doctrine of seeing is based on the *Diamond Sutra* and various publications and scholarly works, notably *Empty Vision* and *Imaging Wisdom*. The latter two books are full of fascinating insights and remarkable academic achievements.[2] The former focuses on the visual metaphors found in a number

[1] In the Buddha's teachings, seeing is not the exclusive way leading towards wisdom and open path. The other sensory organs can follow the similar fashion proposed in this paper to achieve the same goal. Next, the verb "see" can refer literally to the action of eyes or metaphorically to the understanding derived from seeing. This paper starts from the action of seeing and then unfolds the process from seeing to understanding, or if possible, wisdom.

[2] McMahan, David L. *Empty Vision: Metaphor and Visionary Imagery in Mahāyāna Buddhism*. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002; Kinnard, Jacob N. *Im-*

of the Mahāyāna sutras; the latter places emphasis on the visual images of Buddhist art works. Both are devoted to imparting Buddhist wisdom in visualization and seeing. There are, however, two inadequacies that should be noted. First, though both made several references to the *Prajñāpāramitā Sutra in Eight Thousand Lines*, the *Diamond Sutra* was hardly cited. Second, it seems that they have placed too much emphasis on the symbolic role of sight and visual images. David McMahan even highlighted the "devaluation of language" and "privileging of perception" as the key points of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism. His analysis might be helpful in understanding the principle or mechanism of visualization or recollection of the Buddha, but it may not hold true in comprehending and observing emptiness by seeing. Thus the present study departs from the two above-mentioned points, exposes problems with seeing, and presents a unique analysis.

C. Method

Philosophical thinking comprises a major part of the *Diamond Sutra*, and this philosophical dimension is heuristically necessary in the present study. The six steps of the research method are as follows. Step One is to emphasise seeing and expose the problems related therewith. Step Two is to regard seeing as "an interface for spiritual cultivation," a multi-structured surface interweaved with several connected or overlapping parts or sections. Such a multi-structured interface allows spiritual cultivation to take place or, at least, permits seeing to be deconstructed, deepened, strengthened, reconstructed, or reformed. Let us take seeing, for example. The interface of seeing is, in fact, interweaved with what is seen, what is capable of being seen, and the action of seeing. If seeing is deconstructed, further reflected, and strictly scrutinized as aforementioned, seeing will be able to be an interface for spiritual cultivation. Step three subjects seeing to close scrutiny and divides seeing into two types, in terms of seeing as an interface for spiritual cultivation: "entrapped seeing" and "non-entrapped seeing." The former is always entrapped in what is seen or the interface of see-

aging Wisdom: Seeing and Knowing in the Art of Indian Buddhism, Richmond: Curzon, 1999.

ing, and the latter is not entrapped. Entrapped seeing emphasizes what is seen or the surface of seeing, so the paths, if any, will be mostly confined within the surface of seeing. On the contrary, non-entrapped seeing does not stick to any surfaces, parts, or sections, but is devoted to broadening seeing and clearing an open path for seeing. As a result, seeing itself can be seen as "leading over or beyond" or "oriented toward an open path." Strictly speaking, a closed path cannot be called a path but a dead end, since a path, to be so called, must be open to a certain extent. Next, in entrapped seeing, there is either no path or there are closed paths. In contrast, paths in non-entrapped seeing are open. Step Four takes non-entrapped seeing as the keynote, collects and analyzes scriptural evidence, and clarifies complicated ideas and makes them easier to understand. Step Five is to discuss the underlying significance of the wisdom of seeing in non-entrapped seeing and its orientation toward an open path. Step Six focuses on the openness and orientation of the open path in non-entrapped seeing.

D. Outline of the Sections

"Introduction" presents the topics and structure of this paper. Section Two, "Seeing into the Surface of Seeing," examines seeing, exposes its problems, highlights the importance of seeing, and addresses why and how seeing can be closely examined. With the potentiality of seeing into the surface, one is able to adjust one's mindset, which is the fundamental step in spiritual cultivation and the main point of the *Diamond Sutra*. Hence Section Three will be a brief but standard introduction to the sutra. Section Four draws a distinction between entrapped seeing and non-entrapped seeing, and further proposes that non-entrapped seeing can blaze a path for seeing, life, spiritual cultivation and the world. Section Five is focused on the topic of "How the Tathāgata should be seen," examining five dialogues in the *Diamond Sutra* and explaining why "the possession of characteristic marks," "the thirty-two characteristic marks of a great person," "the perfect development of the physical body," and the like are not sufficient to permit one to see the Tathāgata in its reality. Section Six demonstrates that with the open path of seeing and the wisdom of seeing, spiritual cultivation can be fully realized, reaching *dharmakāya* and *dharmatā*. When the

Tathāgata is fully realized by seeing, the Tathāgata in spiritual cultivation can be anticipated. The final section is the Conclusion.

II. "Seeing into the Surface of Seeing"

Most people firmly believe that "What you see is what you get," and that the object one sees is exactly the same as what is seen. Thus they tend to explain the object by what they see. In this way, both the object that is seen and the action of seeing remain at a superficial level. If this can be termed "seeing on the surface," then "seeing into the surface" is likely to provide a different way of seeing, challenge ordinary people's way of seeing, propel one to closely examine the elements involved in seeing, and come up with theoretical accounts.

The present section, which has been divided into two parts, will expose the problems of the ordinary way of seeing: "seeing as a subject matter needs examining," and "the examination of seeing should be put in the context of progress in spiritual cultivation."

A. Seeing as Subject Matter Must Be Examined

As manifested in the *Diamond Sutra*, seeing an object does not focus on the object being seen, nor does it remain on the surface of seeing. If this teaching is workable, then the premise, instead of taking any kind of seeing as granted, is that ordinary seeing is a subject matter worth re-evaluating.

Seeing can generally be divided into three types. Type One is skimming quickly or just for fun. This type of seeing is characterized by finished products, their appearance, everyday vocabulary, and a lack of in-depth thinking. Type Two is seeing from or within a specialized discipline, such as physics, biology, art, science or art history. It is characterized by academic insights and relevant terminology. Type Three refers to seeing and examining the features and multi-structured relationship between what is seen and what is capable of being seen. This is characterized by reflection on the action of seeing and metalanguage, in the hope of fully understanding what is really going on in the process of seeing.

The reason why seeing should be treated as a subject matter worth examination is that ordinary seeing and specialized seeing cannot be taken for granted. The examination of seeing can start with an examination of what is seen, what is capable of being seen, and the action of seeing. These three portions constitute the "three-fold wheel or circle" of seeing, the three wheel axles that make possible the action of seeing, or the "interface" of seeing, a multi-structured interface that is interweaved by the constituents of seeing. Such an analysis undertakes at least two serious tasks. One is to urge people not to hastily assert seeing or habitually accept seeing as what they see. After the three major portions of seeing are elicited, people will be able to examine seeing and understand its mechanism. The other is further to carry out rectification in each portion, make seeing more qualified, deepen seeing, and, if possible, bring about a revolution in seeing.

B. The Examination of Seeing Should Be Placed in the Context of Progress in Spiritual Cultivation

After realizing that seeing is a subject matter worth examining and that seeing can be scrutinized from the three portions of what is seen, what is capable of being seen, and the action of seeing, one can further adjust one's way of seeing and initiate one's spiritual cultivation. Analytically speaking, the multi-structured surface of seeing or the "interface" of seeing treats seeing as a "phase" connected or interweaved by several sections. If the interface or phase is oversimplified, attention is focused on a certain dharma, and this portion is further confined, it follows that the so-called "object being seen," "the seer, or the seeing subject," and "seeing itself" are formed. However, things are recognized or grasped in a compact mess or in a situation that is like an interface, and seeing is in a folded, static or fixed state. This is "seeing on the surface." Conversely, if the folded is unfolded, the static is activated, the fixed is set in motion, seeing move away from the clustered, flat, or compressed mould into a multi-faceted, multi-directional openness. In other words, if a "three-fold wheel or circle" of seeing can be opened up, the three connected wheel axles will not be static or fixed as they seem to be, and the processes of their accumulation, arrangement, organization, alternation or transformation

in seeing can thus be unfolded. In Buddhism, it is designated as the "complete purification of the three-fold wheel," which is used to defy the fixed definitions and emotional understanding of the three major constituent portions.

In terms of various pathways of Buddhist cultivation, seeing not only rids one of ordinary confines but also brings advancement in at least two respects. First, with the advancement of seeing, one can make overall progress in the development of pathways of spiritual cultivation. Second, with the advancement of pathways of spiritual cultivation, practical experiences will be enhanced, and progress in seeing can be made.

III. The Keynotes of the Diamond Sutra*: Spiritual Cultivation and "Open-Path-Oriented" Salvation*

The *Diamond Sutra* is famous for its teachings about the Bodhisattva Vehicle or the Buddhist Pathway to Enlightenment, including the wisdom of seeing. Before going on to discuss the wisdom of seeing, a general understanding of the gist of the sutra is required. This section then intends to offer a succinct but quintessential introduction of the sutra to prepare the reader for later analysis.

A Buddhist can choose either the Bodhisattva Vehicle or Buddhist Pathway to Enlightenment as his or her own way of spiritual cultivation. Regardless of which way he or she chooses, spiritual cultivation is the fundamental step to take. If one is determined to get on the Bodhisattva Vehicle, one must guide all sentient beings in cyclic existence toward Nirvāṇa. Then, the spiritual cultivation and salvation of all sentient beings is combined. Knowing this, however, is not enough. If the task is performed using ordinary people's confined ways of thinking, it is not likely that the aim will be achieved. The sutra teaches that the adjustment of the mind is the *sine qua non* of spiritual cultivation. It is only by the continuous adjustment of the mind that one's spiritual cultivation can advance. Thus spiritual cultivation and the salvation of others are inseparable with the adjustment of the mind.

Furthermore, the "open-path orientation" is one of the themes of the sutra. On the one hand, in guiding a variety of sentient beings, the teachings in the sutra are not to create idol admiration, to con-

fine the experiences of sentient beings, or to maintain any dualistic relationship, but to open up a path for life processes leading toward Nirvana. On the other hand, regarding the operation of the Bodhisattva Vehicle, the teaching aims neither to create myths about the Bodhisattva Vehicle nor to formulate any closed theory, but to make the most of the Bodhisattva Vehicle to clear an open path for continuous spiritual cultivation. Thus by virtue of the Bodhisattva Vehicle, pathways of spiritual cultivation can be opened.

IV. Non-entrapped Seeing Makes a Difference in Seeing Ordinary Bodies

In terms of seeing, the unfolding and advancement of spiritual cultivation and salvation lies in whether or not seeing is entrapped in the interface of spiritual cultivation and salvation. As explained in the previous section, the interface of seeing is a multi-structured surface, a "three-fold wheel or circle" of seeing: what is seen, what is capable of being seen, and the action of seeing. One can see "on the surface" or "into the surface." The choice one makes decides whether or not one's seeing is trapped not. Thus this section will first make a distinction between entrapped (*vastupatita*) and non-entrapped (*avastupatita*) seeings, and then illustrate that non-entrapped seeing constitutes ordinary bodies, reforms the performance of seeing, makes skilful use of negative terms, and thus manifests the wisdom of seeing.

A. *Vastupatita* vs. *Avastupatita*

From the very beginning, the *Diamond Sutra* emphasizes that the process of composing thoughts should be placed under strict scrutiny; otherwise, the ideas will bring about concepts of the existence of things, and/or figures and things are only seen using formulated concepts. Seeing in this way is termed *vastupatita*, "entrapped seeing." *Vastupatita*, or to have fallen among things,[3] means being entrapped in the concepts of existence of or the surface of things

[3] *T.* 220 (9), vol. 7, pp. 982c-983a; *Vajracchedikā-Conze*, p. 42; *Vajracchedikā-Vaidya*, p. 81.

and/or figures. This technical term is used to point out that if one has fallen among things, one sees nothing, and what has been done is in reality almost a waste of time. On the contrary, this sutra endorses *avastupatita*, or not to get fallen among things. This is a more likely way to see through the contexts and causality of things, and to do things correctly.

B. Non-entrapped Seeing on the Constitution of Ordinary Bodies

After showing the possible defects of entrapped seeing, this section demonstrates how to see the constitution of ordinary bodies with non-trapped seeing. According to the *Diamond Sutra*, the constitution of ordinary bodies refers to physical features of worldly sentient beings in contrast with the Tathāgata's body constitution. Two passages are summarized in this part, and in both of them the constitution of ordinary bodies is like being endowed with a body (*upetakāya*) or even with a huge body (*mahākāya*).

In the first passage, the constitution of ordinary bodies is compared to the huge personal existence (*ātmabhāva* or "one's own existence") of the Sumeru, king of mountains. Though such a personal existence is recognized as huge, the point does not lie in the description of how "huge" it is or the endorsement of the idea of "huge," but in examining "personal existence":

> "Personal existence, personal existence," as non-existence that has been taught by the Tathāgata; for that is not existence or non-existence. Therefore is it called "personal existence."[4]

In the second passage, the same simile is used and is also not further elaborated. It scrutinizes the saying of being endowed with a body, or a huge body:

> "That which the Tathāgata has called a man endowed with a body, a huge body – it is said to be a non-body by the Tathāgata. In that sense "endowed with a body, a huge body" is used."[5]

Three points are brought up from the above passages that help illustrate the idea of non-entrapped seeing. The first point is seeing *from the outer layer to the inner layer*. In terms of conception, the items

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[4] *T.* 220 (9), vol. 7, p. 981c; *Vajracchedikā-Conze*, p. 36; *Vajracchedikā-Vaidya*, p. 78.

[5] *T.* 220 (9), vol. 7, p. 984a; *Vajracchedikā-Conze*, p. 49; *Vajracchedikā-Schopen*, p. 102; *Vajracchedikā-Vaidya*, p. 84.

of the outer layer include a huge body, an endowed body, and the person. The representative item in the middle layer is the existence of the self. The items of the inner layer include the existence and the body. That is to say, examination should not focus or remain on the items of the outer layer, but must move toward the inner layer. It follows that making a lengthy discussion of items of the outer layer is shallow. Hence, moving from the outer layer toward the inner layer is one of the salient features of non-entrapped seeing.

The second point is seeing *from phrases to deeper meanings*. With the appearances, features, and characteristic marks captured in confined areas or certain layers, related phrases can thus be composed or put into use. However, seeing from the viewpoint of phrases or words often causes entrapped seeing; that is, seeing will be dominated or confined by phrases or words. Instead of being confined by phrases or words, viewers should try to see into the deeper meanings of things or the principle of transformation. Thus, moving from phrases toward deeper meanings is another notable feature of non-entrapped seeing.

The third point is seeing *from finiteness to infiniteness*. If seeing only changes from phrases to deeper meanings, but the meanings are still confined by basic concepts such as existence, the self, appearances, features or characteristic signs, seeing will still be entrapped. In other words, however numerous and specific meanings have been made, the accepted meanings are still literal, and seeing is still entrapped in the frames built up by phrases and words. One the other hand, in the above two cited passages, there are terms such as "*non-existence*" and "*non-body*." The prefix "non-" is very significant here. Literally, "non-" is a negative term, used to negate something. When something is negated, it presupposes that something has been affirmed. In this case, it seems that the Buddha negates existence and the body, concepts which have long been affirmed to be facts or reality. However, such use of negation is not employed to propose the opposing counterpart. If the negation here is regarded as such, what the Buddha teaches is nothing insightful, for such a perspective is still trapped in the dual or oppositional thinking of affirmation and negation and remains on the surface of words or phrases. Whatever is discussed cannot then be released from the finitude of duality and language. In fact, the negation here cannot be seen or read on the surface of the negation.

It must be seen or read along with the aforementioned way of seeing into the surface. Thus one does not have to affirm any phrases or to assert that which is negated. Instead, this seeing opens up a thought of infinitude. In other words, the affirmation or negation of things or phrases creates confinement, whereas infiniteness neither affirms nor negates any finite things or phrases in terms of reality.[6] Consequently, converting one's seeing from finiteness to infiniteness is also an outstanding feature of non-entrapped seeing, which allows seeing to be performed out of confinement.

V. The Wisdom of Seeing the Tathāgata's Body Constitution in the Diamond Sutra

The *Diamond Sutra* uses at least five paragraphs in the form of a dialogue between the Buddha and his disciple Subhūti to present the perspective and thoughts on seeing through the Tathāgata's body constitution. These dialogues are so important that they deserve in-depth discussion.

A. Should the Tathāgata be Seen by "the Possession of Characteristic Marks"?[7]

This question is concerned with how to see the Tathāgata or "How is the Tathāgata to be seen?" The point to be discussed is whether the Tathāgata should be seen "by means of the possession of characteristic marks" (*lakṣaṇa-saṃpadā*). The answer appears to be yes. The correct answer, however, is quite the opposite. The reason why "the Tathāgata is not to be seen by means of the possession of characteristic marks" is that the means by which the Tathāgata is seen should be examined closely.

The *Diamond Sutra* states: "What has been taught by the Tathāgata as the possession of characteristic marks is truly not the possession of characteristic marks." If the Tathāgata is seen by means of the so-

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[6] cf. Nagatomo, Shigenori. *The Diamondsutra's Logic of Not and A Critique of Katz's Contextualism: Toward a Non-dualist Philosophy*. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2006, 1–54.

[7] *T.* 220 (9), vol. 7, p. 980b-c; *Vajracchedikā-Conze*, p. 30; *Vajracchedikā-Vaidya*, p. 76.

called "possession of characteristic marks" (*lakṣaṇasaṃpat*), then it is "not the possession of characteristic marks" (*alakṣaṇasaṃpat*) in reality. In other words, the means by which the Tathāgata is seen is just physical features created by a conventional signification; the features are not identical with what has been signified in its reality.

This statement reveals an insightful thought: "Wherever there is the possession of characteristic marks, there is fraud; wherever there is not the possession of characteristic marks, there is no fraud."

Taking "the possession of characteristic marks" as the criterion of seeing, the Tathāgata brings about either affirmation or negation. To be more specific, if one identifies the possession of characteristic marks with the Tathāgata, one's recognition of the Tathāgata is distorted, and one will fail to see the reality of the Tathāgata. One only sees on the surface, namely the characteristic marks, failing to see into the surface. On the contrary, if one sees into the possession of characteristic marks or does not identify it with the Tathāgata in its reality, what has been seen will not depart from the reality, nor will it be "false."

After the examination of the means by which the Tathāgata is seen, a conclusion can thus be drawn regarding how the Tathāgata is to be seen:

> "The Tathāgata is to be seen by means of or from (the viewpoint of) the possession of characteristic marks as the non-possession of characteristic marks in reality."

In other words, one should see the Tathāgata from (the viewpoint of) characteristic marks as non-characteristic marks in themselves.

B. Should the Tathāgata be Seen on the basis of "the Thirty-two Characteristic Marks of a Great Person"?[8]

The question raised here once again puts emphasis on how to see the Tathāgata, or "How is the Tathāgata to be seen?" The point to be discussed is whether the Tathāgata should be seen "by means of the thirty-two characteristic marks of a great person (*mahāpuruṣa*)." The answer is again negative. That is, "the Tathāgata should be seen by means of the thirty-two characteristic marks of a great person."

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[8] *T.* 220 (9), vol. 7, p. 982a; *Vajracchedikā-Conze*, p. 38; *Vajracchedikā-Schopen*, p. 99; *Vajracchedikā-Vaidya*, pp. 79–80.

Since the thirty-two characteristic marks of a great person are means by which the Tathāgata is to be seen, their qualification as means must be re-evaluated. The result shows that they are not qualified. The reason is that "each of the thirty-two characteristic marks of a great person is said not to be a characteristic mark on the basis of the Tathāgata." It can be understood in this way: the thirty-two characteristic marks are not the only factors responsible for the failure, since they cannot only be manifested by the Tathāgata but also be perceived by viewers under certain circumstances. Hence, seeing merely with the perception of the thirty-two characteristic marks of a great person is not enough. It is necessary and crucial to develop non-trapped ways of seeing these characteristic marks. In addition, the Tathāgata should not be reduced only to these perceived characteristic marks. Instead, one should endeavour to see into these characteristic marks to understand the Tathāgata in reality.

The following conclusion can be reached: the thirty-two characteristic marks of a great person serve only as an interface. If visions, phrases or cognition stick to the surface, a hasty conclusion or prejudice will be made on or by this surface. In fact, as shown in the previous section, the surface is multi-structured and serves simply as an interface. On this account, the thirty-two characteristic marks of a great person are just a borrowed signification, by which the Tathāgata is seen with an absence of reality. Therefore the argument that the Tathāgata is to be seen by means of the thirty-two characteristic marks of a great person does not hold true.

C. Should the Tathāgata be Seen in Accordance with "the Perfect Development of the Physical Body"?[9]

The question raised here is once again related to how to see the Tathāgata, or "How is the Tathāgata to be seen?" The point to be discussed is whether the Tathāgata should be seen "by means of the perfect development of the physical body or form-body" (*rūpakāyaparinispattyā*). The answer is again negative. That is, "the Tathāgata should not be seen by means of the perfect development of the physical body." The reason is as follows:

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[9] *T.* 220 (9), vol. 7, p. 984b; *Vajracchedikā-Conze*, p. 52; *Vajracchedikā-Schopen*, pp. 103–104; *Vajracchedikā-Vaidya*, p. 86.

> "'A perfect development of the physical body, a perfect development of the physical body,' that is said by the Tathāgata to be an imperfect development of the physical body. In that sense 'perfect development of the physical body' is used."

What the Buddha teaches here is not to be confined by words or to self-contradicted by the method of affirming, negating, and reaffirming. In addition, it exemplifies how one should take advantage of words without the finiteness of words. That is, ordinary language can still lead one to places linguistic rules cannot reach, to the reality of infiniteness, and thus to bringing up non-entrapped seeing.

To sum up, there are at least three main points. First, the phrase of "the physical body developed," a result of eyes' contact with the image, is only a momentary designation, and what one sees, likewise, is only a transient appearance. Both can vary depending on context. Second, since sight is the result of eyes' contacts with the image, what one sees does not constantly exist. In a similar fashion, since phrases and words are just borrowed temporarily to signify what one sees at the moment, they do not have sovereignty or value in themselves. As a result, "the physical body developed" lacks reality of its own in either images or phrases, and is not enough to act as means by which the Tathāgata is to be seen. Third, to the question of "What kind of means is enough by which the Tathāgata is to be seen?", "the physical body developed" is a incorrect answer, but it is not that far from the truth. The key is that "the physical body developed" is only a phrase used to signify things, and that the so-called "physical body developed" is in reality unable to be expressed or confined by the phrase "the physical body developed."

D. Should the Tathāgata be Seen by "the Possession of Characteristic Marks"?[10]

Again, the question raised here is connected with how to see the Tathāgata or "How is the Tathāgata to be seen?" The point to be discussed is whether the Tathāgata should be seen "by means of

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[10] *T.* 220 (9), vol. 7, p. 984c; *Vajracchedikā-Conze*, pp. 52–53; *Vajracchedikā-Schopen*, p. 104; *Vajracchedikā-Vaidya*, p. 86.

the possession of characteristic marks." The answer is again negative. That is, "the Tathāgata should not be seen by means of the possession of characteristic marks." The reason is as follows:

> "What has been taught by the Tathāgata as the possession of characteristic marks is not actually the possession of characteristic marks. In that sense 'possession of characteristic marks' is used."

This dialogue is similar to the third one, with two minor differences. The first distinction concerns the item to be examined. The item in this dialogue is "the possession of characteristic marks," and "the perfect development of the physical body" in the third one. The other lies in the Tathāgata's teaching: in this dialogue, "not the possession of characteristic marks" includes action (the possession) and the feature related to the action (characteristic marks), but "not a perfect development" in the third contains the action part (a perfect development) without the feature related to the action (the physical body). Since the structures are quite similar, the subjects, statements, and reasons of the third dialogue can also be applied to the fourth.

E. Should the Tathāgata be Seen on the basis of "the Possession of Characteristic Marks"?[11]

The question raised here once again deals with how to see the Tathāgata or "How is the Tathāgata to be seen?" The issue is whether the Tathāgata should be seen "by means of the possession of characteristic marks." The Buddha's answer to this question is as follows:

> "If the Tathāgata were to be seen by means of the possession of characteristic marks, a wheel-turning king would also be a Tathāgata."

It is reiterated that "the Tathāgata should not be seen by means of the possession of characteristic marks." That is, if the possession of characteristic marks is the only criterion, the Tathāgata will be reduced to a wheel-turning king (*rājā cakravartī*), or a wheel-turning king could then be seen as a Tathāgata. This will cause confusion and cannot be treated as a means by which the Tathāgata is to be seen.

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[11] *T.* 220 (9), vol. 7, p. 985a; *Vajracchedikā-Conze*, p. 56; *Vajracchedikā-Schopen*, p. 105; *Vajracchedikā-Vaidya*, p. 87.

The question is answered, but it is answered indirectly and negatively by ruling out unsuitable items. How can the question be answered in a direct and positive fashion? The *Diamond Sutra* offers the following statement:

> "The Tathāgata is to be seen from the viewpoint of characteristic marks as not characteristic marks."

In other words, the direct and positive answer is located along the major axis of the *Diamond Sutra*, or even the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra*, namely, the wisdom of observing emptiness. It can be looked at and further explained from two angles. First, if one chooses "the possession of characteristic marks" as the perspective, one will confuse the Tathāgata with a wheel-turning king. Despite this problem, other items will not provide a better-qualified viewpoint. Second, "the possession of characteristic marks" has something to do with the Tathāgata, since under certain conditions the Tathāgata could manifest it to some extent. Moreover, it is also concerned with seeing, since under certain conditions one can still see and name it.

The main theme of the above two viewpoints is "*na abhinipātena, na abhinipātam anāgamya*," or "neither by means of being synthesized into a whole nor being independent of it." "Not by means of being synthesized into a whole" means that to know reality, one has more things to be done than remaining on certain items and waiting to be synthesized into the areas of thus confined items. "Not being independent of" means that to know reality, there is more to be done than knowing certain items and then remaining outside of the confined items. The purported idea of "neither by means of being synthesized into a whole nor being independent of" is to teach one to know reality as it truly is and to show that no items should be confined in the very beginning. To confine oneself to a certain item, treat it as an accepted premise, and then debate over it heatedly are far from being the right path toward reality.

If the idea of "neither by means of being synthesized into a whole nor being independent of" – whose main point is not to become confined within certain items – makes sense, then one asks: what is its basis? The answer is obvious: "characteristic marks as not characteristic marks." However, if "characteristic marks as not characteristic marks" is recognized as a certain item and is firmly clung to or cut off and kept a distance from, one's efforts will be exhausted

and deviated from the path toward reality as it truly is, namely, opening up the so-called characteristic marks and seeing them as not characteristic marks.

If "penetrating wisdom" (*nirvedhikā prajñā*), the main theme of the *Diamond Sutra* or even of the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra*, is taken into account, the above two angles will not be too difficult to understand. "Penetrating wisdom" can be presented vertically and horizontally. When presented vertically, if the process of variation with correlated conditions is sufficiently understood, there will be no fixed things or creatures that do not change, or any confinement that cannot be broken. Horizontally, if one sets aside sensations such as hearing or smelling, and focuses on seeing, the object that is seen will not be circumscribed in the ideas that "the mode of existence is merely the object being seen" or that "the labels identified are exactly the same as the object being seen." As such, the process of seeing will not be confined to such a short distance between seers and the object being seen, and the projected visions will not be pictures that are put into the package of words or discourses. In other words, vertically, seeing does not depart from the context of the entire process of seeing or pick out such items as the seers, the objects being seen, and the respective projected visions. Instead, it will reveal the context of the entire process of seeing, for one to fully understand in what kind of seeing process, in what kind of correlated condition, the cognitive constructs of the so-called seers, objects being seen, and projected visions are set up. Owing to the fact that most of these constructive items are products of the setting up of the seeing process, if the survey starts from examining the conditions correlated with setting and performs a thorough layer by layer analysis, it follows an in-depth understanding of how the projected visions are assembled and collocated with phrases or words. In so doing, the context of the entire process of seeing will be revealed, and then penetrating wisdom will thus come forth.

VI. The Penetrating Wisdom of Seeing Brings about the Advancement of Spiritual Cultivation

If seeing the Tathāgata's body constitution remains on the surface of seeing, such as the possession of characteristic marks, the thirty-two characteristic marks of a great person, the perfect development of the physical body, the seeing, will nevertheless eventually be very limited. Devoting oneself to such confined seeing, with the emphasis put on different areas, one may be able to make remarkable contributions to specialized art, like seeing people, physiognomy, aesthetics, art science, art history, or museology. Nevertheless, the teachings in the *Diamond Sutra* intend to lead one not to any specialized learning but to reveal penetrating wisdom and the advancement of spiritual cultivation upon seeing.

A very important reminder of teachings follows right after the fifth dialogue in the previous section.[12] If what is seen is the form of a body constitution, what is heard is the sound of the object, and the understanding gained from the sensory organs remains on the surface of contact, the efforts, however engaged, are misdirected, and the Tathāgata in its reality will not be seen. Since the Tathāgata is the guide (*nāyaka*) of Buddhist teachings and manifests from the *dharmakāya* ("Dharma-body"; or "the Dharma as the body"), the Tathāgata should be seen as a reflection of the *dharmatā* (the state of being the Dharma). In other words, "the Tathāgata should be seen from the viewpoint of the Dharma (*dharmataḥ*), and the *dharmatā* can be fully realized by this way of seeing." Since the *dharmatā* is not to be discerned, it is impossible for the *dharmatā* to be discerned.

From the above statement, three levels of seeing are thus distinguished. The outermost is "Seeing on the Surface" – seeing the possession of characteristic marks, the thirty-two characteristic marks of a great person, or the perfect development of the physical body. This seeing is composed of varying correlated conditions, and observes or recognizes certain visions from the composed results and applies words or concepts to signify or speak

[12] *T.* 220 (9), vol. 7, p. 985a-b; *Vajracchedika-Conze*, pp. 56–57; *Vajracchedikā-Schopen*, pp. 105–106; *Vajracchedikā-Vaidya*, pp. 87–88.

of them. At this level, seeing can be called *vastupatita*, or "to have fallen among things."

The middle is "Seeing into the Surface" – seeing into the constituents, such as the form of a body constitution or the sound of an object. However, if one sees into the constituents and treats them as fixed with identifiable features, what is seen will be false and will not function at all. For the open path or the right way to be taken, one must see not only the correlated conditions that make constituents form the visions on the surface, but also the reality of correlated conditions through the process of variation.

The innermost of these is "In-depth Seeing" – seeing the reality of correlated conditions through the process of variation is seeing constituents as the *dharmakāya* (Dharma-body; or the Dharma as the body) or the *dharmatā* (the state of being the Dharma). This level is not a level isolated from the other two, but one that opens up access to the previous levels. In this way, seeing the process of variation with correlated conditions penetrates all levels. That is to say that, although the three levels of seeing differ in the depths, insightfulness, and thoroughness, there are no three fixed levels in reality, and none of them can be independent of the other two and exist alone.

With the advancement of penetrative seeing, seeing will not remain on the surface of vision or linger on constituents of the middle level, nor will it branch out into numerous sets of dualistic differences. Instead, practitioners should devote themselves to seeing into the mechanism of assembling and disassembling and what the projected visions and constituents really are, through the process of variation with correlated conditions.

Accordingly, the idea that what has been seen is just the accumulated result of the variation of correlated conditions carries three remarkable messages. First, the so-called visions have no fixed existence in themselves, as is taught in the *Diamond Sutra*: "'Personal existence, personal existence,' as non-existence that has been taught by the Tathāgata"; "That which the Tathāgata has called a man endowed with a body, a huge body – it is said to be a non-body by the Tathāgata"; "'A perfect development of the physical body, a perfect development of the physical body,' that is said by the Tathāgata to be an imperfect development of the physical body"; and "What has been taught by the Tathāgata as the possession of

characteristic marks is truly not the possession of characteristic marks."

Second, constituents have no fixed existence of their own, so "constituents are not constituents." What this message seeks to convey is not that "there are no constituents" or that "constituents do not exist." Nor does it "negate" things. Instead, it presents *dharmatā*. "Constituents are not constituents" can also be expressed by *dharmaniḥsvabhāvatā* ("the lack of own-being concerning constituent items") and *dharmaśūnyatā* ("the emptiness of constituent items").

Third, though "constituents are not constituents," "dharmas" and "not-dharmas" are not in opposition to each other. Instead, by acutely seeing throughout the process of variation with correlated conditions and taking advantage of borrowed words and phrases, one can dismiss the substantialistic notion of "dharmas" and "not-dharmas." That is *"na sa dharmo na-a-dharmaḥ"* or "it is neither a dharma nor a non-dharma."[13]

Seeing the Tathāgata's body constitution is an opportunity to lead seeing from an experienced interface to an interface of spiritual cultivation. Since seeing comes before spiritual cultivation, it helps to open up from the surface, through the inner layer, to the bottom layer, and to offer a path from the experienced vision, through constituents, then to *dharmatā*. First-hand experiences are to be gained on the way of seeing into objects layer by layer. This demonstrates the wisdom of seeing in a universally accessible way. Therefore, if seeing is confined to a closed area, paths will undoubtedly be blocked and seriously limited from within. On the contrary, if seeing is opened up, the pathways of spiritual cultivation will naturally lead to more open areas.

VII. Conclusion

In the *Diamond Sutra*, seeing is very important because it raises the advancement of spiritual cultivation to such sublime spheres as *dharma-kāya*, *dharmatā*, and the Tathāgata. The related discussions in this paper can be summarized as follows:

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[13] *T.* 220 (9), vol. 7, p. 981a; *Vajracchedikā-Conze*, pp. 32-33; *Vajracchedikā-Vaidya*, p. 77.

First, in the *Diamond Sutra*, "seeing" is regarded as one of the most significant topics in Buddhist teaching. The bodies that are seen can be classified into the constitution of ordinary bodies and that of the Tathāgata.

Second, the *Diamond Sutra* includes at least five dialogues that discuss the topic of "how the Tathāgata should be seen," and shed light on the viewpoints that the Tathāgata should not be seen by means of "the possession of characteristic marks," "the thirty-two characteristic marks of a great person," or "the perfect development of the physical body," and that the means by which the Tathāgata be seen should be "non-entrapped," or "open-path-oriented."

Third, the *Diamond Sutra* is open-path-oriented not only in seeing but also in the spiritual cultivation leading toward the Bodhisattva Vehicle and the salvation of all sentient beings from cyclic existence. As a result, seeing is not used to prove the existence of the seer or the object being seen, nor is it used to open an unbridgeable gap between the seer and the object being seen. On the contrary, it is through seeing, which is capable of penetrating or being advanced, that the path of seeing is thus opened. Then, what is seen and what is capable of being seen will be equal and non-dual.

Finally, the *Diamond Sutra* presents penetrating wisdom concerning the path of seeing. From "Seeing on the Surface" which is formed by initially experienced visions, "Seeing into the Surface" by seeing into constituents, to "In-depth Seeing," where constituents in the flow of variation with correlated conditions is elicited, a path of seeing leading toward *dharmakāya*, "*dharmatā*," and the Tathāgata is thus opened.

Abbreviations

T – Taishō shinshūdaizōkyō

Vajracchedikā-Conze – Conze, Edward (ed. & tr.). *Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā*. Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1957.

Vajracchedikā-Schopen – Schopen, Gregory. The Manuscript of the Vajracchedikā Found at Gilgit: An Annotated Transcription and Translation. – *Studies in the Literature of the Great Vehicle: Three*

Mahāyāna Buddhist Texts. Edited by Luis O. Gómez and Jonathan A. Silk. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, 1989, 89–139.

Vajracchedikā-Vaidya – Vaidya, P. L. (ed.). Chapter 2: *Vajracchedikā Nāma Triśatikā Prajñāpāramitā, Mahāyānasūtra-saṃgraha*. Part I. – *Buddhist Sanskrit Texts*. No. 17. Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute, 1961, 75–89.

The Meaning of the *Śālistambasūtra**

Andres Herkel

I humbly dedicate this article to Linnart and all unknown authors of the Buddhist sūtras.

As we know, the concept of causality is one of the most complicated problems in the theoretical framework of Buddhism. It has also provoked a lot of interesting discussions among western scholars, especially in the early stage of Buddhist studies. Some of them confessed that there is a certain kind of paradox or impossibility to understand. Another made clearly unsophisticated conclusions.

The best way to study the Buddhist concept of causality is to study the texts. The context surrounding certain texts must be genuinely Buddhist. All tasks to interpret Buddhist causality on the bases of the concepts borrowed from European culture are extremely interesting but nevertheless one-sided.

Śālistambasūtra ("Rice Plant Sutra") is about Conditioned Arising (*pratītyasamutpāda*, in English also Dependent Origination etc.). Unlike other famous texts about *pratītyasamutpāda* like the *Mahānidānasutta*, *Pratītyasamutpādavibhaṅganirdeśa* etc., this text is instead considered to belong to the Mahāyāna sūtras. In the Hīnayāna the discovery of Conditioned Arising is connected with Gautama Buddha's experience of Nirvāṇa. According to tradition, Conditioned Arising was discovered by Buddha in the first week

* This paper is based on my translation of the *Śālistambasūtra* into Estonian ("Riisitaimesuutra" Sanskriti keelest tõlkinud Andres Herkel. – *Akadeemia*, 6. aastakäik, 1994, nr. 4, pp. 757–771). See also the further considerations in the book Herkel, Andres. *Müüt ja mõtlemine*. [Myth and Thinking] Tartu: Ilmamaa, 2002, pp. 107–154. As textual bases I used two critical editions: *Ārya Śālistamba Sūtra*. Ed. N. Ayaswami Sastri. Madras: Adyar Library, 1950, and Noble Ross Reat. *The Śālistambasūtra*. Tibetan Original, Sanskrit Reconstruction, Critical Notes. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1993.

after attaining Nirvāṇa. In the *Śālistambasūtra* bodhisattva Maitreya teaches Conditioned Arising to the Śāriputra. In this context, reference is also made to Gautama Buddha, who initially proclaimed the sūtra to monks looking upon a stalk of rice.

As in the case of many of the Mahāyana sūtras, the Sanskrit manuscript of *Śālistambasūtra* has not survived. The Sanskrit version, however, is reconstructed on the basis of the Tibetan translation, and comprehensive quotations in the works of Candrakīrti, Śāntideva, Prajñākāramati and another ancient Buddhist scholars.

Most the modern scholars agree that the *Śālistamba* is an ancient Mahāyāna text, where the extensive parallels with the Pāli *suttas* are revealed. Louis de La Vallée Poussin remarked that there is nothing specifically Mahāyānist in *Śālistamba*, other than the fact that the teaching is delivered by bodhisattva Maitreya.[1] Erich Frauwallner also said that the Mahāyānist nature of the sūtra is instead revealed in specific details, but the exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* is very similar to the Hināyānist Pāli texts.[2] Noble Ross Reat adds that the content and even exact phrasing reveals a particular similarity between the *Śālistamba* and the *Mahātaṇhasaṅkhaya Sutta* from *Majjhima Nikāya*.[3]

At this point, permit me to recall the classical exposition of Conditioned Arising which is genuinely present in *Śālistamba*:

> Therein what is Conditioned Arising? The phrase "Conditioned Arising" means: this being, that occurs; from the arising of this, that arises. That is to say: ignorance conditions (mental) formations. (Mental) formations condition consciousness. Consciousness conditions name-and-form. Name-and-form conditions the six sense entrances. The six entrances condition contact. Contact conditions sensation. Sensation conditions desire. Desire conditions grasping. Grasping conditions becoming. Becoming conditions birth. Birth conditions decay and death, and grief, lamentation, suffering, depression and anxiety arise. Thus the arising of this entire great mass of suffering occurs.[4]
>
> *(tatra katamaḥ pratītyasamutpādo nāma / pratītyasamutpādo nāma yaduta asmin satidaṃ bhavati, asyotpādād idamutpadyate / yadidam - avidyāpratyayāḥ*

[1] L. de la Vallée Poussin. *Théorie des douze causes*. Université de Gand, 1913, p. 69.
[2] E. Frauwallner. *Die Philosophie des Buddhismus*. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1969, S. 49.
[3] N. Ross Reat. Introduction. – *The Śālistambasūtra*, pp. 2–3.
[4] *Śālistambasūtra*, 3.

saṃskārāḥ / saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam / vijñānapratyayaṃ nāmarūpaṃ, nāmarūpapratyayaṃ ṣaḍāyatanaṃ, ṣaḍāyatanapratyayaḥ sparśaḥ / sparśapratyayā vedanā, vedanāpratyayā tṛṣṇā, tṛṣṇāpratyayam upādānam, upādānapratyayo bhavaḥ, bhavapratyayā jātiḥ, jātipratyayā jarāmaraṇaśoka paridevaduḥkhadaurmanasyopāyāsā bhavanti / evamasya kevalasya mahāto duḥkhaskandhasya samudayo bhavati//)

Further we see the presentation of the Conditioned Arising in a much broader context than is usually the case in the Pāli texts. The very name of the *Śālistamba* hints at the growing of the rice plant:

> It is as when a sprout comes from a seed, from the sprout a leaf, from the leaf a shoot, from the shoot a stalk, from the stalk a swelling, from the swelling a bud, from the bud a calyx, from the calyx a flower and from the flower a fruit.[5]

(tatra bāhiasya pratityasamutpādasya hetupanibandhaḥ katamaḥ / yadidam bijād-aṅkuraḥ, aṅkurāt-pattraṃ, pattrāt-kāṇḍam, kāṇḍān-nālaṃ, nālād-gaṇḍaḥ, gaṇḍād-garbhaṃ, garbhāc-chukaḥ, śukāt-puṣpam, puṣpāt-phalam-iti/)

This formula is presented as a causal relation of the external Conditioned Arising (*hetupanibandhaḥ*). Further, there is a conditional relation of the external Conditioned Arising (*pratyayopanibandhaḥ*) consisting of six elements: earth, water, heat, wind, space and season. The same elements are a conditional relation for internal Conditioned Arising, except for the sixth position, where instead of season, there is staying consciousness (*vijñāna*). The causal relation of the internal Conditioned Arising simply means the twelve links (*nidānas*) of the classical Chain of the Conditioned Arising: ignorance, (mental) formations, consciousness etc.

In addition to this broader but still quite formalistic exposition of Conditioned Arising, where causal and conditional levels of internal and external spheres are interwoven, there are other genuinely Mahāyānistic details. First of all, I draw attention to the use of metalogical formulas. My first example is about a well-known passage in the classical formula of Conditioned Arising. According to the teaching, individual consciousness (*vijñāna*) begins to develop on the basis of ignorance (*avidyā*) and mental formations (*saṃskārāḥ*). As consciousness begins to develop in the mother's womb, it is also called the consciousness of re-unification (*pratisaṃdhi-vijñāna*). At

[5] *Śālistambasūtra*, 11.

this stage, consciousness in the mother's womb takes his form and is also named. In other words, the fourth link of the Conditioned Arising, name-and-form (*nāmarūpa*) is developed. In this regard *Śālistambasūtra* says:

> And this sprout of name-and-form is not self-made, not made by another, not made by both, not made by God, not transformed by time, not derived from *prakṛti*, not founded upon a single principle, yet not arisen without cause.[6]
>
> *(sa ca nāmarūpāṅkuro na svayaṃkṛto na parakṛto nobhayakṛto neśvaranirmito na kālaparināmito na prakṛtisaṃbhūto na caikakāraṇādhino nāpy-ahetu samutpannaḥ/)*

This passage, as well as some similar passages in the text, are closed to the Nāgārjuna's famous formulation of the tetralemma in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ* I.1.: "Things are born neither from self, nor from another, nor from both, nor without cause." It is noteworthy that such formulations are especially evident at the end of the *Śālistambasūtra*.

Of course, the question of different text-stratums in the composition of the *Śālistambasūtra* can be raised. Many contemporary scholars such as Joseph Walser have also raised the question of the role of the *Śālistamba* as an intermediate text between *Majjhima Nikāya*'s "Word of the Buddha" and further developments in the Mahāyāna, including Nāgārjuna.[7] Even more complicated problems arise in connection with the historiography of this sūtra. My task was much more modest – just to emphasize how important a text the *Śālistamba* is. At least the Buddhist concept of causality and its different facets in the different schools cannot be understood without studying the *Śālistamba*. At the same time, the question to which school the *Śālistamba* actually belongs remains extremely complicated.

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[6] *Śalistambasūtra*, 34.

[7] J. Walser. *Nāgārjuna in Context. Mahāyāna Buddhism and Early Indian Culture.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, p. 168–171.

II
The Ways of Buddhism: Past and Present

Jhānas (Theravāda) = Daśabhūmi (Mahāyāna) = Ten Stages of Mind (Shingon)

Kalpakam Sankarnarayan

Introduction

In the present globalizing world and in the midst of the turbulent situation caused by modernization, which has had both positive and negative influences people from Eastern or Western countries can rely on Buddhism, the world religion that teaches the technique for attaining peace of mind through meditation.

Somehow the common individual continues to suffer because of the erosion of values and ethics in practically every sphere of human activity. The phenomenon is not new, but its magnitude has increased.

To be a good man or citizen, one should nurture inner virtue; one must rid oneself of enemies within – pride, anger, desire and greed. When a person acts in violation of moral precepts, he excites and reinforces the very same mental factors that his practice of meditation is intended to eliminate. This involves him in a crossfire of incompatible aims which renders ineffective his attempts at mental purification. The only way he can avoid frustrating his endeavour to purify the mind of its subtler defilements is to prevent the unwholesome inner impulses from breaking out in the coarser form of unwholesome bodily and verbal deeds. Only when one establishes control over the outer expression of defilements can one begin to deal with them inwardly as mental obsessions that appear in the process of meditation.

These were highlighted by the Buddha. In the case of all of these, it is the mind that has to be taken care of, because in an instant

the mind can travel anywhere and everywhere and back again. Thoughts grow faster. Waves and waves of thoughts arise in one's mind constantly and move away. Control of the mind paves the way to ridding enemies within.

Having steadfastness and self-control, i.e. firmness of mind, helps individuals to overcome suffering and attain salvation/ enlightenment here and now.

The Buddha states that our hope of salvation lies in the regeneration of our nature. One cannot be happy if one's mind and heart are not at peace.[1]

Meditation occupies a central place in Buddhism and combines, in its highest stages, the discipline of progressively increased introversion with the insight brought about by wisdom, or *prajñā*.

The stages of Buddhist meditation start from the four *jhānas* of Early Buddhism to the ten stages of meditation (*daśabhūmi*) of Mahāyāna Buddhism and the ten stages of (Kukai's) Shingon Buddhism. The Buddhists describe final *Nirvāṇa* as attaining the insight of wisdom. The exercises used to develop wisdom involve meditation on the true nature of reality or the conditioned and unconditioned *dharma*s (elements) that make up all phenomena. As much as the emphasis is on meditation, the training of mind is given importance in Buddhism.

The reason why I am harping on the meditation techniques is that: Buddhism believes in the fetters of *karma*, which is the cause of the life in the present as the fruit (of one's own actions – *pratītyasamutpāda*) – certainly not according to the whims and fancies of an external super power; each one of us is the master of our future; it could be that the present chaos is collectively also the outcome of the same. Thus if each individual gives importance and strives to get rid of the fetters of *karma* and its (fruit) *vipāka*, through meditation there is the possibility of escaping from the present chaos within and without.

Meditation, though important in all schools of Buddhism, has developed characteristic variations within different traditions. In China and Japan the practice of *dhyāna* (meditation) assumed sufficient importance to develop into a school of its own (Chan and Zen – based on *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* and *Yogācarabhūmiśāstra*), in which

[1] *Suttavibhaṅga-sutta, Majjhima Nikāya*, I. 22.

meditation is the most essential feature of the school. Though there are variations in the number of stages or steps, the outcome remains the same.

I would like to give a brief account of the three scriptures I am referring to here. The three texts belong to three different centuries, but the *Buddhavacana* are so very relevant to the contemporary modern society irrespective of their different geographical locations. The *Buddhavacana* is a Universal Teaching. The message of the Buddha comes to the world as an effective way of help with present-day afflictions and problems, and as a radical cure for ever-present Ill or Evil. In the teachings of the Buddha, the emphasis is on "mind."

The Buddha *Dhamma* is as applicable in the lands of the West as it is in the East; in the midst of life's turmoil in the home of the layman as well as in the peace of the monk's cell.

Nikāyas

The *Nikāya*s of *Suttapiṭaka*, a Pāli cannon, treat both the life and teachings of the Buddha at length. In addition to the *Dīghanikāya* and *Majjhimanikāya*, the *Jhānasamyutta* or *Samādhisamyutta*[2] deal with contemplation or meditation (*jhāna* or *samādhi*). These are records of the original teachings preserved by the disciples of the Buddha.

Daśabhūmika-sūtra

Daśabhūmika-sūtra is a Buddhist Sanskrit work, generally regarded as a portion of the *Avataṃsaka-sūtra* but found frequently as an independent work. The subject matter of this work is a discourse on the ten steps (*daśabhūmi*) by which buddhahood may be attained. The speaker is the bodhisattva Vajragarbha, who gives himself up to a deep meditation in a vast assembly of buddhas and bodhisattvas, and is then invited by Śākyamuni to explain the 'ten steps'

[2] *Samādhisamyutta*, XXXIV of *Samyuttanikāya*.

while rays of light emanate in all directions from all of the buddhas present.[3]

The Ten Stages of the Development of the Mind (and The Precious Key to the Secret Treasury – Hizō-hōyaku)[4] *of Kūkai's Shingon Buddhism*

Kūkai, posthumously known as Kōbō Daishi, the founder of *Shingon* Buddhism[5] in Japan, was initiated by the Chinese master Huiguo, and produced this most ambitious work the Ten Stages, which is perhaps the most comprehensive religious work that has come down to us from Japan. In the introductory section, he states: "The ten stages are the ten levels of the mind, from lower to highest. The development of the religious mind is a process of spiritual awakening or discovery of one's mind, a full actualization of the intrinsically enlightened mind contained in the lowest stage". In the words of Kukai: "These are the stages of development of the mind through which the dark goatish mind (which only thinks of satisfying the instincts) advances to the higher level, leaving darkness behind and seeking light."

In this work I focus only on the second *jhāna* of the Theravāda tradition, the third *bhūmi* of the Mahāyāna Tradition and the fifth stage of the Shingon tradition reaching which one's mind can be freed from the seed of the cause of *karma*. The whole of humanity is facing the result of karmic fruits – fear of one's own advanced scientific finding or revelation, the fear of man's own vastly improved instruments of destruction. Fear, however, is not a very reliable brake on man's impulses, and it constantly poisons the atmosphere by creating a feeling of frustration which again fans the fires of hate.

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[3] First this work was translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva – 406, then by Bodhiruci – 500–516 and Śīladharma in 789; *Cf.* Nanjio, No. 88f, 105, 110, 1180, 1194.

[4] *Kōbō daishi shodeshi zenshū* (The complete works of the disciples of Kōbō daishi), 3 vols, Kyoto, Rokudai shimposha, 1942.

[5] The Mantrayāna sect of 8th century India.

The four jhānas (dhyāna) *as in the Theravāda tradition in general*

In the Theravāda Buddhist scriptures – the Pāli Canon and its commentaries – the four *jhānas* are divided into two inter-related systems. One is called 'the development of serenity' (*samathabhāvanā*), and the other 'the development of insight' (*vipassanābhāvanā*). The former is also referred to as the development of concentration (*samādhibhāvanā*), and the latter the development of wisdom (*paññābhāvanā*). The aim of the practice of serenity meditation is to develop a calm, concentrated and unified mind as a means of experiencing inner peace and as a basis for wisdom.

During the First Watch, he had knowledge of the recollection of past human lives, and knowledge of the cycle of death and rebirth.

The Second Watch involves recognition that the cycle of rebirth affects all sentient beings in all worlds, and that the law of karma determines the quality and type of rebirth, and the nature of suffering.

The Third Watch involves the recognition of the cycle of causality that leads to death and rebirth, and the means of liberation from this cycle.

The Fourth Watch involves the recognition of the state of enlightenment, and the great awakening of the Buddha.

The practice of insight meditation aims at obtaining a direct understanding of the real nature of phenomena. Of the two, the development of insight is regarded by Buddhism as the essential key to liberation, the direct antidote to the ignorance underlying bondage and suffering. Whereas serenity meditation is recognized as common to both Buddhist and non-Buddhist contemplative disciplines, insight meditation is held to be the unique discovery of the Buddha and an unparalleled feature of his path.

Because the growth of insight presupposes a certain degree of concentration, however, and serenity meditation helps to achieve this, the development of serenity also claims an incontestable place in the Buddhist meditative process. Together the two types of meditation work to make the mind a fit instrument for enlightenment.

With his mind unified by means for the development of serenity, made sharp and bright by the development of insight, the meditator can proceed unobstructed to reach the end of suffering, *Nibbāna*.

Pivotal to both systems of meditation is a set of meditative attainments called the *jhāna*s, which belongs inherently to the element of serenity. The early suttas speak of four *jhānas*, named simply after their numerical position in the series: the first *jhāna*, the second *jhāna*, the third *jhāna* and the fourth *jhāna*. In the suttas these four appear repeatedly, each described by a standard formula which we will later examine in detail.

The *jhānas* figure prominently both in the Buddha's own experience and in his exhortation to disciples. In his childhood, while attending an annual ploughing festival, the future Buddha spontaneously entered the first *jhāna*. It was the memory of this childhood incident, many years later after his futile pursuit of austerities, that revealed to him the way to enlightenment during his period of deepest despondency.[6] After taking his seat beneath the Bodhi tree, the Buddha enter the four *jhānas* immediately before directing his mind to the threefold knowledge that ended in his enlightenment.[7] Throughout his active career the four *jhānas* remained "his heavenly dwelling"[8] to which he resorted in order to live happily here and now. His understanding of the corruption, purification and emergence in the *jhānas* and other meditative attainments is one of the Tathāgata's ten powers which enable him to turn the matchless wheel of the Dhamma.[9] Just before his passing away the Buddha entered the *jhānas* in direct and reverse order, and the passing away itself took place directly from the fourth *jhāna*.[10]

The Buddha is constantly seen in the suttas encouraging his disciples to develop *jhāna*. The four *jhānas* are invariably included in the complete course of training laid down for disciples.[11] In the *Culahatthipādopama-sutta*[12] they figure in the training as the discipline of higher consciousness (*adhicittasikkhā*), right concentration (*sammāsamādhi*) of the Noble Eightfold Path, and the faculty and power of concentration (*samādhindriya*, *samādhibala*). Though a vehi-

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6 M.i, 246–47.

7 M.i.247–49.

8 D.iii, 220.

9 M.i, 70.

10 D.ii, 156.

11 See for example, the *Samannaphala Sutta* D. 2.

12 M. 27 etc.

cle of dry insight can be found, indications are that this path is not an easy one, lacking the aid of the powerful serenity available to the practitioner of *jhāna*. The way of the *jhāna* attainer seems by comparison to be smoother and more pleasurable.[13] The Buddha even refers to the four *jhānas* figuratively as a kind of Nibbāna: he calls them visible Nibbāna, factorial Nibbāna and Nibbāṇa here and now.[14]

To attain the *jhānas*, the meditator must begin by eliminating the unwholesome mental states that obstruct inner collectedness, which are generally grouped together as the five hindrances (*pañcanivaraṇa*): sensual desire, ill will, sloth and torpor, restlessness and worry and doubt (*kāmacchanda, byāpāda, thīnamiddha, uddhaccakukkucca, vicikicchā*). The mind's absorption in its object is brought about by five opposing mental states – applied thought, sustained thought, rapture, happiness and one-pointedness (*vitakka, vicāra, pīti, sukha, ekaggatā*) – called the *jhāna* factors (*jhānangāni*) because they lift the mind to the level of the first *jhāna* and remain there as its defining components.

After reaching the first *jhāna*, the ardent meditator can go on to reach the higher *jhānas*, which is done by eliminating the coarser factors in each *jhāna*. Beyond the four *jhānas* lies another fourfold set of higher meditative states which further deepen the element of serenity. These attainments (*āruppa*) are the base of boundless space, the base of boundless consciousness, the base of nothingness, and the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception (*ākāsānañcāyatana, viññāṇañcāyatana, akiñcaññāyatana, nevasaññānāsaññāyatana*). In the Pāli commentaries these come to be called the four immaterial *jhānas* (*arūpajhāna*), the four preceding states having for the sake of clarity been renamed the four fine-material *jhānas* (*rūpajhāna*). The two sets are often combined under the collective title of the eight *jhānas* or the eight attainments (*aṭṭhasamāpattiyo*).

The four *jhānas* and the four immaterial attainments initially appear as mundane states of deep serenity pertaining to the preliminary stage of the Buddhist path, and on this level they help provide the base of concentration needed for wisdom to arise. The four *jhānas* again reappear, however, in a later stage in the devel-

[13] A.ii, 150–52.

[14] A.iv, 453–54.

opment of the path, in direct association with liberating wisdom, and they are then designated the supramundane (*lokuttara*) *jhānas*. These supramundane *jhānas* are the levels of concentration pertaining to the four degrees of enlightenment experience called the supramundane paths (*magga*) and the stages of liberation resulting from them, the four fruits (*phala*).

Finally, even after full liberation is achieved, the mundane *jhānas* can still remain as attainments available to the fully liberated person, i.e. part of his untrammeled contemplative experience.

Jhāna *and* samādhi

In the vocabulary of Buddhist meditation the word *jhāna* is closely connected with another word, *samādhi*, which is generally rendered as 'concentration'. *Samādhi* is derived from the prefixed verbal root *sam-ā-dhā*, meaning 'to collect or to bring together', thus suggesting the concentration or unification of the mind. The word *samādhi* is almost interchangeable with the word *samatha*, 'serenity', though the latter comes from a different root, *sam*, meaning to become calm. In the suttas *samādhi* is defined as mental one-pointedness (*cittass'ekaggatā* M.i, 301), and this definition is followed through rigorously in the *Abhidhamma*. The *Abhidhamma* treats one-pointedness as a distinct mental factor present in every state of consciousness, exercising the function of unifying the mind on its object.

However, despite the commentator's bid for consistency, the word *samādhi* is used in the Pali literature on meditation with varying degrees of specificity of meaning. In the narrowest sense, as defined by Buddhaghosa, it denotes the particular mental factor responsible for the concentration of the mind, namely one-pointedness. In a broader sense it can signify the states of unified consciousness that result from the strengthening of concentration, i.e. the meditative attainments of serenity and the stages leading up to them. In a still broader sense, the word *samādhi* can be applied to the method of practice used to produce and cultivate these refined states of concentration, which are here equivalent to the development of serenity. It is in the second sense that *samādhi* and *jhāna* are closest in meaning. The Buddha explains right concentration as

the four *jhānas* (D.ii, 313), and in doing so allows concentration to encompass the meditative attainments signified by the *jhānas*.

The moral foundation for jhāna

A disciple aspiring to the *jhānas* must first lay a solid foundation of moral discipline. Moral purity is indispensable to meditative progress for several deeply psychological reasons. It is needed first in order to safeguard against the danger of remorse, the nagging sense of guilt that arises when the basic principles of morality are ignored or deliberately violated. Scrupulous conformity to virtuous rules of conduct protects the mediator from this danger that disrupts inner calm, and brings joy and happiness when the mediator reflects upon the purity of his conduct (see A.v, 1–7).

A moral foundation is needed, for meditation follows from an understanding of the purpose of concentration. Concentration, in the Buddhist discipline, aims at providing a base for wisdom by cleansing the mind of the dispersive influence of the defilements. In order for concentration exercises to effectively combat the defilements, however, the coarser expressions of the latter through bodily and verbal action must first be checked. Moral transgressions are invariably motivated by defilements – greed, hatred and delusion – when a person acts in violation of the precepts of morality, he excites and reinforces the very same mental factors his practice of meditation is intended to eliminate. This involves him in a crossfire of incompatible aims which renders his attempts at mental purification ineffective. The only way he can avoid frustration in his endeavour to purify the mind of its subtler defilements is to prevent the unwholesome inner impulses from breathing out in the coarser form of unwholesome bodily and verbal deeds. Only when he establishes control over the outer expression of the defilements can he turn to deal with them inwardly as mental obsessions that appear in the process of meditation.

The practice of moral discipline consists negatively in abstinence from immoral actions of the body and speech and positively in the observance of ethical principles promoting peace within oneself and harmony in one's relations with others. The basic code of moral discipline taught by the Buddha for the guidance of his lay follow-

ers consists of the five precepts: abstinence from taking life, stealing, engaging in sexual misconduct and false speech and consuming intoxicating drugs and drinks. These principles are bindings as minimal ethical obligations for all practitioners of the Buddhist path, and within their bounds considerable progress in meditation can be made.

After establishing a foundation of purified morality, the aspirant to meditation is advised to cut off any outer impediments (*palibodha*) that may hinder his efforts to lead a life of contemplation. A prospective meditator is advised to avail himself of the living heritage of accumulated knowledge and experience by placing himself under the care of a qualified teacher, described as a 'good friend' (*kalyāṇamitta*), one who gives guidance and wise advice rooted in his own practice and experience.

A *kasiṇa* is a device representing a particular quality used as a support for concentration. The ten *kasiṇas* are those of earth, water, fire and air; the four color *kasiṇas* are blue, yellow, red and white; there is also the light *kasiṇa* and the limited space *kasiṇa*. The *kasiṇa* can be either a naturally occurring form of the element or colour in question or an artificially produced device such as a disk that the meditator can use at his convenience in his meditation quarters.

The *ten recollections* are the recollections of the Buddha, the Dhamma, the Sangha, morality, generosity and the deities, mindfulness of death, mindfulness of the body, mindfulness of breathing and the recollection of peace. The first three are devotional contemplations on the sublime qualities of the Three Jewels, the primary objects of Buddhist virtues and on the deities inhabiting the heavenly worlds, intended principally for those still intent on a higher rebirth. Mindfulness of death is reflection on the inevitability of death, a constant spur to spiritual exertion. Mindfulness of the body involves the mental dissection of the body into thirty-two parts, undertaken with a view to perceiving its unattractiveness. Mindfulness of breathing is awareness of the in-and-out movement of the breath, perhaps the most fundamental of all Buddhist meditation subjects. The recollection of peace is reflection on the qualities of Nibbāṇa.

The *four divine abidings* (*brahmavihāra*) are the development of boundless loving-kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy and equanimity. These meditations are also called the 'immeasurables'

(*appamaññā*) because they are to be developed towards all sentient beings without qualification or exclusiveness.

The *four immaterial states* are the base of boundless space, the base of boundless consciousness, the base of nothingness, and the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. These are the objects leading to the corresponding meditative attainments, the immaterial *jhānas*.

Owing to their simplicity and freedom from thought construction, the ten *kasiṇas* and mindfulness of breathing can lead to all four *jhānas*. The ten kinds of foulness and mindfulness of the body only lead to the first *jhāna*, being limited because the mind can only hold onto them with the aid of applied thought (*vitakka*), which is absent in the second and higher *jhānas*. The first three divine abidings can induce the lower three *jhānas* but not the fourth, since they arise in association with pleasant feeling, while the divine abiding of equanimity occurs only at the level of the fourth *jhāna*, where neutral feeling gains ascendancy.

Mindfulness of breathing is suitable for those with deluded and speculative temperaments. The first six recollections are appropriate for faithful temperaments. Four subjects – mindfulness of death, the recollection of peace, the defining of the four elements, and the perception of the repulsiveness of nutriment – are especially effective for those of intelligent temperament.

The *Visuddhimagga* explains that there are three kinds of seclusion relevant to the present context – namely, bodily seclusion (*kāyaviveka*), mental seclusion (*cittaviveka*), and seclusion by suppression (*vikkhambhanaviveka*) (Vism. 140: 145).

The first of these means physical withdrawal from active social engagement into a condition of solitude for the purpose of devoting time and energy to spiritual development. The second, which generally presupposes the first, means the seclusion of the mind from its entanglement in defilements; it is in effect equivalent to concentration of at least the access level. The third, "seclusion from the substance," is Nibbāṇa, liberation from the elements of phenomenal existence.

The Buddha says that all hindrances arise through unwise consideration (*ayoniso-manasikāra*) and that they can be eliminated by wise consideration (*yoniso-manasikāra*). Both *vitakka* (applied thought) and *vicāra* (sustained thought) play an important role in

meditation (cf. *jhānas*). Applied thought can be unwholesome as in thoughts of sensual pleasure, ill will and cruelty, or wholesome as in thoughts of renunciation, benevolence and compassion (M.i, 116).

The *Visuddhimagga* explains that happiness in the first *jhāna* has the characteristic of gratifying, the function of intensifying associated states, and as manifestation, the rendering of aid to its associated states (Vism. 145: 151).

Applied thought, however, directs the mind onto the object; sustained thought keeps it anchored there. Happiness (rapture) produced by the success of the effort refreshes the mind, whose effort has succeeded through not being distracted by those hindrances.

After attaining the first *jhāna* a few times, the meditator is not advised to set out immediately to strive for the second *jhāna*. This would be a foolish and profitless spiritual ambition. Before he is prepared to make the second *jhāna*, the goal of his endeavour, he must first bring the first *jhāna* to perfection.

The perfecting of the first *jhāna* involves two steps: the extension of the sign and the achievement of the five masteries. The extension of the sign means extending the size of the counterpart sign, the object of the *jhāna*. Beginning with a small area, the size of one or two fingers, the meditator gradually learns to broaden the sign until the mental image can be made to cover the world-sphere or even beyond (Vism. 152–53: 158–59).

Following this, the meditator should try to acquire five kinds of mastery over the *jhāna*: mastery in adverting, attaining, resolving, emerging and reviewing (*āvajjanavasī*, *samāpajjanavasī*, *adhiṭṭhānavasī*, *vuṭṭhānavasī*, *paccavekkhaṇavasī*). (For a discussion of this, see Vism. 154–55: 160–61. The canonical source for the five masteries is the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, i. 100.) Mastery in adverting is the ability to advert to the *jhāna* factors one by one after emerging from the *jhāna* wherever he wants, whenever he wants, and for as long as he wants. Mastery in attaining is the ability to enter upon the *jhāna* quickly, mastery in resolving is the ability to remain in the *jhāna* for exactly the pre-determined length of time, mastery in emerging is the ability to emerge from *jhāna* quickly without difficulty, and mastery in reviewing is the ability to review the *jhāna* and its factors with retrospective knowledge immediately after

adverting to them. When the meditator has achieved this fivefold mastery, he is ready to strive for the second *jhāna*.

The formula for the attainment of the second *jhāna* is as follows:

With the subsiding of applied thought and sustained thought, he enters and dwells in the second *jhāna*, which has internal confidence and unification of mind, is without applied thought and sustained thought, and is filled with rapture and happiness born of concentration (M.i, 181; Vbh. 245).

The second *jhāna*, like the first, is attained by eliminating the factors to be abandoned and by developing the factors of possession. In this case, however, the factors to be abandoned are the two initial factors of the first *jhāna* itself, applied thought and sustained thought; the factors of possession are the three remaining *jhāna* factors, rapture, happiness and one-pointedness. Hence the formula begins "with the subsiding of applied thought and sustained thought," and then mentions the *jhāna's* positive endowments.

After achieving the five kinds of mastery over the first *jhāna*, a meditator who wishes to reach the second *jhāna* should enter the first *jhāna* and contemplate its defects. These are twofold: one, which might be called the defect of proximate corruption, is the nearness of the five hindrances, against which the first *jhāna* provides only a relatively mild safeguard; the other defect, inherent to the first *jhāna*, is its inclusion of applied and sustained thought, which now appear as gross, even as impediments needing to be eliminated to attain the more peaceful and subtle second *jhāna*.

In the first *jhāna* the meditator's faith lacked full clarity and serenity due to "the disturbance created by applied and sustained thought, like water ruffled by ripples and wavelets" (Vism. 163). When applied and sustained thought subside, however, the mind becomes very peaceful and the meditator's faith acquires fuller confidence.

The formula also mentions unification of mind (*cetaso ekodibhavam*), which is identified with one-pointedness or concentration. Though present in the first *jhāna*, concentration only gains special mention in connection with the second *jhāna* since it is here that it acquires eminence. In the first *jhāna* concentration was still imperfect, being subject to the disturbing influence of applied and sustained thought. For the same reason this *jhāna*, along with its con-

stituent rapture and happiness, is said to be born of concentration (*samādhijam*):

> "It is only this concentration that is quite worthy to be called 'concentration' because of its complete confidence and extreme immobility due to the absence of disturbance by applied and sustained thought" (Vism. 158: 164).

The jhānas *and rebirth*

Buddhism teaches that all sentient beings in whom ignorance and craving still linger are subject to rebirth following death. Their mode of rebirth is determined by their *kamma*, their volitional action; wholesome *kamma* issues in a good rebirth and unwholesome *kamma* in a bad rebirth. As a kind of wholesome *kamma*, the attainment of *jhāna* can play a key role in the rebirth process, being considered a weighty good *kamma* which takes precedence over other lesser *kammas* in determining the future rebirth of the person who attains it.

What is required to achieve complete deliverance from the cycle of rebirths is the eradication of the defilements. Since the most basic defilement is ignorance (*avijjā*), the key to liberation lies in developing its direct opposite, namely wisdom (*paññā*).

Wisdom is present as right view and serenity as right concentration, and both function together in perfect harmony, neither one exceeding the other.

The one liberated by wisdom is an *arahat* who does not obtain the immaterial attainments. In the words of the sutta:

> And what person, monks, is the one liberated by wisdom? Herein, monks, someone has not reached with his own (mental) body those peaceful material deliverances transcending material form, but having seen with wisdom his cankers are destroyed. This person, monks, is called one liberated by wisdom. (M.i, 477–78.)

When liberation of mind and liberation by wisdom are joined together and described as 'cankerless' (*anāsava*), they can be taken to indicate two aspects of the arahat's deliverance. Liberation of mind signifies the release of one's mind from craving and its associated defilements, liberation by wisdom the release from ignorance:

> With the fading away of lust there is liberation of mind, with the fading away of ignorance there is liberation by wisdom. (A.i, 61.)
>
> As he sees and understands, thus his mind is liberated from the canker of sensual desire, from the canker of existence and from the canker of ignorance. (M.i, 183–84.)

Here release from the first two cankers can be understood as liberation of mind, and release from the canker of ignorance as liberation by wisdom.

On the side of inner experience the *jhānas* are valued as providing the arahat with a "blissful dwelling here and now" (*diṭṭhadhammasukhavihāra*). The suttas often show arahats attaining to *jhāna*, and the Buddha himself declares the four *jhānas* to be figuratively a kind of Nibbāṇa in this present life (A.iv. 453–54).

For non-arahats the mundane *jhānas* constitute wholesome *kamma*; they are deeds with a potential to produce results, to precipitate rebirth in a corresponding realm of existence. In the case of an arahat, however, mundane *jhāna* no longer generates *kamma*. Since he has eradicated ignorance and craving, the roots of *kamma*, his actions leave no residue; they have no capacity to generate results. For him the jhānic consciousness is a mere functional consciousness which comes and goes, and once gone disappears without a trace. It is significant that in all of these lists of qualities, the last item is always the attainment of arahatship, "the cankerless liberation of mind, liberation by wisdom."

In the period after the Buddha's demise, what qualified a monk to give guidance to others was endowment with ten qualities: moral virtue, learning, contentment, mastery over the four *jhānas*, the five mundane *abhiññā*s (the five *abhiññā*s or 'super-knowledges': the exercise of psychic powers, the divine ear, the ability to read the minds of others, the recollection of past lives, knowledge of the death and rebirth of beings, and the sixth – knowledge of final liberation) and attainment of the cankerless liberation of mind, liberation by wisdom (M.iii, 11–12).

The *second jhāna* of the Theravada tradition, i.e. to be relieved of the karmic canker, is the *third bhūmi* (*prabhākarī*) of the Mahāyāna tradition. (The ten *bhūmi*s are *pramuditā*, *vimalā*, *prabhākarı*,

arciṣmatī, sudurjayā, abhimukhī, dūraṅgamā, acalā, sādhumatī, and *dharmameghā*).

The aspirant prepares himself to undertake the journey by ascending the first *bhūmi – pramuditā* – in which the aspirant makes ten *praṇidhānas* (cf. Suzuki 1981: 307):

...mahāpūjopasthānāya prathamaṃ mahāpraṇidhānam abhinirharati; ... saddharmaparigrahāya dvitiyam; .....yāvan mahāparinirvāṇopasaṃkramaṇāya tritīyam; .....cittotpādābhinirhārāya caturtham; ...sarvajñajñānapratiṣṭhāpanāya ...pañcamam; ..... lokadhātuvaimātryāvatāraṇāya ṣaṣṭham; ...sarvabuddhkṣetrapariśodhanāya saptamam; ...mahāyānāvatāranāya aṣṭamam;... sarvabodhisattvacaryācaraṇāya ca amoghasarvaceṣṭatāyai navamam; ... abhisaṃbodhimahājñānābhijñābhinirhārāya daśamam;... (DBHS, 10)

These ten *praṇidhānas* aim to make one the first, the foremost and the best of all beings. This spiritual preparation takes him to a high level of perfection, and with this frame of mind continues his journey with ardent faith and fervour and reaches the second stage, called *vimalā.*

I highlight the third and fifth *bhūmi* (*prabhākarī* and *sudurjayā*), as the third helps one's different varieties of worldly bondage to become attenuated, and the fifth stage, where he dwells and develops ten qualities of pure mental dispositions (*cittāśayaviśuddhisamatā*) – develops mental , intellectual and moral qualities by meticulous observance of a rigorous course of discipline and ceaseless application. This all-round elevation enables one to fulfill the mission of bringing about the spiritual regeneration of all beings.

The prabhākarī

After reaching the bhūmi of *pramuditā* and *vimalā,* the meditator or aspirant ascends the third stage, called *prabhākarī* or illumination. On this path he is accompanied by ten mental concentrations (*manaskāra*) on ten mental dispositions (*cittāśaya*), viz., 1. on pure mental dispositions; 2. on steadfast mental disposition; 3. on dispassionate mental disposition; 4. on non-dispassionate mental disposition; 5. on non-recurring mental disposition; 6. on firm and obdurate mental disposition; etc.:

...daśabhiś cittāśayamanaskārair ākramati / katamair daśasbhiḥ? yaduta śuddhacittāśayamanaskāreṇa ca sthiracittāśayamanaskāreṇa ca nirviccittāśaya-

manaskāreṇa ca avirāgacittāśayamanaskāreṇa ca avinivartacittaśayamanaskāreṇa ca dṛḍhacittāśayamanaskāreṇa... (DBHS, 19)

The aspirant thoroughly reflects on the fact that all conditioned states of being (things, *saṃskāras*) are impermanent, painful, inauspicious, undependable, and susceptible to production and annihilation in a moment. Furthermore, they are not liable to revert to the past, not liable to pass into another state in the future, and liable to discrimination in the present:

...anityatāṃ ca sarvasaṃskāragatasya yathābhūtam pratyavekṣate duḥkhatāṃ ca aśubhatāṃ ca anāśvāsikatāṃ ca vipralopatāṃ ca acirasthitikatāṃ ca kṣaṇikotpādanirodhatāṃ ca pūrvāntāsaṃbhavatām ca aparāntasaṃkrāntitāṃ ca pratyutpannāvyavasthitatāṃ ca sarvasaṃskāragatasya pratyavekṣate. (*Ibid.*)

He realizes that egoism (*ātmabhāva*) is without any support, doleful, fettered by the pleasant and the unpleasant and is a mass of misery, depression, and mental perturbation. This induces him to set his mind in motion and direct it towards Tathāgata-knowledge. Gradually he becomes conscious of its numerous rare qualities, including its conduciveness to the deliverance of innumerable individuals. He comprehends its immeasurability, and thoroughly investigates the disquieting elements that are involved in all of the conditioned states of being.

The aspirant reaches the stage of a Bodhisattvahood and he ultimately provides the suffering creatures with ten mental (or intellectual) dispositions, viz., that which serves as the refuge for the deliverance of 1. the helpless; 2. the poor; 3. those scorched by the fire of longing, loathing and delusion; 4. those confined within the prison of worldly existence; 5. those subjected to hypnosis of evil passions; 6. those incapable of discrimination; 7. those who are destitute of good resolve; 8. those deprived of Buddha's discipline; 9. those subjected to the cycle of transmigration; and 10. those deprived of the means of emancipation.

He perceives that the sentient beings are confronted with endless discomforting factors. He calls up his dormant energy and becomes aware of the fact that the responsibility of providing them with speedy relief rests with him. He ponders upon the ways and means calculated to rescue them from their boundless afflictions and to establish them in the realm of Nirvāṇa. He reaches the con-

clusion that there is no other way for the achievement of that end than the unobstructed knowledge of salvation (*anāvaraṇavimokṣa-jñānasthānāt*). After a series of discursive deliberations, he becomes firmly convinced that attainment of the afore-mentioned knowledge hinges upon the proficiency in the dharma of the Master, and as such he strives after its realization. He becomes entirely engrossed in the thought of the dharma:

> *...dharmārāmo dharmarato dharmapratiśaraṇo dharmanimno dharmapravaṇo dharmaprāgbhāro dharmaparāyano dharmalayano dharmatrāṇo dharmānudharmacārī.* (*Ibid.* 20.)

He puts the four types of *dhyāna*:

> *...so'syaṃ prabhākaryāṃ bodhisattvabhūmau ...savitarkaṃ savicāraṃ vivekajaṃ prītisukhaṃ prathamaṃ dhyānam upasaṃpadya viharati ...avitarkam avicāram samādhijam prītisukhaṃ dvitīyaṃ dhyānam upasaṃpadya viharati....sukhavihārī niṣprītikaṃ tṛtīyaṃ dhyānam upasampadya viharati... caturthaṃ dhyānam upasaṃpadya viharati.* (*Ibid.*; cf.)

As the four *jhāna*s of *Nikāya*s in their graduated order into actual practice, with a view to bring about the realization of the dharma and the *anudharma* in their true light.

The aspirant treads the path step by step. In this stage he perceives innumerable buddhas. His different varieties of worldly bondage becomes attenuated. His desire, hatred and infatuation come to an end. His roots of merit are purified. His states of mental disposition, viz. receptivity, mildness, friendliness, sweetness of speech, absence of exaltation and depression, and absence of desire for requital relative to previous services and the like, attain a higher level of purification. His course of conduct for the welfare of all beings and intellectual receptivity as one of the virtues of perfection (*kṣāntipāramitā*) become predominant in this stage. He provides all creatures with ways and means conducive to their deliverance from the mire of sensual desire.

In the next stage (the fourth – *arciṣmatī*) his mind reaches an ideal state of perfection due to the development of its different sterling qualities; acquires predominance of energy *qua* virtue of perfection.

When the aspirant reaches the fifth and arduous *sudurjayā* which is difficult to achieve, he concentrates and dwell on ten qualities of pure mental dispositions (*cittāśayaśuddhisamatā*), realizes the four

Noble Truths (*āryasatya*), and helps all the creatures to a state of maturity by means of charity, amiable speech and instructions on the Doctrine. He gets the direct vision of the truth to himself to guide the others.

If one notices the transition from the four *jhānas* (*dhyānas*) of Theravāda to the Mahāyāna *daśabhūmi*, the approach is varied, but the goal remains the same.

Now coming to Kukai's Shingon tradition, which is none other than the Mantrayāna sect of later Mahāyāna tradition, but developed fully by Kukai, who learnt from the Chinese master Huiguo; The Chinese master Huiguo learnt this from the Indian master Amoghavajra, the disciple of Indian Master Vajrabodhi.

The *Mahāvairocana-sūtra*, the most predominant scripture of Zhenyan of China and Shingon of Japan, introduces the ten stages of mind "to attain enlightenment is to know one's own mind as it really is." These ten categories are the ten levels of mind, from the lowest to the highest; in the words of Kūkai "these are the ten stages of the development of mind through which the dark goatish mind (which thinks of satisfying the instincts only) advances higher, leaving the darkness behind and seeking after light." (*Kōbōdaishi zenshū*, I. 397)

In the first stage (*Ibid.* I. 420) – *The Mind of Lowly Man, Goatish in Its Desire* – the ignorant, ordinary man in his greediness does not realize his weaknesses. Like a goat, he thinks only of lust and hunger. Kūkai discusses that a man in this stage, who is unaware of doing wrong, breaks the Ten Precepts (*dasasikkhapada*) and thus kills, steals, commits adultery, lies, exaggerates, utters slander, equivocates, and entertains greed, hatred and biased views. The process of the development of mind, starting at this lower stage, is a gradual rise from a lower level to a higher, brighter one.

In the second stage – *The Mind That is Still Ignorant and Childlike but Nevertheless Abstentious* – influenced by external causes, one realizes the world of ethics in which the observance of individual and social ethics is the requirement for man to be called a human being. For Kūkai, the observance of the Buddhist precepts – not to kill, not to steal, not to commit adultery, and so forth – and of the Confucian ethical code – the practice of benevolence, righteous-

ness, and the like – is necessary for man. Kūkai equates this level of mind with that of a Confucianist.

The withered trees of winter will not always be leafless, and once spring arrives, they bloom and flourish. Thick ice does not remain frozen forever. When summer comes, it melts and flows. Given ample moisture, seeds of grain sprout, and when the time comes, plants bear fruit. As there is no immutable nature in things, how can a man remain always bad? When favourable conditions are provided, even a fool aspires to be equal to a sage. A goatish man has no immutable nature; an ignorant child likewise does not remain ignorant. When his intrinsically enlightened nature begins to permeate him, and when the (sun) light of the Buddha shines upon him from without, there emerges in him a thought that he should moderate his attitude and be a person of better character.

In the third stage – *The Mind That Is Infant-Like and Fearless* – a non-Buddhist hopes for rebirth in heaven, in order to gain peace there. He is like an infant or a calf that follows its mother. Kūkai calls such an aspiration "infant-like" and rejects it as being similar to 'phantoms, dreams ...'. Kūkai assigns this level of mind to Taoism, the sixteen schools such as Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, and various types of yogic practices etc. (*Ibid.* 423)

In the fourth stage – *The Mind That Recognizes the Existence of Psychophysical Constituents But Not That of a Permanent Ego* (there are five: form, sensation, perception, volition, and consciousness – *rūpa, vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskārās, vijñāna*) – the mind recognizes the existence of components but denies a permanent ego. Here Kūkai points out the religious egoism behind the practices of asceticism, yoga, merit accumulation, and escapism involved in a pessimistic view of the world. These fundamental ills, Kūkai holds, originate in the false belief in the existence of a permanent individual soul which isolates one man from another. Kūkai identifies this fourth stage, the mind freed from this way of thinking, with the followers of the historical Buddha (*śrāvakayāna*).

In the fifth stage – *The Mind Freed from the Seed of the Cause of Karma* – having mastered the twelve links of causation, (ignorance, volition, consciousness, name and form, sense organs, contact, sensation, craving, grasping, formation of being, birth, old age and death; these together make up the wheel of life or *saṃsāra*, the cycle of causation and becoming – *pratītyasamutpāda*) – the mind expels

the seed of ignorance. Rebirth necessitated by *karma* comes to an end; even though one does not preach, the fruit is obtained. Kūkai identifies this level of mind, which stands free from the seed of *karma*, and summarizes this stage in his own words.

The sea of mind is forever tranquil
without even a single ripple;
Stirred by the storm of discriminations,
Billows rage to and fro.
Men in the street are deluded;
They are fascinated by phantom-like men and women.
Heretics are crazed;
They adhere to the grand tower of mirage.
They do not know
That heaven and hell are fabricated by their own minds.
Do they come to realize
That "mind only" will free them from their tragedies?
...
By practicing six pāramitās for three aeons,
By practicing the ten stages of meditation,
They will uncover One Mind.
When they become pure-hearted,
Cutting off their emotional and mental obstacles,
They will find their own treasury
Enlightenment Here and Now.

This is how the different schools of Buddhism, though varied (especially considering that Buddhism crossed the geographical boundaries from the land of its birth without shedding blood or spreading war), assimilated the native elements only in practice, but nevertheless retained the basic tenets of the Buddhavacana.

Conclusion

We are all familiar with the different kinds of meditation technique that are practiced throughout the world, for instance *vipassanā*, *yoga*, *zen* or *brahmavidyā* (Tibetan). All of these are different paths that lead to the same goal – salvation, or enlightenment or peace or tranquillity.

The Buddha says that just as in the great ocean there is but one taste, the taste of salt, so in his doctrine and discipline there is but one taste, the taste of freedom. The taste of freedom that pervades the Buddha's teaching is the taste of spiritual freedom, which from the Buddhist perspective means freedom from suffering. In the process leading to deliverance from suffering, meditation is the means of generating the inner awakening required for liberation. The methods of meditation taught, whether in the Theravāda Buddhist tradition, the Mahāyāna *Dāśabhūmika-sūtra* or in the Shingon Ten Stages – are all based on the Buddha's own experience, forged by him in the course of his own quest for enlightenment.

List of Abbreviations

PTS – Pāli Text Society edition
BBS – Burmese Buddhasāsana Samīti edition
A – *Aṅguttara-nikāya* (PTS)
D – *Dīgha-nikāya* (PTS)
DBHS – *Daśabhūmikasūtra*
Dhs – *Dhammasaṃgāni* (BBS)
Dhs.A. – *Dhammasaṃgāni Atthakatha* = *Atthasalini* (BBS)
M – *Majjhima-nikāya* (PTS)
M.A – *Majjhima-nikāya Atthakatha* (BBS)
Miln – *Milindapañha* (PTS)
PP – Path of Purification (translation of *Visuddhimagga* by Bhikkhu Nanamoli, Kandy: BPS, 1975)
S – *Samyutta-nikāya* (PTS)
SA – *Samyutta-nikāya Atthakatha* (BBS)
ST – *Samyutta-nikāya Tīka* (BBS)
Vbh – *Vibhanga* (PTS)
Vin.A – *Vinaya Atthakatha* (BBS)
Vism – *Visuddhimagga* (PTS)
Vism.T – *Visuddhimagga Tīka* (BBS)

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Nālandā and the Mūlasarvāstivādins: Yijing's Accounts with Further Consideration

Bangwei Wang

1. As one of the most important centers of Buddhism in ancient India, Nālandā has for many years drawn great attention from people both within India and beyond. Since its discovery, scholars began to investigate it from various perspectives. One of the most important achievements is the successful archaeological excavation at the site of Nālandā, which provides us with a great deal of information about this sacred place. Meanwhile, scholars have sought to trace its history and relations to the development of Buddhism through other materials. These efforts have yielded significant results, as can be seen today in publications related to Nālandā. The *Accounts* left by Chinese pilgrim monks Xuanzang, Yijing and others undoubtedly played an important role in this process. Their rich contents greatly increase our knowledge of the history of the Śrī-Nālandā-Mahāvihāra. Together with the archaeological discoveries, these *Accounts* permit scholars to obtain a clearer picture of life in the Buddhist community of Nālandā at that time. Nevertheless, much of the history of the place remains unknown. In the context of understanding Buddhist religious life, one such thing is what kind of *vinaya* was used at Nālandā in those days.

2. Nearly sixteen years ago, in a paper presented by me at the 10th Conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies held in Paris in 1991, I suggested as a hypothesis for further consideration that before and during Yijing's time, the prevailing *vinaya* at Nālandā was the *vinaya* of the Mūlasarvāstivādins. The community of Nālandā largely belonged to this *nikāya*.[1] Unfortu-

[1] The paper was later published at Göttingen, Germany. See "Buddhist Nikāyas through Ancient Chinese Eyes, with three appendices", in *Untersuc-*

nately, I have not since had the opportunity or time to explore this direction in greater detail. Having luckily been invited to the conference *The Heritage of Nālandā* in 2006, I used this most suitable opportunity to discuss the issue in detail. In my opinion, it is not insignificant if we hope to reach a full understanding of the *Heritage* of Nālandā.

3. The appearance of the name Mūlasarvāstivāda is somehow strange in the history of Indian Buddhism. Though the Sarvāstivāda had been referred to in many places since the second century, it seems that before the 7th century no one mentioned Mūlasarvāstivāda as a title of Buddhist nikāya, either in India or beyond. As far as I know, the earliest direct reference of it is by Chinese Buddhist pilgrim monk Yijing. In his book 大唐西域求法高僧傳 *Datang xiyu qiufa gaoseng zhuan*, Yijing says that in 665, a vinaya text of the Mūlasarvāstivādins arrived at Luoyang. It had been brought to China by another Chinese Buddhist pilgrim, likely from Nālandā.[2] The text was translated by Yijing later in 700. This will be discussed in greater detail in section 8.

4. In his excellent book 大唐西域記 *Datang xiyu ji (A Record of the Western Regions During the Great Tang)*, Xuanzang in several places indicated the *yāna* and *nikāya* affiliation of the Buddhist community when he visited each country of India. As for Nālandā, although he devoted a whole paragraph to describing its legendary origin and related stories, he did not mention the status of religious practice and the *nikāya* affiliation of the community there.[3] Xuanzang visited India from 627 (or 629) to 645.

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hungen zur buddhistischen Literatur, bearbeited von F. Bandurski, B. Pāsādika, M. Schmidt, B. Wang, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht in Göttingen, 1994, pp. 165–203.

[2] See Wang Bangwei, *Datang Xiyu Qiufa Gaosengzhuan Jiaozhu* (*Biographies of the Prominent Monks Who Went in Search of the Law in the Western Regions During the Great Tang: A Newly Collated And Annotated Text*), with an introduction and three appendices, 大唐西域求法高僧传校注, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1988, reprinted 2000, p. 11. The book thereafter will be mentioned as Wang's version of *Qiufa*. Of course, we believe that the title of Mūlasarvāstivāda appeared before Yijing's arrival in India. The Sanskrit manuscripts of the *vinaya* texts of this *nikāya* discovered in Gilgit in the thirties of last century show that title for the first time from Indian side. The manuscripts are generally dated to the 7th century, just the same time of Yijing's.

[3] See Ji Xianlin et. al. *Datang xiyu ji jiaozhu*, 大唐西域记校注, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1985, reprinted 1990, 1995, 2000, pp. 747–758 and appen-

5. Yijing arrived in India just about forty years after Xuanzang. He set out from Guangzhou in South China in 671, and returned to China in 694. Yijing spent more than ten years studying Buddhism at Nālandā. He wrote two important books at Śrīvijaya (at what is now Sumatra, in Indonesia) in 691, on his way back to China. One is the above-mentioned *Datang xiyu qiufa gaoseng zhuan*. Another is 南海寄歸內法傳 *Nanhai jigui neifa zhuan (Accounts of the Inner Law Sent Home from the South Sea)*.[4] In the latter, Yijing provides an almost complete picture of Buddhist life in India, Southeast Asia and China. Based on his own observations, he described in his book every detail related to life in Indian Buddhist monasteries. To start with, he said that he discussed all matters according to the rules of the Mūlasarvāstivādins, and one should not confuse them with the rules of other *nikāyas*.[5] In his discussion he frequently mentioned Nālandā, fourteen times in total, saying the monastic life at Nālandā was a standard way that other Buddhists should follow. In order to judge what is right or wrong, Yijing used the way of religious life at Nālanda as a model. This, together with other relevant accounts, may show a certain special connection with Nālandā.

And in his *Datang xiyu qiufa gaoseng zhuan*, Yijing mentioned the name of Nālandā twenty-nine times. In his time, Nālandā was a place every Chinese pilgrim monk had to visit and pay homage to. At the end of the first fascicle of the book, Yijing describes many details of the place. He says that the rules and rituals of the monks of Nālandā were shown in two books, one of which is 中方錄 *Zhongfang lu (A record of Madhyadeśa)* and the other is *Nanhai jigui neifa zhuan*.[6]

6. There is also some other evidence to support this conclusion. We know that when Xuanzang and Yijing visited and studied at

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dix I and III of this paper.

[4] See Wang Bangwei, *Nanhai jigui neifa zhuan jiaozhu (Accounts of the inner law sent home from the South Sea*: A study with a newly collated and annotated text), 南海寄归内法传校注, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1995, reprinted 2000. The book will hereinafter be referred to as Wang's version of *Nanhai*.

[5] "All that I have discussed here is in accordance to the Mūlasarvāstivādanikāya. The contents of the vinaya of other nikāyas can not be confused with it." 凡此所論，皆依根本說一切有部，不可將餘部事見釋於斯。Wang's version of *Nanhai*, p.28.

[6] See Wang's version of *Qiufa*, pp. 112-116 and Appendix II of this paper. 其間僧徒綱軌出納之儀，具如《中方錄》及《寄歸傳》.

Nālandā, Nālandā was a centre of the Yogācārabhūmi scholars, or the Vijñānavādins. Xuanzang's teacher in Nālandā, Śīlabhadra, was a Master of the *Yogācārabhūmi* and what inspired Xuanzang to go to India and to study at Nālandā was the desire to learn the above-mentioned text.[7] L. Schmithausen has shown that there may exist some special relationship between the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the Mūlasarvāstivādins.[8]

7. As for Yijing himself, he began to translate the *vinaya* text of the Mūlasarvāstivādins while he was staying at Nālandā.[9] When he left India he took with him a great number of *vinaya* texts, exclusively the Mūlasarvāstivādins, which he had obtained from Nālandā, back to China. He later translated an almost complete set of the *vinaya* texts of this *nikāya*, though unfortunately only some of them are extant today.[10]

8. Among the texts translated by Yijing, there is one entitled 根本薩婆多部律攝 *Genbensapoduobu lū she*, the *Mūlasarvāstivādavinaya-saṃgraha*[11], which was compiled by an Indian Buddhist scholar

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[7] Among the relevant publications available in the western languages, see Shōshin, K. "How Xuanzang Learned about Nālandā". – *Tang China and Beyond: Studies on East Asia from the Seventh to the Tenth Century*, ed. A. Forte, Kyoto, 1988 (Italian School of East Asian Studies, Essays, 1), 1–33.

[8] See Schmithausen, L. "Zu den Rezension des Udānavarga". – *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasien*, 14 (1970), 47–124, particularly, 94–97; and "Beiträge zur Schulzugehörigkeit und Textgeschichte kanonischer und postkanonischer buddhistischer Materialien". – *Zur Schulzugehörigkeit von Werken der Hinayāna-Literatur* (Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Nr. 154), Zweiter Teil, ed. by H. Bechert. Göttingen, 1987, 304–404.

[9] That is the *Genbenshuoyiqieyoubu pinaiye song*, the *Mūlasarvāstivādavinayagāthā* (根本说一切有部毗奈耶颂, Tsisho 24, No. 1459), compiled by a Buddhist scholar called Viśākha, Pishequ 毘舍佉in Chinese. Cf. Yuyama, A. *Vinaya-Texte* (Systematische Übersicht über die Buddhistische Sanskrit Literatur, Erster Teil), Wiesbaden, 1979, 1.25.C.1.k.1. Why did Yijing choose it as his first attempted *vinaya* translation project? A possible answer, I think, is that it presumably was a manual work of the disciplinary life for the Nālandā community when Yijing was at Nālandā.

[10] According to a memorial stupa inscription written by Lu Can 卢灿 in 713 (the 2nd year of Xiantian 先天) just after Yijing died, Yijing had translated 107 texts, 428 *juan*s in total Today, however, we find only about 60 texts in Yijing's translation. See my introduction to the *Datang xiyu qiufa gaoseng zhuan jiaozhu*, Beijing, Zhonghua shuju, 1988, pp. 12–14.

[11] *Genben sapoduobu lü she* 根本薩婆多部律攝, Taisho 24, No.1458.

called Viśvamitra,[12] probably in the late 6th or early 7th century.[13] The text was rendered into Chinese in 700.[14] From another source we know that Viśvamitra was one of the ten prominent Yogācārabhūmi Masters of that time in India. And from the *Datang xiyu qiufa gaoseng zhuan*, we know that before Yijing, in 665,[15] the same text had arrived at Luoyang, probably having been brought to China by another Chinese Buddhist pilgrim, Xuanzhao,[16] who had been to India twice. He also spent a few years at Nālandā learning the Yogācārabhūmi from Indian Master Ratnasiṃha.[17] After he came back to China, he was encouraged by other monks to translate it into Chinese, but was prevented from doing so because of another imperial mission. This is, as far as we know, the earliest direct reference to the Mūlasarvāstivādins in Chinese literature. Cf. above section 4.

9. As we saw above, the name of Mūlasarvāstivādin appeared quite late, in fact as the latest of the *nikāyas* in Chinese Buddhist literature. Of course this does not mean that the Mūlasarvāstivādin *nikāya* arose so late, but it may indicate that the title of Mūlasarvāstivādin came into broad usage at a comparatively late stage. Before Yijing the Chinese Buddhists only mentioned the Sarvāstivādin. However, for the Chinese Buddhists in ancient times, when they referred to the Mūlasarvāstivādins, sometimes they omitted the first part of the title, *Mūla*, instead preferring its simplified form, *Sarvāstivādin*. The same probably holds true for those foreign monks who arrived in China from India and Central Asia. Thus there exists the possibility that some texts traditionally attributed to the Sarvāstivādins in ancient China might actually belong to the Mūlasarvāstivādins, particularly the texts that were translated comparatively late. Xuanzang consistently used the term Sarvāstivādin. Yijing, in most cases, used the term Mūlasarvāstivādin, but he also occasionally used the term

[12] Shengyou勝友 in Chinese.
[13] Cf. A.Yuyama: *Vinaya-Texte*, 1.21.C.1.k.14. Yuyama gave the reconstructed name Jinamitra, but according to Guiji's *Cheng weishi suji*, Taisho 43, No.1830, 232a and to Xuanzang's *Record*, it should be Viśeṇamitra.
[14] The 1st year of Jiushi 久視元年.
[15] The 2nd year of Linde 麟德二年.
[16] 玄照 in Chinese.
[17] Baoshizi 宝師子 in Chinese.

Sarvāstivādin, though by this he sometimes clearly meant the Mūlasarvāstivādins, sometimes both of them. We are not sure whether when Xuanzang referred the Sarvāstivādin, he was also including the Mūlasarvāstivādin in this title. From a comparison of his *Record* with Yijing's *Account*, we might be able to say this is possible. In any case, for another example, two great texts, the *Mahāvibhāṣā* and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, both of which were translated by Xuanzang in ancient China, were said to be texts of the Sarvāstivādins on the one hand, and the Mūlasarvāstivādins on the other. The result of the studies performed recently by some scholars may support the latter assertion. Yijing appears to be more conscious in differentiating the Sarvāstivādin from the Mūlasarvāstivādin while emphasizing the differences between the *Shisong lü* and the *vinaya* of the Mūlasarvāstivādins.

10. In conclusion, though we do not have direct evidence to show the status of Buddhist religious practice at Nālandā in Yijing's time, through the above analyses we may reach the conclusion that the *vinaya* of Mūlasarvāstivādins was the main text guiding the religious life of the Nālandā community in the time of Yijing. This conclusion, if accepted, will help us to understanding more completely the history of this great Buddhist centre of ancient India.

Концепция «татхаты» в контексте дхармической теории фасян*

Леонид Янгутов

Праджня (санскр. *prajñā*) как мудрость, отражающая наивысшее состояние сознания – это просветленное сознание, которое видит вещи в том виде, в каком они существуют на самом деле, вне их преломленности через омраченное сознание. Видение вещей в том виде в каком они пребывают на самом деле – это видение вещей в их таковости.

Таковость – «татхата» (санскр. *tathatā*, кит. 如 *ru*) является важнейшим понятием сутр Праджняпарамиты и стоит в одном ряду с другими буддийскими понятиями, отражающими состояние наивысшего, просветленного сознания. *Л.* Мялль выделяет в «Аштасахасрика-праджняпарамите» четыре основных термина, обозначающих наивысшее состояние сознания. Это такие термины, как «праджняпарамита» (*prajñāpāramitā*), «сарваджнята» (*sarvajñatā*), «ануттара самьяк самбодхи» (*anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi*) и «татхата» (*tathatā*) (*Л.* Мялль. Четыре термина праджняпарамитской психологии. – *Ученые записки Тартуского государственного университета.* Вып. 309. С. 204[1]). Все четыре термина, по сути, являются синонимами в их отражении конечной цели спасения.

Ануттара-самьяк-самбодхи (кит. 阿褥多羅三藐三菩提 *a nou duo luo san mo san pu ti*) переводится как «наивысшее, всеобъемлющее просветление». Именно такое просветление получил Будда Шакьямуни под деревом бодхи на берегу Найраньджаны. *Д.* Т. Судзуки считает, что этот термин является синонимом японского «сатори», китайского «у» (悟 *wu*) (*Д.* Т. Судзуки. *Очерки*

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[1] См. также: Mäll, L. *Studies in the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā and Other Essays.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2005, p. 63. (Примечание редактора.)

о дзэн-буддизме. Спб., 2002. С. 273). В энциклопедическом словаре Динфубао «Фосюэ да цыдянь» говорится о том, что момент постижения Буддой Дхармы называется ануттарой-самьяк-самбодхи (Динфубао. *Фосюэ да цыдянь*. С. 730).

Сарваджня (кит. 薩般若多 *saporuoduo* или 一切智 *yiqiezhi*) в переводе означает всеобъемлющую мудрость. В словаре Динфубао говорится, что сарваджней называется всеобъемлющая мудрость. Сарваджня (*yiqiezhi*) – это другое название Праджняпарамиты (Динфубао. *Фосюэ да сыдянь*. С. 1403).

Татхата – таковость – это истинный вид каждой дхармы, это такой её вид, каковой она является на самом деле. Внешнее проявление этой дхармы не имеет истинного вида, оно лишено реальности, в этом смысле дхарма пуста. Пустота – это истинный вид дхармы. Он таков, каким был изначально. Поэтому называется таковостью. Таковость составляет природу каждой дхармы, природу всех дхарм (кит. 法性 *faxing*). И, наконец, таковость – это то, что существует в своем истинном виде – это истинное существование – это истинно сущее.

Здесь надо сразу же оговориться, что термина, однозначно эквивалентного термину «истинно сущее», в китайском буддизме нет. По словам О. О. Розенберга: "Основными проблемами буддийской систематической литературы являются вопросы о свойствах истинносущего и о спасении" (Розенберг О. О. *Проблемы буддийской философии*. С. 244). Все буддийские школы, считал он, были едиными во мнении о том, что эмпирическое бытие представляет собой волнения или же омраченность «истинно сущей реальности», которые безначальны во времени, как и безначально само истинно сущее. А их разногласия сводятся, главным образом, к двум вопросам: "о сущности истинно реального и об отношении его к проявлению, т.е. к фактическому бытию в моменте, и к эмпирическому или иллюзорному бытию" (там же. С. 246).

Однако концепция истинно сущего в книге О. О. Розенберга не получила подробной разработки. Его анализ философского содержания буддизма был непосредственно привязан к теории дхармы, а само понятие дхармы не было рассмотрено в контексте учения об истинно сущем. Вместе с тем понятие истинно сущего представляется весьма перспективным в плане анализа философского содержания сутр Праджняпарамиты. Его семантическое поле: "имеющийся в действительности," "подлинный," "настоящий," "то же,

что и бытие," "самое главное и существенное в чем-то," "внутреннее содержание" и т.п. (См.: *Словарь русского языка АН СССР.* М., 1984. Т. 4. С. 314; Даль. *Толковый словарь.* М., 1955. Т. 4. С. 368) может быть соотнесено с буддийскими понятиями, которые по сути синонимичны понятию «природа Будды» и характеризуются как противоположные страданию и его причине – ложному Я. Это, с одной стороны, термины индийского буддизма, переведенные с санскрита на китайский язык, например «бхутататхата» (санскр. *bhūtatathatā*, кит. 真如 *zhenru* – «истинная таковость»), «татхагатагарбха» (санскр. *tathāgatagarbha*, кит. 如來藏 *rulaizang* – «сокровищница Татхагаты»), «Татхагата» (санскр. *tathāgata*, кит. 如來 *rulai* – «так пришедший»), «дхармакайя» (санскр. *dharmakāya*, кит. 法身 *fashen* – «тело дхармы») и т.п., с другой стороны, термины, заимствованные из китайской философии, например, 道 *dao*, 理 *li*, 真 *zhen*, 心 *xin* и т.п. Однако, ни одно из перечисленных выше понятий, не переводится однозначно как истинно сущее. Главное значение истинно сущего, с которым соотносятся значения соответствующих буддийских понятий, — это *существование*, это то, что *есть* на самом деле, что *существует* изначально. Причем существование в китайском буддизме не связано с наличием конкретных вещей, здесь имеются в виду не сущие вещи, а сущее как таковое, "сущее само по себе." Такое понимание истинно сущего весьма схоже с западноевропейским пониманием бытия как "сущего само по себе," адекватного реальности, подлинности, истинности. (см.: *Фрагменты ранних греческих философов.* М., 1989. Ч. 1. С. 278; Доброхотов А. *А. Категория бытия в западноевропейской философии.* М., 1986. С. 6). Сущее в обоих случаях рассматривается как тождественное само себе. Однако в отличие от западноевропейской философии, понятие истинно сущего в китайском буддизме не может быть определено с точки зрения пространственно-временных характеристик, оно несовместимо с миром явлений, не допускает наличия инобытия, в нем нет разделения на сущность и существование, оно не включает в себя элементы субстратности, и, наконец, к нему неприменимо знаменитое изречение Парменида "мыслить и быть одно и то же" (*Фрагменты ранних греческих философов.* Ч, 1. С. 287). В этом смысле понятие истинно сущего более всего соответствует содержанию татхаты. Оно не есть тождество мысли, но оно есть отражение наивысшего состояния сознания.

Следует выделить два специфических аспекта понятия «татхата» как понятия, отражающего наивысшее состояние сознания. Это, во-первых, его онтологический акцент в отражении высшего состояния сознания, во-вторых, его имманентность феноменальному миру. В понятии «татхата» наиболее наглядно отразились представления буддистов о наличии природы Будды во всем сущем, и тождестве нирваны и сансары.

Четыре термина, «праджняпарамита», «сарваджнята», «ануттара самьяк самбодхи» и «татхата» – это термины, отражающие состояние сознания, достигшего спасения. Однако по мнению Л. Мялля они не являются синонимами, а представляют собой «основные элементы отличающихся друг от друга подструктур» (Л. Мялль. Указ. Соч. С. 204). Согласно Д. Т. Судзуки: "Понятие татхата (таковость) или бхутата (действительность), относится к метафизике. Нирвана считается духовным состоянием, в котором успокоены все страсти. Татхагата-гарбха имеет скорее психологический, нежели онтологический оттенок, шуньята является негативным термином, имеющим отношение к эпистемологии." (Д. Т. Судзуки. *Очерк о дзэн буддизме*. Ч. 1. Спб. 2002. С. 108).

В Китае понятия « ануттара самьяк самбодхи» и «сарваджня» не получили достаточно широкого распространения. Большую популярность здесь получило понятие татхаты. При этом основной акцент в понимании татхаты был сделан на его онтологическом аспекте, на его феноменальном контексте. Понятие «татхата» проникло в Китай с сутрами Праджняпарамиты. Первый переводчик праджняпарамитской литературы Чжи Чань в качестве эквивалента понятию «татхата» использовал понятие «бэнь у» (本無 *ben wu*). Этот термин, заимствованный из философии сюаньсюэ, отражал онтологическую интерпретацию наивысшего состояния сознания. Позже, в учении Дао Аня, понятие «бэнь у» использовалось в качестве характеристики главных признаков понятия пустоты. Со временем, по мере совершенствования техники переводов, понятие «татхата» стало передаваться на китайский язык через кальку посредством термина «жу» (如 *ru*), который имеет такие значения как: «походить на…», «быть схожим с …», «быть таким же как…», «такой как….», и т.п. (См.: *Большой китайско-русский словарь*. Т. 2». С. 420). В текстах китайских буддистов термин «жу» чаще

употребляется вместе с термином «чжэнь» (真 *zhen*) и переводится как «истинная таковость», что соответствует санскритскому «бхутататхата» (*bhūtatathatā*). В текстах Праджняпарамиты понятие «татхата» было тесно привязано к понятию пустоты. Пустота рассматривалась как таковость. По определению Динфубао, таковость сутр Праджняпарамиты устанавливала пустоту. Но если таковость сутр Праджняпарамиты устанавливала пустоту, то таковость Лотосовой сутры, по мнению Динфубао, устанавливала одну из важнейших характеристик пустоты – срединность. (См.: Динфубао. С. 544). Таковость Лотосовой сутры акцентировала свое внимание на онтологическом аспекте, на её имманентности феноменальному миру. Таковость пустоты получила яркое отражение в философии фасян, таковость срединности в философии школ тяньтай, хуаянь и чань.

В школе фасян учение об истинной таковости было привязано к учению о дхармах, характеризующих истинно сущие аспекты сознания. Поэтому фасяновскую концепцию таковости мы можем понять лишь в контексте ее учения о дхармах, составляющих поток сознания. Сознание в школе фасян рассматривается как единственная реальность.

Для обозначения сознания как единственной реальности в фасян использовался термин «ши» (識 *shi*), основное смысловое значение которого – «знание», «ум». Очевидно, этот факт стал решающим при выборе термина «ши» в его обозначении единственной реальности, поскольку по словам Радхакришнана: "Что бы мы ни говорили о естественном мире, даже то, что он существует вне нас, внутренний опыт отрицать нельзя. Наше знание может не быть собранием истин природы, но никто не будет отрицать его существования. Знание существует. Его наличие очевидно" (Радхакришнан С. *Индийская философия*. Т. 1, Лондон, 1951. С. 537).

В главном трактате школы – трактате «Чэн вэй ши лунь» внешний мир и ложное Я рассматривались как проекция сознания-ши. И, если проекция объявлялась нереальной, не существующей на самом деле, то сам источник проекции – сознание-ши – как существующий на самом деле. Вместе с тем сознание-ши не идентифицировалось в учении фасян с истинно сущим. Иначе говоря, реально сущее в фасян не воспринималось как тождественное истинно сущему и не всякое существование рассматри-

валось как истинное. Поэтому адепты фасян не идентифицировали реально сущее «ши» с понятием «истинная таковость» в отличие от адептов саньлунь, которые идентифицировали пустоту, понимаемую ими как реально сущее с истинной таковостью. Понятие истинной таковости подчеркивало момент реальности истинно сущего, указывая на то, что оно действительно существует, является таковым. Очевидно, поэтому в текстах фасян придавалось большое внимание разъяснению сути «истинной таковости» как истинно сущего. Понимание истинно сущего как истинной таковости объяснялось теорией дхарм, в контексте которой раскрывалось содержание сознания.

Тексты Праджняпарамиты, делавшие акцент на иллюзорности не только собственного Я, но и окружающего Я внешнего мира, обратили в первую очередь свое внимание на отрицании реальности дхарм. Отрицание реальности дхарм осуществлялось в рамках абхидхармических схем. Классические схемы абхидхармической теории, изложенные в сочинении Васубандху «Абхидхарма-коша» были переведены Сюань Цзаном под названием «Цзюйшэ лунь». Это сочинение легло в основу формирования школы цзюйшэ, которая объявила своим главным каноном «Абхидхарма-кошу» («Цзюйшэ лунь») и развивалась в традициях индийской хинаяны.

Школе фасян были присущи общие со школой цзюйшэ принципы смыслового и структурного построения дхармической теории. Однако в трактовках самого понятия «дхарма» они существенно расходились. Основное различие в их понимании дхармы состояло в том, что школа цзюйшэ признавала реальность существования дхарм, а школа фасян отрицала. Трактат «Чэн вэй ши лунь» начинается с подробного анализа нереальности Я и дхарм. Анализ этот отражал также и убежденность адептов фасян в нереальности внешнего мира. Однако смысл отрицания дхарм, представленный в трактате, гораздо шире, чем просто отрицание внешнего мира. Здесь дхармы отрицаются, как не имеющие отношения к природе существования. Им отказывается в онтологическом статусе. Они не могут вступать ни в какие отношения с природой существования, о них нельзя сказать, иллюзорно или истинно они существуют. Они не имеют и трансцендентального значения, а, наоборот, являются внешними выражениями того, что скрыто от нашего зре-

ния. В этом смысле дхармы – не более чем знаки описания того, что существует иллюзорно или же реально. В этом значении О. О. Розенберг определял дхармы как носители признака. "Дхарма, – писал он, – понимается как «носитель признака» – проявления. «Признаки» – это те элементы, на которые был разложен поток сознания и его содержания» (Розенберг О. О. *Проблемы*…С. 105).

Таким образом, дхармы – это символические характеристики сущего, но ни в коем случае не само сущее. Посредством дхарм осуществляется рациональное описание как явного, так и скрытого от нашего глаза трансцендентального существования «только сознания», поэтому дхармы суть знаки описания сознания.

Школы цзюйшэ и фасян расходились и в определении общего количества дхарм: школа цзюйшэ насчитывала 75 дхарм, фасян – 100. Дхармы в той и другой школе классифицировались по определенным признакам, причем принципы классификации, несмотря на наличие общих черт, также несколько различались.

Школа цзюйшэ делила свои 75 дхарм на «подверженные бытию» (кит. «вэй фа» 為法 *wei fa*, санскр. «санскрита дхармы» *saṃskṛtā dharmāḥ*) и «неподверженные бытию» (кит. «увэй фа» 無為法 *wuwei fa*, санскр. «асанскрита дхармы» *asaṃskṛtā dharmāḥ*).

Дхармы, подверженные бытию, характеризовались такими признаками, как рождение, пребывание, изменение и исчезновение, а неподверженные бытию – такими, как пустота, отсутствие рождения и отсутствие исчезновения (См.: Розенберг О. О. *Проблемы*…С. 127–128). Если первые дхармы считались неблагоприятными для спасения, то вторые, наоборот, как способствующие ему.

В школе фасян сохранилось деление подверженных бытию дхарм на 4 группы. Вместе с тем неподверженные бытию дхармы не выделялись в отдельную категорию, а наряду с четырьмя группами дхарм, подверженных бытию, составляли пятую группу дхарм. На первый план в своей классификации адепты фасян выдвигали дхармы сознания. В отличие от школы цзюйшэ, фасян не исчерпывает эту группу лишь одной дхармой, а увеличивает до восьми дхарм. Дхармы недеяния рассматривались как дхармы, которые участвуют в проявлении

истинной природы, которую адепты фасян идентифицируют с истинной таковостью (кит. «чжэнь жу» 真如 *zhenru*). Истинная таковость, напомним, – это истинная реальность в том виде, в каком она есть на самом деле.

Трактовка истинной таковости, понимаемая как истинная реальность в том виде, в каком она есть, представленная школой фасян, не отличается от праджняпарамитской трактовки. Однако, если в праджняпарамитской трактовке истинная таковость была тесно привязана к феноменологическому контексту, то в трактовке фасян, истинная таковость противопоставлялась феноменальному. Пять первых дхарм недеяния характеризуют такие признаки проявления истинной природы сознания, как пустотность; отсутствие оппозиции субъекта и объекта; существования и несуществования; рождения и смерти; причины и следствия; просветленность; отсутствие омраченных дхарм; изначальность природы чистоты; отсутствие эмоций; желаний; различения внешних объектов (см.: Хуан Чаньхуа. *Л.* 516–520, 550.)

Если первые пять дхарм недеяния отражали признаки истинной таковости, то шестая – последняя в этой группе, или сотая дхарма школы фасян, – представляла собой дхарму истинной таковости. Однако это не означало идентичность дхармы истинной таковости самой истинной таковости, как не означала идентичность восьми первых дхарм, отражающих структуру и содержание сознания как такового, самому сознанию. И здесь необходимо отметить, что шесть дхарм недеяния, характеризуя истинную природу сознания, сами не обладают истинным существованием, как, впрочем, и все остальные дхармы. Однако сказать, что они отличаются от природы существования, было бы неверным. В этой связи в трактате «Чэн вэй ши лунь» делается попытка анализа возможных вариантов отношения дхарм к природе существования, которые сводятся к следующему:

1) дхармы совершенно идентичны природе существования (дхармы по своей сущности совершенно идентичны природе существования);

2) дхармы совершенно отличаются от природы существования;

3) дхармы одновременно идентичны природе существования и отличаются от нее;

4) дхармы не идентичны природе существования и не отличаются от нее.

Согласно логике авторов трактата, если дхармы были бы идентичны природе существования, то не различались бы друг от друга по своей сущности, а это противоречило бы тому факту, что все дхармы отличаются друг от друга. Это подобно тому, что различные цвета – белый, черный, коричневый и т.д. – были бы идентичны природе цвета. В таком случае они не различались бы как коричневые, желтые и т.д. Но с другой стороны, невозможно также предположить и то, что дхармы отличаются от природы существования. Если это было бы так, то невозможно было бы объяснить наличие предметов внешнего мира в их явном виде, а это подобно тому, что если бы цвета отличались бы от природы цвета, тогда невозможно было бы наличие их как коричневого, желтого и пр. цвета.

Что же касается одновременной идентичности и отличия дхарм от природы существования, то оно невозможно, поскольку уже было доказано, что дхармы не могут быть идентичными природе существования, а во втором случае было доказано, что дхармы не могут отличаться от природы существования.

И, наконец, четвертое предположение о неидентичности и неотличии опровергается теми же аргументами, что и в предыдущем (третьем) случае, поскольку третье и четвертое предположение по сути тождественны (см.: Chan Wing-tsit. *A Source book in Chinese Philosophy.* New Jersey, 1963).

В этом анализе природы существования дхарм отразилась суть понимания срединного пути адептами фасян. Дхармы как самостоятельно сущие отрицаются, но как знаки сущего или «носители признака» признаются. В связи с этим в учение фасян вводится понятие «вид дхармы» (кит. «фасян» 法相 *faxiang*, санск. «дхармалакшана» *dharmalakṣaṇa*), которое подчеркивало значение дхармы как «носителя признака». В учении о видах дхарм подробно раскрывается содержание истинной таковости. Учение о дхармалакшанах было изложено в сутре «Сандхи-нимочана» (кит. «Цзе шэнь ми цзин», «Сутра, раскрывающая глубокие тайны». Своим названием фасян школа обязана именной этой сутре (см.: Хуан Чаньхуа. *Фо цзяо…Вэйши цзу. Л.* 33а). Понятие вида дхарм иногда заменяется понятием «природа дхарм» (кит. «фа син» 法性 *faxing*). Оба понятия рассматриваются как синонимы.

Многообразие видов дхарм адепты фасян сводят к трем основным видам:

1) вид привязанности к повсеместному; (кит. «бянь цзи со чжи син» 遍計所執性 *bian ji suo zhi xing*, санскр. «парикалпита» *parikalpita*);

2) вид возникновения в зависимости от другого (кит. «и та ци син» 依他起性 *yi ta qi xing*, санскр. «паратантра» *paratantra*);

3) вид совершенной реальности (кит. «юань чэн ши син» 圓成實性 *yuan cheng shi xing*, санскр. «паринишпанна» *parinispanna*).

«Парикалпита», или вид привязанности к повсеместному, характеризует привязанность индивида к внешнему миру и внутреннему Я. Другими словами, это принятие иллюзорных проекций сознания за реально существующие. «Парикалпита» характеризует омраченное сознание, пребывающее в неведении. Для иллюстрации состояния неведения буддисты часто используют пример с веревкой, которую ошибочно приняли за змею.

«Паратантра», или вид возникновения в зависимости от другого, характеризует относительное познание того, что внешний мир и внутреннее Я не обладают собственной природой существования, а зависят от причин. По всей видимости, паратантра характеризует рациональное знание об иллюзорности внешних предметов и внутреннего Я, об их зависимости от сознаний-ши. Однако «паратантра» еще не истинное знание, поскольку она еще не может раскрыть истинную природу сознания. Это подобно тому, что мы узнали, что нет змеи, а есть только веревка. Но мы не знаем, что представляет собой сама веревка (см.: Хуан Чаньхуа. *Фо цзяо... Вэйши цзун. Л.* 66а).

«Паринишпанна» – это и есть истинная таковость. Она характеризуется как постижение истинной сути вещей, что равнозначно постижению истинной природы сознания – истинно сущего.

Учение о трех видах дхарм в школе фасян дополнялось учением о трех природах отсутствиях природ:

1) «природа отсутствия природы собственного вида» («сян у цзы син син» 相無自性性 *xiang wu zi xing xing*);

2) «природа отсутствия природы рождения» («шэн у цзы син син» 生無自性性 *sheng wu zi xing xing*);

3) «природа отсутствия природы побеждающего значения» («шэн и у цзы син син» 勝義無自性性 *sheng yi wu zi xing xing*).

В трактате «Чэн вэй ши лунь» сказано: "Отсутствие природы вида устанавливается в зависимости от парикалпиты, потому что природа [сущность] вида в конечном счете отсутствует. Это подобно цветку в пустыне. Отсутствие природы рождения устанавливается в зависимости от паратантры, потому что это подобно иллюзорным вещам, которые возникают благодаря множеству причин. Отсутствие собственной изначальной природы подобно ложным привязанностям. Об отсутствии природы говорим условно; неверно, что природа полностью отсутствует. Отсутствие природы побеждающего значения (высшей истины) устанавливается в зависимости от паринишпанны, потому что побеждающее значение (высшая истина) покидает привязанности парикалпиты к природе Я и дхарм. Об отсутствии природы говорим условно; неверно, что природа полностью отсутствует" (*Чэн вэй ши лунь*. Кн. 9. *Л*. 2а–2б).

В трактате «Чэн вэй ши лунь» также говорится, что сознание-синь с его внутренней оппозицией субъекта и объекта имеет природу возникновения в зависимости от другого, поэтому не обладает реальным существованием, подобно тому как не обладают реальным существованием иллюзорные вещи. Однако отсутствие реального существования не адекватно абсолютному не-существованию, поскольку за отсутствием реального существования кроется истинное существование (см.: *Чэн вэй ши лунь*. Кн. 2. *Л*. 9а–9б).

Истинное существование – это существование вещей в том виде, каковы они на самом деле. Это есть истинная таковость. В «Чэн вэй ши лунь» дается следующее определение понятию «истинная таковость»: "Истинное – это есть истинное существование, проявление которого не является ложным. Таковость – это есть постоянство [признаков] того, что есть на самом деле, отражающее отсутствие проекций и изменчивости. Это означает то, что истинное существование при всех обстоятельствах постоянно обладает той природой, какую оно имеет на самом деле [природа истинной реальности постоянно такова]. Поэтому называется таковостью» (*Чэн вэй ши лунь*. Кн. 9. *Л*. 3а–3б).

Истинная таковость далее характеризуется следующим образом: она проявляется в пустоте и в не-Я, не обладает ни существованием, ни не-существованием. Ее невозможно выразить в словах и мыслях; она не составляет со всеми дхармами одно и не

отличается от них; является истинным принципом дхарм, поэтому называется природой дхарм. О ней говорится как о существовании, чтобы опровергнуть утверждение о ее не существовании; ее называют пустотой, чтобы опровергнуть наши привязанности к иллюзорному существованию. Она не является ложной и иллюзорной, поэтому называется истинной. А поскольку остается такой, какова она на самом деле, то и называется истинной таковостью (см.: Хуан Чаньхуа. *Фо цзяо... Вэйши изун*. Т. 2. *Л*. 8а–8б).

В школе фасян насчитывали семь признаков истинной таковости:

1) истинная таковость круговорота перерождений; это реальная природа дхарм круговорота перерождений (дхарм, участвующих в круговороте перерождений);
2) истинная таковость двух реальностей; это реальная природа двух не-Я (не-Я личности и не-Я дхармы);
3) истинная таковость только сознания-ши; это реальная природа омраченных и неомраченных (чистых и загрязненных) дхарм только сознания-ши;
4) истинная таковость становления; это реальная природа страдания (истинная таковость феноменального, составляющего в конечном счете страдание);
5) истинная таковость дурных поступков;
6) истинная таковость чистоты и незагрязненности – реальная природа нирваны;
7) истинная таковость правильных поступков – реальная природа Дао (Дао здесь понимается как синоним нирваны; см.: Хуан Чаньхуа. *Фо цзяо... Вэйши цзун*. *Л*. 51 об.–52.)

Перечисленные характеристики истинной таковости указывают на отсутствие дуализма существования и не-существования. Истинная таковость присутствует во всех дхармах, отражающих как феноменальные, так и истинные признаки бытия, она не адекватна дхармам, проявляющим ее признаки, но она не отличается от них. Дхармы истинной таковости не участвуют в феноменальном проявлении бытия, хотя сама истинная таковость лежит в основе проявления как феноменального так и истинного. Она лежит в основе круговорота перерождений, но не всегда может проявить себя. Это зависит от дхарм. Истин-

ная таковость лежит в основе всех поступков в сознании каждого. Адепты фасян не различали онтологический и гносеологический аспекты понимания истинной таковости как истинно сущего. Истинно сущее – это истинная природа всего сущего, но все сущее – это сознание-ши, а потому истинная природа всего сущего и постижение истины об этой природе, по сути, составляют одно и то же.

И в заключение остановимся еще раз на отношении истинной таковости и феноменального бытия, поскольку этот вопрос имел очень важное значение для всех школ китайской махаяны, ибо именно он был непосредственно связан с проблемой спасения. Ведь переход из неистинного бытия в истинное (из сансары в нирвану) непосредственно связан с решением вопроса об их взаимоотношении. Принципы отношения истинного бытия и ложного нашли отражение в учении школы фасян о взаимоотношении таковости как истинной природы дхарм и их внешнего вида как иллюзорного проявления. Истинная природа дхарм и их внешний вид рассматриваются как "параллельные" друг другу, не имеющие точек соприкосновения. Их тождество отрицается. Истинная таковость не имеет путей соединения с видом дхарм, поскольку не подвергается влиянию со стороны феноменального мира, представляющего собой проявление вида дхарм. Не все дхармы способны проявить истинную природу. Такой способностью обладают только шесть дхарм, не подверженных бытию, которые проявляются благодаря неомраченным семенам. Сотериологическая интерпретация проблемы взаимоотношения истинно сущей и феноменальной природы сознания внесла коррективы в махаянскую сотериологию, открывавшую путь спасения для всех. Адепты фасян считали, что такая возможность дана не каждому. Есть существа, которые обречены на вечную сансару. Это положение вызвало возражения со стороны других школ китайского буддизма. Видимо, оно и оказалось одной из причин того, что фасян не пользовалась в Китае достаточной популярностью и просуществовала недолго.

The Concept of tathatā *in the Context of the Theory of Dharma in the Faxiang School*

Leonid Yangutov

Abstract

The concept of *tathatā* 'thusness, suchness' is one of the central concepts of the *Prajñāpāramitā* sūtras, along with *prajñāpāramitā*, *sarvajñatā* and *anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi*. Here all of these terms denote the highest state of consciousness and are to a certain degree synonymous. In this article the concept of *tathatā* is analysed as it is used in the Chinese school of Faxiang, where it denoted Ultimate Reality, the true nature of all dharmas that in itself is undefined. This is expressed in four ways, stating that dharmas are (1) completely identical, (2) completely non-identical, (3) simultaneously identical and non-identical, and (4) neither identical nor non-identical with their true nature of existence.

К проблеме генезиса понятий «праджня», «татхата», «татхагатагарбха»

Сергей Лепехов

Сутры Праджняпарамиты относятся к числу наиболее ранних источников буддизма Махаяны. Они явились теоретической основой для последующего развития всех его основных религиозно-философских школ. Поскольку эти тексты были канонизированы и их авторитет был неоспорим для всех, в том числе и полемизирующих друг с другом направлений махаянского буддизма, естественно, возникла проблема интерпретации канонических положений в зависимости от потребностей и логики собственного развития тех или иных философских школ. Другой аспект проблемы связан с тем, что на протяжении более чем тысячелетней (только в пределах Индии) истории создания и изучения праджняпарамитской литературы неизбежно изменялся исторический контекст, влияющий на восприятие и понимание одних и тех же памятников, и это соответственно влияло на их интерпретацию в изменившихся исторических условиях.

К этому "временному" аспекту проблемы текста примыкает "пространственный": Праджняпарамита изучалась и распространялась не только в Индии, но и далеко за ее пределами, т. е. существовала проблема столкновения и взаимодействия с иными философскими и культурно-психологическими традициями, проявлявшаяся на уровне перевода текста на другой язык и его интерпретации в иной культурной среде. Наконец, можно говорить о происходящем уже на наших глазах своеобразном "столкновении" религиозно-философской и научной парадигм в осмыслении буддийского теоретического наследия и возникающей при этом проблеме его интерпретации.

Наиболее древний из дошедших до нас текстов Праджняпарамиты – «Аштасахасрика-Праджняпарамита-сутра». Некото-

рые ее части датируются Э. Конзе [Conze, 1960, p. 3] приблизительно 100 г. до н. э. Но Л. Мялль считает, что, "по-видимому, во время создания «Аштасахасрики» существовали уже некоторые праджняпарамитские тексты, которые, по всей вероятности, не сохранились [Мялль, 1973, с. 212] . Он же отмечает в «Аштасахасрике» свидетельства существования устной традиции Праджняпарамиты [Там же]. Можно предположить, что еще до «Аштасахасрики» существовала какая-то группа текстов, нигде не зафиксированных или рано утраченных, в которых содержались идеи Праджняпарамиты.

В литературе существует несколько точек зрения относительно места их первоначального возникновения. Наиболее распространенная из них связывает появление первых праджняпарамитских текстов с деятельностью махасангхиков на юге Индии. Южное происхождение Праджняпарамиты подтверждается наличием в тексте ранних сутр отдельных слов и выражений, используемых только в южных диалектах, а также присутствием дравидского субстрата в мифологии. Персонификация Праджняпарамиты в виде женского божества и представление о ней как о «Матери Будд» связывается Э. Конзе с матриархальными традициями дравидов. Влияние этих традиций, возможно, прослеживается и в названии нумерологических текстов ранних абхидхармических трактатов – матрик. Слово *mātrikā* в буквальном переводе означает «мать», а также «магическая буква», «магический алфавит». В раннем буддизме списки дхарм – *матрики* – рассматривались как вместилище мудрости – *праджни*. Мудрость порождает состояние пробуждения, просветления – *бодхи*. здесь присутствуют, на наш взгляд, отголоски тех представлений, согласно которым всякое благо для человека могло происходить только от божества-прародительницы, а мудрость могла быть только божественной благодатью, даруемой за особые религиозные заслуги либо приобретаемой в результате успешной магической практики.

На неземной характер Праджняпарамиты как *особой мудрости* указывают и все легенды, связанные с началом ее распространения. Бутон (1290–1364), известный тибетский историк и систематизатор Ганджура, в «Истории буддизма» сообщает, что полный текст Праджняпарамиты, содержащий 1 000 000 000 шлок, хранится во дворце царя *гандхарвов* (мифические сущес-

тва полубожественного происхождения, обитающие в верхней части неба), менее детальный вариант в 10 000 000 шлок находится в сфере царя богов и еще более сокращенный вариант – собственно «Шатасахасрика» (Праджняпарамита-сутра в 100 000 шлок) – у *нагов* (мифические существа, обитающие в подземном мире, реках, озерах, водоемах, полузмеи-полулюди) [Buston, 1932, II, p. 170].

Именно от *нагов*, согласно легенде, Нагарджуна и получил «Шатасахасрику», которая символизирует здесь вообще полное праджняпарамитское знание. Приведенная легенда является вариантом очень распространенного всюду мифа о змее-поглотителе, мифа, отражающего структуру обряда инициации. Для нас здесь существенно то, что инициируемый после пребывания в чреве змея либо после посещения места его обитания под водой или под землей приобретает магические способности. Анализируя этот миф, В. Я. Пропп пишет: "От змея (из змея) или другого животного в обряде выходит охотник, в мифе – великий охотник, великий шаман."

Оттуда же приносится первый огонь, а при появлении земледелия – первые плоды земли, оттуда же идет и гончарное искусство. Мы увидим, что дальше "будет следовать великий вождь, а еще позднее – бог" [Пропп, 1986, с. 229]. Далее В. Н. Пропп отмечает, что в результате приобретения этих магических способностей "герой получает всеведение" [Там же, с. 230], и делает вывод о том, что "первоначально приобретались способности чисто охотничьи, затем способности, связанные с гончарным искусством, земледелием и т. д. По мере того как человек овладевал природой и производством, отпал магический характер этих способностей и искусств, но те способности, по отношению к которым человек все еще оставался беспомощным, эти способности, хотя бы в мифе... все еще приобретаются с участием змей" [Там же, с. 231].

Ситуация с Нагарджуной и нагами, как мы видим, полностью укладывается в описанную выше схему мифа, и для нас здесь существенно, что, во-первых, праджняпарамитское знание описывается как *сверхзнание*, как *магическое знание*, приобретаемое в результате обряда посвящения. Во-вторых, текст праджняпарамиты в виде материализованной формы этого знания (т. е. в виде книги) рассматривается как *магический предмет*, владение

которым обеспечивает владение сверхзнанием, но в то же время способен благодаря своим магическим свойствам охранять от воздействия злых сил. Отметим здесь связанный с этим обычай прикладывания священных буддийских текстов к темени, бытующий и в настоящее время. В-третьих, владение праджняпарамитой как магическим знанием в принципе, по логике мифа, имеет потенцию обладания социальной властью (концепция чакравартина), а также перспективу деификации. В-четвертых, психические способности, описываемые в праджняпарамитских текстах как *праджня*, остаются для мифологического сознания, порождающего подобные мифы, рационально и практически не освоенными, т. е. такими, "по отношению к которым человек все еще оставался беспомощным."

Все эти мотивы присутствуют и в иконографии Праджняпарамиты, среди атрибутов которой помимо книги (т. е. текста Праджняпарамиты) есть и меч (см. [7, с. 125]). Отметим, что в мифологии традиционно меч является атрибутом царской власти, причем получение его нередко сопровождалось предварительным единоборством со змеем или драконом.

Другой момент, связанный с мотивом змея-поглотителя, проявляется с присутствующей здесь явно символикой воды. А. В. Парибок, посвятивший этому вопросу специальную работу, делает вывод, что вода в палийских источниках "символизирует психику вообще и бессознательное в особенности" [Парибок, 1987, с. 155]. Хотя он полагает, что истолкование пути как переправы, в которой один из берегов символизирует конечную цель, нирвану, не имеет смысла, нам представляется, что мотив переправы все-таки на определенном раннем этапе существовал и отражал мифологический уровень сознания. В мифологии водная переправа связана с путешествием в царство мертвых. Причем присутствие в качестве перевозочного средства лодки (что явствует из контекста), а не животного (коня), согласно В. Н. Проппу [Пропп, 1986, с. 211], ясно указывает на неарийское происхождение мифа.

Связь бессознательного (сна как бессознательного состояния) со смертью достаточно подробно исследована этнографами. Для того чтобы приобрести новое знание (а оно всегда жестко связано с определенным социальным статусом), герою мифа необходимо было ритуально «умереть», т. е. пройти обряд ини-

циации, отбросить «старую память», «старое сознание», для того чтобы приобрести новое. Таким образом, момент перехода через бессознательное, через состояние «смерти», оказывался совершенно неизбежным. Поэтому «погружение в поток» бессознательного с точки зрения мифологического сознания имеет вполне определенный смысл. *Śrotāpanna* («вступивший в поток»), а с точки зрения А. В. Парибка – «обретший слух», т. к. согласно его толкованию символики воды в буддизме "вступать в нее нужды нет, напротив, проблема в том, как бы выбраться" [Парибок, 1987, с. 155] – это попросту инициируемый в соответствии с мифологическими представлениями.

Буддийские источники не едины в объяснении этимологии слова *pāramitā*. Если Харибхадра в «Абхисамаяламкаралоке» производит его от двух корней: *pāram* («берег») и *itā* («движение») – и дает ту интерпретацию слова, о которой уже говорилось выше [Murti, 1960, p. 28], то «Аштасахасрика» [Aṣṭasāhasrikā, 1960, p. 81] производит «парамиту» от *parama* («высший»), толкуя ее с точки зрения высших достоинств как самой Праджняпарамиты, так и совершенствующихся в ней. Любой из этих смыслов может иметь, как было показано выше, мифологическое содержание, но первый вариант поддается также переосмыслению и в чисто логической форме.

Если такие парамиты, как «дана» (*dāna*) – «парамита даяния», «вирья» (*vīrya*) – «парамита усердия», «дхьяна» (*dhyāna*) – «парамита созерцания», могут быть описаны как психологические свойства личности или формы поведения, которые возможны и желательны в норме, но поддаются развитию до большого совершенства, то «праджня-парамиту» (*prajñā-pāramitā*) принципиально нельзя описать как обычное, нормальное состояние человека, достижимое путем накопления и приращения усилий, постоянной тренировки и т. д. Праджняпарамита в отличие от других парамит никак не связана с повседневной практикой, образом жизни, нормами нравственности и морали. Она, безусловно, какое-то знание, в мифологическом сознании связываемое, как мы видим, со сверхчеловеческим, неземным знанием, которое не может быть получено обычным путем. В «Аштасахасрике» это знание определяется как *asaṅga-jñāna* – «несвязанное знание» [Там же, с. 136]. Согласно Харибхадре, это такое знание, "которое не имеет признаков и полностью неза-

висимое" [Murti, 1960, с. 443], т. е. это несистематизированное и, по определению (см. выше), вообще не поддающееся систематизации знание в отличие от Абхидхармы. Если быть еще более точным, то это такое знание, которое вообще не поддается определению. Л. Мялль по этому поводу замечает, что авторы «Аштасахасрики», по-видимому, считали определение Праджняпарамиты ненужным и невозможным. Поскольку все попытки определить Праджняпарамиту как какое-то содержательное знание оказались неудачными, остается предположить, что Праджняпарамита есть указание, знак какого-то состояния, скорее всего психологического, или какой-то ситуации.

В очень короткой «Мандукья упанишаде», состоящей всего из двенадцати частей и посвященной толкованию звука «АУМ», «праджня» упоминается в двух из них:

> *"Когда уснувший не имеет никакого желания, не видит никакого сна, – это глубокий сон. [Находящаяся в] состоянии глубокого сна, ставшая единой, пронизанная лишь познанием, состоящая из блаженства, вкушающая блаженство, чье лицо – мысль, праджня – [вот] третья стопа"*(5).

> *"Состояние глубокого сна, праджня – звук м, третья часть из-за изменения или поглощения. Поистине, кто знает это, измеряет все сущее и поглощает [его в себе]"*(11). (Перевод А. Я. Сыркина) [Упанишады, 2, 1992, сс. 201–202].

"Измеряет все сущее и поглощает его в себе" – возможно потому, что *pra-jña* – буквально: "знание, заполняющее все пространство". В комментариях на эту упанишаду «праджня» ассоциируется с «будущим временем», «глубоким сном», «чистым познанием» и «блаженством». В буддизме «праджня», напротив – «пробуждение», но также – «блаженство» и «чистое познание», точнее – «интуиция».

Если продвинуться еще дальше в глубь веков, то можно обратить внимание на такое древнее ведийское словосочетание, как *parāṃ parāvataṃ*, которое, как отмечает В. С. Семенцов, многие комментаторы (например, Шанкара) уже явно не понимали. Напомним, что *parāṃ parāvataṃ* в «Брихадараньяке» – конечная цель «пути богов». В. С. Семенцов переводит это выражение как «запредельную даль», обращая внимание на то, что в брахманах оно носит "явно архаичный характер", а также на связь с Инд-

рой, для которого оно служит обителью (например, в «Айтарея брахмане»: "Убив Вритру, Индра ушел в запредельные дали; в запредельную даль ушел он," в «Ригведе»: "словно страшный рыскающий зверь горный, ты [Индра] пришел из дали запредельной;" "тот, чей свет достигает [сюда] через сухую степь, из запредельной дали"). [Семенцов, 1981, с. 136–137]. В связи с последним примером обратим внимание на уже отмеченную выше связь шуньи с «пустынностью».

Убийство Вритры, как известно – главный подвиг Индры. Вместе с тем, в «Авесте», отражающей более ранний период жизни индоиранских племен, *vereθra* означала не «демона Вритру», а некое безличное «препятствие», которое побеждается теми, кто обладает особой силой, имеющей в «Авесте» название *xᵛarenah* («лучистый», «золотой», «небесный»). Получение этой силы приводит к увеличению продолжительности жизни «за пределы года», т.е. к бессмертию, чему способствуют возлияния Хаомы (сомы).

В. С. Семенцов указывает далее на связь ригведийского термина *svarnara* («золотой», «небесный»), обозначающего небесный источник Сомы, а также вместилище небесных вод и огня с авестийским *xᵛarenah*. [Там же, с.138] и цитирует ригведийский гимн Индре (4.21.3), где *svarnara* и *parāvat* указываются как места обитания Индры, причем последнее отождествляется с «престолом рита»: "Приди, о Индра, от неба, от земли, быстро [приди] от моря или же от суши; да укрепишь ты нас, о друг Марутов, [приходящий] от сварнары или от запредельности, от престола правды."

Любопытно также сделанное здесь замечание о том, что источник небесных вод и огня и жизни – это то место, где авестийский Йима (= ригведийскому Яме) умирает, теряя свою *xᵛarenah* [там же, с.139].

Отметим, что *parāvat* обозначает, таким образом, область запредельности противоположную по своим свойствам загробному миру Ямы, что, в общем-то, и отмечается в учении о «двух путях».

Pāramitā в буддизме означает «выход за пределы», то есть то же, что и *paravat* в ведийской культуре, да и этимологически они очень близки. Встречаются и буквальные совпадения, например, в ригведийском гимне «К Рудре»:

"Из (всего), что рождено, о Рудра, ты самый
блистательный (своим) блеском,
Самый сильный из сильных, о ты, с ваджрой в руке.
Переправь нас благополучно по ту сторону нужды!
Отбей все преследования недуга!»
(Перевод Т. Я. Елизаренковой) [Ригведа, 1989, с. 274].

Комментируя выражение "переправь… по ту сторону (*parī pāram*)" или "на тот берег", Т. Я. Елизаренкова отмечает, что этот образ, характерный для «Ригведы», "в дальнейшем часто встречается в буддийской литературе" [Там же, с. 682].

Можно предположить, что Праджняпарамита как "выводящее за пределы, заполняющее собой все пространство знание истинной сущности [пустоты]" продолжала сохранять свои генетические связи с древней традицией, что особенно ясно проявляется в текстах, так или иначе связанных с "народным буддизмом."

Далее, учитывая, что Праджняпарамита – понятие чрезвычайно "размытое" («знание, не имеющее признаков»), можно с большой долей вероятности предположить, что оно окажется в ряду каких-то тождеств. Учитывая также, что это все-таки понятие буддийское, можно предположить, далее, что другими понятиями в этом ряду тождеств будут такие, как *Будда, Дхарма, Учение, Нирвана.*

Действительно, в текстах буддизма Махаяны можно встретить такие ряды тождеств (см.: [Conze, 1948]). Но место *Праджняпарамиты* в этом ряду все же, как это ни парадоксально, особое. Она является тем звеном, без которого вся цепочка рассыпается, превращаясь в ряд обособленных, вполне определенных понятий. Выхваченная в своей особости из этого ряда, *Праджняпарамита* может даже рассматриваться как нечто психологически и онтологически более первичное по отношению к другим членам этого ряда [Там же, с. 225]. В этом смысле она представляется чистым *Абсолютом*, о котором ничего больше и сказать нельзя, кроме того, что это *Абсолют*. Но на уровне феноменального бытия *Праджняпарамита* превращается в почти бесконечную цепь приближений к состоянию *Абсолюта* или же бесконечную цепь интерпретаций этого состояния в зависимости от ситуации и действующих лиц. здесь *Праджняпарамита* превращается уже в *текст* – систему знаков, которые по своей при-

роде тождественны, но эта тождественность прямо не проявлена для тех, кто привык воспринимать множественность как многообразие. Выявление этой тождественности и составляет, собственно, практическую сторону *Праджняпарамиты*.

По смыслу *Праджняпарамиты* как категории и всего учения в целом нет необходимости употреблять различные слова (если и поскольку вообще приходится их употреблять) для обозначения: «*содержания учения*» – «*того, кто излагает*» – «*то, с помощью чего это содержание излагается*» - «*то, благодаря чему оно осознается*» – «*того, кто его воспринимает*». Разумеется, такое понятие однозначно определить принципиально не возможно, учитывая, что его многозначность может присутствовать и "работать" в каждом его употреблении, независимо от контекста. Соответственно у каждого, кто его употребляет, предполагается наличие определенной интуиции.

На психологическом уровне *Праджняпарамита* – "это, во-первых, по особым правилам порожденный текст, который может иметь вид внутренней речи, устной речи и письменно зафиксированного текста, носящего название «Праджняпарамиты» и целью которого является создание наивысшего уровня сознания человека. Во-вторых, *prajñāpāramitā* – это одно из названий наивысшего состояния сознания, отражающее его способность полностью понимать текст «Праджняпарамиты» и порождать новые тексты такого же типа" [Мялль, 1973, Вып. 309, с. 209]. Он представляет механизм порождения нового текста как развертывание исходного тезиса: "«Дхарму» можно рассматривать не только как элемент текста, но скорее как текст, который может иметь любую протяженность, начиная с одной буквы, например «А» (полное название этого текста в каноне – *Bhagavatī sarva-tathāgata-mātā ekākṣarā nāma prajñāpāramitā*), или даже с паузы и кончая такими объемистыми сутрами, как «Аватамсака», «Шатасахасрика Праджняпарамита», или даже всей совокупности буддийской литературы («Ученье Будды») настоящий объем которой, кстати, по некоторым причинам (в течение истории все время создавались новые канонические тексты и в то же время исчезали многие другие) не известен ни одному буддологу" [Мялль, 1987, Вып. 754, с. 24]. Что касается праджняпарамитской литературы, то здесь историческая тенденция развивалась в следующем направлении: от больших текстов

«Аштасахасрики» и других до малых сутр типа «Экакшары» и «Свалпакшары». И это вполне понятно, поскольку малые сутры выполняли роль конспекта или даже знака по отношению к пространным праджняпарамитским произведениям и всей вообще буддийской литературе. Вместе с тем структура текста, чаще всего скрытая от глаз непосвященного читателя, во столько же раз усложняется, во сколько раз уменьшается печатный объем текста (объем содержания остается равновеликим другим праджняпарамитским текстам). Таким образом, объем содержания праджняпарамитских понятий и объем текстов могут меняться, не меняя своего основного отношения к обозначаемой ими реальности.

Обратим внимание на термин *śarīra*, который в буддийских текстах обычно используется в значении «безжизненное тело», «мощи», чаще всего «мощи Будды».

После паринирваны Будды его тело было кремировано, а прах разделен между магадхским раджей Аджаташатру и семью представителями разных племен, заявивших свои права на то, чтобы останки Сиддхартха Гаутамы покоились на их территории. В отношении к мощам Будды в ранний период распространения буддизма, безусловно, имело значение его кшатрийское происхождение. Захоронения вождей практически везде служили источником как сакральной силы, так и (благодаря этому) самым важным «подтверждением» легитимности власти. Момент «освящения» власти царя благодаря сохранению на его территории святых мощей великого подвижника, несомненно, присутствует в «Маха парииббана сутте», описавшей события, последовавшие после паринирваны Будды. В ланкийской «Махавамсе», «Записках о буддийских странах» Фа Сяня, других буддийских хрониках можно найти много упоминаний о возложении царем на свою голову мощей Будды. Очевидно, что первоначально культ мощей Будды был не более чем одним из обрядов в общей системе культа предков и использовался царями для подтверждения своих притязаний на обладание определенной территории. Именно так можно интерпретировать строительство Ашокой, а вслед за ним и другими царями, многочисленных ступ.

Учение Будды не было связано узкими рамками каких-то локальных традиций, поэтому почитание его мощей также

могло приобрести универсальный характер. Первым это понял и использовал в своих целях Ашока. Если первые восемь ступ были построены в местах, связанными с наиболее важными событиями в жизни Учителя и носили мемориальный характер, то создание "84 тысяч" ступ Ашоки определялось полностью целями его политики *дхарма-виджаи* – «завоевания с помощью дхармы».

Таким образом, строительство ступ (с точки зрения центрального правительства) способствовало решению двух задач: распространению влияния царской власти и расширению территории государства, а также распространению влияния буддизма как универсальной государственной идеологии. Вместе с тем в почитании ступ, чайтьев не было ничего специфически буддийского. Этот обычай был весьма распространен в древней Индии и множество поклоняющихся мощам святого *садху* наверняка не знали, да и не интересовались – что же он конкретно совершил. Такое положение шло вразрез с духом и смыслом самого буддийского учения и не могло не беспокоить его последователей. Не случайно Махадева, основатель Чайтики, одной из 18-ти школ раннего буддизма, первым провозгласившей культ ступы и культ мощей Учителя, был объявлен еретиком как Стхавиравадинами, так и Махасангхиками. Последователи Махадевы первыми стали поклоняться Будде и бодхисаттвам, разработали учение о заслуге (пунье), которая может приобретаться в результате сделанного дара, и, самое главное, способна быть передана другим существам.

Отголоски скептицизма в отношении культа поклонения ступе и противопоставление ему заслуги подлинного овладения сутью Учения Будды особенно часто встречаются в праджняпарамитских сутрах. В ранней Махаяне и прежде всего в «Праджняпарамите» разрабатываются понятия *рупашарира* и *дхармашарира*, и если под первым разумелись телесные останки, мощи, то под вторым понимались тексты книг, причем имелись в виду не любые канонические тексты, а как считает Л. Мялль, именно свод праджняпарамитских сутр.

В «Праджняпарамите» приобретению заслуг с помощью даров приносимых ступе противопоставляется заслуга, приобретаемая переписыванием книг (т. е. «Праджняпарамиты»).

Строительству ступ и их почитанию, т.е. почитанию *рупашарирыы* противопоставляется переписывание текстов «Праджняпарамиты», т.е. почитание *дхармашарирыы*.

Заслуга переписывания «Праджняпарамиты» приравнивается к заслуге приближения к тем, "кто обладает десятью силами, к духовным руководителям." В число «десяти сил Будды» входит и *vikurvaṇabala* или «сила трансформации», которая, как уже было сказано, объединяет понятия «тело дхармы» и «тело формы».

Тем, кто разрабатывал учение Праджняпарамиты, и их последователям мадхьямикам, удалось объединить в одной концепции два принципиально различных механизма приобщения к традиционной сакральности: через соблюдение обрядов почитание предков и обретение особого сакрального знания – *праджни*, которое, в определенной степени, обесценивает все обряды, но, в то же время, и *заменяет* их. Эта концепция известна как концепция *трех тел Будды*, хотя изначально тел было только два, а впоследствии их стало четыре.

Дж. Туччи полагает, что в нагарджуновом тексте «Чатух-става», объединяющем четыре гимна Будде, как раз и излагается концепция четырех тел Будды, хотя Нагарджуна дает каждому из них имя, «отличающееся от обычных» [Tucci, 1932, p. 311]. Гимны, вошедшие в «Чатух-става» носят следующие названия: «Локатита-става» («Гимн Ушедшему из мира, [Умершему для мира]»), «Наираупамья-става» («Гимн Несравненному»), «Ачинтья-става» («Гимн Непостижимому») и «Парамартха-става» («Гимн Высшей Истине»). Очевидно, что *рупа-кае* здесь соответствует тело, названное Нагарджуной – *локатита*, а *дхарма-кае* – *парамартха*.

Если предположение Туччи верно, то напрашивается параллель между двумя телами Будды и двумя истинами: *самврити-сатьи* (которая определяется как *лока-вьявахара* т.е. «относящееся к условному, относительному, принятому в мире») и *парамартха-сатьи*, занимающих очень важную место среди важнейших доктрин Мадхьямики и в учении Нагарджуны, в частности.

Помимо четырех уже упомянутых гимнов, Нагарджуне приписывается авторство еще трех: «Читта-ваджра-става», «Стутьятита-става» и «Дхармадхату-става». В последнем гимне

дхарма-дхату отождествляется с *татхагата-дхату*, что также равносильно *татхагата-гарбхе*. Если учесть, что слово «дхату» изначально означало «мощи», а *татхагата-дхату-гарбха* в третьей главе «Аштасахасрики», например, употребляется в значении *ступа*, то становится ясна "укорененность" философии Махаяны, причем не только Мадхьямики, но и Виджнянавады в древних слоях символики ведийской и доведийской обрядности. (Знаменательно, что гимны Нагарджуны предназначались для ежедневного трехразового чтения перед ступой).

Во многих ведийских текстах смысл исполнения ритуала заключался в отождествлении жертвы со всем миром и с самим собой, с основными психо-физиологическими функциями. В буддизме дхармы-элементы также отождествляются прежде всего с психо-физиологическими функциями, причем их способность к связыванию в некое единое целое является причиной вовлеченности в круговорот бытия, а осознание их истинной сути путем выхода за его пределы. Также как в «Брихадараньяке» осознание подлинной сути жертвоприношения (= дхарме) приводило на «путь богов».

Согласно широко распространенной точки зрения, традиционное обозначение ведийского канона – *шрути* («слышанное») истолковывается как божественное «откровение», услышанное и затем воспроизведенное певцом во время совершения ритуала. Но, как отмечает В. С. Семенцов, такое понимание слова *шрути* в контексте ведийской культуры основано на недоразумении. Дело в том, что в «Ригведе» "боги вообще ничего не говорят людям, ... субъектом глагола «слышать» *(шру)* в РВ оказывается божество, а не человек" [Семенцов, 1981, с. 16].

Для того, чтобы получить ответ от богов, следовало обратиться к так называемому «*чикитвас*», что означает одновременно «умный» и «видящий». То есть сферу божественного можно было увидеть особым «умственным взором», а затем уже таким образом «увиденное» истолковать на обычном языке. Вот для обозначения такого «умственного видения» и применялись термины: *дхи, дхьяна, дхишана*. Для овладения подобными способностями требовались особые данные и специальная подготовка. Очевидно, что «умственное видение» и нормальное зрение находились в некотором антагонизме. Хорошо видящим все подробности житейского быта, "привязанным своим зрением к

ним," не дано проникать за границы этих видимых форм. В то же время внимание сосредоточенных на поиске высших истин обычно отвлекается от подробностей окружающей суеты. Оказывается, что обычные органы чувств несут "привязывающую к земле" информацию, и потому "вредоносную" для тех, кто стремится в небесные сферы. Контроль за органами чувств, таким образом, приобретал очень важное значение в психофизической подготовке совершенствующего и это в полной мере перешло из ведийской культуры в буддийскую дхьяну (См., например, [Конзе, 1993, сс. 47–55]).

Но *дхи*, *дхьяна* в «Ригведе» – не просто "посылаемые богами сообщения", это также, что важно отметить активный способ воздействия в божественной "бесформенной" сфере, с помощью этой способности, "силы" можно не только что-то "увидеть", но и "создать". Во многих гимнах «Ригведы» знание как *veda* тесно связано с понятием *dhī*, *dhiśaṇā*, т. е. с «видением», «вдохновением», «высшим пониманием», которое охватывает слагателей гимнов – святых *риши*.

Dhī, как отмечалось выше, уже в ранних текстах выступает синонимом *prajñā*, но, что удивительно, даже в «Абхидхармакоше» (в 41 карике), созданной в V в., т. е. спустя, по крайней мере, полтора тысячелетия (!), *dhī* также используется в качестве эквивалента *prajñā*.

Dhī, как ясно из текста «Ригведы», не в коем случае не является каким-то логическим рассудочным знанием. Это – «видения», образы, навеянные галлюциногенным воздействием *сомы*. Только в результате последующего осмысления пропетого гимна появляется какое-то суждение. Поэтому *dhī* и стало именоваться *праджней*, т. е. «пред-знанем».

Prajñā и *abhijñā* обозначают (особенно в ранних текстах), то, что предшествует обычному человеческому знанию, что является его сакральной причиной и условием. С точки зрения исторической психологии эти понятия отражают, по-видимому, тот период в развитии человеческой психики, который характеризовался отсутствием рефлексии и соответствовал так называемой "бикамеральной" фазе развития сознания (см. работы американского психолога Джулиана Джайнса). "Бикамеральный разум" не способен правильно идентифицировать все сигналы, сообщаемые одним полушарием другому (поскольку они дейс-

твовали относительно независимо друг от друга), в результате эти сигналы воспринимались как "голоса" или "видения", проникающие извне и приписываемые богам или духам. Становление самосознания происходит позже (в индийской культуре это соответствует, по-видимому, периоду создания упанишад и маркируется появлением понятия *атман*) и в это же время появляется представление о знании, как ведущей и главной психической способности человека.

Джняна в «Ригведе» означает как сакральное знание, так и обыденное, но чаще встречается в нейтральном значении "знания вообще". В частности, существовало такое устойчивое ригведийское клише как: *pūrve pitaraḥ padajñāḥ* (букв.: "прежние отцы, знающие след"; см.: I, 62, 2c; III, 55, 2b). Возможен перевод: «знающие путь», причем под *путем*, в данном случае, имелся в виду не «путь предков», как можно было бы ожидать, а «путь святых *риши*», знающих *веды* и обряд.

В упанишадах *джняна*, ранее обозначавшее частное, обыденное знание превращается в *виджняну* (*vijñāna*) – способность к различительному познанию, в отличие от целостного знания праджни, *абхиджни*.

Виджняна появляется в текстах, пришедших на смену гимнической поэзии, и характеризуемых наличием обширных по объему и сложных по структуре классификаций, поначалу ритуального, а затем и философского характера.

В «Брихадараньяка упанишаде» *виджняна* обозначает познание "из которого состоит *Атман*" и в сходных контекстах заменяется на синонимичное (в данном случае) – *праджняна* (см. Брихадараньяка II.4.12. и IV.5.13.) Таким образом, *виджняна* соответствует здесь и сакральному знанию (точнее, знанию сакральных текстов), но, в то же время, она является такого рода познанием, в котором уже выделяется субъект и объект (см. Брихадараньяка II.4.14.).

В упанишадах и последующей философской литературе можно отметить наличие двух тенденций в интерпретации термина *виджняна*.

Согласно одной из них, *виджняна* резко отличается от интуитивно-созерцательного целостного знания *праджни* и *дхи (дхьяны, дхишаны)* как различительное знание. В этом смысле она толкуется в текстах как основа эпистемологии (различие знания

и незнания), логического знания (различие причины и следствия) и высшего этического знания (как различения добра и зла).

Согласно другой тенденции, *виджняна* есть выражение наибольшей полноты знания в его нераздельном единстве интуитивных и дискурсивных форм. В этом смысле *виджняна* есть чистое безобъектное и бессубъектное сознание, которое в таком случае превращается, по существу, в *возможность сознания*, и ничем не отличается от "пред-знания" *праджни*. Действительно, во многих текстах оба понятия употребляются как синонимичные. Но, отмечаются также случаи, когда *виджняна* рассматривается как более общий и высший вид знания, чем *праджня*.

Пратитьясамутпада, как отмечает В. Рахула, фактически приравнивается в палийских источниках термину *татхата* [Rahula, 1974, p. 187]. Этот термин обозначает "реальность такой, какая она есть на самом деле" и он равносилен такому понятию, как *yathābhūtam*. Реальность, которая описывается с его помощью – это реальность, открывающаяся просветленному существу, постигшему глубокий смысл всеобщей причинной связи, т. е. пратитьясамутпаду. На русский язык *tathatā* переводиться обычно как «таковость». Близкое по значению *tathatva* (или *tathātva*), встречающееся в «Аштасахасрике», можно перевести как «такость». Там же, в «Аштасахасрике», встречается достаточно редкий термин – *tathāgatatva* («татхагатовость»).

В праджняпарамитских сутрах *татхата* обычно отождествляется с *дхарматой*. У виджнянавадинов *татхата* обозначает высшую реальность. Праджняпарамитские тексты позволяют проследить динамику формирования этой важнейшей категории в философии Махаяны.

В «Самчае» *татхата* встречается всего несколько раз, но в XII-той главе содержится весьма любопытное ее определение:

«Таковость» пребывающего в миру,
«таковость» пратьекабудды,
«таковость» Победителя (Будды – С. Л.) *и*
«таковость» каждого живого существа –
одинаковы.
[Так] парамита праджни понимается Татхагатой.
У того бодхисаттвы [есть] мудрое знание «таковости»,
кто, мудро терпящий мир или ушедший в нирвану,

пребывает на пути истинной природы (dharmatāniyāma),
установленной [осознанием] пустотности дхарм.
Вот почему к Будде обращались:
«Так Приходящий, послушай!» (tathāgatebhoḥ)

(lokasya yā tathatā ya tathatāhitānaṃ
pratyekabuddhatathatā tathatā jinānāṃ |
ekaikabhavitathatā tathatā ananyā
prajñāya pāramita buddha tathāgatena || 3 ||
tiṣthantu loka vidu vā parinirvṛta vā
sthita esa dharmataniyāma śūnyadharmā |
taṃ bodhisattva tathatāmanubuddhyanti
tasmāhu buddha kṛtanāma tathāgatebhoḥ || 4 ||)
[*Prajñā-pāramitā-ratna-guṇa-saṃcaya-gāthā*, 1960, XII, 3–4].

Здесь мы видим, что вначале рассматривается *татхата* каждого отдельного существа, так, как если бы анализировалась каждая отдельная *дхарма* из общего абхидхармистского списка. Затем, когда мы интуитивно приходим к тому, что «таковость» любого существа, любого "события", любой *дхармы* – одинакова, то можно сделать следующий шаг, и предположить, что существует «таковость» вообще, «таковость» как категория. Но в «Самчае» этого прямо не говорится, а указывается подразумеваемым «Так» перед словами "парамита праджни понимается Татхагатой" (*prajñāya pāramita buddha tathāgatena*). В следующей *гатхе tathatā* употребляется уже в смысле всеобщей категории, а не единичного понятия, причем устанавливается ее связь с такими категориями как *dharmatā* и *śūnyatā*, а также показывается, каким образом из нее выводится понятие *tathāgata*.

Следует пояснить, что обращение – "Так Приходящий, послушай!" (*tathāgatebhoḥ*) могло принадлежать только брахманам-небуддистам, поскольку оно было непочтительным и означало, что обращающийся так не признает за Буддой статуса духовного наставника. В «Дхаммападе» такие брахманы названы с осуждением – "говорящие *бхо*" (*bhovādin*). (*Бхо* – междометие, служащее формой приветствия для равных по положению или низших). Но в «Самчае» этого оттенка осуждения в отношении идейных противников не чувствуется. По смыслу самой категории, *Татхагата* выше любых определений и всякой возможности описания или наименования. О нем только и можно сказать, что он "Так пришел" или "Так ушел". «Так Приходящий»

находится вне всяких рангов, статусов и никакое обращение к нему не может быть, поэтому, унижающим.

В «Ваджраччхедике» понятие *tathatā* непосредственно не употребляется, но используется близкий по смыслу термин *tathāvādin* («говорящий о том, что есть на самом деле»), который характеризует Учение Татхагаты:

"И почему так? [Ведь], Субхути, Татхагата говорит о действительности, говорит об Истине, говорит о том, что есть на самом деле, говорит не по разному [об одном и том же]. Не о ложном говорит Татхагата".

(tat kasya hetoḥ? bhūtavādī subhūte tathāgataḥ satyavādī tathāvādy-ananyathāvādī tathāgataḥ | na vitathavādī tathāgataḥ)
[*Vajracchedikā*, 14f; p. 42].

Таким образом, *tathā* в «Ваджраччхедике» выступает синонимом к таким понятиям как *bhūta* («действительность, реальность»), *satya* («истина»), *ananyathā* («неразличное») и корреспондирует (являясь его антонимом) с понятием *vitatha* («ложное; не то, что есть в действительности»).

В «Аштасахасрике» процесс формирования категории *tathatā* представлен в более развернутом виде. Существуют такие фрагменты, где «таковость» соотносится с различными уровнями пути просветления, наряду с Праджняпарамитой и Наивысшим Совершенным Просветлением (*anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi*):

"Невелик класс таких существ, которые устремляются по направлению к Наивысшему Совершенному Просветлению. Еще меньше, Субхути, таких, которые продвигаются к «такости». Совсем уже мало, Субхути, тех, которые прилагают усилия для оказания уважения Праджняпарамите. И совсем-совсем мало таких бодхисаттв-махасаттв, которые безвозвратно ушли в Наивысшее Совершенное Просветление."

(alpakās te sattvāḥ sattvanikāye saṃvidyante, ye anuttarāyāṃ samyaksaṃbodhau saṃprastitāḥ | tebhyo 'pi subhūte alpebhyo 'lpatarakās te sattvāḥ, ye tathatvāyā pratipadyante | tebhyo 'pi subhūte alpatamebhyaḥ prajñāpāramitāyāṃ yogam āpadyemānebhyo 'lpatamās te bodhisattvā mahasattvāḥ, ye 'vinivartanīya anuttarāyāḥ samyaksaṃbodheḥ)
[*Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, 1960, XXV, 429–430; pp. 212–213].

Здесь «таковость» (или, точнее, «такость») рассматривается, как что-то более низкое по сравнению с Праджняпарамитой

и Наивысшим Совершенным Просветлением. В другом месте «таковость» Татхагаты описывается как более первичная по отношению к «таковости» Субхути:

"Сказано было: «Так стхавира Субхути родился после Татхагаты». Не будучи рожденным, стхавира Субхути родился после Татхагаты. «Таковость» стхавиры Субхути родилась после Татхагаты. Как «таковость» Татхагаты не пришла и не ушла, так не пришла и не ушла «таковость» стхавиры Субхути. Так стхавира Субхути родился после «таковости» Татхагаты. [Ведь] с самого начала стхавира Субхути родился после «таковости» Татхагаты. И почему так? Ведь что – «таковость» Татхагаты, то – «таковость» всех дхарм. Что – «таковость» всех дхарм, то – «таковость» Татхагаты. Что – «таковость» Татхагаты и «таковость» всех дхарм, то – «таковость» стхавиры Субхути … Как «таковость» Татхагаты не принадлежит ни прошедшему, ни будущему, ни настоящему, так и «таковость» всех дхарм не принадлежит ни прошедшему, ни будущему, ни настоящему."

(anujāto 'yaṃ subhūtiḥ sthaviras tathāgatasya iti | ajātatvat subhūtiḥ sthaviro 'nujātas tathāgatasya | anujātas tathatāṃ – subhūtiḥ sthaviras tathāgatasya | yathā tathāgata tathatā anāgatā agatā, evaṃ hi subhūti tathatā anāgatā agatā | evaṃ hi subhūtiḥ sthaviras tathāgata tathatāṃ anujātaḥ | ādita eva subhūtiḥ sthaviras tathāgata tathatāṃ anujātaḥ | tat kasya hetoḥ? yā hi tathāgata tathatā, sā sarvadharma tathatā | yā sarvadharma tathatā, sā tathāgata tathatā | yā ca tathāgata tathatā, ya ca sarvadharma tathatā, sā eva subhūteḥ sthavirasya tathatā ... yathā tathāgata tathatā na atītā na anāgatā na pratyutpannā, evaṃ sarvadharma tathatā na atītā na anāgatā na pratyutpannā)
[*Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, 1960, XVI, 307–308; pp. 153–154].

Наконец, можно указать такие фрагменты, где «таковость» существ, находящихся на разных уровнях пути просветления (*bhūmi*), рассматривается как единая, т. е. как Абсолют, что и позволяет сделать вывод о "равности" уровней и, соответственно, существ:

"То, Субхути, что [рассматривается как] уровень обычных людей, уровень шраваков, уровень пратьекабудд, уровень будд, то и называется: «уровень таковости». [Согласно сказанному,] "Все эти [уровни] благодаря «таковости» – недвойственны, неразделимы, неразличимы, свободны от мысленных конструкций"– так они [бодхисаттвы-махасаттвы познают] «таковость», так они [познают] истинную природу дхарм, спасающую многих."

(yā ca subhūte pṛthagjanabhūmiḥ, yā ca śrāvakabhūmiḥ, yā ca pratyekabuddhabhūmiḥ, yā ca buddhabhūmiḥ, iyaṃ tathatābhūmir ity ucyate | sarvaś ca etās tathatāyā advayā advaidhīkārā avikalpā nirvikalpā iti tāṃ tathatāṃ tāṃ dharmatām avataranti).
[*Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, 1960, XVII, 323; p. 161].

И, наконец, в ряде фрагментов «таковость» объявляется источником просветления будд и прямо отождествляется с просветлением:

"Поэтому, Победоносный, «таковость» является причиной просветления Победоносных Будд".

(ato bhagavaṃs tathatāto buddhānāṃ bhagavatāṃ bodhiḥ prabhāvyate)
[Aṣṭasāhasrikā, 1960, XII, 272; p. 135].

"Затем достопочтенный Субхути задал Победоносному такой вопрос: "Что такое, о Победоносный, Наивысшее Совершенное Просветление?"
Победоносный ответил: "Наивысшее Совершенное Просветление, Субхути, и есть таковость."

(atha kalv āyuṣmān subhūtir bhagavantam etad avocat kā punar eṣā bhagavān anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhiḥ?
bhagavān āha tathatā eṣā subhūte anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhiḥ)
[*Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, 1960, XVIII, 342; p. 174].

Как отмечает Т. Мурти, ссылаясь на «Махавьютпатти», *tathatā* находится в одном ряду с такими синонимичными понятиями как *bhūtakoṭi, dharmadhātu* и *śūnyatā*. Все они, в конечном счете, входят в тот смысловой объем, который содержится в категории *paramārtha* (см.: [Murti, 1960, p. 246]). В *парамартхасатье* Татхагата не отличен от Абсолюта-*татхаты* и *шуньи*. [Там же, с. 283]. Но на уровне *самвритисатьи*, по видимому, следует различать *татхату* или *абсолютную истину* и Так Пришедшего *(Татхагата)*, кто *знает* истину [Там же, с. 277].

В слове *tathā* отсутствуют значения, указывающие на какие-либо пространственные и временные характеристики объекта. В нем фиксируется не столько сам факт существования, сколько способ существования (не "что" и "где", а "как"). Неприменимость пространственно-временного описания по отношению к понятиям *tathā* и *tathāgata* постоянно подчеркивается в праджняпарамитских текстах и у мадхьямиков. Но и в «Маджджж-

хима-никае» разъясняется, что задавать вопрос о том, куда уходит после смерти «Так Уходящий», так же бессмысленно, как и спрашивать: в какую сторону (на север, на юг, на восток, на запад) уходит огонь из потухшего костра [*Majjhima-Nikāya*, 1888, I, 486].

Поскольку Татхагата, как выясняется, не может быть адекватно понят и описан в системе пространственно-временных отношений, то остается единственная область для такой попытки – это область сознания. Как уточняют буддисты, – "чистого сознания", не "загрязненного" никакими формами.

Концепция такого сознания, которое совпадает с высшей реальностью – «Татхатой», и была разработана школой йогачаров-виджнянавадинов.

Основная философская задача, которую поставили перед собой мыслители этой школы, заключалась в ответе на вопрос: как возможен переход от единой реальности к множественному бытию, и наоборот. В сотериологическом плане проблема заключалась в том, что спасение возможно только в том случае, если его источник в какой-то степени уже присутствует в спасаемом. Но, если спасение вездесуще (а этого требует логическая непротиворечивость), то тогда в чем проявляется его сущность, или, если конкретизировать проблему, – каковы методы практики спасения.

Для объединения сансарического и нирванического аспектов бытия в одно системное непротиворечивое целое требовался целый ряд "медиативных" категорий. Одной из них, получившей у виджнянавадинов значительное развитие, стала категория *татхагатагарбха* («Зародыш Сущности Так Приходящего» или «Вместилище Так Приходящего»).

В своем специальном терминологическом значении понятие *tathāgatagarbha* встречается уже в «Адхьярдхашатика-праджняпарамите», но из всех праджняпарамитских сутр – только в ней одной [*Adhyardhaśatikā*, 1961, p. 92]. В «Аштасахасрике» встречается очень близкое понятие, которое уже упоминалось выше, и которое проливает свет на процесс формирования категории *татхагатагарбха*:

"Если сын или дочь из хорошей семьи, построят десять миллионов ступ, сделанных из семи драгоценностей, поместят в них мощи Татхагаты для почитания «Так Пришедшего», Архата, Полностью

Просветленного, ушедшего в Нирвану, и если они будут в течение всей жизни оказывать почтение этим ступам всеми способами, какими почитают богов …, как ты думаешь, Каушика [т.е. Шакра], большая ли заслуга, в соответствии с этим, будет произведена сыном или дочерью из хорошей семьи?
Шакра ответил: "Большая, Бхагаван, большая, Сугата …"

(yaḥ kaścit kulaputro vā kuladuhitā vā tathāgatasyārhataḥ samyaksaṃbuddhasya parinirvṛtasya pūjāyai koṭisaḥ saptaratnamayāṃs tathāgatadhātugarbhān stūpān kārayet, kārayitvā ca tān yāvajjīvaṃ ... divyābhiḥ pūjābhiḥ satkuryād ... tat kiṃ manyase, kauśika, api nu sa kulaputro vā kuladuhitā vā tato nidānaṃ bahupuṇyaṃ prasavet? | śakra āha: bahu, bhagavan, bahu, sugata...)
[*Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, 1960, III, p. 62].

Как отмечает Д. С. Руэгг, это место из «Аштасахасрики», рассматривающее *ступу* как *татхагата-дхату-гарбху*, можно считать уже "предтечей" теории *татхагатагарбхи* в Праджняпарамите, хотя в своем развитом состоянии эта доктрина присутствует только в «Адхьярдхашатика-праджняпарамите» [Ruegg, 1977, p. 288].

Мощи Будды (*tathāgatadhātu*) рассматриваются здесь в качестве «зародыша» (*garbha*) будущего состояния Просветления, поскольку, являясь объектом поклонения, способствуют дальнейшему духовному совершенствованию поклоняющегося, направляя его помыслы в правильную сторону.

В качестве источника, порождающего состояние просветленности, состояние Татхагаты рассматривается и Праджняпарамита, которую называют также «Матерью Татхагат». Напомним об уже рассматривавшейся выше параллели между мощами (*шарира*) и праджняпарамитским текстом. Стоит упомянуть также о том, что Праджняпарамита и в самих праджняпарамитских текстах и в сочинениях виджнянавадинов (например, Дигнаги) отождествляется с Татхагатой.

В «Адъярдхашатике» *татхагатагарбха* присутствует во всех живых существах (поскольку все они обладают природой Самантабхадры) [*Adhyardhaśatikā*, 1961, p. 92]. В санскрите слово *гарбха* имеет несколько значений, в том числе: «зародыш» и «лоно». Теория *татхагатагарбхи* была, в основном, сформулирована в таких основополагающих текстах как «Татхагатагарбха-сутра», «Шрималадевисимханада-сутра», «Махапаринирвана-сутра»,

«Ратнаготравибхага», «Уттаратантра». В «Абхисамаяламкаре» в смысле аналогичном *татхагатагарбхе* используется понятие *пракритистхаготра* (по определению Е. Обермиллера, «изначальный, фундаментальный элемент родословной» [Obermiller, 1932, p. 118]). Слово *готра*, также как и *гарбха*, может означать: «зародыш», но, кроме того, и – «элемент линии духовного преемства» «род», «класс», «категорию». Как показал Д. С. Руэгг, концепции *татхагатагарбхи*, *готры* и *экаяны* («единой колесницы») формировались в тесном взаимодействии [Ruegg, 1977, pp. 283–312].

Примечательно и, видимо, не случайно, что мифологемы *гарбха* и *Единое* оказываются в тесной связи в ряде гимнов «Ригведы», причем в наиболее "философских". *Единое*, которое символизирует в «Ригведе» одно их немногих зооморфных божеств с неясными функциями – Аджа Экапад (*aja ekapād*, букв. «Одноногий Козел»; в «Ригведе» иногда обозначает солнце; *aja* означает также «Нерожденный»), упоминается наряду *гарбхой* и *готрой* в известном гимне-*брахмодье* (гимне-загадке) из I-ой мандалы (I, 164).

Чаще всего в «Ригведе» *гарбха* относится к Агни, который понимается как "зародыш вод, зародыш деревьев … зародыш тех, что стоят, зародивши тех, что движутся (*garbhaś ca sthātaṃ garbhaś carathām*)" [Ригведа, 1989, с. 87; 586]. Агни рассматривается, как зародыш, который находится во всех существах, поскольку из всего может родиться огонь. Как небесный огонь под *гарбхой* (или *хираньягарбхой*) может пониматься и Солнце. В космогонических гимнах X-ой мандалы *гарбха* понимается как основа и источник всего существующего и связывается с *Единым*:

"Этот Первый Зародыш породили воды,
в нем сошлись все боги.
[Там] где начало Нерожденного, помещен [тот] Единый.
В нем [находят] опору все существа."

(tam id garbham prathamaṃ dadhra āpo
yatra devāḥ samagachanta viśve
ajasya nābhāv adhy ekam arpitam
yasmin viśvāni bhuvanāni tasthuḥ)
(X, 82, 6).

"В самом начале возник Золотой Зародыш.
Родившись, он стал Единым Повелителем всех существ.
Он утвердил Землю и это Небо.
Для какого бога совершаем обряд жертвоприношения?"

(hiraṇyagarbhaḥ sam avartatāgre
bhūtasya jātaḥ eka patir āsīt
sa dādhāra pṛthivīṃ dyām utemāṃ
kasmai devāya haviṣā vidhema)
(X, 121, 1).

"Знамя всего [на свете], зародыш вселенной,
рождаясь, он заполнил собой оба мира."
(viśvasya ketur bhuvanasya garbha
ārodasī apṛṇāj jāyamānaḥ)
(X, 45, 6).

В последнем фрагменте *гарбха* относится к Агни, которому посвящен гимн, описывающий, по существу, важнейший для всей ведийской ритуальной культуры обряд *агнихотры*, и впервые формулирующий концепцию *трех огней*.

В *агнихотре*, также как в *ашвамедхе* воплощена центральная идея ведийской культуры (как и любой культуры вообще) о *единстве* всего существующего. Достижение единства являлось, в конечном счете, основной целью любого ритуала и наиболее ярко отразилось в последнем стихе последнего гимна «Ригведы», посвященного Агни, «Гимне Единения»:

"[Пусть будет] единым ваше намерение,
едиными – ваши сердца;
Да будет единой ваша мысль,
чтобы вместе вы все легко одолели!»

(samāni va ākūtiḥ
samānā hṛdayāni vaḥ
samānam astu vo mano
yath vaḥ susahāsati)
(X, 191, 4).

В гимне X, 82 и X, 121 *гарбха* связывается с *Единым* и с, не отождествляемым ни с одним из известных в пантеоне «Ригведы» богов, богом *Ка* («Кто»). Неизвестный бог понадобился, поскольку только он мог символизировать целое, единую ведийскую Вселенную, воплощенную в образе (символе, «знамени»

– *ketu*) Золотого Зародыша (*hiraṇyagarbha*). Впоследствии под *хираньягарбхой* стал пониматься *Брахман*. В «Атхарваведе» *Хираньягарбха* понимается как высшее, выше чего ничто не может быть названо («Атхарваведа», X, 7, 28).

Существует очень интересный текст, который проясняет ритуальную связь между *готрой* (родовым именем), *Единым* (в тексте представленным богом *Ка*), а, следовательно, и *гарбхой*. Это довольно известный фрагмент из «Джайминия брахманы», в котором описывается то, что происходит с человеком в загробном мире после его смерти. Там его встречают два стража, которые суть времена (*ṛtu*). Причем времена не в хронологическом, а в сакральном аспекте. Это и времена года, но, также, и сроки правильного совершения жертвоприношения [Семенцов, 1981, с. 87]. Вначале они, по-видимому, попадают на луну, а затем "выводят его за пределы." По смыслу текста можно понять, что имеются в виду как пределы луны, так и пределы времени [Там же]. Его подводят к солнцу и между ними происходит диалог, который и решает всю дальнейшую судьбу покинувшего земной мир. Вот как об этом говорится в тексте:

"Они выводят его за пределы. Он приходит к этому жаром пышащему. Пришедшего, [солнце] спрашивает: "Кто ты есть?" Тому, кто называется [своим собственным] именем или родовым именем, говорит так: "Хорошо, для того, кто [говорит о себе:] «Я», «мое тело», – пусть так и будет". По отношению к тому, кому достается «собственное Я», (тело) [случается вот что:] времена прибегают из того дома, где он [при жизни был домохозяином], и унося, уменьшают. Так он охватывается миром.

Поэтому следует сказать так: "«Я» – это Ка, ты – небо. К тебе, к солнцу, ведущему в небо, я пришел." Ведь поистине Ка это Праджапати. Поэтому, кто знает так – тот достигает неба (suvar-ga) (другое значение: *достигает рождения в привилегированной социальной группе – su-varga); поистине, к солнцу идет он.*

[Солнце говорит] ему: "Кто ты есть, тот и я есть. Кто я есть, тот и ты есть. Приди сюда!" Тогда он постигает сущность совершенных добрых деяний. Его сыновья пользуются наследством, а предки [плодами] добрых деяний. У того, кто знает так – два тела, два наследства. Одно тело и всего одно наследство у того, кто не зная этого, льет в огонь, совершая жертвоприношение агнихотры."

(taṃ hātyarjayante | sa haitam āgacchati tapantam | taṃ hāgatam pṛcchati: kas tvam asi ? iti | sa yo ha nāmnā vā gotreṇa vā prabrūte taṃ hāha: yas

te 'yam mayy ātmābhūd eṣa te sa iti | tasmin hātman pratipatta ṛtavas sampalāyyapadgṛhītam apakarṣanti | tasya hāhorātre lokam āpnutaḥ || tasmān haitena prabruvīta : ko 'ham asmi suvas tvam | sa tvāṃ svargyaṃsuvaragām iti | ko ha vai prajāpatiḥ | atha haivaṃvid eva suvargaḥ | sa hi suvargacchati || taṃ haha: yas tvam asi so 'ham asmi | yo 'ham asmi sa tvam asi | ehī 'ti | sa etam eva sukṛtarasam apyeti | tasya putrā dāyam upayanti pitaras sādhukṛtyām | sa haivaṃvidvān dvyatmā dvidāyaḥ | ekātmā haivaikadāya etad avidvān agnihotraḥ juhoti ||)
[*Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa*, 1.18, 1974, p. 11].

Обратим внимание на то, что самым существенным моментом в этом диалоге является знание имени и *готры*. Фактически судьба человека зависит от того – с какой *готрой* он себя идентифицирует. В. С. Семенцов отмечает, ссылаясь на работы М. Элиаде [Eliade, 1970, p. 203; 212], что мотив спрашивания имени в загробном мире присутствует во многих мифологемах шаманского типа, и указывает на очевидную параллель с процитированным выше текстом «Джайминия Брахманы». Комментируя ситуацию с выяснением на небе имени и родовой принадлежности, он показывает, что в соответствии с кругом идей данного текста (т. е. «Джайминия Брахманы») и ритуальных текстов вообще, а также формулой "*кто так знает*" (*ya evaṃ veda*, сокр. – *y.e.v.*) знание человеком своей родовой сущности означает, что "знающий так" превращается в содержание своего знания (в несколько другом аспекте, но, по существу, об этом же писал и А. М. Пятигорский [Пятигорский, 1973, сс. 216–264]), т. е. в еще одну родовую сущность, в члена рода. В. С. Семенцов убедительно доказывает, что такие представления не только существовали, но и были весьма широко распространены, ссылаясь на правило грамматики Панини, согласно которому имя потомков образуется от имени предка посредством *вриддхи* первого слога. Кроме того, это подтверждается анализом ряда древних обрядов, связанных с почитанием предков (например, поедание клецки или лепешки *пинда*, ритуально замещающей тело умершего предка, бездетной супругой жертвователя) [Семенцов, 1981, с. 153-154].

Таким образом, буддийские тексты, в которых встречаются упоминания о *готрах* шраваков, пратьекабудд и бодхисаттв, а также говорится о том, что в конечном счете существует только одна *готра* – в сущности, следуют логике и духу древней ведий-

ской традиции. Последняя, в том виде, в каком она отразилась в тексте «Джайминия Брахманы», во многих отношениях обнаруживает, как считает В. С. Семенцов, определенную близость идеологиям шаманского типа. "Ценность свидетельства «Джайминия Брахманы», – отмечает он, – состоит в том, что она дает эти учения, происходящие вероятно из магических воззрений, близких шаманизму в почти чистом виде" [Там же]. Этим, по-видимому, объясняется присутствие ярко выраженной "субстратной основы" в учении о *готре* и *гарбхе*, которая присутствует и в буддийской концепции *татхагатагарбхи*.

С теорией *татхагатагарбхи* находятся в тесной связи представления о *гарбхадхату* В этой связи хотелось бы опять вспомнить один из фрагментов «Джайминия Брахманы» (1.17), непосредственно предшествовавший процитированному выше (1.18), в котором излагается учение о земном и небесном "чреве" *(йони)*. Нельзя не отметить сходство семиотической конструкции и используемого "инструментария" (вплоть до деталей) между ведийской и буддийской традицией.

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On the Problem of the Genesis of Terms prajñā, tathatā, tathāgatagarbha

Sergei Lepekhov

Abstract

In the early Mahāyāna and primarily in the *Prajñāpāramitā*, one can observe the development of the concepts of *rūpaśarīra* and *dharmaśarīra*, and while the first of these implied the remains of the body, i.e. relics, the second meant written books, and moreover not some canonical texts but, according to L. Mäll, precisely the collection of *Prajñāpāramitā* sūtras.

The copying of the *Prajñāpāramitā* texts, i.e. the worship of *dharmaśarīra*, is opposed to the construction of stūpas and their worship, that is to worshiping *rūpaśarīra*. Those who elaborated the teaching of *Prajñāpāramitā* and their followers, mādhyamikas, managed to combine in a single concept two principally different

ways of joining the traditional sacrament: by executing rituals of worshiping forefathers and through gaining a special sacral knowledge – *prajñā* – which to some degree depreciates all the rituals, but at the same time substitutes them. This concept is known as the concept of the three bodies of Buddha, though there were initially only two, and later there became four bodies.

In the *Prajñāpāramitā* sūtras, *tathatā* is usually identified with *dharmatā*. Vijñānavādins regarded *tathatā* as the supreme reality. *Prajñāpāramitā* texts make it possible to trace the development of this crucial category in Mahāyāna philosophy. It was exactly such a consciousness concept conforming to the supreme reality of *tathatā* that was developed by the school of yogacāra-vijñānavādins.

In order to combine the sansaric and nirvanic aspects of existence into a single consistent systemic integrity, a whole number of "mediative" categories is needed. One that was considerably developed by vijñānavādins was the category of *tathāgatagarbha* ('the embryo of the existence of the One who comes like this' or 'the receptacle of the One who comes like this').

In its special terminological meaning, the notion of *tathāgatagarbha* is already present in the *Adhyardhaśatikā-prajñāpāramitā*, but among all *Prajñāpāramitā* sūtras – it is the only one in this respect.

The relics of Buddha *(tathāgatadhātu)* are viewed here as an 'embryo' *(garbha)* of the future state of Enlightenment, since as an object of worship, it is conductive to the further spiritual perfection of the practicing person by guiding his thoughts in the right direction.

The *Prajñāpāramitā*, which is also called the 'Mother of Tathāgatas' is considered to be a source of the state of enlightenment, and the state of Tathāgata as well. We shall remind you of the above-mentioned parallels drawn between the relics (*śarīra*) and the *Prajñāpāramitā* text. It is also worth mentioning that the *Prajñāpāramitā*, both in the *Prajñāpāramitā* texts as such and works by vijñānavādins (e.g. Dignaga) is identified with Tathāgata.

In the *Adhyardhaśatikā*, *tathāgatagarbha* is present in all living beings (since all of them possess the nature of Samantabhadra). The word *garbha* has several meanings in Sanskrit, including 'embryo' and 'bosom'. In *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* the notion of *prakṛtisthagotra* (according to E. Obermiller's definition, 'the primal, fundamental element of a genealogy') is used in a sense analogous to

tathāgatagarbha. The word *gotra* as well as *garbha* may mean 'embryo', but also 'an element of the line of spiritual succession', 'origin', 'class', 'category'. It is peculiar and evidently not incidental that the mythologemes *garbha* and *Whole* are closely related in a number of the hymns of the *Ṛgveda*, and in the most "philosophical" ones at that. In the *Atharvaveda hiranyagarbha* is interpreted as the supreme, so that there was nothing that could be called higher.

Thus the Buddhist texts, mentioning *gotras* of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas as well as saying that in fact there is only one *gotra*, in essence follow the logic and spirit of the ancient Vedic tradition. This probably explains the presence of a clearly expressed "substratum basis" in the teaching of *gotra* and *garbha*, which is present in the Buddhist concept of *tathāgatagarbha*. The theory of *tathāgatagarbha* is closely related to the notion of *garbhadhātu*. One cannot but find a similarity in the semiotic construction and the employed "tools" (up to details) between Vedic and Buddhist traditions.

Structuring Reality: Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and the *Treatise on the Middle*

William A. Magee

Introduction

Claude Lévi-Strauss applied his theories about structure to a variety of social phenomena, but perhaps most famously to myths, believing that myths mediate binary opposites—such as life/death, nature/culture, and so forth—by resolving diadic tensions in a web of metaphorical relationships.[1] Proponents of the Middle Way[2] (especially those of the Geluk order) also struggle with the interpretation of opposing pairs—ultimate truth/conventional truth, interpretable meaning/definitive meaning, nominal existence/inherent existence, and so forth—and attempt hermeneutical mediation by searching for consistent and coherent patterns of scripture and reasoning in order to penetrate perceived contradictions and reveal the intended thought of the Buddha.

For Indian and Tibetan proponents of the Middle Way, the practice of hermeneutics begins with the first commentary on the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras[3]— the *Treatise on the Middle*[4] by Nāgārjuna[5] (c. 100 CE)—and continues for almost two millennia.

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[1] Claude Lévi-Strauss, "The Structural Study of Myth," *Journal of American Folklore*, 68 (1955): 428–44.

[2] *dbu ma pa, mādhyamika.*

[3] *shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i mdo, prajñāpāramitāsūtra.*

[4] *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle, Called "Wisdom" (dbu ma'i bstan bcos/dbu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba, madhyamakaśastra prajñānāma-mūlamadhyamakakārikā.)* P5224, Vol. 95.

[5] *klu sgrub.*

Nāgārjuna propagated Great Vehicle teachings at Nālanda Monastic University in Magadha.[6] Little is known of his life or times. It seems likely that Nāgārjuna was a seminal figure in the emergence of the Great Vehicle, since he is considered to be among the earliest authors of the Great Vehicle treatise. An extensive mythology surrounds Nāgārjuna, and this also indicates his importance for the Great Vehicle. He is the chariot-opener of the first philosophical school of the Great Vehicle, the Middle Way, and is considered by his followers to have expressed the essence of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras in his seven treatises. Though interpretations of Nāgārjuna's *Treatise* are numerous, this study will refer primarily to Dzong-ka-ba (1359–1419), the founder of the Geluk lineage, and his Indian predecessor Candrakīrti[7] (600 CE), often considered the founder of the Middle Way Consequence[8] school of Buddhist tenets. Tibetan doxographies divide the Middle Way School into the Middle Way Consequence School and the Middle Way Autonomy School.[9] Defined by their logical methods of creating an inferential understanding of reality, Proponents of Middle Way Consequence tenets were praised in the Geluk monasteries of Tibet for the subtlety of their Middle Way view. Indeed, the Middle Way Consequence school was and is considered by Geluks to be the highest of philosophical systems and the actual 'thought' of the Buddha.

These two scholars display a fairly consistent (if not entirely monolithic) set of opinions about Nāgārjuna and the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras. On the other hand, non-Tibetan scholars of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries exhibit a startling variety of opinions about the nature of Middle Way thought, and in particular disagree over the meaning and purpose of Nāgārjuna's analytical reasonings. Some have considered the Middle Way view to be nihilistic, while others have taken it to be absolutist; still others have felt that the system of Nāgārjuna has no thesis of its own but

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[6] Nāgārjuna's dates are unknown. The Tibetan tradition considers him to have lived for six hundred years beginning first or second century CE.

[7] *zla ba grags pa.*

[8] *dbu ma thal 'gyur pa, prāsaṅgikamādhyamika.*

[9] *dbu ma rang rgyud pa, svātantrikamādhyamika.*

strives to refute other systems with logic. Some, however conclude that Nāgārjuna was merely an unprincipled confidence artist.[10]

One academic trend that is in accordance with the opinion of the scholastic Geluks is to view Nāgārjuna's Middle Way School as having a philosophical view of emptiness that purports to avoid the two extremes of nihilism and permanence. If this trend does not unite the opinions of academics, it at least has the merit of orienting discussion within a single context: the avoidance of an ontological extreme.[11]

According to Geluks, Candrakīrti's interpretation of Nāgārjuna is that the emptiness that is the ultimate nature of all phenomena is an absence of inherent existence.[12] Inherent existence is understood to be substantial or independent existence—the establishment of a thing by way of its own entity[13]—which is the non-existent nature that ignorance misconceives and superimposes upon our selves and the world. Since we assent to these ignorant appearances, we overreact to objects and events based on that misconception. These reactions—virtuous, non-virtuous, and neutral—remain with us as karmic potencies for pleasure and suffering. Thus for the Geluks, our misconception of persons and things as inherently existent causes the sufferings of cyclic existence. According to them, Nāgārjuna's *Treatise* sets forth reasoning to prove that, although phenomena appear to exist inherently, they do not in fact exist that way. This absence of inherent existence is a mere negative of what is imagined by ignorance. It is this which the Geluks call emptiness. Emptiness is not, however, equal to non-existence, for although Proponents of the Middle Way reject inherently-existent agents and objects, they do posit agents and objects that are

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[10] For an excellent discussion of various opinions about what Middle Way reasonings refute, see Elizabeth Napper, *Dependent-Arising and Emptiness* (London: Wisdom Press, 1989), 67–142. She discusses the opinions of Murti, Etienne Lamotte, Jacques May, Edward Conze, Frederick Streng, Richard Robinson, Douglas Daye, G. C. Nayak, Mervyn Sprung, Fernando Tola and Carmen Dragonetti, among others.

[11] See the works on Madhyamaka by Jeffrey Hopkins, Elizabeth Napper, Paul Williams, Anne Klien, Donald Lopez, Guy Newland, José Cabezón, and Georges Dreyfus to mention just a few who follow this trend.

[12] *svabhāva.*

[13] *rang gi ngo bos grub pa.*

but nominally existent. These nominal existents function within a conventional context of causes producing effects. Thus the Middle Way Consequentialist view is a composite of a negative of inherent existence and a presentation of agents and objects that are like illusions. It purports to be the Middle Way between extremes, inasmuch as its proponents believe they are able to logically posit all of the conventional phenomena of cyclic existence and nirvāṇa within a position stressing that the ultimate nature of all of these phenomena is each phenomenon's emptiness of inherent existence.

As the Geluks see repeatedly in the *Treatise*, the Middle Way view negates inherent existence through analytical reasoning. According to Jam-yang-shay-ba, the Middle Way Consequence School focuses on three main forms of reasoning about selflessness: dependent-arising, the sevenfold reasoning, and the diamond-slivers.[14] All of these reasonings are presented in Nāgārjuna's *Treatise On the Middle.* The reasoning of dependent-arising urges the meditator to consider that all phenomena are empty of independent existence because they are dependent-arisings. This involves determining whether all phenomena are dependent and if so, whether dependence and independence can co-exist in one base. The sevenfold reasoning and the diamond slivers involve searching for an object, such as the self of the person, which appears inherently existent to the ordinary consciousness. The non-finding of such an inherently existent person is the meaning of the absence of the inherent existence of the person.[15]

The important point here is that the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras speak of emptiness, and the *Treatise on the Middle* offers reasons to demonstrate the proof of emptiness, for the purposes of both hermeneutical enquiry and meditation. I would like to suggest that there is a structured relationship between the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra pronouncements on emptiness and the reasonings found in Nāgārjuna's *Treatise On the Middle*: specifically, the structure resembles a syllogistic proof statement, wherein the *Sūtra* supplies the thesis to be proved and the *Treatise* supplies the evidential sign or reason.

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[14] See Jeffrey Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness* (London: Wisdom Publications, 1983), pp. 43–59, 175–196.

[15] Hopkins, 192.

Is Structural Analysis Applicable to Middle Way Exegesis?

Structural analysis privileges form over content. In general, the structuralist enterprise seeks the underlying patterning or structure of a text (or other subject), in order to determine its meaning. Seeking meaning through structure, structuralists believe they are able to show that the contrasted patterns of a given cultural system are logically consistent transformations of the same abstract structure of ideas. Lévi-Strauss has been criticized for this formalist approach to myth, since it is too logological for his subject matter. However, Middle Way exegesis is logological in nature, and thus the criticisms leveled against Lévi-Strauss and his analysis of myth may not apply to a limited structuralist analysis of Middle Way exegesis. Middle Way exegesis is in large measure about analysis itself, and the logical processes of analysis, the very "codes by which the mind grasps concrete experience."[16] It is consciously designed so that contrasted patterns are logically consistent transformations of the same abstract structure of ideas. For instance, Geluk exegetes assert conventional existence but not inherent existence. They also assert conventional production but not inherent production. If Geluks asserted inherent production, then the two patterns of existence and production would not be logically consistent transformations of the same abstract structure of ideas.

Ironically, this very advantage of the Geluk system as a model for structural analysis would probably be regarded as a disadvantage by Lévi-Strauss himself. In his *Structural Anthropology*, Lévi-Strauss speaks of conscious and unconscious models of structural analysis.[17] Conscious models have obvious structural organizations, which are not designed to explain the model but to perpetuate it. It becomes difficult for structural analysis to proceed when confronted at every turn by "inaccurate" (or perhaps "self-serving" is a better term) conscious models. Thus although it is possible that the extremely conscious nature of the Geluk system will stand between the meaning of the system and our limited struc-

[16] Seymour Cain, "Study of Religion: History of Study," in *The Encyclopedia of Religion*, ed. Mircea Eliade (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987), Vol. 14, 80.

[17] Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology* (New York: Basic Books, 1963), 281.

tural analysis thereof, I nevertheless feel the structure of Middle Way exegesis is a suitable model for the thesis I am proposing, because it fulfills the four criteria for being such a model:[18]

First, the structure exhibits the characteristics of a system. It is made up of several elements, none of which can undergo change without effecting changes in all other elements.

Second, for any given model there should be a possibility of ordering a series of transformations resulting in a group of models of the same type.

Third, the above properties make it possible to predict how the model will react if one or more of its elements are submitted to certain modifications.

Finally, the model should be constituted so as to make all of the observed facts immediately intelligible.

Middle Way exegesis exhibits the characteristics of a system according to these criteria. It is made up of several elements—texts, dialectic, tenets, and traditions—that are tightly bound in a network of reasoned analysis, none of which can undergo a change without effecting changes in all other elements. Second, there is a possibility of ordering a series of transformations resulting in a group of models of the same type, since the exegesis of later Geluk scholars (such as Nga-wang-bel-den) commenting upon earlier scholars (such as Jam-yang-shay-ba) is mirrored in that of later scholars commenting on Dzong-ka-ba. The most basic expression of this ordered series is Nāgārjuna's *Treatise* on the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras. Third, the above properties make it possible to predict how the model will react if one or more of its elements are submitted to certain modifications. For instance, the model reacts with predictable disagreement when outsiders assert true existence. Finally, because the analytical operations of the exegesis are performed openly, the model is constituted so as to make all of the observed facts immediately intelligible. Moreover, structuralism operates most effectively in analyzing a text containing numerous separate segments which differ in detail but are in some respects similar, can be subdivided, and presents itself to detailed scrutiny. Certainly the sūtras and treatises fulfill these criteria since they

[18] Lévi-Strauss, 279.

address the same subject matter, can be divided into discrete elements, and possess great detail in their patterns and contrasts.

Not only does the Middle Way School fulfill the criteria for being a structure, but it also offers many opposed diads for analysis. For instance, the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and Nāgārjuna's commentary can be seen as a diadic pair suitable for structuralist analysis because they represent different paradigmatic modes for ontological discourse: the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras represent a paradigm of privileged-viewpoint (omniscient) discourse, and the *Treatise on the Middle* represents a paradigm of analytical discourse. Although they represent different paradigmatic modes, they are invariably associated in Middle Way Consequence exegesis, wherein the analytical mode is invoked to explore the privileged-viewpoint mode for the determination of the interpretable and the definitive. Thus Great Vehicle sūtras and treatises provide Geluk exegetes with two distinct modes for the presentation of Middle Way emptiness that in later doxologies are shown to be complementary:

The privileged-viewpoint sūtra model is a scriptural passage spoken by the power of an omniscient being that delineates the nature of phenomena.

The analytical treatise model is a commentary in which a later scholar explaining the ontological thought of the Buddha provides reasonings proving the Buddha's definitive pronouncements on the nature of phenomena.

Neither mode is complete in and of itself. As we shall see, the sūtra mode lacks the reasonings needed (1) for its own establishment as definitive and (2) as the proof of the inference realizing emptiness. The treatise mode lacks the authority of an omniscient author.

Viewing the sūtras and treatises through a structuralist lens shows that the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and the Middle Way Consequence treatises described above are two very different types of texts. They incorporate two distinct styles of presenting emptiness. The Middle Way Consequence treatises do not contradict the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, but there is a tension between the two types of texts, and the very use of the hermeneutical tool itself exacerbates this tension. This is because on the treatise side there is the possibility of logic misconstruing the ineffable ultimate, and

on the sūtra side there is the possibility of clouding stainless reason with emotion-laden faith.

In part because of these two possibilities, the diad of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and their principal Middle Way School commentaries is extensively mediated in later Middle Way exegesis, indicating the existence of a "stress point" in the Geluk system: in this case, the tension between opposing paradigms of discourse on emptiness. We will discuss these stress points below.

One thing to notice about the sūtra/treatise diad is that it is relatively static. The Middle Wheel sūtras of the Buddha always bespeak the same emptiness, and the chapters employing refutation in the *Treatise on the Middle Way* always refute inherent existence (*svabhāva*) with analytical reasoning. This situation is unlike the mythical model proposed by Lévi-Strauss, wherein the diadic tensions of the world are constantly changing, necessitating frequent shifts in the network of inter-relations that resolve those tensions through a rewriting of the myths. The Middle Way Consequence structure is, by comparison, relatively unchanging. Hence, the later doxologies, having resolved the sūtra/treatise tension by enmeshing the opposing principals—sūtra and treatise modes of discourse on emptiness—in a web of logical interaction, remain effective. Indeed, although there are numerous doxologies written later than Jam-yang-shay-ba's *Great Exposition*, they do not break new ground. From the structuralist point of view, there is no need for them to do so, since the diadic tension resolved by the existing doxologies has not shifted.

In general, giving precedence to structure is the opposite of how scholastic religious traditions such as the Geluk order their priorities. The Geluk system is one in which consistency and reason regarding the content of religious doctrines are the guiding lights of exegesis. As José Cabezón remarks, "scholastic hermeneutics is essentially a balancing act," simultaneously juggling three sometimes contradictory principles: "scripture, rationality and the ideology that constitutes its unitary vision of the world."[19] The scholastic enterprise is difficult — in some ways resembling Neurath's boat — for perhaps no scriptural traditions are completely free

[19] José Cabezón, *Buddhism and Language: a Study of Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 70.

from self-contradiction and internal discrepancies. The presence of such discrepancies inevitably gives rise to cognitive dissonance, which is certainly a basic reason for the existence of hermeneutical inquiry in the first place. If this is so, then we might suppose that the Geluks, who have a rich scholastic tradition, must also have a set of reflexive responses mediating real and imagined areas of contradiction and discrepancy. In his informative book on the two truths in the Geluk system, Guy Newland calls such areas of contradiction "stress-points."[20] He remarks that in Geluk exegesis, as in other systems, internal contradictions occur and are mediated at hidden stress points within "a forest of symbols." In some religious systems these symbols are carried by myths or obscured by mysteries and mysticism, but in Middle Way exegesis stress-points are resolved, when they are resolved, through reasoned analysis, which seeks the balm of mediation by adopting strategies that are both logical and scripturally defensible.

Festinger might well be speaking of the Geluks when he suggests that traditions react against dissonance and adopt various strategies to ameliorate it.[21] Newland postulates a two-fold division of strategies that systems adopt to rid themselves of such dissonance: those that utilize analysis in the defense of faith and those that reduce analysis in order to sustain faith.[22] Skeptics might point out that religious traditions attempt to minimize the perception of internal contradiction by inculcating adherents with unquestioning reverence. Perhaps this is true of the Geluks as well. Nevertheless, Geluk strategies to resolve contradiction for scholars are mainly those that utilize analysis in the defense of faith. Following Dzong-ka-ba's praise of Atisha's *Lamp for the Path,* the Geluks pride themselves on having a system that is able to realize all the teachings of the Buddha as without contradiction.[23] Thus, although

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[20] Guy Newland, *The Two Truths* (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1992), 12.

[21] Leon Festinger, *When Prophecy Fails* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956), 26.

[22] Newland, 12.

[23] Dzong-ka-ba's discussion of the four greatnesses of Atisha's *Lamp for the Path* asserts: (1) the greatness of realizing all the teachings as without contradiction, (2) the greatness that all of the scriptures dawn as instructions for practice, (3) the greatness that the thought of the Buddha is easily found, and (4) the greatness that one is prevented from great wrongdoing. Nap-

many modern scholars would agree with David Eckel that the element of paradox is essential in Middle Way exegesis, this is not the position of Geluk scholasticism.[24] As some scholars (including Newland) have asserted, the methodology of the Geluk enterprise is anti-paradox and hostile to unmediated contradictions: as such, it is a hermeneutic of consistency and coherence founded on analysis.[25] Napper describes Dzong-ka-ba's method as follows:[26]

> Dzong-ka-ba was not setting forth an abstract theoretical system but was making use of rational philosophy in the service of a religious goal. Furthermore, within his role as a religious figure, Dzong-ka-ba was not formulating a new and radically different system, but was rather forging a coherent system from an existent body of material... A hallmark of Dzong-ka-ba's style in the endeavor was his commitment to common sense. He insisted that the whole system should fit together, that it should make sense. For him there are no paradoxes.

Napper asserts that Dzong-ka-ba's commitment to analysis as the final arbiter of seemingly paradoxical assertions identifies his hermeneutic as being primarily one of consistency and coherence. We might also call this scholastic. Later Geluk scholiasts such as Jam-yang-shay-ba and Nga-wang-bel-den share this commitment to analysis. For instance, the *Annotations* of Nga-wang-bel-den[27] repeatedly provide such analysis in mediation of the stress points of Middle Way philosophy. Since these Geluk authors use analysis to resolve contradictions, they can also be said mainly to employ a hermeneutic of consistency and coherence. In his study of the two truths, Newland suggests that the purpose of the Geluk hermeneutic of consistency and coherence is:[28]

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per, 26. See the *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path,* Dharamsala edition, 8b.3–14b.2.

[24] David Eckel, *Jñānagarbha's "Commentary on the Distinction Between the Two Truths"* (Albany, SUNY Press, 1987), 48.

[25] Napper, 146.

[26] Napper, 143.

[27] Nga-wang-bel-den, *Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) "Great Exposition of Tenets," Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Thought (grub mtha' chen mo'i mchan 'grel dka' gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor).* Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1964.

[28] Newland, 16.

> to make the Mahāyāna sūtras and the Mādhyamika śāstras the foundation of an edifice of rational theology, a theology without recourse to the defensive manoeuvres of "mystery" or transcendental paradox.

Newland scathingly remarks that those systems that do have recourse to the defensive manoeuvres of mystery or transcendental paradox are involved in "sacralising their own incoherence", thereby ridding themselves of uncomfortable paradox by "disavowing any responsibility for explaining that which it designates as unexplainable, i.e., transcending the limited sphere of human understanding."[29] Newland suggests that in Middle Way exegesis this resolution of tension is accomplished by philosophical doctrines or analysis. He reports that Joachim Wach "describes a process by which myths are gradually organized, standardized and unified, stripped of narrative form, and re-coded as doctrine."[30] The doctrinal formulations of the sūtras and treatises are well beyond the stages of narrative myth. As Newland points out, however, even for doctrinal formulations the problems of contradiction and dissonance do not end.[31] Although it may be better to use the vocabulary of contradiction rather than tension, we can certainly think of tensions existing for the exegete in, for instance, the disparity of presentations between the sūtra and treatise modes of discourse on emptiness. Such tension could derive from the fact that analysis of the sūtra is a charged undertaking: as mentioned above, in the act of applying a hermeneutic there arise the two possibilities for misunderstanding the ineffable and perverting logic to suit the word of the Buddha. Myth plays a very minor role in this process. Instead, analysis mediates the different paradigms by connecting them in a web of analytical interaction, showing emptiness to be the same in both sūtra and treatise, and indicating how sūtra and treatise are not only consistent, but complementary. The many levels of commentary overlaid on the sūtra and treatise presentations on emptiness go a long way towards enmeshing the two principals in a network of connections, thereby fulfilling the structuralist promise of mediating diadic tension. Even though this paper

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[29] Newland, 13.

[30] Newland, 9. See Joachim Wach, *Sociology of Religion,* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1971), 20.

[31] Newland, 9.

deals with analysis rather than myth, the mediation employed to resolve the diads of Middle Way exegesis should still reveal the "purpose" of Middle Way analytical strategies in general.

The Geluk adherence to scholastic principles of logic and coherence is considered by some scholars to be admirable, yet questions remain to bedevil the modern academic regarding Geluk hermeneutics and ontology: (1) is the Geluk practice of hermeneutics just an unneeded scriptural exercise, perhaps designed to hide the fact that the sūtras are not at the core of the scriptural dimension of Geluk-style Buddhism? (2) What are the unstated assumptions of their hermeneutical enquiry, in light of the fact that the outcome never varies? (After all, proponents of Middle Way Consequence tenets *already know* which sūtra passages are considered definitive and which are held to be interpretable by the exegetes of their school.) (3) Finally, because most if not all of the actual determination of the ultimate in the Middle Way Consequence school occurs in Nāgārjuna's *Treatise*, is there a real ontological use for hermeneutics in later Middle Way study?

These are important questions, but this paper will not attempt to answer these, at least not directly. Instead, my purpose here is more basic: to clarify the structural relationship between Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra pronouncements on emptiness and those found in Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle*. When that relationship is illuminated, it may be possible to see other aspects of the Geluk hermeneutical enterprise in that light.

Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and the Treatise on the Middle

As I have already mentioned, the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and Nāgārjuna's *Treatise* belong to two very different genres, embodying (among other differences) two distinct modes of presenting the ultimate emptiness of inherent existence. From the point of view of the Middle Way philosophical school as described by the Geluk order, the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra model is a scriptural passage spoken by the power of an omniscient being that delineates the final nature of phenomena. The *Treatise* mode, on the other hand, provides commentary on those sūtras explaining the ontological thought of the Buddha within providing reasons designed

to prove that his pronouncements on the nature of phenomena are definitive.

Neither mode is complete in and of itself. The Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra mode provides authoritative discourse but lacks the in-depth reasoning process that Nāgārjuna supplies in the *Treatise*. As Conze remarks, the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras "do not develop their doctrine by reasoned argumentation, but rely on simple dogmatic affirmation."[32] Without a detailed presentation of the logical establishment of emptiness, the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras cannot establish themselves as definitive (although they claim to be definitive), and they do not provide the logical evidence for an inferential consciousness realizing emptiness, as will be explained below. Nāgārjuna's *Treatise*, on the other hand, lacks the privileged-viewpoint authority of an omniscient author, but—following the Buddha's assertions regarding the ultimate—is able to employ both scriptural citation and reasoning to establish the Perfection of Wisdom sūtras as definitive and to provide correct reasons for an inferential consciousness realizing emptiness. Schoening underlines this point when he describes the commentarial enterprise in general terms: "The commentary defends the statements of its *sūtra* or reframes them in a logically defensible manner."[33]

Although these two types of texts are very different, there is a mediating relationship between them based on the structure of a classic Buddhist proof statement, or syllogism, aimed at defeating wrong consciousness and creating new understanding. By connecting different paradigms of discourse on emptiness with a mediating relationship, Nāgārjuna's *Treatise* (as well as later Geluk exegesis) seeks to provide scholars and practitioners with a coherent commentarial tradition consistent not only with scripture but also with the requirements of the soteriological process. This is because, as Donald Lopez points out, "sūtra provides the discourse that is interpreted [in Nāgārjuna's *Treatise*] into philosophical doc-

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[32] Edward Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India* (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1982), 199.

[33] Jeffrey D. Schoening, "*Sūtra* Commentaries in Tibetan Translation" in *Tibetan Literature: Studies in Genre*; ed. José Cabezón and Roger Jackson (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1996), 120.

trine, that doctrine turning back upon the sūtra as the standard of interpretation...".[34]

Characteristics of Sūtra Pronouncements on Emptiness

Geluk hermeneutics consists of content analysis to discriminate between passages that are ontologically interpretable and those that are definitive from the standpoint of emptiness. This hermeneutical approach is suggested in sūtra since it proceeds from the third of the four reliances: "Rely on the definitive meaning, not the interpretable meaning." The first two reliances suggest that we rely on the meaning of the words of the teacher, not on the teacher himself. Content-based hermeneutics that relies on the meaning, not on the teacher, makes discussion of the historicity and authorship of the sūtras something of a moot point. Hence Geluks do not much engage in historical text analysis. Instead they assume their canon is authoritative, containing sūtras that are definitive and others that are interpretable, and they seek a particular ontological content in sūtra, independent of claims of authority validated by the syllogistic process.

The Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras are middle wheel sūtras[35] according to the three-wheel hermeneutic expounded in the *Sūtra Unravelling the Thought.*[36] For Geluk exegetes, this implies that the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras are Great Vehicle sūtras having emptiness as the main of the actual objects of expression.

Three general characteristics of Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra pronouncements on emptiness (which do not always apply) are that:

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[34] Donald Lopez, "On the Interpretation of Mahāyāna Sūtras," in *Buddhist Hermeneutics* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988), 52; edited by Donald Lopez.

[35] "The definition of the middle wheel of doctrine is an uncommon sūtra of the great vehicle which is a teaching having taken emptiness as the main of the actual objects of expression." My own translation of the definition of the middle wheel of doctrine is taken from the *General Presentation of Perfection of Wisdom* by Jay-dzun Chö-gyi-gyal-tsen (1469–1546).

[36] *Sūtra Unravelling the Thought / mdo sde dgongs 'grel / dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i mdo, samdhinirmocanasūtra.* P774. Tibetan edition and French translation: Étienne Lamotte. *Samdhinirmocanasūtra: l'explication des mysteres.* Louvain, Paris, 1935.

(1) They are cryptic.
(2) They are linguistically skewed such that they do not always discriminate between mere existence and inherent existence, and thus sometimes seem to be refuting existence itself.
(3) They usually present ontological assertions without also presenting supporting analysis.

This passage from the *Saptaśatikā* exhibits all three of these characteristics:[37]

> Mañjuśrī: What are the qualities and what are the advantages of a perfection of wisdom which is without qualities? How can one speak of the qualities or advantages of a perfect wisdom which is incapable of doing anything, neither raises up not destroys anything, neither accepts nor rejects any dharma, is powerless to act and not at all busy, if its own-being cannot be cognized, if its own-being cannot be seen ... and if, finally, it is non-existent?
>
> The Lord: Well have you, Mañjuśrī, described the qualities of perfect wisdom...
>
> Mañjuśrī: For what reason is this the perfection of wisdom?
>
> The Lord: It is called 'perfect wisdom' because it is neither produced nor stopped. And it is so because it is calmly quiet from the very beginning, because there is escape, because there is nothing to be accomplished, and finally because of its non-existence. For what is non-existence, that is perfect wisdom. It is for this reason that one should expect Bodhisattvas to develop perfect wisdom. It is the range of the Bodhisattvas, the great beings, ranging in all dharmas.

Because of the cryptic nature of this passage, the reader is not immediately able to understand the Buddha's meaning when, for instance, he speaks of a perfection of wisdom that is non-existence. Is the Buddha advocating nihilism? If there is "nothing to be accomplished", is there any utility in Buddhist practice? It seems to many that passages such as this raise more questions than they answer. Paul Williams describes the impression this type of discourse leaves on the unprepared reader when he likens Perfection

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[37] *Saptaśatikā*, 32b–34a. In Conze, *Buddhist Texts through the Ages* (New York, Harper, 1954), 150–151.

of Wisdom Sūtras to "a board game for which we have only the rules, lacking pieces and a board."[38]

This Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra passage is also linguistically skewed towards non-existence, a linguistic device sometimes called "ostending". This is due to a pattern in the Buddha's speech whereby (according to Geluk interpretations) Buddha does not verbally discriminate between mere existence and inherent existence, and thus sometimes seems to be refuting that which exists. Since refutation of the existent is falling to an extreme, and the Middle Way school seeks to avoid extremes, this skewed speech of the Buddha is considered by Geluks not to be literal. Indeed, coherence demands that existent not be termed non-existence. Raw statements by the Buddha of the non-existence of what is elsewhere in scripture asserted to exist are not acceptable to Geluks and are often mediated in Geluk exegesis by being 'patched' with the qualifying word 'inherent'. When the Buddha calls the perfection of wisdom non-existent he is speaking of its lack of inherent existence. The Buddha's statement is thereby "patched" to mean "the perfection of wisdom is not inherently existent".

Early in this passage from the *saptaśatikā*, the veil of skewed speech is briefly lifted when Mañjuśrī says the perfection of wisdom's own-being cannot be seen. This implies there is a type of being other than own-being. For Geluks, this type of being other than own-being is termed mere or nominal existence. For Geluks, all things that exist are nominally existent: mere designations applied to bases of designation. Nominal existence is usually what is meant when Geluk exegetes speak of existence. However, in the *saptaśatikā* inherent existence (which does not exist) is usually what is meant when Buddha speaks of existence. Buddha does not mean that the perfection of wisdom does not have even nominal existence; he means it does not have own-being or inherent existence. From the viewpoint of Geluk exegesis, his speech is skewed ontologically towards non-existence, a problem easily solved with a "patch".

The above passage from the *saptaśatikā* also illustrates that the Perfection of Wisdom sūtras often present ontological assertions

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[38] Paul Williams, *Mahāyāna Buddhism: the Doctrinal Foundations* (New York: Routledge, 1989), 37.

without also presenting supporting analysis. Regarding the perfection of wisdom, for instance, the Buddha says that "it is called 'perfect wisdom' because it is neither produced nor stopped," but the Buddha does not offer analysis explaining why this is so. This accords with Conze's assertion that the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras do not offer reasoned argumentation, instead relying on dogmatic affirmation.[39] In asserting this, Conze points to the third characteristic aspect of sūtra: the lack therein of systematic analysis regarding ontological points. Conze suggests that this lack of reasoned argumentation is due to the fact that the Buddha's authority provided sufficient support for their veracity and truth. Whether Conze is correct or not, Buddhist philosophers soon began producing commentarial treatises supplying analysis to prove or disprove the theses set forth in sūtra. The main of these is Nāgārjuna's *Treatise*.

Characteristics of Treatise Discussions of Emptiness

Although the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras are the scriptural core of the Geluk presentation of emptiness, it is the great Indian commentarial treatises on these and other sūtras that are accorded the lion's share of scholarly attention by them. This is not to say that sūtra plays no role in Geluk exegesis, for sūtras and treatises teaching profound meaning have been closely connected in Middle Way treatises since Nāgārjuna.

I earlier suggested some general characteristics of Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra pronouncements on emptiness: (1) they are cryptic, (2) they are linguistically skewed towards an extreme of non-existence, and (3) they present ontological assertions without also presenting supporting analysis. Middle Way treatise discussions of emptiness, on the other hand, tend to be less cryptic than sūtras, and more interpretive; less linguistically skewed towards an extreme of non-existence because of (occasionally) being "patched" with the qualifications of mere existence and inherent existence. They also present analysis purporting to prove which ontological theses of the Buddha are interpretable and which are defini-

[39] Conze, 199.

tive. Schoening's assertions are that they "defend" the sūtras upon which they comment and "reframe" them in a logically defensible manner.[40] Geluks will certainly agree with this statement, but they will disagree with Eckel when he suggests that the *Heart Sūtra* commentaries do not reflect the original meaning of the sūtra but rather "what a distinctive group of commentators think it meant."[41] Nor do Geluks feel the situation to be as subjective as that Schoening describes: [42]

> How are we to know that the understanding gained [through the treatises] corresponds to that of the original meaning or that that was the commentator's purpose? We can count far more upon learning about the commentator and the meaning he wished to convey ... as well as the doctrinal issues and the received views of the tradition at his time.

It is certainly good to maintain a skeptical attitude about commentarial materials without assuming that we have penetrated the intention of the author, but it is also true that a commentarial author will reveal much about doctrinal issues and the received views of the tradition of his time. However, the Geluk answer to Schoenings' question—how are we to know that the understanding gained through the treatises corresponds to that of the original meaning?—might be that the analysis *itself*—for instance, the reasoning of the diamond slivers—is capable of certifying the original meaning of the sūtra: that phenomena lack inherent production but not mere production. This proof is considered to be valid because, as Newland remarks, the Geluk system is established on the principle that truth is not only knowable, but also accessible to analysis.[43]

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[40] Schoening, 120.

[41] Malcolm Eckel, "Indian Commentaries on the Heart Sūtra: the Politics of Interpretation," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*, 10/2: 69–79.

[42] Schoening, 120.

[43] Newland, 21.

The Role of Sūtra Commentaries in the Buddhist World

Schoening asks another related question in his essay: "What was the role of sūtra commentaries in the Buddhist world?"[44] The Middle Way Consequence tradition asserts that sūtra commentaries differentiate the interpretable and the definitive in sūtra through reasoning. I would like to point out that this implies that they provide the reason clause proving emptiness in syllogistic meditation.

The nature of the Buddha's teaching necessitates a hermeneutic: he spoke different things to different people. Buddhist hermeneutics is integral to a system whose Founder is said to have modified his ontological statements to suit the needs of his listeners. Since the death of the Buddha, Buddhist scholars have engaged (consciously or otherwise) in hermeneutical enquiry to inform their ontological speculations. The hermeneutical need is based on the fact that the Buddha spoke both interpretable and definitive teachings, and therefore reliance upon sūtra alone is not possible. To realize the nature of reality in all its profundity, one must rely on "stainless reasoning," and in part this means one must also rely on treatise authors who employ such reasonings to discriminate between the interpretable and the definitive in sūtra.

The hermeneutical enterprise seeks the intention of the Buddha, but how is that to be determined? In Tibet, Dzong-ka-ba's *Essence of the Good Explanations*[45] is a model for later Geluk scholars' acceptance that Proponents of Mind-Only rely on the *Sūtra Unravelling the Thought* for their scriptural-based hermeneutic of the three wheels. Middle Way exegetes following hermeneutical principles set forth in the *Sūtra Unravelling the Thought* employed a number of hermeneutical tools based on this Mind-Only sūtra to establish Buddha's intention in terms of four criteria: (1) the intended meaning (*dgongs pa*), (2) the foundation of the intention (*dgongs gzhi*), (3) the purpose (*dgos pa*), and (4) the damage to the literal reading (*dngos la gnod byed*).[46] The intended meaning is that which the Buddha is

[44] Schoening, 121.

[45] *The Essence of Good Explanations, Treatise Discriminating the Interpretable and the Definitive* (*drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par phye ba'i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po*). P6142, Vol. 153. Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1973.

[46] Lopez, *Hermeneutics*, 55. Lopez informs us that this list is from Pan-chen bSod-nam-grags-pa's (1478–1554) *drang nges utpala'i 'phreng pa*, his commen-

attempting to convey. In an interpretable scripture, this meaning differs from the foundation of the intention. The foundation of the intention is the basis in Buddha's thought: the ontological ultimate known to him. The purpose is the reason Buddha spoke interpretably. The damages to the literal readings are the contradictions by analysis and scripture that would follow if the interpretable reading were allowed to stand without interpretation.

In part there is circularity in the Geluk hermeneutic: sūtra pronouncements are employed to determine the interpretable and the definitive in sūtras. Reliance on scripture is, however, only one aspect of the process of determining the interpretable and the definitive: the "stainless reasoning" mentioned by Dzong-ka-ba is also an integral part of the Geluk hermeneutic because emptiness (a slightly hidden phenomenon) has reasoned proofs that establish it by way of logical correctness. Even if we doubt the autonomy of reasoning in Buddhism, or the ultimate validity of inferential realizations, it seems clear that Middle Way exegetes do not. For them, syllogistic analysis breaks the circularity and releases them from the text. The analysis itself bestows freedom from the text by empirically validating—with cognitions arising from inferential understandings—the emptiness that is at the core of definitive sūtras. Therefore Lopez may be ignoring the possibility of inferential realization when he asserts of the Geluk hermeneutic, "there is no escape from the text."[47]

It is true that the tradition is fairly fixed after two millennia of exegesis. There are no surprises in Buddhist hermeneutics. The Geluk exploration of the interpretable and the definitive is unlike Gadamer's notion of an exegete's project, "which is constantly revised in terms of what emerges as he penetrates into the meaning."[48] The Buddhist exegete may understand or misunderstand the profound meaning, but there will not be a constant revision of what is interpretable and definitive.

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tary on Dzong-ka-ba's *drang-nges legs bshad snying po.* Earlier scholars speak only of the last three criteria.

[47] Lopez, 67.

[48] Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1975), 236.

Lopez also speaks of the Geluk hermeneutic involving an endless search for meaning. As we have seen, the syllogistic reasoning of treatise analysis is the conscious structure of the Middle Way Consequence hermeneutic. Since the Geluk hermeneutic is based on the syllogism, it is a finite search for meaning, confined within the logic of a proof statement relating a thesis with the three modes of a correct sign. This—the structure of a Buddhist syllogistic proof statement—will be explained in the next section.

We have already seen that treatises provide analysis to settle Buddha's pronouncements on reality. Analysis is used to determine which of the Buddha's scriptures are interpretable and which are definitive. They provide criteria for judging which sūtra passages are interpretable and which are definitive—that is, for judging which speak of mere conventions and which speak of ultimate truths. Candrakīrti remarks in the *Clear Words*[49] that Nāgārjuna composed the *Treatise on the Middle* using reasoning and scripture for the sake of showing what requires interpretation and what is definitive in the sūtras of the Buddha.[50] Since the only hermeneutical criteria for definitiveness is emptiness, the hermeneutical enterprise is accessible to anyone who is capable of following Nāgārjuna's analyses. In fact, according to Candrakīrti, providing access to this hermeneutic was the very purpose for which Nāgārjuna wrote his *Treatise:*[51]

> Some have the doubt: "what is the teaching that has the meaning of reality? Which are intentional?" Some, because of their feeble minds, think that teachings that are of interpretable meaning are of definitive meaning. In order to clear away doubt and mistaken ideas of both of these through reasoning and scripture, the master composed this [*Treatise*].

In other words, the *Treatise on the Middle* was composed with a hermeneutical motivation. It seems that even as early as Nāgārjuna's *Treatise,* the two topics of hermeneutics and soteriol-

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[49] *Clear Words Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle" (dbu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa tshig gsal ba, mūlamadhyamikavṛtti prasannapadā).* P5260, Vol. 98.

[50] Hopkins, 596.

[51] Lopez' translation of the *Auto-Commentary to the Supplement to the Middle Way.* See *Hermeneutics,* 64.

ogy were related. The relationship continues in the exegetical treatises of Candrakīrti, Dzong-ka-ba, Jam-yang-shay-ba and others.

In the passage below, Dzong-ka-ba explains why sūtras alone are not capable of discriminating between the interpretable and the definitive, and he also describes the role of the treatise:[52]

> Having seen that the thusness of phenomena is very difficult to realize and if it is not realized there is no release from cyclic existence, the compassionate Teacher spoke in order for [beings] to realize [emptiness] through many doors of method and reasoning. Therefore the analytical should strive for a method for realizing thusness just as it is. Depend on discriminating between the interpretable and definitive of the Conqueror's sayings, but discrimination between the two is not possible merely through scriptural passages that say, "this is interpretable, or "this is definitive". This is because (1) if it were otherwise, the great Openers of the Chariot Way composing commentaries on the thought [of Buddha] differentiating the interpretable and the definitive would have been senseless, (2) there are many different ways of positing the interpretable and the definitive that is spoken of in scripture, (3) and just as, in general, one is unable to posit [the interpretable and the definitive] through scriptures that just say "this is this" since at that time such [statements] would not always [have a correct sign as a] pervasion, also, in particular, one is unable to establish the interpretable and the definitive merely by scriptural statements that "this is this."
>
> Therefore, the great Openers of the Chariot Way who were prophesied in sūtra to differentiate interpretable and definitive scriptures commented on the thought [of Buddha regarding] the interpretable and the definitive. One should search out the thought [of Buddha regarding the interpretable and the definitive] following those who settle [suchness] well with reasonings that (1) fault interpreting definitive scriptures as having some other meaning and (2) prove the definitive meaning as unsuitable to be interpreted otherwise.
>
> Therefore, in the end, one must discriminate [the interpretable and the definitive] merely through stainless reasoning. This is because a proponent of tenets that contradict reason is not a suitable valid authority and, also, the suchness of things possesses logical proofs that establish it.

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[52] Hopkins' edition, 15.1–15.16. This is my own translation. See Lopez' translation in *Hermeneutics*, 66, and Thurman's translation in *The Central Philosophy of Tibet* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 189.

Dzong-ka-ba suggests that, in order to attain their soteriological goals, Great Vehicle practitioners must depend on discriminating between the interpretable and the definitive. Unfortunately, it is not possible to discriminate between the two just through hearing scriptural passages saying, "this is interpretable, or "this is definitive". Dzong-ka-ba gives three reasons for this:

(1) if it were otherwise, the commentary authors composing commentaries differentiating the interpretable and the definitive would be senseless;

(2) sūtras relate numerous different ways of positing the interpretable and the definitive;

(3) sūtra statements that "this is definitive" are insufficient to establish the interpretable and the definitive.

Since sūtras alone are insufficient to settle the ultimate, Dzong-ka-ba recommends relying on those commentarial authors "who settle [suchness] well with reasonings that (1) fault interpreting definitive scriptures as having some other meaning and (2) prove the definitive meaning as unsuitable to be interpreted otherwise".

For the practitioner, the commentaries have a more practical role. Dzong-ka-ba, it will be recalled, declared the second of the four greatnesses of Atīsha's *Lamp for the Path* to be that all scriptures dawn as instructions for practice. Therefore we can think of the treatise as a repository of analytical reasonings to assist the practitioner in his or her meditations on emptiness. The syllogistic reasoning process employed in meditation on emptiness is designed to generate a valid cognition of the definitive meaning, the first step in a lengthy yogic process that will eventually cause release from cyclic existence. Geluks refer to this mode of practice as the path of reasoning. In general, prior to a direct realization of emptiness, Middle Way practitioners employ a formal syllogistic reasoning process in their analytical meditations to generate inferential understanding of emptiness.[53] This analysis can become lengthy, but its basic structure is syllogistic. Perdue says of syllogisms that they:[54]

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[53] For instance, see Jam-yang-shay-ba, *Great Exposition of Tenets*, 625-697 [57-154].

[54] Daniel Perdue, *Debate in Tibetan Buddhism* (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1990), 60.

> are aimed at defeating wrong consciousnesses and creating new, clear understanding. [They] are designed to address actual doubts or misconceptions held by the persons for whom they are stated.

Perdue is speaking of syllogistic reasoning in the context of dialectical debate. This type of reasoning is, however widely applied by Geluk authors in treatises on emptiness and also in formal debate. This is one aspect of the Middle Way Consequence exegetical structure that cannot be overlooked as an underlying system for ordering relationships and mediating opposing diads. As an example, let us look in the next section at the syllogistic structure underlying the relationship between the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and the Middle Way treatises.

Relating Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and the Treatise on the Middle

The syllogistic format supplies the skeleton of the logical structure underlying the relationship between the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and their Middle Way treatises. In general, the connection between the two roles of sūtra and treatise is a soteriological one. Both definitive sūtras (such as the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras) and later Middle Way treatises (such as Nāgārjuna's *Treatise on the Middle*) claim to delineate the ultimate, the realisation of which enables enlightenment. The hermeneutical process, in deciding upon a definitive meaning, retrieves that meaning—which is the ultimate—and in so doing provides or retrieves the predicate of the thesis of the syllogism proving emptiness. In the case of the diamond slivers reasoning, for instance, which I have examined in detail elsewhere,[55] the hermeneutical process retrieves "empty of inherently existent production" as the pronouncement of a definitive sūtra. "Empty of inherently existent production" can be considered to be the predicate of the probandum (the predicate to be proven) which, together with the subject, yields the thesis: "things having production are empty of inherently existent production".

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[55] See William Magee, "Expressing the Fallacy from the Viewpoint of a Pervader: Nagarjuna and the Putative Consequences of *svabhāva*," in *Chung-Hwa Buddhist Journal* (Vol. 17, 2004).

The ontological process then adduces its own proof, the sign or reason, from treatise literature, which in this instance is the famous tetralemma with which Nāgārjuna begins his *Treatise:* "because of not being produced from self, from [inherently existent][56] others, from both, or causelessly".

A syllogistic proof makes both positive and negative affirmations. In the proof of things having production as empty, that which is to be negated is that things having production are inherently existent. That things having production are inherently existent is the opposite of the thesis. The predicate to be negated is inherent existence, the opposite of the predicate to be proven, emptiness. Being inherently existent is to be negated on its basis, things having production. By explicitly proving that things having production are empty, one implicitly proves the opposite: that they do not have inherent existence.

In order for a syllogism to be valid—in order for it to prove its thesis and generate an inference—its reason must possess the three modes. The three modes are the three criteria that a correct sign must satisfy. It is said that the sign must be these three modes, in the sense of being the embodiment of all three: (1) the property of the subject, (2) the forward pervasion, and (3) the counter-pervasion. Let us look at them individually.

In our syllogism, being the property of the subject means that the subject, things having production, are not produced from the self, from inherently existent others, from both, or causelessly. In other words, the subject is owned by the reason in the sense that the subject has the quality of the reason.

The forward pervasion of our syllogism states that whatever is not produced from the self, from inherently existent others, from both, or causelessly is necessarily empty of inherently existent production. Regarding the forward pervasion, Perdue states:[57]

> Whereas the property of the subject is predicated between the sign and the subject, the pervasions are predicated between the sign and the predicate to be proven, the predicate of the thesis. More technically, in the case of the forward pervasion, it is a relationship between the sign

[56] Bracketed "patch" is supplied by Dzong-ka-ba to make the point that, in his opinion, a sprout is produced from an imputedly existent other.

[57] Daniel Perdue, "The Tibetan Buddhist Syllogistic Form and the Defender's Answers," in *Chung-Hwa Buddhist Journal*, (Vol. 20, 2008), 7.

> and the similar class. The similar class is the basis of the relation of the forward pervasion just as the subject is the basis of the relation of the property of the subject.

In the proof of things having production as empty, the class of empty phenomena is the similar class. In order for a sign to be the forward pervasion it must exist in only the similar class. In our syllogism, this means that things that are not produced from the self, from inherently existent others, from both, or causelessly must exist only among empty phenomena. Perdue makes the point that "the requirement of ascertainment serves to eliminate a dubious cognition. The sign is the forward pervasion only for a person who realizes definitely that the sign exists only among members of the similar class."[58] With this statement Perdue makes the important point that epistemological verification is required as a component of validity.

Regarding the idea of pervasion, Perdue explains it in this way:[59]

> In a valid syllogism, the *sign* is the *pervaded*, for its extent is less than or equal to the extent of the predicate to be proven which pervades it, and it is the *proof*, for the sign proves the thesis. Conversely, in such a syllogism, the *predicate to be proven* is the *pervader*, for its extent is greater than or equal to the extent of the sign which is pervaded by it, and it is the *proven*, for the reason proves it as a predicate of the subject.

In general terms, then, a valid syllogism asserts that if something is that sign, then it is pervaded by being that predicate to be proven. The reverse pervasion is also a pervasion, but instead of the sign being pervaded by the predicate to be proven, that which is not the predicate to be proven is pervaded by that which is not the sign. The reverse pervasion of our syllogism states that whatever is not empty of inherently existent production is necessarily produced either from the self, from inherently existent others, from both, or causelessly. The basis of the relation of the counter-pervasion is the dissimilar class. In the syllogism proving that things having production are empty, the dissimilar class is the putative class of inherently existent phenomena. As Perdue remarks, "If a sign is the counter-pervasion in the proof of something, it is ascertained

[58] Perdue, 7.

[59] Perdue, 8.

as just non-existent in the dissimilar class."[60] Thus, in the reverse pervasion of our syllogism, things that are not produced from the self, from inherently existent others, from both, or causelessly do not exist in the class of the inherently existent.

If a syllogism has a sign possessing these three modes, then—from the Geluk point of view—that syllogism has a correct thesis and is capable of generating an inference in the listener. It is the Geluk contention that our syllogism possesses the three modes, and therefore is capable of generating an inferential understanding of emptiness. My point here is that the predicate of the probandum—emptiness—is stated in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and the reason—that things having production are not produced from the self, from inherently existent others, from both, or causelessly—is mainly set forth in Nāgārjuna's *Treatise*. Many other examples of this syllogistic relationship between sūtras and the *Treatise* can be found.

The need for a syllogistic relationship stems from the fact that a claim in a sūtra that all phenomena are empty possesses the religious authority of a privileged viewpoint, but not epistemic authority. Religious authority is seldom considered epistemic in Buddhism, since the founder himself has suggested that his followers rely not on his words but on their meaning. That their meaning must be experienced means there must be an epistemic basis for sūtra pronouncements. An inferential consciousness is a valid cognition, and so it can supply this basis.

In general, there are said to be two types of valid cognitions, direct perceptions (*pratyakṣa*) and inferential cognitions (*anumāna*). The former are, for instance, visual consciousnesses; the latter are conceptual consciousnesses produced by a reason having the three modes of a correct sign. George Dreyfus distinguishes these as follows:[61]

> These two types of cognition are distinguished on the basis of their objects: whereas [direct] perception relates to real individuals such as shape, taste, and so forth, through experience, inference apprehends conceptual constructs that are general ... on the basis of reasoning.

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[60] Perdue, 9.

[61] Georges Dreyfus, *Recognizing Reality* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997), 49.

In its conceptual way, an inference is valid. This is an experience of something true. For this reason, the Geluk path-of-reason authors highly recommend generating an inferential understanding of emptiness based on the commentarial traditions of India. We can see now why Nāgārjuna's *Treatise* is so highly prized by Geluks. It provides the ontological reason to prove the hermeneutically derived thesis in a syllogism generating an inference of emptiness.

Neither process—hermeneutical (the supplier of the thesis) or ontological (the supplier of the reason)—does the work of the other. The completed syllogism derives its thesis from the retrieved definitive meaning of the hermeneutical process and obtains the reason itself from the library of Middle Way reasonings compiled by Nāgārjuna. Since the process of ontological reasoning derives its predicate to be proven from the hermeneutical process, it cannot be said to be capable of functioning independently of the hermeneutic. Since the hermeneutical process does not supply a reasoning having the three modes, it alone cannot act as a presentation of emptiness. Instead, the two processes are linked in a syllogistic form. Since knowledge of the definitive meaning is necessary for the study of ontology, and ontology cannot provide the definitive meaning itself, for Geluks ontology proceeds from hermeneutics, in the sense that the result of the hermeneutical process is used as the thesis of the ontological proof.

The underlying syllogistic structure relating the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and the *Treatise* considerably mediates the diadic tensions we have posited between the sūtra and treatise modes. These modes are inconsistent with each other and need mediation. Structuralists will see this as a stress-point in the Geluk system because, as we have seen Conze point out, there is a lack of systematic reasonings proving ontological points in sūtra. Reasons proving emptiness are not often put forth in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras. The role of the sūtra is to establish the thesis but not to establish proofs for the thesis. On the other hand, as Schoening remarks about commentaries, they defend the statements of sūtra or reframe sūtra statements in a logically defensible manner. The treatise mode for ontological presentations lacks the privileged omniscient understanding of the reality of the Buddha himself. Middle Way treatise authors such as Nāgārjuna will suggest

numerous reasonings for the establishment of the ultimate, but they will not make ontological pronouncements of their own without reference to sūtra. Thus each of the two textual paradigms is incomplete, and both together are necessary for the soteriological process. Since mediation is required to merge them, they can be seen as a structuralist stress-point. Recognition of this shows that, far from ignoring sūtra, Geluk exegetes employ sūtras in their process of ontological discovery. They connect sūtras and treatises in a syllogistic structure to generate inferences. Some of these inferences are used to determine the interpretable and the definitive, but meditation on emptiness employs syllogistic reasoning to generate an inferential understanding of the ultimate as a necessary precursor to its direct realization by a direct yogic perceiver. By connecting different paradigms of discourse on emptiness within a web of analytical relationships, the authors of the treatise seek to provide the exegete with a coherent commentarial tradition consistent with both scripture and the need to generate an inferential image of emptiness in order to make progress on a path of reasoning.

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Canon Redactor Bu ston's *Advice on Publishing*

Introduced, translated and edited with annotations

Alpo Ratia

For over one millennium the Tibetan language served as a medium of communication for many peoples of Central Asia, while Tibetan literature continued to serve as the principal repository of the sciences and learning of two civilisations, those of late Indian antiquity and medieval Tibet. The Tibetan alphabet (syllabary) was created on the basis of Indian models, reputedly in 632 CE. Following the Muslim conquest of northern India in the late 12th century, Buddhism ceased to function as an organised religion there. By that time, however, thousands of texts of Indian provenance had been carried over the Himalayas and were being translated into Tibetan. Soon Tibetan scholars set about critically assessing, systematising and further developing the Indian heritage in fields such as philosophy, ethics, psychology, medicine, astronomy, administration, poetry, arts and crafts. This scholarly and pragmatic engagement first of all yielded a rich literature and original syntheses (with major Central Asian inputs), but also lineages of enlightened masters and a new Tibetan cultural model which by the 17th century had spread to neighbouring lands, Mongolia, and even the lower Volga.

From the seventh to the 20th century, the majority of texts in the Tibetan language were directly or indirectly related to Buddhism. Central Asian Buddhists venerated scriptures as an essential part of their way of life. They could be found in household altars, stupas, prayer wheels, monastic convocations and even government offices. Functional literacy, however, remained restricted to a minority of the population – mostly monks, the nobility and skilled professionals. Calligraphy was an honoured skill, and for hundreds of years all texts in the Tibetan language were written

or copied solely by hand. The oldest known block-printed text in Tibetan originates from Turfan in Eastern Turkistan, and is dated to the 9th century. Thereafter the next notable block-printed Tibetan work is the first edition of the Tibetan Canon (*bKa' 'gyur*, pronounced *Kanjur*) completed in Peking in 1410. This was a massive compendium in 105 volumes, printed under the aegis of Chinese Emperor Yongle. Wood and paper remained expensive commodities in Tibet, so the techniques of woodblock-printing were adopted with some delay. First, between 1608–1614 a *bKa' 'gyur* edition was printed at 'Jang Sa tham in southeast Tibet. Similarly, the first block-print edition of the secondary Tibetan Deuterocanon (*bsTan 'gyur*, pronounced Tenjur) began to be carved 1737 in sDe dge in southeast Tibet. Nevertheless, even until the 20th century most Tibetan texts continued to be written or copied by hand. Two main exceptions were block-printed Canonical texts and the collected works of famous authors.

By the beginning of the 14th century Tibet had become the inheritor, repository and preserver of late Indian Buddhist civilisation. Thousands of scriptures, commentaries and treatises were already available in Tibetan versions. It was at this historical juncture that the encyclopaedic Tibetan scholar and luminary Bu ston Rin chen grub (1290–1364) entered the stage and carried out his lifework. Great analytic and systematising capacity, coupled with extraordinary industriousness and spiritual attainments, enabled him to play key roles in the transmission of Indian scriptures, in the fashioning of the Tibetan Canon and in scribal publishing. Bu ston's life can be schematically divided into four parts: childhood, monastic studies, abbot's career and active retirement. The Dharmasvamin's editorial and publishing activities essentially occurred during the last two parts.

In 1320 Bu ston (pronounced *Pu-tön*) took up the abbacy of the monastery of *dPal ldan Zhwa lu dgon* in Central Tibet with its 200 or so monk-inmates. Here his activity took four principal forms: spiritual practice, artistic creation, teaching, writing and publishing. Bu ston's fame, brilliance and industriousness, together with patronage and the arrival of students and scholars from near and far, enabled him to develop Zhwa lu into a great 'academic monastery' (*bshad grwa*) for philosophy and esoterics. In his time, Zhwa lu also became one of Tibet's leading monastic publishing cen-

tres. Through these contacts and through his editorial work and scholarship, Bu ston was exposed to all major religio-philosophical schools of thought and practices prevailing in Central Tibet.

Bu ston Rin chen grub left an extraordinary legacy for posterity in the form of his literary works. Bu ston was an encyclopaedic polygraph, and his oeuvre of circa 230 texts is one of the most influential collections to have survived from Tibet. First of all, it includes original works dealing with Canonical texts, oral-commentarial, meditative-cognitive and ritualistic traditions, or they address other contemporary Tibetan needs. He traced the historical 'lines of transmission' (*brgyud, parampara*) of a great many tantras in order to ensure their authenticity, and he systematically classified Tantra cycles and arranged their texts. Moreover, Bu ston was the pre-eminent 14th century translator and Canonical redactor. He single-handedly translated at least 15 Canonical texts in their entirety, and also translated, co-translated or revised over a dozen additional texts. These helped round out the corpus of Tibetan Canonical literature. Thanks to his instantaneous verbal-symbolic facility and very focused concentration, Bu ston was able to dictate texts to his scribes without hesitation.

Bu ston Rin chen grub's greatest literary achievement was his redaction in 1334–1335 of the monumental 227-volume block-print edition of the *Zhwa lu bsTan 'gyur* (pron. *Zhalu Tenjur*) . This was an extensively revised version of the Old *sNar thang bsTan 'gyur* manuscript edition (completed circa 1320). Under Bu ston's ultimate direction, thousands of Buddhist and traditional scientific commentaries and treatises, overwhelmingly of Indian provenance, were collected, sifted through, compared and collated. His editorial staff sought to delete duplicate texts and spurious *apocrypha*, while hundreds of further texts from Central Tibet were added. Bu ston supervised the allocation of additional śāstras. The prestigious edition of the *Zhwa lu bsTan 'gyur* superseded that of Nar thang, and became an intermediary link from which later standard *bsTan 'gyur* editions stem.

The present study centres upon one of Bu ston's minor works, here abbreviated as the Dharmasvamin's "Advice on Scribal Publishing". Bu ston probably composed it during the 1330s in connection with his redaction of the *Zhwa lu bsTan 'gyur*, hence most likely between 1335 and 1336. Any possible later revision of the text

would probably have been carried out before 1356, at which time he retired to the Ri phug hermitage near Zhwa lu. Our study relies on a Śata Piṭaka Series (New Delhi 1971) facsimile edition of the text, unfortunately marred by some scribal or printing errors. This short text carries a medium-length, deferential title: "Entreaty to the Stewards of the Dharma, Spiritual Friends, and Accomplished Scholars Who Produce Great Śāstras" (*bsTan bcos chen po bzhengs pa'i chos gnyer ba dge ba'i bshes gnyen rnams dang yon tan mkhan rnams kyi snyan du gsol ba*). The final word (*gsol ba*) in the title meaning 'prayer' or 'entreaty' reflects the text's earnest intent rather than being a genre marker for formulaic prayers termed *gsol 'debs* or *gsol ba*. The text shares some similarities to epistles (*spring yig*) and memoranda (*brjed byang*). Expositor Bu ston addresses his intended listeners or readership (in the first instance patrons, monastic administrators and chief scribes) indirectly and deferentially in the guise of stewards, spiritual guides, and scholars. Bu ston's Advice is written in classical or Middle Tibetan, including a few archaic and lexically unattested words from the gTsang dialect. The text is in prose and plain style, somewhat zealous or peremptory in tone, and unpolished except for several deferential flourishes and similes that are pregnant in meaning. The text ends with the standard Sanskrit word of benediction *śubham*.

On the surface, Bu ston's Advice deals with relatively mundane subject matter. Bu ston gives various prescriptions on the scribal publishing process, while others are omitted, perhaps because they were well known by his contemporaries. Nevertheless, it provides us with a convenient window to view many aspects of the publishing culture and methods followed in Central Asia during the 14th and succeeding centuries. On the Tibetan Plateau severe climatic conditions restricted most publishing activities to milder seasons when, for instance, ink would flow and not freeze. Until the 20th century the scriptures and treatises produced and used in the Tibetan cultural area were overwhelmingly in the traditional Tibetan format of oblong, loose-leaf manuscripts and spineless books (*dpe cha, pothi*). Major hand-publishing projects presupposed an appropriate monastic venue – a scriptorium (*yig tshang*), funding through patrons (*sbyin bdag*) together with the participation of hundreds of monastic staff, e.g. directors (*zhal ta ba*), chief editors/redactors (*'rtsom sgrig mkhan*), text reciters or dictation giv-

ers (*'don pa po*), scribal managers (*yig gnyer ba*), chief scribes (*gtso bo yig mkhan*), collators (*gras mkhan*), copyists (*yig mkhan*), page-numberers (*grangs yig pa*), proofreaders (*zhus dag pa*), paper makers (*shog bzo ba*), engravers (*rkos mkhan*), goldsmiths for book covers (*gdong rkos kyi gser bzo mkhan*), book-strap makers (*sku rags mkhan*), blacksmiths for strap buckles (*sku rags kyi chab ma'i mgar ba*) and diverse servants (*'zhab thog*) for tea, etc.

The technological level of hand-publishing was obviously very modest by today's standards, but could be ameliorated in line with Bu ston's ethos and counsel on procedures for maximising productivity and avoiding mistakes. Bu ston reminded monastic administrators and their subordinates of Imperial decrees (e.g. the *bKa' bcad*) and higher authorities (e.g. Ministerial President rGyal ba bZang po), and he repeatedly impressed upon them the importance of Dharma publishing projects and the need for individuals to painstakingly fulfil their respective responsibilities. Dictation givers were instructed to read the respective text(s) out loud and slowly, and sometimes two or more times, in order to facilitate proofreading. Scribes were in turn exhorted to listen attentively, and to record what they heard accurately and neatly, not making additions or deletions. Scribes and proof-readers were expected to ensure the correct spelling of words in accordance with standard Tibetan orthography, supplemented by Indian 'Mantra orthography' (*sngags brda*). To this end, certain orthographical guides could be consulted. However, because of misprints even in such guides – no doubt also because of innumerable homonyms in Tibetan – Bu ston emphasised the pressing need to independently analyse and arrive at correct spellings. Now Bu ston's directive to scribes to write 115–120 ligatures per running line helps account for the standardised size of texts within long pothis. This is also a valuable piece of bibliographical information to facilitate the finding of selected texts within such pothis.

Beyond the surface level of Bu ston's Advice on Publishing, there were more serious aims. In order to maintain higher goodwill between authorities and patrons, obligations to them needed to be met well. The demand that the hand-publishing of the Sugata's Word and Buddhist scholars' commentaries and treatises be kept within the preserve of monasteries benefited the latter economically. More fundamentally, under the then prevailing condi-

tions, this helped ensure the preservation of authentic traditions. In Bu ston's time in Tibet not only were literacy, book learning, and scribal competency most commonly found in monasteries, but also carriers of text-related oral commentarial traditions and lineages of enlightened masters. Such traditions and lineages ensured the uninterrupted flow of empowerments and blessings. Individuals would benefit thereby, and the Buddhist establishment and Tibetan cultural area would flourish if the underlying metaphysical foundations – or at least their cognitive expressions – remained sound.

Translation of Bu ston's *Advice on Scribal Publishing*

Annotated translation[1] of the edited Tibetan text

[Foreword: Obeisance formula:]

344:5 Obeisance to all Spiritual Friends![2]

[Text title:]

"Entreaty to the Stewards of the Dharma,[3] Spiritual Friends,[4] and Accomplished Scholars[5] Who Produce[6] Great Śāstras[7]."

[Body of the text. Administrative orders to the directors, chief scribes and their subordinates:]

344:6 I implore You to work according to the instructions I have given. It is very important to listen, grasp with the mind like scholars, and to follow without exception the orders[8]

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[1] Thanks go to *Ācārya*-s Ngag dbang Thogs med and Sangs rgyas bsTan dar for help received in Dharamsala, India with interpreting some of the text's problematical passages. The page and line numbers in the left margins (e.g. 344:5) follow those of the Tibetan text edition.

[2] The Tibetan term *dge ba'i bshes gnyen* (plural °*rnams*) translates the Sanskrit *kalyāṇa-mitra* meaning 'virtuous/ pious friend'. Here Bu ston salutes a wide group of spiritual friends, possibly encompassing even past Canonical authors. Later the term became a general sobriquet for 'spiritual advisor/teacher'.

[3] 'Stewards of the Dharma' (*chos gnyer ba*) probably refers in the first instance to monetary patrons (e.g. Zhwa lu District Ruler Kun dga' Don grub) or to keepers of Dharma texts. The term *chos* (Skt. *dharma*) is frequently an abbreviation for *bstan bcos* (with various archaic spellings or mis-spellings including *bstan chos*). As such, it signifies an exegetical treatise (Skt. *śāstra*) or even Dharma scriptures in general.

[4] 'Spiritual Friends' probably refers here to a narrower group, e.g. monastic administrators. Cf. also fn. 2.

[5] Here 'accomplished scholars' (*yon tan mkhan rnams*) probably signifies chief editors or chief scribes.

[6] The Tibetan version uses the past tense form *bzhengs pa'i*, even though the present tense form (*bzheng ba'i*) is more suitable sense-wise and in idiomatic English. 'bZheng ba'i' means "manufacture/ write/ cause to be written/ endow (e.g. with books)". My translation "produce" covers most of those meanings.

[7] 'Commentaries'/ 'treatises' (*bstan bcos*; Sanskrit: *śāstra*-s), probably Canonical texts.

[8] I.e. '(authoritative) directions/ instructions' (*zhal ta'i rim pa rnams*).

from accomplished scholars who possess full understanding.

[Instructions to paper makers and scribes on the early stages of hand-publishing:]

Having pasted papers directly atop thin, flat paper sheets,[9] begin length-wise on the ready, cut ones;[10] [and] write on them. [While transcribing] Do not use abbreviations.[11] In case of [abbreviations in] the original text,[12] spell out[13] [the words] fully. While attending to the [passages on] patches,[14] at that time you must proof-read.

345: 1 Having done the above, review a little.

[Instructions to scribes, proof-readers and page-numberers on text format and aesthetics:]

Having checked to see whether or not the big and small [page] numbers[15] on the outside margins are clear, make the indistinct and unintelligible ones intelligible. Having seen whether or not the big and small ligatures,[16]

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[9] Particulars on the paper material (provenance, quality and colours) employed at Zhwa lu in Bu ston's time are missing in this text, except for mention of "thin paper sheets" (*shog bu srab pa rnams*). For hundreds of years the standard practice in Tibet was to reinforce thin paper material by gluing it together to produce thicker sheets. Thereafter the sheets were cut into the appropriate pothi format to produce adequate writing copy. Superior quality paper was expensive and had to be imported from abroad, especially China, later also Bhutan.

[10] This difficult reading contains the compound word *chad 'jug* (probably < *chad cing 'jug pa*), which is unattested in standard Tibetan dictionaries. It may refer to glued paper patches or ready-cut/ torn/ worn-out pages. Paper patches served the function of today's rubber erasers.

[11] Literally 'contracted letter(s)' (*bsdus yig*), meaning abbreviations, condensed words.

[12] Literally 'grandmother, earlier mother' (*phyi mo*), i.e. mother text.

[13] Here the imperative expression *khrol mdzod* means "sound out" (e.g. read out loud), and/or "unfold" (e.g. "elaborate upon" [abbreviations]), etc.

[14] Regarding (*chad 'jug*), see fn. 10 above.

[15] "Big and small *ones*" (*ang chung rnams*), i.e. ligatures serving as numbers. Until the 20th century Tibetans usually employed the ligatures of their syllabary (*ka, kha, ga*, etc.), not mathematical numbers, to enumerate folio pages (occasionally also paragraphs and other listings) in their texts.

[16] Large ligatures here presumably refer to the scripts that comprise the bodies of texts, while the small ones may refer to 'interlinear notes' (*mchan bu*-s), marginal numbers, etc.

slashes,[17] dots,[18] and spaces are of correct[19] and regular size, and whether or not each line [of running text] has a total of 115–120 ligatures,[20] write out the incomplete and imperfect ones perfectly.

345: 2 'Elegant scripts'[21] must fall in place, roll down [from the horizontal line], be perfect[22] and of small size; but 'fast [scripts]'[23] may be close, indistinct,[24] and may violate the line of letters. Make sure that all [ligatures] are rendered faithfully, neatly and evenly as directed. At the time of

[17] Tibetan has a number of different punctuation marks, but in practice only two kinds are in very widespread use in the literature: (inter-syllabic) dots (*tsheg*-s) and slashes (*shad*-s; Skt. *danda*-s), which are vertical bars or strokes. The shad is less often a syntactic marker (like our commas, or periods) than an indication of where the reader can pause and take a breath.

[18] The ligatures of Tibetan texts are written in *scripta continua*, with regular spacing between syllables – not between whole words. Dots (*tsheg*-s) mark those intervals. In the present study tshegs are dispensed with. However, capital letters are occasionally introduced for clarity's sake, though they are absent in Tibetan orthography.

[19] Today in standard dictionaries *dkar* means 'white, pure'. In Bu ston's usage it carries very positive connotations of clarity, correctness and the like. It is pobably no mere coincidence that Bu ston received most of his academic training at a Khro phu bKa' brgyud monastery. *bKa'* denotes the word of a figure of authority, e.g. the Buddha. The *bKa' brgyud* order was previously known as the 'White Lineage' (*dKar brgyud*).

[20] Literally 'letter-ligatures' (*kha yig rdog*). The normative advice to scribes on the number of ligatures per line (115–120) is particularly significant. It helps account for the production of standard-sized long *pothi*-s. Secondly, such regular size facilitates the calculation of the location of desired sections or passages within pothis.

[21] The term *gzab ma pa*, meaning 'careful, elegant (one)' refers to *gzab yig* writing, i.e. the hand-printed, quadrangular 'headed' *dbu can* scripts and the semi-quadrangular, 'headless' *dbu med* scripts; possibly also certain ornamental scripts. Since the first diffusion of Buddhism in Tibet, the bodies of Tibetan scriptures and books were principally written in *dbu can*, and to a lesser extent in *dbu med* script.

[22] I.e. complete and perfectly formed ligatures.

[23] The term *shar ma pa*, meaning 'directly proceeding or swift (one)', is apparently synonymous with one or more of the running scripts, commonly known today as 'fast scripts' (*'khyug yig*).

[24] Chandra 1971: 345 (line 3) reads "not contradictory" (*mi 'gal*). This is probably a case of scribal error, because in its context one expects to logically read "unclear" (*mi gsal*).

making corrections the 'reciter'[25] must read [the text] out loud and slowly; that will give assurance. Having proceeded downward in order, and having filled in the lower parts of the finished document – including each word[26] and the spaces between sections of the [same] 'Dharma text',[27] scribes[28] must make no additions or deletions.

[Detailed instructions to scribes and proof-readers on punctuation:]

345: 4 Having achieved [initial] clarity[29] by arranging the [text's] main subject matter into sections[30] and thereafter into chapters,[31] examine meticulously also the [punctuation marks:] slashes (*shad*-s): single, double, quadruple slashes, and dots. What is to be done with sutras and the like? If there are 'root verses',[32] after they are finished, put two slashes. What is to be done with continuous [text sections]? If they are finished, put two slashes, [and at the end of the entire text the concluding words:] "So it is said (*gSung so*)" or the like, plus two slashes. Again, if there is a 'summary verse',[33] [at its end] put two slashes. But [if] a [summary or root verse] occurs mixed within a 'commentarial text',[34] insert one slash at each [end of the verse].

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[25] The *'don pa po* signifies either a text reciter *or* dictation-giver.

[26] 'Word' (*skad*).

[27] Here the text reads *chos* (Skt. *dharma*). This is short for 'Dharma text' (*bstan bcos*), regarding which see fn. 5 above.

[28] Scribes or copyists (*yig mkhan rnams*).

[29] I.e. clear sense, clear understanding or clear copy. Regarding 'clarity' (*dkar*), cf. fn. 19 above.

[30] 'Sections' (*bam po rnams*). The term *bam po* denotes (a) in prose works, a division or section of greater length than a chapter, and (b) in mixed or metrical works, a large metrical section (stanza or canto, said to comprise 300 verses). Cf. H. A. Jäschke, *A Tibetan-English Dictionary*, London 1881: 366.

[31] Chapters (*le'u*-s).

[32] 'Root verses' (*rtsa tshig*).

[33] 'Summary verse' (*bsdus tshig*; preferably spelled *bsdus tshigs*).

[34] 'Commentarial text' (*'grel pa'i tshig*).

[Spelling instructions to scribes and proof-readers:]

345: 6 Having inspected the ink [i.e. ligature(s), and], having inspected further, the two – word[35] and meaning[36] – will be understood well. If doubt has arisen, by carrying out a subtle analysis[37] the meaning[38] will be discerned from the words, and the [correct] spelling[39] will be discerned from that meaning. Distinguish between the two, 'Mantra orthography'[40] and 'Tibetan orthography'.[41] Moreover, in the case of Mantra [orthography], write faultlessly the long and short [vowels][42] and the strong and weak [consonants],[43] according to the wording[44] in the respective 'evocation rite'.[45] Proceed [thus] without the fault of con-

[35] The term *tshig* primarily means word, remark, sentence, speech. Tibetan words frequently consist of two ligatures representing two syllables, each of which may carry a core meaning.

[36] 'Meaning' (*don*).

[37] Literally "fine consideration/examination" (*rtog dpyod zhib po*).

[38] Here *don* refers in particular to the *meaning* of syllables heard or of (unclear/suspect) ligatures seen.

[39] The term *brda* has a panoply of different meanings, but here logically refers to orthography, especially correct spelling.

[40] Because otherwise absent in native Tibetan, auxiliary characters were invented to represent and mark off Indic (Sanskrit or Prākrit) characters and sounds adopted into the Canonical literature. 'Mantra orthography' (*sngags brda*) is especially conspicuous in magical formulas. Almost all of the mantras, *dhāraṇī*-s and *rakṣa*-s accepted by Tibet's 'New' (*gSar ma pa*) religious orders are of Indic origin. Mantra orthography also spread into other Tibetan literary treatments of Indian subject matter.

[41] 'Tibetan orthography' (*bod brda*).

[42] Long Indic characters transliterated into Tibetan logically include long vowels (ā, ī, ū, etc.) and diphthongs (ai, au, etc.). See here Michael Hahn, *Lehrbuch der klassischen tibetischen Schriftsprache*, 4. Auflage, Bonn 1981: 21–23.

[43] Weak Indic consonants transliterated into Tibetan logically include the frequent retroflex consonants (*ṭa*, *ṭha*, *ḍa*, *ḍha*, *ṇa*), visarga and anusvāra (*ṃ*). Ibid: 21–23.

[44] 'Wording' (*bshad tshul*).

[45] The term *sgrub thabs* (Skt. *sādhana*), meaning 'methods of evocation', refers here to 'evocation rite manuals' (i.e. manuals containing visualisation instructions for the invocation and meditative evocation of certain deities). Each *sgrub thabs* is usually associated with some system and literary cycle of Tantra. Different Tantric traditions have characteristic or even unique orthographies, which may be the criterion of correctness for the *sgrub thabs* in question. Thus Bu ston deemed it vital that the spelling and pronunciation of invocations and mantras be fastidiously maintained so as to ensure their continued efficacy and spiritual power.

cealing a hat with the model of a boot.[46] He who lacks various manuals on

346:1 orthography[47] ought to follow the models of what I have done,[48] or follow the standards[49] of the Issued Ordinances (*bKa' bcad*)[50] and

[46] Bu ston's phrase (*lham dpe zhwa la bkab pa'i skyon*) deferentially likens Mantra orthography to a hat, i.e. to what belongs to a superior sphere, in contrast to Tibetan orthography, which, like a boot covering the foot, belongs to a lower sphere, nearer the earth. Use of that phrase over 650 years ago hints at the conservatism of the Tibetan oral tradition. Cf. the contemporary stock phrase cited in Sangye T. Naga & Tsepak Rigzin (comp.), Tibetan Quadrisyllabics, Phrases and Idioms, Dharamsala 1994: 205: "taking a shoe as an example for [making] a hat" (*zhwa dpe lham la 'gebs pa*). In both cases the implication is: Avoid following the wrong model and mixing up what properly belongs to separate spheres! According to Tibetan thinking, the top of a person's head (with its *brahmachakra* and Brahma aperture) is the highest and most sacred part of the human physiognomy. Hence it is taboo to pat children on the head, for instance.

[47] In the phrase 'manuals on orthography' (*dag yig byed kyi yig cha*), the term *yig cha* signifies summary textbooks and study manuals (e.g. those on epistemology, logic and philosophy, commonly in use at Tibetan academic monasteries and colleges); while *dag yig* (probably < *brda yig*) refers to dictionaries, orthography, and in the present case correct spelling.

[48] Literally "according to the definite ones that I have done" (*byas pa'i nges pa can rnams de bzhin*). The definite ones presumably refer to examples of spelling found in Bu ston's previous writings.

[49] Literally "according to the other ones of the *bKa' bcad* and rGyab bzang" (*gzhan rnams bka' bcad dang rgyab bzang rnams kyi rjes su*). Standards/ directives/ exemplars for emulation are interpretative translations for *gzhan rnams*. Regarding rGyab bzang, see fn. 51 below.

[50] The term *bka' bcad*, which I render at the outset as the Issued Ordinances, is an important concept in the history of Tibet's indigenous philology. In his Advice on Scribal Publishing, it is unclear which of its referents (i.e. edicts or regulations of different time-periods) Bu ston means by *bka' bcad*. Etymological analysis and an examination of earlier researches may help solve the *bka' bcad's* possible identities. The compound term's first element signifying the 'authoritative Word' and the like, is represented in archaic Tibetan orthography by *bkas*. In classical Tibetan the second element *bcad* is usually the past tense form of *gcod pa*, which according to Roerich (1985, vol. III: 33) means to cut, separate or decide. In the present compound *bcad* appears to be a past participial modifier. Simonsson (1957: 219) notes that *bcad* (or the alternatively spelled *chad*) sometimes functions as a substantive meaning: a promise or understanding. Moreover, Panglung (1994: 165, fn. 14) opines: "Here I take *chad-pa* for 'decision', 'agreement', 'fixing'". Hence, *bkas/bka' bcad* could be interpreted either in the sense of edict (placing emphasis upon the issuing authority), or of issued regulations (with emphasis upon the contents, e.g. of the philological instructions).

A number of scholars tend to favour the first interpretation, namely: Roerich (1976: 1057: 'Royal Commands'); Róna-Tas (1985: 97: 'Edikt'); Taube (1978 [cited in Róna-Tas 1985: 98]: 'amtliche Festlegung', but also [p. 99]: 'Regelungen'); and Panglung (1994: 172: 'edict'; though on pp. 164, 165: 'prescribed by order'). Other leading scholars favour the second interpretation, namely: Obermiller (1932: 197: 'instructions'); Alfonsa Ferrari (in her translation of mKhyen brtse's Guide to the Holy Places of Central Tibet, Roma 1944: 542: 'istruzioni'); Simonsson (1957: 217, fn. 4 & pp. 228, 230: 'Instruktion[-en]'; p. 230: *vyutpatti*; but also p. 228: 'Befehl'); and Uray (1989: 3 & 15: 'prescriptions fixed by order'). Ever since the creation (before 650 CE) of the Tibetan system of writing, the Tibetan literary language has continued to evolve. Tibetan efforts to *extensively* set out this historical background – if any – are unknown to me. International efforts since Sarat Chandra Das (Tibetan–English Dictionary, Calcutta, 1902: v–ix) appear to have attained a degree of maturity in Róna-Tas' article, "Periodisierung der tibetischen Sprachgeschichte" (1985: 93–105). Here Róna-Tas posits seven basic stages of literary-linguistic development correlating with as many historical periods, viz.: 1. Early Old Tibetan (pre-650), 2. Middle Old Tibetan (650–814), 3. Late Old Tibetan (815–11th century); also *classical Tibetan* encompassing both 4. Early Middle Tibetan (c. 11th – mid 13th century) and 5. Late Middle Tibetan (c. mid-13th century – mid-17th century); followed by *post-classical Tibetan*, i.e. 6. New Tibetan, and 7. Modern Tibetan. Indigenous scholarship on the historical development of Tibet's literary language appears to have been of limited scope. Aside from recording individual events and thematising both the creation of the script (before 650 CE) and the 'Great Revision' (c. 815–), efforts at systematisation have been limited to simpler bi- and tri-partite schemas, especially ones involving the translated literature of the 7th–11th centuries and with the crucial referents variously being: *bkas/bka' bcad* (royal edicts or regulations on language), the activities of key translators and revisors, the 'old' (*brda/skad rnying*) versus 'new language' (*brda/skad gsar*), or time-periods characterised by different linguistic standards. Tibetan historiographical tradition has also changed over time, partly because of the loss of earlier documents, partly also because of simplifications and re-interpretations of history in order to meet new needs. From the vantage-point of the early 14th century Bu ston in his *Chos 'byung* (Obermiller 1932: 183-224; Szerb 1990: 8-107) chronicles early literary and translating activities in Tibet. However, he omits mention of any 'first royal edict' (*dang po'i bkas bcad*) on translation policy issued during the 640s. That is discussed in the *Li shi gur khang* lexicon's Introduction compiled in 1716 by Shes rab rGya mtsho, perhaps on the basis of earlier materials stemming from sKyo ston (Simonsson 1957: 217, fn. 4; and Terjék 1978: 504–509). Bu ston does note (Obermiller 1932: 191; Szerb 1990: 32, line 4) that "works on Grammar and Dictionaries were composed in the Da-jor-tshang-pai-ling (*brDa sbyor Tshangs pa'i gling du brda sbyor*)", late in the 8th century. In connection with the Great Revision Bu ston relates (Obermiller: 196–197; Szerb 1990: 45–46) that "the king issued the following order: The Aparantaka teachers...and others are to translate...Scriptures into Tibetan

directly from the Sanskrit (*Nyi 'og gi mkhan po ā tsā rya...sogs pas..rGya gar skad las Bod kyi skad du bsgyur cing...ces bka' stsal te/*)". "Moreover, the texts translated before were re-edited in the new language, 3 different forms of instructions were made (*sngar bsgyur ba rnams skad gsar bcad kyis gtan la phab cing/ bkas bcad rnam pa gsum mdzad de/)*". Simonsson (1957: 231) renders the sentence differently: "Die früher übersetzten Texte wurden gemäß der neu-festgelegten Sprache geordnet, und drei Instruktionen wurden verfaßt." Cf. Uray's (1989: 3) translation of the underlined, key phrase: "the three different kinds of prescriptions fixed by order". Following the period of disruption in Tibet, Bu ston notes (Obermiller 1932: 212; Szerb 1990: 84) that under the auspices of king Ye she 'od in the West (*mNga' ris*), Rin chen bZang po (958–1055) was sent to India to study Buddhist doctrine. He continues (Obermiller 1932: 213; Szerb 1990: 84–85): "Rin-chen s-ang-po became profoundly versed... and, having invited the Pandits..., achieved the translation of the philosophical part of the Kanon (*Rin chen bzang po mkhas par gyur te/ pandi ta...spyan drangs te*)". Moreover: "the Tantric parts of scripture [were] revised (*sngags gtan la phab/*)". Again there is no mention of any royal edict or of philological instructions. In his later Advice on Scribal Publishing Bu ston refers – without closer specification – to the 'issued ordinances' (*bka' bcad*), which were apparently available and with which his listeners/readers might be familiar.

Uray (1989: 3) apparently resolves the identity of at least two of the three ordinances or instructions cited by Bu ston in his *Chos 'byung*: "The best known of them is the Sanskrit-Tibetan dictionary *Mahāvyutpatti / Bye-brag-tu rtogs-byed chen-po* preserved in the *Bstan-'gyur*"... "It is also in the *Bstan-'gyur* that we find the *Sgra-sbyor bam-po gnyis-pa*, otherwise known as *Madhyavyutpatti / Bye-brag-tu rtogs-byed 'bring-po*, which offers comments on some of the terms in the *Mahāvyutpatti* and guidelines for translation. The third treatise, *Kṣudravyutpatti*, or rather **Alpavyutpatti / Bye-brag-tu rtogs-byed chung-ngu*, is unfortunately only known by its titles, as the text has not survived." Note furthermore that the bilingual dictionary, entitled the Great Essential Etymology (*Mahāvyutpatti* [P 5832, D 4346]), codified the terminology and equivalents to be used by translators. This work is also available in three extra-canonical editions (R. Sakaki, Kyoto 1916; A. Csoma de Körös, Budapest 1984; and Y. Ishihama & Y. Fukuda, *A New Critical Edition of the Mahāvyutpatti*, Tokyo 1989). The *Mahāvyutpatti*'s commentary, entitled the Word-Combination, in Two Parts (*sGra sbyor bam po gnyis pa* [P 5833, D 4347]) is not only available in A Critical Edition of the *sGra sbyor bam po gnyis pa* edited by Mie Ishikawa (Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 1990), but is also studied in detail and partly translated in Simonsson's monograph (1957: 238–280). Both Simonsson (1957: 214, fn. 4; p. 238, fn. 2; pp. 259–261) and Uray (1989: 4ff., 11, 13) concur in identifying the *sGra sbyor's Introduction* as being an edict [cf. the second royal edict in Róna-Tas 1985: 97]. Uray (1989: 11–13) concludes that it was issued at the end of Sad na legs' reign, in 814/815 CE, and not during the following reign of Ral pa can, as Bu ston had erroneously surmised. Note, however, that the *text-body* of the *sGra sbyor* is not an edict, but rather philological instructions prepared by a team of translators!

of [Ministerial President] rGyab bzang.[51] Regardless of the authoritative instructions[52] found in all the manuals,[53] one ought not to rely upon the existing spellings, not even in the foremost orthographical guides.[54] Hence once more, examine each ligature[55] meticulously.

[51] Schaeffer 2004: 271, fn. 31 surprisingly admits "I have been unable as yet to identify the Rgyab bzang."
rGyab bZang (Chandra 1971: 346, line 1) must be the abbreviated and elided name of Bu ston's influential contemporary, called *rGyal po bZang po* by both sGra tshad pa (in Ruegg 1966) and the 5th Dalai Lama (in Ahmad 1995), and perhaps most properly *rGyal ba bZang po* by both gZhon nu dpal (in Roerich 1976) and Petech 1990. Now rGyal ba bZang po (d. 1357/58) served as Regent, i.e. temporal administrator (*dpon chen*) of Tibet during several terms of office between 1329 and 1356, moreover between 1336–1344 as president (*yüan-shih*) of one of the Mongol Yüan dynasty's five most important ministries in Peking, the Department of Buddhist and Tibetan Affairs (*xuanzheng yuan*). On the institutions of *xuanzheng yuan* and *dpon chen*, see Petech 1990: 35-36, 43-46; and Tucci 1949: 32–34. Regarding rGyal ba bZang po, see first of all Petech 1990: 101-105, his many Tibetan Index listings, and the biographical sketch referred to (on p. 93, but unavailable to me:) Sribhutibhadra's *rGya Bod yig tsang* (II: 75a–78a) composed in 1435, and also "translated with a few mistakes" in Tucci 1949: 687, fn. 106. See also Roerich 1977: 217; and Ahmad 1995: 104. Because the said Dept. of Buddhist Affairs included a considerable secretarial staff of redactors and translators, one would expect that it also issued many official publications, exemplary translations in the Tibetan language, and probably also directives on language standards. Hence Bu ston alludes in his Advice to the exemplars of rGyab bzang for emulation (*rgyab bzang rnams kyi rjes su*). Then in about 1344, grand abbot Bu ston declined an invitation to go to Peking, but instead heeded *dpon chen* rGyal ba bZang po's request to visit the latter's estate in the Shangs district (*khri khor*) of West-Central Tibet, where he designed stupas, images, numerous mandalas, and consecrated a great sanctuary (*sku 'bum*). See in this regard Ruegg 1966: 117-118; Bogaert 1996: 33; and Petech 1990: 101-102.

[52] 'Authoritative instructions' (*nges pa bcas*). Here the adjective *nges pa* means, in a conventional context: certain, true, sure; but in a technical, philosophical context: *definitive*, as in the concept of 'definitive meaning' (*nges don, nitartha*).

[53] Bu ston alludes to textbooks (*yig cha*-s), and seemingly implies that that class of literature also includes orthographical guides. Cf. fn. 47 above.

[54] Definite reference to 'orthographical guides' (*dag yig*-s).

[55] Literally 'ligature' (*yig rdog*), i.e. a grapheme consisting of two or more characters.

[Counsel to directors and chief scribes on project management, discipline and remuneration:]

346: 2 Do not copy[56] received, old [texts],[57] even if written down by a (lay) patron.[58] Please publish as allowed new,[59] pure writings[60] by copying inspected scripture[61] in (our) possession. Pray, if the scribes[62] and proof-reader(s)[63] of the scriptorium[64] have not returned [promptly] after the lion-sound[65] of the midday gong,[66] as punishment [serve] each [only]

[56] The negative command "do not write/ copy" (*ma 'bri*) is directed towards monastic scribes.

[57] Literally 'old, extant/existing ones' (*rnying pa 'dug pa rnams*). The general rationale behind Bu ston's warning appears to be the greater risk of texts stemming from householders of being either: (1) non-Buddhist in their subject-matter, (2) apocrypha (*gter ma*-s) parading as scripture; or (3) of inferior quality, partaking of the six faults of treatises, cited according to Bu ston (Obermiller 1931: 43) in the *Yogācarabhūmi*, namely being: senseless, erroneous, propagandistic, unscrupulous, formalistic, or polemical. Another circumstance not mentioned by Bu ston was that such texts were likely to be marred by a greater number of orthographical and scribal errors.

[58] 'Lay patron, sponsor' (*sbyin bdag*, Skt. *dānapati*).

[59] 'New' (*so ma* – an old Tibetan term) superseded in classical and modern Tibetan (by *gsar pa/gsar ma*).

[60] The original has the abbreviation *bris* in place of the complete substantive *bris ma*, i.e. 'writings', derived from the verb *'bri ba*, to write.

[61] *gSung* is an honorific term signifying the 'words, speech, or precept' of a figure of authority (e.g. the Buddha). Elsewhere it may be shorthand for 'scripture' (*gsung rab, pravacana*) or a 'scholastic work' (e.g. an exemplar from amongst 'collected works' [*gsung 'bum*] or 'collected miscellanea' [gsung thor bu]).

[62] 'Scribes, copyists' (*yig mkhan rnams*).

[63] 'Proof-reader(s)' (*zhus dag pa*-s).

[64] 'Scriptorium' (*yig tshang*). The term is lexically attested (Roerich 1986: 251a) analogously as an (old Tibetan) government office; secretariat, archives, etc. Cf. T. G. Dhongthog (comp.), *The New Light English-Tibetan Dictionary*, Dharmsala: LTWA, 1973: 403b: "scriptorium n. (pl. –ia) *bris khang* (*gdon pa'i nang*)".

[65] Chandra 1971: 3 reads literally "lion-like gong (*seng gi 'khar rnga*)". *Seng gi* is the attributive or genitive of *seng ge* (lion). But it could also be the abbreviated form either for *gseng* (*gi*) meaning: well-sounding, or for *seng ge'i sgra* (i.e. lion's roar). Indeed, the phrase appears to allude to the Lion of the Śākyas (– Śākyamuni Buddha) and to the Buddha's Word. As Bu ston (Obermiller 1931: 25ff., 29–30; Las 1988: 13ff., 16–17) points out, one of the sutra literature's stock appellations for the Buddha's Word is "that, which is well-spoken" (*legs par gsungs pa*, Skt. *subhāṣita*). Moreover, the Buddha's Word is endowed with 60 distinctive features, including no. 32: "being powerful like the lion's roar" (*seng ge'i sgra'i shugs so*).

[66] 'Gong, bronze drum' (*'khar rnga*).

half a measure of tea. If they have not listened [carefully] to the instructions, tell them to take pains with the Dharma[-texts].[67] And if they have twice failed to fulfill particulars of the contract[68] fully, let them go. As regards sutras, it is especially important to take every care regarding the very venerable pothis.[69] Moreover, to copy a short sutra[70] is not [like making] the door of a house.[71]

346: 4 It is very, very important through arduous efforts to complete services to the Most High,[72] and to attentively treat all persons [who had been] requested to participate in publishing[73] in accordance with their worthiness[74] and

[67] Literally *chos* (Skt. *dharma*), which here implies *bstan bcos/bchos*, meaning Dharma texts, exegetical treatises or the like.

[68] 'Particulars of the contract' (*'bru chad*).

[69] In the phrase *phyag dpe lags*, the third element is an honorific particle, while *phyag dpe* again is an honorific form for *dpe cha* (Skt. *pothi*).

[70] A 'short/ little sutra' (*mdo phran*).

[71] While contrasting a scripture to the ordinary 'door of a house' (*grong pa['i] sgo*), Bu ston brings to mind an image familiar to the Tibetan monk literati of his time, namely that of the 'entrance gate' (*'jug pa'i sgo*). Buddhist treatises were held to facilitate the path (*lam*) to the fruit (*'bras bu*) of expertise, wisdom and highest spiritual realisation. In this sense *'jug pa'i sgo* figured in the titles of a number of works by Sa skya pa masters, e.g. *Chos la 'jug pa'i sgo* by bSod nams rTsemo (1142 – 1182), and the *mKhas pa rnams 'jug pa'i sgo* by Sa skya Pandita (1182–1251). See hereon David P. Jackson, *The Entrance Gate for the Wise*, vol. I, Wien: ATBS, 1987: 2–4, 10 (fn. 10).

[72] Things belonging to or pertaining to the Most High (*zhabs thog rnams*). This interesting compound literally means "those (°*rnams*) at the foot (*zhabs*) of the uppermost (*thog*)". It usually refers to a range of high or superior phenomena, e.g. a roof, upper storey; thunderbolt; fruit, fortune or wealth. In the present context it could allude to Buddha or some Ādi-Buddha, but most likely refers to the patron at whose behest a publishing project is undertaken and to whom the produced publications belong – for instance, Kund ga' don grub, Lord-Ruler of Zhwa lu District, who served as patron of the *Zhwa lu bsTan 'gyur* Edition.

[73] Conjectural translation: "all who had been requested to engage in scribal publishing" (*zhu ba['i] bgyid pa lags pas kun gyis*). Here 'scribal publishing' is my rendering of *bgyid pa*, the verbal substantive for doing, performing, manufacturing and the like.

[74] Worthiness from the verbal substantive *'os pa*, literally meaning 'being worthy, deserving'.

the excellence of their accomplishments,[75] also afterwards with honoraria and parting gifts.[76]

346:5 Auspiciousness![77]

[75] 'Excellence of their accomplishments/ contributions' (*bzang por yon tan*).

[76] 'Honoraria' (*yon*-s) and 'parting gifts' (*rdzong rnams*). The latter (in plural) literally means fortresses, but has secondary meanings of 'fee for safe-conduct, travelling-present'.

[77] 'Auspiciousness, splendour' rendering the Sanskrit *śubham* (Tib. transliteration: *shu bham*) – a benedictory formula terminating many Canonical texts.

Tibetan text edition of Bu ston's *Advice on Scribal Publishing*

bsTan bcos chen po bzhengs pa'i chos gnyer ba dge ba'i bshes gnyen rnams dang yon tan mkhan rnams kyi snyan du gsol ba

Romanised and diplomatically edited on the basis of a copy from editor Lokesh Chandra's facsimile edition of The Collected Works of Bu-ston (= Śata Piṭaka Series, vol. 66), New Delhi: IAIC, 1971, pp. 344 (line 5) – 346 (line 5). It is reprinted from *Bu ston Rin chen grub dang Thugs sras sGra tshad pa gnyis kyi gsung 'bum*; tome 26/*La*, Lhasa: Zhol par khang, circa 1919.[78]

Corrections, preferred and alternative readings are offered in the footnotes.

Thanks go to the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives (Manuscript and Repro sections) in Dharamsala, India for a copy of this text.

344: 5 //Yongs kyi dge ba'i bshes gnyen rnams la phyag 'tshal lo/ bstan bcos chen po bzhengs pa'i[79] chos gnyer ba dge ba'i bshes gnyen rnams dang'/

344: 6 yon tan mkhan rnams kyi snyan du gsol ba/ ded kyis kha ta byas pa'i lugs bzhin mdzad 'tshal ba/ gzhigs rtog 'them[80] po mdzad nas / yon tan mkhan po rnams la zhal ta'i rim pa rnams ma lus par byon cing'/ yon tan mkan po

344: 7 rnams kyis kyang sems la bzung nas nyan pa gal che'o/ / chad 'jug rnams dkyus su chug cing'/ shog bu srab pa rnams la de'i thad kar shog lhan gyis la/ de'i steng du bris/ bsdus yig ma byed cig/ phyi mo na 'dug pa kun kyang

345: 1 khrol mdzod/ chad 'jug dgos pa'i skabs su zhus dag byed tsa na/ de'i gong nas dum re skyor la mdzad zur gyi ang chung rnams gsal mi gsal la bltas nas mi gsal ba cang mi go ba rnams go bar byed du chug mdzod/ yig ge'i che phra

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[78] Kanakura 1953, i.e. Tohoku 5200, no. 42.

[79] Here the past tense form *bzhengs pa'i*, even though the present tense form (*bzheng ba'i*) would make better sense.

[80] Preferable spelling: 'thems

dang'/ shad par/ tsheg bar rnams la dkar tshad ldan 'ong pa[81] dang'/

345: 2 phreng re kha yig rdog brgya dang bco lnga nas nyi shu'i bar tshang bar 'dug mi 'dug gzigs la/ ma tshang ba rnams la tshang bar bris gsung mdzod/ yi ge gzab ma pa rnams kyis/ thung ba dang'/ rdzogs pa dang'/ 'dril ba/

345: 3 thebs par 'ong pa dang'/ shar ma pa rnams kyis/ 'bru'i thig tshugs dang mi 'gal[82] zhing'/ 'jam po 'ong ba dang'/ spyi khyab tu snyoms pa dang'/ dag po 'ong ba'i zhal ta mdzad/ zhus dag mdzad dus [++][83] 'don pa pos bul po mdzad

345: 4 cing nges po 'ong ba dang'/ babs bsgrig pa la yig mkhan rnams kyis chos cha'i bar du skad re babs dang'/ yi ge rdzogs pa'i gsham rnams su khengs pa bris shing'/ chad pa dang lhag pa med pa gyis gsung mdzod/ bam po mgo skya dang'/ le'u gsham skya bya ba lags pas/ dkar thob pa[s][84] dang'/ chig shad/

345: 5 nyis[85] shad/ bzhi shad tsheg shad rnams la 'ang rtog dpyod zhib po mdzad cing'/ mdo las bya ba lta bu sogs dang'/ rtsa tshig[86] rdzogs pa'i rjes nyis[87] shad thob pa yin na 'ang 'brel pa[88] dang gnyis kyi bar dang'/ gsungs

345: 6 so [++][89] bya ba lta bu sogs [++][90] nyis[91] shad thob pa yin na 'ang'/ slar bsdus tshig[92] nyis[93] shad thob pa yin na 'ang'/ de ma thag 'grel pa'i[94] tshig 'ong ba rnams kyi bar du tsheg shad re byed du chug mdzod/ tshig don gnyis rtogs

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81 Preferable spelling: 'ong ba
82 Suspect reading; preferable alternative: gsal
83 Preferably add: na
84 Preferably add: Instrumental -s to thob pa, predicate of the subordinate clause beginning with bam po mgo...
85 Preferable spelling: gnyis
86 Preferably: tshigs
87 Preferably: gnyis
88 Preferably: 'brel ba
89 Preferably add: las
90 Preferably add: dang
91 Preferably: gnyis
92 Preferably: tshigs
93 Preferably: gnyis
94 Preferably: 'grel ba'i

345: 7 pa phar ltos tshur ltos lags pas/ the tshom byung na lta rtog [++][95] zhib po mdzad pas tshig las don rtogs shing'/ don las brda rtog pa lags so/ sngags brda dang'/ bod brda gnyis so sor phye ste mdzod/ sngags la 'ang sgrub thabs so so'i bshad tshul gyis/ ring thung dang drag zhan sogs

346: 1 ma 'khrul bar mdzad nas/ lham dpe zhwa la bkab pa'i skyon med par mdzod/ dag [++][96] byed kyi yig cha mi 'dra ba du ma bdog pas ded kyis byas pa'i nges pa can rnams de bzhin du mdad cing'/ gzhan rnams bka' bcad[97] dang'/ rgyab bzang rnams kyi rjes su mdzod/ yig cha byung tshad

346: 2 la nges pa bcas kyang'/ dag yig rab la 'ang ma dag srid pas yid mi rton lags so/ / [++][98] yig rdog re re'i phyir yang rtog dpyod zhib po mdzod/ sbyin bdag gis bris kyang rnying pa 'dug pa rnams ma 'bri/ bris byang

346: 3 so ma [++][99] 'bri ba zhal ta'i gsung bdog pas[100] gzigs nas zhal bkod[101] mdzod/ 'bru chad 'them pa'i gnyis par mi [na][102] gtong ba dang'/ zhal ta la mi nyan ba[103] byung na/ chos gnyer bas skad mdzod/ gung seng gi[104] 'khar rnga byung nas ma sleb na/ ja srang phyed re'i chad pa la yig tshang de'i yig mkhan

346:4 rnams dang zhus dag pa gsol/ mdor na grong pa sgo gcig gi mdo phran gcig 'bri bar mi gda' zhing'/ drung gi phyag dpe lags pas kun gyis gzab pa gal che'o/ / zhabs thog[105] rnams kyang 'bad pa chen pos sgrub cing'/ phyis yon

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95 Suggested complete reading: rtog dpyod (cf. 345: 5)
96 Suggested complete reading: dag yig
97 Cf. the word's archaic form: bkas bcad
98 Optionally one can add: kha (Cf. 345:2: kha yig rdog)
99 Preferably add: rnams after so ma
100 Uncertain readings. Alternatively: gsung ba dog pas
101 Preferably: 'god
102 Preferably add: na.
103 Preferably: nyan pa
104 Preferably: seng ge'i
105 Alternatively: zhabs tog

346: 5 rdzong rnams kyang bzang por yon tan la ji ltar 'os pa bzhin zhu ba[106] bgyid pa lags pas kun gyis gzab ba[107] gal che'o// gal che'o//
shu bham[108]//

Afterword

While investigating Tibetan Canon holdings in India, I noticed Bu ston's *Advice on Publishing* in a reprint edition of The Collected Works of Bu-ston. Soon thereafter at a Panel of the Seventh Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies (Graz 1995), I brought the potential usefulness of this text to the attention of scholars. However, my work materials on the text lay in a drawer for years, until I was invited to present my paper "Bu ston's Advice on Publishing" at the Buddhism and Nordland Conference in Tallinn in February 2007. Schaeffer's complementary article only came to my attention in late 2007, after the completion of this article. It gives me pleasure to offer this contribution to the Festschrift in honour of Dr. Linnart Mäll.

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[106] Preferably: zhu ba'i

[107] Preferably: gzab pa

[108] The text's last word, identical with the stock Sanskrit benediction *śubham*, ends transliterated into Tibetan Mantra orthography also with a terminal *anusvāra*.

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О двух направлениях развития в обновленческом движении российского буддизма*

Сергей Нестеркин

На рубеже веков в Российском буддизме начался процесс, который в отечественной науке принято называть обновлением. В качестве реформаторов буддизма в этой связи называют Агвана Доржиева, Чойнзона Иролтуева, Цыбена Жамсарано, Базара Барадина, Михаила Богданова, Бато-Далая Очирова и др., а также Лубсан Сандана Цыденова, Агвана-Салнама Бадмаева, Б. Д. Дандарона и их сподвижников, порой рассматривая их деятельность как составные элементы единого процесса трансформации буддизма в новую форму, "необуддизм." Но на наш взгляд, здесь мы имеем дело с двумя существенно различными процессами, с движениями, которые ставили перед собой во многом разные задачи и применяли для их решения принципиально разные подходы. С одной стороны, деятельность бурятских просветителей и, в значительной степени, таких представителей духовенства, как А. Доржиев, Ч. Иролтуев, Ганжурва-Гэген, являлась частью процессов обновления буддизма, проходивших в то время во многих странах его распространения, и являвшихся реакцией на идеологическую и политическую экспансию стран-колонизаторов, призванную выработать идеологическую основу для сохранения национальной идентичности колонизируемых народов. С другой стороны, Л. С. Цыденов и его последователи ставили себе иную задачу: реформировать буддизм таким образом, чтобы он мог развиваться в новой для себя социо-культурной среде, в западной культуре России. Задачей здесь было не столько сохранение национальной иден-

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тичности, сколько сохранение буддийской традиции в новом культурном пространстве, что косвенным образом решало и первую задачу.

Обновленческое движение в своем классическом виде возникло на Цейлоне как реакция на колониализм, западную технологию и идеологию, и миссионерскую экспансию христианства. В конце XIX века пассивное терпение колониального угнетения сменилось усилиями по восстановлению чувства национального достоинства. Буддизм как религия, глубоко укорененная в национальном сознании, с одной стороны, и пользующаяся высоким авторитетом в западных интеллектуальных кругах, с другой, хорошо отвечала задаче быть идеологией национального возрождения. В среде образованных городских буддистов Цейлона начался процесс реинтерпретации буддизма как учения, близкого по духу передовым идеям Запада. В нем подчеркивались рационалистические моменты, близость к научному подходу в осмыслении мира, ориентированность не на "догмы слепой веры" и откровение (в чем виделось его отличие от христианства), но на опытную верифицируемость его учения. Поскольку современный обновленцам буддизм включал в себя много элементов, не вписывающихся в эту схему, буддисты в сотрудничестве с европейскими буддологами, используя разработанный в европейской гуманитарной науке критический исторический метод, анализировали палийский канон, пытаясь реконструировать гипотетический "изначальный" буддизм, относя все то, что не согласовалось с искомой целью, к "позднейшим наслоениям." Принятые в традиционном буддизме и широко практикуемые, особенно в сельской местности, защитные ритуалы и практики по накоплению добродеяний, вера в существование божеств и духов, подвергались критике. Представители необуддизма были выходцами из нового социального слоя, возникшего при колониальном режиме, слоя, в большей степени впитавшего дух западной цивилизации. По сути, ими была взята западная редакция буддизма с большим протестантским уклоном и использована в собственной интерпретации буддизма как рационалистического, прагматического и социально активного.

Обновленческое движение в России, представленное Э. Ринчино, Ц. Жамсарано и их сподвижниками, находилось, на наш

взгляд, в этом же ряду. Российские обновленцы оценивали положение национальных окраин и, в частности, Бурятии в составе России как совершенно сходное с положением колоний западных держав [Ринчино Э.-Д., 1994, 26].

Возникновение обновленческого движения относится ко времени проведения царским правительством реформ в Забайкалье. Оно появилось как реакция на русскую экспансию, а также на политику царского правительства, направленную на насильственную ассимиляцию и христианизацию бурятского народа.

Обновленцы стремились сохранить свой этнос от ассимиляции, оставляя, в тоже время, возможность для бурятского народа приобщиться к русской, "европейской" культуре, опираясь на национальную религию – буддизм. В 1905 г., не занимая еще никакого официального положения ни в буддийской церкви, ни в органах управления, видные представители этого движения Бадзар Барадийн, Цыбен Жамцарано и Лысок Гончикожапов обращаются к С. Ю. Витте с письмом в защиту достоинства буддистов и их права свободно исповедовать свою веру, не подвергаясь дискриминации по религиозному признаку [Частная записка..., 1905, 38–40].

В процессе обновления, как оно понималось первой из указанных групп, можно выделить две составляющие: административную и философско-доктринальную. Первая предполагала изменение административной структуры церкви, порядка выборности административных должностей дацанов – хамболамы, ширетуев (настоятелей) дацанов, казначеев и т.д., принципов распределения получаемых дацанами доходов, определение порядка формирования расходных статей церковного бюджета, введение ограничений на личные расходы ламства по своему содержанию, изменение механизмов финансового контроля, определение новых принципов взаимоотношения ламства и прихожан. Философско-доктринальное обновление ставило своей задачей реформирование самого вероучения и культовой практики в соответствии с принципами некого "первоначального," "раннего" буддизма, как они представлялись представителям этого движения. Этот "ранний" буддизм представлялся им как философско-этическое учение, следование которому не предполагает совершение различного рода ритуалов.

Одним из оснований для пересмотра сложившихся устоев дацанской жизни являлась критическая оценка сложившегося положения дел с монашеской дисциплиной внутри сангхи, систематическое нарушение хувараками и ламами внутримонастырских уставов. С этой критикой в большой степени были согласны и оппоненты обновленцев в лице Л. Цыденова и его последователей. Последний, например, уходя в затвор, удаляясь из Кудунского дацана, так высказался о сложившимся стиле дацанской жизни: "Дацан – это сансара." Вопросы ограничения личной собственности лам до оговоренных в винае минимумов стояли практически на всех обновленческих съездах, однако основу предлагаемой реформы составляло изменение принципов формирования руководства сангхи.

Административное реформирование имело несколько этапов. Начало было положено на Втором общебурятском съезде при Гусиноозерском дацане, созванном в связи с началом работы «Комиссии по пересмотру законодательства о буддистах России» под председательством С. А. Котляревского.

Съездом в состав Комиссии были избраны А. Доржиев, Д. Сампилон, Р. Бимбаев, С. Жигжитов, С. Цыбиктаров, и Б. Барадин. Им был принят наказ, «определяющий волю бурятского народа» в решении его вероисповедных дел [Наказ и протоколы…].

Основные положения наказа сводятся к требованию свободы вероисповедания, гарантированной государственными законами свободы религиозных объединений – общин и союзов, если они не противоречат основным законам государства. Внутренняя административная система ламаистской церкви реформируется на основах выборности и коллегиальности. Во главе всего буддийского духовенства бурят Иркутской губернии и Забайкальской области по-прежнему стоит выборный бандидо-хамбо-лама. Но для обсуждения общих вопросов периодически собираются съезды духовенства и мирян, в перерыве между сессиями съездов функционирует исполнительный орган – Центральный Комитет по религиозным делам в резиденции хамбо-ламы.

Следующий этап попыток административного реформирования буддийской церкви на обновленческих началах начался после установления советской власти. Бурный период граждан-

ской войны помешал всем разрабатываемым в период 1917–1919 гг. проектам приобрести силу закона и основным нормативным актом, регулирующим взаимоотношения церкви и государства и внутрицерковные отношения по прежнему являлось «Положение» 1853 года.

Работа по подготовке созыва общего съезда буддистов для разработки основных положений административного управления буддийской церкви в Восточной Сибири РСФСР и Бурят-монгольского АО ДВР началась в 1922 г. Предстоящий Духовный собор с самого начала был заявлен как мероприятие, обусловленное в первую очередь политическими причинами.

В письме бывших деятелей Бурнацкома «К сведению верующих масс о высшем духовном соборе буддистов Бурят-Монголии», опубликованном в газете «Шэнэ Байдал» (№ 22 от 2 октября 1922 года) от имени Комитета Бурятской национальной культуры в поддержку ходатайства Хамбо-ламы перед правительствами Бурят-Монгольской автономной области (БМАО) ДВР и РСФСР о разрешении созвать съезд буддистов авторы письма призывают не только лам, но и мирян уделить самое серьезное внимание созываемому собору, так как "жизнь ламства будет обязательно урегулирована государственной властью," если не приложить все силы и старания к тому, чтобы жизнь лам и хувараков "не противоречила жизни широких трудовых масс и государственной системе" (Цит. по: [Герасимова К. М., 1964, 63]). Сам Хамбо-лама необходимость созыва съезда мотивировал необходимостью "пересмотра устаревших и установления новых положений по регулированию внутренней и внешней жизни буддийского духовенства Бурятии согласно новым революционным лозунгам и требованиям" [НАРБ, ф. 643, *д.* 7, *лл.* 7, 11]. Собор созывался с одобрения Центрального комитета бурят-монголов Восточной Сибири, рассмотревшего повестку дня собора и норму представительства от духовенства и мирян и давшего на них положительное заключение [Там же, *л.* 4].

В повестку дня собора входили вопросы об организации ламского быта согласно правилам «Винаи», о реорганизации духовного управления, об улучшении тибетской медицины, об изучении ламами европейской науки, о национализации проповедования и преподавания буддийской религии, об изме-

нении правил посвящения в хувараки, об отмене культа перерожденцев и прорицателей.

15 октября 1922 года в Ацагатском дацане состоялся первый духовный съезд буддистов двух Бурят-Монгольских автономных областей ДВР и РСФСР. В проекте «Положения об управлении духовными делами буддистов Сибири», предложенном к рассмотрению съезда, в основном рассматривался порядок учреждения органов церковного управления и определение их компетенции.

Тенденция ограничить самоуправление духовной общины контролем со стороны мирян, имевшая место в проекте положения 1917-го года, в новом проекте 1922 г. получила дальнейшее развитие. В качестве высшего распорядительного органа церковного управления предлагалось установить Духовный собор, который бы принимал все решения простым большинством голосов, а в качестве исполнительного – Духовный совет во главе с хамбо-ламой. На местах, в дацанах, исполнительную власть предлагалось передать дацанским советам во главе с ширетуями, которые бы избирались и контролировались общим приходским собранием духовенства и мирян, формировавшимся на основе равного представительства – по одному делегату от 20-ти человек, как духовенства, так и мирян.

В качестве религиозной организации – субъекта, на регулирование деятельности которого направлено законодательство, в данном проекте выступала не сангха (община духовных), а "приходская община." Это понятие было заимствовано из православного обихода. В состав общины входили миряне и духовно окармливающее их священство, т.е. подавляющее большинство в приходской общине имели миряне, под контроль которых (в силу их равного представительства духовенством на общем приходском собрании) ставилась вся внутренняя жизнь сангхи. Хамбо-лама и ширетуи по новому положению лишались даже тех распорядительных полномочий, которые давало им положение 1917 г., по которому хамбо-лама как глава церкви имел право издавать указы о правилах жизни духовенства и внутреннем укладе монастырей самостоятельно, и для легализации этих указов не требовалось одобрения коллегиальных советов.

Новое «Положение» давало возможность любому мирянину не только требовать отчета в деятельности духовенства, ста-

вить вопрос о созыве чрезвычайного собрания и переизбрании совета, но и быть избранным в дацанский совет в качестве полноправного члена. Фактически буддийское духовенство ставилось в положение, когда его деятельность должна была регулироваться не каноническими положениями монашеского устава (винаи) и/или уставов махаяны и тантры (для тех, кто принимал соответствующие обеты), но решениями "активистов" из мирян, которые по предложенному проекту легко могли получать большинство в приходских советах. Этим не только решалась актуальная для новой власти проблема контроля за духовенством, но и в большой степени ослаблялось влияние ламства на мирян, поскольку возможность духовенства влиять на принятие решений резко ограничивались.

Не приходится сомневаться, что истинными авторами Проекта были не только (а, скорее, и не столько) деятели обновленческого движения, сколько представители новой советской власти. В пользу этого свидетельствует тот факт, что принятый вскоре постановление ЦИК и СНК от 17. 12. 1925. за № 221 о проведении в Бурреспублике декрета об отделении церкви от государства и школы от церкви по существу развивает предложения «Положения». По этому постановлению вся собственность сангхи переходит к государству, которое выдает ее религиозным общинам для использования, при условии лояльности этих общин. Так что принятие «Положения» могло рассматриваться властью как первый шаг в направлении установления новых отношений церкви и государства на принципах социалистического строительства.

Можно предположить, что стремление советской власти ограничить влияние старой церкви на массы в некоторой степени находило сочувствие и у обновленцев. Старая церковь рассматривалась ими как консервативная сила, мешающая новому государственному строительству, которое они рассчитывали возглавлять. Так, несколько позднее описываемого периода Э. Ринчино, к тому времени уже практически полновластный диктатор Монголии, будучи увлечен идеей создания «государства всех монголов», писал своему другу Д. Сампилону: "Монголы и другие народы Центральной Азии слишком примитивны и изъедены буддийским клерикализмом и мало годятся для созда-

ния такого государства (т.е. панмонгольской державы. – Авт.)." [Ринчино Э.-Д., 1994 (2), 124].

На смену старой церковной организации должна была придти иная, обновленная, доминирующее влияние в которой должна была иметь новая церковная и околоцерковная элита. Возможность широкого влияния мирян на процессы в церкви импонировала обновленцам также и потому, что значительную их часть (пожалуй, большинство наиболее активных деятелей), составляли именно миряне – бурятские интеллигенты, некоторые со специальным востоковедным образованием, не входящие ни коим образом в церковную иерархию и никак не воспринимаемые традиционным ламством в качестве "своих." В глазах духовенства это были еще очень молодые люди,[1] которым отдавалось должное как людям образованным, но их претензии на реформирование буддизма никоим образом не признавались обоснованными, хотя бы потому, что не признавалась их компетентность в предмете, который они взялись реформировать. Надо помнить, что стандартный курс обучения буддийской философии длился 18 лет, и его завершение примерно соответствует получению современного высшего образования, и получаемый по его окончании сертификат свидетельствовал лишь о том, что изучены основы вероучения. То, что человек овладел ими творчески и способен их развивать, доказывалось иначе – через практическую реализацию учения в процессе созерцательной практики, нередко в многолетнем затворе, и демонстрацию явных признаков этой реализации (тиб. *dngos sgrub*). Так что ближайшими ассоциациями к слову "реформатор" у образованного буддиста того времени были такие имена, как Цзонхава, Атиша, Падмасамбхава. Современнику обосновать свое присутствие в этом ряду было трудно. Обновленцы-миряне имели авторитет среди духовенства более как светские лидеры бурятского народа, тесно связанные с властными структурами и сами занимавшие в разное время государственные посты, так что возможность легитимного вхождения в органы церковного управления на равных духовенством давало им, без-

[1] Э.-Д. Ринчино стал председателем Центранацкома бурят в 29 лет, Ц. Жамсарано в 26 возглавил союз «Знамя бурятского народа», Б. Барадин стал видным идеологом обновленческого движения в 27.

условно, большие возможности влияния на религиозную политику церкви.

Провести заявленную в проекте реорганизацию церковного управления в полном объеме, однако, не удалось. За приходским собранием, формируемым из представителей духовенства и мирян, оставили функцию выбора дацанского совета и контроля за его деятельностью, однако в самом общем виде. Пункт же о подчинении дацанской общины приходскому собранию из «Положения» был изъят.

Кроме «Положения», на соборе обсуждался «Устав внутренней жизни монашествующих в буддийских хидах Сибири», в котором регламентировался внутримонастырский быт. Одним из предложений проекта (опубликованного в том же номере «Шэнэ Байдал» от 2 октября 1922 года) было: "Установить порядок содержания и хранения имущества хидской коммуны с таким расчетом, чтобы установленный порядок не противостоял интересам трудовых масс и государственной политике, а также установить точный порядок прихода и расхода. Необходимо также установить, чтобы все имущество хидской коммуны считалось общественной собственностью бурят-монгольского народа."

Надо сказать, что отступления от правил винаи в монашеском быту бурятского духовенства критиковались в первой трети прошлого века не только представителями обновленцев, но и их оппонентами – и последователями Л. Цыденова, и даже некоторыми "традиционалистами–консерваторами." По-видимому, сложившийся быт бурятских монастырей действительно во многом служил тормозом для нормального развития религиозной жизни.

Некоторые положения цитированных выше текстов отражают озабоченность имеющими место нарушениями винаи, в частности владением на правах собственности личным имуществом сверх установленных в уставе и нарушением порядка распределения поступающих доходов. Однако трактовка этих вопросов является одним из самых сложных разделов винаи и содержит массу весьма тонких моментов, относящихся, в частности, к определению различий между владением имуществом как личной собственностью и личным пользованием имуществом, принадлежащим общине и т.п. Предлагаемый же в про-

екте путь решения имущественных вопросов весьма прост и, по существу, состоит в следующем: 1) вся личная собственность духовенства обобществляется и передается дацанской коммуне, 2) вся собственность коммуны объявляется собственностью народа. Эта программа весьма далека от винаи, в которой разработана весьма сложная система сбора и распределения жертвуемых общине средств, тщательно оговорены вопросы пользования общинным имуществом и безусловно порицается как тяжкий грех присвоение мирянами ("народом") имущества общины. Проект напоминает скорее устав колхозной артели, составленный для целей последующей конфискации артельного имущества. Собственно говоря, принятие такого устава, который бы дал *carte blanche* власти на конфискацию церковного имущества, как задача съезда, и не скрывалась его организаторами. Встретив упорное сопротивление духовенства перспективе не только обобществления имущества, но и фактической передаче его под контроль советской власти, А. Доржиев напомнил Собору о трагической судьбе архиереев православной церкви, противившихся изъятию церковных ценностей государством. В результате бурных дебатов положение о немедленном изъятии собственности было заменено общей формулировкой, что, тем не менее, давало достаточные возможности для конфискационной практики государства.

Совершенно очевидно, что обновленцы шли на крупный компромисс в надежде на устойчивые отношения с советской властью, рассчитывая сохранить контроль над ситуацией. Однако, как теперь становится известным из ставших доступными в последние годы архивных документов, вся кампания по обновлению церкви была задумана властью как крупная провокация, целью которой было вызвать раскол в ламской среде, ослабить влияние церкви в народе и, в конечном счете, покончить с ней вообще, безотносительно к ее политической лояльности.

Хорошие контакты А. Доржиева с советской властью в первые годы после революции были вызваны в первую очередь геополитическими интересами России в Тибете, и той ролью, которую Доржиев мог бы сыграть в реализации планов власти, учитывая его связи с тибетским правительством и лично Далай Ламой. К 30-м годам геополитические амбиции были отложены, и с А. Доржиевым постепенно перестают считаться. Его

обращения в советские органы с протестами против притеснений, все более усиливающимися, остаются без последствий.

Другим, доктринальным направлением реформирования буддизма было стремление «очистить» его от имевших место, по мнению обновленцев, позднейших наслоений и вернуться к некоему "изначальному" буддизму, "буддизму Шакьямуни," как его называли в западных обновленческих кругах. Этот буддизм представлялся как философско-этическое учение, атеистическое по сути и лишенное какой-либо обрядовой составляющей.

Идея эта была заимствована университетски образованной частью обновленчества из западной буддологической и околобуддийской (теософской) литературы. Кроме того, она хорошо корреспондировалась с теоретическими взглядами четы Рерихов, довольно тесно сотрудничавших с обновленцами (например, Елена Рерих написала работу «Основы буддизма», которая позиционировалась обновленцами как изложение буддизма с новых позиций). Рерихи считали, что в новой наступающей эре, "Эре Водолея", основой универсальной религии будет именно этика, а медитативные практики, столь характерные для буддизма, потеряют свое значение. Это учение получило наименование "живой этики."

Подобная интерпретация буддизма, существенно упрощавшая его, изымала из его багажа не только развитые системы психотренинга, но и богатое философское наследие, сохраненное тибетским буддизмом и во всей полноте воспроизведенное в Бурятии, и сводила всю буддийскую философию к ее редуцированным формам, содержавшимся в палийском каноне. Это направление деятельности обновленцев практически не дало плодов. Ламы старшего поколения, заставшие обновленческую реформу, с которыми мы беседовали на эту тему, говорили, что ламство не было знакомо с интерпретациями философии буддизма, предлагавшимися обновленцами, и "следовало мадхьямике-прасангике, согласно учению Цзонхавы."[2]

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[2] По сообщению Балбар-Багши. Это единственный ныне живущий лама "старого" поколения. Он еще юношей эмигрировал вместе с большой группой лам Цугольского дацана в Китай, дабы избежать "обновления," и завершил классическое образование в Тибете.

Существенно иной подход к реформированию буддизма был продемонстрирован Л. Цыденовым и его последователями. Лубсан-Сандан Цыденов родился в 1851 году в местности Шана, в 2–3 километрах от с. Кижинга в семье ламы Балтуева Цыдена. Как и большинство мальчиков, Сандана отдали в хувараки в Кижингинский дацан в 6–7 лет, где он получает хорошее начальное монастырское образование. Обучение на философском факультете он продолжил в Тамчинском (Гусиноозерском) дацане, где получает степень гэбши. Вернувшись в Кижингинский дацан, он продолжил образование и вскоре получил степень габжи, одновременно занимаясь изучением тантры. О его авторитете среди буддистов говорит то, что он вошел в состав возглавляемой хамбо-ламой Чойнзоном Иролтуевым делегации буддийского духовенства, командированной в Санкт-Петербург в 1894 г. для участия в торжествах по случаю коронации Николая II. Он был включен на случай возможного в Санкт-Петербурге диспута с учеными-востоковедами. В этот период с ним встречался профессор А. Позднеев, который, интересуясь его идеями, считал его реформатором современного буддизма, "поддерживающим мистическое направление на основе критики желтошапочников и преследующим цели воссоздания классического индийского (первоначального) буддизма" [Архив Совета по делам религии..., 31].

Задачей, которая ставилась Лубсан Санданом, было не создание модели буддизма, которая могла бы консолидировать нацию и сохранить ее перед лицом инокультурной экспансии, но обеспечение трансляции буддийской традиции в западную культуру. Эта задача – передача традиции в иную культуру – для буддизма не нова и с успехом решалась им ранее, при распространении его в Китае, странах Юго-Восточной Азии, Тибете (если говорить о его наиболее крупных адаптированных формах). Как таковая, задача распространения буддизма на Запад впервые оформилась, по-видимому, именно в России. Россия находилась в уникальном положении – она была единственной страной с доминированием западной культуры, в границах которой в течение столетий был представлен буддизм в его традиционной форме.

Высокая адаптивность буддизма к новым культурам обусловлена тем обстоятельством, что в этой религиозной традиции критерием адекватной трансляции является не воспроизводс-

тво ее знаковой формы или, тем более, не ее институциональных особенностей, но возможность воспроизводства состояния сознания, определенного как "просветление," основной характеристикой которого является как раз "беззнаковость." Идеальная форма его выражения – молчание (в речи), или чистый лист бумаги (в письме).

Наполненность этого молчания словами определяется особенностями реципиента, но не выражаемой истины, и в этом случае предпочтительны слова (в широком смысле) той культуры, в которой проповедь звучит. Это объясняет относительную легкость, с которой буддизм выражал себя в новых культурах, создавая свои ярко национальные формы, и сохраняя, в то же время, собственную идентичность.[3]

Исходя из сказанного, для успеха в передаче традиции необходимо, во первых, обеспечить непрерывность в передаче просветленного состояния сознания, которое достигается практикой длительной медитации, во вторых, актуализировать внутри традиции максимально широкое пространство знакового выражения доктрины с тем, чтобы облегчить поиск референтных для новой культуры способов ее выражения.

Л.-С. Цыденовым была предпринята мобилизация теоретических и методических ресурсов тибетского буддизма с тем, чтобы избежать узости в интерпретации доктрины, обусловленной рамками школы гелук. Каждая из школ тибетского буддизма предлагает собственную редакцию учения, форма его изложения в них складывалась веками, адаптируясь к социокультурным, политическим и экономическим реалиям, в которых существовали эти школы. К концу 18-го в. территориальные и административные сферы влияния этих школ окончательно определились и они стали развиваться, все более изолируясь друг от друга. Негативным последствием этого изоляционизма стало то, что полемика по теоретическим вопросам между школами практически сошла на нет, а схоластический элемент в догматике существенно вырос, что привело к определенной

[3] В этом его кардинальное отличие от, например, ислама, в котором вербальная форма выражения истины незыблема. Книга (с большой буквы) в нем предвечна и ни одна буква в ней не может быть изменена. Так что доминирующей формой взаимодействия ислама и другими культурами являлось их разрушение.

узости в подготовке учеников и снижению творческого потенциала школ в целом. Это хорошо понималось ведущими представителями школ. Как реакция на это в XIX в. в Тибете возникло "внешкольное" течение *римэ*.

Л.-С. Цыденов развил подобный подход в Бурятии. В отличие от обновленцев, стремившихся свести содержание буддизма к некому философско-этическому ядру, адаптированному для восприятия широкими слоями верующих, что неизбежно приводило к некоторой поверхностности, он поставил задачей максимально задействовать теоретический и практический потенциал тибетского буддизма. Им было собрано наследие не только гелукпы, но и других основных школ: нингмапы, кагьюпы, шижедпы и сакьяпы. Школа нингмапа практиковалась в Бурятии мало, но в соседней Туве эта традиция была довольно широко представлена. Теоретической основой этой практики является учение дзогчен. Его оформление в Тибете было осуществлено известным философом и йогином Лонченпой (Нацог-Рандолом), оставившим многотомное собрание сочинений. Его итоговую работу «Карнатантра великого учения называемая "Зерцало механизма глубокого содержания"», объединившую учения дзогчена и махамудры, ученик и сподвижник *Л*. С. Цыденова Агван Силнам Доржи (*Д*. Бадмаев) перевел на бурятский язык. В круг практики было также введено учение махамудры традиций кагью и шижед. Кагьюпа до установления гелукпы как доминирующей школы была довольно широко распространена в Монголии, а основная практика шижедпы (чод) представлена в Монголии и Бурятии и в настоящее время. Однако традицию учения тантры Жедорже (Хеваджра), принадлежащую к классу ануттаратантр и являющуюся основной в школе сакьяпа, в то время было невозможно получить в Бурятии. Это объясняется тем, что Хеваджра-тантра как правило не передавалась в традиции гелук. Те редкие гелукпинцы, которые ей занимались, обычно получали посвящение в эту систему от сакьясских учителей, но крайне редко передавали ее в своей традиции, почему до Бурятии оно и не дошло. Такое положение вещей в особенности было характерно для центрального Тибета, но на периферии гелукпинского мира, например, в Китае, этому правилу следовали не так строго. Агван Силнам был послан в Пекин и получил традицию Жедорже от пекин-

ского Чжанчжа-хутухты, вместе с библиотекой литературы по этой системе. Это собрание книг вплоть до 80-х годов XX в., когда учение школы сакья стало более доступно в России через посредство тибетских учителей, было единственной доступной литературой по Хеваджра-тантре в нашей стране. Посвящение в эту систему было передано Агван Силнамом Л. С. Цыденову и небольшому кругу ближайших учеников, что стало началом ее распространения в России. Таким образом, Л. С. Цыденовым и его последователями были собраны все "сливки" учения тибетского буддизма, что позволило включить в практику наиболее эффективные методы различных традиции без "школьных" ограничений.

В области практической реализации учения Л. С. Цыденовым акцентировалась необходимость интенсивной и продолжительной йогической практики в уединении. Именно это, а не организация монашеского быта в соответствии с кодексом винаи, что имело место у "обновленцев," считалось в его традиции приоритетным.

После приезда из Санкт-Петербурга Сандан-лама решает уйти из монастыря и погрузиться в медитативную практику вдали от мирской суеты. В 1908 году его избрали настоятелем Кижингинского дацана, но поскольку он не захотел выходить из затвора, от его имени почти до конца 1915 года обязанности настоятеля исполнял Цыремпилов Гэнин (Тыхэйн-лама). Л. С. Цыденова не удовлетворял образ жизни современных дацанов, так как в них много времени уделялось административно-хозяйственной деятельности и ежедневной ритуальной службе но порой совсем мало медитативной практике. В Бурятии, в отличие от Тибета, не получили распространения монастыри отшельнического типа.

Л. С. Цыденов со своим ближайшим учеником Агван-Силнамом вышли из Кижингинского дацана и вместе с своими сторонниками поселились в тайге на склоне Кудунского хребта. Лубсан Сандан стремился вернуть практическому буддизму строгость правил и интенсивность духовной практики времен индийских йогинов-махасиддхов. В жизни своей сангхи Л. С. Цыденов возродил принципы непосредственного ведения учителем ученика. Он считал, что в меняющихся условиях жизни, в наступающем XX веке, монастырская форма учения будет нежизнеспособной, и перешел к нетрадиционным, с точки зрения доминирующей в

Бурятии школы гелугпа, видам практики (на самом деле соответствующим более ранним периодам буддийской традиции) и установил внешкольные правила устройства сангхи, которые могли бы помочь устоять учению в будущем. В созерцательной практике в затворе, в окружении своих учеников, Лубсан Сандан Цыденов провел более двадцати лет. Затвор был нарушен по причине начавшейся гражданской войны. В конце августа 1918 года власть в Забайкалье захватил атаман Семенов, ранее бывший представителем Временного правительства.

Таким образом, Л. С. Цыденовым был установлен институт монастырей "отшельнического" типа, отсутствовавший ранее в бурятском буддизме. Кроме того, значительное число его последователей, выйдя из дацанов, занимались практикой ваджраяны "в миру," что позволило в дальнейшем, в период разгрома монастырской системы, сохранить не только учение, но и систему его практической реализации. Традиция Л. С. Цыденова была воспринята и развита в необуддизме Б. Д. Дандарона.

В отношении светской власти Лубсан Сандан занял позицию максимальной дистанцированности, вплоть до провозглашения государственной независимости территорий, которые считали себя находящимися под его духовной опекой. Этот шаг был спровоцирован попытками призывов бурят в армию, которые старались провести каждая из противоборствующих сторон.

В феврале 1919 г. Л. С. Цыденову была направлена письменная просьба, (составленная представителями «Кижингинского кредитного товарищества») «о принятии населения под свое покровительство и защиту». В мае 1919 года было проведено Учредительное собрание, на котором было объявлено о создании теократического государства, его "ханом-ламой" был объявлен Сандан Цыденов; также были избраны должностные лица. В постановлении Учредительного собрания говорилось: "В силу данным нам прав свободы мы постановили оставить власть управления народной думы, аймачных управ, хошунов и сомонов, действия которых направлены в особенности к военной цели, совершенно противной и притеснительной для нашего религиозного и гражданского сознания и войти во власть всемогущего Дарма-Ранзын-хана" [НАРБ, Р-1746, оп. 1, № 27, л. 37].

Теократы отказались подчиняться Бурнардуме, было объявлено о ликвидации сомонных и хошунных управлений. Учредительное

собрание постановило именовать впредь сомоны "тосхонами", а хошуны – "балагадами." Отсюда это движение нередко называют "балагатским движением." В теократическое государство вошли одиннадцать балагатских обществ: Кодунское, Челсанайское, Кижинга-гольское, Улан-Бургасанское, Цаганнорское, Сарантуевское, Ород-гольское, Могсохонское, Чесано-гольское, Ехэ-Булакское, Кульхисонское. В целом территория государства занимала долины Чесана, Кодуна, Кижинги, часть территорий нынешних Хоринского и Еравнинского районов. Характерной особенностью этого государства было полное отсутствие каких-либо полицейских и военных сил. Местонахождение кельи Сандана Цыденова было объявлено столицей теократического государства под названием "Соемп-кус."

Лидеры Бурнардумы, не сумев ликвидировать теократическое движение мирным путем, сделали это руками атамана Семенова, направившего отряд казаков во главе с начальником Верхнеудинского гарнизона полковником Коровин-Пиотровским в ставку теократов. Л. С. Цыденов и должностные лица были арестованы и отправлены в верхнеудинскую тюрьму.[4]

Как справедливо отмечает Э. Ч. Дарибазарон, "факты свидетельствуют, что теократическое движение, преследуя благородную цель – защиту народа, спасло много жизней и сумело защитить население, хотя и временно, от насилия грабежей. Это движение продолжалось и после падения режима Семенова, при Советах, вплоть до 1926 года. Оно то утихало, то усиливалось. Оно защищало население от террора, сначала от белого, затем от красного" [Дарибазарон Э. Ч. 1998, 100–101].

Временный характер теократического государства хорошо понимался его лидерами, однако его существование, пусть на относительно короткий срок, спасло его "подданных" от втягивания в междоусобную братоубийственную войну. Кроме того (и это, может

[4] Последний раз, 20 января 1922 года, Сандан Цыденов был арестован уже представителями советской власти. В ордере на его арест говорилось, что Сандан Цыденов проживает в местности Суархэ Хоринского аймака и материалами следствия изобличен как глава и руководитель теократического государства. Его обвинили в ведении контрреволюционной, антисоветской пропаганды. Четыре месяца содержали его в Верхнеудинской тюрьме, затем через Иркутск переправили в Новониколаевскую (Новосибирскую) тюрьму.

быть, не менее важно), его создание, освященное авторитетом Лубсан Сандана, имело знаковый характер. Оно задало в сознании его приверженцев норму отношения к неправедной власти – не соучаствовать в ее делах, и это давало силы к духовному сопротивлению в последующие годы. Думается, не случайно именно в тех районах Бурятии, которые были охвачены этим движением, буддизм стал возрождаться раньше и интенсивнее.

Каждый из рассмотренных здесь проектов российского необуддизма имел свои резоны, своих приверженцев и история обоих еще не закончена – они имеют свое продолжение (идейное и организационное) в современных буддийских общинах. Оценивая их влияние на последующие процессы возрождения буддизма после его почти полного разгрома в конце тридцатых годов, можно отметить, что идеи А. Доржиева в большой степени определили характер организации монастырской жизни в послевоенные годы, после образования Центрального духовного управления буддистов (ЦДУБ). Устав этой организации во многих чертах следовал положениям, выдвигавшимся А. Доржиевым. Опыт последователей Л. С. Цыденова по организации общины созерцателей оказался востребованным в практике Дхарма-центров, организующих свою деятельность вокруг тантрийского Учителя. Первая такая община в России в послевоенные годы образовалась именно вокруг ученика Л. С. Цыденова – Б. Д. Дандарона.

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About Two Directions of the Development of the Renewal Movement of Russian Buddhism

Sergey Nesterkin

Abstract

In the early 20th century, part of the Buddhist Sangha began a process of revising its form of organization as well as its theoretical and practical heritage. Two fundamentally different movements existed in that sphere. They had different tasks and quite different approaches to solving those tasks. On the one hand, the activities of such Buryat enlightenment scholars as B. Baradin, Ts. Jamsarano, as well as representatives of the clergy such as A. Dorjiev, Ch. Iroltuyev, Ganjurova-Gegen, were part of the renewal processes in Buddhism that took place in many countries where it was spread. The renewal process was a reaction against the ideological and economic expansion of the colonialist countries, and was designed to develop the ideological basis for the preservation of the national identity of the colonized nations. On the other hand, Lubsan Sandan Tsydenov and his followers had quite a different task: to reform Buddhism in order to enable it to develop in a new social and cultural environment – in the Western culture of Russia. Their task was not so much to preserve national identity as to develop

the Buddhist tradition in a new cultural environment, which also indirectly solved the question of identity.

A History of Buddhist Translations into Western Languages (up to the beginning of the 19th century)

Ricardo Sasaki

> The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an idling engine, not when it is doing work.
>
> *Ludwig Wittgenstein*

India has many languages, reflecting its own cultural diversity. Despite the fact that Sanskrit is the most widely known of these, many others are largely used for literary transference from the world of ideas to the medium of writing. Pāli is one of these languages, which is especially connected with the transmission of what the followers of the Buddha – the central spiritual personality of India in the sixth century BCE – thought, lived and wished to preserve of their experiences. Though history has recorded contacts between India and the Western world – Greece, Rome and Egypt – for centuries (Plinius in 1 CE already complained about the amount of gold being spent on imports from India), it was only in the last 150 years that problems with the translation of texts from India came to be an important matter of concern in the West.

The Pāli Language

Pali belongs to what modern philology refers to as the Middle Indo-Aryan group, a collection of languages known in Indian tradition as Prakrit (*prākṛt*). The Prakrit languages were used by the population of North India from approximately 500 BCE to 500 CE and are supposed to have come from a common ancestor of Sanskrit, which existed in around the second millennium BCE. The most ancient

survivor is the Vedic or Vedic Sanskrit, the language in which the holy scriptures of the Hindus, the *Vedas*, was written. Later, the great grammarian Pāṇini (4th century BCE) wrote the basis of the correct way of speaking and writing Sanskrit to be used by all educated people. As described by Pāṇini, this is known as Classic Sanskrit, the medium in which some of the most important literary works (*kāvya*) were written. An irregular form of this, known as Epic Sanskrit, was used to convey some of the great epics, such as the renowned *Mahābhārata*.

Meanwhile, the language of the general population has diverged from the mainly educated (*brāhmaṇical*) Sanskrit that existed before the 9th century BCE, spreading into a variety of languages that developed until our days. Warder (1989: 3) recognizes that by the 2nd millennium there were three main dialects: "Vedic in the North-West, the predecessor of Sanskrit in the centre, and the ancestor of Māgadhī in the East." Māgadhī was a form of Prakrit predominant in the kingdom of Magadha, one of the largest and most influential empires of India from the 5th to the 2nd centuries BCE, roughly equivalent in area to what is today Bihar State. Almost nothing survived of the Māgadhī language, but Buddhists in Sri Lanka traditionally believe that the Buddha most certainly spoke in Māgadhī, and that the Pāli texts that are now extant are, in truth, the original Māgadhī. Pāli, in fact, simply means "text", and is an abbreviation of *pāli-bhāsa*, i.e., the "language (*bhāsa*) of the texts (*pāli*)." These were transmitted to the people of Sri Lanka by monks coming from North India, so they were called the "language of the texts." The Theravāda School, the Order of monks responsible for this transmission, believes that Canonical scriptures were in Paiśācī, a form of Prakrit, so it infers that Pāli is Paiśācī, and this is a form of Māgadhī, taken in a broad sense as the language spoken in the entire region. Warder (p. 5) argues that "since according to the grammatical writers there were eleven different varieties of 'Paiśācī,' Pāli may well be one of these."

The Communication of Buddhist Texts

Pāli is only one of the languages used by Buddhists to communicate their scriptures. Throughout the centuries, Buddhist scholars have

striven to achieve a standard of precision and comprehensiveness in their translations of the ideas inherited from the Buddha to the next generation, in the hope that a religious and metaphysical doctrine they had confidence in might be translated faithfully to coming generations. In doing so, they made an immense to the establishment of a bridge between East and West, fostering the spread of culture, science and art, as recommended by article 6 of the bylaws of FIT (International Federation of Translators), which read: it is its responsibility to "assist in the spread of culture throughout the world" (Deslile & Woodsworth 1995: xiii).

The setting up of guiding principles for the communication of the Buddhist message began with the Buddha himself, the Indian sage who claimed to have found the Truth in the sixth century BCE. After the conversion of his first sixty disciples, the Buddha said:

> "Go forth, O Bhikkhus, for the good of the many, for the happiness of the many, out of compassion for the world, for the good, benefit, and happiness of gods and men. Let not two go by one way. Preach, O Bhikkhus, the Dhamma, excellent in the beginning, excellent in the middle, excellent in the end, both in the spirit and in the letter. Proclaim the holy life, altogether perfect and pure. There are beings with little dust in their eyes, who, on hearing the Dhamma, will fall away. There will be those who understand the Dhamma. I, too, O Bhikkhus, will go to Uruvela in Senānigāma, in order to preach the Dhamma. Hoist the flag to the Sage. Preach the sublime Dhamma. Work for the good of others, you who have done your duties." (*Nārada*, n/d: 61)

In opposition to the Hindu-Brāhmaṇa tradition that postulated strictness in maintaining Sanskrit as the language to be used in transmitting the sacred texts, the Buddha himself has urged his disciples to transmit the Dhamma in the local language of the people:

> "Two monks of fine cultivated language and fine eloquent speech came to the Buddha and said: 'Lord, here monks of various names, clan-names, races [or castes] and families are corrupting the Buddha's words by repeating them in their own dialects. Let us put them into Vedic (*chandaso aropema*).' The Lord rebuked them: 'Deluded men! How can you say this? This will not lead to the conversion of the unconverted'... And he delivered a sermon and commanded all the monks: 'You are not to put the Buddha's words into Vedic. Whosoever does so shall

> be guilty of an offence. I authorise you, monks, to learn the Buddha's words each in his own dialect (*sakkāya niruttyā*).'" (Edgerton 1954: 5)

Those sayings opened the doors to missionary work that involved thousands of translators working in tens of different countries throughout history, making them, as Alexander Pushkin rightly said, "the mailman of human civilization." Communication of the teaching (called *Dhamma* in the Pāli language) spread in the many vernaculars throughout ancient India – Pāli and Hybrid Sanskrit being the best known of these that survived in written form – finally crossing the borders of its motherland. The oral teachings transmitted mainly by the Sarvāstivāda, Mahāsāṃghika and Sautrāntika Schools were translated into Central Asian languages[1], which were in turn gradually translated into Chinese by some of the most eminent translators of Asian history, for instance Kumārajīva, Faxian and Xuanzang. Those books were translated from Chinese into Korean, Japanese, Vietnamese and other minor languages. On the other hand, and parallel to this transmission, the oral teaching transmitted by the Theravāda, originally in the Māgadhī dialect, arrived in Sri Lanka and began to be transmitted in Singhalese. Centuries later (in around the 5th century CE), the great scholar and linguist Buddhaghosa (Law 1976) once again translated all of the scriptures and commentaries that accompany them, not into Māgadhī, but to the close dialect called Pāli, and they have been transmitted in this language since them, and were later translated into Thai, Burmese, Cambodian and Lao.

Communication of the texts in the West

European knowledge of Buddhism dates back to at least the 4th century BCE, when Alexander tried to invade India in 326–323 BCE (Reese 1914). Megasthenes visited Pātaliputra as the Emperor's envoy in 300 BCE (Timmer 1930), and though his writings have not been preserved, they survived in the works of many Greek and Latin authors that quote them. Dion Chrysostomos (deceased in 117 CE) mentions that his audience included Bactrians, Scythians and some Indians (*Ad Alexandrinos* 32, 40). In 200 CE, Clement

[1] Like Uighur, Khotanese, Tokharian and Kuchean (Cf. Mizuno 1982: 42)

of Alexandria mentions in his *Stromateis* the Indians that follow the precepts of the Boutta and revere him like a god (*Strom.* I. 15.71. Quoted in Timmer 1930, 84–6). Eusebius (*H. Eccl.* 5,10) who lived between 263 and 339, says that the master of Clement, Pantainos, has traveled to India.

J. Filliozat (Les Échanges de l'Inde et d'Empire Romain aux Premiers Siècles de l'Ère Chrétienne. – *Revue Historique*, 201, 1949, 1–29) quote many contacts between Sri Lanka and South India with Alexandria and Rome in the first centuries of the Christian Era. Henri de Lubac (1952: 13–16) and the *Critical Pali Dictionary* (vol. I. Copenhagen: 1924–48) believed that Alexandria was mentioned in the Pāli texts. The city of *Alasandra* appears four times in the *Milindapañha*, twice in the *Mahāniddesa* and once in the *Mahāvaṃsa* (XXIX.39)

Hieronymus (+/– 347–419) in *Hier.Adv.Iov.* I,42, says that the Buddha would have been born from one of the sides of a virgin: "*Traditur quod Buddham, principem dogmatis eorum e latere suo virgo genêrârit.*"

Perhaps the first entrance of more substantial Buddhist material in Europe was due to a misunderstanding that made the story of the life of the Buddha become transmitted (in the 11th century) as the story of two Christian Saints who lived in India (Lang 1957). By the 11th century it had become in Europe a story of the Buddha in the form of the legend of Barlaam and Josaphat, two supposed Christian Saints born in India. It was only in the last century that we came to know that this was a story made up from the legend of the Buddha. Josaphat (derived from Bodhisatta or Bodhisattva – the word used to refer to Siddhattha Gotama before he became the Buddha) was the son of an Indian king, who in order to avoid his son being converted to Christianity, kept him tied to his quarters. Josaphat was able, nonetheless, to run away from the palace and meet the ascetic Barlaam (who was probably from Bhagavant, an epithet of the Buddha), becoming a Christian and abandoning the real throne. *The Penguin Dictionary of Saints* (1965: 58) states that the Greek version of this legend is attributed to St. John of Damascus, though it has been questioned and probably the original, later translated into many European languages, was an Arabic version. There are versions of the legend of Barlaam and Josaphat in Greek, Latin, French, German, Italian, Provençal, Romanian, Dutch and

Scandinavian, having circulated throughout Europe. The first to notice the similarities between them was an unknown editor of Marco Polo's work. A Portuguese writer, Diogo de Couto, also noted the similarities in 1612 (Lang 1957; his book contains a translation of the legend). The first version of Barlaam and Josaphat, as stated above, was probably written in the 9th or 10th century, adapted from an Arabic text. It is believed that a *Book of the Buddha*, a *Book of Balauhar and Budhasaf* and a *Book of Budhasaf by Himself*, were translated from Pehlevi to Arabic around the end of the 8th century, and in 1888 the Arabic text was published in Bombay and translated into Russian by V. R. Rosen (*Повести о Барламе и Йосафе*. Москва-Ленинград, 1947). Lang attributed the story to the Manichaeans of Central Asia. The Georgian (Christian) version of the legend was translated into Greek in around 1000, and from Greek into Latin in 1048. The Georgian manuscripts were only recently discovered. We cannot, however, consider it to be the first story of the Buddha, as the Europeans by then believed it was Christian.

In the 13th century, Pope Innocent IV sent Franciscans and Dominicans to meet with the Khan of the Mongols, and in 1254 the Franciscan Father Willem van Ruysbroeck from Flanders, spent six months in Karakorum (*Itinerarium*, Sinica Franciscana, I, 230).

Marco Polo (who was in China between 1275 and 1291) and many Christian missionaries brought sparse information about Buddhism; it was, however, crowded with fantasies and exoticism that only helped to form the idea of the "mysterious and fantastic East" in the Western mind.

The Pope Nicholas IV had sent the Father John de Monte Corvino (1247–1328) to the Mongols, with whom he lived for many years (1294–1307). In the same year, the Franciscan Father Odoric de Pordenone was sent to Peking. The last contact with the Khan was made in 1339, when John Marignolli was sent by the Pope Benedict XII (Rachewittz 1971).

Vasco da Gama arrived in India in 1497–8 and opened new contacts with the East that would last throughout the following centuries. Many missionaries were sent to China, Japan, Sri Lanka, Siam (Thailand) and Indochina during the 16th and 17th centuries, for instance the Portuguese Jesuit Antonio de Andrade (1580–1634), who was the first missionary in Tibet. He arrived there in 1624 and two years later, in Lisbon, a description of his trip was published,

called the *Novo Descobrimento do gram Cathayo ou Reinos de Tibet pello Padre Antonio de Andrade da Campanhia de Jesu, Portuguez, no anno de 1626* (Pereira 1921). Due to their uncivilized methods of dealing with local cultures, the missionaries did not, however, have any success in Tibet, and were soon sent away in the following years.

It was not until 1691 that the first Buddhist text appeared in translation, and this was done by Simon De La Loubère. In 1687 he was sent by Louis XIV to Siam (present Thailand) on the third French mission, and there, due to his collection of data, he proposed the hypothesis that the Chinese had imported their religion from the people of Siam, who in turn had imported it from Sri Lanka. In a letter to the king, Simon de la Loubère said, based on a book written in Bali (i.e., Pāli), that the people of Siam worshipped a "Sommona-Codom" (i. e., Samana Gotama). In 1691 he published a *Description du Royame de Siam*, in which he gives a version of the life of a cousin of the Buddha, Devadatta (*La Vie de Thevedat, Le Frère de Sommona-Codom, Traduit du Bali*) and a translation of fragments of the monastic code of discipline (the *Pātimokkha*). Soon thereafter, in 1697 the Jesuit Louis de Comte wrote: "All the Indies have been poisoned with his pernicious doctrine."

In the 18th century new missions were launched by Christians in Tibet. Francesco Orazio Della Penna (1680–1745) lived in Tibet between 1716 and 1732, learning Tibetan and compiling a dictionary of 35,000 words. He also translated Tibetan works, among them the *Lam rim chen mo* by Tsongkhapa and the *Prātimokṣasūtra*. The Jesuit Ippolito Desideri (1684–1733) also stayed in Tibet for five years (1716–1721), studying at monasteries, learning Tibetan and making translations, thereby reaching a remarkable understanding of Tibetan religion (Petech 1952–53).

In 1776 the first Pāli text was published in Europe after the extracts of Simon De La Loubère, the *Kammavācā*, a manual for the ordination of monks, translated by Father Maria Percoto and kept at the *Library of the Propagation of the Faith*. In 1802 it was transferred to the Vatican Library.

The Father Vicente Sangermano (1758–1819) also made some Latin translations of Burmese texts published in English by Francis Buchanan-Hamilton (1762–1829) in the *Asiatik Researches* of 1799 under the title of *On the Religion and Literature of the Burmans*. In his introduction, Buchanan-Hamilton writes: "Annihilation is a very

inaccurate term. Nieban implies being exempted from all of the miseries incident to humanity, but by no means annihilation." How good it would have been if later Western writers on Buddhism had read this article before defining Nirvāṇa as the extinction of the individual.

In 1788 William Chambers wrote to the *Asiatik Researches*, based in the data collected by De La Loubére and Robert Knox (in his book *An Historical Relation of Ceylone* of 1681), that the Ceylonese had a great idol called "Buddhou" that could likely be the same "Sommona-Codom" of the Siamese. Chambers also reveals for the first time the linguistic similarities between Pāli and Sanskrit.

Thirteen years later, in 1801, M. Joinville would say: "It has been justly observed that the Samonocodum of the people of Siam is the same as the Boudhou of the Singhalese", and in the same years Mahony added: "Gautemeh Bhoodha is acknowledged by the Singhalais, to be the same holy character referred to by the Siamese as Sommonokodom and Bootisat."

Those conclusions will be repeated in the 1802 edition of the *English Encyclopedia*, the 1810 and 1817 editions of the *Britannic Encyclopaedia* and the 1829 edition of the *London Encyclopaedia*. Under the heading BUDUN one reads: "One of the Ceylonese gods, who is fabled to have arrived at supremacy after successive transmigrations from the lowest state of an insect, through the various species of living animals. There are three deities of this name, each of whom is said to reign till a bird shall have removed a hill of sand half a mile high and six miles round, by carrying off a single grain once in 1,000 years." 'How confusing!,' we may say, looking at this almost two centuries later.

In 1815 Abel Rémusat (1788–1832), becomes the first Chinese professor at the Collège de France, translating the *Fo-kuo-chi* (*Foguoji*) by Fa-hsien (Faxian) (published in 1836). Stanislas Julien (1797–1873), his successor, would translate the life of Hsüan-tsang (Xuanzang) in 1853 and his *His-yü-chi* (*Xiyuji*) in 1858. The first book on Buddhism to appear in Europe, *Recherches sur Buddhou* by Michel Jean François Ozeray, is published in Paris in 1817.

Interest in the Pāli language and the Buddhist texts has only grown since then, attracting a number of gifted scholars in the difficult and innovative task of translating Eastern texts into European languages. As one of these translators has said: "The pitfalls that

await anyone translating from another European language into his own native English are familiar enough: there is no need for him to fall into them. But when he ventures upon rendering an Oriental language, he will often have to be his own guide." (Ñāṇamoli in Buddhaghosa 1979: xxxii)

One very influential man in the early history of Buddhism in the West was German philosopher Arthur Schopenhaeur (1788–1860). The first mention in his work appears in *The World as Will and Representation* of 1819, some of whose ideas may have come from Indian sources extant in German. In 1844 he had already read many books and would write in the 2nd edition: "If I wished to take the results of my philosophy as the standard of truth, I should have to concede to Buddhism pre-eminence over the others. In any case, it must be a pleasure to me to see my doctrine in such close agreement with a religion that the majority of men on earth hold as their own, for this numbers far more followers than any other. And this agreement must be yet the more pleasing to me, inasmuch as in my philosophizing I have certainly not been under its influence."

In around 1820, Europeans were beginning to realize that the religion that had been started by the Buddha dominated all of Indochina, Sri Lanka, China, Siberia and Japan, in addition to many islands in the Indian archipelago, and many became afraid with its possible number of adherents and its possible threat to Christianity. A fantastic conception of Buddhism begins with the search for discovering what really was the religion named "Buddhism." The first English Orientalists in India did little to help towards better knowledge of B. Due to their exclusive contact with Hindu "experts" and their preconceptions towards Buddhism, they created a false image for the Western public. It is noteworthy that Buddhism had already been free of the Indian philosophical scenery for over 700 years.

By this time, many fantasies appeared in the West. William Jones was the first academic in the English-speaking world to divulge the possible connection between Buddhism and Egypt. His thesis, based on an "analysis" of the Ethiopian characteristics of Buddhist iconography, was that Buddhism was a heresy that arrived in India from Egypt. In 1820 and 1830 many articles appeared that suggesting the African origin of Buddhism, while at the same time many started postulating its origin among the Tartars. In this way, Horace

Wilson suggests in the *Calcutta Review* of 1845 that a colony in Sacae or Scythe would have established itself in India and brought faith in the Buddha to the region. Later, the converted scholars would have brought Buddhism back to Central Asia. Around the end of the 1840s, however, the dispute was over, and the archaeological and textual data already indicated with certainty the Indian origin of the Buddha and his teachings.

In 1821, Rasmus Kristian Rask (1787–1832), a Danish linguist, visited Sri Lanka, becoming the first Western scholar to study Pāli and collecting many manuscripts in Pāli and Singhalese, thereby making Copenhagen one of the most important centres for the study of the Pāli language in Europe.

It was only in 1824 that the first Pāli Grammar was written by Wesleyan missionary Benjamin Clough. He completed the work of W. Tolfrey, publishing it in Colombo (Sri Lanka), although there was no reverberation from the European world.

In 1825 the first biography of the Buddha was published in the *Asiatic Journal* by Russian scholar Issak Jacob Schmidt (1779–1847) of St. Petersburg. Schmidt had lived among the Kalmyks, a people who inhabited the area around the Volga and the Danube (Don), between 1804 and 1806, launching Mongol and Tibetan studies in Russia.

Another Eastern European who was very active at this time was Alexander Csoma De Körös (1784–1842), who published an analysis of the Tibetan *Kanjur* and *Tanjur*. The life of Csoma de Körös is noteworthy. Hungarian by birth, he left his home in 1819 and walked by foot with a crook in his hand, a sac in the back and 200 florins in the pocket, heading East in search of the original home of his race, also studying Buddhism. The turning point in his life happened when he was in India and met English explorer and British government agent Moorcroft, who saw De Körös as a man of great mental power, will and disposition. The British government needed such a man to enter Tibet and study the language. De Körös accepted and left for Ladakh, where he compiled a grammar and dictionary. These first Tibetan works were published in 1834, and due to them De Körös achieved recognition and was invited to belong to many of the societies of the time. His work would later serve as the basis for Helena P. Blavatsky to write her imaginative work, *The Secret Doctrine*. Falsely claiming to have gone to Tibet, H. P. B. only pla-

giarized earlier works (Sasaki, 1995). De Körös died in Darjeeling in 1842, and was even "canonized" in Japan as a "bodhisattva" in recognition for having "opened the heart of the Western world to the understanding of Buddhism."

At this time, George Turnour (1799–1843) realizing the importance of the *Mahāvaṃsa*, a book of historical chronicles of Ceylon (Sri Lanka), dedicated ten years of his life to studied this, and published its first thirty-eight chapters in Sri Lanka. T. W. Rhys Davids would say later on that its importance was so great that it was the "the foundation of all Pāli scholarship." Unhappily, it had no repercussion in Europe. Having learned Pāli from a Buddhist monk in Ratnapura, his translation of the *Mahāvaṃsa* greatly stimulated interest in the ruins of ancient cities that culminated in the foundation of the Ceylon Archaeological Department. He died in 1843.

The above was a brief synthesis of the translation work done until the 1840s in Europe. Much more was done in the following decades. All in all, the pioneers had to face great obstacles. Cultural differences, new unmapped languages, their own prejudices and the lack of extensive historical data all added to the difficulties that lay in the texts themselves. It was a fascinating period, with exciting discoveries but also misleading interpretations.

The translators that came after this time already had a path to follow, but in their noble task of transmitting Eastern ideas to the Western public, they now had to be especially careful, as new challenges as well as old mistakes awaited them.

As we commemorate the 70th birthday of Dr. Linnart Mäll, it is only appropriate to pay tribute to the long line of translators to which Dr. Mäll has justly added his name through his untiring work as lecturer, writer and translator of Buddhist and Eastern texts. We can only hope that Dr. Linnart Mäll may continue to produce many more works of fine scholarship.

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Religion as Umbrella, Religion as Path: A Buddhist Perspective on Death Denial and Life Transformation

David R. Loy

"The process of transmission of religious tradition is potentially the most confining among human institutions, creating for some a kind of cultural prison, or the most liberating because religious commitment permits the individual to stand within a tradition that calls into question all traditions, including ultimately aspects of itself." (Raymond B. Williams, "So, What Are We Professing Here?" – *CSSR Bulletin*. Vol. 29, no. 3, September 2000.)

With the rise of radical Islam and Christian fundamentalism, it is not surprising that aggressive secularism has also become popular. Richard Dawkins (*The God Delusion*) believes that religion is a "very evil" force in the world, and raising children in a religious tradition is child abuse. According to Sam Harris (*The End of Faith, Letter to a Christian Nation*), Islamic states may be impossible to reform because many Muslims are, he claims, "utterly deranged by their religious faith." He speculates that "some propositions are so dangerous that it may be ethical to kill people for believing in them."

As Madeleine Bunting has remarked, this sounds much like the kind of argument used by those who ran the Inquisition. Certainly many sins have been committed in the name of religion, yet are they greater than the sins committed in the name of atheism? The French revolutionaries erected a statue to the Goddess of Reason and then conducted a Reign of Terror that killed at least 20,000 people. The 20th century genocides of Stalin, Mao and the Khmer Rouge were motivated not by religion (which they tried to eliminate) but by secular ideals of a perfect society. As critical theorists such as Adorno and Foucault have emphasized, modern instrumental reason cannot be understood apart from its subservience

to power. We need to be careful if we want to use reason to refute religion, since rationality has its own shadow, its own "faith-based" superstitions. Another way to put it is that not all religions are otherworldly. Today the nation-state has become the god that most people are willing to die and kill for, under the banner of patriotism and collective self-defense. U.S. flag desecration is such a heated controversy because our national flag is, in effect, a religious symbol for many.

Is the old war between science and religion intensifying? One of the main sources of Western civilization is the classical Greek split between philosophy and religious belief, a dualism highlighted in Plato's *Apology*. Socrates died because his way of thinking was threatening to those who still identified with the traditional gods of Athens. That tension between reason and faith has a long history and continues to haunt us but, significantly, it has not been a major theme in either India or China. In pre-modern India, philosophy functioned mainly as the intellectual dimension of the spiritual path; for example, the second most important figure in the whole of the Buddhist tradition is the Mādhyamika philosopher Nāgārjuna. For Aristotle philosophy begins with wonder, yet in India philosophy, like the religious quest, begins with our *duḥkha* "suffering" and figuring out how to resolve it.

The growing importance of East-West dialogue today thus raises an intriguing possibility: whether what Ernest Becker called the "Enlightenment project" that flourished in 18th century Europe – which involved freeing ourselves from the darkness of ignorance and superstition – might be compatible with another kind of enlightenment: the liberation or "awakening" that the Buddhist path (for example) aims at. Becker himself was a fine example of the Enlightenment project at its best: synthesizing the work of many scholars and researchers on the roots of human motivation, in order to understand why *Homo sapiens sapiens* finds it so difficult to live happily. Might religion, at its best, work together with reason and science, at their best, to address the sources of the individual and collective problems that challenge us today?[1]

[1] An example of this is the ongoing series of dialogues on the nature of consciousness involving Buddhist scholars and practitioners (including the Dalai Lama) as well as psychologists and neurophilosophers.

The Western distinction between the sacred and secular realms works to keep faith and rationality apart: the sciences focus on understanding this life and world, religion more on the afterlife, usually in another world. One of the important places the two intersect is human mortality and how we cope with that. Like all other animals, we are born at a certain time and die sometime later, yet we find it extraordinarily difficult to accept that destiny. Being self-conscious means being a self that is conscious of its inevitable fate, and – with very few exceptions – devising ways to resist and deny it.

The ingenious TMT (Terror Management Theory) research of Sheldon Solomon, Jeff Greenberg, Tom Pyszcznski and others has begun to confirm Becker's theories about the role of death-denial in our psychological life and in the development of culture. A religious worldview is an essential part of the way that human societies, very much including our own, have endeavored to deny death in order to preserve the meaningfulness of life. As Tolstoy put it, "Is there any meaning in my life that the inevitable death awaiting me does not destroy?" Religions solve that problem by locating us within a larger metaphysical context that transcends death. We don't really die (or need to die) when we die.

Unfortunately, such death-denial has major consequences for how we experience life here and now, as Becker's last two books show. Psychologically as well as logically, life and death turn out not to exclude each other but rather to form two sides of the same coin. We cannot have one without the other, for to deny either is to deny both. "The irony of man's condition is that the deepest need is to be free of the anxiety of death and annihilation; but it is life itself which awakens it, and so we must shrink from being fully alive" (*Denial of Death*, 66). *The Denial of Death* argues that mortality-denial is to some extent necessary, yet comes at a grave cost. In Buddhist terms, death-denial actually increases our *duḥkha*-suffering rather than reducing it. To live most fully, we must be able to accept our inevitable fate, but can we really do that?

This amounts to a powerful critique of religion: its attempts to evade death end up crippling life. Nevertheless, we may ask: is that religion's only role? Is religion nothing more than a part of humanity's collective childhood to be outgrown, like an infant's security

blanket, as we mature? Or is it possible that religion might mature with us – and might, in fact, help us mature?

Before trying to answer those questions, let us expand the indictment. In considering the problem with religion, we should also acknowledge the traditional Marxist critique of religion as opiate of the people, an essential part of the ideology that the ruling classes have long used to control the working classes: "Don't worry about your unfortunate situation in this life; your suffering has meaning and will be rewarded in the hereafter, if you do what you are told to do now."

This ideological complicity is obvious in European history and colonization, yet it also worked much the same way in pre-colonial Asia. In Hindu and Buddhist societies, the karma and rebirth doctrines have been used, and are still used, to rationalize racism, caste and class, economic oppression, birth handicaps, and so forth. Taken literally, karma (like the "divine right" of European rulers) justifies the authority of political elites, who must therefore deserve their wealth and power, and the subordination of those who have neither. It provides the perfect theodicy: if there is an infallible cause-and-effect relationship between one's actions and one's fate, there is no need to work toward social justice, because it's already built into the moral fabric of the universe. You were born blind, or to a poor family? Well, who but you is responsible for that?

Long before Buddhism became a village religion, its institutions benefited from royal support, and if you want support from the powers-that-be you must support the powers-that-be. The problem with karma, however, is greater than that. Although the earliest Buddhist teachings make it quite clear that laypeople too can attain liberation, the main spiritual responsibility of lay Asian Buddhists, as usually understood today, is not to follow the path themselves but to support the monastic community. For the Buddha the *saṃgha* included lay devotees and practitioners, but today the term refers only to monastics, almost all of them male (except in Taiwan). By making donations to the *saṃgha*, lay men and women gain *puñña* "merit" – karma commodified, as it were. By accumulating merit they hope to attain a favorable rebirth, which may mean the opportunity to become a *bhikkhu*-monk next time. More often, though, lots of merit is understood to mean rebirth into a wealthy family, if not winning the lottery this lifetime (notably missing

here is the desire for the "end of rebirth" that Nirvāṇa is believed to involve. Becker would not have been surprised). This approach makes Buddhism into a form of what has been called "spiritual materialism," because Buddhist teachings are being used to gain material rewards.

Unavoidably, this has had a negative effect on the *saṃgha* too, encouraging it to become a "field of merit" that provides opportunities for laypeople to gain good karma. According to popular belief, the more spiritually developed a *bhikkhu* is, the more merit one's donation deposits into one's spiritual bank account. The most important thing for monastics, therefore, is to follow all the detailed *vinaya* rules and regulations strictly, and to be seen to do that, so that one is viewed as a worthy recipient of lay support. The result is that today many Asian *saṃghas* and their lay supporters are locked into a co-dependent marriage where it has become difficult for either partner to change.

This preoccupation with merit-making provides a curious parallel to the Christian preoccupation with sin – in fact they are mirror-images of each other. Sin is something negative that needs to be absolved, whereas positive karma/merit is something to be sought for and accumulated, yet psychologically they amount to the same thing: thus commodified, they can provide us with a handle on our post-mortem destiny.

Such problems, which in one way or another seem to infect all successful religions, must not be glossed over. But, to ask again, is there another side to religion? The fact that this other side is so often overshadowed by religion's more problematical functions should not lead us to overlook it. Most religions also provide *a path of self-transformation*. Sympathetic evaluations of Becker's work often present religious worldviews as exclusively *defensive*, in that they protect us against a harsh reality we cannot endure. Yet religions are not only umbrellas toward off the overpowering light of a truth we cannot cope with, or ideological drugs to dull and control the masses. At their best they are also tool kits, in effect, that instruct us not only how to live in the world but how to change ourselves. Historically, religious worldviews and practices have encouraged and enabled us to reconstruct who we are, for better and worse.

Let me begin with an example of this that is *not* something I am recommending. Luther's re-conception of the Christian spirit-

ual life led to the development of a new kind of person and a new kind of society; the modern world would not have evolved the way it did – perhaps could not have developed at all – without the Protestant Reformation. In *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* Max Weber argued that Calvinism introduced a "this-worldly asceticism" which promoted capitalism and other social developments that today have become institutionalized into an "iron cage" (his term) for us. According to Weber this can be understood as a new response to the problem of death and afterlife anxiety, since Protestants no longer had recourse to the Catholic sacraments and other intermediaries that had previously mediated man's relationship with God. If he is right, Calvinism encouraged the evolution of a more secular umbrella against mortality fears: capital accumulation. But aren't there other ways to reconstruct ourselves?

Until the development of psychotherapy in the 20th century, and for most people to the present day, religions have provided the main socially acceptable way for people to develop and mature, psychologically as well as morally. The irony, of course – an irony at the heart of my argument – is that the same religious teachings can function in very different ways, according to how they are understood and integrated. More conservative and literal interpretations often work to resist the kind of transformations that contemporary psychotherapy, for example, values and encourages. In Buddhist terms, the important difference is whether salvation is to be achieved by clinging to (assenting to) doctrines and rituals, or by following a spiritual roadmap.

For an example of the latter, consider the foundational myth of Buddhism. Many of us are familiar with the story of how the young Buddha-to-be left his home. Siddhārtha became dissatisfied with his luxurious but circumscribed life within palace walls, where everyone was young and beautiful – where there was no illness, old age, or death. Against his father's wishes he ventured forth in his chariot, and was deeply shocked to encounter for the first time an ill man, an old man, and finally a corpse. Afterwards, when he saw a forest-dwelling ascetic, he was inspired to renounce his comfortable life and retire to the forest, where he endured six years of arduous practice before his enlightenment (more literally, "awakening") under the Bodhi tree.

This extraordinary myth seems to be a late addition to the Buddhist canon, and thus not historically accurate, yet none the less powerful or relevant to us. The important point is that in this story – this religious teaching – death is not denied or evaded. Quite the opposite: awareness of mortality is emphasized because it *inspires* the spiritual quest, which attempts to address the inevitability of death without repressing our fear of it.

We have already noticed that the institutionalization of Buddhism in Asian societies often tamed that spiritual challenge into a reassuring worldview which instead emphasized merit-making and more favorable rebirth. Nevertheless, the point of the original myth – familiar to every Buddhist – has not been lost. For some monastics, graveyard meditation, sometimes involving the contemplation of corpses and skulls, is an important aspect of their religious practices. In the Zen tradition that I am more familiar with, death is constantly brought up as a reminder. Our time on this earth is short; don't waste it, for we may die at any moment!

To help us understand why spiritual practice might involve meditating on corpses, we can benefit from what Becker wrote about anxiety. Instead of evading the dis-ease that death-awareness arouses in us, that anxiety can be use as a "school" to promote self-transformation: "The flood of anxiety is not the end for man. It is, rather, a 'school' that provides man with the ultimate education, the final maturity. It is better than reality . . . because reality can be lied about, twisted, and tamed by the tricks of cultural perception and repression. But anxiety cannot be lied about. Once you face up to it, it reveals the truth of your situation, and only by seeing that truth can you open a new possibility for yourself." (*The Denial of Death*, 87–88).

This quotation comes from Becker's discussion of Søren Kierkegaard, who of course was a very religious Christian. Nevertheless, Becker's chapter on Kierkegaard explains Buddhist practice better than almost anything else I have read on the topic, which suggests to me that we may be touching upon something larger than Buddhism itself. For Kierkegaard "the self must be broken in order to become a self," a claim Becker glosses: "The self must be destroyed, brought down to nothing, in order for self-transcendence to begin, so that the self can begin to relate to powers beyond itself. It has to thrash around in its finitude, it has to 'die,' in order to question that

finitude, in order to see beyond it." Becker sees this progression as quite logical: "if you admit you are a creature, you accomplish one basic thing: you demolish all your unconscious power linkages or supports" (*The Denial of Death*, 88–89). In Buddhist terms, you must let go of your unconscious attachments as well as your conscious ones – including, most of all, oneself/one's self.

What is perhaps most distinctive about Buddhism is the essential relationship it sees between our *duḥkha* (suffering in the broadest sense) and the delusive sense of self. That the sense of self is a psychological/social/linguistic construction (as we would now put it) implies, however, that our basic repression is not awareness of mortality but what might be called awareness of one's emptiness, or unreality. If the sense of self is a construct it is by definition ungrounded, hence intrinsically insecure, which we usually experience as a sense of *lack* that haunts our sense of self. In response, we feel a compulsion to make ourselves more real, in one way or another, according to the kind of person we are and the kind of society we live in. In the contemporary U.S. that usually involves pursuing the symbolic reality supposedly conferred by lots of money, fame, or sexual attractiveness.

This offers a somewhat different take on Becker's neo-Freudian understanding of anxiety and guilt. For Buddhism our fundamental problem is not so much death – something that threatens us in the future – but our "emptiness" right here and now. This emphasis on the here-and-now also offers different possibilities: if the sense of self is a construct, can it be deconstructed? reconstructed?

The Buddhist solution to this predicament is rather simple although not usually easy to achieve: to *become* that emptiness, to yield to it by letting go of oneself. More precisely, the fictive, inherently-insecure sense of self *lets go*, an "ego-death" that meditation practice promotes. In this way absolutely everything is (or can be) lost and "the self brought down to nothing, in order for self-transcendence to begin. Then the self can begin to relate to powers beyond itself," as Kierkegaard puts it. It is precisely here that a door opens to something that remains to be explored by those who want to develop the religious implications of Becker's work. The type of transcendence that Kierkegaard and Buddhism encourage does not necessarily involve escaping to some other (dimension of) reality, either now or after death, nor does it deny our creatureliness

– that we are animals who shit and copulate and sooner or later become food for worms. Rather, it is a "turning around" (*parivṛtti* in Sanskrit) that occurs at the core of one's awareness, in which the groundlessness that was so uncomfortable before is revealed to be the place where a reconstituted sense of self "can begin to relate to powers beyond itself." At that core is something that can never be grasped or understood because it is the very source of our awareness.

Within the Buddhist tradition as popularly deployed, however, there is more reference to the problem of death than to the problem of our emptiness (or "non-being") right now. *Anatta* "non-self" is often explained as the "middle way" between the extremes of eternalism (the self survives death) and annihilationism (the self is destroyed at death). Both alternatives are deluded because they presuppose that there is or was a self to begin with. The evaporation of this dualistic way of thinking reveals what is prior to it, the nature of what resides at one's core. One of the most common Buddhist terms for this source is "the unborn." In the Pāli Canon (the earliest Buddhist scriptures) the two most famous descriptions of Nirvāṇa both refer to "the unborn," where "neither birth nor death … is to be found." The *Song of Enlightenment* of Yung-chia (Yongjia), an early Chan/Zen teacher, states that "Since I abruptly realized the unborn, I have had no reason for joy or sorrow at any disgrace." That "all things are perfectly resolved in the unborn" was the great realization and later the central teaching of the 17th century Japanese Zen master Bankei: "When you dwell in the unborn itself, you're dwelling at the very wellhead of Buddhas and patriarchs." The unborn is the Buddha-mind itself, beyond living and dying.

Is such talk about an "unborn" a reversion to mortality-denial, because referring to something that evidently transcends death? It has sometimes been taken that way, of course, but the important point is that in the Buddhist tradition all such terms are understood to be heuristic: either they help us to follow the path and achieve such a here-and-now realization for oneself, or they become another form of delusion, because one clings to them. The Buddha himself emphasized that his teachings were instrumental, nothing more than a raft to ferry ourselves across the river of *saṃsāra* (the world of suffering) and then to be abandoned when we have reached the other shore. In different religions this "unborn"

source has been given many different names – indeed, the different Buddhist traditions use many different terms for it – but what is important is the process and experience described above. Various doctrines or categories can be employed; the issue is how well they promote this type of transformation.

Of course, one may question whether what I have just offered is anything more than just another religious mystification. It seems to me, however, that whether such an experience is actually possible is not something that can be resolved *a priori*; in which case it becomes a matter for empirical investigation, although obviously such research would be challenged by the usual protocols used to maintain standards of scientific objectivity.

As a "wisdom tradition" Buddhism emphasizes this awakening ("the Buddha" literally means "the Awake") more than anything else, but that experience is not in itself the end of the spiritual path. The sense of self is not only to be deconstructed; it must also be reconstructed. This brings us back to the issue of karma and its corollary, rebirth. The popular Buddhist understanding is that after death we are born again and again, according to our karma, until we attain Nirvāṇa, whereupon rebirth no longer occurs – whatever that means, which is not clear, since the Buddha refused to talk about it. Both historically and still today, most Buddhists have understood rebirth quite literally, as occurring in one of the six realms of *saṃsāra*, which include not only the human realm but also animal, titan, hungry-ghost, heaven and hell realms. Although there is no need here to go into details, the important point about all these realms is that they are impermanent: where we are reborn depends upon our karma, and when that karma has been exhausted we are reborn somewhere else.

Some teachers, however, including revered Asian ones such as Buddhadasa (1906–1993) in Thailand, have understood rebirth as a metaphorical way to describe what is happening right here and now: when my mind is full of hatred, at that moment I am born in the hell-realm, suffering from an inflamed mind. Similarly, the animal realm refers to ignorance and stupidity; the titan realm to ambition, envy and jealousy; the hungry-ghost realm to addiction and desperation; and the heavenly realm to temporary bliss.

A better understanding of karma can help us relate this interpretation to what the reconstruction of (the sense of) self means.

Brahmanical teachings prevalent in India by the time of the Buddha understood karma mechanically and ritualistically. To perform a sacrifice in the proper fashion would invariably lead to the desired consequences. If those consequences were not forthcoming, either there had been a procedural error or the causal effects were delayed, perhaps until one's next lifetime (hence implying rebirth). The Buddha's spiritual revolution transformed this ritualistic approach to getting what you want out of life into a moral principle by focusing on *cetanā* "motivations, intentions," which in effect *ethicized* karma. The *Dhammapada*, for example, begins by emphasizing the pre-eminent importance of our mental attitude:

> "Experiences are preceded by mind, led by mind, and produced by mind. If one speaks or acts with an impure mind, suffering follows even as the cart-wheel follows the hoof of the ox."
>
> "Experiences are preceded by mind, led by mind, and produced by mind. If one speaks or acts with a pure mind, happiness follows like a shadow that never departs."

To understand the Buddha's innovation, it is helpful to distinguish a moral act into three aspects: the *results* that I seek; the *moral rule or regulation* I am following (for example, a Buddhist precept or Christian commandment, although this also includes ritualistic procedures); and my mental attitude or *motivation* when I do something. Although these aspects cannot be separated from each other, we can emphasize one more than the others—in fact, that is what we usually do. By no coincidence, in modern moral philosophy there are also three main types of theories. Utilitarian theories focus on consequences, deontological theories focus on general principles such as the Mosaic Decalogue, and "virtue theories" focus on one's character and motivations.

In the Buddha's time the Brahmanical understanding of karma emphasized the importance of following the detailed procedures (rules) regulating each ritual. Naturally, the people who paid for the rituals were more interested in the results. We have already noticed that the situation in some Buddhist countries is not much different today. Monastics are preoccupied with following the complicated rules that regulate their lives, while laypeople are preoccupied with the rewards of accumulating merit. Both of these

attitudes miss the point of the Buddha's innovative emphasis on intention.

The basic point of karma is that our actions have consequences—more precisely, that our morally relevant actions have morally relevant consequences that extend beyond their immediate effects. In most popular understandings, as we have seen, the law of karma and rebirth is a way to get a handle on how the world will treat us in the future, which also implies, more immediately, that we must accept our own responsibility for whatever is happening to us now, as a consequence of something we must have done earlier.

When karma is understood as *cetanā*, however, it becomes something quite different: the key to spiritual development, *how our present life-situation can be transformed by transforming the motivations of our actions right now.* When we remember the Buddhist teaching about non-self – that one's sense of self is a mental construct – we can see that karma is not something the self *has*, it is what the sense of self *is*, and what the sense of self is changes according to one's conscious choices. "I" (re)construct myself by what "I" intentionally do, because "my" sense of self is a precipitate of habitual ways of thinking, feeling, and acting. Just as my body is composed of the food eaten, so my character is composed of conscious choices, "I" am constructed by my consistent, repeated mental attitudes. People are "punished" or "rewarded" not for what they have done but for what they have become, and *what we intentionally do is what makes us what we are.* As stated in an anonymous verse:

> Sow a thought and reap a deed
> Sow a deed and reap a habit
> Sow a habit and reap a character
> Sow a character and reap a destiny

What I do is motivated by what I think. Intentional actions, repeated over and over, become habits. Habitual ways of thinking, feeling, acting, and reacting construct and compose my sense of self: who I am. The kind of person I am does not fully determine what happens to me, of course, but strongly affects what occurs and how I respond to it. Confession and repentance can be so important because they are how we acknowledge, both to others and to ourselves, that we are striving not to allow something we have done

to become (or remain) a habitual tendency that forms an accepted part of our sense of self.

Such an understanding of karma does not necessarily involve another life after physical death. As Spinoza expressed in the last proposition of his *Ethics*, happiness is not the reward for virtue; happiness is virtue itself. We are punished not for our "sins" but by them. To become a different kind of person is to experience the world in a different way. When your mind changes, the world changes. And when we respond differently to the world, the world responds differently to us. Our ways of acting in the world tend to involve feedback systems that incorporate other people. I may fool people sometimes, yet over time my character becomes revealed as the intentions behind my deeds become more evident. The more I am motivated by greed, ill will, and delusion (the "three poisons" according to Buddhism), the more I must manipulate the world to get what I want, and consequently the more alienated from it I feel – and the more alienated others feel when they see they have been manipulated. This mutual distrust encourages both sides to manipulate more. On the other side, the more my actions are motivated by generosity, loving-kindness, and the wisdom that realizes our interdependence, the more I can relax and open up to the world. The more I feel genuinely connected with others, the less I will be inclined to use them, and consequently the more inclined they will be to trust and open up to me. In such ways, transforming my own motivations not only transforms my own life; it also affects those around me, since what I am is not separate from what they are.

Can this be restated in terms of psychological projection and transference? If they are in-eliminable aspects of the human condition, as Becker persuasively argues, are they always negative (a necessary part of our death-denial defenses), or can they be understood more neutrally, as the psychological and spiritual ways we reach out beyond ourselves to construct the world and reconstruct ourselves? Can we withdraw (let go of) our problematical projections/transferences, and then restructure our self/world with more positive ones? A popular Buddhist meditation practice involves radiating loving-kindness (*mettā*) in an ever-expanding circle, beginning with oneself, then family members and friends, followed by other acquaintances, enemies, and finally all living beings. "May all beings be without suffering; may they all be happy." What

effects might such a practice have on one's projections and transferences?

This demythologized perspective on karma and rebirth amounts to a challenge for Buddhism to grow up. If religious language is basically metaphorical and symbolic, as scholars of religion keep reminding us, then Buddhists today need to challenge the death-denying and therefore life-denying function of more literal (and more popular) understandings. Of course, other religions face the same choice: to continue as death-denying/life-denying institutions, with all the *duḥkha* that entails; or to emphasize their transformative role as spiritual paths. Given the extraordinary crises of our time, which require the best of us in response, it is becoming more and more apparent that religions need to mature into new approaches that de-emphasize dogma in place of ego-self deconstruction and reconstruction.

In their book on 9/11 and its psychological aftermath, some of the TMT researchers conclude by calling for something similar:

"We are all more or less safely embedded within our belief systems; some humanly created system of meaning and value is utterly necessary. Which is most beneficial/least harmful? Caught between rock – the safest, most secure is rigid with concrete depiction of afterlife; the hard place is views more relativistic, less certain, more open and tolerant of differences – but enough to base one's meaning and value on? But is there a middle ground? ... Is there a vision of reality substantial enough to serve our deep psychological needs for death-transcending meaning and value – but flexible enough to endure peaceably the existence of alternative worldviews? If we are unable to find this safer place, then perhaps the human race is doomed to ignominious self-extermination." (Tom Pyszcznski, Sheldon Solomon, and Jeff Greenberg, *In the Wake of 9/11: The Psychology of Terror*, Washington DC: American Psychological Association, 2003, 196–97.)

They conclude with questions, because none of us know if such a safer place will be found. Given the paramount role that religions still play in the collective consciousness of humankind, however, it is safe to say that the religious traditions will need to be deeply involved for any such middle ground to be developed.

III

Humanistic Concepts in Different Traditions of Thought

Der Erleuchtete auf dem Pharaonen-Thron

Manfried Dietrich

1. Vorbemerkung

Auf den ersten Blick wirkt es geradezu befremdend, wenn in einem Titel der „Erleuchtete", mit dem der Begründer des Buddhismus, Siddhārtha Gautama, gemeint ist, und der Thron des „Pharaos", des mächtigen altägyptischen Herrschers über das Nilland an den südöstlichen Gestaden des Mittelmeers, zusammenebracht werden. Dagegen sprechen vorderhand zwei Gründe: Erstens fällt die Vorstellung schwer, daß der „Erleuchtete", der nepalesische Königssohn, der im 6. Jh. v. Chr. am Fuß des Himalaya gelebt und die Enthaltsamkeit gegenüber allen irdischen Gelüsten gelehrt hat, auf einem Thron gesessen haben soll, der ein *„erhöhtes, i.d.R. auf hohe Füße und/oder Stufen gestelltes, kunstvoll gearbeitetes Sitzmöbel, ein Sinnbild der weltl. und geistl. Herrschaft; in den Kulturen des Altertums auch Sitz der Götter"*[1] bezeichnet; zweitens scheint die Entfernung zwischen den Kulturräumen, in denen der „Erleuchtete" einerseits und der thronende Pharao andererseits gewirkt haben, für eine direkte Gegenüberstellung zu groß zu sein. Daß dies dennoch möglich ist, soll im folgenden aufgrund ikonographischer Überlieferungen aufgezeigt werden, die eine räumliche und zeitliche Brücke zwischen den Größen des „Erleuchteten" und des „Pharaos" zu schlagen vermögen.

Die nachfolgenden Ausführungen werden von einer Beschreibung des „Pharaonen-Throns" ausgehen: *Der Löwenthron als Machtsymbol des Pharaos* (Punkt 2). Um eine Verbindung mit Südasien herstellen zu können, kommen anschließend Belege für Löwen-

[1] Brockhaus [20]2001, S. 56a.

throne und die ihnen nahestehenden Sphingenthrone bei den vorderorientalischen Herrschern zur Sprache: *Die Löwen- und Sphingenthrone als Machtsymbole der syro-palästinischen, mesopotamischen und achämenidischen Herrscher* (Punkt 3). Mit dem Zwischenergebnis *Der Löwe als Symboltier des Herrschers in Ägypten und im Vorderen Orient* (Punkt 3.3) soll eine Brücke vom Mittelmeer nach Südasien und zum Auftreten des Löwenthrons in der Buddha-Ikonographie geschlagen werden: *Der Löwenthron des Kuschan-Herrschers Vima Kadphises* (Punkt 4) und *Der Löwenthron in der Ikonographie des Erleuchteten* (Punkt 5). Den Schluß bildet eine Zusammenfassung: *Der Löwenthron als Symbol für die göttliche Macht des Erleuchteten* (Punkt 6).

Die Ausführungen mit dem Titel *„Der Erleuchtete auf dem Pharaonen-Thron"* möchten ein kleines Zeichen des Dankes für die zahlreichen und stets höchst lehrreichen Begegnungen mit dem Jubilar *Linnart Mäll* in Tartu sein, dem herausragenden Kenner des Buddhismus und dem renommierten Erforscher der Geistes- und Kulturwissenschaften Süd- und Ostasiens.

2. *Der Löwenthron als Machtsymbol des Pharaos*

Für das herrschaftliche Sitzmöbel des Pharaos wird das Kompositum „Löwenthron" verwendet, von dem bereits der Leitbegriff „Thron" auf die Macht des ägyptischen Herrschers weist. Ein „Thron" als Sitzmöbel für den Herrscher konnte in Ägypten nach Ausweis der archäologischen Hinterlassenschaften in Kleinfunden und Ikonographie je nach Anwendungsbereich entweder ein „Hokker" (Sitzmöbel ohne Rückenlehne), ein „Stuhl" (ein Sitzmöbel mit Rückenlehne) oder ein „Sessel" (ein Sitzmöbel mit Rückenlehne und Armstützen) sein.[2] Also stellt sich die Frage, wie man sich die Form des hier angesprochenen Sitzmöbels vorzustellen hat.

Da das herrschaftliche Sitzmöbel mit der Tierbezeichnung „Löwe" näher bestimmt wird, der in den nordafrikanischen und eurasischen Kulturräumen zu allen Zeiten ikonographisch und literarisch weit verbreiteten Sinnbild in erster Linie für die Stärke und Macht und in zweiter Linie für die Schutzgewährung war,

[2] M. Metzger 1985 I 4.

kann auf dessen Form, Ausstattung und Funktion geschlossen werden: *„Das Charakteristikum dieser Throne besteht darin, daß die Horizontalholme an der Vorderseite in Löwenköpfen enden und daß die Sitzflächen von Löwenbeinen getragen werden. An den Seiten sind die Löwenbeine reliefartig herausgearbeitet, an der Vorderfront sind sie, wie die Löwenköpfe, vollplastisch gestaltet.... Die Löwen ... erfüllen nicht nur dekorative Zwecke, sie fungieren auch nicht nur als Trägerfiguren, sie sind darüber hinaus als Repräsentation des Pharao zu verstehen."*[3]

Abb. 1. Pharao Chefren in Herrscherpose auf dem Löwenthron (K. Lange - M. Hirmer 1985, Tf. 30).

Für die Frühzeit Ägyptens ist ein aufschlußreiches Beispiel für einen Löwenthron mit dem thronenden Pharao und plastisch herausgearbeiteten Löwenköpfen[4] das Sitzbild des Pharao Chefren (4. Dynastie: ca. 2472–2448[5]) aus dessen Totentempel bei Gise (Abb. 1).[6] Der Pharao sitzt in Herrscherpose auf dem Thron mit hoher Rückenlehne, der durch ein Podest erhöht ist; seine Rechte ruht mit geballter Faust auf dem rechten Knie und die Handfläche seiner Linken auf

[3] M. Metzger 1985 I 10, 12; vgl. auch U. Rössler-Köhler 1980.

[4] Bemerkenswerterweise finden sich im 2. Jt. v. Chr. keine weiteren Beispiele für plastisch herausgearbeitete Löwen als Trägerfiguren im Stile des Chefren-Thrones. Dann überwiegen die Throne mit Löwenbeinen, die in sorgfältig ausgearbeiteten Tatzen enden (siehe z.B. M. Metzger 1985 I, S. 44–45, II Tf. 31–32, 35–36) und denen häufig Löwenköpfe aufgesetzt sind, vgl. M. Metzger 1985 I S. 71, 115–123, bes. S. 123.

[5] M. Verner 2006, S. 133-134; Tabelle: R. Krauss, D. A. Warburton 2006, S. 491.

[6] K. Lange, M. Hirmer 1985, Tf. 30, mit Farbfoto IV; vgl. M. Metzger 1985 II Tf. 5 und S. 10.

Abb. 2. Verzierung an der Seite des Tragesessels der Gattin des Malers Mereruka unter Pepi I. (M. Metzger 1985 II, Tf. 5: Umzeichnung Nr. 20).

Abb. 3. Sphingen und Löwen am Thron des Pharaos Ramses III. (M. Metzger 1985 II, Umzeichnung S. 78).

dem linken Knie, seine nackten Füße stehen auf dem Podest vor dem Thron. In der Skulpturengruppe ergänzen sich in beeindruckender Weise die beiden wichtigsten Elemente des altägyptischen Herrscherdarstellung: Der Pharao sitzt im Ornat auf einem kunstvoll ausgefertigten Löwenthron, der seiner würdig ist.

Aus der großen Anzahl weiterer Beispiele sei noch auf den Tragesessel der Gattin des Malers Mereruka hingewiesen, der unter Pepi I (6. Dynastie: ca. 2276–2228[7]) Wesir war (Abb. 2).[8] In die dem Betrachter zugewandten Seitenfläche des Sessels ist ein hockender Löwe eingraviert, der den Sessel in die Nähe eines königlichen Löwenthrons rückt; dies unterstreicht die Würde der Prinzessin auf dem Sessel.

Eingravierte Löwen finden sich wiederholt auch auf Darstellungen des Mittleren und Neuen Reichs und werden hier durch Sphingen ergänzt, wie folgendes Beispiel zeigt (Abb. 3).[9] Ein Sphinx ist in die Seitenfläche des Tragesessel

[7] Tabelle: R. Krauss, D. A. Warburton 2006, S. 491.

[8] M. Metzger 1985 II, Tf. 5: Nr. 21 mit Umzeichnung Nr. 20, und S. 10; vgl. ders. 1985 I S. 14.

[9] M. Metzger 1985 II, Tf. 39 und S. 78; I 89.

eingearbeitet, in dem der Pharao Ramses III. (20. Dynastie: 1190–1188)[10] thront – der ihn repräsentierende Löwe „schreitet" würdig neben dem Sessel her.

Zusammenfassend kann festgehalten werden, daß der Löwenthron des Pharao – ob mit plastisch herausgearbeiteten oder mit eingravierten Löwen und Sphingen geschmückt – ein Repräsentationsmöbel des Herrschers ist, das durch ein Podest aus der Ebene des Alltags herausgehoben und mit Löwen und Sphingen als Insignien der Stärke, Macht und Schutzgewährung verziert ist. Diese Möbel unterstreichen das ägyptische Verständnis, das den Pharao als einen Herrscher von göttlicher Art sieht.[11]

Der Pharao wird auf dem Löwenthron stets in vollem Ornat und in Herrscherpose dargestellt, weil er dort sein Volk und Land repräsentiert.

3. Die Löwen- und Sphingenthrone als Machtsymbole der syropalästinischen, mesopotamischen und achämenidischen Herrscher

In der Welt des Fruchtbaren Halbmonds zwischen den Libanon- und Zagrosgebirgen – der östliche Mittelmeerraum, die kreto-mykenische und kypro-minoische Welt[12] sowie Kleinasien[13] seien hier trotz wesentlicher Beiträge zum Thema beiseite gelassen – ist der Löwenthron nicht in der Dichte belegbar wie in Ägypten. Da aber der Löwe auch in diesem Bereich das Sinnbild für Stärke und Macht nicht nur für die Könige,[14] sondern auch für die Götter ist, dürfte die schlechte ikonographische Bezeugung des Löwenthrons und des ihm nahestehenden Sphingenthrons in erster Linie daran

[10] Tabelle: R. Krauss, D. A. Warburton 2006, S. 493.

[11] U. Rössler-Köhler 1980, Sp. 1086: „*Die enge Beziehung zwischen dem L. und dem äg. Königtum läßt sich auf zwei Ebenen fassen, die jedoch meistens nicht voneinander trennbar sind, da sie häufig genug ineinander übergehen: Einmal die Ebene des bildhaften Vergleichs (Bildliche Ausdrücke) bis hin zum Symbol, zum zweiten die der im Königsdogma konzipierten göttlichen Herkunft und göttlichen Art des Königs.*"

[12] Ausführlich H.-G. Buchholz 2006, bes. „K Löwen am Thron", S. 152–157.

[13] Throndarstellungen auf „kappadokischen" Rollsiegeln Anfang des 2. Jahrtausends v. Chr.: M. Metzger 1985 I, S. 186–203; Abbildungen: II, Tf. 87–93, S. 178–190.

[14] Für Palästina, Phönikien und Südsyrien siehe z.B. R. Schmitt 2001, S. 121–126.

liegen, daß einschlägige Funde noch ausstehen – in der Literatur lassen sich indes allenthalben Stellen nachweisen, in denen der Löwe eine Metapher für Gott und König ist.

In den nachfolgenden Betrachtungen seien die Kulturräume Syrien-Palästina, Mesopotamien und des Achämeniden-Reichs getrennt erörtert.

Abb. 4. El von Ugarit auf dem Sessel mit Löwenbeinen (M. Yon 1991, S. 336, Fig. 16a).

3.1. Syrien-Palästina

Belege für Sessel und Stühle aus Syrien und Palästina aus dem 2. Jahrtausend v. Chr., die mit ihren Löwenbeinen den Löwenthron zu reflektieren scheinen, gibt es zahlreich. Es sei hier beispielsweise auf die Kalksteinstele aus Ugarit/Ras Schamra aufmerksam gemacht (Abb. 4).[15] Der bärtige Gott El thront auf dem Sessel und empfängt vom König Opfer. Bemerkenswert an dieser Szene ist, daß hier der Gott auf dem löwenbeinigen Thron sitzt, der für Ägypten nicht belegbar ist.

Für die Machtdemonstration des Königs breitet sich während der zweiten Hälfte des 2. Jahrtausends v. Chr. in Syrien und Palästina der auch für Gottheiten belegbare Sphingenthron aus – als Beispiel hierfür sei auf die Ritzzeichnung auf einem Elfenbeinplättchen aus Megiddo (ca. 1350–1150) verwiesen (Abb. 5).[16] Der Stadtkönig thront in vollem Ornat

[15] M. Metzger 1985 II, Tf. 111, Nr. 1169 (Umzeichnung); siehe den Kommentar: I, S. 247-149; M. Yon 1991, S. 305–307 (zu RS 8.295); Foto und Umzeichnung: S. 336, Fig. 16a.

[16] M. Metzger 1985 II, Tf. 113, Nr. 1191; Umzeichnung mit Beschreibung: I, S. 259–261, 265–267, 271.

auf einem von Sphingen flankierten Thron und nimmt Huldigungen entgegen.[17]

Besonders eindrucksvoll ist der göttliche Sphingenthron aus dem achämenidischen Sidon (4. Jh.; Abb. 6).[18] Auf einen Amethyst-Anhänger ist Isis-Hathor eingraviert, die auf einem Sphingenthron sitzt und Opfer entgegennimmt.[19]

Abb. 5. Elfenbeinplättchen aus Megiddo mit dem Stadtkönig auf dem Sphingenthron (M. Metzger 1985 II, Nr. 1191: Umzeichnung S. 260).

Also ist der Löwenthron Ägyptens in Syrien neben dem Sphingenthron, der seine Strukturelemente dem ägyptischen Löwenthron verdankt, zum reinen Götterthron geworden.[20]

Im eisenzeitlichen Israel und seiner Umwelt, an der Levante und im aramäischen Binnenland hat sich, wie Siegel und Stempel in großer Zahl zu erkennen geben, im 1. Jahrtausend v. Chr. statt des Löwenthrons das Motiv des brüllenden Löwen als Symbol für die königliche Macht großer Beliebtheit erfreut.[21] R. Schmitt faßt seine diesbezüglichen Beobachtungen folgendermaßen zusammen: *„Die Löwendarstellungen aus dem Kontext des Palastes, insbesondere ihre exponierte Anbringung auf Thronen, spricht für eine enge Verbindung von Königtum und Löwensymbolik. Der Löwe könnte somit, wie es die ältere*

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17 Zum Sphingenthron auf dem Sarkophag des Ahiram von Byblos, der darauf thronend abgebildet ist und Gaben von einer Prozession entgegennimmt; siehe A. Parrot, M. H. Chéhab, S. Moscati 1975, S. 76–79; bemerkenswert ist, daß der Sarkophag auf vier kauernden Löwen steht, die die Bedeutung des Herrschers unterstreichen; vgl. H.-G. Buchholz 2006, S. 140 Abb. d; M. Metzger 1985 I, S. 259–261, II Tf. 113, Nr. 1183; E. Rehm 2004, S. 36–37, Abb. 14.

18 A. Parrot, M. H. Chéhab, S. Moscati 1975, S. 109–110, Fig. 115.

19 Verwiesen sei hier auch auf die leider nicht gut erhaltene „thronende Venus Heliopolitana (Atargatis)" aus Baalbek: M. Metzger 1985 I, S. 278–279; II Tf. 118, Nr. 1218.

20 M. Metzger 1985 I S. 251, 261–263.

21 R. Schmitt 2001, S. 121–125.

Abb. 6. Isis-Hathor von Sidon auf dem Sphingenthron (A. Parrot, u.a., 1975, S. 109-110, Fig. 115).

(ägyptische) glyptische Tradition bezeugt, als Symboltier der Macht und Kraft, aber auch der aggressiven Potenz des Königtums verstanden werden."[22]

In diesen Rahmen der Königsdarstellung gehört gemäß der Tradition des Sphingenthrons nach R. Schmitt auch häufig der Sphinx, der nach ägyptischem Vorbildern gestaltet ist. Er fungiert hier also nicht nur als Wächter, sondern auch als Repräsentant des Herrschers: *„Der Sphinx repräsentiert den König und ist eine Manifestation seiner überweltlichen Qualitäten..."*[23]

3.2. Mesopotamien und das Achämeniden-Reich

Im mesopotamischen Kulturraum – Babylonien, Assyrien, Elam – gilt der Löwe als Feind des Menschen und Kulturlandes und ist daher vom König zu bekämpfen.[24] Gleichzeitig wird er wegen seiner Wildheit und Kraft wie in Ägypten[25] als Symboltier in der Hauptsache für die weibliche Gottheit Inanna-Ištar verehrt.[26] So flankieren Löwenskulpturen apotropäisch allenthalben die Ein-

[22] R. Schmitt 2001, S. 124.

[23] R. Schmitt 2001, 130; vgl. auch H.-G. Buchholz 2006, S. 152–157, bes. S. 157 mit Zitat einschlägiger Textstellen aus dem Alten Testament (1 Rg. 19,18ff.; Jdc. 14,18).

[24] E A. Braun-Holzinger 1987, S. 88; W. Heimpel 1987, S. 81–82.

[25] U. Rössler-Köhler 1980, Sp. 1081–1086, mit dem Hinweis darauf, daß der Löwe in der Spätzeit auch männliche Gottheiten symbolisieren könne.

[26] W. Heimpel 1987, S. 84: *„Der Löwe wird in seinen verschiedenen Aspekten in der sum. Literatur sehr oft, in der akk. auffallend selten, als Metapher für Götter und Könige benutzt, und zwar am weitaus häufigsten für Inanna/Ištar und Ninurta unter den Göttern und Šulgi unter den Königen"*; E. A. Braun-Holzinger 1987, S. 91. Zum Löwen in der hethitischen Ikonographie der Ištar-Ša(w)oška siehe V. Haas 1994, u.a. S. 354–355; E. A. Braun-Holzinger 1987, 91.

Abb. 7a, b. Inanna-Ištar von Susa auf dem Löwenthron (R. M. Boehmer 1966, S. 354-355).

gänge von Heiligtümern der Innanna-Ištar und ihrer Hypostasen – mitunter aber auch die anderer Gottheiten – und übernehmen die Funktion von Wächtern.[27] Das gilt auch für die göttlichen Sitzmöbel (Hocker, Throne) der Inanna-Ištar: Löwen umrahmen hier entweder als Skulpturen die Möbel oder sind als Reliefs kunstvoll in deren Seitenflächen wiedergegeben.[28] Als Beispiel sei das neusumerische Sitzbild der Göttin Inanna-Ištar vom Anfang des 2. Jahrtausends v. Chr. aus Susa angeführt (Abb. 7a, b).[29] Auf dem Thron sitzt die Göttin im Zottengewand, zwei hockende Löwen sind aus den beiden Seitenflächen und zwei auf den Hinterläufen ‚stehende' aus der Rückwand des Hockers herausgearbeitet.

Bemerkenswert ist der in Mesopotamien und seinen nördlichen Nachbarn (u.a. Uarartu) verbreitete Brauch, die Beine von Möbeln (Thronen, Stühlen, Tischen) in Löwentatzen auslaufen zu lassen. Es ist

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[27] W. Heimpel 1987, S. 82–83, mit Textbelegen; E.A. Braun-Holzinger 1987, S. 89–90.

[28] M. Metzger 1985 I, S. 156–157.

[29] R. M. Boehmer 1966, S. 354–355; M. Metzger 1985 II, Tf. 72, Nr. 666.

Abb. 8. Dareios auf einem Thron mit Löwentatzen (H. Koch 2001, S. 68, Abb. 106).

denkbar, daß es sich hier weniger um den Reflex des aus Syrien und Palästina bekannten löwenbeinigen Thrones – übertragen auch auf andere Möbelstücke – handelt als um ein Dekoration von Möbelbeinen generell.

Die Bedeutung des Löwen für die Welt des Achämeniden-Reichs ähnelt der für das ältere Mesopotamien, es fehlt hier allerdings der positive Bezug des Löwen zur Götterwelt. Da für den Löwen auf Reliefs allenthalben das Bild des Opfers für einen ihn überwältigenden Herrscher gezeichnet wird, ist von der Annahme auszugehen, daß er auch hier vornehmlich als Feind des Kulturlandes angesehen worden ist.

Der Löwe wird auf achämenidischen Königsthronen nicht dargestellt. Auffällig sind allerdings die Löwentatzen am Ende der Thronbeine und Opfertische. Auch hier bleibt zu klären, ob dies ein Reflex des löwenbeinigen Thrones ist, der in Syrien während der zweiten Hälfte des 2. Jahrtausends v. Chr. verbreitet (siehe oben) war, oder ob diese Tatzen lediglich ein dekoratives Element der Dekoration sind (Abb. 8).[30] König Dareios sitzt auf einem Thron mit Löwentatzen und empfängt Gesandte. Bemerkenswert ist das Muster des Teppichs, der als Sitzunterlage auf den Thronsitz gelegt ist (Abb. 9).[31] Die Umrandung bilden schreitende Löwen, die die Macht des Thronenden unterstreichen.

Noch viel deutlicher tritt die Beziehung der Macht durch einen Löwenthron in dem Stelenrelief von Nemrud Dagh,[32] dem Mau-

[30] H. Koch 2001, S. 68, Abb. 106; vgl. dies, 1992, S. 95, Abb. 45.

[31] H. Koch 2001, S. 68, Abb. 108.

[32] E. Errington, ed., 2007, S. 118: Fig. 99



Abb. 9. Sitzunterlage auf den Thron des Dareios (H. Koch 2001, S. 68, Abb. 108).

soleum des Antiochos I. Theos von Kommagene, zutage (Abb. 10). Der Verstorbene, der ca 70–36 v. Chr. regiert hat, sitzt auf einem von Löwen umflankten Thron und nimmt per Handschlag den Gruß der persischen Vorfahren Darius und Xerxes entgegen. Kleidung, Löwenthron-Fußschemel-Arrangement und Sitzhaltung des Antiochos schlagen eine auffallend klare Brücke zu denen der drei Jahrhunderte jüngeren Statue des Kuschan-Herrschers Vima Kadphises aus Math.

3.3. Zwischenergebnis: Der Löwe als Symboltier des Herrschers in Ägypten und im Vorderen Orient

Der in Ägypten verbreitete Löwenthron als Symbol der Macht des Pharaos wird in Syrien und Palästina des 2. Jahrtausends v. Chr. verdrängt. Hier gelten einerseits der Sphingenthron und löwenbeinige Thron und andererseits das Löwenbildnis auf Siegeln und Stempeln als Machtsymbole für den Herrscher.

In Mesopotamien und im achämenidischen Iran wird der Löwe als Feind von Menschen und Kulturland angesehen und vom

Abb. 10. Relief des Antiochos I. Theos von Kommagene (E. Errington, ed., 2007, S. 118: Fig. 99).

König bekämpft. Wenn in Mesopotamien der Löwenthron auftaucht, dann ist er für Gottheiten, in erster Linie allerdings für die Göttin Inanna/Ištar vorgesehen. Der Herrscherthron wird bemerkenswerterweise häufig mit Löwentatzen am Ende der Standbeine abgebildet. Es ist zu bezweifeln, ob hier wie im Syrien und Palästina des 2. Jahrtausends v. Chr. ein Reflex des Löwenthrons postuliert werden darf.

Die Herrscher Syrien-Palästinas, Mesopotamiens und des achämenidischen Iran repräsentieren dann, wenn sie in Herrscherpose und in vollem Ornat auf dem Thron sitzen, ihr Volk und Land.

Im Gegensatz zu Ägypten, wo der Löwenthron ein beliebtes Machtsymbol des göttlich gedachten Pharaos ist, wird der irdische Herrscher in Syrien und Palästina als menschliches Wesen angesehen und nicht mit dem Löwenthron verbunden, also nicht mit den Göttern auf eine Stufe gestellt. Damit rückt die syro-palästinische Königsikonographie in die Nähe der mesopotamischen, in der der König ebenfalls nicht auf einem allein den Gottheiten, hier vor allem der Inanna/Ištar, vorbehaltenen sitzt. Dies fällt insofern auf, als nach zahlreichen Aussagen der Literatur besondere Eigenschaften nicht nur von Göttern, sondern auch von Königen mit denen von Löwen verglichen werden.[33]

[33] W. Heimpel 1987, S. 83–84.

4. *Löwenthron des Kuschan-Herrschers Vima Kadphises*

Nach dem Tod Alexanders d. G. bildet sich im Osten des Seleukidenreichs die Kulturprovinz Baktrien heraus, die auffallend klare hellenistische Züge trägt und für die geistig-kulturelle Entwicklung Mittelasiens und der nordwestlichen Regionen Südasiens von größter Bedeutung ist. Sie wird kurz vor der Zeitenwende von den ‚Yüetschi'-Nomaden aus den östlichen Gebirgsregionen des Pamir und Hindukusch unterwandert und im Laufe des 1. Jh. absorbiert. Bei der Seßhaftwerdung macht sich der ‚Yüetschi'-Stamm der Kuschan (chinesisch: Guischuang) nicht nur Kulturelemente der Architektur, Skulptur und Schrift aus Graeco-Baktrien und aus dem parthischen Iran im Westen zueigen, sondern auch solche aus dem indischen Fünfstromland im Osten und formt daraus eine höchst bedeutsame eigenständige, die Kultur der Kuschan.[34] Die Ausdehnung des Reichs der Kuschan reicht in seiner Blütezeit vom Tienschan im Nordosten bis ans Kaspische Meer im Westen und nach Mathura im Ganges-Tal in Nordwest-Indien. Die Kontrolle aller Handelswege auf dieser Drehscheibe des antiken Ost-West-Handels beschert dem Reich einen unvergleichlichen Reichtum.

Während der Begründer der Kuschan-Dynastie, Heraos, noch keine größere Bedeutung hat, ändert sich dies unter seinen Nachfolgern Kudschula Kadphises und Vima Kadphises rasch, wie die Kulturrelikte verdeutlichen, die sie in ihren Hauptstädten Surkh-Khotal am Nordhang des zentralen Hindukusch-Massivs und in Mathura im Ganges-Tal hinterlassen. Der bedeutendste Herrscher der Dynastie ist Kanischka I. (wohl Mitte des 3. Jh.), unter dessen Nachfolgern Huwischka und Vasudeva I. das Reich am Anfang des 4. Jh. allerdings wieder auseinanderfällt.[35]

Von den zahlreichen Kulturrelikten seien nachfolgend zwei hervorgehoben – der Skulpturenfries der Herrschergilde von der Westwand von Chaltschajan und die Skulptur eines thronenden Herrschers aus Math bei Mathura im Ganges-Tal, die beide aus der Frühzeit des Kuschan-Reichs stammen und bemerkenswerte ikonographische Züge tragen.

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[34] Siehe z.B. D. Schlumberger 1969, 375-401; J. M. Rosenfield 1967; B. Stawiski 1979, S. 62-68; J. Klimkeit 1988, S. 137–143.

[35] Siehe z.B. A. Belenickij 1968, S. 95–100; J. M. Rosenfield 1967, S. 253–255; B. Stawiski 1979, S. 62–68; J. Klimkeit 1988, S. 137–143.

Abb. 11. Skulpturenfries der Kuschan-Herrscher von Chaltschajan (B. Stawiski 1979, S. 96, Umzeichnung).

Abb. 12. Vima Kadphises auf dem Löwenthron (B. Stawiski 1979, S. 97 Abb. 67).

Auf dem Skulpturenfries (Abb. 11)[36] thront auf einem erhöhten Doppelthron das Herrscherpaar und präsentiert sich in vollem Ornat; wie es die Herrscherpose seinerzeit erforderte, sind die Knie beider gespreizt; der Herrscher hält das Szepter in der Rechten und trägt ein schlichtes Diadem.

Die stark beschädigte Skulptur aus Math bei Mathura, die Vima Kadphises zugeschrieben wird, stellt den Herrscher auf dem Löwenthron dar (Abb. 12).[37] In Herrscherpose sitzt Vima Kadphises im Ornat auf dem Thron; sein Kopf ist nicht erhalten, seine Rechte hält das ebenfalls verlorene, auf der rechten Schulter liegende Zepter, seine Linke liegt auf dem linken Oberschenkel; die Knie sind gespreizt, die Füße im Winkel nach außen ausgerichtet.

[36] Umzeichnung: B. Stawiski 1979, S. 96 (mit Beschreibung, S. 94–96).

[37] B. Stawiski 1979, S. 97 Abb. 67 (knappe Beschreibung, S. 90); vgl. auch J.M. Rosenfield 1967, Nr. 1; D. Schlumberger 1969, S. 380.

Die Körperhaltung des Thronenden erinnert also an die des Herrschers auf dem Skulpturenfries von Chaltschajan, sitzt hier aber nicht, wie beim Fries, auf einem hockerartigen Möbel, sondern bemerkenswerterweise auf einem von zwei Löwen umflankten Thron. Dasselbe läßt sich für die Herrschergestalt auf der Tonplakette ebenfalls aus Chaltschajan feststellen (Abb. 13).[38]

Abb. 13 Herrscher auf einer Tonplakette aus Chaltschajan (B. Rowland 1970, S. 49 Fig. 16).

Somit haben wir es bei beiden Objekten mit einem Löwenthron der Art zu tun, wie er in Ägypten für den Pharao oder in Mesopotamien für eine Gottheit bekannt ist. Dies unterstreicht nicht nur eine enge Verbindung des Kuschan-Kunstschaffens mit dem des mesopotamisch-iranischen Westens, sondern auch die hinlänglich gut überlieferte Anerkennung der Göttlichkeit des Kuschan-Herrschers und seiner dynastischen Nachfolger durch ihre Untertanen.[39]

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[38] B. Rowland 1970, S. 49 (Fig. 16), 81. Eine vergleichbare Haltung nimmt Wima Kadphises auf der Vorderseite einer Münze ein, in deren Rückseite der indische Gott Schiwa geprägt ist; in seiner Rechten hält er den Trisula und seine Linke liegt auf dem Höcker seines ‚Reittiers' Nandi: B. Stawiski 1979, S. 42–43. Der Herrscher sitzt hier auf einem Hocker mit gedrechselten Beinen und hält das Szepter mit der Rechten von seinem Oberkörper ab.

[39] Vgl. E. Meyer 1969, S. 54–56; J. M. Rosenfield 1967; J. Wiesner 1968, S. 149; B. Stawiski 1979, S. 66 (die Bezeichnung des Herrschers von Kuschan als „Sohn des Himmels"); B. Rowland 1970, S. 81: „*Der Darstellung der Kushāna-Tracht und der Machtattribute ist mehr Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet als der Andeutung körperlicher Präsenz... Der hieratische Charakter.... verbindet diese Gruppe der Kushāna-Plastik mit den parthischen Königsporträts... ein Hinweis dafür, daß diese Art der Darstellung vergöttlichter Herrscher ihren Ursprung im 1. Jahrhundert n. Chr. hat...*"

5. Der Löwenthron in der Ikonographie des Erleuchteten

5.1. Buddha-Skulpturen aus den Schulen von Gandhara und Mathura

Die Herrscher des Kuschan-Reichs übernehmen den religiös-kulturellen Rahmen nicht nur des hellenistischen Baktrien, sondern auch den des zeitgleichen, römisch beeinflußten parthischen. In indischer Charoschthi-Schrift berichten sie über griechische Götter, Legenden und Rechtsnormen und stellen sie an die Seite von parthischen und baktrisch-zoroastrischen. Also scheinen sie sich als Vertreter aller damals verbreiteten geistig-religiösen Strömungen gefühlt haben.

Umso erstaunlicher ist es, daß es keine deutlichen Anzeichen für eine Annäherung der Kuschan-Dynasten an die buddhistische Lehre gibt, deren religiöse Zentren Gandhara mit der Hauptstadt Taxila und Mathura mitten in ihrem Reich lagen. Sie üben aber Toleranz gegenüber dieser Lehre und verhelfen ihr dadurch, sich über ihr ganzes Reich auszubreiten – ein Reich, das sich während seiner Blüte unter Kanischka I. (3. Jh.) vom Ganges-Tal im Südosten bis ans Kaspische Meer im Nordwesten und an den Pamir im Nordosten erstreckt hat. Also bietet sich den Reisenden und Händlern buddhistischen Bekenntnisses die Möglichkeit, ihre Lehre ungehindert in alle Teile Mittelasiens zu tragen – wie die kulturellen Hinterlassenschaften in diesem Raum lehren, behindern auch die Dynasten nach Kanischka die Lehre nicht. So feiern buddhistische Historiographen Kanischka d.Gr. zwar wie einen ihrer Glaubensgemeinschaft und sehen in ihn einen zweiten Aschoka, der sich im 3. Jh. v. Chr. der Lehre des Erleuchteten angeschlossen und damit die Verbreitung über sein weitläufiges Reich gefördert hat, Kanischka und seine Nachfolger selbst legen aber kein klares Zeugnis für den Buddhismus ab.[40]

Die Ausbreitung über Mittelasien und die Zentren der Kuschan-Herrscher während der ersten Jahrhunderte unserer Zeitrechnung ist für den Buddhismus nur möglich, weil er den Schritt in die Mahayana-Lehre schon begonnen hat: Aufgrund des zyklischen Äonendenkens wird das Dogma der absoluten Einmaligkeit des historischen Siddhārtha Gautama aufgegeben[41] und ihm als Ma-

[40] Vgl. J. Klimkeit 1988, S. 138-143; B. Stawiski 1979, S. 63–64.

[41] Die Suttanipata-Schrift des Pali-Kanons sagt über den Erleuchteten nach seiner Eintritt ins Nirvana; nach D. Seckel 1980, S. 148: *„Er, der (wie die Sonne) zur*

nifestationen Vorgänger und Nachfolger in beliebiger Zahl an die Seite gestellt, die in vergangenen und zukünftigen Zeitaltern die Lehre vertreten haben bzw. predigen sollten. Mit dieser Relativierung der Bedeutung des Erleuchteten in der Kuschan-Zeit ist der Weg für seine Darstellung frei, was entsprechend indischer Tradition zuvor vollkommen undenkbar gewesen wäre und nicht nachgewiesen werden kann.[42]

Für die Darstellung des Erleuchteten wählen die Kuschan-Künstler das Bild eines Mönchs, von dessen Abbild auf einem Thron gesagt werden kann: *„...in der ganz in sich beschlossenen, beruhigten und unbeweglichen, frontalsymmetrischen Stellung der Meditation"* ist es *„ein überaus eindrucksvolles Symbol für die Entrücktheit aus der Welt und dem dreidimensionalen Raum der Erscheinung, des Handelns und Erleidens und für die Unerschütterlichkeit der absoluten Wahrheit und Weisheit, deren vollkommener Stille die zum Heil führende Erleuchtung der Welt machtvoll entströmt."* Wenn der Mönch die Haltung des Sitzens verläßt und die des Stehens, Liegens oder gar Schreitens einnimmt, dann wird damit *„ein Heraustreten aus der Entrücktheit, ein aktives Erscheinen und Wirken angedeutet."*[43]

Die frühesten Bildnisse stammen aus Künstlerwerkstätten in Gandhara und Mathura, den beiden wichtigsten buddhistischen Zentren der Kuschan-Zeit. Ihre Produkte vertreten anschaulich die dort beheimateten Vorstellungen.[44]

Die Gandhara-Schule mit Hauptsitz in Taxila stattet den Erleuchteten romano-buddhistisch mit Lockenhaar, das in einem lockigen Knoten zusammengebunden ist, und einem lockeren Faltengewand aus. Die Gestalten wirken schlank und feingliedrig, so daß er an Skulpturen provinzrömischer Fertigung erinnert[45] (Abb. 14).[46] Aus grauem Schiefer gearbeitet, sitzt Buddha im Asketen-Stel-

Ruhe gegangen ist, kann mit überhaupt nichts verglichen werden. Es finden sich schlechterdings keine Begriffe, in denen seine Wesensessenz ausgedrückt werden könnte."

42 B. Stawiski 1979, S. 66; D. Seckel 1980, S. 22–23, 148–152; J. Klimkeit 1988, S. 95; vgl. auch J. M. Rosenfield 1967; H. Uhlig 1979, S. 25.

43 D. Seckel 1980, S. 162.

44 D. Seckel 1980, S. 23–30.

45 D. Seckel 1980, S. 24. Nach herkömmlichem Verständnis wurde diese Art der Darstellung „graeco-buddhistisch" genannt und verband ihren Ursprung ‚anachronistisch' mit dem hellenistischen Baktrien.

46 H. Härtel; J. Auboyer 1985, Abb. 34; Beschreibung: S. 164.

Abb. 14. Der Erleuchtete aus der romano-buddhistischen Schule von Gandhara (H. Härtel - J. Auboyer 1985, Abb. 34).

lung schutzgewährend – seine Unterarme sich weggebrochen –; sein Thron ist stoffüberzogen und wird zur Unterstreichung seiner Herrschaftlichkeit an den Enden von Löwen überwacht; seine göttliche Erhabenheit hebt die Kopfaureole hervor.

Demgegenüber benützt die Mathura-Schule rötlichem Sandstein und fertigt ihre Buddha-Skulpturen in einem Stil an, der Energie, Kraft und Heldenhaftigkeit ausstrahlt. Den athletischen Körper schützt ein dünnes, eng anliegendes Gewand, das Haupthaar ist glatt nach hinten gekämmt und in einer Schnecke zusammengefaßt[47] (Abb. 15).[48] Buddha sitzt im Yoga-Sitz auf einem von drei Löwen getragenen und mit Weihinschrift verzierten Thron; in königlicher Haltung gewährt er mit der Rechten, in die das Rad der Lehre graviert ist, Schutz und stützt seine Linke aufs Knie; die Fußsohlen hält er nach oben gekehrt; hinter ihm stehen zwei Begleiter, über ihm schweben zwei himmlische Wesen.

Die im Gandhara- und Mathura-Stil erstellten Buddha-Typen stehen in der Frühzeit unvermittelt nebeneinander, beeinflussen sich jedoch in den folgenden Jahrhunderten zusehends.

Buddha-Sitze, in deren Sockel Löwen eingearbeitet sind, werden in kunstgeschichtlichen Beschreibungen verallgemeinernd als „Löwenthrone" bezeichnet,[49] obwohl sie auf den ersten Blick wegen des Fehlens von Arm- und Rückenlehnen nur wenig an einen „Thron" als Sitzmöbel erinnern. Dasselbe gilt beispielsweise auch für den

[47] D. Seckel 1980, S. 155–157.

[48] H. Härtel; J. Auboyer 1985, Nr. 43; Beschreibung: S. 166–167.

[49] Siehe z.B. D. Seckel 1980, S. 161; H. Uhlig 1979, S. 72.

„Löwenthron" aus dem nordostindischen Pala (9. Jh.; Abb. 16),[50] bei dem Buddha erdbeschwörend auf einem Lotusthron mit hoher Rückenlehne sitzt, an der links und rechts zwei aufrecht stehende Löwen eingearbeitet sind; der „Thron" hat somit zwei Löwenpaare, weil zwei Löwen auch im Sockel des „Throns" hocken.

Abb. 15. Buddha im Yoga-Sitz aus der indischen Schule von Mathura (H. Härtel - J. Auboyer 1985, Nr. 43).

5.2. Der Löwe, das Symbol-Tier Buddhas

Die nachfolgend aufgeführten Throne, in die Löwenskulpturen eingearbeitet sind – es sind nur drei aus einer großen Zahl –, leiten über zu Überlegungen über die Bedeutung des Löwen für die Ikonographie des Erleuchteten.

In der Epoche, in der der Erleuchtete noch nicht als Mensch dargestellt werden durfte, hat der Löwe in der Buddha-Mythologie die Rolle des Symbol- oder „Reittiers" übernommen. Dabei stützen sich die Theologen und Ikonographen auf eine Tradition, die auf einen Ehrentitel des Königssohns Gautama zurückgeht: *„Die Löwen... beziehen sich auf Gautamas Ehrentitel Śākyasiṃha, «der Löwe aus dem Śākya-Geschlecht», und zugleich auf seine Sprachgewalt, denn wie der Löwe unter den Tieren die lauteste Stimme besitzt, so ist der Buddha der vernehmlichste unter den geistlichen Lehrern."*[51]

Als sich Kaiser Aschoka im 3. Jh. v. Chr. dem Buddhismus zuwendet, macht er das Löwenkapitell, das eine frei stehende Säule gekrönt hat und von vier rückenständigen Löwenprotomen mit vollplastisch ausgearbeiteten Löwenvorderkörpern abgeschlossen

[50] H. Uhlig 1979, S. 109, Abb. 40; Beschreibung, S. 108.

[51] H. W. Schumann 1997, S. 66–67.

Abb. 16. Buddha im Yoga-Sitz aus dem nordostindischen Pala (H. Uhlig 1979, S. 109, Abb. 40).

ist, zum Staatssymbol (Abb. 17).[52] Das Löwenkapitell besteht aus poliertem Sandstein und zierte eine Aschoka-Säule in Sarnath, dem Zentrum der buddhistischen Gelehrsamkeit in Nordostindien. Damit hat sich der Kaiser zur Durchschlagkraft der laut vorgetragenen Lehre Buddhas bekannt: *„der Löwe ist hier nicht nur Herrschesymbol, sondern verkörpert die sieghafte Macht der Buddha-Lehre, deren Wort die Welt erweckt wie nach der Tiersage das Gebrüll des Löwen seine scheintot geborenen Jungen."*[53]

Mit der Einführung des Löwenkapitells nimmt der buddhistsche Kaiser sicherlich achämenidische Traditionen auf und verbindet sie mit dem indischen Brauch, sie als Krönung einer freistehenden Säule vor ein Heiligtum zu Ehren Buddhas zu stellen.[54] Dies soll Kraft und Siegeszuversicht zum Ausdruck bringen, die dem Löwen als „König unter den Tieren" zugeschrieben werden und die der Kaiser auf Buddha überträgt.

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[52] H. Härtel; J. Auboyer 1985, Nr. 15; Beschreibung: S. 159.

[53] D. Seckel 1980, S. 161.

[54] *In situ* findet sich eine derartige Säule heute beispielsweise noch vor der Caitya-Halle von Karli am Hang der Westghats auf der Höhe von Bombay: B. Rosenheim 2006, S. 58–66, Abb. 82 und 83; Beschreibung: S. 61; oder: die Türlaibungssäulen des Torana-Tors im äußeren Terrassenzaun von Sanchi (1. Jh. v. Chr.: H. Härtel; J. Auboyer 1985, Nr. 139a, Beschreibung S. 213). Die Aschoka-Säulen können auch mit einem einzigen Löwen ausgestattet sein, wie die 243 v. Chr. aufgestellte Lauriya-Nandangarh-Säule in Bihar zeigt (H. Härtel; J. Auboyer 1985, Nr. 132, Beschreibung S. 205).

Ein weiteres Symbol für die Kennzeichnung des Buddhas als Herrscher kommt über drei Jahrhunderte später in der Kuschan-Zeit auf, als die Darstellung des Erleuchteten als Mensch einsetzt: Buddha auf dem Löwenthron in vorderorientalischer Herrscherpose. Diese westliche Tradition der Herrscherdarstellung tritt ikonographisch im Indus-Ganges-Bereich erstmals beim Kuschan-Herrscher Vima Kadphises auf, der, wie oben ausgeführt, zur Unterstreichung seiner göttlichen Würde mit gespreizten Knien auf einem von Löwen umflankten Thron sitzt.

Abb. 17. Löwenkapitell des Aschoka aus Sarnath (H. Härtel - J. Auboyer 1985, Nr. 15).

In der Buddha-Ikonographie finden sich zahlreiche Beispiele für *Bhadrāsana-* oder *Pralambapadāsana*-Sitzhaltung des Erleuchteten, die auch als „europäische" bezeichnet wird. Sie *„ist in allen buddhistischen Ländern üblich. Vor allem in der Gandhāra-Kunst ruhen die Füße gelegentlich auf einem kleinen Hocker, wodurch die Knie angehoben werden. In Indien entspricht dies einer typischen Haltung (āsana) der Könige. Dieser «europäischen Haltung» begegnet man sehr früh in Gandhāra und in Indien (Buddha von Sarnāth aus der Gupta-Zeit, 4.–5. Jh.), in Südostasien (Chandi Mendut bei Borobodur, Java, 8. Jh.), und auch bei zahlreichen Statuen und Gemälden in Tibet, China, Korea und Japan (bei letzteren Ländern ist dies eine für Maitreya typische Haltung)."*[55]

Höhlen der Anlagen von Ajanta und Ellora, die in Tälern der Nordghats bei Aurangabad während des 6.–8. Jahrhunderts ange-

[55] L. Frédéric 2003, S. 48–49; vgl. J. M. Rosenfield 1967, Fig. 167.

Abb. 18. Buddha in „europäischer" Sitzhaltung auf dem Lotus-Thron, Ajanta Höhle 19 (J. Auboyer - J.-L. Nou 1982, Abb. 67).

legt und aus dem massiven Fels herausgearbeitet worden sind, bieten etliche Beispiele für den Buddha in „europäischer" Sitzhaltung – nachfolgend seien zwei näher vorgestellt: In Ajanta (Höhle 19 aus dem 6. Jh.) thront Buddha als Lehrender wie ein Herrscher auf einem Lotus-Thron (Abb. 18)[56] und in Ellora (Höhle 10 aus dem 7. Jh.) der Lehrende in der vorspringende Nische des Stupasockels auf einem Löwenthron, der aus einer Sitzbank mit je einem hockenden Löwen links und rechts am Ende der Bank (Abb. 19)[57] die beiden flankierenden Bodhisattwas weisen die Höhle dem Mahayana-Buddhismus zu. Bei beiden hier angesprochenen und wiedergegebenen Buddha-Skulpturen fällt die gespreizte Kniestellung auf, die an die Sitzhaltung parthischer Herrscher bei den Kuschan-Machthabern erinnert.[58]

5.3. Zwischenergebnis

Die Buddha-Gläubigen der ersten Jahrhunderte des Buddha-Äons halten am Dogma fest, daß der Erleuchtete nach seinem Eingang ins Nirwana jedwede menschliche Vorstellung sprengt und folglich nicht dargestellt werden darf. Damals gibt es für die Vergegen-

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[56] J. Auboyer; J.-L. Nou 1982, Abb. 67; weitere Skulpturen dieser Art finden sich in den Kassetten-Friesen links und rechts von der Hauptskulptur.

[57] J. Auboyer; J.-L. Nou 1982, Abb. 69.

[58] Zu weiteren Beispielen derart gestalteter Sitzfiguren siehe z.B. die Ajanta-Höhle 26: H. Härtel - J. Auboyer 1985, Nr. 143; Beschreibung: S. 216-217; die Bagh-Höhle 2 (B. Rosenheim 2006, S. 175, Nr. 266) und 5 (B. Rosenheim 2006, S. 181, Nr. 276).

wärtigung des Erhabenen nur Symbole, von denen der Löwe als kraftvoller, unbesiegbarer „König der Tiere" eines der wichtigsten ist.

Diese ablehnende Einstellung zur Verbildlichung des Erleuchteten ändert sich um die Zeitenwende, als sich auf der Basis des zyklischen Denkens die Mahayana-Theologie herausbildet. Dies ermöglicht dem Buddhismus den Schritt in den Universalismus, der nötig war, wenn sich die Lehre unter den Kuschan-Herrschern über die Ökumene Mittel- und Südasiens ausbreiten wollte.

Abb. 19. Buddha in „europäischer" Sitzhaltung auf dem Löwenthron, Ellora Höhle 19 (J. Auboyer - J.-L. Nou 1982, Abb. 69).

Bei der Formung des Buddha-Bildes stehen die ikonographischen Möglichkeiten der Kuschan-Herrscher zur Verfügung, die ihrerseits an Bilder ihrer westlichen Vorgängerreiche der Achämeniden, Mesopotamier, Syrer-Palästiner und Ägypter orientiert. Die Künstler setzen den Erleuchteten mit oder ohne sein Symboltier, den Löwen, auf einen Thron und konkretisieren damit seinen ohnehin schon existierenden Nimbus eines Herrschers. Von daher ist es selbstverständlich, daß der Thronende auch die Sitzhaltung eines westlichen Herrschers, die „europäische" Sitzhaltung einnimmt – dabei fällt allerdings die gespreizte Kniehaltung auf, wie sie bei den Parthern beliebt ist. Bei der Einhaltung südasiatischer Vorstellungen wird Buddha daneben aber auch im Yoga-Sitz abgebildet, so daß sich die Buddha-Ikonographie beider Sitzhaltungen bedient – daß die Yoga-Sitzhaltung gegenüber der „europäischen" Sitzhaltung ein deutliches Übergewicht gewonnen hat, ergibt sich daraus, daß die geistige und familiäre Heimat des Lehrers und seiner Lehre Asien war.

6. Zusammenfassung: Der Löwenthron als Symbol für die göttliche Macht des Erleuchteten

Der Löwe dient sowohl in der ägyptischen Ikonographie als auch in der des Vorderen Orients und Mittel- und Südasiens als Symboltier für die Kraft und Unbesiegbarkeit von Göttern oder göttlich verehrten Menschen: In Ägypten saß der Pharao auf einem von Löwen umflankten Thron; in Syrien-Palästina und Mesopotamien war der Löwenthron Gottheiten vorbehalten – in Syrien-Palästina schmückte den Herrscherthron stattdessen das Schutz gewährende Sphingenpaar –; im Iran fehlen Zeugen für einen Löwenthron; in Mittelasiens und in Nordwestindien saßen der vergöttlichte Kuschan-Herrscher und der Erleuchtete auf einem Löwenthron.

Der Gefahr eingedenk, die einem Vergleich und einer Gegenüberstellung ikonographischer Traditionen verschiedener Regionen und Länder innewohnt, wurde versucht, eine Brücke zwischen den Traditionen des Niltals und denen des Fünfstromlandes in Südasien zu schlagen. Da sich dies als möglich erwiesen hat, können die eingangs geäußerten Zweifel, ob es denkbar und sinnvoll sei, Vorstellungen über die Göttlichkeit des Pharaos neben die über den ins Nirwana eingegangenen nepalesischen Königssohn zusammenzubringen, als hinfällig angesehen werden: Der Erleuchtete konnte im übertragenen Sinn durchaus auf dem Pharaonen-Thron sitzen.

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The Enlightened One on the Throne of the Pharaoh

Manfried Dietrich

Abstract

The lion is a very popular symbol for Buddha in the Buddhist iconography from the early times of Ashoka (3rd century BCE) onwards. It can be found in all kinds of works of art, paintings and sculptures throughout history. It denotes the might and effectiveness of the Buddhist teachings. It can particularly be traced in the pedestal of Buddha statues sitting in yoga style or on the sides of a throne portraying Buddha in the "European" pose. In this respect the lion seems to represent the vigour and might of the teacher just as it does in the iconography of gods and kings in Western traditions of art: Here the throne supported by lions are attested not only for the Egyptian Pharaos of the 3rd millennium BCE and Kushan kings of the 3rd century CE, who were adorned as gods, but also for the gods of Syria and Palestine in the 2nd and 1st centuries BCE – the thrones of the kings in 2nd and 1st centuries BCE Syria and Palestine are flanked by protecting sphinxes resembling lions.

The study on the topic "Der Erleuchtete auf dem Pharaonen-Thron" aims to connect the understanding of the widespread use of lions in the Buddhist iconography with that of the Western throne flanked by lions and sphinxes. The lion throne of the Kushan king Vima Kadphises seems to present itself as a suitable link between East and West in terms of the pertinent iconographical traditions.

The Possibility of Humanistic Base Texts in Ancient Peru

Tarmo Kulmar

Objective and method of study

This article was inspired by two factors. The first was a proposition brought up in a private conversation, that the ancient Peruvian cultural hero Wiracocha, who is probably a historical figure, might have written religious texts that might still be extant. The second was a desire to test Linnart Mäll's humanistic base texts theory on such cultures that have texts of a little-researched or ambiguous nature. Thus the objective of the present article is to seek the answer to the question whether the texts related to Wiracocha are humanistic base texts or theistic texts.

In order to conduct the study, a summary is first given of the key points of L. Mäll's theory; second, the person of Wiracocha is analysed in the light of the available data; third, some significant texts related to Wiracocha are provided as illustrative material; and fourth, an answer to the aforementioned question is sought on the basis of the texts.

Key points in the theory of humanistic base texts

A humanistic base text (hereinafter shortened to HB) is a fundamental text of a particular culture that exalts man to the centre of existence and emphasises the importance of positive psychological properties (e.g. dignity, compassion, sense of responsibility, etc.) in human communication. In the Old World, HBs emerged in the environment of developed civilisations that had a written language and an established religion, in approximately the 6th century BCE

– 2nd century CE. Typical examples of HB are Confucius' *Analects*, the *Bhagavadgītā*, the *Suttapiṭaka* and the three synoptic gospels of the New Testament.

HBs have nominal authors. They present a teaching imparted by a teacher. The teacher proclaims the teaching orally, and it is recorded after his death. The recorded texts reflect the author's individuality. The teacher is depicted as an extraordinary person who has supernatural powers but is also no stranger to human weaknesses.

In terms of form, content and terminology, the teaching proclaimed in an HB is related to a particular cultural environment. The teacher emphasises that the teaching is not entirely original, but the time to proclaim it has come. The teaching has humanism at its centre, explaining to man the meaning of his existence and his uniqueness. Man is equal to the gods, even if he does not have the supernatural powers of the gods. This is also demonstrated by the fact that the teacher is a human. The emphasis of the teaching is on man's repentance, renewal and improvement. The teaching also represents a new cultural paradigm. If man recognises it he may be renewed. Man is not the creator of culture; instead, culture functions and changes through man. An HB endeavours to help man overcome his *ego*, which is of natural descent, and elevate his nature from the physical level to the cultural level. This is demonstrated by the teacher-disciple relationship being prioritised over kinship. Nevertheless, man needs to remain human, and regard his fellow man with compassion and love. His most important helper in realising this is his mind. Accordingly, the essence of the teaching involves guiding man onto the path of becoming a new man, that is, a cultured man.

The teacher first proclaims the teaching in a small circle. Later the circle of his adherents widens. The proclamation of a teaching that is cardinally different from the prevailing ideology inevitably prompts repressions against those who proclaim it. The impact of the teaching increases explosively after it is recorded and it becomes a canonical HB. The teaching engenders social institutions (churches), which, albeit attempting to monopolise the interpretation of the canonical HB, play an important role in the propaga-

tion of its ideas. The HB becomes a generator of new, interpretative texts, thus having an increasing impact on the culture.[1]

In summary, it may be said that religious texts as base texts can be divided into theistic and humanistic texts. Theistic texts have god at their centre, whereas humanistic texts are anthropocentric. The latter have certain characteristics, which can be summarised as follows: fixed authorship, the existence of a teacher and a description of his life events, an oral presentation of the teaching and its subsequent recording by the disciples, the manifestation of human character traits in the teacher, the novelty, timeliness and humanity of the teaching and the fact that the doctrinal text becomes a generator of new texts.

The origins and nature of Wiracocha

The word 'Wiracocha'[2] is a compound in the Aymara language, not in Quechua. 'Wira' in Aymara means 'the surface of the earth' and 'cocha' has been derived from the verb 'cachay', which means 'to make'. Thus the real meaning of the word is simply 'The Maker of the World' (in Spanish, *Dios hacedor del mundo*). The cult of Wiracocha was very prominent in the Inca state. Wiracocha was the Creator-God, but also a cultural hero.

As a digression into religious phenomenology, attention must be drawn to the following processes. In the myths of many peoples, a celestial superbeing – a creator-god – is also the continuator of creation in the world of humans. The more a culture depends on an agricultural economy, the greater the significance attached to the bringer of culture that is related to Nature's cycle. The cultural hero is either a celestial superbeing himself or is descended from him. In farming cultures in particular, the process is as follows, in broad outline: (1) the celestial superbeing turns into a so-called resting God, or *deus otiosus;* (2) the functions of the cultural hero are separated from those of the celestial superbeing; (3) the cultural hero

[1] For more information, see The Concept of Humanistic Base Texts. – In: Mäll, Linnart. Studies in the *Aṭasāhasrikā Prajñapāramitā* and Other Essays. Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 2005, 175–193; Bibliographical Data p. 227.

[2] The name has several spellings: Viracocha, Wiracocha, Huiracocha, Uiracocha.

becomes a separate being; (4) the cultural hero becomes the continuator of the creative work of the celestial superbeing; (5) hierarchically, the cultural hero drops below the creator-god. It is also interesting to note that in the myths of agricultural peoples, the cultural hero departs from among humans in some manner after completing his work.

With Wiracocha, both of his functions are emphasised. He has been described as a being with indefinable appearance but also as an old man with a white beard, fair skin and white clothes. He has some characteristics intrinsic to both a creator and a destroyer, both a supergod and a sun god and storm god. On the other hand, he is associated with many myths, is reported to have taught peoples and brought culture to them and then to set off to sea and promised to return. We see that Wiracocha was simultaneously a celestial superbeing and a human teacher.

Where does Wiracocha come from? The Incas arrived in the Cuzco Valley from the far south, from the realm of the Tiahuanaco civilisation. Therefore they undoubtedly brought along cults that were alien to the rest of the Quechua. There are observations that show that Wiracocha must have originated from the Tiahuanaco civilisation. He represented the ancient God of Heaven of the pre-Incan Tiahuanaco civilisation, located in the surroundings of Lake Titicaca, whose cult doubtlessly dates from at least the 1st millennium CE. In both Tiahuanaco and the subsequent Colla state, which arose from the former civilisation, Wiracocha was highly venerated as the God of Heaven. On the other hand, the cult of Wiracocha is associated with the so-called Deity with Sceptres, whose cult dates back as far as the time of the oldest Peruvian civilisation, Chavín. In the archaeological material, the continuity of the cult can be traced back to the turn of the 2nd millennium BCE.[3]

In retrospect, three cultic processes may be assumed in Inca religion. First, after the Incas had introduced the worship of Wiraco-

[3] Garcilaso de la Vega, Inca. *Comentarios reales de los Incas /1609/.* Tomo I–III. Lima: Editorial Mercurio S.A., 1988, Libro 2, Cap. 4; Libro 4, Cap. 21; Libro 5, Cap. 13, Cap. 21. Jones, David M.; Molyneaux, Brian L. *The Mythology of the Americas.* London: Anness Publishing Limited, 2002, 191, 244–245. Kelm, Antje. Grundzüge der Religion des zentralen Andenraumes. – *Alt-Amerikanistik. Eine Einführung in die Hochkulturen Mittel- und Südamerikas.* Hg. Ulrich Köhler. Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag, 1990, 519–534.

cha as the celestial superbeing of Tiahuanaco, it began to merge with the cult of Manco Capac, the mythical forefather of the Inca dynasty and a cultural hero. Consequently, Wiracocha acquired more and more of the characteristics of a cultural hero. Second, Manco Capac became the patriarch of the dynasty, the Son of the Sun, the first Inca on the list of rulers, whose cult was increasingly combined with that of the sun god Inti. Third, in the Lurín Valley culture in central coastal Peru, the Incas encountered Pachacamak, the superbeing of the local tribes, and then the superbeing characteristics of Pachacmak and Wiracocha began to blend, resulting in Pachacamak becoming the celestial superbeing of the Incas.[4]

In summary, it may be maintained that Wiracocha was originally the creator-god of the Tiahuanaco civilisation, who became a cultural hero in the Inca religion.

Religious texts of ancient Peru. Textual illustrations relating to Wiracocha

In the Inca era, no character-based writing system was used in Peru. A special knot script, *quipu*, was employed to store statistical information. People with outstanding memory were trained in Inca society to use *quipus* and retain verbal information. It is natural, therefore, that Incan history and religious texts only began to be recorded after the conquest of Peru. The chroniclers were mostly Roman Catholic clergymen or Spanish colonial officials, who could be Spaniards, mestizos and educated representatives of the indigenous people.

Relatively few pre-Christian religious texts have been recorded. Ancient myths and descriptions of rites enjoy a somewhat better survival rate. The number of religious addresses recorded in verse form (so-called religious hymns or *takiy*s) is less than that of texts in prose (such as prayers). The best-known recorders of verse texts are chroniclers Guamán Poma de Ayala, Inca Garcilaso de la Vega and Santa Cruz Pachacuti Yamqui, whereas prose texts have been recorded in particular by chroniclers Juan de Betanzos, Carlos Vil-

[4] For more, see Kulmar, Tarmo. Zum Problem des Kulturheros in der Inka-Religion. – *Mitteilungen für Anthropologie und Religionsgeschichte*. B. 12, 1997. Münster: Ugarit-Verlag, 1999, 101–110.

lanes Cairo, Francisco López de Gomara, Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa, Miguel Cabello Valboa and Inca Garcilaso de la Vega.

Very important collections of texts have been put down in writing by visitors sent out by the monastic orders of the 16th–17th century bishops. One of these is a collection of stories, prayers and descriptions of rites recorded by Cristóbal de Molina (later also called Cuzcolas)[5], whence are taken the textual illustrations used in this present. As Molina's chronicle is difficult to access, the author of this article used the new edition of several prayer texts addressing Wiracocha, edited by Teodoro L. Menenes and published in Fascicle 1 of "Encyclopaedia of the History of Peruvian Literature" compiled by Dr. Francisco Carillo Espejo.[6]

The author of this article also had at his disposal several verse texts relating to Wiracocha[7], yet for reasons pertaining to both content and form, the prayers in prose presented below were selected. First, it appeared in the course of comparing the texts that there was no substantial difference between the verse texts and prose texts. As the author of this article had to bear in mind the space limitations of the present article, it seemed more sensible to illustrate it with less voluminous texts.

In Text 1, man praises the creator-god Wiracocha for creation, discusses his location, prays to him for support and sacrifices to him. In a sense it is also a philosophical text.

In Text 2, man prays to the creator-god Wiracocha for life, health, prosperity, food and drink.

In Text 3, man prays to the creator-god Wiracocha that he ensure the growth of crops, provide a good harvest and protect against crop failure.

In Text 4, man praises the creator-god Wiracocha for sunlight in the daytime and moonlight at night and prays to him to grant people light, health and peace.

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[5] Molina, Cristóbal de. Relación de las Fabulas y Ritos de los Ingas. – *Revista Chilena de Historia y Geografia*. Vol. 5, 1913. Santiago.

[6] Oraciones y Declaraciones recogidas por Cristóbal de Molina, el Cuzqueño, de Fábulas y Ritos de los Incas: traducción de Teodoro L. Meneses. – Carillo Espejo, Francisco. *Literatura Quechua Clasica. Enciclopedia Historica de la Literatura Peruana*. 1. Lima: Editorial Horizonte, 1986, 69–70.

[7] E.g. *op. cit*, 51, 56, 71–72, 76–77, etc.

Texts 5 and 6 are prayers to the Son of the Sun – the Inca – for health, support, riches, power and progeny, as well as destruction of his enemies.

Texts 1 and 4 are festive hymns that were most appropriate to be used by priests in addressing god.

Texts 2 and 3 are impassioned prayers to god by farmers to ensure daily food.

The person who prays using Texts 5 and 6 cannot be defined with certainty. In this manner, god could be addressed by priests, common people and the Inca alike. Text 6 in particular implies the Inca as the implorer.

I

¡Oh Huiracocha del principio del mundo, Huiracocha del fin del mundo, Huiracocha principal y bello!
2. ¡Oh Creador, Providente! Que diciendo "Sea el hombre, sea la mujer" a todos hiciste.
3. Creado y colocado por tí (en esto mundo), pacificamente y sin cuidados viviré.
4. ¿Donde estás?: ¿estás afuera? ¿estás adentro?; ¿estás en las nubes? ¿estás en la sombra? ¡Escúchame, atiéndeme!
5. ¡Concédeme (te lo ruego)![8] ¡Hazme vivir por tiempo indeterminado, protégeme, susténtame!
6. Y esta ofrenda mía recibeme, donde quieras que estés, ¡Huiracocha!

1. O Wiracocha of the beginning of the world, Wiracocha of the end of the world, the principal and excellent Wiracocha!
2. O creator, provider! /You/ who said, "Be a man, be a woman" to everything you made.[9]

[8] Here and hereinafter: the text in round brackets is an insertion by the editor of the Spanish version of the prayer texts provided in C. de Molina's chronicle.

[9] Meaning that Wiracocha created the world as a being of two sexes.

3. /Everything/[10] has been created and brought to life by you (in this world), /where/ peacefully and securely I can live.
4. Where are you? Are you outside /the world/? Are you inside / the world/? Are you in a cloud? Are you in a shadow? Hear me, attend to me!
5. Grant me (what I ask of you)! Let me live for at least some time indeterminately,[11] protect me, sustain me!
6. And accept my offering /wherever/ you would like to be, Wiracocha!

II

1. ¡Oh Huiracocha; generoso, omnipotente, victorioso Huiracocha,
2. hay hombres que son: dadivosos, pobres y pobrísimos
3. tus hombres que creaste y colocaste (en este mundo) estén sanos y salvos con su mujer y su hijo.
4. Escoge a todos no a pocos.
5. Que por largo tiempo vivan sin falencias, sin interrupciones.
6. Que coman. Que beban.

1. O, Wiracocha – generous, omnipotent, victorious Wiracocha,
2. People are as /they/ are: charitable, poor and very poor.
3. /That/ your men, whom you created and dispersed (in this world) would live and be well /each one/ with their wife and son.
4. Elect all, not a few.
5. That /they/ would live for a long time without poverty,[12] and without interruptions.[13]
6. That /they/ would have something to eat, and that /they/ would have something to drink.

[10] Here and hereinafter: the text between forward slashes is the author's insertion.

[11] Meaning 'freely', 'without worries', 'without frames'.

[12] The word 'falencia' means 'falsity' in Spain but 'poverty' in the Pacific coast dialects of South America.

[13] Meaning 'lastingly'.

III

¡Oh Huiracocha, Huiracocha del principio del mundo! Hacedor perfecto. El que crea. El que provee,
2. Al (hombre) que colocaste y creaste en este mundo bajo, diciendo: "que coma y que beba", la comida lo haga proliferar.
3. La papa, el maiz y todo género de comestibles los tenga.
4. Haz cumplir lo ofrecido.
5. Acreciente para que no padezca escasez, y no padeciéndola crea en ti.
6. Que no hiele que no haga daño.
7. En paz consérvalo.

1. O Wiracocha, Wiracocha of the beginning of the world! Perfect maker, who created, who provided.
2. To those (people) whom you dispersed and created down in this earth, /to whom you/ said, "that you would eat and that you would drink", may /their/ food proliferate.
3. May they have potato, maize and every good edible thing.
4. Make what they have desired happen.
5. Let grow so that no scarcity be suffered, and /let it be so that/ / what/ has been created by you will not diminish.
6. That cold would not deprive, would not do damage.
7. /That/ it would be kept in peace.

IV

¡Oh Huiracocha tú eres quien ordenaque se hagan el día y la noche, que amanezca y brille la luz:
2. a tu hijo, el sol, lentamente hazlo caminar (en el) limpido (cielo) para que benéficamente alumbre al hombre que es tu creatura!
3. ¡Oh Huiracocha, mientras el sol se oculte (en la noche) a los (hombres) que apacientas dales serena y apacible luz lunar!
4. ¡Alúmbralos, sin enfermarlos, sin causarles molestias, antes bien, presérvalos en paz y libres de cuidados!

1. O Wiracocha, you are the one who arranges that there be day and night, and that light would dawn and shine:

2. to your son the Sun, create a path of walking leisurely (in the) limpid (sky), in order that by doing good /there would be/ the shine of light to man, who is your creation!
3. O Wiracocha, the time when the sun hides itself (in the night), give (to men) whom you teach dew at night and gentle moonlight!
4. Let light shine upon them without making them sick, without molesting them; instead, preserve them in peace and in the liberty of protection![14]

V

¡Oh Huiracocha, Huiracocha diligente: el poderoso Inca tu hijo – que para tu servidor creaste – tenga sanos y salvos a los hombres.
2. Que además los sustente.
3.-4. Solamente a los campesinos les dé el Inca los víveres, si los hubiere, para que gocen.
5. ¡Oh Huiracocha, a tu creatura el poderoso Inca – compadécele.
6. Concédele.
7. Protégele.
8. Susténtale indefinidamente.

1. O Wiracocha, diligent Wiracocha: your son /is/ the mighty Inca – whom you created to be your servant – may the people have life and health.
2. In addition, sustain them.
3.–4. In particular the land tillers, to them may the Inca give food supplies,
indeed let them have that which would make them happy.[15]
5. O Wiracocha, be compassionate to the one you created, to the mighty Inca.
6. Grant him /riches/.
7. Protect him.
8. Sustain him indefinitely.

[14] Meaning 'under your full protection'.

[15] An abstruse phrase. Apparently, the idea of the prayer is that Wiracocha give the Inca power to be divinely generous to his people.

VI[16]

¡Oh Huiracocha, Tijsi[17] Huiracocha de Amaybamba,[18] oh hualpayhuana[19] Huiracocha, Hatun[20] Huiracocha de Urcos,[21] oh Tarapaca[22] Huiracocha:
ordenaste que exista el poderoso, el Inca, para mi.
2. A él que lo creaste consérvalo en paz y salvo. Sus hombres, sus vasallos proliferen, y sus enemigos venza hasta el fin de los tiempos.
3. ¡Oh Huiracocha, sin mermar[23] a su hijos y descendientes consérvalo en paz!

1. O, Wiracocha, Tijsi Wiracocha of the Amaybamba /people/, o hualpayhauana Wiracocha, the high Wiracocha of the Urco /people/, o Tarapaca Wiracocha: you arrange /everything/ that exists, mightily for the Inca, for me.
2. Keep him[24] whom you have created in peace and health. May his men, his vassals proliferate, and avenge his enemies to the end of the ages.
3. O Wiracocha, forever keep his sons and descendants in peace!

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[16] The concepts in the Quechua language have been translated using the following dictionary: Tschudi, Joachim Jacob von. *Die Ketschua-Sprache. Dritte Abteilung: Wörterbuch*. Wien, Aus der Kaiserlich-Königlichen Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1853.

[17] Correctly, Ticsi, one of Wiracocha's epithets, which in Quechua means Origin, Basis, Source, as well as Underlying Surface, Foundation.

[18] Amaybamba – apparently one of the peoples of ancient Peru.

[19] 'hualpayhuana' (in Quechua) – creator and rectifier.

[20] 'Hatun' (in Quechua) – high, majestic, sovereign.

[21] Urcos – apparently one of the peoples of ancient Peru.

[22] A difficult-to-translate epithet in Quechua, which may approximately mean Mysterious, Hidden.

[23] 'Sin mermar' literally means 'without decrease'; in the context of a prayer a suitable match would be 'lastingly'.

[24] Meaning 'The Inca', i.e. The Emperor.

Discussion

According to L. Mäll's theory, one should seek texts that originate from the cultural hero Wiracocha as a teacher, contain elements of his human teachings, provide information about himself, have been recorded in some form by his disciples and have inspired the writing of new texts.

In explicit terms, we do not find anything like this. First, the reader will notice that all of the textual illustrations are prayers – addresses by a praying person to a god by the name of Wiracocha. Second, it can be concluded from the content of the prayers that Wiracocha continues to be the creator-god, not a cultural hero. Third, the author of this paper has not found any text, and not even any reference to a text, that contains the teachings of Wiracocha himself. Fourth, none of the texts are directly doctrinal in terms of their content. Fifth, the authorship of the hymns is anonymous. Sixth, there are no reports of the older texts having inspired the writing of newer ones, although that cannot be ruled out. Consequently, the reader does not discern the existence of a teacher; neither does there appear to be any teaching.

Nevertheless, an interesting fact can be observed. Text 1 is a festive hymn and Text 6 is more of a ruler's prayer, but in Prayers 2–5 one can find very humanistic features. In all prayers, Wiracocha is regarded as a good god. Man is regarded fairly realistically, with both good qualities and imperfections (see Text 2, Verse 2). Mercy is besought for all people, not only a few (Text 2, Verse 4). Sufficient food and drink for all is requested (Text 3, Verse 2). Light, health, peace and security are entreated for all people (Text 4, Verse 4). In the first, Inca hymn, Wiracocha is also asked to grant life, health and food to all people (Text 5, Verses 1-4). This is remarkable, particularly in the light of the fact that ancient prayers are generally quite individualistic and supplicant-centred.

The basic structure of the prayers is probably very old and dates from the pre-Incan era. This is implied by Wiracocha being regarded as a creator-god. At the same time, although there are no explicit passages of text that would depict Wiracocha as a teacher and cultural hero, one can observe indirect indications of a once widespread humanistic doctrine. Wiracocha as a teacher was apparently a semi-mythical or semi-historical figure; his histori-

cal prototype may have been Manco Capak, the first ruler of the Incas.

The absence of explicitly humanistic teachings may even make sense, since the Incan Empire represented an early totalitarian system.[25] In the official ideology, only one part of the teaching was retained – the ideas of the Inca state as the centre of civilisation[26] and of the Inca as the Son of the Sun. Humanistic ideas, on the other hand, were censored, and they were permitted to slide into oblivion. Thus marginalised, they only survived in the form of prayer phrases in hymns to the beloved creator-god. The retention of the ideas was further complicated by the absence of a character-based writing system and the fairly selective recording of old Inca texts in the colonial era.

Conclusions

The extant Wiracocha-hymns definitely do not comply with the criteria for humanistic base texts. Instead, we may maintain that prayers to Wiracocha are representative of theistic texts.

Nevertheless, a number of arguments suggest that the semi-mythological cultural hero Wiracocha as a teacher may have actually existed. An occasional prayer phrase permits the proposition that his teaching might have been humanistic. It may therefore be assumed, but not without considerable qualifications, that some sort of humanistic teaching once existed in Incan religion.

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[25] For more information, see Kulmar, Tarmo. Die Totalität des Inkareiches und die Rolle der Religion. – *Trames*. No. 1, Vol 6(56/51), 2002.

[26] Cf. the name of the Inca state, *Tahuantinsuyu* – 'The State of the Four Quarters' (In Quechua).

Humane Concepts in Hittite Culture

Jaan Puhvel

"Humanity", "humaneness" and similar terms are often relativistic notions embedded in the minds of observers. It may not take much to appear comparatively "humane" in the face of habitual harshness and callous cruelty in such codified ancient Near Eastern sources as Assyrian laws, "Deuteronomy", or the Avestan "Videvdat", or in Mesopotamian political doings from the Annals of Ashurbanipal to the latest dispatches from contemporary Iraq. Compared to such reputation, associable with the relevant populations, the early Sumerians and the peripheral Hittites have drawn the attention of historians for relatively more civilized customs and practices. In the Hittite instance, notable scholars like Albrecht Goetze (*Hethiter, Churriter und Assyrer*, 1936), Ferdinand Sommer (*Hethiter und Hethitisch*, 1947), and Alfonso Archi (*Florilegium Anatolicum*, 1979) have remarked about "moderation" manifested in the ancient records with regard to societal and official mores.

Such "moderation", however, did not stand in total polar contrast to the neighborhood. It was on occasion matched by wider ranges of common decency. Official crudity did not snuff out nobler sentiment, as still manifested in the ancient "wisdom literature" of the area (e.g. "Ecclesiastes"; cf. W. G. Lambert, *Babylonian Wisdom Literature*, 1959). When a Hittite admonition (KBo III 23 IV 7–8) enjoins *nu kisduwanti NINDA-an pai* [*hatanti*] *YÀ-an pai nekumanti-ma TÚG-an pai* 'Give bread to the hungry, give oil to the parched, give a garment to the naked!', it matches verbatim admonitions found on Egyptian Middle Kingdom tombstones (cf. Albrecht Goetze, *Kleinasien*², 1957: 90) and in Assyrian texts such as *bariuti issabbu ubbuluti ussatminu mirišutu kuzippi uktattima*: 'the hungry have been sated, the parched have been salved, the naked have been covered with cloak' (cf. K. H. Deller, *Revue d'assyriologie* 61 [1967]: 189).

Expressions of compassion and charity are thus not peculiar to the Hittites, nor can uniqueness be claimed for legal protection of

the bereaved and orphaned. But in addition to articulating such moral imperatives, the Hittites sometimes adhered to higher standards. In the solar prayers to the divine justicer Shamash, which in the main resemble Babylonian prototypes, the case of the orphan is followed by the following declaration of "animal rights" (KUB XXXI 127 + XXXVI 79 I 42–44): *nu UR.ZÍR-as ŠAH-ass-a hannessar hannattari suppalann-a hannessar issit kuyēs ŪL memiskanzi apatt-a hannattari*: 'Justice to dog and pig thou dispensest, and justice to cattle that do not speak with mouth, that too thou dispensest'. Thus dumb animals were subject to direct divine concern and jurisdiction, rather than subordinated to mankind in the manner of "Genesis". Such an attitude takes two and a half millennia to recur in world tradition, with Saint Francis of Assisi and Jacopone da Todi, in whose "Dies irae" all creatures have their day in divine court *(resurget creatura iudicanti responsura).* In the Near East of the second millennium BCE such a sentiment is quite unique and out of context.

In an age and region of pharaonic despotism and other "divine kingship" it is startling to find that the Hittite ruler, even while gradually donning more trappings of oriental pageantry (such as the title "My Sun"), was a mere mortal whose only hint of posthumous apotheosis lay in the past-tense euphemism *siunis kisat* 'became a god'. His power was regulated by rudiments of basic law ("Edict of Telipinus") and some form of parliamentary assembly (*pankus*). He had beside him a female co-regent, a ruling queen in her own right whose term was not tied to his and who could be either his consort or the dowager of a predecessor. Such sharing of power at the top of government is also without parallel.

At the other end of the social hierarchy, the status and position of the unfree was ambivalent but distinct from total abject enslavement or serfdom elsewhere and down the corridors of time to Ancient Rome and later eras. A nuanced Hittite terminology is not discernible, as the pervasive sumerogram *ARAD* denotes everything from servant to subject to serf to slave.

At one level an *ARAD* was legally at the mercy of his master, subject to the latter's will and whim, as stated by Mursilis II in one of his Plague Prayers (KUB XIV 8 Rs. 25–28): *mān ANA ARAD-TI kuedanikki wastul wastul-ma-zza-kan ANA PANI EN-ŠU tarnāi n-an EN-ŠU kuit apiya iezzi n-an iezzi wastul-ma-za-as ANA PANI EN-*

ŠU kuit tarnāi nu ANA EN-ŠU Zl-anza warsiyazzi nu EN-ŠU apūn ARAD-TI EGIR-pa ŪL kappuuizzi 'if some *ARAD* is at fault but confesses fault before his master, his master can then do to him what he pleases; but because he confesses fault before his master, his master's spirit is placated and his master does not settle scores with that *ARAD*'. Such prayerful reference to humane treatment may be self-serving on the part of the king, since it offers an analog to his own confession of sins as a soi-disant *ARAD* of the storm-god, in order to crave abatement of the plague. In real life, crude and summary abuse of underlings is attested, as in the rules for both court and temple servants. In KUB XIII 3, royal employees such as cobblers, coachmen and bath attendants are warned about "bad death" (*idalu henkan*) for covering up even seemingly trivial derelictions, and the same is threatened for their families. Similar cruelty is evident in the instructions for temple officials, where (KUB XIII 4 I 28–30) *mān ARAD-ŠU kuwapi EN-ŠU TUKU.TUKU-nuzi n-an-kan nassu kunanzi nasma-kan KIR$_{14}$-ŠU IGI.HI.A-ŠU GEŠTU.HI.A-ŠU idalauahhanzi* 'if an *ARAD* ever angers his master, they either kill him or mutilate his nose, eyes, and ears', likewise followed by threats of collective punishment for the family. In the Law Code (par. 95 and 99), a burglarizing or incendiary *ARAD* has his nose and ears cut off, while a freeman merely pays compensation. In paragraph 170, a freeman who kills a snake and utters another person's name (a form of magic) gets a heavy fine, but an *ARAD* doing so is put to death.

And yet, throughout the Law Code, an *ARAD* (or female *GEMĒ*) enjoys much the same protection against personal injury as a free person, albeit at a fraction of the indemnification, e.g. 1/2 for a lost nose, 1/4 for a bitten-off ear (par. 13–16). Perhaps the unfree as chattels reflected "investment", so that their fractional compensation was based on a "damaged goods" policy rather than personal injury. Still, family law even regulated intermarriage of the free and unfree (par. 31–34); thus the latter enjoyed some measure of civil status.

Apart from this vexed matter of free vs. unfree, the Law Code generally evinces a trend towards lesser and more enlightened sanctions across the board, away from cruel and physical penalties. In paragraph 92, a beehive thief was "of old" exposed to massive beestings, but "now" six shekels of silver will do as punishment.

In paragraph 101, the stealer of a vine "formerly" suffered some kind of spear-strike, but the current penal levy is six shekels from a freeman, only three from an *ARAD*. In 121, the thief of a plow would once have had his neck "fixed" in a certain way, involving action by plowoxen, but "nowadays" the fines equal those in paragraph 101. Similarly in 166–167, a man who sowed seed on top of another man's cultivation had his neck placed on a plow and was torn between two teams of oxen, which were then also killed for good measure; but "these days" a sacrifice of sheep is all it takes to atone, plus 30 breadloaves and 3 jugs of beer to the wronged party. Here Hittite law has done away with a cruel custom which recalls the decapitation of a grain thief with a plow 25 centuries later in the Hanseatic laws of Lübeck, with traces in German and Estonian folklore (cf. Oskar Loorits, *Grundzüge des estnischen Volksglaubens* 2, 1951: 87). Substitute offerings of sheep also involve slaves who have committed *hurkel*, i.e. capital crimes of a sexual nature (par. 196), but here economic rather than humane considerations may have prevailed (why do away with chattel merely for being immoral?).

A notable feature of Hittite legislation is the scarcity of penal killing and the absence of the areally notorious "eye for an eye" mentality. In the Law Code, death for freemen is practically restricted to certain aggravated sex crimes and to defiance of state authority: "If someone quashes an official judgment, they shall cut off his head" (par. 173; curiously in the same breath "if an *ARAD* frees himself from his master, he goes to pot" (KBo VI 26 II 15 *ANA* ^{DUG}*ÚTUL paizzi*, whatever that implies [confinement in a jar?]). Killing of political adversaries was already rejected by the lawmaker Telipinus, who in his Edict thought of better ways to neutralize defeated opponents condemned by the *pankus*: KBo III 1 II 28–30 *kuwat-war-i akkanzi nu-war-us IGI.HI.A-wa munnanzi n-us LUGAL-us karsaus* ^{LÚMEŠ}*APIN.LAL iyanun* 'Why put them to death? One can lower their sights. So I the king made them plain plowmen', commuting the death sentence to agricultural servitude.

A trend towards less cruelty and greater civility is thus indeed a hallmark of Hittite culture. The royal annals contain their share of military ferocity (cf. Jaan Puhvel, "Verba delendi: Pentagonese in Hittite", *Epilecta Indoeuropaea* 2002: 145–147) but often entail sparing civilian townsfolk rather than draping city walls with flayed human hides in the hideous Assyrian manner. Relative humane-

ness appears in royal pronouncements from the earliest, e.g. the notable edict (KBo XXII 1) in which a ruler invokes the precedent of his own father in remonstrating with nobles who are insensitive to the plight of the poor:

> Ye oppress the workers... Observe my father's word (if ye do not know it, are there not oldsters who can tell you my father's word?): When Father calls you to meeting, he seeks out blame in you... Ye keep giving the king cause for anger... Even as he prescribes, has he not had a tablet inscribed for you nobles: "Look after the land, do not suck the blood of the poor... From the poor man thou takest what is his and dost not do him justice." This is how ye have carried out the word of my father!

Curiously the very term for the nobles' failure is the rare word *gullakkuwan* (KBo XXII 1, 16–17 *nu-smas gullakkuwan sahzi* 'he seeks out blame in you'), cognate with Greek *bláptein* 'harm' and *blásphēma* 'harmsaying, scandal' (hence English 'blame'). Ironically, the same weighty word is uttered by a later king in the instructions for court servants (KUB XIII 3), when the autocrat discovers a piece of hair in his washbasin and exclaims *ki-wa gullakuwan* 'this is scandalous!', summons the responsible bathroom attendant and packs him off to a water ordeal to determine if there is room for cleansing ritual or whether such terminal defilement calls for the death penalty.

Alas, our final inquiry has produced a mixed bag as before, from touching concern for the poor at an early date to petty and cruel hygienic overkill by a touchy later potentate. All in all, the Hittites come across as alternately humane and merely human.

Soul and Body: Some Aspects of Luke's Redaction on the Topic

Randar Tasmuth

1. *Introduction*

Different approaches to the topic are possible. Firstly I will briefly refer to our Estonian context and then turn to the ancient environment of the writings of Luke.

In order to understand which associations Estonian readers may have in regard to the words *soul* and *body*, I picked up these words in our new Estonian Encyclopaedia. There are two basic designations in Estonian for the organic or natural basis of human beings – *keha* and *ihu*, both of which designate body (or respectively *corpse* and *body*, German *Körper* and *Leib*). The latter word, *ihu*, is often used in theological and other religious texts and in the Estonian Bible usually stands for the Greek σῶμα. The word *ihu* is nevertheless absent in the Estonian Encyclopaedia. The reason for this is not clear, since such words like *bodyguard* and *corporal punishment* are explained.[1] The word *keha* is used in secular language and should be understood in parallel with *body* and *Leib*.[2] On the other hand, the word *hing*, which generally signifies *soul*, is explained as a word that is understood in the history of philosophy in different ways and is usually the same as psyche or consciousness.[3] The Estonian

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1 *Ihukaitse* ja *ihunuhtlus*; see ENE 3 (1988), 553.

2 *Keha* is a material whole consisting of tissues and organs (see ENE 4 (1989, 441).

3 *Hing*; see ENE 3 (1988), 417.

Encyclopaedia does not offer much help in understanding the biblical use of the words under discussion.

It is today recognized that the use of modern Western terminology to describe non-Western beliefs influences our analysis, since it assumes the existence among other peoples of the same semantic fields for modern words. Sometimes new terms are introduced, but new dangers appear. Though the modern term *soul* does not correspond to the Ancient word ψυχή, one cannot avoid using both terms.

It is not completely unimportant in which order to discuss these words; die *RGG*[3] defines *soul* (Seele) in Volume 5 (pp. 1634–1636), but does not speak of *body* (Leib) there. In Volume 4 (pp. 286–291), *Leib* (*body*) is presented only together with *Seele* (*Soul*).[4] It seems to be a custom to put the word *body* first and then to speak jointly about body and soul. In the Gospel of Luke the noun σῶμα occurs 13 times (in Mark 4 and in Matthew 14 times), and the noun ψυχή 14 times (in Mark 8 and in Matthew 16 times). Luke and Matthew use both words nearly equally, and much more than one of their common sources – Mark. In Luke the usage of both words is arithmetically balanced, but since ψυχή occurs first in the beginning of the gospel narrative (1:46: *My soul magnifies the Lord*) and often stands first when both words are mentioned (Luke 12:22–23), I begin the study with the noun *soul*.

I shall study the use of these terms both separately and also in relation to each other. I would like to specify how Luke may have understood these terms or categories on the basis of the use of these words in the gospel. Relevant pericopies will be studied to clarify how Luke used the sources and take into account the Hellenistic background. Luke's immediate sources were Mark and other early Christian writings like the Sayings Gospel (Q). Thus I will study what kind of editorial changes Luke made to the text of Mark and how he utilised Q in comparison with Matthew.

I presuppose that Luke's intended readers were Gentile Christians in a predominantly Gentile environment, and thus Luke prob-

[4] See *Leib und Seele* in *RGG*[3] 4 (1960), 286. The article begins with the statement that "Das Verhältnis zwischen L. und S. ist – trotz aller gegenteiligen Behauptungen von Religionstheoretikern – schon unter den primitiven Völkern ein aktuelles Problem".

ably had a wide Greek-speaking readership in mind. A comparison of his views with the Classic Greek and Hellenistic background is inevitable. In addition to that, one should pay attention to the twofold scriptural tradition of Israel, which has both Semitic (Hebrew Old Testament) and Greek (Septuagint) literary traditions. How are Luke's views related to the Greek culture? Does Luke limit the use of the terms *body* and *soul* to the anthropological sphere, or are these terms somehow extended beyond it? If this is the case, which theological references do these terms have? I describe the written background for the formation of the views of Luke as double-layered. The following model exemplifies my approach to the topic:

layer I: Classic and Hellenistic Greco-Roman literature and Scripture (the *Septuagint*)
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
layer II: The *Gospel of Mark*, ... ↓ ... Q, other writings and traditions
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
The Gospel of Luke

The second layer, Christian writings before Luke, is the immediate and direct source for Luke, but these Christian writings are themselves influenced by the legacy of the first level, which comprises Greek and Hebrew literary heritage. In addition, the influence of the writings of layer I that formed part of the cultural background of Luke and his readers may also have had an immediate influence upon Luke. In order to find Luke's editorial elements in his work, one must take into consideration a variety of earlier literary documents, Gentile, Jewish and Christian. I first refer to the anthropological ideas that one may expect to find among the Greek speaking population, and then to the Old Testament. This helps to put the respective texts of Luke in focus.

2. *Soul in the History of the Greek World*

2.1. The early use of the word

This introductory part deals with the features of soul and body that may have had an influence on the views of Luke. How are soul and body appreciated, and how is judgement performed? What is the function, meaning and destiny of soul and body as part of what we now call anthropology?

It is believed that at the earliest accessible level, the Greeks did not yet have a unitary concept of body and mind[5], and Greek has no words for our concepts of body and soul. The word σῶμα simply designates the living organism, the corpse. Since ψυχή is probably etymologically related to ψύχω "to blow (to cool)" and seems to be the vital force that resides in the members and finds expression in the breath, the reference is to the breath-soul.[6] Thus it seems that the soul was related to the body at the very beginning of the literary use of Greek, and their presentation together is quite natural, since both words were used as central anthropological characteristics. It is assumed that Homer distinguished between a free soul and a bodily soul.[7]

According to Homer (*Il.* 9.322), in battle the soul is endangered, which implies that the soul was associated with the life. After leaving man at the moment of death, the soul (*psychē*) goes to the underworld (Hom. *Il.* 5.654). Though so close to the life and breath of man, the soul seems not to have specifically intellectual or otherwise spiritual functions. Since the soul was believed to go to the underworld, however, from the 7th century BCE onwards the ψυχή must guarantee the continuity of life in this world and life in the world to come. *Psychē* somehow represented the identity of the deceased.[8] It may also be said that "it was the 'life' of an individual which was lost at death, and it alone survived in Hades as an

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[5] Bremmer, Jan. 1983. *The Early Greek Concept of the Soul.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 8.

[6] Dihle, A. ψυχή κτλ. *TDNT* 9, 609.

[7] Bremmer, Jan. 1983, 13.

[8] Bremmer, Jan. 1983, 76.

'image' (εἴδωλον)".[9] The description of the εἴδωλον suggests that the Greeks believed the dead soul looked like the living being.[10] This view widens the function of the soul beyond the earthly existence of man. The *psyche* was probably conceived of as a material substance, very fine and akin to air and aether, but material nonetheless. This possibly did not mean that the Greeks thought the soul was corporeal. It is quite probable that "'material' did not mean the same as 'corporeal', and 'immaterial' did not equal 'incorporeal'".[11] Nevertheless, souls were described as having corporeal qualities.

After that, there appeared ideas that later exercised a long-lasting influence on Christian thinking. The idea of the σῶμα as the tomb of the soul arises in the Orphic and Pythagorean schools.[12] The path for the understanding of the relative separation of the soul from the body finds its beginning here. A little later, in the period after 500 BCE, ψυχή is commonly used as a term for human thought, will and emotion. It is possible that the psychological designation of the soul as it is usually understood today had its origin in the ideology of these 5th-century Greek thinkers.

2.2. Platonic and Post-Platonic understanding of the soul

The shift from ideas where the soul was predominantly associated with life and breath to the view that ψυχή has moral connotations is probably expressed by Socrates, who paved the way for Plato. Attention (ἡ ἐπιμέλεια) paid to the soul made way for the idea that man may be judged by the state of his soul. Here one can note a tendency to determine values according to the state of mind. Apparently, according to Socrates, profit and loss are merely that which makes the soul better or worse.[13]

Plato also supports this idea, but by analysing human mental processes, divided the soul into parts that have different worth

[9] Riley, Gregory J. *Resurrection Reconsidered: Thomas and John in Controversy.* Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995, 29.

[10] Bremmer, Jan. 1983, 73.

[11] Lehtipuu, Outi. *The Afterlife Imagery in Luke's Story of the Rich Man and Lazarus.* Academic dissertation. University of Helsinki, 2004, 215.

[12] Dihle, A. ψυχή κτλ. *TDNT* 9, 611.

[13] „Nutzen und Schaden bedeuten allein das, was die Seele des einzelnen Menschen besser oder schlechter mache" (Dihle, A. ψυχή κτλ. *TWNT* 9, 609).

according to adjectives that characterise the soul. Of these parts (λογιστικόν, θυμοειδές and ἐπιθυμητικόν) the cognitive component, λογιστικόν, communicates most strongly with pure being, which is accessible only to thought. This development of psychological philosophy leads to the teaching "that moral struggle is a flight from the world of the senses and approximation to intelligible being, i.e. to God".[14] The pre-eminent part of the soul, λογιστικόν, is pre-existent and immortal, and is thus not bound by the finitude of the world of the senses. Moreover, according to Plato it is only souls that are judged.[15]

In the Stoics, a narrower correspondence between the individual soul and the world soul may be illustrated by the picture according to which the individual soul is a broken-off part of the world soul, with which it will be reunited at death. In the philosophical language of the Hellenistic period, the soul denotes the totality of functions of soul and mind. The soul was understood even as "a kind of 'body', complete with its own mental and spiritual faculties".[16] Later popular ideas suggest that the soul is the impalpable essential core of man, the bearer of thought, will and emotion. However, the connection to life did not disappear totally, since the expression σῶσαι πολλὰς ψυχάς (to save many human lives)[17] was reminiscent of the most ancient meaning of the soul.

3. The Greek understanding of the body

3.1. The older use of the word σῶμα

Whereas the soul was associated with life, the word σῶμα crops up for the first time for a dead human or animal body. Thus men and animals have something in common, since σῶμα is used to designate the material existence of both of them. In comparison with animals, however, in Homer the ψυχή is specifically human. It is not ψυχή but θυμός that leaves the members of an animal at death (*Il.*

[14] Dihle, A. ψυχή κτλ. *TDNT* 9, 613.

[15] Lehtipuu, O. 2004, 217.

[16] Riley, G. 1995, 41.

[17] Dihle, A. ψυχή κτλ. *TDNT* 9, 617.

23.880 etc).[18] Later, in the 5th century, another meaning was attached to the word *body*. In Herodotus it means "trunk" as distinct from the head, κεφαλή, but also the whole "body".

Sheer corporeality is emphasised in the places where σῶμα is understood in its limitation as physical existence that ends with death. In earlier times the Greeks held the view that at death man is abandoned by the vital force, the breath-soul, and thus becomes σῶμα, a corpse. In the Orphics, the mortal body complements the immortal soul, and then the σῶμα is understood as the σῆμα (tomb) of the soul.

3.2. The concept of σῶμα in Plato, Aristotle and later centuries

Naturally, σῶμα still primarily means the body, which is the object of the physician's care. The inorganic materials used by artists are also, however, referred to as σώματα. The body is the visible part of man, which is human and mortal. In Plato the body is merely a dwelling for the pre-existent soul, even "an evil in which man is trapped like an oyster in its shell, and which is thus to be despised and avoided as much as possible".[19] It is no wonder that in that case death is the liberation of the soul, which departs from the body and therewith alone becomes pure, since the body is a mixture of all kinds of things. In addition to that, the body is related to the cosmos. Democritus formulated the principle that man is a microcosm, and Plato understood the cosmos as a soulful, animated and rationally controlled being.

In accord with Aristotle's philosophy, σῶμα is primarily the human body, either including the head or as the trunk, as opposed to the head.[20] In contrast to Plato, however, the body is primary and is viewed as having existed before the soul, and the soul cannot be separated from the body, its εἶδος. In later Stoicism, σῶμα is used to refer to the human body, and the head is the most important member thereof. The element of totality in this term is visible. For Epictetus, death is separation from the body, and hence the

[18] Dihle, A. ψυχή κτλ. *TDNT* 9, 611, note 6.

[19] Schweizer, E. σῶμα κτλ. *TDNT* 7, 1028.

[20] σῶμα is „...der menschliche *Körper*, so dass er ein haupt hat, oder dass er als *Rumpf* diesem entgegengestellt wird" (Schweizer, E. σῶμα κτλ. *TWNT* 7, 1030).

death of the body is not to be feared, only that of the soul. An interesting application of the term *body* appears in the allegorisation of the myth of Dionysios. The rending and restoration of Dionysios is interpreted as a description of the grape-harvest and the flowing of the wine into *one* σῶμα. Such stories with lively pictures of everyday life[21] were very memorable and probably widespread around the Mediterranean. The body is here surrounded by a strong sense of collectivism and emotional flavour surely felt by those who were present at these festivals. Here I will merely refer to the imaginative symbolism that wine and σῶμα possess in this story and also in the Christian Eucharist.

4. The Semitic background of the soul and body

4.1. The soul in the Hebrew Scriptures

Scripture forms an essential part of the background of Luke's work. The usual Hebrew term for ψυχή in the LXX is נֶפֶשׁ , though רוּחַ is also twice translated as ψυχή (Gn. 41:8; Ex. 35:21). For the interpretation of the New Testament use of the ψυχή, it is essential to bear in mind that the word is also used for *life* and *heart*. Sometimes it appears that the three words *soul*, *life*, and *heart* were so closely related that they could be viewed as interchangeable, and thus it is difficult to define and translate נֶפֶשׁ. Problems involving translation into Greek may have several reasons, among which the theology of creation is not insignificant. When the Lord God formed man from the dust of the ground, the *breath of life* that the Lord God breathed into the nostrils of man turned man into a living being, i.e. a *living soul* (נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה Gen. 2:7).

It is neither possible nor necessary to follow the whole Old Testament use and connotations of the term נֶפֶשׁ, but one may refer to them briefly. The wide spectrum of usually anthropologically relevant terms often used in the places where נֶפֶשׁ seems to be quite appropriate demonstrates the richness of the meaning of this uni-

[21] One may imagine the influence of the imagery of the myth which "...der Zerreissung und Wiedervereinigung des Dionysos ... als Beschreibung der Traubenernte und des Zusammenfliessens des Weines zu einem σῶμα interpretiert." (Schweizer, E. σῶμα κτλ. *TWNT 7*, 1035).

versal designation. The word *soul* simply manifests the variety of signs of life and vitality, and breath seems to have the constitutive effect. Among other characteristics is *blood*. The relation between נֶפֶשׁ and blood may be independent of the relation between נֶפֶשׁ and breath, but the three still belong together. Basic to both connections is the view that the body is a living organism, since every form of life disappears when breath and blood leave the body. It is partly perhaps because of this connection that נֶפֶשׁ describes and designates a man's overall nature.

It has been suggested that the meaning of the word *soul* developed in two main directions that might be defined in terms of form and movement. In a certain way "the נֶפֶשׁ is almost always connected with a form. It has no existence apart from the body, and there is some similarity with the views of Aristotle. Hence the best translation in many instances is "person" comprised in corporeal reality".[22] According to that, each individual is seen as a *soul*, and when the text speaks of a single *soul* for a totality, the totality is understood as a single person. There is also, however, the aspect of movement, where the נֶפֶשׁ becomes manifest in orientation to an object. The fact that *soul* may refer to sex drive, hatred, pain, sorrow and striving after God suggests that נֶפֶשׁ may also be understood as an expression of the *will*.

The antithetical relation between *flesh* and *spirit* is too complicated and capacious to be dealt with here. In sum, the anthropology of the Hebrew Scripture shares common features with the other Near Eastern peoples. Israelite anthropology is monistic, and man is always seen in his totality, not as an abstraction, but always set in a specific situation. Dualistic patterns that originated from the times of Plato do not generally occur.

4.2. Is there a Hebrew equivalent to the Greek σῶμα?

This question is very relevant in interpreting Paul, but the issue cannot be avoided if one reads Luke 24:36-43. In searching for synonyms, one usually thinks about the *flesh*, which has a certain difference in meaning in comparison to the *body*. In some texts בָּשָׂר has quite a material meaning, "edible flesh" and is used 104 times in

[22] Jacob, E. נֶפֶשׁ (ψυχή κτλ.), *TWNT* 9, 620.

the LXX in reference to animals and 169 times in reference to men.[23] When בָּשָׂר is not associated with נֶפֶשׁ, it is often used to denote man in his weakness, and means that he must perish, and his days are few. The Pauline understanding of the *flesh* (σάρξ), however, should not be associated with the OT use, where the *flesh* does not stand in moral opposition to the spirit or God, but emphasises the mortality and weakness of man.

It is much easier to make linguistic statistics than to draw theological conclusions. In an extended sense *flesh* denotes the body of men and animals, referring to all living creatures. It seems that there are no strict equivalents to the Greek σῶμα in Hebrew, since בָּשָׂר is translated in many different ways in the Septuagint: for בָּשָׂר the word σάρξ is used 145 times, κρέας 79, σῶμα 23, and χρώς 14 times.[24] This alone demonstrates sufficiently that there is no exact Hebrew equivalent to the Greek σῶμα. For the translators of the Septuagint σῶμα offered a Greek concept that had not yet been developed in Hebrew. For Luke this concept formed part of his point of departure in writing the gospel.

4.3. Hellenistic influences in Judaism

The Hellenistic features in Judaism were largely based on the general use of Greek. In addition to the Septuagint there were also influential Apocalyptic and Pseudepigraphal writings. Though the meaning of specific and important words was probably taken into consideration by the authors and translators of these works, the often lexically unavoidable equation of נֶפֶשׁ and ψυχή nevertheless caused problems. In classical and post-classical Greek, the idea of the soul as an essential incorporeal core of man that can be thought of as distinct from the body emerges, but the conviction that ψυχή gives worth and duration to the human self beyond the limits of physical existence is alien to the Old Testament. In addition, when used to denote a bearer of intellect, ψυχή in Greek usage no longer corresponds to the Hebrew נֶפֶשׁ.

In non-canonical writings, one often finds expressions which correspond to the customary Old Testament usage. At the same time,

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[23] Jacob, E. ψυχη κτλ., *TWNT* 9, 622.

[24] Schweizer, E. σάρξ, *TWNT* 7, 108.

there are instances, however, in which psychologised meaning appears. 1 Macc. 1:48 tells that the soul is scandalised by the non-observance of the Law that demands circumcision (... βδελύξαι τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν). In this relation between the body and the soul, the latter means the inner man. Moreover, in the Wisdom of Solomon, probably composed in the first century BCE,[25] the ideas connected with ψυχή are morally flavoured and reminiscent of Socrates and Plato. According to Wis. 1:4, *wisdom will not enter a deceitful soul, or dwell in a body enslaved to sin*, and Wis. 9:15 says that *a perishable body weighs down the soul, and this earthly tent burdens the thoughtful mind.* Perhaps the best illustration is in Wis. 8:19f, which praises Solomon as the man who received a good soul and entered an undefiled body. Inasmuch as the Hellenistic readers were at home in Greek, they recognised here ideas that were known after Plato.

The New Testament era also witnessed a plurality of views among the Jewish people. Josephus tells about the Pharisees, who say that every soul is immortal. In another passage Josephus reveals his own belief that bodies are mortal, but the soul is forever deathless.[26] Josephus also maintains that the Sadducees believed that the soul extinguishes together with the body, a view that makes them a Jewish counterpart to the Epicureans.[27]

5. *Luke's use of ψυχή in the traditional material*

5.1. Common traditions and similar use of words

Mark first says that the Son of Man came not to be served but to serve, and to give his life (ψυχή) in ransom for the many (Mk 10:45). A comparison shows that Matthew (20:28) preserves the word ψυχή, but Luke omits this word (22:27) and renders the words of Jesus differently: *But I am among you as one who serves*. In another place, however, when speaking about the conditions of discipleship and probably using Q (Luke 14:26; comp. with Matt 10: 37), Luke here uses the word ψυχή, whereas Matthew does not. Is Luke seek-

[25] Horbury, W. „The Wisdom of Solomon" in *The Oxford Bible Commentary*. Oxford, 2001, 652.

[26] Riley, G. 1995, 19 (Josephus, *BJ* 2.163; 3.372).

[27] Lehtipuu, O. 2004, 142.

ing to emphasize the essence of earthly life and that which must be hated for the sake of Jesus?

There are places in which Luke and Matthew use sources in a very similar fashion. In Mark 8:35–36 the soul denotes true life in contrast to physical life.[28] Matthew (16:25–26) is quite close to the text of Mark, and Luke (9:24) does not deviate from it significantly.[29]

In Luke 12:22 and Matt 6:25, ψυχή is parallel to σῶμα in the text that exhorts not to worry about one's life, what to eat, or what to wear. Here the emphasis is on what one does with one's particular life or existence. *Soul* is not to be opposed to *body* but could mean *the self*, though the relationship between them does not become very clear. The universal use of ψυχή probably means that "the contrast in the two members of the saying is that of 'life' in an earthly or earthbound sense, and in a transcendent sense, i.e. not measured merely by material concerns".[30]

There is, however, another expression or version of probably the same saying by Jesus in Matthew 10:39 and in the apocalyptic context of the day of the Son of Man in Luke 17:33. Lexical and syntactic forms are different, but the idea is the same. The Lukan wording goes: *Those who try to make their lives secure will lose it, but those who lose their lives will keep it.* This kind of saying must have been widely known, perhaps even repeated by historical Jesus several times, since we also find a hermeneutically extended version of it in John 12:25. The reference is here to what is commonly called life, *i.e.* physical life on the one hand, and to the promise of the true and full life on the other. This contrast seems deliberate and allows, I think, the interpretation that God has designed ψυχή for more than the merely earthly span of life. Here ψυχή represents the whole human life in its maximum duration. The same word designates the natural and religious life that is experienced only by the man who is freed from trying to preserve it.

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[28] *For those who want to save their life will lose it, and those who lose their life for my sake, and for the sake of the gospel, will save it.*

[29] *For those who want to save their life will lose it, and those who lose their life for my sake will save it.*

[30] Fitzmyer, Joseph A. *The Gospel According to Luke* I. AB, Vol. 28. New York: Doubleday, 1981, 788.

5.2. Texts in which Luke's redaction seems apparent

The story that tells of the killing of body and soul (Luke 12:2–9 and Mt 10:26–31) has no Markan model, is probably derived from Q and is developed in different directions by Matthew (10:28) and Luke (12:4f) respectively:

Do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul; rather fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell. (Matthew)[31]

I tell you, my friends, do not fear those who kill the body, and after that can do nothing more. But I will warn you whom to fear: fear him who, after he has killed, has authority to cast into hell ... (Luke)[32]

Matthew refers in 10:28b to those who can destroy both *soul* and *body* in hell (Gehenna). First Matthew separates between body and soul, however, by asking not to fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul (see 10:28a). In Luke's text Jesus calls his disciples "my friends" and asks not to fear those who kill the *body*, and after that can do nothing more.[33] Luke acknowledges the fact that loss of the bodily life causes fear, but does not mention the killing of soul, nor does he tell the reader that the soul may be cast into hell[34], whereas Matthew says it twice (10:28). Instead of that, Luke composes an original and unparalleled expression: *...and after that can do nothing more.*

One may surmise that reference to both σῶμα and ψυχή nearly side by side would lead to the ideas we today call anthropological dualism. If Luke's concept of man resembled what we today call the holistic approach, he may have wanted to prevent the readers

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31 Matthew contrasts the ability of man, who can destroy only the body, with that of god, who can destroy both body and soul in Gehenna.

32 In Luke, on the other hand, the contrast is between man, who can kill, and God, who both kills and after killing casts persons into Gehenna. This is the only occurrence of the noun Gehenna in Luke.

33 Lk 12:4 is the only place in Luke and the other synoptic gospels where Jesus calls the disciples "friends". Persecution is serious business; it creates fear and trepidation (Just, Arthur A. Jr. *Luke 9:51–24:53.* Concordia Commentary. Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1997, 498).

34 Like Matthew, Luke retains the Jewish Greek word *Gehenna*. The Greek word *geenna* is retained from Q and is not found in LXX. In the Gospel of Luke *geenna* is only found here. Fitzmyer is of the opinion that Luke omitted *but cannot kill the soul* as unclear (*The Gospel According to Luke* X–XIV. AB, 1985. Vol 28A, 959).

from having associations resembling the views of Plato, and even to avoid reactions from people who regarded ψυχή as immortal.[35] It may be that Luke knew 4 Macc 13:14-15 and wanted to avoid questions concerning the partial dichotomy of the body and soul?[36]

We do not have any easy access to the considerations that stood behind the Matthewan and Lukan redactions. But whereas Matthew follows the view that both body and soul may continue their existence in hell and both be destroyed there, Luke has no reference to the soul at all. It appears that Matthew has retained the original form of the passage. In Luke the soul is not the object of killing and there is no answer to the reader's possible question as to how, and in which shape, a man would be cast into hell. Luke obviously avoids expressions that may give rise to difficult and unnecessary speculations about the fate of the soul,[37] and does not extend his text to the degree that demands more detailed eschatological considerations. Soul and body as terms are part of a larger context that also implies discussion of the differing eschatologies and soteriologies of Matthew and Luke.[38]

It appears that in his text, Luke does not like to separate soul and body in a visible manner. Confirmation of this hypothesis may be found in Luke 21:19, where the evangelist pays attention to the persecutions, hatred and disasters that fall upon human beings on earth. He says that *by your endurance you will gain your souls.* The

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[35] Bovon describes the importance of the Greek audience by saying: "Indem er den Ausdruck tilgt, vermeidet er auch den Spott seiner griechischen Leser und Leserinnen, die in der Mehrheit der ψυχή Unsterblichkeit zuschreiben" (Bovon, F. *Das Evangelium nach Lukas.* EKK III/2 1996, 255).

[36] In 4 Macc 13: 14–15 one reads: *Let us not fear him who thinks he is killing us, for great is the struggle of the soul and the danger of eternal torment lying before those who transgress the commandment of God.*

[37] In Ac 2:25–28 Luke avoids reference to the soul not being left in Hades. Instead it is said that the *sarx* (of Jesus) did not see corruption.

[38] Chaim Milikowsky in "Which Gehenna? Retribution and Eschatology in the Synoptic Gospels and in Early Jewish Texts", NTS 1988 (34), 238–249, 242, argues that Luke deliberately changed the original form of the passage "so that it no longer refers to a corporeal, eschatological hell, but to a post-mortem, incorporeal hell of souls". Milikowsky's method to put body and soul into an eschatological context is justified and interesting. Similar procedure in my work, however, would break the space limitations.

soul means life, and thus this verse excludes the idea of an immortal soul which man attains only in the future.

6. Material found only in the Gospel of Luke

6.1. Soul that magnifies the Lord

The inaugural hymn of Luke (1:46: *My soul magnifies the Lord, and my spirit rejoices in God my Saviour*) is based on the Scripture. Respective Biblical traditions were probably quite well known, and a pre-Lucan Jewish Christian source is in the background.[39] The Old Testament presents the view that man is נֶפֶשׁ when he thirsts for God (Ps 63:2) and yearns for God (Isa 26:9). Much of Psalm 34:3 (LXX 33:3) is taken into use here. The lexical elements from the LXX hymnal versions of Ps 33:3 (ἐν τῷ κυρίῳ ἐπαινεσθήσεται ἡ ψυχή μου) and Ps 69:31 (...μεγαλυνῶ αὐτόν...) are clearly visible. "My soul" is a Hebrew surrogate for "I", and in literary parallelism with "my spirit" it can be found in the LXX (Ps 77:3–4).[40] In Luke the soul is a subject of praise of God and is found alongside the spirit (1:46–47). Here it is a positively formed expression, in comparison with 1 Macc 1:48 (see 4.3.).

In Luke 2:35 the metaphor of the sword of sorrow that pierces the soul clearly emphasises human experience and feelings of sorrow and love related to the child. E. Schweizer puts it concisely by stating that the soul thus "denotes the man who can be influenced by others and who is exposed to joy and sorrow but who can also praise God and love Him".[41] As in Luke 1:46, here *soul* stands for "self", and emphasis is on Mary's individual lot. In the Lukan context the expression grows out of Jesus' role, which led to the rise

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[39] The pattern of the hymn is found in 1 Sam 2:1-10 and in the rest of the episode Luke's free composition appears to prevail. The Magnificat's structure is poetical. Echoes of OT hymns are also found in the use of parallelism: synonymous parallelism in 1:46 and 47, synthetic parallelism in 1:51, and antithetic parallelism in 1:52 and 53 (Just, Arthur A. Jr. *Luke 1:1-9:50.* Concordia Commentary. Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1996, 81).

[40] Fitzmyer, Joseph A. *The Gospel According to Luke* I. AB, Vol. 28. New York: Doubleday, 1981, 366.

[41] Schweizer, E. ψυχη κτλ., *TWNT* 9, 641.

and fall of many in Israel.[42] Mary, as part of Israel, will thus be affected too, not her "soul" but her "self", *i.e.* herself all in all.

In the parable of the rich man (Luke 12:16–21) the word ψυχή represents the totality of life, since the rich man gives advice to his *soul* to relax, eat, drink, and be merry. The reference is interesting, since both physical (eating and drinking) and psychical (relaxing and being merry) activities or characteristics are included. Here one notices a unique feature—the soul is addressed by the man in soliloquy. What is required by God is his *soul*. Here ψυχή is the physical life or life in general, an individual one that needs sustenance and is threatened by death.

In some of the other instances, for instance in Luke 16:19–31 and 23:43, the impression is that after death man as a whole will either be in torment or in paradise. The nouns *soul* and *body* do not occur in the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, though the vividly told story raises questions about the form of existence of both the rich man and Lazarus. The analysis would go beyond the limits and I will point out only two aspects. First, both the rich man and Lazarus are not presented as formless shades but are easily recognizable and able to communicate. They appear as persons in the common sense of the word. Second, one Hebrew (Abraham's bosom)[43] and one Greek (Hades) locale is used (16:22f). On the basis of this example alone no definite conclusions are possible, but nothing here refers to the separation of soul and body after death. Though a literary figure, Abraham's bosom is associated with a corporally imaginable environment, and may suggest a place of honour or provoke an association of intimacy.[44]

One specific text (Luke 23:43) touches on eschatological topics. Jesus says to the criminal: *Truly I tell you, today you will be with me in Paradise.* The noun *paradeisos* came into the Greek language from Old Persian in the sense of an "enclosed park, garden" and is attested in Greek from the time of Xenophon.[45] From its use in

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[42] The sword is related to Simeon's oracle. See Fitzmyer, 1981, 429–430.

[43] See the occurrence of this specific abode in 4 Macc 13:17, where Abraham and Isaac and Jacob will welcome those who exercised self-control of their lives on earth.

[44] Fitzmyer, Joseph A. *The Gospel According to Luke* II. AB, Vol. 28A. New York: Doubleday, 1985, 1132.

[45] *Ibid*, 1510.

Genesis (first in Gen 2:8), over time it developed an eschatological nuance, a place of bliss. The most probable interpretation goes that the whole *self* of man was promised access to Paradise, which seems to represent or somehow describe the nature of Jesus' kingdom.

6.2. Specific aspects of the use of the word σῶμα in Luke

Here I refer to some aspects in the usage of the word σῶμα where its relation to ψυχή is essential. First, Luke often uses the word in the most traditional and understandable sense of "corpse". Whereas in Luke 17:37 the body is used for an animal (*Where the corpse is, there the vultures will gather*), then in contrast σῶμα is also used for the body of Jesus by all Synoptics (Mk 15:43; Mt 27:58; Lk 23:52, 55; 24:3, 23) in the accounts of the burial of Jesus. This may imply that like the other evangelists, Luke did not ascribe to σῶμα, taken by itself, any specifically ontological or theological meaning, and used it in the widest sense of the word.[46]

Second, the Lukan extension to the Marcan narrative of the baptism of Jesus emphasises the reality of the presence of the Spirit.[47] Whereas Matthew essentially follows Markan wording,[48] Luke presents an original addendum: the Spirit descended upon Jesus *in bodily form* like a dove (Luke 3:22). Though it is hard to imagine how else a dove would come down than in bodily form, the expression σωματικῷ εἴδει is unique in the Gospels[49]. The noun σῶμα

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[46] The contrast may be driven to an extreme if one places the two texts (the bodies of animals in Lk 17:37) and the narrative of Lord's Supper (the body of Jesus in Lk 22:19) side by side. In this article, however, the Eucharist is deliberately left untouched. In addition, the use of the word σῶμα in this connection has been removed from the text of Mark (14:22).

[47] Joseph A. Fitzmyer points out that it has nothing to do with an anti-Docetic concern. He, however, has no answer to the question, why Luke adds this detail (The Gospel According to Luke I–IX. AB, 1981. Vol. 28, 484).

[48] To be precise, Matthew adds to the spirit τοῦ θεοῦ and Luke τὸ ἅγιον, but these nuances are not centrale to this work.

[49] In 1 Tm 4:8 reference is made to the value of physical training, but there is no connection with εἶδος elsewhere in the New Testament.

François Bovon (*Das Evangelium nach Lukas*. EKK III/1. Zürich: Benzinger Verlag/Neukirchener Verlag 1989, 180) pays attention to the visible appearance of the dove: "Es wird von Lukas durch die Worte 'in leiblicher Gestalt' ergänzt,

does not appear in Luke until 11:34. The expression σωματικῷ εἴδει in a theologically significant place is reminiscent of Aristotle, who explained his concept of body and soul by exemplifying that εἶδος is the body (*i.e.* the form) of the soul (see 3.2).

Here, in Luke 3:22, the *form, shape, or figure* of the dove is needed to make the invisible Holy Spirit visible, perceptible, *wahrnehmbar*. To my mind, Luke does not imply that the spirit needs the form of the dove to exist. The story of the baptism is told from the point of view of a public event, and as such was meant by Luke to become known to the audience. The bodily form (of the spirit) alone is visible and was thus necessary to inform the (implied) witnesses of the event of what was taking place. Here the rare word σωματικός refers to the corporeality of the dove, but thus the mystery of the presence of the spirit *in bodily form* becomes even more mysterious.[50] The meaning and use of the expression σωματικῷ εἴδει in the New Testament is unique here, since in 1 Tm. 4:8 σωματικός has no thematic affinity to this Lukan context.

The question arises of how aware Luke was in using this (Aristotelian) designation εἶδος, or, even, did Luke do it with a certain purpose? I do not know. It seems that the Greek concept of σῶμα made that kind of association possible, since one cannot imagine the word σάρξ here. Those who used Greek had to choose at least between the use of σάρξ and σῶμα in the places where in Hebrew one would predict the use of the one and only word בָּשָׂר. Comparison with the more laconic text of Mark 1:10 (... *and the Spirit descending like a dove on him*) makes the editorial complement of Luke pretty obvious here. It is possible that by using the word εἶδος Luke takes note of his Greek-speaking readers, some of whom were probably familiar with philosophical (Aristotelian) traditions.

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die sich auf das Aussehen wie eine Taube als auch auf das leibhaftige Kommen des Geistes beziehen können".

[50] Walter Grundmann refers to another aspect of the corporeality of the dove by pointing to the Rabbinic literature that regards the dove as the symbol of Israel. According to that the symbol of Israel dwelt in Jesus, and in that way Jesus became an embodiment of Israel (Grundmann, W. *Das Evangelium nach Lukas*. THKNT 3. Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 109).

6.3. Emphasised attention paid to healing

It was told in 3.2 that in Greek σῶμα means the body that is the object of the physician's care. Mark tells a story of a woman who had been suffering from haemorrhages for twelve years (Mark 5:25-34). Mark emphasised in 5:26 that *she had endured much under many physicians, and had spent all that she had; and she was no better, but rather grew worse.* Matthew does not say anything about suffering under physicians (Matt 9:18–26), but Matthew has shortened the story to nearly half of the Markan text and thus the question about the reason for omitting reference to the physicians is difficult to answer.

The story in Luke (8:40–56) about the curing of the woman with a haemorrhage is shorter than the basic text by Mark. The differences must be attributed to the Lucan redaction. Luke's text (8:43) says that *the woman* [*had spent all she had on physicians*] *and no one could cure her.* It is not surprising that Luke also says that no one could cure her, since the healing stories always have the miraculous work of Jesus in mind. Luke has, however, softened the expression in two aspects. First, Luke does not say that the woman had endured under many physicians. Second, it is not stated that her condition instead deteriorated. Furthermore, the clause *had spent all she had on physicians* is omitted in part of the textual tradition, but retained as the result of the consideration of the Committee and enclosed within square brackets.[51] In comparison with Mark, more respect is given here to bodily well-being. In this gospel Jesus takes more care of bodily pains. This feature, though it proves nothing, is nevertheless in harmony with the ecclesiastical tradition that Luke was a physician.

Jesus was arrested in Gethsemane and the story has an episode that tells of at least one companion of Jesus who drew his sword and cut off the ear of the slaves of the high priest. Mark (14:47) does not tell that Jesus says or does anything. Matthew (26:52) completes the story with the command of Jesus to put the sword back in its

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[51] The early and diversified evidence for the shorter text (supported by p^{75} B (D) 0279 sy^{s} sa) is, according to Metzger, "well-nigh compelling" (Bruce M. Metzger. *A Textual Commentary of the Greek New Testament.* UBS 1971, 145). The textual variant containing this phrase is still supported by ℵ (*, C) A L W Θ Ξ (Ψ) $f^{1.13}$ 33. (1424), and others; see NA^{27}.

place, *for all who take the sword will perish by the sword*. Luke, however, gives the story a different ending: Jesus...*touched his ear and healed him* (Luke 22:50–51). That kind of "transplantation" occurs only in the Gospel of Luke, and these two stories present Jesus as a compassionate anointed man of the Lord sent to heal and to bring good news (Luke 4:16-21).[52]

7. The enigma of the nature of the risen Jesus

According to the gospel, some of the Sadducees were interested in the relationship between the life on earth and the life after resurrection. They came to Jesus and told a story about seven brothers who all in turn married a widow of the first brother and all died (Luke 20:27-40). The direct question was: *In the resurrection, therefore, whose wife will the woman be*? Jesus' answer was not juridical but rather ontological. Jesus said that ...*they neither marry nor are given in marriage* (20:35). It is added in v. 36 that they are like angels and are children of God, being children of resurrection. Luke presents angels as the beings who may be used to describe somehow the state of resurrected human beings, though this story does not say anything about the relationship between body and soul.

The dead body of the earthly Jesus is presented similarly to that of humans or animals. The dead body is σῶμα. Joseph of Arimathea asked for the body of Jesus, took it down and laid it in a rock-hewn tomb (Luke 23:50–52). The women followed and saw the tomb and how his body was laid (23:55). No essential differences in comparison with Mark 15:42–47 are visible. The following stories in Luke that tell about the encounters with the resurrected Jesus, however, present him walking, speaking and handling material objects. Neither of the two narratives is based on Mark.

First, two of the disciples were on their way to Emmaus (Luke 24:13–31), and Jesus came near and went with them. All three were talking and discussing, no suspicion about the reality of the stranger was expressed, but his identity remained secret. At the end of the

[52] Some manuscripts (D; it) use the verb ἀποκαθίστημι (re-establish, restore) instead of ἰάομαι (to heal, cure). Grundmann says that Luke uses this legendary feature in order to stress that Jesus' activity was innocent and apolitical (Grundmann, W. *Das Evangelium nach Lukas*, 414).

story the stranger went in to stay with them. The breaking of the bread and it being given to the disciples closes the encounter scene, for after that the stranger vanished from sight. The story does not reveal the author's viewpoint on the nature of Jesus. The disciples do not touch Jesus, but the breaking of the bread is a stronger sign in favour of the corporeality of Jesus, since walking and speaking alone do not sufficiently clearly reveal the more precise nature of the stranger. The end of the scene is carried out with a sense of natural reality. No answer is given to the question the reader may ask: why was Jesus unrecognizable after a few days, whereas the rich man immediately recognized Lazarus as being his poor neighbour on earth?

Second, the following story about Jesus' abrupt appearance among a group of disciples is well introduced by the Emmaus pericope. The two returned to Jerusalem and found there the eleven and their companions together. Those present were terrified, and thought that they were seeing a spirit (or *ghost*; Luke 24:37; ms D gives the reading φάντασμα). Such an introduction seems promising, and here Luke tells a story that has some parallels with John 20 and 21, but differs in emphasising the physical aspect of what Jesus did.

Three facts are of importance. First, the answer of Jesus who says: *Look at my hands and my feet; see that it is I myself* (ὅτι ἐγώ εἰμι αὐτός). *Touch me and see; for a ghost does not have flesh and bones as you see that I have* (Luke 24:39). Why is the noun σάρξ where one may expect to read σῶμα? Why does πνεῦμα (*ghost*, or *spirit*) stand where ψυχή (*soul*) would have been a good option? In the Old Testament πνεῦμα and σάρξ are opposed to each other. In the remarkable text in Ezek 37 one reads that when the breath came, the bones came together and flesh came upon them. Here the bones are in parallel to the flesh, and both are essentially distinguished from the breath (πνεῦμα in LXX).[53]

It seems as if πνεῦμα has been lifted to a higher position than that usually occupied by ψυχη, and σάρξ lies lower than σῶμα. In the Gospel of Luke soul and body are not opposed to each other, and it would have been unexpected to read that "soul does not have

[53] When woman was made, man said: *This at last is the bone of my bones and the flesh of my flesh* (Gen 2:23).

body as you see that I have", since soul and body usually belong together. They may be described as located on the same level and mutually connected. Spirit and flesh are instead contrasted, since *spirit does not have flesh and bones*. One gets the impression that they do not exist together. I express the pattern of this thought in a two-dimensional way:

πνεῦμα (spirit)
↓
ψυχή (soul)→ ←σῶμα (body)
↓
σάρξ (flesh)
↓

Second, verse 24:40 (*And when he had said this, he showed them his hands and his feet*) is omitted in some manuscripts, but found in all the best Greek manuscripts, marked by NA[26] and NA[27] concisely as p^{75} *rell*. This sentence is almost completely identical with John 20:20, which raises the idea that both Luke and John may have used a common tradition. Whereas the disciples were presented as unable to identify Jesus in Emmaus, in Luke 24:40 the author seems intentionally to draw attention to the Hellenistic belief that scars and other bodily marks remain after death. The dead retained not only their appearance (εἴδωλον), but even the marks (στίγμα) which caused their death.[54] The function of Luke 24:40 and John 20:20 is the same – to identify Jesus. Luke may have reserved the full recognition of Jesus until this event, and did not allow it to happen in Emmaus. The pattern in Luke 24 and John 20 is similar: the disciples or Mary Magdalene do not themselves recognize Jesus until Jesus himself lets that happen (not until Luke 24:31 and John 20:16; behold Jn 20:14). In both Luke and John, Jesus reveals himself to the disciples in Jerusalem by referring to his hands (and his feet in Luke 24:40, and his side in John 20:20, 27). These similarities con-

[54] Riley, G. 1995, 50. More precisely, Hector not only bears the wound of Achilles' spear which caused his death (*Il.* 22.326f.) and apparently the scars of many previous wounds, but also the marks suffered by his corpse days after he had died, as a result of being dragged behind Achilles' chariot (Riley 1995, 51).

firm the possibility that both evangelists used a similar tradition, and their redactions also share resemblances.

Third, it is only in Luke that the disciples gave a piece of broiled fish to Jesus, and he took it and ate it in their presence (Luke 24:41-43). The food makes the reader think of John 21:9, but John does not tell that Jesus ate it. Though the question of the nature of the resurrection body is not literally raised, emphasis is still placed on Jesus' bodily appearance. The story is a real demonstration of the corporeality of Jesus' resurrection.[55] More of a problem is the objection raised about Jesus' request to offer him fish in Jerusalem, whereas a similar occasion according to John takes place in Galilee by the sea.

It is apparent that the resurrection appearances of Jesus are portrayed with great bodily realism. The risen Lord is distinguished from a shade or a ghost. Luke is teaching the corporeality of the resurrection as distinct from the Platonic way of describing the survival of the soul after death. One can assume that here one sees Luke's effort to convince readers of the reality of the resurrection (of the body) of Jesus.

Conclusion

The Gospel of Luke shows that its author has much in common with the views that were more or less widely known among the Greek speaking population around the Mediterranean. One may recognize material characteristic of layer I in the text of the gospel. Luke associated the soul with life, and this conviction was common since the times of Homer and from the Hebrew Scriptures. Each individual is seen as a living soul; this view was a common heritage of both Greek and Semitic literature. It is no wonder that Luke shares these views with Mark and Matthew. The Gospel of Luke does not provide evidence that Luke had much in common with Plato, and in any case, there are no signs of the distribution of the soul into parts that have different qualities. The body seems

[55] DeConick, April D. *Voices of the Mystics: early Christian Discourse in the Gospels of John and Thomas and Other Ancient Christian Literature.* London, New York: T&T Clark International, 2001 (2004), 83.

not to be compared to the jail of the soul, not to mention equating the body to the tomb.

There is something similar in the views of Luke and Aristotle, as they believe that the soul and the body belong together. Whereas Aristotle described the body as the physical form of the soul, Luke recounted how the Holy Spirit descended upon Jesus in bodily form like a dove. Even the spirit needs a visible form in order to appear before human eyes. Here attention may be drawn to the stylistic parallelism of the soul and the spirit, since it was already visible in the Magnificat.

In the Gospel of Luke, the soul represents the person: the soul rejoices (1:46), and the soul will be pierced by a sword (2:35; the meaning of this expression is to be taken figuratively), the soul is given advice to drink, eat, relax, and be merry (12:19). In these cases the soul psychologically represents the reactions and activity of the whole person, and corporeality somehow seems to be implicitly present. In addition, the way Jesus cares for the bodies of the sick and injured is certainly editorial, and makes it possible to characterize Luke as a compassionate person.

The Gospel of Luke is often in harmony with similar sayings in Mark and Q, by presenting every human being, every person, as a soul. However, one distinctive editorial change to the material of layer II makes Luke's message quite different from that of Matthew. Luke avoids saying that at death the destinies of the body and soul are different. One may only guess whether he implies the death of the entire person or the self (12:5). The punishment of the rich man comprised the whole self and was described in bodily reality. Similarly, it is the whole self of the repentant criminal who heard the promise to be accepted to Paradise. At the same time, for Luke, the dead body is σῶμα even if the subject of the narrative is Jesus. Here Luke follows the common Synoptic (Markan) tradition of telling the story of the burial of Jesus.

The conclusion that there are no exact equivalents to the Greek σῶμα in Hebrew (see 4.2) also has an effect on the following narratives. The descriptions of the appearances of Jesus to the disciples in Emmaus and in Jerusalem have much in common with similar events described in the Gospel of John. Luke, however, chose the words *spirit* and *flesh* (with *bones*) in order to emphasize the corporeality of Jesus in a most contrasting way. One could argue that

this choice of words indicates that Luke does not want to describe the body and soul as if in some kind of rivalry or as even mutually excluding each other. The words *body* and *soul* are not mentioned here, but if the evidence of the rest of the gospel is considered, body and soul are inseparable, and are rather on the same level than contrasted to each other.

Here the spirit, as described in the Old Testament, also seems to have a position above the flesh. Nevertheless, the importance of flesh with *stigmata* is not reduced, but functions as a vehicle for the revelation of the reality and corporeality of the resurrected Jesus. That is the only thing that ultimately matters.

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Studia in honorem Linnart Mäll: Humanistic Base Texts and the Mahāyāna Sūtras (2008)

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Ten years ago Linnart MÄLL launched the theory of the Humanistic Base Texts stating that the base texts of the main religious teachings of humankind (Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucianism, Christianity) all propound the idea of the central position of man among other phenomena of the universe. Buddha's discourses as well as the teachings of Krishna, the sayings of Confucius and the gospel of Jesus call human beings to love and understand each other, to awake from the darkness of ignorance, to cultivate humane values like compassion, loving kindness, responsibility etc. The launching of those ideas was a spiritual revolution in the history of humankind. Humanistic Base Texts and the textual traditions inspired by them – including the Mahāyāna Sūtras, the favourite area of Linnart Mäll's study – have been the main locomotive of world history during the last two millennia.

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