

WITH COMMENTARY BY Gyel-tsap

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# ĀRYADEVA'S Four Hundred Stanzas *on the MIDDLE WAY*



ADDITIONAL COMMENTARY BY

Geshe Sonam Rinchen

TRANSLATED BY

Ruth Sonam

WITH COMMENTARY BY Gyel-tsap

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# **Āryadeva's Four Hundred Stanzas on the Middle Way**

with Commentary

by Gyeltsap

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Four Hundred Stanzas  
on the Middle Way**

with Commentary

by Gyel-tsap

Aryadeva and Gyel-tsap

translated by Ruth Sonam with additional commentary by Geshe Sonam Rinchen

**Snow Lion Publications  
Ithaca, New York**

Snow Lion Publications  
P.O. Box 6483  
Ithaca, NY 14851 USA  
(607) 273-8519  
www.snowlionpub.com

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Printed in the USA on acid-free recycled paper.

ISBN-13: 978-1-55939-302-7

ISBN-10: 1-55939-302-5

The Library of Congress catalogued the previous edition of this book as follows:

Rgyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen, 1364-1432

[Bzi brgya pa'i rnam bśad legś bśad sñiñ po. English]

The yogic deeds of Bodhisattvas : Gyeltsap on Aryadeva's

Four Hundred / commentary by Geshe Sonam Rinchen ; translated and

edited by Ruth Sonam. — 1st ed.

p. cm. — (Textual studies and translations in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 1-55939-019-0 (pbk.) — ISBN 1-55939-014-X (cloth)

1. Āryadeva, 3rd cent. Catuḥśataka. I. Sonam, Rinchen, 1937- .

II. Sonam, Ruth, 1943- . III. Āryadeva, 3rd. Catuḥśataka. IV. Title. V. Series.

BQ2765.R4813 1993

294.3'85—dc20 93-23972

CIP

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## ARYADEVA'S LIFE

The following account is based on the traditional biographies of Aryadeva found in Bu-don's (bu ston) and Taranatha's histories of Buddhism in India' and on other written sources' as well as the current oral tradition.

Aryadeva is said to have been born on the island of Siinhala, today identified as Sri Lanka. Legend has it that there was a fine lotus pool in the royal gardens of Sinhala. During the day the lotuses opened to the sun and at night they closed and bowed their heads. The royal gardener noticed that one of them had stayed closed for many days and reported this to the king, who came to take a look. Intuition told him that something extraordinary was about to happen, and he instructed the gardener to take good care of the lotus. Every day the king and his court went down to the lotus pool, but the mysterious flower remained closed for seven days. On the eighth day, while everyone was watching, the lotus began to open. Its thousands of petals slowly unfolded and they saw at its center a bright-eyed eight-yearold boy whose body was covered with dew. The king was amazed and delighted, and at once decided to adopt the boy.

Taranatha dismisses this story as too fanciful and bases his account on, among other sources, the brief statement concerning Aryadeva's life which Candrakirti makes at the beginning of his commentary<sup>3</sup> and which Gyeltsap cites in his preface.' According to this, Aryadeva was the son and heir of King Pancasrfiga. Acting on his strong wish to be ordained, he abdicated the throne and received monastic vows from the abbot Hemadeva. He completed a thorough study of the three sets of teaching (tripitaka) before leaving his native land to visit the temples and reliquary monuments of south India.

He met Nagarjuna while the latter was still in King Udayana's country, and when Nagarjuna went to Sri Parvata, Aryadeva accompanied him, became his disciple and remained there to study with him. Some accounts say that his qualities were as great, if not greater than, his teacher's. Before they came face to face, Nagarjuna is said to have sent an attendant to Aryadeva with a bowl of water representing the depth of his knowledge. Aryadeva responded by placing a sharp needle in the water to indicate that he could penetrate all that Nagarjuna knew. In histories of the eighty greatly accomplished yogis he is identified with Karnaripa who surpassed

Nagarjuna in the practice of living off vital essences compounded into pills. While Nagarjuna's compound could bring a withered tree back to life, Aryadeva's urine alone was so potent that when he mixed it with a little water and sprinkled it on a dry tree, the tree burst into leaf. During the time he remained with Nagarjuna, Aryadeva gained many powerful attainments and proficiency in both orthodox and heterodox philosophical systems.

A Brahmin called Durdharsakala, whom Taranatha identifies with Matrceta,<sup>b</sup> and who according to the Tibetan tradition was in fact Asvaghosa before he became a Buddhist, had been going from place to place for twelve years challenging Buddhists in philosophical debate and contests of magical feats. Wherever he went, he defeated them and seemed invincible. He forced the monks to pay homage to Siva, deprived them of their power and humiliated them, thereby causing discouragement and chaos in the spiritual community. His invincibility had been gained by propitiating Siva, who had appeared to him in a vision. When Siva asked him what boon he could grant, Matrceta answered, "Give me victory in debate." Siva promised that no one born from the womb should ever defeat him.

When Matrceta came to Nalanda, the Buddhist monks feared they could not defeat such a daunting opponent and decided to request Nagarjuna for help. They performed a rite of offering to the protector Mahakala. During this ritual a crow emerged from the heart of a naturally formed stone image of the protector. A letter was tied to the crow's neck and it carried their plea for help to the south. When he heard of the request, Aryadeva offered to go in his teacher's place. Before allowing him to leave, however, Nagarjuna stringently tested his prowess in debate by holding the opponent's position. Their debate continued for seven days during which Aryadeva demonstrated his expertise. Finally in his elation, he got carried away and triumphantly declared Nagarjuna's defeat. This was inauspicious. Although satisfied that his student could hold his own, Nagarjuna warned him that he would have to make a sacrifice on the way. He also added that if he did so without regret, what he sacrificed would later be restored to him.

Aryadeva travelled north with miraculous swift-footedness. As he was passing through a forest, he came upon a woman who was trying to accomplish certain powers and needed the eye of a learned monk to do so. He pulled out his eye in response to her entreaty, but felt regret when he looked back and saw her grinding it with a stone. He therefore remained

one-eyed for the rest of his life.

On arriving at Nalanda, he found that Matrceta and his followers had, with the king's consent, taken charge and were keeping watch on all coming and going to and from the monastery. He secretly sent in a message to tell the monks he had arrived. Some accounts say he entered the monastery accompanied by a water carrier, while another version recounts that he took off his robes and put them in his alms bowl which he hid in a load of wood. Having daubed his body with ashes, he shouldered his load and entered the monastery as a woodcutter in the company of a cowherd.

There were several skirmishes before the real contest began. As the monks entered and left the temple each day, Matrceta had been counting their shaven heads. On the day after Aryadeva's arrival Matrceta was counting the monks and was just about to touch Aryadeva's head with the counting stick, when Aryadeva took hold of his hand.

"Where has this round head come from?" demanded Matrceta.

"It has come from my neck!" replied Aryadeva.

Matrceta then said, "There's a one-eyed man here who wasn't here before," and thought, "So this is the one who is to debate with me!"

Aryadeva then exclaimed:

**The Fierce One<sup>7</sup> has three eyes but does not see reality;  
Indra has a thousand but does not see reality.  
But Āryadeva with his one eye  
Sees the reality of all three realms.<sup>8</sup>**

That was their first encounter. After some days Matrceta and his followers were performing ritual ablutions in the Ganges for the purpose of purification. Aryadeva came down to the river carrying a golden pot and ostentatiously began to wash the outside of it. Matrceta asked him why he was washing the outside when the inside was full of excrement. Aryadeva replied, "What is the use of washing your body with water from the Ganges, when you are full of defilements?"

On another occasion, Matrceta challenged Aryadeva as he had unsuccessfully challenged other monks in Nalanda, for none of them were willing to face him in debate. Standing in a doorway with one foot on either side of the threshold, he demanded, "Am I going out or coming in?" Aryadeva answered, "That depends on your intention." Another day Matrceta held up a bird and asked, "Am I going to kill this bird or not?" Aryadeva answered, "That depends on your compassion."

One night Aryadeva entered a temple and made his bed there. At dawn he went into the room where the ghanti<sup>9</sup> was kept and began to strike the wooden gong used for summoning the monks. The monks who lived in the temple tried to stop him, but he continued to strike it and also beat a great drum used for the same purpose. The king, hearing the gong and the drum, enquired what was going on. When he found out, he ordered the debate between the Buddhists and non-Buddhists to begin. The Buddhist scholars were seated on one side of the hall, the non-Buddhist scholars on the other. Two seats piled high with cushions were placed in the center for the contestants, while the king sat in the place of honor. One cushion was to be removed from the opponent's seat each time a contestant won a point.

Matrceta began by challenging Aryadeva to debate with a magic slate on which the correct answers appeared of their own accord. Aryadeva promptly dealt with this by spreading oil on it, which prevented the answers from appearing. Next Matrceta produced a debating parrot also capable of giving the right answers, but Aryadeva at once emanated a cat which killed the parrot. When Matrceta accused him of having done an ill deed, Aryadeva told him that he had left a meditator in Sri Parvata whose task was to purify him of ill deeds. Matrceta demanded to know how one person could purify another's ill deeds. Aryadeva replied by asking how, in that case, the cat's action of killing the parrot could be his ill deed.

Matrceta began to feel that he had met his match. He then introduced another emanation, Sister Pandita,<sup>10</sup> the queen of debate. In no time Aryadeva had emanated a shameless holder of layman's vows who exposed his private parts to her. She withdrew at once, flabbergasted by such outrageous behavior.

Having been outwitted three times by his opponent, Matrceta now hoped that Siva would come to the rescue and enter him. However Aryadeva had already secured the whole place with spells, surrounded it with dirty rags

and placed some excrement" on the canopy which was over their seats in order to keep Siva away. The debate then started in earnest. At the beginning the king and all who were present found it quite easy to follow, and there was agreement on whose cushion should be removed, as first the one and then the other scored points. Gradually, however, only the most learned scholars could follow what was going on, and eventually even they could no longer understand the subtle matters under discussion. No one was in a position to adjudicate nor was anyone aware that Aryadeva had actually succeeded in defeating his opponent.

Suddenly Matrceta transformed himself into a thousand-eyed Indra. Aryadeva outdid him by immediately transforming into a thousand-armed Avalokitesvara. Next Matrceta spewed flames, but Aryadeva extinguished them by releasing a jet of water from his mouth. Then there was no longer any doubt about who had won. In the hope of escaping, Matrceta flew up into the sky. Aryadeva followed him, and as they flew higher and higher, he called to Matrceta that he would die if he left the atmosphere. Matrceta thought this was a ploy to prevent his escape. To convince him Aryadeva told him to unwind one tress of his matted hair and allow it to stream up ahead of him. It was instantly destroyed.

Aryadeva brought Matrceta back to earth and shut him in a temple. He went berserk there and began throwing the scriptures around. Suddenly he noticed a page sticking up in a strange way and stopped to read it. To his amazement he found it contained a prediction concerning him made by the Buddha<sup>12</sup> and felt enormous contrition for what he had done in the past. He gathered up the books and began to read them. The more he read, the more his faith grew, till finally he decided to take monastic vows. He studied with Aryadeva, became a great master of the three sets of teachings and was famed for his eloquent and mellifluous praises of the Buddha. Aryadeva remained in Nalanda for a long time but eventually decided to return to the south.

Before Nagarjuna passed away, he entrusted the quintessential teaching to Aryadeva who continued to work extensively for the good of living beings, studying and teaching with his students in the areas around Sri Parvata. Having received building materials from the mountain and forest deities, he built twenty-four monasteries which became centers for the Mahayana teaching. In Rafiganatha near Kanci, Aryadeva entrusted Rahulabhadra with the teaching and passed away.

In his preface, Gyel-tsap mentions that Bodhibhadra's Explanation of the Compendium of Quintessential Wisdom, a commentary on Aryadeva's Compendium of Quintessential Wisdom, speaks of Aryadeva as having attained the eighth Bodhisattva ground.<sup>13</sup> This is also stated in other accounts. Nevertheless the passage in the Fundamental Tantra of Manjuṣri, said to predict Aryadeva, states:

Further a holy ordained one  
Will live in the town of Siṃhala.  
Though not an *ārya*, his name will be “*ārya*,”  
And he will live on the isle of Siṃhala.  
Refuting outsider opponents,  
He will vanquish the Forders' spells.<sup>14</sup>

It is probable that Aryadeva lived between the middle of the second and third centuries C.E. and that his literary activity can be placed between the years 225 and 250 C.E.<sup>15</sup>

## ARYADEVA'S WORKS

The Tibetan canon contains many works on both sutra and tantra attributed to Aryadeva ('phags pa lha). The catalogue of the Tibetan Tripitaka,<sup>6</sup> listing the contents of the Peking edition, attributes nine teen works on sutra and tantra to Aryadeva and a different list of fifteen works on sutra and tantra to 'phags pa lha. The Treatise of Four Hundred is attributed to the latter.

According to modern Buddhologists there were two Aryadevas, and the works on tantra are not considered to be by the author of The Four Hundred. There appears to be a consensus, however, that at least two other works may be attributed to the author of The Four Hundred. One is a text called The Hundred," found in the Chinese but not in the Tibetan canon, which, together with the works of Nagarjuna, was considered of great importance for the study of the Madhyamika system in China and Japan. The other is The Hundred Syllables,<sup>18</sup> an extremely terse refutation of Samkhya and Vaisesika assertions, attributed to Aryadeva in the Chinese canon and to Nagarjuna in the Tibetan canon. The Four Hundred, The Hundred and The Hundred Syllables display a certain homogeneity in style and subject-matter which supports their attribution to Aryadeva.

Tibetan scholars, on the other hand, believe that Aryadeva was a practitioner of both sutra and tantra, and that he could well have employed diverse literary styles when writing on different subjects. They therefore traditionally attribute many more works to him. In his preface, Gyel-tsap refers to the Lamp for the Collection of Deeds,<sup>19</sup> a Vajrayana work by Aryadeva, pointing out that the author of our text mentions his level of attainment in it. Among all these works only some fragments of The Four Hundred and of a Vajrayana text are extant in Sanskrit, which further complicates the task of attribution.<sup>20</sup>

The Chinese canon contains ten chapters of The Hundred, each consisting of five stanzas, and the last eight chapters of The Four Hundred. It also contains a translation of Dharmapala's commentary on these eight chapters. In his commentary, Candrakirti criticizes such a division of the work into two parts, but both Dharmapala and Hsiian tsang, the Chinese translator of his commentary and of The Four Hundred, had no qualms about such a division, since their interest seems to have lain primarily in

Aryadeva's refutation of heterodox views.

The topics covered by the translated portion of *The Hundred* closely resemble those covered in the second half of *The Four Hundred*. There are additional correspondences with other parts of *The Four Hundred*.<sup>21</sup> This has led to speculation regarding the authenticity of *The Hundred*, particularly in view of the fact that Candrakirti, commenting on the title *The Four Hundred*, says the treatise was also called *The Hundred(s)* and explains the reason for this.<sup>22</sup> In his commentary on Nagarjuna's *Fundamental Wisdom* called *Clear Words*, he refers to *The Four Hundred* in the colophon as *The Hundred's*.<sup>23</sup>

There are, however, also differences in the order in which the topics are presented and in the arguments put forward to refute the opponents' theses. Whereas *The Four Hundred* has only a few analogies in the second half, *The Hundred* contains many, perhaps added by Kumarajiva who translated the work into Chinese. Thus, *The Hundred* could be an independent work or a rearranged and abridged version of *The Four Hundred* with some additions.<sup>24</sup>

The topics treated in *The Hundred Syllables* are considered in the same order as they appear in the second to tenth chapters of *The Hundred*.<sup>25</sup> On account of its similarity in subject-matter to *The Hundred* and *Four Hundred*, the attribution of *The Hundred Syllables* to Nagarjuna is considered mistaken.

## THE FOUR HUNDRED STANZAS

The title of Aryadeva's work, *The Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds*, is interpreted variously by different commentators.<sup>26</sup> In his commentary Gyel-tsap says, "Moreover, this treatise was written to facilitate understanding of the Master Nagarjuna's assertion that these stages of the path of practising the yogic deeds enable those with a Mahayana disposition to attain Buddhahood."<sup>27</sup> In this context "yogic deeds" refers to the spiritual paths or insights to be developed by someone with a Mahayana disposition, *i.e.* one who has great compassion encompassing all sentient beings but who is not necessarily yet a Bodhisattva.

The title of Candrakirti's commentary refers to the work as *The Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas*.<sup>28</sup> In this case the one who practises the yogic deeds is clearly identified as a Bodhisattva. The text is also said to be called *The Yogic Deeds* because it describes the deeds of a yogi or adept of the Middle Way. According to Gyel-tsap and Candrakirti yogic describes the paths which these deeds constitute while in the latter case yogic refers to the kind of person who practises them.

In Tibetan the word for yoga is real 'byor. According to an interpretation generally accepted by Tibetan scholars, the first syllable is part of the word real ma, meaning real or authentic. It is sometimes also taken to refer to the actual or fundamental mode of existence of phenomena. The second part, in this context, belongs to the phrase dbang 'byor ba 'gyur ba, to gain control. Thus yoga may also be interpreted as gaining control over authentic paths or practices, which in this case refers both to paths necessary for the attainment of liberation by those who seek only personal freedom and to paths leading to highest enlightenment which must be practised by those with a Mahayana disposition.

In his commentary Gyel-tsap points out that *The Four Hundred* is a commentary to Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* and not an independent text. This, he says, is evident from the fact that the usual expression of worship at the beginning has been omitted. Aryadeva's text is, however, not merely a commentary on Nagarjuna's work, presenting the two truths through refutation of others' assertions and establishment of the Madhyamika position. It also acts as a supplement. Nagarjuna's *Treatise on*

the Middle Way deals mainly with ultimate truth and concentrates on Buddhist philosophical systems, refuting primarily Vaibhasika and Sautrantika tenets. Aryadeva supplements this by also directing his attention to non-Buddhist systems. He further supplements Nagarjuna's text by explaining in the first half of *The Four Hundred* the extensive paths associated with conventional truths. In doing so he draws upon Nagarjuna's *Precious Garland*.

Candrakirti's *Supplement to the "Treatise on the Middle Way"* performs the same function but approaches it in a different way. Candrakirti interprets Nagarjuna's text from a specifically Prasangika-Madhyamika standpoint and concentrates on refuting Cittamatra and Svatantrika tenets.

Like Nagarjuna, Aryadeva is accepted by all proponents of Madhyamika tenets as a model Madhyamika because theses unique to the Prasangika position are not explicitly stated in his texts. Candrakirti's *Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas"*, however, explains Aryadeva's text from the radical Prasangika-Madhyamika point of view that phenomena do not have intrinsic or objective existence of any kind but are entirely dependent on other factors. He emphasizes the use of consequences as the way to generate the view of the Middle Way in the opponent.

Both Nagarjuna and Aryadeva urge those who want to understand reality to approach it and induce direct experience of it through philosophical enquiry and reasoning. Although such direct experience of reality cannot be communicated as it is, reality is not considered ineffable and unknowable nor are language and conceptuality seen as hindrances preventing such an experience. On the contrary they are seen as essential tools, since it is vital first to gain a sound intellectual understanding of the fundamental nature of things, their emptiness of true existence. The practitioner is thus engaged in removing misconceptions and becoming familiar with correct conceptions.

Since Nagarjuna's *Treatise on the Middle Way* is concerned with ultimate truth and does not explicitly deal with the extensive paths practised by Bodhisattvas, the question of whether it is a Mahayana text arises. Nagarjuna establishes selflessness by adducing a multitude of reasons. A more limited approach is sufficient for practitioners who wish to rid themselves only of the obstructions preventing liberation; Mahayana practitioners who must eliminate obstructions to the perfect knowledge of

all phenomena require an extremely powerful understanding of selflessness. This can only be gained by employing such an extensive and varied approach. In order to develop this powerful perception of reality a vast accumulation of merit or positive energy is necessary. This is created through the kind of love, compassion and altruistic intention cultivated by Bodhisattvas.

By describing, in the first four chapters of *The Four Hundred*, the four basic misconceptions which are responsible for our suffering in cyclic existence, Aryadeva prepares the student to develop the altruistic intention. We need to understand our own suffering clearly and recognize how actions based upon disturbing attitudes and emotions fetter us to the cycle of involuntary rebirths. For unless we feel a genuine distaste for this recurrent process ourselves, we will not have heartfelt compassion for others who constantly experience similar suffering, nor will we feel the love that wishes to ensure their happiness.

Although Aryadeva does not explicitly indicate how overcoming these four misconceptions—which distort our perception of what is actually impermanent, suffering, unclean and selfless—leads to the development of the aspiring altruistic intention, this progression is implicit, since he continues by discussing the qualities of a Buddha as well as the activities of a Bodhisattva. Gyel-tsap draws our attention to this progression toward the end of the second chapter.<sup>29</sup>

In *The Supplement* Candrakirti uses another device for the same purpose. Through the analogy of a bucket in a well or on a water wheel, he demonstrates how we and others move helplessly from one rebirth to another buffeted by different forms of suffering. 'O By thinking deeply about this process with regard to ourselves, compassion for others will also arise. There is, however, one important prerequisite if this is to happen, which is mentioned neither in *The Four Hundred* nor in *The Supplement*. We know from experience that the more lovable we find someone, the more unbearable it is to see them suffer. Therefore unless other living beings seem close and dear to us, their suffering will not stimulate the urgent wish to help them. There are two traditional techniques specifically designed to develop that feeling of closeness to others: recognizing the drawbacks of selfishness and the great benefits of cherishing others by understanding that it is appropriate to do so for a great number of reasons, among which is our

total dependence on them for survival. When this sense of closeness grows, it helps us to begin shifting the focus of attention in our life from self to others. The second technique involves recognizing the close connection between ourselves and others on the grounds that there is no living being who has not been our mother, father, brother, sister, son or daughter during a previous life. Candrakirti's commentary on *The Four Hundred* emphasizes this fact.<sup>31</sup>

Both *The Four Hundred* and *The Supplement* deal not only with ultimate truth, but also with conventional truths in the form of the paths a Bodhisattva must practise to accumulate the merit which provides the vital foundation for a powerful insight into the nature of reality, capable of destroying the obstructions to knowledge of all phenomena. *The Supplement* does this by discussing the first five perfections of giving, ethical discipline, patience, effort and concentration in the context of the Bodhisattva grounds on which special facility in each of these is developed. Aryadeva's text, on the other hand, begins by discussing the misconceptions which someone with a Hinayana disposition must overcome in order to attain liberation and which must also be overcome by an aspiring Bodhisattva. Although the perfections are not all discussed individually, the text examines Bodhisattva conduct and how to overcome obstacles to it.

Through their diverse approaches to Nagarjuna's text, *The Four Hundred* and *The Supplement* enrich our understanding of the conventional and ultimate.

*The Four Hundred*, like *The Treatise on the Middle Way* and many other great Indian basic or "root" texts, is written in an extremely terse style. The stanzas of the Tibetan version have four lines each consisting of seven syllables. In many cases some of these seven syllables only serve to preserve the meter and do not affect the meaning. This characteristic terseness gives the texts a flexibility and ambiguity which permits many interpretations. Tibetan scholars compare their elasticity to that of a musk deer's skin which can be stretched this way and that. Occidental scholars frequently find this ambiguity a source of frustration and search for a definitive meaning. Oriental scholars can more easily accommodate such a variety of interpretations since they take into consideration the different purposes which such interpretations might serve.

Terse and strongly negative statements, which abound in Nagarjuna's and Aryadeva's work, speak of having "no view," "no position" or claim that a

thing or the self "does not exist." These are open to misconstruction and indeed have been misconstrued in that the Madhyamika position is regarded as a nihilist philosophy by scholars who take these statements literally. The commentaries, however, elucidate their true meaning.

## BA-TSAP'S LIFE

The Four Hundred together with Candrakirti's commentary on it was translated into Tibetan by the great translator Ba-tsap Nyi-ma-drak (spa tsab nyi ma grags) in collaboration with Suksmajana. According to the Blue Annals," Ba-tsap Nyi-ma-drak was born in 1055 in the upper district of Ba-tsap in Pen-yul ('phan yul) in central Tibet. As a young man, he braved the long and arduous journey to Kashmir and remained there for twenty-three years, first becoming thoroughly conversant with the Sanskrit language, then studying the Buddha's teaching and translating works by the great Indian Buddhist masters. Among the illustrious teachers with whom he studied were Sajjana's two sons, one of whom was Suksmajana.

Ba-tsap Lo-tsa-wa's greatest contribution lies in his translation and revision of a number of seminal Madhyamika texts.<sup>33</sup> He translated Nagarjuna's Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning<sup>34</sup> and revised a translation of his Treatise on the Middle Way.<sup>35</sup> He also revised a translation of his Precious Garland of Advice for the King.<sup>36</sup>

Of Candrakirti's works, in addition the commentary on The Four Hundred, Ba-tsap also translated Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way",<sup>37</sup> the Autocommentary on the "Supplement", and Clear Words, Commentary on "Treatise on the Middle Way".<sup>39</sup> The first two of these he initially translated with the Indian scholar Tilakakalasa and the third with Mahasumati. After his return to Tibet, Ba-tsap revised all three translations with Kanakavarman when the pandit visited Tibet at Ba-tsap's invitation.

Ge-shay Sha-ra-wa (dge bshes sha ra ba),<sup>40</sup> one of the great Gadam-ba (bka' gdams pa) masters, sent many of his students to Batsap to study Madhyamika. Ba-tsap and his four closest students, known as the "Four Sons of Ba-tsap,"<sup>41</sup> did much to establish the Prasangika-Madhyamika system in Tibet. Ba-tsap also taught the Guhyasamaja Tantra extensively and revised Rin-chen-sang-bo's (rin chen bzang po, 954-1055) translation of an important commentary on it by Nagabodhi with which he felt dissatisfied.<sup>42</sup>

One of the first works Ba-tsap translated after his return to Tibet was a commentary on Vasubandhu's Treasury of Knowledge by Purnavardhana.<sup>43</sup> He also translated Nagarjuna's Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment," and a number of other works on tantra. Of the works by Atisa who was active in Tibet just before Ba-tsap's birth, he translated the Great Compendium of Sutra." Along with Muditaśri he also revised a substantial part of Candrakirti's commentary on Nagarjuna's Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness. The exact date of Ba-tsap's death is unknown, but it was probably in the second decade of the twelfth century.

Contemplating the lives of the great translators, one marvels that they undertook the difficult journey from Tibet to India, in a number of cases even several times. Not only was the journey fraught with hazards, but the climate and conditions to which they had to accustom themselves were very different from those of their own country. Many aspiring translators who set out for India died far from home. The contribution to Tibetan civilization of those who survived is unequalled. Their thirst for knowledge of sutra and tantra and of the commentaries by the great Buddhist sages of India which they could not acquire in Tibet, and their determination to then make that knowledge available to others through translation and teaching cannot fail to move and inspire the modern reader.

## CANDRAKIRTI'S COMMENTARY

The only Indian commentary on The Four Hundred which was translated into Tibetan is Candrakirti's comprehensive Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas"; upon which all the Tibetan commentaries are based. Candrakirti, who is thought by most Western scholars to have lived in the seventh century, mentions other earlier commentaries on Aryadeva's text. He criticizes a commentary by Dharmapala which divides the text into two distinct parts, pointing out that to do so ignores the fact that the two truths are interconnected and integral parts of a whole. Candrakirti further criticizes this commentary as a misinterpretation for its explanation of Aryadeva's text from a Cittamatra standpoint, since to Candrakirti it is self-evident that Aryadeva's philosophical position accords with Nagarjuna's and is thus Madhyamika.<sup>46</sup>

Candrakirti's explanation of the text uncompromisingly presents the Prasangika-Madhyamika position that phenomena do not have intrinsic or objective existence of any kind but are entirely dependent on other factors. The very core of the Prasangika system concerns the compatibility of dependent arising and lack of inherent existence. Although things are utterly unfindable when subjected to scrutiny regarding their fundamental nature, this in no way impairs their ability to function. Indeed it permits them to function. When the ultimate, the emptiness of things, is understood correctly it supports the presentation of the conventional, dependently arising phenomena, and when the conventional is understood correctly as meaning that which arises in dependence on other factors, it supports the understanding that things which arise in such a way necessarily lack inherent existence.

In his commentary Candrakirti explains that the analogies which illustrate every stanza of the first eight chapters and which he elucidates are drawn from an earlier commentary by the master Dharmadasa of whom little is known.<sup>47</sup> These vivid and unusual analogies frequently reveal the seamier side of ancient Indian life.

Dzong-ka-ba (tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, 1357-1419) cites

Candrakirti's commentary on The Four Hundred many times in his Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path and clearly considered it and The Four Hundred as texts of major importance.

## TIBETAN COMMENTARIES ON THE FOUR HUNDRED

Commentary to Aryadeva's "Four Hundred Verses"<sup>48</sup> by Ren-da-wa (red mda' ba gzhon nu blo gros, 1349-1412) is the earliest available commentary on The Four Hundred by a Tibetan author. It is a lucid and concise commentary which omits Dharmadasa's analogies. Ren-dawa does not always qualify the object of refutation as clearly as does Gyeltsap nor does he give as great importance to the establishment of conventional truths. Since Ren-da-wa was Gyeltsap's teacher, it is possible that Gyeltsap had access to this commentary and chose to stress points which he felt required more attention, at the same time presenting the material in a different format. Ren-da-wa concentrates on the meaning of the text, closely following Candrakirti's presentation. He is not as intent as Gyeltsap on summarizing the arguments and formulating them according to the dialectic code.

There are instances where Ren-da-wa's interpretation is at variance with Gyeltsap's more usual version of the Prasara gika system based on Candrakirti's works. For example, in his commentary on stanza 298 (chapter XII), Ren-da-wa says that on seeing reality, nirvana is made manifest. He further specifies that from the path of seeing onwards the meditative equipoise of the Exalted constitutes nirvana with remainder. The reason he gives is that to the Exalted in meditative equipoise the characteristics of products such as the aggregates do not appear, whereas nevertheless the meditator's aggregates do appear to an observer and have not ceased. Nirvana without remainder is achieved when that Exalted person dies and attains a mental body in a pure land.<sup>49</sup> According to the more usual interpretation, a unique feature of the Prasangika presentation is that nirvana without remainder is attained before nirvana with remainder. "With" and "without remainder" are taken to refer to remaining appearances of true existence. Thus during meditative equipoise on emptiness an Exalted person does not perceive any appearance of true existence, whereas in the subsequent period such appearances are once more present.

Naga King's Ornament for Thought, Explanation on the "Four Hundred on the Middle Way"<sup>50</sup> by Bo-drul-den-bay-nyi-ma (bod sprul bstan pa'i nyi ma, ca.1905?-1960?) also omits Dharmadasa's analogies. It deals briefly

with the first eight chapters and concentrates mainly on the second half of the text. Bo-drul's explanation of the stanzas also includes some unusual interpretations of the Prasangika system, a few of which are included here. He identifies conceptions of a self of persons as the root of obstructions to liberation and conceptions of a self of phenomena as the root of obstructions to omniscience, thus distinguishing between these two misconceptions on the grounds of subtlety.<sup>51</sup> He further says that Hinayana nirvana is attained by understanding the person's lack of true existence while Mahayana nirvana, complete enlightenment, is attained by understanding the selflessness of phenomena.<sup>52</sup> More usually the conception of a self of persons is said to arise from the conception of a self of phenomena, both of which are said to act as obstructions to liberation. It is therefore asserted that Hearers and Solitary Realizers must meditate on both the selflessness of the person and of phenomena in order to attain liberation.

Describing the Mahayana paths, Bo-drul states that both obstructions to liberation and omniscience can be divided into speculative and innate obstructions. The speculative ones in both categories are eliminated on the first Bodhisattva ground while the innate ones in both categories are eliminated gradually from the second ground onwards.<sup>53</sup> In this context a more commonly accepted interpretation of the Prasangika system is that there are speculative and innate obstructions to liberation. Such a division however is not made regarding obstructions to omniscience which are divided into the manifest and that part composed of seeds. Furthermore those who have a Mahayana disposition from the beginning do not start to eliminate obstructions to omniscience until they reach the eighth Bodhisattva ground when all obstructions to liberation have already been eliminated.

Bo-drul writes that the emptiness of one aggregate, one source and one element is the emptiness of all knowable phenomena.<sup>54</sup> Gyeltsap emphasizes that the nature of emptiness is always the same but that the emptiness of one thing is not another thing's emptiness, otherwise when an inferential awareness cognizes the emptiness of a pot it would necessarily also cognize the emptiness of a piece of woollen cloth.<sup>55</sup>

In an interesting section at the end of his commentary on the sixth chapter B6-drul explains how specifically understanding the true nature of the mind acts as the most powerful antidote to disturbing attitudes and

Sea Spray, Explanation of the "Four Hundred on the Middle Way",<sup>57</sup> by Gah-tok Nga-wang-bel-sang (kah thog ngag dbang dpal bzang, 1879-1941), includes explanation of the analogies for the first eight chapters and is closely based on Gyeltsap's commentary, which is used verbatim in many places. Gah-tok cites copiously from texts by Maitreya, Bhavaviveka and others and also from Candrakirti's Supplement. In addition he introduces his own personal interpretations, sometimes at variance with Gyeltsap's. For instance, commenting on stanza 180 (chapter VIII), he states that to attain liberation one does not need to cognize that emptiness and dependent arising lack inherent existence because the conception of a self is the root of cyclic existence. Thus the antidote is to understand selflessness.<sup>58</sup> In saying this he makes a distinction regarding the subtlety of what is negated when the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena are cognized.

He appears to make a similar distinction when pointing out how stanza 190 (chapter VIII) shows the complete paths of persons of the three capacities. The first line indicates how, as part of the practices of a person of the least capacity, demeritorious action must be stopped in order to ensure a good rebirth. The second line shows the main practice of a person of intermediate capacity—the understanding of selflessness which is the training in wisdom. Implicit in this are the other two kinds of training, in meditative stabilization and in ethics, and thus everything necessary for the attainment of liberation is included. He then goes on to say that the third line encompasses all Mahayana paths of method and wisdom. It does this by indicating the basis of the view which is the non-inherently existent nature of the emptiness and dependent arising of all phenomena. This pacifies all elaborations, is free from all assertions and shows the true state of the two truths.<sup>59</sup> He thereby again distinguishes between selflessness of the person and selflessness of other phenomena on the grounds of subtlety. This is not in keeping with the more common interpretation of the Prasaṅgika system where a distinction is made only with regard to the basis, *i.e.* persons and phenomena, but not regarding what is negated.

Gah-tok reiterates this point in his commentary on stanza 288 (chapter XII), when he says that usually emptiness is regarded as a mother, its understanding being the cause for enlightenment in any of the three vehicles. Skillful means is regarded as a father, responsible for the distinctions between the three vehicles. Since two kinds of selflessness

were taught, it is his opinion that skillful means is not the only criterion for making such a distinction.<sup>60</sup> This implies a difference based on the kind of selflessness cognized by practitioners of a particular vehicle.

In an inspiring passage commenting on stanza 375 (chapter XV), Gah-tok emphasizes that it is foolish to imagine that we can begin with placement meditation and stresses the great importance of first doing analysis which employs reasoning in order to ascertain the ultimate properly. The stronger our ascertainment of the ultimate grows, the more the conventional will seem to resemble an illusion. The more skillful we become in establishing the conventional, the better we will be able to distinguish to what ultimate analysis is and is not applicable. Our activity and view will become pure and we will be able to overcome all confusion with regard to the two truths. Compassion for all those who suffer through not understanding how things are will then arise. Although it is said by some that investigation is a fault, it is impossible to do true meditation without having heard and thought about the subject-matter sufficiently."

Interlinear Commentary on the "Treatise of Four Hundred Stanzas" by Shen-pen-nang-wa (gzhan dga'gzhan phan chos kyi snang ba, 1871-1927) draws primarily on Candrakirti's commentary and illuminates Aryadeva's text in an effective and concise way.

## GYEL-TSAP'S LIFE AND WORKS

According to traditional biographical sources Gyel-tsap Dar-ma-rinchen (rgyal tshab dar ma rin Chen) was born in 1364 at Ri-nang (ri nang) in the Nyang-to (myang stod) area of Dzang (gtsang) where his father was an official. At the age of ten he was given the vows of a novice monk and received the name Dar-ma-rinchen. He then learned to read and write and studied valid cognition, Maitreya's Ornament for Clear Realization and its commentaries as well as texts on higher knowledge and discipline with different masters but especially with the great Sa-gya (sa skya) master Ren-da-wa. Ren-dawa also taught him MAdhyamika philosophy and gave him extensive instruction on tantra. Along with Dzong-ka-ba, Gyel-tsap became one of Ren-da-wa's seven closest disciples and is said by the Sa-gyas to have held the complete teaching of their tradition.

While visiting a famous Sa-gya monastery in Dzang Gyel-tsap distinguished himself by debating on ten different texts. At the age of twenty-five he took the vows of a fully ordained monk and then travelled to central Tibet where he gained a high reputation for scholarship and prowess in debate. Having defeated two Sa-gya masters, Gyel-tsap decided to challenge Dzong-ka-ba. When he arrived at Nyel-to Ra-drong (gnyal stod ra grong) where Dzong-ka-ba was teaching, he entered the hall while the discourse was in progress without removing his hat in the customary way. Dzong-ka-ba noticed him but continued to teach. Gyel-tsap strode up to the throne on which Dzong-ka-ba was seated and began to mount it. Totally unruffled by this uncouth behavior, Dzong-ka-ba simply moved over to make room for him and continued. As he listened, Gyel-tsap heard many things he had never heard before from any other scholar and his arrogance began to subside. First he removed his hat, then he got down from the throne and seated himself among the listeners.

The desire to challenge Dzong-ka-ba had left him completely; instead he felt the burning wish to become his student. Dzong-ka-ba, it is said, saw in him a jewel-like disciple and accepted him. He taught Gyel-tsap the scriptures, explaining the most difficult points with stainless logic. This inspired Gyel-tsap with such faith and devotion that he decided he would

seek out no other masters but would remain with Dzong-ka-ba for the rest of his life.

In due course he received the complete transmission and explanation of Dzong-ka-ba's Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path. Later he wrote the following in his Gateway for Conqueror Children, Explanation of (Santideva's) "Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds":

**Until I found the foremost holy [Dzong-ka-ba]  
I did not understand even one aspect  
Of the path that cuts through worldly existence,  
The Middle Way of dependent arising free from extremes.  
Whatever good explanations I possess  
Are all due to my master's kindness.<sup>63</sup>**

When Dzong-ka-ba was establishing Gan-den (dga' ldan) Monastery, Gyel-tsap assumed responsibility for its construction and participated personally in the work as far as the rules of discipline for a fully ordained monk permitted. The main construction was completed in 1410. During this great enterprise and in all respects he carried out Dzong-ka-ba's wishes with perfect obedience and became his foremost disciple. Even during Dzong-ka-ba's lifetime, many of his students also studied with Gyel-tsap.

When Dzong-ka-ba was near death he gave his pandit's hat, his yellow robes and his cape to Gyel-tsap as a sign that he was to succeed him. In retrospect it was said that Gyel-tsap's act of mounting the throne with him during that early encounter was an auspicious indication that he would be Dzong-ka-ba's successor as holder of the Gan-den throne. He took on this responsibility at the age of fiftysix when Dzong-ka-ba died and held the position for thirteen years. Through his teaching and example Gyel-tsap led many toward liberation. During this period he spent the summer and winter months meditating and taught during spring and autumn. At the age of sixtyeight he installed Kay-drub Ge-lek-bel-sang-bo (mkhas sgrub dge legs dpal bzang po, 1385-1438), Dzong-ka-ba's other closest disciple, as the next holder of the Gan-den throne. Gyel-tsap lived for one more year which he spent mainly in meditation. He died in 1432 at the age of sixty-nine according to Tibetan calculation.

Among Gyel-tsap's most important works are Ornament for the Essence, Explanation (of Maitreya's "Ornament for Clear Realization") (rnam bshad snying po rgyan); Commentary on (Maitreya's) "Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle" (theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i tik ka); a commentary on Nagarjuna's Precious Garland called Clarifying the Essential Meaning (snying po'i don gsal bar byed pa); a commentary on Nagarjuna's Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning; and a number of commentaries on valid cognition, including Elucidation of the Path to Liberation (in Dharmakirti's) Commentary on (Dignaga's) "Compendium of Valid Cognition" (rnam 'grel thar lam gsal byed). He wrote a commentary on Asainga's Compendium of Knowledge called Essence of the Ocean of Knowledge (chos mngon rgya mtsho'i snyingpo). He also wrote many works on tantra.

## GYEL-TSAP'S COMMENTARY

In his preface to the *Essence of Good Explanations, Explanation of the "Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas"* Gyeltsap provides a complete overview of the text and in keeping with a unique contribution made by Tibetan masters, he has also created a detailed outline which enhances the clarity of his work and serves as an aid to memory. This outline may be found in the appendix.

Gyeltsap's commentary takes the form of a lively and pithy dialogue in which the words of Aryadeva's text are used to answer hypothetical and actual assertions, questions and objections. This device is effective since one frequently identifies with the protagonist's psychological or philosophical position, which Gyeltsap states incisively and succinctly. Each attempt to secure oneself fails as irrefutable arguments demolish the successive positions one takes, making them untenable. This constant shifting of ground, expressed in the protagonist's search for new approaches to justify his position, is a defense against recognizing the truth which Gyeltsap skillfully induces us to face.

In the second half of his commentary, Gyeltsap usually identifies the system of tenets to which the opponent adheres, and refutes the opponent's arguments by means of a clear and concise statement of syllogisms and unwanted consequences. The pace is fast and there are few long or convoluted passages. This presentation is ideal for those with a facility in Buddhist logic, which in the scholarly tradition of Tibetan monasteries was considered prerequisite. For those with no training in this form of logic the arguments may at times appear somewhat elliptical and difficult to follow.

In accordance with the tradition of a "word commentary," Gyeltsap includes all the words of Aryadeva's text, though not necessarily in the order in which they occur. He does not, however, merely explain them, but also elucidates the underlying meaning in the manner of a "meaning commentary."

Unlike Ren-da-wa, Gyeltsap places a very strong emphasis on the valid establishment of conventionalities, repeatedly stressing that Prasangikas in

no way deny the existence of dependently arising phenomena. There is a continual process of calibration between refutation of what in reality does not exist and establishment of what exists conventionally. In thus valuing the conventional he closely follows Dzong-ka-ba, who gave equal importance to appearances, namely dependent arising, and to emptiness, the lack of intrinsic existence.

Gyeltsap always clearly defines the object of negation, stating precisely what kind of existence is being refuted. This acts as an important safeguard against negating too much.

He mentions at the end of the sixteenth chapter that he has given the analogies in an abbreviated form since he feared that otherwise they would take up too much space. In fact his rendition of them is frequently quite cryptic and in translation they have therefore been elaborated from Candrakirti's commentary.

# **SUMMARY OF GYEL-TSAP'S COMMENTARY ON THE FOUR HUNDRED**

Although we do not think of our bodies as permanent, we are unaware of the subtle changes they undergo moment by moment. We are, of course, aware of the less subtle changes which take place and know that we must die. However, death does not demand our immediate attention, since it doesn't seem imminent. We therefore continue to act in accustomed ways, making plans that we are unwilling to relinquish.

This appearance of stability is an illusion which we take for reality. Everything we base upon it is based on a misconception, an erroneous conception of permanence, for in fact the psychophysical aggregates are in constant flux.

The first chapter urges us to consider primarily the coarser aspects of impermanence which an ordinary person can recognize with relative ease. In his commentary Bo-drill points out that this first chapter presents four main topics for meditation on impermanence: the fact that death follows birth, that rise is followed by fall, accumulation by dispersal and meeting by parting. Subtle impermanence is introduced only briefly, since it is much more difficult to recognize.

The chapter begins by reminding us of our own impending death and its inevitability. Our reasons for not fearing death are all invalid. Ultimately we cannot ward off death, no matter what means we employ; we should acknowledge that our efforts to do so simply mask our fear. It is foolish to risk this life for prosperity and fame or endanger the happiness of future lives for the sake of the present one and its brief pleasures, since none of this brings lasting benefit. Life is just a succession of moments which lead relentlessly toward old age.

We notice and feel sad when those we love grow old, but fail to remember that the same is happening to us. Grief when they die is unreasonable, for death is the natural consequence of birth, and living beings come into and go from this world of their own accord. Our attachment to them is an unreliable emotion, contingent upon all sorts of

other factors; it can vanish swiftly. We yearn for relationships and to meet with those who are dear to us, yet meeting is inevitably followed by parting. We should therefore willingly separate from all that we cling to at present, before such a separation is forced on us.

Here the emphasis is placed on recognizing that people, things and situations are not static. Clinging to them and wishing them to remain unchanged is unrealistic and a cause of fear. Once we are able to acknowledge this, our attachment and thereby our fear will diminish, and we will be better prepared to face both life and death.

The second chapter explains that even though the body clearly gives rise to disturbing attitudes and suffering, it can be used constructively and must therefore be cared for in an appropriate and moderate way. While we do not actually think of the body itself as pleasurable, we feel that if only the circumstances were right, we would be able to experience physical well-being and pleasure. This is an illusion, since we mistake what is in itself suffering and a source of suffering for a source of pleasure. Different forms of pain and discomfort are abundant and arise without any effort on our part, whereas pleasure is rare and difficult to induce. Most of the pleasure we experience requires effort and is due to external factors. It is therefore like something foreign to the body. Pain and suffering, on the other hand, frequently arise without any external provocation, indicating the body's intrinsic disposition toward them. In this way the coarsest and most easily recognizable form of suffering is identified.

However, what we normally think of as pleasure is not as it appears, for when it is intensified, it turns into pain. Protracted discomfort does not follow the same pattern; its intensification gives rise to increasingly severe pain. When the body is in the process of disintegrating, is vulnerable, composed of conflicting elements, impossible to keep comfortable, and when every action requires effort, how can it be considered a source of pleasure? Do we ever experience pleasure intense enough to override pain? We mistake the alleviation of discomfort for pleasure, but the relief experienced simply disguises the beginning of a new form of discomfort. How can the mere alleviation of pain be considered "real" pleasure? Thus what is conventionally regarded as pleasure is, in fact, the suffering of change, since it does not last.

The body, which is the basis for these experiences, is the result of past

actions motivated by disturbing attitudes and is thus contaminated. Even when not overtly present, suffering may arise at any moment. This constant potential for suffering reveals that the body itself constitutes the pervasive suffering of conditioning. Without recognizing that the contaminated psychophysical aggregates themselves are the subtlest form of suffering, we cannot develop the genuine wish to free ourselves from the cycle of birth and death. Understanding the other two kinds of suffering leads toward an understanding of this.

Desire for sensual pleasures is unlimited and inexhaustible; no matter what pleasures we enjoy or how long we indulge in them, our thirst will never be quenched. The only effect of sensuality is to increase craving. In demonstrating the undesirability of what we desire as well as the unwholesomeness of desirous states of mind, the third chapter focuses mainly on attachment to sexual pleasure and on the unclean nature of the body.

In doing so, discussion centers on women's bodies and on men's desire for women. To understand the reasons for this one must bear in mind that Aryadeva's text and the subsequent commentaries on it were addressed to what was probably an exclusively male audience consisting almost entirely of monks trying to observe vows of celibacy. Since most human beings are not naturally celibate, one can assume that preoccupation with women's bodies and sexual desire was a pertinent issue for them. One must also recall the status of women throughout recorded history, both in Indian society and most other societies, as possessions first of their fathers and then of their husbands. This enforced passivity, which deprived them of any effective rights within or control of the society in which they lived, left them with very limited means of exercising influence, among which was their sexual desirability. The almost exclusive emphasis on the uncleanness of women's bodies is perhaps a reaction to this manipulative power, since the arguments concentrate primarily on establishing the undesirability of sexual contact with women rather than on the undesirability of a lustful state of mind.

Since learning to apply the appropriate antidotes to disturbing states of mind is a lengthy process, beginners are usually advised to deal with disturbing attitudes and emotions temporarily by putting distance between themselves and whatever stimulates these states. Although reviling women's bodies and behavior may act as an incentive to do this and may to

some extent counteract lust, it could also have the unwanted effect of provoking antipathy to women. Since Aryadeva was a practitioner of the Great Vehicle and therefore motivated by love and compassion for all living beings, one can rest assured that this was certainly not his intention. However, one wonders why the uncleanness of the male body is not stressed to the same extent, since contemplation of the true nature of one's own body can also effectively counteract sexual desire. In any case we must be wary of superimposing modern values and sensibilities on the text but instead draw from it what is relevant and view it within a historical context.

Aryadeva points out that none of the reasons we use to justify our desire, such as the other's attractive appearance, good qualities or behavior, are valid reasons. Moreover we often feel embarrassed when we recall how shamelessly we acted when we were younger. How can the obsessive state of mind associated with desire be called pleasurable? If desire itself were pleasurable we wouldn't feel compelled to satisfy it. On the contrary, it is like an itchy rash-scratching it brings temporary relief, but only aggravates it in the long run. Infatuation makes us act in ways we would normally find humiliating and causes unreasonable jealousy.

To counteract our misconceptions about the body, we must consider how it has come into being through unclean causes and produces unclean substances. Nothing can alter this unclean nature, no matter what artifice we employ. If it is possible to rid oneself of desire for other's bodies, how can we claim that the body really is clean? When we become aware of the defects of what is desired, desire for it ceases.

The misconception of the self, the view of the transitory collection as real "I" and "mine," is one of the fundamental disturbing attitudes. While the tenth chapter refutes various wrong views regarding the self, the main topic of the fourth chapter is pride and egoism, which are manifestations of the coarsest forms of this misconception. Since the effects of egoism and pride are most evident in the autocratic behavior of those who hold power, this chapter examines the conduct of kings to demonstrate that such feelings are unjustified and to show how they may be overcome.

A king has no reason to feel arrogant, since he is actually an employee of the people and holds his position by common consent. His apparent authority and control over the finances and activities of his country are an illusion, for he is invested with these powers by his subjects. It is totally

unjustified for him to use the protection of his subjects as an excuse for irreligious actions. He may think that protecting them, their affairs and customs is a religious practice, but it is merely his duty and no more of a religious practice than any other form of work.

Kings are in a perilous position, for they are easily tempted to abuse the power they wield. Manuals on statecraft are frequently misleading, and the advice they contain is not necessarily for the well-being of the people. Violence toward enemies and harsh punishment of law-breakers is inadmissible behavior for a king; such actions will bring him only infamy and suffering.

Neither a royal birth nor wealth and power are reasons for egoism and pride, since all of these are unreliable and essenceless. Arrogance regarding such things is quickly deflated when confronted with the greater wealth, social standing and authority of others.

Understanding the actual nature of the contaminated psychophysical aggregates and how these four kinds of misconceptions regarding them create suffering makes us wish to free ourselves from cyclic existence. When we then consider the situation of others, which essentially is like our own, we will feel compassion, if a sense of closeness with them has been established. Development of this compassion gives rise to the aspiration to attain enlightenment for the sake of others. A profound personal recognition of the unsatisfactoriness of cyclic existence forms the basis for this, otherwise we will not empathize with them nor wish to help them.

If becoming a Buddha allows us to help living beings in the most effective ways, what is a Buddha like? The fifth chapter describes a Buddha's compassionate and powerful activity, whose well-spring is perfect knowledge. Every action is an expression of compassion. An enlightened being's power is so great that even the word "Buddha" can ward off death in that it implants a seed for the attainment of liberation from the cycle of involuntary birth and death. The Buddha Sakyamuni's silence in the face of certain questions shows his consummate skill resulting from omniscience, rather than demonstrating his lack of omniscience. A Buddha is thus the embodiment of perfected compassion, power and wisdom.

The quality of one's mind and motivation is crucial in determining the value of actions. Bodhisattvas control their minds so effectively that they

never do anything harmful. Through the power of their conventional altruistic intention to attain enlightenment for the good of all others, actions which would normally be harmful are transmuted and become constructive and beneficial. The merit of Bodhisattvas who have developed the ultimate altruistic intention and attained the first Bodhisattva ground is then discussed.

The fifth chapter thus first describes enlightenment, mainly in terms of enlightened activity. Then, to encourage us to attain that state and to develop a profound appreciation of Bodhisattvas, it describes the transformative effects of the altruistic intention.

Implementing this intention through actions which benefit others requires imagination and sensitivity toward their needs and capacities. Bodhisattvas use others' natural affinities and interests as a means of gradually leading them toward an understanding of reality. The more obstinate and confused they are, the greater the Bodhisattva's compassion. Bodhisattvas do not hesitate to assume whatever role or relationship allows them to help most effectively, since this is their only concern. There is nobody with whom experienced Bodhisattvas cannot communicate constructively. This places a great responsibility on them, which they should never neglect. How can we fail to admire and appreciate them, when we realize their true qualities? Not to do so and to feel hostility toward them is a grave error.

A Bodhisattva's training consists of practising the six perfections and the four ways of gaining others' trust in order to help them. Practice of the perfections creates the two great stores of merit and insight which give rise to the Wisdom and Form Bodies of a Buddha. Aryadeva then discusses the merit created by giving, the first of the perfections. We should not be daunted by the magnitude of the Mahayana perspective nor by the profundity of its teaching, but should understand that perfect enlightenment is possible, since exceptional causes yield exceptional results.

However, while we are dominated and troubled by disturbing emotions, it is not possible to accomplish our own good, let alone others'. In the sixth chapter Aryadeva identifies these disturbing emotions which interfere with a Bodhisattva's practice. He also describes how Bodhisattvas treat those who are affected by these turbulent emotions. Unless we recognize these states of mind clearly, we will be unable to get rid of them. Mortification of the body cannot free us from them or from the contaminated actions

instigated by them, for they are rooted in the mind. It is therefore vital to understand particularly how the three main disturbing emotions, desire, anger and confusion, operate and what their effects are. Our inability to recognize the suffering they cause when we are overwhelmed by them is, in fact, the greatest suffering, for it robs us of the incentive to get rid of them.

Since anger and desire require their own specific antidotes, students dominated by either must be treated accordingly. Moreover, confusion, anger and desire predominate at different times of the day; if we understand what stimulates them, we will be better prepared to counteract them.

Desire is extremely difficult to overcome, because initially it seems agreeable. This blinds us to its disastrous effects. Deeply ingrained habitual desire is much more difficult to counter than desire stimulated by a particular circumstance, for the latter can be dealt with by avoiding the stimulus. The destructive force of hatred and anger is far easier to recognize. At the root of all negative emotions lies confusion which can only be eliminated by understanding dependent arising. Eradicating confusion uproots the other disturbing attitudes and emotions as well.

Bodhisattvas must recognize behavior that indicates someone in whom desire, for instance, is predominant and should know how to help such a person. The destructiveness of anger and its inappropriateness as a response to harm inflicted by others are then examined. Such harm is the result of our own previous negative actions. By experiencing the fruit of those actions, their momentum comes to an end, while retaliating simply creates more negative karma. None of the reasons put forward to justify an angry response to real or imagined injuries are valid. Understanding the enormous benefits of patience helps us to overcome anger, for patience and tolerance give rise to many remarkable accomplishments.

While it is important to apply the different techniques described to overcome manifest forms of these disturbing emotions, we must endeavor to gain a correct understanding of reality, for only this will allow us to eliminate them completely. The sixth chapter thus clearly describes how and why we should rid ourselves of the disturbing emotions and help others to do so too, for these emotions act as the source of our continued rebirth within cyclic existence.

The seventh chapter explains that the unbroken cycle of involuntary

births and deaths is caused by actions based upon these disturbing emotions. Cyclic existence is fraught with suffering. Though temporarily we may be reassured by our youth, youth does not last long. Soon we will be compelled to take another rebirth over which we have no control since it is determined by past actions. Countless lives have been thus wasted but at present we have a rare opportunity to break this cycle. If the right conditions are assembled, we can certainly end our cyclic existence, but in the case of someone for whom they are not assembled, no such end can be foreseen. We should therefore recognize how difficult it is for the necessary teaching, a competent exponent and a recipient with the prerequisite qualities to come together at the same time.

Since contaminated actions are responsible for our continued rebirths, we must stop performing them, but our blindness to the horror of cyclic existence prevents us from doing this. In striving for a desired result, we do much that is negative and that inevitably brings suffering. No matter how much energy we invest, we can never be certain our actions will yield the fruit we wish. What we do achieve perishes of its own accord and is impermanent. Then why do we waste so much effort?

Even good rebirths are unsatisfactory, because they too entail suffering, and it is a mistake to perform positive actions out of attachment to the pleasure, prosperity and authority one hopes to experience in them, for attachment will eventually bring suffering. Renunciation, not the acquisition of such pleasures and prosperity, is what brings true and lasting happiness. Only by seeing the illusory nature of the world and of the pleasures it offers can we free ourselves from suffering and attain the highest state of freedom.

The eighth chapter provides advice on how to make the student's mind ready for instruction concerning the fundamental nature of all phenomena. When the identity and causes of disturbing emotions are examined, it becomes evident that the mind can be purified of them, and that we are not forced to continue taking involuntary rebirths under their influence. The fact that most people have not got rid of them is due to their lack of interest.

Whether we attain liberation or remain caught in the cycle of birth and death depends on whether or not we gain a correct understanding of reality. Even a doubt which tends in the right direction causes the fabric of cyclic existence to begin disintegrating. Fear of emptiness and prejudice make us

cling to our habits and are obstacles to the attainment of liberation. Only a sense of strong antipathy to the process in which we are trapped can act as the necessary spur to attaining freedom.

Although understanding the nature of reality is of such vital importance, it is not taught to everyone at once because most people are not ready to understand it. If it is misunderstood or rejected the consequences are extremely grave. It is therefore wise to proceed cautiously. First people should be discouraged from doing unwholesome things and encouraged to do what is wholesome. They should then be helped to overcome gross misconceptions regarding the self and finally the subtler ones, until all wrong views have been eradicated. In doing so, great skill must be employed to ensure that students understand conventional reality correctly. Unless they do, they will not be able to understand ultimate truth. Even if we cannot attain liberation in this life as a result of receiving instruction on emptiness, it will leave a profound imprint which will bear fruit of its own accord in future. Just as our attachment to the body ends when we recognize that it is bound to disintegrate, all other disturbing emotions will end when we understand the dependently arising nature of all phenomena. Cyclic existence comes to an end when the causes that produce it are incomplete. Liberation is therefore possible.

Having gained a sound understanding of conventional truths as they actually are, and having purified the mind by developing the prerequisite Mahayana intention, the student is ready to be introduced to ultimate truth. Though there are as many permanent as impermanent phenomena, the former are more subtle and thus more difficult to comprehend. This is because they cannot be apprehended by the senses, but only by mental perception and primarily by conceptual awareness.

Inability to identify correctly what is permanent leads to the misidentification of permanent phenomena as functional things and of certain impermanent things as permanent. The ninth chapter presents a general introduction to the refutation of true existence by refuting that the self, space, time, particles and liberation are permanent functional things. This is shown to be a contradiction in terms. The refutation of misconceptions regarding the self and time are treated briefly here and at length in the tenth and eleventh chapters.

The protagonist in Gyel-tsap's dialogue argues that there are certain

phenomena which are both functional and permanent and are neither produced by other factors nor give rise to effects, while others are causes but not effects. It is impossible for anything to be permanent and also a functional thing as is claimed, for whatever arises in dependence upon other factors, *i.e.* causes and conditions, is not permanent. A functional thing always has a cause, while that which is permanent never has. It is impossible for a functional thing to be neither cause nor effect, nor for it to be only a cause but not itself an effect as is claimed, since both are contrary to the normal operation of cause and effect. Anything that undergoes a transformation to produce an effect cannot be permanent, nor can a cause and an effect have totally disparate natures such that the one is permanent and the other impermanent.

To demonstrate that particles are not truly existent partless phenomena as asserted, it is shown that they have sides and do not therefore interpenetrate completely when they come together to form a composite. Moreover, in forming such a composite, particles could not move unless they had parts, such as a fore and rear. Since they undergo change during the formation of the composite, how can they be permanent? The causal particles no longer exist once the effect has been produced.

Finally the chapter presents a critique of liberation as asserted by the opponent. It cannot be a functional phenomenon as claimed, for then it should produce an effect, but none can be identified. This is followed by a discussion of what attains liberation and what exists as a basis when liberation occurs, in the course of which it is demonstrated that the basis cannot be a permanent truly existent self. Although the objects refuted in this chapter are those of speculative conceptions of true existence, their refutation is a vital step toward undermining the innate conception of true existence.

Both Buddhists and proponents of non-Buddhist systems in which there is a belief in liberation from suffering posit the self as the basis both for the states of bondage and release. The identity and attributes of this self, which is therefore of great importance, are variously described, supported by numerous reasons. Most of these systems identify the self as a permanent functional thing. The tenth chapter shows the impossibility of the self's existence according to these assertions.

Chapter ten begins by examining the self as asserted by the Vaisheshikas.

First it is shown that gender, which differs from one life to the next, is incompatible with the idea of a permanent self. Nor can a permanent intangible self act as agent of the body's movements, as is claimed, since only something tangible can cause motion. A permanent self would be invulnerable to harm of any kind and would therefore not need to seek spiritual practices as a means of protection. Nor does memory of past lives establish the self as permanent, but demonstrates the presence of a continuum of consciousness, consisting of moments which arise in dependence upon each other. If, as is claimed, the person were mindless matter only capable of memory through an association with consciousness, then the person could not be permanent and unchanging, since it would first lack and then possess the faculty of remembering. Moreover something which at different times has different attributes, such as pleasure and pain, cannot be permanent either.

The Samkhya assertion that a permanent conscious person exists is then examined and its flaws are revealed. What role would the eyes and other senses play, if such a continually conscious person existed? If the person is claimed to be potentially conscious, the self and consciousness could not be a permanent indifferentiable entity, for then the person but not consciousness would exist before an object is experienced. Any transition from potential consciousness to actual consciousness indicates that the person is not permanent.

The Naiyayika assertion that there is a vast permanent partless self which is present in each being is next shown to be illogical, for then that which is one person's self should also be another's. This is followed by an examination of the Samkhya belief that the creative force is unconscious matter with the capacity to produce virtue and nonvirtue but with no capacity to experience their effects. On the other hand if, as the Vaisesikas claim, the self is the doer of actions and experiencer of their results, how can it be permanent, for this necessarily entails transformation from a previous state to a subsequent one.

A permanent self would be invulnerable to the suffering of cyclic existence and would therefore not need to seek release. Moreover, if the self were truly existent, how could giving up conceptions of a self be the means to attain liberation, as is claimed?

All these views are based on a failure to understand that impermanence

does not necessitate discontinuation. Nothing impermanent can be produced from a permanent cause. Therefore a permanent self is not feasible as an initiating cause of activity. Products which undergo change moment by moment are neither permanent nor do they discontinue. This becomes clear when we correctly understand the nature of dependent arising, for though the cause ceases to exist when the effect is produced and is therefore not permanent, an effect has arisen from it and thus there is continuity.

Although the views of the self refuted in this chapter are speculative ones, their refutation is an essential step toward the refutation of the innate conception of the self. If the self existed as it appears to the innate conception, it would necessarily exist in the ways refuted here.

The eleventh chapter continues the refutation of truly existent time, begun in the ninth chapter, as part of the extensive presentation of the selflessness of phenomena with specific reference to products. By refuting the true existence of functional things existing in a temporal context, it is shown that time itself cannot have true existence. Time can neither be a permanent functional thing nor an independent cause, because past, present and future can only be posited in dependence on one another. Neither time nor that which exists within a temporal context can be posited except in relation to each other. Since time operates and can be understood only in relation to things and events, it is not an independent phenomenon. If it were truly existent, things could undergo no change and there would be nothing impermanent.

Time cannot be a permanent cause and produce an impermanent effect, for then cause and effect would be totally disparate in nature. If a thing existed while in the future, as is claimed by the Vaibhasikas, for example, the effect would already exist at the time of the cause, and there would be no sense in making any effort to accomplish a particular result. Effects would, in that case, exist without the need for causes, contrary to the normal operation of actions and their results. On the other hand, if future effects were utterly non-existent, it would be senseless to try to develop insights in order to overcome future disturbing emotions and suffering.

Refutation of truly existent permanent time indirectly also refutes the arising of effects from incompatible causes as well as their fortuitous production. In order to understand and gain conviction regarding the

relationship of actions and their effects, we must gain a sound understanding of the relationship between the past, present and future.

The twelfth chapter begins by examining what qualities make one an ideal recipient for explanations concerning emptiness. Only benefit ensues for both student and teacher when the nature of reality is explained to such a person, while in the absence of these qualities the consequences may be grave.

Someone who is not genuinely openminded and unbiased easily misunderstands even what has been well and clearly explained. Although one may accept that liberation can be achieved by overcoming faulty states of mind, lack of openmindedness prevents one from recognizing that only a correct understanding of reality can eradicate them completely. To attain freedom we need to know the correct means. It is thus vital to gain conviction in the importance and efficacy of understanding emptiness.

Through lack of intelligence people follow misleading teachers and are led astray into thickets of wrong views. Lack of interest prevents one from finding out how to gain liberation and from following what was explained by the Buddha who taught from his own experience. The ideal recipient for instruction on emptiness is therefore openminded, intelligent and interested.

Ingrained ideas about the self prevent ordinary people from considering the possibility of emptiness and cause them to fear it. Since rejecting emptiness makes it difficult to attain a good rebirth and impossible to achieve liberation, great care must be taken to prepare students sufficiently and ensure that they are receptive, otherwise this precious teaching acts as a poison instead of a panacea. A skilled teacher can recognize who is and who is not ready to receive such instruction.

The text continues by briefly identifying the nature of reality and explaining its importance, since neither liberation nor enlightenment can be reached without understanding it. The purpose of studying it is soteriological and not to outshine opponents in debate. Nevertheless, since a person who understands emptiness cannot be beguiled by wrong views based on false arguments, understanding it automatically destroys the deceptive reasoning used by others. How could such a person not fail to pity those who are led away from the truth by false teachers?

Since emptiness is difficult to understand, and since the transformation of

one's attitudes, the focus of Buddhist practice, is hard to achieve, many people choose physical and verbal forms of practice by which they hope to attain liberation. Although non-violence and emptiness are the salient principles of the Buddha's teaching and the only way by which a good rebirth and liberation can be attained, attachment to their own particular religious practices and views prevents people from adopting what the Buddha taught. The wise, however, are unprejudiced enough to adopt whatever is truly beneficial, even if it belongs to -a tradition other than their own.

Our senses and what they experience exercise a compelling influence over us, because they seem to have true and objective existence. The thirteenth chapter demonstrates that neither the senses nor their objects exist as they appear. We feel that since objects are directly perceptible they must have true existence. In that case we should see every aspect of an object, such as a pot, at once. A pot, however, consists of many diverse elements of which visual perception apprehends only one, its visual form. Yet this visual form too has its specific components. Therefore the pot and its constituents are merely imputed to a collection of components and do not exist in and of themselves as directly perceptible objects. This same analytical procedure should be applied to the objects of the other senses: to sounds, smells, tastes and tactile objects. One will discover that none of these are truly existent directly perceptible objects. A closer analysis then follows which establishes that all the components that make up a composite, even particles, have parts. Thus each is simultaneously a component as well as a composite. An analysis of the relationship between the four elements and their outcome, visual form, is then made to demonstrate that they are neither inherently one nor different.

The senses and the process of perception are examined next. Confusing lack of true existence with total non-existence, the opponent argues that the Madhyamika presentation of the senses contradicts what was said by the Buddha about the eyes and so forth being the maturation of past actions. In answer it is established that although nothing can sustain ultimate analysis, since nothing is findable when subjected to this kind of investigation, our experience confirms the existence of our senses and other phenomena. Thus the Buddha's statements about the relationship between actions and their effects are in no way contradicted, since such statements refer to the conventional existence of actions and their effects.

Inquiry is then made as to whether the eye and the visual perception it induces function simultaneously or consecutively, and whether the eye goes toward its object or not; if motion is involved, does it occur before, during or after perception? If no motion is involved, all objects should be equally visible. If the eye were an inherent instrument of perception, its function would not depend on a multitude of other factors. In that case it should also see itself. None of the factors involved in the process of perception-neither objects, sense organs nor their related perceptions-exist inherently or operate independently.

A similar investigation is then carried out in relation to sound and its perception. Does sound emit noise or travel silently? Is it apprehended through contact or not? Does the mind travel toward objects or not? What is the mind's relationship to the senses? How does recognition, which identifies things, function if things do not exist inherently? In each case the conclusion is the same: nothing is findable nor can be pin-pointed under such analysis. Yet events, objects and perception occur, arising in dependence on a combination of many different factors. Their dependent arising is a true source of wonder and amazement. We must learn to recognize that though things appear in one way and exist in another, and though they cannot be found when subjected to a scrutiny that examines their fundamental nature, they do exist and operate.

The fourteenth chapter continues by refuting extreme conceptions of reified existence and total non-existence. If phenomena were inherently existent, they should be independent and findable when sought by a reasoning consciousness analyzing their final mode of existence, but they are neither. Emphasis is placed on the fact that ultimate or inherent existence is being refuted, and that this should not be misinterpreted to mean that things do not have valid conventional existence.

The reason of not being inherently one or many is first presented concisely and then applied to refute non-Buddhist as well as Buddhist contentions, in order to establish that neither what is imputed nor its basis of imputation has true existence.

The text first examines whether the pot and its constituents, like visual form, are inherently one or different. If they were inherently one, there should be a pot wherever there is a visual form. Alternatively, if the pot

possessed visual form as something inherently different from itself, the two would be unrelated, and we should be able to see a pot without necessarily seeing its form. In developing this examination of the relationship between the pot and its parts, the text investigates Vaisesika contentions regarding the relationship between the generality "existence" and specific instances such as a pot. Here, the relationship between a substantial entity (a pot) and its attributes and the relationship between one attribute and another are also investigated.

According to Vaisesika contentions one would not be able to say that the pot exists because the pot and existence are inherently different and thus unrelated. Neither could one say "one pot," since a substantial entity and its attributes, in this case the pot and one, are asserted to be inherently different and possession between them not reciprocal. When we say a "large pot" we mean its form is large. According to the Vaisesikas, however, both form and size are attributes and one attribute cannot qualify another, with the absurd consequence that a large pot could not exist.

Next Sautrantika assertions regarding the relationship between characteristics and what they characterize is examined.

The pot, for instance, is not a truly existent single unit, since it is composed of eight constituents with their own individual properties. Nor is it a truly existent plurality, since there is not a separate pot for each of these constituents. The opponent argues that the constituents combine to form a truly existent pot. Yet how do tangible constituents such as the four elements combine with intangible ones such as visual form? These constituents are merely components and not the compound itself. If the compound is not truly existent because it depends on its parts, neither are the components, since they too depend on their parts.

If form is truly existent, why is one form a pot and another not a pot? Surely all forms should be pots, since distinctions would indicate dependence on other factors. A pot comes into existence through causes which require their own causes. How can anything which is produced in this way be truly existent? When the components retain their own particular properties, how can their combination form a truly existent single unit? The components themselves, for instance visual form, depend on their constituents, such as the four elements; the elements too exist only in dependence upon each other and not in and of themselves. Even elemental

particles, when subjected to similar scrutiny, are found to depend on their parts and other factors. Finally the "diamond fragments" reason, which examines production by focusing on the effect, and the reason of dependent arising are reiterated to establish lack of true existence.

Through inability to understand the continuum of things or the nature of composites correctly, they are thought to be permanent and truly existent. However their lack of true existence should not be confused with non-existence. Things are like magical illusions, in that they appear to exist in and of themselves, but actually depend upon each other. Inherent existence implies permanence which precludes the coming into existence of things in dependence on other factors. Only by understanding that things do not exist as perceived by conceptions of true or inherent existence can the seed of cyclic existence be destroyed. We should therefore make a great effort to develop a correct understanding of reality.

The fifteenth chapter examines the production, duration and disintegration of impermanent phenomena, since the opponent uses the existence of these characteristics to support the argument that products are truly existent. Refutation of inherent production is the main focus, since by refuting this, inherent duration and disintegration are automatically also refuted.

Inherent production of a thing is impossible, for neither that which exists nor that which does not exist at the time of its causes is produced by way of its own entity. Something non-existent at the time of its causes cannot come into being in and of itself. If it could, even totally non-existent things like rabbits' horns could occur, since they would not depend on producing causes. On the other hand, neither would something already existent at the time of its causes require anything to bring it into existence. A thing is not produced while it exists nor while it is non-existent. Since there is no other possibility, how can production be truly existent, for when analyzed nothing is findable.

Do the three characteristics-production, duration and disintegration-occur sequentially? They cannot, for they are simultaneous aspects of an on-going process, dependent on one another. Unless a thing has all three of these features, it cannot be a product.

Moreover inherent production is impossible, since things are not

produced from themselves, *i.e.* from that which has the same nature, nor from that which has a different nature, for neither have inherent existence. Since production, duration and disintegration cannot be found to exist before, simultaneously or after that which they characterize, they cannot exist inherently. Even aging is relative, for a product constantly undergoes production. Are these characteristics and that which they characterize inherently one or different? If they were one, they would lose their specific identities, while if they were different, things could not be impermanent.

Something that already exists is not produced again, nor do its causes still exist, when it has been produced. The relationship between cause and effect and the function of production are then examined to establish their lack of inherent existence. The opponent argues that if neither that which is already produced and therefore functional nor that which is unproduced and therefore non-functional is being produced, what is being produced must be that which is presently undergoing production. To demonstrate that this too is not produced in and of itself, that which is in the process of being produced is next investigated. Is it identifiable as half produced or half unproduced? Does it already have an identity or not? Is it findable as something between the past and the present? Can one find anything, when an attempt is made in this way to identify the process of production and that which is being produced? What is the criterion for existence and non-existence? Through this investigation it becomes clear that causes and effects are interdependent, and that neither the arising of an effect nor the cessation of a cause occurs in and of itself.

The sixteenth chapter once more reviews the purpose of the text, explaining that it is to lead us to liberation by overcoming attachment to cyclic existence. Liberation can only be attained through a correct understanding of reality, but those who are unintelligent or lack sufficient instruction regarding the nature of reality fear emptiness. It is therefore essential to prepare their minds sufficiently by helping them to gain an undistorted understanding of conventional reality. Only then should the path which frees one completely from the cycle of involuntary birth and death be revealed to them.

The preceding chapters refute all kinds of innate and speculative misconceptions about things which are in fact empty of inherent existence. Some final arguments raised by opponents of the Madhyamika system are examined. Opponents support the contention of true existence by pointing

out that both the author, his subject-matter and the words he uses exist. Of course they exist, but not inherently as is claimed, because they depend upon one another. One can only refute another's thesis by convincingly establishing one's own, but the arguments advanced by the opponents to establish their theses remain as unproven as the theses themselves.

As part of a final refutation of extreme views, the fact that even emptiness lacks true existence is emphasized. If Madhyamikas as asserted that emptiness were truly existent, the phenomena which act as its basis would necessarily also be truly existent. However since no such assertion is made, how can these phenomena have true existence?

This is followed by a summary of various refutations of true existence introduced in previous chapters. When one examines how fire exists, whether a thing and its parts are inherently one or different or how particles exist, one finds that nothing is truly existent but that everything depends on other factors. From the point of view of their fundamental nature, there are no distinctions among phenomena, for everything is equally empty of true existence. If opponents of the Middle Way nevertheless choose to dispute this thesis, they must convincingly establish their own position, yet they repeatedly fail to do so. Thus finding cogent arguments that invalidate the Madhyamika position is obviously not as simple as they claim. If things were truly existent merely because one says they are, they would, by the same argument, be empty of true existence merely by saying they are; words alone do not affect reality. It is a mistake to think that things were previously truly existent, but are rendered non-existent through refutation of their true existence. They never existed in this way in the first place. Neither the existence of reasons nor analogies establishing emptiness can be used to support the thesis that things are truly existent, for the reasons and analogies themselves lack true existence. Though things do not exist in and of themselves, they nevertheless exist. Through understanding their true mode of existence, we can gain freedom.

# THE TRANSLATION

The translation consists of Gyeltsap's preface, Aryadeva's verses and Gyeltsap's commentary on them. Gyeltsap's outline of the text has been presented as a separate appendix to show the structure of the whole and to serve as a guide to contemplation of the subject-matter. It therefore does not appear at the head of and throughout each chapter as in the original work.

Each section of Gyeltsap's commentary appears with the relevant stanza by Aryadeva and stands on the page as a discrete unit. These units of commentary correspond to the sections of the outline in the appendix which bear the stanza numbers.

In his commentary Gyeltsap frequently refers to Candrakirti's commentary and additional references to it have been made throughout this translation both in the form of interpolations and in the endnotes. Interpolated material is indicated by brackets or notes.

A section of further commentary has been placed after each of the first eight chapters. This additional commentary incorporates material from other sources which is relevant to the topic discussed within the chapter and suggests further approaches for contemplation and practical application. These sections have been written by the Venerable Geshe Sonam Rinchen and myself.

In translating Aryadeva's text, as little extraneous material as possible has been interpolated in an attempt to preserve something of the original style and to allow Gyeltsap's commentary to demonstrate fully the function of the hermeneutic tradition. The presence of interpolated words is, for the most part, clearly indicated by the use of brackets.

There are some variations among the extant Tibetan versions of the text, for instance those included in the different editions of Candrakirti's commentary. On account of the text's terseness and frequent ambiguity, during the process of translation the commentaries, particularly Gyeltsap's, have been used to provide a key to the meaning. When a choice between different versions of a stanza has had to be made, the version used by Gyeltsap has generally been preferred. Where such differences change the

essential meaning, the alternative reading may be found in the endnotes.

I wish to mention Karen Lang's translation of the text, Aryadeva's Catuḥṣataka, On the Bodhisattva's Cultivation of Merit and Knowledge, Indiske Studier VII, (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1986, also published in India by Motilal Banarsidass). This is a new edition of the Tibetan of Aryadeva's text which includes variants as well as the surviving Sanskrit fragments, constituting less than a third of the four hundred stanzas. Her introduction gives a comprehensive list of previous editions and translations of the text, which has not been repeated here. She provides excellent scholarly and illuminating annotations which indicate the correspondences between Aryadeva's text and Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way along with copious references to other Indian Buddhist and non-Buddhist texts.

Repetition is a stylistic device favored and used to good effect in Tibetan, and a particular word or phrase is often repeated many times within a short passage. While every effort has been made to preserve Gyeltsap's style, English synonyms have occasionally been introduced to relieve the monotony of such repetition.

Since the Tibetan third person singular pronoun is not gender specific and therefore when, for instance, it refers to a Bodhisattva, there is no clear indication of the Bodhisattva's gender, the use of "s/he" and so forth has been avoided, both in the translation of Aryadeva's text and of the commentary, by using plural forms. This has only been done where the intended sense is not affected and statements of a general kind are involved.

May all who are oppressed by unhappiness and suffering find freedom and  
lasting joy.

# Acknowledgments

Work on this translation first began in 1978 after the Venerable Geshe Ngawang Dhargyey taught the whole of Gyel-tsap's commentary on The Four Hundred at the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives in Dharamsala, India. I attended this series of lectures and his excellent presentation stimulated my interest in the text. I was also present later in the year when he was requested to teach the first eight chapters again.

The text proved much more difficult than I had originally anticipated and I quickly discovered both that my knowledge of Tibetan was insufficient and that my understanding barely skimmed the surface of Aryadeva's text and the commentary which I was attempting to translate. But for the Venerable Geshe Sonam Rinchen's enthusiastic encouragement I would have abandoned the project. However his generous offer to help me understand the text gave me the courage to continue and so we began the long process which has finally culminated in this translation.

Paradoxically the more my understanding grew, the more evident it became how little I had actually understood. Thus having completed an initial draft after going through Gyel-tsap's commentary together, it was obvious that I needed to re-examine many parts. With infinite patience Geshe Sonam Rinchen undertook to explain the whole text to me once more, word by word. We simultaneously read Ren-da-wa's commentary and repeatedly consulted Candrakirti and the other Tibetan commentaries mentioned earlier to throw light on passages which appeared ambiguous or difficult to understand. We examined the complete text together in this way many times. I asked innumerable questions, often repeating the same ones, in my attempts to cross the barriers raised by language and alien concepts. Geshe Sonam Rinchen responded with unfailing compassion and untiring generosity.

In 1988 His Holiness the Dalai Lama taught The Four Hundred as part of the spring teaching in the main temple in Dharamsala. This proved an inspiration to persevere with the translation despite the many difficulties it presented.

During our work together I have come to recognize that Geshe Sonam Rinchen is a great Madhyamika master whose personal quest to understand

reality has given him the ability to inspire others and to explain this most difficult subject with uncommon clarity. His simplicity, amazing openness and constant loving kindness are the evidence of his profound insights. Without his presence, encouragement and care this translation would never have been completed and so I thank and pay homage to him from the depths of my heart.

I would like to express my gratitude to all those who over the years urged me to complete this work. I particularly wish to thank the Tibetan interpreters at the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, Dharamsala, India, who helped me at different times during the early stages of preparing this translation - Losang Choephel, Losang Dawa and Losang Gyaltsen.

I would like to acknowledge the inspiration and guidance provided by Professor Jeffrey Hopkins and Dr. Elizabeth Napper through their excellent translations of Madhyamika literature and thank them too for their personal encouragement.

My thanks are also due to Dr. John Newman, the scholars Losang Shastri and Tashi Tsering at the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives and to Losang Norbu Shastri, editor of the translation unit at the Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, Sarnath, India, for information on various subjects.

I am grateful to my editor, Susan Kyser, for her useful suggestions and for kindly and skillfully inserting all the commas that I blithely omitted.

Sallie Davenport, like a wish-fulfilling jewel, offered to process the manuscript when the task of preparing it for publication seemed overwhelming. It is impossible to express the deep appreciation and gratitude I feel for her unfailing graciousness, patience, meticulousness, valuable suggestions and friendship.

Ruth Sonam

Dharamsala, India

November 1993

# Technical Note

The system of transliteration used, with minor modification in that no letters are capitalized, is that devised by Turrell Wylie (see "A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, Vol.22, 1959, pp.261-67).

The pronunciation system used is the "essay phonetic" system developed by Jeffrey Hopkins (see the technical note in Meditation on Emptiness, London: Wisdom Publications, 1983, pp.19-21). This approximates Lhasa pronunciation but is a simplified phonetic system in that it does not try to mirror all minor variations. Hopkins' system indicates a high tone in Tibetan by placing a macron over the consonant. These macrons have been omitted here for the sake of further simplicity although this diminishes the accuracy of the system.

Throughout the text, the first occurrence of any Tibetan name in phonetics is followed by the transliteration. In the following chart of the transliteration and phonetic systems, the Wylie transliteration is given first followed by its equivalent in Hopkins' phoneticization, where the placement of the macrons may be seen as a guideline to more accurate pronunciation.

ka ga kha ka ga gsa ca ja cha ja cha ja to tha to da da da pa ba pha pa ba ba tsa  
dza tsha tsa dza dza zha sha za sa 'a a ra la la ra sha sha ha ha a a nga nga or nga  
nya or nya nya na na or na ma ma or rna wa wa ya ya sa sa

In Hopkins' system the nasals (see far right-hand column) are low in tone when not affected by a superscribed or prefixed letter and high tone when there is a prefix or superscription.

A subjoined la is pronounced la, except forzla which is pronounced da. dbang is phoneticized as wang and dbyangs as yang.

The letters ga and ba are phoneticized ask and p in suffix position.

Sanskrit names that were reconstructed from the Tibetan are preceded by an asterisk.



# **Gyel-tsap's Commentary on The Four Hundred Stanzas of Aryadeva**

with additional commentary by Geshe Sonam Rinchen

# Prologue

Homage to the foremost excellent ones who possess great compassion.

I pay homage at the feet of the Subduer, spiritual guide to  
transmigrators,  
Renowned on this earth as the Omniscient One,  
Who for the very white collection of virtue, like the face of a  
snow mountain,  
Is as a wish-fulfilling gem, the source of everything desired.

With respect I bow at the feet of the Protector Nāgārjuna,  
The only eye with which to see the Buddha's infinite teaching,  
Who ascended to the state of omniscience, having fully  
elucidated  
The Subduer's doctrine, such as the ultimate essence of the  
Conqueror's teaching and so forth.

I bow my head at the feet of the foremost father and son:  
Who from early youth perfected learning,  
Whose boundless knowledge and wisdom flourished,  
Whose wisdom overcame the dangers of worldly existence,  
And whose beneficent compassion removed the dangers of  
peace;  
The radiance of whose renown dispels the obscuration of  
transmigrators.<sup>1</sup>

Though the thought of the great trailblazers<sup>2</sup> is hard to  
understand,  
I take pleasure in the exposition of this great treatise,  
To increase my familiarity with the good explanation,  
And also to benefit others who are fortunate.



## Preface

This Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas has four parts: (1) the title, (2) the translator's homage, (3) the text and (4) the conclusion.

### THE TITLE

**In Sanskrit, *catuḥśatakaśāstrakarikanāma*;  
in Tibetan, *bstan bcos bzhi brgya pa zhes  
bya ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa*, The Treatise  
Called Four Hundred Stanzas.**

Catuhsataka in Sanskrit is translated as "The Four Hundred," sastra as "Treatise," karika as "Stanzas," and nama as "Called".

This treatise has sixteen chapters of twenty-five stanzas each, and almost every stanza explains one complete point. Since it has four hundred stanzas, it is called The Four Hundred. The original text was entitled śatakasastra, The Treatise of Hundreds. Candrakīrti's commentary says:

**Regarding this *Treatise of Four Hundred* [in the title  
of the original text],  
The word "four" is not explicit;  
And in order to dispel ideas,  
It is called *The Hundreds*.  
Because it corrects conceptions,  
It is called a *Treatise*.<sup>3</sup>**

The reason why the word catuḥ, "four," has been omitted is because it dispels countless hundreds of wrong ideas. It was therefore entitled The Treatise of Hundreds in view of its effect; Candrakīrti has explained the

invalidity of an erroneous interpretation based on the word "hundreds" by another commentator. Candrakirti, the author of the commentary, by discerning the intention implicit in the text, has clarified the meaning of this version of the title to preclude others' wrong ideas.

## **THE TRANSLATOR'S HOMAGE'**

### **Homage to the Exalted Manjusri**

It says, "Homage to the Exalted Manjusri" to indicate that the treatise deals extensively with the training in special wisdom by way of its focal objects and since this is its principal topic, it is a treatise of knowledge.

Presentation of the general meaning of the text begins by showing the author's greatness, then dispels another commentator's wrong ideas and briefly shows the actual intention.

## **SHOWING THE AUTHOR'S GREATNESS**

Candrakirti's commentary says:

**Since the Master Āryadeva is accepted as the Master Nāgārjuna's<sup>6</sup> main disciple, his system does not differ from the latter's system. The Master Āryadeva was a prince born on the island of Sinhala. Later he gave up his royal inheritance and took ordination. Then, after travelling through the south of India, he became Nāgārjuna's disciple.<sup>7</sup>**

Having gained a profound understanding of the teaching of sutra and tantra, he practised their meaning and thereby definitely reached the state of Buddhahood in that very life. In 'The Compendium of Deeds,' written by the Master Aryadeva himself, he confirms attainment of the illusory body, exclusive to the Highest Yoga Tantra. The Protector Nagarjuna asserts that the supreme accomplishment will be attained in the very life in which that illusory body is attained. While some versions say he attained the stages of

completion, preceded by the stages of generation, this is accepted to mean the same as the previous assertion by Nagarjuna. Thus there is also no contradiction when he is described as a common being during the early part of his life. The Commentary on the "Compendium of Vajra Wis-dom"<sup>9</sup> states that this master attained the eighth Bodhisattva ground. There are many texts on sutra and tantra by him which have not been mentioned here.

## **DISPELLING ANOTHER COMMENTATOR'S WRONG IDEAS**

Candrakirti's commentary says:

**A contemporary author<sup>10</sup> has divided this treatise into two.**

Based on the word "Hundreds," the Venerable Dharmapala divided the body of the text into two, calling the first eight chapters "Teaching Hundreds," and the last eight "Disputation Hundreds." Furthermore, he has interpreted the essential meaning in a Vijnaptivada] way as a refutation of imaginary phenomena existing by way of their own characteristics. This is not the intention of the text. Candrakirti's commentary says:

**Statements regarding individual textual systems by one who has taken them as separately defined textual systems are nonsense.<sup>12</sup>**

This is because the text shows the stages of the path by which a person of Mahayana disposition proceeds to unsurpassable enlightenment as an integrated sequentially connected totality. Furthermore, since it clearly establishes the essential meaning to be dependent arising without even the slightest inherent existence, no doubt can remain as to whether truly existent other-powered phenomena are accepted in this system. In addition, those systems assert that there is no need to understand subtle selflessness in order to gain release from worldly existence, whereas the need to do so is clearly established in this treatise.

## **BRIEFLY SHOWING THE ACTUAL INTENTION**

Objection: In that case there was no need to write the treatise, because the Master Nagarjuna has explained this extensively in the Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Way, Called "Wisdom" and so forth.

Answer: There is no fault. When our own and others'" contentions are refuted in the Master Nagarjuna's treatises by many collections of reasoning, it might be thought that the Treatise on the Middle Way is a treatise provoking debate, intended to defeat opponents. The Fundamental [Treatise Called] Wisdom and so forth are not intended to provoke debate, but to enable those seeking liberation to understand the suchness of things. Moreover, this treatise was written to facilitate understanding of the Master Nagarjuna's assertion that these stages of the path of practising the yogic deeds enable those with a Mahayana disposition to attain Buddhahood. At the same time it shows that the attainment of liberation by persons of the Lesser Vehicle also depends on understanding the suchness of things.

Objection: Have these points, too, not already been explained in Nagarjuna's Precious Garland on the Middle Way and so forth?

Answer: There is no fault. The text shows very clearly and extensively how development of the altruistic intention to attain enlightenment must be preceded by abandoning the four errors of thinking of the aggregates as clean, pleasurable, permanent, and as having a self; also by training in the attitudes of persons of small, intermediate and great capacity. Moreover, since the text is written in an explicit and comprehensive way that refutes others' wrong ideas about the Protector Nagarjuna's presentation of the two truths, it is not superfluous. The omission of any expression of worship in the text is to indicate that it is merely a supplement to dispel doubts concerning the Master Nagarjuna's text.

Question: How does this treatise explain the stages of the path?

Answer: Candrakirti's commentary says:

**By exposing conventional things just as they are, it teaches the ultimate gradually.<sup>14</sup>**

The first four chapters, showing that it is erroneous to consider the five

aggregates as permanent and so forth, explain extensively how to develop aversion to cyclic existence. Of these, the first chapter shows that since the five contaminated aggregates are produced in dependence on causes and conditions, they are impermanent. By describing extensively how to meditate on death and impermanence, it shows the need to abandon the erroneous belief in permanence.

The second chapter shows how it is erroneous to consider what is contaminated and impermanent to be really pleasurable. Anything impermanent is unsuitable as a trustworthy source of one's ultimate well-being; moreover, the contaminated aggregates are vulnerable by nature.

The third chapter shows how to eliminate the error of considering cyclic existence [i.e. the contaminated aggregates] as clean, for suffering always arouses aversion.

Since it is inappropriate to feel proud by considering as the self and self's that which is unclean and to be discarded, the fourth chapter shows how to eliminate the conceived object of pride, the distorted self which it is appropriate to negate.

Thus these four chapters, by properly training one in the attitudes of a person of intermediate capacity, produce the realization that to remain in cyclic existence under the influence of contaminated actions and disturbing emotions is like being trapped in a pit of fire. Indirectly they show how those with a Mahayana disposition generate the aspiring altruistic intention<sup>15</sup> that makes them want to attain Buddhahood.

Seeing that the attainment of Buddhahood depends on Bodhisattva deeds, once the practical altruistic intention<sup>16</sup> has been generated, the fifth chapter shows how to engage in such deeds.

Seeing that one cannot fully accomplish one's own well-being, let alone others', because of being dominated by disturbing emotions, the sixth chapter extensively shows how disturbing emotions arise and so forth.

Since objects such as visual form cause disturbing emotions to arise, remain and grow, the seventh chapter shows how to prevent the arising of

overt disturbing emotions that focus on these objects.

Since objects such as visual form cause disturbing emotions to arise in those who do not understand their fundamental mode of existence and who have an incorrect mental approach, the eighth chapter shows how to make the students' mindstream receptive, with advice about developing the wish to get rid of disturbing emotions and about the appropriateness of approaching the meaning of reality even by way of a positive doubt, and so forth.

Thus the first eight chapters show how to ripen the mindstream fully, while the last eight show the stages of the paths dependent on ultimate truth, which destroy obstructions formed by disturbing emotions<sup>17</sup> and obstructions to omniscience.<sup>18</sup>

The ninth chapter shows how to meditate on the refutation of permanence to demonstrate that products do not have even the slightest essence of permanence.

The tenth explains internal and external selflessness. The refutation of permanent time is explained in the eleventh. The refutation of extreme views is extensively explained in the twelfth. In the thirteenth the absence of true existence of the sense organs and their objects is explained in detail. In the fourteenth chapter the refutation of extreme conceptions is explained by showing the feasibility of attaining liberation and enlightenment in that all dependently arising phenomena, which resemble the ring of light formed by a whirling firebrand, do not have even the slightest inherent existence.

The fifteenth shows extensively how to meditate on the production, abiding and disintegration of products as being empty of inherent existence.

The sixteenth, in showing the purpose of writing this treatise and eliminating remaining counter-arguments by misguided opponents, explains how to meditate on settling [the procedure between] spiritual guides and students. Thus the treatise extensively explains the stages of the paths that depend on conventional and ultimate truths by describing the focal objects of those paths.

The specific meaning of the text has two parts. The first explains the stages of the paths dependent on conventional truths. The second explains the stages of the paths dependent on ultimate truth.

Explaining the stages of the paths dependent on conventional truths has two parts. The first shows how the aspiring altruistic intention is developed after training in the attitudes of a person of intermediate capacity, by explaining elimination of the four errors. The second explains how to train in the deeds after developing the practical altruistic intention.

## Chapter VII

# Abandoning Attachment to Sense Objects

One must first think about the disadvantages of cyclic existence in order to give up the contaminated actions which are its cause.

### **151. When there is no end at all To this ocean of suffering, Why are you childish people Not afraid of drowning in it?**

The beginningless cycle of rebirths is an ocean of suffering without any end at all, infested by thirty-six sea snake fetters<sup>1</sup> of ignorance, pride and craving of worldly existence.<sup>2</sup> It is churned by sea monsters of the sixty-two wrong views<sup>3</sup> and fraught with whirlpools of birth and death. Why are you ordinary childish people, drowning in it since beginningless time, not afraid? If one should fear to drown in a sea whose depth and breadth are apparent, how much more so in this one! It is like the following analogy: A sage who had five kinds of super-knowledge wanted to go beyond worldly existence. With miraculous speed he placed his foot on the summit of Mount Meru but died before he could reach the other side. After his death he was reborn as a god [and came before the Buddha who told him, "I will show you the world, the source of the world, cessation of the world, and the path that leads to the world's cessation in relation to your body which is just four cubits high." When taught the four noble truths in this way, the sage understood them.]

Assertion: Though cyclic existence has many disadvantages, those who are proud of their youth and so forth are not afraid.

Answer:

**152. Youth lies behind and then  
Once more it is ahead.  
Though [one imagines] it will last,  
In this world it is like a race.**

Since youth and the like do not last, pride on that account is unreasonable. In this life youth lies behind old age; after death it is once more ahead and then again it is behind old age. Though one imagines one can remain young, in this world youth, old age and death compete as if in a race, claiming, "I'm ahead, I'm ahead!" Since none can always remain ahead, it is unreasonable to feel proud because of that. It is like the following analogy: The shadow of the wheel which crushes sesame seeds [sometimes falls in front and sometimes behind.']

Assertion: Though one must go on to another life, it is not frightening.

Answer:

**153. In worldly existence there is never  
Rebirth of one's own free will.  
Being under others' control,  
Who with intelligence would be fearless?**

In worldly existence childish beings like you do not have the power to will their own rebirth in good rebirths as gods, humans and so forth, but are under the control of other factors-contaminated actions and disturbing emotions. While in such a frightening situation, what intelligent person would be fearless? One should feel repugnance at being controlled by contaminated actions and disturbing emotions. One is like a piece of wood swept along by the current.

The words gzhan yang which appear in some versions of the text refer to time and mean "never."<sup>6</sup>

Assertion: Though unable to cut through worldly existence in this life because of being enthralled by pleasure, one will try to do so in a future rebirth.

Answer:

**154. The future is endless and  
You were always a common being.  
Act so that it will never again  
Be as it was in the past.**

Future rebirths are endless and the past is beginningless. Throughout the past you were always only a common being. Act so that the present and future will not be as meaningless as the past during which you failed to free yourself from worldly existence.

Some versions of the text read "again," which should be taken to mean "again in the future."

It is like the following analogy: Though the friends of a man who was going with someone else's woman tried to stop him, he did it again later. The Array of Tree Trunks Sutras says:

**Think of the past bodies you have meaninglessly wasted  
Because of your desires.  
From today engage in the discipline of seeking enlightenment  
And through that discipline destroy desire.**

You must break the continuity of rebirths in worldly existence.

Question: Does the cycle of rebirths have an end or not? If it does one will

gain freedom without the need for effort. If it does not, effort to cut through the cycle of birth and death is senseless, since despite effort one will not gain freedom.

Answer:

**155. The conjunction of a listener,  
What is to be heard and an exponent  
Is very rare. In brief, the cycle of  
Rebirths neither has nor has not an end.**

A listener is one who has attained a special life of leisure and fortune and is ready to generate spiritual paths. What is to be heard refers to discourses teaching suchness, and their exponents are the Tathagatas. These three occur in the world simultaneously as rarely as the udumbara flower.<sup>9</sup>

Tathagatas are rare because they depend on stores of merit and insight accumulated over three countless aeons. The other two depend on Tathagatas. Thus, in brief, for a person who has these three rare and supreme prerequisites for the growth of spiritual paths, the cycle of rebirths is not without an end, since the causes and conditions for stopping it are assembled. In the case of a person for whom they are not assembled, it does not have an end because one cannot determine precisely when the cycle of rebirths will cease. With regard also to its final mode of existence, it is not specified as either having or not having an end in terms of ultimate existence. The three are like the udumbara flower.

Assertion: As long as scriptural texts exist, there will be spiritual friends and oral transmissions of them. One may therefore try to end worldly existence in other rebirths.

Answer:

# **156. Most people cling to An unwholesome direction. Thus most common beings Certainly go to bad rebirths.**

Though the texts and the other two may exist, it is difficult to be a proper listener for the following reason: Most people cling to the ten non-virtuous paths of action, which is an unwholesome direction, and thus through the power of their actions they are reborn in different states. Since most common beings therefore go to bad rebirths, one should make effort to hear the teaching while the two prerequisites are assembled. Not to strive for liberation as if one's head were on fire is like crowning an idiot as king. It is like the analogy of carrying hemp in Candrakirti's commentary.

Two men went to fetch hemp and as they were returning, they saw two loads of cotton. One of them put down his load of hemp and took the load of cotton. He arrived home carrying a load of gold. The other thought, "I've carried this load such a long way, how can I carry the other?" and he continued carrying the load of hemp.<sup>10</sup> Similarly the rich and powerful are attached to their own viewpoint and do not appreciate Buddha's words, which are supported by the reasoning of an unbiased mind. They say, "How can we give up these views to which we've been accustomed for a long time?"

Assertion: Although bad rebirths must be avoided because they are states without freedom, full of many kinds of suffering, one need not feel aversion toward good rebirths since they are happy states.

Answer: It is proper to feel aversion toward good rebirths just as one does toward bad ones.

**157. On earth the maturation of ill deeds  
Is seen to be only deleterious.  
Thus to the wise the world appears  
Similar to a slaughterhouse.**

The remains of previous contaminated actions are seen only to debilitate even those in a good rebirth-deformed limbs and members, defective senses, poverty and so forth are the unwanted maturation of the ill deeds of human beings living on earth. Thus to the wise Exalted, worldly existence seems like a slaughterhouse where living beings are killed. It is like the following analogy: A cherished minister was not afraid of the king and was punished later because of this.

A certain king favored a minister by giving him the highest honors. Later, because the minister did not fear him, the king had his hands, feet, ears and nose cut off. Similarly, those who are rich and do not think about future lives but heedlessly do ill deeds first experience their maturation after death in the hells and so forth. They experience the remaining maturation as misfortunes, when they are eventually reborn as humans.'

Question: If the wise see worldly existence like a slaughterhouse, why do ordinary people feel no horror?

Answer: They are as insane as a mad elephant.

Question: Insane in what way?

Answer:

**158. If “insane” means  
That one’s mind is unstable,  
What wise person would say that those  
In worldly existence are not insane?**

In the world someone whose mind does not function with normal stability due to an imbalance of physical constituents is called insane. If that is insanity, what intelligent person would claim that those in worldly existence are not insane? Ordinary people who want many outrageous things and speak impulsively do not have sound minds. It is like the following analogy: A king had a beloved son but got the idea, because his mind was unsound, that he did not want to see the boy.

A certain king had a son who was very accomplished and dear to his father's heart. When the king did not see his son, he ached with longing, and whenever he saw the boy he put him on his lap and hugged and held him tight. Then one day just the sight of his son upset him terribly, and he said, "You wicked boy, go away and don't stay in my presence. The sight of you bums me like fire." The boy got down on his knees and placed his palms together. Crying and trembling he asked the king in a faltering voice what he had done wrong. The king answered, "You have done nothing wrong, but I feel displeasure at seeing you." Recognizing this change, a skilled physician secretly told one of the ministers, "This loss of affection is a bad sign and indicates that the king's mind undoubtedly is unstable. It may cause insanity. Try to treat him before this illness becomes serious. If you don't and the illness is neglected, it will be difficult to cure." The minister then thought about the situation carefully and it was so, but being preoccupied with the king's business, he abused the physician. He called him a vile mischief-maker and said, "May not even the great man's enemies go mad! Do not speak to anyone else in this way and leave the country!" Nothing was done about the king's illness until after some time it got the better of him, making him laugh, cry, dance and sing for no apparent reason. Ordinary people are insane like the king who lost affection for his son because his mind was unstable. They act perversely because of their mental instability."

The wise rid themselves of rebirth in cyclic existence which is governed by the force of contaminated actions. Moreover they do so by stopping the process of contaminated action.

**159. The pain of walking, one sees,  
Decreases when doing the opposite.  
Thus the intelligent generate  
The intention to end all action.**

One sees that the pain caused by actions like walking, strolling, lying down and so forth decreases and gradually loses its former intensity when doing the opposite kind of action such as sitting. By breaking the continuity of all contaminated actions, all suffering stops. Thus the intelligent expand their minds to encompass the means to attain the state of nirvana in which all contaminated actions projecting worldly existence have ceased. Childish beings in cyclic existence are like someone on a long journey who suffers because of exhaustion and the depletion of his provisions. [They suffer from weariness travelling along the roads of cyclic existence and they suffer because their store of virtuous actions is depleted.]

The intelligent rid themselves of cyclic existence by stopping the process of contaminated action.

**160. When a single effect's original cause  
Is not seen, and one sees the extensiveness  
Regarding even a single effect,  
Who would not be afraid?**

No one can perceive the original cause of even a single effect, such as an element, an elemental derivative, the mind and so forth, which are the outcome of a beginningless continuity. When one realizes that even a single effect has a limitless multitude of causes, what childish person would not be afraid? Therefore one should always feel aversion toward, and strive for the means to gain liberation from, this vast wilderness of cyclic existence, made difficult to cross by the thickets of ignorance failing to comprehend its continuity. For instance, even a single clay pot requires a limitless variety of causes.

**161. Since all results will not definitely  
Be achieved, and those that are  
Will certainly come to an end,  
Why exhaust yourself for their sake?**

Effort would be appropriate if the results of actions for a specific purpose, motivated by attachment, could definitely be achieved. It is however not certain that you will achieve all the results such as perfect happiness. Moreover whatever is achieved is sure to perish in the end. Why exhaust yourself physically, verbally and mentally to achieve mistaken objectives? Make effort to give up actions projecting cyclic existence. It is like the following analogy: When a potter fires his pots, it is not certain whether they will turn out well, and those that do will certainly disintegrate.

Since actions themselves, like their results, are bound to perish, do not exert yourself for no purpose.

**162. Once it is done, work done with effort  
Effortlessly disintegrates.  
Though this is so, still you are not  
At all free from attachment to actions.**

Work, like building a wall, requires effort, but when it is finished it disintegrates effortlessly. This being so, since you still do such things, your utter lack of freedom from attachment to actions shows how foolish you are. It takes effort to set up a stone on a mountain top but it will fall down of its own accord.

Assertion: Though actions which require exertion do perish, one cannot free oneself from attachment to them, because they are a source of pleasure.

Answer:

**163. There is no pleasure in relation to  
Either the past or the future.  
That which occurs now, too, is passing.  
Why do you weary yourself?**

There can be no real pleasure in relation to past consciousness, since it has already ceased, nor in relation to future consciousness, since it is not yet produced. Moreover consciousness which is occurring now disintegrates moment by moment and passes. Since there is no reliable happiness, why do you weary yourself? To strive for a nonexistent effect is unreasonable and like building a house on the bank of a river.

Someone built a house on the bank of a river but the land subsided. He then rebuilt it on another similar part of the riverbank. That too subsided, and so it went on indefinitely. The man who was building the house only wore himself out but did not achieve the result he desired. Worldly endeavors are like that.<sup>16</sup>

Assertion: One should perform virtuous actions for the sake of a high rebirth.

Answer:

**164. The wise feel the same fear for even  
A high rebirth as for the hells.  
It is rare indeed for a worldly state  
Not to produce fear in them.**

Even high rebirths as gods and so forth, ablaze with the fire of rampant disturbing emotions and shrouded in the darkness of ignorance like the hells, produce fear in the wise with direct perception of suchness. As it is rare indeed for any worldly state not to inspire the Exalted with fear, the intelligent should consider the disadvantages of cyclic existence. The accumulation of actions out of craving based on seeing a high rebirth as

something attractive in itself, without cultivating aversion to worldly existence, is rejected. However, it is completely wrong to prevent and give up the accumulation of causes for life as a god or human for the purpose of liberation. It is like the following analogy: After being released from King Bala's jail, one had to follow a single pattern of behavior till the end of one's life and therefore was not freed from bondage.

**165. If childish people ever perceived  
The suffering of cyclic existence,  
At that moment both their mind  
[And body] would completely fail.**

If childish people ever directly perceived the suffering of cyclic existence as do the Exalted, their mind or heart and body would both completely fail, but because they do not realize it, they continue as if they were happy. It is like \*Indrabala, who sacrificed his life out of desire to be chief [and was a chief again in his next life. If ordinary people realized the suffering of the cycle of rebirths they would give up worldly existence for fear of it, and by destroying it completely would become free."]

Though belonging to the best caste and having the finest possessions is known as happiness, aversion even toward that is appropriate.

**166. People without pride are rare,  
And the proud have no compassion.  
Thus it is said to be very rare  
To go from light to light.**

People of good caste and so forth who are not inflated with pride are rare. Moreover, since those who are conceited think themselves best and out of envy want to crush their equals and betters, they lack compassion. Thus the Topics of Instruction<sup>18</sup> and so forth say that it is very rare to go from light

to light. It is like \*Jamadagni's son, who did away with members of the royal caste twenty-one times [because he was proud of his strength and lacked compassion.19]

Assertion: Though the proud are deprecable because they perform ill deeds, it is appropriate for those without pride to strive for a high rebirth.

Answer:

**167. Whoever renounces them now  
Will, it is said, obtain sense objects.  
For what reason would such perverse  
Practice be considered correct?**

It is said that those who promise to be chaste in this life for the sake of a high rebirth in future and who renounce sense objects, having cultivated antipathy toward them, will, as a result of their practices, have whatever attractive objects they desire when they take a high rebirth. If, accordingly, out of aversion one gives up the things one has, it is a perverse practice to seek them again. Why would the wise consider such a pursuit correct? It is unreasonable to seek what one has deliberately renounced. It is like the following analogy: When rams want to butt, though they first recoil, it is perverse [because they do so in order to charge.]

**168. Wealth, the result of merit,  
Must be thoroughly protected from others.  
How can that which must be constantly  
Protected from others be one's own?**

Even those with large resources should not be attached to them, for wealth, the result of meritorious actions like giving, must constantly be protected from other factors such as robbers, thieves, fire, water and so forth. How can anything needing constant and diligent protection from other factors be one's own exclusive property over which one has control? Though the

effects have been accomplished, they cannot benefit one as desired. The need to expend effort constantly on their account is like [the sustained effort required in cultivating<sup>20</sup>] a spiritual guide.

Assertion: If practices like giving are wrong, one should follow conventionally accepted practices.

Answer: Adherence to those is also improper.

**169. Different social customs  
Are termed "religious practices."  
Thus it seems as if society has  
More influence than religious practices.**

The term "religious practice" is applied to different social customs like giving away and taking a bride. Such conventions are called religion but they change according to place and time. It is therefore improper to be attached to society which, though it appears more influential than religion, does not remain stable. It is like taking one's daughter as bride in a particular country.

A certain man visited Yawana and watched a local man light a fire. By means of a spell, the fire uttered the words, "You may take your daughter as wife." The visitor, who was very lustful, had an attractive young daughter at home. He approached the man from Yawana and offered him a lot of money for the spell. When he got home he wanted to marry his daughter and asked the fire to speak. The fire said, "The customs are different."

Assertion: Pleasure does not occur without attractive sense objects. Since these are the result of merit, it is permissible to perform meritorious actions out of attachment to attractive objects in order to have pleasure.

Answer:

**170. Through virtue there are attractive objects,  
But such objects too are considered bad.  
By giving them up, one will be happy.  
What need is there to acquire them?**

Though attractive visual forms, sounds and other objects are obtained through virtues like giving, those who desire liberation disparage and consider even such sense objects bad, since they are the root of futility and are constantly affected by suffering and impermanence. If one becomes happy and virtuous by giving up a source of faults, what need is there to acquire it? No need at all! It is like the following analogy from Candrakirti's commentary: When a certain monk went to beg alms in Cambodia, a trickster told him not to speak in that country.

A monk went to beg from the people of Cambodia. For his own purposes, a trickster told him, "It is the custom in this country not to speak when going for alms, otherwise people will make fun of you." The monk believed him and acted accordingly. The people thought that the fellow had made and sent a mechanical man to dupe them. They marvelled at the way he opened and closed his eyes just like a real man and they discussed all his parts. Then they made a similar mechanical man and sent him to the trickster who told the monk that it was time to speak to people. He did so, which amazed them, and they said that the trickster had clearly outwitted them by doing what they could not do. When the monk discovered the trickster's true nature, he considered him bad.<sup>21</sup>

Assertion: Though sense objects should be disparaged, one ought to create merit for the sake of kingship, a source of superlative pleasure.

Answer: It is inappropriate to do so.

**171. For one not in need of authority,  
Practices for that [end] are meaningless.  
Whoever strives for authority  
Is called a fool among men.**

For adepts who have gained mental control and can effortlessly accomplish whatever they desire, practices such as giving for the sake of attaining worldly authority are senseless. Whoever strives for the authority of mere verbal domination is a fool among men, because he seeks kingship, a source of great futility. It is like the following analogy: An astrologer had a lovable son whom he killed when he knew the boy would die after six days. [His authority to make astrological predictions caused him to act in a futile way.]

Assertion: One should do meritorious actions, since one wants their effects (such as wealth) in future lives.

Answer:

**172. With a view to future effects  
You grasp at practices out of greed.  
When you see the future outcome  
Why are you not afraid?**

If, on realizing that there will be future effects such as wealth, one grasps at practices like giving, out of greed and attachment, one will have to experience many bad rebirths as a result of that attachment. When you see that the future outcome of such attachment is a bad rebirth, aren't you afraid? What use is attachment? Just as you do not grasp at bad rebirth, do not grasp at practices either. It is like an unwise person who buys a place that gives rise to suffering.

**173. Merit is in every way  
Just like a wage for a wage earner.  
How could those who do not want  
[Even] virtue do what is non-virtuous?**

Just like a wage earned by a worker, merit will come to resemble a payment. Therefore the wise do not do even meritorious actions motivated by attachment. When the wise do not want even the virtue that produces worldly existence, because of seeing it as a cause for the cycle of rebirths, how could they do demeritorious actions which are non-virtuous? They always avoid them. It is like the following analogy: When a dog ate *Rangkata's food*, Rarigkata accused a prince who was fasting nearby of having eaten it.

\*Rangkata, a destitute beggar, found some badly cooked food and wrapped it in a stinking pus-stained rag. When he wasn't looking, a dog stole it. Not far away a prince was fasting in the service of his deity. The beggar accused him of breaking his fast by stealing and eating the food. When the prince would not eat even his own wellprepared food, why would he have eaten food like that?2

**174. Whoever sees phenomena as like  
A collection of mechanical devices  
And like illusory beings,  
Most clearly reaches the excellent state.**

Only childish people like cyclic existence. The wise who directly perceive dependent arising as lacking inherent existence see external and internal phenomena as like a collection of mechanical devices made of wood that look like men and women. Those who see phenomena as empty of inherent existence, yet appearing like illusory people, traverse cyclic existence and most clearly reach the excellent states of liberation and omniscience. It is like the mechanic who shamed a painter by means of a mechanical woman.

The painter caused him suffering in return.

A painter was staying in the home of a master mechanic who, as a joke, sent a mechanical woman to him. Thinking that she was a maid who had been sent for him to enjoy and with whom he could do as he pleased, he took her hand only to find it was hard wood. He felt mortified and to take revenge painted himself committing suicide on the wall. When the master mechanic saw it, he felt remorse and thought the painter had killed himself in shame after touching the mechanical device.<sup>23</sup>

**175. For those who do not enjoy  
Any objects in cyclic existence  
It is altogether impossible  
To take pleasure in this [world].**

When those who are wise with regard to the meaning of reality do not enjoy or crave even those objects in cyclic existence which are normally enjoyable, how could they enjoy the source of birth, aging and so forth which normally cause aversion? Thus for them there is never any joy out of attachment to cyclic existence. It is like the following analogy: in the city of Kuṣinagar, Mahasudarsana gave up eighty-four thousand queens because he saw the faults of sense objects, and developed the four concentrations.<sup>24</sup>

Thus as has been explained previously, after considering the disadvantages of sense objects, one should become wise with regard to the meaning of reality and strive to attain unsurpassable enlightenment.

The summarizing stanza:

**Thinking thoroughly about impermanence and  
suffering  
Give up craving for objects such as visual form,  
The cause for this bottomless boundless ocean of  
suffering,  
And strive to attain unsurpassable enlightenment.**

This is the seventh chapter from the Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds, showing the means to give up clinging to objects of enjoyment which humans desire.

This concludes the commentary on the seventh chapter, showing the means to give up clinging to objects of enjoyment which humans desire, from Essence of Good Explanations, Explanation of the "Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas".

#### **COMMENTARY TO CHAPTER VII BY GESHE SONAM RINCEN**

The famous Ga-dam-ba master Ge-shay Bo-da-wa's Precious Heap of Analogies for the Teaching elaborates an analogy by Vasubandhu:

When a fisherman is catching fish, he puts some meat on the end of the hook and throws it down into the depths of the water. Since fish have a great liking for fresh meat, they swallow the bait and the hook catches in their throats. Then they are brought on to dry land and killed. Taste is the fish's undoing. Similarly our tongue pursues tastes and, caught on the hook of disturbing emotions, we are fried in the pan of bad rebirths.

The moth sees the butterlamp as a celestial mansion and with delight at once flies toward it. Burnt by the flame, it falls into the melted butter. Appearance is the moth's undoing. Similarly we see the suffering nature of deceptive appearances as pleasurable. Through our attachment we fall into the ocean of cyclic existence and are burnt by the fires of bad rebirths.

It is said that an elephant likes to be touched. It enjoys having its body gently scratched and remains perfectly still. An iron hook is then attached to the crown of its head, and it can be led wherever one wishes. Touch is the elephant's undoing. Similarly we enjoy physical contact and are caught by the hook of suffering.

A fly enjoys bad smells and circling around falls into the cesspool, only to be carried off by a large or small bird. Smell is the fly's undoing. Similarly we circle around the smell of sensual pleasure, drown in a morass of disturbing emotions and are carried away by demons.

Hunters in the south hide in remote forests and play the flute and vina. Deer love sweet sounds, so the hunters lie in wait till they come near to listen to the music. Then they shoot arrows and kill them. Sound is the deer's undoing. Similarly we run after fame and are killed by the hunters of desire and anger.

Vasubandhu says:

**Sound is the deer's perdition;  
For the elephant it is touch.  
Appearance is the moth's perdition  
And for the fish it is taste.  
The fly is attracted to smells —**

**For them there is but a single cause.  
Among humans, each individual  
Both day and night is constantly  
Destroyed by all five of these.  
How can they attain a happy state?**

Normally we do not recognize just how much sense objects preoccupy us. Not only do we constantly and often automatically seek to satisfy the senses, but the aesthetic criteria of our society or segment of society and our own innate and acquired preferences with regard to sense objects influence our response to others and our judgments.

This preoccupation with sense objects and our craving for new and stimulating sensory experiences is continually exploited and reinforced. The compulsive quality of our attention indicates the presence of attachment, which frequently robs us of expected pleasure and accounts for an underlying anxiety. The more intense the grasping, the greater the anxiety and the more vulnerable we are to frustration which may express itself as anger. Despite repeated disappointments, we continue to pursue the elusive pleasure which these objects seem to promise. Though we may realize that the pursuit of sensual gratification is futile and gives rise to sickness, problems and all kinds of misfortunes, we remain addicted to the hope of finding happiness in this way. Our enthrallment is not superficial but fundamental to us as beings of the Desire Realm, so called because of our preoccupation with sense stimuli. We must therefore reflect again and again on the true nature of sense objects and their inability to provide lasting happiness. This will help to diminish our obsession with them, which blinds us to the unsatisfactoriness and misery of cyclic existence.

## Chapter IX

# Refuting Permanent Functional Phenomena

Explaining the stages of the paths dependent on ultimate truth has two parts. The first is an extensive explanation of ultimate truth. The second shows the purpose of writing these chapters and how to meditate on settling [the procedure between] teachers and students by way of eliminating remaining counter-arguments. The extensive explanation of ultimate truth begins with a general refutation of true existence by refuting permanent functional phenomena. This is followed by refuting truly existent functional phenomena individually. Finally the inherent existence of production, duration and disintegration, the characteristics of products, is refuted.

### GENERAL REFUTATION OF TRUE EXISTENCE

By cleansing the mindstream with the flowing water of means by which to understand suchness, the previous chapters have made it a vessel fit for the nectar of suchness. The remaining chapters will explain how products which arise and disintegrate do not have even the slightest essence of inherent existence.

**201. All are produced for their effect,  
Thus none are permanent.  
There are no Tathāgatas other than  
Subduers [who know] things as they are.**

In the world it is accepted that when a laborer works hard for his wage, it is for the result and not because it is his nature to do so. Similarly all external and internal functional phenomena' do not arise of their own accord. Since they are produced solely through a multifarious aggregation of factors consisting of interrelated causes and effects, functional things are produced for their effects.' They therefore are not permanent, inherently produced or

truly existent. They do not have an essence able to sustain analysis, nor do they exist as things in and of themselves.

Only Subduers, because they have the abilities of perfected body, speech and mind, directly know impermanence, emptiness and all things without exception as they are. Since no one else does, there are no other Tathagatas. Moreover the Teacher said, "Whatever is produced inevitably ceases, for aging and death are conditioned by birth." Thus, since production is for the sake of disintegration, nothing endures by way of its own entity.

Some refute permanence and true existence by virtue of autonomous reasons.' The unfeasibility of this is explained in Candrakirti's commentary.' There is no commonly appearing subject, such as a sprout, posited by tenets, in relation to which a direct valid cognition perceiving it is valid, since all except Prasangikas assert that it is valid in relation to a sprout existing by way of its own character. Prasangikas assert this is impossible.<sup>5</sup>

Vaisesika assertion: Although things that are produced for their effect are not permanent, functional things-from space to the mind,' which lack both the feature of being produced and that of being producers; and the smallest particles, which, though they are producers, are not produced-are permanent and truly existent.

Answer:

**202. There is not anywhere anything  
That ever exists without depending.  
Thus never is there anywhere  
Anything that is permanent.**

Never, at any time or in any place, is there any chance of finding a functional thing that does not depend on relatedness. Thus never is there anywhere a permanent functional phenomenon. Since whatever exists only exists dependently, it does not have even the slightest existence by way of its own entity.

Assertion: Dependently arising phenomena like pleasure and so forth' exist, and the self is the cause that attracts them. Thus the self exists and, moreover, is permanent.

Answer:

**203. There is no functional thing without a cause,  
Nor anything permanent which has a cause.  
Thus the one who knows suchness said what has  
Come about causelessly does not exist.**

There is no personal self since that which has no producing cause is not a functional thing, nor is there anything permanent which has a cause. [Buddha,] the one who knows suchness, said phenomena that come into being causelessly do not exist:

Phenomena with causes and conditions are known. Phenomena without causes and conditions do not exist.

**204. If the unproduced is permanent  
Because impermanent [things] are seen to be prod-  
ucts,  
Seeing that the produced exists  
Would make the permanent non-existent.**

If on seeing that a pot and pleasure are impermanent and produced, one asserts that the self and so forth are by implication permanent, it would follow that because of seeing that a pot and so forth are produced and exist, whatever is permanent like the self should be non-existent like a sky flower.

Assertion: The treatises of knowledge say space, individual analytical cessations,' and non-analytical cessations<sup>9</sup> are permanent and substantially existent. Any refutation of this is invalidated by your own assertions.

Answer: That is not so.

**205. That space and so forth are permanent  
Is a conception of common beings.  
For the wise they are not objects perceived  
Even by conventional [valid cognition].**

Not understanding the significance of applying the term "space" to a mere absence of obstructive contact and so forth, common people think that uncompounded space and so on are permanent [functional phenomena]. Those who are wise concerning the suchness of functional phenomena, far from thinking they exist ultimately, do not regard permanent functional phenomena even as objects perceived by conventional valid cognition. Only that which does not change is termed permanent. What sutra says is not primarily stated to establish [substantial existence, but to refute the existence of permanent functional things].

Assertion: Space is permanent because it is omnipresent. Whatever is impermanent like a pot is not omnipresent.

Answer: The following refutes permanence by refuting omnipresence. It is contradictory to assert that space is omnipresent but partless.

**206. A single direction is not present  
Wherever there is that which has directions.  
That with directions therefore clearly  
Also has other directional parts.**

The part of space contiguous to an eastern pot is not present wherever there is space which has directions, such as where there is a western pot. If it were, the western pot would be in the east and the eastern pot in the west. If to guard against such a fallacy one asserts that the part of space which is in the east is not in the west, directional space very clearly must have other parts. Therefore one should not accept permanent functional things. Sutra says, "Kasyapa, permanence is one extreme, so-called impermanence is the other extreme."<sup>10</sup> The belief that ultimate truths are permanent functional

phenomena is foreign to this teaching."

Assertion of Vaidantikas and others:

## **207ab. Since time exists, functional things Are seen to start and stop.**

Since permanent time exists the beginning and growth of things like a sprout are seen, while in winter and so forth, although other conditions are present, this is seen to stop. One can thereby infer the existence of time which, moreover, is permanent because of not depending on a cause.

Answer: Then it follows that sprouts and so forth are constantly produced and there is never a time when they are not produced, because of being produced by a permanent cause.

Assertion: Their production depends on other factors.

Answer:

## **207cd. It is governed by other factors; Thus it is also an effect.**

Then it follows that time, too, is an effect, for the intermittent production of sprouts is governed by other factors, being dependent on conditions like heat and moisture." We do not assert that time is non-existent, for it says:

**The actions of the embodied do not  
Go to waste even in a hundred aeons.  
When conditions assemble and the time is ripe  
Their fruit will mature.**

If proponents of time as a cause accept it as such, they should also accept it

as an effect.

**208. Any cause without an effect  
Has no existence as a cause.  
Therefore it follows that  
Causes must be effects.**

Without the effect it produces, a cause lacks that which establishes it as a cause, for the establishment of a cause depends on its effect. Thus since it follows that all causes must be effects, one should not accept causes that lack effects.<sup>13</sup> Anything accepted as a cause should be accepted as facilitating an effect.

**209. When a cause undergoes change  
It becomes the cause of something else.  
Anything that undergoes change  
Should not be called permanent.**

A cause such as a seed acts as the cause of something else such as a sprout, through a change from before in its potency. Any functional thing which changes so that its former and later moments are unlike should not be called permanent. Thus one should not accept permanent time and so forth as causes.

**210. A thing with a permanent cause is produced  
By that which has not come into being.  
Whatever happens by itself  
Cannot have a cause.**

If one does not accept that time, too, changes, it follows that a functional thing, such as a sprout whose cause is unchanging permanent time, has

come about of its own accord because of being produced by a cause that has not come into being. Whatever happens by itself cannot have a producing cause, since its dependence on a cause is inadmissible.

**211. How can that which is produced  
By a permanent thing be impermanent?  
Never are the two, cause and effect,  
Seen to have incongruent characteristics.**

How can functional things such as sprouts be impermanent? It follows that they are not, because of being produced by that which is permanent. This entailment follows because cause and effect are never seen to have incongruent characteristics in that one is permanent and the other impermanent.

Vaisesika assertion: Permanent particles of the four elements activated by the force of karma form the substantial entity of a composite, producing the environmental world and so forth.

Answer: That is incorrect, for it follows that when particles coalesce and form a composite, an increase in size is impossible if there is total interpenetration. If some parts coalesce, those that do are causes while those that do not are not causes.

**212. That of which some sides are causes  
While other sides are not is thereby  
Multifarious. How can that  
Which is multifarious be permanent?**

It therefore follows that the smallest particle has parts, because some of its sides are causes while others are not. Being multifarious," it follows that it cannot be a permanent functional thing because of having diverse parts.

Assertion: Although particles interpenetrate completely because they are partless, a separate accretion of coalesced particles forms, which produces

the composite.

Answer: It follows that it is not feasible for particles to interpenetrate completely when composites form. If they merge completely there will be no gradual increase in size from the first to the second composite and so forth.

**213. The cause which is spherical  
Is not present in the effect.  
Thus complete interpenetration  
Of particles is not feasible.**

Also the causative sphere with the characteristic of appearing to the mind as partless and spherical is not present in the resultant substantial entity, the composite.

**214. One particle's position is not  
Asserted as also that of another.  
Thus it is not asserted that  
Cause and effect are the same size.**

Where complete interpenetration does not occur, one particle's position will not be asserted as also that of another. Thus since the causal particles and resultant composite are not asserted to be equal in size, the absurd consequence that the composite is not an object of the senses is avoided. Nevertheless since particles have parts, their consequent unfeasibility as permanent functional things remains.<sup>15</sup>

Assertion: The problem of their having parts occurs when the resultant substantial entity is forming, but prior to that the smallest particles do not have parts.

Answer: That is incorrect. If a particle has no sides, it cannot be surrounded by particles on its four sides.

**215. Whatever has an eastern side  
Also has an eastern part.  
Those whose particles have sides admit  
That they are not [partless] particles.**

If it has sides, such as an eastern one, it definitely must have parts, since any particle with an eastern side must also have an eastern part. For that reason any opponent who holds that particles have sides prior to the formation of a composite admits those particles are not partless ones, because of accepting that they are located within the ten boundless directions.

**216. The front takes up, the back relinquishes —  
Whatever does not have  
Both of these [motions]  
Is not something which moves.**

It follows that such particles would not move from one place to another. When a thing moves from one place to another, its front takes up a position ahead while its rear relinquishes the rearward position, but partless particles neither take up nor relinquish a position. If it is asserted that they do not move, it is contradictory for partless particles to form the substantial entity of a composite. Thus truly existent particles should never be accepted.

Assertion: Permanent particles do exist because adepts perceive them by virtue of the divine eye.<sup>1e</sup>

Answer: What adept sees such a permanent particle?

**217. That which does not have a front,  
Nor any middle,  
And which does not have a rear,  
Being invisible, who will see it?**

Seeing it is not feasible because such a form - a particle which firstly has no front, nor any middle, and finally does not have a rear portion - is not evident to any kind of perception.

Assertion: Since coarse things would have no cause if particles did not exist, particles do exist and, moreover, are permanent because of being causeless functional things.

Answer:

**218ab. The effect destroys the cause;  
Therefore the cause is not permanent.**

It follows that causal particles are not permanent, for just as the seed changes and disintegrates when the sprout is produced, the causal particles are destroyed by the production of the resultant composite.

Objection: This is not established, for they produce a separate effect without giving up their causal identity.

Answer:

**218cd. Alternatively, where the cause  
Exists the effect does not.**

Alternatively, since the presence of the causal particles in a place precludes that of the resultant composite, it follows that they are not cause and effect because of being simultaneous and occupying individual positions, like a pot and a woollen cloth in their respective places.

For the following reason, too, particles are not permanent: particles are obstructive in that they cannot be penetrated completely by other particles. That which is obstructive cannot be permanent.

**219. A permanent thing that is obstructive  
Is not seen anywhere.  
Therefore Buddhas never say  
That particles are permanent.**

The reason why Buddhas never say that permanent particles exist is because they do not perceive obstructive permanent things.

Cittamatrins, who refute the existence of particles by applying the reasoning of ultimate analysis but assert that consciousness is truly existent, should accept objects and consciousnesses as they are conventionally accepted, since exactly the same reasoning applies."

Assertion of our own sectarians<sup>1e</sup> who do not understand uncompounded phenomena as merely nominal: Although it is true that Buddhas do not mention permanent particles, they say uncompounded phenomena are permanent. Thus there is substantially existent cessation, which is like a dam. If this were not so it would be inappropriate to speak of the third noble truth.

Answer:

**220. If liberation, which is other than  
What binds, is bound and the means existed,  
It should not be called liberation  
Since nothing is produced from it.**

True sources bind to cyclic existence, true sufferings are that which is bound and true paths are the means which liberate one from sufferings and their sources. If liberation which is other than these were a functional

phenomenon it should facilitate an effect, but it does not produce any effect and not the slightest facilitation occurs. Thus it is inappropriate to call such a substantially existent cessation "liberation." It contradicts what the Teacher said: "Monks, these five are only names-past time, future time, space, nirvana and the person." One should therefore accept liberation as a mere term, a mere imputation and not as substantially existent.

## **221ab. In nirvāṇa there are no aggregates And there cannot be a person.**

The Subduer said, "That which is the complete abandonment, removal, and extinction of this suffering ... the abandonment of all the aggregates, the end of worldly existence and separation from attachment, is cessation and nirvana." According to proponents of functional things as truly existent, this citation means the aggregates are entirely non-existent in the sphere of nirvana. Nor can there be a person imputed in dependence upon them, for neither the reliance nor reliant exist.

## **221cd. What nirvāṇa is there for one Who is not seen in nirvāṇa?**

Neither the aggregates nor the person are seen as a truly existent reliance which reaches nirvana through the ending of disturbing attitudes and rebirth. What truly existent nirvana reliant upon that is there? Not the slightest, thus one should accept liberation, too, as a mere imputation.

Siimkhya assertion: According to us there is no flaw that nirvana is not liberation because of lacking a reliance. When an adept understands that the principal and person are different the process of involvement in cyclic existence such as the great one and so forth stops.<sup>19</sup> When everything subsides into the latent state of the principal, the conscious person remains alone. Thus there is a liberated self.

Answer:

**222ab. When free from attachment at [the time of]  
liberation  
What good is the existence of consciousness?**

It follows that it is illogical to accept the existence of a conscious person at the time of liberation when there is freedom from attachment to objects, because you assert that the intellect makes known to the person objects to which there is attraction. You also assert that it is the person's nature to be conscious and that this is permanent and immutable. What is the value of accepting the existence of consciousness during liberation? There is not the slightest value, because while accepting the conscious person as an experiencer of objects, the transformations which are experienced no longer exist, having subsided into a latent state.

Question: What if the person remains without consciousness at liberation?

Answer:

**222cd. Also to exist without consciousness  
Is clearly the same as not existing.**

It follows that to accept the existence of a liberated person without consciousness clearly amounts to accepting the person's non-existence, because of accepting that the person and consciousness are of one nature, being either equally existent or non-existent.

Assertion: There is a self during liberation, for though there is no actual consciousness, the potential to be conscious of objects exists.

Answer: That too is illogical.

**223ab. If at liberation a self existed  
There could be a seed of consciousness.**

If at liberation a self existed, there could be such a potential or seed of consciousness, but at that time there is no consciousness.

Objection: If there is no liberated self, there is no liberation and thus cyclic existence is indestructible. Many such unwanted entailments arise.

Answer:

## **223cd. Without it there is no speculation With regard to worldly existence.<sup>20</sup>**

It is irrelevant to speculate whether, because there is consciousness, [people would or would not enter liberation] or whether, because its seed is truly existent, people would or would not enter worldly existence. It would be relevant if a self as reliance existed but there is no liberated self.

## **224. It is certain that those liberated From suffering have no other [self]. Therefore the end of the self Should always be affirmed as good.**

It is certain that in the state of nirvana, people who have gained liberation from suffering by completely abandoning the contaminated aggregates through the total elimination of disturbing attitudes and emotions have no other causeless permanent self which does not depend on the aggregates. Therefore people who aspire to become free should always affirm that the complete ending forever of conceptions of a self is good and should never assert the existence of such a useless liberated self.

Assertion:

**225. The conventional is preferable  
But the ultimate never is.  
Ordinary people have some [belief in this]  
But none in the ultimate.**

If during liberation there is no liberated self, and nirvana which is termed the ultimate is said to be the mere ending of conceptions of a self through the non-recurrence of that which is composite, what is the purpose of striving for such an ultimate? It is preferable<sup>21</sup> for those interested in their own good to accept conventionalities like eyes, sprouts and so forth but not to assert any ultimate,<sup>22</sup> for ordinary people have some belief in virtuous and non-virtuous actions, their homes, forests and so forth but none whatsoever in the ultimate.

This stanza was written in connection with the extensive refutation of the self in the following chapter. Since it is interpreted as a controversial contention in Candrakirti's commentary, it should not be accepted as our own contention.<sup>23</sup>

The summarizing stanza:

**Discovering that external and internal dependently arising  
Phenomena exist in reliance, and understanding  
Their emptiness of existence by way of their own entities,  
Grow wise in the meaning of the middle way free from  
extremes.**

This is the ninth chapter from the Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds, showing how to meditate on the refutation of permanent functional phenomena.

This concludes the commentary on the ninth chapter, showing how to meditate on the refutation of permanent functional phenomena, from Essence of Good Explanations, Explanation of the "Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas".



## Chapter XIII

# Refuting Truly Existent Sense Organs and Objects

Question: When it says [in stanza 300]:

**The intelligent who seek what is good  
Adopt what is worthwhile even from others,**

what is this good explanation?

Answer: It is about seeing that all phenomena have no inherent existence.

Assertion: It is impossible to cognize that all phenomena have no inherent existence, for if they did they would be totally non-existent like the horns of a donkey and so forth, and would not be directly perceptible. However, since a pot and blue are directly perceptible, all functional things are in fact inherently existent.

Answer:

**301. When seeing its form, one does not in fact  
See the whole pot. Who that knows  
Reality would claim that the pot  
Is directly perceptible also?**

It follows that direct perception of a pot which exists by way of its own entity is not feasible. If it were, the awareness perceiving the visible form' of the pot should perceive all its parts. Yet when visual consciousness perceives the pot's form, it does not in fact perceive every single part of the pot. Who that knows the reality of things would claim that the pot is directly perceptible? "Also" refers to also blue existent by way of its own

character.'

The pot is imputed in dependence on eight substances<sup>3</sup> and therefore cannot exist by way of its own character, nor by seeing one part can one see all its parts. Similarly, if fire existed by way of its own entity, the fallacy that it should always keep burning would arise, since it would not require fuel.

Dialecticians contradict both reasoning and common knowledge when they call awareness arising in dependence upon individual sense organs direct perception, and assert that an awareness free from conceptuality in which a sound image and a generic image may be apprehended as merged' is direct perception. Each individual moment of consciousness cannot be a direct perceiver.' In the world objects like the waxing moon, which are directly perceived by many people, are commonly held to be directly perceptible, whereas that which perceives these objects is not. Furthermore since they assert that sense consciousness is a direct perceiver, it is inconsistent to think that it is also a valid perceiver.<sup>6</sup> An extensive explanation of this may be found in Candrakirti's commentary.' It has not been included here for fear that it would be too long.

### **302. By means of this very analysis Those with superior intelligence Should refute individually All that is fragrant, sweet and soft.**

By means of this very analysis using the reasoning which refutes the assertion that sense consciousness is a direct perceiver in relation to a pot, blue and so forth, existent by way of their own entity, the wise with superior intelligence refute separately in each case the contention that sense consciousnesses are direct perceivers in relation to fragrances such as the fragrance of jasmine flowers, sweet tastes and that which is soft to touch, all existent by way of their own entity. Since one cannot make distinctions such as seeing one part but not seeing others, or distinctions with regard to what touches and what does not, or with regard to closeness and distance in

relation to truly existent functional things, such fallacies ensue.

Assertion: All parts of the pot are seen when its visual form is seen, for the pot is not a separate entity from its visual form.

Answer:

**303. If because the form is seen  
Everything is seen,  
Why because of what is not seen  
Would the form not be unseen?**

If on the grounds that visual consciousness sees the pot's form one can posit that all parts of the pot are seen, why on the grounds that visual consciousness does not perceive the pot's smell would even the visible form, which is accepted as seen, not be unseen? If one posits that all parts are seen because one part is seen, even that which is accepted as seen cannot be posited as seen if one part is not perceived.

Assertion: Though the pot is not a directly perceptible object of comprehension, its visible form is established by direct perception and thus, indirectly, the pot existing by way of its own entity is also directly perceptible.

Answer:

**304. There is no direct perception  
Of just the form alone,  
Because it has a close and distant  
As well as a central part.**

It follows that there is no direct perception of just the visible form alone

existent by way of its own entity, because the visible form too has many parts, such as close, distant and central parts, and is thus imputed in dependence upon many parts. There is not the slightest thing existent by way of its own entity that is directly perceptible to any kind of awareness.

**305. This also applies when one examines  
Whether particles have parts or not.  
Thus to prove a thesis by that  
Which must be proved is not feasible.**

When all the parts are separated, that form is finally reduced to the smallest particles. An investigation of whether particles have parts or not applies to those particles too. If they have parts like a front and a back, they are, like the pot, imputed in dependence upon many parts, in which case they no longer are the smallest particles. If they do not have parts, they cannot exist because of being inapprehensible. Thus it is not feasible to prove that the pot exists by way of its entity as a directly perceptible object of comprehension by means of that which must be proved, for things do not exist by way of their own character.

**306. Everything too is a component  
As well as being a composite.  
Thus even a spoken syllable  
Does not have existence here.**

Moreover when objects apprehended by the physical sense organs are examined, all are components in relation to their composites as well as composites in relation to their components and are therefore merely imputed in dependence upon their parts. As with the analysis of the smallest particle, names, which are ultimately reduced to spoken syllables such as "a," are also just conventions in this world and do not exist by way of their own entity. Thus you must recognize all dependently arising phenomena as

mere names and terms.

Assertion: The pot is directly perceptible since visual consciousness sees the pot's visible form existent by way of its own character, consisting of color and shape.

Answer:

**307. If shape is distinct from color  
How is shape apprehended?  
If not distinct, why would the body  
Not also apprehend color?**

Are color and shape inherently one or distinct? If shape such as length and so forth is inherently distinct from color, how can a visual consciousness take shape as its object of apprehension? It follows that it cannot because shape is an entity distinct from color. Alternatively, if they are not distinct but inherently one, why does touch not apprehend color in the dark just as it apprehends shape? It follows that it should because they are one.

Assertion: The visible form source<sup>8</sup> exists because the four great elements which are causal forms exist.

Answer:

**308ab. Only the form is visible  
But the form's causes are not seen.**

Only the resultant form is visible but the form's causes such as the earth element are not seen. Since causal form is imputed in dependence upon resultant form, they cannot be inherently different. If they are inherently one, they must be one.

**308cde. If indeed it is thus,  
Why are both not also  
Perceived by just the eyes?’**

In that case why does just visual consciousness itself not apprehend both the causal and resultant forms? It follows that it should because they are one.

**309. Earth is seen as firm and stable  
And is apprehended by the body.  
Only that which is tangible  
Is referred to as earth.**

Earth is seen as firm and stable and furthermore is apprehended by tactile consciousness. Thus only that which is tangible is referred to as earth. Therefore since visible forms are objects apprehended by visual consciousness and the four elements are objects apprehended by tactile consciousness, they are different. If one accepts them as truly existent, they are unrelated. It would thereby follow that visible form is causeless.

Vaigesika assertion: A pot is not a visible object by way of its own entity but neither is it not a visible object, since it is directly perceptible by virtue of possessing visibility, a separate generality.<sup>10</sup>

Answer: This too is unacceptable.

**310ab. Since it was produced as something visible,  
It is of no use at all to the pot.**

Has the pot come into existence as something visible through its own causes or not? In the first case it would follow that an association with the separate generality of visibility is of no use in making the pot directly perceptible, because it has come into existence as something visible through

its own causes. For this reason the generality of visibility is not produced in relation to the pot.

### **310cd. As with the production of visibility, It lacks even the entity of existence.**

Further, a pot that has no connection with visibility and is not something visible lacks any inherently established entity of existence. Therefore the pot could not be either actually or imputedly directly perceptible as you contend.

Assertion: Because sense organs exist-such as the eyes, which are instruments of perception-directly perceptible objects such as visible form exist.

Answer:

### **311ab. The eye, like the ear, is an outcome of The elements. The eyes see while the others do not.**

Regarding the subject, the eye organ: since the eye perceives visual stimuli while other senses do not, it does not perceive visible form by way of its own entity, for like the nose sense organ it is an outcome of the elements. A demonstration of the valid reasons which invalidate the entailment is given below."

Objection: If the eye and so forth do not exist it contradicts explanations concerning the maturation of actions.

Answer: But even we do not refute that.

Question: Why is that not refuted?

Answer: We refute that things exist by way of their own entity but far from refuting the existence of all that is dependent arising, we affirm it in our own system.

## **311cd. Certainly therefore the Subduer said The fruition of actions is inconceivable.**

Although it cannot sustain investigation by the reasoning which analyzes suchness and though it is not established by way of its own entity, it is undeniable that the eye sees visible form and does not hear sound. Thus recognizing that the maturation of actions is inconceivable, one should accept it without applying analysis by reasoning. Certainly therefore the Subduer said that the fruition of actions is inconceivable. Sutra says:

**The maturation of sentient beings' actions is inconceivable.  
Thus this whole world comes into existence through causes.**

Assertion: The eye and so forth are inherently existent because one experiences consciousness, their effect.

Answer:

**312. Because the conditions are incomplete  
There is no awareness before looking,  
While afterwards awareness is of no use.  
The instrument is of no use in the third case.**

A visual consciousness does not exist before looking at a form, for prior to that the conditions which produce it are incomplete. Alternatively if it exists after looking at the form, it follows that the eye consciousness is of no use in looking at the form, because looking takes place before it exists. As a third possibility one might think that that which looks and consciousness are simultaneous. It would then follow that the instrument of looking would be of no use in the production of that visual consciousness because the two would exist simultaneously and would be unrelated.

Assertion: The eye is the instrument of looking.

Answer:

**313. If the eye travels, that which is  
Distant would take long to see.  
Why are extremely close  
And very distant forms not clear?**

When the eye looks at a form, does it look after travelling to the object or without doing so? In the first case, if when the eye looked at a form there were motion of travelling toward the object, it should take longer to see distant objects. If the eye perceived through contact, why would the eye ointment and spatula, which are extremely close, and very distant forms not be equally clear? It follows that they would be because of being perceived through contact.

**314. If the eye travels when the form is seen  
Its movement is of no benefit.  
Alternatively it is false to say  
What it intends to view is ascertained.**

If the eye travelled to the form after seeing it, its movement would be of no benefit, for though it does so to view the form, that form has already been seen. Alternatively, if it approached without seeing the form which it intended to view, it would be false to say it had definitely been seen, for it approaches what is to be viewed without seeing it, like a blind man.

**315. If the eye perceives without travelling  
It would see all these phenomena.  
For that which does not travel there is  
Neither distance nor obscuration.**

To avoid these errors one might assert that it perceives form by way of its own entity without travelling. In that case the eye which stays here would

see all of these phenomena: the close and distant, as well as the obscured and unobscured. For an eye which does not approach the object there should be no difference between close or distant, obscured or unobscured objects.

**316. If the nature of all things  
First appears in themselves,  
Why would the eye not  
Be perceived by the eye itself?**

Just as the fragrance of the magnolia or blue lotus is first found at its source and afterwards, through contact, on a sesame seed and so forth, it is the way of all things that their nature first appears in themselves. Since it cannot relinquish its nature even in relation to itself, if it is an instrument of looking by way of its own entity, why does the eye not perceive itself? It follows that it should since the eye organ even with the eye as its object cannot give up its nature as an instrument of looking. Yet valid cognition negates that the eye perceives itself. Thus the subject, the eye, is not an instrument of looking at form by way of its own entity, because it does not look at itself.

Assertion: The eye alone does not have the ability to view form. The form is seen in dependence upon a combination of three factors.

Answer:

**317. The eye does not have consciousness  
And consciousness lacks that which looks.  
If form has neither of these,  
How can they see form?**

Since the eye is matter it is not conscious of the object. Consciousness is

not that which looks at the object. The form, the objective condition, is neither that which looks nor consciousness. 11: -v can form be seen by way of its own entity through a combination of these three factors? It follows that it is not feasible because visible form which is one of them has no ability to see.

Just as form cannot be looked at in terms of its own suchness, sound too cannot be listened to in this way.

**318. If sound makes a noise as it travels  
Why should it not be a speaker?  
Yet if it travels noiselessly, how could  
Awareness arise in relation to it?**

When sound is heard, does hearing occur because it approaches as an object of that which listens or not? In the first case, if it approaches as an object of auditory consciousness, does it do so emitting sound or silently? If it travels toward auditory consciousness making a noise as it travels, why is it not a speaker, since like Devadatta it travels, emitting sounds? If this is accepted, it follows that it would not be sound. Alternatively, if it travels toward auditory consciousness noiselessly, how could awareness focusing on the sound be produced, since no sound is emitted?

**319. If sound is apprehended through contact,  
What apprehends the beginning of sound?  
If sound does not come alone,  
How can it be apprehended in isolation?**

Furthermore, if sound is apprehended through contact with the ear organ, what apprehends the beginning of sound before contact occurs? It follows that there is nothing with which to apprehend it, since neither the ear organ nor any other does so. If this is accepted, it follows that it would not be sound. Sound consists of nine substances and thus since it does not come alone, how can sound in isolation be apprehended? It follows that smell and so forth which are inseparably combined with it would also be

apprehended, for according to you they must, like the sound, have contact with the ear organ.

Question: What is wrong if the beginning of sound is not apprehended?

Answer: It would fail to be sound.

**320. While sound is not heard, it is not sound.  
It is impossible  
For that which is not sound  
Finally to turn into sound.**

Until it is heard it is not sound because, like smell, it is not the ear's object. It becomes sound when it is heard. If initially it was not sound but later became sound, it would follow that smell and so forth could do so too, but this is unacceptable with regard to permanent functional things. Sutra says:

**For instance, in dependence upon the strings and wood  
And the hand's effort—through these three together—  
Sound is produced and issues from  
Instruments like the vina and flute.  
When the wise investigate and think  
From where it has come and where it has gone,  
Searching in the main and intermediate directions,  
They find no coming nor going of sound.**

Assertion: The mind apprehends objects after travelling to them.

Answer: That is incorrect. Auditory consciousness does not travel to the object along with the ear organ, for the organs always remain in the body.

**321. Without the sense organs what will mind  
Do after it has gone?  
If it were so, why would that which lives  
Not always be without mind?**

Even if mind, such as an auditory consciousness, approached its object without the sense organs, how could it perform the functions of listening, looking and so forth, since like a blind person it would lack the ability to perceive its object? If it were so, why would that which lives, *i.e.* the self, not always be without mind? When one investigates in this way by means of reasoning, neither sense organs nor consciousnesses have by way of their own entity the ability to apprehend objects.

Objection: If sense organs and their objects do not exist inherently, the aggregate of recognition which discerns what is exclusive to them will be non-existent.

Answer: Although they do not exist when analyzed by reasoning, they are not conventionally non-existent, for mental consciousness apprehends the exclusive aspects of an object such as a visible form which has already been perceived.

**322. An object already seen  
Is perceived by mind like a mirage.  
That which posits all phenomena  
Is called the aggregate of recognition.**

For instance, though a mirage does not contain even a drop of water, a recognition of water occurs. Likewise that which perceives the exclusive aspects of an object, a mental factor positing the exclusive signs of all phenomena, is called the aggregate of recognition. Phenomena are simply posited by recognition and do not exist by way of their own entity.

Objection: If the aggregate of recognition does not exist inherently, it is

impossible to posit phenomena.

Answer: There is no such error.

**323. In dependence upon the eye and form  
Mind arises like an illusion.  
It is not reasonable to call  
Illusory that which has existence.**

Even though it does not exist by way of its own entity, mind arises like a magical illusion in dependence upon the eye and visible form. Any phenomenon whose existence is existence by way of its own entity cannot be called illusory, just as women who exist in the world are not called illusory.

Assertion: It is amazing to claim that the sense organs can in no way whatever apprehend objects and that visual consciousness is produced in dependence upon the eye and visible form.

Answer: That alone is no cause for amazement.

**324. When there is nothing on earth  
That does not amaze the wise,  
Why think cognition by the senses  
And suchlike are amazing.**

Although when analyzed by reasoning a sprout and so forth neither comes into existence from a seed which has ceased nor from one which has not ceased, [sprouts are produced in dependence upon seeds"]. When to the wise there is nothing on earth which is not as amazing as magic, why should one think that cognition of objects by sense consciousnesses which do not have true existence and suchlike are amazing, for this applies equally to everything.

**325. The firebrand's ring and magical creations,  
Dreams, illusions, and the moon in water,  
Mists, echoes, mirages, clouds  
And worldly existence are alike.**

Thus all dependently arising phenomena are like the ring formed by a firebrand which is whirled quickly. Though the woman created through meditative stabilization and the dream body do not have true existence, they act as causes for erroneous attachment to the self. Although the illusory maiden conjured by a magician does not have true existence, she confuses the mind. Similarly the moon in the water, mists and echoes resounding from mountain clefts and caves give rise to a distorted perception of them as they appear to be. A mirage causes mistaken perception, and clouds in the distance seem like mountains. Worldly existence consisting of environments and living beings, while empty of inherent existence, is able to function. Understand that it is like these analogies. Sutra says:

- 1. In a young girl's dream she sees  
A youth arrive then die, and feels  
Happy when he arrives, unhappy when he dies.  
Understand all phenomena are like this.**
- 2. Those who conjure illusions create forms  
Of various kinds—horses, elephants and chariots.  
They are not at all as they appear.  
Understand all phenomena are like this.**
- 3. The reflection of the moon shining  
In the sky appears in a clear pool,  
Yet the moon does not enter the water.  
Understand the nature of all phenomena is like this.**

4. Echoes arise in dependence upon  
Caves, mountains, forts and river gorges.  
Understand all products are like this.  
Phenomena are all like illusions and mirages.
5. A person who is tormented by thirst  
In summer at noon—that transmigrator  
Sees mirages as a body of water.  
Understand all phenomena are like this.
6. Although a mirage contains no water  
Confused beings want to drink it.  
Unreal water cannot be drunk.  
Understand all phenomena are like this.
7. Instantaneously in a cloudless sky  
A circle of clouds appears,  
But try to find from where they came—  
Understand all phenomena are like this.
8. Like mirages and smell-eaters' cities,<sup>13</sup>  
Like magical illusions and like dreams,  
Objects of meditation are empty of a real entity.  
Understand all phenomena are like this.<sup>14</sup>

The summarizing stanza:

**Thus in the illusory city of the three false worlds  
Manipulated by the puppeteer of karmic action  
The smell-eater maiden performs her illusory dance.  
Amazing that desire should chase a mirage!**

This is the thirteenth chapter of the Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds, showing how to meditate on the refutation of sense organs and objects.

This concludes the commentary on the thirteenth chapter, showing how to meditate on the refutation of sense organs and objects, from Essence of Good Explanations, Explanation of the "Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas".

## Chapter XV

# Refuting Truly Existent Characteristics

Assertion: Products exist inherently because their characteristics such as production exist.

Answer: Products would exist if their characteristics existed, but these do not exist inherently. If production is asserted to produce products,' then according to those who propound the non-existence of the effect, the sprout which does not exist at the time of the seed is produced after the final moment of a seed for which the necessary causes and conditions are assembled.

### **351. How can the non-existent be produced, If what does not exist at the last is produced? How can that which exists be produced, If what exists from the outset is produced?**

A sprout which does not exist during the last moment of the seed cannot be produced by way of its own entity, otherwise it follows that donkeys' horns and so forth would also be produced. Thus how can anything which does not exist at the time of its cause be produced by way of its own entity? It cannot. How can anything which exists at the time of its cause be produced? It follows that it will not be produced, since anything existing at the time of its cause was produced from the outset, prior to being itself. The subject, a sprout, is not produced by way of its own entity, for neither that which exists at the time of its cause nor that which does not exist at the time of its cause is produced by way of its own entity.

### **352ab. Since the effect destroys the cause, That which does not exist will not be produced.**

Since the sprout cannot be produced unless the seed undergoes change, the process which produces the resultant sprout destroys the causal seed. Thus something which does not exist at the time of the seed will not be produced by way of its own entity. In general, even though a sprout which is non-existent at the time of the seed is produced, it is incorrect to accept truly existent production, for then one must also accept the production of rabbits' horns.

**352cd. Nor will that which exists be produced  
Since what is established needs no establisher.**

Since something which is established at the time of its cause does not need anything to establish it, that which exists at the time of its cause will not be produced.

**353. There is no production at that time,  
Nor is there production at another.  
If not produced at that time nor another,  
When will there ever be production?**

At a time when the sprout itself exists there is no production, since it does not need to be produced. Other than that, when it does not exist there is no production, since it cannot be produced. If it is not produced at that time nor at the other, when will there ever be production? There cannot be a time of production.

Assertion: Milk turning into something which is curd constitutes production.

Answer: That is incorrect.

### **354. Just as there is no production Of that as the thing it is, Neither is it produced As something else.**

since something which exists as milk does not need to become milk,  $t \sim$  acre is no production. Neither is that milk produced as something else, *i.e.* curd, for the two are different entities.

There is no inherent production for the following reason too:

### **355ab. The first, intermediate and last Are not possible prior to production.**

First production, then duration and lastly disintegration are not possible prior to production, because that which is unproduced cannot have production, duration and disintegration.

Assertion: Production while a thing is being produced, duration while it lasts and disintegration when it disintegrates exist consecutively by way of their own entity.'

Answer:

### **355cd. How can each begin Without the other two?**

How could each at its particular time begin without the other two? Duration and disintegration are impossible without production. The same applies to the other two. Moreover a product is not feasible without any one of these characteristics.

For this reason too products cannot be inherently produced:

**356. The thing itself does not occur  
Without other things.  
Thus there is no coming into existence  
Either from self or from other.**

The thing itself, such as a clay pot, does not occur without other things, such as clay, since it depends upon clay. The clay does not exist by way of its own entity either, since it depends on pebbles. Thus the pot does not come into existence either from self or from other, for since neither self nor other exist by way of their own entity, there is no inherent production.

**357. It cannot be said to exist  
Before, after or simultaneously.  
Therefore production does not occur  
Simultaneously with the pot.**

Moreover there is no inherent production, since it is impossible to say that production and so forth exist before, after or simultaneously with the pot. Therefore the pot's production does not occur simultaneously with the pot by way of its own entity. If it did, since the basis and that which is based upon it would be co-existent,' it would follow that the pot had been produced, for it must exist even as it is approaching production.

Assertion: The pot's production exists, for without it there could be no oldness and so forth, but there is oldness characterized by cessation.

Answer: That is incorrect.

**358. That which was previously produced  
Was not old when first produced.  
Also that which afterwards has been  
Constantly produced is not old.**

The previously produced pot was not old when first produced because at that time it was new. A previously produced thing does not grow old by way of its own entity. Nor is that old which afterwards has constantly been produced, for also at that time it is new. Since afterwards it is newly produced, it will not become old by way of its own entity. Furthermore, by refuting production existent by way of its own entity, oldness existent by way of its own entity is refuted, but mere [conventional] oldness is accepted in our system too.

Since there is no inherent production in any of the three times, production does not truly exist.

**359. A present thing does not  
Come into existence from itself,  
Nor come into existence from the future,  
And also not from the past.**

Since cause and effect are not simultaneous, a present thing does not come into existence from its present self. Nor does it come into existence from the future, nor from the past. Moreover, since there is no inherent production in any of the three times, one must accept that production is false and like a magician's illusion.

Sutra says: "Monks, it is as follows: when the eye is produced, it does not come from anywhere, and when it ceases, it does not go anywhere." Thus if there were inherent production, a thing should come from somewhere when it is produced, like the rising moon, and go somewhere when it ceases, like the setting moon. In that case it would be permanent, but since production and cessation are mere nominal imputations, one must accept that they are like magical illusions.

**360. There is no coming of the produced,  
Likewise no going of that which has ceased.  
Since it is thus, why should existence  
Not be like a magician's illusions?**

Since things do not come from anywhere when they are produced nor go anywhere when they cease, why should external and internal existence not be like a magician's illusions? When dependent arising is seen as it is, it is like a created illusion and not like a barren woman's child.<sup>4</sup>

At this point Candrakirti's commentary says that if mere production is negated, it is the kind of object of comprehension that a barren woman's child is and thus a denial of dependent arising.' Inability to assert production in one's own system and placing hope in a system which claims production neither exists [nor does not exist]<sup>6</sup> destroys the Madhyamika view. Since adherence to such an interpretation creates causes for bad rebirths, it should be discarded like a gob of spittle!

**361. Production, duration and disintegration  
Do not occur simultaneously.  
If they are not consecutive either,  
When can they ever occur?**

Since production, duration and disintegration, the characteristics of products, do not occur simultaneously by way of their own entity nor consecutively by way of their own entity, when do they occur by way of their own entity? The subjects-production, duration and disintegration-do not exist inherently because of not being inherently simultaneous or consecutive.

**362. If for production and all the others,  
All of these occurred again,  
Disintegration would seem like production  
And duration like disintegration.**

Since production, duration and disintegration would all require the production of production and so forth, disintegration, like production, would have another disintegration, and duration too would seem like disintegration in that one would have to assert that it has another duration. Thus there would be infinite regress. In that case the basic characteristics would not be established. Therefore there is not even an atom of inherent existence.

Question: Are the characteristics and that which they characterize one or different in nature?

Assertion: That which is characterized, namely a product such as a pot, is different in nature from its three characteristics-production, duration and disintegration.

Answer:

**363. If that which is characterized is said to be  
Different from its characteristics,  
How can the characterized be impermanent?  
Alternatively, existence of all four is unclear.**

How can that which is characterized, namely a product such as a pot, be impermanent? It follows that it is not, for impermanence and the pot are inherently different. Alternatively, if they are inherently not different, the four, *i.e.* the three characteristics and that which they characterize, do not clearly have the entity of existing as functional things. It follows that the characteristics are not characteristics because of being one with that which they characterize, and that which they characterize is not what is characterized because of being one with the characteristics. One should

therefore not assert that they are inherently one or different.

Assertion: Production and so forth exist inherently because the agent of production exists inherently.

Answer:

**364. A thing is not produced from a thing  
Nor is a thing produced from a non-thing.  
A non-thing is not produced from a non-thing  
Nor is a non-thing produced from a thing.**

The sprout, as an already existing functional thing, is not produced again while the seed as a functional thing exists, because a sprout is not produced unless the seed undergoes change. Also a sprout that has already been produced cannot be produced again. The sprout as a functional thing is not produced from a nonfunctional seed, because a nonfunctional thing does not have the ability to produce an effect. Furthermore a nonfunctional effect is not produced from a nonfunctional cause: a burnt seed does not produce a burnt sprout.

A nonfunctional effect is not produced from a functional cause since the fallacies already explained apply.' Since inherent production is impossible, causes and conditions giving rise to it are meaningless.

Moreover, should one consider that production and disintegration pertain to that which has the nature of a functional thing or a nonfunctional thing? Both are inappropriate.

**365. A thing does not become a thing,  
Nor does a non-thing become a thing.  
A non-thing does not become a non-thing,  
Nor does a thing become a non-thing.**

Something already produced does not again become a thing being

produced, since it is senseless for it to be produced again. A nonfunctional thing is not produced again as a thing, otherwise it follows that even a barren woman's child could be born. Thus there is no inherent production of either functional or nonfunctional things. A totally disintegrated nonfunctional thing does not again become a disintegrating nonfunctional thing, for something non-existent like a barren woman's child does not disintegrate. A functional thing that is already produced does not become a nonfunctional thing, because the two are contradictory. Sutra says: "All products and nonproducts are free [from inherent existence]. Those sages who do not have conceptions [of inherent existence] understand that which is a nonproduct with regard to all phenomena and are free from views of an [inherent] self."<sup>8</sup>

Assertion: Neither that which has been produced nor that which is unproduced is being produced. That which is in the process of production is being produced.

Answer:

**366. A thing in the process of production  
Since half-produced, is not being produced.  
Alternatively it follows that everything  
Is in the process of being produced.**

It follows that a sprout in the process of production is not being produced by way of its own entity, because that which is in the process of production must be posited as half produced and half unproduced. The produced part belongs to what has already been produced and the unproduced part to what is unproduced. There is nothing in the process of production with parts other than these existent by way of its own entity. If the produced and the unproduced are both considered to be that which is presently being produced, both past and future are also in the process of being produced. Alternatively, it follows that all three times are presently being produced, since all produced and unproduced things are in the process of production.

If that which is presently being produced exists by way of its entity, is it

considered to have its own nature or not? Both are unacceptable.' It follows that it could not be in the process of production.

**367. That which has the nature of presently being produced  
Is not in the process of production,  
Nor is that in the process of production  
Which lacks the nature of presently being produced.**

It follows that anything which has the nature of presently being produced does not have the nature of being in the process of production. It follows that whatever does not have the nature of presently being produced is also not in the process of production, because that which is not presently being produced is contrary to that which is.

Assertion: That which is in the process of production exists, since it is located between the past and future. These two times may be posited in relation to what is presently being produced.

Answer:

**368. For anyone to whom the two are  
Impossible without an intermediate,  
There is nothing in the process of production,  
For it too would have an intermediate.**

In any opponent's system in which there is definitely an intermediate stage without which the past and future cannot exist, that which is presently being produced could not exist by way of its own entity, since there would be infinite regress, in that anything in the process of production would require another intermediate stage and that one yet another and so on.

Question: If the half-produced is not in the process of production, what is?

Assertion:

**369. Since the process of production is the arising  
Of the produced through cessation,  
That which is presently being produced  
Appears to be a different entity.**

Since the process of production is, for example, the sprout's being produced through cessation of the seed, something in a state where its production has begun is said to be in the process of production. Thus what is presently being produced appears to be a different entity from that which is half produced and half unproduced.

Answer: If one could point to anything and say, "This thing has been produced from this thing which is in the process of production," one could identify something in the process of production existent by way of its own entity in relation to the thing produced from it.

**370ab. When a thing is produced there cannot be  
Anything in the process of production.**

However when a thing has been produced, there cannot be anything in the process of production which exists by way of its own entity, for, what was in the process of production has ceased. A produced thing which has arisen from such a process of production and which would permit its inference does not exist.

Assertion: The produced is in the process of production.

Answer:

**370cd. If the produced is in the process  
Of production, why is it being produced?**

If the produced is in the process of production, why is it being produced again? This is unfeasible because it has already been produced.

Assertion: A thing which is presently being produced is said to be

produced, for although unproduced, it is approaching production.

Answer:

**371. A thing in the process of production is said  
To be the entirely unproduced arising.  
Since there is no difference, why should the pot  
Not be considered as non-existent?**

If a thing that is in the process of being produced is said to be produced because, even though it is entirely unproduced, it is approaching production, why should a pot while performing its function not be considered a nonfunctional thing? It follows that this is a reasonable assertion, since there is no difference between the produced and the unproduced.

Assertion: There is a difference between that which is in the process of being produced and the unproduced. That which is in the process of production is said to be associated with the activity of production, whereas the unproduced is not necessarily associated with the activity of production.

Answer:

**372. That which is presently being produced,  
Though incomplete, is other than unproduced.  
Yet also since other than produced,  
The unproduced is being produced.**

Since a thing in the process of being produced is associated with the activity of production, you assert that even though it has not completed that activity, it is other than unproduced and future. Yet in that case, since a thing in the process of being produced is other than something produced, you are saying that the unproduced is being produced.

**373. That which is presently being produced,  
Though not yet existent, is later said to exist.  
The unproduced is thus being produced—  
But the non-existent does not arise.**

Since that which is presently being produced is other than something produced, you must accept that it is unproduced. You might claim that anything in the process of being produced exists as a thing, because, even though it did not exist previously, it has afterwards become associated with the activity of production. If on this account you say that an entirely unproduced thing associated with the activity of production is being produced, that too is incorrect. An unproduced thing, referred to as non-existent, has not attained its entity. It does not undergo production, because it is not engaged in that activity.

**374. The completed is called existent.  
The uncompleted is called non-existent.  
When there is nothing in the process of production  
What is being referred to as such?**

That which has completed the activity of production is said to exist as a thing, and that which has not performed the activity of production is said not to exist as a thing. If neither that which has nor that which has not completed the activity of production is in the process of being produced, what is being referred to as presently being produced? Anything in the process of being produced does not have the least existence by way of its own entity.

# **375. Since without a cause There is no effect, Both starting and stopping Are not feasible.**

Investigation by reasoning shows that there is no effect without a cause. Since cause and effect, then, do not truly exist and since the bases therefore do not truly exist, the sprout's starting to be produced and the seed's stopping to exist are not feasible by way of their own entity. Sutra says:

**Sentient beings, humans, those born from power whoever  
they may be,  
None that were born and died here were born [inherently].  
The nature of all things is empty like magicians' illusions,  
But the Forders are unable to recognize it.<sup>10</sup>**

For instance, the men and women conjured by an illusionist cause the spectators of the magic, who think of them as men and women, to feel attraction and aversion. Though they also appear to the magician, he does not think of them in this way. They do not even appear to those who are unaffected by the spell. You must understand that these analogies apply respectively to the perception of common beings who have not understood dependent arising's emptiness of inherent existence, to the wisdom of subsequent attainment of the Exalted, and to the meditative equipoise of the Exalted." You should learn how conventional phenomena are established by conventional valid cognition and ultimate truth by conceptual and non-conceptual reasoning consciousness from the presentation in [Gateway for Conqueror Children], Explanation of [Santideva's] "Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds",<sup>2</sup> and so forth.

The summarizing stanza:

**Production and disintegration of composite things  
Are like dreams and like illusion.  
When they are mere terms and mere imputation,  
How could non-products be truly existent?**

This is the fifteenth chapter from the Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds, showing how to meditate on the refutation of that which constitutes products.

This concludes the commentary on the fifteenth chapter, showing how to meditate on refuting [the inherent existence of] that which constitutes products, from Essence of Good Explanations, Explanation of the "Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas".

## Chapter XVI

# Refuting Remaining Counter-Arguments

These chapters were written so that trainees may enter the state of liberation through giving up attachment to cyclic existence. Without ascertaining the meaning of emptiness as it actually is, one cannot develop enthusiasm for omniscience or even for liberation through the giving up of attachment to cyclic existence. The emptiness of inherent existence of all phenomena frightens those who have not heard sufficient teaching and are bound by the noose of clinging to a self. As already described, the path leading to freedom from worldly existence should therefore only be explained after first making the mind ready, in the way that the death of a king's beloved queen was conveyed to him.'

**376. For various reasons, that which is empty  
Appears nonetheless as if not empty.  
These are refuted individually  
By all the chapters.**

Even though things are empty of inherent existence, they appear not to be empty and are thought of in this way for various reasons, such as considering them truly existent. All of the preceding fifteen chapters refute these reasons individually.

Assertion:

**377ab. When the author and subject also exist  
It is incorrect to call them empty.**

If the chapters were written for these purposes, things are established as not being empty, since the author and the subject matter explained by the fifteen chapters exist. "Also" indicates the words that express the meaning of emptiness. Therefore it is incorrect to speak of the emptiness of inherent existence of things.

Answer:

**377cd. Also with regard to these three, whatever  
Arises in dependence does not exist.**

According to us, the words, subject matter and author are imputations dependent on one another and do not exist independently. Whatever arises in dependence does not exist inherently. Since the author, subject matter and words are all dependently imputed, these three also do not have inherent existence. Thus emptiness is well established.

Assertion: If all of these were empty, the senses and their objects would be like donkeys' horns! But since they exist, things do exist inherently.

Answer:

**378. If through flaws concerning emptiness  
[Things] were established as not empty,  
Why would emptiness not be established  
Through flaws concerning lack of emptiness?**

If on account of the [presumed] flaws concerning proof of emptiness, the words and so forth were not empty because one has to accept their existence, why would emptiness not be established through flaws concerning your proof that things are not empty? It follows that you should certainly accept emptiness because you accept the interdependence of the words and so forth.

You cannot establish your own thesis merely by dismissing the proponents of emptiness.

**379. In refuting the thesis of others  
And in proving your own thesis,  
If on the one hand you like to disprove,  
Why do you not like to prove?**

Opponents asserting that things exist truly must refute the others' thesis of emptiness as well as prove their own thesis that things are truly existent. You, however, are simply engaged in dismissing the proponents of emptiness. If on the one hand you like disproving the thesis of others, why do you not like proving your own? You should! To proponents of emptiness whatever proofs you adduce to validate your own thesis remain as unestablished as that which is to be proved. You should therefore give up adherence to the thesis that things are inherently existent.

Assertion:

**380ab. When thoroughly investigated,  
The non-existent is not a thesis.**

The thesis put forward by proponents of emptiness is not feasible since when thoroughly investigated, it is illogical. Something which does not exist as a knowable object<sup>2</sup> is not an assertable thesis. Therefore the thesis put forward by proponents of true existence is established.

Answer: No thesis is feasible when investigated by the reasoning that analyzes the ultimate.

**380cd. Then all three, such as oneness,  
Also are not theses.**

Since negated by this reasoning, truly existent oneness, otherness and ineffability asserted by any opponent are also not theses. Therefore one should not assert even the slightest true existence.

Assertion:

**381ab. Where a pot is directly perceptible,  
The argument of emptiness is meaningless.**

The reason proving the pot empty of true existence is meaningless and ineffectual, for wherever there is a directly perceptible pot, that truly existent pot is, according to us, established by direct perception.

Answer:

**381cd. Here reasons appearing in textual systems  
Are not [acceptable]; elsewhere they are.**

In relation to the thesis of proponents establishing emptiness of true existence through reasoning, reasons appearing in their opponents' textual systems are unacceptable, because they are engaged in rejecting them.

Question: Then are reasons from these textual systems inappropriate in all cases?

Answer: Elsewhere there is no incompatibility, since they pertain where both protagonists' tenets are similar.

Assertion: You proponents of emptiness accept the entity of emptiness, and since emptiness is not feasible unless it relies on nonemptiness, things are truly existent.

Answer: It follows that the existence of emptiness does not establish its opposite, that there is true existence.

**382. When there is nothing that is not empty,  
How can emptiness be so?  
When the one does not exist,  
Why should the antidote exist?**

If emptiness were truly existent, truly existent things as its basis would be feasible, but as there is nothing that is not empty of true existence, how can emptiness be truly existent? Its basis cannot possibly be truly existent. Why, when the basis does not have true existence, would the antidote negating it be truly existent? For emptiness to be truly existent, its basis would have to have a truly existent nature. Fundamental Wisdom says:

## **If the slightest thing were not empty Emptiness would have some existence**

and so forth.' The Two Truths says:

**Since the object of negation is non-existent,  
The negation clearly does not exist as [its own] reality.<sup>4</sup>**

Assertion: Since there is not even the slightest emptiness, it cannot constitute one's thesis. Nevertheless by accepting the absence of a system of one's own as one's system, one is asserting a thesis. Since there is no thesis which does not depend on a counter-thesis, truly existent things-the counter-thesis-exist.

Answer:

**383. If there were a thesis, absence of the thesis  
Would in entity be a thesis,  
But where there is no thesis  
What can be the counter-thesis?**

If we had any thesis of existence by way of a thing's own entity, the absence of a thesis would in entity be a thesis existent by way of its own entity. However since we do not have any thesis of existence by way of a thing's own entity, a counter-thesis dependent upon that is also impossible. Moreover all theses concerning truly existent things have already been refuted above. Thus if the absence of a thesis does not exist by way of its own entity, what truly existent thing could constitute the counter-thesis? Neither thesis nor counter-thesis have even an atom of true existence. By

this we refute truly existent emptiness as our system, which should not, however, be interpreted as showing that we have no system.'

Assertion: There are truly existent things, because specific things like fire and so forth exist.

Answer:

**384. How can fire be hot,  
When things do not exist?  
This was refuted above: it was said  
That even hot fire does not exist.**

How can fire be hot by way of its own entity? It cannot, for there are no truly existent things. Above it was said that even hot fire does not exist inherently. [Stanza 341] says:

**That which is hot is fire but how  
Can that burn which is not hot?  
Thus so-called fuel does not exist,  
And without it fire too does not.**

This point has already been refuted.

**385. If through seeing things one could refute  
The statement that things do not exist,  
Who then sees the elimination  
Of fallacies regarding all four theses?**

Moreover, even if, on seeing the thing which is fire, it were appropriate to refute the statement that fire does not exist truly, who sees the elimination of fallacies associated with the true existence of oneness and difference and of all four theses such as existence and nonexistence and so forth exposed by the reasoning of dependent arising?' Since all four theses are seen to be flawed, one should not accept any thesis of true existence.

For the following reason, too, it is incorrect to assert true existence:

**386. When there is nowhere, even in particles,  
A truly existent entity, how can it occur?  
Even for Buddhas, it does not exist.  
Thus it is irrelevant.**

As explained in the context of [stanza 305],

**This also applies when one examines  
Whether particles have parts.**

If there were a truly existent entity, it should be observable even in extremely small things such as particles, but it is not observable. How can truly existent production occur for that which does not exist anywhere? It is totally incorrect to accept as existent that which is nonexistent to the perception of Buddhas, the sun-like radiance of whose consummate understanding of the suchness of things dispels all darkness of ignorance. Asserting true existence is thus unrelated to any feasible thesis.

**387. If they are not twofold, how can  
Anything have an existent entity?  
If that is reasonable to you also,  
Why raise further arguments?**

If there is no twofold division of phenomena into truly existent and not truly existent, what, such as particles and so forth, could have a truly existent entity, since all forms of true existence have been precluded? If for the very reasons we have explained, it is appropriate for you too to accept the system which has eliminated the two extremes, why do you cling to the thesis of true existence and raise further arguments against us?

If any reasoning could disprove the thesis concerning emptiness of true existence, we would be convinced, but since things cannot be proved truly existent, you should accept only our thesis.

**388. Regarding the non-functional [aspect] of all things,  
Differentiations are inappropriate.  
That which is seen in all substantial entities  
Is not differentiable.**

If the nature of internal and external things were truly existent, they would not depend on causes and conditions. Also differentiations of truly existent and not truly existent are inappropriate with regard to the absence of truly existent things. There are no differences in the entity of space, because it is a mere absence of obstructing form. Similarly regarding emptiness of true existence, the nature seen in all substantial entities, [stanza 191] says:

**Whoever sees one thing  
Is said to see all.  
That which is the emptiness of one  
Is the emptiness of all.**

Sutra says, "Whoever has come to know the non-functional with regard to functional things has no attachment to functional things." There are no distinctions of truly existent and not truly existent with regard to any phenomenon whatsoever.

Challenge: After first analyzing, you should either accept emptiness or make a reply.

Objection: It would be appropriate to make a reply if the slightest thing were accepted as truly existent, but since according to you everything is nonexistent, how can any reply be made?

Answer:

**389. If owing to non-existence you claim  
No reply is made to the other's thesis,  
Why should you not also prove  
Your own thesis which is refuted by reasons?**

If you claim that no reply is made to the Madhyamika thesis because everything is nonexistent, why should it not also be proper to prove your own thesis which is refuted by the reasons that prove emptiness? Since one cannot refute another's thesis without proving one's own, yours has become nonexistent.

Assertion: Even if one is unable to prove one's thesis, it is said and well known in the world that reasons which refute others' theses are easy to find.

Answer:

**390. Though the world says it is easy  
To find reasons with which to refute,  
Why can the errors regarding  
The others' thesis not be stated?**

Since in that case you too must be in possession of those easily found reasons with which to refute, why are even you unable to fault the others' thesis, that of the Madhyamikas? Thus as you are unable to fault the others' thesis, reasons refuting emptiness are not easy to find.

**391. If just by saying "They exist"  
Things really did exist,  
Why should they not also be non-existent  
Just by saying "They do not exist"?**

If even without reasoning, but merely by saying the words "They exist," things existed as their own suchness, why should their emptiness of true existence not also be established merely by our saying the words "They do not exist truly"? The reasoning is the same in all respects. Therefore, rejecting assertions regarding the two extremes, we both should firmly establish the textual system free from all fabrications which asserts nonexistence of the two extremes.

Assertion: If things do not exist ultimately, the designation "things exist" is incorrect and as unreasonable as terming a barren woman's child existent.

Answer:

**392. If a thing is not non-existent  
Because the term "existent" is ascribed,  
Neither is it existent  
Because the term "existent" is applied.**

If things do not lack true existence because the designation "they are and exist" is ascribed, neither are they truly existent because the designation "they exist truly" is applied. Calling someone with good eyesight blind or someone with a short life long-lived does not make them so. Besides, if things could be accomplished by words alone, it would be just as reasonable to accept that they lack true existence as to think they are truly existent.

Another's assertion: Words do not reveal an object's entity.' If they did, one's mouth would burn when saying "fire" or be full when saying "pot." Therefore we assert that ordinary people all have means of expression and terms for that which is being expressed which do not touch an object's own

entity.

Answer:

**393. If everything is a convention  
Because expressed by ordinary people,  
How can anything which exists  
As [its own] suchness be a convention?**

Supposedly things all exist inherently and as conventions<sup>9</sup> because ordinary people speak of them by means of words which do not touch their entity. But how can anything that exists inherently, existing as its own suchness, be a convention? It could only be ultimately existent.<sup>10</sup>

Assertion: Since you deny that things have true existence, things are nonexistent.

Answer:

**394. If things are non-existent because  
Things all do not exist,  
In that case it is incorrect that all theses  
Concern the non-existence of things.**

If even the slightest thing is nonexistent because things are not truly existent, it is incorrect that all Madhyamika theses concern the nonexistence of things through refutation of previously existent truly established things, for there has never been any true existence."

**395. Since a thing does not exist  
A non-thing cannot exist.  
Without a thing's existence,  
How can a non-thing be established?**

Since truly existent functional things, the object of negation, do not exist, their non-functional negation cannot be truly existent. In the world a completely disintegrates; thing is said to be non-functional.<sup>12</sup> In keeping with this, a completely disintegrated pot would not be feasible if the pot had never existed. Thus how could the non-functional be truly existent, when there are no truly existent functional things? The existence of a dependent thing is not feasible without that on which it depends.

Assertion: In order to prove emptiness you must adduce reasons. Thus since the reasons exist, things are not empty, for like the reasons everything else is also truly existent.

Answer:

**396. If things are not empty because  
They are empty by virtue of reasons,  
The thesis would not be distinct from the reasons,  
And thus the reasons would not exist.**

If things were not empty because emptiness of true existence is established through reasons, and the thesis and reasons were inherently distinct, they would be unrelated. If the thesis were not inherently distinct from the reason but inherently one with it, they would have to be one and therefore what is to be proved could not be understood by depending on the reason. Then it follows that there are no correct reasons, since the fallacy of there being no reasons arises when one asserts truly existent things. Therefore all phenomena are established as lacking inherent existence.

Assertion: Since there are analogies for emptiness of inherent existence, such as the reflection and so forth, everything else, like those analogies,

exists and is not empty.

Answer:

**397. If things are not empty because  
There are analogies for emptiness,  
Can one say, "Just like the crow,  
So too the self is black"?**

Is the analogy related or unrelated to the reason's meaning? The first has already been precluded by the reasoning which refutes truly existent reasons. In the second case, if the meaning is established through an analogy unrelated to the reason, is one able to say, "Just as the crow is black, so too is the self," because they are alike in being functional things? One should be able to do so. Yet an analogy, merely by virtue of its existence, is not suitable as an analogy for true existence.

Question: If analogies, reasons and all things do not exist, what is the purpose of writing all the chapters of your treatise?

Answer: It is for the attainment of liberation and omniscience through understanding the meaning of suchness.

**398. If things exist inherently  
What good is it to perceive emptiness?  
Perception by way of conceptions binds.  
This is refuted here.**

If things existed inherently, what good would there be in perceiving emptiness, since it would be erroneous? Thinking of things as truly existent causes one to accumulate actions and thereby wander in cyclic existence, but through fully understanding that all phenomena lack inherent existence, one gains release from worldly existence. Thus as long as one sees things as

truly existent, because of conceptions which cling to their true existence, one is bound to cyclic existence. In this treatise, therefore, the truly existent person and aggregates, which are the referent objects of conceptions of true existence, are refuted by an extensive collection of reasoning. Sutra says, "All phenomena are empty in that they do not exist inherently" and so forth. Accordingly, this was written to teach lack of inherent existence, which does not contradict the acceptance in our system of all dependently arising phenomena.

Among our own sectarians, Vijnaptivadins and all those who have not understood the actual meaning of the scriptures assert that consciousness is truly existent, and that external objects do not even exist conventionally. This is therefore shown to be wrong, for both are alike in existing conventionally but not ultimately.

**399. To say one exists and the other does not  
Is neither reality nor the conventional.  
Therefore it cannot be said  
That this exists but that does not.**

To say that one exists and the other does not is not a presentation of reality, since both do not exist ultimately and are not ultimate truths. Nor is it a presentation of the conventional, since both exist conventionally and are conventional truths. Therefore all five aggregates exist conventionally but not ultimately, and so it cannot be said that mind and mental factors exist truly while external objects do not even exist conventionally. Thus Madhyamikas, too, accept both external objects and consciousness as they are known in the world.

When assertions regarding true existence of things and so forth have been thoroughly refuted in this way, it is impossible to state any refutation of the assertions regarding emptiness.

Assertion: Even though we are unable to answer you at present, you will receive an answer-there will be those who make great effort on behalf of the Tathagata's teaching.

Answer: That is a futile hope! If we held a faulty thesis, it could be refuted by proving its converse.

**400. Against one who holds no thesis that [things]  
Exist, do not, or do and do not exist,  
Counter-arguments cannot be raised  
No matter how long [one tries].**

No Madhyamikas hold the erroneous theses that things are inherently existent, that even the slightest thing is nonexistent, that nonthings are inherently both existent and nonexistent, or neither. No matter how long one tries, no counter-arguments can be raised. You should understand that refuting skilled proponents of emptiness is as impossible as drawing pictures in space or causing space pain by beating it with an iron bar.

The Master Dharmadasa<sup>13</sup> gave one analogy for each stanza of the first eight chapters. Fearing an excess of words, they have merely been cited but not elaborated in detail.

The summarizing stanza:

**The sun's light dispels all darkness.  
Darkness has no power to destroy the sun's light.  
The correct view destroys all extreme conceptions,  
Banishing any opportunity for controversy.**

This is the sixteenth chapter from the Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds, showing how to meditate on settling [the procedure between] spiritual guides and students.

This concludes the commentary on the sixteenth chapter, showing how to meditate on settling [the procedure between] spiritual guides and students, from Essence of Good Explanations, Explanation of the "Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas".



# Colophon

This concludes the Treatise of Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas from the mouth of Aryadeva, the spiritual son at the Exalted Naga's feet. He was born miraculously from the heart of a lotus on the island of Sinhala. Having crossed the ocean of our own and others' tenets himself, he made the Middle Way most clear by distinguishing between correct and incorrect views.

It was translated and [the meaning] settled in the temple of Ratnaguptavihara in the center of the glorious Kasmiri city of Anupamapura by the Indian abbot Suksmajana and the Tibetan translator Ba-tsap Nyi-ma-drak.

This concludes the explanation both of the great trailblazer and Bodhisattva, the Master Aryadeva's work Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas and of its commentary by the Master Candrakīrti.

It was translated from the Indian into the Tibetan language in the temple of Ratnaguptavihara<sup>1</sup> in the center of the glorious Kasmiri city of Anupamapura<sup>2</sup> by the Indian abbot Suksmajana,<sup>3</sup> son of the Brahmin Sajjana from the paternal line of the Brahmin Ratnavajra<sup>4</sup> and by the Tibetan translator Ba-tsap Nyi-ma-drak (pa tshab nyi ma grags)<sup>5</sup> who had consummate understanding of all texts on sutra and tantra. The meaning of the text was properly settled by explaining and listening to it.

**May the one predicted<sup>6</sup> by the Conqueror who attained the  
supreme state,  
As well as Āryadeva and the glorious Candrakīrti,  
Who most clearly elucidated Nāgārjuna's good system,  
Rest victoriously on the crown of our heads.**

May the one predicted<sup>6</sup> by the Conqueror who attained the  
supreme state,  
As well as Āryadeva and the glorious Candrakīrti,  
Who most clearly elucidated Nāgārjuna's good system,  
Rest victoriously on the crown of our heads.

Unable to bear misinterpretations of this system  
Through the misconceptions of those who follow their own  
presuppositions,  
Who lack the flawless eye of reasoning  
And ignore the textual systems of the great trailblazers,

I have explained the words and meaning of this text simply,  
Commenting in a clear, unconfused and complete way  
On the paths that mature the mind and bring about release  
For all people with a Mahāyāna disposition.

Since Āryadeva's thought is hard to ascertain  
And my mind is poor, my acquired knowledge weak,  
May my spiritual guides and deities  
Forgive whatever errors there may be.

Through any immaculate virtue created by my efforts  
To illuminate the good Mādhyamika path free from extremes,  
May all transmigrators, bound in the prison of worldly  
existence,  
Attain the peerless happiness of liberation.

May I, too, in all future lives never be separated  
From a spiritual guide of the supreme vehicle,  
And through fully entering this path by listening, thinking and  
meditating,  
May I obtain the state of an omniscient Conqueror.

This Essence of Good Explanations, Explanation of the "Four Hundred" was written at the insistence of La-ma Nam-ka-sang-bo-wa (bla ma nam mkha' bzang po ba) who cherishes his precious precepts and holds the three sets of vows, and of La-ma Drak-seng-wa (bla ma grags seng ba), exceptionally tireless in bearing the responsibility of spreading the Subduer's teaching-they urged me again and again from Upper Do-Kam' (mdo khams) with lavish and repeated flower-like offerings. It was written also at the insistence of Kun-ga Seng-ge (kun dga' seng ge) of Dzay-tang<sup>8</sup> (rtse thang), a great holder of the three sets of teachings who has heard the texts of sutra and tantra many times, and at the insistence of numerous other holders of the three sets of teaching.

It was written at Drok-ri-wo-che Gan-den-nam-bar-gyel-way- ling<sup>9</sup> ('brog ri bo che dga' ldan ream par rgyal ba'i gling) by the logician and fully ordained monk Dar-ma-rin-chen (dar ma rin chen). This was made possible by the kind explanations received directly from the noble, venerable and holy Ren-da-wa Shon-nu-to-dro (red mda' ba gzhon nu blo gros), great follower of the Conqueror, with consummate understanding especially that all external and internal dependently arising things are like the reflection of the moon in water, and from the great omniscient one in this time of degeneration, whose prayer to hold the excellent teaching of the Conquerors is perfectly accomplished, the glorious and good foremost precious Lo-sang- drak-ba (blo bzang Brags pa). They are the father and son, the dust beneath whose feet I have long and respectfully venerated.

The scribe was Rin-chen-cho-gyel (rin chen chos gyal), holder of the three sets of teaching and observant of his vows.

By virtue also of this, may the precious teaching of the Conquerors spread and flourish in all ways, in all directions, and endure for a long time.

May any merit resulting from this work help to keep alive the flame of the Buddha's teaching, protected and nourished for many centuries by the people of Tibet. May it act as a cause for all living beings to enjoy peace and enlightenment.



# Appendix

## GYEL-TSAP'S TOPICAL OUTLINE

Each point of the outline is keyed to a stanza number as well as to two page and line numbers that indicate the beginning of the section of commentary relevant to the stanza.

"Var." refers to the Varanasi edition (Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1971) of Gyel-tsap's Essence of Good Explanations, Explanation of the "Four Hundred".

"C.W." refers to Vol. ka of the Dharamsala edition (Shes rig par khang, 1981) of the same work in Gyel-tsap's Collected Works (rgyal tshab rje'i gsung 'bum).

### PART I EXPLAINING THE STAGES OF THE PATHS DEPENDENT ON CONVENTIONAL TRUTHS

Section A: Showing how the aspiring altruistic intention is generated after training in the attitudes of a person of intermediate capacity by explaining elimination of the four errors.

#### *Chapter I*

#### *Explaining how to abandon erroneous belief in permanence by thinking extensively about being mindful of death*

	Var.	C. W.	St.
I. Brief explanation urging conscientious effort on the path to liberation by being mindful of death .....	10.4	514.4	1
II. Extensively explaining how to meditate on impermanence			
A. How to cultivate awareness of one's own death			
1. Meditation on coarse impermanence			

	Var.	C.W.	St.
a. Being alive does not avert death and one should not trust in just that			
(1) Actual explanation .....	12.13	516.5	2
(2) Refuting lack of fear through thinking one will live long .....	13.18	517.6	3
b. Inappropriateness of not fearing death because it is common to all .....	15.3	519.1	4
c. Inappropriateness of not fearing death because of treatments for sickness and aging .....	15.8	519.6	5
d. Extreme inappropriateness of not fearing death because the time of one's death is uncertain			
(1) Need to fear death because of being common to all and directly visible .....	16.20	520.6	6
(2) Refuting unnecessary fear because a definite time of death is not foreseen .....	19.2	522.6	7
e. Refuting that death does not cause the brave fear			
(1) Unfeasibility of only cowards fearing death .....	18.3	521.6	8
(2) Unsuitability of doing ill deeds to safeguard one's life .....	19.2	522.6	9
2. Meditation on subtle impermanence			
a. Since life diminishes moment by moment, do not trust it .....	19.13	523.3	10
b. Inappropriateness of attachment to continuation because liking to live long and not wanting to be old are contradictory .....	20.4	523.6	11
B. Inappropriateness of grieving only at others' deaths while overlooking the disadvantages of not being free from fear of death oneself			
1. Brief explanation .....	20.5	524.3	12
2. Extensive explanation by answering objections			
a. Refuting the appropriateness of grief because one's son went to the next world without asking			
(1) Actual explanation .....	21.17	525.3	13
(2) But for one's confusion, implicitly he did ask to go .....	22.11	525.3	14
b. Inappropriateness of being very attached to one's son			
(1) Reasons for the inappropriateness of extreme attachment to one's son .....	23.3	526.4	15

	Var.	C.W.	St.
(2) Inappropriateness of attachment whether he is obedient or disobedient .....	23.16	527.2	16
(3) Unfeasibility of a father's attachment to his son being steadfast without depending on other factors .....	24.5	527.4	17
c. Inappropriateness of grieving over a dead person in front of other people .....	24.19	528.2	18
d. Inappropriateness of grieving for a dead relative to ensure a close relationship with surviving relatives .....	25.8	528.5	19
e. Inappropriateness of attachment to being with relatives and so forth			
(1) Actual explanation .....	25.20	529.2	20
(2) Inappropriateness of attachment to lasting friendships .....	26.8	529.4	21
f. Inappropriateness of attachment to the seasons' marvels .....	26.20	530.1	22
C. Advice to make effort to practice the path to liberation, giving up attachment to bad actions			
1. Inappropriateness of relying on punitive action regarding what must be done .....	27.10	530.5	23
2. Advice as to the appropriateness of giving up bad actions to live in seclusion from the very start .....	28.3	531.1	24
III. The benefits of meditating on impermanence .....	28.11	531.4	25

## Chapter II

### ***Explaining how to abandon erroneous belief in pleasure by meditating on the contaminated body as suffering***

- I. Explaining the stanzas individually
  - A. How to meditate on the suffering nature of the coarse body
    - 1. Way of showing the suffering body
      - a. Necessity of protecting the body from deterioration despite recognizing its suffering nature ... 1.13 533.3 26
      - b. Eliminating strong attachment to the body ..... 2.8 534.1 27
    - 2. Explaining extensively how to meditate on suffering
      - a. Considering how this body mainly has suffering
        - (1) Actual explanation ..... 3.13 535.1 28
        - (2) Considering how suffering follows one though one wants pleasure and does not want suffering ..... 4.5 535.5 29
      - b. Considering how suffering comes easily without the need for great effort

	Var.	C.W.	St.
(1) If one wishes for rare pleasure, it is appropriate to fear plentiful suffering .....	4.17	536.2	30
(2) Valuing the body out of attachment is like valuing a foe .....	5.6	536.4	31
c. Considering how the body does not transcend its suffering nature .....	5.14	536.6	32
d. Considering how suffering causes harm .....	6.1	537.2	33
e. Considering how very powerful pain is .....	6.13	537.5	34
f. Considering how the sensation of pleasure is like a visitor to the body .....	7.5	538.2	35
g. It is therefore proper to develop aversion to the suffering nature of the body .....	7.14	538.5	36
3. Refuting the existence of real pleasure			
a. Showing that though real suffering exists, real pleasure does not			
(1) Reasons why seeing a slight increase in pleasure does not prove the existence of real pleasure .....	8.12	539.4	37
(2) Although there are causes producing real suffering, there are none producing real pleasure .....	9.1	539.6	38
b. Showing it is erroneous to think of suffering as pleasure			
(1) Inappropriateness of considering the process of dying pleasurable .....	9.15	540.4	39
(2) Inappropriateness of considering being afflicted pleasurable .....	10.5	541.1	40
(3) Inappropriateness of considering pleasurable a composite of various incompatible factors which is like an enemy .....	10.11	541.2	41
(4) Inappropriateness of considering being destroyed pleasurable .....	10.19	541.5	42
(5) Inappropriateness of considering the doing of tiring actions pleasurable .....	11.3	541.6	43
(6) Inappropriateness of considering pleasurable the creation of the causes of suffering for the sake of a little pleasure ...	11.10	542.2	44
c. From the start there is no real pleasure in riding and so forth .....	12.1	542.5	45
d. Ordinary people think of the feeling of satisfaction from alleviated pain as real pleasure .....	12.12	543.2	46
e. Showing other reasons why there is no real pleasure			

	Var.	C.W.	St.
(1) Real pleasure's existence is not established by seeing slight incipient pain stop intense pain .....	13.17	544.3	47
(2) Common beings do not have pleasure that can effectively override pain .....	14.12	545.1	48
B. The Teacher therefore spoke of meditating on the body as suffering .....	15.12	545.6	49
C. How to meditate on the pervasive suffering of conditioning .....	16.10	546.5	50
II. Summarizing the purpose of this chapter			
A. Actual purpose .....	16.20	547.2	a.
B. Showing that real pleasure does not exist .....	18.3	548.2	b.
C. Eliminating others' criticisms .....	18.10	548.4	c.

### ***Chapter III***

#### ***Explaining the means to abandon erroneous belief in cleanness by considering the unclean nature of cyclic existence***

I.	Refuting that pleasure is experienced through satisfaction from savoring attractive objects			
A.	Refuting satisfaction through completely enjoying the objects one craves .....	1.13	550.3	51
B.	An analogy [showing how] rather than becoming free from desire, it increases in proportion to use of the things one craves .....	2.6	550.6	52
II.	Explaining extensively why it is inappropriate to consider the body clean			
A.	Refuting desire for women's bodies			
1.	Inappropriateness of desire towards a woman's beautiful appearance			
a.	Reasons for the inappropriateness of desire for a woman's beautiful appearance .....	3.2	551.5	53
b.	Desire is not necessarily caused only by a beautiful appearance .....	3.19	552.3	54
2.	Inappropriateness of desire based on the difficulty of finding [one with] a beautiful appearance .....	4.3	552.6	55
3.	Refuting desire for a woman with good qualities			
a.	Inappropriateness of desire for a woman with good qualities .....	4.14	553.2	56
b.	Neither desire as a consequence only of good qualities nor the converse necessarily pertains .....	5.5	553.6	57

	Var.	C.W.	St.
4. Inappropriateness of desire for a woman exceptionally attached to one .....	5.12	554.1	58
5. Advice to associate with women given in social treatises is erroneous .....	6.1	554.3	59
6. Other reasons for the inappropriateness of desire for women			
a. Unfeasibility of the pleasure from intercourse with women as the best pleasure in the Desire Realm .....	6.17	555.2	60
b. Unfeasibility of having exclusive control over a woman because of one's desire for her .....	7.6	555.4	61
c. Refuting that desire is pleasurable* .....	7.14	555.6	62
d. Unfeasibility of women alone as the cause of pleasure during intercourse with them .....	8.3	556.3	63
e. Unfeasibility of the pleasure from women being desirable because the infatuated pursue them .....	8.9	556.4	64
B. Refuting desire while seeing the body as unclean			
1. Refuting that a woman's physical and verbal behavior is pleasurable because when with her one bears the gross insults she inflicts .....	9.7	557.3	65
2. Refuting the existence of pleasure through women because of the jealousy felt over them towards other men .....	9.17	557.6	66
3. Inappropriateness of strong desire on realizing that women's bodies are unclean .....	10.6	558.2	67
4. Refuting that the body is not objectionable on the grounds that it is without shortcomings .....	10.13	558.4	68
5. Refuting the idea that women's bodies are clean .....	11.6	559.2	69
6. Refuting other seeming reasons for considering the body clean			
a. Refuting the idea of the body as clean because others are seen to be proud of it .....	11.18	559.5	70
b. Refuting that the body is clean because one sees what is unclean about it being removed with effort .....	12.7	560.2	71
c. Refuting that women's bodies need not be given up on the grounds that sages are seen to enjoy them .....	12.18	560.4	72
III. Refuting the idea of cleanness because of wearing perfumes and so forth .....	13.9	561.2	73
	Var.	C.W.	St.
IV. Refuting the idea that anything towards which freedom from desire may arise is clean .....	13.17	561.4	74
V. Nominally all four non-erroneous features are possible with regard to one thing .....	14.5	561.6	75

## Chapter IV

### ***Explaining how to abandon erroneous conceptions of a self by showing the inappropriateness of considering contaminated things as "I" and "mine"***

I.	Briefly showing how to refute pride's referent object .....	1.6	563.1	76
II.	Extensive explanation			
	A. Refuting arrogance based on power and wealth			
	1. Abandoning haughtiness for five reasons			
	a. Inappropriateness of arrogance because the name of king has been given to a servant ...	2.14	564.2	77
	b. Inappropriateness of arrogance because of having the power to give and collect wealth .....	3.7	564.5	78
	c. Inappropriateness of arrogance because of enjoying whatever objects one wishes .....	3.15	565.2	79
	d. Inappropriateness of arrogance because of being the guardian of the people .....	4.8	565.5	80
	e. Inappropriateness of arrogance because of having the merit of protecting all beings .....	4.15	566.1	81
	2. It is inappropriate for a king to be proud .....	5.4	566.4	82
	3. Considering what is religious and irreligious			
	a. Establishing that violent action towards others by a king is irreligious			
	(1) Inappropriateness of pride because the protection of the people depends on the king .....	5.20	567.2	83
	(2) Punishment of wrongdoers by the king is unsuitable as a religious activity .....	6.8	567.3	84
	(3) Refuting that punishment of the unruly by the king is not an ill deed .....	6.17	568.1	85
	b. Refuting that it is a religious activity			
	(1) Refuting that protecting the people by punishing the unruly is a religious activity .....	7.15	568.5	86
	(2) Analogy showing that when an intelligent king protects his people out of attachment, it is not a religious activity .....	8.3	569.1	87

	Var.	C.W.	St.
(3) The reason why it is not a religious activity is because it is a basis for pride and carelessness .....	8.12	569.4	88
c. Not everything stated by sages should be taken as valid			
(1) Why not everything stated by sages is valid .....	9.3	570.1	89
(2) Showing that the happiness of the people is not assured by taking social treatises to be valid .....	9.10	570.2	90
d. Violence toward enemies is irreligious .....	9.20	570.5	91
e. Dying in battle is not a cause for a happy transmigration .....	10.12	571.2	92
4. It is inappropriate for a king to feel distressed .....	11.2	571.5	93
5. Inappropriateness of punishing harshly when ruling .....	11.16	572.3	94
B. Refuting arrogance because of caste			
1. Refuting arrogance because of being a king's son .....	12.14	573.1	95
2. Refuting arrogance merely because of being royal caste			
a. There have not always been distinct castes .....	13.4	573.4	96
b. Since there are four castes, a royal caste existent by way of its own entity is not ascertained .....	14.7	574.4	97
c. Refuting that one becomes royal caste through the work of protecting everyone .....	14.17	575.1	98
C. Showing other means to give up ill deeds			
1. Refuting the appropriateness of arrogance because kings have great possessions and, when the time is right, can distribute great power and wealth such as riches to many people .....	15.10	575.4	99
2. Refuting that it is therefore appropriate for kings to be very conceited .....	15.20	575.1	100

Section B: Explaining how to train in the deeds, having generated the practical altruistic intention

## ***Chapter V***

### ***The actual meaning***

- I. Showing the greatness of Buddhahood,  
the resultant attainment
  - A. Distinctive features of a Buddha's activities ..... 1.13 557.3 101

	Var.	C.W.	St.
B. Their effect .....	3.5	578.5	102
C. Not answering fourteen questions is no suitable proof for lack of omniscience .....	3.17	579.3	103
II. Explaining how to practice Bodhisattva deeds, the cause of Buddhahood			
A. Special features of the motivation for training in these deeds			
1. Showing mind as the principal of the three doors .....	5.12	581.1	104
2. Showing how even that which is non-virtuous in others becomes supremely virtuous in Bodhisattvas by the power of their attitude .....	5.19	581.3	105
B. Merit of generating the altruistic intention			
1. Merit of generating the first ultimate altruistic intention .....	6.12	581.6	106
2. Specific merit of causing others to generate the altruistic intention .....	7.8	582.5	107
C. Actual mode of training in the deeds			
1. Physical and verbal conduct in acting for others' welfare .....	8.5	583.3	108
2. Specific attitude			
a. Analogy showing one must be compassionate towards a recalcitrant person .....	8.16	583.6	109
b. Stages of guiding trainees .....	9.4	584.3	110
c. Being particularly compassionate towards those with very strong disturbing emotions .....	9.15	584.5	111
d. How to act for others' welfare according to their capacities and inclinations .....	10.2	585.1	112
e. The effect of strongly developed compassion			
(1) When the strength of compassion is thoroughly developed, those who cannot be trained are rare .....	10.12	585.4	113
(2) Faults of not giving encouragement for others' benefit .....	11.1	586.1	114
3. Faults of deficient compassion .....	11.7	586.3	115
4. Faults of not appreciating Bodhisattvas and suitability of cultivating appreciation			
a. Faults of not appreciating Bodhisattvas .....	11.17	586.3	116
b. Suitability of cultivating appreciation			
(1) Suitability of appreciating deeds difficult to perform .....	12.14	587.4	117
(2) Considering their limitless qualities, one should appreciate them .....	13.4	588.1	118

	Var.	C.W.	St.
5. Why they can complete their deeds			
a. Why they take special delight in giving .....	13.16	588.4	119
b. Criticism of inferior generosity .....	14.8	589.1	120
c. Why they can accomplish all deeds .....	14.14	589.3	121
d. Why they do not strive just for their own happiness .....	15.3	589.5	122
e. Why they can take special physical forms .....	15.12	590.2	123
III. Proof of resultant omniscience .....	16.1	590.4	124
IV. Showing why those with poor intelligence fear the Great Vehicle .....	17.16	592.1	125

## Chapter VI

### *Explaining the means to abandon disturbing attitudes and emotions which prevent the deeds*

I. Refuting the contention that contaminated actions and disturbing attitudes and emotions are eliminated by tormenting the body with ascetic practices .....	1.5	593.1	126
II. Explaining the means to abandon disturbing emotions			
A. The way to abandon manifest disturbing emotions			
1. General explanation of how to abandon the three poisons			
a. Functions of the three poisons must be understood .....	2.19	594.4	127
b. Reason for the need to eliminate the three poisons .....	3.8	594.6	128
c. Antidotes to anger and desire must be applied individually .....	3.18	595.3	129
d. How to treat students having desire and anger .....	4.4	595.4	130
e. How to apply the antidotes on understanding the sequence in which disturbing emotions arise .....	4.11	595.5	131
2. Individual explanation			
a. How to abandon desire			
(1) Desire being hard to recognize as something to discard, exertion is required to abandon it .....	5.5	596.4	132
(2) Having understood the differences regarding causes and conditions, it should be abandoned .....	5.14	596.6	133
b. How to abandon hatred .....	6.4	597.2	134
c. How to abandon confusion			
(1) Recognizing the root of disturbing emotions .....	6.15	597.5	135

	Var.	C.W.	St.
(2) Recognizing the antidote which eliminates it .....	7.14	598.4	136
3. Detailed explanation of how to abandon anger and desire			
a. How to abandon desire			
(1) Characteristics of a person habituated to desire .....	8.15	599.4	137
(2) Means of caring for such a person .....	9.5	600.1	138
b. Explaining extensively how to abandon anger			
(1) Considering the disadvantages of anger .....	9.20	600.5	139
(2) Explaining extensively how to apply antidotes to anger			
(a) Inappropriateness of anger at the circumstances which terminate the effects of ill deeds .....	10.15	601.2	140
(b) Inappropriateness of anger because unpleasant words are designated as harmful by oneself and are not inherently harmful .....	11.1	601.4	141
(c) Advice to punish the abuser in treatises on social conventions is wrong .....	11.11	602.1	142
(d) Inappropriateness of anger at those who make others aware of one's faults .....	11.19	602.3	143
(e) Inappropriateness of anger when inferiors use abusive language .....	12.7	602.5	144
(3) Refuting that it is not wrong to punish the slanderer of an innocent person .....	12.16	603.1	145
(4) Preventing anger by considering the benefits of patience			
(a) Appropriateness of patience towards abuse .....	13.5	603.4	146
(b) Inappropriateness of approving of aggression which defeats only the weak .....	13.15	603.6	147
(c) Appropriateness of rejoicing since patience towards [a cause of] anger is the source of all accomplishments ...	13.20	604.2	148
(5) Appropriateness of cultivating patience when disparaged by others .....	14.16	604.6	149
B. How to cultivate the antidote which totally destroys the seeds .....	15.6	605.3	150

## Chapter VII

### ***Abandoning attachment to sense objects on which disturbing emotions focus***

I. Considering the disadvantages of cyclic existence			
A. Considering the general faults of cyclic existence			
1. Why it is necessary to cultivate fear of cyclic existence .....	1.12	606.5	151
2. How to generate aversion to it			
a. Inappropriateness of attachment to youth .....	2.11	607.4	152
b. Appropriateness of fear, because of being governed by contaminated actions and disturbing attitudes and emotions .....	3.1	608.1	153
c. Advice to make effort to abandon the causes for rebirth in cyclic existence .....	3.9	608.3	154
d. Refuting that effort to abandon cyclic existence is purposeless and ineffectual			
(1) Actual meaning .....	4.5	609.1	155
(2) Repudiating hope for the future without effort in this life .....	5.1	609.6	156
B. Specifically abandoning attachment to happy rebirths			
1. Aversion should be cultivated even to happy rebirths .....	5.13	610.3	157
2. Showing that to remain in cyclic existence out of attachment is like insanity .....	6.4	610.6	158
II. Abandoning contaminated actions, the cause for birth there			
A. Advice to abandon actions projecting rebirth there ....	6.17	611.3	159
B. Why it is necessary to abandon them			
1. Since cyclic existence is a source of fear, it should be abandoned by way of its cause, contaminated actions .....	7.13	612.2	160
2. Cultivation of fear considering the effects of contaminated actions .....	8.3	612.4	161
3. Considering the nature of contaminated actions, effort should be made to abandon them .....	8.11	612.6	162
4. Inappropriateness of attachment to contaminated actions on the grounds that they cause pleasure ...	8.18	613.2	163
C. Actual way to abandon them			
1. Repudiating attachment to meritorious actions			
a. Generally repudiating accumulation of actions for the sake of high rebirth out of attachment			
(1) Appropriateness of fear since the Exalted see even high rebirths as [being] like hells .....	9.15	614.1	164

	Var.	C.W.	St.
(2) If ordinary people ever perceived it like this, they would immediately faint .....	10.8	614.4	165
b. Rarity of going from happiness to happiness			
(1) Actual meaning .....	10.15	614.6	166
(2) Repudiating attachment to high rebirths attained through abstaining from ill deeds .....	11.3	615.3	167
c. Detailed repudiation of accumulating actions for the sake of high rebirths			
(1) Repudiating accumulation of actions for the sake of possessions .....	11.20	616.1	168
(2) Repudiating their accumulation out of attachment to worldly practices .....	12.7	616.3	169
(3) Repudiating their accumulation for the sake of attractive objects .....	12.16	616.6	170
(4) Repudiating their accumulation for the sake of power and wealth .....	13.8	617.3	171
(5) Repudiating the accumulation of actions out of attachment to subsequent wealth ...	13.18	617.6	172
2. Repudiating accumulation of demeritorious actions .....	14.6	618.2	173
III. Explaining the need to abandon contaminated actions			
A. The wise, who understand reality, abandon attachment and reach liberation .....	14.18	618.5	174
B. When the wise do not enjoy even a high rebirth out of attachment, their enjoyment of states consistent with aversion is impossible .....	15.8	619.2	175

## Chapter VIII

### *Showing the methods of fully training the student's mindstream making it receptive to the development of spiritual paths.*

I. Why disturbing emotions can be abandoned			
A. Actual meaning .....	1.9	620.3	176
B. Showing how it is possible to abandon disturbing emotions			
1. Disturbing emotions can be abandoned because their focal basis is not definitive .....	2.5	621.1	177
2. Causes giving rise to disturbing emotions do not exist truly .....	2.17	621.4	178
3. Refuting proof that disturbing emotions cannot be abandoned .....	4.1	622.5	179
4. Lack of contradiction in seeing many who have not abandoned disturbing emotions .....	4.11	623.1	180

	Var.	C.W.	St.
II. Explaining extensively how to abandon disturbing emotions			
A. Advice to understand the meaning of emptiness			
1. Advice to take an interest in the meaning of the fundamental mode of existence .....	5.15	624.2	181
2. Showing the need to understand emptiness in order to attain liberation .....	6.6	624.5	182
3. Showing the means to turn away from cyclic existence .....	6.19	625.2	183
4. Giving up fear of emptiness .....	7.12	625.6	184
5. Giving up strong attachment to one's own position .....	8.2	626.3	185
B. Advice to strive for liberation			
1. With effort liberation is easy to attain .....	8.18	627.1	186
2. Impossibility of attaining liberation without cultivating aversion to cyclic existence .....	9.11	627.4	187
3. Appropriateness of striving for liberation because of the very great disadvantages of cyclic existence .....	10.3	628.2	188
4. Meaning of the fundamental mode of existence should not be taught from the outset .....	10.18	628.6	189
5. Stages by which to lead .....	11.16	629.5	190
6. Indistinguishability in entity with regard to the final mode of existence of things .....	12.9	630.2	191
7. Lack of contradiction in teaching the necessity of accumulating merit through giving and so forth .....	13.8	631.2	192
C. Stages leading to the meaning of the fundamental mode of existence			
1. Suchness should not be taught to the unreceptive .....	14.5	631.6	193
2. Means to understand suchness .....	14.20	632.4	194
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## PART II EXPLAINING THE STAGES OF THE PATHS DEPENDENT ON ULTIMATE TRUTH

Section A: Extensively explaining ultimate truth

**Chapter IX**

***General refutation of true existence by refuting  
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B. Refuting the rejoinder .....	2.20	638.2	202
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2. Refuting the rejoinder .....	4.2	639.2	204
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b. Refuting belief in the existence of permanent particles because there are coarse things .....	10.15	645.2	218
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2. Refuting other sectarians' liberation identified with the self			
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## Chapter X

### *Individual refutation of truly existent functional phenomena: Refuting the self*

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b. Refuting it as the activator of the body			
(1) Actual meaning .....	4.8	653.1	230
(2) Showing what invalidates [belief in] a permanent self .....	4.19	653.4	231
c. Refuting proof of a permanent self			
(1) Seeing memory of past rebirths is unsuitable as proof of a permanent self .....	5.8	654.1	232
(2) Unfeasibility of mindless matter remembering past rebirths .....	6.3	654.5	233
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2. Entailment that [the activity of experiencing] cannot stop until the conscious person, the substance, has disintegrated .....	7.5	656.2	236
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### *Individual refutation of truly existent functional phenomena: Refuting truly existent time*

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    1. Refuting a substantially established future
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      - c. Consequence that it is present if substantially established ..... 3.10 665.1 253
      - d. Consequence that impermanence is impossible if all three times are substantially existent.. 3.16 665.2 254
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        - (3) Showing that the existence of future functional things is absurd ..... 5.19 667.1 259
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(2) Why there is no liberation in any teaching other than the Teacher's .....	4.11	678.5	279
(3) Means to gain certainty regarding extremely hidden matters taught by the Teacher .....	5.2	679.2	280
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c. Why childish people fear emptiness .....	7.13	681.5	284
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### *Refuting the true existence of sense organs and objects*

- I. Extensively explaining the reasoning that refutes true existence
  - A. Refuting true existence of that which is apprehended: the sense objects
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      - a. Actual meaning
        - (1) Refuting that a sense consciousness directly perceives a pot existing by way of its own character ..... 1.15 690.2 301
        - (2) Applying this reasoning to other instances ..... 3.5 691.3 302
        - (3) Absurdity of positing that other parts are seen because visible form existent by way of its own character is seen ..... 3.14 691.5 303
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    - 2. Individual refutations
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          - (a) Refuting objects
            - 1: Refuting our own sectarians' contentions
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4: Consequence that the eye is an instrument of looking in relation to the eye .....	10.8	697.6	316
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(b) Refutation by examining whether or not sound is apprehended through contact.....	11.20	699.3	319
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b. Refuting apprehension by mental consciousness .....	13.1	700.2	321
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## Chapter XIV

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B. Extensive explanation			
1. Refuting a truly existent composite by examining the four possibilities			
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b. Explanation			
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(a) Refuting the characteristics			
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a: Actual meaning .....	3.18	706.2	329
b: Inconsistency with the assertion that one attribute cannot rely on another attribute .....	4.10	706.5	330
(b) Refuting that which is characterized .....	5.2	707.3	331
(2) Refuting our own sectarians			
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1: Refutation by examining for oneness or difference .....	5.20	708.2	332
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b: Refuting the rejoinder .....	6.14	708.6	334
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b. Refuting truly existent elements .....	9.9	711.3	341
c. Refuting the rejoinder .....	9.18	711.6	342
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II. Showing the cause for mistaking functional things as permanent and truly existent .....	12.10	714.2	347
III. Briefly showing the reasoning that establishes absence of true existence .....	13.1	714.5	348
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B. Release from worldly existence is gained through understanding emptiness .....	14.7	715.6	350

## *Chapter XV*

### *Refuting the inherent existence of production, duration and disintegration, the characteristics of products*

- I. Extensively establishing dependent arisings which are not inherently produced as existing in the manner of a magician's illusions
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    - 1. Extensive explanation
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(2) Establishing its mode [of operation] .....	2.13	718.1	352
(3) Refutation by examining the time of production .....	2.20	718.3	353
(4) Refutation by examining the thing itself and another thing .....	3.4	718.4	354
b. Refutation by examining the beginning, middle and end .....	3.9	718.6	355
c. Refutation by examining both self and other ....	3.19	719.2	356
d. Refutation by examining sequentiality and simultaneity .....			
(1) Actual meaning .....	4.7	719.6	357
(2) Refuting proof of inherent production .....	4.13	719.6	358
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3. Refutation by examining whether they are one or different .....	7.3	722.3	363
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a. Refuting that production is truly existent because there are truly existent producing causes .....	7.17	723.1	364
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(1) Actual meaning .....	11.6	726.2	371
(2) Refuting the justification .....	11.12	726.4	372
(3) Necessity of accepting that the unproduced is being produced, if that which is in the process of being produced is produced by way of its own entity .....	11.19	726.5	373
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II. Concluding summary of the refutations of inherent existence .....	12.7	727.3	375

Section B: Showing how to meditate on settling [the procedure between] spiritual guides and students by way of [explaining] the purpose of the chapters and eliminating remaining counter-arguments by misguided opponents

## Chapter XVI

### ***Settling [the Procedure Between] Spiritual Guides and Students by way of [Explaining] the Purpose of the Chapters and Eliminating Remaining Counter-Arguments by Misguided Opponents***

I. Briefly explaining the purpose of writing these chapters .....	1.7	728.6	376
II. Eliminating remaining counter-arguments raised by misguided opponents			
A. Refuting reasoning to negate emptiness			
1. Impossibility of refuting the thesis of emptiness			
a. Actual meaning .....	2.13	730.1	377
b. Refutation by virtue of parity .....	3.5	730.4	378
2. Impossibility of proving the thesis of non-emptiness			
a. Actual meaning .....	3.13	730.6	379
b. Refuting the justification .....	4.3	731.3	380
3. Refuting other reasoning			
a. Invalidity of negating emptiness of true existence by reason of direct perception .....	4.14	731.6	381
b. Since emptiness exists, its opposite, true existence, is not feasible .....	5.3	732.3	382
B. Refuting adherence to theses which fall into extremes			

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1. Actual refutation			
a. Refuting that the non-thesis is a thesis .....	6.2	733.2	383
b. Refuting proof that there are truly existent things			
(1) It is not feasible that there is true existence on the grounds that specific functional things are truly existent .....	6.19	734.1	384
(2) Refuting the four extremes by reasoning ....	7.7	734.3	385
(3) Not even the smallest particle of true existence can be observed .....	7.13	734.5	386
c. Showing that everything is equally free from extremes			
(1) Actual meaning .....	8.6	735.2	387
(2) Inappropriateness of asserting differentiations of truly existent and not truly existent with regard to any phenomenon .....	8.13	375.4	388
2. Refuting the justification			
a. Appropriateness of accepting the thesis of emptiness of true existence .....	9.11	736.3	389
b. Difficulty of finding a thesis refuting emptiness of true existence .....	9.20	736.5	390
C. Showing parity of reasoning with regard to true existence or lack of true existence			
1. Both emptiness of true existence and true existence are either equally established or not established merely by words .....	10.12	737.3	391
2. Mere designation as truly existent will not make it so .....	10.19	737.5	392
3. If there were true existence because ordinary people use the verbal convention that things are truly existent, then being conventionally existent they could not exist as their own suchness .....	11.9	738.1	393
D. Refuting non-existence as the thesis			
1. Refuting that negation of truly existent things makes things utterly non-existent .....	12.1	738.4	394
2. As there are no truly existent things that which is non-functional cannot be truly existent either ....	12.7	738.6	395
E. Refuting that things are not empty because analogies and reasons to establish emptiness exist			
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2. Showing the invalidity in the form of absurd consequences [of asserting that] things are not empty because there are analogies .....	13.9	739.6	397
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H. Impossibility of refuting through reasoning that which is free from extremes .....	15.10	741.6	400

# Notes

## ABBREVIATIONS

- Can.     Peking edition of Candrakīrti's *Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas"*, P5266, Vol.98.
- D. Can.   Candrakīrti's *Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas"*, No.3865 of the *sDe dge Tibetan Tripitaka - bsTan hgyur preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo* (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1977-82).
- Bö.     bod sprul bstan pa'i nyi ma, *Naga King's Ornament for Thought, Explanation of the "Four Hundred on the Middle Way"* (Varanasi: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1987).
- Gah.     kah thog mkhan po ngag dbang dpal bzang, *Sea Spray, Explanation of the "Four Hundred on the Middle Way"* (Bylakuppe: Nyingmapa Monastery, 1984).
- Gyel.     rgyal tsab dar ma rin chen, *Essence of Good Explanations* (Varanasi: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1971).
- Ren.     red mda' ba gzhon nu blo gros, *Commentary to Āryadeva's "Four Hundred Verses"* (Varanasi: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1974).

Since work on this translation was carried out entirely in Dharamsala, India, most books on Madhyamika philosophy by modern western scholars were not available. It is therefore not out of a lack of respect or appreciation that no reference is made to these works. On the other hand the writing of Tibetan scholars on this subject was easily accessible and relevant passages which serve to clarify issues arising in Gyeltsap's commentary have therefore been translated from the works of Dzong-ka-ba and others.

### Notes to the Introduction

1Lama Chimpa and Alaka Chattopadhyaya, trans., *Tarandtha's History of Buddhism in India* (Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi & Company, rpt.1980), pp.123-

26. E. Obermiller, *History of Buddhism by Bu-ston* (Heidelberg: Otto Harrassowitz, 1931), pp.130-31.

2Tsultrim Kalsang Khangkar, *On the History of the Buddhist Doctrine in India* (Kyoto: Tibetan Buddhist Culture Assoc., 1988), Part II, pp.61-62. *Tibetan Chronicle of Padma dKarmo* (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1968), pp.71-79. mKhan po blo gros bzang po, *Biography of the Six Ornaments and Two Supreme Ones and a Synopsis of their Views* (rgyan drug mchoggyis kyi nam thar dang Ita ba mdor bdus pa) (Delhi: Jamyang Samten & Trayan, 1979), p.40. *Jewel Garland: Notes on History* (chos 'byung zin bris nor bu'i phreng ba) (Dharamsala: Shes rig par khang, 1970). *Six Ornaments and Two Supreme Ones* (rgyan drug mchoggyis) (Gangtok: Namgyal Institute of Tibetology, 1962).

3Can. 184.1.3.

4Gyel. Ch. 1, 3.12 if.

5For instance, Acharya Abhayadatta Śrī, *Biography of Eighty-Four Saints*, trans. Acharya Sempa Dorje, *Bibliotheca-Indo-Tibetica* 4 (Varanasi: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, 1979), p.85.

6Tdrandtha's *History*, pp.131-32.

7Mahesvara.

8Bu ston, *Collected Works* (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1967), Part XXIV, p.834.4.

9Chandra Das, *Tibetan-English Dictionary*, p.214, says: "A piece of thick plank measuring about 6 feet by 12 inches either of white sandal wood or deodar, which when struck with a hammer or another piece of thick hard wood, produces a kind of ringing sound which is heard from a great distance. It is used on special occasions to summon the monks of a monastery to attend any special service." It is still used today for the confession rite in the Tibetan tradition.

10Some accounts read "sister" (sring mo); others read "ogress" (srin mo).

11According to some versions rotting hide had been placed on Matrceta's

parasol. When he looked up in the hope that diva would come, he caught sight of it and at once removed it. This allowed diva to enter him, thereby enabling him to continue debating with Aryadeva without suffering defeat for much longer than he could otherwise have done.

12Fundamental Tantra of Manjusri (manjugrimulatantra, 'jam deal gyi rtsa ba'i rgyud), P162, Vol.6, 259.3.6 ff.

13Aryadeva, Compendium of Quintessential Wisdom (jndnasdrasamuccayanama, ye shes snying po kun las btus pa zhes bya ba), P5251, Vol.95. Bodhibhadra, Explanation of the Compendium of Quintessential Wisdom (jnanasarasamuccayanamanibandhana, ye shes snying po kun las btus pa'i bshad sbyar), P5252, Vol.95, 146.3.3.

14Fundamental Tantra of Manjusri, P162, Vol.6, 266.2.8. The Sanskrit word drya refers to an Exalted one, namely one who has attained direct understanding of emptiness.

15See Karen Lang, Aryadeva's Catuhṣataka, On the Bodhisattva's Cultivation of Merit and Knowledge, Indiske Studier VII (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1986), p.8, for a discussion of Aryadeva's dates.

16Tibetan Tripitaka (Tokyo-Kyoto: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Foundation, 1956).

17"Sataka (Taisho 1569).

18aksarasataka, yi ge brgya pa, P5234, Vol.95.

19carydmelapakapradipa, spyod pa bsdu pa'i sgron ma, P2668, Vol.61.

20The late Professor J. Upadaya, founder of the Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, Sarnath, and director of the Rare Buddhist Manuscripts Project, discovered a version in Newari of The Hundred on the Essence Facilitating Understanding (pratipattisarasataka, go bar byed pa snying po brgya pa, P4695, Vol.82), which is attributed to Aryadeva. On account of certain stylistic similarities with The Four Hundred, he was prepared to attribute it to Axyadeva. It is a Vajrayana work dealing with the wisdom of bliss and emptiness in the context of the Hevajra Tantra. The expression of worship is made to Heruka.

21For a list of the topics covered by the translated portion of The Hundred and how they correspond to those treated in the second half of The Four Hundred and for further correlations, see Lang. Aryadeva's Catuhsataka, Introduction, pp.11-13. For a translation into English of The Hundred, see G. Tucci, PreDihnaga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources (Madras: Vesta Publications, 1984).

22Can. 184.1.5 if. Gyeltsap cites this passage in his preface and discusses it.

23Clear Words, Commentary on the "Treatise on the Middle Way" (mulamadhyamakavrttiprasannapada, dbu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa tshig gsal ba), P5260, Vol.98, 92.2.3.

24T.R.V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1980), p.93, expresses the opinion that The Hundred is a rearranged version of The Four Hundred. He suggests that Aryadeva wrote The Four Hundred first, then The Hundred and then The Hundred Syllables.

25See V.V. Gokhale's translation, Aksara-satakam, The Hundred Letters (Heidelberg: 1930).

26The following is drawn from Jik-may-dam-66-gya-tso's ('jigs med dam chos rgya mtsho, 1898-1946) Gateway to (Dzong-ka-ba's) "Essence of Good Explanations" (drang nges legs bshad snying po'i jug ngogs) (Dharamsala: Shes rig par khang, 1988), Part II, fol. 30a-b.

27Gyel. Ch. I, 7.15 ff.

28Can. 183.4.5

29Gyel. Ch. 1, 17.16 if.

30 Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way" (madhyamakavatara, dbu ma la jug pa), P5261, P5262, Vol.98, 100.2.5 ff.

31Can. 194.4.7 if.

32George N. Roerich, Blue Annals (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1976), p.341.

33See Karen Lang's "sPa tshab Nyi ma grags and the Introduction of Prasangika Madhyamaka into Tibet," in *Reflections on Tibetan Culture: Essays in Memory of Turrell V. Wylie*, edited by Lawrence Epstein and Richard Sherburne (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), pp.13-14.

34yuktisastikdkarika, rigs pa drug cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa, P5225, Vol.95, translated with Muditasri.

35prajnanamulamadhyamakakarika, dbu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba, P5224, Vol.95, revised with Hasumati.

36rajaparikatharatnavali, rgyal po la gtam bya ba rin po che'i phreng ba, P5658, Vol.129, revised with Kanakavarman.

37madyamakavatara, dbu ma la 'jug pa, P5261, P5262, Vol-98.

38madhyamakavatarabhasya, dbu ma la 'jug pa'i bshad pa, P5263, Vol.98.

39mulamadhyamakavrttiprasannapada, dbu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa tshig gsal ba, P5260, Vol.98.

40He is also known as Shar-wa-ba (shar ba pa). The Blue Annals gives his name in this form.

41Tang-ba Sar-bo (gtang pa sar sbos), Ma-ja Jang-chup-dzon-dru (rma bya byang chub brtson gnus), Ngar Yon-ten-drak (ngar yon tan grags), Tang-sak-ba (thang sag pa).

42Twenty Rituals of the Guhyasamaja Mandala (sriguhyasamajamandalo-payikavinuatividhi, dpal gsang ba 'dus pa'i dkyil 'khorgyi cho ga nyi shu pa), P2675, Vol.62.

43Following Definitions, an Explanation of the Commentary on the "Treasury of Knowledge (abhidharmakosatikalaksananusarini, chos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi 'grel bshad mtshan nyid kyi rjes su 'brang ba), P5594, Vol.117.

44bodhicittavivarana, byang chub sems kyi 'grel pa, P2665, P2666, Vol.61.

45mahasutrasamuccaya, mdo kun las btus pa chen po, P5358, Vol.103.

46Can. 183.5.7 - 184.1.5.

47Can. 184.2.4. Taranatha's History of Buddhism in India, p.186, says, "Born in Bhangala in the east, he [Dharmadasa] was a disciple of Asanga and his brother. He went round the countries all around and built in each direction a temple of Arya Maiijusri. He is said to have prepared a commentary on the entire yogacarya-bhumi."

48dbu ma bzhi brgya pa'i grel pa (Varanasi: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1974), abbreviated hereafter as Ren.

49Ren. 156.14 if.

50dbu ma bzhi brgya pa'i rnam bshad klu dbang dgongs rgyan (Varanasi: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1987), abbreviated hereafter as Bo.

51Bo 65, commentary on stanza 136 (chapter VII).

52Bo. 85.19 if., commentary on stanza 190 (chapter VIII).

53Bo 81-82, commentary on stanzas 178 and 179 (chapter VIII).

54B6. 90.11, commentary on stanza 191 (chapter VIII).

55Commentary on stanza 191 (chapter VIII).

56Bo 70, commentary on stanza 150.

57dbu ma bzhi brgya pa'i rnam par bshad pa rgya mtsho'i zeg ma (Bylakuppe, India: Nyingmapa Monastery, 1984), abbreviated hereafter as Gah.

58Gah. 246.

59Gah. 258 if.

60Gah. 397.

61Gah. 518-519.

62**bstan bcos bzhi brgya pa zhes bya ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa'i mchan 'grel**, Vol. 6 of *gzhung chen bcu gsum gyi mchan 'grel* (Dehra Dun: Nyingmapa Lamas' College, 1978).

63**byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i nam bshad rgyal sras 'jug ngogs** (Varanasi: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1973), p.280.6 if.

#### Notes to Prologue, Preface and Chapter One

1This stanza of the prologue incorporates the names of Ren-da-wa (red mda bagzhon nu blogros, 1349-1412) and of Dzong-ka-ba (tsongkha pa blo bzanggrags pa, 1357-1419) by including the words *gzhon nu blo gros* and *blo bzanggrags pa*. The device of weaving a name into the text is frequently found in prayers recited for the long life of a spiritual teacher.

2**shing rta Chen po**, literally "great chariots," because they broke new ground and opened the way for others to follow.

3**bstan bcos**. Fol. 59a 1, Vol. ka of the first part of General Meaning (*spyi don*)/ Ocean of Enjoyment (*legs bshad skal bzang klu dbanggi rol mtsho*) (Buxadur: Nang bstan shes rig'dzin skyong slob gnyer khang, ca. 1963), the text book of Se-ra Jay (*se rva byes*) College of Se-ra (*se rva*) Monastery by Jay-dzun-ba (*de btsun chos kyi rgyal mtshan*, 1469-1546), clarifying difficult points in the commentaries on the Ornament for Clear Realization, defines *bstan bcos* as "pure speech possessing the two qualities of correcting and protecting" (*'chos skyob kyi yon ten gnyis dang Idan pai ngag nam dag*). Further explanation (fol. 60a, 7 ff.) says, "qualities of correcting and protecting in that it corrects the trainee's mind of disturbing emotions, the enemy, and protects from the suffering of cyclic existence and bad transmigrations" (*gdul bya'i shes rgyud nyon mongs pa'i dgra las 'chos shing 'kor ba dang ngan song gi sdug bsngal skyob par byed pa'i 'chos skyob kyi yon ten*). The text quotes Vasubandhu's description in Science of Exegesis (*vyakhyayukti*, *nam bar bshad pa'i rigs pa*, P5562, Vol. 113), "that which corrects the enemy, all disturbing emotions without exception, and protects from existence in bad transmigrations is a [Buddhist] treatise, because of the qualities of correcting and protecting" (*nyon mongs dgra nams ma lus 'chos pa dang ngan 'gro'i srid las skyob byed gang yin pa 'chos skyob yon ten phyir na bstan bcos te*).

4The custom of inserting a translator's homage at the beginning of the

text was instituted by the great religious kings of Tibet to facilitate identification of its subject matter. The three categories under which texts were classified are knowledge, sutra and discipline. Since texts belonging to the category of knowledge deal primarily with training in wisdom, the homage is made to Manjuṣri, the deity embodying perfect wisdom. Texts belonging to the sutra category deal primarily with training in meditative stabilization. Since Buddhas and Bodhisattvas are its foremost practitioners, homage is made to them. Texts belonging to the category of discipline are mainly about karma, *i.e.* actions and their effects, and since only an omniscient mind can know all its subtleties, homage is made to the Omniscient Ones.

5dmigs pa.

6klu sgrub, first to second century C.E. For a short traditional biography, see Jeffrey Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness* (London: Wisdom Publications, 1983), pp. 356-59.

7Can. 184.1.2 ff.

8caryamelapakapradipa (spyod pa bsdus pa'i sgron ma), P2668, Vol. 61, 361.4.55 if., says, "Birth is known as conventional truth *And that named death as ultimate truth*. I, who have attained these two stages / Through the master's kindness, am a future Buddha." In tantra the arising of the illusory body is associated with appearances, *i.e.* conventional truths. The clear light is associated with emptiness, *i.e.* ultimate truth.

9Although Gyel. Ch. I, 4.5 names this text as ye shes rdo rje kun las btus pa'i greḷ pa, it must refer to Bodhibhadra's commentary on Aryadeva's *Compendium of Quintessential Wisdom* (jñānasarasamuccayanama, ye shes snying po kun las btus pa), P5251, Vol. 95. Commenting on Aryadeva's name in his *Explanation of the "Compendium of Quintessential Wisdom"* (jñānasarasamuccayanamanibandhana, ye shes snying po kun las btus pa'i bshad sbyar), P5252, Vol. 95, 146.3.3, Bodhibhadra says that he is called "Arya" because of having attained the eighth Bodhisattva ground, the Immovable, and "deva" because of being very beautiful like a god.

10chos skyong: Lama Chimpa and Alaka Chattopadhyaya's translation of Taranatha's *History of Buddhism in India* (Calcutta: Bagchi, 1970), p.197,

mentions that Candrakirti and Dharmapala were contemporaries. P.213 says, "[Dharmapala] received ordination under Acarya Dharmadala and listened to Vinaya from him.... He preached the Doctrine at Vajrasana; for over thirty years and succeeded Sri Candrakirti as the upadhyaya of §ri Nalendra. ... He composed a commentary on the Madhyamakacatuhsatika from the Vijñānavāda standpoint. This commentary was composed at Vajrasana and was clearly enough earlier than Candrakirti's Catuhsatikatika." This account also mentions that he was renowned as a bard, which accounts for the appellation snyan dngags mkhan.

11m rigs pa, also sems tram pa, Cittamatra.

12Can. 184.1.4 if. states that because Aryadeva was Nagarjuna's close disciple, "the suchness [explained] in the Treatise of Four Hundred does not have a different character from that explained in the Treatise on the Middle Way."

13This refers to Buddhist and non-Buddhist contentions.

14Can. 183.4.6.

15smon sems.

16jug sems. Gyeltsap's Gateway for Conqueror Children, Explanation of Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la jug pa'i rnam bshad rgyal sras jug ngogs) (Varanasi: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1973), p.16.19 if., says, "While the intention of going to a particular place is the same, the difference [between the aspiration and implementation] lies in whether that intention is accompanied by the action of going or not. The wise understand that the difference between the aspiring and practical altruistic intention is like this. The intention to attain Buddhahood for the sake of others is the same, but the one does not depend upon being accompanied by practice of the six perfections, such as giving, while the other does."

17nyon sgrib, obstructions preventing liberation.

18shes sgrib, obstructions preventing the omniscient state in which a single awareness directly cognizes the two truths simultaneously.

19'phags lam. When the paths of the Exalted, beginning with the path of

seeing, are attained, the end of cyclic existence is in sight and no further actions are created under the influence of ignorance. A Bodhisattva who has reached the path of seeing of the Great Vehicle is no longer subject to involuntary death brought about by contaminated actions and disturbing attitudes and emotions. Vasubandhu's Treasury of Knowledge (abhidharmakosakdikā, chos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi tshig le'ur byas pa, P5590, Vol.115) says, "for one who has seen the truth there is no projecting [activity]" (bden pa mthong la 'phen pa med). Maitreya's Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle (mahayanottaratantraśāstra, thegpa then po rgyud bla ma'i bstan bcos, P5525, Vol.108) says, "The Exalted have completely eliminated / Suffering of aging, sickness and death" ('phags pas rga dang na ba dang /'chi ba'i sdug bsngal rtsad nas spangs).

20dal 'byor, the condition of not merely being human, but enjoying certain freedoms and conducive circumstances which allow one to practise. The majority of human beings are not in the fortunate situation of enjoying all the eighteen features which constitute a human rebirth of leisure and fortune.

21kun to rgu mo, an itinerant female ascetic.

22Nagarjuna and the Seventh Dalai Lama, Precious Garland and the Four Mindfulnesses (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1975), trans. Jeffrey Hopkins, p.58, stanza 278.

23bcud len. According to Dr. Losang Tenzin of the Tibetan Medical Institute, Dharamsala, India, the preparation and administration of essential nutrients is described in the medical tantras. The purpose of taking these nutrients is to restore and preserve physical vitality and postpone the effects of aging. Maintaining physical strength and not permitting it to decline results in longevity. Different kinds of essential nutrients exist such as essential mineral extracts, flower extracts and meat extracts.

24Gyel-tsap here refers to Can. 185.4.5 if.

25The citation of Aryadeva's text in Can. 186.1.7 if. reads, "What wise person would call loving ...?" (byams zhes mkhas pa su zhig smra), to which Gyeltsap refers here.

26Can. 186.3.3 if.

27C-an. 186.3.8 - 186.4.2.

28Can. 186.4.1 if.

29Ren. 12.10-11.

30Can. 187.4.2.

31A concreted resinous gum, with a strong alliaceous odor procured from *Narthex asafoetida*, used in cookery and as an antispasmodic medicine. (Oxford English Dictionary).

32Can. 187.4.4 if.

33Can. 187.5.4.

34Can. 188.5.4 if.

35Can. 189.3.1 if.

36*ibid.*

37Can. 189.3.8 - 189.4.1.

38*ibid.* nges legs, "definite goodness," refers to liberation.

39The text cited in Can. 189.3.5 says, "whoever certainly has" (gang la nges par yod gyur pa).

40dge shes po to ba, 1027-1105, one of the foremost masters of the Gandamba (bka'gdams pa) tradition.

#### Notes to Chapter Two

1Can. 189.5.2 if.

2Can. 190.3.6.

3Can. 190.5.2.

4Can. 190.5.8 - 191.1.1.

5Can. 191.3.7 ff.

6Can. 192.3.3.

7Ren. 14.15. All further interpolations in the commentary to stanza 41 are from Can. 192.4.5 if.

8Gyel-tsap's interpretation seems at variance with Candrakirti's, but since the former's commentary is very terse at this point, it is difficult to determine what he means bygnod byed kyi briag bzhin pa ni. Candrakirti (193.1.3 ff.) says that clothing, soft seats, cooling sandalwood paste and so forth are used to alleviate and prevent suffering and not for pleasure. If they were innate causes of pleasure, they should always produce it, but they do not. Thus antidotes to suffering and decreased suffering are mistaken for pleasure. He makes the point that the process of overcoming suffering by means of antidotes should not be mistaken for pleasure. Accordingly gnod byed kyi brlag bzhin pa ni, words which do not appear in Candrakirti's commentary, would refer to the process of overcoming suffering by that which counteracts it.

9Can. 193.1.6 ff.

10Can. 193.2.2 if.

11Can. 193.2.4 ff.

12rtags kyi dgag bya'i chos refers to inherent existence.

13Can. 193.4.8

14ka to ya na la gdams pa'i mdo is part of the Topics of Detailed Discipline Sutra (vinayaksudrakavastusutra, 'dul ba phran tshegs kyi gzhi, also known as lunggzhi), P1035, Vol. 44, 108.5.6 if.

15dga' bo mngal jug is also part of the above-mentioned sutra (50.2.3 - 60.5.6) and describes the suffering of birth, *etc.* in detail.

16Can. 194.2.4 if.

17Gyel-tsap (Ch. 11, 15.19) uses the plural de bzhin gshegs pa rnam, but follows it with a very specifically addressed statement. Candrakirti

(194.3.2) uses the singular, "the Supramundane Victor" (bcom ldan 'das), to refer to the one who has made the statement. Ren. 27.12 if. quotes it and does not make a specific attribution, but follows it with the words, "the Tathagatas have said confusion is the worst of all obstructions" (de bzhin gshegs pa rnam kyis gti mug sgrib pa kun gyi tha mar gsungs so).

18chos mgon pa'i bstan bcos, referring to rnam pa sde bdun (see below), are not accepted by Sautrantikas as the Buddha's words.

19Vasubandhu's Treasury of Knowledge, P5590, Vol.115, 117.2.3.

201bid. 124.1.8. The order of the lines is not as quoted. The last two lines quoted stand before the first two in Vasubandhu's text, *i.e.* yid 'ong yid du mi 'ong dang / de las gshen zag boas rnam nyid *sdug bsngal nyid gsum* *Idan pa'i phyir ci rigs ma lus sdug bsngal lo.*

21rnam pa sde bdun: Chim-jam-bay-yang (chim 'jam pa'i dbyangs, twelfth century), in his Commentary on the Treasury of Knowledge (chos mngon mdzod kyis tshig le'ur byas pa'i 'grel pa mngon pa'i rgyen) (Buxadur: Nang bstan shes rig 'dzin skyong slob gnyer khang; no date), 11a. 4, lists the seven as: ye shes la jug ka tya'i bus *rab to byed pa dbyig bshes kyis* rnam shes tsogs ni lha skyid kyis *chos kyis phung po sha' ri'i bus* gdags pa'i bstan bcos mo'u gal bus *Bros ba'i rnam grangs gsus po ches* kham kyis tsogs ni gang pos byas-Engaging in Exalted Wisdom (jñānaprasthāna) by Katyāyana; Classification (prakāranapada) by Vasumitra; Collection of Consciousnesses (vijñānakaya) by Devasarman; Aggregate of Phenomena (dharmaskandha) by Āripuṭra; Treatise of Attributions (prajñaptiśāstra) by Maudgalyāyana; Enumeration of Transmigrators (saṃgitiparyāpa) by Mahā-kausthila; Collection of Constituents (dhatukaya) by Puma. Thus he attributes authorship of these texts to Foe Destroyers, but some Sautrantikas do not accept even this.

22Explanation of the "Treasury of Knowledge" (abhidharmakosabhasya, chos mgon pa'i mdzod kyis bshad pa, P5591, Vol.115), 242.3.2 if.

23Can. 195.3.4 ff.

24samādhirajasūtra, ting nge 'dzin rgyal po'i mdo, P795, Vol.31, 283.4.7 if.

<sup>1</sup>Can. 197.3.2.

<sup>2</sup>Ren. 30.11.

<sup>3</sup>Ren. 30.16.

<sup>4</sup>Can. 197.3.8.

<sup>5</sup>Can. 197.4.1 if.

<sup>6</sup>Regarding the emphasis on women's bodies throughout this chapter, see the introduction, page 32-33.

<sup>7</sup>Can. 198.1.2 ff.

<sup>8</sup>*ibid.*

<sup>9</sup>Ren. 31.11 if.

<sup>10</sup>Can. 198.2.2 ff.

<sup>11</sup>Can. 198.5.7 - 199.1.2.

<sup>12</sup>Bo. 32.12.

<sup>13</sup>Can. 199.3.8.

<sup>14</sup>Can. 199.5.3.

<sup>15</sup>Can. 199.5.7 if.

<sup>16</sup>Ren. 35.1 ff.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup>Can. 200.2.2 ff.

<sup>19</sup>B6. 30.14.

<sup>20</sup>Can. 200.5.2.

21Ren. 37.1 ff.

22Gyel-tsap comments on the version of Aryadeva's text which reads, "when all except people" (mi rnams ma gtogs). Both Can. 204.1.4 and D.Can 36.23 read "people do not realize" (mi rnams ma rtogs). Candrakirti says, "How would anyone sensible consider clean that from which a mass of filth constantly is sued," implying that all, except those not in their right mind, would find it objectionable, since he adds, "Therefore, it is wrong to say that women's bodies are not objectionable." Gyeltsap cites Ren-da-wa's interpretation, which he finds does not accord with Candrakirti's.

23Can. 201.1.6 if.

24Can. 201.3.3.

25Ren. 38.6.

26Ren. 38.6 if.

27Chandra Das, Tibetan-English Dictionary (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1976 reprint of 1902 edition), p.777 under the entry pa la sha notes that this tree is *Butea frondosa*; p.1226, under the entry sha Bugs, reads "lit. curled flesh or body [the flower of the tree *Butea frondosa*]."

28Can. 202.1.3 if.

29There seems to have been a fashion in artificial noses in the past. Tycho Brahe (1546-1601), a Danish astronomer, is said to have had a golden fake nose, the original having been lost in a student duel.

30Ren. 39.1 if.

31Can. 202.2.8 ff.

32Ren. 39.10 ff.

33Can. 202.4.1 if.

34Ren. 40.1.

35Can. 202.5.2.

'Can. 203.1.6 ff.

2Can. 203.2.5 if.

3Can. 203.5.3 if.

4skye rgu / skye dgu also can mean "all beings" (skye bo kun). It may refer to those with five aggregates and four elements, thus excluding those who belong to the Formless Realm. It may also refer to nine kinds of beings: those born into the Desire Realm from the Desire, Form and Formless Realms; those born into the Form Realm from the Desire, Form and Formless Realms; and those born into the Formless Realm from the Desire, Form and Formless Realms.

5snyigs ma Inga: (1) Degenerate times, dus snyigs ma. First there was a time of fullness without killing, stealing, sexual misconduct and strife. A gradual deterioration then occurred. The era in which the Buddha ~akyamuni came to this world and in which we live today is known as a time of strife (rtsod dus), in which war, famine, epidemics, droughts, floods and other calamities abound. (2) Degenerate beings, sems can snyigs ma. Those who were easy to teach and guide because of their maturity and receptivity have gained realizations and are on the way to or have already attained liberation. The majority of those who live now are obstinate and difficult to guide. (3) Degenerate life span, tshe snyigs ma. Originally beings had extremely long lives. A gradual decrease in life span has occurred and now people rarely live for much more than eighty years. Untimely death is frequent. (4) Degenerate disturbing attitudes, nyon mongs snyigs ma. These are present in a crude form, leading to many unwholesome physical, verbal and mental activities. (5) Degenerate views, Ita ba snyigs ma. Harmful and misleading views are prevalent and views such as the correct understanding of reality and of the connection between actions and their effects are unpopular.

6Can. 204.1.4.

7Can. 204.3.2 if.

8Ren. 44.3.

9Can. 204.4.5.

10Can. 204.4.6.

11Gyel-tsap uses a version of the text which employs a double negative: rgyu ni gang du med mi 'gyur (see the first line of the stanza). The version of the text cited in Can. 204.5.1 reads rgyu ni gang du yod min 'gyur.

12Can. 205.1.2 if.

13Can. 205.3.3 if.

14Can. 205.4.6 if.

15Can. 206.3.2 if.

16Can. 206.3.8 if.

17Can. 206.4.3 - 207.1.6.

18Aryadeva's text reads ma btang, past tense. Gyel. Ch.IV, 11.12 introduces mi gtong, present and future tenses.

19Can. 207.2.6; Can. 208.1.3.

20The third chapter of Vasubandhu's Explanation of the "Treasury of Knowledge" (abhidhanmakosabh4sya, chos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi bshad pa, P5591, Vol.115) contains a description of this devolution.

21Can. 208.1.3.

22Can. 208.2.1 if.

23Can. 208.4.7 if.

24Can. 208.5.6 if.

#### Notes to Chapter Five

1Any activity, virtuous or nonvirtuous, is performed through one or more of the three doors: body, speech, and mind.

2P795, Vol.31, 289.2.3 if.

31bid., 287.3.3 if.

4For a list of the thirty-two major and eighty minor marks of a Buddha's supreme Emanation Body, see chapter VIII of Maitreya's Ornament for Clear Realization (abhisamayalamkdra, mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan, P5184, Vol. 88). For the causes which give rise to the thirty-two major marks, similitudes of which are also said to adorn universal monarchs, see The Precious Garland (trans. Jeffrey Hopkins and Lati Rinbochay with Anne Klein; New York: Harper and Row, 1975), stanzas 176-196, pp.43-46.

5Can. 209.3.7 if.

6Hearer Vehicle, Solitary Realizer Vehicle and Great Vehicle. Extensive discussion of the three vehicles can be found in Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness (London: Wisdom Publications, 1983).

7Can. 209.5.2 if.

8A rabbit's horn does not exist, thus discussion about its size is irrelevant. Similarly, since there is no truly existent self, discussion as to whether such a self is impermanent or permanent is not apposite.

9The Precious Garland, stanzas 73-74, based on Hopkins' translation, p.27.

10Can. 210.4.1 If.

11The Buddha prescribed that monks should wear robes made of small pieces of cloth stitched together. This was intended to counter attachment to clothing. The Buddha's cousin Devadatta, who failed to recognize his extraordinary qualities, habitually did the opposite of what the Buddha recommended to express his dissent. The "bait" refers to Devadatta's ill deeds, such as causing schism in the spiritual community, which would bring him suffering in the future.

12Ren. 55.7 ff.

13Although Aryadeva's text reads "without cognition" (sems ma rtogs

par), referring here to the intention, both Gyeltsap and Ren-da-wa use "except for the intention" (sems ma gtogs par). Thus Ren. 55.8 ff. reads, "Unless established as a virtuous or ill deed through the motivation of the mind, actions such as coming, going, standing or walking are not in themselves seen as meritorious or demeritorious."

14gcer bu pa. At times this refers to a Nirgrantha (Jaina) ascetic, whose nakedness is intended to symbolize non-attachment and the total renunciation of possessions.

15Can. 210.5.5 ff. says, "Such faults arise for those according to whom merit [and its converse] may be gained without mental cognition and without mind [i.e. intention]. Thus meritorious action and so forth cannot be posited without mental cognition." In both Candrakirti's and Gyeltsap's commentaries the naked ascetic's intentions are not mentioned. Gyeltsap's conclusion that he created both virtuous and nonvirtuous karma seems to contradict Candrakirti's emphasis on the importance of motivation in determining the nature of actions.

16Can. 211.1.6 ff.

17This is a frequently cited story about the Buddha ~akyamuni in a former life.

18Attainment of the Mahayana path of seeing is simultaneous with the attainment of the first of the ten Bodhisattva grounds, each of which is conjoined with the altruistic intention, dedication (bsngo ba), and direct realization of emptiness. The ten perfections-giving, ethics, patience, effort, concentration, wisdom, method, aspiration, power, and exalted wisdom-are practised on every ground, but on each ground one of the perfections is developed completely. Thus on the first ground the emphasis is on the complete development of giving.

19Can. 211.5.4 ff.

20stong gsum gyi stong chen po 'jig rten gyi khams. From this world to the Brahma Abode of the Form Realm is counted as one world system. A thousand such world systems constitute the first set of a thousand. A thousand of the first set constitute the second set of a thousand and a thousand of the second set constitutes the third, the great thousand world

systems, consisting of three sets of thousands, *i.e.* 10 to the ninth power world systems. The term *bye ba phrag brgya* also refers to this number-by *ba* being 10 to the seventh power; *phrag brgya*, a hundred times. The three thousand great thousand world systems are referred to in the third chapter of Vasubandhu's Treasury of Knowledge.

21'*og min* here refers to the highest of the seventeen abodes of the Form Realm and is thus a state within cyclic existence. It can also refer to one's own pure land produced by limitless stores of merit and wisdom, in which one attains enlightenment.

22*rin po the sna bdun*. One version gives ruby, sapphire, emerald, diamond, pearl, coral and lapis lazuli. Another gives lapis lazuli, gold, silver, crystal, red pearl, the essence of stone (*rdo'i snying po*) and a substance referred to as *spug*. According to Dr. Losang Tenzin of the Tibetan Medical Institute, Dharamsala, India, *spug* refers to a kind of gold obtained from animal horns. An indication of its presence is that the horns glow at night. Dr. Dorje Gyalpo, also of the Tibetan Medical Institute, describes the essence of stone as ice which has petrified under perpetual snow to form "water crystal." When placed in water, the crystal is said to be indistinguishable from the water. Traditionally these substances were used in the preparation of Tibetan medicines and are described in the medical tantras. *Bai dur ya*, mostly translated as lapis lazuli, may refer to beryl, which the Oxford English Dictionary describes as "a transparent precious stone of pale green color passing into light blue, yellow and white." The medical tantras speak of three kinds of *bai dur ya*: blue, yellow and white. Only blue lapis lazuli is known, the word "lazuli" being derived from the Persian word meaning "azure."

23Ren. 58.18 *if*.

24Mvaghosa's *Buddhakarita*, Book ?MI, stanza 8 in *Buddhist Mahayana Texts*, edited by E.B. Cowell (New York: Dover Publications, 1969).

25Ren. 59.13 *ff*.

26*ibid*.

27Can. 212.4.8 *if*.

28Can. 213.1.2 *if*.

29bsdu ba'i dngos po bzhi. These four skillful means are employed to gain others' trust and to make others become mentally mature and receptive to increasingly profound teaching. The first is giving (sbyin pa). Since most ordinary people are attracted by material generosity, Bodhisattvas first give gifts and act generously towards those they intend to help, in order to establish a positive relationship. When a suitable occasion arises they teach in an informal, interesting and pleasant way (snyan par smra ba) adapted to the other person's capacities and inclinations. They then encourage the person to apply in practice (don spyod pa) what was explained. At the same time Bodhisattvas must conduct themselves accordingly (don thun pa) to validate the advice through their personal example.

30phung po lhag ma med pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa'i mthar thug pa. The final state of nirvana here refers to Buddhahood which is known as non-abiding nirvana (mi gnas pa'i myang 'das), constituting separation from obstructions to liberation and omniscience, and not abiding in the extremes of worldly existence or solitary peace. In this context the term "without remainder" can be taken to refer to the two Truth Bodies of a Buddha-the Wisdom Truth Body and the Nature Body. The term "with remainder" then refers to the two Form Bodiesthe Enjoyment Body and the Emanation Body. For further explanation of what is meant by nirvana with and without remainder in the different Buddhist systems of tenets, see Geshe Lhundup Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins, *Practice and Theory in Tibetan Buddhism* (London: Rider and Co., 1976), p.142; revised edition, Geshe Lhundup Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins, *Cutting Through Appearances* (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1989), p. 316 if.

31pragantavinigcayapratiharyasdmadhisutra, rab to zhi ba rnam par nges pa cho 'phrul gyi mdo, P797, Vol.32.

32graddhabal4dhandvataramudrasutra, dad pa'i stobs bskyed pa la jug pa phyag rgya'i mdo, P867, Vol.34.

33Can. 214.1.6 if.

34ar ka me tog; in Sanskrit, surjavarta or arkapugpika. Its botanical name is Gyandropsis gynandra or pentaphylla. According to information from the Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, England, this is an annual found throughout much of the tropics, called "bastard mustard" in English works and "spider

wisp" in American ones. Since this plant is mentioned as an unsuitable offering in some texts, it is probably unpalatable or malodorous.

35Can. 214.2.1 ff.

36bzod pa thob. It is not quite clear to what this refers. Bodhisattvas, once they have attained the first ground, have no fear of emptiness and thus have gained forbearance or tolerance with regard to it. They also have the ability to take any rebirth they wish and will never again be born in cyclic existence through the force of contaminated actions and disturbing attitudes. Bodhisattvas on the forbearance stage of the path of preparation have certainty that they will never again be born in a bad transmigration but do not yet have the complete control which ensures they can take rebirth as they wish.

37mngon shes nga. By attaining the divine ear (lha'i ma ba) it is possible to perceive the most subtle sounds of the universe. By accomplishing the divine eye (lha'i mig) it is possible to perceive the most subtle forms in the universe. Knowledge of others' minds (gshan gyi sems shes pa) means one can, for instance, tell which disturbing emotions affect a particular person most. Memory of former abodes (sngon gyi gnas dran pa) refers to the ability to remember one's own and others' past lives. Super-knowledge of miraculous feats (rdzu 'phrul gyi mngon shes) refers to the ability to perform miraculous feats like shaking the ground, making one become many and many become one.

38Can. 214.4.4 ff.

39Can. 214.3.2 if.

40Can. 215.1.6 if.

41Can. 215.2.1 if. mentions the Sanskrit verbal roots do, to cut or divide, in relation to death; da, to give, in relation to practices such as giving; de, to guard; and da, to purify, in relation to safeguarding body, speech and mind.

42Giving the teaching (chos kyi sbyin pa), giving fearlessness (mi jigs pa'i sbyin pa), giving material things (zang zing gi sbyin pa). According to Gah. p.182, the first is associated with concentration and wisdom, the second with ethical conduct and patience and the third with generosity in the most common sense. Effort is associated with all three.

43Can. 215.3.5 if.

44Can. 215.5.2.

45spyod pa ba, who believe that only the words of the Vedas are true and that the words of persons are always false. See Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism, p. 62 or Cutting Through Appearances, p.166; also Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy (George Allen & Unwin; reprint in India: Bombay: Blackie & Son Pvt. Ltd., 1977), Vol.2, pp.375-429.

46rtsod gzhi, basis of debate.

47bsgrub bya'i chos.

48The similarity lies in the fact that the pot and woollen cloth are unrelated.

49rtags.

50dam bca'.

51srid rtse, the highest abode of the Formless Realm and thus of all the abodes within cyclic existence.

52Before a world system comes into existence there are twenty intermediate aeons (bar bskal) of vacuity, followed by twenty during which the world system is forming. It then lasts for twenty and disintegrates for twenty. Eighty such intermediate aeons form a great aeon (bskal pa chen po). When counting in sequence 1, 10, 100, 1000, 10,000, 100,000, *etc.* the sixty-first number is referred to as "countless" (grangs med). Asanga's Bodhisattva Grounds (yogacarya-bhumaubodhisattvabhumi, real 'byor spyod pa'i sa las byang chub sems dpa'i sa, P5538, Vol.110) explains that when the term "three countless aeons" is used regarding the length of time spent accumulating merit for the attainment of enlightenment, it refers to a finite number of great aeons as described above. When the words "many countless aeons" are used, countless means that we cannot count the years, months and days involved. For the names of the sixty numerals, see Chandra Das, Tibetan-English Dictionary, p.241.

53Can. 216.4.6.

54Can.216.5.8 - 217.1.5.

Notes to Chapter Six

1khro ba. Throughout this chapter khro ba is used in the sense of khong khro, one of the six basic disturbing emotions, and not, except possibly in stanzas 145 and 147, in the sense of aggression or belligerence, which is a secondary disturbing emotion stemming from anger. Zhe sdang has also been rendered as anger, since zhe sdang and khong khro are used interchangeably in Tibetan. The common translation of zhe sdang as hatred limits the meaning to an extreme state of bitter animosity, whereas the term clearly refers to a far more common range of emotions such as aversion, hostility, vindictiveness and anger. Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, p.256, defines anger as "an intention to harm sentient beings, to harm sufferings in one's own continuum, or to harm phenomena that are sources of suffering." Ibid., p. 261 reads, "Belligerence is an extremely disturbed state of mind which, upon a great increase in anger, is a wish to inflict harm on another such as by physically striking that person when he is in one's presence." Definitions such as these of the fifty-one mental factors are found in Tibetan monastic textbooks currently in use.

2Can. 218.1.1 if.

3Can. 218.1.5 ff.

4Can. 218.3.2 if.

5In Tibetan medicine, phlegm (bad kan) is associated with an imbalance of the earth and water elements, and bile (mkris pa) with an imbalance of the fire element.

6Can. 218.4.3 if.

7Can. 218.5.2 if.

8Can. 219.2.7 if.

9Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, p.263, defines resentment ('khon 'dzin) as "a wish to harm or to answer harm, involving non-release of a continuum of anger. It has the function of serving as a basis for

impatience."

10mtshams med Inga: murdering one's father, mother or a Foe Destroyer, causing schism within the spiritual community, and with bad intent drawing blood from a Buddha. Unless these actions are purified, their consequences cannot be deferred and rebirth in one of the hell realms will follow in the very next life.

11Can. 219.5.5 ff.

12nyon mongs can gyi ma rig pa. Ignorance is nescience, involving confusion with respect to the nature of phenomena. It refers to active misconception rather than a mere absence of knowledge. Its two principal forms are confusion with respect to the connection between actions and their effects, and confusion with regard to the fundamental nature of phenomena.

13'du byed kyi las, the second of the twelve members of dependent arising of cyclic existence. For a succinct explanation of the dependent arising of cyclic existence, see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, pp.275-83 and Appendix 2.

14Dzong-ka-pa's *Ocean of Reasoning*, Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way" (rtsa shes tik Chen rigs pa'i rgya mtsho; Varanasi: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1973), p.430, says, "Emptiness comes to mean dependent arising for Madhyamikas who have refuted inherent existence through valid cognition, not for others. When such Madhyamikas explicitly (dngos su) ascertain that external and internal things arise dependently reliant on causes, they ascertain the meaning of emptiness of inherent existence through the force of that very awareness."

Through explicitly ascertaining that phenomena arise dependently, those who have discovered the correct view of reality will immediately and explicitly ascertain their emptiness of true existence, for by understanding that true existence implies lack of dependence, they know validly that this and dependent arising are contradictory.

Dependent arising comprises three aspects: dependence on causes and conditions, dependence on parts and dependence on imputation by conceptuality. The first applies only to products while the other two

describe how all phenomena exist. Dependence on causes and conditions and on parts are easier to understand than dependence on imputation. Understanding the former serves as a means to bring about understanding of emptiness. To understand dependence on imputation by conceptuality fully one must understand emptiness. Through the force of explicitly understanding emptiness, this subtle level of dependent arising is ascertained without the need for further reasons.

For further discussion of how dependent arising can both function as the reason for emptiness and be the meaning of emptiness, see Donald S. Lopez, "On the Relationships of Emptiness and Dependent Arising: Some dGe-lugspa Views," Tibet Journal, Vol.XIV, No.1 (Dharamsala, Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1989).

15The expression of worship in Nagarjuna's Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning (yuktisastikakarikanama, rigs pa drug cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa, P5225, Vol.95, 11.2.2) reads:

**Homage to the King of Subduers  
Who taught dependent arising.  
Eliminating [inherent] production  
And disintegration in this way.**

***gang gi skye dang 'jig pa dag  
tshul 'di yis ni spangs gyur pa  
rten cing 'byung ba gsungs pa yi  
tub dbang de la phyag 'tsal lo***

Gyeltsap also refers to Candrakirti's Commentary on the "Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning" (yuktisastikavrtti, rigs pa drug cu pa'i grel pa, P5265,

Vol.98), which explains why among all the supreme qualities for which the Buddha may be praised, his explaining emptiness of inherent existence as meaning dependent arising is singled out for praise by Nagarjuna. Since the Buddha has direct ultimate perception of emptiness of inherent existence as dependent arising and therefore possesses complete personal authority to teach this, he is called the King of Subduers and is superior to other teachers. Sutra passages explaining emptiness of inherent existence as meaning dependent arising are the essence of the scriptural doctrine, and realization of it constitutes the principal doctrine of insight. Without such insight one cannot become free from the seeds of obstructions and thus cannot attain liberation or omniscience. The emptiness of inherent existence of dependent arising is a non-affirming negative. ("A negative which is such that the term expressing it does not suggest in place of the negation of its own object of negation another, positive phenomenon which is its own object of suggestion." For further explanation of this definition see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, p.725). It is also ultimate truth, but as such should not be looked upon as truly existent, since this is a wrong view referred to by Nagarjuna as incurable.

16Can. 220.3.2 if.

17sa 'dzin. The Great Tibetan-Chinese Dictionary (bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo [Beijing: Mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1985] Vol.3, p.2905) defines sa 'dzin pa, the "earth claimant," as a theatrical role. It is reported that this refers to an actor in certain forms of Tibetan drama who has charge of the stage which he symbolically demarcates and cleans by performing a dance at the beginning. It is possible that a similar custom obtained in ancient Indian drama.

18Can. 220.3.8 ff.

19bslab pa here refers to the three kinds of training, which include all practices: training in ethical conduct (tshul khrims kyi bslab pa), training in meditative stabilization (ling nge 'dzin gyi bslab pa) and training in wisdom (she rab kyi bslab pa). Without a foundation of ethical conduct, the mind is too turbulent to permit sufficiently steady concentration for the development of special insight which, when practised in relation to emptiness, becomes the antidote to incorrect mental engagement and misconceptions of reality.

20yon ten bcu gnyis. One should live in seclusion at least five hundred armspans from the nearest settlement, under trees, in a roofless shelter or in a cemetery, depending wholly or partly on what is found there by way of food, clothing and utensils. These four rules counteract attachment to one's dwelling place. Two rules pertain to behavior: one should use a pallet of grass or leaves which must not be renewed and one should never sleep lying down. To overcome attachment to food there are three rules: one should live on alms, begging food from the same people daily or calling at three doors in line without making any distinction, and in both cases accept whatever is given. Food should be eaten in a single sitting each day and nothing more taken after rising from one's place, swallowing the last mouthful or after rinsing one's mouth at the end of the meal. One should not go for alms a second time in the day but should collect as much as is needed and not begin eating before that amount has been received. There are three rules to counteract attachment to clothing: one should possess only the bare essentials (three robes if one is ordained), wear clothing made from felt or discarded rags and only use clothes worn by others for at least four months.

21This possibly refers to the River Son which rises in the modern Indian state of Madhya Pradesh and flows through Bihar.

22Can. 222.2.1 if.

23Can. 222.3.1 if.

24Can. 222.3.7 if.

25The Precious Garland (trans. Hopkins), p.59, stanzas 284-285. Lines 7, 8, 1, and 2 of Gyeltsap's citation constitute stanza 284, and lines 3-6, stanza 285.

26Can. 222.5.7 if.

#### Notes to Chapter Seven

1kun sbyor. Nine primary fetters are mentioned in sutra and in Asanga's Compendium of Knowledge (abhidharmasammuccaya, mngon pa kun btus, P5550, Vol.112). These are the six basic disturbing attitudes and emotions: desire ('dod chags), anger (khong khro), pride (nga rgyal), ignorance (ma rig pa), doubt (the tshom), deluded view (lta ba nyon mongs can), as well as

miserliness (ser sna), envy (phrag dog) and the fetter of holding erroneous conceptions as supreme (mchog to 'dzin pa'i kun sbyor). The latter comprises holding bad views as supreme (Ita ba mchog 'dzin) and holding bad ethics and modes of conduct as supreme (tshul khrims dang brtul zhugs mchog 'dzin). The fetter of deluded views comprises views of the transitory collection as real "I" and "mine" ('jig tshogs la Ita ba), views holding to an extreme (mthar'dzin pa'i Ita ba), and wrong views (log Ita). Anger, miserliness and jealousy only occur in the Desire Realm.

Vasubandhu's Treasury also mentions five fetters concordant with the lowest realm, *i.e.* the Desire Realm (tha ma'i cha mthun inga): views of the transitory collection, holding bad ethics and modes of conduct as supreme, doubt, the wish for sense objects ('dod pa la 'dun pa), and harmfulness (gnod sems). Five fetters concordant with the upper realms (gong ma'i cha mthun inga) are desire of the Form Realm, desire of the Formless Realm, excitement (rgod pa), pride and ignorance.

2srid pa las byung ba'i Bred pa. This refers to desire of the upper realms and is an inwardly directed form of attachment to meditative equipoise. It is referred to as desire of worldly existence (srid pa'i 'dod chags) to preclude misconceptions of the two upper realms as liberated states.

31ta ngan. There are limitless bad views which can be classified as views of permanence, of annihilation, and of both. They may be divided into three groups, each consisting of one hundred and twenty, yielding a total of three hundred and sixty. The Brahma Net Sutra (brahmajdhasutra, tshangs pa'i dra ba'i mdo, P1021, Vol.40), p.286.2.8 if., extensively discusses these views and their origins. The Condensed Perfection of Wisdom Sutra (sancayagathaprajna-paramitasutra, shes rab kyi pha rol to phyin pa sdud pa, P735, Vol.21), p.193.1.2, says, "...just as the sixty-two views are subsumed under the view of the transitory collection" ('jig tshogs Ita bar Ita ba drug bcu gnyis 'dus Itar). This refers to the sixty-two bad views and indicates their connection with the view of the transitory collection as real "I" and "mine".

4Can. 223.5.1 if.

5Can. 224.1.4.

6The text cited in Can. 224.1.7, D.Can. 61.1.7, and the Varanasi edition,

p.115.13, reads 'gro ba gzhar yang yod min na. gzhar yang with a negative means "never." gzhan yang appears in place of gzhar yang in only one edition that was inspected.

7A11 examined versions of the text read de yang mi 'gyur de Itar byos.

8sdong po bkod pa'i mdo. This sutra is not extant in present versions of the bka' 'gyur, however the volume of contents of the sde dge mtshal par bka' 'gyur (Delhi: Karmapae Chodhey Gyalwae Sungrab Partun Khang, 1976-1979), pp.238-39, says, "Volume eleven, the forty-fifth: the Chapter Ornamented by Tree Trunks from the Array of Tree Trunks and its elaborated meaning" (pam po bcu gcig zhe nga pa sdong po dkod pa 'phros don dang bcas pa las sdong pos rgyan pa'i le'u).

9The Explanation of the Guhyasamaja Mandala Ritual (gsang 'dus dkyil 'khor cho ga'i nram bshad), by the Seventh Dalai Lama, Gel-sang-gya-tso (bskal bzang rgya mtsho, 1708-1757) (Delhi; no further publication data available), fol. 3.14, reads:

The King of Ascertainments Sutra (rnam par gtan la dbab pa rgyal po'i mdo) says: "Ananda, it is like this: the udumbara flower appears when a Buddha is born. It is colorful, bright, and has a fine aura. Its fragrance pervades a radius of one mile. This flower removes dimness and clears the memory. It even pacifies sickness. It also removes bad smells, illuminates, and gives off a sweet fragrance which purifies the four elements. If it does not appear even for universal monarchs, how could such a flower, whose occurrence is as rare as Buddhas, appear for unethical sentient beings?" An Account of Realizations (rtogs brjod) describes other features of the flower: "To the north, beyond the great lake Manasarowar and over the five mountain peaks, is an udumbara garden. When Supramundane Victors descend from their existence as gods in the Joyous Land (dga' Idan) and enter their mother's womb, the garden begins to bud. When they are born from their mother's womb the flowers begin to open. When they attain the full awakening of complete unsurpassable enlightenment, the flowers bloom. When they are about to pass away, they wither, and when they pass into the state of parinirvana, the garden's leaves, flowers, petals and fruit fall. An udumbara flower is the size of a chariot wheel. When Supramundane Victorious Buddhas appear in the royal caste, the color of the flower is white. When they appear in the Brahmin caste the color of the

flower is white." Regarding the latter, incorrupt versions read "...is red." This analogy illustrates the rarity of a Buddha's advent.

10Only coarse fabrics like canvas can be produced from hemp. Cotton is of greater value because it can be used for a wide range of fabrics, including extremely fine ones such as muslin.

11Can. 225.1.6 if.

12Can. 225.2.8 ff.

13Can. 225.4.2 if.

14Can. 226.1.3 if.

15'byung gyur. The particles that constitute physical objects consist of eight substances-earth, water, fire, wind, visible form, smell, taste and that which is tangible. The latter four are elemental derivatives or evolutes. See Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, pp. 230-31.

16Can. 226.4.6 if.

17Can. 227.2.4 ff.

18lung gzhi, also referred to as Topics of Discipline (vinayavastu, 'dul ba gzhi, P1030, Vol.41). This explains in 37.1.4 if. how rare it is for beings to go from one good rebirth to another, or from a bad one to a good one. Compared to those who go to bad rebirths, they are as few as the particles of earth that adhere to one's fingertip when compared to the number of particles of earth in the world.

19Can. 227.3.4.

20Can. 227.4.8 if.

21Can. 228.1.7 if.

22Can. 228.4.8 if.

23Can. 229.1.3 if.

24Can. 229.2.3 if.

25dpe chos rin chen spungs pa (no publication data), pp.105-07.2

#### Notes to Chapter Eight

1This division of sense objects is made on the basis of whether or not they are conjoined with the mindstream of a living being. When appearance, sound, smell, taste and tactile quality are features of a being with consciousness, they are referred to as internal sense objects, because of their association with consciousness. When they are not features of a living being and therefore are not associated with consciousness, they are referred to as external sense objects. For example, the appearance, smell, taste, *etc.* of a stone are external sense objects.

2Can. 229.3.6 ff.

3Can. 229.5.1.

4The snake in the analogy and the person are similar in being merely imputed to a basis of imputation and unfindable under analysis. However, unfindability in the case of the snake denotes non-existence, for even when no analysis is made, a rope-snake cannot perform the functions of a snake. In the case of the person, unfindability implies not non-existence but lack of true existence, for when no analysis is made, the person attributed to the collection of the aggregates functions satisfactorily as such, and statements regarding it such as "John is eating" are not invalidated by conventional valid cognition. All phenomena are imputed by conceptuality, but not everything imputed by conceptuality exists.

5The statement that disturbing attitudes and emotions arise through conceptuality indicates two aspects of dependent arising: dependence on imputation by conceptuality and dependence on causes among which an incorrect mental approach is mentioned. The citation from the Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning (P5225, Vol.95, 11.5.5) first emphasizes the causal aspect by saying the world is caused by ignorance, a fact which is confirmed by the Buddha. This can be taken to refer to his description of how the contaminated aggregates arise in dependence on a twelve-membered process. The statement that the world is conceptuality includes the causal aspect, in that the conceptuality of an incorrect mental approach causes disturbing attitudes and emotions, giving rise to contaminated actions

through which the environment and living beings come into existence. It also indicates the dependent nature of all phenomena in being mere designations dependent upon the conceptual consciousnesses that designate them. For an extensive discussion of the dependent arising of cyclic existence, see Hopkins, *Emptiness Yoga* (Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications, 1987), pp. 303-29.

6Can. 230.3.6.

7Can. 230.4.5 if.

8A group of blind people will not reach their destination unless they have a sighted guide. Wisdom is frequently compared to the guide and the other perfections to the blind people.

9Can. 230.5.6 if.

10Can. 231.2.2.

11Can. 331.4.1 if.

12In the outline provided by Gyeltsap, this section is entitled, "With effort, liberation is easy to attain." One may thus conclude that according to Gyeltsap's interpretation, not doing actions does not imply total inactivity, but rather restraint from contaminated virtuous and nonvirtuous actions which produce cyclic existence and, as the question at the beginning of the next section indicates, restraint from actions based on a conception of true or ultimate existence. "Without complication" (*bsam khral med pa*) may sometimes be interpreted as "without the focus of conceptions of true existence" (*bden 'dzin gyi dmigs grad med par*). The focus here refers to true existence, the referent object of such conceptions. Thus "without complication" may also be taken to mean without fabrications of true existence.

13Immunity to sickness (*nad med pa'i stobs*) seems somewhat infelicitously to denote cyclic existence in the analogy.

14*jig tshogs la Ita ba nyi shu*. These are speculative misconceptions concerning the relationship between the self and the aggregates. There are four pertaining to each aggregate. Thus in relation to the aggregate of form they are as follows: the misconceptions that the self is form, that it

inherently possesses form, that form has an inherently existent self, and that the self has inherently existent form.

15The self and aggregates are examined in the following five-fold way as to whether they are inherently one, inherently different, whether the self inherently depends on the aggregates or the aggregates inherently depend on the self, and whether the self inherently possesses the aggregates.

16P795, Vol.31, 290.1.3 says, "Through just one all are known, / Through just one all are seen" (*gcig gis kyang nyid thams cas shes gcig gis kyang nyid thams cas mthong*). Although Gyeltsap's version drawn from Candrakirti's commentary differs slightly, the sense does not: *gcig gis thams cas shes 'gyur zhing gcig gis thams cas mthong bar 'gyur*.

17Gyel. Ch. VIII 12.19 if. and Ren. 95.19 read *gang gis chos gcig sgo nas chos rnam kun* for the first line which is the version translated here. Both Can. 232.5.2 and D.Can. 70.2.3 say, "Whoever by meditating on one phenomenon..." (*gang gis chos gcig bsgoms nas chos rnam kun*). The Meditative Stabilization of Gaganaganja, listed as the Sutra Requested by Gaganaganja (*gaganagan-japariprcchasutra*, 'phags pa nam mkha'i mdzod kyis shus pa'i mdo, P815, Vol.33, 16.3.2) says, *gang zhig chos gcig kis ni chos rnam kun sgyu ma smig rgyu 'dra bar bzung med dang gsog dang rdzun dang rtag pa med par shes / de ni byang chub snying por nyur du gro*. In both versions of Candrakirti's commentary the third line reads *gsob brdzun ther zug min par shes pa de*.

18Jay-dzun-ba, commenting on the citation from the King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra in his General Meaning of the Middle Way (*dbu ma'i spyi don*) (Buxaduor: Nang bstan shes rig'dzin skyong slob gnyer khang, 1963) says, "It does not follow that when one cognizes the emptiness of one phenomenon one cognizes the emptiness of other phenomena. These citations mean that when a valid cognition ascertains lack of true existence with respect to one established base, the lack of true existence of another base can be cognized merely by directing the mind to it with the question whether or not it is truly existent" (fol.52b). This implies that the whole process of reasoning which induced the initial cognition does not need to be repeated.

19Can. 233.1.4 ff.

20Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way" (madhyamakavatara, dbu ma la jug pa, P5261, P5262, Vol.98, 103.1.5): tha snyad bden pa thabs su gyur pa dang / don dam bden pa thabs byung gyur pa ste.

21Things are not totally non-existent but are validly ascertained to exist by a consciousness verifying conventionalities. However, these same things are not found under investigation by a consciousness analyzing their final and fundamental mode of existence.

22"Things" (dngos po) refers to functional things, such as a pot, produced from causes and conditions. "Non-things" (dngos med) refers to non-functional phenomena which are not produced by causes and conditions, such as a pot's emptiness of true existence.

23Can. 233.5.4 if.

24P5224, Vol.95, 1.3.7 reads rdzogs sangs rgyas rnam ma byung zhing nyan thos rnam ni zad pa na rang sangs rgyas kyi ye shes ni / brten pa med par rab to skyes. The versions cited in Candrakirti's commentary and by Gyeltsap all differ slightly but convey the same sense.

25 This refers to a trial by ordeal in which the suspect's innocence is established if he or she survives unscathed the ordeal of licking hot iron.

26D.Can. 72.2.2 if.

27Can. 234.5.3 if.

28Ke'u tshang sprul sku, blo bzang jam dbyangs smon lam, late eighteenth century.

29byang chub lam gyi rim pa chung ngu'i zin bris blo gsal rgya mtsho'i jug ngogs (Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1984), p.472.1 ff.

#### Notes to Chapter Nine

ldngos po, also translated as "functional thing" and "thing," usually connotes something impermanent which is able to perform a function. It may also connote any existent phenomenon, either permanent or

impermanent, and sometimes refers to true existence, as in the phrase *dnegos por smra ba*, "proponents of true existence."

2Functional things are produced through a process and are themselves part of a process, giving rise to their own effects and undergoing constant change and disintegration.

3*rang rgyud kyi gtan tshigs* refers to the reason of an autonomous syllogism (*rang rgyud kyi sbyor ba*) in which the three criteria (*tshul gsum*), *i.e.* the presence of the reason in the subject, the pervasion and counter-pervasion, are established from their own side. Since Prasangikas assert that nothing is established from its own side or has autonomous existence, the use of such a syllogism is unacceptable.

4Can. 235.5.5 ff.

5Proponents other than Prasangikas of Buddhist systems of tenets assert that a valid cognition of a subject such as a sprout is one which is unmistaken with regard to its nature, meaning that the sprout must exist exactly as it appears to that cognition. Since the sprout appears to exist by way of its own character to such a valid cognition, asserted as unmistaken with regard to the sprout's fundamental mode of existence, that would be how the sprout actually existed. If this were so, a valid cognition of a sprout would be a valid cognition of its fundamental mode of existence. Prasangikas do not accept such a valid cognition. Since a subject is thus not asserted to be validly established or certified in a similar way in the Prasangika and other systems, there are no commonly appearing subjects. For Svatantrika-Madhyamikas and the lower tenet systems, if a cognition is valid with respect to an object, it should be unmistaken. For Prasatigikas a cognition may be both valid and mistaken with regard to its object. Unless this were so, it would be impossible for common beings to cognize things, since all perceptions of common beings are mistaken and affected by conceptions of true existence and their latencies. Thus according to Prasangikas, a direct valid cognition perceiving a pot is mistaken with respect to it in that the pot appears to exist inherently. Nevertheless that valid cognition cognizes the pot. Non-Prasatigikas assert that if a perception is mistaken with respect to its object, that perception cannot cognize the object.

6Vaisesikas (*bye brag pa*), proponents of a non-Buddhist system of

tenets, assert that all phenomena are included among six categories of existents: substance, quality, activity, generality and particularity. There are nine types of substance: earth, water, fire, air, space, time, direction, self and mind.

7The second category of existents asserted by Vaisesikas is quality, which is of twentyfive types, of which pleasure is one: form, taste, smell, touch, sound, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, otherness, nonotherness, consciousness, pleasure, pain, desire, hatred, effort, heaviness, moisture, heat, oiliness, momentum, merit and demerit. All qualities depend on one of the nine types of substance.

8so sor rtags 'gog is a separation from contamination, *i.e.* disturbing attitudes and emotions, attained through analyzing the four truths individually. Vaibhasikas assert that all products other than true paths are contaminated in that as focal objects or concomitants they can provoke an increase in contamination. Thus a chair, for instance, is said to be contaminated because as a focal object it can increase any of the three poisons. A disturbing emotion such as desire is contaminated because it increases contamination such as other disturbing emotions with which it is concomitant.

9rtags min 'gog pa is a cessation other than an analytical cessation, attained through the incompleteness of conditions but not through the application of an antidote. It prevents the future production of specific contaminated or uncontaminated phenomena. For instance when Bodhisattvas reach the patience stage of the path of preparation, they automatically attain a non-analytical cessation with regard to the aggregates of bad rebirths. They will never be reborn in such transmigrations again through the force of contaminated actions. These two kinds of cessation asserted by Vaibhasikas are described by Vasubandhu in the first chapter of the Treasury of Knowledge.

10Impermanence here denotes the extreme of total non-existence.

11This statement seems to target the Vaibhasika assertion that space is an ultimate truth and a permanent functional thing, its function being to permit movement through lack of obstructive contact. They say it is an ultimate truth because it can bear analysis in that even when reduced through the

process of analysis, it can still generate an apprehension of itself in a perceiver. Other examples of such ultimate truths are partless particles and partless moments of consciousness.

12According to the Vaidantikas, the fact that the sprout is not produced during certain periods when conditions for its production seem to prevail demonstrates its dependence on time. This means time is a cause since it is the key factor facilitating production. A facilitating factor (phan 'dogs byed) is the definition of a cause (rgyu). Their argument is then used to show that time is an effect because of its dependence on other factors which help it to produce the sprout.

13Something without an effect cannot be posited as a cause. If it has an effect and the effect facilitates its establishment as a cause, it too must be an effect. Thus to assert causes which are not effects would absurdly amount to asserting causes that lack effects.

14sna tshogs pa. The fact not merely that it has parts but that it has diverse or dissimilar parts is stressed.

15'ermanent functional things are asserted to be truly existent, which would preclude having and depending upon parts.

161ha'i mig, a super-knowledge common to both Buddhists and non-Buddhists, attained through the practice of meditative stabilization, enabling perception of subtle forms.

17According to Cittamatrins, the reasoning refuting the existence of particles is that which refutes external existence. For them emptiness of external existence is the final or ultimate nature of form. Thus the existence of particles is refuted through reasoning which analyzes the ultimate. However, the reasoning that analyzes the ultimate also refutes truly existent consciousness which Cittamatrins accept. Contrary to the Cittamatra contention, both particles and consciousness are equally existent conventionally and equally non-existent ultimately.

18rang gi sde pa refers to proponents of Buddhist systems of tenets and in this context specifically to the Vaibhasikas.

19Samkhyas (grangs can pa), proponents of a non-Buddhist system of tenets, assert that the person is permanent because of not changing and is

consciousness because of not being an aggregate of particles. It is the experiencer of pleasure and pain but is neither an agent of virtue or non-virtue. Nor is it the creator of manifest phenomena which evolve from the nature (rang bzhin) and are confused with the person until yogic perception differentiates the two and all manifestations disappear. The nature or principal (gtso bo) and person are truly existent because they are non-manifest. The other twenty-three of the twentyfive categories enumerated by the Samkhyas are manifest and therefore only exist conventionally, since they are falsities.

The great one (chen po), also called the intellect (blo), is one of the twentyfive categories. It is produced from the nature and acts like a two-sided mirror in which images of objects from the outside and of the person from the inside mingle. The intellect empowers the senses, which apprehend objects that are known by the person in this way. For a succinct account of the Samkhya system, see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, pp. 321-26.

20Aryadeva's text, which is ambiguous, reads *de med na ni srid pa la / bsam pa'ng yod pa ma yin no*. The word *srid pa* can refer to worldly existence which is how Gyeltsap and Ren-da-wa have interpreted it. The text has therefore been translated to accord with Gyeltsap's interpretation. *Srid pa* can also mean "to be possible." Bo-drill's interpretation is based on this meaning; p.108.4 says, "Because in the first place the self as reliance does not exist, there too should be no speculation regarding the possibility of a reliant seed of consciousness." To accord with his interpretation, the translation of the text would read, "Without it there too is no speculation / Regarding its possible existence."

21Gyel. Ch.IX,15.12 and B6.108.16, read *sla'i* and *sla yi* respectively, meaning simpler or easier, whereas Ren-da-wa and both versions of Candrakirti's commentary read *bla'i* or *bla yi*, meaning preferable.

22The contention put forward is that from a conventional perspective certain things are accepted as real and existent such as pots, virtuous and nonvirtuous actions and so on. Others are accepted as non-existent fabrications such as the water of a mirage, a mirror reflection as a real face, the principal, the permanent self and so forth, whereas the ultimate is free from assertions of any kind.

23Ga-tok and 156-drill accept this stanza as an expression of the Prasaingika viewpoint. It seems clear, however, from the end of chapter IX (Can. 241.1.5 ff.) and beginning of chapter X (Can. 241.2.6 ff.), that Candrakirti regards stanza 225 as a contention raised for debate. Gyeltsap and Ren-da-wa follow this interpretation.

#### Notes to Chapter Ten

1This refers to stanza 225.

2ma ping. Five kinds of sexually indeterminate persons are described: those with neither male nor female sexual characteristics are called mtshan med ma ping, without signs. Those with the sexual characteristics of both sexes are called mtshan nyid ma ping, with signs. Those whose sexual characteristics are changeable from birth are known as 'gyur ba ma ning, changeable, while those who are bom with male sexual characteristics but later display primarily female ones are referred to as nyams pa ma ping, deteriorated. Those who display male sexual characteristics during the first part and female characteristics during the later part of the lunar month are called zla ba ma ning. It is said that the mental instability suffered by anyone in such a condition makes them unfit to hold individual liberation vows.

3mu stegs can, "one who has a ford to the end," refers to Indian non-Buddhists who assert they have a ford or path leading to liberation from cyclic existence or to a higher rebirth.

4According to Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets (grub mtha'i rnam bzhag (Varanasi: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1970), pp. 50-51, Vaisesikas assert that the self has the following nine attributes: intelligence (blo), pleasure (bde ba), pain (bsdug bsngal), desire ('dod pa), animosity (sdang ba), effort ('bad pa), virtue (chos), non-virtue (chos ma yin) and activity ('dus byas) which includes momentum (shugs), predisposition (bag chags), duration (gnas pa) and disintegration (jig pa). Gender is not included as an attribute.

5According to accounts drawn from the second chapter of the second of the Four Tantras of Secret Instruction on the Eight Branches of the Essence of Nectar (bdud rtsi snying po yan lag brgyad pa gsang ba man ngaggi rgyud bzhi), a redacted version of which was used in Tibet since the twelfth century as the basis for medical knowledge and practice (rpt. Dharamsala:

Tibetan Medical Institute, 1971), the development of the fetus takes place in three phases. The fish phase (nya yi gnas skabs) is from the first to the third month. The turtle phase (rus sbal gyi gnas skabs) when the four limbs begin to form is from the third to the fifth month. The pig phase (phag gi gnas skabs) when hair starts to grow is from the sixth to the ninth month.

6The self which is the object of the conception "I" is a generality (spyi) of which the self of this life and the self of one's former life are instances (bye brag).

7The argument is based on the reciprocal possession which Vaishesikas assert pertains between a substance and its attributes. The different kinds of intelligence (blo) which are attributes of the self, such as the eye intelligence (mig ki blo) are not themselves cognitive (rig pa'i ngo bo), but act as agents of cognition (rig byed) or sensors for mental consciousness.

8Gyel-tsap's Gateway for Conqueror Children, Explanation of "Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds", pp. 242-45, contains a longer presentation of Samkhya tenets together with a refutation of them.

9The flaws alluded to refer to the Samkhya assertion that the person and the activity of being conscious are one entity and to the consequences which this entails.

10Although Gyel. Ch.X, 8.6 reads, "It is improper to claim that the person but not consciousness exists at the time of experiencing an object" (yul la longs spyod pa'i tshe skyes bu yod la shes pa yod pa med ces bya bar mi rigs so), this should surely read, "prior to experiencing an object" (yul la longs spyod pa'i sngar), if the argument is to be sustained. Ren. 120.2 reads yul la long spyod pa'i sngar.

The five mental faculties (yid kyi dbang po): eye (mig), ear (rna ba), nose (sna), tongue (Ice), and skin (pags pa). The five faculties for action (las kyi dbang po): speech (ngag), arms (lag pa), legs (rkang pa), anus (rkub) and genitals ('doors).

12Can. 246.3.3 and Gyel. Ch.X, 14.1 mention mer mer po, the female fetus during the fourth week.

13Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Way Called "Wisdom" (P5224,

Vol.95, 7.3.6) reads gang la brten to gang byung ba / de ni re shig de nyid min *de las gzhan pa'ng ma yin phyir* de phyir chad min rtag ma yin. Gyeltsap cites only the first two lines. The last two say, "It is also not separate from that / Thus there is no discontinuation and no permanence." Dzong-ka-ba's Ocean of Reasoning, p.332, commenting on these lines, says, "Any effect that arises depending on a cause is firstly not one with that cause by way of its own entity, otherwise it follows that everything which is produced and everything that produces would be one. Thus the cause is not something permanent that turns into the effect. Furthermore any effect that arises in dependence on a particular cause is not separate from that cause by way of its own entity. Since it is contradictory for it to rely on the cause if it is separate, it would arise causelessly. Thus there is no discontinuation of the cause's continuum owing to the effect not arising from the cause. Accordingly through the reasoning of dependent arising the effect is established as being neither inherently one with nor different from the cause. By virtue of this reason the cause is free from the defects of permanence and discontinuation."

#### Notes to Chapter Eleven

1Gyel-tsap refers to the refutation of permanent time as a cause in chapter IX, stanzas 207-211.

2A pot nearing production is a future pot. A butter lamp that has gone out, a man who has died and a house that has fallen down are a past butter lamp, a past man and a past house. These must not be confused with the charred wick, the corpse and the ruins which are present. The butter lamp, referring to one that is actually alight, the man and the house are examples of the present. Panchen So-nam-drak-ba (pan chen bsod nams grags pa, 1478-1554) says that the sprout's cause is the future sprout and the sprout's effect is the past sprout. Jay-dzun Cho-gyi-gyel-tsen (rje btsun chos kyi rgyal mtshan, 1469-1546) says the sprout which is presently being produced is the future sprout and the disintegrated sprout is the past sprout. Before a thing has come into existence it is future, and when it has disintegrated it is past. Thus there is first a future pot, *i.e.* a pot to be, then a pot and subsequently a past pot, namely one that has disintegrated. The future in relation to the pot will occur when the pot has disintegrated and will be the pot's effect. The past in relation to the pot occurred when the pot was not yet produced and was the pot's cause.

3ma 'ongs pa'i ma 'ongs pa, referring to the present and past.

4Gah. 345.5 ff.

5gzhi mthun. A common locus of a pot and the future means that which is both a pot and future.

6In the lower systems of Buddhist tenets it is asserted that a disintegrated pot (bum pa zhig pa) is non-functional, which implies that it should be causeless. In that case a butter lamp which has gone out should be uncaused, but it is quite obvious that, for instance, the burning down of the wick and running out of the butter cause the lamp to go out. The disintegration of the pot (bum pa jig pa) is its not remaining for a second moment. If its not remaining for a second moment (dus gnyis par mi sdod pa) is caused, its not having remained for a second moment (dus gnyis par ma bsdad pa) is also caused. Conversely, if its not having remained for a second moment is uncaused, its not remaining for a second moment must also be uncaused. If that were the case it could not disintegrate, since it would not be a composite thing!

7Gah. 351.3

8Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975), Vol.5, p.170, says, "Niyati means the ordering of things. It stands for what we should call the natural law, such as the existence of the oil in the seed, of the grain in the husk, and all natural contingencies." In these volumes Dasgupta translates niyati as "destiny," over which living beings have no control.

9Here "seen" refers to that which is manifest or self-evident and can be cognized by direct perception. "Unseen" refers to the hidden (Ikog gyur) and very hidden (shin to Ikog gyur) which can only be understood through scriptural citations and reasoning. Sometimes "seen" means that which pertains to this life and "unseen" that which pertains to other lifetimes.

10rang grub pa'i dus gnyis par mi sdod pa. This can refer to the fact that a thing only continues to exist in a specific form for a certain length of time, or to the fact that it undergoes constant change. For instance when we look at a cup that has been in constant use for five years, we can see it is no longer the brand new cup we bought in the store five years ago, and when it

eventually breaks, we understand its coarse impermanence through direct personal experience. However the cup has undergone constant momentary changes from the first moment of its existence. There is constant new formation in that the cup of a moment ago has ceased to exist by the next moment, but because there is a continuity of moments of a similar type, we feel that the same cup we saw a moment ago is still there. We are thus unaware of its subtle impermanence, which initially we can only come to understand through reasoning.

11 Explicit cognition (dngos su rtogs pa) means cognition of an object entailing its appearance (snang ba sgo nas rtogs pa). Implicit cognition (shugs la rtogs pa) means cognition entailing non-appearance of the object (ma snang ba sgo nas rtogs pa). For instance, when a conceptual consciousness explicitly cognizes sound as impermanent, it implicitly cognizes sound's lack of permanence and vice versa. It is said that omniscient mind directly cognizes all three times simultaneously. Direct cognition is necessarily explicit cognition. Past, present and future are, however, not cognized as simultaneous.

12Gyel. Ch.XI, 8.2 ff. reads ma 'ongs pa ranggi ngo bo'i sgo nas yod pa'i phyir. Ren. 133.20 says "because it has [attained] its entity" (rang gi ngo bo yod pa'i phyir). This is a distinguishing feature of things which exist in the present.

13Ren. 135.1 ff. says, "If the future did not exist, it would not be appropriate to speak of consciousness being produced, for if, because it is future, the consciousness to be produced does not exist, there will also be no process of production, since it would lack a basis. If consciousness were not produced, attachment which is the basis for desire would also not exist. In that case, if desire did not have attachment as its basis it would arise causelessly. However desire is not causeless, otherwise it would arise in Foe Destroyers too." Attachment in this context can be taken as attachment to the self (bdag la chags pa), in other words, the misconception of the self. Bo. 127.16 mentions "the seeds of attachment and so forth .....

14This point is made in Vasubandhu's Treasury of Knowledge (P5590, Vol.115, 117.5.4) and in his Explanation of the "Treasury of Knowledge" (P5591, Vol.115, 139.1.8). See Lati Rinbochay and Elizabeth Napper, Mind in Tibetan Buddhism (London: Rider and Company, 1980), pp. 18 and 86

for information on what "two consciousnesses" implies in this context.

15A11 Buddhist systems of tenets propound the four seals (lta ba bkar btags kyī phyag rgya bzhi): all products are impermanent, all contaminated things are miserable, all phenomena are selfless and nirvana is peace. As regards view, whether one is a Buddhist or not is in general determined by whether or not one accepts the four seals. As regards conduct, it is determined by whether or not one turns to the Three jewels as one's ultimate source of refuge.

16The visual consciousness cognizes its object clearly (gsa! bar dpyod) in that the object actually appears to that visual consciousness without the presence of a generic image (don spyi). The subsequently arising mental consciousness cognizes it unclearly (mi gsa! ba'i tshul) in that the object is cognized by way of its generic image.

17dran pa. If the previously experienced object on which memory focuses existed inherently, it should exist at the time of remembering. That object would not be deceptive since the way it appears and the way it exists would accord. The remembering consciousness that focuses on it would not be mistaken or deceived for it would experience the object as it actually is. However the previously experienced object is not observable when memory of it arises, yet the remembering mind perceives it as though it were present. The object is therefore false and deceptive and the perceiving consciousness deceived.

#### Notes to Chapter Twelve

1Bhavaviveka's madhyamakahrdayakarika (bdu ma'i snying po'i tshig le'ur byas pa), P5255, Vol.96, 4.2.3.

21Ideal students are unprejudiced, intelligent, enthusiastic in searching for the right path to follow, respectful toward the teacher and teaching and completely attentive.

3Ideal teachers have the following ten qualities: They are (1) disciplined in that they practise restraint from harmful physical, verbal and mental activity and abide by the three kinds of vows; (2) calm because their practice of concentration counters distraction, thereby overcoming coarse disturbing emotions; (3) very peaceful because their practice of wisdom thoroughly pacifies disturbing emotions; (4) rich in scriptural knowledge

regarding the three categories of teaching. They have (5) wisdom understanding suchness, the final mode of existence; (6) knowledge exceeding the student's in those matters in which the student seeks guidance; (7) wisdom and skill in presenting the teachings and guiding others; (8) love and compassion as their motivation for teaching. They are (9) untiring in their effort to help students, and such effort is continual. They are (10) patient in teaching and guiding students and are able to bear their ingratitude. These qualities are mentioned in Maitreya's Ornament for the Mahayana Sutras (mahayanasutralamkarakarika, theg pa chen po'i mdo sde'i rgyan gyi tshig le'ur byas pa, P5521, Vol. 108), 13.4.5.

4Although there is no indication of a plural in the commentaries and it is therefore unclear whether reference is being made to the student's own good qualities or those of other students, Ge-tsang's Notes on the Stages of the Path, p.478, elucidates this point as follows: "Not only will the good qualities of the teacher be seen as good qualities and not as faults, but the good qualities of fellow listeners will also not be seen as faults."

5'phags lam yan lag brgyad:

(1) correct view (yang dag pa'i Ita ba): understanding through thorough investigation what was cognized during meditative equipoise.

(2) correct thought (yang dag pa'i rtog pa): communicating what one has cognized to others, motivated by the wish to help them understand it.

(3) correct speech (yang dag pa'i ngag): convincing others of the correct view and of the fact that one holds it, by speaking to them appropriately.

(4) correct action (yang dag pa'i las kyi mtha): convincing others of the purity of one's ethical conduct by not performing improper actions.

(5) correct livelihood (yang dag pa'i 'tsho ba): convincing others that one's possessions are modest by using only the clothes, *etc.* which the Buddha has permitted.

(6) correct effort (yang dag pa'i rtsol ba): energetically cultivating the paths which counteract disturbing attitudes and emotions to be abandoned by the path of meditation.

(7) correct mindfulness (yang dag pa'i dran pa): counteracting laxity and

excitement by not forgetting the focal object of calm abiding.

(8) correct meditative stabilization (yang dag pa'i ting nge 'dzin): accomplishing special forms of super-knowledge to counteract discordant factors such as obstructions to absorption, through maintaining single-pointedness by means of meditative stabilization.

The eightfold path of the Exalted is the seventh of the seven categories of yogic paths which make up the thirty-seven factors in harmony with enlightenment. Although the eightfold path is normally discussed in the context of the path of meditation, all thirty-seven factors are in fact attained when the path of seeing is reached. This is clearly stated in Maitreya's Ornament for the Mahayana Sutras (P5521, Vol.108, 11.2.5 ff.). The quality of pure water (which is cool, has a good taste, is light, smooth, clear, odorless, not harmful to the throat, and beneficial to the stomach) is affected by the kind of vessel which holds it. Similarly, although the Exalted of all three vehicles attain this eightfold path, its quality varies depending upon which kind of Exalted one has generated it.

6King of Meditative Stabilizations (P795, Vol.31, 283.5.4). Dzong-ka-ba comments on this citation in Ocean of Reasoning, p.440: "In the sphere of nirvana without remainder there are no actions and disturbing attitudes and emotions, nor their effects. Thus all opponents agree on their non-existence. The state ment that phenomena, which do not exist then, have always been non-existent indicates that even during cyclic existence they never existed in terms of their own suchness."

7"The four practitioners of virtue" here refers to those who abide in the fruit of a Stream Enterer, Once Returner, Never Returner and Foe Destroyer. These results are presented in the context of the Hearer Vehicle and range from abandonment of those obstructions to liberation which are eliminated by the Hinayana path of seeing to the complete abandonment of all obstructions caused by disturbing attitudes and emotions. The Exalted achieve these results through meditation on emptiness.

8Commenting on statements by Dignaga and Dharmakirti regarding conviction in the validity of the Buddha's words in his exegesis of Dharmakirti's Commentary on [Dignaga's] Compendium of Valid Cognition, Gyeltsap's Elucidation of the Path to Liberation (ream 'grel thar lam gsal byed; Varanasi: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1974,

p.175 ff.) says that Buddha's statements concerning extremely hidden matters are not deceptive because they are like his statements about obvious and slightly hidden matters. The Buddha's statements that prosperity comes from giving and happiness from ethical conduct are not deceptive because, like his words concerning the four truths, they are not invalidated by any of the following three kinds of cognition used to investigate them-statements regarding what is obvious are not damaged by direct valid cognition, those regarding what is slightly hidden are not invalidated by inference through the power of the fact, and those about extremely hidden matters are not invalidated by inference through conviction. All the great trailblazers use the validity of the Buddha's statements regarding obvious and slightly hidden things to establish the validity of those about extremely hidden matters, arguing that they are all equally the Buddha's words, spoken by the same person. Moreover since his statements regarding the means to attain liberation and omniscience, the main focus of his teaching, are not deceptive, what he has taught about less important matters such as the means through which high rebirth is attained will not be deceptive either.

9Ren. 146.12 if. lists the following four types of valid cognition: direct (mngon sum), inferential (rjes dpag), through appraisal (nye bar jal ba) and through scripture (lung gi tsad ma). While all valid cognition is either direct or inferential, the latter two-which are inferential cognition-are singled out for special attention. In general there are three main types of inferential valid cognition: inference through the power of the fact (dngos stobs rjes dpag); through conviction (yid ches rjes dpag), which is equivalent to valid cognition through scripture; and inference through appraisal of an example (dpe nyer 'jal gyi rjes dpag), sometimes replaced by inference through renown (grags pa'i rjes dpag). Objects of apprehension can only be obvious or hidden, and thus valid cognitions apprehending them are only either direct or inferential. For further discussion of inference see Lati Rinbochay and Elizabeth Napper, *Mind in Tibetan Buddhism*, pp. 76-84.

10Can. 256.1.7 if. succinctly formulates what is meant by self and selflessness in words that are cited in many other works. "Here 'self' is an inherent nature of phenomena, that is, a non-dependence on another. The non-existence of this is selflessness" (de la bdag ces bya ba ni gang zhig dngos po mams kyi gzhan la rag ma las pa'i ngo bo rang bzhin to med pa ni bdag med pa'o).

11Nagarjuna's Praise to the Perfection of Wisdom (prajnaparamitastotra,

shes rab kyi pha rol to ph yin ma'i bstod pa, P2018, Vol. 46), 37.3.2.

12True existence is called a natural stain (rang bzhin gyi dri ma) because all things are naturally free from it without the need for meditation on paths. This so-called natural stain is not a stain at all because it does not exist. Natural nirvana, since it is the fundamental mode of existence of all phenomena, is not actually nirvana, which is a cessation of adventitious stains attained through meditation on paths.

13Nagarjuna's Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning, P5225, Vol.95, 11.3.3.

14Nirvana is not generally said to be attained when one reaches the path of seeing, since it is said to occur when all disturbing attitudes and emotions are eliminated. Here the meaning appears to be that one can attain nirvana in the very life in which one reaches the path of seeing. Gyeltsap's Commentary on the Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning (rigs pa drug cu pa'i tikka, fromgyal tshab rje'i gsung 'bum [Dharamsala: Shes rig par khang, 1981], Vol. ca, p.411.4 ff.) says, "It is not evident in this system that the attainment of the path of seeing is posited as the attainment of nirvana. Sutra says, 'My rebirths are finished, the task is done.' The statement is made in the context of Foe Destroyers."

#### Notes to Chapter Thirteen

1gzugs. Since sounds, smells, tastes and tangible objects are also forms, the term visible form is used as a variant for form to denote the object of visual consciousness.

2rang mtshan pa is taken to be synonymous with ranggi mtshan nyid kyi grub pa in this chapter. Elsewhere it is also translated as "real." Blue is introduced here to emphasize that not only visible form but color, which along with shape constitutes visible form, does not exist by way of its own character either.

3rdzas brgyas. In the Desire Realm the five objects of the senses, when not connected with consciousness, are composed of eight substances (or nine if sound particles are present). These eight are: earth, water, fire, wind, visible form, smell, taste, and that which is tangible. The latter four derive from the elements. When the object is connected with consciousness, particles of the body sense organ are present and there are thus nine

components. If particles of the other sense organs are present, there are ten components and eleven if sound particles are also present.

4"Dialecticians" (rtogge ba) here refers to proponents of true existence (dngos smra ba) who assert that a direct perceiver has the three features of being a consciousness free from conceptuality, unmistaken with respect to its appearing object, a functional thing existent by way of its own entity and of both arising and engaging in its object in dependence upon a sense organ. Candrakirti refutes the first of these in Clear Words, Commentary on INagarjuna'sJ 'Treatise on the Middle Way" (mulamadhyamakamtippirasannapada, dbu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa tshig gsal ba, P5260, Vol.98, 13.2.1 ff.) and refutes the second and third at this point in his commentary on the Four Hundred (259.1.5 ff.). Conceptuality usually involves perception for which a sound image (sgra spyi) and generic image (don spyi) are merged. However, someone unversed in terminology may perceive the generic image of an object without its being merged with an associated sound image. This is one explanation found in many texts for the term sgra don 'dres rung. Jang-gya however asserts that the sound and generic image should not be differentiated in this way.

5A single moment of consciousness cannot be produced and then engage with its object in dependence upon a sense organ as they assert occurs in direct perception, since moment by moment both the sense organ and consciousness cease upon production.

6The opponent asserts that sense consciousnesses are direct perceivers in relation to their objects of engagement, the five sense objects existent by way of their own character. However since objects merely appear to but do not actually exist in this way, these consciousnesses are mistaken and deceptive in this respect. To then refer to them as valid cognition which should be nondeceptive is inadmissible. The Prasafigika definition of direct valid cognition is knowing that is not deceptive with respect to an object of comprehension which is its main object of engagement. Thus for instance, both blue and blue existent by way of its own character appear to a visual consciousness perceiving blue. However the visual consciousness is valid cognition with respect to blue, its main object of engagement, but not with respect to blue existent by way of its own character. In Gyel. Ch. XIII 3.2 if. read sties for zhes in accordance with Can. 259.4.1 and rtog for rtogs in accordance with Can. 259.4.2.

7Can. 259.4.1 if.

8gzugs kyi Skye mched. The six types of objects of consciousness (forms, sounds, smells, tastes, tangible objects and phenomena) and the six organs (eye organ, ear organ, nose organ, tongue organ, body organ and mental organ) are sources in that they act as stimuli to the production and development of awareness.

9Stanza 308 has five lines in all versions inspected.

10spyi don gzhan, one of the six categories of existents asserted by Vaisesikas-substance, quality, activity, generality, particularity and inherence. Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets, p.52.10 ff., says, "A generality acts as a common cause for applying terms and the mind to phenomena which it accompanies."

11The entailment is that visible forms, *etc.* exist because the eye and the other organs that perceive them exist. Implicit in the opponent's assertion is that both the subject and object exist by way of their own entity. Stanza 316 refutes the eye as a perceiver by way of its own entity on the grounds that it does not perceive itself. Its function as a perceiver can thus not be adduced by the opponent as proof of directly perceptible objects existent by way of their own entity.

12Gah. 448.1

13Smell-eaters (dri za, Skt. gandharva) are celestial beings famed as musicians. They enjoy and gain nourishment from smells of all kinds. Although they are classed as gods in some texts and as demi-gods in others, Vasubandhu's Treasury of Knowledge says they are intermediate state beings (bar srid) and that their phantom cities are dwellings in the intermediate state.

14King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra (P795, Vol.31, 283.4.5 ff.) contains the stanzas in the following order: 1 (283.4.5 ff.); 2 (283.4.4 ff.); 3 (283.4.1 ff.); 4 (283.4.3: although the meaning is similar the words are not as cited by Gyeltsap); 5 (283.4.7 ff.); 6 (283.4.8); 7 (283.3.2 ff.); 8 (283.4.1 ff.).

1By qualifying existence with adjectives such as true, inherent, independent, *etc.* and by the use of phrases such as "by way of their own entity," "by way of their own character" and so forth, it is evident that existence in general is not being refuted, but only a particular kind of existence. Aryadeva's text often does not clearly indicate this difference. The Madhyamika view should therefore not be misunderstood as a nihilist view.

2Minds (sems) and their accompanying mental factors (sems byung) possess five similarities (mtshungs Iden Inga). Their base (rten) is the same in that, for instance, both a visual consciousness and its accompanying mental factors such as feeling depend on the same uncommon empowering condition, the eye organ. They share the same focal object (dmigs pa) in that their object of engagement (jug yul) is the same; the same aspect (rnam pa) in that their mode of apprehension is the same; the same time (dus) in that they occur simultaneously; and the same substantial entity (rdzas) in that a moment of visual consciousness, for example, can only be accompanied by a single substantial entity of feeling.

3Hot and burning (tsha zhing bsreg pa) is the definition of fire.

4Vasubandhu's Treasury of Knowledge (P5590, Vol.115, 118.4.4). Reference to simultaneously occurring causes and effects does not indicate the normal sequential cause and effect relationship, but a mutually supportive relationship as in the case of the four elements which occur simultaneously and cannot be isolated from one another. This relationship also pertains in the case of the four characteristics of products-production, duration, aging and disintegration-and exists between mind and the omnipresent mental factors of feeling, discrimination, intention, contact and mental engagement which accompany it.

5In this context refutation of the four alternatives focuses on the effect, negating the inherent production of an effect which exists or which does not exist at the time of its cause, which both does and does not exist at that time, and which neither exists nor does not exist at that time. The reasons used to refute the above, presented in somewhat more detail by Ren-da-wa in his commentary on stanza 265 (p.135.9 ff.) are then applied to refute production in terms of a cause and effect which are inherently one, inherently different, both and neither. This process of refutation focuses on

the cause. Thus the "diamond fragments" reason is used to analyze whether an effect is produced from a cause which is the same entity, an inherently different entity, both of the former or neither of the former. Causeless production of an effect is often substituted for the last category in this analysis. Gah. 481.4 explains the Nirgrantha contention regarding the production of an effect which is both permanent and impermanent or both of one nature with yet different from its cause. An example would be a gold bracelet that does not differ in nature from the lump of gold from which it was made but is different in that the gold has temporarily taken on a new aspect. This is refuted by applying the reasons which refute cause and effect as a single entity and cause and effect as inherently different entities. The contention that cause and effect are neither one entity nor different entities can be refuted by adducing the very same reasons. If they are not one entity, they must be different entities, while if they are not different entities they must be one entity. Implicit in all these contentions is an affirmation that things have objective and inherent existence. All the reasons employed aim at refuting this underlying belief.

6tshad ma sde bdun, Dharmakirti. See bibliography. These texts present the Cittamatra view.

#### Notes to Chapter Fifteen

1Dzong-ka-ba's Ocean of Reasoning (p.155.4 ff.) says, "Because of having characteristics such as production, forms and so forth are said to be products. Sautrantikas and above [i.e. Cittamatrins and Madhyamikas] assert that the characteristics, production and so forth are the activity of production, the activity of persisting and the activity of disintegrating of these phenomena. Vaibhasikas, as explained below, assert that they are agents which cause forms and so forth to be produced, disintegrate and persist. According to the latter, when something such as the form aggregate is defined as a product, it is not so defined because of being produced but because of having a separate agent of production and so forth. According to the former, it is not defined in this way. When Sautrantikas refute that the production and so forth of forms, *etc.* are different substantial entities from the latter, Vaibhasikas object, asking how they could be characteristics of those phenomena that act as bases for characteristics. In reply [Sautrantikas say that Vasubandhu] has explained in [his auto-] commentary on the Treasury [Explanation of the "Treasury of Knowledge" (P5591, Vol.115, 153.2.3)] that the combination of a hump and so forth is a characteristic of

cattle and hardness a characteristic of the earth element, even though they are not different substantial entities. Production and so forth are also like this."

2Our normal conception of production, duration, and disintegration is in terms of a thing's complete life span from the time it is newly produced or formed until it disintegrates, is old, wears out or falls to pieces. Such a linear conception of these characteristics takes no account of the subtle changes which take place moment by moment. Production, duration and disintegration are present at each moment, characterizing different features of an ongoing process. Thus production is the new arising of what did not exist before; duration the persisting of a previous continuum; and disintegration a thing's not lasting for a second moment after its formation.

3Dzong-ka-ba's Ocean of Reasoning (p.67.6 ff.) says, "If the basis and that based upon it existed ultimately, they could not undergo any change in nature. Since the activity would always require a basis, the sprout and so forth would have to exist as a basis for the activity of production even at a time when they are approaching production. Cause and effect would thereby be simultaneous. ... It is not the same with conventional production, since even if [the sprout and production] act as basis and that which is based upon it at one point, they do not always have to do so." Further, p.177.11 if. says, "Both we and others must accept that woollen cloth to be produced is an agent and basis, and its production an activity dependent upon it; also that while the woollen cloth is approaching production, the agent and basis does not exist, but the activity of production does. However if the woollen cloth and production existed ultimately, their being basis and that which is based upon it would have an inherently existent nature and would therefore always infallibly have to exist thus. Since the woollen cloth would have to exist at that time too [when it is approaching production], that which is already existent prior to its production would have to be produced as woollen cloth again."

41bid., p.194.15 if., says, "You should ascertain, as determined by reasoning, that production, duration and disintegration could none of them be posited if they existed by way of their own entity and their existence was not merely posited through the force of convention. Then you should train yourself to see that what is posited through the force of convention is perfectly feasible and that the appearance of all products as diverse entities, even though they are empty of existence by way of their own entity, is like

a magician's illusions and like dreams." In the term dependent arising, "dependent" confirms the absence of independent existence, while "arising" confirms existence, precluding the total non-existence indicated by the analogy of a barren woman's child. Thus "dependent" protects from the extreme of reification and "arising" from the extreme of annihilation.

5Can. 272.3.8 if.

6This may be aimed at the view held by Tang-sak-ba (thang sag pa), one of Ba-tsap Nyi-ma-drak's close disciples, and by others that Madhyamika as propounded by Candrakirti was a theory of neither being nor non-being (yod min med min gyi Ita ba). See Ruegg, "The Jo nan pas: A School of Buddhist Ontologists According to the Grub mtha' sel gyi me Ion," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 83 (1963), p.89.

71f a functional cause could produce a non-functional effect, a seed, for instance, could produce a burnt sprout.

8King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra (P795, Vol.32, 24.1.4 ff.). Dzong-kaba's Ocean of Reasoning (p.194.11 ff.) cites the same lines with only very little variation. The version in Gyel. (Ch. XV, 8.19 ff.) differs somewhat but retains the same meaning and accords with the version cited in Can. 273.3.5 if. except for the last line. This is translated in accordance with Gyel. Ch. XV, 9.1, bdag to Ita bar gyur pas rnam par dben. Can. 273.3.6 reads, "are free from views of permanence" (rtag to lta bar gyur pas rnam par dben). The King of Meditative Stabilizations reads, "are continuously free from views" (lta ba dag las gor mor rnam par dben).

91f things existed truly as is claimed, they ought to be findable on analysis. Here the attempt to pinpoint the thing under production focuses on whether it does or does not have the entity of being in the process of production. Both possibilities are ruled out. In the first case an entity has already been attained, while in the second, involvement in the process of production is precluded. Since experience confirms that things are produced, they must exist in a way that is different from that in which they appear to exist. Appearing to exist in one way and actually existing in another is the mark of falseness. Their existence is therefore not true but false.

10Gyel. Ch. XV, 12.16 if. is only very slightly different from King of

Meditative Stabilizations (P795, Vol.31, 280.4.2 ff.) and retains the same meaning.

11Those under the magician's spell to whom the conjured men and women appear to be real are taken in by the appearance and think they are real. Things similarly appear to be truly existent to ordinary living beings who then assent to this appearance and act accordingly. The illusory men and women he has created appear to the magician too, but he knows they are not real. Similarly, things appear to be truly existent even to the wisdom of subsequent attainment (rjes thob ye shes) of the Exalted, but they do not take them to be so. Those who arrive when everything is over and who are not affected by the spell do not see any illusory men and women and thus do not mistake them for real men and women. Similarly, to the wisdom of the Exalted in meditative equipoise on emptiness (stong nyid mnyam bzhag ye shes) conventional phenomena do not even appear nor do they take them to be truly existent.

12In his Gateway for Conqueror Children, Explanation of "Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds", p. 210.9 ff., Gyeltsap comments on the following lines from the ninth chapter of ~antideva's Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (bodhisattvacaryavatara, byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa, P5272, Vol.99, 258.24 ff.):

**The ultimate is not [this] mind's field of activity;  
[This] mind is asserted to be conventional.**

***don dam blo yi spyod yul min  
blo ni kun bdzob yin par 'dod***

Gyeltsap says, "The first line indicates the definition of ultimate truths, the second the definition of conventional truths. The former and latter [use on mind refers not just to any mind, but to mind to which there is dualistic appearance. Also this is said from the point of view of how its object is apprehended. It should therefore be interpreted as follows: The instance, lack of inherent existence of the person and aggregates, illustrates ultimate truth. To the direct valid cognition directly cognizing this, it is not its field of activity in terms of dualistic appearance. It is that which is known by the

direct valid cognition apprehending it." P. 210.17 if. continues, "The person and aggregates as instances are said to be conventional truths because, for the direct valid cognition which explicitly cognizes them, they are that which is cognized in terms of dualistic appearance." Dualistic appearance here refers to duality of subject and object.

#### Notes to Chapter Sixteen

1Although Can. 275.3.2 if. does not elaborate this analogy, Ge-shay Bodo-wa's Precious Heap of Analogies for the Doctrine (pp.308-09) says,

like the dead queen: In India a certain king went to wage war in another country. He left a capable minister in his place to look after the queens, but one of the finest queens died. If the king had been told that the queen had died, he would have been upset. This would have affected the war adversely, so his wise minister acted with diplomacy. He told a man going to see the king to say, 'The queen has a large pimple on her forehead.' The next one going to see the king was to say, 'The pimple has gotten much bigger'; then, 'It has turned into blisters'; and then, 'They have spread over her whole face and the skin has peeled off. It has turned into an open sore.' The king said, 'It would be best if she dies before I return.' Soon after, they told him she had died, but the war was not affected adversely and the king's grief was not so great. Similarly, skillful spiritual friends do not teach emptiness immediately at the outset, but gradually teach the antidotes to the four wrong conceptions. First, meditation on repulsiveness is taught as an antidote to the wrong conceptions which like a blue-bottle take what is unclean to be clean. Then meditation on all internal and external things as impermanent is taught to counteract the wrong conceptions which take what is impermanent like dew on the grass to be permanent. Next, meditation on the suffering of the whole of cyclic existence is taught as an antidote to the wrong conceptions which take suffering for happiness, like a fish and its bait. Then as an antidote to the wrong conceptions which take what is selfless and like dreams and magical illusions to have a self, one teaches and hears that all phenomena are selfless. It is said that teaching and listening by stages insures that emptiness will not be misunderstood.

This explains what is meant by the enigmatic words, "settling spiritual guides and students" (slob dpon dang slob ma rnam par gtan la dbab pa) in Gyeltsap's title for this chapter and why the words "the procedure between" have been inserted in square brackets. The skillful guide leads the student

step by step in a gradual progression towards an understanding of emptiness after which misconceptions regarding emptiness itself are dispelled. As part of that process the most conspicuous wrong conceptions are dealt with first. Then step by step attention is focused on increasingly subtle matters. The order described by Geshay Bo-do-wa of combatting these wrong conceptions differs from that of our text.

2The opponent interprets the emptiness of a phenomenon as its non-existence. This excludes it from knowable objects, which necessarily exist. Regarding the assertion that emptiness itself is not a knowable object, the view of the great translator Ngok Lo-den-shay-rap (ngog blo Idan sties rab, 1059-1109) and others was that if anything is found when a reasoning consciousness investigates the ultimate mode of existence of a thing, what is found has sustained analysis and must therefore truly exist. If emptiness were found it would be truly existent. This however is unacceptable to Ngok Lo-den-shay-rap because he holds Madhyamika tenets. He therefore asserts that nothing is cognized by a reasoning consciousness analyzing the ultimate. Since emptiness then is neither the object of a reasoning consciousness analyzing the ultimate nor of conventional valid cognition, it is not a knowable object since it is not appropriate as an object of any kind of awareness. Gyeltsap's commentary on this stanza (380) emphasizes that under investigation nothing is findable. This means that when the final mode of existence of a pot is investigated, and one seeks to establish whether the pot is truly existent, *i.e.* exists as it appears, only the absence of a pot existing in this way is found, which is its emptiness of true existence. Merely being found by a reasoning consciousness does not make what is found truly existent. Only if what is sought were found would it be truly existent. Thus if the pot were found when the imputed object to which the term "pot" is attributed is sought, the pot would exist truly as something findable under analysis. An absence of such existence is found, but that absence or emptiness is not the object sought. When emptiness itself is subjected to the same scrutiny, it is not found. Only the absence or emptiness of its true existence is found. For more discussion of this topic, see Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, pp.406-11. For some of the arguments Dzong-ka-ba uses to establish that emptiness is a knowable object, see Elizabeth Napper, *Dependent Arising and Emptiness* (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1989), pp.131-32, and Robert Thurman, *Life and Teachings of Tsong Khapa* (Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1982), pp.162-64.

3Nagarjuna's Fundamental Wisdom (P5224, Vol.95, 6.2.1) concludes the stanza with the following two lines:

## Since not the slightest thing is not empty How can emptiness exist?

Dzong-ka-ba's Ocean of Reasoning, p.259.18 if. comments on the stanza in response to a contention that if one asserts emptiness, things cannot previously have been non-existent by way of their own entity. Things that are bases for emptiness must necessarily exist and do so by way of their own entity. In response Dzong-ka-ba says,

If emptiness had the slightest existence by way of its own entity, there could be something not empty existing by way of its own entity as its basis. However here [in this system] emptiness and selflessness are asserted as the general characteristics of all phenomena. Thus when there is not even the slightest thing which is not empty of a self, how can emptiness exist by way of its own entity? It cannot. [If it did,] since the antidote [emptiness] would be without a reliance, it would be (non-existent) like a sky flower.

4Jnanagarbha, Differentiation of the Two Truths (satyadvayavibangakdrikn, bden gnyis nam 'byed, Toh. 3881, Vol. sa, fol.2a.1-2). Nga-wang-bel-den (ngagdbang dpal Idan, b. 1797) in Explanation of the Conventional and Ultimate in the Four Systems of Tenets (grup mtha' bzhi'i lugs kyi kun rdzob dang don dam pa'i don nam par bshad pa legs bshad dpyid kyi deal mo'i glu dbyangs [New Delhi: Guru Deva, 1972], p. 165) comments on these lines: "The Cittamatrins assert that emptiness, the negation precluding a self of phenomena with regard to the basis of negation, exists as [its own) reality. Since the object of negation of our own system, a self of phenomena, does not exist, the negation precluding it is said not to exist as [its own] reality. Therefore the explanation that the negation of ultimate production is a conventionality means it exists conventionally and does not indicate that it is a conventional [truth]." The negation here refers to emptiness. For further discussion of this, see Lopez, A Study of Svatantrika, p.199.

5Here the argument is similar to that in stanza 382. "No thesis" or "absence of a thesis" (phyog med) refers to emptiness itself and the counter-thesis to the basis of emptiness. "Absence of a thesis" also refers to the

absence of a thesis that exists by way of its own entity. The opponent asserts that though Madhyamikas claim to have no system, their very contention that they have no thesis constitutes a system. Implicit in the opponent's argument is the assumption that anything which exists has inherent existence. In the commentary, stress is laid on the fact that Madhyamikas never claim to have no system, but merely assert that emptiness, the absence of inherent existence, is not itself inherently existent. Similarly they do not deny holding views or theses, but merely deny their inherent existence. A number of contemporary scholars as well as former Madhyamikas in India and Tibet do not accept this interpretation of the many terse statements found in the basic texts of Madhyamika literature to the effect that Madhyamikas hold no views or position and have no system or thesis. According to the special insight section of Dzongka-ba's Great Exposition, these statements are not to be taken literally. For an excellent discussion of this topic, see Napper, *Dependent Arising and Emptiness*, pp.116-22.

6Stanza 346 (chapter XIV) explains how these are refuted by the reason of dependent arising.

7Attachment in this context can mean clinging to the true existence of things, or attachment to the self, the self's happiness, and to that which one hopes will facilitate such happiness. This attachment is rooted in the misconception of the self as truly existent. One experiences suffering by not finding the happiness sought through the acquisition of friends, status, wealth and so forth and instead encountering unwanted situations. This suffering can be stopped by removing its cause, the underlying misconception. The understanding of selflessness apprehends the self in a way diametrically opposed to that in which the conception of true existence apprehends it. When this understanding stops attachment to the self, attachment to the other factors mentioned above also ceases.

8This may be identified as a Sautrantika assertion. Nga-wang-bel-den's *Explanation of the Conventional and Ultimate in the Four Systems of Tenets*, p. 47, says that according to Sautrantikas Following Reasoning impermanent phenomena are "specifically characterized (*rang mtshan*) because of being phenomena that must be realized by a mind that takes them as its appearing object through the appearance of their own uncommon characteristics [in direct perception]. Due to this, they are not

objects of terms since their entities cannot fully appear to a terminologically arisen [conceptual] consciousness" (translation in Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 551). According to Sautrantikas specifically characterized phenomena are not merely imputed by terms and thought, but exist from their own side by way of their own exclusive mode of being. Terms can convey this mode of being but only via the medium of generic images (*don spyi*), and thus cannot evoke them as vividly as they are experienced by direct perception.

9Gyel. Ch. XVI, 11.15-16 reads *jig rten pa la yod pa yin*, which could also mean "...and exist to ordinary perception" (*jig rten pa'i sties ngor yod pa yin*), *i.e.* an awareness not involved in analyzing the fundamental mode of existence of a thing.

101f anything existed inherently, in and of itself, it should be found by a reasoning consciousness examining whether or not it exists as a findable entity. It would then be an ultimate truth and could not be a conventionality which is the object of a conventional cognition.

Here the opponents' argument that Madhyamikas make things which previously existed non-existent by refuting their true existence is used against them. If refutation of their true existence makes things non-existent, they would always have been non-existent because they have never existed truly. The Ornament for Clear Realization (P5184, Vol.88, 6.5.8) says:

**With regard to this there is nothing to remove,  
Nor is there anything to impose.  
By viewing reality correctly,  
When reality is seen, one is released.**

Dzong-ka-ba's commentary on this passage in *Golden Rosary of Good Explanation* (*legs bshad gser gyi phreng ba*, P6150, Vol.155, 189.3.3 ff.) says,

With regard to these dependently arising [phenomena], the two selves [a self of persons and a self of phenomena] are not at all something to be removed, since from the beginning the two have never existed. The two selflessnesses are not something to be imposed or added for they are

perpetually present. Accordingly there is no self to remove nor selflessness to impose. When one views this reality correctly, namely without error, and sees the two selflessnesses which are the meaning of reality, one will gradually gain release from obstructions caused by disturbing attitudes and emotions and obstructions to omniscience.

12Though a pot that has disintegrated is non-functional as a pot, according to the Prasangika system a disintegrated pot (bum pa zhig pa) is a functional thing in that it has come into existence from a cause, the pot's production, and produces an effect, the following moment of the disintegrated pot.

13See introduction, page 23.

#### Notes to the Colophon

1Jean Naudou, *Buddhists of Kashmir* (Delhi, India: Agam Kala Prakashan, 1980), p.210, says, "...the most active monastery during the eleventh century was the Ratnaguptavihara." Taranatha's *History of Buddhism in India*, p. 185, mentions that it was founded by Samghadasa, a disciple of Vasubandhu. It was thus probably more than six hundred years old when this translation was undertaken. The Tibetan version says that the translation was made at rin chen sbas pa'i kun dga' ra bar which Naudou (p. 210) translates as Ratnaguptarama. The expression kun dga' ra ba most commonly means a park or pleasant walled area used by monks for debate and discourse, called chos ra in modern Tibetan. It is also used to refer to a temple housing representations of enlightened body, speech and mind.

2Ibid., pp.208-09, says, "In Kashmir the two most important Buddhist centers are named 'khor-lo fin and grong khyer dpe med. The city designated under the names of grong khyer chen po dpe med [anupamamahapura], grong khyer dpe med [anupamapura], dpe me grong [anupamapura], kha che'i grong khyer [kagmirapura] can then vie in importance, for the work accomplished there, with the large universities of Bengal. ... It is very probable that the city designated under the name of Anupamapura by Cordier, and after him by various authors, is none other than Srinagar."

3Ibid., p.210, speaks of Suksmajana as the last of a brilliant line. He was the son of Sajjana, who was even more outstanding than his father

Mahajana, who collaborated with Marpa. Taranatha's History of Buddhism in India, p. 302, says, "Ratnavajra's son was Mahajana and his son was Sajjana."

4Naudou, op.cit., p.169, says that Ratnavajra was born in the second quarter of the tenth century. Until the age of thirty-six he studied in Kashmir and then went to Magadha. He also studied at Vikramasila, became a pandit, and although a layman holding layman's vows, gained high regard and status in the university. He later returned to Kashmir and also visited Tibet.

5See introduction, page 21.

6"The one predicted" refers to Nagarjuna. The Fundamental Tantra of Manjugri (Manjugrimulatantra, 'jam deal gyi rtsa ba'i rgyud, P162, Vol.6, 259.3.8 ff.) says:

**Four hundred years after I,  
The Tathāgata, have passed away  
A monk called Nāga will arise.  
He will have faith and help the teaching.  
Attaining the very joyful ground,  
He will live for six hundred years.**

(Translation by E. Obermiller in History of Buddhism by Bu-ston, Part 2, p. 111). The Descent into Lanka (lai kavatdrasatra, lang kar gshegs pa'i mdo, P775, Vol.29, 74.3.7 ff.) says:

**In the south, in the area of Bheda [Vidarbha]  
There will be a widely renowned monk, Shriman.  
He, called by the name of Nāga,  
Will destroy the positions of existence and non-existence.**

(Translation by Hopkins and Klein, cited in Napper, *Dependent Arising and Emptiness*, p.250).

7Upper Do-kam normally refers to that part of eastern Tibet which extends toward and borders on central Tibet as opposed to that which extends toward China.

8Dzay-tang is the largest town in the Hlo-ka (!ho kha) region, an area south of Lhasa along the banks of the Brahmaputra River.

9Drok-ri-wo-che is the mountain Dzong-ka-ba chose as the site for Ganden Monastery. Thurman, *Life and Teachings of Tsong Khapa*, p.27, says, "The main temple and over seventy other buildings were completed within a year ... In the following year, the Year of the Tiger (1410), Tsong Khapa went to Ganden ..." and taught there.

# Bibliography of Works Cited

Sutras and tantras are listed alphabetically by English translation of the title in the first section. Indian and Tibetan treatises are listed alphabetically by author in the second. Other works are listed alphabetically by author in the third section.

The words *arya* and *mahayana* have been deleted from the Sanskrit and Tibetan titles, and many of the English titles have been abbreviated. The fact that the titles of Sanskrit and Tibetan texts have been translated into English does not necessarily imply that the works themselves have been translated.

## Abbreviations

P: *Tibetan Tripitaka* (Tokyo-Kyoto: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Foundation, 1956)

Toh: *A Complete Catalogue of Tohoku University Collection of Tibetan Works on Buddhism*, ed. Prof. Yensho Kanakura (Sendai, Japan, 1934 and 1953).

## 1. SUTRAS AND TANTRAS

### Array of Tree Trunks Sutra

gaṇḍavyūhasūtra  
sdong po bkod pa'i mdo  
[?]

### Brahma Net Sutra

# brahmajālasūtra tshangs pa'i dra ba'i mdo P1021, Vol.40

Condensed Perfection of Wisdom Sutra

sañcayagāthaprajñapāramitāsūtra  
shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa sdud pa  
P735, Vol.21

Descent into Lanka Sutra

# laṅkāvatārasūtra lang kar gshegs pa'i mdo P775, Vol.29

Fundamental Tantra of Manjusri

# mañjuśrīmūlatantra 'jam dpal gyi rtsa ba'i rgyud P162, Vol.6

King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra

# samādhirajasūtra ting nge 'dzin rgyal po'i mdo P795, Vol.31-32

Miraculous Feat of Ascertaining Thorough Pacification Sutra

praśāntaviniścayaprātihāryasāmadhisūtra  
rab tu zhi ba mam par nges pa cho 'phrul gyi ting nge 'dzin gyi mdo  
P797, Vol.32

Nanda Entering the Womb Sutra

dga' bo mngal 'jug pa'i mdo  
see *Topics of Detailed Discipline Sūtra*  
P1035, Vol.44, 50.2.3 - 60.5.6

Seal of Engagement in Augmenting the Strength of Faith Sutra

śraddhābalādhānāvatarāmudrāsūtra  
dad pa'i stobs bskyed pa la 'jug pa phyag rgya'i mdo  
P867, Vol.34

Sutra of Advice to Katyayana

ka tya ya na la gdams pa'i mdo  
see *Topics of Detailed Discipline*  
P1035, Vol.44, 108.5.6ff.

Sutra Requested by Gaganaganja

**gaganagañjaparipṛcchāsūtra**  
**nam mkha'i mdzod kyis zhus pa'i mdo**  
**P815, Vol.33**

Topics of Detailed Discipline

**vinayaksudrakavastusūtra**  
**'dul ba phran tshegs kyi gzhi**  
**P1035, Vol.44**

Topics of Discipline

**vinayavastu**  
**'dul ba gzhi**  
**P1030, Vol.41**

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Aryadeva

***Hundred Syllables***  
**aksaraśāstra**  
**yi ge brgya pa**  
**P5234, Vol.95**

*Lamp for the Collection of Deeds*  
**caryāmelāpakapradīpa**  
**spyod pa bsdus pa'i sgron ma**  
**P2668, Vol.61**

*Compendium of Quintessential Wisdom*  
**jñānasārasamuccaya**  
**ye shes snying po kun las btus pa**  
**P5251, Vol.95**

*Bodhisattva Grounds*

yogacaryābhūmaubodhisattvabhūmi

mal 'byor spyod pa'i sa las byang chub sems dpa'i sa

P5538, Vol.110

*Compendium of Knowledge*

abhidharmasamuccaya

mngon pa kun btus

P5550, Vol.112

Atisa

*Great Compendium of Sūtra*

mahāsūtrasamuccaya

mdo kun las btus pa chen po

P5358, Vol.103

Bhavaviveka

*Heart of the Middle Way*  
madhyamakahr̥dayakārikā  
dbu ma'i snying po'i tshig le'ur byas pa  
P5255, Vol.96

Bo-dril-den-bay-nyi-ma (bod sprul bstan pa'i nyi ma, 1905?-1960?)

*Naga King's Ornament for Thought, Explanation of the "Four Hundred on the Middle Way"*

dbu ma bzhi brgya pa'i mam bshad klu dbang dgongs rgyan  
(Varanasi: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1987)

Bodhibhadra

*Explanation of the Compendium of Quintessential Wisdom*  
jñānasārasamuccayanibandhana  
ye shes snying po kun las btus pa'i bshad sbyar  
P5252, Vol.95

Candrakīrti

*Clear Words, Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way"*  
mūlamadhyamakavṛttiprasannapadā  
dbu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa tshig gsal ba  
P5260, Vol.98

*Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas"*  
bodhisattvayogacaryācatuḥśatakaṭikā  
byang chub sems dpa'i rnal 'byor spyod pa bzhi brgya pa'i rgya cher 'grel  
pa  
P5266, Vol.98

*Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning"*  
yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti  
rigs pa drug cu pa'i 'grel pa  
P5265, Vol.98

*Commentary on the "Supplement to the 'Treatise on the Middle Way'"*  
madhyamakāvatārabāṣya  
dbu ma la 'jug pa'i bshad pa  
P5263, Vol.98

*Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way"*  
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dbu ma la 'jug pa  
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sambandhaparīkṣāvṛtti  
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P5731, Vol.130

*Ascertainment of Valid Cognition*  
pramāṇaviniścaya  
tsad ma mam par nges pa  
P5710, Vol.130

*Commentary on the "Compendium of Valid Cognition"*  
pramāṇavarttikakārikā  
tsad ma mam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa  
P5709, Vol.130

*Drop of Reasoning*  
nyāyabindunāmaprakaraṇa  
rigs pa'i thigs pa zhes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa  
P5711, Vol.130

*Drop of Reasons*  
hetubindunāmaprakaraṇa  
gtan tshigs kyi thigs pa zhes bya ba rab tu byed pa  
P5712, Vol.130

*Proof of Other Continuums*  
saṃtānāntarasiddhināmaprakaraṇa  
rgyud gzhan grub pa zhes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa  
P5716, Vol.130

*Reasoning for Debate*

vādanyāyananāmaprakaraṇa

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*Golden Rosary of Good Explanation*

legs bshad gser gyi phreng ba

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*Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path*

lam rim chen mo

P6001, Vol.152

*Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of the "Treatise on the Middle Way"*

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pa'i rga mtsho

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*Presentation of Tenets*

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Maitreya

*Ornament for Clear Realization*  
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mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan  
P5184, Vol.88

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*Precious Garland of Advice for the King*  
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*Refutation of Objections*

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P5228, Vol.95

*Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness*

śūnyatāsaptatikārikā

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*Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning*

yuktiṣaṣṭikārikā

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*Treatise Called "Finely Woven"*

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"Wisdom"*

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~antideva

*Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds*  
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byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa  
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Shen-pen-nang-wa (gzhan dga' gzhan phan chos kyi snang ba, 1871-1927)

*Interlinear Commentary on the "Treatise of Four Hundred Stanzas"*  
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\* Since the title of this section was omitted from the editions of Gyel-tsap's commentary which were examined, the title included here is hypothetical and deduced from the content of the section.

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