

IMRE HAMAR

A HUAYAN PARADIGM FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF  
MAHĀYĀNA TEACHINGS: THE ORIGIN AND MEANING  
OF *FAXIANGZONG* AND *FAXINGZONG*\*

**Introduction**

Dan Lusthaus finds the origin of the paradigm *xing* 性 versus *xiang* 相 in the *Cheng weishi lun* 成唯識論 and concludes:

Ironically, this very distinction became one of the major rhetorical weapons used by Fa-tsang against Hsüan-tsang's school, calling them '[the mere] fa-hsiang' (Dharma-Characteristics) school against his own Sinitic 'fa-hsing' (Dharma-Nature) school. This distinction became so important that every Buddhist school originating in East Asia, including all forms of Sinitic Mahāyāna, viz. T'ien-t'ai, Hua-yen, Ch'an, and Pure Land, came to be considered Dharma-nature schools.<sup>1</sup>

Whalen Lai also attributes the establishment of this paradigm to Fazang, referring to Zhili 知禮: "The name 'Fa-hsiang' was, however, attributed to it by its critics; it is a derogative term alleging that the school did not know thoroughly the deeper Fa-hsing (Dharma-essence). The contrast was intended to bring out the 'Hīnayānist phenomenalism' [sic] inherent in the Wei-shih school and to highlight the 'Mahāyāna essentialism' of its critic. As recalled by Sung T'ien-t'ai master Ssu-ming Chih-li (959–1028), the distinction arose at the time of Fa-tsang's (643–712) attack on the Wei-shih school:

At the time [of Hua-yen (Avatamsaka) patriarch, Fa-tsang,] there was widely held the theory of *chen-ju sui-yüan* (Suchness or *tathatā* accompanying the conditions [the *pratya* that brought *samsāra* into being]) and the theory of a (passive) Suchness that would not create ('let rise') the various existents (dharmas). From that is derived the distinction between a *hsing-tsung* ([Dharma] essence school) and a *hsiang-tsung* ([Dharma] characteristic school). This distinction was made by Fa-tsang and was unknown to our [T'ien-t'ai] master Chih-i.<sup>2</sup>

They are right in that Fazang 法藏 introduced the term *faxiangzong* 法相宗 for the Yogācāra teachings of Xuanzang 玄奘 (600–664), and later this designation became widespread in East Asian Buddhism. In Japan, the Hossō 法相 school represented the most outstanding of the six schools (Sanron 三論, Hossō, Jōjitsu 成實,

\* This study was supported by the Hungarian National Research Fund (OTKA No. T 047023).

<sup>1</sup> Lusthaus 2002: 372.

<sup>2</sup> Lai 1986: 1.

Kusha 俱舍, Ritsu 律, Kegon 華嚴) of the Nara period (710–784).<sup>3</sup> However, attributing the invention of the term *faxingzong* 法性宗 to Fazang is rather dubious, as it cannot be found in his works. The *faxing* 法性 is the Chinese equivalent of the Sanskrit *dharmatā*,<sup>4</sup> which means ‘essence’ or ‘inherent nature.’<sup>5</sup> I will not delve into this frequently used term in Indian and Chinese Buddhism here as this would go beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that the founder of the Tiantai 天台 school, Zhiyi 智顛 (538–597), identified dharma-nature with Buddha-nature by saying: “Buddha-nature is dharma-nature 佛性即是法性.”<sup>6</sup> He thus attributes Buddha-nature not only to the sentient beings but also to the non-sentient beings.<sup>7</sup> Lusthaus’ other claim that Huayan “came to be considered Dharma-nature school” can also be called into question. In order to provide an answer as to whether Huayan belongs to the dharma-nature school, I shall examine the origin and meaning of these two important terms in the history of Chinese Buddhist thought: the *zong* of dharma-characteristics (*faxiangzong* 法相宗) and the *zong* of dharma-nature (*faxingzong* 法性宗).

### Faxiangzong as Yogācāra in Fazang’s works

In his commentary on the *Buddhāvataṃsaka-sūtra* (*Huayan jing tanxuan ji* 華嚴經談玄記), Fazang relates the story of how he met a Central Indian monk, Divākara<sup>8</sup> (Dipoheluo 地婆訶羅, or Rizhao 日照 613–688),<sup>9</sup> in the Taiyuan 太原 monastery<sup>10</sup> of Chang’an in 684, and asked him whether Indian monks distinguish between provisional and actual (*quanshi* 權實) teachings.<sup>11</sup> In his reply, Divākara said that there were two famous Indian masters of the Nālandā monastery: Śīlabhadra (Jiexian 戒賢 529–645)<sup>12</sup> and Jñānaprabha (Zhiguang 智光).<sup>13</sup> He interprets their views on the different levels of Buddhist teachings in the following way.

<sup>3</sup> Tamura 2000: 46.

<sup>4</sup> Soothill 1937: 269, Nakamura 1975: 1252d–1253a.

<sup>5</sup> Monier-Williams 1899: 511.

<sup>6</sup> *Weimo jing lüeshu* 維摩經略疏, T 17783: 8.681a26.

<sup>7</sup> Ng 2003: 78.

<sup>8</sup> On Divākara, see Forte 1974.

<sup>9</sup> Divākara is said to have translated 18 works between 676 and 687. *Kaiyuan shijiaolu* 開元釋教錄, T 2154: 55.564a12–17. With the assistance of Fazang, he translated the *Ghanavyūhasūtra* (*Dasheng miyan jing* 大乘密嚴經, T 681), on which Fazang wrote a commentary (*Dasheng miyan jing shu* 大乘密嚴經疏, XZJ vol. 34). In addition, they worked together on the translation of the parts of the last chapter of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka-sūtra*, the *Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra*, that were missing from Buddhābhadrā’s translation. See Liu 1979: 8–9.

<sup>10</sup> Empress Wu established this monastery by converting her mother’s residence after she passed away. She appointed Fazang as the first abbot. See Liu 1979: 8.

<sup>11</sup> T 1733: 35.111c8–112a22.

<sup>12</sup> Śīlabhadra was Xuanzang’s 玄奘 (600–664) teacher at Nālandā, and is mentioned in his famous record of his travels, *Xiyuji* 西域記 T 2087. See Lusthaus 2002: 395–397.

<sup>13</sup> Mochizuki 3571.

Śīlabhadra, a disciple of Dharmapāla (Hufa 護法 530–561), who belongs to the lineage of Maitreya (Mile 彌勒) and Asaṅga (Wuzhu 無著 310–390?),<sup>14</sup> establishes three levels of teachings on the basis of *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* and *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra*.<sup>15</sup> In the first period, Hīnayāna teaches the emptiness of living beings (*shengkong* 生空), but fails to realise the true principle (*zhenli* 真理) of the emptiness of dharmas (*fakong* 法空). In the second period, the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras* advocate the emptiness of dharmas. The correct principle (*zhengli* 正理) of Mahāyāna is revealed only in the third period, when the tenets of Yogācāra, i.e. three natures and three non-natures, are taught. In addition, these three levels of teaching are explained in terms of the capacity of the audience, the teaching, and the revelation of principle. In the first period, only *śrāvakas* are taught exclusively Hīnayāna teachings that reveal the principle of emptiness of the person. In the second period, only bodhisattvas are taught exclusively Mahāyāna teachings that show the emptiness of both the person and dharmas. In the third period, beings of various capacities are instructed in all vehicles that expose both emptiness and existence (*kongyou* 空有). As the third period comprises all capacities, teachings and principles, it represents the level of explicit statement (*nītārtha*, *liaoyi* 了義).

Jñānaprabha, who belongs to the lineage of Mañjuśrī (Wenshu 文殊) and Nāgārjuna (Longshu 龍樹 ca. 150–250), follows in the footsteps of Āryadeva (Tīpo 提婆 170–270) and Bhāvaviveka (Qingbian 清辯 500–570). He distinguishes three levels of teaching on the basis of the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras* and *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. In the first period, Buddha instructed people of small capacity in the Hīnayāna teaching, according to which both mind and objects exist (*xinjing juyou* 心境俱有). In the second period, the *faxiang* of Mahāyāna (*faxiang dasheng* 法相大乘) is taught to people of mediocre capacity. It explains that objects are empty, while the mind is existent (*jingkong xinyou* 境空心有), which is the principle of consciousness-only. However, these people cannot understand the equality of true emptiness (*pingdeng zhenkong* 平等真空). In the third period, the *wuxiang* of Mahāyāna (*wuxiang dasheng* 無相大乘) is taught to people of superb capacity. It argues that the equal emptiness of both objects and the mind is the level of true explicit statement (*zhen liaoyi* 真了義). In the first period, the audience consisted of the two vehicles which must refer to *śrāvaka-yāna* and *pratyekabuddha-yāna*; in the second, it was made up of the followers of both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, and in the third, it was only bodhisattvas. In terms of teaching, the first period is the teaching of Hīnayāna, the second is that of three vehicles (*sansheng* 三乘), and the last period is that of one-

<sup>14</sup> According to the legend, Maitreya took Asaṅga to the Tuṣita where Yogācāra works were given to him. Some scholars suspect that Maitreya could be a historical person, Asaṅga's teacher, who is referred to as Maitreya-nātha. See Williams 1989: 80–81.

<sup>15</sup> It is interesting to note that Xuanzang's biography (*Da Tang Daciensi sanzang fashi zhuan* 大唐大慈恩寺三藏法師傳, T 2053) by Huili 慧立 and Yancong 彥綜 cites a letter by Xuanzang where Śīlabhadra is said to be the successor to both Āryadeva and Nāgārjuna. This contradicts Divākara's alleged account that associates Śīlabhadra exclusively with Āryadeva and the Yogācāra. See Li 1995: 231.

vehicle (*yisheng* 一乘). As regards the revelation of principle, the heretical view of self-nature (*zixing* 自性) is refuted in the first period, clinging to the essential being of those things that dependently arise is refuted gradually in the second, and the apparent existence still retained in the second period is refuted in the third.

The classification of the two Indian masters can be summarised in two tables:

<i>period</i>	<i>audience</i>	<i>teaching</i>	<i>principle</i>
1. Hīnayāna	<i>śrāvaka</i>	Hīnayāna	emptiness of person
2. Wuxiang	bodhisattva	Mahāyāna	emptiness of person and dharmas
3. Faxiang	all	all	emptiness and existence

(Classification by Śīlabhadra)

<i>period</i>	<i>audience</i>	<i>teaching</i>	<i>principle</i>
1. Hīnayāna	two vehicles	Hīnayāna	refutation of the heretical view of self-nature
2. Faxiang	both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna	three vehicles	refutation of essential being
3. Wuxiang	bodhisattva	one-vehicle	refutation of apparent being

(Classification by Jñānaprabha)

Śīlabhadra's classification is quite well-known from the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* as the three turnings of the Dharma-wheel. According to this scripture, Buddha's teaching can be divided into three successive periods. The first period is the Hīnayāna when the emptiness of self was preached. In the second period, the emptiness of all dharmas was proclaimed in the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras*. However, the hidden meaning of these *sūtras* was revealed only in the third period, which is the teaching of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*. This is the explicit meaning of the teachings that require no further explanation.<sup>16</sup> By the time Bhāvaviveka lived, doctrinal disagreements between the followers of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka had come to the fore. Though he was willing to borrow some methods from his opponents, he was critical of Yogācāra, and maintained the basic Madhyamaka principle of the emptiness of all dharmas, including consciousness.<sup>17</sup>

Fazang introduced two names: *Faxiang* 法相 (characteristics of dharmas) and *Wuxiang* 無相 (without characteristics). He applied the first name to the Yogācāra, and though it was a rather pejorative designation, suggesting that it was a kind of

<sup>16</sup> T 676: 16.697a23–b9; Lamotte 1935: 206–207; Keenan 2000: 49.

<sup>17</sup> Ruegg 1981: 65–66.

Hīnayāna school dealing only with the characteristics of dharmas, it became the traditional name for this Indian school of Buddhist thought in East Asian Buddhism. He applied the term *Wuxiang* to the Madhyamaka school of thought, as it denied the existence of characteristics. Divākara's account of the Indian classification of Buddhist teaching must have exercised a great influence on Fazang, because he refers to it in his other works as well.<sup>18</sup> This small episode in the history of Chinese Buddhism sheds light on the process usually referred to as the 'sinification of Buddhism'. Fazang's encounter with Divākara shows that there was an active dialogue between Chinese and foreign monks during the transmission of Buddhism.<sup>19</sup>

In his commentary on the *Awakening of Faith* and on the *Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun* 大乘法界無差別論, in which he discussed the Indian Buddhist teachings, Fazang distinguishes four cardinal principles (*zong* 宗): (1) clinging to the [existence] of dharmas through their characteristics (*suixiang fazhi zong* 隨相法執宗); (2) real emptiness without characteristics (*zhenkong wuxiang zong* 真空無相宗); (3) consciousness-only [established by] the characteristics of dharmas (*weishi faxiang zong* 唯識法相宗); and (4) the dependent arising of the *tathāgatagarbha* (*rulaizang yuanqi zong* 如來藏緣起宗).<sup>20</sup> These four cardinal principles refer to the teachings of Hīnayāna, Madhyamaka, Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha, respectively. He defines these lineages with the help of the basic Huayan paradigm: phenomena (*shi* 事) and principle (*li* 理).<sup>21</sup> Hīnayāna clings to the characteristics of phenomena. Madhyamaka reveals the principle by the coalascence with phenomena. Yogācāra provides a description of various aspects of phenomena that arise on the basis of principle. The Tathāgatagarbha discusses the interpenetration and non-obstruction of principle and phenomena. In addition, in his commentary on the *Lañkāvatāra-sūtra*, he again furnishes these four kinds of cardinal principles, though with their names slightly changed: (1) existence of characteristics (*youxiang zong* 有相宗); (2) non-existence of characteristics (*wuxiang zong* 無相宗); (3) characteristics of dharmas (*faxiang zong* 法相宗); and (4) ultimate truth (*shixiang zong* 實相宗).<sup>22</sup> Fazang discusses these four categories in terms of dharmas, consciousness, dependent arising, turning to

<sup>18</sup> *Shiermen lun zongzhi yiji* 十二門論宗致義記, T 1826: 42.213a5–c23; *Dasheng qixin lun yiji* 大乘起信論義記, T 1846: 44.242a29–b21.

<sup>19</sup> Robert Sharf has a different view, arguing that "whatever 'dialogue' transpired took place among the Chinese themselves". See Sharf 2002: 19.

<sup>20</sup> T 1846: 44.242b23–c7; T 1838: 44.61c9–13.

<sup>21</sup> The first patriarch of the Huayan lineage, Du Shun 杜順 (557–640), introduced these terms when he changed the terms *form* for *phenomena* and *emptiness* for *principle*. For a translation of his important work, *Discernments of Dharmadhātu* (*Fajie guanmen* 法界觀門), see Gimello 1976: 454–510, and for another which includes Chengguan's commentary, see Cleary 1983: 69–124. For a summary of arguments in this work, see Ziporyn 2000: 171–174.

<sup>22</sup> *Ru Lengqie xinxuanyi* 入楞伽心玄義, T 1790: 39.426b29–427a2.

<i>names in the commentary on the Awakening of Faith</i>	clinging to the [existence] of dharmas through their characteristics	real emptiness without characteristics	consciousness only [established by] the characteristics of dharmas	the dependent arising of the Tathāgatagarbha
<i>names in the commentary on the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra</i>	existence of characteristics	non-existence of characteristics	characteristics of dharmas	real characteristics
<i>scriptures</i>	Four Āgamas, Vibhāṣā	<i>Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras, Mūlamadhyamakārikā</i>	<i>Samdhinirmocana-sūtra, Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra</i>	<i>Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, Ghanavyūha-sūtra, Ratnagotravibhāga-śāstra, Mahāyāna-śradhotpāda-śāstra</i>
<i>masters</i>	Dharmatrāta <sup>23</sup>	Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva	Asaṅga, Vasubandhu	Aśvaghōṣa, Sāramati <sup>24</sup>
<i>dharmas</i>	75 dharmas	emptiness of dharmas	three natures, three non-natures, 100 dharmas based on consciousness	all dharmas arise in dependence on tathāgatagarbha
<i>consciousness</i>	six consciousnesses	emptiness of the six consciousnesses	eight impure consciousnesses	the eighth consciousness is established by the tathāgatagarbha dependent arising

<sup>23</sup> A master of the Sarvāstivāda school. See Mochizuki 3543.

<sup>24</sup> He is the author of *Dasheng fajie wu chabie lun* 大乘法界無差別論, T 1626: 31.1627. Fazang wrote a commentary on it titled *Dasheng fajie wu chabie lun bingxu* 大乘法界無差別論疏 并序, T 1838. See Mochizuki 925–926.

<i>dharmas that dependently arise</i>	existent	empty	both existent and empty	neither existent nor empty, fusion of phenomena and principle
<i>turning to Mahāyāna from Hīnayāna</i>	followers of two vehicles do not become Buddha	beings of determinate nature of two vehicles do not become Buddha, some of the beings of indeterminate nature turn to Bodhisattva path	beings of determinate nature of two vehicles do not become Buddha, beings of indeterminate nature turn to Mahāyāna	both beings of determinate nature and beings of indeterminate nature turn to Mahāyāna
<i>vehicles (a)</i>	only three vehicles	both three vehicles and one-vehicle: three vehicles are revealed, one-vehicle is hidden	three vehicles	only one-vehicle
<i>vehicles (b)</i>	lesser vehicle	three vehicles	three vehicles	one-vehicle
<i>five teachings</i>	lesser vehicle	elementary teaching of Mahāyāna	elementary teaching of Mahāyāna	advanced teaching of Mahāyāna

Mahāyāna from Hīnayāna and vehicles.<sup>25</sup> In Fazang's classification of teachings these four lineages can be related to the first three of the five teachings.<sup>26</sup> Hīnayāna represents the lesser vehicle, Madhyamaka and Yogācāra the elementary teachings of Mahāyāna, and Tathāgatagarbha the advanced teaching of Mahāyāna.

### The interfusion of *xing* and *xiang* in Fazang's works

While Fazang's Huayan master Zhiyan mainly applied various tenets of Yogācāra philosophy, Fazang often referred to Madhyamaka in his works. As KAMATA Shigeo demonstrated, the great master of the Sanlun 三論 lineage, Jizang 吉藏 (549–623),<sup>27</sup> had a considerable impact on Fazang's philosophy.<sup>28</sup> Fazang intended to transcend the scope of Yogācāra by incorporating elements of Madhyamaka. In his commentary on the *Lankāvatāra-sūtra*, in which he discussed the nature of dependent arising (*yuanqi xing* 緣起性), he argued that it is actually both existent and empty, that these two concepts complement one another and form one unity. Nāgārjuna explained that existence does not differ from emptiness (*you bu yi kong* 有不異空), as Asaṅga made clear that emptiness does not differ from existence (*kong bu yi you* 空不異有). However,

The later generation of philosophers lived in a degenerate age and their wisdom was slight. If they heard about the emptiness [of dependent arising], they said that [this concept] interrupts causality. If they heard about the existence [of dependent arising], they said that [this concept] obstructs real emptiness (*zhenkong* 真空). Therefore, Bhāvaviveka refuted the existence that is in contradiction with emptiness. Making this extreme view return to emptiness is the only way to show the existence that is identical with emptiness (*jikong zhi you* 即空之有). Thus, causality is not lost. Dharmapāla and others refuted the emptiness that extinguishes existence. To establish causality is the only way to reveal the emptiness that is identical with existence (*jiyou zhi kong* 即有之空). Thus, real nature (*zhenxing* 真性) is not hidden. Each of these two masters refuted one extreme; thus, they show the middle path together. Their views mutually become complete, and are not contradictory.

後代論師爲時澆慧薄。聞空謂斷因果。聞有謂隔真空。是以清辨破違空之有。令蕩盡歸空。方顯即空之有。因果不失。護法等破滅有之空。令因果確立。方顯即有之空。真性不隱。此二士各破一邊共顯中道。此乃相成非相破也。<sup>29</sup>

<sup>25</sup> He expounds only on the aspects of dharmas, consciousness and vehicles in his commentary on the *Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun*. Here the explanation of the vehicles is slightly different. I refer to it with a (b) in the table. See T 1838: 44.61c13–c28.

<sup>26</sup> The system of the five teachings (lesser vehicle, elementary teaching of Mahāyāna, advanced teaching of Mahāyāna, sudden and perfect) was first established by Zhiyan, but it was Fazang who used this scheme in his works exclusively. For detailed studies of the formulation and content of the five teachings, see Cook 1970, Liu 1981, Gregory 1991: 116–135.

<sup>27</sup> For an introduction to Jizang's philosophy, see Liu 1994: 82–187.

<sup>28</sup> Kamata 1965: 134–143, 325–331.

<sup>29</sup> T 1790: 39.430c16–22. A slightly different version of this passage appears in *Huayan yisheng jiaoyi fenqizhang* 華嚴一乘教義分齊章, T 1886: 45.501a16–25. For a translation of this version, see Liu 1979: 379–380.



This passage can be regarded as a Huayan contribution and solution to the well-known debate between the followers of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka on the theory of the three natures advocated by the Yogācārins.<sup>30</sup> Yogācārins held that though the imaginary nature is empty the dependent nature and the perfect nature have both empty and real aspects. Those things that arise out of the seeds contained in *ālaya* are empty, but the *ālaya* and the seeds are real. The perfect nature is presented as the pure *ālaya* in the *Cheng weishi lun*; it must therefore be the ultimate reality, and cannot be empty.<sup>31</sup> Being advocates of the emptiness of all dharmas, the Mādhyamikas refuted the existence of these two natures as well. In order to harmonize these two views, Fazang formulated a Huayan interpretation of the doctrine of three natures. He wrote that each of the three natures has an empty and an existent aspect.<sup>32</sup>

Each of the three natures has two aspects. The two aspects of the perfect [nature] are changelessness and responding to condition. The two aspects of the dependent [nature] are semblance of existence and being without self-nature. The two aspects of the imaginary nature appear to have being to the ordinary senses and have non-existence in reality.

三性各有二義。真中二義者。一不變義。二隨緣義。依他二義者。一似有義。二無性義。所執中二義者。一情有義。二理無義。<sup>33</sup>

	EMPTINESS	BEING
<i>perfect nature</i>	changelessness	responding to condition
<i>dependent nature</i>	without self-nature	semblance of existence
<i>imaginary nature</i>	non-existent in reality	appearing to have being to common sense
	REAL	FALSE
	NATURE	CHARACTERISTICS

As the empty aspects of the three natures are identical, and the existent aspects are also identical, the identity of the three natures is established. The former aspects are designated as “the eternal origin without destroying derivative 不壞末而常本,” and the latter aspects as “the eternal derivative without moving origin 不動本而常末.” With these designations he places the question into the context of Chinese philosophy. On the other hand, the empty aspects are not identical with the existent aspects; hence, the difference between the three natures is established as well. Fazang concludes with the typical Huayan statement that “reality includes the false derivative and falsehood penetrates the source of reality; it is the interfusion and non-obstruction of nature and characteristics 真該妄末妄徹真源。性相通融無障無礙。”

<sup>30</sup> Bhāvaviveka criticised the doctrine of three natures in chapter five of *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya śāstra* and in *Prajñāpradīpa*. See Ruegg 1981: 65.

<sup>31</sup> Liu 1979: 377–379.

<sup>32</sup> I used Liu’s translation of these terms. See Liu 1979: 365. For a further explanation of this Huayan doctrine, see Cook 1970: 30–53; 1977: 59–61.

<sup>33</sup> T 1886: 45.499a13–15.

Various versions of “interfusion of nature and characteristics,” such as interpenetration of nature and characteristics (*xingxiang jiaoche* 性相交徹) and perfect interfusion of nature and characteristics (*xingxiang yuanrong* 性相圓融), are found throughout Fazang’s works.<sup>34</sup> Terms such as real-false and origin-derivative frequently occur in the Chinese Buddhist texts, but the paradigm of *xingxiang* seems to be a novelty. Where does it originate?

Lusthaus attributes this invention to Xuanzang, who was a prominent figure of his day and Fazang’s contemporary. In verses 5 and 7 of his translation of *Triṃśikā* he – supposedly deliberately – altered the original Sanskrit text through the interpolation of *xingxiang*, though he is famous for the accuracy of his translations. In the definitions of *mano-vijñāna* and the five consciousnesses we read that “discerning perceptual-objects is its nature and characteristic” and “willing-deliberating is its nature and characteristic”, respectively.<sup>35</sup> In the *Cheng weishi lun*, Xuanzang explains *xing* and *xiang* as self-nature (*svabhāva*, *zixing* 自性) and activity-characteristic (*ākāra*, *xingxiang* 行相), respectively. In the case of the five consciousnesses, discerning perceptual-objects is their self-nature, and the functioning (*yong* 用) of this nature is their activity-characteristic. In the same way, the willing-deliberating is the self-nature of the *mano-vijñāna*, and the functioning of this nature is its activity-characteristic. The text goes on to say that these natures and functions define each consciousness. This is to say that the self-natures of the consciousnesses are none other than their activities.

As Xuanzang’s usage of *xing* versus *xiang* is confined to a rather technical discussion of Yogācāra, other considerations should be taken into account in tracing Fazang’s application of *xing*. First, it can be explained as emptiness of self-nature (*zixing kong* 自性空) because the ultimate nature of dharmas is emptiness. There is no doubt that this is the stance of Madhyamaka in this discussion. Thus, the interfusion of nature and characteristics is another sinic explanation of the famous Mahāyāna formula, “emptiness is form and form is emptiness” just like “principle is phenomena”, advocated by the first patriarch of the Huayan lineage, Du Shun 杜順 (557–640). With the introduction of this short expression, interfusion of nature and characteristics, Fazang managed to achieve the same goal as with the discussion of the three natures: to harmonize Yogācāra and Madhyamaka. Second, *xing* can refer to *tathāgatagarbha*, or Buddha-nature that leads to another explication on the basis of the Chinese transmission of Yogācāra that includes Tathāgatagarbha teachings. One of the important tenets of Huayan Buddhism is the theory of nature-origination (*xingqi* 性起), which clarifies how the world evolves out of a pure mind.<sup>36</sup> Thus, *xing* means the nature out of which the world evolves, and *xiang* represents the

<sup>34</sup> Yoshizu 1983.

<sup>35</sup> For a discussion of *xingxiang* in Xuanzang’s translation, see Lusthaus 2002: 371–373.

<sup>36</sup> This name originates from the title of Chapter 32 of the sixty-fascicle *Huayan jing*, *Baowang rulai xingqi pin* 寶王如來性起品. The version of the eighty-fascicle *Huayan jing* will be discussed below.

characteristics of the outer world evolved from nature. However, this Yogācāra is not the elementary teaching of Mahāyāna represented by the teachings of Xuanzang, but rather the advanced teaching of Mahāyāna, that is Tathāgatagarbha. Nonetheless, this deeper level of interfusion apropos of *xing* and *xiang* would later be discovered and discussed by the fourth patriarch of the Huayan lineage, Chengguan 澄觀 (738–839),<sup>37</sup> who was the most loyal disciple of Fazang, though they never met.

### Ten Differences between Faxingzong and Faxiangzong

Fazang's disciple, Huiyuan 慧苑 (673–743), did not discuss the teachings of the two Indian masters elaborated in great detail by Fazang, putatively because the tenet of dependent arising did not play a central role in his philosophy.<sup>38</sup> Chengguan, however, took up this topic again in his commentary on the *Huayan jing*. At the beginning of his account of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka, he recapitulates the two versions of three periods summarised by the third patriarch.<sup>39</sup> He uses the names *faxiang dasheng* and *wuxiang dasheng* introduced by Fazang, but he often refers to them as two *zongs* 宗. Like Fazang, he arrives at the conclusion that these two *zongs* complement one another; neither of them can stand alone, and they must be combined. It is important to note that at the end of this section in his *Subcommentary on the Buddhāvataṃsaka-sūtra* (*Dafanguang fo huayan jing suishu yanyi chao* 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔), Chengguan identifies Madhyamaka as *faxingzong*:

From the aspect of the first school, the *faxiangzong* is the ultimate [meaning of the teaching] and *faxingzong* is not ultimate. From the aspect of the second school, the *faxingzong* is the ultimate, and the *faxiangzong* is not ultimate. Therefore, they are both ultimate and not ultimate, and equally share the principle.

謂約初門。則法相宗爲了。法性宗非了。若約後門。則法性宗爲了。法相宗非了。既皆二義了。二義不了。於理則齊。<sup>40</sup>

As Chengguan continues, in order to combine these two lineages first the differences between them should be known. He lists ten differences.<sup>41</sup>

- (1) one-vehicle or three vehicles 一乘三乘
- (2) one nature or five natures 一性五性
- (3) consciousness is only real or false 唯心真妄

<sup>37</sup> For his biography, see Hamar 2002. For his philosophy, see Hamar 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2003a, 2003b, 2004.

<sup>38</sup> Yoshizu 1983: 308–309. For a recent study on Huiyuan's philosophy, see Li 2000.

<sup>39</sup> T 1735: 35.510b23–c22. T 1736: 36.52c7–53b27. *Xinxu huayan jing shuchao* 新修華嚴經疏鈔, vol. 1. 547–564.

<sup>40</sup> T 1736: 36.53c18–20.

<sup>41</sup> T 1735: 35.511a2–6.

- (4) the *tathatā* is dependent arising or immovable 真如隨緣凝然
- (5) the emptiness and existence related to the three natures are identical or different 三性空有即離
- (6) the number of living beings and buddhas is not increasing or not decreasing 生佛不增不減
- (7) the two truths are identical or different, as well emptiness and existence are identical or different 二諦空有即離
- (8) the four characteristics are simultaneous or successive 四相一時前後
- (9) the subject and the object of enlightenment are identical or different 能所斷證即離
- (10) the body of buddha is unconditioned or conditioned 佛身無爲有爲

In each of the ten statements, the first part is the tenet of the *faxingzong* whereas the second is that of the *faxiangzong*. For example, one nature and one-vehicle form part of the doctrines of *faxingzong*, and the three vehicles and five natures are proclaimed by *faxiangzong*.

The first two differences are lumped together as the one-vehicle, and three vehicles are closely associated with one nature and three natures, respectively.<sup>42</sup> If the doctrine of five natures is regarded as the ultimate teaching, then the doctrine of three vehicles is evident. Those who have the *śrāvaka*-nature belong to the *śrāvaka*-vehicle, those who have the *pratyekabuddha*-nature belong to the *pratyekabuddha*-vehicle, those who have the bodhisattva-nature belong to the bodhisattva-vehicle. Those who do not have a determinate nature can belong to any of the three vehicles, while those who do not have an untainted nature do not belong to any of the three vehicles but to the vehicle of men and gods. Thus, the five vehicles are established. In contrast to this stance, the *faxingzong* accepts the doctrine of one nature, i.e. universal salvation, as the ultimate teaching; it therefore proclaims the one-vehicle.

In fact, the question of Buddha-nature is a long debated topic in East Asian Buddhism. It is a well-known story in the history of Chinese Buddhism that Daosheng 道生 (ca. 360–434) was bold enough to argue against the so-called southern translation of the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* which says that *icchantikas* can never become Buddha.<sup>43</sup> After the northern translation of this *sūtra* supported Daosheng's claim, the view of

<sup>42</sup> This is discussed in great detail in the *Commentary* and *Subcommentary*. See T 1735: 35.511a6–512b13. T 1736: 36.54a25–61b10. *Xinxiu huayan jing shuchao* 新修華嚴經疏鈔, vol. 1. 566–642.

<sup>43</sup> For Daoan's view on *icchantikas*, see Kim 1990: 34–38. The *Fo shuo daban nihuan jing* 佛說大般泥洹經 (T 376) translated by Faxian 法顯 and Buddhahadra was called the southern text, while the *Daban nieban jing* 大般涅槃經 (T 374) translated by Dharmakṣema was known as the northern text. See Ch'en 1964: 113–114. For a study on the Buddha-nature in the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra*, see Liu 1982.

universal liberation became widespread in China. However, Xuanzang took up the orthodox Yogācāra position and excluded *icchantikas* from salvation. But even some of his disciples did not share the opinion of their teacher. His most talented student, Fabao 法寶 (early 8th c.), claimed in *Yisheng foxing jiuqing lun* 一乘佛性究竟論 that one-vehicle was the actual teaching (*shijiao* 實教) and the three vehicles were only provisional teachings.<sup>44</sup> His other disciple Huizhao 慧沼 (650–714) refuted Fabao's views in his *Nengxian zhongbian huiji lun* 能顯中邊慧日論.<sup>45</sup> Approximately during Chengguan's lifetime, a long debate on this problem raged in Japan between the Hossō 法相 monk Tokuitsu 德一 (780?–842?), and the founder of the Tendai 天台 school, Saichō 最澄 (767–822), resulting in several works by these two eminent scholars.<sup>46</sup>

The next eight differences are discussed under the rubrics of the elementary and advanced teachings of Mahāyāna.<sup>47</sup> On the level of the elementary teaching, mostly the characteristics are elaborated, the nature of dharmas, i.e. their absolute aspect, appears only as one of the hundred dharmas.<sup>48</sup> On the other hand, the advanced teaching mainly expounds on the nature of dharmas, and the way in which characteristics can revert to nature. This is to say that the dharmas, like *skandhas*, are empty, and their emptiness is their nature. The *faxingzong* also teaches about the characteristics, but its main purport is to reveal nature as the enigmatic subtlety (*xuanmiao* 玄妙). This explanation seems to be in accord with the tenets of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka, as Yogācāra teaches the doctrine of a hundred dharmas, and Madhyamaka emphasises emptiness as the ultimate reality of dharmas. The third and fourth differences touch upon the nature of the *ālayavijñāna*, which is a key issue in the Chinese transmission of Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha philosophies.<sup>49</sup>

According to the *faxiangzong*, the eighth consciousness, the *ālayavijñāna*, possesses only the aspect of *samsāra* and is only tainted; Chengguan therefore depicts it as “false”. This impure consciousness is the cause of both rebirth in *samsāra* and attaining *nirvāṇa*. He cites Xuanzang's translation of *Mahāyānasamgraha* as a source for this statement.<sup>50</sup> In contrast to this, the *faxingzong* argues that this consciousness also has an aspect of the absolute mind (*zhenxin* 真心) due to the untainted *tathāga-*

<sup>44</sup> Groner 2000: 103–104.

<sup>45</sup> T 1863.

<sup>46</sup> In this debate, Saichō often referred to the arguments of Fabao. See Groner 2000: 91–106.

<sup>47</sup> T 1735: 35.512c12–513a13; T 1736: 36.62c27–67b28; *Xinxiu huayan jing shuchao* 658–702.

<sup>48</sup> The *tathatā* is one of the unconditioned dharmas (*asaṃskṛta-dharmas*). See Lusthaus 2002: 553.

<sup>49</sup> Paramārtha (499–569) played a crucial role in spreading Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha philosophies in China, although these teachings had been known to the Dilun 地論 masters before his arrival in China. For the process of the transmission of Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha teachings, see Paul 1984 and Gimello 1976: 212–337.

<sup>50</sup> *She dasheng lunben* 攝大乘論本, T 1594: 31.133b15–16. For a detailed study on the concept of *ālayavijñāna* in the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, see Waldron 2003: 128–170.

*tagarbha*. He refers to the famous statement from the *Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna* (*Dasheng qixin lun* 大乘起信論) according to which the *saṃsāra* and that which is beyond *saṃsāra* are fused in *ālayavijñāna*.<sup>51</sup>

The issue at stake is the relationship between the Absolute and phenomena.<sup>52</sup> Is the *tathatā*, the Absolute, dependent arising, or is it immovable? Does the Absolute have anything to do with the phenomenal world? According to the interpretation of the final teaching of Mahāyāna (i.e. *faxingzong*), the Absolute and phenomena can be described with the ‘water and wave’ metaphor. Due to the wind of ignorance, waves of phenomena rise and fall, yet they are not different in essence from the water of the Absolute. In contrast with this explanation, the elementary teaching of Mahāyāna (i.e. *faxiangzong*) can be presented by the metaphor of ‘house and ground’. The ground supports the house but is different from it.<sup>53</sup> Referring to the same scriptural sources as Fazang does, Chengguan claims that the dependent arising of *tathatā* is taught on the level of advanced teaching. However, he also emphasises that *tathatā* not only has a dependent arising aspect, but also an immovable one. It can be immovable because it is dependent arising, and it is dependent arising because it is immovable. If the water were to be deprived of its nature of moisture, how could it create waves under the influence of wind? Phenomena can be established by retaining the self-nature of the Absolute. On the other hand, if *tathatā* is not dependent arising, its essence cannot penetrate conditions (*bianyuan* 遍緣). If its essence cannot be found in conditions, how can it be unchanged (*bubian* 不變)? These two aspects are not contradictory, but complement one another.

The next topic touches upon the question of differing opinions between the followers of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka on the status of the three natures. Chengguan seems to be quite aware of the dispute on this matter in Indian Buddhism. As we saw above, Yogācāra attributed emptiness only to the imaginary nature, retaining some kind of existence of the other two natures. Chengguan explains that according to *faxiangzong* the dependent nature has a resembling existence and is therefore not nonexistent (*siyou buwu* 似有不無). Thus, it cannot be identical with the perfect nature that is revealed through the absence of self-nature. However, according to the *faxingzong*, the absence of self-nature in the dependent nature is identical with the perfect nature, and as absence of self-nature is emptiness, thus the perfect nature is identical with emptiness. This way, *faxingzong* demonstrates that the perfect nature is empty, just like the imaginary nature. The dependent arising (*yinyuan* 因緣) includes all three aspects, being identical with both emptiness and existence; hence, these are not separate.

The sixth difference is related to the first and second differences. According to the five natures of *faxiangzong*, beings of the fifth nature divested themselves of

<sup>51</sup> T 1666: 32.576b8–9. Hakeda 36, Girard 2004: 28–29.

<sup>52</sup> Whalen Lai translated and analysed the relevant part of the *Huayan yisheng jiaoyi fenqi zhang* 華嚴一乘教義分齊章. See Lai 1986.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 2–3.

Buddha-nature forever and can never become Buddha. Consequently, they can never leave the realm of living beings; they are sentenced to maintain this world. Thus, this realm cannot decrease. The *faxingzong* teaches that the one principle is ubiquitous (*yili qiping* 一理齊平), that is to say the potency of becoming Buddha is inherent in all living beings including *icchantikas*. The realm of living beings cannot decrease, while the realm of Buddha cannot increase. Why? Because both living beings and buddhas have already been in the domain of *faxing*, and *faxing* cannot increase *faxing*. This is similar to how the Eastern space cannot add anything to the Western space, i.e. the Western space cannot increase with the decrease of the Eastern space. In other words, Buddha and sentient beings share the same absolute nature; there is therefore nothing to increase or decrease.

In the next topic, two questions are discussed: first, the identity or difference of two truths; then, the identity or difference of emptiness and existence. These are closely related as emptiness and existence are regarded, especially by Madhyamaka, as absolute truth and mundane truth, respectively. According to *faxiangzong*, the mundane truth and the absolute truth are different, while according to *faxingzong* they are in fact identical, and as the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* states it is only an *upāya* that there are two truths.<sup>54</sup> The Absolute is not beyond the mundane, it is Absolute if it is identical with the mundane. The former concentrates on discriminating the two truths, while the latter tends to fuse them. Chengguan warns against clinging to any of these positions one-sidedly. The *faxiangzong* argues that the cause ceases when the fruit is produced (*guosheng yinmie* 果生因滅). This way, the extremes of nihilism and eternalism are avoided, as existence is not eternal due to the cessation of cause, and is not interrupted due to the production of fruit. The way in which the *faxingzong* avoids the two extremes is to underline that emptiness is the emptiness that is identical with existence (*jiyou zhi kong* 即有之空), and existence is the existence that is identical with emptiness (*jikong zhi you* 即空之有). It is therefore empty but not interrupted, and existent but not eternal. Non-existence and existence are neither identical, nor different. This is how the middle way is achieved. If they were identical, then the meaning of existence and non-existence would be abolished. If they were different, then it would lead to the extremes of nihilism and eternalism. As is quite obvious, the differing views of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka on the absolute truth are found here. As we discussed above, Yogācāra does not accept the emptiness of absolute nature that is the absolute truth, while Madhyamaka strongly argued for it.

The *faxiangzong* propounds the successiveness of the four characteristics (birth, duration, differentiation, cessation),<sup>55</sup> which is to say that something that was not existent is born due to various conditions. It then endures and in this duration it changes,

<sup>54</sup> For the relevant passage cited by Chengguan, see T 374: 12.443a7–19.

<sup>55</sup> For the relevant passage from *Cheng weishi lun* cited by Chengguan, see T 1585: 31.6a8–17. For the English translation, see Cook 1999: 34–35.

and finally it reverts to non-existence. According to the *faxingzong*, the past, present and future are all empty; their essential natures are therefore extinct, and this is what Chengguan calls returning to nature through coalescence with characteristics (*huixiang guixing* 會相歸性). In this way, *faxingzong* establishes that the four characteristics are simultaneous.

The ninth difference concerns the result of religious practice. The *faxiangzong* states that the object and subject of enlightenment are different. It says that there are two aspects of wisdom: wisdom that eliminates delusion (*duanhuo* 斷惑) and wisdom that realises principle (*zhengli* 證理). According to one of the interpretations, the fundamental nondiscriminating wisdom (*genben zhi* 根本智), i.e. Buddha's absolute wisdom, is able to eliminate the propensities (*suimian* 隨眠) of delusions concerning both principle and phenomena, while the subsequently acquired wisdom (*houde zhi* 後得智), i.e. wisdom related to the ordinary world, cannot. The other opinion is that this latter wisdom can eliminate only the propensities of delusions concerning phenomena.<sup>56</sup> Consequently, the fundamental wisdom and the subsequently acquired wisdom are different. Regarding the wisdom that realises the principle, it says that wisdom that is the subject of enlightenment is conditioned (*youwei* 有爲), but the principle that is realised by this wisdom is unconditioned (*wuwei* 無爲). Thus, the subject and object of enlightenment are not identical. The *faxingzong* also discusses two aspects of wisdom. It shows that in both cases wisdom and the object of wisdom are not different. The wisdom that eliminates the delusion (*huo* 惑) and the delusion that is eliminated, in fact, share the same substance. If we search for the origin of delusion, it cannot be found anywhere; it is thus has a nonabiding origin (*wuzhu ben* 無住本). Therefore, the origin of delusion is nonabiding; that is to say, it does not have an origin (*wuben* 無本). Next, this nonabiding origin is nothing more than a different name for the ultimate truth (*shixiang* 實相). Thus, the origin of the delusion is the essence of wisdom, and consequently their essences are not different. Regarding wisdom that realises the principle, Chengguan argues that the essence of wisdom is being without thought (*wunian* 無念), and it can be defined only with the help of delusion; thus, wisdom does not have a self-nature (*zixing* 自性). This absence of self-nature is also the essence of *tathatā* that is realised in the process of enlightenment. As wisdom, subject, and the *tathatā*, object, have the same essence, i.e. not having self-nature, the identity of subject and object is established.

The last topic revolves around the conditioned or unconditioned nature of the body of Buddha. The main divergence lies in what the two lineages regard as the support of the transcendental wisdom. According to the *faxiangzong*, it is the seeds of the samsāric consciousness (*shengmie shizhong* 生滅識種), while according to the *faxingzong* it is the *tathāgatagarbha*. The *Cheng weishi lun* clearly states that the

<sup>56</sup> This is discussed in *Cheng weishi lun*, which is cited by Chengguan. See T 1585: 31.54c29–55a6. For the English translation, see Cook 1999: 337–338.



four kinds of wisdom include all conditioned qualities of the stage of Buddha.<sup>57</sup> As the four kinds of wisdom are born of seeds, they must therefore be conditioned. In addition, if the consciousness that gives birth to wisdom has a nature of *samsāra*, wisdom that is born out of it must be conditioned. The four kinds of wisdom are included in the three bodies of Buddha. Moreover, one of these four kinds of wisdom, the great perfect mirror wisdom (*mahādarśana-jñāna*, *dayuanjing zhi* 大圓鏡智), creates what a Buddha receives for his own use or enjoyment (*zi shouyong* 自受用); therefore, the body of retribution (*sambhogakāya*, *baoshen* 報身) is conditioned and untainted (*youwei wulou* 有爲無漏). However, the *tathāgatagarbha*, the supporter of wisdom is eternal, thus, that which is supported, i.e. wisdom, must also be eternal. The *Awakening of Faith* distinguishes between two kinds of enlightenment: one is that which beings originally possess (*benjue* 本覺), the other is that which is attained through cultivation (*shijue* 始覺).<sup>58</sup> Consequently, the former is eternal as it exists as a principle (*liyou* 理有), whereas the latter is not because it requires conditions in order to be generated. Chengguan abolishes the distinction between these two kinds of enlightenment, stating that they are both eternal. On the one hand, enlightenment attained through cultivation from the aspect that it is generated it must be regarded as conditioned. On the other hand, it is identical with the nature of *tathāgatagarbha*, and thus is unconditioned. Even the *nirmāṇakāya* of the three bodies of Buddha is therefore eternal. If this is eternal, then the more subtle *sambhogakāya* must be eternal as well. Chengguan adds that wisdom must be identical with essence because if it existed outside essence then it would not be eternal.

In order to evaluate the content of these differences it is worth examining the scriptural sources that Chengguan quotes to substantiate his statements.<sup>59</sup> As we might expect, Chengguan often refers to the *Cheng weishi lun* and other Yogācāra works in discussing the teaching of *faxiangzong*, and cites Madhyamaka and Tathāgatagarbha scriptures to demonstrate the arguments of *faxingzong*. However, we also find Yogācāra works (*Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, Vasubandhu's commentary on the *Daśa-bhūmika-sūtra*) and Mahāyāna sūtras (*Lotus Sūtra*, *Nirvāṇa-sūtra*, *Vimalakīrti-sūtra*) under the rubric of *faxingzong*. It is important to note that the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* and Prajñāpāramitā scriptures are cited by both *faxiangzong* and *faxingzong*.

<sup>57</sup> T 1585: 31.56b1–2. Cook 1999: 348.

<sup>58</sup> Hakeda 38–42, Girard 2004: 30–37.

<sup>59</sup> These references are included in *Xinxiu huayan jing shuchao*. Some of the scriptures listed here are well-known Indian ones, others have survived only in Tibetan and Chinese translations, and we also find works that were presumably written in China. I use the Sanskrit titles whenever they are available or have reconstructed versions. For the reconstructed titles, I am indebted to Demiéville 1978 and Conze 1982.

	<i>faxiangzong</i>	<i>faxingzong</i>
1. one-vehicle or three vehicles 2. one nature or five natures	<p>Samḍhinirmocana-sūtra T 676: 16.695a19–20, 22–25; 697b5.</p> <p>Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra T 220: 7.1066a28–b6.</p> <p>Daśacakraṣṭitigarbha-sūtra* T 411: 13.769c4–27.</p> <p>Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra T 671: 16.526c8–11.</p> <p>Mahāyānasūtrālamkāravākya T 1604: 31.594b1–17.</p> <p>Yogācārabhūmiśāstra T 1579: 30.478b13–c15; 720c23–26. T 1581: 30.888a20–21, b4–5; 900a16–17.</p> <p>Mahāyānasamgraha-upanibandhana T 1598: 31.447a25–b10.</p>	<p>Saddharmapuṇḍarika-sūtra T 262: 9.7c5; 8a17–19; 9a6–11; 11b14–15; 13c10–14; 15a18–19, a29–b3, b9c1–5; 17b7–10, 13–15; 18c14–15; 25c12–20; 30a15, a19–b1; 31b16–21; 50c20–51a1.</p> <p>Saddharmapuṇḍarikopadeśa* T 1519: 26.8b15–17; 8c25–9a3; 9a12–20; 18a4–5</p> <p>Buddhāvataṃsaka-sūtra T 279: 10.275a19–21, 25–26; 444a10–11.</p> <p>Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra T 374: 12.365c6–7; 419b1–7; 420a23–25; 493b17–18; 522c23–24; 523c1–2; 524b8, c8–9, 11–16, 559a21–23; 574b11–28, c5–6</p> <p>Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra T 1509: 25.369c13; 714a9–21.</p> <p>Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra T 671: 16.525c12–19; 527b2–20; 540a9–10; 541a11–12; 555a9–10.</p> <p>Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanāda-sūtra T 353: 12.219c5–18; 220c21; 223b8–9.</p>

		<p>Anuttarāśaya-sūtra T 669: 16.470b3–6; 472a24</p> <p>Ratnagotravibhāga T 1611: 31.830b8–11; 831b6–9.</p> <p>Buddhatvaśāstra* T 1610: 31.788c19–23; 799a6–7.</p> <p>Ghanavyūha-sūtra T 682: 16. 774a13–16.</p> <p>Mahāyānaśaṃgraha T 1594: 31.151b17–18. 1595: 31.212b17.</p> <p>無量義經 T 276: 9.386a10–12.</p> <p>百喻經 T 209: 4.548a22–23.</p>
3. consciousness only is real or false	<p>Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra T 1579: 30.478c12–16.</p> <p>Āryaśāsanaprakaraṇa* T 1602: 31.581a2–3.</p> <p>Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi T 1585: 31.14a17.</p> <p>Mahāyānaśaṃgraha (Xuanzang’s version) T 1594: 31.133b15–16.</p>	<p>Mahāyānaśraddhotpāda-śāstra* T 1666: 32. 576b8–9.</p> <p>Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra T 672: 16.594c11–14.</p>

	<i>faxiangzong</i>	<i>faxingzong</i>
4. the tathatā is dependent arising or is immovable	Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi T 1585: 31.48a23–24.	Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanāda-sūtra T 353: 12.222c4–5. Mahāyānaśraddhotpāda-śāstra* T 1666: 32.576c13–14. Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra T 670: 16.510b4–8, 512b16–17.
5. the emptiness and existence related to the three natures are identical or different 6. the number of living beings and buddhas is not increasing or not decreasing	Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi T 1585: 31.45c8–11; 46b5–18.	Madhyamaka-śāstra T 1564: 30.33b11–12. Ghanavyūha-sūtra T 681: 16.746c10–11.
7. the emptiness and existence are identical or different, two truths are identical or different	Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi T 1585: 31.7c19–20; 12c4; 48a19–21. Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra T 1579: 30.653c27–654a6.	Madhyamaka-śāstra T 1564: 30.20b17–18. Nirvāṇa-sūtra T 374: 12.443a7–19. Mahāyānasamgraha (Paramārtha's version) T 1595: 31.53c5. Kāruṇikā-rājā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra* T 245: 8.829a4–8, 9–13, 16–17, 20.

8. the four characteristics are simultaneous or successive	Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi T 1585: 31.6a8–17.	Mahāyānaśraddhotpāda-śāstra* T 1666: 32.576c1–4. Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra T 475: 14.542b3–6. Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra T 670: 16.512c18–19.
9. the subject and the object of enlightenment are identical or different	Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi T 1585: 31.54c29–55a6.	Buddhāvataṃsaka-sūtra T 279: 10.134b5–6, 24–25. Nirvāṇa-sūtra T 374: 12.410c21, 27–28. Daśabhūmivyākhyāna T 1522: 26.133a10, 28–b2.
10. the body of Buddha is unconditioned or conditioned	Buddhabhūmyupadeśa T 1530: 26.301c1–8. Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi T 1585: 31.55b2–3; 56a7–11; 56b1–2.	Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra T 374: 12.374a21–23, a19–b2, b10–14; 388b26–27. Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra T 475: 14.542a17–18.

### One-vehicle of *faxing*

Fazang's classification of teachings was at variance with that of his master Zhiyan 智儼 (602–668) in that he exclusively identified the *Huayan jing* 華嚴經 with the perfect teaching while his master related it to the sudden teaching as well. In addition, they both regarded the *Huayan jing* as the separate teaching, and the *Lotus Sūtra* as the common teaching, but Fazang degraded the *Lotus Sūtra* to the level of the advanced teaching of the Mahāyāna.<sup>60</sup> He thus established the superior position of Huayan, and his awareness of it was certainly enhanced by the lavish support that he received from Empress Wu 武 (r. 684–705). Fazang was eager to demonstrate that the one-vehicle of Huayan is different from the one-vehicle of *Lotus Sūtra* and from the one-vehicle of *Nirvāṇa-sūtra*, proclaiming that the one-vehicle of Huayan is the basic one-vehicle (*genben yisheng* 根本一乘). Chengguan, however, identifies all one-vehicles as *faxing*, accepting them as his own tradition.<sup>61</sup> On the other hand, though he, unlike Fazang, does not draw a sharp distinction between separate and common teaching, he retains the superiority of Huayan:

The ocean of this teaching is vast and profound; there is nothing that it does not include. Form and emptiness exchange their brightness, merit and function interpenetrate. Concerning its content, it contains the five teachings in their entirety. It comprises all teachings as far as the teaching of men and gods. This is the only way to reveal its profundity and broadness. It is similar to how rivers do not include the ocean, but the ocean must include rivers. Though it includes all rivers, it tastes salty everywhere. Therefore, every drop of the ocean is different from rivers. The previous four teachings do not include the perfect teaching, but the perfect teaching must include those four teachings. Although the perfect teaching includes the four teachings, it goes beyond them. Thus, ten virtues and five prohibitions can also be found in the perfect teaching, but they are not those of the third and the fourth teachings, not to speak about those of the first and the second teachings. [These four teachings] have teachings in common [with the perfect teaching], but they do not hold the same position. As this perfect teaching is described as broad, it is named immeasurable vehicles. It is said to be profound because this teaching reveals the one-vehicle. There are two kinds of one-vehicle. The first is the one-vehicle of common teaching that is common in the sudden and real [final] teachings. The second is the one-vehicle of separate teaching that perfectly comprises all merits. The separate teaching includes the common teaching, and the perfect teaching comprises all teachings.<sup>62</sup>

此教海宏深包含無外。色空交映德用重重。語其橫收全收五教。乃至人天總無不包。方顯深廣。其猶百川不攝大海。大海必攝百川。雖攝百川同一鹹味。故隨一適迴異百川。前之四教不攝於圓。圓必攝四。雖攝於四圓以貫之。故十善五戒亦圓教

<sup>60</sup> Gregory 1991: 128–129; in his comprehensive book, Yoshizu Yoshihide discusses the separate teaching of one-vehicle as a central concept of Fazang's teachings. He demonstrates the distinction between separate and common teachings in Zhiyan's writings; then he treats various aspects of this question in Fazang's works. See Yoshizu 1991.

<sup>61</sup> Yoshizu 1991: 470–477.

<sup>62</sup> For a Japanese translation of this passage, see Yoshizu 1991: 473–474.

攝。上非三四。況初二耶。斯則有所通無其所局。故此圓教語廣名無量乘。語深唯顯一乘。一乘有二。一同教一乘。同頓同實故。二別教一乘。唯圓融具德故。以別該同皆圓教攝。<sup>63</sup>

### Conclusion: is Huayan *faxingzong*?

It is quite clear from the discussion above that it was Chengguan who introduced the term *faxingzong*, and started to use the paradigm of *faxiangzong* versus *faxingzong*. In doing so, he had recourse to philosophical frameworks established by Fazang. First, in treating Divākara's classification of Indian Mahāyāna philosophies, Chengguan identified Madhyamaka with *faxingzong*. Second, on the basis of the paradigm of *xing* versus *xiang* propounded by Fazang, Tathāgatagarbha teachings also came to be included in *faxingzong*. Thus explaining the ten differences between *faxiangzong* and *faxingzong*, the stance of *faxingzong* is described by the teachings of Madhyamaka and/or Tathāgatagarbha. In terms of scriptures that represent *faxiangzong* and *faxingzong*, we have seen that some scriptures belong to both categories. The paradigm of *faxiangzong* versus *faxingzong* is thus a hermeneutical, 'transscriptural' device for the classification of Mahāyāna teachings. It is more flexible than the classical Huayan classification of five teachings advocated by Fazang, which simply qualifies Yogācāra and Madhyamaka as elementary teachings of Mahāyāna, and Tathāgatagarbha as the final teaching of Mahāyāna. This paradigm attempts to sort out some principles in the giant corpus of Mahāyāna literature, and one group of principles or guidelines is called *faxiangzong* while the other is referred to as *faxingzong*. Consequently, the term *zong* 宗 should be rendered as a principle or guideline and definitely not as a 'school'.

When Chengguan elaborates on the ten differences, he says that *faxiangzong* is the elementary teaching of Mahāyāna while *faxingzong* is the final teaching of Mahāyāna. If *faxingzong* is the final teaching, it cannot be identified with Huayan, which represents the perfect teaching, the highest of all teachings. The final teaching claims that the *tathāgatagarbha* is not isolated from the world of life and death; it is thus described as the non-obstruction of principle and phenomena (*lishi wu'ai* 理事無礙) using the Huayan terminology. The perfect teaching also includes this important tenet, but it goes one step further. It advocates the notion that on the basis of the non-obstruction of principle and phenomena, the interrelatedness of phenomena becomes established. This interrelatedness is depicted as the non-obstruction of phenomena (*shishi wu'ai* 事事無礙).<sup>64</sup> As we have seen above, the perfect teaching includes the set of advanced principles called *faxingzong*, but they are not identical: "although the ocean includes all rivers, it tastes salty everywhere."

<sup>63</sup> T 1735: 35.514a6–16.

<sup>64</sup> Shih 1992: 138.

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