

Steinkellner, Handout II: Preliminary samples of fragments and reports

(Matsumoto, August 2012)

(The purpose of these samples is twofold: to demonstrate the method being proposed and to solicit help. The first chapter's *siddhānta*-section contains a number of citations and reports that I have been unable to trace with certainty to a particular tradition, author, or work. I would be grateful for any clues that would be helpful in this regard, such as texts with comparable contents before or after Jinendrabuddhi, who is dated mid-8th century C.E.

Because I prepared these samples in some haste, they should not be quoted!)

1.F.B.Un

1. yathā — **tvam merus tvam samudro 'si nātha tvam kalpapādapaḥ /**

tvam suvaidyaḥ pradīpas tvam eva paramaḥ plavaḥ // — ity

atrevaśabdaprayogam antareṇāpi tadartho gamyate, tathehāpīti bhagavān pramāṇam iva pramāṇam.

(PST 1. 1,12-2,2)

Ci: PST 1. 1,13f (P 2b2f, D 2a2)

3. Source: ?

6. *meru, samudra, kalpapādapa, suvaidya, pradīpa, paramaḥ plavaḥ*

7. *stotra*

8. As in this (stanza) "You are the Meru, you are the ocean, oh Lord, you are the wish-yielding tree, you are the expert physician, you are the lamp (for the world), (and) you alone are the supreme raft (to the other shore)" its meaning is recognized even without using the word "like", so here too. Therefore the Venerable one is a means of valid cognition like a means of valid cognition.

2.F.B.NMul

1. *tathā hi tatra* — ***pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham*** — *ity asya pratyakṣalakṣaṇasya nāpavādaḥ kṛtaḥ.* (PST 1. 4,8f)

Ci: PST 1. 4,8f (P 3b8, D 3b1)

3. *Nyayamukha* 15a

4. Cf. KATSURA [5]: 84.

6. *pratyakṣa, kalpanā*

7. *pratyakṣa*

8. To wit: In this (work) no exception was stated for the definition of perception (in the form of):

"Perception is free of conceptual construction."

9. Cf. HATTORI 1968: 82f; KATSURA [5] 84

3.F.B.NMu2

1. *tathā hi tatraiva — mukhamātram idaṃ sadarthanīteḥ — ityādeḥ ślokasya pūrvārdhena sudhiya eva saṅkṣiptarucer upakārāyedaṃ kṛtam iti sūcitam.* (PST 1. 4,12f)

Ci: PST 1. 4,12 (P 4a2, D 3b2)

3. *Nyāyamukha* 29a

6. *sadathanīti*

8. To wit: In this very (work), by the first half of the *śloka* beginning with "This mere introduction to the correct course (of argumentation)" it is indicated that this (work) has been composed to support only an intelligent (person) who takes pleasure in condensed (statements).

9. Cf. KATSURA [7]: 64f, and PST 1. Introduction, note 77, for a reconstitution of this final stanza of the *Nyāyamukha* by Shōryū Katsura, as well as KATAOKA 2007: notes 30-31.

4.F.B.NMu3

1. *tīrthyatarkabhramitāḥ — mandadhiyo vistareṇa pratipādyāḥ — kusṛtīr apavidhya katham arthatattvabhājah* syuḥ. (PST 1. 5,1f)

Ci: PST 1. 5,1f (P 4a4f, D 3b3f)

3. *Nyāyamukha* 29cd

6. *tīrthya, tarka, arthatattvabhāj*

8. How would those who are confused by the arguments of non-Buddhists, the week-minded who must be taught in detail, abandon the wrong path and, then, experience the (true) reality of entities (*arthatattva*)?

9. Cf. KATSURA [7]: 64f and above.

4.F.B.NMu3.1

1. ***kuṣṛtiḥ*** — *ityādinā tūttarārdhena netareṣām anenānugraha bhavatīti.* (PST 1. 4,13-5,1)

Ci: PST 1. 4,13 (P 4a3, D 3b3)

3. *Nyāyamukha 29c'*

6. *kuṣṛti*

9. Cf. KATSURA [7]: 64f.

4F.B.NMu3.2

1. ***kathaṃ***-śabdena hy *atrāsambhavo dyotyate.* (PST 1. 5,2f)

Ci: PST 1. 5,2 (P 4a5, D 3b4)

3. *Nyāyamukha 29d'*

4.F.B.NMu3.3

1. *ye tu* — ***udghaṭitadhī***-viṣayam *āśaṃsārthaṃ vyācakṣate* - *kathaṃ nāma* ***udghaṭitadhīviṣāḥ*** *kumārgam apasya* ***tīrthyatarkabhramitāḥ*** – *bhūyāsuḥ* – ***arthatattvabhājah*** — *iti, teṣāṃ tad ayuktam.* (PST 1. 5,3-5)

Ci'e: PST 1. 5,3-5 (P 4a5f, D 3b4f)

3. *Nyāyamukha 29b-d*

9. Cf. KATSURA [7]: 64f.

5.F.C.Purandaral

1. *tanmatānusārīṇāś cāpare ślokaṃ paṭhanti* —

prasiddhāni pramāṇāni vyavahāraś ca tatkrtaḥ /

pramāṇalakṣaṇasyoktau jñāyate na prayojanam // — *iti.* (PST 1. 21,10-14)

Ci: PST 1. 21,12f (P 13a3, D 11a6f)

3. Purandara, a Cārvāka of the middle period. *tanmatānusārin* refers to the preceding **Ci** citation of ŚV, *codanā*, 47ab, thereby attesting to the closeness, in some respects, of the Cārvāka and Mīmāṃsā traditions.

4a. TSP 528,9-10: *purandaras tv āha — lokaprasidham anumānaṃ cārvākair apīṣyata eva, yat tu kaiścil laukikaṃ mārḡam atikramyānumānam ucyate, tan niṣidhyate — iti.*

TRD 306,14-15: *viśeṣaḥ punaḥ — cārvākair lokayātrānirvāhaṇapravaṇaṃ dhūmādyanumānam iṣyate kvacana, na punaḥ svargādṛṣṭādiprasādhakam alaukikam anumānam — iti.*

5a. The attribution is based on Kamalaśīla's attribution of the comparable idea of accepting inference for everyday practice to Purandara.

5b. Because of the clear statement *apare ślokaṃ pathanti* and in comparison with the texts in Kamalaśīla and Guṇamati, which are however limited to Purandara's first point, this stanza can be characterized as **Ci**. It is well known that Cārvāka topics were later often transmitted in metrical form, probably mostly composed by their critics for easy reference. Purandara, however, is comparatively early and may well be the author of this stanza.

6. *pramāṇāni, prasiddha, vyavahāra, pramāṇalakṣaṇa*

7. *pramāṇalakṣaṇa*

8. Yet others who follow their opinion recite (thefollowing) *śloka*: — "The means of valid cognition are well known and common practice is accomplished through them. Regarding a statement of definitions of means of valid cognition, no purpose is known."

6.R.S.ŠT1

1. *asakṛd vety anenāpi viśeṣadrṣṭākhyam yad anumānam, tat pramāṇāntaram iti darśayati. tad yathā — pratyakṣenaikadā paricchinne vahnau dhūme ca punaḥ paryāyeṇa tenaiva dhūmena yadā sa evāyam vahnir iti paricchinati —, tadā tad viśeṣadrṣṭākhyam agnicrahaṇaṃ pramāṇāntaram sāmānyato dṛṣṭād anumānāt. (PST 1. 29,10-30,2)*

Ri: PST 1. 29,11-30,1 (P 17a7-b1, D 15a1-3)

3. *Ṣaṣṭitantra* (cf. **?F..** in PST 2. 110,4-6)

5a. Jinendrabuddhi refers to the definition of *viśeṣadr̥ṣṭam anumānam* from the beginning of ?F... (PST 2. 110,4-14).

5b. The conception of two kinds of inference, *viśeṣadr̥ṣṭam* and *sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭam*, is first attested in the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*. It is extant in a lengthy citation in PST 2. 110,4-14 (cf. FRAUWALLNER 1958: 86, 124f with 128). The essential phrases are common to both the beginning of this citation (also cited in PST 1. 35,1) and the present text (... *tenaiva dhūmena ... sa evāyam iti ...*). In explaining Dignāga's argument that a repeated cognition would have to be yet another *pramāṇa*, Jinendrabuddhi uses the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*'s definition of *viśeṣadr̥ṣṭam anumānam* and identifies it as a *pramāṇa* different from the *sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭam* type, which is the proper inference.

These two kinds of inference are also defined in the so-called *Vṛttikāragrantha* of the *Śabarabhāṣya* (ŚBh 30,14f). Kumārila explains the first in ŚV, *anumāna*, 141-143 (= TS 1442-1444, with a clear explanation in TSP 516,18-21), ascribing it to Vindhyaśāsin (ŚV, *anumāna*, 143cd). This ascription, however, can not be taken as convincing testimony (as in MOTEGI 2010: n.35).

6. *viśeṣadr̥ṣṭam, pramāṇāntara, sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭam*

7. *anumāna, viśeṣadr̥ṣṭa*

8. Also through (the expression) "or repeatedly" (Dignāga) shows that an (assumed) inference called "known on the basis of a particular (case)" (*viśeṣadr̥ṣṭam*) is a different means of valid cognition [than that which is called "known on the basis of something general (*sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭam*), that is, inference properly speaking]. To wit: — Fire and smoke have once been ascertained by perception, when one again in turn ascertains through this same smoke that this fire is that same (fire) — then this cognition of fire called "known on the basis of a particular (case)" (*viśeṣadr̥ṣṭam*) is a different means of valid cognition than the inference known on the basis of something general (*sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭam*).

9. Cf. FRAUWALLNER 1958: 124, 128; HATTORI 1968: n.1.17; MOTEGI 2010: n.35.

6.R.S.ṢT1.1

1. *sāṅkhyena hi viśeṣadr̥ṣṭānumānasya lakṣaṇam uktam — yadā tenaiva dhūmena tasyaivāgneḥ punaḥ punar astitvaṃ pratipadyate — iti. atas tanmatam darśayitum evam uktam, ...* (PST 1. 34,16-35,2)

Ri: PST 1. 35,1 (P 19b6f, D 17a3f)

3. *Ṣaṣṭitantra* (cf. ?F... in PST 2. 110, 4-6)

6. *viśeṣadr̥ṣṭam*

6.R.S.ŠT1.2

1. ..., — *sa evāyam* — *iti pradarṣanāt*. PST 1. 36,6f)

Ri: PST 1. 36,6 (P 20a8, D 17b4)

3. *Ṣaṣṭitantra* (cf. ?F... in PST 2. 110, 4-6)

6. *viśeṣadrṣṭam*

7.F.B.Un

1. *ye tu* — *ekendriyavijñānakāryatvenaikarūpāyatanādisaṅgrāhe 'pi nānekaṃ dravyaṃ yugapat grhyate, api tu krameṇaiva* — *ity āhuḥ, te idaṃ vaktāvyāḥ ...* (PST 1. 46,4f)

Ci: PST 1. 46,4f (P 25a8f, D 22a5)

3. Source unidentified

4a. PV 3.197ab: *athaikāyatanatve 'pi nānekaṃ drśyate* (PVV : *grhyate* PVA) *sakṛd / PVV 177,20-178,1: athaikendriyajñānanakatvān nīlāpītādīnām ekāyatanatve rūpāyatanatvasaṅgrāhe 'pi nānekaṃ nīlādi sakṛd drśyate, kiṃ tu krameṇa. tat katham aṇūnāṃ bahūnām ekadā grahaṇam.*

5b. Both Dharmakīrti and the commenting Manorathanandin seem to use the same passage as cited by Jinendrabuddhi, the minor deviations in PVV supporting the assumption of this fragment's character as Ci.

6. *ekarūpāyatanādisaṅgrāha, yugapat, krameṇa*

7. **Abhidharma???** Cf. HATTORI 1968: n. 40,41.

8. Those, however, who say — Even if (the particular atoms) are collectively treated as one and the same color-and-form-basis, etc. because they result in a cognition through one and the same sense faculty, the multiple substance (present in this case) is not grasped (by cognition) at once, but only gradually —, must be told the following: ...

9. Cf. **YOSHIDA** 2011: 155.

8.R.M.Un

1. *syād etat — aindriyasya¹ jñānasya cakṣurādir āśrayaḥ, śābdasya tu manaḥ. tasmād āśrayabhedād ekaviśayatve 'pi tayoh pratibhāsabhedāḥ — iti.* (PST 1. 48,5f)

Ri: PST 1. 48,5f (P 26b1, D 23a3f)

2. ¹ *aindriyasya* em. : *evendriyasya* Ms

3. Most likely a Mīmāṃsaka opinion is being reported here. Cf. ŚV, *pratyakṣa*, 121-122 (TABER 2005: 98) and 160-162 (*ibid.*: 114-116).

4a. PV3.234ab: *ekārthatve 'pi buddhīnāṃ nānāśrayatayā sa cet /*

5a. The thesis reported here is connected with 9.R.M.Un, where it is defended.

6. *āśrayabheda, pratibhāsabheda, āśraya*

7. *śābdendriyajñāna, ekaviśayatva, pratibhāsabheda*

8. The following may be (proposed): —"The bases of sensory cognition are the eye, etc.; of verbal cognition, however, (the basis is) the mind. Therefore, the different appearances of these two (cognitions) are due to (their) different bases, although they have one and the same object."

9. Cf. YOSHIDA 2011: 158f.

9.R.M.Un

1. *syād etat — yadi śābdendriyajñānāyor naiko viśayo yaḥ sāsnaḍimān sa gaur ity upadesād gāṃ pratipadya paścād vyaktiviśeṣaṃ paśyan katham evam avasyati yo 'sau mayā śruto 'yam asāv iti, katham ca gāṃ ānayet ukta indriyaviśaya eva pravartate. na hy anyam upalabdhavato 'nyatra sa evāyam iti pratyayo bhavati. nāpy anyatra codite 'nyatra pravṛttir yuktā. bhavati ca tathā pratyayaḥ pravartate ca śabdād indriyaviśaye. tasmād ekas tayor viśayaḥ — iti. sāpy akalpanaiva.* (PST 1. 48,12-49,1)

Ri: PST 1. 48,12-49,1 (P 26b4-7, D 23a6-b1)

3. Most likely a Mīmāṃsaka argument in close connection with the thesis of 8.R.M.Un, which it defends by indicating the unacceptable consequences if this thesis is not accepted.

4a. PVV 190,10-12: *yad apy ucyate paraiḥ— śābdendriyajñānayoṛ yadi naikaviṣayatvam, tadā viṣāṇādimantam arthaṃ gaur iti śabdāt pratītya kālāntare vyaktiviśeṣaṃ dr̥ṣṭavato 'yam asau śabdāt prān mayā pratīto gaur iti pratyabhijñānam ekatādhyavasāyi yad utpadyate, tan na syāt — iti.*

5b. Because Jinendrabuddhi characterizes the cited words as containing an "idea" (*kalpanā*), and because the comparable citation of something said by "others" in PVV 190,10-12 deviates in the wording considerably despite mediating the same content as in PST 48,12-14, this text is classified as **Ri**.

6. *śābdendriyajñāna, eko viṣaya*

8. The following (idea) may be (proposed): "If (it were the case) that verbal and sensory cognitions do not have one and the same object, how does somebody determine, after understanding a cow on account of the instruction 'a cow is that which has a dew-lap etc.', when he later sees a specific individual case (of a cow), in the following way: 'This is that which I have learned'? Why, moreover, does he act only towards the object of the sense faculty when told 'Bring the cow!'? For somebody who perceives one (item) does not have the cognition 'this is exactly that' with regard to another (item). Activity towards one (item) is also not appropriate, if somebody is incited to another (item). In this way (however) somebody has (this) cognition and is active with regard to the object of the sense faculty on account of a word. Therefore the object of the two (verbal and sensory cognitions) is one and the same." That, too, is nothing but a non-idea.

9. Cf. **YOSHIDA** 2011: 160.

10.F.B.Un

1. *ataḥ kasyacin nipuṇamateś codyam āśankate. tatredaṃ codyam — nanu sarva evāmī pratyakṣabhedā nirvikalpā eva, tataś ca pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham ity anenaiva saṅgrhītāḥ / tathā hi nyāyamukhenaiṣāṃ pṛthag lakṣaṇaṃ praṇītam / tatra kimartho 'yam iha pṛthag lakṣaṇabhedā ucyate — iti.* (PST 1. 50,1-4)

Ci: PST 1. 50,1-4 (27a7-b1, D 24a1-3)

3. The ironic epithet *nipuṇamati* seems to be pointing at an intentionally unnamed, yet known interpreter of Dignāga's work, Īśvarasena being a possible candidate.

6. *nipunamati, pratyakṣabheda, lakṣaṇabheda, Nyāyamukha*

7. *pratyakṣabheda*

8. Then (Dignāga) suspects the objection of a certain clever-minded (person). Regarding this (point), here is the following objection: — "Are not all these different perceptions nothing but non-conceptual, and thus already included by the definition 'perception is free of conceptual construction'?" To wit: The *Nyāyamukha* has prescribed a separate definition for (all) these (different kinds of perception). In this case, to what purpose does he here (in the PS again) formulate different definitions separately?

11.R.M.Un

1. *tatra manovijñāne pratyakṣe—indriyajñānānubhūtam eva tam arthaṃ grhṇāti — iti keśāñcid vipratipattiḥ. rāgādisaṃvedane — nāsty eva tad — iti. yogijñāne 'pi — eṣaiva.* (PST 1. 50,8f)

Ri: PST 1. 50,8f (P 27b2-4, D 24a4-5)

3. False conceptions of mental perception, self-awareness of emotions, and yogic perception are found in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya and, except for the last one, Mīmāṃsā traditions. The inclusion of the last in this elliptic report seems to reveal this to be a reference to the Mīmāṃsā. For *mānasa*, NBṬṬ 26,12 and TSop 281,19-21 attribute this refutation to Kumārila and others (cf. ŚV, *abhāva*, 27), for the non-existence of *rāgādisaṃvedana* and *yogijñāna*, cf. ŚV, *pratyakṣa*, 83 (TABER 2005: 83) and ŚV, *pratyakṣa*, 28cd-32 (TABER 2005: 55f and 179-183, notes 23-24), respectively.

6. *mānasa, rāgādisaṃvedana, yogijñāna*

7. *mānasa, rāgādisaṃvedana, yogijñāna*

8. Among these, the false conceptions of certain (opponents) regarding mental cognition as perception is — that it grasps the object only as (already) experienced by sensory perception — regarding (self-)awareness of passion, etc. — that this does not exist at all — and regarding yogic cognition — the same (false conception).

9. Cf. KAJIYAMA 1966: 45-56.

12.F.B.Un

1. *apare tu — kim punaḥ pañcendriyajam savikalpakam apy asti, yata etad viśeṣaṇam ity āha paramatāpekṣam cetyādi. pareṣām indriyajam jñānam kiñcit savikalpakam yad vyutpannavyavahārasya, kiñcid avikalpakam yad itarasyeti matam. atas tadapekṣam indriyajñānasya kalpanāpodham ity etad viśeṣaṇam paraparikalpitavasikalpendriyajñānavyavacchedārtham iti vyācakṣate.* (PST 1. 50,13-51,1)

Ci: PST 1. 50,13-51,1 (P 27b5-7, D 24a6-b1)

3. Another unidentified Buddhist commentator on PS(V)² proposes that it is perception's qualification as *kalpanāpodha* which is meant by Dignāga to be the reason for his reference to the opinion of opponents (cf. HATTORI 1968: 92, n. 1.44). So far, however, the only such commentary known is that by Īśvarasena.

5a. Conceptual perception is held in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā traditions. For a reason to attribute the idea reported in this text to a Mīmāṃsaka, even perhaps to Kumāriḷa, cf. 13.R.M.Un, §5a.

5b. Because of the subsequent report of the opponent's idea of conceptual perception in conclusion of this passage, a topic not touched upon elsewhere in this context, the whole passage may be characterized as Ci. For the report, cf. 13.R.M.Un.

6. *savikalpaka, avikalpaka*

7. *kalpanāpodha iti viśeṣaṇa*

8. Others, however explain: "Isn't there also a conceptual (cognition) that arises from the five sense faculties, for which reason this qualification (is stated)? This is why (Dignāga) says: 'But the qualification (is stated) in consideration of the views of others', etc. The view of others is: 'A certain cognition that is arisen from the sense faculties is conceptual, (namely that) which is (the perception) of somebody proficient in a (specific) affair (and) a certain (cognition) is non-conceptual, (namely, that) which is the opposite.' Therefore this qualification of sensory cognition, namely, 'free of conceptual construction', which (is stated) in consideration of the (above-mentioned) view, has the purpose of excluding a conceptual sensory cognition as fancied by others."

9. Cf. HATTORI 1968: 92.

13.R.M.Un

1. *apare tu pareṣām — indriyajam jñānam kiñcit savikalpakam yad vyutpannavyavahārasya, kiñcid avikalpakam yad itarasya — iti matam.* (PST 1. 50,13-15)

Ri in F8: PST 1. 50,14f (P 27b6, D 24a7)

5a. The specific differentiation between conceptual perception being that of somebody proficient in a specific affair (*vyutpannavyavahāra*) and non-conceptual perception being that of somebody still inexperienced suggests a background in the Mīmāṃsā. In fact, it seems that expressions used by Kumārila have been modified here, such as *kauśala* and *saṃskṛta* against *abhyāsavarjita*, where Kumārila uses the example of music to explain such differences in perception (cf. ŚV, *pratyakṣa*, 237cd-240; TABER 2005: 143).

6. *savikalpaka, avikalpaka*

7. *indriyajam jñānam savikalpakam*

8. A certain cognition that is arisen from the sense faculties is conceptual, (namely that) which is (the perception) of somebody proficient in a (specific) affair, (and) a certain (cognition) is non-conceptual, (namely that) which is the opposite.

14.F.N-V.Un

1. *atra kecid āhuh — āśrayāsiddhiḥ. tathā hi svasaṃvitter nirvikalpakatvaṃ sādhyam. sā ca jñānasyāpi tāvan na samasti. kutaḥ punaḥ sukhādīnām ajñānarūpāṇām. te hy ekasminn ātmani jñānena saha samavāyāt tenaikārthasamavāyinā gṛhyanta iti svayaṃ prameyarūpā eva. atas te parasyāpi na saṃvedakāḥ, kutaḥ punar ātmanāḥ — iti.* (PST 1. 54,10-55,1)

Ci: PST 1. 54,10-55,1 (P 29b3-5, D 26a2-4)

3. Devendrabuddhi identifies the proponent of the objection in PV 3.250 as "some Vaiśeṣika" (PVP 237b7; cf. also TSP 484,22), whereas Manorathanandin has "Naiyāyikas, etc." (PVV 194,18). The essence of this objection also introduces PVin 1.22, the citation of which the *Tarkarahasya* attributes to the Naiyāyikas (TR 31,11) following Dharmottara (PVinT_i 1. 100a4)

4a. PV 3.250: *avedakāḥ parasyāpi te svarūpaṃ kathaṃ viduḥ /
ekārthāśrayiṇā vedyā vijñāneneti kecana //*

TS 1330: *avedakāḥ parasyāpi svaividbhājaḥ kathaṃ nu te /
ekārthāśritavijñānvedyās tv ete bhavanti cet //*

TSP 484,22-24 (on TS 1330): *avedakā ityādinā vaiśeṣikamatam āśaṅkate. — na
kevalaṃ svasaṃvedena (: °enā TSP) na bhavanti, bāhyasyāpy arthasyāvedakāḥ. na
jñānasvabhāvā iti yāvat. ekasminn ātmani samavetena tu jñānena vedyante — iti tesām
siddhāntaḥ.*

5a. With the explanation that joy, etc. (*sukhādi*) are known through cognition (*jñāna*), because the latter inheres together with the former in the one and same soul like its other qualities, this report reflects a Vaiśeṣika and Naiyāyika ontology (cf. Vyom II. 143,14f). The indication of the specific logical fault accruing for the Buddhist position could not yet be traced.

5b. Compared with the abbreviated report in TSP (see above), the present text could well be a true citation.

6. *āśrayāsiddhi, svasaṃvitti, nirvikalpakatva, samavāya, ekārthasamavāyin*

7. *pratyakṣa, nirvikalpakatvasiddhi, āśrayāsiddhi*

8. With regard to this [Buddhist position that non-conceptuality of joy, etc. is established through self-awareness] some say: "(This is a case in which) the basis (of the logical reason) is un-established. To wit: Non-conceptuality is to be proven through self-awareness. This (self-awareness), however, does not even connect (itself) to cognition in the first place, (and thus) how much less to joy, etc., which do not have the nature of cognition. For these (joy, etc.) are grasped on account of (their) inherence together with cognition in one and the same soul by that (cognition) that is inherent in one and the same entity (i.e., the soul). They are, therefore, in themselves only of the nature of cognitional objects. Since these (i.e., joy, etc.) are not even aware of something else, how much less (are they aware) of themselves."

15.R.S.Un

1. yo 'py āha — *nāntarāḥ sukhādayo nāpi cetanāḥ, kiṃ tarhi tadviparītasvabhāvāḥ
prameyā eva* — *iti, tasyāpi yathoktanīyā klādādyāhārabodhātmaṃ vastu sidham.* (PST 1. 55,12-56,1)

Ri: PST 1. 55,12f (P 30a3, D 26b2)

3. This position is attributed to the Sāṅkhya in PVinT 1, 120a6 and PVV 199,10 (also TR 33,30f; NBTT 32,10f).

4a. PV 3. 268a-c': *kaścid bahiḥsthitān eva sukhādīn apracetanān /
grāhyān āha.*

PVin 1. 22,13f: *nāntarāh sukhādayo nāpi cetanāh. tdātmanāṃ śabdādīnām
anubhavāt tadanubhavakhyātiḥ — ity aparāh.*

5b. As a summary of the position on *sukhādi* in light of the three-*guṇa* theory of Sāṅkhyan ontology, and compared with similar descriptions, this is an **Ri**-text.

6. *sukhādi, prameya*

7. *sukhādi, nāntara, na cetana*

8. Also for that one who says — "Joy, etc. are neither interior nor mental. They are rather nothing but objects of cognition of a nature contrary to both" — a reality is established in the manner mentioned above [PST 1. 55,6f], which consists of a cognition with the appearance of joy, etc.

16.R.S.Un

1. *tasmāt — sūkṣmam utpādakālavibhāgaṃ duravadhāratvād anupalakṣayataḥ
pratyakṣe evaite — iti kasyacin matiḥ syāt.* (PST 1. 60,10-11)

Ri: PST 1. 60,10 (P 32b1, D 28b3f)

3. This text is part of a larger report within the Sāṅkhya section (PST 1. 140,8-10), for which it serves as testimony (cf. **?R.?Un**).

4. PST 1. 140,9f: ... *sūkṣmatarakālabhedasya dūravadhāratvāt ...*

5b. Because the later text is framed with *paro hi ... iti yathā manyate*, and because of the phrase *matiḥ syāt* in the present one, it is characterized as **Ri**.

6. *utpādakālavibhāga, duravadhāratva*

7. *pratyakṣābhāsa, bhrānti, saṃvṛtisajjñāna*

8. Therefore someone could be of the opinion: — "For somebody who does not notice the subtle difference [from a non-conceptual perception] at the time of the arising [of the conception], because (the difference) can hardly be determined, these two [i.e., erroneous and conventional cognition] are certainly perceptions."

17.R.N.Ācāryāḥ1

1. *dr̥śyate ca keṣāñcid vipratipattiḥ, yathā — ghaṭādiṣu jñānam samvṛtisatsu mṛgaṭṛṣṇādiṣu codakādi jñānam pratyakṣam eva. — tathā hi — tasyaiva mṛgaṭṛṣṇādau toyādi jñānasya vyavacchedāvyābhicārīti pratyakṣalakṣaṇe viśeṣaṇam upāttam. akṣopaghātaja-jñānanivr̥ttyartham tad iti cet, na, arthasannikarṣagrahaṇād evānarthasambhūtasya dvicandrādi jñānasya nivṛtteḥ. anyathendriyajam ity eva vācyam syāt. anumānādi-jñānam tu siddham eva yathāpūrvānubhūtasamayasmr̥tibalapravr̥ttam apratyakṣam ca — iti...* (PST 1. 60,11-61,5)

Ri: PST 1. 60,11-61,5 (P 32b2-5, D 28b4-7)

3. The whole text seems to have been taken, with minor variations, from Devendrabuddhi's explanation on PV 3. 289b-d (PVP 249b1-7).

4a. PVA 333,6-12, in explaining the same, offers a parallel report on the error hinted at by Dharmakīrti. This report roughly renders the main point of a discussion between Naiyāyikas on the qualification "non-deviating", and thereby also supports the interpretation of the citation in PST as an Ri-text of the Naiyāyika's critique of Dignāga's list of pseudo-perceptions: *akṣajam eva tad — iti pareṣām bhr̥ntir mṛgaṭṛṣṇikājalajñāne. tathāhi — indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam¹ pratyakṣam ity atra lakṣaṇe mar̥cījalajñāna-vyavacchedāvyābhicāri grahaṇam kṛtam. yadi punar anindriyajam eva tat syāt, prathamapadenaiva vyāvartanāt kim etadarthenāvyabhicāri grahaṇena. dvicandrādi jñānasyānarthasambhūtasya² nivṛttyartham iti cet, na, arthasannikarṣa-grahaṇenaiva tasya vyāvartanāt indriyagrahaṇenānindriyajasya vyāvartanam. samvṛtisadviśayasya tv indriyajatvābhimānaḥ pareṣām savivāda eva. anumānādivacanam tarhi vyartham. na hi tenānindriyajatvam sādhyate. siddhatvād anumānāder³ anindriyajatvasya.*

¹ *avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam* Ms : *avyabhicāri* PVA

² *sambhūtasya* Ms : *sambhātasya* PVA

³ *anumānāder* : *anumānādir* PVA (Ms)

5a. The explanation adds, in all probability based on the opponent's explanation, that the term "non-deviating" (*avyabhicārin*) in NSū 1.1.4 has the purpose of excluding erroneous cognitions. This presupposes the idea that perception is non-conceptual as well as conceptual. Schmithausen has reconstructed this solution to be the opinion of

the Ācāryas on the relationship between error and conception (SCHMITHAUSEN 1965:182). The report above and the related explanation can, therefore, be connected with the theory of perception of the Ācāryas, as well as identified with the core of the Ācāryas' criticism of Dignāga's list of pseudo-perceptions in PS 1. 7c-8b.

5b. The characterization of this text as presenting a specific *vipratipatti* together with the existence of a comparable report in PVA 333,6-12 on PV 3.289 is the reason for classifying it as an **Ri**-text.

6. *saṃvṛtisat, mṛgatṛṣṇādi, pratyakṣa, avyabhicārin*

7. *pratyakṣābhāsa, saṃvṛtisajjñāna, mṛgatṛṣṇādau toyādiññāna*

8. (We) also observe the misconception of certain (teachers). For example: — "A cognition with regard to a conventionally existing jar, etc. and a cognition of water, etc. with regard to a mirage, etc. are certainly perception." — That is to say: "In order to exclude exactly this cognition of water, etc. with regard to a mirage, etc., the qualification 'non-deviating' was added in the definition of perception (of NSū 1.1.4). [Objection:] 'This (qualification) has the purpose of excluding cognitions that have arisen on account of the injury of a sense.' [Answer:] (This is) not (the case), because cognitions such as that of two moons, which have not arisen through an object, are already excluded by the expression 'contact with an object'. If they were not [thus excluded], only 'arisen through a sense' would have to be said. Cognitions such as inference, however, are definitely established as occurring by force of remembering a usual practice (*samaya*) [in regard to two items] as earlier experienced, and (thus) are (, of course, cases of) non-perception."

9. GUPTA 1962:92f; SCHMITHAUSEN 1965:182; CHU 2004:137-139

18.R.B.Un

1. *yas tv āha — dvicandrādiññānaṃ naivendriyajam, api tu mānasam eva — iti, tena vaktavyaṃ kim indriyajasya lakṣaṇam iti. — indriyabhāvābhāvānuvidhānam — iti cet, tad ihāpi tulyam. — tadvikāravikāritvam — iti cet, atrāpy etad evottaram.* (PST 1. 61,14-62,2)

Ri: PST 1. 61,14-62,1 (P 33a2f, D 29a4f)

3. Since the main thesis is refuted by Dharmakīrti with the argument (in PV 3.294) that it contradicts Dignāga's words in the *Vṛtti* on PS 1.15, Schmithausen assumes a

Buddhist proponent (SCHMITHAUSEN 1965: 214, n.145). This thesis is also dealt with in FUNAYAMA 1999: 77 and CHU 2004: 124. Although Vibhūticandra surprisingly identifies its proponent as *kaṇādādayaḥ* (Vibhū 206³), the later Tibetan exegetes clearly see him as a commentator on the PS(V). For example, mKhas grub rje in *Rig pa'i rgya mtsho* 732,3 (*Kun las btus kyi 'grel byed*), and Glo bo mkhan chen in *Rigs nas gsal byed ... as Īśvarasena* (cf. KUIJP 1985: 85). This attribution is also supported, I think, by the ironic designation of its propounder as *ācāryadeśīyāḥ* in DhṬipp 19,9 and TPN 264,20.

The two subsequent proposals of the opponent offered in this quite abbreviated dialogue are also turned down by Dharmakīrti in PV 3.296.

4a. PV 3.294a: *mānasam tad apīty eke.*

PV 3.296: *kiṃ vāindriyam. yad akṣāṇām bhāvābhāvānurodhi cet /*

tat tulyam. vikriyāvac cet, saiveyam. kiṃ niṣidhyate //

PVA 335,32-336,4 has an elaborate explanation of this thesis (translated in SCHMITHAUSEN 1965: 214 and, without the last part, in FRANCO 1986: 84 and CHU 2004: 124), which I consider to be a genuine citation that contains yet another citation at the end: *mānasam evaitad dvicandrādi jñānam marīcikājalajñānavat. tathā hi marīcikāsu prathamam indriyajñānam abhrāntam evopajāyate, paścāt tu jalānubhavavāsanāprabodhāt savikalpakam jalajñānam. sa ca prabodho marīcidarśanād eva. sādṛśyabhājo marīcaya evaṃdharmāṇaḥ. tathātrāpi candraviṣayam abhrāntam prathamam jñānam paścād dvicandrākāro vikalpaḥ. tatra kecid āhuḥ — stimitākṣṇor madhye sthātā sa ekaḥ candra ubhayapārśve krameṇopalabhyamānaḥ kālasaukṣmyād yugapad eva lakṣyate. pārśvadvaye ca dvicandrādhyāropaḥ.*

DhṬipp 19,9-12: *kecid ācāryadeśīyā — dvicandrādivijñānānām mānasī bhrāntir nendriyajā — iti. tasyās ca kalpanāpoḍhagrahaṇenaiva nirāsaḥ, tathā ca dignāganāmnācāryeṇa kalpanāpoḍham pratyakṣam iti lakṣaṇe 'bhrāntagrahaṇam na kṛtam iti pratipannāḥ.*

TPN 264,20-22: *ācāryadeśīyā hi — dvicandrāder bhrāntir mānasī. tasyās ca kalpanāpoḍhapadenaiva nirāsaḥ. ata evācāryeṇa kalpanāpoḍham pratyakṣam pratyakṣeṇaiva sidhyatīti lakṣaṇe 'bhrāntapadam nopāttam (: nopāttim TPN) — iti pratipannāḥ. cf. CHU 2004:125).*

5a. Because there is no other commentator on the PS(V) known before Dharmakīrti, and because the Tibetan testimony is probably not merely based on a reasoned guess, like mine, but rather based on a learned tradition, attributing this thesis to Īśvarasena is quite likely correct. This is not contradicted, I think, by the fact that the later commentators on the NBT consider this position to be an explanation for the absence of the Dharmakīrtian attribute *abhrānta* in Dignāga's definition.

5b. In comparison with the citation by Prajñākaragupta, the present text can be characterized as Ri. Moreover, since only the thesis and two further steps of explanation are reported, both being present in PV 3.294a and 296, it is obvious that Jinendrabuddhi is reporting this source only on the basis of Dharmakīrti's formulations.

6. *mānasa, dvicandrādiḥṅāna*

7. *pratyakṣābhāsa, mānasa, dvicandrādiḥṅāna*

8. That one, however, who says: — "The cognition of two moons, for example, has definitely arisen through a sense" — must declare what the mark of a sense-arisen (cognition) is. If (he proposes): — "(The mark) is (its) conformity to the presence or absence of a sense" — (then) this (mark) is also in the present case [of sense-arisen cognition] the same. If (he further proposes): — "(The mark) is (the cognition's) changing with a change of the (sense)" — in this case, too, the answer is surely the (one given above).

9. SCHMITHAUSEN 1965:214; KUIJP 1985:85; FRANCO 1986: 84; FUNAYAMA 1999:77; CHU 2004:124.

19.F.B.VVi1

1. *tato 'rthād vijñānaṃ pratyakṣam iti. yasya viśayasya vijñānaṃ vyapadiśyate, yadi tata eva tad utpadyate, nānyato¹ nāpi tato 'nyataś ca, taj jñānaṃ² pratyakṣam. tad yathā rūpādiḥṅānaṃ sukhādiḥṅānam iti. etena bhrāntijñānaṃ nirastam, yathā śuktikāyāṃ rajatajñānam. tad dhi rajatena vyapadiśyate rajatajñānam iti. na ca tad rajatād utpadyate, śuktikayaiva tu tad upajanyate. samvṛtijñānam apy anenāpāstam. tathā hi tad ghaṭādibhir vyapadiśyate, ghaṭajñānaṃ paṭajñānaṃ³ ity evam. na tu tat tebhyo bhavati, teṣāṃ samvṛtisattvenākāraṇatvāt. rūpādibhya eva hi tathāsanni-viṣṭebhyas tad bhavati.*

anumānajñānam apy anenaiva nirastam. dhūmajñāna-sambandhasmṛtibhyām api hi tad bhavati, nāgnita eva. tato bhavaty eva, na tu na bhavatiṭṭy ayam apy atrārtho 'bhimataḥ. (PST 1. 87,3-12)

Ci: PST 1. 87,3-12 (P 44b6-45a3, D 39b7-40a4)

2. ¹ *nānyato* Ms : *nānyataḥ*, PST 1. ² *taj jñānaṃ* em. : *jñānaṃ* Ms ³ *ghaṭajñānaṃ paṭajñānaṃ* em. : *ghaṭajñānaṃ ghaṭajñānaṃ* Ms, PST 1. (with P)

3. Vasubandhu's *Vādaśāstrī*

4. Cf. 19.F.B.VVi1.1, 19.F.B.VVi1.2, and 19.F.B.VVi1.3.

In his *Nyāyavārttika*, Uddyotakara refers in his refutation, beyond Vasubandhu's definition (cf. FRAUWALLNER 1933: 282 and 1957: 112), to parts of the definition's explanation as presented by Jinendrabuddhi. Also Vācaspatimiśra has copied the beginning used in Jinendrabuddhi's explanation from Uddyotakara.

NV 38,5-16: *apare punar varṇayanti — tato 'rthād vijñānaṃ pratyakṣam — iti. tan na. tato 'rthād iti yasyārthasya yadvijñānaṃ vyapadiśyate, yadi tata eva tad bhavati, nārthāntarāt, tat pratyakṣam. etenānumānādijñānaṃ apakṣiptaṃ bhavati. na hi tata eva tad bhavati, kiṃ tarhi tataś cānyataś ca tad bhavati. atra tāvad arthagrahaṇaṃ na kartavyam. tato vijñānaṃ ity ucyamāne gamyata eva tadarthād iti. etenaivānumānādivyudāso 'pi pratyuktaḥ. yat punar etat — samvṛtijñānaṃ anenāpakṣiptam — iti, tad etan na budhyāmahe kathaṃ tad apakṣiptam iti. yadi brūṣe — rūpādibhya utpannaṃ jñānaṃ ghaṭasya vyapadiśyate — iti, ato na tato bhaviṣyatīty apakṣiptam iti. tan na yuktam. na hi rūpādibhya utpannaṃ vijñānaṃ ghaṭasya vyapadiśyate. rūpādibhya utpannaṃ rūpādīnāṃ ghaṭād vijñānaṃ ghaṭasyety ato na prasaṅgaḥ.*

NVT 122,9-11: *lakṣaṇaṃ vyācaṣṭe — tato 'rthād iti. yattador nityasambandhād yasyārthasya yadvijñānaṃ vyapadiśyate, yadi tata eva tad bhavati, nārthāntarad vyapadeśāsambandhinaḥ, tat pratyakṣam.*

5a. Well attested as stemming from the *Vādaśāstrī* in PS 1.13 and its *Vṛtti*, as well as in PST 1. 86,4ff and many other texts (cf. HATTORI 1968: n. 2.1.-2.8.). This is fragment 9 in FRAUWALLNER 1957: 137f, translated in 120 (cf. HATTORI 1968: 116; translated in 1960: 48f; and in ANACKER 1984: 40).

5b. Of the available testimonies, this is clearly a Ci-text.

6. *pratyakṣa, artha, bhrānti, samvṛtijñāna, anumāna*

7. *pratyakṣalakṣaṇa, artha, pratyakṣābhāsa, vyapadeśa*

8. "Perception is a cognition (just) on account of this object (*artha*).⁴" When that cognition arises only on account of that (sense-)object (*viṣaya*) for which it is named, but neither on account of another, nor even on account of (yet) another than that,⁴ this cognition is a perception, for example, "a color-and-form, etc.-cognition (or) a joy, etc.-cognition." By this (definition,) (cases of) erroneous cognition are rejected, such as a silver-cognition with regard to mother-of-pearl. For this (erroneous) cognition is named "silver-cognition" on account of silver. It does not arise, however, on account of silver, but it comes about only on account of some mother-of-pearl. Also (cases of) conventional cognition are rejected by this (definition). That is to say, this (cognition) is called, on account of pots, etc., "pot-cognition, cloth-cognition." This (cognition), however, does not come about on account of these (pots, etc.), because these (pots, etc.) are not causes, since (they) are (only) conventionally existent. For this (cognition) comes about only on account of [the atoms of] color-and-form, etc. that are combined [as cognitional supports] in such a way (namely as pots, etc.).⁵ Inferential cognition is also rejected already by this (definition). For that (inferential cognition) also comes about on account of the cognition of smoke and the memory of (its) connection (with fire), but not on account of fire only. Moreover, this is (what is) conceived here [in this definition] as the object (*artha*), on account of which (a cognition) necessarily comes about, but does not not come about.

⁴ I have no idea what the second alternative could refer to. Might it merely have been added for emphasis? T. translates the second as a negative attribute of *śes pa* ("this cognition that (arises) not even on account of another").

⁵ According to NCV 93,14-16, the particular atoms are supersensible and, therefore, cannot be cognized (*buddhau na sanniveśah*). The cognitional support (*ālambana*) is available due to the fact that their appearance in cognition is owed to their collection (*samudayakṛtatannirbhāsatayā*); cf. HATTORI 1968: n. 1.40.

9. FRAUWALLNER 1933; 1957; HATTORI 1960; 1968; ANACKER 1984

19.F.B.VVi1.1

1. *nanu ca yena viṣayeṇa yaj jñānaṃ vyapadiśyate, yadi tat — tato bhavati, na tu na bhavati — ity eṣo 'py atra niyamo 'bhimataḥ.* (PST 1.89,7f)

Ci: PST 1. 89,7f (P 45b8, D 40a7f)

19.F.B.VVi1.2

1. *anyathā katham idaṃ yujyate, yad uktam vādaividhau — anumānajñānam apy anenaiva nirastam. dhūmajñānasambandhasmṛtibhyām api hi tad bhavati, nāgnita eva — iti.* (PST 1.89,10-12)

Ci: PST 1. 89,10-12 (P 46a2f, D 41a2)

6. *anumānajñāna*

7. *anumānajñāna*

19.F.B.VVi1.3

1. *tataś ca tad ayuktaṃ syāt, yad uktam — dhūmajñānasambandhasmṛtibhyām api hi tad bhavati, nāgnita eva — iti.* (PST 1. 90,3f)

Ci: PST 1. 90,4 (P 46a6f, D 41a5f)

7. *anumānajñāna*

19.F.B.VVi1.4

1. *tataś ca tad ayuktaṃ syāt, yad uktam — dhūmajñānasambandhasmṛtibhyām api hi tad bhavati, nāgnita eva — iti.* (PST 1. 90,3f)

Ci: PST 1. 90,4 (P 46a6f, D 41a5f)

7. *anumānajñāna*

19.F.B.VVi1.5

1. *tasmāt — yasya tad vyapadiśyate — ity etan na prāpnoti.* (PST 1. 93,9f)

Cie: PST 1. 93,9f (P 48a2, D 42b6)

3. The citation is directly of PSV 6,16, indirectly, however, from VVi. This citation proves that Dignāga was also referring to the beginning of Vasubandhu's explanation.

19.F.B.VVi1.6

1. *tataḥ — yasya tad vyapadiśyate, tata evotpadyate — iti siddhā pratyakṣatā nīlādijñānānām ity āha ...* (PST 1. 93,12f)

Cie: PST 1. 93,12f (P 48a3, D 42b7)

3. Jinendrabuddhi, within a rhetorical objection, copies the citation of Dignāga as above and continues to cite the VVi, again with small variations.

19.F.B.VVi1.7

1. *tataḥ sa eva prasaṅgaḥ — yasya tad vyapadiśyate — ity etan na prāpnoti.* (PST 1. 93,15)

Cie: PST 1. 93,15 (P 48a3, D 43a1)

3. Cf. 19.F.B.VVi1.7, §3.

19.F.B.VVi1.8

1. *yasyārthasya yaj jñānaṃ vyapadiśyate, yadi tata eva tad bhavati — ity etad viṣayacintāprakṛtam eva.* (PST 1. 94,9f)

Cie: PST 1. 94,9f (P 48b1, D 43a4f)

19.F.B.VVi1.9

1. *ataḥ — yena vyapadiśyate — ity etan na sambhavatīti darśayan āha ...* (PST 1. 94,14f)

Cie: PST 1. 94,14 (P 48b4, D 43a6)

20.R.B.Un

1. *ye hi manyante* — **vādaividhidūṣaṇapara¹ evāyam ārambhaḥ** — *iti, teṣāṃ yad uktam*

svasamvedyaṃ tv anirdeśyaṃ rūpam indriyagocaraḥ //

ity atra gocarārtho vaktavyaḥ. (PST 1. 90,12-91,1)

Ri: PST 1. 90,12 (P 46b3, D 41b2)

2. ¹ °dūṣaṇa° em. : °bhūṣaṇa° Ms

3. A Buddhist realist in the tradition of Sautrāntika, who holds cognition to have an external object (*bāhyārthavādin*), explains the following section of the PSV.

Jinendrabuddhi's reference in the answer is to PS 1.5cd, which he uses to support his interpretation of Dignāga's intention, namely, to advocate in the following (PSV 6,7-24) the view of an object as being internal to cognition (*antarjñeyavādin*). Cf. CHU 2006: 226f. The opponent being reported, however, wishes to avoid this interpretation, and therefore offers a non-committal explanation for the purpose of this section. He can either be identified with Īśvarasena, the only known commentator, or, perhaps preferably, with a later Sautrāntika.

5a. While in terms of its meaning, this could well be a "rhetoric objection," because of the introduction with *ye hi manyante* it is clearly an **Ri**-text.

6. *vādaividhidūṣaṇa*

7. *vādaividhidūṣaṇa*

8. This undertaking [of examination] only aims at refuting the *Vādaividhi*.

9. CHU 2006: 224-227.