Reflexive Nature of Awareness - A Tibetan Madhyamaka Defence

 Those with an interest in these things are now familiar with the idea that the philosophical and meditative tradition called rDzogs chen, known most notably from the rNying ma pa school of Tibetan Buddhism, teaches a primordial substratum (gdod ma'i gzhi) which while beyond all conceptuality is commonly referred to using terms which have a primary mentalistic significance.

For example, this primordial substratum is spoken of as 'mind-as-such' or 'the very nature of mind' (sems nyid/sems kyi chos nyid or sems kyi rang bzhin). Another important term is ranggi rig pa, 'awareness of itself or 'reflexive awareness', sometimes referred to as 'a mere gnosis which is reflexive awareness' (so so rang rig pal ye shes tsam).

This reflexivity of the primordial substratum is one of its most important characteristics, indicated in the use of such metaphors as 'luminosity' (gsal ba) or 'clear light' ('od gsal), and the use sometimes of the mirror-image in trying to give some analogous understanding of that which is held to be beyond all conceptuality. Common to many of these metaphorical images is the idea of something which renders itself known in the very act of referring beyond itself to others.

Thus, to use a common image, the lamp makes known objects in a dark room and in so doing makes itself known too. It is not necessary to bring another lamp ad infinitum in order to illuminate the first lamp.

The mirror is known in its reflectivity, in reflecting an image it also makes itself known as a mirror.

We can speak of this quality found in mirrors and lamps-but, in Buddhist thought, most clearly and notoriously in lamps-as reflexivity.

The lamp is reflexive, it illuminates itself in the very act of illuminating others.

The primordial substratum in rDzogs chen (and Mahãmudrã too for that matter) is of the very nature of mind-as-such, and it is characterised by reflexivity.

This primordial substratum, however, while in some sense ultimate, is not thought of as something completely other than the relative, the conventional.

The nature of mind-as-such could not be divorced from mind, whatever that mind may be including everyday consciousness (rnam shes). Tibetan systems always strive to show how the two truths, ultimate and conventional, are finally integrated.

The ultimate nature of mind (=ye shes, 'gnosis'), mind-as-such (sems nyid), while completely undefiled, always pure, is necessarily the ultimate nature of all mind (indeed all things).

Thus if mind-as-such is fundamentally characterised by reflexivity, it could not be that this reflexivity comes into existence when mind-as-such is realized in the enlightened understanding.

Rather, reflexivity is the very characteristic of all mind, it is what mind is-mind, consciousness makes itself known in the very act of knowing things which are other than it.

Indeed the very presence of reflexivity in all consciousness is closely integrated with the realization of the presence of mind-as-such in all consciousness.



There is no problem in seeing that all this is indeed the rDzogs chen perspective.

The idea that all consciousness is in its very nature characterised by self-awareness (rang rigsvasasiivedana) is also a view held widely in Indian Mahayana thought.

It is an essential feature of Cittamatra (Yogacara), and is defended with epistemological sophistication by Dharmakirti.

As we shall see, it plays an important role in the formation by shantaraksita of what Tibetan doxographers call 'Yogacara-Svatantrika Madhyamaka'.

On the other hand the self-awareness of consciousness is attacked with vigor as part of their criticisms of Yogacara Cittamatra by the Svatantrika Bhavaviveka and also by Candrakirti and Shan tideva.

Candrakirti and Shantideva are both spoken of in the Tibetan tradition as 'Prasañgika Madhyamikas'. Thus it would seem prima facie that the rDzogs chen perspective on self-awareness has some affinities with the Cittamatra trend of Indian thought, but definitely not with Prasañgika Madhyamaka.

On the other hand no Tibetan tradition and few thinkers from the eleventh century onwards would be prepared to admit to holding anything other than a form of Madhyamaka, usually Prasañgika Madhyamaka, as the highest philosophical viewpoint (ita ba).

one would want to admit to holding Yogacara Cittamatra as the highest viewpoint.


There is no doubt that any view of an ultimate reality-whether mentalistic or not-could have problems in integrating with a Prasangika Madhyamaka perspective which clearly criticizes all ultimate, inherently existent, entities.

Nevertheless, there are various strategies by which they could be reconciled.


For example, it is possible to argue that Prasañgika Madhyamaka is correct as far as it goes, but yet does not have the finally final word.

Perhaps it simply clears away that which does not exist, without treating a true Ultimate Reality which in fact does exist.

Or Prasangika could be held to be correct as far as anything which can be conceptualized is concerned, although our putative Ultimate Reality is nonconceptual and therefore not touched by the Prasangika negations of inherent existence.

This might be related to a strategy whereby Prasañgika becomes correct as far as philosophical analysis is concerned, although when we enter into direct nonconceptual absorption in meditation we find a true Ultimate Reality.

Or it might even be possible to argue with the hermeneutical ingenuity not uncommon among Tibetans that Prasañgika Madhyamaka does indeed teach a true Ultimate Reality, or even that the ultimate reality is not really an inherently existent Ultimate Reality at all.

Thus there are strategies by which an adherent of rDzogs chen might attempt to reconcile a Prasañgika perspective with his or her approach to the ultimate reality.



A problem arises, however, with what is held to be a Prasangika approach to the conventional.

We have seen that while reflexivity ('self-awareness') is a feature of the rDzogs chen ultimate reality, it is important that this reflexivity is also present in all mental states, in all states of consciousness.

Consciousness qua consciousness is reflexive.

While a follower of rDzogs chen might be able to accommodate the Prasangika denial of any putative Ultimate Reality, what of the Prasañgika denial of what are in fact essential features of the rDzogs chen ultimate reality?

What of the denial of svasasnvedana? One response would be to suggest that while the Prasangika does indeed deny self-awareness, that denial is of an ultimate self-awareness (which we could then cope with, in fact neutralize, using the suggested strategies above), but does not deny that consciousness qua consciousness, in other words consciousness as known in the world, is self-aware.

In other words, the Prasañgika denial is of only the ultimate status of svasaiivedana, and does not include its conventional existence as indeed an essential feature of what we know and accept conventionally as consciousness.

The problem here, however, is that from at least the time of Tsong kha pa and the foundation of the dGe lugs tradition of Tibetan Buddhism in the early years of the fifteenth century it has been strongly urged that the Prasañgika denial of svasarnvedana is a refutation of the existence of self-awareness or reflexivity both ultimately and conventionally.

Indeed so strongly did Tsong kha pa hold this view that he saw it as one of the eight difficult points which serve to distinguish Prasangika Madhyamaka from other Buddhist tenet systems.

Thus it is central to Tsong kha pa's understanding - of the view of Prasangikas like Candrakirti and Sãntideva that no consciousness at all can be characterised by this feature of self-awareness or reflexivity.



if Tsong kha pa is right, then it would have obvious and severe repercussions for the rDzogs chen perspective. Even if the ultimate reality were reflexive in nature, for anyone who wished to accept Prasañgika Madhyamaka as the highest tenet system it would not be possible to integrate that ultimate into the conventional through the presence of reflexivity in all consciousness.

It might be possible to argue against Tsong kha pa, however, that the Prasañgika critique of svasarnvedana is not at all of its conventional existence but only of its ultimate, inherently existent, status.

Strategies could then subsequently be employed to rescue reflexivity as a feature of nonconceptual ultimate reality realized in nondual absorption.

The first exercise is one of hermeneutics. It has to be argued that to interpret the Prasañgika critique as a refutation of the conventional existence of svasarnvedana is a misunderstanding of Prasañgika sources.

The next exercise is one of philosophical reconstruction. It has to be shown that whether or not it is a concern of the Prasañgika, nevertheless consciousness qua consciousness is indeed characterised by self-awareness, and this does not in fact contradict the Prasangika perspective.

The rDzogs chen ultimate reality can wait for the time being.


There were those prior to Mi pham who argued that the Prasañgika critique of svasaizvedana is of only its ultimate, inherently existent, reality and not its conventional status.

But in his commentary to Santideva's Bodhicaryavatara, and his reply to his critics, 'Ju Mi pham 'Jam dbyangs rnam rgyal rgya mtsho (1846-1912) made perhaps the longest and most sophisticated attempt to explain in terms understandable to dGe lugs scholars why Shantideva and Prasangika Madhyamaka should not be taken as negating the conventional existence of svasaiivedana.

Mipham was strongly opposed by the dGe lugs scholars, for apart from anything else if Mipham were right then it would undermine an essential aspect of dGe lugs doxography and orthodoxy.

One of the eight characteristics of Prasañgika Madhyamaka as discerned by Tsong kha pa-who is said to have received direct instruction on Madhyamaka from Mañjushri himself, and indeed to have been an emanation of Mañjushri- would be wrong.



The present monograph is very much an introduction to this dispute, an attempt to identify some of the issues and arguments and to draw the attention of other scholars to their interest.

In common with some of my previous work it is also an attempt to indicate the diversity of interpretation in Tibetan Mad hyamaka, and some of the strategies by which Tibetan Madhyamikas integrated Madhyamaka into their wider system-building.

This monograph is definitely not the, or even a, final word on its subject. It is perhaps not even a complete work.


Mi pham replied to his Madhyamika critics principally in two texts.

The one, the Sher 'grel brgal Ian nyin byed snang ba which Mipham wrote in reply to criticisms by the dGe lugs lama bLo bzang dpal idan bstan 'dzin specifically of his commentary to Bodhicaryavatara, forms a major source for the present study.

His other reply, the gZhan gyis brtsad pal lan mdor bsdus pa Rigs lam rab gsai de nyid snang phyed, was written in reply to criticisms from another dGe lugs lama, Pa ri blo bzang rab gsal.

Unfortunately, although I have been able to use a number of Mipham's other works in order to supplement the present study, I have not had access to the Rigs lam rab gsal de nyid snang phyed.

This is particularly unfortunate as bin bzang dpal Idan bstan 'dzin's attack on Mi pham's treatment of svasa~wedana is not particularly sophisticated, and in his day it seems that Pa ri bLo bzang rab gsal was Mi pham's principal dGelugs adversary.

On the other hand I have looked through Pa ri bIn bzang rab gsal's ju lan ga bur chu rgyun (1969).

While there are many interesting topics in this collection of three refutations of Mi pham's thought, the issue of svasaizvedana does not appear to have been a notably important theme in their debate.

It seems that perhaps Mi pham's most extensive discussion of svasasiwedana can be found in his reply to bin bzang dpal Idan bstan 'dzin.

At any rate, it is an extensive discussion, giving a series of interesting arguments, and does not appear to differ in treatment of our theme from shorter discussions found in other accessible works by Mipham.



My approach to the treatment of self-awareness in Mipham's texts and that of his critic has been through contextualization in Buddhist intellectual history, and philosophical unpacking, unraveling, and paraphrase.

It will be obvious to anyone who reads Tibetan that I have followed my original sources very closely, although in unpacking I have tended to elaborate critically in the hope of clarification and understanding.

I have included the Tibetan and Sanskrit sources for my discussion directly in the footnotes, with the intention of immediate accessibility, and of course I have striven to be faithful to my sources although I am not sure I have always succeeded.

At points the textual arguments have been so compressed that I am uncertain whether I have understood them properly.

I have indicated when I am unsure in the footnotes. Academic scholarship is, or should be, a collaborative venture and I am quite sure that there are those who know a great deal more about this sort of thing than I do.

Even if they do not, a fresh approach may yet yield new understandings and I look forward to further clarification of this material in the future.

It could be argued that rather than paraphrase and philosophical unraveling I should have presented a straightforward translation, perhaps with commentarial notes.

Or perhaps someone will detect an omission in that I should have offered some discussion of my hermeneutical strategy (Is there such a thing as a 'straightforward translation'?

How do I feel about Gadamer or Derrida?), rather than naively plunging straight into the texts.

I accept the point.

My background is in the history of philosophical ideas, and I dislike the constraints of formal translation, even with a commentary.

On the other hand I like naively plunging straight into the primary sources. I do what I do, and approach my material in the way I approach it.

My justification is that I do not aim for any ultimate, any perfection, but simply to say something that might be of some interest to others.

Those who wish for a formal translation are very welcome to wish for one, and perhaps even to do one.

Those who wish to discuss methodology and hermeneutical strategies are also very welcome to do so.

In my naiveté I prefer to do something else.

Centre for Buddhist Studies
University of Bristol
July 1994

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