Dorji Wangchuk The rÑiṅ-ma Interpretations of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory* 1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS The theory of “Buddha Nature” or tathāgatagarbha (henceforth TG)1 formed an important school of thought in Mahāyāna Buddhism and continues to enjoy popularity in some circles even today, although it has been dismissed by some scholars as non-Buddhist.2 It has drawn the attention of several scholars. On the Tibetan front, David Seyfort Ruegg has through a series of publications greatly contributed to the understanding of the TG theory, particularly that of the dGe-lugs-pa tradition. A number of studies devoted to the TG theory from the perspective of the exponents of the gźan stoṅ (“extrinsic emptiness”)3 * This article is a revised and enlarged version of the paper presented at the Tenth Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies (6th-12th September 2003) held in Oxford. I owe my gratitude to a number of individuals who contributed in different ways to bringing this article to its present form. I am grateful to my wife Orna Almogi (University of Hamburg) for painstakingly going through this article at its various stages of writing. I also owe my thanks to Prof. Lambert Schmithausen (University of Hamburg), Prof. Karin Preisendanz (University of Vienna) and Dr. Anne MacDonald (University of Vienna) for their valuable suggestions. I would also like to thank Prof. David Jackson (University of Hamburg) for going through an earlier version of this article. My thanks also go to Kazuo Kano (University of Hamburg) for his proof-reading of the final version. I am, of course, solely responsible for the content of the article. 1 See Michael Zimmermann’s recent study of the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, the earliest exposition on Buddha Nature in India, where he presents a detailed discussion of the term tathāgatagarbha (Zimmermann 2002: 39-50). Note that I use Tathāgatagarbhasūtra as a proper noun referring to this particular sūtra and TG sūtra as a common noun referring to a sūtra which deals primarily with the tathāgatagarbha doctrine. 2 Some modern Japanese scholars have openly dismissed the TG theory as non-Buddhist, an issue which lies outside my present topic. For some details, see Zimmermann 2002: 82-84. 3 A tradition may for polemical reasons label a rival tradition as a proponent of gźan stoṅ (“extrinsic emptiness”) or raṅ stoṅ (“intrinsic emptiness”). However, as suggested in Kapstein 2000: 121, it would be, from a methodological point of view, sensible to refrain from using labels such as gźan stoṅ and raṅ stoṅ unless a Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens / Vienna Journal of South Asian Studies, Bd. XLVIII/2004, 171-213 © 2005 by Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien 172 Dorji Wangchuk theory have also appeared in recent years.4 However, much remains to be explored in the works of various Tibetan authors of different traditions and periods. given tradition prefers to use one of these terms to describe its own conception of emptiness. Furthermore, since we tend to be too generous with the use of the terms raṅ stoṅ and gźan stoṅ, I would like to make clear from the very outset how rÑiṅma scholars understand these terms. For them, a given “x” (no matter what) is said to be raṅ stoṅ if it cannot withstand (bzod pa) the logical analysis of Madhyamaka reasoning. A given “x” that can withstand such a scrutiny, which is for them an impossibility, would imply its “true or hypostatic existence” (bden par grub pa). Please note that my translation of the technical term bden par grub pa or bden grub is based on Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 37 where it is explained as “a permanent substantial entity established ‘in truth’, i.e., hypostatically (bden par grub pa).” See also Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 320 and Seyfort Ruegg 2002: 296, Indices, s.v. bden grub. Hence, if the logical analysis of Madhyamaka reasoning is applied, for example, on a cow or TG, neither of them will be able to withstand the force of logical analysis. A single case of “hypostatic existence” would be sufficient to cause the collapse of the entire Madhyamaka system. Thus, from the perspective of such a scrutiny, a given “x” is always raṅ stoṅ. Further, if a given “x” is empty of a numerically different given “y,” then “x” is said to be gźan stoṅ. In this sense, a given “x” is always empty of “y” and hence always gźan stoṅ. For example, a cow is always empty of a bull and so is TG empty of adventitious impure phenomena of saṃsāra. Thus, from this viewpoint, a given “x” can be both raṅ stoṅ and gźan stoṅ. On the other hand, for Dol-po-pa Śes-rab-rgyal-mtshan (1292-1361), the initiator of the gźan stoṅ theory, whether or not “x” is raṅ stoṅ or gźan stoṅ would depend on whether “x” is a conventional phenomenon or absolute reality. If “x” is a conventional phenomenon, it is raṅ stoṅ, and if it is absolute reality, it is gźan stoṅ. Hence, Dol-po-pa uses the expressions kun rdzob raṅ stoṅ or kun rdzob stoṅ ñid and don dam gźan stoṅ or don dam stoṅ ñid (Ri chos, p. 305.8) and states that the banal (tha śal) emptiness (i.e., itaretaraśūnyatā) belittled in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra is neither of the two (ibid., p. 154.15-155.15). In principle, Dol-po-pa could have described this itaretaraśūnyatā (“emptiness of reciprocity”) as kun rdzob gźan stoṅ in opposition to what he called kun rdzob raṅ stoṅ and don dam gźan stoṅ but has apparently, for strategic reasons, refrained from doing so. Designating itaretaraśūnyatā as kun rdzob gźan stoṅ would have been self-defeating because then he would have been forced to concede that there is at least one kind of gźan stoṅ which is unacceptable even by his own standard. Thus, he could consolidate his gźan stoṅ theory by insisting that only the absolute can be gźan stoṅ and only gźan stoṅ can be absolute (ibid., p. 308.12-15). 4 See, e.g., Seyfort Ruegg 1963; Broido 1989; Hookham 1991 and 1992; Stearns 1999; Mathes 1998, 2000 and 2002. Note, however, that one may have to be careful not to anachronistically presuppose that one homogenous gźan stoṅ theory existed at every place and time in Tibet (e.g., see the Si tu’i raṅ rnam, p. 266.7-267.2; Smith 2001: 265). In fact, the comparing and contrasting of the various gźan stoṅ interpretations would shed important light on the history of the concept and might The rÑiṅ-ma Interpretations of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory 173 One important Tibetan interpretation of TG that has been ignored so far is that of the rÑiṅ-ma school. The little attention it has received is in the context of studies pertaining to the Tibetan Madhyamaka and rDzogs-chen doctrines.5 Can one, however, speak of a single rÑiṅ-ma interpretation of TG without the risk of oversimplification? Admittedly, not all rÑiṅ-ma scholars interpreted TG in the same way. They may differ in their erudition, style of interpretation and emphasis according to the particular time and place in which they lived. Even one and the same scholar may interpret it differently in different works, or even in different passages of the same work. Nevertheless, despite the differences in details within the various schools of Tibetan Buddhism, each of them, including the rÑiṅ-ma school, has, in my opinion, its own few archetypical intellectual figures who shape, lead and represent their respective traditions, and whose positions agree at least in substance if not always in every detail. And thus later rÑiṅ-ma-pas consider Roṅzom-pa (eleventh century), Kloṅ-chen-pa (1308-1363) and Mi-pham (1846-1912) as their three archetypical intellectual models, and their interpretations of a given doctrine as the “official” rÑiṅ-ma position.6 Before examining their views, I would like to briefly discuss how some of the leading rÑiṅ-ma scholars – whose interpretations of the TG contribute to a better understanding of the evolution, continuation and reception of such concepts. 5 Kloṅ-chen-pa’s discussion of TG occurring in the seventh chapter of his Tshig don mdzod is assessed in Germano 1992: 77-82. John Pettit published a translation of Mi-pham’s Ṅes śes sgron me and its commentary by ’Khro-chu ’Jam-dpal-rdo-rje (Pettit 1999a) and also included a translation of Mi-pham’s gŹan stoṅ seṅ ge’i ṅa ro, p. 359-378.4. See “The Lion’s Roar Proclaiming Extrinsic Emptiness,” in Pettit 1999a: 415-427. The recent doctoral dissertation by Karma Phuntsho also discusses Mi-pham’s stance on the TG theory (Phuntsho 2003). 6 One might ask just how authoritative and representative Roṅ-zom-pa, Kloṅchen-pa and Mi-pham were and are for the rÑiṅ-ma school. Mi-pham himself considered Roṅ-zom-pa and Kloṅ-chen-pa as the most authoritative interpreters of the rÑiṅ-ma doctrine and he saw himself as the follower of the two. See the Dam chos dogs sel, p. 378.5-379.2, the dBu ma rgyan ’grel, p. 42.5, the Ṅes śes sgron me, p. 121.1-2. See also the colophon to his Roṅ zom bla rnal, p. 61.6: mtshuṅs med ma hā paṇḍi ta chen po’i rjes su ’jug par khas ’che ba mi pham rnam par rgyal bas zla tshe bzaṅ po la bris pa dge’o ||. The fact that Mi-pham is responsible for the latest systematisation of the rÑiṅ-ma doctrine and that he did so primarily by relying on Roṅ-zom-pa and Kloṅ-chen-pa, is, in my view, sufficient for considering the three as respresentative and authoritative, as they are indeed perceived by the rÑiṅ-ma tradition today. See also Smith 2001: 16. 174 Dorji Wangchuk doctrine are considered authoritative for the rÑiṅ-ma school – are portrayed in some secondary literature. Of the major rÑiṅ-ma scholars, Roṅ-zom-pa has been presented as clearly preferring Yogācāra–Madhyamaka by Georges Dreyfus,7 apparently following John Pettit who merely states that Roṅ-zom-pa in his Grub mtha’i brjed byaṅ suggests that the Yogācāra–Madhyamaka is “more important” (don che ba).8 What the closing phrase of the pertinent statement by Roṅ-zom-pa actually says is: “The treatise [or position] of Yogācāra–Madhyamaka appears (snaṅ) to be more significant.”9 The statement gives Roṅ-zompa’s personal opinion about the then prevalent two Madhyamaka systems (i.e., Sautrāntika–Madhyamaka and Yogācāra–Madhyamaka) and not his doctrinal affiliation.10 Kloṅ-chen-pa and Mi-pham have been portrayed as exponents of the gźan stoṅ theory. For example, according to Samten Karmay, Kloṅ-chen-pa’s stance on the TG theory is identical to that of Dol-po-pa’s.11 Similarly, David Germano (apparently following S.K. Hookham) describes Kloṅ-chen-pa’s comments regarding the doctrine of emptiness and TG as “fairly typical” of the gźan stoṅ concepts in Tibet.12 These scholars’ impressions are not altogether unjustified because Kloṅ-chen-pa’s evaluation of TG prima facie looks so See Dreyfus 2003: 331. Pettit 1999a: 90-91, 485, n. 315. 9 lTa ba’i brjed byaṅ, p. 11.11-14: dbu ma rnam gñis kun rdzob kyi tshul mi mthun pa la | luṅ daṅ rigs pa gaṅ che ba ni rgyud daṅ mdo sde spyi’i gźuṅ daṅ | rigs pa spyi’i tshul daṅ | dbu ma’i mkhan po gźuṅ phyi mo mdzad pa’i slob dpon klu sgrub daṅ | ārya de ba’i gźuṅ ltar na yaṅ | rnal ’byor spyod pa’i dbu ma’i gźuṅ don che bar snaṅ ṅo ||. 10 If one wishes to speak about Roṅ-zom-pa’s doctrinal affiliation, then one can safely state that he was, in the first place, affiliated with rDzogs-chen doctrines, and that his method of establishing emptiness is closer to that of the Prāsaṅgika– Madhyamaka than to any other Buddhist system, regardless of whether or how much access he had to Prāsaṅgika texts. This becomes particularly evident in his Theg chen tshul ’jug and was also the impression of some traditional Tibetan scholars such as Mi-pham (see, for example, the Ṅes śes sgron me, p. 75.3-4, the dBu ma rgyan ’grel, p. 309.6-310.1 and the Dam chos dogs sel, p. 378.6) and Blobzaṅ-mdo-sṅags Chos-kyi-rgya-mtsho (1903-1957), a dGe-lugs-cum-rÑiṅ-ma scholar from Khams, who even went on to prove that Roṅ-zom-pa’s view is a Prāsaṅgika view (see the lTa ba’i dris lan, p. 70-71). Whether the Prāsaṅgika–Madhyamaka view was in some form present during the early propagation of Buddhism in Tibet may depend, among other things, on whether Śāntideva was indeed a Prāsaṅgika– Mādhyamika as the Tibetan tradition has perceived him to be. 11 See Karmay 1988: 184-185; cf. Kapstein 1992: 23, n. 1. 12 See Germano 1992: 78. See also Hookham 1991: 136, 150. 7 8 The rÑiṅ-ma Interpretations of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory 175 positive that one might assume it to be identical with that of Dol-popa’s. Even amongst the traditional Tibetan scholars there were figures like Koṅ-sprul who preferred to place Kloṅ-chen-pa and Karma-pa Raṅ-byuṅ-rdo-rje (1284-1339) in the group of gźan stoṅ exponents.13 This doctrinal agenda is still continued by living Tibetan exponents of the gźan stoṅ doctrine. A few modern scholars have designated Mi-pham as an exponent of the gźan stoṅ theory as well. However, a closer look reveals that in most cases, it is the terminology that has led to this determination; that is, the term gźan stoṅ has not necessarily been used by these scholars in a strict technical sense. One author who seems to consciously seek to prove Mi-pham a gźan stoṅ exponent is Paul Williams.14 Leading rÑiṅ-ma teachers of more recent times have also been Śes bya rgya mtsho, p. 567.8-10; Smith 2001: 338, n. 888. See Williams 1998 (particularly, p. 199-216). For reviews of Williams 1998, see Kapstein 2000, Tatz 2001: 78-79. A few words should be said here regarding Paul Williams’ study of “auto-perception” (raṅ rig: svasaṃvedana/svasaṃvitti) and his attempt to connect it with the controversial issue of gźan stoṅ. To agree with Mi-pham’s understanding or interpretation of “auto-perception” is one thing and to understand his position accurately is yet another matter. In my view, Williams seems to have missed the point regarding the controversial issue of “auto-perception,” particularly in regard to Mi-pham’s stance on this issue. If he had studied Mi-pham’s interpretation of “means of valid cognition” (pramāṇa), he would have seen why the theory of “auto-perception” was crucial for Mi-pham. According to him, the whole theoretical structure of perception and inference developed by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti would collapse without the theory of “auto-perception.” Mi-pham insists that as long as one accepts conventional valid cognition (tha sñad tshad ma), one must accept “auto-perception,” at least on the conventional level, just as one accepts “perception of others” (gźan rig). Thus, without a clear concept of Mi-pham’s background and his view on pramāṇa, any study of Mi-pham’s view on “auto-perception” is destined to be less than successful. A proper assessment of Mi-pham’s understanding of Madhyamaka would have revealed that for Mi-pham, there is no phenomenon that can withstand (bzod) the Madhyamaka logical analysis, and this includes “auto-perception.” The Prāsaṅgika–Mādhyamikas (such as Candrakīrti and Śāntideva) do refute the Yogācāra notion of “auto-perception” but, for Mi-pham, this is done so in the context of establishing absolute reality or “that which is free from manifoldness” (niṣprapañca). However, even Prāsaṅgika– Mādhyamikas should, according to Mi-pham, have no problem in accepting “autoperception” on the conventional level, just as they have no problem accepting “perception of others.” For Mi-pham, anything that can be attested by means of conventional valid cognition is acceptable on the conventional level. If a thing is impossible even on the conventional level, then it should be something like a “permanent sound” (sgra rtag pa) or a “rabbit’s horn” (ri boṅ gi rwa). But, for him, neither is “auto-perception” like a “permanent sound” nor did Candrakīrti and Śāntideva consider it to be so. However, Tsoṅ-kha-pa believed that Candrakīrti and 13 14 176 Dorji Wangchuk presented as proponents of the gźan stoṅ theory. Cyrus Stearns’ The Buddha from Dolpo, which greatly contributes to the understanding of Dol-po-pa’s life and thoughts, tends to oversimplify the rÑiṅ-ma explanation of the TG theory. For instance, Stearns, relying on verbal communication with sDe-gźung Rin-po-che (1906-1987), maintains that rÑiṅ-ma teachers such as bDud-’joms Rin-po-che (1904-1987) and Dilmgo mKhyen-brtse (1910-1991) were proponents of the gźan stoṅ doctrine.15 I am not aware of any textual evidence that would suggest that these teachers were proponents of the gźan stoṅ doctrine, at least not in Dol-po-pa’s sense. Both bDud-’joms Rin-po-che and Dil-mgo mKhyenbrtse, in fact, speak about the oneness of emptiness and appearance or the compatibility of the Middle and Last Cycles of Buddha’s teachings.16 Śāntideva held “auto-perception” to be impossible even on the conventional level. This is the point of departure of the actual issue and the controversy took place within the contextual framework of Pramāṇa and Madhyamaka, which were seen by Mi-pham as complementing and strengthening rather than as excluding or nullifying each other. Hence, bringing in rDzogs-chen and gźan stoṅ issues in this context is unwarranted. If Williams had studied rDzogs-chen or the rÑiṅ-ma interpretation of TG, he would have realised that for the rÑiṅ-ma-pas (including Mi-pham), there is a strict distinction between mind (sems) and gnosis (ye śes). The expression so sor raṅ gis rig par bya ba (pratyātmavedanīya) which actually means “accessible to personal experience only” or “to be known directly and introspectively,” an idea also acceptable to Candrakīrti or Śāntideva, has also been taken out of context by Williams. Unless we understand the methods of interpretation systematized by Mi-pham, we will never fully comprehend the way he conceives Pramāṇa, Madhyamaka, TG and rDzogs-chen or his conception of their intricate relationship with one another. And unless we have a clear picture of how Mi-pham understood raṅ rig in these systems, we shall only have a fragmentary and distorted idea of Mi-pham’s stance on raṅ rig. 15 See Stearns 1999: 215, n. 137-138. 16 bDud-’joms Rin-po-che explicitly states: “Thus, by clinging to and postulating one of the positions of appearance and emptiness, one would not be able to avert the erroneous (lit. “bad”) views that hold on to the extremes. Therefore, it is necessary to properly establish the sphere of reality (dharmadhātu), the union of appearance and emptiness [or] the ultimate [and] actual absolute truth, as the equality of [saṃsāric] existence and [nirvāṇic] calmness” (bsTan pa’i rnam gźag, fol. 109b2-4: des na snaṅ stoṅ gaṅ ruṅ re’i phyogs su źen ciṅ bzuṅ bas ni mthar ’dzin gyi lta ba ṅan pa bzlog mi nus pas | chos dbyiṅs snaṅ stoṅ zuṅ ’jug mthar thug rnam graṅs ma yin pa’i don dam srid źi mñam ñid du legs par gtan la ’bebs dgos śiṅ |). Dil-mgo mKhyen-brtse likewise considers the Middle and Last Cycles as complementary, for he explains absolute reality as “the ultimate of what is to be established in a way that the purports of the Middle and the Last Promulgations become The rÑiṅ-ma Interpretations of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory 177 One notices a general tendency among modern scholars to associate, in addition to the above-mentioned rÑiṅ-ma teachers, rÑiṅ-ma doctrines with gźan stoṅ teachings.17 These scholars can be grouped into three: (a) those who are obviously predisposed to the gźan stoṅ theory, (b) those who are opposed to the gźan stoṅ doctrine and (c) those who are too generous with the use of the term gźan stoṅ.18 One of the reasons why the rÑiṅ-ma position on TG has remained somewhat elusive appears to entwined as one and is the finale of the ocean-like systems of sūtra and tantra” (bDud rtsi’i snaṅ ba, fol. 71a6: ’khor lo bar mtha’ dgoṅs pa gcig dril gyis gtan la dbab bya mthar thug pa mdo sṅags grub mtha’ rgya mtsho’i skyel so yin la). See also the Zil gnon dgoṅs gsal (fol. 178a6-b2) where Dil-mgo mKhyen-brtse speaks about the union (zuṅ ’jug) of the “primordial purity” (ka dag), which is equated with “freedom from the eight extremes of manifoldness” (spros pa’i mtha’ brgyad las ’das pa), and the “immanently present” (lhun grub) Buddha bodies (sku) and gnosis (ye śes) constituting the TG, and his ’Jam dpal dgoṅs rgyan (fol. 239a2-b5), where TG (among several other terms) is indicated as a synonym of the emptiness of the Middle Promulgation. See also his rDo rje mdud grol (fol. 136a5-b4 & 150a3-4) where he explains the view of Prāsaṅgika–Madhyamaka in the same way Mi-pham does. 17 According to Karmay, who relied on the Italian edition (1973) of The Religions of Tibet, Tucci maintains that the doctrines of rDzogs-chen and of the Jonaṅ-pas were developed from the Hva-śaṅ’s doctrine of TG (see Karmay 1988: 87). This claim, however, does not appear in the later English translation of the book. S.K. Hookham describes rDzogs-chen as typically gźan stoṅ-type teachings and claims that giving it a raṅ stoṅ gloss is the attempt of the present Dalai Lama “to abate the long standing hostility” towards rDzogs-chen and to protect it “from the ravages of the ‘exclusive Rangtongpa’” (Hookham 1991: 16; see also Hookham 1992: 151-152, n. 4). For reviews of Hookham 1991, see Ehrhard 1993 and Griffiths 1993. See also Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 87. 18 See, for example, Smith 2001: 231, where it is stated that “Mi pham’s open advocacy of the Gzhan stong was another red cape, and the bulls were not slow to charge,” and ibid., p. 327, n. 788 where both the sToṅ thun seṅ ge’i ṅa ro (p. 563606.5) and the gŹan stoṅ seṅ ge’i ṅa ro (p. 359-378.4) are said to be works on the gźan stoṅ theory. It is of course true that Mi-pham wrote on the gźan stoṅ theory and even defended it and can be thus called a “gźan stoṅ sympathiser.” He, however, did not consider himself a gźan stoṅ pa (Dam chos dogs sel, p. 378.5-379.1: ñams mtshar tsam du bris pa yin na yaṅ || raṅ bzos bde gśegs dam chos bslad mi ruṅ || ’chal ṅag soṅ na rgyal ba rnams la bśags || raṅ bzos bśad na ci yaṅ zad mtha’ med || bdag la gźan stoṅ sgrub pa’i khur kyaṅ med || roṅ kloṅ rnam gñis klu sgrub gźuṅ daṅ mthun || dman pa bdag kyaṅ rtse gcig der ’dun kyaṅ || ma bris dbaṅ med pha rol tshig gis bskul ||). Surprisingly, although the Ṅes śes sgron me is the locus classicus for the rÑiṅ-ma position regarding the issue of raṅ stoṅ and gźan stoṅ, John Pettit, in his study of this work, seems to be uncertain about Mi-pham’s position (Pettit 1999a: 114-124). However, cf. Pettit 1999b. 178 Dorji Wangchuk be the complexity of the matter itself which forbids a simplistic expression of it in terms of raṅ stoṅ or gźan stoṅ. In the following passages, I shall present (a) the early Tibetan background of the TG theory, (b) a brief historical sketch and (c) a general profile of the rÑiṅ-ma interpretation of the TG doctrine, and (d) finally my assessment of the rÑiṅ-ma stance on the TG theory in India and Tibet,19 and thereby demonstrate how complex and distinctive the rÑiṅ-ma interpretation of TG actually is. Nonetheless, although I shall strive to describe their interpretation accurately, some of my observations will remain tentative. It is, however, not my intention to discuss here whether the rÑiṅma interpretation is in keeping with the TG theory as originally conceived in India. 2. EARLY TIBETAN BACKGROUND OF THE TG THEORY Although some of the important Indian sources, particularly treatises (śāstra) such as the Ratnagotravibhāga (or Uttaratantra), were translated only in the eleventh century during the early gSar-ma era, the sūtras dealing with the TG doctrine were translated during the first period of translation.20 The TG doctrine was thus known to Tibetans from the early stages of the propagation of Buddhism in Tibet. Furthermore, the term TG or its semantic equivalent *sugatagarbha21 can Given the space limitations for this article, I have refrained from translating all my citations. Also note that I have not aimed at being exhaustive as regards the indication of primary and secondary sources. 20 See Seyfort Ruegg 1973: 23-26, where the titles of Indian sources on the TG doctrine are listed, almost all of which are recorded in the lDan dkar ma catalogue. 21 The term *sugatagarbha is said not to be attested in Sanskrit (Seyfort Ruegg 1973: 6, n. 2; Karmay 1988: 184, n. 47). However, the term bde gśegs sñiṅ po does occur in the Tibetan translations of the Aṅgulimālīyasūtra (P fol. 174a5; D fol. 166b2: bde gśegs sñiṅ po theg pa che las skyes ||) and Ghanavyūhasūtra (P fol. 62b1; D fol. 55b1: bde gśegs sñiṅ po dge ba’aṅ de ||; cf., however, Taishō 747a7) for which the Sanskrit is not extant. (I thank Kazuo Kano for these references.) This may represent a “correction” that was made in the course of the text’s transmission. Given that the terms bde bar gśegs pa and de bźin gśegs pa are susceptible to confusion, particularly when they are contracted to bde gśegs and de gśegs, respectively, it is easy to imagine that the latter might have been corrected to the former in these texts. On the other hand, it is also possible that sugata was indeed in the orginal reading, used metri causa for tathāgata, because the Chinese translation of the Aṅgulimālīyasūtra (Taishō 531a7) presents the character for Buddha (i.e., fo) instead of the usual characters for tathāgata (i.e., jou lai). 19 The rÑiṅ-ma Interpretations of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory 179 be found in several rÑiṅ-ma tantras belonging to the Mahāyoga,22 the Anuyoga23 and the Atiyoga24 classes, although the number of occurrences is relatively small. It also appears in some of the earliest indigenous Tibetan works such as the lTa ba’i khyad par by Ye-śes-sde,25 the Thabs śes sgron ma by dPal-dbyaṅs26 and the bSam gtan mig sgron by gNubs-chen Saṅs-rgyas-ye-śes.27 Yet even though the TG theory has certainly been present from early times in the rÑiṅ-ma literature, it seems to have played quite an insignificant role and never gained prominence or an independent status, in the way it was conceived, for instance, in the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra. Rather, the rÑiṅ-ma-pas incorporated it into the system of Madhyamaka, which was portrayed as the predominant system in Tibet already during the imperial period, for For examples, see the *Guhyagarbha, p. 159.1; 348.4: e ma’o bde gśegs sñiṅ po las || raṅ gi rnam rtog las kyis sprul ||. See also the Glaṅ chen rab ’bog, p. 257.45; 260.1-6; 283.7-284.5. 23 The Kun ’dus which belongs to the Anuyoga class also mentions the term *sugatagarbha (p. 31.1-2): skye med ye śes ñid kyi dbyiṅs || gdod nas bder gśegs sñiṅ po las || rnam rtog glo bur las kyis bsgribs || de ñid ’gro mgon skyabs chen yin ||. See also ibid., p. 146.1-2. 24 The term TG or *sugatagarbha also occurs in Atiyoga or rDzogs-chen tantras such as the rDor sems me loṅ (p. 207.1-2) which states: ’jig rten gyi khams kyi sems can thams cad la | de bźin gśegs pa’i sñiṅ po raṅ chas su til ’bru la mar gyis khyab pa bźin du gnas so ||. See also the Srog gi ’khor lo, p. 599.2-3 (also cited in the bSam gtan mig sgron, p. 292); bDe ba’i myu gu, p. 630.6-7; Ye śes gsaṅ rgyud, p. 760.2. 25 lTa ba’i khyad par (P fol. 258a7-b3; D fol. 218b4-7): ’phags pa [= ’phags P] duṅ phreṅ gi mdo las kyaṅ | de bźin gśegs pa’i sñiṅ po gsal bar ma gyur pa’i [= ba’i P] tshe ni kun gźi źes bya’o || gsal bar [= par P] gyur pa de’i tshe ni chos sku źes bya ba gsuṅs so || … don bsdus pa źes bya’i bstan bcos las kyaṅ chos sku źes bya ba la | chos ni thog ma med pa nas rigs su gyur pa de bźin gśegs pa’i sñiṅ po la bya ste | sems can thams cad kyi raṅ bźin no || de ni yaṅ dag pa ma yin pas bsgribs pas dri ma can du gyur te | gaṅ gi tshe sbyor ba sṅon du btaṅ nas ’khrul pa daṅ bral ba de’i tshe raṅ bźin du ’gyur ro || raṅ bźin du gyur pa de ni chos kyi sku źes bśad do ||. 26 Thabs śes sgron ma (P fol. 286b8-287a1; D fol. 385a1): bde gśegs sñiṅ po sems kyi raṅ bźin la || yun riṅ dus nas rmoṅs pa’i sems can rnams || bdag tu ’dzin pa’i sems rgyud so sor snaṅ || raṅ bźin ñid ni rgyal ba’i chos skur gcig ||. 27 See the bSam gtan mig sgron, p. 292. However, as already discussed in Karmay 1988: 184, the term bde gśegs sñiṅ po occurs only within a citation from the Srog gi ’khor lo. It should be noted that the bSam gtan mig sgron (p. 137) also cites a passage from the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, which, however, does not include the term TG. Note also that the term TG is recorded in the Mahāvyutpatti (no. 699), but only as the name of a Bodhisattva. However, the five kinds of spiritual disposition (pañcagotra), related to the TG theory, are recorded there (Mahāvyutpatti, no. 1261-1265). 22 180 Dorji Wangchuk example, in the report about the royal decree according to which only Nāgārjuna’s view, propagated mainly by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, was to be followed.28 Nevertheless, while the acceptance of the Madhyamaka notion of being “free of manifoldness” (niṣprapañca) never waned in the rÑiṅ-ma philosophical system, the TG theory gradually gained importance over the centuries and thus had an ever increasing impact on the thoughts of the school. The increase in popularity of the Ratnagotravibhāga must have contributed to this shift in the importance of the TG theory in the rÑiṅ-ma tradition. 3. A BRIEF HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE TG THEORY IN THE RÑIṄ-MA SCHOOL I shall attempt here to give a brief outline of rÑiṅ-ma authors whose works may shed light on the way the TG teaching was perceived in each period of time in the rÑiṅ-ma history. It is the allusions to the TG theory by Ye-śes-sde, dPal-dbyaṅs and gNubs-chen Saṅs-rgyas-ye-śes that give us some idea as to how it was received during the imperial period. The Theg pa chen po rnal ’byor gyi tshul la ’jug pa by A-ro Yeśes-’byuṅ-gnas (tenth century?), which is at present only available embedded in a recent commentary (written ca. 1934), does not mention the term TG. However, A-ro’s view of emptiness or absolute truth seems to be similar, if not identical, to that of Roṅ-zom-pa’s. Noteworthy is his notion of the equality of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa29 and the way he establishes “freedom from manifoldness” by negating all extremes, 28 See the dBa’ bźed, p. 88; the Ñaṅ ral chos ’byuṅ, p. 407.1-3; Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 2-3, n. 2. Some Tun-huang materials (Tun hoṅ śog dril, p. 200, Pelliot Tibétain 112.1) also state that Madhyamaka views are regarded to be of definitive meaning (nītārtha). It should be noted that the Madhyamaka system as such has, however, never been given hierarchic precedence over tantric systems or Atiyoga (or rDzogs-chen) in the rÑiṅ-ma doxographical literature nor has rDzogs-chen been considered a substitute for the Indian Madhyamaka. It is interesting to note that dPal-maṅ dKon-mchog-rgyal-mtshan (1764-1853) stated that Padmasambhava “without doubt” maintained the view of Prāsaṅgika–Madhyamaka (Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 22-23, n. 41). The Man ṅag lta phreṅ, attributed to Padmasambhava, is designated a text of “Mantra–Madhyamaka” (sṅags kyi dbu ma) by Śākya-mchogldan (Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 55-56, n. 117). I have not been able, however, to find such a designation in the rÑiṅ-ma literature. 29 Theg rnal ’grel pa, p. 133.3-134.5; 156.3-159.2. The rÑiṅ-ma Interpretations of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory 181 including even the “middle” position.30 Roṅ-zom-pa’s extant writings give us a glimpse of how the TG theory was perceived by a rÑiṅ-ma scholar of the eleventh century. The writings of Ñaṅ-ral Ñi-ma-’od-zer (1136-1204) may be able to tell us how the idea of TG was perceived by himself or his contemporaries. His Chos ’byuṅ, however, does not disclose much. It simply states that nine hundred years after the Buddha’s passing away (parinirvāṇa), Asaṅga and his brother (i.e., Vasubandhu) came to interpret the teachings of the Last Cycle as having a definitive meaning.31 However, his notion of absolute and conventional truth revealed in a verse of obeisance indicates that his view was in tune with the Madhyamaka concept of “freedom from manifoldness.”32 The twelfth-century work Theg pa spyi bciṅs by Kaḥ-thog Dam-pa-bdegśegs (1122-1192) does not mention the term TG, but uses terms such as “genuine [or] actual universal ground” (rnal ma don gyi kun gźi), Prajñāpāramitā33 and the “indivisibility of the [two] truths” (bden pa dbyer med) with no qualitative differentiation.34 In the twelfth/thirteenth century, we have the doxographical work bsTan pa’i sgron me35 by Rog Śes-rab-’od (1166-1244), in which the TG theory is brought in connection with the rDzogs-chen doctrine.36 Rog clearly connects the Last Cycle of the Buddha’s teachings (usually those dealing with the TG doctrine) with Yogācāra doctrines and the Middle Cycle of Buddha’s teachings (dealing with the Prajñāpāramitā) with the teaching of “freedom from manifoldness.”37 Further, mKhas-pa lDe’u, who postdates 1261, makes *sugatagarbha an object of his reverence.38 He also describes TG as “[characterised by] nonduality of clarity and emptiness” (gsal stoṅ gñis med).39 Theg rnal ’grel pa, p. 135.1-140.4. Ñaṅ ral chos ’byuṅ, p. 87.3-5. 32 Ñaṅ ral chos ’byuṅ, p. 1.9-10: don dam spros bral mkha’ ltar dag pa la || kun rdzob rten ’byuṅ tshogs snaṅ sgyu ma ltar ||. 33 Theg pa spyi bciṅs, p. 27.12. 34 Theg pa spyi bciṅs, p. 29.4-7: bden gñis dbyer med ces kyaṅ bya || byaṅ sems dbyer med ces kyaṅ bya || dbyer med lhun grub ces kyaṅ bya || zuṅ ’jug chen po ces kyaṅ bya || mñam rdzogs chen po ces kyaṅ bya ||. 35 The bsTan pa’i sgron me is described in Martin 1997: 38, no. 40. 36 bsTan pa’i sgron me, p. 226.6-227.6; Karmay 1988: 184, n. 49. 37 bsTan pa’i sgron me, p. 18.3-19.1. 38 lDe’u chos ’byuṅ, p. 182.3-4. For a description of the lDe’u chos ’byuṅ, see Martin 1997: 44, no. 55. 39 lDe’u chos ’byuṅ, p. 182.12-13: saṅs rgyas ’byuṅ ba’i raṅ gi sems bde bar gśegs pa’i sñiṅ po can |; p. 183.8-10: bde gśegs sñiṅ po skad pa | raṅ gi sems saṅs rgyas 30 31 182 Dorji Wangchuk In the fourteenth century, Kloṅ-chen-pa offered one of the most sophisticated interpretations of the TG theory in Tibet, and it has since served as the standard for the later rÑiṅ-ma interpretations. Although he assessed TG quite positively, he did not deviate from the rDzogschen concept of emptiness beyond all extremes. Of the rÑiṅ-ma scholars after Kloṅ-chen-pa, some tended to lean more towards the Last Cycle of the Buddha’s teachings (dealing with TG) whereas others attempted to balance the Middle and Last Cycles. However, to the best of my knowledge, no rÑiṅ-ma scholar has ever considered only one of these two Cycles as purely definitive by dismissing the other as purely provisional. The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century rÑiṅ-ma interpretations of TG can be found in the writings of scholars such as Lochen Dharma-śrī (1654-1717), particularly in his dPag bsam sñe ma (composed in 1708), Kaḥ-thog Tshe-dbaṅ-nor-bu (1698-1755) and ’Jigsmed-gliṅ-pa (1730-1798). The rÑiṅ-ma understanding of TG in the nineteenth century is documented in the works of dPal-sprul Rin-poche (1808-1887), rGyal-sras gŹan-phan-mtha’-yas (b. 1800) and rDzogschen mKhan-po Padma-badzra (1806?-1884).40 The interpretation of TG by Mi-pham is a landmark in the rÑiṅ-ma history. Mi-pham’s line of interpretation was continued by his direct and indirect disciples, notably, mKhan-po Kun-bzaṅ-dpal-ldan or Kundpal (1872-1943), Źe-chen-rgyal-tshab ’Gyur-med Padma-rnam-rgyal (1871-1926), Kaḥ-thog mKhan-po Nus-ldan-mkhyen-btse’i-blo-gros,41 Bod-sprul mDo-sṅags-bstan-pa’i-ñi-ma (1900/1907-1959) and Glag-bla bSod-nams-chos-’grub (1862-1944). The most recent rÑiṅ-ma interpretations of TG can be found in writings such as the bsTan pa’i rnam gźag by bDud-’joms ’Jigs-bral-ye-śes-rdo-rje and in several works by Dil-mgo mKhyen-brtse. 4. THE CONTOUR OF THE RÑIṄ-MA INTERPRETATIONS OF TG DOCTRINE There may be indeed anomalous interpretations of the TG theory within the rÑiṅ-ma school that need to be studied closely. In this regard, the interpretation of TG doctrine by rÑiṅ-ma scholars such as su rtogs pa la bya’o || gsal stoṅ gñis med dam | bde ba gsal ba mi rtogs [= rtog] pa gsum du śes pa de | bde bar gśegs pa’i sñiṅ po’o ||. 40 The dates for mKhan-po Padma-badzra are in accord with those given in the rNam thar ñuṅ ṅu (p. 8.17-13.8) composed by dBaṅ-chen-dar-rgyas. 41 Kaḥ thog lo rgyus, p. 151.1-20; cf. Legs-bśad-’byor-ldan, ibid., p. 149.19150.21. The rÑiṅ-ma Interpretations of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory 183 Kaḥ-thog Rig-’dzin Tshe-dbaṅ-nor-bu (1698-1755) – who was responsible for revitalising the gźan stoṅ doctrine42 and for converting Si-tu Chos-kyi-’byuṅ-gnas (1699-1776)43 into a gźan stoṅ proponent – and Lochen Dharma-śrī (1654-1717) can be of particular interest. I have not been able to study Tshe-dbaṅ-nor-bu’s stance on the issue.44 As for Dharma-śrī’s evalution of TG, it is so positive that it might even seem to convey the impression that he was a gźan stoṅ exponent.45 In general, the understanding of emptiness (or “freedom from manifoldness”) seems to directly affect the way in which TG is understood. For example, I have come to see that even amongst rÑiṅ-ma authors, those who understand the “freedom from manifoldness” of the Middle Cycle as the “indivisibility of the two truths” have a balanced approach towards the Last and Middle Cycles whereas those who understand the “emptiness” of the Middle Cycle as “mere emptiness” tend to tilt con- See Smith 2001: 20-21. Si tu’i raṅ rnam, p. 266.7-267.2; ’Das rjes rnam thar, p. 726.7-727.2; Smith 2001: 20, 90. However, compare Si-tu’s bKa’ ’gyur dkar chag (p. 68.8-75.2) where he discusses the issue of definitive and provisional meaning. 44 Cf., however, Smith 2001: 265, where Koṅ-sprul’s view of gźan stoṅ doctrine is contrasted with that of Kaḥ-thog Tshe-dbaṅ-nor-bu. Whether Tshe-dbaṅ-norbu’s interpretation of TG theory is identical with that of Dol-po-pa is yet to be seen. 45 However, unlike Dol-po-pa, Lo-chen Dharma-śrī considered the Middle Cycle to be of definitive meaning even though “a mixture of definitive and provisional meaning” or “of temporary definitive meaning” and the Last Cycle to be of definitive meaning (dPag bsam sñe ma, fol. 138a4-6: bar tha gñis draṅ ṅes gaṅ yin la bźed pa mi mthun pa maṅ yaṅ | bar pa ṅes don daṅ phyi ma draṅ don du gsal bar ston pa’i mdo sde’i luṅ med ciṅ | nad pa’i sman daṅ yi ge slob pa’i dpe’i dgoṅs don daṅ yaṅ ’gal bas | raṅ lugs ni bar pa draṅ ṅes phyed ma’am gnas skabs pa’i ṅes don daṅ | tha ma ñid ṅes don du ’dod de |). Particularly noteworthy is his attempt to resolve the apparent tension between Kloṅ-chen-pa’s description of Prāsaṅgika– Madhyamaka as the pinnacle of the non-tantric systems on the one hand and his positive evaluation and emphasis of the TG doctrine of the Last Cycle on the other, by explaining them to be of two different cases, namely, (a) “the case of identifying by means of study, [the view that] has to be ascertained” (thos pas gtan la dbab bya ṅos ’dzin pa’i skabs) and (b) “the case of [actually] ascertaining [it] by means of practice [and] experience” (sgom pa ñams myoṅ gis gtan la ’bebs pa’i skabs), respectively (dPag bsam sñe ma, fol. 184b2-185a2). Some later rÑiṅ-ma scholars such as Bod-sprul who preferred Mi-pham’s balanced approach were apparently certainly ill at ease with those rÑiṅ-ma interpretations that came dangerously close (from the perspective of the raṅ stoṅ exponents) to that of Dol-po-pa’s (’Jam dbyaṅs dgoṅs rgyan, p. 93.4-7). 42 43 184 Dorji Wangchuk siderably towards the Last Cycle and thus appear to come precariously close to Dol-po-pa’s interpretation. Hence, the prominence rÑiṅ-ma scholars give to the Middle and Last Cycles seems to depend on how they understand emptiness. Mi-pham seems to be one of those scholars who made great effort to counterbalance the tendentially increasing weight given to the Last Cycle, by emphasising the “indivisibility of the two truths,” which according to him is also accentuated by Prāsaṅgika– Mādhyamikas. One may say that in general the rÑiṅ-ma-pas throughout their history seem to have had either a balanced approach to the Middle and Last Cycles or tended to tilt towards the Last Cycle, though hardly ever to the degree Dol-po-pa does. The weight was also seldom concentrated only on the Middle Cycle by a total removal of weight from the Last Cycle. However, in spite of the increasing tendency to evaluate TG positively, the main-stream rÑiṅ-ma-pas generally never went so far as to interpret it as a “hypostatic existence” (bden par grub pa). Their interpretation of the TG teaching has been consistent with the following ideas expressed in the Man ṅag lta phreṅ attributed to Padmasambhava, which probably presents a collection of extracts from various Mahāyāna scriptures:46 All All All All All phenomena phenomena phenomena phenomena phenomena are are are are are intrinsically empty (svabhāvaśūnya). primordially pure. completely luminous. by nature [characterised by] nirvāṇa. perfectly awakened from the beginning.47 This synthesis of ideas seems to have guided the rÑiṅ-ma scholars, particularly Kloṅ-chen-pa and Mi-pham, to accept the positive theory of the TG even as the Prāsaṅgika–Madhyamaka came to be regarded by them as the pinnacle of the sūtra systems,48 and the notion of “freeThese do not seem to be exact quotes, but rather paraphrases. Roṅ-zom-pa (lTa phreṅ ’grel pa, p. 340.6) explains these lines as “occurring in miscellaneous scriptural authorities” (luṅ thor bu rnams nas ’byuṅ ba). 47 Man ṅag lta phreṅ, fol. 416a8-417a2: chos thams cad ni ṅo bo ñid kyis stoṅ pa’o || chos thams cad ni gzod ma nas rnam par dag pa’o || chos thams cad ni yoṅs kyis ’od gsal ba’o || chos thams cad ni raṅ bźin gyis mya ṅan las ’das pa’o || chos thams cad ni ye nas mṅon par rdzogs par saṅs rgyas pa’o źes gsuṅs so ||. Cf. also the Theg chen tshul ’jug, p. 450.11-13. 48 See the Yid bźin mdzod, p. 55.3; Yid bźin mdzod ’grel, Vol. waṃ, p. 643.2-4; Theg mchog mdzod, vol. e, fol. 64b1-2 & 64b4-5 and Grub mtha’ mdzod, p. 108.45. Mi-pham too saw the view of Prāsaṅgika–Madhyamaka as the highest in the sūtra system (bKa’ brgyad rnam bśad, p. 35.4-5; Yid bźin grub bsdus, p. 483.3). 46 The rÑiṅ-ma Interpretations of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory 185 dom from manifoldness” as identical with the rDzogs-chen notion of “primordial purity” (ka dag).49 According to Roṅ-zom-pa, the Madhyamaka notion of “absolute reality” is also shared by the Vajrayāna system. He states:50 As for the Mādhyamikas, [they] maintain that even mind is in reality no real entity and that from the highest perspective, all phenomena are primordially unborn, without essential nature and are characterised by the pacification of all [extremes of] manifoldness. Also the position of the tantric treatises [regarding] the characteristics of absolute reality is similar to that [of the Madhyamaka system].51 49 According to Kloṅ-chen-pa, the rDzogs-chen approach of establishing “freedom from extremes” is to a great extent similar to that of the Prāsaṅgika–Madhyamaka (Chos dbyiṅs mdzod ’grel, fol. 76b1-2: raṅ bźin rdzogs pa chen po ’di’i lugs kyis mtha’ bral la sogs pa’i mjal tshul phal cher dbu ma thal ’gyur daṅ mtshuṅs pa las | dbu mar stoṅ stoṅ po nam mkha’ ’dra ba rtsis gźir byed pa ste | ’dir ni rig pa ka nas dag pa rjen zaṅ ṅe ba ma grub la mi ’gag pa tsam de la gźir byas nas | de daṅ de’i ṅaṅ las śar ba’i chos rnams mtha’ grol nam mkha’ ltar ’jal ba ste |). Likewise, Mi-pham does not distinguish between the “freedom from manifoldness” established by Prāsaṅgika–Madhyamaka and the “primordial purity” established by the rDzogs-chen system (see the Ṅes śes sgron me, p. 88.6-89.1: ka dag bdar śa chod pa la || thal ’gyur lta ba mthar phyin dgos || spros bral tsam gyi cha nas ni || de gñis khyad par med do gsuṅ ||; the dBu ma rgyan ’grel, p. 46.3-4). Cf. also the Ṅes śes sgron me, p. 119.6: spros bral dbu ma chen po daṅ || ’od gsal rdzogs pa chen po gñis || don gcig miṅ gi rnam graṅs te || de las lhag pa’i lta ba med || (cf. the English translation of this verse in Pettit 1999a: 237). See also the Ṅes śes sgron me, p. 84.6: rdzogs chen yod min med min ni || mtha’ bźi’i spros daṅ bral ba yin || (Pettit 1999a: 205). 50 lTa ba’i brjed byaṅ, p. 9.21-24: dbu ma pa ni yid kyaṅ don dam par rdzas su med de yaṅ dag par na chos thams cad gdod ma nas ma skyes pa ṅo bo ñid med pa | spros pa thams cad ñe bar źi ba’i mtshan ñid du ’dod do || gsaṅ sṅags kyi gźuṅ yaṅ don dam pa’i mtshan ñid de daṅ mthun par ’dod de |. See also the lTa ba’i brjed byaṅ, p. 20.22-21.2 and lTa phreṅ ’grel pa, p. 321.7-9: dbu ma pas rten ciṅ ’brel te ’byuṅ ba’i tshul rtogs pas ni | raṅ rig pa’ de ñid kyaṅ | rgyu daṅ ’bras bu’i dṅos po’i bdag ñid thob pa’ myed par rtogs te | spros pa thams cad las yoṅs su ’das par rtogs so ||. See also ibid., p. 20.16-18. 51 Roṅ-zom-pa, however, sees the Madhyamaka notion of “freedom from manifoldness” as a strength but its inability to dispense with the concept of “true conventional” reality (tathyasaṃvṛti) as a weakness which hinders its proponents from establishing the equality (mñam pa ñid) of all phenomena (Theg chen tshul ’jug, p. 476.17-21). 186 5. TG Dorji Wangchuk IN THE WRITINGS OF ROṄ-ZOM-PA, KLOṄ-CHEN-PA AND MI-PHAM Before we evaluate the rÑiṅ-ma stance on the TG doctrine in India and Tibet, let us briefly look at how much the three scholars upon whom I rely were themselves concerned with the theory. The term TG does not appear in any of the titles of works attributed to Roṅ-zom-pa.52 Nevertheless, he discusses the term and concept of TG in several of his extant writings such as the dKon mchog ’grel, Dam tshig mdo rgyas and Theg chen tshul ’jug.53 In the dKon mchog ’grel, he explains the term *sugatagarbha (= TG) in the following manner:54 [Being endowed with] *sugatagarbha is, as commonly known, maintained to be the sentient beings’ possessing of the cause for awakening [or their] possessing of the seed of non-tainted [phenomena]. According to the profound [system], the very nature of the mind being awakened, it is [called] the Awakened [= Buddha] Nature.55 In particular, Roṅ-zom-pa’s Raṅ byuṅ ye śes seems to be, at least in content, a treatise on the TG theory from a tantric perspective.56 Just as the Ratnagotravibhāga seeks to establish that all sentient beings possess TG, the Raṅ byuṅ ye śes seeks to “show that the ordinary minds of worldly sentient beings (pṛthagjana) possess ‘self-occurring gnosis’” (so so skye bo’i tha mal pa’i śes pa raṅ byuṅ gi ye śes can du ston pa).57 52 See Roṅ-pa Me-dpuṅ’s list of Roṅ-zom-pa’s writings in Almogi 1997: 242-248 (Appendix A); Almogi 2002: 75-80. 53 The term TG or rather its semantically equivalent terms can be found explicitly mentioned in several of Roṅ-zom-pa’s writings. For examples, see the dKon mchog ’grel, p. 81.17-18 (sems can gyi sems raṅ byuṅ gi ye śes kyi sñiṅ po can yin pa); ibid., p. 127.13 (bde bar gśegs pa’i sñiṅ po); Dam tshig mdo rgyas, p. 370.10 (de bźin gśegs pa’i sñiṅ po can); ibid., p. 382.12 (byaṅ chub kyi sñiṅ po can); gSuṅ thor bu, p. 107.1 (sems can thams cad byaṅ chub kyi sñiṅ po can); ibid., p. 111.22-23 (so so skye bo’i tha mal pa’i śes pa raṅ byuṅ gi ye śes can du ston pa); Grub mtha’i brjed byaṅ, p. 220.8 (ye nas byaṅ chub kyi sñiṅ po can); Theg chen tshul ’jug, p. 545.1-14; and Rab gnas cho ga, p. 181.19-20 (’gro ba ris drug tha mal pa thams cad ni | byaṅ chub kyi sñiṅ po can gyi raṅ bźin yin la |). 54 dKon mchog ’grel, p. 127.13-15: de la bde bar gśegs pa’i sñiṅ po źes bya ni | thun moṅ du grags pa sems can rnams byaṅ chub kyi rgyu can zag med kyi sa bon daṅ ldan pa’o || źes ’dod do || zab mo ltar na sems kyi raṅ bźin ñid byaṅ chub yin pas byaṅ chub kyi sñiṅ po’o ||. 55 A similar explanation is also given in the Theg chen tshul ’jug, p. 545.1-14, where the term kun gźi (ālaya) is explained according to both the common and uncommon Mahāyāna systems (Karmay 1988: 179; Schmithausen 1995: 335f.). 56 See the gSuṅ thor bu, p. 111.21-130.6. 57 gSuṅ thor bu, p. 111.22-23, 113.13. The rÑiṅ-ma Interpretations of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory 187 Roṅ-zom-pa also states that he wrote this treatise specifically “so that [people can] grasp [this teaching on ‘self-occurring gnosis’] as being of definitive meaning” (ṅes pa’i don du bzuṅ bar bya ba’i phyir).58 As already mentioned (cf. p. 178f.), the term *sugatagarbha (= TG) does occur in the rÑiṅ-ma tantras belonging to the Mahāyoga, Anuyoga and Atiyoga classes, if rather infrequently. Yet other terms such as “self-occurring gnosis” (raṅ byuṅ gi ye śes: svayaṃbhūjñāna) or bodhicitta (i.e., in its most absolute sense) are more prevalent or preferred in the early rÑiṅ-ma literature. One notices, however, that Roṅ-zom-pa’s interests rest primarily on the tantric and particularly rDzogs-chen idea of “selfoccurring gnosis” and not directly on TG as such. For example, if Roṅzom-pa at all cites a TG sūtra, he seems to do so only because it contains the term or idea of “self-occurring gnosis” and not because it propagates the TG theory. This may explain why he hardly cites TG sūtras or passages containing the term TG. Thus, my impression is that he sought to interpret the TG theory in the light of “self-occurring gnosis” and not vice versa as was apparently the case with Dol-po-pa. Kloṅ-chen-pa is supposed to have written one general commentary on all five works of Maitreya, called the Rin chen them skas (including root-verses and auto-commentary), which unfortunately is lost.59 No commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga is listed in the catalogues to Kloṅ-chen-pa’s works. However, a commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga has recently been discovered; it was authored by a certain Blo-grosmtshuṅs-med and has the title Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos kyi ṅes don gsal bar byed pa’i rin po che’i sgron me (= Rin chen sgron me). Some Tibetan scholars have, since the appearance of the commentary, assumed Blo-gros-mtshuṅs-med to be Kloṅ-chen-pa. I have not yet seen any argumentation supporting the attribution of the Rin chen sgron me to Kloṅ-chen-pa or for considering this Blo-grosmtshuṅs-med (there is said to have been more than one author at around this time with the same name) and Kloṅ-chen-pa to be one and the same person. The Rin chen sgron me is probably not penned by Kloṅ-chen-pa.60 Nevertheless, Kloṅ-chen-pa’s presentation of the TG See ibid., p. 119.6-8, 129.8-9. See the Dad gsum ’jug ṅogs, p. 101.18-20 and the mThoṅ ba don ldan, p. 214.7-9. 60 It seems that this attribution is based on the following faint similarities. (1) Doctrinally, like Kloṅ-chen-pa, Blo-gros-mtshuṅs-med (the author of the commentary) explicitly interprets TG as having a definitive meaning. This is evident also from the title and the following remarks in the author’s colophon: “Thus I 58 59 188 Dorji Wangchuk doctrine can be found in varying detail in his existing works, particularly in the Grub mtha’ mdzod,61 Śiṅ rta chen po,62 Yid bźin mdzod have taken this trouble to explain this treatise [i.e., the Ratnagotravibhāga] according to the scriptures containing a definitive meaning” (Rin chen sgron me, p. 678.12: de slad gźuṅ ’di ṅes don gsuṅ rab bźin || rnam par bkrol ba’i ṅal ba ’di byas so ||). (2) Chronologically Kloṅ-chen-pa and Blo-gros-mtshuṅs-med can be designated to the same period. If Bu-ston’s discussion with this Blo-gros-mtshuṅs-med led him to write his De bźin gśegs pa’i sñiṅ po gsal źiṅ mdzes par byed pa’i rgyan in 1359 (Seyfort Ruegg 1966: 152; 1973: 4-5, n. 3, 149, n. 2) and if Kloṅ-chen-pa and Blogros-mtshuṅs-med were one and the same person, it would pose no chronological problems, for Kloṅ-chen-pa (1308-1363) too was a contemporary of Bu-ston (12901364). (3) There is a vague similarity in the titles of the commentary by Blo-grosmtshuṅs-med, the Rin po che’i sgron me, and Kloṅ-chen-pa’s lost general commentary (spyi don) on the so-called “Five Works of Maitreya” (byams chos sde lṅa) called Rin po che’i them skas. (4) There is also a certain similarity betweeen the personal names Blo-gros-mtshuṅs-med and Tshul-khrims-blo-gros (one of the several names of Kloṅ-chen-pa). (5) Both Blo-gros-mtshuṅs-med and Kloṅ-chen-pa studied in gSaṅ-phu Ne’u-thog seminary. Thus, the above factors, coupled with the earnest desire to find lost works of Kloṅ-chen-pa, may have caused the attribution of the commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga to Kloṅ-chen-pa. On the other hand, several factors indicate why Blo-gros-mtshuṅs-med and Kloṅ-chen-pa could not have been one and the same person. (1) Kloṅ-chen-pa referred to himself by way of different names in different works and his multiple names have all been recorded in his biography (Dad gsum ’jug ṅogs, p. 110.5-21). He personally mentioned his multiple names and gave reasons as to why a certain name was used in a certain context (Chos dbyiṅs mdzod ’grel, fol. 209b1-6). If Blo-gros-mtshuṅs-med had indeed been one of Kloṅ-chen-pa’s names, one would expect to find it at least in one of these records. This, however, is not the case. It is of course possible that not all of his names were recorded. (2) Kloṅ-chen-pa’s lost Rin chen them skas is explicitly stated to be a general commentary to the “Five Works of Maitreya” whereas Blogros-mtshuṅs-med’s Rin chen sgron me is said to elucidate the definitive meaning of the Ratnagotravibhāga only. A commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga is not mentioned in the catalogues of Kloṅ-chen-pa’s writings. One cannot of course rule out the possibility that some of his works were not listed in the catalogue. (3) I am unable to detect any striking stylistic or terminological pecularity of Kloṅ-chenpa’s in Blo-gros-mtshuṅs-med’s Rin chen sgron me. Of course an author’s style of writing does not always remain static, and we lack an indisputable commentary by Kloṅ-chen-pa on a major Indian śāstra with which we could compare the style and terminology of Blo-gros-mtshuṅs-med’s commentary. (4) The commentary does not provide the names of any Tibetan teacher or work in the verses of obeisance (mchod brjod), the concluding verses (mjug rtsom) or the body of the work that might give us some hints regarding the author’s rÑiṅ-ma affiliation. Although a conclusive statement cannot be made at this stage, my impression is that the commentary was most probably not written by Kloṅ-chen-pa. 61 See the Grub mtha’ mdzod, p. 161.3-190.2. 62 Śiṅ rta chen po, Vol. ña, p. 310.3-350.2. The rÑiṅ-ma Interpretations of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory 189 ’grel,63 Sems ye brtag pa and Tshig don mdzod.64 References to TG or *sugatagarbha and closely associated ideas can also be found in several of his other writings.65 The most important works on the topic by Mi-pham are his annotated commentary to the Ratnagotravibhāga66 as well as his sToṅ thun seṅ ge’i ṅa ro, gŹan stoṅ seṅ ge’i ṅa ro and Ṅes śes sgron me. Mi-pham’s sToṅ thun seṅ ge’i ṅa ro is actually a discourse on Ratnagotravibhāga 1.28, which presents the three logical arguments that seek to prove that all sentients beings possess Buddha Nature. The “official position” of the rÑiṅ-ma school on TG may be said to be spelled out in this work.67 The gŹan stoṅ seṅ ge’i ṅa ro68 is a brief excursus on the doctrine of extrinsic emptiness. It seems to be merely the cornerstone for a larger work that Mi-pham had envisioned but did not develop on paper beyond 63 Yid bźin mdzod ’grel, Vol. e, p. 9.1-23.2 (chapter one), Vol. waṃ, fol. 151b1155b5 (chapter eighteen). See also Yid bźin mdzod, p. 3.2-5.6, 70.5-75.1. 64 Tshig don mdzod, chapter two (saṅs rgyas kyi sñiṅ pos khyab tshul), fol. 40a6-45a3. Cf. Germano 1992: x & 78. 65 For examples, see his Phyogs bcu’i mun sel (fol. 57b5-58b2 & 316b3-318a6); Śiṅ rta bzaṅ po (particularly, p. 50.4-54.2); Chos dbyiṅs mdzod ’grel, sGyu ma ṅal gso and Raṅ byuṅ rdo rjer dri ba. 66 An annotated commentary (mchan ’grel), does not normally go into the details of doctrinal positions. Yet mKhan-po Kun-bzaṅ-dpal-ldan, one of Mi-pham’s important students, who prepared the rGyud bla’i mchan ’grel for printing after his teacher’s death (colophon, p. 556.6-557.1), notes that Mi-pham’s rGyud bla’i mchan ’grel clearly presents his own position without falling into either of the extremes of “appearance” or “emptiness,” although he had used the Indian commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga (attributed to Asaṅga) and Tibetan commentaries (on the same work) by Dol-po-pa (1292-1361), Thogs-med-bzaṅ-po (12951369), Red-mda’-ba (1349-1412) and Roṅ-ston (1367-1449). See the compiler’s colophon, p. 554.5-555.3: de la spyir phyag mchan yod rigs rnams gaṅ la gzigs pa’i rgya bod kyi ’grel pa rnams raṅ raṅ gi mjug tu gsal ba las ’dir yaṅ | ’phags pa thogs med daṅ | dol po | rgyal sras thogs med | red mda’ ba | roṅ ston rnams kyi ’grel pa phyag mchan du gsal na yaṅ | dṅos don du raṅ gar thad ka’i ’grel bar [= par] gaṅ yod mchan du btab pa lta bu ma yin par rgyal tshab chen po ñid kyi dgoṅs par gaṅ ’byor gyis | gnad don sñiṅ po snaṅ stoṅ phyogs su ma lhuṅ ba’i raṅ lugs gsal por bkod ’dug par gzur gnas dpyod ldan rnams kyis ’grel pa de dag la źib par gzigs rtog mdzod daṅ gsal par [= bar] rtogs ṅes yod pa lags so ||. 67 sToṅ thun seṅ ge’i ṅa ro, p. 563-606.5. Unlike some of Mi-pham’s other works, the sToṅ thun seṅ ge’i ṅa ro was revised by the author himself; he did this in 1891 (lcags [mo] yos), twenty-four years (lo skor tshar gñis) after it was first composed (see author’s colophon, sToṅ thun seṅ ge’i ṅa ro, p. 606.1-5). 68 gŹan stoṅ seṅ ge’i ṅa ro, p. 359-378.4. 190 Dorji Wangchuk some preparatory notes. There is neither an author’s colophon nor mention of the date of composition. The verses of introduction and conclusion (thog tha’i tshigs su bcad pa rnams) were composed and inserted by Źe-chen-rgyal-tshab (1871-1926).69 Nothing is said about the title but it is probable that the title gŹan stoṅ khas len seṅ ge’i ṅa ro too was assigned by him and not by Mi-pham.70 Although Mi-pham did not recognise the gźan stoṅ view as such, he went on to defend it in his Dam chos dogs sel.71 One can find further references on the TG in Mi-pham’s writings on Madhyamaka, Prajñāpāramitā and rDzogs-chen. His Ṅes śes sgron me is a rÑiṅ-ma classic in which the key doctrinal positions on the theory and praxis of the rÑiṅ-ma school including the issue of raṅ stoṅ and gźan stoṅ are clearly presented.72 ’Jam-dbyaṅs Blo-gros-rgya-mtsho alias Źe-chen-rgyal-tshab Padma-rnamrgyal (1871-1926), who was largely responsible for the compilation of Mi-pham’s works, reports (gŹan stoṅ seṅ ge’i ṅa ro, colophon, p. 378.2): “[It is evident that Mi-pham] had prepared a brief [draft] merely as a seed [or] basis for [the actual] composition” (rtsom gźi’i sa bon tsam mdor bsdus gnaṅ ’dug pa). Cf. Pettit 1999a: 427. 70 This work has already been translated into English. See Pettit 1999a: 415427. 71 See the Dam chos dogs sel, p. 369.3-375.2. 72 Ṅes śes sgron me, p. 71.1-123.5. The importance of the Ṅes śes sgron me is demonstrated by the number of commentaries written on it thus far. (1) The earliest commentary of the Ṅes śes sgron me is perhaps the Blo snaṅ sgo ’byed (see bibliography) by mKhan-po Kun-bzaṅ-dpal-ldan (1872-1943). Cf. Pettit 1999a: 462, n. 12. (2) The second commentary is by Kaḥ-thog-mkhan-po Nus-ldan-mkhyen-brtse’i-blo-gros (Kaḥ thog lo rgyus, p. 151.15; Pettit 1999a: 8), which I have unfortunately not seen. (3) The third commentary called Ṅes śes rin po che’i sgron me’i rnam bśad ’od zer dri med is by Khro-chu ’Jam-dpal-rdo-rje (or simply ’Jamrdor). The text was published by rNam-grol-gliṅ Monastery, Mysore; a translation can be found in Pettit 1999a: 241-413. (4) The fourth commentary is by Khaṅ-dmar Rin-chen-rdo-rje who served as the sixth abbot (between 1940 and 1943) of Khams-bye bŚad-grwa at rDzoṅ-gsar (rDzoṅ gsar lo rgyus, p. 199.2): ljags rtsom | tshad ma rigs gter gsal byed daṅ mi pham ṅes śes sgron me’i ’grel pa sogs yod do ||). I have not seen this work either. (5) The fifth and most recent commentary is by Slob-dpon Theg-mchog, a Bhutanese scholar currently based at rDo-grub Monastery in Gangtok. This commentary entitled Ṅes sgron śan sbyar lha rṅa’i sgra (Pettit 1999a: 8, 462, n. 11), contains mainly citations from authoritative scriptures (luṅ) rather than logical argumentations (rigs pa). 69 The rÑiṅ-ma Interpretations of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory 6. ASSESSMENT OF THE RÑIṄ-MA STANDPOINT ON THE 191 TG THEORY Louis de La Vallée Poussin seems to have been the first Western scholar to show that already in the Pāli sources “rationalist” and “mystic” positions existed. Not only did the adherents of the two positions debate, but some sources also attempted to reconcile the two.73 Lambert Schmithausen has similarly distinguished two conceptions of liberation and awakening in early Buddhist canonical sources, designating them “positive–mystical” and “negative–intellectualist.”74 In the Tibetan context, Seyfort Ruegg has often used the terms “apophatic and negative” on the one hand and “cataphatic and positive” on the other to describe the raṅ stoṅ and gźan stoṅ theories, respectively.75 Thus, following Schmithausen’s terminology, Indian Mahāyāna scriptures such as the Prajñāpāramitā and the Madhyamaka “scholastic corpus” (rigs tshogs) of Nāgārjuna, said to belong to the Middle Cycle according to the Tibetan tradition, are “negative-intellectualist,” whereas the TG sūtras and the “hymnic corpus” (bstod tshogs) attributed by the Tibetans to the same Nāgārjuna are “positive–mystical.” But how do the Tibetans perceive these two trends in the Indian scriptures? Do they see them as incompatible and mutually exclusive, and thus opt for one by rejecting the other? Or do they choose one, not by rejecting but by allotting the other to a subordinate position, in the sense of Paul Hacker’s “inclusivism” as defined by Schmithausen?76 Or, do they reconcile and harmonise the two trends by considering them complementary?77 See de La Vallée Poussin 1936-37: 189ff. and Schmithausen 1981: 214. Schmithausen 1981: 223-224, 247; Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 8-9, n. 6 & 9. 75 See, for instance, Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 10. 76 Whenever I speak of Paul Hacker’s “inclusivism” I mean his theory of “inclusivism” as defined by Schmithausen, that is, as “a method of intellectual debate in which the competing doctrine, or essential elements of it, are admitted but relegated to a subordinate position, or given a suitable reinterpretation, and which aims not so much at reconciliation but at prevailing over the other doctrines or its propounders” (Schmithausen 1981: 223). This definition is also cited in Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 9, n. 9. For more details on “inclusivism,” see Oberhammer 1983 and Halbfass 1995: 10-12. 77 Following Paul Hacker’s theory of “inclusivism” as defined by Schmithausen, I distinguish the “inclusivistic” approach from the “reconciliatory” or “harmonising” approach and consider them to be diametrically opposed to each other. Thus, a tradition that attempts to reconcile raṅ stoṅ and gźan stoṅ doctrines by treating them as equal and complementary is said to follow a “reconciliatory” or “harmonising” approach whereas a tradition that subordinates either one by interpreting it to have only a provisional sense, is said to follow an “inclusivistic” approach. 73 74 192 Dorji Wangchuk One may say that the Jo-naṅ-pas have followed the “positive–mystical” trend and the main-stream Sa-skya-pas the “negative–intellectualist” one, and that both of them have taken an “inclusivistic” approach in Paul Hacker’s sense. That is, the teachings of “intrinsic emptiness” of the Middle Cycle are admitted by the Jo-naṅ-pas but are relegated to a subordinate position in being considered to be of provisional meaning,78 and similarly, the teaching of TG of the Last Cycle is admitted by the main-stream Sa-skya-pas but relegated to a subordinate position in being considered to be of provisional meaning, at least in the context of establishing the view according to the sūtra system.79 Furthermore, it could appear that mKhas-grub-rje, who speaks for the main-stream dGe-lugs-pas, attempts to reconcile and harmonise these two currents. But what he actually attempted was to offer a reductionistic reinterpretation of the teaching of TG by emptying it of its contents such as the attributed inherent excellent Buddha qualities and refilling it with the mere absence of a “hypostatic existence” (bden par grub pa) of the mind, while still retaining the term TG. It is true that mKhas-grub-rje did not denounce or downgrade the doctrine of TG. He even considered Mahāyāna scriptures such as the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra to be similar to or consistent (phyogs mthun) with the scriptures of the Middle Cycle (such as the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras) and as containing a definitive meaning. The purport of the Ratnagotravibhāga – which is said to mainly explain the purport of Mahāyāna sūtras such as the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra – is considered by him to be or “exist as a prāsaṅgika Dol-po-pa subordinates the raṅ stoṅ teaching of the Middle Cycle in two ways: (a) The impermanent conventional phenomena (including even those belonging to the path) taught as raṅ stoṅ in the Middle Cycle are factual (don la gnas). But this raṅ stoṅ is, according to him (Ri chos, p. 155.10-12), kun rdzob raṅ stoṅ (or kun rdzob stoṅ ñid) and does not meet the standards of what he calls don dam gźan stoṅ (or don dam stoṅ ñid), because only what is absolute can be gźan stoṅ and only what is gźan stoṅ can be absolute (ibid., p. 308.12-15). (b) Permanent and absolute phenomena are actually gźan stoṅ and hence of definitive meaning. Hence, teachings of the Middle Cycle such as “dharmadhātu is empty of dharmadhātu” (chos kyi dbyiṅs ni chos kyi dbyiṅs kyis stoṅ) should be interpreted in a provisional sense (Ri chos, p. 279.6-9: ’khor lo bar ba’i [= pa’i] gźuṅ gźan daṅ gźan du yaṅ | raṅ stoṅ ma yin pa la raṅ stoṅ du gsuṅs pa thams cad draṅ don dgoṅs pa can ñid du khoṅ du chud par bya ste | legs par rnam par phye ba’i man ṅag thun moṅ ma yin pa’i sgron me la brten nas so ||). See also ibid., p. 284.9-16. Cf. Stearns 1999: 3. 79 sDom gsum rab dbye, verses 1.138-142 in Rhoton 2002: 58 (translation), 285 (text). See also Stearns 1999: 269-270, n. 129 and Jackson 1987: 267, 336. 78 The rÑiṅ-ma Interpretations of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory 193 purport” (dgoṅs pa thal ’gyur du gnas).80 However, it turns out that for him TG is nothing but a specific cause (rgyu) of Buddhahood which he interprets as “the emptiness [of the mind], that is, the mind’s being empty of hypostatic existence” (sems bden par grub pas stoṅ pa’i stoṅ ñid).81 Therefore, unlike Seyfort Ruegg who views this as a harmonisation of the two trends,82 I believe mKhas-grub-rje’s approach fulfils the definition of “inclusivism,” since, although he does not, at least in letter, subordinate the doctrine of TG, in spirit he has reduced it to the mere absence of “hypostatic existence” of the mind. Thus, in fact, all three – the main-stream Sa-skya-pas, the Jo-naṅ-pas and the mainstream dGe-lugs-pas – have sought to resolve the apparent tension between the “positive–mystical” and “negative–intellectualist” antitheses in Indian Buddhism by adopting an inclusivistic approach, but each has done so in a quite distinct manner. How do the rÑiṅ-ma-pas deal with the Indian “positive–mystical” and “negative–intellectualist” currents, and with the raṅ stoṅ and gźan stoṅ issues in Tibet? They do so in two different manners, the first relating to the “positive–mystical” and “negative–intellectualist” currents, the second to the raṅ stoṅ and gźan stoṅ issues. In the former case, they attempt to reconcile and harmonise the “negative–intellectualist” current in India as represented by the Prajñāpāramitā literature and the Madhyamaka “scholastic corpus” with the “positive–mystical” current as represented in the TG sūtras, the “hymnic corpus” and in works such as the Ratnagotravibhāga and the Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā belonging to the Maitreya–Asaṅga complex. The contents of these two currents of Indian Buddhist teachings are not re-interpreted by them, nor is the content of one given a subordinate position by designating it as of provisional meaning. The excellent qualities attributed to the TG are also not reduced to mere absence of “hypostatic existence” but their teachings are accepted literally. For them, the difference between the 80 rGyud sde spyi rnam, p. 96.13-23: rgyud bla ma … raṅ lugs la rje rin po che’i bźed pas | bka’ bar pa’i phyogs mthun gyi mdo | bde gśegs sñiṅ po’i mdo … la sogs pa’i dgoṅs pa gtso bor ’grel la | dgoṅs pa thal ’gyur du gnas śiṅ | ’phags pa thogs med kyis kyaṅ thal ’gyur du bkral bar bźed … |. 81 rGyud sde spyi rnam, p. 52.1-8: bde bar gśegs pa’i sñiṅ po ni | … sems bden par grub pas stoṅ pa’i stoṅ ñid de la sems kyi chos ñid raṅ bźin rnam dag ces bya ste | de yaṅ glo bur gyi dri ma daṅ ma bral ba’i gnas skabs kyi sems kyi chos ñid raṅ bźin rnam dag de la bde bar gśegs pa’i sñiṅ po’am | raṅ bźin du gnas pa’i rigs | źes bya’o ||. 82 See Seyfort Ruegg 1968: 506; Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 81. 194 Dorji Wangchuk two currents lies in the degree of emphasis. That is, the “negative–intellectualist” current emphasises the aspects of emptiness (stoṅ pa’i cha), whereas the “positive–mystical” its aspect of luminosity (gsal ba’i cha). The teachings of emptiness and luminosity, being the two aspects of one reality,83 are both of definitive meaning.84 For example, Roṅ-zompa, while commenting on the terms gsaṅ ba sñiṅ po, de kho na ñid and ṅes pa contained in the longer title of the *Guhyagarbha, explains “reality” (de kho na ñid) from both an ontological and epistemological point of view and considers both the ontological and epistemological “reality” to be “definitive,” which he regards as “definitive meaning.”85 83 The theories of one universal ground (gźi), one vehicle or way (lam) and one goal (’bras bu) all seem to be based on the theory of one absolute reality, a doctrinal premise also accepted by the rÑiṅ-ma-pas. They therefore cannot and do not apply numerical or qualitative distinctions to absolute reality taught in the various systems of Mahāyāna (be it the TG School, Prāsaṅgika–Madhyamaka or the rDzogs-chen system) that explicate or presuppose the “indivisibility of the two truths.” Thus from the ontological perspective, the actual nītārtha of the special Mahāyāna teachings is the “indivisibility of the two truths” regardless of what terminology (be it “TG” or “freedom from manifoldness”) one may employ to designate it. The “indivisibility of the two truths” is obviously equated by Roṅzom-pa with TG (gSuṅ thor bu, p. 30.5-7): “Thus the mode of the indivisibility of the two truths or even the mode of the two truths accepted [by some] which is the pureness sphere of reality (dharmadhātuviśuddhi) should be considered to be the nature of all phenomena, namely TG” (de bas na bden pa gñis dbyer med pa’i tshul daṅ | bden pa gñis su ’dod pa’i tshul ñid kyaṅ | chos kyi dbyiṅs rnam par dag pa gaṅ yin pa de ñid | de bźin gśegs pa’i sñiṅ po chos thams cad kyi raṅ bźin yin par gzuṅ dgos so ||). Kloṅ-chen-pa (Yid bźin mdzod, p. 74.1-3) considered both “TG” and the “freedom from manifoldness” of the Prajñāpāramitā and Madhyamaka to be synonymous (miṅ gi rnam graṅs). Similarly, Mi-pham explicitly equated TG with the indivisibility of the two truths in his Ketaka, p. 30.4: don du khams bde gśegs sñiṅ po’am yaṅ dag pa’i mtha’ chos kyi dbyiṅs snaṅ stoṅ zuṅ du ’jug pa’i de bźin ñid. According to Mi-pham, the uniqueness of the Prāsaṅgika approach is that it seeks to establish the indivisibility of the two truths from the very outset (dKa’ gnad ci rigs, p. 550.3: thal ’gyur bas bden gñis dbyer med kyi chos dbyiṅs tha sñad kun bral ñid daṅ po nas gtan la ’beb par byed do ||). 84 For Kloṅ-chen-pa’s statements, see the Śiṅ rta chen po, Vol. ña, p. 685.6-688.2. Mi-pham’s theory of “conventional valid cognition based on pure perception” (dag pa’i gzigs pa la brten pa’i kun tu tha sñad pa’i tshad ma), which can be traced back to certain ingenious ideas of Roṅ-zom-pa, is indispensable for resolving problems such as the apparent tension between the Middle and Last Cycles, and the difficulty in considering the epistemic gnosis to be of definitive meaning. However, these issue are beyond the scope of this article. 85 dKon mchog ’grel, p. 57.5-8: chos thams cad kyi de bźin ñid ni rtag tu ji ltar [= lta] ba bźin ñid de | ’di la ’gyur ba med pas de kho na ñid ces bya’o || de rtogs pa’i The rÑiṅ-ma Interpretations of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory 195 In addition, absolute reality, often referred to as “self-occurring gnosis,” is also considered to be of definitive meaning.86 The two currents are hence viewed as complementary.87 Nonetheless, in spite of this approach which may be seen as characteristic for the rÑiṅ-ma position as a whole, my impression is that Roṅ-zom-pa inclines more towards the ye śes kyaṅ don mthun par skye ste | ’di la bslu ba med pas de kho na ñid ces bya’o ||; ibid., p. 57.21-24: ṅes pa źes bya ṅes pa’i don te | ’di ltar rgyal ba rnams kyi dgoṅs pa brgyud de draṅ ba’i tshul gyis ’gro ba chud mi gson pa’i thabs su gsuṅs pa lta bu tsam ma yin gyi | ñid kyis ji ltar thugs su chud pa’i don skal ba ldan pa rnams la tshig gzugs por bstan pa yin pas ṅes pa źes bya’o ||. 86 See the gSuṅ thor bu, p. 119.5-7, which states: “Thus, even the mind (sems) of ordinary sentient beings possesses “self-occurring gnosis” (svayaṃbhūjñāna). As for this teaching, [it] is not [an indirect] statement of intention (abhiprāya) [i.e., of provisional meaning] but [is] taught in a straightforward manner and hence the purport too should be known to be definitive” (de ltar na so so skye bo tha mal pa’i śes pa’aṅ raṅ byuṅ gi ye śes can no || źes gsuṅs pa ’di’aṅ dgoṅs pa’i tshig ma yin te | gzugs por gsuṅs pa ñid yin pas | don ’di yaṅ mtshan ñid pa yin par śes par bya’o ||). See also, ibid., p. 123.21-124.3. 87 Mi-pham often attempts to strike a balance between the views expressed in Nāgārjuna’s treatises and those of the Maitreya–Asaṅga complex. Nāgārjuna is seen as the elucidator of the profound aspect (zab pa’i cha) and Asaṅga as the elucidator of the aspect of vastness (rgya che ba’i cha) of the Buddha’s teachings. See the dBu ma rgyan ’grel, p. 13.6-14.1, 48.3-4; Ṅes śes sgron me, p. 82.5: klu sgrub lugs daṅ byams pa’i gźuṅ || phan tshun bu ram sbraṅ rtsi bźin ||. See also the sToṅ thun seṅ ge’i ṅa ro, p. 564.4-565.3: de yaṅ ston pa bde bar gśegs pas gsuṅ gi skabs la lar stoṅ pa ñid bstan pa’i sgo nas bde gśegs sñiṅ po’i ṅo bo gsal bar mdzad | la lar stobs sogs kyi yon tan ye ldan du bstan pa’i cha nas bde bśegs sñiṅ po’i raṅ bźin gsal bar mdzad de | de gñis ’gal med zuṅ du ’jug pa dgos kyaṅ | bden gñis dbyer med pa’i gnad zab pa las śin tu zab pa la yid ches rñed pa’i dbaṅ gis la las bde gśegs sñiṅ po ṅo bos mi stoṅ pa’i rtag par blta | la las ni stoṅ rkyaṅ tsam la bzuṅ nas sku daṅ ye śes kyi yon tan ’bral med ye ldan du bźag tu med pa’i chad lta skur ’debs kyi phyogs la gnas par gyur …. |. And also ibid., p. 586.2-6: des na ’khor lo bar par bstan pa’i stoṅ pa ñid daṅ | tha mar bstan pa’i sku daṅ ye śes dag snaṅ stoṅ zuṅ du chud par bya dgos pas | ’khor lo bar pa daṅ tha ma’i ṅes don gyi skor rnams dbye gsal [= bsal] med par gñis ka ṅes don du kun mkhyen kloṅ chen rab ’byams kyis bźed pa ’di kho na ltar gzuṅ bar bya ste | de gñis gcig ṅes don byas na gcig draṅ don bya dgos pa’i ’gal ba med pa ma zad | zuṅ du tshogs par byas nas bde gśegs sñiṅ po de lta bu la rgyu rgyud kyi don du byas nas rdo rje theg pa’i man ṅag gi gnad ’byuṅ bas saṅs rgyas kyi bstan pa de dag gnad gcig tu ’bab par śes par bya dgos śiṅ | mthar thug gi don ’di la klu thogs rnam gñis sogs ’phags pa rnams dgoṅs pa gcig ste chos dbyiṅs bstod pa daṅ sems ’grel la sogs pa daṅ | rgyud bla ma’i ’grel pa sogs kyis gsal bar rtogs pa’i phyir ro ||. Further see the rGyud bla’i mchan ’grel, p. 371.5-372.4, 381.2-382.5; Tshig bdun rnam bśad, p. 321.6-323.5. 196 Dorji Wangchuk “negative–intellectualist” trend,88 Kloṅ-chen-pa more towards the “positive–mystical” one,89 and Mi-pham towards reconciliation and harmonisation by striving to balance not only the two trends found in Indian Buddhist literature but also the views of Roṅ-zom-pa and Kloṅchen-pa.90 The approach of the rÑiṅ-ma-pas to the issue of raṅ stoṅ and gźan stoṅ in Tibet, however, is for the most part “inclusivistic” (in Paul Hacker’s sense). Both the position that views the TG as “hypostatically existent” or not essentially empty (ṅo bo mi stoṅ pa) and the position that views the TG as nihilistically empty (stoṅ pa phyaṅ chad) or denies its qualities are seen as untenable.91 For these scholars, it is of course true that a horse is empty of a cow and TG empty of adventitious impur- 88 While Roṅ-zom-pa explicitly seeks to prove that even the ordinary mind of sentient beings is already characterised by the presence of “self-occurring gnosis” and while the philosophical and doctrinal features central to the TG theory are conspicuous in his writings on rDzogs-chen, he hardly mentions the excellent qualities spontaneously present at the level of the universal ground. However, since the “self-occurring gnosis” equated by him with TG or bodhicitta in the rDzogschen sense is said to undergo no change at the level of the universal ground (gźi), the path (lam) and the result (’bras bu), the knowledge we gain about his notion of the ultimate result, for which there exist sufficient materials, will help us understand his notion of TG too. In this regard, the study on the position of Roṅ-zompa (and other major early scholars) on whether gnosis exists at the stage of Buddhahood being currently conducted by Orna Almogi (University of Hamburg) will be of great interest. 89 Kloṅ-chen-pa’s interpretation of TG is by and large very positive and suggests that he was mainly combating a reductionistic interpretation of TG. His inclination towards the “positive–mystical” current seems to be the reason why he is often put in a line with Dol-po-pa (see above, n. 8). 90 Regarding the understanding of the stage of the Buddha (saṅs rgyas kyi sa), it is also the view of Rag-mgo-mchog-sprul, the current and twelfth throne-holder of Rag-mgo Monastery in Go-’jo in Khams, that Mi-pham harmonises Roṅ-zompa’s notion of essence (ṅo bo) “free from manifoldness” with Kloṅ-chen-pa’s notion of the aspect of luminous nature (raṅ bźin). See the Luṅ gi rgya mtsho, p. 376.4-6, which states: raṅ [= roṅ] zom chos kyi bzaṅ pos ṅo bo spros bral ka dag gi gnad bśad pa daṅ | kun mkhyen chen pos raṅ bźin ’od gsal lhun grub kyi gnad bśad pa daṅ | mi pham ’jam dpal dbyaṅs kyis de gñis kyi gdoṅs gnad gcig tu dril te ’chad tshul lo ||. 91 sToṅ thun seṅ ge’i ṅa ro, p. 567.2-4: bde bśegs sñiṅ po ṅo bo mi stoṅ pa’i bden grub brtag [= rtag?] pa daṅ | yon tan med pa’i stoṅ pa phyaṅ chad du ’dod pa gñis ka sgrub byed med la gnod byed mthoṅ źiṅ | ṅo bo stoṅ pa daṅ raṅ bźin yon tan ye ldan gyi sñiṅ po ’gro ba’i khams na yod pa la | gnod byed med ciṅ sgrub byed yaṅ dag yod par mthoṅ ṅo ||. The rÑiṅ-ma Interpretations of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory 197 ities and hence both “empty of other” (gźan stoṅ), but this concept of emptiness is so obvious and banal that it has little to do with the Prajñāpāramitā or Madhyamaka notion of “freedom from manifoldness.” Thus, according to them, this notion of gźan stoṅ does not fulfil the criterion of emptiness (stoṅ go mi chod), that is, the Madhyamaka notion of emptiness, and realisation of such an emptiness is of no soteriological relevance or value.92 For example, Roṅ-zom-pa, explaining the expression “by nature utterly mysterious” (ṅo bo ñid kyis rab tu gsaṅ ba) appearing in the *Guhyagarbha, states that all phenomena are by nature empty (ṅo bo ñid kyis stoṅ pa) but this fact remains a mystery as a result of one mistaking them to be empty of other (gźan gyis stoṅ pa). Although Roṅ-zom-pa’s expression gźan gyis stoṅ pa is not terminological, it does suggest that the concept of such an emptiness was considered by him to be deficient or erroneous.93 Likewise, raṅ stoṅ in the sense of “absence of hypostatic existence” is for the rÑiṅ-ma-pas a mere emptiness (stoṅ rkyaṅ), and thus can neither be the kind of ultimate emptiness established by the Mādhyamikas94 nor be equated 92 However, it is also important to look at this issue from Dol-po-pa’s perspective. According to him, raṅ stoṅ does not meet the standards of the actual emptiness (Ri chos, p. 155.10-12), just as gźan stoṅ (for his opponents) does not meet the standards of the actual emptiness. 93 dKon mchog ’grel, p. 127.5-7: chos thams cad ṅo bo ñid kyis stoṅ pa yin pa la | gźan gyis stoṅ par mthoṅ nas ji ltar snaṅ ba raṅ gi ṅo bo ñid kyis stoṅs par ma rtogs pas ṅo bo ñid kyis rab tu gsaṅ ṅo ||. See the Ṅes śes sgron me, p. 77.1: spyir na gźan gyis stoṅ pa de || stoṅ go ṅes par mi chod de || rta la ba laṅ ma grub kyaṅ || rta de stoṅ bar [= par] ga la ṅes || (see also Pettit 1999a: 197-198). See also sToṅ thun seṅ ge’i ṅa ro, p. 590.3: raṅ gi ṅo bo ma stoṅ na chos gźan gyis stoṅ pa yod kyaṅ stoṅ go mi chod de |. For details, see ibid., p. 589.4-591.4 and gSuṅ sgros, p. 437.6-438.1: chos raṅ ṅos nas ma stoṅ pa chos gźan gyis stoṅ pa ni ’jig rten pa’i stoṅ tshul yin gyi don dam rnal ’byor pa’i spyod yul ga la yin ste | bum pa yod pa daṅ | de la snam bu med pa | gnag gi rwa yod daṅ | de steṅ ri boṅ gi rwa med pa lta bus | kun rdzob tu yod pa’i chos rnams stoṅ pa’i go ga la chod |. 94 According to Mi-pham, what a Prāsaṅgika–Mādhyamika like Candrakīrti seeks to establish is “freedom from manifoldness” or the “indivisibility of the two truths,” and he does this by eliminating the last shreds of clinging to the duality or separateness of the two truths (dBu ma rgyan ’grel, p. 62.6). Mistaking the mere absence of “hypostatic existence” for the ultimate emptiness is, according to Mipham, like mistaking apes in the forest for celestial beings (sToṅ thun seṅ ge’i ṅa ro, p. 570.5-571.2). Kloṅ-chen-pa as well does not recognise the mere emptiness or absence of self as the final emptiness (Śiṅ rta chen po, Vol. ña, p. 330.6-331.1: khyed kyi bdag med pa daṅ | stoṅ pa ñid la źen pa’aṅ bdag daṅ mi stoṅ pa’i gñen po tsam yin gyi | ṅes pa’i don ni ma yin te |; ibid., p. 332.6-333.2: ’di ltar stoṅ pa ñid kyaṅ snaṅ ba’i chos can snaṅ dus ñid nas gcig daṅ du mar ’dzin pa’i spros pas stoṅ pa daṅ | 198 Dorji Wangchuk with TG.95 For them, the notions of raṅ stoṅ and gźan stoṅ are in the first place merely indicative of two different modes of enquiry, namely, “non-implicative negation” (med dgag) and “implicative negation” (ma yin dgag), or “negation and assertion” (dgag sgrub), which are possible and relevant only in the domain of conceptual thought. Primordial reality as such is, for them, beyond the notions of raṅ stoṅ and gźan stoṅ, beyond “exclusion” and “inclusion,” beyond negation and assertion, beyond elimination and establishment (bsal gźag).96 In this way, the rÑiṅ-ma-pas relegate the notions of both raṅ stoṅ and gźan stoṅ to a subordinate position. Therefore, from this perspective, they can neither be designated as exponents of the position of gźan stoṅ nor as exponents of that of raṅ stoṅ. Yet as a method of enquiry, the rÑiṅma-pas, according to Mi-pham, prefer the method of “non-implicative negation” which is indicative of raṅ stoṅ, and thus, from the viewpoint of methodology, they are exponents of the position of raṅ stoṅ.97 raṅ raṅ gi ṅo bos stoṅ pa me loṅ gi gzugs brñan lta bu la brjod kyi | mthar thams cad ci yaṅ med pa daṅ daṅ po daṅ da lta med pa ñid ’khrul par snaṅ ba ltar ma yin te |). 95 sToṅ thun seṅ ge’i ṅa ro, p. 567.5-572.2, 591.4-593.4. Moreover, for Mi-pham the notion of an impermanent or conditioned TG is unacceptable. See ibid., p. 593.4600.3. 96 See the Ṅes śes sgron me, p. 75.2-3: de gñis blo yis brtag [= btags?] pa tsam || don la gñis kar [= ka?] khas mi len || dgag sgrub gñis daṅ bral ba yi || blo ’das gdod ma’i chos ñid yin ||, and also ibid., p. 119.2: med dgag ma yin dgag sogs daṅ || tha dad daṅ ni snaṅ stoṅ sogs || ris su chad pa med pa ste |. Cf. ibid., p. 111.3-4: dgag sgrub spros kun bral bas na || gnas lugs don bźin chos kun kyaṅ || khas blaṅ rigs pas min [= mi?] grub phyir || gaṅ du khas ni len mi byed || (Pettit 1999a: 196); dBu ma rgyan ’grel, p. 271.2-3. 97 Roṅ-zom-pa (Theg chen tshul ’jug, p. 458.19ff.), when discussing the rDzogschen perception of “deceptive appearances” (’khrul snaṅ), explains that the rDzogs-chen system neither denies the “appearance” (snaṅ ba) as such nor does it hold that it possesses any defining characteristic (mtshan ñid). Nobody, according to him, would dispute about the obviousness of “appearance” and hence it is not an issue of philosophical debates (ibid., p. 459.1-2: thun moṅ gi dbaṅ po’i mthun snaṅ ’di la snaṅ mi snaṅ ni su’aṅ mi rtsod do). The philosophical debate is about whether there is anything behind the facade of “appearance” and if so what. In other words, the philosophical debate is about the “being” (yin pa) and “existence” (yod pa) of the “characteristics” of “appearance” (ibid., p. 461.2: de’i mtshan ñid ji ltar yin pa daṅ ji ltar yod pa la rtsod do). He then explains how various philosophical systems use the “mode of four [kinds of] negation and assertion” (dgag sgrub bźi’i tshul) to establish one’s own philosophical position and refute the philosophical positions of others. When discussing the Madhyamaka approach of “establishment” and “elimination,” he states that the Mādhyamikas do not propose an implicative negation (ma yin dgag pa). See ibid., p. 465.2-5: de la dbu ma’i tshul The rÑiṅ-ma Interpretations of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory 199 Yet the approach of the rÑiṅ-ma-pas to the Tibetan issue of raṅ stoṅ and gźan stoṅ is not always “inclusivistic.” It may be regarded to a limited degree as reconciliatory as well. Kloṅ-chen-pa often speaks about the harmony among the various Tibetan traditions98 as does Mipham. Even though Mi-pham obviously found the position of the Jonaṅ-pas as well as that of the dGe-lugs-pas rather radical, he attempted to reconcile these seemingly irreconcilable positions.99 According to him, it is only in their approaches, and not in their intended goal that the Jo-naṅ-pas and the dGe-lugs-pas differ. Mi-pham viewed the difference between the Jo-naṅ emphasis on the positive aspect and the dGelugs stress on the negative aspect as a difference in the strategies (thabs: upāya) employed to argumentatively establish (sgrub) nirvāṇa and eliminate (’joms) saṃsāra, respectively.100 Modern scholars such as Schmithausen and Seyfort Ruegg would designate these approaches via eminentiae and via negationis, respectively, both to be traced already in las | ji ltar rnal ’byor spyod pa rnams kyis don dam pa’i mtshan ñid du yod pa daṅ yin par lta ba de dag ni | kun du [= tu] brtags [= btags?] pa ste gtan myed do źes myed par ’gegs par byed | ma yin par dgag par [= pa?] bsgrub par bya ba’i don dam pa ni dbu ma pa mi sgrub bo || and also the Ṅes śes sgron me, p. 75.3: stoṅ tshul kho nar bsams nas ni || dri na med dgag ñid yin te || (for the English translation, see Pettit 1999a: 196). 98 Hookham 1991: 136. 99 Mi-pham’s attempt to reconcile the two positions that appear to be diametrically opposed has also been correctly noted in Dreyfus 2003: 321. 100 dBu ma rgyan ’grel, p. 72.2-4: ’on kyaṅ med pa daṅ yod pa’i phyogs re re rtsal du bton pa’i gźuṅ rnams kyaṅ kun ñon phyogs ’joms pa daṅ | rnam byaṅ phyogs sgrub pa’i thabs mkhas khyad par ba yin kyaṅ | mthar thug gi gnas lugs la de kho na ltar sgrub pa ni ma yin te | dper na | srid pa’i sdug bsṅal la ’jigs pa’i yid daṅ | źi ba la dga’ ba’i yid gñis | las daṅ po pas bskyed dgos pa yin kyaṅ | byaṅ sems bdag ñid chen po rnams kyis srid źi mñam pa ñid du gzigs pa’i skabs na | ’khor ’das la ’jigs sred kyaṅ spaṅ dgos pa bźin no ||. Cf. Schmithausen 1981: 214, for the following observation on an attempt made in early Buddhism to establish a psychologically plausible relation between the content of liberating insight and its effect: “For it is clear that in principle there are two possibilities (admitting of course of the possibility of the two being combined): in a psychologically plausible process, the cessation of Craving could be achieved either by realizing the negative, disgusting character of mundane existence (i.e., by realizing duḥkhasatya), or by realizing the positive, peaceful or blissful character of the cessation of mundane existence (i.e., Nirvāṇa, which could easily, and in fact has, become the meaning of ‘nirodhasatya’). In fact we can find, in the canonical texts, two further types of descriptions or theories of Liberating Insight, each exactly corresponding to one of these two possibilities.” 200 Dorji Wangchuk Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism.101 I do not think that Mi-pham’s harmonising attempt was merely a tactful strategy intended to obscure or erase the existing differences. Although often ignored by both the parties, Mi-pham indeed saw a common element upon which they could agree. According to him, Dol-po-pa had accepted the idea that reality as experienced in meditative equipoise is free from manifoldness.102 Hence, if what one experiences in meditative equipoise is indeed ultimate reality, then even for Dol-po-pa, the highest reality is “freedom from manifoldness.” Dol-po-pa indeed explicitly states that in the meditative state (mñam bźag) one abides in the state of “freedom from manifoldness” in accordance with the Middle Cycle and then in the post-meditative state (rjes thob) distinctions are made according to the Last Cycle and Vajrayāna.103 Similarly, according to Tsoṅ-kha-pa, so long as one holds the “appearances [of phenomena characterised by] dependent origination” (snaṅ ba rten ’byuṅ) and their emptiness (stoṅ pa) apart, one has not yet perfected one’s view. One’s view becomes only then perfect when the “appearances” [of phenomena] and their “emptiness” are perceived simultaneously. This idea of Tsoṅ-kha-pa’s was used by Mi-pham to argue that also Tsoṅ-kha-pa understood ultimate reality to be characterised by the “union of appearance and emptiness” (snaṅ stoṅ zuṅ ’jug) and not by mere absence of “hypostatic existence” as emphasised by most of Tsoṅ-kha-pa’s interpreters.104 This “union of See Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 42-43. dBu ma rgyan ’grel, p. 71.5-6: rtogs pa’i dbaṅ phyug dol po pas kyaṅ | rjes thob śan ’byed pa’i śes rab kyis dpyad tshe | mthar ’bras sku daṅ ye śes kyi raṅ bźin bde gśegs sñiṅ po ñid rtag brtan źi ba g.yuṅ druṅ gi bdag ñid mi bslu ba’i bden pa dam pa yin ciṅ | mñam gźag [= bźag?] la zlo ba’i tshe na spros pa kun bral bsgom par gsuṅs pa’aṅ śin tu gnad zab ciṅ |. 103 Ri chos, p. 138.20-139.1: de’i phyir ’khor lo tha ma gñis daṅ | rdo rje theg pa’i don gcig mod kyi ñams su len pa na | la zlo ba chos ñid zab mo la ’khor lo bar ba [= pa] daṅ mthun par rtog med spros bral du mñam par bźag nas | rjes thob śan ’byed pa’i tshe chos rnams la yaṅ dag par so sor rtog pa na ’khor lo tha ma daṅ rdo rje theg pa las gsuṅs pa bźin du legs par rnam par phye ste ṅo sprad na theg pa chen po’i gsuṅ rab thams cad kyi don zab mo ñams su len pa tshaṅ [= tshaṅ la] ma nor źiṅ yoṅs su dag pa ñid du ’gyur ro ||. See also ibid., p. 255.8-13, 259.20-261.21, 337.21-24. 104 Mi-pham’s attitude toward Tsoṅ-kha-pa was a mixture of ambivalence and conciliatoriness. Mi-pham often argued that Tsoṅ-kha-pa’s ultimate view was that of “freedom from manifoldness” or the “union of emptiness and appearance of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda).” See the Rab gsal brgal lan, p. 289.6290.1, 416.5-418.6, 420.2-421.4. However, it should also be noted that Mi-pham is somehow more conciliatory toward Tsoṅ-kha-pa’s views than towards those of most dGe-lugs interpreters, with few exceptions such as lCaṅ-skya Rol-pa’i-rdo-rje 101 102 The rÑiṅ-ma Interpretations of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory 201 appearance and emptiness” is, for Mi-pham, identical with “freedom from manifoldness.” Thus, according to him, both Dol-po-pa and Tsoṅkha-pa, like many other Indian and Tibetan scholars and sages, were referring to one and the same absolute truth upon which, ironically, both vehement disputes and reconciliation hinged.105 7. CONCLUSION To conclude, let me summarise in a few sentences the rÑiṅ-ma position on the doctrine of TG by pointing out its similarities and dissimilarities with other Tibetan interpretations. The rÑiṅ-ma-pas seem to agree fully with the Sa-skya-pas in their understanding of “freedom from manifoldness,”106 and in their consideration of the teachings of excellent qualities of TG to be of definitive meaning, they very much agree with the Jo-naṅ-pas.107 In their approval of the teachings of both intrinsic emptiness and the TG to be of definitive meaning,108 they resemble the dGe-lugs-pas. However, although in letter the rÑiṅ-ma position regarding the interpretation of the TG theory is akin to that of the main-stream dGe-lugs-pas, in spirit it is what may seem a combination of the position of main-stream Sa-skya-pas and that of the Jo-naṅ-pas. (1717-1786). See the lTa mgur ’grel pa, p. 838.6-849.5; gSuṅ sgros, p. 541.3-4: dgag pa ’di dag rje bla ma la brjod do sñam du bsam par mi bya ste | de’i dgoṅs pa zab pas ṅed cag gi yaṅ bla mar ’dzin pa’i phyir ro ||. See also ibid., p. 546.3-547.2. The locus classicus of Tsoṅ-kha-pa’s idea of the “union of emptiness and appearance of dependent origination” is his Lam gtso rnam gsum, often cited by Mi-pham. See, for example, Mi-pham’s dBu ma rgyan ’grel, p. 71.2-4. 105 Roṅ-zom-pa also speaks about the single taste of the Buddha’s teachings; see Wangchuk 2002: 287-288 and Pettit 1999a: 90. The trend can be also found in certain of Kloṅ-chen-pa’s writings such the bSam gtan ṅal gso, p. 23.6-24.1, and its commentary, the Śiṅ rta rnam dag, p. 119.3-5, where Prajñāpāramitā, Madhyamaka, Źi-byed, Mahāmudrā and rDzogs-chen are equated. See also the Yid bźin mdzod ’grel, Vol. waṃ, p. 840.2-3. Further see Mi-pham’s dBu ma rgyan ’grel, p. 69.5-72.2 and Ṅes śes sgron me, p. 93.1-5. Particularly noteworthy in the context of “reconciliation” is Mi-pham’s use of the expression saṅs rgyas daṅ grub thob dgoṅs pa gcig which can be traced back to Sa-paṇ’s Thub pa dgoṅs gsal, fol. 59a5. Cf. the lTa mgur ’grel pa, p. 851.4-854.1. 106 For example, compare Sa-paṇ’s statement in his sDom gsum rab dbye, verse 3.255: pha rol phyin pa’i spro bral las || lhag pa’i lta ba yod na ni || lta de spros pa can du ’gyur || spros bral yin na khyad par med || (Rhoton 2002: 129 & 308) and Mi-pham’s similar statements in his Ṅes śes sgron me (p. 88.6-89.1). 107 Ri chos, p. 157.20-158.1; Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 503. 108 Seyfort Ruegg 1968: 506. 202 Dorji Wangchuk Yet, unlike the Sa-skya-pas, they do not consider the teachings of TG to be of provisional meaning, and unlike the Jo-naṅ-pas, they neither consider the Middle Cycle to be of provisional meaning nor consider TG to be an entity or reality that is “hypostatically existent.”109 Unlike the dGe-lugs-pas, they do not consider TG to be merely the absence of “hypostatic existence” of the mind. Although methodologically they favour the raṅ stoṅ approach and hence prefer to designate themselves as exponents of raṅ stoṅ, TG – which is equated by them with the “selfWe have seen that Roṅ-zom-pa accepts the teachings of TG or “self-occurring gnosis” or the “indivisibility of the two truths” as being of definitive meaning. However, if one were to bring TG or even “freedom from manifoldness” under the lens of Madhyamaka analysis, as apparently done by Roṅ-zom-pa, even they would not withstand the “force of logical analysis” (rigs pa’i dpuṅ). See the gSuṅ thor bu, p. 124.6-7: ye śes de’aṅ raṅ ’byuṅ [= byuṅ] yin la | raṅ ’byuṅ [= byuṅ] gi ye śes de ñid kyaṅ yaṅ dag par ma grub na | ’di’i rol pa’i dkyil ’khor lta ga la grub | ces kyaṅ rtogs śiṅ goms par byas nas |; Theg chen tshul ’jug, p. 521.8-10: spros pa ñe bar źig bsgrub du [= tu]’aṅ myed pas | myed pa’i myed pa’aṅ myed ces smos so || de ltar mtha’ myed na dbus kyaṅ mi ’grub la dbus la gnas pa’aṅ mi ’grub bo ||. It is not yet clear to me whether the Jo-naṅ-pas themselves designate TG as an entity or reality that is “hypostatically existent” (bden par grub pa) or whether this is an “(illogical) consequence” (thal ba) imputed to them by their opponents. This point, in my view, is decisive for our understanding of the position of the Jo-naṅ-pas. If it is an “(illogical) consequence” that entails from their acceptance of TG as being characterised as permanent (nitya), immutable (dhruva), blissful (śiva), and eternal (śāśvata) and even ātman, then we shall have to carefully study the Jo-naṅ-pas’ explanations. In my view, Dol-po-pa’s acceptance of the indestructibility of TG and his assertion that “TG is not empty of its qualities” would not automatically mean that for him TG is a “hypostatic existence.” If Dol-po-pa’s acceptance of the indestructibility of TG indeed implies his acceptance of the “hypostatic existence” of TG, then there is no reason why anyone else’s acceptance of the “indestructibility” of true reality (dharmatā) would not also imply the acceptance of the “hypostatic existence” of true reality. For example, even mKhas-grub-rje accepts the immutability of TG (rGyud sde spyi rnam, p. 52.16-18: raṅ lugs la yaṅ bde gśegs sñiṅ po daṅ ṅo bo ñid sku’i rnam graṅs de dag | ’dus ma byas śiṅ dṅos po med pa | rtag brtan ther zug yin gyi | bden par grub pa ni ma yin no ||). Similarly, Dol-po-pa’s assertion that “TG is not empty of its qualities” does not seem to imply his assertion of the “hypostatic existence” of TG because the word “empty” (śūnya) is obviously understood by him as simply “devoid” and not in a Madhyamaka technical sense. In other words, what he seems to be making a case for is only the “presence of the qualities attributed to TG” and not necessarily its “hypostatic existence.” My impression is that Dol-po-pa’s acceptance of “freedom from manifoldness in meditative equipoise” rather suggests that Dol-po-pa did not consider TG to be an entity or reality that is “hypostatically existent.” This matter, however, needs to be studied more closely. 109 The rÑiṅ-ma Interpretations of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory 203 occurring gnosis” or universal ground (gźi) in the rDzogs-chen sense – is conceived by them as transcending the notions of both raṅ stoṅ and gźan stoṅ, that is, as being intrinsically empty (ṅo bo stoṅ pa), luminous in nature (raṅ bźin gsal ba) and spontaneously present together with all-embracing compassion (thugs rje kun khyab).110 Abbreviations and Bibliog r aphy ABBREVIATIONS D The Nyingma Edition of the sDe-dge bKa’-’gyur and bsTan’gyur. Oakland: Dharma Publication, 1981. DK The Collected Writings (bka’ bum) of Dil-mgo mKhyen-brtse. Delhi: She chen Publications, 1994 [cited by number of folios in Arabic numerals]. DzD mDzod-bdun by Kloṅ-chen-pa. Gangtok, Sikkim: Dodrup Chen Rinpoche (repr. Thimphu: National Library of Bhutan). MK Mi-pham bKa’-’bum. sDe-dge edition. ÑG rÑiṅ-ma rGyud-’bum. mTshams-brag edition. ṄK Ṅal-gso-skor-gsum by Kloṅ-chen-pa. Gangtok, Sikkim: Dodrup Chen Rinpoche (repr. Thimphu: National Library of Bhutan). P Daisetz T. Suzuki (ed.), The Tibetan Tripitaka (Peking edition). Tokyo – Kyoto: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute, 1955-1961. RS Roṅ-zom-chos-bzaṅ-gi-gsuṅ-’bum, Vol. 1-2. Sichuan: Sikhron Mi-rigs-dpe-skrun-khaṅ, 1999. Taishō Paul Demiéville et al. (ed.), Répertoire du Canon Bouddhique Sino-Japonais. Édition de Taishō (Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō). Fascicule Annexe du Hōbōgirin. Paris – Tokyo: Librairie d’Amérique et d’Orient Adrien-Maisonnneuve – Maison Franco-Japonaise, 1978. For example, see Kloṅ-chen-pa’s Śiṅ rta chen po, Vol. ña, p. 342.1-4: gdod ma’i sems ñid ’od gsal ba stoṅ gsal raṅ byuṅ ye śes ṅo bo stoṅ pa nam mkha’ lta bu | raṅ bźin gsal ba ñi zla lta bu | thugs rje’i mdaṅs ’char tshul ma ’gags pa me loṅ g.ya’ dag pa’i ṅos lta bu | chos sku loṅs sku sprul gsum gyi raṅ bźin | bde bar gśegs pa’i sñiṅ po ’khor ’das gaṅ du’aṅ rgya chad daṅ phyogs lhuṅ med pa’i ṅaṅ nas | ṅo bos stoṅ pas ’char sgo phye | raṅ bźin gsal bas raṅ byuṅ gi ’od lṅa yul du snaṅ | thugs rje rig pa ye śes dpyod byed śes par skyes pa las ’khrul par ’dod de | gsaṅ sñiṅ las | e ma’o bde bśegs sñiṅ po las || raṅ gi rnam rtog las kyis ’khrul || źes so ||. 110 204 Dorji Wangchuk PRIMARY SOURCES Aṅgulimālīyasūtra P 879; D 213; Taishō 120. bDe ba’i myu gu Byaṅ chub kyi sems bde ba’i myu gu. In: ÑG, Vol. ka, p. 628-634. bDud rtsi’i snaṅ ba Dil-mgo mKhyen-brtse, ’Phags ma’i sñiṅ thig gi cha lag bi ma la’i bla sgrub byin rlabs sñiṅ po’i lam yoṅs rdzogs kyi khrid yig byin rlabs bdud rtsi’i snaṅ ba. In: DK, Vol. pha, fol. 1-104. bKa’ brgyad rnam bśad Mi-pham, dPal sgrub pa chen po bka’ brgyad kyi spyi don rnam par bśad pa dṅos grub sñiṅ po. In: MK, Vol. 21, p. 1-205. bKa’ ’gyur dkar chag Si-tu Chos-kyi-’byuṅ-gnas, sDe dge’i bka’ ’gyur dkar chag = bDe bar gśegs pa’i bka’ gaṅs can pa’i brdas draṅs pa’i phyi mo’i tshogs ji sñed pa par du bsgrubs pa’i tshul las ñe bar brtsams pa’i gtam bzaṅ po blo ldan mos pa’i kunda yoṅs su kha bye ba’i zla ’od gźon nu’i ’khri śiṅ. Sichuan: Si-khron Mi-rigs-dpe-skrun-khaṅ, 1988. Blo snaṅ sgo ’byed Kun-bzaṅ-dpal-ldan, Ṅes śes rin po che’i sgron me’i tshig gi don gsal ba’i ’grel chuṅ blo gros snaṅ ba’i sgo ’byed. In: Ṅes śes sgron me’i rtsa ’grel. Sichuan: Si-khron Mi-rigs-dpeskrun-khaṅ, 1997, p. 1-54. bSam gtan mig sgron gNubs-chen Saṅs-rgyas-ye-śes, rNal ’byor mig gi bsam gtan or bSam gtan mig sgron. Leh: ’Khor-gdoṅ gTer-sprul chimud-rig-’dzin, 1974. bSam gtan ṅal gso Kloṅ-chen-pa, rDzogs pa chen po bsam gtan ṅal gso. In: ṄK, Vol. za, p. 1-25. bsTan pa’i rnam gźag bDud-’joms Rin-po-che, gSaṅ sṅags sṅa ’gyur rñiṅ ma’i bstan pa’i rnam gźag bstan pa’i rnam gźag mdo tsam brjod pa legs bśad snaṅ ba’i dga’ ston. Kalimpong: Zaṅs-mdoddpal-ris Monastery, n.d. bsTan pa’i sgron me Rog Śes-rab-’od, Grub mtha’ so so’i bźed gźuṅ gsal bar ston pa chos ’byuṅ grub mtha’ chen po bstan pa’i sgron me. Nemo Leh: Tshul-krims-’jam-dbyaṅs, 1977. Chos dbyiṅs mdzod ’grel Kloṅ-chen-pa, Chos dbyiṅs rin po che’i mdzod kyi ’grel pa luṅ gi gter mdzod. DzD, Vol. ga. Dad gsum ’jug ṅogs Glag-bla bSod-nams-chos-grub, Kun mkhyen chos kyi rgyal po rig ’dzin kloṅ chen rab ’byams kyi rnam thar dad pa gsum gyi ’jug ṅogs. In: Kun mkhyen kloṅ chen rab ’byams kyi rnam thar. Sichuan: Si-khron Mi-rigs-dpe-skrun-khaṅ, 1996, p. 4-166. Dam chos dogs sel Mi-pham, rDo grub pa dam chos źes pas gźan gyi zer sgros bsdus nas mkhas su re ba’i ’khyal ṅag de dag mi mkhas The rÑiṅ-ma Interpretations of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory 205 mtshaṅ phud du kho raṅ nas bskul ba bźin ñams mtshar du bkod pa. In: MK, Vol. ṅa, p. 360-415. Dam tshig mdo rgyas Roṅ-zom-pa, Dam tshig mdo rgyas chen mo. In: RS, Vol. 2, p. 241-389. ’Das rjes rnam thar ’Das rjes kyi rnam par thar pa. The Autobiography and Diaries of Si-tu Paṇ-chen (with a foreword by E. Gene Smith). [Śata-piṭaka Series, Indo-Asian Literatures 77]. New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1968, p. 726-741. dBa’ bźed Pasang Wangdu and Hildegard Diemberger, dBa’ bzhed. The Royal Narrative Concerning the Bringing of Buddha’s Doctrine to Tibet (Translation and Facsimile Edition of the Tibetan Text). 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In: RS, Vol. 2, p. 197-231. gSuṅ sgros Mi-pham, dBu ma sogs gźuṅ spyi’i dka’ gnad skor gyi gsuṅ sgros phyogs gcig tu bsdus pa rin po che za ma tog. In: MK, Vol. 22, p. 427-673. gSuṅ thor bu Roṅ-zom-pa, gSuṅ thor bu. In: RS, Vol. 2, p. 26-130. *Guhyagarbha gSaṅ ba’i sñiṅ po de kho na ñid ṅes pa. In: ÑG, Vol. wa, p. 152.6-218.6. gŹan stoṅ seṅ ge’i ṅa ro Mi-pham, gŹan stoṅ khas len seṅ ge’i ṅa ro. In: MK, Vol. ga,, p. 359-378. ’Jam dbyaṅs dgoṅs rgyan Bod-sprul, lTa grub śan ’byed gnad kyi sgron me’i tshig don rnam bśad ’jam dbyaṅs dgoṅs rgyan. In: lTa grub śan ’byed gnad kyi sgron me’i rtsa ’grel. Sichuan: Si-khron Mirigs-dpe-skrun-khaṅ, 1996, p. 62-300. 206 Dorji Wangchuk ’Jam dpal dgoṅs rgyan Dil-mgo mKhyen-brtse, sÑan brgyud ’jam dpal gśin rje’i thugs tig gi rnam bśad ñuṅ ṅu rnam gsal ’jam dpal grub pa’i dgoṅs rgyan. In: DK, Vol. pha, fol. 235-273. 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