Body and Mind in Early China and Greece

Lisa Raphals University of California, Riverside,

Abstract: This article surveys several early Chinese and Greek representations of the self, with particular interest in relations between body and mind. I begin with Edward Slingerland’s application of recent research in conceptual metaphor analysis to early Chinese texts, his arguments on early Chinese root metaphors for self and an important study of mind-body dualism in early China. Next I introduce metaphors of mind and body in texts from technical expertise traditions that Slingerland’s survey does not cover. The last section introduces three apparently comparable sets of early Chinese and Greek metaphors:

(1) analogies between mind and body and ruler and subordinates; (2) metaphors of the body as a container in which the mind is somehow contained; and (3) the notion that a person is a set of balances between constituent elements. Keywords: China; conceptual metaphor analysis; Greece; metaphors; mind-body dualism; self.

The question of mind-body dualism is of contemporary importance for several reasons. First, several humanistic and scientific disciplines focus on embodiment as an important dimension of the human condition, and a view of the relations between body and mind, spirit or soul is central to any understanding of the self. Second, the question of mind-body dualism is of particular interest in Chinese and comparative philosophy because of a range of claims from both Western and Chinese sources that “Chinese thought” is “holist” – including claims that there was no mind-body dualism in early China – and contrasts between ostensive Chinese holism and “Western” dualism. One set of arguments focuses on differences between Chinese and Western understandings of

heart and mind. For example, the cognitive linguist Ning Yu has argued that Chinese cultural conceptualizations of the heart or mind differ fundamentally from Western dualism: the heart is understood as the central faculty of both affective and cognitive activity and the source of thought, feelings, emotions and guiding behaviour. Yu argues that this cultural conceptualization differs in fundamental ways from the dualism of modern Western philosophy, which asserts a dichotomy between reason

and emotion, in which thoughts and ideas are linked to a largely disembodied “mind” and desires and emotions with an embodied “heart” (Yu 2007: 27–28; cf. damasio 1994; lakoff and Johnson 1999). The nature of the distinction between “heart” and “mind” in Chinese philosophy is much debated. On some views, the Western distinction does not exist at all and early Chinese philosophy understood “heart” and “mind” as one xin 心: “the core of affective and cognitive structure, conceived of as having the capacity for logical reasoning, rational understanding, moral will, intuitive imagination, and aesthetic feeling, unifying human will, desire, emotion, intuition, reason and thought” (Yu 2007: 28). a different approach is that of Edward Slingerland, who considers

mindbody dualism to be one of several reductionist “Chinese-Western” dichotomies, namely Western dualism vs Chinese holism (Slingerland and Chudek 2011; critique by Klein and Klein 2012; Slingerland 2013). Slingerland (2013: 9–15) argues against the strongly holist positions of roger ames, François Jullien, and herbert Fingarette, among others (ames 1993a: 149, 1993b: 168; Jullien 2007: 8, 69; lewis 2006: 20; Fingarette 1972: 2008; Santangelo 2007: 292). he argues (Slingerland 2013: 9–15) that early Chinese thought is characterized by at least a “weak mind–body dualism”, in which mind and body are experienced as functionally and qualitatively distinct, although potentially overlapping at points.3 This article attempts to nuance the question by offering a comparison of a range of Chinese and Greek accounts of relation between mind and body, typically expressed as metaphors for the relation between the two,

including conceptual metaphors of the kind identified by George lakoff, Mark Johnson and others. (Of particular importance are lakoff and Johnson 1980; Johnson 1987; lakoff and Johnson 1999; Fauconnier and Turner 2002). I argue, first, that there is a substantial ongoing spectrum of both holist and dualist positions in both early Chinese and Greek texts, that cannot be dismissed by a progressivist model, or reduced to a simple antinomy between strongly dualist and holist views. Second, many of these views are illustrated by a range of conceptual metaphors of mind and body that can be described as broadly holist and broadly dualist. By broadly holist I refer to descriptions and metaphors of body and mind, soul or spirit that emphasize commonalities between them, for example in a mixture or amalgam in which they are physically indistinguishable components. Within this range, strong holism makes no distinction at all between them, whereas in weak holism, they are functionally or qualitatively discernible, but the distinction is not emphasized. By broadly dualist I mean descriptions and metaphors that emphasize

their functional or qualitative distinctions, and in which they occupy distinct and bounded physical spaces or exhibit mutually opposed qualities. Strong dualism explicitly opposes them, and in weak dualism, they are distinct, but in strong relation to each other. It should be noted that on these definitions, there is no firm boundary between weak holism and weak dualism. These metaphors can be grouped into three kinds: broadly holist, broadly dualist and blends with aspects of each. Broadly holist metaphors include metaphors of body and mind, soul or spirit as composites and metaphors in which the body is a container of the mind or spirit, or in which other parts of the body are containers for mind or other psychological faculties. Broadly dualist metaphors characterize the mind or soul as ruler of the body, described metaphorically as a separate entity. Finally, some blended metaphors

include both holist and dualist elements. In these metaphors, mind or soul rules the body, but as a part of a larger whole that includes both. In several cases, this relation is also analogized to the state or to the cosmos. an initial problem is how to translate Chinese term xin in a way that avoids prejudgment: as “heart”, “mind”, or more neutrally but perhaps less satisfactorily as “heart-mind”. There is no consensus on this issue; for example, Yu consistently uses “heart”, Slingerland consistently uses “mind”. My chosen solution is to use all three terms, using whichever term seems most appropriate to the context under immediate consideration. I focus on three sets of metaphors that repeatedly occur in both traditions. One group of COMpOSITE METaphOrS describe body and mind as some kind of composite or amalgam. They do not specify the structure of the composition, and disagree on the nature of the composite and what holds the amalgam together. a second group of CONTaINEr metaphors describe the heart, mind, soul or spirit as either contained in the body (BOdY aS CONTaINEr OF MINd) or as a container of the spirit (hEarT-MINd aS CONTaINEr OF SpIrIT) or another heart-mind (MINd aS CONTaINEr OF MINd). They all can be described as weak dualism in that body and mind are described as distinct – and one cannot be reduced to the other – but they are either made of the same substances or of different substances in indissoluble relation. More dualist accounts appear in texts that analogize the relation of MINd aS rUlEr governing officials or subjects. Both the Chinese and Greek materials also portray a range of viewpoints on a spectrum between dualism and holism. The following sections offer a preliminary and comparative survey of three Chinese and Greek views of the nature of relations between mortal bodies and mortal or immortal

minds or souls on a scale of mind-body dualism and holism. The final section turns to a comparative perspective. 1. Preliminary Considerations 1.1. Which Body and Which Mind? an initial problem arises because body and mind are not neutral terms. They are culturally constructed, and are also subject to changes of meaning over time. an example is changing meanings of the interrelated English terms mind, spirit, soul, and heart. as anna Wierzbicka has argued, in older strata of English, the term mind was closely linked to emotions and moral values, and thus had important psychological and spiritual dimensions. By contrast, contemporary usage of the term focuses on reason, intellect, thinking and knowing, with a presumed moral and emotional neutrality (emotions being more closely linked to the heart, often used in contrast to mind). Over time, anglophone understandings of

dualism between a material body and its non-material counterpart have shifted from a soulbody dichotomy to a mind-body dichotomy in which mind has effectively replaced soul, a broad concept that originally combined religious, psychological, and moral aspects of a person. Wierzbicka argues that, in contemporary anglo-Saxon usage, soul is largely restricted to religious discourse, and mind has acquired the psychological aspects of personhood. The result is, as she puts it, a new kind of dualism, “devoid of religious and moral connotations and reflecting the supreme value placed on rational thinking and knowing, rather than on other aspects of the human person” (Wierzbicka 1989: 50, cf. 48–50 and Yu 2009: 3–4). how then to escape from the categories of a broadly Cartesian modern dualism and the danger of imposing categories based on tacit claims that there is an ontological distinction between material bodies and immaterial minds, spirits or souls?4 Other difficulties arise by seeking to solve these problems through comparative methods, which risk assuming correspondences between the comparanda and imposing the categories of another language and time onto historically and culturally distant texts.5 Even native speakers of (various versions of) contemporary Chinese or Greek remain linguistically and culturally distant from homeric Greek or Classical Chinese. Michael Clarke identifies three important pitfalls. The first is to assume that thought and emotion somehow imply “minds” that are separable from “bodies”. The second is to assume that what survives death is a “spirit” that inhabited the “body” during life and leaves it at death. The third is to associate immaterial “minds” with immaterial “spirits” out of a shared distinction from “bodies”. Clarke’s method is to rely on “vigilant

7 self-consciousness” on two points: refusing to rely on the concept of soul and refusing to assume that the essential part of a person is the same in psychological life and after death. like Clarke, my approach is “bottom up” rather than “top down”: starting from the texts and being vigilant against the intrusion of anachronistic categories in an imperfect world. This vigilance is aided by the double comparison of both early Chinese and early Greek texts. I begin with a brief introduction (to be expanded in later discussion) of the basic vocabularies – Chinese and Greek – of the key constituents of a “person” that bear on what in modern terms is called mind-body dualism. I then turn to two comparable sets of metaphors that illustrate a range of views of the relations between body and mind.

1.2. The Chinese Semantic Field Classical Chinese has no near equivalents for terms such as “body”, “mind” and “soul”.6 Three major terms for “body” differ from the English notion important ways. Xing 形 refers to form or shape, of bodies but also of other things. Shen 身 and gong 躬 refer to a body, person, or “physical person”; shen can refer to the lived body or the physical person, but also to the personality. Ti 體 referred to the concrete physical body, including limbs and physical form, but also to the “embodiment” of other things, including spiritual, cosmic, and moral states. Ti and shenti 身體 refer to the physical body of a living thing.7 Shen and shenti are also terms for a “person” or individual. Other terms for a person or individual do not refer to a

body, including the pronouns wu 吾 (“I”, “my”), yu 予 and wo 我 (“I”, “my”, “me”), and zi 自 (a reflexive adverb for oneself); and the noun ji 己 (“person”, “self”). Most texts attribute consciousness and thought to the heart, mind or “heart-mind”: xin 心. The xin is the mind, but it is also the physical organ of the heart.8 But a person can also have will or intentions (zhi 志), awareness, knowledge or consciousness (zhi 知), desires (yu 欲), and thought or awareness (yi 意). Several other terms with complex semantic fields refer to “spirit” or “soul”. Shen 神 (“spirit”, also translated as “numinous”, “divine” or “spirit[ual]”) is a component of a person, but also can refer to gods and spirits, sages, ancestors, ghosts, monsters and various denizens of mountains and waters. Its complexity is evidenced by the range of binomes in which it occurs, including: gui shen 鬼神 (“ghosts and spirits”), shen qi 神氣 (“spirit qi”), shen ming 神明 (“spirit brilliance”), ming shen 明 神 (“bright spirits”), jing shen 精神 (“refined spirit” or “essence and spirit”), and shen ling 神靈 (“spirit power”).9 Shen is closely linked to the maintenance of life; for example, according to the Huainanzi:

夫形者，生之所也；氣者，生之元也；神者，生之制也。一失位，則三者傷矣。 The body [xing] is the residence of life; qi is the origin of life; shen is the governor of life. If [even] one loses its place, then [all] three are harmed (Huainanzi 1: 39 (“Yuan dao shun” 原道訓)). This passage makes clear that shen is indispensable to life. It is also closely related to jing 精 (vital essence) and qi 氣 (breath, vital energy or vital force), and to two terms for “soul”. Hun 魂 or “hun-soul” (literally “cloud soul”) and po 魄 or po-soul (literally “white soul”) have no English

equivalent. Y. K. lo argues, that before the sixth century bce, the ancient Chinese believed that all humans had a “soul”, which, in the south was called hun and in the north was called po. due to cultural fusion between south and north China about the sixth century bce, these two sets of “single-soul” beliefs combined to create a belief in a dual hun-po soul. Understood as a dual soul, the hun (also called hun qi 魂氣) was considered to be yang and ethereal, and to leave the body after death; the po was yin and material, and remained with or near the corpse.10

1.3. The Greek Semantic Field The Greek lexicon also shows a shifting range of relations between what in contemporary terms are called the body, mind and soul. In the homeric poems, there was no one word for body as a whole, and a complex and changing vocabulary addressed various aspects of corporeality. For example, sōma, the major term for “body” in philosophical discourse, originally probably referred to the “bulk” of a body, rather than its articulated, and animated limbs. (as such, it was commonly used of a dead body, whose parts were no longer animated).11 Other terms referred to parts or aspects of the

body. Demas referred to the structure of the body as a whole. The plural terms guia and melea referred to it as an aggregate of parts: guia to the limbs as moved by the joints and melea to the limbs in the sense of muscular strength. Chrōs referred to the body’s skin, flesh or frame: the bounding limit of the human body. It could be washed, softened (by pain, fear, suffering or joy), and pierced or penetrated (by spears and arrows). By contrast, the bodies of animals were covered by “skin” (rhinos) or “hide” (derma, the detached and processed skins of animals used in armour, clothing, etc.). Both terms clearly distinguished “inner” and “outer” (liddell and Scott 1940: χρώς; Gavrylenko 2012). Sarx (from proto-Indo-European *twerḱ, “to cut”) referred to “flesh” as covering the bones, and could refer to portions of meat, and the “body” in the sense of the fleshy side of leather or the edible flesh of a fruit (e.g. Il. 8.380, Od. 9.293, 11.219). By contrast, in late Greek and Christian writings it referred to the flesh as the seat of affections

and lusts, in strong opposition to “spirit” (liddell and Scott 1940: σάρξ.). These shifts show how an originally neutral term developed strongly negative connotations, connected with death and destructive emotions. Clarke (1999: 53–69) usefully refers to several homeric terms for aspects of mental life as the “thymos family”, including thymos (“spirit”), phrēn (plural phrenes, “diaphragm”), ētor, kēr and kradiē (“heart”), and noos (“mind”), linked to physical locations in the body, though not with a specific organ. Thymos was connected to the emotions, especially friendship, joy, grief anger and fear.12 plato took it as one of three constituents of the human psyche. Noos was linked to intellectual activity and judgment. It was attributed to gods, especially the noos of Zeus. It was located in the chest but was not material; it could not be pierced or struck. an overlapping family of terms name what

leaves the body at the moment of death: thymos, menos (“strength”) and psychē. Menos is not a physical organ; Bremmer (1983: 57–58) describes it as: “a momentary impulse of one, several, or even all mental and physical organs largely directed toward a specific activity”. It can refer to the ardour of a warrior, and could be “breathed forth”. Psychē also has no explicit location in the body. It leaves the body during unconsciousness and after death, whereupon it goes to hades. It is thus a precondition for life and also represents the individual after death. Finally, in hades, the carrier of the identity of the dead person was described as nekus or nekros (“corpse”), psychē or eidolon (“shadow, shade”). Psychē is also striking for this double role: it leaves the body at death but it also carries on in hades. as such, it has been defined as the homeric “soul”, but as Clarke argues, the one term has very different meanings of the two contexts of the psychē that is lost at death and the psychē that inhabits the underworld. This term especially changed in meaning over time and underwent considerable semantic expansion during the sixth and fifth centuries bce. By the end of the fifth century, psychē was

used to describe a “soul” that was unique to living things and accounted for all the vital functions of any living thing, especially in the work of aristotle. It was the seat of mental, psychological and emotional states (including perception, desire, emotions and thought), the bearer of virtues such as courage and justice. hellenistic theories of the soul by contrast focus on the soul as responsible for mental or psychological functions (lorenz 2009). This semantic expansion makes possible, though in no sense necessary, a contrast between soul and body. In summary, although I will use them here at times for purposes of convenience, the terms body, mind and soul cannot be taken as universal categories of comparison either between or even within cultural contexts. The meanings of such terms as Greek psychē and Chinese xin underwent important changes and variations.

2. The Chinese Metaphors a range of Chinese metaphors describe the relations between mental and physical aspects of persons as composites and containers. These broadly holist accounts describe xin (“mind”) or zhi (“intelligence”) as animating and pervading the physical person. Others describe both as composites of two substances: jing and qi (introduced above). Yet others describe the body in particular as a porous container that holds the xin. Broadly dualist accounts, by contrast, focus on the xin as ruler of the body.

2.1. Holist Chinese Accounts: Composites and Containers Several Chinese texts from the fourth through the first centuries bce describe the mind and body as a composite, but they differ in the elements of the composition, the relations of the parts of the composite, and the metaphors used to express these relations. In some the body-mind is an unspecified amalgam. Others specify a container (body or mind) and a contents (mind, or a “mind within the mind”). In some the container is specified as a house. In others the “containment” is distributed among a system of related organs or visceral systems that “store” a systematically related set of contents.

MIND-BODY AS COMPOSITE:

Mind Holding Together the Living Body The oldest MINd-BOdY aS COMpOSITE accounts are from the so-called dialectical chapters of the Mozi 墨子.13 They describe mind or sentience “holding together” (chu 處) the physical living body: (1) 生，形與知處也 . Sheng (life) is the body [xing, literally the form] being located with the intelligence (Mozi 65/40/8, Sun 40: 471, No. 22, “Sheng”, trans. Graham 1978: 280, a22).

here, chu seems to refer to spatial position; a person is alive as long as the shape (xing) is located with – shares the same space as (chu) – the intelligence or consciousness (Graham 1978: 282). The Mohist text also notes two situations in which a body is alive but not sentient. It defines sleep as “the intelligence not knowing of anything” (臥，知無知也 , Mozi 65/40/9, Sun 40: 471, No. 23, trans. Graham 1978: 280, a23) and dreaming as “supposing to be so while asleep” (夢，臥而以為然也, Mozi 65/40/9, Sun 40: 471, No. 24; trans. Graham 1978: 280, a24). Several points are of interest here. First, this passage describes the intelligence (zhi 知) and the physical form (xing) as distinct entities (described

by distinct words and graphs) that nonetheless share a location in space. Insofar as they share a location, we might be tempted to take this view as holist. But a problem arises because the Mohists clearly believed that consciousness survived the body, and specifically state that: “The dead have consciousness” (si ren you zhi 死人有知, Mozi 49/31/16, Sun 31: 338, cf. Graham 1978: 281). This account of mind-body relations is thus different to aristotle’s account of the faculties of the soul, where the living body is inextricably joined to the soul. Finally, the Mohist text argues that both a

living physical body and sentience are prerequisites for life in a human being. It is also interesting that the logical implications of this coexistence in physical space are not explored. The text does not address the question of what happens to the body-intelligence composite after death, when the intelligence no longer holds together the physical form. Finally, this passage identifies life itself as this coexistence; it implies that the mind cannot survive the body, and that the body requires the animation of the heartmind to be alive at all. Composites of Body and Mind Other accounts of living persons as composites of body and mind appear in three of four chapters of the Guanzi concerned with the nature of the heart-mind: two chapters titled “art of the Mind” 1 and 2 (Xinshu shang 心術上 and Xinshu xia 心術下, chapters 36 and 37) and “Inner Workings” (Nei ye 內業, chapter 49). all three present considerable textual complexities.14 Several passages in the Guanzi describe body and mind as

composites of jing and qi (introduced above). a discussion of how to cultivate “power” (de 德, a quasi-magical power or virtue, in the sense of “good at”) begins with the claim that power can only develop when the physical form is correctly aligned: (2) 形不正者德不來, 中不精[靜]者心不治。正形飾德，萬物畢得。 If the form is not correctly aligned, power will not come. If what is within [[[zhong]]] is not quiescent, the mind cannot govern. align the form and cultivate power; then all things may be fully grasped (Guanzi 13.5b-6a (Xinshu xia 13.37), trans. after rickett 1998: 58–59).15 This passage describes body and mind as working together for a common goal, the acquisition of a power associated with sages and the legendary rulers of antiquity. But how do they do it? The passage next points to a potential conflict between the senses and the mind:

無以物亂官毋以官亂心此之謂內德。 是故意氣定 然後反正。氣者 , 身之充也。行者 , 正之義也。充不美 , 則心不得. do not let things disorder the senses; do not let the senses disorder the mind. This is called inner power [nei de]. and so, once awareness [yi] and qi are stabilized, it [the form] becomes correctly aligned of itself. Qi is what fills the physical person [shen]; in conduct, right alignment should be the guiding principle. If what fills [the physical person] is not good, the mind will not succeed (Guanzi 13.5b-6a (Xinshu xia 13.37), trans. substantially modified from rickett 1998: 58–59).16

This passage identifies inner power with an equilibrium that prevents disorder arising in the mind through the influence of the senses. The actions of the body (including sense perception) are clearly distinguished from the actions of the mind, but they are not described as ontologically different. Unlike several passages discussed below, this passage stops short of claiming rulership for the mind over the senses, but it does point to its important normative functions, and argues that correctly ordered heartminds affect the body: (3) 人能正靜者，筋肕而骨強。… 昭知天下，通於四極。金心在中不可匿。外 見於形容，可知於顏色 . as for those who can exercise both right alignment and quiescence, their muscles are firm and their bones sturdy… they are brilliant and understand the entire world; they penetrate to its four extremes. Since complete minds lie within, they cannot be concealed. Outwardly they can be seen from bearing and observed from complexion (Guanzi 13.7a-b (Xinshu xia 13.37), trans. modified from rickett 1998: 62). here the combination of correct alignment (whether of body or body and mind) and mental quiescence strengthens muscle and bone, but the physical manifestations of self-cultivation are not limited to a welltoned physique. Their “complete minds” (literally jin xin 金心, minds made of metal or gold)

cannot be hidden, and manifest in bearing (xing rong 形容), and coloration (yan se 顏色). The passage also points to the potential for disorder if the senses affect the mind excessively. Finally, the passage underscores the immediate way that body and mind affect each other. What is this passage arguing against? Its strong claim is that selfcultivation depends not just on textual study, but on physical and possibly meditative practices. Similar claims are made in Mencius’ description of his ability to cultivate his “flood-like qi” (haoran zhi qi 浩然之氣, 2a2).17 “Inner Workings” goes further by describing jing as responsible for life, the energy of non-living things, spirit, and sageliness:

(4) 凡物之精，此則為生. 下生五穀，上為列星. 流於天地之間, 謂之鬼神，藏於 胸中，謂之聖人. The vital essence [[[jing]]] of living things is what gives them life. Below it vivifies the five grains; above it creates the ranked stars. Floating between heaven and earth, we call it ghosts and spirits. Stored within the chest, it is called sageliness (Guanzi 16.1a (Nei ye 16.49), trans. after rickett 1998: 39, 1.1).18 here, the chest is a container in which jing can be stored (zang 藏), literally put away in a treasury. Other texts indicate other containers and contents, for example:

(5) 精存自生，其外安榮，內藏以為泉原，浩然和平，以為氣淵. 淵之不涸，四體 乃固，泉之不竭，九竅遂通，乃能窮天地，被四海. 中無惑意, 外無邪菑. 心全於 中，形全於外，不逢天菑，不遇人害，謂之聖人. When the vital essence is present, it naturally produces life; outwardly it produces a restful glow; stored internally, it becomes a fountainhead. Flood-like, harmonious and smooth, it becomes the wellspring of qi. as long as the wellspring does not run dry, the four parts of the body remain firm; as long as the wellspring is not exhausted, the passages of the nine apertures remain clear; thus it is possible to explore the limits of heaven and Earth and cover the four seas. Within there are no delusions; without there are no calamities. When mind is complete inside and form is complete outside, and one encounters neither heaven-sent calamities or man-made harm, such a person is called a sage (Guanzi 16.4a (Nei ye 16.49), trans. after rickett 1998: 47–48, 8.4).

here the body is a container that stores jing, which is literally “treasured within” (nei zang 內藏). as a result, it becomes a source of qi, which strengthens the body and even produces sagacity. These Guanzi passages present a weak holism in which body and mind are separate entities with different functions but nonetheless interpenetrate and influence each other completely. The text is clear that they must work together, but the exact nature of their relations are not clarified.

Containers: Mind (or Body) as House The Guanzi also presents several CONTaINEr metaphors that structure body and mind as containers. One describes the heart-mind as a house that forms the dwelling of spirit (shen):

(6) 潔其宮，開其門，去私毋言，神明若存. Clean the mansion [of the mind] and open its gates! Once you have rid yourself of partiality and are without speech, spirit brilliance [shen ming] will appear (Guanzi 13.2a (Xinshu shang 13.36)).19

according to the explanation to this passage, “mansion” refers to the mind and “gates” to the senses (the eyes and ears, Guanzi 13.4b (Xinshu

shang 13.36; trans. rickett 1998: 79). Statements and explanations in the Xinshu shang are discussed above.). here the body-mind is a house that is surrounded by gates and cleaned by a good airing out, which does not necessarily require opening the gates. The key activity is a deliberate emptying in order to make possible a spontaneous replacement. Within the house gates of the body, the mind (xin) is a container whose contents are spirit (shen). In another example:

(7) 世人之所職者精也，去欲則宣，宣則靜矣，靜則精，精則獨立矣. 獨則明， 明則神矣. 神者至貴也，故館不辟除，則貴人不舍 焉，故曰不潔則神不處. 人 皆欲知而莫索之，其所以知彼也，其所以知此也. What people must grasp is the vital essence [[[jing]]]. If they get rid of desires, their minds will be open. Being open, they become quiescent. Being quiescent, they become of single purpose. Being of single purpose, they become detached. Being detached, they become enlightened. Being enlightened, they become spirit-like. Spirit is honored above all else. If the hall is not opened up and cleaned out, an honored person will not stay in it. Therefore the statement says: ‘Should you fail to make a clean sweep, spirit will not remain’ (Guanzi 13.3a-b (Xinshu shang 13.36), trans. after rickett 1998: 76).

here again the xin is a house that, under correct circumstances, spirit can enter and inhabit. Double Containers: Body Contains Mind Contains Mind In another passage from “art of the Mind”, xin is both container and contents: (8) 豈無利事哉，我無利心，豈無安處哉? 我 無安心，心之中又有心. 意以先 言，意然後形，形然後思，思然後知. 凡心之形, 過知失生. how can it be that our undertakings do not produce benefit? It is because our minds do not produce benefit. how can there be situations in which we are not at peace? It is because our minds are not at peace. Within the mind there is another mind. The power of awareness comes before words [[[Wikipedia:emphasis|emphasis]] added]; after awareness come forms; after forms comes thought; and after thought comes knowledge. It is ever so that if the form of the mind is overwhelmed by too much knowledge, it loses its vitality (Guanzi 13.8a (Xinshu xia 13.37); rickett 1998: 63).

here, a “mind within the mind” (xin zhi xin 心之心) operates before sensory input; in contemporary terminology it is precognitive. a similar passage appears in “Inner Workings”: (9) 我心治，官乃治. 我心安，官乃安. 治之者心也，安之者心也，心以藏心，心 之中又 有心焉. 彼心之心，音[[[意]]]以先言[音]，音然後形，形然後言[名]. 言[名] 然後使，使然 後治.

When our minds are well regulated, our sense organs [lit. officials] are also well regulated. When our minds are at peace, our sense organs are also at peace. What regulates them is the mind; what pacifies them is the mind. The mind therefore contains an inner mind. That is to say within the mind there is another mind [[[Wikipedia:emphasis|emphasis]] added]. In that mind’s mind, the power of awareness comes before words [[[sound]]]. after awareness come forms. after forms come words [names]. after words [names] comes putting the mind to use. after putting the mind to use comes its regulation (Guanzi 6.3b-4a (Nei ye 16.49), trans. after rickett 1998: 46–47, 8.2 and 8.3).

Taken together with the previous accounts of a mind within the mind, these passages describe a double system of enclosure in which the body contains the mind and the mind contains an inner mind, which operates prior to, and in that sense independent of, input from the body or outside. In all these container metaphors the body is a container whose content includes the mind, but the containers differ in important ways. Much depends on whether the container is permeable and whether its contents are substantial. For example, in Mencius 2a2 the body is a container of the heart-mind or person and flood-like qi

(haoran zhi qi) fills the body. But if the container is permeable the body becomes a model of the interpenetration of self and cosmos. properly cultivated and not damaged, the floodlike qi fills not only the body but heaven and Earth; in other words, the container is permeable, and qi can both enter the body and emanate from it (without loss to it). a very different image is of the body as a hollow container whose contents are in some sense empty, for example, in the second chapter of the Zhuangzi (Zhuangzi jishi 2: 45–46). Yet another variant is Mencius’ account of a self that is effectively transparent, in which the xin is visible in body (4a15, 7a21). all these accounts can be described as weakly holist. In these metaphors of mind and body as a composites and containers, mind and body are spatially inseparable.

Distributed Containers: Visceral Systems Store Mental Dispositions a very different expression of weak holism appears in an account of the composition of the body and mind in the first Chinese medical classic the Yellow Emperor’s Classic of Internal Medicine or Huangdi neijing 黃帝 內經.20 here we find several accounts of the heart or mind as one of five organs: visceral “containers” that store mental qualities or dispositions.21 This text presents the earliest known account of the internal organs (or more properly visceral systems, consisting of both organs and their “channels” or extensions (jing luo 經絡) throughout the body. This text theorizes the body as being composed of two types of qi: yin and yang 陰陽, and jing

refers to “vital essence” in a strongly biological or medical sense. Each organ contains (“stores” or “treasures”, zang) a psychological aspect of a person: (10) 心藏神，肺藏魄，肝藏魂，脾藏意，腎藏志，是謂五藏所藏. The heart stores spirit [shen]; the lungs store po; the liver stores hun; the spleen stores thought [yi]; the kidneys store will [zhi] (Huangdi neijing suwen 23: 153 (Xuanming wu qi 宣明五氣), trans. after Unschuld and Tessenow 2011, 1: 409). This storage is semi-permeable. The five viscera store spirit, thought, will, hun and po, but these qualities are also circulated throughout the body in

the channels (jing luo) associated with each organ, but retained within the body. This passage is closely paralleled by several in the Lingshu that describe connections between the five viscera and the emotions. The chapter titled “roots of Spirit” (Ben shen 本神) describes connections between the five yin viscera and five emotions from the therapeutic viewpoint of a practitioner: (11) 凡刺之法，先必本于神。血、脈、營、氣、精神，此五藏之所藏也。 至其淫 泆離藏則精失、魂魄飛揚、志意恍亂、智慮去身者 In all acupuncture, every method must take its basis in the spirit. The blood [xue], vessels [mai], nutritive energy [[[ying]]], qi, essence [[[jing]]] and spirit [shen] are stored in the five viscera. When debauchery occurs they leave the viscera: jing is lost, the hun and po fly and scatter; thought and will [zhi yi] are disordered; wisdom and forethought [zhi lü] leave the body (Huangdi neijing lingshu, 8.1.1, 290 (Ben shen 本神)). This passage links spirit to a range of mental states or dispositions (thought, will, wisdom, etc.) as well as to their five correlate viscera, and clearly shows that the viscera can lose their precious contents through inappropriate emotions or actions. It continues that life arises from the interaction of power (de) and qi:

故生之來謂之精；兩精相搏謂之神；隨神往來者謂之魂；並精而出入者謂 之魄；所以任物者謂之心；心有所憶謂之意；意之所存謂之志；因志而存 變謂之思；因思而遠慕謂之慮；因慮而處物謂之智。 Therefore the coming of life is called essence; the interaction of the two [kinds of] essence is called spirit. What follows the spirit in going and coming is called hun; what goes along with essence in going out and coming back in is called po. That which makes use of things is called the mind; that which the mind reflects upon is called thought; that which preserves thought is called will. To preserve and change something because of will is called reflection [si]. To reach a vision long afterwards because of reflection is called concern [lü]. To understand how to regulate things because of concern is called intelligence [zhi] (Huangdi neijing lingshu 8.1.2, 290 (Ben shen)).

The passage describes essence as the prerequisite for physical life, but also closely links it to the mental qualities of spirit, hun, po, mind, thought, will, reflection, concern and intelligence. It goes on to explain how emotional excesses affect the viscera and injure the body: 是故怵惕思慮者則傷神，神傷則恐懼流淫而不止。… 喜樂者，神憚散而不 藏。 … 恐懼者，神蕩憚而不收。 This is why, if there is fear, reflection, and concern, it injures spirit; if spirit is injured there is fear and panic that do not stop… if there is excessive joy it causes spirit to shrink and scatter and it can no longer be stored… if there is fright it causes spirit to wash and shrink away and it cannot be recollected (Huangdi neijing lingshu 8.1.3, 290 (Ben shen)).

怵惕思慮則傷神，神傷則恐懼自失。破ḱ脫肉，毛悴色夭死于冬。 as for the heart, fear, reflection and concern injure spirit, and when spirit is injured there is fear and the [[[sense]] of] self is lost. That destroys the muscles and makes the flesh waste away. If the hair thins and the complexion has the look of the shortlived; death occurs in winter (Huangdi neijing lingshu 8.2, 291 (Ben shen)). The passage correlates emotional states with injury to the viscera or even death. Worry and sadness (chou you 愁憂) injure the spleen and thought; sorrow and sadness (bei ai 悲哀) harm the liver and hun; excessive joy and pleasure (xi le 喜樂) injure the lungs and po; excessive anger (sheng nü 盛怒) injures the kidneys and will.22 The conclusion of the passage clearly links vital essence (jing) with both mental and material aspects of personhood and material survival:

是故五藏主藏精者也，不可傷，傷則失守而陰虛；陰虛則無氣，無氣則死矣。 是故用鍼者，察觀病人之態，以知精、神、魂、魄之存亡，得失之意，五者以 傷，鍼不可以治之也。 Therefore, one must never harm the essence stored by the five viscera. If you harm it, it loses itself and yin becomes empty. When yin is empty there is no qi, and if there is no qi, death occurs. This is why practitioners of acupuncture must carefully study the state of the sick, so as to understand the presence and absence and the gain or loss of essence, spirit, hun, and po (Huangdi neijing lingshu, 8.2, 291 (Ben shen)). From a therapeutic viewpoint, the passage emphasizes the need to take into account consultors’ emotional or affective states in order to practice acupuncture effectively. Other therapeutically oriented passages present similar metaphor of the viscera as permeable containers that store spirit, essence, hun and po.23 Other passages differ in their details. The “discourse on regulating the Conduits” (Zhou jing lun 調經論) answers a question about the states of

excess and deficiency that cause disease with the claim that deficiency conditions always arise in the five yin viscera: (12) 夫心藏神，肺藏氣，肝藏血，脾藏肉，腎藏志，而此成形，志意通內 連骨 髓，而成身形 Now, the heart stores spirit, the lungs store qi, the liver stores blood, the spleen stores flesh, the kidneys store intention, and this completes the physical form. Thought and intention [zhi yi] penetrate [everything], in the interior they link with bones and marrow, thereby completing the physical appearance of the body (Huangdi neijing suwen 62: 334–335 (Zhou jing lun 調經論), trans. after Unschuld and Tessenow 2011, 2: 102).24

This passage links the five yin viscera to the five fundamental substances of the body: spirit, qi, blood (xue 血), flesh (rou 肉) and will (zhi 志). Unlike several passages quoted earlier, these substances are overall material, with the possible exception of shen and zhi, with no reference to “souls”, material or otherwise. here shen seems to be a component of the physical body (xing), which is completed by the five viscera. For that reason, this passage seems significantly holist. Other chapters of the Huangdi neijing describe the role of the heart as a visceral organ. The “discourse on phenomena [[[Wikipedia:reflecting|reflecting]] the Status of] Qi in a Normal person” states that in summer the true [qi of the] depots penetrates into the heart. The heart stores the qi of

the blood and the vessels.25 Several points are important in these passages. First, they identify five distinct aspects or qualities (four non-material and one material) associated with mind, soul or spirit, including the “souls” hun and po. The list conspicuously does not include any account of mind (xin) as distinct from the heart (xin), which is located in the chest. Second, these five qualities or substances are stored within the five zang 臟 viscera: the heart, lungs, liver, spleen and kidneys. The Huangdi neijing locates this account within the description of two kinds of organs (zang fu 臟腑). “depots” or “treasuries” (zang) are described as yin and are concerned with transformation and storage. They complement six yang fu viscera, whose function is

reception and passage: the gall bladder, stomach, large intestine, small intestine, urinary bladder, and “triple burner” (san jiao 三焦).26 In other words, the categories of the text make it explicit that these five viscera are “containers”. Third, these passages present another version of weak holism. Mind and body are clearly separate, since elements of one are described as stored within corresponding elements of the other, but it is not possible to separate a material organ, for example, the liver, from the non-material hun stored within it. These passages are ambivalent in their treatment of the heart or mind (xin). They correlate injuries to the heart with injuries to the four other

yin viscera, possibly supporting the strongly holist claim that the heart is a material organ no different from the other four zang. But the heart is closely and consistently linked to spirit (shen) and is consistently described as its “container”. all five viscera are closely linked to both non-material components and affective states. Even seen as weak dualism, this viewpoint would be quite different from “Western” mind-body dualisms that create a polarity between one mental faculty (the mind, soul, or spirit) and all material aspects of the body. here the contrast would between multiple aspects of

mind, spirit or soul and multiple aspects of the material body. These passages describe the heart and other zang viscera as permeable containers whose contents are easily injured or diminished through excess in emotion or action. Finally, the metaphors for mind, body and spirit identified in these texts overlap with image schemata and conceptual metaphors identified by lakoff, Johnson and others as part-whole, insofar as both body and mind are parts of a whole, and that jing and qi are parts of the entire person.27 I describe the composites of the Huangdi neijing as container metaphors because various psychological faculties are explicitly described as “contained” within the organs or visceral systems of the body.28 2.2. Dualist Chinese Accounts: Heart-Mind as Ruler Most early Chinese texts are of multiple authorship and thus frequently contain passages that are inconsistent or contradictory.29 Other passages from the Guanzi and Huangdi neijing offer more strongly dualist accounts of body and mind in which the mind

is a ruler and the body its unspecified officials or subjects. (For further treatments of ruler metaphors see Slingerland 2013: 16–18; Yu 2009.) These metaphors are distinct from accounts of the mind as the ruler of subordinates with explicit roles or duties (discussed below in section 2.3). Ruler and Officials The hEarT aS rUlEr OF ThE BOdY metaphor differs from mind-body composites and containers in that ruler and ruled occupy separate and distinct physical space and are clearly separable, both as physical objects and as psychological agents. The hEarT aS rUlEr OF ThE BOdY metaphor appears in the Guanzi, Zhuangzi, Mencius and Xunzi, but these texts differ considerably in their descriptions of what rulers rule and their judgments about the heart-mind’s hegemony over the body. The Guanzi, Mencius and Xunzi describe this relationship with approval but with very different emphases. In the Guanzi version:

(13) 心之在體，君之位也. 九竅之有職，官之分也. 心處其道，九竅循理. 嗜欲 充益，目不見色，耳不聞聲. In the body the mind holds the position of the prince. The functions of the nine apertures resemble the separate responsibilities of officials. If the mind is at rest in dao, the nine apertures function properly. If lust and desire occupy it fully, the eyes do not see colors and the ears do not hear sounds (Guanzi 13.1a (Xinshu shang 13.36); trans. modified from rickett 1998: 71).

The explanation to this passage further emphasizes the regulatory role of the mind, describes the sensory organs of sight and hearing as “officials” (guan 官), and describes the art of the mind as “acting without acting” (wuwei 無為): (14) 心之在體，君之位也。九竅之有職，官之分也。耳目者，視聽之官也，心而 無與視聽之事，則官得守其分矣。夫心有欲者，物過而目不見，聲至而耳不聞 也，故曰：「上離其道，下失其事」。故曰，心術 者，無為而制竅者也。故曰：君。 In the body, the mind holds the position of prince. The functions of the nine apertures resemble the separate responsibilities of officials. The ears and eyes are the officials for seeing and hearing. If the mind does not interfere with the activities of seeing and hearing, the officials will be able to maintain their separate functions. Now if a person’s mind is filled with desires, the eyes do not see when things pass by and the ears do not hear when there are sounds. Thence it is said: if the person on high departs from dao, those below will be lax in

work. hence it is said: The art of the mind lies in controlling the apertures through wuwei. Therefore it is described as: “prince” (Guanzi 13.2b-3a (Xinshu shang 13.36), trans. modified from rickett 1998: 75). Mencius (6a15) approaches the matter somewhat differently, by responding to the question of why some people are great and others petty. For him, what matters is which part of a person guides and controls: those who follow the great part of themselves are great; those who follow the petty part are petty, so some are guided one way and others another: (15) 耳目之官不思，而蔽於物 … 心之官則思，思則得之，不思則不得也。 The offices of the eyes and ears cannot think, and can be confused by things … the office of the mind can think, and is successful only if it does think; otherwise, it will not find the answer (Mengzi zhengyi 23: 792, cf. lau 1970: 168). here the notion of the mind’s rulership is implicit, since only a ruler guides and controls the organs or officials (guan) under it. Xunzi by contrast is explicit that the heart-mind is the ruler of the body: (16) 心者，形之君也，而神明之主也，出令而無所受令 … 故口可劫而使墨云， 形可劫而使詘申，心不可劫而使易意，是之則受，非之則辭。

The heart is the lord of the body and the master of spirit brilliance [shen ming]. It issues orders, but it takes orders from nothing… thus, the mouth can be compelled either to be silent or to speak, and the body can be compelled, either to contract or to extend itself, but the heart cannot be compelled to change its thoughts. What it considers right, one accepts, what it consider wrong, one rejects (Xunzi jijie 21: 397–98, trans. after hutton 2014: 229).30 The second chapter of the Zhuangzi mentions the rulership of the heartmind only to ridicule its apparent arbitrariness, by suggesting that there is no inherent reason that the heart-mind should be the lord and the body its “servants and concubines” (chen qie 臣妾, Zhuangzi jishi 2: 55–56).

Ruler and Slaves perhaps the strongest account of the ruler-ruled contrast comes from a text titled, Wu xing 五行 (Five Kinds of Action), excavated from tombs at Mawangdui 馬王堆 (Changsha, hunan, c.168 bce) and Guodian 郭店 (Jingmen, hubei, ca 300 bce):31 (17) 耳目鼻口手足六者，心之役也. The six (parts), the eyes, ears, nose, mouth, hands and feet are all slave to the mind (Guodian Chu mu zhujian 1998: 151 (Wu xing), slip 28, trans. Csikzentmihalyi 2004: 307, 22.1). This passage is the one instance of which I am aware of a Chinese MINd aS rUlEr OF SlaVES metaphor. It is all the more striking because it comes from an excavated texts, rather than from the received tradition. To sum up so far, the above texts use a range of metaphors to present relations between body and

mind or spirit in ways that resist neat classification. Most resist description as either strong holism (with no division between body and mind and no ontological distinction between them) or as strong dualism (a clear division between a physical, often subservient, body and a disembodied, ontologically distinct mind). What we can do is to position them on a scale of strong to weak holism (or weak to strong dualism). The four composite metaphors (1–4, above) are arguably the most holist insofar as they make the least explicit distinction between structural parts of the amalgam or composite. They are also distinguished by porosity in the sense that inner characteristics have outer manifestations. For example, correct inner alignment manifests externally as brilliance and in the muscles and complexion (3). Composite metaphors also stress different aspects of the amalgam. In some, it is the complementarity of body and mind that is necessary for effective self-cultivation. In others it is a potential opposition between the mind and senses, or body.

Container metaphors (5–12) make an explicit metaphorical distinction between container and content, but they present a complex story because they portray different kinds of containers with different kinds of contents. Several present the body as a container (5, 10-12) or house (6, 7) of the mind, and in some cases there is a double container of a mind within the mind (8–9). In some, the mind, will, intentions, etc. are storied within specific visceral systems, which are themselves delimited components of the body (10–12); here, the entire body is a container for the mind of which the visceral systems are parts.

The nature of parts is less clear in passages that describe the heart-mind itself is a container for a mind within the mind, since it is more difficult to identify the “inner” mind with the heart organ. I now turn to a series of “blended” metaphors that present mixtures of broadly holist and dualist aspects. The theory of of “blending” or “conceptual blending”, introduced by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, expands conceptual metaphor theory by allowing for the possibility of “mapping” multiple metaphors or “mental spaces” onto a “blended” target that contains structures from all its sources, and results in a new conceptual structure.32 another series of Chinese mind-body metaphors are blends of holist and dualist metaphors.

2.3. Chinese Blended Metaphors We have already seen several examples of dualist metaphors of hEarT aS rUlEr OF ThE BOdY (13–16). Several other metaphors blend hEarT aS rUlEr metaphors with others. HEART AS RULER + BODY AS CONTAINER The Xunzi passage discussed above described the heart-mind as ruler of the body. another passage combines this account with another familiar metaphors of BOdY aS CONTaINEr:

(18) 耳目鼻口形能，各有接而不相能也，夫是之謂天官。心居中虛，以治五官， 夫是之 謂天君。 The eyes, ears, nose, mouth and body each has its own form and abilities, and they cannot assume each others’ abilities – these are called one’s heavenly faculties [literally “officials”, guan]. The heart dwells in the central cavity so as to control the five faculties [officials] – this is called one’s heavenly lord (Xunzi jijie 17: 309, trans. modified from hutton 2014: 176).33 The container is not specified, but is implied by the “central cavity” (zhong xu 中虛) of the body. here that containment is linked to its ability to govern, on the analogy of a ruler centrally positioned in his state. This

container is semi-porous. While information may move from the outside in, the passage makes clear that orders and instructions issue only from the inside out. a different formulation appears in identical passages in the Wenzi and Huainanzi: (19) 心者形之主也，神者心之寶也。形勞而不休則蹶，精用而不已則竭，是故 聖人貴而尊之，不敢越也。 The heart is master of the body; spirit is the treasure of the heart. When the body labors and does not rest it becomes diminished; when jing is used unceasingly it becomes exhausted. Therefore sages honor and venerate

it and do not dare dissipate it (Wenzi 3: 129 (Jiu shou 九守); Huainanzi 8: 226 (Jing shen shun 精神訓)).34 This passage also blends the hEarT aS rUlEr (of the body) with a container metaphor, MINd aS CONTaINEr (of spirit). Its emphasis is different from that of (18). here the context is an injunction that sages preserve their jing and, by implication, spirit. The danger seems to be that spirit or shen, the “treasure” stored and preserved in the heart, can be diminished through the heart’s role as ruler or master of the body. In other words, these two functions of the heart are in potential opposition. Other passages in late Warring States and han texts also contrast attractions and desires associated

with the senses and the body to the normative judgments of the heart-mind.35

HEART AS RULER+ STATE AS BODY a different view of the hEarT aS rUlEr metaphor appears in the Huangdi neijing, which blends it with a metaphor of STaTE aS BOdY. It should be noted that STaTE aS BOdY metaphors are not implicit in hEarT aS rUlEr metaphors because rulers rule other things than states: unspecified subordinates, slaves, etc. Blended metaphors of this kind from several texts go further, and link specific functions in the body or mind to specific government functions. For example, in the following Huangdi neijing passage, the heart is a ruler whose subjects are government officials identified with visceral systems of the body:

(20) 心者，君主之官也，神明出焉。肺者，相傅之官，治節出焉。肝者，將軍之 官，謀慮出焉. The heart is the official that acts as ruler and monarch; spirit brilliance [shen ming] originates in it. The lungs are the official that acts as minister and mentor [[[xiang]] fu]. Order and moderation originate in it. The liver is the official that acts

as general. planning and deliberation originate in it (Huangdi neijing suwen 8: 76–77 (Ling lan mi dian lun 靈蘭秘典論), trans. after Unschuld and Tessenow 2011, 1: 155–56). here, the role of the “officials” is to maintain the life of the body, which dies if they do not perform correctly. This passage does not emphasize the issue of permeability, though it is reasonable to infer that communication between the officials/viscera is important. It makes clear that spirit

brilliance (shen ming) originates in the heart, but it does not emphasize either its storage in the heart or movement in the body.

HEART AS RULER + STATE AS BODY + HEART AS CONTAINER another Huangdi neijing passage blends three metaphors: hEarT aS rUlEr, hEarT aS CONTaINEr and STaTE aS BOdY.

In the Lingshu chapter “pathogenic agents”, the Yellow Emperor huang di 黃帝 and his teacher Qi Bo 歧伯 are discussing the role of the ruler in the theory of acupuncture. huang di asks why the lesser Yin vessel in the hand is the only one that cannot be needled at the point shu 獨, and Qi Bo responds: (21) 少陰，心脈也。心者，五藏 六 府之大主也，精神之所舍也，其藏堅固，邪弗 能容也。容之則心傷 , 心傷則神去，神去則死矣。故諸邪之在於心者，皆在於 心之包絡。包絡者，心主之脈也，故獨無俞焉。 lesser Yin is the channel of the heart.

The heart is the grand master [da zhu] of the five zang viscera and the six fu viscera, and the dwelling of spirit. It stores firmness, so pathogenic agents cannot take hold. If they do take hold, the heart is injured. If the heart is injured, spirit departs, and if spirit departs then death occurs (Huangdi neijing lingshu 71.3.2, 447 (Xie ke 邪客)).

The passage also emphasizes the importance of the impermeability of the heart as the container of spirit and also of firmness (jiang gu 堅固). here the heart is vulnerable to intrusion by pathogenic agents (xie ke 邪客), and porosity is represented as medically life-threatening. The triple-blend metaphor of hEarT aS rUlEr, STaTE aS BOdY and hEarT aS CONTaINEr is particularly interesting because it resolves a potential inconsistency between the holist unity of heart and body (which occupy the same physical space) and the dualist distinction between ruler and officials (who are physically distinct and not cocontained). This inconsistency can be resolved by viewing both rulers and officials as parts of a body politic. Several passages analogize the position of the heart-mind in the body (of which it is a physical part) to that of the ruler in the state (of which he is a part). according to the Guanzi chapter “ruler and Officials”:

(22) 君之在國都也，若心之在身體也。道德定於上，則百姓化於下矣。 戒心形 於內，則容貌動於外矣。 The prince occupying the capital of his state is like the mind in the body. When dao and de are established above, the people (lit. hundred surnames) will be transformed below. When a sincere mind takes shape within, it is manifested in the physical appearance without (Guanzi 31.5b (Jun chen xia 君臣下), trans. after rickett 1985: 418–19). a similar metaphor appears in the Wenzi chapter “Upper Virtue”:

(23) 主者，國之心也，心治則百節皆安，心擾即百節皆亂 The king is the heart of the state. When the heart governs [peacefully], the hundred joints [of the body] all are at peace; when the heart is agitated, the hundred joints are all in disorder (Wenzi 6: 257 (Shang de 上德)). These passages emphasize the unity of the state as a whole.

HEARTMIND AS RULER + GOVERNMENT AS WOVEN CLOTH Finally, the Xunzi uses another blended metaphor that emphasizes political unity, combining a metaphor of the heart-mind as a craftsman/ruler and a metaphor of good political order as the warp and weft of woven cloth: (24) 心也者，道之工宰也。道也者，治之經理也。心合於道，說合於心，辭合於 說。正名而期 The heart is the craftsman and overseer of dao. Dao is the warp and pattern of good order. When the heart fits with dao, when one’s persuasions fit with one’s heart, when one’s words fit one’s persuasions, then one will name things correctly and procure agreement (Xunzi jijie 22: 423; trans. modified from hutton 2014: 282).36

here the hegemony of the heart-mind is not as a ruler but as a craftsman (gong 工) and overseer or governor (zai 宰). These passages all distinguish body, heart-mind and spirit, in a variety of ways. None make strong dualist claims or firm ontological distinctions, such as between a material body and an immaterial mind or spirit or between a mortal body and an immortal mind, spirit or soul. The latter point is important because of widespread archaeological and historical evidence for belief in some kind of presumably non-material survival after death. archaeological evidence from Warring States tombs suggests belief in some kind of detachment of a non-corporeal “self” from the physical body after death. This subject is a matter of scholarly controversy, but there is clear evidence from late Warring States Chinese mortuary practices of

belief in an afterlife, however understood, that was entirely independent of the world of the living, and which featured a non-corporeal soul that retained consciousness after death.37 accounts of the mind ruling the body (or senses, or its organs) are the most dualist, or the least holist, because they make a strong distinction between two metaphorically (if not physically) distinct entities, the ruler and the ruled. In most cases (13–16, 18, 20–21), the ruler is physically discrete from his administrators, but joined with them as part of the body politic, which in some cases is explicit (18, 19). In one passage found in two excavated texts (17), the heart-mind is the ruler of slaves. This passage is more strongly dualist insofar as ruler and ruled are not part of

a greater whole of the same cosmological significance. how then should we describe the position of these texts? One alternative is what Slingerland calls “weak holism”, the claim that in early China we do not find an ontological distinction between a distinct material body and a disembodied mind, soul or spirit.38 But we could equally describe the position of these texts as weak dualism. They all describe the body and mind or spirit as distinct. They are analogized to different things, and one cannot be interchanged with or reduced to the other. Is the cup half empty or half full? I think the important

point here is that they are neither strongly holist nor strongly dualist. Instead, they emphasize the necessary complementarity of mind and body, but in several different ways. In the weakly bounded composites described in the first two sections, both are necessary to the existence of the whole. In accounts based on parts and whole, including ruler-ruled metaphors and the distributed faculties of the Huangdi neijing, clearly distinct parts are necessary to the functioning of the whole.

3. The Greek Metaphors Greek accounts also populate a spectrum from the strongly holist (the homeric poems and the materialism of Epicurus) to the strongly dualist (the pythagoreans and plato). a range of Greek philosophical viewpoints agree that body and soul are different and identify mental activity with the soul. There is also a polarity between two viewpoints on their separability. But as we shall see, the distribution of the metaphors is different from that of the Chinese texts surveyed above.

3.1. Holist Greek Accounts The earliest Greek holist accounts of body and mind, if we can even use those terms, are found in the homeric poems. here there is no clear

body-one soul dichotomy. The homeric poems include a rich vocabulary for various aspects of corporeality, which do not correspond to contemporary accounts of the human body.

Inseparable Composites: Homeric Psychosomas as a. a. long (2015: 5–6) points out, the homeric poems do not bifurcate their characters into bodies and minds or bodies and souls. homer’s men and women “rather than being represented as embodied minds or as having a mind that is distinct from the body, are what I call psychosomatic wholes”. But, he adds, the homeric poems did not carve people up into these two distinct entities or dimensions. however, the words they used were pressed into service by later authors to express bifurcations that were alien to homeric sensibilities. a few examples from the homeric lexicon

of terms for aspects of the body illustrate both points. Chrōs (“skin”, “flesh” or “frame”) referred to the bounding limit of the (human) body. In the homeric poems, it could be washed and physically pierced or penetrated by spears and arrows, but could be emotionally softened by pain, fear, suffering or joy. It is contrasted with demas, guia and melea (discussed above on p. 137). The bodies of animals are described differently; they are covered by “skin” or “hide” (derma, rhinos), a clearly demarcated envelope that distinguishes “inner” and “outer”. Valeria Gavrylenko argues that in the homeric poems the

chrōs of homeric heroes retained a unity of texture throughout, with no clear distinction between the “outer” and “inner” body.39 By contrast, in later usage, chrōs refers to the “fleshy” parts of the body, rather than its outer envelope.40 In the homeric poems sarx is a value-neutral term for the “flesh” that covers bones, portions of meat, or the “fleshy” sides of leather or fruit.41 But in late Greek and Christian writings it took on the highly charged association with desires and lusts, the opposite of “spiritual” (liddell and Scott 1940: σάρξ). as these shifts in meaning show, a term that was originally

neutral developed strongly negative connotations, and became connected with death and with emotions that had negative effects on the human body. Finally, in the homeric poems, the term psychē is a “soul” that persists in hades after death, in contrast to the thymos, which disperses at death. The shade of Odysseus’ mother explains it all to him in hades, and incidentally uses a number of these key terms: (25) For once the sinews [ines] no longer hold together the sarx and bones, the strong menos of the kindled fire overpowers them once the thymos has departed from the white bones, and then the psychē flies away like a dream flying off.42

That the psychē persists after death in the homeric poems is also made clear by accounts of its appearance in dreams, for example, the appearance of the psychē of the dead patroklos to achilles (Il. 23.65-107). Unlike thymos, phrenes and noos, which are common to gods and mortals, in the homeric poems, only mortals have psychēs and sōmas. long makes the point that it was the idea that an individual – a “person” with a distinct identity, unlike the shades in hades – could survive death, there must be something that can survive the death of the body. But it was not until the end of the fifth century bce that a

strong contrast appeared between psychē and sōma. In the homeric poems, these terms are used only of a “soul” after death and of a lifeless corpse, respectively. long argues that an important catalyst for plato’s extreme dualism was the arguments of the historical Gorgias, which emphasized the weaknesses of souls in resisting persuasive speech.43 an important point here is that in the homeric poems, the relation of body (variously described) and mind or soul is not described as container and contents, as it is in most later Greek writers. One problem with the container model is the rich polysemy of homeric words for flesh and bodies and for souls. The other problem is that, as long (2015: 25) puts it, “living persons in homer are bodies through and through”. But, he asks, does this mean that the homeric poems have no notion of a soul? In addition to psychē, there were several “body souls” thymos, noos, menos and phrenes (discussed above on p. 137). long (2015: 35) argues that of these, thymos stands for the homeric soul because in the homeric poems

it represents a person’s mental and emotional identity or self. Finally, four quasi-synonymous words for “heart”, kardia, kradiē, ētor and kēr, are also loci for the emotions of anger, grief, pain, joy, eagerness, fear, and courage. In addition, ētor and kēr are associated with love. They are also connected with thought and emotion. Kēr in particular is connected with deliberation. Kradiē is a quasi-autonomous agent within a person that can “order” actions. Ētor can be “loosed” from a person or “removed” by death.44 These terms had both physical and emotional referents. The heart could be the target for an enemy’s spear (Il. 13.442), but it could also leap at the prospect of battle (Il. 10.94) and be the seat of fear (Od. 5.389). The phrenes could be the target for a sword thrust (Od. 9.301) or for an insult (Il. 5.493), and could be the seat of anger (Il. 2.241).45 In summary, homeric psychosomas, as long calls them, are strongly holist. There are no distinct containers, contents, minds or bodies. as Clarke (2000: 115) puts it: “homer does not oppose mental life to the life of the body, but takes them as an undifferentiated whole. There is no ‘ghost in the machine’: homeric man does not have a mind, rather his thought and

consciousness are as inseparable a part of his bodily life as are movement and metabolism”. Aristotelian Composites We find metaphors of body and soul as inseparable composite in plato, aristotle and the Stoics. plato anticipates but does not pursue the idea that living things are composites of bodies and souls (phaed. 79a, Tim. 42e-44d). Several hellenistic accounts can be described as holist to varying degrees. aristotle and the Stoics have both dualist and holist features.46 aristotle describes the soul as: the first principle of all animal

life (archē tōn zōōn, da 402a6-7) and “the first actuality of a natural body that potentially has life” (412a27). It is inseparable from the body (413a5) and is the cause and principle of the living body (415b10). Several things are striking about these passages. First, aristotle makes the original and important move of hypothesizing all living things (including humans) as complex composites of body and soul, with body supplying matter or potentiality and soul supplying form or actuality.47 De Anima describes six faculties of the soul that are, to varying degrees, common to all living things.48 For purposes of the present discussion, the point is not how the faculties are distributed across species, but rather that all living things, including humans, are

composites of body and soul. as heinrich von Staden has argued, many hellenistic philosophers and physicians, including Epicurus, many Stoics, and Galen, share a view of relations between soul and body wherein all psychē is sōma, but not all sōma is psychē. This corporeal psychē is spatially extended, threedimensional, capable to action and reaction, and mortal. It is generated with the body and does not precede or survive it, and cannot exist independently of it. Thus soul and body are mutually dependent and together define a living thing. different hellenistic thinkers hold these views for different reasons, justify them in different ways, and disagree on many points; but all were concerned with how the soul differed from the body.49 Unlike the homeric poems, and like the Chinese texts discussed in section 2, these quasi-holist Greek accounts include metaphors of mind and body as both composites (of various kinds) and containers. But unlike the Chinese discussions, hellenistic accounts of composites included very detailed reflections on the nature of different kinds of mixtures (discussed below).

Epicurean Containers The materialist holism of Epicurus (341–270 bce) arises from his contention that the only things that exist in themselves are bodies and void

(Epicur. Ep. Hdt. 39–40; lS 5, 1: 27–28). Therefore the soul is material and distributed throughout the body: (26) the soul is a fine-particled body [hē psychē sōma esti leptomeres] diffused through the whole structure [par’ holon to athroisma paresparmenon], most resembling wind with a certain blending of heat, in some respects like one and in others the other (Epicur. Ep. Hdt. 63, trans. after lS 14a1, 1: 65 and Bailey 1926: 38–39).50

This aggregate contains the body’s vital powers (dynameis), especially sensation (aisthēsis). The soul is described as a part (meros) of the rest of the aggregate (to loipon athroisma), and the body is described as something that in some sense “contains” the soul:51 (27) It [the soul] would not be in possession of this [[[sensation]]] if it were not contained in some way [estegazeto pōs] by the rest of the aggregate. and the rest of the aggregate, having granted this responsibility to the soul, itself too receives from the soul a share of this kind of accidental attribute – though not of all those which the soul possesses (Epicur. Ep. Hdt. 64, trans. lS 14a3, 1: 65).52 Further, the container is porous insofar as the aggregate of the whole body (athroisma) receives something from the soul. Finally, the soul is mortal and cannot survive the destruction of the body:

(28) Moreover, if the whole structure is dissolved, the soul is dispersed and no longer has the same powers [dynameis] nor performs its movements [kineitai], so that it does not possess sensation either (Epicur. Ep. Hdt. 65, trans. lS 14a6, I: 66). This view precludes the existence of a non-material soul, so the psychē must be corporeal. Epicurus also held that the soul cannot exist independently of its particular body.53 On this view, the body is a material container that holds material contents, including the psychē. The two “bodies” of soul and the rest of the body are thus distinct but mutually dependent, since neither can function without the other. In the different context of discussions of

pleasure, Epicurus contrasts body, or more properly flesh (sarx) and mind (dianoia), but as Christopher Gill observes, the point is not to suggest that mind and body are ontologically different, but rather to emphasize the mind’s role in using reason to maximize bodily pleasure.54 Inseparable Stoic Composites Gill emphasizes the holism of much hellenistic philosophy, and argues that Epicurean and Stoic ideas converge in what he calls “psychophysical holism” and “substantial holism”, which he contrasts with the “substantial dualism”

of plato in particular. Both, he argues, present a holistic conception of the human personality as a psychophysical and psychological organism or unit, rather than as a combination of psychē and body, or of mind/reason and emotion/desire. he argues that, instead of either dichotomy, both pairs are seen as states within a single entity, within a universe that is similarly structured.55 perhaps the most elaborate account of humans and animals as body-soul composites comes from the Stoics, for whom a human being is an ensouled, rational and mortal body “compounded” (sugkeitai) of sōma and psychē.56 Stoic

accounts of such composites are detailed and specific because the Stoics explicitly questioned the nature of composites. Chrysippus developed a theory of mixture that distinguished three kinds of composite of physical substances. he explicitly described the relation of body and soul as an example of “blending” (krasis), in which the elements are completely interpenetrated but still retain their individual natures and component substances permeate the entire blend. They are porous in that they “pass through” each other so that all parts of the blend contain all its substances and their qualities; but the original substances and their qualities are preserved.57 Thus a living animal is a complete blend of body and soul, with no part only body or only soul, but because there is no fusion of the two, each retains its own distinctive properties. plutarch describes the Stoic distinction somewhat differently, as

(1) “separated” parts (diestōta, like an army); (2) “contiguous” parts (synaptomena, like a house or ship) and (3) “unified” bodies (hēnōmena, like stones or logs), including bodies that were unified and “grown together” (symphuēs), such as living things.58 The important point for present purposes is the existence of a long, and non-unified, Greek account of mind and body as pervasive, inseparable composites that are explicitly not containers, since containers require separated parts. The Stoic hierocles (fl.2nd century ce) takes the account of the unified bodies of living things further by arguing that an animal must perceive itself before it perceives anything else:

(29) One must know that an animal immediately, as soon as it is born, perceives itself [aisthanetai heautou] (hierocles I.35-40, trans. Bastiannini and long in ramelli 2009: 4–5).59 (30) animals perceive their own parts [merōn tōn idiōn aisthanetai]. Thus, winged creatures, on the one hand, are aware of the readiness and aptness of their wings for flying, and, on the other hand, every land animal is aware both that it has its own members and of their use; and we ourselves are aware of our eyes and ears and other parts (hierocles I.50-55, trans. Bastiannini and long in ramelli 2009: 4–5).

(31) Every hegemonic faculty begins with itself. In this way a cohesive structure [hexis], which binds together what pertains to it, is first binding of itself (hierocles VI.10-15, trans. Bastiannini and long in ramelli 2009: 16–17). These statements, taken together, claim that animal and human selfperception creates a “cohesive structure” (hexis), but the hegemonic faculty that binds it is bound of itself.

Hippocratic Harmonies In the hippocratic corpus (c.450–350 bce), most discussions of psychē and sōma are in a diagnostic or therapeutic context, but a few are more general, of which the most important is in the hippocratic text “On regimen I”. here, psychē and sōma are two distinct but closely related aspects of human nature. (The authors explicitly restrict their discussion to the psychē of humans and do not discuss other animals.) Psychē and sōma are composed of mixtures of two substances, fire and water:60

(32) Into humans enter parts of parts and wholes of wholes [merea mereōn, hola holōn], having a mixture of fire and water [sugkrēsin puros kai hudatos], some to take, the others to give, and the takers create an increase and the givers a diminution. When men saw a log, one pulls and the other pushes, but they do the same thing, and making less they make more. It is the same for human nature (regimen I, 6.1-10, littré 6: 478–79). (33) Into humans there enters a soul, that is a mixture of fire and water [puros kai hudatos sugkrēsen ekhousa], a component of a person’s body [moirēn sōmatos anthrōpou] (regimen I, 7.1-3, littré 6: 480).

here body and soul are a composite of the type identified by Chrysippus as krasis, but with an important twist: all the parts of a person must be contained in what enters the body, since otherwise it would not be able to grow. These components grow at their own pace, specifically described in terms of tension between them: (34) Just as carpenters sawing a log, one pulls, the other pushes, but doing the same thing. The one below who pushes supports the one above, without whom saw would not work, and if they use force, everything is off (regimen I, 7.10-13, littré 6: 480). The two carpenters here are not body and soul but rather fire and water, the two opposing forces that constitute both. Their pushing and pulling is analogized to the work of other craftsmen, including fullers and cobblers, who use division and reassembly to create a harmony of diverse parts (ek diaphorōn symphoron).61

In the view of these hippocratic authors, the constitution of both psychē and sōma depends on four components of fire and water: dry fire, moist fire, moist water and dry water. The hottest and strongest fire controls all things and orders them according to nature and it contains psychē, noos, practical intelligence (phronēsis), growth (auxēsis), motion (kinēsis), decrease (meiōsis), mutation (diallaxis), sleep (hypnos), and waking (hegēsis).62 differences in the material amalgam account for differences in the “intelligence of the soul” (phronēsis psychēs). The greatest intelligence results from a blend of the moistest fire and the driest water blended in the body (krēsin labonta en somati).63 according to this text, regimen can improve or worsen the blend of fire and water in the body and soul by improving the balance. This can result in greater or less intelligence, but it cannot affect other aspects of personality.64 This composite is a krasis in that fire and water are interpenetrated but still retain their individual character, but their relation is repeatedly described as a tension that produces harmony:

(35) When carpenters saw, one pushes; the other pulls. Both are doing the same thing. When they make a hole, one pulls; the other pushes; the pressure makes one go up and the other go down. Making it less, they make it more and making it more they make it less; and they are imitating the nature of human beings (regimen I, 16.1-4, littré 6: 490).

But that tension occurs within a holist framework, as both sōma and psychē are described as material substances. These passages make it clear that holist accounts are not restricted to the homeric poems, and to a period before the possibility of division between body and soul was clearly articulated. In other words, there is no “evolution” from holism to dualism. like the Chinese accounts, they include both composite and container metaphors, but with interesting differences. aristotle’s composite, like that of the Mohists, emphasize the complete interpenetration of body and intelligence or soul. however, in aristotle’s case, that interpenetration characterizes all living things in a hierarchy of ascending faculties, and the soul ceases to exist

after the death of the body. The Mohists are not concerned with the faculties of animals, but do insist that the dead have consciousness. The nature of body-soul composites becomes an explicit topic of inquiry for several Stoics, and leads to the theory of krasis, a mixture of completely interpenetrated elements that still retain their individual natures. The language of the hippocratic text On Regimen I makes it clear that its authors also understand the mixture of body and soul qua fire and water as a krasis.

a second point is the relative de-emphasis on container metaphors. Epicurus (27) does refer to the soul as being “somehow contained” (estegazeto pōs), but he also describes it as a composite (26, 28), for example, as a “fine particled body” (26). Container metaphors are not prominent in the holist accounts, but as we shall see in the next section, they figure importantly in Greek dualist accounts of body and soul.

3.2. Dualist Greek Accounts Greek dualist accounts are of two distinct kinds. Some are container metaphors in which the soul is contained – even “entombed” – in the body during life. a second is in metaphors of the soul as ruler. In contrast to Chinese images of the heart as ruler of subordinate officials, Greek images of the soul ruling the body repeatedly contrast it to animals or slaves. The context for that image is a change in the meaning of psychē from its homeric associations with (probably human) life to fifth-century views of it as the bearer of moral qualities and as a site of emotional and cognitive activity. as hendrick lorenz puts it, the result of these developments was a new conceptual distinction between body and soul, or in long’s terms, as beliefs in an afterlife of the human psychē began to circulate, the essence of human identity shifted from the psychosomatic to the psychic (lorenz 2009; long 2015: 69; for the homeric view see Furley 1956).

Pythagorean Containers: Sōma Sēma The idea of an immortal soul that survives the death of an embodied person is first attested about 500 bce, in ideas associated with the pythagoreans. at about the same time, Orphic cults associated with the mythic poet Orpheus and the god dionysus proliferated. These beliefs are difficult to date or interpret. pythagorean interest in the psychē produced a radical break with homeric views in the new notion that a living being (human or animal, at least) is empsychon, that it has a psychē within, and that it is immortal. Charles huffman argues that pythagoreans such as philolaus of Croton (470-c.385 bce) used the word psychē to refer to a “soul” that was the centre of the personality during life and transmigrated after death. It was primarily understood as the seat of emotions, closely connected to sensation, and distinct from the intellect. It was common to humans and animals. It was not a “comprehensive soul”, but rather one among several psychic faculties, and clearly located in the body (huffman 2009: esp. 23–24):

(36) and there are four principles of the rational animal, just as philolaus says in On Nature: brain [enkephalos], heart [kardia], navel, genitals. The head [is the seat] of intellect [kephala men noou], the heart of life and sensation [kardia de psychās kai aisthēsis], the navel of rooting and first growth, the genitals of the sowing of seed and generation. The brain [contains] the origin of man, the heart the origin of animals, the navel the origin of plants, the genitals the origin of all (living things). For all things both flourish and grow from seed (philolaus, fr. 13; trans. after huffman 1993: 307).

Within this hierarchy, it is clear that the psychē was common to humans and animals but not plants. The passage is striking for its terminological distinction between perception and intellect, a distinction that became important for plato and aristotle (huffman 1993: 319). It makes a strong distinction between the intellect (noos), seated in the head or brain, and psychē, seated in the heart. But it does make clear that the psychē is contained within the body.65 a fragment of more dubious authenticity goes further and asserts that: (37) on account of certain penalties the soul [psycha] is yoked to the body [sōmati] and is buried in it as in a tomb [samati] (philolaus, fr. 14; trans. after huffman 1993: 402).66

This idea is in turn echoed by plato in the Gorgias (493a1-3) and Cratylus (400c1-7), which ascribes this view to the Orphics. Other fragments attest to the pythagorean view that the psychē was immortal and incorporeal:

(38) The soul is put into the body through number and a harmony that is immortal and at the same time incorporeal. and a little later: The body is loved by the soul because without it, it is not able to use the senses. after it has been drawn out of it at death, it lives an incorporeal life in the world (philolaus, fr. 22 (Claudianus Mamertus on the pythagoreans); trans. after huffman 1993: 411).

Plato: Soul as Ruler of Animals and Slaves For plato the soul can exist without the body because it is immortal and incorporeal. Thus the true self is separate from the body and is identified with the rational faculty.67 plato identifies reason or the rational soul as the true self, and introduces several important arguments.68 First is the claim in Alcibiades 1 that “what we ourselves are” (ti pot’ esmen autoi) is not the body but the psychē, the “user of the body” (tōi sōmati khrōmenon) and also its ruler.69 Socrates specifically rules out the possibility that we are a combination of the two (sunamphoteron), and adds that the body cannot rule itself because the soul rules it. as a result, someone who tends

the body (sōma therapeuei) tends a possession but not one’s self (oukh auton therapeuei). But to tend one’s psychē it is necessary to see it, and that is done through the mirror of another soul, specifically the parts of the psyche where wisdom, the virtue of the soul, abides.70 This argument to some extent a denial of both composite and container metaphors insofar as plato stresses the soul’s separation from the body, even if the two coexist in space. Second is his claim that the soul can exist without the body because it is an immortal and incorporeal substance. In the Phaedo (79b-80e), Socrates compares the soul to the divine and to permanent, invisible and immaterial Forms and the body to visible things that are material and constantly changing. In Republic X, after arguments for the immortality of the soul, Socrates distinguishes between the embodied soul as it is in life and the soul as it is “in truth” (alētheia); to see the latter it must be viewed as having nothing in common with the body. Only then does its true unity emerge (611c-612b). In the Phaedo by contrast the metaphor is of the soul as a ruler of slaves. plato argues that:

(39) When soul and body are joined together [en tōi autōi ōsi psychē kaì sōma], nature makes one to be a slave [douleuein] and the other to rule (plato, Phd. 80a). The comparison here is to the gods, who are immortal and by nature rulers of the mortal; the soul, by analogy, is the natural ruler of the body. But as david Bostock points out, the comparison is inexact for two reasons. The gods do not need to inhabit the mortal to rule it, nor does the soul always succeed in ruling the body (Bostock 1986: 119, cf. 126, 130–33, 146). plato uses these analogies as the basis for the “affinity argument” between souls and gods for the immortality of the soul. For purposes of this discussion, what is interesting is that, unlike the prevalent Chinese analogy of ruler and subordinate minister, the soul-body relation in this analogy is between ruler and servant or slave, who has no will or direction. Elsewhere, plato uses the image of Odysseus restraining his anger as a metaphor for the soul as ruler of parts of the body. In the Phaedo (94b-d) plato argues against the theory that the soul is a harmony, because of the parts that make up a person (tōn en anthrōpōi pantōn) only the soul can rule, therefore it does not yield to or harmonize with the feelings of the body. Instead it leads (hēgemoneusousa), opposes (enantioumenē), and even tyrannizes over (despozousa) the other components of the body, and speaks to the desires, passions and fears as if were something other apart from them. he illustrates this by the metaphor of Odysseus who:

(40) smiting his chest, he reproved his heart [kradiē] with these words: ‘Bear up heart, for you have endured worse than this’ (plato, Phd, 94d, cf. hom. Od. 20.17-18).

here, Odysseus seems to represent the soul prevailing over the body, though the terms plato uses are desire (epithymia), anger (orgē) and fear (phobos). plato stops short of insisting that “Odysseus” is somehow distinct from his body or heart, but it is ironic that this image denies the psychosomatic unity of persons so characteristic of the homeric poems. a different metaphor appears in the Phaedrus, where the tripartite soul morphs into chariot in which reason (logistikon) is the charioteer who drives the winged horses of spirits (thymoeidēs) and appetite (epithumetikon). (41) the charioteer holds the reigns of a pair of horses, moreover one of the horses is noble and good, and of good stock, while the other has the opposite character, and its stock is opposite. Therefore, the driving is necessarily difficult and troublesome (plato, Phdr. 246b, trans. after hackforth 1952: 69). These two SOUl aS rUlEr metaphors are very different. Odysseus’ heart, spirits and appetites are parts of himself, fully human and not enslaved. In the Phaedrus the charioteer, chariot and horses are also parts of a whole, the equipage of the moving chariot, but the two thymos components of the soul are subhuman and bound. The horses are yoked to a chariot, whether they obey or fight the charioteer. 3.3. Greek Blended Metaphors plato uses other body-soul metaphors that are blends in the sense that they combine multiple metaphors. however, unlike the Chinese blended metaphors, which combine dualist and holist elements, the Greek blended metaphors are dualist. although they appear to describe composites or containers – the soul “in” the body – they consistently undermine possible holist elements by insisting on the soul’s separation and distinctness from the body.

Plato’s Blended Metaphors: SOUL AS RULER + STATE AS BODY The image of Odysseus mastering his heart reappears in Republic 441b. here, there are three parts of the soul: reason (logistikon) high spirits (thymoeidēs) and appetite (epithymētikon).71 Taken in isolation, this passage might seem to be a straightforward SOUl aS rUlEr metaphor, but the context of the entire discussion is an analogy of correct rulership of the body and the state. at first glance, this blended metaphor appears to

combine the dualist SOUl aS rUlEr metaphor and a more holist STaTE aS BOdY metaphor, in which all the components, for all their differences, are parts of the unity of the state (or body). But the problem is that plato repeatedly distances Odysseus from his body, just as he repeatedly distances the soul from the body in the Phaedo passages discussed above.

Aristotle: SOUL AS RULER + STATE AS BODY aristotle’s image of the soul as ruler returns to the metaphor of slavery, rather than hierarchy, but within the context of analogies between the body and the state. In the Politics he argues that any living thing consists of a body and a soul, of which the soul is by nature (physei) the ruler (archon) and the body the ruled (archomenon). (42) it is possible to discern the rule both of master [despotikēn] and of statesman [politikēn]: the soul rules the body with the sway of a master [archei despotikēn archēn], the intelligence [noūs] the appetites [orexeis] with constitutional or royal rule [politikēn kai basilikēn] (aristotle, Pol., 1254b4-7, cf. 1254a34-35).

aristotle continues that for the soul to rule the body is both natural and to the advantage of the ruled. he then analogies this situation to the “natural” rule of humans over domesticated animals and of men over women. In all these cases he considers one better than the other, and the natural ruler over a natural subject (1254b10-15). Finally he concludes that all people who differ as widely as the soul from body and human from animal are by nature slaves (12b4b17-20). again, the Greek analogy of soul as ruler is a ruler over animals or slaves, rather than ruler over subordinates. Both metaphors (ruler of animals and ruler of slaves) are dualist in the sense that the psychē/ruler is physically distinct from the slaves or horses he controls. all are separate entities, in that ruler, charioteer, slaves and horses are all physically complete and discrete entities and not components of a larger whole. put another way, they are not “total mixtures” (krasis di’ holōn) in the Stoic sense of krasis, discussed above.72

Plato’s World Soul: SOUL AS RULER + COSMOS AS BODY a different blend of the SOUl aS rUlEr metaphor occurs in the Timaeus, where the “body” being compared to the human body is not a state but the cosmos itself. The Timaeus describes the universe as a living thing created by a divine demiurge. Its body is composed of fire, earth, air and water, and it includes all kinds of living things as its parts (29d-32c). according to the Timaeus, in forming the universe, the demiurge:

(43) put intelligence [noos] in its soul and soul in its body [psychē de en sōmati xunistas] that he might be the maker of a work that was by nature most fair and perfect. In this way then we ought to affirm according to the probable account that this universe is a living creature, possessed of soul and intelligence [kosmon zōion empsychon ennoun] (plato, Tim. 30b8-11).

Its soul is composed of harmonically proportionate portions of a mixture of (divisible and indivisible) Sameness, difference and Being, divided into intersecting circles of Same and different (35ab). It was woven together with the body from the centre out in every direction and covered it all around on the outside (36e). after creating the soul of the universe the demiurge created humans by using residue to create a number of souls equal to the number of stars and assigned one to each, and delegated to the gods the task of weaving mortal bodies and set them to rule over humans (42de). Galen’s Distributed Rulers Galen (129–200 ce) also argued for a tripartite soul along broadly platonic lines. he tried to find some agreement between what we might call the dualism of plato and the holism of the hippocratic authors. his move is to claim that a physiological account of mutually dependent parts of the body (parT-WhOlE) parallels a philosophical account of a tripartite soul (SOUl aS rUlEr). Galen assigns plato’s three “souls” to three different organs of the body:

(44) I claim to have proofs that the forms of the soul are more than one, that they are located in three different places, that one of them is divine, by which we reason [theïon estin ōi logizomestha], and the other two have to do with the feelings [pathētika] – with the one we are angry; with the other, which plants have too, we desire the pleasures that come through the body, and further that one of these parts is situated in the brain [en egkephalōi], one in the heart [en kardiai], and one in the liver [en hēpati] (Galen, php, de lacy 1978–84: 598.27-600.4).73

Elsewhere Galen refers to this reasoning faculty as “hegemonic” (hankinson 1991a: 200 esp. n. 10). Where Galen differs from plato is in at least suggesting that the soul is mortal, for example, in That the Powers of the Soul Depend upon the Temperament of the Body: (45) if the rational part is a form of the soul, then it is mortal: for it is a temperament of the brain (Galen, QaM IV 774-5, trans. hankinson 1991a: 203).

(46) all of this creates a strong presumption with regard to the whole of the soul that it is not incorporeal; for how could the soul be driven into an unnatural state as a result of its association with a body, unless it were some quality of a body, or some form, or some affection, or some power of a body? (Galen, QaM IV 788, trans. hankinson 1991a: 203).

Galen’s account of the different parts of the soul in the brain, heart and liver recalls the distribution of psychic faculties in the Huangdi neijing. But it is striking that at least some of the latter’s distributed container metaphors were broadly holist insofar as they emphasize the role of the zang organs and the faculties then “contain” in the functioning of the entire body. By contrast, Galen’s emphasis, like plato’s is in the separateness and distinctiveness of the psychē.

4. The Problem of Surviving Death Before drawing general conclusions, a difficulty remains to be addressed that arises from both sides of the foregoing comparison. Several texts, both Chinese and Greek, address the survival of some version of a person – xin, shen, hun, po or psychē – or unspecified other consciousness, after death. The Mohists are explicit about this, and a wide variety of material evidence from early China suggests the prevalence of such beliefs. But the idea that something of a person survives death presents difficulties for any holist account. It might be argued that any belief in the survival after death of some kind of mind or consciousness is an inherently dualist argument, since the body is clearly mortal. a comparative perspective makes it clear that this is not so. Just as we can identify a range of positions on the question of mind-body holism and dualism, we can also articulate a range of positions on the survival of “something” after death. let us consider four combinations of two pairs of beliefs about dualism and beliefs about some kind of consciousness surviving death, namely: 1. mind-body holism, 2. mind-body dualism, 3. denial of post-mortem consciousness 4. assertion of post-mortem consciousness. For purposes of this discussion, it should be noted that assertion of postmortem consciousness can take many non-philosophical forms, including popular belief, funerary ritual and other evidence of belief that some element of, for example, a dead ancestor, survived death and required

sacrifices, offerings, grave goods, etc. In many cases the Greek texts make explicit claims on these points, whereas many of the Chinese texts do not and require interpretation. For these reasons, the Greek texts may offer more clarity on the range of possible positions on this combination of views. at the two extremes of this spectrum are views that I will refer to as strong mortality and strong immortality. Strong mortality is the combination of mind-body holism (1) and denial of post-mortem consciousness (3); in the texts surveyed here, the strongest examples is this view are aristotle and Epicurus. a perhaps weaker version of this view is the syncretism of Galen, who combines platonic and Stoic views. he follows plato’s tripartite view of the soul (Republic) and his assignment of those faculties to three organs of the body (Timaeus), but also subscribes to the aristotelian, Stoic and broadly Greek view of the unity physical and mental (or more properly, psychic) faculties (hankinson 1991a: 198–99, 1991b: 209–10). Strong immortality is the combination of mind-body dualism (2) and the assertion of post-mortem consciousness (4). Claims for strong immortality are clearly represented on the Greek side by the pythagoreans, who asserted the transmigration of the souls of humans, other animals and plants, and by plato, who asserted the immortality of the psychē. Two intermediate positions can be identified as claims for weak mortality and weak immortality. Claims for weak mortality combine mind-body dualism (2) and denial or scepticism about post-mortem consciousness (3). I can find little evidence of this position in either Chinese or Greek antiquity. The closest would probably be Galen (discussed above), but his platonism does not extend to the espousal of mind-body dualism. Claims for weak immortality combine mind-body holism (1) with claims for or some kind of recognition of post-mortem consciousness (4). Greek examples include the homeric poems (insofar as the psychē leaves the body at death and goes to hades) and the Stoics (who combine assertions of the unity of the physical and psychic with belief in the immortality of the psychē). Chinese examples clearly include the Mohists, who, as has been argued above, argue for a “composite” mind-body holism but also assert that the dead have consciousness. I would argue that they also include most of the other Chinese texts surveyed here. They do not make explicit statements on post-mortem consciousness, but nonetheless can be read in the context of late Warring States and han views of an afterlife that, among other things, required substantial preparation by the living in the form of grave goods and funerary rituals. The important point for the present discussion is that claims for weak immortality can coexist with mind-body holism, albeit not in its strongest forms.

5. Conclusion This very preliminary account leaves us with several conclusions. The first is that we cannot essentialize Chinese and “Western” mind-body dualisms. Both the Chinese and Greek evidence present examples of holist, dualist and blended metaphors of different kinds. Nor can we adopt a simple progressivist model to account for this variety within each cultural context. Thus, second, this comparison underscores that there is no “evolution” from holism to dualism in either cultural context. To put it differently, the absence of any “natural” progression from holism to dualism has important implications for a variety of teleological assumptions behind standard accounts of the history of Western philosophy. Instead, the evidence shows a spectrum of possibilities, with many of the most philosophically interesting positions being in the middle. Whether we describe that “middle” as weak holism or weak dualism will depend on our starting assumptions. Much of the interest is not in the dualisms but in the details. What kind of container is the body? What kind of ruler is the mind? What kind of possibly very different evidence do we get from material culture, and from the technical traditions? For example, some accounts of composite body-minds in both humans and animals are based on the claim of similar constitution between humans and animals: of blood and qi in the Chinese case and of the four roots or elements in the cases of Empedocles, the hippocratic Corpus, and aristotle.74 One noticeable difference in the texts surveyed above is the relative emphasis on container metaphors in the Chinese texts and composite metaphors in non-dualist Greek texts (25–38). In both cases, the mind, soul or spirit is in some sense contained within the body, but explicit container metaphors emphasize its (or its parts’) boundaries and porosity or lack of it, for example in the Guanzi (5–9, 22) and Huangdi neijing (10–12, 20–21). By contrast, Greek dualist accounts

present composite and container metaphors but de-emphasize them. The pythagorean “sōma sēma” (36–38) is an explicit container metaphor, but its force is to disparage the imprisonment of the psychē during the life of the body. although psychē and body are joined together as an unspecified composite (39) plato emphasizes the soul’s enslavement of the body and de-emphasizes or denies their cocomposition, for example, in the image of Odysseus mastering elements within the container of his body (40). The Timaeus is explicit that the soul is somehow contained within the body (43), but that containment is deemphasized. By contrast, plato’s tripartite soul is contained within the body, within which reason masters both kinds of spirit, which are separate from it, but like it, in the interior of the body’s container.

In other dualist ruler-slave images, the ruler controls an entity that is not co-contained. In plato’s Phaedrus chariot metaphor (41), the ruler’s chariot is linked to its horses by their harness; he is connected and controls, but inhabits separate space. aristotle distances himself even further from the container schema in his account of the soul ruling the body. his analogies, humans ruling animals and men ruling women all describe entities compelling other, physically separate entities. In summary, while several of the same metaphors appear in both Chinese and Greek texts, they are used in different ways and in the service of different arguments. The range of metaphors presented here clearly shows that dualism – or holism – is no one’s cultural property.

6. Time Line

Chinese Greek 7th century bce 750–700 writing of Homeric poems 6th century 551–479 Confucius c. 580–496 Pythagoras 5th century c. 430 Mo Di fl. 470–c. 385 Philolaus of Croton 437–347 Plato c. 450–350 Hippocratic corpus 4th century 372–289 Mencius 4th century Zhuangzi c. 384–322 Aristotle 341–270 Epicurus 3rd century 310–237 Xunzi 280–207 Chrysippus 2nd century 179–122 Liu An (Huainanzi) 1st century bce c. 100 comp. Huangdi neijing 99–55 Lucretius 1st century ce 45–120 Plutarch c. 55–135 Epictetus 2nd century 129–200 Galen fl. 2nd century Hierocles Endnotes 1. This paper is indebted to comments by Sor hoon Tan, luke O’Sullivan, and two anonymous readers for the Journal of Cognitive Historiography. 2. lisa raphals is professor, Chinese and Comparative literature and cooperating faculty, philosophy department, University of California, riverside. 3. Methodologically (Slingerland 2013: 28), he also argues for a “humanities-Science interface” in the use of large text databases, arguing that they provide a more “objective” alternative and serve as a corrective to cherry-picking of key passages. 4. particularly useful is Clarke 1999, esp 3–49, to which the following discussion is indebted. 5. For example, the Swedish Sanskritist Ernst arbman’s distinction between a “body soul”

and a “free soul” entails the assumption of some correspondence between early Greek and Vedic Indian beliefs. according to arbman’s (1926) taxonomy (discussed in Bremmer 1983: 8–10), a body soul endows the body with life and consciousness, is active during the conscious life of a living person, and is often divided into several parts. a free soul is usually nonmaterial and represents the individual. It is active when the body is unconscious, and does not have an exact location in the body. For critique of this approach see Clarke 1999: 43–44. 6. The historian of medicine Volker Scheid (2002: 27–28) argues that in English and other Indo-European languages, “body” has the implicit meaning of a vat or container. he also claims that it is categorically opposed

to “mind”, a claim not supported by the homeric evidence. 7. The less common term qu 軀 also refers to the physical frame (Sivin 1995; Sommer 2008). 8. For an excellent treatment of the semantics of these terms see lo 2003. This study focuses on the Analects of Confucius, but gives a detailed account of their early history. 9. For this term see despeux 2007, esp. 73–74 and Sterckx 2007. 10. For hun and po see Seidel 1982, Yü 1987, Brashier 1996 and lo 2008. 11. Bruno Snell (1951) famously argued that in homer sōma always referred to a corpse and never to a living body, which the “soul” (psychē) leaves at death, cf. adkins 1970 and renehan 1979. 12. For homeric references see Bremmer 1983: 14–21 and 54–57. For more on these terms see harrison 1960. 13. The Mozi

refers to texts and teachings associated with Mo di 墨翟 (fl. c. 430 bce). The two chapter titled “Canons” (chapters 40 and 41, Jing shang 經上, Jing xia 經下) were probably written and compiled between the late 4th and mid 3rd centuries bce, and consist of terse statements. Two chapters of “Explanations” (chapters 42 and 43, Shuo shang 說上, Shuo xia 說下), provide commentary to them. I follow Graham’s (1978) translation and conventins for citing Canons (a) and their corresponding explanations (B). 14. For example, order in the Guanzi text does not reflect their age; “Inner Workings” is last but is the longest and oldest. “art of the Mind, 2” (Xinshu xia) is closely related to it, and appears to develop ideas from it, while “art of the Mind, 1” (Xinshu

shang) is a completely separate work, but a fourth chapter, “The pure Mind” (Bai xin 白心, chapter 38), expands on several concepts from both “Inner Workings” and “art of the Mind, 1”. an additional difficulty is that “art of the Mind, 1” consists of “statements” and “explanations” of them, and there is considerable debate about the authorship of the latter, especially. Guo Moruo 郭沫若 argued that the Nei ye and Xinshu chapters were written by the Jixia academy scholar Song Xing 宋 銒 (385–304 bce). In Guo’s view (1944: 247) the statements were written by Song Xing and the explanations were notes by his students. For discussion of these chapters see rickett 1998: 15–16 and 32–39. 15. here and in other Guanzi passages, line breaks what in the original is in

rhymed verse are eliminated for the sake of brevity. 16. Especially his translation of jing and qi as “vital essence” and “vital force”, respectively. 17. Mark Csikszentmihalyi (2005) identifies this kind of argument with a “material virtue” tradition, exemplified in the Mencius and the Wuxing or “Five Kinds of action”, recovered from tombs at Guodian and Mawangdui. 18. This passage would not be retrieved in large-scale text studies of mind-body dualism that only use xin to indicate “mind” (cf. Slingerland and Chudek 2011). 19. For a different translation see rickett 1998: 73. I follow rickett in translating guan 宮 here as “mansion”, rather than “official” or “(sensory) organ”. The term can refer to a dwelling or (official) residence. 20. The Huangdi neijing was probably compiled about 100 bce, but contains materials

probably assembled over the previous several hundred years. In its present form, it consists of two parts, the “Basic Questions” (Huangdi neijing suwen 黃帝內經素問) and the “Spiritual pivot” (Huangdi neijing lingshu 黃帝內經靈樞). The Suwen describes theoretical principles and methods of diagnosis, while the Lingshu focuses on acumoxa and other forms of therapy. For discussion of its textual history see Unschuld 2003. Translations of the Suwen are based on Unschuld and Tessenow 2011. Translations of the Lingshu are my own, but are indebted to Wong 1987 and Milsky and andrès 2009. 21. For discussion of the

heart-mind as container see Slingerland 2003: 226–28. 22. Huangdi neijing lingshu 8.2, 291 (Ben shen). The passage also states that the heart receives the vessels (mai), which in turn house the spirit (心藏脈，脈舍神, 8.3, 292, Ben shen). It adds that if the heart qi is empty, there will be anxiety, and if it is full, there will be unceasing laughter. Other chapters also reflect the view that excessive emotion harms the viscera. For example, according to the chapter “The Origin of Maladies”: “grief and worry harm the heart; double coldness harms the lungs; rage and anger harm the liver” (憂思傷心，重寒傷肺，忿怒傷肝, Huangdi neijing lingshu, 66.4, 439, Bai ji shi sheng 百病始生). 23. For example, the “discourse on the Nine Needles” states that the heart, lungs, liver and spleen store spirit, po, hun and thought, but the kidneys store essence and will (五藏：心藏 神，肺藏魄，肝藏魂，脾藏意，腎藏精志也). Huangdi neijing lingshu 78.5.2, 472 (Jiu zhen lun 九鍼論). 24. according to the Wang Bing commentary, the phrase zhi yi 志意, which Unschuld and Tessenow translate as “mind”, refers to the five spirits. 25. 藏真通於心，心藏血脈之氣也. Huangdi neijing suwen 18: 110 (Ping ren qi xiang lun 平人氣象論) trans. after Unschuld and Tessenow 2011, 1: 305. 26. Huangdi neijing suwen 4: 37 (Jin gui zhen yan lun 金匱真言論), Unschuld and Tessenow 2011, 1: 89. 27. For part-whole schemata see Johnson 1987: 28, 100, 126; lakoff and Johnson 1989: 28–30, 35. 28. For container metaphors see lakoff and Johnson 1980: 10–12, 30–32; Johnson 1987:

33–40, 59–64, 88, 105, 125; lakoff and Johnson 1989: 20, 31–36, 275–82. 29. loewe 1993 is a particularly useful guide to this issue. 30. For further discussion of the heart-mind’s hegemony see robins 2014. 31. Guodian Tomb No. 1 was unearthed in 1993. Its occupant was the teacher of King Qingxiang of Chu 楚頃襄王 (r. 298–263 bce). The tomb contained some 800 bamboo slips, including a manuscript version of the daode jing and previously unknown works. For a full introduction and translation see Cook 2012. 32. In blending theory, a simple source to target domain mapping or “single-scope blend” occurs when two input spaces (or metaphors) project onto a third “blended” space, but the structure comes from only one input. In multiple scope blends, structure comes

from more than one input domain. as a result the blend has a new structure. For introductions to blending theory see Coulson 2001, Fauconnier and Turner 2002 and Slingerland 2011, esp 13–15. 33. hutton translates guan as “faculties” (see n. 21, above) and xin as heart. 34. The Huainanzi 淮南子, a collection of scientific and philosophical essays from the court of huainan, is attributed to liu an 劉安 (c. 179–122 bce), King of huainan. references to the Wenzi 文子 first appear in the han dynasty. an bamboo strip copy of the text was discovered in the tomb of of King huai 懷王 of Zhongshan (dingzhou 定州, hebei), dated to 55 bce. 35. For additional citations and discussion see Yu 2007, 2009; Slingerland 2013: 16–17. 36. according to the commentary to this passage: “a craftsman is able to accomplish things; an overseer is able to rule over them”.

37. For this view see Falkenhausen 2006: 300. For claims for the non-corporeality of the dead see Cook 2006: 17 and lai 2005: 42, 2015. For contrary claims see Wu 1994; poo 1990 and 1998. There are also textual accounts of an afterlife in accounts of ghosts in the Zuo zhuan and of bringing the dead back to life in the Zhuangzi. For other arguments for mind-body dualism in early China see Goldin 2003. For a summary of these issues see Slingerland 2013: 10–15.

38. See Slingerland 2013: 8–10. Slingerland advocates this position against what he calls a strong holist position, which claims no qualitative distinction between mind and body. 39. liddell and Scott 1940: χρώς; adkins 1970: 21; renehan 1979; Snell 1951; Gavrylenko 2012. 40. See Snell 1982: 6; Vernant 1989: 11; Gavrilenko 2012: 489. 41. E.g. Il. 8.380, Od. 9.293, 11.219. This term is discussed above on page 137. 42. Od. 11.215-22. For other accounts see Il. 1.1-10, Od. 11.74. 43. For these points see long 2015: 208–209 n. 7 and 7–8, respectively. 44. For these terms see Cheyns 1985, summarized briefly in darcus Sullivan 1995. 45. For these references see harrison 1960: 64. For further discussion see Furley 1956. 46. For important discussions of body and soul in hellenistic philosophy see Everson 1991; King 2006; long 1982, 1991; Sorabji 2006 and Von Staden 2000. 47. For example, if an axe were alive its soul would be what defined it as an axe (the ability to hew, chop, etc.) and its body would be metal (da 412b11-16). See lloyd 1983 and 1996, French 1994. 48. Nutrition (and reproduction, threptikon), desire (oretikon), sensation (aisthetikon), locomotion (kineton kata topon), imagination (phantasia) and reason (noūs). plants have only the faculty of nutrition (da 414a29-414b1). 49. Von Staden 2000: 79–80 and 86. Cf. Sorabji 2006: 33 and 115–36, esp. 115–18. 50. Cf. von Staden 2000: 81, 85; Gill 2006b: 48–49. 51. Epicur. Ep. Hdt. 63, trans. lS 14a1-3, 1: 65. On this point see Von Staden 2000: 82. 52.

liddell and Scott 1940 (στεγ-άζω) gloss the verb stegazo “to cover” as the roof of a building or the body that “covers” the soul. 53. Epicur. Ep. Hdt. 67; lS 14a7, 1: 66. 54. See lS 21E1, 24C2, 21r2 and 21V, cited in Gill 2006a: 114–16. 55. Gill 2006b: 209–12. These ideas are elaborated at greater length in Gill 2006a. 56. Sextus Emp. Op 1.79, cf. Op 2.29, Adv. math. 11.46 = SVF 3.96). 57. The othe two are juxtaposition and fusion. In juxtaposition or joining (mixis parathesei, kath’ harmēn), each substance preserves its own integrity, although all its surfaces are in contact with other substances, for example, beans and grains in wheat. In fusion (synchysis), by contrast, the characteristics of the original substances are destroyed and a new substance, is

created, for example, a compounded medical drug. See alexander, De mixtione 3, SVF 2.473, esp. pp. 155, 24–29. See Todd 1976: 30–65; Sorabji 1988: 79–105; Von Staden 2000: 98–100. 58. plutarch, Praec. conjugalia, 34, SVF2.366. Cf. long 1982, 38; Von Staden 2000, 100. 59. Cf. Von arnim 1906, long 1991: 107. 60. regimen I, 3.24-4.1-21, littré 6: 472–77. references to hippocratic texts are from littré 1839–1861. English translations are indebted to littré and to the translation of W. h. S. Jones in the loeb Classical library. Both body and soul are shaped by inheritance and environment, including regimen. See Gundert 2000: 31–32, Simon 1978, ch. 2 and Singer 1992: 131–43. 61. regimen I, 14-16 and 17.1, littré 6: 492. 62. regimen I, 10.15-19, littré 6: 486. 63. regimen I, 35.1-4, littré 6: 513. Fire has moisture from water and vice versa, so both are as self-sufficient as possible.

64. regimen I, 36.1-11, littré 6: 522–24. Irascibility, indolence, craftiness, simplicity, quarrelsomeness and benevolence are due to the nature of the passages through which the soul passes, and are due to the nature of the vessels through which it passes, what objects it encounters and with what it mixes. These things cannot be changed through regimen. 65. plato (Tim. 69d-71a) also assigns human psychic faculties to specific regions of the body. 66. These texts are written in the doric dialect, which accounts for variations in terms for soul (psycha) and tomb (sama). 67. antecedents of this view begin

with the homeric poems ( Od. 11.601-3), where Odysseus speaks with the dead shade of heracles, who “himself” (autos) is with the gods. 68. plato, Phd. 63bc, Alc. 133c4-6, Rep. 9, 589a6-b6, cf. Socrates’ claim that he is not his body but his rational soul (Phd. 115c). 69. plato, Alc., 128e-130a. For discussion of these passages see Gill 2006a: 5–6 and 344–58. 70. plato, Alc., 130a-133c. Similar claims occur at Rep. 611d and Phd. 78d-84b, discussed below. 71. plato, Rep., 339e-441a. For a somewhat different view see lorenz 2009. 72. For a useful discussion see Singer 2016, sec. 6. 73. For discussion see hankinson 1991a, 1991b and 2006. 74. a different kind of “composite” account, as in the Chinese case is where the amalgam of body and xin is also broken down into identifiable physical components in a state of balance or homeostasis. This probably has Greek analogues in Empedocles and the hippocratic corpus (hankinson 1991b).

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