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Buddhist Logic before Dinnaga

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(Asanga, Vasubandhu, Tarka-sastras)
By professor guiseppe tucci
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland
1929.07, p 451-488

 We must admit that very little is known about the first development of Indian logic and particularly about Buddhist logic before Dinnaga. If we take the best manuals of Indian logic now available, such as those by Suali, Vidyabhusana, Keith, or the most comprehensive Histories of Indian philosophy like those of Dasgupta and Radhakrishna we shall easily recognize that the data contained therein are far from being satisfactory; more than that, they are also very often wrong. In fact, almost the only source from which their statements are derived is the book by Sugiura,

1) who certainly had the merit of giving the first account of Indian logic as preserved in Chinese sources, but, being himself absolutely without knowledge of orthodox nyaya and of Sanscrit, is in his statements and in his translations very often misleading.

(2) On the other hand, it is evident that a better knowledge of the logical schools before Dinnaga might settle many a vexed question, including those of the originality of Dinnaga himself, his indebtedness to previous masters, and the relation between his theory of the syllogism and that expounded in the Prasastapada-bhasya. Unfortunately the largest part of the texts on logic anterior to Dinnaga seems to be lost.

We have, it is true, two fragments preserved in Chinese; one is the so-called Upaya-hrdaya--not Upaya-kausalya-hrdaya as suggested by Nanjio and accepted by Bagchi; the other is a fragmentary treatise in three chapters, attributed by some catalogues of the canon to Vasubandhu. By Nanjio, Ui and Bagchi it is called Tarka-sastra. The first was translated by Ki Kya Ye

(1) ; the second by Paramartha. Although the statement of Takakusu that all the works translated by Paramartha are anterior to A.D. 500 is too dogmatical, we are at any rate confronted here with a fairly ancient book.

(2) So far as the first text is concerned, there are no grounds either for affirming or for denying its attribution to Nagarjuna; but there is no doubt that it represents fairly ancient theories which are very nearly akin to those contained in the Caraka-samhita.
(3) These two treatises have been retranslated into Sanscrit by me and will shortly be published in the Baroda Sanscrit Series.

As they are certainly the most ancient fragments of the Vivada-sastras that we possess, their bearing upon the problem of the relations between pure heuristic and Later Nyaya doctrines is very great.

But we should like to have other texts of indubitable authorship, in order to fix a terminus a quo and to ascertain which school must be credited with an original contribution to logical theories. Fortunately, such texts have been preserved.

We may divide them into three categories, (a) Chinese sources; (b) Tibetan sources; (c) Sanscrit sources. The first category includes the translations of the following books:--[l] Yogacarya-bhumi-sastra, ·ì ¦÷®v¦a½×, by Asanga. Of this monumental work we have also the Tibetan translation (Bstan agyur, mdo dsi, foll. 1-332--Cordier.

        1. On Ki Kia Ye (fifth century A.D.) see Chavannes,
           Cinq cent contes, iii, n. 1, Demieville, BEFEO.
           xxiv, 1924, pp. 65-6, n. 4. We know from the K'ai
           yuan shih kiao lu, ¶}¤¸ÄÀ±Ð¿ý, that before Ki Kia
           Ye another translation of this work had been made
           by Buddihabhadra of the Eastern Tsin. Cf. Bagchi,
           Canon Bouddhque en Chine, p. 346.
        2. BEFEO. 1904, p. 3.

        3. See Ui's Studies in Indian Phil., vol. ii, p. 428.

      Catalogue du fonds tibetain, vol. iii, p. 378).
[2] Prakaranarya-vaca-sastra, Åã´­¸t±Ð½×. The chapter concerning our subject corresponds almost verbatim with the preceding.

[3] Mahayanabhidharma-sangiti-sastra, ¤j­¼ªü¬s¹F¿i¶°½×. The theories expounded in this work differ very often from those contained in the two preceding texts. Its doctrines are explained in the commentary written upon it by Sthiramati(1) and called

[4] Mahayanabhidharma-samyukta-sangiti-sastra, ¤j­¼ªü¬s¹F ¿iÂø¶°½×. Then we can collect a great deal of information from the commentaries written by K'uei Chi, the disciple of Yuan Chwang. I have used the Commentary on the Nyayapravesa, which has been partly translated by me in a previous study(2) which may complete in some way the statements contained in the present paper. I am aware of the fact that K'uei Chi wrote also a commentary upon the Yogacarya-bhumi-sastra, called ·ì¦÷®v¦a½×²¤Ä¡, and another on the Abhidharma-samyukta-sangiti

(3); but I could not here in Indin get copies of these two texts. On the other hand, I have used the commentary of Shen T'ai, another disciple of Yuan Chwang, on the Nyaya-mukha.

(4) The second category is represented by the Pramana-samuccaya-vrtti, by Dinnaga

(5) It contains, as we shall see, much precious information about the logical activity of the schools that preceded him.

        1. On Sthiramati see Peri in BEFEO. 1911, 348 and
        2. Notes on the Nyaya-pravesa in Bollettino della
           Scuola di Studi Orientali, 1928.
        3. This is called ¤j­¼ªü¬s¹F¼¯Âø¶°½×­z°O, usually
           quoted under the abridged form ¹ïªk½×²¨.
        4. The Nyaya-mukha (not Nyaya-tarka-dvara-sastra; see
           JRAS. 1928, p. 7) has been translated into English
           by me and compared with the corresponding portions
           of the Pramana-samuccaya. It will shortly be
           published in the Materialien zur Kunde des
           Buddhismus of Professor Walleser.
        5. The Pramana-samuccaya is preserved in Tibetan,
           together with two translations of the vrtti of
           Dinnaga himself (Bstan agyur, mdo, ce, Cordier, p.
           434). I have used the copy of the University of
           Calcutta, which has been kindly put at my disposal
           by the authorities. This copy belongs to the
           Narthang edition.

            In the third category we may include those quotations and allusions which can be found in Uddyotakara's Nyaya-varttika and Vacaspati Misra's Nyaya-varttika-tatparrya-tika. It is evident that the second and the third category can supply us only with fragments, while in the first we are confronted with complete texts or commentaries, which, through the intermediacy of Yuan Chwang, are likely to go back to a tradition of exegesis current in the Indian monasteries at the time of the travels of the great pilgrim. In any case, by combining all these references, we can attain a better knowledge of Indias logic before Dinnaga than we have had up to the present.

We shall begin by studying the Chinese translations which belong to the so-called Yogacara school started by Asanga and developed by Vasubandhu. The teaching of this school, in its dogmatical structure, seems to be more related to the Sautrantika doctrines than to the ontological theories expounded in the Lankavatara or in the Mahayana-sraddhotpada.

The contents of the chapters that are of interest to us were made known by Sugiura, and after him by Vidyabhusana, who based himself upon the resume given by the Japanese scholar. But even this summary is far from correct or complete. Moreover, there is in the books referred to many a detail which has been passed unnoticed by the Japanese and Indian scholars.

Even the attribution of the Yogacarya-bhumi-sastra to Maitreya is wrong, although it is generally accepted and repeated by Indologists. This fact is rather important because, accepting the attribution of the text to Maitreya, we should be compelled to admit ipso facto an earlier date for it; but there is no doubt that it is by Asanga and represents perhaps one of the last and most complete products of the wonderful activity of the great master. In the exposition that follows we shall indicate by A the group Yogacarya-bhumi-sastrra and Prakaranarya-vaca and by B the group Sangiti and Samyukta-sangiti.


The first classification that we meet is that concerning "speech", vakya, ½×, There are seven heads, viz.:--

I. vakya in itself, ½×Åé©Ê,
II. The place where speech is made, the parisat, ½×³B ©Ò,'e. I
II.The basis or the support of speech, ½×©Ò¨Ì, smra. bai.gzi, vakya-mula or vakyasraya.
IV. Adornment of speech, ½×²øÄY, smra.bai.rgyan, vakyalankaar.
V. The defeat of a speech, i.e. in argument, ½×¼Z­t, smra.bai.c', vakya-nigraha.
VI. That which derives or comess forth from a speech, ½×¥XÂ÷,, *vada-sambhava.
VII. Those characteristics which are the causes of a speech being appreciated (by the hearers), ½×¦h©Ò §@ªk,'os. rnams.

We shall later discuss the third point, which has the main interest for us, and give here a mere summary of the various subdivisions of the other six items, as they have not the same bearing on the history of logical theories in India.

. vakya. This can be of six kinds--
(a) Vakya in itself.

(b) Excellent words, that is words with which the world is pleased. (c) Disputation-words, which are uttered when two men engaged in a discussion maintain quite different opinions about a particular object or a particular thesis.

It is worthy of notice that, while 13 simply states that it consists in holding opposed views, A insists at length upon the various causes of the dispute. It asserts that these are to be found in the abhinivesa, "attachment," of the creatures belonging to the kama-dhatu or in the criticism that human beings are inclined to express about the sinful deeds of body, mind and speech of others, or in the discussion of the various drstis, e.g. those of eternity or of uccheda, at a time when the disputants are not yet free from passion.

(d) Rebuke-words (apavada-vakya), ·´Á½½× or

(B) ·´½×, ts' It includes unpleasant words or the teaching of false theories.
(e) Accordant speech, ¶¶¥¿½×, mt' any speech which is in accordance with the dharma and aiming at producing a right knowledge in tile mind of the hearers.

(f) Teaching, ±Ð¾É½×, The first two items can be either good or bad, and therefore it is necessary to distinguish them according to circumstances; the next two are always bad and therefore must be avoided. The last two are always good and therefore must be practised.
            II. Place where a speech is made--
            (a) before a king;
            (b) before a governor;
            (c) in a great assembly;
            (d) before sramanas who are well versed in the
            (e) before Brahmans;
            (f) before those who like to hear the dharma.
            IV. Adornment of speech. Its fundamental aspects
        are five according to A, but six according to B.

             A. I and II B. Sangiti and Sthiramati
          (a) Perfect knowledge of Id.
        one's own as well as of
        another's system, µ½¦Û¥L©v
        bdag.dan.p'a.rol.gyi.lugs. ses . pa (sva-para-siddhanta-jnana).
          (b) Perfection of the phrase, Id.
        »y¥y¶êº¡ ts'ig.sbyor. bp'un.sum.ts'ogs. pa. A phrase
        is perfect when it is possessed
        of five good characteristics.
        That is to say, it must be:-

        (1) devoid of any rustic No mention of these five
        expression. subdivisions. The perfection
        (2) easy. of the phrase consists in
        (3) evident. avoiding mistakes through
        (4) coherent. knowledge of the sabda-sastra
        (5) having a good meaning and the vyutpatti-sastra.
        (c) µL¬È,, Id.
        abhirutva, fearlessness. Even
        if one finds himself among a
        parisat numerous or hostile,
        he must be sure of himself.
        (d) ´°µÂ,, dhirata, Id.
        (e) Speech possessed of Id.
        those characteristics that will
        be esteemed and attractive,
        À³¨Ñ, Adds: ÅG¤~=pratibhana
                                      when sentences flow

            At this point A gives a list of twenty-seven
        prasamsa-gunas, which are the ornaments, as it were,
        of an excellent speech:-

            (1) high estimation by hearers;
            (2) belief and acceptance by hearers;
            (3) absence of fear;
            (4) knowledge of the mistakes in the thesis of
        the adversaries;
            (5) knowledge of the superiority of one's own
            (6) absence of abhinivesa;
            (7) not to be partial towards one's own system;
            (8) not to renounce one's own law and rules;
            (9) to understand quickly what has been said by
        the adversaries;
            (10) to grasp quickly what has been said by the
            (11) to explain quickly what has been said by the

            (12) the power of captivating the assembly with
        gifts of speech;
            (13) to be able to rejoice those who like
            (14) the power of expressing in the best way the
        meaning of the arguments;
            (15) no trace of depression in the body, while
            (16) no depression in mind while discussing;
            (17) no stammering;
            (18) to maintain always presence of mind
            (19) no bodily fatigue to be shown;
            (20) memory always functioning;
            (21) mind uninjured;
            (22) no pain or impediment in the throat;
            (23) expressiveness of the voice;
            (24) restraint of one's own mind in order to
        prevent anger;
            (25) to comply with the other's mind in order to
        avoid his wrath;
            (26) to act in such a way that the adversary may
        be persuaded in his own mind;
            (27) to be considered everywhere as a great
        V. Nigraha-sthanas. These can be of three fundamental
        kinds: -
            (a) vacana-sannyasa, ¬B¨¥,;
            (b) when the speaker perceives that his words
        have been refuted with success by the opponent and
        therefore tries to avoid further discussion, ¨¥©},', vacanabhibhava;
            (c) erroneous speech, vacana-dosa, ¨¥¹L,

 Vacana-sannyasa consists in confessing one's own defeat and in acknowledging that the thesis of the adversary is right. According to group I it can be of thirteen kinds; e.g. my thesis is wrong, your thesis is right, etc. Vacanabhibhava occurs when a speaker, realizing that his arguments are wrong, tries to avoid the discussion, saying that he has something else to do, or brings into the discussion new arguments not connected with previous ones, or looks irritated, angry, conceited, or reveals some defect or fault in the adversary which the latter does not like to have disclosed, or looks offended or shows impatience or distrust, or has nothing to reply and therefore keeps silence, or looks abashed and trembling or bends his head or appears as if he were deprived of the faculty of thinking and specking.

 Vacana-dosa can be of nine kinds-- (a) to speak at random;

(b) violent expressions, suggested by anger, etc.;
(c) obscurity of expression, when the speaker cannot be understood either by the assembly or by the adversary;
(d) lack of proportion, when the expression is either defective or excessive (adhikya-nyunatva);
(e) meaningless, «D¸q¬ÛÀ³,, vyartha. It is of ten kinds:--

(1) anarthaka, µL¸q,;
(2) aparthaka, ¹H¸q,;
(3) yukti-hani, ·l²z,;
(4) sadhya-sama, »P©Ò¦¨µ¥,;
(5) jati, ©Û¶°¹LÃø, ltag.gc';
(6) arthanupalabdhi, ¤£±o¸q§Q,;
(7) asambaddha, ¸qµL¦¸§Ç,;
(8) aniscita, ¸q¤£¨M©w,
(9) siddha-sadhya, when the probandum is already proved, ¦¨


(10) a speech according to illogical or wrong doctrines, ts''ags.pai.snad.du.mi.hos.''o, ¶¶¤£ºÙ ²z½Ñ¨¸´c. Sthiramati knows only the first five of these nigraha-sthanas, and he considers the other five as mere explanations of them (1< 6, 2 < 7, 3 < 8, 4 < 9, 5 < 10);

(f) aprapta-kala, when the various arguments are not brought forward in order;
(g) aniscita (or aniyata), when someone either attacks an argument that he has already established as his thesis or establishes as a thesis an argument that he has already attacked or suddenly changes his ideas; (h) obscurity;
(i) lack of cohesion.

VI. That which derives or comes forth from a speech. This is threefold, consisting of
(a) guna-dosa-pariksa, Æ[¹î¼w¥¢,;
(b) parisat-pariksa, ²³·|, ak';
(c) pandityapanditya- pariksa, µ½¤£µ½, mk''as.

The first consists in examining whether the discussion undertaken will be of some use or not to the speaker and to the hearers. If one knows that no good result is to be expected from the discussion, he must avoid it. The second consists in ascertaining whether the parisat is impartial, learned, strictly honest. If this be not the case, the discussion must be avoided. The third consists in examining whether one has the knowledge and the ability necessary to carry on the discussion satisfactorily, If an aspirant acknowledges that he is not possessed of the requisite and indispensable qualities, he must renounce the disputation.

VII. The characteristics which cause a, speech to be appreciated by the hearers are

(a) knowledge of one's own and opposing systems,
(b) absence of fear,
(c) promptitude of intelligence:
(a) sva-para-mata-jnana, µ½¦Û¥L©v, bdag. dan.p';
(b) abhiruta, µL¬È, mi. ajigs; (
c) pratibhana, ÅG¤~, Now we shall study the section dedicated to the third item, that is, to the basis or support of a speech. In a discussion we can distinguish two elements, which are respectively called
(a) the probandum, sadhya, ©Ò¦¨¸q, bsgrub.par.bya. bai.don, and

(6) the proof, sadhana, ¯à¦¨, The probandum is twofold, that is to say, we may prove either a subject (lit. an entity, svabhava, ¦Û©Ê, or an attribute (lit. a quality, visesa, ®t§O, bye.brag). In the first case I can affirm or deny the existence of something, that is, I can say that it is or is not. In the second I may affirm or deny that a given quality belongs or not to the subject. In this way according to the example given by Sthiramati a sadhya can be of either of the following types:-

(a) "the atman is, is not."
(b) "the atman is all-pervading" or "sound is non- eternal"

The proof, or sadhana, consists of eight terms, although the list and the definition of these vary remarkably in the various texts that represent our sources.
                 A. B.
          (1) pratijna, proposition, Id.
          (2) hetu, reason, ÅG¦], Id.
          (3) drstanta, example, ¤Þ Id.
          (4) sadharmya, homogeneity, Application, ¦X.
              ¦PÃþ, mt'un. Pa.
          (5) vaidharmya, heterogeneity, ²§Ãþ,'
              Conclusion, µ².
          (6) pratyaksa, direct per- Id.
              ception, ²{¶q ,mnon. sum.
          (7) anumana, inference, ¤ñ Id.
          (8) agama, authority, ¦Ü Id.
              ±Ð, yid.c'es.pai.lun.
          (1) "Proposition," pratijna.

      A. Pratijna consists in maintaining as one's own thesis a particular point of view concerning the twofold probandum already referred to. It is either based on the sastra, or is the result of an independent intuition (pratibha), or has been heard from somebody else. And it is designed either to maintain one's particular point of view, or to show the mistake in another's argument, or to subdue the other's pride, etc.

B. Pratijna is the argument that the vadin accepts of his own free will, as that which must be proved (¥H©ÒÀ³¦¨ ¦Û©Ò³\¸q = *sadhyatvena svayam anujnato 'rthah); and it must be expressed to others in such a way that they can understand. Sthiramati explains how the various elements of the definition are necessary; "that which must be proved," because what is already proved is not a thesis; " accepts of his own free will," because what is said by another is not a pratijna; "to others," in order to show that it takes place where there are a vadin and a prati-vadin; "expressed by words," because what is expressed by mere signs (ingita) of the body is not a pratijna; "in such a way that they can understand it" because a proposition the meaning of which is not clear cannot be called a pratijna.

   [2] "Reason," hetu. A. Hetu is meant to prove the probandum, and it shows forth that logical reason which is derived from the "example", "homogeneity, " "heterogeneity, " "direct perception," "inference," and "authority". B. When an object (artha) to be proved is not yet evident, the reason consists in the indication of those characteristics which will make it known, and which rest upon its perceptibility or non-perceptibility by direct perception and so on. Perceptibility and non-perceptibility concern either the essence (¦ÛÅé, svabhava) or the form (¬Û»ª, mimitta).

        [3] "Example," drstanta.

       A. This also is designed to proved the probandum; it consists in adducing those same dharmas which are inherent in a reason and which are accepted by common belief, general knowledge, etc.

            B. It consists in expressing the relation between
        what is seen (drsta-anta) anil what is not yet seen (¥¼¤t, adrsta-anta).

          [4] A. "Homogeneity, " that is similarity of characteristics (¬Û»ª, rtags, nimitta); similarity of essence (¦ÛÅé,, svabhava); similarity of action (·~, las, karma); similarity of attributes (ªk , c'os, dharma); similarity of cause and effect (¦]ªG , rgyu.dan.abras, karya-karana). It is worthy of notice that according to the Chinese translation the last four are subdivisions of the first item.

        B. "Application" is a logical rule, rightly expressed, which adduces other facts belonging to the same class or genus in order to prove the attribute (of the subject).

[5] A. "Heterogeneity, reciprocal diversity. It has four aspects, which are the opposites of those referred to under
[4] (or five according to the Tibetan translation).
            B. "Conclusion." This consists in affirming that
        certitude has been reached.

  Here Sthiramati gives the following example of a syllogism:- Suppose that a Buddhist wants to maintain against an atma-vadin that the atman does not exist. He will argue in this way:--

[1] pratijna: all dharmas are anatman.
[2] reason: because, if we assume (prajnapti) that the atman is in the skandhas, we fall into a fourfold mistake.(1)

     1. Four cases are possible: --

(a) the atman has the characteristics of the skandhas;
(b) it is in the skandhas;
(c) it is in another place;
(d) it is assumed without any relation to the skandhas.

(a)As the skandhas are not autonomous, but dependent on causes and conditions and subject to birth and destruction, the same implication would be necessary as far as the atman is concerned; but this is contradictory to the common definition of the atman.

(b)As the skandhas which are the basis (©Ò¨Ì, asraya or adhara) are non-eternal, the atman which rests upon them (¯à¨Ì, adheya) must be non-eternal.
(c)In this case the atman would be without cause and therefore without function (µL¥Î, niskriya).
(d)In this case the atman would be isolated and free; no need therefore to strive for its liberation.

    [3] "Example," namely those which we make when we assume that in the present the past is still existent.

[4] "Application": as the atman has been refuted, the other attributes also, such as eternity, etc., are to be declared non-existent.
[5] "Conclusion": therefore the five skandhas are anatman and non-eternal.
[6] "Direct perception." A. This has three characteristics, that is:-
(a) it is evident, «D¤£²{¨£,, a-paroksa.
(b) devoid of imagination, «D«äºc©Ò¦¨; but Tib. mnon. par. brtag. zin. yin. pa. ma. yin. pa. dan (reading doubtful). brtags. par. bya. ba. yan. ma. yin. pai. mnon. sum. gyi. ts'ad. ma. = *parikalpita-parikalpya-abhava.
(c) devoid of error, «D¿ù¶Ã©Ò¨£, ma. ak'rul. pa.,a-bhranta.
(a)It derives from the senses when they are uninjured, and it precedes manaskara. It depends upon
(a) production of homogeneous perception, ¦P Ãþ¥Í, mt'un. pa. skyes. pa;
(b) production of heterogeneous perception, mi. mt'; but Tibetan, followed by Yogacarya-bhumi-sastra, yan.dag.par., samatikranta-utpada;
(c) proximity, ¤£·¥¹H, t', an-ati-durata. (a) When the indriyas belonging to the sphere of kama (kamavacara) perceive (lit. are born in) objects belonging to the same sphere.
(b) When the senses belonging to a superior bhumi perceive objects belonging to a superior bhumi.
(c) Obstructions which must be absent in order to have a direct perception are of four kinds,
(i) obstruction which derives from covering, as through darkness or ignorance; (ii) obstruction which derives from being hidden, as through the force of some mantra, etc.; (iii) obstruction which derives

      1. The same arguments must be repeated here mutatis mutandis.

  from being overpowered, ¬M»Ù©Òê,, abhibhava, as the small by the great, etc.; (iv) obstruction which derives from bewilderment, moha, such as magic power, maya, sleep, taimirika, etc.

(b) The second term also is twofold; first of all it includes the perception of objects which results as soon as these come in contact with us. So, e.g., when a doctor gives a medicine to a patient, through the colour, the smell, the taste, etc., he has a direct perception of the medicine. On the other hand, the virtues which are inherent in the medicine can only be imagined until the disease is over. They are no more imagined when one knows that the patient has recovered, The term refers also to the adhimukti or realization of a particular element, e.g. water, in another element, e.g. earth, in the process of meditation.

c) abhranta means absence of seven kinds of errors; these errors are the following:--
(a) samjna-bhranti, to think that an object is this when it is not this, atasmin tad eva; e.g. to take a mirage, marici for water.
(b) sankhya-bhranti; e.g. to see the complex in the elementary, as happens to the taimirika, who sees two moons instead of one.
(c) akara-bhranti, to suppose that an object has a certain form when it has not; e.g. to see a wheel in a turning fire.
(d) varna-bhranti; as in the case of someone suffering from kamala, ­{¥½Ã¹, mig.ser.gyi.nad.
(e) karma-bharanti, to attribute an action to something which in fact is not so acting; e.g. the appearance of movement in trees when one runs very fast.
(f) drsti-bhranti, to persist in the errors already referred to and to think that they correspond to reality.
(g)citta-bhranti, to rejoice in these errors. All these varieties of perception can be reduced to the four following:-- rupendriya-pratyaksa;
        loka-pratyaksa, including in fact the two preceding; suddha-pratyaksa, which can be laukika, as well as lokottara.

B. Perception is the very thing, rightly perceived, devoid of error. "The very thing" and "rightly" are intended to express the right perception of the rupa, etc., through the eyes and to indicate that a pot, etc., that, according to common belief, is the object of perception, is, in fact, not the object of perception, as it is only a conventional assumption °², "perceived," is meant to indicate that in the act of perception all the causes of obstruction must be absent; "devoid of error" excludes false and erroneous perceptions, as that of a marici, etc.

       [7] Anumana.

            A. It consists in the discrimination of an object through imagination. It is of five kinds (cf. above, p. 463,
[4] A):- nimitta-anumana; as to infer fire from smoke; it depends on the fact that the relation between the two was noted before. sva-bhava-anumana; as to infer unperceived existence from a present perceived existence or from one part of an entity to deduce the unperceived part, e.g. to infer the past from the present or a car from a single portion of it, as a wheel. karma-anumana, from an action to infer the basis or the support of it; e.g., when we see an object from afar, if it is motionless, we infer that it is a tree; if it moves, we infer that it is a man. dharma-anumana; when we know that many dharmas are inter-related, from the perception of some we infer the existence of the others.

From birth we infer death, etc. karya-karana-anumana, inference of notions which are related as cause and effect.

B. "Inference" is any conviction besides that derived from direct perception; as, when me have already seen an object and now see only a part of it, we infer the
other part.

        [8] "Authority." A. It includes the teachings of the wise or the doctrines that have been heard from them or are in accordance with them. It is of three kinds: (a) it is included in the holy words; or

(b) it represents the opposite (pratipaksa) of the passions; or
(c) it is not contradictory to the characteristics of the law.

B. It is not contradictory to the other two pramanas. At the end of this chapter A adds the following notes on the syllogism in general:--
If someone asks why we have to formulate the proposition when we want to establish the argument assumed by us, the reply is that this proposition is meant to show the argument that we wish to prove.

The "reason" shows, on the other hand, that that logical and sure evidence which is based upon a manifest fact is not absent in the object to be proved. The "example" indicates that evident object in which this logical reason is seen to be present.

The other five elements of a syllogism are meant to express contradiction and noncontradiction with the "reason" and the "example".

This contradiction consists in two kinds of fallacies, aniscita, uncertain, ¤£¨M©w,, and sadhya-sama, identical with the probandum, ¦P©Ò¦¨, ba. The aviruddha, on the other hand, is certain, niscita, aikantika, ¨M©w,, and different from the sadhya, ²§©Ò¦¨, bsgrub.par.bya.bai.k'

  These are the contents of the logical chapters of the Yogacara works as preserved in Chinese and partly in Tibetan.

It is quite evident that they have a mixed character; purely logical doctrines are inserted in dogmatical discussions, and generally the various topics are treated in such a way as to testify that hetu-vidya did not yet fit quite well into the general scheme of the doctrine.

Even those sections that deal with mere vivada-rules, e.g. those dedicated to the nigraha-sthanas, have a far less systematic character than in the Caraka-samhita or in the Upaya-hrdaya; many of the items which come under that group have in fact very little to do with logic.

The theory of the nigraha-sthanas itself is not based on the classification of the possible wrong formulations of a syllogism. A comparison with the list of the nigrahasthanas given in the Nyaya-sutras and in the Caraka-samhita will prove useful in establishing the relation between the various texts.

          (V, ii, 1).
        pratijna-hani id. [4]
        pratijnantara = III, g
        pratijna-virodha viruddha (13, cf.

        pratijna-sannyasa --I, vacana-sannyasa
        hetv-antara id. [14] included in II
        arthantara id. [15] included in II
        nirarthaka id. (10, vyartha, cf. under III, e
                                under vakya-dosa)
        avijnatartha =III, c, obscurity
                                                 of expression
        aparthaka id. (11; cf. under under III, e
        aprapta-kala kalatita [6] III, f
        nyuna id. [8] =III, c
        adhika id. [9] III, c
        1. The numbers in brackets show the serial order that the various Nigraha-sthanas have in the actual list of the Caraka-samhita.

         (V, ii, 1).
        punar-ukta id. [12]
        ananubhasana included in II
        ajnana id. [1]
        apratibha included in II
        viksepa vacanabhibhava II
        matanujna id. (5, abhyanujna) paryanuyojyo- id. (3, anuyojyasya-peksana nanunyoga)
        niranuyojyanuyoga id. (2, ananuyoj-yasyanuyoga)
        apa-siddhanta prakarana-sama
                            ahetu [7] samsaya-sama
        hetv-abhasa varnya-sama

 It is quite evident that we are confronted in A with unsystematic and perhaps archaic theories of the nigraha-sthanas, the classification of which seems to have been suggested more by extrinsic reasons concerning the behaviour of the disputants than by analysis of the intrinsic errors of a speech.

Moreover, we do not find any trace of technical terminology. An argument is considered as wrong chiefly because it does not convey any meaning. Therefore it receives the general designation of "vyartha", meaningless.

The ten varieties of this can be reduced to five only, as rightly suggested. by Sthiramati himself. But this list of five has nothing in conmon with the five hetv-abhasas of the Nyayasutras, except the sadhya-sama. The anarthaka, which happens when there is arthanupalabdhi, is the anartha-nigraha-sthana of the N.S. and Caraka.

 The aparthaka is the same as that of Caraka and N.S. Jati is simply enunciated. Let us pass now to the most interesting section and consider first of all the question of the pramanas. Nagarjuna knows only four pramanas, pratyaksa, anumana, upamana, and agama; these are referred to in the Upaya-hrdaya and are refuted as self-contradictory in the Vigraha-vyavartani.

(1) Asanga in his treatises reduces the means of knowledge to three only, pratyaksa, anumana and agama,
(2) and it is quite evident that in B even agama is authoritative, according to him, only in so far as it is based on the first two pramanas. We must study these means of knowledge separately.

Pratyaksa, according to A, must be aparoksa,

(3) unmixed with imagination, nirvikalpa, and devoid of error, abhranta, or avyabhicari.

(4) The first two items of aparoksa have some bearing upon the study of the dogmatics of Buddhist mysticism, but not so much upon the history of these doctrines, with which we are dealing here.

The other two, avyavadhana and anatidurata, are more interesting to us, as they represent a classification of the various cases in which, owing to some hindrance, the direct perception of an object cannot be produced. The question of the paroksa was discussed very early in Indian speculation.

Patanjali's and Caraka have already a list of the various avaranas; then the complete series of the eight impediments that obstruct perception can be found in Vasubandhu's commentary on tile Sata-sastra of Aryadeva (5) and they perfectly agree with the list given in the Sankhya treatises (Sankhya-karika, 7). The following scheme will show the analogies which our text presents with the other schools and at the same time its peculiarities.

1. For the Upaya-hrdaya and the Vigraha I can refer to my forth coming translation in the Baroda Sanscrit Series.

2. Three pramanas can be found also in the Commentary of Sthiramati upon the Trimsaka-karika of Vasubandhu, p. 26.

3. Or apariksita; this expression is, in fact, in the Caraka-samhita, Sutrasthana, xi, 8.

4. The two terms are almost synonymous, and the Chinese as well as the Tibetan can be translated in both ways.

5. For the list given in the Sata-sustra see my translation of this text in Studi e Materiali di Storia delle Religioni, 1925. On the avaranas, according to Patanjali's and Caraka, see Strauss, Mahabhasya ad Panini, 4, 1, 3, in Aus Indiens Kultur, Festgabe Richard von Garbe, 1927,

Comm. on the Sankhya

Patanjali's. Caraka. S(ata) S(astra). texts. A. ati-sannikarsa id. id. (2) as in S.S. -- all- viprakarsa id. id. (1) as in S.S. durata murty-antara- avarana vyavadhana(6) id.

vyavadhana 1, 2 tamasavrtatva indriya-daur- karana-daur- indriya-ghata id.

balyatva balya

ati-pramada mano-'nava- mano 'nav. id. 4, mola


samanabhi- samanabhihara[7] id.


abhibhava abhibhava[7] id. 3,

ati-sauksmya sauksmya[5] id. abhibhava

The next necessary quality of pratyaksa is according to A abhranta or avyabhicari; that is, it must be devoid of error.

These errors can be of five kinds; in fact, it is evident that the two other errors given by Asanga in the supplementary list of the seven bhrantis, I mean citta-bhranti and drstibhranti have more a dogmatical than a logical bearing and belong rather to inference than to direct perception.

The samjna-bhranti, defined as consisting in believing atasmin tad, corresponds to the savyabhicari, as understood by Vatsyayana in commenting on N.S., I, 1, 4. It is rather interesting to note that the other varieties of bhranti were accepted by Dharmakirti, as we can infer from the examples given for each of them.

Thus the sankhya-bhranti (example, timira, as in Dharmak.) corresponds to the indriya-gata-vibhrama-karana of N.B.T.; the nimitta-bhranti (example, alata-cakra, as in N.B.T.; N.B. asu-bhramana) corresponds to the visaya-gata-vibhrama-karana; karma-bhranti (example, a moving tree, as in N.B.T.; nau-yana of the N.B.) corresponds to the bahyasraya-sthita-vibhrama-karana of the N.B.T.; varna-bhranti (kamala) corresponds to the samksobha of the N.B., that is, to the adhyatma-gata-vibhrama-karana of the N.B.T. We must not discuss here whether Asanga, was right in assuming that samjna-bhranti is a separate class (1); but we

1. In fact, it is clear that all the various bhrantis consist in assuming atasmin tad. must insist upon this analogy between Asanga and Dharmakirti.

We know that Dinnaga, does not add the attribute abhranta to his definition of pratyaksa and that in Iris Pramana-samuccaya-vrtti he attacked the epithet avyabhicari given by the Naiyayikas.

 On the other hand, Dharmakirti defines pratyaksa not merely as kalpanapodha, but as kalpanapodham abhrantam.

This addition is not an innovation introduced by him, but due to his acceptance of the old theory of the Sautrantikas.

This fact is not only proved by our. tests, but also is clearly pointed out by Mallivadin in his Tippani (p. 19, Stcherbatsky ed.). But Asanga adds another division of pratyaksa in four items, that is:-

(a) rupendriya-pratyaksa;

(b) manah-pr. ;

(c) laukika-pr., which includes these two;

(d) suddha-pr., pure, which can be eitherr laukika

or lokottara.

This classification of direct perception is also worthy of notice, because it shows some points of contact with the fourfold pratyaksa which we find in Dinnaga as well as in Dharmakirti.

In fact, it is easy to recognize that the first two items and the last correspond respectively to the rupendriya, manah, and yogi-pratyaksa of the Pramana-samuccaya, Nyaya-mukha, Nyaya-bindu, etc.

It is difficult to see what the third item is meant to represent, but it seems that it has nothing to do with the sva-samvedana-prattajsa, which is very likely to have been an innovation due to Dinnaga and depending on his epistemological theories.

But, as it is evident from the texts, Asanga knew another definition of direct perception, namely that which we find in the Sangiti; here the pratyaksa is the very thing rightly perceived and devoid of error.

The Chinese ¦Û¥¿©ú¤F µL°g¶Ã¸q presupposes an original like this, svayam samyak-pratito 'bhranto 'rthah.

The commentary by Sthiramati clearly indicates that this definition is meant to distinguish the exact perception from the fictitious; we cannot speak of having a perception of a pot.

In fact, when me see a pot we cannot say that the knowledge that we have of the pot is direct perception, as this is confined to rupa, etc., that is, to the dharmas from which it results. We find, therefore, here the same definition of direct perception which was formulated by Vasubandhu.

In fact, we-know from Uddyotakara, that this master gave the following definition of pratyaksa:--"tato 'rthad vijnanam" (Nyaya-varttika, Benares ed., p. 40).

That in this and in many other places Uddyotakara quotes verbatim from the works of Vasubandhu, and chiefly from his Vada-vidhi, is proved by the refutation that Dinnaga writes of that same definition, which he attributes to the Vada-vidhi.

Pramana-samuccaya, chap. i, fol. 3a :-

don. de. las. skyes. rnam.


P.S.Vrtti,(1) a, fol. 16 :-

don. de .las. skyes. pai. rnam. ses.

mnon. sum. yin. zes. bya. bai. adir.

P.S.V., b, fol. 79b:--

don. de . las. skyes. pal. rnam. par. ses. pa .mnon.

sum. yin. no. zes. bya. ba. adir .....

It is important to see how one and the same author is trying to define perception in two different ways. The fact is that according to the Sutras or even to the Abhidharma literature there is hardly any place for Pratyaksa, as it is understood in the other schools. It was relatively easy for the Vaisesika or the Nyaya, both being realistic systems, to formulate a theory of perception, but it was

1. As I said before, we have two translations of the

vrtti of the Pramana-samuccaya, which do not

always agree and seem to be very often defective.

This fact increases the difficulty of the test,

which is one of the most abstruse.

not so easy to introduce this doctrine into a system which is chiefly based on the dharma theory and in which there was only question of particular moments of internal vijnanas, each corresponding to its analogous external ayatana or dhatu.

The definition as given in the Sangiti and strictly related to that of Vasubandhu is more in accordance with the traditional dogmatics; the second is far more elaborate and it is of the highest interest, as wve already find there the terms which will be accepted by Dinnaga (kalpanapodha) and by Dharmakirti (abhranta), showing therefore the first noticeable attempt towards the later and more organic development of Buddhist logic.

If we pass now to anumana, or inference, we must point out that no explicit mention is to be found either in A or in B of the distinction between the svarthanumana and the pararthanumana, which is expounded in the Pramana-samuccaya, but which was certainly anterior to Dinnaga.

In fact, the pararthanumana was known to the Tarka-sastras, as we shall see later on. But the distinction is implied in Asanga.

Although, in accordance with traditional dialectic, the syllogism comes first in his works, anumana, included in the list of the pramanas, represents the subjective means through which we can apprehend an object or a truth, quite independently of that verbal formulation which is inherent in a syllogism, and consists in the evident and valid conclusion that our mind can draw from some facts previously ascertained by direct experience.

To the two definitions contained in A and B we may add that of the Vada-vidhi, referred to and criticized by Dinnaga:-

P.S., ii, fol. 9a:-

de . la. med .na. mi. abyun .ba.

ran. rig. rnam. pas. adod. ce. na.

P.S.V., chap. ii, a, fol. 34b :-

rtsod . pa . sgrub . pa . nas . ni . med . na . mi .

abyun . bai . don .mt'on. ba. de. rig .pa. rjes. su. dpag.


P.S.V., b, chap. ii, fol. 116b:-

rtsod. sgrub. par. med(1). na. mi. abyun. bai. don.

mt'on. ba. de. rig. pa .ni. rjes. su. dpag. pa'o.

Now in this sentence we can easily recognize the definition of anumana quoted and refuted by Uddyotakara in his Nyaya-varttika, p. 54, apare tu bruvate nantariyakartha-darsanam tad-vido 'numanam. It is therefore evident that here also we are confronted with another fragment from Vasubandhu; consequently the attribution of this definition to Dinnaga himself, as suggested by Randle, cannot be accepted.

Anumana presents the five fundamental aspects(2) which we shall find in the homogeneous example; that is, we may have nimitta-anum., bhava-anum., karma-anum., dharma-anum., karya-karana-anum. Only two items of this fivefold classification can be seen in the list of the Vaisesika-Sutras (karya, karana, samyogi, virodhi, samavayi, V.S. ix, ii,

1), while in Dharmakirti we have, as is known, only anupalabdhi, svabhava, and karya.

But, as me should expect, the section which is largely developed is that dealing with the syllogism. This is divided into two parts, a probandum, sadhya, and a proof, sadhana.

The proof is said to be eight-fold; but the eight members are in fact reduced to five only, as the last three are nothing but the pramanas already referred to.

The first thing that we must point out is that the probandum is considered as separate from the syllogism itself; it is not the pratijna or proposition.

This probandum can be of two kinds, either an "essence" or a "quality", svabhava or visesa.

In the first case the mere existence or non-existence of the subject can be predicated; e.g. "the atman is", "the atman is not."

In the second case the probandum is a particular predicate which must be proved as belonging or not belonging to the subject, e.g. "the atman is all-pervading", "the atman is not all-perrvading." This notion of the sadhya is ---------------- 1.

Xyl., byed. 2. Randle, Fragments from Dinnaga, p. 21. common to both A and B; but, if we consider the five avayavas, which constitute the syllogism, the difference between the two groups of texts is greater. Pratijna, hetu, drstanta occur in both groups, although there is some difference as regards the various terms.

But the last two terms are enunciated in a quite different way.

While in B we find the same terms as in the Nyaya-sutras, which occur also under another name in Prasastapada, in A we have only "homogeneity" and "heterogeneity", which are nothing but two different aspects of the drstanta itself, as K'uei Chi already recognized.

This fact is worthy of notice, because it shows that, while in the first instance Asanga followed the ancient scheme, as handed down in the various Tarka-sastras, or Vivada-sastras, in his greater work he acknowledges that the last two members are superfluous, thus practically reducing the syllogism to three members only, as it is proved by the additional notes with which he concludes the section that we are studying.

If we were to follow the explanation of Sthiramati, we should be compelled to admit that a three- membered syllogism is also expounded in the Sangiti.

But I do not think that his interpretation is exact. Although the definition given by the Sangiti is not perfectly clear, it seems that upanaya consists for Asanga, in referring to the subject the analogous facts ascertained by the example, in order to prove the attribute expounded in the proposition. Sthiramati lived long after Asanga, when Buddhist logic, chiefly through the speculations of the Tarka-sastras of Vasubandhu and Dinnaga, had reached a well-developed and advanced stage.

At that time the syllogism was generally considered to be composed of three terms only; so that in order to bring the Sangiti into accordance with the new theories without altering the textual reading of the book, Sthiramati, who according to the Chinese sources was well versed in logic (BEFEO. 1911, p. 379), tried to give the terms another meaning.

In fact, the syllogism that he gives as an instance is really composed of three members only.

The other two are meant to express that other attributes, proved by the same reason, can be predicated of the subject.

That the reason "because it is a product" can prove the noncternity as well as the absence of atman is accepted by Dinnaga also and Dharmakirti.

Therefore I am inclined to think that in the Sangiti we have, in fact, the traditional type of syllogism of five members, which Sthiramati, in his commentary, endeavours to explain in accordance with the new theories.

If it be so, A would represent the first text in which we find an attempt to decrease the members of the syllogism. We can represent the theories held by Asanga concerning the syllogism in the following way:--


sadhyu sound "non-eternal"

svabhava visesa

pratijna "sound is non-eternal"

sadhana hetu "because it is a product"

drstanta homogeneity "as a pot"

heterogeneity, "as the ether"

sadhya as before



sadhana drstanta



Be that its it may, the fact remains that we do not find in Asanga any trace of the theory of the threefold aspect of a "reason, the trairupya, which certainly represents the startingating point of the new logic.

At least we have no grounds either for affirming or denying that Asanga must be credited with this innovation, which at any rate is very far from that perfection of elaboration which is the chief merit of Dinnaga's logic.

At any rate, we know that some of the Tarka-sastras expounded a five-membered syllogism, while in the Chinese sources this reduction of the syllogism to three members is generally attributed to Vasubandhu, a statement that is supported by Vacaspati Misra himself.

(l) For Vasubandhu the three avayavas are pratijna, hetu and drstanta. We shall see subsequently his definition of the "reason".

So far as the pratijna is concerned, we know from Uddyotakara that the definition proposed by the Vada-vidhi was sadhyabhidhanam pratijna (N.V. 117). This definition might at the first glance appear similar to that given by the Naiyayikas; but this is not the case, as the word sadhya has in the definition of the Vada-vidhi]] a different and peculiar meaning; here, in fact, sadhya is understood as paksa-dharma, where paksa is the object to be proved in the course of tile discussion.

This can be gathered from the full definition quoted in the Pramana-samuccaya-vrtti, chap. iii, fol. 45b, bsgrub. byar. brjod. pa.tsam. dam. bca'. bar. agyur. ba. ma. yin. gji. adi. ltar. p'yogs. bsgrub. bya. yin. no. p'yogs. de. ci. cig. rnam. par. dpyad. pal. adod.pai. don. te. P.S.V. b, 127b: bsgrub. par. ni. bsgrub. bya. brjod. pa. tsam. dam.bca'. ba. ma. yin. gyi. 'on. kyan. p'yogs. kyi. c'os. bsgrub. bya'o. p'yogs. gan. yin. pa. rnam. par. dpyad. par. adod. pal. don. p'yogs. yin.te.

This means that the definition sadhyabhidhana-matram has not the same meaning as in the Nyaya-sutras and therefore is not subject to the refutation that Dinnaga made of the N.S. Sadhya is said to have here a technical sense.

The original of the sentence, which is evidently composed of two fragments put together by Dinnaga, in order to show how the Vada-vidhi interpreted the definition, can easily be restored into Sanscrit: Vada-vidhau sadhyabhidhana-matram pratijna na bhavati, api tu paksadharmah sadhyam.pakso vicaranayam isto 'rtho.

The restoration is obvious, as the second part of the definition is also to be found in the Nyaya-varttika (p. 106) in a place where Uddyotakara refutes the Buddhist theories concerning the paksa. In this way we have also identified

1. N.V.T., p. 288 (Benares ed.), atra Vasubandhu

pratijnadayas trayo 'vayava dur-vihita

Aksapadalaksanenety uktam; cf. N.V., p. 136.

another of the manifold doctrines criticized by Uddyotakara in the course of his work without giving the name of their author.

No allusion, so far as I know, call be found in the Nyaya-varttika to the theory of the "example" expounded in the Vada-vidhi; but, fortunately, the definition of the drstanta given in that book has been preserved by Dinnaga; and from this it appears that according to Vasubandhu the example is the expression of the relation between the reason and the sadhya. P.S.V. a, chap. iv, fol. 70b:, stc. P.S.V.b, fol. 154a: bar. bstan. pa. gan. yin. pa. adi. brjod. pa. dpe. yin. te. But what about the " reason "?

Must the tri-laksana theory of the hetu be really attributed to Dinnaga or is it an innovation of Prasastapada? Or are there proofs through which we can safely assume that it was anterior to both?

Our sources show beyond any doubt that the tri-laksana theory was known to the Buddhist schools before Dinnaga. First of all, we gather both from K'uei-Chi and from Shen- T'ai(1) that the theory of the vi-paksa was known to the ancient masters, who held two different opinions about it, which were not accepted by Dinnaga.

Some thought that the vi-paksa is that which excludes the sa-paksa as well as the paksa; so in the syllogism "sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pot" the vi-paksa "ether" excludes the contrary of the non-eternal as well as of the pot. On the other hand, other logicians said that the vi-paksa is everything except the non-eternal, while for Dinnaga, as is known, vi-paksa is yatra pakso na vidyate.

We find here the same terms and elements which are peculiar to the definition of the reason as given by Dinnaga or in the versus memoriales quoted by Prasastapada. Moreover, the actual

1. K'uei-Chi, chap. iii, Shen-T'ai, chap. ii. Even

for the Tarka-sastra preserved in Chinese (see

above, pp,. 452 sqq.) the third laksana of the

hetu is vi-paksa-vyavrtti.

definition of the hetu contained in the Vada-vidhi and refuted by Dinnaga confirms the Chinese sources. In fact, in that book the reason is said to consist in the enunciation of that dharma which is non-existent where there is no attribute analogous to the sadhya.

P.S.V. a, chap. iii, fol. 57b: mt'un. med. la. med. pa.

yi. c'os. bstan. rtags. zes. pa.

P.S.V. b, fol. 138a: bsgrub.par. ni.

de. lta. bui. med. na. mi. abyun. bai. c'os. ne.

bar. bstan. pa. ni. gtan. ts'igs. so.

Dinnaga objects to the formal exactness of the definition; but it seems that even for Vasubandhu the paksa-dharmata, vi-pakse sattva, sa-pakse sattva were the three fundamental characteristics of the reason.

And, as we shall see later on, me have another text almost certainly anterior to Dinnaga in which the three laksana-theory is clearly expounded. We must now consider the various theories concerning logical errors.

Asanga, in the concluding portion of A, reduces all the possible logical errors to the contradictory, which contains two sub-groups, inconclusive, aniscila or anaikantika and sadhya-sama.

There is no trace of this theory in B, where allusion to logical mistakes can be found eventually in the section dedicated to the nigraha-sthanas. On the other hand, the Vada-vidhi knows the same list of the hetv-abhasas as is accepted by Dinnaga, that is, asiddha, aniscita, and viruddha.

The definition of these errors, if we are to follow the statement of the Pramana-samuccaya, was not given in the Vada-vidhi; but they were only enunciated and specified through a corresponding example.(1)

1 P.S. V. a, chap. iii, 63b: de. la. re. zig. rtsod.

pa. sgrub. pa. nas. ma grub. pa. dan. ma. nes. pa.

dan. agal. bai. don. ni. gtan. ts'igs. ltar. snan.

ba'o. zes. zer. ro. de. la. ma. grub. pa. la.

sogs. pa. ni. dper. brjod. nas. mts'an.nid. ma

.yin. te. dper. na.mig. gi[s]. gzun. bya. yin.

par. p'yir. mi. rtag. go. zes. bya. ba. ma.

grub. pa. dan. lus. can. ma. yin. pai. p'yir. rtag

. go. zes. bya. ba. ma. nes. pa. dan. bye. brag.

rnams. kyi. dban. po. las. byun. bai. p'yir. mi.

rtag. go. zes. bya. ba. agal. ba. gcig. dan. gran.

can. pai. rgyu. la. abras. bu. yod. pa. yin. te.

yod. pa. skye. pai. p'yir. ro. zes. bya. ba. agal.

ba. gnis. pa'o.

Asiddha: "sound is non-eternal, because it is perceived by the eye." Aniscita: "sound is eternal, because it is formless."

The viruddha can be of two kinds,

(a) if a Vaisesika maintains that sound is eternal because it can be perceived by the senses;

(b) if a Sankhya says that the effect is preexistent in the cause, because it is born.

This means that according to the Vada-vidhi, as is in fact proved by another passage of the Pramana-samuccaya, the viruddha-hetvabhasa is either pratijna-viruddha or siddhanta-viruddha, a theory that is refuted by Dinnaga in the Nyaya-mukha as well as in the Pramana-samuccaya.

Thus, gathering and comparing the various fragments and quotations scattered in the sources still available, we can supply, in a certain way at least, the loss of the original texts and attain a better knowledge of logical theories accepted or formulated by Buddhist writers before Dinnaga.

The first result of these investigations is that long before Dinnaga logic, which as tarka or hetu-vidya was blamed and condemned by the ancient schools, was accepted at least as a subsidiary science by the Buddhist doctors and developed

P.S.V. b, fol. 146a: re. zig. rtsod. pa. bsgrub.

par. ni. ma. grub. pa. dan. ma. nes. pa. dan. agal.

ba. ni. don. nid. gtan. ts'igs. kyi.skyon. yin. te.

de. la. ma. grub. pa. la. sogs. pa. rnams. kyi.

mts'an. nid. ma. bsad. par. dpe. rnams. bsad. pa. ni.

dper. na. ma. grub. pa. ni. sgra. mi. rtag. ste. mig.

gis. gzun. bai. p'yir. zes. bya. ba. dan. ma. nes. pa

ni. lus. can. ma. yin. pai. p'yir. rtag. go. zes.

bya. ba. lta. bu'o. bye. brag. par. rnams. kyi. dban.

pos. gzun. bar. bya. yin. pai. p'yir. mi. rtag. go.

zes. bya. bai. agal. ba. gcig. dan. grans. can. gyi.

abras. bu. rgyu. la. yod. pa. yin. te. skye. bai.

p'yir. ro. zes. pa. ni. agal. ba. gnis. pa. yin. no.

P.S. V. a, 46, chap. iii, b: rtsod. par. sgrub.

par. ni. adi. agal. bai. gtan. ts'igs. ltar. snan. ba

nid. kyi. k'on. du. bsdus. te. mts'an.nid. de. lta.

bu. las. ni. agal. ba. dan. ldan. min. de. ni. agal.

bar. rnam. pa. gnis. su. bstan. te. dam. bca'. bai.

don. dan.. agal. ba. dan. grub. pal. dan'o.

P.S. V. b, chap. iii, fol. 129a: rtsod. pa. sgrub

pal. yan. adi. agal. bai. glan. ts'igs. nid. du.

adus. pa. yin. gyi. dei. mts'an. nid. k'o. nas. de.

ni. agal. ldan. nin. der. ni. agal. ba. rnam. pa.

gnis, bstan. te. dam. bca'. ba. dan. agal. ba. dan.

grub. pa. mt'a'. dan. agal. ba'o.

on independent lines. Great masters such as Asanga and Vasubandhu, and perhaps many others whose names are lost, perfected the ancient rules of discussion, katha or vivada. Asanga was, as far as we can guess, the first to introduce hetu-vidya in his dogmatical works.

The growth of the great philosophical systems, the codification, so to say, of the sutras, the blossoming of a large dogmatical literature, devoted to commenting upon them, involved the sects in many discussions and struggles, through which not only were vivada and its rules perfected, but mere heuristic began to leave the place to logic and epistemology, an achievement for which Dinnaga was mainly responsible.

Even for Vasubandhu logic was Still a section of vada; and, in fact, all the books written by him on this ropic seem to have had the title vada. According to Shen T'ai some of his works were:-- [1] ½×¤ß, Lun hsin, Vada-hrdaya, a title which reminds us very much of the *Upaya-hrdaya.

The restoration as Vada-kausala, proposed by Vidyabhusana, is untenable. [2] ½×¦¡, Lun shih, which is the of the Tibetan sources and the Vada-vidhi of Uddyotakara, the fragments of which we have collected in this paper. [3] ½×­y, Lun kuei.

This Vidyabhusana restores arbitrarily as Vada-marga. In a previous paper I had no definite suggestion to advance.

(l) But now I think that more precision is possible: ¦¡ shih and ­y kuei are synonyms in Chinese; therefore we have to suppose that even in the Sanscrit original two synonyms were used, vidhana conveying the same meaning as vidhi, just as shih is equivalent to kuei. The Sanscrit sources confirm this hypothesis; in fact, a Vada-vidhana-tika is quoted in the Nyaya-varttika, p. 117, yad api Vada-vidhana-tikayam sadhayatiti sabdasyatiti svayam parena ca tulyatvat svayam iti visesanam sadhayatiti kilayam sabdah prayojye prayoktari ca tulya-rupo bhavatiti... We

1. See my Notes on the fragments from Dinnaga, JRAS.

1928, 379-90.

find here expressed the same theory as already met with in that passage of the Samyukta-sangiti in which Sthiramati, who, as is known, was a follower of Vasubhandhu, is commenting upon the definition of the pratijna contained in the Sangiti.

Therefore I think that we call safely restore the Chinese ½×­y as Vada-vidhana. Another conclusion that seems to follow from the material collected is that tile question of a mutual borrowing between Dinnaga and Prasastapada must be dropped.

The fact that the theory of the three laksanas of a reason was known before Dinnaga rather implies that each master took it, although perhaps developing and formulating it in a better and more organic way, form some other, previous, school of Vada-sastra which, in this respect at least, held different views from those expounded in the Nyaya-sutras.

That this is really the case is proved by the fact that we have another text anterior to Dinnaga in which the tri-laksana theory is clearly enunciated. This text is the Tarka-sastra,

(1) which, if we are to judge from the Chinese sources, enjoyed a very great authority not only in India, but also in Central Asia and in China. Dharmagupta studied that book while residing in Kucha.

Paramartha translated it into Chinese and commented upon it.(2) We do not know its author; but it is evident that the present redaction of the text, as it has been handed down to us, was written by some Buddhist.

Now in the second section of this book, dedicated to the jatis, under the item sadharmya-khandana or sadharmya-sama, we read the following sentence ¬ÛÂ÷, which translated into Sanscrit runs thus:--

asmabhis tri-laksano hetuh pratisthapitah; tad yatha paksa-dharmah sapaksa-sattvam vipaksa-vyavrttih. References to the same doctrine can be found in other passages of the same book.

1. On the ¦p¹ê½× see Ui's Studies in Indian Philosophy, vol. i, 222.

2. The commentary written by Paramartha was called ¦p

¹ê½×²¨. Cf. BEFEO. 1911, p. 351, n. It is lost.

Although the text contains a list of nigraha-sthanas which is almost identical with that in the Nyaya-sutras, it presents also some very precise similarities to views accepted by Vasubandhu. We know from Dinnaga that the theory of the jatis, as expounded by Vasubandhu in his Vada-vidhi, was different from that expounded by Aksapada.

Vasubandhu divided all the possible cases of jatis into three groups,


and in each of these were comprehended various sub-groups, which have been quoted by Dinnaga in the following way: --

P.S.V. a, chap. vi, fol. 94a: rlsod. pa. sgrub. p'yin. ci.log.dan. yan. dag. pa. ma. yin. pa.

. nid. dan. agal. ba. nid. rnams. kyis. lan. skyon.

brjod. pa. yin. no. zes. brjod. do. p'yin. ci.

log. ni. c'os. mt'un. pa. dan. c'os. mi. mt'un. pa.

dan. rnam. par. rtogs. pa. dan. bye. brag. med. pa.

dan. p'rad. pa. dan. ma. p'rad. pa. rnams. la. ni.

gtan. ts'igs. dmigs. sin.. abras. bu. mts'uns. pa. la

sogs. pa. ni. t'e. ts'om. du. brjod. do.

P.S.V. b, fol. 177a: rtsod. pa. sgrub. par. ni.

p'yin. ci. log. dan. yan. dag. pa. ma. yin. pa. dan.

agal. ba. rnams. ni. lan. gyi. skyon. zes. bsad. pa.

yin. no. de. la. p'yin. ci. log. c'os. mt'un.

pa. dan. mi. mt'un. pa. dan. rnam. par. rtog. pa. dan

. k'yad. par. med. dan. gtan. ts'igs. dan. p'rad. pa.

dan. dmigs. pa. dan. t'e. ts'om. dan. ma. brjod. pa.

dan. abras. bu. mts'uns. pa. la. sogs. pa'o.

P.S.V. a, fol. 95a: yan. dag. pa. ma. yin. pa. ni

t'al. bar. agyur. ba. dan. don.kyis. go. bar.

mts'uns. pa. la. sogs. pa'o.

95b: agal. ba. ni. ma. skyes. pa. dan. rtag. par

.mts'uns. pa. la. sogs. pa'o.

P.S.P. b, fol. 178b: t'al. ba. dan. don. gyis. go.

ba mts'uns. pa. la. sogs. pa. ni. yan. dag. pa.


Ibid.: ma. skyes. pa. dan. rtag. pa. mts'

la. sogs. pa. agal. ba. yin. pa.

The text, especially in tile passage concerning the viparita, does not seem to be quite correct; but with the help of the commentary of Dinnaga we can make a list of the jatis accepted by Vasubandhu which is analogous to that found in the fragment of the Tarka-sastra preserved in Chinese, as is proved by the following scheme:- -

Vada-vidhi Tarka-sastra


sadharmya-sama 1 id.

vaidharmya-sama 2 id.

vikalpa-sama 3 id.

avisesa-sama 4 id.

ahetu-sama 5 id.

prapty-aprapti-sama 6 id.

upalabdhi-sama 7 id.

samsaya-sama 7 id.

avarnya-sama 7 id.

karya-sama 7 id.


prasanga id.

arthapatti, etc. id., plus: prati-drstanta


anutpatti-sama id.

nitya id., plus: svartha-viruddha.

As I have said before, we do not know anything about the author of this book, or its age; but we may presume that it was anterior to Dinnaga. It may be also that this Tarka-sastra, or a redaction of it, was existent already in the time of Vatsyayana.

There is in Nyaya-sutras, ii, 2.3, an allusion to some logicians who denied any validity to arthapatti, as being inconclusive.

Vatsyayana, commenting upon this sutra, writes, asatsu meghesu vrstir na bhavatiti satsu bhavatity etad arthad apadyate, satsv api caikada na bhavati seyam arthapattir apramanam iti. Now we have in the second section of the Tarka-sastra referred to the following passage:- ¥iÅ㪫ªÌ¡C¦³¤GºØ¦³¸q¦Ü¦³«D¸q¦Ü¡C ¸q¦ÜªÌ­Y¦³ «B¥²¦³¶³¡C ­Y¦³¶³«h¤£©w©Î¦³«B©ÎµL«B, which can be translated into Sanscrit thus:-- yad abhivyaktam dvi-vidham, arthapattir anarthapattis ca.yadi vrstir bhavati tada meghenapi bhavitavyam, meghe saty api tu kadacid vrstir bhavati, kadacin na bhavatity anaikantikata.

The correspondence is almost perfect; so we should be inclined to think that Vatsyayana and even the final redactor of the Nyaya-sutras knew, if not this same text, then another of those Tarka-sastras which seem to have existed long before Dinnaga and in which the criticism of arthapatti was already formulated.

That we can speak of Tarka-sastras and not of a single Tarka-sastra is proved by two references to them which can be found in the Pramana-samuccaya-vrtti. In both cases Dinnaga uses the plural; moreover, the second fragment clearly shows a doctrine of the syllogism quite different from that contained in the text translated into Chinese. The first quotation is to be found at the beginning of the third chapter dedicated to the pararthanumana:-

P.S. V. a, chap. iii, 44: gal. te. rjes. su.

dpag. par. bya. ba. ston. pa. ni. dam. bca'. ba.

brjod. par. bya. ba. ste. rtog. gel bstan. bcos.

rnams. su. gzan. gyi. don. rjes. su. dpag. pa. dgon.

pa. de. ji. ltar. yin. ze. na.

P.S.V. b, 126b: hon. te. rtog. gei. bstan. bcos.

rnams. su. gzan. gyi. don. rjes. su. la.

rjes. su. dpag. par. bya. ba. ston. pa. dam.

bca', which perhaps corresponds

to an original like this:--yady anumeyabhidhanam

pratijnavacanam iti Tarka-sastresu pararthanumanam.

The other quotation occurs just at the beginning of

the fourth chapter, in which Dinnaga [[]]expounds his

doctrine of the "example ":-

P.S.V. a, chap. iv, 66b: rtog. ge. pai. bstan.

bcos. rnams. su. ni. p'yogs.kyi.c'os.nid. tsam

.gtan.ts'igs.kyi.sbyor. ba. yin. no. zes. grags. te.

dper. na. adi. byas. pai. pyir. zes. pas. sgra. mi.

rtag. par. go. bar. lta. bu'o.

P.S.V.b, fol. 149a: rtog. gei. bstan. bcos.

rnams. su. sbyor. ba. la. gtan.ts'igs. zes. bya. bas.

p'yogs. kyi. c'os. tsam. nid. bstan. pa. yin. te.

dper. na. byas. pai. p'yir. zes. adir. sgrai.

zes. bya. ba. rtogs. pa. yin. no.

These two translations do not perfectly agree, but their meaning is clear. According to the Tarka-sastras the indissoluble connection between the major and the middle term in the syllogism is expressed by the paksa-dharma, and therefore the "example" is not necessary, that is, the middle term as residing in the subject of the inference is sufficient to prove the probandum.

The theory, which we find else-where in the later development of Indian logic, is not accepted by Dinnaga, who thought the example absolutely necessary to express the other two laksanas of the "reason".

The same theory is also referred to and criticized by the JainaNyayavatara,(1) which calls it the theory of the antar-vyapti. It was certainly not accepted by Vasubandhu, as Vidya-bhusana thought, but it was at any rate anterior to Dinnaga, as is sufficiently proved by the above reference, which shows how far logical speculations must have advanced even before the advent of the great Buddhist thinker.

This very important development of logical schools in the period between Asanga and Dinnaga,of which we have unfortunately some fragments only, must change our ideas of the authorship of the various theories which we find in the texts handed down to us, and also Of the relation between the various authors. We must

1. Nyayavatara 20: antar-vyaptyaiva sadhyasya siddher

bahirudahrtih vyartha syat tad

a-sad-bhave 'py evam nyaya-vido


that is, a syllogism like this, "on the hill there is fire, because there is smoke," is perfectly valid, as there is an inner indissoluble connection between the major and the middle term and therefore the example " as in the kitchen" (bahir-vyapti) is not necessary. This theory cannot be attributed to Vasubandhu, as suggested by Vidyabhusana, History of Indian Logic, p. 268, n. (and in nis edition of tile Nyayavatara, Calcutta, 1909, p.l7).

That Vasubandhu formulated the syllogism in three members is proved by what we already said and by the clear statements of K'uei-hi and Vacaspati Misra. acknowledge that perhaps the treatises which still remain are but a small part of all which was written regarding this subject by some generations of thinkers. The similarity that we can find between this and that author does not imply a mutual borrowing, but can be quite well explained as due to the fact that either writer was following some previous authoritative text or original.

A Correction

Owing to distance from England I was not supplied with proofs of my article, in which, consequently, there are a few misprints and mistakes. p. 451, l. 3: read Giuseppe. p. 454: The Yogacarya-bhumi-sastra has been proved by Ui to be by Maitreya: Studies in Indian Philosophy (in Japanese), i, p. 359, and Zeitschrift fur Indologie und Iranistik, Band 6, 1.

Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan, Philadelphia, 1900. 2. On the other hand, a great deal of information can be gathered from Ui's book on the Vaisesika philosophy. Cf. also his Studies on Indian Philosophy, ¦L«×­õ¾Ç¬ã¨s Tokyo. The classical book of Stcherbatsky, Erkenntnistheorie und Logik nach der Lehre der spateren Buddhisten, deals chiefly with Dharmakirti's thought.

Heft 2. So, while at first Asanga followed his

guru's views, he then altered his opinions.

p. 453, l. 2: The second Chinese character should

be ´­. ibid., l. 4: The fourth Chinese character

should be ¬s; so also in l. 8.

p. 458, l. 23: under item(a): gton. ba.

p. 459, under item (9): siddha-sadhya: corr.

"when the probandum is already proved."

p. 461, l. 15: under (1): dam.bca'

p. 464, l. 24: t'ag. rin. ba.

p. 466, l. 10: The Chinese character must be read

after "conventional assumption."

p. 479: Even this definition of the drstanta is

in Uddyotakara; see my article on the "Vada-vidhi,"

Indian Historical Quarterly, vol. iv, p. 634.

p. 484, ll.26-7: t'al. bar. Instead of K'uei Chi

and Shen T'ai read K'uei-chi, Shen-t'ai.