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Buddhist Studies Review 1991 Vol. 8, 1-2

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Epithets of the Buddha - tr. John D. Ireland Methodological Considerations concerning the Language

of the Earliest Buddhist Tradition - Heinz Bechert „ The Salistamba Sutra - tr. John M. Cooper . Bibliographical Remarks bearing on the Kasyapa-

parivarta - Bhikkhu Pasadika

Certainty and the Deathless - John D. Ireland Stanley Weinstein and the Study of Sino- Japanese Buddhism - T. H. Barrett „_„..„ Religious Changes in Late Indian Buddhist History (I)

- Lai Mani Joshi .

Ekottaragama (XII) - tr. Thich Huyen-Vi - News and Notes „..„..„., Obituaries ___„_....„ Letter to the Editor _ „ _ ,-

Book Reviews „_..„„„„ ISSN 0265-2897 © 1991 Buddhist Studies Review

Buddhist Studies Review is the bi-annual journal of the Institut de recherche bouddhique Linh-So'n and the Pali Buddhist Union

Editorial Address : c/o Russell Webb, 31 Russell Chambers, Bury Place, London WC1A 2JX - England

Annual Subscription : Individual : £150

Joint or institutional : £12.50 - payable by cheque, Giro transfer (to A/C No. 52 613 4003) or international money order to 'Buddhist Studies Review'

Frontispiece: the calligraphy in Sino-Vietnamese characters (Nom) by Ven Thich Huyen-Vi reads:

"[In Emptiness there is. . . }

no feeling or perception,

volitions or consciousness;

no eye or ear,

nose or tongue,

body or mind."

The seals engraved by Ven. Bhikkhu Dhamma-

viro, Thailand, convey the same meaning as the


Vol. 8, 1-2




We apologise for the fact that, once again, you have had to wait so long for this issue. As we mentioned in the previous issue, we planned to acquire a word processor and appropriate software, and this is now in place and functioning. There are, however, due partly to our inexperience and partly to certain limitations of the software, a few gremlins which we hope will be overcome next time. We cannot, for example, do alternate running headings at the top of pages or Chinese characters, so please bear with us. The software is due to be updated shortly and this should no longer be a problem. Because of the size of print produced, you will note a change in format. Since we have had complaints in the past that the type-size was too small, we hope you will be happier with our new look.

This is again a double issue, but we are now doing our very best to catch up and the next issue should be the first of two to be published in 199Z Hopefully you will not have to wait too long before you are reading us again. Thank you for your patience.


Buddho dasabaio sattha sabbahnu dipaduttamo Munindo bhagava natho cakkhuma (a)hgiraso muni. The Awakened One, Him of the Ten Powers, the Teacher, the All-knowing One, the Supreme Biped. The Lord of Sages, the Blessed One, the Protector, the Seeing One, the Resplendent One, the Sage.

Lokanatho (ajnadhivaro mahesi ca vinayako Samantacakkhu sugato bhuripanho ca tnarajl. The World Protector, the Unexcelled One, the Great Seer and the Guide. The All-seeing One, the Happy One, Him of Extensive Wisdom and the Conqueror of Mara.

Narasiho naravaro dhammaraja mahdmuni Devadevo lokagaru dhammasami tathdgato Sayambhu sammasambuddho varapafmo ca ndyako The Lion of Men, the Excellent Man, the Dhamma-king, the Great Sage. The God of Gods, the World Teacher, the Dhamma-Lord, the Thus-Gone. The Self-made, the Fully Enlightened One, Him of Excellent Wisdom and the Leader.

Jino sakko tu siddhattho ca gotamo Sakyasiho tat ha sakyamuni va (a)diccabandhu ca. . The Conqueror, the Sakyan, then the Accomplished One, (Son of) Suddhodana and Gotama. The Lion of the Sakyas, also the Sakyan Sage and the Kinsman of the Sun,

(Moggallana's AbhidhanappadTpika, edited by Velligalla Siddhattha, Ceylon 1900, p.2. Translated by John D. Ireland)




Hp.inj Bechert

The almost simultaneous publication of works by Franklin Edgerton on Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit (Grammar! Dictionary/ Reader, New Haven 1953; Delhi 1970) and by Heinrich Liiders on the language of the original Buddhist Canon (Beobachtungen uber die Sprache des buddhistischen Urkanons, ed. W. Waldsehmidt, Berlin 1954) touched off a scholarly discussion on the language of the earliest Buddhist tradition and on the nature of the Middle Indian dialects underlying 'Buddhist Sanskrit', which was reflected not only in the numerous reviews of both these works, but also in a series of articles in academic journals. At thaj time, a symposium on this subject was held during the German Oriental Conference ('Deutscher Orientalistentag') in 1954. It should be emphasised, however, that this interest failed to produce a general communis opinio regarding the questions that were raised, or that was even accepted by the greater part of the scholarly world; indeed, the discussion merely seemed to die away. It was revived, however, more than twenty years later, and most of the relevant arguments as well as various theories were formulated in the volume Die Sprache der altesten buddhistischen UberlieferunglThe Language of the Earliest Buddhist

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Tradition (ed. H. Bechert, Gottingen 1980)'. Relevant problems were further discussed by Oskar von Hiniiber (Das dltere Mittelindisch im Uberblick, Vienna 1986). and by K.R. Norman in various essays.

The question, of course, has a long history. Both N.L. Westergaard (Om de oetdeste Tidsrum i den indiske Historic med Hensyn tit Literaturen, Copenhagen 1860, p.84) and RAW. Kuhn (Beitrage zur Paligrammatik, Berlin 1875, especially pp.6 and 9) had asserted long ago that the language of the Pali Canon could not be identical with the language spoken by the Buddha himself, as the Sinhalese tradition maintains. Both identified Pali as the language of Ujjayani, and their most prominent follower has been R.O. Franke (Pali und Sanskrit, Strassburg 1902, p.131 ff,). Franke even proposed that the tradition according to which Kaccayana, the author of the oldest surviving Pali grammar, had lived in Ujjeni, should be considered 'a dim recollection' of this original Pali (op, tit., p.139, n.2; cf. also O. von Hiniiber, 'Zur Geschichte des Sprachnamens Pali', Beitrage zur Indienforschung. Ernst Waldschmidt zum 80. Geburtstag gewidmet, Berlin 1977, pp.237-46).

In 1912 Sylvain Levi proposed the thesis that a language of the 'precanonicaf Buddhist tradition could be detected in the

1 This essay is based on my paper 'Allgemeine Bemerkungen zum Thema "Die Sprache der ahesten buddhistischen Oberlieferung'" therein, representing methodological considerations which, it seems to me, remain valid for the further study of the problems involved even today, I wish to thank James Di Crocco for preparing the English translation and Philip Pierce for rereading the text.

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earliest terminology of the Buddhists, especially in the terms used in the Vinaya; he maintained that in this 'precanonical' language - and by this he meant essentially what H. Oldenberg (e.g. in 'Studien zur Geschichte des buddhistischen Kanons', NAWG 1912, p.206 = Kleine Schrifteri 2, Wiesbaden 1967, p.1024) somewhat misleadingly called simply 'MagadhT' - the intervocalic tenues are weakened (S. Levi, 'Observation sur une langue precanonique du bouddhisme', J A 1912, pp.495 ff; cf. also EJ. Thomas, 'Pre-Pali Terms in the Patimokkha', Festschrift M. Winternitz, Leipzig 1933, pp.161 ff.). H. Liiders, who had already taken up this problem in connection with his epigraphical studies (see 'Epigraphische Beitrage' III, 1913 = Philologica Indica, Gottingen 1940, p.288), stated at first that 'the earliest Buddhist scriptures were written in Old Ardhamagadhf, and that 'the works constituting the available Pali canon, like those of the Sanskrit canon are, at least in part, translations of works in Old Ardhamagadhl*. Later he called the language in question simply an 'eastern dialect' or also 'the eastern language' (cf. Beobachtungen uber die Sprache des buddhistischen Urkanons, p.8) and used the term 'Urkanon' - 'original canon' - for the material underlying the available texts. W. Geiger advanced a different opinion; he stated that 'Pali was not a pure MagadhT, but was rather a kind of lingua franca based on MagadhT which the Buddha himself had used', and that 'the Pali canon represented an attempt to reproduce the buddhavacanam in its original form' (Pali Literatur und Sprache, Strassburg 1916, p.4). As we know, there was no general agreement with Geiger's thesis. Finally Helmer Smith ('Le futur moyen indien', JA 1952, p.178) stated that we must postulate the existence of a 'koine gangetique, dont PardhamagadhT et le pali representent les normalisations les plus anciennes' for the period in question. If this is accepted, then the approach to the problem of

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methodology must be quite different from that of the scholars quoted above.

We can proceed from the above on the assumption that none of the canonical texts exactly reflects the language of the Buddha or even of the earliest Buddhist tradition, and that accordingly the various textual versions are based in one way or another on earlier stages of the tradition couched in a different linguistic form. Thus we must further assume that there has been a transference of the texts from one linguistic form to another, with or without intermediate stages, either in the form of a deliberate translation or a gradual transformation in the oral tradition. In the course of this transformation certain peculiarities have been preserved which represent the linguistic form of earlier stages of the tradition that has since been lost We have agreed to call these 'Magadhisms', and some of them might well have belonged to the language of the Buddha. The primary task now before us is to make sure that we are fully aware of the implications of the terminology which we employ in this field. A second essential task is to move our thinking ahead from the isolated discussion of certain individual observations of a linguistic nature, on which we have concentrated the greater part of our deliberations to date, to a consideration of the broader interrelationship of the questions associated with our problem. Thirdly, we must review our research methods and strive to develop them even further, and we should make use of the results of research into related developments outside India

Now I should like to try to formulate some questions in this vein and thereby venture some suggestions as to how we should go about the problem, without in any sense intending to

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propose definite solutions. In this connection it would be best to start with the subject itself, which has long been formulated as the question of what was 'the language of the Buddha'. Taking into consideration the circumstances of the life of the Buddha as we know them, we can certainly come up with conjectures about which local dialect the Buddha must have spoken, but it would be much more appropriate to formulate the question in such a way that what we are really setting out to find is the linguistic form of what we term the 'earliest Buddhist tradition' - that is, the body of traditional material that underlies all the variants of the tradition that have come down to us, and thus represents, as it were, the archetype of the Buddhist tradition. At this point it is only natural to recall the passage in the Vinaya where the Buddha himself may have given us a clue as to the linguistic form in which his teaching was transmitted (see E Lamotte, History of Indian Buddhism, Louvain-la-Neuve 1988, pp.552-5), and along with it the controversy over the interpretation of this passage. (See John Brough, 'Sakaya niruttiya: Caul kale het\ Die Sprache der altesten buddhistischen Uberlieferung, pp.3S41)

The question as to the linguistic form of the earliest Buddhist tradition cannot be separated from the question of the content and structuring of this tradition. Was there really such a thing as an 'Urkanon*. or is it not more likely that separate bodies of traditional material came to be integrated into one Canon, gradually at first, in the course of the dissemination and diversification of Buddhism, eventually to form the 'earliest tradition'? The corpus of traditional material would then have been organised into Pitakas, Nikayas, Agamas, Angas, etc., in accordance with various principles of classification. It now appears as if, along with the fusion of distinct regional traditions

into supra-regional streams, there also ensued a fusion of different principles of organisation, in accordance with which the division into Pitakas was largely accomplished; the other organisational systems which originally had equal standing were then used for the subdivision of the Sutrapitaka. It would thus seem that these same organisational principles were applied simultaneously at several places, independently of each other, to traditional material which itself had already become locally diversified, so that many correspondences arose which would not necessarily have had to derive from an archetype. Consequently we have to be extremely sceptical about any assumption that an 'Urkanon' ever actually existed.

We can now formulate our question more precisely. In every case we much check to see at what stage of development certain complexes of tradition were so organised that they could already be regarded as constituting a structured literary work. There can be no doubt that this occurred very early for the formulary for confession (P. pdtimokkha, Skt. pratimoksa it is much more difficult, however, to determine in which phase of the tradition the formularies for governing the life of the community (P. kammavaca, Skt. karmavacanah) were put in order and came to underlie the broader context of a 'skandhaka' text. For the history of the formation of the Vinayapitaka we can refer to the book by E Frauwallner (The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginnings of Buddhist Literature, Rome 1956) and to an entire series of other studies which have appeared since, while for the text of the four Nikayas or Agamas no really serious attempt to reconstruct the four 'Ur-Agamas' has yet been undertaken. So far as we can see at this time, such an attempt would probably be doomed to failure, because in this case the application of the principles of organisation was introduced at a

time when the local diversification of the tradition was already further advanced than with the Vinaya. The compilations available to us hardly go back to any 'Ur-Agamas', but originated as the result of local applications of the same principles of organisation to bodies of traditional material that were still largely in agreement. As a natural consequence of this, various compilations of texts came into being that resembled each other in many respects, and their similarities can lead to the erroneous assumption that there might have been an original form of the corpus as a whole.

Besides, in the early period we must also take into account numerous borrowings from other branch traditions; thus we are dealing with a tradition that is largely .'contaminated', and consequently if we try to reconstruct the oldest form of the tradition on the principle of a genealogical tree we can easily go astray.

The question now arises as to when the tradition was actually established in definite form. Buddhist tradition of course maintains that the texts were already established at the time of the First Council, but were still being transmitted orally for a long time thereafter - in Ceylon from the advent of the Theravada until the time of King Vattagamanr Abhaya (89-77 B.C.E.). As for the traditional date when the Pali Canon was first written down, we can declare with certainty that, in view of the most recent research into the source history of the Ceylonese chronicles, the traditional account constitutes reliable historical information. Also, if my conjecture is correct that the process of committing these texts to writing had actually been initiated in the motherland some time previously, we can reject outright the possibility that a written translation into Pali of the

works of the earlier Pali Canon was made from some other dialect, even if the other well-known arguments against such a notion did not exist

To be able to pass on textual complexes as large as these by word of mouth while still maintaining an acceptable level of accuracy requires a special system, and it is precisely this that is attested to by the tradition that there existed specialists in the skill of recitation (bhanaka), which represented a parallel with the methods of transmission used by the Vedic schools. To a certain extent the Buddhist practice of oral transmission continues to exist side by side witht the written even today, especially in Burma

Thus, there cannot be a shadow of doubt - and at this point I believe I can pass from asking a question to making a flat assertion - that what we are dealing with in the early period is an oral tradition. Indeed, literary historians have long since determined with great exactitude the effect of a long oral tradition on the form of literary texts (see G. von Simson, 'Zur Phrase yena . . . tenopajagama/upetya und ihren Varianten im buddhistischen Kanon', Beitrage zur Indienforschung, pp.479-88).

Now that we have come to this conclusion we can answer more accurately the question as to the nature of the 'transmission' of the texts. If we look for remnants of earlier linguistic forms in the available texts, we must do so bearing in mind the characteristic features of oral tradition; to interpret the differences between the versions of the Buddhist text we must bring to bear an entirely different methodological approach from that which we would use, say, in comparing the versions of the Asokan inscriptions, even though these inscriptions

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belong to the same linguistic and chronological domain.

Thus, in seeking out traces of earlier linguistic forms, we must heed the principle already formulated by S. Levi for our own question and later applied successfully by Hermann Berger (in Zwei Probleme der mittelindishcen Lautlehre, Munich 1955) to the solution of a large number of individual problems; namely, we must always look for the specific conditions which have led to the. preservation of forms from an alien dialect in these linguistic monuments. This precept applies whenever we see in the language in question not simply a 'hybrid dialect' but a specific linguistic form into which the given textual material has been 'transformed' or 'transmitted'. We have accepted as a premise that this applies to Pali. Thus H. Berger has designated as 'Magadhisms' (op. cit, p.15 ff.) such linguistic doublets as occur only or chiefly in stereotyped series of synonyms (e.g. kinha along with kanha\ or which are found in verses whose metrical structure would be distorted if the normal Pali form (e.g. kiccha for the 'Magadhism' kasira) were used. Both premises are in keeping with the special demands of oral transmission and oral conversioa

I should like to cite as an additional example the use of bhikkhave and bhikkhavo in the earlier prose sections of the Pali Canon. We find the 'Magadhism' bhikkhave in the actual sermon of the Buddha, while the vocative bhikkhavo occurs in the introductory formula. The text of the Majjhima Nikaya begins as follows :

tatra kho Bhagava bhikkhu amantesi: bhikkhavo ti. bhadante ti re bhikkhu Bhagavato paccassosum. Bhagava etad avoca: sabbhadhammamulapariyayam vo bhikkhave desessami.

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The form bhikkhave is thus established as a specific usage in the Pali text which can be explained as a way of recalling the actual speech of the Buddha. Once such a standard procedure has been devised, it could be applied to newly created texts without further ado, and thus the occurrence of this 'Magadhism' would tell us nothing about the original language of the text in question. On the other hand, it would explain why we find only bhikkhavo throughout the verses of the Suttanipata, which otherwise is so full of 'Magadhisms'.

The forms in -e (for Sanskrit -as), which of course were determined very early to be Magadhisms in the Pali Canon (Kuhn, Beitrage, p.9; V. Trenckner, Pali Miscellany, Copenhagen 1879, p. 75 etc.), also provide exemplifications of this methodological principle, which are plausible in other ways. If we refer to the list of such cases compiled and expanded by H. Luders (Beobachtungen, §§ 1-24), we find that - except for set expressions to which e.g. seyyatha and yebhuyyena owe their adoption into Pali - the causes for the preservation of such forms are generally speaking misunderstandings in transmission. This applies also to those passages in the Patikasutta (Luders, op. cit., § 5) that can obviously no longer be correctly understood. As with seyyatha and bhikkhave, the easily remembered formulation - and thus the existence of a stereotyped mode of expression - may have contributed significantly to the preservation of the -e in the passage of the Sakkapanhasutta (Geiger, op. cit., § 80; Luders, op. cit., § 6) and the Sunakkhattasutta (Trenckner, op. cit., p.75; Liiders, op. cit., §7).

On the other hand, this very form provides an example of how we can go astray if we rely exclusively on the grammatical

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form and do not pay attention to the context. Luders, for instance, explains (Beobachtungen, § 8) the nominative in -e in the language of the heretics in the Samannaphalasutta as 'Magadhisms', although it is difficult to perceive why an historical peculiarity of the language of the Buddha should be preserved in the language of the heretics only, while it is not found in the speech of the Buddha himself. I have attempted to explain these forms and related passages in the Jataka as 'Sinhalisms', i.e. as forms first adopted in Ceylon from the local vernacular to characterise the uncultivated patois of the heretics CUber Singhalesisches im Palikanon', WZKSO 1, 1957, pp.71-5). This implied that these forms were inserted in the text in early Ceylon during the period of oral tradition. K.R. Norman disagreed ('Pali and the Language of the Heretics', Acta Orientalia 37, 1976, pp.113-22), but I am not at all convinced by his arguments which I shall discuss elsewhere. In any case, we may not consider these forms as 'Magadhisms' in the usual sense of the term. They do not seem to be residua from the language of the oldest tradition, but are forms which came into the text later, even though they look like 'Magadhisms' purely from the standpoint of form. If, on the other hand, the ending -ase in the nominative plural, which occurs in the verses, was not transformed into -aso in the Pali texts (with one or two possible exceptions under peculiar conditions only), it was for the reason that the form in -aso was not usual in 'genuine' Pali and thus there was no point in substituting it.

I am still in agreement with a thesis advanced by R Berger (op. eft, p.15) that, in general, forms like pure which appear in the traditional Pali texts should not be regarded as 'Magadhisms', although -e appears for -ah instead of *puro which the laws of Pali phonetics would lead us to expect; hence Berger's comment

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QbidX 'It is hard to understand why the Pali translators would have neglected to put this particular word, common as it is, into the corresponding western form while they never made the same slip with other adverbs (faro, bahuso etc.)'. This must be a case of formation by analogy (and indeed with a significance corresponding to that of agge and similar forms; cf. Karl Hoffmann in Berger, op. cit, p.15, n.6). The same holds true for Pali sve or suve (Skt. svah). Here again we must not allow ourselves to be misled by a merely apparent congruence with the Eastern dialect.

Thus we can clearly see the general applicability of the principle enunciated above to the example of the occurrence of -e for -as in Pali, and, as we proceed to exclude, on the basis of convincing arguments, forms like these, which are not 'Magadhisms', we can then turn to working out the complex of true 'Magadhisms' which remains. The example has also shown us how important it is to take note of the further destinies of the transmitted texts. Aspects of the history of the transmission of the Pali Canon have been examined recently by O. von Hinuber, K.R. Norman and other scholars. Various orthographic and grammatical peculiarities result from the influence of the vernaculars of the countries in which the texts were handed down, or from the influence of Sanskrit.

These basic considerations also hold true for that form of the language known to us from the 'Gandhan-Dharmapada' (J. Brough, The Gandhari Dharmapada, London 1962); this was tentatively identified by F. Bernhard ('Gandhari and the Buddhist Mission in Central Asia*, Ahjali. O.H. de A. Wijesekera Felicitation Volume, Peradeniya 1970, pp.55-62) and even earlier by H.W. Bailey ('Gandhan', BSOAS 11, 1946, pp.764-97) as the

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language of the Canon of the Dharmaguptaka school before its Sanskntisation. (Cf. also J.W. de Jong, A Brief History of Buddhist Studies in Europe and America, Varanasi 1976, pp.62f.).

The situation is more complicated in the case of the texts in 'Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit'. There was an indigenous term for this language, viz. arsa. It is used in Kaumaralata's grammar, as has been pointed out by H. Liiders (Philologica Indica, Gottingen 1940, pp.686 f., 693 f., 713 ff.) and more recently recalled by D. Seyfort Ruegg ('Allusiveness and Obliqueness in Buddhist Texts', Dialectes dans les Utteratures indo-aryennes, ed. C Caillat, Paris 1989, p.285 If. Most of these texts were written in various forms of Middle Indie before Sanskntisation. We can proceed on the basis of the traditions of the Buddhists themselves that - depending on which sect was involved -Hhey are based on different languages. The familiar tradition that four different languages were used by the four main sects (Lin Li-kouang, L' Aide-memoire de la vrai loi, Paris 1949, pp.175-81) is not, of course, an actual description of the historical facts, yet we can perceive that it represents a recollection of the linguistic differences of the various versions of the canonical texts. Akira Yuyama has presented a detailed critical discussion of this

2 Seyfort Ruegg remarks that 'this specific use of the word arsa has also been omitted from the Sanskrh-Wdnerbuch der buddhistiscten Texu aus dm Turfan-Funden even though the term, as noted by Luders, is attested in the •Turfan" collection'. However, this use is found in grammatical literature only. but not in the corpus of texts to be evaluated in this dictionary. The guidelines governing tke choice of material to be included in this dictionary were explicitly approved by Seyfort Ruegg in his review in JAOS 106 (1986). p.597, so that his criticism concerning the entry for arsa is not justified.

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tradition (*Bu-ston on the Languages Used by Indian Buddhists at the Schismatic Period*, Die Sprache der altesten buddhistischen Uberlieferung, pp.175-81). Accordingly, the thesis once expressed by F. Edgerton concerning an 'essential dialectic unity' of the Prakrit underlying the hybrid Buddhist Sanskrit (see, e.g. Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar, § 1.80) no longer requires any specific refutation.

Our task now lies in differentiating between the various strata of dialectic change. There is good reason to believe that Sanskritisation began when the texts were committed to writing, and we can be helped along by the fact, well-known from the lessons of textual criticism, that textual changes occurring in the course of written transmission come about in a different manner from those developed in an oral tradition. Sanskritisation itself is known to have been a multi-stage process, and we are much better informed about it than we are about the previous stages of textual development, especially since we actually have available to us earlier versions of many texts which are closer to the Middle Indie variants as well as later, more strongly Sanskritised versions. Naturally we are speaking here only of the Buddhist works in Sanskrit which are actually based on a Middle Indie original. Various other Sanskrit Buddhist works were written from the beginning in the so-called 'hybrid dialects'; for a discussion of this question, see C Regamey, 'Randbemerkungen zur Sprache und Textuberlieferung des Karandavyuha' (Asiatica. Festschrift Friedrich Weller, Leipzig 1954, pp.514-27).

As has already been demonstrated by the foregoing discussions, the question of the relationship of the individual versions to the earliest tradition must be viewed in connection

with the problems of the history of the early Buddhist sects, and we must also enquire into their localisation. The home of Pali, for example, cannot be determined exclusively on the basis of linguistic arguments, but only with due regard to the early history of the Theravada. Consideration of that history made it possible to classify Pali as the language of Vidisa (cf. E. Frauwallner, The Earliest Vinaya, Rome 1956, p.18 ff.), a determination which would not have been possible on the basis of current arguments from the standpoint of historical linguistics, but which nevertheless was in close agreement with the results of philological research. Local factors also help to explain the noteworthy similarities between Pali and the language of the texts of the Lokottaravadins, which the history of the formation of the sects leaves quite obscure.

Yet we must still keep in mind the linguistic aspects of the problem. The comparison of the language of the early Buddhist texts with the language of the Asokan and other early Prakrit inscriptions has been carried out in the minutest detail, mdeed, much of the research has, if anything, been undertaken too systematically. For example, we can only view with the greatest scepticism any attempts to come to conclusions about pronunciation on the basis of orthography, since we must never lose sight of the broad spectrum of possible divergences between orthography and pronunciation that we are familiar with from our knowledge of the development of other languages and from examination of later stages in the evolution of the Indie languages themselves.

Similarly, the questions of the conditions necessary for the emergence of a written language must be approached by methods which are predominantly linguistic. Fortunately we

possess a number of examples from other areas - such as the origin of the written form of the Romance languages - for which we have developed an extremely useful research apparatus. The question of the language of the earliest Buddhist tradition and its progressive development into the corpus of material as it stands today must undoubtedly be viewed as part of the formation of standardised (and therefore also in certain ways 'hybrid') languages during the developmental stages of Middle Indie, which ultimately came to be written languages. Moreover, the use of Middle Indie languages in the earliest Indian inscriptions, which of course constitute the oldest written evidence of the Indo-Aryan languages, suggests the hypothesis that we have here the earliest written Indie language, to which, however, the established tradition of a language of priests and scholars that was transmitted orally at first and nevertheless became standardised down to the last detail - i.e. Sanskrit - stands in the same relationship as Latin does to the written Romance languages. We can infer from the passage in the Vinaya that we have mentioned, and also from the actual development of language, that originally, and indeed in deliberate contrast to the Brahmanic tradition, the Buddha had definitely not been striving to bring about a linguistic standardisation to be used in the propagation of his teachings.

Does it not seem reasonable, then, to assume that the earliest tradition actually consisted of a linguistic multiplicity, and that a specific 'language of the earliest Buddhist tradition 1 does not exist at all? In view of all this there would hardly seem much point in continuing to look for this language; instead we should redirect the thrust of our enquiry towards the process of 'standardisation' of the linguistic form of the tradition as such. In this connection it would be quite helpful if we could answer

the question as to how the traditional canonical texts of the Jains developed up to the point when they took definitive form, and how the Ardhamagadhi of the Svetambara texts actually originated. The significant differences between the language of the canonical prose of the Pali Canon and the language of the early verses give rise to the further question as to whether or not a poetic language existed in Middle Indie, which was possibly supra-regional in use but in certain places may have been subjected to a process of assimilation with local languages, as Helmer Smith conjectured. Whatever answers we finally come up with to all these questions, it would seem imperative, in any case, always to keep in mind the wide variety of points of view and be wary Of supporting just one principle argument

Considered in isolation and viewed only with reference to individual linguistic phenomena, this question might well appear to be one of those abstruse problems of detail in a highly specialised science the solution to which touches on the progress of that science as a whole only with reference to a narrowly limited issue. If, however, we view our question in its broader ramifications, its answer will prove to be an important element in the task of elaborating an accurate understanding of the entire linguistic, literary and religious development in India during the fifth to the first century B.CE


Translated b y Irhn M. Cooper

(i) Preliminary Remarks

The Salistamba Sutra, an early text on Dependent Origination, is here translated (by kind permission of the publishers) from a reconstructed version in Sanskrit edited by N. Aiyaswami Sastri 1 .


(i) Preliminary remarks and footnotes to such.

(ii) Translation of Aryasalistambasutra with amended opening

section from p.xlii of the book, with translation of Sastri's

footnotes to such.

(iii) Translation of Sastri's reconstructed opening of the Sutra

(pp.1-2 of the book), with Sastri's footnotes.

(iv) Translator's notes, J

(v) Translation of Sastri's additional notes.

Sastri's footnotes, and my footnotes to these remarks are indicated by Arabic numerals; the translator's notes by lower case letters of the roman alphabet and Sastri's Additional Notes by upper case roman letters (these last two sets of notes appear at the end of the article in sections iv and v). Reference to

1 Arya Salistamba Sutra. Edited with Tibetan version, Notes and Introduction etc. by N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Adyar Library. 1950 (Adyar Library Series No.76).

Buddhist Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991) - Cooper

Sastri's text is by page numbers. The parts of the Notes and Additional Notes that are in English have been left unchanged.

Sastri states in his Introduction that the Sutra was reconstructed almost completely to its original form, omitting only the beginning and end, by quoting the Siksasamuccaya (ed. C. Bendall, Bibliotheca Buddhica I, St Petersburg 1897-1902 [repr. Osnabruck 1970, Tokyo 1977] = Siks), the Madhyamakavrtti (ed. L. de La Vallee Poussin, Bibliotheca Buddhica IV, St Petersburg 1903-13. = Mdhvr) and the Bodhicaryavatarapafijika (ed L, de La Vallee Poussin, Bibliotheca Indica I, Calcutta 1902. = Bcpf.

There is another reconstructed Sanskrit text (and Tibetan text) by L. de La Vallee Poussin 3 , an English translation by Stanley Frye 4 , and a very noteworthy unpublished work by Noble Ross Reat 5 . I have found Frye's and Reat's work helpful in making my own translation.

Sastri analyses the contents of the Sutra in his Introduction (pp.xi-xiii). On p.xiv he says that 'Buddhist tradition narrates that the formula [of Dependent Origination) dawned on Gautama

2 ibid*, ppjt-xi

3 L de La Vallee Poussin, Tkeorie des Douze Causes, Gand [Ghent] 1913.

4 The Sublime Sutra of the Great Vehicle Entitled 'The Rice Plants", translated by Stanley Frye in Dreloma, Drepung Loseling Magazine, Drepung Loseling Library Society Publications, Karnataka, January 1985.

5 'The Salistamba Sutra, Tibetan Original, Sanskrit Reconstruction, English Translation and Critical Notes (including Pali parallels, Chinese version and ancient Tibetan fragments)' by N. Ross Reat (the copy in my hands does not have a Chinese version, perhaps because it is a computer printout).

Buddha during the first week of his stay under the tree of wisdom after his enlightenment (v. Dharmapala's comm. on Therigatha, p.2; and H. Oldenberg, Buddha, His Life, His Doctrine, His Order. London 1882 [repr. Delhi 1971], pp.114-15; EJ. Thomas, The Life of Buddha as Legend and History. London 1926 [repr. 1975], p.85)\ However in the Nidanasamyukta it says that the Noble Eightfold Path and the chain of twelve causes which produce duhkha had been rediscovered by the Buddha while he was still a Bodhisattva 6 . Sastri also says, on p.xvi, that "Nagarjuna (Mulamadhyamaka Karika I) and other Mahayanic writers (v. Tattvasangraha) believe that the Buddha deserves our homage because he has proclaimed to the world the doctrine of causation which has not been realised by any other previous teacher so far" - although the Nidanasamyukta states that Dependent Origination and the Noble Eightfold Path were known to ancient sages 7 .

As regards the name of the Sutra, I have translated Sastri's title - Aryasalistambasutra - as 'the holy sutra of the clump of rice plants', whereas the four descriptions of the Chinese translations give the title as Salisambhava Sutra (p.xx) and, of course, this title appears in the Sanskrit name of the Sutra which is given before the Tibetan title in the latter version of the

6 See Pali Buddhist Review 5, 3. 1980, 'A Fragment of the Nidanasutra, tr. John M, Cooper', p.53, §2; p55, |2 of translation; pi8, §2.

L. de La Vallee Poussin, op. d/, p.v, n.2: "D'apres certaines sources, la meditation des Douze Causes est reservee aux Prat yekabudd has, C'est en decouvram le Praiityasamutpada [PS] que le Bouddha est devenu Bouddha". Text: The PS is "le message decisif du Maitre".

7 Ibid, p57, L4 from bottom; p.58, 1L7-9.

Buddhist Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991) - Cooper

Sutra which begins on p.43 8 . The Tibetan saJu represents the Sanskrit sdli 'wild rice', the -hi is the genitive of this, Ijanpa according to Das means % green, not ripe; 2. green corn in the first stage of its growth, green leaves of barley and oats', zhes.bya.wa is 'so to be styled', theg,pa.chen.pohi.mdo means 'Mahayana sutra'. In a handout distributed at the Dalai Lama's philosophy seminar in London in July 1984 there is a diagram of 'dependent arising' attributed to the 'Rice Seedling Sutra', which is obviously a translation of the Tibetan title as analysed above. The confusion, I think, arises from the fact that sambhava can mean 'birth, origin, source", giving rise to the translation 'rice seedling', or it can mean 'being or coming together, meeting, union', whence the other Sanskrit title stamba ('clump, tuft*). I have preferred the second meaning as it fits both Sanskrit words. A third option exists, as Sastri himself on p.xi translates in the first paragraph of the Sutra (on p.xlii), 'The Buddha once looking at the stalk of a Sali plant addressed to the Bhiksus this sutra„.'. This rendering may have originated from No.280 of Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka where the Chinese title of the Sutra, Fo-shwo-tao-kan-kin / Fo-shuo-tao-kan ehing], is rendered into English as 'Sutra Spoken by Buddha on the Paddy Straw'. I think this third meaning has arisen from taking stamba as stambha, which means 'stem'. However, as I do not see any reason to emend stamba to stambha I have not followed this

8 In the Tibetan translation of the title, the word 'shaken' seems to be a misprint for, 'arya'.

third translation 9 .

There is a fourfold aspect of Dependent Origination in the Salistambasutra: (1) a causal relationship of external dependent origination, (2) its conditional relationship, (3) causal relationship of internal dependent origination, (4) conditional relationship of internal dependent origination.

Although the Salistambasutra is a Mahayana text there is little in it that would be unacceptable to a follower of the H may ana. Richard H. Robinson, in Early Madhyamika in India and China, Madison 1967 (p.64), says that the Stanzas attack the Hlnayanist concept of dependent co-arising, and quotes Siva in the Middle Treatise as saying, "Because the Buddha wished to cut off all such false views and make them know the Buddha-dharma, he first in the sravaka-dharma declared the twelve nidanas"

The word avidya, translated by 'ignorance', probably means a definite state of delusion rather than just absence of knowledge.

Sastri in his footnotes points out instances where Mdhvr, Siks and Bcp differ from his text, but he does not mention all of them.

(ii) Translation of Sutra

9 Siambaka means the same thing as stamba. O. von Bohrlingk and R. Roth, Sanskrit Wbrierbuck. 7 vols, St Petersburg 1852-75, pJ255, says Salistambhaka is a wrong reading of -stambaka.


Salutation to all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas

(p.xlii) 'Thus have I heard" etc. "The Blessed One was living in Rajagrha, on the hill called Grdhrakuta (Vulture's Peak) 1 with a large number of monks, 1,250 monks, and very many Bodhisattvas." The venerable Sariputra said this to the Bodhisattva Maitreya, "(The Buddha) looked at a clump of rice plants and spoke this sutra to the monks, 'He, monks, who sees dependent origination sees the teaching. He who sees the teaching sees the Buddha.' Having spoken thus, the Blessed One became silent. So what is the meaning of this sutra spoken by the Blessed One? What is dependent origination? What is the teaching? What is the Buddha? And how, seeing dependent origination, does one see the teaching?' etc. 'Therein what is called dependent origination is namely ignorance" etc. (And having this in view, this is spoken there in the sutra) "Whether Tathagatas arise or not there is still this inherent nature, constant nature of Dharma, unchangeable sameness of the Dharma, true state of things, not untruth, sole truth, reality, truth, fact, absence of contrariety, absence of error", thus and so forth spoke the Blessed Maitreya

(p2) 4 When it had been spoken thus, the Bodhisattva, the Great Being, Maitreya said this to the venerable Sariputra, "This is what has been said by the Blessed One, the master of the Teaching, the omniscient one, O venerable Sariputra, 'He who sees dependent origination, monks, sees the teaching. He who sees the teaching sees the Buddha.' In this, what is called dependent origination? What is called dependent origination is namely: (1) This being, that becomes; from the arising of this, that arises 5 . (2) Conditioned by ignorance are volitional actions, conditioned by volitional actions is consciousness, conditioned by consciousness is mentality-materiality, conditioned by mentality-materiality are the six senses, conditioned by the six senses is contact, conditioned by contact is feeling, conditioned by feeling is craving, conditioned by craving is grasping, conditioned by grasping is becoming, conditioned by becoming is birth, conditioned by birth, old age and death, grief,

4-4 This portion is cited in Bcp. pp.386-7 omitting XI) This being, arises'. (Notes 1-3 appear on p.OOJ

5 This is frequently referred to in Buddhist literature both in Pali and Sanskrit. Its Pali form is This being, that becomes; from the arising of this. that arises. When this is absent lhat does not happen; because of the cessation of this that ceases' (Tr. Taking niridka as an obvious misprint for nirodha). Nidanasamyutta in S II, pp.28, 65, 78, 85; M III, p.63. Other references: Mahavastu (ed. E. Senart, 3 vols, Paris 1882-97) It, p.285; Mdhvr, p.9 with n.7; Bcp, p.182; Dharmapala's Comm. on Alambanapariksa (ed. N.A. Sastri, Adyar 1942), pp.28 (it is said in the traditional teaching, 'This being, that becomes', is the expression of dependent origination"), 68; my [Sastri's] 'Central Teaching of Manimekhalai' §4, III.

It is also referred to as Dharmasariketa in Bcp. p.414, 18.

See the Buddha's teaching this Dharma to Udayin, M II, p32.

lamentation, misery, dejection and perturbations arise the arising of this whole great mass of misery.

thus is

In that, from the cessation of ignorance (p3) the cessation of volitional actions come about, from the cessation of volitional actions the cessation of consciousness comes about, from the cessation of consciousness the cessation of mentality-materiality comes about, from the cessation of mentality-materiality the cessation of the six senses comes about, from the cessation of the six senses the cessation of contact comes about, from the cessation of contact the cessation of feeling comes about, from the cessation of feeling the cessation of craving comes about, from the cessation of craving the cessation of grasping comes about, from the cessation of grasping the cessation of becoming comes about, from the cessation of becoming the cessation of birth comes about, from the cessation of birth, old age and death, grief, lamentation, misery, dejection and perturbations cease - thus the cessation of this whole great mass of misery comes about. This is called dependent origination 4 by the Blessed One.

What is the teaching? It is the Noble Eightfold Path, as here follows: right understanding, right thought, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration. This has been said by the Blessed One to be the Noble Eightfold Path, the teaching in which the acquisition of the result and Nirvana are taken together as one. Therein what is the Blessed Buddha? He who is called the Buddha because of his knowledge of all states of being, possessed of the noble eye of wisdom, possessing his spiritual body (Dharmakaya), sees those characteristics to be cultivated and those not to be cultivated 1 ".

'Therein how does one see dependent origination? Here it has been said by the Blessed One 6 * 'He who sees (this) continually without a self, soulless independent origination 7 as not wrong, unborn, unbecome, uncreated, uncompounded, unobstructed, without support, auspicious, secure, that which cannot be taken away, unchanging 8 , unceasing, and without self-nature (sees the teaching). But he who 9 thus sees (this) continually without a, self, soulless teaching as not wrong, unborn, unbecome, uncreated, uncompounded, unobstructed, without support, auspicious, secure c , that which cannot be taken away, unchanging, unceasing, and without self-nature 10 , u sees the Buddha possessed of the uttermost spiritual body, by the very (p.4) attaining of 12 right knowledge in the full realisation of the holy teaching.' Why is it called 'dependent origination? It is with causes, with conditions, not without causes, not without conditions. Therefore it is called 'dependent origination* 6 . In that connection the Blessed One has briefly described the

6-6 Cited in Bcp, pp576-7.

6a Cited also ibid^ p387. II. 8-12.

7 This formula is also repeated in the last para, of this Sutra (Tr. really the antepenultimate para. See nJ20)|

8 Om in Tib.

9 Bcp reads simply 'thus*. Tib. seems to read: such teaching as eternally. . .*.

10 Ibid^ shortened: 'soulless' and so on, as before, up to 'he sees it as unceasing and without self-nature'.

11 Tib. construes this sentence thus: 'Having completely realised the holy teaching, by attaining right knowledge he sees the Buddha, whose body is the supreme Dharma'.

12 Bcp thy the very) attainment from (right) knowledge.*.

characteristic attribute of dependent origination. There is this result of its conditioned nature, that whether 13 Tathagatas arise or not there is still the inherent nature of these dharmas, inasmuch as there is that which is this inherent nature of dharmas, constant nature of dharmas, unchangeable sameness of the Dharma, sameness of dependent origination, true state of things, true state of non-contrariety, sole truth, reality, truth, absence of contrariety, absence of error.'

I4 Now, moreover, this dependent origination arises from two (causes). From which two? They are, namely, from dependence on causes and from dependence on conditions. It is also to be seen as twofold, as external and and internal. In that connection what is the dependence on causes of the external dependent origination? It is (for example): from the seed comes the sprout; from the sprout comes the leaf; from the leaf comes the stalk; from the stalk comes the hollow stalk; from the hollow stalk comes the knot 15 , from the knot comes the calyx; from the calyx 16 comes the flower, from the flower comes the

13 The shorter form of this formula is oft-repeated in canonical and other works, e.g. Lanka vatarasutra (e. B. Nanjio. Kyoto 1923), pp.144. 218. Ku mania also refers lo it in his Tantravarlika, p.163, and further see Mdhvr, p.40, and La Vallee Poussin's extensive note upon it Cp. also Bcp, p.588.

14 Bcp, pp,577-9 quotes from this to the end of the (section on the) external dependent origination, (Tr. See n.27).

13 '(comes the) knot; from the knot' om. in Tib.

16 '(comes the) awn; from the awn' om. in Tib. (Tr. 1 am not happy with awn (bristly beard), but the only other meaning is calyx, which we have already had (with garbha). It is not surprising thai the Tibetan omits it. I follow the Tibetan.)

fruit. When the seed does not exist the sprout does not come to be; as far as: when the flower does not exist the fruit does not come to be. But when the seed exists the sprout comes forth; thus as far as: when the flower exists the fruit comes forth. In that connection the seed does not think thus: 'I bring forth the sprout.' The sprout also does not think thus: 'I am brought forth by the seed' (p.5). Thus as far as: the flower does not think thus: 'I bring forth the fruit"; the fruit does not think thus: 'I am brought forth by .the flower.' Moreover when the seed exists the sprout comes forth, it appears. Thus as far as: when the flower exists the fruit comes forth, it appears. It is thus that dependence on causes of the external dependent origination is to be seen.

How is the dependence on conditions of the external dependent origination to be seen? It is from the coming together of six elements. From the coming together of which six elements? It is, namely, from the coming together of the elements 17 of earth, water, heat, air, space and seasons that the dependence on conditions of the external dependent origination is to be seen. In that connection the element of earth does the work of supporting the seed. The element of water moistens the seed. The element of heat ripens the seed. The element of air develops the seed. The element of space does the work of freeing the seed from obstructions. The season does the work of transforming the seed. When these conditions do not exist, the sprout does not come forth from the seed. When the

17 Xof the) elements' om. in Bcp.

external element of earth is unimpaired and the elements 18 of water, heat, air, space and season are thus unimpaired, then when the seed is being destroyed on account of the coming together of all (these elements) then" the sprout comes forth.

In that connection the element of earth does not think thus, 'I do the work of supporting the seed'. Likewise the element of water also does not think thus, 'I moisten the seed'. The element of heat also does not think thus, 'I ripen the seed'. The element of air also does not think thus, 'I develop the seed'. The element of space also does not think thus, 'I do the work of freeing the seed from obstructions'. The season also does not think thus, 'I do the work of transforming the seed'. The seed also does not think thus, 'I bring forth the sprout' d . (p.6) The sprout also does not think thus, 'I am brought forth by these conditions'. Now, moreover, when these conditions exist and when the seed is being destroyed the sprout comes forth. Thus as far as; when the flower exists the fruit comes forth 20 . And that sprout is not self-made, nor made by another, nor made by both, nor made by God, nor transformed by time, nor produced by nature, (nor dependent on a single cause 21 ,) nor even produced without a cause. Now, moreover, when the seed is being destroyed by the coming together of the elements 17 of earth, water, heat, air, space and season the sprout comes forth. Thus is the dependence on conditions of the external dependent origination to be seen.

18 Tib omits 'elements (of)'.

19 Bcp omits 'then'

20 This sentence om. in Bcp,

21 Om. in Tib. (Tr. This must be n.21, not note 1 as in the text).

In that connection, the external dependent origination is to be seen with five aspects 22 . With what five? 'Neither on account of eternity, nor on account of annihilation, nor on account of transference', on account of the production of a major result from a minor cause, and on account of the continuity (of the effect) corresponding (to the cause)'. How is it 'neither on account of eternity'? Because the sprout is one thing and the seed is another. Nor is it that the sprout and the seed are identical. Nor 23 does the sprout arise from the destroyed seed; nor even from the undestroyed (seed) 23 . Moreover, the seed is destroyed, and just then does the sprout arise. Therefore it is not on account of eternity. How is it not on account of annihilation? The sprout comes forth neither from a previously destroyed seed nor even from an undestroyed seed". However, the seed is destroyed; at that very time the sprout arises like the swinging up and down of the arm of a balance. Therefore it is not on account of annihilation. How is it not on account of transference? 'The sprout is different from the seed 525 / Therefore it is not on account of transference. How is it on account of the production of a major result from a minor cause? (p.7) 'When a small seed is sown it produces a large fruit'. Therefore it is on account of the production of a major result from a minor cause. How is it on account of the continuity (of

22 Bcp reads "(with five) causes'. 23-23 This portion om. in Bcp.

24 'seed' om. in Tib.

25 So reads Bcp, But Tib. reads: 'Because the sprout is one thing and the seed another. Nor are the sprout and the seed identical'. Note this explanation is also given in connection with 'It does not eirist on account of -eternity' above.

the effect) corresponding (to the cause) 26 ? 'Whatever kind of seed is sown it produces such a fruit'. Therefore 'and on account of the continuity (of the effect) corresponding (to the cause)'. Thus the external dependent origination is to be seen with five 22 aspects 27 .

Likewise the internal dependent origination arises from two (causes). From which two? They are, namely, from dependence on causes and dependence on conditions 28 .

29 In that connection, what is the dependence on causes of the internal dependent origination? It is, namely, 'conditioned by ignorance are volitional actions, as far as conditioned by birth are old age and death 130 , If ignorance should not exist then volitional actions will not be known; thus as far as, if birth should not exist then old age and death will not be known. Now 31 when there is ignorance the volitional actions come forth; thus as far as when there is birth, old age and death come forth. In that connection ignorance does not think thus, 'I bring forth the volitional actions'. The volitional actions also do not

26 'How. . . cause' cm in Tib,

27 End of the explanation of the 'external dependent origination'. The full text of this portion is cited in Bcp, as stated above, see n.14.

28 Candrakirti quotes a larger extract of the Sutra covering the whole explanation of the 'internal dependent origination' in his Mdhvr, ed. La Vallee Poussin. pp.560-70.

29 Santideva also draws a similar extract from this, almost to the end of the Sutra, in his Siks, ed. C. Bendall, pp.219-27.

30 Mdhvr repeats the formula fully.

31 Mdhvr 'Or rather' (Tr. samkaranam emended to samskaranam).

think thus, 'we are brought forth by ignorance*. Thus as far as: birth 32 also does not think thus, 'I bring forth old age and deathV old age and death also do not think thus, 'we (lit. T) are brought forth by birth'. Nevertheless, when there is ignorance the volitional actions come forth (p.8), appear, thus as far as when there is birth, old age and death come forth, appear. Thus is the dependence on causes of the internal dependent origination to be seen.

How is the dependence on conditions of the internal origination to be seen? From the coming together of six elements. From the coming together of which six elements? It is, namely, from the coming together of the elements of earth, water, heat, air, space and consciousness that the dependence on conditions of the internal dependent origination is to be seen. In that connection what is the element of earth of the internal dependent origination? That which produces hardness on body-compaction 33 (i.e. solidity), that is called the element of earth. That which does the work of cohesion 34 of the body is called the element of water. That which digests what has been eaten, drunk or consumed for the body is called the element of heat. That which does the work of breathing in and out of the body is called the element of air. That which produces hollowness™ inside the body is called the element of space. That which brings forth the sprout of mentality-materiality of the

32 Siks jatyah (Tr. instead of jaler. meaning unchanged).

33 Mdhvr yah kayasya samslesat instead of . . .samslesatah (Tr. meaning unchanged).

34 Siks 'the cohesion work" (Tr. meaning unchanged).

35 Siks 'a state of hollowness'.

body in the way (C) of (two) bundles of nada-reeds, 36 mind- consciousness conjoined with the group of the five types of consciousness and together with the defiled mind-consciousness, this is called the element of consciousness. In that connection 37 there is no arising of the body when those conditions do not exist. When the internal element of earth is unimpaired, and likewise the elements of water, heat, air, space and consciousness are unimpaired, then on account of the coming together of all (these) a body is produced. In that connection the element of earth does not think thus, 'I produce hardness on body-compaction'. The element of water does not think thus, 'I do the work of cohesion of the body', (p.9) The element of heat also does not think thus, 'I digest what has been eaten, drunk or consumed 38 for the body'. The element of air does not think thus, *I do the work of breathing in and out of the body'. The element of space does not think thus, 'I produce hollowness inside the body 13 '. The element of consciousness does not think thus, 40 T bring forth the mentality-materiality of the body'. The body also does not think thus 40 , 'I am produced by these

36 Tib. adds 'which is (the mind -consc iousness)'.

37 Siks asatsu praiyayem (Tr. meaning unchanged). Tib. and Siks omit 'In that connection'.

38 Mdhvr and Siks khadita (Tr. meaning unchanged as both words mean 'eaten, devoured, consumed').

39 Mdhvr after this adds: 'The season also does not think thus, "I do the work of maturing the body".'

40-40 Om. in Siks (Tr. This makes quite a difference to the meaning, as the reader can see).

conditions.' ^Nevertheless the body arises when these conditions exist

In that connection the element of earth is not the self, not a being, not the soul, not a creature, not a man, not a human, not female, not male, not neuter, nor T, not 'mine*, nor of anybody else. Likewise the element of water, the element of heat, the element of air, the element of space 42 and the element of consciousness are not the self, not a being, not the soul, not a creature, not a man, not a human, not female, not male, not neuter, nor T, not 'mine', nor of anybody else.

43 In this connection what is ignorance? It is that which, when these 44 very six elements, there are perception of a unit, perception of a lump, perception of the permanent, perception of the stable, perception of the eternal, perception of happiness, perception of the self, perception of a being, a soul, a creature, a person, an individual, a character, perception of a man, a human, perception of T and 'mine' 45 . Suchlike various kinds of

41 Mdhvr 'Nevertheless (the body arises) on account of the coming together of these conditions when they exist'.

42 'the element of the season' added in Mdhvr.

43 The following passage is also cited in Bcp, pp.387-9.

44 Bcp etesam (Tr. 'of these'. Meaning unchanged), Siks ya esveva satsu dkaiusu. . . (Tr. Using the locative, 'when these very six elements are present'. Fa must be a misprint for ya).

45 Siks 'perception of a being, a soul, a man, a human, (perception of) T. . .*. Mdhvr 'perception of a being, perception of a soul, a character, a man, a human, (perception of) T, . .'. Bcp 'perception of a being, perception of a soul, a creature, a man, a human, T, and "mine*. . .'.

46 So Mdhvr. But Siks 'The four formless aggregates of grasping together with the consciousness produced with them - they are mentality; (materiality:) and there are the four great elements, and on the basis of these is derivative form, and abbreviating these together they are mentality-materiality'. (Tr, There are 28 subdivisions of the aggregate of form, namely the four great elements (elemental forms) and 24 derivative forms. I am taking upadaya to be a misprint for upadaya.) Bcp 'The four great elements and the objects of grasping are materiality, materiality of these things taken together. The four formless aggregates of grasping, together with the consciousness that arises with them, are mentality. They (together) are mentality-materiality'. Tib, has much simplified the sentence thus: The four aggregates of grasping, together with the consciousness that arises with them, they are mentality-materiality'. (Tr. The four great elements are earth, air, fire and water.)

47 Siks bhavana (Tr. 'produced by contact is feeling 1 ).

misconception - this is called Ignorance*. Thus when there is ignorance, lust, hatred and (p.10) delusion are occupied with their objects. In that connection, the lust, hatred and delusion which are linked to these f objects, those are called 'volitional actions' (conditioned by ignorance). Consciousness is the recognition of an object. Four aggregates, together with consciousness, are formless, called (the aggregates of) grasping - they are mentality; materiality consists of the four great elements with the derivative forms derived from them - those are materiality; the one is mentality and the other is materiality, and taking them together as one they are mentality-materiality 46 . The faculties connected with mentality-materiality are the six senses. The coming together of the three objects 8 is contact. The experience of contact is feeling 47 . Clinging to feeling is craving. Developed 11 from craving is grasping. Action produced by grasping and producing rebirth (lit. rebecoming) is becoming.

Buddhist Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991) - Cooper

The manifestation of the aggregates, caused by becoming 48 , is birth. The ripening of the aggregates of the person born is ageing 49 . The annihilation of the ageing aggregates is death 50 . The anguish in him with attachments^, dying, bewildered, is grief. Speech arising from f^rief is lamentation 52 . An experience which is unpleasant 53 , conjoined with the groups of the five types of consciousness, is misery. Mental misery conjoined with taking it to heart 54 is dejection. And also those others which are minor causes of misery of this kind are called perturbations.

(p.ll) S5 In that connection, ignorance means great darkness 56 . The predispositions (or volitional actions) mean the accumulation of karma. Consciousness means making known 57 . Mentality-materiality means ( 58 mutual) support. The six senses

48 Tib. "caused by that (Becoming)'.

49 Siks The ripening of the aggregates is ageing'. Bcp The ripening of the aggregates brought forth by birth is ageing'.

50 Siks 'annihilation is death". Bcp 'annihilation of the aggregates (or of the body). . .'.

51 Siks, Bcp and Mdhvr 'the internal anguish (of him with attachments, . .)'.

52 Siks 'wailing is lamentation'. Bcp sakollhalapanam (Tr. meaning unchanged).

53 Siks asatam (Tr. meaning unchanged).

54 Mdhvr 'associated with the mind". Bcp 'united with taking to heart the misery'. Siks 'united with taking it to heart'.

55 This para, is omitted and abbreviated by "etcetera" in Siks.

56 Mdhvr '(The darkness) of delusion' (Tr. instead of "great darkness*).

57 Bcp vijnanana = perceiving, understanding. (Tr. Combined with arthena in the text there would be no way of knowing whether the word ended in -a or -a.)

mean the "entrances of impressions. Contact means touching. Feeling means experiencing. Craving means desire. Grasping means attachment. Becoming* means the causing of rebirth. Birth 61 means the appearance of the aggregates. Ageing means the ripening 62 of the aggregates. Death means [their] annihilation. Grief means sorrow. Lamentation means complaint * 3 by speech. Misery means the tormenting of the body. Dejection means the tormenting of the mind. Perturbations mean the * 4 minor causes of misery* 5 .

"Moreover, not understanding the facts, misunderstanding, unknowing, is ignorance. Thus when there is ignorance three kinds of volitional actions come forth: those conducive to merit, those conducive to demerit, those conducive to immovability. In that connection, of the volitional actions conducive to merit there comes to be consciousness just conducive to merit*. Of the volitional actions conducive to demerit there comes to be a consciousness just conducive to demerit'. Of the volitional actions conducive to immovability there comes to be a

58 Om. in Tib. Bcp 'means understanding',

59 Bcp 'the means of obtaining (the sense impressions)*, Tib. skyebtd,sgoi.phyir. (Tr. = 'means the entrance of birth") lit. janmadvararthena,

60 Mdhvr 'means rebirth*.

61 Mdhvr "means birth' (Tr. Tautology, like other sentences in this paragraph).

62 *of the aggregates' om. in Mdhvr.

63 'by speech' om. in Mdhvr.

64 Bcp upakiesana. . . (Tr. using the neuter or feminine action noun) "(means) the making of minor causes of misery'.

65 The citation in Bcp ends here.

66 Cited from this para, in Siks and Bcp, pp.479-83. Mdhvr 'or rather".

consciousness just conducive to immovability 1 . This is^ called (p.12) "'conditioned by volitional actions is consciousness'. The four formless aggregates (mentality), with accompanying consciousness, and that which is materiality, that is called 'conditioned by consciousness is mentality-materiality' 68 . The performances of actions proceed* 9 by the six doors of the senses with the growth of mentality-materiality. Thus it is said 'conditioned by mentality-materiality are the six senses'. And the six groups of contact originate from the six senses. This is called 'conditioned by the six senses is contact'. When there is contact of a particular kind a feeling of the corresponding kind comes forth. This is called 70 'conditioned by contact is feeling'. When somebody especially enjoys that feeling 71 , delights" in it, clings to it, and having clung to it abides in that condition, that is called 'conditioned by feeling is craving'. Thus the desire which is for its own permanent retention, with the thought, 'let

67 Om. in Mdhvr.

68 Siks. 'Likewise mentality-materiality'. Mdhvr: "Conditioned by consciousness is mentality-materiality' : 'the four formless aggregates beginning with feeling incline towards coming into existence here or there* - this is mentality. Together with the aggregate of materiality it is "mentality-materiality'. It is called mentality-materiality. Bcp: Therefore then, conditioned by consciousness is men tali ly-materia lit y\

69 Mdhvr adds "(and) are known'.

70 Mdhvr adds 'O monks".

71 Siks and Bcp "When somebody feels that (feeling), clings (to it), abides (in it)'. (Tr. adhisthaii must be a misprint for adhitisthati) Tib. reads 'those particular feelings. . . omitting 'when somebody*.

72 Bcp "gladdens", (Tr, 'gladdens (that feeling)' may be a way of saying 'rejoices at that feeling', 'delights in it*).

there not be any separation from the state of enjoyment, delight, grasping and clinging by one's own beloved objects and objects of delight* 73 , this is called (D) "conditioned by craving is grasping'. Thus desiring, he causes rebirth-producing karma to arise, by the body, by speech and by the mind. That is called 'conditioned by grasping is becoming', (p.13) What 7 * is the coming forth of the five aggregates produced by that karma, that is called 'conditioned by becoming is birth'. There is annihilation on account of the growth and ripening of the aggregates brought forth by birth 76 . Therefore this is called 'conditioned by birth are old age and death'.

"Thus this twelve-linked dependent origination has mutually related causes, mutually related conditions, is not eternal, not transient, not conditioned, not unconditioned, 78 not without

73 Bcp 'Retention is more and more the desire, with the thought, "(There

are). . . (and) grasping; let there not be any separation (from these) by one's own beloved objects and objects of delight'". Siks (Tr. the Siks version of this sentence is the same as that of Bcp except that it has 'my (me) beloved objects. . ." instead of 'one's own (atma) beloved objects. . .'). Mdhvr '. . . May there be no separation. . . from the state of grasping. , .*. Tib. omits 'permanent' and 'which'.

74 Mdhvr adds "monks".

75 Siks yd karma... so. (Tr. i.e. Siks places 'what" at the beginning of the sentence instead of in the middle, and omits 'that' before "karma").

76 Siks and Bcp Yo jaiyabhinirvritanam skandhanatnapacayaparipakad vinaso bhavati. (Tr. meaning unchanged). Tib. 'There is ripening (of the aggregates) and annihilation".

77-77 This para, and up to 'In that connection, consciousness' in the next para, are omitted and contracted to 'one* more' in Bcp,

causes, not without conditions 78 , not informative, "not liable to destruction, ^annihilation or stopping, 8, not begun at the beginning of time, not destroyed, and proceeds along like the current of a river.

82 If this twelve-linked dependent origination has mutually related causes, mutually related conditions, is not eternal, not transient, not conditioned, not unconditioned, not without causes, not without conditions, not informative, not liable to destruction, annihilation or stopping, not begun at the beginning of time, not destroyed, and proceeds along like the current of a river 82 , then these four links of this twelve-linked dependent origination proceed as causes for assembling (these twelve causes) together. What four? They are ignorance, craving, action J and consciousness. "In that connection, consciousness is a cause as a seed by nature. Action is a cause as a field by nature. Ignorance and craving are causes as defilements by nature. Therein the defilements of action produce 83 the seed of consciousness. Therein action performs the function of a field for the seed of consciousness. (p.H) Craving moistens the seed of consciousness. Ignorance scatters the seed of consciousness.

78 Om. in Sifcs.

79 Mdhvr adds 'not uninformative, not dependency originated, not non-dependently originated, . . not unliable to destruction. annihilation. . . or stopping. . .'.

80 Siks omits 'not liable to annihilation".

81 Siks adds 'not marked by dispassion'.

82-82 Om. in Siks. Mdhvr reads ". origination is not destroyed and

proceeds along like the current of a river".

83 Siks and Bcp samjanayami 'produce' (Tr. meaning unchanged).

In the absence of these 84 conditions there is no coming forth of the seed of consciousness, Here action does not think thus, 'I perform the function of a field for the seed of consciousness'. Craving also does not think thus, 'I moisten" the seed of consciousness'. Ignorance also does not think thus, '1 Redder the seed of consciousness'. The seed of consciousness also does not think thus, 1 am produced by these conditions.'

Nevertheless 86 , the seed of consciousness, established in the field of action, drenched with the moisture of craving, sprouts up, having oeen well scattered by ignorance. When the sense-organs are being reborn in a suitable place it brings forth 1 the sprout of mentality-materiality in the womb of the mother 87 . And that sprout of mentality-materiality is neither made by itself nor made by another, nor made by both, nor made by God 88 , nor matured by time, nor produced by nature, nor dependent on one 89 cause, nor arisen without causes either. Nevertheless, on account of the union of mother and father, the

84 Mdhvr 'those'.

85 Mdhvr 'I perform the function of moistening".

86 Siks and Bcp 'But' (oi 'But yet*}.

87 Siks 'When the seed of consciousness has been established in the field of action, drenched with the moisture of craving, scattered by ignorance, in the rebirth of the sense organs arising here or there it sprouts up in the womb of the mother. The sprout of mentality-materiality comes forth.' (Tr. Sastri's ayana is a misprint for ayatana. The Siks has sandhau but apparently had prati in the margin. (See his n,8 on p.224)) Bcp (Tr. First sentence as in Sastri's work.) The sprout of mentality-materiality comes forth'.

88 Siks 'created by God and others'. Bcp 'created by God*.

89 Tib. omits 'one'.

concurrence of the mother's season and the coming together of other conditions, the seed of consciousness, incited by their enjoyment 90 , wherever they may be, brings forth the sprout of mentality-materiality in the womb of the mother 901 on the occasion of the sense-organs being suitably reborn, in conditions of existence which have no possessor, which are devoid of an ego, not being [one's] property 91 , like empty space, and which have the nature of characteristics of a magical illusion, because the causes and conditions are not defective.

(p.15) 92 Now eye-consciousness arises from five causes. From what five? As follows: (E) conditioned by the eye and conditioned by form, light, space and mental advertence produced by these 93 there arises eye-consciousness. In that connection the eye does the work of the basis of eye-consciousness. The visual object (form) does the work of the sense-object of eye-consciousness. Light does the work of manifesting. Space does the work of freeing (eye-consciousness) from obstructions. Mental advertence produced by these does the work of focussing the attention. In the absence of these conditions 94 eye-consciousness does not arise. However, when

90 Siks asvadarutpraviddham. Bcp asvadananupraviddham. (Tr. 1 do not think there is any difference in meaning except that maybe 'attracted' rather then 'incited' is meant)

90a Bcp 'in the womb of the mother suitably wherever she may be'.

91 Siks and Bcp add "not hostile".

92 This para. om. in Bcp by peyalam 'as before.

93 Siks tajjanca (Tr. probably no difference in meaning intended).

94 Siks uses locative absolute instead of genitive absolute (Tr. meaning unchanged).

the internal sense of sight is unimpaired, and likewise the visible form, light, space and mental advertence produced by these are unimpaired, then from the coming together of all (these) eye consciousness arises 95 . In that connection the eye does not think thus, 1 do the work of the basis of eye-consciousness'. 96 The visible form also does not think thus, 'I do the work of the sense-object 97 of eye-consciousness'. Light also does not think thus, i do the work of manifesting for eye-consciousness* 98 . Space also does not think thus, 'I do the work of freeing eye-consciousness from obstructions'. Mental advertence produced by these also does not think thus, 'I do the work of focussing the attention of eye-consciousness'. Eye-consciousness also does not think thus, 'I am produced 99 by these conditions.' Nevertheless 100 when these conditions are present the arising of eye-consciousness takes place, and likewise the remaining faculties are to be considered each in the appropriate way 101 .

(p.16) in \n that connection nothing passes over from this

95 Siks has sarvasamavayac instead of sarvesamsamavayat (Tr. meaning unchanged, Sastri's samavayac is a misprint) and 'the arising of eye-consciousness comes about'.

96 Mdhvr adds 'Likewise'.

97 Siks arambana. . . (Tr. meaning unchanged).

98 Siks omits 'for eye-consciousness'.

99 Siks janita iti (Tr. Siks takes vijhana as masculine, as it does with blja, p.224. L12).

100 Mdhvr 'Nevertheless on account ot the coming together of these conditions which are present. . .'.

101 Mdhvr karaniyam '(the same thing ) is to bs done (with the other faculties)'. Siks kartavyam (Tr. the same meaning as Mdhvr).

world to another world. '"However, there is the appearance of the result of action because the causes and conditioned are unimpaired. ,04 lt is just as if a reflection of a face is seen in a very clean circular mirror. But in that case the face does not pass over into the mirror. However, there is the appearance of the face because the causes and conditions are unimpaired. Likewise, nobody disappears from this world 105 , nor does he appear elsewhere. But the result of action appears because the causes and conditions are unimpaired. It is just as if 106 the moon-disc were moving four thousand yojanas m above. Likewise, again, the reflection of the moon is seen in a small pot full of water. But the moon-disc has not fallen from that place 107 and (been) transferred into the small pot of water. However, there is the appearance of the moon-disc because the causes and conditions are unimpaired. Likewise, nobody has disappeared from this world 105 , nor appeared elsewhere. But there is the appearance of the result of action because the causes and conditions are unimpaired 104 .

(F) It is just as when a fire blazes when the condition of fuel is present. When there is inadequate fuel it does not blaze

102 This para, and the following are cited in Bcp.

103 Bcp 'There is the result of action and (here is recognition [i.e. awareness) (of these). . .'.

104-104 Bcp omits this entire example by peyalam "etcetera", and Siks does so without it. Mdhvr adds 'O monks' after It is just as if.

105 Tib. omits 'world*.

106 Mdhvr adds *0 monks'.

107 Mdhvr adds 'in the sky above'.

up 108 . In just the same way, the seed of consciousness, produced by the defilements of action, brings forth the sprout of mentality-materiality in the womb of the mother, in the rebirth of the senses arising here or there, in conditions of existence which have no possessor, which are devoid of an ego, not being [one's] property", like empty space, and which have the nature of characteristics of a magical illusion 109 , because (p.17) the causes and conditions are not defective. Thus is the dependence on conditions of the internal dependent origination to be seen 110 .

In that connection the internal dependent origination is to be seen with five aspects 111 . With what five? 'Neither on account of eternity, nor on account of annihilation, nor on account of transference", on account of annihilation, on account of the production of a major result from a minor cause, and on account of the continuity (of the effect) corresponding (to the cause)'. How is it not on account of eternity? Because the aggregates ending in death are one thing and the aggregates 112 belonging to birth are another. Nor is it that the aggregates ending in death and those belonging to birth 112 are identical. Nevertheless, the aggregates ending in death are destroyed. And

108 Siks (Tr. instead of these two sentences has) 'It is just as when a fire does not blaze because there is inadequate fuel'. Bcp reading like Siks, adds 'but does blaze up when there is no lack of fuel*. Tib. reads '. . .(does) not (blaze up) because the causes and conditions are inadequate. . . (but) blazes up because all the causes and conditions are present'.

109 Mdhvr adds "and which are adventitious'.

110 This sentence om. in Mdhvr and Siks.

111 Mdhvr. Siks and Bcp 'causes' (Tr. instead of 'aspects').

112 Bcp adds 'which appear'.

at that very time 113 the aggregates belonging to birth appear. Therefore, it is not on account of eternity. How is it not on account of annihilation? Neither when the aggregates ending in death have been previously 11 * destroyed do the aggregates belonging to birth appear, nor when they are not destroyed. Nevertheless, the aggregates ending in death are destroyed and at that very time 115 the aggregates belonging to birth appear, like the swinging up and down of the arm of a balance 116 . Therefore, it is not on account of annihilation. How is it not on account of transference? Different (p.18) kinds of beings achieve birth as the same type of being 117 . Therefore, it is not on account of transference . How is it on account of the production of a major result from a minor cause? A small minor cause is done; a consequent major result is experienced. Therefore, it is on account of the production of a major result from a minor cause. How is it on account of the continuity (of

113 Tib. omits and at that very time'. Bcp omits this sentence and the previous one Siks for these two sentences has 'Nevertheless the aggregates ending in death are being destroyed and the aggregates belonging to birth appear'.

114 Siks omits 'ending in death' and 'previously'

115 Siks omits 'at that very time'. (Tr. nJ15 over maranantikesu should be


116 Mdhvr adds 'like the reflection of the moon-disc (in water)'.

117 Siks and Bcp 'It is because the (five) aggregates which belong together from each different kind of being are reborn in a different birth'.

Tib. 'From each different kind of being rebirth occurs in a birth common to all'. La Valiee Poussin reports that Tib. of Mdhvr reads with a negative: mgon.parJigrup.parjruhyed.pao. (See Mdhvr p.569, n5). But our Xylograph has no such reading.

the effect) corresponding (to the cause)? As the action that is to be accomplished is performed, so the result that is to be correspondingly experienced is experienced. Therefore, it is also on account of the continuity (of the effect) corresponding (to the cause). Thus the internal dependent origination is to be seen with five (aspects) 118 .

1 "Whoever, Venerable Sariputra, sees this dependent origination, duly taught by the Blessed One, thus truly by wisdom according to the facts, 120 as continually without a self, soulless, accordingly not untrue, unborn, unbecome, uncreated, uncompounded, unobstructed, without support 121 , auspicious, secure, that which cannot be taken away, permanent, unceasing, and without self-nature, and (G) regards it as unreal 122 , vain, void 123 , insubstantial, 124 as a disease, as a boil, as a splinter 124 , as pain, as impermanent, as misery, as empty, as without a self, (H) pays no attention to the past?, thinking, 'Did indeed I exist in past time, or did I not exist in past time? Who indeed was I in past time; 125 how indeed was I in past time 125 ?' Or again, he pays

118 Tib., Siks and Mdhvr omil this sentence. Thus ends the citation in Bcp. Mdhvr also closes its long citation here.

U9 Mdhvr cites this para, on p,593f. 'It was said thus in the holy Salistamba Sutra by the great Bodhisattva, the holy Maitreya, Who (sees) this dependent origination. . .*.

120 This set of phrases is already referred 10 on p.29. See n.7.

121 Mdhvr and Siks 'without obstructions'.

122 Siks untrue'.

123 Mdhvr and Siks rktatah Tr. instead of riktatah, meaning unchanged). 124-124 Siks omits 'as a disease. , . boil. . . splinter'.

125-125 Siks omits this clause.

no attention to the future", thinking, 'Will I indeed exist in future time or will I not exist in future time? Who indeed will I be in future time; '"how will I be in future time 12S ?' Or again he pays no attention to the present?, thinking, 'What indeed is this how indeed is this being who we shall become? 126 , where did this being (i.e. I) come from, where will he go when he dies?' 127 What false views there wiU be in the common world of some 128 ascetics and brahmins, namely those pertaining to the theory of the self, to the theory of a being 129 , to the theory of a soul to the theory of a person, (I) to the theory of auspicious ceremonies, having been initiated and finished with, have been abandoned at the time, (J) having been recognised, completely cut off at the roots, disappeared like the tuft of leaves at the top of a palm tree (cut down) 1 *, and having the nature of not arising or ceasing in the future.

He who, Venerable Sariputra, fully endowed with willingness to accept such a doctrine, fully understands the dependent origination, for him the Tathagata. Arhat, the perfectly enlightened one, endowed with knowledge and conduct, who has attained happiness, knower of the worlds supreme charioteer of men to be tamed, teacher of gods and men, the Blessed Buddha, predicts perfect, supreme enlightenment, saying, 'You will become a perfectly, supremely enlightened Buddha*." Thus spoke Maitreya, the Bodhisattva, the

126 Quotation in Siks ends here.

127 Tib. 'where did these beings come from, where will they go when they


128 Tib. omits 'some".

129 Mdhvr omits 'to the theory of a. being'.

Great Being 130 .

Then the Venerable Sariputra, together with the worlds of gods, men, demons and Gandharvas rejoiced in and applauded the words of Maitreya, the Bodhisattva, the Great Being 131 .

The Mahayana sutra called The Holy (Sutra) of the Gump of Rice Plants' is completed.

(iii) The original reconstructed opening of the Sutra

The first paragraph of the Sutra as translated above is taken from "Additions and Alterations" on p.xlii, where it says 'The beginning portion of the Sutra is cited in Abhidharmakosavyakhya (ed. U. Wogihara, 2 vols, Tokyo 1932-6. = AbhKvy) III, p.48\ However, as the footnotes, the additional notes and the comparison with a Chinese version of the Sutra refer to the first two paragraphs of Sastri's text as originally reconstructed by him on [his] pp.1-2, these two paragraphs are translated below.


(p.l) Thus have I heard. At one time the Blessed One was living at Rajagrha, on the Grdhrakuta (Vulture's Peak), with a

130 Mdhvr omits this para.

131 Mdhvr Then the Venerable Sariputra applauded and rejoiced in the words of Maitreya the Bodhisattva, the Great Being, rose from his seat and departed, and the monks also departed'.

large company of monks, 1*250 monks, and very many Bodhisattvas, Great Beings. The Venerable Sariputra approached the place (A) where Maitreya the Bodhisattva, the Great Being used to walk 1 up and down. When he had approached they conducted a diverse friendly conversation 2 with each other and both sat down on a stone slab

3 Then the Venerable Sariputra said this to Maitreya, the Bodhisattva, the Great Being: "Having looked at a clump of rice plants here today, Maitreya, the Blessed One spoke this Sutra to the monks, (B) 'He who, monks, sees dependent origination sees the teaching; he who sees the teaching sees the Buddha'. Having spoken thus the Blessed One fell silent 3 . Now, Maitreya, (p.2) what is the meaning of this aphorism spoken by the Buddha? What is dependent origination? What is the teaching. What is the Buddha? How, seeing dependent origination, does one see the teaching? How, seeing the teaching, does one see the Buddha?"

(End of opening section; this section corresponds to the first paragraph in the body of the translation.)

1 I.e. (he was walking on) the ground, or floor, of the monastery. Tib. "Maitreya's ambulatory'. Cp. Vinaya Texts (SBE), II, pp. - ?. 390, n,4.

2 Pali expression: 'Having conducted a friendly and polite conversation' - e.g.

in M I (27), pI78.

3-3 These sentences are reproduced in AbhKvy ad III, 28, N. Dun's ed, p.48. See La Vallee Poussin's note in his edition of Mdhvr, p.6. n.2 The phrase *He who (sees) dependent origination' etc, is oft-quoted as agama (Tr. traditional doctrine) in Buddhist Sanskrit literature; e.g. Mdhvr, p.160, 6; and Bhavya's Karatalaratna, p39, [rec. by N.A. Sastri, Adyar 19381

(iv) Translator's notes

a [in section iii] (p.xlii Sastri) Gradhra must be a misprint for Grdhra.

b [this, and the following, in main translation (section ii)] Or:

'sees those characteristics of Arhats and the holy ones

proceeding to Arhatship'.

c Am should be abhayam 'secure'.

d The text says: The seed also does not think thus, 'I bring

forth the seed'. As this does not seem to make sense I have

risked emending itx

e Or transmigration.

f asu must be a misprint for esu.

g Emending gharma to dharma. The three objects must be

the sense organ, the object of sense and the consciousness

arising from the contact of these two.

h Vaipulya is Pali vepullam (Childers) = development, quoting

from the Pratimoksasutra.

i See Nyanatiloka's Buddhist Dictionary (4th ed., BPS, Kandy

1980), pp.16, 30, 106-7 and 180, 'Purifia: "Meritorious" are called

the karmically wholesome (kusala) states of the Sensuous Sphere

(kdmdvacara) and the Fine-material Sphere (rupavacara),

whereas the wholesome states of the Immaterial Sphere

(arupdvacara) are called Imperturbable (anehja) [which I have

translated as 'immovable'! Demeritorious acts can only result in

rebirth in the kdmdvacara, the Sensuous Sphere.

j Action {karma) must be volitional action (samskdra).

k Sastri's avakiromi must be a misprint. Siks has

avakirdmi (p.224). It may mean that ignorance scatters the seed

or that it covers it up.

1 Abhinirvayati must be a misprint for abhinirvartayati; cf.

[Sastri's] p.14, 1.3 from bottom.

m A yojana may be anything from two and a half to eighteen

miles, according to Monier-Williams's Dictionary.

n Reading samkrantih as sarnkrantitah.

o The force of the argument is that a creature can be reborn

as a different kind of creature, which is not what one would

expect if the soul-migration theory were true.

p This idea is confirmed in Abhidharmakosa III, 25c-d:

'Turning away from complete bewilderment in the past, future

and intermediate time'. (See Sastri, p.xlii).

q Compare 'He whose faults have been completely destroyed

and cut down like the top of a palm tree, will attain

concentration by day and by night' (Udanavarga 10,

'Sraddhavarga - Faith', v.13 in BSR 4, 2, 1987, p.96 (tr. from the

French of N.P. Chakravarti by Sara Boin-Webb)).

(v) Additonal Notes (Sastri, pp.29-30)

(A) p.l, 1.4 [in section iii above! Carikrama (Tr. ambulatory) is a place where a monk walks in circuit while reciting dharanil, a prayer (Tr. i.e. japa, mantra or incantation); cp. Bhartrhari's verse, cahkramdno 'dhlsvatra japamscahkramanam kuru (Tr. "Recite while walking up and down" here means "Do cankramana while muttering (a prayer etc.)"), cited in Mahabhasya II, p.247 (Bombay edition). A reference to the Buddha's cankama at Sarnath is made in the Inscription in the third year of Kaniska, see Epigraphia Indica VII, pJ76.

(B) p.l, 1.8 {section iii]: Cp. M I (28), Mahahatthipadopama Sutta (Tr. 'The Greater Discourse on the Simile of the Elephant's Footprint'), p.191, 11. 1, 26-7: This, moreover, was spoken by the Blessed One. "He who sees dependent origination sees the

teaching (DhammaX he who sees the teaching sees dependent origination'". - a discourse by Sariputta. Note Dhamma in this passage is not the Eightfold Path as understood in the Salistamba Sutra; S HI 120: 'He who sees the teaching sees me; he who sees me sees the teaching'. Cp. It. 92. See La Vallee Poussin, 'Notes sur les corps du Bouddha', Le Museon 1913, pp.259-90.

(C) p.8, 1.14 [main text, section it above, for this and following notes]: 'in the way of a bundles of nada-reeds*, cp. Mahanidana Sutta, D II 55 (correctly 15t S 1; Oldenberg, Buddha, op. ciu p.230; AbhKvy VIII, pp.667, 31: 'because mentality and materiality are said to be mutually dependent, like two bundles of nada-reeds'. Yasomitra cites some passages from a Sutra: '"It is as follows, venerable sin if two bundles of nada-reeds were in the sky above and they were leaning against each other, then leaning against each other they would stay in position. If someone "were to remove one, the other would fall down; if the other were removed, the one would fall down. In this way, Venerable Sariputra, mentality and materiality are dependent on one another. Depending on one another they endure* and so forth" (p.668, 1-6). Nagarjuna also uses this simile in his Pratityasamutpadahrdaya (Tr. 'Heart of Dependent Origination') ad ver.l.

(D) p,12, 9: Cp. M I (38) p.267: That which is delight in feelings is grasping'.

(E) p.15, 2: Cp. M I (28) pp.190-1: Where mention is made only of the three: cakkhu ['eye'], rupa ['form or object seen'] and manasikara ['mental advertence'!

Buddhist Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991) - Cooper

(F) p.16, 12: M I (72) p.487: 'A fire blazes in dependence on fuel in the form of straw and firewood' etc. See Upadanasutta, S II 84, for a fully developed simile,

(G) p-18, 10-12: 'regards. . . as without a self. Cp. M I (64) p.435, 32-34 and p.436, 30-32.

(H) p.l8-p.l9, 2: 'past time', 'future time' and 'the present' are detailed in exactly similar terms in M I (38) p.265, 1-17.

(I) pJ9, 4: Cp. M 1 (38), p.265, 25. "Or would you, monks, . . fall back on those which are the customs and curious ceremonies of ordinary recluses and brahmins (thinking) these to be the essence?'

(J) p.19, 6: Cp. M I (72) p.487: "Even so, Vaccha, that material shape by which one recognising the Tathagata might recognise him - that material shape has been got rid of by the Tathagata, cut off at the root, made like a palm-tree stump that can come to no further existence and is not liable to arise again on the future". And [M 36] p.250: '. . ."Even as, Aggivessana, a palm tree whose crown is cut off cannot come to further growth, even so, Aggivessana, got rid of, cut off at the root, made like a palm-tree stump so that they can come to no further existence in the future are those cankers [Tr. of the Tathagata - missing in Sastri] that have to do with the defilements, with again-becoming, that are fearful [Tr. Sastri's sadara is an error], whose result is anguish, making birth, ageing and dying in the future'". (Tr. note: In the above two passages from Pali I have followed the PTS version.)

hishiryo presupposes an intuitive actualisation of inner energies with an invisible centre which is yet tangible through its effects and transforming power. It is part of a common vocabulary of 'understanding' among Japanese steeped in Zen and its allied arts (do). On the empirical level, it is rooted in the kara (Chin. t'an-t'ien) and there is nothing arbitrary about it. However, on p. 116, Stambaugh seems to go out of her way to distance Do sen's understand ins of zazen from anv formal praxis at all and it is hard to avoid the conclusion that this was done in order to make Dogen's ideas seem more congruent with Heidegger's than the facts really warrant, and to do so is as unfair to Dogen as it is to Heidegger. Generally, this chapter is so loaded with 'Heidegger' that it is intrusive (given the title of the book). For all of Heidegger's apparent divergence from traditional Western metaphysics, his ideas are still individualistic/subjective in a distinctly Western sense. Watsuji Tetsuro's 'Ethics' (Rinrigaku, vols 10 and 11 of his Zenshu) illustrates some significant differences; where Heidegger posits the individuality of Dasein (the being-in-the-world of an individual), Watsuji stresses the collectivity of Mitsein, showing that the Japanese model is only able to posit the existence of the 'individual' within the context of his relatedness-to-others (ningen). This is not meant to be a criticism of Heidegger, we are simply pointing out areas where the Japanese model differs from Heidegger.

A final point : Heidegger once spoke of language as 'the house of Being' - but it is hard to imagine Dogen doing the same, despite his recognition of the need to give expression (dotoku) to the Dharma, and at this point, I think the dialogue breaks down, or rather, it just ceases to be relevant. Stambaugh's extensive use of parallels drawn from the Western

tradition leaves precious little room to. appraise Dogen's ideas against the general background of Mahayana Buddhism and, as such, this work provides us with a peculiarly foreshortened view of Dogen's teaching. The facts are that Dogen was not a 'thinker' in the Western sense at all and, in the final estimate, the only way to assimilate his ideas is to utilise that essential praxis recommended in his teachings. Inevitably, however, the kind of dialogue that Stambaugh has in mind will continue to grow and, so far as it goes, this book is a genuine attempt to explore dialogue between the two traditions and well worth reading.


1) THE SALISTAMBA SUTRA translated by John M. Cooper, pp.21-57

p.27, 1.18: for p.00 read p.53.

p.29, 1.3: for 'independent' read 'dependent'.

p.30, n.13 : for 'e'. read 'ed.\

p.37, 1.12: after 'elements' insert 'are present'.

p.39, 1.2: for 'person born' read 'born one' (Tr. not necessarily

human). 13: for 'aging' read 'aged'; after 'death' add 'Or: the annihilation of the worn-out body is death 5 .

p49, 1.13: delete 'small'.

p.51, 1.5: delete 'being who shall we become' and replace by

'being who who shall we become'. P-53, 1.19: add 'on my p.26' after 'translation'. p.54, 1.2: for 'section in' read 'section ii'.

Buddhist Studies Review 9, 1 (1992) - Corrigenda, etc.

1.4: delete [this. . . (section ii)l p.56, 1.9: delete 'a' before 'bundles'.

2) THE KASYAPAPARIVARTA (KP) BIBLIOGRAPHY by Bhikkhu Pasadika, pp.59-70.

Only when the latest issue of BSR was in the press and while I was writing another paper on KP ('Remarks on Two Kasyapaparivarta Translations'), I remembered the publication of two fragments of Central Asian Sanskrit manuscripts of KP by Vorob'ev-Desjatovskij to which J. W. de Jong refers in 'Sanskrit Fragments of the Kasyapaparivarta', pp. 251-3, As for bibliographical particulars, I am much obliged to Prof. O. v. Hintiber of Freiburg University who was so kind as to fill the lacuna in the bibliographical remarks by sending me the following piece of information wanting at loc. rir„ p.61 (between Item Nos 15-16):

1957: Vorob'ev-Desjatovskij,

V. S.

'Vnov' najdennye listy rukopisej Kasyapaparivarty' (Newly Found Leaves of KP MSS) in Rocznik Orientalistyczny 21, pp.491-500.

Bh. P.

3) NEWS & NOTES, p. 148

The contact address for the Fundacion Instituto de Estudios Budistas is now: Olazabal 1584, 3* "C", 1428 Buenos Aires,



The Udana. Inspired Utterances of the Buddha. Translated by John D. Ireland. Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy 1990. 160 pp. $8.50.

It is certainly time that we had a new translation of the Udana, s the onlv available version is to be found among the Pali Text

  • jOCiet.y S fcCiivh '.jli^i..Aaii.y yau.iio

1935. The 3PS presents

this new translation wi.

th an attractive cover, gooa paper and a clear modern typeface, quite an achievement in Sri Lanka considering the troubled times there

The translator has rendered the Pali prose and verse into free-flow ins En dish as well as brought out the deep meaning of these bnef sayings. As an example of this, readers should look at the account of Bahiya (1.10), perhaps comparing it with the older translation. We are fortunate that the translator of this book is a Buddhist who has practised for many years.

He provides us with many notes drawn from Pali traditional commentaries by way of explaining some matters in the text which are unclear. These notes are usually based on the explanations of the Commentaries, though in a few cases he- offers us other possible interpretations. For instance, the Corny always shows disdain for brahmins who are described as uttering the sound HUM, said to be a mark of their pride. The translator accordingly translates huhumka as 'haughty'. The verse ascribed to the Buddha (1.4) also mentions being 'without Hum Hum', as though the Hum-repetition were an evil. So it is interesting to reflect that later Buddhists have valued the practice of sounding Hum and not seen it as anything to do with caste or pride.


Rhikkhu Pasadika

In view of the fact that the oldest strata of the Kasyapaparivarta (KP) point to the very beginnings of Mahayana/Bodhisattvayana literature proper (cf. E. Conze's observations in his review of F. Weller's German translation of KP, No.31 below), bibliographical remarks pertaining to this text may not be out of place, although exhaustiveness cannot be claimed. Special thanks are offered to Professors H. Bechert and J.W. de Jong, to Peter Skill ing and Russell Webb for having provided me with relevant materials and valuable pieces of information.

1922: Bendall, G & Sikshd-Samuccaya: A Compendium

Rouse, W.H.D. of Buddhist Doctrine (English tr. of KP quotations on pp.53-5, 144, 147, 190, 220-1), London; repr, Delhi 1971, 1981.

1926: von Stael-Holstein, The Kasyaparivarta, a Mahdydna

A. (ed) 3 193tt Winternitz, M. 4 1933: Paranavitana, S.

sutra of the Ratnakuta Class '{in the original Sanskrit, in Tibetan and in Chinese)', Shanghai. Der Mahay ana-Buddhismus nach Sanskrit- und Prakrittexten (incl. German tr. of a number of KP sections), Tubingen. 'Indikatusaya Copper Plaques' (with

Buddhist Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991) - Pasadika

5 1933: von Stael-Holstein, A. (ed) 6 1933: Weller, F.

3 plates showing, inter alia, epigraphical remains of parts of KP) in EZ III, pt20, pp.199-212. A Commentary to the Kasyapa- parivarta (by Sthiramati, Tibetan and Chinese versions), Peking (National Library of Peking and National Tsinghua University). Index to the Tibetan Translation of the Kasyapaparivarta, Cambridge, Mass. 7 1934: Yamaguchi, S. (ed) Madhydnta-vibhagatika of

Sthiramati (containing 11 KP quotations; cf , No.34), Nagoya. Index to the Indian Text of the Kasyapaparivarta, Cambridge Mass; repr. in KS I, pp343-605. 'A Note on the Indikatusaya Copper Plaques' (a comparative study of short KP extracts written on 15 of the Indikatusaya plaques and corresponding portions in von Stael-Holstein's text) in EZ IV, pt5, pp.238-42.

L'Aide-Memoire de la Vraie Loi (Saddharma-Smrtyupasthdna Sutra) - Introduction au compendium de la loi (Dharma-Samuccaya), 'Donnees linguist iques du Kasyapaparivarta' (ppl67-71), Paris. 'Contemplation of Thought' (tr. of

8 1935: Weller, F. 9 1939 Paranavitana, S. 10 1949 Lin Li-kouang 11 1954: Conze, E

Buddhist Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991) - Pasadika

Siksasamuccaya 233-4 (Bendall ed), corresponding to Bodhicaryavatara - Panjika 526-7 (La Vallee Poussin ed.), i.e. KP sections 97-102) in Buddhist Texts through the Ages (p.162), Oxford; repr. Boston 1990.

12 1954: Robinson, R.H. Chinese Buddhist Verse (pp.28-30, English tr. of some KP passages tr. from the Sung version of KP), London. 13 1955: Murti, T.R.V. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (incl. English tr. of a number of KP sections), London; repr. 1980. 14 1956/58: Frauwallner, E Die Phitosophie des Buddhismus

(incl. German tr. of KP sections 52A 5665, ppJ64-70), Berlin. 'Gedanken iiber den Gedanken' (German tr. of KP 97-102 quoted is the Siksasamuccaya, tr. by M. Winder) in I m Z eichen Buddhas (German title of Buddhist Texts through the Ages, see above Noll) (pp.132-3), Frankfurt Candrakirti, Prasannapada Madhyamakavrtti (12 chapters tr. into French from Sanskrit and Tibetan, with critical ed. of the Tibetan version; besides the KP citations dealt with in the body of the work, appendix carries tr. of

15 1957: Conze, E 16 1959 May, J. Buddhist Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991) - Pasadika 17 196ft Vaidya, RL. (ed) 18 I960. Vaidya, RL. (ed.) 19 1961: Vaidya, RL. (ed.) 20 1961: Weller, F. 21 1961: Weller, F. 22 1962: Weller, F. 23 1963: Weller, F. KP 13M3), Paris.

Madhyamakasastra of Nagarjuna, with the Commentary: Prasannapada by Candraklrti (KP quotations on pp.14- 16, 64, 108-9, 144, 153 corresponding, respectively, to KP sections 102, 141-9, 71, 63-5, 138-43, 57; references to KP in La Vallee Poussin's ed are given in E Lamotte Traite IV, cf. No.36), BST 10.

Prajhdkaramati, Bodhicaryavatara- pahjika (KP quotations on pp.73, 245-6; references to KP in La Vallee Poussin's ed. are given in E Lamotte, Traite IV), BST 12. Santideva, Siksdsamuccaya (KP quotations on pp.33, 34, 81, 82, 108, 126; references to KP in C. Bendall's ed. are given in E Lamotte, Traite IV), BST 11. 'Passive Ausdrucksweisen im mongolischen Texte des Kasyapaparivarta' in WZKMUL 10, 4, pp.563-602.

'Qayanundqan'in der mongolischen Ubersetzung des Kasyapaparivarta' in MIO 8, pp.218-28.

Zum Kasyapaparivarta 1: Mongolischer Text, ASAW 54, 2. 'Betrachtungen uber einen Ratna-

Buddhist Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991) - Pasadika

24 1964: Weller, F. 25 1965: Weller, F. 26 1965: Weller, F. 27 1966: Pasadika, Bh. 28 1966: Weller, F. 29 1966: Weller, F. 30 1966: Yoshimura, & kiita-Text' (Weller's interpretation of KP) in Forschungen und Fortsehritte 37 (pp.369-74), Berlin; repr. in KS I, pp.537-4Z 'Kasyapaparivarta nach der Tjin-Ubersetzung verdeutscht' in WZKMUL 13, pp.771-804. l Buyu und bolai im mongolischen Texte des Kasyapaparivarta' in Central Asiatic Journal 10 (pp.3-43), The Hague/Wiesbaden. Zum Kasyapaparivarta 2: Verdeutschung des sanskrit-tibeti- schen Textes, ASAW 57, 3. Translation of Selected Passages of the Kashyapa-Section' (inadequate tr. of Sanskrit text due to translator's not knowing Tibetan at that time), in The Wisdom Gone Beyond, an Anthology of Buddhist Texts by various hands (pp.107-23), Bangkok.

'Die Sung-Fassung des Kasyapaparivarta, Versuch einer Verdeutschung' in Monumenta Serica XXV (pp.207-361), Los Angeles; repr. in KS II, pp.1136-1304. 'Kasyapaparivarta nach der Djin-Fassung verdeutscht' in MIO 12, pp379-462.

The Thirty-two Instructions in the Kasyapaparivarta' (studies of KP,

Buddhisi Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991) - Pasadika

31 1968: Conze. E 32 197ft Umotte, E 33 197ft Weller, E 34 1971: Pandeya, R.C

main subject of KP, 32 codes of Bodhisattva instructions, interpretation of these instructions, comparative diagram), in K anakura Commemoration Volume, Kanakura Hakase Kokikinen Indogaku Bukkyogaku Ronshu (pp55-71), Kyoto. Review of F. Weller Zum Kasyapaparivarta 2: Verdeutsch- ung des sanskrit-tibetischen Textes, in IU X, 4 (pp.302-5); repr. in Further Buddhist Studies (pp,216-19), Oxford 1975. Le Traite de la grande vertu de sa- gesse C Mahaprajhaparamitdsdstra) III (on p.1227 quoting - together with French tr. - KP, sections 63-5; references to Prasannapada, Ratnagotravibhaga, Lahkavatara where KP 63-5 is cited). Louvain. 'Kasyapaparivarta nach der Han-Fassung verdeutscht* in Buddhist Yearly 1968/69 (pp.57-221), Halle; repr. in KS II, pp.13054459.

Madhyanta-Vibhdga-Sastra, Containing the Karika-s of Maitreya, Bhasya of Vasubandhu and TIka by Sthiramati (KP quotations on pp.13, 53, 174, 180-6 corresponding to KP sections 60,

Buddhist Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991) - Pasadika

35 1974: Nagao, G, Sakurabe, H. 36 1976: Lamotte, E 37 1977: Bechert, H. 38 1977: de Jong, J.W.

16, 52, 63-4, 66-71; references to KP in Yamaguchrs ed. (cf. No.7) are given in de Jong's review of Lamotte's Traite IV; cf. No.41), Delhi.

Daijo Butten 9, Japanese tr. of Sanskrit text of KP, Chuokoronsha, Tokyo.

Le Traite de la grande vertu de sa- gesse {Mahdprajhdparamitasastra) IV (incl. long note on the Ratnakutasutra/KP with bibliographical/text-historical details and list of KP quotations occurring, inter alia, in Mahayanasutralamkara and Prasannapada (La Vallee Poussin ed.), pp.1843-7; further references to and French tr. of KP sections on pp.1848, 1908, 2020, 2066, 2081), Louvain.

'Mahayana Literature in Sri Lanka: The Early Phase' (referring to the lndikatusaya copper plaques and KP) in PRS, pp.365-8. 'Sanskrit Fragments of the Kasyapaparivarta' (edition of 3 fragments corresponding to KP sections 128-35 and first words of section 136, reconstruction of text, important textcritical and text-historical remarks, ample

Buddhist Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991) - Pasadika Buddhist Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991) - Pasadika 39 1977: Kajiyama, Y. 40 1977-79: Pasadika, Bh. 41 1978: de Jong, J,W. 42 1979. Gard, R.A. (ed)

bibliographical information regarding e.g. Finnish, French, Japanese and Russian publications related to KP) in Beitrdge zur Indienforschung (E. Waldschmidt Felicitation VoL) (pp.247-55), Berlin. 'Thus Spoke the Blessed One. . .' (referring to v. Stael-Holstein's research on KP and his remarks on evam maya srutam ekasmin samaye) in PRS, pp.93-4. 'The Dharma-Discourse of the Great Collection of Jewels, the Kasyapa-Section' (serialised, almost complete tr. of Sanskrit text with the help of Tibetan and Chinese versions), in Linh-So'n - publication d'etudes bouddhologiques (Nos 1-9), Joinville-le-Pont (Paris). Review of E. Lamotte Le Traite de la grande verm de sagesse de Nagarjuna IV (incl. reviewer's completion of Lamotte's list of KP citations, with reference to Madhyantavibhagatika and Dasabhumikavibhasa, to many Japanese contributions on KP and formation of the Ratnakuta) in T'oung Poo LXIV, 1-3, L-eiden. Buddhist Text Information No.20 (on the Ratnakuta/KP, pp,l-4), Stony Brook, New York (Institute

43 1980: Nakamura, H. et al. 44 1980 Pasadika, Bh. 45 1980 Sander, L, Waldschmidt, E 46 1981: Gard, R.A. (ed.) 47 1981: Gard, R.A. (ed.) 48 1983: Chang, G.CC (gen. ed.) for Advanced Studies of World Religions).

Indian Buddhism, A Survey with Bibliographical Notes (plentiful text-historical and bibliographical information especially with regard to Japanese publications dealing with KP - on pp.159, 210, 365), Hirakata (Kansai University of Foreign Studies Publication). 'The Kasyapaparivarta COd-srung-gi le'u) - Prolegomena' (incl. a synopsis of KP, some doctrinal points) in The Tibet Journal V, 4 (pp.48-58), Dharamsala. Sanskrithandschriften aus den Tur- fanfunden IV (6. Mahayana-SOtras, Catalogue No.374, fragments of KP corresponding to KP 151-3 of v. Stael-Holstein's ed.) (p.280), Wiesbaden.

Buddhist Text Information No.28 (on Chinese Maharatnakutasutra, Ta pao chi ching, pp.5-11). Buddhist Text Information No.29 (text-historical remarks on the Ratnakuta, p.7).

'The Sutra of Assembled Treasures' (tr. of Qin (Ch'in) version of KP, Nanjio No.23 (43), Hobogirin, Repertoire No.310 (43)) in A Treasury of Mahay ana

Buddhist Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1990 - Pasadika 49 1983: Winternitz, M. 50 1986: Pfandt, P. 51 1987: de long, J.W, 52 1987: de Jong, J.W. 53 1987: Harrison, P.

Sutras (pp. 378-414), New York/Pennsylvania State University. A History of Indian Literature 2 (new English tr. by V.S. Sharma - of Geschichte der indischen Literatur, Leipzig 1920 - pp.316-18, 350 on KP), rev. ed„ Delhi. Mahayana Texts Translated into Western Languages (KP bibliography, references to the Taisho, titles in romanised Chinese and Japanese, and to the Tdhoku Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons on pp.44-5, 132), rev. ed. with supplement, Cologne. A Brief History of Buddhist Studies in Europe and America (with historico - bibliographical in- formation on KP research, pp.48, 71, 81, 98), 2nd revised and enlarged ed, Delhi.

Review of J. Hedinger Aspekte der Schulung in der Laufbahn eines Bodhisattva. Dargestellt nach dem Slksasamuccaya des Santideva (textcritical remarks on readings in KP 98, 101 vis-a-vis KP citations in the Siksasamuccaya, pp.233-4) in ITJ 30.

"Who Gets to Ride the Great Vehicle? Self-image and Identity Among Followers of the Early Buddhist Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991) - Pasadika 54 1989: Pasadika, Bh. 55 1989: Silk, J.A.

Mahayana' (disquisition mainly based on the earliest Chinese tr. of Mahayana Sutras, incl. KP) in JIABS 10, 1, pp.67-89. Nagdrjuna's Sutrasamuccaya, a Critical Edition of the mDo kun las btus pa (romanised ed. based on the 4 main Tanjur recensions, incL reproduction of Taisho text; 2 KP sections are quoted in Tibetan version of the Sutrasamuccaya, but are wanting in Chinese tr.; cf. pp.22-3 (= Peking ed. 181al ff., corresponding to KP 90, 88), p.213 (= Taisho 1635, vol.32, p.52c3, cf. E Lamotte's remark in Traite IV, p.1846, referring to Chinese tr. of Sutrasamuccaya: "L'ouvrage cite cinq passages d'un Ratnakutasutra. . ., mais je ne les retrouve pas dans le Kasyapaparivarta". For 'Ratnakutasutra' read 'RatnarasTX Copenhagen (Fontes Tibetici Havnienses II).

'A Note on the Opening Formula of Buddhist Sutras' (references to v. Stael-Holstein's research on KP; to Silk's bibliographical notes on the subject in hand may be added: P. Harrison The Samadhi of Direct Encounter with the Buddhas of the Present (International Institute for

Buddhist Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991) - Pasadika 6 1990: Bechert, H. (ed) 57 1991: Galloway, B.

Abbreviations ASAW Buddhist Studies), Tokyo 1990, p.5 f.; cf. No. 39) in JIABS 12, 1, ppi58-63.

Abkurzungsverzeichnis zur buddhistischen Literatur in Indien und Sudostasien, Sanskrit-Worter- buch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden, Beiheft 3 (pp.75, 182; 83, 195; 29, 135; 68, 180), | Gottingen.

'Thus Have I Heard: At One Time. . .' (cf. above Nos 39, 55) in IIJ 34, 2, pp.87-104.

Abhandlungen der Sachsischen Akademie der

Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, Philologisch-historische

Klasse, Akademie Verlag, Berlin. BST Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, Darbhanga.

EZ Epigraphia Zeylanica, London

IIJ fndo-lranian Journal, Dordrecht

JIABS Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Madison/Northfield (USA). KS Friedrich Weller Kleine Schriften, ed. W. Rau,

Stuttgart 1987. MIO Mitteilungen des Instituts fur Orientforschung,

Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. PRS Lewis Lancaster (ed.) Prajhaparamitd and Related

Systems, Berkeley 1977. WZKMUL W issenschafttiche Zeitschrift der

Karl-Marx-Universitat Leipzig.


There is a generally held opinion among scholars that at the time of the Buddha there were many lay persons who had become arahants, although during the early centuries of Buddhist history this had been a matter of dispute - some insisting that to achieve this goal a person would have to be a bhikkhu or monk, others that a lay person was able to become an arahant, but could not then retain his lay status. The Theravada tradition is that if a layman did become an arahant he either Vent forth', that is, entered the Sangha, or passed away (parinibbdyati) that same day (Milindapanha, p.264). In the Tevijja-Vacchagotta Sutta (M 71) the Buddha states that no lay person can become an arahant without getting rid of the 'householder's fetter' (gihisamyojanal The household life was thus not considered propitious for arahantship. Is there, however, any firm evidence in the Sutta Pitaka that lay arahants did exist? As it has been a matter of dispute this seems unlikely, but the purpose of this essay is to examine some of the evidence regarding the problem of the lay arahant and the nature of the ariya-savaka ('noble disciple') in Pali canonical literature.

In Dialogues of the Buddha (Vol.HI, P-5), the Rhys Davids' translation of the Digha Nikaya, there is a footnote giving several references said to demonstrate the existence of lay arahants at the time of the Buddha. The first reference is to Vin 1 (p.17) where Yasa becomes an arahant while the Buddha instructs his (i.e. Yasa's) father. In fact Yasa was not at that

Buddhist Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991) - Ireland

moment a bhikkhu, but the circumstances being such he could hardly be said to be living an ordinary lay life. He immediately afterwards asks for the 'going forth*, thus conforming to the tradition mentioned above. On consulting the second reference, S V 94, this mentions nothing about arahants lay or otherwise and must be an error. The next reference is to A in 451 which consists of the names of twenty or so laymen and of each it is said that he '. . . has arrived at certainty regarding the Tathagata, has seen the Deathless and lives (motivated by) having experienced the Deathless' (. . . tathagate niuhahgato amataddaso amatam sacchikatva iriyati).

That this passage does not refer to lay arahants is confirmed by the Commentary. It merely alludes to the fact that these laymen are ariya-savaka, assured of salvation. However, it is this reference (apparently) that has been adduced as being the main evidence for the existence of lay arahants by modern scholars. That the laymen named did indeed become either sotapannas, sakaddgamins or ana gamins (stream-enterers, once-returners, non-returners) can be confirmed by consulting the further references to them to be found in various places 1 . Most are well-known individuals, such as Anathspindika, Mahanama, Purana, Isidatta, Hatthaka of Alavi, etc, w'.ose fates are known from elsewhere in the Sutta Pitaka, but there are no arahants on the list

That this Ahguttara passage has been thought to refer to laymen becoming arahants was evidently due to C.A.F. Rhys Davids' misunderstanding of it and EM. Hare's translating it

1 Notably in the Dictionary of Pali Proper Names (PTS).

Buddhist Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991) - Ireland

incorrectly in Gradual Sayings. Hare's rendering of nitthahgata as 'gone to the end' (GS III, PP 31M4) is wrong if the various other contexts where the word occurs are consulted. Nittha does indeed mean 'end, conclusion', but in combination with the verb gacchati ('to go'), it evidently means 'to come to a conclusion (about something), to be sure, to be certam, to come to or arrive at a certainty'. Note that the Pali idiom 'gone' is used where in English we would say 'come'. In the Cula-Hatthipadoma Sutta (M 27), for example, occurs the sentence: 'When I saw four footprints in the Samana Gotama I was certain [or, I came/went to the conclusion, mttham agamaml 'The Blessed One is fully enlightened. . .".'

In the Ahguttara passage, too, it is the Buddha or Tathagata who is referred to. Again, in the Udana Commentary (p.76) occurs this sentence: Therefore it must be concluded {mttham. . . gantabbamX not by water is one cleansed.'

The negative anitthangata is also found (e.g. A II 174, S III 99) meaning 'being unsure, uncertain', and is a synonym of hesitation or doubt (kahkhiw, vicikicchita). It ought to be obvious that an adaptation of 'gone to the end' would not fit the examples quoted, nor is it likely anywhere else where the expression occurs. However, following Hare's rendering, it is probably Lamotte's paraphrase of this Ahguttara passage in his Histoire du bouddhisme indien that has been in misleading many scholars and authors. He says The Anguttara knows of some twenty lay people. . . who attained the end (nistha), the Immortal (amrta), without ever having taken up the

Buddhisi Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991) - Ireland

religious life 12 . This is a distorted and misleading account of what the text actually says. Nevertheless, it has apparently been accepted without question by many ever since it appeared in 1958 and it is thus this reference that is most often cited as evidence for the existence of lay arahants 3 .

Far from implying some final attainment, tathagate nitthahgato simply means the person concerned has reached a conclusion about the Tathagata; he has the certainty that the Buddha is indeed fully enlightened. It is because he has acquired the faith or confidence (saddha) that arises through knowledge and insight into the Dhamma taught by the Buddha. His certainty arises because he has actually 'seen the Deathless' for himself. He is amataddaso: 'one who sees (daso) the Deathless {amata)\ The Buddha has revealed to him the four Noble Truths (ariya-sacca), specifically the ending of suffering, which is the Deathless, and the path leading to it. And he has understood it, that is, he has acquired Right View and thus

2 Etienne Lamotte, History of Indian Buddhism, English tr. by Sara Webb-Boin [correctly Boin-Webb], Louvain 1988, p.80.

3 Richard Robinson, in what is obviously a quote of this Lamotte passage, stales, 'The Sutras list twenty upasakas who attained the highest goal without ever becoming monks' (The Buddhist Religion, Belmont 1970, p3T, also H.W. Schumann, 'The Pali Canon lists the names of tweniy-one householders who became Arahants without ever becoming monks' (The Historical Buddha, lr. by M.O'C. Walshe, London 1989, p.191). And Nathan Katz too, when he says, 'Certainly if one reads the primary texts on this issue, one learns of numerous lay arahants' (Buddhist Images of Human Perfection, Delhi 1982, p.179), one may hazard a guess he is referring to Lamotte. These are just three examples

Buddhist Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991) - Ireland

stepped onto the Path, the ariya-magg*. Right View is acquired by hearing the Teaching with the Dhamma-ear Idlammasota) and seeing the goal by having the Dhamma-eya %hammacakkhu) opened for him by the Buddha. It is by means of the Dhamma-eye that the Deathless is seen. The whole process is described in the story of Suppabuddha the leper (Udana 5,3), where the Buddha by a gradual talk prepares Suppabuddha's mind, uplifts and purifies it from the hindrances t0 understanding, and when the moment is right, reveals the four Truths: suffering, origination, cessation and the Path. Whereupon the 'stainless Dhamma-eye arises' that sees whatever is of the nature to originate (through conditions), all that is of a nature to cease (through their removal)'. Suppabuddha declares he has understood, affirms his faith in the Buddha by going for refuge and is later said to have become a sotapanna. The point is, Nibbana or the Deathless or the four Truths are seen at the moment of entry onto the ariyan-plane. Thus, to have seen the Deathless' is again not a final attainment, but the initiation into what, for us who have not seen it, must remain a profound mystery; the opening of the 'door to the Deathless, whereby the ordinary person, the outsider or puthujjana, is transformed into an ariya-savaka.

However, there is still work to be done, the Path has still to be trodden, and this is indicated by the ending of this brief Ahguttara passage. The verb iriyati means: to go on, to proceed, to progress, to live or behave in a particular way. It

4 The Path always begins with Right View and progresses in a causal sequence as indicated in the Mahacattarisaka Sutta (M 117). This » despite Nyanatiloka'a denial, - see his Buddhist Dictionary under 'Magga.

Buddhist Studies Review 8. 1-2 (1991) - Ireland

indicates activity, movement, and the reason for it is because of 'having experienced, or realised, the Deathless' (amatam sacchikatva). In other words, the experience of having seen the Deathless is now the motivating force in his life, that impels him onward towards its final attainment

Are there any other references in the Sutta Pitaka that can establish there were arahants at the time of the Buddha who continued living as laymen? We believe there are none that stand up to serious consideration. There is S V 410, for instance, which deals with how a wise lay-follower {sapahho upasako) should admonish another wise lay-follower who is sick so that the latter gets rid of all attachments. It ends with the Buddha declaring there is no difference between such a layman who so avers and a bhikkhu who is rid of the asavas (i.e an arahant). However, the point is that this is a deathbed exhortation and so conforms to the idea, mentioned above, that the attainment of the highest goal by a lay person necessitates either dying or 'going forth' as a bhikkhu. Another example of such an exhortation is that of Sariputta instructing Anathapindika as he lay on his deathbed (M 143), but this did not lead to Anathapindika becoming an arahant. Here it is said that he was a sotapanna and after death was reborn as a deva in the Tusita heaven. Another possibility is the Sekha Sutta (M 53), which was addressed to a company of lay people headed by Mahanama the Sakyan. This deals with the course of training leading up to the highest goal. Bui practising this course necessitates becoming a bhikkhu, for the Sutta states that the disciple undertakes to observe the Patimokkha and thus implies the removal of the 'householder's fetter': the ownership of property, the accumulation and storing of possessions, the procreation of children and so forth.

It may seem unfair that the laity are excluded from the highest goal. However, this view is based upon a number of misconceptions and the assumption of a rivalry between the laity and the Sangha, an assumption for which there is no justification at the time of the Buddha. Although arahantship evidently necessitated living the bhikkhu-life, lay people could be sotapannas, sakadagamins and anagamins, and many were, and in large numbers, if the suttas are to be believed All these constituted the Blessed One's community of disciples assured of salvation, the ariya-sangha. And not only human beings, for divine beings, too, devas and brahmas from the various heavenly worlds, were included in this spiritual community. It is this ariya-sangha in its entirety that is said to be '. . . worthy of offerings, worthy of hospitality, worthy of gifts, worthy of salutation, an incomparable field of merit for the world', it should be noted, and not merely the Bhikkhu Sangha per se as is sometimes suggested and assumed. All these various kinds of noble persons are equally assured of salvation, in contrast to the pmhujjana, the outsider, who has had no such assurance. So the sotapanna, etc. should not be regarded as being inferior to the arahant in this respect There is also another consideration. The Theravada commentarial tradition assumes that the goal of all Buddhist endeavour is arahantship and the three 'lower' paths of the sotapanna, etc. are stages on the way to that goal. However, in the suttas themselves there is very little to support this theory and it may be that originally the four 'paths' were possibly regarded not as 'stages' but as alternative goals that were realised by the individuals concerned. Depending upon the capacity of the person - perhaps due to past kamma which varied for each individual - upon being instructed in the Dhamma, he or she attained one or other of the paths (of the

Buddhist Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991) - Ireland

sotapanna, etc.). This instruction in the Dhamma is sometimes said to be initiated by the Buddha when he perceives, by reading the minds of his audience, someone there is capable (bhabbo) of understanding it and realising one or other of these paths, as was the case with the leper Suppabuddha. In the suttas, furthermore, once named individuals are declared to be sotapannas, etc., it is never said they finally ended as another kind of noble person (ariya-puggala). Nor is it ever suggested that those who became arahants had first to become sotapannas, then sakaddgdmins and anagamins as is assumed in the Commentaries. In fact it is the definitions of these various persons that preclude one kind from becoming any other, as Horner once pointed out 5 . All are equal in that, upon being taught the Dhamma by the Buddha, they have been granted a vision of the Deathless and established upon the path leading to its actualisation, to anna or final knowledge. However, the several kinds of ariya-savaka are distinguished by the length of time they must continue in existence before realising this aim, this probably being due to the nature of their past kamma still awaiting fruition. The arahant attains anna 'here in this present life' (ditth'eva dhamme, 'in this invisible state'). In a number of places (e.g. S V 237, etc.) it is said, if a person '. . .does not attain anna beforehand [patihacca, a gloss on ditth'eva dhamme] here in this present life, then he attains it at the time of dying. If he does not attain anna beforehand here in this present life nor. . . at the time of dying, then by the destruction of the five lower

5 LB. Horner, Early Buddhist Theory of Man Perfected, London 1936, p.223f. See also Peter Masefield, Divine Revelation in Pati Buddhism, London 1986. p.l27f.

Buddhist Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991) - Ireland

fetters he attains extinction in the totcrvaT {antard-parmbbdy?, e without returning 'here', that is, he is the first of the five kinds of anagamin or non-returner). Elsewhere, final knowledge in this present life and the state of non-returnmg are called the twin fruits of the holy life {brahmacariyaT For the sakadagdmin and the sotapanna a yet longer period must elapse before final knowledge is attained. They have to undergo several more births up to a maximum of seven^ The significance of all this is that, once an indw.dual has left his present life before attaining ahha, he has passed beyond he point where he could become an arahant. Moreover, the once-returner or sakadagdmin, because he is a 'returner cannot, naturally, then become a non-returner and so forth.

Not only could lay people become sotapannas, sakadagd- mins and anagamins, but references in the Sutta Pi|aka to the first and second especially allude more often to the lay ariya-savaka than to the bhikkhu. This is i" contnriia.on » the view sometimes stated by modern wnters*. In fact when,

6 This is a term of uncertain meaning There are a number of reasons for

thinking it may indicate the existence of an 'intermediate state between death and rebirth, an an.araohava, and accepted as such by some Buddhtst school* he Sarv.stiv.da, etc. But this is not countenan-Kl in the Theravada exegeuc* tradition which denies the existence of such a state. For an exam.naUon of this problem see Masefield, op. c&, p!09f.

7 Eg M 10; It, suttas 45-7. etc. • . . one of these two fruits is to be expected, finai knowledge in this present life or. there being some restdual defilement (upadisesa), the state of non-returning'.

8 Eg Steven Collins, Selfless Persons, Cambridge 1982. p.92, says, '. . . the idea of being . p.r»n on the Path, and therefore a, least a stream-winner

Buddhist Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991) - Ireland

upon being instructed in the Dhamma by the Buddha, a person declares he goes for refuge 'to the Lord, to the Dhamma and to the Order of bhikkhus' and then says, 'May the Lord accept me as a lay-follower as one gone for refuge from this day forth for as long as life lasts', one may conclude that person to be an ariya-sdvaka and at least on the sotapanna path. Whereas if, instead of becoming a lay-follower, he says, 'May I, Lord, receive the going forth in the Lord's presence. . .", this is almost invariably followed by, Then the venerable so-and-so. . . soon realised even here in this present life through his own direct knowledge that unequalled goal of the holy life. . . And the venerable so-and-so became one of the arahants*. It seems as if it is expected that one who goes forth will become an arahant, or that he goes forth because he knows he has the capability to become one.

In the Maha-Vacchagotta Sutta (M 73) there is found a threefold division of the Buddha's followers. First there are the monks and nuns who are arahants, then there are the lay-followers who are of two kinds (1) householders, both men and women, who are living the holy life {brahmacariya, which must mean the practice of celibacy here) and are anagamins, and (2) householders of both sexes who are enjoyers of sense-pleasures (i.e. non-celibates) who *have accepted the Teaching, overcome doubt and perplexity (i.e. 'have arrived at certainty') and live confident and independent of others in the

( sotapanna), must originally have meant no more than being a monk". This is not the picture one derives from the early Pali literature. It is more likely sotapanna was a term brought in to accommodate the pious lay-follower who was unable to take the step of 'going forth" into homelessness.

Teacher's instruction'. Of each of these six categories (three pairs of male and female) the Buddha says there are not merely a hundred. . . five hundred, but many more such followers and Vacchagotta remarks that if any one of these categories was missing the holy life propagated by the good Gotama would be incomplete in this regard.

That there actually existed lay people who were celibates during the Buddha's lifetime may seem surprising, even a novel idea hardly mentioned in modern Buddhist writings. However, although the large numbers could be attributed to pious exaggeration, that they existed is confirmed in one or two other places. There is, for example, the instance of Ugga of Hatthigama who gave up his four young wives, giving the eldest in marriage to a man of her choice, when he became an anagamin (A IV 214). It is because the anagamin, like the arahant is rid of the five lower fetters (samyojana) that bind beings to the sensual world that he leads a life of continence (brahmacari). The sotapanna and sakadagamin, the 'enjoyers of sense-pleasures' and hence still sexually active, while having overcome the three fetters of personality-belief {sakkaya-dmfuX doubt and attachment to outward observances, still have the fetters of sensual desires and malevolence and will return again after death to this world, the Kamaloka (the world of sense-desires). The anagamin is free of these fetters although not yet free of the five higher fetters, and so will arise in the Pure Abodes of the form world (Rupaloka), but cannot return again here to the Kamaloka. The arahant, being rid of all fetters, is not liable to be reborn anywhere. The higher fetters are- desire for form and formless realm existence, conceit,

restlessness and ignorance 9 . It is the subtle residual clinging supplied by these fetters that enables the anagamin to continue living a limited lay-life. It is the absence of these fetters in the arahant that precludes him from so living and for whom the Bhikkhu Sangha was established by the Buddha.

A number of lay anagamins, such as Hatthaka of Alavi and Ugga of Vesali, are said to have had large numbers of followers. Although the Commentaries sometimes suggest their following was of a purely secular nature, that they were communal leaders, headmen or rajas, it does seem more likely they were actually preachers of the Dhamma with other lay people as their pupil-disciples. After he passed away, Hatthaka visited the Buddha as a brahma-god of the Aviha heaven and remarked that now devas come from afar to hear the Dhamma from him (A I 279). Citta of Macchikasanda even instructed bhikkhus (cf. Citta Samyutta, S IV 281ff).

A distinction perhaps should be drawn between the actual state of affairs and the 'ideal' picture that is presented (e.g. in M 73, Ud 6,1, etc.). There must have been many who heard the Buddha preach but remained unaffected and we learn of quarrelsome, badly behaved monks, schismatics and so forth.

9 Perhaps 'ignorance' as a translation of avijja, especially in the context of the samyojana, may be misleading. It cannot here refer to ignorance as stupidity or delusion (mohai, but rather the absence of the specific knowledge(s) possessed by the arahant, thai is, the threefold knowledge or levijja: the knowledge of former births, seeing the arising and passing away of other beings according lo kamma, and especially the knowledge of the ending of the flow of defilements (asava).

These were the puthujjana, those who were apart (puthu) from the 'ariya' They were outsiders, foolish people who could not comprehend the Dhamma when it was taught to them and retained their various erroneous views. The ideal was that all bhikkhus should be arahants and that the attainment of the arahant. path was the sole reason for going forth. The laity then consisted of both celibate anagamins and sotapannas still enjoying sense-pleasures, all entirely devoted to the Buddha and supplying the Order of bhikkhus with its needs. The arahant bhikkhus were full-time professionals, the elders of the community, the guardians of the Teaching, instructors and advisors Whether or not this ideal was ever realised during the lifetime of the Buddha, after his passing away the ariya-sangha underwent a rapid decline. And indeed this was inevitable. The literal meaning of savaka is 'hearer and upon the departure of the Buddha there would soon be no more of that '. - community of "those who had heard" (the Dhamma directly from) the Blessed One' (the bhagavato savaka-sangnol Thus Subhadda was not only the last savaka converted by the Buddha (D II 153), but the last savaka of all !

Although there would still be those who by their own efforts successfully practised the Path to enlightenment, as is testified throughout the long history of Buddhism, this was on a more limited scale than formerly. Evidently few savakas were able to make others 'see the Deathless' in the same way that the Buddha could. And it would be more difficult to arrive at the certainty' of faith in the Blessed One when one could no longer meet him face to face. As the venerable Anuria said shortly after the Buddha passed away, 'There is not even one bhikkhu brahmin, who is possessed in every way and in every part of all those things of which the Lord was possessed. . . this Lord was

one to make arise a path that had not arisen before, to bring about a path not brought about before, to show a path not shown before. . . But the savakas are now path-followers who do so by following after him' (M 108).

Interestingly, as Peter Masefield has pointed out 10 , when it is said the Buddha 'makes arise a path. . , shows a path', this must have been meant in the sense of making it arise in a particular person on a particular occasion and not in a general sense of propagating a universal teaching for all. Despite the Buddha's stricture on accepting teachings based on hearsay, the latter view arose after the passing of the Buddha and the disappearance of the original savaka-sahgha when direct contact was no longer possible. The Buddhist community had to come to terms with this new situation and to interpret what had been collected and preserved of what the Buddha had said and taught. In this interpretation one of the ideas that appeared was that the four paths were stages on the way to the ultimate attainment of Nibbana, and this in turn has led inevitably to further changes in outlook in present day Theravada Buddhism. If the view is entertained that arahantship is to be regarded as the sole goal of Buddhist endeavour and the sotdpanna, etc. is relegated to a stage on the way to that goal, then the tendency is to regard the arahant as the only true l ariyan disciple'. Again, if the arahant has to be a bhikkhu, the ariya-sahgha is then conceived as some kind of elite within the Bhikkhu Sangha itself. The laity being excluded from any meaningful spiritual attainment is then demoted to a secondary role. In recent times undue emphasis has been placed upon the social division of the Buddhist world,

10 Masefield, op. cii, pp.141-2

widening the gulf between the Sangha and the laity, and even going so far as to identify the latter with the puthujjana. However, this is to ignore and confuse the evidence of the texts themselves, which conceived of a spiritual dimension cutting across the purely social divide of the bhikkhu and the layman.

THE SACRED MOUNTAIN, Pilgrims & Travellers at Mount Kailas in Western Tibet and the Great Universal Symbol of the Sacred Moutain, by John Snelling. East-West Publications, London and The Hague 1991. 457 pp., profusely illustrated in b/w and colour, 3 maps. £19.95 This is a completely revised and updated edition of John Snel ling's account of the sacred mountain Mt. Kailas in Western Tibet, as seen through the eyes of the travellers and pilgrims who visited it from the early 19th century onwards. Since the first edition appeared in 1983, however, a new wave of Western and Indian travellers has been able to visit the mountain, thanks to the relaxation of China's attitude to Western tourism, so accounts of their visits have been added to those of the classic period. A vast array of colour and black-and-white photographs, both historic and modern, adorn the text of this entertaining account of one of the most spiritually potent places in the world, while for those valiant hearts actually planning to visit Mt. Kailas there is a whole section of advice and information for modern travellers, plus a number of beautifully-drawn maps.

THE ELEMENTS OF BUDDHISM, by John Snelling. Element Books, Shaftesbury 199L 136 pp., illustrated. £4.99

This concentrated little book is an attempt to give both the newcomer and the established Buddhist a succinct overview of all Buddhist schools: their history, teachings and practices. There are chapters detailing the Indian background, the life of the Buddha and Buddhist cosmology, plus special sections on meditation, ethics, philosophy and the spiritual quest in the contemporary West. Straightforward in style and non-sectarian in spirit, this book makes an excellent introduction to what is in fact a vast and often confusing field


T.H. Barrett

Japan may not by some definitions be the most Buddhist of Asian countries, yet it is without a doubt the country in which it is easiest to study the whole historical range and depth of the Buddhist religion. Paradoxically, however, a glance at any history of Buddhist studies shows that remarkably few Westerners, especially scholars publishing in the English language, have approached Buddhism armed with a knowledge of the living Sino-Japanese tradition of the faith. True, some of the great Indologists and Sinologists have made use of Japanese scholarship, but until very recently few academics have made it the starting-point of their researches: rather, the Sino-Japanese tradition has been more often represented (or misrepresented) in English by the sometimes explicitly anti-academic proponents of Zen Buddhism 1 .

It is, of course, possible to point to one or two notable

I For a list of the surveys which may be consulted to verify this point, see n.l on p.247 of Russell Webb 'Contemporary European Scholarship in Buddhism' in T. Skorupski (ed.) The Buddhist Heritage (Buddhica Briiannica I; Institute of Buddhist Studies, Tring 1989), pp.247-76, which article provides in itself an updated survey for a large part of the field. Vet the importance of Japanese Buddhist studies has been an open secret at least since the publication of S. Levi, 'Maieriaux japonais pour 1 etude du bouddhisme', Bulletin de la Maison Franco-Japonaise I (1927), pp.1-63: note, eg., the mention of S. Weinstein's teacher Hosaka Gyokusen. already leaching at Komazawa, on p.10.

pioneers in bringing the fuller riches of Sino- Japanese Buddhism to the attention of the English-language reader. Bruno Petzold (1873-1949), a German scholar of Tendai Buddhism, published much of his work in English; indeed, since his memory still seems to remain green in Japan, his writings continue to be published there 1 . Here in London we should surely not forget the remarkable New Yorker, William Montgomery McGovern (1897-1964), PhD. (Oxon), who introduces himself on the title page of his A Manual of Buddhist Philosophy as 'Lecturer in Japanese and Chinese at the School of Oriental Studies, University of London; Priest of the Nishi Honganji, Kyoto, Japan* 3 . McGovern was at the School from 1919 -to 1924; that his subsequent career was probably an increasing disappointment to the Nishi Honganji may be guessed at from his publications, namely To Lhasa in Disguise (1924); Jungle Paths and Inca Ruins (1927); Early Empires of Central Asia (1938); From

2 For Petzold, see 'Reminiscences about Mr. Bruno Petzold, by Shinsho Hanayama', Young East 3.12, 1954, pp.18-20, though I have not been able to locate a copy of this in Britain, nor a copy of the collection of his writings published posthumously under the title Tendai Buddhism, Yokohama 1979, nor a copy of the work on Buddhist Prophet Nichiren (Tokyo 1978) by Petzold edited by S. lida and W. Simonds: the last two studies are cited by M. Pye (tr.) Emerging from Meditation by Tominaga Nakamoto (Duckworth, London 1990), p.192, and lida 'Watakushi no Hoku-Bei Bukkyogaku sanjunen', p.20, nil, in Kommawa Daigaku Bukkydgahtbu ronshu 20 (1989), pp.1-20, respectively,

3 Only one volume of this Manual (on cosmology) ever appeared (Kegan Paul, Trench. Trubner &. Co. Ltd, London 1923, this has been reprinted by the Chinese Materials Center Inc., San Francisco 1977. Other details on McGovern are taken from Who Was Who in America, Volume Four, 1961-1968 (Marquis- Who's Who Inc, Chicago 1968), p.638.

Luther to Hitler (1941); and Strategic Intelligence and the Shape of Tomorrow (1961). From 1929 he had taught at Northwestern University, apart from war service in intelligence which added the title of Commander, US. Naval Reserve, to his priesthood. For a former lecturer of the School, McGovern makes a slightly disturbing appearance in John K. Fairbanks autobiography: 'We privately believed him to be a charlatan but if so he was a very smart one. : .* 4 .

Though Stanley Weinstein was also born in New York (in 1929) and also taught at the School, his consistent dedication to the promotion of Buddhist studies could not contrast more sharply with McGovern's passing interest. Although it is misleading in respect of Prof. Weinstein's own biography, the Encyclopedia of Religions correctly places him in the post-War expansion of East Asian Buddhist Studies in the United States: 'World War II also had an effect on Buddhist studies. In particular, many young Americans who took part in government language-study programmes were assigned the task of learning Japanese and Chinese. . . Stanley Weinstein at Yale University has focused his research and teaching on Japanese methods and sources, stressing that the number of scholars in Japan who are engaged in Buddhist studies far exceeds all of those in the rest of the world, making the detail of information

4 John K. Fairbank, Chinabound (Harper and Row. New York 1982). p.165.

available in Japanese crucial for adequate study' 5 . The opinions attributed to him are accurate enough, but Weinstein was not swept into East Asian studies by the War: it was a matter of deliberate choice, as a published autobiographical talk on his academic career clearly shows 6 .

Weinstein's earliest interest in Japan was awakened by the writings of the Irish-Illyrian Lafcadio Hearn (1850-1904), who ended his life as a Japanese citizen 7 . Hearn's exotic tales inspired him while still a teenager to undertake the study of Japan and the Japanese language completely on his own initiative, using the cumbersome and by then already dated publications of W.G. Aston and B.H. Chamberlain. It was through his initial explorations of Japanese history, literature and society in the books available to him that he came to sense the major importance of Buddhism in Japanese life, but he had no opportunity to pursue his studies further until service in the Korean War had taken him to East Asia for the first time. Even in Korea itself the legacy of the recent Japanese occupation allowed him to improve his knowledge of spoken Japanese and lay the foundations of an impressive private

5 Mircea Eliade (e&), The Encyclopedia of Religion (Macmillan Publ. Co, New York 1987), Volume Two, p.559 - from 'Buddhist Studies', by Lewis Lancaster.

6 'Ninon Bukkyo to ichi Amerikajin Bukkyo kenkyuka no setten: Todai no Bukkyo no hakkan ni chinande', Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyogakubu ronshu 19 (1988). pp.13-29. In what follows I have fell free to supplement this source with my own reminiscences of Prof, Weinstein's remarks in conversation.

7 Note Kennefh Rexroth (ed.), the Buddhist Writings of Lafcadio Hearn (Wildwood House Ltd, London 1981), especially the editor's introduction.

library of Japanese books, but the OL Bill gave him just what was needed: the chance to study at a Japanese Buddhist


Swayed by the prevailing Western interest in Zen, he chose Komazawa University, Tokyo, academic stronghold of the Soto school of Zen. As it turned out, the great texts of that school proved (for linguistic and other reasons) not very rewarding for a beginner, but fortunately Komazawa was an institution, like several other Buddhist universities in Japan, with roots deep in the scholastic tradition of mediaeval Japan, so apart from its own sectarian emphasis it also upheld the teaching of the foundation texts of early and mediaeval Japanese Buddhist learning, the Chinese translations of Yogacara philosophical literature. From his second year onward, Stanley Weinstein began to concentrate on this literature and its East Asian commentaries, and when he graduated in 1958 with Highest Honours, his graduation thesis was on a technical aspect of Yogacara thought.

At this point he entered the M.A. course of Tokyo University, supported financially by the Ford Foundation, who in helping to establish Buddhist studies within East Asian studies had little choice but to pay for education in Japan, since postgraduate teaching in East Asian Buddhism hardly existed in the United States at that point - like Britain, more than thirty years later. The Tokyo University experience proved invaluable for Weinstein, allowing him to study with Yuki Reimon, an expert on East Asian Yogacara whose personal commitment to Jodo Buddhism made a deep impression, as did his insistence on studying Buddhist doctrines in their full social and political context.

Buddhist Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991) - Barrett

After completing this M.A, Weinstein found that the Ford Foundation now stipulated that he could only qualify for their support if he took an American PhD, so despite permission to continue at Tokyo he switched to Harvard in 1960, where Professor M. Nagatomi had just started the teaching of East Asian Buddhism at graduate level. This was to lead to the completion (in 1966) of a doctorate on the Kanjtn kakumusho, a work written in Japan in 1244 as a restatement of Yogacara thought in simple terms for the mediaeval age and which had earlier been rendered by Yuki from Classical Chinese into Japanese 8 .

By this time he was at the School of Oriental and African Studies, where he held the newly created post of Lecturer in Far Eastern Buddhism from 1962 to 1968 - a post which was at the retirement of his successor lost once more, as similar positions burgeoned in the United States and elsewhere. His published memories of the School stress the great benefit he derived from the company of his colleagues studying Buddhist topics through other languages, for example the late Professor John Brough (1917-84)'. Among his students at this time was David J. Kalupahana, now a well-known scholar of Buddhism himself. Of his colleagues beyond Buddhist studies, Prof. D.C Twitchett was also able to call on his expertise to write a conference

8 In the series Kokuyaku issaikyo, Shoshubu, Volume 15 (Daito shuppansha, Tokyo 1937), ppJ51-223,

9 By this time Brough himself was also actively interested in exploiting East Asian sources to elucidate aspects of Buddhist philology; see The sinological writings of John Biough (1917-84)'. Bulletin of the British Association of Chinese Studies, 1984, pp31-l

paper on the Tang dynasty, under which Yogacara thought had become firmly established in East Asia For this he developed some work already published in Japanese by Yuki Reimon, extending his approach to demonstrate the importance of the T'ang state's patronage to the success of the great Buddhist schools of the day 10 .

By the time that he delivered the paper, however, he had transferred to an Associate Professorship (from 1974 a Professorship) at Yale University. Here, according to his recollections, he found himself hard pressed by a much greater load of graduate teaching - though I must say that I myself saw no sign of effort in the consistently enthusiastic and stimulating teaching I received during his early years at Yale. In any case the success of his work with graduates right from the start is demonstrated by the fact that his earliest students - David Chappell, Paul Groner and John McRae - are all now established teachers of East Asian Buddhism themselves.

His own work, meanwhile, returned in part to mediaeval Japan: Yale, after all, possessed a great historian of Japan in John Whitney Hall, who was well able to appreciate the importance of Buddhist studies in understanding Japan's past. But Weinstein also remained committed to further work on the T'ang for the Cambridge History of China. The volume containing his contribution, planned twenty years ago, has not yet appeared, but in the meantime his chapter has been

10 'Imperial Patronage in the Formation of T'ang Buddhism', in A.F. Wright and D.C. Twitchett (ed.) Perspectives on the Tang (Yale University Press, New Haven 1973), pp265-306.

history of the Buddhist church of this period, especially by those " £ m ° aCC ° Um thC C ° nStraints ™£ which'i 2

Prn/w the 199 ° J ° rdan LeCtUres in Comparative Religion"

consider the most basic questions concerning Japan and Buddhina How was Buddhism established in Japl? Ho W "id

l^zniT with its J r nese ™*™ ^ wL d ;

student of Japan is remarkably poorly served by current choiarsh fp on the relationship between early Buddhism and Japanese religion. J.H. Kamstra published a lengthy tudv in 1967 the introduction of Buddhism into Jap n^b high time for the topic to be treated afresh, whh gre^te precision and concision. Alicia Matsunaga likewise P bliS a mono graphlc st dy in 1%9 concernj the P ^1

the key whereby Buddhist figures and Japanese div nitL tme

u Buadhtsm under the rang Can]brjdge Un . versuy p ^

s betrayed by hls n . 16 , which |ocates s[udy , above m an entirely di ff eren , coUecrtion of essays on Tang society.

MedieT, thC °T mel ,hC B " ddhaS: Re ' igiOUS » Early and S U90 aPa

Z2 It i es - ,japanese reiigi nof

B U ddh Ism The Encountef wjth Buddhjsm , Kamj

The transformation of Buddhas into Kami"

to be construed as manifestations of one another, but the same strictures apply 14 . Both these works, moreover, (to say nothing of broader surveys, such as that by Alicia and Daigan Matsunaga 15 ) are written primarily from the standpoint of Buddhism, without taking a balanced view of non-Buddhist belief. Because of the rather unfortunate reputation acquired by Shinto up to the middle of this century, recent research into its early historical antecedents has been severely lacking 16 , but such work as has been done by Western scholars on modern Japanese religion only serves to emphasise the importance of non-Buddhist elements 17 .

Stanley Weinstein's Jordan Lectures, therefore, provided a badly-needed and also authoritative account of the crucial early, formative phases of Japan's religious development. Their

14 The Buddhist Philosophy of Assimilation: The Historical Development of the Honji-suijaku theory. Charles E. Tutlle and Sophia University. Rutland, Vermont and Tokyo 1969.

15 Foundations of Japanese Buddhism, 2 volumes. Buddhist Books International, Los Angeles and Tokyo 1974-6.

16 [ owe this observation to Prof. Richard Bowring, A certain amount of work has been done in Japanese to demonstrate the Chinese elements in non-Buddhist religion in early times: A. Shigematsu, Kodai kokka to Dokyb (Yoshikawa Kobunhan, Tokyo 1985) would be one recent example. Needless to say. all too few Western Japanologists possess the range of linguistic skills necessary to participate in such research.

17 1 have in mind the writings of such scholars as Carmen Blacker, H. Byron Earhardt, Helen Hardaere and Winston B. Davis: see. e.g., Carmen Blacker, The Catalpa Bow (George Allen & Unwin, London 1975) for a fine representative work of Western scholarship on modern Japanese religion.

approach (as the foregoing remark will have shown) was historical, but was combined with a consideration of social and political factors and an unrivalled awareness of the importance of a correct grasp of doctrinal matters. In their published form they will constitute indispensible reading for anyone interested in the Japanese cultural heritage, the mature reflection of a long and remarkable academic career.



I a\ Mani Jnshi

Part One


Preliminary Observations

The history of Buddhism in India covers a period of nearly seventeen centuries, from the fifth century B.G to the twelfth century C.E. The last five centuries, from the seventh to the twelfth, thus constitute the late phase. Of the many events that marked this period the following four are outstanding:

i) Production and publication of a large number of Tantric texts, ii) Assimilation of several features of Brahmanical and tribal ritualism and of a few elements of Brahmanical Hindu theology by Tantric Buddhism, iii) Assimilation of a large number of Buddhist doctrines and practices by Brahmanical Hinduism. iv) Gradual decline and final destruction of Buddhism in most parts of India.

  • Presented to the Second East-West Religions in Encounter Conference, Honolulu, January 1984.

A study of paradigm changes in Buddhist history has to take note of the current theory of three phases of Buddhism in India. Major changes in paradigms are supposed to be connected with changing epochs of Buddhist history. Some modern scholars divide the history of Buddhism in India into three phases: Early, Middle and Late, it is also customary with modern scholars to use sectarian names, invented no doubt by a section of ancient Buddhists, for three forms of the Buddhist religiousness. The three sectarian names are 'Hinayana' or Little Vehicle, 'Mahayana' or Great Vehicle, and 'Vajrayana' or Diamond Vehicle. A correspondence is often seen between these three forms and the three phases. In other words, Little Vehicle is assigned to the Early Phase, Great Vehicle to the Middle Phase, and Diamond Vehicle to the Late Phase.

This seemingly neat and clear scheme appears to reflect paradigm changes in the history of Buddhism in chronological order, but there are difficulties involved in this facile formulation of the complex development of Buddhist ideas and practices during so long a period as seventeen hundred years. This formulation gives a rather misleading impression of the antiquity and history of diverse Buddhist doctrines and practices, and also tends to ignore the continuity of Buddhism. One is likely to think that the Great Vehicle supplanted the Little Vehicle and was in turn supplanted by the Diamond Vehicle. This is an error. The so-called Little Vehicle continued to flourish throughout the duration of the three periods, though in a slightly modified form and with reduced vigour. Similarly, the so-called Great Vehicle continued to flourish vigorously even during the period of the Diamond Vehicle. The history of Buddhism has been characterised by a remarkable degree of

change along with a remarkable degree of continuity. Old sects and schools existed alongside the new sects and schools; old paradigms were neither discarded nor suppressed, but they were continously reinterpreted and expanded in the light of new

situations 1 .

Another point worthy of our attention at this juncture is that we, as academic students of Buddhist religiousness, cannot adopt sectarian approaches in our studies. For example, we cannot say that the Buddhists in the early phase were followers of an inferior course of religious culture; nor can we say that the Buddhists of the middle and late phases were followers of superior courses of religious culture. Sakyamuni Buddha, who lived and taught in the early years of the early phase, cannot be called a representative of the Little Vehicle; on the other hand we cannot accept the view that the followers of the Diamond Vehicle were degenerate Buddhists. In short, sectarian views and mutual doctrinal and practical differences of the Buddhists should not colour our perception nor distort our conception of the dynamics and dialectics of Buddhist religious history. A number of Buddhist texts in Pali and Sanskrit refer to forebodings of the decline and effacement of Buddhism in India with the passage of centuries 1 . However, we shall not be

1 See Edward Oonze. A Short History of Buddhism, George Allen & Unwm. London 1980, pp.13-16. In his earlier work. Buddhist Thought in Indut, Ub„ 1962) Conze had discussed what he called "The Three Phases of Buddhut Philosophy" under the headings, "Archaic Buddhism". "The Sthaviras". and 'The


2 David W Chappell has discussed this question in considerable detail in 'Early Forebodings of the Death of Buddhism' fa. Numen XXVII. Leiden 1980.

justified in an attempt to correlate the succeeding phases and three forms of Buddhism, for these prophecies are found in the texts belonging to all three phases.

The belief in the gradual decline and final destruction of the Dharma may be said to have been a part of Buddhism since the earliest times of its history. Paradigm changes have been a constant feature of Buddhist history. What is important to bear in mind is that Buddhist teachers and leaders in every century thought and taught that the Dharma was a dynamic forced to be adapted to changing circumstances inherent in human history. They did not hold the view that there was a strict correspondence between the three phases and three vehicles, nor did they teach that the succeeding vehicles represented increasing decay of the doctrine and practice. There is a belief current among Tibetan Buddhists that the Sravakayana, Bodhisattvayana and Vajrayana are based upon spiritual and intellectual gradation and represent increasingly subtle ideas and stages. This, of course, is a sectarian view; but it warns us against seeking a correspondence between successive phases associated with the three vehicles and an increasing decline of Buddhism with the emergence of each successive vehicle.

We are obliged to mention here the well-known Buddhist theory of the origin of the three vehicles (yana) when we are talking of paradigm changes in the history of Buddhism. The older set of three vehicles mentioned in some early Mayayana sutras, viz., Sravakayana, Pratyekabuddhayana and Bodhisattvayana, is explained as an example of the Buddha's pp.122-54.

judicious use of diverse liberative techniques (upayakausalya). The three vehicles, those of the Disciples, the 'Isolated Buddhas', and World Saviours or Bodhrsattvas have one single final goal of Supreme Enlightenment (anuttara samyak sambodhi). By resorting to numerous expedient devices the Buddha seeks to save living beings in the world who are likened to a multitude of children playing in a house which is burnt by fire on all sides The Saddharmapundarlkasutra denies the possibility of any real vehicle except the Buddha-Vehicle (Buddhayana) which is called the one and only vehicle (ekayanaf. The Mahayana sutras take it for granted that the practice of the bodhisattvas is the heart of the Buddha's project of universal salvation. These texts cut through our modern theory of the emergence of the Mahayanic doctrines and practices during the so-called 'middle phase' The Saddharmapundarlkasutra in fact records that the Transcendent One (Tathagata) 'set in motion the Wheel of the Dharma' (dharmacakrapravartana) twice, first at Rsipatana-Mrgadava near VaranasI, and then at Grdhrakuta in Rajagrha 4 . According to this view, the essentials of both Little Vehicle and Great Vehicle were taught by the Buddha. Buddhist texts belonging to the late phase record the tradition of three dharmacakrapravartanas. These authorities teach that doctrines and practices which constitute the Vehicle of the Disciples were expounded by the Blessed One when he set in motion the Wheel of the Dharma for the f L rst time at

3 Saddharmapundarlkasutra ed. P.L. Vaidya. Mithila Institute. Darbhanga 1960, pp.27, 54-5. The Chinese recension of Kumarajiva has been tr. by Leon Hurvitz as Scripture of the Lotus Blossom of the Fine Dharma, Columbia University Press, New York 1976, pp.62-6.

4 Saddharmapundarlkasutra IID3-4 and p5h Hurvitz, op. tit, pp.56-7.

Rsipatana; doctrines and practices which are known as the Bodhisattvayana or the Great Vehicle were taught by him when he set in motion the sublime Wheel of the Dharma for the second time on the mountain top called Grdhrakuta; whilst those of the esoteric vehicle known as the Diamond Vehicle were revealed by the Lord at a place called Dhanyakataka (modern AmaravatI) in the course of the third dharmacakrapravartana 5 . The Vajrayana authorities also teach that the Great Vehicle subsumes the Diamond Vehicle; the Mahay ana is twofold: one based upon the practice of perfection of spiritual qualities (paramitas), and the other based upon the practice of meditation on mystic words and symbols (mantras) 6 . In short, according to these Buddhist traditions all three vehicles are as old as the age of Sakyamuni Buddha Paradigm changes, if any, in the history of Buddhism canrtot be understood in terms of three successive phases, each of which is separated from the other by several centuries; all the different paradigms were set forth already in the fifth century B.C. by the founder of Buddhism. Those Buddhists who believe in the theory of setting

5 Sekoddesa-Tika (of Naropa) ed, M.E, Carelli, Oriental Institute, Baroda 1941, pp. 2-5; see Rahula Samkrtyayana, Puratattva-Nibandhavall, Kitab Mahal, Allahabad 1958, p.U3. A slightly different version of setting in motion the Wheel of the Dharma will be found in Mkhas Grub Rje's work translated by F,D. Lessing and Alex Wayman, Introduction to the Buddhist Tantric System, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1978, pp.41ff.

6 Advayavajra-samgraha (of Maitripa alias Advayavajra) ed. H.P. Sastri, Oriental Institute, Baroda 1927 p.14. See also Mkhas Grub Rje, op. cir, pp21-5, who says that there is no discrepancy between the teaching of the tantras and that of the paramitas (Mahayana sutras) concerning the method of becoming a Buddha.

in motion the Wheel of the Dharma thrice want us to believe that there have been no changes, no revolutions in Buddhist history!

Buddhist scholars are, however, astounded by the great variety of Buddhist practices. The differences among the philosophical opinions held by different Buddhist schools that originated in India are equally amazing. The bodhisattvas appear to us so different from the arhats who in their turn differ only slightly from the pratyekabuddhas; and the mahasiddhas lived a life-style and spoke a language that would have shocked all the upasakas and upasikas of Sakyamuni Buddha. Indeed, just as the arhats and 'Great Disciples' (mahasravakas) like Sariputra are said to have been astonished by the wonderful and inconceivable liberative techniques adopted by Buddhas and bodhisattvas and taught in the Saddharmapundarlka and the Vimalakirtinirdesa 7 , so the numerous bodhisattvas, Sarvanivaranaviskambhin and others, are said to have been frightened to such an extent that they became unconscious when the Guhyasamaja Tantra was revealed. Similarly, all the wise ones (bodhisattvas), Vajragarbha and others, are reported to have been so thoroughly amazed and

7 Saddarmapundarlkas&tra, pp.24ff; Htirvitz, op. cit, p P 25ff; R Kern's transl. of the Sanskrit version, Saddharmapundarlka or the Lotus of the True Law. Clarendon Press. Oxford 1884 (Dover Publications, New York 1963), PP 35-6; Vimalakirtinirdesasutra tr. by Robert Thurman as The Holy Teaching of Vimalaklni, Pennsylvania Stale University Press, University Park 1976. pp.24-5. 50, 54, 92-3; Tibetan text ed. with Sanskrit restoration and Hindi iransL by Bhiksu Prasad ika and Lai Mani Joshi. Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, Sarnath 1981, Introduction,

bewildered that they also became unconscious and fell to the ground when the Hevajra Tantra was revealed 8 ! These records seem to contradict the belief that the three vehicles are merely three facets or aspects of the Buddha's teaching,. The Buddhists of the Mahayana sutras and Vajrayana tantras would not see here any contradiction or opposition. Contradictions and oppositions within the tradition are either understood in terms of skill-in-means (upayakausalya) adopted to suit diversity in the intellectual and spiritual equipment of the people whose final liberation is the burden of the Teaching, or as something inherent in all empirical experience (samvrti) of embodied existence in the world (Samsara).

8 Guhyasamaja Tantra (Gst) ed, B. Bhaitacharya. Oriental Institute, Barods 1931, p.21; ed. S. Bagchi, Milhila Institute, Darbhanga 1965, pp.15-16: Sarvanivaranaviskambhin prabhrtayo mahabodhisattva ascarya prapta adbhutapraptah, . .bhitah sanirasla m&rcchita abhuvan.

Hevajra Tantra (Hvt) ed. D.L. Snellgrove, OUP. London 1959, Part 2, Sanskrit and Tibetan Texts, ChX, v!4, pp.36-7:

evam irutva tit vat sarve Vajragarbhadayo budhah I

paramavismayapanna murcchitahz paiitavanau II Snellgrove's transl. may be seen in Hvt 1 (p.82) but I think his rendering of budhah as 'buddhas' is incorrect. On the opening page the text clearly records that Vajragarbha and others in the assembly are bodhisattvas, Buddhas cannot be supposed to become 'senseless' (murcchitah) as Snellgrove's iransL - 'Hearing this, all the Buddhas, Vajragarbha and the rest, were seized with the greatest astonishment and fell senseless to the ground' - seems to imply. The word budhah means 'wise ones' and here refers to the bodhisattvas like Vajragarbha who had not as yet heard 'this most secret of all secret things' (guhyat iguhyataram).

The one and only eternal, changeless, ultimate absolute is the Cosmic Buddha, often identified with the transcendental Dharma and conceived as the Dharmakaya. This conception of the Buddha has been the paradigm supreme in the Buddhist tradition in all its phases. Everything else, including Buddhism itself, has been regarded as changeable. Buddhism or the Dharma as Buddhists know it, has been understood as a constellation of provisional means and methods of realising the primary and secondary goals of religious life. As such it has been dynamic and diversified. The doctrine of universal change and impermanence is a basic Buddhist doctrine, and it applies to Buddhism as well. The history of Buddhism shows that it has been a growing and changing tradition; such process of growth and change stopped only when Buddhism was plundered, persecuted and finally effaced in India. I will have more to say about this below.

Having made these preliminary remarks on the theory of paradigm change in the history of Buddhism in India, I shall now proceed to analyse in what follows some of the salient features of Buddhist religiousness in early medieval India. My analysis will be based chiefly on some Tantric Buddhist Sanskrit texts. It can be studied under three headings, or categories of paradigms: philosophical conceptions, aims of religious and spiritual culture, and methods used to attain those aims.


Philosophical and Theological Conceptions

Although great Buddhist philosophers like Santideva,

Candrakirti, Dharmakirti, Silabhadra, Kalyanaraksita, Santaraksita, Vinitadeva, Kamalasila, Haribhadra and Dharmottara flourished during the first half of this period (700-900 C.E.), I will not refer to their views in the present context. Here I want to confine my remarks to what might be called Tantric Buddhist thought. The leaders and teachers of this variety of Buddhism are called siddhas or mahasiddhas, 'Perfected Ones' or 'Great Adepts'. Since they are the followers and propagators of the Mahayana, their writings contain most of the major philosophical doctrines of the classical Mahayana. They had little or no interest in Buddhist logic, but they vigorously continued Madhyamika and Vijfianavada traditions of thought, often reinterpreted old conceptions and presented a new synthesis of the contents of sutras and tantras. Their philosophy became a mixture of Madhyamika absolutism, Vijiianavada idealism and the mystical theology of the Vajrayana.

The siddhas not only freely used classical terms in a new sense, they also invented many new terms and used them as synonyms of classical terms. For instance, the old term bodhicitta is used in the sense of ultimate reality; in the early texts it was understood as the thought of Enlightenment. Likewise, the new term vajra is used in the sense of the classical term sunya; thus what was understood as 'void' is now called 'diamond'. Another point to be kept in mind while discussing the philosophy of the tantras and siddhas is that they used what is called samdhabhasa or sandhya-bhdsd, a kind of intentional speech, secret, esoteric, enigmatic or paradoxical

language 5 . This fact has made appreciation of Tantric thought quite difficult and controversial. Since language is the standard vehicle of thought communication, if it is 'secret' or 'symbolical or 'paradoxical', an ordinary academic scholar who is not initiated into the mysteries, rituals, techniques and psychological symbolism of this system may not be able to grasp the untold but hidden and intended meaning of the riddles of the Vajrayana. Keeping in mind these problems we may refer to some leading ideas of the siddhas.

(i) Reality: Absolute and Relative

The siddhas held a monistic and non-dualistic view of Reality {advaya, advaital There is no duality or diversity in the Reality which is cosmic and all-pervading. By nature luminous (prabhasvara) and immaculate (suddha), it is the nature of great bliss (mahdsukha). Without beginning and without end (anadinidhanaX quiescent, free from existence and non-existence (bhava-abhdvavivarjital it is the unity of emptiness {sunyata) and compassion (karunaY*. This idea of the unity of emptiness {sunyata) and karma, of wisdom (prajha) and means {upaya), is a very important theme in these sources. This idea harmonises all polarities and synthesises seemingly paradoxical conceptions and situations. This Reality is often described in negative terms, although positive descriptions also are found abundantly. Thus

9 See Lai Mani Joshi, Studies in the Buddhistic Culture of India, 2nd ed, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1977. pp.289-90, 420-1; Per Kvaerne, An Anthology of Buddhist Tantric Songs. Universiteisfarlag, Oslo 1977, pp.37 and 274.

10 Gst XV111.37; Cittavi suddhi-prakarana ed. P.B Pale!. Visvabharali.

Santiniketan 1949, v.l.

we are told that it is all-void (sarvasunya), like space (khasama), unutterable (avdcya), inexpressible (nisprapahca), unthinkable (acintya), selfless (nairatmya), supportless (nirdlamba), and so on.

One of the important names of this reality is sahaja. This word literally means born together with, co-emergent, innate, natural, simultaneously arisen. The term is crucial and its significance is such as to give the name Sahajayana to the system of the siddhas. It refers to the co-emergence of wisdom (prajha or sunyata) and means (karund or upaya) in the final state of Liberation (moksa) which is characterised by great bliss (mahdsukha). According to Sarahapada (eighth century), the Innate is the Reality which is neither manifest nor hidden, neither existent nor non-existent 11 . Frequently the siddhas pile up paradoxes in their elucidation of the nature of sahaja. A characteristic example is the following verse:

abhave bhdvandbhdvo bhavana naiva bhavana I iti bhavo na bhdvah syad bhavana nopalabhyate ll n

'Existence is conceptualisation of non-existence, and this conceptualisation does not exist,' A similar view is expressed in the Hevajra Tantra 13 and the verse quoted above is repeated in several tantric texts.

The sahaja is identified with the Enlightened One, the Thought of Enlightenment (bodhicitta), with the Self (sunyata- jhana-vajra-svabbhdvatamako'hamy\ and with the nature of the Cosmos (sarva-dharma-svabhdva). This Great Bliss, the Innate Joy (sahajdnanda), is the same as Nirvana. We read in the *Hevajra Tantra: 'Thus the Buddha is neither existence nor non-existence. Although he has a form with arms and a face, he is formless in the Supreme Bliss. So the entire world of beings is the Innate (sahaja), for it is of the nature of the Innate. Likewise, it is of the nature of Nirvana, too, when the mind is in the state of purity'".

Another major symbol or name of this Reality is Vajrasattva. The term vajra literally means diamond or thunderbolt. It is the synonym of wisdom (prajha). Here wisdom is not so much a diamond-cutter (vajracehedika) as the diamond itself. The Reality is conceived as the Diamond, as Adamantine. A verse quoted by Krsnapada (ninth century) as well as by Advayavajra (tenth century) explains why emptiness (sunyata) is called diamond (vajra}.

drdham sdram asausirsyam acchedydbhedya iaksanam I adahi avindsi ca sunyata vajram ucyate //»*

11 E. Conze et aL Buddhist Texts Through the Ages, Bruno Cassirer, Oxford 1954. pp.226-7.

12 Gst 113; Pancakrama ed. Louis de La Vallee Poussin, Louvain 1896, p.2, v.19; Sekoddesa-Tika, p.41; Snellgrove, op. cif. Part 1. p.77, n3, gives a different translation.

13 Hvt 2, p30 (I.viiL44).

14 Sadhanamala ed. B. Bhauacharya, Oriental Institute, Baroda 1925 (repr. 1968), Vol.1, p.273 and passim.

15 Hvt 2, p.50 (Hii43-44).

16 Yogaratnamala in Hvt 2, pp.104-5; Advayavajra-samgraha. p.37. Ttansl. of the word asausirsyam is uncertain.

'Emptiness is called diamond because it -is firm, substantial, unchangeable, cannot be cut, cannot be penetrated, cannot be burnt, and is imperishable.'

Here we clearly have a positive conception of siinyatd. The same Reality is called Vajrasattva, literally Adamantine Being. According to Siddha Advayavajra, this compound name signifies the same ultimate Reality which the Madhyamikas called siinyata and the Vijfianavadins called cittamdtratd:

vajrena sunyata prokta sattvena jndnamatratd I tadatmyam anayoh siddham vajrasattva svabhdvatah // 17

"Vajra indicates emptiness and sattva indicates mere consciousness. The identity of these two follows from the nature of the Adamantine Being'

In several places in the tantras vajra is a symbol of the male principle called the jewel (mani) when lotus (padma) is used as a symbol of the female principle. Philosophically speaking, vajra represents the whole truth; it is viewed as the unity of body, speech and mind (kdyavdkcittavajra). The personified form of the Reality is called Vajradhara and Vajrin. Vajra is identical with sahajcc, Vajrayana and Sahajayana lead to the same Truth.

The doctrine of the two truths is basic to this idealogy. The two truths are phenomenal or relative (samvrti, vyavahdra) and transcendental or absolute (paramdrtha, vivrti). The all-void

17 Advayavajra-samgraha, p24.

(sarvasunya), which is luminous (prabhasvara), is the absolute

(paramdrtha); void (sunya), more void (atisimya) and great void

(mahasunya) belong to the realm of relative truth. The siddhas

teach that the doctrine of the Adamantine Lord is twofold:

according to the steps of origination (utpattikrama) and

according to the steps of realisation

(nispannakrama, utpannakrama). Without dwelling on

Nagarjunian parallels, we may immediately note that the siddhas

declare that the steps of origination belong to the realm of the

phenomenal (samvrti) while those of realisation to that of the

transcendental (vivrti) 18 . It is an error to suppose that these two truths are unrelated to each other. In fact, the two are

inseparable. Once again we are reminded of the classical

Buddhist teaching on the relation between the phenomenal world and the absolute. According to one tantric authority:

samvrtisatasya hetuh prabhasvarah,

18 Yogaratnamala, p.104. It is a quotation from an unknown source

utpattikrama paksam ca utparmakrama paksatah I

kramadvayam upadaya desana vajradharinam 1/ See the Samvarodvaya-Tantra: Selected Chapters, ed. and tr. Sinichi Tsuda, The Hokuseido Press. Tokyo 1974. Chapters II and III. The theory of two kramas is mentioned also in the Gst XVIII.83, and the Caryagitikosa ed. Per Kvaerne, op. cit, p.103. On the doctrine of the two truths see Mulamadhayamakarika XXXIV.8-11 with the Commentary of Candrak.rti; Bodhicaryavaiara 1X2 with Prajriakaramatis Commentary, L.M. Joshi, Truth: A Buddhist Perspective 1 in The Journal of Religious Studies IV, Punjabi University, Patiala 1962, pp.65-76; Mervyn Sprung (ed.) The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedanta, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht 1973.

satnvrtisatyan prabhasvarasya hetuh 19

The relative truth is due to the absolute truth, and the absolute truth is due to the relative truth.'

This inseparable mutual relation between relative and absolute aspects of the Reality is in fact the inseparable mutual relation between Samsara and Nirvana, or between everyday experience (lokasamvrti) and the ultimate sphere of peace and bliss (paramartka). There is no real dualism here because there is in reality no difference between Samsara and Nirvana at the highest level of spiritual perfection. We read in the Hevajra Tantra;

'Just as is Samsara, so is Nirvana; there is no other Nirvana than Samsara, so it is said. For Samsara means form, sound and so on (he., smell, taste, touch and mental states); it means feelings and so on (i.e., other personality factors); it means the sense-organs (i.e., eye, ear, nose, tongue, skin and mind); Samsara means hatred and so on (i.e., greed and delusion). All these things (dharmas) are of the nature of Nirvana; they appear in the form of Samsara because of delusion. The wise person, having purified Samsara, realises it as Nirvana. This Nirvana or liberation (nirvrti) is the Thought of Enlightenment (bodhtcitta) which

19 Cited from the commentary to the Pahcakrama by L. de La Vallee Poussin in Bouddhisms: Eludes et Maieriaux, Luzac & Co., London 1898. pJ80,

has both relative and absolute facets' 20 .

This view is in keeping with the teaching of the Mahayama sutras and the treatises of the Madhyamika school 21 . From the standpoint of an enlightened person, dualism between the relative and the absolute does not hold good. Not only that, he also does not "consider as real those things which are real for the ordinary folk. Thus the authors of the Hevajra Tantra record that 'In reality there is neither form nor seer, neither sound nor hearer. There is neither smell nor one who smells, neither taste nor taster, neither touch or one who touches, neither thought nor thinker 722 .

The siddhas uphold not only the Madhyamika ideas but also the ideas of the Vijnanavada school. Anahgavajra (eighth century) says that Samsara is a condition of the mind when enveloped by darkness born of numerous ideations; it is ephemeral like the lightning in a storm, and is besmeared with the dirt of attachment and so on which is not easily removable. The same mind becomes an excellent jewel when it is freed from these excretions. It then becomes the excellent Nirvana, the foremost reality, luminous, beyond imagination and devoid of defilements, neither a subject nor an object 23 . According to

20 Hvi 2. p.66 (ILiv32-35). Author's transl.

21 See Aksayamatinirdesasutxa, yatsvabhavas ca klesah, talsvabhava bodhih, quoted in BodhicaryavataraPahjika, ed. P.L, Vaidya. Milhila Institute, Darbhanga 1960, p.246 (IX-106, Mutamadhayamakarika XXV.19-20.

22 Hvt 2, p.14 (l.v.l). Sneligroves trans]., Part 1. p.60.

23 Prajnopayaviniscayasiddhi IV.23 in Two Vajrayana Works ed. B. Bhaitacharya, Oriental Institute, Baroda 1929.

Indrabhuti (eighth century) the Supreme Reality (paramam tattvam) is the highest Diamond-Wisdom (vajrajnana); it is not fixed, like the sky it is all pervasive and free from characteristics. Known as Samantabhadra, Mahamudra and Dharmakaya, it is the object of knowledge and the mirror-like knowledge itself 24 .

Reality is thus of the nature of consciousness which subsumes the knower, knowledge and the known. Both Samsara and Nirvana are facets of this very consciousness. Here mind, thought, knowledge and consciousness appear as synonyms {citta, mana, vijhana, vijhapti). Mind or Consciousness is the Cosmic Reality. It is both the end and the means. According to Sarahapada, 'Mind is the universal seed. Both Samsara and Nirvana spring forth from it. Pay honour to this, that like a wish-granting gem, gives all desirable things' 25 . The mind is by nature pure and luminous. Defilements are accidental or adventitious (dgantuka) 2 *. Similarly all phenomena are by nature luminous and like the sky". Since in reality there is no impurity, there can in reality be no difference between defilement and purification 28 . The doctrine of the ratnagotra or

24 Jnanasiddhi 1.47-48 in Two Vajrayana Works, op. Ctf,

25 See E. Conze el at, Buddhist Texts Through the Ages, p.230, v.41.

26 Hvt 2, p.70 (II.iv.69): sattva buddha eva kirn agantukamatavrtak Cf. Ahguttaranikaya I (PTS ed.), p.10; and Samyuttanikaya III (ifc.), p. 151: pabhassaram idam bhikkhave cittam tarn ca kho agantukehi upakkilesehi upakkUittham.

27 Gsl 11.7, p.9 (Darbhanga ed.}. prakrti prabhasvara dharmah suvisuddha nabbah samah.

28 Hvt 2, p38 (Lx32 samsara vyavadanena ndsli bhedo mana ga pi.

tathagatagarbha expounded in texts like the Srimalasirphanadasutra and the Ratnagotravibhaga-mahayanottara tantrasastra, teach that the seed of Buddhahood is a cosmic reality which exists in all beings 29 . The siddhas reaffirm this doctrine in the light of the Innate isahaja) which is of the nature of Great Bliss (mahasukha) and is all-pervading like the sky. The dualism between purification of mind (cittavisuddhi) and defiled mind (upaklistacitta) is due to ignorance. The enlightened sage who knows the true nature of reality, having destroyed ignorance, goes beyond this dualism. The mind is thus the cause of bondage as well as of liberation 30 . In liberation there is neither mind nor no-mind, neither defilement nor purity, neither Samsara nor Nirvana. Ultimate Reality or Buddhahood is therefore incomprehensible and ineffable. All conceptions of it are misconceptions; all names of it are mere conventional designations. In order to understand this reality which is beyond understanding, one must be a siddha. Such is the conception of the Ultimate Reality (tattva) in this phase of Buddhist thought.

(ii) Divinity, the World and Living Beings

Though the tantras continued to refer to several elements of

29 See Srimalasimhanadasutra in A Treasury of Mahayana Sutras, general editor Garma C. Chang, Pennsylvania Stale University Press. University Park 1983, pp.380-1; Jikido Takasaki, A Study on the Ratnagotravibhaga Wttaratanira). Islituto Italiano per il Medio ed Eslremo Oriente, Rome 19n6, pp.32 ff.

30 Ed - Unfortunately the late author's note here is lost.

classical non-theistic or atheistic Buddhology, they introduced frankly theistic ideas. Buddhology of this period is in fact Tantric theology. Here I can only quote some statements from Tantric texts which illustrate cosmogenic, cosmological and pantheistic ideas of the siddhas. A clear and systematic summary of Tantric Buddhist theology is not possible at this stage when the large number of Tantric Buddhist works remain unpublished. Classical Buddhist doctrines and symbols are fused with esoteric cosmology and mystical/yogic symbolism in such a way that it is very difficult to bring into light a world-view which will fit into the framework of any other known system. In other words, Tantric Buddhist theology is unique.

The Divine Lord (bhagavan) who reveals the Tantric doctrines and practices is described as dwelling in bliss with his female aspect, called Vajrayosit in the Guhyasamaja Tantra and the Hevajra Tantra, and VajravTsvari in the Candamaharosana Tantra 31 . She is conceived as the core (hrdaya) of the diamond (vajra) of the body, speech and mind of all the Tathagatas. The Lord himself is also described as the Lord of the body, speech and mind of all the Tathagatas (sarva-tathagata-kaya-vak-citta-ad hipati). He is the unity of the body, speech and mind of all the Buddhas. This unity is mystical or esoteric (guhya\ it is the greatest secret (guhyatiguhyatararnX the most myterious of

31 Gst. p.l, and Hvt, pZ have identical words; evam maya sruiam ekasmin samaye bhagavan sarvatathagata kayavakcitta hrdaya vajrayosid bhagesu vijahara. The Candamaharosana Tantra, Chapters I-VIIL ed. and tr. Christopher S. George, American Oriental Society, New Haven 1974, p.18: evam maya srutam... bhagavan vajrasattvah sarvatathagata kayavakcitta hrdayavajradhatvlsvari bhage vijahara.

mysteries (rahasyatirahasya, mahaguhya). One of his names is Hevajra. Another of his names is Vajrasattva. We have noted earlier Advayavajra's explanation of the name Vajrasattva as representing the nature of Reality as the unity of sunyata and jnanamatrata. The Hevajra Tantra tells us that the name Hevajra represents two principles in harmony; the HE sound proclaims great compassion (mahakaruna), and VAJRA is the name of wisdom (prajha). Reality is the unified essence of these two, wisdom and means, prajna and upaya, hence called Prajhopaya. The name Vajrasattva is likewise a symbol of the unity of diamond {vajra) and being (sattva); because it is impenetrable (abhedya) it is known as vajra; because of the unity of the triple-world of becoming (tribhavasya ekata), it is called the Being (saliva)" Hevajra, Vajrasattva, Prajnopaya, Tathagatakayavakcitta and Bhagavan are thus names of this unifying Principle in the universe. Heruka and Candamaharosana are also his hierophanies.

Here we have to recognise that Buddhology was transformed into Tantric theology without setting aside Buddhological ideas and symbols. Sakyamuni had long been forgotten but Buddhahood, the idea of the Buddha, was reshaped and reformulated by Tantric teachers. In this theology we see a fresh and vigorous effort to reaffirm life and the world in the light of newly discovered powers and attitudes which had been an anathema to all standard forms of ascetic soteriologies. The Buddha is occasionally remembered but always identified with the newly envisioned Reality which, though formless and immaculate, assumes diverse forms, benevolent as well as

in the navel in the heart in the throat in the head

wrathful, dark as well as brilliant, masculine as well as feminine, austere as well as orgiastic, in accordance with the complex and incomprehensible nature of the phenomenal world.

In addition to the Three Bodies of the Buddha well-known to us from earlier sources, the tantras contain visions of a fourth body. In a symbolic way they are all to be found within the human body. The order and location of these bodies according to the Hevajra Tantra is as follows 33 :

L mrmanakaya or Human Body

2. dharmakaya or Absolute Body

3. sarnbhogakdya or Enjoyment Body

4. sahajakaya or Innate Body The sahajakaya is also called vajrakdya, Diamond Body, and svabhavikakaya, the Essential Body or the Natural Body, Tantric theology is a theology of bliss (ananda). Each of these bodies is associated with bliss or joy. Thus simple bliss {ananda) is associated with the Human Body, supreme bliss (paramdnanda) with the Absolute Body, detachment bliss (yiramdnanda) with the Enjoyment Body, and innate bliss (sahajdnanda) with the Innate Body. The sahajakdyalvajrakdyal svabhavikakaya is the Highest Truth and it is characterised by the highest bliss called the Innate Bliss. This is beyond Samsara and Nirvana yet attainable within this body, within this life in the world. The tantras have a scheme of a subtle body with 'circles' (cakras) and 'veins' (nddis) conceived as a microcosmic structure (mandala) of the

33 Ibid., p.68 (II.iv.51-55h Snellgrove's discussion in Part 1, pp.34-8; S.B. Dasgupu, An Introduction to Tantric Buddhism, University of Calcutta, Calcutta 1958, 2nd ed, pp.174-6.

macrocosmic existence 34 .

Various are the manifestations of this divinity. The steps of origination and of realisation mentioned above are the processes through which the diverse and complex relation between this divinity and the numerous individual living beings becomes intelligible. The order of manifestation of the steps of origination {utpatfikakrama) reveals the structure of this relation. A full and systematic theory of creation or origin of the phenomenal world out of this divinity is not found in Tantric texts so far published. Occasional statements scattered in these texts give some hints of how the siddhas understood this matter. At last one text retains the classical doctrine of the conditioned origin of phenomenal life {pratltyasamutpdda). In the beginning of the XVIth chapter of the Candamaharosana Tantra we read the following dialogue between Bhagavati and Bhagavan, between 'goddess* and 'god':

Bhagavati asked: 'Explain, O Supreme Lord, how the world originates, how it is destroyed, and how the perfection is achieved,*

Bhagavan said: 'Conditioned by causes the world comes into existence; its destruction too is conditioned by causes. Having known these two phenomena, one achieves perfection by

34 See Giuseppe Tucci, Theory and Practice of the Mandala, Rider & Co, London 1969; Lama Anagarika Govinda, Foundations of Tibetan Mysticism, Rider & Co., London I960; Gopinath Kaviraj, Bharatiya Samskrti aur Sadhana I (Hindi), Rashirabhasha Pari sad, Patna 1963.

meditating on the Non-dual {advayamT*.

The Hevajra Tantra has a passage which traces the origin of the phenomenal world to the divinity. At one place we are told that 'Wisdom is called the Mother, because she gives birth to the world. She is also called Sister (bhaginl) because she shows the division (vibhdgdP 6 . According to the commentator of this text, the 'division' (vibhdga) refers to the division of the Reality into absolute and relative. At another place, this text teaches that 'the Samsara is Heruka's form, and he is the saviour Lord of the world' 37 . Then we have the definitive statement:

madhavam hi jagat sarvam madbhavam

bhuvanatrayam I madvyapUam idam sarvam ndnyamayam drstam

jagat IF*

'The entire world is borm from me, the triple world is born from me. All this is pervaded by me, of nothing else does

this visible world consist.'

This statement reminds us of the proclamation of Lord Krsna in the BhagavadgitiL

35 Candamaharosana Tantra, Chapter XVI, ed. L de La Vallee Poussin in Bouddhisme: Etudes el Materiaux, Tkeorie des Douze Causes, Libraine Scientifique, Gand 1918, pl25. Author's transl.

36 Hvt 2, p.16 (Lv,16. see Yogaratnamala, pil8, lines 14-15.

37 Hvt 2, p.92 (ILixiO): samsaram herukakaram jagaduttaranam prabhum.

38 Ibid^ p30 (Lviii.4t; cf. Bhagavadgita VIL6; 1X10; X.39.

The orthodox Buddhist view of ultimate reality had not as yet disappeared from India Writing in the eighth century, the great Buddhist philosopher Santaraksita opened his famous Tattvasamgraha with the following lines:

'This Tattvasamgraha, Compendium of True Doctrines, is being composed after bowing to that Omniscient Person, the greatest of expounders, who, with a view to bringing about the welfare of the world, propounded the Doctrine of the Wheel of Intervolved Causation, Independently of any self-sufficient revelation, supreme mercy having entered His very soul through long innumerable cycles (5-6). The Wheel of Causation is free from all notions of the functions of any such cause as Primordial Matter, God, both of these (Primordial Matter or God), Soul, and such other entities; it is mobile; it is the basis of all such notions as karma (actions, good and bad), the fruits of acts, the connection between these two(l). It is devoid of all such concepts as Quality, Substance, Movement, Universal, Inherence, and so on; it is amenable to words and cognitions only in an assumed (superimposed) form(2). It is definitely cognized by means of two clearly defined Means of Cognition; it is not mixed up with the nature of anything else, even in the slightest degree(3). It admits no translocation; it is without beginning and without end; it is like a reflected image and such other things; it is absolutely free from the whole lot of

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fantasies, it has not been comprehended by others(4r 9 .

This statement thus clearly rejects all form of theism; it rejects doctrines of Prakrti, Purusa, Isvara, Atma, and also of a combination or union of the two principles, God and his Nature (prakrti, mayo, sakti) as in theistic Vedanta, and of Prakrti and Purusa as in the Samkhya school, as a source of the world. In short, it rejects all those forms of reality that are postulated in the six schools of Brahmanical thought In his commentary on these verses, Kamalasila (eighth century), among other things, points out that the knowledge of this truth of pratityasamutpada is dvenika, that is, peculiar to the Buddha. Visnu (Hari), Siva (Hara) and Brahma (Hiranyagarbha) do not possess this knowledge, and the Buddha's revelation of this truth was not based on the Vedas which the tlrthikas, Brahmanical followers, regard as 'self-sufficient-proof, but on his own intuitive vision

The Tantric theologians, however, were a product of that fusion of Mahay ana Buddhism and Puranic Brahman ism which those is the West have described as 'Hinduism'. Just as substantial portions of Visnuism and Vedanta represent a brahman ised version of some fundamental Buddhist doctrines

39 Tattvasamgrafia of Samaraksita with the Commentary of Kamalasila, ed, Ember Krsnamacarya, 2 vols. Oriental Institute, Baroda 1926. English ir, by Ganganaiha Jha. 2 vols. Oriental Institute, Baroda 1937, 1939, vvJ-6.

40 See Lai Mani Joshi, Discerning the Buddha A Study of Buddhism and of the Brahmanical Hindu Attitude to It, Munshiram Manoharlal, Delhi 1983, ppJ77ff.

and practices, so some portions of Tantric Buddhism may be said to represent a late Buddhist version of Puranic Brahmanism. Religious practices of modern Buddhists and Hindus in Nepal are indicative of this fusion.

We should, therefore, not be surprised when we read the following views published in a Buddhist text composed jointly by two siddhas who were contemporaneous with Santaraksita and Kamalasila. Describing the profound nature of 'Equality-Taste* (samarasa) or the taste of the perfect unity of prajha and upaya which is to be attained by the esoteric method of 'wisdom-initiation' (prajhabhisekaX the authors of the Hevajra Tantra expound a mixed theology which can find itself at home in Vedantic Visnuism, and in modern world theology;

'The knowledge (jhana) which is free from consciousness of self and other arises from one's own knowing. It is like the sky free from defilements, void, of the nature of being and non-being, and supreme; a fusion of wisdom and means, a fusion of passion and dispassion. It is the life-breath of living beings; its is the Supreme Imperishable {paramaksaraX the all-pervading, abiding in all embodied beings. It is the universal living breath (mahapranaX it subsumes the world; being and non-being and whatever other things there are (in the world) have their genesis in it. It is the Cosmic Consciousness (sarvam-vijhana-rupam), the Ancient Man (purusah puranaX God (isvaraX the Self (atma), Soul 0'ivo), Being {sattva), Time (kalah), and

Person (pud gala) too. It is the intrinsic nature (svabhava) of all beings as well as their illusory form (mayarupi) H1 .

This formulation will evoke a spontaneous appreciation from modern Theosophists and followers of Ramakrishna-Vivekananda -Gandhi, It presents perhaps the earliest synthesis of diverse ideas of Reality found in Jainism, Vedanta, Samkhya, Buddhism and among the followers of Eternal Time 42 . This synthetic theology also indicates that the siddhas disregarded not only the caste-system, conventional ethical norms, traditional philosophical opinions, but also systematic thinking within the framework of Buddhism and Hinduism. It was an unfamiliar Buddhist exposition never heard previously in Buddhist quarters. That is why all the bodhisattvas in the audience headed by the Bodhisattva Vajragarbha were struck by great amazement and became unconscious and fell to the ground 43 .

More or less similar ideas can be gleaned from several other Tantric texts so far published. The Candamaharosana Tantra describes the Lord Adamantine-Being (bhagavan vajrasattva) as free from being and non-being, sunk only in fourfold bliss, of inexpressible form, without any

41 Hvt 2, p.36 U.x.8-12). Author's transl. For a brief comment see

Yogaratnamala, pp.131-2

42 Yogaratnamala, p.132, and the Prasannapada, p.165 (Darbhanga ed.) have quoted a verse of these Kalavadins which is as follows;

khlq pacali hhuiani kalah samharate prajah I kalak suptesu jagarti kalo fu duratikramak II

43 Hvt 2, p.26 (I.x.l4, also Gst, p.16; see n.8 above.

thought-concentration, and abiding in all men. It describes the goddess, the Ruler of the Adamantine World (bhagavati Vajradhatvlsvarl), as the identity of emptiness and compassion, established in divine pleasure, bereft of frivolity, inexpressible, without agitation and established in all embodied women 44 .

Theistic terms and concepts are found in the Guhyasamaja Tantra also. The Lord (bhagavan) who teaches the secret and mysterious theology to members of a secret assembly (guyhasamaja), is called the Lord of all Tathagatas (sarvatathagatasvamin), Lord of the world (bhuvanesvara), Supreme Lord (paramesvara), the Great Imperishable (mahdksaraX the Maker (karta), and the Creator (srasta)**. He is rareiy if ever referred to as the Buddha; his names are Vajradhara, Vajraraja, Vajrakaya, Vajrasattva, Kayavakcittavajrin and so on; his forms too are numerous: Mahavairocana or Vairocana, Aksobhya, Ratnaketu, Amitayus, Amoghasiddhi and so on. His most significant and mystical epithet is Kayavakcittavajra, the Diamond which is the unity of Body, Speech and Mind. This Diamond (vajra) or Diamond-Being (vajrasattva) symbolises the unity of Diamond-Body (kayavajra), Diamond-Speech (vagvajra) and Diamond-Mind (cittavajra). At one place these three facets of Diamond are identified with the Brahmanical triad (trimurn):

kayavajro bhaved brahma vdgvajras tu mahesvarah I

44 Candamaharosana Tantra, p.18, vvl-4 abridged

45 Gst (Darbhanga edj, pp3, 14. 25, 28. 32. 40.

cittavajradharo raja saiva visnurmashardhikah //**

Thus Diamond-Body is Brahma, Diamond-Speech is Siva, and Diamond-Mind, the King, is the great magician Visnu. One might also say that Vajrasattva is far above any one of these great gods for he is the unity of all of them.

Similar ideas abound in the Samvarodaya Tantra. It invokes the authority of the Vedas and Siddhantas to eulogise the four fundamental elements (caturbhutd), viz., air, fire, water and the earth. The last element is called the place where the Supreme Lord (paramesvara) called god (deva), and consciousness (vijhana) eternally dwells. This god or consciousness is transformed into knowledge (/nana) which takes the shape of five deities. Then the text enumerates five personality factors (pancaskandha), five types of knowledge, five Tathagatas (from the Tantric pantheon mentioned above) and so on* 7 . The deity yoga, we are told, is unthinkable, just as the sport or play (nataka) of Buddhas is unthinkable, because they have the form of a multitude of dakinls (goddesses with magical powers) in union with Lord Heruka 48 . This god is conceived as standing in a shooting position (alldha posture of the feet) in the centre of the solar circle like a hero; he is three-faced and six-armed 49 .

This Heruka is often identified with Prajnopaya, and a

Ibid, XVH19; see also ppJ04-5. Samvarodaya Tantra 1V.9-14. Ibid, IV31. Ibid, XIIL15.

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yogin often conceives himself in meditation as of the nature of Heruka. A sort of Vedantic notion of self occasionally occurs in these texts. Contemplating complete Non-duality (sarvam advayatam), beyond subjectivity and objectivity, the Tantric yogin free from all conventional ideas and practices dwells in the bliss of the indivisibility of sunyata and karuna. It is said that the Supreme Self (paramatma) dwells without hesitation in the form of his self (atmarupay.

The individual soul (pinda) with its internal and external (equipments) is pure like the sky; thus the liberated self (muktatma) always sees the self (atma) as he does the sky. It is bodiless, without beginning and without end, is free from qualities like sound, and so on, is released from duality (dvitlyena vinirmuktam), and somehow exists in every way. Having based being on non-being, it renders being without basis; having made thought without thought, it does not think any thing at


The text also states that beings are like thought, and thought is like the Jinas (Victors); this was revealed by the Buddha who is free from thought. He who does not think of thought, all his thoughts disappear; not to superimpose various kinds of superimpositions and to be dispassionate is to achieve the Great

50 Ibid, IV32; XXI.7-9.

51 Ibid, XXXIH2-4. Author's transL Bliss 52 .

The Tantric Buddhist pantheon is truly enormous and complex, and we cannot here discuss even its major figures and features 53 . The position of religious preceptor (guru), the symbolism of numerous rituals, sacred formulas (mantras), diagrams (yantras), physical postures (asanas), finger-postures (mudras), mystic maps (mandalas) and articles of use in Tantric practice, all these and many other elements of Tantric Buddhist culture have yet to be studied in depth and detail The work so far done by several scholars in this field has only touched some areas of the meaning and importance of what is likely to remain a major paradoxical problem of the history of Buddhist civilisation.

It was observed earlier in this paper that the siddhas maintained a monistic or non-dualistic theory of ultimate reality. It can also be suggested now that, along with monistic or non-dualistic ideas, there is in these tantric texts a definite strand of theistic or monotheistic doctrine. Several passages quoted above suggest that Vajrasattva is viewed as the Supreme

52 Ibid^ XXXIIIJ1-1Z

53 See G. Tucci. Tibetan Painted Scrolls, Rome 1949; B. Bhattacharya, The Indian Buddhist Iconography, K.L. Mukhopadhyay, Calcutta 1958 (chiefly based upon the Sad hana mala)-. Alice Getty, The Gods of Northern Buddhism, Oxford 1928 (repr. 1963); LA Wad dell. The Buddhism of Tibet or Lamaism, London 1895 (repr. 1972); R. Nebesky-Wojkowitz, Oracles and Demons of Tibet, The Hague 1956; Slephan Beyer, The Cult of Tara, University of California Press, Berkeley 1978; Marie-Therese de Mallmann, Etude Iconographique sur Manjusri, Paris 1964.

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God, as the Creator and Pervader. He is conceived as Personal as well as Impersonal. One of his names is Paramadibuddha 54 .

'This Supreme First Enlightened One (paramadibuddha) is the originator of Buddhas; possessed of the triple body (trikaya), he is the knower of Three Bodies. This exalted Lord is Omniscient, the Adorable, the Nondual, the Supreme First Buddha. He is Pure, Bliss, Compassion, and Imperishable Knowledge. He reveals all existences through Emptiness. He has hands and feet everywhere; eyes, heads and faces everywhere; his ears are everywhere. He is established in the universe, encompassing all. There is this One Essential Body (svabhavika kaya), Emptiness-Compassion-in-One, famous as Genderless (na pumsaka), and as the Male-Female-inOne (yuganaddha)

54 See Sekoddesa-Tika, the Candamakdrosana Tantra and the SvayambhuPurana, ed. H. P. Sastri, Royal Asiatic Society. Calcutta 1894-1900, and L. de La Vallee Poussin, , Adibuddha' in ER.E. I. p.93.

55 Sddhanamdla II, p.505 (Dvibhujasambaropadesa), lines 5-12

Buddhandm, janakah irikaya-sahitas-traikdya-samvedakah I sarvajhah paramadhibuddha bhagavan vande lameva-advayam It ham tat sukham runaddhili kartma-jndnam-aksaram I sunyatapratimeneva sarvabhdvasya darsanam IS sarvatah panipddadyam sarvato'aksi siro mukham I sarvatah srutiman loke sarvam-avrtra list hat i If ekah svdbhavikah kayah sunyatakaruna-advayah I napumsakam iti khyato yuganaddha Iti kvacit II

These verses freely translated here were composed by Mahapandita Ratnakaragupta who probably lived in the eleventh century. Three works are attributed to him in the Tibetan Tanjur, and two of his short ritual texts are preserved in the Sadhanamala, a collection of 312 sadhanas, a manuscript of which was written in 1165 C.E. Buddhology was thus transformed into Theology before it died in its homeland during the age of the Great Adepts.


traduit de la version chinoise par Jhirh Hnven-Vi

Fascicule sixieme

Partie 13

Reeevoir des of frandes

5. Ainsi ai-je entendu. Une fois quand le Bouddha residait a Sravasti 2 , dans le bois de Jeta, au pare d'Anathapindada, entoure de plusiers milliers de disciples et de fideles qui venaient ecouter sa predication, il y avait un brahmane nomme "Predispose-en-faveur-des-fleuves" 3 qui s'approcha du Bienheureux, deposa son lourd fardeau, et se tint debout a ses cotes. H se dit: Aujourd'hui le sramana Gautama va donner une predication a plusiers milliers de disciples et de fideles.

1 Voir T2. 573cl et suiv.; cf. Majjhimanikaya I, p.36 et suiv. (Vatthupamasulta); voir LB. Horner drX Middle Length Sayings 1. pp.45-5L

Outre les recensions pali et de l'EA du Valthupamasutta. une troisieme version de ce discours se trouve dans le Madhyamagama (MA). TL 575a21 et suiv. Pour une etude comparative du lexte pali et celui du MA voir Thich Minh Chau. The Chinese Madhyama Agama and ihe Pali Majjhima Nikaya (Saigon 1964), p.228 el suiv,

2 Quant a la localisation du sutra, l'EA saccord avec le pali, tandis que celle du MA correspond avec ce qui s'appelle selon le pali Tarbre Ajapalanigrodha sur le rivage de la Neranjara pres d'Uruveli*.

3 En ce qui eoncerne la bain rituelle, Tredispose-en-faveur-des-fleuves" j^ /g.j est thematiquement un nom qui cc-nvient au Sundarika-Bhiradvaja de la recension pali, et qui dans le MA s'appelle "Pur de par 1'eau" 'iVHf .


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Cependant je suis aussi pur et serein que lui, puisque le sramana Gautama mange des aliments riches et succulents alors que je ne mange que des fruits ordinaires pour ma subsistence. En ce moment le Bienheureux savait ce que le brahmane pensait et il dit aux bhiksu:

II y a vingt-et-un comportements malsains 4 qui corrompent l'esprit des gens et les conduisent forcement dans les voies mauvaises (durgati), ils leur empechent la renaissance dans un monde meilleur. Quels sont ces vingt-et-un comportements?

1- La haine 5

2- Le desir de tuer

3- La paresse

4- L'attachement aux plaisirs

5- Le doute (permanent)

6- La colere

7- La jalousie .8- L'inquietude

9- Le depit

10- La rancoeur

11- L'impudence

12- L'impudicite

13- La duperie

14- La malhonnetete

15- Le faux raisonnement (lit: forger, fabriquer)

4 Lit. '21 liens' { ££ , grantka); le pali a itpakkilesa, au nombre de 16. et le MA a '21 depravations' ou 'pollutions' {vidusana, non pas au sens donne dans Edgerton, BHSD, p.487).

5 II est a noter que TEA commence avec 'la haine' (dvesa), le pali avec "la cupidite et la convoitise' (abhijjha-visamalobha} et le MA avec *les vues fausses*.

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16- Le desir de lutter

17- La vanite

18- L'egocentrisme (c.a.d, I'amour-propre, la


19- L'envie

20- L'orgueil

21- La cupidite.

6 bhiksu! si quelqu'un possede ces vingt-et-un comportements malsains, son esprit est infecte, il s'engagera forcement dans des voies mauvaises, il lui sera impossible de renaitre dans un monde meilleur. Cest comme un vetement nouveau [fabriquel de la laine fine, tout blanc, qui jaunit au cours des annees par la poussiere et les saletes. On ne peut le colorer en bleu, en jaune, en rouge ou en noir. Pourquoi? Parce qu'il a la poussiere et les saletes. Ainsi, 6 bhiksu, si quelqu'un laisse impregner son esprit des vingt-et-un comportements malsains, il est certain qu'ils le conduisent forcement dans des voies mauvaises, qu'ils lui empechent la renaissance dans un monde meilleur. Au contraire, s'il y a quelqu'un dont l'esprit n'est pas infecte par ces vingt-et-un comportements malsains, il est certain qu'il renattra dans les cieux et non pas en enfer. Cest comme un tissu de laine fine, tout blanc et propre: on peut le teindre en n'importe quelle couleur bleu, jaune, rouge ou noir; avec une reussite certaine. Pourquoi ? Parce que le tissu est blanc et propre. 11 en est de meme pour une personne dont Pesprit a ete purifie des vingt-et-un comportements malsains; il est certain que cette personne renaitra dans les cieux et non pas en enfer.

S'il arrive a un disciple des saints (arya-sravaka) d'avoir un comportement haineux, il faut qu'il essaye de le maitriser. II

faut faire la meme chose pour les autres comportemems - le desir de tuer, etc. S'il arrive a un disciple des saints d'etre purifie de la haine et des autres comportements malsains, il a un comportement paisible et gai, et de la bienveillance (maitri) pour tout le monde sans distinction aucune. Cette bienveillance universale apportera la paix et la joie a tout le monde. Et c'est dans la paix et la joie qu'il aura la vue juste des choses. II a aussi de la compassion (karuna) pour tout le monde sans distinction aucune. Cette compassion apportera la paix et la joie a tout le monde. Et c'est dans la paix et la joie qu'il aura la vue juste des choses. II aura le plaisir (mudita) d'avoir apporte la paix et la joie a tout le monde sans distinction aucune. Ce plaisir apportera la paix et la joie a tout le monde. Et c'est dans la paix et la joie qu'il aura la vue juste des choses. II aura la fermete dans la protection [de la Doctrine)* pour tout le monde sans distinction aucune. Cette fermete apportera la paix et la joie a tout le monde. Et c'est dans la paix et la joie qu'il aura la vue juste des choses.

II parvient ainsi a la foi inebranlable dans le Tathagata. Alors il brandit inebranlablement le drapeau [de la Doctrine). Parmi les dieux, les dragons, les asura, les sramana, les brahmanes, ou les habitants de ce monde, il arrive ainsi a la paix, la joie, la vue juste des choses. Ainsi est vraiment le Tathagata, perfectionne, pleinement illumine, doue de la science et de la bonne pratique, bien alle, connaisseur du monde(des mondes), chef de la caravane, maltre des dieux et des hommes, le pleinement eveille qui protege tous. Ainsi cette [foi] lui [le

6 Lit,: Tesprit protecteur', ce qui veul dire upekkha (Majjhima), upeksa (lit dans le MA: 'renoncer").

Buddhist Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991) - EA XII

disciple) apporte la paix et la joie et il a la vue juste des choses.

II parvient encore [a la foi inebranlable] dans la Doctrine: 7 La Doctrine du Tathagata est tout a fait lucide, elle ne change jamais, elle est veneree. Ainsi un homme sage doit observer la Doctrine, dans laquelle il aura la paix et la joie. II vient de nouveau [a la foi inebranlable] dans la Communaute: la Communaute du Tathagata est pur et serein, honnete et conformement a la Doctrine; [ses membres] obtiennent les accomplissernents parfaits qui suivent: ['observance des regies religieuses (slla\ la concentration ($amadhi\ la sagesse (prajM), la delivrance (moksal Teveil. La Communaute des saints comporte quatre paires (celui qui entre dans le courant™ arhat) et huit personnes (ci.d. les quatre arya, dont chacun(e) realise le 'chemin' et le 'fruit' de son niveau de saintete). Ce sont les saints de la Communaute du Tathagata. lis sont respectables, venerables, et peuvent vraiment faire [ce qui doit etre fait], Cette [foi] lui [le disciple) apporte la paix et la joie et il a la vue juste des choses. II se sert de sa concentration, de son esprit serein depourvu de toute impurete et de tout comportement malsain, de son caractere doux; il peut manifester ses pouvoirs surnaturels; il peut ainsi connaitre ses innombrables vies anterieures; connaitre parfaitement ce qui s'etait passe il y a une generation, deux generations. . . dix generations. . . cent generations. . . d'innombrables generations anterieures; connaitre ses noms, ses prenoms, ses facons de vivre, sa joie, sa peine, ses

7 Tandis que U liste des qualites de Buddha (buddha-guna) est assez proche du pali (iti pi so bhagava araham. . X les enumerations qui suivent des dhamma- et samgha -guna dans TEA rappelle de loin seulement le pali svakkhaio bhagavata dhammo. . . supalipanno bkagavalo sdvakasangho. . . .

succes, ses defaites, etc. . . connattre la pensee des etres vivants, il peut utiliser son oeil divin pour observer les differentes especes d'etres vivants, leurs aspects physiques, leurs caracteres, leurs comportements, leurs vies successives, leurs evolutions selon leur karma (bonnes ou mauvaises actions).

II se sert de sa concentration (samadhi) pour se purifier, pour eliminer les mauvaises actions, les mauvaises pensees, les comportements malsains, et realise ainsi des pouvoirs surnaturels. II se sert ensuite du 'plus haut pouvoir surnaturel': devenir libre des souillures. II realise [les Verites] de la souffrance, de 1'origine de la souffrance, de la cessation de la souffrance et [du chemin qui] conduit a la cessation de la souffrance. Apres cette realisation, il se trouve libere de la souillure des plaisirs des sens, de la souillure de 1'ignorance. Dans la liberation le savoir vient qu'il est libere, et il comprend: 'La naissance et la mort sont detruites, la conduite de Brahma (la vie de purification) a pris sa fin, ce qui devait etre fait a ere fait, il n'y aura plus de devenir [pour moil*.

Un bhiksu qui sait se conduire ainsi est un veritable disciple des saints; son esprit est libere; meme s'il consomme beaucoup de boissons et d'aliments savoureux, il ne fait rien de mal. Pourquoi? Parce qu'il n'a plus de convoitises, parce qu'il n'a plus de desirs, de haine, de rancune, de doute, 11 est nomme un bhiksu, parmi les bhiksu, qui, au sens le plus haut, est lave par un lavage interne.

Alors le brahmane "Predispose-en-faveur-des-fleuves" dit au Bienheureux: Sramana Gautama! vous devriez aller vous baigner

Buddhisi Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991) - EA XII

dans le fleuve Sundarika 8 .

- 6 brahmane! le Bienheureux demanda, qu'y-a-t*il de I'eau du fleuve Sundarika?

Le brahmane repondit: L'eau est tres claire. Cest un fleuve benefique. Quiconque se baigne dans ce fleuve se debarrasse entierement de tous 1 maux.

Alors le Bienheureux recita ce poeme:

Notre corps est le resultat de nos actions pendant

d'innombrables milliers d'annees passees. Le bain dans ce fleuve soi-disant benefique, Ainsi que dans d'autres petites mares, Ne peut jamais nous debarrasser des nos actions

tenebreuses. Les imbeciles aiment aller se baigner souvent

dans ce fleuve; Cependant avec leurs maux anterieurs accumules, L'eau du fleuve ne peut pas purifier leur karma. L'homme pur vit toujours heureux Dans robservation des regies de purete. L'homme pur mene une vie de purete, Sa fermete lui apportera surement de bons

8 U iransliteration chinoise est proche de 'Sundarika', a. Horner, op. cfc. p.49. n.l. se referant au brahmane Sundarika-Bhiradvaja qui. dans d'autres endroiis du canon pali. est presente comme pratiquani du culte du feu sur les rivages du fleuve Sundarika. Touiefois dans le Majjhima I, p.39, le fleuve s'appelle Bahuka.

Buddhist Studies Review 8. 1-2 (199!) - EA XII

resultats. Si quelqu'un s'abstient de voler, De tuer, De mentir

SMI considere les autres comme lui-meme, II peut se baigner n'importe ou, II est tou jours paisible dans son bonheur serein. Comment ce fleuve peut-il nous purifier? N'est-il pas comme si un aveugle etait [capable

de] reveler ce qui est cache 9 ?

Maintenant le brahmane dit avec vehemence au Bienheureux:

- Gautama! maintentant je suis comme un bossu qui retrouve son dos droit, comme un aveugle qui retrouve la vue, comme un egare qui retrouve le bon chemin, comme une personne [jadrs] incapable de voir et maintenant douee des yeux pour voir qui trouve la lumiere dans une maison obscure. O oui! le sramana Gautama a utilise d'innombrables moyens salvifiques pour nous expliquer le merveilleux Dharma. Je veux suivre votre Chemin et pratiquer conforrnement.

Ainsi le brahmane "Predispose-en-faveur-des-fleuves" [demanda a etre admis dans la communaute du Samgha,] et il recut les regies completes de moine par egard desquelles les jeunes hommes de famille quittent la maison pour entrer dans la vie sans maison. II suivait strictement 1'enseignement Idu Bouddha] et pratiquait la conduite de Brahma sans egal [jusqu'au

9 Lit. 'rendre ue i^ui est lenebreux/secrel'.

Buddhist Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991) - EA XII

temps] qu'il savait vraiment: La naissance et la mort sont detruites, la conduite de Brahma a pris sa fin, ce qui deya.t etre fait a ete fait, il n'y aura plus de devenir [pour mod A ce moment-la, le venerable Sundarika 10 devint un perfectionne iarhat). Le venerable Sundarika ecoutait les paroles de Bouddha, se rejouissait et les mettait respectueusement en pratique.'

6 n * Ainsi ai-je entendu. Une fois quand le Bouddha residait a Rajagrha, au Mont De Vautours (Grdhrakuta) avec 500 grands bhiksu Sakra, le roi des dieux, ayant passe dans la journee, revint dans la soiree aupres du Bienheureux, se prostema a ses pieds, puis s'installa a ses cotes. II recita le poeme suivant pour demander rexplication au Tathagata:

[Les grands maltresl ont souvent declare

Que ceux qui ont traverse le cycle de la

renaissance sont purifies. Maintenant que fai traverse le ravin des

renaissances, Je venais vous demander de bien vouloir

nVexpliquer le sens profond de ces mots. J'ai constate que tous les etres vivants ici presents Ont fait de bonnes actions, et ont etes encourages A accomplir des bienfaits de differentes sortes.

10 Ici, au lieu de Tredispose-ea-faveur-des-fleuves" comme ci-dessus. le

nom transcrit est 'Sundarika'; cf. n.8.

U Cf. Samyuttanikiya I. pp.233-4 (Yajamanasutta); vo ir CAP. Rhys Davids

(ir.), Kindred Sayings I, pp.297-8.

Buddhist Studies Review 8. 1-2 (1991) - EA XII

Mais quelle est Taction la plus meritoire? Maintenant que vous etes au Mont des Vautours, Veuillez nous expliquer ce qu'il faut faire en priori te.

Le Bienheureux, [sachant la bonne intention de Sakra qui avail pose cette question pour aider les autres,] lui repondit en recitant ce poeme:

Dans les quatre voles mauvaises [Tenfer, les 'ames

errantes et affamees', les animaux, les asura)

on n'a pas les moyens de faire le bien d'utie

facon complete. Seuls les saints ont ces moyens. Car ils ont pratique les regies completes de la

purete, Ils ont la foi solide en la Doctrine en la mettant

en application, lis n'ont plus la cupidite, ni la colere, Ils ont la vue juste des choses, et sont purifies. L'action la plus meritoire pour eux Est de sauver tous [les etres vivants] du ravin [des

renaissancesl Tandis que les etres vivants Qui veulent faire de bonnes actions Pour evoluer vite dans la bonne voie, Doivent choisir la subvention au besoins du

Samgha, Lequel sauvera d'innombrables etres vivants. Comme l'ocean produit d'innombrables choses

precieuses, Le Samgha des saints

Donnera des predications sur la brillante sagesse.

Pour vous aider a evoluer vite

Je dis qu'il faut subventionner aux besoins du

Samgha. Cest Taction la plus meritoire. N'oubliez jamais ces paroles tres importantes.

Apres avoir entendu ces paroles precieuses du Bouddha, Sakra, le roi des dieux, se prosterna a ses pieds; il en etait tres heureux et il les mettait respectueusement en pratique.

7. Ainsi ai-je entendu. Une fois, quand le Bouddha residait a Rajagrha, au Mont des Vautours (Grdhrakuta) avec 500 grands bhiksu, le venerable Subhuti etait seul dans sa eabane de meditation dans la citadelle de Rajagrha, pres du Mont des Vautours. En ce moment le venerable Subhuti souffrait d'une maiadie grave, il voulait savoir quelle etait Torigine de cette souffrance, comment se guerir, quel est le devenir de cette souffrance apres la guerison. II prepara le tapis et le coussin de meditation, se mit en position de lotus, le corps droit, Tesprit concentre, il meditait sur la facon d'eliminer les souff ranees.

Alors Sakra, le roi des dieux, sachant la pensee du venerable

Subhuti, donna I'ordre a Pancasikha 12 en recitant ce poeme:

[Le venerable Subhuti) est tres actif dans sa

liberation de tout attachement, II s'entraine souvent au Mont des Vautours. Aujourd'hui il a un grand souci, Et il arrive a purifier ses sens par [le sejour] dans

la vacuite. Depechons-nous de lui rendre visite pour

demander conseils. Seulement en observant la physionomie du

venerable Nous recolterons de grands profits. Cest ainsi que nous agrandissons notre amas de


Pancasikha dit: 'Oui, Seigneur!' Et Sakra, le roi des dieux, accompagne de 500 deva (dieux) et de Pancasikha, va en un clin d'oeil du del de Trayastrimsad au Mont des Vautours, non loin de la cabane du venerable Subhuti. (Sakra) dit a Pancasikha en recitant ce poeme:

Vous avez fait toutes les bonnes actions,

Vous avez pratique la meditation,

Vous etes sociable, serein, et vous avez une belle

voix claire et etendue. Allez voir [le venerable Subhuti).

12 #£. ifc,4j doit certainement represenier le Gandharva Pancasikha; cf.

E. Waldschmidt, Bruchstucke buddhisiischer Sutras mis dem zentralasiatiscken Sanskritkanon (Leipzig 1932, Wiesbaden 1979), p.63 (259). n3 (Sakraprasnasulra 1).

Pancasikha dit: 'Oui, Seigneurf Puis il accorda sa guitare de lapis-lazuli, alia au devant du venerable Subhuti, le complimenta en chantant:

Vos inquietudes sont completement finies,

Vos illusions et vos peines sont parties,

Vos impuretes- ont completement et pour tou jours

pris fin, Votre meditation vous a conduit a TeveiL Votre esprit est calme, le fleuve Ide vos passions)

tari. Veuillez detroner Mara et conduire les etres

vivants a la realisation [du dharma supremel Votre travail et votre vertu seront grandioses

comme 1'ocean, Nous esperons pouvoir reussir rapidement pour

etre digne de votre confiance. Vos yeux purifies ressemblent aux belles fleurs de

lotus Qui n'ont aucune tache de boue, et dont les pistils

jaunes restent purs. Aujourd'hui nous sommes reunis ici, Dans 1'espoir de reussir a sejourner vraiment dans

la vacuite. Nous avons deja traverse les quatre courants Ide

la naissance, de la vieillesse, de la maladie et de

la mortt Nous n'avons plus de souff ranees physiques, II nous reste la concentration et l'eveil pour

parvenir a la perfection. Moi-m6me et les 500 deva ici presents,

Nous sommes venus des differentes directions

pour presenter nos hommages Au Bouddha Sakyamuni et aux saints, Pour realiser - le plus tot sera le mieux - [le sens

profond de] la vacuite.

Ayant entendu eette chanson, le venerable Subhuti se leva et complimenta Pancasikha: Excellent, excellent, 6 Pancasikha! Votre voix et votre musique forment une harmonie parfaite. La musique ne sort pas de la parole, la parole ne s'ecarte pas de la musique, les deux se fusion nent en une chanson miraculeuse!

Sakra, le roi des dieux, s'approcha du venerable Subhuti, le salua, se mit a ses cotes et lui demanda:

- Pourquoi celui qui fait de bonnes actions subit des malheurs? Votre corps est souffrant, d'ou vient ce mal? Du corps ou de Pesprit?

- Tres bien, tres bien, 6 Kausika 13 ! repondit le venerable Subhuti a Sakra, le roi des dieux. - II y a continuellement des choses (dharma) qui apparaissent, d'autres qui disparaissent. Toute existence est relative et relationnelle. Tout poison a son antidote, 6 Kausika! Les choses, Roi du Ciel, s'entremelent, s'eliminent, donnent naissance a autres choses. Le noir elimine le blanc, le blanc annule le noir. Pour guerir le desir sexuel, Roi du Ciel, il faut mediter que le corps est malsain. Pour guerir la haine il faut utiliser la bienveillance et la compassion. Pour

13 $Q is? e£l peut-etre une maniere de transcrire Kausika, un autre

nam de Sakra/lndra.

guerir I'ignorance et l'imbecilite il faut faire intervenir la sagesse. Cest ainsi, 6 Sakra, roi des dieux, que toute existence retournera [au niveau de la verite absolue] a la vacuite: pas d'ego (atmanl pas de personne (pudgala, purusa), pas de force vitale (ayus), pas d'ame (jiva), pas de sages ni de vulgaires, pas de formes ni de phenomenes, pas d'hommes ni de femmes. Cest comme le grand vent qui ravage les arbres, la grele qui detruit les fleurs, la secheresse qui fletrit les plantes, la pluie qui les fait epanouir. 6 Roi du Ciel, tout ce qui existe forme un chaos et se stabilise. J'ai eu des soucis et des inquietudes, maintenant que je les ai supprimes, je ne suis plus souffrant. - Alors Sakra, le roi des dieux, dit a Subhuti:

- J'ai aussi eu des soucis et des inquietudes. Maintenant que j'ai ecoute votre enseignement, je m'en suis debarrasse. La plupart des gens, las de la bassesse et de la mechancete de ce monde, veulent retourner aux mondes celestes; mais la-haut il y a d'autres problemes aussi vilains.

- Maintenant, dit le venerable Subhuti, c'est le moment favorable pour evoluer.

Alors Sakra, le roi des dieux, se leva, se prosterna aux pieds du venerable Subhuti, fit trois tours autour de celui-ci pour le saluer.

Le venerable Subhuti recita ce poeme:

Les sages ont souvent dit ceci:

Ceux qui font de bonnes actions ont raison de

croire qu'ils sont en train d'evoluer vers le

bonheur parfaiL

Cest la foi inebranable des sages.

Entendre le Dharma pent guerir des inquietudes.

Ayant entendu ces paroles du venerable Subhuti, Sakra, le roi des dieux, les mettait joyeusement en pratique.'



British Library

All Oriental manuscripts and books are now situated in the India Office Library, 197 Blaekfriars Road, London SE1 8NG (tel. 071-412 7000), to form the Oriental and India Office Library Collections (01 OC) which change is reflected in the Newsletter. Reading Room, photographic and fax facilities have been enhanced by improved accommodation. By the end of 1996, however, these holdings and facilities will be relocated to the new site of the British Library at St. Pancras in central north London.

British Museum

Following the opening of the Japanese Gallery two years ago, another gallery will be created to house the Buddhist sculptures from Amaravati, hitherto concealed due to lack of public viewing space since 1960. The Indian display is scheduled to open in mid-1992.

First Buddhist Institute in South America

The Fundacion Instituto de Estudios Budistas was created towards the end of 1989 in Buenos Aires and formally inaugurated in the following spring at a public meeting in the Centro Cultural San Martin, also in the Argentine capital. This organisation is the brainchild of a husband and wife team, the Buddhologist Dr Carmen Dragonetti and Indologist Dr Fernando Tola (respectively President and Vice-President of the Fundacion), who have distinguished themselves over many years and effectively personify these fields of study in South America.

The declared Objects are 'to promote, make accessible and elevate studies and research on Buddhism, on the cultures in

which this flourished (India, Central, South-East and Far East Asia) and on the languages used by it (Sanskrit, Pali, Chinese, Japanese, etc.)'. Activities will include courses, research seminars, working groups and large Buddhist conferences. During 1990, for example, courses in Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese and Japanese were held in relation to the grammar, translation and commentaries of mainly Buddhist texts; also courses on Buddhism, its development and main teachings, the reading of relevant texts in Spanish and translating from Pali and Sanskrit; ending the year with a conference on the Saddharmapundarlkasutra.

To contact the FIEB write to: Arribenos 2350 Casa 1, 1428 Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Asociacion l^atinnamericana de Estudios Budistas This organisation was also established at the end of 1990 with the object of studying and promulgating Buddhist culture. Based in Mexico City, it is supported financially by the Kokusai Bukkyogaku Kenkushyo (International Institute of Buddhist Studies, Tokyo). Plans include translating and publishing Buddhist texts and secondary works, creating a public library on the subject (apart from the library of the FIEB, non-existent on the continent), organising exhibitions of Buddhist art and even erecting a statue of Sakyamuni Buddha in a public place.

The official organ of the Asociacion is the Revista de Estudios Budistas, an attractive and well-presented periodical scheduled to appear twice yearly. The first two issues were published this year.

The President of the Asociacion is Prof. Benjamin Preciado at El Colegio de Mexico (where the well-established Centro de Estudios de Asia y Africa is directed by Prof. Jorge Silva) with a committee which includes Marco Antonio Karam, Director of

the Casa Tibet de Mexico.

For further information about the Asociacion, write to Apartado Postal # 19-332, C.P. 03901, Mexico, D.F., and for details of the Revista, contact Revista de Estudios Budistas, 2741 Sunset Boulevard, Los Angeles, CA 90026, USA.

Conference s and Seminars

1. The 7th International Conference on Buddhist Education.

Sponsored by the Institute for Sino-Indian Buddhism, this was held in Taipei, July 1990. More than sixty scholars from Asia, Europe and North America participated in the discussion of thirty-one papers submitted on the theme, 'Development of Modern Buddhist Education'.

2. A 'National Seminar on Vijnanavada' was held at the University of Delhi in the Department of Buddhist Studies

on 22 March 1991. The relatively neglected doctrines of the Yogacara have lately been enhanced by three recent publications: Surekha V. Limaye (ed. and tr.), The Mahay dnasutralahkara of Asahga (Delhi 1991?), YS. Shastri, Mahaydnasutralahkara of Asanga (Delhi 1989), and Thomas E. Wood, Mind Only. A Philosophical Doctrinal Analysis of the Vijnanavada (University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu 1991).

3. The Association for Asian Studies held its 50th annual meeting in New Orleans, April 1991. Further details, and of

its other activities, may be obtained from the Association's address, 1 Lane Hall, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA.

4. To mark the centenary of the Maha Bodhi Society, its most

active Indian branch, in Bangalore, sponsored the 'First International Buddhist Convention* on 10 June 1991; sixteen speakers read papers on 'The Buddhist Approach to Contemporary Problems'. The gathering of invited guests and participants included government ministers from Karnataka state, Ananda Mitra (Sanghanayaka of the Indian Bhikkhu Sangha), L. Ariyavamsa (Nayaka Mahathera, New Delhi), Bhikkhu Sanghasena (President, MBS, Bangalore), Geshe Lobsang Tsering and other senior representatives of the Tibetan monastic community, together with invitees from India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Thailand, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan and Australia. The Netherlands, Spain and the USA were represented by Olande Ananda Thera, Ven. Jampa Shenpar and Prof. Kenneth Liberman respectively.

5. The Eleventh International Conference of the Assocation of

South Asian Archaeologists in Western Europe, hosted by the Freie Universitat, was held in Berlin, July 1991.

6. The Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion

Buddhism Section was held in Kansas City, Missouri, November 1991. Twenty-four papers were submitted from twenty American universities or colleges and McMaster University (Ontario, Canada) covering the following themes: Foundational Philosophies: Alayavijnana and Tathagarbha in India, China, and Tibet; Topics in Buddhist Studies; Buddhism and Orientalism at the Turn of the Century; Genre and Canon in Buddhist Literature; Deity and Deification in the Tantras.

7. A symposium on 'Buddhist Studies in the Nordic Countries', jointly organised by the Seminar for Buddhist Studies (the

Universtities of Copenhagen and Aarhus) and the Institute for / the History of Religions (University of Oslo) and generously ( sponsored by the Nordisk Ministerrad, was held in June 1991 at Sams0 College, Denmark. (In 1989 Samse College had already been the venue for a symposium on 'The Esoteric Buddhist Tradition'; see the report in Studies in Central and East Asian Religions 2, Copenhagen and Aarhus 1989, pp.182-7, and BSR 7, 1-2, p.92f.) The purpose of this year's symposium was to convene scholars (mainly from the Nordic countries) who work on various aspects of Buddhism so as to ascertain the latest position of this vast field of research. The areas dealt with in the symposium papers, in the workshop and presentations of current research, included India, Tibet, Mongolia, China, Japan and Korea, unfortunately excluding South-East Asia due to the absence of a scholar who had intended to present a paper on the Traibhumi-Katha - A Buddhist Cosmology from Thailand'.

Nine symposium papers were delivered and subsequently discussed, and an account of Buddhist art was given with the help of colour slides. In his paper on 'The Gaganaganjapariprccha and Early Mahayana', J. Braarvig (Oslo) not only threw new light on the origins of Mahayana Buddhism, but also on early phases of an attempted consolidation and classification of Mahayana doctrine as suggested by, inter alia, the Mahasamnipata collection of Mahayana scriptures. Braarvig directed the participants' attention to the hitherto barely noticed Buddhologicat problem as to whether the first Indian attempts at classification of the Mahayana doctrine predate Nagarjuna I or not. U. Hammer (Uppsala) discussed 'Basic Themes in the Kalacakratantra' by treating both doctrinal aspects and, with reference to modern Kalacakra initiations, political implications. Drawing on Dhp vv.419-20, on the story of Vahgisa in the Dhp-Atthakatha and other allied sources, including Taisho

No, 385, the Antarabhavasutra, P.-A. Berglie (Stockholm) presented 'The Brahman who Tapped on the Skulls of the Dead'. This paper dealt with 'remnants of a soul theory in Buddhism' or with what other scholars have called 'the problem of precanonical Buddhism 1 . Bh. Pasadika (Gottingen) contributed a paper entitled 'On the Thematic Concord between a Sutrasamuccaya Quotation from the Ajatasatruparivarta and Madhyamakakarikas XXIII, Viparyasapariksa', and A. Lande (Oslo and Birmingham) discoursed upon 'Buddhism in the West A Case Study from Birmingham'.

The initial lecture of the second day's session was C. Lindtner's on 'Yoga i Indisk Mahayana' in which yoga was associated with hypnosis (but not in a vulgar sense). After mentioning Sudhana's visit to a lady-bodhisattva, as recorded in the Gandavyuha, I. Astley-Kristensen (Aarhus) examined 'Traditions of Bliss in Buddhism' by elucidating the 'relationship between suffering, happiness and great bliss'. H. Biischer (Copenhagen), a Yogacara specialist, put forward 'Aporias Conceptive of Vijnaptimatrata', whilst H.H. Serensen (Copenhagen) took stock of 'Esoteric Buddhism in Dunhuang', making it clear that esoteric Buddhism is not necessarily Tantric Buddhism. Finally, M. Thowsen (Oslo) described the until-now altogether unknown 'Chinese Buddhist Sculptures in the Munthe Collection'.

(Bh. P)

8. The 10th Conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies. Sponsored by UNESCO and its Sri Lankan delegation, the Universite de Paris X and its Laboratoire d'Ethnologie et de Sociologie Comparative, this bi-annual congress was held at UNESCO headquarters in July. It opened with addresses by Dr Ananga W.P. Guruge

(Ambassdor of Sri Lanka), C.L. Sharma (Deputy Director-General of UNESCO) and Prof. A.W. Macdonald (Paris). The keynote address on The Present and the Future of Buddhist Studies' was delivered by Prof. D. Seyfort Ruegg (Visiting Professor at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, 1991-2). This was followed by a panel on the date of the Buddha led by Profs A.K. Narain (Varanasi), R.F Gombrich (Oxford) and H. Bechert (Gottingen). The proceedings were attended by bhikkhus from Sri Lanka, Thailand, France and


The papers submitted included the following.

Theravadin Studies

Two papers (unfortunately scheduled on different 'panels') dealt with the Agganna Sutta, one by Richard Gombrich - 'A Fresh Look at Some Features of Early Buddhism', and one by Rupert Gethin (Bristol) - 'Cosmology and Psychology in the Agganna Sutta and Pali Commentaries'. Steven Collins (Chicago), in his 'Oral Aspects of Pali Literature', demonstrated that aural/oral traditions have remained important in the Theravadin lineage, despite the writing down of texts. Peter Harvey (Sunderland) discussed *The Mind-body Relationship in Pali Buddhism', according to the interpretation of both Sutta and Abhidhamma. Konrad Meisig (Miinster) dealt with 'Metres in the Sinhalese Guttila-kavyaya'. Coming to the modern period, Bhikkhu Mettananda (Wat Phra Dhammakaya, Bangkok) spoke on 'The Dhammakaya Movement: A Cultural Analysis', and LS. Cousins (Manchester) surveyed the history of Theravada Buddhism in England. San Sarin (a Cambodian scholar resident in France) offered a paper entitled 'Buddhism Transformed: Religious Practice and Institutional mixed games in Cambodia'.

Sravakayana Studies

Kamaleswar Bhattacharya (Paris) treated 'Realisrne ontologique et opportunisme grammatical dans 1'Abhidharmadipa et la Vibhasaprabhavrtti', Sieglinde Dietz (Gottingen) discussed the Karanaprajnapti in its Chinese and Tibetan translations in relation to recently identified Sanskrit fragments. Peter Skilling (Bangkok) spoke on 'The Raksa Literature of the Sravakayana' and The Pancaraksa'. Amalia Pezzali (Bologna) summarised the relevant sections of the Abhidharmakosa in 'The Four Noble Truths: an Analysis'. Marion Meisig (Munster) spoke on 'King Sibi in the Oldest Buddhist Chinese Version*. Bert Desseim (Ghent) examined a 'Miscellany on the Heart of Scholasticism (Tsa A-pi-t'an Hsin Lun)\ and 'Buddhist Nikayas through Ancient Chinese Eyes' was the title of Wang Bangwei's (Peking University) paper.

Mahayana Studies

Probing the purport of Candrakirti's philosophy, C.A. Scherrer-Schaub (Lausanne) presented 'Candrakirti's Yuktisastikavrtti'. Bhikkhu Pasadika (Gottingen) spoke 'On the Authorship of the mDo kun (as btus pa (Sutrasamuccaya)', arguing for the likelihood of the traditional attribution to Nagarjuna. Paul Harrison (Canterbury, New Zealand) 'restored' the meaning of Dharmakaya, demonstrating that its interpretation by several generations of modern scholars as an 'Absolute Body' cannot be supported by texts, at least for the early and middle periods. Jens Braarvig (Oslo), in 'The Gaganaganjapariprccha and Early Mahayana', addressed the question of the date of compilation of such collections as the Mahasamnipata and Ratnakuta. Peter Ebbatson (Oxford) dealt with 'The Structural Significance of Chapter 24 of the Mulamadhyamakarika* in terms of recent Western analytical philosophy. N. Ross Reat (Queensland) spoke on 'The Salistamba Sutra' and the Origins of Mahayana Buddhism*. An important contribution was Akira Yuyama's (Tokyo) 'Some Remarks of Sino-Sanskrit Glossaries Preserved only in Japan'.

Tibetan Studies

Jose Cabazon (Iliff) reported on the Tsogs Gtam Chen mo, an oral text of the Byes College of Sera monastery. Robin Kornmann (Princeton) in 'Epic Machinery in the Gesar, a Comparative Study', discussed the famous Tibetan epic in terms of emergent written tradition and literary criticism. Alexander Macdonald (Paris X), 'Zabs-dkar et le demembrement', enlightened his audience with the lively and satirical verses of the lama Zhabs-dkar. Michio Sato (Iwate) dealt with 'The Significance of Mi la ras pa's Buddhism'.

Art History

John C. Huntington (Ohio) spoke on the date of Tantric Cave' 465 at Dunhuang, and Susan L. Huntington (Ohio State) on 'Aniconism and the Emperor's New Clothes'. Braj M. Sinha (Saskatchewan) spoke on 'A Study of Avalokitesvara's Imagery in the Karanda-vyuha\

Comparative Studies

Per-Arne Berglie (Stockholm) reflected on the concept of the antarabhava in 'The Brahman who Tapped on the Skulls of the Dead'. P. de Silva (London) spoke on 'Aversive Strategies for Behaviour Change in Early Buddhism', comparing the techniques of aversion therapy with those recommended in the Pali Nikayas, such as the asubhakammatthanas.

While many interesting and informative papers were given, the conference suffered from some problems in organisation. Two days of sessions were held in the several rooms of two different UNESCO sites, separated by a ten-minute walk. This created considerable difficulty in learning what was going on, in getting to papers in which one was interested, and in meeting fellow delegates to compare notes. Although described as 'panels' on the programme, the sessions were not organised on any theme; indeed papers on quite disparate themes were scheduled together. It is hoped that those participants who have not promised their papers to established periodicals will contribute them to the official Report which will, in addition, include abstracts from the remaining papers and summaries of the ensuing discussions.

(Bh.P and PS.)

New Periodical

Asian Philosophy, an international journal of Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Buddhist, Persian and Islamic philosophical traditions will appear twice yearly from Carfax Publishing Co., P.O. Box 25, Abingdon, Oxon 0X14 3UE. The contents of NoJ include Frank J. Hoffman, 'Towards a Philosophy of the Buddhist Religion', and Klaustermaier, The Nature of Buddhism'. The joint editors are Dr Indra Mahalingam (Dept. of Law, University College of Wales, Aberystwyth) and Brian Carr (Dept. of Philosophy, Nottingham University).


A gfihananda Bharati (1923 - May 1991)

Born in Vienna of Czech parentage with the name of Leopold Fischer, he evinced an early interest in Indian culture and subsequently mastered Sanskrit and Hindi. During the early part of the Second World War he served as an interpreter to the Indian National Army' under S.C Bose, but thereafter continued his studies of Sanskrit, Indian Philosophy and Ethnology at Vienna University. In 1947 he travelled to India where, four years later, he became the first Western monk to be admitted to the Sannyasi (DasanamT) Order, receiving the name of Agehananda Bharati which he retained for the rest of his life. For the next ten years he taught at the University of Delhi, Banaras Hindu University and other institutions and, after lecturing in Thailand and Japan, emigrated to the USA in 1961. He was initially associated with the Far Eastern Institute at the University of Washington, Seattle, but subsequently transferred to Syracuse University, New York, where, in 1971, he was appointed Chairman of the Department of Anthropology and Ford-Maxwell Professor of South Asian Studies. He recorded his experiences in Austria and India in The Ochre Robe (New York 1970; repr. Santa Barbara 1980), otherwise his only publications relevant to Buddhism are 'Modern Hindu Exegesis of Mahayana Doctrine* (Philosophy East and West XII, Honolulu 1962), 'Sakta and Vajrayana, Their Place in Indian Thought' {Studies of Esoteric Buddhism and Tantrism, Koyasan University 1965), The Tantric Tradition (London and New York 1965; Delhi 1990; German ed., Freiburg 1977), 'Monastic and Lay Buddhism in the 1971 Sri Lanka Insurgency' (Religion and Social Conflict in South Asia, ed. Bardwell L. Smith, Leiden 1976), and

Buddhist Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991) - Obituaries

Great Tradition and Little Traditions. Indologica) investigations in cultural anthropology (Varanasi 1978).

Bimal Krishna Matilal (1935 - June 1991)

A Sanskrit scholar and teacher who mastered both Indian and Western logic, B.K. Matilal succumbed to cancer at Oxford. Coming from West Bengal, he read Sanskrit and Indian Philosophy at the University of Calcutta and then studied at Harvard which awarded him a doctorate in 1965. He was thus enabled to lecture at the Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta (until 1970), and at Toronto for the next twelve years before being appointed as Spalding Professor of Eastern Religion and Ethics at Oxford- He was the founder-editor of the Journal of Indian Philosophy (Dordrecht from 1970) which featured many of his writings that 'combined rigorous Western analytical methods and traditional Indian learning'. His full-length works include Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis (The Hague 1971), The Logical Illumination of Indian Mysticism (Oxford 1977), Logical and Ethical Issues of Religious Belief (Calcutta 1982), Logic, Language and Reality (Delhi 1985), Perception. An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge (London 1986), Buddhist Logic and Epistemology (Dordrecht 1986), and co-ed. Sanskrit and Related Studies (Delhi 1991).

Anna Katherina Seidel (31 July 1938 - 29 September 1991)

One of the foremost Western exponents of Taoism, Dr Seidel

died as a result of a viral infection following a liver transplant in a San Francisco hospital.

Born in Berlin, she read Sinology at Munich and Hamburg, between 1958-61, thereafter pursuing a study of the ancient religions of China (especially Taoism) at the Sorbonne under the supervision of Max Kaltenmark and R.A. Stein. Her doctoral dissertation was published with the title La divinisation de Lao-tseu dans le taoisme des Han (EFEO, Paris 1969). From the beginning of 1969 she was attached to the Japanese branch of the Ecole francaise d'Extreme-Orient, in Kyoto, and collaborated with Hubert Durt in producing the French-language Buddhist encyclopaedia, Hobogirin, based on Chinese and Japanese sources, and (from 1985) the 'School's' journal, Cahiers d'Extreme-Asie 1-5 (to which she contributed the definitive 'Chronicle of Taoist Studies in the West 1950-1990' - Vol.5, 1989-90). She helped revise the Repertoire du Canon bouddhique sino-japonaise (Paris-Tokyo 1978) and wrote the following pieces for the Hobogirin: 'Chosamboshin 1 and 'Chujaku' (V, 1979), 'Dabi\ 'Daigo' and 'Daiji' (VI, 1983), and 'Danda', 'Datsueba', 'Dembo', 'Den'e', etc. (to be published in VIII and IX). Other writings include 'Le Sutra merveilleuse du Ling-pao supreme, traitant de Lao tseu qui convertit les bar bares (manuscrit S. 2081) - Contributions a l'etude du Bouddho-taoisme des Six Dynasties* (Contributions aux etudes de Touen-houang III, ed. M. Soymie, EFEO 1984) and 'Henri Maspero' (The Encyclopedia of Religion, ed. M. Eliade, New York 1987).

I m Marvel Pruden (1938 - 30 October 1991)

We very much regret to report the death in Los Angeles of this

specialist in Far Eastern Buddhism. Ordained in Japan as a priest in the Koyasan Shingon-shu (Japanese Tantric) lineage, he was a regular member of the Koyasan branch temple in Los Angeles, where a memorial ceremony was held for him in December 1991.

Pruden graduated from UCLA, then obtained his doctorate from Harvard in 1971, his dissertation consisting of 'The Risshu-koya An Annotated Translation', a Sino-Japanese (Kambun) Vinaya text. He also spent three years at Tokyo University where he studied the Ritsu tradition under Prof, Akira Hirakawa. He taught at the prestigious Brown University (Rhode Island) and Emerson College (Boston) before returning to his home state to teach at the Nyingma Institute and the Institute of Buddhist Studies (both in Berkeley). Between 1976-80 he served as Dean of Academic Affairs at the University of Oriental Studies (Los Angeles). Inaugurated in 1973 as the College of Oriental Studies, it was subsequently upgraded to University and then to American University of Oriental Studies. This was the first institution devoted exclusively to the study of Buddhism and Asian culture and was intended 'to create scholars in Oriental culture, philosophy, psychology, religion and languages and to better understanding between East and West'. M.A. and Ph.D degrees were offered in Buddhist Philosophy, Zen Studies, Comparative Religion, East- West Philosophy and East- West Psychology; BA degrees in Oriental Studies and Buddhist Ministerial Education; as well as Diplomas in Buddhist/Zen Studies. The late Vietnamese Dharma Master, Thich Thien-An, was its Presidentm, under whom Pruden lectured on Buddhism, Tantric Buddhism, Asian Languages (he was fluent in Chinese and Japanese, as well as studying many other languages), Buddhist Chinese, Buddhist Literature and History. In 1981 he became the University's second President, and a Doctor of Dharma course was pioneered

Buddhist Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991) - Obituaries

together with related academic innovations. When not lecturing, Prof. Pruden travelled the world fund-raising for this


According to the Fall Quarter 1981 prospectus, 'Dr Pruden has translated numerous Japanese and Chinese works into English. His publications include articles, translations of Pure Land texts, and a book on Shingon (Japanese Tantric) ritual to be published by the Heian. Press [?]. He has just finished a translation of [Mochizuki's] doctrinal History of Chinese Pure Land Buddhism'. However, the writers of this tribute have only seen his magisterial English translations of the Abhidharmakosa- bhasyam (4 vols, Berkeley 1988-90) - which incorporates in its first volume his seminal essay 'The Abhidharma: The Origins, Growth and Development of a Literary Tradition' -, and of the Karmasiddhiprakarana (Berkeley 1988), from the French versions of, respectively, Louis de La Vallee Poussin and Etienne Lamotte. (He had intended to effect a similar secondary translation of Bhavaviveka's Karatalaratna and was invited to translate at least one text for the Bukkyo Dendo Kyokai's ambitious, and so far unrealised, popular English edition of the Taisho Tripitaka.) He also contributed the entries for 'Gyonen*, 'Koben' and Tien-t'ai' for The Encyclopedia of Religion (ed. Mircea Eliade, New York 1984).

Pruden's relaxed manner apropos academic affairs and his unfailing sense of humour endeared him to colleagues and friends alike and both will miss his vibrant personality.


Buddhist Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991)


Dear Editor,

Whilst appreciating that Karel Werner's piece on Rationality in Early Buddhism in your last issue was mainly concerned with Frank Hoffman's book it seems to me that various of his preliminary and concluding remarks should not pass unchallenged. I can certainly accept that Buddhism is not rational in quite the simplistic way that some imagined earlier this century but we need to bear in mind that nothing is easier than to be irrational about rationality and that views about it have evolved as much as views about Buddhism. In science and philosophy rationality clearly has something to do with responsiveness and consistency in dealing with the available evidence. In politics and religion it also has something to do with the 'art of the possible", i.e. of assessing how far and in what ways opinions can be altered at any given point in time. 'Primitive' Buddhism was obviously subject to inherent constraints in both respects, i.e. it was a non-coercive creed forced to accommodate a range of popular beliefs light-years removed from our own and lacking access to documented history or modern techniques of research. We must judge it in that light

Regarding more specific points in the article I feel bound to question whether the idea of the 'suprarationaT (p.40) does anything more than provide dogmatists with an easy way of undercutting legitimate criticism. As far as I'm concerned all experiences are pre-rational in themselves no matter how trivial or exalted they might be, the function of rationality being to establish coherence and relationship between them.

Nor can I accept that Buddhism is 'not an empiricism* (p.44) simply because it does 'not provide knowledge in the way that

science does' though I agree that the latter point is entirely fair. Gotama rejected reliance on tradition and metaphysical system-building in favour of an experiential progression which he thought could be replicated by others if they pursued his methods. This is surely an attempt to import the outlook of science into religion in a period when science itself was in any case not yet distinguishable from philosophy. Also I fail to see what approach other than radical empiricism could have produced the anatta doctrine.

Much more contentious than any of the above, however, is the charge of 'selective attitudes' directed at some twentieth-century interpreters, and with specific reference to the rebirth dogma. Now this might be read as a rebuke to these who have tried to argue that early Buddhism did not teach rebirth in the normally understood sense, but the following quote suggests rather a quasi-fundamentalist demand for orthodoxy (p.39): '. . . it [i.e. rebirth) is essential to the central doctrine of Buddhism which is the attainment of Nirvana/Nibbana, hardly conceivable as to be established in a single life'.

This statement may be conventionally correct but it completely ignores the gradualist and pragmatic bias of the Nikayas. If the Buddhist Dhamma is found to be more effective than alternatives in the understanding and containment of dukkha that is sufficient reason for embracing it. Whether one or more lives are available for its pursuit and what assumptions can safely be made about any final goal is necessarily of secondary significance. Perhaps Buddhist pundits should learn to apply the parable of the arrow to their own imponderables.

There is, of course, a more common line of argument to support obligatory belief in rebirth, though it is not mentioned

by Dr Werner, This is the view that the doctrine of kamma cannot be maintained without the support of the rebirth idea. A hostile critic might regard such a position as reason for rejecting both but, that aside, it seems to me to rest entirely on the unsupported inference that kamma translates into complete moral determinism. Such support is not to be found in the texts. At M II 214 moral determinism is a standpoint attributed to the Jains and at S IV 230 Gotama's answer to a question as to whether it is also his is a denial accompanied by a list of factors other than 'the ripening of kamma' which contribute to human misfortune. There is also the indirect evidence of debates with brahmans claiming the superiority of their caste. In these moral determinism favours the brahmans because Gotama's insistence that merit depends on behaviour not birth is exactly the kind of distinction that its rationalisations eliminate. I conclude that, in the view of early Buddhism, the human condition can only be partly explained by reference to kamma, in which case the idea can be examined empirically without any assumptions about rebirth.

It is perhaps rather ironic in this connection that Dr Werner states that Ian Stevenson's case histories do not have the 'power of empirical proof (p.47). I agree, but Dr Stevenson has nonetheless produced far and away the best prima facie case for rebirth precisely because he has brought debate about it into the modern world, has sought to apply a rigorously scientific methodology throughout, and has no idealogical axe to grind. By comparison Buddhist traditionalists seem to have very largely backed themselves into a corner with the aid of a metaphysical house-of-cards which cannot make any concessions to critics without collapsing altogether.

Sincerely David Evans


pa* Sramanvaphflla-Sutra. Synoptische Ubersetzung und Glossar der chinesischen Fassungen verglichen mit dem Sanskrit und Pali. Konrad Meisig (Freiburger Beitrage zur Indologie 19) Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 1987. ix, 625 pp. DM 58.

Among the manuscripts which were discovered in Gilgit in 1931 were folios which N.N. Dutt was able to identify as part of the Mulasarvastivadin Vinaya Pitaka. A small number of these belonged to the Sahghabhedavastu, which Dutt labelled the Sramanya-phala-sutra (Gilgit Manuscripts, Vol.111, part IV, Calcutta 1950, p.xxii), because of its resemblance to the Pali Samannaphalasutta, although it is not so entitled in the Sanskrit. The missing folios of the Sahghabhedavastu were subsequently found and the whole text was edited by R. Gnoli (The Gilgit Manuscript of the Sahghabhedavastu, Parts I & II, Rome 1977-78). Dr Meisig has now produced a synoptical German translation of three Chinese versions of this text, accompanied by critical footnotes, and an extensive glossary (pp.380-625).

One of the Chinese versions comes from the Dirghagama of the Dharmaguptakas, the second from the Ekottaragama of an unknown sect, while the third is an independent work, also of unknown affiliation. To his translations of these Meisig prefixes the Sanskrit version, in an unchanged reprint of the relevant portion of Gnoli's edition, and a Pali version which is a new edition made on the basis of the published recensions and the variant readings quoted in their footnotes. To this new edition is added what appears to be an impressive critical apparatus. On examination, it turns out to be a collection of the

Buddhist Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991) - Reviews

divergent readings of the Pali Text Society's edition (= Ee), the Burmese Chatthasahgayana edition (= Be), the Sinhalese Buddha Jayanti Tripitaka Series edition ( = Ce), the Nalanda-Devanagarf-Pali Series edition (= Ne), and two Siamese editions of 1893-4 and 1958 Se and Se3), with the footnotes from all those editions, even going so far as to include their misprints, e.g. niriyasete which Ne alleges Ee reads at D I 54,7 (it actually reads niriyasate). As Ne, in all but a handful of cases, is a repetition of Be, there is usually no point in quoting its readings. Since the footnotes to several of the Oriental editions consist of references to divergent readings in other traditions, much of what is quoted is repetition, We find, for example, on p.110 (ad D I 50,14) where Meisig's text has pattiko, the footnote: padiko va Se Se3 Ne (sya [Meisig consistently prints the abbreviation in this form instead of sya which Ne actually uses, and similarly si instead of si]) Be (sya [ditto]). All this means is that the two Siamese editions read padiko, and the editors of Ne and Be have noted this fact. Even more absurd, we find, for example, on p.348 (ad D I 81,29, 31) where Ee reads agahcirrL, the footnote; agahcim Ee Ne (ro), which means that the editor of Ne has noticed that Ee ('RotmanD reads agancim. There seems little point in including such unnecessary information.

In his critical apparatus on p.137 Meisig refers to the divergent opinions of Bechert and the present reviewer about the nominative singular forms in -e which occur in Makkhali Gosala's account of his own philosophy, and the differing views of Hinuber and Vogel about the difficult word patuva at D I 54^0, but for the most part he says nothing about the reasons behind his choice of readings in the edition of the Pali text which he has produced. It would, for example, have been interesting to know why on p.122 of his edition he reads

pucchittho in D I 51,22, but pucchita in 51,24. It is clear that since both words are constructed with the verb abhijdnati *to remember, recall', the form should be the same in both cases. Prof, von Hinuber has, in fact, shown ('Pali as an artificial language', in Indoiogica Taurinensia X (1982), pp!33-40) that the correct form is the non-Pali absolutive in -no, which Meisig lists as a variant, but dismisses as a w(rong) Keading).

It is possible that von Hiniiber's article apeared too late for Meisig to take account of it, although it should have been possible to insert the necessary reference to it when the dissertation was being prepared for the press. Meisig notes (p.viii) that his work on the Sramanyaphalasutra was finished early in 1984, and he has not taken account of anything published thereafter. Later that year Prof. G. MacQueen of McMaster University published an article entitled 'The doctrines of the six heretics according to the Sramanyaphala Sutra' Undo- Iranian Journal 27 (1984), pp.291-307). This was based largely on the portion of his 1978 Harvard dissertation (entitled

  • A Study of the Sramanyaphala Sutra', and quite unknown to Meisig) which studied the section of the Sutra dealing with the teachings of the six heretics. It is clear from that article, in which MacQueen states that he translated into English the three Chinese versions used by Meisig and also the Chinese translation of the Mulasarvastivadin version, that the two dissertations deal with the text in different ways, complementing each other rather than overlapping. It is good to know that MacQueen's dissertation has also been published, since the appearance of both in print will be a great help towards the study of this very

important text

K.R. Norman

A Study of the Sramanyaphala-Siitra. Graeme MacQueen. (Freiberger Beitrage zur Indologie 21). Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 1988. vii, 307 pp. DM 68.

In the foregoing review of Konrad Meisig's Das Sramanyaphala-Siitra, the present reviewer noted that the author had taken no account of Prof. MacQueen's dissertation on the same text. It is good to see the latter has now appeared in print.

Seven versions of the Sramanyaphalasutra exist, in part or in whole. Only the Pali edition and two of the Chinese versions are called 'The fruit of the sramana's life', although references to the work in the traditions of other schools indicate that this was its correct name. The Pali Samannaphalasutta is part of the Theravada DIghanikaya; the Sanskrit version is part of the Sahghabhedavastu of the Mulasarvastivadin Vinaya, as is the Tibetan recension and one of the four Chinese versions. Chapter I of the book describes these versions, and gives translations of the relevant portions of the Sanskrit and the four Chinese versions. In these extracts MacQueen has decided (p.29) to give the Indian technical terms in their Sanskrit form, since there is no way of telling what the particular form of the Prakrit(s) underlying these Chinese recensions might have been. This decision, however, leads to a situation whereby those acquainted with Pali will be surprised to read (p.121) that the Pali edition states that the event occurred on the posadha of the fifteenth day.

Chapter II aims to determine the relationships between these various versions, and to reconstruct the ancient text which may be thought to underlie the Sramanyaphalasutra text family, although MacQueen makes it clear (p.U6) that he is not claiming that his reconstruction of this version is identical with the

earliest form that the text ever had. To this end, he divides the Sutra up into its component portions (the opening formula, the beginning of the narrative, the journey to the Buddha, the meeting between King Ajatasatru and the Buddha, the king's question and the Buddha's reply, etc.), and considers the relevant section, if it exists, of each of the seven versions.

It is clear that there are considerable differences in the order in which the six heretical teachers are introduced in the various recensions, and in the doctrines ascribed to each of them, and MacQueen devotes much of this chapter to an investigation of these problems, checking his deductions against the evidence available to us from other sources. In view of the attacks upon the Pali version of the Buddhist Canon which have become more common in recent years (p.167), it is very interesting to observe that he comes to the conclusion (already made known in his article, 'The doctrines of the six heretics according to the Sramanyaphala Sutra', op. cit) that the version of 'The visit to the Six Heretics' to be found in the Pali Samannaphalasutta comes closest to his postulated ancient text, although it is by no means identical with it. He further concludes (p.189) that the results arrived at for this section are representative of the general situation regarding the text as a whole, and the Pali version is to be regarded as the most archaic of our seven texts. This view is supported by the fact that the Pali version seems to have been closed to additions at an earlier date than the others, some of which contain details found in Pali only in Buddhaghosa's Commentary, a state of

affairs to which the present reviewer has also drawn attention 1 . MacQueen notes, however, that any reasonable solution to the affiliation problems of the versions would have to accept that borrowing had taken place between the various traditions (p,195), which would seem to indicate that monks were sometimes acquainted with texts of other sects.

Although the long section of the Sutra dealing with the rise of a Buddha and the training of a sramana who has gone forth in faith, culminating in the destruction of the asravas and his victory over rebirth, seems to be ancient, MacQueen ignores it, on the grounds that it is not uniquely connected with the Sramanyaphalasutra. He points out that, although the section is related at length in the Pali version of the Sutra, being merely abbreviated elsewhere, this is because that is the first sutra in the Dighanikaya in which it occurs. In the Chinese Dirghagama it is similarly dealt with at length in the first sutra in which it occurs, which, because of the different order of sutras, is not the Sramanyaphalasutra.

Chapter III deals with themes and thematic change, examining the changes which have taken place in the meaning of the Sutra and the way in which they have come about. The study is put into the context of Hinayana canonical literature as a whole, so that it makes a contribution to our understanding of early Buddhism in general. Variations in the story of the Buddha's mastery as a teacher and his conversion of the parricide Ajatasatru demonstrate a developing divinisation of the Buddha, whereby Ajatasatru shows respect for the Buddha at an

1 See K.R. Norman, 'Four etymologies from the Sabhtya-suita', in Sornaratna Balasooriya et al. (eds) Buddhist Studies in honour of Walpola Rahula, London 1980. P pl73-84 lp.1781

early stage of their meeting and has no need to test him. MacQueen shows that the Sramanyaphalasutra also deals with the theme of prasada 'peace (of mind)', for it is Ajatasatru's mental turmoil and his desire for release from it that sends him on his visit to the Buddha. The emphasis upon this theme varies from text to text, and is particularly strong in onfe of the Chinese versions, which is entitled 'the fruits of one intent on tranquillity' instead of '. . .the sramana's life'. It seems likely that this translation is based, to some extent, upon a misunderstanding of the Prakrit samana, which was assumed to be from samana 'calmness', rather than from sramana. The greatest change of all is to be found in the version in the Chinese Ekottaragama, where the importance of the change from external mastery to inward mastery which typifies the activities of a sramana is greatly reduced and emphasis is laid instead upon the idea that meritorious action brings reward here and now. It seems clear that this change is due to an affiliation of the Chinese Ekottaragama with Mahayana teachings, probably because the text was actually transmitted by Mahayanists.

The book is reproduced from the typescript of MacQueen's Ph.D. thesis. Other than the removal of the summary and the title page of the thesis, it shows no change from that work (except for the mysterious moving of one line on p.269). The occasional misprint in the original has not been corrected, nor has the Bibliography been brought up to date. There is, for example, no reference to MacQueen's own article in the Indo-lranian Journal, mentioned above. MacQueen laments [p.14] the non-appearance of a portion of the Sanskrit version. This has since been published (in 1978) and does indeed constitute a whole with the previously known portion. The relevant portion of the text is reprinted in Konrad Meisig's

book, which is also omitted from MacQueen's Bibliography. Only the briefest note on the reverse of the title page tells the observant reader that this work was completed over ten years ago.

In this book MacQueen has shown what can be gathered from a detailed comparative study of a single text. Taken with Meisig's work, which complements MacQueen's rather than overlaps it, it enables a critical study of the Sramanyaphalasutra to be made, which sheds light not only upon the history of the text itself, but upon the history of Buddhism as a whole during the early centuries of its existence.

K.R. Norman

The Discnu rse on the Fruits of Recluseship. The Samanhaphala Sutta and its Commentaries. Bhikkhu Bodhi (tr.). Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy 1989. xi, 191 pp. US$ 10.

This is the fourth of Bhikkhu Bodhi's translations of individual suttas from the Pali Canon. Whereas translations by other scholars contain, at best, occasional extracts from the atthakatha in the footnotes, or include portions of the commentarial exegesis in the body of the work, this book has the merit that it contains not only the translation of the canonical text itself but also translations of very extensive quotations from the atthakatha, the old tlka upon the text and a more recent tlka.

The Sutta tells of the visit paid to the Buddha by King Ajatasattu and of his question: 'Is it possible to point to any visible fruits of the samana's life?' Before answering the question, the Buddha asks if Ajatasattu had asked the same question of anyone else. Ajatasattu states that he has done so, and recounts his visits to the six heterodox teachers who were

the Buddha's contemporaries. Each of them, when asked the same question, had failed to answer it, but had merely given a brief account of his own doctrines. The Buddha then sets about answering the question himself. He points out fourteen fruits of the samana's life, the first two being tangible and temporal. He then proceeds to the twelve higher fruits, the four jhanas and the eight cognitive achievements known as vijja. Of these, six are the abhihnds and the other two are insight knowledge (vipassanahana) and the knowledge of the mind-made body. Prefixed to these twelve higher fruits is the description of the course of training which is the cause of their attainment, starting with the arising of a Tathagata and the gaining of faith in him, which leads to the entrance into homelessness. The course culminates in the knowledge of the destruction of the asavas, i.e. the attainment of Arahantship, which is the ultimate fruit of the samana's life. At the close of the discourse, Ajatasattu declares himself a follower of the Buddha by going to the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sangha for refuge.

After a brief introduction (pp.1-15), Bhikkhu Bodhi gives the complete translation of the Sutta (pp.16-51), supplying the paragraph numbers of the PTS edition of D I to facilitate cross-reference to the text, although, for reasons wich are not explained, he occasionaly departs from the PTS numbering, either running paragraphs together or sub-dividing them so that the paragraph numbers sometimes differ by one, and very occasionally by two. He then gives the commentarial exegesis on the Sutta (pp.52-185), dealing with it portion by portion, translating the atthakatha, and the purana-tlka upon that, and occasionally the abhinava-tika as well, but omitting the grammatical portions of the Commentaries and at times abridging some of the less important 'scene-setting' paragraphs. On occasion he expands the translation, but does not always

make it clear that he is doing so. So, for example, he expands (p.35) the long lists in the Sutta (§ 56) of single words specifying wrong modes of livelihood, etc., by incorporating the explanations given in the Commentary. Similarly, he sometimes expands the translation of the latter by incorporating material from the tlka.

He states that his aim is to include 'everything of fundamental doctrinal or political importance, while omitting the less relevant digressions as well as the copious grammatical and etymological clarifications which have no meaning for an English reader'. While accepting that this is probably true of the average non-technical English reader, it does not necessarily apply to anyone who is sufficiently interested in the Buddha's teaching to wish to read the original Pali of the Sutta and to refer to the Commentary for an explanation of some of the grammatical problems which the text offers. Such a person will find Bhikkhu Bodhi's work gives little help with the translation of commentarial explanations. It is true that these portions are difficult to express in anything like intelligible English, but the fact that it can be done is shown by Bhikkhu Nanamoli's various translations and the rendering of the Dhammapada-atthakatha by Palihawadana and Carter. In fact, despite Bhikkhu Bodhi's statement, he does include some of Buddhaghosa's etymological speculations, eg. pp.172, 173 note, 180.

There are already two complete translations of the Drghanikaya into English, the older one by T.W. Rhys Davids and the more recent one by Maurice Walshe. Rhys Davids' translation of the Sutta is good, but his English is somewhat archaic and occasionally ponderous. Walshe is more up to date, sometimes more accurate, but occasionally he seems to avoid a difficulty, intentionally or otherwise, by paraphrasing slightly. If there are verbal reminiscences of both Rhys Davids and Walshe

in Bhikkhu Bodhi's version it is not surprising, since he states that he consulted both of these, inter alia. The differences between the three versions are not great and can be described as variations of presentation, rather than content

Since both translations were consulted, it is strange that occasionally Bhikkhu Bodhi chooses the interpretation which seems less likely. Thus, in the description of Nigantha Nataputta's doctrines, he translates the four restraints, each one of which contains the word vari, as 'restrained with regard to all water'; 'endowed with the avoidance of evil'; 'cleansed by the avoidance of all evil'; 'suffused with the avoidance of all evil'. In these interpretations he is following Rhys Davids, who was in turn following Buddhaghosa. It seems unlikely, however, that when each restraint contains the word van, it should be used in one of them in the sense of 'water', while in the other three it is to be taken as the equivalent of varana ('restraint'). Walshe would seem to be more correct in translating all four occurrences as 'curb'. It cannot be that Bhikkhu Bodhi is over-awed by the Commentary, since in § 41 he follows Rhys Davids in differing from Buddhaghosa's construing of a


Such minor points apart, Bhikkhu Bodhi's translation is to be recommended as being both accurate and readable, and we look forward to his next translation of a Pali sutta.

K.R. Norman

Das Sutra vo n Hrn vier Standen. Das Aggahiia-Sutta im Licht seiner chinesischen Paralleled Konrad Meisig. (Freiburger Beitrage zur Indologie 20), Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 1988. ix, 249 pp. DM 44.

The systematic comparison of selected Pali suttas with corresponding versions in Chinese or other languages continues to produce valuable results. The Aggannasutta (D 27) has three separate Chinese parallels, referred to here as DA (the Chinese Dirghagama text), MA {the Chinese Madhyamagama text) and E (the Chinese independent text (=Einzeltext)). Since D (the Pali text) seems clearly to be an amalgam of somewhat disparate elements, the comparison is in this case exceptionally fruitful. The two elements concern, respectively, the origin of things in general and the origin of the four castes or classes.

In the English summary (p.67) it is said: The Buddha's word (buddhavacana) is not preserved in its pure form. The Buddhist canons consist of many heterogeneous layers. Most of these layers are of secondary origin. They were invented by later redactors. These add i tons should be recognised and eliminated by comparing the parallel versions of a text'. This is the task undertaken by Dr Meisig. He has performed his task of sifting skilfully, and though I have no Chinese, I feel that his handling of the Chinese material is trustworthy, and the Chinese-Pali-German glossary (pp. 171-235) inspires total confidence despite this reviewer's inability to make a serious attempt to check it. The transcription used, incidentally, is not the now fashionable Pinyin but follows Unger's Einjuhrung in das kiassische Chinesisch (1985), which is close to the familiar Wade-Giles. My only reservation in principle concerns Meisig's statement that most of the heterogeneous layers in the texts were 'invented by later redactors'. While this may be so, it is at least possible that some were introduced from parallel branches of the tradition of no less authenticity than those elements that are common to all versions (some of which, conversely, could also be redactorial inventions!). This consideration, however, does not invalidate the work of sifting undertaken here.

Meisig's work in this particular text-complex is really a re-examination and continuation of the work of Ulrich Schneider (Indo-iranian Journal 1 (1957), pp.253-85) on the basis of a literary analysis of the content of the Pali Aggannasutta alone. Schneider's main contention was that the cosmogony (aggahha) to which the Pali sutta owes its name was not in fact included in the original text. The basic research is summarised in the long chapter, pp.1-66, somewhat curiously designated Einleitung. The other two main parts of the work are the Synopse (pp.73 (after the English summary) -169, and the above mentioned glossary, followed by a bibliography (pp.241-9). The Einleitung is in four parts: Textkritik, Uterarkritik, Form- kritik and Redaktionskritik. A first sifting showed that the tradition falls into two groups: DA + MA (from a common source 'x') and D + E (from a common source 'y'). The assumed archetype dates from a period before the splitting up into schools (DA is from the Dharmaguptakas and MA from the Sarvastivadins, while the school to which E belongs is uncertain). DA is held to represent the nearest approach to the archetype, while MA has been 'contaminated' from a 'y' source.

Using the sophisticated tools of critical analysis, Dr Meisig makes out a good case in support of Schneider's contention that the cosmogonic section was indeed at an early (pre-Asokan) stage introduced into a discourse dealing with the four estates. The conclusion that the Sutra 'establishes the social relevance of the "Four Noble Truths". It rejects the Brahmanical ideology of varna and announces an ethic of salvation for everybody' is true if unexciting. We have here, then, another example to show that by about 250 BCE the Canon was already (or still) in a state of flux. Of course a totally (or almost totally) fixed Canon in the form of the Pali Tipitaka only came into being somewhat later in Ceylon. This, however, applies only to the form of the

Buddhist Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991) - Reviews

teaching, and docs not necessarily militate against the claim of the Theravada school to have preserved the content faithfully (which it demonstrably did better than the Sarvastivadins). When it comes to the discussion of Buddhist origins, this point is well worth bearing in mind.

The English summary is a useful aid in following the sometimes involved argument, even for readers who have no trouble with German. It is a pity, though, that Dr Meisig, with such a brilliant command of Chinese, Sanskrit and Pali, could not have put it in better English. He should have had some help with this.

Maurice Walshe Extended Mahavarpsa. Ed. G.P. Malalasekera, Pali Text Society, Oxford 1988. Iviii, 380 pp. £12.25.

In articles in JRAS 1902 and JPTS 1902-3, Edmund Hardy gave information about an enlarged version of the Mahavamsa (covering the. same period of time as, but twice the length of, the Mahavamsa which Tumour had edited in 1837), which he had discovered in the Bibliotheque Nationale. It was written in Cambodian script and ascribed to a monk named Moggallana. Wilhelm Geiger later discovered another copy of the text in Cambodian characters in the Colombo Museum, and made use of both manuscripts when preparing his new edition of the Mahavamsa in 1908.

When G.P. Malalasekera was preparing his edition of the Mahavamsa-tika, Geiger sent him transcripts of these manuscripts, and when Malalasekera later suggested the desirability of publishing the work, Geiger supported the proposal. The edition, based on these two manuscripts and three others which has come to light, appeared in 1937 as Volume in of the Aluvihara Series of the Royal Asiatic Society (Ceylon Branch). Although all the manuscripts were in Cambodian

Buddhist Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991) - Reviews

characters, or acknowledged to be copies of Cambodian

manuscripts, Malalasekera, rightfully fearful of prejudicing the

study of the author and origin of the text, preferred to give it

the name 'Extended Mahavamsa', rather than 'Cambodian

Mahavamsa'. In a lengthy introduction he considered the

relationship between this text and the Mahavamsa,

Mahavamsa-tika, and other chronicle texts. He came to the

conclusion that the author of the Extended Mahavamsa did not

have a copy before him of the Mahavamsa, but both works

borrowed from a common source or sources. The author did,

however, have access to the Mahavamsa-tika, and in many

passages the Extended Mahavamsa is merely a versification of

the corresponding passages of that work.

Malalasekera's edition has been out of print for many years.

Finding that the RAS (Sri Lanka Branch) had no plans to reprint

it, the PTS requested, and were given, permission to publish a

reprinted edition. Malalasekera was forced to leave many

questions, including the authorship, date and provenance,

unanswered. Since he wrote, more information has become

available about the history of Pali works in South and

South-East Asia, and it is hoped that the re-appearance of this

text will awaken interest in, and perhaps lead to a solution of,

these and other problems.

K.R. Norman

ThR Mahasud nrsanavadana and The Mahasiidarsanasutra, Hisashi Matsumura. Bibliotheca Indo-Buddhica 47 (Sri Satguru Publica- tions), Indian Books Centre, Delhi 1988. Ivii, 142 pp. Rs.350.

Among the Sanskrit manuscripts discovered in Gilgit in 1931 were several examples of the Avadana (Pali Apadana) type of

literature. In 1980 Hisashr Matsumura successfully submitted a study of four of these Gilgit Avadanas (Mandhatavadana, Mahasudarsanavadana, Candraprabhavadana and Visvantaravadana), prepared under the supervision of Prof. J.W. de Jong, for the Ph.D. degree at the Australian National University, Canberra. His particular choice of texts was made because they all have Tibetan and Chinese parallels, which greatly assist in the establishment of the Sanskrit text. The Mahasudarsanavadana has two parallels in the Ksudrakavastu and the Bhaisajyavastu of the Mulasarvastivada Vinayavastu, and also another Sanskrit parallel text in the Central Asian Sarvastivada Mahasudarsanasutra which forms a portion of the Sanskrit Mahaparinirvanasutra (in the Pali DIghanikaya the Mahasudassanasutta is a separate text). In his 1980 study Matsumura gave copious references to these parallel versions in his notes.

In the work under review Matsumura has reproduced his edition of the Gilgit text, while on the facing page he has presented an edition of the Central Asian version of the Mahasudarsana text, with the notes at the end. Not only is this arrangement easier for the reader, since the readings of the Central Asian manuscripts do not have to be sought amidst the whole critical apparatus as in the earlier work, but it enables Matsumura to include in footnotes on each page transliterations of all fragments of the Mahaparinirvansutra, including some new fragments which were not available to Waldschmidt when he published his edition of that text. The variant readings in the fragments from Central Asia are such that it is not possible to amalgamate them together and produce a collated text, which justifies Matsumura's adoption of such a method of presentation. He expresses the view that a comparable method will become prevalent in other cases where it proves impossible to reconstruct the prototype of any text

In the first of two appendices the versions of the Mahasudarsana story as it appears in the Tibetan translations of the Bhaisjyavastu and Ksudrakavastu are given on facing pages. The second appendix gives the very truncated version of the Mahasudarsana story which appears in the Sanskrit version of the Bhaisajyavastu, also found in Gilgit. There is a list of abbreviations and an index of Sanskrit words which are discussed in the notes. In an addendum a recently identified .fragment of a Mahasudarsanasutra manuscript, too small to give any new information, is edited. At the end of the book four charts give information about the condition of the extant Central Asian manuscripts, and the relationship between the Mahasudarsanasutra and the Mahaparinirvanasutra.

A portion of the extensive introduction to this book is devoted to a discussion of the relationship between the various versions of the Mahasudarsana text. It is clear that despite all the study which has been devoted to this text, many problems still remain to be solved about the differences in the order of episodes in the various versions. All those who are interested in the relationship between the various Hinayana schools and their literature will be grateful to Dr Matsumura for the very painstaking way in which he has set out the available Sanskrit and Tibetan material for the further study of the Mahasudarsana story.

KM. Norman

Journal of the, Pali Text Society XII. Pali Text Society, Oxford 1988. v, 217 pp. £12.25.

Although the JPTS does not aim to be an annual publication,

nevertheless the editor had collected enough material of a publishable standard to be able to produce Volume XII within a year of the appearance of Volume XL

As befits the Council's decision that the Journal should publish short Pali texts, translations, and commentaries on texts, catalogues and handlists of Pali books and manuscripts, and similar material, the greater part of this volume (pp.65-168) is devoted to a translation by Ann Appleby Hazlewood of the Saddhammopayana, the text of which appeared almost exactly one hundred years ago in the Journal for 1887. In another article Dr Supaphan Na Bangchang reproduces (pp.185-212) the text of a letter written in Pali by the Aggamahasenapati of Siam to the royal court at Kandy in 1756 as part of an exchange of missions and letters following an appeal from Ceylon to Siam for help in religious matters. She prefixes to the letter a summary in English. A related article by Prof. O. von Hinuber (pp.175-83) considers, and identifies where possible, the list of texts which are said in that letter to have been sent from Siam to Ceylon because there was such a lack of Dhamma texts in the island. He shows that although they are said to number ninety-seven, there seem in fact to be only seventy-five different texts, some of them quite unknown at the present time. The same author adds a short additional note (pp.173-4) on the oldest dated manuscript of the Milindapanha, which formed the subject of an article he contributed to JPTS Vol.XI.

Prof. Sodo Mori contributes an article (pp.1-47) on the Uttaviharatthakatha and Samasasara (based on his 'Study of the Pali Commentaries', published in Japanese in 1984), examining at length all the references in the Pali Commentaries to these two sources, which seem not to belong to the Mahavihara tradition in Ceylon. There is a set of lexicographical studies (pp.49-63) by the present reviewer, and two notes by Prof. R. Gombrich on

points arising in Chapter IX of the Visuddhimagga (pp.169-71).

The volume ends with notices from the Council of the Society inviting suitable people to apply for the Society's Research Fellowships in Pali Studies, and from the Editor soliciting suitable articles, preferably in camera-ready form, for publication in further numbers of the Journal.

KJl. Norman

The Ideas and Meditative Practices of Early Buddhism. Tilmann Vetter. EJ. Brill, Leiden 1988. xxxviii, 110 pp. Df 1.42.50.

Reading this book has been a frustrating experience. On the one hand, here is an obviously earnest scholar who has worked his way through a vast corpus of canonical material (not only in Pali, but also in Sanskrit, both hybrid and classical, and Chinese) in order to get as accurate an idea as possible, through textual analysis and interpretation, of the earliest teachings and practices of Buddhism. On the other hand, the final result of all this effort and learning is rather less than enlightening.

This is a slim volume, but working one's way through it can be an exhausting task. Time and again one finds oneself struggling with opaque or confusing statements, sometimes because of the language they are couched in, sometimes because of the lack of detailed enough substantive back-up (in the form of references, quotations, etc.) for them.

Some of the discomfort, certainly, is due to the poor English translation, and that is not the author's fault. The Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), with whose financial assistance the book was translated, did not get very much value for their money. Every now and then there Is a good enough approximation to common English usage but, for

the most part, syntax, vocabulary and style are generally far from idiomatic, and not infrequently downright wrong 1 . This does not make for easy reading.

The main difficulty, however, lies in the manner of exposition. At first sight, this appears to be a highly structured study, starting with an 'Outline of the most ancient form of Buddhism 1 and following up with chapters on 'Dhyana-Meditation' (which covers the four rupa jhanas, or formal absorptions; incidentally, why *dhyana' and not 'jhana', since the book is supposed to deal primarily with the Pali Canon?), 'Discriminating Insight' (i.e. the way of vipassana, or insight meditation), 'Sphere-Meditation* (the four arupa jhanas, or formless absorptions, and 'Karma* 2 .

Unfortunately, this promising framework is filled out in a decidedly patchy manner. There are problems, as already mentioned, resulting from the scarcity of detailed material for

1 Examples can be found on every page, but here are just a few by way of illustration: 'But is there also a logical ground for this feeling? It is.' (pjcxx). ". . .the Anattapariyaya, which even more unlikely was preached at the first encounter. . .' p.36). 'At a fast day he advises them to collect food. , .* (p.97). '. . . the sentence obviously added. . . does not have had to play a role. , .' (p30). 'In the Mahapadana suila, which does not seem to be composed before Asoka. . .' (pp.99-100). 'Because the text. . . does not enter upon this point, it seems permissible to look for an explanation at other places in the canon' (pll). 'In later times an earnest wish is assumed to do more with good karma than only make such a choice between possibilities that could anyway result from one's karma' p.99, n.21).

2 Plus an appendix on 'Mysticism in the Atthakavagga'. which, as the author informs us. is a portion of an earlier learned paper on the older parts of the Sutta Pitaka.

some of the interpretations or suggestions put forward. The autrjpr is quite aware of this, and pleads for forbearance at the very beginning of the 'Preface': "Not many details are discussed as the book is still intended to be an introduction to early Buddhism. I hope that Buddhist scholars will accept this limitation and concentrate on the main lines* (p.vii).

All the same, when rather speculative conclusions are introduced by conjectural terms such as 'presumably', 'we may assume', 'probably', 'very likely' and so on 3 , a minimum of underpinning is clearly desirable. In fact, evidence is supplied with regard to certain points, but not to others that need it just as much. There is an unevenness here which extends also to the organisation and discussion of the material, so that at times I had difficulty in following the argument. This, of course, may well be my fault rather than the author's. But an introduction to a subject should surely aim at maximum clarity of exposition.

Actually, a lot of the difficulties are probably due to the genesis of the book. The author's 'original intention was to introduce university students to the ideas and meditative practices of early Buddhism' (p.vii). What we have here, then, would seem to have been, initially, a sort of working manual, presumably for the use of the author's own students and under his guidance. Used in this kind of context, i.e. as an educational aid, the manual proved no doubt perfectly useful, as any gaps or uncertainties could easily be dealt with, and additional information supplied, orally by the author in the course of normal university tuition. Problems arose only when the author decided that 'it seemed worth the effort to bring the results of this attempt to the attention of Buddhologists outside the

3 e.g. ppxxxiii, 63, 68, 70, 77, 81, 87, 88, 93.

Netherlands by translating it into English' (p.vii). This meant a change of target readership and a change of language. On both counts, the translation has not been a success. As regards the language, the serious shortcomings of the translation have already been pointed out. As for the substance, whatever recasting did take place for the benefit of fellow Buddhologists outside the Netherlands was clearly not comprehensive enough.

Vetter takes as his starting point the studies of Frauwallner and Schmithausen 4 and 'to avoid making things too complicated', he concentrates on 'only three of the most striking tenets analysed by Schmithausen' (p.xxi). Incidentally, Vetter's repeated use of the word 'tenets' (with its philosophical and dogmatic connotations) is symptomatic of a tendency in which he is far from being alone among Buddhologists without direct personal experience of the practices taught by the Buddha: a tendency to consider the Buddha's teachings as a set of theoretical philosophical principles (tenets) rather than as pragmatically oriented instructions for psychological action.

But to return to Vetter's argument. The three 'tenets' are three soteriological paths, and the main thrust of the discussion runs, as far as I can see, something like this:

Path No.l is 'dhyana-meditation' (i.e. the practice of tranquillity, samatha), involving the four formal absorptions (rupa jhana). This would seem to be the earliest Buddhist way of salvation and was based originally on the sole practice of the Noble Eightfold Path (being the applied exercise of the middle

4 E. Frauwallner, Geschichte der indischen PkUosophie I (Salzburg 1953) and L. Schmithausen, 'On some Aspects of Descriptions or Theories of "Liberating Insight" and "Enlightenment"', in Studien turn Jainismus und Buddhismus (Wiesbaden 1981),

way between sensual pleasure and self-mortification). The Four Noble Truths would have been added somewhat later as a theoretical framework to the experience of right samadhi, the goal and culmination of the Eightfold Path. Subsequently, the realisation of at least one of the three kinds of special knowledge (i.e. knowledge of recollection of past lives, knowledge of the passing away and reappearance of creatures in various worlds, and knowledge of the Four Noble Truths) as a condition of enlightenment would have been added as well (pp.xxi, xxiii-xxxii).

A further development (Path No. 2) of the 'dhyana-meditation' tradition can, thinks the author, 'be dismissed as not having been taught by the Buddha, at least not in an early period of his long career as a teacher' (pjtxii). This consisted in the addition to the 'dhyana' path of the four formless absorptions (arupa jhana) culminating in the cessation of all perception and feeling (sanndvedayitanirodha). Vetter recognises that this 'does not seem to be an ancient Buddhist {his underlining] means of finding salvation' (p.xxii).

Path No.3, the way of 'discriminating insight' (i.e. vipassana) would seem to have emerged somewhat later than the first 'dhyana-meditation' path (although still going back to very early times) and was related to the formulation of the twelvefold chain of Dependent Origination (paticcasamuppdda) and the realisation of non-self (anattdl 'One is freed from all desire - and thereby later from rebirth and suffering - when, with

Buddhist Studies Review 8. 1-2 (1991) - Reviews

discriminating insight (P. pariha 5 ) one segments oneself [my emphasis] in [sic] five constituents and recognises each as being transient and therefore suffering, i.e. unsatisfactory, and, consequently, as not worthy of being called self or mine' (pp.xxi-xxii). (Note here again the self-defeating conceptualisating tendency already seen above in connection with the term 'tenets': to say that, in insight meditation, one 'segments oneslf into five constituents, implying an exercise in intellectual analysis, is to miss the whole point, i.e. that the meditator actually observes the aggregates as experiential data, and that it is precisely this choiceless observation that has a salutary effect).

Always according to the author, in the soteriology of 'dhyana-meditation', from its earliest to its late form, liberation is achieved through the destruction of the cankers (asavakkhaya, viz. sense desire, desire for existence and ignorance; later 'views' was added as a fourth canker), whilst the way of 'discriminating insight' leads to liberation through freedom from desire. The two methods are essentially distinct, though attempts were made, in the course of time, to combine them into an integrated system Vetter agrees that perhaps the oldest method in the practice of insight 'was to use dhyana-meditation. . . in aid of the path of discriminating insight' (p.xxxv). What he fails to recognise is that the Buddha's distinctive contribution lay precisely in the development of mindfulness (sati) to achieve insight (vipassana), and that the combination of samatha and vipassana was altogether the

5 This is not the only example of confusingly idiosyncratic translation in this book. Panna is, of course, wisdom, and Insight (vipassana) the means of achieving it.

earliest typically Buddhist meditative practice.

It is by now generally agreed that samatha meditation altogether (and not just the formless absorptions, as Vetter suggests in his path No.2) is, taken by itself, a clearly pre-Buddhist technique. It is only when used as a preparation or adjuvant for the development of insight that it becomes integrated into the Buddhist path. As I have suggested before 6 , the long-standing debate as to the relative importance of tranquillity (samatha) and insight (vipassana) practices for the achievement of liberation is a largely unnecessary one. The weight of informed opinion among authors who are both textual scholars and expert practitioners is that the jhanas, by themselves, do not lead to the supramundane states of stream-entry and subsequent stages. What must be borne in mind in this connection is the crucial distinction (most lucidly made by Ven. Henepola Gunaratana in his fundamental study of the subject 7 between 'mundane* jhanas - which are the ones addressed in discussions of this kind - and 'supramundane' jhanic states, i.e. the levels of absorption at which the paths and fruits occur 8 . It is the confusion between these two that has generated so much argument.

Since Gunaratana's study, and Prof. King's notable one on the relationship between pre-Buddhist and Buddhist meditation 9 ,

6 BSR 5, 1 (1988), p.74. 7 The Path of Serenity and Insight. An Explanation of the Buddhist Jhanas (Delhi 1985). 8 op. cf„ pp.212-13. 9 Tkeravada Meditation. The Buddhist Transformation of Yoga. Winston L. King (The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park and London 1980).

there is, I submit, little room for argument and confusion on the issues which are of central concern to Dr Vetter. Unfortunately, he has not taken either of these two basic works into account

Amadeo Sole-Leris

Theravada Buddhism, A Social History from Ancient Times to Modern Colombo. Richard F, Gombrich. Routledge, London 1988L x, 237 pp. Hbk £20.00, pbk £7.95.

On pp.5-6 the author, in beginning his justification for writing a social history of Buddhism, quotes Gibbon: 'The theologian may indulge the pleasing task of describing Religion as she descended from Heaven, arrayed in her native purity. A more melancholy duty is imposed on the historian. He must discover the inevitable mixture of error and corruption which she contracted in a long residence on earth, among a weak and degenerate race of beings*.

Not, of course, that the history of Buddhism in Sri Lanka could possibly be called a story merely of error and corruption - far from it, but the faithful chronicler must record such things (or what he sees as such) equally with the shining examples of religious purity and devotion to be found in the story of the Sasana. Whatever shortcomings Sinhalese Buddhism may have shown at times, it is its glory to have preserved the Theravada tradition, to have committed its scriptures to writing, and to have passed the tradition on to neighbouring coutries. Thus, if some of us draw our inspiration from the Burmese meditation teachers or from the forest monks of North-East Thailand, we should not forget the old Sri Lankan monks who brought that tradition to them in the first place. But of course Buddhism does not operate in a vacuum but among ordinary people (some of them in the robe) who sometimes do show themselves to be, if not 'weak and degenerate', at least over-credulous and lacking in spiritual discrimination, or too much subject to worldly motives.

Prof. Gombrich's approach is 'metaphysically neutral', which is very right and proper. 'What makes any religious innovation acceptable?' (p.lQ). Answer if it seems to offer solutions better than those already available to current problems. (Parenthetically, this reviewer is a Buddhist because Buddhism seems, indeed increasingly, to do just that!) Aq illuminating section discusses the inadequacies of Marxian and Weberian theory. Popper's view of 'unintended consequences' fares rather better at his hands. 'The Buddha could not have foreseen most of the consequences that have flowed from his preachings' (p.18). This statement may be disputed by some Buddhists, though they would be wrong to do so even on a fundamentalist view of the texts: had he foreseen everything with the omniscience he in fact disclaimed (though it was inevitably attributed to him!), there would have been no need for him to amend a single one of the Vinaya rules as first laid down.

A feature of Sinhalese Buddhism is its conservatism. This is typical of the island as a whole: we are told that the Tamil of Jaffna is more archaic than that of India 35 miles away. Thus, the monks of the Mahavihara resisted with great tenacity and success the efforts of the rival Abhayagiri monastery to import new-fangled 'Mahayana' ideas. On the whole the changes that did take place in the Sangha were social not doctrinal, so that the letter of the Dhamma was preserved with considerable exactitude even when its spirit tended to be neglected. Sad, though humanly unsurprising as this is, the achievement involved should not be discounted. The spectacle of a land-owning and even slave-owning Sangha divided into

nikayas that were barely on speaking terms is not a pretty one, and the time came when discipline was so lax that valid ordinations could only be undertaken by the importation of good monks from Thailand (1753). Nevertheless, the Dhamma survived in Ceylon despite its demise in India. It survived the Portuguese and the Dutch (neither of whom controlled the interior), and it even survived (with some help from the Theosophists) the Christian missionising of the Victorian English. Which goes perhaps to show that even he who merely counts another's cattle performs an invaluable service as long as he keeps count accurately.

The story in modern times of what Prof. Gombrich aptly calls 'Protestant Buddhism' is told skilfully and sometimes amusingly. The process of coming to terms with the modern world was a difficult one for some, and no doubt the confrontation with Buddhists from other lands, and above all with Westerners who took Buddhism seriously enough to join the Sangha and meditate must have seemed almost shocking. This is a rich book, full of insights as well as out-of-the-way information. One of the few criticisms I have to offer concerns the omission of any reference to the great German bhikkhu Nyanatiloka and his no less distinguished disciple Nyanaponika and their school Surely they deserve a place in the story?

Maurice Waishe

Mahayana Buddhism . The Doctrinal Foundations. Paul Williams. Routledge, London 1989. xii, 317 pp. Hbk £30, pbk £9.95.

Indian Mahayana as a whole has received scant attention from either specialists or 'popular* writers for far too long. Although there are numerous studies and monographs on various parts

and schools of Indian Mahayana the subject as such is rarely treated overall. On the infrequent occasions when Indian Mahayana is tackled generally the origins of Mahayana are skated over lightly, whereas closer attention is given to Chinese and Japanese developments. Happily, Dr Williams' book is not of this type. He not only deals at length with Mahayana Buddhism in India but also devotes a large introductory section to the antecedents of Indian Mahayana and to its links with the earlier 'mainstream' schools. Out of a total of ten sections or chapters seven are taken up with Indian Mahayana in its various forms. The remainder deal with Tibetan, Chinese and Japanese aspects which, though they are only sketches, are sufficiently detailed to show some of the main features of latter-day developments in the Far East. The major part of the book, therefore, presents us with a substantial description and discussion of Mahayana doctrine and practice in its Indian form. This proper emphasis on the early Indian doctrines is all the more valuable because it enables the Chinese reconstructions and interpretations to be perceived more clearly and related more accurately. In general then, this book is warmly to be welcomed, if only for the reasons mentioned above.

The book is divided into three prts: an Introduction dealing with Mahayana origins and the first Mahayana sutras, then five chapters under a main heading of 'Wisdom* followed by four chapters under the heading of 'Compassion'. This scheme has clear advantages for the 'Wisdom' part and it perhaps contains the best of the expositions. In this 'Wisdom* part we find excellent presentations of the Prajiiaparamita texts, the Madhyamaka and the Tathagatagarbha doctrines, as well as a section on Yogacara, here called Cittamatra, which is somewhat less sure in its coverage of this important lineage. In the last part, under the heading of 'Compassion', there are sections on

the Bodies of the Buddha, the Bodhisattva Path, Faith and Devotion, and the sequence begins with a section on the Lotus Sutra. It is not entirely clear to this reviewer why this last part should be headed 'Compassion', despite the fact that it contains one very good section on Compassion and the Bodhicitta. From the contents of this final group of topics it might have been better entitled 'Skilful Means' iupayakausalya). Also, by starting it off with a piece on the Lotus Sutra (p.141) following a section on Chinese (Hua-yen) Buddhism, it displaces the Lotus from its primary position as one of the originating texts of the Mahayana and may give the erroneous impression that the Lotus is a late text with Chinese affiliations.

Addressing the sections in a little more detail, the Introduction is most refreshing in that it faces squarely the perennial problem of Mahayana origins. Perhaps one should not be so critical of scholars in the Buddhist field who seem to have maintained an unspoken pact of silence on this matter until comparatively recently. Their defence would probably be that it is only in the last two decades that sufficient material has come to light for worthwhile hypotheses to be constructed. Even so, A. Bareau had set out the bare bones of the fundamental data as long ago as 1955 (in Les Sectes bouddhiques du Petit Vehicule, Paris 1955). It is therefore with considerable pleasure and interest that one follows Williams' solid discussion of the problem in the round, rather than certain particular points of it. Perhaps it will now be legitimate to regard his work as a forerunner of much more of the same kind In particular, his identification of the Ajitasenasutra, a text discoverd in Gilgit, as indicating '. . . a stage of proto-Mahayana. . (p.26), is another piece of the vast jig-saw set in place. He also firmly rejects the idea, already fairly widespread, that Mahayana was a movement inspired by, and a result of, lay pressure. On pp.22-4 he points

up the evidence that early Indian Mahayana was very much a monastic movement with little widespread support at the beginning. And on p.6 he says '. . .Mahayana appears to have been an uninfluential minority interest until well into the CE . . .'. This reviewer concurs with that but would add that the whole Indian Buddhist Sangha, particularly the Mahasanghikas and the Sarvastivadins, had become much more responsive to lay needs and aspirations long before any Mahayana appeared. Doubtless the fact would not have been lost on the 'minority interest*. On another important aspect of this matter, Williams makes it clear (p.5) that he believes Mahayana to have arisen as a result of development, not from schism. Then he confronts the difficulties over the authorship of the first Mahayana sutras. He states (p.29) that it is not always absurd '. . .that a Mahayana sutra may contain elements which go back to the Buddha...'. Nevertheless, he seems to follow Lamotte in favouring the view that these first sutras were authored under the impact of visionary instructions whilst in deep meditation. On p.30 he writes '. . .the origins of these texts [are not derived from] the historical Buddha. . . but rather with visionary experience and inspiration by [other] Buddhas who continue to exist... in their Buddha Fields or Pure Lands. . .'. Although this reviewer does not rule out such a possibility, it would seem even more likely that because Mahayana came into existence by means of a long evolutionary development, the minority of monks who took part in that development were sustained and inspired by deeper insights into Sakyamuni's teaching by 'diligently studying the sutras' containing his words. The working hypothesis on this aspect which is favoured by this reviewer has been set out elsewhere. However that may be, the introductory section of this book presents a most persuasive case for the origins of Indian Mahayana which takes account of the latest work and which conforms to the known data.

In the first main part, headed 'Wisdom', the sections on the Prajnaparamita and the Madhyamaka are well supplied with useful expositions of the main themes. On p.46 especially, the crucial matter of the Two Truths is well expressed and emphasised. Also, on p.49, it is said that the Prajnaparamita sutras '. . .are speaking from the point of view of the Buddha's non-dual, non-perceptional awareness. . .' which is, of course, the basis of the Two Truth doctrine, i.e. that the awareness of an enlightened being is of a different order to that of ordinary mortals. What both are aware of is the same: pure, clear and all-embracing for the former, but defiled, obscure and narrow for the latter.

The section on the Madhyamaka is not overburdened with explanations of explanations as is sometimes the case, but the necessary expositions are crisp and to the point. The main description of sunyata (pp.60-3) is a good example. Here, the primary matter is stressed, i.e. that sunyata concerns 'the absence of inherent existence' (presumably nihsvabhava) in all conditioned events, concepts and whatever. This understanding of how things really are is the result of the acquisition of the perfected prajna and, as is said on p.62. '. . .Emptiness is the ultimate truth (paramarthasatya). . . about the object being analysed. . .'. The section also contains a further elucidation of the Two Truths doctrine (pp.69-72) in rather more detail and from the Tibetan standpoint.

When the next section (Ch.4 'Cittamatra') comes to be considered some criticisms seem to be in order. The title of this chapter is rather idiosyncratic inasmuch as the major school discussed is the Yogacara or sometimes, the Yogacara/Vijrianavada. 'Cittamatra' is presumably Tibetan nomenclature for this school and the use of this title perhaps

indicates the author's Tibetan orientation. No criticism of that is intended but it is liable to confuse the interested public if a practice common to almost all European Buddhist scholars of this century is cast aside. This school continues to be called 'Yogacara' though some of its doctrines are described as 'cittamatra'. Here, the only reason given for the change of name is that it '. . .refers to its principal classical doctine. . .' (p.82). On that reasoning it might equally well be called the 'Alayavijiiana' school

Although this chapter deals with two important doctrines in some detail, it is much less informative than the subject warrants. The Alayavijiiana and the Three Aspects are key topics but, set out on their .own as they are here, they do less than justice to the wide-ranging scope of Yogacara teaching. Not even a passing mention is made of Yogacara's major contribution to the long-standing difficulties involved in the ancient doctrines concerning karmic retribution (vipaka), i.e. the characteristic teachings of the 'seeds' (bija) and 'perfuming/impregnation' (vasana). Nor is there any indication of the extensive attention given in this school's main text to the elaboration of the Bodhisattva Path. Large sections of the Mahayanasutralamkara, Mahayan as am gratia and Vijhaptimatratasiddhi are devoted to a reworking of the ancient system of the Five Paths. The development of the seeds (bija) under the trace influences (vasana) over the whole enormous length of the Bodhisattva's career, leading to the critical 'turning around of the base' (asrayaparavrttt) are prime Yogacara themes, indeed they are part of the overall context in which alayavijiiana is to be understood. None of this finds a place in the author's Ch.4 and as a consequence the picture of Yogacara which is conveyed is distinctly stunted and reduced to a rather selective presentation.

The first part, 'Wisdom', is rounded off with sections on the Tathagatagarbha and the 'Flower Garland' tradition, particularly in China. It is noticeable that in Ol5 the Chinese idea of the 'Buddha-nature' is equated with the specifically Indian doctrine of the Tathagatagarbha (p.98). In this connection it is perhaps of interest to note that in the Chinese dossier of the bSam-yas debates, Kamalasila challenged Mo-h-yen's (the Chinese monk Mahayana's) use of the Buddha-nature idea as being little more than heretical doctrine (see Demieville's he Concile de Lhasa, Paris 1952, p.107). Williams, however, seems to distance himself from the more extreme developments of the Buddha-nature teaching. On p.107 he says \ . .quite wrong. . . that all beings are already enlightened. . .', and on p.112 he says that the Chinese theme that stones and grasses can be 'saved' is not an Indian idea. On the other hand, it is not too difficult to understand how such doctrines came to be developed from the indisputably Indian ideas of 'cittamatra' and 'vijnaptimatra' which render all external objects into mental projections. However that may be, he is of the opinion that the theory of the Buddha essence is an important one in East Asian Buddhism.

The second part, 'Compassion', contains a useful chapter on the Trikaya doctrine and a substantial chapter (Ch.9) on the Path of the Bodhisattva. Somewhat unaccountably the latter chapter contains a potted history of the entry of Buddhism into Tibet (pp.187 ff), but it also expounds with considerable skill the integrated progress through the Paramitas within the ten stages of the Bhumis, Unfortunately, this chapter ends on a note of confusion and uncertainty (p,214) which could well undermine the reader's confidence.

The tenth and last chapter is concerned with Faith and Devotion and includes descriptive pieces on some of the major Bodhisattva-Mahasattvas and certain Buddhas. For this reviewer,

by far the most stimulating and interesting part of this chapter is the detailed treatment of the practice of buddhanusrnrti (Recollection of the Buddha-qualities). This is a topic rarely accorded such attention and is only occasionally mentioned in Buddhist studies. This deficiency is all the more remarkable when one recalls that the Mahaprajnaparamita-upades a describes this form of meditation as one of the most important practices for Bodhisattvas. This section is followed by another good piece on the Buddha-fields (ksetra). The work is concluded by a splendid fifteen page bibliography, which includes details of many of the major European translations and studies as well as recent scholarly studies normally buried in learned periodicals.

There are few misprints, which is a blessing. Apart from those included in the corrigenda, three others should be mentioned: on p.81 'Abbidharma' should be 'Abhidharma'; on p.186 'mediator' should be 'meditator'; and on p. 199 'conern' should be 'concern'.

A final criticism of what is certainly a work of great value to students and to general readers alike. The author tends to sprinkle his pages with some lighthearted exclamations. Humour is a precious commodity and can be used judiciously with wholesome effect, but when it descends to levity, as on p.240 '. . .So theref, it then becomes excessive and out of place in a serious work.

None of the criticisms expressed here detract from the fact that this book deserves a special welcome in that it enters the enormous empty space presently existing in the field of Indian Mahayana. Not only does Dr Williams address the subject as a whole but he also deals cogently and informatively with many of the necessary topics. More than that, he deals with vital topics hardly ever mentioned elsewhere. He is to be warmly congratulated on the subject matter and on the substance of the work he has now presented to the public. This reviewer is at least grateful to him for the fact that there is at last a book on Indian Mahayana that can be recommended to students and enquirers.

Eric Cheetham

A Note from Paul Williams

The Editor has very kindly offered me the opportunity to reply to Eric Cheetham's review of my book. 1 am indeed grateful to the latter for his appreciative review, with which I am reasonably satisfied. The notion of a 'Reply' suggests some radical disagreement which It seems to me does not exist. I would like to offer, however, a few observations in response to some of his comments.

First, concerning the origins of the Mahayana, Mr Cheetham attributes to me rather less caution thatn I usually like to hold. He writes that I seem 'to follow Lamotte in favouring the view that these first sutras were authored under the impact of visionary instruction while in deep meditation*. Our reviewer then gives a truncated quote from the book (p.30), apparently expressing my view, to which he has added some material in square parentheses. It may be in place to cite a fuller version of the actual text:

'More important, however, is a tradition found in the Mahayana sutras themselves which would associate the origins of these texts not with the historical Buddha. . . but rather with visionary experience and inspiration by one of a number of Buddhas who continue to exist on a higher plane. . .

This teaching, which to my mind provides a convincing basis for understanding the origins of at least some of the Mahayana sutras. . . * It should be clear that I do not suggest that all Mahayana sutras can be explained in this way, and 1 do not make the bald statement that these texts cannot be derived from the historical Buddha, I am saying, however, that there are texts which themselves indicate an origin of new Dharma teachings from a Buddha met in meditative experience, and this no doubt explains some of the early Mahayana material. I am not necessarily in disagreement with Cheetham's comments on the 'diligent study of the sutras', although reference to 'deeper insights' carries with it an implicit value judgement which I think I would want to avoid.

Cheetham devotes particular critical attention to my treatment of Cittamatra. He is right in thinking that I chose 'Cittamatra' as a title on the basis of the common Tibetan designation of the school as sems tsam. The exact name of the school as a whole, taking all the texts and doctrines attributed to it together, is a little unclear. 'Vijfianavada', of course, refers to a doctrine, as does 'Cittamatra'. I accept, however, Cheetham's critical point that in referring to the tradition itself as Cittamatra I may cause needless confusion in departing from the standard practice among scholars, I have indicated clearly in my text, I think, alternative designations. The problem, however, in Cheetham's comments on my treatment of Cittamatra, here as elswhere, is that he has assumed that in this chapter I set out to treat reasonably fully a whole school, the school usually known in Western writings as 'Yogacara'. I did not In designating the second section of my book as 'Wisdom' I intended in the main to treat some Mahayana understandings of 'the way things really are', together with some of their ramifications and implications.

Thus I called the chapter 'Cittamatra' because this term is in its Tibetan version in standard usage in at least some Mahayana circles in a way in which 'Vijnanavada' (or 'Akyavijnanavada') is not, and it designates perfectly well the principal teaching of the tradition concerning the way things really are. Since I set out only to treat certain ontological topics within the Yogacara school, the fact that I omitted some other topics important to that school may be regrettable but is nevertheless justifiable, particularly given the limitations on space imposed by the publishers. I agree that the Yogacara contribution to discussions of karma, and the Bodhisattva Path, are important The latter does get some treatment later in the book, when the relevant topic is treated, but not everything could be covered. More serious would be the claim that my treatment of the ontology is distorted as treatment of ontology (the way things really are) by these omissions. Cheetham rather implies that it is, but this would require further detailed argument than has been given in the space of his review.

In reviewing my treatment of the Tathagatagarbha doctrine, Cheetham states that I seem to distance myself 'from the more extreme developments of the Buddha-nature teaching'. He gives two quotes from my book as indicating my own views on the topic. However, his first quotation from p.107 of the book ('. . .quite wrong. . . that all beings are already enlightened. . .') in the original context is not given as my own observations but as something that explicitly follows the dGe lugs treatment of the Tathagatagarbha. This is the dGe lugs position. 1 do not state in the book that it is my own view, my 'distancing from extreme developments'. Indeed I would not use the word 'extreme*, which is a relative term and carries with it implications of a value judgement which in this context I would not be prepared to defend. Again, Cheetham indicates that I

hold that the saving of stones and grasses is not an Indian idea. I am much more cautious. What I actually say is that this idea has 'no precedents. . . as far as I know. . . in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism*. I agree with him that once the doctrine of Cittamatra is taken cosmologically (and combined with that of the Tathagatagarbha) the saving of stones and grasses may well follow. The interesting question, however, is whether the cosmological interpretation was explicitly drawn before the so-called Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana in China, which, as I indicate in the book, was a text capable of harmonising splendidly with certain Neo-Taoist cosmological speculations which had already taken place.

Lastly, my levity! Inappropriate attempts at humour are distressing, and even appropriate attempts are distressing to those who do not find them funny. For that I apologise. Mahayana doctrine is a difficult topic, and can be deadly boring both to read and write about. In a book aimed at students some lightness of touch and pace becomes 'skilful means'. The problem is that what is mildly amusing to one person may be offensive to another. One cannot tickle all the people all the time! However, in the example Mr Cheetham chooses to cite, my use of 'So there!' on p.240, I think he has not quite appreciated the point. In eontext I am discussing the way in which certain early Mahayana sutras show a rivalry between each other, each trying to outdo the other. Thus we are told at one point that the Buddha-field of Manjusri is much better than Amitabha's Sukhavatl. And in the Vimaladattapariprechasutra the future Buddha-field of Vimaladatta, at present an eight year-old girl, is said to be much better than that of Manjusri. Vimaladatta had already been following the Bodhisattva Path for sixty aeons when Manjusri made his vows. The whole thing is reminiscent of children's games. We have a vision of

Vimaladatta, the eight year-old girl, poking her tongue out and saying 'So there!'. Of course, to make this point is no doubt unnecessary as simple description. However, it does say something - and it is more fun to read than simple description. In this case at least I am unrepentant So there!

Paul Williams

The Framework of Nagarjuna's Philosophy. A.M. Padhye. Bibliotheca Indo-Buddhica 35 (Sri Satguru Publications), Delhi 1988. 160 pp. Rsl50.

According to our author, the project of the Buddha was 'to establish philosophy on a firm foundation' (p,99). This had subsequently become distorted, and 'religionized' and 'psychologised'. Nagarjuna sought to re-establish the original emphasis. For Nagarjuna, Nirvana is a 'philosophical solution to philosophical problems. It is neither an ethical nor a religious ideal, but is a proper perspective or a focus that one ought to adopt to be able to have a proper grasp of things in the world' (p.102). Padhye is concerned to oppose those who interpret Nagarjuna as a monist, absolutist, nihilist, or as a 'mystic' (mysticism, he tells us, involves God, and there is no evidence that Nagarjuna wanted to establish a God - p.16). His concern with the tired issues of absolutism and nihilism in the interpretation of Madhyamaka suggests that Padhye has read few of the most recent writings on the tradition, a suggestion confirmed by his bibliography, which lists hardly anything published after 1980, and makes no mention of the works of Lindtner, Hopkins, or the principle works of de Jong (referred to by Padhye as 'Jungl), May, Ruegg, Robinson, or even Streng's book on Emptiness. It appears that Padhye reads neither French

nor, crucially, Tibetan. Although he claims to expound what Nagarjuna really meant, his account rests on the Madhyamakakarika (MMK) as embedded in the Prasannapada of CandrakTrti (he appears unaware of de Jong's text-critical amendments to the de La Vallee Poussin edition), together with occasional references to the Vigrahavyavartani (Vig.) and one reference to the Sanskrit Ratnavali fragments. Although he uses Candrakirti's Prasannapada, Padhye ignores the Madhayamakavatara, written according to Candrakirti himself as an introduction to the MMK. Our author is thus also extraordinarily poorly read in Madhyamaka works, including those works attributed by Candrakirti to Nagarjuna. He makes scarcely a mention of the Prajnaparamitasutras, and seems to have read very little in other Buddhist thought.

Padhye argues that the notion of pratityasamutpada has two meanings in Nagarjuna's writings. The 'commonsensical' view sees it as a theory of causation explaining how things come to be in the world. This, Padhye asserts, is incoherent because there cannot be a necessary connection between things presented sequentially (he appears to be following Hume rather than Nagarjuna here). Thus the commonsense world is false. However, Padhye asserts that the pratityasamutpada also has another 'philosophical* meaning which reveals the true nature of the world as the Buddha wanted to expound it. This true nature is of things which really, truly, exist. They are discrete separate particular things, which occur and cease, although not in causal relationships. They are the genuinely real. Thus the Buddha's, and Nagarjuna's, project was to distinguish what really is the case from what is not, and free mankind from in particular the 'bewitching platonism' which makes us think that certain entities, like universals, exist when in reality they do not. Nirvana lies in seeing things in this new light. In itself it is nothing to do with religion. According to Padhye the understanding of Nirvana as the cessation of greed, hatred and delusion, or the highest bliss, was a misinterpretation of the teaching of the Buddha (p.97).

All this is quite extraordinary, and Padhye's evidence for his thesis seems to me to be very slim indeed (in spite of the fact that he repeats his view again and again, presumably in the hope of making it more convincing). Padhye takes from Nagarjuna the statement that if something is dependency originated it could not be inherently existent (have a svabhava). He seems to conclude from this that all the 'commonsense objects' which are dependency originated do not exist (p.42). However, he also takes from the MMK 18:9 the characterisation of tattva, reality, as being not dependent on the teaching of another, tranquil, not differentiated by verbal differentiations, non-conceptual and so on, and from CandrakTrti (on 18:8) tathya (= tattva) as that which is invariable {yasya anyathatvam ndsti). Since inherent existence would be unchanging, it follows that Nagarjuna is affirming inherently existing objects, tattva, that is, svabhdvas as 'genuinely real things' (pp.44-5). This is supported by Candraklrti's occasional references to a type of svabhava which is not denied by the Madhyamaka (on MMK 5:8 or 22:11, for example). Unfortunately Padhye has not read Candraklrti's Madhyamakavatara. There, in his commentary on 6:181-2, CandrakTrti explains that the Madhyamaka reference to a true svabhava is not a reference to any truly existing thing, but rather to the true way of things itself, the dharmata ( = tathyaltattva) which is invariable, which remains the case whether Buddhas occur or do not. It is not a strange realm of really existing things, but the truth, the fact that all things, without exception, lack inherent existence. This is the way the Madhyamaka tattva has always been interpreted by Prasahgika

commentators like CandrakTrti. As Atisa puts it in his Satyadvayavatara, 'If one examines with reasoning the conditional as it appears, nothing is found. That nonfindingness is the ultimate. It is the primeval way of things' (dharmata: v.21).

Padhye's treatment of his meagre Sanskrit sources is cavalier in the extreme. He cites, in support of his position that Nagarjuna 'not only repudiates svabhava of dharmas but also holds that some items, free from dharmas, are self-existent, they are real. . . even though ungenerated' (p.35), the commentary on Vig. 60 (or 61 in the edition used by Padhye): We do not negate the svabhava of dharmas nor do we affirm the svabhava of anything (art ha) separate from dharmas (my tr; na hi vayam dharmanam svabhdvam pratisedhayamo dharmavimrmuktasya va kascidarthasya svabhdvamabhyupagacchamah} ). It is clear in context, however that Nagarjuna is stating that the Madhyamika does not make an inherently existent denial of things. The bizarre suggestion that for Nagarjuna something free from dharmas really inherently exists is the exact opposite of what Nagarjuna is saying (in reply to an opponent in Vig. 10). Again, CandrakTrti tells us, according to Padhye, that texts which are interpretable (neyartha) are those which indicate the proper mode of investigation leading to philosophical illumination. Definitive texts (nltdrtha) lead to freedom from bewitchment through misleading impressions etc. (p.27). The actual text in the Prasannapada is a quote from the Aksayamatisutra which states that interpretable sutras are those which introduce the Path; definitive those which introduce the Result (on MMK 1:3). Once more, Padhye refers to the famous statement in Vig. 29 that 'if I had any thesis then I would have this fault. I do not have a thesis, therefore I do not have any fault'. For Padhye this means that Nagarjuna is simply stating

the Buddha's own theory, not any of his own (p.44; cf. pp.135-6). This is absurd, and Padhye offers no evidence for it at all. It directly contradicts both the context of the VigrahavyavartanI, in which the opponent has argued that Nagarjuna's words themselves must inherently exist, and Nagarjuna's own commentary, which states that there can be no thesis when all is empty. That is, emptiness applies to his own thesis as well. At one point our author gives a strange and previously unknown textual variant which appears to support his own theory. He tells us that according to Nagarjuna we should 'accept those knowledge claims that are acceptable and reject those that are not so' (p.77). His reference is to MMK 22*llab, which in the Vaidya edition which Padhye claims to have used reads: sunyam iti na vaktavyam asunyam iti va bhavet I i.e. 'Empty' is not to be said; nor should there be 'non-empty'. This reading of the Sanskrit text is confirmed by Tucci's manuscript, unknown to Louis de La Vallee Poussin, but used by J.W. de Jong as a basis for his 'Textcritical notes on the Prasannapada' (Indo-Iranian Journal 20, 1978). It corresponds to the Tibetan: stong ngo zhes kyang mi brod de I mi stong zhes kyang mi bya zhing It The verse clearly states that neither empty nor non-empty are to be asserted, and does not oppose the rejection of some things with the acceptance of others. Padhye, however, cites a variant version: sunyam iti na vaktavyam asunyam yadi va bhavet I i.e. 'Empty is not to be said if it should be non-empty'. He gives no source for this variant, which is obviously incorrect. According to his bibliography Padhye used only the Vaidya edition of the MMK embedded in the Prasannapada, that is, a reprinting of the de La Vallee Poussin edition. One is forced to ask where such a convenient misreading comes from?

According to our author Nagarjuna has never characterised his philosophy as sunyavada. Ratnaklrti (he must mean

Candraklrti) also repudiated this as a name for the Madhyamaka philosophical position (pJ.29 - Padhye attacks the liberal meaning of sunya as 'empty', Le. non-existent, but seems unaware of the development of this term as a technical word in Buddhist thought). As a matter of fact, however, Padhye is simply wrong. Nagarjuna refers to the Madhyamaka as sunyatdvadins (which is the same thing) in Vig. 69 plus commentary. Candraklrti speaks of sunyatadar sana for Madhyamaka in his commentary on MMK 18:5, and of sunyatdvdda on 24:13 (for other examples see the references in Yamaguchi's index to the Prasannapada).

Padhye's interpretation of Nirvana as 'philosophical enlightenment' is equally astonishing, and totally fails to appreciate Nagarjuna in the context of the Prajnaparamitasutras and the Mahayana. The Mahayana itself is scarcely mentioned in the book, although a study of the complete text of the Ratnavali, accepted by Padhye as a work of Nagarjuna, not to mention other works by the Master, would show how committed Nagarjuna was to the bodhicitta, the twin Bodhisattva accumulations of merit and wisdom, Buddhahood as an ultimate goal, and the ten bhumis of the Bodhisattva's career. In spite of Padhye's claim that the Buddha's and Nagarjuna's notion of Nirvana was not religious, and had nothing to do with the mistaken idea of a cessation of greed, hatred and delusion, this is precisely what Nagarjuna says Nirvana is in Sunyatasaptati 73 \

Padhye's ignorance of Buddhist thought is impressive. Without comment he translates dharma in the context of Buddhist philosophy by one of its non-Buddhist (e.g. Nyaya) meanings as 'quality' or 'property', as reflected in the predicate of a subject-predicate sentence (pp.79 ff). Thus to say that all dharmas are sunya is to say not that all things without

exception are empty (of inherent existence), but rather that all really existing particulars cannot be captured in everyday subject-predicate language. This is because predicates require shareability. Padhye seems to have little knowledge of Vaibhasika thought, where a dharma is a dravya, a fundamental and unique real rather than a shareable property. Dharmas are what is actually there. To say that all dharmas are empty is to say nothing about predicates, but rather to assert that nothing is actually there as inherently existing at all (cf. Astasahasrikaprajfiaparamita: 'Even if perchance there could be anything more distinguished [than Nirvana), of that too I say that it is like an illusion, like a dream'; Conze tr., p.99).

Padhye's book is repetitive, full of misprints, and the English style is extremely clumsy and difficult to follow. Carelessness is frequent. At one point Padhye claims that Stcherbatsky moved from an earlier theory of pratityasamutpada in Buddhist Logic to a later theory in The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana. Buddhist Logic was published in 1930, although the Dover edition used by Padhye appeared in 1962. The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana was originally published in 1927, the Indian edition of Padhye in 1977! The present work is based on an inadequate study of Madhayamaka texts, particularly the many works of Nagarjuna reaonably attributed to the Master, and an insufficient knowledge of Buddhism. Its author seems to have been concerned to produce a new theory, and find it in the few texts he used, regardless of evidence to the contrary. His theory bears no resemblance to that of any commentator on Nagarjuna, It is to be .regretted that he has spent more time combatting writers like Stcherbatsky than consulting with the Tibetans in India who, whether correct or not, embody a living and illuminating lineage of Madhyamaka interpretation. Padhye's book was

Buddhist Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991 - Reviews

originally his doctoral thesis. I regret that it seems to me to be completely inadequate.

Paul Williams

Ed. See also Ramendranath Ghose, The Dialectics of Nagarjuna. Allhabad 1987.

Sitting. A Guide to Po nd Meditation Posture. Kamalashila. Windhorse Publications, Glasgow 1988. 28 pp. £1.95.

This unpretentious little booklet by a member of the Western Buddhist Order who is a practising meditation teacher should prove especially helpful to beginners, but even experienced meditators will benefit from its sensible advice. In clear and straightforward language, and with the help of drawings, it describes the various postures that can be adopted for sitting meditation and explains how to maintain them without undue strain, including practical suggestions on ways to make sitting practice easier.

A few simple exercises are described and illustrated which, regularly practised, will help to loosen one's joints and strengthen one's muscles. The exercises are drawn from different systems, including Hatha Yoga (the author was formerly a yoga teacher), T'ai Chi, conventional physical training and the Alexander technique.

The main body of advice and exercises is prefaced by a few general remarks on meditation in Buddhism and the importance of awareness of the body in this connection. This 'ntroduction' is, on the whole, as clear and sensible as the rest of the work although, perhaps inevitably, the striving for brevity and

Buddhist Studies Review 8, 1-2 (1991 - Reviews

simplicity (it is only three and a half pages long) has entailed much oversimplification. Especially the bald statement that 'indfulness is a state of near-meditation* (p.7) is, as it stands, apt to mislead the beginners for whom the booklet is primarily intended, since it ignores the important distinction between the general attitude of mindfulness one endeavours to keep up outside formal sittings and the full exercise of mindfulness in the practice of satipatthana (the four foundations of mindfulness), which is the essence of insight meditation (vipassana).

Attention must also be drawn to a slip in terminology: the second of the five hindrances to meditation is ill-will (vyapada) and not, as stated on p.ll, anger (kodha), which is only a particular manifestation of the more general condition.

However, the occasional imperfection in no way detracts from the overall quality and usefulness of this eminently sensible piece of work. A truly practical guide which can be warmly recommended to all meditators.

Amadeo Sole-Leris

Advaita Vedanta and Madhyamika Buddhism Eastern Religions in Western Thought. M.A. Cherian, published by the author, Broadstairs, Kent 1988. 195 pp. No price given.

The Preface mentions, as if in one breath, in categoric and condensed statements, often linked together in long chains of clauses and subclauses, virtually all the problems and questions the enquiring mind has ever occupied itself with, from the beginning of philosophical thought in antiquity to the latest re-examination and critical assessment of scientific axioms and theories. It thus shows the breadth of the author's interest

which he wishes to share with the reader without, in his own words, intentionally trying to prove any preconceptions. Perhaps unintentionally, however, he does reveal to the reader his view of reality in the ultimate sense: it is that which does not change and which is ABSOLUTE; and it is to him synonymous with NON-DUALITY and NOTHINGNESS. The question is: what part does this Absolute, non-duality or nothingness play in the fluid world which we inhabit, in our experience of evil and suffering and in our hope for salvation? The book would seem to be a survey of the human search to provide the answer, and may be summarised as follows:

Chapter 1, 'Maya, the appearance of reality', is obviously concerned with the non-absolute, i.e. with the relative experience of reality on whatever level we encounter it. In this context it mentions many attempts to ascertain, describe or explain the nature of the changing reality of our experience made by scientists through experimentation as well as theoretical thought, by philosophers through speculation and analysis and by Indian religious systems.

Chapter 2, 'Science, the philosophy of nature', would seem to be trying to show the implications of the world as may a to science which, we are told, deals not with truth but only with verismilitude and is circumscribed by dubious metaphysics and what passes in it for proof is not proof at alL Scientific laws are based on faith, dogma, tradition and superstition of a certain kind and the same goes for religions. Neither scientific nor religious conventions can be known as true, they can only be taken to be true. Sciences, religions and philosophies can be built up from arbitrary foundations unrelated to truth or reality, valid only within their own sphere or terms of reference. The author scans the whole area of modern science from classical physics to the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics with

references to logical operations and mathematical calculations and with the accompaniment of quotations from philosophers old and new and concludes that 'seemingly modern ideas have ancient pedigrees'.

Chapter 3, 'Philosophy, the nature of science', comments first on the disagreements of philosophers throughout the history of philosophy, ,then on various inadequate definitions of philosophy and on what its task is or should be. The author then blames philosophy, when occupied with logical analysis of thought, for not justifying the logic it uses. He further condemns some philosophers for their system-building without producing satisfactory evidence for the systems. The author then gives an elementary survey of the beginnings and progress of philosophy from ancient Greece to modern times, with accounts of the teachings of a number of individual philosophers from Socrates to Wittgenstein and Ayer.

Chapter 4, 'The problem of evil', suggests that evil and suffering can hardly be anything other than our interpretations of events and experiences. The solutions of authoritarian religions help only if one is a believer or has broken down, is frightened or in a panic, ready for a mental or physical strait jacket. Hinduism and Buddhism do not require strict belief for the practice of their paths, Their requirement is dispassionateness and non-attachment. The Bhagavadgtta provides the best practical rules for that purpose.

Chapter 5, 'Non-duality, nothingness', restates the tenet that everything we know in the universe, including ourselves, is in a state of flux. Metaphysics is the search for the immutable against which changing states can be measured. If conflict of appearance were all there is, the appearances would not be understood as conflicting. All knowledge presupposes Non-duality. In agreement with the tenor of Indian philosophy

based on the Upanisads and culminating in Sankara, the author understands non-duality to mean the identity of the Absolute and the individual self, foreshadowed in the experience of deep sleep without dreams. The Advaita system shows that without the Absolute there would be no basis for any kind of knowledge on the relative level which is, of course, limited and valid only pragmatically. Nothing can be said about the Absolute except that it is one and indivisible and that it undergoes no change. The author then paraphrases the Madhyamaka dictum about the identity of Sarhsara and Nirvana by a rather anecdotal and not very meaningful saying: 'NIRVANA is the reality of SAMSARA, SAMSARA is the falsity of NIRVANA, both are Nothingness'

Chapter 6, 'Reincarnation in rebirths', subscribes to the once current but unproven and now challenged view that the theory of rebirth is later than the Vedas and then mentions its appearance or traces in other traditions: Greek, Christian, Judaic, Druidic and, of course, Vedanta and Buddhism. The author sees the best argument for rebirth in the inexorable law of cause and effect which becomes the doctrine of karma in the context of the theory of rebirth, but has some difficulty in reconciling it with the notion of the unreality of the phenomenal and relative world. With respect to the Absolute all life and all matter are one.

Chapter 7, 'Appearance and Reality', a metaphysical theme, is dealt with even more anecdotally than the preceding topics. It touches on the disparity between fate which men cannot control and their reactions to it, on the problems of Christian belief, idealistic philosophy, political systems of democracy and dictatorship, the role of law and policing in society and many other areas. When he returns to the philosophical aspect of the theme, he seems to identify himself with the proposition that

we cannot describe the outside world or even know that there is an outside world independent of sensory perception. It is back to the earlier and often repeated statement that we can only have theories, but if reality is that which does not change, as established by Advaita Vedanta, our theories cannot get at it, because reality is not physical or phenomenal. To know that is wisdom.

Chapter 8, 'What there is', summarises the preceding pages and selectively repeats some of the assertions in them, adding a few new ones. We can only have theories about the world. The world is maya. There is no conclusive verification in science. The Absolute is realised as self-identity through self-experience. Truth is silence.

At first glance the book may impress one by the sheer breadth of its horizon. There are in it many reasonably accurate characterisations and condensed observations from the field of the history of philosophy, from the works of individual philosophers, from the field of various sciences and from the modern theories of physics, mathematics and logic, as well as some pertinent criticisms of the religious scene. At second glance and particularly when reading the book carefully, one is much less impressed. One drawback is its style. It is not narrative, does not give a systematic account of