Early Evidence for the ‘no self’ doctrine? A note on the second anātman teaching of the Second Sermon
Early Evidence for the ‘no self’ doctrine? A note on the second anātman teaching of the Second Sermon
AlExAndEr WynnE
1. The Second Sermon of the Buddha, preserved in the various Vinaya texts
of different Buddhsit sects and as a separate discourse in the Pāli canon (the
Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta), contains two important anātman teachings. The first of
these anātman teachings is found in only one other text: the Cūḷasaccaka Sutta
of the Majjhima nikāya (no. 35). The second and variants of it are, however,
much more widely distributed throughout the early Buddhist discourses,
particularly those preserved in Pāli. As Collins has pointed out, ‘a very high
proportion of the discussions of not-self in the Suttas consist in various versions
of this argument’.2 This is therefore the more important anātman teaching of
the Second Sermon (although it is to be noted that it lacks the term anātman/
anattā).3 The different versions of the Second Sermon report it as follows:
From the Pāli Vinaya Mahāvagga:
Vin I.14.5: taṃ kiṃ maññatha bhikkhave: rūpaṃ niccaṃ vā aniccaṃ vā ti? aniccaṃ bhante. yaṃ panāniccaṃ dukkhaṃ vā taṃ sukhaṃ vā ti? dukkhaṃ bhante. yaṃ panāniccaṃ dukkhaṃ vipariṇāmadhammaṃ, kallan nu taṃ samanupassituṃ: etaṃ mama, eso ’haṃ asmi, eso me attā ti? no h’ etaṃ bhante. ‘What do you think, bhikkhus: is form permanent or impermanent?’ ‘Impermanent, master.’ ‘Is that which is impermanent unsatisfactory or satisfactory?’ ‘Unsatisfactory, master.’ ‘And is it suitable to regard that which is impermanent, unsatisfactory and subject to change as “This is mine, I am this, this is my attā”?’ ‘no, master.’
From the Mūlasarvāstivādin Saṅghabhedavastu: I.138.21: kiṃ manyadhve bhikṣavo: rūpaṃ nityam vā <anityaṃ vā>? anityam idaṃ bhadanta. yat punar anityaṃ duḥkham vā tan na vā duḥkham? duḥkham idaṃ bhadanta. yat punar anityaṃ duḥkhaṃ vipariṇāmadharmi, api nu tac chrutavān āryaśrāvaka ātmata upagacched: 2 Collins (1982: 98). 3 But see the teachings that begin book IV (Saḷāyatanavagga) of the Saṃyutta nikāya, where all sense faculties and their objects are said to be impermanent (anicca), unsatisfactory (dukkhaṃ) and so not attā (anattā). derivatives of this teaching, where the five aggregates are also stated to be anattā, can be found at S III, 20-21, 23-24 and 179.
etan mama, eso ’ham asmy, eṣa me ātmeti? no bhadanta. kiṃ manyadhve bhikṣavo: vedanā… saṃjñā… saṃskārā… vijñānaṃ nityaṃ vā anityaṃ vā? anityam idaṃ bhadanta. yat punar anityaṃ <duḥkhaṃ> vā tan na vā duḥkham? duḥkham idaṃ bhadanta. yat punar anityaṃ <duḥkham> vipariṇāmadharmi, api nu tac chrutavān āryaśrāvaka ātmata upagacched: etan mama, eṣo ’ham asmy, eṣa me ātmeti? no bhadanta. From the (Mūlasarvāstivādin)4 Catuṣpariṣat Sūtra: 15.6 (Waldschmidt p. 164): kiṃ manyadhve bhi(kṣavaḥ: rūpaṃ nityam ani)tyam vā? anityaṃ bhadant(a). 15.7: y(at punar anityaṃ duḥkhaṃ tan na vā duḥkham)? duḥkhaṃ bhadanta.
15.8: yat punar anityaṃ duḥkhaṃ vipariṇāmadharmy (api nu tac chrutavān āryaśrāvaka ātmata upagacched: e)tan mama, eṣo ’ham asmi, (eṣa ma ātmeti)? 15.9: no bhadanta. 15.10: evaṃ vedanā… saṃjñā… saṃskārā… vijñānaṃ nit(y)am (anityaṃ vā)? 15.11: (anityaṃ bhadan)ta. 15.12: yat punar anityaṃ duḥ(khaṃ tan na vā duḥkham)? 15.13: (duḥkhaṃ bhadanta). 15.14: (yat punar anityaṃ duḥ)khaṃ vipariṇāmadharmy api nu tac chrutavān āryaśrāva(ka ātmata upagacched: etan mama, eṣo ’ham asmi, eṣa ma ātmeti)?
15.15: no bhadanta.
Although the Mahāsāṃghika Mahāvastu version of the Second Sermon reports a quite different teaching, it similarly stresses the impermanence of the five aggregates and the necessity of not regarding them as ‘one’s ātman’: Mhv III.337.20: sacen manyatha bhikṣavo: rūpaṃ nityaṃ vā anityaṃ vā? anityaṃ hi taṃ bhagavaṃ. rūpasya khalu punar bhikṣavaḥ anityatāṃ viditvā, calatāṃ prabhaṅguṇatāṃ vipariṇāmavirāganirodhatāṃ viditvā, ye rūpapratyayā utpadyensuḥ āśravā vighātā paridāghā sajvarā sāṃkleśikā punarbhavikā āyatyāṃ jātijarāmaraṇīyās, te nirudhyante. teṣāṃ nirodhān na utpadye āśravā vighātā paridāghā sajvarā sāṃkleśikā paunarbhavikā āyatyāṃ jātijarāmaraṇīyā. sacet manyatha bhikṣavo: vedanā… saṃjñā… saṃskārā… vijñānaṃ nityaṃ vā anityaṃ vā? anityaṃ hi taṃ bhagavaṃ…
Mhv III.338.12: tasmād iha vo bhikṣavaḥ evaṃ śikṣitavyaṃ: yat kiṃcid rūpaṃ, adhyātmaṃ vā bahirdhā vā, audārikaṃ vā śūkṣmaṃ vā, hīnaṃ vā praṇītaṃ vā, yaṃ dūre ’ntike, atītam anāgataṃ pratyutpannaṃ, sarvaṃ rūpaṃ: na etaṃ mama, na eṣo ’ham asmi, na eṣo ātmā ti. evaṃ vo bhikṣavaḥ śikṣitavyaṃ 4 Since the Catuṣpariṣat Sūtra is virtually a verbatim repetition of the same biographical portion of the Saṅghabhedavastu, it was probably extracted from the Vinaya Skhandhaka of the Mūlasarvāstivādins. FULL_14-09-2009.indd 60 16/11/2009 21.21.47 Alexander Wynne • Early Evidence for the ‘no self’ doctrine? 61 Mhv III.337.20: ‘What do you think, bhikṣus: is form permanent or impermanent?’
‘It is impermanent, master.’ ‘When you have understood the impermanence of form, and know its unsteadiness, corruptibility and the fact that it is subject to change, fading away and cessation, the corruptions that might arise in dependence on form – which are a trouble, a torment, and a fever that defile and lead to rebecoming, birth, decrepitude and death in the future – they cease. Through the cessation of them, the corruptions which are a trouble, a torment, and a fever that defile and lead to rebecoming, birth, decrepitude and death in the future – they do not arise. ‘What do you think, bhikṣus: is feelings… apperception… volitions… consciousness permanent or impermanent?’
‘It is impermanent, master….’ Mhv III.338.12: ‘Therefore, bhikṣus, in this matter you should train yourselves as follows: ‘Whatever form is internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or elevated, in the distance or nearby, past, present or future – all form should be regarded thus ‘This is not mine, I am not this, this is not my ātman.’ So should you train yourselves, bhikṣus. Although this version of the teaching is significantly different in its wording from the corresponding Pāli and Sanskrit versions cited above, its message is the same: the five aggregates are impermanent, subject to change and so unsuitable to be regarded as one’s ātman. The similarity between the different texts suggests that this teaching was more or less fixed before the first schism between Sthavira and Mahāsāṃghika, i.e. at some point in the pre-Aśokan period after the Second Council of Vaiśālī.5 during this early, pre-schimsatic period, it would seem that there was a Vinaya biography of the Buddha’s early teaching career in which the Second Sermon concluded with the teaching that the five aggregates are impermanent, unsatisfactory and so not ātman/attā. It is of course possible that the Mahāsāṃghika and Sthavira communities shared teachings after the first schism, and that this explains the above similarity between Sthavira (Pāli and Mūlasarvāstivādin) and Mahāsāṃghika texts. But even if this was the case, it can hardly be denied that the ideas of the Second Sermon must have been relatively fixed by the time of the missions said to have taken place under Aśoka (c. 255-250 BC).6 For after this point the Theravādin tradition of Sri lanka was separated by a great distance from the Buddhist communities of northern India, and it would have been no simple matter for 5 Gombrich (1992: 258): ‘We may thus date the Second Council round 60 A.B. or round 345 B.C.; the dates are very approximate and the precise margin of error incalculable’. Gombrich had earlier estimated it to be between 50 and 75 years after the Buddha’s death (1988: 17), which elsewhere he dates to 404 B.C. (1992: 246): ‘The Buddha died 136 years before Aśoka’s inauguration, which means in 404 B.C.’ According to Cousins (1991: 59) the Second Council is to be dated to seventy or eighty years after the Buddha’s death in 413 B.C. Prebish has recently argued that the date of 100 AB, which is contained in ‘all the texts’ on the subject, should be accepted (2008: 15). 6 On these missions, see Frauwallner (1956: 13ff) and Wynne (2005: 48ff).
different Buddhist groups to share texts.7 While contact between the Sri lankan Theravādins and Indian Buddhist sects certainly continued – indeed it is proved by a variety of evidence such as ancient inscriptions from Andhra Pradesh,8 Pāli books said to have been received from the north-West (Milindapañha, Nettipakaraṇa, Peṭakopadesa etc.)9 and so on – a levelling of texts in the post- Aśokan age is far less likely than a general fixing of texts before the Aśokan expansion of Buddhism.10 We can be reasonably sure, therefore, that the second anātman teaching of the Second Sermon belongs in the early period of pre- Aśokan Buddhism, and was considered important enough to have been given a prominent position in an important account of the beginning of the Buddha’s ministry. Indeed, for the authors of this ancient pre-sectarian Vinaya biography, the importance of this anātman teaching was surpassed only by those teachings included in the First Sermon, i.e. the Four noble Truths and the noble Eightfold Path as the middle way between indulgence and asceticism.11 As for the teaching itself, norman has noted that the terms nicca and sukha in the Pāli version indicate that the attan denied is the transcendent ātman of the early Upaniṣads.12 While these terms certainly allude to the Upaniṣadic ātman, however, it does not follow that the ultimate reason for this is to deny the Upaniṣadic ātman. Indeed these terms seem to be used in a more general sense, for the term sukha is used as an antonym of the term dukkha, which in this case must have the weak sense of ‘unsatisfactory’, since the impermanence of the five aggregates does not mean that they constitute ‘suffering’, but only that the human condition is inherently unsatisfactory. The teaching therefore states how it is unsatisfactory 7 See Wynne (2005: 65-66): ‘It is unlikely that these correspondences could have been produced by the joint endeavour of different Buddhist sects, for such an undertaking would have required organisation on a scale which was simply inconceivable in the ancient world. We must conclude that a careful examination of early Buddhist literature can reveal aspects of the pre-Aśokan history of Indian Buddhism.’. 8 For a recent study of the inscriptions referring to the Sri lankan Theravādins at Amarāvatī, see Cousins (2001).
9 As has been noted by norman (1997: 140), although northern texts such as the Milindapañha, the Peṭakopadesa and the Nettipakaraṇa were highly respected by the Theravādin commentators, they were not given canonical status by them. Moreover, although they contain “a number of verses and other utterances ascribed to the Buddha and various eminent theras, which are not found in the canon… There was no attempt made to add such verses to the canon, even though it would have been a simple matter to insert them into the dhammapada or the Theragāthā.” The point that the Pāli tradition received literature from other sects but excluded it from the canon had been made already by Oldenberg (1879: xlviii).
11 Although it is also possible that the First Sermon was considered a necessary introduction
to the Buddha’s teaching, and a sort of preparation for the higher anātman teachings that
followed.
12 norman (1981: 22) has pointed out that the response to the Buddha’s final question can
only be given ‘by those who know, in advance, that the term attā is by definition nicca and
sukha, and therefore anything which is anicca and dukkha cannot be attā. This gives us a
clear indication of the type of attā which is being discussed. It is the Upaniṣadic idea of an
ātman which is nitya and sukha’.To this we might add that by equating ‘impermanence’
(anicca) with being ‘subject to change’ (vipariṇāmadhamma), the Buddha recalls a key
feature of the self according to the yajñavalkyakāṇḍa (e.g. BU IV.5.15), i.e. that it is
unchangeable. BrOnKHOrST has noted that BU IV.5.15 ‘introduces the notion of the
immutability of the self’ (2007: 233).
that something permanent or enduring cannot be found in the five aggregates.
This is not a straightforward denial of the Upaniṣadic ātman, then, but a radical
enquiry into personal identity: the teaching attempts to establish that form and
so on are affected by causes and conditions (vipariṇāmadhamma) and so cannot
constitute what could be called a ‘self’, i.e. ‘that which a person is really and
intrisically he (in contradistinction to what is adventitious)’.13 The Upaniṣadic
ātman would seem to be invoked in order to make this point. Furthermore, since
the teaching presupposes that a ‘self’ should be everlasting or permanent (nicca/
nitya), it is assumed to be some sort of spiritual identity. The teaching is therefore
a philosophical enquiry into ultimate personal identity, it being assumed that this
should be of a spiritual nature.
2. Although this teaching denies the notion of a ‘self’, since the denial is focused on the lack of ‘self’ in the five aggregates, it would not seem to state that a person is without a true identity per se.14 This is because the list of five aggregates is not an analysis of what a human being is made of. As rupert Gethin has noted, this fivefold list is instead an analysis of conditioned experience:15 [T]he five khandhas, as treated in the Nikāyas and early abhidhamma, do not exactly take on the character of a formal theory of the nature of man. The concern is not so much the presentation of an analysis of man as object, but rather the understanding of the nature of conditioned existence from the point of view of the experiencing subject. Thus at the most general level rūpa, vedanā, saññā, saṃkhārā and viññāṇa are presented as five aspects of an individual being’s experience of the world…
Sue Hamilton has similarly written that the five aggregates are ‘not a comprehensive analysis of what a human being is comprised of… rather they are factors of human experience’.16 This phenomenological understanding seems to make good sense of the textual evidence. If the five aggregates were not an analysis of the different ‘factors of human experience’, the following passage from the Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta would make no sense: Here, bhikkhus, the bhikkhu contemplates: ‘Form is thus, its arising is thus, its fading away is thus; feeling is thus, its arising is thus, its fading away is thus; apperception is thus, its arising is thus, its fading away is thus; volitions are thus, their arising is thus, their fading away is thus; consciousness is thus, its arising is thus, its fading away is thus.’17 13 This is the primary philosophical definition of the term ‘self’ in the Oxford English Dictionary.
14 This is commonly believed. According to Walpola rahula, for example, ‘Buddhism stands unique in the history of human thought in denying the existence of such a Soul, Self or Ātman.’ (1959: 51) 15 Gethin (1986: 49). 16 Hamilton (2000: 27). 17 M I, 61.3: idha bhikkhave bhikkhu: iti rupaṃ iti rūpassa samudayo iti rūpassa atthagamao; iti vedanā iti vedanāya samudayo iti vedanāya atthagamao; iti saññā iti saññāya samudayo
In this text the five aggregates are aspects of a person that can be observed.
Since a person is made up of many things that cannot be observed in this way,
it would seem that the list of five aggregates was devised precisely in order
that a person could contemplate his phenomenal nature. According to this
experiential understanding of the five aggregates, then, it would seem that the
second anātman teaching denies only that a person lacks a true identity or self
in conditioned experience, and not that there is no self per se: this is a ‘not-self’
rather than a ‘no soul’ teaching. Another understanding of the five aggregates,
however, is contained in the Vajirā Sutta, where the bhikkhunī Vajirā – rather
than the Buddha – is said to utter the following verses to Māra:
Why do you believe in a living being?
Is not this your view, Māra?
This is nothing but a heap of formations:
no being is found here. (553)
When there is a collection of parts
the word ‘chariot’ is used;
In the same way, when the aggregates exist (khandhesu santesu) the conventional term ‘being’ (is applied to them). (554) Only suffering (dukkham eva) comes into existence, And only suffering endures.
nothing apart from suffering comes into existence, And nothing apart from suffering ceases to exist. (555)18 This passage states that a person is made up of a collection of impermanent parts (khandhas) in which there is no essential being (satta), just as a chariot does not exist beyond the parts of which it consists. This is without doubt a statement of the classical ‘no self’ doctrine. Indeed Vajirā’s statement that ‘only suffering comes into existence, and only suffering endures’ is akin to Buddhaghosa’s statement that ‘there is only suffering, but nobody who suffers’,19 and to Śāntideva’s statement that ‘the person who experiences suffering does not exist’:20 all assume that there is no ‘ghost’ in the machine. How can the evidence of the Vajirā Sutta be reconciled with the second anātman teaching? Since the ‘no self’ idea is not expressed in the second anātman teaching, and since this teaching is a common feature of the early Buddhist literature, the ‘no self’ idea of the Vajirā Sutta would seem to be the more unusual teaching, and so is most probably to be understood as a later iti saññāya atthagamao; iti saṅkhārā iti saṅkhārānaṃ samudayo iti saṅkhārānaṃ atthagamao; iti viññāṇaṃ iti viññāṇassa samudayo iti viññāṇassa atthagamao. 18 S I, 296 (v. 553-55): kin nu satto ti paccesi Māra diṭṭhigatan nu te, suddhasaṅkhārapuñjo ‘yaṃ na yidha sattūpalabbhati. (553) yathā hi aṅgasambhārā hoti saddo ratho iti, evaṃ khandhesu santesu hoti satto ti sammuti. (554) dukkham eva hi sambhoti dukkhaṃ tiṭṭhati veti ca, nāññatra dukkhā sambhoti nāññatrā dukkhā nirujjhati. (555) Buddhaghosa cites some of these verses in his Visuddhimagga (xVIII.25, 27; Warren and Kosambi: 508).
19 Vis xVI.90 (Warren and Kosambi p.436): dukkham eva hi, na koci dukkhito. 20 Bcv VIII.101 (Tripathi p.164): yasya duḥkhaṃ sa nāsty.
development. If so, we could hypothesise that the ‘not-self’ doctrine of the
second anātman teaching somehow developed into the ‘no self’ teaching of
the Vajirā Sutta. The problem with this hypothesis is that there is little textual
evidence in support of it: we have no idea when, where and by whom the second
anātman teaching and the ‘no self’ doctrine were formulated. We could perhaps
take the Vajirā Sutta as evidence for an anātmavādin school in ancient Śrāvastī,
but the location of this canonical episode in Śrāvastī cannot be assumed.
Progress in this matter depends, then, on forming a better understanding of
the geographical location and chronological development of early Buddhist
thought. But even before this, we must somehow establish that no self’ doctrine
was a later development of an early period in which in which the ‘not-self’
doctrine of the second anātman teaching flourished. Fortunately, however, the
Second Sermon contains evidence suggesting exactly this development in early
Buddhist thought.
3. All accounts of the Second Sermon describe how the first five disciples of the Buddha attained liberation immediately after hearing the second anātman teaching. Before this, the five disciples are said to have attained a preliminary understanding of the dharma while listening to the First Sermon (on the Four noble Truths as the middle way between asceticism and indulgence).21 In the Pāli account it is first stated that the bhikkhu Koṇḍañña attained ‘vision into the dharma’ (dhamma-cakkhu): While this discourse was being spoken, the venerable Koṇḍañña attained this spotless and undefiled vision into the dharma (dhammacakkhu): ‘Everything that is characterised by arising is also characterised by cessation.’22
Further unspecified dharma teachings are described before the four other bhikkhus attain the same level of understanding,23 but once they do the scene is set for the liberation of the five after hearing the Second Sermon. This crucial, defining moment in the Pāli Vinaya account of Buddhist origins, is described as follows: While this discourse was being spoken, the minds of the five bhikkhus were released from the corruptions without grasping.24 21 Vin I, 10.10ff. This teaching is preserved elsewhere as the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta (S V, 420).
22 Vin I, 11.32: imasmiñ ca pana veyyākaraṇasmiṃ bhaññamāne āyasmato Koṇḍaññassa virajaṃ vītamalaṃ dhammacakkhuṃ udapādi: yaṃ kiñ ci samudayadhammaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ nirodhadhamman ti. 23 Vin I, 12.28: atha kho āyasmato ca Vappassa āyasmato ca Bhaddiyassa Bhagavatā
dhammiyā
kathāya
ovadiyamānānaṃ
anusāsiyamānānaṃ
virajaṃ
vītamalaṃ
dhammacakkhuṃ udapādi: yaṃ kiñ ci samudayadhammaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ nirodhadhamman ti.
Vin I, 13.6: atha kho āyasmato ca Mahānāmassa āyasmato ca Assajissa Bhagavatā dhammiyā kathāya ovadiyamānānaṃ anusāsiyamānānaṃ virajaṃ vītamalaṃ dhammacakkhuṃ udapādi: yaṃ kiñ ci samudayadhammaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ nirodhadhamman ti. 24 Vin I, 14.34: imasmiñ ca pana veyyākaraṇasmiṃ bhaññamāne pañcavaggiyānaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ anupādāya āsavehi cittāni vimucciṃsu.
The notion that liberation is attained when the mind is released from the
corruptions is, of course, a common feature of numerous early Buddhist texts.
Most notably, it occurs at the conclusion of the standard description of the
Buddhist path found throughout the dīgha nikāya’s Sīlakkhandhavagga.25
despite this apparent ubiquity, it is unusual that another canonical account of
the five bhikkhus’ liberation is different. According to the Ariyapariyesana Sutta
the five bhikkhus simply ‘attained nirvana’:
And then, O bhikkhus, the group of five bhikkhus, being thus exhorted
and instructed by me … attained the undefiled, unsurpassed release
from bondage that is nirvana. And the knowledge and vision arose in
them: ‘unshakeable is our release, this is our final birth, there is now no
more rebecoming.’26
This version of the five bhikkhus’ liberation is remarkable for a number of reasons. First, it is identical to the account of the Bodhisatta’s liberation also found in the Ariyapariyesana Sutta: the Bodhisatta is similarly said to have ‘attained nirvana’.27 This is the only place in the Pāli discourses where the awakening of the Bodhisatta and a bhikkhu are identically described.28 Second, the Ariyapariyesana Sutta is the only Pāli discourse in which the pericope describing the post-awakening knowledge of liberation is applied to persons apart from the newly awakened Buddha: the five bhikkhus are similarly said to recognise their liberation with the formula: ‘unshakeable is our release, this is our final birth, there is now no more rebecoming’.29 Third, there is no other account of liberation in which the expression ‘to attain nirvana’ (i.e. nibbānaṃ + adhi-gam) is used in the Pāli Suttapiṭaka.30 And fourth, this is the only Pāli Sutta which is set in the hermitage (assama) of a certain Brahmin called rammaka,31 who is not otherwise mentioned in the Pāli canon.32 These peculiarities suggest that the Ariyapariyesana Sutta contains the earliest account of the Buddha’s awakening.33
25 This account begins at d I, 62. 26 M I, 173.7ff: atha kho bhikkhave pañcavaggiyā bhikkhū mayā evaṃ ovadiyamānā evaṃ anusāsiyamānā … asaṅkiliṭṭhaṃ anuttaraṃ yogakkhemaṃ nibbānaṃ ajjhagamaṃsu. ñāṇañ ca pana nesaṃ dassanaṃ udapādi: akuppā no vimutti, ayam antimā jāti, n’ atthi dāni punabbhavo ti.
27 See n. 43 below. 28 E.g. the account of the Bodhisatta’s realisation of the three knowledges differs from the similar account of a bhikkhu’s realisation of the three knowledges in the standard long account of the Buddhist path, by using abbhaññāsiṃ (e.g. M I, 23.14ff) rather than pajānāti (d I.834.1ff). 29 See Wynne (2007: 20). See also (Wynne: 136 n.68), where I point that the pericope is very similar in the Chinese Sarvāstivādin Sūtra version of the text. For the Chinese Sarvāstivādin version of this text see Chau (1991: 153-159). 30 Wynne (2007: 20).
31 M I, 160.29: tena h’ āyusmanto yena Rammakassa brāhmaṇassa assamo ten’ upasaṅkamatha… 32 dPPn, s.v. 33 For full details see Wynne (2007: 14-25). Andre Bareau also believed this text to contain the most ancient account of the Buddha’s awakening (1963: 72-74).
If this evidence is to be believed, it would seem that the Pāli Vinaya Mahāvagga
must be the later account. But if so, how is the widespread agreement between
the two accounts be explained? This agreement can be seen, for example, in the
identical accounts of how the Buddha persuaded the five bhikkhus to receive
his teaching. Although this speech, which the Buddha is made to repeat the
obligatory three times, is narrated as a response to the fact that the five bhikkhus
address the Buddha by the term ‘sir’ (āvuso),34 it concludes as an exhortation for
the bhikkhus to receive the Buddha’s new teaching:
do not address the Tathāgata by his name or with the term ‘sir’
(āvusonāmena), bhikkhus, for a Tathāgata is an arahant and is completely
awakened. Focus your ears, bhikkhus, the immortal has been attained
(amatam adhigataṃ),35 I will instruct you, I will teach the dharma. If
you practice in accordance with this instruction, before long – in this
very life – you will understand, realise, attain and abide in the supreme
goal of the holy life, that for which noble scions go forth from home to
homelessness.
In this speech the Buddha states that he has attained the ‘immortal’ (amataṃ adhigataṃ) and will teach the five bhikkhus. In both the Ariyapariyesana Sutta and the Vinaya Mahāvagga, this statement corresponds to the language used before and after the account of the persuasion: M I, 167.30 = Vin I, 4.33: This truth (dhammo) which I have attained (adhigato) is profound, hard to perceive and understand, calm, supreme, beyond the sphere of logic, subtle and to be realised by the wise.37 M I, 168.5 = Vin I, 5.8: I have attained (adhigataṃ) this with difficulty, away now with explication!38
34 Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi (1995: 264) translate this term as ‘friend’, presumably in order to make sense of the fact that the Buddha thinks that the term is beneath him. But āvuso is derived from the Sanskrit āyuṣmant ‘long lived’, which is in Sanskrit a term of respect (MMW s.v.: ‘often applied as a kind of honorific title (especially to royal personages and Buddhist monks)’). The more interesting possibility raised by this story is that the Buddha balked at being addressed by a term suggesting worldly prestige or honour, as it does when it refers to ‘royal personages’, preferring instead the more apophatic and mystical tathāgata.
35 This is how Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi (1995: 264) translate amatam adhigataṃ aham anusāsāmi (‘…the deathless has been attained. I will teach you…’), although it could be taken as ‘I will teach the immortal that has been attained’. 36 Vin I, 9.12 = M I, 171-72: mā bhikkhave tathāgataṃ nāmena ca āvusovādena ca samudācaratha, arahaṃ bhikkhave tathāgato sammāsambuddho. odahatha bhikkhave sotaṃ, amatam adhigataṃ, aham anusāsāmi, ahaṃ dhammaṃ desemi. yathānusiṭṭhaṃ tathā paṭipajjamānā‚ na cirass’ eva yass’ atthāya kulaputtā sammad eva agārasmā anagāriyaṃ pabbajanti, tad anuttaraṃ brahmacariyapariyosānaṃ diṭṭhe va dhamme sayaṃ abhiññā sacchikatvā upasampajja viharissathā ti. 37 adhigato kho me ayaṃ dhammo gambhīro duddaso duranubodho santo paṇīto atakkāvacaro nipuṇo paṇḍitavedaṇīyo. 38 kicchena me adhigataṃ halan dāni pakāsituṃ. FULL_14-09-2009.indd 67
M I, 168.27 = Vin I, 5.31: Open this door to the immortal (amatassa
dvāraṃ), let them hear the truth to which the Spotless One has
awakened!39
M I, 169.24 = Vin I, 7.4: doors to the immortal (amatassa dvārā) have
been opened for those who listen and let their faith flow out.40
M I, 171.11 = Vin I, 8.25: I am going to the city of Kāsi to set the
wheel of dharma in motion, I will beat the drum of the immortal
(amatadundubhin) in this blind world.41
These references show that the notion of attaining (adhi-gam) the ‘immortal’ (amata) is important in both the Ariyapariyesana Sutta and the Vinaya Mahāvagga. But if the Mahāvagga really is the later account, it follows that it must have borrowed the above narrative on the attainment of the ‘immortal’ (and the decision to impart it to others) from the Ariyapariyesana Sutta. That this is so seems to be proved by the fact that the notion of attaining the ‘immortal’ is a much more firmly rooted and integral part of the Ariyapariyesana Sutta. Indeed this notion is mentioned right at the very beginning of the opening narrative in the Ariyapariyesana Sutta:
M I, 162.37: And what, O bhikkhus, is the noble search? A certain person, being himself subject to death, and understanding the danger in that which is subject to death, seeks the immortal (amataṃ), unsurpassed release from bondage that is nirvana.42 The text goes on to describe how the Bodhisatta decided to take up this ‘noble Search’:
M I, 163.9ff: I too, bhikkhus, before the awakening – when I was just an unawakened Bodhisatta … being myself subject to death, and understanding the danger in that which is subject to death, I sought the immortal (amataṃ), unsurpassed release from bondage that is nirvana.
The description of the Bodhisatta’s awakening that follows is based on exactly the same text on the attainment of the ‘immortal’: 39 apāpur’ etaṃ amatassa dvāraṃ, suṇantu dhammaṃ vimalenānubuddhaṃ. 40 apārutā tesaṃ amatassa dvārā, ye sotavanto pamuncantu saddhaṃ. 41 dhammacakkaṃ pavattetuṃ gacchāmi Kāsinaṃ puraṃ, andhabhūtasmiṃ lokasmiṃ āhanchaṃ amatadundubhin ti. 42 katamā ca bhikkhave ariyā pariyesanā? idha, bhikkhave, ekacco… attanā maraṇadhammo samāno maraṇadhamme ādīnavaṃ viditvā amataṃ anuttaraṃ yogakkhemaṃ nibbānaṃ pariyesati.
43 aham pi sudaṃ bhikkhave pubbe va sambodhā anabhisambuddho bodhisatto va samāno … attanā maraṇadhammo samāno maraṇadhamme ādīnavaṃ viditvā amataṃ anuttaraṃ yogakkhemaṃ nibbānaṃ pariyeseyyan ti.
M I, 167.9ff: O bhikkhus, being myself subject to death and understanding
the danger in that which is subject to death, I realised the immortal
(amataṃ), unsurpassed release from bondage that is nirvana.44
These sections of the Ariyapariyesana Sutta set the context for the account
of the Bodhisatta’s decision to teach that follows. The Ariyapariyesana Sutta
therefore refers to the ‘immortal’ throughout its account of the Bodhisatta’s
awakening. references to the ‘immortal’ are found in the initial conception
of the noble Search, the statement that Bodhisatta pursued this search, the
description of his awakening, the account of the Buddha’s decisions to teach,
his encounter with the five bhikkhus and finally the account of their liberation.
The sections on the ‘immortal’ contained in the Vinaya Mahāvagga, on the
other hand, are only found after the account of the Bodhisatta’s awakening.
Since the Ariyapariyesana Sutta provides the narrative context which makes
sense of the notion of ‘attaining’ the ‘immortal’, and since this idea is found
consistently throughout the narrative, there can be no doubt that the sections
on the ‘immortal’ belonged originally to this text. If so, it would seem that the
sections on the ‘immortal’ found in the Vinaya Mahāvagga were lifted directly
from the Ariyapariyesana Sutta. For some reason, however, the authors of the
Vinaya Mahāvagga deviated from the account of the five bhikkhus’ attainment
of the immortal’ and instead composed a new account in which they stated that
the minds of the five bhikkhus are liberated from the corruptions.
4. The extant Vinaya literature of the other early Buddhist sects is in agreement
with the Mahāvagga of the Pāli Vinaya. Both the Mahāsāṃghika Mahāvastu as
well as the Mūlasarvāstivādin Saṅghabhedavastu and Catuṣpariṣat Sūtra show
the same features, i.e. a basic text in which numerous references to the Buddha’s
attainment (adhi-gam) of the ‘immortal’ (amṛtam) are followed by the account
of how the minds of the five bhikkhus were liberated from the corruptions.
Thus the Mahāvastu narrates how the Buddha contemplates not teaching the
dharma he has attained with difficulty (kṛcchreṇa me adhigato),45 to which
Māra responds that the Buddha has opened the door to the immortal (apāvṛtaṃ
te amṛtasya dvāraṃ),46 a statement with which the Buddha eventually agrees
(apāvṛtaṃ me amṛtasya dvāraṃ)47 before declaring that he will go to Benares to
beat the ‘drum of immortality’ (amṛtadundubhiṃ).48 The Mahāvastu version of
the First Sermon then describes how the mind of Kauṇḍinya was released from
the corruptions first,49 before the same is said of the other four bhikṣus.50
44 so kho ahaṃ bhikkhave … attanā maraṇadhammo samāno maraṇadhamme ādīnavaṃ
viditvā amataṃ anuttaraṃ yogakkhemaṃ nibbānaṃ pariyesamāno amataṃ anuttaraṃ
yogakkhemaṃ nibbānaṃ ajjhagamaṃ.
45 Mv III.314.11: kṛcchreṇa me adhigato alaṃ dāni prakāśituṃ.
46 Mv III.317.17: apāvṛtaṃ te amṛtasya dvāraṃ, śṛnontu dharmaṃ vimalānubuddhaṃ.
47 Mv III.319.3: apāvṛtaṃ me amṛtasya dvāraṃ.
48 Mv III.327.6: Vārāṇasīṃ gamiṣyāmi āhaniṣyaṃ amṛtadundubhiṃ.
49 Mv III.337.3: imasmiṃ ca punar vyākaraṇe bhāṣyamāṇe āyuṣmata Ājñātakauṇḍinyasy’ anupādāy’ āśravebhyaś cittaṃ vimuktaṃ, caturṇāṃ bhikṣūṇāṃ virajaṃ vigatamalaṃ dharmeṣu dharmacakṣu viśuddhaṃ Aśvakisya Bhadrikasya Vāṣpasya Mahānāmsya, triṃśatīnāṃ ca devakoṭīnāṃ virajaṃ vigatamalaṃ dharmeṣu dharmacakṣu viśuddhaṃ. 50 Mv III.338.19: imasmiṃś ca puna vyākaraṇe bhāṣyamāṇe āyuṣmān Ājñātakauṇḍinyo balavaśibhavaṃ prāpuṇesi. caturṇāṃ bhikṣūṇāṃ anupādāy’ āśravebhyaś cittāni
The key events in the Mūlasarvāstivādin texts (the Saṅghabhedavastu and
Catuṣpariṣat Sūtra) are very similar: the Buddha contemplates a life of ease
without teaching after reflecting that it would be hard for others to understand
the profound dharma he has attained (adhigato me dharmo gambhīro),51 Māra
requests that he open the door to the immortal (amṛtasya dvāraṃ),52 the Buddha
replies that the dharma which has been difficult to attain (kṛcchreṇa me adhigato)
will not be easily understood by others,53 before declaring that he will open the
door to the immortal (apāvariṣye amṛtasya dvāraṃ).54 The narrative concludes
with the mind of Kauṇḍinya being released from the corruptions first,55 followed
by the same for the minds of the other four bhikṣus.
There can be little doubt that these Sanskrit Vinaya accounts derive from the same source which was originally the basis of the parallel Pāli Vinaya account, i.e. an old, pre-sectarian Vinaya biography. And it can hardly be denied that the authors of this pre-sectarian Vinaya biography based many of its particulars on an older Sūtra discourse. The older Sūtra account, contained in the Ariyapariyesana Sutta and its Sarvāstivādin parallel, was followed only up to a certain point: its narrative of the Buddha’s initial reluctance to teach, the request of the god Brahma that he should do so, the Buddha’s pondering about whom to teach and finally his persuasion of the five bhikkhus were all taken over from the pre-sectarian version of the Ariyapariyesana Sutta. But vimuktāni āyuṣmato Aśvakisya Bhadrikasya Vāṣpasya Mahānāmasya, paṃcāṅgikānāṃ ca devakoṭīnāṃ virajaṃ vigatamalaṃ dharmeṣu dharmacakṣūṃṣi viśuddhāni, āttamanā āyuṣmantā paṃcakā bhadravargikā bhagavato bhāṣitam abhinande. 51 SbhV I.128.23 (see CPS 7.10/Waldschmidt p. 108): atha bhagavata etad abhavat: adhigato me dharmo gambhīro gambīrāvabhāso durdṛśo duravabodhaḥ, atarkyo ’tarkyāvacaraḥ sūkṣmo nipuṇapaṇḍitavijñavedaṇīyaḥ. taṃ ced ahaṃ pareṣāṃ ārocayeyam taṃ ca pare na vijānīyuḥ, sa mama syād vighātaḥ, syād bhramaḥ, cetaso ‘nudaya eva, yan nv ahaṃ ekākī araṇye pravaṇe dṛṣṭadharmasukhavihārayogam anuyukto vihareyam iti. Compare Mv III.314.1: gambhīro ayaṃ mama dharmaḥ abhisaṃbuddho nipuṇo sukhumo duranubodho atarkāvacaro paṇḍitavedanīyo sarvalokapratyanīko… Mv III.314.6: ahaṃ ca ne pareṣāṃ deśayeyaṃ pare khu me na vibhāvayensuḥ so me syā vighāṭaḥ. yaṃ nūnāhaṃ eko araṇyaparvate tuṣṇībhūto vihareyaṃ.
Also compare the Pāli M I, 167.30 = Vin I, 4.32. 52 SbhV 129.10-11: apāvṛṇīṣva amṛtasya dvāram, vadasva dharmaṃ virajonubaddham. CPS 8.9 (Waldschmidt p. 114): avavṛṇīṣva amṛtasya dvāram, vadasva dharmaṃ virajānubaddham.
53 SbhV 129.13: kṛcchreṇa me adhigato ’khilo brahman pradālya vai, bhavarāgaparīttair hi nāyaṃ dharmaḥ susaṃbuddhaḥ.
CPS 8.11 (Waldschmidt p. 114): kṛcchreṇa me adhigataḥ khilā brahman pradālitāḥ, bhavarāgaparītair hi nāyaṃ dharmaḥ susaṃbuddhaḥ.
54 SbhV 130.8: apāvariṣye amṛtasya dvāraṃ ye śrotukāmāḥ praṇudantu kāṅkṣāḥ. CPS 8.16 (Waldschmidt p. 118): avāvariṣye amṛtasya dvāraṃ ye śrotukāmāḥ pramodantu śrāddhāḥ.
55 SbhV 138.6: asmin khalu dharmaparyāye bhāṣyamāṇe āyuṣmata Ājñātakauṇḍinyasy’ ānupādāy’ āśravebhyaś cittaṃ vimuktam; avaśiṣṭānāṃ tu pañcakānāṃ bhikṣūṇāṃ virajo vigatamalaṃ dharmeṣu dharmacakṣur utpannam. CPS 14.11 (Waldschmidt p. 162): asmin khalu (dharmaparyāye bhāṣyamāṇa āyuṣmata Ājñātakauṇḍinyasyānupādāyāsravebhyaś cittaṃ vimuktam. a)vaśiṣṭānāṃ pañca(kānāṃ bhikṣūṇāṃ virajo vigatamalaṃ dharmeṣu dharmacakṣur utpannam. 56 SbhV 139.14. asmin khalu dharmaparyāye bhāṣyamāṇe avaśiṣṭaṇāṃ pañcakānāṃ bhikṣūṇām ānupādāy’ āśravebhyaś cittāni vimuktāni. CPS 15.19 (Waldschmidt p. 170): (a)smin khalu dha(r)maparyā(ye bhāṣyamāṇe ‘vaśiṣṭaṇāṃ pañcakānāṃ bhikṣūṇām anupādāyāśravebhyaś cittaṃ vimuktam.
on top of this old narrative, the authors of the Vinaya biography substituted
a different account of the five bhikkhus’ liberation. According to the authors
of the old Vinaya biography, liberation is achieved through a contemplation
of Buddhist doctrine, a contemplation which effects the liberation of the mind
from the corruptions. What does this mean?
5. If the notion of the mind’s liberation from the corruptions was an intentional deviation from an earlier account, we should regard it as a doctrinally motivated change. But what doctrinal understanding does this change indicate? What does it mean to speak of the mind being liberated rather than the person? It surely indicates a tendency towards reductionism which is found throughout Buddhist literature past and present. A person is routinely reduced to the ‘(awakening) mind’, for example, throughout Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra:57 The Awakening Mind should be understood to be of two kinds; in brief: the Mind resolved on Awakening and the Mind proceeding towards Awakening. (I.15) The distinction between these two should be understood by the wise in the same way as the distinction is recognized between a person who desires to go and one who is going, in that order.58 (I.16)
Should their mind become angry or displeased on account of me, may even that be the cause of their always achieving every goal.59 (III.15) My mind seeks acquisitions, reverence, or renown, or again wants an audience and attention. Therefore I remain like a block of wood.60 (V.51)
Wherever the mind, deluded about happiness, goes for pleasure, a thousandfold suffering will arise and attend it.61 (VIII.18) These statements suggest that the mind is a sub-entity of a person that can have the resolve for awakening and proceed to it; it can also become angry, seek acquisitions and pleasure, be deluded and so on. As one of the most important Indian Buddhist texts, the Bodhiacaryāvatāra is an exemplary source of ancient Mahāyāna reductionism. With regard to ancient Theravāda Buddhism the same could be said of Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga. reductionism can be clearly seen, for example, in chapter fourteen:
57 Translations of Bodhicaryāvatāra verses are taken from Crosby and Skilton (1996). 58 Bcv I.15-16 (Tripathi pp. 11-12): tad bodhicittaṃ dvividhaṃ vijñātavyaṃ samāsataḥ, bodhipraṇidhicittaṃ ca bodhiprasthānam eva ca (15). gantukāmasya gantuś ca yathā bhedaḥ pratīyate, tathā bhedo ‘nayor jñeyo yāthāsaṃkhyena paṇḍitaiḥ (16). 59 Bcv III.15 (Tripathi p. 41): yeṣāṃ kruddhā prasannā vā mām ālambhya matir bhavet, teṣāṃ sa eva hetuḥ syān nityaṃ sarvārthasiddhaye. 60 Bcv V.51 (Tripathi p. 64): lābhasatkārakīrtyarthi parivārārthi vā punaḥ, upasthānārthi me cittaṃ tasmāt tiṣṭhāmi kāṣṭhavat. 61 Bcv VIII.18 (Tripathi p. 145): yatra yatra ratiṃ yāti manaḥ sukhavimohitam, tat tat sahasraguṇitaṃ duḥkhaṃ bhūtvopatiṣṭhati.
Consciousness knows an object as dark blue or yellow, and brings about
the penetration of its characteristics. But even though it endeavours, it is
not able to manifest the path. Understanding knows an object in the way
already stated, and brings about the penetration of its characteristics. By
endeavouring it manifests the path.62
reductionism can be taken back further than these classical Buddhist texts,
however. The entire Abhidharma, as expressed in the extant Abhidharma texts
of various Buddhist sects, is little more than a vast enterprise in reductionism.
As an exhaustive attempt to explain the world in terms of its mental and physical
events, the Abhidharma effectively eliminates the human person as a whole
from religio-philosophical enquiry. The Theravādin account of consciousness
is especially reductionistic, as can be seen from the following explanation of
Gethin:
[T]he basic Abhidharma conception of how the mind functions is this: a collection of at least eight dharmas (consciousness and associated mental factors) arises for a moment and then falls away to be immediately followed by the next combination of consciousness and associated mental factors. Each combination is conscious of just one object.63 The Abhidharma shows that reductionism developed early in the history of Buddhism. But what does it mean? Both the Bodhiacaryāvatāra and Visuddhimagga suggest that the refusal to speak of the person as a whole is based on the belief that there is no essential aspect to a person. In the Bodhicaryāvatāra, the existence of an enduring spiritual substance or self is denied as a matter of course:
The continuum of consciousness, like a queue, and the combination of constituents, like an army, are not real. The person who experiences suffering does not exist. To whom does that suffering belong?64 (VIII.101)
Through habituation there is the understanding of ‘I’ regarding the drops of sperm and blood of two other people, even though there is in fact no such thing.65 (VIII.111)
The Visuddhimagga states exactly the same idea with the dictum that ‘there is only suffering, but nobody who suffers’.66 This evidence suggests that the 62 Vis xIV.3 (Warren and Kosambi p. 369): viññāṇaṃ nīlaṃ pītakan ti ārammaṇañ ca jānāti lakkhaṇapaṭivedhañ ca pāpeti, ussakitvā pana maggapātubhāvaṃ pāpetuṃ na sakkoti. paññā vuttanayavasena ārammaṇañ ca jānāti lakkhaṇapaṭivedhañ ca pāpeti, ussakitvā maggapātubhāvañ ca pāpeti. 63 Gethin (1998: 211). 64 Bcv VIII.101 (Tripathi p.145): saṃtānaḥ samudāyaś ca paṅktisenādivin mṛṣā, yasya duḥkhaṃ sa nāsty asmāt kasya tat svaṃ bhaviṣyati? 65 Bcv VIII.111 (Tripathi p.145): abhyāsād anyadīyeṣu śukraśoṇitabinduṣu, bhavaty aham iti jñānasamaty api hi vistuni. 66 Vis xVI.90 (Warren and Kosambi p.436): dukkham eva hi, na koci dukkhito…
reductionist tendency in Buddhist thought is related to the belief that a person
has no self.
6. A similar relationship between reductionism and the ‘no self’ doctrine can
be seen in numerous modern Buddhist writings. In Kornfield’s collection of
the teachings of modern Theravādin masters (Kornfield 1977), reductionism is
common. For example:
Mind as a rule takes delight in dwelling on the sight of particular features
and forms. When they are absent, mind is wanting in satisfaction. (p.75:
Mahasi Sayadaw)
And only the mind which is cleansed of the five elements of sensual lust, ill will, sloth agitation, and doubt can function properly to realize Vipassana insight. (p.88: Sunlun Sayadaw) This very joy induces clarity and freshness, mental calm and stillness, and serves, naturally and automatically, to give the mind the ability to think and introspect. (pp.127-28: Achaan Buddhadasa) The wandering mind itself can also show the truth of the three characteristics of experience. (p.148: Achaan naeb) When the heart views the body in the foregoing way, with wisdom, it will become wearied both of one’s body and the bodies of other people and animals. (p.177: Achaan Maha Boowa) The mind knows all formations as changing and limited, and rushes forward to the ‘conditionless element’. The mind is stirred with regard to the inherent unsatisfactoriness of all formations of existence, and rushes forward to the ‘desireless element’. The mind regards all things as empty, as foreign, and rushes forward to the ‘void-element’. (p.205: Taungpulu Sayadaw)
In all these examples it is the mind or heart – rather than the person – that is said to ‘take delight’, ‘think and introspect’, ‘becomes wearied’, ‘know’ things and ‘regard’ things in a particular way. Such statements would be absurd to a person unfamiliar with the reductionistic tendency in Buddhist thought, since it makes no sense to predicate cognitive acts to anything other than the person as a whole. This feature is not just typical of modern Theravāda Buddhism, however, but it is also common in modern Mahāyāna thought. We can consider the following examples from a recent publication of the Fourteenth dalai lama (1994):
We gain the omniscient state of mind, which perceives the entire range of phenomena without any obstruction. (p. 83) next is ignorance, which misconceives the identity of the Four noble Truths, the law of karma, and so forth. In this particular context,
ignorance refers to a mental factor that is totally ignorant of the nature
of the Three Jewels and the law of karma. (p.122)
In the last step, the actual development of bodhicitta, the mind aspiring
to achieve enlightenment for others, you should not be satisfied by seeing
the importance of enlightenment for the sake of others alone. (p.145)
Ethics is a state of mind that abstains from engaging in any situation or
event that would prove harmful to others. (p.161)
Effort is the state of mind that delights in virtuous actions. (p.168)
Wisdom analyses the nature of phenomena. (p.179)
In these examples the dalai lama routinely attributes cognition to a part of the person instead of the person himself: states of mind or being, or the ‘mind aspiring to achieve enlightenment for others’ (bodhicitta), and even abstract nouns as such ‘ignorance’, ‘ethics’ and ‘effort’ are all, apparently, subjects of experience. The reductionistic style of thinking would seem to be engrained in the modern Buddhist mindset. And just as the Bodhicaryāvatāra and Visuddhimagga indicate that reductionism goes hand in hand with the no self belief, so too is this belief common in modern Buddhist writings, e.g. in Kornfield’s collection of modern Theravāda teachings: When the meditator comes to know the difference between a bodily process and a mental process, should he be a simple man, he would reflect from direct experience thus: “There is the rising and knowing it, the falling and knowing it, and so on and so forth. There is nothing else besides them. The words man or woman refer to the same process; there is no person or soul.” (p.67: Mahasi Sayadaw)
In reality, ‘self’ is but a very rapid continuity of birth and decay of mental states and matter. (p.134: Achaan naeb) If one analyses his own being into its constituent parts, either by dividing it into the aggregates of body, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness, or by other more minute divisions, one will finally realize the truth that there is no self or soul anywhere to be found. (p.188: Taungpulu Sayadaw) Other than these three co-existing elements [[[Wikipedia:cognition|cognitive]] faculty, perceived object and consciousness] there is nothing else, no see-er, no ‘I’, ‘you’, or ‘he’ who sees. (p.214: Mogok Sayadaw) Much the same perspective is found in the writings of the fourteenth dalai lama, e.g.: ‘The Buddha taught that no such self exists and that our belief in an independent self is the root cause of all suffering.’67 reductionism and the 67 dalai lama (1994: 111).
no self belief would seem, then, to be parts of a single doctrinal understanding.
Indeed the two are very closely related in the modern Theravādin and Mahāyāna
writings cited above, especially in the teachings of the Theravādin masters
covered by Kornfield:
But really you are only a combination of elements or a group of changing
aggregates. If the mind is free it does not discriminate. no big and small,
no you and me. There is nothing. Anatta, we say, or non-self. really, in
the end there is neither atta nor anatta. (p.45: Achaan Chaa)
At this stage, he becomes satisfied with the knowledge that there is no I,
mine, self, and that only formations arise; formations only are cognising
other formations. (p.79: Mahasi Sayadaw)
We must realize that the wandering mind is a mental state, or we will
mistakenly think it is ‘I’ wandering about and thus the idea of personality
will remain instead of being eliminated. (p.140: Achaan naeb)
Hence it is of extreme importance to realize that when we hear or see,
it is simply the mental state or process which hears or sees. (p.147:
Achaan naeb)
Thus, analytic knowledge developed in Vipassana sees all beings not as permanent souls or personalities. (p.196: Taungpulu Sayadaw) Feeling must not be personified with ‘I’, ‘my’ feeling. It is feeling that feels. It is simply a process. There is no ‘I’ that feels. (p.229: Mogok Sayadaw)
In these statements the reductionistic style of discourse is connected to the belief in the non–existence of the self; both are inextricably linked and presumed to be basic Buddhist truths. A similar relationship between reductionism and a belief in the non-existence of the ‘self’ can be seen in following statement of the dalai lama in The Way to Freedom (p.124):
If the ignorance that misconceives the self is a mistaken consciousness, it can be eliminated by correcting the mistake. This can be accomplished by generating within our minds a wisdom that realizes the direct opposite of that state of mind, a wisdom realizing that there is no such intrinsically existent self. When we compare these two states of mind – one believing in an intrinsically existent self, the other perceiving the absence of such a self – the apprehension of self might initially appear very strong and powerful. But because it is a mistaken consciousness, it lacks logical support. The other type of mind, the understanding of selflessness, might be very weak at the initial stage, but it has logical support. Sooner or later this wisdom realizing selflessness is going to gain the upper hand.
In this example, the reduction of the perceiving agent to ‘mistaken consciousness’
or ‘states of mind’ is connected to a denial of the ‘self’s’ existence. It is hard
to doubt, then, that the reductionist tendency of these modern Theravāda and
Mahāyāna teachings is intimately connected to the Buddhist belief that there
is no self, just as seems to be the case in the ancient Theravāda and Mahāyāna
writings of Buddhaghosa and Śāntideva considered above. Indeed we would
not be far wrong if we were to suggest that reductionism developed in Buddhist
thought precisely from the no self belief, in a manner suggested by Walpola rahula as follows:
There is another popular question: If there is no Self, no Ātman, who realizes nirvāṇa? Before we go on to nirvāṇa, let us ask the question: Who thinks now, if there is no Self? We have seen earlier that it is the thought that thinks, that there is no thinker behind the thought. In the same way, it is wisdom (paññā), realization, that realizes.68 7. The above evidence shows that in the absence of a soul, Buddhist thinkers attribute cognitive acts to a person’s most important cognitive faculty: the mind. This is not to say that they do away with everyday discourse in which it is said that a person acts, thinks and perceives. It means, rather, that this conventional discourse is supplemented by the tendency to speak in the more philosophically correct discourse of the ultimate truth that there is no ‘self’. Thus Buddhist teachers tend to account for psychological processes not by using language correctly, in which the only proper subject of experience is the human being as a whole, but from the perspective of the ultimate Buddhist truth that a person lacks an everlasting or essential substance. reductionism, in other words, is the logical counterpart to the no self doctrine, the flip side of the anātmavādin coin. This is true of ancient Buddhist thinkers such as Buddhaghosa and Śāntideva, as much as it is true of modern Buddhist teachers such as the dalai lama. We have seen that this reductionistic tendency is well developed in the canonical Abhidharma works, and if so it would seems that its origin is to be sought in the earlier canonical books of the Sutta and Vinaya Piṭakas. As a deviation from an older understanding of how a person realises (adhi- gam) the immortal (amata) nirvana, conclusion of the Second Sermon marks a significant development in Buddhist thought. The authors of the Vinaya account would not have veered from an old account to create a new and fundamentally different version of the five bhikkhus’ liberation without good reason. The use of the reductionistic formula was intentional, and if so it must surely indicate a new and different doctrinal perspective. The new doctrinal position, it seems, involved a reluctance to speak of liberation as something attained by a person: the authors of the pre-sectarian Vinaya biography rejected a strongly stated ‘personalistic’ description of the five bhikkhus’ liberation, and replaced it with what looks like a reductionistic account. And if reductionism is the logical counterpart of the ‘no self’ doctrine, it would seem that the Vinaya authors were anātmavādins: they believed that the Buddha had taught the non-existence of the ‘self’. Moreover, it would seem that this belief was read into the paradigmatic anātman teaching that there is no ātman/attā in the five aggregates, for it is this 68 rahula (1959: 42).
teaching that triggers the reductionistic account of the five bhikkhus’ liberation
in the Second Sermon. The Second Sermon is therefore proof that an important
doctrinal change had taken place in early Buddhist circles. The old teaching that
no ātman/attā can be found in the five aggregates was at some point taken to
indicate that a person lacks a ‘self’ per se. In other words, a ‘not-self’ teaching
had developed into a ‘no self’ teaching. It would thus seem correct to believe
that the Vajirā Sutta represents a relatively late stratum in the Pāli Suttapiṭaka.
Its ‘no self’ doctrine cannot be taken back to the Buddha, but was of such
influence that it came to define the Buddhist mainstream for more than two
thousand years.
Abbreviations
Bcv
Bodhicaryāvatāra (see Tripathi 1998)
BU
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (see Olivelle 1998)
CPS
Catuṣpariṣat Sūtra (see Waldschmidt)
d
dīgha nikāya
dPPn
Dictionary of Pali Proper Names, G.P. Malasekera.
M
Majjhima nikāya
MMW
A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Monier Monier-Williams
Mv
Mahāvastu (see Senart)
S
Saṃyutta nikāya
SbhV
Saṅghabhedavastu (see Gnoli)
Vin
Vinaya
Vis
Visuddhimagga (see Warren and Kosambi)
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