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Emptiness and Liberation in the Pure Land

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Otani University Academic Repository / 大谷大学学術情報リポジトリ

The Eastern Buddhist 46/1: 79–137©2017 The Eastern Buddhist SocietyI wouldlIke to express my gratitude to Christopher I. Beckwith, Robert Kritzer, Sumi Lee, Charles Ramble, Lambert Schmithausen, Iain Sinclair, and Ryan Ward for their generous assistance. Special thanks are due to A. Charles Muller, for his advice, for providing me with an unpublished translation of Wonhyo’s commentary on the shorter Sukhāvatīvyūha-sūtra, and for his years of research on Wonhyo’s works. Without his publications, this article would have been impossible.

Research on this paper was supported by the Academy of Korean Studies’ grant AKS-2012-AAZ-104, funded by the Ministry of Education, Science and Tech-nology, Republic of Korea. This article is dedicated to Burkhard Quessel (University of Ham-burg, British Library), a living treasure of inspiration and support. 1 The term “systematics” and its derivatives are used in this article in the sense of theoretical organization and philosophical advancement of religious ideas.

See also Keenan 1987, p. 29.Emptiness and Liberation in the Pure Land: A Reconsideration of the Views of Asaṅga and WonhyoAc hI m BAy e rAim and Scope of This ArticleInABoutthefourthcenturyce, the Buddhist scholar Asaṅga (c. 315–390) provided a rational, scholastic, and theoretical basis for the doctrines of the Pure Land sutras. Before Asaṅga, Mahayana sutras had propounded the perspective of rebirth in one of several pure Buddha lands, most notably Sukhāvatī, showing only rudimentary attempts at a system-atization of these doctrines. This article contains an outline of Asaṅga’s systematics and their later reception by the Korean scholar Wonhyo 元曉(617–686 CE).1 In addition, some glimpses of Sukhāvatī doctrines in con-temporary Mahayana Buddhism will be provided, referring firstly to the views of Nakamura Hajime, and further below to those of Thích Nhất Hạnh and Dennis Hirota.

THE EASTERN BUDDHIST 46, 180In order to assess the premodern Pure Land thought of Asaṅga and Won-hyo, exemplary passages from their writings are presented and evaluated, along with some of the comments by Vasubandhu (c. 330–410) on Asaṅga’s views. The analysis will focus on the question of how these writers align the ontology and soteriology of the Pure Lands with their understanding of Mahayana systematics in general.Methodological ConsiderationsEver since its first English publication in 1980, Nakamura Hajime’s Indian Buddhism has remained a standard companion to the study of Buddhism in its homeland.

Nakamura relates the history of Buddhism in ancient India, organized into dense and concise sections, and provides solid bibliographical references for further research. An updated version of this standard work has not yet been produced, and thus the original edition of 1980 remains among the indispensable sources for research in this field. Though mostly con-cerned with a factual view on ancient history, Nakamura exceptionally dis-cusses developments in research history, thus providing a minimal amount of “discourse analysis,” as we might call it nowadays.

Notably, in his sec-tion on Pure Land texts and traditions, Nakamura, in his usual conciseness, includes some remarks that surpass mere fact-finding about ancient cultural history: “Now time has elapsed. How should contemporary Pure Land Bud-dhists interpret [the] Pure Land? Why is it that Pure Land Buddhism is not welcomed in the West?”2 Nakamura does not answer this question directly.

Rather, he concludes his section on Sukhāvatī texts by saying: However, more intellectual and sophisticated Pure Land Bud-dhism in later days in various countries could not be satisfied with the figure of Amitābha related hyperbolically in scriptures. What is Amitābha? Is he a person, or a principle? Some of them adopted the interpretation that his essential body is dharma, the universal law.

The idea of the Pure Land also had various unclear points, and it caused a controversy in later days whether [the] Pure Land is a Reward Land or a Transformation Land.3Quite surely, Nakamura’s question of why Pure Land Buddhism did not receive a warm reception in the West is not intended to be merely a “dis-interested search for truth”4 about the history of Buddhist culture. It is at 2 Nakamura 1980, p. 207.3 Ibid., pp. 208–9. On this debate, see also Tanaka 1990, pp. 105–6.4 Russell 1945, p. 835.


BAYER: EMPTINESS AND LIBERATION81the same time a question about the future of Buddhism, with far-reaching implications for the future of Buddhist studies as an academic field. This question of persisting relevance has motivated the production of this article and delineated its aim and scope, under the presupposition that an accurate understanding of the past provides the most solid foundation for decisions in the present with consequences in the future.

As is common in other fields of science, I conduct basic research here in the hope that it may help to develop practical solutions. The present study is “disinterested” only insofar as an attempt is made to assess the historical facts as objectively as possible and thereby shed more light on disputed topics, while keeping in mind that stud-ies in the history of thought have in recent decades been criticized for a lack of objectivity and self-reflection.6 Awareness of the motivation underlying any kind of academic writing does indeed help in minimizing bias, but be that as it may, this article is primarily written with the pragmatic aim of gain-ing reliable information about premodern and modern Pure Land thought.

Some further words on methodology are necessary with regard to another point that has been the subject of recent debates: when studying the Pure Land traditions, we recognize a considerable gap in education and ambi-tion between those who devised the pertinent texts and religious practices, on the one hand, and a significant proportion of the followers for whom these were meant, on the other. In recent decades, it has rightly been ques-tioned whether it is legitimate to study the writings of the erudite few while neglecting the culture of the common people, the vast majority. In fact, I admire many of the rather anthropological studies of Buddhism for their clarity and profundity,7 and their scheme seems to me just as valid as the 5 These considerations apply to premodern Pure Land thought as a whole.

More specifi-cally, Indian Pure Land thought has been outlined in the framework of a recent publication on Tibetan Pure Land culture (Halkias 2013). A thorough evaluation of Halkias’s publication made a swift reassessment of the respective sources seem sensible. Nonetheless, although I will consistently refer to the pertinent pages of his work, it seemed more beneficial to pres-ent new translations and interpretations rather than discuss Halkias’s views and methodol-ogy. For a critical review, see Jones 2014, p.

The academic discourse about objectivism and subjectivism in research methodology, which had its peak in the late 1980s, has been summarized and evaluated by Sokal and Bric-mont (1999, p. 16). I agree with the authors’ assessment and, unable to go into detail here, warmly recommend their article to the interested reader.7 See, for example, Mumford’s (1989) reflections on the cultural exchanges between Gurung shamanist funeral rites and Tibetan Buddhist rites in two neighboring Himalayan villages or Hodous’s (1924) records of conversations about Buddhism during his 1901–1917 stay in China.


THE EASTERN BUDDHIST 46, 182philological approach followed in this article.8 Still, when studying ancient culture, we must acknowledge that globally, most regions have shifted from more than ninety percent illiteracy in premodern times to more than ninety percent literacy today;9 the former majority has now become the minor-ity, at least in the countries to which Pure Land Buddhism has spread. This development is one of several reasons that commend pursuing both anthro-pology and philology on an equal footing.The gap between authors and followers seems to play a role, for example, in the disputed question of whether Pure Land practices aim at rebirth in the Pure Land as the final goal, or whether rebirth in the Pure Land is just a means to achieving nirvana, which in some passages is specified as full Buddhahood, the non-abiding (Skt. apratiṣṭhita) nirvana.10 While the sources analyzed in this article clearly affirm the latter, the philologist has to be aware that there were (and are) followers aiming at the former, often less for themselves but rather for their parents and ancestors.

Keeping this in mind, the current article will follow Nakamura’s suggestion and trace some of the more “intellectual and sophisticated” theories on the existence of the Pure Land and its place on the Buddhist path.12Ontology: Mind, Matter, and Emptiness in the Pure Lands In the passage quoted above, Nakamura mentions several philosophical issues of actuality, two of which seem most essential: firstly, whether the Buddha Amitābha is, in Nakamura’s phrasing, a “principle,” and secondly “whether his essential body is dharma, the universal law.” If both questions were to be answered in the positive, then what would this principle, this universal law, comprise concretely? In other words, what principle could the Buddha Amitābha symbolize? The possible interpretations are probably innumerable: compassion, wisdom, benevolent guidance, care for the deceased of previous generations, and other principles are available to the exegete. Here, I would like to focus on what is likely the most central principle in 8 See also Kapstein’s (2014, p. 3) balanced view on this issue.9 Suzuki (1997, pp. 72, 74), for example, records a poem in praise of the nenbutsu念仏composed in the first half of the twentieth century, saying, “As I am illiterate, I dictate it, and my son writes it down.” 10 On nirvana in Sukhāvatī, see, for example, Harvey 2013, pp. 165, 216. Buswell and Lopez (2013, s.v. Sukhāvatīvyūhasūtra) rather taciturnly state that “all of the beings born there will achieve enlightenment in their next lifetime.” 11 See also Bayer 2013, pp. 77–81.12 Several fundamental methodological issues cannot be addressed here; again, I can only recommend the above mentioned treatment by Sokal and Bricmont (1999, esp. p. 2).


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Mahayana Buddhist thought, the “highest meaning” (Skt. paramārtha), which is, essentially, emptiness (Skt. śūnyatā) and its complete understand-ing. In other words, it is indeed the dharmakāya. Already one of the oldest Mahayana texts, the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa, contains a wealth of passages that describe the Pure Lands as empty or illusory, just like our ordinary world is ultimately, but only ultimately, empty:13The [[[Tathāgatas]]] purify the Buddha fields,Perceiving of the activities of beings Just as the field of space,Not having the conception of beings as beings.14In terms of the body of a Buddha, the same text teaches:Venerable Ānanda, the Tathāgatas have the dharmakāya [as their body], not the body of the flesh (āmiṣa). The Tathāgatas have the supramundane body because they have completely transcended (samatikrāntāḥ) all mundane dharmas. . . . The body of the Bud dha is not composed15 and [it has] passed beyond all verbal des-ignations.1613 Cf. Halkias 2013, p. 10.14Vimalakīrti-nirdeśas (ch. 7, par. 7, verse 15): buddhakṣetrāṇi śodhenti sa[t]tvānāṃ caritaṃ yathā / ākāśakṣetrānuprāptā na sa[t]tve sa[t]tvasaṃjñinaḥ //. Cf. the translation of T no. 475, 14: 550a1–2 by McRae (2004, p. 154): “Although he understands that the buddha lands / And sentient beings are empty / He always practices purifying his land / Teaching the hosts of beings.”15 My rendering “composed” adheres closely to the etymology of saṃskṛta in the sense of “making, producing” (kṛ) by means of putting “together” (saṃ; to the same effect, Tib. ’dus byas).

This does not necessarily imply that the object thus “composed” consists of a combina-tion of several material or spiritual substances. Especially in Buddhist usage, a saṃskṛta phenomenon can be “conditioned” in a merely abstract way, too, namely conditioned by causes that are no longer present in the phenomenon. When understood in that way, the prefix saṃno longer adds the more palpable connotation of “together” to the word, but rather the well-attested, more abstract, and surely secondary, connotation of “finished, complete.” The Chinese equivalent youwei 有爲 (Yokoyama and Hirosawa 1996, s.v.), for example, does not express any combinative connotation.

Vimalakīrti-nirdeśas (ch. 3, par. 45): api tu bhadantānanda dharmakāyās tathāgatā nāmiṣakāyāḥ / lokottarakāyās tathāgatāḥ sarvalokadharmasamatikrāntāḥ / [ . . . ] asaṃskṛtas tathāgatasya kāyaḥ sarvasaṃkhyāvigataḥ. Although the situation seems to be quite com-plex (see Vimalakīrti-nirdeśas, p. xiii), the translators into Tibetan appear to have misread sarvasaṃkhyāvigataḥ as sarvasaṃskāravigataḥ (see ibid., n. 2). Hence Thurman 1976, p. 33: “The body of a Tathāgata is uncompounded and free of all formative activity.” Cf. translation of T no. 475, 14: 542a by McRae (2004, p. 107). THE EASTERN BUDDHIST 46, 186This applies equally to both the Pure Lands and the body of the Buddhas.

The same idea is expressed in the Vajracchedikā, in a passage that reads:The Bhagavat spoke: Subhūti, if any bodhisattva said, “I will bring about arrays (vyūhāḥ) of [[[pure]]] fields,” he would speak wrong. Why is that so? [What people call] “the arrays of fields, the arrays of fields”: these are taught by the Tathāgata to be non-arrays (avyūhāḥ).23While emptiness and nonduality appear as commonplace principles through-out the literature of Madhyamaka and classical Yogācāra,24 we find more specific Yogācāra doctrines in Asaṅga’s commentary to the Vajracchedikā:25Because they are the outcome (niṣyanda)26 of wisdom ( jñāna),Because they are mere cognition (vijñaptimātrata),

He does not discern (udgraha)27 the [[[Buddha]]] fields.Because they have no shape and because they are supreme,They are thought to be, by nature, non-array as well as array.2823Vajracchedikā, section 10b (my translation);

Sanskrit according to Conze 1957, p. 35: bhagavān āha / yaḥ kaścit subhūte bodhisattva evaṃ vaded / ahaṃ kṣetra-vyūhān niṣpādayiṣyāmīti / sa vitathaṃ vadet / tat kasya hetoḥ / kṣetra-vyūhāḥ kṣetra-vyūhā iti subhūte ’vyūhās te tathāgatena bhāṣitāḥ. Cf. Halkias (2013, pp. 10–11 and p. 220, n. 20).24 In my usage, “classical Yogācāra” refers to those segments of the Yogācāra tradition adhering to the doctrines of ālayavijñāna, the three natures (trisvabhāva), and the view of subject and object as mind only (cittamātra).

See Bayer 2010, p. 28, n. 67.25 On this text, see, for example, Nakamura 1980, p. 256. Cf. Halkias 2013, p. 12, and p. 249, n. 149.26 “Outcome” (niṣyanda) here carries the connotation of an outcome that shares important characteristics of its cause (Tucci 1956, p. 63: Ch. version 1, xi習, version 2, liu流; Tib. rgyu mthun). See also Bayer 2010, p. 343, n. 131. Keenan’s (1989, p. 38) translation, “nothing but constructions flowing from wisdom,” accurately renders the metaphorical implication of /syand, “flow.”27 “Discerning” (ud-/grah) usually refers to grasping (/grah) the specific characteristics of an item out of (ud-) mere sense data, which is a function of the skandha of apperception (saṃjñā).

See Bayer 2010, p. 315, n. 41.28 My translation. Tucci 1956, p. 63, verse 20: jñānaniṣyandavijñaptimātratvāt kṣetranodgrahaḥ / avigrahatvād agratvād avyūhavyūhatā matā. Tucci proposes an emenda-tion to avyūha[ṃ] vyūhatā. While an anusvāra can easily vanish on a manuscript, the com-pound avyūhavyūhatā goes along well with the Tibetan and Chinese versions. This reading would even support Tucci’s translation “the arrangement (vyūha) of these fields is said to be essentially a non-arrangement (avyūha)” (p. 103). Cf. Halkias 2013, p. 12.


BAYER: EMPTINESS AND LIBERATION87Cause and effect described in this reasoning appear to be similar to the process described in the Triṃśikā (hereafter, Thirty Verses): first, the nature of phenomena is discerned as mere cognition, a realization which then leads to the realization of their ultimate nonduality. Unlike the worldly phenomena mentioned in the Thirty Verses, phenomena in the Pure Lands are created by a Buddha’s wisdom.

Asaṅga further describes various attributes of a Pure Land in his *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha (hereafter, MSg), for example in the fol-lowing passage:It has arisen from supreme, supramundane wholesome roots [ch. 10, section 30a.5],It has the characteristics of a sovereign cognition that is eminently pure [30a.6],It is the abode of the Tathāgata [30a.7].29Further below, Asaṅga explains these three attributes in more abstract terms:It [has] an exalted cause [30b.5],It [is] an exalted result [30b.6],It [has] an exalted master [30b.7].

The explanations of “exalted cause, result, and master” strongly resemble specific Abhidharma explanations on karmic causation, namely the teach-ings on the “sovereign result” (Skt. adhipati-phala), a kind of karmanwhich determines environmental conditions such as the quality of soil or rainfall. The term for “master” used in the MSg original was probably San-skrit adhipati, since the respective terms in Tibetan (bdag po) and Chinese (zhu主) are known as equivalents for adhipati (or otherwise svāmin).31 I will say more on the “sovereign result” below when discussing Wonhyo’s 29 Numbering of the sections according to Nagao 1987, pp. 119–20 (left-to-right pagina-tion).

Lamotte 1938, vol. 1, p. 94: 5. ’jig rten las ’das pa de’i bla ma’i dge ba’i rtsa ba las byung ba / 6. dbang sgyur ba’i rnam par rig pa shin tu rnam par dag pa’i mtshan nyid / 7. de bzhin gshegs pa’i gnas (see also Griffiths et al. 1989, pp. 354–55). T no. 1594, 31: 151a15: 5. 勝出世間善根所起, 6. 最極自在淨識為相, 7. 如來所都.

Note that the expression du都 means “capital,” at least as a connotation: another indication that a Buddha presides over his Pure Land similar to a king presiding over his kingdom.30 D4048 (fol. ri 41b3), P5549 (fol. li 48b6): 5. rgyu phun sum tshogs pa dang / (D: rgyu phun sum tshogs pa dang /; P:omitted) 6. ’bras bu phun sum tshogs pa dang / 7. bdag po phun sum tshogs pa (see also Lamotte 1938, vol. 1, p. 94; Griffiths et al. 1989, p. 359). T no. 1594, 31: 151a26: 因圓滿。果圓滿。主圓滿.31 Equivalents for adhipatiphala are bdag po’i ’bras bu in Tibetan, and zeng shan guo增上果 in the standard terminology of Xuanzang 玄奘 (c. 602–664).

BAYER: EMPTINESS AND LIBERATION91In the same way, Vasubandhu’s summary of Yogācāra doctrine, the Thirty Verses, also culminates in a description of the unthinkable dharmakāya:The element without inflows (anāsrava),Is the unthinkable, wholesome, imperishable, joyful Body of Lib-eration.It is the so-called [[[body]] of]44 the doctrine of the Great Sage.45(verse 30)The “Body of Liberation” (vimuktikāya) is a doctrinal topos known from the Saṃdhi-nirmocana-sūtra.

It designates a state of liberation reached by śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and fully awakened Buddhas that is different from the dharmakāya, which is reached only by fully awakened buddhas.46According to Sthiramati’s commentary on the Thirty Verses, the “Body of Liberationsignifies overcoming the obstructions consisting in kleśas (kleśāvaraṇa); and, the dharmakāya, in this context, signifies overcom-ing the obstructions in the way of the things to be known ( jñeyāvaraṇa).

The Uttaratantra further states that the “Body of Liberation” represents one’s own benefit, and the dharmakāya the benefit of others.48 Still, when it comes to the factual qualities of these two bodies, the Saṃdhi-nirmocana-sūtra propounds that, even though there are significant differences, these are hard to describe.49The gradual path of understanding as outlined in the Thirty Verses culminates in the attainment of these two bodies, with the dharmakāya being the ultimate body of the Tathāgata.

One cannot help but notice that this resembles the above-quoted passage in the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa (ch. 3, par. 45), according to which:44 See Sthiramati’s commentary (Buescher 2007, p. 142): mahāmuner dharmakāya ity ucy-ate.45 Buescher 2007, p. 149: sa evānāsravo dhātur acintyaḥ kuśalo dhruvaḥ / sukho vimuktikāyo ’sau dharmākhyo ’yaṃ mahāmuneḥ. See also the translation by Frauwallner (2010, p. 417).

Chapter 10, section 2, of the Saṃdhi-nirmocana-sūtra is probably the earliest source for the concept of vimuktikāya. See Buescher 2008, p. 161, n. 2; Schmithausen 2014, p. 354, n. 1599.47 See Buescher 2007, p. 142, and Nagao 1991, p. 24.48Uttaratantra, ch. 2, verse 30 (Johnston 1950, p. 84). See also Takasaki 1966, pp. 30, 320, n. 56, and pp. 322–23; Schmithausen 1971, p. 163; Brunnhölzl 2009, p. 330; Fuchs 2000, p. 197.49 See Lamotte 1935, p. 149: de la dpe bya bar yang sla ba ma yin (Saṃdhi-nirmocana-sūtra, ch. 10, section 2).


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atics, so that the fervent critiques by Candrakīrti (c. 600–650) remained unheard. On the other hand, Asaṅga’s approach to Sukhāvatī doctrines became a much disputed matter. In these two points, the East Asian standard position reversely mirrors the Tibetan mainstream in which Candrakīrti is defended with great fervor, while the ten recollections of Amitābha (see below) never gained much prominence.

A first look at Asaṅga’s systematization could lead to the impression that he held the Pure Land doctrines in rather low esteem,71 and therefore, it seems appropriate to disregard secondary sources and later interpretations for the moment and take a direct look, once again, at his writings. In the second chapter of the MSg,72 Asaṅga presents a doctrine of four “intentions” (abhiprāya) of the Buddha, that is, four different intentions underlying dif-ferent sections of the Buddha’s teachings.

Among those, the second kind of intention concerns the Pure Land teachings:[The second kind of intention,] “intention for another time,” means the following: [statements such as,] “by grasping only the name of the Buddha ‘Many Jewels’ (Bahuratna),74 one will be established in the right, complete awakening” etc., or, “by only making a sol-emn wish,75 one will be reborn in the world of Sukhāvatī, just as it was spoken [by the Buddha].”7670 See also Bayer 2013, p. 83, n. 23.71 See Tanaka 1990, pp. 12–13. Cf. Halkias 2013, p. 19.

On the textual situation, see Griffiths et al. 1989, p. xv, and Nakamura 1980, p. 264, where the available versions of the MSg and its commentaries are listed.73 See Tanaka 1990, p. 223, n. 47.74 It is unclear to which sutra the name Bahuratna alludes, even though the name is similar to Prabhūta-ratna in the Lotus Sutra. See Nagao 1982, p. 392, n. 3.75 The translation “solemn wish” for praṇidhāna is used provisionally for lack of a better term. Some of the related problems are addressed in Edgerton 1953, vol. 2, s.vv. praṇidadhāti, praṇidhāna, praṇidhyeti. See also Gómez 1996, p. 224, n. 7.76 MSg, ch. 2, section 31.2.

D4048 (fol. ri 20b5–6), P5549 (fol. li 23b2–4): dus gzhan la dgongs pa ni ’di lta ste / de bzhin gshegs pa rin chen mang gi mtshan bzung (D: bzung; P: gzung) bas bla na med pa (D: pa; P: par) yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub tu nges par ’gyur ro zhes bya ba lta bu dang smon lam btab pa tsam gyis ’jig rten gyi khams bde ba can du skye bar ’gyur ro zhes ji skad gsungs pa lta bu’o (see also Lamotte 1938, vol. 1, p. 41). Sanskrit parallels in the Mahāyāna-sūtra-alaṃkāra-bhāṣya according to Lamotte 1938, vol. 2, p. 130: [bahuratnasya {added by Lamotte}] tathāgatasya nāmadheyagrahaṇamātreṇa niyato bhavaty anuttarāyāṃ samyaksaṃbodh[au], (Lévi 1907, p. 83, l. 24), and ye sukhāvatyāṃ praṇidhānaṃ kariṣyanti te tatropapatsyante, (Lévi 1907, p. 83, l. 4–5). Cp. T no. 1592, 31: 103b16–19: 二者時節意趣。所謂若稱多寶如來名者。即定於阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。如無量壽經。若有眾生願取無量壽世界即生爾 (my underlines). See also Tanaka 1990, p. 210, n. 63. Cf. Halkias 2013, p. 19. Related papers thumb The conceptions of seeing the Buddha and Buddha embodiments in early Prajñāpāramitā literature Provided by: Digitale Hochschulschriften der LMU | Publisher: Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München | Year: 2018 by Zhao Wen thumb More Missing Pieces of Early Pure Land Buddhism: New Evidence for Akṣobhya and Abhirati in an Early Mahayana Sutra from Gandhāra Provided by: Otani University Academic Repository / 大谷大学学術情報リポジトリ | Publisher: THE EASTERN BUDDHIST SOCIETY by Strauch Ingo

Possible roots of the pure land Buddhist notion of practice in light of some early Buddhist sources Provided by: Jagiellonian Univeristy Repository | Year: 2015 by Szuksztul Robert

Le commentaire de Tankuang sur l’Eveil à la Foi dans le Grand Véhicule: la probable influence de Wonhyo Provided by: ZORA | Publisher: De Gruyter | Year: 2017 by Guerra-Glarner Monika

The Revival of Tantrism: Tibetan Buddhism and Modern China Provided by: Humanities Commons | Publisher: 'Modern Language Association' | Year: 2015 by Martino Dibeltulo Concu

Thoughts on the Early Indian Yogācāra Understanding of Āgama- Pramāṇa Provided by: Università degli studi di Torino: SIRIO@unito.it - SIstema RIviste Open access | Publisher: Università degli Studi di Torino | Year: 2018 by Tzohar Roy


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