FROM MÄDHYAMIKA TO YOGÄCÄRA
FROM MÄDHYAMIKA TO YOGÄCÄRA
An Analysis of MMK, xxrv.18 and MV, 1.1-2
by Gadjin M. Nagao
In the Sino-Japanese Buddhist tradition, the Mädhyamika and Yogäcära-Vijñänaväda tenets have been understood to be both parallel and opposite to each other. The San-lun-tsun, the Chinese version of the Mädhyamika, was regarded as nihilistic or an Emptiness School, and the Fa-hsiang-tsun, the Vijñänaväda, was regarded as realistic or an Existence School. While the former was characterized as Mahäyäna due to its doctrine of emptiness, the latter was considered to be semiMahäyäna for three basic reasons: the Vijñänaväda remained realistic like the
Abhidharma School; it elucidated the three yänas side by side without being confined to the Bodhisattvayäna; and it did not emphasize the doctrine of Buddha-nature. These traditional but erroneous views have now been revised by most modern scholars. Presently, the Mädhyamika philosophy, which began with Nägärjuna, is believed to be wholly inherited by Maitreya-nätha, Asañga, and other Yogäcäras. The PrajñäPäramitä sütras are equally revered as authentic by both schools, and further, the doctrine of emptiness occupies an important position even in the Yogäcära school.
While, in the history of Western philosophy, it was deemed necessary for a newcomer to negate and transcend previous philosophies through criticism, the situation in Buddhism, especially Yogäcära Buddhism, was such that it developed its doctrines in a fairly different pattern from that of Western philosophy. The Yogäcäras developed their doctrines by inheriting the entire body of thought of their former masters. Of course, even though a faithful transmission of a teaching without any changes was intended, in so far as there was a development,
this development necessarily involved a degree of change. Therefore, although both schools advocated the doctrine of šü.nyatä, the manner in which they interpreted the meaning of this term has been different. In accordance with the divergent views held by the schools as they grew in India and in China, there has been a difference in how they worded the doctrine and in how they logically developed it.
The verse XX IV. 18 of Nägärjuna's Müla-madhyamaka-kärikä (hereafter, MMK) I has been famous in the Sino-Japanese tradition since the T'ien-t'ai school elaborated the doctrine called "Threefold Truth" and took this verse as one of its bases. The verse concludes with the term madhyamä PratiPat (Middle Path), and hence the treatise was named Madhyamaka-kärikä. On the other hand, there is a treatise of the Yogäcãras named
Madhyäntavibhäga (hereafter, M V). The root verses of this text have been ascribed to Maitreya-nãtha or Asañga and the prose commentary (bhä»ã) has been attributed to Vasubandhu. The features of the first two verses, MV 1.1-2, 2 closely resemble those in verse XX IV. 18 of MM K. In this paper, I would like to examine all three verses in the hope that I can trace an aspect of the development of Buddhist philosophy from Mãdhyamika to Yogãcära.
It seems that T.R.V. Murti was also aware of this similarity.3 After pointing out that the Abhidharmic systems interpreted Pratïtya-samutPäda (originating co-dependently) incorrectly and arguing that the Mãdhyamika system was a re-interpretation of it as šünyatã, he refers to MMK, XXIV. 18. He then explains the Vijñãnavãda position by saying, "In the Vijñänaväda, šünyatä is accepted, but with a modification," and quotes M V, 1.1 as the Vijñänaväda formula. He should, however, have included M V, 1.2 in the formula, because the two verses together not only represent the basic tenet contained in the first chapter of M V, but also the fundamental point of view which the treatise is attempting to express.
At the outset, let us examine in detail MM K, X X IV. 18. The verse in Sanskrit is as follows:
.
íünya,tam ta.?l Pracahpn.ahe / sa PrajñaPtir uPãdãya. PratiPat saiva madhyamä //
This can be rendered in English as follows:
What is originating co-dependently, we call emptiness.
It is a designation based upon (some material). Only this is the Middle Path. 4
In this verse we see four key-terms: Pratïtya-samutPäda (originating co-dependently), šünyatä (emptiness), uPãdäya-PrajñaPti (designation based upon some material), and madhyamã PratiPat (Middle Path). Generally, these four are associated with each other and in some way considered equal. According to Candrakïrti's explanation, šünyatä, uPãdäya-PrajñaPti and madhyamäPratiPad are considered to be "different names" (viíe§a-satpjñä, synonyms) 5 of Pratïtya-samutPãda. Of these four terms, however, the last three (omitting the first, Pratïtya-samutPäda), were taken by the T'ien-t'ai school to constitute the so-called "Threefold Truth": the truth of the empty (k'ung), the provisional (chia), and the middle (chung).6
As the context of the verse and Candrakïrti's "više§a-samjna suggest, these three or four terms are regarded as reciprocally identical and simultaneous, but not in chronological sequence. Especially in the T'ien-t'ai doctrine, the ultimate and
perfect identity of the three is emphasized. It is true that there is no chronological sequence of the four terms, but neither is it permitted to re-arrange them and state them in reverse order; there must be something that led the author to select the four terms and mention them in this particular sequence. I believe this something can be called the author's "logic," and consequently the four terms are in logical order, being linked to each other through a process of reasoning.
Now, to begin with, all interpretations are in agreement with the fact that what is originating co-dependently is empty, or non-existent. In other words, co-dependent origination is characterized by emptiness. This is, as Murti puts it, a re-interpretation of Pratïtya-samutPãda in contradistinction to the Abhidharmic interpretation, which understands it from a realistic viewpoint, taking it to be existent. This re-interpretation is revolutionary, because Pratïtya-samutPäda, which had been conceived of in terms of something real, existent and affirmative is now declared to be empty, non-existent and negative. In order to give a logical rationale for this process, Candrakïrti (as well as Buddhapãlita and Bhävaviveka) introduced the phrase: "Because it is devoid of self-being (niésvabhäva), it is 31
empty. "7 Here, existence and non-existence or affirmation and negation are combined into one. This indicates the dynamism or paradox spoken about in Mahãyãna texts. It differs from the static idea of the Abhidharmic systems and corresponds to what the PrajñäPäramitä-sütras expound in the formula: "rüPam eva Sünyatã" (this very matter is the essence of emptiness).
Next, the verse states that šünyatä in this context is uPädäyaPrajñaPti, or "a designation based upon (some material)." Although the compound uPãdãya-PrajñaPti is problematic, and scholars have interpreted it differently,8 it is safe to assume that it can be interpreted as: uPädänam uPädäya PrajñaPtth. 9 In this case, uPädäna means: "material as cause"; uPädäya (an absolutive) literally means: "having taken to one-self, appropriating," and therefore, I have translated it "based upon," which is an interpretation also substantiated by the Tibetan translation brten nas (depending on). PrajñaPti (Tib. gdags pa) or "designation" is of a worldly or conventional character, being opposite to Paramärtha, which is supra-mundane and beyond any conceptualizations. Thus, the phrase as a whole means: "a designation based upon (some material)."
Jacques May translates the compound uPädäya-prajñaPti as "désignation métaphorique" (he seems to prefer this translation to L. de La Vallée Poussin's "désignation en raison de"), and, after equating "šünyatä = uPädäya-Prajñapti," he gives the following explanation: "La sünyatä est désignation métaphorique de la réalité absolue." And also equating "šünyatä= madhyamãPratiPad" in regard to the 4th pada, he gives a similar interpretation: "Madhyamä pratipad est aussi une désignation métaphorique de la réalité absolue.
His interpretations would indicate that absolute reality manifests itself on the level of conventional truth, metaphorically taking the names §ünyatä or madhyamä-PratiPad. If this be the case, these explanations seem not to coincide with the two equations mentioned by him, and also seem to disregard the positive role played by uPädäya-prajñapti as the third key-term. As he explains, any concepts, names or designations, are conventional; they are not on the level of ultimate truth and cannot represent the ultimate reality, which remains silent (tüstlïmbhäva), beyond all grasping (anupalabdhi, anabhilãPya). This is the truth revealed by Nägärjuna in terms of the Twofold Truth (satya-dvaya), the conventional and the ultimate. But, I believe,
the present verse is not intended to discuss the Twofold Truth; rather, it expresses a logical process starting from the Buddha's Pratïtya-samutPãda and concluding with the Buddha's Middle Path. In this process, uPãdãya-PrajñaPti occupies an important stage.
Venkata Ramanan translates uPädäya-Prajñapti as "derived name," although he does not clarify how and from what the name is "derived." He states, however, "the [meaning of] relativity, conditionedness (Pratïtya-samutPãda) . . . is also conveyed by uPädäya-PrajñaPti, derived name.
It is my contention that uPãdäya-Prajñapti is another name for Pratï9a-samutPãda. In a passage, Candrakïrti states: "[Those foolish people) do not see the truth of Pratïtya-samutPäda which has the most profound meaning, being free from {the wrong views on eternalism and nihilism, and being given the name uPãdäya-PrajñaPti. "12 This indicates that uPãdãya-PrajñaPti and Pratïtya-samutPäda are synonymous.
According to Avalokitavrata's explanation of the phrase uPãdänam uPädäya prajñaPtik, the word uPãdäna (material cause) means hetu-Pratyaya (cause and condition): a sprout is so named based upon a seed, its uPãdãna; Tathägata is so designated based upon the virtues such as the ten powers, the fòur convictions, etc., as His uPädäna. Being thus designated as based upon causes and conditions, not only the sprout but also Tathägata is empty, devoid of self-being. It is clear that Avalokitravrata interprets uPãdäya-PrajñaPti with the meaning of Pratïtya-samutPäda.
However, the compound uPãdãya-PrajñaPti, although similar to Pratïtya-samutPãda of the first pada, should still be different from it for the reason that, in the second pada, Pratïtya-samutPãda has been negated and declared as šünyatã. In the 3rd pada, in contrast to this, uPädãya-PrajñaPti is Pratïtya-samu.tPäda revived from within šünyatä after having been once negated. In other words, the world of Pratítya-samutPãda, in so far as it has been negated or has a negative aspect (1st and '2nd padas), is šünyatã. But, in spite of this negation, in so far as the ultimate reality does not
cease to manifest itself as uPädäya-prajñaPti (3rd pada), Pratitya-samutPäda is operative and functioning in the samsäric world, and therefore, still alive. Without this aliveness or the revival from šünyatã, even madhyamä PratiPat could not be established. The Middle Path is a dynamic path and not a mere cessation or extinction as expressed by the "Hïnayänic" nirväpa (of course, I do not intend "HÏnayãnic" to refer to Theraväda). One of the meanings of "Mahäyãnic" nimäpa is the Bodhisattva's avatiîthita-nirvãpa (not dwelling in nirvana).
Such a revived pratïtya-samutPãda is a "designation" (PrajñaPti), for it appropriates, depends upon, or bases itself upon (uPädäya) something else, or some kind of material (uPödäna). In this sense, it is synonymous with samketa (conventional symbol) and loka-vyavahãra (common practice), terminologies used to designate conventional truth. Thus, uPãdäya-PrajñaPti means "a designation based upon some material." Because it comes after the negation of §ünyatä, it is a knowledge gained by a sort of bodhi or enlightenment. It can also involve the Buddha's lau (conventional knowledge functioning after non-discriminative knowledge is obtained), to use •the later Yogäcära terminology.
To recapitulate, Pratîtya-samutPäda is twofold:
(l) the first order Pratitya-samutPäda as expounded in the first pada of the verse, and
(2) the second order Pratïtya-samutPäda ( = uPädäya-PrajñaPti) as expounded in the 3rd pada.
The first order Pratïtya-samutPäda is said to be "direct," because it has not yet been denied and represents the ordinary worldly life which is not yet negated as Sünyatä. In other words, people are living it without any awareness of its true nature as šünyatã. This Pratïtya-samutPäda dies in the second pada. In spite of its death, or its negation, worldly life necessarily continues, but now it is accompanied by a kind of šünya consciousness.
The 3rd pada represents this stage, in which the second order Pratïtya-samutPäda is revived.
This second order or revived Pratitya-samutPäda is said to be "indirect," because it has come through šünyatä and consequently was not directly derived from the first order. In contrast to the first order, which must be negated, and which corresponds to the word rüPa of "rüPam eva šünyatã," the second order is a re-affirmed Pratitya-samutPäda which corresponds to the word rüPa of "šünyataiva rüPam" (this very essence of emptiness is matter). Although the first order Pratïtya-samutPäda must be negated, there still is a need for a life in which people can strive to live a moral life or can make every effort to exert themselves in religious practices.
Finally, the fourth pada states: "Only this is the Middle Path." The Middle is always revealed by being freed from two extremes, such as existence and non-existence, or affirmation and negation. The dynamic movement from the first order PratïtyasamutPãda of the first pada, to its negation (§ünyatã) in the second pada, and further to its revival as the second order PratïtyasamutPäda ( = uPädäya-
PrajñaPti) in the third pada is the Middle Path (madhyamã-PratiPad). It is dialectical, moving from affirmation to negation and again to affirmation. The Middle is not a point between two extremes and cannot be found at a certain point, because the path is total process, dynamic and dialectical. (The Middle can be found even in the extremes in so far as affirmation is negation and negation is affirmation.)
To conclude this section, the four terms explained above can be equated in a straight line:
= uPädäya-PrajñaPti
But from the above discussion and from the dialectical character of the whole process, I would rather equate them in the following way:
(affirmative) (negative) madhyamä-PratiPad
(affirmative)
The equation of Pratïtya-samutPäda šünyatã is the most basic: all others are derived from it. Any one of these terms can be equated with madhyamä-PratiPad, but only through the whole process of negation and affirmation as discussed above.
Having examined MMK, X X IV. 18, we are now in a position to analyse the two verses of MV which elucidate the notions of abhüta-parikalpa, sünyatä, and madhyamä-PratiPad. In Sanskrit, verses 1.1-2 read as follows:
abhütaparikalPo 'sti, dvayar!l tatra na vidyate / šünyatä vidyate tv atra, tasyäm api sa vidyate //I. I na šünyarp näPi cãíünyam tasmät samam vidhïyate / sattväd asattvãt sattväc ca, madhyamä PratiPac ca sä // 1.2
This can be rendered in English as follows:
There exists unreal imagination; duality does not exist therein.
Emptiness, however, exists in it, and also the former exists in the latter. (1.1)
Therefore it is stated that all entities are neither empty nor non-empty,
Because ot existence, because of non-existence, and again because of existence. And this is the Middle Path. (1.2)"
The word "imagination" (parikalpa) generally refers to cognitive functions or consciousness (vijñäna), which in turn is characterized by the Yogäcãras as "dependent-on-other" (paratantra), i.e., Pratitya-samutPäda. Basically speaking, the
cognitive functions or thought of ordinary people is always stained by ignorance, hence the word "unreal" (abhüta). The phrase "there exists unreal imagination" (the 1st pada), however, does not mean that existence (of the imagination) is proclaimed or
insisted in a metaphysical or ontological sense. It simply describes the fact that all the common features of daily life are constituted by cognitive functions. Thus the fact that "unreal imagination exists" is the beginning point of the Yogäcära's {
{Wiki|Weltanschauung}}. "Duality" (dvaya) means the duality of subject and object. Although, on the one hand, cognition necessarily implies a dichotomy, on the other hand, from the viewpoint of ultimate truth, neither the object grasped nor the grasping subject has substantial existence. Therefore, "duality does not exist therein" (the 2nd pada), i.e., duality does not exist as substantial
reality to be found in unreal imagination. This negation of duality, or absence of cognition with regard to duality, is restated in the third pada, employing the term sünyatä: "Emptiness, however, exists in it (i.e., in unreal imagination)." Because šünyatä is found in unreal imagination, unreal imagination is negated and, therefore, equal to šünyatä itself. Thus far, the verse conveys a meaning similar to the equation Pratïtya-samutPãda = šünyatã in the MM K. In the 4th pada, however, the opposite is also true: "the former [unreal imagination] exists
in the latter [in emptiness]." The phrase is important in that it means the revival of unreal imagination (or Pratïtya-samutPäda) and corresponds to uPädäya-prajñapti of the MMK.
Next, in accordance with the above statement, verse 1.2 reads: "Therefore all entities are neither empty nor nonempty." The reason for this is explained by three phrases beginning with "because of." According to the Vasubandhu's Bhäya, the first phrase, "because of existence" means "because unreal imagination exists," and refers to the statement, "neither empty." The second phrase, "because of non-existence," meaning
"because duality does not exist," refers to the statement, "nor non-empty." The third phrase, "again because of existence," meaning "because emptiness exists in unreal imagination and unreal imagination exists in emptiness," refers to the statement, "neither empty.'
The verse concludes with the statement, "This is the Middle Path." In this sense, the two verses clearly indicate that the M V, whose title was originally "Madhya-vibhäga" (instead of "Mad was originally written to elucidate the Middle and to exemplify that very fact by discussing the emptiness of unreal imagination.
When one compares verse XXIV. 18 of the MMK with these two verses of M V, the similarity between them should now become obvious. The reason why Murti should have given both verses as the Yogãcära formula should also be clear. As stated previously, these two verses of MV are key-verses of this text and convey the fundamental ideas of the Yogäcära school. And one can see that the Yogäcäras, indeed, inherited the idea of emptiness and the [[Middle
Path]] from Nägärjuna. It is almost as if Maitreya-nätha or Asañga imitated, elaborated and expanded Nägärjuna's verse. An analysis of these two verses will not only help us to understand Buddhist thought, but will also demonstrate how these ideas progressed in the development of Buddhist thought from Mädhyamika to Yogäcãra.
Now that we have discussed the MMK verse and the two verses of MV individually, I would like to devote the remainder of this paper to a comparative study of the similarities and differences between the MMK verse and the two verses of M V. The corresponding padas of these verses and the relationship of them can be diagrammed as follows (the four padas are indicated by the letters: a, b, c, and d, respectively):
As the diagram suggests, the point of departure for the two schools differs. MMK, XXIV.18a begins its discussion with Pratïtya-samutPäda, whereas M V, I. la begins its discussion with abhütaparikalpa. The different topics with which the two texts begin reflect the fact that, while the discussions found in
the MMK are always metaphysical and abstract, dealing with such notions as Pratïtya-samutPäda, utpatti (arising), gamana (going), and so on, the author of MV replaced these notions with ones such as citta (mind), vijñäna (consciousness), and abhütaParikalPa (unreal imagination), which are more concrete, practical, and
related to everyday life situations. But, abhütaparikalpa, which is essentially vijñäna, is not contextually different from PratïtyasamutPäda, because it also has the nature of Paratantra (dependent-on-other), as stated before. Therefore, even though abhútaparikalPa is a term deeply associated with a monk's yogic practices, in so far as it is of Paratantra nature and is taken as the starting point or the primary object of investigation, abhütaparikalPa does not differ from Pratïtya-samutPãda, where the Mädhyamikas begin their investigation.
Whereas MMK, XX IV. 18b simply and directly informs us that Pratïtya-samutPãda is šünyatã, without elaborating its logical process, M V, 1.1 gives a fuller explanation and develops its view around a more complicated logical process. Here šünyatä is discussed from two points of view: non-existence (of duality) and existence (of šünyatã). The discussion extends its logical argument into M V, 1.2 as the diagram indicates. At first, the §ünyatä established by negating the "duality" of subject and object may seem far removed from the "emptiness" of the MMK. When one considers, however, that the author of the MV wanted to
demonstrate the šünyatä of abhütaparikalPa, which is characterized as Pratïtya-samutPäda and is the most logical and natural place to begin one's reflection in yogic practice, it is not unusual to find that the author of MV chose to negate the "duality" of subject and object. Moreover, it should be noticed that not only object but also subject is negated. The later Vijñänaväda is sometimes referred to as a school in which
the outer world (object) is negated (bähyärthäbhãva) and only the existence of inner consciousness (subject) is maintained (vijñänamätra). lb But this is not the case here. By the negation of both subject and object the šünyatã of the whole world is intended. This is parallel to the statement often found in the Mahäyãna sütras, "all entities are empty," and to the Mãdhyamika equation of the whole world (Pratïtya-samutPäda) with šünyatä.
['his šúnyatä is not a mere negation; it transcends both existence and non-existence. Consequently, MM K (X X Il. I l) states: "one should not proclaim something as empty', nor nonempty." M V, 1.2, however, gives us a more elaborate explanation. It first states that "all entities are neither empty nor nonempty" and then continues to explain this statement on the basis of three reasons: existence, non-existence, and existence. On the foundation of such a paradoxical statement, the MV finally develops its thought into the Middle Path.
Undoubtedly, the three reasons beginning with "because of existence" are reasons expounding different levels. The first two, "because of existence" and "because of non-existence," are obviously paradoxical and on the same level represent affirmation and negation respectively. The third reason, "again because of existence," must be understood to transcend the former two and, therefore, to be different from the first, in spite of the fact that the first and the third reasons are worded in the same way. The meaning of "existence" in the third reason is twofold: it includes the existence of šünyatä and the existence of unreal imagination.
Sünyatä was originally characterized by negation and nonbeing. Therefore the "existence of šürnatä" is itself a contradiction and this has been the focus of attack by Bhãvaviveka, the Mãdhyamika polemicist. The Yogãcãra teachers, however, aware of this contradiction, dared to define šünyatä as "nonexistence of the duality and existence of [that] non-existence" (M V, 1.13). Sünyatä is thus simultaneously non-existent as well as existent.
As for the "existence of unreal imagination," it corresponds to the second order Pratïtya-samutPãda. As I have shown in my previous discussion, Pratïtya-samutPãda is once negated as šünyatã, but revived again in the term uPãdäya-PrajñaPti (MM K, X X IV. 18c). But MV does not stop with the statement that emptiness exists in unreal imagination; it goes on further to say that unreal imagination exists in emptiness: "also the former
exists in the latter" (tasyäm api sa vidyate). That is to say, abhütaparikalpa (as Paratantra = Pratïtya-samutPäda) is revived in the midst of emptiness, as the second order abhütaParikalPa, so to speak, after its duality is negated. It is in a sense a redeemed and justified abhütaparikalpa. This revived abhütaparikalpa is to be understood as contextually the same as "designation based upon (some material)" (uPädäya-PrajñaPti).
In conclusion then, it is now clear that the zigzagging logic found in the MMK, X X IV. 18, which develops its thought through the steps of affirmation (Pratïtya-samutPäda) to negation (šünyatä) and further to affirmation again (uPädãyaPrajñaPti) is followed exactly by the author of the M V, with the exception that the latter, using a little different wording, adds the logical basis for this dynamic process with statements such as "because of existence," and so on. By zigzagging logic I mean a paradoxical and dialectical logical process which evidences a dynamism continually' moving from being to non-being and again to being, in which the former two are transcended. Both texts agree with each other in so far as they arrive ultimately at the same Middle Path through that vital and dialectical process.
Although I have attempted to show that these texts are similar in their schemes of developing the Middle Path, very subtle problems remain. It may be true that the Yogäcäras inherited in general the Mãdhyamika thought concerning šünyatã. But, is it proper to speak of the logical process involved i
n establishing šünyatä as the same in both schools? Isn't it that, although the name šünyatã is shared by both, what is intended by this name is entirely different in the two schools? For one thing, their points of departure differ: the Mädhyamika starts from Pratïtya-samutPäda, while the Yogãcära starts from abhütaparikalpa.
Another remarkable difference is that the Yogäcäras speak of the "existence of non-existence" when defining šünyatã. We must also pay attention to the fact that, although both the Mädhyamikas and the Yogãcãras are thought to base their idea of šünyatä on the PrajñäPäramitã-sütras, the Yogäcäras also place importance on the Cülasuññata-sutta of the Majjhima-nikãya. (For details about this point, readers are referred to my discussion in another paper.)' 7 Due to these differences, one can assume that there is, or could be, a considerable difference between the two schools concerning their idea of šünyatã. Even if there is such a difference, however, is it due to natural development during the course of time, or to the different tenets particular to the schools, or to the differences in the texts
upon which they established themselves? Or, rather, are we to say that in spite of these questions, the difference, if any, is negligible when contrasted to the vast universality and ultimacy of ideas such as šünyatä, the Middle Path, and co-dependent origination? (I would like to express my hearty gratitude to Professor Leslie S. Kawamura and Ms. Michele Martin for their correction of the English text.)
NOTES
l. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, Mülamadhyamakakärikãs (mãdhyamikasütras) de Nägärjuna, avec la PrasannaPadã Commentaire de Candrakirti, Bibliotheca Buddhica IV (St.-Pétersbourg, 1913), p. 503.
2. Gadjin M. Nagao (ed.), Madhyäntavibhäga-bhäya, A Buddhist Philosophical Treatise Edited for the First Time from a Sanskrit ManuscriPt (Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1964), pp. 17-18.
3. T.R.V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1955), pp. 7-8. 4. Other translations bv modern scholars are available in: Jacques May, Candrakïrti, PrasannaPadä Madhyamakavrtti (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1 959), p. 237; Frederick J. Streng, Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning (Nashville & New York: Abingdon Press, 1967), p. 213; Kenneth K. Inada, Nägãrjuna. A Translation of his Mülamadhyamakakãrikä with an Introductory Essay (Tokyo: Hokuseido-shoten, 1970), etc. 5. La Vallée Poussin, MMK, p. 504.14.
6. Cf. J. Takakusu, The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy (Honolulu: Office Appliance Co., Third Ed.), p. 129: "Therefore, objectively, we have the triple truth, and subjectivelv, we have the triple knowledge. Of the triple truth, the Void is at the same time the temporary, the temporary is at the same time the middle, which is at the same time the Void.'
7. La Vallée Poussin, p. 500.15.
8. F. Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), p. 145 (s,v. uPädãya); May, Candrakïrti, p. 161, n. 494; p. 237, n. 840.
9. Bhävaviveka interprets uPädäya-PrajñaPti as "ñe bar len pa dag la brten nas gdags pa" in his PrayñäPradïPa-mülamadhyamakavrtti, The Tibetan Tripitaka (Peking Edition), ed. D. T. Suzuki, 95, p. 247-1-2.
10. May, p. 238, n. 840.
l l . K. Venkata Ramanan, Nagarjuna's Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass, 1975), p. 339a. 12. La Vallée Poussin, p. 214-215.
13. Avalokitavrata, Prajñä-PradïPa-!ïkä, Tibetan Tripigaka Peking, 97, p. 277-3. The following is an abridged translation.
14. Cf. Th. Stcherbatsky, Madhyänta-vibhanga, Bibliotheca Buddhica X XX (Moscow: Academy of Sciences of USSR Press, 1936), pp. 16, 24.
15. The title, Madhyäntavibhäga, "Elucidation of the Middle and Extremes," is generally used, but the author himself states that the treatise was originally called Madhya-vibhäga, "Elucidation of the Middle." Therefore, it can be interpreted to be more a "Madhyamaka-šãstra" than that of Nägärjuna. Actually, its discussion on the Middle appears initially in verses
1.1-2 and then in verses V.23-24. See my article: "On the Title Madhyäntavibhäga" (in Japanese), in Chükan to Yuishiki (Mãdhyamika and Vijñãnaväda: A Collection of papers on the Mahäyäna Philosophy) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1978), pp. 443-454.
16. In the earlier Yogãcära, too, we can find the affirmation of the nonbeing of outer things and being of cognition-only. But at the same time it is stated that perceiving the truth of cognition-only, the non-being of outer things is perceived, and when an outer oþject is not perceived, the perceiving subject likewise is not perceived (M V, 1.6). After the realization of such šünyatä, the cognition-only is re-attained which is different from the first one and equal to tathatä (suchness), or ParinÅPanna-svabhäva (consummated nature) and in which impressions of both subject and object (gräha-dvayaväsanä) are extinguished.
17. G. M. Nagao, " 'What Remains' in Sünyatã: A Yogäcära Interpretation of Emptiness" in Mahäyäna Buddhist Meditation, ed. Minoru Kiyota (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1978), pp. 66-82.
