Hermeneutic and Polemical Tradition of Late Mahāyāna Buddhism: Citations and hypothetical arguments in Haribhadra’s Abhisamayālakārāloka (Ch.30-31) Bill M. Mak Introduction This article examines the references and citations found in Ch.30-31 of Haribhadra's (fl. mid-late 8th century CE) Abhisamay laṅk r lok (AAA), a voluminous commentary on the Aṣṭas hasrik prajñ p ramit (AP) based on the scheme of Abhisamay laṅk ra (AA), and the way they are employed in the text.1 As with other learned pandits of his days, Haribhadra wrote in excellent Sanskrit and in an encyclopedic style, making extensive references to orthodox works such as s tras and commentaries, as well as those of his opponents. Beside demonstrating the author's erudition, such references were sought as corroborative supports to Haribhada's views on one hand, and as denouncement on the other to those in contradiction to his. The importance of the AAA in late Indian Mah y na Buddhism is reflected in the subsequent Tibetan tradition where the Tibetan translation of the AAA remains to date an important text to be studied.2 We may assume that at least in the mind of Haribhadra’s audience, these various works being referred to were reasonably well-known and considered authoritative in certain scholarly milieux in eighth century India. An investigation of these quotations and references should thus contribute to our understanding of the source and point of reference of Haribhadra's ideas, his doctrinal position, as well as the role the author saw himself as a commentator. AAA Ch.30-31 is a commentary to the story of Sad prarudita, an isolated episode in the AP which was placed outside the scheme of AA proper in AAA. For discussion of the relation between AP, AA and AAA, see the author's “Haribhadra’s Commentary (Abhisamay la k r lok ) on the Story of Sad prarudita (Ch. 30-31 of Aas hasrik Prajñ p ramit )”. In Ñ nappabha : A Felicitation Volume in Honour of Venerable Dr. Pategama Gnanarama Mah Thera, ed. by Rangama Chandawimala and Chandima Wijebandara, Singapore: Ti-Sarana Buddhist Association, 2011, pp 84-87. 2 T hoku 3791 [Cha. 1b1-341a7]. 1 1.0 Buddhist references in AAA Ch. 30-31 1.1 Quotations from other Buddhist Sūtras As the AAA was set out to be a commentary on the AP based on the AA scheme, the text was expectedly filled with references to the mūla presented in a sequential order.3 While the contents of the AP was prima facie taken as buddhavacana and their justification per se would not be deemed necessary, justification for Haribhadra's elucidation of the implicit doctrinal import and hidden structures of the meandering contents of the AP, especially of the rather convoluted and apparently incongruent content of the Sad prarudita would indeed be necessary. As seen in the examples below, the s tras which the justifications are based on must be assumed by the audience to be authoritative. 1.1.1 Saṃyuktāgama AP context:4 Following the description of the causally produced yet insubstantial body of the Tath gata, the insubstantiality of phenomena conditioned by the assemblage of factors (hetupratyayas magrī) was explained through analogy of the vīṇ . AAA position: Haribhadra went one step further to explain that this assemblage of factors or the "casual complex" is not to be taken as the true cause (t ttvikam) responsible for the generation of phenomena.5 In a long discursion It is of interest to note that the mūla Haribhadra referred to is not identical to the extant AP in Sanskrit, which represents the a later recension of the text and closely parallels the contents of the Song translation by Shihu (T228) dated 985 CE. For example, the term upav ṇī (a component of the vīṇ ) which Haribhadra glossed (upav ṇī p r vasthit tantrīvi e - W969, together with other parts of the instrument such as upadh nī) is not found in the editio princeps of the AP or any mss. I have access to so far. 4 W969; Conze 1973:292. 5 Even though sound is perceived as a result of convergence of all [components], by the explanation of arbitrarily perceived sound, one rejects the “causal complex” (s magry s) to be something real (t ttvikam) having productive nature. sarveṣ ṃ sam yog c chabda ḥ prajñapyata ity anenâpi pr jñaptika- abda-nirde ena s magry s t ttvikaṃ janakasvabh vaṃ nirasyati (W969). Sparham translated the passage as “Thus, by giving an exposition of sound that is labeled, he refutes that the own-being of a complete collection is an absolute reality”. (Sparham 2011: 4.290). While the general impression Sparham gives is correct, he missed the key term janaka-svabh vam or “productive nature”, a bahuvrīhi which connects with t ttvikam. In other words, Haribhadra breaks the casual connection between the phenomenon and its apparent casual complex, which led to his deconstruction of causality in the following section. 3 158 (W969-976), Haribhadra tried to demonstrate the logical absurdity of causality (k ryakaraṇabh va) through the deconstructive catuṣkoṭi of pairing singular/multiple cause(s) with singular/multiple result(s).6 However, Haribhadra defended himself against the accusation of denial of causality, which underlies the fundamental Buddhist doctrine of pratītya-samutp da, as expressed succinctly by the Sa ṃyukt gama verse: yad ut smin satīdam bhavati.7 tattvataḥ pram ṇaA-sah yatvenpram ṇa-sah yasya k rya-k raṇabh vasynabhyupagam tB kathaṃ nâyath dar anamC abhyupagamaḥE. tath hy et van-m trakamF eva pratyakṣe pratibh sate. yad ut smin satîdaṃ bhavatti, tac csm bhir aniṣiddhamG eva. yas tu pram ṇopapanna-svar paḥ k rya-k raṇaH-bh vo varṇyateI, sa J pratyakṣa-samadhigamyo na bhavati, nirvikalpakatvena pratyakṣasya pram ṇopapanna-svar patvvadh raṇaH-s marthya-vaikaly t.8 A pramāṇa [NWT, prahāṇa P B bhāvasyānabhyupagamāt] W, bhāvasyābh° NPTWpWc, khas mi len pa tib. C nāyathādarśanam [NWT, nayathārthadarśanam P D 6 For English translation of this passage, see Sparham 2009: 290-303. Further discussion and more accurate interpretation may be found in Moriyama 1988, 1989. The four-fold argument against causality is known as catuṣkoṭyutp dapratiṣedhahetu 四句制生因論 (mu bshi ske ba ‘gag pa’i gtan tshigs). Its earliest formulation extant appears to be Jñ nagarbha (early 8 th century)’s SDK V14 (Eckel 1987Ś8,23). The formulation was adopted also in Kamala la (contemporary of Haribhadra)’s MAL and SDNS. The catuṣkotyutp dapratiṣedhahetu appears to be a critique to Dharmak rti’s view concerning causality as presented in his PVK and HB. See Amano 1966, Amano 1967, Amano 1980, Moriyama 1988, Moriyama 1989. For the general introduction of the tetralemma and its various application through the history of Buddhist dialectics, see Robinson 1957Ś302. For studies of N g rjuna’s catuṣkoṭi and its relation to ūnyat and pratītyasamutp da, see Katsura 2000; Westerhoff 2006. According to N g rjuna, all the speakable nominal truths in Buddhist teachings fall under the sa ṃvṛti category, whereas only the unspeakable truth of nyat falls under the param rtha category. See Nagao 1990:76; 何建興 2007Ś10. See also Kanakura’s 金倉円照＜印 の論証法＞東北 大学文学部研究年報1.88. 7 In the context of exegetical literature, the phrase is usually followed by asyotp d d idam utpadyate, together of which was synonymous to pratītyasamutp da as seen in Catuṣpariṣatsūtra 7.4 and the Chinese translation of Prajñ p ramitopade a (所謂是 有故 是 有，是 生故是 生T1509.25.298a). However, as noted by Lamotte, the pratītyasamutp da associated here does not necessarily entail the typical twelvefold chain. See Lamotte, Étienne. Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse, Tome V (1980). Louvain: Institut Orientaliste, 1949. 2191 fn.1. Cf. also de Jong, J.W. “A Propos du Nid nasaṃyukta”. In Mélanges de Sinologie offerts à Monsieur Paul Demiéville. Vol. 2. 1974. 137-149. 8 W971-2. 159 abhyupagamaḥ] [NWT, abhyupagamam P F mātrakam] NPW, mātram ekam T G aniṣiddham [NWT, aniddham P H kārya-kāraṇa] NWT, ... [raṇa PI varṇyate] WT, vaṇṇyate NP [J samadhigamyo]NpcPW, samādh° NacTWpWc, rtogs pa tib Hsvarūpatvāvadhāraṇa]NPW, °dhāraṇā T Because in reality (tattvatas), i.e., by being subject to valid means of knowledge (pram ṇa-sah yatvena), causality which is subject to invalid means of knowledge (apram ṇa-) is not accepted [by us, i.e., the M dhyamikas], how would the acceptance [of causality] not be non-empirical?9 For in this way, in direct perception, only so much manifests [itself]. As "if this is there, then that arises", that indeed we do not deny.10 However, that which is to be realized (samadhigamyas) through direct perception as described as causality, whose nature being realized through valid means of knowledge, does not exist. This is because, inasmuch as direct perception is free of imagination, the capacity of determining (avadh raṇa-) nature realized through valid means of knowledge is insufficient (vaikaly t).11 1.1.2 Ratnameghasūtra AP context:12 In Ch.30, after Sad prarudita was informed by an “image of Tath gata” (tath gata-vigraha) that the teaching of Prajñ p ramit may be sought from Dharmodgata, Sad prarudita entered into many “doors of meditative states" (sam dhi-mukh ni).13 AAA positionŚ As Haribhadra equates the story of Sad prarudita as an illustration of the Mah y na path of enlightenment, conspicuous events such as this need to be interpreted as signposts of spiritual attainment.14 The An alternative reading in P gives opposite reading na yath dar anam. Here I take the rhetoric question as confirming the non-empirical or false nature of causality. 10 Cf. NidS 14.2, SN II 25-27. 此 故彼 ,此無故彼無。 雜阿含經 T99.2.98b. Also MN III.63.23. 11 My translation is somewhat different from Sparham's: "Direct perception does not know of a cause and effect depicted as validated by valid cognition because it is non-conceptual, and therefore devoid of the capacity to ascertain what valid cognition validates." (Sparham 2011:4.294). 12 W940-1; Conze 1973:281-2. 13 In the Sanskrit edition, 62 of sam dhis were described. The Chinese translations all varyŚ T224/225-47; T227-52; T223-51; T228-60. 14 Mak 2011:91-92. 9 160 justification for Sad prarudita's attainment of the Adhimuktic ryabhūmi by means of numerous sam dhis was found in a rather obscure passage from the Ratnameghasūtra, a popular Mah y na text whose Sanskrit version is no longer extant.15 tatra mṛdu-madhydhim tra-catur-nirvedhabh g ydhigama-bhed t sarva-dharma-svabh va-vyavalokandi dv da a sam dhayaḥA. tannirj t s tv adhimukticary B-bh m v eva m y -vivarjita ity dayaḥ pañc at sam dhaya câvagantavy ḥ. rya-ratnamegha-s tre câsy mC evdhimukti-cary -bh mau vartam no bodhisattvaḥ pṛthagjano 'pi sarva-b la-vipatti-samatikr nto 'saṃkhyeyaD-sam dhi-dh raṇ vimokṣbhijñdi-guṇnvitaḥ paṭhyata iti. aya-pari uddhi-bal d evaE prathama-bh my-adhigamrthaṃF 16 samādhayaḥ]NW, samādhayas PT B nirjātāstvadhimukticaryā]NPWpT, nirjātāstvadhimukta Wc, nirjātāś cādhimukticaryā W, tib. yang de las nges par 'byung pa mos pas spyod pa C cāsyām]NPT, cāsyāṃ W D 'saṃkhyeya]NT, 'saṃkheya P E eva]NPWT, iva Wc, nyid tib. F adhigamārthaṃ]NPT, adhigamārtha W A Amongst these [doors of meditative states], due to the distinction of understanding (adhigama-bhed t) of the mild, medium and superior fourfold penetration of insight (catur-nirvedhabh gīya-), there are twelve concentrations such as the "All-dharma-nature-viewing" and so on. Fifty concentrations such as "Illusion-abandoned" and so on should be understood as the ones evolved out of these (tan-nirj t ḥ) [twelve concentrations] in the Bhumi of Resolute Conduct (adhimukticary Though no longer extant in Sanskrit, the Ratnameghasūtra was translated into Chinese by Mandrasena曼陀羅仙 in 503 CE - 大乘寶雲經 (T658), by Dharmaruci/Bodhiruci in 693 CE 佛說寶雨經 (T660) and by Dharmap la in 1023 CE (T489). It was translated also into Tibetan (T hoku 231). Its popularity is attested by fact that it was quoted at least four times in the Chinese translation of the Mah prajñ p ramitopade a as identified by Lamotte. Furthermore, according to Lamotte, the text belongs to a group of individual texts which have not been incorporated into bigger collections like the Prajñ p ramit , Avata ṃsaka, Ratnakūṭa and Mah saṃnip ta. "l’auteur du Traité disposa des Mah y nas tra originaux parus en Inde durant environ trois siècles et qui furent traduits en chinois entre 179 et 503 p.C. Il semble qu’à son époque ces s tra se présentaient comme des publications autonomes et n’étaient pas encore incorporés dans de vastes collections comme celles de la Prajñ , de l’Avata ṃsaka, du Ratnakūṭa et du Mah saṃnip ta.” Lamotte, Étienne. Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse, Tome III (1970), XXXVII. 16 W960. 15 161 bhūmau) alone. And just as in the Noble Jewel Cloud Sutra17, a Bodhisattva residing in the Bh mi of Resolute Conduct (adhimukticary -bhūmau), even though he is an ordinary being (pṛthagjanas), he is taught to transcend all the adversities (vipatti-) resulted from immaturity (b la-), and is accompanied by the virtues of innumerable concentrations, dh raṇis, liberative power (vimokṣa-), supernatural powers and so on (abhijñ di-)18. 1.1.3 Daśabhūmikasūtra AP context:19 At the very end of the chapter of Dharmodgata, Sad prarudita after listening to the teaching of Dharmodgata entered into numerous "doors of meditative states" as he did earlier, but this time in the presence of Dharmodgata. The actual number of "doors of meditative states" described this time was actually less than before though the total number was supposed to be 60,000 (sa ṣṭiḥ sam dhimukh atasahasr ṇi). AAA positionŚ The strange resemblance of Sad prarudita's meditative experience in two occasions is difficult to explain. For Haribhadra the increased number of "doors of meditative states" is taken as the justification of Sad prarudita's spiritual progress. According to the scheme Haribhadra had devised, Sad prarudita should have traversed the Adhimuktic ryabhūmi and attained the Bodhisattva Bh mi of Joy (pramudit ), the first Bh mi of the ten bh mi-system found in the Da abhūmisūtra (incorporated also as part of the Avata ṃsakasūtra) where the experience of a hundred of sam dhis was described, though Haribhadra could not take the number quite literally as he had earlier. yathoktṣṭbhisamaytmaka-prajñ p ramit -de anlambana-sam dhibal d bah ni sam dhi-mukh ni pratham y m eva bh m v adhigat nîty Twelve Bh mis were described in the S traŚ 一未發菩提心地。 極喜地。三 垢地。四 發光地。五焰慧地。六極 勝地。七現前地。八遠行地。九不動地。十善慧地。十一法 雲地。十 普光明佛地 T660.16.300c. The passage described how a Bodhisattva-to-be having gained the most supreme resolute dharma nature (增 最極增 信解法性), entered into the first stage. The Bh mi is known as "unarisen Bodhicitta" and is considered a turning point for an ordinary being becoming a Bodhisattva. 18 又於阿僧企耶諸 摩地。總持解脫神通智明。T600.16.300c. 19 W987; Conze 1973:298. 17 162 haŚ evaṃ pramukh nty di. atra sam dhy-abhinirh rop y eva sam dhi-mukh ni, na tu sam dhayaḥ. pramudit y ṃ bh mau sam dhiataṃ labhata iti da abh make bhihitatv t. sam dhi-svabh v ny eva v sam dhi-mukh ni. tatra ata-grahaṇasyopalakṣaṇatv d iti pratipattavyaṃ.20 Due to the force of sam dhis which depends on the teaching of Prajñ p ramita whose essence is the Eight Abhisamayas as described, many “doors” (mukh ni) to the sam dhi were acquired even in the first bh mi. And it is therefore said in the s ta, “thus the foremost [sam dhis]” and so on. With respect to this, the means (up ya) of generating the sam dhis (sam dhy-abhinirh ra-) are the “access” to sam dhi (sam dhi-mukh ni), but not [actually] the sam dhis. That is since as it has been explained in the Ten Bh mis (da abhūmake) [S tra] that in the Bh mi of Joy (pramudit y m), one obtains a hundred of sam dhis.21 Alternatively, the “faces” of sam dhi (sam dhimukh ni) have precisely the nature of sam dhis. With regard to that, it should be understood that it is due to the word “hundred” ( atagraha ṇasya-) being a figure of speech (upalakṣa ṇatv t)22. 1.2 Quotations from other texts of known authors As evident throughout the text, Haribhadra has a certain technique of picking up patterns in the AP selectively and interpret them in various ways, sometimes ingeniously and sometimes arbitrarily as we have seen in 1.1. Haribhadra did so, however, with the sole purpose of fitting the different ideas into his integrated scheme of Mah y na doctrines. According the opening of the text itself, the explanations given in AAA were based on four previous works, namely Asaṅga's Tattvavini caya, Vasubandhu's Paddhati, rya Vimuktisena's Vṛtti and Bhadanta Vimuktisena's V rttika.23 However, as far as Ch.30-31 of our editiones principes, no quotations from Hairbhadra's four sources could be identified and the quotations which we can identify come from in fact a much wider source. The Mah y na doctrines Haribhadra adopted in the AAA as 20 W988. Gaṇḍavy has tra (Vaidya ed.) 206. 勤行於精進即得百 經 T286.10.504a. 22 Technically, a synecdoche. 23 Conze 1978:51. 21 163 昧⋯是初菩薩地名之為歡喜 十住 evinced by his choice of quotations in Ch.30-31 come most from the three exegetical traditions of i) M dhyamaka, ii) Yogac ra, and iii) Bauddha-ny ya (Pram ṇa). Amongst the twenty-five quotes identified in these two chapters, most of them are from the last two traditions described above. The authors and works quoted are listed as follows (in chronological order):24 (i) Maitreya. Abhisamay laṅk ra stra. (ii) Asaṅga. Mah y nasūtr laṅk rabh ṣya. (iii) Asaṅga. Mah y nasaṃgraha. (iv) Vasubandhu. Mah y nasaṃgrahabh ṣya. (v) Dign ga. Ny yamukham. (vi) Dharmak rti. Pram ṇav rttika. (vii) Dharmak rti. Hetubindu. (viii) Kamala la. Bh van krama. In the case of (i), as we have already seen earlier, Haribhadra attempted to map the abhisamaya system of the Larger PP to AP, thus giving a watertight structure to the Lesser PP. In the case of (ii), (iii) and (iv), it appeared the author had taken the various Yogacara doctrines such as trisvabh va for granted and tried to read various details in the mūla in the light of these doctrines. In the case of (v), (vi) and (vii), the author was concerned with logical procedures and the various pram ṇa axioms which provided a point of reference for author’s own proposition. As for (ix), along with digressions on subjects such as whether multiple Tath gatas are possible in one world system, 24 In our selection, only one quote was explicitly indicated by the author, namely Vasubandhu’s MSBh. Other than AA and MSA which were abundantly quoted throughout AAA, these citations were simply inserted into the text without elaboration. In the case of parallel materials with other works such as BhK and various commentaries on PV, while there is no absolute certainty which way the borrowing goes, it appears more probable that the materials in AAA are not the most original due to their fragmented nature. Along with all the unidentified source of passages marked by the invariable ity eke and ity anye, a comprehensive study of all citations of the entire is highly desirable in order establish the true relation of AAA with other works, especially those of his contemporary. 164 and a lengthy exposition on the fallacy of causality (1.1.2), these passages where various views were embedded, do not actually contribute directly to the commented passages in the mūla per se, but were learned fanciful diversions where Haribhadra engaged himself in philosophical speculation. 2.0 Refutation of heterodox and non-Buddhist views 2.1 Reference to anonymous quotations and Nyāya AAA was interspersed with anonymous quotations marked with ity eke and iti anye. And indeed some of the sources of Haribhadra’s cited materials as we have seen were not even marked by iti. However, whenever ity eke and iti anye, they seem to suggest some kind of alternative ideas which could possibly be the author’s own without committing to them.25 (ix) Interpretation of redundant examples Context of mūla: In the opening speech of Dharmodgata to Sadāprarudita, the Tathāgata was described as not coming from anywhere nor going anywhere. It was further equated to a list of terms such as tathatā, bhūakoṭi, śūnyatā, virāgatā, nirodha, ākāśadhātu and so on, to illustrate the oneness and non-dualistic of tathatā. AAA: Haribhadra after suggesting that the eight terms mentioned in relation to Tathatā were in fact the eight abhisamaya-s, continued to describe another view: anye tu hetd haraṇdhiky d dhikyaṃ nigraha-sth naṃ kṣudranaiy yikairA apy ucyate, tat kathaṃ ny ya-parame varo bhagav n ud haraṇdhikyamB uktav n iti codyaṃ kṛtv , yatra n maikaḥ pratip dyas tatra tat-prasiddhasyikasyiv bhidh naṃC yuktaṃD, tatra tu parṣan-maṇḍale bahavo bhinna-matayaḥE saṃniṣaṇṇ iti tadadhik reṇa yuktam anekod haraṇaF-vacanaṃ, vikalpena vm G dṛṣṭ nt H na samuccayenety evaṃ sarvatrdhika-vacaneI parih raṃ 25 Such approach is occasionally observed in works of other encyclopedic writers. For example, in Var hamira's Bṛhajj taka (6th century CE), the author etymologized the words hor (which in fact came from Greek ὥρα, an technical term in astronomy/astrology translated usually as "ascendent") as an abbreviation from ahor tra (horety ahor travikalpam eke v ñchanti pūrv paravarṇalop t - 1.3a). The author attributed such view to an unidentified eke to distinguish it from his own; yet without refuting it, the author gives the impression of a tacit agreement. Such ambivalence may reflect the fact that the author could not yet provide a conclusive statement regarding to a particular view, but included it because he considered it to be an important reference, a "footnote" for himself or his future readers to consider. 165 varṇayanti. tath dṛṣṭ ntasyiva kathan t prat tyasamutpannatv diko hetuḥ pr jñair abhy han n nokta iti.26 B naiyāyikair]NWT, naiyānikair P °dhikyam]NWT, °dhikam PWc C prasiddhasyaika-syaivābhidhānaṃ] PT, °dhāṇaṃ W, °dhānaḥ N D yuktaṃ]PW, yuktam T, ukt° Wc, yuktaḥ N, rigs pa yin no tib. E matayaḥ]NWT, matayo P F anekodāharaṇa]NPWT, adhik° Wc, dpe mang po tib. G vā'mī]NPTWpWc, cāmī W, 'di dag kyang tib. H dṛṣṭāntā]NPWT, °nta Wp, °ṣṭākā Wc I vacane]NT, °netu Wp, °neṣu W, °naṃ P, - Wc A Others, however, on account of the excess of reasons or examples, claim that, as even the petty logicians teach redundancy ( dhikyam) to be a fault (nigraha-sth nam), how could the Blessed One, the Lord of Reasoning, have uttered an excess of examples? They then explained the refutation with regard to all cases of superfluous expression in such a way: Wherever there is indeed one person to be taught, the naming of things that is well-known only to that [person] is appropriate. However, in such case as in a circle of audience where many people of different minds have gathered together, the utterance of many examples with reference to those [people] were appropriate. Alternatively, those examples [are put forth] optionally and not collectively. [Furthermore,] based on the explanation of precisely the example, the cause [of the premise] being dependent origination and so on was not stated since it may be inferred by the wise ones. Here an alternative solution of a certain “other” was given. As this solution rejected to read the enumerated examples exclusively, it contradicted with Haribhadra’s interpretation of the eight examples being precisely the eight abhisamaya-s. The reader was therefore left to wonder what Haribhadra’s exact position was and why he included this alternative view which seemed to weaken his claim. According to this view, the Buddha was praised for his excellence in reasoning (thus ny yaparame vara) and the kṣudra-nyaiy yikas,27, presumably the orthodox non-Buddhist ones, was mentioned in passing to point to the exigency of the argument. According to this view, since redundancy is a type of Nigraha-sth nam- 26 W964. 166 s (faulty positions) which lead to defeat in a debate, one should give an explanation to this otherwise blatant fault.28 The handling of redundant expressions appear, however, one of the recurring themes throughout the AAA. Thus in explaining the redundant expression pakṣī akuni, both of which mean “bird”, Haribhadra explained, pakṣiṇaḥ akuner iti. pakṣau dv v asyeti pakṣ , naro 'pi mitr ri-pakṣasadbh v t pakṣ sy d iti. akuni-grahaṇaṃ. iv dir api akuniḥ sy d iti pakṣ ti vacanaṃ.29 With regard to “pakṣiṇaḥ akuner”, pakṣin is one that has two wings, but so can a person be a pakṣī due to the presence of “sides” such as those of friends and enemies. Therefore the word akuni [was used]. Since iva and so on can also be akuni, therefore the word pakṣin [was used]. While such explanation might seem trivial to the readers, it appeared to address a certain concern in Haribhadra’s mind, that is, the redundancy characteristic of the mūla. In this particular case, the redundant examples helped to pinpoint the intended meaning, in a way similar to the “other’s” view earlier which favored an optional, non-exclusive reading (vikalpena). It seems therefore Haribhadra was indeed concerned with this problem of redundancy – on one hand, a literal interpretation of the mūla was always prioritized when available, suggesting Haribhadra’s somewhat orthodox positionś when an alternative view was available, it would be presented as “other’s view” when in fact it could very well be the author’s own, addressing his logical concerns. 2.2 Reference to Sāṃkhya (x) S ṃkhya's view of causality A more common term would possibly be kut rkika (lit. one with bad reason, cf. Lank 10.91). The pejorative term in particular is used by both Buddhists and non-Buddhists to describe each other. See Krasser 2004:140; Acharya 2007:45. 28 Ny yasūtra 5.2.13. From a contemporary perspective, however, redundancy is considered a lapse in dialectic rather than in logic. It should be noted also that in Dharmak rti’s V dany ya, eighteen faults of example (dṛṣṭ ntadoṣa) were mentioned without any reference to dhikyam (VN 21.14; Much 1986:136). 29 W645. 27 167 The s mkhya-s were referred to twice in the passages we are examining. Here I would refer to the catuṣkoṭi we have seen earlier (1.1.1) where the view of S ṃkhya was refuted in passing. Context of m laŚ Haribhadra was attempting to show the fallacy of a singular result generated by multiple causes. The opponent proposed a concept of inherent cause in another object which entails an endless chain of causation and an infinite regress (anavasth ). Haribhadra dismissed such view because for the M dhyamakas, whose view the author uphold, causality (hetuphalabh va) is not accepted and therefore cannot be presupposed, unlike the S ṃkhya who claim that all effects are inherent in their causes in a theory known as satk ryav da, e.g., the form of a pot is inherent in the mud and the potentiality is released by the collaborating factors.30 abhedâvi eṣe 'piA hetu-dharma-s marthy d yath na sarvaṃ sarvas dhakaṃB, tadvad bhedâvi eṣe 'pi na sarvaṃ sarva-s dhakam ity evam-abhyupagata-hetu-phala-sambandhaṃC s ṃkhyâdikaṃ praty ucyam naṃ obh mD dhatte. yas tuE tattvato hetu-phala-bh vâpav d F m dhyamikas taṃ prati svabh vâti ayas teṣ ṃ svahetor iti hetudharma-s marthyaG-lakṣaṇo hetur asiddhaḥH sva-pakṣa-siddhaye siddhavat katham up d yate.31 B abhedāviśeṣe 'pi]NPWT, - tib. sarvasādhakaṃ]NWT, sarvāsādhakaṃ P sambandhaṃ]NWT, D E sambandhaḥ| P śobhām]NPTWc, śobhāṃ W yas tu]NPW, vastu T F bhāvāpavādī]NWT, bhāvādī P G H sāmarthya]NPWT, °rthye Wp, - tib. asiddhaḥ]NWT, asiddhāḥ P A C Just as everything does not produce everything32, due to the power of the property (dharma) of the cause33 [which is present in something, but absent in others], even though [all these things are] equal (avi eṣe) It may be noted that the S ṃkhyas, unlike the M m ṃsakas, are not always considered archrivals of the Buddhists. In fact, one S ṃkhya text, Suvar ṇasaptati stra 金七十論 by varakṛṣṇa (4th-5th century CE) was translated into Chinese by Param rtha and is included into the Chinese Tripiṭaka (T2137). 31 W971. 32 Haribhadra's rephrasing of the opponent's argument, the criticism of which was stated already earlier, possibly a reference to Dharmak rti - yath ’bhed vi eṣa’pi na sarvaṃ sarvas dhanam / tath bhed vi eṣe’pi na sarvaṃ sarvas dhanam. PVK 3.173/ PVSV 87 (sv rth um na-pariccheda 173). 33 The extra feature svabh v ti aya of the opponent is reduced here by the siddh ntin to hetudharma, which is created out of the yet unestablished assumption of causality. 30 168 in being non-different [from each other] (abheda-), in the same manner even though there is no difference [among all these things] in being different [for each other], everything would not produce everything. [Such explanation with] the relation between cause and result accepted in such way works well ( obh m dhatte) for someone such as the S ṃkhyas.34 As for the M dhyamika, who rejects the relation of cause and effect (hetu-phala-bh va-) as real (tattvatas), for him a reason, which is characterized by a capacity of a property of the cause [which consists in] the “extra feature”35 of these [things] which is due to its own cause (svahetos), [such a reason] is not established; how could it be employed for proving his own position (svapakṣa-siddhaye) as if it were established (siddhavat)? 2.3 References to Mīmāṃsā (xi) Kum rila – lokav rttika (Niralambanav da 108-109ab) Context of mūla: Dharmodgata described to Sadāprarudita that the Tathāgata does not come from anywhere or go to anywhere, just as what one sees in the dream does not truly exist. Sadāprarudita acknowledge that no dharma in dreams can be considered as fully substantial (pariniṣpatti) as dreams are deceptive (mṛṣ v da). sarvatr lambana ṃA b hyaṃ de a-k lnyathtmaka ṃ | janmany anyatra tasmin v tad k lntare 'pi v | A tad-de o 'nyaB-de o v svapna-jñ nasya gocaro ||36 sarvatrālambanaṃ]PWT, sarvatrālambanaḥ N B nya]NPT, anyad W In all instances [of dream cognition], the natures of external objective supports differ in terms of space and time, namely in some other birth Literally, “one adds glory”. According to Karṇakagomin and akyabuddhi’s commentary to PVK, first half of the verse refers to S ṃkhy view and the second half Buddhist (i.e., Dharmak rti’s). Amano 1966Ś346 n16. 35 Svabh v ti ayaŚ “special excellence” has the sense of something additional in the own nature. 36 SV nir lambanav da 108-109ab. 108c: janmany ekatra bhinne vā. 109a taddeśo vā ‘nyadeśo vā. Wogihara identified only the first four padas as verse. In fact they were followed by two more padas (W967). In both mss N and P, v was missing in pada e and gocara in pada f was euphonized with na bhavati, suggests very likely that somewhere along the transmission the scribe has missed the pausa and dropped the v as well. Note also the third pada in AAA is slightly varied from the extant janmany ekatra bhinne v (in one lifetime or a different one) though the meaning is essentially the same. 34 169 or this one, or whether it is present [at time of dream] or another time. The domain of dream-cognition is either in this place or in another place. The view that Haribhadra tried to defend against is the M m ṃs view that dreams might have some kind of objective basis and are real in some sense. The fact that verses were quoted verbatim suggested that Kum rila’s work, or at least this particular passage was well known to amongst Haribhadra’s contemporaries.37 Kum rila’s original idea is that dreams have some kind of connection to the external reality both in terms of space and time. Thus as the commentator Sucarita pointed out, one’s past experience constitutes the dream object’s “substratum”.38 Kum rila in the same chapter later enumerated a number of examples such as ra mitaptoṣaram, suggesting that even illusive phenomena have some basis in the external reality. Haribhadra's refutation went as follows: na bhavaty. anyâk ra-jñ nasyânyâlambaneA 'tiprasaṅg t. na cnyadB b hyaṃC r pam upapadyate, alp yasy api ve mani bahu-yojanaparim ṇ n ṃ giri-taru-s gard n ṃ sa-pratigh n m upalambh t. tasm d bhr ntam eva tath vidhaṃ jñ nam upaj yata ity al kaḥ svapnaḥ.39 ālambane]NpcPWT, ālambanene Nac B cānyad]NPWT, - tib. Wc, vāpt Wp, phyi rol gyi tib. A C bāhyaṃ]NPWT, vāky [The above statement by Kum rila] cannot be true, because it would be an over-extension (atiprasa ṅg t) if the cognition of one form becomes the objective support of another thing. No other external forms are possible because [in the dream], we perceive mountains, trees, oceans and so on which are of big-size and are tangible, despite being in a smaller house. Therefore, this kind of [dream-]cognition arises as only false. So, dreams are false. Also Kamala la’s TSP 101. Jha, Ganga Nath. Slokavartika. Second Edition. Delhi: Sri Satguru, 1983. See also Teraishi, Yoshiaki 寺石悦章(2000). シ ローカヴァールティカ シ ーニ ヴァーダ章の研究(4): 和訳と解釈.九州竜谷短期大学紀要, 46-48. 39 W967. 37 38 170 It should be noted that the dream analogy had a long tradition in India 40 and both Mah y na Buddhists and Advaita Vedantists developed this idea into a form of idealism. Mayopama was repeated throughout the AP and Haribhadra was obliged to defend such view. While for Kum rila, even an illusion could be real, whereas for Haribhadra it cannot because it leads to errors. In the case of a dream, the dream perception contradicts the objective reality and the two cannot co-exist. A summary of sources and citations found in AAA Ch. 30-31 Conclusion In the foregoing discussion we have seen how Haribhadra creatively and quite ingeniously handled the structural and doctrinal incongruities of the PP texts, exemplified by Ch. 30-31 of the AP, by justifications from a variety of sources. These sources are not limited to s tras whose authority was well established, but 40 indrajlamiva mymaya svapna iva mithydaranam (Mait. Up. iv.2). 171 also commentarial works of both the M dhy maka, Yog c ra and Pram ṇa traditions. From the examples we have seen, it appears quite clear that Haribhadra firmly subscribed to M dhy maka and Yog c ra views and doctrines but remained critical to Pram ṇa works such as those of Dharmak rti. While the AAA was set out to be a commentary to the AP, it is clear that Haribhadra took the work as a mere springboard to his two-fold intent: firstly, to elucidate his unique amalgamation of M dhy maka-Yog c ra doctrinesś secondly, to refute in passing opponents such as the Ny yas and the M m ṃsakas, who were no doubt active participants of the vibrant scholarly society of eighth century India, of which the learned Buddhists were also a part of. Appendix A List of commentarial works cited in AAA Ch.30-3141 Abbreviations AKB BhKI Abhidharmako abh ṣya of Vasubandhu. Pradhan, P. (ed.). Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1967. First Bh van krama of Kamala īla. Tucci, G. (ed). Minor Buddhist Texts, Part II. Serie Orientale Roma. Vol. IX. Rome: 1958. C Catuh ataka of rya Deva. Jain, Bhagchandra (ed.). Nagpur: Alok Prakashan, 1971. HB Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ. Ernst Steinkellner (ed.). Teil I: Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text; Teil II: Ubersetzung und Anmerkungen. Wien: Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1967. MSA Mah y nasūtr laṃk ra. Lévi, S. (ed.). Paris: 1907. 41 Amongst the citations I have identified in AAA Ch. 30-31, the source of three verses remain unidentified (W983.11-16): na kṛp mandatêd n ṃ na ca me dharma-matsaraḥ | nâc ryamuṣṭir nâ aktir na ca me duḥkhalat || na ca me niṣṭhitaṃ straṃ tarkay mi na cântik t | jñ tuṃ na ca me akt viney na ca s dar ḥ || na de ay mi yenêti jñ payan paritarṣayan | dvau m sau pratisaṃl no bhagav n ardham eva ca || 172 MSABh PVK PVSV Mah y nasūtr laṃk ra-Bh ṣya. Lévi, S. (ed.). Paris: 1907. Pram ṇav rttikak rika of Dharmakirti. Miyasaka, Y. (ed.). Pramanavarttika-Karika (Sanskrit and Tibetan). Acta Indologica 2, 1971/72. The Pram ṇav rttikam of Dharmakīrti. The First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Gnoli, Raniero (ed.). Roma: Instituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1960. V TS lokav rttika of rī Kum rila Bhaṭṭa with commentary of Ny yaratn kara. Ganga Sagar Rai (ed.). Varanasi: Ratna, 1993. 173-4. Tattvasa ṃgraha of ntarakṣita with the commentary of Kamala īla. Krishnamacharya, Embar (ed.). Gaekwad's Oriental Series No.30, 31. Baroda, 1984-88. Reference W928.16 W929.2 W936.22 W938.1-2 Text dharma-srotasi buddhebhyo'vav daṃ labhate tad | tath hi sam dhi-guṇeṣv abhisaṃpratyaya-lakṣaṇay raddhay yogina chandaḥ samutpadyate…atas tatpratipakṣeṇopekṣ bh van y parijñ yai prah ṇ ya punaḥ s kṣ tkriy ṃ prati | nyatdisam dh n ṃ tridh rthaḥ parik rtitaḥ || dhy n-'bhijñ bhinirh r l lokadh t n sa gacchati | p jrtham apramey ṇ ṃ buddh n ṃ ravaṇ ya ca || apramey n up syâsau buddh n kalpair ameyagaiḥ | karmaṇyat ṃ par m eti cetasas tad-up san t || 173 Author / Work Asaṅga / MSA 14.3 Kamala la / BhKI 518 Asaṅga / MSA 18.79 Asaṅga / MSA 14.17-18 W939.24-25 W940.5-6 W940.7-8 W967.4-5 W967.14-5 W968.6 W969.18 W970.5 W970.26 W971.7 W971.14 42 tmani sati para-saṃjñ sva-paravibh g t parigraha-dveṣau | anayoḥ saṃpratibaddh ḥ sarva-kle ḥ praj yante || bodhisattv hi satataṃ bhavanta cakravartinaḥ | prakurvanti hi sattv rthaṃ gṛhiṇaḥ sarvajanmasu || kle o bodhyaṅgat ṃ y taḥ saṃs ra ca amtmat m | mahop yavat ṃ tasm d acinty hi jinâtmaj ḥ || sarvatrlambanaṃ b hyaṃ de ak lnyathtmakaṃ | janmany anyatra tasmin v tad k lântare 'pi v | tad-de o 'nya-de o v svapna-jñ nasya gocaro || l d api varaṃ bhraṃ o na tu dṛṣṭeḥ kad cana | lena gamyate svargo dṛṣṭy y ti paraṃ padam || karma-jaṃ loka-vaicitryam yad artha-kriy -samarthaṃ tad atra param rthasad nityaṃ sattvam asattvaṃ v sy d ahetor anynapekṣaṇ t na vai bh v n ṃ k cit prekṣ -p rvak rit …tath bhavanto nop lambham arhanti et vat tu sy tŚ kuto 'yaṃ svabh vâti ayas teṣ m iti… an dirT hetu-paraṃpar tasm d ya evobhaya-ni cita-v c hetuḥ, sa eva She-dacheng-lunben 攝大乘論本 T31.1594.150c. 174 Dharmak rti / PVK 219cd/220ab Asaṅga / MSA 20.3 Asaṅga / Mah y nasaṃgra ha (Sanskrit text not extant)42 Kum rila / V 108-109ab ryadeva / C 25:11/286 Vasubandhu / AKB 5.1a/277.1 Dharmak rti / PVK 3.3 Dharmak rti / PVK 2.180 Dharmak rti / HB 9.6-10 Dharmak rti / PVSV 84 Dign ga / s dhanaṃ d ṣaṇaṃ ca W971.14-5 W972.7 W988.1820 43 abhedvi eṣe 'pi hetu-dharmas marthy d yath na sarvaṃ sarva-s dhakaṃ, tadvad bhedâvi eṣe 'pi na sarvaṃ sarvas dhakam artha-kriy -k ritvaṃ satyatvanibandhanam evaṃ trayastriṃ at kalpâsaṃkhyeyair buddhatvaṃ pr pyata She-dacheng-lun-shi 攝大乘論釋 Ny yamukham (Sanskrit text not extent) Dharmak rti / PVSV 87 (cf. PVK 3.173) Dharmak rti / PVK 2.3a Vasubandhu / MSBh (Sanskrit text not extant)43 T31.1595.218a (cf. T31.1593.126b). 175 Abbreviations of editions of texts used AA AAA AP N P PP PvP T W Abhisamay laṃk ra-Prajñ p ramitopade a stra. Maitreya. Stcherbatsky and Obermiller (ed.). Bibliotheca Buddhica XXIII, 1929. Abhisamay laṅk r lok (Editions T, W and mss. N, P) Aṣṭas hasrik prajñ p ramit . Mitra, Rajendralala (ed.). Ashtas hasrik Ś A Collection of Discourses on the Metaphysics of the Mah y na School of the Buddhists Bibliotheca. Indica, [110]. Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1888. Nepalese ms. of AAA. NGMPP A 37/7 Tibetan ms. of AAA. Wang Sen Catalogue No. 67 from minzugongcang fanwenxieben 民族宮藏梵文寫本collection. Prajñ p ramit (See AP, PvP) Pañcaviṃ atis hasrik praj p ramit I-VIII. Takayasu, Kimura (ed.). Tokyo: Sankibo Busshorin, 1986-2007. Tucci, Giuseppe (ed.). The Commentaries of the Prajñ p ramit sŚ The Abhisamay laṅk r lok of Haribhadra. Gaekwad's Oriental Series, no. 62, Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1932. Based on three mss A, B, N. Wogihara, U. (ed.). Abhisamay laṅk r lok Prajñ p ramit vy khy Ś Haribhadra together with the Text Commented on. Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 1932-35. References Amano Hirofusa 天野宏英. 1983. "後期の般若思想." In 講 思想. 東京: 春秋社. 193-223. 大乗仏教2 - 般若 Conze, Edward. 1973. The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines & Its Verse Summary. Bolinas: Four Seasons Foundation. ———. 1978. The Prajñ p ramit Literature. Tokyo: Reiyukai. Hikata, Ryusho. 1958. Suvikr ntavikr mi-Paripṛcch -Prajñ p aramit -Sūtra. Fukuoka: Kyushu University. 176 Isoda Hirofumi, 磯田煕文. 1977. "bhumi-sambhara に いて- Dharmamitra に よる." 印 學佛教學研究 26 (1): 350-354. Lamotte, Étienne. Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse, Tome I-V (19491980). Louvain: Institut Orientaliste. ———. 1958. Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien des Origines À l'ère Saka. Louvainla-Neuve: Institut Orientaliste de l'Université Catholique de Louvain. 1976 reprint. Mak, Bill M. 2011. “Haribhadra’s Commentary (Abhisamay laṅk r lok ) on the Story of Sad prarudita (Ch. 30-31 of Aṣṭas hasrik Prajñ p ramit )”. In Ña ̄nappabhā: A Felicitation Volume in Honour of Venerable Dr. Pategama Gnanarama Mah Thera. Edited by Rangama Chandawimala. Singapore: TiSarana Buddhist Association. 84-97. Mizuno K gen, 水野弘元. 1953. "菩薩十地説の発展に 研究 1 (2): 321-326. いて." 印 学仏教学 Moriyama Seitetsu, 森山清徹. 1988. "後期中観派のダルマキールティ批判— —因果論を巡 て." 印 学仏教学研究 37 (1): 393-388. ———. 1989. "後期中観派の学系とダルマキールティの因果論Catuṣkoṭyutp dapratiṣedhahetu." 仏教大学研究紀要 73:1-47. Much, Michael Torsten. 1986. “Dharmak rti's definition of ‘Points of Defeat’ (nigrahasth na)”. In Buddhist logic and epistemology: studies in the Buddhist analysis of inference and language. Dordrecht: Reidel. 133-142. Obermiller, Eugéne. 1933. Analysis of the Abhisamay lamk ra (Fasc. I & II). London: Luzac. Przyluski, Jean. 1932. “Bouddhisme et Upaniṣad. [avec la collaboration d'Etienne Lamotte]”. [Reprinted in Lamotte, Étienne. 2004. Opera Indologica Notes sur La Bhagavadgita. Louvain-la-Neuve: Université catholique de Louvain, Institut orientaliste. Peeters]. BEFEO XXXII:141-169. 177 Silk, Jonathan. 2001. “Contributions to the Study of the Philosophical Vocabulary of Mah y na Buddhism”. The Eastern Buddhist XXXIII (1): 144-168. Sparham, Gareth (trans.). 2006-2012. Abhisamay laṃk ra with Vṛtti and lok . Vol.1-4. Jain Publishing Company. 178 Vijjvimutti Editor Ven. Dr. Rangama Chandawimala Thero Buddhist and Pali College - Singapore 2013 (2557 B.E.) This Academic Volume is Published by Buddhist and Pali College of Singapore September 2013 © Rangama Chandawimala Thero All Rights Reserved Members of Vijjvimutti Academic Committee Venerable Dr. Pategama Gnanarama Venerable Dr. Rangama Chandawimala Venerable Pupule Seelananda Dr. Jenny Quek Proofreader and Co-editor Ms Jessie See The page setting of this book is done by Ven. Dr. R. Chandawimala Thero The cover is designed by Mr. Somachandra Peiris (Sri Lanka)