Logical Difficulties Explained
The doctrine of flux rests on the fundamental principle that co-existence of two contradictory qualities is impossible in one and the same substratum and that this fact alone constitutes the ground of difference of mutually different objects. But even this fundamental position has been challenged. It is argued that there is no logical repugnance in the fact that a thing may possess different attributes without prejudice to its integrity. The Buddhist assumes that the seed which is admittedly the cause of the germinating sprout, is the cause as well of the supplementary phenomena, viz., changed soil and the like, found in association with the sprout. Now, is the causal efficiency in respect of the subsidiaries the same efficiency which produces the sprout? If the two efficiencies are identical, the soil, etc., and the sprout will be identical in nature. If, however, they are different, the self-same seed will be split up into different entities, because different efficiencies, being exclusive of each other, are mutually contradictory and cannot inhere in the same entity on your own theory. Such is the case with regard to the burning lamp, which consumes oil and burns the wick at the same time. And so also with regard to the colour-form amalgam (rūpa), which produces an after-entity vested with colour, taste and smell. And these effects being different from each other, presuppose different causal powers, which will spilt up the causal integer into so many different causal entities. Moreover, the seed is efficient in regard to the sprout but it is inefficient with respect to the ass and the like; and efficiency and inefficiency, being contradictory, will divide even one and the same seed-entity into different entities—a contingency which even the Buddhist will demur to accept. So efficiency and inefficiency can subsist in perfect accord in the same causal entity and cannot of necessity make it different at different moments. The whole plea of the Buddhist that contradictory attributes cannot co-exist in the same substratum therefore falls to the ground and with it his theory of flux.
These thinkers, the Buddhist observes, are obviously labouring under a confusion of thought. That a particular causal entity may possess different natural powers in the shape of different attributes without detriment to its integrity is not denied. What we seek to emphasise is that different attributes may connote contrariety, but not contradictory opposition. Contradiction is a relation which exists between two particular terms—where the affirmation of one necessarily implies the denial of the other and vice versa —they being mutually exclusive. Thus, the existence of a particular power is contradictorily opposed by the non-existence of that power and not by the existence of a different power. The production of sprout is opposed by the non-production of sprout and not by the production of any other entity. Besides, perceptual evidence testifies to the identity of a particular entity though it might be possessed of manifold distinct attributes or powers. Thus, for instance a single jug is seen to possess two distinct attributes—substantiality (draviyatva) and the generic nature of a jug (ghaṭatva) and there is no contradiction between them. And even two contradictory qualities, e. g., efficiency and non-efficiency, can co-exist without logical opposition in one and the same entity, provided they relate to different objects. There is no repugnance in the fact that the seed is efficient in regard to the sprout and not so in respect of the ass. But the opposition is manifest if two contradictory qualities are supposed to relate to one and the same substance. Thus we cannot conceive by any stretch of imagination that the two contradictory qualities, such as efficiency and non-efficiency in relation to the self-same product, can co-exist without splitting up the identity of the thing concerned. If there is no contradiction between such exclusive attributes, there will be no contradiction anywhere in the world and all distinctions will be nugatory.
It has been urged by the opponent that though contradiction is undeniable between two mutually exclusive attributes at one and the same time, there is no reason why these two characters may not be found in the same entity at different times. There is no contradiction in the fact that the self-same seed produces sprout in one place and does not do so in another place. And if efficiency and non-efficiency can co-exist without opposition in the same entity by virtue of the different place-relations, there is no earthly reason why there should be any opposition if two mutually exclusive attributes should appear in the same substratum if the time-factors are different. The same crystal that was inactive before, may become active at a subsequent moment, and the same seed that was lying inactive in the granary, may subsequently develop causal efficiency for sprout without involving any logical absurdity. There is no logical inconsistency between permanent efficiency and inconstant production subject to variation of time.
The whole controversy, the Buddhist rejoins, is based upon an apparent misapprehension. We do not hold that difference of place is an antidote to opposition in contradiction, we only insist that there is no contradiction in such cases. Causal efficiency in a particular place is opposed by its absence in that place only and not in a different place, nor by a different sort of efficiency. But this analogy of difference in place cannot be extended to difference in time, as contradiction is a relation of opposition constituted by two mutually incompatible attributes and time and place relations have no direct bearing upon it. The principal factor of contradiction is mutual incompatibility and as permanent efficiency has been redargued by the dialectical necessity of constant production or non-production, permanent efficiency and variable production have been found to be mutually incompatible. But as there is no incompatibility in the fact that the seed produces a sprout in a particular place but is inactive outside that place, we cannot regard the seed per se as different entities. On the contrary, the unity of the seed is attested by strong, unmistakable perceptual experience, which must be accepted as absolutely authentic as there is no invalidating evidence, a priori or a posteriori.
Concomitance of Existence with Flux
The entire theory of flux is pivoted on the truth of the proposition‘whatever is existent is momentary.’ And existence has been proved to consist in causal efficiency alone and this efficiency is exercisable in succession or simultaneity. But as succession and simultaneity are not predicable of a permanent non-fluxional entity, all existents are perforce proved to be momentary. But what is the proof that causal efficiency is not competent to a permanent entity? Because succession or nonsuccession, in which causal efficiency can be exercised, is incompatible with it. Permanency consists in the identity of a thing in botlr previous and subsequent moments and succession or non-succession implies difference of identity indifferent moments. And identity and change, the connotations of permanence and succession on the one hand and non-succession on the other respectively, being contradictory in nature, cannot co-exist in a permanent substratum. And succession or non-succession being the condition precedent, in Sanskrit terminology vyāpaka (pervader or container), the absence of the former in a non-momentary entity will necessarily entail the absence of the latter, according to the rule that the exclusion of the continent implies the absence of the content.
The Naiyāyika has raised a storm of controversy over the above position of the Buddhist. He contends that the rule—the exclusion of the continent implies the exclusion of the contained— cannot be enforced in the case of the ‘permanent,’ which is the subject of the syllogism advanced by the Buddhist:
“whatever is lacking in causal agency, in succession or non-succession has not causal efficiency, as a rabbit’s horn. The supposed ‘permanent’ entity has no such agency (and therefore has no causal efficiency).”
Evidently the argument is not a hypothetical argument of the type of reductio ad absurdum that is employed to enforce an undesirable contingency in the adversary’s position (prasaṅgānumāna), because the probans, ‘the absence of successive or non-successive agency’ is a proved fact and not assumed (for argument’s sake) on the affirmation of the adversary and lastly, it does not tend to establish the contradictory position—all the three conditions of prasaṅgānumāna being conspicuous by their absence. Nor can it be regarded as an independent argument (svatantra), as the subject (the permanent) is nonexistent and a middle term unrelated to an existent subject (āśrayāsiddhahetu) is not competent to prove any conclusion. The subject of the present syllogism is the permanent entity, but such a thing is a chimerical abstraction on your own theory and as such cannot be cognised either by perception or by inference, as they are cognisant of real entities alone.
generated by the power of perception and bringing up its rear; generated by the cognition of a characteristic mark; generated by a memory-impression; cognisant of a doubtful entity; and lastly, cognisant of an unreal fiction. The first two alternatives will affirm the existence of the permanent and consequently a denial of the same will involve a necessary contradiction. The third, subject to possible aberrations, is not susceptible of sublation, as memory-impression presupposes previous experience and the latter is impossible without a real datum. The fourth is not a possible hypothesis, as neither existence nor non-existence can be categorically predicated of a doubtful entity. The fifth alternative, viz., pure imagination giving purely imaginary data, is to be positively scouted, as in that case the fallacy of subject-less reason will have no raison d’être as an imaginary subject will be available everywhere. So no inference is possible with a fictitious subject (minor term). The same argument holds good of the example also.
Moreover, it has been trotted out that there is opposition in contradiction between a permanent entity and causal agency, successive or non-successive. But opposition can be understood if the terms in opposition are apprehended quite as much as heat and cold, eternity and conditionality are known to be in opposition from concrete data as snow and fire and the like. Again, negation is cognisable if there is a positive substratum actually cognised, as, for instance, the non-existence of a jug is cognised on the ground actually perceived. Perception of an actual substratum is thus the necessary condition of cognition of negation. Furthermore, a relation, whether oppositional or other wise, is understandable if the subject and predicate, the two constituent terms, are real, concrete facts. If the non-momentary entity that is sought to be denied is known by experience, denial of it will be a contradiction. If the non-momentary be an entitative fact, negation of causal agency, which is the equivalent of ‘existence, will be a contradictory reason. If the subject be of a negative character, there will be a subjectless middle term and also a logical seesaw; if it be conceived to partake of a dual’ nature (both existence and non-existence) the reason will be inconclusive (anaikāntikam So the whole argument intended to prove the contradiction of a ‘permanent’ with existence is vitiated by a triple fallacy.
It may be contended that the non-momentary may be visualised by pure imagination and even an imaginary datum can be the term of a syllogistic argument. But this contention will not stand the dilemma: Is your imaginary datum real or unreal? If real, you cannot deny it. If it is purely imaginary and unreal, is the opposition sought to be proved real or imaginary? The former alternative is impossible, as opposition by an imaginary opposite is not conceivable. There can be no opposition regarding a barren woman’s son. And if the opposition itself be a fancied unreal opposition, the denial of existence regarding the non-momentary will not be real. And so the doctrine of flux, supposed to rest on the bed-rock of the aforesaid argument, will be thrown overboard.
Udayanācārya in his Nijāyakusumāñjali, Ch. III, has put forward an elaborate plea that no negation is predicable of an unreal fiction (alīka). Mere non-apprehension cannot prove the non-existence of anything, but only the non-apprehension of a thing competent to perception. The analogy of such unreal fictions as a rabbit’s horn and the like is wide of the mark. Because even a rabbit’s horn or a sky-flower has such competency subject to defects in the sense-organ and other conditions of perception. The presence of organic defect or mental aberrations and the like is the necessary condition of perception of such unreal things and, when this requisite condition is present, the perception in question is inevitable. So the denial of a rabbit’s horn and the like is not possible when there is such competency constituted by the necessary conditions set forth above. And when such fictions are negated, it simply implies that the necessary condition of their perception is lacking. Nor is inference competent to prove the non-existence of an absolutely unreal fiction, because negation is intelligible if the object of negation (pratiyogin) and the locus or substratum (āśraya or dharmin), on which the non-existence of anything is cognised, are real positive entities. Even illusory perception of an absolute nonentity is impossible. When the silver is perceived in the mother-of-pearl by illusion, the silver as such is a real entity and when true perception of the mother-of-pearl sublates the previous cognition of silver, what is sublated is the wrong spatio-temporal relation and not the reality of silver, which exists in another place and time. So the permanent non-momentary entity, the negation of which can prove the existence of the momentary, must be a real, existent fact, as nothing but a real can be negated. And if it is a real entity, absolute negation of it will be a contradiction in terms. The doctrine of momentary reals, therefore, stands self-condemned.
‘In reply to this elaborate criticism of the Naiyāyikas the Buddhist points out that an imaginary, unsubstantial datum (avastu) is as much serviceable as a real fact. Besides in negative inference, a reference to the substratum or locus (āśraya) is not at all necesssary—what is needed is to show that the negation of the more general concept necessarily implies the negation of the less general, which is included in the denotation of the former. The non-existence of the tree necessarily connotes the non-existence of the śimśapā, a particular species of the former, on the general maxim that the exclusion of the continent involves the exclusion of the contained, without any reference whatsoever to the place where such non-existence may be cognised.
And if negation be supposed to contain a necessary reference to a substratum or locus, an imaginary substratum or locus will answer the purpose. Because the subject-predicate relation is found to be used as much in connection with a real entity as with an imaginary fiction. Thus, for instance, such propositions, as ‘there is no sharpness in a rabbit’s horn,’ ‘there is no fragrance in a sky-lotus,’ ‘there is no stunt in a barren woman’s son,’ are as much allowable as the propositions, ‘there is bovine nature in a cow,’ ‘there is whiteness in the cloth,’ and the like. Moreover, jour assertion that ‘an unreal fiction cannot be a subject,’ does not militate against our position, if you mean that it cannot be the subject of a real predicate. But if your implication is that the unreal cannot be the subject even of an unreal predicate, you contradict yourself, because by denying all predication respecting an unreal fiction, you yourself make it the subject of your denial. Certainly it is sheer autocracy to forbid others from doing what you yourself do. The absurdity of the adversary’s position will be demonstrated by the following dilemma: When you aver that the unreal cannot be the subject of a syllogistic argument, do you deny the character of subject of this unreal, or any other or of nothing at all? On the first alternative, the character of subject is not denied of the unreal, because the absence of subjecthood (dharmitvābhāva) is predicated of it. On the second alternative, nothing is predicated of the unreal, as the subject of predication is quite different from it. The third alternative is devoid of meaning, as the predicate ‘absence of subjecthood’ is not related to any subject at all. So the denial of subjecthood of an unreality is impossible in any circumstance. The very statement that ‘the unreal cannot be the subject of a predicate’ presupposes the subjecthood of the unreal, otherwise the whole statement will be un-meaning. If you want to avoid the contradiction of making the subject of an unreality, you will be perforce reduced to silence. An unenviable position for sooth! If he keeps silent, he cannot prove his thesis; and if he chooses to speak, he contradicts himself. Perhaps the Naiyāyika will rejoin: ‘Silence is the proper course for a logically minded person when an unreal topic is broached.’ Certainly this is cleverness par excellence. After discoursing to the best of his ability on the nature of the unreal, he now seeks to back out by a subterfuge seeing defeat inevitable. Certainly discourse on an unreality is not prohibited by a royal mandate. It is established, therefore, that a syllogism, having the non-monentary, whether an unreality or doubtful reality, as the minor term and absence of succession and simultaneity as the middle term and non-existence as the major term, is a perfectly logical syllogism, as all the objections against it have been proved to be devoid of sense and substance.
Now, a predicable attribute can be threefold in character:
one that is objectively real, for instance, blue and the like; one that is objectively unreal, for instance, pure unqualified negation; and one partaking of a dual character, as for instance, mere non-perception. That an objectively real attribute cannot be predicated of an unreal subject is perfectly reasonable. But to maintain that even the second and the third category of predicables are not predicable of an unreal subject is an evident piece of contradiction. So the charge of the fallacy of subject-less reason (āśrayāsiddhahetu) falls to the ground. The charge could be substantiated if the non-momentary subject could not be apprehended, as an unknown entity is not amenable to any predication. But the very fact of its denial shows that it is not absolutely unknown. The unreal, therefore, is cognisable quite as much as the real, though the nature and process of understanding is necessarily different in each case. Perceptual and inferential cognition and determinative reflection arising in the trail of perception are directly or indirectly caused by the generative power of an objective reality. But an unreal, imaginary datum has no such generative power and is conjured up by pure imaginative intuition. Certainly negation is no concrete reality, with a distinctive shape and form, that can be envisaged. But it is a concept which has a pragmatic value and this pragmatic value can be possessed even by a purely subjective concept, visualised by pure imagination. Accordingly our thinking principle must be credited with this faculty of pure intuition, independent of the influence of an extra-mental reality, otherwise these purely subjective ideas will be left unaccounted for. And even the most staunch realist cannot avoid using these purely subjective concepts, as all predication about them, affirmative or negative, necessarily presupposes their existence. And as they cannot have an objective existence, they must be accepted as subjective facts or pure ideas. So there is no logical or psychological difficulty in accepting the non-momentary, permanent entity as a usable concept, though it is avowedly a pure idea and not an objective reality. The demand of the Naiyāyika and other realists that all our ideas are derived from experience of external objective data is extravagant and leads to self-contradiction. So the non-momentary is a possible datum and, hence, the accusation of a ‘subject-less reason’ falls to the ground. It has been urged that if an imaginary concept can become the subject of a predication, then the fallacy of subjectless reason will be an unreal myth, as an imaginary subject will be always and everywhere available. But the apprehension is baseless. The fallacies of reasons in relation to an unreal subject and a dubious subject (āśrayāsiddha and sandigdhāśraya hetu) occur, when a real predicable is predicated of an unreal and a doubtful subject respectively. The imaginary subject remains a doubtful real before the reason is applied and is accounted as unreal when the reason is driven home. There is no room for the aforesaid fallacies, however, as the probans (hetu), the probandum (sādhya) and the subject (dharmin) are all imaginary concepts alike. The homologues (dṛṣṭānta), space, a rabbit’s horn and the like are equally imaginary concepts. All the objections of the Naiyāyika could hold good if either the subject or the predicate were real. So the charge of the fallacy of subjectless reason cannot be brought home when the subject and the predicate are both unreal fictions and even the most rabid realist cannot deny to the mind, on pain of self-contradiction, the faculty of pure imaginative intuition visualising even an unreal, airy nothing.
The plea of Udayana that the object (pratiyogin) of negation must be a real, objective fact, attested by experience, has been found to be a hollow assertion. His second plea that negation can be perceived in a real substratum, actually experienced, remains to be examined.
Now, the Naiyāyika contends that negation of succession and simultaneity cannot be apprehended except in a real substratum, and as there is no real substratum in this case, perception of non-existence of succession and simultaneity is impossible. Accordingly, non-existence of the non-momentary is equally inapprehensible, as there is no substratum such as the surface, of ground on.which, non-existence of the tree and the like is actually perceived. But the objection of the Naiyāyika, the Buddhist observes, is altogether baseless. Non-existence is not a concrete reality, which can be envisaged on its own account. The cognition of the non-existence of the tree is nothing but the cognition of a particular ground-surface out of relation to the tree, and such is the case with regard to other negations as well. In the case of succession and non-succession, again, the non-momentary subject, bodied forth by an imaginative intuition, is the substratum, which, being cognised alone without relation to succession and non-succession, is interpreted as the cognition of the latter’s non-existence. And the cognition of the non-momentary without relation to causal efficiency is the cognition of the negation of the latter.
The non-momentary subject is the product of pure imaginative intuition which is, however, projected outside and visualised as. real by a process of intellection called adhyavasāya (imaginative intuition). And this adhyavasāya consists in an. impulsive movement of the mind, generated by the force of the immediately preceding cognition, towards an object though not actually cognised. And Ratnakīrti assures us that he has established and fully explained the nature and function of this adhyavasāya in his work, entitled ‘ Citrādvaitasiddhi.’ So there is no logical bar to the apprehension of the negation of succession and non-succession, as the substratum in the form of the non-momentary is present there, on which its negation can be perceived. And this condition of the perception of non-existence is satisfied as much by an unreal subjective concept as by a real objective fact.
It may be urged that an unreal subject cannot have any logical bearing on the question of validity, as validity can be determined on the basis of a real objective fact alone. But, what is the precise meaning of this objective basis? Does it mean (1) that it must be derived even remotely from an objective datum, or (2) that it must have a practical bearing in some form or other on real data of experience, or (3) that it must have a necessary relation to a real objective substratum?
In the first alternative, there is no difficulty, as the idea of succession and non-succession and of causal efficiency is derived from real data, of which the necessary relation is cognised. The second alternative is also satisfied, as the idea of the non-momentary is the instrument of establishing the momentary nature of reals. The third alternative is not lacking either, as the non-momentary subject is a real, subjective concept, in relation to which the absence of succession and non-succession and, consequently, of causal efficiency is predicated. The non-momentary, though non-existent as an external objective fact, is yet existent as a real, subjective concept. And so the real foundation is not lacking since reality may be either subjective or objective.
The accusation of triple fallacy is baseless, since the non-momentary as ‘the subject,’ ‘absence of succession and simultaneity,’ as the probans, and the probandum, ‘non-existence’— all the members of the syllogism, are conceptual facts. The fallacies would have arisen if the terms of the syllogism were real objective facts. The argument proving non-existence in the present case stands altogether in a different category from the argument which seeks to establish ‘existence.’ Because the terms of the latter are all objectively real facts and not pure concepts as in the former and so all the threefold fallacies crop up.
The contention of Trilocana, that opposition can be apprehended if the terms in opposition are cognised, does not affect our position as the non-momentary is comprehended as a real concept. Nor can it be maintained that all comprehension means experience alone and as there is no experience of the non-momentary, there can be no opposition regarding it. Because, in that case, you cannot deny the existence of a barren woman’s son, as such unreal fictions are never known through experience, and such expressions as ‘there is no beauty in a barren woman’s son’ will be an anathema to you.
The last objection, that contradictory opposition being a relation between two terms will become itself fictitious if one of the terms be unreal, will not hold water. If opposition is conceived to be an independent entity standing with one foot on each term, it would certainly become fictitious if either of the terms was unreal. But we, Buddhists, do not hold opposition to be an independent entity, connecting the terms from outside—so that with one term vanishing the relation might vanish. Contradictory opposition in our view is nothing but the mutual exclusion of two contradictory terms, as that of existence and non-existence, and this opposition is absolutely real Certainly existence and non-existence do not overlap each other. The opposition between permanence and succession or non-succession is equally a real opposition. Permanence connotes uniformity and non-change in different times, and succession or non-succession implies change of nature at different moments. And change and non-change, being mutually exclusive, are contradictorily opposed, and this opposition is as much real as that of existence versus non-existence. But it may be urged that you, Buddhist, do not admit the existence of opposition independent of and external to the ‘opposites;’ and as one of the opposites, at any rate, viz., the non-momentary, is an unreal fiction, how can the opposition in question be real? Yes, the Buddhist does not believe that a third factor, viz., opposition, is necessary to make two terms opposite to each other. Opposition is nothing apart and distinct from the terms in opposition. Any two particular terms are said to be in opposition, because the existence of one implies the non-existence of the other. So, opposition is nothing but the mutually exclusive nature of the terms:in themselves. And if they are not by nature exclusive of each other, the relation of opposition lying outside or alongside of them cannot make them opposed.
So the Naiyāyika does not gain anything by positing the oppositional relation as an independent entity. On the contrary he introduces confusion. Because relations, external to and independent of the relata, are not intelligible. The Buddhist does not admit any relation external to the terms. If there is any relation it is internally inherent in the terms themselves. It would be logically more correct to say that ‘the terms are opposed’ than saying ‘there is opposition between the two,’ if by opposition be understood something aloof and distinct from the constituent terms.
FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES: :
This would appear to be an unusual view, but it follows from the Buddhist theory of causation, which will be elucidated in the next chapter. But I think it to be still necessary that something should be said in advance on this knotty issue, as I am afraid that the point may escape the reader. To be brief, the Buddhist holds that several factors, the basic cause and the subsidiaries, combine to produce a self-same effect. For instance, the sprout is believed to be the joint product of seed, soil, water and the like and each of these causal factors is credited with independent productive efficiency for the same. If we look closely we cannot fail to note that the sprout is not an isolated product, though perhaps the most remarkable and most expected, but that there are other phenomena associated with it, to wit, the changed soil, fermented water and so on. Now, what would be the cause of these phenomena? Certainly, the previous entities, viz., the seed and the so-called subsidiaries, each in their individual capacities, as co-operation in the sense of mutual service is denied. So the seed should be looked upon as the cause not only of the sprout, but also of the other phenomena found together, precisely in the same fashion as the subsidiaries are believed to be the cause of the sprout.
na cai’vaṃ samānakālakāryāṇāṃ deśabhede’pi dharmibhedo yuktaḥ, bhedasādhakapramāṇābhāvāt indriyapratyakṣeṇa nirastavibbramāśaṅkenā ’bhedaprasādhanāc ca.
SBNT., p. 46.
“tathā hi pūrvāparayor ekatve nityatvam, kṣaṇadvaye’pi bhede kramitvam. tataśca nityatvaṃ kramākramitvaṃ ce’ty abhinnatvaṃ bhinnatvaṃ ce’ tyuktaṃ bhavati. etayoś ca parasparaparihārasthitilakṣaṇatayā virodhaḥ. tat kathaṃ nitye kramākramasambhavaḥ.”
SBNT., p. 55.
“vyāpakavyāvṛttyā vyāpyavyāvṛttir iti nyāyena vyāpaka-kramākra-mavyāvṛttyā’kṣaṇikāt sattvavyāvṛtteḥ siddhatvāc ca.”
SDS., p. 20.
yasya kramākramikāryaviṣayatvaṃ nā’sti na tat śaktam, yathā śaśaviṣāṇam. nā’sti ca nityābhimatasya bhāvasya kramākramikāryaviṣayatvam iti vyāpakānupalambhaḥ.
SBNT., p. 55.
nanu vyāpakānupalambhataḥ sattvasya kathaṃ svasādhyapratibandhasiddhiḥ, asyā’py anekadoṣaduṣṭatvāt. tathā hi na tāvad ayaṃ prasaṇgāhetuḥ, sādhyadharmiṇi pramāṇasiddhatvāt, parābhyupagamasiddhatvābhāvāt, viparyayaparyavasānābhāvācca.
—SBNT., p. 56.
For a fuller account of Prasaṅgānumāna see infra the chapter entitled “Prasaṅgānumāna,” Pt. II.
api ca tat kalpanājñānaṃ pratyakṣapṛṣṭhabhāvi vā syat, liṅgajanma vā, saṃskārajaṃ vā, sandigdhavastukaṃ vā, avastukaṃ vā.
SBNT., p. 57 et seq.
antimapakṣe tu na kaścid hetur anāśrayaḥ syāt, vikalpamātrasiddhasya dharmiṇaḥ sarvatra sulabhatvāt.
Ibid, p. 57.
ibid, p. 61.
Ibid, p. 62. The logical seesaw in the second horn of the dilemma arises in this way: The non-momentary cannot be a reality because causal agency in succession or non-succession is incompatible with it and the latter is incompatible, because the non-momentary is unreal.
duṣṭopalambhasāmagrī śaśaśṛṅgādiyogyatā |
na tasyāṃ no’palambho’sti nāsti sā’ nupalambhane ||
N. KU., Ch. III, 3.
vyāvartyābhāvavattai’va bhāvikī hi viśeṣyatā |
abhāvavirahātmatvaṃ vastunaḥ pratiyogitā ||
N. KU., Ch. III, 2.
tasmād vaidharmyadṛṣṭānte neṣṭo’vaśyam ihā’ śrayaḥ |
tadabhāve tu tan ne’ti vacanād api tadgateḥ ||
Vide SBNT., p. 62, 11. 9, et seq.
‘yenai ’va hi vacanenā ’vastuno dharmitvaṃ niṣiddhaṃ tenai ’va vacanenā ’vastuno dharmitvābhāvena dharmeṇa dharmitvam abhyupagatam.
—SBNT., p. 63.
The emended reading in the footnote has been further emended as above.
parastu pratiṣidhyata iti vyaktam idam īśvaraceṣṭitam. Ibid, p. 63.
Ibid, pp. 63-64. Cf. tasmād anupākhye vipakṣe hetor vyatirekanivṛttau vā vyatireke vā sahṛdayānāṃ mūkatai’vo’citā. Tat. Ti, p. 173.
Ibid, pp.. 63-64.
“trividho hi dharmo dṛṣṭaḥ, kaścid vastuniyato nīlādiḥ; kaścid avastuniyato yathā sarvopākhyāvirahaḥ; kaścid ubhayasādhāraṇo yathā anupalabdhimātram.”
Ibid, p. 04.
“sākṣāt pāramparyeṇa vastusāmarthyabhāvinī hi vastu-pratītiḥ, yathā pratyakṣam anumānaṃ pratyakṣapṛṣṭhabhāvī ca vikalpaḥ, avastunas tu sātnarthyābhāvād vikalpamātram eva pratītiḥ, na hy abhāvaḥ kaścid vigrahavān yaḥ sākṣātkartavyo’pi tu vyavahartavyaḥ. sa ca vyavahāro vikalpād api sidhyaty eva.”
Ibid, p. 65.
vikalpaś cāyaṃ hetūpanyāsāt pūrvaṃ sandigdhavastukaḥ, samarthite tu hetāv avastuka iti brūmaḥ.
Ibid, p, 66.
“tad evam avastudharmāpekṣayā’vastuno dharmitvasya vikalpamātreṇa pratīteś cā’pahnotum aśakyatvān nā’yam āśrayāsiddho hetuḥ.” Ibid; p. 66.
Vide N. KU., Ch. III, 2.
‘adhyavasāyāpekṣayā cabāhye’kṣaṇike’vastuni vyāpakābhāvād vyāpyābhāvasiddhivyavahāraḥ. adhyavasāyaś ca samanantarapratyayabalāyātākāraviśeṣayogād agṛhīte’pi pravartanaśaktir boddhavyaḥ. īdṛśaś cā’ dhyavasāyārtho’smaccitrādvaitasiddhau nirvāhitaḥ.
SBNT., p. 71.
ayañ ca nyāyo yathā vastubhūte dharmiṇi tatbā’vastubhūte’pi’ti ko viśeṣaḥ.
Ibid, pp. 71-72.
nanv etad avastudharmi no’payogi, vastvadhiṣṭhānatvāt pramāṇavyavasthāyā iti cet.
—Ibid, p. 73,1. 4.
The text, however, presents a different reading, which is hopelessly meaningless and can by no stretch of imagination be made to fit in with the context. We have, accordingly, emended the text as above.
Vide SBNT., p. 73. 11. 4-17.
The term ‘non-momentary’ (akṣaṇika) may have a twofold meaning, according as the negation is understood either as absolute (prasajya-pratiṣedha), or relative (paryudāsa). In the first sense, it will mean ‘nonexistence of the momentary;’ in the second sense, it will mean ‘a positive entity different from the momentary.’ The latter sense is accepted here and so the ‘non-momentary’ is a real datum as a concept, though not as an objective fact.
It is an established logical conclusion that ‘existence’ per se cannot be proved by inference. An argument is possible if there is an existent fact. We can prove any other circumstance of a thing except its existence, which must be accepted as the irreducible datum of inference. If the very existence of the subject, the minor term in a syllogism, is doubted, all inference will come to a standstill. Proof means the application of a middle term, but no middle term is competent to prove the existenoe of a doubtful subject. Thus, if tho middle term is a positive fact, it will be ‘unproven in respect of the subject;’ in other words, it will be a subjectless reason (āśrayāsiddhahetu); if it be negative, it will be a contradictory reason, proving the contradictory of existence, which is the probandum; if it be of dual nature (positive and negative in one), it will be inconclusive, proving neither existence nor non-existence. This has been summed upin the verse:
“asiddho bbāvadharmaś ced vyabhicāry ubhayāśrayaḥ |
dharmo viruddho’bbāvaś ca sa sāttā sādhyate katham ||”
This verse is an oft-quoted one, found in the Pañjikā of Kamalaśila, the Nyāyamañjarī, the Parīkṣāmukhalaghusūtravṛtti of Anantavīryya and other books. The verse however is not quoted by Ratnakīrti, but obviously alluded to here, op. cit., p. 74, 11. 14-21. (See N. M„ p. 128., P.M L.S.V., p. 28; T.S.P., pp. 412-13.)
‘na hi virodho nāma vastvantaraṃ kiñcid ubhayakoṭidattapādaṃ sambandhābhidhānam iṣyate’smābhir upapadyate vā, yenai’kasambandhino vastutvābhāve apāramārthikaḥ syāt.
Op, cit., p. 75.
“nanu nityatvakramayaugapadyavattvañ ca viruddhe vidhūya nā’paro virodho nāma. kasya vāstavatvam iti ced, na hi dharmāntarasya sambhavena virodhasya pāramārtbikatvaṃ brūmaḥ, kintu viruddhayor dharmayoḥ sadbhāve. anyathā virodbanāmadharmāntarasadbhāve’pi yadi na viruddhau dharmau kva pāramārthikavirodhasadbhāvaḥ? viruddhau ca dharmau, tāvatai’va tāttviko virodhavyavahāraḥ, kim apareṇa pratijñāmātrasiddhena virodhanāmnā vastvantareṇa?”
Op. cit., p. 70.