Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratis ̇ t ̇ hānavāda: A Late Indian Subclassification of Madhyamaka and its Reception in Tibet

briefly note here that earlier Tibetan scholars such as rNgog lo tsa ba Blo ldan shes rab (1059-1109?) criticised this subclassification as havingbeen made on the basis of differences in the establishment of the absolute level— criticism that would be repeated by several later scholars. Other Tibetan scholars, such as sTagtshanglo tsa ba Shes rab rin chen (b. 1405), defendingthis subclassification, pointed out several Indian sources in which it is found. Some of these sources have already been noted by modern scholars, such as David Seyfort Ruegg; they include the Tattvaratnavalf of Advayavajra (11th cent.), the ’Paramarthabodhicittabhavanakrama ascribed to a certain Asvaghosa/Sura, and Candraharipada’s (11th cent.) ’Ratnamala. One may add here Jnanavajra’s (11th cent.?) ’Tattvamarga- darsana, several other works by Advayavajra, the *Guruparamparakramo- padesa by the latter’s disciple Vajrapani (11th cent.), and perhaps also the bKa' gdams bu chos ascribed to Atisa (982-1054). As most of these works can be dated with certainty to the eleventh century, it could well be that this is also when this division of Madhyamaka came into vogue, and that too, probably in circles of scholars belonging to the Madhyamaka- Vajrayana synthesis.

Interestingly, most of these sources present doxographical schemes that include these two strands of Madhyamaka. Both Candraharipada’s ’Ratnamala and the bKa' gdams bu chos divide Mahayana into four schools, namely, Sakaravada and Nirakaravada (subdivisions of Yogacara), and Mayopamavada and Apratisthanavada (subdivisions of Madhyamaka). Jnanavajra’s ’Tattvamargadarsana, followingalongsimilar lines, divides the Mahayana into five schools, including, in addition to the four just mentioned, the Sautrantikas. Likewise, Vajrapani, in his ’Guruparamparakramopadesa, splits the Mahayana (in conformity with Advayavajra’s Tattvaratnavalf,

upon which it comments) into two strands, the Causal Vehicle of Characteristics and the Resultant Adamantine Vehicle (for which strands, however, Advayavajra employs the terms paramitanaya and mantranaya). He further divides the Causal Vehicle of Characteristics into three schools: Sautrantika (regarded by him as inferior), Yogacara (regarded by him as mediocre), and Madhyamaka (regarded by him as superior) He then goes on to divide Yogacara into Sakaravada and Nirakaravada, and Madhyama- ka into Mayopamavada and Apratisthanavada. I shall return to these doxographical schemes below, where they will be discussed in somewhat more detail, but this brief mention of them here should suffice to demonstrate that the Mayopamavada-Apratisthanavada divide featured prominently in some Indian masters’ systematic presentations of doxo- graphical schemes.

Concerningthe division of Madhyamaka into Mayopamavada and Apratisthanavada, Seyfort Ruegg has remarked that similar terminology was employed in early Tibetan works, such as sKa ba dPal brtsegs’s lTa ba'i rim pa'i bshad pa ( = lTa ba'i rim pa'i man ngag snang ba bcu bdun), though in a different sense. Indeed, my preliminary examination of this work, and several early works by the Tibetan scholar dPal dbyangs, leads me to believe that in no case do the terms sgyu ma lta bu and rab tu mi gnas pa (with variants such as mi gnas pa and gnas medpa, or the term rten med (pa) again a rendering of apratisthana) refer to two different branches of Madhyamaka, but are apparently used, rather, to refer to the same thing, namely, the nonexistence of phenomena as real entities. Nonetheless, it appears that at least in some (Tibetan) sources, sgyu ma lta bu was used to describe phenomena while establishingthe conventional level, and rab tu mi gnas pa to describe phenomena while establishingthe ultimate level,

which may, however, reflect the Apratisthanavada position.

3. Discussions in Indian Sources

In the following I shall present—by way of either citation or summary— several passages from Indian sources in Tibetan translation in which the Mayopamavada—Apratisthanavada division of Madhyamaka is discussed.

Tellingly, all authors cited seem to be Apratisthanavadins, inasmuch as in all cases the Apratisthanavada position is presented as doxographically higher, whereas the Mayopamavada position is vehemently criticised.

(a) Asvaghosa/Sura

The *Paramdrthabodhicittabhdvandkrama is a short versified work that has been ascribed to Asvaghosa (or Sura) and was translated by Padmakaravarman and Rin chen bzang po. It has the characteristics of a doxography and briefly describes and refutes the philosophical positions of the non-Madhyamaka Buddhist systems. The work seeks to examine ‘the nature of the mind, that is, reality which is bliss’ (sems nyid bde ba'i de nyid) by employing the so-called tetralemma analysis (spelled out, for example, in the Mulamadhyamakakdrikd 1.1). The two kinds of Madhyama- ka systems presupposed by it are obviously Mayopamavada and Apratisthanavada, although these terms are not used. For Mayopamavada can be described as the position, so described there, according to which phenomena, when not analysed, impinge on the subject as ‘mere illusions,’ and when

analysed, can be shown to be indeed deceptive. And Apratisthanavada can likewise be described as a position according to which the true nature of phenomena is that they lack a substratum; moreover, although this nature is expressed by terms such as ‘emptiness,’ emptiness itself is empty, and although it can be illustrated by means of analogies such as ‘like an illusion,’ it is actually not an object susceptible of illustration. The text argues that the very terms employed to designate the various phenomena do not themselves exist, and that in fact there is nothing to be eliminated. According to it, not perceiving any phenomena constitutes awakening. One important difference that the author seems to see between Mayopamavada and Apratisthanavada concerns the method of gaining access to true reality. For the former, true reality is attestable in the form of some kind of affirmation, whereas for the latter it is not. It is

argued, from the second point of view, that the logical fallacies that necessarily result from any affirmation would be subsumable under the fallacies resultingfrom the postulation of one of the four extremes (i.e., here, existence, nonexistence, both, or neither). The author thus suggests that because Mäyopamaväda resorts to some kind of affirmation it cannot defend itself against the charge of positing one or the other of the extremes.
If [one assumes that] the fallacies [incurred by] all affirmations

Are subsumable under these (i.e. the fallacies of maintainingone of the four extreme positions],
Then [Mäyopamaväda] is deluded, inasmuch as [it on the one hand accepts phenomena] in a non-analytical and naive manner,
[And on the other,] based on analysis, [it affirms that their true nature] is mere illusion. (1)
Even those [who maintain that] mind [partakes of] an aspect of illusion
And [that] awakening, too, is like an illusion,
Are not [able to] see the verbally inexpressible
Freedom from manifoldness, namely, Manjusn (i.e. in his definitive, ‘ontological’ sense). (2)
The illusory [[[nature]] proposed by you can]not [be expressed in terms of] mere illusion.
If it [could] be, it would not be [[[logically]]] attestable.
If it were attestable, it would follow
That other (i.e. non-Buddhist) systems, too, [would be propounding the same] doctrine of illusionism.
Therefore the nature of illusion is [such that]
It is not expressible through [statements such as] “It is like an illusion.” (3)
Nonetheless, the Compassionate One (i.e. the Buddha),
Resting [on the scheme of] the two modes of reality, Proclaimed the [[[doctrine]] of] no-self, [which is like] a lion’s roar, In reliance on the conventional [mode of] reality. (4) *Apratisthana-Madhyamaka is illustrated
Through the different modes of the various vehicles,
[Namely,] by means of synonymous terms such as ‘emptiness’ [And by] numerous analogies, such as ‘being like illusions.’ (5) [But] although [an attempt can be made] to illustrate [[[true reality]], it is] not an object [susceptible] of illustration.
There is nothing whatsoever to be eliminated with regard to it. Given that [it] is empty, emptiness, too, is empty.
In this [[[dimension]]] there are neither buddhas nor sentient beings. (6) Self and other, phenomena [as they] appear and [as they] exist, Release and bondage are mere names.
[But] names [ultimately] do not exist either.
Everything resembles space. (7)
Thus, when phenomena are not perceived,
[That very] non-manifestation or non-perception is [considered to be] perceiving Manjusrl.
[In this way one] crosses the ocean of samsdra,
An existence [[[subject]] to] birth and dying. (8)


(b) Candraharipada

As I have pointed out elsewhere, Candraharipada—a Kasmiri master from whom Rin chen bzangpo (958-1055) and rNgoglo chungLegs pa’i shes rab (b. 10th cent.) received a number of Tantric initiations —in his *Ratnamdld divides Buddhist thought up into seven schools, namely, into Vaibhasika, Sautrantika, Pratyekabuddha, Sakara[[[vada]]], Nirakara[[[vada]]], Mayopama[[[vada]]], and Apratisthana[[[vada]]]. Since Candraharipada’s treatment of the schools is rather unsystematic—the work merely consisting of a collection of verses cited from or inspired by various Buddhist treatises—it is quite difficult to determine from it exactly what he conceives the difference between the positions of Mayopamavada and Apratisthanavada to be. I shall, however, quote a few verses that are revealing in this regard. The position of the Mayopamavada (presupposing Yogacara doctrinal elements) seems to be expressed in the following lines of verse, stating that according to this school of thought phenomena, when analysed on the basis of logical reasoning, are found to be free from the extremes of existence and nonexistence, and when not so examined, are found to be of two kinds, either inanimate matter or cognition:

Self-cognition [as the ultimately existent phenomenon], which is the outcome of [Yogacara’s] refutation of the absolute [of the lower
systems, which they consider] to be conceptually constructed (brtags pa'i yang dag),
[Is in fact] an illusory conglomerate.

[[[Phenomena]], when] examined [on the basis of] logical reasoning, turn out to be free from the extremes of existence and nonexistence,
While if [they are viewed] in a non-analytical, naive manner, both inanimate matter (bems [po]: jada) and cognitive [constructs are possible].

A few lines later, Candraharipada presents a critique of this position— presumably put forward by Apratisthanavadins. First it is pointed out that the postulation of real entities leads to unwarranted conclusions, and these in turn inevitably lead to disputes, an idea found already in earlier Madhyamaka works such as the Yuktisastika. Candraharipada’s presenta-tion of the issue seems to make it clear that the main bone of contention between Mayopamavada and Apratisthanavada, at least from the latter’s standpoint, is not the illusory nature ascribed to phenomena or the description of appearances as illusion-like, but rather the ontological status of this illusory nature or these illusion-like appearances. The Apratisthana- vadins’ greatest difficulty seems to be the position attributed to Mayopamavada according to which the ‘illusory [[[nature]] of phenomena] is attestable on the basis of logical reasoning’ (sgyu ma rigs pas grub [pa])— which explains why Mayopamavada has often been designated in Tibetan sources as sGyu ma rigs grub pa. An Apratisthanavadin would have no difficulty in admitting that all phenomena are illusion-like or illusory in nature insofar as this is accepted as a non-analytical, naive stance as opposed to a verity based on logical reasoning. (The question as to whether a Mayopamavadin would indeed posit that the illusory nature of

phenomena is attestable on the basis of logical reasoning is a separate matter.)

It is argued that a demonstration of the illusory nature of phenomena on the basis of logical reasoning—something which, although not explicitly stated by Candraharipada, seems, according to other sources cited in the present study, to be the conclusion drawn by the Mayopamavadins, in line with their stance just cited—leads to the logical flaw that phenomena would then be real, and generally questions the logic behind resorting to the term ‘illusion’ in order to illustrate things that have been shown to be unreal:
If the illusory [[[nature]] of phenomena could] be attested on the basis of logical reasoning—
Inasmuch as [all phenomena as they] appear [and as they] exist are illusion-like

And gnoses and buddhas [too] are illusory—
It would follow that [[[phenomena]]] are not illusory but [rather] real.
If [the Mayopamavadins then] said: “No, [that] would not follow, inasmuch it [can] be attested that [[[phenomena]]] are illusory,”
[Then either] the meaning ‘logically attestable’ would not be applicable,
[Or] there would be no point in applying the term ‘illusion’ [in the first place].
The learned ones hold that such [a position], too,
Has not transcended the demon of clinging to entities.

The Apratisthanavada view is presented in the verses that follow. In the 146 M a yopam a dvayav a da versus Sarvadharm a pratisth a nav a da (Almogi)
first few lines, the nature of phenomena is stated to be such that it can be established as neither of the components of such pairs as existent and nonexistent, empty and non-empty, illusory and real, or samsdra and nirvdna. Then, in the remaininglines, the notion that there is nothingthat can be eliminated or added is underscored, and the view that gnosis does not exist at the stage of a buddha is urged.

(c) Jnanavajra
Jnanavajra (fl. 11th cent?), in his *Tattvamdrgadarsana,
identifies five philosophical tenets of Mahayana, referred to by him as ‘bases’ or ‘fundamentals’ (rten): Sautrantika, Sakaravada, Nirakaravada, Mayopama- vada, and Apratisthanavada. He discusses these tenets under four points: conduct (spyod lam), view (lta ba), meditation (bsgom pa), and flaws (skyon), and provides lengthy and detailed descriptions of each of them. But unfortunately the Tibetan translation is very poor, which significantly hinders an understandingof the text. I shall nonetheless attempt to provide here a summary of the main points on the basis of my preliminary reading. First, Jnanavajra states that while there are no differences in regard to the conduct advocated by the above-mentioned five Mahayana tenets, there are differences in regard to their views, which he then summarises as follows:
It is maintained that the five [[[tenets]]] do not differ in regard to the conduct duringthese three phases (i.e. preparatory, actual, and posterior phases of conduct), but that there are differences in regard to

[their] views. [Their positions in regard to all] three—preparatory, actual, and posterior [phases of conduct are as follows]: Sautrantika holds to [the notion of] dependent arising. Sakara[[[vada]]] holds to [the existence of] mental images. Nirakara[[[vada]]] holds to [the existence of] ‘good conception’ (i.e. pure cognition). Mayopama[[[vada]]] holds that [[[phenomena]]] are like illusions. Apratisthana[[[vada]] maintains that] although [this] is [the case on] the conventional level, [it] is not [so on] the absolute level. [It] holds that [on the conventional level they] are unreal appearances, like a dream. [But] regarding the absolute level they take no stand. The other [[[tenets]]] take positions in regard to the absolute.

Jnanavajra’s discussion of the views of the two Madhyamaka systems can be tentatively summarised as follows: The Mayopamavadins reject the positions of both Sakaravada (i.e. here clearly Satyakaravada, which maintains the existence of true images) and Nirakaravada (which maintains the nonexistence of images), asserting that it is neither the case that images are true nor that there are no images, but rather that images are like illusions, which, like any other phenomena, are impermanent on account of being momentary, but at the same time continuous (skad cig gis mi rtag la rgyun du gnas), that is, in terms of their mode of appearance. Therefore, according to them, on the absolute level images, when analysed, are unattestable; still, the illusions are true, since otherwise experiencing happiness or suffering would be fictitious (brdzun), and it would then be pointless to strive for Buddhahood, while the four buddha-Bodies for their part would not exist either. In support they refer to Buddhaguhya who, according to them, claimed to have shown, on the basis of logical reasoning,

that the physical Bodies are like illusions [resulting from] residual impressions (bag chags); and Kamalaraksita, who maintained that ‘these’ (i.e. the non-establishment of images and their being established as illusions?) reflect the state of meditative absorption and the post¬meditative state, [respectively]. They also refer to the position of others according to which the physical Bodies appear to sentient beings without any intervening conceptualising.

The Apratisthanavadins reject all previous positions, asserting that all of them merely apply to the conventional level, while arguing that in the case of the absolute level neither negative determination (vyavaccheda: rnam par bcad pa) nor positive determination (pariccheda: yongs su gcod pa) is valid. They, too, are said to resort to the ‘four great syllogisms’ (gtan tshigs chen po bzhi) of Madhyamaka. Only three of them, however, are identical with those of other systems, while the fourth one is called the ‘non¬establishment of the objects of knowledge and the knower’ (shes bya shes byed ma grub pa). They first set about refuting the charge that they advocate annihilationism, arguing that all the entities that the Mayopama- vadins claim exist on the absolute level as illusions—namely, the mind in its true nature, emptiness, the perfection of insight, and the dharmakaya—are

in fact merely conventional [[[phenomena]] resulting from] dependent arising. Since the Apratisthänavädins accept that phenomena on the conventional level are mere illusions, they cannot be accused of annihilationism when they reject the Mäyopamavädins’ postulation that these illusions are true on the absolute level. After presenting their application of the four great syllogisms to establish their case, Jnänavajra highlights some of the points of disagreement between the two branches, in the form of objections and replies. The Apratisthänavädins, having no theses in regard to the absolute, refute the Mäyopamavädins’ postulations concerning the absolute by means of a series of reductiones ad absurdum (prasanga). The objection posed by the Mäyopamavädins that if, on the conventional level, phenomena are illusions, it would follow that it would be no use striving for Buddhahood, [because then even an ordinary being would have access to the true nature of phenomena], is rejected by arguing that even if one accepts the Mäyopamavädins’ postulation regarding the absolute, it need not be equally applicable to the conventional [since the distinctive

features of individual phenomena are still retained on the conventional level]: just as the functions of water and fire are different and the sensations of bliss and suffering are different, so are samsara and nirvana, and thus there is no problem in accepting the dharmakaya, svabhavikakaya, and the two rupakayas as conventional phenomena.
In what follows, the objections and replies mainly revolves around the Mäyopamavädins’ critique, and in fact rejection, of the Apratisthänavädins’ claim that, unlike the Mäyopamavädins, who attempt to establish the absolute in the form of a positive determination, they, in their refusal to formulate either a negative or a positive determination, have no thesis in regard to the absolute. First, in an allusion to the fourth syllogism applied by the Apratisthänavädins, the Mäyopamavädins pose the question whether their claim that they have no proof (shes byed) refers to the absolute or to the conventional level, to which the Apratisthänavädins


reply that in regard to the absolute they have no thesis, and therefore they need no proof, while in regard to the conventional neither a proof (shes byed) nor something to be proven (shes bya) would make any difference in view of the continuum nature of phenomena, which is characterised by momentariness. Then they go on to rebuff the next possible critique—that if they put forward neither a proof nor something to be proven, they are propagating nihilism—by arguing that since they have nothing to postulate they cannot be accused of being nihilist, any more than space can be accused of any fault. The Mayopamavadins then confront the Apratistha- navadins with the following critique: You claim that neither a negative nor a positive determination can be achieved. This negatively determining the fault of nihilism, however, amounts to establishing it in the form of a positive determination. So you, too, are left with a positive determination; for you, too, there is something that can be determined on the basis of analysis of the absolute. The Apratisthanavadins, in reply, continue to insist that their attempting neither a negative nor a positive determination in regard to the absolute means that they have no

thesis, and accuse the Mayopamavadins, in their own attempt to establish the absolute by formulating a positive determination, of wrongly concluding—having found fault with the Apratisthanavadins’ analysis of the conventional—that the Apratisthanavadins have come to a negative determination on the conventional level, which, as in their own case, would naturally result in a positive determination on the absolute level. The Apratisthanavadins, however, claim that, on the basis of their analysis of the conventional level, they merely establish that there is nothing to be established on the absolute level; they do not make any assertions regarding the absolute, as the Mayopamavadins do. The Mayopamavadins retort that the positive determination applied by the Apratisthanavadins to the conventional level cannot, in that case, be established22 on that level, with which observation the Apratisthanavadins agree. Consequently the Mayopamavadins enquire


whether this non-establishment of a positive determination can be determined, and argue that if it can, whether in the form of either a positive or negative determination, then the Apratisthanavadins too, like the Mayopamavadins, would be bound by such a determination, while if they reject both negative and positive determinations, they would never be able to prove anything, as nothing can be proven without a proof. In response, the Apratisthanavadins claim that they negatively determine what is postulated by the Mayopamavadins regarding the absolute level, dispro¬ving it by an analysis of the conventional level, and that this refutation is established on the conventional level. Both positive and negative determinations eventually cease being compelling or come to a natural standstill (rang zhi ba)—in other words, become redundant—on the conventional level, and thus no ‘excluder’ (sel byed) need be proposed by them for the absolute level. The expressions ‘not affirmed’ and ‘absolute level,’ they argue, refer to nothing but this state of affairs, and can be regarded as conventional, inasmuch as one cannot avoid expressing them. They agree that what is to be established (ci 'grub) is the absolute, and further, that on the conventional level that which is indeterminate (ci yang ma yin pa) is transient, being, like a river, an undisrupted chain ofmoments.


The Mayopamavadins, in a last attempt to point out further fallacies in the Apratisthanavadins’ position, ask whether the latter’s non-postulation of any thesis—which is based on the ‘coming to a standstill’ of the negative determinations set forth by the Mayopamavadins and their own setting forth of positive determinations (considered by themselves as valid)—has come about in the form of some negative determination or not. If not, then they submit that it must be on the basis of some positive determination, for otherwise they would incur the fault of postulating a third alternative


22 P reads grub pa ma, D reads grub pa man (P, 162a5; D, 145a5; S, vol. 41: 386.7). The text should clearly read either grub pa min or, perhaps better, grub pa med, as in the immediately following sentence.

(phung po gsum pa'i skyon). They go on to ask whether, if it has come about in the form of some negative determination, the determinant (gcod byed) has arisen from some other determinant or from itself, and argue that neither can be the case. This, too, is rejected by the Apratisthanavadins, who counter with the followingexamples: Seeingand hearingexist due to the existence of objects that are respectively visible forms and audible sounds, and if there were no such objects, the sense faculties would induce neither seeingnor hearing and thus if these conditions were not present the sense faculties would naturally disappear. Likewise, as longas fuel has not been spent a fire will keep burning, whereas once it has been,
the fire will naturally die away. Thus, they state, there is nothingthat can be negatively determined, and hence [[[phenomena]]] are by nature devoid of a substratum.

(d) Advayavajra

There are two short versified works ascribed to Advayavajra (alias Avadhutapada or Maitripa) devoted to an explanation of the terms maya and apratisthana, namely, the Mayanzrukti and Apratzsthanaprakasa. Since these two works, extant in both the Sanskrit originals and their Tibetan translations, focus on the meaningof the terms maya and apratisthana and not on the Mayopamavada and Apratisthanavada branches of Madhyama- ka, they do not provide information regarding the employment of the two terms by the two branches or the differences between these branches, and thus I shall not discuss them here. In his Tattvaratnavalz", which is a somewhat longer work (also available in both Sanskrit and Tibetan),

Advayavajra explicitly refers to both Madhyamaka branches and deals with them briefly. According to him, the Mayopamavadins hold that phenomena, when analysed, are found to be free from the four extremes of existence, nonexistence, both, and neither, and so long as they are not analysed, can be accepted as existing in the manifold ways they appear. They do not see this as contradictory since they consider phenomena to be one, inasmuch as they are like illusions. The Apratisthanavadins for their part maintain that phenomena are not their various designations, and insist that they do not propagate annihilationism, since according to them phenomena are neither eternal nor are they disrupted, nor are they both or neither of the two. The true nature of phenomena is that they are all devoid of a substratum. I shall treat this brief presentation by Advayavajra in more detail below on the basis of the rather elaborate commentary by his disciple Vajrapani.
Further, in his *Apratisthdnadesakavrtti, Advayavajra briefly presents the view of Yogacara, only to refute it with the aid of authoritative citations and logical reasoning, both of which he refers to as the great fangs of the lion-like *Apratisthanavada-Madhyamaka, which [opponents] cannot withstand (rab tu mi gnas parsmra ba'i dbu ma seng ge lta bu'i lung rigs kyi mche ba ches mi bzad pa). First, a certain sutra is cited in which five methods of examining phenomena are noted, apparently corresponding to Sautrantika, Sakaravada, Nirakaravada, Mayopamavada, and Apratistha- navada, respectively:

(1) All phenomena exist in the manner they appear, since phenomena, which are rooted in the four elements, exist on the conventional level like illusions.

(2) All phenomena are nothingbut mind, since phenomena, variously designated, appear at all times variously as a self or as objects, on the basis of residual impressions implanted in the mind, giving a sense of permanence and continuance as conceptual constructs. On the ultimate level, however, they have no own-nature since they do not exist apart from the mind.

(3) The mind itself has not arisen, since it has neither shape nor colour, nor is it subjected to the three times, nor does it have a periphery or middle.

(4) All phenomena appear in the form of illusions and, like illusions, cannot be established, since all phenomena arise and emerge from causes and conditions.

(5) All phenomena are by nature non-arisen and by nature devoid of a substratum, are free from all extremes associated with actors and actions (? las dang bya ba'i mtha'), are beyond the domain of conceptual and non-conceptual, and are primordially free from manifoldness, since all this beingthe true nature of all phenomena.


This is followed by the following logical argumentation:

What is the logical reasoning? The extant well-expounded writings of great beings of the past state that as all phenomena have simply arisen in accordance with the mechanism of dependent arising, they are like illusions. Thus, on the ultimate level, the arisingfrom themselves, somethingelse, both, or causelessly is not at all tenable, and so on the ultimate level they are like a ‘sky lotus.’ This teaching alone is sufficient. If those endowed with the eye of insight would undertake a straightforward, careful examination on the basis of the syllogism of

identity (rang bzhin gyi gtan tshigs: svabhavahetu) alone, they [would realise that] in the end nothing attestable [can] be found, and thus it is established that all phenomena are devoid of a substratum.

(e) Vajrapäni’s * Guruparamparakramopadesa

The eleventh-century master Vajrapäni, in his *Guruparamparakramo- padesa, adopts the doxographical scheme of his master Advayavajra found in the Tattvaratnavali, dividing the entire Buddhist system as follows: The three Vehicles—Srävakayäna, Pratyekabuddhayäna, and Mahäyäna— rest on a total of four ‘bases’ (i.e. tenets), namely, Vaibhäsika, Sauträntika, Yogäcära, and Madhyamaka. Srävakayäna and Pratyekabuddhayäna follow Vaibhäsika, which in turn is divided into two, Western Vaibhäsika and Käsmira Vaibhäsika. Srävakayäna is divided into three corresponding to disciples’ faculties, namely, dull, mediocre, and sharp. Those with dull and mediocre faculties are said to follow Western Vaibhäsika, and those with sharp faculties and those following Pratyekabuddhayäna, Käsmira Vaibhäsika. Mahäyäna is first divided into two, namely, Causal *Laksa- nayäna and Resultant Vajrayäna. The Causal *Laksanayäna is then divided into three, again corresponding to disciples’ faculties: for those with dull faculties, Sauträntika; for those with mediocre faculties, Yogäcära; and for those with sharp faculties, Madhyamaka. Both Yogäcära and Madhyamaka are further divided into two, namely, the former into Säkäraväda and Niräkäraväda, and the latter into Mäyopamaväda and Apratisthänaväda.

Vajrapäni then discusses the total of nine systems introduced by him— three subdivisions of Srävakayäna for disciples with dull, mediocre, and sharp faculties (1-3); Pratyekabuddhayäna (4); the three subdivisions of Causal *Laksanayäna for disciples with dull, mediocre, and sharp faculties,
that is, Sautrantika (5), Yogacara with its two subdivisions of Sakaravada and Nirakaravada (6-7), and Madhyamaka with its two subdivisions of Mayopamavada and Apratisthanavada (8-9)—under four points: discern-ment (so sor rtog pa: pratyaveksana), meditation (sgom pa: bhavana), stains (i.e. risks) in meditation [that should be avoided] (sgom pa'i dri ma), and view (lta ba: drsti/darsana).

In his discussion of Mayopamavada, Vajrapani first cites and comments upon the four lines of verse from Advayavajra’s Tattvaratnavall according to which the Mayopamavadins hold that phenomena, when analysed, are found to be free from the four extremes of existence, nonexistence, both, and neither, and then goes on to comment as follows:
Now I shall explain the Mayopama[[[vada]]] system:

...
Therefore, it claims [the existence of] a luminous cognition that is like an illusion and free from the four extremes (i.e. of existence, nonexistence, both, and neither) Moreover, it teaches that nirvanic phenomena, too, are like illusions [or] like dreams, and that even if there were a phenomenon superior to nirvana, it, too, would be like an illusion [or] like a dream. Therefore, the diverse [[[phenomena]]] and the mind itself are one insofar as they are like illusions. This is the

discernment [of Mayopamavada]. Maintaining [the realisation that] all the various [[[phenomena]]] are one insofar as they are like illusions, neither real nor false—like the moon [seen on a body of] water or a reflection in a mirror—is the meditation [of Mayopamavada]. Attachment to [the extreme of] annihilationism is [considered by it] a stain in meditation [that should be avoided]. Acting for the sake of sentient beings after purifying the [first] five perfections in regard to the three spheres [of actor, act, and recipient] by means of the three non-objectifications—by means, [that is,] of a perfection of insight [that cognises that phenomena] are like illusions—is the view [of Mayopamavada].

Further, [Apratisthanavada] maintains, as follows, that because all phenomena are devoid of a substratum, that which is like an illusion [can]not be established:
No one has ever seen [[[phenomena]]]—

Be they conspicuous or inconspicuous—as they [really] are.
Thus although [they] may be expressible in words, [they] are devoid of content,
Just like [the expression] ‘the son of a barren woman.’

[Query:] Is that which is like an illusion something luminous (i.e. a cognitive entity) or is it something other than the mind (sems)? [Response:] A phenomenon that is other than the mind is not attested. If it is the mind, on the level where the mind itself [can]not be established, that which is illusion [can]not be established either. Why is that so ? Because there is nothing other than the mind itself.

[Perceiving phenomena as being something] like an illusion is the cognition of an injudicious person, [entailing as it does both] false imputation and false depreciation. For example, if a person with diseased eyes looks at the sky, [he] would say, under the influence of his diseased eyes, that a second moon, balls of hair, or the like appear, [thereby] falsely imputing [[[existence]] to them]; a judicious person, with his knowledge, on the other hand, would recognise, as soon as [they] appear, that [these phenomena] do not exist, and say that [they] do not exist, [thereby] falsely depreciating [their appearance]. Likewise, saying that illusion-like [[[phenomena]]] appear in various [[[forms]]] on account of [one’s] karma and ignorance is false imputation; and the statement that [they] are like illusions—made on account of a judicious person’s aptitude [for recognising these phenomena], as soon as [they] appear, to be empty—is false depreciation. Therefore [Mayopamavada] rests on the extremes of false imputation and false depreciation.
In his discussion of Apratisthanavada, Vajrapani first cites three verses from Advayavajra’s Tattvaratnavall—the first presenting the view that phenomena are found to be free from the four extremes of eternalism, annihilationism, both, and neither —follows with a citation of Abhisa- mayalamkara 5.21 (= Ratnagotravibhaga 1.154) , and then proceeds to expand on them as follows:

Furthermore, the position of the Sarvadharmapratisthanavada:

[[...11

It rests neither on false imputation of existence nor on depreciation into nonexistence. The experiencingof the mind as various appear¬ances is [the result of1 dependent origination, and thus [phenomena1 are non-arisen. That which is non-arisen appears as if [it1 arises, and thus the two—arisingand non-arising—are not different [from each other1. Likewise, if one examines, on the basis of logical reasoning, that which appears, [one realises that it1 is empty; while that which is empty, unattested, and unable to withstand logical analysis is appearance. That which is empty is nothingbut appearance, and appearance is nothingbut that which is empty. For example, the appearance of water in a Fata Morgana is empty of water, and the absence of water [in it1 appears as water.39 The two—the water’s appearance and the absence of water [in it1—are not different [from each other1. Likewise, an appearance has no own-nature, while that which has no own-nature appears. An appearance and the lack of an own-nature, [which latter means1 emptiness, are not different [from each other1. For example, if a bundle of firewood is consumed by fire, [it becomes1 one in essence with the fire. Then, once the firewood is

exhausted, the fire does not exist [any more1. Likewise, once [the nature of all1 the diverse appearances has been established as emptiness, on the basis of logical reasoning, [one realises that1 even the nonexistence of entities and emptiness do not subsist. Similarly, regarding [appearance and emptiness as] not being different: once [their] being different [can] no [longer] be attested, [their] being identical is no [longer] attestable either. Therefore, [in order to] eradicate other [beings’] attachment or to eliminate false imputation and false depreciation, or in a provisional sense, one speaks [of phenomena] as being empty and non-arisen. Yet, [when] explored by judicious persons, or in a

definitive sense, [even] these (i.e. emptiness and non-arising) do not subsist. Negative determinations, positive determinations, false imputation or false depreciation do not subsist either. Attachment, negation and affirmation, and two [separate states of] meditative absorption and post-meditation do neither exist nor subsist. This is the discernment [of Apratisthanavada]. The non- [focusing of] attention (or: non-mentation, yid la mi byed pa: amanasikdra) that is devoid of false imputation, false depreciation, and attachment [in regard to phenomena] is the meditation [of Apratisthanavada]. [To be sure, reaching a state of] total blankness (lit. ‘becoming [like] inanimate matter’) as a result of holding an annihilationistic view in regard to all [external] objects and [thus no longer] experiencing [phenomena] is [considered by it] a stain in meditation [that should be avoided]. Acting for the sake of sentient beings after purifying the [first] five perfections in regard to the three spheres [of actor, act, and recipient] by means of the three non- objectifications—by means, [that is,] of a perfection of insight [that cognises phenomena] without [succumbing to] false imputation, false depreciation, and attachment—is the view [of Apratisthanavada]. For example, when a judicious person with healthy eyes looks at the sky, thanks to his healthy eyes he perceives no balls of hair or the like

whatsoever, and [that] judicious person does not engage in false imputation or false depreciation by saying, “[Such objects] exist” or “[Such objects] do not exist.” Likewise, since [accordingto Apratisthà- navàda] the essence of phenomena is that [they] are all non-arisen by nature, and so [can] in no way abide in terms of either existence or nonexistence, [it] in no way rests on false imputation and false depreciation vis-à-vis existence or nonexistence. This is [its] cognition of true reality. The compassion [advocated by both] Màyopama- [vàda] and Apratisthàna[vàda] is an objectless compassion. It is an objectless compassion because [the focusing of one’s] attention (or: mentation) is [in this case] without perceivingany phenomena whatsoever.
(f) bKa' gdams bu chos ascribed to Atisa

The work titled 'Brom ston pa rgyal ba'i 'byung gnas kyi skyes rabs bka' gdams bu chos (or short: bKa' gdams bu chos) is found in the recently published Jo bo'i gsung 'bum, though it was very probably not written by Atisa but rather by some of his direct Tibetan disciples, and perhaps includes input by later followers of his. It is, however, not to be ruled out that the work incorporates notes taken during and after oral instructions given by the master, such as the passage cited here. In its first chapter, relating ’Brom ston’s birth as the Brahmin child gSal ba (dGe ba'i bshes gnyen pa bram ze'i khye'u gsal bar ji ltar skye ba bzhes pa'i le'u), a similar division of Mahàyàna is found in a passage containing teachings ascribed to Atisa.

It (i.e. Mahàyàna) has two [schools]: Madhyamaka and Yogàcàra. Madhyamaka has two [branches]: Madhyamaka which holds [that
phenomena] are mere appearances (i.e. ’Pratibhasamatra- Madhyamaka) and Madhyamaka which holds [that phenomena] have no substratum (i.e. ’Apratisthana[vada]-Madhyamaka). ’Pratibhasamatra-Madhyamaka establishes that the false appearances are false, and demonstrates this with the aid of the eight illustrations of illusion—dreams and the rest. Furthermore, because the pair [comprising] that which is to be demonstrated and the demonstrator are respectively a deceptive object and subject, they need to be abandoned and yet to be known (or: they need to be known as something to be abandoned). ’Apratisthana[vada]-Madhyamaka teaches that buddhas may appear or may not appear, but the true nature of all phenomena is [that they] have had no substratum since primordial times, and therefore it is to be accepted and known. Yogacara has two [branches]: that which postulates that appearances

are true and that which postulates that they are false. From the point of view of *Apratisthana[vada]-Madhyamaka, both of these [posi¬tions] are deluded, and yet need to be known.

4. The Reception of the Mayopamavada-Apratisthanavada Divide in Tibet It is impossible to discuss in detail the Tibetan reception of the partitioning of Madhyamaka into Mayopamavada and Apratisthanavada within the framework of this article, but I wish to touch upon some of the main issues on the basis of a few examples. As stated above, despite the fact that this division can be traced to Indian sources, it was categorically dismissed by several Tibetan scholars. The first was apparently rNgog lo tsa ba Blo ldan shes rab (1059-1109?), who with the following two lines in his sPrings yig seems to have triggered the Tibetan controversy regarding this subclassification:
The subclassification of Madhyamaka into the two systems

Of *Mayadvaya[vada and] Sarvadharmapratisthana[vada] instils a sense of wonder [only] among simpletons.

In the centuries that followed, the nature of this division was heatedly debated between those who dismissed it and those who accepted it, particularly as regards whether it was made on the basis of a view concerning the ultimate level, and—related to this—as regards the methods employed by these two branches to establish the ultimate level. Even those who accepted this division held different positions as to its relation to the more familiar division of Madhyamaka—whether Aprati- sthanavada is to be equated with Prasangika-Madhyamaka and Mayopa- mavada with Svatantrika-Madhyamaka, or whether both should be subsumed under Svatantrika-Madhyamaka.


(a) Deliberations on the Nature of the Division


Those who vehemently rejected the Mayopamavada-Apratisthanavada divide seem to have associated it with a postulation regarding the absolute. The situation among those who accepted it seems more complex. As we have seen above, the Mayopamavadins are generally said to hold phenomena to be like illusions, while the Apratisthanavadins assume no thesis. As we have also seen, the terms ‘negative determination’ and ‘positive determination’ play a central role in this connection.
(i) Gro lung pa Blo gros ’byung gnas

Gro lung pa Blo gros ’byung gnas (11th cent.), who clearly followed his master rNgog lo tsa ba in categorically rejecting this distinction, states the following:
Further, some foolish persons [claim that] there are two Madhyama- ka schools, namely, Apratisthana[vada] and Mayopamavada. [They] claim that Acarya Santaraksita and others proposed that the illusory [nature of phenomena] is the absolute, and that, having categorically negated (i.e. in the form of a negative determination) the true existence (bden pa) imagined by the Substantialists (dngos po[r] smra ba: vastuvadin), [these masters went on], on the basis of logical reasoning, [to] affirm a false existence (brdzun pa), [in the form of] a positive determination. [This can] in no way be [true, given the following] statement in Madhyamakalamkara [63]:


Therefore these entities

Have the characteristic of [merely being] conventional [reality]. If one posits that it (i.e. conventional reality) is the absolute, Then what is there that I can do !
[Santaraksita] considered this false existence to be a mere object of perception, and [he also] stated that [what is established in the form of] a positive determination, [of the sort] included amongthe four [kinds of] affirming negation [employed for] the negation of arising, is false conventional [reality]. If one posits that [a given ‘x’], be it existent or nonexistent, is attestable on the basis of logical reasoning, one would be possessed by the great demon of extreme views, and thus remote from the Middle Way. For [Santaraksita also] stated, among other things, that if [one posits] existence, [one would fall into the extreme of] eternalism.
(ii) Phywa pa Chos kyi seng ge

Until recently Phywa pa Chos kyi seng ge’s (1109-1169) works have not been accessible, and his positions on various Madhyamaka issues were known of only second-hand, as reported by later Tibetan scholars. Phywa pa has long been considered to have been a Tibetan proponent of Svatantrika-Madhyamaka and a vehement opponent of Prasangika- Madhyamaka —an issue, however, beyond the scope of this study. What I merely wish to do here is to present Phywa pa’s assessment of the Mayopamavada-Apratisthanavada divide (which he clearly does not approve of) as found in his doxographical work entitled bDe bar gshegs pa dang phyi rol pa'i gzhung rnam par 'byed pa (henceforth: gZhung rnam 'byed). He discusses the issue, in the context of presenting the absolute

truth (or reality) accordingto the Madhyamaka system, as follows:
In regard to the absolute truth (or reality), some have claimed that there are two [Madhyamaka1 systems (lugs), namely, [Mayopamava- da,1 which posits that appearances, [things1 devoid of true existence, are like illusions (bden pas stongpa'i snang ba sgyu ma lta bur smra ba), and [Apratisthanavada,1 which posits that no true existence (bden pa) [positively determinable1 in the form of an implicative negation [exists1 anywhere [as something1 having a substratum. [All1 this [amounts to1 a foolhardy exposition (mun sbrul gyi bshad pa). Regarding the claim that Mayopamavada is a system different (lugs gzhan) from Apratisthanavada: (a) Is [Mayopamavada1 a different system because [it1 does not accept that [phenomena are1 empty of hypostatic existence, or (b) is [it1 a different system because [it1 accepts that appearances are [positively determinable1 in the form of an implicative negation? (a) In the first case, if Mayopamavada does not accept that [phenomena are1 empty of hypostatic existence, this would contradict the fact that it does accept manifold appearances, and thus it would illogically follow that it does not even accept the illusion¬like [nature of phenomena1. (b) In the second case, (i) is [Mayopamavada1 different from Apratisthanavada because it accepts mere appearances that are [positively determinable in the form of1 an implicative negation, or (ii) is [it1 different from Apratisthanavada because [it1 accepts that appearances [that are positively determin¬able in the form of1 an implicative negation are [capable of1 withstandinglogical analysis (dpyad bzod)? (i) In the first case, it

would follow that even Apratisthanavada itself would be a different system from Apratisthanavada, inasmuch as [it too] accepts mere appearances that are [positively determinable in the form of] an implicative negation. If it did not accept [that], it would follow that it, like the Lokayata [system, could be accused of postulating the view of] annihilationism, inasmuch as [it would then] depreciate conventional [truth/reality], and inasmuch as it would deny not only what is not apparent, like the latter (i.e. the Lokayata system), but even deny what is obvious. (ii) In the second case, it would follow that Mayopamavada, in accepting that these [appearances] are [capable of] withstanding logical analysis and [positively determinable in the form of] an implicative negation, would not be different from the Substantialists.

Again, if it is maintained that Apratisthanavada is a system different from [that of] Mayopamavada, [the questions would be] whether it is a different system (a) because [it] does not accept [that the nature of phenomena is] illusory or (b) because [it] does not accept that the illusory [nature] is capable of withstanding logical analysis? (a) In the first case, [it would mean that Apratisthanavada] accepts no conventional [phenomena] at all (i.e. not even one that is illusory in nature), and thus it would follow that Apratisthanavada is censurable even by [the standards of] the Lokayata [system], for whereas the Lokayata [system] depreciates [only] a portion of the conventional [phenomena] (i.e. those that are not apparent), Apratis- thanavada would depreciate all conventional [phenomena]. (b) In the second case, it would follow that Mayopamavada itself would be different from Mayopamavada, inasmuch as it would accept (i.e. in contrast not only to the Apratisthanavada position but also to its own)
that the illusory [nature of phenomena] is capable of withstanding logical analysis. Positing that [it] is capable of withstanding logical analysis [entails] a hypostatic appearance (bden pa'i snang ba), and thus the semantics of ‘illusory [nature]’ would not hold [any longer]. And in positing that appearance is capable of withstanding logical analysis, [Màyopamavàda] would not be [doing anything] different from the Substantialists. Thus no Màdhyamika would consider the illusory [nature of phenomena to be capable of withstanding logical] analysis. There are no differences, then, among the Màdhyamikas, inasmuch as they all accept that the utter unattestability [of phenomena] alone (cir yang ma grub pa kho na) is capable of withstanding logical analysis.

(iii) Rog Shes rab ’od

We have seen that the terms negative determination (vyavaccheda: rnam par bcad pa) and positive determination (pariccheda: yongs su gcod pa) play a great role in the arguments surrounding the two strands of Madhyamaka under discussion. The issue is complex and needs to be
further investigated, but here I shall merely present Rog Shes rab ’od’s (1166-1244) brief explanation of these two terms in connection with the notion of mayopama and apratisthana:53

The second [point], what is to be negated [in the form of] a negative determination, has two [subpoints]: general and specific [ones]. As to the first, [namely,] the characteristics of the general negandum, whatever position one arrives at—after scrutinising on the basis of logical reasoning—according to which there are some features of a true nature (rang bzhin: svabhava), be it [of] existence or nonexist¬ence, is the negandum. If one specifies the negandum [according to the negation applied], there are two: [that which is negated in] a non- implicative negation (med pa dgag pa) and [that which is negated in] an implicative negation (ma yin pa dgag pa). As to the non-implicative negation, [it is applied to] negate the propounding of external objects as [real] entities by ordinary people and Sravakas. As to the implicative negation, [it is applied to] negate what is propounded by the Mind-Only [school], which [posits] self-cognition as the absolute.

[The third point], what is to be established [in the form of] a positive determination, has two [subpoints]: ‘being like illusions’ and ‘having no substratum.’ [The establishment of phenomena as] being like illusions is the negation of the true existence of appearances (snang ba'i dngos po) and in its place the establishment of [their] mere illusory [nature]. [The establishment of phenomena as] having no substratum is the negation of the position maintaining the true existence of appearances and then—without even maintaining a mere illusory [nature in their regard]—[attempting to establish that they] have no substratum.

(b) Mayopamavada-Apratisthanavada versus Prasangika-Svatantrika

The question as to whether Apratisthanavada is to be equated with Prasangika-Madhyamaka and Mayopamavada with Svatantrika- Madhyamaka, or whether both are to be subsumed under Svatantrika- Madhyamaka, was answered differently by different scholars, who, in this regard, can be generally divided into two groups. The first one, including Rog Shes rab ’od and Klong chen pa (1308-1364) subsumed both Mayopamavada and Apratisthanavada under Svatantrika-Madhyamaka, whereas the second, including mKhas pa lDe’u (13th cent.) bCom ldan Rig pa’i ral gri (1227-1305) sTag tshang lo tsa ba, mKhas grub rje (1385-1438) (followed by other dGe lugs scholars) and Mi pham rNam rgyal rgya mtsho (1846-1912) identified Mayopamavada with Svatantrika- Madhyamaka and Apratisthanavada (or at least a branch of it) with Prasangika-Madhyamaka. In the following I shall first cite Rog Shes rab ’od’s presentation, where Mayopamavada and Apratisthanavada are subsumed under Svatantrika-Madhyamaka, and provide an overview of the division as presented by Klong chen pa, who, however—unlike Rog Shes rab ’od—further subdivides each of the two (referred to by him as respectively ‘lower’ and ‘higher’ Svatantrika-Madhyamaka). Then, as
 
171 representative of the second group, I shall present mKhas pa lDe’u’s and Mi pham’s partitioning of Madhyamaka, followed by Nyang ral Nyi ma ’od zer’s (1136-1204) explanation of these two strands of Madhyamaka and that of the further subdivisions of Apratisthanavada. At the conclusion of this section I shall present a summary of bCom ldan Rig pa’i ral gri’s treatment of Madhyamaka, which in my view reflects the diversity of opinion among Tibetan scholars on this issue and gives a general overview of some of the points of contention.
Rog Shes rab ’od states the following:57
[As to] the fourth general point, [namely,] the object of application (’jug yul) of inference (rjes dpag: anumana), there are two [approaches]: svatantra andprasanga. The difference between the two [is as follows]: the mere elimination of faults, namely, doubts regarding one’s own autonomous view, is svatantra, while the refutation of others’ theses is prasanga. Among [those who employ] svatantra [there are] two [strands]: Mayopama[vada] and Apratisthana[vada]. The difference between the two [is as follows]: That [strand] which, in determining negatively, negates the negandum and then, in determin¬ing positively, affirms that the [nature of phenomena] is like delusive illusions is Mayopama[vada]. That [strand] which negates [the existence of] real entities from the perspective of a negative determination and has no thesis whatsoever from the perspective of a positive determination is Apratisthana[vada]. These two are Svatantrika-[Madhyamaka]. Prasangika-[Madhyamaka] takes no stance of its own but refutes [whatever is] posited by others as absolute. By what means is it refuted? [It] is refuted by means of the five kinds of logical reasoning (rigs pa: yukti) shown above.

Klongchen pa’s scheme can be summarised as follows:58

Madhyamaka

Svatantrika-Madhyamaka Prasangika- Madhyamaka

Mayopamavada

= Lower Svatantrika (rang rgyud 'og ma) Apratisthanavada =Higher Svatantrika (rang rgyud gong ma)
1. sGyu ma rigs grub tu 'dod pa 1. Kun rdzob rab tu mi gnas pa
2. sGyu ma ltar snang du 'dod pa 2. rGyu mtshan mi gnas pa
3. lDog cha mi gnas pa
3. sGyu ma tsam por 'dod pa 4. lDog byed mi gnas pa
[rnam grangs rab tu mang] 5. gCig mi gnas pa
6. Du ma mi gnas pa
7. gCig dang du ma dang bral ba mi gnas pa
8. sNang tsam rab tu mi gnas pa
[rnam grangs dpag tu med pa]

The subclassification of Madhyamaka as proposed in the Theg mchog mdzod
(vol. 1: 125.1-126.5)
mKhas pa lDe’u and Mi pham, who equate Prasangika-Madhyamaka with a branch of Apratisthanavada, divide Madhyamaka as follows:

Madhyamaka

Mayopamavada Apratisthanavada

1. sTong pa rab tu mi gnas pa
2. rGyun chad rab tu mi gnas pa
3. bTang snyoms rab tu mi gnas pa
4. Zung 'jug rab tu mi gnas pa = Prasaiigika- Madhyamaka

The subclassification of Madhyamaka as proposed in the lDe'u chos 'byung
(119.16-20) and bKa' brgyad rnam bshad (33.1-35.5)
This second scheme is also found in the gSang sngags lung gi bang mdzod, a gter ma text said to has been discovered by Nyang ral Nyi ma ’od zer, and one of the main sources for Mi pham’s bKa' brgyad rnam bshad. This text is one of the few that attempt to explain the difference between the further subdivisions of Apratisthanavada found in Tibetan sources:

Madhyamakais [of] two [kinds]:(I) Mayopamadvaya[vada] and (II) Apratisthana[vada]:
(I) [For] Mayopamadvayavada, Madhyamaka proper (don gyi dbu ma) is freedom from the four extremes. As regards the view of *Mayadvaya[vada], it maintains that there are no external entities out beyond cognition (or mind), [this] by way of refuting the position of the Alikakaravada [branch] of Yogacara according to which [the manifold appearances caused by] residual impressions [implanted in] the mind can be described neither as being identical with it (i.e. the mind) nor as being something different [from it], while a perfect nature that is momentary is the absolute. [Query:] Well, how does [it, for example,] postulate (i.e. explain) white and red appearances? [Response:] [It] maintains that these appearances appear on account of residual impressions as mere illusion. Further, given that [they] have been caused by a condition, namely, self-cognition, they are [considered] to be non-arisen.

Moreover, it accepts two [kinds of truth or modes of reality, namely,] (1) absolute and (2) conventional:

(1) The conventional is of two [types]: (i) false conventional and (ii) efficacious (or functional) conventional. (i) The false [conventional] is like the appearance of two [moons that arise] from [one] moon. Although it (i.e. the second moon) appears, it is not efficacious. (ii) The efficacious conventional is endowed with four characteristics: it has arisen from causes and conditions; it is efficacious; it appears in a similar manner (i.e. to individuals sharing the same form of existence with the same non-erroneous sense of perception); and if it is examined it [is found to] be empty.

(2) The absolute is of two [types]: (i) quasi-absolute truth (parydyaparamdrthasatya) and (ii) absolute truth proper (nispary-

ayaparamarthasatya). (i) Quasi-[absolute truth]: By applying the four kinds of logical reasoning (rigs pa: yukti) to the subject of a thesis (chos can: dharmin), [any] absolute entity (yang dag pa'i dngos po) [can] be rejected, and so [phenomena] are established as mere illusions. [As to the term paramarthasatya (don dam pa'i bden pa):] because [quasi-absolute truth] is the object of correct gnosis, it is called ‘absolute’; because it is non-erroneous and non-deceptive, it is called ‘truth.’ As to [the term] paryaya (rnam grangs), it refers to deconstructive logical reasoning. (ii) Absolute truth proper: If visual perception has not arisen, it [simply] has not arisen. When [it] has arisen, [it] has arisen in the form of visible matter. Visible matter is [in essence] of the nature of visual perception. Since visual [perception] is accompanied by images of

visible matter, it is said to be ‘with images.’ Even though [the visual perception] is accompanied [by images of visible matter, the visible matter itself] is empty of real entities. Thus appearances [of visible matter and the like] do not cease, and [they continue to] appear in the form of mere illusions. And as they (i.e. phenomena) [are considered to] be one, [inasmuch as they are all like illusions, this school of thought] is called Màyopamàdvaya[vàda].
As regards being free from the four extremes: [The Màyopama- vàda’s view] is free from the extreme of eternalism because [it proposes that phenomena are] empty of true [existence]; it is free from the extreme of annihilationism because [it proposes that phenomena, which] are empty and yet appear, are unceasing; it is free from the extreme of [postulating] both [eternalism and annihilation- ism] because [it proposes that] the same [phenomena that] appear in the form of mere illusions are also devoid of true existence; it is free

from the extreme of [postulating] neither of the two because [it proposes that phenomena can]not be established as neither of the two through [the negation of] both. The Madhyamakalamkara states:

As [we] do not [claim that] the various [phenomena are characterised by] eternalism,

[And] do not propound annihilationism,
[Or] neither eternalism nor annihilationism either.
[Our position] is free from the four extremes.
The explanation of the position of Mayopamadvaya[vada] is [herewith] concluded.

(II) Apratisthana[vada] has four [divisions]: (1) Apratisthana[vada that emphasises] emptiness, (2) Apratisthana[vada that emphasises] extinction, (3) Apratisthana[vada that emphasises] equanimity, and (4) Apratisthana[vada that emphasises] the union [of appearance and emptiness].

(1) Apratisthana[vada that emphasises] emptiness postulates that the absolute and the conventional are separate. That is, [for it] the various appearances are conventional reality, and [thus] are deceptive and untrue appearances. On the absolute level, [phenomena are postulated as] being free from all extremes of manifoldness. [It is also] postulated that these entities are utterly nonexistent (gtan nas

177 med pa) just as whatever [apparently] substantial entities (rdzas kyi dngos po) that exist in a dream, for example, are utterly nonexistent after one has awakened. The Abhisamayalamkara states:

In virtue of [having realised] emptiness, one is released.
If one does not realise it, one is bound.

And:
What is the absolute [reality] of all phenomena like?
[The Buddha] declares: [It is] emptiness.

(2) Apratisthana[vada that emphasises] extinction postulates that as long as conceptual thoughts exist, [their] antidote—the accumulation of gnosis (jnanasambhara')—also exists, but once conceptual thoughts are exhausted, even the term gnosis no [longer] exists. For example, it is like [charcoal]: as long as charcoal is present, [the colour] white does not occur.

(3) Apratisthana[vada that emphasises] equanimity [postulates the following]: The preceding views rest on the extremes of false imputation and depreciation: That is, the Sravaka [system] has falsely imputed the object-subject dichotomy. [Mayopamavada] has suc-
cumbed to depreciation, inasmuch as [it] postulates that [phe¬nomena], like illusions, are empty of an own-nature, [while it] has falsely imputed [existence to a logically attestable] illusory [nature]. The Apratisthàna[vàda that emphasises] emptiness has succumbed to depreciation in [postulatingthat phenomena] do not exist even as mere illusions; [and it] has falsely imputed [existence to utter] empti[ness].

(4) Apratisthàna[vàda that emphasises] the union [of appear-ance and emptiness postulates as follows]: Cognitions (or cognitive entities) have no substratum (yongssugnaspamedpa=rabtumignas pa). Appearances have no true existence [even] when one’s self- cognitive mind appears in the form of an [endless] cycle of dependent arising. As truly existent entities are not attestable [they can]not be held to be false [either]. [And it] proposes no thesis whatsoever. The Candrapradlpa (i.e. Samadhirajasutra) states:

No one, [not even] an intelligent [person],

Would be able to challenge

A view that contains no proposition,

[Propounding] neither existence, nonexistence, [both] existence and nonexistence, nor neither [of the two].

179 Having refuted the [claim that] appearances are truly existent, *Madhyamaka-Mayopamavada maintains that illusion (or illusory nature) is attestable on the basis of logical reasoning. This is untenable: As far as illusion is concerned, any characteristic (mtshan nyid ci yin) [attributed to it that is allegedly] attestable on the basis of logical reasoning [can] be logically invalidated (rigs pas gnod pa). [Objection: The position according to which] the cognitive subject that postulates that appearance is truly

[existent] is attestable on the basis of logical reasoning is not refutable on the basis of logical reasoning. [Reply:] Well, in that case it needs to be asked whether illusion is existent from having arisen or existent from not having arisen, employing thereby [the logical reasoning of] ‘vajra slivers/fragments’ (rdo rje gzegs ma) [and the following line of argument]: Is appearance existent on account of [its] having arisen or [its] not having arisen? If [Mayopamavada] states that it is called an illusion on account of its having arisen and [of its nevertheless being] nonexistent, it could be analogously stated (mgo bgre) that it is also called an appearance on account of [its] having arisen and [of its nevertheless being] nonexistent.

The supposed differences between these and other subdivisions of the two branches of Madhyamaka certainly need further investigation. Worth mentioning here, however, is the fact that Nyang ral explains rGyun chad rab tu mi gnas pa as the branch that maintains that gnosis exists as an antidote as long as conceptual thoughts exist, but once the latter come to an end, even the term ‘gnosis’ ceases to exist. This could certainly be taken as descriptive of Apratisthanavada as understood by Rong zom pa. Also worth mentioning is that a number of bKa’ brgyud scholars, such as Padma dkar po (1527-1592), reportedly characterised the distinction between Sutric and Tantric Mahayana as paralleling that between Rab tu mi gnas 1

pa and Zung’jugrab tu mi gnas pa.

Lastly, I would like to summarise the main points of bCom ldan Rigpa’i ral gri’s treatment of Madhyamaka in his Grub mtha' rgyan gyi me tog, which attempts to address some of the issues surroundingthe Tibetan controversy regardingthis Madhyamaka divide. Rigral first divides Madhyamaka into Svatantrika-Madhyamaka and Prasangika- Madhyamaka, and then adds that these are also called (zer) Mayopama- [vada1 and Apratisthana[vada1. He goes on to list several differences (as obviously claimed by others) between the two branches—namely, that they differ over whether they postulate the existence or nonexistence of gnosis at [the stage of1 a buddha; whether they accept or reject hypostatic existence on

the conventional level; whether they do or do not have a thesis (khas len gyi lta ba yod med, lit. “whether they do or do not have a view [statable in terms1 of propositions”); regarding the number of [types of1 valid cognition [accepted by them1; whether they do or do not postulate that all objects are false and all minds are deluded; whether or not they postulate subdivisions of the conventional; whether they consider the absolute to be [characterisable in terms of1 a non-implicative negation or freedom from manifoldness;

and so forth—but then rejects the idea that one can differentiate between them on the basis of these criteria, since this approach would be inconclusive and even misleading. He refrains, however, for reasons of space, from discussingthe matter in more detail. In the end, accordingto him, the basic distinction between the two lies in [the type of1 syllogism [employed1 (i.e. svatantra or prasanga). After addressingthis point and citingfrom several authoritative Indian works, he goes on to state that what are called Mayopama[vada1 and Apratisthana[vada1 in the Mahamudra [system] of Maitnpa and elsewhere are in fact nothing but

these two systems (i.e. Svatantrika-Madhyamaka and Prasangika- Madhyamaka). This scheme, he opines, simply reflects a shift of emphasis: Svatantrika-Madhyamikas, when expounding on [reality,] tend to [empha-sise] the illusory [nature of phenomena], while Prasangika-Madhyamikas tend to [emphasise] freedom from manifoldness, [which means that] not even the illusory [nature of phenomena] has a substratum. Both of them set out to establish the illusory nature [of phenomena] on the basis of logical reasoning, and therefore saying that sGyu ma rigs grub [pa] (i.e. Mayopamavada, the school according to which this illusory [nature] is attestable on the basis of logical reasoning) is

inferior (ngan pa) is[an expression of] ignorance (mi shes pa). After providing several citations from authoritative works, he continues by arguing that the claim by some that there are Madhyamikas who postulate that the illusory [nature of phenomena] is the absolute truth is nothing but a superficial evaluation (’ol tshod), for if [this illusory nature] is transient, then [the claim that it is] the absolute cannot hold, whereas if it is not transient, then [the claim that it is] illusion-like would not hold; any postulation of the dependent [nature] on the absolute level would, moreover, conform to the system of the Substantialists. He further argues that the exposition found in some scriptures according to which the illusion-like [nature] is the absolute refers to the quasi-absolute (rnam grangs pa'i don dam). Therefore, he concludes, all Madhyamikas are in agreement inasmuch as they postulate that the absolute is freedom from manifoldness.


5. Concluding Remarks

From what we have seen in the above-cited sources it can be said that the treatment of the Mayopamavada-Apratisthanavada divide by both Indian
scholars and their Tibetan successors, while often addressing similar questions and points of contention, was by no means homogeneous. What one can, however, say is that Mayopamavada is normally presented by Apratisthanavada as a Madhyamaka school that attempts to positively determine the illusion-like nature of phenomena, while Apratisthanavada is commonly said not only to reject such an attempt but, in addition, not to take a position at all in regard to the absolute (some, though, state that they positively determine phenomena, as being substratumless). Nonetheless, since all Indian sources cited above present the matter from the Apratisthanavadin viewpoint, one wonders whether there was anyone at all who considered himself a Mayopamavadin—that is, in the sense portrayed by their Apratisthanavadin ‘opponents’—or whether the entire

‘controversy’ and ‘debate’ took place, at least initially, within Apratisthana- vada circles alone with (more or less) imaginary opponents. Whatever the case, this subclassification of Madhyamaka is certainly a late one, and apparently confined to a small circle of primarily Tantric Indian masters. This scheme therefore seems—possibly because institutionalised Buddh¬ism on the Indian subcontinent was virtually coming to an end—to have never had the chance to undergo proper systematisation in India or to be

systematically subjected to refutation by its opponents. Tibetans therefore inherited this doxographical scheme in a very rudimentary form, to say the least. And although they commonly attempted to systematise and harmonise whatever apparently conflicting doctrines they did inherit, we see in our case an unusually vehement rejection on the part of some Tibetan scholars, despite the fact that the scheme is found in several Indian sources. One possible explanation stems from the fact that the Indian proponents of this scheme, being strongly inclined towards Tantric teachings, did not enjoy much authority among Tibetan masters more inclined towards non-Tantric teachings. What is undoubtedly certain is that this scheme not only did not conform (at least not in an obvious manner)

183 with the widely accepted subclassification of Madhyamaka duringthe first propagation period of Buddhism in Tibet (i.e. that into Sautrantika- Madhyamaka and Yogacara-Madhyamaka), but it also appeared to relegate highly revered masters such as Santaraksita and other Yogacara- Madhyamikas to the inferior Mayopamavada branch, which was, at least for some, unacceptable (the same could be said, though, in regard to the Svatantrika-Prasangika divide). Moreover, this scheme did not seem to correlate any more straightforwardly with the new partitioning of Madhyamaka into Svatantrika-Madhyamaka and Prasangika- Madhyamaka, which finally gained the upper hand in Tibet (the nature of this latter scheme, to be sure, has also remained, to a certain degree, a matter of debate).


One of the main points of contention, and one reason for the vehement rejection, is no doubt the fact that most (later) Tibetan authors seem to have taken the difference between Mayopamavada and Apratisthanavada to refer to their allegedly divergent postulations regarding the absolute. The claim that a Madhyamika would postulate some kind of existence on the absolute level was no doubt unacceptable in their view. However, there remains the question of whether this was indeed the case. As I have shown in my above-

mentioned study on various conceptions of Buddhahood— which, broadly speaking, can be subsumed under two groups: on the one hand, a conception of Buddhahood according to which the stage of a buddha comprises the purified dharmadhatu alone, and on the other, several conceptions that propose that the stage of a buddha comprises, in addition, other elements (such as non-conceptual gnosis, pure mundane gnosis, buddha-Bodies, bliss, and the like)—Rong zom pa convincingly shows that these different conceptions of Buddhahood refer to the conventional level and not to the absolute level. That is, the first conception is ascribed to Madhyamikas who do not seem to follow any of the Yogacara theories

of knowledge for their postulation of the conventional level, while the remaining conceptions are ascribed to Madhyamikas who follow one of the Yogacara theories of knowledge towards that end. Moreover, the first group is associated with Apratisthanavada, and the second with Mayopamavada. Provided that Rong zom pa’s understanding of the nature of the Mayopamavada-Apratisthanavada divide (which is clearly sup¬ported by some Indian and early Tibetan sources) reflects the initial state of affairs, one wonders what would have been the reason for this cleft. I have already pointed out that Rong zom pa’s presentation of the controversy surrounding the constituents of Buddhahood and its

connec¬tion with the Yogacara theories of knowledge on the one hand and to the Mayopamavada-Apratisthanavada divide on the other is unique in its scope and grasp of the issue, not only in comparison to discussions found in other Tibetan sources but also to ones that took place in India. However, as pointed out earlier, the recent publication of the so-called bKa' gdams gsungs 'bum has revealed that Rong zom pa was not alone in his views on the Madhyamaka stance on Buddhahood and other issues, and presumably one is likely to find early material therein that will shed more light on the matter and help us answer at least some of the many open questions. It cannot be ruled out that Rong zom pa, at one end of the scale, is representative of highly sophisticated attempts at clarification and systematisation of the issue, which unfortunately fell into oblivion, whereas later authors, at the other end, reflect unawareness of such efforts, and certainly not of the epistemological issues underlying this divide.


Appendix


(a) Asvaghosa/Sura

• Paramarthabodhicittabhavanakrama (P, 18a6-b4; D, 16a3-7 ; S, vol. 64:
  

46.8-47.3)

gal te grub pa mtha’ yas pa’i II gnod pa ’di la rab tu ’du II des na ma brtags nyams dga’ steI sgyu ma tsam la brtags pas bslusI(1) sems ni sgyu ma’i rnam pa steI byang chub kyang ni sgyu ma ’draI des kyang tshig tu brjod spangs teI spros bral ’jam dpal mthong ba minI (2) sgyu ma sgyu ma tsam min teI gal te yin na de mi grubI grub na gzhan gyi gzhung lugs kyangI sgyu ma’i chos su thal bar ’gyurI de phyir sgyu ma’i rang bzhin niI sgyu bzhin ’di zhes brjod du medI(3) <’on kyang>80 thugs rje ldan pa yis II bden pa gnyis kyi tshul gnas teI tha snyad don la rab brten nasI bdag med seng ge’i sgra chen bsgragsI(4) stong pa nyid sogs rnam grangs sgoI sgyu ma ’dra sogs dpe mtha ’yasI theg pa sna tshogs thabs tshul gyisI mi gnas dbu ma nye bar mtshonI(5)


mtshon kyang mtshon bya ma yin te I
’di la bsal bya ci yang med I stong pa nyid kyang stong pas stongI ’di la sangs rgyas sems can medI(6) bdag gzhan snang zhing srid pa’i chosI rnam grol rnam par bcings pa yangI ming tsam ming yang yod ma yinI thams cad nam mkha’ dang ’dra steI (7) de ltar chos rnams mthong med naI mi mngon mi snang ’jam dpal mthongI skye dang <’chi ba’i srid pa>83 yi I ’khor ba’i rgya mtsho pha rol ’groI(8)

(b) Candraharipäda

• Ratnamälä (P, 69a6-7; D, 71a4; S, vol. 63: 1045.12-14): brtags pa’i yang dag bkag pa yis I shugs la rang rig sgyu ma’i lusI rigs dpyad yod med mtha’ las grolI ma brtags nyams dga’ bem rig gnyisI
  
• Ratnamälä (P, 69a8-b1; D, 71a5-6; S, vol. 63: 1045.17-1046.1): snang srid sgyu ma lta bu laI ye shes sangs rgyas sgyu ma laI sgyu ma rigs pas grub na niI
  

sgyu ma ma yin yang dag thal II mi ’gyur sgyu mar grub ce nail rigs grub don ni yang dag minI sgyu ma’i ming gis ci byar yodI de yang dngos ’dzin gdon las niI ma ’das pa ru mkhas rnams ’dod

(c) Jñänavajra

• Tattvamârgadarsana (P, 148a5-8; D, 133a7-b2; S, p. vol. 41: 356.7-12): de yang spyod lam khyad par med par dus gsum du lnga char ’dod la lta ba la khyad yod de I sbyor dngos mjug gsum mdo sde pas rten ’brel du ’dod la I rnam bcas sems kyi rnam par ’dod I rnam med pas bzang rtog tu ’dod laI sgyu ma lta bus sgyu ma lta bur ’dodI rab tu mi gnas pas kun rdzob yin gyi don dam ma yin teI rmi lam lta bu mi bden par snang bar ’dod deI don dam la khas len med pa’o I gzhan don dam du ’dod pa’o I.
  

(d) Advayavajra

• Apratisthânadesakavrtti (P, 235a5-8; D, 215b4-6; S, vol. 26: 1536.8-16): rigs pa gang zhe naI bdag nyid chen po rnams kyis sngon du legs par bkod pa’i gang dag yod par grags pa’i chos thams cad rten cing ’brel par ’byung ba tsam las byung ba’i phyirI sgyu ma lta bu’o zhes bya ba dangI de nyid kyis don dam par na rang dang gzhan dang gnyis ka dang rgyu med pa las skye ba nam yang mi ’thad pa’i phyir don dam par nam mkha’i padma lta bu’o zhes bstan pa ’di kho nas chog ste I shes rab kyi mig dang ldan pa rnams kyis rang bzhin gyi gtan tshigs ’di kho na’i sgo nas drang por zhib tu bltas na I mthar ci yang grub pa ma rnyed pas I chos thams cad rab tu mi gnas par grub pa’o ||.
  

(e) Vajrapäni

• Guruparamparäkramopadesa (P, 184b6-185a3; D, 164b4-165a1; S, vol. 41: 446.10-447.13):
  

rim gyis ’jug pa’i dbang du byas na theg pa ni gsum steI nyan thos kyi theg pa dangI rang sangs rgyas kyi theg pa dangI theg pa chen po’o| theg pa gsum ni gnas pa bzhi la gnas teI gnas pa bzhi ni bye brag tu smra bar gnas pa dangI mdo sde par gnas pa dangI rnal ’byor spyod par gnas pa dangI dbu <ma par>100 gnas pa’o || nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas ni bye brag tu smra ba la gnas so| bye brag tu smra ba la yang gnyis teI nub phyogs bye brag tu smra ba dangI kha che bye brag tu smra ba’o| nyan thos la gsum steI dbang po tha ma dangI ’bring dangI rab bo| de la tha ma dang ’bring po ni <nub phyogs>102 bye brag tu smra ba la gnas so || rab dang rkyen rtogs ni kha che bye brag tu smra ba la gnas so| theg pa chen po la yang gnyis teI rgyu mtshan nyid kyi theg pa dangI ’bras bu rdo


rje’i theg pa’o || de la rgyu mtshan nyid kyi theg pa la gsum ste I tha ma dangl ’bring dangl rab bo || tha ma ni mdo sde pa’o || ’bring ni rnal ’byor spyod pa’o || rab ni dbu ma pa’o || rnal ’byor spyod pa la gnyis te I rnam pa dang bcas pa dang I rnam pa med pa’o || dbu ma pa la yang gnyis te I sgyu ma lta bu gnyis su med par smra ba dang I chos thams cad rab tu mi gnas par smra ba’o|

• Guruparamparäkramopadesa (P, 189a3-b6; D, 168a7-169a1; S, vol. 41: 456.11-457.19):
  

da ni sgyu ma lta bu’i gzhung bshad par bya ste I

gnyis ka min pa’ang ma yin pa| mtha’ bzhi las ni rnam grol ba| de nyid dbu ma pa yis rig| » ces bya bas 1 yod pa ma yin pa ni gcig dang du ma’i sbyor bas gnod pa’i phyir ro || med pa ma yin pa ni snang ba nyams su myong ba yod pa’i phyir ro| gnyis ka ma yin pa ni gnyis ka la skyon yod pa’i phyir ro| gnyis ka ma yin pa yang ma yin pa ni rgyu med pa mi srid pa dang I phung po gsum pa med pa’i phyir ro|
de bas na mtha’ bzhi las grol ba’i sgyu ma lta bu’i shes pa ’od gsal bar ’dod <do ||>115 de yang mya ngan las ’das pa’i chos kyang sgyu ma lta bu rmi lam lta <bu la>116 mya ngan las ’das pa las ches lhag pa’i chos yod na yang de yang sgyu ma lta bu rmi lam lta bu’o zhes gsungs pas I sna tshogs dang
sems nyid sgyu ma lta bur gnyis su med pa ni so sor rtog pa’o || sna tshogs thams cad chu zla’am me long gi gzugs brnyan ltar bden pa ma yin la brdzun pa yang ma yin par sgyu ma lta <bur gnyis>118 su med par ’jog117 pa ni sgom pa’o| chad par zhen pa ni sgom pa’i dri ma’o| sgyu ma lta bu’i shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pas pha rol tu phyin pa lnga mi dmigs pa gsum gyis ’khor gsum yongs su dag par byas nas sems can gyi don byed pa ni lta ba’o|
gzhan yang chos thams cad rab tu mi gnas pas sgyu ma lta bu nyid ma grub par ’dod de 1 de yang ’di skad du I

gsal lam mi gsal yang rung ste|
sus kyang ji bzhin ma mthong bas|
mo gsham gyi ni bu bzhin du|
brjod du zin kyang don med de|

zhes bya bas sgyu ma lta bu nyid ’od gsal lamI ’on te sems las gzhan zhe naI
sems las gzhan pa’i chos ni ma grub laI sems nyid yin na sems nyid ma grub pa’i dus su sgyu ma nyid kyang mi ’grub bo| de ci’i phyir zhe naI sems nyid las gzhan med pa’i phyir ro| sgyu ma lta bu yang mi mkhas pa’i shes pa ste I sgro ’dogs skur pa ’debs pa ste I dper na skyes bu <mig ma dag pas>127 mig nam mkha’ la bltas na mig ma dag pa’i stobs kyis zla ba

gnyis pa dang | skra’i ’khor lo la sogs pa snang zhes sgro ’dogs la mkhas pa’i shes pas snang ma thag tu med par shes te | med do zhes skur pa ’debs so I de bzhin du sgyu ma lta bu yang las dang ma rig pa’i dbang gis sna tshogs su snang ngo zhes sgro btags la| mkhas pa’i stobs kyis snang ma thag tu stong ste| sgyu ma lta bu zhes skur pa ’debs soI de bas na sgro ’dogs pa dang skur pa ’debs pa’i mtha’ la gnas soI

• Guruparamparakramopadesa (P, 189b6-190b5; D, 169a1~b5; S, vol. 41: 457.20-459.21):
  

de nas gzhan yang chos thams cad rab tu mi gnas par smra bar ’dod pas

«sna tshogs rtag pa ma yin teI chad par yang ni khas mi lenI rtag dang chad pa gnyis ka dangI gnyis ka min pa’ang ma yin noI ’dir ni thams cad mi gnas parI dngos po’i de nyid mkhas pas rigI des na ’di lta’i rnam rtog giI sems ni sems kyis rig ma yinI ji srid sgro ’dogs thams cad niI de kun thams cad du med pasI dbu ma’i don la sgro ’dogs medI des na dgag dang sgrub pa medI» ces bya ba dang| gzhan nas kyang| «’di la <bsal bya>135 ci yang med I gzhag par bya ba gang yang med I yang dag nyid la yang dag blta I yang dag mthong na rnam par grolI» zhes
bya bas

yod pa’i sgro ’dogs dang med pa’i skur pa ’debs pa la mi gnas te I sems nyid sna tshogs su <snang ba nyams su>138 myong ba nyid rten cing ’brel par ’byung bas na ma skyes pa steI ma skyes pa nyid skye ba ltar snang steI skye ba dang skye ba med pa gnyi ga tha mi dad do || de bzhin du snang ba nyid rigs pas brtags na stong pa yin laI stong pa ma grub pa rigs pas brtag mi bzod pa nyid snang ba’o| snang ba nyid las kyang stong pa gzhan ma yin laI stong pa nyid las kyang snang ba gzhan ma yin no| dper na smig rgyu la chur snang ba nyid la chu yis stong laI chu med pa nyid chur snang steI chur snang ba dang chu med pa gnyis tha dad pa ma yin no | de bzhin du snang ba nyid na rang bzhin med <la I>141 rang bzhin med pa nyid snang ba’o| snang ba dang rang bzhin med pa stong pa nyid ni tha mi dad <do ||>143 dper na bud shing du ma mes bsregs na me’i ngo bor gcig ste I de nas bud shing zad pa dang me nyid mi gnas so| de bzhin du sna tshogs su snang ba nyid rigs pas stong pa nyid du byas nas dngos po ma grub pa dang stong pa nyid kyang mi gnas so| de bzhin du gnyis su mi gnas pa yang gnyis su ma grub pa’i tshe na gnyis su med pa yang mi ’grub bo| de bas na gzhan gyi zhen pa bzlog <pa ’am>1451 sgro skur gcad <pa ’am>1471 <drang ba’i>148 don du stong pa dang skye ba med pa zhes brjod kyi I mkhas

193 pas btsal <pa ’am>1501 nges pa’i don du de nyid mi gnas te I rnam gcod dang I yongs gcod dang I sgro ’dogs dang 1 skur pa ’debs pa yang mi gnas laI zhen pa med cing dgag pa dangI sgrub pa med la mnyam gzhag dang rjes thob gnyis su med cing mi gnas pa ni so sor rtog pa’o I sgro skur dang zhen pa med par yid la byed pa med pa ni sgom pa’o I don thams cad chad par lta zhing nyams su myong ba med pas bems por gyur pa ni sgom pa’i dri ma’o I sgro skur med pa dang I zhen pa med pa’i shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pas pha rol tu phyin pa lnga mi dmigs pa gsum gyis ’khor gsum yongs su dag pas sems can gyi don byed pa ni lta ba’o I dper na skye bo mig dag pa mkhas pa <mig gis>155 nam mkha’ la <bltas pas>156 mig dag pas skra’i ’khor lo la sogs pa ci yang mi dmigs la I mkhas pas yod ces bya ba’am med ces bya bar sgro ’dogs <pa ’am>158 skur pa ’debs par mi byed do I de bzhin du chos thams cad rang bzhin du ma skyes pa’i ngo bo nyid kyis yod med gang yang mi gnas pas yod med kyi sgro skur gang du yang mi gnas pa ni de kho na nyid kyi shes pa’o I sgyu ma lta bu dang rab tu mi gnas pa’i snying rje yang dmigs pa med pa’i snying rje ste I chos thams cad cir yang mi dmigs par yid la byed pas na mi dmigs pa’i snying rje’o I


(f) Atisa (ascribed)

bKa' gdams bu chos (160.9-16):
de la gnyis I dbu ma dang I sems tsam mo || dbu ma la gnyis te I snang ba tsam gyi dbu ma dangl rab tu mi gnas pa’i dbu ma’o || snang ba tsam gyi dbu ma ni | chos rdzun pa yin pa rdzun par gtan la ’bebs te I rmi lam la sogs pa sgyu ma’i dpe brgyad kyis bstan no| de yang bstan bya ston byed gnyis ka ’khrul ba’i yul dang yul can yin pas spang bya yin la shes par bya dgos so || rab tu mi gnas pa’i dbu ma ni | sangs rgyas rnams byon yang rung I ma byon yang rung | chos rnams kyi chos nyid ye nas mi gnas par gsungspasl blang bya yin la shes par bya dgos so || sems tsam la gnyis te I snang ba bden par smra ba dang I rdzun par smra ba’o || de dag gnyis car rab tu mi gnas pa’i dbu ma la ltos te ’khrul ba yin la shes par ni bya dgos I
(g) Gro lung pa Blo gros ’byung gnas
bsTan rim chen mo (437b7-438a3):
yang blun po kha cig dbu ma’i lugs gnyis te I rab tu mi gnas pa dang sgyu ma lta bur smra ba’o| slob dpon zhi ba ’tsho la sogs pa ni sgyu ma don dam pa bzhed pa ste I dngos po smra bas btags pa bden pa bkag nas brdzun pa yongs gcod rigs pas bsgrub pa kho na’o zhes zer ba ni ci ’ang ma yin te I dbu ma’i rgyan nyid las I
de phyir dngos po ’di dag ni|
kun rdzob pa nyid mtshan nyid ’dzin|
gal te don dam ’di ’dod na|
de la bdag gis ci byar yod|
ces rdzun pa de snang ba’i yul tsam du gsungs la I skye ba dgag pa dgag bzhis bsdus pa’i yongs gcod ni log pa’i kun rdzob nyid du gsungs pa’i phyir dangl yod pa’am med pa’ang rung ’ga’ zhig rigs pas gnas par smra na mthar lta ba’i gdon chen pos zin pas dbu ma’i lam las thag ring ba nyid do| yod na nges par rtag par zhes bya ba la sogs pa gsungs pa’i phyir ro|

(h) Phywa pa Chos kyi seng ge
gZhung rnam 'byed (65.6-67.2):
don dam pa’i bden pa la yang kha cig bden pas stong pa’i snang ba sgyu ma lta bur smra ba dang | ma yin dgag tu bden pa gang du yang rab tu mi gnas par smra ba’i lugs gnyis yod zer ba ni mun sbrul gyi bshad pa ste | sgyu ma lta bur smra ba rab tu mi gnas par smra ba las lugs gzhan du brjod pa de (a) bden pas stong par khas mi len pas lugs gzhan yin nam| (b) snang ba ma yin dgag tu khas len pas lugs gzhan yin| (a) dang po ltar na sgyu ma lta bur smra bas bden pas stong par khas mi len na de snang ba sna tshogs par khas len par ’gal bas sgyu ma lta bu nyid kyang khas mi len par <thal lo>1701| (b) gnyis pa ltar na (i) snang ba ma yin dgag pa tsam khas len pas rab tu mi gnas pa las lugs gzhan yin nam (ii) snang ba ma yin <dgag de>174 dpyad bzod du khas len pas rab tu mi gnas pa las lugs gzhan yin | (i) dang po <ltar na>175 rab tu mi gnas par smra ba nyid kyang rab tu mi gnas pa las lugs gzhan du ’gyur te| snang ba ma yin <dgag de>177 tsam khas len pa’i <phyir ro>1781 khas mi len na kun rdzob la skur pa ’debs pas rgyang <’phen pa>179 ltar chad par ’gyur te I des ma mthong ba bkag pa ltar ’dis mthong ba nyid kyang bkag pa’i phyir ro I (ii) gnyis pa ltar na sgyu ma lta bur smra ba dpyad bzod ’di pa ma yin dgag khas len pas dngos por smra ba dang tha dad <med par>183 ’gyur ro I

rab tu mi gnas pa yang sgyu ma lta bur smra ba las lugs gzhan du brjod naI (a) sgyu ma khas mi len pa’am (b) sgyu ma dpyad bzod du khas mi len pas lugs gzhan yinI (a) dang po ltar na rab tu mi gnas pas kun rdzob <thams cad>187 mi ’dod pas <rgyang ’phen pas>188 kyang smad par bya bar ’gyur teI rgyang ’phen pas kun rdzob kyi phyogs gcig la skur pa btab pa yin la rab tu mi gnas pas kun rdzob <thams cad>192 la skur ba btab pa’i phyir roI (b) gnyis pa ltar na sgyu ma ltar smra ba nyid kyang sgyu ma ltar smra ba nyid las tha dad du ’gyur teI sgyu ma dpyad bzod par khas len pa’i phyir roI dpyad bzod du khas len na bden pa’i snang ba yin

 pas sgyu ma’i don mi gnas la I snang ba dpyad bzod par ’dod pas dngos por smra ba dang yang tha dad med par ’gyur ro || <de bas na>198 dbu ma ba <thams cad>199 kyis sgyu ma lta bu nyid ni dpyad par mi ’dod pas I cir yang ma grub pa kho na dpyad bzod par ’dod pa la tha dad gtan med pa yin no|
(i) Rog Shes rab ’od
Grub mtha' bstan pa'i sgron me (A, 176.5-177.5; B, 264.3-265.3):
gnyis pa rnam bcad dgag bya la gnyis teI spyi dangI bye brag go| dang po dgag bya spyi’i mtshan nyid niI dngos po ’amI dngos med kyang rung steI rigs pas dpyad nas rang bzhin gyi khyad par ’ga’ zhig dang ldan par ’dod pa gang rnyed pa de dgag bya yin no || <dgag bya>205 la bye brag tu phye na gnyis teI med pa dgag pa dangI ma yin pa dgag pa’o| med pa dgag pa niI so so skye bo dangI nyan thos paI phyi rol gyi don dngos por ’dod pa ’gogs laI ma yin pa dgag pa niI sems tsam rang rig don dam du ’dod pa ’gogs pa’o|.
yongs gcod bsgrub bya la gnyis teI sgyu ma lta buI rab tu mi gnas pa’o| sgyu ma lta bu niI snang ba’i dngos por bkag nasI shul du sgyu ma
tsam cig sgrub pa’o || rab tu mi gnas pa ni | snang ba’i dngos por ’dod pa bkag nas sgyu ma tsam du yang mi ’dod de rab tu mi gnas pa’o ||
Grub mtha' bstan pa'i sgron me (A, 189.2-190.3; B, 275.2-276.2):

spyi don bzhi pa rjes dpag gi ’jug yul la gnyis te| rang rgyud dang| thal ’gyur ro| de gnyis kyi khyad par ni| rang rgyud kyi lta ba la dogs pa’i skyon sel tsam cig rang rgyud yin la| gzhan gyi khas len ’gogs pa de thal ’gyur ro| rang rgyud la gnyis te| sgyu ma lta bu dang| rab tu mi gnas pa’o| de gnyis kyi khyad par yang| rnam bcad kyi dus su dgag bya bkag nas| yongs gcod la rdzun pa’i | sgyu ma lta bur khas len pa ni| sgyu ma lta bu’o| rnam bcad la bden pa’i dngos po bkag nas| yongs gcod la khas len gang yang med pa ni rab tu mi gnas pa’o| de gnyis rang rgyud do| thal ’gyur ni| rang gi khas len gang yang med pa la| gzhan gyis yang dag tu khas len pa ’gogs pa’o| de gang gis ’gogs na| gong du bstan pa’i rigs pa lnga pos ’gogs so|

(j) Nyang ral Nyi ma ’od zer
gSang sngags lung gi bang mdzod (141.6-146.4):
dbu ma la gnyis te ! (I) sgyu ma ltar gnyis su med pa dang ! (II) rab tu mi gnas pa’o !
(I) <142> sgyu ma ltar gnyis su med par smra ba ni ! mtha’ bzhi dang bral ba don gyi dbu ma’o! sgyu ma gnyis med kyi lta ba ni! sems tsam

 199 rnam rdzun gyis sems nyid kyi bag chags dang i de nyid dang gzhan du brjod du med pa dang don dam yongs grub skad cig mar ’dod pa bkag nas ’di shes pa las ma gtogs pa phyi rol gyi don med par ’dod pa de i ’o na dkar dmar gyi snang ba ’di ji ltar ’dod zhes na i snang ba ’di nyid bag chags kyi dbang gis i sgyu ma tsam du snang bar ’dod i de yang rang rig pa’i rkyen las bskyed pa’i phyir ma skyes pa ces bya’o i
de yang (1) don dam (2) kun rdzob gnyis su ’dod de!

(1) kun rdzob la yang gnyis! (i) log pa’i kun rdzob dang| (ii) don byed pa’i kun rdzob bo ! (i) log pa ni zla ba las gnyis su snang ba lta bu ste ! snang yang don byed mi nus pa’o ! (ii) don byed pa’i kun rdzob ni ! mtshan nyid bzhi dang ldan pa ste ! rgyu rkyen las skyes pa ! don byed nus pa | mthun par snang ba ! brtags na dben pa’o !
(2) don dam la gnyis ! (i) rnam grangs kyi don dam pa’i bden pa
dang! (ii) rnam grangs ma yin pa’i don dam pa’i bden pa’o! (i) rnam grangs ni ! gtan tshig bzhi chos can la bzhag pas ! yang dag pa’i <dngos po>219 bcad nas ! sgyu ma tsam du bsgrub pa’o ! ye shes dam pa’i yul du gyur pas don dam pa zhes bya’o ! ma nor mi slu bas bden pa ces bya’o ! rnam grangs ni ’joms byed kyi rigs pa la <143> bya’o! (ii) rnam grangs ma yin pa’i don dam pa’i bden pa ni ! mig gi rnam par shes pa ma skyes na ma skyes ! skyes na gzugs su skyes ! gzugs mig gi rnam par shes pa’i ngo bo yin ! <mig gzugs>224 gzugs kyi rnam pa dang bcas pas

rnam bcas ' zhes bya’o ' bcas bzhin du yang dag pa’i dngos por stong pas snang ba ma ’gags te ' sgyu ma tsam du snang ba yin la ' de gnyis su med pas sgyu ma gnyis med zhes bya’o'

mtha’ bzhi las grol lugs ni' yang dag pa’i stong pas rtag pa’i mtha’ dang bral' stong zhing snang ba ma ’gags pas chad pa’i mtha’ dang bral' sgyu ma tsam du snang ba nyid yang dag gi dngos por stong pas gnyis ka’i mtha’ dang bral' gnyis ka bas gnyis med ma grub pas' gnyis med kyi mtha’ dang bral' dbu ma rgyan las'

sna tshogs rtag pa ma yin pas'
chad pa yang ni khas mi len'
rtag chad gnyis ka ma yin pas'
mtha ’bzhi las ni yongs su grol'
ces ’byung ngo' sgyu ma ltar gnyis su med pa’i ’dod pa bshad zin no'

(II) rab tu mi gnas pa la bzhi ste' (1) stong pa rab tu mi gnas pa' (2) rgyun chad rab tu mi gnas pa I (3) btang snyoms rab tu mi gnas pa ' (4) zung ’jug rab tu mi gnas pa
(1) stong pa rab tu mi gnas pa ni' don dam dang kun rdob tha dad du ’dod pa ste' snang pa sna tshogs ’di kun rdzob kyi bden pa ’khrul pa’i snang <144> ba mi bden pa’o ' don dam pa na spros pa’i mtha’ thams cad dang bral ba’o' dper na rmi lam rdzas kyi dngos po ci yod pa las' sad nas gtan med pa bzhin' dngos po ’di gtan nas med par ’dod' mngon par rtogs pa’i brgyan las'
stong pa nyid kyis grol bar ’gyur'
de ma shes na ’ching bar ’gyur'

201 zhes pa dang i
chos thams cad kyi yang dag pa ji lta bu lags i
bka’ stsal pa stong pa nyid i
zhes pa’o i

(2) rgyun chad rab tu mi gnas pa nii ji srid rnam rtog yod kyi bar dui gnyen po ye shes kyi tshogs kyang yod lai rnam rtog zad nas ye shes kyi ming yang med par ’dod doi dper na sol ba ma zad na dkar po mi yong pa ltar roi

(3) btang snyoms rab tu mi gnas pa nii de man chad kyi lta ba sgros btags dangi skur ’debs kyi mtha’ la gnas te i nyan thos kyis gzung ’dzin du sgros btagsi sgyu ma lta bur rang bzhin gyis stong par ’dod pa pa skur <pa btab>234 i sgyu ma sgros btags i stong pa rab tu mi gnas pas sgyu ma tsam du yang med ces skur pa btabi stong pa sgros btags soi

(4) <zung jug>236 rab tu mi gnas pa ni i blo yongs su gnas pa med de i snang ba rang gi sems kyi rang rig rten ’brel gyi ’khor lo sna tshogs su snang ba’i dus na bden pa’i dngos <145> po ma grub i bden pa’i dngos po ma grub pas rdzun par mi ’dzini khas gang du yang mi len tei zla ba sgron ma lasi

yod dang med dang yod med medi
khas mi len pa’i lta ba la I
de la blo dang ldan pa nii
sus kyang klan ka bya mi nusi
zhes ’byung ngoi

dbu ma sgyu ma lta bu ni i snang pa yang dag du ’dod pa bkag nas i sgyu ma rig pas bsgrub par ’dod de mi ’thad de i sgyu ma ni mtshan nyid ci yin rigs pas grub lai rigs pas gnod pa’oi snang ba dag su ’dod pa’i blo yangi rigs pas grub pa la rigs pa mi gnod pa la bya’oi ’on snang ba skyes nas <grub bam>248 ma skyes pas grub zer nas rdo rje gzegs ma gtong nai sgyu ma skyes nas grub pami ma skyes pas grub bya’oi skyes nas ma grub des na sgyu ma zhes bya’oi zhes zer nai skyes nas ma grub pa des snang ba yang ces bya’o zhes mgo bgre’o i
(k) Rig pa’i ral gri
Grub mtha' rgyan gyi me tog (391.1-6):
de ’dra’i dbu mar smra ba la ||
rang rgyud pa dang thal ’gyur gnyis ||
de la sgyu ma lta bu dang|
rab tu mi gnas zhes kyang zer|
’di gnyis kyi khyad par sangs rgyas la ye shes yod med du ’dod pa’am kun rdzob la bden pa khas len mi len nam khas len gyi lta ba yod med dam tshad ma’i grangs mang nyung ngam yul thams cad rdzun pa dang blo thams cad

’khrul par ’dod mi ’dod dam kun rdzob la dbye ba ’dod mi ’dod dam don dam med dgag dang spros bral la byed pa la sogs pa tsam gyis ni khyad par mi phyed de ma khyab pa dang ’khrul pa’i phyir ro || de rgyas par bshad na ni shin tu mang por ’gyur ro || ’on kyang ’di gtan tshigs kyi dbye ba yin no ||
Grub mtha' rgyan gyi me tog (393.6-394.5):

mai tri pa’i phyag rgya bzhi la sogs pa nas sgyu ma lta bu dang rab tu mi gnas pa zhes ’byung ba de’ang ’di gnyis yin te rang rgyud pa rnams ni sgyu ma lta bu shas eher ’chad la I thal ’gyur ba ni sgyu ma tsam mi gnas pa’i spros bral shas cher ’chad pas shas che chung la btags pa yin no| ’di gnyis ka sgyu ma lta bu ni rigs pas sgrub pa yin te ... des na sgyu ma rigs grub ngan pa yin no zhes zer ba ni mi shes pa yin no|
Grub mtha' rgyan gyi me tog (396.2-6):

kha cig gis sgyu ma lta bu don dam pa’i bden par ’dod pa’i dbu ma pa yod ces zer ba de ni ’ol tshod kho na yin te brtags pas ’jig na don dam yin pa nyams la I mi ’jig na sgyu ma lta bu nyams pa’i phyir dang I gzhan dbang don dam du ’dod pa dngos po smra ba’i lugs yin pa’i phyir ro| gzhung ’ga’ zhig las sgyu ma lta bu la don dam zhes bshad pa de ni rnam grangs pa’i don dam yin no| de’i phyir dbu ma pa thams cad don dam spros bral la ’dod par mthun par yin no|

Sigla and Bibliography


1. Sigla


A&B See Grub mtha' bstan pa'i sgron me.
D sDe dge bKa' 'gyur and bsTan 'gyur. Numbers accordingto Hakuju Ui et al., eds., A Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons (Bkah-hgyur and Bstan-hgyur). Sendai: Tohoku Imperial University, 1934.

P Peking bKa' 'gyur and bsTan 'gyur. Numbers accordingto Shoju Inaba et al., The Tibetan Tripitaka. Peking Edition. Catalogue & Index, Reduced-size edition. Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co., 1985.
S bsTan 'gyur (dpe bsdur ma). Beijing: Krung go’i bod kyi shes rig dpe skrun khang, 1994-2005.

2. Primary Sources

a. Indian Sources

• Apratisthanadesakavrtti Advayavajra, *Sarvadharmapratisthanade- sakatattvârthagathâvrtti.
  

—Tib. P3144; D2296; S1204, vol. 26.

• Dharmadhatudarsanagïti Atisa, *Dharmadhatudarsanagiti.
  

—Tib. P3153; D2314; S1216, vol. 26.

• Guruparamparakramopa- Vajrapani, *Guruparamparakramopadesa. desa —Tib. P4539; D3716; S2414, vol. 41.
  

Hevajratantra Srihevajramahatantraraja.

—In The Hevajra Tantra: A Critical Study. Part 2: Sanskrit and Tibetan Texts, ed., D. L. Snellgrove. London Oriental Series 6. London: Oxford University Press, 1959: 1-101.

• Paramarthabodhicittabhava- Asvaghosa/Sura, *Paramarthabodhicitta-
  

nakrama bhavanakrama.
—Tib. P5308; D3912; S3141, vol. 64. *Ratnamala Candraharipada, *Ratnamala.
—Tib. P5297; D3901; S3130, vol. 63. *Sugatamatavibhangakarika Jetari, *Sugatamatavibhangakarika.
—Tib. P5296; D3899; S3128, vol. 63. *Tattvam.argadarsana Jnanavajra, *Tattvamargadarsana.
—Tib. P4538; D3715; S2413, vol. 41.
Advayavajra, Tattvaratnävali.

—Skt. H. Ui (ed.), Tattvaratnavali. Nagoya Daigaku Bungakubu Kenkyu Kiyou (The Journal of the Faculty of Nagoya Universi¬ty) 3.1, 1950: 1-31.
—Tib. P3085; D2240; S1146, vol. 26.
Tattvaratnavaloka Vagisvarakirti, “Tattvaratnavalokah with Vivarana of Mahäpandita-Vägisvarakirti.” Dhih 21 (1996): 129-149.
Yuktisastika Nagarjuna, Yuktisastika.
—In Chr. Lindtner (ed. & tr.), Master of Wisdom: Writings of the Buddhist Master Nagarjuna, Translation and Studies. Re¬vised edition of 1986. Berkeley: Yeshe De Project, Dharma Publishing, 1997: 72-93 (Tibetan text and English translation), 174-175 (Sanskrit fragment).
b. Tibetan Sources

bKa' brgyad rnam bshad Mi pham rNam rgyal rgya mtsho, dPal sgrub pa chen po'i bka' brgyad kyi spyi don
rnam par bshad pa dngos grub snying po.In MS, vol. 21: 1-207.

bKa' gdams bu chos 'Brom ston pa rgyal ba'i 'byung gnas kyi skyes rabs bka' gdams bu chos. In Jo bo'i gsung 'bum. Ed. dPal brtsegs bod yig dpe rnying zhib jug khang. Beijing: Krung go'i bod rigpa dpe skrun khang, 2006: 157-591.
bSlab pa gsum gyi rgyan gyi bCom ldan rig pa'i ral gri, bSlab pa gsum gyi
me tog rgyan gyi me tog. In bCom ldan rigs [sic]
pa'i ral gri'i gsung 'bum. 10 vols. [[[Lhasa]]:

Khams sprul bSod nams don grub, 2006], vol. 4 (nga): 258-439. [scans: TBRC: W00 EGS1017426]
Gro lung pa Blo gros 'byung gnas, bDe bar gshegs pa'i bstan pa rin po che la 'jug pa'i lam gyi rim pa rnam par bshad pa. Lhasa: Zhol par khang, [1800s].
Mi pham rNam rgyal rgya mtsho, dBu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad 'jam dbyangs bla ma dgyes pa'i zhal lung. In MS, vol. 13 (nga): 1¬359.
Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po, sGyu 'phrul gsang ba snying po'i rtsa rgyud tshul bzhi yan lag bco lngas bkral ba dkon cog 'grel. In RZChZSB under the title rGyud rgyal gsang ba snying po dkon cog 'grel, vol. 1: 31-250.

Grub mtha' bstan pa'i sgron Rog Shes rab 'od, Grub mtha' so so'i bzhed me tshul gzhung gsal bar ston pa chos 'byung grub mtha' chen po bstan pa'i sgron me. A
Detailed Survey of Comparative Siddhanta in the Context of Mahayana Buddhism and in Particular the rNin-ma-pa Tradition of Tibet. Edited from a Tibetan Blockprint by the Ven. ’Khor-gdong gTer-sprul ’Chi-med- rig-’dzin. Ladakh: Tshul khrims ’jam dbyangs, 1977. [ = A]
—In bKa' ma shin tu rgyas pa. Compiled and edited by mKhan po ’Jam dbyangs. 120 vols. Chengdu, 1999, vol. 114: 105-315. [scans: TBRC: W25983-4019][=B]
sTag tshang lo tsä ba Shes rab rin chen, Grub mtha' kun shes nas mtha' bral sgrub pa zhes bya ba'i bstan bcos rnam par bshad pa legs bshad kyi rgya mtsho. In Tshul khrims rgyal mtshan, ed., Grub mtha' kun shes kyi rtsa 'grel. Beijing: Mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1999: 26-230.

bCom ldan rig pa’i ral gri, Grub mtha' rgyan gyi me tog.InbCom ldan rigs [sic] pa'i ral gri'i gsung 'bum. 10 vols. [[[Lhasa]]: Khams sprul bSod nams don grub, 2006], vol. 5 (ca): 102-425. [scans: TBRC: W00EGS1017426]
Nyang ral Nyi ma ’od zer (discovered),
mdzod gSang sngags lung gi bang mdzod. In bKa'
brgyad bde gSegs 'dus pa'i chos skor. The largest version of the bKa’ brgyad or “Eight Pronouncement” system of the rNin- ma-pa tradition recovered from its place of concealment by Myan-ral Ni-ma-’od-zer. Reproduced from the complete mTshams- bragmanuscript reflectingthe tradition of Gon-ra Lo-chen Nag-dban-gzhan-phan-rdo- rje. Paro, Kyichu Monastery: Ngodrup & Sherab Drimay, 1980, vol. 4: 97-178. [scans: TBRC: W22247]
gSang sngags nges par byed See mDo rgyud rtogs pa'i sgron ma.

pa'i don
gSung lan dus gi pho nya dGe ’dun rin chen, Phyag rgya chen po las brtsams pa'i dri tshig grub pa'i mdung rnon zhes bya ba'i gsung lan dus kyi pho nya.In bShes gnyen chen po dge 'dun rin chen mchog gi gsung 'bum. 10 vols. Rewalsar: Sherab Gyaltsen Lama & Acharya Shedup
Tenzin, Zigar Drukpa Kargyud Institute, 1985-1991, vol. 6: 439-500.
gZhung rnam 'byed Phywa pa Chos kyi seng ge, bDe bar gshegs pa dang phyi rol pa'i gzhung rnam par 'byed pa.InbKa' gdams gsung 'bum phyogs bsgrigs thengs dang po. 30 vols. Chengdu: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 2006, vol. 9: 7-73.
IDe'u chos 'byung mKhas pa lDe’u, rGya bod kyi chos 'byung rgyas pa. Chief ed. Chab spel tshe brtan phun tshogs. Gangs can rig mdzod 3. Lhasa: Bod ljongs mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1987.
lTa phreng 'grel pa Rongzom Chos kyi bzangpo, Man ngag lta phrenggi 'grel pa. In RZChZSB, vol. 1: 303-351.
mDo rgyud rtogs pa'i sgron Nyang ral Nyi ma ’od zer (discovered), ma mDo rgyud rtogs pa'i sgron ma. P4781, D
not found; S2657, vol. 44.

MS 'Jam mgon 'ju mi pham rgya mtsho'i gsung 'bum rgyas pa sde dge dgon chen par ma. The Expanded Redaction of the Complete Works of Ju Mi-pham. Reconstructed and reproduced from the survivingprints at the order of H. H. Dilgo Chhentse Rim- poche. 27 vols. Paro: Lama Ngodrup & Sherab Drimey, 1984-1993.
'Od gsal snying po Mi pham rNam rgyal rgya mtsho, gSang 'grel phyogs bcu mun sel gyi spyi don 'od gsal snying po.InMS, vol. 19: 1-271.
Rang byung ye shes Rongzom Chos kyi bzangpo, Rang byung ye shes chen po 'bras bu rol pa'i dkyil 'khor du blta ba'i yi ge. In RZChZSB, vol. 2: 111¬130.
RZChZSB Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po, Rong zom chos bzang gi gsung 'bum. 2 vols. Chengdu: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1999.
Theg mchog mdzod Klong chen pa Dri med ’od zer, Theg pa'i mchog rin po che'i mdzod.InmDzod bdun, Gangtok: Dodrup Chen Rinpoche. n. d. [Reprint: Thimphu: National Library of Bhutan, n. d.], vols. ca-e & cha-wam .
Theg tshul Rongzom Chos kyi bzangpo, Theg pa chen po'i tshul la 'jug pa zhes bya ba'i bstan bcos.
In RZChZSB, vol. 2: 415-555.
Thugs rje spyan thag gi gnas See mDo rgyud rtogs pa'i sgron ma. 

3. Secondary Sources
Almogi 2009 Orna Almogi, Rong-zom-pa's Discourses on Bud- dhology: A Study of Various Conceptions of Buddhahood in Indian Sources with Special Reference to the Controversy Surrounding the
Existence of Gnosis (jnäna: ye shes) as Presented by the Eleventh-Century Tibetan Scholar Rong- zom Chos-kyi-bzang-po. Studia Philologica Buddhi- ca Monograph Series 24. Tokyo: International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 2009.
Ichigo 1989 Masamichi Ichigo, ed. & tr., “Santaraksita’s Madhyamakalamkara.” In Luis O. Gomez & Jonathan A. Silk, eds., Studies in the Literature of the Great Vehicle: Three Mahayana Buddhist Texts. Michigan Studies in Buddhist Literature 1, ed. Luis O. Gomez. Ann Arbor: Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Michigan, 1989: 141-240.
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2 Amongthe Tibetan critics were rNgoglo tsa ba, Gro lungpa, and Tsongkhapa
127 mig ma dag pas] em., ma dag pas PD. Cf. the reading in the parallel passage
137 This is a citation of Abhisamayälamkära 5.21( = Ratnagotravibhäga 1.154). For further references and a translation, see Wangchuk 2007, pp. 199-200, n. 11; Almogi