WIENER STUDIEN ZUR TIBETOLOGIE UND BUDDHISMUSKUNDE HEFT 90 .1 DAVID HIGGINS AND MARTINA DRASZCZYK MAHĀMUDRĀ AND THE MIDDLE WAY POST-CLASSICAL KAGYÜ DISCOURSES ON MIND, EMPTINESS AND BUDDHA-NATURE VOL. I INTRODUCTION, VIEWS OF AUTHORS AND FINAL REFLECTIONS ARBEITSKREIS FÜR TIBETISCHE UND BUDDHISTISCHE STUDIEN UNIVERSITÄT WIEN WIEN 2016 WSTB 90.1 WIENER STUDIEN ZUR TIBETOLOGIE UND BUDDHISMUSKUNDE GEGRÜNDET VON ERNST STEINKELLNER HERAUSGEGEBEN VON BIRGIT KELLNER, KLAUS-DIETER MATHES und MICHAEL TORSTEN MUCH HEFT 90 WIEN 2016 ARBEITSKREIS FÜR TIBETISCHE UND BUDDHISTISCHE STUDIEN UNIVERSITÄT WIEN DAVID HIGGINS AND MARTINA DRASZCZYK MAHĀMUDRĀ AND THE MIDDLE WAY POST-CLASSICAL KAGYÜ DISCOURSES ON MIND, EMPTINESS AND BUDDHA-NATURE VOL. I INTRODUCTION, VIEWS OF AUTHORS AND FINAL REFLECTIONS VOL. II TRANSLATIONS, CRITICAL TEXTS, BIBLIOGRAPHY AND INDEX WIEN 2016 ARBEITSKREIS FÜR TIBETISCHE UND BUDDHISTISCHE STUDIEN UNIVERSITÄT WIEN DAVID HIGGINS AND MARTINA DRASZCZYK MAHĀMUDRĀ AND THE MIDDLE WAY POST-CLASSICAL KAGYÜ DISCOURSES ON MIND, EMPTINESS AND BUDDHA-NATURE VOL. I INTRODUCTION, VIEWS OF AUTHORS AND FINAL REFLECTIONS WIEN 2016 ARBEITSKREIS FÜR TIBETISCHE UND BUDDHISTISCHE STUDIEN UNIVERSITÄT WIEN Herausgeberbeirat / Editorial Board Jens-Uwe Hartmann, Leonard van der Kuijp, Charles Ramble, Alexander von Rospatt, Cristina Scherrer-Schaub, Jonathan Silk, Ernst Steinkellner, Tom Tillemans Copyright © 2016 by Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien / David Higgins & Martina Draszczyk ISBN: 978-3-902501-28-8 IMPRESSUM Verleger: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universitätscampus, Spitalgasse 2-4, Hof 2, 1090 Wien Herausgeber und für den Inhalt verantwortlich: B. Kellner, K.-D. Mathes, M. T. W. Much alle: Spitalgasse 2-4, Hof 2, 1090 Wien Druck: Ferdinand Berger und Söhne GmbH, Wiener Straße 80, 3580 Horn CONTENTS Acknowledgement Introduction Current State of Research Politico-Historical Background Doctrinal Background Navigating the Middle Ways The Nature of Liberating Knowledge 12 14 17 22 25 29 41 Shākya mchog ldan Shākya mchog ldan and the Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā Tradition Life, Writings and Influences Madhyamaka and the Dialectic of Emptiness: Rang stong and Gzhan stong The Three Natures (trisvabhāva) The Two Truths (satyadvaya) Mahāmudrā and Buddha Nature Direct Perception and Nondual Wisdom The Great Seal in Shākya mchog ldan’s Mahāmudrā trilogy Mahāmudrā: What it is and What it is Not Madhyamaka, Mantrayāna and Mahāmudrā Mahāmudrā and What Remains (lhag ma : avaśiṣṭa) The Problem of Cessation Contested Methods of Realization Responses to Sa skya Paṇḍita’s Criticism of Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā A Philosophical Defence and Justification of Mahāmudrā Defending Mahāmudrā Views The Self-sufficient White Remedy (dkar po gcig thub) Mental Nonengagement (amanasikāra) and the Fire of Wisdom Concluding Remarks 44 45 51 57 65 67 74 101 109 109 116 121 124 127 131 131 135 135 139 145 Karma phrin las Overview Life, Writings and Influences Madhyamaka Approach Extant Writings Views of Reality The Compatibility of Rang stong and Gzhan stong The Two Types of Purity Buddha Nature Endowed with Qualities On the Unity of the Two Truths “Thoughts are Dharmakāya” Understanding Coemergence: the Inseparability of Saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa 148 149 156 159 168 169 169 181 184 200 210 217 Concluding Remarks 223 Karma pa Mi bskyod rdo rje Overview The Differentiation and Identification Models Reconciling Affirmation and Negation Life, Writings and Influences Blending Mahāmudrā and Madhyamaka Emptiness and Hermeneutics of the Three Turnings Core Soteriological Ideas and the Role of Philosophical Distinctions Buddha Nature Nature of Reality Nature of Mind The Problem of the Remainder (lhag ma : avaśiṣṭa) On the Prospect of a Groundless Ground On Whether or Not a Buddha has Wisdom Mahāmudrā as Mental Nonengagement (amanasikāra) Concluding Remarks 226 227 229 238 242 250 253 265 269 275 277 299 314 320 325 341 Padma dkar po Overview Life, Writings and Influences The Basic Framework: Mahāmudrā and the Unity of the Two Truths Emptiness and the Hermeneutics of the Three Turnings Hermeneutics of Mahāmudrā as Ground and Path The Two Faces of Mahāmudrā: the Modes of Abiding and Error Mahāmudrā as the Mode of Abiding (gnas lugs phyag chen) Mahāmudrā in the Mode of Error (’khrul lugs phyag chen) Yang dgon pa on the Two Modes of Mahāmudrā Padma dkar po’s Transposition of Yang dgon pa’s Distinction Interpretations of the Mahāmudrā Distinction Mahāmudrā and the Unity of the Two Truths Asymmetrical Unity and Rival Truth Theories (Jo nang and Dge lugs) The Ground of Truth Path Mahāmudrā and Liberating Knowledge Nonconceptual Knowing in the Shadow of the Bsam yas Debate Three Strands of Amanasikāra Interpretation in Indian Buddhism Padma dkar po’s Three Grammatical Interpretations of Amanasikāra Responding to Criticisms of Amanasikāra Concluding Remarks 342 343 347 350 352 356 357 359 363 369 376 378 382 385 393 398 399 403 413 422 426 FINAL REFLECTIONS 429 A C KN OW L ED G E MEN T The authors would like to gratefully acknowledge the many people who made this work possible. These two volumes are the result of research that was generously funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) from 2012 to 2015 and that was conducted under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Klaus-Dieter Mathes. The project was entitled “‘Emptiness of Other’” (Gzhan stong) in the Tibetan ‘Great Seal’ (Mahāmudrā) Traditions of the 15th and 16th Centuries” (FWF Project number P23826-G15). As the majority of our research was undertaken in Vienna, we would first of all like to thank our colleagues in the Department of South Asian, Tibetan and Buddhist Studies at the University of Vienna for their interest in our project and to acknowledge the excellent and congenial work environment provided in the Institute. Above all, we owe a debt of gratitude to Prof. Klaus-Dieter Mathes for launching this project and for the continuous encouragement and guidance he provided from start to finish. His previous in-depth work on classical buddha nature theories provided a major impetus to this project. In the early stages of the project, research trips were undertaken to India and Nepal (three weeks in 2012 by Martina Draszczyk and three months in 2013 by David Higgins) where the Vajra Vidya Library in Sarnath and the Karmapa International Buddhist Institute in Delhi were especially helpful in providing us with texts essential for our research. Dr. Higgins was able to obtain from the Vajra Vidya Library a xylograph copy of a rare edition of an early critical review of Tibetan tantric buddha nature theories by Mi bskyod rdo rje that the author originally referred to as Nerve Tonic for the Elderly (Rgan po’i rlung sman) but which appears in his Collected Works under the less irreverent title Sublime Fragrance of the Nectar of Analysis (Dpyad pa bdud rtsi’i dri mchog). This copy proved necessary for completing a proper critical edition and translation of this important text, parts of which appear in this publication. Our research in India and Nepal provided an invaluable opportunity to work closely with traditionally-trained scholars of Bka’ brgyud doctrine on resolving various difficult points (dka’ gnad) of Mahāmudrā exegesis in some of our main primary sources. In this regard, we would like to express our heartfelt thanks in particular to Mkhan po Tshul khrims rgya mtsho of KIBI Institute, Delhi in India and David Karma Chos ’phel of Thrangu Tashi Yangtse Monastery, Namo Buddha in Nepal, for taking the time to patiently address our many questions. Throughout the three years, a number of Mkhan pos held successive positions as lecturers at Vienna University: Dkon mchog rang grol (2011‒2012), Gyur med rdo rje (2012‒ 2013), and Dkon mchog bstan ’phel (2013‒2015). Our special thanks go to them for working with us through difficult sections of the texts included in our study. Although a work of this nature is very much a collaborative effort, we are solely responsible for any errors or deficiencies in the final product. Without the stimulating exchanges and encouragement of our colleagues, this monograph could never have come to fruition. We owe a particular debt of gratitude to the following individuals: Prof. Michael Torsten Much, Prof. Akiro Saito, Prof. Tom Tillemans, Prof. Kazuo Kano, Prof. Helmut Tauscher, Prof. Vincent Eltschinger, Prof. Roger Jackson, Prof. Carmen Meinert, Prof. Jiri Holba, Prof. Martin Adam, Dr. Anne MacDonald, Dr. Jim Rheingans, Dr. Philippe Turenne, and Dr. Volker Caumanns. INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION The Mahāmudrā teachings that form the doctrinal nucleus of the various Tibetan Bka’ brgyud sects in Tibet have stimulated a rich heritage of philosophical, poetic and didactic writings since their inception in the 11th century by the physician-turned-monk Sgam po pa Bsod nams rin chen (1079‒1153). Yet they have also been the target of unremitting criticism by other Tibetan Buddhist schools beginning with Sa skya Paṇḍita Kun dga’ rgyal mtshan’s (1182‒1251) denunciation of certain modern-day Mahāmudrā (da lta’i phyag rgya chen po) views early in the 13th century. As a result, the doctrinal history of Bka’ brgyud traditions has frequently been interwoven with polemics, and increasingly so as the expansion of their institutional networks and doctrinal influence brought them into closer dialogue and confrontation with other ascendant Tibetan Buddhist schools. In the midst of such exchanges, Sgam po pa’s Mahāmudrā teachings have always found able defenders, and not all of them having a primary affiliation with any Bka’ brgyud lineage. Apologists have included the likes of the Sa skya master Shākya mchog ldan, and many Rnying ma masters including Klong chen rab ’byams pa (1308‒1364), Rtse le Sna tshogs rang grol (b. 1608), and Zhabs dkar Tshogs drug rang grol (1781‒1851). The tradition was also to some extent validated by the Dge lugs polymath Thu’u kwan Chos kyi nyi ma (1737‒1802) who followed a standard Tibetan rhetorical strategy of defending the purity of the early Bka’ brgyud founders while accusing modern-day proponents of various misinterpretations of their original teachings.2 1 Attempts to legitimize the authenticity of Dwags po Bka’ brgyud teachings have generally proceeded from the contention that these teachings not only accord with authoritative Indian Buddhist doctrinal systems but also represent their ultimate import or definitive meaning (nges don). This placed the onus on defenders such as the four examined in this book to establish the continuity of Bka’ brgyud doctrines and practices with authoritative IndoTibetan traditions of exegesis (bshad lugs) and praxis (sgrub lugs) and also show how they offered a distinctive path beyond the many errors, deviations, and impasses that result from a wrong or partial understanding of such traditions. Against detractors who had raised questions about the Indian provenance of certain Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā doctrines such as Sgam po pa’s “White Panacea” (dkar po gcig thub), and also doubts about whether such teachings should even be considered Buddhist at all3, Mahāmudrā apologists stood united in promoting this tradition as a way firmly grounded in insights and methods of Indian Buddhist third 1 Dwags po is the name of a district situated south of the Gtsang po river and west of Kong po which was the birth-place of Sgam po pa, the “physician from Dwags po” (dwags po lha rje). The Dwags po Bka’ brgyud is the major subsection of the Bka’ brgyud tradition having numerous subsects which can all be traced back to Sgam po pa and his immediate disciples. 2 See R. Jackson 2006, especially 13. 3 For an illuminating full-length treatment of this controversy, see D. Jackson 1994. 14 INTRODUCTION turning sūtras, the tantras, and the dohās and upadeśas of the mahāsiddhas. It is presented as a path that distils from these traditions the most direct and effective means of reaching the Mahāyāna goal of spiritual awakening for the sake of oneself and others. Some of the most cogent expositions and defenses of Sgam po pa’s Mahāmudrā doctrines and practices were advanced during the post-classical era (15th and 16th centuries)4 following the overthrow of the Sa skya hegemony by the founder of the Phag mo gru dynasty, Ta’i Situ Byang chub rgyal mtshan (1302‒1364) in 1354.5 This was a period when several of the Bka’ brgyud lineages for the first time enjoyed sufficient institutional backing, religious authority, and intellectual freedom to begin replying to the criticisms of Sa skya Paṇḍita Kun dga’ rgyal mtshan (1182‒1251) and his Sa skya and Dge lugs advocates. If one considers the long list of scholars who critically replied to Sa paṇ’s Mahāmudrā criticisms by means of the standard methods of argumentation based on scripture (lung) and reasoning (rigs), one cannot fail to be struck by the fact that all belonged to the post-classical period or later.6 The sectarian and heatedly polemical climate of the time ensured that their responses did not go unchallenged for long; in due course the critical responses of Shākya mchog ldan, Mi bskyod rdo rje, and Padma dkar po in their turn provoked fierce rebuttals from defenders of Sa skya pa and Dge lugs pa doctrine.7 Such interactions must be seen as part of a broader post-classical 4 We have followed the periodization suggested by van der Kuijp 1989 who coins the term “post-classical” to refer to a period of Tibetan epistemology beginning in the 15 th century “characterized by a reappraisal of PreClassical [late 10th to late 12th centuries] tshad ma, by critiques of Sa-paṇ’s work, and by its defense” (6). Within the framework of our research, this period is characterized by an unprecedented increase in Bka’ brgyud polemical responses to Sa paṇ and later Sa skya and Dge lugs critics. 5 Van der Kuijp (2003) notes (431‒32), on the basis of Byang chub rgyal mtshan’s autobiography, that the Phag mo gru founder continued to face formidable resistance until at least 1361, during which time the Sa kya was still considered superior de jure, if not de facto. 6 The list of scholars who critically responded to Sa paṇ’s broadsides against Dwags po Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā teachings includes ’Gos Lo tsā ba Gzhon nu dpal (1392‒1481), the Fourth Zhwa dmar Chos grags ye shes (1453‒ 1524), Karma phrin las Phyogs las rnam rgyal (1456‒1539), Chos rgyal bstan pa Dwags ram pa (1449‒1524), Shākya mchog ldan (1423‒1507), the Eighth Karma pa Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507‒1554), Dwags po Bkra shis rnam rgyal (1511‒1587), the Fourth ’Brug chen Padma dkar po (1527‒1592), the ’Bri gung Zhabs drung Chos kyi grags pa (1595‒1661), ’Brug pa mkhas dbang Sangs rgyas rdo rje (1569‒1645), Ngag dbang ’Phrin las (17th c.), and Rtse le Sna tshogs rang grol (b. 1608). For a discussion of different respondents to Sa paṇ’s Sdom gsum rab dbye criticisms of Bka’ brgyud views, which includes some of the names listed above, see Huber 1990, 400. Several of the authors named here responded to Sa paṇ’s critiques in the context of commentaries on Rang byung rdo rje’s Zab mo nang don. This largely unexplored commentarial literature which to date comprises thirteen extant commentaries (as well two minor works), the most recent being Zab mo nang gi don ’grel ba’i lus sems gsal ba’i me long of Thub bstan phun tshogs (b. 1955) published in 2004 (Lhasa: Bod ljongs mi dmangs dpe skrun khang), is an invaluable source for understanding doctrinal developments in Bka’ brgyud traditions during the formative 14th to 16th centuries. 7 For an “impressionistic” overview of Tibetan polemical literature during the 14 th to 16th centuries, see Cabezón and Dargyay 2006 (18‒33). A detailed survey of post-classical polemical literature concerning Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā traditions would go well beyond the scope of this book. Confining ourselves to some of the polemical works associated with the authors considered herein, we can mention the following. Shākya mchog ldan posed one hundred questions regarding Sa skya Paṇḍita’s Sdom gsum rab dbye in a work entitled Good 15 INTRODUCTION trend toward the consolidation and protection of representative views and practices of the major Tibetan schools. These were typically legitimized by claims of fidelity to Indian Buddhist sources and reinforced by the charisma and prestige of the traditions’ spiritual founders. This phase of doctrinal consolidation developed in tandem with the expansion of religious institutions and the forging of institutional identities. Because scant attention has hitherto been paid to post-classical Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā traditions, the state of knowledge of key philosophical developments and exchanges during the most mature stage of their development has been piecemeal and inchoate. The present work was motivated in part by the paucity of systematic knowledge about post-classical Mahāmudrā doctrinal and polemical trends, their major proponents, and their intellectual milieux. Our primary aim has been to critically examine the attempts to articulate and defend Bka’ brgyud views and practices by four leading post-classical thinkers and offer a selected anthology of their representative writings on Mahāmudrā. Their contributions Questions Concerning ‘Differentiation of the Three Codes’ (Sdom gsum rab dbye la dri ba legs pa, see SCsb(A), vol. 17, 4487‒4627). This was critically responded to by Go ram pa Bsod nams seng ge in his Sdom pa gsum gyi bstan bcos la dris shing rtsod pa’i lan sdom gsum ’khrul spong (see Jackson, David 1989b) and also by Glo bo mkhan chen Bsod nams lhun grub (1456‒1532), on which see Jackson, David 1991, 235‒237. On these works, see also Komarovski 2011, 20 and 313 n. 20 and 21. Rejoinders to Shākya mchog ldan’s criticisms of Tsong kha pa are found in the Chen po Shāk mchog pa’i rtsod lan by Se ra rje btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan, a subsection of the Zab mo stong pa nyid kyi lta ba la log rtog ’gog par byed pa’i bstan bcos lta ba ngan pa’i mun sel, in Dgag lan phyogs sgrigs, 175–385, on which see Cabezón and Dargyay 2006, 30 and n. 154. Mi bskyod rdo rje’s criticisms of Shākya mchog ldan’s Mahāmudrā-related epistemological and buddha nature views are found in his MA commentary Dwags po’i shing rta (Zi ling ed.), 1920‒212 and 2610‒5416 and his Nerve Tonic for the Elderly (Rgan po’i rlung sman, 10102‒10231), on which see Volume II of present study, translation: 105‒9 and 111‒15, critical edition: 109‒11 and 115‒17. Mi bskyod rdo rje’s criticisms of Dge lugs pa interpretation of *Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka in his aforementioned MA commentary were repudiated by Se ra rje btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan in his Gsung lan klu sgrub dgongs rgyan (in Dgag lan phyogs sgrigs, 69‒173). Padma dkar po’s criticism in his Phyag chen rgyal ba’i gan mdzod that the Dge ldan pa “succumbed to an eternalist view regarding the ultimate and a nihilist view regarding the conventional” (examined in chapter four below) was countered by the Dge lugs scholar Sgom sde shar chen Nam mkha’ rgyal mtshan (1532‒1592) in his Byang chub sems 'grel gyi rnam par bshad pa'i zhar byung 'brug mi pham padma dkar pos phyag chen gyi bshad sbyar rgyal ba'i gan mdzod ces par rje tsong kha pa la dgag pa mdzad pa'i gsung lan (in Dgag lan phyogs sgrigs, 607‒645). Padma dkar po’s refutations of Sa paṇ’s criticisms of Mahāmudrā doctrine in the Phyag chen rgyal ba’i gan mdzod, a masterful exposition and defence of Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā, were countered by the Sa skya scholar Mang thos Klu sgrub rgya mtsho (1523‒1596) in his Sdom gsum rab dbye'i dka' 'grel sbas don gnad kyi snying po gsal byed phyag chen rtsod spong skabs kyi legs bshad nyi ma'i 'od zer, in Klu sgrub rgya mtho gsung skor vol. 5, 111‒206. As a counter-response to Mang thos’s rebuttal, Padma dkar po’s leading disciple Mang thos Sangs rgyas rdo rje (1569‒1645) in turn wrote a lengthy defence of his master’s Phyag chen rgyal ba’i gan mdzod entitled Phyag rgya chen po’i man ngag gi bshad sbyar rgyal ba’i gan mdzod ces bya ba’i bstan bcos la rtsod pa spong ba’i gtam srid gsum rnam par rgyal ba’i dge mtshan, in Sangs rgyas rdo rje gsung ’bum vol. 4, 293‒636. For some of the Dge lugs responses to Mi bskyod rdo rje and Padma dkar po, see Seyfort Ruegg 2000, 70‒71 and n. 160. Relevant parts of some of the above-mentioned works are considered in the chapters below. A balanced account of post-classical intersectarian debates concerning Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā doctrines would have to consider responses by Jo nang scholars to Bka’ brgyud, Dge lugs and Sa skya critics. See, for example, Gnyag dbon Kun dga’ dpal’s (1285‒1379) influential overview and defence of the Jo nang system entitled Bde gshegs snying po'i rgyan gyi 'khrul 'joms dang bstan pa spyi 'grel gyi rnam bshad in which he criticizes Sgam po pa’s precept that “thoughts are dharmakāya”. 16 INTRODUCTION represent a high-water mark in Mahāmudrā exegesis. The institutional expansions that occurred during this time undoubtedly exerted a ratchet effect on intersectarian dialogue and polemics, raising scholasticism to new levels of maturity and sophistication. It was a time when several Bka’ brgyud traditions, most prominently the Karma Bka’ brgyud, enjoyed unprecedented temporal power and religious influence thanks to the support of powerful Tibetan aristocratic clans. The scholars chosen for consideration are [1] Shākya mchog ldan (1423‒1507), a celebrated yet controversial Sa skya scholar who developed a strong affiliation with the Karma Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā tradition in the last half of his life, [2] Karma phrin las Phyogs las rnam rgyal (1456‒1539), a renowned Karma Bka’ brgyud scholar-yogin and tutor to the Eighth Karma pa, [3] the Eighth Karma pa himself, Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507‒ 1554), who was among the most erudite and influential scholar-hierarchs of his generation, [4] and Padma dkar po (1527‒1592), Fourth ’Brug chen of the ’Brug pa Bka’ brgyud lineage who is generally acknowledged as its greatest scholar and systematiser.8 The book is divided into two volumes, with the first comprising an overview of the Mahāmudrā treatments of the authors based on a close reading of their seminal Mahāmudrā writings and the second presenting edited texts and translations of selected materials by these authors on Mahāmudrā and related doctrines. CURRENT STATE OF RESEARCH Although each of the authors considered in this work has received some attention in contemporary Buddhist studies, their views on Mahāmudrā have not been closely examined in light of the antecedent Buddhist philosophical views they built upon or in relation to the views of their coreligionists that they endorsed or opposed. What follows is a concise overview of previous work on these authors to define the parameters of our research. Shākya mchog ldan’s philosophical views have been the subject of several full-length studies including a book on his Yogācāra and Madhyamaka interpretations by Yaroslav Komarovski (2011). This author also published an annotated translation of three of Shākya mchog ldan’s short treatises on Madhyamaka (2000) as well as a few articles that will be noted below. An unpublished PhD dissertation by Philippe Turenne (2010) investigates how Shākya mchog ldan understood the Five Dharmas of Maitreya as keys to assimilating the divergent aspects of Mahāyāna, especially its tantric aspect, and why he regarded all five as being of definitive meaning. Mention should also be made of an unpublished PhD thesis by Volker 8 One conspicuous absence in this cast of characters is the Seventh Karma pa Chos grags rgya mtsho who was the main teacher of Shākya mchog ldan and Karma phrin las and predecessor of the Eighth Karma pa. His famous summary of Buddhist epistemology entitled Tshad ma rigs gzhung rgya mtsho is an important desideratum for future research which will require careful comparison with Indian pramāṇa sources. 17 INTRODUCTION Caumanns (2012) that offers a well-documented study of the life and works of Shākya mchog ldan. There have been a number of shorter treatments of Shākya mchog ldan’s position on buddha nature. David Seyfort Ruegg (1963, 74) briefly discusses Tibetan exegetes who attribute to both the Jo nang pas and Shākya mchog ldan the type of Gzhan stong buddha nature theory found in the Bṛhaṭṭīkā according to which the perfect nature is empty of the imagined and dependent natures. Van der Kuijp (1983, 43 and n. 157) translates a short passage from Shākya mchog ldan’s Dbu ma'i byung tshul, vol. 4, 2397‒ 2403 comparing Rngog Blo ldan shes rab’s (1059‒1109) ‘analytical’ Ratnagotravibhāga (RGV) tradition of defining buddha nature as a nonaffirming negation (med par dgag pa : prasajyapratiṣedha) with Bstan Kha bo che’s (b. 1021) ‘meditative’ interpretation of it as naturally luminous wisdom. 9 Bstan Kha bo che’s interpretation of buddha nature as natural luminosity of mind is also noted in Tillemans and Tomabechi 1995 (891–96). Kazuo Kano’s unpublished PhD thesis on Rngog Blo ldan shes rab (2006) cogently summarizes Shākya mchog ldan’s buddha nature position vis-à-vis that of Rngog and includes a translation and analysis of Shāk mchog’s classification of the major lines of buddha nature interpretation in Tibet. Mathes 2004 offers an interesting comparison of the Yogācāra-based buddha nature views of Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan (1292‒ 1361) and Shākya mchog ldan: while the former maintains that buddha nature is the perfect nature empty of the imagined and dependent natures, Shākya mchog ldan follows the Yogācāra definition of the perfect nature as the dependent nature empty of the imagined nature. This article includes a translation and discussion of Tāranātha’s account of an imagined dialogue between Dol po pa and Shākya mchog ldan on the nature and status of tathāgatagarbha. Mathes 2008 (32 and n. 143) makes reference to Shākya mchog ldan’s identification of Rngog’s buddha nature theory in terms of a nonaffirming negation. Komarovski 2006 includes translations of two of Shākya mchog ldan’s short treatises on buddha nature: the Sangs rgyas kyi snying po’i rnam bshad mdo rgyud snying po, SCsb(A), vol. 13, 124–136 and Rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos kyi nges don sngon med nyi ma, ibid., vol. 13, 113–124. This article also provides a useful listing of more than twenty texts of different genres by Shākya mchog ldan that discuss buddha nature. Komarovski 2010 discusses whether Shākya mchog ldan’s interpretation is ‘contemplative’ or ‘dialectical’ without, however, mentioning the researches by Seyfort Ruegg, van der Kuijp and Kano on this important issue. With regard to Shākya mchog ldan’s Mahāmudrā writings, Seyfort Ruegg 1989 (105‒ 108) briefly discusses the author’s Mahāmudrā trilogy, seeing it as an attempt to harmonize tensions between Sa skya Paṇḍita’s criticisms regarding Sgam po pa’s Mahāmudrā and the 9 See also Seyfort Ruegg 1969, 35‒37 for a discussion of the accounts of these two lineages by Sum pa mkhan po and Tāranātha. 18 INTRODUCTION Bka’ brgyud tradition’s own accounts of its views and practices. David Jackson 1994 (128‒ 33) also emphasizes this harmonizing element in a short overview of some of Shākya mchog ldan responses to Sa skya Paṇḍita’s criticisms of Dwags po Mahāmudrā from the Mahāmudrā trilogy. This harmonizing element is certainly evident in parts of the trilogy (especially the third work), yet other sections reveal a more openly critical style of engagement that explicitly takes issue with the criticisms of Sa paṇ, especially as reframed by his later advocates. The reader is referred to the translation and critical edition of this trilogy in volume II of the present study. The treatments of Jackson and Seyfort Ruegg illustrate the difficulty of making an unequivocal assessment of Shākya mchog ldan’s stance on this complex issue. Finally, Dreyfuss 1997 (27‒29) gives a relatively brief but illuminating treatment of some of Shākya mchog ldan’s Gzhan stong-oriented epistemological views in the context of commenting on some of the leading Sa skya Pramāṇa scholars in Tibet. Although Dreyfus (1997, 29) has observed that Shākya mchog ldan endorsed a Gzhan stong position only in works following his first meeting with the Seventh Karma pa (1454‒1506) in 1484, we have found textual evidence (see chapter one) to support an earlier date for his approval of Gzhan stong. Yet we have also documented a more ambivalent stance toward Gzhan stong that the author appears to have adopted in his later Mahāmudrā writings. The foregoing synopsis of previous scholarship on Shākya mchog ldan reveals the need for an inaugural study of the author’s views on Mahāmudrā in relation to those of his coreligionists and in light of his own complex and shifting philosophical affinities. This we have attempted in the first chapter. Turning to Karma phrin las, the limited range of his extant writings10 has so far hindered any balanced treatment of his thought. As early as 1969, Herbert V. Guenther published an English translation of Karma phrin las pa’s commentary on Saraha’s King Dohā, having earlier used material from the author’s dohā commentaries in his study of Nāropa (Guenther 1963). An unpublished MA thesis on Karma phrin las pa by Jim Rheingans (2004) offers a well-substantiated account of the author’s life based on various hagiographical and historical sources and includes a short overview of his writings.11 Jan Sobisch 2002 translates and interprets some Question and Answer (dris lan) materials by Karma phrin las pa on the Three Vow (sdom gsum) theories in Tibetan Buddhism and includes a brief summary of his biography.12 Karl Brunnhölzl 2009 contains a translation13 of a portion of the first chapter of Karma phrin las pa’s commentary on Karma pa III Rang byung rdo rje’s Zab mo nang don 10 For a survey of his extant writings which are traditionally said to have filled ten volumes but currently amount to a few commentaries, a collection of songs (mgur) together with replies to queries on a variety of topics, and a few miscellaneous texts on ritual, see the introductory remarks in chapter two. 11 Rheingans, 2004. 12 Sobisch, 2002, 217‒71. 13 Brunnhölzl 2009, 313‒23. 19 INTRODUCTION which elucidates the latter’s theory of buddha nature. Anne Burchardi 2011 includes a translation14 of an excerpt of Karma phrin las pa’s Discussion to Dispel Mind’s Darkness: A Reply to Queries of [Bsod nams lhun grub, the Governor of] Lcags mo 15 that addresses the relationship between Rang stong and Gzhan stong, identifying Rang byung rdo rje as a proponent of a Gzhan stong view in which Rang stong and Gzhan stong are understood to be without contradiction. Because this text contains inter alia the best available statement of Karma phrin las pa’s views on Self-emptiness and Other-emptiness, and their compatibility, we have included a complete translation of this text in volume II. The limited availability of the author’s extant Mahāmudrā works has not allowed for a comprehensive assessment of his thought on this subject. However, it has enabled us to give a cursory overview of his Mahāmudrā views and to trace lines of doctrinal continuity between Shākya mchog ldan who was one of his teachers and Mi bskyod rdo rje who was his most renowned disciple. The Eighth Karma pa Mi bskyod rdo rje’s status as a formidable Buddhist thinker was first brought to the attention of the scholarly community via two pioneering articles by Paul Williams (1983) and David Seyfort Ruegg (1988).16 Both were focused on the introductory section (spyi don) of the author’s late Madhyamakāvatāra commentary entitled Dwags brgyud grub pa’i shing rta.17 Williams provided a cursory treatment of the author’s critique of Dge lugs pa positions, whereas Seyfort Ruegg offered a more substantial doxographical analysis of different Indo-Tibetan Madhyamaka views and their sūtric and tantric lines of transmission, focusing on the first few folia of this commentary. Subsequent doctrinal research on the Eighth Karma pa has largely confined itself to this opening portion of the introduction 18 and the sixth chapter19 of this commentary, as well as his early and influential Abhisamayālaṃkāra commentary that was recently examined and partially translated by Karl Brunnhölzl as part of his wide-ranging study of Bka’ brgyud and Rnying ma commentaries on this śāstra20. This study contains some useful material on the Eighth Karma pa’s interpretations of the Mahāyāna gotra theory in the Abhisamayālaṃkāra. Mention must also be made of an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation on Mi bskyod rdo rje by Jim Rheingans (2008) that offers the first systematic 14 Burchardi 2011, 317‒43. 15 KPdl, Dri lan yid kyi mun sel (ca 88‒92). See also Volume II, translation: 88‒91, critical edition: 91‒94. 16 See Williams 1983 and Seyfort Ruegg 1984. 17 Full title: Dbu ma la 'jug pa’i rnam bshad Dpal ldan dus gsum mkhyen pa’i zhal lung Dwags brgyud grub pa’i shing rta. Seattle: Nitartha international, 1996. (733 p.) 18 See Broido 1985 and Brunnhölzl 2004. 19 See Goldfield et al. 2005. In this work four translators each translated “key portions” of Mi bskyod rdo rje’s commentary on the sixth chapter of the Madhyamakāvatāra according to their own “individual translation styles and choice of terms” under the guidance of Mkhan po Tshul khrims rgya mtsho (b. 1934). 20 For the Karma Bka’ brgyud commentaries, see Brunnhölzl 2010 and 2011a. 20 INTRODUCTION biographical study of the Eighth Karma pa based on careful analysis of a wide range of primary historical and hagiographical sources.21 In sum, the current understanding of the Eighth Karma pa’s philosophical views are based almost exclusively on portions of two early non-tantric Mahāyāna commentaries22, leaving the vast majority of his exegesis on tantric and Mahāmudrā systems a veritable terra incognita for research. These lacunae are noteworthy when one considers the preponderance of tantric over “sūtric” interpretations both in Mi bskyod rdo rje’s exegesis of buddha nature and in his criticisms of rival theories, not to mention his writings on Mahāmudrā. The result is that the vast majority of the Eighth Karma pa’s work on Mahāmudrā, buddha nature and other central topics has received little scholarly attention, and none at all has been devoted to his innovative efforts to relate Dwags po Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā views to the broader currents of Buddhist doctrine and praxis, both sūtric and tantric. Our survey of the author’s Mahāmudrā exegesis vis-à-vis his philosophical views, and the accompanying selection of important expositions and defences of Mahāmudrā doctrines and practices, are intended as a first attempt to fill this gap. Padma dkar po’s Mahāmudrā views have advanced gradually over the past halfcentury beginning with Herbert V. Guenther’s pioneering use of the author’s writings to help clarify Bka’ brgyud views on mahāmudrā, the Six Doctrines of Nāropa (nāro chos drug), Four Yogas (rnal ’byor bzhi) and other tantric materials in the context of his study of Nāropa (Guenther 1963) and several articles from this period. A later work (Guenther 2005) includes as its second chapter (15‒24) an annotated translation and short discussion of Padma dkar po’s Explanation of the Four Yogas of Mahāmudrā: Eye for Seeing the Definitive Meaning (Phyag rgya chen po rnal ’byor bzhi’i bshad pa nges don lta ba’i mig).23 The only other scholar to critically engage with Padma dkar po’s thought is Michael Broido who composed a series of articles on this master in the early 1980s. These articles discuss Padma dkar po’s interpretations of tantra (rgyud) (Broido 1984) and yuganaddha (zung ’jug : yuganaddha) (Broido 1985), his contributions to Buddhist hermeneutics (Broido 1982, 1983 and 1984), and his critical replies to Sa skya Paṇḍita’s criticism of Sgam po pa’s White Panacea (dkar po gcig thub) doctrine (Broido 1984a). The last of these articles and his paper on Padma dkar po’s view of the two truths (Broido 1985b) have provided some useful doctrinal background for our consideration of Padma dkar po’s Mahāmudrā exegesis. On the whole, the previous studies on Padma dkar po leave much to be said about how he developed the core elements of his Mahāmudrā exegesis in relation to their Indian and 21 See Rheingans 2008. 22 Of these, Mi bskyod rdo rje’s many digressions on buddha nature doctrine in his Madhyamakāvatāra commentary have received no attention. 23 In PKsb vol. 21, 423‒29. 21 INTRODUCTION Tibetan sources and the intellectual climate of his age. It is hoped that our analysis of his Mahāmudrā views and accompanying translations of pertinent materials reveals the extent to which he not only adopted subject matter such as Yang dgon pa’s distinction between mahāmudrā in the modes of abiding and error (gnas lugs phyag chen and ’khrul lugs phyag chen) and the amanasikāra interpretations of Maitrīpa (alias Maitreyanātha), but also adapted them to his own post-classical philosophical, polemical and soteriological concerns. The foregoing overview of previous studies on our authors has cast some light on areas of their Mahāmudrā exegesis in need of further research and clarification. With these in mind, our critical engagement with the authors’ treatments of Mahāmudrā has consecrated special attention to three pertinent issues: [1] how the authors related Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā teachings to prevailing Indo-Tibetan Buddhist philosophical views on emptiness, the nature of mind, nature of reality and buddha nature, [2] how they framed these teachings in relation to Indo-Tibetan Buddhist doxographical classifications such as Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, as well as hermeneutical categories such as the three dharmacakras and distinctions between provisional and definitive meaning, and [3] how they defended leading Mahāmudrā views and practices against charges of incoherence and even heresy (chos min, chos log) in an intellectual climate increasingly dominated and riven by sectarian exclusivism and religious conservativism. Before embarking on our survey of post-classical discourses on Mahāmudrā, it may be useful to begin by sketching in broad strokes the politico-historical and doctrinal backgrounds out of which they arose. POLITICO-HISTORICAL BACKGROUND While our focus in this work is primarily doctrinal, we have been repeatedly reminded that ideas never develop in isolation from the societies and institutions from which they emerge. In this regard, it may be worthwhile to shed a little light on the religious and sociopolitical background out of which post-classical Bka’ brgyud exegesis evolved. During the 15th and 16th centuries, Bka’ brgyud lineages, like other Tibetan Buddhist lineages, were in the midst of expanding their monastic networks to accommodate growing numbers of students. As the Tibetan Buddhist world transitioned from smaller local monasteries to larger monastic institutions, there was a proportionate increase in large fixed costs such as the construction and upkeep of monasteries and estates, the creation of artistic works and monuments, the performance of rituals, the commissioning and printing of sacred texts, and the authoring of biographies of important religious hierarchs.24 All this required a steady source of income. As a result, the growth and survival of monastic institutions depended more and more on the 24 See van der Kuijp and McCleary 2008, 2. 22 INTRODUCTION patronage of wealthy Tibetan aristocratic clans. The need to look locally for protection and financial backing was precipitated in part by the political transition in China from the Mongolian Yuan dynasty (1271‒1368) to the Ming dynasty (1368‒1644). This regime change brought with it a significant shift in China’s foreign policy toward Tibet from the Yuan’s hands-on system of mutual benefit based on preceptor-patron (bla yon) relations25 to the more hands-off approach and the liberalization of local politics characteristic of the Ming rulers.26 The Ming dynasty’s disengagement of China from Tibet meant that the expanding Buddhist institutions were forced to look to wealthy domestic clans for protection and patronage if they were to survive in an increasingly competitive political-ecclesiastical environment. For a time, the Karma Bka’ brgyud sect seemed to be clear winners in this regard, securing the patronage of the powerful Rin spungs pa clan. They did so by building on and domesticating its long history of forging preceptor-patron relations with foreign powers beginning with the Tangut court and continuing, after its overthrow, with the succeeding Mongolian Yuan dynasty. In exchange for patronage and protection, the Karma Bka’ brgyud hierarchs, like their Sa skya counterparts, typically offered the emperor and his family spiritual counsel and tantric rituals such as Kālacakra or Mahākāla rites both to confer a measure of spiritual authority on the rulers and protect the state from calamity. Religious hierarchs of the Sa skya and Karma bka’ brgyud sects served not only as ritual officiants and spiritual advisors to their patrons but were often promoted to high positions in the court such as Imperial Preceptor (di shi 帝師, Tib. ti shri). A number of recent studies have demonstrated the close connection that existed between the institutionalization of Tibetan reincarnation lineages and the forging of clericpatron relations with foreign powers during the Yuan dynasty, and with Tibetan aristocratic clans from the Ming dynasty onward. Elliot Sperling (1987a) has observed that the first Karma Bka’ brgyud hierarchs forged close ties with the Tangut court as early as the 12th century. Indeed, the tradition’s founder Dus gsum mkhyen pa (1110‒1193) was said to have been invited by the emperor of the Tangut state of Xixia to give esoteric teachings but sent his disciple Gtsang po pa Dkon mchog seng ge (d. 1218/19) in his stead. Dkon mchog seng ge was the first Tibetan cleric to receive the honorific title Imperial Preceptor, a post assumed after his death by a cleric belonging to the ’Ba’ rom subsect of the Dwags po Bka’ brgyud 25 On the importance of the ‘preceptor-donor’ relationship in the ecclesiastical history of Tibetan Buddhist orders, see Van der Kuijp 2004, Sperling 1987a, Manson 2009, and three articles by Seyfort Ruegg (1991, 1995, 1997). In Seyfort Ruegg 1997 (860), the author states that the earliest use of yon mchod “as a copulative compound designating the relation between a donor and preceptor” is in the Deb ther dmar po, but Manson 2009 (38‒39 n. 54) notes that Karma Pakshi’s autobiography already uses the term in that sense. 26 Van der Kuijp and McCleary 2008. See also Sperling 1983. 23 INTRODUCTION named Ti shri ras pa Shes rab seng ge (1164‒1236)27. Ti shri counted among his teachers a direct disciple of Sgam po pa, Darma dbang phyug (1127‒1203), and two Bka’ brgyud founders Zhang Brtson ’grus grags pa (1121/23‒1193), founder of the Tshal pa Bka’ brgyud sect, and ’Jig rten mgon po (1143‒1217), founder of the ’Bri gung Bka’ brgyud sect. ’Jig rten mgon po is said to have received lavish offerings from the Tangut emperor in exchange for his religious services. Among the clerics who survived the collapse of the Tangut state, was Ti shri ras pa’s successor in the ’Ba’ rom lineage, Gsang ba ras pa dkar po Shes rab byang chub (1198‒1262). That he was born in the Tangut state but later reappears as a Tibetan cleric in the Mongol emperor Qubilai’s retinue indicates, as Elliot Sperling has observed, the continuity between the cleric-patron models of the Tangut and Mongol courts. Tangut patronage of early Bka’ brgyud clerics and its institutionalization of the office of Imperial Preceptor preceded and likely served as a paradigm for the later Mongolian patronage of Sa skya and Bka’ brgyud clerics. Leonard Van der Kuijp (2004) has shown that the Bka’ brgyud Kālacakra system came to play a vital role in the forging of Tibetan-Mongolian relations during a critical stage in Tibet’s political history. The Kālacakra tantra’s strengthening influence on foreign relations can be largely attributed to its popular yet highly esoteric ritual system which proved instrumental in enabling high-ranking Karma bka’ brgyud preceptors to curry favour with the powerful Mongol court after the Mongolian conquest of 1240 and throughout the period of its control over China during the Yuan dynasty (1276‒1368). It is well-established, then, that the Karma Bka’ brgyud tradition proved remarkably adept at fostering relationships of mutual benefit with powerful families, first with foreign imperial dynasties and later with domestic aristocratic dynasties. The success of these reciprocal relations undoubtedly owed much to the prestige and stability associated with this tradition’s system of reincarnate bla mas known as Karma pas. Not only could a high ranking reincarnate bla ma command much higher prices for services rendered than other teachers but lineal reincarnations could conveniently be “found” in strategically important persons and places, whether Tibetan or foreign. The Dge lugs pa would later successfully imitate this paradigm by introducing their own system of reincarnate Dalai Lamas28 who were also 27 For information about this cleric who is also referred to as Sangs rgyas ras chen, see Sperling 1987b. Sperling suggests a possible Chinese precedent of this office of Imperial Preceptor in the Tangut state. A biography of the first Black Hat (zhwa nag) Dus gsum mkhyen pa relates that Dkon mchog seng ge was preceded by three previous reincarnations, the last of whom was also a preceptor to the Tangut emperor named Rgya (i.e., “Chinese”) Be bum ring mo or Rgya Byang chub sems dpa’. See Sperling 1987, 38. 28 According to van der Kuijp and McCleary 2008 (22‒23), “[t]he Gelukpa adoption of incarnates was an attempt to compete directly with the Karma pas. The increasingly hierarchical structure of Tibetan Buddhism meant that incarnates could command higher prices than other types of monks for their religious services. Thus, by taking on a unique feature of the Karma pa, the Gelukpa were benefiting from the prestige and economic success of the Karma pa incarnates.” 24 INTRODUCTION regarded not only as reincarnations of their predecessors but also as incarnations of the Bodhisattva of compassion Avalokiteśvara. Building on their long history of successful cleric-patron relationships, the Karma Bka’ brgyud, and to a lesser extent the other Bka’ brgyud sects, were able during the 15th and 16th centuries to establish unprecedented positions of temporal power and religious influence in central Tibet. Their ascendancy owed much to the patronage of the powerful Rin pung clan which in 1434‒1435 defeated the Phag mo gru dynasty who had supported the Dge lugs pa sect. During its hegemony (1435‒1565), the Rin spungs regime governed much of Western Tibet and some of Central Tibet. Indeed, it almost brought the Tibetan lands around the Tsangpo River under one central authority before its powers began to diminish after 1512. Following the final overthrow of the Rin spungs by the Tsang pa dynasty of Shigatse in 1565, the Karma bka’ brgyud sect was able to secure the new regime’s patronage up until its final defeat by the increasingly powerful militia of the ascendant Dge lugs sect in 1642. But prior to the ascendancy and eventual hegemony of the Dge lugs sect which has prevailed down to the modern period, the continuous patronage of the Karma Bka’ brgyud sect, and to a lesser extent the ’Bri gung and ’Brug pa sects, by a succession of powerful aristocratic clans allowed for unprecedented expansion not only of their temporal power but also of their scholastic achievements and doctrinal influence, all of which reached their apogee during the 15th and 16th centuries. DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND To give a better sense of the main philosophical trends in the Mahāmudrā exegesis of the four authors, it is necessary to touch briefly on some of the key Buddhist doctrinal issues they engaged with. It will become clear that, despite evidence of sectarian and doctrinal dissent between some of these authors29, they shared much common ground when it came to the nexus of core Buddhist soteriological ideas concerning the nature of truth/reality, the 29 A letter by Padma dkar po entitled A Reply to the Queries of Bshes gnyen Rnam rgyal grags pa (Bshes gnyen rnam rgyal grags pa’i dris lan), Padma dkar po gsung ’bum vol. 12, 491‒508, provides an important source for understanding the at times strained relationships between the ’Brug pa, Sa skya and Karma bka’ brgyud schools in the post-classical era. Interestingly, the letter attests to Padma dkar po’s high regard for Shākya mchog ldan’s “unparalleled” knowledge of authentic Indian and Tibetan Buddhist scriptures which he then cites as a major influence on Karma bka’ brgyud scholasticism, but one that they unjustly repaid with criticism rather than open acknowledgement (ibid., 4981‒3). He also makes this interesting observation (ibid., 5072‒3): “Although [we] have no discord with those [in the] Sa[ kya], Dge [lugs], and Rnying ma [traditions], there is some discord with the Rje Karma teacher and disciples” sa dge rnying ma su dang mi mthun pa ma byung kyang | rje karma dpon slob dang ma mthun pa cig byung | In this regard, he registers his concerns (ibid., 5031‒5) about the incursion of armed Karma Kam tshang troops dispatched by the Karma political party (kar srid) into the Kong po district, their use of weaponry including guns and missiles (rgyogs dang me rgyogs), the poisoning of rivers, their burning down of one of his vihāras, and the general atmosphere of discord between the ’Brug pa and Karma Kam tshang traditions. On the prevalence of sectarian rivalry during this time, see Shakabpa 2010, 274‒75 and Sørensen and Hazod, 2007, 508. 25 INTRODUCTION nature of mind, buddha nature, and emptiness that had occupied centre stage in Tibetan scholasticism since the Royal Dynastic Period (8th to 9th c CE). A key finding in our research was that the major participants in post-classical Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā exegesis shared a common concern to reconcile two basic models of truth or reality (satya) that had long been discussed and debated by Indian and Tibetan Buddhists: [1] a differentiation model based on robust distinctions between conventional and ultimate truths (saṃvṛtisatya versus paramārthasatya) and their associated modes of cognition and emptiness, and [2] an identification or unity (zung ’jug : yuganaddha) model of the two truths and their associated modes of cognition and emptiness. Whereas the differentiation model was typically aligned with a strongly innatist view of the ultimate (buddha nature, the nature of mind, or the nature of reality) that underscored its “sublime otherness” (gzhan mchog) from all that is conventional and adventitious, the identification model, predicated on the view of a common ground uniting all conditioned and unconditioned phenomena, emphasized the pervasiveness of the ultimate and its immanence within the conventional in order to indicate how the ultimate permeates the mind-streams of individuals in bondage. A central philosophical aim of our research was to consider and compare how the four representative authors and their colleagues sought to synthesize and reconcile these differentiation and identification models within pertinent traditional Buddhist theoretical contexts such as buddha nature (tathāgatagarbha), the two truths (satyadvaya), the three natures (trisvabhāva), the two modes of emptiness (rang stong and gzhan stong), the hermeneutics of the three turnings of the dharmacakra, and the related hermeneutical distinction between definitive meaning (nītārtha) and provisional meaning (neyārtha). A highly influential precedent for the differentiation model is a passage in Asaṅga’s Mahāyānasaṃgraha (I.45‒4830) where the author draws a sharp distinction between pure, supramundane mind (lokottaracitta) and the conditioned ālayavijñāna, thereby specifying an innate, unconditioned mode of cognition that is prior to and a precondition of the eight modes of consciousness (kun gzhi tshogs brgyad) as elaborated in the Yogācāra psychology. By contrast, influential examples of the identification model that are met with in the Laṅkāvatāra and Ghanavyūha sūtras explicitly identify buddha nature with the substratum consciousness (ālayavijñāna).31 One may also mention here a parallel nondifferentiation model of truth/ 30 Davidson 1985, 215 and Mathes 2008, 58. Sthiramati draws a similar distinction between ālayavijñāna and the supramundane gnosis (lokottarajñāna : jigs rten las ’das pa’i ye shes) that fundamentally transforms or sublates parāvṛtti) it in his commentary on Triṃśikā 29‒30. See Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi (Levi 1925), 44; Davidson 1985, 218 and n. 28. On replacement and elimination models of fundamental transformation (āśrayaparivṛtti), see Sakuma 1990. 31 On this interpretation and some of its Tibetan adherents such as the bKa’ brgyud scholars ’Gos lo tsā ba Gzhon nu dpal and ’Ba’ ra ba rgyal mtshan dpal bzang, see Mathes 2008, 18, 117 and 464 n. 612. ’Gos lo tsā ba noted (Mathes 2008, 341‒42) that the equation of ālayavijñāna with tathāgatagarbha is based on the acceptance of two aspects of the former: a stained ālayavijñāna which needs to be reversed in order to attain buddhahood and a purified ālayavijñāna taken as an unconscious vijñāpti or subtle inward mind which ’Gos lo identifies with the 26 INTRODUCTION reality that was widely adopted in many non-tantric and tantric discourses emphasizing the nonduality of the two truths (bden gnyis gnyis med), and the inseparability of appearance and emptiness (snang stong dbyer med). In the context of Buddhist soteriology, the tension between these differentiation and identification paradigms had as its counterpart a longstanding dialectic between two competing views concerning the nature of goal-realization. One frames it as a developmental process of accumulating merits and knowledge that serve as causes and conditions leading to spiritual awakening, whereas the other characterizes it as a disclosive process of directly recognizing an unconditioned mode of being and awareness and then becoming increasingly familiar with it as the mind’s reifications and their obscuring effects subside.32 Faced with the task of reconciling these seemingly incommensurable ontological and soteriological paradigms, leading post-classical Bka’ brgyud thinkers adopted different versions of soteriological contextualism, a term we have coined to describe the view that the sense, relevance and efficacy of soteriological models can only be understood relative to the context(s) in which they are used.33 From this perspective, the differentiation and identification models with their contrasting categories and metaphorics—the first positing a basic difference between conventional and ultimate and comparing it to the sky and its clouds, the second positing their essential equality as illustrated by the ocean and its waves—came to be regarded not as contradictory but as complementary, relating as they do to different contexts of salvific theory and praxis. According to Mi bskyod rdo rje, for example, an aspirant on the Buddhist path is urged to conceptually distinguish between what is to be abandoned (adventitious mind) from what is to be realized (innate mind). But this path is said to transcend such oppositional constructs, culminating in a nondual nonconceptual wisdom (nirvikalpajñāna) of the undifferentiated nature of things (dharmadhātu) that recognizes antidotes (gnyen po) as being of the same unborn (skye med) and prediscursive (spros bral) nature as what is to be relinquished. This is the view of unity (zung ’jug) that is generally identified as a hallmark of Mahāmudrā teachings. On this view, the Buddhist path is ultimately self- dharmadhātu. Based on the identification of the ālayavijñāna with the tathāgatagarbha, the Laṅkāvatārasūtra interprets āśrayaparāvṛtti as the transformation or purification of the seventh consciousness (manas) which liberates the pure ālayavijñāna. See Lai 1977, 67 f. In a similar vein, the Ghanavyūhasūtra states (D 110, 55b1; L 113, 85a6-7): “The Tathāgata taught *sugatagarbha using the term ālaya[vijñāna].” bde gshegs snying po dge ba’ang de | | snying po de la kun gzhi sgras | de bzhin gshegs pa ston pa mdzad | 32 In a similar vein, the landmark comparative study of Seyfort Ruegg (1989) investigates the dual themes of “‘nature’ and ‘nurture’ in the twin realms of soteriology and gnoseology, a pair of topics that call for examination in terms of the notions of ‘innatism’, ‘spontaneism’ and ‘simultaneism’ as contrasted with graded acquisition and reinforcement through progressive cultivation.” (p. 3) 33 For a general account of contextualist views, which have been gaining popularity in contemporary philosophy, see Price, A. W. Contextuality in Practical Reason, Oxford University Press, 2008. 27 INTRODUCTION undermining insofar as the conceptual distinctions that are necessary to realize nondual nonconceptual wisdom necessarily consume themselves at the time of its realization.34 We have attempted in the chapters to follow to determine and explain how our four authors could be at once advocates of robust soteriological distinctions and at the same time proponents of the Mahāmudrā view of the unity (zung ’jug) nonduality (gnyis med) or inseparability (dbyer med) of truth/reality. For example, in Mi bskyod rdo rje’s commentary on Karma Pakshi’s Direct Introduction to the Three Kāyas that he composed in the last years of his life, the author defends the view that the two truths/realities are nondual inasmuch as all phenomena, conventional and ultimate, have always been beyond discursive elaboration (spros bral).35 In this regard, he maintains that the nonduality or inseparability of the two realities is a doctrinal cornerstone of both Mahāmudrā and Madhyamaka philosophies, having been advocated by a long line of Indian Mahāmudrā and Madhyamaka masters including Saraha, Śavaripa, Nāgārjuna, Buddhapālita, Candrakīrti, Maitrīpa, Atiśa, and as well as by the 11th century Tibetan Rnying ma master Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po.36 34 Post-classical Mahāmudrā exegetes were keenly aware that the method of radical negation employed in Madhyamaka must be self-consuming: since conceptual reasoning is by definition conditioned and adventitious and therefore not beyond the scope its own critical surveillance, it must at some point deplete or consume itself, as suggested by the analogy from the Kaśyapaparivarta of the Ratnakūṭa that Kamalaśīla had famously cited: “The characteristic of discerning reality (bhūtapratyavekṣā) is here [in the Nirvikalpapraveśadhāraṇī] considered to be mental nonengagement (amanasikāra). That [discernment] has the nature of being conceptual, but it is burned away by the fire of genuine wisdom arising from it, just as a fire kindled by rubbing two pieces of wood burns these very pieces.” Nirvikalpapraveśadhāraṇīṭīkā (NPDhṬ), P: no. 5501, 157b5‒6: yang dag par so sor rtog pa’i mtshan ma ni ’dir yid la mi byed par dgongs so | | de ni rnam par rtog pa’i ngo bo nyid yin mod kyi | ’on kyang de nyid las byung ba yang dag pa’i ye shes kyi mes de bsregs par ’gyur te | shing gnyis drud las byung ba’i mes shing de gnyis sreg par byed pa bzhin no | | See also Kamalaśīla’s BK III (Skt. ed. Tucci 1971, 20) where the same example, and similar words, are used, and reference is made to the Ratnakūṭa. 35 Sku gsum ngo sprod, Mi bskyod rdo rje gsung ’bum vol. 21, 1484‒5: “Therefore, so long as the mind has not let go of [reifying the two truths in terms of true and false], and there is conceptualizing cognition that clings to and believes in [them], then it will never dwell in the lofty state of the equality of the two truths, inseparability of the two truths, single taste of the two truths and unity of the two truths. Then how does this equality of the two truths, and inseparability that is the unity of the single flavour of the two truths come about in a mind that does not take the two truths as objects, as mere established bases? As [truth] cannot be touched by thinking based entirely on linguistic representation [in terms of] subject and object, when it comes to the way of perceiving that which is other than mere talk stipulating ‘union’ as the consummate conclusion regarding the so-called “equality of the two truths,” where does there exist anything that can be posited as one or two, or equal or non-equal?” de ltar blos ma btang bar ji srid zhen 'dzin rtogs rigs yod pa de srid du bden gnyis mnyam nyid dang bden gnyis dbyer med dang bden gnyis ro gcig dang bden gnyis zung 'jug gi go 'phang la 'gar yang 'khod pa med do | | 'o na bden gnyis gzhi grub pa tsam du'ang yul du mi byed pa'i blo ngo na bden gnyis mnyam nyid dang bden gnyis dbyer med ro gcig tu zung du 'jug pa ji ltar 'ong zhe na | de ltar yul dang yul can kun nas smra brjod bsam pas reg par ma nus pa la bden gnyis mnyam nyid ces sogs zad par 'khyol ba'i zung chad pa'i gtam tsam las gzhan de lta'i tshul la gcig dang gnyis pa dang mnyam mi mnyam du bzhag tu ga la yod | See below 228‒29 and n. 642. 36 Ibid., 1443 f. Toward the end of his life, Mi bskyod rdo rje evidently became an advocate of Rong zom pa’s Apratiṣṭhānavāda Madhyamaka views and especially those based on “classical texts maintaining the inseparability of the two aspects of reality” (bden pa rnam pa gnyis dbyer med par ’dod pa’i gzhung). He cites Rong zom pa six times in this late commentary but not in any previous works. Concerning Rong zom’s endorsement 28 INTRODUCTION Shākya mchog ldan similarly claimed that while realization of the unity of the two truths, and of appearance and emptiness, was the goal of the Buddhist path, it is nonetheless necessary to balance the divergent perspectives of consciousness and wisdom while on the path. Likewise, Padma dkar po uses Yang dgon pa’s distinction between mahāmudrā in its modes of abiding (gnas lugs phyag chen) and delusion (‘khrul lugs phyag chen) to underscore the need to discern the irreducible unity of the common ground (mahāmudrā in the abiding mode) from the reifications that distort and conceal it (the mode of delusion). NAVIGATING THE MIDDLE WAYS Interestingly, the common task of post-classical Mahāmudrā exegetes to reconcile the differentiation and identification models was in many cases accompanied by an attempt to chart a middle course, using Madhyamaka canons of dialectical reasoning, between the polarized Gzhan stong and Rang stong positions that had deeply divided most Tibetan schools since the 14th century, particularly the Jo nang pas37 and Dge lugs pas. To one side, the postclassical exegetes sought to avoid the type of eternalist view (rtag lta) of existence (yod pa) that had become associated in the minds of many Tibetans with Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan’s (1292‒1361) Empty of other (gzhan stong) doctrine that posited the ultimate as an eternal, transcendental truth above and beyond the causal complex of conventional truth/ reality, and that characterized the two truths as two “great kingdoms” (rgyal khams chen po) “having nothing to do with each other”.38 To the other side, they steered clear of the kind of “nihilist view of existence” that they associated with Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa’s (1357‒1419) Empty of own-nature (rang stong) doctrine which had wholly rejected positive appraisals of reality in favour of a purely negative account characterizing the ultimate exclusively in terms of a nonaffirming negation (med dgag). It is against this backdrop that the Fourth ’Brug chen Padma dkar po had, on the one hand, criticized the Jo nang Gzhan stong adherents for adopting an eternalist stance regarding the ultimate and nihilistic stance regarding the conventional 39 and, on the other hand, of Apratiṣṭhānavāda and the “inseparability of truth/reality” view which he termed “special Mahāyāna,” see Almogi 2009, 39‒42 et passim. 37 For a pioneering survey of the history and doctrines of this school and an analysis of Dge lugs pa criticisms of it, see Seyfort Ruegg 1963. 38 See for example Ri chos nges don rgya mtsho, Pecing ed. 1998, 4184 f.; Bka’ bsdu bzhi pa rang ’grel, Paro ed. 1984, vol. 1, 5996 f., 6125 f. et passim. In the words of Padma dkar po: “It is said [by Jo nang pas] that there is an immense dichotomy between the two truths, and between the pairs ‘saṃsāra and nirvāṇa’ and ‘consciousness and wisdom’, together with their respective self-manifestations.” Phyag chen rgyal ba’i gan mdzod, Padma dkar po gsung ’bum vol. 21, 1764‒5. 39 Phyag chen rgyal ba’i gan mdzod, Padma dkar po gsung ’bum vol. 21, 1882‒3: “This doctrinal position of yours has assumed a nihilist view vis-à-vis all that is [held to be] self-empty (rang stong) or conventional (kun rdzob) [but] an eternalist view in accepting all that is ultimate to be something real. Because it is thereby incompatible 29 INTRODUCTION criticized the Dge lugs Rang stong proponents for adopting an eternalist view of the conventional and nihilistic view of the ultimate.40 This assessment helps us to understand Padma dkar po’s rather unexpected admission that “my tradition is Rang stong” (bdag gi lugs ni rang stong) in contraposition to the views of “those who have fallen into a one-sided position known as Gzhan stong”. These he equates with opponents criticized by Candrakīrti in his Prasannapadā who falsely imagine conditioned things to be empty—i.e., nonexistent— while “falsely imagin[ing] an intrinsic essence (svabhāva) of things for the purpose of [establishing] a basis of that [emptiness].”41 Given that Padma dkar po had moreover identified Gzhan stong with Cittamātra, specifically the Alīkākāravāda strand, and that Cittamātra schools were said to be repudiated root and branch by the Apratiṣṭhāna-Mādhyamikas, his endorsement of a Rang stong view begins to appear all but inevitable. The case of Shākya mchog ldan is just as interesting. In his Mahāyāna philosophical works, he often explicitly gives the affirmative Gzhan stong and Alīkākāra-Madhyamaka methods and discourses priority over their negational Rang stong counterparts, and even with the impartial explanations concerning the ultimate (don dam) in both the synopsis of views of the chapter on Inner [Kālacakra] and the Summary of Yoga [i.e., Vimalaprabhā] it is not at all acceptable.” khyed kyi 'dod pa 'di rang stong ngam kun rdzob thams cad chad pa | don dam thams cad bden par khas blangs pas rtag ltar song bas | nang le'i lta ba’i mdor bsdus dang rnal 'byor bsdu ba gnyis kar don dam pa la phyogs med par bshad pa dang 'gal ba'i phyir gtan mi 'thad do | | 40 Phyag chen rgyal ba’i gan mdzod, ibid., 1052‒4: “[For] Dge ldan pas, ‘without nature’ (rang bzhin med pa) means that [1] ultimately there is nothing at all, like a barren woman’s son, and that [2] conventionally all entities never become nonexistent. For that reason, [the Dge ldan pas] say that “the extreme of existence is eliminated by appearance and the extreme of nonexistence by emptiness.” In this regard, [the Dge ldan pas] have fallen to the sides of both eternalism and nihilism. They have succumbed to an eternalist view regarding the ultimate and a nihilist view regarding the conventional. And by explaining the acceptability of maintaining these two stances, they do not know [how] to eliminate one-sided positions in terms of a single ground.” de yang dge ldan pa | rang bzhin med pa’i don gyis don dam par cang med mo gsham gyi bu lta bu dang | rang bzhin med pa’i don gyis kun rdzob tu dngos po tham cad med par nam yang mi ’gyur ba zhig ste | de’i rgyu mtshan gyis snang bas yod mtha’ dang | stong pas med mtha’ sel lo zhes zer ro | | ’di ni rtag chad gnyis ka’i phyogs su lhung ste | don dam chad pa dang | kun rdzob rtag ltar song zhing phyogs gnyis su gzung rung bshad pas gzhi gcig gi steng du phyogs lhung sel ma shes so | | 41 See Chos ’khor rim pa gsum gyi dogs gcod, Padma dkar po gsung ’bum vol. 7, 3303‒5 where the following passage from Prasannapadā is then quoted: “But one who, without seeing the distinction between the two truths, sees the emptiness of conditioned things—that person, seeing emptiness and aspiring to deliverance, may falsely imagine conditioned things to be nonexistent; or taking emptiness as something existent as an entity, he may also falsely imagine an intrinsic essence of things for the purpose of [establishing] a locus of that [emptiness]. In either case, emptiness wrongly viewed will certainly destroy him.”Prasannapadā, ed. La Vallée Poussin 1970, 495 (Vaidya 216): yas tu evaṁ satyadvayavibhāgam apaśyan śūnyatāṁ saṁskārāṇāṁ paśyati, sa śūnyatāṁ paśyan mumukṣur nāstitāṁ vā saṁskārāṇāṁ parikalpayed, yadi vā śūnyatāṁ kāṁcid bhāvataḥ satīm, tasyāś cāśrayārthaṁ bhāvasvabhāvam api parikalpayet | ubhayathā cāsya durdṛṣṭā śūnyatā niyataṁ vināśaṃ kuryāta | a addit. suggested by Prof. Akira Saito (personal communication); Mss. vīnaśam parikalpayet; LVP vināśayet; Tib. (May 1959 ed.): gang gis de ltar bden pa gnyis kyi rnam par dbye ba ma mthong bar ’du byed rnams stong pa nyid du mthong ba des ni stong pa nyid mthong bas ’du byed rnams yod pa ma yin pa nyid du rtog par byed la | yang na stong pa nyid ’ga’ zhig dngos por brtags nas de’i rten gyi ched du dngos po’i rang bzhin yang rtog par byed de | de ni gnyis ga ltar yang stong pa nyid la lta nyes pas nges par phung bar byed pa yin no | | 30 INTRODUCTION stipulates that the very idea of “unity” has its inception in Gzhan stong traditions but is unattested in Rang stong traditions (as will be discussed in chapter one). However, in his Mahāmudrā exegesis, the author assigns both Rang stong and Gzhan stong to the dialectician’s system of severing imputations (sgro ’dogs bcad pa’i lugs) through studying and thinking, adding that both are intellectually fabricated (blos byas) and in this sense “poisoned” (dug can). He proceeds to explain how both are transcended by the Mahāmudrā yogin’s system of first-hand experience (nyams su myong ba’i lugs) based on meditation (sgom) that alone leads to the realization of unity beyond extremes. All this may also help to explain why Mi bskyod rdo rje, who was partisan to the same Madhyamaka traditions as Padma dkar po, became increasingly reluctant to side with polarized views of emptiness and instead ends up being as critical of the Gzhan stong views that had by his time become associated primarily with Dol po pa and Shākya mchog ldan as he is of the Rang stong views associated with Tsong kha pa and his disciples. This tone of reticence is conspicuous in the Karma pa’s lengthy response42 to Paṇ chen Rdo rgyal, a student of Shākya mchog ldan, who had asked him about the role of gzhan stong in the state of meditative equipoise: When it was explained [by Dol po pa] that the Gzhan stong of a permanent entity (rtag dngos gzhan stong) is superior whereas the Rang stong of freedom from elaboration (spros bral rang stong) is inferior, regarding such conceptual differentiations themselves, these distinctions [pertain] to the phase of distinction in the post-meditation state (rjes thob) but not to the phase of transcendence in the meditative equipoise (mnyam bzhag). [Now,] when the phase of transcendence in equipoise was not [properly] investigated, then the profound permanent entity of your Gzhan stong [was deemed] consistent with [post hoc] explanations of what was experienced by meditators. [But] by whom among them would [this] permanent [nature] constitute transcendence?43 The author goes on to clarify that “in meditative equipoise when there is transcendence and [unmediated] experience, no such distinctions between rang stong and gzhan stong are actually found” because this state not only uproots the stains to be relinquished but also severs all discursive elaborations, leaving behind no ‘indispensables’ (nyer mkho) (i.e., no ontological commitments). It is therefore a mistake, in the Karma pa’s eyes, to ontologize such post hoc observations by embedding them in the nature of things and using them to support a 42 This reply may match a dialogue reported to have taken place between the Karma pa and Paṇ chen dor rgyal in 1536 at ’Bri khung monastery in Central Tibet (dbus) when the former was twenty-nine years old. See Rheingans 2008, 137‒38. 43 Paṇ chen rdo rgyal ba’i legs bshad, MKsb vol. 3, 2523‒5. 31 INTRODUCTION metaphysical absolutism. He concludes a detailed criticism of opposing Rang stong and Gzhan stong positions by saying “as for me, I don’t subscribe to these extreme positions and [therefore] don’t proclaim either Rang stong or Gzhan stong.”44 He concludes with an aspiration to follow the advice of his root teacher Bkra shis dpal ’byor (1457‒1525) “to relinquish views and destroy all tenets in line with the illustrious Dwags po Bka’ brgyud lineage.”45 In general, post-classical Mahāmudrā exegetes viewed the rapprochement between Mahāmudrā and anti-foundationalist strains of Indian Madhyamaka philosophy—specifically, the *Prāsaṅgika and Apratiṣṭhāna systems46—as critical to their philosophical aims. Our authors framed this synthesis in terms of the reconciliation of affirmative (cataphatic) and negative (apophatic)47 styles of thought and discourse. In the words of Mi bskyod rdo rje: “It is said that the instructions of Nāgārjuna were taught from a negative orientation (bkag phyogs) whereas those by Saraha were taught from an affirmative orientation (sgrub phyogs).”48 Following the Second ’Brug chen Rgyal dbang rje, Padma dkar po similarly distinguishes the negating orientation (dgag phyogs) emphasized in the sūtra-based Vehicle of Characteristics (mtshan nyid kyi theg pa) from the affirming orientation (sgrub phyogs) emphasized in the tantra-based Vajrayāna. Viewed in terms of their associated styles of discourse, the former emphasizes negative determinations (rnam bcad : vyavaccheda) whereas the latter emphasizes positive determinations (yongs gcod : pariccheda). The difference, as the Second ’Brug chen Rgyal dbang rje had explained, is that the former “annihilates (tshar gcad pa) by counteracting objects to be abandoned,” whereas the latter “assimilates (rjes su ’dzin pa) through the nonduality of objects to be abandoned and their counteragents.” Now, for Padma dkar po, negative determinations are integral to the Apratiṣṭhānavāda Madhyamaka which dispenses with all epistemic and ontological foundations, whereas positive determinations are integral to Vajrayāna articulations of immutable bliss supreme (mahāsukha). The senses of both are combined in the term “emptiness endowed with the excellence of all aspects” (sarvākāravopetāśūnyatā) and this expresses the unity at the heart of the ’Brug pa Mahāmudrā tradition.49 This idea of fecund emptiness conveniently unites the via negationis 44 Paṇ chen rdo rgyal ba’i legs bshad, MKsb vol. 3, 2564‒5. 45 Ibid., 2571‒2. 46 As will be clarified below, both traditions claim that all phenomena are without any epistemic essence or ontological foundation, i.e., without any defining essence nor any inherently existent foundation on which all phenomena depend but which does not itself depend on anything. 47 For an adaptation of these western philosophical-theological terms to the description of the two currents of Buddhist thought that Schmithausen 1981 (214 ff.) has distinguished as “positive-mystical” and “negativeintellectualist”, see Seyfort Ruegg 1989, 8 et passim. 48 Glo bur gyi dri ma tha mal gyi shes par bshad pa’i nor pa spang ba, MKsb vol. 15, 10745‒10752. 49 This paraphrases a stanza in Padma dkar po’s Zhal gdams tshigs su bcad pa'i rim pa bdud rtsi’i gter, PKsb vol. 21, 24: “Negatively determined, [it is] without fixed standpoint; positively determined, [it is] immutable 32 INTRODUCTION of negative determinations and via eminentiae of positive determinations. A keynote in the Mahāmudrā philosophies of all four thinkers is that this inseparable unity of presence and emptiness (snang stong dbyer med) can only be fully realized through first-hand experience but not through deductive reasoning. This is because the goal itself is a fundamental mode of being or experiencing but not a judgement about that mode of being which is necessarily both derivative and contrived. By combining a disclosive Mahāmudrā path of first-hand experience with a rigorous Madhyamaka rejection of metaphysical foundations, the authors attempted to ply a middle course between the Scylla and Charybdis of eternalism and nihilism. A few words are in order concerning the Apratiṣṭhāna-Madhyamaka view that was endorsed by Karma phrin las, Mi bskyod rdo rje and Padma dkar po. The term apratiṣṭhāna has been subject to varying interpretations, having been taken as a characterization both of phenomena (i.e., that they lack fixed characteristics or foundation)50 and of the cognition that apprehends them (i.e., a cognition that does not abide, or is not fixed, in extremes of eternalism or nihilism).51 This latter interpretation is found in Maitrīpa’s Amanasikāra teachings. A case in point is the author’s Sekanirdeśa 29ab (“Not abiding/not to be fixed in anything is known as Mahāmudrā”52) and Rāmapāla’s explanation of it (SNP P 15b6‒7): “‘In anything’ means in the dependently arisen skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas. ‘Not abiding/not fixed’ means nonsuperimposition (aropa) and mental nonengagement (amanasikāra).” Here it is precisely cognition which is “not fixed” on anything, but with the understanding that phenomena lack any fixed basis on which the mind may find purchase. Among the few extant attempts to summarize the Apratiṣṭhānavāda view and the epistemological issues involved, the clearest seems to be the one given by the great 11th century Rnying ma scholar Rong zom pa Chos kyi bzang po. This is of interest to us not only for purposes of clarification but also because the Eighth Karma pa in his later years became an advocate of Rong zom’s Madhyamaka view which based itself on “classical texts maintaining the inseparability of the two aspects of reality” (bden pa rnam pa gnyis dbyer med par ’dod pa’i gzhung). In his synopsis of Apratiṣṭhānavāda, Rong zom draws attention to two related senses of its view, viz., that all phenomena are [1] without any determinate characteristics despite the various names and other linguistic conventions used to denote them, bliss supreme. It is named ‘emptiness endowed with the excellence of all aspects’ (sarvākāravopetāśūnyatā). Although distinguished by [such] conceptual delimitations, [they have] the same meaning. Such is the mahāmudrā of our own tradition.” rnam gcod rab tu mi gnas te | | yongs gcod ’gyur med bde ba dang | | rnam kun mchog ldan stong nyid ming | | ldog pas ’byed la don gcig pa | | nged rang lugs kyi phyag chen yin | | 50 The term apratiṣṭhāna is defined in Böhtlingk as “ohne festen Ort,” “without fixed/permanent location”. See Monier-Williams s.v. pratiṣṭhāna: “n. a firm standing-place, ground, foundation… pedestal, foot”; Böhtlingk: “fester Standpunct,” “Grundlage,” “Fussgestell”. 51 sarvasminn iti pratītyasamutpannaskandhadhātvāyatanādau | apratiṣṭhānam amanasikāro ’nāropaḥ | See Mathes 2007, 555. 52 See Mathes 2007, 555. For Rāmapāla’s explanation, see also Isaacson and Sferra 2014, 321. 33 INTRODUCTION and furthermore [2] without any deeper foundation, any metaphysical bedrock, that makes them what they are. In short all phenomena are unfixed (or indeterminate) both in essence and origin. They have neither determinate essences that define what they are nor any ontological foundation on which they depend. Consequently, the investigating mind arrives at no determinate essence or foundation. This observation, says Rong zom pa, applies not only to positive determinations of objects of knowledge but also to the stage of buddhahood wherein the purified dharmadhātu is said to be characterized by the stilling of all discursive elaborations. In his Lta ba'i brjed byang, he states: “For Nonfoundationalists, [1] although all phenomena are described and established in terms of various characteristics such as names, symbols, and conventions, one does not establish a basis/locus (gnas pa) for any such characteristics. [2] Since [phenomena] are not founded on, and do not rely upon, a unitary foundation (gnas gcig)—not even an extremely subtle or extremely profound one, let alone (a cang che) a gross one—[they] are said to be completely ‘nonfoundational’. This [tradition] determines [phenomena] in this way also when positively determining (yongs su gcod pa) the objects of knowledge, and also claims that during the stage of a buddha as well the purified dharmadhātu is characterized by the complete pacification of discursive elaborations.”53 Notwithstanding the considerable disagreement over which Buddhist traditions or thinkers represented the Apratiṣṭhāna view, our three Mahāmudrā exegetes equally took its synthesis of Mantrayāna and Madhyamaka as a prototype for their own efforts to unite affirmative Mahāmudrā dohā discourses of Saraha and the tantras with the negative Madhyamaka discourses of Nāgārjuna and his successors. It is noteworthy that Karma phrin las cryptically equates the Great Madhyamaka tradition of Nonfoundational Unity (zung ’jug rab tu mi gnas pa) with the ultimate view of Dignāga (480‒540) and Dharmakīrti (7th cent.) that he correlates with the Dwags po Mahāmudrā view.54 He further claims that Sgam po pa’s Mahāmudrā of Nonfoundational Unity is in accord with the five texts of Maitreya but “somewhat different” from both the Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika systems which, in their concern to “overturn the beliefs in real entities of the lower philosophical systems,” end up maintaining that meditation is just “the reliance on a continuous process of memory/reflection (dran pa) based on prior analysis”.55 We shall see that Mi bskyod rdo rje regarded both the so-called *Prāsaṅgika and Apratiṣṭhānavāda Madhyamaka systems as the summit of Buddhist 53 Lta ba’i byang brjed (Almogi 2009, rab tu shin tu mi gnas pa ni chos thams cad la ming dang brda dang tha snyad kyi mtshan nyid sna tshogs su bstan cing | rnam par bzhag kyang ji lta bu'i mtshan nyid du'ang gnas pa mi 'grub ste | rags pa a cang ches kyi | tha na rab tu phra ba zhe'am | shin tu zab pa'i gnas gcig la yang mi gnas mi rten pas | rab tu shin tu mi gnas pa zhes bya'o | | 'di ni shes bya yongs su gcod pa'i dus na'ang 'di ltar gcod la sangs rgyas kyi sa'i dus na'ang chos kyi dbyings rnam par dag pa spros pa yongs su zhi ba'i mtshan nyid du 'dod do | | We follow the critical text of this passage as translated and discussed in Almogi 2009, 228‒29. See also Tauscher 2003, 209 & 244, n. 10. (translation our own) 54 KPdl, 1506. See also below 161. 55 See below, 160 and n. 441. 34 INTRODUCTION philosophical thought and frequently took them as the basis for critiquing other Indian and Tibetan Buddhist philosophical views. In his eyes, these systems not only serve as an ideal preparation for Mahāmudrā; they also share its basic view and goal of being free from discursive elaboration (spros bral : niṣprapañca). Padma dkar po sees the inseparable unity emphasized in Apratiṣṭhānavāda Madhyamaka as an ideal model for reconciling the negative orientations and determinations of Nāgārjuna’s reasoning corpus (rigs tshogs) with the positive orientations and determinations contained in his hymnic corpus (bstod tshogs), as well as in the dohās and tantras. Putting it differently, he says that it is through “nonfoundationalism of mere discourse” (smra tsam rab tu mi gnas pa) that one realizes the “nonfoundationalism of unity” (zung ’jug rab tu mi gnas pa) that is in his eyes the “greatest of great Middle Ways” (dbu ma chen po’i chen po).56 For the three Mahāmudrā authors, the Apratiṣṭhānavāda Madhyamaka provided the philosophical underpinning of Maitrīpa’s Madhyamaka system of mental nonengagement (yid la mi byed pa’i dbu ma). Mi bskyod rdo rje identified three main practice-lineages of this tradition in his Madhyamakāvatāra (MA) commentary: Mantra-Madhyamaka, SūtraMadhyamaka and Alīkākāra-Cittamātra-Madhyamaka, the last of which was represented by the Indians Vajrapāṇi (b. 1012) and Kor Ni ru pa (aka. Ni ru pa ta, b. 1062), and the Nepali Bal po A su (aka. Skye med bde chen).57 Elsewhere in the commentary, and in his sixth Dgongs pa gcig pa (Single Intent) commentary, he further identifies two major lines of transmission of Amanasikāra-Mahāmudrā teachings from India to Tibet: [1] the Dwags po Bka’ brgyud doctrinal system passed down from Saraha and Śavari dbang phyug to Mar pa, Mi la ras pa etc., and [2] the Khro phu Bka brgyud tradition of instructions (gdams srol) on amanasikāra given by Mitrayogi to Khro phu Lo tsā ba etc. that contained the definitive meaning of sūtras and tantras.58 Mi bskyod rdo rje observes in his Single Intent commentary that the aim of these Amanasikāra-Mahāmudrā traditions is to realize in view and meditation profound emptiness, the pacification of discursive elaborations, which is simply the true nature (chos nyid) of cognition that is directly recognized when the conceptually-imputing cognition that gives rise to conceptually-imputed appearances of all phenomena resolves into its source, cognizant emptiness (or empty cognizance). “The [teaching] that primarily takes as its view and meditation the point where the nature of these two [awareness and emptiness] have resolved 56 KPdl, 5723‒4: don skyes bu la skyon med pa zhes dang | ’di ni legs pa’o zhes pa lta bu | zhe ’dod kyis lta ba bzang ngan du mi srma | | smra tsam rab tu mi gnas pa dang | zung ’jug rab tu mi gnas pa dang | dbu ma chen po dang | dbu ma chen po’i chen por ’jug pa’i khyad tsam yod ces lan du bgyis so | 57 See also Seyfort Ruegg 1984, 8‒9, and below 332‒33 and n. 959 for further details. 58 Dbu ma la ’jug pa’i rnam bshad, 32513‒21 and Dgongs gcig ’grel pa VI, MKsb vol. 6, 993‒1001. For further details on these lineages and authors, see below, 330‒36. 35 INTRODUCTION like water poured into water is called “sustaining natural awareness”.59 He adds that “if a profound emptiness other than that is taken as view and meditation, then some nonaffirming negation (med dgag) wherein the phenomenal awareness and the rest is never connected with its abiding nature is posited as a mental object. A view and meditation on emptiness that makes one inordinately attached to that [object] through the mode of apprehension is therefore not acknowledged by this [Mahāmudrā] approach to be totally pure.”60 The Eighth Karma pa notes in the MA commentary that many proponents of reasoning such as Gro lung pa were ill-disposed to the explanations of Madhyamaka in traditions such as Maitrīpa’s Amanasikāra, saying they were not in accord with Madhyamaka and should therefore be suppressed. Mi bskyod rdo rje adds that Sa paṇ and all sorts of Bka’ gdams pas developed a hostile attitude toward the Amanasikāra teachings of Saraha and Maitrīpa, in spite of their purity.61 In light of such criticisms, it is understandable why scholars such as Karma phrin las, Mi bskyod rdo rje and Padma dkar po devoted as much attention as they did to clarifying and legitimizing the sources and contents of these teachings. To form a clearer picture the view of Apratiṣṭhānavāda and its relation to other Buddhist philosophical systems, let us consider the following annotated overview of the different Tibetan Madhyamaka traditions given by Mi bskyod rdo rje in the third section of his first Dgongs gcig commentary: For Mādhyamikas, by negating the claim that mind is established as a real entity, the bases of designation of the two truths are not truly established as separate [things]. Hence, there is nothing to posit as two truths established in terms of intrinsic essences. {It is not the case that two truths are posited by truly establishing the mode of being of knowable objects in terms of two truths. Nonetheless, when they are established as “truths” in order to negate that the knowable is truly established, then if we analyze whether they [can be] established as ultimate truth or established as conventional truth, it is in order to negate that either can be established as true [or real].}62 However, in terms of mere conventional discursive practice, the designation “ultimate truth” was used to show just the aspect that all phenomena are not established by nature, discursive elaborations having been at rest from the very beginning. And the expression “conventional truth” [was used 59 Dgongs gcig ’grel pa VI, MKsb vol. 6, 994‒5: de gnyis rang bzhin chu la chu bzhag tu song ba’i cha de la gtso bor lta sgom du byed pa de la ni | tha mal gyi shes pa skyong ba zhes | 60 Dgongs gcig ’grel pa VI, MKsb vol. 6, 996‒1001: de las gzhan du zab mo stong pa nyid lta sgom du byed pa na chos can shes pa sogs dang rang bzhin gtan mi ’brel ba’i med dgag cig yid yul du bzhag cing de la ’dzin stangs kyis cher zhen par byed pa ni stong nyid kyi lta sgom rnam par dag par phyogs ’di pas mi bzhed pa’i phyir te | 61 See below, 330. 62 Interjected interlinear notations (which make up most of the quoted passage) are included in braces { }. 36 INTRODUCTION to show] simply the dependent arising of appearances that are only an illusion, being captivating only so long as they are not investigated. In this regard, there are two Madhyamaka [traditions]: the “Madhyamaka of the Illusory that is Verified by Reasoning” (sgyu ma rigs sgrub kyi dbu ma) and the “Madhyamaka of Nonfoundational Unity”63 (zung ’jug rab tu mi gnas pa’i dbu ma).64 In general, since the term “Tīrthika” (mu stegs pa; “one who holds to extremes”)65 means one who maintains extremes of eternalism or nihilism, it refers not only to non-Buddhists, but to Buddhist Tīrthikas as well, up to and including the Cittamātra. The Madhyamaka do not receive the name Tīrthika because they have uprooted all views and philosophical tenets. {Concerning the classification of Madhyamaka: in India, there were the three called Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka, Yogācāra-Madhyamaka66, and *Lokaprasiddha63 The division of the Madhyamaka into Sgyu ma lta bu and Rab tu mi gnas pa is already made by Sgam po pa Bsod nams rin chen (1079‒1153) in his Tshogs chos legs mdzes ma where he further subdivides the Rab tu mi gnas strand into Zung ’jug rab tu mi gnas pa’i dbu ma and Rgyun chad rab tu mi gnas pa’i dbu ma. See Seyfort Ruegg 2000, 35 n. 60. See also Almogi 2010 for other 11th century sources on this distinction. 64 This classification of Madhyamaka is discussed by Stag tshang lo tsā ba in his Grub mtha’ kun shes (203), a work frequently cited by Mi bskyod rdo rje. Mkhas grub rje Dge legs dpal bzang (1385‒1438) maintained that the Madhyamaka of the Illusory Verifiable by Reasoning was advocated by Śāntarakṣita, Vimuktasena and Haribhadra who claimed that the illusion-like constellation (tshogs) of appearance and emptiness is the ultimate truth, whereas the Madhyamaka of Nonfoundational Unity was advocated by Candrakīrti et al. who believed that the nonaffirming negation (med dgag) consisting in the refutation of there being any truth to appearances is the ultimate truth. Mkhas grub then notes that Rngog Blo ldan shes rab (1059‒1109) “repeatedly explained in An Epistle Called a Drop of Nectar (Spring yig bdud rtsi'i thig le verse 14) that ‘to classify them in this way is to posit [something] that will astonish even the foolish’” (see edition of Kano 2007, 11). Because the illusionlike conjunction of appearance and emptiness in fact is a conventional truth, there is no single Great Mādhyamika who accepts it as the ultimate truth. Were it an ultimate truth, it would follow, absurdly, that everything established [by valid cognition] (gzhi grub) would be an ultimate truth, for it is impossible that a phenomenon not be empty of truth.” See Cabezón 2010 and 1993, 89. 65 This is an hermeneutical etymology of the Tibetan term mu stegs pa which was originally a more literal rendering of the Sanskrit tīrthika (“forders”), literally, ‘those belonging to, associated with’ (possessive suffix – ika) ‘stairs for landing or for descent into a river,’ ‘bathing-place,’ ‘place of pilgrimage on the banks of sacred streams’ (see Monier-Williams c.v. tīrtha,); the term may have originally referred to temple-priests at river crossings or fords where travellers propitiated a deity before crossing. The Sanskrit term seems to have undergone metonymic transfer in referring to those able to ford the turbulent river of saṃsāra (as in the Jain Tīrthaṅkaras, “Ford-makers”) and it came to be used in Buddhist sources to refer to teachers of rival religious traditions. The Sanskrit term is closely rendered by the Tibetan mu stegs pa: “those on the steps (stegs pa) at the edge (mu)”. Mi bskyod rdo rje follows a common Tibetan hermeneutical etymology of mu stegs pa as referring to those who (pa) dwell (gnas for stegs : avasthā) in extremes (mtha’ for mu : tīrtha). 66 Tibetan exegetes introduced two subclassifications of Madhyamaka―that is, the division into SautrāntikaMadhyamaka and Yogācāra-Madhyamaka prevalent during the early propagation of Buddhism in Tibet and the division into Svātantrika-Madhyamaka and Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka prevalent during the later propagation period―in order to systematically define and differentiate the various strands of Madhyamaka found in Indian sources. On these and other Madhyamaka subsclassifications, see Mimaki 1982, 27-38, Ruegg 2000, 55-58. 37 INTRODUCTION Madhyamaka.67 According to the Notes on the Oral Tradition (Gsung rgyun zin bris) by ’Brom ston, “there also existed in India one [called] Vaibhāṣika-Mādhyamika. When those in India who had abided by the two [early] Buddhist schools (rang sde) and the third, Cittamātra, joined the Mādhyamikas, then whatever conventions they previously posited regarding conventional-obscurational truth in their respective philosophies, they also maintained later on [when they became Mādhyamikas].” The illustrious Candrakīrti [said] “I don’t accept customary conventions according to the philosophical systems but accept only the consensus opinions of the world.” Here in Tibet, the tradition of Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti has been designated as “Prāsaṅgika” and the tradition of Bhavya as “Svātantrika”. As for the subclassification of Madhyamaka, the division into the Illusory [nature] Verifiable through Reasoning and Nonfoundational Unity appears to have been rejected by the Mahātma Translator father and son [i.e., Rngog Lo tsā ba and his disciple Gro lung pa].68 According to the Doctrinal Stages [Bstan rim chen mo] by the great Gro lung pa69, “Some fools present traditions of Madhyamaka as being two-fold: the Apratiṣṭhāna[vāda] and Māyopamādvayavāda. They claim that Ācārya Śāntarakṣita and others maintained that illusions are ultimate. [They further claim that] having negated by negative determination the true existence (bden pa) imputed by Substance Ontologists (dngos po[r] smra ba : vastuvādin), [they proceeded] on the basis of logical reasoning, to affirm a false existence (brdzun pa) [by] a positive determination. This is not at all what was said. According to the Madhyamakālaṃkāra:70 Hence, these entities Have the characteristic of [being] conventional. If one claims that [these conventional entities] are the ultimate, What can I do about it? So [Śāntarakṣita] considered that false existence to be only an object of perception, and stated that the positive determination subsumed under the four [kinds of] 67 Seyfort Ruegg 2000, 47‒48: “according to Pa tshab, Bhavya with his Svātantrika followers advocated a pramāṇa that is vastubalapravṛtta, whereas the Prāsaṅgikas Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti accepted only one that is lokaprasiddha.” This last designation was used by Candrakīrti to characterize his acceptance of worldly views on a conventional level. For further details, see Mimaki 1982, 32-39. 68 See also Seyfort Ruegg 2000, 32‒35. Tsong kha pa and his Dge lugs pa successors followed the lead of these two in denying the validity of this distinction. 69 On this passage from Bstan rim chen mo (Bde bar gshegs pa’i bstan pa rin po che la ’jug pa’i lam gyi rim pa rnam par bshad pa. Lhasa: Zhol par khang, n.d., 437b7‒438a3), see Almogi 2010, 164‒65. 70 See Ichigō 1989, 212. For English translation see ibid., 213. 38 INTRODUCTION affirming negation [applied to] the negation of origination, is the false conventional [truth]. If one posits that [something], be it existent or nonexistent, is verifiable on the basis of logical reasoning, one would be possessed by the great demon of extreme views, and thus far from the Middle Way. For he also stated inter alia that if [one posits] existence, [it results in] eternalism.}” 71 This quotation attests to the atmosphere of dissension among Tibetan schools over the acceptability of the late Indian distinction between Apratiṣṭhāna and Māyopamādvaya traditions and how it was to be aligned with existing Tibetan classifications of Madhyamaka. Orna Almogi (2010) has suggested that the widespread rejection of the classification within the Bka’ gdams pa community had to do with the fact that “the Indian proponents of this scheme, being strongly inclined towards Tantric teachings, did not enjoy much authority among Tibetan masters more inclined towards non-Tantric teachings.”72 She also notes that the scheme did not correlate in any straightforward manner with the widely accepted Tibetan subsclassifications of Madhyamaka into Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka and Yogācāra-Madhyamaka (in the early propagation period) or into Svātantrika-Madhyamaka and PrāsaṅgikaMadhyamaka (in the later propagation period).73 The authors in our study reflect the widespread divergence of opinion on how best to combine these different classifications. The majority of Tibetan exegetes had identified Apratiṣṭhāna (or at least one strand of it) with *Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka, and the Māyopamādvayavāda with Svātantrika-Madhyamaka.74 This group included many scholars from different traditions such as Mkhas pa Lde’u jo sras (13th c.), the Bka’ gdams pa scholar Bcom ldan Rig pa’i ral gri (1227‒1305)75, the Sa skya pa Stag tshang lo tsā ba (b. 1405)76, the ’Brug pa ’Ba’ ra ba Rgyal mtshan dpal bzang (1310‒1391)77, the Dge lugs scholars Mkhas grub rje (1385‒1438) and many of his successors78, and Rnying ma pa Mi pham Rnam rgyal rgya mtsho (1846‒1912)79. There were also a few scholars such as the Rnying ma pa scholars Rog bande Shes rab ’od (1166‒1244) and Klong chen rab ’byams pa (1308‒1364) who subsumed both Apratiṣṭhānavāda and 71 Dgongs gcig ’grel pa Ic, MKsb vol. 4, 9122‒9136. 72 Almogi 2010, 182. 73 See Almogi 2010, 182‒83. 74 On these classifications, see Almogi 2010 and Seyfort Ruegg 2000. 75 On these first two, see Almogi 2010, 170 and 180‒81. 76 See Seyfort Ruegg 2000, 34; Almogi 2010, 170. 77 See Mimaki 1982, 34; Seyfort Ruegg 200, 34. 78 See Seyfort Ruegg 1981, 58‒59, n. 174. 79 See Almogi 2010, 170. 39 INTRODUCTION Māyopamādvayavāda under the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka tradition80, thus implicitly according a higher status to *Prāsaṅgika.81 Still others, we have seen, rejected the classification of Madhyamaka into Apratiṣṭhānavāda and Māyopamādvaya entirely, among them the early Bka’ gdams pas Rngog Blo ldan shes rab (1059‒1109)82, his students Gro lung pa Blo gros ’byung gnas (b. 11th c.) and Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109‒1169)83, and the later Dge lugs pa founder Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa (1357‒1419).84 The positions of our three authors are less clear-cut since none of them composed a summary of philosophical systems (grub mtha’), the type of work wherein such classifications are typically delineated. We have indicated that Karma phrin las regarded the Apratiṣṭhānavāda tradition as superior not only to the Māyopamādvayavāda but also to both *Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika since meditation on unity beyond extremes transcends the analytical meditation of these two Madhyamaka traditions that is focused on undermining the varying beliefs in real entities characteristic of the lower philosophical schools. Mi bskyod rdo rje seems to have viewed the Apratiṣṭhāna as being on par with *Prāsaṅgika to the extent that both emphasize the absence of discursive elaboration (spros bral) and he regarded both as having decisively invalidated not only the foundationalist presuppositions of the so-called lower schools of philosophy but also the types of inferential reasoning in ascertaining the ultimate employed by the Svātantrikas and Māyopamādvayavādins. Padma dkar po appears to have stood alone in presenting both Svātantrika and *Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka traditions as subclasses of the Apratiṣṭhānavāda Madhyamaka. In his treatise Elucidating the Three Exegetical Traditions of Madhyamaka (Dbu ma’i gzhung lugs gsum gsal bar byed pa), he explains his own somewhat atypical classification by suggesting that what both Svātantrika and *Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka traditions share in common with the Apratiṣṭhāna tradition is their objective to eradicate discursive elaborations (spros pa).85 Where they differ is that the Svātantrika believes that this can be achieved through reasoning based on reliable epistemic procedures, whereas *Prāsaṅgika does not, seeking instead to simply point out how opponents’ conclusions are at odds with their own 80 See Almogi 2010, 165‒68. 81 See Almogi 2010, 170. This may have had something to do with the fact that Rnying ma masters traced their teachings to a period two or three centuries before the Indian Māyopama and Apratiṣṭhāna distinction was introduced. It bears recalling, however, that the 11th century Rnying ma pa Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po was partisan to the Apratiṣṭhāna Madhyamaka tradition. 82 See Seyfort Ruegg 2000, 32‒33. See Almogi 2010, 165‒68. See Seyfort Ruegg 32‒33 and also n. 60 where the author notes that Tsong kha pa endorsed “Rngog’s criticism of the applicability of this pair of terms to the level of the paramārtha.” 83 84 85 See below, 354 and n. 1024. 40 INTRODUCTION original beliefs.86 What emerges clearly from examining the Madhyamaka views of the three authors is that the Madhyamaka-Mahāmudrā synthesis of the late Indian Apratiṣṭhāna view provided them with an ideal framework for integrating Mahāmudrā teachings on the luminous nature of mind with Madhyamaka teachings on emptiness. They therefore accorded this tradition the highest position in their doxographical systems. THE NATURE OF LIBERATING KNOWLEDGE In light of the authors’ philosophical affinities, it is hardly surprising that all four stood united in giving direct (yogic) perception (mngon sum) or personally realized wisdom (so sor rang rig pa’i ye shes) priority over rational inference. All would agree with Shākya mchog ldan’s assessment that an emptiness arrived at through analytical reasoning can only be an abstraction (don spyi) that is conceptually determined, and cannot be the nonrepresentational ultimate (rnam grangs pa ma yin pa’i don dam)87 which is amenable only to direct perception and personally realized wisdom. The reasons are largely phenomenological. Since discursive analysis derives from a prediscursive or nonconceptual mode of perception, it can at best play the preparatory role of eliminating reifications that obscure or distort the perception of reality. This assessment was crucial to the ways they individually distinguished the uncontrived type of knowledge arising from meditative experience (sgom) from the adventitious type of knowledge employed in studying and thinking (thos bsam). Distinctions of this kind proved integral to their differing attempts to specify the roles and relative efficacy of discursive and prediscursive modes of soteriological knowledge, an issue that in one form or another had been repeatedly discussed and fiercely debated in Tibet since the time of the Sino-Indian Bsam yas Debate hosted by the emperor Khri Srong lde btsan toward the end of the eighth century. The question at the heart of this debate was whether goal-realization occurs gradually through analytical meditation, as argued by the Indian participant Kamalaśīla, or all at once through contemplating the nature of mind, as proposed by his Chinese Chan adversary Heshang Moheyan (Tib. hwa shang mo ho yen). It is well known that the account of the debate preserved in Tibetan historical sources has Kamalaśīla roundly defeating his opponent, thereby securing Indian Buddhism as the official state religion and sanctioning the banishment of Chinese Chan practitioners and their suddenist teachings from Tibet. The reality must have been otherwise since Sino-Tibetan Chan communities are known to have existed in Tibet well into the tenth century CE. At any rate, the standard debate narrative soon assumed the status 86 Dbu ma’i gzhung lugs gsum gsal bar byed pa nges don grub pa’i shing rta, PKsb vol. 9, 87 On the translation of the term paryāya (Tib. rnam grangs) as it occurs in the distinction between a “represented ulimate” (rnam grangs [dang bcas] pa’i don dam : [*sa]paryāyaparamārtha) and “nonrepresented ultimate,” see below, 96 n. 241 and especially 102 n. 263. 41 INTRODUCTION of a comprehensive founding myth88 within the Tibetan cultural memory, one that has since been used, in various rhetorical contexts, both to valorize a standard Indian Buddhist scholastic model of reason-guided gradualism and to ostracize as ‘non-Buddhist’ (chos min) any subitist elements—especially those found in Mahāmudrā and Rdzogs chen teachings— that were thought to advocate a stuperous Chinese Heshang form of meditation. There were certain key epistemological and soteriological problems raised at the Great Debate that contined to smoulder in the centuries to follow and that often enflamed conflicts between Tibetan schools. By the post-classical period, a great deal of scholarly attention from all sides was fixed on a set of issues concerning [1] the relationship between view (lta ba) and conduct (spyod pa), or between insight (shes rab) and skillful means (thabs), [2] the transition from studying and thinking (thos, bsam) to meditation (sgom), [3] the function and scope of the more and less conceptually-mediated cognitive styles, [4] the proper contexts for gradual (rim gyis) versus simultaneous or all-at-once ([g]cig char) styles of pedagogy and realization, and [5] the connection between premeditated versus unpremeditated, or contrived (bcos) versus uncontrived (ma bcos), modes of altruistic activity. For our Bka’ brgyud exegetes, the key to understanding and resolving these problems lay in the insight that conceptual and nonconceptual modes of liberating knowledge are complementary rather than contradictory. It was crucial, however, to specify their respective roles within changing soteriological contexts. Padma dkar po consecrated considerable attention to showing that Mahāmudrā teachings on nonconceptual wisdom and mental nonengagement are fully compatible with the type of Madhyamaka teachings encouraging well-founded mental engagement (yoniśo manasikāra) and discerning reality (bhūtapratyavekṣā) promoted by Kamalaśīla, but also fully concordant with the kind of objectless meditation emphasized in Mantrayāna Completion Stage (utpannakrama) practices wherein the mind, deprived of any object with which to identify, reposes in luminous emptiness. In their attempts to mediate between these complex and contrasting views on truth, emptiness, buddha nature, the nature of mind, and styles of liberating knowledge, the four scholars each charted his own philosophical middle course between the prevailing eternalistic and nihilistic currents of Buddhist thought. If this meant avoiding the imputation of a permanent metaphysical reality, a view they linked with the Jo nang school, it also meant circumventing the kind of unwarranted depreciation of ultimate reality that they saw as the undesirable result of taking as the view of the ultimate an exclusive or sheer emptiness (stong pa rkyang pa)—a complete absence of anything whatsoever—that was the scope of a nonaffirming negation (med dgag), a view that they associated mainly with the Dge lugs pa school. It is in light of this shared concern to reconcile Gzhan stong-based and Rang stongbased Middle Way approaches within the framework of an affirmative but antifoundationalist 88 See Bretfeld 2004. 42 INTRODUCTION approach to goal-realization that we can broadly characterize the primary philosophical orientation of these leading post-classical thinkers as a “Mahāmudrā of the Middle Way”. Given our still fragmentary knowledge of post-classical developments in Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā philosophy and polemics, it is hoped that the present study will offer the reader a panoramic overview of some of the central religo-philosophical issues and debates that defined this most fruitful period of Tibet’s intellectual history through the lens of four of its most productive and influential thinkers. 43 SHĀKYA MCHOG LDAN 44 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN SHĀKYA MCHOG LDAN AND THE BKA’ BRGYUD MAHĀMUDRĀ TRADITION Shākya mchog ldan (1428‒1507) has long been regarded as one of the most prolific and learned scholars of his generation. As a testament to the breadth of his scholarship, his extant Collected Works fill twenty-four volumes and cover an impressively wide range of subjects, mostly of a philosophical nature. Within his own Sa skya tradition, Shākya mchog ldan’s erudition and influence as a teacher earned him the title Great Ācārya (slob dpon chen po) and garnered him the recognition of being one of the tradition’s Six Ornaments Beautifying the Snowy Land (gangs can mdzes pa’i rgyan drug). These accolades aside, Shākya mchog ldan has mainly been regarded as a controversial figure, even an apostate, whose probing reconsiderations of the views of Sa skya Paṇḍita, supreme authority of his own Sa skya school, and his vehement criticisms of the views of Tsong kha pa, founder of the Dge lugs pa school, led to the general neglect of his writings by his own school and their wholesale proscription by the Dge lugs pa establishment. It is only in the past four decades, with the resurfacing and distribution of the long-banned copy of his Collected Writings in 1975, that his works have begun to once again attract the attention they deserve. Most of our current state of knowledge of this important master derives from the aforementioned studies of Komarovski, Kano, Jackson, Seyfort Ruegg, Van der Kuijp, Turrene, and Caumanns.89 An important chapter in Shākya mchog ldan’s development as a philosopher and exegete that has hitherto received only cursory treatment (by Jackson and Seyfort Ruegg) is his productive engagement with the Dwags po Mahāmudrā tradition that developed and intensified during the last half of his life. This development found its culmination in a trilogy of writings dedicated to articulating and defending this tradition that are analyzed, critically edited and translated in volume two of this work. An assessment of Shākya mchog ldan’s treatments of the Dwags po Mahāmudrā tradition may be expected to fill a crucial gap in our understanding of his philosophy, a gap of no small magnitude given the author’s conviction that this tradition represents the summit of Buddhist thought and practice. Here, the question immediately arises: Why did a renowned Sa skya scholar and teacher choose to openly defend the validity, and even superiority, of a tradition that had come under relentless criticism by the supreme religious and scholastic authority of his own tradition, Sa skya Paṇḍita, and virtually all of the latter’s successors? As a first step toward making sense of the author’s growing allegiance to this contested tradition, we can take note of two controversial issues concerning Buddhist theory and practice that had long claimed his attention and briefly conjecture why he thought the Mahāmudrā tradition offered the best prospect of resolving them. One was the issue of how to reconcile philosophical analysis with contemplative experience by combining, within the traditional framework of study (thos), thought (bsam) and meditation (sgom), the key elements of the 89 For previous research on Shākya mchog ldan, see Introduction. 45 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN diverse, and sometimes seemingly divergent, vehicles of Buddhism, exoteric as well as esoteric. The second was the issue of how best to realize a unity (zung ’jug : yuganaddha) beyond extremes of existence and nonexistence, affirmation and negation, within the sphere of spiritual praxis, a unity sometimes referred to as the inseparability of manifestation and emptiness (snang stong dbyer med). Of course, the very formulation of these issues makes use of conventional distinctions between view and practice, analysis and contemplation, and related rubrics that the author himself regarded as discursive constructs that must eventually be transcended. But, in the author’s eyes, such transcendence is possible only when one recognizes the abiding nature or prereflective source of conceptual thinking that itself eludes the appropriations of negative and positive determinations. And in his eyes, the most viable path to this goal was that outlined in the teachings of the Dwags po Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā system. The present chapter looks at Shākya mchog ldan’s assessment and defence of this system and its teachings within the broader contexts of the author’s doxographical affiliations and philosophical views on buddha nature, mind, soteriological knowledge and emptiness. Although his Mahāmudrā trilogy forms the primary focus for assessing his contributions, we have also consulted a number of separate treatments of this tradition in his Replies to Queries (dris lan) texts and other writings. The trilogy consists of the following works which, in all extant editions of the author’s Collected Works, are presented in the following sequence: [1] Undermining the Haughtiness of Others: a Treatise Clarifying Mahāmudrā90, [2] Ascertaining the Intent of the Supreme Siddhas: A Treatise Called ‘Distinguishing Mahāmudrā’91: and [3] Distinguishing Mahāmudrā or the Great Ship of Unity: A Treatise Dispelling Errors in the Interpretation of Mahāmudrā of Scripture and Reasoning92. Only the second of these texts can be assigned a date; in its colophon the author records that he composed it when he was 76 years old (just four years before his death). It is not unlikely that all three works were composed at a relatively late date since they explore an integrated set of themes and to some extent balance each other thematically, but we have no way of confirming this thesis. It is noteworthy that the dated work is the most openly critical of Sa skya Paṇḍita’s condemnations of the Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā system and its tone is less conciliatory than the other two. One plausible scenario is that this was the last of his Mahāmudrā works on the supposition that its candidly critical tone reflects a late point in the author’s life when he would have felt 90 Phyag rgya chen po gsal bar byed pa’i bstan bcos tshangs pa’i ’khor lo gzhan blo’i dregs pa nyams byed, (hereafter Undermining or PCdn), SCsb(B) vol. 17, 359‒3761. 91 Phyag rgya chen po’i shan ’byed ces bya ba’i bstan bcos grub pa mchog gi dgongs pa rnam nges, (hereafter Ascertaining the Intent or PCgn), SCsb(B) vol. 17, 3761‒3854. 92 Phyag rgya chen po’i shan ’byed or Lung rigs gnyis kyi phyag rgya chen po’i bzhed tshul la ’khrul pa sel ba’i bstan bcos zung ’jug gi gru chen, (hereafter Great Ship of Unity or PCks), SCsb(B) vol. 17, 3854‒4122. 46 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN less inhibited to speak his mind than previously. But without corroborating evidence, this can only be a matter of speculation. The Mahāmudrā trilogy reveals as clearly as any of the works in the author’s corpus how Shākya mchog ldan understood and formulated the above-mentioned issues of reconciliation and unity and how he thought they could best be resolved. The three works mark a high point in the author’s own development as a Buddhist thinker and open a window on some of the key soteriological issues that defined the vibrant but polemically tempestuous intellectual climate of his age. The distinctive doctrinal elements of his Mahāmudrā texts stand out most clearly when viewed against the background of the author’s philosophical oeuvre as a whole and in light of its central preoccupations. The author’s Collected Works reveal a highly independent thinker who intrepidly grappled with the “big problems” of Buddhist philosophy such as truth, emptiness, the nature of mind, buddha nature, and soteriological knowledge. What is perhaps most striking in his treatments of such issues is the extent to which he attempts not only to assess multiple Buddhist viewpoints on such problems but also to work out how they should be coordinated and reconciled with one another from the standpoint of individual assimilation and praxis. In short, he was a master both of dialogical and dialectical thinking.93 We have proposed that the task of clarifying the relationship between philosophical thinking and contemplative experience was at the heart of his philosophical project. He consecrated a great deal of attention to determining the proper role and relative efficacy of each based on the conviction that it was not only an issue of inestimable importance for combining the study and practice of Buddhism but also one that had generally been misunderstood by his contemporaries. In this regard, he identified two major strands of Indo-Tibetan Buddhist thought: [1] the dialectician’s system of severing imputations (sgro ’dogs bcad pa’i lugs) based on studying and thinking, which can be approached either via Self-emptiness (rang stong) or Otheremptiness (gzhan stong)94, and [2] the yogin’s system of first-hand experience (nyams su myong ba’i lugs) based on meditation. While Shākya mchog ldan considered both to be valid and important Buddhist approaches, he deemed it a serious mistake to privilege the former to the exclusion of the latter, to give methods and texts concerned with reasoning which investigates the ultimate priority over those concerned with first-personal attestation. The reasons he gives are largely phenomenological. As important or necessary as the elimination of reifications through rational investigation may prove to be, its result is always a deductive conclusion, a negative or positive determination, and should therefore never be taken as an 93 On these two styles of thinking, see below, 241‒42 and n. 677. 94 Like many other scholars of his time, Shākya mchog ldan used these Tibetan rubrics rang stong and gzhan stong to broadly characterize and distinguish between negating (apophatic) and affirming (cataphatic) strains of Indian Buddhist thought. 47 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN end in itself. To do so is to conflate the elimination of what is to be negated (dgag bya) with what is to be realized. For Shākya mchog ldan, the elimination of what is to be negated is not the goal itself but a preparatory clearing away of what conceals it. As Shākya mchog ldan sees it, any emptiness arrived at through radical negation can only be an abstraction (don spyi) that is conceptually determined, it cannot be the nonrepresentational ultimate (rnam grangs pa ma yin pa’i don dam) that is amenable only to direct perception or personally realized wisdom. On this view, conceptual analysis can at best play the propaedeutic role of eliminating reifications that obscure or distort the real and thus prevent the disclosure of personally realized wisdom and the buddha qualities. Because the Gzhan stong view makes room for a positive appraisal of what mahāmudrā is from the vantage point of first-hand experience, it is thought to come closer to the perspective of unity (yuganaddha), the cornerstone of the Mahāmudrā teachings, than Rang stong which is focused on objects of refutation (dgag bya). However, in his Mahāmudrā writings, both the negating Rang stong and affirming Gzhan stong traditions, useful as they may be as preliminary methods, remain confined to the sphere of the dialectician, a sphere that is transcended in the personally realized wisdom of the yogin who realizes a unity beyond extremes of existence and nonexistence. In this vein, Shākya mchog ldan rather boldly characterizes Mahāmudrā as a system of thought and practice independent of the approaches of Self-emptiness (rang stong) or Other-emptiness (gzhan stong) that are deemed to represent “poisoned”, i.e., conceptually fabricated, viewpoints. In articulating this relationship between conceptual analysis and nonconceptual realization, Shākya mchog ldan makes an important distinction between the actual view (lta ba dngos), which he regards as a prephilosophical view grounded in first-hand experience, and the myriad viewpoints (lta ba) or established conclusions (grub mtha’) that make up the universe of Buddhist and Non-Buddhist philosophical tenet-systems. Shākya mchog ldan maintains that one’s philosophical viewpoint should have the actual view based on first-hand experience as its point of origin and orientation. To give a philosophical viewpoint primacy over the prephilosophical view is to put the soteriological cart before the horse and to embark on a path of speculation and dogmatism. In sum, Shākya mchog ldan’s philosophical project was dedicated in large part to striking a balance between negating and affirming modes of Buddhist knowledge and discourse and this is in his view possible only when one restores the phenomenological primacy of first-hand attestation over theoretical deliberation. The goal is to realize a unity in which the entire spectrum of dialectical positions regarding truth, knowledge and emptiness have given way to the inseparability of manifestation and emptiness. For Shākya mchog ldan, the most efficacious and least convoluted path to this transcendent unity is the Dwags po Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā because it offers persons of requisite acumen a method of direct access to buddhahood, the abiding nature of mind, and 48 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN minimizes the need for conceptual and ritual mediation. Equating mahāmudrā with the unborn nature of mind, Shākya mchog ldan identifies it with unchanging buddha nature which is at once [1] the ground of the clearing process, [2] the clearing process itself which, through wisdom, clears away adventitious stains, and [3] its fruition as the transcendent qualities of purity, selfhood, bliss, and permanence.95 He adds “there is no difference between the element of sentient beings (sems can gyi khams) and that of buddhas (sangs rgyas kyi khams)”96: what characterizes sentient beings—the unfounded mentations based on the aggregates (skandhas), sense-bases (āyatanas), elements (dhātus), and sense-faculties (indriyas)—are purely adventitious and dependent upon the purity of mind.97 Accordingly, as the adventitious impurities subside, the nature of mind, i.e., primordial wisdom, becomes manifest. Shākya mchog ldan traces the view that forms the backbone of Mahāmudrā practice to three main exegetical traditions: [1] the Tathāgatagarbha discourses of the third turning, particularly the Ratnagotravibhāga, [2] the Siddha dohās, especially the Dohā Trilogy (do hā skor gsum) of Saraha, and their commentaries, and [3] the tantra corpus. These all affirm nondual wisdom as that which remains, or withstands critical assessment, when distorting dualistic reifications and afflictions have been dispelled. Concerning methods of realization, Shākya mchog ldan is emphatic that mahāmudrā is accessible only to nonconceptual, nondeluded direct cognition. Unlike the Rang stong and Gzhan stong systems of severing superimpositions (sgro ’dogs bcad pa) by studying and thinking which employ inferential knowledge, the Mahāmudrā practice is said to be a matter of directly perceiving the nature of mind, of familiarizing oneself with ultimate bodhicitta. Shākya mchog ldan neatly sums up the difference between the approaches of the dialectician and yogin by citing an unidentified quotation which states that “dialecticians (mtshan nyid pa) make outward observations, severing superimpositions outwardly, whereas yogins (rnal ’byor pa) make inward observations, severing superimpositions inwardly”. 98 In other words, the yogin redirects the capacity to find fault from externals to their inward 95 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 17‒18, critical edition: 29. “The element of *sugatagarbha is that which has been given the name mahāmudrā. In this which is the ground for the clearing (sbyang gzhi) of stains, the *sugatagarbha that is the cleanser (sbyong byed) of the nine kinds of stains that are the objects to be cleared (sbyang bya) clears them by means of the wisdom of awareness, whereby the fruition of the clearing process (sbyang ’bras) emerges, i.e., the transcendent qualities of purity, selfhood, bliss, etc.” 96 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 19, critical edition: 30. 97 The author bases himself on Ratnagotravibhāga I.52–57 which gives the analogy of the elements of earth which is supported by water, water by air, air by space but space not being supported by anything. Likewise, the psychophysical aggregates, sensory elements and sensory capacities are supported by actions and afflictive emotions, which are supported by unfounded mentations, which are in turn supported by the purity of mind which, however, is not itself supported by any of these phenomena. 98 Similar characterizations were employed by Karma phrin las (see chapter two) and the Second ’Brug chen Rgyal dbang rje and Fourth ’Brug chen Padma dkar po (see chapter four). 49 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN source, mind’s mistaken self-identifications. All this may strike the reader as intriguing, coming as it does from a Sa skya scholar who was renowned for his wide-ranging erudition in critically assessing the many systems of Buddhist philosophy. Given that the author had in his earlier writings referred to himself, with more than a little self-irony, as a “dry dialectician” (mtshan nyid pa skam po), we can take his endorsement of the yogin’s inward turn as indicative of his own changing orientation and shifting priorities.99 In his Mahāmudrā works, Shākya mchog ldan takes pains to clarify that his hierarchical ranking of the two systems of severing superimpositions and first-hand experience is by no means an attempt to advocate the latter at the expense of the former, to privilege knowledge based on direct experience over knowledge based on analytical reasoning. This would be to play into the hands of the dialectician. Rather his intent is to adequately characterize the relations of priority that exist between first-hand experience and critical analysis: all activities of reflection, thematizing and theorizing derive and deviate from a more basic nondiscursive mode of being and awareness and return to it at the moment of realization. To say that nonconceptual realization depends on conceptual analysis is to misunderstand the priority relation between them and take what is to be relinquished— conceptual fabrication—as the basis of the path. Mahāmudrā in his view restores the proper relation by recognizing the prereflective nature of thought and taking nondual wisdom as the basis of the path. From this standpoint, the wisdom of Mahāmudrā does not unequivocally depend on the logical reasoning of either the Rang stong or Gzhan stong strands of Madhyamaka, though both may prove necessary to the aspirant who stands in need of a preparatory purging of illegitimate imputations and unwarranted deprecations by means of studying and thinking. Nor does such wisdom in all cases require the tantric methods of empowerments and Generation and Completion stages, as effective as these may be for those requiring the elimination of deep-seated afflictions and attachments. While Shākya mchog ldan holds this tantric preliminary method to be even more efficacious than Madhyamaka reasoning, he nonetheless accepts, in contrast to Sa skya Paṇḍita Kun dga rgyal mtshan (1182‒1251), the validity of an upadeśa-based access to the experience of mahāmudrā that does not require the prescribed repertoire of tantric rituals and practices which may, to the most suitable recipients of these teachings, prove to be a distraction or even an obstacle.100 99 See Komarovski 2011, 35. 100 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 53, critical edition: 75. “In the words of some [others], it is said that there are two [types of practitioners], the gradualists and the simultaneists. To the first, this mahāmudrā is taught [once they have] adequately been made a suitable vessel for the Secret Mantra by taking refuge, developing bodhicitta, empowerment, blessing, and so on. To the simultaneists who, having thoroughly ripened their mind-streams during many previous lifetimes, do not need to rely on the sham of preliminary practices and so on in this life, the main practice is shown right from the start. In that regard, it is said that even though it is not possible to [directly] show them “mahāmudrā is this”, it will nonetheless come by simply instructing them to “rest naturally 50 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN Shākya mchog ldan characterizes the realization of Mahāmudrā as a process which involves the whole person, bringing into play innate altruistic capacities for thinking, feeling and acting that have been obscured and distorted by the mind’s own self-objectifications. While studying and thinking may play a crucial role in orienting the mind toward what is essential, it is certain affective and intersubjective dispositions such as confidence and devotion which may prove most effective in triggering the disclosure of mind’s luminous nature.101 Mahāmudrā arises at the confluence of the student’s devotion and teacher’s blessings, whatever other preparatory measures may have preceded this emergence.102 LIFE, WRITINGS AND INFLUENCES To gain a clearer picture of the historical and doctrinal elements that shaped Shākya mchog ldan’s engagement with Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā tradition, it may be useful to sketch in rough strokes the important milestones in his life, giving particular attention to his affiliations with Karma Bka’ brgyud teachers and teachings. 103 Shākya mchog ldan was born in 1428 in Central Tibet in the vicinity of the famous monastic seminary of Gsang phu ne’u thog.104 At age ten (1437), following a course of preliminary studies, he received pre-novice in uncontrived mind,” once they are acquainted with what the words mean.” la la’i gsung gis | gdul ba’i gang zag la | rim gyis pa dang gcig car ba gnyis | dang po la skyabs ’gro sems bskyed dbang byin brlabs sogs kyis gsang sngags kyi snod rung du byas | bzod phyag rgya chen po ’di ston pa yin no | | cig car ba tshe rabs mang por rgyud yongs su smin pa la tshe ’dir sngon ’gro sogs kyi mgo skor la ma ltos par dang po nyid nas dngos gzhi de ston pa ni | de yang phyag rgya chen po de ’di yin zhes ston nus pa ma yin gyi | ’on kyang sems ma bcos lhug par zhog shig ces bstan pa tsam gyis brda’ don ’phrod nas ’ong pa yin gsungs | 101 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 24, critical edition: 33. 102 PCgn, see Volume II, translation: 35, critical edition: 43. “The emptiness of mahāmudrā is attained through devotion to the bla ma, blessings, karmic connection and the accumulation of merit.” phyag rgya chen po’i stong nyid ni | bla mar mos dang byin rlabs dang | las ’phro ba sod nams tshogs las yin | grub … 103 For a more comprehensive biography of Shākya mchog ldan based on various biographical and historical sources including the comprehensive biography of the master composed by Kun dga’ grol mchog (1507‒ 1565/66) based largely on accounts by Shākya mchog ldan’s disciples and grand-disciples, see Komorovski 2011, chapter one. This work additionally provides a valuable survey of the socio-political atmosphere in which Shākya mchog ldan lived and worked, a period characterized by increasing political and polemical tensions. More details about Shākya mchog ldan’s life are to be expected with the publication in 2015 of the rivised dissertation on the life and work of Shākya mchog ldan by Caumanns 2012, Der Mahāpaṇḍita des Klosters gSermdog-can: Leben und Werk des Sa-skya-Meisters Shakya-mchog-ldan (1428‒1507). 104 Gsang phu was a Bka’ gdams monastery established in 1073 by Rngog Legs pa’i shes rab (11 th c.), a disciple of the renowned Bengali master Atiśa alias Dīpaṃkaraśrijñāna (982‒1054) who founded the Bka’ gdams order. Gsang phu was the most important and influential of six seminaries (chos grva chen po drug) established between the 11th and 13th centuries in the Dbus province, the others being Skyor mo lung, Zul phu, Dga’ ba gdong, Bde ba can and Gung thang (i.e. Chos ’khor gling). Gsang phu was under the authority of the Rngog clan and started operations with 500 students. Sørensen and Hazod (2007, 685) note that the six learning centres played a vital role in the establishment of the major Dge lugs pa key monasteries in the 15th century, being incorporated into their network. On formative developments in Buddhist epistemology at Gsang phu, see Van der Kuijp 1983, 51 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN ordination (bar ma rab byung) along with the ordination name Shākya mchog ldan from the Sa skya master Rong ston shes bya kun rig (1367‒1449) who had by this time gained a reputation as a brilliant scholar and teacher, and a formidable critic of Tsong kha pa’s views. Rong ston identified the boy as the reincarnation of one of his own teachers, the Sa skya master Bag ston Gzhon nu rgyal mtshan (14th c.) and of the latter’s student Bag ston Shākya ’od zer. In the same year, Shākya mchog ldan entered the Sa skya ’Phan yul Gnas sgo college at Gsang pu ne’u thog, the seat of the great paṇḍita Don yod dpal ba who also became one of his most important teachers. The monastery was at this time supported by the powerful Phag mo gru pa clan and mainly played host to Dge lugs and Sa skya students.105 The young scholar began an intensive course of studies in classical Buddhist works on Vinaya, Abhidharma, Prajñapāramitā, Pramāṇa, and Madhyamaka, as well as ritual, tantra and meditative techniques. Not confining his studies to Gsang phu, he travelled to many other learning institutions in search of specialists in various fields to broaden his knowledge of the main Buddhist traditions of exegesis and practice. The biographical sources characterize his early teenage years as a period of extensive intellectual studies combined with dedicated meditative practice. These resulted in contemplative experiences of luminous clarity that are said to have had the effect, among other things, that he could read during the night without the need for additional lighting. During this early phase of study and meditation, Rong ston pa continued to be one of his principal teachers, introducing his student to all the major areas of Buddhist philosophy. At age thirteen (1440), Shākya mchog ldan received from him the novice vows (dge tshul). Despite his youth, he was already able to give instructions on Sa skya Paṇḍita’s Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter (Treasure of the Science of Valid Cognition) and Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa and he soon became known as the “boy teacher” (slob dpon bu chung). When he was fifteen (1442), the Phag mo gru pa rulers, who at this time gave special patronage to the Dge lugs tradition, ordered the monks to study in Dge lugs institutions, a directive that did not sit well with Shākya mchog ldan, particularly as he did not approve of Tsong kha pa’s Madhyamaka interpretations.106 It is significant, for example, that in the spring of 1442, Shākya mchog ldan was required to go to the Dge lugs monastery of Se ra monastery to attend extensive teachings on Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā according to decrees issued from Ne’u sdong that made the attendance of Sa skya and Dge lugs pa monks mandatory. These events seem to have left a deep impression on the youth who would, later in life, frequently lament chapters 1 and 2. On the traditions of debate and logic at Gsang phu, see Onoda 1992, chapter 2. On abbatial succession at Gsang phu, see Van der Kuijp 1987, Onoda 1988, and Sørensen and Hazod 2007, 686 f. 105 See Shunzo Onoda 1988, “Abbatial Successions of the Colleges of gSang phu sNe’u thog Monastery”. 106 Komarovski 2011, 28‒29 52 S H ĀK Y A M C H OG LD AN the decline in understanding of the original Bka’ gdams traditions of exegesis and praxis by so-called “latter-day” proponents of Madhyamaka reasoning who took the goal of Buddhist thought and practice to consist in the realization of emptiness as a nonaffirming negation (med dgag). Although he would later comment that it was at age twelve that he first had the courage to differentiate his own philosophical view from those of rivals (mainly the Dge lugs pa), it was not until age thirty-two that he began writing his own refutations of Dge lugs pa views107, a trend that would continue for the remainder of his long life. Already by the age of eighteen (1445), Shākya mchog ldan began his teaching career at Gsang phu where he earned the epithet “adjunct instructor” (zur ’chad pa), and, a year later, “master” (slob dpon). At the age of twenty, he undertook the study of Sanskrit and became completely fluent in this language, able to converse in it and translate from and into it. From the age of twenty-two onward, he obtained the Lam ’bras and the tantric Mahāmudrā transmissions as well as extensive Bka’ gdams mental training (blo sbyong) teachings from different teachers. It was also during this time that he began receiving tantric transmissions and empowerments from teachers of various traditions, mainly Sa skya and Bka’ brgyud pa. Shākya mchog ldan received empowerments on the Cakrasaṃv ara and Vajravārāhī,teachings on the Hevajra and other tantras, and various other instructions, from the Karma Bka’ brgyud master Grags pa ’od zer (15th c.). From another famously nonsectarian Bka’ brgyud teacher, Spyang lung sdings pa Gzhon nu blo gros (1372‒1412), who had studied with Tsong kha pa and Red mda’ ba gzhon nu blo gros (1349‒1412) as well as many Sa skya and Bka’ brgyud masters, he received extensive Bka’ brgyud teachings.108 These are but two indications of the close ties he was beginning to forge with the Karma bka’ brgyud tradition, ties which would strengthen in the years to follow as he developed a growing familiarity with its systems of exegesis (bshad lugs) and praxis (sgrub lugs). When he was twenty-five (1452), Shākya mchog ldan received full monastic ordination from Kun dga’ bzang po (1382‒1456) who became another of his most important teachers. He excelled in his monastic examinations (grwa skor), greatly pleasing his ordination master. Shākya mchog ldan had by this time become one of the most learned scholars of his generation and was elevated to the title of a Sa skya Dge shes (sa skya pa’i dge shes) and then a “Great One” (chen po) at Gsang phu, the final step before becoming an Abbot (mkhan po). However, he seems to have become increasingly dissatisfied with the type of rote learning—the memorization of classical scripture by means of repetition—advocated at Gsang phu and in the summer of 1468, he left his teaching post in the hands of a high-ranking colleague and spent the next nine months in a Hevajra retreat at ’Od gsal rtse mo. He later 107 See Komarovski 2011, 34. 108 See Komarovski 2011, 30. 53 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN recounted that during this retreat he received indications that negativities had been purified and there arose many luminous visionary experiences (’od gsal gyi ’char sgo). From the age of twenty-seven (1454) onward, Shākya mchog ldan had begun composing treatises on a variety of topics, and would eventually leave for posterity enough writings, many of them philosophical, to fill twenty-four volumes. Regarding his own philosophical orientation, it is clear from his collected writings that he devoted considerable attention to the Niḥsvabhāvavāda or *Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka system until approximately 1470 (age fortythree), the year following his Hevajra retreat. From this time onward, his view shifted more and more to what he called Alīkākāravāda Madhyamaka, Great Madhyamaka (dbu ma chen po) or Gzhan stong, though he continued to teach the works of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti extensively and to regard the *Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka methods of reasoning as important preparatory tools for dispelling doubts and wrong imputations. Although not opposed to *Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka methods of reasoning per se, what he did object to was the tendency among his contemporaries to take such methods as an end in themselves and as the conditio sine qua non of goal-realization. As will become evident in the pages to follow, Shākya mchog ldan’s distinctive doxographical identification of Alīkākāravāda as a Madhyamaka tradition par excellence—one whose adherents were said to have included the likes of the famous epistemologist Dignāga—would leave him vulnerable to harsh criticism by other scholars, not least of all by the Eighth Karma pa Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507‒1554).109 It nonetheless gave Shākya mchog ldan a unique standpoint from which to make an important distinction within the doxographical universe of Indo-Tibetan Buddhist philosophies between two major strands of Madhyamaka: [1] traditions such as the Niḥsvabhāvavāda that rejected the existence, even conventionally, of any kind of transcendent awareness or wisdom that can be said to withstand critical assessment and be left as a remainder upon the realization of buddhahood, and [2] traditions such as the Alīkākāravāda that not only affirmed that such transcendent awareness is indeed what remains but also explicitly identify this remnant nondual awareness with the ultimate truth, the dharmadhātu, itself.110 It was because this latter tradition also maintained that this transcendent cognition does not exist as a real entity (dngos po) that Shākya mchog ldan proposed that its view must be considered Madhyamaka rather than Cittamātra, an identification that many scholars such as Stag lo tsā ba Shes rab rin chen, Mi bskyod rdo rje and Padma dkar po would reject. In sum, this doxographical scheme, though controversial, provided Shākya mchog ldan with a philosophical-epistemological orientation that could be shown to be completely in harmony with the affirmative third turning Mahāyāna, Siddha, and Tantra discourses and their shared disclosive view of goal-realization common commitment to the Madhyamaka principle 109 For an analysis of Mi bskyod rdo rje’s criticisms, see chapter three. 110 See below, 59‒60 et passim. 54 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN of freedom from extremes of existence and nonexistence. His own philosophical viewpoint was based on the complementarity between the Yogācāra and Niḥsvabhāvavāda exegetical traditions and the reciprocity between their positive and negative determinations. In his forty-third year (1471), Shākya mchog ldan was given his own seat at the monastery of Gzi lung (aka Zi ling/Zi lung) in Gtsang that had originally been established by Don yod dpal ba (1398‒1484). In appreciation of his vast erudition and being the best of Don yod dpal’s students, the monastery was ceded to him by this master’s other students. Shākya mchog ldan renamed his new seat the “Golden Monastery” (thub bstan gser mdog can), after which he himself was sometimes referred to by the epithet “Great Teacher (mahāpaṇḍita) from the Golden Monastery” (gser mdog paṇ chen). It may be noted that this change of monastic venue signaled an important shift in Shākya mchog ldan’s political and spiritual alliances since this establishment was supported by the Rin spung pa clan. As powerful rivals of the Phag mo gru pa, the Rin spung pa had by the early fifteenth century become active supporters of both the Karma Bka’ brgyud and Sa skya traditions. From this time on, Shākya mchog ldan enjoyed the patronage of the Rin spungs family for whom he in turn gave teachings and tantric empowerments. At the same time, he seems to have increasingly fallen out of favour with the Sa skya establishment. At the age of fifty-seven (1484) Shākya mchog ldan met for the first time the thirtyone year old Seventh Karma pa Chos grags rgya mtsho (1454‒1506), a renowned and highly influential scholar who received extensive patronage and land holdings from the Rin spungs family. Among much else, Chos grags rgya mtsho gave his senior student teachings on the Fourth Karma pa Rol pa’i rdo rje’s (1340‒1383) Great Madhyamaka Reasonings (dbu ma’i gtan tshigs chen mo).111 From this time onward, Shākya mchog ldan included in his teaching repertoire many Dwags po Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā doctrines such as the Six Yogas of Nāropa (na ro chos drug) and Mahāmudrā of Coemergent Union (phyag chen lhan cig skyes sbyor). In 1502 and again in 1503, Shākya mchog ldan, now in his mid-seventies, reunited with the Seventh Karma pa, this time accepting him as his root guru.112 The last three decades of Shākya mchog ldan’s life were marked by a growing interest in the Dwags po Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā tradition which had been so severely criticized by his own Sa skya tradition beginning with Sa skya Paṇḍita. It also marked a decisive shift in his own intellectual-spiritual vocation from that of a dialectician (mthan nyid pa) dedicated to the systems of severing superimpositions, Rang stong and Gzhan stong, toward that of the yoga-practitioner (rnal ’byor pa) devoted to systems of first-hand experience. 111 Komarovski 2011, 43 and n. 157. 112 This was reported by Chos grags rgya mtsho’s secretary and disciple Dpa’ bo Gtsug lag phreng ba (1504‒ 1564/66). For references, see Komarovski 2011, 49 and n. 185. 55 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN Some of Shākya mchog ldan’s most striking philosophical insights resulted from his ongoing efforts to clarify the complex relationships between these two vocations. We can see these same concerns mirrored in the Mahāmudrā writings of Karma phrin las, Mi bskyod rdo rje and Padma dkar po. Shākya mchog ldan’s high regard for the Dwags po Bka’ brgyud tradition would eventually find expression in the trilogy of works dedicated to elucidating and defending its teachings113, especially from its Sa skya and Dge lugs detractors, at least one of that was composed shortly before his death.114 Shākya mchog ldan died at his monastery Gser mdog can in 1507 at the age of eighty. Because of his substantial contributions to Buddhist philosophy and his enormous, if not always adequately acknowledged, influence as a teacher, Shākya mchog ldan earned the distinction of being one of the Sa skya school’s so-called Six Ornaments Beautifying the Snowy Land (gangs can mdzes pa’i rgyan drug)115. He was also among the few Tibetan masters to receive the title Great Master (slob dpon chen po). Such tributes notwithstanding, Shākya mchog ldan’s openly critical comments about the views of such prestigious religious authorities as Tsong kha pa (1357‒1419) and his provocative reappraisals of the views of Sa skya Paṇḍita (1182‒1251)116 his latter-day adherents ensured that he would find few allies among the Dge lugs pa or his own Sa skya pa coreligionists. His outspoken criticism of socalled “modern-day” representatives of various traditions eventually earned him the dubious distinction of being one of Tibet’s most controversial thinkers. Sa skya scholars have tended to maintain high regard for the breadth of Shākya mchog ldan’s scholarship but a critical view of his reappraisals of the views of Sa skya Paṇḍita, his own tradition’s supreme authority and most acclaimed scholar. This together with his treatments of Yogācāra and Gzhan stong views as complementary to or even superior to Madhyamaka and Rang stong views led to the general neglect of his writings within the Sa skya establishment, which generally saw the latter two views as superior to the former. By the same token, these philosophical affiliations and especially Shākya mchog ldan’s unsparing criticisms of the views of Tsong kha pa, founder and supreme authority of the Dge lugs pa tradition, led to more serious reprisals. Long viewed as heretical by Dge lugs pa authorities, his works were, in the seventeenth century, included in a lengthy list of banned publications. 113 This trilogy is critically edited and translated in Volume II of this monograph, 11 ff. 114 The colophon informs us that Ascertaining the Intent of the Supreme Siddhas: A Treatise Called Distinguishing Mahāmudrā, PCgn, SCsb(A) vol. 17, 3464‒3551; SCsb(B) vol. 17, 3761‒3854; SCsb(C) vol. 17, 4572‒4683, was composed in the author’s seventy-sixth year. 115 Komarovski 2011, 3‒4. The other five are G.yag ston sangs rgyas dpal (1348‒1414), Rong ston smra ba’i seng ge (1367‒1449), Ngor can kun dga’ bzang (1382‒1456), Rdo rje ’chang kun dga’ bzang po (1382‒1456), and Rdzog pa kun dga’ rnam rgyal (1432‒1496). These Six Ornaments along with the Five Foremost Venerable Founders (rje btsun gong ma lnga) are considered to be the most important masters of the Sa skya tradition. 116 See Komarovski 2011, 37‒38. 56 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN Dge lugs supporters confiscated copies of his writings and sealed the printery in which his blocks were kept, where they remained virtually unavailable for centuries. An exception was one copy of the twenty-four volumes of his Collected Writings which managed to survive in Bhutan thanks to the efforts of the Head Abbot of Bhutan, Shakya Rin chen (1710‒1759) who successfully petitioned the Tibetan Government for permission to obtain a copy of these writings on the pretext of his claim to being a reincarnation of the master.117 Based on this copy, a modern reproduction of Shākya mchog ldan’s works was published by Kunzang Tobgey in Thimphu, Bhutan in 1975 and have since become widely available to scholars. There is also anecdotal evidence that other copies of the master’s writings were preserved in certain Sa skya monastery in Tibet but that they were hardly ever consulted.118 MADHYAMAKA AND THE DIALECTIC OF EMPTINESS: RANG STONG AND GZHAN STONG Yaroslav Komarovski has observed in his Vision of Unity that Shākya mchog ldan’s writings reflected a general Sa skya interpretation of Niḥsvabhāvavāda Madhyamaka until his late forties, during which time he maintained that the tenet of the Gzhan stong followers “does not surpass the view of Alīkākāravāda even a little”.119 During this earlier period, Shākya mchog ldan also endorsed the Tibetan consensus view that Alīkākāravāda was a Cittamātra subsect, though he would in later years come to regard it as a Gzhan stong Madhyamaka tradition on par with Niḥsvabhāvavāda Madhyamaka, if not superior to it when it comes to meditation. It is therefore indisputable that Shākya mchog ldan changed some of his early views or, as Komarovski puts it, “broadened” and “clarified” his positions 120. It should also be noted, however, that despite the widely held view that Shākya mchog ldan became a proponent of the Gzhan stong view only in his fifties, certain remarks in his earlier works indicate that in his thirties he already endorsed Gzhan stong as an indispensable Madhyamaka view grounded in the Maitreya texts and their commentaries as well as the tantras. Consider the following quotation from his commentary on Sa skya Paṇḍita’s Mkhas pa la ’jug pa composed when he was thirty-eight years old121: 117 This was noted by Gene Smith in an unpublished article entitled “Banned Books in the Tibetan Speaking Lands”. 118 According to one informant, Ngor Mkhan po Bsod nams rgya mtsho, some copies had been kept in the libraries of the Sa skya monasteries Ngor Ewaṃ Chos ldan and Rta nag Thub bstan rnam rgyal but that hardly anybody took an interest in them. Volker Caumanns, “Tibetan Sources on the Life of Serdog Paṇchen Shākya Chogden,” as quoted in Komarovski 2011, 3 and n. 4, p. 307‒08. 119 Komarovski 2011, 104. 120 Komarovski 2011, 4‒5. 121 This seems to be the basis for the first difference mentioned in Tāranātha’s account of the imagined dialogue between Shākya mchog ldan and Dol po pa in Mathes 2004 (295‒96). 57 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN The identification of the Madhyamaka view is twofold, the Perfections system and Mantra system. The first has two [aspects]: The Rang stong Madhyamaka which takes the middle turning literally, and the Gzhan stong Madhyamaka which takes the third turning literally. As for the first, the classical texts are the reasonings corpus (rigs tshogs) and commentaries by the *Prāsaṅgikas and Svātantrikas which explain them in extenso. As for the second, the classical texts are the Maitreya works and all the commentaries by Asaṅga and his brother that explain them in extenso, as well as the Mantra Madhyamaka. [Now,] concerning [Gzhan stong Madhyamaka], when the extreme of eternalism is refuted, it is not at all the case that the entire spectrum of the conventional would not be explained as self-empty (rang stong). On the side of reasoning by way of study and thinking, the entire spectrum of ultimate truth is also ascertained as being empty of own [essence]. Therefore, the discipline for refuting the reification of all objects of knowledge is indeed exceedingly vast. At the time of meditative equipoise, whether this is explained in a convoluted or straightforward manner by anyone, be they learned or unlearned, there is no other way than identifying the view of Other-emptiness (gzhan stong) as it is taught in precisely these classical texts and their commentaries. 122 The author here presents Gzhan stong as a necessary corollary of Rang stong that becomes indispensable in the context of meditative equipoise when the aspirant is in a position to ascertain and affirm the ultimate. Shākya mchog ldan’s identification of Alīkākāravāda as a Gzhan stong Madhyamaka tradition can be roughly traced to the author’s fiftieth year. This was prior to his becoming a student of the Seventh Karma pa (1454‒1506) who, as Karma phrin las pa (1456‒1539) informs us, upheld the view that there is no contradiction between the Gzhan stong and Rang stong views.123 As Karma phrin las pa describes his teacher Chos grags rgya mtsho’s position: 122 Mkhas pa la ’jug pa’i rnam bshad, SCsb(C) vol. 24, 1142‒1151: dbu ma’i lta ba ngos ’dzin la gnyis te | phar phyin lugs dang sngags lugs so | dang po la gnyis te | ’khor lo bar pa’i sgra ji bzhin pa rang stong gi dbu ma dang | ’khor lo gsum pa’i sgra ji bzhin pa gzhan stong gi dbu ma dag las | dang po ni | gzhung rigs tshogs dang | ’grel ba thal rang du grags pa dag gis rgyas par bshad la | gnyis pa ni | gzhung byams chos dang | ’grel pa thogs med mched kyis rgyas par gang bshad de dag thams cad dang | sngags kyi dbu ma ni rtag pa’i mtha’ ’gog pa’i tshe kun rdzob mtha’ dag rang stong du mi ’chad pa ni gang na yang med la | thos bsam gyi rigs ngor don dam pa’i bden pa mtha’ dag kyang rang stong du gtan la phab pas shes bya mtha’ dag gi steng du rnam rtog gi ’dzin pa ’gog pa la chun shin tu che ba yin mod | sgom byung mnyam gzhag gi tshe na | mkhas mi mkhas su zhig gis ’khyog po dang drang po ji ltar bshad kyang | gzhung ’grel nyid las gsungs pa’i gzhan stong gi lta ba’i ngos ’dzin tshul las gzhan du ’das pa med do | 123 In the extant works of the Seventh Karma pa, difference between Gzhan stong and Rang stong is not explicitly discussed. For a brief presentation of the Seventh Karma pa’s Gzhan stong position according to Karma phrin las pa, see Burchardi 2011, 318‒31. 58 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN The ground of emptiness of gzhan stong is *sugatagarbha, mind’s nature, this very natural luminosity. What it becomes empty of, what is to be relinquished, are the adventitious stains that are referred to as the concepts of the apprehended and the apprehender. Therefore, ultimate truth is nothing but the nature of mind which is free from the concepts of the apprehended and the apprehender. [This], i.e., natural luminosity, unity, coemergence, the inseparability of the expanse and awareness, natural awareness itself, is the profound view of Gzhan stong.” Thus, my teacher explained that “even the so-called Rang stong and Gzhan stong are not incompatible”.124 By the time he met Karma pa Chos grags rgya mtsho for the first time in 1484 at the age of fifty-six, Shākya mchog ldan had already composed The Ocean of Scriptural Statements and Reasoning125 and Ascertainment of the Dharma Sphere126, two treatises which explicitly characterize the Alīkākāravāda view as Gzhan stong Madhyamaka.127 He had composed these texts in 1477 and 1479 when he was forty-nine and fifty-one respectively.128 In his later works, Shākya mchog ldan emphasized that Nāgārjuna and Maitreya/ Asaṅga, the pioneers of the two Mahāyāna traditions, developed complementary systems of exegesis and praxis. On this view, whether the wayfarer approaches the goal of buddhahood through the nonaffirming Niḥsvabhāvavāda Madhyamaka system or the affirming Alīkākāravāda Madhyamaka system, both offer conceptually-mediated approaches to the same meditative realization of nondual wisdom, the former dispelling reifications of its existence and the latter dispelling reifications of its nonexistence. The key difference between these two traditions, then, is that in post-meditation, the Niḥsvabhāvavāda Mādhyamikas deny that anything “truly established” remains upon realization, whereas the Alīkākāravāda 124 KPdl, 922‒3: stong gzhi bde bar gshegs pa’i snying po ni | | sems nyid rang bzhin ’od gsal ’di nyid yin | | stong byed spang bya glo bur124 dri ma de | | gzung dang ’dzin pa’i rnam rtog ’di la zer | | de phyir gzung ’dzin rnam rtog dang bral ba’i | | sems nyid kho na don dam bden pa ste | | rang bzhin ’od gsal zung ’jug lhan cig skyes | | dbyings rig dbyer med tha mal shes pa nyid | | gzhan stong zab mo’i lta ba yin zhes gsung | | des na rang stong gzhan stong zhes pa yang | | ’gal ba min zhes bdag gi bla ma bzhed | | 125 Theg pa chen po dbu ma rnam par nges pa’i bang mdzod lung dang rigs pa’i rgya mtsho, SCsb vol. 14. This work was written in 1477. 126 Chos kyi dbyings su bstod pa zhes bya ba’i bstan bcos kyi rnam par bshad pa chos kyi dbyings rnam par nges pa, SCsb vol. 7. This work, a commentary on the Dharmadhātustava, was written in 1479. 127 Komarovski 2011, 43. 128 Dreyfus 1979, 29 attributes Shākya mchog ldan’s shift from a typical Sa skya Rang stong position to his own distinctive Gzhan stong position to the period after Shākya mchog ldan had met with Karma pa Chos grags rgya mtsho for the first time. He also points out that Shākya mchog ldan’s Gzhan stong view differed from that of Dol po pa sherab rgyal mtshan (1292‒1361). 59 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN Mādhyamikas affirm the realization of the ultimate as stainless nondual wisdom, adding that this nondual wisdom eludes any kind of reasoning based on beliefs such as existence and nonexistence, or truth and falsity.129 Shākya mchog ldan claimed, perhaps most emphatically in his Mahāmudrā trilogy, that since both Rang stong and Gzhan stong depend on reasoning which is conceptual in nature, and since the nondual wisdom of dharmadhātu remains inaccessible to conceptual reflection and thematization, both approaches must ultimately be transcended. That said, the author is careful not to discount their effectiveness for those in the grip of mistaken perceptions and conceptions. In Replies to Queries of Rab dkar, he regards the Rang stong method of employing nonaffirming negation (med par dgag pa) in the phase of studying and thinking as a stepping stone on the path130 to the main practice of realizing unity (yuganaddha). In his Replies to Queries of Bshes gnyen mus pa rab ’byams, Shākya mchog ldan further explains that while the Gzhan stong and Alīkākāra views are relevant to the main practice phase (dngos gzhi) since they commonly endorse a conception of unity that is understood to be “without flaws of contradiction or conflation”, the Rang stong view falls short of the actual view (lta ba dngos) and thus pertains to the preliminary phase (sngon ’gro). Even if this Rang stong view proves indispensable while it is necessary to dispel the poison of total delusion, it is itself said to be “poisoned” in the sense of being conceptually-determined.131 Having explained the Rang stong view as preliminary in the phase of the view, the explanation of unity during the phase of the main practice is as follows. Since this [unity] which is also designated as being “without flaws of contradiction or conflation” is explained as something admissible in Gzhan stong, it is in accord with the Alīkākāra [system]. However, the preparation is said to be Rang stong because although it is not the actual view since it is poisoned [i.e. conceptually fabricated], one cannot do without it in the beginning because it is necessary to dispel the poison of total delusion. To give an example, to reach Vajrāsana [i.e., Bodhgāya, the seat of awakening], it is necessary to first get well-acquainted with the route.132 129 See Komarovski 2011, 74, 86, 172‒73. 130 Rab dkar gyi dris lan, SCsb(C) vol. 23, 4512‒4: “First, these [nonaffirming negation] are sought by means of studying and thinking.” dang po [= med par dgag pa] de dag ni thos bsam gyis btsal ba yin la | 131 See above, 31 et passim. 132 Bshes gnyen mus pa rab ’byams dris lan mthong ba don ldan gyi skor, SCsb(C) vol. 23, 4833‒4835: lta ba’i dus kyi sngon ’gro la rang stong gi lta ba bshad nas | dngos gzhi’i dus su zung ’jug bshad la | ’di yang ’gal ’dus skyon med ces pa’i ming can gzhan stong na chog cig la bshad pas rnam rdzun dang mthun la | sbyor ba rang stong du bzhed kyang | dug dang bcas pas lta ba dngos ma yin kyang thog mar mi dgos ka med yin te | kun tu rmongs pa’i dug sel dgos pa’i phyir | dper na rdo rje’i gdan du sleb pa la thog mar lam ngo shes dgos pa bzhin no | 60 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN As the analogy suggests, the Self-emptiness view may prove useful as a conceptual map to navigate one’s way toward the destination of awakening, but should not be confused with the actual view (lta ba dngos) which the author elsewhere characterizes as “the view grounded in first-hand experience that is the mainspring (gtso bo) of views” (lta ba’i gtso bor gyur pa nyams myong gi lta ba).133 What is at stake here is a difference between a philosophical “view” (lta ba : dṛṣti) in the sense of a doxographic belief-system to which one gives intellectual assent and a prephilosophical “de facto view” (lta ba dngos) grounded in the immediacy of lived experience. For Shākya mchog ldan, the task of the scholar-yogin is to ensure that one’s philosophical view does not lose touch with its prediscursive grounding in first-hand experience. It is precisely because the Gzhan stong and Alīkākāra views take the experience of unity as their point of origin and orientation in the main practice phase that they are deemed to be a step beyond the preliminary stage of negatively determining what is not the goal, namely all the speculations and misconceptions we have about it. It is evident from Shākya mchog ldan’s assessment of Self-emptiness and Otheremptiness that he thinks the Gzhan stong view brings one closer to the unity beyond extremes since it frankly acknowledges the transsubjective sources of morality and meaning that are the final aim of negation or affirmation. However, in his Mahāmudrā writings he argues that since both poles of the negation-affirmation dialectic remain within the horizon of oppositional yet reciprocally determined constructs, they are in this sense both “poisoned” from the vantage point of nondual wisdom, the Mahāmudrā of indivisible unity. On this view, Gzhan stong is accorded a preeminent position in the doxographical universe of exoteric Buddhist philosophical systems since it endorses a unity beyond extremes; yet it is relegated to the exoteric system of severing superimpositions from the perspective of the esoteric Mantra and Mahāmudrā systems of first-hand experience. We can discern in Shākya mchog ldan’s Mahāmudrā trilogy the extent to which his distinction between the preliminary phase of studying and thinking by means of the dialectic of Self-emptiness and Other-emptiness and the main practice of meditation which realizes the underlying unity turns out to be integral to his philosophical emphasis on the primacy of mahāmudrā and the nondual wisdom with which it is equated. Provocatively, he asserts that the realization of mahāmudrā does not necessarily depend either on preliminary methods of analysis according to Madhyamaka canons of reasoning, nor on the elaborate sequence of 133 In his Rab dkar gyi dris lan, SCsb(C) vol 23, 5114, Shākya mchog ldan uses the term “actual view” (lta ba dngos) or “view based on first-hand experience that is the mainspring of views” (lta ba’i gtso bor gyur pa nyams myong gi lta ba) to demarcate the view of studying and thinking from the view connected with meditating. See above, 48. 61 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN tantric rituals, empowerments, and visualizations, powerful as these may be in cases where such preliminary “purifications” are deemed to be necessary: Moreover, from among the two, the system of severing superimpositions and the system of first-hand experience, this tradition of the [Mahā]mudrā practitioner is the latter. Concerning the former, there are the two great traditions, the system of Self-emptiness and the system of Other-emptiness. However, the [Mahā]mudrā practitioner follows neither. The view of severing superimpositions by means of studying and thinking is taken [by him or her] to be an intellectually fabricated view and a poisoned view. As for the arising of the wisdom of mahāmudrā, it is not asserted that this must unequivocally depend on the bestowal of the higher empowerments, let alone on the logical reasoning of the Madhyamaka.134 The point could scarcely be stated more emphatically: as important and effective as Madhyamaka reasoning and tantric ritualism may be for clearing the myriad obscurations and obstacles that impede the realization of mahāmudrā, neither can be regarded as obligatory for all persons and situations. We will see the extent to which this contrasts with the views of Sa skya Paṇḍita who regarded the sequence of empowerments and mudrās as indispensable to mahāmudrā realization without exception. From Shākya mchog ldan’s perspective, individuals vary tremendously in their interests and abilities and, most importantly, in their relative capacities to recognize the nature of mind. Consequently, there is no single prescribed method of preparation, no master key that fits all the locks, so to say. As for the main practice (dngos gzhi) phase, what triggers the actual realization of mahāmudrā may have much more to do with situational affective and intersubjective dispositions such as devotion and faith (or confidence) than with any prescriptive course of intellectual or ritual preparation. As Shākya mchog ldan explains: “Devotion” means having confidence in the qualities of realization. When this has arisen, self-luminous self-awareness, which one has had since beginningless time, becomes manifest. The great bliss of self-luminous self-awareness has pervaded all [beings] from the very beginning. The different ways of awakening in line with individual capacities are not unequivocally determined.135 At this juncture, it may be helpful to take stock of Shākya mchog ldan’s views of Rang stong and Gzhan stong in relation to other classical and post-classical thinkers. We have seen 134 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 68, critical edition: 83. 135 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 24, critical edition: 33. 62 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN that Shākya mchog ldan accorded high status to the so-called Alīkākāravāda view and that he controversially came to regard it not only as a Gzhan stong view but also as a Madhyamaka tradition par excellence. Shākya mchog ldan’s inclusion of Alīkākāra in the ranks of Madhyamaka traditions did not go unchallenged by Bka’ brgyud pa scholars. As will be discussed in chapter three, the Eighth Karma pa Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507‒1554) devotes a substantial section of his Madhyamakāvatāra (MA) commentary and other writings to a criticism of this view. To summarize the main lines of his argument, he rejects Shākya mchog ldan’s identification of Alīkākāra with Madhyamaka, as well as his parallel claim that the distinction between Satyākāra and Alīkākāra—i.e., those who believe representations to be true or false, respectively—should be understood as a distinction between Cittamātra and Madhyamaka respectively. According to the Eighth Karma pa, both these claims stand in flagrant contradiction to accepted Buddhist doxography. He argues that the distinction between Satyākāra and Alīkākāra was introduced to demarcate between two strands of Cittamātra philosophy that both took as their doctrinal basis (gzhi) the claim that mind is truly established as ultimate (sems don dam bden grub par ’dod pa gzhir byas) and diverged only on the issue of whether they affirmed or denied the existence of (true) mental representations (rnam pa yod med). As for the basic distinction between Cittamātra and Madhyamaka, the Eighth Karma pa maintains that all lines of Cittamātra were said to have been decisively refuted and transcended by Madhyamaka philosophy, most decisively by the Apratiṣṭhānavāda Madhyamaka-Mahāmudrā system of Maitrīpa and his colleagues that combined the Madhyamaka system of Nāgārjuna with the Mahāmudrā instructions of Saraha and his followers.136 Coming to the nub of his criticism, he states that since the Madhyamaka tradition is by definition a “Middle Way” which avoids the extremes of existence and nonexistence, eternalism and nihilism, it is best characterized as a tradition which has transcended all realist positions, not least of all the Cittamātra viewpoint that mind or wisdom can be truly established as a real entity, and even as ultimate truth.137 Bearing in mind that Mi bskyod rdo rje does not go so far as to dismiss Cittamātra models of mind and reality (he makes liberal use of both in his writings), and that he was a strong proponent of the Maitreya texts, his Madhyamakāvatāra 136 See below, 291‒95. 137 Dwags po grub pa’i shing rta, 218‒11: “Mind Only adherents claim that the factor of mind, knowledge, awareness, intellect, special knowledge, and wisdom—[treated as] synonyms having the same meaning—has the characteristic of the perfect [nature], being a knowable object that is truly established as ultimate. However, if one posits the characteristic of a perfect [nature] as a knowable object in this way, one falls into the extremes of eternalism and nihilism. Hence those who relinquish extremes of eternalism and nihilism and advocate [a view which] has superceded that philosophical system are called Mādhyamikas.”sems tsam pas sems dang shes pa dang rig pa dang blo dang mkhyen pa dang ye shes don gcig ming gi rnam grangs pa zhig don dam bden par grub pa shes bya yongs grub kyi mtshan nyid can du ’dod la | shes bya yongs grub kyi mtshan nyid de ltar ’jog na rtag chad kyi mthar lhung bas rtag chad kyi mtha’ spangs te grub mtha’ de las phul du byung bar smra ba de dbu ma pa’o | | 63 S H ĀK Y A M C H OG LD AN commentary nonetheless leaves little doubt that he regards Madhyamaka, especially the *Prāsaṅgika Madhyamka of Nāgārjuna and Apratiṣṭhānavāda Madhyamaka system of Maitrīpa, as the pinnacle of Indian Buddhist philosophies and that, among these, he regards its expositions of emptiness as more lucid (ches gsal) than the rest. 138 Shākya mchog ldan for his part recognized that the *Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka method of ascertaining emptiness as a nonaffirming negation through conceptual analysis, which was fast becoming the default philosophical paradigm among his contemporaries, was endangering the necessary balance between negative-intellectual (cataphatic) and affirmative-experiential (apophatic) currents of Buddhist thought and praxis. His persistent concern about the privileging of an intellectual paradigm that systematically denied the validity and existence of the very modes of awareness (such as buddhajñāna) that had traditionally been regarded as the source and goal of the Buddhist path goes a long way toward accounting for his own endorsement of a cataphatic Gzhan stong approach to goalrealization that gives primacy to personally realized nondual wisdom. His position is well summarized by a statement in his Abhisamayālaṃkāra commentary (written at age seventyone) concerning the practice of deep insight (lhag mthong : vipaśyanā): “When the abiding mode as the aim of investigation is taken as a nonaffirming negation, it is designated as ‘a seeing that doesn’t see anything’, and when it is identified as the wisdom of emptiness, it is the ‘authentic unmediated seeing’ which is ‘personally realized wisdom’. 139 Put simply, the reconciliation and transcendence of the negative and positive determinations are both realized in the unity of nondual wisdom. In the polemically impassioned intellectual climate of his age, Shākya mchog ldan’s emphasis on recovering a unity beyond negative and positive determinations could not avoid sharp opposition from both sides of the spectrum. From one side, Rang stong *PrāsaṅgikaMadhyamaka proponents of emptiness as a nonaffirming negation rejected his Gzhan-stongoriented affirmation of nondual wisdom as Cittamātra-based hypostatization of the mental. 138 Dwags po grub pa’i shing rta, 416‒20: “The extensive doctrinal systems on emptiness, are found in the precious scriptures of the Madhyamaka and Cittamātra of Mahāyāna as well as in the countless tantras. But among all these, the vast range of teachings commentaries of the Madhyamaka are found to be far more lucid [than the rest] because, by teaching an emptiness that leaves behind not even the slightest remainder of discursive elaborations and characteristics, this tradition takes the emptiness that remains to be fully comprehensive in scope.” stong pa nyid kyi chos tshul rgyas pa ni theg chen dbu sems kyi gsung rab rin po che dang | rgyud sde mtha’ yas par bzhugs pa yin la | de’i nang nas kyang dbu ma’i bka’ bstan bcos mtha’ dag tu ches gsal bar bzhugs pa yin te | lugs ’dir spros mtshan gyi lhag ma cung zad kyang ma lus par stong nyid du bstan nas stong pa nyid kyi lus yongs su rdzogs par mdzad pa’i phyir | 139 Mngon par rtogs pa’i rgyan ’grel pa don gsal ba dang bcas pa’i rnam par bshad pa shing rta’i srol gnyis gcig tu bsdus pa’i lam po che, 1082‒3: “When the abiding mode that is the object of investigation is taken as a nonaffirming negation, it is designated as “a seeing that doesn’t see anything”. When it is identified as the wisdom of emptiness, it is an authentic direct seeing, which is the “personally realized wisdom”. rnam par brtags pa’i don gnas lugs med dgag la byas pa’i tshe | ci yang ma mthong ba la mthong ba’i ming gis btags pa dang | stong pa nyid kyi ye shes la ngos bzung ba’i tshe mngon sum du mthong ba mtshan nyid pa ste | so sor rang rig pa’i ye shes so | See Komarovski 2011, 271. 64 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN From the opposite side, Gzhan stong Jo nang proponents of a permanent metaphysical reality beyond temporality and dependent arising discounted his view of a momentary, impermanent wisdom, an idea we will examine shortly. To these opposed views we can add the criticisms of those such as the Eighth Karma pa Mi bskyod rdo rje who were certainly in sympathy with Shākya mchog ldan’s avoidance of eternalistic or nihilistic strains of Tibetan Buddhist thought but who would nonetheless allege that his anti-metaphysical critique did not go far enough since it still complied with the Cittamātra absolutization of the cognitive factor.140 We have seen that a cornerstone of Shākya mchog ldan’s philosophy is the view that the Rang stong ascertainment of the ultimate through reasoning that establishes emptiness as a nonaffirming negation should be regarded only as a preliminary method of eradicating reifications and should not be taken as an end in itself. To take the elimination of obscurations as the final goal is to absurdly preclude the blossoming of wisdom and qualities that such purification is supposed to enable, at least according to tantric, Tathāgatagarbha and Siddha traditions. In Shākya mchog ldan’s word’s, “In the classical texts of the Niḥsvabhāvavāda, it is asserted that all phenomena are empty of an own-essence and that settling one-pointedly in this emptiness is wisdom. I would say this is like calling a mother a ‘barren woman’.”141 The analogy is clear: to regard the wisdom of goal-realization as a sheer absence (nothing whatsoever) misses out on its naturally occuring fecundity and dynamism. It should be clear by now that the author’s assessment of the Gzhan stong position is more complex and nuanced than his account of Rang stong. On the one hand, he approved of Gzhan stong’s positive appraisal of the ultimate, but on the other hand, rejected the tendency among its most influential proponents toward the extreme of existence or absolutism. In this regard, he was inclined, particularly in his Mahāmudrā works, to parameterize both Rang stong and Gzhan stong as dialectical positions to be transcended. To better understand this critical stance toward Gzhan stong, it may be useful to consider how he diverged from the most influential Gzhan stong paradigm of his day, that of the Jo nang system.142 The principal points of divergence are discernable in his accounts of the Yogācāra theory of three natures (trisvabhāva) and the general Buddhist theory of two truths (satyadvaya). THE THREE NATURES (TRISVABHĀVA) In line with the trisvabhāva theory as presented in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (MS) and Madhyāntavibhāga (MAV), Shākya mchog ldan maintains that the dependent (paratantra) 140 Mi bskyod rdo rje’s arguments are summarized below, 287 f. 141 PCgn, see Volume II, translation: 40, critical edition: 46. 142 See Mathes 2004 for an illuminating comparison between the buddha nature interpretations of Dol po pa and Shākya mchog ldan. 65 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN nature is empty of the imagined (parakalpita) nature is the perfect (pariniṣpanna) nature. The object of refutation (dgag bya) is thus the imagined nature, or dualistic appearances, corresponding to the basis of negation according to the Niḥsvabhāvavāda view that conventional phenomena are nonarisen and thus self-empty. The basis of negation of emptiness is the dependent nature in which dualistic appearances operate, and the way in which this is empty of the imagined is the other-emptiness which constitutes the perfect nature or the absolute. However, the view of Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan (1292‒1361), which reflects more closely the Tathāgatagarbha theory as presented for example in the Bṛhaṭṭīkā, defines the perfect nature as the emptiness of the imagined and dependent natures.143 The difference between these two models is that the Yogācāra system distinguishes three natures, whereas the Jo nang Tathāgatagarbha model only discerns the perfect and the imagined nature. On this view, since the dependent nature is included in the object of refutation (dgag bya), there is in the final analysis no difference between the imagined and dependent natures.144 Shākya mchog ldan rejects the Jo nang model both on doxographical and logical grounds. As for the first, the Jo nang explanation of the perfect nature as the basis of negation and of the other two natures as the object of negation does not reflect the central Yogācāra view since it collapses the imagined and dependent natures into a single object of refutation and hence ends up being a two nature theory. As for the logical reason for rejecting the Jo nang model, Shākya mchog ldan argues that it relies on an invalid syllogism. According to Buddhist logic, a syllogism must have a subject (dharmin), a probandum or predicate to be proven (sādhyadharma), and a reason (liṅga). To take the classic example, in proving the thesis “sound is impermanent”, one must first establish the subject ‘sound’, then the predicate to be proven ‘impermanent’, and the reason ‘because it is produced’. One mark of an invalid syllogism is to import the probandum into the subject, e.g., “impermanent sound” and take that as the starting point; the proof is illegitimately included in the subject of the proof, thus presupposing what is supposed to be proven. This is considered to be the flaw in Dol po pa’s thesis that the perfect nature is empty of the imagined and dependent natures. By taking the perfect nature as the basis of emptiness (stong gzhi), Dol po pa establishes the subject (perfect nature) and the predicate to be proven (empty of imagined and dependent natures) at the same time, thus accepting in advance what the syllogism is supposed to establish. In Shākya mchog ldan’s words: “As for invalidating [this thesis]: if the reasoning that establishes emptiness has to establish emptiness of the imagined and dependent [natures] at the same time as the perfect [nature], which is the subject [of the syllogism], then it absurdly follows that the predicate to be proven [probandum] is 143 Komarovski 2011, 128‒29 and n. 57, 351. 144 Interestingly, this is similar to Candrakīrti’s view on the three natures in Madhyamakāvarabhāṣya on MA VI.96 66 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN already established at the time of determining the subject which is the basis of the argument. On the other hand, there could exist a correct reasoning which establishes the probandum without [pre]determining the subject, which is the basis of the argument.”145 In other words, one could establish the emptiness of the dependent and imagined nature without presupposing in advance a metaphysical ground (of emptiness) that is empty of these. This seems difficult to reconcile with the standard Tathāgatagarbha formulation that buddha nature is empty of adventitious stains. Yet, as Shākya mchog ldan argues on the basis of the Yogācāra theory of the three natures, it is not appropriate to interpret the dependent nature as self-empty, because its nature is the perfect nature which is other-empty.146 Hence, he maintains that while the dependent nature, consisting in states of mind in which dualistic appearances operate, are unreal and nonexistent, they do not lack an own nature, because their actual nature is the perfect nature. Denying their actual nature is thus tantamount to a denial of the perfect nature and is therefore at odds with the basic Gzhan stong position.147 In his One Hundred and Eight Dharmas, Shākya mchog ldan starts with the Cittamātra premise that all appearances are nothing but consciousness. The perfect nature which is the essence of consciousness in turn ‘seals’ all phenomena. Maitreya in this way considers the perfect nature to be the basis for all qualities. 148 We have given some idea of the extent to which Shākya mchog ldan’s Gzhan stong Madhyamaka-based account of the three natures diverged from that of Dol po pa. A number of parallel differences are discernable in his assessment of Gzhan stong and Rang stong views concerning the two truths. THE TWO TRUTHS (SATYADVAYA) While Dol po pa draws a clear line between conventional and ultimate truth, and between consciousness and wisdom, characterizing them as polar opposites like darkness and light, nectar and poison, or two different great kingdoms149, Shākya mchog ldan emphasizes 145 See Komarovski 2011, 353, n. 74: gnod byed ni stong nyid sgrub byed kyi rigs pas chos can yongs grub kyi steng du dgag chos kun btags dang gzhan dbang gis stong par sgrub dgos na rtsod gzhi’i chos can nges pa’i dus su bsgrub bya grub zin par thal ba dang | yang na rtsod gzhi’i chos can ma nges par bsgrub bya sgrub pa’i gtan tshigs yang dag srid par ’gyur ro | (translation our own) 146 Komarovski 2011, 134, and n. 75, 353. 147 Komarovski 2011, 134. 148 Chos tshan brgya dang brgyad, SCsb(B) vol. 13, 3066‒3071: “All appearances do not exist as something other than consciousness [and] the essence of consciousness is the perfect nature by which all objects of knowledge are sealed. Maitreya, [thus] considers the perfect nature itself to be the basis of all qualities ....” snang ba kun | | rnam rig tsam las gzhan yod min | | rnam rig ngo bo yongs grub kyis | | shes bya kun la rgyas ’debs byed | | rje btsun byams pas yongs grub nyid | | yon tan kun gyi rten yin par | | dgongs nas … 149 See Stearns 2010, 106‒10. 67 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN that the two truths or realities and their associated modes of cognition are neither the same nor different. For them to be the same or different they would each have to possess an intrinsic essence (rang gi ngo bo : svabhāva), an individuating principle that makes them what they are: “Conventional [phenomena] are self-empty (rang stong) and thus without essence, while the ultimate truth does not exist as a real existent and hence is [likewise] without essence.” 150 In this regard, he rejects the Dge lugs pa theory that the two truths are “two delimitations of a single essence” (ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad), that the conventional and ultimate truths inhere separately in one and the same object. As he explains, “‘delimitation’ (ldog pa) is synonymous with ‘other-exclusion’ (gzhan sel : anyāpoha)... [and] to that extent, a sprout and its ultimate reality are not established as different.”151 To put it simply, although conceptions of conventional and ultimate truth are arrived at through conceptual delimitation—excluding in each case what they are not—there is no intrinsic difference between conventional phenomena and their ultimate nature. They are both equally devoid of intrinsic essence. Shākya mchog ldan also rejects the opposite Jo nang thesis that the two truths consists in a “difference that negates identity” (gcig pa bkag pa’i tha dad), that the two truths represent separate spheres or “great kingdoms” (rgyal khams chen po) that have “nothing to do with each other” (Jo nang pa).152 Against this view, and in line with well-known arguments against identity and difference advanced in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra (SNS), he contends that if the two truths were different, it would absurdly follow that [1] the ultimate truth would not be the true nature of the conventional, [2] superimpositions would not be eradicated when the ultimate is realized, [3] that which is not found by analyzing the conventional is not ultimate truth, and [4] afflictions and purifications would be simultaneous. As for the identity thesis, he argues that it would entail the four absurdities that [1] when the conventional is seen, the ultimate is seen as well, [2] just as afflictions increase when one focuses on the conventional, they would likewise do so when one focuses on the ultimate, [2] there would be no ultimate to seek apart from the conventional, and [4] just as the conventional is discursive (spros bcas), the ultimate would be discursive as well.153 To validate his conception of a middle path that 150 Dbu ma rnam par nges pa’i chos kyi dbang mdzod lung dang rigs pa’i rgya mtsho, SCsb(A) vol. 15, 313: kun rdzob rnams ni rang stong yin pas ngo bo med la | don dam pa’i bden pa ni dngos por med pa’i phyir | ngo bo med do | 151 Ibid., SCsb(A) vol. 15, 324‒325: ldog pa zhes pa ni gzhan sel gyi ming gi rnam grangs yin la | … de tsam gyis myu gu dang de’i don dam bden pa tha dad du mi ’grub ste | … 152 For Bka’ brgyud refutations of the Dge lugs and Jo nang versions of these theories, see Mi bskyod rdo rje’s Dwags brgyud grub pa’i shing rta, 27612 ff. and 2922 ff. and below, 311 f. For Padma dkar po’s criticisms of these traditions, see below, 385 f. 153 See Dbu ma rnam par nges pa’i chos kyi dbang mdzod lung dang rigs pa’i rgya mtsho, SCsb(A) vol. 15, 336‒ 342 where Shākya mchog ldan summarizes arguments from the SNS: “Difference and identity each entail four fallacies. Regarding the first, it would absurdly follow that [1] the ultimate truth would not be the true nature of the conventional, [2] superimpositions would not be eradicated when the ultimate is realized, [3] that which is not found by analyzing the conventional is not ultimate truth, and [4] afflictions and purifications would be 68 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN avoids extremes of identity and difference, he quotes a passage from the SNS which states that “the characteristic of the conditioned realm and ultimate truth is the characteristic of being free from identity and difference. Those who conceive of them as either the same or different have succumbed to unfounded [speculation].”154 In his late commentary on the definitive meaning of the Ratnagotravibhāga, Shākya mchog ldan argues that consciousness is not validly established and hence does not exist, although it is postulated as existing on the basis of delusion.155 In this regard, he maintains that consciousness which deals with conventional phenomena and wisdom which cognizes the ultimate are radically different. Yet in his view, although they are incommensurable, having no common denominator (gzhi mthun), and are as distinct from one another as clouds and the sky or patina and gold156, they are nonetheless discernable as concurrent and interactive modes of cognition; each instance of consciousness is said to have an inwardoriented aspect of wisdom, even though “it is impossible for the clarity factor of wisdom to become the essence of consciousness and vice versa”: Among the whole spectrum of delusory phenomena of consciousness, each instance has the factor of inward-looking wisdom. However, it is impossible for the clarity factor of wisdom to become the essence of consciousness, and vice versa. Otherwise, it would absurdly follow that wisdom is the experiencer of joys and sorrows of worldly existence. It would also absurdly follow that those unreal reifications that are named “consciousness” are the basis of accomplishing the full simultaneous. Four fallacies are [likewise] ascribed to identity: It would absurdly follow that: [1] when the conventional is seen, the ultimate is seen as well; [2] just as afflictions increase when one focuses on the conventional, they would likewise do so when one focuses on the ultimate; [2] there would be no ultimate to search for apart from the conventional and [4] just as the conventional is has discursive elaborations, the ultimate would have elaborations as well.” tha dad pa la skyon bzhi | gcig pa la skyon bzhi | dang po ni | don dam bden pa kun rdzob kyi chos nyid ma yin par thal ba dang | don dam rtogs pas snang pa la sgro ’dogs mi chod par thal ba | kun rdzob rigs pas ma rnyed pa nyid don dam ma yin par thal ba | kun nas nyon mongs pa dang rnam par byang ba dus gcig tu thal pa’o | | gcig pa la brjod pa’i skyon bzhi ni | kun rdzob mthong ba na don dam mthong par ’gyur ba dang | kun rdzob la dmigs nas nyon mongs ’phel ba bzhin du don dam la dmigs nas kyang der ’gyur ba dang | kun rdzob las logs su don dam btsal du med par ’gyur ba dang | kun rdzob spros bcas yin pa bzhin du don dam yang spros bcas su thal ba rnams so | | 154 Dbu ma rnam par nges pa’i chos kyi dbang mdzod lung dang rigs pa’i rgya mtsho, SCsb(A) vol. 15, 335‒6: gnyis pa lung gi sgrub byed ni | mdo sde dgongs ’grel las | ’du byed khams dang don dam mtshan nyid ni | | gcig dang tha dad bral ba’i mtshan nyid do | | gcig dang tha dad nyid du gang rtog pa | | de dag tshul bzhin ma yin zhug pa yin | | zhes gsungs so | See also Lamotte (ed.) 1935, 47. See also Mathes 2008, 79 and n. 420. 155 Rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos kyi nges don sngon med nyi ma, SCsb(A) vol. 13, 1216‒1221: “In general, even though consciousness is not validly established, it is accorded the superimposition of existence on account of delusion. So there is no need to even speak about awareness for it is not accorded existence [at all] because it is precisely conventional truth.” spyir rnam shes ni tshad mas mi ’grub kyang | ’khrul pas yod par sgro btags pa nyid du khas len gyi | rig pa lta ci smos | yod par kyang khas mi len te | kun rdzob bden pa nyid kyi phyir ro | 156 Although patina (oxidation) does not occur on pure gold, it may form on alloys. 69 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN range of immaculate qualities. In the absence of primordial wisdom, adventitious consciousness does not arise as delusory appearances. Nonetheless, the possibility of a common ground of these two is not accepted because they are similar to clouds in the sky, patina on gold, and turbidity in clear water. 157 We may conclude that consciousness and wisdom are concurrent but nonconvergent modes of cognition; they do not blend with one another. As the author here intimates, they stand to one another in a relationship of asymmetrical ontological priority according to which wisdom is the condition of possibility of consciousness but not the reverse. Each instance of consciousness has within it the clarity aspect of wisdom which, however, does not partake of the nature of consciousness. This account reflects the Alīkākāravāda emphasis on the primacy of nondual wisdom within the framework of consciousness. The acuteness of the distinction between them also resonates to some extent with the Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā differentiation between consciousness and wisdom, though the Eighth Karma pa Mi bskyod rdo rje, as we will later see, accused Shākya mchog ldan’ and his disciples of inconsistency in this regard. The Karma pa objects that whereas Shākya mchog ldan claims in his Cakrasaṃvara Commentary that consciousness arises as the clarity factor of wisdom, his disciple Paṇ chen Rdo rje rgyal ba conversely claims that wisdom arises as the clarity factor of consciousness. 158 The sharpness of the distinction between wisdom and consciousness also invites comparison with the Jo nang view that posits the two as mutually exclusive, the former being truly established, permanent, ultimate, and beyond dependent rising and the three times (past, present and future)159 and the latter being adventitious, impermanent, conventional, and 157 Rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos kyi nges don snon med nyi ma, SCsb vol. 13(A), 121: rnam shes ’khrul pa’i chos ji snyeda pa la nang blta ye shes kyi cha re re yod kyang | ye shes kyi gsal cha rnam shes kyi ngo bor ’gyur srid pa dang cig shos kyang der ’gyur srid pa ni ma yin te gzhan du na | ye shes srid pa’i bde sdug myong ba por thal ba dang | rnam shes kyi ming can yang dag pa ma yin pa’i kun tu rtog pa de dag zag med kyi yon tan mtha’ dag gi sgrub gzhi nyid du thal bar ’gyur pa’i phyir ro | | gdod ma’i ye shes de med par glo bur gyi rnam shes ’khrul snang du mi ’byung mod | gnyis po’i gzhi mthun srid par ’dod pa ni ma yin te | nam mkha’ la sprin dang | gser la g.ya’ dang | chu dangs ba la rnyog pa bzhin no | atext has nyid See Komarovski 2011, 239‒40. (translation our own) 158 See below, 297‒300, where Mi bskyod rdo rje assesses various mutually contradictory positions on the consciousness and wisdom relationship by Shākya mchog ldan and his disciples. A note on the relevant section of Mi bskyod rdo rje’s Rgan po’i rlung sman adds that “the teacher Shākya mchog ldan had asserted in his Cakrasaṃvara Commentary (Bde mchog rnam bshad) that consciousness (rnam shes) arises as the clarity factor (dvangs cha) of wisdom whereas his student Paṇ chen Rdo rgyal ba (a.k.a. Rdo rje rgyal mtshan, b. 15 th c.) asserted that wisdom is the clarity factor of consciousness. “Hence, the positions subscribed to by these two, master and disciple, are [as] opposed as East and West.” bla ma paṇ chen śaka mchog pas ni bde mchog gi rnam bshad du ye shes kyi dvangs cha la rnam shes ’char ba dang | bla ma paṇ chen rdor rgyal ba ni rnam shes kyi dvangs cha ye shes su smra ’dug pas | dpon slob gnyis kha ltar phyogs shar nub ’dzol ’dug go | | 159 See for example Tāranātha’s Zab don nyer gcig pa, Collected Works vol. 18, 2133‒4: “[Opponent:] It is said that nondual wisdom is momentary awareness, i.e., it is not permanent, and without any possibility for abiding. [Tāranātha:] That [wisdom] is not momentary. Since it is beyond the three times [past, present and future] it is 70 S H ĀK Y A M C H OG LD AN dependently arisen and time-bound.160 A key point of divergence, however, lies in Shākya mchog ldan’s contention (examined below) that wisdom is momentary and also impermanent in the specific sense that only the present moment can be said to exist but this is “instantaneously disintegrating”. Thus wisdom is in Shākya mchog ldan’s eyes not permanent and certainly not atemporal since it is itself simply the streaming present. All that said, wisdom is, in Shākya mchog ldan’s view unconditioned in that it shares no common ground with karma and the afflictions, and given that moments are not triggered by any causes and conditions independent of mind’s nature. It may be concluded that he on the one hand grants that wisdom must be accepted as impermanent on the ultimate level because as a real existent (dngos po) it is instantaneously disintegrating (skad cig gyis ’jig pa). Yet, he can on the other hand maintain that wisdom may conventionally be taken as permanent in the specific sense of having ‘continuity’ (rgyun) with the proviso that this is only a conventional designation, used, in contradistinction to impermanence, to ascribe permanence to a real existent such as wisdom whose continuity is uninterrupted (rgyun mi ’chad pa yi dngos po).161 Holding to a middle path that avoids interpreting the two truths as the same or different, Shākya mchog ldan arrives at the central philosophy of Buddhist tantrism and the Dwags po Mahāmudrā tradition: the inseparable unity of the conventional and ultimate. In the context of Sa skya Lam ’bras and Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā practices, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, and the conventional and ultimate truths are found to be inseparable. In his Discussions in the Presence of Mkha’ spyod dbang po addressed to the Fourth Zhwa dmar Chos grags ye shes (1453‒1542),162 Shākya mchog ldan proclaims that Sgam po pa’s Mahāmudrā and Sa skya tantric Lam ’bras teachings commonly emphasize the inseparability of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa: Here on this Snowy Plateau, the indistinguishability of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa which is emphasized by the Sa skya pas and the Mahāmudrā of Zla ’od gzhon nu [Sgam po pa] are the same in meaning despite being given different names. The object of realization (rtogs bya) is the unity of clarity and emptiness, the process of realization (rtogs byed) is realization through empowerment rituals and the Bla ma’s blessings… In short, because there are no other phenomena besides the lucid awareness—an experience that is empty of all concepts—this ‘Seal’ (phyag rgya : mudrā) is described as “Great” (chen po : mahā). When not realized, there is permanent and lasting.” gnyis med ye shes de rig pa skad cig ma yin | rtag pa min | gnas pa’i go skabs med pa cig yin gsung | de skad cig ma ma yin | dus gsum las grol bas rtag pa brtan pa yin gsung | 160 See Padma dkar po’s synopsis of this system in Volume II, translation: 157‒69. 161 Komarovski 2011, 231 and 380, n. 38. 162 Mkha’ spyod dbang po’i spyan drung du ’bul ba’i mol mchid, SCsb(B) vol. 17, 5244: ces chos rjes zhwa dmar pa’i ka’ shog gi lan du phul ba’o | 71 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN saṃsāra, and when realized, there is nirvāṇa. Because one does not observe anything apart from these, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are inseparable.163 In a reply to queries by Bshes gnyen Mus pa rab ’byams, he expresses the view most succinctly by stating that “in the main practice phase, the view is characterized as ‘unity’”.164 We are now in a position to look more closely at how Shākya mchog ldan frames the Rang stong and Gzhan stong positions in relation to the Dwags po Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā views and meditation. It is clear that he regarded the Mahāmudrā tradition’s emphasis on firsthand experience (nyams myong) and direct perception (mngon sum) as a decisive step beyond the more theory-bound Rang stong and Gzhan stong positions, which tended to be, at least when appropriated as oppositional doxographical categories, mutually implicated in a dialectic of denial or affirmation. By contrast, the Mahāmudrā tradition is seen as a path beyond affirmation and negation, existence and nonexistence. According to Shākya mchog ldan’s Undermining the Haughtiness, Sgam po pa taught a view that did not take Nāgārjuna’s method of severing elaborations or Asaṅga’s method of ending dualistic thoughts as compulsory for the most suitable recipient. Moreover, he cautions that a Mantrayāna attainment of mahāmudrā unsupported by the genuine experience of self-luminous self-awareness runs the risk of deviation (gol sa). As he explains: If one does not arrive at a genuine experience of self-luminous self-awareness, which is of definitive meaning, and realizes mahāmudrā based on the Mantra[yāna], there is the danger of falling into deviations. Thus, when mahāmudrā, which is the pervasive factor that runs through everything, is realized as [explained] previously, one should examine whether the realization of it is stable or unstable. When it is unstable, it is not incongruous to familiarize oneself with the methods of ending dualistic [thoughts and] discursive elaborations as taught by the two charioteers [Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga]. However, those with diligence who have the inclination to leave behind these very [methods] which [they already] understood previously may correctly familiarize themselves [with mind’s true nature in meditation] and familiarize themselves with the state of not grasping 163 Mkha’ spyod dbang po’i spyan drung du ’bul ba’i mol mchid, SCsb(C) vol. 17, 6294‒6301: gangs can ljong ’dir sa skya pas | | rtsal bton ’khor ’das dbyer med dang | | zla ’od gzhon nu’i phyag rgya che | | ming ’dogs ma gtogs don gcig nyid | | rtogs bya gsal stong zung ’jug de | | rtogs byed dbang gi cho ga dang | | bla ma’i byin brlabs kyis rtogs pa’o | | … | | mdor na rtog pa thams cad kyis | | stong pa’i myong ba gsal rig tsam | | ma gtogs chos gzhan med pa’i phyir | | phyag rgya ’di nyid chen por brjod | | ma rtogs tshe na ’khor ba dang | | rtogs tshe mya ngan ’das pa yang | | ’di las gzhan pa ma dmigs phyir | | ’khor ’das dbye ba med de yin | | 164 Bshes gnyen mus pa rab ’byams dris lan mthong ba don ldan gyi skor, SCsb(C) vol 23, 4833: lta ba … | dngos gzhi’i dus su zung ’jug bshad la | 72 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN things by means of concepts the appearances of manifold dependent arising in post-meditation. That is said to be the main point of this [Dwags po Mahāmudrā] teaching.165 With regard to the Rang stong or Niḥsvabhāvavāda Madhyamaka system, it would be a serious error in Shākya mchog ldan’s eyes to either identify the nonaffirming negation of not finding anything upon analysis as mahāmudrā itself or to promote it as a necessary ‘upgrade’ to the Mahāmudrā view. This would contradict both the Ratnagotravibhāga and Saraha. “If you claim that mahāmudrā is a nonaffirming negation [deduced by] not finding anything by searching, this contradicts the Uttaratantra scripture as well as the works of Saraha. When the searching consciousness has not found anything by means of reasoning, the wisdom that is left behind as the remainder is identified as mahāmudrā.”166 Shākya mchog ldan elsewhere maintains that the very idea of unity—a cornerstone of the Dwags po Mahāmudrā teachings—is not attested within the orthodox Rang stong tradition, but rather had its inception in the Gzhan stong system. He adds that the luminosity taught in the Pañcakrama is also not in line with the Rang stong approach, nor is this tantra’s claim that adamantine nature of mind is of definitive meaning.167 It is in view of such considerations that Shākya mchog ldan aligns the Dwags po Mahāmudrā more closely with the Gzhan stong than the Rang stong tradition. That said, he does, in another Mahāmudrā text, grant that although what is experienced as a result of the Niḥsvabhāvavāda Madhyamaka is not in accord with the root Mahāmudrā scriptures, “it is nonetheless acceptable to ascribe the ‘ascertainment of freedom from extremes leading to assimilation as unity’ explained in that [system] to this Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā tradition”.168 As for the Gzhan stong- or Alīkākāravāda Madhyamaka approach, emptiness is seen as the real (i.e. efficacious) existent of an affirming negation (ma yin par dgags pa’i dngos po) and can therefore be experienced directly in meditation. 169 Yet, this Gzhan stong 165 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 16, critical edition: 28. 166 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 26, critical edition: 34. 167 Sgom chen ye shes bzang po’i dris lan lta ba so so’i ngos ’dzin tshul nges don gnad kyi lde mig, SCsb(A) vol. 23, 1044‒5: “In brief, within the orthodox (lhad med) Rang stong, the designation “unity” does not exist. Unity has its inception in the Gzhan stong system. Moreover the luminosity in the Five Stages (Pañcakrama) cannot be explained in line with the Rang stong texts. That which is the “vajra of mind” is explained in that [Pañcakrama] as being of definitive meaning.” mdor na rang stong lhad med la | zung ’jug zhes bya’i tha snyad med | | zung ’jug gzhan stong lugs las ’byung | | rim lnga pa yi ’od gsal yang | | rang stong gzhung bzhin ’chad mi nus | | sems kyi rdo rje gang yin pa | | de la nges pa’i don du bshad | | 168 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 51, critical edition: 74. 169 Komarovski 2011, 178. 73 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN Madhyamaka approach falls short of the Dwags po Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā as well170 since it requires the analytical steps of establishing the lack of intrinsic essence of outer objects, determining them to be but appearances of mind, and establishing that the inner apprehender (subject) doesn’t have any basis either. It now becomes understandable why Shākya mchog ldan assigns Gzhan stong a lower position in his Dwags po Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā writings than in his other writings where he is more inclined to regard it as an experience-based meditation practice that is fully in line with the goal of unity of appearance and emptiness. From the Mahāmudrā perspective, the reasoning that establishes an absolute which is empty of the adventitious obscurations but not empty of buddha qualities has the clear advantage of endorsing a positive appraisal of the ultimate that draws attention to the actual dynamism and fecundity of lived experience in its most originary condition. Yet it stops short of the experience itself since the conceptual methods it employs keep it locked into a dialectic of reciprocal negation with those of the Rang stong position. In sum, it is evident that although Shākya mchog ldan was inclined, in some of his Buddhist philosophical writings, to treat Niḥsvabhāvavāda and the Alīkākāravāda on relatively equal terms, as self-sufficient philosophical tenets leading to an ultimate realization that is beyond the conceptual formulations of these tenets,171 there are clear indications that Shākya mchog ldan elsewhere, and perhaps most markedly in his Mahāmudrā works, not only ranked the affirmative Alīkākāravāda Madhyamaka higher than the negative Niḥsvabhāvavāda Madhyamaka but also framed both as stepping stones on the path of preliminary philosophical therapeutics to a higher unity that transcends the negative-affirmative dialectic altogether. Let us now turn our attention to Shākya mchog ldan’s position regarding the relationship between buddha nature and Mahāmudrā and then look at the complex views of buddha nature out of which this position evolved. MAHĀMUDRĀ AND BUDDHA NATURE For Shākya mchog ldan, Mahāmudrā and Tathāgatagarbha discourses similarly build on the premise that the nature of mind or buddha nature is both the condi