Also by Jeffrey Hopkins
Emptiness Yoga
The Tantric Distinction
Tibetan Arts of Love
The Dalai Lama at Harvard with the Dalai Lama
Deity Yoga with the Dalai Lama
The Kalachakra Tantra: Rite of Initiation for the Stage of Generation with
the Dalai Lama
Kindness, Clarity, and Insight with the Dalai Lama
The Meaning of Life From a Buddhist Perspective with the Dalai Lama
Tantra in Tibet with the Dalai Lama
The Buddhism of Tibet and the Key to the Middle Way with Lati Rimpoche
Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism with Kensur Ngawang Lekden
Cutting Through Appearances with Geshe Lhundup Sopa
Death, Intermediate State, and Rebirth in Tibetan Buddhism with Lati
Rinbochay
Fluent Tibetan: A Proficiency Oriented Learning System, Novice and
Intermediate Levels with William Magee and Elizabeth Napper
Health Through Balance: An Introduction to Tibetan Medicine with
Dr. Yeshi Donden
Meditative States in Tibetan Buddhism with Lati Rinbochay, Locho
Rinbochay, and Leah Zahler
The Precious Garland and the Song of the Four Mindfulnesses with
Lati Rimpoche
Tantric Practice in Nyingma with Khetsun Sangpo Rinbochay
Walking Through Walls: A Tibetan Presentation of Calming Meditation
with Geshe Gediin Lodro
Wisdom Publications
199 Elm Street
Somerville, Massachusetts 0 2 1 4 4 USA
First published in 1983
This revised edition, 1996
© Jeffrey Hopkins 1983,1996
A L L RIGHTS RESERVED.
No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any means,
electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information
storage and retrieval system or technologies now known or later developed,
without permission in writing from the publisher.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Hopkins, Jeffrey
Meditation on emptiness / Jeffrey Hopkins ; assistant editor,
Elizabeth Napper. —Rev. ed.
p.
cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-86171-110-6 (alk. paper)
1. Prasangika.
2. Sunyata.
3. Meditation—Buddhism.
BQ7477.H676 1996
294.3'4—dc20
95-25827
ISBN 0 86171 110 6
1 1 10 09 08 07
8 7 6 5
Cover design by:
LJ-Sawlit
Cover Art: Nagarjuna Thangka (B67D22), courtesy of Asian Art Museum of
San Francisco, the Avery Brundage Collection.
Wisdom Publications' books are printed on acid-free paper and meet the guidelines for
permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity
of the Council on Library Resources.
Printed in the United States of America.
Contents
List of Illustrations 7
Introduction 9
Technical Note 19
List of Abbreviations 23
Acknowledgements 25
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
P A R T ONE: M E D I T A T I O N 27
Purpose and Motivation 29
Self: The Opposite of Selflessness 35
Meditation: Identifying Self 43
Meditative Investigation 47
Dependent-Arising 53
Diamond Slivers 57
Realization 61
Calm Abiding 67
Special Insight 91
Tantra 111
Buddhahood 117
PART TWO: REASONING INTO REALITY
Introduction 127
1 T h e Diamond Slivers 131
2 The Four Extremes 151
125
3
4
5
The Four Alternatives 155
Dependent-Arising 161
Refuting a Self of Persons 175
PART THREE: T H E BUDDHIST WORLD
Introduction 199
1 The Selfless 213
2 Dependent-Arising of Cyclic Existence 275
3 The Four Noble Truths 285
1
2
3
4
5
6
197
P A R T F O U R : S Y S T E M S 305
Self 307
Non-Buddhist Systems 317
Hlnyana 335
History of the Mahayana 353
Chittamatra 365
Madhyamika 399
PART FIVE: PRASANGIKA-MADHYAMIKA
1 The Prasangika School 431
2 Debate 441
3 Bhavaviveka's Criticism of Buddhapalita 455
4 Chandraklrti's Defense of Buddhapalita 469
5 Chandraklrti's Refutation of Bhavaviveka 499
6 Prasangika in Tibet 531
7 Validation of Phenomena 539
8 Meditative Reasoning 549
429
PART SIX: TRANSLATION: E M P T I N E S S IN T H E
P R A S A N G I K A S Y S T E M 561
Introduction 563
Contents 581
1 Background 583
2 Interpretation of Scripture 595
3 T h e Object of Negation 625
4 Refuting Inherently Existent Production 639
5 Other Types of Production 651
6 Dependent-Arising 659
7 Refuting a Self of Persons 677
A P P E N D I C E S 699
1 Types of Awareness 701
2 Other Interpretations of Dependent-Arising 707
3 Modes of Division of the Vaibhashika Schools 713
4 Negatives 721
5 Proof Statements 729
Glossary 735
Bibliography 755
Notes 793
Tibetan Text 907
Emendations to the Tibetan Text
List of Charts 979
Index 981
967
PUBLISHER'S ACKNOWLEDGMENT
T h e P u b l i s h e r g r a t e f u l l y a c k n o w l e d g e s the g e n e r o u s
help of the Hershey Family Foundation in sponsoring
the production of this book.
List of Illustrations
zyvutsrponmlkjihgfedcbaVTSPNMKJDCBA
Manjushrf 8
Krakuchchhanda 28
Kanakamuni 42
Kashyapa 60
Shâkyamuni 116
Nâgârjuna 130
Âryadeva 198
Buddhapâlita 284
Bhâvaviveka 316
Chandrakirti 352
Asanga 398
Vasubandhu 440
Dignâga 454
Dharmakirti 548
Shântarakshita 580
Padmasambhava 624
Aiïsha 700
Thu-mi-sam-bho-ta 728
Mar-ba 794
Sa-gya Pandita Jam-yang-gun-ga-gyel-tsen
Dzong-ka-ba 982
908
Introduction
Homage to Manjushrf.
Emptiness is the very heart of Buddhist practice in Tibet. In
tantra even the visualized gods, goddesses, channels, suns,
moons, and so forth are qualified by emptiness. Without an
understanding of emptiness the practice of Buddhism, be it sutra
or tantra, cannot be complete.
Emptiness is explained in different ways by the four Buddhist
schools of tenets: Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, Chittamatra, and
Madhyamika. The Madhyamika view and, within the division
of Madhyamika into Svatantrika and Prasangika, the Prasangika
view form the basis for the transformational psychology of
tantra. Thus, this book on Prasangika-Madhyamika is written
with the intent of presenting not only what emptiness is but also
how emptiness is realized in meditation, so that emptiness may
become more than a concept of abstract philosophy.
Phenomena are empty of a certain mode of being called 'inherent existence', 'objective existence', or 'natural existence'. This
'inherent existence' is not a concept superimposed by philosophical systems but refers to our ordinary sense of the way that
things exist—as if they concretely exist in and of themselves,
covering their parts. Phenomena are the things which are empty
10
Meditation on Emptiness
of inherent existence, and inherent existence is that of which
phenomena are empty. Emptiness or, more properly, an emptiness is a phenomenon's lack of inherent existence; an emptiness
is a negative or utter absence of this concrete mode of being with
which we are so familiar.
Reasoning is the method used to establish that emptiness, or a
lack of substantiality, is the mode of being of objects, and it also
constitutes a yogi's approach to direct realization of emptiness.
Having precisely identified this sense of the massiveness or concreteness of objects, a yogi reflects on the impossibility of such
through thoroughly familiarizing himself with one of the sets of
reasonings that show this lack of natural existence to be the
mode of being of an object. He gains an inferential understanding of the emptiness of one object and extends this understanding to all objects. Then gradually, through the force of greater
and greater familiarity, he passes to a simultaneous, direct cognition of the emptiness of all phenomena in all world systems. He
thereby begins to cleanse his mind of its tendencies to misconceive the nature of phenomena; his cognition of emptiness is like
medicine for eradicating his assent to the false appearance of
things as inherently existent. Finally, he eradicates even the false
appearance of inherent existence to his senses, thereby removing
all obstacles to knowledge of everything, and becomes omniscient. He does not eradicate existence; he eradicates only the
false sense of inherent existence.
Whether this book is merely abstract philosophy or whether it
becomes relevant to everyday experience depends on gaining a
sense of what inherent existence would be and then seeing that
everything one perceives appears this way. The pivot of the
practice of emptiness and of the generation of the wisdom that
realizes emptiness is the identification that objects appear as if
they exist in and of themselves. Then, an attempt is made to try
to find these objects which so boldly appear to be self-existent;
the mind becomes totally absorbed in attempting to find an
object—among its parts, as the composite of its parts, as something separate from the parts, and so forth. If the search is done
with keen interest, the significance of not being able to find the
Introduction
11
object will be earth-shaking. A yogi will then gain firsthand
experience of the falling to extremes against which Buddha so
frequently warned. Previously, the yogi took the independent
existence of things as the very basis of his life; now that he cannot find anything to call an object, he falls to the opposite
extreme of utter nihilism. The middle way, which is not a blending of these extremes but an utter refutation of both inherent
existence and total non-existence, becomes relevant and comprehensible for the first time. The two extremes are identified in
experience, and it is possible to realize a sense of valid, nominal
existence through gaining the understanding that emptiness is
an elimination only of inherent existence. Emptiness becomes
the context within which a yogi purifies his perception, imagining the world to be the habitation of a deity and himself to be a
deity—all within the continuous understanding ofunfindability.
Emptiness is the same in both sutra and tantra; the difference
between the two systems with regard to emptiness is in the description of the consciousness that cognizes it. In Highest Yoga
Tantra there are special subtle minds, normally of no help to an
individual, which become aids on the path to Buddhahood when
they are generated in meditation for the purpose of realizing
emptiness. An understanding of emptiness is a prerequisite for
such realization, and this book attempts to present emptiness as
it is taught in that system considered in Tibet to be the acme of
philosophical systems, the Prasangika-Madhyamika. The
system is based on the teachings of the Indian sage, Nagarjuna,
who founded Madhyamika through his definitive presentation
of the explicit meaning of Buddha's Perfection of Wisdom
Sutras (Prajnaparamita). Nagarjuna's thought was further
clarified as being Prasangika-Madhyamika by Chandraklrti, and
in the domain of emptiness Chandraklrti's system has held
almost complete sway in the various Tibetan orders.
The sources for this explication of emptiness are almost
entirely from the Ge-luk-ba order of Tibetan Buddhism, which
stems from the teachings of Dzong-ka-ba (Tsong-kha-pa, 13571419). Jam-yang-shay-ba's ('Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa, 1648-1721)
Great Exposition of Tenets, a Ge-luk-ba presentation of the
12
Meditation on Emptiness
Prasangika-Madhyamika emptiness and a textbook for the Gomang College of Dre-bung Monastery in Hla-sa, Tibet, forms
the basis for this book.
I first encountered the Great Exposition of Tenets in 1963 when I
began studying with Geshe Wangyal, a Kalmuk-Mongolian
scholar and adept from Astrakhan, who spent thirty-five years
studying in Tibet in the Go-mang College of Dre-bung
Monastery. At that time the Great Exposition of Tenets seemed to
be hopelessly complicated. Nevertheless, Geshe Wangyal's
teaching was inspiring, and near the time of my departure from
his monastery in Freewood Acres, New Jersey, in 1968, he
advised me to read all of Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of
Tenets. I put this in mind and while acting as a resource assistant
at Haverford College in 1968 began to read a little from a condensation of the Great Exposition of Tenets done by Jam-yang-shayba's next incarnation, Gön-chok-jik-may-wang- bo (dKon-mchog'jigs-med-dbang-po, 1728-91). Upon going to the University of
Wisconsin I was able to study and translate this short text with
Geshe Lhundup Sopa, a scholar of Se-ra Monastery who was
first among the First Rank of the ge-shays receiving degrees in
1962 and who came to Madison from Geshe Wangyal's monastery. His excellent answers to my questions made it possible to
put together an outline map of Buddhist philosophy as viewed
by the Ge-luk-ba order of Tibetan Buddhism.
All this prepared me for my first encounter with a former
Abbot of the Tantric College of Lower Hla-sa, Kensur Lekden,
another Go-mang scholar who came to Geshe Wangyal's monastery in the fall of 1968 just after I left. I had returned there
during a vacation and was captivated from the very start by his
lucid, compact, free-flowing presentation of almost any aspect of
Buddhist philosophy. I returned to the monastery in the summer of 1969 and, following Geshe Wangyal's advice, began
listening to Kensur Rinbochay's (Precious Former Abbot Lekden's) commentary on the Great Exposition of Tenets and on the
Mongolian scholar Nga-wang-bel-den's (Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan,
born 1797) Annotations, an explanation of the difficult points of
Introduction
13
the Great Exposition of Tenets. I tape-recorded his teachings and
translated most of Jam-yang-shay-ba's exposition of the nonBuddhist systems as described in Buddhist literature. Toward
the end of the summer we skipped over the lower Buddhist
systems and read the presentation of Prasangika tenets in the
twelfth chapter.
Returning to Madison, I began translating the chapter on
Prasangika, and in January of 1969 when Professor Richard
Robinson, the co-founder of the Buddhist Studies program in
Madison, and I founded Tibet House in Cambridge, Wisconsin,
we invited Kensur Rinbochay to teach us. Kensur Rinbochay
gave two series of fourteen lectures on the three principal aspects
of the path to enlightenment and on Chandrakirti's Supplement
to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' (Madhyamakavatara), which I translated at Tibet House. (These have been published as the first part of Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism.)
Professor Robinson also invited Kensur to give a seminar at the
University of Wisconsin on Prasangika philosophy which we
conducted after Professor Robinson's untimely death in the
summer of 1970.
At Tibet House, Kensur Rinbochay taught me the rest of Jamyang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets (approximately three
hundred folios), Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations (four hundred
sixteen folios), and almost all of Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way (four hundred twenty-four out of five
hundred folios), the Go-mang textbook for Madhyamika studies.
I thereby was able to cover most of the Madhyamika reading
which a monk in the Go-mang College of Dre-bung Monastery
would traditionally do. Kensur Rinbochay was famous for his
abilities as a lecturer, and he, indeed, could weave a fascinating
and often moving story of philosophical and spiritual ideas. His
kindness in explaining again and again the important points of
Buddhist philosophy was a lesson in compassion and a demonstration of how Buddhist philosophy was for him a vivid, living
phenomenon.
Kensur Rinbochay left Tibet House in August of 1971 by
which time I had finished translating Jam-yang-shay-ba's
14
Meditation on Emptiness
presentation of emptiness in his Great Exposition of Tenets. My
intention was to present a book on the meditation on emptiness,
and to that end had obtained a Fulbright-Hays fellowship for a
year's study in Germany and India. Four days after I left for Germany in November of 1971, Kensur Rinbochay died of congestive heart failure. In Germany at the University of Hamburg, I
studied for three months with Geshe Gediin Lodro, a Go-mang
scholar of a later generation than that of Geshe Wangyal and
Kensur Rinbochay. A special feature of the Go-mang scholars,
probably stemming from Geshe Jinba around the turn of the
century, is an unusual ability to explain philosophy, not just
react to it, as sometimes happens when debate is a principal
mode of instruction, and Geshe Gediin Lodro soon showed himself to be a scholar of scholars. When he received his ge-shay
degree in India in 1961, he not only was first among those of the
First Rank but was also first among three who in an extraordinary year had been given the honor of being first among those of
the First Rank. Geshe Gediin Lodro's knowledge was invaluable;
he knew not only how to answer questions but also how to lead
to the heart of conceptual problems so that the entire context of a
question would come to life. Possessing an extraordinary ability
both to answer and lecture on minute questions about Buddhist
philosophy, he was the ideal person to smooth out the last
remaining questions on the translation.
Proceeding on to India, I went to Dharmsala in the north
where the Dalai Lama has his headquarters. I arrived just in time
for sixteen four-hour public lectures by His Holiness on Dzongka-ba's Middling Exposition of the Stages of the Path and was fascinated to find that this reincarnated Lama was not only highly
educated but also extremely practical. I had no intention of staying in Dharmsala, but the single figure of the Dalai Lama kept
me there, coming back to his audience room again and again to
ask my most difficult questions on the philosophy and practice
of emptiness. His answers were illuminating to say the least, and
after six months he had answered my questions to the point
where I had no more to ask—a state which I frankly had had no
hope of achieving. I had the good fortune to attend lectures by
Introduction
15
His Holiness on Nagarjuna's Six Collections of Reasonings
during which he gave the oral transmission and explanation. His
Holiness commissioned me to translate Nagarjuna's Precious
Garland (RatnavalT) along with a short poem by the Seventh
Dalai Lama, The Song of the Four Mindfulnesses, and his own
short treatise on emptiness, Key to the Middle Way, as well as his
The Buddhism of Tibet. (These have been published as the first
two volumes of the Wisdom of Tibet Series.) I had many interviews with the Dalai Lama about the translations, and the discovery that he was to my sight utterly worthy of being the spiritual and temporal leader of Tibet defied my cynical sense of
world order.
While in Dharmsala, I also studied a Nying-ma-ba presentation of tenets as found in the first part of the Precious Treasury of
the Supreme Vehicle (Thegpa'i mchog rinpo che mdzod) by Longchen-rap-jam (kLong-chen-rab-'byams, 1308-63) with the Nyingma-ba lama Khetsun Sangpo. In addition, later when Khetsun
Sangpo visited the University of Virginia in 1974, we read Longchen-ba's presentation of the sutra schools in his Treasury of
Tenets {Grubpa'imtha'rinpo che'imdzod). Khetsun Sangpo also
had acquired a photographic reprint of the Sa-gya-ba Dak-tsang's
(sTag-tshang, born 1405) Understanding All Tenets, which in
1972 was otherwise unavailable. A reading of it revealed how
much Jam-yang-shay-ba relied on the very text that he was primarily refuting and showed the continuity of tradition between Sagya and Ge-luk.
Contact with a Ga-gyu-ba presentation of Madhyamika was
gained through reading parts of a commentary on Chandrakirti's
Supplement to (Nagarjuna's 'Treatise on the Middle Way' by
Mi-gyo-dor-jay (Mi-bskyod-rdo-rje, 1507-54), the eighth Karmaba. Acquaintance gained in this way with Nying-ma, Sa-gya, and
Ga-gyu interpretations was crucial to understanding Jam-yangshay-ba's presentation in that it provided the historical background of many positions.
Though those texts contributed greatly to my understanding,
this book primarily presents a particular interpretation within
the Ge-luk-ba order with an aim of imparting a sense of a living
16
Meditation on Emptiness
system that affects the outlook, meditation, and goals of its
scholar-yogi adherents. Thus, this book is not framed as an argument; still, through the stylistic choice of points of emphasis
there is an implicit argument against accepting many modern
views on Madhyamika as applying to all interpretations of that
system. Almost all contemporary renderings of Madhyamika
run contrary to Ge-luk-ba authors such as Jam-yang-shay-ba on
many central points. It should be clear by the end of this book
that the traditional interpretation given here does not agree with,
and in fact refutes, all of the following positions with respect to
Prasangika-Madhyamika:
1 Their outlook is nihilistic, agnostic, or sceptic.
2 They are anti-reason.
3 The uncommon view of the system is that words are inadequate to evoke an experience of objects like that of direct
perception.
4 They have no system, no views on cause and effect or
rebirth, no positive theses, and no negative theses.
5 They are merely debaters.
6 Wisdom is emptiness.
7 Wisdom is contentless.
8 Emptiness is the Absolute.
9 The two truths are two ways of viewing the same object.
10 That objects possess a definite nature is the object of negation in the view of emptiness.
11 Their system is a turning away from philosophical analysis
to the vulgar views of the world.
12 All views are bad.
13 Withdrawal from thought is the best meditation. Or, words
are enemies. Or, the source of all suffering is words.
14 Reasoning is used only to refute other systems.
15 What is seen in direct sense perception is the truth; what the
senses reveal cannot be denied in any way; one must appreciate the uncommon thingness of each phenomenon as its
suchness.
16 Direct perception of suchness requires a leap.
Introduction
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
17
There is no I at all.
The selflessness of persons denies the existence of persons.
Conventional truths are established only by ignorance.
Conceptuality is ignorance.
Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way must be viewed in
isolation.
Emptiness does not exist.
Form is one with emptiness.
Nagarjuna did not set forth the path.
Teachings about the path are for those of low intelligence.
Dependent-arising and emptiness are one.
Emptiness and dependent-arising are a paradox.
None of the Hlnayana categories are accepted.
Analysis is not meditation.
Meditation is just stabilization.
Phenomena are whatever one thinks they are.
Conventional truths are negated by ultimate truths.
The dependent-arising of this presentation of meditation on
emptiness is itself a demonstration of Buddha's focal teaching, of
his 'slogan', as the Dalai Lama put it, of dependent-arising. My
aim is not to present original reflections on emptiness but to portray as well as I can how emptiness is a practical force within the
Ge-luk-ba tradition of Tibetan Buddhism. The material is
largely drawn from the oral explanations which I have received
and from Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets and
Great Exposition of the Middle Way as well as Jang-gya's (ICangskya, 1717-86) Presentation of Tenets (Grub mtha'i mam gzhag).
The flavor of the oral tradition is presented with a view to capturing how the doctrine of emptiness figures in the lives of the
practitioners who embody it.
Technical Note
Renderings of the Tibetan alphabet in roman letters are almost
as numerous as the scholars who have worked with Tibetan.
However, Turrell Wylie, after careful analysis, has set forth in a
reasoned presentation ('A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription', HJAS, Vol. 22, pp.261-7, 1959) a simple system capable of
representing the letters of the Tibetan alphabet. Therefore, his
system is followed here (except in that the first pronounced letter
is capitalized in names).
As he says, his is only a system of transliteration, not aimed at
facilitating pronunciation and, therefore, is restricted in this
book to parenthetical citation, glossary, and bibliography.
Tibetan names must be rendered in a pronounceable form if
Tibetan Buddhist studies are to rise out of the arcane, and thus it
is necessary to devise a system specifically for that purpose, not
seeking a form reconstructable into Tibetan (which has many
unpronounced letters). Again, practically everyone who has
worked with Tibetan has attempted this, though some have
either given up or not even tried, opting instead for the unpronounceable transliteration form. This writer has long thought
that if Tibetan names could be written in a simple pronounceable
form, people unfamiliar with the language could remember
20
Meditation on Emptiness
them, as a consequence of which Tibetan Buddhism would not
seem so distant. The one obstacle has been that several names
are already known in a misleading form. For instance, the capital
of Tibet is Hla-sa, pronounced with the 'h' first, though it has
almost always been spelled Lhasa. Indeed, this is like the English
word 'where' in which 'h' is pronounced first, but it seems
unlikely that anyone would think to do this for 'Lhasa'.
Also, due to the fact that most transliteration systems treat the
first, fifth, ninth, thirteenth, and seventeenth letters of the
Tibetan alphabet as ka, ca, ta,pa, and tsa, respectively, most writers have used these in the 'phonetic' form. Thinking that this
might be due to a difference in dialect, this writer has been hesitant
to interfere with this policy; however, it has been found that these
letters are not pronounced this way in any Tibetan dialect. Rather,
they are pronounced more like ga, ja, da, ba, and dza, the mark
above the consonant indicating that the tone is 'high', meaning
that the sound is pronounced not deep in the throat but higher or
more forward and tending to be sharp and short.
The third, seventh, eleventh, fifteenth, and nineteenth letters
(when they are in the root position with a head or a prefix) are
pronounced ga,ja, da, ba, and dza in a low tone (which need not
be indicated by a line underneath since these letters are usually
pronounced that way in English). In a simple, easily pronounceable system of'phonetics' for use in books and essays, but not for
real phonetic spelling in the sense of including all minor variations, these English letters can indicate the Tibetan despite
changes due to prefixed and headed letters.
Most writers have used kha, cha, tha, pha, and tsha for the
second, sixth, tenth, fourteenth, and eighteenth letters, the 'h'
indicating that these letters are aspirated (spoken with breath
such that one can even feel it on the hand close to the mouth).
However, it seems to this writer that ka, ta, pa, and tsa are aspirated in English anyway, or at least semi-aspirated, whereas kha
etc. are both unfamiliar and confusing, frequently leading to
mispronunciation—tha and pha being associated with those
letters in English words such as 'thin' and 'phone'. Thus, it
seems appropriate to delete 'h' from these letters.
Technical Note
21
This yields a table of conversion from transliteration to 'essay
phonetics' as follows: (In each pair, the transliteration form is on
the left and the 'essay phonetic' form on the right.)
ka
ca
ta
pa
tsa
zha
ra
ha
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
ga
ja
da
ba
dza
sha
ra
ha
kha
cha
tha
pha
tsha
za
la
a
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
ka
cha
ta
pa
tsa
sa
la
a
ga
ja
da
ba
dza
'a
sha
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
ga
ja
da
ba
dza
a
sha
nga
nya
na
ma
wa
ya
sa
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
nga
nya
na
ma
wa
ya
sa
In this book, the 'essay phonetic' forms are used with the following refinements to reflect actual pronunciation: k and p are
substituted for g and b in suffix position; nga, nya, na, ma, and la
are used when these letters appear after a prefix or under another
letter, as their pronunciation becomes high at that time; also,
dbyang is rendered as yang and dbang as wang for the same
reason.
For vowels, 'a' indicates the vowel sound of'opt'; 'i', o f ' i t ' or
'eat'; 'u', of'soon'; 'ay', of'bake'; 'e', of'bet'; '0', of'boat'; and
'o' indicates the vowel sound of 'er' (minus the 'r').
The names of Tibetans and Mongolians who live in or have
published in the West are spelled as they spell them. Aside from
these, all other Tibetan names have been rendered in the system
given above in order to bring their pronunciation more in accord
with actual spoken Tibetan in the central dialect; the transliterated form of each name is given in the index.
The hyphens between syllables are retained in the 'essay phonetic' form so that the beginning and end of syllables can be
easily distinguished.
Throughout the book 'cognize' and 'realize' are used synonymously to translate one Tibetan word, rtogs pa. Similarly,
'impute' and 'designate' both translate 'dogs pa, and thereby
'basis of imputation' and 'basis of designation' are interchangeably used for gdags gzhi. Also, nine Sanskrit words are treated as
22
Meditation on Emptiness
English words, resulting in the dropping of their diacritics.
These are Bodhisattva (hero with respect to contemplating
enlightenment), Buddha (one who has awakened from the sleep
of ignorance and spread his intelligence to all objects of knowledge), karma (action, and often also the predisposition established by an action), mandala (a divine circle—a deity's body or
the habitat of a deity), nirvana (passage beyond sorrow), sutra
(abridged expression of profound meaning—the word of Buddha
except for tantra), tantra (continuum, referring here to the continuum of words that express the topics of a base, path, or fruit
continuum), vajra (best of stones, diamond, symbolizing an
immutability or indivisibility of method and wisdom), and yogi
(a meditator who has joined or yoked mental stability and
insight). A glossary of key terms giving the Sanskrit and Tibetan
equivalents is given at the end of the book.
The transliteration scheme for Sanskrit names and titles is
aimed at easy pronunciation, using sh, sh, ch and chh rather than
s, s, c and ch. With the first occurrence of each Indian title, the
Sanskrit is given, if available. The full Sanskrit and Tibetan
titles are to be found in the bibliography which is arranged
alphabetically according to the English titles of sutras and
according to the authors of other works.
Note to the 1996 edition
Please excuse the frequent appearance of "he" a n d "his"
instead of "they" and "their" or "she" and "her." Although the
book was written at a time when the convention was still to
use the masculine for the generic, I do not consider convention
to be an excuse. My heartfelt apologies.
J.H.
List of Abbreviations
(For the full entries of the Tibetan texts see the Bibliography.)
Alaya: Dzong-ka-ba's Extensive Commentary on the Difficult
Points of the 'Afflicted Mind and Basis-of-All'
Ann\ Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's)
'Great Exposition of Tenets'
Concentrations: Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formlessnesses
Dak: Dak-tsang's Revelation of All Tenets
Den-dar: Den-dar-hla-ram-ba's Presentation of the Lack of Being
One or Many
Gon: Gon-chok-jik-may-wang-bo's Precious Garland of Tenets
GM: Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way
GT: Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
Jang: Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
Kay-drup: Kay-drup's General Presentation of the Tantra Sets, as
found in Lessing and Wayman's Fundamentals of the Buddhist
Tantras (The Hague: Mouton, 1968)
Lectures: Pa-bong-ka's Lectures on the Stages of the Path
M H T L : Dr. Lokesh Chandra's Materials for a History of
Tibetan Literature (New Delhi: International Academy of
Indian Culture, 1963)
24
Meditation on Emptiness
P: Tibetan Tripitaka (Tokyo-Kyoto: Tibetan Tripitaka Research
Foundation, 1956)
Pa : The Ashtadhyayiof Panini, ed. and trans, by Srisa Chandra
Vasu (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1962)
Toh: A Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons, ed.
by Prof. Hukuji Ui, and A Catalogue of the Tohoku University
Collection of Tibetan Works on Buddhism, ed. by Prof. Yensho
Kanakura (Sendai, Japan: 1934 and 1953)
Tu-gen: Tu-gen Lo-sang-cho-gyi-nyi-ma's Mirror of the Good
Explanations
Acknowledgements
I wish to express deep gratitude to the late Professor Richard
Robinson who encouraged me to write this book on how the
meditation of emptiness figures in a living tradition. Also, I wish
to thank Anne Klein, Joe Wilson, and John Strong for reading
the text at various stages and making many helpful suggestions.
A great debt of gratitude is owed to Professor Richard B. Martin,
South Asian Bibliographer at Alderman Library, University of
Virginia, for extensive bibliographic assistance.
I wish to acknowledge the crucial support of two Fulbright
Fellowships, in 1972 and 1982, the former introducing me to the
work of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the latter, to the world
of monastic debate at the School of Dialectics in Dharmsala.
Also, several small grants from the University of Virginia were
helpful in allaying photocopying and postage expenses.
Many thanks to Daniel Perdue and Gareth Sparham for their
painstaking proofreading of the galleys. Also, the greatest gratitude is due Elizabeth Napper for countless editorial suggestions,
making the index, and marking the galleys.
Part One
Meditation
toniedaM
1 Purpose and Motivation
Sources
Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
The Perfection of Wisdom Sutras set forth emptiness as the final
mode of existence of all phenomena. 1 Nagarjuna explained the
approaches to that emptiness, and Buddhapalita and Chandrakirti lucidly commented on Nagarjuna's explanations in exact
accordance with his thought. It is necessary to rely on the perfection of wisdom as these masters explain it, not only to attain
omniscience, but even to attain liberation from cyclic existence.
One who wishes to become a Hearer Superior, Solitary Realizer
Superior, or Bodhisattva Superior must rely on this perfection of
wisdom. The Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra
(A shtasahasrikaprajnaparam it a)2 says:
Subhuti, one who wishes to realize the enlightenment of
a Hearer is to learn just this perfection of wisdom. Subhuti, one who wishes to realize the enlightenment of a
Solitary Realizer is to learn just this perfection of wisdom.
30
Meditation on Emptiness
The Bodhisattva, the Great Being who wishes to realize
the supreme perfect complete enlightenment, is also to
learn just this perfection of wisdom.
Nagarjuna's works teach that realization of the subtle emptiness of all phenomena is a prerequisite for the path of liberation
from cyclic existence. His Precious Garland (35ab) says:
As long as the aggregates are [misconceived,
So long is there [misconception of an I.
One cannot free oneself from cyclic existence merely through
cognition of the coarse selflessness of the person. One must
realize the final subtle suchness of the person and of the mental
and physical aggregates.
One must eradicate the innate non-analytical intellect that misconceives the nature of the person and other phenomena. It is
not sufficient merely to withdraw the mind from conceiving a
self of persons and of phenomena, or merely to stop the mind's
wandering to objects, for these do not constitute realization of
emptiness. If they did, then deep sleep and fainting would
absurdly involve realization of emptiness. Aryadeva says:
When selflessness is seen in objects,
The seeds of cyclic existence are destroyed.
Chandrakirti says in his Supplement to (Nagarjuna 'sj 'Treatise on
the Middle Way'{VIA 16):3
[Extreme] conceptions arise with [the conception of
inherently existent] phenomena.
It has been thoroughly analyzed how phenomena do not
[inherently] exist;
When [the conception of an inherently existent] phenomenon does not exist,
These [extreme conceptions] do not arise, just as there is
no fire when there is no fuel.
Bhavaviveka says:
With the mind in meditative equipoise,
Purpose and Motivation
31
Wisdom analyzes in this way
The entities of these phenomena
Apprehended conventionally.
Shantideva says:
When one has searched [for these] as realities,
Who desires and what is desired?
Dharmakirti says:
Without disbelieving the object of this [misconception]
It is impossible to abandon [misconceiving it].
With one voice all the Mahayana masters proclaim that analysis
of objects, and not mere withdrawal of the mind from them, is
the path to liberation.
One must analyze well whether the inherent existence of phenomena, as it is conceived by the innate non-analytical intellect,
exists or not. Through reasoning and scriptural citation one
must ascertain that objects do not exist as conceived and penetratingly understand the falseness of inherent existence. It is
very important to analyze again and again with discriminating
wisdom. The King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra (Samadhiraja) says:
If the selflessness of phenomena is analyzed
And if this analysis is cultivated,
It causes the effect of attaining nirvana.
Through no other cause does one come to peace.
The Cloud of Jewels Sutra (Ratnamegha) says, 'Analyzing
through special insight and realizing the lack of inherent existence constitute understanding of the signless.' The Questions of
Brahma Sutra (Brahmapariprchchha) says, 'The intelligent are
those who correctly analyze phenomena individually.'
The great Mahayana masters taught many forms of reasoning,
directed toward the ascertainment of suchness, in order to illuminate the path of liberation for the fortunate and not for the sake
of mere disputation. Dzong-ka-ba says, 'All of the analytical
32
Meditation on Emptiness
reasonings set forth in Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way
(Madhyamakashastra) are only for the sake of sentient beings'
attaining liberation.' The wish to attain liberation from cyclic
existence is the motivation for entering into analysis of phenomena and attaining realization of emptiness.
Among Buddhist practitioners, those of lesser capacity enter
into religious practice for the sake of attaining a happy migration
in a future life.4 They have seen the sufferings of bad migrations
and seek to avoid pain through endeavor at virtue. One cannot
make effort at religious practice merely for the sake of improving
the present lifetime and be considered a practitioner of Buddhism; at least, a Buddhist's motivation is aimed at attaining a
happy migration as a human or a god in a future life. Others,
who have greater capacity, seek to leave cyclic existence completely. They see that the attainment of a happy migration in the
next life is not sufficient because they must still grow old,
become sick, die, and be reborn again in accordance with their
former deeds. Their motivation for practice is the wish to attain
liberation from cyclic existence for themselves. Still others, who
have even higher capacity, realize the extent of their own suffering, infer the suffering of others, and practice so that they may
become free from cyclic existence and attain Buddhahood in
order to help all sentient beings to do the same.
Thus, it is very important that a motivation be stated verbally
and explicitly before meditation:
I am meditating on emptiness and analyzing phenomena
in order to attain liberation from cyclic existence and
omniscience so that I may help all sentient beings to do
the same.
The other possible motivation is:
I am meditating on emptiness and analyzing phenomena
in order to attain liberation from cyclic existence.
The former is far more powerful because, through it, the meditation is related to all sentient beings. The force of the meditation
increases as many times as the beings with whom it is related.
Purpose and Motivation
33
Emptiness itself is a very powerful object of meditation. Aryadeva says:5
Those of little merit would not even
Have doubts about this doctrine [of emptiness].
Even suspicion [that objects are empty]
Wrecks [the seeds of] cyclic existence.
Even a suspicion that emptiness—the lack of inherent existence
—is the mode of being of phenomena disturbs the very causes
that produce the rounds of powerless suffering. For, when one
has such suspicion, the actual mode of being of objects acts for
the slightest bit as an object of one's mind. Dzong-ka-ba says:
Aspirational prayers should be made for the ability to
listen to the treatises on the profound [emptiness], to
memorize them, to think about their meaning, to meditate on them, and over the continuum of lives to have
faith in them, all without harming ascertainment of the
dependent-arising of cause and effect.
Jam-yang-shay-ba warns that though the transmission of the
Buddhist teaching to Tibet was prophesied in sutra, it was also
prophesied that there would be few who would take the perfection of wisdom all the way through to the process of meditation. 6
He says there are many who memorize the words and many who
propound the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras but few who actually
achieve the perfection of wisdom. He adds that there are
uncountable numbers who through the force of the five ruinations do not want to meditate on emptiness but still claim to
meditate on the 'natural mind' or something other than emptiness that lacks the elaborations of duality. Since 'natural mind',
'freedom from the elaborations of duality', and so forth are none
other than emptiness itself, and since it is meditation on emptiness that puts an end to the elaborations of misconception, it is
mistaken to think that there is another final object of meditation.
The various teachings that Buddha does not even abide in the
middle way, or that Buddha ultimately does not even teach
emptiness must be understood as referring to his not abiding
34
Meditation on Emptiness
in, or his not teaching, an inherently existent middle way, or
inherently existent emptiness.
Those who actually do not meditate on emptiness but claim to
do so mistakenly think that merely by withdrawing the mind
from objects and by ceasing thought they can realize the suchness of phenomena. Rather, analysis is the very foundation of
meditation on emptiness.
r
2 Self: The Opposite of Selflessness
Sources
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
Corresponding section of the translation pp.625-36
Emptiness in all four Buddhist schools is a 'self-emptiness', but
this does not mean that objects are empty of themselves.7 If
objects were empty of themselves, then no object, not even an
emptiness, would exist. Rather, 'self-emptiness' in the Prasangika system specifically refers to an object's lack of its own
inherent existence.
The term 'self-emptiness' distinguishes the Buddhist emptiness from systems such as Samkhya, which assert that the person
is empty of being the various other objects of the world. Such an
emptiness is an 'other-emptiness', and realization of it is attained
through distinguishing one thing from another, as in the case of
distinguishing the person (purusha) from the nature (prakrti)
that gives rise to all appearances according to the Samkhya
system. Realization of a 'self-emptiness', on the other hand,
involves distinguishing the absence of a false predicate of an
object, for example, the absence of its own inherent existence,
36
Meditation on Emptiness
and does not involve distinguishing one entity from another
entity. Still, when emptiness is cognized directly, the objects that
are the bases of the quality of emptiness do not appear to the
mind. Based on this, some, including the Jo-nang-bas of Tibet,
misinterpreted the Buddhist emptiness as an 'other-emptiness'.
That which is negated in the Prasangikas' subtle theory of selflessness is self, defined as inherent existence. The hypothetical
synonyms of'self in the Prasangika system are:8
1 true establishment (satya-siddhi/bhava, bden par grub pa/
dngos po)
2 true existence (satya-sat, bden par yodpa)
3 ultimate existence (paramartha-siddhij don dam par grub pa)
4 existence as [its own] suchness (tattva-siddhide kho na nyid
du grub pa)
5 existence as [its own] reality (samyak-siddhi, yang dag par
grub pa)
6 natural existence or existence by way of its own character
{svalakshana-siddhi, rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa)
7 substantial existence (dravya-sat, rdzas yod)
8 existence able to establish itself (tshugs thub tu grub pa)
9 existence from the object's side [rather than being imputed
from the subject's side] (svarupa-siddhi, rang ngos nas grub
pa)
10 objective existence (vishaya-siddhij yul gyi steng nas grub pa)
11 existence through its own power (svairi-siddhi\ rang dbang du
grub pa)
12 existence in the object that receives designation (prajnaptivishaya-siddhi, btags yul gyi steng nas grub pa)
13 existence right in the basis of designation (gdags gzhi'i steng
nas grub pa)
14 inherent existence {svabhava-siddhi, rang bzhin gyis grub pa)
15 existence through its own entitiness (svabhavata-siddhi, ngo
bo nyid gyis grub pa)
16 existence in the manner of covering its basis of designation
(gdags gzhi'i go sa gnon pa 'i tshul du yod pa)
17 existence from the side of the basis of designation {gdags
gzhi'i ngos nas grub pa).
Self: The Opposite of Selflessness
37
The members of this list are only 'hypothetical' synonyms
because in Buddhist logic 'synonym' (ekartha) means 'one
object', and thus all synonyms necessarily exist. Since these
terms for 'self refer to non-existents, they can only be 'hypothetical' synonyms.
The subtle self that is negated in the Prasangika view of selflessness implies an independent entity; thus, all these terms are
opposites of dependent-arising. Each illuminates a little more
the meaning of non-dependence. 9 For instance, 'existing from
the side of the basis of designation' means that if one searched to
find the object designated, one would find it either among the
bases of designation, or as their composite, or as the composite of
their former and later moments. 'Substantially existent' means
not existing through the force of expressions but existing through
the object's own power. 'Existing able to establish itself means
not established through the force of terms and expressions but
existing in the object's basis of designation by way of the object's
own entity. 'Existing through its own power' means existing
through the object's own particular mode of being.
The Prasangikas' unique meaning of 'dependence' is 'establishment through the power of a designating consciousness'.
Phenomena depend on thought in the sense that only if the
thought that designates an object exists, can that »object be
posited as existing (conventionally), and if the thought that
designates an object does not exist, the (conventional) existence
of that object cannot be posited. Since this applies to all objects,
nothing exists inherently.
It is similar to the imputation of a snake to a rope. If a speckled
and coiled rope is not seen clearly, the thought can arise, 'This is
a snake'. At that time, the composite of the parts of the rope and
the parts themselves cannot at all be posited as a snake; the snake
is only imputed by thought. In the same way, when in dependence upon the mental and physical aggregates the thought '1'
arises, the composite of the former and later moments of the continuum of the aggregates, or the composite of the aggregates at
one time, or the individual aggregates themselves cannot in the
least be posited as the I. Also, there is nothing that is a separate
38tsrponmjigedbaME
Meditation on Emptiness
entity from the aggregates or their composite which can be
apprehended as I. Therefore, the I is only established by thought
in dependence on the aggregates and does not exist inherently, as
it appears to do.
The same type of analysis can be applied to a person and his/
her relationship to the six constituents that are his/her bases of
imputation or designation—earth, water, fire, wind, space, and
consciousness. A person is not a collection of these, nor any of
them individually, nor anything separate from them. A person is
thereby shown not to exist inherently.
Prasangika is the only school that accepts all the above mentioned terms as synonyms; the non-Prasangika schools do not
attach the same significance to these terms and thus organize
them differently (see Chart 1). For instance, the Chittamatrins
certainly would not say that dependent phenomena (paratantra)
are independent just because they inherently exist; for them
'inherent existence' merely means that objects have their own
mode of being. The Prasangikas, however, answer that the very
words, 'inherent existence' or 'own mode of being', imply independence.
Also, the non-Prasangikas say that if phenomena were only
designated in the sense of being unfindable among their bases of
designation, they would not exist at all because the unfindable
could not possibly be functional. However, for the Prasangikas
the other schools have missed the meaning of 'only designated'
or 'only imputed' (prajnapti-matra, btagspa tsam); Prasangikas
say that although this term means that the object designated is
not its basis of designation, it does not imply non-functionality.
It is a central but difficult point of the Prasangika-Madhyamika
system that what is merely designated can be functional, just as a
girl created by a magician can attract an unwitting audience.
It is said that often when a yogi thinks he is progressing in
understanding the presentation of emptiness, he loses ground in
understanding the presentation of conventional objects and that
often when he thinks he is progressing in understanding the
presentation of conventional objects, he loses ground in understanding the presentation of emptiness. 10 It must be borne in
Chart 1:zyxvutsrponmlkihgfedcbaME
Modes of Existence
I
II
ultimate existence
true establishment
paramartha-siddhi
satya-siddhi
don dam par grub pa
bden par grub pa
existence as [its own]
suchness
tattva-siddhi
de kho na nyid du
grub pa
existence as [its own]
reality
samyak-siddhi
yang dag par grub pa
true existence
satya-sat
bden par yod pa yxwvutsrqponmlkihgfedcbaVTSRPFC
III
natural existence
svalakshana-siddhi
rang gi mtshan nyid
kyis grub pa
IV
inherent existence
svabhdva-siddhi
rang bzhin gyis grub pa
existence from its own
(the object's) side
svarupa-siddhi
rang ngos nas grub pa
The Prasangikas view all four columns as equally non-existent, ultimately and conventionally. The Svatantrikas find columns one and two the
same, denying these of all phenomena both ultimately and conventionally; they find columns three and four the same, affirming these
conventionally for all phenomena, but not ultimately. The Chittamatrins affirm all four columns for emptiness and impermanent phenomena and
deny the first three columns, but not the fourth, for imputed existents such as space. The Sautrantikas Following Reasoning affirm all four
columns for impermanent phenomena and deny the first three, but not the fourth, for permanent phenomena. The Vaibhashikas affirm all four
columns for ultimate truths, such as partless particles and partless moments of consciousness; however, they affirm only the second, third, and
fourth columns for conventional truths, such as tables and houses.
40
Meditation on Emptiness
mind that for one who has found the Prasarigika view, progress
in the presentation of emptiness aids in the presentation of conventional objects and progress in the presentation of conventional objects aids in the presentation of emptiness.
Through refuting only inherent existence and not refuting
mere existence, the Prasangikas avoid the extreme of annihilation. Through affirming only nominal existence and not affirming inherent existence they avoid the extreme of permanence. In
other words, they describe precisely how things do and do not
exist. The lack of even nominal or designated existence would be
an extreme of annihilation—an extreme of non-existence—
because objects do exist imputedly. Inherent existence would be
an extreme of permanence—an extreme of existence—because
objects do not inherently exist.
The extremes are no nominal existence, which would mean no
existence whatsoever, and inherent existence—the first being
'finer' and the second being 'coarser' than the correct presentation. The main extreme conceptions, therefore, are the conception that things do not designatedly exist and the conception that
things exist inherently. The extremes do not exist, but their conceptions do and can be destroyed.
Many think that the Prasangikas have fallen to an extreme of
nihilism, being no different from the Nihilists who deny the
existence of rebirth, and so forth." The Prasangikas themselves
refuse any similarity; they say that one cannot ascertain the
emptiness of former and later births through just the nonperception of former and later births. One must first identify
what former and later births are and identify their existence.
Then, through reasonings such as the present birth's becoming a
past birth when the future birth becomes the present birth, one
identifies that past, present, and future births are mutually
dependent and thus do not exist inherently. Identifying that
former and later births do not exist inherently, one ascertains the
emptiness of births. Such identification both of the positive
subject (births) and the negative predicate (non-inherent existence) is essential, for one cannot ascertain an emptiness just by
seeing nothing.
Self: The Opposite of Selflessness
41
The Nihilists referred to here are the Dialectician Nihilists
and not the Meditating Nihilists, for some of the latter attain
meditative clairvoyance and thereby realize a limited number of
former and future births. The Dialectician Nihilists assert that
future lives do not exist because no one is seen to come here to
this life from a former life and no one is seen to go from this life
to a future life. The Madhyamikas, on the other hand, assert that
future lives do not exist inherently because they are dependentarisings or, in other words, because they are designated by terms
and thoughts. However, they do not deny the existence of
former and future lives. Both the theses and the reasons of the
Nihilists and the Madhyamikas are very different.
3 Meditation: Identifying Self
Sources
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
The Fifth Dalai Lama's Sacred Word of ManjushrT
Kay-drup's Manual of Instructions on the View
Ling Rinbochay's oral teachings
Corresponding section of the translation pp.684-5
Jam-yang-shay-ba delineates five stages in meditation on emptiness.12 These outline the progress of one newly developing the
powers of meditation:
1 how a beginner develops experience with respect to the view
of emptiness
2 how to cultivate a similitude of special insight based on a
similitude of calm abiding
3 how to cultivate actual special insight based on actual calm
abiding
4 how to cultivate direct cognition of emptiness
5 how to meditate on emptiness during the second stage of
Highest Yoga Tantra.
44
Meditation on Emptiness
FIRST STAGE OFMEDITA TION ON EMPTINESS
How a beginner develops experience with respect to the view of
emptiness
During the first stage a yogi gains an initial familiarity with the
meaning of emptiness through one of several reasonings. He
proceeds through three basic essentials in meditation: identifying the object negated in the view of selflessness, ascertaining
that selflessness follows from the reason, and establishing the
reason's presence in the subject.
The initial object of meditation is the selflessness of the
person; the reasoning used is the sevenfold reasoning as set forth
by Chandrakfrti.
1 Identifying the object negated in the theory of selflessness
First, one concentrates and clears one's mind.13 Sitting quietly,
one waits for the I to appear. If it does not, an appearance of it is
created by thinking '1', and with a subtle type of consciousness
one watches the appearance.
If the consciousness that watches the appearance is too strong,
one will not see the I, or it will appear and quickly disappear.
Therefore, one should allow the consciousness conceiving I to
be generated continuously, and through watching this I as if
from a corner, one will gain a firm sense of it.
One could also imagine that one is being accused, even falsely,
and watch the sense of I. One could remember an incident of
false accusation, during which one thought, 'I did not do this, I
am being wrongly accused.' By watching the I who is accused, a
firm sense of the way that the non-analytical intellect apprehends I can be ascertained.
If the memory of such an accusation is not strong, a yogi cultivates it until the sense of I as misconceived by the innate nonanalytical intellect is obvious. This innate mind does not analyze
whether the I is the same as or different from mind and body.
Without any reasoning and through the force of habituation, it
conceives of an I that is as if self-sufficient, able to establish itself,
naturally or inherently existent from the very start and fused
with the appearance of mind and body.14
r
Meditation: Identifying Self
45
Though such an I does not in reality exist, an image or concept
of it does exist and will appear. It is initially difficult to identify
the appearance of a concrete I, but in time it becomes obvious.
Sometimes the I appears to be the breath, and sometimes the
stomach as when one has an upset stomach and says, 'I am
sick." 5 Sometimes the I appears to be the eye, ear, nose, tongue,
body, or mental consciousness. In sum, the I appears at times to
be physical and at times mental. The Fifth Dalai Lama says that
in the end the appearance of the I and the appearance of the
mind and body are as if mixed like water and milk, undifferentia t e , but so clear as to seem graspable with the hand.
Dzong-ka-ba's disciple Kay-drup says in his Manual of Instructions on the View:16
If the mind thinking 'I' is not generated, you should fabricate the thought 'I' and immediately thereafter analyze
its mode of appearance. You will thereby come to know
its mode of appearance without mixing it with any other
object... If you look gently from a corner without losing
the consciousness thinking '1', there is a separate mode
of appearance of I to the consciousness which thinks '1',
and this appearance is not any of the mental and physical
aggregates. The I does not appear to be just a nominal
designation, but appears as if self-established. Through
holding that the I exists the way it appears, you are
bound in cyclic existence.
Can the I appear to be self-established if its appearance is undifferentiatedly mixed with that of mind and body? It would seem
logically impossible for it to be self-established and yet mixed,
but the innate intellect apprehending I does not analyze its object
logically before, during, or after its apprehension. The appearance of a self-established I is mixed with the appearance of
factors of mind and body but is not exactly the same. The
present Dalai Lama's Senior Tutor, Ling Rinbochay, said that if
someone sticks a pin in your finger, you feel that the pin has been
stuck in you and not just in your finger. You have a distinct sense
of the I that is hurt.
46
Meditation on Emptiness
In order to ascertain this appearance, it is extremely important
to prolong subtle examination of it without letting it immediately disappear. Some teachers advise watching the I for a week
or even months before proceeding to the second step.
It is interesting to note that the jiva or 'limited individual
being' in Vedanta is often said to be the size of the thumb and
located in the 'heart'. In Vedanta the jwa is to be merged with
the infinite self, Brahman, and in Buddhism the appearance of a
concrete I is analyzed, found to be non-existent, and overcome,
resulting eventually in a direct realization of emptiness in which
the subject, the wisdom consciousness, is merged with its object,
emptiness, like fresh water poured into fresh water.
4 Meditative Investigation
Sources
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
Corresponding section of the translation pp.687-94
2 Ascertaining that selflessness follows from the reason
The second of the three basic steps in meditation on the personal
selflessness is the ascertainment that if the I exists the way it is conceived, then it must be either the same entity as the mental and
physical aggregates or a different entity from those aggregates.'7
If the I inherently exists, it must be either inherently the same
entity as the aggregates or inherently a different entity from the
aggregates. Sameness and difference of entity are mutually
exclusive; if two things exist, they must be either the same or
different. If the I is found to be neither inherently the same
entity as the mind and body nor a different entity from them,
then the I does not inherently exist.
Through the seven-fold reasoning, one attempts to infer that the
I does not inherently exist as it appears to do. Such an inference
cannot be generated if one has not ascertained that non-inherent
existence pervades, or occurs with, every instance of not being
48
Meditation on Emptiness
inherently the same as or different from the aggregates. In other
words, a yogi must realize that whatever is inherently neither the
same entity as nor a different entity from its basis of designation
does not inherently exist. One must come to a firm conclusion
that there is no third possibility of concrete existence. When one
does, one begins to doubt the existence of the self in much the
same way as one starts to doubt an old friend. 18
3 Establishing the presence of the reasons in the subject
The seven-fold reasoning in brief is:
'I' do not inherently exist because of (i) not being the
aggregates, (ii) not being an entity other than the aggregates, (iii) not being the base of the aggregates, (iv) not
inherently being based on the aggregates, (v) not inherently possessing the aggregates, (vi) not being just the
composite of the aggregates, and (vii) not being the shape
of the aggregates.
The third step in meditation on emptiness—after identifying the
inherently existent I and ascertaining that it must be either the
same as or different from mind and body—is the establishment
of the first reason as a quality of the I—proving that the I is not
mind and body. Many reasons are suggested here, and each
should be considered thoroughly until one is found which disturbs the notion that the I is mind and body." (The reasonings
are explained in detail in Part Two.)
i Establishing that the I is not mind and body
The I is not the mental and physical aggregates because then the
assertion of an I would be senseless. '1' would be just another
name for the aggregates.
The I is not the aggregates because just as the aggregates are
many, so the selves would be many, or just as the I is one, so the
aggregates would be one.
The I is not the aggregates because the I would be produced
and would disintegrate just as the aggregates are produced and
disintegrate. The I is not inherently produced and does not
Meditative Investigation
49
inherently disintegrate because if it did, memory of former
births would be impossible. For, the two Fs of the different lifetimes would be unrelatedly different because they would be
inherently other.
The I is not inherently produced and does not inherently disintegrate because then deeds done (karma) would be wasted as
there would be no transmission of the potencies accumulated
from actions since the Fs of the different lifetimes would be
unrelated others.
The I is not inherently produced and does not inherently disintegrate because the I would meet with the results of actions not
done by itself. If, on the other hand, the potencies accumulated
from actions were transmitted, an I which was totally different
from the I that committed the deeds would undergo the results
of those deeds.
ii Establishing that the I is not different from mind and body
The I is not an entity other than mind and body because if it
were, the I would not have the character of the aggregates, such
as production, disintegration, abiding, form, experiencing, and
realizing objects.
The I is not a separate entity from the mental and physical
aggregates because if it were, there would be no basis for the
designation I. The I would be a non-product, and non-products
are changeless whereas the I obviously changes.
The I is not a separate entity from the aggregates because if it
were, there would be no object to be apprehended as I. The I
would be a non-product like nirvana or a non-existent like a
flower in the sky.
The I is not a separate entity from the aggregates because if it
were, the I would be apprehendable apart from the aggregates
just as the character of form is apprehendable separate from the
character of consciousness. But it is not.
iii Establishing that the I is not the base of mind and body
The I is not inherently the base of the mental and physical aggregates like a bowl for yogurt or like snow that exists throughout
and surrounds a forest of trees because if it were, the I and the
50
Meditation on Emptiness
aggregates would be different entities. This has already been
refuted in the second reasoning.
iv Establishing that mind and body are not the base of I
The I is not inherently based on the aggregates like a person
living in a tent or like a lion living in a forest because if it were,
the I and the aggregates would be different entities. This has
already been refuted in the second reasoning.
v Establishing that the I does not inherently possess mind and
body
The I does not inherently possess the aggregates in the way that
a person possesses a cow because if it did, the I and the aggregates would be different entities. The I does not inherently
possess the aggregates in the way that a person possesses his
body or a tree its core because then the I and the aggregates
would inherently be the same entity. These positions have already
been refuted in the second and first reasonings.
vi Establishing that the I is not the composite of mind and body
The I is not just the composite of the aggregates because the
aggregates are the basis of the designation I and an object designated is not its basis of designation. The I is not the composite of
the aggregates because the composite of the aggregates does not
inherently exist; if the composite of the aggregates were inherently one with the aggregates, the composites would be many
like the aggregates, or the aggregates would be one like the composite. Also, if the composite of the aggregates were a different
entity from the aggregates, it would be apprehendable apart
from the aggregates and would not have the character of the
aggregates. But this is not so.
vii Establishing that the I is not the shape of the body
The I is not the shape of the body because shape is physical and
if the I were merely physical, it would not be conscious. Also, the
shape of the body does not inherently exist because it is a composite of the shapes of the limbs of the body.
Without any further cogitation, one realizes that the I does not
Meditative Investigation
51
inherently exist. One has already ascertained that non-inherent
existence follows if a phenomenon is in none of these seven relationships with its bases of designation, and now one has seen that
the I and body and mind can have none of these seven relationships. Therefore, the I does not exist as a concrete entity as it is
perceived.
For beginners it is necessary to become acquainted with the
reasoning over a long period of time before an understanding of
emptiness can be generated. However, reasons do not require
endless establishment because if every reason had to be established by another reason, one would never realize the main
thesis.20 The reasons are established to a point where experience
manifestly establishes them.21 If a person lacks this experience, it
is necessary to seek other means, such as examples, to gain the
necessary experience that establishes the reasons.
5 Dependent-Arising
Sources
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
Corresponding sections of the translation pp.673-6
If a yogi is directed by his guru to meditate on the non-inherent
existence of the I through the reasoning of dependent-arising, he
would meditate on the thought:
I do not inherently exist because of being a dependentarising.
The meditation has three steps:
1 Identifying the object negated in the view of selflessness
This step is the same as that described in chapter three for the
sevenfold reasoning. The yogi identifies the appearance of an I
as if it covers its bases of designation and identifies how the mind
assents to this appearance.
2 Ascertaining that selflessness follows from the reason
One ascertains that whatever is a dependent-arising does not
54
Meditation on Emptiness
inherently exist because inherent or independent existence is the
opposite of dependent-arising.
3 Establishing the presence of the reason in the subject
The I is a dependent-arising because of being produced by
contaminated actions and afflictions since the life of a being in
cyclic existence is created by predispositions established by an
action motivated by ignorance. (Even the virtuous deeds that
give rise to happy migrations and the non-moving deeds that
give rise to lives in the form and formless realms are motivated
by ignorance with respect to the nature of the person.) The I is a
dependent-arising because of achieving its entity in dependence
on its parts—its former and later moments, mind and body, and
so forth. The I is a dependent-arising because of being imputed
in dependence on a consciousness that designates, '1'.
Without any further cogitation one cognizes that the I does not
inherently exist because one has previously ascertained that
whatever is a dependent-arising does not inherently exist and has
now established the presence of the reason—being a dependentarising—in the subject I. The brevity of the reasoning of dependent-arising illustrates why yogis initially use the sevenfold
reasoning, which reveals in detail how the I cannot be found
under analysis. The sign of dependent-arising is sufficient to
show that the subject cannot be found under analysis; however,
repeated investigation of dependent-arising is required before it
is seen that analytical unfindability or non-inherent existence is
concomitant with being a dependent-arising.
The reasoning of dependent-arising is also used for phenomena other than persons, such as the body:
The body does not inherently exist because of being a
dependent-arising.
1 Identifying the object negated in the view of selflessness
One identifies an appearance of body wherein it seems as if
inherently existent and self-established within the context of
being undifferentiably mixed with the appearance of the five
Dependent-Arising
55
limbs and trunk. It is an appearance of body as if it covers the
five limbs and trunk.
2 Ascertaining that selflessness follows from the reason
Whatever is a dependent-arising does not inherently exist
because inherent existence means that which exists in and of
itself, independent of others.
3 Establishing the presence of the reason in the subject
The body is a dependent-arising because of being produced by
the blood of the mother and the semen of the father. The body is
a dependent-arising because of attaining its own entity in
dependence on its parts—arms, legs, head, trunk, and so forth.
The body is a dependent-arising because of being imputed in
dependence on arms, legs, head, trunk, and so forth.
Without any further cogitation one realizes that the body does
not inherently exist. Again, the brevity of the reasoning may not
be sufficient for a beginner in which case one could turn to the
sevenfold reasoning:
The body does not inherently exist because of (1) not
being the arms, legs, etc., (2) not being a separate entity
from the arms, legs, etc., (3) not being the base of the
arms, legs, etc., (4) not inherently depending on the
arms, legs, etc., (5) not inherently possessing the arms,
legs, etc., (6) not being the composite of the arms, legs,
etc., and (7) not being the shape of the arms, legs, etc.
6 Diamond Slivers
Sources
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
Corresponding section of the translation pp.639-50
If the diamond slivers are used as the mode of analysis, the meditation has six steps based on the thought:
The body is not inherently produced because of not
being produced from self, from inherently existent
others, from both, or causelessly.
1 Identifying the object negated in the view of selflessness
This step is the same as in the last two meditations. The appearance of a body covering the limbs and trunk is mixed with the
appearance of the limbs and trunk and yet appears to exist in
itself, to exist concretely.
2 Ascertaining that selflessness follows from the reason
Whatever is not produced from self, from inherently existent
others, from both, or causelessly is not inherently produced
because inherent production is limited to these four possibilities.
58
Meditation on Emptiness
Production is either caused or uncaused; and, if caused, the only
possibilities are that the causes are the same entity as the effect,
or a different entity from the effect, or both.
3 Establishing the presence of the first reason in the subject
The body is not produced from self (from what is the same entity
as itself) (a) because, if it were, its production would be senseless
and endless, (b) because what already exists in something is not
produced from that something, (c) because it would contradict
what the world manifestly sees, and (d) because the producer and
the produced would be one.
4 Establishing the presence of the second reason in the
subject
The body is not produced from causes which are inherently
existent others because if it were, the body could be produced
from anything that was other than it. For, inherently existent
others are non-related others since otherness is their nature.
The body is not produced from causes which are inherently
existent others because the body and its causes are not inherently
existent others since the body does not exist simultaneously with
its causes. For instance, the body at age ten does not exist simultaneously with the body at age five which is a cause of it. However, if cause and effect were inherently other, the body that is
approaching production would have to exist at the time of the
activity of its approaching production because this activity
depends on it.
Also, for causes, such as the parents or the body of an earlier
age, to be causes of the present body which are inherently other
than it, the causes would still have to exist because it is in relation
to the causes that the body is other. How can a thing be inherently other than a thing that does not exist?
5 Establishing the presence of the third reason in the subject
The body is not produced from both itself and others because all
the fallacies of production from self and from other descend on
such a theory.
Diamond Slivers
59
6 Establishing the presence of the fourth reason in the subject
The body is not produced causelessly because then the copulation of the parents for the sake of conceiving a child would be
senseless. The mother's care of the child in the womb and later
after birth would be senseless. Taking effort to nourish the body
for the sake of future health would be senseless. For, the body
would arise causelessly.
The body is not produced causelessly because if it were, a body
could be produced even from a chair or a door, because everything would arise from everything.
The yogi first identified the body as a product and then saw
that what is inherently produced must be produced according to
one of four possibilities. Thus, upon the establishment of the
four reasons as qualities of the body, he realizes without further
cogitation that the body is not inherently produced. He then
draws out the implications of this realization to include the cognition that the body does not inherently exist. For, if the body is
a product and it is not inherently produced, it does not inherently exist.
7 Realization
Sources
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
Corresponding section of the translation pp.651-8
In the Prasangika system, the sevenfold reasoning, dependentarising, and the diamond slivers are the three main forms of
reasoning for establishing selflessness. Three other forms are the
refutation of the four extreme types of production, the refutation
of the four alternative types of production, and the reasoning
establishing the lack of being one or many.
In the refutation of the four extreme types of production a yogi
would most likely take a phenomenon included within the personal continuum such as body or mind, but he might also take as
his subject an external phenomenon, such as an apple:
An apple is not inherently produced because (1) an existent is not inherently produced, (2) a non-existent is not
inherently produced, (3) what is both existent and nonexistent is not produced, and (4) that which is neither
existent nor non-existent is not produced.
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Meditation on Emptiness
1 Identifying the object negated in the view of selflessness
The yogi identifies the appearance of an apple wherein the apple
seems as if it exists there from its own side without being designated by the subject. The very appearance of an apple toward
the subject is the appearance of an inherently existing apple.
2 Ascertaining that selflessness follows from the reason
Whatever product is not ultimately produced as an existent, a
non-existent, what is both existent and non-existent, or what is
neither is not inherently produced. For, the possibilities of the
nature of an effect are limited to these four.
3 Establishing the presence of the first reason in the subject
An inherently existent apple is not produced because what
inherently exists must always exist and thus there would be no
need for it to be produced. Or, an apple which is in all ways existent at the time of its causes is not produced because causes and
conditions cannot create anything that already exists.
4 Establishing the presence of the second reason in the subject
A non-existent apple is not produced because if it were, the
horns of a rabbit or the hairs of a turtle could also be produced.
Or, an apple is not newly inherently produced because of not
existing at the time of its causes, as is the case with a lotus in the
sky. For, whatever is inherently produced must always exist
because if it did not exist at some time, it would always be inherently non-existent.
Also, an apple would have to exist at the time of its causes
because the action of the apple's approaching production exists
simultaneously with the action of its causes' approaching cessation. Since the apple is the base of the action of its approaching
production, it must exist together with its action if the two are
findable. Thus, the apple would have to exist at the time of the
seed of the tree that produces it, but this is not the case.
5 Establishing the presence of the third reason in the subject
An apple that is both existent and non-existent is not produced
because there is no such thing, since existence and non-existence
are mutually exclusive.
Realization
63
6 Establishing the presence of the fourth reason in the subject
An apple that is neither existent nor non-existent is not produced
because there is no such thing.
The yogi then realizes without further cogitation that an apple
does not inherently exist; in other words, he knows that a concrete apple such as earlier appeared to his mind does not exist. A
vacuity that is the negative of such an apple appears to his mind,
and he remembers the meaning of this vacuity much as a man,
who searched thoroughly for his prize bull in his four pastures
and did not find it, would not forget the loss of his bull when he
returned home.22
In the refutation of the four alternative types of production the
subject meditated upon might be an eye consciousness:
An eye consciousness is not inherently produced
because of not being a case (1) of one inherently producing one, (2) of many inherently producing one, (3) of one
inherently producing many, or (4) of many inherently
producing many.
1 Identifying the object negated in the view of selflessness
The yogi identifies the appearance of an eye consciousness as if it
exists in its own right without dependence on designation by
thought or terms, as if it exists covering the moments of consciousness which are its basis of imputation.
2 Ascertaining that selflessness follows from the reason
Whatever product is not a case of one producing one, many producing one, one producing many, or many producing many is
not inherently produced because the possibilities of inherently
existent production are limited to these four.
3 Establishing the presence of the first reason in the subject
An eye consciousness is not a case of one cause inherently producing one effect because if it were, two of the three aspects of an
eye consciousness (being a conscious entity, having power with
64
Meditation on Emptiness
respect to colors and shapes, and being generated in the image of
its object) would be uncaused.
4 Establishing the presence of the second reason in the subject
An eye consciousness is not a case of many causes inherently
producing one effect because if it were, only one of the three
aspects of an eye consciousness would be produced.
5 Establishing the presence of the third reason in the subject
An eye consciousness is not a case of one cause producing many
effects because if it were, the three aspects of an eye consciousness would not have individual causes.
6 Establishing the presence of the fourth reason in the subject
An eye consciousness is not a case of many causes producing
many effects because if it were, the one general eye consciousness would be uncaused and its three aspects caused.
Thereby, the yogi without further cogitation realizes that an
eye consciousness is not inherently produced and thus does not
inherently exist. He absorbs the import of this realization, and if
it becomes weaker, he performs the analysis again until the cognition of unfindability returns in force. He tries to become accustomed to this unfindability so that he will never think the
opposite again.
The reasoning establishing the lack of being one or many has
already been illustrated in the sevenfold reasoning in the sense
that the I does not inherently exist because of not inherently
being one with or different from the aggregates. However,
another form of the reasoning establishing the lack of being one
or many is illustrated here in the example of a house:
A house does not inherently exist because of not inherently being one and not inherently being many.
1 Identifying the object negated in the view of selflessness
The yogi calls to mind a house and identifies the appearance of
the house as a whole existing in its own right. The inherently
Realization
65
existent house is what he might point to when pointing a house
out to someone else. Findability is portability, 23 and the yogi
works for a long time to catch a sense of just what is being pointed
out, knowing that it is important to stay with an appearance of
inherent existence both so that it becomes well known and so
that the ramifications of its absence can be felt.
2 Ascertaining that selflessness follows from the reason
Whatever is neither inherently one nor inherently many does
not inherently exist because these two positions exhaust all possibilities of inherently existent things. The yogi accustoms himself to this fact by considering hundreds of objects, such as
house, boards, group, members, glass, mind, and so forth and
seeing that from a specific point of view they are each either one
or many. For instance, a group is definitely one from the point of
view of the entity, group, and the members of a group are definitely many when considering the constituents of the group.
3 Establishing the presence of the first reason in the subject
A house is not inherently one because of having parts. Whatever
has parts cannot have an inherent nature of oneness because then
a plurality of parts would be impossible.
4 Establishing the presence of the second reason in the subject
A house is not inherently many because there is no inherently
existent oneness. When a part of a composite is refuted, the composite which is composed of those parts is also refuted. Since the
many is composed of ones, refuting inherently existent oneness
refutes inherently existent manyness.
Through having ascertained the pervasion and having established the reasons as qualities of the subject, the yogi realizes
without any further cogitation that a house does not inherently
exist. He knows then that there is nothing he can actually point
to when identifying a house. He knows that there is no house
which covers its parts. He remains in the force of this realization
as long as he can, not allowing the vacuity which is a negative of
a pointable house to become a mere nothingness.
66
Meditation on Emptiness
The main object of meditation during the first stage of meditation on emptiness is the I.24 Through the sevenfold reasoning the
yogi comes to realize that a self-established I, covering its bases
of designation, does not exist at all anywhere at any time. He perceives an utter vacuity that is the absence of such an I, and he
ascertains the mere elimination of the I that is negated in the
view of selflessness with nothing positive in its place. He sustains this space-like realization, which is so called because just as
space is the mere absence of obstructive contact, so the selflessness that he sees is the mere absence of such a self. When his
certitude of the non-existence of an inherently existent I weakens, he again reflects a little on the reasoning and renews the
strength of the view of the emptiness of a self-established I.
The yogi during this stage of meditation has generated an
inferring consciousness that realizes the emptiness of the person,
and this consciousness has no ascertainment of knower and the
object known. All the elaborations of subject and object are said
to disappear in the sense that a consciousness that infers emptiness does not ascertain subject and object; however, subject and
object still appear at this time. Though appearing, they are not
determined, for a consciousness inferring emptiness does not
identify the object, emptiness, and the subject, the cognizing
wisdom. The only phenomenon that is ascertained is the mere
absence of a self-established I such as usually appears to the
mind. It is not even thought, 'This is emptiness.' 25
In an inferential realization of emptiness, an emptiness is cognized conceptually or through the medium of an image. Despite
the profound nature of such inferential intuition, direct realization is yet to be attained.
8 Calm Abiding
Sources
Pa-bong-ka's Lectures on the Stages of the Path
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Concentrations and
Formlessnesses
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
Lati Rinbochay's oral teachings
Geshe Gediin Lodro's oral teachings
SECOND STAGE
OF MEDITATION ON EMPTINESS
How to cultivate a similitude of special insight based on a similitude
of calm abiding
The second stage of meditation on emptiness is the mode of
cultivating a similitude of special insight based on a similitude of
calm abiding.26 During it, the yogi achieves calm abiding, defined
as a stabilization arisen from meditation and conjoined with
special pliancy. Etymologically, calm abiding (shamatha, zhi
gnas) is explained as the mind's abiding (stha, gnas) on an internal object of observation upon the calming (shama, zhi) of distraction to the outside.
68
Meditation on Emptiness
PREREQUISITES FOR ACHIEVING CALM ABIDING
The causal collections or prerequisites for achieving calm abiding are six:27
1 Staying in an agreeable place
This has five features:
a. Good acquisitions. One needs easily obtainable sustenance
not involving wrong livelihood or offerings from sinful persons.
b. Salutary location. Staying in an area blessed by the presence
of former holy persons affords blessings, but if such is not
available, one should at least not stay where those who have lost
their vows dwell, where the spiritual community has undergone
disturbance, or where there are fierce animals, robbers, nonhuman evil spirits, and so forth.
c. Salutary place. The place should not generate hot or cold
diseases, and the area and water should be agreeable.
d. Salutary friends. It is harmful for beginners to stay alone
without friends, and thus one should have at least three companions whose views and behavior are concordant and whose presence promotes conscientiousness. Also, since sound is the thorn
of concentration, one needs to be free of the sound of humans
during the day and of dogs and water, etc., at night.
e. Possession of the pleasant 'articles' of yoga. Through hearing
and thinking one should eliminate false ideas with respect to the
object of meditation and become skilled in the essentials of practice.
2 Few desires
One should not have desire for food, clothing, and so forth,
either of good quality or in great quantity.
3 Knowing satisfaction
One should be satisfied with gaining only mediocre food and
clothing, for if one is not and instead is attached to them, one will
be distracted to the purposes of accumulating and keeping
wealth, and meditative stabilization will not be generated.
4 Pure ethics
The pacification of subtle internal distraction depends on
Calm Abiding
69
abandoning coarse external distractions; hence, ill behavior of
body and speech should be restrained and pacified through
proper ethics, for if one is dominated by coarse discursiveness,
one's mind will not abide in a natural state.
5 Forsaking commotion
If commotion is not abandoned, time will be passed in senseless
activities and conversation, etc. Thus, for the sake of generating
concentration, one needs few purposes and few activities—this
coming of its own accord if a meditator has few desires and
knows satisfaction. For one-pointed practice, astrology, medical
practice, prophecy, performing rites, and so forth must be forsaken. Also making effort at something of small purpose, such as
a minor topic of scholarship, does not achieve the essential
purpose, much like being attached to sugar-cane but not taking
the sugar.
6 Thoroughly abandoning thoughts of desire and so forth
One must turn the mind away from these through contemplating their faults and reflecting on impermanence.
Pa-bong-ka states that if all these prerequisites are complete and
one practices with effort, the achievement of calm abiding will
not take more than six months.
T H E OBJECT OF CALM ABIDING
.Calm abiding must be achieved with respect to an internal or
imagined object, and thus even when non-Buddhists use a
pebble or stick as the object, these are only bases of later imagination by the mental consciousness; one cannot achieve calm
abiding with the eye consciousness.28 The Buddhist scholar-yogi
Nagabodhi, being unable to achieve progress with other objects,
imagined that the horn of a buffalo had grown from his own
head, since he was familiar with it; however, in general for a
Buddhist not just any object is suitable. Rather, the object itself
should aid in the process of eliminating the chief faults obstructing meditative stabilization, laxity and excitement. To aid in
eliminating laxity, it should be easier, upon observing the object,
70
Meditation on Emptiness
to generate faith and enthusiasm, and to aid in eliminating
excitement, it should be easier to hold the mind to that object
and generate sobriety.
The object with respect to which calm abiding is achieved
should possess a special purpose.29 Observation of emptiness, as
here in the second stage of meditation on emptiness, has the
special feature of facilitating generation of special insight, but
emptiness—due to its profundity—is a difficult object for beginners. Unless memory of the realization of emptiness during the
first stage remains firm, since one must temporarily forsake
analysis and remain only in stabilizing meditation in order to
achieve calm abiding, the ascertainment of emptiness can
weaken to the point where one is no longer meditating on emptiness but on nothingness. Such meditation would only increase
ignorance, and thus many choose a different object.
It is said that the desirous should concentrate on ugliness,
reflecting on (1) the ugliness of pain, (2) the relative ugliness of
the beautiful in dependence on something more beautiful, (3) the
ugliness of the afflictions, (4) the ugliness of rapid disintegration,
or (5) the ugliness of filthy substances.30 The hateful should concentrate on love, wishing help and happiness for friends, enemies, and neutral persons. The ignorant should concentrate on
the dependent-arising of cyclic existence (see pp.275-83). The
proud should concentrate on the six constituents in their own
continuum—earth, water, fire, wind, space, and consciousness
(see p.627)—thereby overcoming the conception of the body as
an amorphous whole and attaining a discrimination of ugliness
by seeing the parts, such as fat; by this means pride is deflated.
Those with too much discursiveness should concentrate on the
inhalation and exhalation of breath. These five types of objects
are called objects of observation for purifying behavior and have
the special feature of facilitating the conquest of desire and so
forth and thus aid in the generation of meditative stabilization.
Those in whom either desire, hatred, obscuration, pride or
discursiveness predominate should choose an object as outlined
above because without overcoming the vibrancy of the afflictions by way of those objects of observation, firm meditative
Calm Abiding
71
stabilization cannot be attained.31 Hence, the desirous temporarily should not use joy, love, or the like as the object of observation. Similarly, the hateful should not concentrate on suffering,
and those with predominate discursiveness should not use bright
objects, etc. A particular object of observation, however, is not
specified for those whose afflictions are small or of equal
strength; they may use any of these.
It is said that observation of the body of a Buddha is better
than all others because it not only has the special feature of facilitating the achievement of meditative stabilization through its
blessings but also has the special feature of completing the collections of merit as well as enhancing later cultivation of deity yoga in
tantra.32 At the point when the object of observation—a Buddha
body—becomes firm, ordinary appearances are replaced by pure
appearances, and one sees a Buddha night and day; through this,
one becomes a suitable vessel for Secret Mantra. Also, through a
Buddha's always appearing to the mind, one accumulates the
merit of seeing a limitless number of Buddhas, whereby innumerable benefits, such as not being overcome by pain even in dire
circumstances, arise.
Thus, in order to aid in the development of calm abiding, the
yogi might not take emptiness as his object of observation. However, once the object is chosen, he would not switch from it to
another until a fully qualified calm abiding has been achieved,
much as one would not change the place of friction when trying
to ignite a fire by rubbing two sticks together. 33 During this
period, continuous effort without, for instance, resting for a day
or two, is required.
FAULTS AND A N T I D O T E S IN DEVELOPING CALM
ABIDING
In the process of developing calm abiding a yogi overcomes five
faults through eight antidotes (see Chart 2).34
1
Laziness
The first fault, laziness, involves either not wishing to engage in
cultivating meditative stabilization or the inability to continue
72zyvutsrponmlkjihgfedcbaSMFEA
Meditation on Emptiness
Chart 2: Faults of Meditative Stabilization and their Antidotes
Five Faults
Eight Antidotes
laziness
(kausïdya, le lo)
faith (shraddha, dad pa)
aspiration (chhanda, 'dun pa)
exertion (vyayama, rtsol ba)
pliancy (prasrabdhi,
shin tu sbyangs pa)
forgetting the advice
(avavâda-sammosha, gdams
ngag brjed pa)
[non-identification of]
laxity and excitement
(laya, auddhatya; hying ba,
rgod pa)
mindfulness (smrti, dranpa)
introspection (samprajanya,
shes bzhin)
non-application
(anabhisamskâra, 'du mi
byed pa)
application (abhisamskdra,
'du byed pa)
[over-]application
(abhisamskdra, 'du byed pa)
equanimity (upekshd, btang
snyoms)
the practice once begun. Laziness is of three types: indolence
through attachment to sleep and so forth; adhering to nonvirtuous activities of desire and so forth; and a sense of inadequacy, thinking, 'I cannot do this'. Thus, laziness is not just
sluggishness but also the factor of enthusiasm for afflictions, as
well as a false sense of inadequacy. The three types of laziness
cause procrastination and are overcome through faith, aspiration, exertion, and pliancy.
Faith is mainly conviction in the qualities of meditative stabilization and its fruits, but also includes both the faith ofclarity, which
is a captivation with those qualities, and the faith that is the wish to
attain those qualities. In order to attain faith in meditative
stabilization, it is necessary to contemplate the disadvantages of
Calm Abiding
73
not having stabilization—such as losing the value of virtuous
practice through distraction—and the advantages of having i t such as steadiness of mind whereby feats, clairvoyance, magical
emanation, and so forth can be achieved. Also, with stabilization
sleep turns into meditative stabilization, afflictions lessen, and
spiritual paths are easily generated in the mental continuum.
The faith that sees these qualities induces aspiration, which
involves a seeking of meditative stabilization.
Aspiration, in turn, induces effort, which here is an enthusiasm for meditative stabilization, leading to exertion, which acts
as the antidote to the three types of laziness. As will be explained
later, exertion eventually generates a mental and physical pliancy
or serviceability that is the final antidote to laziness.
2 Forgetting the advice
The second fault, forgetting the advice from one's lama on the
object of meditation, means to lose the object of observation, the
pole to which the elephant of the mind is being tied with the rope
of mindfulness in order to be brought under control by the hook
of introspection. Forgetfulness here is an afflicted mindfulness—
taking to mind a non-virtuous object through the power of
excitement, laxity, and so forth. It is overcome through mindfulness uiiich is defined as having the function of non-forgetfulness
with respect to a familiar phenomenon. This non-afflicted mindfulness has three features:
a. Objective feature: a familiar object. If emptiness is the object
of observation, familiarity with it was gained during the first
stage of meditation on emptiness; there, with realization of noninherent existence, one 'found' the object. If, on the other hand,
the body of a Buddha is the object of observation, familiarity is
gained through repeated viewing of a picture or image and then
causing it to appear to the mind.
b. Subjective feature: non-forgetfulness within observation of
that object. With mindfulness, the aspects of the object appear
continuously without forgetfulness, as in being mindful of food
when hungry.
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Meditation on Emptiness
c. Functional feature: causing the mind not to scatter to other
objects of observation.
One must hold to the object of observation with a tight mode of
apprehension without distraction; only that object should
appear to the mind.
3 Non-identification of laxity and excitement
Then, when mindfulness is able to hold the mind to the object of
observation, the third fault, non-identification of laxity and
excitement, arises. Laxity is defined as the mental factor of
declination in the mind's mode of apprehension when cultivating virtue; it is an internal distraction, a depression in the intensity of the mind's clarity. In a coarse neutral form of laxity the
object is not seen, as if one had entered into darkness. This is a
time of suddenly losing the intensity of the factor of clarity,
losing the object, and being unable to move the mind to any
object; in this state, the mind abides in a subjective clarity, but
without intensity, and is unable to remain on the object of observation. Another form of coarse laxity occurs when the mind has
stability in the sense of abiding on its virtuous object of observation but lacks clarity; this is a virtuous form of laxity due to the
mind's abiding on a virtuous object. Subtle laxity occurs when
one has the stability of not losing the mode of apprehension of
the object as well as clarity, but lacks an intensity of clarity due to
having loosened the strength of the mode of apprehension.
Since both subtle laxity and actual meditative stabilization have
stability and clarity, it is difficult to distinguish between the two.
The factor distinguishing meditative stabilization, however, is an
intensity of clarity. An absence of intensity refers to a looseness of
mind and can occur within the stability ofbeing able to stay on the
object; firming of the factor ofstability within this looseness acts as
a cause of subtle laxity. Having an intensity of clarity, on the other
hand, means that the mind dwells tightly on the object of observation. Having or not having this intensity is compared to loosely or
tightly holding a bowl, or the difference between usual faith in a
lama and the particularly strong faith that is occasionally generated when a tightening in the mode of apprehension occurs.
Calm Abiding
75
Since in a state of subtle laxity the movement of the breath in
the nostrils can stop, resulting in a firm mind for even an entire
day, some have mistaken this for meditative stabilization and
have even advised loosening the mode of apprehension of the
object. They have confused this with a similar occurrence in the
stage of completion of Highest Yoga Tantra upon the entering,
remaining, and dissolving of the winds in the central channel; in
the latter, however, the movement of the abdomen also stops and
profound states are induced. From mis-identifying subtle laxity
as meditation, not only can the four concentrations and four
formless absorptions not be achieved, but also in this lifetime
itself forgetfulness will increase and wisdom diminish, resulting
in cultivating—as if intentionally—the means of achieving
rebirth as an animal.
Though lethargy and drowsiness can lead to laxity, laxity is
neither of them. Lethargy is a heaviness of body and mind,
included within obscuration and accompanying all root and
secondary afflictions (see p.265), whereas laxity is a factor of
withdrawal inside and thus cannot accompany the afflictions of
desire, hatred, and so forth, which are distractions outside. Lethargy darkens and obscures the mind whereas laxity does not.
However, the mention of laxity here as a fault in meditative
stabilization implicitly includes lethargy, sleep, and so forth.
Within laxity itself, two types are to be distinguished, one which
is an over-withdrawal of the mind inside and another which is a
mere diminishment of the mind's mode of apprehension.
Excitement is a disquiet of the mind and scattering to an object
of desire—mindfulness of a pleasant object, such as remembering at night a dance seen during the day. Since excitement is a
secondary affliction included within the factor of desire, not all
scatterings are instances of excitement, as when the mind scatters to an object of anger or even to another virtuous object.
Although all scattering harms meditative stabilization and is
implicitly included in the mention of excitement, it is not stated
explicitly because those newly cultivating meditative stabilization
are of the Desire Realm. They must mainly cease attachment to
pleasant forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects whereas
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Meditation on Emptiness
scattering to virtuous or hated objects is less frequent and for
shorter periods. However, when cultivating calm abiding, scattering to pleasant or unpleasant objects or to virtuous ones, such
as becoming mindful of making donations, interrupts the stabilizing of the mind and, therefore, must be stopped.
Coarse excitement is a case of losing the object of observation
in forgetfulness, whereas in subtle excitement the object is not
lost but a corner of the mind is involved in fast-moving thought
such that a pleasant object is about to appear to the mind. The
state of subtle excitement is compared to water moving about
under ice on a frozen river.
The antidote to non-identification of laxity and excitement is
introspection that quickly recognizes them. Like a spy, introspection investigates and determines whether or not laxity and
excitement have arisen. Constant cultivation of introspection
would prevent stability; yet, if introspection were not cultivated
at all, one would not know the faults that had already occurred,
like allowing a thief to enter and carry off the wealth; therefore,
one must prepare mindfulness beforehand and then occasionally
initiate inspection of whether laxity and excitement have arrived
or not. As in the example of (1) holding a cup of tea with the
hand, (2) holding it firmly, and (3) investigating with the eye to
see if it is tilted, (1) mindfulness holds to the object of
observation, (2) the mode of apprehension is tightened, and (3)
introspection analyzes whether laxity and excitement have
arisen or not.
4 Non-application
When either laxity or excitement have arisen, non-application of
their antidotes is a fault. Application—the mental factor of intention which here is an engagement in a virtuous object—is necessary as its antidote.
Antidotes to laxity. Since subtle laxity is a case of having both the
stability of being able to remain on the object and subjective clarity but of lacking intensity, it is not necessary to leave the meditative session or switch to another object when it arises. Rather,
Calm Abiding
77
it is sufficient merely to tighten the mode of apprehension; however, if it is tightened too much, excitement will be generated,
and thus a moderation of tightness and looseness is necessary, as
is the case with the strings of a violin for achieving a pleasant
sound. If one suspects that excitement is about to be generated,
one should loosen the mode of apprehension a little, whereas if
one suspects that laxity is about to be generated, one should
tighten a little. The mid-point between these is known only
through experience. However, just as there is greater danger
from an enemy within one's own circle because of the difficulty
of identification, so there is greater danger of mistaking laxity for
meditative stabilization, and thus tightness should be emphasized.
If, having tried to tighten the mind, one is unable to remove
the fault of subtle laxity and experiences a lack of clarity in the
mode of apprehension, coarse laxity has arrived. This is the fault
of over-withdrawing the mind inside; to counter it, one should
'extend' the object a little, increasing it in brilliance or noticing
its details. If this still does not remove laxity, one should leave
the object of observation and invigorate this depressed mind by
cultivating joy—reflecting on the difficulty of finding the meaningful life of leisure and fortune as a human, on the auspicious
attributes of the Three Jewels, on the advantages of relying on a
spiritual guide, or on the benefits of the altruistic intention to
become enlightened. One can also take to mind a luminous
object or imagine great acts of charity. If the mind heightens
through such techniques and awakens, one should again apprehend the original object of observation. For those who are not
used to these techniques, it is difficult for them to help immediately; however, for one who is familiar with them, contemplating, for instance, the difficulty of finding this meaningful life of
leisure and fortune is like throwing cold water on the face.
However, if laxity is still not removed, one can use the forceful method of imagining one's own mind as a drop of white light
at the heart and with the sound 'phat' causing it to exit from the
crown of the head, ascend high in the sphere of the sky, and mix
undifferentiably with the sky.
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Meditation on Emptiness
If laxity is still not removed, one should leave the session and
remove the causes that generate it—lethargy, sleep, darkened
mind, and so forth—by staying in a cool area, going to a high
place with a vast view, walking about, washing the face with cold
water, and so forth. When, having done this, the mind has awakened, one should, as before, apprehend the object of observation.
Antidotes to excitement. Subtle excitement is a case of distraction
within not losing the object; its arising is due to the fault of
having tightened the mind too much, and thus one should loosen
the mode of apprehension a little. If that does not help and one is
still distracted, then coarser excitement has been generated.
Since this is caused by a happy mind, one should not be too
happy, for progress will be impeded, as was the case with
Buddha's father who did not achieve the state of Stream Enterer
due to being too happy at his son's success. At this point, it is not
necessary to leave the session; rather, one should contemplate
sources of sobriety, such as death, impermanence, cyclic existence, and the sufferings of bad migrations.
If excitement is still not removed, one can use a forceful
method of eliminating it, such as observing the inhalation and
exhalation of the breath when dominated by discursiveness;
exhaling, one should think, 'Going there', and when inhaling,
'Coming here'. Or, one can mentally count the breaths, counting
in rounds up to ten, back to one, up to ten, back to one, and so
forth. 35 If, though this is done, excitement is not eliminated, one
should temporarily leave the session.
Since beginners can only remain in contact with the object of
observation for short periods, initially one should meditate in
brief sessions even eighteen times a day; in due course stability
will be achieved of its own accord, at which time the session can
be lengthened. It is important not to try at first to meditate for
long periods; otherwise, upon sight of the meditation cushion,
one will feel nausea and laziness. The session should be left
while it is going well, when one still feels that it would go well if
continued.
Calm Abiding
79
5 Over-application
When laxity and excitement have been eliminated, application of
their antidotes is a fault preventing stability of mind; as its antidote one uses equanimity, that is, one desists from applying the
techniques for pacifying laxity and excitement, such as invigorating the mind, withdrawing it inside, and so forth. This is a
loosening of, or leaving off, the exertion involved in those antidotes—an equanimity that causes the mind to abide naturally on
the object of observation accompanied by intense clarity. This
occurs on the ninth state of mind (to be explained below) when
one loosens the exertion of the introspection investigating
whether laxity and excitement have arisen without, however,
loosening either mindfulness or the intensity of the mode of
apprehension of the object.
As Pa-bong-ka concludes:36
Having completed the prerequisites for calm abiding in a
place having the five qualifications and so forth, one sits
on a comfortable cushion [in a posture] having the seven
features of Vairochana. A Shakyamuni, only a fingerlength high, separates from the lama on one's head and is
set in space [about six feet] in front of one's navel [or at eye
level]. Initially, the object of observation will not be clear
and one does not need to make it so. For if mere generalities of the parts—head, arms, legs and so forth—and a
mere sense of flashing gold appear and if mindfulness
keeps the mind undistractedly [on the object] without
forgetfulness and with a tight mode of apprehension, this
mode of sustaining [meditation] through such mindfulness alone contains all the ways of eliminating laxity and
excitement. This is an unparalleled quintessential
instruction to be held in the heart by great meditators, for
the tight mode of apprehension eliminates laxity and nondistraction eliminates excitement.
If, when meditating this way, stability arises, then
because one has come closer to laxity, one should be
wary of it, [increasing] clarity and tightening the mode of
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Meditation on Emptiness
apprehension. However, if clarity arises, one is closer to
excitement and thus should be wary of excitement and
seek stability.
One should not pretend to be achieving meditative
stabilization while not knowing what is needed to
possess it; rather, one should definitely achieve a meditative stabilization possessing the two features of (1)
stability in general but mainly (2) clarity with a tight
mode of apprehension. As explained above in detail,
mindfulness holds the object of observation without
losing it, and at that time whether coarse or subtle laxity
or excitement are about to arise, introspection immediately recognizes them, and they are stopped through
directly relying on their specific antidotes. Then, when
laxity and excitement are eliminated, one should not make
the exertion of the antidotes but abide one-pointedly on
the object of observation, sustaining it with great clarity
that possesses intensity.
N I N E STATES IN DEVELOPING CALM ABIDING
There are nine states or levels in the process of developing calm
abiding (see Chart 3), of which the first two occur during the first
stage of meditation on emptiness; the remaining seven occur
during the second. Although actual meditative stabilization
(samadhi) is associated with calm abiding, each of the preliminary nine states is called a meditative stabilization due to being an
instance of the development of the mental factor with that name
(see p.247).37
1
Setting the mind
The first state is a meditative stabilization that, following the
hearing of advice for meditation, withdraws the mind from all
external objects of observation and aims it at an internal object.
It is achieved through the power of hearing advice from a lama
about an object of observation because initially one merely sets
the mind on the object based on that advice, not from a natural
A
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Meditation on Emptiness
familiarity gained by thinking on it again and again. Aside from
only occasional placement on the object, the mind mostly cannot
remain on it, and thus a continuum of setting cannot be established.
Through the force of engaging in investigating and analyzing
what the mind is doing, one recognizes the mind's becoming lost
due to scattering and excitement and consequently has the sense
that thoughts are increasing. However, thought has not actually
become more manifold; it is just being identified.
If the emptiness of the I is used as the object, the wrong view
of the inherent existence of the person predominates due to previous familiarity such that the correct view is actually only an
occasional interruption in the stream of distraction.38
2
Continuous setting
The second state is a meditative stabilization that involves an
ability to lengthen a little the continuum of observing an object
without distraction. It is achieved through the power of thought
because, due to sustaining the continuum of tying the mind to
the object of observation through repeated thought, one is for
the first time able to extend that continuum a little. One can
remain undistracted for the period that it would take to recite
one hundred om manipadme hum. Still, distraction during this
phase exceeds abiding on the object.
The first two states arise in the manner of forcible engagement
since it is necessary to force or tighten the mind with striving.
Despite this, laxity and excitement frequently and continuously
arise, the one being generated after the other like a waterfall,
such that the mind cannot be set in meditative stabilization.
During the second state one has the sense that thought is resting because it sometimes quiets and sometimes is generated. The
difference between the first two states is that during the second the
mind remains longer on the object of observation, be it the noninherent existence of the person or the body of a Buddha, etc.
3 Re-setting or withdrawal and setting
The third state is a meditative stabilization that, due to slight
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83
familiarity with the object of observation, returns or re-ties the
mind to it through mindfulness's immediate realization of distraction. Like putting a patch on cloth, the mind is returned to the
continuum of observation through immediate recognition of
distraction, which, therefore, is less frequent than in the previous
state. This is the time when powerful mindfulness is generated,
and thus the third state is said to be achieved through its power.
The difference between the second and third states is that the
third involves a shorter continuum of distraction, and thus here
'meditation'—from the trilogy of hearing, thinking, and meditating—begins, although in a looser sense one was meditating
earlier.39 In the same vein, 'analytical meditation' is technically
possible now even though analysis occurred earlier. However,
since analysis at this point would obstruct attainment of calm
abiding, the yogi does not analyze but instead attempts to remain
one-pointedly on, as in the two examples, the emptiness realized
analytically during the first stage of meditation or the body of a
Buddha.
4 Close setting
The fourth state is a meditative stabilization that involves an
improved stability of mind, its having been withdrawn from the
vast array of objects by the power of mindfulness. During the
previous state distraction was abandoned through recognizing it,
and thus the mind is now, with effort, set just on its object. From
having generated strong mindfulness, losing the object no longer
occurs; thus, the fault of forgetting the lama's advice on the
object no longer arises. This ability to remain on the object without losing it is the great difference between the third and fourth
states.
The fourth state is achieved through the power of mindfulness
because strong mindfulness is able to tie the mind closer and
closer to its object of observation. With this state, like an adult,
mindfulness has matured, or, in other words, its power has been
completed. Although the object is never lost and thus coarse
excitement has ceased, powerful laxity and excitement still
occur; hence it is necessary to rely on their antidotes.
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Meditation on Emptiness
5 Disciplining
The fifth state is a meditative stabilization that involves a liking
for meditative stabilization through having seen with experience
its advantages. With the fulfillment of powerful mindfulness in
the last state, introspection also becomes powerful, whereby it
recognizes the faults of scattering to objects of discursiveness as
well as secondary afflictions and does not allow such scattering.
Thus, this state and the next are said to be achieved by the power
of introspection.
Since during the fourth state the mind was strongly withdrawn inside, the danger of subtle laxity on the fifth is great. One
must with powerful introspection distinguish subtle laxity and,
through contemplating the advantages of meditative stabilization, revivify the mind. The withdrawal of the mind practiced
over the first three stages culminates in the fourth with the ability to stay on the object, but this withdrawal itself proceeds too
far, and now it is necessary to apply the antidotes to subtle laxity.
Through contemplating the auspicious qualities of meditative
stabilization, such as the resultant clairvoyances and the ability
to penetrate the meaning of difficult topics such as emptiness,
one takes joy in meditative stabilization. The difference between
this and the former state is that now coarse laxity does not arise.
6 Pacifying
The sixth state is a meditative stabilization that stops distraction,
knowing its faults through experience in dependence on introspection. Due to the mind's becoming overly invigorated during
the fifth state, here on the sixth the danger of generating subtle
excitement is great. Powerful introspection recognizes it, whereupon even subtle excitement is viewed as a fault and stopped.
Thus, the difference between this and the former state is that
now there is no great danger that subtle laxity will arise and the
arising of subtle excitement is less frequent. During the sixth
state the power of introspection becomes fully developed.
7
Thorough pacifying
The seventh state is a meditative stabilization that involves
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85
enthusiasm for abandoning with exertion desirous attitudes,
mental discomfort, lethargy, sleep, and so forth. Since the powers
of mindfulness and introspection were fulfilled on earlier levels,
it is difficult for laxity and excitement to arise; however, one
must generate effort, view even subtle laxity and excitement as
faults, and abandon them as much as possible. The difference
between this and the former state is that here one does not need
great qualms about the danger of coming under the influence of
subtle laxity and excitement.
Whereas during the fifth and sixth states one has qualms that
laxity and excitement could damage one's concentration, during
the seventh, effort is able to stop them such that they cannot
greatly interrupt the process. Thus, the seventh and eighth
states are achieved by the power of effort in the sense that
through exertion even subtle discursiveness and secondary
afflictions are abandoned, whereby laxity and excitement cannot
interrupt meditative stabilization.
Although during the third through seventh states one can
remain for a considerable time in a continuum of meditative
stabilization without generating laxity and excitement, laxity
and excitement do interrupt again and again at least in a minor
way, and thus these states are characterized by interrupted
engagement. During the first two states the mind is more out of
meditative stabilization than in it, and thus the designation
'interrupted engagement'—meaning an interruption of meditative stabilization—is not used with respect to them. Forcible
engagement is specified for the first two states even though it
occurs in the first seven, because the third through seventh also
involve interrupted engagement.40
8 Making one-pointed, or making continuous
The eighth state is a meditative stabilization that involves the
ability of continuous placement in meditative stabilization for an
entire session without interruption by laxity and excitement due
to the exertion of applying their antidotes. At the beginning of
the session one relies on a little exertion directed at maintaining
mindfulness with respect to the antidotes to laxity and excitement
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Meditation on Emptiness
whereby one is able to sustain the session without even subtle
laxity or excitement during that period.
The eighth state is achieved through the power of this small
effort, and because not even subtle laxity and excitement arise,
the state is characterized by uninterrupted engagement. During
the earlier states, the enemies—laxity and excitement—were
powerful, then decreased in strength, and now have completely
degenerated; therefore, it is no longer necessary to rely on the
exertion of introspection analyzing whether laxity or excitement
have or are about to arise. The difference between the seventh
and eighth states is this absence of laxity and excitement.
9 Setting in equipoise
The ninth state is a meditative stabilization devoid of the activity
of thought due to the fact that meditative stabilization shines
forth of its own accord from familiarity, without depending on
the striving and exertion of maintaining mindfulness of antidotes. It is achieved through the power of familiarity with onepointedness during the eighth state such that one engages wholly
in meditative stabilization spontaneously, without exertion.
Thus, the ninth state is characterized by spontaneous engagement, like recitation by one trained in it.
The difference between the eighth and ninth states is that the
latter does not depend on striving and exertion. A similitude of
calm abiding—a one-pointed mind included within the Desire
Realm—is achieved.
CALM ABIDING
Calm abiding is attained when the ninth state is conjoined with a
fully qualified pliancy—a serviceability of body and mind. 41
During the ninth state one can effortlessly abide in meditative
stabilization free from even subtle laxity and excitement, but this
is only a similitude of calm abiding. To attain actual calm abiding, special joy and bliss of physical and mental pliancy must be
developed through again and again familiarizing with meditative
stabilization.
The slight form of pliancy that is generated at the beginning of
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87
the ninth state increases to the point where mental pliancy is
generated. This means that winds or currents of energy involved
in unsalutary physical states are first calmed and leave the body
through the top of the head,42 where a sense of bliss is generated,
like the touch of a hot hand after shaving the head. Immediately
thereafter, a m e n t a l pliancy, which is a pacification of the
unsalutary states that make the mind heavy and prevent its usage
in virtue at will, is generated, affording a serviceability of mind.
Through its power, a wind of serviceability that induces physical pliancy moves throughout the body, causing separation from
unsalutary physical states of roughness and heaviness and affording an ability to use the body at will in virtuous actions without
any sense of hardship. In this way, a physical pliancy of smoothness and lightness in which the body is light like cotton and
seems as if filled with this wind of physical pliancy is generated.
In dependence on this, a bliss of physical pliancy that has a
nature of very pleasant smoothness and lightness is generated.
Then, continued meditative equipoise generates a bliss of mental
pliancy, in which one's body seems to dissolve into the object of
observation and no other phenomena appear, whereupon the
mind is so buoyantly joyous that it is as if unable to remain on its
object. When this buoyant joy is purified a little and the sense of
bliss diminishes slightly, one attains an immovable pliancy concordant with meditative stabilization in the sense that the mind
remains stably on the object of observation. Simultaneous with
this, actual calm abiding is attained.
With calm abiding, one attains a mind included within the
Form Realm as well as a preparation (samantaka) for the first
concentration which is called 'not unable' (anagamya) because
this mind can serve as the mental basis for the path consciousnesses that are the antidotes to all afflictions of the three realms
—Desire, Form, and Formless. Thus, calm abiding is achieved
when the mind is conjoined with physical and mental pliancy
and is also in control in the sense of one's being able to direct it to
whatever object of observation one wishes.
When calm abiding is achieved, there are many signs of progress:
88
Meditation on Emptiness
1 the mind has the capacity to purify afflictions
2 when in meditative equipoise, pliancy is quickly generated
3 even subsequent to meditative equipoise, features of pliancy
are generated
4 with pliancy and meditative stabilization mutually increasing
each other, sleep and meditative stabilization become mixed,
and many pure appearances are seen in dreams
5 during meditative equipoise all coarse appearances disappear,
and the mind seems to have mixed with space
6 when arising from the session, one has the sense of adventitiously gaining a body
7 fewer afflictions are generated, and those that arise are weak
and are immediately extinguished of their own accord
8 the five obstructions-(1) aspiration to objects of the Desire
Realm, (2) harmful intent, (3) lethargy and sleep, (4) excitement and contrition, and (5) doubt—mostly do not arise
9 the mind's factor of stability is firm like a mountain and the
factor of clarity is such that it seems one could count the particles in a wall.
Though such calm abiding is a prerequisite for cognizing emptiness directly, its attainment alone does not cause one to achieve
any of the five Buddhist paths - accumulation, preparation,
seeing, meditation, or no more learning. Non-Buddhists proceed
to generate the four concentrations and four formless absorptions, but since calm abiding alone can serve as the mental basis
of path consciousnesses that overcome the afflictions from the
root, it is not necessary for a Buddhist to do so (though all eventually do). The Buddhist turns to the cultivation of special
insight.
Identifying the second stage of meditation on emptiness
If the yogi uses emptiness as the object of observation during
cultivation of calm abiding, the experience with emptiness
which he gained during the first of the five stages of meditation
on emptiness becomes firmer during the second stage.43 One who
is newly achieving calm abiding temporarily forsakes analysis
Calm Abiding
89
during this second stage. Since during the first he developed a
conceptual understanding of emptiness through inference by
means of extensive analysis, during the second he concentrates
on this image or concept of emptiness, desisting from further
analysis while in the formal meditative session as it would interrupt his progress toward calm abiding. Between sessions, however, he might resort to analysis to renew his understanding of
the absence of inherent existence; then, during the formal
session, he merely sets his mind on emptiness with continuous
mindfulness and so forth as explained above.
When he finally achieves calm abiding with respect to emptiness, he returns to analysis, but this time with a highly developed mind in that it is stable, clear, intense, and serviceable.
Still, too much analysis tends to disturb the factor of stability; so,
he alternates between analytical and stabilizing meditation,
using the same modes of analysis as in the first stage and then
setting the mind on the content understood. If analysis is not
done, the ascertainment of emptiness lessens, and if after analyzing, the mind is not set on the content thus ascertained, clarity is
not attained.
When an object other than emptiness—such as the body of a
Buddha—is used as the object of observation in developing calm
abiding, the second stage of meditation on emptiness occurs
after having attained calm abiding, at which point the yogi
renews analytical investigation of emptiness. In either case, he
must first achieve calm abiding and then strive to conjoin this
stabilized mind with analysis of emptiness. The activity of analysis causes the mind of calm abiding to become slightly nonmanifest, requiring the yogi to pass again through the nine
states, but the second stage of meditation on emptiness is mainly
the eighth state, making one-pointed.
In summary, whether one uses emptiness or another object as
the object of observation in the development of calm abiding,
one must achieve calm abiding first and then conjoin that mind
with analytical investigation, cultivating a similitude of special
insight based on a similitude of calm abiding. Even though one
formerly attained actual calm abiding, one is not, on the second
90
Meditation on Emptiness
stage, able to retain a fully qualified calm abiding while analyzing.
Analysis and stabilization are alternated for the sake of inducing
calm abiding again, but this time with the difference of being
induced by analytical meditation on emptiness, which during the
second stage induces the eighth state of one-pointedness or even
the ninth state of equipoise, but not actual calm abiding. When
analytical meditation itself induces the eighth state, a yogi attains
a similitude of calm abiding and a similitude of meditative equipoise (samahita, mnyam bzhag).
9 Special Insight
Sources
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Concentrations and
Formlessnesses
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
Gon-chok-jik-may-wang-bo's Presentation of the Grounds and
Paths
Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
His Holiness the Dalai Lama's oral teachings
THIRD STAGE OF MEDITATION ON EMPTINESS
How to cultivate actual special insight based on actual calm
abiding
The third stage consists of the mode of cultivating actual special
insight based on actual calm abiding.44 During the initial part of
this phase, stabilizing meditation and analytical meditation are
harmonized by alternating from the one to the other, for too
much analysis would promote excitement and reduce the factor
of stability whereas too much firmness would cause one not to
want to analyze.
92
Meditation on Emptiness
As explained in the previous chapter, one who previously used
the body of a Buddha as the object of observation in cultivating
calm abiding has switched to emptiness, analyzing the final
nature of the I. Since he must pass through all four mental
engagements—forcibly, interruptedly, non-interruptedly, and
spontaneously engaging45—with respect to the emptiness of the
I, he must again with tight mindfulness keep on the object,
investigating its nature in the manner set forth for the first stage
of meditation on emptiness, without straying to other objects or
modes of analysis. When, through introspection, the meditator
sees that excitement is about to arise, he alternates to stabilizing
meditation, concentrating just on the meaning found through
analysis. At this point, calm abiding is again induced with emptiness as the object of observation;46 however, this is still not
special insight, which arises only when analytical meditation
itself induces stability and thereby mental and physical pliancy.
Through this process of repeated alternation between analytical and stabilizing meditation, special insight—defined as a wisdom of thorough discrimination of phenomena conjoined with
special pliancy induced by the power of analysis47—is generated.
Its causal prerequisites are to have relied on an excellent being,
to have sought much hearing of the doctrine, and to have contemplated properly the meaning heard.48 Etymologically, special
insight (vipashyana, lhag mthong) means sight (pashya, mthong)
exceeding ( v i l h a g ) that of calm abiding because a clarity is afforded through analysis, different from the non-analysis during
calm abiding.49 The arising of clarity upon repeated thought and
analysis with regard to either a true or false object is a fact of
dependent-arising. For, if rather than just remaining in stabilizing meditation after achieving calm abiding, one performs analytical meditation, one is able to induce a very firm meditative
stabilization and powerful wisdom consciousnesses that act as
powerful antidotes overcoming afflictions, and one is able easily
to make previously non-manifest objects, such as emptiness,
manifest.
Since both pliancy and the calm abiding of a one-pointed mind
are induced by the power of analysis, the special insight which is
Special Insight
93
a thorough discrimination of phenomena and the calm abiding
which is a one-pointedness of mind operate in parallel at the
same time and with equal power.50 Hence this is a union of
special insight and calm abiding; within stabilization one is
capable of strong analysis, which in turn induces even greater
stabilization. Previously, analytical meditation was cultivated so
that the mind would become of the entity of special insight, but
at that time one did not have actual special insight which must be
conjoined with calm abiding induced by analytical meditation;
calm abiding and analysis were like the two ends of a scale, the
one becoming slightly non-manifest when the other became
manifest. Now, however, one has wisdom that is arisen from
meditation, as contrasted to the wisdom arisen from thinking
which was the ascertainment of emptiness by inferential valid
cognition attained during the first stage and the wisdom arisen
from hearing which was attained when the structure of the verbal teaching was determined. For beginners, that which differentiates a state arisen from meditation is the attainment of
pliancy, and thus calm abiding marks the beginning of such
states; however, with the attainment of special insight one has a
wisdom arisen from meditation, pliancy having been induced by
analysis. Unlike states arisen from hearing and thinking during
which the object—emptiness—and the subject—the wisdom consciousness—appear to be unrelatedly distant and cut off, one
now has the experience of piercing the object of observation,
without the sense of subject and object as distant and cut off.
Even though some dualistic appearance remains, the very coarse
dualistic appearance of subject and object at the times of hearing
and thinking has disappeared. One has the sense of approaching
the state in which the wisdom consciousness and emptiness are
like water put in water. It is for the sake of achieving such steady
meditation that desisting from applying the antidotes to laxity
and excitement is cultivated during the ninth state of equipoise.
Upon the attainment of a union of calm abiding and special
insight with emptiness as thi object, the path of preparation is
attained.51 The path of preparation—which cannot be attained if
one's object is something other than emptiness, such as the four
94
Meditation on Emptiness
noble truths or the coarse personal selflessness—is the second of
the five paths, accumulation, preparation, seeing, meditation,
and no more learning. The Mahayana path of accumulation,
which is so named because it marks the beginning of amassing
the collections of merit and wisdom for the sake of enlightenment, was attained earlier when, after long training, one spontaneously generated the wish to attain highest enlightenment in
order to establish all sentient beings in final happiness. The path
of preparation is so named because the attainment of a union of
calm abiding and special insight with emptiness as the object prepares a yogi for his initial direct cognition of emptiness. On the
path of preparation the conceptual aspect of the realization of
suchness is gradually removed in four periods:52
1
Heat
The heat period of the path of preparation is a sign that the fire
of the non-conceptual wisdom of the path of seeing will soon be
generated. One newly attains a meditative stabilization that has
clear conceptual perception of suchness.
2 Peak
Prior to the peak period of the path of preparation, roots of
virtue could be annihilated through the force of anger and so
forth, but now one has reached the peak, or end, of the instability
of virtuous roots. One newly attains a 'nirvana' that is a passing
beyond the sorrow of the annihilation of roots of virtue and
newly attains a meditative stabilization that is a heightening of
conceptual perception of suchness.
3 Forbearance
During the forbearance period of the path of preparation one
newly attains an endurance, or lack of fear, with respect to the
profound emptiness. One also attains a 'nirvana' that is a passing
beyond the sorrow of bad migrations because one will no longer
be born as a hell-being, hungry ghost, or animal through the
force of contaminated actions and afflictions (though one might
choose to be born there to be of service to such beings). One
thoroughly attains conceptual, clear perception of suchness
Special Insight
95
and newly attains a meditative stabilization wherein an appearance of the object meditated—emptiness—is no longer ascertained in contradistinction to the subject—the mind of special
insight.
4
Supreme mundane qualities
This period of the path of preparation is the supreme of worldly
qualities. One newly attains a meditative stabilization that
immediately precedes a speedy generation of the path of seeing.
During the first two periods of the path of preparation, heat and
peak, subject and object appear during meditative equipoise, and
the meditator can ascertain both. A mere vacuity of the object
negated, inherent existence, appears; the yogi can delineate this
appearance or concept of emptiness as the object and himself as
the subject. Even if the emptiness being conceptually cognized is
the emptiness of oneself, one nevertheless has a sense of object
and subject, emptiness on the one hand and a consciousness
realizing it on the other, though not in the coarse way that these
appear prior to attaining special insight. One is abiding in the
space-like meditative equipoise, and the phenomenon which
was investigated to determine whether it inherently exists or
not and which is qualified by this emptiness no longer appears
at all.
During the periods of heat and peak the capacity to forsake the
conception of inherent existence with respect to objects increases,
and due to this, the coarser potencies of manifest innate conceptions of inherent existence diminish. Thus, at the time of forbearance the yogi can no longer ascertain the appearance of the
object meditated, emptiness. However, this does not mean that
he ceases to ascertain emptiness; rather, the conceptual aspect of
the ascertainment disappears to the point where, even though
there still is an appearance or image of emptiness, he can no
longer recognize it as such. Then, at the time of supreme
mundane qualities the cognizing subject also cannot be ascertained. The sense of the object disappears first because it is more
difficult to forsake adherence to the inherent existence of the
subject.
96
Meditation on Emptiness
FOURTH STAGE
OFMEDITATION
ON
How to cultivate direct cognition of emptiness
EMPTINESS
The fourth stage of meditation on emptiness occurs in direct
realization of emptiness. During the period of supreme mundane qualities at the end of the path of preparation, one can no
longer ascertain the factors of an object meditated and a subject
meditating; however, subtle forms of both still appear. Subsequently, .through continuous meditation, all appearances of
subject and object are extinguished in suchness—emptinessand subject and object become like water poured into water,
undifferentiable. Emptiness is then realized directly without the
medium of an image, and the path of seeing, the initial direct
cognition of the truth, is attained.
Through the path ofseeing ayogi removes artificial conceptions
of inherent existence, those acquired not from beginningless conditioning but from contact with false systems of teaching. False
teachings fortify the innate misconception of the inherent existence of persons and other phenomena, which is acquired from
beginningless misconception of the nature of things and is overcome on the path of meditation through continuous conditioning to the truth.
The meditative equipoise of the path of seeing is divided into
two parts, an 'uninterrupted path' that abandons the artificial
afflictions and a 'path of release' that is the state of having abandoned those artificial afflictions. An uninterrupted path is so
named because without interruption or interval a yogi will pass
on to a path of release that is a condition of having been released
from these afflictions. The uninterrupted path of a path of
seeing corresponds to the 'eight forbearances', and the path of
release corresponds to the 'eight knowledges' (see Chart 4).53
During the eight forbearances the realization of the lack of
inherent existence is applied to objects and subjects—to the four
noble truths and the subjects that realize the absence of inherent
existence with respect to them. Through direct realization of the
emptinesses that qualify these objects, artificial conceptions of
inherent existence with respect to the four noble truths are
Special Insightzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcba
97
Chart 4: Path of Seeing
(read from bottom to top)
subsequent knowledge*
subsequent forbearance+
knowledge*
forbearance+
true paths-
r -subjecttrue cessations -r
—object—
, •
t
true origins -object—
—subjecttrue sufferings —object—
subsequent knowledge*
forbearance 1
I—knowledge*
1—forbearance +
•c subsequent
|—subsequent knowledge*
I—subsequent forbearance"1"
I—knowledge*
"1—forbearance1"
I—subsequent knowledge*
I—subsequent forbearance*
I—-knowledge*
1—forbearance*
*path of release
• ^uninterrupted path
(The eight forbearances occur simultaneously as one uninterrupted path, and the eight knowledges occur simultaneously as
one path of release).
simultaneously abandoned. In other words, the initial direct
realization of emptiness causes the artificial conception of inherent existence to be abandoned simultaneously with respect to
true sufferings (such as an afflicted being wandering in cyclic
existence), true origins (such as a conception of true existence
itself), true cessations (such as the absence of an affliction
brought about by cultivation of its antidote), and true paths
(such as a realization of emptiness). The emptiness of the
wisdom consciousness cognizing these is also realized at the
same time; this realization is nevertheless called 'subsequent'
because in the lower systems of tenets there is a step by step
98
Meditation on Emptiness
procedure, even though in this system an actual temporal
sequence does not occur.
The eight knowledges, the knowledge that those artificial conceptions of inherent existence have been abandoned, are the path
of release. The presentation of eight parts to the uninterrupted
path and eight parts to the path of release details phenomena,
qualified by emptiness, which a yogi might take as objects of
meditation on the paths of accumulation and preparation, and
the simultaneous functioning of the eight indicates the great
power of direct realization of emptiness. For the Hinayana
schools, it is possible to ascend these sixteen steps one by one;
the Vaibhashikas propound such a gradual ascent as the only
mode of the path of seeing whereas the Sautrantikas assert that
sharper beings cover the sixteen in two steps. The Prasangikas,
on the other hand, assert that the path of seeing is necessarily
limited to this two step simultaneous procedure because a consciousness directly cognizing emptiness necessarily realizes the
emptiness of all objects of knowledge, and thus it is not necessary to pass from one to the other among the various phenomena
qualified by emptiness.
For a Hearer or Solitary Realizer, the uninterrupted path of a
path of seeing marks the commencement of being a Superior
(Aryan, 'Phags pa) and of being an Approacher to the level of a
Stream Enterer. The path ofrelease of the path ofseeing marks the
attainment of the level of an Abider in the fruit of a Stream
Enterer. For a Bodhisattva, the uninterrupted path of the path of
seeing marks the commencement of being a Superior and of
attaining the first of the ten Bodhisattva grounds (bhiimi, sa).
In one meditative sitting a yogi passes from the fourth and last
level of the path of preparation, called 'supreme mundane qualities', through the uninterrupted path and path of release of the
path of seeing.54 When he rises from meditative equipoise, he has
a consciousness called 'subsequent attainment' that is influenced
by the previous direct realization of emptiness. Although phenomena appear to be inherently existent, he, like a magician viewing his own creations, knows that all phenomena are empty of
inherent existence. Later, when he forgets his direct realization,
Special Insight
99
he has a 'distracted subsequent attainment'. His other meditative consciousnesses, such as those of compassion and of the
realization of impermanence, are paths of seeing because they
are in his continuum, but they are neither paths of seeing as
meditative equipoise nor paths of seeing as subsequent attainment; they are a third category which is neither.
Though all artificial conceptions of inherent existence are
removed on the first Bodhisattva ground and though during
meditative equipoise the innate conception of inherent existence
is dormant, a conception of inherent existence can arise again
outside of direct contemplation of emptiness. The grosser, or
artificial, stains were removed on the path of seeing, and now on
the path of meditation the subtler stains, the innate sense of
inherent, true, natural, or objective existence are removed, not
just temporarily, but forever—never to arise again.
A path of meditation is a continuous familiarizing with the
emptiness that was initially and directly cognized on the path of
seeing. In meditative equipoise a Bodhisattva, Hearer, or Solitary Realizer again and again enters into direct realization of
emptiness, and in subsequent attainment practices the deeds
appropriate to his motivation. A Bodhisattva, ground by ground
focuses on a different perfection:55
first ground:
second ground:
third ground:
fourth ground:
fifth ground:
sixth ground:
seventh ground:
eighth ground:
ninth ground:
tenth ground:
giving
ethics
patience
effort
concentration
wisdom
method
wishes
power
exalted wisdom.
All ten perfections are practiced on each ground, but a different
one is brought to fulfilment on each. A perfection brought to fulfilment remains thus, and another is brought to its level. Finally,
on the tenth ground, all ten perfections are in a state of complete
development.
100
Meditation on Emptiness
On the first ground, a Bodhisattva, after rising from meditative equipoise, can in one instant:56
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
see a hundred Buddhas
receive the blessings of a hundred Buddhas
go to a hundred Buddha Lands
illuminate a hundred lands
vibrate a hundred worldly realms
live for a hundred eons
see with true wisdom the past and future for a hundred eons
enter into and rise from a hundred meditative stabilizations
open a hundred different doors of doctrine
ripen a hundred sentient beings
emanate a hundred of his own body
cause each of the hundred bodies to be surrounded by a hundred Bodhisattvas.
On the second ground, these twelve qualities are a thousand; on
the third, a hundred thousand; on the fourth, a hundred ten million; on the fifth, a thousand ten million; on the sixth, a hundred
thousand ten million; on the seventh, a hundred thousand ten
trillion; on the eighth, a number equal to the particles of a billion
worlds; on the ninth, a number equal to the particles often million billions of worlds; on the tenth, a number equal to the particles of an inexpressible number of an inexpressible number of
Buddha Lands.
As he ascends the grounds, a Bodhisattva gains the capacity to
be born as a being of greater and greater influence. As his virtues
increase, he is able to outshine, or suppress, greater numbers of
beings and more powerful beings, not for the sake of exercising
power but for the sake of helping them. As Nagar juna says in the
fifth chapter of his Precious Garland:51
Just as the eight levels of Hearers
Are explained in their vehicle,
So are the ten Bodhisattva
Grounds in the Mahayana.
Special Insight
The first of these is the Very Joyful
Since the Bodhisattva is rejoicing.
He forsakes the three entwinements and is born
Into the lineage of the Tathagatas.
Through the maturation of these qualities
The perfection of giving becomes supreme.
He vibrates a hundred worlds
And becomes a great lord of the world.
The second is called the Stainless
Because the ten [virtuous] actions
Of body, speech, and mind are stainless
And he naturally abides in them.
Through the maturation of these qualities
The perfection of ethics becomes supreme,
He becomes a Universal Monarch helping beings,
Master of the glorious [four continents]
And of the seven precious substances.
The third ground is called the Luminous because
The pacifying light of wisdom arises.
The concentrations and clairvoyances are generated,
While desire and hatred are extinguished completely.
Through the maturation of these qualities
He practices supremely the deeds of patience
And putting an end to desire completely
Becomes a great wise king of the gods.
The fourth is called the Radiant
Because the light of true wisdom arises
In which he cultivates supremely
The harmonies of enlightenment.
Through the maturation of these qualities he becomes
A king of the gods in [the Land] Without Combat.
He is skilled in quelling the arising of the view
That the transitory collection [is a real self].
101
102
Meditation on Emptiness
The fifth is called the Very Difficult to Overcome
Since all demons find it extremely hard to conquer
him.
He becomes skilled in knowing the subtle
Meanings of the noble truths and so forth.
Through the maturation of these qualities he becomes
A king of the gods abiding in the Joyous Land.
He overcomes the sources of afflictions
And of the views of all Forders (Tirthika).
The sixth is called the Approaching because he is
Approaching the qualities of a Buddha;
Through familiarity with calm abiding and special
insight
He attains cessation and is thus advanced [in wisdom].
Through the maturation of these qualities he becomes
A king of the gods [in the Land] of Liking Emanation.
Hearers cannot surpass him, he pacifies
Those with the pride of superiority.
The seventh is the Gone Afar because
The number [of his qualities] has increased,
Moment by moment he can enter
The equipoise of cessation.
Through the maturation of these qualities he becomes
a master
Of the gods [in the Land] of Control over Others'
Emanations.
He becomes a great leader of teachers for he knows
Direct realization of the [four] noble truths.
The eighth is the Immovable, the youthful stage.
Through non-conceptuality he is immovable
And the spheres of his body, speech, and mind's
Activities are inconceivable.
Through the maturation of these qualities
He becomes a Brahma, master of a thousand worlds.
Special Insight
103
Foe Destroyers and Solitary Realizers and so forth
Cannot surpass him in establishing the meaning [of
the doctrines].
The ninth ground is called
Good Intelligence.
Like a regent he has attained correct individual
Realization and therefore has good intelligence.
Through the maturation of these qualities
He becomes a Brahma who is master of a million
worlds.
Foe Destroyers and so forth cannot surpass him
In responding to questions in the thoughts of sentient
beings.
The tenth is the Cloud of Doctrine because
The rain of excellent doctrine falls.
The Bodhisattva is consecrated
With light by the Buddhas.
Through the maturation of these qualities
He becomes a master of the gods of Pure Abode.
He is a supreme great lord, master
Of the sphere of infinite wisdom.
A yogi who has attained direct realization of emptiness cannot
remain in that realization while perceiving the phenomena qualified by emptiness and also cannot perceive phenomena while
directly realizing emptiness.58 He loses the direct cognition of
emptiness when he rises from meditative equipoise, for the
appearance of conventional phenomena rules out a direct cognition of emptiness and a direct cognition of emptiness rules out
the appearance of conventional phenomena. In terms of how
emptiness and other phenomena appear to him, the two truths
are as if contradictory; such are the obstructions to omniscience
—the simultaneous realization by one consciousness of all phenomena, both the phenomena qualified by emptiness and the
emptinesses themselves. A Bodhisattva has a great wish to rid
104
Meditation on Emptiness
himself of this obstruction because it prevents him from knowing those things that make attempts to help other beings fruitful.
Although he does not actually begin to abandon the obstructions
to omniscience until the eighth Bodhisattva ground, the wish to
do so is his basic motivation during the seven preceding grounds
as he is ridding himself forever of the various degrees of the conception of inherent existence, the root of the obstructions to
liberation.
On each ground a Bodhisattva abandons varying degrees
of the innate conception of inherent existence and the poisons
it induces along with their seeds.59 These objects of abandonment are arranged in relation to the three realms and the nine
levels. The three realms are the Desire, Form, and Formless
Realms; of the nine levels, the first corresponds to the Desire
Realm, the next four to the four divisions of the Form Realm,
called the Four Concentrations, and the last four to the four divisions of the Formless Realm, called the Four Formless Absorptions. The Four Concentrations and Four Formless Absorptions
are places of rebirth where beings have particularly strong concentrative powers; these powers can be achieved within a lifetime in the Desire Realm, and thus the three realms outline the
possible states of consciousness in terms of concentrative ability
within a human lifetime in the Desire Realm and also present in
condensed form all the possible states of rebirth within cyclic
existence.
The conception of inherent existence and its attendant afflictions are divided into eighty-one steps, nine each with respect to
the nine levels, so that each level has a series of nine obstacles
that are to be abandoned: big big, middle big, and small big; big
middle, middle middle, and small middle; big small, middle
small, and sma1! small (see Chart 5). The Prasangikas assert that
no one proceeds through these eighty-one steps one by one;
rather, the nine big big innate afflictions are simultaneously
abandoned; the nine middling big are simultaneously abandoned, and so forth through the small small. One proceeds in
nine steps with each step having an uninterrupted path, which is
a path of direct cognition of emptiness actively forsaking a
Special InsightzyxwvutsrponmlkihgfedcbaTS
105
Chart 5: Innate Afflictions Forsaken on the Path of Meditation in
Terms of the Three Realms and Nine Levels
(read from bottom to top)
- Peak of Cyclic Existence
(ninth level)
afflictions
regarding Formless
Realm
afflictions
regarding
Form Realm
Nothingness
(eighth level)
64-72
Infinite Consciousness
(seventh level)
55-63
Infinite Space
(sixth level)
46-54
Fourth Concentration
"(fifth level)
37-45
Third Concentration
(fourth level)
28-36
Second Concentration
(third level)
19-27
First Concentration
(second level)
10- 18
— small afflictions
regarding
Desire Realm
(first level)
73-81
-middling-
—big-
-small small
-middling small
-big small
9
8
7
-small middling
-middling middling
-big middling
6
5
4
-small big
-middling big
-big big
3
2
1
corresponding affliction, and a path of release, which is a consciousness directly cognizing emptiness within the condition of
having abandoned that affliction. The 'active forsaking' of an
affliction does not mean that the path and the affliction combat
106
Meditation on Emptiness
each other; rather, simultaneously with the production of an
uninterrupted path the corresponding affliction ceases.
To destroy the big big afflictions only a small small path is
needed, much the same as when initially cleaning a garment the
grosser stains are easily cleaned with a little washing. To destroy
the small small afflictions a big big path is needed, and the same
is to be respectively applied to the intermediate degrees.
On each of the second through eighth Bodhisattva grounds a
portion of the innate afflictions is forsaken:
second ground:
third ground:
fourth ground:
fifth ground:
sixth ground:
seventh ground:
eighth ground:
the nine big big
the nine middling big
the nine small big
the nine big middling
the nine middling middling
the nine small middling
the nine big small, the nine middling small,
and the nine small small simultaneously.
The grounds are not enumerated for Hearers and Solitary
Realizers even though they abandon the same afflictions as do
Bodhisattvas. As Hearers and Solitary Realizers abandon the
various degrees of afflictions, they are classified into the 'eight
levels of approaching and abiding' with respect to their attainment of the fruits of a Stream Enterer, Once Returner, Never
Returner, or Foe Destroyer (see Chart 6).
With the attainment of the path of release of the path of seeing,
a Hearer or Solitary Realizer is an Abider in the fruit of a Stream
Enterer. While making effort to overcome the first six of the nine
degrees of innate afflictions pertaining to the Desire Realm, he is
an Approacher to the level of Once Returner, and once these six
are overcome, he becomes an Abider in the fruit of Once Returner. He will return to the Desire Realm by the power of afflictions
only once more, at which time he will strive to overcome the
remaining three degrees of innate afflictions pertaining to the
Desire Realm, becoming an Approacher to the level of a Never
Returner. With success in overcoming all afflictions pertaining
to the Desire Realm, he becomes an Abider in the fruit of a Never
Special Insight
107
Chart 6: Eight Levels of Approaching and Abiding
(read from bottom to top; afflictions refer to those in Chart 5 on
p. 105)
afflictions
being
forsaken
Abider in the
fruit of a Foe
Destroyer
Approacher to the
fruit of a Foe
Destroyer
10-81
Abider in the
fruit of a
Never Returner
Approacher to the
fruit of a
Never Returner
7-9
Abider in the
fruit of a
Once Returner
Approacher to the
fruit of a
Once Returner
1-6
afflictions
already
forsaken
path
1-81
no more learning
1-9
meditation
1-9
meditation
1-6
meditation
1-6
meditation
meditation
Abider in the
fruit of a
Stream Enterer
seeing—path of
release
Approacher to the
fruit of a
Stream Enterer
seeing—
uninterrupted
path
Returner, never again returning to the Desire Realm due to the
afflictions although he might return to the Form and Formless
108
Meditation on Emptiness
Realms within cyclic existence many times. When he makes
effort to overcome the remaining seventy-two degrees of innate
afflictions pertaining to the Form and Formless Realms, he
becomes an Approacher to the level of Foe Destroyer, and when
all innate afflictions have been overcome, he is an Abider in the
fruit of a Foe Destroyer.
When, as in the Prasangika system, the afflictions are forsaken
simultaneously rather than serially, a yogi first abandons simultaneously the first, tenth, nineteenth, twenty-eighth, thirtyseventh, forty-sixth, fifty-fifth, sixty-fourth, and seventy-third
degrees of the afflictions. Thus, it is said that while abandoning
this first of the nine rounds, he already is an Approacher to the
fruit of a Foe Destroyer.
When a Hearer or a Solitary Realizer has abandoned all nine
rounds of the innate afflictions, he is a Foe Destroyer and has
attained the path of no more learning of his vehicle. However, he
has not ceased learning in general; he is urged by Buddhas to
enter the Mahayana both in order to help other beings and to
perfect his own aims. Though he has eliminated the innate afflictions and thereby removed the obstructions to liberation from
cyclic existence, he has not even begun to remove the nonafflicted ignorance that constitutes the obstructions to omniscience—the appearance of inherent existence and the stains of
viewing the two truths as separate entities.
Upon their generation of a spontaneous, strong wish to attain
highest enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings, Hearer
and Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers enter the Mahayana path
of accumulation. They proceed through the paths of accumulation, preparation, seeing, and meditation and ascend the Bodhisattva grounds, eliminating not the innate afflictions, because
these have already been destroyed through the Hinayana path,
but the obstructions to attainment of the many special qualities
of Bodhisattvas. They must spend one period ofcountless eons on
the paths of accumulation and preparation and another period of
countless eons on the first eight grounds doing this.
On the eighth ground all Bodhisattvas—those who proceed
only on the Mahayana path and those who first completed the
Special Insight
109
Hinayana path—finally begin to eliminate what they have sought
to overcome since their entry into the Mahayana, the obstructions
to omniscience. They spend one period ofcountless eons proceeding from the second part of the eighth ground to Buddhahood, forsaking by degrees the stains that prevent them from full effectiveness in their efforts to help other beings. The obstructions to
omniscience (literally, obstructions to objects cf knowledge:
jneyavarana) plague all sentient beings, not just eighth ground
Bodhisattvas, for the appearance of inherently existent objects to
the sense and mental consciousnesses lends a false support to the
innate conception of inherent existence, the assent to this false
appearance. However, only eighth ground Bodhisattvas have the
capacity to begin to counteract the appearance of inherent existence. The long endeavor in amassing the collections of merit and
wisdom has been for the purpose of so empowering the mind
that it is possible to counteract these most subtle obstructions.
The obstructions to omniscience are divided into four degrees
that are to be eliminated on the last three grounds, called 'pure'
because eighth through tenth ground Bodhisattvas are purified
of the innate afflictions:
second part of eighth
ground:
ninth ground:
first part of tenth
ground:
last part of tenth
ground:
big obstructions to omniscience
middling obstructions to omniscience
coarse small obstructions to
omniscience
subtle small obstructions to
omniscience.
The final uninterrupted path in the continuum of a sentient
being eliminates the subtlest obstructions to Buddhahood, and
the corresponding path of release is Buddhahood itself. In order
to generate this final uninterrupted path, however, it is necessary to enter the path of tantra. Even though the Buddhahoods
described in sutra and in tantra are the same, the paths of sutra
alone can carry a yogi only to the tenth Bodhisattva ground. To
achieve Buddhahood, it is necessary to supplement these paths
with the paths of Secret Mantra.
10
Tantra
Sources
His Holiness the Dalai Lama's oral teachings
Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
Nga-wang-bel-den's Illumination of the Tantric Texts
A Bodhisattva spends at least three countless eons on the paths
of accumulation, preparation, seeing, and meditation and
reaches the last part of the tenth ground, but in order to remove
the subtle small obstructions to omniscience he still must enter
the Secret Mantra Vehicle.60 His path has been very long; if he
were fully qualified and had entered the tantric vehicle from the
beginning, he would have been able to attain Buddhahood in just
one lifetime. Tantra is the quick path for those who are fit receptacles, but not for those who cannot bear the difficulties of the
long path.61 To practice tantra requires even greater compassion
and greater intelligence than are required on the sutra path; thus,
though many persons in the degenerate era are interested in
tantra, tantra is not for degenerate persons.
Tantra is limited to persons whose compassion is so great that
they cannot bear to spend unnecessary time in attaining Buddhahood, as they want to be a supreme source of help and happiness
112
Meditation on Emptiness
for others quickly.62 The most qualified of tantric practitioners
complete the path in one lifetime, and it is said that those who
are less qualified but maintain their vows will attain the supreme
achievement in either seven or sixteen lifetimes.
In order to enter the tantric path it is necessary to have good
understanding of the three principal aspects of the path to full
enlightenment: the thought to leave cyclic existence, the aspiration to highest enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings,
and the correct view of emptiness."Therefore, it is impossible to
enter the Mantra Vehicle before the first of the five stages of
meditation on emptiness; however, it could be entered anytime
after the yogi had gained an acquaintance with emptiness, the
first of these five stages, provided he had the other qualifications
of compassion and so forth.
There is an exoteric explanation that once a Bodhisattva has
attained a non-tantric path of seeing he must wait until he reaches
the tenth ground to enter the tantric path.64 However, according to
an oral transmission, a Bodhisattva can enter the Mantra Vehicle
at any time; his great compassion and sharpness of mind as well as
his ability to create manifestations which visit Buddhas in different lands insures that he would know ofthe tantric path and seek it.
Thus, the second, third, and fourth of the five stages of meditation
on emptiness could be replaced by similar stages within the practice of tantra, beginning at any point within these three. It is not
obligatory to pass through the ten Bodhisattva grounds to enter
the practice of tantra, nor is it obligatory to pass through the
three lower tantras to enter Highest Yoga Tantra.
CALM ABIDING AND SPECIAL INSIGHT IN
TANTRA
Tantra in general is divided into four types which in ascending
order are: Action (Kriya), Performance (Charya), Yoga (Yoga),
and Highest Yoga (Anuttarayoga). The mode of developing a
union of calm abiding and special insight with emptiness as the
object is similar in the first three tantra sets to that in the sutra
teachings in the sense that, after attaining calm abiding,
Tantra
113
analytical meditation and stabilizing meditation are alternated in
order to prevent respectively laxity and excitement, or lack of
penetrating ascertainment and lack of stability.6' However,
unlike the sutra system, all four tantras emphasize a union of
manifestation and emptiness—the vivid appearance of oneself as
a deity in conjunction with conceptual cognition of emptiness.
In other words, it is accepted in the tantric systems that a phenomenon which is qualified by emptiness can continue to appear
to an inferential consciousness that realizes its emptiness. Both
the vivid appearance of a deity and realization of the deity's noninherent existence are practiced by one consciousness. In most
interpretations of the sutra systems, however, a phenomenon
qualified by emptiness does not appear to an inferential consciousness cognizing its emptiness; just its emptiness appears.
Thus, in the sutra systems the union of wisdom and method
refers merely to cognition of emptiness as supplementing the
Bodhisattva deeds, or the Bodhisattva deeds as supplementing
cognition of emptiness. In tantra, on the other hand, one consciousness is sufficient to contain the practice of the profound—
the wisdom realizing non-inherent existence—and the practice
of the vast—the appearance of oneself as a deity. Furthermore,
because from the beginning a yogi imagines himself as having
the body, enjoyments, abode, and activities of a Buddha, he
amasses far more quickly the merit necessary to produce a
Buddha's Form Body, and in this sense tantra is the quick path.
In the yoga of union of the profound and the manifest, a meditator reflects on emptiness through any of the reasonings outlined in the first stage of meditation on emptiness. According to
the three lower tantras, he achieves calm abiding and then alternates between analytical meditation and stabilizing meditation,
within continuous realization of emptiness and within vivid
appearance of himself as a deity. However, in Highest Yoga
Tantra it is not necessary either to achieve calm abiding first or
to perform such alternation.66 Highest Yoga Tantra is divided
into stages of generation and completion, during both of which
the yoga of the union of manifestation and emptiness is
performed, but with a difference. In the stage of generation, due
114
Meditation on Emptiness
to the force of holding the mind fully to a subtle object in a
special place within the body, such as a tiny drop or letter at the
heart, and due to the type of object being meditated, the winds
gradually abide inside, whereby excitement can be quickly
stopped. Thus, the yogi can perform strong analytical meditation without concern that he will lose the factor of stability.
When the eighth state preliminary to calm abiding is achieved, a
type of analytical meditation involving the emanation and withdrawal of, for instance, vajras, easily stops coarse conceptuality
and induces the simultaneous achievement of calm abiding and
special insight. Attainment of the union of calm abiding and
special insight is thus very fast in Highest Yoga Tantra—provided that the meditator is qualified.
FIFTH STAGE OF MEDITATION ON EMPTINESS
How to meditate on emptiness during the second stage of Highest
Yoga Tantra
In the second and final stage of Highest Yoga Tantra, that of
completion, there are a series of techniques, suited to the meditator's physical constitution and mental temperament, that cause
the winds (prana) to enter, remain, and dissolve in the central
channel.67 The purpose is to manifest a series of four subtle
minds and, in turn, to use the subtlest, the mind of clear light, to
cognize emptiness. When the winds have fully entered,
remained, and dissolved in the indestructible drop in the center
of the heart, emptiness is directly cognized by the very subtle
mind of clear light. At this point in just one period of the path of
seeing, the yogi forsakes not only the artificial but also the innate
afflictions. The emptiness that is cognized is exactly the same
emptiness that is taught in sutra; however, the bliss consciousness that cognizes emptiness is far subtler than the corresponding consciousness presented in the sutra systems.
Since even some Hearers are said to forsake the innate afflictions in as little as three lives, the extraordinary speed of Highest
Yoga Tantra is not just the instantaneous abandoning of the artificial and innate afflictions on the path of seeing; it also refers to
Tantra
115
the swift abandonment of the obstructions to omniscience. Rising
from the path of seeing, a yogi's very subtle mind and.the very
subtle wind that is its mount serve as the causes of an illusory
body which is pure in the sense that the afflictions have been
abandoned and is actual in the sense that it is not just imagined.
With this special mind and body, the obstructions to omniscience are quickly eliminated, and Buddhahood is realized.
During the stage of completion in Highest Yoga Tantra the
emphasis is not on meditation analyzing emptiness by way of
reasoning but on stabilizing meditation for the sake of gathering
the winds in order to manifest a subtle consciousness cognizing
emptiness. However, these stabilizing concentrations cannot be
effective unless they are built on firm ascertainment of emptiness attained through analytical reasoning, undertaken during
the stage of generation and before.68 It is within the context of an
ascertainment of emptiness that a yogi concentrates on the physical and psychic centers although during the actual session itself
he desists from applying his mind to analytical reasoning. Still,
analytical meditation of a different type is required in order to
generate a sharpness and brightness of concentration,69 in
dependence on which the winds are gathered, thereby generating through meditation the same subtle minds that are actualized
powerlessly and without benefit at death. The deepest and
subtlest of these minds and the wind that is its mount are the
actual substances that develop into a Buddha's mind and body.70
Though it may be possible without the view of emptiness to
actualize some of these subtle consciousnesses, it is impossible
without the view of emptiness to actualize the most subtle.71 As
the tutor of the Eighth Dalai Lama, Ye-shay-gyel-tsen (Ye-shesrgyal-mtshan) reports:72
It is said that this profound view of the middle way is the
life of both the sutra and tantra paths. Also, it is said that
particularly with respect to Highest Secret Mantra there
is no chance of having an actual path of Mantra without
this view.
11 Buddhahood
Sources
Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
On the path Bodhisattvas familiarize themselves in innumerable
ways with the six perfections.73 They develop limitless wishes
and dedications, and they experience in myriad forms the joys of
the wisdom that cognizes the profound suchness of all phenomena in the manner of a fusion of subject and object. Whether
following the sutra or tantra path, the Bodhisattva's base is the
same: the aspiration to highest enlightenment for the sake of all
sentient beings. The deeds are, in general, also the same: the six
perfections. In the sutra systems a limitless variety of these deeds
is prescribed whereas in tantra an additional method, yoga of the
union of the profound and the manifest, is used to empower the
mind to combat the obstructions to omniscience. The effect of
these paths is the attainment of a Buddha's Form Body and
Truth Body which are the fulfilment of the aims of both oneself
and others.
The uninterrupted path at the end of the tenth ground is called
118
Meditation on Emptiness
the end of the continuum as a sentient being because although a
Buddha is sentient, he does not have a mind that has obstructions yet to be eliminated. The uninterrupted path at the end of
the continuum of a sentient being is the antidote to the very
subtle obstructions to omniscience; it cognizes the suchness of
all phenomena in the manner of being of one taste with suchness. Like fresh water poured into fresh water, there is no distinction experienced between the wisdom consciousness and
emptiness. Still, it has the potentialities that will make possible,
immediately afterwards, the instantaneous appearance of the
inconceivable qualities of a Buddha.
While the yogi is in deep contemplation on emptiness only, he
passes into a condition wherein, simultaneous with continuous
direct cognition of emptiness, all the phenomena that are qualified by emptiness appear to him. He passes to the final path of
release, and while in a meditative equipoise in which there is not
the slightest interference of duality, this same consciousness
directly cognizes all the many varieties of objects of knowledge
as clearly as one sees an olive in the palm of one's hand. Since the
potencies of mistaken dualistic appearance have been eradicated,
the yogi attains the divine eye that has no impediments with
respect to objects of knowledge and is not impeded from seeing
one object by seeing another. He has exhaustively eliminated the
obstructions to omniscience, has actualized the limit of reality,
has actualized the Truth Body, and has become thoroughly and
completely enlightened with respect to all phenomena.
The bodies of a Buddha are variously enumerated as one, two,
three, four, or five.74 These are more extensive or condensed
forms of each other and thus to not indicate a difference of
meaning.
One:
Two:
Three:
Four:
Truth Body
Truth Body and Form Body
Truth Body, Enjoyment Body, and Emanation Body
(the last two being included within Form Body above)
Nature Body, Wisdom Body, Enjoyment Body, and
Emanation Body (the first two being included within
Truth Body above)
Buddhahood
Five:
119
Nature Body, Wisdom Body, Actual Enjoyment Body,
Imputed Enjoyment Body (such as the body of a tenth
ground Bodhisattva), and Emanation Body (the
middle two being included within Enjoyment Body
above).
When the wisdom of meditative equipoise at the end of a yogi's
continuum as a sentient being (that is, his uninterrupted path
consciousness directly cognizing emptiness) becomes the final
path of release, this wisdom of meditative equipoise itself
becomes the Wisdom Body, a composite in one entity of both
meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment. This means
that all phenomena, emptinesses and conventionalities, are
directly cognized all of the time. The emptiness of this final
uninterrupted path becomes the Nature Body, the absence of all
obstructions in the continuum of a Buddha.
The Truth Body is so called because its two parts, the Nature
Body and the Wisdom Body, are respectively the ultimate true
cessation and the ultimate true path.75 A Nature Body is of two
types, a naturally pure Nature Body which is the absence from
beginningless time of inherent existence in the pure sphere of
Buddhahood, and an adventitiously pure Nature Body which is
the absence in the pure sphere of Buddhahood of the adventitious stains—the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to
omniscience—through the application of their antidotes. Both
are non-products and mere absences, but only the first is called a
non-product because it lacks production, duration, and disintegration and lacks a beginning, middle, and end. The second type
of Nature Body is called 'spontaneous' because the aspect of
having utterly eliminated the subtle motivational effort that initiates deeds of body and speech allows for the spontaneity of the
Enjoyment and Emanation Bodies.
Both aspects of the Nature Body are emptinesses which are the
absence of inherent existence of a Buddha's omniscient mind;
the naturally pure Nature Body is an emptiness from the point of
view that the mind is always naturally free of inherent existence.
The adventitiously pure Nature Body is this emptiness from the
viewpoint of its being a quality of a mind that has been cleansed
120
Meditation on Emptiness
of all contaminations. Thus, both Nature Bodies are emptinesses
and ultimate truths.
The Nature Body is said to have five qualities:
1 non-production, because of having no production, duration,
or disintegration and no beginning, middle, or end
2 non-difference, because of being undifferentiable from the
final nature of phenomena in terms of not being a different
entity from phenomena
3 non-perversity, because it has not fallen to the two extremes
of reification of what does not exist and denial of what does
exist
4 purity, because of being free of the afflictive obstructions, the
obstructions to omniscience, and the obstructions to meditative absorption
5 clear light, because the stains do not inherently exist, because
it is not fully cognizable by the intellect, and because it is an
object of perception by yogis in individual meditative equipoise.
The Nature Body is vast because it is not knowable as being limited to any measure. It is innumerable because it surpasses the
number of sands of the Ganges. It is unthinkable because it cannot be conceived as any of the four alternatives. It is unequal
because one who has actualized it is unequal with all who have
not. It is completely pure because the defects of the afflictions and
their predispositions have been completely abandoned.
The Wisdom Body is the final, perfect wisdom. It is called the
wisdom cognizing the mode of existence of phenomena in the
sense that it perceives all emptinesses. It is called the wisdom
cognizing the varieties of phenomena in the sense that it also perceives all conventionalities. In brief, the Wisdom Body is a
Buddha's omniscient consciousness; his eye, ear, nose, tongue,
body, and mental consciousnesses are each omniscient. Thus, a
single moment of any consciousness cognizes all phenomena; his
eye consciousness perceives not just colors and shapes, but also
sounds, odors, and so forth, including the emptiness of each phenomenon perceived. A Wisdom Body is everywhere because a
Buddhahood
121
Buddha's wisdom consciousness cognizes the emptiness of everything non-dualistically.
When a Bodhisattva arrives at the end of the continuum of
being a sentient being, his body ornamented with a similitude of
the major and minor marks of a Buddha becomes a Buddha's
Enjoyment Body. Through the power of former wishes and
without any intellection, various Emanation Bodies are issued
from the Enjoyment Body, appearing simultaneously in countless lands throughout the ten directions and aiding sentient
beings in accordance with their interests, dispositions, and
beliefs. One does not first become a Buddha and then think
about what needs to be done; one responds immediately and
without thought or effort to the needs of all sentient beings. The
Enjoyment Body and Emanation Bodies are achieved simultaneously because (1) both are fruits of training in the equality of
cyclic existence and peace; (2) both are fruits of training to produce pure lands for Enjoyment and Emanation Bodies in order
to provide bases for sentient beings to gain enlightenment; and
(3) both are fruits of training in wisdom and method such that at
the time of highest enlightenment there are no obstructions with
respect to the perfection of all qualities.
An Enjoyment Body abides in a Highest Pure Land (Akanishta). Highest Pure Lands are above the seventeen types of
lands in the Form Realm and thus are called 'Highest' (literally,
'not below'). Each Buddha has his own Highest Pure Land produced by his limitless collections of merit and wisdom and as
vast as space; it is achieved from a portion of his wisdom and is
not composed of particles of matter.
An Enjoyment Body is said to have five qualities:
1 An Enjoyment Body is impermanent, but it continuously
displays the same type of body ornamented with the major
and minor marks of a Buddha; therefore, it is immortal.
2 An Enjoyment Body continuously speaks the same type of
doctrine, the Mahayana, and thus is a Body that enjoys or
uses the Mahayana doctrine as opposed to the Emanation
Bodies which abide in Pure Lands and preach both Hfnayana
and Mahayana.
122
Meditation on Emptiness
3 An Enjoyment Body continuously displays the activities that
arise from wisdom and compassion.
4 These activities of body, speech, and mind are performed
without effort.
5 Though an Enjoyment Body does not exist as many different
personal continuums, it displays many Emanation Bodies.
It is said that even though the displayer of Emanation Bodies is
an Enjoyment Body, Emanation Bodies are not Enjoyment
Bodies but are of the same continuum as an Enjoyment Body.
Through the force of compassion and wishes over countless
eons the ultimate wisdom itself appears in the aspect of a body.
Each of the parts of the body directly cognizes all phenomena and
proclaims inconceivable intonations of doctrine; mind and body
are no longer separate phenomena. Not only is the Enjoyment
Body an appearance of the wisdom consciousness itself, but also
the pure numberless phenomena that a Buddha cognizes from his
own point of view are the entity of this wisdom itself. In dependence on others, a Buddha also perceives impure phenomena which
have as their final cause afflicted ignorance (the conception that
phenomena inherently exist) and non-afflicted ignorance (the
appearance of these phenomena as if inherently existent).
Based on the accumulation of inconceivable merit for untenable eons and based on repeated, inconceivable, powerful wishes
while a Bodhisattva, an Enjoyment Body continuously displays
countless Emanation Bodies that appear in accordance with the
dispositions of beings and act for the sake of furthering their
aims of attaining high status as humans and as gods and attaining
the definite goodness of liberation and omniscience. Spontaneously and without thought a Buddha, like a wish-granting
jewel, achieves the aims of beings but does not stir for an instant
from the sphere of the final nature of phenomena.
There are three main types of Emanation Bodies:
1 artisans, such as a guitarist, goldsmith, or scribe
2 constructions, such as a tree or a deer
3 supreme beings, who display the twelve activities of a Bodhisattva who becomes a Buddha.
Buddhahood
123
Responding to sentient beings' needs throughout time and
space, Emanation Bodies appear, perform their task without
effort, and are withdrawn. A sentient being's noticing or not
noticing them as such depends on his fortune which is formed
through the potencies established on the mind by his virtuous
and non-virtuous deeds. As long as space exists, the various
activities of a Buddha, arising from great compassion, come into
existence spontaneously and continuously.
Part Two
Reasoning into Reality
ytsonligeaR
Introduction
Sources
Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way
Geshe Gediin Lodro's oral teachings
Corresponding section of the translation pp.636-8
Phenomena are divided into persons and phenomena, with the
latter 'phenomena' meaning 'phenomena other than persons'. 76
Objects are so divided because adherence to the inherent existence of persons and adherence to the inherent existence of other
internal phenomena, such as the body, are the two principal
binders of beings in cyclic existence. Persons are enjoyers or
users, and other phenomena are the enjoyed or the used.
The non-inherent existence of persons is the personal selflessness (pudgalanairatmya), and the non-inherent existence of
other phenomena, such as mind, body, hand, house, and mountain, is the selflessness of other phenomena (dharmanairatmya).
The two selflessnesses—of persons and of other p h e n o m e n a are not divided by way of different objects of negation—different
interpretations of 'self—but by way of classes of objects that are
the bases of the quality of non-inherent existence.
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Meditation on Emptiness
The Mahayana schools other than Prasangika do not divide
the two selflessnesses this way. For the Chittamatrins and Svatantrikas, the selflessness of phenomena (non-difference of entity of
object and subject for the Chittamatrins and non-true existence
for the Svatantrikas) applies to all phenomena including persons.
For them, the selflessness of phenomena is subtler than the selflessness of persons, and thus the personal selflessness can be
realized without realizing the subtler selflessness of phenomena.
They assert a difference of intelligence between Hearers, who
meditate mainly on the personal selflessness, and Bodhisattvas,
who meditate on the subtler selflessness of phenomena.
For the Prasangikas, the two selflessnesses are equally subtle
and an inferential realization of one yields an ability to realize the
other. Furthermore, when emptiness is directly cognized, all
emptinesses are directly cognized, and, therefore, even Hearers
and Solitary Realizers on the path of seeing cognize the subtle
emptiness of all phenomena directly.77 Still, Bodhisattvas are
said to be more intelligent than Hearers in the sense that they
approach emptiness from many and various points of view, as in
the twenty-seven chapters of Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle
Way, instead of through only one or two.78
There is a question as to whether the selflessness of persons in
the Chittamatra and Svatantrika systems applies only to persons
or to all phenomena. 79 This selflessness is the non-existence of a
self-sufflcient person, and some say that to speak of a 'person'
with respect to a phenomenon such as a house is absurd. They
say that the personal selflessness of phenomena other than
persons refers to their not being objects of use of a self-sufficient
person. Others say that phenomena other than persons do not
have a self-sufficient entity separate from their parts and that this
is their personal selflessness. Still others say that a meditator
realizes the non-existence of a self-sufficient person with respect
to the mental and physical aggregates, and then by extension
realizes that other external phenomena are not a self-sufficient
person. In any case, for the Chittamatrins and Svatantrikas,
meditation on the personal selflessness is mainly based on the
person but can be extended to a person's relationship with
Introduction
129
external phenomena. Meditation on external objects as not being
objects of use of a self-sufficient person is said to be very helpful
in breaking the web of relationships that support and nourish the
conception of a self-sufficient person.
In the Chittamatra and Svatantrika systems the two selflessnesses differ in degree of subtlety; therefore, these systems have
separate sets of reasonings to prove the different types of selflessness. The two selflessnesses in the Prasangika system do not
differ in subtlety, but the Prasangikas still use separate sets of
reasonings. The self of phenomena is refuted by the diamond
slivers, refutation of production of the four extremes, and refutation of production of the four alternatives. The reasoning of
dependent-arising refutes the self of both persons and other phenomena. The self of persons is refuted by the five-cornered and
seven-cornered sets of reasonings.
The two sets of reasonings are divided not because they
exclusively prove either persons or other phenomena to be selfless but because the various Madhyamika masters have mainly
used them this way.80 A student is advised to apply the fivecornered and seven-cornered reasonings to all phenomena, and
the three sets of reasonings that examine production can also be
applied to persons.
1
The Diamond Slivers
Sources
Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way
Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
Geshe Gediin Lodro's oral teachings
Dzong-ka-ba's Essence of the Good Explanations and
Illumination of the Thought
Corresponding section of the translation pp.639-50
Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way begins with an analysis
of production that mainly refutes the inherent existence of products other than persons.81 In the Treatise and in Chandraklrti's
Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' the
diamond slivers are the main means for approaching the absence
of true production.
It is said that through understanding this absence of true
production it is easy to understand the other nine of the ten
samenesses of phenomena. Realization of the ten samenesses is
explained in the Sutra on the Ten Grounds (Dashabhumika) as the
means by which a fifth ground Bodhisattva proceeds to the sixth
ground. The ten samenesses are:
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Meditation on Emptiness
1 sameness of all phenomena as signless, or the sameness of all
phenomena in the absence of signs such as white, red, and so
on for a consciousness in meditative equipoise on the nature
of phenomena
2 sameness of all phenomena as natureless, or as free from
being established by way of their own nature
3 sameness of all phenomena as productionless, or as free
from naturally existent production in the future
4 sameness of all phenomena as non-produced, or the sameness of all past and present phenomena as free from naturally existent production and cessation
5 sameness of all phenomena as vacuous, or the sameness of
things yet to be produced and things already produced as
void or empty of natural existence
6 sameness of all phenomena as pure from the start, or as purified of natural existence, not through scripture and reasoning, but from the start
7 sameness of all phenomena as free from the elaborations of
thought, or as free from the elaborations of dualistic perception for a consciousness in meditative equipoise on the
nature of phenomena
8 sameness of all phenomena in being ultimately non-adopted
and non-discarded (as in the case of adopting virtues and discarding non-virtues)
9 sameness of all phenomena in being like a magician's illusions, dreams, shadows, echoes, moons in the water, reflections, and emanations, or in being empty ofinherent existence
as illustrated by these seven examples
10 sameness of all phenomena in not having the duality of
things (bhava) and non-things (abhava), or the sameness of
products in not inherently being things and of non-products
in not inherently being non-things.
The seventh is an attribute of the first; the third, fourth, and fifth
are attributes of the second; and the rest are attributes of both the
first and the second.
Nagarjuna chose to explain the sameness of non-production
because through it the other samenesses are easily understood.
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133
The main means that he chose to establish non-true production
is the diamond slivers.
S T A T E M E N T OF T H E REASONS
The diamond slivers are so called because each is a powerful
means of destroying the conception of inherent existence.82 The
reasoning is composed of a thesis:
The subjects, things, are not inherently produced.
And a four-cornered proof:
Because of not being produced from themselves, from
naturally existent others, from both, or causelessly.
These four reasons are themselves each theses which are nonaffirming negatives. They do not imply anything positive in
their place, such as the existence of no production from self. Still,
they do imply another non-affirming negative—that things are
not inherently produced—because although non-affirming negatives lack positive implications, they can imply other nonaffirming negatives of the same type. The reasoning which
proves that things are not inherently produced does not establish
that things are nominally or conventionally produced. The
diamond slivers are non-affirming negatives, and just the absence
of inherently existent production, not the presence of nominal
production, is realized when inferring or directly cognizing the
emptiness of production. The four negative theses do serve as
proofs of another thesis—that things are not inherently produced
—and thus their import can be stated syllogistically, as above.
The reason why no more than four negative theses are needed
to prove that things are not inherently produced is that the four
are refutations of all possibilities of true production. Production
is either caused or uncaused. If caused, the cause and the effect
are either the same entity, different entities, or both the same and
different. Thus, the possibilities for inherently existent production, or production that can be found under analysis, are only
four: production of an effect that is of the same entity as the
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Meditation on Emptiness
cause, production of an effect that is a different entity from the
cause, production of an effect that is both the same entity and a different entity from the cause, and causeless production. Because
the possibilities of inherently existent production can be limited,
when all possibilities have been refuted, inherently existent production has been perforce refuted, and the thesis of no inherently existent production can be realized. If the possibilities
could not be limited, one would be forever waiting in a state of
doubt for new possibilities, and the thesis could never be realized. Therefore, it is an important step in meditation to investigate and decide firmly, based on the above reasoning, that the
possibilities have been limited to those stated and that if those
can be refuted, the thesis will be proved.
Since production from imputedly existent others is the only
existent type of production, when production from other is
refuted under analysis, this alone establishes that things lack
inherent existence. Still, it is necessary to examine the problem
of production from the viewpoints of other philosophical systems, all of which can be included into these four modes. If three
of these modes of production do not stand a chance conventionally, they could not possibly withstand ultimate analysis; however, persons and systems must be approached on their own
grounds, and, therefore, all four positions are attacked.
A meditator seeks to generate a consciousness realizing that
there is no inherently existent production, and, thus, refutations
are not stated aimlessly. The generation of an inferential cognizer (anumanapramana, rjes dpag tshad ma) depends on the establishment of the reasons and the fact that the predicate of the
thesis, the absence of inherently existent production, follows
from these reasons.
Still, the presence of the reasons (non-production from self
and so forth) in the subject (things), the pervasion of the reasons
by the predicate of the thesis (not being inherently produced),
and the counter-pervasion do not have to be proved in the manner of the logicians through syllogisms. The Prasangikas'
main means for generating an inferential consciousness is to state
unwanted consequences of the four possibilities and thereby
The Diamond Slivers
135
generate in an intelligent person a consciousness inferring the
thesis that there is no inherently existent production. The
Sautrantikas, Chittamatrins, and Svatantrikas say that one must
first state unwanted consequences in order to break the pointedness or vibrance of the opponent's adherence to his own view but
that the consequences must be followed by a syllogistic statement. (The Vaibhashikas are omitted here because of lack of
information regarding their positions.)
Although the Prasangikas do not accept the need for this, Jamyang-shay-ba does use the syllogistic mode to present the thesis
and the four reasons for the sake of ease in explanation (see
p.640): He takes as his subject 'things which have production', a
seemingly redundant phrase because, in the strict use of the
word, 'things' (bhava) mean products. 83 The reason he qualifies
'things' with 'which have production' is that the Vaibhashikas say
that permanent phenomena are 'things'. As his annotator, Ngawang-bel-den, says, he wants to make sure that when he proves
that things are not naturally produced, the Vaibhashikas will not
say, 'You are proving the already proved because we agree that
permanent things are not produced.' The Prasangikas are
proving to the non-Buddhist schools and the other Buddhist
schools that impermanent things are not inherently produced.
Since the Svatantrikas assert that conventionally things are
inherently produced, they are included in the opposition.
The thesis of no production from other is qualified as no production from naturally existent others because conventionally things
are produced from causes that are other than themselves but do not
naturally exist. (The remaining three possibilities do not require
qualification because, unlike production from what is merely
other, they do not exist even conventionally.) If the qualification
were not given for production from other, then there would be no
production at all, and this would deny the cause and effect of
actions and result in an utter nihilism. Still, some non-Ge-luk-ba
interpreters say that the qualification is unnecessary either
because phenomena are unpredicable dependent-arisings or
because there is no need to present production in Madhyamika
itself because the Madhyamikas have no system. Dzong-ka-ba's
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Meditation on Emptiness
position84 is that the Madhyamikas obviously have a system; he
explains that when Chandrakirti says that production from other
does not exist either ultimately or conventionally, he means that
production which can be found under analysis does not exist even
conventionally. The meaning of'naturally existent production'
implies 'production which can be found under analysis', and thus
the qualification is necessary in order to eliminate the mistake that
mere production from causes that are other is being refuted. Chandrakirti in his Clear Words (Prasannapada) often predicates his
refutations with 'under such analysis' lending credence to Dzongka-ba's view.85
At issue is the best means of leading students—whom all
accept as not knowing the difference between naturally existent
production and production—to the Madhyamika realization of
no production without utterly destroying the possibility of illusory-like production. The criticism of Dzong-ka-ba seems mainly
based on the feeling that the qualification of production from
other with 'naturally existent' would keep students from realizing the startling import of the Madhyamika sense of no production. Many non-Ge-luk-bas seem to feel that the brilliant
philosophical subtlety of Dzong-ka-ba's view is beyond comprehension and thus obscures the path. However, Dzong-ka-ba
himself says86 that beings who have not entered the Madhyamika
view cannot discriminate between conventional existence and
inherent existence; thus, his affirmation of the valid establishment of conventional existence should not be taken as confirming the common ignorant misconceptions of the nature of
existence. The meaning of conventional or imputed existence
must be sought as something new; otherwise, the very reason
for Dzong-ka-ba's subtle presentation of cause and effect and so
forth in the Madhyamika system will be lost. He calls his followers to realize that even conventionally the validly established
phenomena of the world are not their bases of designation.
NON-PRODUCTION FROM SELF
The refutation of production of something from self, or from
The Diamond Slivers
137
its own entity, is done through demonstrating the consequent
absurdity of senseless production: 87
The production again of a sprout is senseless because of
having already achieved its own entity. Since the production of a thing means the attainment of its own
entity, then if once having achieved its own entity, it is
produced again, its re-production is purposeless.
The opponent answers:
Having already attained its own entity and needing production are not contradictory.
His thought is that a sprout, for instance, has attained its own
entity in its unmanifest state (in its causes) but still requires
production in the sense of manifestation.
This is refuted by the absurdity of endless production:
If so, then sprouts, and so forth would be produced again
and again because though they have achieved their own
entity, they must be produced.
The opponent might answer:
That which exists non-manifestly as a potential entity
must be produced manifestly, but once it has been manifested, it need not be produced. Therefore, both the
former and latter consequences do not follow from the
reasons given.
The Samkhyas cannot extricate themselves from error this way,
for if a manifestation exists from the start, it need not be produced. Also, if a manifestation were reproduced, then its production would be endless. Thus, the fallacies remain. If a manifestation did not exist from the start, one has let fall the position that
only what exists formerly in the cause is produced.
Since the already produced—that which has already achieved
its own entity—must be produced again, there would be no
opportunity for the production of effects, such as sprouts,
because the causes, seeds, would be produced endlessly. There is
no point in something's being produced from itself.
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Meditation on Emptiness
A Samkhya might respond:
The natures of both the seed and the sprout are a partless
one, but the transformations as seed and sprout are different. Therefore, from the viewpoint of the transformations, the seed disintegrates and the sprout is produced.
It is not asserted that a sprout is produced from a sprout.
So, there is no fallacy.
A Madhyamika answers:
It follows that a sprout would not cause its seed to disintegrate because the natures of the seed and the sprout are
one. For example, a sprout cannot cause a sprout to disintegrate.
Though the Samkhya himself does not assert that a sprout is produced from a sprout, his position that the natures of both the
seed and the sprout are a partless one forces him to accept the
absurdity that the appearance of a sprout could not cause the
disintegration of its seed because they are a partless one.
Furthermore, there is a refutation of the oneness of the natures
of the seed and the sprout:
It follows that a seed and its sprout would not have different shape, color, taste, powers, and fruition because the
natures of the seed and its sprout are one in all respects.
A Samkhya might respond:
The natures of the seed and its sprout are one, but their
states are different; therefore, the state of the seed is
abandoned when the state of the sprout is assumed.
Answer:
It follows that the nature of a seed is not the nature of its
sprout because when the phenomenon of the state of the
seed is done away with, there is the phenomenon of the
state of a sprout. It so follows because the phenomenon
of the state of the seed is the phenomenon of the seed and
there is no phenomenon of the seed other than the entity
of the seed.
The Diamond Slivers
139
Further, there is an unwanted consequence of the mutuality of
apprehension of both seed and sprout in each state:
Just as during the state of the sprout the seed is not
apprehendable by a sense consciousness, so it follows
that the sprout would be non-apprehendable.
Further:
Just as during the state of the sprout the sprout is apprehendable by a sense consciousness, so it follows that the
seed would also be apprehendable. For, the entity of the
seed and the entity of the sprout are one in all respects.
Because these consequences cannot be accepted, one should not
assert that the natures of the seed and the sprout are one.
All Buddhist schools except Vaibhashika accept that in general
an existent is produced and that what is non-existent prior to its
production is produced or attains an existent entity.88 Vaibhashika is omitted because this school asserts that at the time of the
seed the future of the sprout exists and that at the time of the
sprout the past of the seed exists and, for them, the future of the
sprout is a sprout and the past of the seed is a seed. Their view is
that things cannot be produced from what does not exist earlier
because of the unwanted consequence that production would be
adventitious and causeless. Therefore, they assert that an effect
exists at the time of its future, which occurs previous to the
aggregation of its causes and conditions. The aggregation of its
causes and conditions produces the sprout at the time of its
present. Thereby, the entity abides before and after its production.
All other Buddhist schools—Sautrantika, Chittamatra, and
Madhyamika—consider Vaibhashika to be almost like Samkhya
on this point. All Buddhist schools except Vaibhashika say that
at the time of the seed the sprout is the seed; at that time, the
sprout is not a sprout; the sprout does not then exist.89 The horns
of a rabbit 90 (an example of an utter non-existent) also do not
exist at that time, but the difference between the horns of a rabbit
and a sprout is that at the time of its seed a sprout abides as the
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Meditation on Emptiness
entity of a seed even though it is non-existent. If the sprout were
existent, it could not abide as the entity of its seed because it
would be a sprout. The Samkhya view is that only the existent
can be produced; thus, the Buddhist sense that effects abide as
the entity of causes but are non-existent at the time of their
causes differs greatly. Just as the yogurt in a bowl is not produced from the bowl, so that which already exists in something
is not produced from that something.
NON-PRODUCTION FROM O T H E R
There are three ways of refuting production of effects from
causes that are inherently other than those effects:91
1 refuting both inherently existent otherness and inherently
existent production
2 refuting inherently existent production
3 refuting inherently existent otherness.
Refuting both inherently existent otherness and inherently existent
production
It follows that thick darkness arises from a tongue of
flame and that any effect arises from what are commonly
considered to be its causes or non-causes because inherently other effects arise in dependence on inherently
other causes.
If causes and effects were inherently existent others, then they
would not be dependently existent others but would be nonrelated others. If an effect were produced from a cause that is an
unrelated other, it is the same as allowing that it could be produced from everything that is conventionally considered not to
be its causes because they are equally other than the effect. In the
same way, if a cause produced an effect that is an unrelated
other, it is the same as allowing that a cause could also produce
any entity, such as a lamp's producing darkness.
A proponent of production from other might object:
The Diamond Slivers
This consequence does not apply; though cause and
effect are inherently other, an effect which a cause is able
to produce is the effect of that cause, and a cause which is
able to produce that effect is the cause of that effect. A
sprout of rice is not produced from a barley seed and is
not produced from its non-producers, such as the future
moments of its own continuum. A sprout of rice is produced from that which is included in its same continuum
and from producers that are prior to it. Therefore, everything is not produced from everything.
Answer:
This is not correct; once cause and effect are inherently
other, this otherness must be their mode of being. Once
otherness is their mode of being, they must be utterly
non-related. Thus, it is not possible for a rice seed and a
barley seed to be different with respect to whether they
can produce a shoot of rice or not because they both are
inherently other than a rice shoot.
Further:
A seed is not inherently other than a sprout because a
seed has no inherently existent otherness. It so follows
because if a seed were inherently other than its sprout,
then it could not be a dependent existent or nominal
other. It would necessarily have a separate entity of
otherness such as is mistakenly propounded by the Vaisheshikas.
Further:
A seed and its sprout are not inherently other because a
sprout does not exist simultaneously with its seed. It so follows because if they existed inherently, they would
neither depend on nor be affected by anything. They
would never disappear, and thus the sprout would have to
exist even at the time of the seed. However, they do not
exist simultaneously because without a transformation
141
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Meditation on Emptiness
of the seed there is no production of a sprout. Thus, a
seed and its sprout are not inherently other, and production of a sprout from a seed does not exist inherently. For
this reason, one should forsake the thesis that things are
produced from inherently existent others.
Refuting inherently existent production
If the entities of the phenomena that are effects, such as
sprouts, do not exist in their causes either collectively or
individually or as things other than their causes, then the
entities of the effects to be produced do not exist prior to
their production. If so, how could production from other
exist?
An effect would have to exist prior to its production if production
existed inherently. Once production is accepted, the cause's
approaching cessation and the effect's approaching production
are simultaneous, as it is even in the Prasangika's own
presentation of conventionally existent production. 92 The activity
of approaching production depends on the effect because it is the
effect that is approaching production. If production were findable
under analysis, then, whenever the activity of approaching production existed, the base of this activity, the sprout, would have to
exist. For, the two are in a relation ofsupported and supporter, and
since this is their nature, it cannot change.
The activity of approaching production exists at the time of
the cause's approaching cessation, and since the effect must exist
along with its activity, the seed and the sprout would have to
exist simultaneously. This is impossible because simultaneity
would rule out that the one produced the other. If the sprout
were already existent, what could a seed do to produce it?
Still, if a seed produces something, this something that is
growing forth must exist, but if it already exists, how can it be
said that the seed produces it?
If they do not exist simultaneously, how can it be said that
production exists inherently? For, the activity of approaching
production and that thing which is approaching production
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143
would have to exist simultaneously if production were findable.
How could there be growing without the thing that is growing?
Someone might object:
It is seen that one end of a scale moves downward at the
same time that the other end moves upward. Just as
these activities exist simultaneously, the activities of
approaching cessation and of approaching production
exist simultaneously. Thereby, it is shown that seed and
sprout exist simultaneously.
Answer:
Even if the activities of the rising and lowering of the
two ends of a scale exist simultaneously, a seed and a
sprout are not similar because they do not exist simultaneously, and, thus, their activities do not exist simultaneously. A sprout's state of presently being produced is its
approaching production; therefore, it does not exist at
that time. A seed's present ceasing is its approaching cessation; even though the seed is existent, in the next
moment it will not exist. Therefore, a sprout and its seed
do not exist simultaneously and are not similar to the
two ends of a scale.
Buddha used the example of the scale in the Rice Seedling Sutra
(Shalistamba) to show that these two actions exist simultaneously as dependent-arisings, when there is no analysis, like a
magician's illusions.
Refuting inherently existent otherness
If the effect's own entity does not exist at the time of the
cause, then there is no referent in relation to which the
causes could become 'other'. Thus, there is no phenomenon of otherness in seeds and so forth, and so no production from other.
Someone might try to avoid this fallacy by stating:
Though there is no inherently existent otherness in what
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Meditation on Emptiness
does not exist simultaneously, since cause and effect
exist simultaneously and are other, there is production
from other.
Answer:
What already exists has no need for production.
Errors concerning the refutation of production from other
Many interpreters of Madhyamika think that since two things
that are other must exist simultaneously in order to be other and
since cause and effect necessarily exist at different times, the production of an effect from a cause other than it is impossible.93
Dzong-ka-ba rejects this interpretation of the Prasangika refutation of production from other because the very faults that are
ascribed to others by the Prasangikas would apply to themselves.
In other words, since the Prasangikas assert cause and effect conventionally, they must also assert that conventionally cause and
effect exist at different times and that cause and effect are other.
If the Prasangikas refuted all otherness in what do not exist
simultaneously, it would be impossible for them to present cause
and effect.
Therefore, the refutation of production from other refers not
to other in general but to 'inherently existent other'. When this
is refuted, mere analytically unfindable, conventional otherness
of cause and effect is not refuted, and cause and effect can be
presented without fault.
If analytically findable production from other existed, then an
effect would have to exist at the time of its causes in order for its
causes to be other than it, and since cause and effect are necessarily serial, analytically findable otherness cannot obtain between
them. Thus, Dzong-ka-ba objects to other interpreters' failure to
delineate inherently existent otherness as the object of refutation.
It is necessary to present the reasoning that refutes inherently
existent production in such a way that it does not harm one's own
presentation of conventional phenomena. For instance, it is said
that the action of approaching production can exist conventionally
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145
without the existence of the sprout that is approaching production, much the same as a seed and a sprout do not exist simultaneously even though they are related.94 Conventionally, a seed is
the source or object related to and its sprout is the relater; however, both do not have to exist simultaneously within the context
of analytically unfindable nominalities. It is necessary to distinguish between what constitutes ultimate analysis and what constitutes conventional analysis. Making complicated distinctions
does not necessarily constitute ultimate analysis. Here, ultimate
analysis is a searching for an otherness that can bear analysis,
such as investigating whether the something in relation to which
a thing is called 'other' is present or not.
Seeing all analysis as ultimate analysis, many interpreters of
Prasangika say that the Madhyamikas themselves have no presentation of cause and effect; thus, they think that it is not necessary to qualify production from other with 'inherently existent'.
For Dzong-ka-ba, production exists conventionally and validly,
and production from the merely other must be accepted because
the remaining three possibilities—self, both, and causelessly—
are absurd. Therefore, the refutation of production from other
must be qualified as 'production from inherently existent other'.
From his viewpoint many Madhyamika interpreters have overextended the scope of Nagarjuna's refutations.
It is a cardinal point in the systems of interpreters of Prasangika who do not accept valid establishment that Prasangikas
assert nothing themselves but use only the inner contradictions
of others' assertions to refute them. Thus, some Tibetan scholars say that Prasangikas hold that a reason is not validly established for both parties in a debate because the stater would not
know what was validly established for his opponent since he
would not know the other's mind either through direct perception or inference. They add that he himself would not know
what was validly established because even when one has 'decided'
that something is validly established, error is possible.
Dzong-ka-ba answers that if such an interpretation of Prasangika were true, then Prasangikas could not refute others from the
point of view of others' own assertions because they would not
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Meditation on Emptiness
know what the others actually asserted since they would not
know others' minds. They could not state refutations of others
because even though they had 'decided' that something is a refutation, it is possible to be mistaken.
These same interpreters of Prasangika say that pervasion of a
reason by a predicate cannot be validly established because
through direct perception one only realizes, for instance, that the
existence of fire pervades the existence of smoke in a specific
place, such as a kitchen. One does not realize that the existence
of fire pervades the instances of smoke in all places and at all
times. They say that an inferring consciousness cannot realize
the pervasion because it would have to cognize all phenomena in
order to certify that all instances of smoke in all places and all
times are pervaded by the existence of fire. Therefore, they say
that there is no valid establishment of the pervasion of a reason
(presence of smoke) by a predicate (presence of fire); they say
that there is only pervasion that accords with the conventions of
the world.
Dzong-ka-ba answers that this is extremely wrong. When one
inferentially realizes that on a mountain pass there is fire because
of the presence of smoke, as in a kitchen, the pervasion is not of a
particular instance of smoke by a particular instance of fire.
Rather, the generality 'fire' is realized as pervading the generality 'smoke'. If it were taken that the pervasion referred to fire on
a pass pervading smoke on a pass, then, when this pervasion is
realized, the thesis would already be realized. In other words,
when it is determined that fire on a pass pervades smoke on a
pass, one would already have realized the thesis—'On the pass
there is fire.'
Furthermore, examples are given in order to facilitate realization of the same predicate, and, therefore, the predicate of the
thesis which is implied in the example ('as in a kitchen') must be
the same as in the main thesis, 'there is fire'. If the predicate of
the example were specified as kitchen-fire, then the main thesis
would absurdly have to read, 'on the pass there is kitchen-fire'.
Rather, Dzong-ka-ba says that the subject ('on the pass') is the base
with respect to which one realizes the presence of fire because of
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147
the presence of smoke and that this base should not be confused
with the predicate of the thesis ('there is fire') through making it
into 'there is pass-fire'.
According to Dzong-ka-ba, scholars who reject valid inference
on the basis of the requirement of having to realize the pervasion
of a specific reason by a specific predicate do not understand the
Buddhist position on the subject. Rather than using good reasoning, they use a mass of coercives that are exactly alike in their
lack of force. He says that they are similar to those who have
fallen into a river and are trying to save themselves by grasping
at floating grass. Though a specific smoke is seen on the pass, the
pervasion based on which one realizes the specific thesis is a
general pervasion.
The Sa-gya scholar Dak-tsang (sTag-tshang) refuted Dzong-kaba saying that it is contradictory to accept that seed and sprout
are different substantial entities (dravya) and then not accept
'production from other'. 95 Jam-yang-shay-ba turns the same
reasoning back on Dak-tsang, saying that Dak-tsang then must
accept production from other because the latter implies that he
accepts that the 'other' of'production from other' means just an
otherness of entity and not 'inherently existent others'.
Dzong-ka-ba's assertion is that seed and sprout are other entities and that a sprout is produced from its seed. However, this
does not constitute an assertion of 'production from other'
because the 'other' of'production from other' means 'inherently
existent other'. Dak-tsang himself does not accept that seed and
sprout are even 'other', but Jam-yang-shay-ba thinks that Daktsang is 'forced' to assert this because the term 'substantial
entity' is a part of common analysis. Since cause and effect must
be accepted conventionally and since they must be accepted as
other substantial entities, Dak-tsang must accept production
from other if he says that 'other' means just 'other substantial
entities' rather than 'inherently existent others'.
Dak-tsang then would contradict the many dictums of the
Prasangika system which say that both ultimately and conventionally production from other is not asserted. Dak-tsang, however, is quite aware that production from other cannot be
148
Meditation on Emptiness
accepted even conventionally. For him, it is Dzong-ka-ba who
breaks the dictum by applying analysis and then accepting that
cause and effect are different entities.
Dzong-ka-ba's answer probably is that once dependently
arisen production is accepted, it must be asked whether cause
and effect are the same entity or different entities. If it is unsuitable to ask about sameness of entity or difference of entity, or
mere self and other, it would be tantamount to saying that any
analysis of the terms 'self and 'other' would immediately
involve ultimate analysis, even in cases of looking into whether
something done several years ago was done by oneself or
another.
Once valid establishment of conventional production is accepted, production must be explained as involving causes and
effects which are either the same or different. If it cannot be said
that cause and effect are merely other, the whole presentation of
reasoning and valid establishment falls to the ground. Dzong-kaba's followers cogently say that analysis into whether an apple
seed and the tree that will grow from it are merely different is
just conventional analysis.96 Any further investigation into
whether they are totally unrelated and so forth would constitute
ultimate analysis and would exceed the sphere of the conventional. Thus, the 'other' of 'production from other' refers to
others that can be found under analysis. Conventionally existent
inherent otherness is also refuted, but mere conventionally existent otherness is not.
Still, when a mother says, 'I gave birth to a boy,' this is not
accepted as a case of production from self. Although from the
mother's viewpoint her son is produced from herself, conventionally she and her son are other. The world's merely saying
something does not make it conventionally existent; reasoned,
systematic analysis is not forbidden.
NON-PRODUCTION FROM BOTH SELF AND O T H E R
The theistic Samkhyas assert that all transformations are produced from the nature (prakrti) which is the same entity as its
The Diamond Slivers
149
transformations, as well as from the god Ishvara, who is other
than the transformations. 97 Therefore, all transformations are
produced from both self and other.
The Jainas assert that, for example, a man named Maitreya
who already existed as a living being (jiva) in a former life took
re-birth, and thus, Maitreya is produced from himself since
Maitreya and his living being are not other.98 Also, Maitreya is
produced from that which is other than himself—parents, virtue,
non-virtue, contaminations, and so forth—therefore, he is also
produced from the other. In the same way, a pot is the same
entity as the clay but a different entity from the potter's activities.
These assertions might seem to combine the advantages of
production from self and production from other; however, they
also accrue the fallacies of both. Each part of the dual assertion is
refuted by the respective refutations of production from self and
production from other already given.
NON-PRODUCTION CAUSELESSLY
The Nihilists do not assert that there is utterly no caused production because causation that can be observed, such as the
making of a pot, does exist. However, the sharpness of thorns,
the plunging downward of water-falls, the colors of flowers, and
so forth are said to be causeless, arising just by the nature of the
entity.99 They draw the conclusion that making effort at ethics is
a waste of precious time because no moral carry-over from one
lifetime to another is seen. Not being seen, such causation does
not exist.
The Buddhists say that the sharpness of thorns is produced
from the same seeds that produce the thorns.100 The ascertainment that the sharpness of thorns arises sometimes in some
places is a proof that they are produced in dependence on other
entities, and these entities upon which they depend are called
causes.
If things were uncaused, the planting of fields and the like
would be senseless because things would arise themselves.
150
Meditation on Emptiness
Anything could arise from anything. If the production of things
were adventitious, then just as a bread-fruit tree, for instance,
would not be the cause of its own fruit, so because all things,
such as lemon and mango trees, are also not causes of bread-fruit,
bread-fruit would be produced from them because they are
equally non-causes in relation to bread-fruit.101
CONCLUSION
The four possibilities of inherently existent production are
thereby proved to be non-existent.102 It is thus established that
things are not inherently produced. This, in turn, establishes
that products do not exist inherently because for products to
exist inherently they would have to be inherently produced.
Realization of the absence of inherently existent production of a
product is a realization of its emptiness.
Refutations of the views of philosophical systems on the four
possibilities of inherently existent production are not just refutations of rival systems but should be taken as a branch of the process
of overcoming one's own innate sense that things are inherently
produced.103 The innate non-analytical intellect does not conceive
cause and effect to be either the same, or inherently different, or
both, or neither; however, if the objects that the intellect misconceives as inherently existent did in fact inherently exist, they
would necessarily exist in one of these four ways. Thus, through
eliminating these four possibilities, the inherently existent products that are the objects of this innate ignorance are shown to be
non-existent. By attacking in this way the falsely conceived object,
the falsely conceiving subject is gradually overcome. The false
subject is removed by overcoming belief in the false object.
Actual realization of an emptiness of inherent production transforms a person's view of the world and frees him or her from the
chains of attachment toward products. Ultimately, direct cognition of emptiness in a totally non-dual manner elevates one to the
level of a Superior, and through continuous cultivation of this cognition cyclic existence—the beginningless round of birth, aging,
sickness, and death—is terminated.
2
The Four Extremes
Sources
Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
ChandrakTrti's Commentary on the 'Supplement'
Corresponding sections of the translation pp.651-3
Does a cause produce an effect which is existent, non-existent,
both, or neither?104 This analysis is a refutation of the four
extremes but can also be called a refutation of the four alternatives.
(The diamond slivers can also be called a refutation of the four
extremes and a refutation of the four alternatives simply because
there are four extremes or four alternatives considered.)105 As
above, the possibilities for inherently existent production are
limited to four, and when these four are eliminated, the absence
of inherently existent production is established.
The reasoning in brief is:106
An existent effect is not ultimately produced because
whatever exists ultimately must always exist, and thus
there would be no need for producers, that is, causes.
A non-existent effect is not ultimately produced because
if a non-existent effect were produced, the horns of a
rabbit could also be produced.
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Meditation on Emptiness
An effect which is both existent and non-existent is not
produced because there is no such thing as an existent
and non-existent effect; no one thing possesses contradictory natures.
An effect which is neither existent nor non-existent is
not produced because there i-s no such thing.
Or, in another way:
A sprout which is in all ways existent at the time of its
causes is not produced by causes and conditions because
causes and conditions cannot create anything that
already exists.
A sprout is not ultimately produced newly because of
not existing at the time of its causes, just as a lotus in the
sky, which is utterly non-existent, does not exist at the
time of its causes and is not newly produced.
An effect, if ultimately existent, must exist at the time of its
causes because whatever is ultimately produced must always
exist since if at any time it did not exist, it would ultimately be
non-existent forever. The ultimately existent is not fit to depend
on causes and conditions; hence, there could be no difference
between production when the causes and conditions are complete and non-production when the causes and conditions are
non-complete.
Also, an effect would have to exist at the time of its causes
because the action of the growing forth of an effect such as a
sprout must depend on the sprout. Thus, at the time when the
sprout is approaching production (which is the same time that its
seed is approaching cessation), the sprout which is the base of
the activity of growing forth must exist. Since the cause has not
yet ceased at that time, both would exist at the same time.
ChandrakTrti says in his Commentary on the 'Supplement':107
Now, there is no time when a cause, from among cause
and effect, depends on an effect [and thus could achieve
otherness with respect to an effect]. In order to show this,
The Four Extremes
it is said [in the Supplement, VI.21], 'If producers are
causes producing products other [than themselves], it is
to be considered whether they produce an existent, nonexistent, that which is both, or that which is neither. If it
exists, of what use are producers? What could these producers do for the non-existent? What could they do for
that which is neither?'
Causes, that is, producers, are not producers of an
existent product because of the fallacies already set forth,
such as, 'It is just not reasonable that what has already
been produced be produced again.' 108 Thus, there is no
need at all of causes [for what already exists].
Also, what could these producers do for a non-existent
product?109 It would be non-existent like the horns of an
ass.
It is said, 'For whoever asserts that the effect is existent
and for whoever asserts that the effect is non-existent, it
would be senseless to set pillars and so forth for a house.'
Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way [XX.21-22]
also says:
If the
What
If the
What
entity
will a
entity
will a
of the
cause
of the
cause
effect exists,
produce?
effect does not exist,
produce?
If it is not producing,
A cause is not possible.
If causes are not existent,
Of what would there be an effect?
Even if an effect were both existent and non-existent, what
could causes do for it? For, the fallacies previously set
forth would follow. 'Bothness' [here] is a thing that is
both, or that which exists as both [existent and non-existent]. Possession of the entities of existence and non-existence does not occur in one thing at one time. Therefore, a
thing that has such a nature does not exist. Because it is
153
154
Meditation on Emptiness
just not existent, what could causes which are producers
do for it?
The Treatise [XXV. 14] says:
How could nirvana
Be both a thing and a non-thing?
These two do not exist in one,
Like light and darkness.
Just so [VIII.7]:
An existent and non-existent doer
Does not do an existent and non-existent [doing].
How could one [entity] have existence and nonexistence
Which are mutually exclusive?
Also, what could causes do for an effect which is
neither existent nor non-existent? For, an effect that has
forsaken the entities of existence and non-existence does
not exist. If the existent and non-existent do not occur,
that which is both not existent and not non-existent,
being the negative of these, would not be any different.
When these two are not established, that which is both
not existent and not non-existent just does not occur.
The Treatise [XXV. 15] says:
The teaching of nirvana
As [both] not a thing and not a non-thing
Would be established
If things and non-things were established.
ChandrakTrti applies this refutation of the four extremes to
various types of production from other, and Nagarjuna and
Ausha extend its import to include a refutation of inherently
existent abiding and ceasing. For, once there is no inherently
existent production, how could there be inherently existent
abiding or ceasing?
3
The Four Alternatives
Sources
Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
Geshe Gediin Lodro's oral teachings
Corresponding section of the translation pp.653-8
The principal Indian source for the refutation of the four alternatives is the Svatantrika Jnanagarbha's Discrimination of the
Two Truths (Satyadvayavibhahga) and his own commentary.110
Not finding any Prasangika sources, many scholars, including
Jang-gya, do not accept this reasoning as Prasangika." 1 It is not
that the import of the refutation of the four alternatives cannot
be considered Prasangika but a question of whether this reasoning is emphasized sufficiently among Indian Prasangikas to be
considered an integral part of their system.
Jam-yang-shay-ba, however, lists it as one of the Prasangikas'
means of refuting the inherent existence of phenomena, saying
that the reasoning refuting the four alternatives is so attractive
that it literally captivates the mind of the intelligent (see p.654).
It is:112
A product such as an eye consciousness is not ultimately
156
Meditation on Emptiness
produced because ultimately only one effect is not produced from only one cause, ultimately many effects are
not produced from only one cause, ultimately only one
effect is not produced from many causes, and ultimately
many effects are not produced from many causes.
The very meaning of production mitigates against ultimate
existence because 'ultimately existing' means 'existing through
its own power'. If an entity's existence depends on production,
the entity does not exist through its own power. Still, one's mind
will not be captivated by this interesting reasoning unless one
probes the refutation further. The establishment of the fourcornered reason must be investigated thoroughly in order to gain
its import.
An eye consciousness is chosen as the example because the
three causes of the production of an eye consciousness are well
known in Buddhist literature. An eye consciousness is caused by
three factors: a visible form, an eye sense power, and a former
moment of consciousness. A visible object—color and s h a p e causes an eye consciousness to be produced in the image of that
object. An eye sense power causes an eye consciousness to have
the ability to apprehend colors and shapes and not sounds, odors,
and so forth. A former moment of consciousness causes an eye
consciousness to be a conscious entity. In other words, the ability
of an eye consciousness to apprehend visible objects is derived
from its respective sense; its being generated in the image of a particular object is caused by a particular visible form; its being conscious is caused by a previous moment of consciousness.
The refutation of the first alternative, that ultimately only one
effect is produced from only one cause, is based on the fact that
an eye sense power not only produces an eye consciousness but
also produces its own next moment.
If it were said that the single effect produced by an eye
sense power is only its own second moment, it would
absurdly follow that all beings would be blind because
the production of an eye consciousness from an eye
sense power would not occur.
The Four Alternatives
157
If it were said that an eye sense power produces only an
eye consciousness, it would absurdly follow that all
beings would be blind because there would be no continuous production of two moments of an eye sense.
The first moment of the eye sense would generate an eye consciousness, but because there would be no second moment of the
eye sense, a second moment of eye consciousness would be nonexistent, and an ordinary being cannot realize anything in just
one moment.
The refutation of the second alternative, that ultimately many
effects are produced from only one cause, is accomplished
through three absurd consequences:
It would absurdly follow that:
1 the experiential aspect of an eye consciousness would not
be the imprint or effect of an immediately preceding
moment of consciousness
2 the aspect which is the image's generation in the
consciousness would not be the effect of the visible form
3 the aspect of an eye consciousness which is its ability to
apprehend a particular type of object would not be the
effect of an eye sense power, its special empowering cause.
The reason is that ultimately only one cause would produce
many effects, and only one cause would be assigned for these
three effects.
The refutation of the third alternative, that ultimately only
one effect is produced from many causes, is:
It absurdly follows that only one of the three attributes
of an eye consciousness is produced by the three causes
of an eye consciousness. Therefore, it absurdly follows
that the other two attributes either do not exist or are
produced causelessly.
The fourth alternative, that ultimately many effects are produced from many causes, is the most likely alternative, and its
refutation is many-sided:
158
Meditation on Emptiness
It might be said that a composite of the three causes ultimately produces the three attributes and that the three
attributes are not ultimately different but only appear to
the mind to be different. Then, because they would
actually exist one way but appear another way, they
would be false and thus could not be truly existent. Further, if the three attributes are not different and do not
appear to be different to any mind, the three attributes
would be one, and it could not be said that many causes
produce many effects.
If the three attributes are ultimately different, it would
follow that an eye consciousness and the three attributes
of an eye consciousness would be ultimately different.
Then, since the composite of the three causes produces
the three attributes, one would have to find a cause for
the consciousness which is different from them. Furthermore, an eye consciousness and its three attributes are
not ultimately different because if they were, the wisdom
realizing suchness would have to perceive them as different since difference would be their mode of being, but it
does not.
Moreover, an eye consciousness would be produced
by a visible form because its being generated in the
image of the object is produced by the form. Also, an eye
consciousness would not be produced by a visible form
because its being a conscious entity is not produced from
a visible form. An eye consciousness is not a different
entity from its attribute of being produced in the image
of its object and also it is not a different entity from its
attribute of being a conscious entity. Therefore, it would
be both produced from a visible form and not produced
from a visible form.
The pivot around which these consequences turn is that if an eye
consciousness were ultimately the same entity as its attributes, it
would be one with its attributes in all respects. Such are the conditions that an object findable under analysis must fulfill; if the
The Four Alternatives
159
sameness of an eye consciousness with its attributes is its inherent nature, how could it also be different from these attributes?
In the same vein:
A visible form absurdly would be both a producer and a
non-producer of an eye consciousness. It would produce
an eye consciousness because it generates the consciousness in its image, and it would not produce an eye consciousness became it does not generate its quality of
being conscious.
If the three attributes are produced from the composite
of the three causes, then the causes individually would not
be producers. If the three causes are individually the producers, then the effect, the eye consciousness, would be
uncaused because only the three attributes of an eye consciousness would be caused. If it is asserted that the three
causal factors produce an eye consciousness, then the eye
consciousness which is not different from its three different attributes would be uncaused. For, the three attributes would be uncaused, and the eye consciousness is not
different from them.
It is said that not finding things such as cause and effect under
analysis is somewhat like searching a room from top to bottom
for a big, obvious thing such as a good-sized box.113 One is not
able to find it, and the search generates utter conviction that it
cannot be found. This analytical consciousness which does not
find objects is a wisdom consciousness. Through cultivating it,
realization dawns, revealing how objects are utterly unfindable
when analyzed in such a manner but are imputedly existent,
effective, and validly established.
ELIMINATION OF ERROR
Because these four types of production do exist conventionally,
it is necessary that the qualification 'ultimately', 'inherently', or
'naturally' be affixed to the refutations. Otherwise, the scope of
the refutation would be over-extended. In the Prasangika system
160
Meditation on Emptiness
there is nominal production of one from one, many from one,
one from many, and many from many.
The best source for showing that one producing one and so
forth exist conventionally is in sutra where it is taught that (1) one
action can produce one life, (2) one action can produce many
lives, (3) many actions can produce one life, and (4) many actions
can produce many lives (see p.657). It could be asked whether a
single life is only one effect, but such investigations into whether
a series can rightly be considered a unit or not is a mode of ultimate analysis. When the continuum of a lifetime is sought in the
individual moments of the continuum, it cannot be found. The
continuum is not the individual moments nor their composite; if
a continuum were a composite of the moments, either each
moment would be a continuum or there would be no separate
moments.
Conventionally, or nominally, cause and effect are preserved.
It is said that just as external cause and effect can differ greatly in
size, as in the case of an apple seed's producing an apple tree,
even more so does the force and endurance differ between cause
and effect in the internal sphere." 4 The mind's power is such
that a little non-virtue can cause tremendous havoc and a little
virtue can cause tremendous advancement. Just so, one complete
action with strong motivation to attain Buddhahood for the sake
of living beings can act as the basis not just for one lifetime but
for many. The marvels of cause and effect are not lost in the
devastating import of no inherent existence. An understanding
of emptiness enhances an understanding of cause and effect.
4 Dependent-Arising
Sources
Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
Corresponding section of the translation pp.659-76
In the Madhyamika system all phenomena, both impermanent
and permanent, are dependent-arisings (pratityasamutpada).
Through the reason of their being dependent-arisings, their
emptiness is established.115 The Questions of Sagaramati Sutra
(Sagaramatipariprchchha) says:
Those which arise dependently
Are free of inherent existence.
The Questions of the King of Nagas, Anavatapta, Sutra (Anavataptanagarajapariprchchha) says:
Those which are produced from causes are not
produced.
They do not have an inherent nature of production.
Those which depend on causes are said to be
Empty; those who know emptiness are aware.
In this quote, the reason which establishes an emptiness of
162
Meditation on Emptiness
products is indicated by 'produced from causes'. The meaning
of not being produced is clarified by the next line, 'They do not
have an inherent nature of production'; it is not mere production
but inherently existent production that is eliminated. Also,
Buddha himself clarified his teaching of no production in the
Descent into Lanka Sutra (Lahkavatara), 'O Mahamati, thinking of no inherently existent production, I said that all phenomena are not produced.'
In the quote from the Questions of Anavatapta Sutra the words
'those which' indicate the phenomena that are subjects being
shown to lack inherently existent production; they are outer phenomena, such as sprouts, and inner phenomena, such as actions.
The third line, 'Those which depend on causes are said to be
empty', indicates that reliance and dependence on causes is the
meaning of being empty of inherent existence. An emptiness of
inherent existence is the meaning of dependent-arising; emptiness does not mean the negation of mere production or an
absence in phenomena of an ability to perform a function.
The reasoning is:
Sprouts and so forth are not inherently produced
because of being dependent-arisings.
The predicate of the thesis ('are not inherently produced') eliminates the extreme of permanence; the reason ('being dependentarisings') eliminates the extreme of annihilation. Seeing that the
reasoning of dependent-arising refutes all extremes and that this
teaching is a quality elevating Buddha above all other teachers,
Nagarjuna praised Buddha in the opening verses of his Treatise
on the Middle Way:
I bow down to the perfect Buddha,
The best of propounders, who taught
That what dependently arises
Has no cessation, no production,
No annihilation, no permanence, no coming,
No going, no difference, no sameness,
Is free of the elaborations [of inherent
Existence and of duality] and is at peace.
Dependent-A rising
163
The word 'dependent-arising' in Sanskrit is pratityasamutpada. It has two parts: pratitya, a continuative meaning 'having
depended', and samutpada, an action noun meaning 'arising'.
The formation of pratitya is:
in - n + prati + su - su+ktva which changes to lyap -1 - p
+ tuk (between i and y a ) - k - u + s u - s u = pratftya.
In other words, the verbal root in, meaning 'going', loses its indicatory letter n, leaving i. To this, prati is affixed, and the nominative case ending su is affixed to prati but immediately erased
because prati is an indeclinable. The continuative ending ktva is
added to i in the form of lyap, of which the accent letter / and the
p that indicates the addition of the augment tuk are dropped.
This leaves prati i ya. Tuk is added between i and ya, and the
indicatory k and pronunciation letter u are dropped. The i of
prati and the i of the verbal root are combined, making pratitya.
The nominative case ending su is added but is immediately
dropped because the continuative pratitya is an indeclinable.
The formation of samutpada is:
pada +ut (before pada) + sam (before utpada) + su (after
ut) + su (after sam) - su - su + ghan (which is a vrddhiing of a) + su - u (with the s changing to) ru - U (with
the r changing to) h = samutpadah.
In other words, the prefixes ut and sam are added to pada which
means 'going'. The nominative case ending is added to these two
and then is immediately dropped because they are indeclinables,
making samutpada. The vowel of pad is strengthened for the
sake of denoting an action noun, making samutpada. The
nominative case ending su is added; the u is erased; the 5 changes
into ru; the u is erased, and the r changes into visarga, making
samutpadah.
Pratitya is thus shown to be a continuative meaning 'having
depended' and not a secondary derivative noun as many Madhyamikas and non-Madhyamikas wrongly claim. For them, the t of
itya is added because the root i is being used to form an action
noun. Ya is then an affix used to form a secondary derivative noun.
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Meditation on Emptiness
Thus, for them itya means 'that which goes', and 'prati' means
'multiple', or 'diverse', or 'this and that'. In this mistaken interpretation pratitya means 'that which goes or disintegrates
diversely'. Pratitya being viewed not as a continuative but as a
noun, it is wrongly asserted that in the compound pratityasamutpada a genitive plural case ending has been erased and
should be added when taken out of compound, making pratTtyanam which means 'of those which go, depart, or disintegrate
diversely'. The etymological meaning of pratityasamutpada is
thereby wrongly taken to mean 'the composition and arising of
effects which disintegrate in each diverse moment and which
have definite, diverse causes and conditions'.
Chandrakirti does not say that this meaning is wholly wrong,
but that it is a bad etymology because though it would apply to a
use of pratityasamutpada in a general sense, it would not apply
when pratityasamutpada refers to a specific arising of a single
effect from a single cause. However, taken as 'having depended,
arising' or 'dependent-arising', it applies to both general and
specific references.
The Prasangikas say that samutpada does not just mean 'arising' (lit., 'going out'), in the sense of arising from causes and conditions in the way that a sprout arises from a seed. It also means
'establishment' (siddha, grub pa) and 'existence' (sat, yodpa), (two
words that are often used interchangeably in Buddhist terminology). The term pratityasamutpada thereby refers not just to products, or things which arise from causes, but also to nonproducts since their existence is relative. All phenomena are
dependent-arisings.
The term 'dependent-arising' not only refers to a process of
production and of coming into existence but also to these things
which are produced and come into existence." 6 Phenomena
themselves are dependent-arisings; a pot is a dependent-arising;
a consciousness is a dependent-arising; an emptiness is a dependent-arising, and so forth.
The non-Buddhist Grammarians object to the term and its
meaning, saying that since pratitya is a continuative, the act of
depending must precede the act of arising. If that which depends
Dependent-A rising
165
or meets its causes exists before its arising, then it would contradict the Buddhists' own dictum that an effect does not exist at
the time of the cause. Therefore, the Grammarians reject both
the grammatical correctness of the term and the philosophical
correctness of its meaning. However, according to Buddhists an
effect does not have to exist at the time of its causes for it to
depend on those causes; the mere production ,of an effect by
causes is the meaning of 'dependence'.
Bhavaviveka, in effect, refuses to etymologize the term in detail,
thereby suggesting that pratityasamutpada attains its meaning
through conventional usage and is not bound to an etymological
meaning. Chandrakirti speculates that Bhavaviveka compares it
to the compound aranyetilaka which literally means 'sesame in
the forest' but is used to indicate anything that does not answer to
one's expectations. Just as wild sesame yields no oil, so events that
do not yield one's expectations are called 'sesame in the forest'.
The etymology, though connected to the meaning, is much
narrower than the meaning which is gained through common convention. Chandrakirti speculates that for Bhavaviveka the etymology of the term pratityasamutpada likewise does not bear
close scrutiny; by common convention, however, it just means
'conditionally', that is, 'when this is, that arises'.
Chandrakirti disagrees, making reference to a verse in Nagarjuna's own Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning (Yuktishashtika) where
the master himself obviously etymologizes pratityasamutpada:
Tat tatprapya yadutpannam notpannam tat svabhavatah
'That which is produced having met this and that
[collection of causes and conditions] is not inherently
produced.'
The word substituted for pratitya is another continuative,
prapya,117 which means 'having attained' (or 'having met'
according to the Tibetan translation in this context for prapya,
phrad nas). The stanza thereby refutes Bhavaviveka's contention
that Buddhapalita erred in taking prapya as the meaning of
pratitya. Bhavaviveka's contention, as is made clear by his commentator Avalokitavrata,118 is like that of the Grammarians. His
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Meditation on Emptiness
point is that if an eye consciousness, for example, were existent,
it could meet with the eye sense and form which are its causes.
However, if it were existent at the time of its causes, it would be
senseless for the causes to produce it. According to Avalokitavrata, Bhavaviveka's objection is based on the principle that phenomena which meet must be simultaneously existent, but Bhavaviveka himself does not make clear the reasons for his objection. Chandraldrti surmises that perhaps Bhavaviveka means
that only physical things can meet; Avalokitavrata's interpretation is broader, but the requirement of simultaneous existence is
present for a physical meeting also.
ChandrakFrti's answer to Bhavaviveka's objection is two-fold:
First, Buddha made statements such as, 'This monk has
met with (that is, attained) the fruit'. Second, Nagarjuna
himself used the word prapya as a substitute for
pratitya.
His answer is indeed to the point because Bhavaviveka would
not want to quarrel with Nagarjuna.
Interestingly, in Nagarjuna's verse etymology, prati seems to
be etymologized as 'this and that' (tat tat); this would affirm the
view that prati is to be taken as meaning 'multiplicity', or
'diverse', or 'this and that', contradicting Chandrakirti's contention on this point. Chandraldrti might answer, however, that
Nagarjuna is giving an example of things relied upon, not an
etymology of prati. For, prati itself means prapti, 'meeting' or
'attainment', and it modifies i, which usually means 'go', to
cause it to mean prapti."9 Prapti means apeksha, 'reliance', and
thus the compound pratityasamutpada means 'arising in
reliance' and 'arising in dependence', or, more cogently,
'dependent-arising'. It means the arising of things in dependence
on causes and conditions, a very sign of their non-inherent
existence.
Prapyasamutpada, apekshyasamutpada, and pratityasamutpada are synonyms; however, they are sometimes explained
with individual meanings. Prapyasamutpada, 'arising through
meeting', is taken as referring to the dependent-arising which is
Dependent-A rising
167
the production of things by their causes. This is the meaning that
the Vaibhashikas, Sautrantikas, and Chittamatrins give to
'dependent-arising'; for them, however, dependent-arising is a
sign of things' true existence, not a sign oftheir non-true existence.
'Meeting' can even be taken literally in the sense of indicating that
a cause's approaching cessation and its effect's approaching production are simultaneous.
Apekshyasamutpada, 'existing in reliance' or 'relative existence', is taken as referring to the dependent-arising which is the
attainment by products and non-products of their own entities in
reliance on their parts. This meaning of dependent-arising is a
distinguishing feature of the Madhyamika system and is said to
be the Svatantrika-Madhyamikas' favored means of proving no
true existence, but it is also shared with such Prasangika masters
as Aryadeva.120 Things undeniably appear to the mind to be
separate from their parts as when it is thought, 'This house has
ten rooms'. The house appears to be one thing and the ten rooms
appear to be another.
Pratityasamutpada, 'dependent-existence', is taken as referring to the dependent-arising which is the designation of all phenomena in dependence on the thought that designates them.
Without thought to designate the existence of phenomena, the
arising of phenomena does not occur. However, phenomena
undeniably appear to common beings as if they exist in and of
themselves, appearing from the object's side toward the subject
rather than appearing to be imputed by the subject toward the
object. 'Existing in dependence on a designating consciousness'
is the special meaning of dependent-arising in the Prasangika
system. The other two meanings are also wholeheartedly accepted by the Prasangikas, but their own special interpretation is to
tak & pratityasamutpada as referring to the designation of phenomena dependent not just on their parts or bases of designation
but also on the thought that designates them.
When Chandrakirti says that dependent-arising is the arising
of things dependent on causes and conditions, the words 'causes
and conditions' do not refer just to usual causes and conditions
such as seeds or ignorance. 'Causes and conditions' also refer to
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Meditation on Emptiness
the parts of an object—an object's basis of designation—and to
the thought that designates the existence of an object. The word
'arising' means not just 'production' but also 'existence' and
'establishment'; all phenomena are dependent existents or relative existents. Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way (VIII. 12)
says:
A doer arises dependent on a doing,
And a doing exists dependent on a doer.
Except for that, we do not see
Another cause for their establishment.
It is clear that Nagarjuna does not mean that these two cause
each other with each one arising after the other one; such would
be impossible. Doer and doing are mutually dependent in terms
of the attainment of their entities through designation by
thought.
Dependent-arising is the king of reasonings because it can, without residue, overcome both extremes. The reasoning is:
All phenomena do not inherently exist because of being
dependent-arisings.
Or, in its most powerful form:
All phenomena do not inherently exist because of being
dependently imputed.
Here, 'all phenomena' means 'each and every phenomenon'.
Through ascertaining the reason—that all phenomena are
dependent-arisings—the extreme of annihilation is avoided, and
realization of the dependent-arising of causes and effects is
gained. Through ascertaining the thesis—that all phenomena do
not inherently exist—the extreme of permanence is avoided, and
realization of the emptiness of all phenomena is gained.
Furthermore, through ascertaining the reason—that all phenomena are dependent-arisings—the extreme of permanence is
also avoided because it is realized that phenomena are just
interdependently existent, not inherently existent. Through
Dependent-A rising
169
ascertaining the thesis—that all phenomena do not inherently
exist—the extreme of annihilation is also avoided because it is
realized that only inherent existence is negated, not existence in
general. As a yogi progresses in understanding dependentarising, realization of how the reason and the thesis each avoid
the two extremes becomes subtler and subtler.
All other reasonings that prove no inherent existence derive
from this king of reasons, dependent-arising. In the Prasangika
system the main reasonings proving no inherent existence are
the refutation of the four extreme types of production, called the
diamond slivers, and the sevenfold analysis of the relationship of
the person and the mind-body complex, to be explained in the
next chapter. Ultimately, the diamond slivers meets back to
dependent-arising as Chandrakirti says in his Supplement
(VI. 114):
Because things are not produced causelessly,
Or from Ishvara and so forth,
Or from other, from self, or both,
They are dependently produced.
The very fact that external phenomena, such as sprouts, and
internal phenomena, such as actions, arise dependent on their
causes (seeds and ignorance) establishes that their production is
empty of natural existence and eliminates that they are produced
from self, other, both, or causelessly. This is mainly based on the
reasoning of dependent-production, and in this sense the diamond slivers derives from dependent-arising.
The diamond slivers also derives from dependent-designation,
which is more difficult to realize than dependent-production.
When a yogi searches to find the object that is being imputed in
the expression, 'A sprout is growing,' he gains ascertainment
that it does not grow from self, other, both, or causelessly.
Through the force of this realization he develops ascertainment
that the production of sprouts and so forth is just a conventional
designation and through this develops ascertainment that if the
object imputed in the expression 'production' is sought, it cannot
be found. This is how the reasoning which refutes production of
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Meditation on Emptiness
the four extreme types derives from dependent-arising, or
dependent-designation.
Ultimately, the sevenfold reasoning refuting an inherently
existent person also derives from dependent-arising. As Chandraldrti says (Supplement VI. 158):
[The person] is not established in fact
Or in the world in the seven ways,
But without analysis, here in the world
Is imputed in dependence on its parts.
The non-finding of a person as either the same as mind and
body, or as different from them, or as their base, or as based on
them, or as possessing them, or as their shape, or as their composite induces the ascertainment that a person is just imputed to
the mental and physical aggregates. Similarly, a realization that a
person is just imputed in dependence upon the aggregates
induces the ascertainment that a person is not findable in
these seven ways. Thus, the sevenfold analysis can be seen as
contained in an investigation of dependent-designation, the
subtlest meaning of dependent-arising.
It is even said that emptiness and dependent-arising are synonyms, but this is not in the sense that 'pot' and its definition 'that
which is bulbous and able to hold water' are synonyms. Also, the
synonymity of emptiness and dependent-arising does not mean
that a consciousness which ascertains that effects arise dependent on causes and conditions also ascertains the meaning of their
being empty of inherently existent production. Furthermore,
the meaning of the term 'dependent-arising' is not asserted to be
the meaning of emptiness. An explicit ascertainment of a
dependent-arising does not even carry with it an implicit ascertainment of emptiness. Rather, emptiness is synonymous with
dependent-arising for Madhyamikas who through valid cognition have refuted inherent existence.
Not just anyone who realizes dependent-arising can realize its
synonymity with emptiness since many even see dependentarising as a reason for asserting inherent existence. However,
when a Madhyamika ascertains that external and internal things
Dependent-A rising
171
are dependent-arisings, he realizes, based on the force of this
very understanding, that being empty of inherent existence is
the meaning of being a dependent-arising. For, he has realized
that what inherently exists does not rely on anything, and he has
realized that inherent existence and dependent-arising are
contradictory.
Since through dependent-arising itself he has found realization
of the emptiness that negates inherent existence, when he sees,
hears, or is mindful that sprouts and so forth depend on causes and
conditions, he is drawn to thinking of the manner in which these
sprouts do not inherently exist. His mind has been thoroughly
trained to consider the unfindability of phenomena through
merely perceiving that they arise dependent on causes and conditions. He is so conditioned to think of emptiness as soon as he
notices causal conditionality that in a future life, even though
emptiness is not taught to him, the mere hearing of the doctrine
of cause and effect revivifies his former understanding. His
probing of the unfindability of phenomena is renewed, and his
progress on the path toward direct cognition of emptiness is
enhanced. He overcomes the bonds of forgetfulness that accompany the passage from one lifetime to another due to the difficulties of birth and the accustoming to a new body. Since cause and
effect are taught practically everywhere, the yogi can 'outwit' the
contrary forces that would take him away from continuing penetration of emptiness by taking the doctrine of cause and effect
and using it as his means to penetrate emptiness.
Through realizing how the other types of reasoning meet back
to dependent-arising, it is seen how working properly on any one
of them could involve understanding the meaning of all the
others. Through seeing dependent-arising, it is said that a yogi
sees Buddha in the sense that Buddha as a Truth Body is not different from the nature of dependent-arisings.121
ELIMINATION OF ERROR
Because all phenomena, including emptinesses, are dependentarisings and thus do not truly exist, Jam-yang-shay-ba (see p.676)
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Meditation on Emptiness
criticizes Dak-tsang for claiming that 'ultimate' (paramartha,
don dam), 'validly established' (pramanasiddha, tshad mas grub
pa), and 'able to set itself up' (Tib: tshugs thub tu grub pa) are
synonyms. Dak-tsang refuses to accept that conventional phenomena are validly established because for him 'validly established'
means that an object is able to establish itself independently.122
Jam-yang-shay-ba points out that there is no system of tenets,
even within Hfnayana, which asserts that what is validly established must also be 'able to set itself up'. For, in the Sautrantika
system 'generally characterized phenomena' (samanyalakshana,
spyi mtshan) or permanent phenomena are validly established
but are not able to establish themselves because they depend on
thought.
Still, it does seem that the Vaibhashikas assert that all phenomena are self-established because they assert that every phenomenon has its own self-sufficient entity.123 The Vaibhashikas
maintain that all existents are 'substantially established' (dravyasiddha, rdzas grub) though they reserve 'substantially existent'
(dravyasat, rdzasyod) merely for those phenomena that can bear
analysis. For the Vaibhashikas, ultimate truths are not emptinesses, as the Madhyamikas and Chittamatrins assert, but
objects such as forms and consciousnesses which, even if analyzed
down to their smallest particles or moments, are still instances of
form or consciousness. Objects such as tables and chairs, however,
disappear from the mind ifone considers their individual particles
and asks if those are tables; thus, they are conventional truths.
However, each particle is still an instance of form; therefore, the
Vaibhashikas assert that partless particles, partless moments of
consciousness, and permanent phenomena can bear ultimate
analysis. For them forms, consciousnesses, spaces, and so forth are
ultimate truths. All composite objects, such as chairs and pots, are
conventional truths, and Jam-yang-shay-ba seems to be implying
that though conventional truths are for them 'substantially
established', they are not 'able to set themselves up'.
In any case, the Sautrantikas, Chittamatrins, and Madhyamikas
agree that what is validly established need not be self-established.
Jam-yang-shay-ba says that if one insists that in the Prasangika
Dependent-A rising
173
system an ultimate, that is, an emptiness, must be both validly
established and able to set itself up, one misses the distinctive
feature of Madhyamika and the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras,
this being the dependent existence of everything. However, Daktsang does not accept the valid establishment of anything and
says further that whatever is 'validly established' must be also
'self-established'. He, therefore, does not himself accept that
emptinesses are 'self-established', but Jam-yang-shay-ba forces
on him the conclusion that emptinesses are 'self-established' or
truly existent because for Jam-yang-shay-ba an emptiness must
be validly established just because it exists.
Since an analytical consciousness discovers or finds the unfindability of an object, this unfindability (emptiness) might seem to
be inherently existent.124 It is true that when an analytical consciousness searches to find whether an object inherently exists or
not, it does find an emptiness of the object; however, when this
very analytical consciousness searches to find the emptiness of
the object, it 'finds' or cognizes an emptiness of the emptiness of
the object. Thus, though an emptiness is an ultimate truth, it
does not ultimately exist. This does not diminish the fact that
when conjoined with practice of the Bodhisattva deeds, cognition of and thorough acquaintance with emptiness grant the
highest of boons, liberation from cyclic existence and, finally,
omniscience.
5
Refuting a Self of Persons
Sources
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way
Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
Geshe Gedun Lodro's oral teachings
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
Corresponding section of the translation pp.677-97
In general 'self (atman, bdag), 'person' (pudgala, gang zag) and
'I' (aham, nga) are synonyms along with 'creature' or 'being'
(purusha, skyes bu), which has also been translated here as
'person'. 125 However, when Prasangikas speak specifically of a
self of persons (pudgalatman, gang zag gi bdag), this 'self does
not refer to the conventionally existent person which is imputed
in dependence on the aggregates of mind and body. In the term
'self of persons', 'self means 'inherent existence', and the word
'persons' means 'nominally exist persons'. Hence, the term 'selflessness of persons' means the non-inherent existence of nominally existent persons. 'Inherent existence' means 'independent
existence', 'objective existence', 'natural existence', or 'existence
under its own power', etc. The meaning of inherent existence
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Meditation on Emptiness
is best seen when one progresses toward realizing the imputed
nature of the person.126
Yogis who long to be freed from the round of birth, aging,
sickness, and death do not initially meditate on the emptiness of
pillars, pots and sprouts but on the emptiness, or selflessness, of
persons.127 Having gained an understanding of the emptiness of
persons, a yogi turns to meditation on the emptiness of the other
phenomena which are included within the continuum of a person, such as body and mind, and finally to meditation on the
emptiness of phenomena not included within the personal continuum, such as pillars and houses. He might use the king of
reasons, dependent-arising, in his meditation on the emptiness
of the person, but the fivefold and sevenfold reasonings are
renowned among the Prasangikas as the easiest means for gaining a quick and penetrating understanding of emptiness.
The fivefold reasoning is based on a description in sutra of
twenty false views of a real self:128
1
2
3
4
viewing forms, i.e., body, as a self
viewing the self as inherently possessing forms
viewing the self as inherently existing in forms
viewing forms as inherently existing in the self
5
6
7
8
viewing
viewing
viewing
viewing
feelings as a self
the self as inherently possessing feelings
the self as inherently existing in feelings
feelings as inherently existing in the self
9
10
11
12
viewing
viewing
viewing
viewing
discriminations as a self
the self as inherently possessing discriminations
the self as inherently existing in discriminations
discriminations as inherently existing in the self
13 viewing compositional factors as a self
14 viewing the self as inherently possessing compositional factors
15 viewing the self as inherently existing in compositional factors
16 viewing compositional factors as inherently existing in the self
Refut ing a Self of Persons
17
18
19
20
viewing
viewing
viewing
viewing
177
consciousness as a self
the self as inherently possessing consciousness
the self as inherently existing in consciousness
consciousness as inherently existing in the self.
These are five sets of four positions; Nagarjuna's fivefold analysis is based on these four positions with the addition of a fifth:
viewing the self as a different entity from forms and so forth.
Five modes are not mentioned in sutra because Buddha had
already taught that without apprehending the aggregates, it is
impossible for the innate false view of a self to conceive of a real
self. For this reason, a false view of the self as a totally different
entity from the aggregates is not innate but artificial, learned
through the mistaken teachings of the non-Buddhist Forders.
Also, because the innate false view of a real self does not conceive
the person and the aggregates to be either one or different, all
twenty false views of a self are only artificial. However, if the self
existed as conceived by the innate view of a real self, it would be
either one with the aggregates or a different entity from the
aggregates. Therefore, the self as conceived by the innate misconception of inherent existence is analyzed in the same way as
the self that is misconceived through artificial teachings.
The object of observation of an innate false view of an inherently existent person is the nominally existent self or person and
not the mental and physical aggregates. However, among the
twenty false views of a self the object of observation is often the
aggregates. Still, the aggregates are phenomena related to the self
which is the object observed by a false view of a self, and, therefore,
even these are named 'false views of a real self. For instance, if
forms are viewed as an inherently existent self, the base of the
view or the object of observation is a form, and, therefore, such a
misconception is a conception of a self of phenomena and not of
a self of persons. When, on the other hand, the person is viewed
as inherently possessing form, the object of observation is the
person, and, therefore, such a misconception is a conception of a
self of persons. If the person is viewed as inherently existing in
forms, the base of the view or the object of observation is a form,
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Meditation on Emptiness
and, therefore, such a misconception is a conception of a self of
phenomena and not of a self of persons. If it is viewed that forms
inherently exist in the person, the person is the base of the view
or the object of observation, and such a misconception is a conception of a self of persons.
The same distinctions can be extended to the other sixteen
views. Thus, some of the so-called 'false views of a real self are
actually misconceptions of a self of phenomena other than persons. Since Nagarjuna's fivefold reasoning is based on the modes
of the false view of a real self, both the fivefold and the sevenfold
reasonings can be said to involve refutation of a self of phenomena other than persons in order to establish the selflessness of
the person. Due to the fact that the base or object of observation
of the false view of a real self must be the person and not the
aggregates, it might be necessary to say that not all twenty false
views of a real self are actual false views of a real self but are only
named so. The fivefold reasoning as stated in Nagarjuna's
Treatise on the Middle Way is:
The self does not inherently exist because of (1) not
being the aggregates, (2) not being other than the aggregates, (3) not being the base of the aggregates, (4) not
depending on the aggregates, and (5) not possessing the
aggregates. An example is a chariot.
The reason is fivefold, and thus it is called the fivefold reasoning.
Chandraldrti added two more 'corners' to the reason:
(6) not being the shape of the aggregates, and (7) not
being the composite of the aggregates.
In a slightly longer form the sevenfold reasoning is:129
Except for only being imputed in dependence upon
the aggregates which are its basis of imputation, there
is no self-subsistent self, for:
1 the aggregates which are the basis of the imputation are
not the person
Refut ing a Self of Persons
179
2 the person is not an entity other than the aggregates
which are the basis of its imputation
3 the person is not the support of the aggregates which are
its basis of imputation
4 the person ultimately does not depend on the aggregates
which are its basis of imputation
5 the person ultimately does not possess the aggregates
6 the person is not the shape of the aggregates which are its
basis of imputation
7 the person is not the composite of the aggregates which
are the basis of its imputation.
For example, if a chariot is sought analytically, there is
no self-subsistent chariot to be found.
In the sevenfold reasoning, in order to realize the thesis that the I
does not inherently exist, it is necessary first to realize the pervasion of the sevenfold reason by the predicate of the thesis. In
other words, one must first realize that whatever does not exist
in these seven ways does not inherently exist. After that, one
establishes the presence of the seven reasons in the subject, I. By
the force of realizing the pervasion of these seven reasons by the
predicate of non-inherent existence and by the force of establishing the presence of these seven reasons in the subject, I, the I can
be realized as not inherently existent.
First, the predicate of the thesis ('does not inherently exist') is
to be applied to an example ('chariot') which is familiar in the
world, since an example is easier to understand than the actual
thesis. It is not that the emptiness of a chariot is to be realized
before realizing the emptiness of a person, but it is important
first to see how the mode of analysis works through an example
which is easier than the actual subject. Applied to a chariot the
reasoning is:130
A chariot does not inherently exist because of not being
its parts, not being other than its parts, not being in its
parts, not being that in which its parts exist, not possessing its parts, not being the composite of its parts, and not
being the shape of its parts.
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Meditation on Emptiness
These seven reasons must be established as qualities of the subject, a chariot.
A chariot is not inherently the same entity as its own parts
(axles, wheels, etc.) because if it were one with them, just as its
parts are many, so the chariot would also be many. Or, just as the
chariot is one, its parts also would be one. Furthermore, the
agent—the chariot as the whole which conveys its parts when it
moves—and the object—the conveyed parts—would absurdly be
one.
A chariot is not inherently other than its own parts because if it
were other, it would be a different entity from its parts. Things
which are different entities and which exist at the same time
must be unrelatedly other; therefore, just as a horse and a cow
are unrelatedly other and apprehendable separately, so a chariot
would have to be apprehendable separately from its own parts.
However, it is not so apprehended. Therefore, a chariot is not
inherently other than its parts.
A chariot's parts do not inherently depend on the chariot
because if they did, the parts and the chariot would have to be
inherently other. The impossibility of this has already been
explained.
Also, a chariot does not inherently depend on its parts because
if it did, the chariot and its parts would have to be inherently
other. The impossibility of this has already been explained.
A chariot does not inherently possess its parts either in the
manner that a man possesses a cow or in the manner that a man
possesses his body. For, the former mode of possession is that of
different entities, and the latter mode of possession is that of the
same entity. Thus, the chariot and its parts would have to be
either different entities or the same entity. Both of these have
already been refuted.
A chariot is also not just the composite of its parts because the
shapes of the individual parts cannot be a chariot nor can the
shape of the composite of the parts be a chariot since it is impossible for the shapes before or after arrangement to be a chariot. If
it were said that the shapes of the parts which are not different
from their shapes before arrangement are a chariot, then since
Refut ing a Self of Persons
181
there is no difference in shape before and after arrangement, just
as the shapes are not a chariot before arrangement, so they would
not be a chariot after arrangement. If it were said that the shapes
of the parts which are different from the shape that they had
before arrangement are the chariot, then since there would be
different shapes to the axles, wheels, and so forth, after arrangement, these different shapes would have to be apprehendable.
However, they are not.
Also, the shape of the composite of the parts is not a chariot
because the composite of the parts does not inherently exist.
There is no composite of the parts of a chariot separate from the
parts of a chariot because if there were, the composite could be
apprehended without apprehending the parts. Nor is the composite of the parts one with the parts themselves because if it were,
either the composite would be many like the many parts or the
parts would be one like the one composite.131 Therefore, the
shape of the composite of the parts only imputedly exists and is
not suitable to be a substantially existent chariot. For the Prasangikas, the shape of the composite of the parts is a basis of the
imputation of a chariot, but not even conventionally can it be
considered a chariot.
When a chariot is sought in these seven ways, it is not found,
but a chariot does not thereby become non-existent. Still, the
non-finding of a chariot in these seven ways is true both ultimately and conventionally. Even as a conventional truth a chariot is unfindable in these seven ways; however, a chariot conventionally exists because the assertion of a chariot is not made from
the point of view of its being established by the reasoning that
analyzes whether it inherently exists or not. A chariot is established as existing when there is no analysis to find the object
imputed; it is established only by a non-defective, conventional,
worldly consciousness. Thus, a chariot is presented as only
imputedly existent in the sense that it is imputed in dependence
on its parts (the axles, wheels, etc.) and is not any of them.
The Svatantrikas, Chittamatrins, Sautrantikas, and Vaibhashikas all say that if the composite of the parts, or the shape, etc.,
could not be assigned as the whole, the chariot (or whole) would
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Meditation on Emptiness
be non-existent. For there is no whole which is a separate entity
from its parts. Therefore, in all these schools chariots and so
forth are assigned as some phenomenon from among their bases
of designation: either their composite, their shape, or one of the
bases of imputation. These schools do not accept that chariots
and so forth are just nominally imputed in the sense of being
unfindable among their bases of designation. For them, things
have their own natural existence. In these schools, to be merely
nominally imputed only means that a phenomenon is not something separate from its bases of designation. For instance, though
a person appears to be the boss of his aggregates of mind and
body, he is shown to be one of the aggregates—either the mental
consciousness, or a mind-basis-of-all (alayavijnana, kun gzhi
mam shes), or the continuum of the aggregates, or the continuum of the mental consciousness, and so forth.
In the extraordinary Prasangika system, neither the composite
of the parts nor the individual parts are taken to be the whole.
Still, the Prasangikas are able to present well all the objects and
agents of cyclic existence and of nirvana within the context of
just nominally imputed wholes, parts, qualities, qualificands,
and so forth.Dzong-ka-ba urgently advises that this method of
analysis be studied and practiced because it is a profound means
of quickly finding the view of emptiness. As Chandraklrti says in
the Commentary to the 'Supplement', 'These worldly conventionalities do not exist when analyzed in this way, but exist through
non-analytical renown. Therefore, when yogis analyze these
through this series [of reasons], they penetrate very quickly to
the depth of suchness.'
Through the example of a chariot one gains familiarity with
the modes of the sevenfold reasoning.132 However, unlike the
other Buddhist schools, the Prasangikas do not say that for the
example of the chariot to be correct the meditator must first realize the predicate of the thesis, 'does not inherently exist', as a
quality of the chariot and then proceed to the subject of the
original syllogism, the person. If one first had to realize the
emptiness of a chariot before realizing the emptiness of a person,
then the emptiness of a person would not be the initial object of
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183
meditation for those who seek liberation. Furthermore, it would
be pointless to state many reasons to prove the selflessness of a
person because one would realize the emptiness of a person
through merely turning one's mind to this subject. For, the
emptiness of a chariot would already have been validly cognized,
and a realization of the emptiness of one thing is sufficient preparation for the realization of the emptiness of anything else that
the mind turns to while still remembering the first realization. In
the Prasangika system, examples which are merely more familiar
in the world than the subject of the main thesis are often given.
This is why mirror images and magician's illusions are so often
used as examples; just as a mirror image of a face is empty of
being a face, so objects are empty of being inherently existent.
However, realization that a mirror image of a face is not a face is
not a cognition of the emptiness of a mirror image. It is a conventional analog of the extraordinary and unfamiliar cognition of
emptiness.
Thus, a yogi's aim in analyzing a chariot is not to gain a thorough realization of a chariot's emptiness but to gain familiarity
with the mode of reasoning so that he can apply it to the person,
for it is misconception of the nature of the person that causes
transmigration and the repeated rounds of the suffering of birth,
aging, sickness, and death. The seven-cornered reason must be
established as a quality of the person:133
1 The self and the aggregates are not inherently one
because the assertion of a self would then be senseless.
For, 'self would only be a synonym of the aggregates,
just as 'rabbit-bearer' (that which has the figure of a rabbit in it) is a synonym of'moon'. Also, just as the aggregates are many, so the selves would be many. Or, just as
the self is one, so the aggregates would only be one. Also,
because the aggregates are entities which are produced
and which disintegrate, the self also would be produced
and would disintegrate.
If it is accepted that the self is nominally produced and
nominally disintegrates, there is no fault. However, if
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Meditation on Emptiness
the production and disintegration of the self naturally
existed, then there would be three faults: memory of former births would be impossible, deeds done would be
wasted, and one would meet with the results of actions
not done by oneself. These three faults arise because the
selves of former and later births would be naturally individual and thus would be unrelatedly other. Moreover,
it is impossible for those which are naturally other to
belong to one continuum, just as the being named Maitreya and the being named Upagupta who are other and
are contemporaries are not one continuum. For, Chandraldrti says (Supplement VI.61):
The phenomena which are based on Maitreya and
Upagupta
Are different and thus not included within one
continuum.
Whatever are naturally separate are not
Fit to be included within one continuum.
If two lives were naturally or inherently other, this
otherness would be their nature; a sameness of continuum could not obtain between them.
If the self were inherently produced and inherently disintegrated, Buddha could not have remembered that in the past he
was such and such a person because the two persons would be
naturally separate. For instance, when someone named Devadatta remembers his past lives, he does not remember that he
was Yajna who is his own contemporary. The fallacy of there
being no memory of former lives is similar to the consequence
that if cause and effect were naturally existent others, then darkness would arise from a tongue of flame. In other words, once
the elements of a continuum are naturally existent or analytically
findable as others, then a continuity cannot obtain between
them, and there can be no continuum.
Deeds done would be wasted because the self which performed
the deeds would have utterly ceased by the time the effects are
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185
experienced in another lifetime. For, the aggregates would
inherently disintegrate at the end of a lifetime, and the self would
be one with them. If the person did experience the results of former deeds, since those deeds would not have been done by him,
he would be undergoing the effects of deeds done by another
since each lifetime would be inherently separate from all other
lifetimes.
The same faults do not accrue to the Prasangikas' own presentation of the self and of the relationship between deeds done in
one lifetime and the effects that are experienced in another lifetime. For the Prasangikas, the 'mere I' gives rise to the thought
'I', and the various selves in the different lifetimes are instances
of the 'mere I'.134 The 'mere I' exists from one lifetime to another
just because the expression 'I' is common to former and later
lifetimes. Conventionally or nominally, the generality I exists
from one lifetime to another, even though the particular beings
which are its instances do not live from one lifetime to another. It
is said to be much the same as the fact that a gold pot and a
bronze pot are pots but a gold pot is not a bronze pot and a
bronze pot is not a gold pot. Just so, the particular I of one lifetime is not the particular I of another lifetime, but they are both
I. Still, this does not mean that there is a generality which is a
separate entity from its individual instances. Just the reasoning
that the particular I of each lifetime is an I is sufficient to establish that the 'mere I' exists nominally from one lifetime to
another. Any further analysis into the nature of the general and
particular I would constitute ultimate analysis in the face of
which nothing is found.
2 The self and the mental and physical aggregates are
not different entities because if they were, the self would
not have the character of the aggregates such as production, disintegration, abiding, form, experiencing objects,
and so forth.135 In that case, there would be no basis for
the designation 'self, and there would be no object to
apprehend as a self because the person would be a nonproduct.
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Meditation on Emptiness
All products are included within the five aggregates; thus, if the
person did not have the character of the aggregates, it could not
be a product. If the person were a non-product, it would have to
be either a permanent existent, like nirvana, or a non-existent,
like a flower in the sky. Such a phenomenon could not be a basis
of the designation 'self and could not serve as an object to be
apprehended as a self. For, the self would then be changeless,
and a changeless self could not take rebirth, die, cognize objects,
and so forth.
Also, if the self were a different entity from the aggregates, then just as the character of consciousness can be
apprehended separately from the character of form, so a
self without the character of mind and body would have
to be apprehendable. However, since the self is not
apprehendable separately from the aggregates of mind
and body, the self is not a separate entity from the aggregates.
The non-Buddhist Forders assert that the self has a different
character from the aggregates when they say that it is beyond
mind and body. However, Dzong-ka-ba says that the Forders fail
to realize that the self is only a name, that the self only nominally
exists. Since the Forders see that it is impossible for the self to be
the aggregates of mind and body, they fabricate a view of a permanent self, separate from mind and body.136 Chandraklrti says
that the Forders fall from conventional truths through not realizing the character of the self as a designation dependent on the
aggregates and fall from ultimate truths through not realizing
the lack of inherent existence of the self.137
One of the most incisive reasonings refuting a self separate
from the aggregates is that it would be useless to call such an
unchangeable phenomenon 'self. Without the experiencing of
objects or the taking of rebirth the word 'self loses any meaning.
The Vedantins use the term 'self, however, to refer to the
non-dual and final nature of the universe. They refer to cognition of the all pervasive Brahman which is the self of the universe
as well as one's own actual self. The finitude and diseased nature
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187
of the ordinary self is cancelled in its identification with Brahman, and the distance of Brahman as the ultimate reality is cancelled in its identification with the self. The immediacy of the
self remains and is extended through identification to Brahman,
and the ultimacy or absolute nature of Brahman remains and is
extended through identification to the self. The finite living
being ( f i v a ) becomes the infinite Brahman in vivid realization.
The transmutation of the living being into Brahman requires a
complete destruction of egocentricity. Still, the essence of reality
is called 'self.
In Buddhism, also, when emptiness is directly cognized, the
object—emptiness—and the subject—a wisdom consciousnessbecome like water poured into water, totally undifferentiable.
However, the Prasangikas seem to be questioning the value of
calling the highest reality 'self just because such a designation
would increase egocentricity. The usage of the word 'self is not
required to preserve a sense of immediacy, for immediacy is the
very mode of direct perception as is witnessed every day, and
when it is said that reality is perceived directly, a sense of the
immediacy of reality is conveyed without reliance on the word
'self. Also, the teaching of one all-pervasive entity would only
block the way to destroying the sense that each individual thing
is a truly existent one. The very chains of cyclic existence are
forged with the conception of true existence that does not analyze oneness and manyness. Beings are bound in cyclic existence
by their failure to investigate whether phenomena, which they
habitually conceive to exist inherently, are truly one or truly
many. To conceive reality as a truly existent one pervading the
many might further the habitual non-analytical intellect that
causes the powerless wandering in cyclic existence. If the manifold universe could be subsumed under a truly existent Brahman, it might seem that the many parts of a table, for instance,
could be subsumed under a truly existent table.
Still, it is not to be thought that meditations on the all-pervasive
are absent in Buddhism. The formless meditative absorptions in
which space, consciousness, nothingness, or something subtler
than even nothingness are seen as all-pervasive are common to
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Meditation on Emptiness
both Hinyana and Mahayana and the non-Buddhist systems as
well. In tantric practice a meditator often views himself and his
environment as one entity; the world is visualized as a mandala
and is reduced to the size of a drop. Also, the metaphor of water
poured into water as a description of the mode of the direct cognition of emptiness intentionally .indicates a fusion of subject and
object. Technically, everything true of the subject is not true of
the object and vice versa, but the experience must be something
like that. No ordinary being has ever experienced such a complete oneness, for a oneness is always a composite of parts, and
each part is not one with every other part in terms of function,
position, and so forth. It is questionable whether the word 'one'
can convey any of the sense of such a state. Still, some Tibetan
orders do refer to the one mind, or the one sphere of the nature of
phenomena, whereas the Ge-luk-bas restrict themselves to a
metaphor, the undifferentiability of fresh water poured into
fresh water.
The question here is not whether there are practices common
to Hinduism and Buddhism that are aimed at developing a sense
of pervasion but whether these practices are the primary means
of cognizing reality. For the Buddhists such practices are means
to enhance the concentrative power of the mind in order to further analytical penetration into the nature of things. This analysis revolves around developing an understanding that oneness
and manyness do not naturally inhere in objects. An unsuccessful attempt to find the self under specific types of analysis is seen
as a prerequisite for progress toward liberation from cyclic existence. In both sutra and tantra teachings such analysis is a necessity because it is this which breaks the bonds of misconception,
and misconception of the nature of things is the ignorance that
causes the powerless rounds of birth, aging, sickness, and death.
For instance, Buddhists accept that non-Buddhist yogis have
attained the marvelous experience of the entry, abiding, and dissolving of the winds into the central channel. However, the
Buddhist form of the practice is still considered to be basically
different because the non-Buddhists' practice is not preceeded
by this type of analysis of phenomena.138 Thus, it is said that
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189
without the view of emptiness a yogi cannot cause the winds to
dissolve into the indestructible mid-point of the heart center.
What the Prasangika analysis is refuting in the sevenfold reasoning must be clearly defined; the self is not being reduced to
miniscule size nor is it being expanded to pervade the universe.
The self is realized as an imputation dependent on the mental
and physical aggregates. The meditator is told again and again
that when he realizes the unfindability of the self, what appears
is an utter vacuity which is the mere absence of an inherently
existent self.'39 He is told again and again that at the time of
direct cognition subject and object become like fresh water
poured into fresh water and that the emptinesses of all phenomena are directly cognized without the slightest appearance of
those phenomena themselves.
Conventionally, the self and the aggregates are the same entity
and different opposites of negatives because even conventionally
the self is not the aggregates nor is it a separate entity from the
aggregates. A person (or self) is none of the aggregates which are
its basis of designation but is an instance of the fourth aggregate,
samskaraskandha, or pile of compositional factors. Being impermanent, the self must be an aggregate, and the self is designated
as a member of the fourth aggregate because it has the character
of all the aggregates. Since the self has the character of all the
aggregates, it cannot be designated as a form aggregate, feeling
aggregate, discrimination aggregate, or consciousness aggregate.
It is, therefore, called a 'compositional factor' aggregate because
this aggregate is the repository for all impermanent things which
are not included among the other aggregates.
It has been established in the first two 'corners' of the sevenfold reasoning that the self is neither inherently the same as nor
different from the aggregates. The remaining five reasons are
included in these two positions because sameness and difference
of entity are a dichotomy. If the self and the aggregates inherently exist, they must be either one entity or different entities.
When these two positions are refuted, the inherent existence of
the self is refuted. Thus, even though all possible positions have
already been refuted, the other five positions are refuted for the
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Meditation on Emptiness
sake of attacking the various modes of the habitual misconception of a self.
3 The self does not act as the base of the aggregates like
a bowl for yogurt or like snow that exists throughout and
surrounds a forest of trees.140 For, in that case the self and
the aggregates would be different, and this position has
already been refuted.
The examples provide clues for glimpsing and eventually identifying ways in which the non-analytical intellect tends to conceive
the self.
4 The self does not inherently exist in or depend on the
aggregates like Devadatta living in a tent or a lion living
in a forest. For, in that case the self and the aggregates
would be different, and this position has already been
refuted.
5 The self does not possess the mental and physical
aggregates either as a different entity, as in the case of a
man possessing a cow, or as the same entity, as in the
case of a man possessing his body or a tree possessing its
core. For, in the first case the self and the aggregates
would be different entities, and in the second case they
would be the same entity. Refutations of these positions
have already been stated.
The meaning of the word 'have' or 'possess' is being analyzed
here. It seems most likely that a self would possess its aggregates
in the manner of sameness of entity, but once a sameness of
entity is asserted to be findable under analysis, then the possessor
and the possessed become one. The concept of'my body' or 'my
mind' cannot bear such analysis.
6 The self is not just the composite of the aggregates of
mind and body because the composite is the basis of the
designation 'self and, therefore, cannot be the self.
It is said141 that a Buddha does not confuse or mix the basis of the
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191
designation of a phenomenon with the phenomenon that is
designated. Jang-gya says that this difficult point is based on a
sutra that teaches that just as 'chariot' is imputed to the parts of a
chariot, so the person is imputed conventionally in dependence
on the aggregates.142 The Prasangikas view this as meaning that
the person is not the aggregates and that this non-identity is
clearly perceived by a Buddha.
Furthermore, the composite of the mental and physical
aggregates does not inherently exist because the composite is unfindable as either inherently one with or different from the aggregates.
If the composite of the aggregates were one with the aggregates,
the composite would be as many as the aggregates, or the aggregates would be one just as the composite is only one. If the composite were inherently different from the aggregates, then it
would be apprehended separately from the aggregates and
would not have the character of the aggregates, but this is not
so.143
The reasoning that the object imputed cannot be the
basis of the imputation also refutes the view that the self
is the continuum of the aggregates because then object
imputed and basis of imputation would be one. Also, if
the self were the composite of the aggregates, then the
self as the agent of the appropriation, or assumption, of
the aggregates would be one with the aggregates which
are its appropriation.
The five aggregates are accepted as that which is appropriated by
a self as when it is said that such and such a person takes rebirth
or assumes a new body and mind. The composite of the five
aggregates is thus also accepted as the appropriation. If the self
were the composite, the appropriator and the appropriated
would be one.
If the composite of a person's various consciousnesseseye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental consciousnesses
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Meditation on Emptiness
—is asserted to be the person, then the absurdity of the
plurality of the composites and the persons would follow.
Similarly, if it is said that only the mental consciousness is
the person, each moment of the mental consciousness
would absurdly be a different person because each
moment of the mental consciousness is different.
7 The self is not the shape of the aggregates because
shape is physical, and if a self were merely shape, then
the mind, etc., would not be posited as the self. If it were
said that both the physical shape and the mind are the
self, then either the self would be two, or shape and consciousness would be one.
In most cases, beings are identified by their shape; the difference
between a cow and a human is commonly determined by their
different shapes.144 It is being taught here that common beings
confuse the basis of the designation, which is not the person,
with the person that is designated. (All animals—cows, horses,
and so forth—are accepted as persons.) It is commonly said, for
instance, that a dog is black whereas it is meant that the color of
its hair is black. The color of a dog is a basis of the designation
'dog', but it itself is not a dog.
The non-finding of the person in any of these seven modes is
the meaning of the non-inherent existence of the person. Since
even as a conventional truth a person is not findable in these
seven ways, even conventionally a person does not naturally
exist. However, when there is no analysis to find the object
imputed, a person undeniably is validly established as able to
perform functions; therefore, the self does nominally exist. Furthermore, when a consciousness thinking, 'I', is generated, it is
generated based on the five aggregates. Hence, it is said that a
person is only imputed or designated in dependence on the five
aggregates.
As Chandrakirti's Commentary on (Aryadeva's) 'Four Hundred'
(Bodhisattvayogacharyachatuhshatakatika) says,145 'Therefore,
when analyzed in this manner, an inherent existence of things
is not established. Thus, [only] an illusory nature remains
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193
individually for things.' Chandrakfrti thereby indicates that an
illusory object does remain.
The Madhyamika view is the complete negation without residue of inherent existence, which is refuted through analytical
reasoning. After the negation, there must also remain a flawless
presentation of all the objects and agents of the dependentarising of cause and effect which are like the creations of a magician, appearing to be inherently existent but actually not inherently existent. Thus, the Madhyamika view is a composite of (1)
a non-affirming negative of inherent existence and (2) a presentation of agents and objects which are like illusions. Jang-gya says
there are practically none who understand the Madhyamika
view, emphasizing that it is extremely difficult to find the correct
view. One is exhorted to make great effort to understand this
view without allowing the pure teaching to be distorted by one's
own tendencies toward nihilism or eternalism.
The mine
When reasoning investigates whether the self inherently exists,
it does not find the self in any of the seven ways.146 This having
been done, an inherent existence of the mine is easily refuted. It
is not that the very same consciousness that realizes the noninherent existence of the I realizes that the mine does not inherently exist. Rather, if the yogi merely turns his attention to the
mine, its emptiness is easily realized in dependence only on the
consciousness that realized the emptiness of the I. Since further
reasoning is not required, Madhyamika treatises do not offer a
separate reasoning to aid in realizing the non-inherent existence
of the mine.
When an emptiness has been realized indirectly and inferentially through the medium of a concept, this realization is
sufficient to clear the way for the immediate but subsequent realization of the emptinesses of other phenomena.147 Separate
reasoning is not required even though the realization of one
emptiness is not itself a realization of all emptinesses. However,
when the emptiness of one thing is cognized directly, the emptiness of all phenomena is cognized directly. It is not that the
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Meditation on Emptiness
emptiness of one thing is the emptiness of everything; rather, the
extraordinary mode of the direct cognition of emptiness—in
which the object, emptiness, and the subject, the wisdom consciousness, are undifferentiable like fresh water poured into
fresh water—allows for cognition of the emptiness of all objects.
Having inferentially realized the emptiness of the I, one can
readily realize the non-inherent existence of the mine both as the
possessor of mind, body, and so forth and as the phenomena
included within the continuum and possessed by the person.
Then, passing outside of the sphere of the false view of a transitory collection as a real I and mine, one meditates on the emptiness of phenomena which are mine but not included within the
continuum, such as a house, and then meditates on other phenomena which are not mine, such as a city. The same sevenfold
reasoning is used to analyze the relationship between the phenomena designated and the bases of designation, as in the example
of a chariot. These phenomena cannot be found under analysis
and thus do not inherently exist; however, they are still accepted
as validly established conventionally when there is no analysis.
This acceptance is congruous with Buddha's statement that he
does not debate with the world about the existence or nonexistence of objects.148 The sevenfold reasoning does not refute
nominal existence, only objectively established existence.
The mere apprehension of I and mine are not erroneous; the
error is the further misconception of the nominally existent I and
mine as objectively existent. Even Buddhas have valid cognizers
that perceive I and mine, but they do not confuse the basis of
designation with the phenomenon designated. Some say that
this teaching is so subtle and difficult to penetrate that it is not
only useless but also injurious.149 They say that those who cannot
discriminate between nominal existence and objective existence
would be led into affirming their misconceptions of I and mine as
real because Dzong-ka-ba asserts that the mere apprehension of I
and mine is valid. Still, this most unusual and penetrating of
Dzong-ka-ba's teachings is a call to eradicating misconceptions
and should not be taken as affirming one's accustomed conception
of oneself. It is undeniable that ordinary beings see the bases of
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195
designations as the phenomena designated, and Dzong-ka-ba's
teaching is clear that even conventionally nothing is its basis of
designation. Dzong-ka-ba is able, through the subtlety of affirming the apprehension of I and mine as valid, to present all the
objects and agents of cyclic existence and of nirvana under the
rubric of valid establishment and thereby block one gate of the
road to nihilism. This subtlety does not in any way affirm an
ordinary being's consent to the appearance of objects as objectively existent; eternalism, or the reification of what exists, is not
a concomitant of affirming valid existence. As Jam-yang-shay-ba
says, to think that the valid establishment of objects implies their
objective existence does not pass beyond the thought of nonMadhyamikas.
The cardinal difference between the Prasangikas and the nonPrasangikas, as defined by Dzong-ka-ba, Jam-yang-shay-ba, and
so forth, is the Prasangikas' uncommon notion that the existent
person is not any or all of the mental and physical aggregates.
The other Buddhist schools accept either the composite of the
aggregates, or the continuum of the aggregates, or the mental
consciousness, or the continuum of the mental consciousness as
the self. For them, actions could have no cause or effect if the self
were merely imputed in the sense of being totally Unfindable
among the bases of designation of the self. The Prasangikas
answer that if objects were analytically findable as the concrete
entities they seem to be, cause and effect would be impossible.
According to the Prasangikas, even Hearers and Solitary Realizers cognize the same emptiness as Bodhisattvas; all Superiors
realize that persons and other phenomena do not inherently
exist.150 It is necessary to be freed from the afflictions to achieve
nirvana, which is the passage beyond the afflictions, and the
chief of afflictions is the conception that persons and other phenomena inherently exist. Thus, without destroying this conception, liberation from cyclic existence is impossible. Chandrakirti
clearly states that the emptiness of both the person and other
phenomena must be cognized in order to achieve liberation.151
The reason is that the conception of a self of phenomena causes
the conception of a self of persons. For Chandrakirti, to be
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Meditation on Emptiness
liberated from cyclic existence means to have destroyed the conception that persons and other phenomena inherently exist.
When a yogi has penetrated the selflessness of the person, he
applies the same reasoning to the mind and body and all other
phenomena since the principle of a lack of sameness or difference of a phenomenon designated and its basis of designation can
be applied to all phenomena. In other words, the emptiness
understood with respect to the person is easily applied to each
and every phenomenon. If one gains a penetrating understanding of the imputed nature of the person, it is impossible still to
hold the view that the aggregates of mind and body are not
merely imputedly existent.
The power of inferential realization of the emptiness of one
phenomenon is such that a yogi is caused thereby to drop any
tenets asserting the inherent existence of any phenomenon whatsoever. This conveys some sense of the esteem in which an inference of emptiness is held and of how difficult it is to develop. A
yogi must proceed through the stage of correct doubt during
which he suspects that phenomena are not inherently existent.
In time, through long meditation, he develops a reasoned
assumption that phenomena do not inherently exist. Eventually,
an inference of such is generated, and through becoming familiar with this inference, he directly perceives emptiness in an
utterly non-dual cognition.
Part Three
The Buddhist World
Introduction
Sources
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
Long-dol's One Hundred and Eight Bases of Explanation
Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
Gyel-tsap's Commentary on (Maitreya's) 'Sublime Continuum'
Corresponding section of the translation pp.625-6
Before meditating on emptiness it is necessary to know what
exists; otherwise, a yogi will not know what is to be meditated
upon as empty of inherent existence.152 Without identifying
what exists, one would think that an emptiness means an utter
non-existence and not just an absence of inherent existence as a
predicate of a conventionally existent object. All the excellent
masters asserted that it is incorrect to teach emptiness from the
very beginning because, as Jam-yang-shay-ba says, 'If emptiness
were taught to the stupid from the beginning, their ignorance
would increase, and they would be harmed.'
Nagarjuna's Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning says:
Initially for one seeking suchness
It is taught that everything exists.
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Meditation on Emptiness
Chandrakirti echoes this in his commentary, saying:
If emptiness were taught in the very beginning to those
who have not developed their intellect, very great ignorance would be produced; therefore, the Superiors do not
teach emptiness in the very beginning.
Also, a great many tantric texts make it clear that no matter how
gifted a student is he must practice tantra in stages.
Some commentators, however, have mistakenly taken
advanced teachings on the final stage of tantra, such as not being
allowed to touch images and books made from clay, stone, or
wood, and have applied them to sharp beginners. Particularly,
many have misapplied the teaching in the Highest Yoga Tantras
that analysis is not suitable in the meditative equipoise of the stage
of completion, mistakenly claiming that sharp beginners should
not analyze but set their minds in utter vacuity. Their view is based
on the misconception that all conventional objects are like the
horns of a rabbit and the falling hairs seen by a person with cataracts, that is, non-existent. They proclaim that all conventional
objects do not exist and that the meaning ofconventional existence
is 'what exists for a mistaken mind'. They declare that the 'gradual' teachings are for the dull, misapplying teachings pertaining to
the final stages of tantra to sharp beginners. They are wrong
because even the intelligent must analyze to discover suchness, be
it through sutra or tantra practice. A non-conceptual and totally
non-dualistic cognition of emptiness must be preceded by an inference of emptiness. '"Inference, in general, is the cognition ofa hidden meaning through having perceived a sign (reason) and having
realized the concomitance of a predicate with this sign. Emptiness
is cognized in dependence on a realization of, for instance,
dependent-arising. Proper thought is indispensible.
If the emptiness of something is to be realized, this 'something' must be identified; an emptiness is not a vacuity which is
merely the non-perception of an object. If the aggregates
(skandha, phung po), constituents (dhatu, khams), sources (ayatana, skye mched), and so forth do not appear to the mind, an
Introduction
201
explanation of emptiness will be applied 'as if to a midnight sky',
and a vacuousness of ignorance will only be increased. Therefore, one must comprehend the Prasangikas' presentation of
phenomena.
Jam-yang-shay-ba (see p.626) refers to (in paraphrase) 'the phenomena that are renowned and well known in the world' which
are so called because they are established as existing by an innate
non-analytical awareness. This is not the mistaken innate intellect that apprehends phenomena as inherently existent, but the
valid innate mind. A consciousness that analyzes whether an
object can be found among or separate from its bases of imputation does not find objects; therefore, it is not in the face of an
analytical consciousness that objects are said to exist. They exist
in the face of a valid, innate, non-analytical awareness which
every being has, from a hell-being to a Buddha. The objects that
are established as existing conventionally by such a consciousness are never refuted; an analytical consciousness refutes merely
their ultimate or objective existence.
Phenomena are divided into two classes: an afflicted class consisting of fifty-three phenomena and a pure class consisting of
fifty-five phenomena.154 These one hundred and eight phenomena are the bases of the explanations of emptiness in the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras and are called 'the one hundred and
eight bases of commentary'. The classification into afflicted and
pure classes does not imply that all members of each class are
afflictions or pure phenomena; the groupings are merely rough
divisions.
The fifty-three phenomena of the afflicted class
The five aggregates which are the bases for the further division of
most of the other phenomena:
1 forms
2 feelings
3 discriminations
4 compositional factors
5 consciousnesses
202
Meditation on Emptiness
The six senses which are the supports of their respective consciousnesses:
6 eye sense powers
7 ear sense powers
8 nose sense powers
9 tongue sense powers
10 body sense powers
11 mental sense powers
The six consciousnesses which depend on these senses:
12 eye consciousnesses
13 ear consciousnesses
14 nose consciousnesses
15 tongue consciousnesses
16 body consciousnesses
17 mental consciousnesses
The objects of those consciousnesses:
18 visible forms
19 sounds
20 odors
21 tastes
22 tangible objects
23 phenomena
The six contacts (distinguishing objects as pleasant, unpleasant, or
neutral) which arise upon the aggregations of a sense, an object, and
a consciousness:
24 contacts upon the aggregation of an eye sense, a visible form,
and an eye consciousness
2 5 contacts upon the aggregation of an ear sense, a sound, and an
ear consciousness
26 contacts upon the aggregation of a nose sense, an odor, and a
nose consciousness
27 contacts upon the aggregation of a tongue sense, a taste, and
a tongue consciousness
28 contacts upon the aggregation of a body sense, a tangible
object, and a body consciousness
Introduction
203
29 contacts upon the aggregation of a mental sense, a phenomenon, and a mental consciousness
The six feelings which are the experiences arising from contacts:
30 feelings arising from contact upon the aggregation of an eye
sense, a visible form, and an eye consciousness
31 feelings arising from contact upon the aggregation of an ear
sense, a sound, and an ear consciousness
32 feelings arising from contact upon the aggregation of a nose
sense, an odor, and a nose consciousness
33 feelings arising from contact upon the aggregation of a
tongue sense, a taste, and a tongue consciousness
34 feelings arising from contact upon the aggregation of a body
sense, a tangible object, and a body consciousness
35 feelings arising from contact upon the aggregation of a
mental sense, a phenomenon, and a mental consciousness
The six elements which are the bases of production:
36 earth
37 water
38 fire
39 wind
40 space
41 consciousness
The twelve branches of dependent-arising, which are to be seen as disadvantageous:
42 ignorance
43 action
44 consciousness
45 name and form
46 six sources
47 contact
48 feeling
49 attachment
50 grasping
51 existence
52 birth
53 aging and death
204
Meditation on Emptiness
The fifty-five phenomena of the pure class
The six perfections which are the paths of practice:
1 giving
2 ethics
3 patience
4 effort
5 concentration
6 wisdom
The eighteen emptinesses which are the paths of the view:
7 emptiness of the internal, that is, of the five senses (adhyatmashunyata)155
8 emptiness of the external, that is, of the six types of objects
which are the objects of the five senses and of the mental
consciousness (bahirdhashunyata)
9 emptiness of the internal and external, that is, of the loci of
the senses, the gross orbs of the eyes, etc. (adhyatmabahirdhashunyata)
10 emptiness of emptiness, that is, of the emptiness that is the
nature of phenomena (this eliminates the qualms of those
who might think that emptiness truly exists because it is
established by a consciousness which analyzes suchness)
(sh unyatash unyata)
11 emptiness of the great, that is, of the ten directions
(mahashunyata)
12 emptiness of the ultimate, that is, of nirvana (paramarthashunyata)
13 emptiness of products (samskrtashunyata)
14 emptiness of non-products (asamskrtashunyata)
15 emptiness of what has passed beyond the extremes, that is,
of what is free of the extremes of permanence and annihilation (iatyantashunyata)
16 emptiness of what is beginningless and endless, that is, of
cyclic existence (anavaragrashunyata)
17 emptiness of the indestructible, that is, of the indestructible
Mahayana (anavakarashunyata)
18 emptiness of nature, that is, of the emptinesses which are the
Introduction
19
20
21
22
23
24
205
nature of phenomena (this eliminates the qualms of those
who might think that an emptiness truly exists because a
final nature exists without being produced by anyone)
(prakrtishunyata)
emptiness of all phenomena, that is, of the eighteen constituents, etc. (sarvadharmashiinyata)
emptiness of definitions, that is, of the definitions of all phenomena from forms through to omniscient consciousnesses
(lakshanash unyata)
emptiness of the unapprehendable, that is, of the past, present, and future which are unapprehendable as the cessation
of phenomena, their presence, and their non-production
(anupalambhash unyata)
emptiness of the inherent existence of non-things, that is, of
inherently existent non-products (abhavasvabhavashunyata)
emptiness of things, that is, of the five aggregates (bhavashunyata)
emptiness of non-things, that is, of non-products (abhavashunyata)
The thirty-seven harmonies with enlightenment which are theyogic
paths, divided into seven sections:156
25 four establishments in mindfulness—of body, feelings,
thoughts, and phenomena—attained with the lesser path of
accumulation. These are meditations on the impermanence,
misery, emptiness, and selflessness of one's own body, feelings, thoughts, and other internal phenomena. Bodhisattvas
would extend the field of meditation to include all sentient
beings' bodies, feelings, and so forth.
26 four thorough abandonings—the abandoning of afflictions
already generated, the non-generation of afflictions not yet
generated, the increasing of pure phenomena already generated, and the generation of pure phenomena not yet generated—attained with the middling path of accumulation.
These are called 'thorough' abandonings because the mode
of practice is suitable, when supplemented by the aspiration
206
27
28
29
30
31
Meditation on Emptiness
to highest enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings,
to lead one to Buddhahood. Without changing the type of
object or mode of cognition, these paths lead to final enlightenment whereas the non-Buddhist 'abandonings' have to be
altered in form to lead to the final aim. Even the accomplishments of virtues are 'abandonings' because their respective
opposites must be forsaken.
four legs of manifestation - aspiration, effort, thought, and
analysis. These are called 'legs' because they are prerequisites for magical manifestation. The four exist simultaneously when a manifestation is actually being made, and
they are serial when one is practicing magical manifestation,
first generating an aspiration to create a manifestation, and
so forth. They are attained on the great path of accumulation
five powers—faith, effort, mindfulness, meditative stabilization, and wisdom—attained on the levels of heat and peak of
the path of preparation
five forces—faith, effort, mindfulness, meditative stabilization, and wisdom—attained on the levels of forbearance and
supreme mundane qualities of the path of preparation
seven branches of enlightenment—mindfulness, discrimination of phenomena, effort, joy, pliancy, meditative stabilization, and equanimity—attained with the path of seeing
eight-fold path—correct views, correct realization, correct
speech, correct aims of actions, correct livelihood, correct
effort, correct mindfulness, and correct meditative stabilization—attained with the path of meditation. When the state
of Foe Destroyer is actualized, all thirty-seven harmonies of
enlightenment have been attained.
The paths of calming:
32 four noble truths—true sufferings, true origins of suffering,
true cessations of suffering, and true paths out of suffering
33 four concentrations—first, second, third, and fourth concentrations
34 four immeasurables—equanimity, love, compassion, and joy
Introduction
207
35 four formless absorptions—infinite space, infinite consciousness, nothingness, and peak of cyclic existence
36 eight liberations: these eight are called 'liberations' not
because they liberate beings from cyclic existence but
because they free beings from the manifest activity of specific afflictions. They are to be distinguished from complete
cessations of afflictions which involve the conquest of both
the manifest appearance and the potencies of the afflictions.
1 the embodied looking at a form: a yogi considers himself
to be a being with a body and cultivates any of the four
concentrations which are included in the Form Realm
2 the formless looking at a form: a yogi considers himself to
be a being without a body and cultivates any of the four
concentrations which are included in the Form Realm
3 beautiful form: a yogi considers himself to have an attractive body and cultivates any of the four concentrations
which are included in the Form Realm. (The above three
are considered prerequisites for making physical manifestations and are called the three paths of manifestation.)
4 infinite space: a yogi concentrates on space and imagines
it is infinite with just space as his object of observation
5 infinite consciousness: a yogi concentrates on consciousness and imagines it is infinite with just consciousness as
his object of observation
6 nothingness: a yogi imagines that there is nothing to be
apprehended and no apprehender
7 peak of cyclic existence: a yogi imagines that there are no
coarse objects to be apprehended but that there are subtle
objects of apprehension
8 equipoise of cessation: a yogi enters a state of meditative
equipoise which is the absence of the manifest activity of
the six consciousnesses
37 nine serial absorptions—first concentration, second concentration, third concentration, fourth concentration, infinite
space, infinite consciousness, nothingness, peak of cyclic
existence, and absorption of cessation
38 paths of insight—meditative stabilization on the three doors
208
Meditation on Emptiness
of liberation: wishlessness, signlessness, and emptiness.
Wishlessness is the emptiness of a phenomenon from the
point of view of its not inherently producing effects.157 Signlessness is the emptiness of a phenomenon from the point of
view of its not having been inherently produced from
causes. Emptiness is the emptiness of the entity of a phenomenon itself.
The paths of special qualities:
39 five clairvoyances—divine eye, divine ear, knowledge of
others' minds, memory of former lives, and knowledge of
the extinction of contaminations
40 four meditative stabilizations—'going as a hero', 'sky treasury', 'stainless', and 'loftily looking lion'
41 four doors of retention—the retention of patience (for the
sake of fearlessness with respect to emptiness), the retention
of secret speech (for the ability to make spells to pacify the
injurious), the retention of words (for not forgetting names,
thoughts, and meanings), the retention of meaning (for not
forgetting the individual and general characteristics of phenomena)
The paths of effect:
42 ten powers:158
1 knowledge of sources and non-sources. This is direct
knowledge of cause and effect within cyclic existence, such
as the arising of pleasure from virtues and of pain from nonvirtues, and direct knowledge of causes and effects included within the class of pure phenomena, such as the paths
and their fruits. This first power is achieved through steadiness with respect to ascertaining the relation of cause and
effect and with respect to the two forms of the mind of
enlightenment—the aspiration to highest enlightenment
for the sake of all beings as well as its consequent practices
and the wisdom directly cognizing emptiness.
2 knowledge of the fruition of actions. This is direct knowledge of the definiteness of actions (such as the fact that
non-virtues never cause pleasure and virtues never cause
Introduction
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
209
pain), the increase of the potencies established by actions,
the non-wasting of deeds done, and the non-meeting with
the effects of actions not done by oneself. It is achieved
through conviction in the relationship of actions and their
effects.
knowledge of those who are superior and those who are
inferior, or those who have faith and those having heavy
afflictions and so forth. It is achieved through teaching
doctrines in accordance with the faculties of trainees.
knowledge of the varieties of dispositions. This is the
knowledge of the many different lineages in the mental
continuums of trainees. It is achieved through teaching
doctrines in accordance with the dispositions of trainees.
knowledge of the varieties of trainees' interests in the
various great and small vehicles. It is achieved through
teaching doctrines in accordance with the interests of
trainees.
knowledge of the paths proceeding to cyclic existences
and of the paths to the three enlightenments of Hearers,
Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas. It is achieved
through practicing the various vehicles and paths.
knowledge of the concentrations (dhyana), liberations
(vimoksha), meditative stabilizations (samadhi), and
meditative absorptions (samapatti), and knowledge of
others' afflictions and others' non-contamination. It is
achieved through completing the practice of meditative
stabilization.
knowledge mindful of former states. This is direct
knowledge of all former lives of oneself and others. It is
achieved through not having spoiled the roots of virtue
during the paths of learning.
knowledge of one's own and others' deaths and births.
This is included within the clairvoyance of the divine
eye and is achieved through formerly giving lamps and
supramundane paths to sentient beings.
knowledge of the extinction of all contaminations. This
is achieved through formerly teaching doctrines for the
210
Meditation on Emptiness
sake of extinguishing contaminations and through one's
own actualization of such meaning.
The six knowledges of(1) sources and non-sources, (2)
fruition of actions, (3) the superior and inferior, (4)
varieties of dispositions, (5) varieties of interests, and (6)
paths are similar to a diamond instrument piercing the
armor of the obstructions to omniscience. The three
knowledges of (7) the concentrations and so forth, (8)
former states, and (9) death and birth are similar to a
diamond instrument destroying the wall of the obstructions to meditative absorption. The knowledge of (10)
extinction of all contaminations is similar to a diamond
instrument cutting the trees of the afflictive obstructions.
43 four fearlessnesses:159
1 fearlessness with respect to the assertion, 'I am completely and perfectly enlightened with respect to all phenomena.' For, one will not encounter even the name of
an opponent who could correctly say that one does not
know such and such a phenomenon. It is achieved
through lacking any stinginess with respect to the doctrine.
2 fearlessness with respect to teaching that the afflictive
obstructions are obstacles to liberation and that the
obstructions to omniscience are obstacles to simultaneous cognition of all phenomena, and that, therefore,
these are to be ceased. For, one will not encounter even
the name of an opponent who could correctly say that
reliance on desire and so forth would not obstruct a
being from liberation. It is achieved through not falling
under the influence of an obstructive doctrine.
3 fearlessness with respect to teaching the paths of deliverance. For, there is no opponent who could say
correctly that these paths are not paths leading to liberation. It is achieved through practicing the paths to
liberation.
4 fearlessness with respect to asserting that the
Introduction
44
45
46
47
211
contaminations have been extinguished. For, one will
not see even the name of an opponent who could correctly dispute the assertion that one has attained the
cessation of all afflictions and their potencies. It is
achieved through formerly abandoning pride.
four sciences—knowledge of doctrines, of the general and
specific characters of phenomena, of the many languages so
that appropriate definitions can be given, and of the varieties
of entities, aspects, relationships, and differences of phenomena in the sense of having the bravery to make these distinctions
great love
great compassion
eighteen unshared attributes of Buddhas:160
1 being non-mistaken physically, such as not going on the
wrong road
2 being non-mistaken verbally
3 not decreasing in mindfulness
4 not ever not being in meditative equipoise
5 not having the various discriminations of one-pointedly
apprehending cyclic existence as to be forsaken and nirvana as to be attained, or, in other words, not discriminating cyclic existence and nirvana, or phenomena and
their emptiness, as different entities
6 not being disinterested
7 aspiration
8 effort
9 mindfulness
10 wisdom
11 non-degeneration of liberation, that is, non-degeneration
from the abandonment of obstructions
12 non-degeneration of the wisdom realizing liberation
13, 14, 15 governing by wisdom the activities of body,
speech, and mind
16, 17, 18 non-obstructed wisdom with respect to all objects
of knowledge in the past, present, and future due to the
absence of any impeding obstructions
212
Meditation on Emptiness
The five beings who actualize the paths:
48 Stream Enterers
49 Once Returners
50 Never Returners
51 Foe Destroyers
52 Solitary Realizers
The three final fruits:
53 knowers of the bases, or Hearers' cognizers of emptiness
54 knowers of the paths, or Bodhisattvas' cognizers of emptiness
55 omniscient consciousnesses, or Buddhas' cognizers of all
phenomena simultaneously.
1
The Selfless
Sources yxwvutsrponmlkihgfedcbaTPLKJIHCB
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
Traditionally, a master begins a student's instruction with a
presentation of the Buddhist world.161 He starts with the selfless
as a basis and divides the selfless into the existent and the nonexistent:
Chart 7: Divisions of the Selfless
selfless
nairdtmya
bdag med
non-existent
asat
med pa
existent
sat
yod pa
In the Prasangika system 'the selfless' means that which does not
inherently exist. The first category of the Buddhist world is the
non-inherently existent because both existents and non-existents
214
Meditation on Emptiness
do not inherently exist. Since nothing inherently exists, this is
the broadest possible category.
Non-existents
Some of the more famous examples of non-existents are the
horns of a rabbit, the hairs of a turtle, a garment made of turtle
hairs, the diadem of a frog, a blue snow mountain (a snowy
mountain appearing to be blue), a double moon, a self-sufficient
person, and inherently existent phenomena. The horns of a
rabbit do not inherently exist because they do not exist at all.
The mere realization of their non-existence reveals that the
horns of a rabbit do not inherently exist; therefore, the noninherent existence of the horns of a rabbit is not an emptiness.
An emptiness is not understood through realizing the mere nonexistence of an object; it is known through comprehending in an
existent object the absence of the quality of inherent or objective
existence.
It is said that the horns of a rabbit do not inherently exist, are not
inherently existent, and are non-inherently existent. In Buddhist
logic none of these statements is necessarily an affirmingnegation;
the fact that the horns of a rabbit are non-inherently existent does
not imply that they have some other type of existence. The statement indicates a non-affirming negation.
A synonym of'non-existent' is 'non-phenomenal non-product'.
Non-existents are non-products because they are not produced
from an aggregation of causes and conditions; they are also nonphenomena because they do not exist, unlike phenomenal nonproducts, such as the permanent phenomenon space, which do
exist.
Existents
An existent is selfless, or non-inherently existent; its noninherent existence is an emptiness. Synonyms of 'existent' (sat,
yodpa) are 'phenomenon' (dharma, chos), 'object' (vishaya, yul),
'object of knowledge' (jneya, shes bya), and 'established base'
(vastu, gzhi grub). Thus, everything that exists is a phenomenon (dharma), so translated because all dharmas are objects of
The SelflesszyxwvutsrponmlkjihgfedcbaW
215
knowledge and can appear to the mind, even permanent phenomena such as emptiness and space. All existents are phenomena,
and there is no noumenon which is a separate entity from the
category of phenomena because nothing independently exists.
T h e word 'noumenon' is not used in this translation scheme
though it might be used for words indicating the nature of phenomena, such as dharmata, as long as it is understood that all
noumena are phenomena.
All existents are objects because whether they are subjects or
objects they can be objects of a consciousness. All existents are
objects of knowledge, or more literally objects of knowing,
because all objects are continually known by some consciousness. Without even considering the penetrating clairvoyances of
Buddhas and yogis, the various hungry ghosts and unusual types
of beings which exist everywhere insure that even particles in
the centers of huge rocks are cognized by some being.
All existents are existent bases or established bases because they
are established as existing by valid cognizers. Valid cognizers are
consciousnesses that are either direct perceivers, which cognize
their objects without the medium of images and concepts, or
inferring consciousnesses, which cognize their referent objects
through images and concepts (see pp.346-7).
Existents are divided into two types:
Chart 8: Divisions of Existents
permanent phenomenon
- nitya
rtag pa
existent
thing
— bhava
dngos po
PERMANENT PHENOMENA
Permanent phenomena are defined as phenomena that do not
disintegrate, disintegrating phenomena being those which cease
every instant due to causes and conditions. T h e permanent are
216
Meditation on Emptiness
specified as non-disintegrating phenomena because the nonexistent or non-phenomenal are also non-disintegrating. Because
of the inclusion of the word 'phenomena' in the definition of the
permanent, non-existents are not permanent, even though they
do not disintegrate. A synonym of permanent phenomenon is
'uncompounded phenomenon' (asamskrtadharma, 'dus ma by as
kyi chos).
There are two types of permanent phenomena: the occasional
permanent and the non-occasional permanent. Though in
common parlance 'permanent' means 'always existent', the
philosophers of the Sautrantika school and above have limited its
meaning to 'non-disintegrating existent'. Therefore, phenomena
that come into existence and go out of existence but do not disintegrate momentarily due to causes and conditions are 'occasional
permanents'. For instance, the emptiness of a cup comes into
existence when the cup is made and goes out ofexistence when the
cup is destroyed; however, because the emptiness of a cup does not
disintegrate moment by moment and does not change momentarily from one thing into another through the action of causes and
conditions, it is non-disintegrating. Thus, because the emptiness
of a cup is both a phenomenon and non-disintegrating but does
not exist forever, it is an 'occasional permanent'. However,
emptiness in general, though not existing as a separate entity
from its specific instances, is always existent because there never
is a moment when there is no instance of emptiness. There are
always minds, space, the potential elements, and so forth, and
these are all empty of inherent existence.
There is some debate about whether such a presentation
makes emptiness an impermanent phenomenon. Since the
coming into and going out of existence of an emptiness depend
on a phenomenon that is produced and ceased by causes and conditions, it begins to look as if an emptiness is produced and
ceased. However, it is said that the coming into existence of an
emptiness, which is merely the non-inherent existence of an
object, is unlike the production of an object by causes and conditions, and thus no one speaks of the production and disintegration of emptinesses.
The SelflessyxwvutsrponmlkjihgfedcbaT
217
Permanent phenomena are divided, but not exclusively (there
are other phenomena which are technically permanent, such as
the double reverse of pot which only appears to thought through
the mental exclusion of non-pot or, more accurately, non-one
with pot) into four types:
Chart 9: Divisions of Permanent Phenomena
space
akasha
nam mkha'
permanent
phenomenon
analytical cessation
pratisamkhyan irodha
so sor brtags 'gog
non-analytical cessation
apratisamkhyanirodha
so sor brtags min gyi 'gog pa
suchness
tathata
de bzhin nyid
Space
A space is a mere absence of obstructive contact. Space is all pervading because there is an absence of obstructive contact everywhere, even where solid objects exist, for without an absence of
obstructive contact an obstructive object could not be there in
the first place.
Because a space is a mere absence of obstructive contact, it is a
non-affirming negative—there is no positive thing implied in its
place—and it is in this sense that an emptiness, which is a nonaffirming negative of inherent existence, is said to be similar to a
space. Also, space, like emptiness, has parts because each
physical object has a lack of obstructive contact, just as each
object has a lack of inherent existence. The space of an object
refers not to the area of the object but to the absence of
obstructive contact associated with it.
218
Meditation on Emptiness
Analytical cessations
Analytical cessations are final states of cessation of obstructions
upon analysis of the nature of phenomena, which are such that
those obstructions will never return. They are enumerated as
true cessations, the third of the four noble truths, in terms of the
individual obstructions being abandoned on the levels of the
paths. 'Cessation' here means the absence of an affliction following abandonment and does not refer to the process of cessation.
Analytical cessations are compared to the state of a locked door
after a robber has been thrown out of a house in that the obstructions that have been abandoned will never return. Analytical cessations come into existence even though they are not produced;
thus, although they never go out ofexistence, individually they are
occasional permanents.
A nirvana is an analytical cessation that comes into existence
upon the abandonment of the last affliction. It is not the act of
cessation or the act of passing beyond sorrow but a phenomenon
possessed in the continuum of a yogi that is the mere absence of
the ceased afflictions.
Non-analytical cessations
Non-analytical cessations are compared to the state of having
thrown out a robber but having failed to lock the door. They are
temporary absences of afflictions and so forth due to the incompleteness of necessary conditions, upon the aggregation of which
the afflictions will return. For instance, when a person pays
intense attention to what he is seeing, he does not desire food.
The desire for food has not disappeared from his mental continuum forever, but has temporarily disappeared. Non-analytical
cessations come into existence and go out of existence and so are,
in terms of specific instances, occasional permanents.
Suchness
'Suchness' refers to 'emptiness' because whether Buddhas appear
or not the nature of phenomena remains as such.162 A suchness is
also a 'natural nirvana' (prakrtiparinirvana, rang bzhin myang
'das) which does not refer to an actual passage beyond sorrow, that
The Selfless
219
is, an overcoming of the afflictions, but to an emptiness itself
that naturally is passed beyond inherent existence. The teaching
that cyclic existence and nirvana are not different means that the
phenomena of cyclic existence are the same entities as their
natural nirvanas, or emptinesses, and not separate entities. It
does not mean there is no difference between being afflicted with
the conception of inherent existence and not being so afflicted.
THINGS
The other division of existents is comprised of things or actualities. The definition of thing is: that which is able to perform a
function (particularly the function of producing an effect).
Therefore, according to all schools except Vaibhashika, permanent phenomena are not things. The Vaibhashikas say that
permanent phenomena are things because, for instance, a space
performs the function of allowing an object to be moved. The
other systems of tenets, including Prasangika, say that the presence or absence of another obstructive object is what allows or
does not allow an object to be moved, not space itself which is
just a non-affirming negative of obstructive contact. Still, even
the Prasangikas call emptiness—a non-affirming negative of
inherent existence—a 'cause' of Buddhahood because without it
the transformation of the mind into wisdom would not be possible. However, it is not said that space causes the possibility of
movement, just as emptiness does not actually cause Buddhahood.
Things are impermanent (anitya, mi rtagpa) because of being
phenomena that disintegrate moment by moment. Though impermanent things are momentary, they are not just one moment; if
they were, it could not be said that beings without yogic direct
perception ever perceive things because they are not capable of
realizing a single isolated instant. The impermanent things that
these beings cognize are series of moments; the phenomena are
imputed to a series of moments and are unfindable among the
various moments or as the series itself. Still, the imputed nature
of things does not prevent their performing functions; rather,
being merely imputed is a prerequisite for the performance of a
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function. If things were frozen in a world of inherent existence,
unaffected by causes and conditions and unable to affect anything else, there could not be any cause and effect. Non-inherent
existence is the very basis of cause and effect, and the presence of
cause and effect is a sign of non-inherent existence.
Things are also products, or caused phenomena, or compounded phenomena (samskrta, dus byas) because they are made (krta,
byas) in dependence on the aggregation (sam, 'dus) of causes and
conditions. The term 'thing' (bhava, dngospo), when used strictly
as it is here in the table of phenomena, applies only to products;
however when it is used loosely as it often is in the Perfection of
Wisdom Sutras, it refers to both products and non-products as
when Buddha says that all things do not ultimately exist.
Things, or products, are divided into three:
Chart 10: Divisions of Things
form
— rupa
gzugs
consciousness
jnana
shes pa
thing
—
non-associated compositional factor
viprayukta-samskara
Idan min 'du byed
Forms
Source:
Cha-har Ge-shay's Identification of Elements, Elemental Evolutes,
And So Forth
Etymologically, a form is so called because it is suitable to become
an object of a sense consciousness upon the aggregation of other
causes, such as the presence of an eye sense.163 However, because
there are forms that are perceived only by the mental consciousness, this explanation is merely an etymology and not a definition.
Forms are divided into eleven types—the five physical sense
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221
powers, the five objects of the senses, and forms which are
objects only of the mental consciousness:
Chart 11: Divisions of Forms
_ eye sense
chakshurindriya, mig gi dbang po
_ ear sense
shrotrendriya, ma ba'i dbang po
_ nose sense
ghranendriya, sna'i dbang po
_ tongue sense
jihvendriya, Ice 'i dbang po
body sense
kayendriya, lus kyi dbang po
form
_ visible form
rupa, gzugs
_ sound
shabda, sgra
_ odor
gandha, dri
_ taste
rasa, ro
_ tangible object
sprashtavya, reg bya
form for the mental consciousness
dharmayatanarupa
chos kyi skye mched pa 'i gzugs
Sense powers
The five sense powers are neither the coarse organs, which are
the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, and body, nor are they consciousness. They are clear matter located in the coarse organs which
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cannot be seen with the eye but can be seen by certain clairvoyants. They give their respective consciousnesses dominance or
power with respect to certain objects and are thus called 'powers'
(;indriya, dbang po). An eye sense has power with respect to
visible forms, that is, colors and shapes, but not with respect to
sounds, odors, tastes, or tangible objects. An ear sense has power
with respect to sounds but not visible forms, and so forth. Sense
powers give their respective consciousnesses the ability to apprehend and to be generated in the aspect of their respective objects.
Eye (chakshuh, mig), eye sense power (chakshurindriya, miggi
dbang po), eye-constituent (chakshurdhatu, mig gi khams), and
eye-source (chakshurayatana, mig gi skye mched) are synonyms.
An eye sense power is called an eye-constituent because of being
the cause giving rise to the continuation of its own similar type,
that is, later moments of itself. It is also called an eye-source
because of being a door, cause, condition, or source producing and
increasing an eye consciousness. The same terminology is also
used for the ear, nose, tongue, and body sense powers.
The particles of each sense power are arranged in a specific
shape: eye sense, like that of a bud of a zar-ma flower; ear sense,
like the knot of a birch tree; nose sense, like two fine hollow
needles at the root of the nostrils; tongue sense, like half moons
having the area of only the point of a hair throughout the center
of the tongue; body sense, like skin or hide throughout the body.
As types of the body sense, the particles of the female organ are
arranged like the inside of a drum, and those of the male organ
are arranged like a thumb.
The sense power of the mental consciousness is not physical
and thus has no shape; a former moment of any of the six consciousnesses acts as the sense power of a mental consciousness.
For instance, when one pays attention to a color, an eye consciousness acts like a sense power in that it gives the mental consciousness the ability to perceive a visible object.
A sense power is an uncommon empowering condition (asadharana-adhipatipratyaya, thun mong mayinpa 'i bdag rkyen) of a
consciousness because it gives it power with respect to its own
special type of object. Also, a former moment of consciousness
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223
causes it to be an entity capable of experiencing objects. Thus, a
mental consciousness has two consciousnesses as its causes: any of
the six consciousnesses which is its empowering condition and a
former moment of consciousness which is its 'immediately preceding condition' (samanantarapratyaya, de ma dag rkyen).
A consciousness is also caused, or affected, by an object in the
sense that an object causes a consciousness to be generated in its
image, much as objects cause a mirror to reflect their image. These
objects are called 'observed-object-conditions' (alambanapratyaya, dmigs rkyen). However, the world which is being seen is
not just a mental image; the co-ordination of an image in consciousness with an object certifies that the object is being
perceived properly, but the object seen is an external object, not an
internal image. The Buddhist theory is not that everything being
perceived exists inside either the eye or the brain.
Visible forms
Visible forms (riipa, gzugs) are defined as objects of apprehension by an eye consciousness and are to be distinguished from
the general term 'form' which is the basis of the division into
eleven types of forms. A visible form is called a form-constituent
(rupadhatu) because of being a cause giving rise to the continuation of its own similar type, that is, later moments of visible
form, and is called a form-source (rupa-ayatana) because of
being a form that is a door, cause, condition, or source of an eye
consciousness. Visible forms are of two types:
Chart 12: Divisions of Visible Forms
color
— varna
kha dog
visible formshape
— samsthana
dbyibs
Colors. There are twelve colors, four primary and eight secondary
(see Chart 13). The four primary colors are the colors of the four
elements. Wind is blue; earth, yellow; water, white; and fire, red.
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Chart 13: Divisions of Colors
_ blue
nila, sngon po
yellow
pita, serpo
primary color
white
avadata, dkar po
_ red
lohita, dmar po
_ cloud
abhra, sprin
color
smoke
dhuma, du ba
_ dust
rajah, brdul
_ mist
mahika, khug sna
secondary color
illumination
aloka, snang ba
_ darkness
andhakara,
munpa
_ shadow
chhaya, grib ma
_ sunlight
atapa, nyi ma 'i 'od ser
It is not that clouds and so forth are secondary colors but that
their colors are secondary colors. However, some scholars do say
that illumination, darkness, sunlight, and shadow themselves are
secondary colors. Illumination refers to the light of the moon,
stars, fire, medicine, and jewels. Darkness refers to a form that
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obscures other forms and causes one to see gloom and blackness.
Darkness obscures other forms such that they cannot be seen,
whereas shadow makes other forms a little unclear but still perceivable; thus, darkness and shadow have a difference of density.
Sunlight refers to the illumination of other forms when the sun
appears.
The eight secondary colors do not include the secondary
colors that are mixes of primary colors, such as green which is a
mix of blue and yellow, and thus the category is not all-inclusive.
An eye consciousness actually apprehends only colors and
shapes. Although pots, pillars, and so forth appear to an eye consciousness and although it is said that an eye consciousness sees
them, pots, pillars, and so forth are not objects of apprehension
by an eye consciousness. Rather, the color and shape of pots,
pillars, and so forth—that is, their visible form—are objects of
apprehension by an eye consciousness and thus are also formconstituents and form-sources. Although pots and pillars are matter and are forms, they are not visible forms, form-constituents or
form-sources, but tangible objects, tangible-object-constituents,
and tangible-object-sources. Similarly, when one sees the visible
form of a human or horse, one sees their shape and color but
does not, in a sense, see a human or horse. Also, seeing earth and
water is a case of seeing their color, for earth and water are
tangible objects, and, therefore, the eye does not see the capacity
of hardness or of moistening. Furthermore, when the visible
form of a pot is seen, an eye consciousness does not conceive,
'This is a pot'; a mental consciousness is the identifier and
designator of names.
Shapes. Shapes are of eight types only (see Chart 14). Long refers
to the form of a long board, a long rope, a long (deep) spring, and
so forth. Short arises in relation to those. High and low refer to,
for instance, a high mountain and a low valley. A square, or perhaps polygon, is technically a shape of equal sides, such as dice,
or a pentagon, hexagon, and so forth; however, the shapes of a
rectangular box or a board are also included. Round refers to
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Chart 14: Divisions of Shapes
long
dirgha, ring ba
short
hrasva, thung ba
_ high
unnata, mtho ba
shape -
_ low
avanata, dma' ba
square
vrtta, lham pa
round
parimandala, zlum po
_ level
shata, phya le ba
non-level
vishata, phya le ba ma yin pa
either the globular, like an egg, or the flat, like a mandala. Level
refers to any shape having an even surface, whereas non-level
refers to a shape with, for instance, bumps and depressions.
Sounds
Sounds, which are defined as objects of hearing by an ear consciousness, are of only eight types (see Chart 15). Sound, soundconstituent, and sound-source are synonyms. Although sounds
are entities constructed from particles, they are not formsources, that is to say, visible forms.
Odors
Odors, which are defined as objects of smelling by a nose consciousness, are of only four types (see Chart 16). An equal odor,
such as the odor of sesame, does not infuse other objects, whereas
the opposite is true of an unequal odor such as the odor of garlic.
Odor, odor-constituent, and odor-source are synonyms.
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Chart 16: Divisions of Odors
fragrant odor
sugandha
dri zhim pa
equal fragrant odor
samasugandha
zhim pa 'i dri mnyam pa
unequal fragrant odor
visamasugandha
zhim pa'i dri mi mnyam pa
odorunfragrant odor
• durgandha •
dri mi zhim pa
equal unfragrant odor
samadurgandha
mi zhim pa 'i dri mnyam pa
unequal unfragrant odor
visamadurgandha
mi zhim pa ¥ dri mi mnyam pa
Tastes.
Tastes, which are defined as objects of taste by a tongue consciousness, are of only six types:
Chart 17: Divisions of Tastes
_ sweet, e.g., taste of molasses
madhura, mngar ba
_ sour, e.g., taste of lemon
amla, skyur ba
_ salty, e.g., taste of ocean salt
lavana, lan tshva ba
taste-
pungent, e.g. taste of ginger
katuka, tsha ba
bitter, e.g., taste of gentiana chiretta
tikta, kha ba
_ astringent, e.g., taste of the myrobalan fruit
kashaya, bska ba
Sweetness arises from a predominance of earth and water; sourness, from a predominance of fire and earth; saltiness, from a
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predominance of water and fire; pungency, from a predominance of fire and wind; bitterness, from a predominance of water
and wind; and astringency, from a predominance of earth and
wind.
Tangible objects.
Tangible objects, which are defined as objects of touch by a body
consciousness, are of only eleven types—the four elements and
seven tangible objects that are arisen from the elements:
Chart 18: Divisions of Tangible Objects
earth
prthivi, sa
element
bhuta, 'byung ba
water
ap, chu
fire
tejas, me
wind
vayu, rlung
tangible
object
smoothness
shlakshnatva, 'jam pa
tangible object
arisen from
elements
bhautika, 'byung
'gyur
roughness
karkashatva, rtsub pa
heaviness
gurutva, lei ba
lightness
laghutva, yang ba
cold
shita, grang ba
hunger
bubhuksha, bkres pa
thirst
pipasa,
skompa
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Meditation on Emptiness
The definition of earth is the hard and obstructive; its entity is
hardness, and its function is the obstruction of other physical
objects. The definition of water is the damp and moistening.
The definition of fire is the hot and burning. The definition of
wind is the light and moving.
The particles that serve as the bases for the construction of
physical objects are aggregates of the eight substances: earth,
water, fire, wind, visible form, odor, taste, and tangible object
arisen from elements. (Sound is not included because it does not
have a continuum of similar type.) Thus, wherever one of the
elements exists, the other three also exist, but there is a difference of strength and, thus, dominance. (Some say that the others
dwell in the manner of seeds, that is, in potency.)
The fact that stone, wood, and so forth hold together indicates
the presence of the water element in the earth element; that
stones and trees move indicates the presence of the wind element
in the earth element; that sparks are produced when two stones
meet indicates the presence of the fire element. Similarly, that
the water element can serve as a support for boats, leaves, and so
forth indicates that the earth element is present in the water
element; that leaves and roots rot in water and that there are
warm springs indicate the presence of the fire element in water;
that water flows downward and moves about indicates the presence of the wind element. Similarly, that leaves and grass are
held up in the wind indicates the presence of the earth element in
the wind element; that there are warm winds and that damp
objects dry when spread out to the wind indicates the presence of
the fire element in the wind element; that currents of wind are
held together in a twister indicates the presence of the water
element. Similarly, that one tongue of fire grasps another and
that a tongue of fire can support leaves, grass, and so forth indicates the presence of the earth element in the fire element; that
tongues of fire do not split apart but burn together indicates the
presence of the water element; that tongues of flame move about
indicates the presence of the wind element.
The seven tangible objects that are evolutes of the elements arise
from the four elements. Smoothness arises from a preponderance
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231
of water and fire. Roughness arises from a preponderance of
earth and wind. Heaviness arises from a preponderance of earth
and water. Lightness arises from a preponderance of fire and
wind. Cold arises from a preponderance of water and wind.
Hunger arises from a preponderance of wind. Thirst arises from
a preponderance of fire.
The colors of particles depend upon the element that is predominant. If the earth element is predominant, the color is
yellow; if water, white; if fire, red; and if wind, blue. The shapes
of particle clusters are determined by the arrangement of color
particles and are not separate particles themselves. The particles
of color/shape are different from the particles of odor, taste, or
touch and thus are classed separately from the four elements as
visible objects.
Visible forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects are
all 'atomic' in that they are masses of particles, but these are not
necessarily single particles.164 Otherwise, the only sense objects
would be single particles, and there would be no gross objects.
Though visible forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects
are 'atomic', many say that these are not 'established atomically'
(rdul du grub pa) because the word 'established' carries with it the
force of 'truly established' (satyasiddha, bden grub) or its synonym 'truly existent' (satyasat, bden par yod pa). Since 'established atomically' is the definition of matter (kantha, bem po), it
can be said that the Prasangikas do not accept 'matter'. This,
however, does not mean that particles or gross objects constructed from particles are not accepted in the Prasarigika system.
Indeed, the word 'matter' seems to refer to the atomically constructed and nothing more; however, the difficulty is not merely
in translation. For, in a similar way the Chittamatrins accept
forms and particles which are of the same entity as a perceiving
consciousness, but they do not accept 'matter' because for them
the term itself implies an external object. To say in Tibetan that
there are particles and objects constructed from particles but no
bem po is as forceful as saying in English that there are particles
and objects constructed from particles but no matter. The word
'matter' carries with it a connotation offindability under analysis,
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Meditation on Emptiness
or true existence. That there are particles and masses of particles
is accepted conventionally, but matter, because of the
implications of the word, is not accepted even conventionally
(according to Jam-yang-shay-ba).
Since visible forms and so forth are atomically constructed, it
may be wondered why the four elements which are necessarily
present in every particle are classified under tangible objects.
The reason is that without touch, the function of earth, hardness
and obstructiveness, cannot be experienced. Similarly, without
touch, the function of water, dampness and moistening, cannot
be experienced; without touch, the function of fire, heat and
burning, cannot be experienced; without touch, the function of
wind, lightness and moving, cannot be experienced. Therefore,
the four elements are classed as tangible objects. Visible forms,
odors, tastes, and the other tangible objects are evolutes of the
elements.
The five sense powers and the five objects are called the ten
obstructive physical objects. Among these, colors and shapes
that can be shown to an eye consciousness are called demonstrable obstructive forms; thus, demonstrable form and object of
apprehension by an eye consciousness are synonyms. The five
sense powers and the four remaining objects—sounds, odors,
tastes, and tangible objects—are undemonstrable obstructive
forms.
Forms for the mental consciousness
The final category of forms is comprised of forms for the mental
consciousness, which are undemonstrable and non-obstructive.
They are defined as form aggregates which are objects only of
the mental consciousness and thus are classed not as formsources (rupayatana, gzugs kyi skye mched) but as phenomenasources (dharmayatana, chos kyi skye mched)165 (see Chart 19)
Forms arising from aggregation. A single particle does not appear to
an ordinary being's sense consciousness, but when the mental consciousness analyzes a gross form into parts, a single particle does
appear, and thus it is classed as a form for a mental consciousness.
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233
Chart 19: Divisions of Form for the Mental Consciousness
form arising from aggregation (of the
eight substances), e.g., a single particle
a bh isamkshepika
bsdu ba las gyur ba
space-form, e.g., appearance of clear
space only to a mental consciousness
abhyavakashika
mngon par skabs yod pa
form for the
mental
consciousness
form arising from promises, e.g., a vow
or an absence of a vow
samadanika
yang dag par blangs pa las gyur ba
imaginary form, e.g., a horse, elephant,
or house in a dream, or a non-actual
meditative object such as an area filled
with corpses
parikalpita
kun btags pa
form for one with meditative power, e.g.,
earth or water appearing to one in isolated
meditative stabilization on earth or water
vaibhutvika
dbang 'byor ba
The shape of a single particle is necessarily round, but its colors
are various as described above for the four elements. Since single
particles appear only to the mental consciousness, all shapes and
colors are not included in the category of visible forms seen by an
eye consciousness.
Space-forms. Space appears both to an eye consciousness and a
mental consciousness and thus the bluish space that appears to an
eye consciousness is a visible form whereas the space that appears
to a mental consciousness is a form for a mental consciousness.
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Meditation on Emptiness
Both are impermanent whereas uncaused space, which is a nonaffirming negative of obstructive contact, appears only to an
inferential mental consciousness and is permanent. Like emptiness, it is a mere absence of a negated factor—for emptiness,
inherent existence, and for space, obstructive contact.
Forms arising from promises. When one takes a vow of individual
liberation, a form arises in dependence on the shape of the body,
as in crouching, and in dependence on the sounds of speech, as
in declaring that one will turn away from killing. This subtle
physical entity is said to arise at the moment of first taking the
vow and remains with the person until losing the vow or death.
Similarly, a form arises from non-restraint as, for instance, in
dependence on a butcher's physical and verbal actions in killing
animals and selling their flesh. A middling variety of such is a
form that arises from physical or verbal virtue. Forms arising
from promises are continuations of virtue or sin and arise from
revelatory actions of body or speech or arise from cultivating
meditative stabilization. Since the motivations of these actions
are not knowable by others, they are called 'non-revelatory
forms' (avijnaptirupa, mam par rig byed mayin pa'igzugs).
Imaginary forms. Dream objects, such as elephants, and nonactual objects of meditation, such as corpses filling the world,
appear as if they were actual forms but are not; thus, they are
classed as imaginary forms. The Prasangikas say that a dream consciousness is solely a mental consciousness appearing in the
aspects of the five sense consciousnesses. A dream object is an
external object affecting a mental consciousness just as a reflection
in a mirror is an external object affecting an eye consciousness.
The non-Buddhist Mfmamsakas say that the light of the eye hits
the mirror, and through returning to the eye an image is seen. The
Buddhist Vaibhashikas say that a clear type of form arises in
the mirror. The Sautrantikas, Chittamatrins and YogacharaSvatantrikas say that a mirror image is a false appearance to the
mind and is not a different entity from the mind. The Prasangikas,
however, say that reflections, the falling hairs seen by one with
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235
cataracts, and mirages are visible forms just as echoes are sounds.
A consciousness perceiving these is nevertheless mistaken
because, for example, a mirror image of a face appears to be a
face and not just a mirror image.
Forms for one with meditative power. Forms that appear to one
who has attained mastery in meditation are objects of meditation
that exist in fact. Mere earth or mere water as a meditative manifestation of one who has attained mastery in meditation is actual
and is not an imaginary form. Included in this category are
objects of meditative manifestation that can be shown to another
being's eye consciousness, but this does not make the object as it
appears to the master a visible form; for him it still is a form for
the mental consciousness. This is compared to the varieties of
externally existent objects seen by different types of beings, as in
the case of a god's seeing a bowl of fluid as ambrosia and a
hungry ghost's seeing pus and blood in the same place.
Consciousness
Sources:
Ye-shay-gyel-tsen's Clear Exposition of the Modes of Minds and
Mental Factors
Lati Rinbochay's oral teachings
The second division of things, or impermanent phenomena, is
consciousness, defined as the clear and knowing.166 Consciousness is of two types:
Chart 20: Divisions of Consciousness
mind
— chitta
consciousness —
sems
mental factor
— chaitta
sems byung
Minds
A mind is a knower of the mere entity of an object, whereas a
mental factor is a knower which, on the basis of observing that
236
Meditation on Emptiness
object, engages in the object from the point of view of other
features, such as function and so forth. Minds and mental factors
are different within being the same entity; they possess five similarities which, as described in Vasubandhu's Treasury of
Knowledge (Abhidharmakosha) are:
1 Sameness of base. A mind and its accompanying mental factors depend on the same sense power, as in the case of an eye
consciousness and its mental factors which both depend on
the physical eye sense power.
2 Sameness of object of observation. A mind and its mental factors observe the same object. For instance, when the main eye
consciousness apprehends blue, so does the mental factor of
feeling that accompanies it.
3 Sameness of aspect. For instance, if the main eye consciousness is generated in the aspect (or image) of blue, so is the
mental factor of discrimination that accompanies it.
4 Sameness of time. A mind and its mental factors are produced,
abide, and cease simultaneously.
5 Sameness of substantial entity. Just as at any one time the substantial entity of a particular mind is single and there are not
many minds of the same type, such as several eye consciousnesses, so the substantial entity of, for instance, the mental
factor of intention that accompanies the eye consciousness is
also single.
Asanga's Compendium of Knowledge (Abhidharmasamuchchaya)
combines the sameness of object of observation and sameness of
aspect and adds another, sameness of realm and level. This refers
to the fact that if, for instance, the main mind is of the Desire
Realm, only mental factors of the Desire Realm will accompany
it, and not mental factors of the Form or Formless Realms.
Minds are of only six types (see Chart 21). An eye consciousness is an individual knower depending on the eye and observing
visible form. An ear consciousness is an individual knower
depending on the ear and observing sound. A nose consciousness is an individual knower depending on the nose and observing odor. A tongue consciousness is an individual knower
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237
Chart 21: Divisions of Minds
eye consciousness
chakshurvijnana
mig gi mam par shes pa
—
ear consciousness
shrotravijnana
ma ba Y mam par shes pa
—
nose consciousness
ghranavijnana
sna 'i mam par shes pa
mind
tongue consciousness
—
jihvavijnana
Ice'i mam par shes pa
—
body consciousness
kayavijnana
lus kyi mam par shes pa
—
mental consciousness
manovijnana
yid kyi mam par shes pa
depending on the tongue and observing taste. A body consciousness is an individual knower depending on the body and observing tangible objects. A mental consciousness is an individual
knower depending on the mind sense (which is a former moment
of consciousness and thus non-physical) and observing phenomena.
The mind cognizing emptiness, either inferentially or directly,
is a mental consciousness, not an eye, ear, nose, tongue, or body
consciousness, except in the case of a Buddha whose consciousnesses are cross-functional. The mental consciousness has the
capacity to penetrate, first conceptually and then non-conceptually, the nature of phenomena, which not only is beyond the
realm of a non-Buddha's sense perception but also is obscured
by a false overlay that until Buddhahood accompanies sense perception. In dependence on reasoning, the mental consciousness
238zyvutsrponmlkjihgfedcbaTSOMIFED
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first realizes an emptiness of a particular object conceptually—by
way of the image of a vacuity which is a negative of inherent
existence; then through familiarity with that knowledge, the
imagistic element is removed, whereupon the mental consciousness becomes a Superior's wisdom directly cognizing emptiness.
Mental factors
There are fifty-one mental factors which are classed in six
groups:
Chart 22: Divisions of Mental Factors
omnipresent factor (5)
— sarvatraga
kun 'gro
_
determining factor (5)
viniyata
yul nges
virtuous factor (11)
— kushula
dge ba
mental factor
root affliction (6)
— mulaklesha
rtsa nyon
secondary affliction (20)
— upaklesha
nye nyon
changeable factor (4)
— aniyata
gzhan 'gyur
Omnipresent mental factors. The omnipresent mental factors are
so named because they necessarily accompany all minds, even
the wisdom cognizing emptiness. The five omnipresent mental
factors are:
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239
Chart 23: Divisions of Omnipresent Mental Factors
feeling
— vedana
tshor ba
discrimination
samjna
'du shes
omnipresent
mental factor
intention
• chetana
sems pa
contact
- sparsha
reg pa
mental engagement
manaskara
yid la byed pa
Feeling. Feeling is an entity of experience individually experiencing the fruitions of virtuous and non-virtuous actions. Its
objects are pleasure, pain, and neutrality. Pleasure is that with
which, when it ceases, one wants to meet again; pain is that from
which, when it arises, one wants to separate; and neutrality,
being neither pleasure nor pain, is that with respect to which,
when it arises, neither the wish to meet nor the wish to separate
occurs. Pleasure, pain, and neutrality are called 'fruitions' in
order to emphasize that all generations of pleasure, pain, and
neutral feeling are results of former actions.
All pleasures, even that arising from a cool breeze in a hell,
arise from virtuous actions (karma, las) accumulated in the past.
Similarly, all pains, even a headache in the continuum of a Foe
Destroyer, arise from non-virtuous actions accumulated in the
past. In other words, pleasure and pain do not arise causelessly,
or from a discordant cause, such as the nature ( p r a k r t i r a n g
bzhin) asserted by the Samkhyas or the lord Ishvara as asserted
by the Aishvaras. Rather, general pleasure and pain, such as
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being born as a human or as a hell-being, arise from general virtuous and non-virtuous actions, such as an ethical deed or the sin
of murder. Similarly, the varieties of particular pleasures and
pains arise from the varieties of particular virtuous and nonvirtuous actions. The development of certainty as to this definite
and undeceived relationship of action and effect—of pleasure to
virtue and pain to non-virtue—is praised as the basis of all auspicious doctrines and called the correct view of all Buddhists.
Pleasure (sukha), pain (duhkha), and neutrality (aduhkhasukha) can each be divided into physical (kayiki) and mental
(chaitasiki) feeling, making six types of feeling. Physical feeling
refers to that accompanying any of the five sense consciousnesses, not just that accompanying the body consciousness. It is
called physical because the five sense powers are composed of
clear matter and because the body sense power pervades the
sense powers of eye, ear, nose, and tongue. Mental feeling is that
accompanying the mental consciousness.
From the viewpoint of their base or sense power, feelings are
of six types:
1 feeling arising from contact upon the aggregation of a visible
object, eye sense, and eye consciousness (chakshuhsamsparshaja vedana)
2 feeling arising from contact upon the aggregation of a sound,
ear sense, and ear consciousness (shrotrasamsparshaja
vedana)
3 feeling arising from contact upon the aggregation of an odor,
nose sense, and nose consciousness (ghranasamsparshaja
vedana)
4 feeling arising from contact upon the aggregation of a taste,
tongue sense, and tongue consciousness (jihvasamsparshaja
vedana)
5 feeling arising from contact upon the aggregation of a
tangible object, body sense, and body consciousness
(kayasamsparshaja vedana)
6 feeling arising from contact upon the aggregation of a phenomenon, mental sense, and mental consciousness (manahsamsparshaja vedana).
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Taking into account pleasure, pain, and neutrality, these six are
further divided into eighteen types of feeling.
When divided from the viewpoint of object of abandonment
and antidote, there are two types:
1 feeling as the base of attachment (gredhashritavedana), which
is feeling accompanying attachment to attributes of the
Desire Realm
2 feeling as the base of deliverance (naishkamyashritavedana),
which is feeling accompanying a mental consciousness that
has turned away from desire for attributes of the Desire
Realm and is included within an actual concentration.
This division into two is made in order to make known how
attachment is induced by the power of feeling and how one
separates from attachment to feeling in dependence on the concentrations.
There is also a division of feeling into materialistic (samishavedana) and non-materialistic (niramishavedana). The former is
feeling accompanying attachment to contaminated mental and
physical aggregates, whereas the latter is feeling accompanying
a wisdom consciousness directly cognizing selflessness.
Discrimination. Discrimination apprehends, upon the aggregation of an object, sense power, and a consciousness, the
uncommon signs of an object. There are two types:
1 non-conceptual apprehension of signs: apprehension of the
uncommon signs of an object appearing to a non-conceptual
mind
2 conceptual apprehension of signs: apprehension of the
uncommon signs of an object appearing to thought.
These two types of discrimination operate on (1) perceptions,
involving the designation of expressions to objects manifestly
perceived, (2) hearing, involving the designation of expressions
in dependence on hearing believable words, (3) differentiations,
involving the designation of expressions to objects ascertained in
dependence on signs (such as in determining that an article is
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good due to possessing the signs of superior quality), and (4)
knowledge, involving the designation of expressions to objects
ascertained directly.
There is also a division of discrimination into two types:
1 discrimination apprehending signs in objects: apprehension
individually differentiating the features of an object, such as
blue, yellow, and so forth
2 discrimination apprehending signs in expressions: apprehension individually differentiating the features of expressions,
such as in, 'This is a man; that is a woman.'
From the viewpoint of its base, discrimination is of six types:
1 discrimination arising from contact upon the aggregation of a
visible object, eye sense, and eye consciousness (chakshuhsamsparshaja samjna)
2 discrimination arising from contact upon the aggregation of a
sound, ear sense, and ear consciousness (shrotrasamsparshaja
samjna)
3 discrimination arising from contact upon the aggregation of
an odor, nose sense, and nose consciousness (ghranasamsparshaja samjna)
4 discrimination arising from contact upon the aggregation of
taste, tongue sense, and tongue consciousness (jihvasamsparshaja samjna)
5 discrimination arising from contact upon the aggregation of a
tangible object, body sense, and body consciousness (kayasamsparshaja samjna)
6 discrimination arising from contact upon the aggregation of a
phenomenon, mental sense, and mental consciousness
(manahsamsparshaja samjna).
From the viewpoint of object of observation, it is also of six types:
1 reasoned discrimination (sanimittasamjna): (a) discrimination skilled in the relationship of names and meanings, (b) discrimination observing products as impermanent and so forth,
and (c) discrimination having a clear subjective aspect and
object of observation
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2 unreasoned discrimination (animittasamjna): (a) discrimination unskilled in the relationship of names and meanings, (b)
discrimination observing products as permanent and so forth,
and (c) discrimination lacking clear subjective aspect and
object of observation
3 discrimination of the small (paritta samjna): (a) discriminations in the continuum of an ordinary being in the Desire
Realm who has not attained an actual concentration and (b)
discriminations observing attributes of the Desire Realm
4 discrimination of the vast (mahadgata samjna): (a) discriminations observing the Form Realm and (b) discriminations in
the continuums of beings of the Form Realm
5 discrimination of the limitless (apramanasamjna): (a) discriminations observing limitless space or limitless consciousness
6 discrimination of nothingness (akinchinsamjna): discriminations observing nothingness (a state beyond coarse feeling
and discrimination).
In general, discrimination involves the differentiation and
identification of objects; as a mental factor accompanying a nonconceptual mind such as an eye consciousness, it implies a nonconfusion of the details of the object without which a later
identification could not be made.167 Discrimination is the heart
of identifying the object of negation in the view of selflessness
and then reflecting on a reasoning proving non-inherent existence; thus, far from being a hindrance to the path, correct discrimination is to be enhanced.
Intention. Intention (or attention) is the mental factor that moves
and directs the mind that accompanies it to its object; it has the
function of engaging the mind in the virtuous (kushala, dge ba),
non-virtuous (akushala, midge ba), and neutral (avyakrta, lungdu
ma bstanpa). Intention is the most important of all mental factors
because through its power minds and mental factors engage in
objects, like pieces of iron powerlessly moved by a magnet.
From the viewpoint of its base, intention is of six types:
1
intention arising from contact upon the aggregation of a
244
2
3
4
5
6
Meditation on Emptiness
visible object, eye sense, and eye consciousness (chakshuhsamsparshaja chetana)
intention arising from contact upon the aggregation of a sound,
ear sense, and ear consciousness (shrotrasamsparshaja chetana)
intention arising from contact upon the aggregation of an odor,
nose sense, and nose consciousness (ghranasamsparshajd
chetana)
intention arising from contact upon the aggregation of a taste,
tongue sense, and tongue consciousness (jihvasamsparshaja
chetana)
intention arising from contact upon the aggregation of a
tangible object, body sense, and body consciousness
(kayasamsparshaja chetana)
intention arising from contact upon the aggregation of a phenomenon, mental sense, and mental consciousness
(manahsamsparshaja chetana).
Intention is mental action (manaskarma, yid kyi las) from among
the two types of action (karma, las), actions of intention (mental
actions) and intended actions (physical and verbal actions).
Contact. Contact distinguishes its object—upon the aggregation of object, sense power, and mind—as pleasant, unpleasant,
or neutral in accordance with subsequent feelings of pleasure,
pain, or neutrality; thus, it has the function of serving as a basis
for feeling. Since contact distinguishes its object as pleasant,
unpleasant, or neutral, it serves as a cause for the feelings of
pleasure, pain, or neutrality which in turn serve as causes for
desire, hatred, and ignorance.
From the viewpoint of its base, contact is of six types:
1 contact upon the aggregation of a visible object, eye sense,
and eye consciousness
2 contact upon the aggregation of a sound, ear sense, and ear
consciousness
3 contact upon the aggregation of an odor, nose sense, and nose
consciousness
4 contact upon the aggregation of a taste, tongue sense, and
tongue consciousness
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5 contact upon the aggregation of a tangible object, body sense,
and body consciousness
6 contact upon the aggregation of a phenomenon, mental sense,
and mental consciousness.
Mental engagement. Mental engagement directs the mind
accompanying it to a specific object of observation (alambana,
dmigspa). The difference between intention and mental engagement is that intention moves the mind to objects in general
whereas mental engagement directs the mind to a specific
object.
Without the five omnipresent factors, the experience of an object
would not be complete. Without feeling, there would be no
experience of pleasure, pain, or neutrality. Without discrimination, the uncommon signs of the object would not be apprehended. Without intention, the mind would not approach its object.
Without contact, there would be no basis for feeling. Without
mental engagement, the mind would not be directed to a specific
object of observation. Thus, all five are needed to experience an
object.
Determining mental factors. The five determining mental factors
are shown in Chart 24.
Aspiration. Aspiration observes a contemplated phenomenon
and seeks it. Aspiration serves as a base for the initiation of effort
in the sense that, for instance, through perceiving the advantages
of meditative stabilization, a captivating faith in meditative
stabilization is produced, and in dependence on this, a strong
continuous aspiration seeking meditative stabilization is generated such that one is able to generate continuous effort. Effort in
meditative stabilization, in turn, generates a pliancy of mind and
body that bestows an ability to remain in the practice of virtue
night and day, thereby overcoming the laziness which is a nondelight in cultivating meditative stabilization and liking for what
is discordant with meditative stabilization. Thus, faith, aspiration, effort, and pliancy are the antidotes to laziness.
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Chart 24: Divisions of Determining Mental Factors
aspiration
chhanda
'dun pa
—
determining _
mental factor
—
belief
adhimoksha
mos pa
mindfulness
smrti
dran pa
stabilization
samadhi
ting nge 'dzin
knowledge
— prajna
shes rab
Aspiration is divided into three types: aspiration wishing to
meet, aspiration wishing not to separate, and aspiration that
seeks. The last is again divided into aspiration seeking desires,
aspiration seeking views, and so forth.
Belief. Belief holds an ascertained object to be just as it was
ascertained; it has the function of keeping the mind from being
captivated by another view. For instance, when one considers
Buddha and other teachers and analyzes to discover which is an
undeceiving refuge, one ascertains that only Buddha is the teacher
of an undeceiving refuge. Then, when the doctrine taught by
him and the spiritual community properly achieving his doctrine are ascertained by valid cognition as undeceiving, a firm
belief in them as final refuges is gained. Thereupon, Forders and
so forth cannot lead one away from this position. One has then
entered among the number of Buddhists, and based on this, all
auspicious qualities increase.
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Mindfulness. Mindfulness is non-forgetfulness with respect to
a familiar phenomenon; it has the function of causing nondistraction. Mindfulness has three features:
1 objective feature: a familiar object. Mindfulness cannot be
generated toward an unfamiliar object.
2 subjective feature: non-forgetfulness within observation of
that object. Even though one might have become familiar
with an object previously, if it does not presently appear as an
object of mind, mindfulness cannot occur.
3 functional feature: causing non-distraction. Since the stability
of the mind increases in dependence on mindfulness, nondistraction is specified as the function of mindfulness.
Mindfulness that possesses these three features is extremely
important for both sutra and tantra practice, as all auspicious
qualities of the grounds and paths increase in dependence on
mindfulness and introspection. In particular, all achievements of
meditative stabilization in sutra and tantra are attained through
the power of mindfulness.
Stabilization. Stabilization is a one-pointedness of mind with
respect to an imputed object; it has the function of serving as the
base of knowledge, that is, special insight. The object of stabilization is specified as 'imputed' because when meditative stabilization is cultivated, the mind is held to a mentally imputed or
imagined object of observation. This indicates that meditative
stabilization is not generated by a sense consciousness, such as
by an eye consciousness staring at an object, but by the mental
consciousness observing an internal object. Through continuous
cultivation of meditative stabilization, the object of observation
—whether true or untrue—will be perceived clearly and nonconceptually.
In dependence on the meditative stabilization of calm abiding,
which is a setting of the mind internally in equipoise, special
insight is achieved through the force of analytical wisdom.
Therefore, the function of stabilization is specified as serving as
the base of knowledge. Stabilization, in turn, depends on ethics.
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Knowledge. Knowledge (or wisdom) individually differentiates
the faults and virtues of objects of analysis; it has the function of
overcoming doubt. When one analyzes with reasoning and gains
ascertainment, doubt is overcome; thus, the function of knowledge is specified as overcoming doubt.
Virtuous mental factors. The eleven virtuous mental factors are:
Chart 25:
Divisions of Virtuous Mental Factors
_ faith
shraddha, dad pa
_ shame
hrT, ngo tsha shes pa
_ embarrassment
apatrapya, khrel yod pa
_ non-attachment
alobha, ma chags pa
_ non-hatred
advesha, zhe sdang med pa
virtuous mental
factor
non-ignorance
amoha, gti mug med pa
_ effort
virya, brtson 'grus
_ pliancy
prasrabdhi, shin tu sbyangs pa
conscientiousness
apramada, bag yod pa
_ equanimity
upeksha, btang snyoms
_ non-harmfulness
avihimsa, mam par mi 'tshe ba
Faith.
Faith has the aspect of clarity (prasada, dang ba),
The Selfless 249
conviction (abhisampratyaya, yid ches), or a wish to attain (abhilasha, 'thob dod) with respect to the existent (such as actions and
their effects), the possession of qualities (such as by the Three
Jewels), or powers (such as the powers of the path to actualize
cessation). It has the function of serving as a basis for aspiration.
The faith of clarity, or clarifying faith, is, for instance, the clarity
of mind that comes through perceiving the qualities of the Three
Jewels; it is called 'clarifying' because just as when a waterclarifying jewel is put in water, the dirtiness in the water is
immediately cleansed, so when this type of faith is generated in
the continuum, mental troubles are cleared away, whereupon
the qualities of realization are suitable to be generated.
The faith of conviction is, for instance, the gaining of conviction in dependent-arising or in actions and their effects through
contemplating these doctrines as set forth by the Conqueror. The
faith which is a wish to attain is, for instance, the faith thinking,
'I will definitely attain the cessation of suffering', upon contemplating the four noble truths, ascertaining true sufferings and
true sources as objects of abandonment and true cessations and
true paths as objects of attainment, and realizing that through
striving in the proper way these can be attained.
Although the world equates faith (dadpa) and liking (dga'ba),
they are not the same. Liking one's child or spouse and liking
beer are cases of liking but not of faith. Also, the faith which is a
concern and conviction from one's depths with respect to the
faults of cyclic existence is faith but not liking. The faith which is
a conviction and liking from the depths through contemplating
the qualities of a spiritual guide or the benefits of wholesome
actions and their effects is both faith and liking.
Furthermore, faith and respect (gus pa) are not the same
though they are considered to be so in the world. For instance,
liking a spiritual guide is faith, but respecting a spiritual guide
involves contemplating his kindness, knowing shame, and valuing him highly; thus, faith and respect are different mental
factors.
As explained earlier, effort is the cause of all auspicious qualities, and in order to generate effort, aspiration seeking those
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Meditation on Emptiness
qualities is necessary. In order to generate aspiration, one must
perceive those qualities and have the faith of conviction in them.
Thus, faith is frequently praised in the scriptures and their commentaries as the basis of all auspicious attainments.
Shame and embarrassment. Shame is an avoidance of misconduct due to one's own disapproval whereas embarrassment is an
avoidance ofmisconduct due toothers' disapproval. These mental
factors both have the function of serving as a basis for restraining
misconduct. In the case of shame, when one is about to engage in
misconduct, one avoids it by thinking, 'This is not something I
should do,' whereas in the case of embarrassment, one avoids it
by thinking, 'Since others will despise me, this is not suitable.'
This latter involves concern for the displeasure of a lama,
teacher, or the like.
Shame and embarrassment serve as a basis for restraining misconduct in the sense that to restrain physical, verbal, and mental
misconduct, one must definitely have shame and embarrassment; for if one does not have either concern from one's own
point of view over the fruition of an action or concern for the discomfort of a lama or teacher, there is no way to cease misconduct.
Non-attachment, non-hatred, and non-ignorance. Non-attachment is an emergence from and non-desire for cyclic existence and
the articles of cyclic existence. Non-hatred is a factor that, in
observing either harmful sentient beings, sufferings, or sources of
suffering, conquers the generation ofhatred; it is an absence ofthe
intent to harm. Non-ignorance is a knowledge of individual analysis that can serve as an antidote to ignorance; it is either attained
from birth through the fruition of actions in an earlier lifetime
without depending on contributing causes in this lifetime or arises
through application byway of hearing, thinking, or meditating.
Non-attachment, non-hatred, and non-ignorance have the function of serving as bases for non-engagement in misconduct, being
roots of all virtuous practices, methods for ceasing all misconduct,
and the essence of all paths. Since all grounds and paths are for the
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251
sake of abandoning the three poisons of desire, hatred, and
ignorance and since these three mental factors cause one to
emerge from the three poisons that cause all misconduct, their
function is specified as serving as bases for restraining misconduct.
A being of small capacity generates non-attachment to this life
and, turning away from this life, seeks his own welfare in future
lives. A being of middling capacity generates non-attachment
toward all the marvels of cyclic existence and, having reversed
his grasping from the depths, seeks release from all cyclic existence. A being of great capacity generates non-attachment to both
cyclic existence and a state of solitary peace and seeks the nonabiding nirvana of a Buddha wherein he can remain in meditative equipoise on emptiness while at the same time manifesting
countless forms in order to help migrators in cyclic existence. In
this way, all paths can be related to non-attachment as well as to
non-hatred and non-ignorance.
Effort. Effort is a mental delight in virtue; it has the function
of fulfilling and accomplishing virtues. Although in the world
everything that involves striving is called effort, toil only for the
sake of the affairs of this lifetime is not effort but is laziness that
is an attachment to bad activities; it is discordant with effort.
There are five types of effort:
1 effort of armoring—this is the thought prior to engaging in
virtue that is the mind's taking delight in that activity. It is
like putting on great armor in that it affords a willingness to
engage in extended activity.
2 effort of application—a mental delight while engaging in
practice
3 effort of non-inferiority—a delight generated such that one
will not be discouraged, thinking, 'How could one such as I
do this?'
4 effort of irreversibility—a fullness of mental delight such that
circumstances cannot divert one from engaging in virtuous
activity
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Meditation on Emptiness
5 effort of non-satisfaction—a striving for higher qualities without being satisfied with achieving small virtues.
All auspicious qualities depend on effort.
Pliancy. Pliancy is a serviceability of mind and body such that
the mind can be set on a virtuous object of observation as long as
one likes; it has the function of removing all obstructions. It is of
two types:
1 physical pliancy—through the power of meditative stabilization physical unserviceability is purified, whereupon the
body is light like a ball of cotton and capable of being used in
virtuous activity according to one's wish
2 mental pliancy—through the power of meditative stabilization
the mind becomes free of unserviceability, whereupon it has
the facility to engage in a virtuous aim without impediment.
The function of pliancy is specified as removing all obstructions
because through its power all unfavorable conditions of mind
and body are purified. Once pliancy is attained, meditative
stabilization is increased from within; through this the bliss of
pliancy increases, whereupon meditative stabilization again
increases. Through this, in turn, the mind becomes empowered,
when conjoined with special insight, to overcome obstructions.
Conscientiousness. Conscientiousness keeps the mind from
contaminations and causes the achievement of virtue while abiding in effort. It keeps the mind from coming under the influence
of the afflictions and has the function of serving as a basis for the
achievement of all mundane and supramundane marvels. Conscientiousness is of five types:
1 conscientiousness with respect to the former—a remedying of
past faults in accordance with the doctrine
2 conscientiousness with respect to the later—an earnest intention to remedy future faults
3 conscientiousness with respect to the middle—remedying
faults without forgetfulness in the present
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4 conscientiousness prior to activity—a tightening of the mind,
thinking, 'How nice it would be if I could behave and abide in
such a way that faults do not arise!'
5 conscientiousness of concordant behavior—abiding and
behaving in such a way that faults do not arise.
Conscientiousness is very important as a root of all grounds and
paths.
Equanimity. Equanimity is an evenness of mind, a dwelling in
a natural state, and a spontaneous abiding discordant with the
afflictions. It is associated with non-attachment, non-hatred, and
non-ignorance and has the function of not allowing an opportunity for the afflictions.
In dependence on techniques for setting the mind onepointedly, the nine states of mind (see pp.80-86) are gradually
achieved. When the ninth is attained, the exertion of using the
antidotes to laxity and excitement is no longer needed. At that
point one attains a spontaneous abiding of the mind on its object,
and with this state an equanimity that involves non-application
of the antidotes to laxity and excitement is attained. Thus, equanimity here is an equanimity of application, not an equanimity
of feeling nor the immeasurable equanimity of wishing that all
sentient beings abide in an equanimity free of desire and hatred,
intimacy and alienness.
The function of equanimity is specified as not allowing an
opportunity for the afflictions because when the ninth state of
mind is attained, it is easy to overcome the afflictions of the
Desire Realm and also at the time of meditative equipoise laxity
and excitement do not arise.
Non-harmfulness. Non-harmfulness is a compassionate attitude, included as part of non-hatred, which is patience devoid of
intention to injure. It observes suffering sentient beings and
thinks, 'May they be free of such suffering!' The function of
non-harmfulness, not injuring sentient beings, is said to be the
essence of Buddha's teachings.
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Meditation on Emptiness
These eleven virtuous mental factors are called 'natural virtues'
because they are virtuous entities in themselves, without depending on consideration of other factors such as motivation and so
forth. Though these eleven are the principal virtues, there are
four other types:
1 virtue through relation—the minds and mental factors that
accompany any of the eleven virtues
2 virtue through subsequent relation—virtuous predispositions
established by virtuous minds and mental factors
3 virtue through motivation—physical and verbal actions motivated by faith and so forth
4 virtue through ultimacy—suchness, or emptiness, is designated a virtue because when one observes and meditates on it,
all obstructions are purified; however, it is not an actual
virtue.
From the viewpoint of state or situation, virtues are divided
into eight types:
1 virtue by way of attainment at birth—such as faith that arises
through the force of predispositions established in former
lifetimes without depending on familiarization in this lifetime
2 virtue by way of application—such as the faith of wishing to
attain Buddhahood that arises in dependence on relying on a
virtuous spiritual guide, listening to the excellent doctrine,
properly taking such to mind, and achieving doctrines that
are conducive to attaining nirvana
3 virtue by way of an activity in front—imagining, for instance,
a field of assembly of Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, and so forth in
front of oneself, and then bowing down and making offerings
4 virtue by way of helping—actions such as ripening sentient
beings by way of the four means of gathering students (giving
articles, teaching the means for attaining high status in cyclic
existence and definite goodness, causing others to practice
what is beneficial, and behaving that way oneself)
5 virtue by way of bearing—such as wholesome actions that
serve as the means for attaining high status and definite goodness
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6 virtue by way of acting as an antidote—such as actions that
possess the special power of directly overcoming objects of
abandonment and the unfavorable
7 virtue by way of pacification—such as true cessations
8 virtue by way of concordant cause—such as the five clairvoyances and ten powers that arise through the force of attaining
true cessations.
A similar presentation of seven types is made with respect to
non-virtues:
1 non-virtue by way of attainment at birth—such as spontaneously engaging in murder due to predispositions from a former lifetime
2 non-virtue by way of application—such as misconduct of
body, speech, and mind that arises in dependence on relying
on a non-virtuous friend, listening to specious doctrine,
improperly taking such to mind, and so forth
3 non-virtue by way of an activity in front—such as offering a
blood sacrifice to an image
4 non-virtue by way of harming—such as actions of body,
speech, and mind that injure sentient beings
5 non-virtue by way of bearing—such as actions impelling
future lifetimes and actions completing the character of a
future lifetime that yield only suffering as their fruit
6 non-virtue by way of non-conduciveness—such as bad views
that prevent generation of non-contaminated paths
7 non-virtue by way of interruption—such as bad views that
interfere with virtuous activity.
Root afflictions. Afflictions, in general, are defined as knowers
that, when generated, cause the mental continuum to be very
unpeaceful. The six root afflictions, which are so called because
they are the sources of all other afflictions, are shown in Chart
26.
Desire. Desire perceives an internal or external contaminated
phenomenon to be pleasant from the point of view of its own
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Chart 26: Divisions of Root Afflictions
desire
- raga
'dod chags
anger
— pratigha
khong khro
root affliction
—
pride
mana
nga rgyal
ignorance
avidya
ma rig pa
doubt
~ vichikitsa
the tshom
afflicted view
drshti
Ita ba nyon mongs can
entity and thereupon seeks it. It has the function of generating
suffering. Like oil that has set in cloth, desire adheres to its
object of observation and thus is difficult to separate from it.
Desire is divided into three types: desire of the Desire Realm,
desire of the Form Realm, and desire of the Formless Realm.
The reason for stating that the function of desire is the generation of suffering is that the root of all suffering is birth, and the
main cause of birth in cyclic existence is desire, or attachment.
Anger. Anger is an intention to harm sentient beings, to harm
sufferings in one's own continuum, or to harm phenomena that
are sources of suffering (such as thorns). It has the function of
causing oneself not to remain in contact with happiness and
serves as a basis for misconduct. Through anger, one does not
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abide in happiness in this lifetime, and immeasurable suffering is
induced in the future.
Pride. Pride depends on the view of the transitory collection as
a real I and has the aspect of a puffing up of the mind upon
observing one's own wealth, qualities, youth, and so forth. It has
the function of serving as a basis for the arising of disrespect and
suffering. There are seven types of pride:
1 pride—a puffing up of the mind, thinking that one is superior
to lower persons
2 excessive pride—a puffing up of the mind, thinking that one
is superior to equal persons
3 pride beyond pride—a puffing up of the mind, thinking that
one is greatly superior even to persons who are superior to
others
4 pride of thinking I—a puffing up of the mind, observing the
appropriated aggregates of mind and body and thinking, 'I'
5 pride of conceit—a puffing up of the mind, thinking that one
has attained what has not been attained, such as clairvoyance
or meditative stabilization
6 pride of slight inferiority—a puffing up of the mind, thinking
that one is just a little lower than others who are actually
greatly superior
7 wrongful pride—a puffing up the mind, thinking that one has
attained auspicious qualities when one has actually deviated
from the path, such as claiming high attainments when one
has actually been carried away by a spirit.
Because pride causes disrespect for high qualities and for those
who possess high qualities, it serves to obstruct the new attainment of doctrines of verbalization and realization, to cause
rebirth in bad migrations, and, even when reborn as a human, to
cause birth in a low class, such as a servant. Thus, it produces
the unwanted in both this and later lives.
Ignorance. Ignorance is an absence of knowledge that involves
obscuration with respect to the status of phenomena. It has the
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Meditation on Emptiness
function of serving as a basis for the arising of false ascertainment, doubt, and afflictions. Its principal antidote is the wisdom
cognizing selflessness.
Ignorance is of two types: obscuration with respect to actions
and their effects and obscuration with respect to suchness. The
latter serves as the causal motivation for all rebirth in cyclic existence, but in terms of operational motivation at the time of
actions, obscuration with respect to actions and their effects is
specified as the cause of accumulating actions that result in birth
in bad migrations whereas obscuration with respect to suchness
is specified as the cause of accumulating actions that result in
birth in happy migrations.
In dependence on ignorance, the other afflictions arise, and in
dependence on them contaminated actions are accumulated.
From those, all sufferings in cyclic existence are produced. Therefore, all afflictions and faults arise in dependence on ignorance.
Doubt. Doubt is a two-pointedness of mind with respect to the
four noble truths, actions and their effects, and so forth. It has
the function of serving as a basis for non-engagement in virtues.
Doubt obstructs all virtuous activities and especially interferes
with seeing the truth.
Afflicted views. There are five afflicted views: (see Chart 27).
View of the transitory collection. A view of the transitory
collection observes the appropriated mental and physical aggregates and conceives them to be a real I and mine. It is an endurance in the sense of not fearing the mistakenness of inherently
existent I and mine; a desire in the sense of seeking a mistaken
object; an intelligence in the sense of thoroughly discriminating
its object; a conception in the sense of adhering strongly to its
object; and a view in the sense of observing its object. A view of
the transitory has the function of serving as a basis for all bad
views.
It is called the view of the transitory collection because the
mental and physical aggregates, which are the base of the view,
The SelflessyxwvutsrponmlkjihgfedcbaTS
259
Chart 27: Divisions of Afflicted Views
view of the transitory collection (as real
I and mine)
satkayadrshti
'jig tshogs la Ita ba
view holding to an extreme
~ antagrahadrshti
mthar 'dzin pa'i Ita ba
conception of a (bad) view as supreme
drshtiparamarsha
Ita ba mchog 'dzin
afflicted view —
conception of (bad) ethics and modes of
_ conduct as supreme
sh Tlavrataparamarsha
tshul khrims dang brtul zhugs mchog 'dzin
—
perverse view
mithyadrshti
log Ita
are impermanent, and thus transitory, and are a composite of the
plural, and thus a collection. The name itself indicates that there
is no permanent and partless person. (See p. 176 for its divisions.)
A view of the transitory collection conceives of an inherently
existent I and exaggerates the distinction between self and other.
Thereupon, desire for one's own side and hatred for others
arises.168 Through viewing the self, pride is generated, a view of
the self as eternal or as annihilated at death arises, and the conception of one's own bad behavior as superior is generated. Similarly,
teachers of selflessness and their teachings of cause and effect, the
four noble truths, the Three Jewels, and so forth are conceived to
be non-existent or become objects of doubt. In this way, the view
of the transitory collection acts as the basis of all afflictions.
Although usually identified as ignorance, in this context its relation to ignorance is like the relation of a mind conceiving the presence of a snake to the dimness surrounding a rope in a dark area.
260
Meditation on Emptiness
View holding to an extreme. A view holding to an extreme
observes the self as apprehended by the view of the transitory
collection and conceives it to be either permanent in the sense of
unchanging or annihilated in the sense of not transmigrating to
another lifetime. Since it causes descent to the extremes of permanence and annihilation, it has the function of obstructing progress on the middle way free from the two extremes. As above, it
is an endurance, desire, intelligence, conception, and view.
Conception of a (bad) view as supreme. A conception of a (bad)
view to be supreme observes a view of the transitory collection, a
view holding to an extreme, a perverse view, or the mental and
physical aggregates in dependence on which these views arise
and conceives such (1) to be supreme in the sense of claiming it
to be perfect, (2) to be chief in the sense of holding that there is
nothing greater, (3) to be superior, or (4) to be ultimate in the
sense of holding that it has no equal. A conception of a (bad) view
to be supreme has the function of serving as a basis for adhering
strongly to bad views in that it establishes predispositions for not
separating from them in this and future lives. As above, it is an
endurance, desire, intelligence, conception, and view.
Conception of (bad) ethics and modes of conduct as supreme. A
conception of (bad) ethics and modes of conduct to be supreme
takes as its object (1) a faulty system of ethics that is intended to
abandon faulty ethics, (2) a faulty mode of conduct that prescribes dress, behavior and physical and verbal activities, or (3)
the mental and physical aggregates in dependence on which
these are performed. It considers these to purify sins, liberate
from afflictions, and release from cyclic existence. It has the
function of serving as a basis for fruitless fatigue. As above, it is
an endurance, desire, intelligence, conception, and view.
Perverse view. A perverse view is a denial of cause, effect,
functionality, and existent phenomena and can involve holding
that Ishvara and so forth are the cause of beings migrating in
cyclic existence. Denial of cause is a view that good and bad
The Selfless
261
behavior and so forth do not exist. Denial of effect is a view that
fruitions ofvirtuous and sinful actions do not exist. Denial offunctionality is a view that former and later lives and so forth do not
exist. Denial of existent phenomena is a view that, for example,
attainment of the state of a Foe Destroyer does not exist.
Perverse views have the function of severing virtuous roots,
causing tight adherence to non-virtuous roots, serving as a basis
for engaging in non-virtue, and causing non-engagement in
virtue. Since denial of cause, effect, and rebirth sever all virtuous
roots, these are the worst among all perverse views.
Secondary afflictions. The twenty secondary afflictions, which
are so called because they are close to or portions of the root
afflictions, are shown in Chan 28.
Belligerence. Belligerence is an intention to harm another
through striking and so forth when one is in any of the nine
situations of harmful intent, thinking:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
'This person has harmed me.'
'This person is harming me.'
'This person will harm me.'
'This person has harmed my friend.'
'This person is harming my friend.'
'This person will harm my friend.'
'This person has helped my enemy.'
'This person is helping my enemy.'
'This person will help my enemy.'
Belligerence has the function of serving as a basis for bearing
weapons, punishing, and preparing to injure others. It differs
from the root affliction anger in that anger is an impatience and
intent to harm that arises when a harmful sentient being, or
one's own suffering, or sources of suffering appear to the mind.
Belligerence is an extremely disturbed state of mind which,
upon a great increase of anger, is a wish to inflict harm on
another such as by physically striking that person when he is in
one's presence.
262zyvutsrponmlkjihgfedcbaSMEDA
Meditation on Emptiness
Chart 28: Divisions of Secondary Afflictions
— belligerence, krodha, khro ba
— resentment, upandha, 'khon 'dzin
— concealment, mraksha, 'chab pa
- spitt, pradâsha,
'tshigpa
— jealousy, irshyd, phrag dog
— miserliness, mâtsarya, ser sna
- deceit, maya, sgyu
— dissimulation, shâthya, g.yo
- haughtiness, mada, rgyags pa
harmfulness, vihimsa, rnam par 'tshe
~ ba
secondary
affliction
- non-shame, âhrïkya, ngo tsha med pa
non-embarrassment, anapatrdpya, khrel
med pa
— lethargy, sty ana, rmugs pa
— excitement, auddhatya, rgod pa
- non-faith, âshraddhya, ma dad pa
— laziness, kausïdya, le lo
non-conscientiousness, pramdda, bag med
pa
forgetfulness, mushitasmrtitâ, brjed nges
pa
non-introspection, asamprajanya, shes
bzhin ma yin pa
- distraction, vikshepa, rnam par g.yeng ba
The Selfless
263
Resentment. Resentment is a wish to harm or to answer harm,
involving non-release of a continuum of anger. It has the function of serving as a basis for impatience.
Concealment. Concealment is a wish, through the force of
ignorance, to hide a fault when another person, such as a spiritual guide, points out that fault. It has the function of increasing
faults, of serving as a basis for contrition and not abiding in
contact with happiness, and of impelling rebirth in bad migrations.
Spite. Spite is a wish, through the force of belligerence and
resentment, to speak harsh words out of ill-will to another who
has pointed out a fault. It has the function of causing one not to
abide in happiness in this lifetime by causing engagement in
many faulty actions, such as speaking harsh words, and by
generating many non-meritorious actions. Spite also generates
unpleasant fruitions in future lives.
Jealousy. Jealousy is a disturbance of the mind from the depths
that involves an inability to bear another's fortune due to being
attached to goods and services. It involves hatred and has the
function of causing discomfort of mind and not abiding in contact with happiness.
Miserliness. Miserliness is a tight holding onto articles without
letting them go through the power of attachment to goods and
services. It has the function of serving as a basis for the nondiminishment of possessions, and it generates the unwanted in
this and later lives.
Deceit. Deceit is a pretension of having good qualities, whereas
one does not, through the force of strong attachment to goods and
services. As in the case ofthe hypocrisy of pretending to have a disciplined mind in order to deceive others, deceit can involve ignorance and desire and has the function of serving as a basis for wrong
livelihood. 'Wrong livelihood' refers to deceitfully gaining goods
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Meditation on Emptiness
(1) through hypocrisy, (2) through speaking soft words in
accordance with another's thought, (3) through praising others'
possessions, (4) through speaking on the faults of miserliness and
so forth, and (5) through praising another's act of giving and so
forth.
Dissimulation. Dissimulation is a wish to hide one's faults
from others through the force of desire for goods and services.
Both dissimulation and deceit have the function of preventing
the attainment of true preceptual instruction and cause one in
this and future lifetimes not to meet with a Mahayana spiritual
guide.
Haughtiness. Haughtiness is a puffing up of the mind through
taking joy and comfort in observing one's own good health,
youth, beauty, power, signs of long life, prosperity, and so forth.
It has the function of serving as a basis for all afflictions and
secondary afflictions and acts as a root of non-conscientiousness.
Harmfulness. Harmfulness is an unmerciful wish to harm
other sentient beings. Involving anger, it is a lack of compassion
as in wanting to harm or to cause others to harm, or in taking
delight when seeing or hearing of harm to sentient beings. It has
the function of injuring others.
Non-shame. Non-shame is a non-avoidance of faults from the
viewpoint of one's own disapproval or of religious prohibition.
It can involve desire, hatred, and ignorance and has the function
of assisting all root afflictions and secondary afflictions. For
example, if a monk, when encountering an intoxicant, did not
avoid drinking it, thinking, 'This is something I should not do,'
he would have the mental factor of non-shame.
Non-embarrassment. Non-embarrassment is non-avoidance of
faults from the viewpoint of another's disapproval. It can
involve desire, hatred, and ignorance and has the function of
assisting all root afflictions and secondary afflictions. If one does
The Selfless
265
not avoid faults thinking that the Teacher Buddha and clairvoyant gods would be disturbed and others would criticize oneself,
one would have non-embarrassment. It and non-shame assist all
afflictions and act as causes of all faults, for without a wish to
avoid faults, one cannot keep from them. Thus, these two
mental factors are said to accompany all non-virtuous minds.
Lethargy. Lethargy is a heaviness and unserviceability of body
and mind. It involves ignorance and has the function of assisting
all root and secondary afflictions, for in dependence on lethargy
these increase.
Excitement. Excitement is a scattering of the mind to attributes
of the Desire Realm experienced previously and an engagement in
them with attachment. Excitement is a non-peacefulness of mind
that involves desirous engagement in the pleasant; it has the function of preventing calm abiding. Thus, all scatterings of the mind
are not instances of excitement since excitement is a portion of
desire whereas the mind is frequently distracted to objects by way
ofafflictions other than desire and even scatters to virtuous objects
of observation. Scattering involving desire is both scattering and
excitement whereas other instances are just scattering.
Non-faith. Non-faith is non-conviction, non-delight, and nonwishing with respect to virtuous phenomena. It involves ignorance and has the function of serving as a basis for laziness. Nonfaith is the opposite of the three types of faith; it is non-conviction
in actions and their effects, etc., non-delight and dislike of the
possessors of auspicious qualities such as the Three Jewels, and
non-wishing or non-seeking of liberation and so forth.
Laziness. Laziness is a non-delight in virtue due to attachment
to lying down and so forth. It involves ignorance and has the
function of preventing application in virtue. (See p.71.)
Non-conscientiousness. Non-conscientiousness causes a looseness of mind, not keeping it from afflictions and faults and
266
Meditation on Emptiness
resulting in non-cultivation of virtuous phenomena. It can
involve an abiding in desire, hatred, and ignorance as well as laziness and has the function of serving as a basis for the increase of
non-virtues and decrease of virtues.
Forgetfulness. Forgetfulness is an unclarity of mind and a forgetting of virtuous objects through mindfulness of objects of the
afflictions. It has the function of serving as a basis for distraction
in that, based on afflicted mindfulness, the mind is distracted to
the objects of observation of the afflictions.
Non-introspection. Non-introspection is an unknowing engagement in physical, verbal, and mental deeds. It has the function of
serving as a basis for the infractions of codes of ethics.
Distraction. Distraction is a scattering of the mind from its
object of observation. It can involve desire, hatred, and ignorance and has the function of preventing separation from desire.
Excitement is a scattering of the mind to pleasant objects whereas
distraction is a scattering to any object.
Changeable mental factors. The four changeable mental factors
are so called because they become virtuous, non-virtuous, or
neutral by the power of the motivation and the minds accompanying them. They are shown in Chart 29.
Sleep. Sleep is a powerless withdrawal inside of the engagement by sense consciousnesses in objects. It depends on causes
such as heaviness of body, weakness, fatigue, taking the figure of
darkness to mind, and so forth. Sleep involves ignorance and has
the function of serving as a basis for losing virtuous activities.
The proper time for sleep is the middle watch of the night, not
the first or last watches nor during the day. During the middle
watch of the night one should sleep with a wish to practice
virtue, and not motivated by afflictions. Thus, there are two
types of sleep, virtuous and non-virtuous, the latter having the
function of degenerating virtuous activities.
The SelflessywvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaW
267
Chart 29: Divisions of Changeable Mental Factors
—
changeable _
mental factor
sleep
middha
gnyid
contrition
kankrtya
'gyod pa
investigation
vitarka
rtog pa
analysis
vichara
dpyod pa
Contrition. Contrition is remorse or regret for a deed done by
oneself in accordance with one's own thought or upon pressure
by someone else which one subsequently comes to dislike. It
involves ignorance and has the function of interrupting the
stability of the mind. Contrition is of three types:
1 virtuous—remorse for sins done previously
2 non-virtuous—remorse for meritorious actions done previously, such as making donations and then feeling sorry for
having depleted one's wealth
3 neutral—remorse for activities that neither helped nor
harmed others, such as making a mistake sewing.
Contrition for sins is suitable when their fruition has not yet
occurred and they can still be affected by confession and so forth.
When the fruition of a sin has already occurred, such as in
having been born blind, contrition can no longer overcome the
effect of the deed.
Investigation and analysis. Investigation is an inquiry into the
rough entities of objects as well as their names whereas analysis
is a fine discrimination of these. In dependence on their objects,
268zyxvutsrponmlkihgfedcbaSNMIGFEDCBA
Meditation on Emptiness
investigation and analysis are of three types, virtuous, nonvirtuous, and neutral. The virtuous, such as analyzing selflessness
with an intention to emerge from cyclic existence, has the function
of serving as a basis for abiding in contact with happiness in that it
generates pleasant effects. Non-virtuous investigation and analysis, such as inquiring into pleasant and unpleasant objects motivated by desire and hatred, has the function of serving as a basis for
not abiding in happiness in that it generates unpleasant effects.
Investigation and analysis into crafts, styles, and so forth without a
virtuous or non-virtuous attitude are neutral. (For another way of
presenting consciousness see Appendix 1.)
Non-associated, compositional factors
Source
Gon-chok-den-bay-dron-may's Beginnings of Annotations on
(Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Essence of the Good Explanations'
T h e final division of impermanent phenomena is comprised of
compositional factors which are neither form nor consciousness.169 They are called compositional factors because ofbeing factors that allow for the aggregation of causes and conditions and for
the production, abiding, and cessation of products. They are
called 'non-associated' because, unlike minds, they are not
associated with minds or mental factors. Non-associated
compositional factors are divided into two types:
Chart 30: Divisions of Non-Associated Compositional Factors
non-associated
compositional—
factor
person
pudgala, gang zag
non-person compositional factor
apudgalaviprayuktasamskara
gang zag mayin pa 'i Idan min 'du byed
A person is a non-associated compositional factor because ofbeing
designated in dependence upon a collection of form and consciousness. Since a person is neither form nor consciousness but
impermanent, it can be only an instance of the remaining category
The Selfless
269
of impermanent phenomena, a non-associated compositional
factor.
Non-person non-associated compositional factors are of
twenty-three types (see Chart 31). These twenty-three are called
'designations to states'. 'Acquisition' is designated to a state of
the increase and decrease of virtues and so forth, of which there
are two types: 'finding acquisition' which is a new attainment of
such increase or decrease and 'possessive acquisition' which is
the retention of it.
'Absorption without discrimination' is designated to a state
involving a lack of the coarse feelings and discriminations associated with the third concentration and below. It is produced in
dependence on the fourth concentration by common beings
only. 'Absorption of cessation' is designated to a state achieved
only by Superiors in which there is a lack of the coarse feelings
and discriminations associated with the peak of cyclic existence
(the highest formless level) and below. 'One having no discrimination' is designated to the state of a person born among the gods
in the condition of being without coarse feelings and discriminations.
'Life faculty' or 'life' is designated to the state of living; it is the
base of consciousness and warmth. 'Similarity of type' is designated to the state or condition of likeness. 'Birth' (or 'production'), 'aging', 'duration', and 'impermanence' are designated to states of the characteristics of things. 'Group of stems',
'group of words', and 'group of letters' are designated to various
states of verbal conventions. Stems are bare names without case
endings, etc., whereas words are stems with case endings, etc.
'State of an ordinary being' is designated to one who has not
attained the qualities of Superiors. (The Vaibhäshikas substitute
non-acquisition for this category and do not assert the remaining
nine, limiting their presentation of non-associated compositional
factors to fourteen.) 'Continuity' is designated to the noninterrupted state of a continuum of causes and effects. 'Distinction' is of three types: distinction of the particular. and the
general, distinction of virtues and sins and pleasures and pains,
and distinction of causes and effects. 'Relatedness' is of three
270zyxvutsrponmlkjihgfedcbaTSPNMGFEDCA
Meditation on Emptiness
Chart 31: Divisions of Non-Person Non-Associated
Compositional Factors
• acquisition prapti, 'thob pa
—
absorption without discrimination;
asamjnisamapatti, 'du shes med pa 'i
snyoms 'jug
absorption of cessation;
nirodhasamapatti, 'gogpa'i snyoms 'jug
_ one having no discrimination; asamjnika,
'du shes med pa pa
— life faculty; jivitendriya, srog gi dbang po
_ similarity of type; nikayasabhagata, rigs
'thun pa
- birth; jati, skye ba
- aging; jar a, rga ba
- duration; sthiti, gnas pa
non-person
non-associated,
compositional
factor
- impermanence; anityata, mi rtag pa
- group of stems; namakaya, minggi tshogs
group of words; padakaya, tshig gi tshogs
_ group of letters; vyanjanakaya, yi ge'i
tshogs
_ state of an ordinary being; prthagjanatva,
so so skye bo nyid
continuity; pravrtti, 'jug pa
distinction; pratiniyama, so sor nges pa
- relatedness; yoga, 'byor 'grel
- rapidity; java, 'gyogs pa
— order; anukrama, go rim
time; kala, dus
- area; desha, yul
number; samkhya, grangs
- collection; samagri, tshogs pa
The SelflessywvutsrqponmlkihgfedcbaUT
271
types: 'means' which is the collection of, for instance, an artisan's
tools, 'aggregation' which is a collection of causes but specifically their reliance on each other within the collection, and 'suitability' which is each thing's having its own function.
'Rapidity' is designated to a condition of the arising of effects
immediately after their causes and to the speed caused by persons, magical emanations, and so forth. 'Order' is designated to a
serial state of former and later, high and low, and so forth.
'Time' is designated to states of the past, present, and future.
'Area' is designated to the composite of a place and the persons
therein. 'Number' is designated to a condition of measure.
'Collection' is designated to the state of a complete collection of
causes, and specifically to that completeness.
AGGREGATES, C O N S T I T U E N T S , AND SOURCES
Sources
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
Another way of dividing all impermanent things is into the five
aggregates, or, more literally, 'heaps' or 'piles' (skandha, phung
po).m These five are:
Chart 32:
The Five Aggregates
— forms (rupa, gzugs)
— feelings (vedana, tshor ba)
thing-
— discriminations (samjna, 'du shes)
— compositional factors (samskara, 'du byed)
— consciousnesses (vijnana, rnam shes)
The heaps are so called because when Buddha taught them he
heaped up various grains—rice and so forth—into five piles, to
represent the categories of impermanent phenomena. These
heaps are defined as aggregates of phenomena, and, therefore,
'aggregate' is often used here as the translation equivalent.
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Meditation on Emptiness
The eleven types of forms and all their instances constitute the
first aggregate, 'forms'. The three types of the mental factor
'feeling'—pleasure, pain, and neutrality—and all their instances
constitute the second aggregate, 'feelings'. The mental factor of
discrimination and all its instances constitute the third heap,
'discriminations'. Non-associated compositional factors and the
remaining forty-nine mental factors as well as all their instances
constitute the fourth aggregate, 'compositional factors'. The six
main minds and all their instances constitute the fifth aggregate,
'consciousnesses'. The person is imputed in dependence upon
these aggregates of impermanent phenomena and is unfindable
either separate from or among them.
All impermanent phenomena not only of the personal continuum but also of the external world are included in these five.
However, the emptiness of the mind, a permanent phenomenon
included within the personal continuum, is not counted among
the five aggregates because the five aggregates are exclusively
impermanent. Thus, all phenomena of the personal continuum are not included in the five aggregates, only the impermanent.
The last four aggregates are mental phenomena and the first is
physical; thus, the five are the 'mental and physical aggregates'.
Each instance of the five is also called an 'aggregate' because, for
instance, a table itself is an aggregate of particles and a consciousness is a continuum of moments. A single particle and a single
moment of consciousness are also called a form aggregate and a
consciousness aggregate not because they are aggregates of
particles or moments but merely from the point of view of designating a part—for example, an instance of a form aggregate—
with the name of the whole—'form aggregate'.171 This mode of
appellation in which every instance of an aggregate is itself called
an aggregate accords with the relationship between a generality
and its instances. If the generality is 'form aggregate', each of its
instances must be a form aggregate. To be an instance of a generality (such as pot), a phenomenon (such as a gold pot) must be the
same entity as the generality, the phenomenon must be it (a pot),
and there must be other instances.
The Selfless
273
All phenomena, both permanent and impermanent, can be divided into the eighteen constituents (dhatu, khams), which are so
called because they give rise to phenomena of similar type.172
These are the six objects, the six sense powers, and the six consciousnesses, every instance of which is called a constituent:
Chart 33:
The Eighteen Constituents
object
sense power
form
sound
odor
taste
tangible object
phenomenon
eye sense power
ear sense power
nose sense power
tongue sense power
body sense power
mind sense power
consciousness
eye consciousness
ear consciousness
nose consciousness
tongue consciousness
body consciousness
mental consciousness
'Phenomenon', the sixth category of objects, refers to other phenomena, those that are not sense objects but are objects only of
the mental consciousness, such as impermanence and emptiness.
Since sense objects are also objects of a mental consciousness,
the category 'phenomena' does not include all objects of a mental
consciousness—just its exclusive objects among which mental
factors and permanent phenomena, such as space, are included.
Since each of a Buddha's six consciousnesses cognizes all phenomena, this list does not apply to Buddhas. However, the
ability of a Buddha to cognize all objects with any consciousness
does not imply that there is only one mind which is merely designated with the names of the six consciousnesses when it arrives
at the various organs and experiences their respective objects.
The cross-functionality of a Buddha's consciousnesses is an
extraordinary quality and does not affect the presentation of the
consciousnesses and objects of non-Buddhas.
The eighteen constituents include all phenomena, both
permanent and impermanent, due to the inclusion of all permanent phenomena in the category 'phenomenon'. These eighteen
can be reduced to the twelve sources (ayatana, skye mched)
through eliminating the six consciousnesses, yet still contain all
phenomena because the six consciousnesses are still included in
274
Meditation on Emptiness
the category 'mind sense power'. The mind sense power is a previous moment of any of the six consciousnesses which acts as the
base of a mental consciousness much as a physical sense power
acts as the base of a sense consciousness.
The twelve sources are so called because they open the way for
the production of the six consciousnesses.173 They are the six
objects and the six sense powers:
Chart 34:
The Twelve Sources
object
sense power
form
sound
odor
taste
tangible object
phenomenon
eye sense power
ear sense power
nose sense power
tongue sense power
body sense power
mind sense power
Teachers repeatedly enumerate the twelve sources or the
eighteen constituents in order to emphasize a sense of the multiplicity of phenomena that are the bases of imputing or designating a person. The tables are memorized, with students not
only repeating the names but causing the phenomena to appear
to their minds. This practice helps greatly to crowd out the sense
of self and prepare the way for a recognition of the imputed
nature of the person. Then, one can proceed to investigate the
imputed nature of these phenomena themselves.
2 Dependent-Arising of Cyclic
Existence
Sources
Dzong-ka-ba's Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path
Geshe Lhundup Sopa's oral teachings
Pan-chen So-nam-drak-ba's General Meaning of (Maitreya's)
'Ornament for Clear Realization'
Den-ba-dar-gyay's Analysis of Dependent-Arising
The last twelve of the fifty-three phenomena of the afflicted class
are the twelve members of the dependent-arising of cyclic existence.174 These twelve are to be viewed as faulty because they
obstruct the path to liberation. They are:
1 ignorance (avidya, ma rig pa)
2 action (samskarakarma, 'du byed kyi las)
3 consciousness (vijnana, mam shes)
a. cause consciousness
b. effect consciousness
4 name and form (namariipa, minggzugs)
5 six sources (shadayatana, skye mched drug)
6 contact (sparsha, reg pa)
276
7
8
9
10
11
12
Meditation on Emptiness
feeling (vedana, tshor ba)
attachment (trshna, sredpa)
grasping (upadana, len pa)
existence (bhava, srid pa)
birth (jati, skye ba)
aging and death (jaramarana, rga shi).
Ignorance does not just mean non-knowledge; it is also a consciousness that conceives the opposite of correct knowledge.
Ignorance here is a misconception of oneself as inherently existent and of phenomena included in one's own continuum as
being objects controlled by an inherently existent I. Ignorance
views the nominally existent I, which is merely designated in
dependence upon the mental and physical aggregates, as an
inherently existent self and views the aggregates themselves as
under the control of this self. Thus, its principal antidote is knowledge of the true nature of the I as empty of inherent existence.
Ignorance can also refer to obscuration with respect to the coarse
relationships of actions and their effects, as in the case of ignorantly
making sacrifices in order to gain liberation, but as the first of the
twelve members of dependent-arising, it is necessarily a conception of a self of persons that gives rise to the later members.
In a particular round of dependent-arising, the first member
applies only to the period of obscuration or misconception
which in a previous life served as the motivator of one particular
action. This single complete action, the second member of the
twelve, is called a path of action because it serves as a path to
rebirth in a bad migration (hell-being, hungry ghost, or animal)
or a happy migration (human, demi-god, or god). For an action
to be a complete path of action it must have its necessary members: an intention (such as the wish to kill someone), thought
which identifies the object properly, preparation for the accomplishment of the action, successful conclusion, and non-reversal
of intention before the action is completed.175 This complete
action establishes a potency on the 'cause consciousness' or the
consciousness at the time of the action, the first half of the third
member.
Dependent-Arising of Cyclic Existence
277
Action as the second member usually refers only to one meritorious or non-meritorious contaminated action in a former life,
either in the life immediately preceding this life or in any other
former life. Based on ignorance with respect to the nature of the
person, a path of action leading to a happy migration is accumulated. Based also on ignorance with respect to actions and their
effects, a path of action leading to a bad migration is accumulated. The former is a meritorious action projecting or impelling
rebirth as a human or god of the Desire Realm, and the latter is a
non-meritorious action projecting rebirth in a bad migration as
an animal, hungry ghost, or hell-being. Based on ignorance with
respect to the nature of the person, an action of meditative stabilization projects, or provides the power for, a happy migration in
a Form or Formless Realm; it is a meritorious action which is
called 'unmoving' because its effect can reach fruition only in the
type of life and level for which it was projected, this corresponding to the type of meditative stabilization. An example of an
unmoving action is a deed of meditative absorption in the first
concentration that projects an effect included within the first
level of the Form Realm and which will only ripen in the first
level of the Form Realm. An example of a moving action is a
deed such as murder that projects an effect included within a bad
migration but which might not actually ripen in a bad migration,
reaching fruition in a human life as a form of human suffering.
Thus, meritorious and non-meritorious actions are 'moving'
actions because their projected effects and actualized effects are
not necessarily of the same type of life and level even though
they may be the same.
Dependent on the motivational ignorance that precedes and
gives rise to them, virtuous actions and actions of meditative
absorption lead to rebirth in cyclic existence, albeit in a favorable
situation. Pa-bong-ka's commentary on Dzong-ka-ba's Great
Exposition of the Stages of the Path says,176 'The second member,
action, is the performance of an activity, motivated by ignorance, which produces the mental and physical aggregates of a
rebirth. It is like doing work.' The first half of the third member,
'cause consciousness', refers only to the moment when the
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Meditation on Emptiness
potency of the action 'stains' the consciousness which exists at
the time the action is completed.
The first two and a half members, ignorance, action, and cause
consciousness, are causes projecting a future birth (see Chart 35);
they are, therefore, called a 'future dependent-arising'. What
they project are the next four and a half members, effect consciousness, name and form, sources, contact, and feeling. The
first of these, 'effect consciousness', refers only to the moment of
the mental consciousness just after bridging the gap from the
previous life to the new life, which in womb-birth is the first
moment in the womb. Then, with the next moment, name and
form apply. 'Name' refers to the four non-form aggregates—feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, and consciousnesses—and 'form' refers to the aggregate of forms.
A being in the intermediate state between lives has all six consciousnesses as well as at least the five omnipresent mental factors, including feeling and discrimination. Together with the
mind are potencies, established by countless actions, in a dormant state; these are instances of compositional factors, and thus
all four non-form aggregates are present during the intermediate
state. Also, a being in the intermediate state has a subtle physical
body which is called an 'unobstructed body' because it can pass
through walls, mountains, and so forth; thus, the form aggregate
is also present during transmigration.
Name and form, as the fourth member of dependent-arising,
refer to the five aggregates of the new life immediately after conception. At that point there are mental and body consciousnesses. 'Form' refers to the roundish shape (embryo), oblong
shape (the lengthening embryo), and so forth. (In the Formless
Realm 'form' refers only to the dormant seeds of form, which are
neither form nor consciousness.)
The six sources are the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental sense powers. Through the development of the form aggregate which at that time is the embryo (the semen of the father
and the blood of the mother penetrated by the consciousness)
and the four 'name' aggregates (feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, and consciousnesses) the remaining four of
Dependent-Arising of Cyclic ExistencezyxwvutsrponmlkjihgfedcbaT
279
Chart 35: Buddha's Explicit Teaching in the 'Rice Seedling
Sutra' of One Round of a Twelve-Membered Dependent-Arising
life A-
life B
1 ignorance
2 action
3 consciousness
a. cause consciousness
4
5
6
7
b. effect consciousness
name and form
sources
contact
feeling
8 attachment
9 grasping
10 existence
life C
11 birth
12 aging and death
projecting causes
projected effects
actualizing causes
actualized effects
Life A precedes life B at any time, and life B precedes life C with
no interval.
the six sources—eye, ear, nose, and tongue sense powers—come
into being. (The body and mental sense powers exist from the
first moment of the embryo.) If the birth is spontaneous as in a
hell or heaven, the sense powers all come into being with the
inception of the new life, unlike the serial development as in
birth from a womb, from an egg, or from heat and moisture.
The term 'sources' as the fifth member of dependent-arising
refers to a specific five moments in the development of a life in
cyclic existence; the first is the achievement of the sense powers
of mind and body, and the second through fifth occur at the production of the other four sense powers which depend on the
gradual development of name and form. Therefore, 'sources' are
identified as only the six sense powers, excluding the six objects
(see p.274). The six objects or external sources are ever present
and need not be produced in dependence on name and form
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Meditation on Emptiness
because the embryo has color and shape, sound (for example, if
hit), odor, taste, softness and so forth as tangible objects, and
impermanence.
The sixth member, contact, arises from the aggregation of
object, sense power, and consciousness and has the function of
distinguishing objects as pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral.
'Aggregation' refers not to a simultaneous collection, but to the
production of a consciousness by a sense power and an object.
The seventh member, feeling, is comprised of feelings of
pleasure, pain, or neutrality in accordance with the discrimination by contact. Since feeling is divided into six types from the
viewpoint of the six types of contact produced by the six sources,
it involves a serial production in accordance with the production
of each source. However, 'feeling' refers not just to the first
moment of each of the six types of feeling but also to moments of
feeling throughout the life that serve as the objects of the next
member, attachment.
In sum, effect consciousness, name and form, sources, contact,
and feeling are effects projected by ignorance, action, and cause
consciousness in the sense that the latter make them suitable for
actualization. An action that depends on ignorance projects
these through staining a potency on the cause consciousness.
This potency of a particular type of life is similar to the outline of
a picture, the details of which are provided by other deeds, called
completing actions.
The potency is actualized by attachment, grasping, and existence. The eighth member, attachment, is desire not to separate
from a feeling of pleasure, to separate from a feeling of pain, and
for a non-diminishment of neutral feeling. The ninth member,
grasping, an increase of attachment, is of four types:
1 desirous grasping—desire involving strong attachment to the
Desire Realm attributes of pleasant forms, sounds, odors,
tastes, and tangible objects
2 grasping for views—desire involving aspiration to bad views,
not including the view of the transitory collection of mind
and body as real I and mine
3 grasping for ethics and modes of conduct—desire involving
Dependent-Arising of Cyclic Existence
281
strong attachment to bad ethics and bad modes of conduct
which are associated with bad views
4 grasping for a self—desire involving strong attachment to the
pride of selfhood and the view of the mental and physical
aggregates which have the nature of transitoriness and of an
aggregation as real I and mine.
Attachment and grasping nourish or actualize the particular
potency that is the projecting cause of the next life and thus can
occur at any time during the life. However, since such moments
of attachment and grasping are most efficacious near the time of
death, attachment and grasping here for the most part refer to
instances near the time of death.
The tenth member, existence, is a case of giving the name of
the effect to the cause. For it is the potency established by the
second member, action, when it has been thoroughly nourished
by attachment and grasping and has become empowered to
develop into the next life. Since 'existence' occurs at the moment
just preceding the new existence or life which is its effect, calling
the tenth member 'existence' is a designation of it with the name
of its effect.
Attachment, grasping, and existence are causes that actualize
the potency projected by ignorance, action, and cause consciousness. The actualizer is grasping, which is caused by attachment,
and birth and aging and death are what are actualized. Through
grasping, the potency previously established in the consciousness by an action is fully empowered, this state being called
'existence'.
Among the twelve members, ignorance, action, and cause consciousness take place in a former life. Effect consciousness, name
and form, sources, contact, feeling, attachment, grasping, and
existence occur in the present life. Birth and aging and death
occur in the future life. For the production of this life only ignorance, action and cause consciousness are explicitly presented;
for the production of the future life only attachment, grasping,
and existence are explicitly presented. However, each birth has
both the three projecting causes and the three actualizing causes.
Particular causes are emphasized for each of the two births
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Meditation on Emptiness
for the sake of pointing out the existence of all of them for all
births.
The actualized effects are birth, that is, the five mental and
physical aggregates just after transmigrating to the new life, and
aging and death. Aging refers to the process of change beginning
from the second moment of the new life and applying through to
death. Death is the cessation of the continuum of a similar type
of mental and physical aggregates. Aging and death are put as
one member because there are cases of death immediately after
rebirth, without aging.
In this way one round of the twelve members of dependentarising is completed in three lifetimes. The effect consciousness,
name and form, sources, contact, feeling, attachment, grasping,
and existence of this lifetime are not in the same round of
dependent-arising as the birth and aging and death of this lifetime. The birth and aging and death of this lifetime are the result
of the actualizing members of the last lifetime. In this way, two
rounds of dependent-arising are occurring simultaneously. Similarly, actions motivated by ignorance in this lifetime are each
beginning other new rounds of dependent-arising. (For other
presentations, see Appendix 2.)
A benefit of contemplating dependent-arising is the creation of
a sense of distress. Through understanding that a life is created
by nourishment—through attachment and grasping—of a
potency established by an action that is motivated by ignorance,
one can thereby infer the existence of past and future lives.
Through this, one sees that innumerable potencies have been
established in the mind and are ready for actualization. The
impermanence and precariousness of this life is obvious, and the
conditions for empowering another potency to create a new life
that might be very miserable are ever-present. Similar to a person who knows that calamity is about to befall him, one will,
upon understanding one's position, seek with great effort to
extricate oneself from such a situation. The afflictions that give
rise to the rounds of dependent-arising will be identified as enemies, and one will seek the means of overcoming them.
After a practitioner identifies the misery in his own continuum,
Dependent-Arising of Cyclic Existence
283
he knows through inferential extension that other sentient
beings are suffering the same miseries. Just as he wishes to free
himself from misery, so he develops the wish to free all sentient
beings due to their closeness over the continuum of lives. In this
way compassion is generated, and with it as a motivation, one
will seek with great vigor to vanquish ignorance, attachment,
and grasping which are now identified as the enemies of all
sentient beings. The benefit of the study and realization of
dependent-arising is eventually the attainment of Buddhahood.
3 The Four Noble Truths
Sources
Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
Geshe Gedun Lodro's oral teachings
Gon-chok-den-bay-dron-may's Presentation of the Four Truths
Pan-chen-So-nam-drak-ba's General Meaning of (Maitreya's)
'Ornament for Clear Realization'
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way
Like the two truths, the four noble truths—true sufferings, origins of suffering, cessations, and paths—are objects and not
concepts of truth, beauty, and so forth.177 Unlike the two truths,
however, the four noble truths do not include all objects; absent
are permanent phenomena, such as spaces and non-analytical
cessations, as well as impermanent phenomena such as a Buddha's
Enjoyment and Form Bodies or an ordinary being's body in a
pure land.
The first truth is true sufferings, which are the mental and physical aggregates produced by contaminated actions and afflictions. They include all instances of mind and body of ordinary
beings except those generated by pure wishes, meditation, and
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Meditation on Emptiness
so forth. Even the environments shared by beings in the various
cyclic existences are true sufferings because they are created
from potencies established by contaminated actions and afflictions. However, the body of an ordinary being born in a pure
land is not a true suffering because it is not created by contaminated actions and afflictions but by pure wishes for rebirth in a
pure land. A common being's consciousness inferentially realizing impermanence or emptiness is also not a true suffering
because it arises from cultivation of the path and is born from
meditation, not from the afflictions. Still, a common being's
inferential cognizer of emptiness is said to be 'contaminated'
(sasrava, zag bcas) because it is polluted with dualistic
perception in the sense that its object, emptiness, appears to be
inherently existent though it is not being conceived as inherently
existent.
Of the two types of true sufferings, internal and external,
internal true sufferings are 'cyclic existences' (samsara, 'khor ba)
and are included within the three types of suffering. The first is
the suffering of misery, or all feelings of physical and mental
pain. The second is the suffering of change, or all feelings of
pleasure which are contaminated with the misconception of
inherent existence. For example, just as the warmth of the sun is
pleasant on a cool day but is a source of pain if one stays too long
in it, all the pleasures of cyclic existence, if over-extended,
become sources of suffering. Furthermore, even if one enjoys
the pleasures of cyclic existence in measure, these still are sufferings of change because they are suitable to create suffering if
overused. If such were inherently pleasurable, long-term usage
would increase the pleasure; however, suffering is eventually
induced. Thus, the need for moderation is a sign of their not
naturally being pleasurable.
Discouragement with the suffering of misery and of change is
not sufficient to induce a fully qualified aspiration for liberation.
The third type of suffering, that of composition, is the root and
pervader of the other two, and discouragement with it must be
sought with particular emphasis. The suffering of composition
means simply to be under the outside influence of contaminated
The Four Noble Truths
287
actions and afflictions such that one is ready to suffer pain upon
the aggregation of minor causes. The main conditions are always
present—when one is in cyclic existence—to undergo considerable suffering upon the sudden aggregation of the remaining
causes, such as a change in the environment. Thus, even though
one might not have manifest feelings of pain, one is still subject
to suffering upon meeting with minor causes. This type of suffering is called 'pervasive' because no matter how one searches
among the ordinary body and mind, every instance of it is miserable, either manifestly painful or capable of inducing suffering.
It is called 'compositional' because it induces suffering in the
future. As Gon-chok-den-bay-dron-may says:178
Though a prisoner certain to be executed is not punished
physically, there is no opportunity for pleasure in his
inner mind which realizes the daily approach of death.
Similarly, a person carrying a burden, even when resting, does not take much pleasure until reaching the destination.
In this way, a yogi develops discrimination of the phenomena of
cyclic existence as unfavorable, like executioners raising swords,
and the wish to leave cyclic existence arises. Thereupon, by
inferring the plight of others based on one's own, compassion
wishing to protect others arises without difficulty. This is the
special purpose of Buddha's setting forth true sufferings first.
The second of the four truths is true origins, the sources of suffering—the afflictions and actions contaminated with the afflictions. Here 'afflictions' specifically are the first member of
dependent-arising—ignorance—and the other afflictions that are
produced based on ignorance, the remaining five root afflictions
and the twenty secondary afflictions (see p.255-66). Actions, as
the other source of suffering, refer to the second member of
dependent-arising—the meritorious, non-meritorious, and nonmoving actions motivated by ignorance that impel rebirth respectively in happy migrations as humans or gods, in bad migrations as hell-beings, hungry ghosts, or animals, or in the Form
288
Meditation on Emptiness
and Formless Realms. Afflictions and actions are the causes of
suffering even though in general they themselves are true sufferings because they are what give rise to true sufferings. Like illnesses, true sufferings are to be identified, and like the causes of
illness, true origins are to be abandoned.
The third of the four truths is true cessations, the extinguishment
of true sufferings and origins. These are the individually enumerated cessations that are states of having abandoned obstructions and correspond to the uninterrupted paths causing their
attainment. By stages one attains complete deliverance from the
various levels of afflictions such that they will never return, culminating in the attainment of nirvana, the emptiness of the mind
in the continuum of one who has abandoned all afflictions whatsoever.
The chief affliction is ignorance, and its chieftype is the conception of inherent existence. Therefore, anyone who has attained
nirvana, even if he has not attained Buddhahood, has completely
destroyed the conception of inherent existence. Foe Destroyers
(Arhan, dGra bcompa) are those who have destroyed (han, bcom)
their enemy (ari, dgra), the afflictions. All Foe Destroyers—
whether Hearers, Solitary Realizers, or Buddhas—have attained
a nirvana that is an utter cessation of the afflictions.
Even though true cessations, the ultimate of which are nirvanas, are attained in dependence on a path that eradicates the
afflictions, they are said to be permanent phenomena in the
sense that since they do not change moment by moment, they
are non-disintegrating. However, the true cessations in the continuum of a yogi come into being upon his attainment of the
various levels of the paths; thus, there are debates about whether
or not true cessations and nirvanas are impermanent phenomena.
The answer given is that a true cessation is not an act of cessation
but an emptiness of the mind in the continuum of one who has
utterly and forever removed at least some portion of the afflictions.
All true cessations are emptinesses and thus permanent, but all
emptinesses are not true cessations as is the case with the emptiness of inherent existence of the body. Emptinesses, except for
The Four Noble Truths
289
those of the mind in the continuum of persons who have overcome
afflictions, are not any of the four noble truths.
The fourth noble truth is true paths, which are the means of
attaining true cessations. Just as a state of health is to be attained
by the sick and the medicines to attain that state are to be relied
upon, so true cessations are to be realized and true paths are to be
relied upon. Except for vows which are non-revelatory forms, all
true paths are consciousnesses, called paths because they are factors which, through being generated in the mental continuum,
take one to liberation from cyclic existence. Here, there are eight
paths:179
1 correct view—the opposite of the view of the transitory collection of mind and body as real I and mine, the opposite of the
permanent and annihilistic views of the self and the aggregates, the opposite of perverse views such as asserting the
absence of cause and effect, the opposite of views conceiving
bad ethics and bad disciplines to be superior, and so forth.
Thus, a correct view is not necessarily just a consciousness
cognizing emptiness though such is included in the term.
2 correct realization—especially the consciousnesses which
subtly analyze emptiness
3 correct speech—the vows and so forth which are the contraries of wrong livelihood and so forth
4 correct aims of actions—the actions of body and speech in
dependence on vows
5 correct livelihood—the abandonment of wrong modes of livelihood, such as butchering animals
6 correct effort—the mental factor of effort that causes gradual
progress on the path
7 correct mindfulness—constant attentiveness to objects of
awareness and to modes of perception of those objects necessary for ascending the paths
8 correct meditative stabilization—the meditative ability to
remain one-pointedly on the objects of the paths.
The four noble truths are called 'noble' (arya) because they are
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Meditation on Emptiness
taught by Nobles or Superiors (Aryan, 'Phags pa) or because
they are ennobling.180 They are called truths (satya, bden pa)
because through meditation on them one unmistakenly enters
into the paths of liberation and omniscience. Because the teachings that sufferings and their origins are to be abandoned and
that cessations and the paths that actualize them are to be adopted are true and thus do not deceive disciples into cultivating false
paths, they are truths. However, unlike ultimate truths they do
not necessarily exist the way they appear, because except for true
cessations, they are falsities in the sense that true sufferings, for
instance, appear in direct perception to exist inherently but do
not. Therefore, the four noble truths are not just truths for
Nobles or Superiors because, if they were, they would have to be
truths for the special cognizers of Superiors—their direct perceivers of suchness—whereas when emptiness is directly
perceived, conventional truths such as true sufferings do not in
any way appear to the mind. Thus, the Prasangikas say that the
four noble truths are truths for conventional valid cognizers. For
the Vaibhashikas, however, they are truths just for Nobles
(Superiors) because they are perceived directly by a Superior's
wisdom of meditative equipoise.
Buddha set forth the four noble truths—true sufferings, origins, cessations, and paths—in the order not of their causation but
of their realization. In causal order, true origins—afflictions and
actions contaminated with the afflictions—give rise to true sufferings—the phenomena included within the scope of the contaminated mental and physical aggregates—while true paths,
such as the realization of emptiness, cause the attainment of true
cessations—the state of being freed forever from a certain portion of the afflictions and their consequent sufferings. However,
in his presentation of the four noble truths Buddha put the
effects before the causes to indicate their application in practical
realization.
When one recognizes sufferings as like an illness, one understands that one must become free from them. Then, seeing that
abandoning sufferings depends on overcoming their origins, one
The Four Noble Truths
291
generates a wish to abandon these. Having identified the origins
of suffering as the afflictions, the chief of which is the ignorance
conceiving inherent existence, one realizes that since the conception of inherent existence is baseless, the causes of suffering can
be abandoned whereby a wish to actualize cessation is generated.
Having seen that sufferings and their origins must and can be
abandoned, one engages in the means for abandoning them, true
paths. This is said to be the general procedure of intelligent persons and an unparalleled quintessential instruction not just for
initial realization but also for initially training the mind. As Gonchok-den-bay-dron-may says:181
When we analyze our own mental continuum carefully,
we see that beyond a mere verbal image of it, it is
extremely difficult to develop an aspiration to liberation
from the depths of the heart; rather, we are naturally
involved in the causes of suffering—contaminated
actions and afflictions. This is because beginninglessly
we have mistaken a mind which is under the influence of
the afflictions, and thus actually a suffering, to be happiness. For example, when certain types of hidden heat
disorders are mistaken to be cold disorders, the antidotes
to heat disorders are not taken and one intentionally
seeks the diet, behavior, and so forth increasing the heat
disorder. Just as to overcome the heat disorder, it is absolutely essential to identify it, so if one does not recognize
that which has a nature of suffering as suffering and turn
away from it from the depths, there is no way to be led
upward through annihilating the root of suffering. In
this condition, though one pretended to seek liberation,
one would proceed only to error, conceiving some low
contaminated state to be it; thus, an actual wish for liberation would not occur. As Aryadeva's Four Hundred
says:
How could one who is not discouraged
About this aspire to its pacification?
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Meditation on Emptiness
M E D I T A T I O N ON T H E FOUR NOBLE T R U T H S
The four noble truths are objects of extensive meditation, with
each truth having four attributes, making a total of sixteen attributes.
1
True sufferings
i Impermanence. The meditation centers on the thought:
The contaminated mental and physical aggregates are
impermanent because of being produced occasionally
(not existing forever).
The impermanence of true sufferings is their momentary disintegration, which is a fault arising from the afflictions and actions
contaminated with the afflictions. However, the impermanence
of a Buddha's omniscient consciousness is an advantage of this
consciousness and arises from the force of the completion of the
accumulations of wisdom and merit. Unlike a Buddha's omniscient consciousness which, though impermanent, continuously
remains of the same type, true sufferings change in the process
of disintegration, gradually leading one to lower rebirths. Meditation on the impermanence of true sufferings overcomes
viewing them as permanent.
ii Misery. The meditation centers on the thought:
The contaminated mental and physical aggregates are
miserable because of being under the outside influence
of contaminated actions and afflictions.
True sufferings are miserable because they are not independent
phenomena but under the outside influence of former afflictions
and actions contaminated with the afflictions. The experience of
ordinary beings confirms the misery of birth, aging, sickness, and
death whereas realization of the suffering ofbeing under an outside influence requires long analysis. Meditation on the misery of
true sufferings counters viewing them as pure and pleasurable.
iii Emptiness. The meditation centers on the thought:
The Four Noble Truths
293
The contaminated mental and physical aggregates are
empty because of being devoid of a supervisory self that
is a different entity from them.
True sufferings are empty of being a permanent, single, independent self. The permanent is the non-disintegrating; the
single is the partless; and the independent is what does not
depend on others for its existence. That true sufferings are
empty of being a permanent, single, independent self or of being
objects of use of such a self is their emptiness. Meditation on the
emptiness of true sufferings overcomes viewing them as a self.
iv Selflessness. The meditation centers on the thought:
The contaminated mental and physical aggregates are
selfless because of not existing as an independent self,
but being under the influence of many other impermanent factors.
True sufferings are empty of being a self-sufficient person. A
self-sufficient person would be a controller of the mental and
physical aggregates, like a master over his servants. That true
sufferings are empty of being such a self-sufficient person or
objects of its use is their selflessness. Meditation on this .counters
the view of true sufferings as a self-sufficient person or as the
objects of use of such a person.
2
True origins
i Cause. The meditation centers on the thought:
Contaminated actions and attachment are causes
because of being the roots of suffering.
Meditation on these as causes counters the notion that suffering
is causeless, as is asserted by the Hedonists (Charvaka, Tshu rol
mdzes pa).
ii Origin. The meditation centers on the thought:
Contaminated actions and attachment are origins
because they again and again produce suffering in all its
forms.
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Meditation on Emptiness
Meditation on these as origins counters the notion that suffering
is caused by just one cause, such as permanent time as is asserted
by the Dipakas.
iii Strong production.
thought:
The
meditation
centers
on
the
Contaminated actions and attachment are strong producers because they produce suffering with great force.
Meditation on true origins as strong producers counters the
notion that the nature of things is permanent but their states
changeable, as is asserted by the Vaidakas and the Samkhyas.
iv Condition. The meditation centers on the thought:
Contaminated actions and attachment are conditions
because attachment to cyclic existence acts as a cooperative condition for suffering.
Meditation on true origins as conditions counters the notion that
suffering is created under the supervision of a deity, as is asserted
by the Naiyayikas and Vaisheshikas.
3
True cessations
i Cessation. The meditation centers on the thought:
A separation which is a total extinguishment of a suffering by its antidote is a cessation because of being a state
of having abandoned that suffering.
Meditation on true cessations as cessations counters the view
that there is no liberation from cyclic existence, as is asserted by
the Hedonists.
ii Pacification. The meditation centers on the thought:
A separation which is a total extinguishment of a suffering by its antidote is a pacification because of being a
state of having abandoned an affliction.
Meditation on true cessations as pacifications of contaminations
counters notions conceiving contaminated states to be liberation
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295
as is the case with the Jaina assertion of a place of liberation on
top of the worlds that is like an upside-down white umbrella.
iii Auspicious highness.
thought:
The meditation centers on the
A separation which is a total extinguishment of a suffering by its antidote is auspiciously high because of being a
liberation other than which there is no superior source
of help and happiness.
Meditation on true cessations as auspiciously high counters the
notion that there is a liberation superior to the cessation of suffering, as is the case with the Samkhya assertion of the liberated
self as high liberation.
iv Definite emergence. The meditation centers on the thought:
A separation which is a total extinguishment of a suffering by its antidote is a definite emergence because of
being a liberation from that suffering such that it will
never return.
Meditation on true cessations as definite emergences from suffering counters the notion that liberation, once attained, is
reversible.
4
True paths
i Path. The meditation centers on the thought:
The wisdom directly cognizing selflessness is a path
because it causes one to proceed to liberation.
Meditation on this as a path counters the notion that there are no
paths of liberation from cyclic existence.
ii Suitability. The meditation centers on the thought:
The wisdom directly cognizing selflessness is suitable
because of being the antidote to ignorance.
Meditation on the wisdom realizing selflessness as suitable counters the notion that it is not a path of liberation.
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Meditation on Emptiness
iii Achievement. The meditation centers on the thought:
The wisdom directly cognizing selflessness is an achiever
because it realizes the nature of the mind unmistakenly.
Meditation on this wisdom as an achiever counters the notion
that such paths as worldly concentrations, receiving initiation in
a mandala of Ishvara, or undergoing the asceticism of the five
fires (one each on the four sides and the sun above as in Jainism)
are paths of liberation.
iv Deliverance. The meditation centers on the thought:
The wisdom directly cognizing selflessness is a deliverer
because it unquestionably causes one to pass to a state of
irreversible liberation, extinguishing sufferings and
afflictions completely.
Meditation on wisdom as a deliverer counters the notion that
there is no total eradicator of suffering.
COARSE AND SUBTLE SELFLESSNESS
The Vaibhashika sub-schools, except for the five schools advocating a self, say that through direct cognition of the four noble
truths and their sixteen attributes Hearers, Solitary Realizers,
and Bodhisattvas reach their respective paths of seeing. Through
continuously meditating on them during the path of meditation,
they also reach their goals, the states of Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Buddha Foe Destroyers. Dharmakifti says that the
purpose of the first two attributes of true sufferings is to help in
the realization of the last two attributes, emptiness and selflessness.182 Thus, the Sautrantikas Following Reasoning say that
paths of seeing and the state of Foe Destroyer are attained through
direct cognition of the mental and physical aggregates that lack
being a self-sufficient person or lack being the objects of use of
self-sufficient persons.
Among the Mahayana schools, the Chittamatrins and Sautrantika-Svatantrika-Madhyamikas say that Hearers and Solitary
Realizers take the emptiness that is a person's lack of being
The Four Noble Truths
297
self-sufficient as their main object of meditation (see Chart 36).183
The Yogachara-Svatantrika-Madhyamikas say that only Hearers
take the emptiness of a self-sufficient person as their main object
of meditation; Solitary Realizers take the emptiness that is the
non-existence of subject and object as different entities as their
main object of meditation.
The non-Prasangika schools agree that the conception of the
person as a self-sufficient entity and the poisons that arise from it
are the afflictive obstructions. They are the afflictions obstructing one from liberation from cyclic existence (kleshavarana, nyon
sgrib). All these schools agree that through eradication ofthe afflictive obstructions, Hearers attain the state of Foe Destroyer.
Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, Chittamatra, and SautrantikaSvatantrika add that Solitary Realizers have the same principal
object of meditation, with Vaibhashika and Sautrantika also
saying that it is the same for Bodhisattvas.
The Chittamatrins say that Bodhisattvas principally meditate
on a non-difference in entity of subject and object, whereas the
Svatantrikas say that Bodhisattvas principally meditate on an
absence of true existence. These two schools thereby propound
that Bodhisattvas rid themselves of subtler obstructions than do
Hearers and Solitary Realizers. They remove the obstructions to
simultaneous cognition of all phenomena (jneyavarana, shes
bya'i sgrib pa). For Chittamatrins and Svatantrikas, though
Hearers and Solitary Realizers do not meditate on the final nature
of things, their meditation, despite its coarseness, is still capable of
destroying the bonds to cyclic existence.
The Prasangikas disagree; they say that the conception of a
self-sufficient person is only a coarse afflictive obstruction and
that no one can attain liberation from cyclic existence through
eradicating it. However, meditation on the emptiness of a selfsufficient person is indeed helpful for eventual abandonment of
the subtle afflictive obstruction, the conception that phenomena
truly exist (see Charts 37, 38, and 39). The Prasangikas do not
separate out one type from among the coarse and subtle emptinesses as the main object of meditation for Hearers and Solitary
Realizers and another for Bodhisattvas. For Prasangika, beings
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Meditation on Emptiness
on all three types of paths realize the same emptiness, the lack of
inherent existence of all phenomena. The conception that phenomena inherently exist obstructs beings from liberation from
cyclic existence; without realizing that all phenomena—both
persons and other phenomena—do not inherently, truly, or
objectively exist, conquest of cyclic existence is impossible.
The destruction of the afflictive obstructions is simultaneous
with the attainment of the state of Foe Destroyer for both Hearers and Solitary Realizers and is simultaneous with the attainment of the eighth ground for Bodhisattvas. On the eighth,
ninth, and tenth grounds Bodhisattvas proceed to destroy the
obstructions that prevent simultaneous cognition of all phenomena. Being eighth-grounders or above, they have destroyed the
conception that phenomena inherently exist, but due to previous
conditioning phenomena still appear as if inherently existent;
nevertheless, they know that these appearances are false just as a
magician knows that his creations are false, no matter how vividly
the illusion may appear. Finally, through the eradication of the
appearance of inherent existence, an omniscient consciousness
of Buddhahood is attained, and one is able for the first time to
perceive objects through the senses with no trace of false appearance. One is then able to cognize simultaneously and directly the
emptinesses of all phenomena and all phenomena themselves.
A selflessness is an emptiness, to be viewed as a predicate or
quality of existent persons and phenomena. These predicates
vary from the coarse—or easier to realize—to the subtle—or
more difficult to realize. It is said that the non-existence of a
permanent, single, independent person is easy to realize through
such reasons as the impossibility of a permanent being's taking
rebirth since the permanent can never change.
In the Prasangika system the emptiness of a self-sufficient
person is not the final mode of existence of the person, and thus
one cannot be liberated from cyclic existence through realization
of and meditation on it. Cognition of the person as empty of such
a self will not even cause one to ascend to the path of preparation
of a Hearer. For, Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas
all attain special insight into the emptiness of inherent existence
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303
simultaneously with their attainment of the path of preparation.
Still, the realization of the emptiness of a self-sufficient person is
a stepping-stone to realization of the emptiness of inherent existence. If one is incapable of understanding the coarse emptiness,
one will certainly not be capable of cognizing the subtle; therefore, it is important that the coarse selflessness be identified as
well.
A 'self-sufficient' (Tib. rang rkya ba) person is a 'substantially
existent' (dravyasat, rdzasyod) person.184 In general, both terms
refer to an object than can appear to the mind without depending
on the appearance of other objects; thus, the opposite of 'substantially existent' is 'imputedly existent' (prajnaptisat, btags
yod). Here in the coarse selflessness, 'imputedly existent' is identified as eliminating the possibility that the person is an entity
independent of the aggregates of mind and body. All Buddhist
schools, except Prasangika and the Vaibhashika sub-schools that
advocate a self, say that a person is 'imputedly existent' in the
sense of not being a separate entity from the mental and physical
aggregates. However, these schools propound that the person is
either the composite of these aggregates, or one of them, or their
continuum, or the continuum of one of them. For Prasangika,
however, this is incorrect; a person is neither separate from the
mental and physical aggregates, nor the mental and physical
aggregates themselves; rather, a person is merely imputed in
dependence upon the aggregates. The imputedly existent person of the other schools is considered by the Prasangikas to be
substantially existent because the latter say that the meaning
of 'substantially existent' is to be findable separate from or
among the bases of imputation of the object.
Here in the four noble truths in the realization that a person is
not self-sufficient, the meaning of'only imputed' is not so subtle;
the term merely indicates that a person depends on his mental
and physical aggregates. Opposite to this, many mistaken systems teach that a person has a character separate from that of his
aggregates; they view a person as like a herder or a lord and the
mental and physical aggregates as his herd or subjects. 18 ' For
the non-Prasangika schools of Buddhist tenets, this view of a
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Meditation on Emptiness
self-sufficient person exists innately in ordinary beings, but for
Prasafigika it is only a product of false teachings. The Prasahgikas say that the innate sense of a self-sufficient person is the
person's appearing to be like a head salesman and his aggregates
appearing to be like salesmen. The head salesman, unlike the relationship between a shepherd and his flock, is not separate from the
category 'salesman', but he is the boss of the other salesmen. Similarly, though a person is of the nature ofthe aggregates, he appears
to be the controller of them; the aggregates, like salesmen, appear
to depend on the person who, like a head salesman, appears not to
depend on the aggregates. In fact, the person depends on the
aggregates; however, when one thinks, 'My body', it seems that
first there must be an I and then a body which is owned or controlled. This is the way that a self-sufficient person appears.
When the dependent nature of the person is reflected upon in
meditation and when it is seen that the person is nothing separate from the aggregates, one can withdraw from desires and so
forth that are entered into for the sake of such a person. One can
then reflect on phenomena other than persons, such as mind and
body or external possessions, as not being objects of use and
enjoyment by a self-sufficient person. Such meditation is powerful and serves to advance one to the point ofbeing a fit vessel for
the doctrine that persons and other phenomena do not inherently exist. Through being taught non-self-sufficiency, a meditator is led into seeing the dependent nature of the person and is
thereby drawn into probing the significance of dependence, the
very sign of non-inherent existence.
Part Four
Systems
1 Self
Source
Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
T H E ASSERTION OF SELF
The non-Buddhist systems assert the existence of a substantially
existent self based on scripture and counterfeit reasoning.186 The
scriptures are those transmitted from one to another, setting
forth the existence of a personal self. The reasonings are:
,A self exists because without prior consideration, when
phenomena such as the shape of a face are seen, the
thought of the presence of a person is generated, not just
the thought of the presence of a shape.
A self exists because without prior consideration, when
enjoyment preponderantly of pleasurable feelings is perceived, the thought of the presence of a high person is
generated, not just of feeling. When enjoyment preponderantly of painful feelings is perceived, the thought of
the presence of a low person is generated, not just of feeling.
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Meditation on Emptiness
When the name 'Devadatta' is designated, one thinks of
a person, not just of a discrimination of the name.
When engagement in afflictions—such as desire—or virtues—such as faith—are perceived, the thought of the
presence of a childish person or a wise person is generated, not just of engagement.
When the mind understands its objects through the eyes
and so forth, one does not just think that the mind sees
but that 'I see.' This shows that there is a sentient being,
or I separate from the mind.
If there were no self separate from the mental and physical aggregates, one would not think, 'I have seen a
form,' or '1 will see a form,' but would only think of the
aggregates as engaging in activities. However, this is not
the case; one must definitely think of the self prior to
engagement in activities.
B U D D H I S T R E F U T A T I O N OF SELF
Since those seeking liberation must completely refute the referent object of the view of the transitory collection as a real I and
must assert a mere I or mere person, they must become skilled in
the ways of refutation and proof through reasoning. Otherwise,
falling to the extreme either of asserting no I at all or of affirming
a substantially existent I, all their efforts will be senseless. Since
the mere person is not to be refuted, a person as qualified by a
certain attribute is. This is called a true (*satyaka, bden pa),
ultimate (paramartha, don dam), or substantially existent
(dravyasat, rdzas yod) person.
In short, the person is conceived to exist substantially whereas
it only exists imputedly (prajnaptisat, btags yod). Here, an
imputedly existent object is a phenomenon, such as a forest or
army, which when it appears as an object of the mind must
depend on the appearance of some other basis which has a character different from it, such as trees or soldiers. However, the
Self
309
substantially existent appears under its own power without
depending on such—for instance, a tree or soldier. This explanation of 'substantial existence' comes from the lower systems
because in the Prasangika system nothing substantially exists
since the appearance of any phenomenon must depend on the
appearance of its basis of imputation, which is not itself.
1 Refuting the reasoning that the person substantially exists
because it is observed that when phenomena such as the shape of a
face are seen, the thought of the presence of a person is generated
without prior consideration
Are phenomena, such as the shape of a face and so forth, perceived and the thought of a sentient being generated with respect
to them, or is something else perceived and the thought of a sentient being generated with respect to it? If the former, then that
thought is erroneous because it conceives such to be a sentient
being whereas a sentient being is other than the shape of a face
and so forth. If the latter, one has let fall the position that the
thought of a sentient being is generated only from perceiving
such phenomena.
Does that base which, when perceived, generates the thought
of a sentient being have the nature of a sentient being or not? If
the former, then that thought is erroneous because the sentient
being appears to be self-sufficient in the sense of having a character different from that of the mind and body. If the latter, then
one would have to assert that even a pot could serve as a cause
generating the thought of woolen cloth.
Do you accept that the thought of a sentient being can be
generated with respect to what is not a sentient being or not? If
not, it is manifestly contradicted by the experience of generating
the thought of a human to a pile of stones seen in the distance. If,
however, the thought of a sentient being can be generated with
respect to what is not a sentient being, then the basic assertion
that the thought of a sentient being understands its object just as
it is is indefinite.
Do you accept that the thought of non-sentient being can be
generated with respect to a sentient being? Do you accept that
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Meditation on Emptiness
the thought of a certain sentient being can be generated with
respect to another sentient being?
When the aggregates are perceived, is the base that generates
the thought of a sentient being manifest or hidden? If manifest,
then the aggregates would be the sentient being because another
phenomenon not included among them is not manifestly perceived. If hidden or obscure, then a small untrained child would
not generate a thought of a sentient being.
2 Refuting that the person substantially exists just because it is
observed that one engages in activities having first thought, 'I will
murder,' or 'I will forsake murder'
Do these activities arise from mental causes or from the cause of
the self? If the former, then one has let fall the position that these
are activities of a substantially existent person. If the latter, then
it contradicts the position that these activities are preceded by
thought.
Is the cause of the activities permanent or impermanent? If
permanent, then it could not act. If impermanent, then these
could not be the activities of a permanent self.
Does the sentient being who is the agent have a nature of exertion or non-exertion? If the former, then the self could not be
permanent. If the latter, it would be contradictory to say that the
non-exerting exerts.
Do the activities of a sentient being have causes or not? If not,
then the activities would always be performed. If caused, then
since they would be preceded by other causes, they would not be
the independent activities of a self.
Are activities performed under one's own power or under the
influence of the other? If the former, then the sufferings of birth,
aging, sickness, death, and so forth would never be experienced
because what one experienced would be in one's own power. If the
latter, then it would not be suitable for these to be the activities of
the self because the self is asserted to be under its own power.
3 Imputation of the self to the aggregates
If the person is imputed to the mental and physical aggregates,
Self
311
then it could not be a self-sufficient entity different from the
aggregates.
If the person abides in the aggregates like a pile of grain in a
mandala, is the person permanent or impermanent? If permanent, then it could not be helped or harmed by pleasure and
pain; hence, it would not accumulate virtuous and non-virtuous
actions (karma las) and thus would not assume a body, in which
case there would be no sense in asserting it as a person. If impermanent, then something that is other than the aggregates and is
produced and disintegrates would have to be observed, but it is
not.
If the person is other than the aggregates (which include all
products) like sticks set side by side, then since the person would
be a non-product, it would be senseless to assert it.
If the aggregates do not exist at all, then since there could be
no relation with fetters, one would be liberated effortlessly.
4 Positing the character of the person
If a person separate from the aggregates exists, does it have the
nature of being the viewer of forms and so forth or not? If it does,
is it imputed to the eye consciousness and so forth or is it another
object altogether? If the former, then it could not be substantially existent.
If the self is the viewer of forms and so forth but is other than
the eye consciousness, then it would be either the object or the
instrument of viewing. If it is the object, then it would be the
basis of the activity of viewing. This could be in the sense of, like
a seed, newly producing its own similar type in the next moment,
but then the viewer would be impermanent, not permanent as is
asserted. Or, this could be in the sense of transformation, like a
potter or a human with magical powers, but then it would be
impermanent and conventional. If just as a magician emanates
illusions under his own power, so the self is under its own
power, then the viewer would not undergo any suffering. The
self might be conceived as the basis of the activity of viewing in
the same way as the earth serves as the basis of and destroys the
moving (sentient beings) and non-moving (the environment),
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Meditation on Emptiness
but this is not observed in the self. Or, the self could be the basis
of activity, like space, in the sense that one can stretch out and
contract one's limbs in space which is non-obstructive, but this
also is not observed in the self. Furthermore, if just as space is
posited to a mere elimination of obstructive contact, so the
viewer is posited to a mere elimination of its object of negation,
then the self could not appear to the mind under its own power
because it would be a mere absence.
If the viewer is the instrument of viewing, then like a sickle, its
engaging in activity would definitely depend on an agent in
which case it would be dual-natured, being both that which
engages the object (as the instrument) and that which is engaged
in the object (as the object upon which the agent acts). If, like a
fire, it sometimes engages its objects under its own power without an agent (as in spontaneous combustion), then it would be
senseless to assert the existence of the person in fear of the lack of
an agent.
If the person does not have the nature of being the viewer of
forms and so forth, then it is senseless to assert a person that does
not have any valid cognition.
5 Positing the self as afflicted and purified
Does the self have the character of being afflicted and purified,
or is it other than these? If it does, then it would be unreasonable
to assert a person separate from the aggregates because food,
clothing, and so forth help the self, imbalance of the elements
and so forth harm it, and afflictions are perceived only in the
aggregates, not in anything else. If the self does not have the
character of the afflicted and the purified, then it could not be
afflicted and purified.
6 Positing the self as engaging and disengaging
Does a person who has the character of engagement and disengagement engage and disengage or does a person who does not
have the character of engagement and disengagement do such? If
the former, then a person separate from the aggregates could not
exist because the activity of engagement is observed only in the
Self
313
phenomena of the aggregates. There is (1) engagement by way of
having causes, like the body from its causes of semen, blood, and
so forth, (2) engagement by way of having a nature of production, like a sprout, (3) engagement by way of having a nature of
disintegration, like the gradual descent of a waterfall, (4) engagement from the one to the other like the connection of a flame to
its next moment of similar type, and (5) engagement of transformation—having done one activity, engaging in another—like
mounting a mount and thereby changing one's situation. All of
these are observed only in the aggregates.
If a person who does not have the character of engagement and
disengagement engages and disengages, then the self would not
become engaged, because of not having the character of engagement. Since disengagement depends on a previous engagement,
it is impossible when engagement is impossible.
7 Positing the self as the experiencer, agent, and liberator
Is something that is affected by pleasure and pain which are
generated by objects asserted as the experiencer or is one who is
not? One who is not affected by pleasure and pain could not be
the experiencer since something that is helped or harmed from
enjoying objects of experience is the meaning of an experiencer.
If something that is affected by pleasure and pain generated by
objects is the experiencer, then it is senseless to say that the self
substantially exists because the state of being affected is perceived only in impermanent products.
Is something that is affected by the mind asserted as the agent,
or is something that is not? As above, being affected is perceived
only in impermanent products. Something that is not affected by
the mind is not an agent because 'agent' means something that is
affected by the mind.
Is something that is affected by the root and secondary afflictions asserted as the self that is liberated or is something that is
not? As above, being affected is observed only in impermanent products. Something that is not affected by the afflictions
could not be liberated because of not having been formerly
bound.
314
8
Meditation on Emptiness
Positing the self as the instrument
Is agentship posited only to the self or can it also be posited to
others? If only the self, then it would not be suitable to say 'The
light of burning fire illuminates the area,' indicating an agent
other than the self. If others can be posited as agents, then it
would be allowable to designate the self as the agent in seeing,
hearing, and so forth, but there would be no point in asserting a
substantially existent self.
9 Positing the self as what is expressed by 'person'
Is the verbal convention 'person' used only for the self or also for
others? If only the self, then it would be wrong for one, having
observed only the body of a being, to use the verbal convention
of his name with respect to it. If'person' can be used for other
things than the self, it could also be used for the viewer of forms
and so forth. Though such would be allowable, it would be
pointless to assert a further self.
10 Positing the view of self
It is not feasible for the view of self to be virtuous because it is
especially produced in the obscured, is generated without application of effort, generates fear with respect to liberation, and is
seen to nourish faults such as desire. Being non-virtuous, the
view of a self is erroneous and mistaken with respect to its referent object, in which case one cannot prove the existence of self
through citing the existence of the view of self. Furthermore, it
is not feasible for the view of selflessness to be non-virtuous
because the Omniscient Buddha spoke highly of it and because it
must be achieved with great effort, does not generate fear with
respect to liberation, causes the speedy attainment of auspicious
fruits, and acts as the antidote of faults.
Is it that a substantially existent self abides as an objective reality
and thus through its power the view ofselfis generated, or is it that
whereas the person lacks substantial existence, the existence of a
substantially existent selfis superimposed through the power of
conditioning to improper thought? If the former, then it would
follow that Buddhists could not generate ascertainment of
Self
315
selflessness because this view of self, which would be produced
by the power of the thing itself, would prevent it. If the latter,
then it cannot be proved that a substantially existent self exists
by way of citing the existence of the view of self.
In brief, a person which is not imputed in dependence upon the
collection, continuum, and so forth of the mental and physical
aggregates does not inherently exist because of not being established as one nature with or a different nature from the aggregates. However, the opposite, the substantial existence of the
self, is believed due to the assumption that the self exists validly
as it appears to the innate false view of the transitory collection as
a real I. To such an innate false view the self only appears to be a
different object from the aggregates, for one seeks to leave these
aggregates and gain others that are better than these but does not
wish to leave the self.
When the substantial existence of the person is refuted, one
understands implicitly that the person only imputedly exists. A
mere person must be asserted on the positive side, and mere
imputation is to be realized through the implicit force of refuting
substantial existence. Thus, although self (atman, bdag) and
person (pudgala, gang zag) are in general synonyms, they are not
synonyms in the expression 'selflessness of the person'; in this
context, the term 'self refers to substantial existence (dravyasat,
rdzas yod), whereas the term 'person' refers to the nominally
existent sentient being imputed to the mental and physical
aggregates. Though some Buddhist Vaibhashika systems (exemplified by some modern-day Theravadins) assert that there is no
agent, only action, Dzong-ka-ba says187 that they are mistakenly
opposing worldly conventionalities. The fact that a substantially
existent agent cannot be found does not mean that person or
agent do not exist at all; they exist imputedly and effectively.
Bhavaviveka
2 Non-Buddhist Systems
Sources
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
The Buddhist tenet systems are differentiated from the nonBuddhist in that their teacher—Buddha—has extinguished all
faults, attained all auspicious attributes, and taught from his own
insight the profound doctrine of dependent-arising.188 Their
teaching harms neither themselves nor others, and their view is
the assertion of the non-existence of a permanent, single, independent self.
Non-Buddhist teachers, teachings, and views are just the
opposite; their teachers have not extinguished all faults, their
teachings harm some sentient beings, and their view is of a permanent, single, independent self. This is not to say that their
teachers do not have some auspicious attributes, or that all of
their teachings harm, or that all of their views are wrong. Rather,
their teachers do not have the perfection of a Buddha; within
their teachings there is at least one that harms a sentient being,
and they have a wrong view on the status of the self. Even the
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Meditation on Emptiness
Jainas, who cultivate not harming others, harm themselves in
extreme asceticism and thereby also harm the organisms that
live in their bodies. Also, even the Nihilists claim that the
self is permanent or unchanging during its existence, however
short.
It is necessary to take into account the meaning and not just
terminology in dividing the Indian systems into Buddhist and
non-Buddhist, for Buddhists are not the only ones to use the
terms 'emptiness' and 'selflessness'. The Vaishnavas and Aishvaras assert an emptiness which for them is merely the vacuity
resulting from destruction at the end of a great eon. Also, the
native Tibetan Bön religion asserts a selflessness which for them
is a permanent truly existent essence.
Non-Buddhist Indian systems of tenets are almost innumerable; however, twenty-five are mentioned by Avalokitavrata,
Dzong-ka-ba, and Dzong-ka-ba's disciple Kay-drup as having
split off from Samkhya.189 Jam-yang-shay-ba selects twelve for
his discussion of non-Buddhist systems due to their being
explained clearly in texts surviving in Tibet. From the Buddhist
point of view, eleven of these are assertions of an extreme of permanence, that is, they assert as existent what is non-existent.
The remaining one is an assertion of an extreme of annihilation,
that is, they assert as non-existent what is existent.
The eleven schools adhering to a view of permanence are:
1 Samkhyas and Kapilas (Enumerators and Followers of
Kapila)
2 Brahmanas (Followers of Brahma)
3 Vyakaranas (Grammarians)
4 Vedantins (Adherents to the Finality of the Vedas)
5 Guhyakas (Secretists)
6 Vaishnavas (Followers of Vishnu)
7 Mïmamsakas (Performers, or Analyzers)
8 Shaivas (Followers of Shiva)
9 Vaisheshikas (Differentiators)
10 Naiyayikas (Logicians)
11 Nirgranthas or Jainas (The Naked or Followers of the
Jinas).
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The school adhering to a view of annihilation is that of the
Charvakas (Hedonists). Unlike the Buddhist schools of tenets
which are all included in four types (with tantrists included
among the Chittamatrins and Madhyamikas), all the nonBuddhist schools cannot be included in these twelve, or even in
the twenty-five alluded to above.
The way to determine whether a system is inner—Buddhist—
or outer—non-Buddhist—is to investigate whether or not the
teacher has extinguished all faults and has attained all auspicious
attributes, whether or not the teaching abandons harming sentient beings, and whether the view is of selflessness or self. Or in
another way, the Buddhist teaching can also be established
through four means: view, meditation, behavior, and fruit. The
view, avoiding the extremes of asserting that a person is a separate substantial entity from the mental and physical aggregates or
that a person designated in dependence upon these does not
exist, is that of the four seals (see p.336). The meditation, avoiding the extremes of being too tight or too loose, eradicates all
transmigration, including the Peak of Cyclic Existence which is
the highest Formless Realm. The behavior avoids the extremes
of both sensuous indulgence and fatiguing asceticism with
regard to clothing, food, abode, and medicine.190 The fruit is the
non-return of obstructions that have been abandoned through
individual analytical cessation.191
The non-Buddhist view is of a permanent, partless, independent self. Their meditation leads only to rebirth in higher realms
within cyclic existence. Their behavior has fallen to extremes of
severe asceticism or indulgence. Their fruit is the return of
obstructions which only seem to have been abandoned.
To distinguish an insider from an outsider without identifying
him or her as a proponent of specific tenets is merely to examine
where refuge is taken. One who takes refuge in Buddha, his Doctrine, and the Supreme Community from the depths of his
heart is a Buddhist. Therefore, it is said to be mistaken to assert
that the teacher of non-Buddhists and of Buddhists is the same,
for Buddha is the only perfect teacher, and his teaching is
unique.
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Meditation on Emptiness
Proponents of outer tenets affirm that the self apprehended by
a consciousness viewing a permanent, partless, independent self
is real. Proponents of inner tenets refute such. Those outsiders
who accept only objects of direct perception, refusing to accept
inference as valid, are proponents of annihilation (uchchhedavadin, chad smra). Outsiders who also accept hidden objects which
are revealed by inference and/or scripture are proponents of permanence (shashvatavadin, rtag smra).
According to Prajnavarman's Commentary on (Udbhatasiddhasvamin's) 'Exalted Praise' (Visheshastavatika) and according to
Chandrakirti's Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the
Middle Way', all non-Buddhist systems are traced to the founder
of the Samkhya system, Kapila.192 The Brahmin Kapila appeared
in the world during the first of the twenty intermediate eons of
abiding of this world system, when a life-span was immeasurable,
and in retreat attained a solitary liberation through asceticism. In
order to teach his path to others, he composed the Samkhya texts
that mainly set forth the twenty-five categories of realities. The
many and various systems of Forders (Tirthika, Mu stegs pa)
split off from the root Samkhya as a result of disagreement over
minute differences of opinion concerning the self as it was
explained by Kapila.
However, some scholars, in accordance with the thought of
Bhavaviveka's Blaze of Reasoning (Tarkajvala), say that all the
Forder systems arose individually, having their own fundamental teachers and different books, without relying on the Samkhya
treatises.
According to the Jainas, however, the fundamental teacher of
all Forders is the sage Arhat, who gave all the many and various
systems of tenets to his companions. Afterwards, when Brahma
came, Arhat said, 'Great Brahma, you have come leisurely; you
have come very late. Because I have given away all the treatises,
use these Vedas.'
Jam-yang-shay-ba says that these various accounts show how
very difficult it is to come to any conclusion about the origins
of the Forders.193 Jang-gya, who in his presentation of tenets
relied heavily on Jam-yang-shay-ba, says that the story of the
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321
twenty-five Forder schools splitting off from the Samkhyas is
meant to refer to their basic similarity of view of a permanent,
partless, independent self, and not to an actual historical
•
'
194
origin.
Bhavaviveka's Blaze of Reasoning195 reports that the pure offerings set forth in the Vedas initially spread widely. However, at a
time when the morality of beings had diminished, sages debated
about the Vedic injunction, 'Various things are good [for offering].' Some said that the offering of animals was not suitable,
whereas some said it was. Those who wished to eat meat performed impure offerings and even altered the Vedas. Thus, the
two types of offerings arose in stages, the initial pure offerings
without animal sacrifice and later impure offerings that include
blood sacrifice.
In general, non-Buddhists are called 'other sectarians'
because they are followers of sects other than those of the
Buddhists. They are called 'outsiders' because they are outside
of the correct view of emptiness. Their treatises teaching paths
to high status within cyclic existence and to liberation from
cyclic existence are called 'Fords to the End'. The authors of
such treatises are called 'Makers of the Ford to the End' (Tirthahkara, Mu stegs byed).
SAMKHYAS
According to Bodhibhadra, Samkhyas (Enumerators) are so
called because they advocate a definite enumeration of the causes
that produce existents.196 Or, according to Bhavaviveka's Blaze
of Reasoning, they are called Samkhyas because they assert that
one is liberated through understanding the enumeration of
the twenty-five categories of realities. They propound that all
products are produced from their own nature and thus are
called Proponents of the Nature as Cause. Because they follow the sage Kapila, they are called Kapilas. Because they
accept that the non-manifest principal (pradhana, gtso bo) is the
cause of all products, they are called Proponents of the Principal.
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Meditation on Emptiness
The school is divided into the non-theistic and the theistic.
The non-theistic Samkhyas are followers only of Kapila and do
not take the lord fshvara to be the motivating cause of the manifestation of the world. They assert that all products exist at the
time of their causes and are made manifest by conditions. The
theistic Samkhyas, following Patanjali, take the lord Ishvara to
be their teacher and assert that the transformations or manifestations of phenomena depend on his supervision. They say that
though all causes and effects are the same in nature, they differ as
transformations.
The twenty-five categories of realities that both Samkhya schools
accept
1 person (purusha, skyes bu) [or self, consciousness, conscious
self, mind, sentience, knower of the field]
2 fundamental nature (prakrti, rang bzhin) [or nature, principal, universality, general principal]
3 intellect (buddhi, bio), or great one (mahat, chen po)
4 I-principle (ahamkara, nga rgyal)
a. I-principle dominated by motility (rajas, rdul)
b. I-principle dominated by darkness (tamas, mun pa)
c. I-principle dominated by lightness (sattva, snying stobs)
Five subtle objects or potencies of objects which evolve from the
I-principle dominated by darkness:
5 visible forms (rupa, gzugs)
6 sounds (shabda, sgra)
7 odors (gandha, dri)
8 tastes (rasa, ro)
9 tangible objects (sprashtavya, reg bya)
Eleven faculties which evolve from the I-principle dominated by
lightness:
Five mental faculties:
10 eye (chakshus, mig)
11 ear (shrota, ma ba)
12 nose (ghrana, sna)
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323
13 tongue (rasana, Ice)
14 body or skin (sparshana, pags pa)
Five physical faculties or action faculties:
15 speech (vach, ngag)
16 arms ( p a n t l a g pa)
17 legs (pada, rkang pa)
18 anus (payu, rkub)
19 genitalia (upastha, 'doms)
20 Intellectual faculty (manas, yid) the nature of which is both
mental and physical
Five elements:
21 earth (prthivl, sa) which evolves from the odor potency
22 water (dp, chu) which evolves from the taste potency
23 fire (tejas, me) which evolves from the visible form potency
24 wind (vayu, rlung) which evolves from the tangible object
potency
25 space (akasha, nam mkha') which evolves from the sound
potency.
The person lacks the qualities of motility, darkness, and lightness. Inactive because of pervading all migrators, it is neither an
agent of virtue or non-virtue nor the creator of manifest phenomena. The person is a permanent existent because of not changing and is consciousness because of not being an aggregate of
particles. It is the experiencer because of experiencing pleasure
and pain. The person 'dwells beside' the nature until liberation
in the sense that the manifestations which evolve from the nature
are confused with the person until yogic discrimination separates the two and all manifestations disappear.
The other twenty-four categories—the nature and so forth—
are aggregates of particles and, therefore, are matter. The nature
is a permanent and partless entity that pervades all its transformations and is the agent of virtue and non-virtue, etc. The nature
and its transformations are the objects enjoyed by the person,
but it itself is always non-manifest; even the sage Kapila did not
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Meditation on Emptiness
directly see it. The nature is the three qualities of motility, darkness, and lightness in equilibrium. These three qualities (guna,
yon tan) are:
1 lightness (both in light/heavy and light/dark), desire, and
pleasure: sattva, snying stobs
2 motility, hatred, and pain: rajas, rdul
3 darkness, obscuration, and gloom: tamas, munpa.
The nature is also called the final mode of existence of phenomena and the ultimate. However, the person also is an ultimate,
and the intellect, I-principle, and the five subtle elements are also
natures in that they are sources of transformations. The nature is
the original source of all the transformations.
From the nature the great one or intellect is produced. It is like
a two-sided mirror, in which the images of objects from the outside and of the person from the inside meet or mix. The intellect
'empowers' the senses and apprehends the objects that the
senses apprehend which in turn are then known by the person.
This is the way that the person knows objects.
From the intellect three I-principles are produced. From the
dark I-principle the subtle elements of odors, tastes, visible
forms, tangible objects, and sounds are produced. These five
respectively produce the five elements: earth, water, fire, wind,
and space. From the lightness I-principle the eleven faculties are
produced. The motile I-principle is the motivator of the former
two. This is how Avalokitavrata presents the functions of the
three I-principles; however, Dzong-ka-ba, in his commentary
on Chandrakirti's Supplement, and Gyel-tsap, in his commentary
on DharmaHrti's Ascertainment of Valid Cognition (Pramanavinishchaya), say that the dark I-principle is the motivator
and the motile I-principle is the source of the five subtle elements.
The twenty-five categories are divided into four types: natures
(causes), transformations (effects), both natures and transformations, and neither natures nor transformations. The nature is
only a nature since it is the cause of all the transformations and is
not itself caused. The intellect, I-principle, and the five subtle
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325
elements are both natures and transformations in that they both
cause transformations and are themselves caused by something
else. The eleven faculties and the five elements are only transformations because, though they are caused, they do not produce
anything else. The person is neither a nature nor a transformation because it neither creates nor is created.
The nature and the person are truly existent phenomena
because they are non-manifest. The other twenty-three are manifest and are, therefore, only conventionally existent; they are
falsities.
The Samkhyas explain production as the manifestation
through minor causes of what is already existent. Disintegration is an effect's dissolution into its own nature. The theistic
Samkhyas add that the varieties of environments and animate
beings are not produced from just the nature because it is mindless. That which is mindless is not capable of being a supervisor, and without-a supervisor the creation of effects is not
possible. The person is not suitable to be the supervisor because
when the person is alone, before the appearance of the transformations, there is no knowledge; the intellect has not yet been
produced, and without ascertainment by the intellect there is
no realization of objects. Therefore, the varieties of effects are
produced through the mutual dependence of the great lord
Ishvara and the nature. An increase in strength of motility—
among the_ three qualities that abide in the entity of the nature
—causes Ishvara to issue forth all beings. An increase of
lightness causes duration. An increase of darkness causes disintegration.
Though Ishvara and the nature, which are the causes producing all environments and animate beings, always exist, the serial
production, duration, and disintegration of effects is said to be
admissible. For, the three qualities—motility, darkness, and
lightness—increase and diminish serially.
When the person wishes to enjoy objects, the nature realizes
its desires, unites with the person, and creates the varieties of
transformations. Eventually, through a lessening of desire, the
person comes to view objects as faulty and parts from desire. By
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Meditation on Emptiness
cultivating the concentrations and formless absorptions the
divine eye is obtained. When this eye looks at the nature, the
latter is ashamed just as a mistress is when she is discovered by a
wife. Having been discovered, the nature parts from the person,
and, opposite to the stages of production, all the transformations
dissolve into the nature. When these have become non-manifest
and the person remains alone, liberation is attained.
Since discrimination is the means to liberation, a yogi meditates in general on the twenty-five categories and in particular on
the person as empty of the nature and on the nature as empty
of the person. This type of emptiness is called 'emptiness of
the other'—the person is empty of being the nature, and the
nature is empty of being the person. When the two are no longer
confused, the root of cyclic existence is cut, and liberation is
attained.
BUDDHIST REFUTATION OF SAMKHYA
If, as the Samkhyas claim, that which existed at the time of its
causes were nevertheless produced again, it would be a senseless
production, and there would be no end to the re-production.
For, the already existent would require production.
If their causes are permanent and thus do not diminish, the
disappearance of the twenty-three effects is contradictory.
Because the intellect is matter, it cannot experience pleasure
and pain.
Because the nature and the person pervade all, it is contradictory
for them to be partless. Does all or only a part of the principal pervade every individual thing?197 If the former, the principal would
be separate from itself just as a bull and a pot, which the principal and the person pervade, are separate entities. If only a part of
the principal pervades individual manifestations, then it is admitted to have parts.
Is Ishvara a person? If he were, he would not be suitable to be
the supervisor because persons are not agents in the Samkhya
system and persons alone, without the nature, have no knowledge. If Ishvara is not a person, then there is a twenty-sixth
Non-Buddh ist Systems
327
category. Also, if nothing appears to a liberated person due to the
parting of the principal and all its transformations, is Ishvara,
the supervisor of all appearances, non-liberated?
If the person is a partless entity, it cannot be consciousness. If
the person is permanent, how could it be bound and freed?
It follows that one cannot be freed from cyclic existence
merely through cognizing that the person and happiness, pain,
and so forth are different. For, even untrained children realize a
separation of themselves from their faculties and from happiness, pain, and so forth. Conceiving themselves as the seeker,
they seek happiness and faculties which are superior to those of
the present. Furthermore, they conceive of themselves in former
and later moments as one but realize that happiness and pain
arise and cease.
It is not possible to be liberated from cyclic existence through
meditating on one's faculties as suffering and through seeking
to become separate from them. For, such a mind of disgust
for suffering is accompanied by hatred. Also, at that time one
still has desire, even if suppressed. To achieve liberation from
cyclic existence it is necessary to destroy the misconception
of objective existence that gives rise to desire, hatred, and suffering.
CHARVAKAS
The Charvakas (Hedonists) are so called because they advocate
satisfaction with only what is pleasant (charu, mdzespa) here in
this life.198 They are called Proponents of Annihilation because
they propound that at death, or after a number of lives, the continuum of the self ceases. They are called Nihilists because they propound that rebirth does not exist and that moral cause and effect
do not exist. They are called Barhaspatyas because they follow
the god Brhaspati. They are called the Gone-Afar (Ayata, rgyang
phanpa) because they have gone apart from the right view. They
are called Daivagurus after their teacher Devaguru ; that is,
Brhaspati, and Juk-dop-jen-bas ('Juk-stobs-can-pa) after their
teacher Juk-dop, a student of the renowned sage Lokachakshu
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Meditation on Emptiness
and a contemporary of the logician Dharmakirti.199 They are
called Proponents of Inherence and Proponents of Nature
because they consider that many things, such as the sharpness of
thorns and the descent of a waterfall, appear naturally, without
depending on causes.
They are nihilists not because of believing in nothing or that
life is totally worthless, but because they believe only in what
they can perceive directly, discarding inference as a means of
valid knowledge. Seeing that charity does not necessarily bring
wealth as the clergy claim, they propound that this life and its
attributes of life-span, wealth, and so forth are not results of
merits and demerits in former lives. They are moral nihilists.
Since they rely on direct perception as their sole source of knowledge, they deny causation where it cannot be seen, such as even
in the coloring of flowers and the roundness of peas. However,
they affirm causation that can be seen, such as the molding of a
vase from clay.
The Nihilists are divided into Meditators and Dialecticians.
The Meditators attain clairvoyance through which they perceive
former and future births for thirty, sixty, or ninety eons according to their mental level.200 Unlike Buddhists, they assume that
the cycle of rebirth has a beginning because their clairvoyance is
limited and they do not perceive a beginningless cycle of
births. With their clairvoyance they follow themselves and
others from lifetime to lifetime noticing no immediate relationship of cause and effect with respect to the experience of pleasure
and pain.
The Dialecticians see the same lack of causal relationship in
the stages of a single human's life and thus deny moral law along
with rebirth. Wishing to save the world from uselessly wasting
its riches on clergy and uselessly participating in efforts aimed at
improving a future life, they advocate no cause and effect in the
moral sense. It is also said that the sage Lokachakshu desired to
lie with his daughter and so explained to her the absence of
moral law.
For a Nihilist, consciousness is a fermentation of the elements,
much like inebriation produced from alcohol. Mind is not
Non-Buddh ist Systems
329
considered to be a phenomenon of a different nature from
matter. Matter in all systems is composed of particles, but mind
in most systems is not. The Buddhists, based on a view of an
essential difference between mind and matter, expound a theory
that mind and body have their own separate substantial
causes—the mind's main cause being a former mind. Thereby, a
beginningless cycle of existence is established because a mind
must always have a mind preceding it as its substantial cause.
The Nihilists reject this notion saying that mind has a physical
nature just as the capacity to cause inebriation is of the same
nature as beer. The mind is an effect of the body just as light is an
effect of a lamp. The mind is a quality of the body just as a mural
is a quality of a wall.
Nihilists say that the scope of the person is limited to the scope
of the senses. This counters the Buddhist notion of a subtle
type of impermanent self that transmigrates and the nonBuddhist notion of a permanent self beyond sense perception.
Nirvana is then the annihilation of mind and body with the
return of the body to the four elements and the dispersion of
the senses into space. 'Live happily until death. After death
you have no location or place. When the body has become ashes,
how can it live again? Therefore, former and later [lives] do not
exist.'
A Dialectician Nihilist asserts that a mind on the point of
death has no conjunction with a later mind just because it is a
mind on the point of death. Even though he does not believe that
there are Foe Destroyers, he cites the example of the final
moment of the mind of a Foe Destroyer which, according to the
Buddhist Vaibhashikas, ceases upon death. For a Vaibhashika,
the continuum of mind and body of a Foe Destroyer ceases when
he dies whereas the Mahayana schools say that this is impossible, declaring that in this respect the Vaibhashikas are like
Nihilists.
Nihilists assert that because the mind is produced from the elements, there are no Foe Destroyers who have eradicated the
afflictions of desire, hatred, and ignorance. Therefore, they do
not accept an omniscient Buddha or Supreme Community.
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Meditation on Emptiness
Similarly, there is no excellent Doctrine because there is no
abandonment of afflictions and no path that abandons them.
The Dialecticians add that there are no Foe Destroyers
because beings are permanent, stable, perpetual, and unchanging as long as they exist and thus do not become good or bad
through the power of causes. The Meditators, when they attain
any of the equipoises of the four concentrations or of the four
formless absorptions, think that they are Foe Destroyers. Near
the time of their death, they fall from their meditative stabilization, see their rebirth in a lower condition, and conclude,
'There is no Foe Destroyer, and there is no path of a Foe Destroyer.'
BUDDHIST REFUTATION OF NIHILISM
The mind right after conception has a preceding mind just
because it is a mind. For, cause and effect must be of a harmonious nature. Even one whose mental powers are not clear and
whose senses are torpid immediately after birth searches to eat
food and searches to drink the milk of the breast without being
taught. This is by the force of previous conditioning in other
lives.
Consciousness is not produced from inanimate causes because
the substantial causes of the inanimate and of consciousness are
definitely separate. The natures of the two are different; the one
is an aggregation of particles and the other is not.
Nihilists say that the mind is produced from the mindless elements because the mind is a product, just as inebriation is produced from beer and fire is produced from a magnifying glass
and those two are products. However, because inebriation is an
attribute of a mind and not a mind, the example is not proper.
Because causes must accord in type with their effects, the reason
cited is in fact contradictory; it proves that the mind is not produced from the mindless elements.
The Nihilists say that a mind at the point of death has no
conjunction to another life because it is a mind at the point of
death, like the final mind of a Foe Destroyer. The reason is
Non-Buddh ist Systems
331
inconclusive because there are cases of memory of former lives
and because babies have different styles of behavior. Furthermore, that the Vaibhashikas claim that the mind of a Foe Destroyer ceases at death does not make it so. The continuum of the
mind never ceases, and the Vaibhashikas merely fall to the depth
of the Nihilists in claiming so, as do some wrong interpreters of
Prasangika who say that in meditative equipoise on emptiness
there is no mind (confusing the fusion of subject and object at the
time of direct cognition of emptiness with disappearance of the
mind).
Body is not the main cause of mind because if it were, a dead
body would absurdly be conscious. Also, the mind does not
depend on the body in the sense of being its substantial effect
because the increase and diminishment of wisdom and so forth
do not depend on the increase and diminishment of the body.
This is not to deny that mind and body affect each other; rather,
all states and changes of mind do not depend on the body. Also,
mind does not depend on body in the sense of its having a physical nature because if it did, a person's mental qualities would be
perceived by a sense consciousness that perceives the body.
Because the Nihilists say that the body is permanent as long as it
lasts, the mind also would always have to have the same disposition.
The Nihilists are wrong in claiming that there is no omniscient consciousness. The development of clear and direct perception by a conditioned mind is the proof through which
omniscience is established. Much as an object of desire repeatedly taken to mind can appear vividly before a lustful person, emptiness can be seen directly and not just through the
medium of images or concepts. Once this is shown, then the
gradations of the path and final omniscience are easily established.
The limitless development of love and wisdom is established
by proving the existence of former and future lives. For, since
love and wisdom are qualities of mind, they develop naturally
together with a consciousness that becomes conditioned to the
ways of love and wisdom. A feature of consciousness is that the
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Meditation on Emptiness
same effort required to begin a continuum of love or wisdom is
not required for each of the successive moments, much like the
natural continuance of fire once it has been started. Since there
are future lives, there is sufficient time for the full development
of wisdom and love.
Because thorns and so forth are produced from their own
seeds and because the sharpness of thorns and so forth are produced from those same seeds, the sharpness of thorns is not a
suitable example of the causeless production of suffering. The
ascertainment that thorns arise sometimes in some places proves
that they are produced in dependence on their own objects of
dependence, and these objects of dependence are accepted as
their causes. A cause is that which aids its own effect; that which
does not aid is not an object depended upon for production. If
things were causelessly produced without depending on others,
things would either always exist, or never exist, or everything
would be produced from everything.
The Nihilists say that there are no former and later births, no
omniscience, and no effects of charity, etc., because they have
not seen them directly. Does this mean that all persons have not
seen them directly or that just the Nihilists have not seen them
directly? Also, do they directly see them to be non-existent or do
they realize them to be non-existent through inference? That all
persons have not seen them is doubtful; how, without omniscience, can anyone know what all have and have not seen? If only
the Nihilists have not seen them, it is answered that it is mistaken
that the non-existent is co-extensive with what the Nihilists have
not seen.
If the Nihilists say that a direct perceiver sees former and later
births, omniscience, and so forth as non-existent, the answer is
that non-existence of other lives and so forth could not be an
object of direct perception because, according to the Nihilists,
other lives are non-existent entities. How can the non-existent be
seen directly? If their non-existence is established by way of inference, then by accepting such an inference the fault is entailed of
first denying the validity of inference and then of using inference
to establish a point. For, the proponents of Nihilism say that only
Non-Buddh ist Systems
333
direct perception is valid. The non-existence of former and later
births and so forth not only cannot be established by valid inference, but also an attempt to do such would demolish their own
position that inference is not valid.
3
Hi nay ana
Sources
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
Gon-chok-jik-may-wang-bo's Precious Garland of Tenets
A Buddhist is one who accepts the Three Jewels—Buddha, his
Doctrine, and the Supreme Community—as the final refuge,
whereas a non-Buddhist is one who does not.201 Buddha is the
teacher of refuge; the Doctrine—especially the true cessation of
obstructions—is the actual refuge, and the Supreme Community
are the friends helping persons toward refuge.
Refuge may be taken with any of three motivations:
1 Some persons have concern and fear for the sufferings of
bad migrations as animals, hungry ghosts, and hell-beings.
(Lives within cyclic existence are called 'migrations' [gati, 'gro
ba ] because beings move from one to another within the round.)
Due to their belief that the Three Jewels have the power of protecting from bad migrations, they take refuge in them from the
depths of their hearts.
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2 Others, realizing the impermanence and changeability of
even happy migrations, have concern and fear for the sufferings
of all cyclic existences including those of happy migrations as
humans, demi-gods, and gods. Due to their belief that the Three
Jewels have the power of protecting from all these sufferings,
they take refuge in them from the depths of their hearts.
3 Still others, having realized their own miserable condition,
infer that all are suffering and generate fear for all sentient
beings' cyclic existence. They fear that even if beings turn
toward a religion, they will seek one that leads only to a solitary
peace, thereby neither perfecting themselves nor devoting themselves to the welfare of others. They also have concern and fear
for others' afflictions preventing liberation from cyclic existence, and their obstructions preventing omniscience. Due to
their belief that the Three Jewels have the power of protecting
all beings from these four faults, they take refuge in them from
the depths of their hearts.
This last is the motivation of a Mahayanist, a being of greatest
capacity.
Vaibhashikas, Sautrantikas, Chittamatrins, and Madhyamikas
are Buddhists and also proponents of particular systems of
tenets. 'Tenet' is a translation of siddhanta or siddhyanta (grub
mtha'), which literally means 'established conclusion' or 'that
which is an establishment and a conclusion'.202 An established
conclusion is so called because a meaning has been established
for the holder's mind through reasoning, scriptural citation, or
both, and he will not pass beyond this conclusion. A Buddhist
proponent of tenets is one who not only accepts the Three Jewels
as the highest refuge but also propounds the tenets of the four
seals which testify to the fact that a doctrine is Buddha's.
Thus, all Buddhist systems—Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, Chittamatra, and Madhyamika—propound the four seals:203
1
2
3
4
all products are impermanent
all contaminated objects are miserable
all phenomena are selfless
nirvana is peace.
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337
For the highest system, the Prasangika division of Madhyamika,
products are conventionally but not inherently existent phenomena produced from the aggregation of causes and conditions.
Products are impermanent even to the point that other than their
own production they require no cause, major or minor, for their
disintegration. Contaminated objects are mainly consciousnesses that conceive things to exist inherently but are also the
environments and other phenomena that are created from the
merit and demerit accumulated by sentient beings when they
engage in actions motivated by the ignorant misconception of
inherent existence. All phenomena are selfless in the sense that
both persons and all other phenomena such as body, mind,
house, and fence do not inherently exist. The passage beyond
ignorance and its consequent miseries is nirvana, which is
explained as meaning 'passed beyond sorrow'. 'Sorrow' is here
identified as the afflictions, the principal of which is the conception that things inherently or naturally exist. Peace is not
bestowed by a deity or obtained otherwise than through nirvana.
VAIBHASHIKA
'Vaibhashika' means a follower mainly of the Great Detailed
Exposition (Mahavibhasha) which is a compendium on knowledge (abhidharma, chos mngon pa), a study of phenomena.204
This text distills the meaning of the Seven Treatises of Knowledge which only the Vaibhashikas accept as spoken by Buddha.
'Vaibhashika' (Bye brag smra ba) also means one who asserts that
past, present, and future objects are all instances (vishesha, bye
brag) of 'substantial entities' (dravya, rdzas). It is further said
that Vaibhashikas are so called because, like the non-Buddhist
Vaisheshikas, they propound many 'substantially established
phenomena' (dravyasiddhadharma, rdzas grub kyi chos) such as
uncaused space which the other Buddhist systems say are
existent but only designated by thought.
Vaibhashikas assert partless particles that aggregate into gross
objects. According to the Kashmiri sub-school, the particles do
not touch each other but are held together by space. Others say
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Meditation on Emptiness
that the particles surround each other without interstice, while
others say that they touch each other. In any case, gross objects
are formed through the aggregation of partless particles, and
thus external objects—objects which are entities external to a
perceiving consciousness—are said to exist truly.
The Vaibhashikas also assert partless moments of consciousness. An aggregation of these is a continuum of consciousness
that perceives its object 'nakedly', that is, without itself being
generated in the image of its object.
For Vaibhashika, ultimate truths (paramarthasatya, don dam
bdenpa) are objects that can bear analysis. This means that even
when reduced, either physically or through the process of analysis, they still generate in a perceiver an apprehension of themselves. For instance, a clay pot, if broken with a hammer or
analyzed into its parts, no longer generates a consciousness that
perceives a pot or thinks 'pot.' Therefore, a pot is not an ultimate
truth. However, the matter of the pot is still matter even down to
the finest unbreakable particle. Therefore, objects such as partless
particles, partless moments of consciousness, and permanent
phenomena are ultimate truths—true for the ultimate analytical
supramundane consciousness. They are also called ultimate
truths because they definitely have ultimate existence.
All objects that require an aggregation of particles or of
moments are conventional truths (samvrtisatya, kun rdzob bden
pa)—conventional because they are designated in accordance
with worldly conventions and truths because such designations
are true.
Both ultimate and conventional truths are substantially established (dravyasiddha, rdzas grub), though only ultimate ones are
substantially existent (dravyasat, rdzas yod). Vaibhashika is the
only school to differentiate 'substantially established' and
'substantially existent', the intention being to provide a status of
'substantiality' for conventional truths. Though conventional
truths are imputedly existent (prajnaptisat, btags yod) they are
substantially established because in this system these imputations are true; when the objects designated are sought, an autonomous entity is found.
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The non-Buddhist Vaisheshikas and Naiyayikas carry the doctrine of substantially existent entities to the point where whole
and part are separate entities, as are quality and qualificand, doer
and doing, and definition and definiendum. 205 For the Naiyayikas, within the realm of the existent, whatever appear to the
mind to be different are different substantial entities.
The Vaibhashikas are said to have been highly influenced by
non-Buddhist thought even to the point where they are a mixture of Buddhist and non-Buddhist. Their name is, therefore,
sometimes traced to the name 'Vaisheshika'.206
Furthermore, like the Samkhyas, the Vaibhashikas accept that
a sprout, for instance, exists as a sprout at the time of its future,
that is, when the sprout is yet to be produced. They say that if a
product did not exist before its actualized state in present time,
its production would be adventitious. If non-existents were produced, even non-existent things like the horns of a rabbit could
be produced. For the other Buddhist schools, however, a sprout
at the time of its future exists as the entity of its seed, but the
sprout does not exist as a sprout and, therefore, does not exist.207
The Vaibhashikas are also the only Buddhist school to accept
simultaneous cause and effect as, for example, in the case of a
consciousness and its accompanying mental factors, such as
intention and feeling, which support each other like the poles of
a tripod. No other Buddhist school accepts simultaneous cause
and effect, citing as their reason that one thing cannot affect
another that already exists; it can only affect later moments of
the other.
'Vaibhashika' is a general name referring to eighteen subschools that, according to differing explanations, split off from
one, two, three, or four basic orders after Buddha's death.
According to an explanation by Bhavaviveka of a division from
two basic orders, they are as shown in Chart 40.208 Bhavaviveka
says that there are six Mahasamghika, seven Sarvastivadin, and
four VatsFputriya sects and that this is a list of eighteen; thus the
eighteenth would have to be the Haimavatas. (For other renditions of the split into eighteen sub-schools, see Appendix 3.)
Not all eighteen sub-schools actually accept the 'Vaibhashika'
H i nay ana 341
notion that past, present, and future objects are substantial entities. The Mahashasakas, for instance, say that past objects and
future objects do not substantially exist; only present objects
do.209 Furthermore, not all accept that there is no simultaneous
cognition of all phenomena because the 'one expression' of the
Ekavyavaharika (literally, those who have one expression) school
is the assertion of a Buddha's simultaneous cognition of all phenomena.210
Some of the eighteen sub-schools arose from the simple fact
that their teachers were different or that their monasteries were
located in different areas. Difference of language also contributed
to the divisions, but according to Kensur Lekden, the chief cause
was the Hlnayana notion that all Buddha's sutras are literal.
(The evidence does not show this to be the case as interpretation
of scripture was important in many Hlnayana schools.)211
The five Sammitiya sub-schools (see Padmasambhava's rendition in Appendix 3) assert the existence of a person that is neither
the same as nor different from the mental and physical aggregates. However, they and the other thirteen Vaibhashika schools
all assert the non-existence of a permanent, partless, independent self. The thirteen non-Sammitfya schools also assert the
non-existence of a substantially existent or self-sufficient person.
Their assertion of selflessness does not mean that there is utterly
no self or person but refutes the existence of a certain type of self.
For these thirteen Vaibhashika schools, a person is not independent of the mind and body but is a phenomenon within the
mind-body complex. Some say that a person is the continuum of
the five aggregates of forms, feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, and consciousnesses. Others say that a person is
the mental consciousness; still others say that a person is all five
aggregates.
For these thirteen Vaibhashika schools, the non-existence of a
self-sufficient person is known as the subtle selflessness of
persons. The coarse selflessness is a person's non-existence as a
permanent, partless, independent entity. Through cognizing
and becoming accustomed to the subtle personal selflessness, the
knot of cyclic existence is cut, and the state of Foe Destroyer is
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Meditation on Emptiness
attained. One has destroyed the foe which is the conception of
the person as a substantial or self-sufficient entity.
Simultaneously with becoming a Foe Destroyer, one attains a
nirvana with remainder—the state of having passed beyond the
afflictions (the chief of which is the conception of a self-sufficient
person) while still possessing a physical support that receives its
impetus from former contaminated actions and afflictions.
Then, at death the continuum of mind and body is severed in a
nirvana without remainder. The attainer of the nirvana without
remainder is thus said to be the Foe Destroyer who is about to
die because once dead, his continuum of mind and body has
utterly ceased, and there is then no one who could possess a nirvana without remainder.212
For the Vaibhashikas, five of the six types of Foe Destroyers
can fall from their attainment even as far back as the path of
seeing. According to the other schools, however, such degeneration makes a mockery of the conception of the total abandonments of afflictions which are called true cessations, the third of
the four noble truths.213
The Vaibhashikas, despite being Hinayana in terms of their
tenets, accept a Bodhisattva path that is trod by very rare beings
—the one in our age being Shakyamuni Buddha.214 That they
accept such is clear from their literal acceptance of Buddha's Life
Stories (Jataka) which recount his generation of the aspiration to
enlightenment and his practice of the six perfections. They also
accept as literal the Discipline (Vinaya) which recounts Buddha's
performance of the twelve deeds of a fully enlightened being.
The Bodhisattva path requires an accumulation of the collections of merit and wisdom for three periods of countless eons
whereas the path of a Solitary Realizer requires only one
hundred eons. A Buddha completely removes both the afflictive
and non-afflictive obstructions whereas the Hearers and Solitary
Realizers, though they utterly abandon the afflictive obstructions, only 'abandon' the non-afflictive obstructions through
non-attachment. In the Vaibhashika system the afflictive
obstructions are the conception of a self-sufficient person and
the poisons of desire, hatred, and ignorance that result from it.
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The non-afflictive obstructions are ignorance of the distant in
time, the distant in place, the profound and subtle qualities of a
Buddha, and subtle objects such as the subtle details of cause and
effect relationships. These are eradicated through a Bodhisattva's
great accumulation of merit.
With respect to how practitioners ascend the paths, the Vaibhashikas say that a rhinoceros-like Solitary Realizer and a
Bodhisattva pass in one meditative sitting from the beginning of
the path of preparation through the paths of seeing, meditation,
and no more learning. Thus, a Buddha's body is an ordinary
human body of matter and is a true suffering even though it no
longer can generate suffering for him. It is a true suffering
because his body receives its impetus from former contaminated
actions and afflictions. Therefore, the Buddha Jewel that is the
object of refuge only refers to the phenomena of no more
learning in his continuum.
Famous Vaibhashika masters are Vasumitra, Dharmapala,
Buddhadeva, Samghabhadra and so forth.
SAUTRANTIKA
The other Hfnayana school of tenets is Sautrantika.215 Jam-yangshay-ba distinguishes it from the Sautrantika that is a sub-school
of Vaibhashika, but the scholar Dak-tsang (b.1405) of the Sagya (Sa-skya) order, whom Jam-yang-shay-ba frequently refutes
in his Great Exposition of Tenets, disagrees. He says that there
are eighteen Hinayana sub-schools, seventeen Vaibhashika and
one Sautrantika.216
Etymologically, the Sautrantikas are so called because they
rely mainly on sutras in propounding tenets. However, since all
Buddhist systems cite scripture and reasoning to support their
tenets, the name Sautrantika is not a definition but an indication
of emphasis. Etymologies are traditionally examined to discover
whether they apply to a wider or narrower range than the precise
meaning of the word, or whether the etymology can also serve as
a definition. Here, the etymology of Sautrantika covers a wider
set than those actually indicated by the term.
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Meditation on Emptiness
The Sautrantikas are of two types: Followers of Scripture—
mainly of Vasubandhu's Treasury of Knowledge—and. Followers
of Reasoning—mainly of Dignaga's Compendium of Valid Cognition (Pramanasamuchchaya) and Dharmakirti's Seven Treatises
on Valid Cognition (see Bibliography). The latter are considered
to be the higher of the two because of their resemblance to
Mahayana counterparts, the Chittamatrins Following Reasoning, and because their assertions on the processes of reasoning are
more developed. The Ge-luk-ba order of Tibetan Buddhism, of
which Jam-yang-shay-ba is a member, is fond of Dharmakirti's
logic, especially as described by his Sautrantika followers. They
see the Sautrantika system of Dharmottara and so forth as a stepping-stone to an understanding of Mahayana tenets—their fondness refuting any suggestion that the Hinayana schools are
despised in Tibet.
The Followers of Reasoning are more famous than the Followers of Scripture for their works on logic, but it cannot be said that
the Followers of Scripture are not advocates of reasoning. Dignaga himself was a student of Vasubandhu, who was a Sautrantika Following Scripture before becoming a Chittamatrin,
though Dignaga is said to have surpassed his teacher in the field
oflogic. 217
The tenets of the Sautrantikas Following Scripture are similar
to those of the Vaibhashikas; however, they, along with the
Followers of Reasoning, do not accept that past and future
objects are instances of substantial entities. They also do not
accept that a Foe Destroyer can fall from his attainment. All Sautrantikas agree that the Seven Treatises of Higher Knowledge
were not uttered by Buddha, and most add that they were not
even uttered by Foe Destroyers because the latter would not set
forth mistaken teachings, such as that of the substantial existence
of space. Sautrantikas say that space, analytical cessations, and
non-analytical cessations are mere negatives or absences of tangibility, afflictions, and so forth and thus are only imputedly existent, though permanent in the sense of being non-disintegrating.
All Sautrantikas also assert that cause and effect cannot be simultaneous and that a consciousness does not perceive its object
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nakedly but is generated in its image. On these points the Sautrantikas disagree with the Vaibhashikas and agree with the
Mahayana schools of tenets.
The differentiation between Sautrantika and the Mahayana
schools is the former's agreement with Vaibhashika that objects,
which are entities external to the consciousness perceiving them,
truly exist. The Hinayana schools also do not assert that phenomena other than persons are selfless except in the sense that they
do not exist as objects of use of a self-sufficient person. They
consequently do not assert that there are obstructions to omniscience—obstructions to simultaneous cognition of all phenomena (jneyavarana, shes bya'i sgribpa). As a result, they also do
not accept the ten Bodhisattva grounds.
The HTnayana schools do not accept the existence of a
Buddha's Enjoyment Body (Sambhogakaya, Longs sku) which
immortally preaches doctrine to Bodhisattva Superiors. Therefore, it is very difficult for one who is a Hfnayanist by tenet to
become a Mahayanist by path as defined by the Mahayana
schools.218 In order to do so, he would have to generate an altruistic aspiration to enlightenment, as a Mahayanist by path does
when he takes upon himself the burden of freeing all sentient
beings from cyclic existence and establishing them in the happiness of Buddhahood. Without the possibility of omniscience and
an immortal Enjoyment Body, the generation of such an unusual
compassionate attitude would be next to impossible.
Many of the HTnayana schools do not even accept the Mahayana sutras as being Buddha's word, thinking that many Mahayana teachings contradict the four seals.219 For instance, the
teaching that a Buddha's Enjoyment Body abides forever without disintegrating contradicts the first seal that all products are
impermanent. (The Mahayanists answer that though an Enjoyment Body disintegrates moment by moment, its continuum
remains of the same type, unlike an ordinary body which
becomes sick, old, and so forth; thus, it is immortal but still
impermanent.) The Hmayanists say that the Mahayana teaching
that a Bodhisattva proceeds from joy to joy contradicts the
second seal that all contaminated objects are miserable. They say
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that the Mahayana teaching that through cultivating the path
one attains a superior self contradicts the third seal that all phenomena are selfless. Also, they say that the teaching that a Hearer or
Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyer, after attaining a nirvana without remainder, enters into cultivation of the Mahayana path contradicts the fourth seal that nirvana is peace.
With such an aversion to the special Mahayana teachings that
make an aspiration to help all sentient beings realistic, it would
be almost impossible for a practitioner's sense of compassion to
counter the influence of such tenets. However, it is said that a
few Hinayanists by tenet have generated the full aspiration to
altruistic enlightenment as described in the Mahayana scriptures. They thus become Mahayanists in terms of their path and
not just in the way that the Bodhisattva path is described by the
Hmayana schools. For the Hihayana schools of tenets, the
Bodhisattva path merely entails a much longer period of the collection of merit; it does not involve such unusual aspirations.
The most marked difference between the Sautrantikas Following Reasoning and those Following Scripture lies in their assertions on the two truths. The Followers of Scripture agree with
the Vaibhashikas that ultimate truths are objects such as partless
particles and partless moments of consciousness which can withstand breakage and analysis, still generating a consciousness that
apprehends them. For the Followers of Reasoning, however,
ultimate truths are objects ultimately able to perform a function,
especially the function of creating an effect. For them, all impermanent objects are ultimate truths—truths for an ultimate consciousness which is not mistaken with respect to its appearing
object .
Valid sense consciousnesses that correctly perceive visible
forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects and mental
consciousnesses that directly perceive such objects as the four
noble truths are non-mistaken. However, an inferring consciousness, though non-mistaken with respect to its referent object, is
mistaken with respect to its appearing object. The reason is that
it perceives an image of an object, and the image appears to be
that object.220 For instance, when an inferential consciousness
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realizes the impermanence of an ox based on the sign that an ox
is born and the pervasion of whatever is born by impermanence,
the impermanence of an ox is its referent object. Its appearing
object is a generic image or concept of the impermanence of an
ox that seems to be the real thing; thus, it is said that a correct
inferential consciousness is mistaken in terms of its appearing
object.
Images or concepts, not being objects of a totally non-mistaken
consciousness, are not ultimate truths. They also are not impermanent but permanent, not in the Vaibhashika and nonBuddhist sense of the continual existence of a thing from one
moment to the next, but in the sense of not undergoing momentary disintegration.
Each person's images or concepts do indeed come into existence in dependence on the person's having formed an image of
such an object, but from the viewpoint of their representing the
exclusion of everything which is not that object, they are said to
be permanent. For the non-Buddhist Forder systems, a generality (samanya, spyi) is permanent and partless. Through identifying it in one object, a person thereafter notices it in its other
instances and thereby knows its manifestations. Thus, for the
non-Buddhist Forders, the naming and noticing of objects is
positive; terms and thoughts are affixed to objects through the
power of the objects themselves. In short, for the Forders, one
initially learns of the presence of a universal in an instance, and
through that process of naming, one is able to know all instances
of the universal when they appear in one's ken.
For the Sautrantikas Following Reasoning and for the Mahayana schools of tenets, the process of naming and noticing is
negative or exclusionary. Ox appears as an exclusion (apoha,
gzhan sel) of non-ox to a consciousness that thinks, 'Ox.' In other
words, the process of naming relies on the elimination of non-ox.
Without the appearance to the mind of something as the negative of non-ox, thought cannot identify 'ox'. Non-non-ox does
indeed mean ox, but it must appear to the mind through the
negative route of eliminating non-ox.
Though non-non-ox means ox, it is a negative implying a
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Meditation on Emptiness
positive object whereas ox is just a positive phenomenon. It is
not that ox does not exclude or negate non-ox, but ox is positive
rather than negative because ox does not appear to thought
through an explicit exclusion of non-ox. A further complexity is
that though ox is impermanent, the isolate of ox, which means
ox in isolation, is permanent because of appearing only to
thought, for ox devoid of all of its instances is something that can
appear only to thought. Thus, though ox is the isolate of ox, the
isolate of ox is not ox.
Furthermore, an appearance as non-non-ox (which here means
a conceptual appearance ofox to a mental consciousness) is permanent, that is, non-disintegrating. Some contemporary Tibetan
scholars identify this appearance (or as it has been translated
here, generic image or meaning-generality) as the thing that
appears to the mind when we think about 'ox'. They agree that it
seems to move and change, sometimes being one color, sometimes another, etc., but they still say it is permanent because it
does not disintegrate moment by moment as do external objects
such as stones. The appearance of change is due to the mind.
Others say that the appearance of this white-haired thing that
appears to the inner mind is not the meaning-generality (arthasamanya ,don spyi) of ox, but they have no identification of'appearance' in this context. One scholar says that the meaning-generality
of ox is impermanent, an internally created picture, and added that
when he says this in the debating courtyards, the heads of the
other scholars split wide open.
In any case, the Sautrantikas Following Reasoning, as well as
the Mahayanists, present an essentially negative or exclusionary
process of naming. One takes as one's basis the white-haired
thing and takes as one's reason the presence of certain characteristics such as a dew-lap and a hump and then applies the name
'ox' to a generic image or meaning-generality that is actually an
appearance as non-non-ox. A consciousness which has such a
generic image as its appearing object is mistaken in that it understands its referent objects, such as the actual many and various
oxen, through the medium of an image which is not manifold
and various—thereby confusing place, time, and nature. Thus,
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an inferring consciousness realizing the impermanence of an ox,
though valid with respect to its main object, impermanence, is
mistaken in terms of its appearing object, an image of the impermanence of an ox which appears to be actual impermanence. A
definite preference for direct cognition is implied, with inferential realization valued as a means to it.
A generic image or meaning-generality appears to the mind
through dependence on thought, not through its own entity;
therefore, it is said to be permanent. Such phenomena are conventional or obscured truths (samvrtisatya, kun rdzob bden pa)
because they are truths, or existents, for thought. Thought—the
intellect—is obscured because it cannot act directly on impermanent objects; it must work through the medium of images and
concepts. The intellect, as has been seen, is mistaken; however,
the intellect, when correct, does not conceive or hold the internal
appearance as non-non-ox to be non-non-ox, that is, ox; such
only appears to it, much as a reflection of a face in a mirror
appears to be a face but is not usually conceived to be so. Thus, a
correct intellectual consciousness is mistaken with regard to its
appearing object but not with regard to its referent object.
The Sautrantikas Following Reasoning hold that the explicit
objects of direct perception are impermanent objects. The
Mahayanists, on the other hand, assert that the permanent phenomenon, emptiness, can be directly perceived. The Sautrantikas Following Reasoning explain that a yogi, in direct perception, explicitly realizes the impermanent mental and physical
aggregates and implicitly realizes the permanent phenomenon of
emptiness which in their system is the non-existence of the
person as a self-sufficient entity. An emptiness is thus not an ultimate truth but an obscured truth because it is a truth for
thought, appearing to the mind through the route of the negation of a self-sufficient person. A selflessness, or an emptiness, is
a non-affirming negative (prasajyapratishedha, med dgag), not
implying anything in its place, and thus is permanent and cannot
be seen directly.
The Sautrantika emphasis on impermanent things is obvious:
impermanent objects are called ultimate truths, and yogis, in the
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most exalted of cognitions, explicitly realize not emptiness but
the impermanent aggregates. If an object can perform the function of creating an effect, it is determined as ultimately existing;
a pot, which for Vaibhashikas and for Sautrantikas Following
Scripture is a conventional truth, is an ultimate truth for the
Sautrantikas following Dharmakirti.
On the subject of impermanence itself the Sautrantikas offer a
presentation that differs significantly from Vaibhashika and
agrees with Mahayana.221 The Vaibhashikas say that production,
abiding, aging, and disintegration are not four activities but four
agents: (1) that which causes production, (2) that which causes
aging, (3) that which causes abiding, and (4) that which causes
disintegration. These four characteristics of impermanent phenomena are substantial entities separate from the phenomena
themselves. They are said to exist simultaneously as characteristics of one phenomenon, but to perform their functions serially.
According to the Vaibhashikas, the momentariness of impermanent things actually refers to the period of these four instants.
Both types of Sautrantikas, however, hold that (1) production
is the new arising of what did not exist before, (2) abiding is the
remaining of a type similar to what preceded it, (3) aging is the
non-similarity in entity of a later moment and a former moment,
and (4) disintegration is a product's not remaining a second
moment after its present. All four characteristics exist simultaneously because what is newly produced is just what does not
remain for a second moment. What is newly produced is also just
what abides as a type similar to its preceding cause and is just
what is a different entity from its former cause. Therefore, all
products last only the instant of their production; they require
no further cause for their disintegration than their own production. Products have a nature of momentary disintegration; it is
not something else that makes them so.
The Sautrantikas Following Reasoning also differ from the
Vaibhashikas in that they assert self-consciousness. Selfconsciousness is here not introspection or self-awareness, but a
consciousness's cognizance of itself non-dualistically much as
the sun illumines itself while it illumines others. In this context,
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351
self-consciousness has little function in the spiritual path, and
despite its somewhat impressive name does not occupy even a
degree of importance that elicits a clear position from each
school. Still, self-consciousness figures into the definitions of the
proponents of Hihayana tenets. The definition of a Vaibhashika
is:
a Hihayana proponent of tenets who does not assert selfconsciousness and who asserts the true existence of
external objects—with qualification.220
(The qualification excludes the Sautrantikas Following Scripture who seem also not to accept self-consciousness, but this is a
matter of controversy.) The definition of a Sautrantika is:
a HTnayana proponent of tenets who asserts the true
existence of self-consciousness and of external objects—
with qualification.
4 History of the Mahayana
Sources
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
This great eon is called the Fortunate Eon because during it one
thousand Buddhas will appear in this world.223 A great eon is
composed of eighty intermediate eons, divided into four periods
of twenty each for formation, abiding, destruction, and vacuity
of the world system. The last great eon ended in a destruction by
fire, in which the whole of the Desire Realm and the first of the
four areas of the Form Realm, called the First Concentration,
were destroyed.
The Four Concentrations are situated, one on top of the other,
above the Desire Realm, which is our habitation. After seven
great eons end with destructions by fire, the next one ends with
destruction by water, during which the Second Concentration is
also destroyed. After seven cycles ending in destruction by
water, the Third Concentration is also destroyed by wind. The
Fourth Concentration is never destroyed by fire, water, or wind
because it is free from the eight faults of inhalation, exhalation,
investigation, analysis, pleasure, pain, mental pleasure, and
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Meditation on Emptiness
mental displeasure.224 The individual environments of the
Fourth cease with the death of the being on which their existence
depends.
When the twenty intermediate eons of formation in this eon
began, the area of the First Concentration was formed, and sentient beings were born there once again. Thereafter, the four
abodes of the Desire Realm gods who inhabit the sky were
formed. Our own world, in a system of one billion worlds, was
formed when a great and powerful blue wind began blowing and
circulating in the shape of a half moon.225 Great rains of seven
types of precious substances fell and formed a vast white round
ocean, supported by the dense winds. From the turbulence of
the ocean were formed a yellow square of gold and then earth.
From the dependent-arising of the combination of these three, a
red triangle of fire formed, at which time the basis of the great
Mount Meru and its surrounding mountains, four continents,
and eight sub-continents was complete.
At first the land surface was a marvelous substance that someone, through previous conditioning, was led into eating. Until
that time, their spontaneously produced bodies had no anus or
genitals; for the sake of excretion these now appeared. Gradually, the marvelous radiance of the beings degenerated, and the
earth became hard with a corn-like plant growing in abundance.
Some, however, were not satisfied with merely taking their portion day by day and began hoarding. Some began stealing; some
killed; houses were built to hide the sexual act. Gradually the
sins were committed, and the causes of birth in the bad migrations were made. The twenty eons of formation were finished
with the formation of the birth-places for animals, hungry ghosts
and hell-beings.
The pattern was produced a billion times simultaneously, providing lands for gods, demi-gods, humans, animals, hungry
ghosts, and hell-beings in accordance with their nature as determined by previous deeds. The life-span for humans, which at
that time was extremely long, gradually began to shorten, and
when it was forty thousand years, the first of the thousand
Buddhas of this great eon, Krakuchchhanda, appeared.226 When
History of the Mahay ana
355
the average life-span was thirty thousand years, the second
Buddha, Kanakamuni, appeared. At twenty thousand years, the
third, Kashyapa (who is to be distinguished from the Hearer
Kashyapa who was Shakyamuni Buddha's senior disciple)
appeared. When the average life-span was only one hundred
years, the very length of which reflects the poor state of the
world, the heroic Shakyamuni, already a Buddha, appeared
simultaneously in all one billion worlds of this world system to
show the way to enlightenment. His teaching will remain for
five thousand years. Eventually, the human life-span will degenerate to an average of ten years, accompanied by a destruction of
the beings—but not the environment—by either weapons, sickness, or starvation, the current intermediate eon ending with a
destruction by weapons. The remaining beings will experience
renunciation whereupon emanations of Buddhas will appear to
lead them on the path of virtue due to which the life-span will
again begin to lengthen. During the period of lengthening, no
Buddhas will appear as such, with the next openly declared
Buddha—Maitreya—appearing four billion nine hundred million human years from now after the next decrease has begun.
The current era is that of Shakyamuni Buddha, whose lineage
is traced back to a child born from an egg.227 The egg formed
from semen that dripped onto a sugar cane leaf from a man
wrongly accused as a killer. He was strung up for punishment,
and having proved his innocence through causing his teacher's
very black face to turn golden, his semen dripped down onto a
sugar cane leaf. It formed an egg which his teacher nurtured, and
a child hatched. Thus, the child, the lineage, and eventually
Shakyamuni himself came to be known as Sugar-Cane-One
(Ikshvaku, Bu ram shingpa).
His clan was called Shakya or 'the able' because of the clanking's amazement at his banished sons' and daughters ability to
inter-breed in exile. They had been banished to satisfy a second
wife's wish for her son to become king, and later when the king's
attitude changed, his family was sought in exile with resultant
amazement at their prolific inter-breeding.
Shakyamuni Buddha lived for eighty-one years, during which
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Meditation on Emptiness
the highest of his philosophical teachings were the Perfection of
Wisdom Sutras. They present the most profound of all views,
the absence of inherent existence in all phenomena. Offering the
essence of Buddha's thought, they contain not only the doctrine
of emptiness but also in hidden form, the modes of the paths to
supreme enlightenment.
Four hundred years after Buddha's death, Nagarjuna, the
prophesied upholder of Buddha's deepest teaching, was born.228
He systematically explained the meaning of the Perfection of
Wisdom Sutras in his Treatise on the Middle Way which is called
'fundamental' (mula) because it is the basic text of the Madhyamika system he founded. Living for six hundred years, his teachings are divided into three proclamations of doctrine which he
performed based on former prayer-aspirations made in the presence of the Tathagata Lu-rik-gyel-bo (kLu-rigs-rgyal-po). Nagarjuna's first proclamation of doctrine began with his becoming a
monk under the abbot of Nalanda, Rahulabhadra, that is,
Saraha,229 at which time he was called Shriman (dPal-ldan).
While prefect of Nalanda, Nagarjuna protected the monks from
famine through alchemy, exhorted the indolent, and expelled
the wayward.
His second proclamation commenced before one hundred
years had passed in his lifetime. He went to Naga-land, taught
doctrine to the Nagas, and brought back to this 'continent' the
One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra, etc.,
along with a great quantity of clay from which he made almost
ten million reliquaries {stupa) and many images. He composed
the Five Collections of Reasonings that establish emptiness as the
mode of existence of all phenomena and thus founded the
Madhyamika system which avoids all extremes. At that time he
was called Nagarjuna. Nagas, or dragons, have their abode in the
ocean, have treasures such as wish-granting jewels, and spew
forth fire from their mouths, burning fuel and overcoming
others. Just so, Nagarjuna possessed the profound understanding that eradicates the two extremes, possessed the treasure of
profound good doctrine, and burned the fuel of bad views, thus
clearing away mental darkness. Also, just as Arjuna protected
History of the Mahay ana
357
the kingdom and tamed his enemies, so Nagarjuna protected the
kingdom of doctrine and conquered the foe, cyclic existence,
itself. Therefore, he was called Naga-Arjuna, Nagarjuna.
His third proclamation of doctrine commenced with a visit to
the northern continent three hundred years into his lifetime. On
the way he met the king Shatavahana, then in his youth, and
prophesied his ascension to the throne.230 From the northern
continent, where he stayed for two hundred years in altruistic
activity, he wrote the king a letter called the Precious Garland of
Advice for the King. When the average life-span was eighty years
—nine hundred years after the death of Buddha and five hundred years into his lifetime—Nagarjuna came for the third time
to South India, the first time being his birth and the second his
return from Naga-land. He brought with him the Great Drum
Sutra (Mahabheriharakaparivarta), the Lion's Roar of ShrimaladevTSutra (ShrTmaladevTsimhanada), the Tathagata Essence
Sutra (Tathagatagarbha), and the Ornament of the Wisdom
Engaging the Sphere of All Buddhas Sutra (Sarvabuddhavishayavatarajnanalamkara).23> These four sutras became the basis of
extensive explanation in Maitreya's Sublime Continuum of the
Great Vehicle (Uttaratantra) which clarifies the meaning of the
Tathagata essence, or emptiness of the mind, that permits
development into Buddhahood.
During the third proclamation, Nagarjuna wrote praises of the
Tathagata essence and lectured on the Great Drum Sutra etc.,
living another one hundred years. Upon his death he himself
went to the Blissful Pure Land {Sukhdvati, bDe ba can) and sent
a manifestation to the Joyous Pure Land (Tushita, dGa'Idan) to
question Maitreya about the Great Drum Sutra. In the future he
is to become a Buddha. After the passage of the thousand
Buddhas of this eon, there will be sixty-two eons without the
appearance of any; then, after one hundred thousand ten million
Solitary Realizers have appeared, seven Buddhas will appear.
Nagarjuna will appear as the eighth, living for fifteen intermediate eons in extremely favorable conditions, with his teaching
remaining for ten billion years.
Since he was away from South India for such long periods,
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Meditation on Emptiness
many have thought that there were two or three Nagarjunas, but
it is clearly indicated in the Great Cloud Sutra (Mahamegha) and
the Great Drum Sutra that there was only one. With respect to
his level of attainment, Bhavaviveka's disciple Avalokitavrata
wrote, in accordance with the way things seemed to the world,
that Nagarjuna was a first ground Bodhisattva; however, he
actually was a seventh grounder who attained the eighth in that
lifetime. Thus, the prophesies of Nagarjuna in the Descent into
Lanka Sutra and the Fundamental Tantra of Manjushri
(Manjushrimulatantra) as a first ground Bodhisattva should be
taken to mean that although he was a seventh ground Bodhisattva, he manifested the ways of a first grounder for the sake of
leading sentient beings. Still, the tantra system—which is accepted as having the final say—views Nagarjuna as having attained
Buddhahood during that lifetime.
He did not newly invent the teachings of the Madhyamika
system; Hihayana and Mahayana arose simultaneously during
Shakyamuni's lifetime.232 After his death, the Mahayana sutras
remained in the lands of humans for forty years, but then with
tumultuous times they disappeared. This is why the Mahayana
had to be brought back, making it necessary for many authors to
prove that it was the word of the Buddha—Maitreya in his Ornament for the Mahayana Sutras {Mahayanasutralamkara), Shantideva in his Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (Bodhisattvacharyavatara), Bhavaviveka in his Heart of the Middle Way
(Madhyamakahrdaya), etc.233 Though one hundred and twenty
years after Buddha's death the great religious king Ashoka respected and spread the teaching, it is clear that the Mahayana was
then practically non-existent among humans; however, it had
spread widely in the lands of gods and dragons and even in other
areas.234 On this 'continent' it was limited to Bodhisattvas abiding on the earth and to tantric yogis who were secretly practicing
it themselves and teaching it to the fortunate.
Because of the wide dissemination of the Hihayana Hearer
orders, the Mahayana scriptures were as if non-existent. Though
the great Brahmin Saraha appeared and spread mainly the
Mahayana tantric teaching, it was the prophesied Nagarjuna
History of the Mah ay ana
3 59
who restored the teaching of the Mahayana to the world and,
through the help of his students, spread it widely. The chief of
his students was Aryadeva who also attained the eighth Bodhisattva ground during that life. Nagarjuna and Aryadeva are
called the Model Madhyamikas because the founders of the two
branches of Madhyamika—Svatantrika and Prasangika—quote
them as equally reliable sources.
Nine hundred years after Buddha's death and five hundred
years into Nagarjuna's six hundred year life, the teacher Asanga
was born.235 He attained the third Bodhisattva ground during
that life and, roughly during the time of Nagarjuna's third proclamation of doctrine, founded the Chittamatra (Mind-Only)
system. The timing had to have been like that, for Nagarjuna
refuted mind-only in his Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment
(Bodhichittavivarana), and this shows that he was still alive when
the Chittamatra system was formed. In accordance with the doctrine of mind-only, Asanga commented on the meaning of the
Sutra Unravelling the Thought (Samdhinirmochana) in his Five
Treatises on the Levels and Two Compendiums, etc. (see Bibliography). However, in his commentary on Maitreya's Sublime
Continuum of the Great Vehicle, Asanga explained the thought of
the Questions of King Dharanishvara Sutra (DharanTshvararajapariprchcha) and the Tathagata Essence Sutra in accordance with
Prasangika, which was actually his own final system.
He showed that the mind-basis-of-all (alayavijnana, kun gzhi
mam shes) is taught in Hihayana scriptures just as Nagarjuna had
showed that the Madhyamika selflessness is taught in them and
that the HTnayana teaching of complete forsaking of the mental
and physical aggregates in the fmal nirvana refers to the mode of
appearance in meditative equipoise on emptiness.
Living for one hundred and fifty years, Asanga was mainly
intent on founding the Chittamatra system. It is said 236 that he
did so in order to convert to the Mahayana his brother Vasubandhu who first was a Vaibhashika, then a Sautrantika, and
finally a Chittamatrin due to Asanga's persistent efforts.237
Just after Asanga's founding of the Chittamatra system,
Buddhapalita laid the foundation for the Prasangika system with
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Meditation on Emptiness
the writing of his commentary on Nagar juna's Treatise on the
Middle Way. Even though Chandraldrti, through his defense of
Buddhapalita, opened the way for Prasangika, Jam-yang-shay-ba
considers Buddhapalita to be the founder. For, Buddhapalita in
his commentary on the Treatise on the Middle Way used many
consequences (prasahga, thai 'gyur) rather than syllogisms to
establish emptiness. The commentaries by Devasharma,
Gunashrf, Gunamati, and Sthiramati were not translated into
Tibetan, 238 but those authors as well as Bhavaviveka and his
commentator, Avalokitavrata, mainly used syllogisms (prayoga,
sbyor ba). The other commentaries on the Treatise, the Akutobhaya— accepted as being falsely attributed to Nagarjuna239—
and Chandrakirti's Clear Words do not mainly use syllogisms;
however, Buddhapalita's commentary predates Chandrakirti's.
Also, the authorship of the short Akutobhaya is doubtful, though
it certainly is not by Nagarjuna because his chief disciples did
not quote it whereas they did liberally quote Nagarjuna's commentary on his Refutation of Objections (VigrahavyavartanT).
Also, chapter twenty-seven of the Akutobhaya quotes Aryadeva,
and Nagarjuna would not have quoted his own student.240 Thus,
because Buddhapalita was the first main commentator on the
Treatise to use consequences instead of syllogisms, Jam-yangshay-ba considers him to be the founder of the Prasangika
system. Still, not even Jam-yang-shay-ba says that Buddhapalita
specifically rejected the usage of syllogisms as the best means of
generating in an opponent the view that all phenomena are
empty of inherent existence.241
Buddhapalita is said to have written many books, but only his
commentary on Nagarjuna's Treatise survives in Tibetan or any
other language. He achieved a meeting with Manjushri and
attained tantric realization.
The great teacher Bhavaviveka (or Bhavyakara, Bhavaviveka,
Bhavya, Bhavyaka, Bhavyakara, Bhavyaviveka, Bhavivikta,
Bhaviveka, or Bhagavadviveka)242 author of many books and
source for much of what is known about Buddhist and nonBuddhist tenets, objected to Buddhapalita's consequences used
in refuting the four extreme types of production—from self,
History of the Mahay ana
361
other, both, or neither. Bhavaviveka also heartily refuted the
Chittamatra position of no external objects and its notion that
imaginary phenomena (parikalpitadharma, kun btagspa'i chos),
such as analytical cessations, do not inherently exist. He asserted
that all phenomena do not exist ultimately but do conventionally
exist inherently or naturally; he thereby founded the great
system of Svatantrika-Madhyamika.
Bhavaviveka is considered to be the founder of Svatantrika
even though his commentator, Avalokitavrata, says that Bhavaviveka was following Devasharma's commentary on Nagarjuna's
Treatise, for he was the first to set forth extensively the incorrectness of Chittamatra (which he considered to be just Asanga's
fabrication and not taught by Buddha at all) and the correctness
of Madhyamika within the context of asserting that conventionally all phenomena exist inherently. Similarly, Nagarjuna was
preceded in his views by the king Indrabhuti and the great Brahmin Saraha, but they are not assigned as the founders of Madhyamika because they did not set off Madhyamika in contradistinction to the other Buddhist systems.243
Bhavaviveka founded the Svatantrika system when Asanga's
Chittamatra system had been widely disseminated. He vowed to
attain Buddhahood during his life, but attained it in the next as
Vajraghantapada. Both he and Chandrakirti were students of
Nagarjuna toward the end of his six hundred year life.
After Bhavaviveka's founding of the Svatantrika system, Chandrakirti rejected the usage of autonomous syllogisms (svatantraprayoga, rang rgyud kyi sbyor ba) and established the Prasangika
system as different from Svatantrika and the other Buddhist
schools of tenets. He refuted inherent existence (svabhavasiddhij
rang bzhin gyis grub pa) both ultimately and conventionally, establishing that even conventionally phenomena are only designated
by thought.
Manjushrf told Dzong-ka-ba, founder of the Ge-luk-ba order in
Tibet, that the tenth ground Bodhisattva Chandrakirti had descended from a realm very high in the world system to spread
Nagarjuna's system and that his explanations were in all ways
reliable. Though Chandrakirti openly refuted Bhavaviveka,
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Meditation on Emptiness
Vasubandhu, Dharmapala, Dignaga, and so forth,244 no one
openly refuted him. To some this shows that Chandrakirti lived
much later than them; however, Jam-yang-shay-ba is of the opinion that Chandrakirti was an actual student of Nagarjuna.
Dzong-ka-ba's disciple Kay-drup says that this view is supported
by the masters of the Guhyasamaja Tantra (Guhyasamaja),
scriptural citation, and reasoning.245 Thus, through living for
three hundred years, Chandrakirti was roughly contemporaneous with those scholars whom he refuted.
In order to overcome others' sense that things exist the way
they appear, Chandrakirti once milked a picture of a cow. Living
for three hundred years in the usual gross physical body, he is
said still to be alive in a rainbow body. As evidence of this, he
met with a Tibetan translator of his Supplement to (Nagarjuna's)
'Treatise on the Middle Way'; due to his speaking quickly some
errors appeared in the translation.246
Just after Chandrakirti's three hundred years, Shantarakshita
founded the Yogachara-Svatantrika-Madhyamika system. He is
similar to a Yogacharin, or Chittamatrin, in that he shows that
external objects do not exist either conventionally or ultimately
and that objects conventionally are of the same entity as the perceiving consciousness.247He is a Svatantrika because he holds that
phenomena only conventionally exist inherently and a Madhyamika because he accepts that all phenomena do not exist ultimately. Similarly, Bhavaviveka's Svatantrika-Madhyamika
system is called Sautrantika-Svatantrika-Madhyamika because,
like a Sautrantika, he asserts the existence of objects external to a
perceiving consciousness—that is, gross objects which are aggregates of particles. (Prasangikas assert conventionally existent
objects that are external to a perceiving consciousness but are
not aggregates of particles, only imputed to them.)
Just as Nagarjuna and Bhavaviveka were anticipated in their
teachings by other scholars who, however, did not open a broad
path for the chariots of their systems to travel, so Shantarakshita
was anticipated by others. Vimuktisena's view is clearly that of a
Yogachara-Svatantrika-Madhyamika, and Maitreya's Ornament
for Clear Realization (Abhisamayalamkara), which was brought
History of the Mahayana
363
to this world by Asanga on his return from the Joyous Pure Land,
manifests the same view. Also, it is clear that the YogacharaSvatantrika-Madhyamika system was present during the time of
Bhavaviveka who was a definite predecessor of Shantarakshita.
For he refuted it, saying that to accept mind-only first and then
to pass on to the view of no ultimate existence is like spreading
mud on the body and then washing. Avalokitavrata interprets
Bhavaviveka's referent as Chittamatra, but the only system that
passes through the gradation of realizing first mind-only and
then no ultimate existence is Yogachara-Svatantrika. Also, Yogachara-Svatantrika was present later when Shantarakshita was
examining to discover which type of Madhyamika was the best.
He made this choice and through his extensive works founded the
system that was the final major development in the Madhyamika system, the Yogachara-Svatantrika-Madhyamika. Chandrakfrti's Prasangika-Madhyamika, however, held sway, ultimately becoming the dominant system throughout Tibet and
Mongolia.248
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Meditation on Emptiness
Chart 41:
Mahayana Chronology in India
0 A.N. (After the Nirvana)
Buddha died, having lived
eighty-one years and two
months.249
400 A.N.-1000 A.N.
Nagarjuna, the founder of the
Mahayana system in general
and the Madhyamika system
in particular.
900 A.N.-1050 A.N.
Asanga, the founder of the
Chittamatra system.
Approx. 975 A.N.-1275 A.N.
Chandrakirti, the
disseminator of Prasangika.
Bhavaviveka, the founder of Svatantrika-Madhyamika in general
and Sautrantika-Svatantrika-Madhyamika in particular, preceded Chandrakirti by a little, and Buddhapalita, the founder of
Prasangika-Madhyamika, preceded Bhavaviveka by a little.
Shakyamitra, Nagabodhi, and Ashvaghosha were students of
Nagarjuna near the end of his life.
Padmasambhava died in 864 A.D. after living one thousand
seven hundred and seventy-three years, and Shantarakshita died
in 845 A.D. after living nine hundred and ninety-nine years.250
5
Chittamatra
Sources
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
Corresponding section of the translation pp.602-20
The Chittamatrins (Mind-Only-ists) are so called because they
assert that all phenomena are of the nature or entity of the
mind.251 (They are also called Vijnanavadins and Vijnaptivadins
for the same reason.) This is not the same as asserting that all
phenomena are mind because minds are observers of objects,
and if all phenomena were minds, stones and so forth would
absurdly have objects of observation.252 Rather, just as dream
objects are not the mind that perceives them but also not separate entities from the mind, so the objects of the world are not the
consciousnesses that perceive them but also not separate entities
from those consciousnesses.
Another name for Chittamatrins is Yogacharins, (Practitioners
of Yoga), because they arrange the practices of the path "from the
viewpoint of yoga. This, however, is just an etymology and not
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Meditation on Emptiness
a definition because all Buddhist tenets are presented for the sake
of yogic practice.253
The Chittamatrins are divided, like the Sautrantikas, into
Followers of Scripture and Reasoning. The former are followers
mainly of Asanga's Five Treatises on the Levels, and the latter of
Dignaga's Compendium of Valid Cognition and Dharmakfrti's
Seven Treatises on Valid Cognition. Though, in general, the
term 'Chittamatrin' refers to the Followers of Scripture, that is,
of Asanga, the Followers of Reasoning are said to be the more
advanced of the two groups.254 This is because Asanga teaches
that there are three final vehicles, meaning that some sentient
beings never achieve Buddhahood because their vehicle is completed at a lower stage on which they remain forever. According
to him, some Hearers only realize that a person is not a selfsufficient entity and never realize that objects and subjects are
empty of being separate entities. These Hearers aim only toward
a solitary peace. The Chittamatrin followers of Dharmakfrti,
however, point to the impermanence of fetters and to the skill of
the Buddha in teaching and thereby show that all eventually
cognize both selflessnesses and attain the highest enlightenment.
Thus for them there is only one final vehicle and all sentient
beings eventually attain Buddhahood.
The Sautrantikas Following Reasoning interpret Dharmakfrti's teachings otherwise and accept three final vehicles but
with oniy one type of realization of selflessness. This selflessness
is the emptiness, or absence, of a self-sufficient person. In both
Chittamatra schools, however, there are different types of selflessness which vary in difficulty of realization, it being more
difficult to realize that objects and subjects are empty of being
separate entities than to realize that a person is not a self-sufficient
entity. Thus, there are two types of selflessness: one of phenomena in general and one only of persons.
The Chittamatra Followers of Scripture are the only Buddhist
school to accept eight consciousnesses: the five sense consciousnesses, a mental consciousness, a mind afflicted with egoism
(klishtamanas, nyon yid) and a mind-basis-of-all (alayavijnana,
kun gzhi rnam shes). The Followers of Reasoning and all other
Chittamatra
367
Buddhist schools assert only six consciousnesses with some of
the functions of the seventh and eighth being performed by the
mental consciousness. There are sub-schools of Chittamatra
which assert one, two, seven, and nine consciousnesses, but they
are considered to have strayed from the positions of the four
Buddhist schools of tenets.
The definition of a Chittamatrin is:
a person propounding Buddhist tenets who uses reasoning to refute external objects and who asserts that
dependent phenomena, such as consciousnesses, truly
exist.
MIND-ONLY
Mind-only is the very core of the Chittamatrin teachings; for
them it means that there are no objects which are entities external to a perceiving consciousness. They and the YogacharaSvatantrikas, who assert mind-only conventionally, are the only
Buddhist schools which assert that there are no external objects.
All the other schools—Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, SautrantikaSvatantrika, and Prasangika—assert that an object of a sense consciousness is an entity external to the perceiving consciousness.
For them, objects are a cause of a consciousness in that they
cause it to be produced in their image. Causes must exist before
their effects, not simultaneously or afterward because nothing
can affect an already existent entity in that very moment.255
Thus, because of the cause and effect relationship of object and
sense consciousness, and because causally related things must be
different entities, the non-mind-only oriented schools assert that
object and subject are different entities.
The Chittamatrins disagree, saying that Buddha taught that a
sense consciousness perceives a present object, whereas if object
and subject were cause and effect, then, since a cause has ceased
when its effect exists, a sense consciousness would be perceiving
a past object. The non-mind-only schools must accept that an
object of a sense consciousness exists one instant prior to its
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Meditation on Emptiness
apprehender, but they say that the object is present in that there
is no moment intervening between the object moment and the
perceiver moment. The Chittamatrins, however, are able to
uphold Buddha's teaching on this point without any qualifications; for them, object and subject exist simultaneously. A seed
(bija, sa bon) or predisposition (vasana, bag chags) is activated
and simultaneously produces both an object and a cognizing
subject, much as in a dream. (A Buddha has no seeds or latencies
but perceives objects through the complete awakening or actualization of his collections of merit and wisdom.)
For the Chittamatrins, an object is of the same nature or entity
as its perceiving subject, although an object is not a mind, not a
cognizing agent, illuminating and realizing objects. If an object
were a mind, it would have to be shown that it apprehends
objects, and such cannot be shown. In this way, with object and
subject the same entity and different isolates, not synonyms but
mutually exclusive with one never the other, the Chittamatrins
are able to uphold mind-only and still present the five aggregates, including forms. There are no forms that are separate entities from a perceiving consciousness, but there are forms that are
the same entity as a perceiving consciousness. Again, as with the
Prasangikas' assertion of nominally existent objects, the view is
extremely subtle, and it should not be thought that because the
system says there are objects, it is referring to objects as one
knows them. For, a sense consciousness of a sentient being perceives objects as if they were distant and cut off, whereas the
objects declared to be existent in the Chittamatra system are not
cut off from the subject.
According to the Chittamatrins, the final root of cyclic existence is the conception that object and subject are different entities; this is the subtlest and strongest of all misconceptions, and
when it is destroyed, all misconceptions are destroyed. Thus, the
subtle selflessness of all phenomena is a non-difference in entity
between subject and object. Bodhisattvas mainly meditate on
this and thereby overcome the obstructions to simultaneous and
direct cognition of all phenomena.
Included in the obstructions to simultaneous and direct
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cognition ofall objects ofknowledge, together with the conception
of object and subject as different entities, is the conception that
phenomena naturally exist as the grounds or bases of engagement
of names.256 The non-existence of objects as natural bases of
engagement of names is a selflessness of phenomena that is as
subtle as the non-existence of subject and object as different entities, but is easier to realize. An understanding of it serves as a
means of entering into an understanding of non-duality.
In refuting that phenomena naturally exist as grounds or bases
of names, the Chittamatrins are not merely saying that the
appearing objects of thought, meaning-generalities, do not
naturally exist because of depending on thought. For the Sautrantikas propound such, and here a subtle selflessness of phenomena must be more subtle than anything found in the lower
systems of tenets. Nor are they saying that forms and so forth do
not naturally exist because for them forms naturally exist as
unpredicable phenomena. Forms do naturally, truly, inherently,
and ultimately exist because if they did not, they would not exist
at all. For the Chittamatrins, the Prasangika view that objects do
not naturally, truly, inherently, and ultimately exist is a denial of
phenomena; if impermanent things did not naturally exist, they
would be totally non-existent.
When the Chittamatrins speak of objects as not being naturally bases of names, they base this on the adventitious relationship between objects and names and between names and objects.
For instance, when an ordinary beirg's eye consciousness
perceives a pot, the pot not only appears to be a bulbous thing
able to hold fluid, but also the bulbous thing appears to be the
basis of the designation 'pot'. The bulbous thing seems to be the
basis of the designation 'pot' by way of its own being and not just
established so by verbal convention. After an eye consciousness
perceives the object, thought imputes, 'This is a pot,' without
the intervention of any other thought. The sense consciousness
alone is able to draw thought into imputing, 'This is a pot,' without the aid of intervening reflection. Therefore, when another
asks what the expression 'pot' means, people do not say 'It is the
"pot" that is only nominally imputed to a bulbous thing capable
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of holding water.' They say, 'It is a bulbous thing capable of
holding water.'
Due to previous conditioning, objects falsely appear to sense
consciousnesses as if naturally bases of names, and then thought,
assenting to this appearance, falsely conceives them likewise.
This is the Chittamatrin assertion. The Sautrantikas say that
both the appearance of objects as naturally bases of names and
the conception of them as so are correct because sense objects are
truly existent external objects, and when they appear to a faultless sense consciousness, their very mode of being must appear
just as it is. Still, they say that mental images which appear to
internal thought do not naturally exist and are only a reification
of what depends on thought for its existence.
In the Chittamatra system, forms and so forth are not external
objects; they appear to be external objects through the force of
predispositions accumulated through beginningless conditioning to the naming of objects. Forms are only of the nature of
inner consciousness, but appear to be natural bases of names
through the force of predispositions for expression. Therefore,
the appearance of forms as naturally existent bases of names is
not suitable to arise from the way things are, without dependence on establishment by names and thoughts. Otherwise, the
fact that forms are the bases of names would not depend on a
consciousness, in which case forms would be different entities
from a perceiving consciousness, and this is refuted by many
reasonings. The assertion that things are not by way of their own
character grounds of the designation of names meets back to the
assertion that subject and object are not different entities.
If the opposite were true—if things were naturally bases of
names—then the establishment of a bulbous thing as the basis of
the name 'pot' would not depend on thought because it would
exist as the basis of the name 'pot' through its own mode of
being. If this were accepted, then the generation of a consciousness that thinks, 'Pot,' would not depend on thought. If this
were accepted, then it would follow that before one learned the
name 'pot' a consciousness thinking, 'This is a pot,' would be
generated through only looking at a bulbous thing.
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Furthermore, since one being who has many names would
inherently be the bases of these names, this one being would
have to be that many beings. Just as the names appear to be
different to thought, their objects would have to be different in
reality because objects would naturally generate a naming consciousness.
Also, two beings who have the same name would be one being,
similar to their one name which appears the same to thought.
Therefore, phenomena do not naturally exist as bases of the
affixing of names, and thought which apprehends them so is
mistaken. It is undeniable that beings perceive objects as if they
were of their own nature the bases of the affixing of names; this
false perception must be destroyed.
One is exhorted to engage in the four investigations and the
four cognitions:
1 investigation into whether names are merely adventitious,
mere imputation, or whether they are designated through the
force of the object's own mode of being
2 investigation into whether objects naturally or adventitiously
exist as bases of names
3 investigation into whether in the designation of entities the
relationship between the word and the object exists substantially
4 investigation into whether objects exist naturally as bases of
the designation of qualities, such as their production, destruction, color, impermanence, and use.
1 realization that names do not exist inherently in the objects
they denote
2 realization that objects do not exist inherently as the bases of
the designation of names
3 realization that the designation of entities based on the relationship of names and objects does not exist inherently
4 realization that the designation of qualities does not exist
inherently.
The latter four are realized conceptually on a Bodhisattva's paths
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o f accumulation and preparation and directly or non-conceptually
on the paths of seeing, meditation, and no more learning. They
act as a means of entering into a realization of mind-only.
Through establishing that a mental consciousness is mistaken
when it apprehends objects as naturally existent bases of names,
it is also established that such an appearance to a sense consciousness is mistaken. It is thereby negated that objects are
external entities, unrelated to consciousness, and thus it is established that objects are only appearances to the consciousness that
apprehends them. Thereby, it is refuted that a spot of blue, for
instance, is a different entity from its perceiving consciousness.
Asanga collected many examples from sutras to show that
cognition is possible without external objects. For instance, no
one considers it to be contradictory for a yogi who is meditating
on ugliness to have a consciousness of an image of foulness without this foulness existing in reality. Just so, it is not contradictory
to have a consciousness of external objects due to the predispositions of ignorance even though there are no external objects.
Similarly, hell-beings see a bowl of fluid as molten bronze.
Hungry ghosts see it as pus and blood; animals such as fish, as an
abode; humans, as water for drinking; gods, as ambrosia. If these
existed as external objects, there would be the contradiction of
one thing having many contrary natures. Therefore, everything
is just consciousness, that is, of the nature of mind.
Furthermore, if there were external objects, the externality of
objects would be their mode of being, and thus the uncontaminated wisdom that cognizes the mode of being would be conceptual. Ordinary beings would absurdly be directly perceiving the
mode of being and so would lack ignorance. There also would be
no liberation from ignorance and thus no means of developing
an omniscient consciousness. Therefore, external objects are
only fabrications of thought.
The example of a magician's illusions is given to overcome
doubt that without external objects one could not apprehend
objects. The example of a mirage is given to overcome doubt
about how minds and mental factors could be produced without
external objects. The example of a dream is given to overcome
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doubt about how one could find things attractive and unattractive without external objects. The example of a hallucination is
given to overcome doubt about how the varieties of consciousness could be produced without external objects. The example
of an echo is given to overcome doubt about how the various
expressions could arise without external objects. The example of
a moon reflected in water is given to overcome doubt about how
an image that is an object of meditative stabilization could arise
without external objects. The example of magical manifestation
is given to overcome doubt about how Bodhisattvas are born in
accordance with the thoughts of beings.
From these examples of the production of a consciousness
without the presence of an external object one can realize that it
is possible for external objects to be non-existent.
The Chittamatrins refute the view that material objects are
constructed from the amassing of partless particles through
pointing out that if a partless particle is surrounded by other particles, the place where one of the surrounders touches the one in
the center would not be the place where the others do and thus
there would be touched and untouched parts. Or, if the supposed six particles surrounding the center one all touch the same
place on the center particle, then nothing could be larger than
the one partless particle. Some respond saying that the surrounding particles do not touch the center particles, but it is
answered that nevertheless one of the surrounders would be
closer to one side of the center particle than the others, and so the
center particle would have to have sides and thus parts.
Furthermore, a spot of blue and an eye consciousness that
apprehends it are not different entities because the observation
of one by a valid cognizer is co-extensive with the observation of
the other by a valid cognizer. In other words, whenever an eye
consciousness observes an object, a self-consciousness observes
the eye consciousness. (For Chittamatrins and some Sautrantikas every consciousness is self-conscious because later when an
object seen is remembered, one also remembers the subject.
This shows that the subject must have perceived itself at the
same time as it was perceiving its object; otherwise, the subjective
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element would not be remembered.)257 Dharmakfrti states the
reasoning of necessary simultaneity of observation of the subject
and the object to prove that a sense consciousness and its objects
are not different entities. This is based on the concomitance of
whatever are necessarily simultaneously observed with absence
of difference of entity.
Jang-gya258 explains that the above reasoning does not just
prove a non-affirming negative which is a non-difference of
entity of subject and object; it also implicitly proves that a sense
object and a sense consciousness which apprehends this object
are one entity. For if two things that exist are not different entities, they must be one entity. Also, this reasoning is used as a
means to realize mind-only; therefore, how could it merely be
establishing a non-affirming negative—a non-difference of entity
of subject and object? To cognize the thesis would imply a cognition of sameness of entity of subject and object. Thus, Jang-gya,
unlike Jam-yang-shay-ba, finds it difficult to say that for Chittamatrins what is being proved here is just a non-affirming negative. However, on other occasions, he seems to agree with Jamyang-shay-ba that a subtle selflessness of all phenomena is a nonaffirming negative—a mere non-difference in entity between
subject and object. This non-affirming negative is a quality of
each and every phenomenon because an object is empty of, or
lacks, a difference in entity from a subject, and a subject is empty
of a difference in entity from its object.259 Each phenomenon
from a form through to an omniscient consciousness possesses
such a quality, which is an ultimate truth because of being a final
object of observation of a path of purification. Blind to this excellent quality, sentient beings wander in cyclic existence, assenting
habitually to the false appearance to their senses of a difference
in entity between subject and object.
PRASANGIKA CRITIQUE OF MIND-ONLY
The Prasangikas say that Buddha set forth a non-literal teaching
of mind-only in order to overcome certain trainees' attachment
to forms; the basis in his own thought was the fact that the mind
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375
is the principal creator of everything.260 The explicit teaching
that objects are of the same entity as the mind is refuted by the
reasoning that subject and (external) object are mutually existent; if one exists, the other must exist, and if one does not exist,
the other must not exist. Therefore, mind-only in the sense of no
external objects is not taken literally. Both object and subject are
conventionally existent, and conventionally there are objects
external to a perceiving consciousness.
According to Prasangika, the mind is the principal creator of
everything because sentient beings accumulate predisposing
potencies through their actions, and these actions are directed by
mental motivation. These potencies are what create not only
their own lives but also the physical world about them. All environments are formed by karma, that is, actions and the potencies
they establish. The wind, sun, earth, trees, what is enjoyed,
used, and suffered—all are produced from actions. Potencies on
the mind of each person in combination with those of similar
beings create the very substance of their world system. The Prasangika assertion is not like the Chittamatrin one that a potency
or seed simultaneously creates a cognizing subject and a cognized
object. Rather, the physical world is constructed through the
former actions of beings of similar type, and that world is conventionally an entity external to a consciousness which perceives
it. For, the world of objects acts as a cause of consciousness,
affecting it in various ways.
Still, the mind, the motivator of actions, is the principal creator. The Prasangika view, like that of Chittamatra, is of a world
inextricably involved with the person. Mahayanists practice the
Bodhisattva deeds of compassion with a view toward the creation of pure lands for temporary Emanations (Nirmanakaya,
sPrul sku), who are surrounded by both common beings and
Superiors, and a Highest Pure Land (Akanishta, 'Og min) for
their immortal Enjoyment Body (Sambhogakaya, Longs sku)
which is surrounded only by Bodhisattva Superiors. In these
lands one provides the conditions for others to advance on the
path, including the land on which they stand. Perhaps it could
be said that development of the ability to produce pure lands is a
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conscious sublimation of the uncontrolled process of the creation of less suitable worlds by contaminated actions.
Both Chittamatrins and Prasangikas accept roughly the same
presentation of phenomena; they disagree on their nature. For
instance, both schools accept that when different types of beings
look at a bowl of fluid, the fluid actually becomes different
things. For a human it is cool water; for a god, ambrosia; for a
hungry ghost, pus and blood etc. To a Chittamatrin this in itself
proves that there are no external objects; the very world of
objects is under the influence of the mind, changing in entity due
to the presence of different types of beings. To a Prasangika,
however, such changes in the external world show that objects
do not inherently exist and show how powerful the mind and the
potencies of actions are. Such changes are a sign of the lack of
inherent existence in that objects depend on their perceivers and
are not existent just in and of themselves under their own
power.261 Even when a human and a hungry ghost perceive a
bowl full of fluid simultaneously, a Prasangika is ready to say
that there are two parts to the fluid, one water and one pus and
blood, existing simultaneously as external objects. It is even said
that a hungry ghost, who possesses a coarse body, can stand in
the same spot as a human, who also possesses a coarse body.
For a Prasangika, the examples of dreams and so forth show that
objects can appear to be inherently existent but not be so; they can
be unfindable among their bases of imputation and still be effective. That objects are not naturally bases of names proves, for a
Prasangika, that phenomena do not inherently exist; the Chittamatrins misunderstand the import when they add that sense
objects are inexpressible truly existent phenomena. From their
examination of names and the naming process the Chittamatrins
make the unwarranted conclusion that objects are of the nature of
the mind. They mistakenly think that by knowing that a sense consciousness misperceives its objects as naturally bases ofnames one
will somehow be caused to realize that the perception of objects as
external entities is mistaken. For the Prasangikas the reasoning
which proves that objects are not naturally bases ofthe designation
of names proves that all phenomena do not inherently exist. All
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377
phenomena depend on the mind which imputes them; this very
dependence is a sign of their non-inherent existence. Still, the
Chittamatrin analysis of names and objects is a stepping-stone to
the Prasangikas' more subtle teaching.
According to Prasangika it is simply wrong to say that a spot of
blue and an eye consciousness that apprehends it are necessarily
simultaneously observed by valid cognizers and, therefore, are
not different entities. For there is no self-consciousness. If there
were self-consciousness, then agent and object would be one; a
knife could cut itself; a finger could touch itself, with toucher
and touched exactly identical. A lamp does not illumine both
itself and the other because a flame itself has no darkness to clear
away; it is bright by nature. If light illumined light, then darkness would obscure darkness in which case darkness would not
be seen.
Here 'self-consciousness' (svasamvedana, rang rig) refers
specifically to a consciousness's cognition of itself simultaneous
with cognizing its object and does not refer to introspection or
watching oneself. All systems advocate reliance on introspection
and self-awareness which are essentials for effective meditation;
in these cases the mind is perceiving a previous moment of the
mind or a part of the mind is perceiving the general mind. Even
in systems that assert self-consciousness, it is not an aid to selfawareness. 'Self' in 'self-consciousness' means the consciousness
itself and not the person. Self-consciousness is a consciousness's
perceiving itself in a non-dualistic manner; it does not involve
analysis such as whether the mind is wandering or remaining
with its object.262
Without self-consciousness, it cannot be shown that an eye
consciousness apprehending a spot of blue is observed by a selfconsciousness at the same time that the spot of blue is observed
by the eye consciousness. Thus, another supposed proof of the
non-existence of external objects falls, the conclusion for
Prasangika being that a difference in entity between subject and
object exists conventionally though certainly not in the manner
in which common beings perceive it.
Still, for Chandrakirti not all teachings of mind-only even
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literally mean that there are no external objects; sometimes this
teaching literally and without interpretation indicates that the
mind is the principal creator of all the varieties of objects. Thus,
there are two types of mind-only doctrines: non-literal and literal.
Both need finally to be interpreted to discover the final mode of
existence of the mind and its objects as lacking inherent existence, but when the teaching of mind-only only indicates that the
mind is the principal creator as in the Siitra on the Ten Grounds,
it is validly established and literal. This is Chandrakirti's Prasangika interpretation of the literal and non-literal teachings of
mind-only.
The Sautrantika-Svatantrika Bhavaviveka is far more severe.263
He says that Buddha never taught a mind-only which means no
external objects; even the teachings that Chandrakirti accepts as
superficially teaching no external objects Bhavaviveka says do
not. They are all literal, teaching that the mind is the principal
creator. Bhavaviveka accuses Asanga of fabricating a teaching of
no external objects and polluting Buddha's teaching out of pride
in his abilities as a scholar. Bhavaviveka takes the YogacharaSvatantrika teaching that first one realizes mind-only and afterwards realizes the lack of true existence of the mind and compares it to first smearing mud on the body and then bathing. He
questions why one should not from the beginning attempt the
best teaching which is the lack of true existence of all objects. For
him the Chittamatra emptiness is not a step on the ladder toward
the Madhyamika emptiness whereas for the Ge-luk-bas it is.
Still, according to the Ge-luk-ba interpretation of Prasangika
one cannot be liberated from cyclic existence through cognizing
a lack of difference in entity between subject and object and cannot attain omniscience through the Chittamatra system. For the
Prasangikas, to be a Superior (Aryan, 'Phagspa)—one who has
attained a direct cognition of emptiness either as a Hearer, Solitary Realizer, or Bodhisattva and thereby risen above common
beings—means that one has cognized the absence of inherent
existence of all phenomena. Unlike the other Mahayana schools,
the Prasangikas assert that all Superiors, whether Hihayana or
Mahayana, cognize the same emptiness;264 Mahayanists are
Chittamatra 2>19
more intelligent and their mode of cognition is more forceful,
but the emptiness cognized is the same for all. Without cognizing the lack of inherent existence of the person, one cannot be
liberated from cyclic existence, and the very cognition of the
absence of inherent existence in the person implies the ability to
cognize its absence in other phenomena, such as mind, body,
possessions, and so forth, because the mode of emptiness is similar. It is only the base of the predicate emptiness that is different.
Despite the Prasangikas' view on the profound attainment of
all Superiors, Hihayana and Mahayana, they do not accept that
one can be liberated through cognizing emptiness as set forth by
the other Buddhist tenet systems, Hihayana or Mahayana. One
is thus to distinguish between HTnayana and Mahayana as modes
of the practice of paths and as systems of tenets that describe the
paths followed by HTnayanists and Mahayanists.
Consequently, there are Prasangikas who attempt to cognize
the emptiness of inherent existence as HTnayanists, that is to say,
with the motivation of liberating only themselves from cyclic
existence. They are Mahayanists by tenet but Hlhayanists by
path. A Prasangika can be a Mahayanist by path only through
generating in his or her mental continuum the non-artificial
determination to attain Buddhahood in order to liberate all sentient beings from misery and join all with happiness. He must
generate an attitude of compassion which exceeds the usual by
taking upon himself alone the burden of liberating all beings
from suffering. Through much artificial practice he must bring
this wish to the point of spontaneity. Finally, whether walking,
eating, standing, or lying down he is able to generate a sense of
dedication toward altruistic enlightenment through just turning
his mind to the topic. When he is able to do this out of meditative
session just as strongly as he can at the time of meditation, this is
the sign that he has attained the spontaneous aspiration to
enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings. Thereby, he
becomes a Bodhisattva and attains the path of accumulation,
which is this spontaneous wish itself as well as his other practices. He then becomes a Mahayanist by both path and tenet.
Buddha Superiors as well as Bodhisattva, Solitary Realizer,
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and Hearer Superiors are all Prasangikas by tenet because they
have cognized emptiness directly. The attainment of special
insight into emptiness is simultaneous with the attainment of the
path of preparation, and thus even persons on any of the three
paths of preparation (Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Bodhisattva)
must also be Prasangikas.265
Cognition of a non-difference in entity between object and
subject is mistaken because it contradicts what exists, since a
difference does exist conventionally. It must be remembered that
for something to be conventionally or nominally existent the
object cannot be found separate from or among the bases of its
designation. Also, it must be remembered that the mode of direct
cognition of emptiness is such that subject and object are undifferentiated like fresh water poured into fresh water and that a Buddha
continually abides in this state even when he is perceiving conventional objects. Perhaps, the Chittamatrins are attempting to
describe this aspect of the final state and extend its significance to
every mental state.
The Prasangikas are describing another aspect, the continual
perception of the unfindability of the imputed object in its bases
of imputation, relegating the unusual mode of direct cognition of
this unfindability to the analogy of water poured into water.
Also, when Prasangikas practice the stage of generation in Highest Yoga Tantra, they visualize themselves as deities and their
surroundings as the habitation of a deity, with the persons and
objects forming their environment as the same entity as themselves. It is specifically said that one is not to view the surrounding sentient beings as having minds that are entities separate
from one's own mind. The sameness of entity of subject and
object is brought into practice as an aid to realizing the more
subtle presentation of emptiness as the lack of inherent existence.
The Prasangikas do not say that the Chittamatrin teachings
are not appropriate for certain trainees; at issue is which teaching
is the higher, which can liberate sentient beings from cyclic
existence, and which can establish sentient beings in omniscience. Their exclusivity comes in declaring their own teaching
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to be the only final teaching. For either school to declare that the
other is its equal would be to deny their own emphasis on reasoning as a means of bridging the gap between misconception and
insight.
BUDDHA N A T U R E
In the Tathagata Essence Sutra, the Nirvana Sutra, and so
forth,266 Buddha speaks of a permanent, fully developed Buddha
possessing the ten powers and existing in the continuum of each
sentient being. The Prasangikas say that this teaching is an
example of giving to the 'cause' the name of the effect, for the
emptiness of the mind of each sentient being is what allows for
change of that person's mind, and this emptiness is being called a
fully developed Buddha. The emptiness of the mind, its lack of
existence by way of its own being or its dependence on causes
and conditions, is that most marvelous quality of the mind allowing it to be transformed into the wisdom of a Buddha. This
emptiness is not a fully developed Buddha but is like a 'cause' of
Buddhahood in that if the mind did not lack inherent existence,
it would be utterly static, unable to be affected by practice of the
paths.
Buddha praised this essential and marvelous 'cause' calling it a
fully developed Buddha. In order to lead beings who were incapable of understanding emptiness correctly, he taught a Tathagata essence which is a fully developed Buddha obscured in the
sheaths of misconception. The basis in his thought was the existence of the Tathagata essence or Buddha nature which is the
emptiness of the mind—not a fully developed Buddha, which
could never be obscured, dulled, or hidden by anything.
Buddhahood is not a temporary but an immortal state in which
body and mind, though impermanent, are similarly and endlessly produced.
Buddha set forth the non-literal teaching of a Tathagata
essence for Mahayana trainees who are not yet able to cognize
the profound emptiness; he taught it in order to allay their fears
of emptiness. The refutation of the explicit teaching is that all
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sentient beings would be Buddhas, and practice of the path
would be senseless.
The Buddha nature, that is, emptiness of the mind, of each
sentient being is his natural lineage, that quality which naturally
abides in the mental continuums of all sentient beings allowing
them to attain Buddhahood and thus giving them the Buddha
lineage (gotra, rigs) or Buddha constituent (dhatu, khams). It is
called a 'cause' of development into Buddhahood even though,
being permanent, it is not actually so. The emptiness of the
mind is permanent, or non-disintegrating, because although it is
a predicate of the mind, it is not produced and destroyed each
moment as the mind is. Emptiness is the mere negative or
absence of objective existence. 'Permanent' for all Buddhist
schools except Vaibhashika means 'non-disintegrating', without
necessarily indicating perpetual existence. However, the emptiness of the mind is both non-disintegrating and always existent
because from beginningless cyclic existence each sentient
being's mind has existed and will continue to exist uninterruptedly right through Buddhahood when it is the Wisdom Body
(Jnanakaya, Ye shes kyi sku). The emptiness of the mind,
because it is the precondition of change and transformation, is
called a 'cause' of Buddhahood and according to a practitioner's
position on the path is temporarily called a Hearer, Solitary
Realizer, or Bodhisattva lineage. At Buddhahood, the Bodhisattva lineage becomes the Nature Body (Svabhavikakaya, Ngo
bo nyid sku) of a Buddha. Though the emptiness of the mind is
permanent and non-changing, it is said to improve when the
mind of which it is a predicate improves. Finally, the mind itself
reaches consummation as the Wisdom Body, and the emptiness
of the mind becomes the Nature Body—these being the two
aspects of a Buddha's Truth Body (Dharmakaya, Chos sku), so
called because the Wisdom Body is the ultimate true path and
the Nature Body is the ultimate true cessation.267
For the Chittamatrins also, the teaching of a Tathagata
essence as a fully developed Buddha in the continuums of all sentient beings is non-literal. For them, the basis in Buddha's
thought was the mind-basis-of-all (alayavijnana, kun gzhi mam
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383
shes), the impermanent basis of all attainments. A seed naturally
abiding in the mind-basis-of-all is the natural lineage, an impermanent phenomenon which is the potential for spiritual attainment.268 Here, it is not emptiness that is called the Buddha
nature but a potency predisposing the individual to certain paths
and allowing the attainment of states that never existed before in
the mental continuum. This seed, therefore, is not planted or
established newly 'on' the mind-basis-of-all but abides there
naturally, without beginning.
In sum, neither Chittamatrins nor Prasangikas accept as literal
the teaching of a permanent body of Buddha obscured in the
continuums of all sentient beings. According to the Ge-luk-bas
an assertion of this teaching as literal is beyond the pale of the
four schools of tenets of this Buddha's teachings. The Prasangikas, taking the Descent into Lanka Sutra as their source, show
that the teaching of a permanent essence points to the lack of independent existence of the mind, that quality which when cognized
can lead to Buddhahood. Emptiness in general is the element of
(superior) qualities (dharmadhatu, chos dbyings) because meditation on it acts as a cause generating the qualities of Superiors.269
The emptiness of the mind is singled out as the Buddha nature
because it specifically allows for mental improvement- and the
cognition of what previously was not cognized.
MIND-BASIS-OF-ALL
According to the Chittamatra system as explained by Asanga,
each sentient being has a mind-basis-of-all.270 It is a repository of
seeds or predispositions, including those that simultaneously
produce an apprehending subject and an apprehended object. It
is a non-defiled, neutral consciousness and thus capable of being
'infused', or 'stained', or 'perfumed' with virtuous, non-virtuous,
and neutral potencies. It is a steady consciousness capable of
existing through states which are otherwise mindless, such as
deep sleep, the meditative equipoise of cessation, and fainting. It
derives its potency from one complete action done in the past
and lasts as long as the potency established by that action lasts.
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Meditation on Emptiness
It pervades the entire body, and when a person is about to die,
his mind-basis-of-all withdraws from the limits of the body,
slowly making those parts cold. Finally, it leaves the body and
takes rebirth through the force of another of its seeds, carrying
with it the seeds already accumulated but not yet activated. It is a
continuum of seeds, similar to a stream, existing for Hearers and
Solitary Realizers until they become Foe Destroyers and for
Bodhisattvas until the eighth ground. Beyond these levels it is
called a fruition consciousness (vipakavijnana, rnam smin rnam
shes) until Buddhahood when it is transformed into a mirror-like
wisdom.
The principal function of the mind-basis-of-all is contained in
its seed aspect. However, the senses themselves and all the
objects that appear to them also appear to the mind-basis-of-all,
but it does not notice or identify them, nor is it capable of either
remembering or inducing another consciousness to take notice
of them. A sense consciousness directly perceives its objects and
is capable of drawing the mental consciousness into noticing or
identifying them; however, although objects appear to a mindbasis-of-all, it is incapable of drawing the mental consciousness
into noticing those objects.
The Chittamatrins who follow Asanga are the only school to
assert the existence of a mind-basis-of-all. Along with it, an afflicted mind (klishtamanas, nyonyid) is asserted, together with the
other six consciousnesses that are commonly accepted: eye, ear,
nose, tongue, body, and mental consciousnesses. A mental consciousness ascribes names to objects, perceives slightly hidden
objects such as impermanence and emptiness, misconceives a
difference of entity of subject and object, and so forth. A mindbasis-of-all does not cognize emptiness even though it has seeds
with it that ripen and cause a mental consciousness to do so.
The afflicted mind, or the seventh from among the eight consciousnesses, mistakenly conceives the mind-basis-of-all to be a
self-sufficient person. Even though the mind-basis-of-all, because
it is the transmigrating entity, is indeed found to be the actual
person when one searches to find it, it is not a self-sufficient
person. Thus, the seventh mind is described as afflicted by four
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mental factors: view of a self, obscuration with respect to a self,
pride in a self, and attachment to a self. When these mental factors are overcome through their antidote—realization of selflessness—the untainted entity of the seventh mind remains. Then,
when the conception of subject and object as different entities is
destroyed totally and forever at Buddhahood, the seventh mind
is transformed into the wisdom of sameness cognizing all phenomena as equally free from a difference in entity between subject
and object.
All Buddhist schools refute a certain type of self and accept
another.271 All deny that there is a permanent, single, independent self. All except the Pudgalavadins (Proponents of a Person)
deny that there is a substantially existent or self-sufficient
person; they present the person as something other than these
two. The Pudgalavadins assert a self which is neither the same as
nor different from the mental and physical aggregates. The
Kashmiri Vaibhashikas and the Sautrantikas Following Scripture assert that the continuum of the mental and physical aggregates is the self. The Sautrantikas Following Reasoning, the
Chittamatrins Following Reasoning, and the SautrantikaSvatantrika-Madhyamikas assert that a subtle form of mental
consciousness is the self. The Chittamatrins Following Scripture assert that the mind-basis-of-all is the self. The YogacharaSvatantrika-Madhyamikas assert that the continuum of the
mental consciousness is the self. For Prasangika, none of these is
the self, which is the I imputed in dependence upon the mental
and physical aggregates.
Those who accept a consciousness as the actual self are specifically referring to the transmigrator, a neutral, subtle entity.
They also accept that there is a self imputed to the aggregates,
but in all systems except Prasangika 'only imputed' (prajnaptimatra, btags pa tsam) eliminates only that something separate
from its bases of imputation is the self, not that the composite of
the bases of imputation or any one of them is it. Therefore, Tugen (Thu'u-bkvan, 1737-1802) says that only in the Prasangika
system does the word 'only imputed' have its full meaning.272 In
all the other systems something must be the self; otherwise, for
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Meditation on Emptiness
them there could be no transmigration, activity, and so forth.
They identify the mental consciousness or the continuum of the
aggregates as the self. Their meaning of 'only imputed' carries
the sense of identification with one or more of the bases of imputation. In the Prasangika system 'only imputed' means that also
not any of its bases of imputation is the self; nonetheless, the
imputed self or person can function. The mere-I is the transmigrator and the carrier of the seeds or potencies from one life to
another. It is the object that gives rise to the thought '1' in lifetime after lifetime. It is the I that is imputed or designated in
dependence upon the mental and physical aggregates in the
Desire and Form Realms and upon only the mental aggregates in
the Formless Realm. The Chittamatrins, however, assert that
the mind-basis-of-all is the actual I since it is the transmigrator
and carrier of seeds.
Thus, it should not be thought that because the Buddhist systems deny self, there is no transmigrator. The non-Buddhist systems could not posit transmigration without a permanent self; the
Buddhisi schools oftenets, on the other hand, posit many different
modes of transmigration without a permanent self.
The Chittamatrins following Asanga feel that because Buddha
said that the six consciousnesses of a person do not function in
deep sleep and in the meditative equipoise of cessation, etc.,
there must be another very subtle consciousness, the continuity
of which keeps the person alive.273 Also, since the six consciousnesses have periods of non-existence, the seeds or predispositions, if stored there, would be destroyed, and the continuity of
lives would be severed. Therefore, they posit the existence of a
mind-basis-of-all. The schools that accept the mental consciousness or its continuum as the self answer that Buddha was referring to the coarse states of the mental consciousness and that
there is a subtle, neutral, stable mental consciousness that passes
from one lifetime to another and exists through the equipoises of
cessation, bearing the continuity of the seeds.274
The Chittamatrins following Asanga accept that a mind-basisof-all is accompanied by the five mental factors that accompany
any consciousness—feeling, discrimination, intention, contact,
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387
and mental engagement. The absorption of cessation is nevertheless without coarse feeling and discrimination even though the
mind-basis-of-all and its five factors are present because the feeling and discrimination that accompany the mind-basis-of-all are
subtle and non-manifest. This same reasoning allows the other
schools to posit a subtle mental consciousness that is accompanied by such subtle, non-manifest factors and thus to say that
there is no need to assert a separate mind-basis-of-all as an eighth
consciousness.275
PRASANGIKA POSITION ON
THE MIND-BASIS-OF-ALL
In the Prasangika system, external objects, and not seeds, are
what provide sense objects although the overlay of false appearance is produced from seeds. A mental consciousness, and not an
afflicted mind, misconceives the nature of the person. A subtle
mental consciousness, and not a mind-basis-of-all, abides
throughout the 'mindless' states. The mere-I, not a mind-basisof-all, transmigrates. The six consciousnesses are temporary
bases of seeds; the mere-I, not the mind-basis-of-all, is the
constant basis of the seeds.
The basis in Buddha's own thought when he taught a mindbasis-of-all was emptiness, the basis of all phenomena which is to
be minded well (alayavijnana). Taking vijnana not as referring
to the agent or action of knowing but as the object, the Prasangikas see the mind-basis-of-all as referring to the 'basis of all to be
known well or in detail', emptiness. Emptiness is the basis of all
in that it makes possible all the various types of beings, nirvana,
cyclic existence, and so forth.
Buddha's purpose in teaching a mind-basis-of-all was to provide a base for the transmission of cause and effect through a
continuum of lives for those disciples who could not understand
the mere-I as the bearer of predisposing tendencies. The refutation of the explicit teaching is that, although a mind-basis-of-all
is said to be impermanent, it is like the Samkhyas' nature
(prakrtirang bzhin) which contains all causes.276 Because the
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Meditation on Emptiness
causes already exist, everything would necessarily be produced
all of the time, or once and never again.
The Yogachara-Svatantrikas, who do not assert an external
world, do not even conventionally assert a mind-basis-of-all; for
them, a mental consciousness bears the seeds that create the
appearance of an external world. Thus, it is said that no Madhyamika school asserts the existence of a mind-basis-of-all even
though one Indian Madhyamika, Abhayakara, early in his life is
said to have asserted a mind-basis-of-all.277 There are also a few
passages in Nagarjuna's writings that refer to a basis-of-all, but
these are said to refer to the mental consciousness that takes
rebirth.278
Although Nagarjuna does say once in his Precious Garland and
once in his Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning that everything is included
in the mind, the Ge-luk-bas point to his Essay on the Mind of
Enlightenment for his position:279
A knower realizes an object known.
Without an object known, there is no knower.
Also, many yogic treatises make reference to a basis-of-all (alaya,
kun gzhi), but there the term means the nature of phenomena
(dharmata, chos nyid), or emptiness.280 Thus, not even conventionally do the Prasangikas accept a mind-basis-of-all; they say that
this teaching points to emptiness, the basis of all change.
T H R E E NATURES
Buddha said that every phenomenon has three natures (trisvabhava, rang bzhingsum): imaginary or imputed (parikalpita, kun
btags), other-powered (paratantra, gzhan dbang), and thoroughly established (parinishpanna, yongs grub).m There are an
endless number of non-existent imaginaries, such as the horns of
a rabbit or the hairs of a turtle, but according to the Chittamatra
system the most significant imaginary nature of every phenomenon is its being a different entity from an apprehending subject. Buddha called attention to an illusory element in ordinary
perception, the bifurcation of object and subject into separate
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389
entities, calling it 'imaginary' to show that it is utterly unfounded
and should be eradicated.
Subject and object as different entities are non-existent
imaginaries, as are objects that are established by way of their
own character as bases of names and self-sufficient persons.
Ordinary beings experience objects in an unfounded way, as if
they were entities separate from themselves and as if they were
naturally bases of the affixing of names, and conceive themselves
to be the lord or controller of mind and body. Buddha called
these elements imaginaries because they are mere reifications
through names and thoughts and do not actually exist.
The objects that serve as the bases for misconceiving imaginaries are other-powered natures. These are impermanent phenomena produced not by their own power but in dependence on
specific aggregations of causes and conditions which are other
than themselves. These phenomena lack independence, unable
to remain any longer than their own one moment. By calling
impermanent products 'other-powered natures', Buddha draws
attention to the dependent nature of products, countering the
usual tendency to see objects as if they exist in themselves. These
phenomena are falsities because they appear to be natural bases
of names and to be entities separate from a perceiving subject but
are not. They are said to deceive because they appear one way
and exist another. However, products, though falsities, do not
falsely exist; rather, they truly exist since they are produced from
causes and conditions.
The non-existence of such an imaginary nature in a dependent
nature is a thoroughly established nature. This is immutable and
the final object of observation by a path of purification. An
object which is a different entity from a subject does not exist; a
subject which is a different entity from its object does not exist;
these non-existences are emptinesses in the Chittamatra system.
The emptiness of subject and object as different entities is
named 'thoroughly established' in direct contrast to 'imaginary'
in order to show that this is the highest quality of an object and
should be sought. The thoroughly established nature includes
the emptiness not only of subject and object as different entities
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Meditation on Emptiness
but also of objects which are naturally existent as bases of names
and of a self-sufficient person. 'Emptiness' in the Chittamatra
system refers to these three.
All phenomena, from forms through to omniscient consciousnesses, have the three natures—even permanent phenomena
such as space and emptiness, though for these the term
'dependent nature' does not mean 'that which is dependent on
causes and conditions for its production' but just identifies the
entity of permanent phenomena as a base of an imaginary nature
and a thoroughly established nature. Or, according to another
interpretation, the dependent nature of a permanent phenomenon refers to a consciousness which cognizes it and is an
impermanent phenomenon dependent on causes and
conditions.282
Products, or impermanent phenomena, themselves are
dependent natures, and thus it should not be thought that a
product is one thing and its dependent nature another. Among
permanent phenomena, emptinesses are thoroughly established
natures, and space, analytical cessations, and non-analytical cessations are a special category of existent imaginaries, being
imaginary in the sense that they appear to exist by way of their
own character but do not, since they are posited in dependence
on terms and thoughts. Space, for instance, is the mere absence
of obstructive contact and is cognized by non-Buddhas only
through inference—appearing to the mind through the elimination of obstructive contact.
A phenomenon's thoroughly established nature (ultimate
truth) is not a different entity from its dependent nature (conventional truth). The relationship of the two is a sameness of entity
within a difference of isolates. An emptiness is a dependent
nature's own non-difference in entity between subject and
object.
Emptinesses—that is, thoroughly established natures—truly,
ultimately and naturally exist as do dependent natures, because
the Chittamatrins consider that for an emptiness or a product to
exist at all, it must ultimately exist.
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391
PRASANGIKA VIEW ON T H E T H R E E N A T U R E S
The Prasangikas say that Buddha taught that thoroughly established and dependent natures truly exist in order to overcome
the fright of those who could not understand how an emptiness
or an impermanent phenomenon could not truly exist but still
exist. According to the Prasangikas, the basis in Buddha's
thought was the conventional existence of all phenomena, since
objects are imputed by terms and thoughts, unfindable among
their bases of imputation, but conventionally existent.
The Prasangikas also substitute inherent existence as the chief
non-existent imaginary in place of non-difference in entity
between subject and object. In their interpretation the nonexistence of dependent phenomena as this imaginary is a thoroughly established nature because no phenomenon ultimately
exists and all phenomena exist only conventionally. Beings are
called to identify a mistaken aspect in all ordinary perceptions,
the appearance of objects as if they exist right there in their bases
of imputation; such objects are called 'imaginaries' in order to
show their unfounded character and the necessity of ridding oneself of the misperceptions and misconceptions of inherent existence. In the Prasangika system, the absence of inherent existence
as a predicate of dependent phenomena is their thoroughly
established nature, appearing in direct perception to exist the
way it actually does. Emptiness is not a realm separate from the
world of objects but their highest quality. Buddha implicitly
exhorts yogis to discover and cognize it through giving it the
name 'thoroughly established nature'.
An emptiness no more truly exists than any other phenomenon, but just as products can be cognized directly despite
their lack of true existence, so an emptiness can be cognized
directly despite its lack of true existence. Through accustoming
oneself to its import, the cyclic existence which is generated
through the conception of imaginaries can be stopped, and
dependent natures can be seen as they are.
Since in Prasangika emptiness—the absence of inherent
existence (svabhavasiddhij rang bzhingyis grub pa)—is the nature
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Meditation on Emptiness
{svabhava, rang bzhin) of all phenomena, it should not be
thought that svabhava is refuted in all its meanings. Svabhava
meaning svabhavasiddhi or 'inherent existence' is refuted, but
svabhava as 'final nature' or just 'character' (such as heat and
burning as the character of fire) is not refuted.
The final nature that ordinary beings imagine in dependent
phenomena is an imaginary, but for a Buddha the actual final
nature is a thoroughly established nature. However, this does
not mean that there are two ways of looking at dependent phenomena, one in which a dependent phenomenon itself becomes an
imaginary and another in which it becomes a thoroughly established nature. Rather, the 'final nature' in reference to an
untutored being is an imaginary because he or she conceives the
inherent existence of dependent phenomena to be real, and the
final nature in reference to a Buddha is a thoroughly established
nature because a Buddha continually perceives the absence of
inherent existence as the reality of objects. The attempt here is to
avoid making products into emptinesses, to preserve thoroughly
established natures as the nature of phenomena and not make
them the phenomena themselves even in the eyes of a Buddha.
Still, Buddhas simultaneously and directly cognize all phenomena and their emptiness with the same consciousness.
T H R E E FINAL VEHICLES
All Buddhist systems of tenets, Hinayana and Mahayana, accept
three vehicles: Hearer, Solitary Realizer, and Great Vehicles.283
These are three different modes of practice for three different
types of individuals. The Vaibhashikas, Sautrantikas, and Chittamatrins who follow Asanga accept that there are three final
vehicles or, in other words, that there are some beings who never
attain the highest achievement because, after completing their
lower vehicle, they do not pass on to the higher. Specifically, it
means that there are some sentient beings who never attain
Buddhahood.
For the Vaibhashikas, Shakyamuni Buddha is the only being
of this period to attain Buddhahood; a Buddha is a being who
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393
accumulated the collections of wisdom and merit for three
countless eons whereas the most that any other being is capable
of achieving is in the neighborhood of one hundred eons, as in
the case of a rhinoceros-like Solitary Realizer.284 Also, Buddha
eradicated both obscurations, the afflictions of desire, hatred,
and ignorance and the non-afflictive ignorance. The first prevents the attainment of liberation from cyclic existence, and the
second prevents the attainment of an all-knowingness which in
their system is not the simultaneous cognition of all phenomena
but the knowledge of everything one by one. Hearer and Solitary
Realizer Foe Destroyers have eradicated the afflictions, but they
have merely abandoned the non-afflictive ignorance through
non-attachment.285 Thus, for the Vaibhashikas, Hearer and Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers are inferior to a Buddha and never
attain Buddhahood; they finish their paths, and upon death the
continuum of mind and body ceases in a remainderless nirvana.
'Remainderless' means that there no longer is any mind-body
complex that derives its impetus from contaminated actions and
afflictions; a remainderless nirvana is a substantiality (<iravya,
rdzas) and a functioning thing (bhava, dngos po) which is the
cessation of the obstructions to liberation from cyclic existence,
its function being the prevention of obstructions.286 Since
Vaibhashikas do not accept that a Foe Destroyer after death
forms a new physical support through pure wishes and meditative powers, the attain er of a remainderless nirvana is said to be a
person about to pass into extinction but not one who has passed
into extinction, for there is no mind, body, or person after a
remainderless nirvana.
The Sautrantikas' assertion of three final vehicles is roughly
similar; however, they assert that a remainderless nirvana is a
phenomenon (dharma, chos), not a functioning thing (bhava,
dngos po) but rather a non-affirming negative which is a nothingness. For the Hihayana schools, manifestation after the death of
an enlightened being is impossible, whereas the Mahayanists
disagree, comparing Hihayanists to Nihilists on this point.
The Chittamatrins who follow Asanga also propound three
final vehicles, saying that because sentient beings have different
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Meditation on Emptiness
types of minds and different styles of behavior, their vehicles
must also be different.287 Some beings want only their own
happiness; some want others to suffer; some want happiness for
themselves and desist from harming others; some want only the
happiness of cyclic existence; some want only to liberate themselves from cyclic existence; and some want only to free others
from cyclic existence. These differences of attitude and style of
behavior arise from differences in faith and interest which in
turn are due to the presence of different lineages. Since it is thus
unquestionable that the various lineages are different in the
causal state, in the effect state they would not all pass into only
one vehicle.
These Chittamatrins, therefore, assert three final vehicles as
well as five lineages. The five are:288
1 those who from the point of attaining the path of accumulation
right through to attaining the path of no more learning are
Hearers, not changing or abandoning paths in mid-stream
2 those who from beginning to end are Solitary Realizers
3 those who from beginning to end are Bodhisattvas
4 those who are indefinite, first in one vehicle and then another,
either advancing upward as from a Hearer path to a Bodhisattva one, or falling downward as from a Bodhisattva path to
a Hearer one
5 those who have no lineage for liberation from cyclic existence, will never free themselves from misery, and will never
attain omniscience.
Hearers are so called because they hear the doctrine from
others and when they attain the fruit of practice, cause others to
hear that they have attained the goal, 'I have done what was to be
done; other than this I will not know another existence.'289 Or in
another etymology, Hearers are so called because they hear
about the superior fruit of Buddhahood or its path from a Buddha
and, without practicing it, proclaim it to others. According to the
Chittamatrins following Asanga, the Hearers 'who travel only to
peace', upon attaining the state ofFoe Destroyer, do not pass on to
the Mahayana but at death enter into a remainderless nirvana.
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395
However, those Hearers do not become extinct but possess a
wisdom of perpetual meditative absorption in the sphere of
peace. They have eradicated the obstructions to liberation from
cyclic existence and through their meditation do not possess the
obstructions to omniscience, but the latter have not been abandoned through their antidote, and, therefore, they are not
Buddhas.290 Thus, Chittamatra, unlike the Hihayana schools of
tenets, does not propound that the continuum of mind and body
ceases in a remainderless nirvana because a Hearer Foe Destroyer is reborn in a pure land in meditative absorption inside a
great lotus.291 A distinctive feature of the Mahayana teaching is
the assertion that pure wishes and meditative powers can cause
one to be reborn in a pure land, whereas for the Hinayanists it is
as if cleansing the process of rebirth involves destroying the
ability to manifest. For the Mahayanists, the process of purification reveals increasing control over mind and matter to the point
where Buddhas and Bodhisattvas even after their 'deaths' can
appear simultaneously in many places in order to aid beings.
That each Buddha has an immortal Enjoyment Body abiding in
his Highest Pure Land is a Mahayana tenet not shared with
HTnayana.
The Chittamatrins following Asanga say that there are other
Hearers who complete their vehicle, attain the state of Foe Destroyer, and through the urgings of a Buddha, pass on to the
Mahayana, eventually attaining Buddhahood.292 They enter the
Mahayana after attaining a nirvana with remainder. They have
been liberated from cyclic existence but still possess a body—remainder—that derives its impetus from contaminated actions
and afflictions. However, they have attained nirvana because
they have passed beyond sorrow, which is identified as the afflictive obstructions, the chief of which in the Chittamatra system is
the conception that a person is a self-sufficient entity separate from
the mental and physical aggregates. They enter the Mahayana and
are empowered by the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas so that
although they appear to pass into a remainderless nirvana, they
do not, remaining alive in a magical manifestation which not
even the gods can see. They complete the collections of wisdom
I
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Meditation on Emptiness
and merit, meditating on the non-difference in entity between
subject and object, thereby destroying the obstructions to simultaneous cognition of all phenomena. Becoming Buddhas, they
complete the Mahayana path.
The Chittamatrins following Asanga say that Buddha sometimes taught one vehicle rather than three in order to draw those
of indefinite lineage into the Mahayana and to keep those Bodhisattvas who might fall to a lower path within the Mahayana.
However, the Chittamatrins Following Reasoning—the Mahayana followers of Dharmakirti—answer that there is only one
final vehicle,293 for contaminations are caused and, therefore,
impermanent. Also, it is not that there is no means of eradicating
the afflictions because through cultivating the antidotes to their
causes all contaminations are eradicated. Also, it is not that there
is a means but no one knows it because one who knows the
nature of the causes knows their antidotes. Also, it is not that
there are none who seek it because the compassionate seek to
overcome suffering. Also, it is not that there is no teacher of the
means because a protector Buddha teaches a path he manifestly
sees, knowing the effects of his teaching and thereby not erring.
ONE FINAL VEHICLE IN PRASANGIKA
The Prasangikas agree that there is only one final vehicle, saying
that when Buddha taught three final vehicles the basis in his own
thought was that temporarily there are three different vehicles.
His purpose in teaching three final vehicles was to overcome the
fright of those who could not imagine completing the immeasurable collections of merit and wisdom of the Mahayana. The
explicit teaching of three final vehicles is contradicted by the
presence of a Buddha nature in every sentient being.
Just as the proponents of mind-only assert that a basis-of-all
acts as the basis of the phenomena of cyclic existence and of
nirvana, so the Madhyamikas assert that a natural lineage, or the
mind's lack of inherent existence, acts as the base and support of
all phenomena of cyclic existence and of nirvana.294 Emptiness
should not, however, be confused with a physically pervasive
ft
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397
entity that produces all phenomena. Emptiness is the base of all
phenomena because due to the lack of inherent existence all the
actions and agents of cyclic existence and of nirvana are possible.
For if phenomena existed inherently, they would be independent and thus incapable of change through being acted upon by
causes. Emptiness does pervade all phenomena in the sense that
wherever there is a phenomenon there is an emptiness, but it is
not a material substance that produces phenomena. Still, without it change would be impossible, and in this light emptiness
can be viewed even as the 'substance' of phenomena.
Emptiness is not only the object of the highest wisdom and of
the path of deliverance; it is the very justification of change,
allowing beings of different types to reach the same high achievement. The mind's character of dependence on causes— its noninherent existence—is the Buddha nature that makes Buddhahood possible for all.
6
Madhyamika
BACKGROUND
Sources
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way
Dzong-ka-ba's Ocean of Reasoning
In the Ge-luk-ba monasteries of Tibet the Madhyamika system
was studied through textbooks written as commentaries on Chandrakirti's Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle
Way'(Madhyamakavatara).
Madhyamaka, in the title, refers to
Nagarjuna's Madhyamakashastra and not to his other works
because when Chandrakirti quotes the Madhyamakashastra, he
merely says, 'From Madhyamaka,' whereas when he quotes
Nagarjuna's other works, he refers to them by their own names.
The word madhyamaka itself is formed from the stem madhya
meaning 'middle', with the affix ma yielding a derivative noun
that has the same meaning as its base. Madhyama means 'the
very middle' or 'the middlemost'. Bhavaviveka derives the affix
ka from the verbal root for 'proclaiming', kai, thus taking madhyamaka as meaning 'that which proclaims the middle', that is,
either a person, a system of tenets, or treatise that propounds the
middle. In the case of Nagarjuna's title, it refers to a treatise
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setting forth the middle, or middle way not in the sense of the
middle path but the middle way things are; therefore, the word
Madhyamaka when used in this sense is translated as Treatise on
the Middle Way even when it is not accompanied by the explicit
word for 'treatise', shastra.
Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way extensively teaches
both the profound emptiness and the extensive varieties of spiritual paths, etc. His text delineates reasonings that establish an
emptiness of inherent existence as the final mode of existence of
all phenomena, not with one or a few but many examples and
through many approaches in twenty-seven chapters. The four
noble truths, the two truths, nirvana, production, perception,
etc. are analyzed with respect to activity, agent, and object,
appropriator and appropriated, substance and attribute, and so
forth. In his treatise, Nagarjuna treats the two truths even more
extensively than Chandrakfrti does in his Supplement. The
Treatise teaches:296
1 the nature of the two truths
2 that if one does not know the two truths, one does not know
the essence of Buddha's scriptures
3 the purpose of teaching the two truths
4 the faults of misconceiving the two truths
5 that because the two truths are difficult to realize, Buddha did
not teach them in the beginning.
Nagarjuna says:
1 (XXIV. 8)
Doctrines taught by the Buddhas
Rely wholly on the two truths,
Worldly conventional truths
And ultimate truths.
Truths are objects that exist the way they appear. Thus, conventional objects are truths only in the sense that they seem to
exist the way they appear for an ignorant consciousness, a concealer (samvrti) of suchness through conceiving phenomena to
exist inherently. Hence, all objects except emptinesses are
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conventional truths or truths-for-a-concealer. An emptiness,
however, is a truth because it exists the way it appears to direct
perception, this is, as empty of inherent existence. It is an ultimate truth, because among phenomena it is supreme since
through meditating on it obstructions are removed and since it is
the object of the highest wisdom.
2 (XXIV. 9)
Those who do not comprehend
The difference between these two truths
Do not know the nature
Of the profound doctrine of Buddha.
Those who do not know the difference between conventional
and ultimate truths do not know the essence of Buddha's teaching, the principle of the profound dependent-arising. Therefore,
one who wants to know the actuality of the Conqueror's teaching should comprehend the suitability of all actions, objects, and
agents in dependently produced and dependently designated
conventionalities that appear like a moon in water. Also, one
must comprehend by that very reason the mode of the ultimate
that abandons the two extremes of inherent existence and total
non-existence.
3 (XXIV. 10)
Without relying on conventions
The ultimate cannot be taught.
Without realizing the ultimate
Nirvana is not attained.
Someone says, 'If the ultimate is a nature free of [dualistic] elaborations, then it needs to be taught, but what is the point of
teaching conventionalities such as the aggregates, constituents,
and sources? If the unreal is to be abandoned, there is no point in
teaching what is to be abandoned.'
Answer: Although it is true that the erroneous—conventionalities that appear to be real but are not—are to be abandoned, the
ultimate cannot be taught without depending on worldly ultimates such as object of expression, expresser, knowing, object
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known, and so forth—the conventions related with Superiors
that are asserted to be conventional truths. Also, without teaching the ultimate, it cannot be realized, and without that, nirvana
cannot be attained. Therefore, because of being the means of
attaining liberation, just as one who wants water has need of a
vessel, so initially one definitely should assert conventionalities
just as they are.
4 (XXIV. 11)
If emptiness is viewed wrongly,
Those of small intellect are hurt,
Like wrongly holding a snake
Or wrongly using a spell.
A yogi who realizes that conventional truths produced merely
through ignorance do not inherently exist and realizes their ultimate emptiness will not fall to the two extremes. For he does not
conceive that an objectively existent nature, which formerly
existed, now does not exist. Also, because he has not damaged (or
refuted) worldly conventionalities that are like reflections, he has
not damaged actions and their fruits (and thus does not fall to an
extreme of nihilism). Such a yogi also does not falsely superimpose ultimate existence on phenomena because he has seen
that actions and their fruits can occur in only non-inherently
existent things; he knows that things do not inherently exist, and
that all actions, their fruits, and so forth would not be possible if
they inherently existed. Those, however, who see that phenomena do not inherently exist without perceiving such a difference between the two truths either think that things do not exist
or impute true existence to emptiness and thereby think that
things inherently exist as bases of emptiness. These are both
wrong ways of viewing emptiness, and in this way those with
little intellect are hurt.
When they see that things do not inherently exist, it seems to
them that there is no way of positing actions, agents, and objects,
whereby they conclude that all does not exist—falling to a view
of deprecation. Or, if they do not deprecate everything, they
question how these things, while they are being apprehended,
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403
could be empty of inherent existence—concluding that the
meaning of non-inherent existence is not the meaning of emptiness and thereby abandoning emptiness. Through this they
accumulate an action (karma, las) resulting in being bereft of the
doctrine and are born in a bad migration.
5 (XXIV. 12)
Therefore, realizing that the dull-witted
Would have trouble understanding this doctrine,
The mind of the Subduer
Turned away from teaching doctrine.
Since one who views emptiness wrongly is harmed and since
those of little intelligence cannot apprehend the meaning of
suchness correctly, after enlightenment Shakyamuni—when he
saw the dispositions of sentient beings and the great profundity
of the doctrine—knew that those of little intellect could not realize the depths of the profound doctrine of dependent-arising.
Therefore, his mind turned away from teaching. (This, however, is accepted as being his first teaching, for his pretended
retreat from teaching indicated the profundity of his doctrine
and thereby generated interest.)297
Chandrakfrti did not treat all these topics in his Supplement,
which is, therefore, less extensive than the Treatise though of
greater length. A work is extensive not because of a great number of words, but because of covering many topics; for instance,
Maitreya's Ornament for Clear Realization is short but its meanings are indeed vast. Therefore, Nagarjuna's Treatise is more
extensive than Chandrakirti's longer Supplement.
Furthermore, the Treatise is not limited to an extensive explanation of emptiness; it also extensively sets forth the suitability of
conventional phenomena within an emptiness of inherent existence as well as the four truths, actions and their effects, the Three
Jewels, the eight levels of approaching and abiding in the fruits of
Stream Enterer, Once Returner, Never Returner, and Foe Destroyer, and so forth. Jam-yang-shay-ba298 says that if, as some
scholars say, Nagarjuna's Treatise does not set forth the varieties
of phenomena, paths, and so forth, then to do so, it would be
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necessary to give a tally of the bugs in the world. Still, Jam-yangshay-ba agrees that these varieties are not the principal object of
discourse in the Treatise; the profound emptiness is. When
Nagarjuna identifies particular phenomena which are the bases
of their own emptiness, he explicitly but secondarily indicates
the paths, grounds, fruits, and so forth. As Nagarjuna says
(XXIV. 14ab):
For whom emptiness is possible
For him all is possible.
The establishment of the phenomena of cyclic existence and nirvana is possible when emptiness is possible. If things inherently
or naturally existed, they would be independent and could not be
affected by causes and conditions. Emptiness, or the lack of
inherent existence, makes possible production, abiding, and
disintegration.
Chandrakfrti's Supplement reveals emptiness through far less
forms than the Treatise; it is a supplement in that it fills certain
holes in the Treatise that became apparent with the founding of
the Chittamatra and Svatantrika systems. Nagarjuna wrote the
Treatise during his second proclamation of doctrine which preceded the founding of those two systems. Therefore, the Treatise
required clarification to show that it was not suitable to interpret
its meaning according to those systems.
Chandrakfrti also provides an extensive discussion of the three
types of compassion (compassion observing sentient beings,
observing sentient beings as qualified by momentary impermanence, and observing sentient beings as qualified by non-inherent
existence), the ten Bodhisattva grounds, Buddhahood, and the
cultivation of calm abiding on the fifth ground and special
insight on the sixth. Jam-yang-shay-ba explains that Chandraklrti was not filling holes in the Treatise in the sense of providing
what was incomplete or making extensive what was not already
extensive, but rather in the sense of making the extensive more
so and of taking secondary subjects as principal. He explains that
Chandrakfrti makes clear that students of the Treatise should
practice the Bodhisattva paths and ascend the grounds.299
Chandrakfrti wrote a commentary to his own Supplement; the
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405
founder of the Ge-luk-ba order, Dzong-ka-ba (1357-1419) wrote
a commentary called Illumination of the Thought, Extensive
Explanation of (Chandrakirti's) 'Supplement to (Nagarjuna's)
"Treatise on the Middle Way"', and the major Ge-luk-ba monastic colleges have their own commentaries on both Chandrakirti's
and Dzong-ka-ba's works, usually in the form of general explanations accompanied by debates. These works are the basis for the
study of Madhyamika and more particularly of Prasangika, centering on the topic of the two truths.
TWO TRUTHS
Sources
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
The two truths are objects, not vague concepts of truth, beauty,
and so forth.300 They are phenomena (dharma, chos), objects
(vishaya, yul), existents (sat, yodpa), and objects of knowledge
(jneya, shes by a).
Truths are those things that exist the way they appear, and
thus only ultimate truths (paramarthasatya, don dam bdenpa) or
emptinesses qualify as truths. The other various and sundry
objects do not exist the way they appear, except to Buddhas.
These objects are truths only for a concealer of suchness, an
ignorant consciousness; therefore, they are called truths-for-aconcealer (samvrtisatya, kun rdzob bden pa).
Truths-for-a-concealer are falsities, appearing one way and
existing another. Thus, since only an ultimate truth can actually
sustain the meaning of truth, it is not truths that are divided into
the two truths. Objects of knowledge, or phenomena, are the
basis of division of the two truths. The Meeting of Father and Son
Sutra (Pitaputrasamagama) says, 'Objects of knowledge are
exhausted in the two truths.'
Since those which are divided into the two truths are phenomena (and the synonyms of 'phenomena'), each member of
either division is a phenomenon, an object, an existent, and an
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object of knowledge. This means that an emptiness is a phenomenon, object, existent, and object of knowledge as are all other
various and sundry objects.
Among six positions on the topic of what is divided into the
two truths which are refuted by Jam-yang-shay-ba is that of the
translator Ngok, (Ngog-lo-tstsha-ba bLo-ldan-shes-rab) and his
followers, who do not accept that an emptiness is an object of
knowledge because the mere non-finding of an object under analysis is just called an emptiness, and, thus, there is no phenomenon 'emptiness' existent there. Ngok's idea is that if an analytical consciousness cognized an emptiness, then that emptiness
would necessarily inherently exist. For, an analytical consciousness is searching to find whether an object inherently exists or
not, and if it 'finds' or cognizes an emptiness of inherent
existence of that object, then it would seem that the emptiness
must inherently exist since, according to him, it would be able to
bear ultimate analysis. Therefore, according to him mere
appearances are the basis of the division into the two truths and
not objects of knowledge because an ultimate truth, that is, an
emptiness, is not an object of knowledge.
The Ge-luk-ba answer301 to this is: An analytical consciousness
investigating whether a table, for instance, is separate from its
basis of designation, or is the composite of its bases of designation, or is some one of its bases of designation does not find a
table. This very non-finding is an emptiness, and this nonfinding is 'found' or cognized by an analytical consciousness.
However, because an analytical consciousness is not investigating whether the emptiness of the table can be found, its 'finding'
or cognizing the emptiness of the table, i.e., its lack of inherent
existence, does not necessitate that the emptiness be inherently
existent. This is because the analytical consciousness was not
searching for the emptiness of the table but for the table. When,
in turn, an analytical consciousness searches for the emptiness of
the table, it also cannot be found; an emptiness of the emptiness
of the table is 'found'. This type of finding does not mean that
the object can bear ultimate analysis; nothing can bear ultimate
analysis; even an emptiness cannot.
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407
Every emptiness is, in turn, qualified by an emptiness, necessitating an infinite regress, but this does not entail a fallacy just as
there is no fallacy in the fact that there are an infinite number of
causes that eventually lead to the production of a sprout. Infinite
regresses are damaging only when they necessitate an impossibility; since the causal sequence that leads to the production of a
sprout can stretch back through measureless time, there is no
fallacy such as the impossibility of millions of causes having to
occur in a tiniest moment.
Still, the situation with an infinite number of emptinesses is
different from that of an infinite chain of causes over time. Since
each emptiness of the emptiness of the emptiness of the emptiness, etc., of a table is a phenomenon, they must all be cognized by a Buddha if he is to be omniscient. Also, if first one
emptiness is understood and then the mind turns to the next, and
the next, and the next, there would be no time in which all the
emptinesses related with just one object could be known. However, this is true only for the mode of cognition of emptiness by
inference. An inferring consciousness first realizes the emptiness
of a thing through the medium of a concept; then, through
merely turning the mind to another object, its emptiness is
immediately known. However, when emptiness is directly cognized—that is to say, without the medium of concepts and
images—all emptinesses throughout all world systems are simultaneously known. The mind and its objects—all emptinessesare totally undifferentiated like fresh water poured into fresh
water; a transformation has been effected that allows simultaneous cognition of the emptiness of everything.
Direct cognition of all emptinesses does not mean that all phenomena are directly known; rather, the mode of existence of all
phenomena is realized. When a yogi has become familiar with
direct cognition of emptiness on the Bodhisattva's path of meditation and has completed the necessary stock of merit, he
becomes a Buddha, able to know directly and simultaneously
both the emptinesses of all phenomena and the phenomena
themselves. An analytical consciousness does not create an
emptiness; it discovers the nature of a phenomenon; thus, an
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emptiness of an emptiness does not come into being when the
first emptiness is understood. An emptiness, like any other phenomenon, is itself empty of inherent existence, just as hotness is
the nature of red pepper even when it is not being tasted.302
The emptiness of one thing, though no different in color,
shape, and so forth from another emptiness, is not the emptiness
of another thing. However, because of their similarity of type,
meditation on the emptiness of one thing functions as meditation on the emptiness of all things. For, having inferentially realized the emptiness of one thing, merely turning the mind to
another subject yields cognition of its emptiness without having
to rely again on the process of reasoning.
If the emptiness of one thing were the emptiness of another,
one would be forced to accept that the lack of inherent existence
of a pot is the lack of inherent existence of a person and that the
apprehension of the inherent existence of a pot is the apprehension of the inherent existence of a person, but this is clearly not
the case. One must understand that emptinesses are divided by
way of their bases, that is, the things that are empty. Therefore,
ultimate truth is not partless; otherwise, it would contradict the
various scriptures that speak of two, four, sixteen, eighteen, etc.,
divisions of emptinesses. The King of Meditative Stabilizations
Sutra says, 'Just as you have understood the discrimination of a
self, so apply [this understanding of the lack of inherent existence] to all.'303 Having learned about the emptiness of the
person, a yogi is to apply this understanding to all phenomena;
therefore, knowing one emptiness inferentially does not mean
that all emptinesses are already known. Otherwise, why, after
knowing the emptiness of the person, would one have to apply it
to other phenomena?
The presentation of emptinesses as different emphasizes the
stage of the path concerned with developing an inferential
understanding of emptiness. However, there is the powerful
experience of utter undifferentiability of subject and object in a
direct cognition of emptiness in which it seems that subject and
object become more 'one' than the word 'one' could ever convey.
For 'one' is always a composite of different things; there is no
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'one' that can appear to thought which is not a composite. The
Ge-luk-bas must resort to the realm of exceptions and analogies
at the time of presenting the mode of direct cognition of emptiness; all emptinesses in all world systems are realized, subject
and object are like water in water, but for an outside 'observer'
subject and object are different and each emptiness is different
from every other emptiness. Sometimes, it seems as if the Geluk-bas deliberately disregard the more fantastic, relegating it to
the realm of exceptions rather than attempting to blend the outlooks of higher experiences with their presentation. It seems as if
they occasionally lose sight of the goal during their highly intricate philosophical maneuverings whereas other interpreters
seem more content to keep the goal in mind and risk some apparent difficulties in presenting conventional objects.
This indeed is the way the difference between the Ge-luk-bas
and the non-Ge-luk-bas often appears, if only because the Geluk-bas, having accepted the task of laying out all phenomena
under the umbrella of valid establishment, must spend so much
time in formulating conventionalities. However, there is a
deeper point; in his tantra teaching Dzong-ka-ba objects to those
who do not thoroughly practice the stage of generation—roughly
speaking, imagination of oneself as a deity and one's surroundings as the environment of a deity. He objects to those who
immediately, without ripening their mental continuum, rush to
clear away all forms and abide in some sort of vacuity, which is
not the vacuity that is a negative of inherent existence but
nothingness.304 Similarly, Jam-yang-shay-ba says that in Tibet
few have wished to meditate on emptiness and have called meditation on a vacuity of nothingness meditation on emptiness.305
For him and for Dzong-ka-ba, analytical meditation on emptiness involves reflection on the reasons why things do not inherently exist. The meditator should state to himself a subject, such
as '1', a predicate, such as 'do not inherently exist', and a reason,
such as 'because of not being the same as or different from the
mental and physical aggregates, mind and body'. Then, he
should continue to prove the reason, reflecting on the meaning
until conviction and the resultant intuition are generated. This
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type of meditation acts as an antidote to the misconception of
inherent existence whereas mere withdrawal of the mind from
the object I, though often felicitous, will not counteract the misconception of an inherently existent I.
In Ge-luk-ba teachings, analysis is stressed, and emptiness is
presented as the highest predicate, quality, or nature of each
object—its lack of inherent existence. Non-perception of it is like
not perceiving the best quality of everything one sees—their
thoroughly established nature. The attempt to keep emptinesses
individual is in order to emphasize that each and every one of
these various and sundry objects lacks inherent existence; emptiness is not a vague negative, but a specific negative of inherent
existence in each and every object. The content of wisdom is the
incontrovertible cognition of this.
Other than saying that the experience of a direct cognition of
emptiness is like fresh water poured in fresh water, of what benefit are words like 'one' in leading a yogi to the experience? The
experience is entered through analysis, through gaining an inferential intuition into emptiness and directly attacking the very
cause of cyclic existence, not through superimposing a vague
concept on experience. Though most Tibetan orders, after the
defeat of the Chinese Ho-shang Mahayana, accept analysis, its
use is often more limited for non-Ge-luk-bas than for Ge-luk-bas.
For Dzong-ka-ba an emptiness is an imputedly existent phenomenon like any other object, but for Ngok it is only a designation
pointing to this non-finding of objects by an analytical consciousness. Jam-yang-shay-ba says that in that case an emptiness
would not exist, and there would be no ultimate truths. These
differing systems serve to highlight the fact that nothing can bear
analysis. That the Ge-luk-bas are able to view this non-finding as
an object, an ultimate object, and as validly established allows
them to take literally passages in sutras that others find require
interpretation, such as the presentation ofsuchness as a phenomenon in the Meeting of the Father and Son Sutra above when it
presents objects of knowledge—existents—as the basis of the
division into the two truths. Still, suchness is a mere nonaffirming negative of inherent existence, not a positive
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phenomenon, and when it is realized, one is not thinking, 'This
is emptiness.'
The next position that Jam-yang-shay-ba refutes is that of Tangsak-ba (Thang-sags-pa) who says that the entities of all phenomena beginning with forms, feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, and consciousnesses and extending through to and
including omniscient consciousnesses are the bases of division
into the two truths. The problem with this position is that since,
for instance, a form would be a basis of division into a truth-fora-concealer and an ultimate truth, the ultimate truth which is a
division of the form would have to be a form in which case it
would be composed of material particles. This, of course, is not
Tang-sak-ba's intention; he means that every phenomenon,
from a form through to an omniscient consciousness, has two
entities, one a truth-for-a-concealer and the other an ultimate
truth. However, Jam-yang-shay-ba would perhaps say that when
searching for proper terminology, even unintended absurdities
must be considered.
Some say that non-reified objects are the basis of the division
into the two truths. Just objects which exist, not those falsely reified into existence, are divided into the two truths. To this Jamyang-shay-ba makes the trifling objection that then reified systems, such as Samkhya which falsely reifies many objects, would
not be truths-for-a-concealer whereas they are. Wrong systems,
even if they involve reifications, do exist as systems.
Dak-tsang, in turn, is criticized for his assertion that noninvestigated and non-analyzed objects of knowledge are the basis
of the division into two truths. Dak-tsang's reason is that under
investigation and analysis nothing is found; thus, the two truths
are only non-analytical. Jam-yang-shay-ba rejects this view
because the two truths themselves are objects of intensive analysis. One would have to contradict ChandrakTrti's statement that
Madhyamikas are skilled in presenting what conventionally
exists.306 Also, since an emptiness is found by an analytical consciousness, how can it be said that ultimate truths are nonanalyzed objects of knowledge? 307 Jam-yang-shay-ba thereby also
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rejects Dak-tsang's view that objects of knowledge are established as existing by an ignorant consciousness, refusing a role
for valid establishment in a presentation of what exists.
A fifth position that truths are the basis of division is refuted
by the fact that then truths-for-a-concealer would exist the way
they appear, since they would be truths. The sixth is actually not
a position but a lack of interest in what is divided into the two
truths despite extensive discussion on the two divisions; Jamyang-shay-ba refutes this by saying that then the truths would be
attributes without a substratum.
Thus, the basis of division into the two truths is only objects
of knowledge, and since all existents are divided without residue
into the two truths, there is no third or fourth truth. The four
noble truths are included in the two truths, with true sufferings,
origins, and paths being truths-for-a-concealer and true cessations being ultimate truths, that is, emptinesses within the continuum of those who have abandoned totally and forever any
portion of the obstructions.
Also, the two truths are mutually exclusive and a dichotomy;
in other words, if something exists, it must be either a truth-fora-concealer, or an ultimate truth. Thus, if something is a truthfor-a-concealer, it is not an ultimate truth, and if something is an
ultimate truth, it is not a truth-for-a-concealer. Jam-yang-shay-ba
quotes the Meeting of Father and Son Siitra to prove through
scriptural citation that there is no third truth:308
Without depending on others the Knower
Of the World taught these two truths,
Conventional and likewise ultimate—
A third truth does not exist.
He quotes Kamalashila's Illumination of the Middle Way to show
that the two truths are mutually exclusive contradictories:309
'With respect to phenomena that have the character of mutual
abandonment [i.e., a dichotomy], when having refuted [that
something under consideration] is the one, if it is [also] not established as the other, then it does not exist. Therefore, a position
that is neither is not feasible.'
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The two truths are not different entities but one entity within
nominal difference.310 If conventional and ultimate truths were
different entities, the lack of inherent existence of a form would
not be the final mode of existence of the form because it would be
completely separate from the form. Just so, realization of the
non-inherent existence of a form would not overcome the conception of the form as inherently existent. Also, a yogi's cultivation of high paths would be senseless because understanding
emptiness would not be related with destroying misconception
of the objects themselves. Similarly, a Buddha would not have
forsaken the apprehension of inherent existence because he
would have only a powerless apprehension of an emptiness
which was entirely separate from objects.
On the other hand, if the two truths were utterly the same,
everything true of the one would be true of the other. In that
case, for every truth-for-a-concealer such as desire and hatred
which was overcome on the path, an ultimate truth also would
be overcome. Just as truths-for-a-concealer have many dissimilar
and different aspects such as color, shape, odor, and taste, so ultimate truths would be dissimilar and different. Just as many
truths-for-a-concealer are afflictions, so many ultimate truths
would also be afflictions. Just as common individuals directly
cognize truths-for-a-concealer such as forms, sounds, odors, and
tastes, so they would absurdly directly cognize the emptiness of
forms and so forth.
Therefore, the two truths are not different entities; they are the
same entity. This is what the Heart of Wisdom (the Heart Sutra )
means when it says that emptiness is form and form is emptiness.31 1 The two truths are not one, but are nominally different, for
they appear differently to thought. The relationship is called a
oneness of entity but a difference of isolates or opposites of the
negatives. The negative of truth-for-a-concealer is non-truth-fora-concealer, and its opposite is non-non-truth-for-a-concealer,
which indeed is truth-for-a-concealer but as known through a
negative route. Similarly, the negative of ultimate truth is nonultimate truth, and its opposite is non-non-ultimate truth.
Because non-truth-for-a-concealer is different from non-ultimate
truth, the opposites of the negatives are also said to be different.
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The meaning can be more easily seen with an example. Take
table and product. If the mind turns to deciding whether the two
are different, it determines whether there are any non-tables
which are products and any non-products which are tables.
When it is said, pointing at the basis of the imputation 'table',
'This is a table,' and 'This is a product,' it is not obvious just
from the statement whether only tables are products. It then
must be seen that there are non-tables, such as cups, which are
products and that there are no non-products which are tables
because non-products are either permanent phenomena or nonexistents. From this approach, non-table and non-product are
different, and thus it is said that the opposites of those negatives,
non-non-table and non-non-product, are different. However,
table and product are the same entity just because a table is a
product. Though there are products which are not tables,
product is the same entity as table because there is no generality
product which is a separate entity from its specific instances,
such as tables, houses, fences, mountains, and so forth.
A truth-for-a-concealer and an ultimate truth are a case of two
phenomena which are the same entity and different opposites of
the negatives with the two terms being mutually exclusive;
nothing can be both. Product and table are the same entity and
different opposites of the negatives within the relationship of a
generality and its particular instance. Impermanent thing and
product are the same entity and different opposites of the negatives wherein the two terms are not mutually exclusive but
synonymous because all instances of either are instances of the
other. They are nevertheless one entity but different opposites of
the negatives and not utterly one because the mention of the one
does not necessarily entail the appearance to the mind of the
other. Still, product and impermanent thing are synonyms,
the first being a thing from the viewpoint of its being made by
causes and conditions and the second from the viewpoint of its
disintegrating moment by moment. In the same way, khyi
(which means 'dog' in Tibetan) and dog are the same entity and
different opposites of the negatives because when 'khyi' is said,
'dog' does not necessarily appear to the mind. Only khyi and khyi
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are the same entity and the same opposite of the negative, or
more strictly, the same isolate.
These distinctions yield a sense of the impact for this writer
when, after a discussion of the fresh water poured into fresh water
metaphor for the direct cognition of emptiness, the late Ge-lukba scholar and tantric abbot, Kensur Lekden, leaned toward me
and said that it almost seems as if the cognizer and cognitum are
one opposite of the negative.
Nagarjuna says in his Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment312
that the two truths are like product and impermanent thing;
however, his example is said313 not to show that the two are synonyms but that they are the same entity, with the existence of one
being impossible without the existence of the other. That the
two truths are not synonyms is determined through the Sutra
Unravelling the Thought,w which nevertheless does not explicitly
state that they are the same entity and different opposites of the
negatives. In a similar vein, Dzong-ka-ba reports that some have
said that the two truths, though not different entities, have a
difference which is a mere negation of their being one.315
The Jo-nang-bas hold that the two truths are different entities. 316 Theirs is a view of'emptiness of other'—an ultimate truth
is empty of being a truth-for-a-concealer and a truth-for-a-concealer is empty of being an ultimate truth. This is said to be similar to the Samkhya teaching that the root of cyclic existence is the
confusion of the person and the nature and that liberation is
gained by realizing that the person is not the manifesting nature
and that the manifesting nature is not the person. Through
differentiating the two, a yogi is released from cyclic existence.
For a Ge-luk-ba, it is true that an ultimate truth is not a truthfor-a-concealer and vice versa, but this distinction does not constitute emptiness. An emptiness is a phenomenon's own lack of
inherent existence; thus, this doctrine is called 'emptiness of self
which does not mean that a table is empty ofbeing a table but that a
table is empty of its own inherent existence. Otherwise, if a table
were empty of itself, there would be no tables and, by extension, no
phenomena; an emptiness would also be impossible because an
emptiness would be empty ofbeing an emptiness.
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Meditation on Emptiness
The Jo-nang-ba assertion of a difference of entity between the
two truths contradicts the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, but it
does reflect the Ge-luk-ba acceptance that at the time of direct
cognition of emptiness (by anyone except a Buddha) none of the
conventional phenomena which are the bases of the quality
emptiness appear to the mind. A direct cognition of emptiness is
non-dual in four ways:317 (1) all appearances of inherent existence
have ceased, (2) all appearances of conventionalities have ceased,
(3) all appearances of subject and object have ceased, and (4) all
appearances of generic images (or conceptual meaninggeneralities) have ceased.
The disappearance of conventional phenomena is said to be
due to the mind's concentration solely on emptiness and due to
the cessation of the five sense consciousnesses. Until Buddhahood a direct cognition of suchness precludes cognition of other
phenomena just as cognition of other phenomena precludes
direct cognition of emptiness; the stains of the mind are such
that the one blocks the other.318 When anyone except a Buddha
directly realizes emptiness, merely the quality emptiness appears
without the appearance of the qualificands—the phenomena
which are empty.
Thus, though the two truths are inextricably related, it is possible to perceive one and not the other; common beings perceive
truths-for-a-concealer without perceiving ultimate truths, and
sentient beings in meditative equipoise on emptiness perceive
ultimate truths without perceiving truths-for-a-concealer. However, if it is wrongly viewed that an ultimate truth is a different
entity from a truth-for-a-concealer, an emptiness could not be
the final mode of existence of phenomena and meditation on it
would not serve to dissolve misconceptions about the nature of
objects.
An ultimate truth, or more literally, a highest object truth
(paramarthasatya, don dam bden pa) is so called because an
emptiness is the most exalted of all phenomena and is the object
of the wisdom that realizes suchness.31' It is a truth because it
exists the way it appears in direct cognition. Truths-for-aconcealer (samvrtisatya, kun rdzob bden pa) are so called because
Madhyam ika
417
all other objects are assumed by ignorance to exist the way they
appear. An ignorant consciousness is not just a consciousness
which does not know suchness but a concealer of suchness
through actively assenting to the false appearance of objective
existence. Even in direct sense perception, forms, sounds, odors,
tastes, and tangible objects appear to exist inherently, as if they
existed in their own right. All phenomena except emptinesses
appear to the cognizers that certify them as existing as if they
exist inherently. Since the ignorance that assents to this appearance is the root of cyclic existence, its role in everyday perceptions is emphasized through naming all phenomena except
emptinesses 'truths-for-a-concealer', truths for ignorance.
Even for Foe Destroyers and eighth ground Bodhisattvas, who
have totally and forever overcome the conception that phenomena inherently exist, phenomena still appear to exist inherently, to be their bases of imputation, but these liberated beings
know that they are not. Like magicians who see their own creations but, unlike the deceived audien e, know them to be illusions, Foe Destroyers and eighth ground Bodhisattvas have
destroyed ignorance and know that phenomena do not inherently exist. Therefore, it is only through their knowledge of how
other beings conceive conventionalities that these conventionalities are still for them truths-for-a-concealer. Though they have
destroyed the concealer of suchness in their own continuums,
they realize how others misconceive phenomena.
To a Buddha, conventionalities appear the way they exist, for
a Buddha has eradicated not only the afflictions, the chief of
which is the ignorance that misconceives the nature of phenomena, but also the appearance of inherent existence caused by
beginningless conditioning to ignorance. Therefore, the explanation that conventionalities do not exist the way they appear
does not hold true for a Buddha. Still, even for a Buddha conventionalities—all phenomena except emptinesses—are truths-for-aconcealer because he knows how things are perceived and conceived by others.
Chandrakirti etymologizes the word samvrti of samvrtisatya as
'concealer' (samantadvarana, sgrib byed), 'conventionality'
418
Meditation on Emptiness
(vyavahara, tha snyad), and 'interdependence' (parasparasambhavana, phan tshun rten pa).120 All existents except emptinesses
are conventional truths and interdependent existents. They are
conventional in the sense that they are conventions as consciousnesses or expressions or as objects of consciousnesses or expressions. They are interdependent in the sense that doer depends on
doing and doing depends on doer, etc. However, the latter is
only an etymology and not a definition, for an emptiness is also
interdependent in that it depends on the phenomenon of which
it is the final mode of being.321 Just as the nature of a phenomenon depends on that phenomenon, so the phenomenon also
depends on its nature. Furthermore, an emptiness depends on
the meditative equipoise that certifies it, and it also depends on
its basis of imputation, the non-inherent existence of an object.
Thus, though all phenomena are interdependent, conventionalities are called interdependent existents in order to stress their
false appearance as if they exist in and of themselves.
Since neither ultimate truths nor truths for a concealer inherently exist, the division of the two truths is not an ontological
division. Both exist only conventionally (samvrtisat, kun rdzob tu
yodpa) with samvrti here referring to a valid dualistic cognizer;
both truths exist for valid dualistic cognizers and not in ultimate
analysis. The division of the two truths emphasizes two types of
objects of consciousness, truths and falsities. Both, however, are
falsely existent or falsely established because neither is independent; each depends on its imputing consciousness and on the
other.
Whether understood by a particular being or not, emptiness is
forever established as the nature of objects, which do not gain
non-inherent existence through being cognized as lacking inherent existence. They never did, never do, and never will inherently exist. Emptiness is validated by a consciousness of meditative equipoise, and there has always been someone cognizing
emptiness.322 Though each person needs to validate it for himself, this does mean that because it is not validated for someone,
it is not validated in general. If this were the case, it would be
difficult to establish the existence of anything.
Madhyam ika
419
For Prasangika nothing exists objectively, that is to say, as if of
its own will right with its basis of imputation. Prasangika philosophy, though emphasizing the subjective element, is still not a
turn to utter subjectivity in which what exists for the individual
is what exists. There are standards and criteria for valid establishment, and in this sense both suchness and the phenomena
qualified by it are objective.323 The division into two truths on
epistemological grounds is a call to eradicate ignorance and to
attain the highest wisdom. It is a call to recognition that a conventional cognizer, even if valid with respect to the existence or
non-existence of objects, is not valid with respect to their suchness. It is a call to a new mode of perception, to a cognition of a
reality that has been ever-present.
The two truths are not vague realms of misty truth as suggested
by translations which use the singular, such as 'Absolute Truth'
and 'Conventional Truth'. In Sanskrit and Tibetan the singular
is used for a class name whereas in common English usage a
general term is most often either in the plural, or in the singular
with the indefinite article 'a'. It would be correct to refer to conventional truths as 'Conventional Truth' only if it were suitable
to refer to tables as table, e.g., 'Table is object,' rather than
'Tables are objects.'
However, translating paramarthasatya in the singular as 'ultimate truth' even without an article can be considered a matter of
choice depending on the context, because though there are many
types of emptinesses, they are only enumerated as such in accordance with the various types of phenomena that are bases of the
quality emptiness. Still, at least in the Ge-luk-ba interpretation
the emptiness of one thing is not the emptiness of another in the
sense of exact identity, and from this viewpoint the term has
often been translated here either in the singular with the article
'an' as 'an ultimate truth' or in the plural as 'ultimate truths'.
Despite this, when referring to a direct cognition in which all
emptinesses are simultaneously realized, it seems cumbersome
to say, 'A yogi directly cognizes ultimate truths', because it
seems to imply that only some ultimate truths are being
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Meditation on Emptiness
cognized. Rather, usage of the singular as in, 'A yogi directly
cognizes ultimate truth in a totally non-dualistic manner,' or 'A
yogi directly cognizes emptiness after having become accustomed to an inferential realization,' at least suggests that there is
no ultimate truth which at that point is not being cognized. The
meaning, nevertheless, is not amorphous, but specific; an emptiness is a phenomenon's lack of inherent existence. Thus, one
'reflects on an emptiness' or 'generates an inferential cognition
of an emptiness' because it is the emptiness of a specific phenomenon that is being reflected upon and realized.
Also, for paramartha, 'ultimate' is a better translation than
'Absolute' because 'Absolute' suggests something that exists in
and of itself, independently, whereas nothing is independent in
the Madhyamika system, even an emptiness.
As was said earlier, a truth-for-a-concealer is not established as
existing by a concealer—an ignorant consciousness. Its erroneous inherent existence is 'established' by ignorance. Since the
mere existence of truths-for-a-concealer is not refuted by emptiness, the division into the two truths is not of mental objects into
those of the stupid and those of the wise. The conventional existence of objects is certified by valid cognizers and never eradicated by ultimate analysis, which refutes only the inherent existence of objects, both conventionally and ultimately. Once ultimate analysis establishes that the inherent existence of an object
cannot be found, it cannot be found ultimately or conventionally; hence, the doctrine of the two truths is not a concession to
the ways of ignorance. Chandrakirti establishes that even
conventionally objects are not their bases of imputation; even
conventionally objects are merely interdependent.
This does not mean that when a truth-for-a-concealer, such as
a chair, is perceived, a common being perceives it ay a truth-fora-concealer.32* Though one must depend on truths-for-aconcealer, such as words, definitions, examples, and so forth, in
order to realize an ultimate truth, one must gain an understanding of an ultimate truth—an emptiness—in order to realize
that a truth-for-a-concealer is just a truth-for-a-concealer. Beings
whose minds have not turned toward emptiness do not actually
Madhyam ika
421
know truths-for-a-concealer as such, though indeed they perceive and use them every day. Thus, the name 'truth-for-aconcealer', itself is a call toward an understanding of emptiness.
The same impact is present when samvrtisatya is taken as 'conventional truth', for it implies that there is a non-conventional
analytical consciousness for which these objects do not exist the
way they appear. Also, samvrtisatya as 'interdependent existent'
calls for a recognition of the lack of independent or inherent
existence. However, the most forceful meaning of samvrtisatya
is 'truth-for-a-concealer' which is used so predominantly that
Jam-yang-shay-ba points out that it is not the only etymology of
the term.325
In the Prasangika system there is no division of truths-for-aconcealer into the real and the unreal from the point of view of a
reasoning consciousness because all are unreal in the sense of
being falsities that do not exist the way they appear.326 However,
based on the world's discrimination of what is true or untrue,
real or unreal, through determining whether, with respect to
impermanent objects, they can perform functions in accordance
with their appearance, the Prasangikas accept a division of
truths-for-a-concealer into the real and unreal. The unreal are
objects such as a mirror image which appears to be a' face but
cannot perform the functions of a face. A mirror image exists,
however, and, therefore, can be classed among the two truths.
An example of a real conventional truth is a face.
Even though an ignorant consciousness accepts an inherently
existent person to be true, an inherently existent person is not a
truth-for-a-concealer, real or unreal, because such does not exist.
Therefore, the etymology of samvrtisatya as an object which the
concealer, ignorance, takes to exist the way it appears is wider than
the actual meaning of the term. Things that ignorance assumes to
be true but do not at all exist cannot be classed among the two
truths, which are only existents. Thus, the name 'truth-for-aconcealer' is not a definition. Just as Buddha said that all products
are deceptive, so his choice of a name for conventional objects,
'truths-for-a-concealer', points to an error in the perception of
them: they seem to exist in and of themselves, but do not.
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Meditation on Emptiness
I N T E R P R E T A T I O N OF SCRIPTURE AND
PHENOMENA
Sources
Geshe Gedün Lodrö's oral teachings
Corresponding section of the translation pp. 595-623
Sutras that mainly and explicitly teach ultimate truths are definitive (nit art ha, nges don) because the mode of existence of the
phenomena discussed in such passages is definite as just what is
said.327 No further interpretation is necessary to discover the way
things are.
Though a direct cognition of ultimate truth cannot be described exactly as it is, the cognition and its object can be
taught.328 For example, as Chandrakirti says, if one without
cataracts tells another who has and sees hairs falling before him,
'There are no hairs here,' the person with cataracts will not
realize the lack of hairs the way the person without the disease
does; however, it cannot be said that he does not realize the nonexistence of the hairs. In the same way, when someone who lacks
the contaminations of the darkness of ignorance teaches about
suchness, a listener cannot realize it the way the speaker does,
but it is accepted that in general it is not that he does not realize
suchness.
When Shantideva says that 'the ultimate is not an object of the
mind', he means that it is not an object of direct perception by a
dualistic mind.329 A non-dualistic wisdom consciousness, which in
relation to its cognitum emptiness is like water poured into water,
is needed in order to know an emptiness just as it is experienced by
a Superior. Kensur Lekden said that after direct cognition a yogi
intensely wishes to tell others how it is, but no words succeed.
Sutras that mainly and explicitly teach truths-for-a-concealer
require interpretation (neyartha, drang don). Because the mode of
being of the phenomena discussed in such passages is not
explicitly presented, it is necessary to search out a mode of being
other than what is explicitly said. In other words, sutras that do
not explicitly teach emptiness must be interpreted in order to
understand it. Their subjects may be validly established, but the
final mode of being of these subjects is not explicitly mentioned.
Madhyam ika
423
Also, sutras that teach non-existent objects, such as a permanent
self, must be interpreted to discover Buddha's intention in preaching such a doctrine to a particular type of trainee. The teaching of a
permanent self has as its basis Buddha's thought that there is continuous rebirth. The purpose is to influence listeners, who for the
time being cannot posit an impermanent self without becoming
morally nihilistic, to accept cause and effect and thereby generate
devotion to virtue which yields rebirths of high status. The teaching of a permanent self is refuted by the reasoning that a permanent self cannot be reborn since what is permanent cannot change.
Other sutras must be interpreted just to discover what is being
said. For instance, a passage that says, 'Father and mother are to
be killed,' does not even say that father and mother are to be
killed. Rather, it says that 'existence'—the fully potentialized
latency that in the next moment will become a new life—and
'attachment', which nourishes this latency (see pp.280-1), must
be destroyed. Such passages must be interpreted first to determine what is being said and then to determine the mode of existence—emptiness—of the phenomena discussed.
In definitive sutras the mode of being is definite right there in
the texts, but this does not mean that literal passages requiring
interpretation are indefinite in the sense of not being validly
established.330 'Definitive' here connotes not only validity but
also ultimacy.
'Sutras' are passages spoken by Buddha and not necessarily
whole texts; even a few words or a phrase can be a sutra. Thus,
because all actual Perfection of Wisdom Sutras are definitive,
some phrases in books called Perfection of Wisdom Sutras
which set forth conventionalities, such as the location of the discourse, are not actual Perfection of Wisdom Sutras. For they
require interpretation to determine the final mode of being of the
phenomena discussed, such as the location's emptiness of objectively established existence. Also, because actual Perfection of
Wisdom Sutras are literal, though the phrase, 'There are no
forms', is accepted as spoken by Buddha, Buddha did not speak a
phrase teaching that there are no forms. He taught that forms are
not inherently existent as is clearly specified in various Perfection
of Wisdom Sutras, such as the Heart of Wisdom; this
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Meditation on Emptiness
qualification is extended to all similar instances in the text. Buddha never taught that there are no forms because teaching or not
teaching a doctrine is determined on the basis of whether there is
or is not a student for it. There must be a special or specific type of
trainee for a teaching, and there are no special students for a teaching that there are no forms. Buddha taught that forms do not inherently exist, that forms are impermanent, that forms are not different entities from perceiving consciousnesses, and so forth.
The Chittamatrins, unlike the Prasangikas, do not make a division of definitive and requiring interpretation on the basis of
whether ultimate or conventional truths are taught but on the
basis of whether the teaching in the sutra is literally acceptable.
This means that for the Chittamatrins all sutras of which the
teaching is validly established, such as of the five aggregates, are
definitive; those which are not validly established, such as of a selfsufficient person, require interpretation.
For the Chittamatrins, the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras are
nevertheless the supreme of all Buddha's sutras, but their speaking of an absence of natural existence is not said to be literal. For
them, Perfection of Wisdom Sutras are not definitive and require
interpretation, not because their subject matter is secondary but
merely because they are not literal. The special students of the
Perfection of Wisdom Sutras must be of sharper faculties than
those of the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, a definitive sutra,
because from the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras themselves they
must be able to determine the Chittamatrin presentation of the
three natures and so forth without relying on a text, such as the
Sutra Unravelling the Thought, which clearly differentiates what
does and does not truly exist.
The Svatantrikas agree with the Prasangikas that definitive
sutras mainly and explicitly teach emptiness. However, the Svatantrikas hold that a definitive sutra must be literal. For instance,
the Heart of Wisdom Sutra where it says that phenomena do not
inherently exist is non-literal because it requires qualification to
indicate that ultimately (paramarthatas, don dam par) phenomena do not exist inherently, since for Svatantrikas phenomena
inherently exist conventionally. In the Svatantrika school, to be
literal a sutra that teaches ultimate truths must specify
Madhyamika
425
'ultimately' in its refutation of inherent existence, though it need
not be specified explicitly in every instance.
That scriptural passages are to be divided into definitive and
requiring interpretation is taught in sutra itself through the four
reliances:331 (1) rely on doctrine, not on persons; (2) rely on meaning, not on words; (3) rely on definitive sutras, not on those requiring interpretation; and (4) rely on wisdom, not on knowledge.
Initially, at the time of hearing the teaching, one should not rely
on the person of the teacher, looking to his fame, wealth, and so
forth. Rather, one should listen to anyone's teaching that explains
the path out of suffering. One should not take the words as most
important but mainly pay attention to the meaning. Again, when
thinking about the teaching, one should take definitive sutras as
most important and should recognize that those requiring interpretation are a means of realizing the definitive—emptiness. When
practicing, one should not feel satisfied with just the knowledge
arising from hearing and thinking but should devote oneself to
generating the non-conceptual wisdom arising from meditation.
The two types of scriptures are also differentiated in sutras
teaching that all products are falsities, thus establishing that
passages propounding the non-true existence of products are
definitive. (Sutras often take products as their examples of falsities, but this does not mean that non-products, such as space, are
not falsities. Rather, products are the chief of objects encountered by'common beings and, therefore, are singled out as falsities, appearing one way and existing another.)332
Nagarjuna's refutation of production, establishing that production does not inherently exist, indicates through reasoning
that sutras which speak of inherently existent production or do
not mention the actual empty status of production require interpretation. Consequently, sutras that specify production as
lacking inherent existence are definitive.
Nagarjuna himself did not explicitly state in any of his works on
which sutra he was relying for his differentiation of sutras into two
types.333 However, one can infer from his mode of procedure that
he was relying on the Teaching of Akshayamati Sutra which is
quoted as a source for the differentiation by Chandrakirti in his
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Meditation on Emptiness
Clear Words, by Avalokitavrata in his commentary on Bhavaviveka's Lamp for (Nagarjuna's) 'Wisdom' (Prajnapradipa), and
by Kamalashila in his Illumination of the Middle Way.
It is said that the Prasangika system presents Buddha's own final
differentiation ofthe two types ofscriptures even though it contradicts the thought of the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, which the
Chittamatrins use as their basis for the division. However, it does
not contradict Buddha's thought when he taught the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, in that the latter merely accords with the mentality of certain Mahayana disciples who were incapable of comprehending the final teaching. It is similar to the noncontradiction in terms of Buddha's own thought when he taught
Hinayanists that killing was totally forbidden but taught
Mahayanists that killing is permitted in certain circumstances.
(Bodhisattvas—some say eighth grounders and above and some
say first grounders and above—may, in order to help others, commit seven of the ten non-virtues: killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, lying, speaking harshly, speaking divisively, and chattering
senselessly.334 However, they are never allowed to commit the
three mental non-virtues—covetousness, harmfulness, and wrong
views. In general, these seven non-virtues are permitted when
they are the only possible way to stop someone from bringing great
harm on himself or others; thus, they are performed altruistically,
not with an intent to harm.)
The Sutra Unravelling the Thought sets forth three turnings of
the wheel of doctrine by Buddha. The division into three is made
according to subject matter, specifically the manner in which selflessness is presented.335 The first turning is comprised of sutras
that set forth the selflessness of persons but do not refute that
phenomena are established by way of their own character as bases
of names and conceptions. The second is comprised of those that
on the literal level set forth the non-true existence of all phenomena, without distinguishing that some do and others do not truly
exist. The third is comprised of those that clearly discriminate
the true existence of emptinesses and impermanent phenomena
and the non-true existence of imaginary phenomena. Since the
Chittamatrins follow the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, they
Madhyamika
427
assert that all sutras of the first and second wheels require interpretation whereas all those of the third wheel are definitive. The
Prasangikas, on the other hand, assert that the first and third
wheels as explained in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought require
interpretation and that the middle wheel is definitive.
The three wheels of doctrine can also be arranged in a different
manner. In this system the first wheel is comprised of sutras
mainly spoken for Hfnayana disciples, teaching the four noble
truths and concordant topics. 'Hfnayana disciples' are Hearers
and Solitary Realizers, who do not have separate wheels of the
teaching because Solitary Realizers can attain their paths in
reliance on the Hearers' division of the teaching. The second
wheel is comprised of sutras mainly spoken for Mahayanists,
those of the wheel of signlessness, such as the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras and so forth, as well as those teaching concordant
topics. The third wheel is comprised of sutras mainly spoken for
Mahayanists, those of the wheel of good discrimination, such as
the Sutra Unravelling the Thought and so forth as well as those
teaching concordant topics.
According to the Prasangikas, a sutra of the first wheel, which
is meant for Hfnayanists, is not necessarily a first wheel sutra as
set forth in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, for according to
the Prasangika system, Hfnayanists cognize the same selflessness as Mahayanists, and therefore, many first wheel passages do
not require interpretation. Without realizing the emptiness of
inherent existence through understanding that analytically findable existence does not occur, liberation is impossible. Thus, a
central Prasangika tenet is that some Hfnayana scriptures also
teach the final mode of being of objects.336
Without understanding the mode ofbeing of objects—without
understanding that objects are not their own final mode ofbeing
—no one, Hfnayanist or Mahayanist, can uproot the basis for the
afflictions that bind beings in cyclic existence, the mistaken
notion that objects exist from their own side right with their bases
of designation. Thus, both Hfnayanists and Mahayanists—those
motivated primarily to get out of cyclic existence for themselves
and those mainly seeking others' welfare—must cognize the
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Meditation on Emptiness
middle way between the extremes of over-concretized existence
and no existence at all, seeing the compatibility between emptiness and dependent-arising.
To accomplish this, a practitioner must distinguish between
what teachings are definitive in that they present the final mode
of subsistence of objects and what teachings require interpretation to arrive at that final mode of being. This differentiation,
moreover, is not limited to scriptures, but must be carried over
to objects as well—emptinesses being definitive and all other
objects requiring interpretation to arrive at their final mode of
subsistence. The basis of this is a division of hermeneutics in
Madhyamika into two categories—of the objects of expressions
(brjod bya V drang nges) such as chairs, tables, bodies, and emptinesses; and of means of expression (rjod byed drang nges) such as
sutras. A practitioner is called to interpret all ordinary objects of
experience to discover their inner nature.
Part Five
Prasangika-Madhyamika
1
The Prasangika School
Sources
Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
Corresponding section of the translation pp.586-8
The works of both Nagar juna and Aryadeva are considered by
both Svatantrikas and Prasangikas to be reliable sources.337 From
the Prasangika point of view Nagarjuna and Aryadeva are
Prasangikas though neither specified themselves as such nor
openly presented the special features of that system. They are
called Model Madhyamikas.338
Buddhapalita did not clearly specify that consequences are to
be used in place of autonomous syllogisms;339 however, his
extensive use of consequences qualifies him, according to Jamyang-shay-ba, to be the founder of the Prasangika school. It is
with Bhavaviveka's refutation of Buddhapalita and insistence on
autonomous syllogisms that the necessity for a clear statement of
Prasangika method arose. At that point, Chandrakfrti defined
the system in relation to the other schools, clearly explicating the
incorrectness of using autonomous syllogisms and the correctness of consequences for generating in another the view of the
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Meditation on Emptiness
middle way, and it is for this reason that most Tibetan monastic colleges consider Chandraklrti to be the founder of Prasangika.
Thus, the Partisan Prasangikas are those who explicitly differentiate themselves as Prasangikas through extensive use of consequences and/or through specific challenges of the Svatantrika
viewpoint from a Prasangika standpoint. Among them are
Buddhapalita, Chandraklrti, Shantideva, and Atisha.
There are other Prasangikas who are neither Models because
they were not used as valid sources by all Prasangikas and
Svatantrikas nor Partisans because they did not explicitly reject
the Svatantrika viewpoint. However, it can be seen from their
works that their view accords with Prasangika; they are the Nonpartisan Prasangikas: Shakyamitra, Nagabodhi, Rik-bay-ku-juk
(Rigs-pa'i-khu-byug, a student of Chandraklrti), Shura (Ashvaghosha), etc.
SYNONYMS
Prasangikas are called Only Appearance Madhyamikas, for as
Chandraklrti says (see p.586), they assert the existence of conventional phenomena—those phenomena which appear to the conventional mind—by way of their conditionality, not through
asserting any of the four extremes: that phenomena inherently
exist, utterly do not exist, both inherently exist and utterly do
not exist, or are another inherently existent alternative.
'Conditionality' (idampratyayata, rkyen nyid 'di pa tsam), or
'having this particular condition, is a synonym for the dependentarising of compounded phenomena.340 Not covered by the term
'conditionality' is the dependent-arising of uncompounded
phenomena, such as space, analytical cessations, non-analytical
cessations, and emptinesses. Non-products—or permanent phenomena—are dependent-arisings in two ways: (1) they arise, or
exist, in dependence on their parts or bases of imputation, and (2)
they arise, or exist, in dependence on a conceptual consciousness
that imputes them. For example, the space ofa room is imputed or
designated to an absence of obstructive contact and to the space
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of the various parts of the room; thus, it depends both on its
bases of designation and on the mind that designates it.
Here, with regard to permanent phenomena, 'arising' in the
term 'dependent-arising' does not mean 'being produced' but
'existing' (sat, yodpa)ov 'established' (siddha, grub pa). Permanent
phenomena are dependent-arisings in that they are 'dependency
existent' or 'dependently established'.
The dependent-arising of impermanent phenomena is itself a
sign that products are not produced from themselves, naturally
existent others, both, or causelessly. The first alternative and the
last two alternatives require no qualification; however, the
second, production from other, does require the qualification
'naturally existent'. For products are indeed conventionally produced from causes that are conventionally existent others. There
is no production, even conventionally, which can bear analysis,
but there is conventionally existent self and other and conventionally existent production from what is other. Self and other
are mutually dependent as are cause and effect. Because ofbeing
interdependent, they cannot be naturally existent, that is to say,
established by way of their own character.
It is by way of this conditionality that a Prasangika accepts phenomena. The Sanskrit word translated by 'phenomena' is dharma.
Because all dharma are objects ofknowledge (jneya, shes bya), they
can appear to the mind, and thus the word 'phenomena' from the
Greekphaindmenon meaning 'appearance' is used as a translation
equivalent. There are impermanent and permanent phenomena,
and in this system oftranslation there is no noumenon which is not
a phenomenon. For even emptiness is a phenomenon in that it
appears to the mind and is an object (vishaya, yul); in the
Prasangika system nothing exists independently, in and of itself,
as 'noumenon' suggests. Even an emptiness is a dependent-arising
because it is imputed to a lack of inherent existence which is its
basis of imputation and, like all other phenomena, cannot be
found when sought among its bases ofimputation. 341 Just as much
as a chair is not its legs, arms, back, or seat, or even their composite,
so the emptiness of a chair is not the lack of inherent existence of
the legs, arms, back, or seat, or even their composite.
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Meditation on Emptiness
'Conditionality' refers to the dependent-arising of products,
and indeed all Buddhist schools of tenets accept that products
are dependent-arisings inasmuch as all effects depend on causes.
However, the Prasangika sense of'conditionality' is brought into
focus when it is seen that they accept the dependence not only of
effects on causes but also of causes on effects. For a seed is a cause
only in relation to its effect, a sprout. (For convenience, a sprout
can be considered to be a shoot of some height when the two bulbous halves of the seed are no longer present and a root system
has developed.) Its ability to produce an effect, given the proper
conditions, makes it a cause. Except in relation to the sprout,
how can it be said that a seed is a cause? This is obvious and
requires no special analysis, for in the Prasangika system, if
anything could bear ultimate analysis, it would inherently exist
whereas nothing inherently exists. That a cause is dependent on
an effect is obvious to the ordinary non-analytical intellect.
However, no other Buddhist system of tenets—Vaibhashika,
Sautrantika, Chittamatra, or even Svatantrika—accepts that
causes are dependent on effects. They reason that causes do not
rely on effects for their production whereas effects do rely on
causes for their production. However, the Prasangikas'
approach is from the viewpoint of the designation of the ultimately unfindable nominality 'cause' and not from the viewpoint of its production, for they agree that a cause does not
depend on its effect for its production. The Prasangika assertion
of the interdependence of cause and effect highlights their
emphasis on the interrelated nature of names and the naming
process, the dependence of all phenomena on thought.
All phenomena are interdependent though each and every
phenomenon is not interdependent with each and every other
phenomenon. A calf depends on its causes, cow and bull, etc.,
and the cow and bull as parents depend on their calf though they
were not born from the calf. Still, a calf and a pony are not
dependent on each other.
It is by way of this conditionality that the one hundred and
eight afflicted and purified phenomena are asserted to exist, but
the name 'Only Appearance Madhyamika' does not imply that
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435
Prasangikas assert that phenomena merely appear to the mind
whereas in fact they do not exist. Though analysis shows that
phenomena ultimately do not exist, ultimate analysis does not
deny that objects exist conventionally. Truly existent or inherently existent objects are rejected through Madhyamika analysis
but not the mere objects themselves. However, it is to be remembered that the status of conventionalities is such that they are not
separate from their parts; they are neither their parts individually
nor the composite of their parts. They are not their bases ofimputation even conventionally. A chair is only the 'chair' imputed in
dependence on legs, arms, back, seat, and so forth arranged in a
certain shape. The conventions of the world are exactly the
opposite of the Prasangika view on this point; the world,
through beginningless ignorance, confuses the object imputed
with the basis of imputation. All of the conventions of the world
are not, then, accepted in the Prasangika system. The Prasangikas mostly accept those phenomena which the world says
exist, but not the way the world feels those phenomena exist.
Phenomena appear to the world to exist naturally, and the world
assents to this appearance; such appearances are false, and such
assent is mistaken.
In the same vein, Bu-don (Bu-ston) m says that Prasangikas are
called 'Madhyamikas using what is renowned in the world'
(Loka-prasiddha-varga-chari-madhyamika). The name is perhaps a deliberate contrast with the Hindu emphasis on scriptural wisdom over ignorant worldly conventions. However,
even in the Prasangika system the world's ignorance is still the
first link of the dependent-arising of the misery of cyclic existence. Therefore, the Prasangikas, though mostly accepting the
world's opinion on what exists, do not enshrine every aspect of
the worldly non-analytical intellect. For it is analysis itself that
will break the knot of cyclic existence through rescuing beings
from the tangles of misconception.
Prasangikas are also called Non-Abiding Madhyamikas, or
Thoroughly Non-Abiding Madhyamikas, because through
refuting inherent existence they avoid the extreme of permanence and through asserting conventional existence they avoid
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Meditation on Emptiness
the extreme of annihilation. They do not abide in any way,
coarse or subtle, in either, but in the middle or center which
denotes neither a mixture of existence and non-existence nor a
gray area of agnostic doubt. The middle way philosophically is
the way things are—not mistaking what exists for what does not
exist and not mistaking what does not exist for what exists.
All systems claim to occupy the center.343 For example, the
Dialectician Nihilists say that they avoid the extreme of permanence through not asserting phenomena which are beyond sense
perception and avoid the extreme of annihilation through asserting those that are manifest to the senses. The Samkhyas say that
they avoid the extreme of permanence through asserting the
transformation of states and avoid the extreme of annihilation
through asserting the unchangeability of the nature. The Vaibhashikas, the lowest Buddhist school of tenets, say that they
avoid the extreme of permanence through asserting that all
products are impermanent and avoid the extreme of annihilation
through asserting that past and future objects are substantialities. The Sautrantikas say that they avoid the extreme of permanence through not asserting that permanent phenomena, such as
space, are substantial entities and avoid the extreme of annihilation through asserting that forms and so forth are naturally bases
of names. The Chittamatrins say that they avoid the extreme of
permanence through asserting that forms and so forth are not
naturally bases of the affixing of names and avoid the extreme of
annihilation through asserting that products and emptinesses
truly exist.
The Svatantrika-Madhyamikas say that they avoid the
extreme of permanence through asserting that objects do not
exist from the viewpoint of an objective mode of subsistence
which is not established through the object's appearing to a nondefective consciousness. For all objects attain their inherent
existence through appearing to a non-defective consciousness.
The Svatantrikas do not find it contradictory to assert that
objects have no objective, inherent existence which is not established by the mind and to assert that objects do exist
inherently.344 A beautiful woman created by a magician has no
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437
mode of being that is not posited by the mistaken minds of the
audience who have come under the spell of the magician. However, this does not mean that the beautiful woman has no mode
ofbeing; she has one posited by a mistaken consciousness. Just
so, though phenomena seem to have their own mode ofbeing or
own mode of subsistence free from any positing consciousness,
they do not; however, they do have their own mode of subsistence within the scope of its being posited to them through their
appearing to consciousness. In the case of the illusory woman,
the positing consciousness is mistaken whereas in the case of phenomena the positing consciousness is correct or non-defective—
free from error due to spells, moving objects, disease, and so on.
The Svatantrikas, therefore, say that they avoid the extreme of
annihilation through asserting that conventionally objects exist
inherently or exist in their own right.
The Prasangikas find such to be contradictory, and thus they say
that they avoid the extreme of permanence through asserting that
objects do not exist inherently. For them, existing ultimately
(paramarthasiddha, don dam par grub pa) and existing inherently
(svabhavasiddha, rang bzhin gyis grub pa) are synonymous
whereas for the Svatantrikas they are not. The Prasangikas say
that they avoid the extreme of annihilation through asserting
that conventionally all phenomena are only nominal and exist
only imputedly. They do not find it contradictory for phenomena to exist only designatedly and yet be able to perform functions. They do not find it contradictory for things to be
unfindable among their bases of designation either singly or as a
composite and yet exist. In fact, the only way that things can perform functions is to exist merely imputedly, for if objects did
inherently exist, they could not be affected by causes nor could
they affect anything. Existence would be impossible in a world
of frozen substantialities; things would be static, for they would
not depend on causes.
Objects are imputed in the way that a snake is imputed to a
rope.345 Just as much as a snake cannot be found among the parts
of the rope either individually or collectively, so phenomena,
even when correctly imputed, cannot be found among their
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Meditation on Emptiness
bases of imputation, individually or collectively, and, of course,
not separately. Nevertheless, there is a difference between a
snake wrongly imputed to a rope and a snake rightly imputed to
a proper basis of designation because the latter can perform the
functions of a snake.
Therefore, when Prasangikas cite the example of a rope-snake,
it illustrates only the mode of imputation; the purport of the
example is not that the existence of phenomena is the same as the
existence of a rope-snake. A rope-snake does not exist and cannot
perform the functions of a snake whereas things do exist and
create effects within the context of being ultimately unfindable
nominalities.
The most difficult point in the Prasangika system is this: the
utter unfindability of phenomena in their bases of designation
and yet their ability to perform functions. Prasangikas do not
deny the bhava (dngospo) which is defined as 'that which is able
to perform a function', particularly the function of creating an
effect. They deny the bhava which means inherent existence
(svabhava, rangbzhin in the sense of rang bzhin gyis grub pa), the
non-dependence of things on their parts, their bases of designation, or the consciousness that designates them. Thus, when an
emptiness of inherent existence is rightly seen in an object, understanding of imputed existence is furthered. When imputed existence is rightly seen, understanding of the emptiness of inherent
existence is furthered. As long as these two are seen to be contradictory, that is, as long as a refutation of inherent existence seems
to refute the effective existence of phenomena, one has not passed
beyond the views of non-Madhyamikas. Nagarjuna's Treatise on
the Middle Way (XXIV. 14ab) says:
For whom emptiness is possible
For him all is possible.
This eliminates the view that Madhyamikas themselves accept
emptiness but accept conventional phenomena only in dependence on others' misconceptions. Nagarjuna said that 'for him',
that is, for the Madhyamika who accepts emptiness, everything
—all the objects, agents, and actions of cyclic existence and of
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439
nirvana—is suitable. The key to the Prasangika assertion of conventional phenomena is that though they assert the existence of
what the world says exists, they do not assert that phenomena
exist the way that the world sees them.
Not only are the world's habitual conceptions wrong but also
other philosophies, far from actually abiding in the middle way,
have fallen to extremes. They tie even tighter the knot of cyclic
existence. All of these extremes are forsaken by the Prasangikas
who detail with exactitude the way that phenomena exist. When
emptiness of inherent existence is seen to be harmonious with
imputed existence, then the middle way in which the Prasangikas abide can be cognized.
2 Debate
Sources
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
Geshe Gediin Lodro's oral teachings
Buddhapalita's refutation—in commentary on the first chapter
of Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way—of the Samkhya
position that an effect is produced from a cause which is of the
same nature as itself drew heavy criticism from Bhavaviveka.346
An examination of Buddhapalita's refutation, Bhavaviveka's
criticism, and Chandrakfrti's defense of Buddhapalita reveals
central differences between the two divisions of Madhyamika:
Prasangika, founded by Buddhapalita/Chandrakfrti, and
Svatantrika, founded by Bhavaviveka.
The Samkhya position is:
The cause of a barley shoot is a barley seed, and its minor
causes are water, manure, and so forth. The nature of the
cause and of the minor causes is partless, and thus the
nature of the seed is the nature of the water and of the
manure, and the nature of the water is the nature of the
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Meditation on Emptiness
seed and of the manure, and so on. For these causes have
a common effect.
The barley shoot exists at the time of the barley seed
because the barley shoot abides in the nature of its causes
at the time when they are still causes and when the effect or
manifestation has not yet been produced. For example, a
pot exists in the nature of the clay. Therefore, the nature
of the causes and the nature of the effect are one and thus
are each other.
Though some Samkhyas speak not of production but of manifestation, the relationship of oneness of the nature and the manifestation is the same as with producer and produced, or cause and
effect.
Buddhapalita flings consequences at the Samkhyas' assertion.
First he sets his thesis:
Things are not produced from their own entities.
Then in answer to anyone's wondering what fallacies there are
in asserting production of something from that which is of the
same nature, he gives a brief refutation in the form of two consequences:
There are the fallacies that their re-production would be
senseless and, not only that, would also be endless.
Buddhapalita's actual words are: 'Things are not produced from
their own entities because their production [again] would be just
senseless and because production would be endless.'
The way he flings the consequence that re-production would
be senseless is:
It follows with respect to the subject, a sprout, that its
production again is senseless because of already existing
in its own entity.347
The Samkhya, however, holds that what is existent but unmanifest must be made manifest. Therefore, he might answer that it
is not entailed by something's already existing in its own entity
Debate
443
that its production again is senseless. In that case, the second
consequence of the endlessness of its production is flung:
It follows with respect to the subject, a sprout, that its
production is endless because, though it already exists in
its own entity, there is sense in (or a need for) its reproduction.
If the existent requires re-production, then even when the effect
is manifest, it would still require re-production because it exists.
Buddhapalita says, 'The production again of things already
existent in their own entities is purposeless. If though existent
they are produced, they would never not be produced.'
The Samkhya holds that what has already been manifested
need not be produced; therefore, he might again answer that
there is no entailment. However, his answer does not hit the
mark, for by switching from the vocabulary of production to that
of manifestation he cannot escape inquiry about whether the
manifestation exists at the time of its unmanifest state. If he says
that the manifestation does not exist at the time of its unmanifest
state, he would fall from his view that all products, though
formerly existent, are manifested by causes because the manifestation would not exist at the time of its unmanifest state. Therefore, he might accept that the manifestation existed from the
time of its unmanifest state. He would be saying that it is not
entailed by a manifestation's existing at the time of its unmanifest state that it would not be produced again. Then the consequence of endlessness is flung:
It follows about the subject, a manifestation, that its production is endless because, though it exists from the time
of its unmanifest state, it has a need for production
again.
CONSEQUENCES AND SYLLOGISMS
Consequences (prasahga) are used to generate in an opponent a
consciousness that infers a thesis.348 Unwanted consequences
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Meditation on Emptiness
that contradict an opponent's position and arise from his position are frequently used. Employing a reason and a pervasion
approved by the opponent, a consequence of his views which
contradicts another of his views is presented to him.
For instance, if among the various tenets of a school there were
the assertions that a sound is permanent, that a sound is a
product, and that all products are impermanent, the following
consequence would be stated:
It follows that the subject, a sound, is not a product
because of being a permanent phenomenon.
The opponent himself has accepted the reason, that a sound is a
permanent phenomenon. He has accepted the pervasion, that
whatever is a permanent phenomenon is not a product. Thus, he
is forced to accept the unwanted thesis that a sound is not a
product, and this contradicts his own view that a sound is a
product. The stater of the consequence would say, 'The three
spheres have been accepted!' This means that the reason, the
pervasion of the reason by the predicate of the consequence, and
the opposite of the consequence have been accepted.349
The sample consequence above also implies its opposite meaning:
The subject, a sound, is an impermanent phenomenon
because of being a product.
The opposite of the original reason is put as the predicate of the
implied thesis, that is, 'permanent phenomenon' becomes
'impermanent phenomenon'. The opposite of the predicate of
the original thesis is put as the reason of the implied syllogism,
that is, 'not a product' becomes 'a product'.
To repeat, the consequence,
It follows that the subject, a sound, is not a product
because of being a permanent phenomenon,
implies the syllogism,
The subject, a sound, is an impermanent phenomenon
because of being a product.
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445
Through the statement of the consequence, a consciousness that
infers the implied opposite meaning is generated in the opponent.
Non-Prasangikas also use consequences to break down the
vibrance or pointedness of the opponent's adherence to his own
view. However, they do not accept that a consequence alone can
generate in the opponent a consciousness inferring the implied
thesis. Prasangikas assert that the statement of a consequence
alone is sufficient, provided the opponent is intelligent and
ready. To such an opponent, a further explicit statement of a
syllogism is purposeless.
The intent is to generate in the opponent an inferring consciousness, though not necessarily through the route of implying
the opposite meaning as just explained. For instance, Buddhapalita's consequences above are intended to generate in the
Samkhya a consciousness which infers that there is no production from self and not that there is production from other.
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way™ lists
five types of consequences.
1 Consequence generating an other-approved inference, i.e., generating an inference in another using a subject, reason, and pervasion
approved in the opponent's system
Example: It follows that the subject [of this consequence], a sprout, is not a dependent-arising because of
being objectively existent.
This type is also called 'a consequence implying its opposite
meaning'. It both contradicts the opponent's assertion that a
sprout is a dependent-arising and implicitly establishes that a
sprout does not objectively exist. The other-approved syllogism
which is implied by the consequence is:
The subject [of this syllogism], a sprout, is not objectively existent because ofbeing a dependent-arising.
The above consequence would be flung at a Buddhist proponent
of objectively existent things. Svatantrika and the other lower
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Meditation on Emptiness
Buddhist systems accept that all impermanent things are
dependent-arisings at least in the sense that they arise dependent
on an aggregation of causes and conditions, and they also accept
that the very sign of their dependent-arising proves their objective existence. For them, if things did not objectively exist, they
would not exist at all.
If, after the statement of the consequence, the opponent were
still recalcitrant, his answer would be, 'The opposite is entailed',
meaning that whatever is a dependent-arising is objectively existent. However, his answer would not hit the mark because the
meaning of 'objectively existent' is 'independently existent',
thereby contradicting dependent-arising. The opponent might
require more consequences to reveal to him his self-contradiction.
However, for one who is ready to realize his self-contradiction,
the above consequence is sufficient to generate in him a consciousness inferring that a sprout does not objectively exist and,
by extension, that all phenomena do not objectively exist.
2 Consequence through similarity of reason
Example: It follows that a sound apprehending ear consciousness sees colors and shapes because a color and
shape apprehending eye consciousness ultimately sees
colors and shapes.
If an eye consciousness ultimately saw colors and shapes, then it
would be independent, that is, would not depend on the eye
sense that endows it with the ability to perceive colors and
shapes but not sounds. Since consciousnesses would apprehend
their objects without dependence on their respective senses, an
ear consciousness would also absurdly apprehend colors and
shapes. The thesis being implied is that an eye consciousness
and, in general, sense consciousnesses do not ultimately perceive
their objects. The implied thesis here, however, is not, as in the
previous example, the subject plus the opposite of the reason.
3
Contradictory consequence
Example: It follows that the subject, the ox-generality
Debate
447
which is a permanent thing, does not pervade its many
particular instances because ofbeing a partless unity.
This consequence merely demonstrates a contradiction in the
opponent's view and neither implies the opposite meaning, like
the first type of consequence, nor uses a similarity of reason, like
the second. The opposite meaning would be:
The subject, the ox-generality which is a permanent
thing, is not a partless unity because of its pervading its
many instances.
It is true that the ox-generality is not a partless one because it has
as many parts as the number of oxen it 'pervades' or encompasses. However, the ox-generality is impermanent because all
instances of ox are impermanent. Thus, the subject of the thesis,
the permanent ox-generality, does not exist and, therefore, could
not be proved to possess the quality of the reason, that is, it could
not be shown that the permanent ox-generality has as many parts
as the number of oxen it pervades.
The implied thesis of this consequence is not its opposite
meaning but that an ox-generality which is a permanent thing
does not exist. Another implied is:
The ox-generality has parts because of pervading its
many particular instances.
The opponent here is a non-Buddhist Vaisheshika.
The other types of consequences are contradictory, but this
type is merely contradictory in that it does not share the special
qualities of the other four types.
4 Consequence expressing contradiction and proving one's own
assertion
Example: It follows that the subject, a sprout, is senselessly re-produced because of already having attained its
own entity.
A Samkhya accepts that re-production is sensible in the sense
that what has already attained existence in its non-manifest state
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Meditation on Emptiness
still requires production to become manifest. Therefore, the
consequence of senseless re-production expresses an inner
contradiction of this position. Furthermore, since the view being
proved by this consequence is that there is no production from
self, the Prasangika's own assertion is being proved. Again, the
issue is not that only some consequences prove something,
either positive or negative, for all correct consequences prove
something. Rather, this type of consequence is distinguished by
its particular force, as in the example where no production from
self is proved but the opposite of the reason is not implied.
5
Consequence established through similarity of reason and thesis
If someone said that it followed that the form aggregate exists
inherently because the feeling aggregate exists inherently, this
consequence would be stated:
It follows that the reason 'the feeling aggregate inherently exists' cannot prove that the form aggregate inherently exists because the reason and thesis are equally
difficult to prove.
Even if there were inherent existence, there is no difference in
difficulty of realization in establishing that the feeling aggregate
inherently exists and that the form aggregate inherently exists.
To fulfill the purpose of generating the inference of a thesis in
another, the establishment of the sign (reason) as present in the
subject must be easier than the realization of the thesis. For
instance, a sound is proven to be an impermanent thing through
the sign of its being a product. Though 'impermanent thing' and
'product' are synonyms because all instances of the one are
instances of the other, being a product can serve as a correct sign
of being an impermanent thing, for being a product is easier to
understand than being an impermanent thing. To be a product
means to be made, and a mere snapping of the fingers can
demonstrate that a sound is made or created by causes and conditions. That products are impermanent, i.e., that they necessarily
disintegrate moment by moment, is harder to realize. Therefore,
Debate
449
when the reason is as hard to establish as the thesis, the reason is
not suitable.
Much like a consequence, a syllogism (prayoga, sbyor ba)
consists of a thesis and reason; however, in the logic school of
Dignaga and Dharmaklrti the stater of a syllogism must himself
accept the reason's presence in the subject, the pervasion of the
reason by the predicate of the thesis, and the pervasion of the
negative of the predicate by the negative of the reason. For
instance:
The subject, a pot, is an impermanent thing because of
being arisen from exertion—just as, for example, speech
[is arisen from exertion and is impermanent].
The stater of the syllogism must accept the reason's presence in
the subject—that a pot is arisen from exertion. He must accept
the pervasion—that all things arisen from exertion are impermanent—and the counter-pervasion—that all permanent things are
not arisen from exertion. However, in the case of a consequence
neither subject, predicate, nor reason need be accepted by the
stater. It is only necessary that the opponent accept, or be forced
from his own position to accept, these three. Consequences are
means of dealing with opponents on their own grounds, and
Chandrakfrti declares that, if the opponent will not accept consequences stemming from his own views, there is no point in
proceeding to state syllogisms to him.351
Thus, first of all, the difference between the Svatantrika
Bhavaviveka on the one side and the Prasangika Buddhapalita
on the other is Bhavaviveka's insistence on the eventual statement of syllogisms. It is not that Prasangikas do not use syllogisms amongst themselves when there is agreement on the status
of the subject, etc.; rather, the point at issue is what constitutes
the necessary and best means of generating in an opponent the
view that phenomena do not truly exist.
This controversy stems from different opinions on whether
phenomena appear correctly to a non-defective sense consciousness. The Prasangika position is that not only do ordinary beings
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Meditation on Emptiness
misconceive the nature of phenomena but also phenomena
appear to them in a mistaken aspect. In other words, an assenting
to an incorrect appearance of phenomena as inherently existent is
what constitutes the misconception that phenomena inherently
exist. Even for eighth ground Bodhisattvas and Foe Destroyers
(both of whom have totally overcome the conception that things
inherently exist) phenomena still appear as if inherently existent.
It is only for a Buddha that phenomena appear just as they are.
Thus the Prasangikas say that although a sense consciousness
can be valid with respect to the existence of its object, it is never,
except in the case of a Buddha, correct about the mode of existence of the object. For, due to the force of previous conditioning,
objects appear to a sense consciousness as if existing objectively
whereas they do not. They cannot be found among their bases of
designation when sought, but appear as if existent in their own
right.
However, Bhavaviveka's school, Sautrantika-Svatantrika,
asserts that phenomena appear correctly in terms of their inherent existence to a non-defective sense consciousness. Bhavaviveka agrees that phenomena appear to sense consciousnesses to
exist by way of their own character and asserts that they exist so.
From this basis, he says that it is possible to state a syllogism in
which subject and reason appear similarly to both parties in the
debate. Bhavaviveka asserts that being arisen from exertion conventionally exists inherently in a pot, as do the natures of pervasion and counter-pervasion whereas a Prasangika sees the
presence of the reason in the subject, the pervasion, and the
counter-pervasion as existing imputedly or nominally, without
inherent existence.
Both systems accept that an inferring consciousness is a valid
cognizer (pramana, tshad ma). The statement of a valid reason
that the subject possesses and which itself possesses the proper
pervasion and counter-pervasion is not just verbal manipulation
but a revelation of the nature of things which is hidden to the
direct perception of ordinary beings. Prasangika, as well as
Svatantrika, relies on inference to gain an understanding
of emptiness. A meditator's statement to himself and intense
Debate
451
reflection on consequences and syllogisms in meditation are presented in both sutra and tantra systems as the means of gaining a
familiarity with emptiness. Thus, in both sutra and tantra, cognition of emptiness through inference is a prerequisite for direct
cognition.
According to Prasangika, once the view of emptiness is about
to be entered, syllogisms about the final nature of phenomena
are appropriate; however, when debating with those who are
not yet about to generate the view in their continuum, consequences mainly are used. The case is the same in meditation;
consequences are stated in order to break down one's own adherence to the wrong view; then, syllogisms may be stated, if necessary.
Without considering the difference between Prasangika and
Svatantrika, the definition of a Madhyamika in general is:352
A proponent of Buddhist tenets who totally refutes all
extremes of permanence, i.e., that any phenomenon ultimately exists, and refutes all extremes of annihilation,
i.e., that phenomena do not exist conventionally.
Therefore, all Madhyamikas—Prasangikas and Svatantrikas—
avoid the extreme of permanence or existence through refuting
that phenomena ultimately exist, truly exist, or exist as their own
reality. They avoid the extreme of annihilation or non-existence
through asserting that all phenomena exist conventionally, or
nominally.
The word madhyama itself refers to the middle way that
things are, the profound meaning of dependent-arising free from
the two extremes, permanence and annihilation. The extremes
here are misrepresentations of existence and non-existence.
Because phenomena do not exist ultimately, the ultimate existence of phenomena is an extreme of existence. Because phenomena do exist conventionally, the non-existence of phenomena
conventionally is an extreme of non-existence. Avoiding the
extremes of existence and non-existence, however, does not
mean that Madhyamikas refrain from making assertions about
existence and non-existence because they do assert that
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Meditation on Emptiness
phenomena exist conventionally but not ultimately, even if these
assertions exist only nominally.
A Svatantrika is a Madhyamika who asserts that a non-defective
consciousness which perceives an object as existing inherently in
its basis of imputation is valid and thus accepts that an object so
cognized appears similarly to both parties in a debate.353 Based
on the common appearance of a subject, the Svatantrika states a
reason to prove a predicate about this subject. Thus, the definition of a Svatantrika-Madhyamika is:
A proponent of no true existence who asserts that
conventionally all phenomena exist by way of their own
character.
Truly existent phenomena are refuted by Svatantrikas through
relying on a logical mark, a reason, that has the inherently existent threefold aspects: presence in the subject, pervasion, and
counter-pervasion. This usage of autonomous inferences
(svatantra-anumana, rang rgyud kyi rjes dpag) to generate in
an opponent a cognition of emptiness is the source of their
name.
The definition of a Prasangika is:
A Madhyamika who does not assert that phenomena
exist by way of their own character even conventionally.
Etymologically, a Prasangika is so called because of asserting
that an inferential consciousness realizing a thesis of no inherent
existence can be generated in the mental continuum of a disputant through only the demonstration of consequences (prasahga, thai \'gyur).354
According to Prasangika all sense information is characterized
by misinformation about the status of objects, for things undeniably appear to common beings to exist inherently in their bases
of designation. Therefore, consequences that operate within the
sphere of a non-Madhyamika's own views are relied upon to convince him that nothing can bear analysis, thereby causing him to
realize the absence of objectively established existence.
Debate
453
Thus, Svatantrikas and Prasangikas are named on the basis of
the means by which they generate in others the view that phenomena do not truly exist.
3
Bhavaviveka's Criticism of
Buddhapalita
Sources
Bhavaviveka's Lamp for (Nagarjuna 's) 'Wisdom'
Avalokitavrata's Commentary on (Bhavaviveka's) 'Lamp for
(Nagarjuna's) "Wisdom "'
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
The split between Svatantrika and Prasangika grew out of Bhavaviveka's criticism of Buddhapalita's refutation of the Samkhya
view that an effect is produced from a cause which is the same
entity as the effect.355 Their commentaries on the first chapter of
Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way reveal their differences.
Buddhapalita said:
Things are not produced from their own entities because
their production [again] would be just senseless and
because production would be endless. It is thus: the production again of things already existing in their own
entities is purposeless. If though existent they are
produced, they would never not be produced.
456
Meditation on Emptiness
Bhavaviveka took the first sentence not merely as a brief display
of a thesis and consequences but as indicating an autonomous
syllogism (svatantra-anumana, rang rgyud kyi rjes dpag). (Svatantra is usually translated as 'independent' rather than 'autonomous'; however, the very motto of Buddha's teaching is
dependent-arising, and thus 'independent' for svatantra seems a
too obvious self-contradiction. Also, here 'inference' does not
refer to a consciousness, but to a syllogistic statement. Therefore, svatantra-anumana is translated often as 'autonomous
syllogism'.)
According to Bhavaviveka, Buddhapalita's autonomous syllogism, if taken at face value, is:
The subjects, things, are not produced from their own
entities because production is senseless and endless.
Bhavaviveka thought that the reason as stated would obviously
not be Buddhapalita's intended reason, for Buddhapalita himself would not assert that production is senseless and endless. He
thought that Buddhapalita's intended meaning would have to
be:
The subjects, things, are not produced from their own
entities because production is sensible and has an end.
According to Bhavaviveka, this autonomous syllogism sets forth
a thesis of non-production from self but cannot prove it because
it offers neither a reason nor an example which have the capacity
of refuting production from self. This is Bhavaviveka's first
objection to Buddhapalita's mode of reasoning.
Bhavaviveka states his own syllogism refuting production
from self as an example of a correct autonomous syllogism:
The subjects, the inner sources (see p.273) such as an eye
sense, are not ultimately produced from self because of
existing—like, for example, existent consciousness
[which exists and is not produced from itself].
For a Samkhya, the person or consciousness is eternal and thus not
a product; therefore, just as a person or consciousness requires
Bhavaviveka's Criticism of Buddhapalita
457
no production, so an eye sense requires no production because it
exists (even in its unmanifest state).
Bhavaviveka's second objection to Buddhapalita's supposedly
intended syllogism is this: A Samkhya would question what
'production from self or 'production from their own entities'
means. Does it mean production of effects from already manifest
entities? If it does, Buddhapalita's syllogism is proving what is
already established for Samkhyas since Samkhyas themselves
accept that the manifest is produced from the non-manifest and,
once manifest, requires no further manifestation. Because
Samkhyas do not accept that effects are produced from entities
which are already manifest, Buddhapalita would be laboring to
prove what they already accept.
Or, the Samkhya's question would be: Does the reference to
production from self apply to production of an effect from the
entity of the non-manifest nature (prakrti, rang bzhin)? If so, the
syllogism would prove just the opposite of what Buddhapalita
intended. It could not prove that there is no production from self
because all products are produced from the nature. The
Samkhya would say:
The subjects, things, are produced from themselves,
that is, from the nature which is the same entity as themselves, because production is sensible and has an end.
Therefore, Bhavaviveka concludes that Buddhapalita's intended
syllogism does not avoid the fallacies that a Samkhya, having
analyzed the thesis, would be expected to adduce.
Also, as a third fault, because Buddhapalita stated something
that is not established as his reason—that production would be
senseless and endless—it must be reversed into: production is
sensible and has an end. This being so, the predicate of the thesis
also must be reversed; it must be changed from 'Things are not
produced from themselves' to 'Things are produced from
others'.
To restate this step, the reason as stated ('production is senseless and endless') is unacceptable because it must be a property
of the subject ('things'), and it is not established that things have
458
Meditation on Emptiness
senseless and endless production. Therefore, the reason must be
changed to 'production is sensible and has an end' in consideration of Buddhapalita's 'actual' meaning, for it is established that
things have sensible and finite production.
Furthermore, Bhavaviveka would claim that Buddhapalita
could not have intended his reason to mean:
If produced from themselves, it would be senseless and
endless.
For syllogistically this would be:
The subjects, things, are not produced from self
because, if produced from self, their production would
be senseless and endless.
The reason why Buddhapalita supposedly could not have meant
this is that when the reason is established, the thesis would
already be established. Contrary to this, it is always necessary to
establish that the reason is a property of the subject, then establish that the predicate of the thesis follows from the reason, and
then, for the first time, realize the predicate of the thesis as a
quality of the subject. In other words, when it is established that
if things are produced from self, their production is senseless and
endless, it is already established that things are not produced
from self. There would be no point in further establishing the
concomitance of the predicate of the thesis, 'no production from
self with the reason, 'if produced from self, their production
would be senseless and endless'. Therefore, Bhavaviveka concludes that since it is 'clear' that Buddhapalita himself did not
accept what he explicitly stated, he must have meant:
The subjects, things, are produced from others because
production is sensible and has an end.
Bhavaviveka says that Buddhapalita thereby contradicts the
Madhyamika tenet that the refutation of the four extreme types
of production is a non-affirming negation (prasajya-pratishedha,
meddgag). In other words, when production from self is refuted,
production from other should not be implied in its place. Even
Bhavaviveka's Criticism of Buddhapalita
459
though Buddhapalita did not state as an explicit thesis that
things are produced from others, Bhavaviveka decided that this
was his implicit thesis, and, therefore, his explicit thesis becomes
an affirming negation (paryudasa-pratishedha, ma yin dgag)—an
explicit negation of production from self which implies an affirmation of production from other in its place. According to Bhavaviveka, Buddhapalita's explicit thesis actually is:
About the subjects, things, their production from themselves is not just eliminated.
In the Madhyamika system a thesis of any of the four extreme
types of production is just to be eliminated; nothing is to be
implied in its place, not even conventionally existent production, even though such is validly established as existing. If an
affirming negation were set forth, it would contradict the intention of Nagarjuna's Treatise to eliminate all elaborations (prapancha, sprospa) of true existence for which only non-affirming
negations are appropriate. If an affirming negation were used,
one would then be seeking to affirm that things are conventionally produced, rather than merely eliminating that phenomena
are produced from self, other, both, and neither and seeking to
take this mere absence as one's object in meditative equipoise.
Thus, if Bhavaviveka's description of Buddhapalita's intention
is correct, the latter would indeed have erred.
Bhavaviveka would add that although it is not the case in
general that when a reason is reversed the thesis also has to be
reversed, Buddhapalita's intention was clearly not just to prove
no true existence but also to prove that production exists nominally or conventionally.356 For in his introductory remarks to his
commentary on the first chapter of the Treatise, Buddhapalita
indicates that the first chapter is in answer to an objector who
says,357 'Show how this which is called production is only a convention.' Also, concluding a brief refutation of production from
self, other, both, and neither, Buddhapalita says, 'Since the
production of things is thus in all ways inadmissible, there is no
production; therefore, this called production is only a convention.' 358
460
Meditation on Emptiness
Let us cite the entire passage in question from Buddhapalita's
commentary:359
Here [an objector] says, 'Show how this which is called
production is only a convention.'
Answer: That is shown first [in the first stanza of
the first chapter of Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle
Way\.
There is never production
Anywhere, of any thing
From itself, from others,
From both, or without cause.
Concerning this, if some things are produced, consider
whether the production of those things is from self, from
other, from both self and other, or causelessly. Upon
examination it is not feasible in all ways.
'From self is synonymous with 'from [its own] entity'.
About that, respectively, things are not produced from
their own entities because their production [again]
would be just senseless and because production would
be endless.360 It is thus: the production again of things
already existing in their own entities is purposeless.
[Also] if though existent they are produced, they would
never not be produced. Hence, that also is not asserted.
Therefore, respectively, things are not produced from
self.
They also are not produced from other. Why? For it
would [absurdly] follow that everything would be produced from everything.
They also are not produced from both self and other
because [such] would [absurdly] entail the fallacies of
both [production from self and from other].
They also are not produced causelessly because it would
[absurdly] follow that everything always would be
produced from everything and because there would be the
fallacy that all endeavor would be just senseless. Since the
production of things is thus in all ways inadmissible,
Bhavaviveka's Criticism of Buddhapalita
461
there is no [inherently existent] production; therefore,
this called production is only a convention.
According to Jam-yang-shay-ba, these statements led Bhavaviveka to believe that Buddhapalita was taking it that since production is delimited to either production from self or production
from other, the refutation of the former implies the affirmation
of the latter. Thus, the root ofBhavaviveka's criticism of Buddhapalita is the latter's own introductory remarks to the refutation
of production which seem to indicate that his intention is to
show through the refutation that production exists conventionally. Because of this, Bhavaviveka viewed Buddhapalita's consequences as implying a proof of a positive phenomenon, that is,
conventionally existent production from other.
In a brilliant display of intellectual ingenuity that exists to this
day among the Ge-luk-ba colleges, Jam-yang-shay-ba traces Bhavaviveka's objection back to Buddhapalita's somewhat questionable introductory remarks. Bhavaviveka himself only says:361
About this, one [that is, Buddhapalita] who is other [than
Bhavaviveka himself] makes the explanation, 'Things
are not produced from their own entities because their
production would be just senseless and because production would be endless.'
That is not suitable (1) because [Buddhapalita] does
not express a reason [capable of proving that there is no
production from self] as well as an example; (2) because
[the reasoning as Buddhapalita states it] does not avoid
the fallacies adduced by another [that is, the fallacies that
a Samkhya would be expected to adduce]; and (3) because
[Buddhapalita's] words afford an opportunity [to an
opponent to expose contradiction within his own system.362 His explanation affords such an opportunity]
because since [the thesis and the reason must] be reversed
from what is explicitly stated, what emerges is the opposite of the thesis and the reason—that things are produced from other because production is fruitful and
because production has an end—due to which [he] would
contradict [Madhyamika] tenets.363
462
Meditation on Emptiness
Bhavaviveka's commentator, Avalokitavrata, elaborates on the
criticism, clarifying points largely through making sure that the
grammar is understood and the moves are properly identified.
His commentary is painstakingly slow and repetitive but is
worth citing because it clearly reveals the broad outlines of Bhavaviveka's argument:364
[Bhavaviveka's
says:
Lamp
for
(Nagarjuna's)
'Wisdom']
About this,365 one [that is, Buddhapalita] who is other
[than Bhavaviveka himself] makes the explanation,
'Things are not produced from their own entities
because their production would be just senseless and
because production would be endless.'
This indicates that also on this occasion of proving that
things are not produced from self the commentator, the
master Buddhapalita, makes such and such an explanation. In that, 'About this' means 'on this occasion of
proving that things are not produced from self. 'Other'
refers to the Elder (Sthavira, gNas rtan) Buddhapalita
who is other than most of the many commentators on
this Treatise [on the Middle Way]—ranging from the
honorable master [Nagarjuna] himself,366 the Elder
Buddhapalita, Chandrakfrti, Devasharma, Gunashn,
Gunamati, and Sthiramati through to the master Bhavaviveka.
The master Buddhapalita makes this explanation:
'Things are not produced from their own entities
because their production would be just senseless and
because production would be endless.' In that, 'Things'
(bhavah, dngospo mams)3" are the external and internal
sources (ayatana, skye mched). 'From themselves'
(svata, bdaggi bdag nyid las) [which is rendered into English above as 'from their own entities' following the
Tibetan which is following this very gloss by Avalokitavrata] means 'from [their] entities' {bdag nyid las).
Bhavaviveka's Criticism of Buddhapalita
[Buddhapalita is referring to production] from that. 'Are
not produced' means '[are not produced] ultimately'.
Why are things not produced from their own entities?
'Because their production would be just senseless' [or,
more literally, 'because of the senselessness of their production']. 'Their production' (tadutpada, de dag gi skye
ba) means the production of those things. 'Senseless'
(vaiyarthya, don medpa) means 'devoid of sense', 'purposeless', 'fruitless'. 'Ness' (_ya[?], nyid) is the fact of
their production being without sense, the senselessness
of their production.
By saying 'because their production would be just
senseless' [Buddhapalita] is indicating: If things are produced from an existent [state], their production would be
just senseless because there would be nothing different
from what had already been produced, nothing which
had not arisen earlier.
Also, 'because their production would be endless'
[indicates]: If, though existent, something were produced, then through being produced it would be
produced in that aspect without cessation; therefore, [its
repeated] production would just not finish. 'Makes the
explanation' means that the Elder Buddhapalita makes
that explanation on this occasion of proving that things
are not produced from self.
[Bhavaviveka's Lamp for (Nagarjuna's)
says:
'Wisdom']
That is not suitable (1) because [Buddhapalita] does
not express a reason [capable of proving that there is
no production from self] as well as an example; (2)
because [the reasoning as Buddhapalita states it] does
not avoid the fallacies adduced by another [that is, the
fallacies that a Samkhya would be expected to
adduce]; and (3) because [Buddhapalita's] words
afford an opportunity [to an opponent to expose contradiction within his own system. His explanation
463
464
Meditation on Emptiness
affords such an opportunity] because since [the thesis
and the reason must] be reversed from what is
explicitly stated, what emerges is the opposite of the
thesis and the reason—that things are produced from
other because production is fruitful and because production has an end—due to which [he] contradicts
[Madhyamika] tenets.
In this passage the commentator [Bhavaviveka] himself
proves that the explanation by the Elder Buddhapalita is
not suitable. In that, 'is not suitable' is [Bhavaviveka's]
thesis that the explanation by the Elder Buddhapalita is
not suitable. Why is it not suitable? 'Because [Buddhapalita] does not express a reason [capable of proving that
there is no production from self] as well as an example.'
This indicates that in his explanation he has only proclaimed a mere thesis, 'Things are not produced from
self,' and has not expressed a reason why they are not
produced from self such as [Bhavaviveka did in his syllogism when he gave as the reason] 'because of existing'
and has not expressed an example of the non-production
of the existent from self such as [Bhavaviveka did when
he said] 'like, for example, an existent consciousness,'
and therefore [his explanation] is not suitable.
Furthermore, [it is not suitable] 'because [the reasoning as Buddhapalita states it] does not avoid the fallacies
adduced by another [that is, the fallacies that a Samkhya
would be expected to adduce'. This indicates that] even
if he had fully expressed and established a reason and an
example, it would, without question, have the fallacies
adduced by another who propounds [ultimately existent]
production, but you [Buddhapalita] did not avoid them;
therefore, because of not avoiding the fallacies adduced
by another, [the explanation] is not suitable.
For what further reason is it not suitable? 'And
because [Buddhapalita's] words afford an opportunity
[to an opponent to expose contradiction within his own
Bhavaviveka's Criticism of Buddhapalita
system].' [This indicates that] the explanation by the
Elder Buddhapalita is also unsuitable because ofbeing a
passage that affords an opportunity for censure by
another party. 'And' (cha, yang) is to be taken as [indicating] that not only is [his explanation] unsuitable because
of not expressing a reason and an example and because of
not avoiding the fallacies adduced by another but also it
is unsuitable because of affording an opportunity [for
censure].
To indicate just that [third fault, Bhavaviveka] says,
' . . . [the thesis and the reason must] be reversed from
what is explicitly stated'. What is explicitly stated? It is
just Buddhapalita's explanation, 'Things are not produced from their own entities because their production
would be just senseless and because production would
be endless.' 368 To be reversed from that is to be reversed
from that which is explicitly stated. The opposite of
'Things are not produced from their own entities' is
'things are produced from other'; the opposite of
'because their production would be just senseless' is
'because their production is fruitful', and the opposite of
'because production would be endless' is 'because production is finite'. Hence, because of affording an opportunity [for censure] it is also unsuitable.
How [does Buddhapalita's explanation] come to be a
passage affording an opportunity [for censure] through
reversing what is explicitly stated? Therefore, [Bhavaviveka] s a y s , ' . . . what emerges is the opposite of the thesis
and the reason [or, more literally, the property of that].'
The 'thesis' (sadhya, bsgrub par by a ba) is the thesis,
'Things are not produced from their own entities.'
'What emerges is opposite of that' means that what
emerges is the opposite of 'Things are not produced
from their own entities,' i.e., things are produced from
other.
The 'property of that' (taddharma, de'i chos) is the
property of that thesis, that is to say, [the reason which
465
466
Meditation on Emptiness
is] the property of the subject of that thesis: namely,
'because their production would be just senseless and
because production would be endless.' 'What emerges is
the opposite of those': what emerges is the opposite of
'because their production would be just senseless'—
namely, because production is fruitful—and the opposite
of 'because production would be endless'—namely,
because production is finite.
How does [Buddhapalita's explanation] come to afford
an opportunity [for censure] due to the emergence of the
opposite of those? Therefore, [Bhavaviveka] says,
'things are produced from other because production is
fruitful and because production has an end'. [This
means that Buddhapalita gives someone an opportunity
for censure through opening up] the opportunity of
[someone's saying that he is holding] (1) that things are
produced from other, which emerges as the opposite of
the thesis 'Things are not produced from their own entities'; (2) production is fruitful, which emerges as the
opposite of the property [proving the thesis] 'because
their production would be just senseless'; and (3) production is finite, which emerges as the opposite of the
property [proving the thesis] 'because production would
be endless'.
What fault is there in such? As a possible response by
his opponent, [it would show that Buddhapalita] 'contradicts [Madhyamika] tenets'. For it would contradict the
tenets in the master [Nagarjuna's] scriptures that he does
not assert that things are [ultimately] produced from
other, that he does not assert that production369 is [ultimately] fruitful, and that he does not assert that production is [ultimately] finite.
Therefore, this explanation by the Elder Buddhapalita
is not suitable since it contradicts reasoning and scripture.
Dzong-ka-ba, in commenting on these points in his Ocean of
Bhavaviveka's Criticism of Buddhapalita
467
Reasoning,370 disagrees with Avalokitavrata about what tenet is
contradicted. He says that it is the tenet that the statement in
Nagarjuna's Treatise 'there is no production from self is a mere
elimination of production from self. As Jam-yang-shay-ba371
points out, the three points show that a tenet is contradicted—
they are not the tenet that is contradicted.
There is no question that Bhavaviveka is indeed right in
saying that the refutation of the four extreme types of production is just a non-affirming negation and that it would contradict
Madhyamika tenets if Buddhapalita indulged in an affirming
negation on this occasion of ultimate analysis. However, a
defender of Buddhapalita would answer that his refutation of the
four extreme types of production is indeed a non-affirming negation. For his emphasizing that production exists conventionally
does not mean that he considers that the refutation of production
establishes conventionally existent production. Buddhapalita is
briefly setting out the general thrust of Nagarjuna's Treatise that
nothing exists ultimately and that everything is feasible within
the context of mere nominalism; he means:
Though non-production from the four extremes is here a
non-affirming negation, production does exist nominally.
Furthermore, even if Buddhapalita's words do seem to suggest
an affirming negation, since he did not wish to suggest such, he
cannot be called to task for it. Even sutra says, 'That which is
produced from causes is not produced,' and Bhavaviveka himself says, 'The subject, a form, does not exist ultimately because
of existing—like, for example, a magician's illusion [which exists
and does not exist ultimately].' No one asserts that these statements imply conventional production or conventional existence
even though they might seem to.
Based on Buddhapalita's somewhat misleading words, Bhavaviveka took his consequences as implying a proof of conventionally existent production from other. Then, he proceeded to
extract Buddhapalita's supposed actual meaning according to
this notion. He then showed that this would contradict the
468
Meditation on Emptiness
Madhyamika tenet that the refutation of production is a nonaffirming negation.
This does not mean, however, that non-affirming negations
have no implications.372 A non-affirming negation cannot imply
a positive phenomenon or even an affirming negation but can
imply another non-affirming negation of the same type. For
instance, the non-affirming negation (or negative phenomenon),
the non-existence of a son of a barren woman, implies the nonaffirming negation, the non-existence of the beauty or ugliness of
the son of a barren woman. Also, meditation on emptiness, a
non-affirming negation of inherent existence, with respect to one
phenomenon functions as meditation on the emptiness of everything. In the same vein, it is said that until one has eradicated
adherence to the inherent existence of the mental and physical
aggregates, one has not cognized the absence of inherent existence of the person. Similarly, the thesis that things are not inherently produced from self, other, both, and neither implies that
production does not exist inherently, thereby implying that
things lack inherent existence.373 These are all non-affirming
negations that imply other non-affirming negations.
Therefore, non-affirming negations (or negative phenomena)
may have implications, but those implications are all other nonafFirming negations of the same type. An affirming negation, on
the other hand, implies something positive in its place. For
instance, the fat Devadatta's not eating during the day implies
his eating at night. (For a discussion of negatives see Appendix 4.)
In conclusion, Bhavaviveka's criticism of Buddhapalita's
consequences revolves around his interpretation of the latter's
prefatory and concluding remarks to the refutation of production. He interpreted them as showing that Buddhapalita saw
conventionally existent production as being proved by the refutation of true production, thereby contradicting the basic
Madhyamika tenet that the object realized through a refutation
by ultimate analysis is a mere negation or elimination of true
existence.
4 Chandrak i rti 's Defense of
Buddhapalita
Sources
Chandrakirti's Clear Words
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way
Gom-day Nam-ka-gyel-tsen's Settling Difficult Points in the
Opposite of the Consequences
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
Corresponding section of the translation pp. 584-6
For ChandrakFrti, all of the fallacies that Bhavaviveka found in
Buddhapalita's refutation of production from self are inadmissible.374 Chandrakirti's Clear Words{ 14.1-15.3, 10.11-11.2)says:
The master Buddhapalita says, 'Things are not produced from their own entities because their production
[again] would be just senseless and because production
would be endless. There is no need for production again
(punarutpada, yang skye ba) of things which already
exist in their own entities. If though existent they are
produced, they would never not be produced.'
About this, some [namely, Bhavaviveka] express faults,
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Meditation on Emptiness
'That is not suitable (1) because [Buddhapalita] does not
express a reason [capable of proving that there is no production from self] as well as an example; (2) because [the
reasoning as Buddhapalita states it] does not avoid the
fallacies adduced by another [that is, the fallacies that a
Samkhya would be expected to adduce]; and (3) because
[Buddhapalita's] words afford an opportunity [to an
opponent to expose contradiction within his own system.375 His explanation affords such an opportunity]
because since [the thesis and the reason must] be
reversed from what is explicitly stated, what emerges is
the opposite of the thesis and the reason—that things are
produced from other because production is fruitful and
because production has an end—due to which [he] would
contradict [Madhyamika] tenets.'
We [that is, Chandrakirti] view all of these fallacies as
not being reasonable.
CHANDRAKlRTI'S DEFENSE AGAINST
T H E FIRST FALLACY
The first fallacy was that Buddhapalita could not refute production from self because he did not state a reason and an example of
an autonomous syllogism. Chandrakfrti's answer is that through
disputation with contradictory consequences an opponent can
indeed come to accept that there is no production from self.
Buddhapalita demonstrated the inner contradictions in production from self with two consequences:
It follows about the subject;, a sprout, that its production
again is senseless because of already existing in its own
entity.376
If it is answered that the consequence is not entailed by the
reason, the second consequence is:
It follows about the subject, a sprout, that its production
is endless because though it already exists in its own
entity, there is need for its re-production.
Chandrak i rti's Defense of Buddhapalita
471
The opponent can perceive that these consequences contradict
his tenets because a Samkhya asserts that production again (into
a manifest state) is sensible (even though he does not assert that
the production again of the already manifest is sensible) and does
not assert that products are produced endlessly. Thereby,
Buddhapalita shows that the proofs for the existence of production from self are unreasonable, for a Samkhya can find no
example of re-production of that which has already been produced. Since senseless re-production and endless production of
that which has already been produced contradict his own tenets
about production, the Samkhya is caused to fall away from his
assertion of production from self.
Furthermore, if one is able to show such inner contradictions
and the opponent perceives them yet persists in his error, there
is no point in further stating reasons and examples of autonomous syllogisms. Bhavaviveka's rushing to state autonomous
syllogisms just shows his liking for logic.
Also, if one is a Madhyamika who refutes all extremes as in the
King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra, one should not use autonomous syllogisms, in which the reason has inherently existent
presence in the subject, pervasion, and counter-pervasion. This is
because a Madhyamika has no assertion of other positions
among the four extremes and so forth, such as that things inherently exist, utterly do not exist, both inherently exist and inherently disintegrate, or that there is an inherently existent middle
way that forsakes the two extremes ofexistence andnon-existence.
A Madhyamika has no thesis which contradicts the Madhyamika system.
Nagarjuna's Refutation of Objections says:377
If I had any [inherently existent] thesis,
Then I would have that fault [of contradicting my own
thesis that there is no inherent existence].
Because I have no [inherently existent] thesis,
I am only faultless.
It is not being said that a Madhyamika has no theses; he merely
has no theses that inherently exist. He has no theses upholding
472
Meditation on Emptiness
the existence of phenomena which can be found under analysis.
However, Madhyamikas do have both negative and positive
theses.378 That they have negative theses is clear in the refutations of going and coming and of production, for instance.
Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way says (II.8):
Respectively, a goer is not going,
A non-goer also is not going,
Indeed what third other than
A goer and a non-goer is going?
Also, (1.1):
There is never production
Anywhere of any phenomenon
From itself, from others,
From both, or causelessly.
Madhyamikas also have positive theses as in Nagarjuna's Essay
on the Mind of Enlightenment, 'I assert dependently arisen activities to be like dreams and magicians' illusions.' His Refutation of
Objections 379 says, 'We do not set forth a non-assertion of conventionalities.' His Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning says:
Those who assert dependent phenomena
As like moons in water,
As not real and not unreal,
Are not tricked by views.
His Praise of the Supramundane (Lokatitastava) says, 'You
[Buddha] have taught agent and object as conventionalities.
Your assertion is that they are established as mutually dependent.'
Also, Chandrakfrti says in his own commentary on his Supplement, 'The wise should think that this position is faultless and
beneficial and should definitely assert it.' Also, 'Therefore,
because dependent imputation is asserted in the same way as the
assertion of dependent-arising as just conditional, it does not
follow for our position that all conventionalities are annihilated;
it is suitable also for the opponent to assert just this.' Throughout
Chandrak i rti's Defense of Buddhapalita
473
his commentary to his own Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' and in his Clear Words Chandrakfrti
refers to theses stated in the basic text and the reasonings or consequences which prove these theses.380 Thus, Madhyamikas
have both negative and positive theses.
Since Nagarjuna does seem to say in his Refutation of Objections that he does not have any theses, the background of that
statement needs to be known.381 A Madhyamika has said, 'Phenomena do not inherently exist,' to which a proponent of inherently existent phenomena has answered, 'If the words of this
thesis inherently exist, then it would not be correct that all phenomena do not inherently exist. If the words of this thesis do not
inherently exist, they are nothing and cannot refute the inherent
existence of phenomena.' The idea of the opponent is that if
things exist, they must exist by way of their own being. If things
do not, then they do not exist at all and, like the hairs of a turtle,
cannot effect anything.
Thus, the debate in the Refutation of Objections is not about
having or not having a thesis in general. It is about whether the
words of the thesis, 'Phenomena do not exist inherently,' exist
inherently. The meaning of Nagarjuna's answer is:
If I asserted that the words of such a thesis existed inherently, I would have the fault of contradicting my own
thesis that all phenomena do not exist inherently. However, because I do not assert that the words of my thesis
exist inherently, I do not have this fault.
Thus, this passage which is often quoted to show that Madhyamikas have no theses does not do so. Madhyamikas have
nominally existent positive and negative theses; they do not have
any theses which are analytically findable or any theses which
affirm the existence of analytically findable phenomena.
It is not fitting for a Madhyamika to assert the existence of
autonomous syllogisms because, even conventionally, nothing
exists autonomously or inherently. However, Dzong-ka-ba adds
that it does not necessarily follow that if one accepts autonomous
syllogisms, one is not a Madhyamika, for Svatantrikas do so but
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Meditation on Emptiness
are still Madhyamikas.382 Since they are higher than Chittamatrins
because they prove with limitless forms of reasoning that all phenomena do not truly exist, they are not suitable to be other than
Madhyamikas. The non-contradiction of being a Madhyamika
and yet accepting what is not fit for a Madhyamika is similar to
the non-contradiction of being a monk and yet having minor
infractions of the monk's code.383
In defense of Buddhapalita against Bhavaviveka's attribution
of the first 'fallacy', Chandrakfrti's Clear Words (15.3-16.10,
11.1-12.4) says:384
I view all of these fallacies as not being reasonable. How?
His saying 'because [Buddhapalita] did not express a
reason [capable of proving that there is no production
from self] as well as an example' is not reasonable.
Why? [Buddhapalita] is inquiring in the following way
of an opponent who asserts production from self:385
You [Samkhyas] propound that 'from self [means]
that the existence [of things that involve production
acts] as a cause and that just it [i.e., the existent] is
produced.386 However, we do not see that there is purpose in the production again of the existent, and we
also see that [such production] would be endless.
However, you [Samkhyas] do not assert that the
already produced [that is, the already manifest] is produced again and also do not assert that [the production of a thing] is endless. Therefore, your debate
[that is to say, your position of production from self] is
devoid of correctness and contradicts your own
assertion.
When [Buddhapalita] debates through just these [consequences] which have the effects [derived] from stating a
reason and example, would the opponent not accept it?
However, if the opponent is not overcome even through
debate by way of contradicting his own assertions, then
due to [his] shamelessness he also just would not be
Chandrak i rti's Defense of Buddhapalita
475
overcome by [stating] reasons and examples. We
[Prasangikas] do not debate with the crazily stubborn.
Therefore, when the master [Bhavaviveka] sets out inferences at inappropriate times, he is manifesting just his
own liking for inference.
Also, it is not suitable for one who is a Madhyamika to
make autonomous inferences because of not asserting
other positions [among the four extremes]. Moreover,
Aryadeva [XVI.25] explains:387
Even over a long period of time
Censure cannot be expressed
For one who has no position of [inherent] existence,
Non-existence, or existence and non-existence.
Also, [Nagarjuna's] Refutation of Objections [stanzas 29
and 30] says:
If I had any [inherently existent] thesis,
Then I would have that fault [of contradicting my
own thesis that there is no inherent existence].
Because I have no [inherently existent] thesis,
I am only faultless.
If [in accordance with your thought] 388 the factualities
Of direct perception and so forth did observe some
[inherently established objects of comprehension],
Then [it would be suitable] to prove those [in your
own system] and refute [others], but since [valid
cognizers observing
Such objects of comprehension] do not exist [even
conventionally], there is no [chance for you] to
censure me.
CHANDRAKIRTI'S DEFENSE AGAINST
T H E SECOND FALLACY
Chandrakfrti next declares inadmissible the second fallacy
adduced by Bhavaviveka in what the latter considered to be
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Meditation on Emptiness
Buddhapalita's intended syllogism refuting the Samkhya
position.389 Bhavaviveka's criticism was that Buddhapalita did
not avoid the fallacies which a Samkhya would be expected to
adduce upon analyzing his thesis and reason. Chandrakfrti's
answer is that Buddhapalita did not state an autonomous syllogism like Bhavaviveka's:
The subjects, the inner sources such as an eye sense, are
not produced from self because of existing—like, for
example, an existent consciousness.
Chandrakfrti objects to Bhavaviveka's syllogism, saying that he
has not avoided the fallacy of proving what is already established
for Samkhyas if non-production from self refers to non-production from an entity of an effect. For, Samkhyas hold that manifestations are not produced from the manifest, that is, from effects,
but from the non-manifest. On the other hand, if non-production
from self refers to non-production from the entity of a cause, one
would have the fallacy of the reason's proving exactly the opposite for a Samkhya.
Similarly, if the reason of Bhavaviveka's autonomous syllogism ('because of existing') is analyzed, the same faults need to
be eradicated. If 'existing' means that an eye sense exists from
the time of its causes, then the reason, for a Samkhya, only goes
to prove that things are produced from self. If 'existing' means
that an eye sense exists at the time of its manifestation, then one
would be proving what is already established for the Samkhyas
since they themselves assert that it has already been produced
into its manifest or effect state and thus does not require production.
Chandrakfrti says that though Bhavaviveka himself incurs
these fallacies, Buddhapalita did not state such a thesis or reason.
Rather, the thesis of Buddhapalita's consequence is:
It follows about the subjects, things, that their production again is senseless.
The reason is:
Because of already existing in their own entities.
Chandrak i rti's Defense of Buddhapalita 56
(It should be remembered that Buddhapalita only said, 'Things
are not produced from their own entities because their production would be just senseless and because production would be
endless.')
According to Jam-yang-shay-ba, Chandrakfrti saw in Buddhapalita's refutation the positing of a thesis:
Things are not produced from their own entities.
Then, he saw two consequences demonstrating damage to the
view that things are produced from their own entities:
1 It follows about the subjects, things, that their production
again is senseless because of already existing in their own entities.
2 It follows about the subjects, things, that their production is
endless because, although already existent in their own entities, there is need for their production.
In other words, Chandrakfrti is saying that Bhavaviveka misread Buddhapalita's text, for aside from positing a general thesis
that things are not produced from self (that is, from their own
entities), Buddhapalita did not express a syllogism (see p.456)
such as 'The subjects, things, are not produced from their own
entities because production is senseless and endless' (or in its
altered form 'because production is sensible and has an end').
The fallacies which Bhavaviveka imputed to Buddhapalita are
flung back at him by Chandrakfrti. It is Bhavaviveka and not
Buddhapalita who has the questionable autonomous syllogism
with a vague predicate of the thesis ('are not produced from self
or 'are not produced from their own entities') and a vague reason
('because of existing'). In this vein, Chandrakfrti's Clear Words
(16.11-18.4, 12.4-12.18) says:
When in that way a Madhyamika just does not express
autonomous inferences, how could [Buddhapalita] have
an autonomous thesis [such as Bhavaviveka stated]—
'The inner sources are not produced from self—which
the Samkhyas would cause to be overturned as follows:
478
Meditation on Emptiness
What is the meaning of this thesis? Does 'from self
mean from the entity of the effect or from the entity of
the cause? Which is it? If it is from the entity of the
effect, then [you have the fault of] proving what is
already established [for us]. If it is from the entity of the
cause, then it has the sense of [proving] the opposite
because [according to us Samkhyas] all that have production are produced only within the context of existing in
the entities of [their] causes.
Also, how could we [Buddhapalita and Chandrakfrti]
have a reason [such as that stated by Bhavaviveka]—
'because of existing'—which would be either [a case of]
proving what is already established [for a Samkhya] or of
having the opposite meaning [for a Samkhya] and with
respect to which we would have to toil to get rid [of the
fault that we would be] proving what is already established or [the fault of) having the opposite meaning!
Therefore, just due to not being susceptible to the consequence of those faults, answers to them did not [need]
to be expressed by the master Buddhapalita.
An hypothetical extension of Bhavaviveka's argument
Chandrakfrti goes on to say that hypothetically Bhavaviveka
might accept that the reasons, etc., which prove non-true
existence do not appear similarly to Madhyamikas and nonMadhyamikas, making an autonomous syllogism impossible, in
which case Buddhapalita should have stated a correct otherapproved inference (parasiddha-anumana, gzhan grags kyi rjes
dpag). (Even though an actual anumana refers to an inferring
consciousness, here in parasiddha-anumana, literally 'otherapproved inference', it refers to the application of a reason
approved by the other party in the debate, an 'other-approved syllogism'. Synonymous with parasiddha-anumana is parasiddhalihga (gzhan grags kyi rtags), 'other-approved reason'. Svasiddhaanumana (ranggrags kyi rjes dpag), 'self-approved inference', and
svasiddha-lihga (rang grags kyi rtags), 'self-approved reason', are
also synonymous with parasiddha-anumana, 'other-approved
Chandrak i rti's Defense of Buddhapalita
479
inference', because 'self and 'other' here both refer to the opponent from different points of view.) 390 Thus, according to Chandrakfrti, Bhavaviveka may mean that Buddhapalita did not state
a correct other-approved inference because the latter did not give
a proper reason and example.
In answer to this, Chandrakfrti states that there is no need for
an other-approved syllogism because the inner contradictions
and unreasonableness of the opponent's view can be shown by
consequences and by showing him that his proofs of production
from self are unreasonable, and thus there is no further purpose
in stating an other-approved syllogism. That the Samkhya's
'proofs' of production from self have no capacity to do so is the
clearest sign of the eradication of the Samkhya's own view. For,
if upon statement of contradictory consequences, he wants to
hold to his position, he must proceed to prove that there is production from self, for it is the way of logicians to state reasons in
order to generate in another an ascertainment of a thesis just as
one oneself has ascertained it. The Samkhya's syllogism would,
for instance, be:
The subject, a sprout unmanifest at the time of its
causes, is produced from its own entity because the nonexistent is not produced and because the causes of one
thing are distinct from the causes of another.
The Samkhya's idea is that if the non-existent were produced or
made manifest, then the horns of a rabbit could be produced.
Also, things have their own distinct causes, and this indicates
that they exist non-manifestly in their causes.
However, a Buddhist would not accept the reason as correct.
For a Buddhist (that is to say, for a Sautrantika on up), even
though what is non-existent at the time of its causes is produced,
what is non-existent in general is not produced, and also the
causes of one thing are indeed distinct from the causes of another
thing, but these two facts do not entail that things are produced
from their own entities. The reason, therefore, does nothing to
advance why things are produced from their own entities; the
syllogism is only a repetition of the basic thesis itself. Technically
480
Meditation on Emptiness
speaking, there is no concordant example to be found which can
serve as a basis for ascertaining the entailment.391 The Samkhya's
proofs are no proofs at all in that they are just outflows of his
own assertions, incapable of establishing them. In this vein,
Chandrakfrti's Clear Words (18.5-19.7, 12.18-13.18) says:
[Bhavaviveka] might think, '[I might allow that] since
according to Madhyamikas the position [or thesis],
reason, and example [of an autonomous syllogism] are
not established, autonomous inferences are not to be
expressed, and, therefore, one would not prove the
meaning of a thesis refuting production from self and
would not clear away the other's thesis through an inference established for both [parties]. Still, one must
express contradiction of the other's thesis through one's
own [other-approved] inference. Hence, one must have a
position [that is, a thesis] and so forth that are devoid of
the faults of position, reason, and example. Thus, since
[Buddhapalita] did not express such and did not avoid
the fallacies of those [which a Samkhya would be expected to draw, Buddhapalita] just has those faults [of not
stating a reason and example capable of proving no production from self and of not avoiding the fallacies which
a Samkhya would cite upon examining what no production from self means].'
Answer: That is not so. Why? One [such as a Samkhya]
who [upon being pressed by the consequences set forth
by Buddhapalita] wishes to generate ascertainment of
something which he holds as a thesis in others in just the
way that he has ascertained it, should demonstrate to
others [that is, Madhyamikas] just that logical proof
through which that meaning is understood. Therefore,
it is respectively the custom for just the other party
[here, the Samkhya] to state a proof of the meaning of a
thesis which he himself asserts [in response to the contradictions shown by Buddhapalita's consequences rather
than for Buddhapalita to proceed to set forth an otherapproved inference]. However, this [reasoning which a
Chandrak i rti's Defense of Buddhapalita
481
Samkhya states to a Madhyamika to try to prove production from self] is not a [valid] reasoning for the other
[party, the Madhyamika]. Because the reason and
example [which a Samkhya cites] are not [valid], the
proof of the meaning of his thesis is just a statement of
outflows of [his own] assertions. Therefore, since he has
asserted a position that is devoid of logical correctness, it
deceives just himself, due to which it cannot generate
ascertainment in another. In this way, just this inability
of his attempt to prove the meaning of his thesis [due to
being faulty] is the clearest eradication of his [position].
What need is there here to express damage [to his position] by way of inference! [For, the contradiction of his
view that something exists and yet needs to be reproduced has been shown, and upon the Samkhya's
presentation of his own view in syllogistic inference, the
Madhyamika has given answers showing its illogicality.]
Buddhapalita's indication of an other-approved inference
Still, hypothetically, Bhavaviveka might insist on the statement of
a self-approved or, as it is also called, an other-approved syllogism,
because there are many other-approved syllogisms in Nagarjuna's
writings and in many sutras. Chandrakfrti answers that even if an
other-approved syllogism needed to be stated, Buddhapalita did
state one when he said, 'Things are not produced from their own
entities because their production [again] would be just senseless.'
This indicates a correct other-approved syllogism:
With respect to the subjects, things such as a non-manifest
pot and so forth abiding in the potential entities of their
causes, their production again is senseless because of
already existing in their own entities—like, for example,
a manifest pot [which already exists in its own entity and
the re-production of which would be senseless].
This other-approved syllogism is similar to the consequence
which Jam-yang-shay-ba first interpreted in Buddhapalita's
statement as:
482
Meditation on Emptiness
It follows about the subject, a sprout, that its production
again is senseless because of already existing in its own
entity.
Except for slight differences in format, there is no substantial
difference in this case between the consequence and otherapproved syllogism. In general, however, consequences have
greater usage than other-approved syllogisms because they must
be stated in all instances of generating an inference in another in
order, at least, to break the pointedness or the vibrance of the
other party's adherence to a wrong view.392 An other-approved
syllogism need not be stated for intelligent opponents, when a
consequence alone is sufficient to generate a consciousness inferring the intended thesis.
The question between Chandrakfrti and Bhavaviveka is
whether Buddhapalita's statement indicates such a correct
other-approved syllogism. To quote Buddhapalita again:
Things are not produced from their own entities because
their production [again] would be just senseless.
Chandrakfrti sees the word 'their' in the reason clause as indicating the subject and the example. His source is Buddhapalita's
more extensive rendition:
The production again of things already existing in their
own entities is purposeless.
This more extensive statement of 'their' as 'of things already
existing in their own entities' implicitly contains within it an
example—like a manifest pot—which possesses both the reason
—already existing in its own entity—and the predicate—senseless production again. A valid example must possess both the
reason and the predicate and be approved by the Samkhya, who
agrees that a manifest pot already exists in its own entity and
does not require further production. Since this more extensive
statement is Buddhapalita's own commentary on the brief statement, it must be applied to the condensed version.
Similarly, the phrase, 'existing in their own entities', in the
Chandrak i rti's Defense of Buddhapalita
483
longer statement bears the reason of the syllogism. The predicate of the thesis is indicated in the shorter version itself, 'production would be senseless', though the word 'again' (punar,
yang) does need to be added from the longer statement, making
'production again would be senseless'.
Therefore, even if Buddhapalita's words are taken from the
viewpoint of presenting an other-approved inference, the faults
imputed by Bhavaviveka do not apply. This is because Buddhapalita's words contain a five-membered statement of proof:
1 Thesis: With regard to things such as a non-manifest pot and
so forth, their production again is senseless.
2 Pervasion: That production again is senseless pervades, or
applies to all cases of, things already existing in their own
entities.
3 Example: Like an already manifest pot.
4 Exemplification: Just as an already manifest pot already exists
in its own entity, so things such as a non-manifest pot already
exist in their own entities.
5 Summary: Therefore, because things already exist in their
own entities, the production again of things is senseless.393
(See Appendix 5 for a discussion of other proof statements.)
About this, Chandrakirti's Clear Words (19.8-21.7, 13.18-15.4)
says:
[Bhavaviveka] might say, 'Nevertheless, the fault of contradiction with one's own inference [that is to say, with
an inference acceptable to a Samkhya] must, without
question, be expressed.'
[Answer: ] The master Buddhapalita also just expressed
such. How? For he said, 'Things are not produced from
their own entities because their production [again]
would be just senseless.' In that, the [word] 'their' (tad,
de dag) [in the reason clause] holds [or indicates] 'those
which already exist in their own entities'. Why? This is
because [Buddhapalita's subsequent statement] 'The
production again of things already existing in their own
484
Meditation on Emptiness
entities is purposeless,' is [his] commentary on that
abbreviated statement [and we must, therefore, carry it
over to the shorter statement]. Also, this [longer] statement ['those which already exist in their own entities']
bears a concordant example ['a manifest pot'] renowned
to the other [party, the Samkhya] which possesses the
qualities of [the predicate of] the probandum ['senseless
production again'] and the proof ['already existing in its
own entity'].
In [Buddhapalita's longer statement], 'already existing
in their own entities' bears the reason. [In the shorter
statement itself] 'because production would be just
senseless' holds the predicate of the probandum [once it
is changed to 'production again (punarutpada, yang skye
ba) is senseless' in accordance with the longer statement].
In:
A sound is an impermanent thing because products
are [necessarily] impermanent things. It is seen that
products are impermanent things, as in the case, for
example, of a pot. Likewise, a sound is also a product.
Therefore, because of being a product, [a sound] is an
impermanent thing.
product which is manifested [or used] due to its connection [with the predicate of the probandum] is the reason.
Just so, here also [the syllogism is]:
Things [such as a non-manifest pot and so forth] are
not produced from self because the production again
of what already exist in their own entities is just senseless. Just as it is seen that pots and so forth which
already abide in front [of oneself] and which already
exist in their own manifest entities do not rely on
being produced again, so if you think that there are
pots and so forth which already exist in their own
entities at the time of the lump of clay and so forth,
Chandrak i rti's Defense of Buddhapalita
485
then production even at that time of what already
exist in their own entities does not exist.
In that [syllogism], the reason—'already existing in their
own entities'—which is manifested [or used] due to its
connection [with the predicate of the probandum,
'senseless production again'] and which is unmistaken
with respect to refuting re-production expresses contradiction through the Samkhya's own inference [that is, an
inference acceptable to a Samkhya].
Therefore, how is it that [Bhavaviveka] says, 'That is
not suitable because [Buddhapalita] does not express a
reason as well as an example'?
The unassailability of Buddhapalita's other-approved inference
Chandrakfrti found in Buddhapalita's commentary a syllogism
that is unassailable. For a Samkhya would have no qualms about
the thesis since the subject is clearly stated as a non-manifest pot
and so forth, and a non-manifest pot does not require production.
Also, the thesis—that a non-manifest pot and so forth have no need
of production again—is new to a Samkhya and cannot be said to
be a case of trying to prove what is already established for him
since he accepts that the first production of a thing is its attainment of an existent entity in its causes and that it requires further
production into a manifest state. He would also have no qualms
that the reason was proving exactly the opposite because the
thesis is that the production again of a non-manifest pot is purposeless. About this, the Clear Words (21.8-.14, 15.4-. 15) says:
Not only is it just not that a reason and example were not
expressed, but also it is not that the fallacies adduced by
the other [party, the Samkhya] were not avoided. How?
For, the Samkhyas do not assert that a pot dwelling in
front [of oneself] which has a manifest form (abhivyaktarupa, mngon par gsal ba'i rang bzhin) manifests again,
and [thus] here it is an entity established as an example
[of something which already exists in its own entity and
is not produced again].394 Since the probandum is:
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Meditation on Emptiness
those which are potential entities and do not have a
manifested nature, predicated with a negation of production,
how could [the Samkhyas] have the qualm that [Buddhapalita's syllogism has] the fault of a position [thesis] that
is proving what is already established [for them] or has
the sense of a contradictory reason [proving for them not
that things are not produced from self but that they are].
Therefore, even if [Buddhapalita] did express contradiction395 [of the Samkhya view] through self[-renowned]
inference [that is, a syllogistic statement approved by the
Samkhyas], they would not set forth the fallacies which
[Bhavaviveka] mentioned. Hence, it is just not that
[Buddhapalita] did not avoid fallacies adduced by the
other [party since they would not adduce them]. For
these reasons, it should be known that these [two]
objections [to Buddhapalita's remarks by Bhavaviveka]
are just senseless.
Chandrakfrti says that, furthermore, Buddhapalita's syllogistic
statement does not have the fault of not applying to all products,
since by using 'a pot and so forth' as the subject all things that
have production are included in the subject and not just some
specific products, such as pots. Thus, a Samkhya would not have
any qualms that the reasoning did not apply to all products. The
Clear Words (22.1-.2, 15.15-. 18) says:
Because the phrase 'and so forth' in 'a pot (ghata, bum
pa) and so forth' was expressed with the intention of
including all things asserted as being produced,
[Buddhapalita's syllogistic statement] also does not
become indefinite by way of [not including] cloth (pata,
snam bu)-and so forth.396
A second other-approved inference contained in Buddhapalita's
commentary
In the above syllogism which Chandrakfrti found in Buddhapalita's commentary, the thesis is that things such as non-manifest
Chandrak i rti's Defense of Buddhapalita
487
pots have no need of being produced again, not that they are not
produced from self (or from their own entities), the latter being
considered, in the context, to be vague and thus subject to questioning by a Samkhya. In this interpretation of Buddhapalita's
remarks, his opening statement that things are not produced
from their own entities is, according to Jam-yang-shay-ba, just a
general thesis applying to the section, not the specific thesis of
either the consequences or the other-approved syllogism just
explained. Nevertheless, Chandrakfrti finds a second otherapproved syllogism in the same passage that has the absence of
production from self as the predicate of the thesis:
The subjects, objects other than the person which are
asserted by the Samkhyas to be produced, are not produced from self because of existing in their own entities,
as is the case, for example, with the person (purusha,
skyes bu).
According to Jam-yang-shay-ba,397 Chandrakirti's point is that
even if Buddhapalita is proving for a Samkhya that objects other
than the person are not produced from self, there is no fault of the
Samkhya's having qualms that Buddhapalita is trying to prove
what is already established for them, or that it proves just the
opposite, or that it is indefinite due to not being all-inclusive. In
other words, the argument is so well framed that none of these
faults can be adduced.
Jam-yang-shay-ba does not explain how this syllogism is faultless; he merely says that it is easy to realize that it is. Clearly, it is
all-inclusive in that 'objects other than the person which are
asserted by the Samkhyas to be produced' includes all phenomena that are subject to production, since it excludes even the
fundamental nature (prakrti, rang bzhin), which is other than
the person but is not produced, and yet includes all evolutes of
the fundamental nature. Also, it is clear that the example is
established for the Samkhya, who holds that the person exists in
its own entity and is not produced from self since it is not produced at all. Perhaps, the specification of the subject as all phenomena that are subject to production rules out any question
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Meditation on Emptiness
about the predicate of the thesis—'are not produced from self—
such as whether it means that these are not produced from their
manifest form since manifest objects are not subject to production, and thus 'are not produced from self must mean that 'not
produced from their unmanifest causal form in which they preexist.' Chandrakfrti's Clear Words (22.3-.5, 15.18-16.1) only
says:
Or, [the brief statement by Buddhapalita indicates] this
other syllogism:
Objects other than the person which [the Samkhyas]
propound as being produced from self are not produced from self because of existing in their own entities, as is the case, for example, with the person.
[In that] this example [of the person] is expressed.398
Refuting production from self also refutes manifestation from self
Buddhapalita's refutation of production from self also applies to
those Samkhyas who assert not production but manifestation. For
production and manifestation are similar in the non-appearance
first of what is later apparent. Thus, any objection by a Samkhya
that Buddhapalita's refutation does not hit its mark would be
unfounded. Chandrakfrti's Clear Words (22.6-.8, 16.1-.5)says:
Even if [a Samkhya objected that] a refutation of production does not harm a proponent of manifestation, manifestation is designated with the term 'production', and
due to qualitative similarity [of production and manifestation] with respect to earlier non-apprehendability and
later apprehendability, the term 'production' just
expresses manifestation. Thereby, it is not that refuting
it [i.e., production] does not damage [the assertion of the
manifestation of what already exists in an unmanifest
state].
But did Buddhapalita really say all that?
Chandrakfrti, who has been conducting this debate based on
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489
what Bhavaviveka actually said and extending it into the hypothetical, now indicates that Bhavaviveka's only possible answer
at this point would be that one cannot actually find these meanings in Buddhapalita's remarks. Chandrakirti's answer is that
although Buddhapalita did not extensively state these exact
words, his statements are laden with meaning and that he, Chandrakirti, has said nothing not indicated by Buddhapalita. The
Clear Words (22.9-23.2, 16.5-.9) says:
[Bhavaviveka might object:] Without [Buddhapalita's]
having anything that expresses the meanings which you
have set out, how was such analysis, found?
Answer: These statements of meaning399 [by Buddhapalita], due to having great import, contain the abovementioned meanings. Being explained, they issue forth
this having the nature of the meanings given. Hence,
there is nothing [in what I have said] that is not indicated
in them.
In summary, the purpose of Chandrakirti's defense of Buddhapalita is to show:400 (l) that consequences are sufficient to generate in an opponent an inference of the desired thesis, (2) that
autonomous syllogisms are utterly out of place in the Madhyamika system, and (3) that if it is insisted that other-approved
syllogisms are required, Buddhapalita's more extensive statement together with the initial brief one contain a correct fivemembered syllogism.
His defense is reminiscent of the style of Nagarjuna's Treatise
in that he gives a complete presentation and then, taking another
tack, sets forth a new one. In the same way, in the second chapter
of the Treatise Nagarjuna refutes inherently existing going
through analyzing the area gone over, then begins again and
refutes it through analyzing the goer, then through analyzing the
beginning of going, and finally through analyzing its opposite,
rest. Each is sufficient to refute naturally existent going completely, and yet he resorts to other methods for the sake of attacking the diverse ways in which the misapprehension of one topic
is supported. When many angles are analyzed, it is more likely
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Meditation on Emptiness
that the proper inferring consciousness will be generated in the
other party. Also, it is necessary to refute the different philosophical systems directly through their own approaches and
tenets.
The root of Bhavaviveka's objection is that he did not think
that Buddhapalita's brief demonstration meant what it is found
to mean by the more sympathetic. As Jam-yang-shay-ba so
clearly spells out, the reason behind Bhavaviveka's disagreement
is found in Buddhapalita's prefatory remarks where he seems to
indicate that something positive, the conventional existence of
production, is being proved on this occasion of refuting the four
extreme types of production. Jam-yang-shay-ba agrees with Bhavaviveka that Buddhapalita's remark is questionable, but says
that Buddhapalita was summarizing not what is specifically
proven by the refutation of the four extreme types of production
but the general meaning of the chapter taken in the light of the
whole text: inherently existent production is refuted but production does exist nominally.
CHANDRAKLRTI'S DEFENSE AGAINST
THE THIRD FALLACY
This brings us to the third and final fallacy adduced by Bhavaviveka—that since it is necessary for Buddhapalita to assert the
opposite of his thesis and reason, he contradicts the Madhyamika tenet that the refutation of the four extreme types of production is a non-affirming negation.401 According to Bhavaviveka, Buddhapalita's intended meaning is that production from
self is not just eliminated but is replaced by production from
other because production is purposeful and has an end.
To repeat, Buddhapalita said, 'Things are not produced from
their own entities because their production [again] would be
senseless and because production would be endless.' Bhavaviveka saw the statement as indicating two consequences:
1 It follows that the subjects, things, are produced senselessly
because of being produced from self.
Chandrak i rti's Defense of Buddhapalita
491
2 It follows that the subjects, things, are produced endlessly
because ofbeing produced from self.
When a consequence implies its opposite meaning, the negative
of the reason in the consequence is put as the predicate in a syllogism, and the negative of the predicate in the consequence is put
as the reason in the syllogism. Bhavaviveka saw these consequences as implying their opposite meaning:
1 The subjects, things, are not produced from self because their
production is not senseless.
2 The subjects, things, are not produced from self because their
production is not endless.
Chandrakfrti answers that Buddhapalita did not state such
consequences at all, never mind intending to imply their opposite meaning. Instead, the two consequences should read:
1 It follows the subjects, things, are produced again senselessly
because of being produced from self (or because of already
existing in their own entities).
2 It follows that the subjects, things, are produced endlessly
because of being produced from self (or because, although
existing in their own entities, there is sense in their being produced again).
The idea is that for the Samkhyas the first production of things is
their attainment of existence in the nature or entity of their
causes; then, they are produced again when made manifest. The
reason why the first consequence should read 'produced again',
rather than 'produced', is that although Buddhapalita's brief
statement says only 'produced' (utpada, skye ba), the more extensive statement following it (see p.460) says 'produced again'
(punarutpada, yang skye ba).
Bhavaviveka thought that Buddhapalita was flinging the
absurd consequence that, in general, production is senseless and
endless, and thus he thought that the opposite—sensible and
limited production—was being asserted. However, once it is
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Meditation on Emptiness
understood that the consequences are that things are produced
again senselessly and endlessly, it can be seen that the opposite
meaning—that things are produced again sensibly and not endlessly—is accepted only by a Samkhya. For, a Prasangika has no
such thesis of the sensible and limited re-production of things.
Understanding what Buddhapalita's consequences actually
are and that their opposite meaning is asserted only by a
Samkhya is so central to the controversy between Buddhapalita
and Bhavaviveka that the Ge-luk-ba colleges call this phase of
their Middle Way studies 'The Opposite of the Consequences'
(thai bzlog). Chandrakirti's Clear Words (23.3-24.2, 16.10-.17)
says:
The opposite meaning of the consequences [—that things
are produced again sensibly and not endlessly—] is related only with the other [party, the Samkhya], not with us
because we do not have [such] a thesis. Therefore, how
could we be contradicting [the Madhyamika tenet that
the refutation of production is a non-affirming negation]? 402 Through proving that the opposite of the consequences [is related with, or held by, the other party] we
only wish to adduce as many fallacies as possible to the
other party [so that he will give up his assertion of production from self].403 Therefore, how could the master
Buddhapalita—following the unerring system of the
master Nagarjuna [in which production from other, as
well as sensible and finite re-production are not asserted]404—have said any words that would make him
susceptible in the sense of affording an opportunity for
another [to show contradiction with the Madhyamika
system]!
Some Tibetans (and indeed many Western scholars) have
explained that this passage indicates that Madhyamikas (or
Prasangikas) do not have any theses in general. Jam-yang-shayba405 says that it is easy to realize that this is wrong. Since the
referent of Chandrakirti's remark that Madhyamikas have no
thesis is specific—meaning specifically that Madhyamikas do
Chandrak i rti's Defense of Buddhapalita
493
not hold the thesis that production again is sensible and limited
—the passage cannot serve as a source showing that Madhyamikas have no theses in general.
Consequences do not have to imply their opposite meaning
The mere fact that these statements are properly constructed
unwanted consequences does not mean that Buddhapalita must
assert their opposite. As Chandrakfrti has just indicated,
through showing a Samkhya that he is logically subject to consequences that are opposite to his own views he can see the internal
contradictions of asserting production from self and thereby will
drop it, provided he does not shamelessly persist in his error.
Thus, on this occasion when a proponent of no inherent
existence, a Prasangika, is adducing for a proponent of inherent
existence, a Samkhya, the consequences that re-production is
senseless and endless, these are not consequences implying their
opposite meaning from among the five types of consequences
(see pp.445-9), but merely unwanted consequences stated for
the sake of refuting the opponent's thesis of production from
self. For, Buddhapalita did not state them intending to imply
their opposite, and words accord with the intention of the
speaker—they do not coerce the speaker powerlessly but accord
with the speaker's motivation. For instance, when a Buddhist
says 'consciousness' and a Samkhya says 'consciousness', the
two have radically different meanings. In this vein
Chandrakirti's Clear Words (24.2-.6, 16.17-17.3) says:
When a proponent of no inherent existence adduces a
consequence for a proponent of inherent existence, how
could it follow that he is subject to the opposite meaning
of the consequence? Words do not make the speaker
powerless like [an executioner]406 with a club or noose
[forcing a victim to say all sorts of things]. Then, how [do
words indicate what they express]? If they have the capacity [to indicate their respective meaning], they accord
with the speaker's intention in speaking. Therefore,
[Buddhapalita's] adducing consequences [here] has the
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Meditation on Emptiness
effect only of refuting the other party's thesis [that reproduction is sensible and finite];407 hence he does not
come to have the opposite meaning of the consequences.
As Jam-yang-shay-ba notes,408 Chandrakfrti is saying that Buddhapalita's consequences here at the point of refuting production
from self do not imply their opposite meaning; he is not saying
that no consequences imply their opposite meaning.
This is frequently Nagarjuna's procedure
It is clearly Nagarjuna's method in the Treatise frequently to use
consequences, rather than syllogisms, to refute others' positions.
For example, in refuting through an absurd consequence that a
definition inherently subsists in what is defined,409 he says
(V. led):
If space existed before its definition,
It would follow that it was without definition [at that time,
due to which it would not exist].
He states an unwanted consequence in order to refute another's
position and to cause him to cognize that a definition does not
inherently subsist in what is defined and, therefore, that the
existence of a definition does not serve to show that the defined
inherently exists. The consequence implies its opposite meaning: Space does not exist before its definition because of having a
definition. However, it does not imply that space exists after its
definition.
Also, in refuting through an absurd consequence that dependent establishment exists inherently in conventionalities, Nagarjuna says (IV.2abc):410
If a form [such as a sense power] existed [inherently]
Separate from the form's cause [the elements],
It would follow that a form is causeless [because depending on causes would be contradictory with its inherent
existence].
Nagarjuna here is implying the opposite meaning, i.e., that a
Chandrak i rti's Defense of Buddhapalita
495
form is not inherently separate from its causes because a form
is caused. An unwanted consequence is being stated to refute a
position, and the opposite is also being implied.
Similarly, in refuting that nirvana is a functioning thing
(bhava, dngos po), Nagarjuna says (XXV.4ab):
Nirvana is not a [functioning] thing.
[For] it would follow that it would have the characteristics of aging and death.
Since the consequence is:
It absurdly follows that nirvana has the characteristics of
aging (changeability) and death (disintegration) 4 "
because of being a functioning thing,
the opposite is something that a Prasangika in the Ge-luk-ba
school, which indeed asserts that nirvana is not a functioning
things since it is unchanging, could assert:
Nirvana is not a functioning thing because of not having
the characteristics of aging and disintegration.
Though consequences sometimes imply their opposite meaning
as in these cases, Bhavaviveka cannot insist that Buddhapalita's
consequences do so just because they are consequences, for there
are many types, including those that do and do not imply their
opposite. Dzong-ka-ba412 gives an illustration of one that implies
its opposite: If it is asserted that a sprout exists by way of its own
entity, then the consequence is flung:
It follows that a sprout would not arise in dependence
upon a seed because of existing by way of its own entity.
This implies the opposite:
A sprout does not exist by way of its own entity because
of arising in dependence upon a seed.
As Dzong-ka-ba says, there are a great many instances of consequences' proving a thesis which is the opposite of the reason in
the consequence by way of a reason which is the opposite of the
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Meditation on Emptiness
predicate of the consequence. However, even in these cases, all
that is being established is a mere elimination of the inherent
existence which is asserted by the other party. A positive phenomenon is not being implied, and thus the Madhyamika tenet that
the reasonings proving emptiness establish only a non-affirming
negation of inherent existence is not contravened even when the
opposite is implied. Still, the question why Chandrakfrti cites as
his three examples consequences that do imply their opposite
remains; one could only say that he is giving examples of Nagarjuna's procedure of using consequences, not of consequences
that do not imply their opposite meaning.
Chandrakirti's Clear Words (24.7-25.2, 17.3-.10) says:
In this way, the master [Nagarjuna] mostly eradicates
others' positions by way of merely adducing consequences as through (V.l):
Space does not at all exist
Before its definition.
If space existed before its definition,
It would follow that it was without definition [at that
time, due to which it would not exist].
And (IV.2):
If a form [such as a sense power] existed [inherently]
Separate from the form's cause [the elements],
It would follow that a form is causeless [because
depending on causes would be contradictory with
its inherent existence].
Nowhere is there any [functioning] object that is
causeless.
Likewise (XXV.4):
Nirvana is not a [functioning] thing (bhava, dngospo).
[For] it would follow that it would have the characteristics of aging and death.
There are no [functioning] things
Without aging and death.
Etc.
Chandrak i rti's Defense of Buddhapalita
497
Chandrakfrti's pointing out here that Nagarjuna's procedure
frequently is to adduce consequences (prasahga, thai 'gyur)
appears to be a central reason why, in Tibet, Chandrakfrti's
school came to be called Prasangika.
Why does Bhavaviveka not find Buddhapalita's words to be rich
with syllogisms like Nagarjuna's?
Bhavaviveka would find syllogisms implied in Nagarjuna's consequences; so, Chandrakfrti asks him why he does not find them
in Buddhapalita's statements. The hypothetical Bhavaviveka
answers that it is the job of a commentator in the process of
expanding on the meaning of a root text to present syllogisms
with proper reasons and examples. To this, Chandrakfrti cites
the devastating fact that Nagarjuna, in commenting on his own
Refutation of Objections, did not extensively use syllogisms. The
Clear Words (25.3-.7, 17.11-. 16) says:413
If the master [Nagarjuna's] statements are considered to
be causes of many syllogisms due to being meaningful
statements and thus of great import, why are the master
Buddhapalita's statements also not considered that
way?
Objection [by the hypothetical Bhavaviveka]: It is the
custom of commentators to set forth syllogisms at
length.
[Answer:] That also is not so because when even the
master [Nagarjuna] commented on [his] Refutation of
Objections, he did not set out syllogistic statements.414
Thus, Madhyamika custom or tradition does not call for the
usage of syllogisms. Bhavaviveka's insistence on syllogistic
reasoning goes against Madhyamika procedure.
Chandrakfrti next probes more deeply into the reasons behind
Bhavaviveka's insistence on syllogistic statements, concluding
that it stems from a basic misconception about the nature of
reasoning, which in turn stems from a misapprehension of
emptiness. In this way, in the next and final phase of this controversy Chandrakfrti goes on the offensive—having defended Buddhapalita by (1) first showing that consequences are sufficient,
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Meditation on Emptiness
(2) inbetween showing that even if one insists on a syllogistic
statement, it is there in Buddhapalita's remarks, and (3) finally
showing again that consequences are sufficient. By rimming his
argument with demonstration of the sufficiency of consequences, Chandrakfrti causes us to wonder what is behind
Bhavaviveka's view. He is now ready to set out his view of
emptiness, more profound than Bhavaviveka's. It is a dramatic
moment.
5
Chandrakirti's Refutation of
Bhavaviveka
Sources
Chandrakirti's Clear Words
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way
Gom-day Nam-ka-gyel-tsen's Settling Difficult Points in the
Opposite of the Consequences
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
Corresponding section of the translation pp.696-7
T H E GENERAL I N D I C T M E N T
To start, Chandraklrti turns to analyzing Bhavaviveka's refutation of the Samkhya position of production from self.415 The general indictment of Bhavaviveka is that even though he asserts the
Madhyamika view, he states many faulty autonomous syllogisms
—despite a wish to show great skill in logic. For instance, he states
the following syllogism to refute production from self:
Ultimately the internal sources (eye sense, ear sense,
etc.) are not produced from self because of existing, like,
for example, an existent consciousness. (Hereafter, 'eye
sense' will be substituted for 'inner sources' for the sake
of brevity.)
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Meditation on Emptiness
Many fallacies, such as the non-establishment of the presence of
the reason ('existing') in the subject ('the inner sources'), are
seen. Chandrakirti's Clear Words (25.7-26.2, 17.16-18.2) says:
Furthermore, this logician [Bhavaviveka], while wishing
merely to demonstrate that he has great skill in treatises
of logic, expresses autonomous syllogisms which are
realized to be the locus of collections of a great many
fallacies, despite his asserting the Madhyamika view.
How? Respectively, here he states this syllogism, 'Ultimately the internal sources are not produced from self416
because of existing, like existent consciousness.417
Since, in the Samkhya system the person, or consciousness, is
permanent, it is not produced and thus obviously not produced
from self; so, a Samkhya can easily agree with the suitability of
the example, i.e., that consciousness is existent and not produced
from self. In this type of reasoning, the reason is not a nonobservation of a related object but an observation of something
contradictory (existence) with the predicate of what is being
negated (being produced from self). Bhavaviveka's penchant for
this style of reasoning is said to be based on the easy availability
of cogent examples418 approved by the other party.
According to Jam-yang-shay-ba, Bhavaviveka's intention in this
syllogism is to convey that just as the non-apprehension ofproduction and cessation mentioned by Nagarjuna in the expression of
worship at the beginning of his Treatise on the Middle Way is taken
in reference to a mind of meditative equipoise on emptiness, so the
four extreme types of production should be explained as not existing in the face of meditative equipoise on emptiness. Considering
'ultimate' as referring to a mind of meditative equipoise on emptiness, Bhavaviveka is actually wishing to say, 'For an ultimate consciousness, an eye sense is not produced from selfbecause of existing, like, for example, an existent consciousness.'
DOES ' U L T I M A T E L Y ' G O W I T H T H E PREDICATE?
Chandrakrrti says that Bhavaviveka's syllogism is not correct
Chandrak i rti's Refutation of Bhavaviveka
501
because—within its being unclear why the qualification 'ultimately' is affixed and to what it should be affixed—it is fallacious
no matter how it is taken. He questions where 'ultimately'
should be affixed in the syllogism. Does it go with the predicate?
If so, it would mean:
An eye sense is not ultimately produced from self
because of existing, as in the case of, for example, an
existent consciousness.
Bhavaviveka might want to affix it to the predicate because to
refute production conventionally would contradict the Madhyamika's own tenets; therefore, it should be refuted only ultimately.
However, Chandrakrrti answers:
1 There is no need from the Madhyamika's point of
view to affix 'ultimately' to the predicate because, though
a Madhyamika asserts production conventionally, he
does not assert production from self even conventionally.
Therefore, production from self is to be refuted in general
without affixing the qualification 'ultimately'. For this
reason both Buddha in the Rice Seedling Sutra, etc., and
Nagarjuna in his Treatise refute production from self in
general and do not affix 'ultimately' to the refutation.
2 There is no need from a Samkhya's point of view to
affix 'ultimately' to the predicate because there is value in
refuting the Samkhya, who has fallen from both ultimate
truths and conventional truths, both ultimately and conventionally. Not recognizing emptiness, he falls from ultimate truths; falsely ascribing existence to a permanent
person and so forth, he falls from conventional truths.
3 There is no need from the ordinary worldly person's
point of view to affix 'ultimately' to the predicate in order
to preserve worldly production from self because the
world also does not assert production from self. Without
considering whether things are produced from any of the
four alternatives—self, other, both, or neither—the world
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Meditation on Emptiness
just accepts that a sprout, an effect, arises from a seed, a
cause. Buddha said that he accepts what the world accepts,
and this also is the way that Nagar juna accepts production
conventionally—without analysis, such as investigating
whether an effect is produced from itself, others, both, or
causelessly.
About this, Chandrakirti's Clear Words (26.2-27.6, 18.2-19.6)
says:
Why is the qualification 'ultimately' put in this [syllogism]?
[Hypothetical answer by Bhavaviveka: It is affixed to
the predicate] because production which is asserted in
accordance with worldly conventions is not to be refuted
and because if it were refuted [conventionally], it would
follow that one would be damaged by [one's own] assertion [of conventionally existent production],
[Response:] This is not suitable because [a Madhyamika] does not assert production from self even conventionally. [The Rice Seedling] Sutra419 says:
Also, when a sprout is produced, arising from its
cause—a seed—it is not created by self, not created by
[naturally existent others], not created by both, not
produced causelessly, not created by Ishvara, and not
metamorphosed by time. It does not arise from particles, does not arise from the nature (prakrti, rang
bzhin), and does not arise from its own entity.
Similarly [the Extensive Sport Sutra (Lalitavistara)]*20 says:
If a seed exists, the sprout does also.
The sprout is not what the seed is.
It is not [inherently established as] other than it or
just it.
Hence the nature of phenomena (dharmata, chos
nyid) is not permanent and not annihilatory.421
Also, this very [text, Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle
Way, XVIII. 10] says:
Chandrak i rti's Refutation of Bhavaviveka
503
Whatever arises dependently is respectively
Not just that [i.e., its causes] and is not
Also other than that. Hence [causes]
Are not annihilatory nor permanent.
[Hypothetical response by Bhavaviveka:] The qualification is made relative to the other's [that is, the
Samkhya's] system.
[Answer:] That also is not suitable because their
presentations are not asserted [by Madhyamikas] even
conventionally. It is to be realized that it is advantageous
to refute in both ways [that is, conventionally and ultimately] the Forders (Tirthika, Mu stegs pa) who have
fallen from non-erroneous perception of the two truths.
Thus, to express the qualification relative to the other's
system (mata, gzhung) is also not suitable.
Furthermore, the world—in relation to which the
qualification would be meaningful [if it asserted production from self]—does not construe production from self.
The world does not employ analysis such as 'from self
or 'from other' and so forth. The world understands
only this, 'An effect arises from a cause.' The master
[Nagarjuna] presented [cause and effect] this way too.
Therefore, the qualification ['ultimately'] is ascertained as meaningless in all respects.
DOES ' U L T I M A T E L Y ' GO W I T H T H E SUBJECT?
Bhavaviveka might, however, say that 'ultimate' should be
affixed to the subject because the production of an eye sense,
which Samkhyas accept as ultimate, is refuted even conventionally:
An ultimate eye sense is not produced from self because
of existing, as in the case, for example, of an existent consciousness.
Chandrakfrti answers that since Bhavaviveka himself does not
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Meditation on Emptiness
accept an ultimate eye sense, the subject and thus the reason are
not established for him. (In an autonomous syllogism the subject
and reason must be mutually and similarly established for both
parties in a debate; in addition, an ultimate eye sense is not a fit
subject for any type of syllogism with a positive reason such as
'existing', since it simply is not established.) The Clear Words
(27.7-.9, 19.6-.9) says:
[Hypothetical response by Bhavaviveka:] This qualification was made wishing to refute the conventional production [of subjects which are asserted to exist ultimately],
[Answer:] Then, you would have a fallacious position
[thesis] in which the base [subject] is not established
(asiddhadhara, gzhi ma grub pa) and a fallacious reason
in which the base [subject] is not established (ashrayasiddha, gzhi ma grub pa) since you do not assert sourceseyes and so forth—ultimately.4213
It might be said that there is no fault because Bhavaviveka
accepts conventionally existent production, and a conventionally produced eye sense is taken as the subject of the syllogism.
However, there then would be no place to which 'ultimately'
could be affixed, for it would be affixed neither to the subject nor
to the predicate.
Again, it might be said that 'a conventional eye sense' is the
subject and 'is not ultimately produced' is the predicate. However, this also is incorrect because Bhavaviveka did not say it,
and even if he had, the subject would not exist for a Samkhya.
The Samkhyas do not accept that an eye sense exists conventionally the way Madhyamikas use 'conventionally'. In Madhyamika terms, the Samkhyas accept an eye sense as substantially
existent (dravyasat, rdzas yod) and not as imputedly existent
(prajnaptisat, btags yod) or conventional as the Madhyamikas
do. Though the Samkhyas assert that the principal (pradhana,
gtso bo) and person (purusha, skyes bu) are ultimate truths and
that the rest of the twenty-five categories are conventional
truths, since they ascribe a different meaning to 'conventional',
Chandrak i rti's Refutation of Bhavaviveka
505
it would be necessary to explain which meaning of 'conventional' was being used. Using the Madhyamikas' meaning would
be unacceptable to the Samkhyas; using the Samkhyas' meaning
would make the subject non-existent for the Madhyamikas.
Even on this level Bhavaviveka's argument is ill-framed. Chandrakirti's Clear Words (27.9-28.3, 19.9-.17) says:
[Hypothetical response by Bhavaviveka:] Since eyes and
so forth exist conventionally, there is no fault.
[Answer:] Then what does 'ultimately' qualify?
['Bhavaviveka':] Since the ultimate production of
conventionalities such as eyes is being refuted, 'ultimately' qualifies the refutation of production.
[Answer:] In that case, [you] should have said, 'Ultimately there is no production of conventionalities such
as eyes,' but such was not said. Even if you had, because
the other party [the Samkhya] asserts eyes and so forth
just as substantially existent (dravyasat, rdzas su yod
paf22 and does not assert them as imputedly existent
(prajnaptisat, btags par yod pa), the position [thesis]
would be fallacious in that the base [subject] would not
be established. Hence, that is not suitable.
C O M M O N L Y APPEARING SUBJECTS
Bhavaviveka might answer that one should not qualify either the
subject or the predicate with 'ultimate' or 'conventional' but take
as the subject just a general eye sense which is common to both
disputants. He might assert that when various schools of tenets
debate, it is necessary to take just general terms for the subject
and the predicate, for if each school affixed its own particulars,
there would be no such thing as inference. (I feel that with this
final major move in the now entirely hypothetical argument
Chandrakfrti has gotten down to his basic point: Bhavaviveka's
insistence on the statement of syllogisms indicates that for him
the elements of a syllogistic argument—subject, predicate,
reason, and example—appear commonly to both parties of a
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Meditation on Emptiness
debate, Madhyamika and non-Madhyamika, that is to say, are
asserted as certified by valid consciousnesses in a similar way in
their respective systems, whereas if Bhavaviveka knew Madhyamika well, he would know that such is impossible. The defense
of Buddhapalita has prepared the ground by revealing the intensity of Bhavaviveka's insistence on syllogistic reasoning, and
the examination of the qualification 'ultimately' has removed a
possible objection—Chandrakfrti is suggesting that Bhavaviveka
really did not mean anything by it anyway. In other words, we
are not dealing in the merely hypothetical but in what Chandrakfrti feels is actually at the core of Bhavaviveka's thought.)
Bhavaviveka might cite some examples. For instance, if, when
a Buddhist proved to a Vaisheshika that a sound is an impermanent thing, he specified the subject as a sound which is derived
from the great elements, the subject would not exist for the
Vaisheshika. If, in accordance with Vaisheshika tenets, 'a sound
which is a quality of space' were specified, it would not exist for
the Buddhist. Similarly, if, when a Vaisheshika debated with a
Jaina, he specified 'a sound which is a product' as the subject, it
would not exist for the Jaina. If he specified in accordance with
Jaina tenets 'a sound which existed formerly and is manifested
by conditions', the subject would not exist for the Vaisheshika
himself.
Similarly, Bhavaviveka might add that the predicate of a thesis
also cannot possibly be qualified with the particular tenets of
each school but must be only the general term. For instance, if
when proving that a sound is an impermanent thing, a Buddhist
specified the predicate as 'an impermanent thing the disintegration of which is [externally] caused', the predicate would not
exist for the Buddhist himself because things require no further
cause for their disintegration other than their own production.
Still, if he took as the predicate 'an impermanent thing the disintegration of which is uncaused', the predicate would not exist for
the Vaisheshika.
Bhavaviveka might add that the reason why even the predicate
must be just the generality which appears similarly to both
parties in the debate is that before proving a thesis, one must give
Chandrak i rti's Refutation of Bhavaviveka
507
a concordant example which possesses both the predicate
(impermanent thing) and the sign (product). Since the predicate
is, therefore, a quality of the example, it is clear that the predicate must appear similarly to both parties and, if so, must be just
a generality not qualified by any school's particular tenets. In
this vein, Chandrakirti's Clear Words (28.4-29.7, 19.17-20.8)
says:423
[Hypothetical response by Bhavaviveka: For example,]
in [the proof] that sound is an impermanent thing just
generalities are to be taken as the subject and the predicate, not specified [with the particular tenets of the
debaters]. If specifics were used, the conventions of
inference [that is, inferring consciousness] and object
inferred would be non-existent. For, if [as the subject]
one used 'sound which is derived from the elements', it
would not be established for the other party [the Vaisheshika]. However, if one used 'sound which is a quality of
space (akasha, nam mkha')\ it would not be established
for oneself, the Buddhist.
Similarly, even when a Vaisheshika posits the thesis
that sound is an impermanent thing, if [as the subject] he
used 'sound which is a product', it would not be established for the other [party, the Jaina], However, if [the
subject were specified as 'sound] manifested [by conditions]', it would not be established for himself.
Similarly, [with respect to the predicate] if [impermanence were specified as] that of which the disintegration
is caused, it would not be established for the Buddhist
himself. However, if [it were specified as] causeless, it
would not be established for the other party [a Vaisheshika]. Therefore, just as here [in these examples] mere
generalities are to be used as the subject and the predicate, so here also [in the refutation of production from
self] a mere subject devoid of qualification is to be
used.
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Meditation on Emptiness
There are no commonly appearing subjects
Chandrakirti's answer is that all of this is inadmissible. A valid
cognizer must certify the subject of a syllogism as existing, and
in systems such as Bhavaviveka's and a Samkhya's which assert
(either explicitly or implicitly) that all objects exist by way of
their own character this valid cognizer must be non-mistaken in
terms of the object's establishment by way of its own character.
Thus, in Bhavaviveka's system, a mistaken sense consciousness
is not accepted as finding or certifying its object of comprehension; rather, the subject about which the two parties are debating
whether it is ultimately produced or not must be certified as
existing by such a non-mistaken consciousness. Because of this,
Bhavaviveka cannot assert that eyes and so forth are falsities,
appearing one way and yet existing another—that is to say,
appearing to be established by way of their own character but
not—since he asserts that the consciousness certifying the subject is non-mistaken. However, eyes and so forth which are
found by a non-mistaken valid cognizer just plain do not exist.
Thus, although Bhavaviveka and a Samkhya agree on the status
of the subject with respect to its being established by way of its
own character, such a subject simply does not exist. In this way,
the meaning of there being no commonly appearing subjects is
that the subject in a syllogism such as Bhavaviveka's simply does
not exist. Chandrakirti's Clear Words (29.7-30.3,20.8-.12) says:
That is not so, because at just that time [of proving that eyes
and so forth are without truly established production] 4
when it is the case that here a negation of production is
asserted as the predicate of the probandum, this one
[Bhavavivekal himself just asserts the degeneration Tor
non-establishment]425 of the entities of the subjects [eyes and
so forth]—the basis of that [predicate, non-production
from self]—which are found by a mere erroneous [consciousness. Bhavaviveka instead holds that the subjects
of his syllogism, eyes and so forth, are found by a nonerroneous or non-mistaken consciousness in which case
they would not be falsities; however, they are falsities
Chandrak i rti's Refutation of Bhavaviveka
509
since they appear to exist inherently but do not, and thus
the subject is not established.] The erroneous and the
non-erroneous are different [that is, a dichotomy].
To repeat, at this time when Bhavaviveka is attempting to prove
that for an ultimate or reasoning consciousness an eye sense is
not produced, he might not qualify the subject with tenets peculiar to any system, but the subject must still be validly cognized
by both parties. However, in Bhavaviveka's system if a consciousness is mistaken with respect to the inherent existence of
an object, it is not valid. For him, to be valid with respect to an
object a consciousness must also be valid with respect to the
object's being established by way of its own character. Thus,
once a sense consciousness apprehending blue, for instance, is
valid, it must be non-mistaken with respect to its appearing
object (the blue), and once a conceptual consciousness, such as
an inferential consciousness realizing the impermanence of the
body, is valid, it must be non-mistaken with respect to its referent object (the impermanence of the body).426 Since the consciousnesses that realize these are non-mistaken, these objects cannot
be falsities, appearing to exist one way but actually existing in
another way; otherwise, the consciousnesses would be mistaken
with respect to that seeming mode ofbeing.
However, they are falsities, and falsities simply cannot be
among objects found by a non-mistaken consciousness. The
reason for this is that false objects and true objects—that is to say,
erroneous objects found by a mistaken consciousness and nonerroneous objects found by a non-mistaken consciousness—are
mutually exclusive, even a dichotomy; whatever exists must be
either one or the other. In this context, a mistaken consciousness
is one to which eyes and so forth, for instance, appear to be established by way of their own character because objects which are
so established do not exist, just as the falling hairs which appear
to someone with cataracts do not exist in the least.
Chandrakirti's Clear Words (30.3-.4, 20.12-. 15) says:
Therefore, like the falling hairs [seen by] one with cataracts and so forth, when what does not exist [by way of
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Meditation on Emptiness
its own character] is apprehended by [i.e., appears to] an
erroneous [consciousness] as just existing [that way],
how could even a portion of an object existent [by way of
its own character] be observed?
Similarly, in this context a non-mistaken consciousness is one
which directly perceives only the nature of phenomena, emptiness, since it does not involve the appearance of false objects that
even in direct perception seem to exist one way but do not. A
consciousness in meditative equipoise perceives only emptiness
in a totally non-dualistic way, without the slightest appearance of
conventional objects which appear to sentient beings as if they
are established by way of their own character but do not. To a
consciousness of meditative equipoise on emptiness, there is not
the slightest appearance of something that does not exist the way
it appears; this is like the fact that the consciousness of one
without cataracts does not see falling hairs and so forth and thus
it does not certify those falling hairs as existing. In this vein,
Chandrakirti's Clear Words (30.5-.8, 20.15-.20) says:
Like the falling hairs and so forth of one without cataracts, when a non-erroneous [consciousness of meditative equipoise on emptiness] does not superimpose the
unreal [i.e., objects established by way of their own
character], how could it observe the merest portion of a
conventionality that does not exist [by way of its own
character]? Therefore, the honorable master [Nagarjuna]
says [in his Refutation of Objections]:427
If [in accordance with your thought] the factualities
Of direct perception and so forth did observe some
[inherently established objects of comprehension],
Then [it would be suitable] to prove those [in one's
own system] and refute [others], but since [valid
cognizers observing
Such objects of comprehension] do not exist [even
conventionally], there is no [chance for you] to
censure me.
Chandrak i rti's Refutation of Bhavaviveka
511
According to Chandrakfrti, all consciousnesses of sentient
beings except a direct cognizer of emptiness are mistaken, and
thus there can be no valid cognizer of the subject in a syllogism
which is not mistaken with regard to the mode ofbeing of that
subject. However, a non-deceived consciousness, which nevertheless is mistaken about the inherent existence of its object in
the sense not that it conceives the object to exist inherently but
that the object merely appears to exist that way, can establish the
existence of objects that are falsities—objects which appear to
exist by way of their own character or inherently but do not. A
distinction is made between the appearing object (snangyul) of a
consciousness and its object of engagement ('jug yul); a valid
cognizer (pramana, tshad ma) can be mistaken with respect to its
appearing object but not with respect to its object of engagement.
Thus, it is not that Prasangikas hold that the subject in a
debate is not certified by the valid cognizers of both parties, for
they hold that each party—whether they recognize it or not—
has valid cognizers of mere objects, such as eyes, which are
valid with respect to neither the inherent existence nor the noninherent existence of the object.428 However, only a Prasangika
recognizes valid cognizers to be such; a non-Prasangika holds
that the very valid cognizer which certifies the existence of the
subject of the syllogism certifies its being established by way of
its own character. Thus, in one way it is said that there are no
commonly appearing subjects in the sense that in the systems of
the two, the Prasangika and the non-Prasangika, the establishment of the subject by valid cognition is not asserted similarly.
In another way, even though the two parties, such as Bhavaviveka and a Samkhya, might agree that the subject of a syllogism
is certified by a consciousness that is non-mistaken with respect
to its being established by way of its own character, the subject,
when qualified this way, does not exist, and thus from this point
of view it can be said that a commonly appearing subject does
not exist.
Again, in another way, if in a debate in which one was seeking
to prove non-ultimate production, the other party understood
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Meditation on Emptiness
the subject as being certified by a consciousness that is valid with
respect to neither its inherent existence nor its non-inherent
existence, that person would already have understood the
Prasangika view of the emptiness of inherent existence. The
person would have come to be able to differentiate between
inherent existence and mere existence—making it possible to
identify that there are consciousnesses which neither certify
inherent existence nor realize non-inherent existence but only
realize their object. Thus, there would be no need to establish
non-ultimate production for such a person. In this case, there is
also no commonly appearing subject—even though both parties
recognize the 'subject' as being certified by a similar type of valid
cognizer—simply because there is no subject which needs to be
proven as lacking ultimately existent production.
Thus, when there is no non-erroneous consciousness to certify
the existence of the subjects of syllogisms such as eyes (the subject of Bhavaviveka's syllogism proving that eyes are not produced from self) which for Bhavaviveka are qualified by being
found by a non-erroneous consciousness, the subjects just plain
do not exist. Since such a subject cannot be established, the two
parties—even if they, like Bhavaviveka and a Samkhya, both
hold the view that the consciousness certifying the subject certifies its inherent existence—do not have a common mode of establishing the subject with valid cognition. For a non-erroneous
consciousness in this context just perceives emptiness, resulting
in there being no valid cognizer non-erroneously knowing subjects such as eyes.
In this way, the subject is shown not to be established in common for the two proponents. This makes the thesis, the combination of subject and predicate, non-established simply because
the subject is not established. For the same reason, the sign's
being a property of the subject (pakshadharmata, phyogs chos)
also is not established. Chandrakirti's Clear Words (30.9-.11,
20.20-21.5) says:42&
Because in that way the erroneous and the non-erroneous
are different, on an occasion when the non-erroneous [is
realized by the wisdom of meditative equipoise] the
Chandrak i rti's Refutation of Bhavaviveka
513
erroneous does not exist [in its perspective]. Hence, how
could a conventionality [that is to say, falsity such as] an
eye which is the subject [in this syllogism] be [in its perspective]? Therefore, due to the irreversibility of having
a fallacious position [thesis] in which the base [subject] is
not established (asiddhadhara, gzhi ma grub pa) and a
fallacious reason in which the base [subject] is not established (ashrayasiddha, gzhi ma grub pa), this [attempt at
an answer—that commonly appearing generalities are to
be used—] is just not an answer [since there is no valid
cognizer, mistaken or non-mistaken, to certify the existence of such subjects].
Are there ever commonly appearing subjects?
Chandrakfrti is saying that there is a difference between proving
impermanence and proving emptiness with respect to whether
or not there can be commonly appearing subjects. Thus, it
might seem that we are to conclude that even in the Prasangika
system there are occasions when commonly appearing subjects
are possible.429 However, Gom-day Nam-ka-gyel-tsen430 specifies
that the Buddhist here is of the lower schools, thereby suggesting that even when debating on impermanence there is no commonly appearing subject in the Prasangika system. This is
cogent because the non-Prasangika would still hold that the valid
cognizer which certifies the subject certifies its inherent existence, but no such subject exists.
However, if one held that even in the Prasangika system there
are commonly appearing subjects on occasions such as in debating about impermanence, one could say that the question of
inherent existence is here of no consequence and that this is why
both Chandrakfrti and Dzong-ka-ba center their discussion of no
commonly appearing subjects around the proof of no ultimately
existent production or no production from self, in which the
question of inherent existence is intimately involved. In this
way, some Tibetan scholars say that the Prasangika tenet that a
subject does not appear similarly to both parties in a debate
applies only to occasions when proving emptiness.431 Chandrakirti's Clear Words (30.12-.14, 21.5-.9) says:
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Meditation on Emptiness
There also is no similarity with the example. Even if
there [in the example] a generality of sound and a generality of impermanence which are not asserted as qualified [with particular tenets] do exist for both [the Buddhist and the Vaisheshika], nevertheless proponents of
emptiness and proponents of non-emptiness do not
[agree on] asserting a generality of eyes as conventionally
[existent in the sense of not being established by way of
its own character] or as ultimately [existent]. Hence,
there also is no similarity with the example.
Bhavaviveka has to admit his own reason is not established
Chandrakfrti indicts Bhavaviveka further, saying that he must
accept the consequence that his reason refuting production from
self is not established. For when another Buddhist school stated
the syllogism:
The subjects, the inner sources, are only caused because
the Tathagata said so,
Bhavaviveka said that the reason was not established. His
thought was that if it were said that the Tathagata meant ultimately existent causation, the reason would be non-existent for a
Madhyamika whereas if the Tathagata meant only conventionally existent causation, the reason would be non-existent for a
Proponent of True Existence. Since besides these two there is
no third category, Bhavaviveka himself objected that the reason
had the fallacy of not being established for both disputants.
Here in the case of Bhavaviveka's attempt to refute production
from self, there is also no third category other than (1) objects
found by mistaken consciousnesses and (2) objects found by nonmistaken consciousnesses. If the subject, the sign, and so forth are
claimed to be cognized by a non-mistaken consciousness, then
they would not be established for Madhyamikas. For Madhyamikas (actually Prasangikas) say that except for the wisdom of
meditative equipoise on emptiness any consciousness of a sentient being is mistaken. If it is claimed that the subject, the sign,
and so forth are cognized by a mistaken consciousness, then they
Chandrakirti's Refutation of Bhavaviveka
515
would not be established for non-Madhyamikas. For the Proponents of True Existence assert that a valid consciousness is
non-mistaken with respect to the inherent nature of its object. It
is self-contradictory for Bhavaviveka to assert something parallel
to what he finds to be a fallacy in others.
This is a convincing argument, but the debate does stem from a
difference of tenet in the Prasangika and Svatantrika systems.432
Chandrakirti does not accept that consciousnesses of sentient
beings are non-mistaken valid cognizers with respect to the
inherent existence of their objects, whereas Bhavaviveka does.
The latter finds that it is not contradictory for a consciousness to
perceive things as inherently existent and to be non-mistaken
because things do conventionally exist inherently. Chandrakirti
finds the two to be contradictory because both true existence and
inherent existence are equally to be refuted, both ultimately and
conventionally.
This means that for Bhavaviveka when an object is sought
among its bases of imputation, it can be found. For instance, a
table is the composite of its parts, and the actual person is a
subtle form of the mental consciousness. For Chandrakirti, an
object cannot be found among its bases of imputation; a table is
not the composite of its parts, and a person is not a consciousness. In the Prasangika system, even conventionally objects are
only imputedly existent; they are designations. Furthermore, it
is undeniable that sentient beings perceive objects just the opposite way; the basis of imputation appears to be the thing itself.
Thus, a Prasangika asserts that all sentient beings' sense and
mental consciousnesses, except direct cognizers of emptiness,
are mistaken. Hence, it is not that Bhavaviveka has a manifest
contradiction433 but that he does not assert something which a
Madhyamika, as interpreted by Chandrakirti, should—that
conventional objects are certified only by mistaken consciousnesses. If he did assert this, he would be subject to the same kind
of analysis that he makes with respect to the Hearer school's syllogism. In other words, in proving to a Samkhya that eyes and so
forth are not produced from self, he would be holding that such
conventionalities are certified by mistaken consciousnesses,
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Meditation on Emptiness
whereas for the Samkhya the consciousness certifying the subject—eyes—would also certify its inherent existence; in that case
the subject would not be established in common for the two of
them.
The claim of self-contradiction is Chandrakirti's way of highlighting the fact that Bhavaviveka, in asserting that a valid cognizer of a conventionality is unmistaken, is going against what
should be a basic Madhyamika tenet—that except for a consciousness directly realizing emptiness all consciousnesses of
sentient beings are mistaken in that their objects appear to exist
inherently but do not.
Chandrakfrti offers no explicit evidence that Bhavaviveka
asserts that such consciousnesses of conventionalities are nonmistaken; there is merely his earlier statement (p.508) that Bhavaviveka himself accepts that objects found by a mistaken consciousness are not established:
. . . at this time [of proving that eyes and so forth are without truly established production] when it is just the case
that a negation of production is asserted as the predicate of
the probandum, this one [Bhavaviveka] himself just
asserts the degeneration [or non-establishment] of the
entity of subjects [eyes and so forth], the basis of that
[predicate, non-production from self], which are found
by a mere erroneous [consciousness].
If Bhavaviveka asserts that objects found by an erroneous or mistaken consciousness are not established, then since he obviously
holds that the subjects of his syllogisms are established, he must
hold that they are certified or realized by non-mistaken consciousnesses. From this, many Tibetan scholars have drawn the
conclusion that for Bhavaviveka the object of negation in the
view of emptiness does not appear to sense consciousnesses.
In Tibet, these points have been formalized into a Svatantrika
system by scholars using as their basis brilliant exploration of the
implications of brief statements such as this. By presenting a system in structured form, what is gained is clarity and sharpness in
differentiating positions, resulting in ease in applying such tenets
Chandrakirti's Refutation of Bhavaviveka
517
in meditation. Still, in the debating courtyards of the monastic
universities, the sources for these now seemingly hardened positions are examined in detail with the result that those who pursue the topics in depth realize the almost fluid nature of the
sources while reconstructing and examining the patterns of
Dzong-ka-ba's thought as he formalized these systems. The
challenge is first to come to know Dzong-ka-ba's interpretation
so well that one can read it into his sources and then to examine
the sources to determine if the interpretation is justified—both of
these phases being required in the debating courtyard. A basic
requirement is to go beyond the texts to construct what Bhavaviveka, for instance, was getting at. Thus, dynamic ingenuity is
not limited to the past; it is ever-presently required. Our examination of the texts here is, therefore, only the tip of the iceberg.
About Bhavaviveka's being forced to accept that his own
reason is faulty, Chandrakfrti's Clear Words (30.15-31.10, 21.92.6) says:
Just this mode of expressing the fallaciousness of the
position [or thesis] which is that the basis [the subject] is
not established is to be applied also in expressing the
fault of non-establishment with respect to this reason—
'because of existing'.434 For, this logician [Bhavaviveka]
himself [comes to] assert the points explained above.
How? Another stated this proof:
Causes and so forth producing the internal sources
just exist because the Tathagata said so. Whatever the
Tathagata said is that way, as, for example, is the case
with [his] saying that nirvana is peace.
At that time [Bhavaviveka] expressed the following fault:
What are you asserting is the meaning of the reason?
[Are you saying] 'because the Tathagata said such [in
terms of] conventional [existence]' 435 or 'because the
Tathagata said such [in terms of] ultimate [existence]'?
If conventionally, the meaning of the reason is not
established for yourself, but if ultimately, [then as
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Meditation on Emptiness
Nagarjuna, I.7ab, says,] 'When [one analyzes whether] 436 the phenomena [of effects] exist, do not exist, or
[both] exist and do not exist [at the time of their causes],
they are [understood as] not established [by causes].' At
that time, conditions [producing] effects which have a
nature of existence, non-existence, or both [at the time
of their causes] are refuted. Therefore (I.7cd) 'How
could [an ultimately established definition, that is,]
establisher (nirvartaka, sgrub byed) [or producer] be
[the definition of] causal [condition (hetupratyaya,
rgyu 'i rkyen)]? In that case, it is not feasible [to say that
because the definition of causal condition ultimately
exists, causal conditions ultimately exist].' The meaning of [Nagarjuna's] statement is that those [ultimately existent things] are just not causes producing
[effects]. Therefore, because [we Madhyamikas assert
that] 437 what is established [that is, effects] and
establishers [that is, causes] do not exist ultimately,
[for a Madhyamika] that reason is just nonestablished [if the referent is to ultimate existence].
Or it is just contradictory [if the referent is to
ultimate existence due to being very contradictory
with a predicate of the probandum which should be a
conventionality].
Bhavaviveka's other autonomous reasons are not established
Chandrakirti adds that Bhavaviveka's other autonomous syllogisms similarly incur the fallacy of the non-establishment of the
subject, reason, and example since in the latter's system these
must be certified by a valid cognizer which is non-mistaken with
respect to the mode of being of the object. For a Prasangika a
valid cognizer can be mistaken with regard to the object's inherent existence but still be able to certify the existence of the object
as a falsity; however, this does not mean that ignorance establishes the existence of objects.438 Ignorance wrongly imputes the
inherent existence of objects; valid dualistic cognizers establish
the existence of objects.
Chandrakirti's Refutation of Bhavaviveka
519
About these other autonomous syllogisms, Chandrakirti's
Clear Words (31.11-33.3, 22.6-3.12) says:
Because this one [Bhavaviveka] himself [comes] in this
way to assert the non-establishment of reasons, in all
inferences in which [he] states inherently existent phenomena (vastudharma, dngos po'i chos)m as reasons, the
reason and so forth are not established for him. Hence,
all [his] proofs are destroyed. For, in:
Ultimately the internal sources are not produced
from their conditions which are other [than them]
because of being other, as, for example, is the case
with a pot,440
or:
The producers of the internal sources such as eyes,
which others441 want to say [exist] ultimately, are not
ascertained as conditions [producing the internal
sources] because of being other, as, for example, is the
case with threads and so forth,
'other' and so forth are not established for oneself [i.e.,
Bhavaviveka].
On an occasion when another expressed the following
reason:
The internal sources are only produced because of
making the special designations of those which
possess their objects [that is to say, because of being
the reasons why their respective consciousnesses are
called 'eye consciousnesses' and so forth],442
this one [Bhavaviveka], wanting to speak of the nonestablishment of that reason, says that if production,
going, and so forth were established as existing ultimately by the eye of 443 wisdom of a yogi in meditative
equipoise seeing the reality of things just as it is, then
that reason—'because of making the special designations
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Meditation on Emptiness
of those which possess their objects'—would just have
the sense of being established [but it is not established]
because [ultimately existent] going is also refuted just
through the refutation of [ultimately existent] production.
This [sort of reasoning that Bhavaviveka used against
his opponent] likewise is to be applied also444 to a reason
which he formulates:
Ultimately the not-yet-gone-over is not being gone
over because of being a path, like the path already
gone over.
In that, the reason—path—is not established for him
[due to not being established by the meditative equipoise
of a yogi seeing suchness, this being the only unmistaken
consciousness that a non-Buddha has].
Also, in:
An eye that serves as a basis [of an eye consciousness],
does not ultimately see forms because of being an eye
sense power, as, for example, is the case with [an eye
sense power] that is similar [to one that serves as the
basis of an eye consciousness but does not actually
serve as a basis of an eye consciousness such as during
sleep],
and likewise:
An eye does not [ultimately] see forms because of
having arisen from the elements, as, for example, is
the case with form,445
and:
Earth is not [ultimately] an entity of hardness because
of being an element, as, for example, is the case with
wind,444
and so forth it is to be applied that the reasons and so
forth are not established for yourself [Bhavaviveka].
Chandrakirti's Refutation of Bhavaviveka
521
Bhavaviveka's reason is inconclusive
Furthermore, the reason of Bhavaviveka's autonomous syllogism would be inconclusive for a Samkhya:
The subject, an eye sense, is not ultimately produced
from self because of existing, as, for example, is the case
with an existent consciousness.
A Samkhya might think that an eye sense, because it exists, is not
produced from self as in the case of consciousness but is produced from self as in the case of a pot. For him, a consciousness
or person is not a product and thus, of course, is not produced
from self; therefore, an eye sense is not produced from self in the
sense that a consciousness is not produced from self, but it is produced from self in the way that a pot is. Bhavaviveka might
object that pots are equally proven not to be produced from self,
but that is not what he said since his subject was limited to the
internal sources unlike Buddhapalita's broad subject that
includes all things involving production. Chandrakirti's Clear
Words (33.4-.6, 23.12-18) says:
Also,447 this reason—'because of existing'—is indefinite
in that the other party [would wonder], 'Is it that the
internal sources because of existing are not produced
from self in accordance with how consciousness exists or
is it that, like pots and so forth, they are produced from
self?'
['Bhavaviveka' objects:] It is not indefinite because
pots and so forth are equally proven [not to be produced
from self because of existing],
[Answer:] That is not so because such was not
expressed.
Our other-approved syllogisms do not incur those faults
Chandrakirti says that all of these fallacies accrue to Bhavaviveka because of his using autonomous syllogisms in which the
subject and so forth must appear similarly to both parties in the
sense that they must be established similarly in the systems of
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Meditation on Emptiness
both. It is not sufficient in an autonomous syllogism that the
subject be just validly established by one party and just validly
established by the other party. Rather, the subject must be established or certified similarly in the systems of both disputants. Just
so, the presence of the sign in the subject, the pervasion, counterpervasion, and example must be validly established in the systems of both parties in a similar manner. This is the meaning of
there being no similarly appearing subject, etc.
These fallacies do not accrue when one uses other-approved
syllogisms. For instance, Nagarjuna says (III.2cd):
How can that which does not
See itself see another?
This is an other-approved syllogism:
The subject, an eye, does not inherently see another,
a form, because of not seeing itself, like, for example,
a pot.
It is not necessary to establish the reason, the example, and the
subject (even though they are established for a Madhyamika) 448
because the opponent himself accepts them. In order to ascertain
the pervasion, i.e., that non-inherently existent perception of
others pervades that which does not perceive itself, first a general
pervasion is to be ascertained. This is done through a general
counter-pervasion:
If things have an inherently existent nature, first that
nature is to be apprehended in a thing, and then this
nature can be apprehended in another which possesses
that thing. For instance, because water has moisture,
moisture is apprehended in earth which possesses water.
Also, because a pleasant odor is apprehended in a certain
flower, the pleasant odor is apprehended in a cloth
which possesses, or is infused with, the odor of this
flower.
Then, a general pervasion is stated:
Chandrakirti's Refutation of Bhavaviveka
523
If there is non-apprehension of a nature in a thing, then
it follows that there is non-possession of this nature in
another phenomenon which possesses this thing. For
example, since jasmine flowers do not possess a foul
odor, a foul odor is not apprehended in clothing that
possesses, or is infused with, them.
Having demonstrated the general pervasion, it is applied to the
present context:
It is admissible that if an eye has perception of itself,
then it inherently sees another form when together with
it. However, since an eye does not see itself, it does not
inherently see another form.
When the opponent ascertains such a refutation as a refutation
through realizing that not seeing oneself and inherently seeing
another are contradictory, he ascertains the Madhyamika view of
no inherent existence. At this time, he forsakes the theses and
tenets of a Proponent of True Existence and simultaneously
realizes that though things do not have inherent existence, conventionally existent activity and agency are possible. He then
comes to distinguish non-existence and non-inherent existence
for the first time, understanding that non-inherent existence
does not contradict functionality. Chandrakirti's Clear Words
(34.1-.12, 23.18-4.16) says:
[Hypothetical objection by Bhavaviveka:] Is it not that
just those faults which you ascribe to another's [that is,
my, Bhavaviveka's, own] syllogisms accrue to your
inferences, due to which they would just have the fallacies of non-establishment of the subject, reason, and so
forth? Therefore, do not object to one [of us] with the
faults that are incurred by both. Therefore, all these
faults are not suitable.
Answer: Proponents of autonomous inferences
(svatantra-anumana, rang rgyud kyi rjes su dpagpa) come
to have these faults but we do not use autonomous
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Meditation on Emptiness
inferences because our449 inferences have the fruit of only
refuting others' theses.
It is as follows. [For example] another450 who thinks
that the eye [inherently] sees is refuted by inference
renowned to himself:
You assert that an eye [has] the attribute of not seeing
its own entity and also451 assert that if it does not have
the attribute of [inherently] seeing other [forms such
as blue, then that an eye sees] just does not occur.
Therefore, whatever [substratum] does not possess
[the attribute of] seeing its own entity also does not
possess [the attribute of] seeing others [such as blue
and so forth], as, for example, is the case with a pot
[which does not inherently see others because of not
seeing its own entity]. Also, an eye does not possess
[the attribute of] 452 seeing its own entity; therefore, it
also does not possess [the attribute of inherently]
seeing others [such as forms]. Therefore, seeing
others—blue and so forth—which is contradictory
with not seeing its own entity is contradicted just by
inference renowned to yourself.
Since only such is expressed by our453 inferences, how
could our position be subject to those faults as mentioned and due to which454 fallacy would be equally
incurred?
The syllogism is valid because the subject and so forth are
validly established for the opponent. It is not necessary that the
subject and so forth be validly established in the same manner
for the stater of the refutation. However, this does not mean that
they are not established for the Madhyamika; they are, and they
must be. What is not required is that the subject and so forth be
validly established in a similar manner in the systems ofboth disputants. Therefore, the term 'other-renowned syllogism' eliminates that the subject and so forth are established in a similar
Chandrakirti's Refutation of Bhavaviveka
525
manner for the Madhyamika; it does not suggest either that these
are not established for the Madhyamika or are a matter of doubt.
Thus, something's being 'other-renowned' or 'other-approved'
comes down to how it is renowned or established for the other
party, not to whether it is accepted as validly existing. As Dzongka-ba says:455
Therefore, the subject, predicate, and reason of an otherrenowned syllogism must exist conventionally; it is not
sufficient that they merely be asserted as existing by him
[the other party].
The conventions of the world alone are appropriate for logical
treatises, and in the world disputes are settled either by a third
party accepted by both disputants or by one's own word, but not
by the opponent's word. Just so, people are convinced by
reasons established for them and not merely by the fact that
reasons are established for others. Chandrakirti's Clear Words
(34.13-35.4, 24.16-5.5) says:
[Hypothetical rejoinder by Bhavaviveka:] Is there
damage by inference even from an inference established
for either [of the parties]?
Answer: There is. It is just by a reason established for
oneself, not by one established for the other [disputant],
since such is seen in the world. In the world, sometimes
[one party] prevails and [the other] is defeated by the
word of a judge which both take to be valid, and sometimes, by just one's own word, but victory or defeat is
not by the other's word. Just as it is in the world, so it is
also in logic because only the conventions of the world
are appropriate in treatises of logic.
Vasubandhu and Dignaga assert that in both affirmations and
negations the subject and so forth must be established for both
parties, but according to Chandrakirti they actually should
accept the usage of other-approved or other-renowned syllogisms. For in a refutation by scriptural citation the scripture
need not be accepted as a valid teaching by both in the debate,
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Meditation on Emptiness
just by the defending party. Also, in inferences for oneself (as in
meditative reflection) it is sufficient that the subject and so forth
be established for oneself and need not be established for both
because in an inference for oneself there is no second party.
Thus, it is senseless for them to insist on common establishment
of the subject and to say that consequences alone cannot generate
an inferring consciousness. Buddhas aid those worldly beings
who do not know suchness with just what is renowned among
them. Chandrakirti's Clear Words (35.4-36.2, 25.5-. 16)-says:
Therefore, some say, 'There is no harm by inference
that is through the force of being renowned to the other
[party] because [we] wish to refute mere renown to
others.' Also, there is someone who thinks, 'That
[reason] 456 which expresses ascertainment [established]
for both is [capable of] proof and refutation; that which is
either established for just one or about which there is
doubt [by either party as to whether it is established] is
not capable of such.' In dependence upon the world's
presentation of conventions they also should assert just
this mode, as described above, with respect to inference.
For, damage through scripture is not only by way of
scripture established for both [parties]. Then how? It is
[also] by way of [scripture] established for [the other
party] himself. [Furthermore] in inference for oneself
just what is established for oneself is weightier at all
[times], not what is established for both.
Therefore, expression of the definitions of logic [as
they are renowned in the systems of the Svatantrikas and
below] 457 is not needed because the Buddhas help beings
who are trainees and who do not know suchness with
reasoning as it is renowned to them. Enough extensive
elaboration.
REMARKS
There is great emphasis in the Prasangika system on the conventions of the world, which provide a common ground and insure
Chandrakirti's Refutation of Bhavaviveka
527
that the Prasangika will not be trying to help the world with a
language it does not understand. 458 Yet, it should not be thought
that a Prasangika seeks to defeat all logicians through contradictory consequences in order to return to the vulgar views of the
world. The refutations of other doctrinal systems are to be
applied to the eradication of one's own innate ways of misconceiving the person and other phenomena. Though Prasangikas
mostly assert the existence of the phenomena which the world
says exist, they do not accept what the world conceives about
how these phenomena exist. No phenomenon exists by way of
its own character; all phenomena exist imputedly, including
emptiness. No phenomenon is its basis of imputation; all phenomena lack inherent existence. It is undeniable that the opposite
appears to worldly beings and that, in turn, the world adheres to
this appearance.
The insistence on referring to what is renowned in the world
is not anti-philosophical; it is a call to see what appears without
philosophical fabrication to the ordinary mind. This ordinary
mind is possessed by one and all, philosopher and nonphilosopher. The innate intellect is of two kinds: one the
referent objects of which are non-existent and the other the
referent objects of which are existent. The first is the habitual
untutored intellect which without analysis conceives phenomena to exist inherently. Because an inherently existent
object is utterly non-existent, the referent object of a consciousness conceiving inherent existence is non-existent. However,
the image or concept of inherent existence which it perceives
does exist. This mind is to be extirpated through hearing,
thinking, and meditating on the non-existence of that referent
object.
The second type of habitual non-analytical intellect is just the
usual mind of everyday affairs that enters into thoughts and
activities without analyzing whether the object exists ultimately
as it appears or not. The Prasangikas are emphasizing attention
to this mind, for it is this in its conceptual and non-conceptual
forms which certifies the existence of all phenomena, establishing even the existence of emptiness although it is a mind of
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Meditation on Emptiness
meditative equipoise that certifies emptiness itself. Through
attending to this mind one can determine what exists, and
through determining what exists one learns what the bases of
emptiness are. Since emptiness is a quality of objects—their lack
of inherent existence—one must first identify what exists and
then, using these existents as bases, meditate on their lack of
inherent existence. Prasangikas assert what the world asserts not
only because these phenomena do indeed exist but also because
just these same phenomena are to be seen as lacking inherent
existence. The concern is with the mind and its objects, as they
are, without the fabrications of mistaken philosophical systems.
It is clear from Chandrakirti's lengthy defense of Buddhapalita and from his attack on Bhavaviveka that he was versed in
both their systems. His refutations of Samkhya, Nihilism, and so
forth indicate a thorough study of non-Buddhist and Buddhist
schools of tenets, comparative logic, and so on. Chandrakirti's
reliance on the world's renown or what is established in the
world is not a turning away from philosophy, study, or analysis
but a refined view of an analytical philosophy.
Though phenomena such as the ten Bodhisattva grounds
which form the structural basis of Chandrakirti's Supplement to
(Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' are also said to exist
conventionally, it is undeniable that they are not well known to
ordinary beings. However, Dzong-ka-ba says459 that when the
ten grounds become objects of the mind through hearing and
experience, they appear to a non-analytical ordinary awareness;
therefore, they are said to exist conventionally. Through this
maneuver he shows that there is no need to abandon the extraordinary features of the spiritual path for the sake of according
with the world.
Similarly, Chandrakirti lays out in great detail and with abundant definitions the standard phenomena of the world and those
fabricated by other philosophical systems. He thereby stresses a
study of definitions and an identification of the bases of emptiness before entering into the reasoning that refutes inherent
existence.
Also, Chandrakirti accepts what the world accepts for the most
Chandrakirti's Refutation of Bhavaviveka
529
/><2rf-M:hat is, except in cases such as the world's assumption that
the body is clean (if it is washed), pleasant, unchanging, and
under the control of a self.460 Furthermore, he refuses to allow
that there can be a subject of a syllogism which is validly established in a similar manner for a Madhyamika and a non-Madhyamika; this is because all consciousnesses of a sentient being,
except for a direct cognizer of emptiness, are mistaken with
regard to the mode of existence of objects. Only a Buddha has
both sense and mental consciousnesses which perceive objects
exactly as they are, imputedly existent; only he does not, in sense
perception, confuse the object imputed with its basis of imputation. (A Buddha is not a sentient being, sattva (sems can), because,
though he is conscious and has mind—sense and mental consciousnesses—he does not have a consciousness which still has
obstructions yet to be abandoned, and this is the definition of a
sentient being.461 All beings except for Buddhas have obstructions yet to be abandoned—even the highest of Bodhisattvas as
well as Hearer and Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyers.)
Since beginningless cyclic existence all sentient beings have
been chained to the false conception that phenomena exist inherently in their bases of imputation such that even a sense consciousness, though free from thought construction, perceives its
objects as if they inherently exist. This appearance of inherent
existence is assented to, and cyclic existence continues its
unbroken round. All beings, non-Buddhist and Buddhist, Hmayanist and Mahayanist, must overcome the conception of inherent existence to break the round of powerless birth, aging, sickness, and death. As a technique to do so, a Prasangika removes
the very basis of usual syllogistic debate by denying the existence
of unmistaken valid cognizers of conventional objects in all who
are not Buddhas. He uses consequences that call for analysis of
everyday objects to discover the nature of objects. Analysis, the
very opposite of ordinary intellect, which is defined as unanalytical, is demanded. Even syllogistic statements about this final
nature cannot be used until one is about to realize the view of
non-inherent existence and of the conventional valid existence of
nominalities.
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Meditation on Emptiness
Uneducated beings would have difficulty understanding the
format of a consequence, never mind its import. Therefore, the
Prasangika's reliance on consequences and on what is renowned
in the world does not reflect a vulgarization of Buddhism for the
masses. Rather, it is an acknowledgement that people are convinced on their own grounds—an emphasis on watching one's
own mind to discover or reveal what exists for oneself so that
these existents may serve as bases for meditation on emptiness.
In paying such close attention to the ordinary workings of the
mind, the other type of ordinary mind—the non-analytical consciousness which assents to the false appearance of things as
truly existent—can be seen more easily.
Prasangikas and Svatantrikas were named in Tibet from the
point of view of the way in which they seek to generate in others
a consciousness that infers the non-true existence of things, but
it does not follow that all Prasangikas and Svatantrikas are debaters. They are seeking to accustom themselves to the view of
emptiness through the statement of consequences and syllogisms to themselves in meditation and do not necessarily go
about debating. Even a follower of Prasangika tenets may temporarily follow the Hinayana path, taking for the motivation of
meditation on emptiness the wish to liberate himself or herself
from cyclic existence and leaving for later the full development
of the wish to free all beings from cyclic existence. Even those
with the motivation of a Mahayanist would not necessarily
debate or even teach during that particular lifetime, for it is
necessary first to educate oneself before educating others.
Still, even a person who is a Mahayanist by tenet and Hinayanist by path or motivation reveres and will eventually generate the great compassion of the Mahayana which requires taking
upon oneself the burden of liberating all sentient beings. Eventually he will teach to others the view of the middle way through
consequences.
6 Prasangika in Tibet
Sources
Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
Khetsun Sangpo's oral teachings
Buddhism first came to Tibet when books rained from the sky
on the palace of King Hla-to-to-ri-nyan-dzen (Lha-tho-tho-rignyan-btsan, 374-494*) in 433 A.D.462 The King was sixty at the
time, and through paying respect to the books he assumed the
appearance of a twenty year old, living for sixty more years to the
age of one hundred twenty. Five generations later, during the
reign of King Song-dzen-gam-bo (Srong-btsan-sgam-po, 617698*), Buddhism was established in the snowy land through the
efforts of his minister Thu-mi-sam-bho-ta who travelled to India,
learned Sanskrit, created a Tibetan alphabet, and translated
many books including sutras brought from Naga-land by Nagarjuna.
The first of the two disseminations of Buddhism into Tibet
extends to the time of the translator Rin-chen-sang-bo (Rin-chenbzang-po, 954-1055) whose translations form the boundary line
beginning the new translations of tantra. The thorough transmission of the explanation and achievement in practice of the
532
Meditation on Emptiness
Buddha's complete system occurred in the first dissemination
during the reign of Tri-song-day-dzen (Khri-srong-lde-btsan, 790848*) beginning in 803. During that period many Indian panditas visited Tibet; the Prasangika master Padmasambhava (877
B.C.-A.D. 864*) who was the founder of the Nying-ma order,
Dharmakirti (not the famous logician), Vimalamitra, and
Buddhaguhya who are all included within the Nying-ma order,
all came at this time. The Nying-ma-bas, or followers of the old
translations, are so named because they use translations, especially of Highest Yoga Tantras, made prior to the time of Rinchen-sang-bo.
These panditas, along with the Yogachara-SvatantrikaMadhyamika Shantarakshita (ca. 165 B.C.-A.D. 844*) bore the
burden of explaining everything from the discipline (vinaya, 'dul
ba) to Madhyamika philosophy as well as tantra.463 Padmasambhava tamed the spirits of Tibet and initiated the king, princes,
and others into tantra. Together with Shantarakshita and the
king, Padmasambhava established doctrinal colleges at Sam-yay
(bSam-yas), Hla-sa, and Yar-lung-drang-druk (Yar-klung-grang'brug) and established meditation centers at Sam-yay-chen-bo
(bSam-yas-chen-po), Shel-drak (Shal-brag), Chu-wo-ri (Chu-bori), and Drak-yer-ba (Brag-yer-pa). Students in turn founded
many doctrinal colleges and meditation centers, and thus though
Padmasambhava mainly taught tantra, he spread all forms of the
teaching. Similarly, Dharmakirti performed the mandala initiations of the Yoga Tantras, and so forth, but his teaching was not
confined to tantra. The rules of tantra at that time were very
strict, and it was not until later when the Tibetans were more
educated in Buddhism that these and other masters spread tantra
widely.
The Svatantrika-Madhyamika master Shantarakshita bore the
Hihayana Sarvastivada lineage of discipline which is traced back
to Rahula, Buddha's own son. Thus, the Sarvastivada discipline
was favored over the other lineages. Later the king decreed that
all were to follow the Bodhisattva abbot Shantarakshita in behavior, with the result that the texts of the other lineages of
discipline were not even translated into Tibetan.
Prasangika in Tibet
533
Shantarakshita warned that though no non-Buddhist could
harm the continuation and development of Buddhism in Tibet, a
dangerous internal schism would arise. Leaving his advice in
bronze in the king's treasury, he counselled the king to call his
student Kamalashila when the prophecy came to pass. After
Shantarakshita's departure from Tibet, the Chinese abbot Hoshang Mahayana (Hva-shang) composed many texts primarily
setting forth his view of non-application of the mind to anything.
His system spread widely in Tibet, even being accepted by the
queen. King Tri-song-day-dzen saw that this system, which
deprecated the many techniques of skillful means, did not accord
with Nagarjuna's teaching. Being reminded of Shantarakshita's
words, he invited Kamalashila to come to Tibet to debate with
Ho-shang Mahayana at Sam-yay (ca. A.D. 846*).464 Through
citation of scripture and reasoning Kamalashila defeated the
Chinese abbot, spread again the complete teaching, and praised
analytical wisdom in his three books on the Stages of Meditation
(.Bhavanakrama). The king decreed that all were to follow
Nagarjuna's Madhyamika view, but unlike the translation into
Tibetan of only the Sarvastivada discipline, this did not prevent
the views of other schools of tenets from being translated—the
reason being that the great Indian teachers considered a study of
various views valuable in ascertaining the features of the final
view. It is said that Kamalashila was killed by a Chinese spy
shortly before the king's own death in A.D. 848.
Even though some Indian scholars who upheld Chittamatra
did visit Tibet during the first dissemination, since Padmasambhava, DharmakTrti, and so forth were Prasangikas in view and
Shantarakshita was a Svatantrika, there is no question that the
view of Tibet at that time was Madhyamika. Jang-gya reports
that Ye-shay-day (Ye-shes-sde), who was a student of both Padmasambhava and Shantarakshita, accorded with the latter's Yogachara-Svatantrika-Madhyamika, but some say that his view was
mainly Prasangika in accordance with the view of Padmasambhava.465 Ye-shay-day was a great translator who used the name
Vairochana for his tantra translations, Indrabodhi for his translations of medical treatises, Gen-jak-tang-da (Gan-jag-thang-ta)
534
Meditation on Emptiness
for his Bon translations from Shang-shung (Zhang-zhung) language into Tibetan, and Ye-shay-day for his sutra translations.
Ye-shay-day's breadth is typical of many scholars of the period.
During the second dissemination, a while after the persecution
of Buddhism during the last six years of the reign of King Langdar-ma (gLang-dar-ma, 877-906*), the great translator Rincheng-sang-bo (954-1055) relied on many Indian teachers,
learned a great deal of philosophy and tantra, and translated many,
many texts. His view was said to be that of a Thoroughly NonAbiding Madhyamika, that is, Prasangika; overcoming many mistaken tantric practices, he spread the teaching widely throughout
Tibet. Thus, when Buddhism returned to prominence in Tibet,
it was still the Madhyamika view and especially Prasangika that
dominated philosophy.
The principal agents of the second dissemination were Rinchen-sang-bo and his teacher Atlsha (982-1054*).466 Ausha reestablished the system of studying all aspects of Buddhism—the
various sutra and tantra systems in terms of the practice of one
individual—and this method persists through to the present. His
student Drom-don ('Brom-ston) was able to penetrate Chandrakirti's system, and Atlsha declared with pleasure that only the
Prasangika view was to be upheld in Tibet. Atfsha wrote that one
could cognize suchness through the precepts transmitted from
Chandrakfrti, and the Ga-dam-ba (bKa'-gdams-pa) lineage stemming from Atisha contains many texts that accord with the
thought of Chandrakirti's Prasangika-Madhyamika.
Relying heavily on Atfsha's works, the Ge-luk-ba order, originally a branch of Ga-dam-ba, took Prasangika as their own final
system. The famous Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path by
Dzong-ka-ba (1357-1419), the founder of Ge-luk-ba, is a commentary on Atfsha's Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment (Bodhipathapradtpa); in it Dzong-ka-ba presents, among other things,
the particular features of special insight (vipashyana, lhag
mthong) in the Prasangika system. Not just the Ge-luk-bas, but
also the Nying-ma-bas, Ga-gyu-bas (bKa'-brgyud-pa), and Sagya-bas pay great respect to Atfsha and study his works thoroughly.467
Prasangika in Tibet
535
The great Ga-dam-ba Ngok-lo-dza-wa Lo-den-shay-rap (Ngoglo-tstsha-ba bLo-ldan-shes-rab), a student of Atfsha, quotes Bhavaviveka and Chandrakirti as sources but, along with his students,
appears to agree mainly with Shantirakshita's YogacharaSvatantrika. Also, there were some Chittamatrin followers of the
teacher Suvarnadvipa (gSer-gling-pa), who, though a Chittamatrin, was AtFsha's principal guru for the generation of the
altruistic aspiration to enlightenment.
The view of the Jo-nang-ba or Jo-mo-nang-ba school, a division of the Sa-gya order, is said by some to be a fabrication that is
beyond the pale of the Indian schools of tenets. Their interpretation of the Madhyamika emptiness is that the permanent,
unchanging realm or constituent (dhatu, khams) of the Tathagata which exists in all sentient beings is empty of all impermanent phenomena. Emptiness here is an emptiness of the other:
the Tathagata realm, or Buddha nature, is empty of being impermanent phenomena and impermanent phenomena are empty of
being the Tathagata realm. The other orders say that though
emptiness is not impermanent phenomena and vice versa, this
does not constitute emptiness; emptiness is a negation of self in
the sense that phenomena are empty of, or lack, their own inherent existence. The Jo-nang-bas were refuted by many, but despite being considered as similar to the Vedantins in view, their
founder Yu-mo-ba is renowned among scholars of all orders for
his literature on the Kalachakra Tantra.
The great_ Sa-gya-ba scholar, Bu-don (Bu-ston, 1290-1364),
originally a Nying-ma-ba and later a scholar of literally all orders
and systems of tenets, accords greatly with the Prasangika Gadam-bas in view. It is said that he held Chandrakirti's works to
be the best of all.
The great Ga-dam-ba translator Ba-tsap-nyi-ma-drak-ba (Patshab-nyi-ma-grags-pa) spent twenty-three years in Kashmir,
invited the pandita Kanakavarman (gSer-gyi-go-cha) to Tibet,
and translated and taught many Madhyamika treatises. His four
famous students, as well as many of his other students, spread
Chandrakirti's system even more widely than he did.
There are some Madhyamika followers in Tibet about whom
536
Meditation on Emptiness
it is difficult to say whether they are Svatantrika or Prasangika.
Go-rin-bo-chay Kuk-ba-hlay-dzay ('Gos-rin-po-che Khug-pa-lhasbtsas) travelled to India twelve times, met with seventy-two
scholars, and made many explanations of tantras. He was most
likely a member of both the Ga-dam and Sa-gya orders, and
though he was a Madhyamika, it is not clear which branch
he asserted as his final system. Similarly, the translators Bakay-gay (Ba-khe-gad, Khe-gad-'khor-lo-grags), Ra (Rva, Rva rDorje-grags), Dro ('Bro, 'Bro Shes-rab-grags), and Nyen (gNyan,
gNyan Dar-ma-grags) and so forth either because of their teachers or because of their own assertions are seen to be Madhyamikas, but no clear delineation of Svatantrika or Prasangika can
be made.
The Sa-gya order stems from Drok-mi Shakya-ye-shay ('Br okmi Shakya-ye-shes, 933 to either 1047 or 1050*) who spent
twelve years in India studying especially with tantric teachers,
then returned to Tibet, and spread tantra. He became Mar-ba's
first Sanskrit teacher when Mar-ba was still a child. Drok-mi
practices the mother tantras under the Indian pandita Gayadhara whose coming to Tibet greatly furthered the Sa-gya order
and who ultimately died there in order to be near his place of
rebirth. Drok-mi is said to have been a Madhyamika; also, since
he sought to explicate the thought of the great Indian yogi
Virupa, his view is Prasangika. The final view of the Sa-gya
order is that of the Great Madhyamika, that is, Prasangika, their
identification of the view being mixed with tantric precepts and
known as the union of manifestation and emptiness. The great
Sa-gya pandita Jam-yang-gun-ga-gyel-tsen ('Jam-dbyangs-kundga'-rgyal-mtshan) was a Prasangika in view in both his tantra
and sutra teachings. The later Sa-gya scholar Ren-da-wa (Redmda'-ba), a teacher of Dzong-ka-ba, wrote a commentary on
Chandrakfrti's Supplement as well as instruction manuals for
meditation on the Prasangika view. A Prasangikahimself, his
writings on the view agree greatly with Dzong-ka-ba's.
The founder of the Shi-jay (Zhi-byed) order was Pa-dam-basang-gyay (Pha-dam-pa-sangs-rgyas), who many say was Bodhidharma, also known as Kamalashlla (but not Shantarakshita's
Prasangika in Tibet
537
student Kamalashila). He was a student of eighty gurus, including Nagarjuna, Maitripada, and Naropa, lived for over five
hundred years, visited Tibet five times, spread Buddhism widely
in both China and Tibet, and is said to have visited Mi-la-re-ba
near the end of his life. Based on the Perfection of Wisdom
Sutras, he divided his teaching into three systems—sutra, tantra,
and union of sutra and tantra—spreading a doctrine much like
that of sudden enlightenment. It is said that he pretended to die a
few times in China.468
The writings of the famous clairvoyant Ma-ji-lap-dron (Macig-Iab-sgron) who is the founder of the Jo (gCod) branch of the
Shi-jay order accord significantly with the Prasangika system.
After she defeated Indian yogis through debate and feats of yoga,
her system of exorcism, or elimination of suffering (gCod), originally brought to Tibet by Bodhidharma who received it from
Aryadeva, spread back to India where it remained for a short
while.469
The renowned founder of the Ga-gyu order, Mar-ba (Lho-brag
Mar-pa-chos-kyi-blo-gros, 1012-1096) visited India three times
and Nepal four, meeting with one hundred and eight gurus,
including Naropa, Maitripada, Jnanagarbha (not the Svatantrika
Jnanagarbha), Shantibhadra, and so forth. He practiced in detail
the yoga of the Guhyasamaja Tantra and most of the father and
mother tantras. Returning to Tibet, Mar-ba had many students
who upheld his lineage, and because his tantric activities were
vast, his lineage spread widely. It is obvious that he relied on
many teachers of both Chittamatra and Madhyamika views, but
in his own words he relied mainly on Naropa and Maitripada in
all aspects—whether view, meditation, practice, or tantra. That
both Naropa and Maitripada were Prasangikas can be seen from
their own words; thus, it is clear that the instructions on the view
in the Mar-ba lineage are the great Madhyamika-Prasangika.
Still, it is not necessary that every instruction in his lineage be
Prasangika, for it is a sign of a great master that he does not teach
the same to everyone or immediately attempt to explain his own
view. Thus, some precepts in his lineage accord with Chittamatra.
538
Meditation on Emptiness
Many of the songs of Mar-ba's famous student Mi-la-re-ba
(Mi-la-ras-pa, 1040-1123) accord with Prasangika. Even those
that speak of the four yogas, which is also a topic of the Chittamatrin Ratnakarashanti, can be explained as either Chittamatrin
or Madhyamika. Since his teachings are not general presentations
of tenets but answers to questions put by disciples, they accord
with the disposition of the questioner. Mi-la-re-ba's student
Gam-bo-ba (sGam-po-pa, 1079-1153) made popular usage of the
term 'mahamudra' as a name for Ga-gyu-ba instructions on
suchness in both sutra and tantra teachings. Gam-bo-ba's
student Pak-mo-drup-dor-jay-gyel-bo (Phag-mo-grub-rdo-rje-gyalpo) had many students who formed branches of the Ga-gyu
order.
In sum, the eight principal Tibetan orders—Nying-ma, Sagya, Ga-dam (which includes Ge-luk), Ga-gyu, Shang-ba Ga-gyu
(Shang-pa bKa '-rgyud, which was founded earlier than Mar-ba's
Ga-gyu), Shi-jay (which includes Jo-yul), Jor-druk (sByor-drug, a
tantric order based on the Kalachakra Tantra), and Dor-jay-dayba (rDo-rje-bzlas-pa, a tantric order based on the tantras of the
deity Bhairava)—mostly base their study of Madhyamika on
Chandrakirti's Supplement."0 Students would memorize and
debate Chandrakirti's Supplement, and only some would
memorize Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way.
In terms of the view of emptiness, all the major Tibetan orders
are Madhyamika, and almost all who differentiate between
Prasangika and Svatantrika are Prasangika. Prasangika was and
still is seen as the acme of philosophical systems and the basis for
the special techniques of deity yoga in tantra.
7
Validation of Phenomena
Sources
Den-dar-hla-ram-ba's Presentation of the Lack of Being One
or Many
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings
Geshe Gediin Lodro's oral teachings
Geshe Lhundup Sopa's oral teachings
Corresponding section of the translation pp.632-6
Even from the Prasangika standpoint it is not sufficient merely
to tear down other philosophies.471 Not only must external
debate be used as a branch of the attempt to overcome one's own
misconceptions but also one must in one's own system of conventional existence present with valid confirmation all the
actions, objects, and agents of cyclic existence and nirvana.
This very assertion of the valid establishment of all phenomena is what the Sa-gya-ba scholar Dak-tsang and others find so
objectionable in Dzong-ka-ba. Dak-tsang cites as the cause for
Dzong-ka- ba's 'error' the latter's addiction to logic.472
The cause for such a burden of contradictions [in
Dzong-ka-ba's writings] is that, despite [Chandrakirti's
540
Meditation on Emptiness
and others'] statements again and again [that phenomena
exist] only for the world without analysis, [Dzong-ka-ba]
applied reasoning and proved [their valid conventional
existence] due to the force of his habituation to logic.
Dak-tsang found eighteen 'contradictions' in Dzong-ka-ba's
writings, the foremost of which is his assertion that there is a
valid establishment of all phenomena in the Prasangika
system:473
Those [pretending] to follow Chandrakfrti who assert
through analysis with many reasons that impure mistaken appearances are validly established have a great
burden of contradictions.
The basic problem is that in the Prasangika system when objects
are sought among or separate from their bases of imputation,
they cannot be found and, thus, how can it be said that phenomena are validly established? How can valid cognition, either
direct perception or inference, affirm an unfindable phenomenon as existing?_
According to Dzong-ka-ba, every phenomena has its establisher, that is, a consciousness that certifies it as existing.474 A
correct sense consciousness which directly perceives its o b j e c t or in other words apprehends its object without the medium of
images and concepts—certifies the existence of visual objects,
sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects. The mere realization
of their objects by those consciousnesses in turn certifies their
own existence.47' There is no further certifier of the certifier, and
this is the reason why a valid cognizer exists in dependence on its
own realization and does not inherently exist.
Similarly, an inferring consciousness which realizes uncaused
space—a mere negative of obstructive contact—is the certifier of
space. Just so, the wisdom of meditative equipoise certifies
emptiness, although before directly cognizing emptiness, its
existence can be certified by a valid dualistic mental consciousness that arises in dependence on reasoning and scripture.
Emptiness is more difficult to realize than its existence, just as
Validation of Phenomena
541
liberation from cyclic existence is more difficult to realize than
the mere existence of liberation. However, sense consciousnesses certify both their objects and the existence of their objects
because the one is no more difficult to realize than the other and
because it is impossible to identify another consciousness which,
after a sense consciousness has certified its object, certifies the
existence of that object.
Since it is obvious that double moons, blue snow mountains, a
permanent self, and so forth are seen but do not exist at all, it
cannot be said that everything which is perceived by the six consciousnesses is certified as existing. Some distinction of error has
to be made; otherwise, there would be no way to determine
which conventional phenomena exist and which do not. How
else could Chandrakirti say:476
From fear, not realizing that the self is just nominal, not
knowing dependent imputation as it is, fallen away even
from conventional truths, fooled by sheer wrong imagination through counterfeit inferences, [the non-Buddhist
Forders] imagine a self and propound its character due
to ignorance. A refutation of them even conventionally
was given [in chapter eight where] the mutual establishment of a self and its appropriation [the mental and
physical aggregates] was set forth.
How could Chandrakirti say that the Forders fall away even
from conventional truths if there were not a valid means to determine what does and does not exist conventionally? How could
Chandrakirti assert that the self is just nominal, a dependent
imputation? It could not be done merely through polling the
populace because, though the populace might not say that the
self is permanent, they certainly would not even get a hint of
what dependent imputation means.
By what means is it that Shantideva determines what is and
what is not the path in his Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds ? By
what means is it that Nagarjuna determines the modes of the
ethics he advises for the king in his Precious Garland of Advice for
the King? If it were said that these are determined by the valid
542
Meditation on Emptiness
establishment which is just popular in the world, then Chandrakirti's nominalism would also have to be an object of popular
valid establishment.
Dzong-ka-ba's answer is that these correct direct and indirect
cognizers are valid within their sphere, in the sense that they
determine whether, with respect to impermanent phenomena,
the object imputed can perform the functions of the object or
not.477 For instance, there is no difference with respect to the
non-findability of a man imputed to a conscious human body
and a man imputed to a pile of stones. However, the common
intellect can determine without any special analysis which of the
two is imputedly existent and which is just an imputation. The
one can perform the functions of a man whereas the other cannot. Approaching and taking a good look is sufficient as a valid
check of the coordination of basis of imputation and object
imputed. Though an object imputed is not its basis of imputation and cannot be found among the bases of imputation or
separately, it can be determined through simple checks whether
the imputation is correct or not. To exist does not mean just to
exist for thought; coordination of basis of imputation and object
imputed is required.478
The difference between a picture of a cow and a cow is that the
former cannot perform the functions of a cow but the latter can.
However, Chandrakirti is renowned for having milked a picture
of a cow in order to overcome others' sense of inherent existence.
Might it not be that the ability to perform a function is linked
inextricably with thought and thus the great yogis can do anything with anything? The Ge-luk-bas answer that, of course,
they too accept the special powers of yogis but add that the yogis'
and the world's presentations of phenomena should not be
mixed. For the yogis' presentation would utterly eradicate the
world's conventions;479 some yogis' eye consciousness can cognize odors, and their ear consciousness can cognize colors and
shapes. A Buddha's hair cognizes all phenomena simultaneously; moments are stretched to eons; eons are reduced to
moments. A Buddha can fit the world into a hair pore without
changing the size of the hair pore or of the world. Thus, the
Validation of Phenomena
543
sphere of valid establishment is the coarse conventions of the
world; within that context what is validly established holds true,
and even Buddhas and yogis need not contradict these truths just
because their sphere is subtler.480
Still, does this mean that we poor worldlings are to have our
dull presentation of phenomena and the yogis their subtle
presentation? Even if it is granted that it is not ignorance that
validly certifies these phenomena, but correct cognizers within a
certain sphere, are we to hallow the admitted dullness of our
sphere? What is the purpose of adhering to the world's limited
knowledge? Why consecrate it with 'valid establishment' (pramanasiddhi, tshad mas grub pa)}
The Ge-luk-bas answer that it is necessary first to realize the
existence of phenomena before meditating on their emptiness.481
Otherwise, the Nihilists who cognize an absence of former and
future lives and the Madhyamikas who cognize an absence of
inherent existence of former and future lives would be the same
(see p.632-3). Furthermore, the cause and effect of actions are
very subtle, and beings are bound in cyclic existence by the laws
of cause and effect until they cognize emptiness directly and then
become familiar with it over a long time.'If a practitioner does
not correctly outline the laws of cause and effect, he will be
caught by his mispractices, whereby his very opportunity to
meditate on emptiness will be lost. Furthermore, Buddhahood is
not a mere state of total non-duality; rather, it is the perfection of
mind and body, and dualistic perception in the sense of subject,
object, and so forth continue though without the dualism of misperceived or misconceived inherent existence. A Buddha's
wisdom and body are continuing effects of profound and vast
practice. The cognition of emptiness is not the eradication of
phenomena but a thorough understanding of their mode of existence. One learns how to perceive phenomena without confusing
the basis of imputation with the object imputed.
Because ordinary beings cannot distinguish between inherent
existence and conventional existence, as soon as it is said that
objects are validly established, they tend to believe that objects as
they perceive them are affirmed. Therefore, some non-Ge-luk-ba
544
Meditation on Emptiness
masters have taught that nothing except emptiness validly exists;
they feel that since a student is unable to distinguish between
inherent existence and conventional existence, he can destroy his
conception of inherent existence through destroying his sense of
existence and then afterwards determine what remains. Agreeing
with them, the twentieth century renegade Ge-luk-ba monk Gendun-cho-pel (dGe-'dun-chos-'phel) says that no teacher need fear
that his students would fall to a view of utter annihilation or nihilism because no one can escape the data of his senses.482 He agrees
that there is something left over after the fabrications of inherent
existence are destroyed, but in the meantime students do not
require fortification from nihilism through a teaching of valid
establishment.
Gen-dun-cho-pel is said to have led an exciting life, and this may
be the cause for his conviction that students would not fall into
nihilistic views. He wrote a commentary on the Aphorisms on
Desire (Kamasutra) from his own experience; he visited India and
was arrested upon his return to Tibet as a Russian spy. He is said to
have been quite a drunk, but also it is reported that upon retiring
from the street with a friend in a drunken stupor he explained
Nagar juna's teaching with a very clear head.483 The vibrance ofhis
life may have prevented him from falling into nihilism despite his
obvious devotion to the doctrine of the unfindability of objects.
However, that sense data are enough to keep all students from
nihilism does not stand in the face ofsome current 'Buddhist' literature; the shadow of nothingness is often dark; the lack ofdiscrimination between non-inherent existence and non-existence is
obvious.
Still, Gen-dun-cho-pel's point is significant; he often refers to
scholars who pressed him with their debates, and it appears that
his objections are not to a philosophical incorrectness in Dzongka-ba's teaching but to a pedagogical fault. Since even Dzong-kaba says that no beginner can discriminate between existence and
inherent existence, an emphasis on the valid establishment of conventionalities might merely fortify the habitual sense that things
exist the way they appear. Gen-dun-cho-pel essentially is accusing
the Ge-luk-bas of being too subtle for their own good.
Validation of Phenomena
545
The highly respected Mongolian scholar and Ge-luk-ba geshay Den-dar-hla-ram-ba (bsTan-dar-lha-ram-pa) in his Presentation of the Lack of Being One or Many says in the same vein:484
Except for refuting just these mountains, fences, houses,
and so forth which so forcefully appear to exist concretely, we are very wrong if we search for some other
horn-like thing to refute. ['Horn-like' means something
sticking out above everything else, obvious or prominent, something separate from the object itself.] For
Jang-gya-rol-way-dor-jay's (ICang-skya-rol-ba'i-rdo-rje)
Song on the Practice of the View says, 'It seems that
having fully accepted these concrete appearances as
givens, they are searching for some horn-like thing to
refute.'
Still, some say [in answer] to this, 'This is wrong
because the mountains, fences, houses, and so forth as
they appear to common beings are the objects of direct
apprehension by sense consciousnesses. Therefore, it is
unsuitable to refute them in any way because [Dzongka-ba's] "Great Exposition of Special Insight" [in his
Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path ] says, "None of
the objects of non-conceptual sense consciousnesses are
ever refuted through reasoning."'
That indeed is true; however, an object which appears
to a non-conceptual [sense] consciousness is the object
which is conceived to exist inherently by a conceptual
consciousness [in the sense that a conceptual consciousness assents to the object's appearance of inherent existence], Therefore, related with this object are the appearance of objective existence which is to be refuted and
the mere appearance [of the object] which is not to be
refuted. [However] before attaining the view [of noninherent existence but conventional, valid, effective
existence] these two appear confused as one. When the
view is found, these two [the appearance of objective
existence and the mere appearance] are discriminated,
and it is well renowned in the words of the wise that
546
Meditation on Emptiness
there is this essential that the mere appearance is not
refuted. When mountains, fences, houses, and so forth
appear to ordinary beings, they appear in all respects to
exist objectively. Therefore, one should meditate until,
destroying this mode of appearance, it is cancelled in all
respects for one's mind, and the fear, 'Now there is
nothing left over,' is generated.
The generation of such fear is extremely rare. Kaydrup's Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate says, 'If even
arrival at the point of actual generation of fear and fright
of the profound emptiness is extremely rare, what need
is there to say that arrival at an actual ascertainment,
which is an understanding of an emptiness through
experience, is almost non-existent.'
Therefore, greatly superior to the present-day philosophers to whom not even an image of the mode of
objective existence has appeared are those in former
times who overextended what is refuted [in the view of
selflessness and held that the objects themselves are
refuted].
There are reasons for not being frightened about
emptiness. On the one hand, the stupid who do not
know either the term or meaning of emptiness are not
frightened because they do not know any of its disadvantages or advantages. For example, the stupid who do
not know about how one can fall from a horse are brave
to mount a wild horse. On the other hand, those who
perceive emptiness directly do not fear it because they
lack the cause of fear, that is, the conception of inherent
existence which is abandoned through seeing [the truth],
like a being who has learned well the ways of controlling
a wild horse.
Then, who fears [emptiness]? It is suitable for fear to
be generated in one who has understood emptiness a
little and is investigating whether such and such a phenomenon exists or not. For suddenly the phenomenon
appears to his mind to be totally non-existent. An
Validation of Phenomena
547
example is a person who has understood a little but not
completely how to mount a wild horse.
Even though the 'mere appearance' of an object is not negated in
the view of selflessness, one has to bring oneself in analysis to the
point where the object is utterly unfindable and totally disappears. One can at that time come up with nothing that is the
object; this is a time of fright. It is said that eventually one will
be able to comprehend what the 'mere appearance' that is not
refuted is.
The Ge-luk-ba view is indeed subtle. It attempts to describe
what nominal existence is: the non-identification of the imputed
object as its basis of imputation and yet the coordination of these
two as determined by whether the object so designated can perform its functions. Ge-luk-bas do sometimes seem to proceed to
disregard emptiness and enter into long discussions about this or
that conventional phenomenon. However, it rests on the oral
teaching to emphasize attention to what objective existence and
nominal existence mean and not just to enumerate and justify
what conventionally exists.
Gen-dun-cho-pel's revolt from Ge-luk-ba teachings suggests
that in the eyes of one intelligent being, not too many scholars
and yogis were able to follow such a difficult middle path.
8 Meditative Reasoning
Sources
Dzong-ka-ba's Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path
Nga-wang-bel-den's Explanation of the Conventional and the
Ultimate in the Four Systems of Tenets
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Concentrations and
Formless Absorptions
Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets
Many, both in the East and in the West, have interpreted Prasangika-Madhyamika to be a systemless system that, based on
the realization that words are incapable of generating an experience of objects like that of direct perception, uses reasoning
merely to refute other views while propounding a meditation
that is solely a withdrawal from conceptuality. This view contrasts sharply with the Ge-luk-ba interpretation. That Prasangikas have no system is refuted by Dzong-ka-ba in his Great
Exposition of the Stages of the Path :485
Nowadays some who wish to be Prasangika-Madhyamikas [say]: 'Our own system even conventionally does
not have any assertions based on the ultimate or the
550
Meditation on Emptiness
conventional. For, if we had such theses, then we would
have to assert examples and reasons that prove them, in
which case we would become Svatantrikas. Therefore,
there is no such thing as an 'own system' for Prasangikas
since [Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, and Chandrakfrti] say that
Madhyamikas have no position and no thesis. As Nagarjuna's Refutation of Objections says:
If I had any thesis,
Then I would have that fault.
Because I have no thesis,
I am only faultless
'
Answer: If this which you propound is not the Madhyamika system, then it is contradictory to establish it
through citing passages from the Superior [Nagarjuna]
and his spiritual sons. Also, since [according to you] it
cannot be posited as Chandrakfrti's or any other Buddhist system, it would be outside this religion. [However] if you say that it is Madhyamika and, from within
that, the system of Chandrakfrti, then it would contradict [your assertion] that Madhyamikas [in general] and
Chandrakfrti [in particular] do not have their own
system.
Likewise, it is not feasible to propound—in hopes of
being freed from assertions—that all presentations are
solely from others' point of view. For, in saying, 'The
existence of forms and so forth should be asserted solely
from the viewpoint of other,' though you do not assert
the existence of forms and so forth, you certainly must
assert a positing from others' viewpoint, in which case
you are not freed from assertions. Since at that time you
must assert the others from whose viewpoint [these
presentations] are posited, as well as the positer, and so
forth, to propound that assertions are made solely from
the viewpoint of others not only does not help but harms
your [position of] not having your own system.
Meditative Reasoning
551
Dzong-ka-ba rejects the interpretation that Prasangikas in particular or Madhyamikas in general have no system. Those who
propound such have misunderstood the various passages in
Madhyamika texts that seem to indicate this. (Dzong-ka-ba's
interpretation of the passage from Nagarjuna's Refutation of
Objections is given on pp.471-3.)
Nor is it the uncommon Prasangika-Madhyamika view that
words are inadequate to convey experience just as it is. For
according to Nga-wang-bel-den, Jam-yang-shay-ba's annotator,
this is the view of the Hinayana Sautrantikas. In his Explanation
of the Conventional and the Ultimate in the Four Systems of
Tenets486 he explains in detail that in the system of the Sautrantikas Following Reasoning—that is, those following Dignaga and
Dharmakfrti—impermanent phenomena such as pots, pillars,
bodies, minds, and so forth are:
. . . specifically characterized phenomena (svalakshana,
rang mtshan) because of being phenomena that must be
realized by a mind that takes them as its appearing object
through the appearance of their own uncommon characteristics [in direct perception]. Due to this, they are not
objects of terms since their entities cannot fully appear to
a terminologically arisen [conceptual] consciousness.
Also, a mind realizing them is not generated through the
mere existence of terminology, mental application, and
so forth that are other than them.
Thus, to say that the uncommon Madhyamika view is that
words cannot generate perception of an object as direct sense
perception can is to say that there is no difference in view
between Sautrantika and Madhyamika. It is not the latter but the
former who explicitly point out that the appearing object of a
thought or conceptual consciousness is a meaning-generality
(arthasamanya, don spyi) which is necessarily simple, being
merely an appearance as the opposite of everything that is not
that particular object.
Rather than trying to prove that reasoning and words are
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Meditation on Emptiness
inadequate, the Prasangika-Madhyamikas base themselves on
the adequacy of these to show that the appearance of objects as if
concretely or solidly existent is false. Far from deciding that
reasoning is mistaken because it does not agree with appearance,
reasoning is used to show that the appearance of objects is false—
that their nature is other than what appears, that the sense consciousnesses of sentient beings are mistaken with respect to their
appearing objects, that, as Kensur Lekden so often said, there is
a conflict between what appears and what is. The point at issue is
not whether words can generate an experience like that of direct
perception. That they cannot is accepted and held in common
with lower systems of tenets. Investigation into emptiness means
examining whether phenomena actually have the concrete existence that even in non-conceptual direct sense perception they
appear to have. It is from this point of view that Gon-chok-jikmay-wang-bo says,487 'All sense consciousnesses in the mental
continuum of a sentient being [a non-Buddha] are necessarily
mistaken.'
The process of reasoning itself, used by a competent yogi, is
viewed as the means of gaining access to emptiness—a slightly hidden phenomenon that is not accessible to initial understanding
through direct perception.488 Far from being counter-productive
to realizing emptiness, reasonings such as dependent-arising, the
lack of being one or many, and so forth reveal emptiness in an
incontrovertible cognition of the nature of phenomena, albeit
through the medium of an image. Inferential cognition is thus
not a mulling over of concepts but a conclusion reached through
perceiving a sign in a subject, realizing its concomitance with a
predicate, and then realizing that the subject has that predicate.
The conceptual or imagistic element ofthis realization is removed
through repeated cultivation, resulting in direct cognition. Thus,
conceptual and direct realization are in a harmonious relationship of cause and effect.489 To discard reason would be to forsake
the sole access to this which is hidden to the direct perception of
an ordinary being.
Hence, meditation on emptiness is not the same' as withdrawing from conceptually. Jam-yang-shay-ba makes this point
Meditative Reasoning
553
clearly and at length in his Great Exposition of the Concentrations
and Formless Absorptions :490
Someone says: 'Since the mode of subsistence,
emptiness, is not anything, the mind of its meditation
should not apply itself to anything. [Such nonapplication] is how to meditate on emptiness—selflessness—and its achievement is the measure of having
achieved special insight realizing selflessness.'
Answer: Then it would [absurdly] follow that the son
of a barren woman and his mind would be meditating on
emptiness—selflessness—because both do not apply the
mind to anything. The three circles [ofself-contradiction]!
[You have accepted the reason, the predicate's following
from the reason, and the opposite of the consequence.]
The reason is so because [both the son of a barren
woman and his mind] do not exist.
Someone [refining the above position] says: 'Within
the scope of minds and persons, any conception such as,
"It is this or that," is a case of conceiving true existence.
Therefore, not conceiving such and not applying the
mind to anything [constitute meditation on emptiness].'
Answer: It [absurdly] follows that, within the scope of
minds, if one remains without conceiving, 'It is this or
that,' one is meditating on emptiness because [for you]
that is the meaning of meditation on emptiness. If you
accept this, then it [absurdly] follows that the five sense
consciousnesses of an ordinary fool individually realize
emptiness and meditate on it because they remain without conceiving, 'It is this or that.' You have accepted the
entailment. The reason is so because [those five] are
sense consciousnesses. You cannot accept [that the sense
consciousnesses of such a person realize emptiness and
meditate on it] because these are of an ordinary being.
[The reason] entails such because it is explained that the
sense consciousnesses of a sentient being [that is, anyone
but a Buddha] are not valid with respect to suchness. For,
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Meditation on Emptiness
Chandraldrti's Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on
the Middle Way' says, 'It is not feasible that the dumb be
valid,' and the King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra
says, 'Eye, ear, and nose are not valid'.
Even if [this position] is put in the framework of the
mental consciousness, then it [absurdly] follows that
every case of thick sleep would be a meditation on emptiness because even the stupid know that at that time the
mind cannot be applied to anything. If you accept that
such is meditation on emptiness, then it [absurdly] follows
that even though one meditates on emptiness, it is not
possible to be liberated because even though there has
been limitless meditation on such emptiness since beginningless time, there are still a limitless number of animals
and so forth who are not liberated. You accept the reason.
If you accept [the consequence], then it [absurdly] follows
that there does not at all exist a path that liberates from cyclic existence because through meditation on emptiness
one cannot be liberated. You accept the reason. The three
circles [of self-contradiction]!
Someone says: 'At that time [during thick sleep] one
does indeed experience emptiness and the Truth Body,
but since it is not with mindfulness, one is not liberated'.
Answer: Then, it follows from your assertion that
there is something to be mindful about with respect to
emptiness. If you accept this, then it follows that it is not
correct that emptiness is not an object of any mind
because it is an object of mindfulness. You have accepted
the reason. The three circles [of self-contradiction]!
Furthermore, [one can through using this reasoning]
examine fainting and so forth as well as the existence and
non-existence of meditator and means of meditation and
so forth and refute [wrong positions]. Such [positions]
are opposed and extensively refuted in the Kalachakra
Tantra. For an extensive [rendition] see Dzong-ka-ba's
Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path.
Also, it follows that the views of your system and of
Meditative Reasoning
[the Chinese Abbot] Ho-shang (Hva-shang) are similar
because he asserted that not applying the mind to anything is meditation on emptiness and you also assert the
same.
To this someone says: It follows that the views of HoShang's and our systems are not the same because Hoshang refuted giving and so forth whereas we do not.
Answer: Then it follows that with respect to the view
you two do not differ because you speak of a difference of
deeds and implicitly accept that there is no difference in
view.
Someone who follows such [a system] says: To refute
the conception of self through analysis is to adjust
conceptual elaborations like a dog chasing after a stone
[that has been thrown at it. However] from the start to
hold the mind without scattering to anything is like a
dog's seizing the hand that threw the stone, and thus
this alone is profound. When the view is settled
through scripture and reasoning, one is sunk in verbal
conventions.
Answer: It follows that this is not correct because without analyzing and refuting the referent object of the
conception of self [that is, inherent existence] it cannot
be abandoned. For, this is the thought of the Conqueror
[Buddha] and the supreme ornaments of the world.
Sutra says:
'How is it that a Bodhisattva conquers over strife?'
'Manjushn, [by] analyzing and abiding in the
unapprehendable nature of phenomena.'
The King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra says:
If the selflessness of phenomena is analyzed
And if this analysis is cultivated,
It causes the effect of attaining nirvana.
Through no other cause does one come to peace.
Aryadeva's Four Hundred says:
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Meditation on Emptiness
When selflessness is seen in objects,
The seeds of cyclic existence are destroyed.
Chandrakfrti's Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on
the Middle Way' says:
The wise say that the reversal of conceptions
Is the fruit of analysis.
Dharmakfrti says:
Without disbelieving the object of this
[misconception]
It is impossible to abandon [misconceiving it].
Furthermore, [one can through using this reasoning]
examine whether the mind meditating [on emptiness] is
[necessarily] conceptual or free from conceptually and
refute [wrong positions that it is necessarily one or the
other as it can be either].
Also, someone says: When one has not yet found the
view of selflessness, mere setting [of the mind] without
thinking of anything is not meditation on emptiness, but
once the view has been found, all such setting without
thought is meditation on emptiness.
Answer: It [absurdly] follows that once the view has
been found, even [thick] sleep would be meditation on
emptiness because all settings [of the mind] without
thought once the view has been found are meditation on
emptiness. You accept the reason. If you accept the consequence, then it [absurdly] follows that such sleep is
cultivation of the wisdom realizing emptiness because it
is cultivation of the view realizing emptiness. You accept
the reason. [The reason] entails such because the view is
necessarily of the substantial entity (dravya, rdzas) of
wisdom. The reason is easy to establish. If you accept
the consequence, then it [absurdly] follows that such
sleep is cultivation of the discrimination of phenomena
which is an investigation of emptiness.
Meditative Reasoning
Someone says: Although all setting [of the mind] in
non-conceptuality once the view has been found is not
meditation on emptiness, prior to each [session of] sustaining non-conceptuality one should analyze with the
wisdom of individual investigation and then, after that,
all setting in non-conceptuality is meditation on emptiness.
Answer: It [absurdly] follows that once the view has
been found and analysis is done for each [session], falling
into [thick] sleep is meditation on emptiness because it is
a setting in non-conceptuality by one who has found the
view and performed a stint of analysis. You have accepted that such follows. The reason is established because
the subject is what it is. You cannot accept the consequence.
Someone says: When meditating on emptiness, ascertainment of it is induced [by reasoning]. Then within
non-degeneration of the mode of apprehension of emptiness, setting [the mind] in non-conceptuality is the mode
of sustaining the full form of the view or special insight
into emptiness.
Answer: Then it [absurdly] follows that such meditation is the mode of cultivating wisdom and special
insight realizing emptiness because [according to you] it
is the mode of cultivating the view and special insight
realizing emptiness. You have accepted the reason. You
cannot accept the consequence because that is the mode
of cultivating the calm abiding and meditative stabilization realizing emptiness. For, that is stabilizing meditation realizing emptiness. That the reason is so follows
because stabilizing meditation realizing emptiness is the
cultivation of meditative stabilization and calm abiding
realizing emptiness, whereas analytical meditation
realizing emptiness is the cultivation of wisdom and
special insight realizing emptiness. This is so because
individual modes of cultivating calm abiding and special
insight realizing emptiness exist and because in general
557
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Meditation on Emptiness
analytical meditation is cultivation of special insight and
stabilizing meditation is cultivation of calm abiding. [See
Part One, chapters eight and nine for a discussion of
calm abiding and special insight.]
Meditation on emptiness is not a matter of withdrawing from
conceptuality but of creating through reasoned analysis a mind
that is capable of acting as an antidote or counter-agent to the
conception of inherent existence. In dependence on this investigation the view is found, whereupon it is possible to use emptiness as the object in the process of developing calm abiding.
Once that is achieved, stabilizing and analytical meditation are
alternated until analysis itself induces greater stabilization and
special insight is attained. This special insight—with analysis
and stabilization in union—is cultivated through continued
reliance on reasoning to the point where it becomes direct perception, when emptiness is no longer known through the
medium of a meaning-generality but nakedly in non-dual cognition. _
Asjang-gya says:491
In particular, the many forms of reasoning for ascertaining suchness that were set forth [by the Mahayanists] are
only for the sake of clarifying the path of liberation for
the fortunate, not for the sake of becoming intent on
debate. Buddhapalita says, 'What is the purpose in
teaching dependent-arising? The master [Nagarjuna]
whose very nature is compassion saw that sentient
beings are beset by various sufferings and assumed the
task of teaching the reality of things just as it is so that
they might be liberated. Therefore, he began teaching
dependent-arising.' Also, Chandrakfrti's Supplement to
(Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' says, 'The
analyses in the Treatise were not done for the sake of
attachment to debate; suchness was taught for the sake of
liberation.' Also, Dzong-ka-ba says, 'All the reasoned
analyses set forth in the Treatise on the Middle Way are
only so that sentient beings might attain liberation.'
Meditative Reasoning
559
Thus, the main purpose of the twenty-seven chapters of Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way with its many forms of reasoning is taken to be the refutation not of other systems but of one's
own innate conception of inherent existence. Though beings do
not innately conceive that products, for instance, are produced
from themselves, others, both, or neither, refutation of these
four refutes the innate conception of the inherent existence of
products because if products did exist in accordance with their
concrete mode of appearance, they would have to exist in one of
these four ways. Also, since other systems variously hold these
views, they are refuted secondarily in the process of developing a
meditative consciousness that understands the impossibility of
such concrete or inherent existence and becomes accustomed to
that emptiness. The primary aim is to become a source of help
and happiness through penetrating the empty nature of phenomena that serves as the foundation of transformation into Buddhahood.
Part Six
Translation
Emptiness in the
Prasangika System
From the twelfth chapter
of Jam-yang-shay-ba's
Explanation of 'Tenets',
Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra
Brilliantly Illuminating
All of Our Own and Others' Tenets
And the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness],
Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning
Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings
Introduction
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets, published in
1699, is one of only several books of its kind, two of the others
being Jang-gya's Presentation of Tenets (Grub mtha'i rnam
bzhag), which is based on Jam-yang-shay-ba's text, and Daktsang's Understanding All Tenets (Grub mtha' kun shes) which
Jam-yang-shay-ba takes as his main object of refutation. There are
many other short books which present the basic tenets of the
various non-Buddhist and Buddhist systems; however, there is
none of the length and breadth of the Great Exposition of Tenets.
Replete with quotations from Indian sources, it presents the
tenets of the philosophical culture of India in three hundred and
ten folios (Dalama edition). A translation into English in the
manner of the section done here, with all quotes restored to full
length, would take 2500 pages.
According to Kensur Lekden, a master of the Great Exposition
of Tenets would have the many sources for the work around his
room and refer to them as quoted. Daily the students in Gomang (sGo-mang, meaning 'many doors' because Buddha's
teaching has many doors or approaches and because those who
have realized emptiness can walk through walls), the college of
Dre-bung ('.Bras-spung) monastery that uses Jam-yang-shay-ba's
564
Meditation on Emptiness
textbooks, would have to present back to the teacher from memory
the teacher's previous commentary on the Great Exposition of
Tenets. The students would take sides and debate the many
points, becoming clever at upholding and demolishing various
positions and developing their intelligence and memory. The
basic text would be memorized; the master would teach the
whole work twice, and at the conclusion the students would have
a map of the whole field of Buddhist philosophical literature.
They would then be able to differentiate the systems and avoid
confusing the works of authors of conflicting systems. They
would be ready for the specialized texts on the path structure,
Prasangika-Madhyamika, logic and epistemology, phenomenology, and discipline.
Jam-yang-shay-ba also wrote a textbook just on PrasangikaMadhyamika, a commentary to Chandrakfrti's Supplement,
which is in some ways far more extensive than his chapter on Prasangika in the Great Exposition of Tenets, such as in the discussion
of autonomous syllogisms. Still, in other respects, the Great Exposition of Tenets is more extensive than the former, as in presenting
the Prasangika theory of interpretation and formation of the Sanskrit of 'dependent-arising', pratttyasamutpada. Thus, each is
studied for a fuller appreciation of the other. These two form the
basis of the knowledge of Madhyamika in the Go-mang College of
Dre-bung which, within the sphere of the dominant Ge-luk order,
was also influential—along with other colleges—in the Am-do
province of Tibet as well as in Inner Mongolia, Outer Mongolia,
the Buryat area of Siberia, and the Kalmuk areas of Russia.
Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets has thirteen
chapters:
1 Discussion of tenets in general
2 Refutation of the extreme of nihilism: Charvaka
3 Refutation of an extreme of permanence: Samkhya and
Kapila
4 Refutation of an extreme of permanence: Brahmana, Vyakarana, Vedanta, and Guhyaka
5 Refutation of an extreme of permanence: Vaishnava and
Mfmamsaka
Introduction
565
6 Refutation of an extreme of permanence: Shaiva, Naiyayika,
and Vaisheshika
7 Refutation of an extreme of permanence: Nirgrantha (Jaina)
8 Introduction to Buddhist tenets in general and presentation
of Vaibhashika
9 Sautrantika
10 Introduction to the Mahayana and presentation of Chittamatra
11 Introduction to Madhyamika, its history, refutation of
wrong views about Madhyamika, and presentation of Svatantrika
12 Prasangika
13 Elimination of doubts about the Vajrayana.
Jam-yang-shay-ba's root text, written in verse mainly with nine
syllables per line, consists of sixteen folios; his commentary is
three hundred and ten folios (Dalama edition). The basic text is
called (see bibliography for Tibetan titles): Presentation of
Tenets, Roar of the Five-Faced [Lion] Eradicating Error, Precious
Lamp Illuminating the Good Path to Omniscience. His commentary is called: Explanation of 'Tenets', Sun of the Land of
Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and
Others' Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound [Emptiness],
Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All
Beings.
The word 'tenets' in the title of the commentary refers to the
root text; his commentary on it is like the light of the land of
Samantabhadra, which is not lit by a sun that rises and sets but
shines continuously through the power of meditative stabilization. This book of tenets fulfils the hopes of all beings seeking
the ability to gain the wanted and avoid the unwanted since it
explains what the wanted and unwanted are and how to achieve
and avoid them. Through delineating the profound meaning of
emptiness, it shows the path to liberation from cyclic existence
and the eventual attainment of omniscience.
The great Outer Mongolian scholar, Nga-wang-bel-den
(Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan, born 1779), known more commonly as
Bel-den-cho-jay (dPal-ldan-chos-rje), wrote an extensive
566
Meditation on Emptiness
commentary of annotations (four hundred and sixteen folios,
Sarnath edition) on Jam-yang-shay-ba's autocommentary (three
hundred and ten folios, Dalama edition). It is called: Annotations
for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Tenets', Freeing the
Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Thought. Ngawang-bel-den's annotations do indeed untie the knots of many
difficult points in Jam-yang-shay-ba's text especially by elaborating the meaning of quotations, and thus it has been used extensively in the translation for both interpretation and addition of
bracketed material.
Jam-yang-shay-ba is famous for his lengthy works replete with
citations of Indian sources. Whereas his followers often point to
his frequent citation of sources as a great advantage, the followers of the textbook literature by Pan-chen So-nam-drak-ba
(1478-1554), used in the Lo-sel-ling College of Dre-bung and the
Shar-dzay College of Gan-den, conversely point to their writer's
ability to condense important topics into easily readable prose,
highly accessible to beginners. In the middle is Jay-dzun Chogyi-gyel-tsen (1469-1546), whose textbooks, used by the Se-ra
Jay and Gan-den Jang-dzay Colleges, tend to fall between those
two in terms of length.
Here in the Great Exposition of renew Jam-yang-shay-ba's devotion to the source literature is particularly helpful as it makes his
presentation of Prasangika an anthology of the basic literature
in both sutra and the commentarial treatises.In order to reduce the
bulk of the text, Jam-yang-shay-ba condensed many quotations.
However, since, as Kensur Lekden reported, a master ofthe Great
Exposition of Tenets would have the cited texts available and make
use of them during instruction, this translator has sought out those
texts and filled in the ellipses, with the result that thirty percent of
the translation is comprised of these reconstructions. The full,
edited Tibetan text, with the reconstructions clearly marked, is
given at the end of this book; the page numbers in brackets
throughout the translation refer to it.
About the author
According to Lokesh Chandra's account given in his Materials
Introduction
567
for a History of Tibetan Literature,492 Jam-yang-shay-ba Ngawang-dzon-drii was born in the Am-do province of Tibet in 1648.
Having studied the alphabet at age seven with his uncle, who was a
monk, he mastered reading and writing and six years later became
a novice monk. He went to Hla-sa at age twenty-one to pursue his
studies at the Go-mang College of Dre-bung Monastic University; six years later he received full ordination and at age twentynine entered the Tantric College of Lower Hla-sa. He spent two
years in meditative retreat in a cave near Dre-bung from age thirtythree. (Perhaps it was at this time that Manjushri, also called
Manjughosha, appeared to him and smiled, due to which, according to Kensur Lekden, he came to be called 'One On Whom Manjughosha Smiled', Jam-yang-shay-ba.)
At age fifty-three he became abbot of Go-mang and at sixtytwo returned to Am-do province where he founded a monastery
at Dra-shi-kyil (bKra-shis-'khyil), this being 1710. Seven years
later he founded a tantric college at the same place. He wrote
prolifically on the full range of topics of a typical Tibetan polymath and, having received honors from the central Tibetan government and the Chinese Emperor, died at the age of seventythree or four in 1721/2.
Partly because of the close connection between Go-mang College and the Mongolian peoples stretching from the Caspian Sea
through Siberia, who were predominantly Ge-luk-ba by this
time, Jam-yang-shay-ba's influence on the Ge-luk-ba order has
been considerable. Like the other textbook authors, he was seeking to explicate the thought of the founder of the Ge-luk-ba
order, Dzong-ka-ba (1357-1419), and perhaps it was because he
was the last of the great textbook authors and thus had the
others' works before him and could speak from a fully developed
tradition of such study that he could put such great emphasis on
the Indian sources of Dzong-ka-ba's thought.
About the editions of the text used
Five editions of Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets
were gathered over several years. Four of them turned out to
have the same basis:
568
Meditation on Emptiness
1 the Dalama edition published in Musoorie in 1962
2 photographs (of the part translated here) of the text in the
possession of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. The photography was kindly done by Sherpa Tulku and Khamlung Tulku.
Unfortunately, the final pages were not included, and thus
publishing data is not available. The margin of every page
reads 'grub 'greV, as do the other three in this class.
3 a hand-written copy (of the part translated here) of the edition
held in the library of Go-mang College in Mundgod, Karnataka State. This was graciously provided through the efforts
of Kensur Lekden, by way of the then abbot of Go-mang
Den-ba-den-dzin. Again, the pages with publication data
were not copied.
4 a hand-written copy (of the twelfth and thirteenth chapters) of
an edition, surreptitiously procured—from a library in a
country that shall remain unnamed—by Mr. Gyatso Tsering,
Director of the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives in
Dharmsala. The colophon states that it was commissioned by
'gam bear mkhan po chos 'byor rgya mtsho'.
The first, third, and fourth contain variations due to scribes' and
print-setters' inaccuracies, but they share basic inaccuracies with
the second; thus we can posit that they stem from a common edition. These basic inaccuracies do not appear in the other edition
obtained:
5 a photographic reprint of the Dra-shi-kyil edition published in
1972 in New Delhi by Ngawang Gelek Demo in Volume 14 of
the Collected Works of'Jam-dbyans-bzad-pa'i-rdo-rje.
The last is by far the best edition due to not having some major
errors, which all the other four have, and due to using the virama
extensively in the section on forming the Sanskrit termpratityasamutpada under renderings of Sanskrit groups of letters in
Tibetan. (A copy of this edition has recently been made by Gomang College; it contains no publication information above and
beyond what is in the Dra-shi-kyil edition.)
According to Kensur Lekden, Jam-yang-shay-ba's works
Introduction
569
have suffered from poor printing from the start due to the fact
that the author wrote quickly in his old age, with little attention
to the details of publication. The annotator, Nga-wang-bel-den,
frequently points out printing errors, which appear in the edition represented by one through four in the list above. It can be
deduced from his commentary (dbu 67b.8 note ca, for instance)
that he did not have the Dra-shi-kyil edition at his disposal since
he challenges readings that are clearly not in the Dra-shi-kyil
edition but are in the other.
Both editions are replete with error; nevertheless, due to Jamyang-shay-ba's proclivity for quotation, it was possible to compare a great portion of the text with the Peking edition as found in
the Tibetan Tripitaka published under the auspices of the Tibetan
Tripitaka Foundation (Tokyo-Kyoto, 1956). Thus, in counsel
with the Go-mang scholars mentioned below, it was possible to
edit the text; a list of a hundred and ninety-one emendations of the
Go-mang hand-copy is given after the reconstructed text.
Jam-yang-shay-ba's sources
The portion of the Great Exposition of Tenets translated here has
two hundred and nine quotations, counting a few quotes within
quotes. The sources in order of frequency of quotation are:
1 Chandrakirti's Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the
Middle Way' (Madhyamakavatara) and his own commentary, thirty-eight quotations
2 Chandrakirti's Clear Words, a Commentary on (Nagarjuna's)
'Treatise on the Middle Way' (Madhyamakavrtti-prasannapada), twenty-eight quotations
3 Chandragomin's [Sanskrit] Grammar (Chandravyakarana),
eleven quotations
4 Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way (Madhyamakashastra), eight quotations
5 Nagarjuna's Compendium of Sutra (Sutrasamuchchaya),
seven quotations
5 Nagarjuna's Precious Garland of Advice for the King (Ratnavali), seven quotations
570
Meditation on Emptiness
5 Buddhapalita's Commentary on (Nagarjuna 'sj 'Treatise on the
Middle
Way' (Buddhapalitamulamadhyamakavrtti),
seven
quotations
6 Perfection of Wisdom Sutra (Prajnaparamita, in twenty-five
thousand or eighteen thousand stanzas), five quotations
6 Descent into Lanka Sutra (Lahkavatara), five quotations
6 Aryadeva's Four Hundred (Chatuhshataka), five quotations
6 Chandrakfrti's Commentary on (Aryadeva's) 'Four Hundred'
(Chatuhshatakatika), five quotations
6 Jnanagarbha's Discrimination of the Two Truths (Satyadvayavibhahga), five quotations
7 Shantideva's Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (Bodhisattvacharyavatara), four quotations
7 Dzong-ka-ba's Essence of the Good Explanations (Legs bshad
snying po), four quotations
7 Dzong-ka-ba's Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the
Middle Way' (rTsa shes tik chen), four quotations
7 Kalapa's Aphorisms (Kalapasiitra), four quotations
8 Sutra Unravelling the Thought (Samdhinirmochana), three
quotations
8 Sutra on the Ten Grounds (Dashabhiimika), three quotations
8 Rice Seedling Sutra (Shalistamba), three quotations
8 Nagarjuna's Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning (Yuktishashtika),
three quotations
8 Bhavaviveka's Lamp for (Nagarjuna's) 'Wisdom' (Prajnapradipa), three quotations
9 Ashvaghosha's Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment
(Paramarthabodhichittabhavanakramavarnasamgraha),
two quotations
9
Teaching of Akshayamati Sutra (Akshayamatinirdesha), two
quotations
9 King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra (Samadhiraja), two
quotations
9 Nagarjuna's Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness (Shunyatasaptati)
and his own commentary, two quotations
9 Mahamati's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Friendly Letter'
(SuhrllekhatTka), two quotations
Introduction
9
9
9
9
9
9
10
571
Kamalashfla's Illumination of the Middle Way (Madhyamakaloka), two quotations
Bhavaviveka's Blaze of Reasoning (Tarkajvala), two quotations
Fifth Dalai Lama's Sacred Word of Manjushri, two quotations
AtTsha's Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment (Bodhipathapradipa), two quotations
Dzong-ka-ba's Praise of Dependent-Arising, two quotations
Kay-drup's Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate, two quotations
one quotation each:
Nagarjuna's Refutation of Objections (Vigrahavyavartani)
Nagarjuna's Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment (Bodhichittavivarana)
Nagarjuna's Friendly Letter (Suhrllekha)
Chandrakirti's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Sixty Stanzas
of Reasoning' (Yuktisastikavrtti)
Avalokitavrata's Commentary on (Bhavaviveka's) 'Lamp for
(Nagarjuna 's) "Wisdom "' (Prajnapradipavrtti)
Dharmakirti's Commentary on (Dignaga's) 'Compendium of
Valid Cognition'(Pramanavarttika)
Dzong-ka-ba's Explanation of (Chandrakirti's) 'Supplement'
Extensive Sport Sutra (Lalitavistara)
Heart of Wisdom Sutrc (Prajnahrdaya)
White Lotus of the Excellent Doctrine Sutra (Saddharmapundarika)
Chapter of the True One Sutra (Satyakaparivarta)
Questions of King Dharanishvara Sutra (Dharanishvararajapariprccha)
Irreversible Wheel Sutra (Avaivartachakra)
Lion's Roar ofShrimaladevi Sutra (Shrimaladevisimhanada)
Sutra on the Heavily Adorned (Ghanavyuha)
Questions of the King of Nagas, Sagara, Sutra (Sagaranagarajapariprchchha)
Kashyapa Chapter Sutra (Kasyapaparivarta)
Meeting of Father and Son Sutra (Pitdputrasamagamana)
572
Meditation on Emptiness
Compendium of Doctrine Sutra (Dharmasamgiti)
Six unidentified sutra quotations.
T h e authors in order of frequency of quotation are:
1
2
3
4
4
5
6
6
6
7
8
9
Chandrakfrti, seventy-three quotations
Buddha (sutra), forty quotations
Nagarjuna, thirty quotations
Dzong-ka-ba, eleven quotations
Chandragomin, eleven quotations
Buddhapalita, seven quotations
Aryadeva, five quotations
Bhavaviveka, five quotations
Jnanagarbha, five quotations
Kalapa, four quotations
Ashvaghosha, Mahamati, Kamalashila, Atfsha, Kay-drup,
and the Fifth Dalai Lama, two quotations each
Avalokitavrata and Dharmakfrti, one quotation each.
T h e above tally is just for the parts of Jam-yang-shay-ba's chapter on Prasangika translated here on the definition, synonyms,
divisions, literature, and emptiness of the Prasangika system. It
is obvious from the two lists that at least for Jam-yang-shay-ba
Chandrakfrti is by far the principal source for the Prasangika
position on emptiness and its relation to the other schools. (The
last part of Jam-yang-shay-ba's presentation of the Prasangika
system deals with the attributes of a Buddha and relies heavily
on Maitreya's Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle [Uttaratantraj. Thus, the tally should be taken as applying not to Jamyang-shay-ba's entire presentation of the Prasangika system but
mainly to his presentation of emptiness.)
When Madhyamika is studied in the Ge-luk-ba monastic colleges, it is Chandrakfrti's Supplement that is memorized and that
serves as the basis for the entire study of Madhyamika. Dzongka-ba's commentary and the individual monastic textbooks are
used as aids for illuminating the meaning of Chandrakfrti's text.
These books by Chandrakfrti which are so often quoted are all
explanations, directly or indirectly, of Nagarjuna's philosophy.
Even the sutras quoted by Jam-yang-shay-ba are mostly those
Introduction
573
which Nagarjuna quoted in his Compendium of Sutra or made
reference to in his Treatise or Chandrakirti quoted in his books.
It is, of course, not surprising, since Nagarjuna was the founder
of Madhyamika, to find that almost all of the philosophical quotes
for Madhyamika derive from him either directly or through his
chief commentator, Chandrakirti. What is noteworthy is that
Chandrakfrti's works of clarification are heavily relied upon to
determine Nagarjuna's meaning.
As Jam-yang-shay-ba says at the end of his section on Prasangika literature, the main source for the content of his presentation
is Dzong-ka-ba. It seems that almost all of Jam-yang-shay-ba's
quotes from Indian philosophical commentaries—Nagarjuna
through Atfsha—are cited by Dzong-ka-ba; Jam-yang-shay-ba is
not giving a new presentation but arranging Dzong-ka-ba's presentation in a more convenient form for comparative study.
That most of the forty sutra quotations are also to be found in
Dzong-ka-ba is not coincidence; Jam-yang-shay-ba was seeking
to clarify Dzong-ka-ba's teaching especially in contradistinction
to Dak-tsang (born 1405), a scholar of the Sa-gya (Sa-skya) order
who indicted Dzong-ka-ba for self-contradiction. Jam-yangshay-ba defended the founder of his order and indicted Daktsang for self-contradiction in return. Jam-yang-shay-ba's genius
and importance lies not in innovation in Madhyamika philosophy but in his defense of Dzong-ka-ba's interpretation and in his
thorough presentation of the non-Buddhist and Buddhist philosophical systems. Jam-yang-shay-ba's work came almost three
hundred years after both Dzong-ka-ba and Dak-tsang and at a
time when Ge-luk-ba influence was on the rise under the leadership of the Fifth Dalai Lama; thus, he by no means saved Dzongka-ba's teaching. It is more that his particular style of vast and
thorough presentation, coupled with what at times is partisan
fire, was suitable for developing the kind of sharp intellect that
the monastic colleges of Tibet value.
Nagarjuna was clarifying the thought of Buddha; Chandrakirti was clarifying the thought of Nagarjuna; Dzong-ka-ba was
clarifying the thought of Chandrakirti; and Jam-yang-shay-ba
was clarifying the thought of Dzong-ka-ba. A measure of how
important each clarification was is how often the clarifier is
574
Meditation on Emptiness
subsequently quoted as opposed to how often what is clarified is
cited; still, though Chandrakfrti is quoted most frequently and
though his works finally drew more study and attention in Tibet
than Nagarjuna's, Chandrakfrti is definitely secondary to Nagarjuna. Nagarjuna was the master and Chandrakfrti the commentator; Chandrakfrti did not write a book like the Treatise on the
Middle Way which set a whole new trend in Buddhist philosophy and practice. A study of Chandrakfrti is viewed as a study
of Nagarjuna.
Though it could also be said that a study of Nagarjuna is a
study of Buddha, the sutras are far too vast and varied to lend the
sense that a study of Nagarjuna is a study of Buddha in general.
Nagarjuna's Treatise is an epitome of the Perfection of Wisdom
Sutras, and without the Treatise, as Chandrakfrti says (commenting on VI.3 of his Supplement), it would be extremely
difficult to understand what these sutras mean. The difference
between Nagarjuna's and Chandrakfrti's clarifications is that
Nagarjuna's is far more basic. It sets an order where order
seemed not to exist. Chandrakfrti shed additional light on the
order revealed by Nagarjuna.
According to all the various Ge-luk-ba interpretations, Chandrakfrti showed that phenomena do not exist by way of their
own character even conventionally whereas Bhavaviveka at least
implies that phenomena conventionally exist by way of their
own character. This means that for Chandrakfrti even conventionally phenomena are not the composite of their parts or their
bases of imputation. In relation to the other commentaries this
was his 'innovation'.
Dzong-ka-ba's 'innovation' was to present the conventional
valid existence of all phenomena, detailing the acceptability of
the certification of the conventional existence of all phenomena
by valid cognizers. Dzong-ka-ba showed that Madhyamikas do
have a system of their own and that it is supported by valid cognition despite the utter unfindability of phenomena among their
bases of imputation. Dzong-ka-ba thus distinguished his teaching
from most of the other Tibetan commentators, preserving in a
very subtle way the validity of the classic Buddhist phenomenology through delimiting the scope of the Madhyamika reasoning.
Introduction
575
According to Dzong-ka-ba, Nagarjuna's analysis refutes the
inherent existence of conventionally existent phenomena; it does
not refute their conventional existence which is validly established. Emptiness and dependent-arising are compatible within
valid establishment.
Jam-yang-shay-ba had no such central 'innovation' for
Prasangika philosophy. His commentary on Chandrakirti's
Supplement provides a work in a different genre: scholastic
debates which provide final conclusions about Prasangika. Despite Jam-yang-shay-ba's many differences with the other Ge-lukba monastic textbook lineages, no difference was nearly as
important as Dzong-ka-ba's astoundingly different and cogent
definition of emptiness, delimiting the scope of what is negated
in the theory of selflessness to inherent existence and preserving
valid, conventional, effective existence.
Thus, Jam-yang-shay-ba's 'innovation' was to give a presentation of Buddhist and non-Buddhist systems of tenets in far greater
detail than any previous Tibetan scholar had given. He thereby
furthered in Tibet and Mongolia the study of comparative philosophy. His principal sources are Bhavaviveka's presentation of the
Indian systems in his Heart of the Middle Way (Madhyamakahrdaya) and commentary, the Blaze of Reasoning, Shantarakshita's
Compendium on Reality (Tattvasamgraha)—though of course
Bhavaviveka and Shantarakshita, being Svatantrikas, are not his
source for the Prasangika system—and Chandrakirti's commentaries.
In the Great Exposition of Tenets, the Buddhist systems are
presented in ascending order of importance, but the presentations are remarkably unbiased. The cause for this is probably the
Tibetan insistence on debate as a teaching method. Since the aim
of each debate is to defend one's position, whatever position one
is assigned is defended at all costs in the sense that unfair presumptions by any opponent are unhesitatingly refuted. Each
monastic college has its favored and peculiar assertions which
are indeed often defended with partisan vigor; however, this
very partisan vigor is also invested in their opponents' positions
within the debating courtyards of each college when their own
members take the opposite viewpoint.
576
Meditation on Emptiness
The philosophical disagreements are many, and it is therefore
quite often impossible to speak of a Tibetan position on a subject. Often it is impossible to speak of a particular sect position
because of differences within the sect. Sometimes, also, it is
impossible to speak of a monastery position because of differences between the colleges which are the basic divisions of the
monastery. There are even different lineages of assertions within
monastic colleges; according to Geshe Gediin Lodro, Go-mang,
for instance, had four. However, the principal units are the
monastic colleges, with far more happening between the various
monastic colleges of the Ge-luk-ba order than between Ge-luk-ba
and non-Ge-luk-ba.
Not to discriminate differences in tenet as a pretension of nonbias is considered to be a sign of great ignorance and of dislike of
religion, and indeed the devotion to debate cultivates both an
excellent memory and a quick sense of discrimination, necessary
for penetrating reality. Bias and partisanship are rejected, but
discrimination is hallowed, though, of course, this is not easily
accomplished. Jam-yang-shay-ba openly attacks the Sa-gya-ba
scholar Dak-tsang, often in an inflammatory way, in his Great
Exposition of Tenets which was written for the dual purpose of
refuting Dak-tsang and of establishing the 'correct' view of
emptiness. Jam-yang-shay-ba cites scripture and reasoning in his
unceasing indictment of Dak-tsang; he not only devotes forty
folios solely to refuting Dak-tsang but also spices many sections
with brief refutations and even name-calling. Dak-tsang is a
'spouter of disconnected discourse through possession by the
madness causing one to mouth ignorance' (GT, ca 19a.5), 'one
who wishes to do a dance having cut off the head of a crazy,
dancing peacock and hung it on his behind' (see p.648), and so
on endlessly.
The nasty comments provide occasional comic relief in this
heavy book, but there is no denying that the insults are inflammatory and counter-productive. It often seems as if Jam-yangshay-ba's head was about to be rent asunder in amazement at
quite common positions. In the debating courtyards scholars
sometimes resort to ridiculous laughter and absurd comparisons
Introduction
577
in order to heap upon the opponent the full devastating force of
embarrassment and thereby cause him to lose footing even if he
has not lost it logically. Still, each scholar must in turn take Daktsang's side in debate and win using his tenets. The aim in the
debating courtyard is not to heap more abuse on Dak-tsang;
rather, it is an enactment of a hypothetical encounter between
Dak-tsang (born 1405) and Jam-yang-shay-ba (1648-1721/2) for
the sake of exploring the principles of interpretive systems.
Most scholars in the Go-mang College of Dre-bung College
have won debates as a hypothetical Dak-tsang against a hypothetical Jam-yang-shay-ba. Indeed, even when teaching, they do not
automatically leap into the stream of abuse but analyze to determine whether Dak-tsang's supposed contradictions are
explicitly so or ones he would be 'forced' to accept from another
viewpoint. The designations of insanity and so forth quickly lose
their shock value due to over-use and the shared knowledge that
it is a game, but the technique also sometimes engages fierce
aspects of the personality and lays at one's intellectual disposal
energy that would otherwise be cut off. There is also, no doubt, a
fascination with the tremendous importance that the utterly
fabricated situation of re-enacting debates from the past assumes
as a participant watches his attempts at waylaying the opponent
and then revels in ridicule when the opponent is trapped or
undergoes the opposite when he himself is trapped. Debate,
above all, is used for group stimulated learning, the members
increasing each other's knowledge through bringing special
knowledge gained from their own research to the courtyard and
then creatively exploring issues. The process of forcing each participant to identify with what are supposedly ridiculous positions causes one to become self-scrutinizing through seeing that
other positions have their own logic, thereby challenging one's
uncritical acquiescence to abusive caricature. The group dynamic (at least at the School of Dialectics in Dharmsala) is such that
the participants keep a check on each other to prevent the type of
over-kill that occasionally leaps into Jam-yang-shay-ba's style.
Kensur Lekden reported that Jam-yang-shay-ba's own devotion to citing sources came from embarrassment in debate when
578
Meditation on Emptiness
attempting to defend a Buddha's more fantastic qualities, such as
the cognition of all phenomena by his hair. The requirement of
accommodation to scripture balances the strong emphasis on
reasoning. In even the most reasonable of books on Buddhist
tenets, the fantastic is by no means obscured.
Collaborators for the translation
As mentioned at the beginning of this work, I studied almost all
of Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Tenets and Nga-wangbel-den's Annotations under the guidance of Kensur Lekden
(1900-71), a Go-mang scholar and former abbot of the Tantric
College of Lower Hla-sa while still in Tibet. Without his help—
his openness, willingness, and skill in introducing and expanding on topics—the task would have been impossible. Also, the
clarification of fine points gained from three months work with
Professor Geshe Gediin Lodro (1924-79) at the University of
Hamburg, a Go-mang scholar who was a student of Kensur Lekden, was essential. They were both excellent scholars with hearts
of compassion ever eager to help.
Emptiness in the Prasangika System
by Jam-yang-shay-ba
Translated in collaboration
with Kensur Lekden
and Geshe Gediin Lodro
The text has been divided
into seven chapters
to facilitate understanding
Contents
1 B A C K G R O U N D 583
Definition and Etymology of Prasangika 584
Synonyms of'Prasangika' 586
Divisions of Prasangika 587
Literature on Which the Prasangikas Rely 588
2 I N T E R P R E T A T I O N OF SCRIPTURE
595
3 T H E OBJECT OF NEGATION 625
The Object of Negation in the View of Selflessness
Measure of What is Negated 625
Correctness of that Measure 632
Reasonings Refuting Inherent Existence 636
Brief Indication 636
4 R E F U T I N G I N H E R E N T L Y EXISTENT
P R O D U C T I O N 639
Diamond Slivers 639
Statement of the Reasons 639
Proofs for the Modes of the Reasons 640
Non-Production from Self 640
Non-Production from Other 643
625
Non-Production from Both Self and Other
Non-Production Without Causes 649
649
5 O T H E R TYPES OF PRODUCTION 651
Simultaneous Refutation of Production of the Four
Extremes and of the Existent, Non-Existent, Both,
and Neither 651
Refutation of Production of the Four Alternatives 653
Actual Exposition 653
Elimination of Error 655
6 DEPENDENT-ARISING 659
Actual Exposition 659
Correct Way of Interpreting Dependent-Arising 662
Formation of PratTtyasamutpada 662
Explanation of the Meaning of Dependent-Arising 664
Refutation of Errors 665
Refutation of Other Commentators 665
Refutation of Bhavaviveka's Interpretation 668
Elimination of Error Concerning Dependent-Arising 676
7 R E F U T I N G A SELF OF PERSONS
Actual Exposition 677
Elimination of Error 696
677
1 Background
Namas Svarasvatyai cha gurumanjughoshaya cha.m Homage to
both Svarasvatf and Guru Manjughosha.
With respect to this Prasangika system the foremost lama, the
great Dzong-ka-ba, says [at the end of his Essence of the Good
Explanations]:494
One respects from the heart all the good explanations
Of those like adornments among the wise of the world.
Still, the eye of intelligence, a garden of jasmine, is
opened fully
By the white rays of good explanations come from the
moon [Chandrakirti],
Overcoming all extreme conceptions through the
reasoning that cyclic existence
And nirvana are inevitable dependent-arisings.
Having seen the path revealed by Buddhapalita,
Who would not take Nagarjuna's good system as chief?
Thus, the Prasangika-Madhyamika system is the very acme of
the best among all systems and schools of tenets. It is the great
path of perfection travelled, being travelled, and to be'travelled
by all the Conquerors of the three times [past, present, and
584
Meditation on Emptiness
future], the incomparable unparalleled mother that gives birth to
the four types49*5 of Superiors, [2] and the sole, excellent path of
passage. Without considering body, enjoyments, and so forth,
all the Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, and Superiors made effort toward
it, sought it, concentrated on it, and meditated on it. It is the
unsurpassed ambrosia delighting others, the profound middle
path clearing away all coarse and subtle extremes and extreme
conceptions, the final thought of Nagarjuna which Buddhapalita established as the Prasangika system. For its chariot a
great way was made by the honorable Chandrakfrti.
The explanation of the Prasangika system has six parts:
1 the definition [of a Prasangika] along with an etymological
explanation
2 synonyms
3 divisions
4 the texts on which they rely
5 scriptural passages of definitive meaning and those requiring
interpretation
6 tenets.
DEFINITION AND ETYMOLOGY OF 'PRASANGIKA'
(See pp.441-530.) The root text says:
Because they do not accept autonomous inferences
But mainly state consequences
That contradict the assertions of their opponents,
They are called Prasahgikas.
Chandrakfrti's Clear Words [3] says,496 'It is not admissible for
one who is a Madhyamika to use an autonomous inference
because another position [among the four extremes] is not
asserted.'
'Existing under its own power' (rang dbang du grub pa),m
'existing inherently' (svabhavasiddha, rang bzhin gyis grub pa),
and 'autonomous' (svatantra, rang rgyud) are synonyms. Thus,
the application of a reason [that is, a syllogism] the three aspects
Background
585
of which exist inherently is an autonomous inference (svatantraanumana, rang rgyud kyi rjes dpag).
If such autonomous inferences are asserted, then [other phenomena such as] production would perforce [be asserted to exist
inherently].498 Thus, when analyzing, there would necessarily be
a position which would be one of the four extremes [and which
could withstand ultimate analysis]. In that case, a thesis which is
a position of one of the four extremes499 would have to be
asserted. However, the assertion of any of the four extremes is
not suitable [for Madhyamikas] because they must uphold the
meaning of the middle way which avoids those extremes. Aryadeva's Four Hundred says:500
Even over a long period of time
Censure cannot be expressed
For one who has no position
Of [inherent] existence, non-existence,
Or existence and non-existence.
Nagarjuna's Refutation of Objections says:501
If I had any [inherently existent] thesis, [4]
Then I would have that fault [of contradicting my own
thesis that there is no inherent existence].
Because I have no [inherently existent] thesis,
I am only faultless.
Therefore, [a Prasangika] does not assert autonomous [inferences or any other autonomous phenomena even] conventionally.
Even so, Prasangikas have a great many means of generating
in opponents the view realizing that phenomena do not truly
exist. For the definition of a Prasangika-Madhyamika is:
a Madhyamika who mainly states refutations of an
opponent's assertion of any of the four extremes through
the expression of a correct contradictory consequence—a
consequence which either implies or does not imply the
opposite meaning, and so forth, as will be explained
below.
586
Meditation on Emptiness
This is also an etymological explanation of'Prasangika-Madhyamika' (Middle Way Consequentialist).
In this Prasangika system, the statements of consequences and
other-approved syllogisms have respectively greater and lesser
usage,502 but they are not entirely mutually exclusive. For, the
usage of an other-approved syllogism is mostly similar to that of
a consequence. An example of an other-approved syllogism is:
There is no sense in the production again of a thing
which [already] exists in its own entity, [5] as in the case
of a manifest pot.
SYNONYMS OF 'PRASANGIKA'
(See pp.432-9.) The root text says:
They are known as Prasahgikas,
Only-Appearance Madhyamikas,
And Non-Abiding Madhyamikas.
They mainly use contradictory consequences to generate in
others the view [that no phenomenon inherently exists]; therefore they are called Prasahgikas (Consequentialists).
Chandrakfrti's Clear Words says,503 'The establishment of
conventional phenomena is asserted by way of mere conditionality (idam pratyayatamatra, rkyen nyid 'dipa tsam), not by way of
asserting [any of] the four positions...' Also, 'When mere conditionally is asserted, both cause and effect are mutually
dependent; hence, their establishment does not inherently
exist... 'Therefore, Prasahgikas are also called Only-Appearance
Madhyamikas. They are Madhyamikas who assert the existence
of just these appearances from the viewpoint of conditionality
when there is no analysis and no investigation [to find an object
designated],
Shura's [Ashvagosha's] Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of
Enlightenment (Paramarthabodhichittabhavana) says:504
[Buddha], proclaimed selflessness with the great roar of
a lion.
Background
587
Through synonyms such as emptiness, [suchness, final
reality,] and so forth,
Limitless examples such as likeness with a magician's
illusions, [dreams, mirages] and so forth [6]
And the skillful means of a variety of vehicles,
[Buddha] made known the meaning of the middle way
not abiding [in any gross or subtle extremes].
Thus, because [Prasangikas] do not abide in even any of the
extremes of permanence or annihilation, they are called NonAbiding Madhyamikas and Thoroughly Non-Abiding Madhyamikas.
DIVISIONS OF PRASANGIKA
(See pp.431-2.) The root text says:
Their divisions are Models,
Partisans, and Non-Partisans.
With respect to the divisions of Prasangika, earlier Tibetans
rightly called the 'father' Nagarjuna and his 'son' Aryadeva the
Madhyamikas of the model texts. This is because all—the two
founders of the chariot-ways of Prasangika and Svatantrika
[Buddhapalita or Chandrakfrti, and Bhavaviveka] etc.—without
difference treated Nagarjuna and Aryadeva as totally reliable
sources.505
The partisan Prasangikas are Buddhapalita, the honorable
Chandrakirti, Shantideva [and so forth]. Those who are nonpartisan but maintain the Prasangika view are Shakyamitra,
Nagabodhi, Rik-bay-ku-juk (Rigs-pa'i-khu-byug) 506 and so on,
Dzong-ka-ba's Essence of the Good Explanations says,507 'Also,
there are many eminent scholars, the masters Shura [Ashvaghosha], Nagabodhi, and so forth; however, [7] there are no translations of their treatises on Madhyamika [here in Tibet].' The
latter part of the second chapter of The Five Stages (Panchakrama) by Shakyamitra508 clearly manifests [the Prasangika view].
Also, upon consideration, Nagabodhi's Classification of the Ends
588
Meditation on Emptiness
of Actions (Karmantavibhahga) and so forth [clearly manifest the
view of a non-partisan Prasangika],
Though Ashvaghosha's view is very clearly that [of a nonpartisan Prasangika], Dak-tsang asserts that Ashvaghosha is a
model [Madhyamika] and then that he explicitly refutes Svatantrika. However, Buddhapalita, Nagabodhi, and so forth are not
seen to have quoted Ashvaghosha as a source [and they would
have if he were a model]. Though the two, Bhavaviveka [and his
chief student Jnanagarbha],509 as well as those coming after them
quoted Ashvaghosha, this does not of itself make Ashvaghosha a
model. Also, [Dak-tsang claims that] Shura's statement [in his
Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment ],510 'Also, illusions are not just illusions', refutes Svatantrika. If [Dak-tsang
were right], then it is clear that Ashvaghosha would be a partisan
Prasangika-Madhyamika [and not, as Dak-tsang claims, a
model].511
Objection: Dzong-ka-ba's Essence of the Good Explanations
says,512 'Also, there are many eminent scholars, the masters
Shura [Ashvaghosha], Nagabodhi, and so forth; [8] however,
there are no translations of their treatises on Madhyamika [here
in Tibet].' Thus, if this Prasangika text [Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment ] is Ashvaghosha's, then does it not
contradict Dzong-ka-ba?
Answer: Ashvaghosha's Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of
Enlightenment is a meditation manual; therefore, even though it
does teach Madhyamika, Dzong-ka-ba's remark was made [with
reference to treatises on the Madhyamika view and not its meditation], as in the case of the separate treatment of Nagarjuna's
Collections of Praises and his Collections of Reasonings.513
L I T E R A T U R E ON W H I C H
T H E PRASAHGIKAS RELY
The root text says:
Their books are the profound sutras,
The Collections of Reasonings, the Four Hundred,
Background
589
Engaging in the Deeds, the Compendium of Sutra,
The Compendium of Learnings, the Lamp for the Path,
and so forth.
T h e sutras quoted by the Superior [Nagarjuna] and his spiritual
son [Aryadeva] as sources for the definitive meaning [emptiness]
are taken as sutras teaching the profound meaning. These are the
following sutras from the turning of the wheel of the doctrine of
signlessness:
1 the seventeen mother and son sutras of the Perfection of
Wisdom class5'4
2 Teaching of Akshayamati Sutra (Akshayamatinirdesha)
3 King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra (Samadhiraja)
4 Compendium of Doctrine Sutra (Dharmasamgiti)
5 Questions of the King of Nagas, Anavatapta, Sutra (Anavataptanagarajapariprchchh a)
6 Questions of the King of Nagas, Sagara, Sutra (Sagaranagarajapariprchchha)
7 Jewel Mine Sutra (Ratnakara)
8 Sport of Manjushri Sutra (Manjushrivikridita)
9 T h e first chapter of the Heap of Jewels Sutra (Ratnakuta),
called Chapter Showing the Three Vows Sutra (Trisambaranirdeshaparivarta)
10 And further from the Heap of Jewels Sutra:
Kashyapa Chapter Sutra (Kashyapaparivarta)
Bodhisattva Section Sutra (Bodhisattvapitaka) [9]
Sutra Showing the Inconceivable Secrets of the Tathagatas
(Tathagatachintyaguhyanirdesha)
etc.
T h e following are sutras teaching both the profound [emptiness] and the extensive [deeds of compassion]:
1 Sutra on the Ten Grounds (Dashabhiimika)
2 Sutra Showing the Realm of the Inconceivable Qualities and
Wisdom of the Tathagatas (Tathagatagunajnanachintyavishay avatar anirdesha)
590
Meditation on Emptiness
3 Questions of Sagaramati Sutra (Sagaramatipariprchcha)
4 The four sutras on the four meditative stabilizations515
5 Buddhavatamsaka
Sutra
(Buddhdvatamsakanamamahavaipulya)
6 Questions of King Dharanishvara Sutra (DharanTshvararajapariprchchha)
7 Sutra on the Heavily Adorned (Ghanavyuha)
Etc.
Though the sutras of the last wheel require interpretation, [the
Prasahgikas] rely on the six perfections and so forth in them.
They are:
1 Great Drum Sutra (MahabherTharakaparivarta)
2 Tathagata Essence Sutra (Tathagatagarbha)
3 Sutra Unravelling the Thought (Samdhinirmochana).
If one wonders on what commentarial treatises [the Prasahgikas] rely, the texts considered to be completely valid are those
[Chandrakfrti mentions] in his Clear Words,516 'Having seen the
Compendium of Sutra, the Precious Garland of Advice [for the
King], the Praises, a n d . . . ' Thus, again and again [these works
of Nagarjuna] are quoted in the Clear Words:
1 Compendium of Sutra (Sutrasamuchchaya)
2 Precious Garland of Advice for the King (Rajaparikatharatnavali) [ 10]
3 And among Nagarjuna's Praises of Reality directed toward
the ultimate [emptiness]:
Praise of the Element of Qualities (Dharmadhatustotra)
Praise of the Supramundane (Lokatitastava).
Moreover, he speaks of:
Praise of the Three Bodies (Kayatrayastotra)
Peerless Praise (Nirupamastava)
Praise of What Surpasses Praise (Stutyatitastava)
Praise of the Inconceivable (Achintyastava)
Praise of the Mind Vajra (Chittavajrastava)
Etc.
Background
591
Also, the Clear Words says, 5 1 7 '... with effort over a very long
time the stanzas propounded in the Treatise, the Sixty Stanzas of
Reasoning, the Finely Woven, the Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness,
and the Refutation of Objections,...' Thus, there are
Nagarjuna's Five Collections of Reasonings" [that establish
emptiness]:
1 Fundamental Treatise on the Middle Way Called 'Wisdom'
(Prajnanamamulamadhyamakakarika)
2 Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning (Yuktishashtikakarika)
3 Treatise Called'The Finely Woven' (Vaidalyasutranama)
4 Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness (Shunyatasaptatikarika) [11]
5 Refutation of Objections (Vigrahavyavartanikarika).
Furthermore, the Clear Words™says, A n d having seen the
[Four] Hundred and so forth [by Aryadeva, etc.] and likewise
many profound s u t r a s . . . ' Thus, there are Aryadeva's texts: the
Treatise of Four Hundred Stanzas (Chatuhshatakashastrakarika)
as well as those included in 'and so forth', the Length of a
Forearm519 (Hastavalaprakaranakarika) and the Establishment of
the Reasoning and Logic Refuting Error (Skhalitapramathanayuktihetusiddhi). Also, the several texts about the accumulations for
enlightenment, etc., and the profound sutras are those quoted as
sources in Nagarjuna's Compendium of Sutra and by this master
[Chandrakirti] mentioned earlier.
Buddhapalita's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the
Middle Way' (Buddhapalitamulamadhyamakavrtti) and above
[that is, the texts of the early Prasangikas such as Nagarjuna and
Aryadeva] are taken as completely reliable [by Chandrakirti and
later Prasangikas].
Also, the Clear Words says:520
. . . as well as the commentary done by Buddhapalita, I
have gathered together the good explanations of Bhavaviveka [and those of these masters] which were transmitted
from one to another [and the texts of Shura, Jnanagarbha, etc.] as well as what I received from [Nagarjuna's
own] analysis [of the meaning of his words] and have
592
Meditation on Emptiness
expounded this in order to please those of great intelligence. [12]
Thus, one must rely on the correct explanations by Bhavaviveka
and so forth which were transmitted from one to another. One
should not scar the teaching of the Conqueror with fabrications
not in the sutras and commentaries. [For instance, Dak-tsang
without foundation speaks] of the nine spheres of objects in the
mental continuum of a Buddha Superior which are to be abandoned through meditation. 521 T h e precious Elder [Atfsha] and
the precious Teacher [Drom-don ('Brom-ston)] said, 'It is not
suitable for a follower of the Elder to be brash [and not cite scripture and reason]; be wary of the effects of actions.' Considering
that statement as well as how the Teacher [Buddha] earnestly
transmitted the teaching to Ananda, please press your palms
together [in respect] toward all, not allowing yourself and others
to be ruined. 522
The Clear Words523 also says:
Nagarjuna, with the honorable Rahulabhadra [Saraha],
clearly taught the system of this [ Treatise on the Middle
Way] for a long time, [their] word being followed by
[Arya]deva. His students, with decisive minds [gained]
through analyzing the Treatise, defeated all the Forders
and set forth the supreme Subduer's teaching for a long
time. [13]
Thus, [Chandrakfrti] speaks of the master, the Superior [Nagarjuna's], long period of teaching, also his students' composition of
many commentaries on the master's texts, and their eradication
of the Forders. Therefore, it is clear that this master [Chandrakfrti] also relied on the oral transmission of their teachings, but
[Chandrakfrti goes on to] explain that most of those texts had
already disappeared. 524
T h e master Chandrakfrti stated the names of Vasubandhu,
Dignaga, and so forth [in commentary on his Supplement ] 525 and
refuted them, but there is no one who stated Chandrakfrti's
name and refuted him. T h e four great commentaries and so
Background
593
forth'of this master [Chandrakirti] who was renowned as a tenth
ground Bodhisattva [are:
1 Clear Words, Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the
Middle Way' (Mulamadhyamakavrttiprasannapada)
2 Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning'
(Yuktishashtikavrtti)
3 Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness'
(Sh unyatasaptativrtti)
4 Commentary on (Aryadeva's) 'Four Hundred Stanzas on the
Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas' (Bodhisattvayogacharyachatuhshatakatika)
And so forth], [14]
Also, in general, stabilizing and analytical meditation, the
three vows of Bodhisattvas,526 the ways of meditating on the profound [emptiness], etc., as well as hearing and explaining, etc.
—all beginning from reliance on a spiritual guide—are extensively set forth in the Bodhisattva Shantideva's texts:
1 Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (Bodhisattvacharyavatara)
2 Compendium of Learnings (Shikshasamuchchayakarika).
Therefore, these two [Chandrakirti and Shantideva] are completely reliable.
One can take as reliable Atfsha's Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment (Bodhipathapradipa) and those works of AtTsha included
within the term 'and so forth' in the basic text, Quintessential
Instructions on the Middle Way (Madhyamakopadesha) and Introduction to the Two Truths (Satyadvayavatara), as well as Prajnamoksha's Commentary on (Atrsha's) 'Quintessential Instructions
on the Middle Way' (Madhyamakopadeshavrtti).
One should take the good parts of Atfsha's527 Explanation of
(Shantideva's) 'Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds' (Bodhisattvacharyavatarabhashya) and Commentary on the Difficult Points of
'Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment' (Bodhimargapradipapanjika).
One can rely on Maitreya's Treatise on the Sublime Continuum
of the Great Vehicle (Mahay anottaratantrashastra) and Asanga's
594
Meditation on Emptiness
Explanation of (Maitreya's) 'Treatise on the Sublime Continuum
of the Great Vehicle' (Mahdydnottaratantrashastravydkhya).
One should take whatever is common to Prasangika and
Svatantrika in Maitreya's Ornament for Clear Realization (Abhisamayalamkara) and in Aryavimuktisena's and Haribhadra's
discussions on the path, etc.
For an unconfused account with respect to what is uncommon
[to Prasangika I, Jam-yang-shay-ba,] having taken as valid the
good explanations of the three—the great being, the foremost
[Dzong-ka-ba who is the] father and his two spiritual sons [Gyeltsap and Kay-drup], will explain the Prasangika system just
according to them even though I might not cite them in quotation. For, free from error, they expounded clearly through millions of reasons.
2
Interpretation of Scripture
About definitive sutras and those requiring interpretation (see
pp. 422-8, 365-97) the root text says: [15]
Sutras teaching the two truths
Are respectively those to be interpreted,
Because they must be interpreted otherwise,
And the definitive, because the mode
Of existence is definite there.
There are two ways of interpretation:
When even the literal meaning is not suitable
And when the literal meaning, though established,
Is not the final mode of existence.
The first and last wheels require interpretation.
The middle are definitive sutras.
Five sutra sections of the Descent into Lanka,
The Unravelling the Thought, and The Heavily Adorned,
Thinking that there is no other creator
And thinking of emptiness
Teach mind-only [meaning] no external objects,
A permanent essence, the existence of the basis-of-all,
The true existence of other-powered phenomena
596
Meditation on Emptiness
And of thoroughly established phenomena,
And three final vehicles. These five
Teachings are proved to require interpretation.
There are many purposes for the master, the Superior [Nagarjuna's], composing the Treatise on the Middle Way and differentiating what requires interpretation and what is definitive. For,
the Treatise was written for the sake of non-obscuration with
regard to the two truths, for the sake of making known the purpose of the two truths, for the sake of eliminating doubt in those
who wonder just what requires interpretation and what is definitive, [16] and for the sake of dispelling the wrong understanding
that conceives what requires interpretation to be definitive, that
is, to be the way things are. Chandrakfrti's Clear Words says:528
This Treatise on the Middle Way was composed by the
master [Nagarjuna] for the sake of showing the difference
between that requiring interpretation and the definitive.
With respect to this, those scriptural passages speaking of
production and so forth of dependent-arisings were not
spoken from the viewpoint of the nature of objects [as
known by] the non-contaminated wisdom of those free
from the dimness of ignorance. Rather, they were
spoken from the viewpoint of the objects of mind of
those whose eye of intelligence is obscured by the dimness of ignorance.
From the viewpoint of perceiving suchness, the
Supramundane Victor529 said, 'O monks, this which is
nirvana, having the attribute of non-deceptiveness, is the
ultimate truth. All conditioned things are false, having
the attribute of deceptiveness [appearing to exist in their
own right when in fact they do not].' Etc.
Similarly, 'There is here no suchness and no nonerroneous suchness. [17] These have the attribute of
deception. These also have the attribute of destructive
allurement.530 These also are falsities; these are illusions,
delusions of children.'
Similarly:
Interpretation of Scripture
597
Forms are like balls of foam.
Feelings are like bubbles.
Discriminations resemble mirages.
Compositional factors are like banana tree trunks.531
Consciousnesses resemble magical illusions.
Thus the Sun Friend Buddha said.
Similarly, 'If a monk, mindful and attentive, exerting
effort, analyzes phenomena day and night, he should
realize peace, the auspicious abode of the extinction of
conditioned things, the selflessness of phenomena.' 532
Etc.
Due to not understanding the thought of [Buddha's]
teaching set forth in this way, some would have doubt:
'Here, what is the teaching having the meaning of suchness? [18] What indeed is that having [some other]
thought [as its basis]?' Also, due to having a weak intellect some think teachings which in fact require interpretation are definitive. In order to dispel with reasoning
and scripture the doubt and wrong understanding of
these two types of beings, the master [Nagarjuna] composed this Treatise.
There are differentiators of scriptures requiring interpretation
and those of definitive meaning, because they are done so (1) by
the four reliances [the third being, 'Rely on sutras of definitive
meaning, not on those requiring interpretation,'], (2) by reasoning as in Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way:™
Things are never produced
At all anywhere
From themselves, other,
Both, or causelessly.
etc., and (3) also through many scriptural citations such as in
Nagarjuna's Treatise:™
The Supramundane Victor said that fraudulent
Phenomena are falsities.
598
Meditation on Emptiness
All conditioned things have the attribute of deception,
[19]
Therefore, they are falsities.
When asked 'Is a former limit [of cyclic existence]535
discerned?'
The Great Subduer said, 'No.'
Cyclic existence is without beginning or end.
[Ultimately] it has no former and later parts [and thus
does not inherently exist].
In the 'Advice to Katyayana'
'Exists', 'does not exist', and 'both'
Are rejected by the Supramundane Victor, knower of
[The nature of]536 things and non-things.
The differentiation of what requires interpretation and what is
definitive is devised from the viewpoint of the subject matter [in
the passage], A sutra mainly teaching the ultimate [emptiness] is
said to be definitive whereas one mainly teaching conventionalities [phenomena other than emptinesses] is said to require interpretation. The Teaching of Akshayamati Sutra says,537 'What are
definitive sutras? What require interpretation? Sutras setting
forth the establishment of conventionalities [20] are called
"requiring interpretation". Sutras setting forth the establishment of the ultimate are called "definitive".'
Question: How are conventionalities and the ultimate established?
Answer: There are ways of establishing them. Respectively,
the setting forth of any of the varieties of actions and agents
through various words and letters is the way that conventionalities are established. The setting forth of the doctrine of [emptiness which] is unapprehendable [as inherently existent], is
beyond the [dual] intellect, difficult to view, and difficult to
realize is the way that the ultimate is established. The Teaching
of Akshayamati Sutra says:538
Those sutras teaching [about various objects] by way of
various words and letters are said to require interpretation.
Interpretation of Scripture
599
Those teaching the profound, difficult to view, and difficult to realize are called definitive. Those teaching
those objects indicated by various words [such as] self,
sentient being, living being, nourisher, being, person,
progeny of Manu, child of Manu, agent, and experiencer in the manner of there being, for instance, [an
inherently existent] owner when there is no [inherently
existent] owner are said to require interpretation. [21]
Those sutras teaching the doors of liberation, the
emptiness of phenomena, no [inherently existent]
signs, no [inherently existent] wishes, no [inherently
existent] products, no [inherently existent] production,
no [inherently existent] sentient being, no [inherently
existent] living being, no [inherently existent] person,
and no [inherently existent] controller are called the
definitive. This is called reliance on definitive sutras
and non-reliance on those requiring interpretation.
The teachings of conventional phenomena in the first wheel of
the teaching and in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought require
interpretation. For it is necessary to search out the mode of existence [of the phenomena mentioned in these texts] apart from
what was explicitly taught there. The King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra, the One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of
Wisdom Sutra, and so forth are definitive because the mode of
existence of the phenomena [discussed in those texts] is definite
as just the meaning of their explicit teaching.
With respect to interpreting the mode of existence [of the conventional phenomena mentioned in the first and third wheels]
there are examples [such as a magician's illusions that contradict
them] but the interpretation is from the viewpoint of [there
being a pedagogic] need [which gave rise to the teaching]. Most
passages requiring interpretation should have [both examples
contradicting them and pedagogic need]. With respect to interpretation of the subject matter, reasonings such as not being able
[in analysis] to find [the object designated] damage [the teaching
of conventionalities if one takes merely that to be the final mode
598
Meditation on Emptiness
All conditioned things have the attribute of deception,
[19]
Therefore, they are falsities.
When asked 'Is a former limit [of cyclic existence]535
discerned?'
T h e Great Subduer said, 'No.'
Cyclic existence is without beginning or end.
[Ultimately] it has no former and later parts [and thus
does not inherently exist].
In the 'Advice to Katyayana'
'Exists', 'does not exist', and 'both'
Are rejected by the Supramundane Victor, knower of
[The nature of]536 things and non-things.
The differentiation of what requires interpretation and what is
definitive is devised from the viewpoint of the subject matter [in
the passage]. A sutra mainly teaching the ultimate [emptiness] is
said to be definitive whereas one mainly teaching conventionalities [phenomena other than emptinesses] is said to require interpretation. The Teaching of Akshayamati Sutra says,537 'What are
definitive sutras? What require interpretation? Sutras setting
forth the establishment of conventionalities [20] are called
"requiring interpretation". Sutras setting forth the establishment of the ultimate are called "definitive".'
Question: How are conventionalities and the ultimate established?
Answer: There are ways of establishing them. Respectively,
the setting forth of any of the varieties of actions and agents
through various words and letters is the way that conventionalities are established. T h e setting forth of the doctrine of [emptiness which] is unapprehendable [as inherently existent], is
beyond the [dual] intellect, difficult to view, and difficult to
realize is the way that the ultimate is established. T h e Teaching
of Akshayamati Sutra says:538
Those sutras teaching [about various objects] by way of
various words and letters are said to require interpretation.
Interpretation of Scripture
599
Those teaching the profound, difficult to view, and difficult to realize are called definitive. Those teaching
those objects indicated by various words [such as] self,
sentient being, living being, nourisher, being, person,
progeny of Manu, child of Manu, agent, and experiencer in the manner of there being, for instance, [an
inherently existent] owner when there is no [inherently
existent] owner are said to require interpretation. [21]
Those s u t r a s teaching the doors of liberation, the
e m p t i n e s s of p h e n o m e n a , no [inherently existent]
signs, no [inherently existent] wishes, no [inherently
existent] products, no [inherently existent] production,
no [inherently existent] sentient being, no [inherently
existent] living being, no [inherently existent] person,
and no [inherently existent] controller are called the
definitive. This is called reliance on definitive sutras
and non-reliance on those requiring interpretation.
The teachings of conventional phenomena in the first wheel of
the teaching and in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought require
interpretation. For it is necessary to search out the mode of existence [of the phenomena mentioned in these texts] apart from
what was explicitly taught there. The King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra, the One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of
Wisdom Sutra, and so forth are definitive because the mode of
existence of the phenomena [discussed in those texts] is definite
as just the meaning of their explicit teaching.
With respect to interpreting the mode of existence [of the conventional phenomena mentioned in the first and third wheels]
there are examples [such as a magician's illusions that contradict
them] but the interpretation is from the viewpoint of [there
being a pedagogic] need [which gave rise to the teaching]. Most
passages requiring interpretation should have [both examples
contradicting them and pedagogic need]. With respect to interpretation of the subject matter, reasonings such as not being able
[in analysis] to find [the object designated] damage [the teaching
of conventionalities if one takes merely that to be the final mode
600
Meditation on Emptiness
of subsistence], [22] Also, scriptures saying in one voice that all
products are false and so forth damage [such].539
Also, [with respect to definitive sutras] many examples such as
illusions, many reasons such as, 'If [the object designated] is
sought, it is not found,' and many scriptures teaching the profound non-production determine that the final mode of existence
is just this [that is set forth explicitly in the text].
Here [in the Prasangika system] the way that texts requiring
interpretation are to be interpreted [or literally, 'led'] does not
refer to leading trainees—as by the indirect teachings [of a real
self for the sake of] introducing them [to virtuous endeavor] but
to interpreting the subject being discussed. In brief, there are two
ways of interpretation: one when the literal meaning of the passage is not even suitable to be what is expressed by the sutra as in,
'Father and mother are to be killed,' [which actually teaches that
'existence' and 'attachment' are to be abandoned 540 and the other
when the literal meaning of the passage is suitable to be what the
sutra expresses but interpretation is required to determine the
mode of existence of the phenomena discussed in the text]. For
instance, though the teaching that pleasures are produced from
wholesome actions and sufferings from unwholesome actions is
literal, it would not be suitable to assert these facts as the mode of
existence of the two. One must interpret their mode of existence
otherwise, as lacking self [objective existence]. Thus, there are, in
brief, two modes of interpretation: of that which is not literally
acceptable in order to discover the subject matter and of the literally acceptable to discover the nature of the phenomena discussed.
T h e King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra [23] says:541
One knows the features of definitive sutras
In accordance with the Sugata's teaching of emptiness.
All doctrines of a sentient being, a person, a being,
Are to be known as requiring interpretation.
Therefore, [the Prasangikas'] differentiation of the three wheels
of the teaching [as to whether they require interpretation] does
not accord with the system set forth in the Sutra Unravelling the
Thought. T h e Extensive Sport Sutra says:542
Interpretation of Scripture
601
I have found a truth, profound, peaceful, lacking
T h e elaborations [of thought], radiant, non-conditioned,
the ambrosia.
Though I taught it, no one would understand.
I should stay without speaking in the forest.
[Hihayana passages] such as this and the Hfnayana scriptures
quoted in Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way that explicitly
teach the ultimate are sutras of the first wheel; yet, [the
Prasahgikas] say that these do not require interpretation. Therefore, there is no necessity that the individual three wheels [as
taught by the Prasahgikas] be the first, second, and third wheels
as identified in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought [which states
that every scripture of the first wheel requires interpretation].
Of the three wheels [identified] in the Sutra Unravelling the
Thought, the first wheel explains that the four truths and so forth
exist by way of their own character (svalakshanasat, rang gi
mtshan nyid kyis yod pa).™ [24] The last wheel explains that
imaginaries do not exist inherently and that other-powered phenomena and thoroughly established phenomena exist ultimately
and inherently. [According to the Prasangika system] these two
types of sutras require interpretation.
Also, the Heart of Wisdom Sutra544 of the middle [wheel of the
teaching], for instance, says, '[Avalokiteshvara] was viewing [the
five aggregates] as empty of inherent existence.' Therefore, such
[sutras] are definitive.
This way [that the Prasahgikas divide scriptures into those
requiring interpretation and the definitive] does not accord with
the Sutra Unravelling the Thought [which states that the first and
second wheels require interpretation and that the third wheel is
definitive. However, the Prasahgikas' disagreement with this
sutra] does not mean that it contradicts the thought [of Buddha],
for such [a system as is set forth in that sutra] is suitable
for certain types of trainees, and [no matter how much it differs
from the final system] it does not contradict Buddha's thought.
For example, Hearers are never permitted to kill, but certain
Mahayanists are, according to the purpose. Though these two
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Meditation on Emptiness
are systems of one speaker, they are not contradictory [in that the
difference is explained through taking into account the level of
the listener],
[All non-literal passages requiring interpretation such as,
'Father and mother should be killed,' or, 'A mind-basis-of-all
exists,' must have another basis in Buddha's thought, a purpose,
and refutations of their explicit meaning.]
Question: With respect to passages that are to be interpreted
[and are non-literal], what are here [in the Prasangika system] the
basis in Buddha's thought, the purpose, and the refutation of the
explicit meaning?
Answer: [In general, there are numerous types of passages
requiring interpretation. However, Chandrakirti cites the Descent into Lanka Sutra as proof that four types of teachings
require interpretation.]
Some persons [cite ChandrakFrti's Supplement ]:545
These passages [in the Descent into Lanka Sutra and so forth]
show that other such sutras require interpretation.[25]
These [interpreters wrongly] say that from among the Chittamatrin teachings just four passages require interpretation
[whereas they should say four types do]:
1 the Sutra Unravelling the Thought where it teaches the three
natures of Chittamatra [the sixth and seventh chapters]
2 the two chapters of the Sutra Unravelling the Thought teaching a basis-of-all (alaya, kun gzhi)546
3 [the eighth chapter of the Sutra Unravelling the Thought
called] 'Questions ofMaitreya' where it teaches that there are
no objects external [to a perceiving consciousness]
4 [the seventh chapter of] the Sutra Unravelling the Thought
where it teaches three final vehicles.
The third and fourth are indicated by the term 'and so forth' in
Chandrakirti's own commentary to his Supplement.
[It is correct that these are four types of passages which Chandrakirti says require interpretation. However,] it is incorrect
[that there are only four passages from Chittamatra teachings
Interpretation of Scripture
603
referred to here and requiring interpretation]. For Dzong-kaba's Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of (Chandrakirti's)
'Supplement' says,547 'This [Prasangika] system considers all of
the aforementioned four categories to require interpretation.'
This statement explains that by way of topical abridgement and
unification under subjects there are mainly four.
There are the three explicitly mentioned in Chandrakirti's
own commentary on his Supplement and the teaching of three
final vehicles discussed in Nagarjuna's Compendium of Sutra.
However, if passages requiring interpretation are differentiated
by way of various modes of expression and inner divisions, there
are a great many. For example, there are the ways that three final
vehicles are taught, such as in the Sutra on the Myrabolan Fruit
(Myrabola) [which says that, if a person removed one by one myrabolan fruits from a pile as large as Mount Sumeru, he would finish
quickly whereas, ifhe attempted to name individually all the types
or lineages (gotra, rigs) of sentient beings, he would never
finish].548 The Sutra Unravelling the Thought says:549
Thinking that [the purification and the path of purification of the three vehicles are the same in the sense that all
three deliver beings from cyclic existence and are the
same in the sense that the path is the meditation of selflessness] I teach one vehicle. However, it is not that there
are no varieties of sentient beings—[26] the naturally
dull, middling, and sharp—among the types of sentient
beings.
Also, [there is the teaching that there are three final vehicles
because three] truly existing lineages are apprehended individually.550 Furthermore, [there is the teaching that] Foe Destroyers
are not reborn through transmigration as found, for instance, in
the [Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza] Perfection of Wisdom Sutra
[which is taken by the Chittamatrins who follow Asanga as indicating that some sentient beings never reach Buddhahood]: 551
Those [Hearers] who have entered a state destined
for the lightness [of nirvana] do not have the power to
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Meditation on Emptiness
generate the aspiration to unsurpassed, complete, perfect enlightenment. Why? Because they have severed the
continuum of cyclic existence [through not being born
by the power of either afflictions or compassion].
Also, the Sutra Unravelling the Thought says:552
Though all the Buddhas exert themselves, those who
have the lineage of a Hearer, proceeding solely to
peacefulness, do not have the power to generate an
intention toward the highest, complete, perfect enlightenment upon being set in the best of enlightenments.
Also, there is, for example, the explanation [in the Sutra
Unravelling the Thought ] 553 that through fear [of the suffering of
cyclic existence Foe Destroyers have forsaken helping others,
and thus] their Buddha lineage has been severed. There are
many passages and many ways of indicating that no matter how
much Foe Destroyers meditate, [27] they cannot generate compassion and the unusual attitude [of taking upon oneself the burden of helping all sentient beings].
The individual scriptures showing that each of these [ways of
teaching three final vehicles] requires interpretation were quoted
in Nagarjuna's Compendium of Sutra and were just not quoted
here [in Chandrakirti's commentary to his Supplement ]. Thus,
[it is wrong to say that Chandrakirti is referring to just four
passages requiring interpretation], Nagarjuna's Compendium of
Sutra quotes the explanations that all the Buddhas of the three
times and all the present Buddhas of the ten directions teach one
vehicle:554
It is extremely difficult to find sentient beings who have
faith in one vehicle [due to the difficulties of the required
accumulations of merit and wisdom in the Mahayana],
However, [all vehicles] are exhausted in one because such
was taught in many sutras. The White Lotus of the Excellent Doctrine Sutra says, 'Also, based on one vehicle, I
teach doctrine to sentient beings in this way. Buddha's
vehicles arrive at their conclusion in omniscience. There
Interpretation of Scripture
605
is no ascription of two or three vehicles. This is the
nature [of the teaching] even in all the transient worlds of
the ten directions.
'Why? All those Tathagatas who appeared in the past
in all the transient worlds of the ten directions [28]
taught doctrine to sentient beings based on one vehicle.
This is the vehicle to Buddhahood. Also, all those Tathagatas who will appear in the future will teach doctrine to
sentient beings based on one vehicle. Also, all those
Tathagatas who are presently appearing in all the transient worlds of the ten directions are teaching doctrine to
sentient beings based on one vehicle.
'Through that format this is to be understood: If there
is even no ascribing of two vehicles in any of the transient worlds of the ten directions, what need is there to
mention three?'
In this sutra555 [Hearers such as] Shariputra [29] are prophesied
to attain the unsurpassed enlightenment; [this implies that there
is only one final vehicle since even Hearers finally attain the
highest enlightenment].
Also, Nagarjuna's Compendium of Sutra quotes556 the explanation that, if different vehicles had been taught, Buddha would
have had different discriminations [in the sense of desire for
some students and hatred for others]. He would have had the
fault of miserliness [because he would have withheld the best
teaching from some. Thus, it is shown that all the vehicles] only
flow into the Mahayana. T h e Compendium of Sutra says:
T h e Chapter of the True One Sutra says, 'Manjushri,
because [trainees] emerge [from all obstructions]
through one vehicle, the field of Buddha has the essence
of the Mahayana. I do not ascribe vehicles of Hearers
and Solitary Reaiizers. Why? Because the Tathagata
does not have various discriminations. Manjushri, if the
Tathagata taught the Mahayana to some, the vehicle of
the Solitary Reaiizers to some, and the vehicle of the
Hearers to some, the Tathagata's mind would be very
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Meditation on Emptiness
impure, would have the fault of attraction and also little
compassion, and would be secretive with regard to the
doctrine.
'Manjushrf, all the doctrines that I teach to sentient
beings are for the sake of attaining omniscient wisdom.
Flowing to enlightenment [30] and descending into the
Mahayana, they are the means of achieving omniscience;
they lead completely to one place [omniscience]. Therefore, I have no establishment of vehicles.
'Manjushrf, an establishment of vehicles is done to
set persons in Tathagatahood. It is done to set them in a
small collection [of merit and wisdom] and in a limitless
collection. However, because the element of qualities
(dharmadhatu) 537 [emptiness] is not diverse, they do not
have different vehicles. These teachings of conventionalities are uttered only as means of entering [the path to
omniscience]. Ultimately there is one vehicle, not two.'
Also, [Nagarjuna's Compendium of Sutra quotes] a Perfection of
Wisdom Sutra [translated here in accordance with the
Prasangika interpretation]: 558
Those devaputras who have not generated the aspiration
to unsurpassed, complete, perfect enlightenment [31]
will generate that aspiration. Those [Hearers] who have
entered a state destined for the lightness [of nirvana] do not
have the power [that is, are far from having the power] to
generate the aspiration to unsurpassed, complete, perfect enlightenment. Why? Because they have [temporarily] severed the continuum of cyclic existence [their
Buddha lineage]. When they generate the aspiration to
unsurpassed, complete, perfect enlightenment, even I
will be pleased, and I will not upset their roots of virtue.
They will take great cognizance of the doctrine that far
exceeds even the superior.
This passage shows that if Foe Destroyers generate the attitude
[of aspiration to enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings,
Interpretation of Scripture
607
Buddha] will be pleased and will not upset [their roots of virtue,
that is, will not propound to them a teaching of five lineages or
three vehicles].559 They will become cognizant of the very superior doctrine [that is, will generate the aspiration to enlightenment relying on extraordinary births].
Thus, it is explicitly taught that even Foe Destroyers generate
the aspiration to perfect enlightenment for the sake of all beings.
Therefore, the three scriptures [the Sutra on the Myrabolan
Fruit, the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, and the Perfection of
Wisdom Sutra mentioned above] are said to require interpretation.
Also, [Nagarjuna's Compendium of Sutra quotes] the Questions
of King Dharamshvara Sutra :560
T h e Euddhas, the Supramundane Victors, [32] do not
appear for the sake of a variety of discourses [diverse
vehicles]. They appear in order to cause sentient beings
to be fully enlightened and realize the element of qualities, which is of one taste, without obstruction, the boon
of all sentient beings. Thus, they turn the irreversible
wheel [of doctrine causing continual progression toward
Buddhahood].
O child of good lineage, a jeweler, for instance, takes
an unpolished jewel from a jewel-mine. He washes it
with a strong solution of soda and wipes it with a black
haircloth. However, he does not cease his efforts with
just this; he washes it with a strong solution of quicksilver and rubs it with wood and wool. However, he does
not cease his efforts with just this; he washes it with the
juice of a great herb and wipes it with a fine cloth.
Having polished it, the jewel is free of the types of fetters
and is called vaidurya (cat's-eye gem).
Just so, a Tathagata ascertains the impure [Buddha]
nature of all sentient beings. [33] He causes sentient
beings who greatly enjoy cyclic existence to be disquieted through disquieting discourse on impermanence,
suffering, selflessness, and unpleasantness. He introduces them to the disciplinary practice of Superiors.
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Meditation on Emptiness
A Tathagata does not cease his efforts with just this; he
causes them to understand the Tathagata's own mode of
discourse through discourse on emptiness, signlessness,
and wishlessness. However, a Tathagata does not cease
his efforts with just this; he leads those sentient beings to
the Tathagata's land through discourse on the irreversible wheel [cultivation of the union of method and wisdom] 561 and discourse on the complete purification of
the three spheres [of agent, action, and object].
Those sentient beings of various lineages and natures
—having become equal—realize the nature of Tathagatahood, whereby they are called the highest [field of
merit] worthy of giving. [34]
This passage explains through the example of the three stages of
cleansing a gem that [a Buddha] cleans away the stains of even
Foe Destroyers' obstructions and establishes them in Buddhahood. Therefore, the teachings that Foe Destroyers do not have
the capacity for Buddhahood are explained as requiring interpretation.
Also, [Nagarjuna's Compendium of Sutra quotes] the Irreversible Wheel Sutra (Avaivartachakra):562
T h e youthful Manjushrf asked, 'What is the teaching of
doctrine by the Buddhas, the Supramundane Victors,
like?' Buddha said, 'The teaching of doctrine by the
Buddhas, the Supramundane Victors, is like an irreversible wheel of doctrine.' Manjushrf asked, 'Supramundane Victor, how is it that the Supramundane Victor,
based on three vehicles, teaches doctrine?'
Buddha said, 'Son of good lineage, those sentient
beings [to whom I teach three vehicles] admire low
[vehicles]; they do not understand the one vehicle. T h e
skillful in means lead them thus. Son of good lineage, the
Buddhas, the Supramundane Victors, possess great skill
in means. [35] T h e Supramundane Victor has appeared
at the time of the five ruinations; 563 these are non-admirers of the one vehicle.'
Interpretation of Scripture
609
This explains that the teaching of three vehicles is for the sake of
leading those who do not understand the one vehicle.
Also, [Nagarjuna's Compendium of Sutra] quotes the Lion's
Roar of ShrimaladevT Sutra :564
The so-called utter passing away (parinirvana, yongs su
my a ngan las 'das pa) is a skillful means of the Tathagatas. All three vehicles are aspects of the one vehicle; he
who understands the one vehicle understands the unsurpassed, complete, perfect enlightenment.
T h e foregoing sutras were quoted together [in one section of
Nagarjuna's Compendium of Sutra]. Also, here in the Lion's
Roar of ShrimaladevT Sutra,565 as before, the non-birth of Foe
Destroyers is shown to require interpretation. [The Compendium of Sutra quotes the Descent into Lanka Sutra :566
Their faults due to predispositions and their madness
due to meditative stabilization having ceased, Hearers
and Solitary Reaiizers [36] rise again from the uncontaminated realm. Through fulfilling the collections included
within the worldly realm (the collection of merit) and the
non-worldly uncontaminated realm (the superior collection of the wisdom of emptiness), they attain the capacity
for the extraordinary body of wisdom and emptiness.]
T h e Descent into Lanka Sutra says:567
Even Hearers who have attained an abiding in the bliss
of meditative stabilization will attain the body of bodies
of the Conqueror.
And:
Having attained the body
Of meditative stabilization,
They do not rise for eons.
Just as drunken persons
Forsake beer and become sober,
So even they will attain
My body of wisdom and emptiness. [37]
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Meditation on Emptiness
Though there are many scriptural passages teaching the rebirth
of Foe Destroyers and their attainment of the Mahayana path
through the Buddhas' prodding, these were counted as one in
Chandrakirti's Supplement: the teaching of one final vehicle.
Not only that, but also the King of Meditative Stabilizations
Sutra shows that [the teaching of] a true existence of individual
lineages requires interpretation. It says:568
The essence of the Tathagata exists in all migrators,
And thus there are no unfortunate sentient beings.
Also, there are the explanations in the Tathagata Essence Sutra
and in Maitreya's Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle that
the Buddha lineage exists in all sentient beings. Even these
teachings are just included in [the one topic of] the teaching of
one vehicle. Thus, Chandrakfrti's Supplement says:569
These passages [in the Descent into Lanka Sutra and so
forth] show that other such sutras require interpretation.
His own commentary on this [38] says:570
What are the 'other such passages [that require interpretation'? T h e teaching of] the non-existence of imaginaries
and the [inherent] existence ofother-powered phenomena
that occurs in the Sutra Unravelling the Thought when
explaining the three natures: imaginaries, other-powered
phenomena, and thoroughly established phenomena.
Similarly, [the Sutra Unravelling the Thought teaches]:571
There is a deep and subtle consciousness, the taker [of
rebirth],
Having all the seeds and flowing like the continuum
of a river.
If it were understood as a self, it would not be proper,
Thus I do not teach it to children.
And so forth. [The Descent into Lanka Sutra] says:572
Just as a doctor distributes
Medicines to the ill,
Interpretation of Scripture
611
So Buddha teaches
Mind-only to sentient beings.
This passage [and others from the Descent into Lanka]
show that these [types of passages] require interpretation.
Thus, it is said that just as a doctor distributes individual medicines in accordance with illnesses, so Buddha [39] teaches trainees mind-only and so forth.
Also, all passages taught merely in conformity with the
thoughts of sentient beings require interpretation. Since it is
mistaken to take these teachings literally, like apprehending
water in a mirage, it is said that one should not be enamoured of
the words but seek the definitive meaning [emptiness]. The
Descent into Lanka says:573
Sutras teaching in conformity with the thoughts of
sentient beings have meaning that is mistaken; they are
not discourse on suchness. Just as a deer is deceived by a
waterless mirage into apprehending water, so doctrine
which is taught [in conformity with the thoughts of sentient beings] also pleases children but is not discourse
causing the wisdom of Superiors. Therefore, you should
follow the meaning and not be enamoured of the expression.
This indeed describes all [non-literal passages requiring] interpretation. However, if they are described individually, on this
occasion five types of sutras are mentioned:
1 mind-only and no external objects
2 the teaching in the Tathagata Essence Sutra of a permanent,
stable essence in the continuums of all sentient beings which
has the [major and minor] marks of a Buddha [40]
3 the description of a basis-of-all
4 the description of the true existence of other-powered phenomena and thoroughly established phenomena
5 the teaching of three final vehicles.
[The first, third, fourth, and fifth are accepted by the Chittamatrins Following Scripture as definitive or literal; they assert the
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Meditation on Emptiness
second, the teaching of a permanent Tathagata essence, to be
non-literal and actually to be referring to the impermanent
mind-basis-of-all.]
In the Descent into Lanka Sutra the teaching of mind-only is
explained through the example of [the distribution of medicine
to] the sick. This shows that the teaching of mind-only in the
'Questions of Maitreya' chapter of the Sutra Unravelling the
Thought requires interpretation.
[Still, according to Prasangika 'mind-only' is not always a nonliteral teaching requiring interpretation, since it is often taught
for the sake of emphasizing that the principal creator of pleasure,
pain, activities, and so on is the mind and not a deity or anything
else. Thus, when the teaching of mind-only does not reject external objects, it is a valid literal teaching even for Prasangika. It
requires interpretation only to determine the final mode of existence of the phenomena discussed.] T h e statement in the Sutra on
the Ten Grounds,574 'These three realms are mind-only,' is said by
Bhavaviveka to mean that the creator propounded by the Forders does not exist and that only the mind is the principal creator.
Chandrakirti's Supplement [similarly] explains [the meaning of
'mind-only' based] on the Sutra on the Ten Grounds itself:575
T h e Bodhisattva of the Manifest [sixth ground],
Who is nearing [the element of qualities]
And understands that the three realms are only mind
Realizes that the creator [of the world] is only mind,
Thus he knows there is no permanent self as the creator.
Not only that, but also the Descent into Lanka Sutra says:576 [41]
I explain as mind-only
[What is said to be] the c r e a t o r Person, continuum, aggregates, causes,
Particles, principal, and Ishvara.
Thus, there are those who, though they are Buddhists, advocate
as the creator a substantially existent person or a continuum or
aggregates which are asserted to be the person. Also, some
Buddhists advocate substantially existent causes as the creator.
Interpretation of Scripture
613
T h e Vaisheshikas advocate particles as the creator of the world;
the Samkhyas, the principal; and the Aishvaras, Ishvara. Refuting them, Buddha said that only the mind is the creator.
[Some say that this passage from the Sutra on the Ten Grounds
refutes forms which are entities external to a perceiving consciousness and that this is done through understanding that the
three realms are only the truly existent mind. However, it would
be inadmissible for Buddha to say in the same sutra that the
mind exists inherently and that the mind is produced from
causes. For inherent existence and dependent-arising are mutually exclusive.]"7' If [this passage from the Sutra on the Ten
Grounds means that] there are no forms separate from a [truly
existent] mind, [why did Buddha in the same sutra] say,578 'The
mind [is produced] by the cause of actions'? Also, he would not
have spoken [of the production] of name and form [by consciousness if there were no form]. Thus, because [the Sutra on the Ten
Grounds] explains that the mind creates the varieties of the
world, one should understand [that here the word 'only' of
mind-only] refutes a creator which is not mainly the mind [and
thus in this context does not refute external objects].
Question: The Descent into Lanka Sutra says:579
[Objects] do not exist as external objects as perceived.
[42]
The mind appears as various [objects through the power
of predispositions].
[Because the mind is generated] in the likeness of bodies
[senses], enjoyments [objects of senses], and abodes
[physical sense organs and environments],
I have explained [that all phenomena are] mind-only.
Is this to be explained [as referring to the mind as the main
creator and not refuting external objects]?
Answer: No. Here a doctrine of mind-only which refers to the
non-existence of external objects is presented, and it is said that
what is perceived as bodies, enjoyments, and abodes is the entity
of the mind [perceiving them]. The teaching of such in the Sutra
Unravelling the Thought and so forth is for the sake of overcoming
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Meditation on Emptiness
trainees' attachment to forms and so forth. With respect to the
basis of Buddha's thought [when he taught this non-literal teaching of mind-only meaning no external objects], it is clear that he
was thinking that all phenomena are posited through their mental images as [is taught in] Nagarjuna's Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning.™ In this context he set forth mind-only.
T h e refutation of this type of mind-only by both Bhavaviveka
and this master [Chandrakirti] is the thought of the Superior
[Nagarjuna] himself. Nagarjuna's Essay on the Mind of
Enlightenment says:581
T h e Subduer's teaching
That all these are mind-only
Was so that children would forsake [43]
Their fears. It is not suchness.
Also, Nagarjuna's Precious Garland says:582
Just as a grammarian [first] has [his students] read a
model of the alphabet, so Buddha taught his trainees the
doctrines they were able to bear. To some he taught doctrines in order to turn them away from sins. This was so
that some [beings of small capacity] would achieve [the
fruits of] merit [in rebirths as gods and humans]. He
taught some [beings of middling capacity] doctrines
based on the dualism [of object and subject as different
entities]. To some he taught doctrines not based on dualism [that object and subject are empty of being separate
entities and that consciousness ultimately exists]. He
taught some [beings of heightened faculties] doctrines
profound and frightening to the fearful, having an
essence of emptiness and compassion, the means of
achieving [highest] enlightenment. [44]
Therefore, Chandrakirti's Supplement says:583
These sutras teaching no external objects of perception,
Teaching that the mind appears as the varieties of objects,
T u r n away from forms those extremely attracted to forms.
These also just require interpretation.
Interpretation of Scripture
615
[A teaching that requires interpretation according to both
Chittamatra and Prasangika is that of a permanent, fully developed Tathagata essence.] Similarly, the Descent into Lanka Sutra
says:584
Mahamati said, 'The Tathagata essence taught in the
Supramundane Victor's sutras is said by the Supramundane Victor to be naturally radiant [lacking the
elaborations of thought], pure [free of adventitious contaminations], and thus from the beginning just pure.
The Tathagata essence is said to possess the thirty-two
characteristics [of a fully developed Buddha] and to exist
in the bodies of all sentient beings.
'The Supramundane Victor says that like a precious
gem wrapped in a dirty cloth, the Tathagata essence is
wrapped in the cloth of the aggregates, constituents, and
sources, overwhelmed by the force of desire, hatred, and
i g n o r a n c e , [45] d i r t i e d w i t h t h e d e f i l e m e n t s of
thought, and is permanent, stable, and everlasting.
'If so, Supramundane Victor, how is this propounding
of a Tathagata essence not like the Forders' propounding of a self? Supramundane Victor, the Forders teach
and propound a self which is permanent, a non-agent,
without the qualities [of form and pleasure, etc.], pervasive, and non-perishing.'
The Supramundane Victor said, 'Mahamati, this
teaching of a Tathagata essence is not like the Forders'
propounding of a self. O Mahamati, the completely perfect Buddhas, Tathagata Foe Destroyers, teach a Tathagata essence meaning emptiness, the final reality,
nirvana, no [inherently existent] production, signlessness, wishlessness, and so forth. [46] So that children
might avoid the fear of selflessness, they teach through
the means of a Tathagata essence the state of no thought,
the object [of the wisdom] free from appearances.
'Mahamati, future and present Bodhisattvas—
the great beings—should not adhere to this as a self.
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Meditation on Emptiness
Mahamati, for example, a potter makes a variety of
vessels out of one mass of clay particles with his hands,
manual skill, a rod, water, thread, and mental dexterity.
Mahamati, the Tathagatas teach the selflessness of phenomena which overcomes all imagined signs. Through
[their techniques] having wisdom and skill in means—
whether they teach it as the Tathagata essence or as selflessness—they, like a potter, teach with various formats
of words and letters.' [47]
Thus, there is the teaching in the Tathagata Essence Sutra of a
permanent body adorned with the major and minor marks of a
Buddha, possessing the powers and so forth, and existing in the
continuums of all sentient beings. This is explained, as before [in
the case of the teaching of mind-only that means no external
objects] to require interpretation from the viewpoint of another
basis in [Buddha's] thought, his purpose, and the fact that there
are refutations of the explicit teaching. Both this [teaching of a
permanent Buddha Body in all sentient beings] and the teaching
of the existence of a basis-of-all have emptiness as the basis in his
thought. T h e refutation of the explicit teaching is that if it were
taken literally, such a teaching would be like that of the Forders
[who absurdly ascribe change to the permanent]. Thus, the
teaching of a permanent Buddha Body in all sentient beings is
proved by reasoning to require interpretation. Chandrakirti's
Supplement says:585
T h e teachings that a basis-of-all exists, that the person
[inherently] exists,
And that only the aggregates [inherently] exist
Should be taken as teachings for those who would not
understand
The very profound meaning [of emptiness],
[For the Prasangikas, the teaching of an impermanent mindbasis-of-all actually is based on a permanent Tathagata essence—
the emptiness of the mind.] The Sutra on the Heavily Adorned
Interpretation of Scripture
617
[Just as] lands [are the basis of] the varieties [of all things
grown],
So the basis-of-all [is the basis for cyclic existence and
nirvana].
T h e virtuous Tathagata essence is also this [basis-ofall], [48]
Tathagatas teach the essence with the term 'basis-of-all'.
Though the essence is proclaimed as the basis-of-all,
Those of weak intellect do not understand.
Thus, a natural lineage which is the emptiness of true existence
of the mind in each sentient being—the Sugata essence or
Buddha lineage—is called a basis-of-all. For it abides as the
nature of all the phenomena [which make full enlightenment
possible, these terms all referring to the emptiness of the mind].
[The natural lineage or Buddha lineage—the emptiness of
inherent existence of the mind—is called alayavijnana which
here means 'basis-of-all which is to be known well'.] Vijnana is
so called because of being that which knows [that is, the knower]
or because of being this which is to be known well or in detail
[that is, the known]. Taking [the term vijnana of alayavijnana]
according to the latter etymology [as 'that which is to be minded or
known in detail'], the Tathagata essence is proclaimed as vijnana,
that which is to be known in detail. Chandrakfrti's Commentary on
the 'Supplement' says,587 'It should be known that because it abides
as the nature of all the phenomena [which make full enlightenment possible], only emptiness is indicated by the term "mindbasis-of-all" (alayavijnana, kungzhirnam shes).'
[The three natures as taught by Chittamatra also require interpretation.] Chandrakfrti's Supplement says:588
Thus, one has understood the arrangement of scriptures
[of definitive meaning and requiring interpretation].
Any sutra setting forth non-suchness, [49] teaching that
which requires interpretation, is to be interpreted.
Through realizing [this, these provisional teachings
become a cause of entering into the realization that phenomena do not exist inherently]. Also, know that [any
618
Meditation on Emptiness
sutra] which bears the meaning of emptiness is definitive.
Through such passages it is explained that the Sutra Unravelling
the Thought requires interpretation where it shows the differentiation of the [true] existence and non [-true] existence of the
first two of the three natures of the Chittamatra system [otherpowered phenomena and imaginaries. T h e explanation in the
Sutra Unravelling the Thought that impermanent phenomena
truly exist needs to be interpreted as having as its basis in
Buddha's thought their conventional existence.] For the Teaching of Akshayamati Sutra and so forth explain that the teachings
of truly existent phenomena require interpretation.
Also, [another reason why the explanation that other-powered
and thoroughly established phenomena truly exist requires
interpretation is that Prasangikas] distinguish the existence and
non-existence of the three natures [in another way]. According to
the 'Questions of Maitreya' [chapter] of the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra, all phenomena from
forms through to omniscient consciousnesses do not ultimately
exist but exist only in the terminology and conventions of the
world. There it is said in answer to a question about the way that
forms and so forth exist,589 'They exist according to the terminology and conventions of the world but not ultimately.' Thus, it is
said that all phenomena from forms through to omniscient consciousnesses [only nominally exist].
Therefore, Chandrakirti's commentary on his Supplement
says:590
I will say a little bit [about our own system's presentation
of the three natures]. For instance, a snake is [only] imagined in a coiled rope which is a dependent-arising, [50]
for there is no snake in the rope. However, a snake is
thoroughly established in an actual snake because it is
not imagined. Similarly, that the final nature of things is
in other-powered phenomena which are products is
imagined [because] the final nature is not a product, for
[Nagarjuna] said:591
Interpretation of Scripture
619
The nature is not fabricated
And is not dependent on another.
This final nature that is imagined in presently apprehended products which are dependent-arisings and like
reflections [in that the way they appear and the way they
exist do not agree] is the actual final nature as the object of a
Buddha. For [as the object of a Buddha's cognition] it is
not imagined. Not contacting [or being obstructed by]
things that are products, [his wisdom knowing the mode
of existence] actualizes only the final nature. Thus, since
he understands suchness, he is called 'Buddha'.
One has thus understood the presentation of the three
natures: imaginaries, other-powered phenomena, and
the thoroughly established. [51] [In this way] the
thought of the Sutra [Unravelling the Thought] is to be
explained [as requiring interpretation and the thought of
the 'Questions of Maitreya' (see p.620) on the three
natures is to be understood],
[The Chittamatrins treat the imputation of a difference of entity of] the two, apprehending subjects and
apprehended objects [imputed in dependence on otherpowered phenomena] as an imaginary. This should be
considered [or analyzed], because apprehending subjects
and apprehended objects [are other-powered phenomena and] other-powered phenomena [which are not
subjects or objects] do not exist as things.
Let us illumine a little the meaning of his words. The way of
[wrong] imagination is that whereas the final mode of existence
does not exist as perceived in an other-powered phenomenon, it
is perceived there through superimposition. For, the perception
[that other-powered phenomena exist in their own right] despite
their not actually so existing is an imaginary superimposition,
like the superimposition by a consciousness apprehending a rope
as a snake despite the snake's not existing in the rope. For, otherpowered phenomena do not fulfill the sense of a non-fabricated
nature, etc.
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Meditation on Emptiness
Other-powered phenomena presently being seen or apprehended are like mirror reflections in that there is no agreement
between the way they appear and the way they are. Their nature
or mode of being is an actual thoroughly established phenomenon [an emptiness] according to the sight of a Buddha [52]
because he perceives without superimposing [true] existence
when there is no [true] existence. It is like a snake's not being
superimposed on an actual snake, and thus the object apprehended is thoroughly established. This sets out the definition and
etymology of 'thoroughly established' (parinishpanna, yongs
grub) and also explains that other-powered phenomena are the
bases of the superimposition of imaginaries as well as the bases
of emptinesses—thoroughly established phenomena.
Question: [It has been shown that the 'Questions of Maitreya'
chapter of the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom
Sutra teaches that all phenomena do not exist ultimately but exist
only nominally; however, the same chapter seems to show just the
opposite.] T h e 'Questions of Maitreya' says,592 'Maitreya, these
imagined forms [the ultimate existence imagined of forms] should
be viewed as not existing substantially. These imputed forms
[forms themselves] should be viewed as existing substantially
because thought substantially exists and not because [the forms]
exist under their own power.' [Here it says that thought 'substantially exists'; 'substantially existent' (dravyasat, rdzasyod) means
'ultimately existent' (paramarthasat, don dam par yodpa) in the
Prasangika system, and since the Prasangikas say nothing ultimately exists] how is [one to understand this quote]?
Answer: Here 'substantially existent' means just 'existent' (sat,
yodpa) because one can understand from the context that [substantially existent] here does not refer to anything other than
[just 'existent']. It does not refer to the 'substantiality' meaning
'inherently existent' or 'truly existent'. The Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra says:593 [53]
'In dependence on the name, discrimination, and convention of the term "form" to these and those things
which have the character of compositional phenomena,
Interpretation of Scripture
an intrinsic existence of forms is imagined. These are
imagined forms.
'Maitreya, in dependence on the name, discrimination, designation, and convention of the terms "feelings", "discriminations", "compositional factors",
"consciousnesses",—through
to—"qualities
of a
Buddha" to these and those things which have the character of compositional phenomena, there is imagined an
intrinsic existence of feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, consciousnesses—through to—the intrinsic existence of the qualities of a Buddha. These are
imagined feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, consciousnesses—through to—imagined qualities
of a Buddha. [54]
'[Then with respect to other-powered phenomena]
there are the nominal, discriminated, imputed, and conventional "forms", "feelings", "discriminations", "compositional factors", "consciousnesses"—through to—
"qualities of a Buddha" that are designated to these and
those things which have the character of compositional
phenomena, in dependence on thought abiding in just
the nature of thought. These are imputed forms, imputted feelings, imputed discriminations, imputed compositional factors, imputed consciousnesses—through to—
imputed qualities of a Buddha.
'Whether the Tathagatas appear or not, reality and the
sphere of the actual status of phenomena just abide.
Reality's forms are imputed forms' permanent, permanent, stable, stable non-intrinsic existence and non-self
of phenomena as imagined forms—suchness, final
reality. [55] These are reality's feelings, discriminations,
consciousnesses—through to—reality's qualities of a
Buddha.' Thus Buddha said.
The Bodhisattva Maitreya asked, 'From among these
three types of forms [imagined forms, imputed forms,
and reality's forms], which forms are to be viewed as not
substantially existing? Which as substantially existing?
621
622
Meditation on Emptiness
Which as neither not substantially existing nor substantially existing but as distinguished by being ultimate
objects? From among the three types of feelings, the
three types of compositional factors, the three types of
consciousnesses—through to—the three types of qualities of a Buddha, which are to be viewed as not substantially existing? Which as substantially existing? [56]
Which as neither not substantially existing nor substantially existing but distinguished by being ultimate
objects?' Thus [Maitreya] asked.
The Supramundane Victor said to the Bodhisattva
Maitreya, 'O Maitreya, these imagined forms [the ultimate existence imagined in forms] should be viewed as
not substantially existing [because of not existing at all].
These imputed forms [forms themselves] should be
viewed as substantially existing [that is, conventionally
existing] because thought substantially exists and not
because forms exist under their own power. Reality's
forms [emptinesses] should be viewed as neither not substantially existing [because of existing as the nature of
phenomena] nor as substantially existing [because of not
existing by way of their own character] but as distinguished by being ultimate objects.'
Dzong-ka-ba's Essence of the Good Explanations says:594
Therefore, the 'substantiality' of the 'substantially existing' and 'not substantially existing' mentioned in the
'Questions of Maitreya' is not the 'substantiality' set
forth in other texts as the pair, 'substantiality and imputation' (dravya and prajnapti, rdzas btags). They also are
not the 'establishment by way of [the object's] own character' (svalakshana-siddhi, rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub
pa) set forth by the Madhyamikas as 'substantiality'
(dravya, rdzas).
[It has been shown that many teachings, accepted literally by
the followers of Chittamatra, are interpreted otherwise by the
Interpretation of Scripture
623
Prasahgikas. However] the Prasangika system does not assert
that whatever the Chittamatrins accept as literal or as being
definitive is necessarily actually non-literal [since both systems
assert that the teachings of the six perfections and so forth are
literal].595 Also, the Prasahgikas do not assert that the opposite
follows [either; they do not assert that whatever the Prasangika
system says is literal the proponents of Chittamatra necessarily
say is non-literal]. For the Sutra on the Ten Grounds says,596 [57]
'These three realms are mind-only,' and [the Mahayana Sutra of
Knowledge (Mahayanabhidharma) says]:597
The beginningless realm
Is the source of all phenomena.
Because it exists, all migrations
And even nirvanas are attained.
The Prasahgikas accept these passages literally, [the first as
negating a main agent other than the mind and the second as setting forth a Tathagata essence which is the emptiness of the
mind. 598 The Chittamatrins also accept these passages literally
but with a different interpretation of their literal meaning; for
them the first refutes forms which are entities external to a perceiving consciousness, and the second sets forth the mind-basisof-all.]
3 The Object of Negation
T h e explanation of Prasangika tenets has three parts: their presentation of (1) the base, (2) paths, and (3) fruits of these paths.
[The first of these is translated here.]
T h e Prasangika presentation of the base has five parts: (1) the
object of negation in the view of selflessness, (2) the reasonings
refuting the object of negation, (3) the basic objects of the two
truths, (4) the uncommon features [of the Prasangika system],
and (5) the valid cognizers certifying the above as well as an elimination of error. [The first two are translated here.]
T H E OBJECT OF NEGATION
I N T H E VIEW O F SELFLESSNESS
This section has two parts: the measure of what is negated [58]
and the correctness of this measure.
Measure of what is negated in the view of selflessness
(See pp.35-41.) T h e root text says:
All of cyclic existence and nirvana
Appearing and renowned [to the mind]—
626
Meditation on Emptiness
The varieties [of phenomena] and their mode [emptiness]—
Are posited by the inborn non-analytical [awareness]
As existing according to the conventions of the world.
Therefore, 'existing objectively [without just being an
imputation] there by thought',
'Substantially existing', 'existing by way of its own
character',
'Existing from its own [the object's]side',
'Truly existing', 'existing in its own right', and so forth
Are synonymously what is negated.
Forms and so forth are the phenomena of cyclic existence—the
afflicted class—and [the phenomena of nirvana]—the pure class
(see pp.201-12). These phenomena are all included within 'the
varieties and their mode which appear to and are renowned to
the mind'. All these phenomena must be posited [as existing] for
the inborn worldly [mind] which does not analyze [to try to find]
the object designated and does not superimpose [falsity] through
the conception [of phenomena] as truly existent.
Therefore, all the varieties and their mode [their emptiness]
are only imputed [from the subject's side to] there [the object's
side] by terms and thoughts. This is because these phenomena,
except for being just nominally imputed [from the subject's side]
to there, are not their individual parts, nor the mere composite of
their parts, nor the continuum [of their moments], etc. [59] For
example, in darkness a coiled speckled rope is imputed by
thought to be a snake, and from a distance a cairn [a pile of
stones] is merely imagined to be a human. Nagarjuna's Precious
Garland says:599
Because the phenomena of forms [which have the
obstructiveness of which space is the absence] are only
names, space also is just a name [and does not exist inherently. If someone said that forms exist inherently, then]
when the elements do not exist [inherently], how could
forms exist [inherently]? Therefore, even name-onlyness does not exist [inherently because that which
possesses a name does not exist inherently].
The Object of Negation
627
Aryadeva's Four Hundred says:600
Without [imputation by] thought [like the imputation of
a snake to a rope] there is no [finding of] the existence of
desire and so forth. If so, who with intelligence would
maintain that a real object is [produced dependent on]
thought? [For, being imputed by thought and existing as
its own reality are contradictory.]
Chandrakfrti's
says:601
Commentary on
(Aryadeva's)
Four Hundred'
Undoubtedly, those which exist only through the existence of thought and those which do not exist when there
is no thought are to be ascertained as not existing by way
of their own entities, like a snake imputed to a coiled
rope. [60]
Also, the Meeting of Father and Son Sutra says:602
O Great King, a person, a being, has the six constituents, the six bases of contact, and the eighteen activities
of mind.
Based on what is it said that the person has the six
constituents? Great King, the six constituents are these:
the constituent of earth, the constituent of water, the
constituent of fire, the constituent of wind, the constituent of space, and the constituent of consciousness.
Great King, these are the six constituents. My saying
that a person has the six constituents is based on this.
Based on what is it said that a person has the six bases
of contact? Great King, the six bases of contact are these:
the base of contact which is the eye for seeing forms, the
base of contact which is the ear for hearing sounds, [61]
the base of contact which is the nose for smelling odors,
the base of contact which is the tongue for sensing tastes,
the base of contact which is the body for feeling the tangible, and the base of contact which is the mind for
knowing phenomena. Great King, these are the six bases
628
Meditation on Emptiness
of contact. My saying that the person has the six bases of
contact is based on this.
Great King, based on what is it said that the person has
the eighteen activities of mind? Great King, the eighteen
activities of mind are these. When a human sees a form
with his eyes, he experiences the form as pleasurable,
painful, or neutral. When he hears a sound with his ears,
he experiences the sound as pleasurable, painful, or neutral . When he smells an odor with his nose, he experiences
the odor as pleasurable, painful, or neutral. [62] When he
senses a taste with his tongue, he experiences the taste as
pleasurable, painful, or neutral. When he feels the tangible with his body, he experiences the tangible as pleasurable, painful, or neutral. When he realizes a phenomenon
with his mind, he experiences it as pleasurable, painful, or
neutral. Great King, these six experiences of pleasure,
these six experiences of displeasure, and these six experiences of neutrality are in brief the eighteen activities of
mind. Great King, these eighteen are activities of mind.
Great King, my saying that these activities are the eighteen activities of mind is based on this.
Great King, [63] the constituent of earth is of two
types: internal and external. Great King, what is the
internal constituent? It is, inside the body, any of the
hard and solid aspects, the close, conjoined with consciousness. Also, what are they? The internal earth constituent is to be known as hair, mustache, nails,603 teeth,
impurities, excrement, skin, flesh, veins, sinews, bones,
marrow, heart, liver, lungs, kidneys, spleen, diaphragm,
large intestine, small intestine, bladder, urinary canal,
anal canal, anus, brain, veins of the brain—also, any type
of hardness, solidity, and the close, conjoined with consciousness inside the body.
Great King, what is the external earth constituent?
Any type of hardness, solidity, the non-close, [64] not
conjoined with consciousness is to be known as the
external earth constituent.
The Object of Negation
Great King, when the internal earth constituent
arises, it does not come from anywhere. When it ceases,
it does not go anywhere.
Great King, a woman thinks of the internal, 'I am a
woman.' Having imputed, 'I am a woman,' internally,
she thinks of the external with respect to a man, 'A man.'
Having imputed 'man' to the man externally, she
becomes desirous and wishes to join with the external
man.
T h e man also thinks of the internal, 'I am a man.'
Having imputed, 'I am a man,' internally, he thinks of
the external with respect to a woman, 'A woman.'
Having imputed 'woman' to the woman externally, he
becomes desirous and wishes to join with the external
woman. Through desiring to join, they join together.
Through the cause of joining there is the state of the
fluid embryo.
Great King, both tlje imputed and the imputer do not
[inherently] exist. [65] There is no woman in the woman
[that is, in the basis of the imputation 'woman']. There is
no man in the man [that is, in the basis of the imputation
'man']. Though they are thus non-existent, wrong
thought is generated, but even this thought does not
exist inherently.
Even the joining and the fluid embryo do not exist
inherently as is imagined. How can that which does not
exist inherently become hard?
Great King, having understood thought thus, you
should understand hardness. It is to be understood that
whenever hardness is produced, it does not come from
anywhere. Great King, this body has a time in the end of
going to the cemetery. When its hardness disintegrates
and ceases, it does not go east, south, west, north, up,
down, or to the intermediate directions. Great King,
view thus the internal earth constituent.
Great King, there are occasions when the world abides
in the sky as a heavenly mansion of Brahma, [66]
629
630
Meditation on Emptiness
consisting of the seven types of precious substances. O
King, when its hardness arises, it does not come from
anywhere. Though it abides as the massive [mountains],
hard and firm, established through the cause of the diamonds of the Chakravada and Mahachakravada
mountains, when its hardness arises, it does not come
from anywhere. Though it abides as Meru—the King of
Mountains—Yugamdhara, Nimimdhara, Ishadhara,
Vajradhara, Khadiraka, Vinataka, Ashvakarna, Sudarshana, Mahasudarshana, Bare [Mountains], 604 Gandhamadana, or the Kitadri which are other than those, [67]
or though it abide as the billion world systems including
everything, or though it abide as an earth eighty thousand yojanas in height and sixty thousand yojanas in
width, O King, when its hardness arises, it does not
come from anywhere.
Great King, when this world is destroyed, there is a
time when this great earth is burnt by fire, or destroyed
by water, or wrecked by wind. When it is burned by fire,
there will be no smoke, and there will be no remains of
ashes. For instance, when the flame of a butter or oil
lamp burns space, there is no smoke and no remains of
ashes. Just so, when this world system of one billion
worlds is burned by fire, there will be no smoke, and
there will be no remains of ashes.
Also, when it is destroyed by water, there is no remainder. For instance, [68] when salt dissolves in water, there
is no remainder. Just so, when this world system of one
billion worlds is destroyed by water, there will be no
remains.
When it is wrecked by wind, there will be no remainder. For instance, when a scattering wind drives about,
no little birds are seen remaining. Just so, when this
world system of one billion worlds is wrecked by wind,
there will not be even a little remainder.
Great King, the arising of the earth constituent is
thus empty. The destruction and arising of the earth
The Object of Negation
631
constituent are also empty of inherent existence. Great
King, the earth constituent, except for only being a designation, should not be viewed as an earth constituent.
That which has the designation [the basis of the designations 'woman' or 'man'] is not the woman and is not the
man. Thus, O King, with wisdom realize these as they
are in reality. [69]
The meaning of this sutra is that [the constituents and so forth]
do not exist, except as only nominal imputations. This is indicated
by the quote from the beginning through to 'The earth constituent, except for only being a designation should not be viewed as
an earth constituent.' Then the passage, 'That which has the
designation is not the woman and is not the man,' explains that
the basis of the imputation—that which has the name—is not the
phenomenon which is imputed, a woman or a man.
Nagarjuna's Precious Garland, condensing the meaning of
that, says:605
If a person is not earth, not water,
Not fire, not wind, not space,
Not consciousness, and not all of them,
What person is there other than these?
The passage 'a person is not earth, not water, not fire, not wind,
not space, not consciousness' explains that a person is not each
of the bases of the imputation 'person'. The statement 'not all'
explains that a person is not even the composite of the bases of
imputation 'person' [that is, not even the composite of the six
constituents]. T h e statement 'What person is there other than
these?' explains that there is no person which does not depend
on [the six constituents that are] the bases of the imputation
'person'.
Thus, [70] the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras say that even [the
highest of phenomena,] nirvanas and emptinesses, are only
established [from the subject's side to] there [the object's side]
through names and thoughts. Similarly, [the Prasangika system,]
unlike Svatantrika and so forth, asserts that the members of the
632
Meditation on Emptiness
following list, except for being different names, are [hypothetical]606 synonyms. [The Prasangika system] treats these terms as
[hypothetical] synonyms in that they are what is negated by the
reasonings [proving emptiness. The terms that mean 'self in the
view of selflessness are:]
1 existing 'on' [that is, as a natural predicate of] the object
[which gets] the imputation
2 substantially existing
3 existing able to establish itself—[this term and the preceding
term] are opposites of dependent-arising [as are all the others
in the list]
4 existing by way of its own character
5 existing from [the object's] own side [rather than being imputed from the subject's side]
6 existing through its own power
7 truly existing
8 existing inherently.
Aryadeva's Four Hundred says:607
All these [phenomena] are not self-powered;
Thus, there is no self [inherent existence],
Chandrakirti's commentary says,608 'Here, that which has its
own intrinsic existence, has inherent existence, has its own
power, or has no dependence on another would exist by itself;
therefore, it would not be a dependent-arising.'
Correctness of the measure of what is negated
(See pp.539-47.) T h e root text says: [71]
The Madhyamikas, those free from the extremes,
Posit all actions and agents
In this [system] of no 'existence from [the object's] own side'
And of 'imputation by name and thought there [to the
object]'.
Anything coarser or finer than this
Is an extreme of permanence or annihilation.
The Object of Negation
633
Thus, that which is to be refuted [by reasoning] must be identified from its subtlest level. For, if it is not, one cannot ascertain
the actual non-existent which is the negative [of self]. For, Shantideva's Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds says:609
Without contacting the superimposed existent
One cannot apprehend its non-existence.
Also, one cannot ascertain the emptiness of formeer and later
births, for example, without ascertaining that aspect which is
their non-existence by way of their own being. Thus, the emptiness of births is not ascertained through only perceiving an utter
vacuity that is merely the non-perception of former and later
births. Buddhapalita, the honorable Chandrakfrti, and many
others assert this; Buddhapalita says [in his commentary on
Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way]:610
[The Nihilists say,] 'This world [or life] does not exist [as
an effect of past lives]. A future world does not exist.
[Also] spontaneously born sentient beings [such as hellbeings] do not exist,' and so forth. [72] What is the difference between their view and the [Madhyamikas'] view
that all things are not produced and do not cease?
[Answer:] There is a great difference between these
two. Not knowing the meaning of emptiness, you think
that these two are similar. Acting with equanimity [that
is, indifference] when one has not analyzed [to find that
all sentient beings should be valued equally] and acting
with equanimity when one has so analyzed are similar
only in that both can be characterized as acting with
equanimity. However, acting with equanimity but without analysis is involved in the entwinements of ignorance. Acting with equanimity when one has analyzed [is
the result of knowledge and] is used by the Supramundane Victors.
Just as these two differ very greatly, so here also the
perceptions [found in the texts of the Nihilists] such as,
'This world does not exist,' [meaning that this life is not
634
Meditation on Emptiness
the effect of other lives] are thoughts beclouded with
ignorance. However, the other one [the Madhyamika]
who sees that all phenomena are not [inherently] produced and do not [inherently] cease because they are
empty of existing by way of their own being has preceded his conclusion with the mind of analysis. [73] Therefore, these two [Nihilist and Madhyamika] are very different.
Also, [Chandrakirti's] Clear Words says: 6 "
Here some say, 'The Madhyamikas are indistinguishable from Nihilists because they propound that virtuous
and non-virtuous actions, agents, fruits, and all worlds
[lives] are empty of inherent existence. Also, the Nihilists say that these are non-existent. Therefore, Madhyamikas are indistinguishable from Nihilists.'
It is not so.
How?
Madhyamikas are proponents of dependent-arising;
they say that due to arising dependent on, or reliant on,
causes and conditions 612 all—this world, the next, and so
forth—lack inherent existence. The Nihilists do not
ascertain that future worlds [future lives] and so forth do
not truly exist (abhava, dngos po med pa) because of
being empty of inherent existence due to being dependent-arisings.
Therefore, [the Prasangikas] refute the subtle object of negation
—that is, refute that even particles exist from their own side—
[74] but know how to posit all actions and agents of cyclic existence and nirvana within [asserting] that all phenomena are only
nominalities and only imputations by thought. [A person who
maintains such a system] is a Madhyamika—one who does not
abide in the extreme of existence or permanence [such as asserting that phenomena] exist inherently, etc., and who, [through
propounding] the suitability of the existence of all phenomena
conventionally as only nominalities, does not abide in the extreme
The Object of Negation
635
of non-existence or annihilation. As [Buddha] says in the Kashyapa Chapter :613
[Inherent] existence is the one extreme. No [conventional] existence is the second extreme. That which is the
center between these two is unanalyzable [because it
cannot be analyzed just as it is by thinking about it], is
undemonstrable [because it cannot be explained to
another just as it is], is not a support [because it is not an
object of the senses], is unperceivable [because from the
viewpoint of the mind directly realizing it duality has
disappeared], is unknowable [because it cannot be ascertained just as it is by a dualistic mind], and is placeless
[because it is not a place or source of the afflictions].
Kashyapa, this is called the middle path, individual
analysis of phenomena.
Also, such is said in Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way :614
'[Inherent] existence' is a holding to permanence.
'No [conventional] existence' is a view of nihilism.
Therefore, the wise do not abide in either
[Inherent] existence or no [conventional] existence.
Also, through affixing 'inherent existence' (svabhava, rang
bzhin) [to the refutation of existence] the extreme of nonexistence is avoided. [75] [This is because that which is negated
as a predicate of phenomena is only inherent existence and not
existence in general; a negation of existence in general would be
an extreme of non-existence because phenomena do exist
conventionally.] The extreme of [inherent] existence is avoided
by [affirming that phenomena are] only imputations [and thus
not inherently existent]. Therefore, the Svatantrikas' estimation
of what is to be negated [merely true existence and not inherent
existence] is coarser than that [of the Prasahgikas who refute that
phenomena inherently exist even conventionally].
Also, with respect to this assertion of phenomena as only
imputations, some Tibetans [wrongly] do not accept even
worldly trueness and falseness. [It is true that there is no difference
636
Meditation on Emptiness
between] an illusory horse created by a magician and an actual
horse with respect to their existing or not in accordance with
how they appear. [Both an illusory horse and an actual horse
appear as if they inherently exist, but in fact do not; therefore,
they equally do not exist even conventionally in accordance with
how they appear.] However, if one does not accept a [worldly]615
trueness and falseness with respect to whether something does
or does not exist, then one contradicts Chandrakirti: 616
If the world does not harm you, based on the world itself
Refute these [conventionalities].
You and the world debate about these,
And afterwards I will rely on the stronger.
And, 'Do not lose the conventionalities renowned in the world.'
And, 'Perceivers of falsities are asserted as two types [those perceiving the real and unreal relative to a worldly consciousness].'
One should understand that [not accepting any worldly trueness
and falseness] does not pass beyond adhering to extremes. [Asserting a coarser object of negation] also does not pass beyond adhering to extremes. Thus, one should cast aside [such assertions].
REASONINGS R E F U T I N G I N H E R E N T E X I S T E N C E
This section has two parts [76]: brief indication and extensive
explanation.
Brief indication of the reasonings refuting inherent existence
(See pp. 127-9.)
Question: [The two selflessnesses, i.e., the lack of inherent
existence in persons and in other phenomena] are realized by
way of separate reasonings. Is this similar to the opinion of
Svatantrikas and below [i.e., Chittamatrins] and some Tibetan
'Prasangikas' that the objects negated in the two selflessnesses
differ in that the selflessness of persons is coarser and the selflessness of other phenomena is subtler?
Answer: [No, the two selflessnesses are realized by way of separate reasonings, but the object of negation, inherent existence, is
The Object of Negation 40
the same in each case; thus, .one is not coarser or subtler than the
other.] Though the two selflessnesses do not differ in subtlety,
the reasonings used for their realization are separate. In order to
indicate this the root text says:
There are the two selves
Of persons and [other] phenomena.
The non-existence of these there
Is asserted as the two selflessnesses.
A self of [other] phenomena
Is refuted by the four:
The diamond slivers and so forth.
A self of persons is refuted
By the fivefold and sevenfold [reasons].
Both also [are refuted] by dependent-arising.
Chandrakfrti's
says,617
Commentary on (Aryadeva's)
'Four Hundred'
Here 'self is an inherent existence (svabhava) of phenomena, that is, non-dependence on another. T h e nonexistence of this is selflessness. This [selflessness] is
realized as twofold through a division into persons and
[other] phenomena—a selflessness of persons and a selflessness of [other] phenomena. [77]
Thus, the self to be negated is non-dependence or non-reliance
on another, the 'other' being terms, thoughts, and so forth.
Absences of this self on its bases—persons and [other] phenomena—are respectively posited as the selflessness of persons and of
phenomena. This is the thought of the master Buddhapalita.
Four types of reasonings refute a self of phenomena [other
than persons], whereas a self of persons is refuted by the reasoning in sutra and in Nagarjuna's Treatisem that is a searching for
it in five ways. A self of persons is also refuted in Chandrakfrti's
Supplement by the reasoning that is a searching for [but not finding the self] in seven ways. [Chandrakfrti added to the fivefold
reasoning] two more refutations based on the teaching that
the mere composite of the five aggregates is the basis of the
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Meditation on Emptiness
imputation [and not the I]; these refute the assertions that the
mere composite of the aggregates is the self and that the shape [of
the body] is the self.
Both selves [of persons and of phenomena] are refuted by the
reasoning that they lack being one and many and by the reasoning
that they are dependent-arisings. These will now be explained.
4 Refuting Inherently Existent
Production
T h e extensive explanation of the reasonings refuting inherent
existence has two parts: reasoning refuting a self of phenomena
[other than persons] and reasoning refuting a self of persons
together with an elimination of error.
T h e reasoning refuting a selfofphenomena [other than persons]
has four parts: (1) the diamond slivers, [78] (2) the [simultaneous]
refutation of production of the four extremes and production of
the existent, the non-existent, [both, and neither], (3) the refutation of production of the four alternative types, and (4) along with
an elimination of error, the reasoning of dependent-arising
making known [the absence of true existence in] all phenomena.
D I A M O N D SLIVERS
(See pp.57-9, 131-50.) This section has two parts: statement of
the reasons and of the proofs for the modes of the reasons.
Statement of the reasons
(See pp. 137-42.) Sautrantikas, Chittamatrins, and Madhyamikas
agree that when stating reasons to prove a thesis there should be
640
Meditation on Emptiness
no statement of proof without first overcoming the pointedness of
the wrong view adhered to by the opponent with a demonstration
of a [contradictory] consequence. However, here for the sake of
easy exposition [a syllogism is put forth] in the root text:
Because production from self,
Other, both, or causelessly
Does not exist, inherently
Existent production does not exist.
T h e subjects, things which have production, have no inherently
existent production because there is no production of them from
themselves, from [inherently existent] others, from both, or causelessly—as in the case of a mirror image. Chandrakirti's Supplement says:619 [79]
Because there is no production from self, or other, or both,
Or without relying on causes, things lack inherent
existence.
Atfsha's Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment says:620
Things are not produced from
Themselves, others, both, or
Causelessly; thus there is no
Inherent existence.
Truly established production would have to accord with one of
these four extremes. Furthermore, if something is not produced
from any of these four, it follows that it is not truly produced. Not
only is this proved by reasoning, but also those who assert truly
established production assert such. Therefore, it is not necessary
to state a proof here [that not being produced from any of the four
extremes entails an absence of truly existent production].
Proofs for the modes of the reasons
Non-production from self
(See pp. 136-40.) T h e root text says:
If [things] were produced from themselves,
[Their re-production] would be senseless and endless.
Refuting Inherently Existent Production
641
That which [already exists in something] is not [produced
from] it,
Causes and effects would always be seen,
It would contradict worldly perception,
All objects and agents [of production] would be one. [80]
Some Samkhyas say, 'A sprout exists at the time of its seed or of
its [causal] entity. Since the natures of both the seed and the
sprout are a partless unit—being mutually each other—there is
no confusion of effects with wrong causes, and production is
possible. However, if at the time of the cause [the effect] were
totally non-existent, a non-existent [effect] could not be produced. If [that which is non-existent at the time of its causes]
were produced, then even the horns of a rabbit could be produced.'
T h e Sautrantikas and above [Chittamatrins and Madhyamikas] agree that in general a non-existent is not produced, and,
therefore, an existent is produced. Furthermore, they agree that
'production' is so called because it is the attainment of an existent entity by what is non-existent previous to its production. No
one [among the Sautrantikas, Chittamatrins, and Madhyamikas]
asserts, like the Samkhyas, that [a thing] is produced from its
own entity or that it is produced again.
Hence, it follows about the subjects, things which have production, that their production again would be senseless because
they would have previously attained their entity.
Objection: There is no necessity [that if things had previously
attained their entity, their production again would be senseless].
Answer: It follows about the subjects, these [things], that their
production would be endless because [for you] production again
of what is already existent is meaningful.
Here also, the Samkhya might say, 'There is no necessity [that,
if production again of what is already existent is purposeful, 621
the production of things would be endless. For we Samkhyas say
that what already exists in a non-manifest state must be produced or made manifest.]'
However, his answer does not hit the mark because he does
642
Meditation on Emptiness
not assert that what was previously non-existent [a non-existent
manifestation] is newly produced. [Thus, he cannot say that a
manifestation of the sprout which was previously non-existent is
produced since he would fall away from his own theory of the
production of the existent.]
Also, [81] it follows that there would be no point in production
of something from itself because it would have already achieved
its own entity.
Moreover, it follows either that a white seed only continues
endlessly or that the production of only a green sprout continues
endlessly because that which has already been produced would
be produced again.
Furthermore, though a cause such as a white seed has disintegrated and is non-existent, its effect—a sprout—is seen. Thus,
even the world does not accept the simultaneity of seed and
sprout. [Therefore, the Samkhya's view] also contradicts what is
seen.
It follows that the agent and the object of cause and effect [producer and produced] would be one because a thing would produce itself.
Buddhapalita [says in his commentary on Nagarjuna's Treatise]:622
Things are not produced from their own entities because
[if they were] their production [again] would be just
senseless and because production would be endless. The
production again of things already existing in their own
entities is purposeless. If though existent, they are produced, they would never not be produced.
Chandrakfrti's Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the
Middle Way'
There is no point in the production of something from
itself [that is, from a cause that is the same entity as itself
because it would have already attained existence]. [82]
Also, it is just not reasonable that what already has
been produced be produced again.
Refuting Inherently Existent Production
643
If it is thought that the already produced is produced
again, the growing of a sprout, etc., would not be found
here [in the world]; the seed would be produced endlessly.
How could that [seed] be destroyed by that [sprout?
For, according to you, seed and sprout are not other.]
For you, the sprout's shape, color, taste, capacity, and
maturation would not be different from those of its
creator cause, the seed.
If, having forsaken the entity [of the state] of the seed,
it becomes an entity [of a state] different from it, then
how could it have the nature of that [seed]?
If for you the seed is not other than the sprout here [in
the world], just as the seed [is unapprehendable at the
time of the sprout], the sprout would not be apprehendable. Or, because they are one, just as the sprout [is
apprehendable], so the seed would be apprehendable [at
the time of the sprout]. Therefore, this [non-otherness of
seed and sprout] is not to be asserted.
Though the cause is destroyed, the effect is seen; [83]
thus, even the world does not assert that they are one.
Therefore, this ascription of things arising from self is
not admissible in reality or even in the world.
If production from self were asserted, the produced
and the producer—object and agent—would be one.
Since they are not one, production from self is not to be
asserted because of the fallacies extensively explained
[here and in Nagarjuna's Treatise].
Non-production from other
This section has two parts: the actual exposition of the proofs of
non-production from other and an elimination of error.
Actual exposition of non-production from other. (See pp.140-44.)
The root text says:
If things were produced from [what is inherently] other,
Then darkness would arise from a flame,
644
Meditation on Emptiness
And all would arise from all,
Both causes and non-causes.
Because [cause and effect would be] other,
They could not be one continuum, like wheat and barley.
Cause and effect would have to be simultaneous,
But because it is not so, what production
Is there of another from another?
If [it is claimed that there is inherently existent and thus analytically findable] production from what is other, then it contradicts
many scriptures and reasons. T h e reasons are as follows.
It [absurdly] follows that thick darkness arises from a flame
[84] because another arises from what is other by way of its own
character. Also, the Superior [Nagarjuna] says:624
A [naturally existent] otherness
Of cause and effect is never admissible.
If there were an otherness of cause and effect,
A cause would be the same as a non-cause.
Thus, it [absurdly] follows that all would arise from what are its
causes and from what are not its causes because cause and effect
would be naturally existent others. Chandrakirti's Supplement
says:625
If depending on others another arises, then even from
a tongue of fire thick darkness would arise. All would
also be produced from all because even non-producers
[non-causes] would have otherness the same [as producers or causes].
Objection: T h e fallacies of these consequences do not apply.
[Though a cause and its effect are naturally existent others] 626 an
effect which is helped [by a cause] is the effect of that [cause]. [85]
A substantial cause and its effect are included in the one continuum of [for instance] a seed; they must be one continuum. That
which is of a continuum different [from the effect] is not suitable
to be [its] substantial cause, etc. For example, a barley seed is the
cause of a barley sprout which is in its same continuum but is not
a cause of a kimshuka flower.627
Refuting Inherently Existent Production
645
[In answer to this, there are these contradictory consequences:]
It [absurdly] follows that the subjects, a barley seed—a substantial cause—and a barley sprout—its effect—are not one continuum because [according to you] they mutually are naturally
existent others, as in the case of Maitreya and Upagupta or as in
the case of wheat and barley.
It follows that a seed and its sprout are not naturally existent
others because they do not exist simultaneously and also
because, when cause and effect are naturally existent others, the
actions of production and cessation, etc., are impossible. The
Superior [Nagarjuna says in his Treatise on the Middle Way]:67*
The entities of the things [which are effects such as
sprouts] do not exist in their causes [either collectively or
individually or in something other than their causes]. If
[the effect's] own entity does not exist [at the time of its
causes], then how could there be an entity of otherness
[in the causes without the existence of the effect in relation to which they are called other]? [86]
Chandrakfrti's Supplement says:629
Objection: Just this is called something's effect because
that something is able to create it. That which is able to
produce it, even though [a naturally existent] other, is
the cause. [Therefore, because of being special others,
two things are cause and effect but not because of just
being others in general.] Because there is production
from what is included in the same continuum and from
what is a producer, a sprout of rice is not [produced]
from a barley [seed], etc.
Answer: Barley, the kesara lotus,630 the kimshuka
flower, and so forth [because of being other than a rice
shoot] are not asserted to be producers of a rice shoot, do
not have the capacity [of producing a rice shoot], are not
included in the same continuum [as a rice shoot], and are
not [what precedes a rice shoot and is]631 homogeneous
646
Meditation on Emptiness
[with a rice shoot]. Just so, a rice seed also does not have
these [four qualities] because it is just [a naturally existent] other.
Sprout and seed do not exist simultaneously. [The
sprout in relation to which a seed is called 'other' does
not exist at the same time as the seed, and thus there is no
otherness.] Without otherness how could the seed be
other [than the sprout]? Thus, it is not established that a
sprout is produced from a seed. Cast aside this position
that there is production from the [naturally existent]
other.
Objection: Just as the ascending and descending of the
two ends of a scale are not seen to be non-simultaneous,
[87] so the production of what is to be produced and the
cessation of the producer are [simultaneous. Therefore,
cause and effect exist simultaneously and thus can be
other in relation to each other.]
Answer: [Even] if [the two activities of the ascending
and descending of the two ends of a scale] are simultaneous, here [in what is exemplified] there is no [simultaneity]; it is non-existent. Because that which is presently
being produced [for example, a sprout] is approaching
production, it is non-existent. That which is presently
ceasing [for example, a seed], though existent, is asserted
to be approaching disintegration. Thus, how is this similar to a scale [the activities of the two ends of which exist
simultaneously]? When [the sprout which acts as the
base of the action of growing and thus is] the agent is
non-existent, [the existence of the activity of the
sprout's] growing is also not an admissible entity.
Here, some Svatantrika-Madhyamikas say:
It is true that there is no truly existent otherness and no
simultaneity of [truly existent] actions of production and
cessation. However, is it not the thought of the Rice
Seedling Sutra [when it gives the example of the two ends
of a scale] 632 that without analysis the actions of the seed's
Refuting Inherently Existent Production
647
cessation and of the sprout's production simultaneously
exist from their own side?
However, damage accrues to this view the same as before. The
thought of the sutra is that these activities exist conventionally,
not from their own side.
Objection: [According to you Prasahgikas, production is not
admissible because of the non-existence of otherness which in turn
is due to the non-simultaneity of seed and sprout. If so, then production would exist because of the existence of otherness in whatever exists simultaneously. For example] 633 an eye consciousness
is produced through depending on an eye sense, a visible form,
and feeling which just are simultaneous [with the eye consciousness]. Therefore, production from other is just established.
Answer: It follows that the subject, an eye consciousness, [88]
is not produced from others which exist simultaneously with it
and which are its producers—that is, a visible form, an eye sense,
feeling, and so forth—because of already existing simultaneously
with these as another. Chandrakfrti's Supplement says:634
Objection: An eye consciousness has otherness in relation
to its producers, an eye sense and so forth which exist
simultaneously [with the eye consciousness] and the discrimination and so forth which arise together [with an
eye consciousness].
Answer: Of what use is production [to what already
exists]?
Objection: [An eye consciousness] does not exist [at the
time of its causes].
Answer: For this the fallacy [that the eye sense etc.
would not be other than a not yet existent eye consciousness] has already been explained.
Elimination of error concerning the refutation of production from
other
(See pp. 144-8.) T h e root text says:
That others temporally different are refuted is mistaken.
648
Meditation on Emptiness
[Using] a mass exactly the same and so forth are also
mistaken.
Because the four extremes are not asserted
And because production from other is said
To be non-existent even in the world,
Its assertion here is a dance of the insane.
As Dzong-ka-ba's Illumination of the Thought, Explanation of
(Chandrakirti's) 'Supplement' says,™ some Tibetans assert that
this refutation of production from other is a refutation of others
that are temporally different [without the qualification of being
naturally existent]. Also, some Tibetans use 'logical' coercives
which are exactly the same [instead of good logic. These assertions] etc. are easily understood to be erroneous.
Dak-tsang, as was explained before [in chapter eleven which is
not translated here] 636 here again [89] asserts production from
other. This assertion shows the nature of one who wishes to do a
dance having cut off the head of a crazy, dancing peacock and
hung it on his behind. For, you [Dak-tsang] quoted the Rice Seedling Sutra :637
Also, when a sprout is produced, arising from its cause—
a seed—it is not created by itself, not created by [naturally existent] others, not created by both, not created by
Ishvara, and not metamorphosed by time. It does not
arise from particles, does not arise from its own nature,
and is not produced causelessly.
Also, you are seeking to explicate the system of this passage from
Chandrakirti's Clear Words :638
T h e world does not employ analysis such as 'from self
or 'from [naturally existent] others' and so forth. T h e
world understands only this, 'An effect arises from a
cause.' T h e master [Nagarjuna] presented [cause and
effect] this way too.
Also, Chandrakfrti's Supplement says,639 'Production from other
is non-existent even in the world.' [90]
Refuting Inherently Existent Production
649
Non-production from both self and other
(See p. 148-9.) T h e root text says:
Because there is no [production]
From self and other separately,
Production from both is refuted.
Both the [theistic] Samkhyas who propound Ishvara as the cause
[of all phenomena together with the nature] and the Nirgranthas
[Jainas] assert, as was explained before [in chapters three and
seven which are not translated here], that pots and so on are produced both from themselves and from others.
These assertions are inadmissible because that part of the
assertion which is the production of something from self is
damaged by the earlier refutations of production from self and
that part which is production from other is damaged by the
earlier reasonings refuting production from other. Chandrakfrti's Supplement says:640
Also, production from both is not an admissible entity
because those fallacies already set forth accrue [to the
assertion of production of something from both self and
others].
Non-production without causes
(See p. 149-50.) The root text says:
If things were produced causelessly,
Exertion would be senseless.
It would contradict perception.
All would be produced from all.
It [absurdly] follows that planting seeds, cooking food, and engaging in commerce for the sake of the arising of temporary and final
effects are senseless [91] because, though there are no causes,
effects arise. Also, it [absurdly] follows that crows would have the
decorations of peacock feathers and that horses would have horns.
Also, it [absurdly] follows that, just as a bread-fruit tree would not
be a cause of that tree's fruit, so trees bearing nimba [a bitter fruit],
650
Meditation on Emptiness
mango, and so forth also would not be the causes of their own
fruit. 641 Also, it [absurdly] follows that the ripening of mangos,
lakucha [a type of bread fruit],642 and so forth would not depend
on the seasons because they would be produced causelessly.
Even if these consequences are accepted, it is not admissible
because there is much damage [to asserting such]. For instance,
not only does causeless production contradict what is seen by
the world, it strongly contradicts what is seen by the world.
Chandrakirti's Supplement says:642"
If it is veiwed that [things] are produced only causelessly,
then everything would always be produced from even
everything, and for the sake of the arising of certain
effects the world also would not gather seeds and so
forth, doing many hundreds of things [for the sake of
those effects].
These positions were refuted formerly [in chapter two on the
Nihilists which is not translated here]. [92]
5 Other Types of Production
SIMULTANEOUS REFUTATION OF PRODUCTION
OF T H E FOUR EXTREMES AND OF T H E EXISTENT,
NON-EXISTENT, BOTH, AND NEITHER
(See pp.61-3, 151-4.) T h e root text says:
If [things] are produced from others,
Consider [whether the effects are]
Existent, non-existent, both, or neither.
Of what use [are causes] for the existent?
The non-existent lacks object and agent.
These [reasonings] refute their being both.
What would causes do for what lacks both?
No things have any of the three—inherently existent production,
abiding, or ceasing—or production from [inherently existent]
others. For the existent, non-existent, both, and neither are not
produced. As before, [reasoning and others' systems establish that
if things have inherently existent production, abiding, and ceasing
or production from inherently existent others], it is necessary [that
the effect must be either existent, non-existent, both, or neither].
Furthermore, among the four modes of the reason, [first] that
652
Meditation on Emptiness
which has already attained an existent entity is not produced
again because the damages to production from self are incurred.
T h e totally non-existent is not produced because of having no
activity. That which is both existent and non-existent is not produced because, since the two—existence and non-existence—are
mutually exclusive, they do not subsist in one entity. That which
is neither existent nor non-existent is not produced because such
does not exist. Nagarjuna's Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness says:643
Because the existent exists, it is not produced. [93]
Because the non-existent does not exist, it is not
[produced].
Because the qualities are incompatible,
The existent and non-existent is not [produced].
Because there is no production,
There is no abiding and no ceasing.
Nagarjuna's own commentary on this says:644
Because a thing (bhava, dngos po) exists, it could not be
produced from causes. For the existent is explained as
'the presently existent'. Because the non-existent does
not exist, it could not be produced from causes. Because
the existent and non-existent are not concordant, such
is not produced, for they are mutually exclusive. The
existent and the non-existent possess mutually exclusive
qualities; hence, due to their incompatibility how could
that which is both existent and non-existent be produced? Because there is no [inherently existent] production, there also is no [inherently existent] abiding and no
[inherently existent] ceasing.
Chandrakirti's Supplement says:645
If producers are causes producing products that are
other [than themselves], it is to be considered whether
they produce an existent, non-existent, that which is
both, or that which lacks both. If it exists, of what use
are producers? What could these producers do for the
Other Types of Production
653
non-existent? What could they do for that which is both?
What could they do for that which lacks both? [94]
In Chandrakfrti's own commentary the reasons are individually
established.646
Atfsha's Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment says:64'
The production of the existent is not admissible.
T h e non-existent also is like a flower of the sky.
Because both fallacies are entailed,
That which is both is not produced.
Chandrakfrti's Supplement applies [this refutation of production
of the four extremes] to production from other, whereas the
Superior [Nagarjuna] and the Elder Atfsha give general explanations [of it without specifying production from other]. They
refute not only production but also abiding and ceasing.648
Moreover, because there are four alternatives to be considered
—only existent, only non-existent, both, and neither—this
reasoning can be called a refutation of four alternatives [and not
just four extremes]. Therefore, do not think that a refutation of
the four alternatives (mu bzhi) precludes a refutation of the four
extremes (mtha' bzhi).
REFUTATION OF PRODUCTION
O F T H E FOUR A L T E R N A T I V E S
This section has two parts: the actual exposition of the reasoning
and an elimination of error.
Actual exposition of the reasoning refuting production of the four
alternatives
(See pp.63-4, 155-9.) As is stated in Kamalashfla's Illumination of
the Middle Way,w> our own Buddhist schools which propound
[truly existent] things say:
It is not admissible that there is no true production, for it
is said and seen that there is production of many effects
and of one effect from one cause—[for example] a seed—
654
Meditation on Emptiness
and that many causes and conditions also [95] produce
many effects and one effect.
In order to refute the systems that assert such, the root text says:
Things are not truly produced by causes.
One does not produce one, nor many one,
Nor one many, nor many many.
T h e subjects, things, are not ultimately produced by causes
because ultimately one cause does not produce one effect, ultimately many causes do not produce many effects, ultimately one
cause does not produce many effects, and ultimately many
causes do not produce one effect. For there are reasons captivating to the intelligent. For example, if one eye consciousness has
the imprints of many causes, then it would not ultimately be produced by one cause. Also, it would [absurdly] follow that just as
the causes are many, the effect which is their imprint would be
many consciousnesses. [96] Jnanagarbha's Discrimination of the
Two Truths says:6-"'
Many do not create one thing,
Many do not create many,
One does not create many,
One does not create many things,
One also does not create one.
Also:
You [Proponents of Truly Existent Things] assert that
[an eye consciousness which is] the effect [of three causes
—object, eye sense, and former moment of consciousness—] is not plural but that its qualities [that is, the
qualities of its being produced in the image of the object,
of its ability to apprehend a particular type of object such
as visible forms rather than sounds, and of its being an
experiencer], are different. Thus, alas, why not [assert]
that Ishvara creates [everything]?
Also:
Other Types of Production
655
Just as [it would be contradictory for an eye consciousness to be] simultaneously produced [from a form] and
not produced [from a form], so say why it would not be
contradictory [for the form to be] ultimately^ {yang dag
par) a producer [of the eye consciousness] and not a producer [of the eye consciousness]? [97]
Also:
If it is asserted that the [three imprints or] qualities are
produced from [the composite of the three] causes, the
individual [causes] would not be the producers. Also, if
[the three causes] are [individually the producers, the eye
consciousness which is] the effect would be causeless.
Also:
If you assert that [the eye consciousness which is] the
effect is produced from [the three] causes, then it
[absurdly] follows that the [three imprints or qualities
which are] plural and the [eye consciousness which is]
non-plural would, as before, be causeless.
Elimination of error concerning the refutation of the four
alternatives
(See pp. 159-60.) T h e root text says:
Because one produces one and
Because the others are suitable,
Not affixing here a qualification
Of what is negated is mistaken.
Here also Dak-tsang says that because the four alternatives—one
cause producing one effect, etc.—are non-existent, [98] a qualification such as 'ultimately' or 'naturally' should not be affixed to
what is negated [in the four reasons].651 This is not correct
because it is asserted that [conventionally] a cause, such as one
instant of the eye sense, produces one effect, one instant of an eye
consciousness. Also, Chandrakfrti's Clear Words, when [giving an
etymology of] dependent-arising (pratityasamutpada), says:652
656
Meditation on Emptiness
In a passage such as, 'Dependent on an eye sense and
forms an eye consciousness arises,' a particular object [of
dependence] has been openly accepted [—'dependent on
an eye sense']. When the production of one consciousness, which has as its cause one eye sense, has been
asserted, how could the term pratitya have the meaning
of multiplicity?
Also, the same text at the point of giving the meaning of the term
'direct perceiver' ( p r a t y a k s h a ) m says:
Because there is no sense of [an eye consciousness's
depending on] a multiplicity [of sense powers], one eye
consciousness which has as its base one moment of an
[eye] sense could not be a pratyaksha [according to the
wrong etymology as 'depending on a multiplicity of
sense powers'].
Also, Chandrakirti's commentary on Aryadeva's Four Hundred
says:654
How could one moment of a consciousness be & pratyaksha [i.e., that which depends on a multiplicity of sense
powers, according to the wrong etymology]? For [one
moment of consciousness] does not engage [its object]
through depending on a multiplicity of sense powers.
[One moment of an eye consciousness does not depend
on a multiplicity of sense powers of dissimilar type, such
as also depending on an ear sense] because they are noncompatible. [Also, one moment of an eye consciousness
does not directly depend on a multiplicity of former and
later moments of a sense power of similar type, i.e., eye
senses] because the moments of the sense power and of
the consciousness [99] disintegrate right after they are
produced.
Asanga's Compendium of Knowledge, for instance, contains collections of individual sutra teachings explaining that one action [in
one lifetime] empowers many bodies [in other lifetimes], that
Other Types of Production
657
many actions empower one body, that many actions empower
many bodies, and that one action empowers one body. Such is
asserted also here in Prasangika texts. Shantideva's Engaging in
the Bodhisattva Deeds says:655
T h e effects [produced] by one clear consciousness
[which is enthusiastic in cultivating the first concentration, etc.] are [births in the rank of] a Brahma, etc. [However, if the mind is not powerful] the effect [of the consciousnesses well as of body and speech is not such
because the activity is weak.
Also, as quoted earlier, the fruits of one moment of faith in Buddhas and Bodhisattvas are immeasurable. Also, there is the explanation that if one even makes a ritual object called sachcha656 the
essence of which is a relic, one will be born as a universal emperor as many times as there are particles in it.
However, if one's base or mind is weak, though one performs
virtues and so on for a long time, [100] the effects are small.
Shantideva's Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds says:657
[Buddha] the Knower of Suchness said
That though one performs for a long time
All the repetitions and asceticisms,
Doing them with a mind distracted is useless.
Also, sutra says, 'O monks, asceticisms, recitations, and so forth
when the mind is distracted to desire are fruitless.' Also, Shantideva's Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds says:658
Due to a sin done even for a single moment
One dwells in the Most Tortuous Hell for an eon.
Similarly, one should realize [that production of one effect from
one cause, and so forth, exist conventionally] through many biographies and [Buddha's] life stories. One should look in Nagarjuna's Compendium of Sutra, Shantideva's Compendium of
Learnings, and so forth [for further confirmation].
In brief, Kamalashila's Illumination of the Middle Way says:659
658
Meditation on Emptiness
Question: Is it not seen that many are produced from one
and that one is produced from many? [101] Therefore,
how can these [views] be forsaken?
Answer: These are not [ultimately] admissible, but
even we are not proving that these are not seen.
Thus, he explains that [the four alternative types of production]
are not admissible ultimately but are not not manifestly perceived. Also, Kamalashfla's Illumination of the Middle Way
says:660
T h e master [Nagarjuna] also saw that cause and effect
exist conventionally and that conventionally there is, as
reputed, production of many from one and of one from
many. Also, he realized that the attributes of an eye consciousness and so forth exist through the operation or
non-operation of an eye sense and so forth. Thus, in
order to take care of childish beings, when demonstrating the usage of effect-signs (phalalihga, 'bras rtags)661 he
said that if the causes were plural, [the effects] would be
plural. However, it is to be known that it is not so ultimately.
6 Dependent-Arising
T h e presentation of the reasoning of dependent-arising, making
known the absence of true existence in all phenomena, has two
parts: the actual exposition of dependent-arising and a refutation
of errors.
ACTUAL EXPOSITION OF DEPENDENT-ARISING
(See pp.53-5, 161-71.) T h e root text says:
Because here there are no phenomena
That are not dependent-arisings [102]
And because dependent-arising [means]
Only 'existing upon meeting',
'Existing in reliance', and 'existing dependently',
All phenomena are not able to set themselves up
And do not exist from their own side.
Profound and extensive, eradicating the two extremes,
This is the king of reasonings.
Unlike the Proponents of [Truly Existent] Things, here [in the
Prasangika system] phenomena which are not dependentarisings are not asserted. For whatever exists must both be
660
Meditation on Emptiness
relatively existent and lack inherent existence. Nagarjuna's
Treatise on the Middle Way says:662
Because there are no phenomena
That are not dependent-arisings,
There are no phenomena that are not
Empty [of inherent existence].
Also, Aryadeva's Four Hundred says:663
There is not ever anywhere
Anything's existence without dependence.
Thus there is also not ever anywhere
Any permanent [self]. [103]
Common beings think
Space and so forth are permanent [realities].
T h e wise do not see these as realities
Even with worldly [understanding].
Also, [the Questions of the King of Nagas, Sagara,] Sutra says:664
The wise realize phenomena as dependentArisings, they also rely not on extreme views.
They know phenomena as having causes and conditions.
There are no phenomena without causes and conditions.
Also, Chandrakirti's Clear Words says:665
Thus, 'There are no phenomena that are not dependentarisings,' and dependent-arisings are also empty. Hence,
'There are no phenomena that are not empty.'
Also, Nagarjuna's Treatise says:666
We explain 'arising dependent [on causes and
conditions]' [104]
As [the meaning of] the emptiness [of inherently existent
production].
That [emptiness of inherently existent production] is
dependent imputation.
Just this [emptiness of inherently existent production] is
the middle path.
Dependent-A rising
661
Also, Chandrakirti's Clear Words says:667
Due to lacking the two extremes of [inherent] existence
and non-existence, just this emptiness which is characterized as no inherently existent production is called the
middle path, the middle passage. Therefore, emptiness,
dependent imputation, and middle path are synonyms of
dependent-arising [for one who has generated the Madhyamika view in his continuum].
With respect to the term 'dependent-arising' (pratttyasamutpada) and its meaning, the Grammarians say that if what depend
and meet are cause and effect, then because effect would exist at
the time of cause, 'arising' would be impossible. Also, it would
contradict the non-assertion of the existence of the effect at the
time of its causes. Thus, they do not accept either the term
pratityasamutpada or its meaning.
Also, the [Buddhist] 668 Proponents of [Truly Existent] Things
assert that all dependent-arisings are truly existent and are products. [105] Therefore, the attempt to prove a selflessness [which
means no true existence] through the reason of dependentarising proves just the opposite for them. [In syllogistic form,
this is: the subject, a sprout, is not inherently produced because
of being a dependent-arising. About this] 669 Dzong-ka-ba's
Praise of Dependent-Arising says:670
How can those who see the opposite [proved] and those
who see [the reason] as non-established understand your
[i.e., Buddha's] system [of emptiness as no inherent
existence]?'
In [Chandrakirti's commentary on] Nagarjuna's Sixty Stanzas of
Reasoning [a qualm is raised by an objector about whether
dependent-arising can serve as a sign of no inherently existent
production]: 671
Here some say, 'Your way of speaking is one that never
existed before. It is not reasonable that the term "dependent-arising" indicates no production and no cessation.
662
Meditation on Emptiness
Just as your saying, "A child was born," would not mean
you were saying, "A child was not born," this [usage of
dependent-arising to prove no production and no cessation] is just inadmissible.'
For extensive [discussion on the Grammarians' non-acceptance
and others' misinterpretations of dependent-arising] see Vasubandhu's own explanation of his Treasury of Knowledge (Abhidharmakoshabhashya) and its Commentary (Abhidharmakoshatika) by Rajaputra Yashomitra 672 and also Vasubandhu's Commentary on the 'Sutra on Dependent-Arising'(Pratityasamutpadadivibhahganirdesha) and its Explanation by Gunamati.
Because there are also different ways of forming the term
pratTtyasamutpada, I have arranged the interpretations of the
former great translators and [grammatical references] to
Kalapa's Aphorisms (Kalapasiitra) and Chandragomin's Grammar (Chandravyakaranasiitra) [106] and will explain a little the
thought of Chandrakirti's Clear Words on the topic.
Correct way of interpreting dependent-arising
This section has two parts: formation of the term pratityasamutpada and explanation [of its meaning].
Formation of pratTtyasamutpada
(See pp.163.) To form pratityasamutpadah put down the root
for going, in. Erase the n since it is an indicatory letter. Put down
i; before it putprati. [The nominative ending] su is added to this.
Due to its being an indeclinable,673 su disappears.
Chandragomin's Grammar (I.iii.129) says,674 'Ktva is suitable
when alam and khalu have a prohibitive [sense]. After men.
[Affix it] to the former in time of two [actions with] the same
agent.' Also, in Kalapa's Aphorisms the sixth section on verbal
affixes says,675 'Also, ktva [is affixed] when alam and khalu have a
prohibitive sense. After men. [Affix it] to the anterior of [actions
with] the same agent.' Therefore, [the continuative] ktva is
added.
Chandragomin's Grammar (V.iv.6) says,676 'In a compound
which does not have the negative particle, lyap [is substituted]
Dependent-A rising
663
for ktva.' Therefore, ktva changes to lyap. According to the
sixth section on verbal affixes in Kalapa's Aphorisms,677 ktva
becomes yap, but Chandrakfrti's Clear Words accords with
Chandragomin's Grammar. [107]
Because the I of lyap is for the sake of accent and the letter^ is
indicatory of the addition of the augment tuk, they are erased.
Put down ya.
Chandragomin's Grammar (V.i.69) says,678 '[Affix] tuk to a
[root ending in] a short [vowel] which has no personal ending
when [a verbal affix] having an indicatory p follows.' Therefore,
tuk is added between i and ya.
Because the k is indicatory and the u is for the sake of pronunciation, the two are erased. Put down t.
In Kalapa's Aphorisms the first section on verbal affixes
says,679 '[Affix] t to the end of a root which has an indicatory/).'
[Because] the consonant has no vowel, it is drawn to the latter
letter. Thus, tya is achieved.
Chandragomin's Grammar (V.i.106) says,680 'When a simple
vowel [is followed by] a simple vowel, the long [corresponding
vowel is the single substitute for both vowels].' Thus, joining
prati and i, make [the vowel long], Pratitya is achieved; it is a
stem.
Chandragomin's Grammar (II.i.93) says,681 'When the meaning only [of the noun is denoted], the first [case is employed].'
Thus, the singular of the first case, su is added. According to
Kalapa's Aphorisms it is si.
Chandragomin's Grammar (II.i.38) says,682 'The case affix is
erased after an indeclinable.' Kalapa's Aphorisms says, 'After an
indeclinable also [the case affix is erased].' Thus, the si [or sm] is
erased; thereby, pratitya is achieved. It is used for three [meanings]: 'having met', 'having relied', and 'having depended'. [108]
Here in the Prasangika system, it is explained [that pratitya
refers to any of these three meanings] according to the context
and that it does not necessarily mean just one of them.
Also, p a c h a s the sense of'going'. Put down pad. Before it, put
down the prefix ut, and before it put down sam. Su is added to these
two and is erased as before [due to their being indeclinables].
664
Meditation on Emptiness
Chandragomin's Grammar (I.iii.7) says,683 'Ghan, [the verbal
affix a causing the substitution of vrddhi for the preceding
vowel, comes] also when an action [is denoted].' [In Kalapa's
Aphorisms] the fifth section on verbal affixes says,684 '[The affix]
ghan [comes] after [the roots] pad, ruj, vish, sprsh, and uch.'
Therefore, at the end of the root pad, ghan is added. The significatory gh and the n which signifies vrddhi are erased. Put down
the a which is the life otgha. T h e initial of the root is augmented.
Putting [these parts] together in stages, one achieves samutpada.
Chandragomin's Grammar (II.i.93) says,685 'When the meaning
only [ofthe noun is denoted] the first [case is employed].' Thus, to
this add su; erase u. Also, (VI.iii.98),686 'For the [final] s and the
sh of sajush, ru [is substituted at the end of a word].' 5 becomes ru.
Chandragomin's Grammar (V.i.l 19) says,687 '[The u is the substitute] of ru when [it is followed by] a soft consonant and [preceded] by a non-protracted a.' Thus, the u, being indicatory, is
erased.
Chandragomin's Grammar (VI.iv.20?) says,688 'When there is a
pause, visarga [is substituted for r ].' Thus, r is made into visarga;
samutpadah is achieved. It is explained at this point as meaning
'arising', 'established', and 'existing'. [109]
Explanation of the meaning of dependent-arising (see pp.164.)
Thus, the meaning of pratTtyasamutpada is the arising of things
dependent on causes. For prati is a prefix meaning 'meeting',
and i is the root for going, in, but—with the continuative ending
and modified by the prefix prati—pratTtya is used for 'meeting'
and 'relying'. Also,pada with samut before it is used for 'arising'
and at other times is also explained as 'existing' (sat) and 'established' (siddha). Chandrakirti's Clear Words says:689
Prati has the meaning of meeting (prapti, phrad pa).
[The verbal root] i has the meaning of going. Here the
term pratTtya, a continuative, is used for 'meeting' or
'relying' because of the modification of the meaning of
the verbal root by the modifier [prefix]. It is explained,
'The meaning of the verbal root is led forcefully
Dependent-A rising
665
elsewhere by a modifier [prefix], like the sweetness of the
waters of the Ganges [110] [being changed] by ocean
water.' [The root] pad preceded by samut means 'arise'
(pradurbhava, 'byung ba); therefore, the term samutpada
is used for 'arising'. Hence, the meaning of pratityasamutpada is 'the arising of things in reliance on causes
and conditions'.
Many commentators who have written about this explanation
think that lyap is the [Sanskrit] equivalent of [the genitive particle] kyi [in Tibetan], They are also seen to make coarse errors
about prati and iti. Also, though the great translator Sthiramati
forms the term prati tyasamutpada, it is not clear.690 Having seen
that without understanding these [explanations of the formation
of prati tyasamutpada] one does not understand the early part of
Chandrakfrti's Clear Words, I have clearly expounded a little,
free from error.
Refutation of error concerning the etymology of
pratt tyasam utpada
This section has two parts: refutation of other commentators'
formation and of Bhavaviveka's.
Refutation of the formation of prati tyasamutpada
by other commentators
This section has two parts: statement of their assertion and refutation of it.
Statement of other commentators' assertion on the formation of
pratt tyasamutpada (See p.163-4.) Some former commentators
on Nagarjuna's Treatise, other than Buddhapalita and Bhavaviveka, say:
T h e term prati has a distributive meaning like 'diversely'
or 'this and that'. [ I l l ] [The verbal root] i or in has the
meaning of 'going', or 'departing and disintegrating'.
Itya, which is the affix ya added to the verbal root,
means 'that which goes'. Taking itya as a secondary
666
Meditation on Emptiness
derivative noun, [pratTtyasamutpada means] the arising
of what possesses departing or disintegrating diversely,
diversely.
Chandrakfrti's Clear Words says:691
Others say that [the noun] iti means going, disintegrating. Itya means that which is conducive to going.692 Prati
has the sense of multiplicity. Having explained that the
term itya has an ending for a secondary derivative noun,
they say [pratTtyasamutpada means] the arising of those
which go or disintegrate, diversely, diversely (pratiprati
ityanam vinashinam samutpada).
Bhavaviveka's Lamp for (Nagarjuna's) 'Wisdom' says,693 'Some
others say that the arising of those which disintegrate diversely is
pratTtyasamutpada.' Avalokitavrata's Commentary (PrajnapradTpatTka) on this says:694
T h e 'some others' are some other proponents of Madhyamika tenets.695 [112] 'The arising of those which disintegrate diversely' means the composition and arising
of effects that disintegrate in each diverse moment and
have definite, diverse causes and conditions; it is synonymous with 'arising upon meeting'.
[In Bhavaviveka's text] 'is pratTtyasamutpada' indicates the conclusion of the meaning of the preceding
words. It indicates that the composition and arising of
effects that disintegrate in each diverse moment and
have definite, diverse causes and conditions is pratTtyasamutpada. Proponents of Madhyamika tenets other
than the commentator [Bhavaviveka] himself say this.
When they form the term pratTtyasamutpada, the n of the verbal
root for going, in, is erased. [The zero affix] kvip is added and
entirely erased. ' T is suitable [to be affixed] at the end of a root
which has an indicatory/).' 696 Because of the sense of'going' [an
action noun], t is added. Since it was said,' Ya [is affixed] also as an
affix for derivative nouns [meaning] "good in t h a t y a which is
Dependent-A rising
667
an affix for derivative nouns is added. [The case ending] si is
added. [113] When this is joined with prati, there is [the noun]
pratTtyah. T h e rest [of their formation of prati tyasamutpadah]
is similar to that given above. Chandrakfrti, Bhavaviveka, and
Avalokitavrata refute this assertion that there is a case ending
[that is, a genitive ending making pratTtyanam ] which has been
deleted [in the compound].
Refutation of these other commentators' way of forming pratt tyasamutpada (see pp.l63-4.)Their explanation of prati as meaning
multiplicity and itya as being a derivative noun is not correct.
For, the explanation of prati as meaning multiplicity, though
suitable for just general [applications of the term], does not cover
specific applications. A term for 'many' or multiplicity is
[hypothetically] 697 suitable when a general [reference for the
term is given as in], 'He who sees prati tyasamutpada, that is, the
arising of those which depart or disintegrate diversely, [sees
suchness].' 698 In yah pratityasamutpadam pashyati the term
pratityasamutpadam is a compound; therefore, it is
[hypothetically] correct that a case-ending inside the compound
could have been deleted. However, when a particular referent is
given as in, 'An eye consciousness is produced depending on an
eye sense and a form' chakshuh pratitya rupam cha utpadyate
chakshurvijnanam,699 multiplicity is not suitable in one
particular. H e r t p r a t i t y a is not compounded with anything. It is
not suitable [to say that] there is a compound here because the
Sanskrit original for 'and' {cha) in 'an eye sense and a form' was
not deleted and [the accusative ending] am of'on a form' (rupam)
was not deleted. Also, there is no case ending to be seen from the
end of pratitya until chakshuh. This is because [pratitya is here
just] fit to be an indeclinable, a continuative. Chandrakirti's
Clear Words says:700 [114]
Their etymology would be excellent in a passage such as,
'O monks, I will teach you prati tyasamutpada,' or 'He
who sees prati tyasamutpada sees suchness.' For the
meaning of multiplicity occurs, and there is a compound
[thus allowing for the possibility that pratitya means
pratTtyanam].
668
Meditation on Emptiness
However, here in a passage such as, 'Dependent on an
eye sense and forms an eye consciousness is produced,' a
particular object [of dependence] has been openly accepted—'dependent on an eye sense'. When the production
of one consciousness, which has as its cause one eye
sense, has been asserted, how could the term pratTtya
have the meaning of multiplicity?
However, the meaning of 'meeting' occurs in the term
pratTtya even when a specific object is not asserted;
arising having met [causes and conditions] is dependentarising. Also, [the meaning of 'meeting'] occurs when a
specific object is asserted, [115] for it is said that
dependent on an eye and forms—that is, meeting an eye
and forms or in reliance on an eye and forms—[an eye
consciousness arises].701
If the term itya were a derivative noun, then here in
'Dependent on an eye sense and forms an eye consciousness is produced' (chakshuh pratTtya rupani cha utpadyate chakshurvijnanam) the term pratTtya would
[absurdly] not be an indeclinable. Also, since there
would not be a compound, a case termination would be
present [at the end of pratTtya], The reading would
[absurdly] be: chakshuh pratTtyam vijnanam rupani cha,
'That which departs to an eye sense and to forms, a consciousness, [arises].' And [since such is total nonsense] it
is not so. Therefore, its etymology as just an indeclinable, a continuative, is to be accepted.
T h e meaning [is that pratTtya must be accepted as a continuative] because chakshushcha702 rupam pratTtya chakshu[rvijnanamj appears [in the sutra and no case-ending is given for
pratTtya].
Refutation of Bhavaviveka's way of interpreting
pratTtyasamutpada (see pp.165-6.)
Incorrectness of Bhavaviveka's refutation of another
Bhavaviveka's Lamp for (Nagarjuna's) 'Wisdom' states Buddhapalita's way [of interpreting pratTtyasamutpada]:703
Dependent-A rising
669
With respect to pratityasamutpada, [116] one [Buddhapalita] says that due to the sense of multiplicity in the
prefix prati (rten cing), due to the sense of'meeting' ('brel
ba) in i, and due to the sense of'arising' ('byung ba) in the
term samutpada, pratityasamutpada means 'arising
dependent on these and those [causes and conditions]' or
'arising upon meeting these and those [causes and conditions]'.
Bhavaviveka also states [the other way of interpreting the term
cited] previously [on p.666].
Chandrakfrti, thinking that such an explanation shows Bhavaviveka's lack of skill in stating an opponent's position, asserts
that Buddhapalita's thought is not as Bhavaviveka stated it. For
Buddhapalita says that pratitya means 'meeting' ( p r a p t i p h r a d
pa); and thus prati (rten cing) does not have a sense of multiplicity, and itya ('brel ba) does not mean 'meeting'. Chandrakfrti's
Clear Words says:704
Thus, he [Bhavaviveka] states others' positions and
refutes them. It is regarded that there is a lack of skill in
his stating of others' positions. [117] Why? He [Buddhapalita] who explains the term pratitya705 as meaning
'meeting' does not explain prati as having a sense of multiplicity or that i means 'meeting'.
Then, what [does Buddhapalita say]? Buddhapalita says that
prati (rten cing) means 'meeting' and itya ('brel bar) means
'going'. Though individually they have different meanings,
when these two are combined, the prefix [prati] changes the
meaning of the latter word [itya]. It is like the sweet water of the
Ganges becoming salty when it meets the salt water [of the
ocean]. Thus, the two words indicate just one meaning, 'meeting'. Hence, the meaning of pratityasamutpada is 'arising upon
meeting [causes and conditions]'.
When the term pratityasamutpada is applied to all things in
the sense of 'arising upon meeting this and that collection of
causes and conditions' and one says, 'Hetupratityasamutpada,'
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it is taken as being related with multiplicity. However, [118]
Buddhapalita did not assert [that there is any sense of] multiplicity in a specific [application of the term] as in 'Dependent on an
eye sense and a form [an eye consciousness is produced].' Chandrakirti's Clear Words says:™6
Then what [does Buddhapalita say]? He says that prati
(rten cing) means 'meeting'. I ('brel bar) means 'going'.
T h e combination pratTtya means just 'meeting'. 707
Now when a consideration of all possible entities is
asserted as being expressed by the term pratTtyasamutpada— etymologized as 'arising upon meeting' or
dependent-arising—then a relation with multiplicity is
being stated: 'Arising upon meeting this and that collection of causes and conditions' is [the meaning of]
dependent-arising. [However,] when a consideration of a
particular instance is asserted, there is no relation with
multiplicity, [as in] 'Having met an eye sense and forms
[an eye consciousness arises].'
Such is the unskillfulness of the master [Bhavaviveka]
in citing [another's position].
Not only that, but also [Bhavaviveka's] way of refuting the
others' system is not correct [119] because [his statement] is
reduced to being just the thesis, '[Buddhapalita's explanation] is
not correct,' without any reason.
However, Bhavaviveka's thought may have been that because
a consciousness has no form, it could not meet an eye sense and a
form because meeting exists only between the physical. However, even if that were his thought, it would be incorrect because
it is asserted that monks meet [that is, attain] the four fruits
[Stream Enterer, Once Returner, Never Returner, and Foe Destroyer, which are not physical], Sutra says, 'This monk is one
who has met [attained] the fruit.'
Also, prapya ('having met' or 'upon meeting', phrad nas) is a
synonym of apekshya ('having relied' or 'in reliance upon', Itos
nas). Also, the Superior Nagarjuna [in his Sixty Stanzas of
Reasoning] asserts that the term pratTtya (rten cing 'brel ba)
means prapya ('having m e t \ phradpa):m
Dependent-A rising
671
That which is produced having met this and that
[collection of causes and conditions]
Is not inherently produced.
(Tat tat prapya yad utpannam notpannam tat
svabhavatah.)
Chandrakfrti's Clear Words says:709
[Bhavaviveka says,] 'That is not admissible because of
the non-existence of the meaning of these two [wrong
interpretations of pratityasamutpada]710 in 'An eye consciousness is produced depending on an eye and forms.'
This refutation is not correct. [120] Why? He does not
state a reason why there is no occurrence [of a meeting],
and, therefore, he has only a thesis.
Then, this might be [Bhavaviveka's] thought: 'A consciousness has no form; therefore, it has no meeting with
an eye sense. For it is seen that there is a meeting just of
those which have form.'
This is also not admissible because of the assertion of
'meeting' here in, 'This monk is one who has met the
fruit.' Also, the term 'having met' (prapya, phrad nas) is
a synonym of the term 'having relied' (apekshya, bltos
nas). Also, the master Nagarjuna accepts the term
pratitya as meaning just prapti 'meeting', [or 'having
met' when used as a continuative. Nagarjuna's Sixty
Stanzas of Reasoning says:]711
That which is produced having met this and that
[collection of causes and conditions]
Is not inherently produced.
(Tat tat prapya yad utpannam notpannam tat
svabhavatah.)
Therefore, others [Chandrakfrti himself] say that even
[Bhavaviveka's] refutation is not admissible.
Incompleteness of Bhavaviveka's own etymology and meaning of
pratityasamutpada
(See pp. 165-6.) Even Bhavaviveka's own way of explanation is
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Meditation on Emptiness
incorrect [121] because though he asserts that he will [etymologize pratTtyasamutpada] explaining [the parts] individually, he
does not state individual meanings for pratTtya and samutpada.
Also, [in his Lamp for (Nagarjuna's) 'Wisdom'] Bhavaviveka says
no more than, 712 'the meaning of "conditionality" is the meaning
of pratTtyasamutpada—"Whan this is, that arises; due to the
production of this, that is produced" \ 713 Chandrakirti's Clear
Words says:714
What then is [the meaning of pratTtyasamutpada according to Bhavaviveka? He] presents his own system
as, 'The meaning of conditionality is the meaning of
prat Ttyasamutpada —when this is, that arises; due to
the production of this, that is produced.' This also is
incorrect because he did not state a particular meaning for each of the two terms, pratTtya and samutpada, and because he asserted that he would give an etymology.
Objection: Bhavaviveka says such asserting that pratTtyasamutpada is a term the meaning of which is determined by conventional usage and does not have the character set forth in its etymological explanation. It is like aranyetilaka [which literally
means 'sesame in the forest' 715 but is conventionally used to
mean anything not answering to one's expectations]. T h e word
'et cetera' [in Chandrakirti's text, which is soon to be quoted,
refers to other such non-literal terms derived] from the transmission of earlier forms of speech, such as 'lakeborn' (saraja) for a
lotus grown on dry earth [122] and 'lying on the earth' (mahisha)
for a buffalo that is standing.
A nswer: This also is not correct because the master, the Superior
Nagarjuna, individually differentiated pratTtya and samutpada
as components of the term: tat tat prapya 'having met this and
that' [collection of causes and conditions] and utpannam 'arisen'.
[Nagarjuna's Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning says,] 716 'Tat tat prapya
yad utpannam notpannam tat svabhavatah : That which is produced having met this and that [collection of causes and conditions] is not inherently produced.'
Dependent-A rising
673
Also, you [Bhavaviveka] wish, for instance, to explain [the
term] in accordance with Nagarjuna's Precious Garland:7'7
When this is, that arises,
Like long when there is short.
However, even you must explain this as [having the meaning of
'depending' or 'relying' or] 718 'meeting'. Therefore, that which
you have refuted becomes [that which you yourself must assert].
[123] Chandrakirti's Clear Words says:719
Objection: Such is said [by Bhavaviveka] having asserted
pratityasamutpada to be a conventional term [not necessarily following its etymological meaning] like aranyetilaka [meaning anything which does not answer to one's
expectations], etc.
Answer: This also is not correct because the master
[Nagarjuna] asserts pratityasamutpada just in relation to
its members: ' Tat tat prapya yad utpannam notpannam
tat svabhavatah. That which is produced having met
this and that [collection of causes and conditions] is not
inherently produced.'
[Bhavaviveka] explains pratityasamutpada with:
When this is, that arises,
Like long when there is short.
Then, does he not assert just that depending (pratitya,
rten te) on short, meeting (prapya, phrad cing) to short,
relying (apekshya, bltos nas) on short, long comes to be?
Therefore, it is not fitting that he assert just what he
refutes.
Thus, pratityasamutpada means the dependent-arising of
products—their arising in reliance on their own causes and conditions. [124] It also means the dependent-arising [of all phenomena, products and non-products]—their existence meeting to
or in reliance on their own parts, their own bases of imputation, or
their own members. For with regard to the Sanskrit original of
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Meditation on Emptiness
'arising' (samutpada), Vasubandhu's Commentary on the 'Sutra
on Dependent-Arising'' explains sam as 'coming together', 'aggregating', etc. Also, Rajaputra Yashomitra 720 explains pada as
'existing' etc.
Because all phenomena are just existent in dependence upon,
in reliance upon, or meeting to [causes and conditions, their
parts, and their basis of imputation], they are not able to set
themselves up and do not exist through their own power. Aryadeva's Four Hundred says:721
That which has a dependent arising
Cannot be self-powered; since all these
Lack being under their own power,
There is no self [inherent existence].
Also, the Superior Nagarjuna says [in his Sixty Stanzas of
Reasoning]:722
That which is produced having met this and that
[collection of causes and conditions]
Is not inherently produced. [125]
Also, it is as Chandrakirti's Commentary on (Aryadeva's) 'Four
Hundred' says:723
I am not a proponent of no phenomena (*abhavavadin,
dngospo medpar smra ba) because I propound dependent-arising.
Question: Are you a proponent of [inherently existent]
phenomena (*bhavavadin, dngospor smra ba)}
Answer: No, [I am not a proponent of inherently existing phenomena] because l a m a proponent of dependentarising.
Question: What do you propound?
Answer: I propound dependent-arising.
Question: Then, what is the meaning of dependentarising?
Answer: It means no inherent existence. It means no
inherently existent production. It means the arising of
Dependent-A rising
675
effects which have a nature like that of magical illusions,
mirages, reflections, magical cities of Smell-Eaters, emanations, and dreams. It means emptiness and selflessness.
Also, here [in the syllogism, 'The subject, such and such, does
not inherently exist because of being a dependent-arising'] the
profound is the predicate—'does not inherently exist'—and the
vast is the reason—'being a dependent-arising'. T h e way that the
profound is fully present in the predicate and the vast is fully
present in the reason should be sought in detail in Nagarjuna's
Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning, Chandrakfrti's commentary on it,
Nagarjuna's own commentry on his Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness, and his Precious Garland as well as in Gyel-tsap's commentary, etc. Nagarjuna's Friendly Letter (Suhrllekha) says:724 [126]
This dependent-arising is the profound preciousness
Of the treasury of the Conqueror's speech.
Who sees this correctly sees the highest aspect
[Of the teaching] of Buddha, the Knower of Suchness.
Also, Mahamati's commentary on this says:725
This dependent-arising is the preciousness of the Tathagata's speech because one who knows this well realizes
correctly the teaching of the Tathagata. 'Profound'
means 'solely profound'.
Also:
Or, 'He who sees this correctly...' means seeing just the
preciousness of the treasury which is the Conqueror's
speech. T h e profundity is non-creation by self, noncreation by o t h e r . . .
Thus, this dependent-arising overcoming all conceptions of both
extremes is the king of reasonings. The foremost lama [Dzong-kaba in his Praise of Dependent-Arising] says:726 [127]
Among teachers the teacher of dependent-arising
And among types of knowledge the knowledge of
dependent-arising
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Meditation on Emptiness
Are like the Conqueror King [Buddha] among worldly
beings.
E L I M I N A T I O N O F ERROR C O N C E R N I N G
DEPENDENT-ARISING
(See pp.171-3.) T h e root text says:
Therefore, [asserting] that the ultimate
Is able to set itself up is [like wanting]
To eat space; no one takes 'validly established'
And 'able to set itself up' as synonyms.
Dak-tsang, as was explained before [in the eleventh chapter
which is not translated here],727 asserts that 'ultimate object'
(paramartha, don dam), 'able to set itself u p ' (tshugs thub), and
'validly established' (pramanasiddha, tshadgrub) are synonyms.
However, the three—the father, the Superior [Nagarjuna], and
his spiritual sons [Aryadeva and Buddhapalita]—explain that
dependent-arisings are not autonomous. Therefore, this assertion that an ultimate [an emptiness] is able to set itself up is like
asserting that space can be eaten.
Also, Dharmakfrti's Commentary on (Dignaga's) 'Compendium
of Valid Cognition'(Pramanavarttika) says,728 'Because there are
two types of objects of comprehension, there are two types of
valid cognizers.' Thus, Vaibhashikas, Sautrantikas, and so forth
assert that even generally characterized phenomena (s am any alakshana, spyi mtshan) [permanent phenomena] are validly
established [but, of course, do not accept that they are able to set
themselves up]. Thus, there is not even one [school of tenets]
asserting that 'able to set itself up' is necessarily present in the
meaning of 'validly established'. Therefore, do not scar
Buddha's teaching [with such absurdity]! [128]
7 Refuting a Self of Persons
T h e presentation of the reasoning refuting a self of persons has
two parts: actual exposition and elimination of error.
ACTUAL EXPOSITION OF T H E REASONING
R E F U T I N G A S E L F OF P E R S O N S
(See pp.31-51, 175-95.) T h e root text says:729
A self under its own power is non-existent
Because the aggregates are not the person,
The person is not [an entity] other [than the aggregates],
The person is not the base of the aggregates,
The person also does not [ultimately] depend on the
aggregates,
The person does not [ultimately] possess the aggregates,
The shape [of the aggregates] is not the person,
Like a chariot. Apply [this analysis] to all phenomena.
With respect to this, I have extensively refuted elsewhere 730
many wrong notions about these sets of twos:
1 I and my
2 the view of the transitory collection as a real I and the view of
the transitory collection as real my
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Meditation on Emptiness
3 the conventional, mental valid cognizer apprehending I and
the conventional, mental valid cognizer apprehending my
4 basis of imputation and phenomenon imputed, etc.
Therefore, here I will just illustrate the difficult points.
Sutra says,731 'O monks, any devotee or Brahmin who views a
self is viewing only these five appropriated aggregates.' Also, the
root text [Chandrakirti's Supplement ] says,732 [129] 'There is no
[innate] apprehension [of a self] separate from the aggregates.'
Also, '[The teaching by Buddha that the self is the aggregates] is
[just] a refutation of a self different from the aggregates because
other sutras say that forms and so forth are not the self.' Chandrakirti's own Commentary on the 'Supplement' says:733
T h e object of observation of [a consciousness viewing
the transitory collection as an inherently existent self] is
the [nominally existent] self. For, that which conceives
an [inherently existent] I has its object [an inherently
existent] self.
Thus, the appearance of a [nominally existent] I, or self, sentient
being, god, etc., in dependence on the transitory aggregates which
are composites of plural [factors] is the [nominally existent] I, or
self, sentient being, god, etc.
Furthermore, Buddhapalita says [in his commentary on
Nagarjuna's Treatise],734 'That which the self possesses is called
mine.' Thus, the maker into own of eyes and so forth—which are
the things owned and are qualified as being 'own'—is assigned as
own, mine, a sentient being's mine, a god's mine, etc.
A viewing consciousness which, having apprehended a [nominally existent] I, conceives that I to exist truly [130] is both a consciousness viewing the transitory collection as a real I and an
ignorance. A viewing consciousness which, having apprehended
[nominally existent] mine, conceives that mine to exist truly is
both a consciousness viewing the transitory collection as real
mine and an ignorance. These are explicitly said to be consciousnesses viewing the transitory collection [as real I and mine] in
Chandrakirti's own Commentary on the 'Supplement':735
Refuting a Self of Persons
679
There [in VI. 120] a 'consciousness viewing the transitory collection' is an afflicted knowledge dwelling in
thoughts of such [inherently existent] I and mine.
Also, Chandrakfrti's Supplement says:756
Initially adhering to a self, I,
And then generating attachment for things, 'This is
mine.'
His Commentary on the 'Supplement' says:7'7
These worldly beings, before adhering to mine, imagine
through the conception of an [inherently existent] I that
a non-[inherently] existent self does exist [inherently],
and they adhere to just this as true. Then thinking
'mine', they adhere also to all things other than the
object of the conception of I [as truly established].
Also, Dzong-ka-ba's Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle IFoy'says in detail:738
The [conventionally existent] I is the base generating the
thought T. There is a consciousness observing it which
as its mode conceives [the I] to exist by way of its own
character. [131] This is both an innate consciousness
viewing the transitory collection which [falsely] conceives I and an obscuration with respect to a self of
persons. There is a consciousness observing the [conventionally existent] mine which as its mode conceives [the
mine] to exist by way of its own character. This is both
an innate consciousness viewing the transitory collection
which [falsely] conceives mine and an obscuration with
respect to the mine of a person.
[Thus, 'mine' refers not to things which are considered as belongings but to the maker of things into one's belongings; hence,
mine is a type of person.] 739 Nevertheless, the person does not
become many continuums [I being one and mine being another]
due to the fact that I and mine are one entity, differentiated only
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Meditation on Emptiness
in thought through their isolates. For example, in the Superior
Ananda's continuum the I, monk, human, Stream Enterer,
Shakya clan member, and royal caste member have different
meanings but are one continuum. Therefore, it should be understood that the types of consciousnesses conceiving I in his continuum are manifold.
T h e appearance as I with respect to the aggregates and the
appearance as I in dependence on the aggregates are I. However,
not only are the aggregates not I, but also the aggregates appearing as I are not I. For, the appearance as an I established from its
own side is not the object I.
Also, eyes, ears, and so forth are bases of the imputation 'mine'
(ngayiba) and [132] illustrations [not of the mine but] of what is
owned ( n g a y i y i n rgyu), but they are not mine. For they are not
that which possesses mine (nga yi can) nor the maker of mine
(nga yir byed pa po). Also, the conception of eyes, ears, and so
forth as existing by way of their own character is a conception of
a self of phenomena; what conceives the mine which appears in
dependence on them to be inherently existent is the [false] conception of mine. Dzong-ka-ba's Ocean of Reasoning says:740
A consciousness observing a base [such as an eye generating the thought] 'mine' and conceiving it to exist in
that way [by way of its own character] is a conceiver of a
self of phenomena. Therefore, 'observing the mine' does
not refer to observing those [eyes, ears, and so forth
which are the bases giving rise to the thought 'mine'].
Also, Kay-drup's Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate [seems to
speak of eyes and so forth as illustrations of mine but actually] is
explaining that they are illustrations of things owned (bdag giyin
rgyu):™
The eyes, ears, and so forth included within one's own
continuum are illustrations of both mine and phenomena in the division [of all phenomena] into persons and
phenomena.
Chandrakirti's Clear Words says:742
Refuting a Self of Persons
681
That which pertains to the self is the mine; it means
one's own five aggregates.
Still, he is referring to the bases [generating the thought] 'mine'
(bdaggi ba'igzhi) [and not mine itself]. Kay-drup's Opening the
Eyes of the Fortunate says:743 [133]
The eyes, ears, and so forth included within one's own
continuum are illustrations of both mine and phenomena in the division [of all phenomena] into persons and
phenomena. They appear to innate [non-analytical]
awarenesses as mine which is established from the
object's own side or they appear to innate awarenesses as
mine, and then observing such mine, one conceives that
it exists by way of its own character. This is the innate
[mis]conception of mine.
Therefore, on the basis that [the eyes, ears, and so forth in one's
own continuum] are the objects generating the view of the transitory collection that [falsely] conceives of mine, you should know
that when mine appears to a Buddha, he perceives it as only
imputed to its basis of imputation and does not perceive the basis
of the imputation as the phenomenon imputed. Also, you should
know that a composite of the two [mistaken appearance of the
mine as inherently existent and the emptiness of such] appears to
lesser Superiors.
Furthermore, Dak-tsang and so forth say:744
It is wrong that when the conception of self is analyzed,
one refutes the identification of a self separate from the
aggregates and afterwards refutes the true existence of
the aggregates. This is because the self and the aggregates appear as one to the innate [non-analytical intellect], for the root text [Chandrakirti's Supplement]
says,745 [134] 'There is no [innate] conception [of a self]
separate from the aggregates.'
Ridiculing the instruction manuals on the view [of emptiness],
even one of our own logicians propounds [that there is no innate
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Meditation on Emptiness
conception of the self and aggregates as different]. 746 These assertions are the bad talk of those with partial vision much like the
way a one-eyed yak eats grass.
[Contradictory consequences are now stated to refute the view
that innate, non-analytical awarenesses perceive the self as one
with the aggregates and that, therefore, analysis of the self means
analysis of the aggregates.] It [absurdly] follows that an innate
[non-analytical] awareness would not conceive [the self and the
aggregates] as different as in 'my body' and 'my mind'.
It [absurdly] follows that there would be no innate [nonanalytical awareness misconceiving the self and the aggregates
as like a master and his subjects.
If it is accepted [that there is no innate non-analytical awareness misconceiving the self and the aggregates as like a master
and his subjects], then it [absurdly] follows that Chandrakirti
would be wrong to say,747 'What is related to [or preceded by] the
view of self [that is, of inherent existence] is extinguished.'
It [absurdly] follows that the Sutra on the Ten Grounds concerning the fourth ground [and quoted by Chandrakirti] 748 at
this point [in the fourth chapter of his Commentary on the 'Supplement'] would be wrong. There are many [such contradictory
consequences].
You seem to be basing your opinion on [Chandrakirti's statement in his Supplement ],749 'There is no [innate] conception [of a
self] separate from the aggregates.' [However,] this refutes [the
theory that there is an innate conception of] 750 a self that has a
character discordant with the aggregates and that there is an
innate conception of a permanent self independent of the aggregates; it does not refute that the self and the aggregates are just
different. [For you] it [absurdly] follows that this distinction
would be incorrect because of your thesis [that the self and the
aggregates appear as one to an innate non-analytical awareness].
T h e three circles of self-contradiction! [You have accepted (1)
the reason, (2) that the predicate of the consequence is entailed
by the reason, and (3) the opposite of the consequence.]
If it is accepted [that the self and the aggregates are not merely
different], then since the self and the aggregates exist and a
Refuting a Self of Persons
683
difference between them has been rejected, it [absurdly] follows
that the self and the aggregates would be one.
Also, [if it is accepted that the self and the aggregates are not
merely different], then it [absurdly] follows that Chandrakfrti
would be wrong when he clearly states in his root text [that the
self and the aggregates are not different entities but are just different]:" 1 [135]
Those who have fallen down senseless into [lives as] animals for many eons also do not perceive this unborn permanent [self]. Having seen that the conception of [an
inherently existent] I operates even in them, [what intelligent being would think that such an unborn permanent
self is the base of the innate conception of an inherently
existent self?] Thus, there is no self other than the aggregates.
Furthermore, while saying such, [we] 7,2 say that the way that the
I in a human continuum appears is that it appears undifferentiable from the aggregates and as if standing on its own (hrang
hrang ba) and concrete (phob phob pa). About this also, some
[Dak-tsang and so forth] 753 say, 'Such an appearance of the I is
totally incorrect because the I is a non-associated compositional
factor [that is, a product which is neither form nor consciousness] and because non-associated compositional factors do not
appear this way.'
[Contradictory consequences are stated in response.] It
[absurdly] follows that there would be no appearance of I [to
the mind] because [according to you] the appearance of the
aggregates which are the bases of the imputation 'I' is not the
appearance of the I.754 T h e three circles of self-contradiction!
It [absurdly] follows that when the I appears, an independent I
would appear because the I would have to appear without
depending on the appearance of the aggregates. T h e three circles
of self-contradiction!
It [absurdly] follows that when the I appears to an innate [nonanalytical awareness], without the appearance of the aggregates
—the basis of the imputation—the appearance of an I, the
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Meditation on Emptiness
phenomenon imputed which is merely neither form nor consciousness, would occur. For, your thesis is correct [according to
you]! [136]
If that were accepted, it would contradict Chandrakirti's statement, 755 'There is no [innate] conception [of a self] separate from
the aggregates.'
Not only that but also the way that the I appears to an innate
[non-analytical awareness] is that it seems to exist from the side
of the aggregates [and not just as an imputation from the
subject's side] within the context that the basis of the imputation
'I' and the phenomenon imputed are inseparably mixed like milk
and water. For at that time, it must appear by way of a mixture of
the appearance of the aggregates, which are the basis of the
imputation, and the appearance of the I, which is the phenomenon imputed [in dependence upon them]. If the I appeared
separately from the aggregates, then the self would not appear to
have the character of the aggregates—production, disintegration, shape, etc., being the feeler, discriminator, accumulator of
actions, actor, knower, and so forth. Nagarjuna's Treatise on the
Middle Way says:756 •
If [the self] were other than the aggregates,
It would not have the character of the aggregates.
Also, Chandrakirti's Clear Words says:757
If the self were separate from the aggregates, it would
have the character of non-aggregates. [137] T h e five
aggregates have the character of suitability as form, 758
experiencing, apprehending signs, composition, and realizing objects individually. Also, just as consciousness [is
different] from form, so the self which is being asserted to
be different from the aggregates would be established as
having a character different [from the aggregates]. Also,
its different character would be apprehended just as [the
character of] mind [is apprehended separate] from form,
but it is not apprehended so. Therefore, the self is not
separate from the aggregates.
Refuting a Self of Persons
685
Buddhapalita also says such. [If the person and the aggregates
appeared totally separately] then a white horse, a speckled bull,
and so forth would be impossible.
Also, the Sacred Word of Manjushri by [the fifth Dalai Lama,]
the great master and foremost of Conquerors, says:759
Sometimes the I will seem to exist in the context of the
body. Sometimes it will seem to exist in the context of
the mind. Sometimes it will seem to exist in the context
of the other individual aggregates [feelings, discriminations, and compositional factors]. At the end of the arising of such a variety of modes of appearance, [138] you
will come to identify an I that exists in its own right, that
exists inherently, that from the start is self-established,
existing undifferentiatedly with the mind and body
which are [also] mixed like milk and water.
This is the first essential [in meditation on the selflessness of I], the ascertainment of the object to be negated
[in the view of selflessness]. You should analyze until
deep experience of it arises. Having generated such in
your mental continuum, you thereby crystallize an identification of the I conceived by the innate consciousness
conceiving I as able to set itself up within the context
that it and your own five aggregates are like water put in
water. [139]
This appears to be an unprecedented good explanation, based on
experiencing the meaning of the texts by the father Nagarjuna
and his spiritual sons.
The objects generating the thought 'I' in the mind of a person
such as Devadatta are not of different continuums, but there is a
plurality of gods, humans, animals, and so forth [because he was,
is, and will be these at various times over his continuum of lives].
T h e finer points should be known, such as that the I and the
mind of his continuum have operated beginninglessly and that
though [the I and the mind] have been produced and have ceased
[moment by moment], they have never been destroyed. However, the states of being a god or animal, etc., are established
686
Meditation on Emptiness
through assuming such a body, and the states are destroyed
through casting off such a body.
Also, since gods, humans, and so forth are differentiated by
way of their physical supports [that is to say, their bodies], the I
sometimes seems to exist in the context of the body. On the other
hand, since the passage of the mere I through to Buddhahood
depends on the mind [which leaves one body and assumes
another], the I sometimes seems to exist in the context of the
mind. If one [wishes to] penetrate the depths of the view, one
should analyze these points well in accordance with Nagarjuna's
Treatise on the Middle Way and Dzong-ka-ba's Great Commentary on it. Dzong-ka-ba's Ocean of Reasoning says:760
Therefore, do not hold that the two, the human who is
the imputer of the designation T and the [conventionally existent] self which is the basis that is being imputed
with the designation, are co-extensive. Know that the
human is one part of the self. [140]
Also:
When Devadatta's selves of former and later lives are not
individually differentiated, the self that serves as the
basis of the [valid] conception of I is the mere I which has
existed beginninglessly. Therefore, the selves of the
individual migrators when they appropriate the bodies
of gods and so forth are instances of the formerly mentioned mere I].
Also, it is said in the word of the foremost Conqueror [the Fifth
Dalai Lama's Sacred Word of Manjushri],161 'Sometimes the I
will seem to exist in the context of the body. Sometimes it will
seem to exist in the context of the mind.'
Also, Chandrakirti's own Commentary on the 'Supplement'
says:762
There is no [innate] adherence to a self anywhere except
with respect to the aggregates. Hence, there is no fifth
form of the [false] view of the transitory collection [as
real I and mine].
Refuting a Self of Persons
687
Thus, there are twenty artificial views of the transitory collection, like twenty mountain peaks, 7 " and as antidotes to destroy
them Chandrakirti states as signs or reasons the meaning of a
statement in sutra that he quotes:764
Form is not the self; also the self does not possess form.
T h e self is not in form; form is not in the self... .Just so,
the self is not consciousness; [141] the self does not
possess consciousness. T h e self is not in consciousness;
consciousness is not in the self.
[Chandrakirti] establishes [through those reasons] the subtle selflessness, that is, the lack of inherent existence in all phenomena,
mentioned in a sutra which says,765 'All phenomena are selfless.'
Therefore, it is with such in mind that the foremost precious
[Dzong-ka-ba] says766 that the refutation of artificial [misconceptions] is a branch of refuting innate [misconceptions of persons
and phenomena]. Also, refutations of extremes with respect to
the selflessness of phenomena [other than persons] are used as
reasons [in the sevenfold reasoning refuting a self of persons].767
Let us summarize the meaning of these sutras. The subjects, a
Tathagata or a person, 768 do not exist autonomously or inherently because:
1 they are not the mental and physical aggregates which are the
basis of their imputation, that is, they are not one with the
aggregates which are the basis of their imputation
2 they are not others separate from the aggregates which are
the basis of their imputation, that is, they do not exist as entities separate from these aggregates which are the basis of their
imputation
3 inherently they are not like a tub, the support of the mental
and physical aggregates which would then be like a juniper 769
[142] *
4 they do not inherently depend on the mental and physical
aggregates
5 they do not inherently possess the mental and physical aggregates in the manner of a sameness of entity, as in the
688
Meditation on Emptiness
case of Devadatta's possessing an ear, and they do not possess
the aggregates in the manner of a difference of entity, as in the
case of Devadatta's possessing wealth.
In Nagarjuna's Treatise the reason is given with:770
[The Tathagata] is not [inherently one with his own five]
aggregates; [the Tathagata] is not [inherently] other than
[his own five] aggregates; the aggregates are not [inherently dependent] on him; he is not [inherently dependent]
on those [aggregates]; the Tathagata does not [inherently]
possess the aggregates.
Then, the thesis is given as:
What [inherently existent] Tathagata is there? [That is,
there is no inherently existent Tathagata.]
Also, Nagarjuna's Precious Garland gives the reason with:771
T h e aggregates are not [inherently one with] the self;
those [aggregates] are not [inherently dependent] on that
[self]; that [self] is not [inherently dependent] on those
[aggregates]; without those [aggregates] that [self] is not
[apprehendable separately; the self] is not mingled with
the aggregates like fire and fuel.772
T h e 'mingling' [of the self and the aggregates] refers to possession
[in which possessor and possessed] are one entity as explained previously [on page 687] when indicating what is negated [in the
view of selflessness]. [143] The thesis is given with:
Therefore, how could a self exist?
Furthermore, the reasons are to be established individually:
If those two [a Tathagata or a person] are one with [their
respective] mental and physical aggregates, it [absurdly]
follows that they are impermanent. It [absurdly] follows
that they are [each] multiple. It [absurdly] follows that a
self is not asserted. It [absurdly] follows that remembering other births is impossible.
Refuting a Self of Persons
Buddhapalita''s Commentary on (Nagarjuna's)
Treatise says:7
Respectively, the aggregates are not the Tathagata. Why?
The aggregates possess the qualities of arising and disintegration; therefore, it would follow that the Tathagata was
just impermanent. Also, the appropriator [the self] is not
suitable to be just one with the appropriated [aggregates].
Also, Chandrakirti's Clear Words says:774
With respect to this [first stanza of the eighteenth chapter in Nagarjuna's Treatise], if the self were thought to
be the aggregates, then the self would have production
and disintegration because of depending on the production and disintegration of the aggregates. Also, the self is
not asserted thus [144] because of the consequence of
many faults. 775 As [Nagarjuna] will explain (XXVII.12):
Also it does not arise [newly]
Not having existed [in a former life]
For fallacy follows there,
T h e self would be a product
And its arising would be causeless.
And similarly (XXVII.6):
T h e appropriated [aggregates] are not the self,
[For] the aggregates arise and disintegrate.
How indeed could the appropriated
Be the appropriator?
Furthermore, this position is to be understood from the
extensive analysis in the Supplement :776
If the aggregates were the self,
T h e n because of the plurality of those aggregates,
the selves would also just be many.
Also the self would be a substantiality and viewing it
as such
Would not be erroneous if it is acting on a
substantiality. [145]
690
Meditation on Emptiness
In nirvana annihilation of the self would definitely
occur.
There would be destruction and production of the
self in the moments prior to nirvana.
Due to the destruction of the agent, effects of those
[actions] would be non-existent.
Also another would experience [the effects of actions]
accumulated by another
Here I will not extensively elaborate on it. Thus, respectively the aggregates are not the self.
If these two [a Tathagata or a person] were entities different
from their mental and physical aggregates [which are their bases
of imputation], then it would [absurdly] follow that they are not
aggregates. It would [absurdly] follow that they would not be
feelers and so forth. It would [absurdly] follow that they would
be permanent. It would [absurdly] follow that they would be
apprehended apart from the mental and physical aggregates. It
would [absurdly] follow that they would not be existent selves. It
would [absurdly] follow that they would be without activity and
would not be agents. Buddhapalita's Commentary on (Nagarjuna 's) Treatise says:777
A Tathagata also is not other than his aggregates; he does
not exist as a separate phenomenon which is not the
aggregates. Why? He would not accord with the impermanent aggregates; therefore, he would just be permanent. If [a Tathagata and his aggregates] were other, it
would follow that he would be apprehended [separate
from the aggregates which are his basis of imputation].
Because he is not apprehended [separate from his aggregates], [146] a Tathagata is not other than his aggregates.
Also, Chandrakfrti's Clear Words says:778
If the self were separate from the aggregates, it would
have the character of non-aggregates. T h e five aggregates
have the character of suitability as form, experiencing,
Refuting a Self of Persons
691
apprehending signs, composition, and realizing objects
individually. Also, if the self is asserted to be different
from the aggregates, just as consciousness is different
from form, the self would be established as having a
character different from the aggregates. Also, its different character would be apprehended just as [the character of] mind [is apprehended separate] from form, but
such is not apprehended. Therefore, the self also is not
separate from the aggregates.
Even if a self or a Tathagata inherently acted as the base of the
mental and physical aggregates [which are in their continuum] or
even if these two inherently depended over there on the aggregates, the fallacies of a self different from the aggregates would
ensue. Buddhapalita's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) Treatise
says:779 [147]
Aggregates do not exist in a Tathagata like a forest of
trees in snow. Why? Those which are supported [aggregates] and their base [a Tathagata] would be other; therefore, it would follow that a Tathagata was permanent.
Also, a Tathagata does not exist in aggregates like a lion
in a forest of trees. Why? There would be the fallacy just
indicated.
Also, Chandrakirti's own Commentary on the
says:780
'Supplement'
If [the self and the aggregates] were [inherently] other,
they would be fit to be the [intrinsically existent] entities
of that which is supported and its support like yogurt in
a metal bowl, for example. Since the two, yogurt and
bowl, are just other in worldly conventions, they are
seen to be the entities of that which is supported and its
support. However, the aggregates are not thus different
[entities] from the self, and the self also is not a different
[entity] from the aggregates. Therefore, these two are
not the entities of support and supported.
692
Meditation on Emptiness
A Tathagata and a person do not possess the mental and physical aggregates in the mode of being inherently different or nondifferent entities. [148] If they possessed the mental and physical
aggregates in the mode of inherent non-difference as if mingled
or like a core, the fallacies of their being one with the aggregates
would ensue. It would [absurdly] follow that a Tathagata and a
person were impermanent, etc. If they possessed the mental and
physical aggregates in the mode of inherent difference, the
fallacies resulting from a difference of the self and the aggregates
would ensue. Buddhapalita's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's)
Treatise says:781
A Tathagata does not possess [his] aggregates in the way
that a tree possesses [its] core. Why? He would not be
other than the aggregates; therefore, there would be the
fallacy of his being impermanent.
Also, Chandrakirti's Supplement says:782
It is not accepted that the self [inherently] possesses the
body. For the self [has already been refuted as inherently
one with or different from the aggregates and thus] is not
[inherently existent]. Therefore, the relationship of the
selfs possessing the aggregates does not exist [inherently], If it is said that they are other [entities, like Devadatta's] possessing a cow or that they are not other [entities like Devadatta's] possessing his body, [the answer is
that] the self is not one with or other than the body.
[Therefore, the selfs possessing form does not inherently exist.]
Furthermore, Chandrakirti's own Commentary on the 'Supplement' says:783
Also, the suffix indicating possession [mat- or vat-pratyaya] is employed for the non-different in riipavan
devadattah, 'Devadatta is a possessor of a form [a body].'
It is employed for the different in goman, 'Devadatta is a
possessor of a cow.' [149] Since form and the self do not
Refuting a Self of Persons
693
have [naturally existent] sameness or otherness, there is
no saying that the self [inherently] possesses form.
Hence, when these are condensed, they are included within
[the reasoning that the self and the aggregates] lack [true] oneness and difference. However, Chandrakirti's Clear Words1M
explains that [five positions instead of just two] are refuted in
relation to the modes of operation of the consciousnesses viewing the transitory collection [as real I and mine].
This reasoning is able to prove selflessness with respect to all
phenomena since when any of the aggregates, constituents, or
sources are analyzed into their basis of imputation and phenomenon imputed, they do not exist in any of those five ways. Therefore, one takes as one's reason that which refutes the object
adhered to by artificial conceptions and refutes the innate conception that the phenomenon imputed exists from the side of its
basis of imputation. Nagarjuna's Precious Garland says:78"1
Just as the person is not [established as its own] reality
Because of being [only designated in dependence upon]
a composite of the six constituents,
So each of the constituents also
Is not [established as its own] reality because of being
[designated in dependence upon] a composite.
Also: [150]
T h e three elements are not [one with] earth.
T h e three elements are not [dependent] on this [earth].
This [earth] is not [dependent] on those [three elements].
Without those [three elements] there is no earth.
Like [earth] each [of the other three elements]
Is not [findable when analyzed in those four ways],
Therefore the elements also are false like the self.
Also, some Svatantrikas and some of our own schools which
propound [inherently existent] things explicitly posit the mind
as the self that takes rebirth. 786 Some propound as the self the
special configuration [or shape] of the aggregates because gods
694
Meditation on Emptiness
and humans are posited by way of special configurations of the
aggregates due to former actions (karma, las). In order to refute
these [Chandrakfrti] adds two facets of reasons:
The mere composite [of the five aggregates or of the consciousness aggregate] is not the self, and the physical
shape is not the self.
Chandrakirti's Supplement says:787
A chariot is not accepted as other than its members [or
parts]. That it is not other [but is one with its members] is
not [established. Inherently] it does not possess its members. It is not [inherently dependent] on its members. Its
members are not [inherently dependent] on it. It is not the
composite [of its members]. It is not the shape [ofits members. T h e self and the aggregates] are similar. [151]
This sevenfold analysis is also a supreme of reasonings for
settling everything—forms and so forth—as selfless. Chandrakirti's Supplement says:788
All things whatsoever—pots, cloths, tents, armies,
forests, rosaries, trees, houses, carts, hotels, etc., and
likewise [other things] designated by beings from whatsoever point of view—are to be known [as existing only
according to unanalytical renown]. For the King of Subduers did not dispute with the world. Quality, part,
passion, definition, fuel, and so forth as well as qualificand, whole, the impassioned, 789 illustration, 790 fire, and
so forth—these [objects] do not exist in the seven ways
when subjected to the analysis of the chariot. They exist
through [non-analytical] worldly renown which is other
than that.
Also, about this, Dak-tsang says [in paraphrase]:791
T h e Sammitfyas and so forth assert that the five aggregates are the basis of the imputation 'self. Also, Bhavaviveka and so forth assert that only the mind is the basis
Refuting a Self of Persons
695
of the imputation 'self. However, none of our own
schools asserts that the mind is the self. [152]
Without even reading any of Bhavaviveka's and Chandrakirti's
books, Dak-tsang has the courage to make distinctions, thereby
making an external display of his own ignorant innards. [Contradictory consequences are offered in response.] Then it [absurdly]
follows that when another [non-Buddhist] school proves that the
mental consciousness is the self, it would not [for Bhavaviveka]
prove what is already established [for him]. Also, it [absurdly]
follows that Bhavaviveka would not assert that the collection
of the body and the senses are a basis of the imputation 'self.
For [according to you] (1) Bhavaviveka does not assert that the
mental consciousness is the self and (2) from among the five
aggregates, he takes only the mental consciousness as the basis
of the imputation 'self. T h e three circles of self-contradiction!
If both consequences are accepted, then it [absurdly] follows
that it is wrong for [Bhavaviveka] to explain in his Blaze of Reasoning [when another school tries to prove that the mental consciousness is the self] that they are proving what is already established [for him]:792
This is a proof of what is already established [for me]
since we also actually impute the term 'self to [the mental] consciousness conventionally. Because [the mental]
consciousness takes rebirth, it is called the self.
It [absurdly] follows that it is wrong [for him] to say, '[we also]
actually impute the term " s e l f ' to [the mental] consciousness',
that is, that the term 'self is used as an actual name for [the mental] consciousness [because, according to you, he does not assert
such], [153] Also, it [absurdly] follows that it is wrong [for
Bhavaviveka] to prove that [the mental] consciousness is the self
through the reason of its being the taker of rebirth [because,
according to you, he does not assert such].
Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that it is wrong [for Bhavaviveka] in his Blaze of Reasoning to explain that the collection of
696
Meditation on Emptiness
the body and the senses is a basis of the designation 'self [and
thus is the self]:793
Because [the mental] consciousness takes rebirth, it is
called the self. It is imputed to the collection of the body
and the senses.
Also, it [absurdly] follows that it is wrong [for Bhavaviveka] to
cite as a source for this [a sutra] teaching that the collection of the
aggregates is the basis of designation [of the self and thus is the
self]:794
It is said, 'Just as one thinks "chariot", for example, with
respect to a collection of parts, so in dependence on the
aggregates "sentient being" is designated conventionally.'
Also, it [absurdly] follows that, when Chandrakirti quotes this
sutra, he would be refuting that the aggregates are the basis of
the imputation 'self [instead of that the collection of the aggregates is the self since it is clear that he is refuting Bhavaviveka's
interpretation and you claim that Bhavaviveka interprets the passage as showing that the collection of the aggregates is not the person but is the basis of imputation ofthe person in which case Chandrakirti must be refuting this]. Also, [for the same reason] it
[absurdly] follows that Chandrakirti would not assert that the
mind and the aggregates are bases of the imputation 'self [whereas
he obviously does]. Also, it [absurdly] follows that the two—
Bhavaviveka and Chandrakirti—do not differ with respect to
asserting or not asserting establishment by way of [the object's]
own character (svalakshanasiddhi, rang gi mtshan nyidkyis grub
pa) [154] because [according to you] they are the same in not
positing the phenomenon imputed as its basis of imputation.
Etc. You have a mass of the three circles of self-contradiction!
ELIMINATION OF ERROR CONCERNING
T H E R E F U T A T I O N OF A S E L F OF PERSONS
(See pp.449-51, 505-30.) T h e root text says:795
Refuting a Self of Persons
697
They assert that on some occasions there is valid
establishment
With the three modes appearing similarly
And that there are just [similarly appearing] reasons.
However, they do not assert self-powered valid
establishment,
Therefore, they do not assert autonomous [syllogisms]
That autonomous [syllogisms are asserted] in this system is
mistaken.
Dak-tsang's saying that the Prasahgikas assert autonomous syllogisms conventionally is, as was explained before [in chapter
eleven which is not translated here],796 the tremendous mistake
of confusing an other-renowned reason and an autonomous
reason as the same.797 For on some occasions when Prasahgikas
critically investigate the meaning of the profound [emptiness]
among themselves, there is valid establishment, like a magical
illusion, with the three modes [of the reason] appearing similarly
to both parties in the debate.798 Also, though the three modes,
subject, and reason are established as like illusions and as appearing similarly to both parties in the debate, there is no valid establishment in which the three modes [of the reason] exist under
their own power. Also, [Prasahgikas] do not assert that [autonomous syllogisms] exist even conventionally because they assert
that inherent establishment does not exist even conventionally.
Appendices
1 Types of Awareness
(See Chart 41; the numbers indicate the progression toward a
direct non-conceptual cognition of emptiness.)
A cognizing consciousness or valid cognizer not only is correct
with respect to its main object but also is an incontrovertible
knower. 799 Therefore, a mind such as correct assumption, since
it is not incontrovertible, is not a valid cognizer. Because the
Prasangikas do not etymologize the syllable pra in pramana as
meaning 'new', but as either 'main' (gtso bo) or 'correct' yang
dag pa), pramana does not refer to a 'prime valid cognizer' in the
sense of being new but to a consciousness which is non-deceived
with respect to its prime or main object. 'Non-deceived' means
that the mind is incontrovertible, and 'main object' refers to the
object of the mode of apprehension ('dzin s tangs kyiyul) of the
consciousness. A conceptual consciousness such as when thinking about one's house is mistaken with regard to its appearing
object (snangyul) in the sense that an image of an object appears
to be that object, but a correct conceptual consciousness is not
mistaken with regard to the main object to which the image
refers. Therefore, a conceptual consciousness can be valid, as in
the case of an inferential consciousness, which is incontrovertible with respect to its main referent object (zhenyul).
704
Meditation on Emptiness
A direct valid cognizer (pratyaksha-pramana) is not, for the
Prasangikas, necessarily a non-conceptual consciousness; the
word 'direct' merely eliminates dependence on a sign or reason.
Therefore, the second moment of an inferential consciousness
(anumana) is no longer inferential but direct (pratyaksha) in that
it perceives its object (emptiness, for instance) without relying
on a sign, such as dependent-arising, but through the force of the
previous cognition.
In his progress toward a non-conceptual direct cognition of
emptiness a yogi's consciousness of the nature of objects changes
radically (see the numbers on Chart 41). First he has a strong
sense that objects inherently exist; this is a wrong consciousness.
Then, through hearing about emptiness and/or reflecting on its
meaning, his conception of inherent existence weakens a little,
and he merely suspects that objects inherently exist; this consciousness is doubt not tending toward the fact—he suspects that
objects inherently exist. Then, he has doubt not tending and
tending toward the fact equally, thinking that objects probably
do and do not inherently exist. Then, through study and extended meditation he develops doubt tending toward the fact, thinking that objects probably do not inherently exist, but still he only
suspects so. Further hearing, study, and extended meditation on
the profound brings him to the point of correct assumption—a
conceptual understanding of emptiness which can be generated
through tht processes of inference but is not yet inference because
it is not incontrovertible.
Penetrating more and more the reasons for non-inherent existence, he gains a conceptual cognition of emptiness—an inference. An image or concept of the vacuity which is an object's
lack of inherent existence appears to him; thus, 'conceptual' does
not mean that he is sunk in discursiveness. He has already cognized, for instance, the concomitance of non-inherent existence
with whatever cannot be found in the seven ways outlined by
Chandrakirti; he has already cognized the presence of the sign
(non-findability in the seven ways) in the subject (I). Therefore,
at the moment of inference he no longer is considering the preliminary factors of inference but is realizing emptiness. He
Types of Awareness
705
attempts to remain in this conceptual cognition as long as possible, developing special insight based on calm abiding, so that
he can progress toward his first non-conceptual direct cognition
of emptiness in which even the image of the vacuity of concrete
findable existence has disappeared, and the subject—the wisdom
consciousness—and the object—the emptiness of inherent existence—are like water put in water, undifferentiable.
2 Other Interpretations of
Dependent-Arising
Asariga sets forth Buddha's implicit teaching of the twelve
members of a dependent-arising of cyclic existence (see Charts
42 and 43).800 In the implicit teaching there is only one round of
dependent-arising, but this is similar only in name to the one
round of the explicit teaching which refers to one turning of the
wheel of the twelve. In the implicit teaching, a round or unit
does not refer to one cycle of the twelve but to one round of cause
and effect. This one round is determined by the time of the
effect.
Thus, if all of the effect members—'effect consciousness'
through 'existence', as well as 'birth' and 'aging and death'—occur
in one lifetime, the set of twelve would involve only one round of
cause and effect. However, with this interpretation ofthe meaning
of 'round', the explicit teaching which shows the completion of
the members in three lifetimes would indicate two rounds of cause
and effect because the projected effects, 'effect consciousness'
through 'existence', take place in this life, and the actualized
effects, 'birth' and 'aging and death', take place in the next life.
Since 'rounds' are not determined by the time of cause, the time of
the causes does not affect the computation.
708utsrponmlihgfedcaVTOMIEDBA
Meditation on Emptiness
Chart 42: A Version of Buddha's Implicit Teaching According to
Asahga (the completion of the twelve members at the least in two
lives with one unit or round of cause and effect)
1
2
3
a.
4
5
6
7
ignorance
action
consciousness
cause consciousness
b. effect consciousness
name and form
sources
contact
feeling
8
9
10
attachment
grasping
existence
11
birth
12
aging and death
projecting causes: life A
projected effects: life B
actualizing causes: life A
actualized effects: life B
Lives A and B are successive.
Asanga's system is a one round system because all of the effect
members occur in the present life. It is a two or three life system
because the projecting causes and the actualizing causes might
occur in the same life, that is, the immediately preceding life, in
which case it would take two lives, or the projecting causes
might take place before the immediately preceding life in which
case it would take three lives.
Even when Asahga lays out a two-round system (see Charts 44
and 45, he does not consider a future life as in the explicit teaching. T h e twelve members are divided into two rounds by considering effect consciousness, name and form, sources, contact, and
feeling as seeds in the sense that the projecting causes make them
ready for actualization. Therefore, the time of the effect—the
formation of the seeds—occurs in the same lifetime as the projecting causes—ignorance, action, and cause consciousness.
Other Interpretations of Dependent-A risingzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcb
709
Chart 43: A Version of Buddha's Implicit Teaching According to
Asahga (the completion of the twelve members at the most in
three lives with one unit or round of cause and effect)
1
2
3
a.
ignorance
action
consciousness
cause consciousness
b. effect consciousness
name and form
sources
contact
6
7
feeling
4
5
8
10
attachment
grasping
existence
11
birth
12
aging and death
9
projecting causes: life A
projected effects: life C
actualizing causes: life B
actualized effects: life C
Life A precedes life B at any time, and life B and life C are
successive.
Their actualization by the actualizing causes—attachment, grasping, and existence—is birth and aging and death. Since the time
of the actualized effects and the time of the projected effects are
not the same when considered this way, the set of twelve here
consists of two rounds of cause and effect.
By considering 'effect consciousness' through 'feeling' as
seeds ready to be actualized, the two sets of causes for the production of a life—the projecting causes and the actualizing causes
—are manifestly seen to apply to one lifetime, without relying on
inference as in the explicit teaching. Also, the point is emphasized that there is potential suffering in the form of 'effect consciousness' through 'feeling' as seeds, and actual suffering in the
form of 'birth' and 'aging and death'.
There also is a teaching, emphasized by the Sautrantikas,
710utsrponmlihgfedcaVTOMIEDBA
Meditation on Emptiness
Chart 44: A Version of Buddha's Implicit Teaching According to
Asahga (the completion of the twelve members in at least two
lives with two units or rounds of cause and effect)
1
2
3
a.
ignorance
action
consciousness
cause consciousness
b. effect consciousness
name and form
sources
6
contact
7
feeling
4
5
8
10
attachment
grasping
existence
11
birth
12
aging and death
9
projecting causes: life A
projected effects as
seeds: life A
actualizing causes: life A
actualized effects: life B
Lives A and B are successive.
that the twelve members occur simultaneously. This does not
mean that all members occur in the same instant, but in the
period of one action. Here, ignorance forms the motivation of
the action with the aid of grasping, attachment, and existence.
Action is the actual production of the activity with 'effect consciousness' through 'feeling' as well as 'birth' and 'aging and
death' being further delineations of this action. In this interpretation the order of the twelve does not have reference to
temporal sequence.
Other Interpretations of Dependent-A rising
711
Chart 45: A Version of Buddha's Implicit Teaching According to
Asahga (the completion of the twelve members at the most in
three lives with two units or rounds of cause and effect)
1
2
3
a.
4
5
6
7
ignorance
action
consciousness
cause consciousness
b. effect consciousness
name and form
sources
contact
feeling
8
9
10
attachment
grasping
existence
11
birth
12
aging and death
projecting causes: life A
projected effects as
seeds: life A
actualizing causes: life B
actualized effects: life C
Life A precedes life B at any time, and life B and life C are
successive.
3 Modes of Division of the
Vaibhashika Schools
Bhavaviveka's three versions of the division of the spiritual community into eighteen schools are preserved in the Tibetan translation of his Blaze of Reasoning (P5256, Vol. 96 66.4.4-68.4.4).
Exactly the same material is also preserved in the Tibetan translation of his Nikayabhedavibhahgavyakhyana (P5640, Vol. 127).
Bhavaviveka's first
rendition
(See Chart 46.) T h e first schism is variously reported to have
taken place in 600 A.N. (After the Nirvana), 160 A.N., and 116
A.N. 801 T h e last accords with Paramartha's description of the
schism, 802 and Jam-yang-shay-ba says that 116 A.N. is correct. 803
Paramartha adds the information that at the Council of Rajagrha,
held two months after the death of the Buddha, the Samgha was
nominally split into Sthaviras and Mahasamghikas, the former
being the five hundred Foe Destroyers and the latter being
ordinary monks. Later at the second Council in 116 A.N. the
division became doctrinal. Both Taranatha 804 and Jam-yangshay-ba indicate that Bhavaviveka's first list is the assertion of
the Sthaviras with regard to the way the Samgha divided.
714zyvutsrponmlkihgfedcbaZVTSRPONMLJGFEDCB
Meditation on Emptiness
Chart 46: Bhavaviveka's First Rendition of the Eighteen Vaibhashika Schools (as found in his Blaze of Reasoning, Vol. 96 66.4.4fl)
Mahasamghikas -
1 Mahäsamghikas (dGe 'dun phal
chenpa)
Ekavyavahärikas (Tha snyad geig
pa)
Lokottaravadins ('Jig rten 'das
par smra ba)
4 Bahushrutiyas (Mang thospa)
5 Prajnaptivädins (bTags par smra
ba)
6 Chaitikas (mChod rten pa)
7 Pürvashailas (Shar gyi ri bo pa)
8 Aparashailas (Nub kyi ri bo pa)
9
10
Sthaviras
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
Sthaviras (gNas brtanpa) =
Haimavatas
Sarvästivädins (Thams cadyod
par smra ba) =
Vibhajyavädins = Hetuvädins
= Muruntakas
Vatsfputriyas (gNas ma'i bu pa)
Dharmottaras (Chos mchogpa)
Bhadrayänfyas (bZang lam pa)
Sammitfyas (Mang bkur ba) =
Avantakas = Kurukullas
Mahäshäsakas (Mang ston pa)
Dharmaguptakas (Chos sbas pa)
Suvarshakas (Char bzang 'bebs
pa) = Käshyapiyas
Uttariyas (bLa ma pa) =
Samkräntivädins
It should be noted that the synonyms which Bhavaviveka
gives are synonyms only with respect to this table. For instance,
in his first list the Sthaviras. and Haimavatas are synonyms, but
in his second the Haimavatas are a sect which split off from the
Mahasamghikas who are neither synonymous with, nor a division of, nor the parent of the Sthaviras.
Modes of Division of the Vaibhashika SchoolsyxwvutsrponmlkjihgfedcbaV
715
Chart 47: Bhavaviveka's Second Rendition of the Eighteen Vaibhashika Schools (as found in his Blaze of Reasoning, Vol. 96
67.2.Iff)
- 1 Sarvastivadins
-
" Sarvastivadins _ 2 Sûtravâdins
(mDo sde smra ba)
r~3 Sammitfyas
Sthaviras
- 4 Dharmottaras
-Vatsiputnyas-
~ 5 Bhadrayanfyas
- 6 Sannagarikas
(Grong khyer drug pa)
7 Mahasamghikas
8 Purvashailas
— 9 Aparashailas
— 10 Râjagirikas (rGyal po'i ri)
Mahasamghikas — 11 Haimavatas (Gangs ripa)
12 Chaitikas
— 13 Siddhârthikas (Don grub pa)
14 Gokulikas (Ba lang gnas pa)
15 MahFshàsakas (Sa ston pa)
— 16 Kashyapfyas ( 'Od srungs pa )
Vibhajyavadins —
— 17 Dharmaguptakas
18 Tâmrashâtiyas (Gos dmar ba)
Bhavaviveka's second rendition
Bhavaviveka says that the second list (see Chart 47) has the same
'foundation' as the first list. Jam-yang-shay-ba805 explains that
this means that the time and place of the original schism are the
Chart 48:zyvutsrponmlkihgfedcbaZVTSRPONMLJGFEDCB
Vasumitra's Rendition of the Eighteen Vaibhashika Schools (as found in his Samayabhedoparachanachakra,
P5639, Vol. 127)
• 3 Dharmottaras
— 4 Bhadrayanfyas
— 2
1 Sarvastivadins —
(or Hetuvadins)
Mahishasakas-
- 5 Sammitiyas
- 6 Sannagarikas
Dharmaguptakas
Kashyapiyas (or
Suvarshakas)
9 Samkrantivadins ('Pho bar smra ba) (or Sautrantikas)
Sthaviras-
Lio
r11
Haimavatas
_12
Bahushrutiyas
Ekavyavaharikas
13 Prajnaptivadins
Mahasamghikas -
Vatsiputnyas-
_14
Chaitikas
_15
Aparashailas
_16
Purvashailas
17 Lokottaravadins
18 Kukkulikas (Bya gag ris)
Modes of Division of the Vaibhashika Schools
111
Chart 49: VinTtadeva's Rendition of the Eighteen Vaibhashika
Schools (as found in his Samayabhedoparachanachakre nikayabhedopadeshanasamgraha, P5641, Vol. 127)
Mahasamghikas
1
2
3
4
5
Purvashailas
Aparashailas
Haimavatas
Lokottaravàdins
Prajnaptivâdins
Sarvastivadins
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Sarvastivadins
Kashyapfyas
Mahfshasakas
Dharmaguptakas
Bahushrutfyas
Tàmrashâuyas
Vibhajyavâdins
(rNam par phye ste
smra ba)
Sthaviras
SammitTyas
13 Jetavanfyas
(rGyal byed tshal gnas)
14 Abhayagirikas
('Jigs medgnas)
15 Mahâvihàrins
(gTsug lag khang chen)
16 Kurukullas
(Sa sgrogs ris)
17 Avantakas
(Srung ba pa)
18 Vatsfputrfyas
same as in the first list. This is significant in that it indicates
that the schism which took place at the second Council in 116
A.N. was a schism into three schools. Both Taranatha 806 and
Jam-yang-shay-ba say that this second list is the assertion of
the Mahasamghikas with regard to the way the Samgha divided.
Bhavaviveka's third rendition
Jam-yang-shay-ba identifies Bhavaviveka's third list (see Chart
40, p.340) as the assertion of the Sammitfyas. Bhavaviveka
reports that some say that the Sannagarikas are a division of the
Mahagirikas and that others assert that they are a division of the
Sammitfyas.807
718yvutsrponmlkihgfedcbaVTSRPMGEDCB
Meditation on Emptiness
Chart 50: Padmasambhava's Rendition of the Eighteen Vaibhäshika Schools (as reported by Jam-yang-shay-ba, GT, kha 6a.7)
Sarvastivadins
1
2
3
4
Mahasamghikas
Käshyapfyas
Mahlshäsakas
Dharmaguptakas
Mülasarvästivädins
5
6
7
8
9
10
Pürvashailas
Aparashailas
Haimavatas
Vibhajyavädins
Prajnaptivädins
Lokottaravadins
Sammitiyas
Sthaviras
11
12
13
14
15
16 Jetavamyas
17 Abhayagirikas
18 Mahävihärins
Tämräshatiyas
Avantakas
Kurukullas
Bahushrutiyas
Vatslputrlyas
Shakyaprabha's rendition
Jam-yang-shay-ba reports that Shakyaprabha conceived all of the
sub-schools to be derived from the Sarvastivadins.808
Vasumitra's and Vimtadeva's renditions
Vinftadeva says that he based his list on Vasumitra's rendition
(see Charts 48 and 49) and that it represents the Sarvastivadins'
assertion. The evident disagreement between the two lists
suggests that Vasumitra had another rendition which has not
survived.
Padmasambhava's
rendition
Padmasambhava's version (see Chart 50) is based on the Bhikshuvarshägraprchchhäsütra (P5649, Vol. 127).
The Ceylonese Chronicles
The renditions of the Ceylonese Chronicles (see Chart 51) have
been Sanskritized for the sake of consistency.809
Chart 51:yvutsrponmlkihgfedcbaVTSRPMGEDCB
The Rendition of the Eighteen Vaibhashika Schools according to the 'Dipavamsa'and
3 Sarvastivadins
4 Kashyapfyas
— 2 Mahishasakas
5 Samkrantivadins
6 Sautrantikas
7 Dharmaguptakas
1 Sthaviravadins
9 Dharmottarfyas
10 Bhadrayanlyas
8 Vatsiputriyas
11 Sannagarikas
12 Sammitiyas
15 Prajnaptivadins
14 Gokulikas
16 Bahushrutivas
17 Chaitikas
13 Mahasamghikas
18 Ekavyavaharikas
'Mahavamsa'
4 Negatives
Phenomena (dharma, chos) are divided into positive phenomena
(vidhi\ sgrub pa) and negative phenomena (pratishedha, dgag
/>a).810 It is important to note that the basis of division is phenomena and not statements, propositions, and acts of logic, and thus
this is not a division of propositions and so forth into positive
and negative statements, or logical affirmations and negations.
Rather, this is a division of objects, or existents, into those that
are positive and those that are negative. Since the divisions are
exhaustive, anything that exists is either a positive or a negative
phenomenon; there is no third category. Also, every instance of a
positive or negative phenomenon is an existent.
Following is a table of synonyms of'existent' with their respective definitions:
1 existent: something observed by valid cognition
2 established base: something established by valid cognition
3 object of knowledge: something fit to be taken as an object of
an awareness
4 phenomenon: something holding its own entity
5 object of comprehension: something realized by valid cognition
722
Meditation on Emptiness
6 object: something known by an awareness
7 object of comprehension by an omniscient consciousness:
something realized by an omniscient consciousness.
That the above are synonyms means that whatever is a negative
or a positive phenomenon is necessarily an existent, an established base, an object of knowledge, a phenomenon, an object of
comprehension, an object, and an object of comprehension by an
omniscient consciousness as well as something observed by valid
cognition, etc. Hence, the mere fact that an emptiness is a negative means that it is an existent, an object, and so forth.
A positive phenomenon is defined as:
a phenomenon which is not an object realized by the
thought consciousness apprehending it in the manner of
an explicit elimination of its object of negation.
First of all, a positive thing (vidhi) is a phenomenon, an existent;
a non-existent such as the horns of a rabbit could never be a positive phenomenon. Second, the division into positive and negative
phenomena is made by way of how objects appear to thought or
conceptual consciousnesses; if a conceptual consciousness must
realize the object by way of openly and explicitly eliminating an
object of negation, the object is not positive but negative. For
instance, to realize non-cow, cow must be openly eliminated, but
to realize cow, non-cow does not have to be explicitly eliminated
though indeed it is implicitly eliminated. Thus, non-cow is a
negative phenomenon, and cow is a positive phenomenon.
The definition of a negative phenomenon is:
an object realized by the thought consciousness apprehending it in the manner of an explicit elimination of its
object of negation.
Again, a negative must be an object, an existent, a phenomenon.
It is also something that must be conceptually realized through
the open or explicit negation of an object of negation. Examples
of negative phenomena are non-pot, {bum pa ma yin pa), nonnon-pot {bum pa ma yin pa ma yin pa), opposite from non-pot
Negatives
723
(bum pa ma yin pa las log pa), and non-existence of pot {bum pa
medpa). Although non-non-pot means just pot, it must be realized by way of explicitly eliminating non-pot, and thus it is a
negative phenomenon. Although it does not exist as a different
entity from pot, which is a positive phenomenon, it is merely different from pot and is a negative.
Negatives are divided into two types—affirming negatives
(paryudasapratishedha, ma yin dgag) and non-affirming
negatives (prasajyapratishedha, med dgag). In brief, the difference between the two is that the term which expresses an affirming negative suggests something else in place of its negation,
whereas the term that expresses a non-affirming negative does
not. For instance, the sentence, 'The fat Devadatta does not eat
during the day,' expresses a phenomenon, namely, fat Devadatta's not eating during the day, but it does not merely eliminate eating during the day since the mention of 'fat' implies or
suggests that he eats at night. Thus, fat Devadatta's not eating
during the day is an affirming negative; it is an object, an existent, a phenomenon, and an object of knowledge that is negative,
but the expression of it implies something in place of what it
negates. Though the determination that it is a negative depends
on how it is expressed, it is the phenomenon itself that is thereby
determined to be a negative. For, the sentence, 'The fat Devadatta does not eat during the day,' is itself, as a sentence or group
of sounds, a positive phenomenon. Thus, it is not the proposition, but the object of reference of the proposition that is the
negative.
The formal definition of an affirming negative is:
a negative which is such that the term expressing it suggests in place of the negation of its own object of negation another, positive phenomenon which is its own
object of suggestion.
In the example of fat Devadatta's not eating during the day, eating at night, a positive phenomenon, is suggested. Another
example of an affirming negative is non-non-pot, which suggests
pot. Another is non-pot, which suggests things that are not pots.
724
Meditation on Emptiness
Affirming negatives are further divided into four types depending on how the terms that express them suggest positive phenomena in place of their negations—either explicitly, implicitly, both,
or by context. These four are:
1 Affirming negative which is such that the term expressing it
explicitly suggests another, positive phenomenon which is its own
object of suggestion
For example, a mountainless plain is expressed by the term
'mountainless plain'. The term eliminates mountains but openly
speaks of a plain; thus, a mountainless plain is an affirming negative which explicitly suggests or reveals a positive phenomenon.
The same is true of the existence of the absence of inherent existence, for the term expressing it, 'The absence of inherent existence exists', or 'existence of the absence of inherent existence'
eliminates inherent existence but openly speaks of the existence of its absence, a positive phenomenon. Thus, though the
absence of inherent existence is a non-affirming negative, its
existence is an affirming negative of the explicitly suggestive
variety. Since meditation on an emptiness means to meditate on
a specific non-affirming negative, the object of meditation is not
the existence of an emptiness (although it does exist) but an
emptiness itself.
2 Affirming negative which is such that the term expressing it
implicitly suggests another, positive phenomenon which is its own
object of suggestion
For example, fat Devadatta's not eating during the day. Also,
since non-non-pot eliminates non-pot but does not explicitly
suggest pot, it is an affirming negative of the implicitly suggestive type.
3 Affirming negative which is such that the term expressing it both
explicitly and implicitly suggests another, positive phenomenon
which is its own object of suggestion
For example, the phrase, 'The existence of the non-emaciated
body of the fat Devadatta who does not eat during the day,' eliminates eating during the day, implicitly suggests eating during
Negatives
725
the night, and explicitly speaks of the existence of his body.
Thus, the phenomenon which it expresses is an affirming negative the suggestiveness of which is both implicit and explicit.
4 Affirming negative which is such that the term expressing it suggests by context another, positive phenomenon which is its own object
of suggestion
For example, in the context of knowing that King Siddhartha is
either of the royal or brahmin class, his not being of the brahmin
class eliminates that he is of the brahmin class and, through the
context of one's having determined that his lineage is either the
royal or brahmin class, suggests that he is of the royal class.
In all four of these cases, something is suggested in place of the
negation of the object of negation. However, with a non-affirming
negative nothing positive is suggested—only an object of negation is negated. Nevertheless, a non-affirming negative is an
object, an existent, a phenomenon, and so on.
Thus the definition of a non-affirming negative is:
a negative which is such that the term expressing it does
not suggest in place of the negation of its own object of
negation another, positive phenomenon which is its own
object of suggestion.
For example, the non-existence of the horns of a rabbit is
expressed by the sentence, 'The horns of a rabbit do not exist,'
and this does not suggest anything positive in place of the horns
of a rabbit. Though it can suggest another non-affirming negative such as the non-existence of the beauty of the horns of a rabbit, it does not suggest any positive phenomenon in place of its
object of negation.
In this same vein, an emptiness merely eliminates inherent
existence; it does not imply anything positive in its place.
Though emptiness is compatible with conventional existence, it
does not suggest conventional existence in place of its object of
negation; still, it is stressed that a proper understanding of emptiness acts to assist an understanding of conventional existence.
An emptiness is the mere elimination of inherent or objective
726
Meditation on Emptiness
existence and thus is a mere negative, a non-affirming negative, a
mere absence of its object of negation.
Even the emptiness of inherent existence of a table does not
suggest a positive phenomenon even though the phrase 'the
emptiness of inherent existence of a table', or the sentence, 'A
table is empty of inherent existence,' openly and explicitly
speaks of table. For, table is not suggested in place of the negated
object of negation, inherent existence; it merely is the base of the
negation.
Non-affirming negatives are divided into two classes—those
whose object of negation does occur among objects of knowledge
and those whose object of negation does not occur among objects
of knowledge. For example, the non-existence of the horns of a
rabbit negates the horns of a rabbit which do not exist anywhere,
and similarly the absence of inherent existence eliminates inherent existence which never has nor will occur anywhere. Thus,
these two are non-affirming negatives whose object of negation
does not occur among objects of knowledge, that is to say, among
existents. On the other hand, the non-existence of a pot, such as
on a certain table, eliminates the existence of a pot there, but pot
does occur among existents at some other place, and thus nonexistence of a pot is a non-affirming negative whose object of
negation does occur among objects of knowledge.
Through making this division in terms of whether the object
negated is, in general, an existent or not, it is being stressed that
an emptiness is a lack of something—inherent existence—that
never did nor will exist. Though an emptiness exists, its object of
negation never does. Realization of an emptiness, therefore, is
not a case of destroying something that once existed or of realizing the passing away of something that did exist; rather, it means
to realize a quality of objects, a negative attribute, that is the
mere absence of something that never existed but nevertheless
was imagined to occur.
The existence of an object right in its own basis of designation
never did or could occur, but beings conceive the opposite and
thus have been drawn beginninglessly into cyclic existence.
Extrication from that misconception can happen only through
Negatives
727
realizing the absence of such reified existence, becoming accustomed to it in intense meditation, realizing it directly in meditative equipoise in which nothing but emptiness appears and the
mind is merged with it like fresh water poured into fresh water,
and over and over again re-entering that direct cognition. Meditation on emptiness is the medicine that, when accompanied by
compassionate method, can clear away all obstructions such that
unimpeded altruistic activity is manifested. Thus, though
emptiness is a mere negative, it is a doctrine neither of nihilism
nor of agnosticism, but a confident affirmation of a basic nature,
the realization of which yields powerful, beneficial results.
5
Proof Statements
Chandrakirti gives an example of a five-membered proof which
Jam-yang-shay-ba says can be interpreted correctly in two ways :811
1 Thesis: A sound is an impermanent thing.
2 Pervasion: Being an impermanent thing pervades being a product.
3 Example: Being an impermanent thing pervades being a product, as in the case, for example, of a pot.
4 Exemplification: Just as a pot is a product, so a sound is a product.
5 Summary: Therefore, because a sound is a product, it is an
impermanent thing.
Or,
1 Thesis: A sound is an impermanent thing.
2 Sign: Because products are impermanent things.
3 Demonstration of the pervasion in an example: It is seen that
being an impermanent thing pervades being a product as in
the case, for example, of a pot.
4 Applying the example to the meaning: Like a pot, a sound is
also a product.
730
Meditation on Emptiness
5 Summary: Therefore, because of being a product, a sound is
an impermanent thing.
The Buddhist logicians of the Dignaga-Dharmakixti school consider such a five-membered statement of proof to be redundant.
In their school a correct statement of proof has two members:
1 Expression of pervasion: Being an impermanent thing pervades
whatever is a product, as in the case, for example, of a pot.
2 Expression of the presence of the sign in the subject: A sound is
also a product.
The example has been affixed to the expression of pervasion; the
thesis, exemplification, and summary are not stated because they
are considered to be implicit. The five-membered statement is,
therefore, redundant.
However, in the Dignaga-Dharmakfrti school the actual, full
process of debate is as follows for proving that a sound is impermanent to an opponent who asserts that a sound is permanent.
1 Statement of a consequence implying a proof of the opposite
It follows that the subject, a sound, is not a product
because of being a permanent thing.
The consequence is stated for the sake of 'breaking down the
pointedness or vibrance' of the opponent's adherence to the
wrong view. Through the demonstration of inner contradictions
in his own system (that a sound is permanent, that a sound is a
product, and that whatever is a product is impermanent) he
becomes doubtful about his own view. This prepares him for the
statement of the reasoning which proves that sounds are impermanent; he becomes a suitable vessel for the second step.
2 Statement of the reasonings that establish the presence of the sign
in the subject, the pervasion, and the counter-pervasion
a.
Statement of the reasoning that establishes the presence of the
sign in the subject
The subject, a sound, is a product because of being produced from causes and conditions.
Proof Statements
731
The reason of this syllogism need not be established because it is
obvious from, for instance, a snapping of the fingers that sounds
are produced from causes and conditions. If it were necessary to
establish every reason—if there were not an appeal to obvious
experience—the number of reasons required to establish the
presence of the original sign in the subject would be limitless,
and there would be no opportunity to realize the basic thesis.
Still, if the opponent is not yet satisfied, it is not the proper occasion for establishing the three modes of the sign, i.e., for proving
to him that sounds are impermanent. Other indirect means are
required to bring him to the point of recognizing the obvious
dependence of sounds on causes and conditions.
b.
Statement of the reasoning that establishes the pervasion
The subject, a product, is an impermanent thing because
of being a momentary thing.
The mind that explicitly realizes the pervasion also implicitly
realizes the counter-pervasion and vice versa; therefore, only
either the pervasion or the counter-pervasion needs to be established. This is because explicitly realizing that the sign exists in
only similar cases implies cognition that the sign is only nonexistent in dissimilar cases. Just so, if the sign is explicitly cognized as only non-existent in dissimilar cases, it is implicitly cognized as existent only in similar cases.
If it is necessary to establish that products are momentary
things, one can state:
The subject, a product, is a momentary thing because
without its disintegration depending on any other cause,
it—from its inception—has a nature of disintegration,
just as in the case of lightning.
If this is not obvious, further proof is not warranted, and it will
be necessary to approach the opponent in a roundabout manner
to prepare him for another try at the basic thesis.
c. Statement of the reasoning that establishes the counterpervasion
732
Meditation on Emptiness
The subject, space, is not a product because of being a
permanent phenomenon.
This reason could, in turn> be established with:
The subject, space, is a permanent phenomenon because
of being existent and not being produced from causes
and conditions.
No further proof is warranted.
3
Correct statement of proof for similar instances
Whatever is a product is pervaded by being an impermanent thing, as in the case, for example, of a pot; a sound
is also a product.
(This is exactly the same as the two-membered statement of
proof.) A person of very sharp intellect would also grasp the
opposite, and, therefore, for him the next step would not have to
be stated. Or, the fourth step might be stated and not the third.
The choice of whether to state a proof for similar or dissimilar
instances is determined by the type of opponent. If he is dominated by indecision, not being able to decide whether products are
permanent or impermanent, a prooffor similar instances is stated.
If the opponent is dominated by the opposite view that products
are permanent, a prooffor dissimilar instances is stated. However,
to all except the very sharp, both must be proved. The stater bases
his decision of what is necessary on the opponent's responses
during step two and to questions asked him.
4
Correct statement of proof for dissimilar instances
Whatever is a permanent thing is pervaded by being a
non-product, as in the case, for example, of space; a
sound, however, is a product.
5 Restatement of the correct statement of proof for either similar or
dissimilar instances
This is done for the sake of generating in the opponent a simultaneous awareness of the three modes of the reason, i.e., its
Proof Statements
733
presence in the subject, the pervasion, and the counter-pervasion.
This awareness is also called 'a mind apprehending the sign (or
reason)' and is the direct cause of the inferring consciousness
realizing that a sound is impermanent. At this moment the opponent becomes a correct, or full-fledged, second party of a debate
in that he is prepared for the basic reasoning that a sound is an
impermanent thing because of being a product. (The first party
is the stater.)
6
The statement of the basic syllogism
The subject, a sound, is an impermanent thing because
of being a product.
The then full-fledged second party realizes that a sound is impermanent, after which he ceases to be a second party because he
has finished realizing the thesis.
Thus, though a statement of proof in the Dignaga-Dharmakfrti school has only two members, the actual prescribed mode
of debate entails many more. What a Prasangika is saying is that
all these steps are not necessary for sharp opponents. The mere
statement of a consequence, 'It follows that the subject, a sound,
is not a product because of being a permanent phenomenon,' can
generate in a proper second party a consciousness inferring the
thesis that a sound is an impermanent thing. It is not the usage of
consequences that singles out the Prasangika but his assertion
that the statement of a consequence alone is sufficient to generate in another a consciousness realizing a thesis.
Glossary
An asterisk beside an entry indicates
a reconstruction of the Sanskrit
Glossary
English
Sanskrit
able to set itself up
—
absorption
action
Action Tantra
affirming negation/
affirming negative
afflicted mind
affliction
afflictive obstruction
aggregate
analysis
analytical cessation
analytical meditation
anger
application
artificial
aspiration
samapatti
karma
kriyatantra
paryudasapratishedha
klishtamanas
klesha
kleshavarana
skandha
vichara
pratisamkhyanirodha
—
pratigha
abhisamskara
parikalpita
chhanda
Tibetan
tshugs thub tu
grub pa
snyoms 'jug
las
bya rgyud
ma yin dgag
nyon yid
nyon mongs
nyon sgrib
phung po
dpyod pa
so sor brtags 'gog
dpyad sgom
khong khro
'du byed pa
kun btags
'dun pa
738ytsrponmlkihgedbaTSMGE
Meditation on Emptiness
English
Sanskrit
Tibetan
autonomous
inference
autonomous
syllogism
svatantranumana
rang rgyud kyi rjes
dpag
rang rgyud kyi
sbyor ba
basis-of-all
basis of designation
belief
belligerence
bliss
Blissful Pure Land
Bodhisattva
svatantraprayoga
alaya
—
adhimoksha
krodha
sukha
sukhavatf
bodhisattva
body consciousness kayavijnana
body sense
kayendriya
calm abiding
cause
changeable factor
Chittamatra
clairvoyance
close setting
coarse selflessness
color
common being
compassion
Complete
Enjoyment Body
compositional factor
concealment
concentration
conception of self
shamatha
hetu
aniyata
chittamatra
abhijna
upasthapana
—
varna
prthagjana
karuna
sambhogakaya
samskara
mraksha
dhyana
atmagraha
kun gzhi
gdags gzhi
mos pa
khro ba
bde ba
dbe ba can
byang chub sems
dpa'
lus kyi rnam par
shes pa
lus kyi dbang po
zhi gnas
rgyu
gzhan 'gyur
sems tsam
mngon par shes pa
nye bar 'jog pa
bdag med rags pa
kha dog
so so skye bo
snying rje
longs spyod rdzogs
pa'i sku
'du byed
'chab pa
bsam gtan
bdag tu 'dzin pa
GlossaryzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaYWVTSRPONMLK
739
English
Sanskrit
Tibetan
condition
conditionality
pratyaya
idampratyayata
Conqueror
conscientiousness
consciousness
consequence
constituent
contact
contaminated
contaminated action
contamination
continuous setting
continuum
contradictory
consequence
contrition
conventional
existence
conventional truth/
truth-for-aconcealer/
obscured truth
cooperative
condition
correct view
counter-pervasion
creature/being/
person
cyclic existence
jina
apramada
jna/vijnana
prasariga
dhatu
sparsha
sasrava
sasravakarma
asrava
samstapana
samtana
samvrtisatya
rkyen
rkyen 'di pa tsam
nyid
rgyal ba
bag yod pa
shes pa/rnam shes
thai 'gyur
khams
reg pa
zag bcas
zag bcas kyi las
zag pa
rgyun du 'jog pa
rgyun/rgyud
'gal brjod thai
'gyur
'gyod pa
kun rdzob tu yod
pa
kun rdzob bden pa
sahakaripratyaya
lhan cig byed rkyen
samyakdrshti
vyatirekavyapti
purusha
yang dag pa'i lta ba
ldog khyab
skyes bu
samsara
'khor ba
deceit
deed
definitive
maya
karma
mtartha
sgyu
las
nges don
—
kaukrtya
samvrtisat
740ytsrponmlkihgedbaTSMGE
Meditation on Emptiness
English
Sanskrit
Tibetan
deity yoga
dependent-arising
dependent
phenomenon
desire
desire realm
determining factor
direct cognition
*devayoga
pratftyasamutpäda
paratantra
lha'i mal 'byor
rten 'byung
gzhan dbang
räga
kämadhätu
viniyata
direct perception/
direct perceiver
discipline
disciplining
discrimination
dissimulation
distraction
doubt
pratyaksha
'dod chags
'dod khams
yul nges
mngon sum du
rtogs pa
mngon sum
vinaya
damana
samjnâ
shäthya
vikshepa
vichikitsä
'dul ba
dul ba byed pa
'du shes
g-yo
rnam par g.yeng ba
the tshom
ear consciousness
shrotravijnäna
ma ba'i rnam par
shes pa
rna ba'i dbang po
brtson 'grus
spros pa
chos dbyings
—
ear sense
shrotrendriya
vfrya
effort
elaborations
prapancha
dharmadhätu
element of
[superior] qualities
Emanation Body
nirmänakäya
embarrassment
apatrâpya
emptiness
shünyatä
sambhogakäya
Enjoyment Body
bodhi
enlightenment
upekshä
equanimity
established
atomically
excitement
auddhatya
—
sprulsku
khrel yod pa
stong pa nyid
longs sku
byang chub
btang snyoms
rdul tu grub pa
rgod pa
GlossaryzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaYWVTSRPONML
741
English
Sanskrit
Tibetan
exertion
existence able to set
itself up
existence as [its
own] reality
existence as [its
own] suchness
existence by way of
its own character
existence from the
object's side
existence from the
side of the
basis of designation
existence in the
manner of covering
its basis of
designation
existence in the
object designated
existence right in
the basis of
designation
existence through
its own entityness/
inherent existence
existence through
its own power
existent
existent base
existing in reliance/
relative existence
extreme
extreme of
annihilation
vyäyäma
rtsol ba
tshugs thub tu grub
pa
yang dag par grub
pa
de kho na nyid du
grub pa
rang gi mtshan
nyid kyis grub pa
rang ngos nas grub
pa
gdags gzhi'i ngos
nas grub pa
—
*samyaksiddhi
*tattvasiddhi
svalakshanasiddhi
*svarüpasiddhi
—
—
—
—
*svabhävatäsiddhi
gdags gzhi'i go sa
gnon pa'i tshul du
yod pa
btags yul gyi steng
nas grub pa
gdags gzhi'i steng
nas grub pa
ngo bo nyid kyis
grub pa
*svairfsiddhi
rang dbang du grub
pa
yod pa
sat
gzhi grub
*vastu
apekshyasamutpada ltos nas grub pa
anta
uchchhedänta
mtha'
chad mtha'
742ytsrponmlkihgedbaTSMGE
Meditation on Emptiness
English
Sanskrit
Tibetan
extreme of
permanence
eye consciousness
eye-constituent
eye-source
shashvatânta
rtag mtha'
chakshurvijnâna
chakshurdhâtu
chakshurâyatana
mig gi rnam shes
mig gi khams
mig gi skye mchec
shraddhâ
parichaya
vedanâ
arhan
kshânti
balavâhana
tfrthika
mushitasmrtitâ
avavâdasammosha
dad pa
yongs su 'dris pa
tshor ba
dgra bcom pa
bzod pa
sgrim ste 'jug pa
mu stegs pa
brjed nges pa
gdams ngag brjed
pa
gzugs
gzugs sku
gzugs kyi khams
chos kyi skye
mched pa'i
gzugs
gzugs khams
gzugs kyi skye
mched
gzugs med khams
'bras bu
rnam smin rnam
shes
faith
familiarity
feeling
Foe Destroyer
forbearance
forcibly engaging
Forder
forgetfulness
forgetting the
advice
form
Form Body
form-constituent
form for the mental
consciousness
rupa
rupakâya
rupadhâtu
dharmâyatanarùpa
Form Realm
form source
rupadhâtu
rupâyatana
Formless Realm
fruit
fruition
consciousness
àrupyadhâtu
phala
vipakavijnàna
generally
characterized
phenomenon
sâmânyalakshana
spyi mtshan
GlossaryzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaYWVTSRPONMLK
743
English
Sanskrit
Tibetan
generic object/
generic image/
meaning-generality
giving
great compassion
ground
arthasamanya
don spyi
dana
mahakaruna
bhumi
sbyin pa
snying rje chen po
sa
harmfulness
haughtiness
Hearer
hearing
heat
Hedonist
Highest Pure Land
Highest Yoga
Tantra
vihimsa
mada
shravaka
shruta
ushmagata
charvaka
akanishta
anuttarayogatantra
rnam par 'tshe ba
rgyags pa
nyan thos
thos pa
drod
tshu rol mdzes pa
'og min
rnal 'byor bla med
kyi rgyud
I
ignorance
imaginary
imaginary
phenomenon
impermanent
imputedly existent
inference
inferential valid
cognizer
inherent existence
aham
avidya
parikalpita
parikalpitadharma
nga
ma rig pa
kun btags
kun btags pa'i
chos
mi rtag pa
btags yod
rjes dpag
rjes dpag tshad ma
innate
innate affliction
sahaja
sahajaklesha
intention
chetana
anitya
prajnaptisat
anumana
anumanapramana
svabhavasiddhi
rang bzhin gyis
grub pa
lhan skyes
nyon mongs lhan
skyes
sems pa
744ytsrponmlkihgedbaTSMGE
Meditation on Emptiness
English
Sanskrit
Tibetan
interruptedly
engaging
introspection
investigation
sachchhidravähana
samprajanya
vitarka
bar du chad cing
'jug pa
shes bzhin
rtog pa
jealousy
Joyous Land
frshya
tushita
phrag dog
dga' ldan
Knowledge
knowledge/wisdom
abhidharma
prajnâ
chos mngon pa
shes rab
laziness
lethargy
liberation
lineage
love
kausidya
styäna
vimoksha/moksha
gotra
maitri
le lo
rmugs pa
thar pa
rigs
byams pa
Mädhyamika
making one-pointed
matter
meditative
absorption
meditative equipoise
meditative
stabilization
mental and physical.
aggregates
mental
consciousness
mental engagement
mental factor
mädhyamika
ekotikarana
kantha
samâpatti
dbu ma pa
rtse geig tu byed pa
bem po
snyoms 'jug
samähita
samädhi
mnyam bzhag
ting nge 'dzin
skandha
phung po
manovijnäna
yid kyi rnam shes
manaskâra
chaitta
yid la byed pa
sems byung
GlossaryzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaYWVTSRPONML
745
English
Sanskrit
Tibetan
merit
method
migrator
mind
mind-basis-of-all
mind of
enlightenment
mindfulness
miserliness
punya
upâya
gati
chitta
alayavijnâna
bodhichitta
bsod nams
thabs
'gro ba
sems
kun gzhi rnam shes
byang chub kyi
sems
dran pa
ser sna
natural existence/
existence by way
of [the object's]
own character
natural nirvana
svalakshanasiddhi
rang gi mtshan
nyid kyis grub pa
*prakrtiparinirvana
nature
Nature Body
negation/negative
phenomenon
neutral
prakrti
svabhâvikakâya
pratishedha
rang bzhin myang
'das
rang bzhin
ngo bo nyid sku
dgag pa
Never Returner
Noble/Superior
nominal existence
smrti
mâtsarya
avyâkrta
lung du ma bstan
pa
anagâmin
phyir mi 'ong
ârya
'phags pa
—
ming tsam du yod
pa
prasajyapratishedha med dgag
non-affirming
negation/nonaffirming negative
non-analytical
apratisamkhyâniso sor brtags min
cessation
rodha
gyi 'gog pa
non-application
anabhisamskàra
'du mi byed pa
non-associated com- viprayuktasamskâra ldan min 'du byed
positional factor
746ytsrponmlkihgedbaTSMGE
Meditation on Emptiness
English
Sanskrit
alobha
non-attachment
nirvikalpajnäna
non-conceptual
wisdom
nonpramäda
conscientiousness
non-embarrassment anapaträpya
non-existent
asat
non-faith
äshraddhya
non-harmfulness
avihimsä
non-hatred
non-ignorance
non-introspection
advesha
amoha
asamprajanya
*apudgalavipranon-person
compositional
yuktasamskära
factor
non-produced
asamskrtadharma
phenomenon/
uncompounded
phenomenon
non-revelatory form avijnaptirupa
Tibetan
ma chags pa
rnam par mi rtog
pa'i ye shes
bag med pa
khrel med pa
med pa
ma dad pa
rnam par mi 'tshe
ba
zhe sdang med pa
gti mug med pa
shes bzhin ma yin
pa
gang zag ma yin
pa'i ldan min 'du
byed
'dus ma byas kyi
chos
non-shame
non-thing
non-virtuous
nose consciousness
nose sense
not unable
ährikya
abhäva
akushala
ghränavijnäna
ghränendriya
anâgamya
rnam par rig byed
ma yin pa'i gzugs
ngo tsha med pa
dngos med
mi dge ba
sna'i rnam shes
sna'i dbang po
mi lcogs med
object
object of knowledge
object of negation
object ofobservation
vishaya
jneya
pratishedhya
âlambana
yul
shes bya
dgag bya
dmigs yul/dmigs pa
GlossaryzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaYWVTSRPONMLK
747
English
Sanskrit
objective existence
observed-objectalambanapratyaya
condition
obstructions to
kleshavarana
liberation/afflictive
obstructions
obstructions to
jneyavarana
omniscience/
obstructions to
objects of
knowledge
odor
gandha
omnipresent factor sarvatraga
omniscience/exalted sarvakarajnana
knower of all
aspects
Once Returner
agamin
only imputed
prajnaptimatra
other-approved
parasiddhanumana
inference/otherrenowned inference
other-approved
parasiddhalinga
reason/otherrenowned reason
other-approved
parasiddhaprayoga
syllogism/otherrenowned
syllogism
other-powered
paratantra
pacifying
pain/suffering
path
shamana
duhkha
marga
Tibetan
yul gyi steng nas
grub pa
dmigs rkyen
nyon mong pa'i
sgrib pa
shes bya'i sgrib pa
dri
kun 'gro
rnam pa thams cad
mkhyen pa
phyir 'ong
btags tsam
gzhan grags kyi rjes
dpag
gzhan grags kyi
rtags
gzhan grags kyi
sbyor ba
gzhan dbang
zhi bar byed pa
sdug bsngal
lam
748ytsrponmlkihgedbaTSMGE
Meditation on Emptiness
English
Sanskrit
Tibetan
path of
accumulation
path of meditation
path of no more
learning
path of preparation
path of release
path of seeing
patience
peak
perfection
Perfection Vehicle
sambhäramärga
tshogs lam
bhävanämärga
ashaikshamärga
sgom lam
mi slob lam
prayogamärga
vimuktimärga
darshanamärga
kshänti
mürdhan
päramitä
päramitäyäna
sbyor lam
rnam grol lam
mthong lam
bzod pa
rtse mo
phar phyin
phar phyin kyi theg
pa
spyod rgyud
rtag pa
Performance Tantra
permanent
phenomenon
person
personal
selflessness
pervasion
phenomenon
phenomenon-source
charyätantra
nitya
pleasure/bliss
pliancy
position
potency
Prasangika
predisposition
preparation
pride
principal
product
Proponent of
Annihilation
sukhä
prasrabdhi
paksha
väsanä/bäla
präsangika
väsanä
sämantaka
mäna
pradhäna
samskrta
uchchhedavädin
pudgala/purusha
pudgalanairätmya
vyäpti
dharma
dharmäyatana
gang zag
gang zag gi bdag
med
khyab pa
chos
chos kyi skye
mched
bde ba
shin sbyangs
phyogs
bags chags/nus pa
thai 'gyur pa
bag chags
nyer bsdogs
nga rgyal
gtso bo
'dus byas
chad par smra ba
Glossary
English
Sanskrit
Tibetan
Proponent of
Permanence
shashvatavadin
rtag par smra ba
reason
reasoning
referent object/
determined object
reliquary
requiring
interpretation
re-setting
resentment
root affliction
hetu
yukti
—
gtan tshigs
rigs pa
zhen yul
stupa
neyârtha
mchod rten
drang don
avasthâpanâ
upanâha
mûlaklesha
slan te, 'jog pa
'khon 'dzin
rtsa nyon
sautrantika
Sautrantika
sautfântikasvâtanSautrantikatrikamàdhyamika
SvatantrikaMadhyamika
secondary affliction upaklesha
seed
bfja
self
âtman
svasiddhânumâna
self-approved
inference/selfrenowned inference
self-approved
svasiddhalinga
reason/selfrenowned reason
self-consciousness/ svasamvedana
self-knower
self of persons
pudgalâtman
self of phenomena dharmâtman
self-sufficient
selflessness
nairatmya
749
mdo sde pa
mdo sde spyod pa'i
dbu ma rang
rgyud pa
nye nyon
sa bon
bdag
rang grags rjes
dpag
rang grags kyi
rtags
rang rig
gang zag gi bdag
chos kyi bdag
rang rkya ba
bdag med
750ytsrponmlkihgedbaTSMGE
Meditation on Emptiness
English
Sanskrit
Tibetan
selflessness of
persons
selflessness of
phenomena
sentient being
setting in equipoise
setting the mind
shame
shape
similar immediately
preceding
condition
sleep
Solitary Realizer
sound
source
space
special insight
spite
spontaneously
engaging
stabilization
stabilizing
meditation
stage of completion
stage of generation
Stream Enterer
substantial cause
substantial entity
substantial existence
substantially
established
substantially
existent
pudgalanairätmya
dharmanairätmya
gang zag gi bdag
med
chos kyi bdag med
sattva
samädhäna
chittastäpanä
hrf
samstäna
samanantarapratyaya
sems can
mnyam par 'jog pa
sems 'jog pa
ngo tsha shes pa
dbyibs
mtshungs pa de ma
thag rkyen
middha
pratyekabuddha
shabda
äyatana
äkäsha
vipashyanä
pradäsha
anäbhogovähana
—
gnyid
rang sangs rgyas
sgra
skye mched
nam mkha'
lhag mthong
'tshig pa
lhun grub tu 'jug
pa
ting nge 'dzin
'jog sgom
nishpannakrama
utpattikrama
shrotäpanna
upädäna
dravya
dravyasat
dravyasiddha
rdzogs rim
bskyed rim
rgyun zhugs
nyer len
rdzas
rdzas su yod pa
rdzas su grub pa
dravyasat
rdzas su yod pa
samädhi
GlossaryzyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaYWVTSRPONML
751
English
Sanskrit
Tibetan
suchness
tathatâ
Sugar-Cane-One
Superior
suppleness/pliancy
supramundane
supreme mundane
qualities
Svatantrika
syllogism
synonym
ikshvâku
âryan
prasrabdhi
lokottara
laukikâgryadharma
de bzhin nyid/de
kho na nyid
bu ram shing pa
'phags pa
shin tu sbyangs pa
'jig rten las 'das pa
'jig rten pa'i chos
kyi mchog
rang rgyud pa
sbyor ba
don gcig
tangible object
taste
sprashtavya
rasa
tathàgatagarbha
svatantrika
prayoga
ekârtha
dashabhumi
pramuditâ
vimalâ
prabhâkarî
archishmatr
sudurjayâ
reg bya
ro
de bzhin gshegs
pa'i snying po
sa bcu
rab tu dga' ba
dri ma med pa
'od byed pa
'od 'phro ba
sbyang dka' ba
abhimukhf
dûramgama
achalâ
sâdhumatï
mngon du gyur pa
ring du song ba
mi g.yo ba
legs pa'i blo gros
dharmameghâ
chos kyi sprin
siddhànta/
siddhyanta
pratijnâ
bhâva
grub mtha'
Tathagata essence
ten1 grounds
very joyful
2 stainless
3 luminous
4 radiant
5 difficult to
overcome
6 manifest
7 gone afar
8 immovable
9 good
intelligence
10 cloud of
doctrine
tenet/system of
tenets
thesis
thing/actuality
dam bca'
dngos po
752ytsrponmlkihgedbaTSMGE
Meditation on Emptiness
English
Sanskrit
Tibetan
thinking
thorough pacifying
chin ta
vyupashama
thoroughly
established
Three Refuges
tongue
consciousness
tongue sense
true establishment
parinishpanna
bsam pa
nye bar zhi bar
byed pa
yongs grub
jihvendriya
satyasiddhi/bhâva
true existence
truly established
truly existent
truth
Truth Body
satyasat
satyasiddha
satyasat
satya
dharmakâya
ultimate
ultimate existence
ultimate truth
uninterrupted path
uninterruptedly
engaging
paramârtha
paramarthasiddhi
paramârthasatya
ânantaryamârga
nishchhidravâhana
trisharana
jihvàvijnâna
Vaibhàshika
vaibhàshika
valid cognition/
pramâna
valid cognizer
valid establishment *pramânasiddhi
*pramànasiddha
validly established
vehicle
yâna
view
drshti
view of the
satkâyadrshti
transitory collection
skyabs gsum
lce'i rnam par shes
pa
lce'i dbang po
bden par grub pa/
dngos po
bden par yod pa
bden par grub pa
bden par yod pa
bden pa
chos sKu
don dam pa
don dam par grub p;
don dam bden pa
bar chad med lam
chad pa med par
'jug pa
bye brag smra ba
tshad ma
tshad mas grub pa
tshad mas grub pa
theg pa
lta ba
'jig tshogs la lta ba
Glossary
753
English
Sanskrit
Tibetan
virtuous/virtuous
factor
visible form
kushala
dge ba
rüpa
gzugs
prana
rlung
prajnä/jnäna
jnänakäya
mithyädrshti
shes rab/ye shes
ye shes chos sku
log lta
yogatantra
yogächärasvätantrikamädhyamika
mal 'byor rgyud
mal 'byor spyod
pa'i dbu ma rang
rgyud pa
wind/current of
energy
wisdom
Wisdom Body
wrong view
Yoga Tantra
YogacharaSvatantrikaMadhyamika
Bibliography
of works cited
Note
Sutras and tantras are listed alphabetically by English title in the
first section (p.757); Indian and Tibetan treatises are listed alphabetically by author in the second (p.766); other works are listed
alphabetically by author in the third (p.788).
The words arya and mahayana have been deleted from the
Sanskrit and Tibetan titles, and many of the English titles are
abbreviated.
For modern editions of texts of the Madhyamika school and
their Tibetan versions as well as a more complete list of
translations, see David S. Ruegg's The Literature of the
Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India (Wiesbaden: Otto
Harrasowitz, 1981).
1
Sutras and Tantras
Bodhisattva Section Sutra
Bodhisattvapitakasutra
Byang chub sems dpa'i sde snod kyi mdo
P760.12, Vol. 22-3
Buddhavatamsaka Sutra
Buddhavatamsakanamamahavaipulyasutra
Sangs rgyas phal po che zhes bya ba shin tu rgyas pa chen
po'i mdo
P761, Vol. 25-6
Chapter of the True One Sutra
Satyakaparivartasutra
bDen pa po'i le'u'i mdo
[?]
Chapter Showing the Three Vows Sutra
Trisambaranirdeshaparivartasutra
sDom pa gsum bstan pa'i le'u'i mdo
P760.1, Vol. 22
Cloud of Jewels Sutra
Ratnameghasutra
dKon mchog sprin gyi mdo
P879, Vol. 35
758
Meditation on Emptiness
Compendium of Doctrine Sutra
Dharmasamgftisutra
Chos yang dag par sdud pa'i mdo
P904, Vol. 36
Condensed Perfection of Wisdom Sutra
Sanchayagathaprajnaparamitasutra
Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa sdud pa tshigs su bead pa
P735, Vol. 21
Descent into Lanka Sutra
Larikavatarasutra
Lang kar gshegs pa'i mdo
P775, Vol. 29
Trans, by D.T. Suzuki, The Lankavatara Sutra (London:
Routledge, 1932)
Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra
Ashtasahasrikaprajnaparamitasutra
Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa brgyad stong pa'i mdo
P734, Vol. 21
Translated by E. Conze, Astasahasrika Prajnaparamita (Calcutta: Asiatic Society Bibliotheca Indica no. 284, 1958;
reprinted by Four Seasons Foundation, Bolinas, Cal., 1962)
Eighteen Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra
Ashtadashasahasrikaprajnaparamitasutra
Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa khri brgyad stong pa'i mdo
P732, Vol. 19-20
See E. Conze's The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom (Berkeley: U. Cal., 1975).
Extensive Sport Sutra
Lalitavistarasutra
rGya cher rol pa'i mdo
P763, Vol. 27
Fifty Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra
Bhagavatfprajnaparamitapanchashatikasutra
bCom ldan 'das ma shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa lnga bcu
pa'i mdo
P740, Vol. 21
Translated by E. Conze in The Short Prajnaparamita Texts
(London: Luzac, 1973), pp. 154-6
Bibliography: Sutras and Tantras
759
Five Hundred Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra
Panchashatikaprajnaparamitasutra
Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa lnga brgya pa'i mdo
P738, Vol. 21
Translated by E. Conze in The Short Prajnaparamita Texts,
pp. 108-21
Fundamental Tantra of Manjushri
Manjushrfmulatantra
'Jam dpal gyi rtsa ba'i rgyud
PI62, Vol. 6
Great Cloud Sutra
Mahameghasutra
sPrin chen po'i mdo
P898, Vol. 35
Great Drum Sutra
Mahabheriharakaparivartasutra
rNga bo che chen po'i le'u'i mdo
P888, Vol. 35
Guhyasamaja Tantra
Sarvatathagatakayavakchittarahasyaguhyasamajanamamahakalparaja
De bzhin gshegs pa thams cad kyi sku gsung thugs kyi gsang
chen gsang ba 'dus pa zhes bya ba brtag pa'i rgyal po chen po
P81, Vol. 3
Partial translation in A. Wayman's The Yoga of the Guhyasamajatantra (Delhi: Motilal, 1977)
Heap of Jewels Sutra
Maharatnakutadharmaparyayashatasahasrikagranthasutra
dKon mchog brtsegs pa chen po'i chos kyi rnam grangs le'u
stong phrag brgya pa'i mdo
P760, Vol. 22-4
Heart of Wisdom Sutra
Prajnahrdaya/Bhagavatfprajnaparamitahrdayasutra
Shes rab snying po/bCom ldan 'das ma shes rab kyi pha rol tu
phyin pa'i snying po'i mdo
PI60, Vol. 6
Translated by E. Conze in Buddhist Texts Through the Ages
(Oxford: Cassirer, 1954), pp.152-3
760
Meditation on Emptiness
Hevajra Tantra
Hevajratantraraja
Kye'i rdo rje zhes bya ba rgyud kyi rgyal po
P10, Vol. 1
Translated by D.L. Snellgrove, Hevajra Tantra (London:
Oxford, 1959)
Irreversible Wheel Sutra
Avaivartachakrasutra
Phyir mi ldog pa'i 'khor lo'i mdo
P906, Vol. 36
Jewel Mine Sutra
Ratnakarasutra
dKon mchog 'byung gnas kyi mdo
P792, Vol. 31
Kalachakra, King of Tantras, Issued from the Supreme Original
Buddha
Paramadibuddhoddhrtashrikalachakranamatantraraja
mChog gi dang po'i sangs rgyas las phyung ba rgyud kyi rgyal
po dpal dus kyi 'khor lo
P4, Vol. 1
Kashyapa Chapter Sutra
Kashyapaparivartasutra
'Od srung gi le'u'i mdo
P760.43, Vol. 24
King of Meditative Stabilizations Sutra
Samadhirajasutra/Sarvadharmasvabhavasamatavipanchitasamadhirajasutra
Ting nge 'dzin rgyal po'i mdo/Chos thams cad kyi rang bzhin
mnyam pa nyid rnam par spros pa ting nge 'dzin gyi rgyal
po'i mdo
P795, Vol. 31-2
Partial translation by K. Regamey, Three Chapters from the
Samadhirajasutra (Warsaw: 1938)
Life Stories
Jatakanidana
sKyes pa rabs kyi gleng gzhi
P748, Vol. 21
Bibliography: Sutras and Tantras
761
Lion's Roar of Shrimaladevi Sutra
Shrlmaladevisimhanadasutra
Lha mo dpal 'phreng gi seng ge'i sgra'i mdo
P760.48, Vol. 24
Translated by A. and H. Wayman, The Lion's Roar of Queen
Srimala (New York: 1974)
Mahay ana Sutra of Knowledge
Mahayanabhidharmasutra
Theg pa chen po'i mngon pa'i chos kyi mdo
[?]
Meeting of Father and Son Sutra
Pitaputrasamagamasutra
Yab dang sras mjal ba'i mdo
P760.16, Vol. 23
Nirvana Sutra
Mahaparinirvanasutra
Yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa chen po'i mdo
P787-9, Vol. 30-1
Translated by K. Yamamoto, The Mahayana Mahaparinirvana-Sutra (Ube City; Karinbunko, 1974), 3v.
One Hundred and Fifty Means Perfection of Wisdom Sutra
Prajnaparamitanayashatapanchashatikasutra
Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i tshul brgya lnga bcu pa'i mdo
P121, Vol. 5
Translated by E. Conze in The Short Prajnaparamita Texts,
pp. 184-95
One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra
Shatasahasrikaprajnaparamitasutra
Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag brgya pa'i mdo
P730, Vol. 12-18
See E. Conze's The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom (Berkeley:
U. Cal., 1975)
One Letter Perfection of Wisdom Sutra
Ekaksharfmatanamasarvatathagataprajnaparamitasutra
De bzhin gshegs pa thams cad kyi yum shes rab kyi pha rol tu
phyin pa yi ge gcig ma'i mdo
P741, Vol. 21
762
Meditation on Emptiness
Translated in E. Conze's The Short Prajnaparamita Texts,
p.201
Ornament of the Wisdom Engaging the Sphere of All Buddhas
Sutra
Sarvabuddhavishayavatarajnanalokalamkarasutra
Sangs rgyas thams cad kyi yul la 'jug pa'i ye shes snang ba'i
rgyan gyi mdo
P768, Vol. 28
Perfection of Wisdom in Several Words Sutra
Svalpaksharaprajnaparamitasutra
Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa yi ge nyung ngu
PI59, Vol. 6
Translated by E. Conze in The Short Prajnaparamita Texts,
pp. 144-7
Questions of Brahma Sutra
Brahmapariprchchhasutra
Tshangs pas zhus pa'i mdo
P825, Vol. 33
Questions of King Dharamshvara Sutra
Dharanfshvararajapariprchchhasutra/
Tathagatamahakarunanirdeshasutra
gZungs kyi dbang phyug rgyal pos zhus pa'i mdo/De bzhin
gshegs pa'i snying rje chen po bstan pa'i mdo
P814, Vol. 32
Questions of Sagaramati Sutra
Sagaramatipariprchchhasutra
bLo gros rgya mtshos zhus pa'i mdo
P819, Vol. 33
Questions of Suvikrantavikrami Perfection of Wisdom Sutra
Suvikrantavikramipariprchchhaprajnaparamitasutra
Rab kyi tshal gyis rnam par gnon pas zhus pa'i shes rab kyi pha
rol tu phyin pa'i mdo
P736, Vol. 21
Translated by E. Conze in The Short Prajnaparamita Texts,
pp. 1-78
Questions of the King of Nagas, Anavatapta, Sutra
Anavataptanagarajapariprchchhasutra
Bibliography: Sutras and Tantras
763
kLu'i rgyal po ma dros pas zhus pa'i mdo
P823, Vol. 33
Questions of the King of Nagas, Sagara, Sutra
Sagaranagarajapariprchchhasutra
kLu'i rgyal po rgya mtshos zhus pa'i mdo
P820, Vol. 33
Rice Seedling Sutra
Shalistambasutra
Sa lu'i ljang pa'i mdo
P876, Vol. 34
Seven Hundred Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra
Saptashatikaprajnaparamitasutra
Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa bdun brgya pa'i mdo
P737, Vol. 21
Translated by E. Conze in The Short Prajnaparamita Texts,
pp. 79-107
Sport of Manjushri Sutra
Manjushrivikriditasutra
'Jam dpal rnam par rol pa'i mdo
P764, Vol. 27
Sutra on the Heavily Adorned
Ghanavyuhasutra
rGyan stug po bkod pa'i mdo
P778, Vol. 29
Sutra on the Myrabolan Fruit
Myrabolasutra
Ba ru ra'i mdo
[?]
Sutra on the Ten Grounds
Dashabhumikasutra
mDo sde sa bcu pa
P761.31, Vol. 25
Translated by M. Honda in 'An Annotated Translation of the
"Dasabhumika"' in Studies in Southeast and Central Asia,
ed. D. Sinor; Satapitaka Series 74. (New Delhi: 1968),
pp. 115-276
Sutra Showing the Inconceivable Secrets of the Tathagatas
Tathagatachintyaguhyanirdeshasutra
764
Meditation on Emptiness
De bzhin gshegs pa'i gsang ba bsam gyis mi khyab pa bstan
pa'i mdo
P760.3, Vol. 22
Sutra Showing the Realm of the Inconceivable Qualities and Wisdom of the Tathagatas
Tathagatagunajnanachintyavishayavataranirdeshasutra
De bzhin gshegs pa'i yon tan dang ye shes bsam gyis mi khyab
pa'i yul la 'jug pa bstan pa'i mdo
P852, Vol. 34
Sutra Unravelling the Thought
Samdhinirmochanasutra
dGongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i mdo
P774, Vol. 29
Translated by E. Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana-siitra (Paris:
Louvain, 1935)
Tathagata Essence Sutra
Tathagatagarbhasutra
De bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po'i mdo
P924, Vol. 36
Teaching of Akshayamati Sutra
Akshayamatinirdeshasutra
bLo gros mi zad pas bstan pa'i mdo
P842, Vol. 34
Ten Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra
Ashtadashasahasrikaprajnaparamitasutra
Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa khri pa'i mdo
P733, Vol. 20-1
See E. Conze's The Large Siitra on Perfect Wisdom (Berkeley:
U. Cal., 1975)
Three Hundred Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra/The Diamond
Sutra
Trishatikaprajnaparamitasutra/Vajrachchedika
Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i sum brgya pa'i mdo/rDo rje
gcod pa
P739, Vol. 21
Translated by E. Conze in The Short Prajnaparamita Texts,
pp. 122-39
Bibliography: Sutras and Tantras
765
Twenty-Five Doors Perfection of Wisdom Sutra
Panchavimshatikaprajnaparamitamukhasutra
Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i sgo nyi shu rtsa lnga pa'i
mdo
P124, Vol. 5
Translated by E. Conze in The Short Prajnaparamita Texts,
pp. 199-200
Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra
Panchavimshatisahasrikaprajnaparamitasutra
Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag nyi shu lnga pa
P731, Vol. 18-19
Translated by E. Conze, The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom
(Berkeley: U. Cal., 1975)
White Lotus of the Excellent Doctrine Sutra
Saddharmapundarfkasutra
Dam pa'i chos pad ma dkar po'i mdo
P781, Vol. 30
Translated by L. Hurvitz, Scripture of the Lotus Blossom of
Fine Dharma (New York: Columbia, 1976)
2 Sanskrit and Tibetan Treatises
Akutobhaya (Ga-las-'jigs-med)*
Akutobhaya's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the
Middle Way'
Mulamadhyamakavrtti-akutobhaya
dbU ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa ga las 'jigs med
P5229, Vol. 95
Aryadeva ('Phags-pa-lha)
Establishment of the Reasoning and Logic Refuting Error
Skhalitapramathanayuktihetusiddhi
'Khrul pa bzlog pa'i rigs pa gtan tshigs grub pa
P5247, Vol. 95
Four Hundred/Treatise of Four Hundred Stanzas
Chatuhshatakashastrakarika
bsTan bcos bzhi brgya pa zhes bya ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa
P5246, Vol. 95
Length of a Forearm
Hastavalaprakaranakarika
* Geshe Gedun Lodro suggested that this text had been given the name of its
author, as is the case with Buddhapalita's commentary on the same. The text is
falsely attributed to Nagarjuna (see p.360).
Bibliography: Sanskrit and Tibetan Treatises
767
Rab tu byed pa lag pa'i tshad kyi tshig le'ur byas pa
P5248, Vol. 95; P5244, Vol. 95
Asanga (Thogs-med)
Explanation of (Maitreya's) 'Sublime Continuum of the Great
Vehicle'
Mahayanottaratantrashastravyakhya
Theg pa chen po'i rgyud bla ma'i bstan bcos kyi rnam par
bshad pa
P5526, Vol. 108
Five Treatises on the Levels
Actuality of the Levels/Levels of Yogic Practice
Bhumivastu/Yogacharyabhumi
Sa'i dngos gzhi/rNal 'byor spyod pa'i sa
P5536-8, Vol. 109-10
Compendium of Ascertainments
Nirnayasamgraha
gTan la dbab pa bsdu ba
P5539, Vol. 110-11
Compendium of Bases
Vastusamgraha
gZhi bsdu ba
P5540, Vol. I l l
Compendium of Enumerations
Paryayasamgraha
rNam grang bsdu ba
P5542, Vol. I l l
Compendium of Explanations
Vivaranasamgraha
rNam par bshad pa bsdu ba
P5543, Vol. I l l
Sravakabhumi
Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Vol. XIV. Ed. Dr.
Karunesha Shukla
Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1973
Two Compendiums
Compendium of Knowledge
Abhidharmasamuchchaya
768
Meditation on Emptiness
mNgon pa kun btus
P5550, Vol. 112
Sanskrit text: Abhidharma Samuccaya, ed. Pralhad
Pradhan Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati, 1950
Translated by W. Rahula, Le Compendium de la SuperDoctrine Philosophic (Paris: Ecole Frangaise
d'Extreme Orient, 1971)
Compendium on the Mahay ana
Mahayanasamgraha
Theg pa chen po bsdus pa
P5549, Vol. 112
Translated by Etienne Lamotte, La Somme du Grand
Vehicule d'Asahga, Vol. II. (Louvain: 1939)
Ashvaghosha (rTa-dbyangs)
Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment/Essay on the
Stages of Cultivating the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment
Paramarthabodhichittabhavanakramavarnasamgraha
Don dam pa byang chub kyi sems bsgom pa'i rim pa yi ger
bris pa
P5431, Vol. 103
Atfsha, 982-1054
Commentary on the Difficult Points of 'Lamp for the Path to
Enlightenment'
Bodhimargapradfpapanjika
Byang chub lam gyi sgron ma'i dka' 'grel
P5344, Vol. 103
Explanation of (Shantideva's) 'Engaging in the Bodhisattva
Deeds'
Bodhisattvacharyavatarabhashya
Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i bshad pa
P5872, Vol. 146
Introduction to the Two Truths
Satyadvayavatara
bDen pa gnyis la 'jug pa
P5298, Vol. 101; P5380, Vol. 103
Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment
Bodhipathapradfpa
Bibliography: Sanskrit and Tibetan Treatises
769
Byang chub lam gyi sgron ma
P5343, Vol. 103
Quintessential Instructions on the Middle Way
Madhyamakopadesha
dbU ma'i man ngag
P5324, Vol. 102; P5326, Vol. 102; P5381, Vol. 103
Avalokitavrata (sPyan-ras-gzigs-brtul-zhugs)
Commentary on (Bhavaviveka's) 'Lamp for (Nagarjuna's)
"Wisdom"'
Prajnapradfpatika
Shes rab sgron ma'i rgya cher 'grel pa
P5259, Vol. 96-7
Bhavaviveka (Legs-ldan-'byed)
Blaze of Reasoning, Commentary on the 'Heart of the Middle
Way'
Madhyamakahrdayavrttitarkajvala
dbU ma'i snying po'i 'grel pa rtog ge 'bar ba
P5256, Vol. 96
Partial translation by S. Iida in Reason and Emptiness
(Tokyo: Hokuseido, 1980), chap. III. 1-136, pp.52242
Heart of the Middle Way
Madhyamakahrdayakarika
dbU ma'i snying po'i tshig le'ur byas pa
P5255, Vol. 96
See directly above for partial translation
Lamp for (Nagarjuna 'sj 'Wisdom', Commentary on the 'Treatise on the Middle Way'
Prajnapradipamulamadhyamakavrtti
dbU ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa shes rab sgron ma
P5253, Vol. 95
Bhavaviveka the Lesser (Legs-ldan-chung-ba)
Precious Lamp for the Middle Way
Madhyamakaratnapradlpa
dbU ma rin po che'i sgron ma
P5254, Vol. 95
Buddhapalita (Sangs-rgyas-bskyangs)
770
Meditation on Emptiness
Buddhapalita's Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the
Middle Way'
Buddhapahtamulamadhyamakavrtti
dbU ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa buddha pa li ta
P5254, Vol. 95
Char-har Ge-shay (Char-har dGe-bshes), 18th century
Identification of Elements, Elemental Evolutes, And So Forth
'Byung ba dang 'byung gyur sogs kyi ngos 'dzin
The Collected Works of Cha-har dge-bshes blo-bzangtshul-khrims, Vol. 10
New Delhi: Chatring Jansar Tenzin, 1973
Chandragomin
Chandragomin's Grammar
Chandravyakaranasutra
Lung du ston pa candra pa'i mdo
P5767, Vol. 140
Sanskrit edition: Candravyakaranam. Jodhapura, 1967
Chandraklrti (Zla-ba-grags-pa)
Clear Words, Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the
Middle Way'
Mulamadhyamakavrttiprasannapada
dbU ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa tshig gsal ba
P5260, Vol. 98; also: Tibetan Publishing House, 1968
Partial translation by J. May, Candrakirti Prasannapada
Madhyamakavrtti (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1959);
also J.W. De Jong, Cinq Chapitres de la Prasannapada
(Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1949); also M. Sprung, Lucid
Exposition of the Middle Way (London: Routledge,
1979)
Commentary on (Aryadeva's) 'Four Hundred Stanzas on the
Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas'
Bodhisattvayogacharyachatuhshatakatfka
Byang chub sems dpa'i mal 'byor spyod pa bzhi brgya pa'i
rgya cher 'grel pa
P5266, Vol. 98
Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness'
Shunyatasaptativrtti
Bibliography: Sanskrit and Tibetan Treatises
771
sTong pa nyid bdun cu pa'i 'grel pa
P5268, Vol. 99
Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning'
Yuktishashtikavrtti
Rigs pa drug cu pa'i 'grel pa
P5265, Vol. 98
Commentary on the 'Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on
the Middle Way'"
Madhyamakavatarabhashya
dbU ma la 'jug pa'i bshad pa
P5263, Vol. 98
Partial translation by L. de La Vallee Poussin, Museon
8 (1907), pp.249-317; 11 (1910), pp.271-358; and 12
(1911), pp.235-328
Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way'
Madhyamakavatara
dbU ma la 'jug pa
P5261, Vol. 98; P5262, Vol. 98
Dak-tsang (sTag-tshang-lo-tsa-ba Shes-rab-rin-chen), 1405-?
Ocean of Good Explanations, Explanation of 'Freedom From
Extremes Through Understanding All Tenets'
Grub mtha' kun shes nas mtha' bral grub pa zhes bya ba'i
bstan bcos rnam par bshad pa legs bshad kyi rgya mtsho
Photographic reprint in the possession of Khetsun
Sangpo; no other data
Also: Thim-phu: Kun-bzang-stobs rgyal, 1976
Den-ba-dar-gyay (bsTan-pa-dar-rgyas), 1493-1568
Analysis of Dependent-Arising
rTen 'brel gyi mtha' bcod
Mey College of Sera Monastery, 1969
Den-dar-hla-ram-ba (bsTan-dar-lha-ram-pa), 1759-?
Presentation of the Lack of Being One or Many
gCig du bral gyi rnam gzhag legs bshad rgya mtsho las
btus pa'i 'khrul spong bdud rtsi'i gzegs ma
Lhasa: Great Press at the base of the Potala, Fire Dog
Male year of the sixteenth cycle
Also: Collected gsung 'bum of Bstan-dar Lha-ram of Alag-sha. Vol. 1 New Delhi: Lama Guru Deva, 1971
772
Meditation on Emptiness
Dharmakfrti (Chos-kyi-grags-pa)
Seven Treatises on Valid Cognition
Analysis of Relations
Sambandhaparikshavrtti
'Brel pa brtag pa'i rab tu byed pa
P5731, Vol. 130
Ascertainment of Valid Cognition
Pramanavinishchaya
Tshad ma rnam par nges pa
P5710, Vol. 130
Commentary on (Dignaga's) 'Compendium of Valid Cognition'
Pramanavarttikakarika
Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa
P5709, Vol. 130
Drop of Reasoning
Nyayabinduprakarana
Rigs pa'i thigs pa zhes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa
P5711, Vol. 130 ,
Translation by T. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic (New
York: Dover, 1962)
Drop of Reasons
Hetubindunamaprakarana
gTan tshigs kyi thigs pa zhes bya ba rab tu byed pa
P5712, Vol. 130
Proof of Other Continuums
Samtanantarasiddhinamaprakarana
rGyud gzhan grub pa zhes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa
P5716, Vol. 130
Reasoning for Debate
Vadanyayanamaprakarana
rTsod pa'i rigs pa zhes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa
P5715, Vol. 130
Dignaga (Phyogs-glang)
Compendium of Valid Cognition
Pramanasamuchchaya
Tshad ma kun las btus pa
P5700, Vol. 130
Bibliography: Sanskrit and Tibetan Treatises
773
Partial translation by M. Hattori, Dignaga, On Perception
(Cambridge: Harvard, 1968)
Dzong-ka-ba (Tsong-kha-pa), 1357-1419
Essence of the Good Explanations, Treatise Discriminating What
is to be Interpreted and the Definitive
Drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par phye ba'i bstan
bcos legs bshad snying po
P6142, Vol. 153
Translation by R.A.F. Thurman (Princeton: forthcoming)
Extensive Commentary on the Difficult Points of the 'Afflicted
Mind and Basis-of-All', Ocean of Eloquence
Yid dang kun gzhi'i dka' ba'i gnas rgya cher 'grel pa legs
par bshad pa'i rgya mtsho
Delhi: Lhalungpa, no date
Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great
Exposition of the Stages of the Path'
The Lam rim chen mo of the incomparable Tsong-kha-pa,
with the interlineal notes of Ba-so
Chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan, Sde-drug Mkhan-chen
Ngag-dbang-rab-rtan, 'Jam-dbyangs-bshad-pa'i-rdo-rje,
and Bra-sti Dge-bshes Rin-chen-don-grub
New Delhi: Chos-'phel-legs-ldan, 1972
Golden Rosary of Eloquence/Extensive Explanation of (Maitreya's) 'Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the Perfection of Wisdom, Ornament for Clear Realization', As Well As
Its Commentaries
Legs bshad gser gyi phreng ba/Shes rab kyi pha rol tu
phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i
rgyan 'grel pa dang bcas pa'i rgya cher bshad pa
P6150, Vol. 154
Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path
Lam rim chen mo
P6001, Vol. 152
Also: Dharmsala: Shes rig par khang, 1964
Partial translation by A. Wayman, Calming the Mind and
Discerning the Real (New York: Columbia, 1978)
774
Meditation on Emptiness
Illumination of the Thought, Extensive Explanation of (•Chandrakirti's) 'Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the
Middle Way'"
dbU ma la 'jug pa'i rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab
gsal
P6143, Vol. 154
Partial translation by J. Hopkins in Compassion in Tibetan
Buddhism (London: Rider, 1980)
Middling Exposition of the Stages of the Path
Lam rim 'bring
P6002, Vol. 152
Also: Dharmsala: Shes rig par khang, 1968
Partial translation by R.A.F. Thurman in The Life and
Teachings of Tsong Khapa (Dharmsala: LTWA, 1982)
Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on
the Middle Way'
dbU ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba'i
rnam bshad rigs pa'i rgya mtsho
P6153, Vol. 156
Also: Varanasi: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing
Press, no date.
Translation of chapter two by J. Hopkins, 'Ocean of Reasoning' (Dharmsala: LTWA, 1977)
Praise of Dependent-Arising/Praise of the Supramundane Victor
Buddha from the Approach of His Teaching the Profound
Dependent-Arising, Essence of the Good Explanations
Sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das la zab mo rten cing 'grel bar
'byung ba gsung ba'i sgo nas bstod pa legs par bshad
pa'i snying po
P6016, Vol. 153
Translation by Geshe Wangyal in The Door of Liberation
(New York: Girodias, 1973)
Quintessential Instructions on the King of Tantras, the Glorious
Guhyasamaja, Lamp Thoroughly Illuminating the Five Stages
rGyud kyi rgyal po dpal gsang ba 'dus pa'i man ngag rim
pa lnga rab tu gsal ba'i sgron ma
P6167, Vol. 158
Bibliography: Sanskrit and Tibetan Treatises
775
Stages of Instruction from the Approach of the Profound Path of
Naropa's Six Practices
Zab lam na ro'i chos drug gi sgo nas 'khrid pa'i rim pa
P6201, Vol. 160
Translated by C.C. Chang, Esoteric Teachings of the
Tibetan Tantra (Lausanne: Aurora, 1961)
Fifth Dalai Lama (Ngag-dbang-blo-bzang-rgya-mtsho), 1617-82
Sacred Word ofManjushrT, Instructions on the Stages of the Path
to Enlightenment
Byang chub lam gyi rim pa'i 'khrid yig 'jam pa'i dbyangs
kyi zhal lung
Blockprint in the possession of Trijang Labrang, Dharmsala; no other information
Also: Thim-phu: Kun-bzang stobs-rgyal, 1976
Partial translation by J. Hopkins, 'Practice of Emptiness'
(Dharmsala: LTWA, 1974)
Gen-dun-cho-pel (dGe-'dun-chos-'phel), 1905P-1951?
Ornament to Nagarjuna's Thought, Eloquence Containing the
Essence of the Profundities of the Middle Way
dbU ma'i zab gnad snying por dril ba'i legs bshad klu
sgrub dgongs rgyan
Kalimpong: Mani Printing Works, no date
Gom-day Nam-ka-gyel-tsen (sGom-sde Nam-mkha' rgyal mtshan),
1532-92
Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of the Consequences, Key
to (Chandrakirti's) 'Clear Words', Written by Jam-bay-yang
Gom-day Nam-ka-gyel-tsen
Thai bzlog gi dka' ba'i gnas gtan la 'bebs pa 'jam pa'i
dbyang sgom sde nam mkha' rgyal mtshan gyis mdzad
pa'i tshig gsal gyi lde mig in The Obligatory Texts (Yigcha) for the Study of Madhyamika of Byes Grwa-tshah of
Se-ra Monastery, Madhyamika Text Series Vol. 4
New Delhi: Lha-mkhar yons-'dzin bstan-pa-rgyalmtshan, 1973
Gon-chok-den-bay-dron-may
(dKon-mchog-bstan-pa'i-sgronme), 1762-1823
Beginnings of Annotations on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Essence of the
776
Meditation on Emptiness
Good Explanations' on the Topic of Mind-Only, Illumination
of a Hundred Mind-Only Texts
bsTan bcos legs par bshad pa'i snying po las sems tsam
skor gyi mchan 'grel rtsom 'phro rnam rig gzhung
brgya'i snang ba
Tibetan blockprint in the possession of HH the Dalai
Lama; no other data
Explanation of the Difficidt Points of (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Afflicted
Mind and Basis-of-All', Entrance for the Wise
Yid dang kun gzhi'i dka' gnad rnam par bshad pa mkhas
pa'i 'jug ngogs
Musoorie: Gomang College, no other data
Presentation of the Four Truths, Port of Those Wishing Liberation, Festival for the Wise
bDen bzhi'i rnam gzhag thar 'dod 'jug ngogs mkhas pa'i
dga' ston
Collected Works of Gun-than dkon-mchog bstan-pa'i
sgron-me, Vol. 2
New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1972
Gon-chok-jik-may-wang-bo (dKon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbang-po),
1728-91
Precious Garland of Tenets/Presentation of Tenets, A Precious
Garland
Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa rin po che'i phreng
ba
Dharmsala:-Shes rig par khang, 1969
Translated by Sopa and Hopkins in Practice and Theory of
Tibetan Buddhism (London: Rider, 1976) and by H.V.
Guenther in Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice
(Baltimore: Penguin, 1972)
Presentation of the Grounds and Paths, Beautiful Ornament of
the Three Vehicles
Sa lam gyi rnam bzhag theg gsum mdzes rgyan
Buxaduor: Gomang College, 1965
Also: The Collected Works of dkon-mchog-'jigs-meddbang-po, Vol. 7. New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo,
1972
Bibliography: Sanskrit and Tibetan
Treatises 23
Gunamati (Yon-tan-blo-gros)
Explanation of (Vasubandhu's) 'Commentary on the "Sutra on
Dependent-A rising'''
Pratftyasamutpadadivibhariganirdeshatfka
rTen cing 'brel bar 'byung ba dang po dang rnam par
'byed pa bstan pa'i rgya cher bshad pa
P5497, Vol. 104-5
Gyel-tsap (rGyal-tshab), 1364-1432
Commentary on (Maitreya's) 'Sublime Continuum of the Great
Vehicle'
Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i tfkka
Blockprint in the possession of HH the Dalai Lama; no
other information.
Jam-yang-shay-ba ('Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa), 1648-1721
Great Exposition of Tenets/Explanation of 'Tenets', Sun of the
Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our
Own and Others' Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound
[Emptiness], Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All
Hopes of All Beings
Grub mtha'i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha' kun dang
zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma
lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu'i re ba kun skong
Musoorie: Dalama, 1962
Great Exposition of the Concentrations and Formless Absorptions/Treatise on the Presentations of the Concentrative and
Formless Absorptions, Adornment Beautifying the Subduer's
Teaching, Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning, Delighting the
Fortunate
bSam gzugs kyi snyoms 'jug mams kyi rnam par bzhag
pa'i bstan bcos thub bstan mdzes rgyan lung dang rigs
pa'i rgya mtsho skal bzang dga' byed
Folio printing in India; no publication data
Great Exposition of the Middle Way/Analysis of (Chandrakirti's) 'Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle
Way"', Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning, Thoroughly
Illuminating the Profound Meaning [of Emptiness], Entrance
for the Fortunate
778
Meditation on Emptiness
dbU ma 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab
don kun gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs
Buxaduor: Gomang, 1967
Presentation of Tenets, Roar of the Five-Faced [Lion] Eradicating Error, Precious Lamp Illuminating the Good Path to
Omniscience
Grub mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa 'khrul spong gdong lnga'i
sgra dbyangs kun mkhyen lam bzang gsal ba'i rin chen
sgron me
Folio printing in India; no publication data.
Jang-gya (ICang-skya), 1717-86
Presentation of Tenets/Clear Exposition of the Presentations of
Tenets, Beautiful Ornament for the Meru of the Subduer's
Teaching
Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa gsal bar bshad pa
thub bstan lhun po'i mdzes rgyan
Varanasi: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press,
1970
Song on the Practice of the View
dbU ma'i lta ba nyams su len tshul de kho na nyid snang
bar byed pa'i sgron me
M H T L : 3915
Jnanagarbha (Ye-shes-snying-po)
Discrimination of the Two Truths
Satyadvayavibhanga
bDen gnyis rnam 'byed
[Not in P] Toh.3881
Jnanashrfbhadra (Ye-shes-dpal-bzang-po)
Commentary on the 'Descent into Lanka'
Lankavataravrtti
Langkar gshegs pa'i 'grel pa
P5519, Vol. 107
Jnanavajra (Ye-shes-rdo-rje)
Commentary on the 'Descent into Lanka Sutra', Ornament of
the Heart of the Tathagata
Larikavataranamamahayanasutravrttitathagatahrdayalamkara
Bibliography: Sanskrit and Tibetan Treatises
779
Langkar gshegs pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo'i
'grel pa de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po'i rgyan
P5520, Vol. 107
Kalapa
Kalapa's Aphorisms
Kalapasutra
Ka la pa'i mdo
P5775, Vol. 140
Kamalashlla
Commentary on the Difficult Points of (Shantarakshita's)
'Compendium on Suchness'
Tattvasamgrahapanjika
De kho na nyid bsdus pa'i dka' 'grel
P5765, Vol. 138
Translated by G. Jha, The Tattvasahgraha of Santaraksita with the commentary of Kamalasila, Gaekwad's
Oriental Series Vol. lxxx and lxxxiii (Baroda: 1937-9)
Illumination of the Middle Way
Madhyamakaloka
dbU ma snang ba
P5287, Vol. 101
Stages of Meditation
Bhavanakrama
sGom pa'i rim pa
P5310-12, Vol. 102
Kay-drup (mKhas-grub), 1385-1438
Manual of Instructions on the View
ITa khrid mun sel sgron me
Toh.5499
Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate, Treatise Brilliantly Clarifying the Profound Emptiness
Zab mo stong pa nyid rab tu gsal bar byed pa'i bstan bcos
skal bzang mig 'byed
Tibetan blockprint edition in the possession of Geshe
Wangyal; no other information. [Toh.5459]
Long-drol (kLong-drol), 1719-94
Tibetan Buddhist Studies of Kloh-drol bla-ma Nag-dbah-blo-bzah
780
Meditation on Emptiness
Mussoorie: Lokesh Chandra, 1963
Also: New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1973
Mahamati (bLo-gros-chen-po)
Clear Words, Extensive Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) 'Friendly
Letter'/Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Friendly Letter'
Vyaktapadasuhrllekhatfka
bShes pa'i spring yig gi rgya cher bshad pa tshig gsal ba
P5690, Vol. 129
Maitreya (Byams-pa)
Five Treatises of Maitreya's Doctrine
Discrimination of Phenomena and the Nature of Phenomena
Dharmadharmatavibhanga
Chos dang chos nyid rnam par 'byed pa
P5523, Vol. 108
Discrimination of the Middle Way and the Extremes
Madhyantavibhanga
dbUs dang mtha' rnam par 'byed pa
P5522, Vol. 108
Translated in part by T. Stcherbatsky, MadhyantaVibhanga (Calcutta: Indian Studies Past and Present,
1971)
Sanskrit text: Madhyanta-Vibhaga-Sastra, ed. Ramchandra Pandeya, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971
Ornament for the Mahay ana Sutras
Mahayanasutralamkarakarika
Theg pa chen po'i mdo sde'i rgyan gyi tshig le'ur byas pa
P5521, Vol. 108
Ornament for Clear Realization
Abhisamayalamkara
mNgon par rtogs pa'i rgyan
P5184, Vol. 88
Translated by E. Conze, Abhisamayalahkara, Serie
Orientale Roma VI (Rome: IS.M.E.O., July 1954)
Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle
Mahayanottaratantrashastra
Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i bstan bcos
Bibliography: Sanskrit and Tibetan Treatises
781
P5525, Vol. 108
Translated by E. Obermiller, Sublime Science of the
Great Vehicle to Salvation (Acta Orientalia, XI, ii, iii,
and iv); and by J. Takasaki, A Study on the Ratnagotravibhaga (Rome: IS. M.E.O., 1966)
Nagabodhi (kLu-byang)
Classification of the Ends of Actions
Karmantavibhariga
Las kyi mtha' rnam par 'byed pa
P2676, Vol.62
Nagarjuna (kLu-sgrub)
Commentary on 'Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness'
Shunyatasaptati vrtt i
sTong pa nyid bdun cu pa'i 'grel pa
P5231, Vol. 95
Compendium of Sutra
Sutrasamuchchaya
mDo kun las btus pa
P5330, Vol. 102
Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment
Bodhichittavivarana
Byang chub sems kyi 'grel pa
P2665, Vol. 61; P2666, Vol.61
Five Collections of Reasonings (see Six Collections and delete
the Precious Garland)
Friendly Letter
Suhrllekha
bShes pa'i spring yig
P5682, Vol. 129
Translation by Geshe L. Tharchin and A.B. Engle,
Nagarjuna's Letter (Dharmsala: LTWA, 1979)
Peerless Praise
Nirupamastava
dPe med par bstod pa
P2011, Vol. 46
Praise of the Element of Qualities
Dharmadhatustotra
782
Meditation on Emptiness
Chos kyi dbyings su bstod pa
P2010,"Vol. 46
Praise of the Inconceivable
Achintyastava
bSam gyis mi khyab par bstod pa
P2019, Vol. 46
Praise of the Mind Vajra
Chittavajrastava
Sems kyi rdo rje la bstod pa
P2013, Vol.46
Praise of the Supramundane
Lokatftastava
'Jig rten las 'das par bstod pa
P2012, Vol. 46
Praise of the Three Bodies
Kayatrayastotra
sKu gsum la bstod pa
P2015, Vol. 46
Praise of What Surpasses Praise
StutyatiTtastava
bsTod pa las 'das par bstod pa
P2020, Vol. 46
Six Collections of Reasonings
Precious Garland of Advice for the King
Ra j aparikathar atnavali
rGyal po la gtam bya ba rin po che'i phreng ba
P5658, Vol. 129
Translated by J. Hopkins and Lati Rimpoche in The
Precious Garland and The Song of the Four Mindfulnesses. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1975); partial
translation by G. Tucci, JRAS 1934, pp.307-25;
1936, pp.237-52, 423-35
Refutation of Objections
Vigrahavyavartanfkarika
rTsod pa bzlog pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa
P5228, Vol. 95
Translated by K. Bhattacharya, The Dialectical Method
of Nagarjuna (Delhi: Motilal, 1978)
Bibliography: Sanskrit and Tibetan Treatises
783
Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness
Shunyatasaptatikarika
sTong pa nyid bdun cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa
P5227, Vol. 95
Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning
Yuktishashtikakarika
Rigs pa drug cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa
P5225, Vol. 95
Treatise Called 'The Finely Woven'
Vaidalyasutranama
Zhib mo rnam par 'thag pa zhes bya ba'i mdo
P5226, Vol. 95
Treatise on the Middle Way/Fundamental Treatise on the
Middle Way, Called 'Wisdom'
Prajnanamamulamadhyamakakarika/
Madhyamakashastra
dbU ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba
P5224, Vol. 95
Translated by F.J. Streng, Emptiness (Nashville and
New York: Abingdon, 1967); etc.
Stanzas on the Essence of Dependent-Arising
Pratftyasamutpadahrdayakarika
rTen cing 'brel par 'byung ba'i snying po'i tshig le'ur
byas pa
P5236, Vol. 95
The Five Stages
Panchakrama
Rim pa lnga pa
P2667, Vol. 61
Nga-wang-bel-den (Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan), 1797-?
Annotations for (Jam-yang-shay-ba's) 'Great Exposition of
Tenets \ Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious
Jewel of Clear Thought
Grub mtha' chen mo'i mchan 'grel dka' gnad mdud grol
bio gsal gees nor
Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1964
Explanation of the Conventional and the Ultimate in the Four
Systems of Tenets
784
Meditation on Emptiness
Grub mtha' bzhi'i lugs kyi kun rdzob dang don dam pa'i
don rnam par bshad pa legs bshad dpyid kyi dpal mo'i
glu dbyangs
New Delhi: Guru Deva, 1972
Illumination of the Texts of Tantra, Presentation of the Grounds
and Paths of the Four Great Secret Tantra Sets
gSang chen rgyud sde bzhi'i sa lam gyi rnam bzhag rgyud
gzhung gsal byed
rGyud smad par khang edition; no other data
Pa-bong-ka (Pha-bong-kha), 1878-1941
Lectures on the Stages of the Path, compiled by Trijang Rinpochay
Lam rim zin bris/rNam grol lag bcangs su gtod pa'i man
ngag zab mo tshang la ma nor ba mtshungs med chos
kyi rgyal po'i thugs bcud byang chub lam gyi rim pa'i
nyams khrid kyi zin bris gsung rab kun gyi bcud bsdus
gdams ngag bdud rtsi'i snying po
Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1965
Pan-chen So-nam-drak-ba (Pan-chen bSod-nams-grags-pa), 14781554
General Meaning of (Maitreya 'sj 'Ornament for Clear Realization '
Phar phyin spyi don/Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i
man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan 'grel
pa dang bcas pa'i rnam bshad snying po rgyan gyi don
legs par bshad pa yum don gsal ba'i sgron me
Buxaduor: Nang bstan shes rig 'dzin skyong slob gnyer
khang, 1963
Prajnamoksha (Shes-rab-thar-pa)
Commentary on (Atisha's) 'Quintessential Instructions on the
Middle Way'
Madhyamakopadeshavrtti
dbU ma'i man ngag ces bya ba'i 'grel pa
P5327, Vol. 102
Explanation of (Shantideva's) 'Engaging in the Bodhisattva
Deeds'
Bodhisattvacharyavatarabhashya
Bibliography: Sanskrit and Tibetan Treatises
785
Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i bshad pa
P5872, Vol. 146
Prajnavarman (Shes-rab-go-cha)
Commentary on (Udbhatasiddhasvamin's) 'Exalted Praise'
Visheshastavanamatlka
Khyad par du 'phags pa'i bstod pa'i rgya cher bshad pa
P2002, Vol. 46
Prthivibandhu (Sa'i-rtsa-lag)
Commentary on the 'White Lotus of the Excellent Doctrine
Sutra'
Saddharmapundarfkavrtti
Dam pa'i chos pundarlka'i 'grel pa
P5518, Vol. 107; Dharma 4017
Rajaputra Yashomitra (rGyal-po'i-sras Grags-pa'i-bshes-gnyen)
Commentary on (Vasubandhu's) 'Treasury of Knowledge'
Abhidharmakoshatrka
Chos mngon pa'i mdzod 'grel bshad
P5593, Vol. 116
Ratnakarashanti (Shanti-pa/Rin-chen-'byung-gnas-zhi-ba)
Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Compendium of Sutra', Ornament Sparkling with Jewels
Sutrasamuchchayabhashyaratnalokalamkara
mDo kun las btus pa'i bshad pa rin po che'i snang ba'i
rgyan
P5331, Vol. 102
Ren-da-wa (Red-mda'-ba), 1349-1412
Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Friendly Letter'
bShes pa'i spring yig gi 'grel pa
Tibetan blockprint in the possession of Geshe Wangyal;
no publication data
Translated by Geshe L. Tharchin and A.B. Engle,
Nagarjuna's Letter (Dharmsala: LTWA, 1979)
Sha-mar Gen-dun-den-dzin-gya-tso (Zhwa-dmar dGe-bdunbstan-'dzin-rgya-mtsho), 1852-1910
Lamp Illuminating the Profound Thought, Set Forth to Purify
Forgetfulness of the Difficult Points of (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great
Exposition of Special Insight'
786
Meditation on Emptiness
lHag mthong chen mo'i dka' gnad rnams brjed byang du
bkod pa dgongs zab snang ba'i sgron me
Delhi: Mongolian Lama Guru Deva, 1972
Shantideva (Zhi-ba-lha)
Compendium of Learnings
Shikshasamuchchayakarika
bsLab pa kun las btus pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa
P5336, Vol. 102
Translated by C. Bendall and W.H.D. Rouse, Siksa
Samuccaya (Delhi: Motilal, 1971)
Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds
Bodhisattvacharyavatara
Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa
P5272, Vol. 99
Translated by Stephen Batchelor, A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life (Dharmsala: LTWA, 1979); contemporary commentary by Geshe Kelsang Gyatso, Meaningful To Behold (London: Wisdom Publications, 1980)
Tu-gen Lo-sang-cho-gyi-nyi-ma (Thu'u-bkvan bLo-bzang-choskyi-nyi-ma) 1737-1802
Mirror of the Good Explanations Showing the Sources and Assertions of All Systems of Tenets
Grub mtha' thams cad kyi khungs dang 'dod tshul ston pa
legs bshad shel gyi me long
Sarnath: Chhos Je Lama, 1963
Udbhatasiddhasvamin (mTho-btsun-grub-rje)
Exalted Praise
Visheshastava
Khyad par du 'phags pa'i bstod pa
P2001, Vol. 46
Vasubandhu (dbYig-gnyen)
Commentary on the 'Sutra on Dependent-Arising'
Pratftyasamutpadadivibhariganirdesha
rTen cing 'brel bar 'byung ba dang po dang rnam par
dbye ba bshad pa
P5496, Vol. 104
Explanation of the 'Treasury of Knowledge'
Bibliography: Sanskrit and Tibetan Treatises
787
Abhidharmakoshabhashya
Chos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi bshad pa
P5591, Vol. 115
Translation by Louis de La Vallee Poussin, L'Abhidharmakos'a de Vasubandhu (Paris: Geuthner, 1923-31)
Treasury of Knowledge
Abhidharmakoshakarika
Chos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi tshig le'ur byas pa
P5590, Vol. 115
For translation, see previous entry
Ye-shay-gyel-tsen (Ye-shes-rgyal-mtshan), 1713-93
Clear Exposition of the Modes of Minds and Mental Factors,
Necklace for Those of Clear Mind
Sems dang sems byung gi tshul gsal bar ston pa bio gsal
mgul rgyan
The Collected Works of Tshe-mchog-glin yons-'dzin yeses-rgyal-mtshan, Vol. 16
New Delhi: Tibet House, 1974
Translation by H.V. Guenther and L.S. Kawamura,
Mind in Buddhist Psychology (Emeryville: Dharma,
1975)
Special Instructions on the View of the Middle Way, the Sacred
Word of Lo-sang
Zab mo dbu ma'i lta khrid thun mong min pa bio bzang
zhal lung
Appendix to Guenther's Tibetan Buddhism Without Mystification, Leiden: Brill, 1966; translated therein
3
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1955.
Batchelor, Stephen. A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life.
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Bendall, C., and Rouse, W.H.D. Siksa Samuccaya. rpt. Delhi:
Motilal, 1971.
Bhattacharya, K. The Dialectical Method of Nagarjuna. Delhi:
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Chang, C.C. Esoteric Teachings of the Tibetan Tantra. Lausanne:
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Conze, Edward. Abhisamayalahkara. Serie Orientale Roma VI.
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Astasahasrika Prajnaparamita. Bibliotheca Buddhica
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Buddhist Texts Through the Ages. Oxford: Cassirer,
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The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom. Berkeley: U. Cal.,
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De Jong, Jan W. Cinq chapitres de la Prasannapada. Paris:
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. 'La Madhyamakasastrastuti de Candrakfrti' in J. W. De
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. 'Textcritical Notes on the Prasannapada'. Indo-Iranian
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Demieville, Paul. 'L'origine des sectes bouddhiques d'apres
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Geiger, Wilhelm. Trans. The Mahavamsa, or the Great Chronicle of Ceylon. London: Pali Text Society, 1934.
Gokhale, V.V. 'The Vedanta-Philosophy Described by Bhavya
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no. 3, pp. 165-80.
Guenther, Herbert V. Tibetan Buddhism Without Mystification.
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Unwin, 1975.
Hattori, Masaaki. Dignaga, On Perception. Cambridge: Harvard,
1968.
Honda, M. 'An Annotated Translation of the "Dasabhumika"'.
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Jha, G. The Tattvasahgraha of Santiraksita with the Commentary
of Kamalaslla, Gaekwad's Oriental Series Vol. lxxx and
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Lamotte, Etienne. Samdhinirmocana-sutra. Paris: Louvain, 1935.
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791
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Sprung, Mervyn. Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way. London:
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Stcherbatsky, Theodore. Buddhist Logic. New York: Dover,
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Madhyanta-Vibhanga. Calcutta: Indian Studies Past
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1932.
Takasaki, J. A Study on the Ratnagotravibhaga. Rome:
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Taranatha. History of Buddhism in India. Trans, by Lama
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Tharchin, Geshe Lobsang, and Engle, Artemus B. Nagarjuna's
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Vasu, Srisa Chandra. Ed. and trans. The Ashtadhyayl of
Panini. Delhi: Motilal, 1962.
Wangyal, Geshe. The Door of Liberation. New York: Girodias,
1973.
Wayman, Alex. Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real. New
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The Yoga of the Guhyasamajatantra. Delhi: Motilal,
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Wayman, A., and Wayman, H. The Lion's Roar of Queen SrTmala. New York: Columbia, 1974.
Notes
Since this book is for the most part interwoven with paraphrase of the
texts mentioned in the introduction and paraphrase of explanation
gleaned from the oral tradition, the main function of the notes, except
in the translation sections, is to provide the reader with a key to this
weaving through identifying the particular sources. T h e most commonly cited texts are abbreviated, a list of which is given on pp. 23-4
Entries in the Tibetan Tripitaka Research Foundation publication of
the Tibetan Tripitaka (Tokyo-Kyoto, 1956) are indicated by the letter
' P ' , standing for 'Peking edition', followed by the entry number. See
the Bibliography for the full Sanskrit and Tibetan titles.
1
2
3
4
5
Part One, chapter one is mainly a paraphrase of Jang, 416.20421.17.
Quoted by ChandrakFrti in his Clear Words, P5260, Vol. 98
54.4.7.
Brackets are from Dzong-ka-ba's Illumination of the Thought,
Extensive Explanation of (Chandrakirti's)
'Supplement to the
Middle Way', P6143, Vol. 154 81.1.5-7.
T h e source for this and the next paragraph is Kensur Lekden,
whose teaching is based on Affsha's Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment and Dzong-ka-ba's elaboration of it in his Great Exposition
of the Stages of the Path.
T h e brackets and the succeeding two sentences are taken from
Ann, d b u 104a.5fF.
796
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
Meditation on Emptiness
The remainder of the chapter is based on GT, cha 32a.4-32b.7.
Part One, chapter two is mainly taken from Kensur Lekden's
teachings, which are based on common Ge-luk-ba literature.
T h e Sanskrit is, for the most part, felicitously reconstructed from
the Tibetan. For svairT, see GT, ca 61 a. 1.
Source for this and the next three paragraphs is Ann, dbu 68a. Iff
and 67a.Iff.
Oral teachings of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and Geshe Lhundup Sopa.
Source for this paragraph and the last three sentences of the next
is Ann, dbu 68b.2ff, following Buddhapalita (see p.633-4).
Part One, chapter three follows the pattern set by Jam-yang-shayba in GT, cha 32b.7ff, with other writings as cited below.
Until the next note, the source is Kensur Lekden.
Jang, 416.5.
Source until the next note is the Fifth Dalai Lama's Sacred Word
of Manjushri (blockprint in the possession of Trijang Labrang,
Dharmsala; no other information), 89a.ff. See also pp.685 of this
text.
Ann, dbu 83b.5.
Part One, chapters four through seven are condensations of Part
Two, chapters one through five for the sake of meditation; therefore, see the corresponding chapters in Part T w o for the specific
sources.
Geshe Rapden.
Geshe Rapden.
Geshe Gediin Lodro.
See Tenzin Gyatso's The Buddhism of Tibet and The Key to the
Middle Way (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p.56.
Geshe Gediin Lodro.
His Holiness the Dalai Lama, when bestowing the oral transmission and explanation of Nagarjuna's Six Collections of Reasonings in Dharmsala, 1972.
Sources until the next note are Kensur Lekden and GT, 33a.2ff.
Tenzin Gyatso, The Buddhism of Tibet and The Key to the Middle
Way, p.77.
Part One, chapter eight is mainly drawn from Pa-bong-ka's Lectures on the Stages of the Path, compiled by Trijang Rinbochay
(Sarnath: Pleasure of the Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1965),
302b.3-315b.6, and Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the
Notes
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
797
Concentrations and Formlessnesses (modern folio printing in
India, no place or date of publication), 22b.3-81b.l. T h e next
two sentences are from the latter, 55b.5-56a.4.
The section on prerequisites is taken from Lectures, 312b.3314a.7.
Lectures, 315b.4, and Concentrations, 45a.4. T h e remainder of
the paragraph is from Concentrations, 47a.2-47b. 1.
This sentence is from Concentrations, 45a.6. T h e rest of the paragraph is taken from the oral teachings of Lati Rinbochay.
This paragraph paraphrases Concentrations, 57a.5-58a.2.
This and the last sentence of this paragraph are drawn from Concentrations, 68a.2-4. T h e middle two sentences are from the
same, 48b.5-6.
Concentrations, 45b.3. T h e next two sentences are from the
same, 68a.4-69b.3.
This and the next sentence are drawn from Lectures, 306a.8306b.2.
T h e section on faults and antidotes is drawn from Concentrations, 69b.4-75b.5, and Lectures, 304a.7-31 la.2. T h e Sanskrit for
Chart 2 is taken from Maitreya's Madhyanta-Vibhaga-Sastra, ed.
Ramchandra Pandeya (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971),
pp.130-1.
Concentrations, 59b.2.
Lectures, 31 la.3-31 lb. 1. T h e brackets are from Lati Rinbochay's
teachings.
T h e section on the nine states is drawn from Lectures, 31 lb.5313b.3, and Concentrations, 76b.3-77b.3. T h e Sanskrit for Chart
3 is taken from Asanga's Sravakabhumi, Tibetan Sanskrit Works
Series, Volume XIV, ed. Dr. Karunesha Shukla (Patna: K.P.
Jayaswal Research Institute, 1973), pp.363-6; and Asanga's
Abhidharma Samuccaya, ed. Pralhad Pradhan (Santiniketan:
Visva-Bharati, 1950), p.75. This sentence is taken from the oral
teachings of Lati Rinbochay.
Geshe Gedun Lodro.
This and the next sentence are drawn from GT, 33a.3.
These last two sentences are from Dzong-ka-ba, Great Exposition
of the Stages of the Path (Dharmsala: Shes rig par khang, 1964),
347b. 1-4.
T h e section on actual calm abiding is drawn from Lectures,
314a.5-315a.5; and Concentrations, 78a.2-81b.l.
798
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Meditation on Emptiness
Lati Rinbochay.
This final section of the chapter is based on Geshe Gediin
Lodro's commentary on GT, cha 33a.3-7, and Ann, dbu
105a.4ff.
Part One chapter nine is drawn from many sources as cited in the
following notes. T h e next sentence is from Concentrations,49b.3.
Concentrations, 84a.5.
Concentrations, 39a.6.
Concentrations, 8 l b . 3 .
Concentrations, 83b.2.
This sentence and the remainder of the paragraph are taken from
Concentrations, 83b.7-84a.2.
T h i s paragraph is drawn from Concentrations, 86b.4-7 and
54b.l-55b.4.
Until n.52 the text follows GT, cha 33a.7ff.
G5n-chok-jik-may-wang-bo, Presentation of the Grounds and
Paths, Beautiful Ornament of the Three Vehicles (Buxaduor:
Gomang College, 1965), 13b.5-14a.6.
Jang, 500.9-501.1. T h e Hlnayana presentation substitutes the
Desire Realm and the upper two realms for 'object' and 'subject',
according to Geshe Lhundup Sopa.
See n.52 for source.
Jang, 498.17-506.7.
Gon-chok-jik-may-wang-bo, Presentation of the Grounds and
Paths, Beautiful Ornament of the Three Vehicles, Collected
Works, Vol. 7 (New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1971), 458ff.
Nagarjuna and the Seventh Dalai Lama, The Precious Garland
and The Song of the Four Mindfulnesses (London: George Allen
and Unwin, 1975), pp.84-7, stanzas 440-60.
Source for this paragraph is the oral teachings of His Holiness
the Dalai Lama.
The rest of the chapter is based on Jang, 500.9-501.1, as well as
the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden, recounting standard abhidharma teachings as modified by the Mahayana tenet systems.
Part One, chapter ten is based for the most part on the oral teachings of His Holiness the Dalai Lama which this author translated
and edited as the first part of Tantra in Tibet (London: George
Allen and Unwin, 1977). T h e other sources are Jang,
525.15-531.3, and Nga-wang-bel-den, Illumination of the Texts
of Tantra, Presentation of the Grounds and Paths of the Four
Notes
799
Great Secret Tantra Sets (rGyud smad par khang, no date), entire.
61 Source for this and the next sentence is Jang, 529.18.
62 This sentence is from the oral teachings of His Holiness the
Dalai Lama. T h e next is from Nga-wang-bel-den's Illumination
of the Texts of Tantra, 12a.2.
63 Kensur Lekden.
64 This and the next sentence are taken from the oral teachings of
His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
65 For amplification on this and the next paragraph see Tantra in
Tibet (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977). Also see Ngawang-bel-den's Illumination of the Texts of Tantra, 13b.2-14b.2.
66 T h e remainder of this paragraph is taken from Concentrations,
53b.3, and Nga-wang-bel-den's Illumination of the Texts of
Tantra, 13b. 1-4.
67 General source for the rest of the chapter is Nga-wang-bel-den's
Illumination of the Texts of Tantra, 14b.7fF(see 31b.7 and 33a.6
for the reference to abandoning the innate afflictions).
68 This and the next sentence are taken from Ann, dbu 105b.6106a. 1, and Geshe Gediin Lodro's oral teachings.
69 Ling Rinbochay.
70 His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
71 Geshe Gediin Lodro.
72 Special Instructions on the View of the Middle Way, the Sacred
Word of Lo-sang, 13b.4-5. This is number 48 in Herbert V.
Guenther's Tibetan Buddhism Without Mystification (Leiden:
Brill, 1966).
73 Part One, chapter eleven mainly paraphrases Jang, 506.7525.15, with amplification from Kensur Lekden.
74 GT, cha 49a.8-51a.5.
75 His Holiness the Dalai Lama gave this as an etymology that was
meaningful to him though not based on any text.
76 Part Two, introduction is drawn mainly from Jang, the first two
paragraphs being from 421.20 and 410.3. T h e last sentence of
the first paragraph is taken from the oral teachings of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, lecturing in 1972 on Dzong-ka-ba's
Middling Exposition of the Stages of the Path.
77 GM, 106b.3ff.
78 GM, 142b. 5.
79 T h e main source for this paragraph is Geshe Gediin Lodro. Also
see Jang, 183.7-14.
800
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
Meditation on Emptiness
This paragraph is taken from the oral teachings of Kensur
Lekden.
Part T w o , chapter one mainly follows Jam-yang-shay-ba's presentation of the diamond slivers, which is translated in Part Six,
relying heavily on Ann, as cited below. T h e first two paragraphs
are drawn from Jang, 422.7, and GM, 223b. 1 and 197a.3ff.
See pp.639ff. T h e commentary relies heavily on the oral teachings of Geshe Gediin Lodro and Kensur Lekden.
Ann, dbu 70 gong a.2ff. See p.640.
Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path (Dharmsala: Shes rig
par khang, no date), 387a.6ff.
In Sanskrit, evam vicharyamana. See, for instance, Clear Words,
(Poussin, 107.13; P5260, Vol. 98 19.1.8\ yatashchaivam gantrgantavya gamanani vicharyamanani na sand).
Quoted by Gen-diin-cho-pel in his Ornament to Nagarjuna's
Thought (Kalimpong: Mani Printing Works, no date), 13a.2. See
also GM, 139b.6 and 256a.4.
T h e section on non-production from self paraphrases Ann, dbu
70 'og a.6ff.
This paragraph is drawn from Ann, dbu 70a.3ff.
This paragraph is taken from the oral teachings of Geshe Gediin
Lodro.
Kensur Lekden reported that this animal has a split lip, and thus
is actually a hare. In this case, 'rabbit' would actually be g.yos in
Tibetan.
T h e section on non-production from other, until the refutation of
error, paraphrases Ann, dbu 71a.5ff.
Jang, 427.10.
Sources for the discussion of error, until the next note, are
Dzong-ka-ba's Essence of the Good Explanations, Treatise Discriminating What is to be Interpreted and the Definitive, P6142,
Vol. 153 197.5.5-198.2.2, and Dzong-ka-ba's Illumination,
P6143, Vol. 154 37.4.2-37.5.3.
Ann, dbu 52a. 1.
GM, 281b.3ff; GT, ca 37b.4.
This and the next paragraph are taken from the oral teachings of
Kensur Lekden.
Ann, d b u 52a. 1.
This paragraph paraphrases ChandrakTrti's Commentary on the
'Supplement', P5263, Vbl. 98 136.8.7.
Notes
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
801
Gon, 13.7. See Sopa's and Hopkins' Practice and Theory of
Tibetan Buddhism (New York: Grove, 1976), p.64.
Source for this and the next sentence is GT, ka 27a.6.
This sentence paraphrases Chandrakmi's Commentary on the
'Supplement', P5263, Vol. 98 137.3.6. This is more cogent than
Jam-yang-shay-ba's corresponding passage (p.649-50); perhaps
the latter version is corrupt.
This paragraph is taken, with amplification from Geshe Gediin
Lodro, from Jang, 424.1 Iff.
See Jang, 419.16-421.2 and 411.6.
Part Two, chapter two is drawn from Ann and Chandrakrrti as
cited in n.106 and n.107.
Jang, 424.6 and 429.7.
Source until the quote from Chandrakrrti is Ann, dbu 52a.2ff.
P5263, Vol. 98 122.5.2ff.
Supplement, P5262, Vol. 98 101.3.4, Chap. VI.8c-13. See
pp.642-3.
Bskyed par byed pa should read bskyed par bya ba.
Part Two, chapter three is mainly a paraphrase of Ann; see n. 112.
Jang, 429.4.
The remainder of this section until the last paragraph paraphrases Ann, dbu 52b.2ff and 73a.2ff.
Geshe Gediin Lodro.
Lati Rinbochay.
Part Two, chapter four, until the elimination of error, is mainly
drawn from Jang, 443.5-458.9.
This paragraph is based on the common usage of 'dependentarising' among Tibetan scholars.
The significance of Nagarjuna's use of prapya is lost in the
Tibetan translation which substitutes brten, i.e., pratTtya, for
prapya. This and the next two paragraphs leave off paraphrasing Jang, offering other opinions and the author's reflections.
Avalokitavrata, Commentary on (Bhdvaviveka's) 'Lamp for
(Nagarjuna's) "Wisdom"', P5259, Vol. 96 170.2.1.
T h e text returns to paraphrasing Jang', see n.115.
See his Length of a Forearm, P5248 (which some Western
scholars attribute to Dignaga).
Ren-da-wa, Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Friendly Letter',
5 lb.6: sangs rgyas ni chos kyi skus rab tu phye bas rten 'brelgyi
gnas lugs las tha mi dadpa'iphyir ro.
802
122
123
Meditation on Emptiness
Dak, 71b.5.
This paragraph is taken from the oral teachings of Geshe
Gediin Lodro.
124 This paragraph is taken from the oral teachings of Kensur
Lekden.
125 Part T w o , chapter five is drawn from many sources, but
primarily from Jang as indicated below. T h e first sentence is
from GM, 485b. 1, with commentary by Kensur Lekden.
126 Dzong-ka-ba, Illumination, P6143, Vol. 154, chap. VI, beginning.
127 Jang, 435.15.
128 Source for this and the next two paragraphs is Ann, dbu 84a.2ff.
129 Ann, dbu 129a.2ff.
130 Except where noted, the commentary paraphrases Jang,
431.18ff.
131 Ann, dbu 27a.5.
132 This and the next paragraph are drawn from the oral teachings
of Geshe Gediin Lodro.
133 T h e commentary returns to paraphrasing Jang, 437.7ff, and
Ann, dbu 85a.5ff.
134 Ann, dbu 8 lb.8. Source for the remainder of the paragraph is
Ann, dbu 82a.8ff.
135 Commentary returns to paraphrasing Jang, 437.7ff, and Ann,
dbu 86a.8ff.
136 Ann, dbu 86b.6.
137 Clear Words, P5260, Vol. 98 53.3.7. T h e paraphrase of Jang
and Ann leaves off; the commentary is now basically the
author's.
138 This and the next sentence come from the oral teachings of
Geshe Gediin Lodro.
139 Kensur Lekden emphasized this point many times. T h e next
paragraph is also taken from his teaching.
140 T h e commentary returns to paraphrasing Jang, 438. Iff, and
Ann, dbu 87a.Iff. For the examples, see p.691.
141 See p.681.
142 Jang, 438.10.
143 Ann, dbu 27a.5.
144 Source for the rest of the paragraph is Kensur Lekden.
145 T h i s and the next paragraph are from Jang, 439.8fT.
146 This paragraph paraphrases Jang, 441.20ff.
Notes
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
803
T h e remainder of the chapter is mainly based on the teaching of
Kensur Lekden.
Jang, 443.2.
See Gen-diin-cho-pel's Ornament to Nagarjuna's Thought.
See Tantra in Tibet (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977)
for Dzong-ka-ba's presentation of Hmayanists' cognition of
emptiness, pp.93-9. Also, see Compassion, pp. 150-71.
Commentary on the 'Supplement', P5263, Vol. 98 111.1.8ff.
Part Three in general is a reflection of Kensur Lekden's
embodiment of an approach to Madhyamika that does not
eliminate the rich Buddhist presentations of phenomena but
incorporates them under the umbrella of dependent-arising and
emptiness of inherent existence. T h e beginning of the Introduction, until the next note, is drawn from GT, ca 12a.6ff.
Geshe Gediin Lodro. T h e 'midnight sky' reference is from GT,
ca 12b.6.
T h e remainder of the Introduction is mainly taken from
Tibetan Buddhist Studies of Kloh-drol bla-ma Nag-dbah-blo-bzah
(Mussoorie: Lokesh Chandra, 1963), Vol. I, 247-8.
Source for the interpretations is Ann, dbu 93a.8ff. T h e Sanskrit
is from T.R.V. Murti's The Central Philosophy of Buddhism
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1960), pp.351-2.
Ann, dngos 55a.8ff. Source for the point of attainment is Ann,
dbu 121a.4 and dngos 23b.4.
Geshe Gediin Lodro.
Gyel-tsap, Commentary on (Maitreya's) 'Treatise on the Sublime
Continuum of the Great Vehicle, 182a.6-183a.6, chap. III.
IBID, 183a.6-183b.6.
IBID, 184b.l-184b.5.
Part Three, chapter one is based in general on the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden; using 'the selfless' as the source of the
chart, rather than 'existent', is his own uncommon quintessential instruction. For the general list set Jang, 87.16-92.7. For
discussion of many of the terms see Sopa's and Hopkins' Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism (London: Rider and Co.,
1976). The material, for the most part, is usually taught with
the Collected Topics of Valid Cognition (bsDus grva), the process
of which relies to a great degree on the oral tradition, which
Lati Rinbochay imparted at the University of Virginia in the
spring and summer of 1976. Geshe Gediin Lodro's and Geshe
804
Meditation on Emptiness
L h u n d u p Sopa's elaborations on specific terms were particularly illuminating.
162 GT, nga 43b. 1. For a fuller discussion see the second part of the
Supplement in Tantra in Tibet (London: George Allen and
Unwin, 1977), pp. 193-4.
163 T h e main source for the section on forms is Cha-har Ge-shay's
Identification of Elements, Elemental Evolutes, And So Forth,
T h e Collected Works of Cha-har dge-bshes blo-bzang-tshulkhrims (New Delhi: Chatring Jansar Tenzin, 1973), Vol. 10,
389-427. This section deviates at several points from Asanga's
Compendium of Knowledge as found in Abhidharma Samuccaya
of Asanga, ed. by Pralhad Pradhan (Santiniketan: VisvaBharati, 1950), pp.3-4. T h e Sanskrit terms were mainly taken
from Vasubandhu's Treasury of Knowledge. T h e etymology of
'form' is from Geshe Gediin Lodro.
164 This paragraph is based on teachings from Geshe Gediin
Lodro.
165 This section on forms for the mental consciousness also relies
on GM, 352a.3ff.
166 T h e main source for the section on consciousness is Ye-shaygyel-tsen's Clear Exposition of the Modes of Minds and Mental
Factors, Necklace for Those of Clear Mind, T h e Collected Works
of Tshe-mchog-glin yons-'dzin ye-ses-rgyal-mtshan (New
Delhi: Tibet House, 1974), Vol. 16,1-101. See H.V.Guenther's
and L.S. Kawamura's translation of this in Mind in Buddhist
Psychology (Emeryville: Dharma, 1975). Ye-shay-gyel-tsen's
Indian source is Asanga's Compendium of Knowledge; see
pp.4-10 of the edition given in n.163.
167 Geshe Gediin Lodro.
168 With the exception of the last sentence, which is drawn from
the oral teachings of Lati Rinbochay, the paragraph paraphrases Dzong-ka-ba's Middling Exposition of the Stages of the
Path (Dharmsala: Shes rig par khang, 1968), 87a.2-5.
169 T h e main source for the section on non-associated compositional factors is Gon-chok-den-bay-dron-may's Beginnings of
Annotations on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Essence of the Good Explanations' on the Topic of Mind-Only, Illumination of a Hundred
Mind-Only Texts (blockprint in the possession of HH the Dalai
Lama, place and date of publication unknown), 60a.2-61a.6.
His Indian Source is Asariga's Compendium of Knowledge; see
Notes
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
805
pp. 10-11 of the edition given in n.163. T h e etymology given in
this paragraph is from the oral teachings of Geshe Gediin
Lodro.
This section is drawn, for the most part, from Kensur Lekden's
teachings. This first sentence, however, is from GT, kha 10b.6.
Geshe Lhundup Sopa.
GT, kha 10b.6.
IBID.
Part Three, chapter two is largely based on Dzong-ka-ba's
Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path, P6001, Vol. 152
54.2.5ff. Geshe L h u n d u p Sopa's explanation of this text was
invaluable. T h e section is also supplemented with points from
monastic texts, namely, Pan-chen So-nam-drak-ba's General
Meaning of (Maitreya's) 'Ornament for Clear Realization' (Buxaduor: Nang bstan shes rig 'dzin skyong slob gnyer khang,
1963), 314b.3-332a.l, and Den-ba-dar-gyay's Analysis of
Dependent-Arising (Mey College of Sera Monastery, 1969),
entire.
Geshe Lhundup Sopa.
Pa-bong-ka, Lectures on the Stages of the Path, compiled by Trijang Rinbochay (Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing
Press, 1965), 279a.
Part Three, chapter three is drawn from Jang, 126.10-128.4,
Geshe Gediin Lodro's oral teachings, Gon-chok-den-bay-dronmay's Presentation of the Four Truths, Port of Those Wishing
Liberation, Festival for the Wise, Collected Works, Vol. 2 (New
Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1972), 877-914, and Pan-chan
So-nam-drak-ba's General Meaning of (Maitreya's) 'Ornament
for Clear Realization' (Buxaduor: Nang bstan shes rig 'dzin
skyong slob gnyer khang, 1963), 69a.6-74a.l.
Presentation of the Four Truths, 887.3.
T h e descriptions are condensed from explanations by Geshe
Gediin Lodro.
GM, 184b.3-4. T h e source for the next sentence is Geshe
Gediin Lodro.
Presentation of the Four Truths, 885.3.
Presentation of the Four Truths, 908.3, and GT, ca 55a.7.
Charts 36-9 are tabular forms of teachings emphasized by
Kensur Lekden and common to Ge-luk-ba teaching.
Jang, 179.18ff.
806
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
Meditation on Emptiness
This paragraph follows GM, 179b.5ff. T h e last paragraph is a
summation by the author.
Part Four, chapter one is drawn from Ann, stod 20b.3-23b.7.
Ann, dngos 25b.6.
Part Four, chapter two is taken mainly from GT and Ann. T h e
first section until the separate discussion of Samkhya is drawn
from GT, ka 9b.8-15b.l, and Ann, stod 19b.7-20a.6.
Source for this and the next paragraph is Ann, 33a.6-33b.2.
Dak,AbA.
With respect to the term 'individual analytical cessation',
Geshe Gediin Lodro reported that the word 'individual' is
usually treated as referring to the individual four truths and
their sixteen attributes.
The text until the next note is drawn from Ann, stod 32b.5ff.
Kensur Lekden.
Jang, 18.13ff.
Source for this and the next paragraph is Ann, stod 33a.2-5.
T h e section on Samkhya is drawn from GT, ka 29a.2-35b.8,
Ann, stod 63b.3-65b.7, and Jang, 29.8-37.4.
T h e rest of the paragraph and the next are drawn from the oral
teachings of Kensur Lekden.
T h e section on Charvaka is drawn from GT, ka 21a.6-28a.2,
Ann, stod 43b.7-44b.7, and Jang, 29.8-37.4.
Dak, 9a.5.
Dak, 9a.5.
Part Four, chapter three is drawn from several sources, as listed
below. For the topic of refuge see Jang, 13.2fF. T h e next two
paragraphs are taken from the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden.
GT, ka 9a.8fT. T h e source for the next sentence is Gon, 4.1-4.
Though this teaching is common to GT, Jang, Gon, Dak, and
so forth, this explanation mainly follows the oral teachings of
Kensur Lekden. See GT, ka 13b.6ff.
T h e sources for the section on Vaibhashika are GT, kha 1-18,
Ann, dngos 34b.3-36a.2, Jang, 84.13-97.7, Tu-gen, 25.3-27.1,
and Gon, 17.12-30.3.
Ann, stod 1 lb.8. T h e source for the next sentence is Ann, stod
106b.4.
Kensur Lekden.
Geshe Gediin Lodro.
Blaze of Reasoning, P5256, Vol. 96 67.2.6ff.
Notes
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
807
GT, kha 17a.5.
GT, kha 7b.2.
Kensur Lekden. T h e counter-evidence is from John Buescher.
Kensur Lekden.
Kensur Lekden.
Dak, 28a.5.
T h e sources for the section on Sautrantika are GT, ga 1-18,
Ann, dngos 55a.3-56a.6, and Jang, 97.8-131.4.
Dak, 28a.4.
Kensur Lekden.
Jam-yang-shay-ba emphasizes that such does occur whereas
Dak-tsang emphasizes the extreme difficulty of it.
T h e source for the contradictions is Dak, 28b.4-29a.2. T h e
Mahayana answer to the first qualm is from Kensur Lekden.
This section on generic images or, more literally, meaninggeneralities (arthasamanya, don spyi) is drawn from conversations with Tibetan scholars over a long period of time—Geshe
Sopa, Geshe Gediin Lodro, Kensur Lekden, Geshe Rapden,
Ling Rinbochay, and Lati Rinbochay.
This section on impermanence is drawn from Ann, dngos
27b.6-31a.7.
T h e source for this and the next definition is Gon, 17.16 and
30.10.
Part Four, chapter four is mostly drawn from the oral teachings
of Kensur Lekden. T h e first part until the discussion ofNagarjuna's history reflects a story that he particularly liked to tell.
T h e intention of the chapter is to give an example of a brief traditional history, not a definitive history, in order to give a
broader picture of the culture. For a history of Madhyamika,
see D.S. Ruegg's The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of
Philosophy In India (Wiesbaden; Harrassowitz, 1981).
T h e source here is Lati Rinbochay, citing the eighth chapter of
Vasubandhu's Treasury of Knowledge.
T h e colors and shapes are taken from Cha-har Ge-shay, Identification of Elements, Elemental Evolutes, And So Forth, T h e
Collected Works of Cha-har dge-bshes blo-bzang-tshulkhrims, Vol. 10 (New Delhi: Chatring Jansar Tenzin, 1973),
414.
See E. Obermiller's History of Buddhism by Bu-ston (Heidelberg: Heft, 1932), Part One, p.98.
808
5 Meditation on Emptiness
227
Geshe Gediin Lodro said that these stories, which were related
by Kensur Lekden, can be found in Lho brag chung chung.
T h e general source for Nagarjuna's history is GT, ca 4a.2fF.
See Taranatha's History of Buddhism, translated by Lama
Chimpa and Alaka Chattopadhyaya (Varanasi, 1964), p.67.
T h e source for this and the next sentence is Geshe Gediin
Lodro; then the text returns to a paraphrase of GT, as cited in
n.228.
T h e source for this and the next sentence is Geshe Gediin
Lodro; then the text returns to paraphrasing GT, as cited in
n.228.
GT (ca 3b.4) cites Maitreya, 'Not formerly prophesied [as arising later], they arose simultaneously.'
Alaya, 6a.
T h e source for the remainder of this paragraph and the first
sentence of the next is Tu-gen, 13.15fF; then the text returns to
paraphrasing GT.
T h e text paraphrases GT(ca 6b.7ff), except where noted, until
the last sentence of this chapter.
Tu-gen, 18.15fF.
Kensur Lekden.
Jang, 282.9.
Avalokitavrata (see p.462) accepts the book as Nagarjuna's own
work (P5259, Vol. 96 190.2.8).
Kay-drup, 88.6. Also, see n.414.
T h e text returns to paraphrasing GT, ca 9a.6ff.
V.V. Gokhale, ' T h e Vedanta-Philosophy Described by Bhavya
in his Madhyamakahrdaya', Indo-Iranian Journal, 2, (1958),
no. 3, p. 166, n . l .
Jang, 288.13fF.
ChandrakTrti openly refutes Bhavaviveka in the first, ninth, and
eighteenth chapters of his Clear Words and criticizes Vasubandhu, Dharmapala, and Dignaga in his commentary to the
third stanza of the colophon to his Supplement to (Nagarjuna's)
'Treatise on the Middle Way'.
Kay-drup, 90.1.
Kensur Lekden.
T h e remainder of this paragraph is drawn from the teachings of
Kensur Lekden, who was relating a commonly held Ge-luk-ba
interpretation.
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
Notes
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
809
See Part Five, chapter one.
T h e Southern Buddhist tradition and Western scholarship
generally put Buddha's death date at 483B.C. T h e contemporary Nying-ma scholar Khetsun Sangpo, in accordance with an
interpretation of the Kalachakra Tantra by Puk-ba Hlun-drupgya-tso (Phug-pa Lhun-grub-rgya-mtsho),j places it at 881 B.C.
T h e source here is the oral teaching of Khetsun Sangpo.
Part Four, chapter five is mostly drawn from GT, nga 1-66,
Ann, dngos 112b.7-116a.6, Jang, 157.4-275.10, and Gon, 40.755.3.
This and the next sentence are from the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden.
Kensur Lekden.
Kensur Lekden.
T h e rest of this paragraph and the next two are elaborations
from Kensur Lekden.
T h e source for the rest of this section through to the Prasangikas' refutation is Jang, 234.18fT.
Kensur Lekden.
Jang, 251.12ff. T h e section begins at 250.1.
This and the next two sentences are drawn from the oral teachings of Kensur Lekden.
This critique mainly follows the corresponding section in Part
Six, chapter two, with considerable commentary from Kensur
Lekden.
Den-dar, 3b.4. For the rest of the paragraph see GM, 374.6ff.
GM, 398b. 1.
GT, ca 63a.3ff.
See Tantra in Tibet (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977),
Part Two, chapter two. Dzong-ka-ba's most extensive exposition
of this point is found in his commentary to the first chapter of
Chandrakfrti's Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the
Middle Way', translated by J. Hopkins in Compassion in Tibetan
Buddhism, (London: Rider and Company, 1980), pp.150-81.
GT, cha 37b.2.
Jnanavajra (P5520, Vol. 107 246.4.4) identifies these as the
sutras teaching a Tathagata essence. This section on the
Buddha nature is mainly explication of the corresponding
section in Part Six, chapter two, drawn from the oral teachings
of Kensur Lekden.
810
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
Meditation on Emptiness
HH the Dalai Lama gave this etymology, relating that though
he has not seen it in the literature, he has found it helpful.
Alaya, 17a.l.
Ann, dbu 8b.6.
The presentation of the Chittamatra assertion on the mindbasis-of-all is taken from Dzong-ka-ba's Alaya, as well as from
Geshe L h u n d u p Sopa's oral teachings.
This and the next two paragraphs are drawn from the oral
teachings of Kensur Lekden, as well as from Ann, dbu 25b.ff,
and Tu-gen, 20.3ff.
Tu-gen, 22.20.
T h e discussion returns to being based on Alaya, 30a.9ff.
Kensur Lekden.
Kensur Lekden.
Geshe Gediin Lodro.
Gon-chok-den-bay-dron-may, Explanation of the Difficult
Points of (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Afflicted Mind and Basis of All',
Entrance for the Wise (Musoorie: [Gomang College], no date),
5b.7.
GT, ca 48b.3 and 48b.6.
P2665, Vol. 61 286.1.6; see GT, ca 48b.5.
See n.277.
T h e main sources for this section are GT, nga 25b.7-27b.l, and
Jang, 175.8-178.14. T h e oral teachings of Kensur Lekden are
particularly important throughout this section.
Kensur Lekden identified this as the position of the Lo-sel-ling
College of Dre-bung Monastery.
The over-riding source for this section on the three vehicles is
Kensur Lekden. Individual texts are cited in further notes.
Gon, 26-7.
Jang, 95.2.
GT, kha 12b.4.
T h e source for this paragraph is Jang, 269.7fF.
GT, nga 14b.6ff.
The two etymologies are from GM, 16a.3ff. See n.495.
Geshe Gediin Lodro.
Kensur Lekden mentioned this teaching several times.
This paragraph is drawn from Jang, 270.8ff.
T h e remainder of the paragraph is taken from Ann, stod
89a.4ff.
Notes
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
811
Ann, dbu 66a.5fT.
The background section of Part Four, chapter six is drawn,
except for the first sentence and last paragraph, from GM,
3b.3-13a.2.
Jam-yang-shay-ba is drawing here from Dzong-ka-ba's Ocean of
Reasoning, Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle
Way' (Varanasi: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press,
1973), 401.15-426.7. T h e commentary on the stanzas is taken
from Dzong-ka-ba's explanation.
Kensur Lekden.
GM, 8a.4. When Jam-yang-shay-ba {GM, 8a.6) says that
conventional phenomena which are the bases of emptiness are
'suitable to be explicitly indicated [by Nagarjuna's Treatise] in
a secondary manner' (stonggzhiphalpa'i tshuldu dngos bstan la
rung ba), he seems to suggest that a Perfection of Wisdom Sutra
would also explicitly indicate conventional phenomena such as
the paths when it indicates these as bases of emptiness. However, it is said that the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras indicate the
path structure and so forth neither explicitly nor implicitly but
in a hidden way. T h e reason for this is that the reasonings proving emptiness only establish a non-affirming negation, not
something positive, with the result that a consciousness realizing emptiness realizes only emptiness. Jam-yang-shay-ba would
not go against this point; thus, there is a question how he could
uphold it. Still, his other point—namely, that the Treatise
extensively indicates the suitability of conventional phenomena
within the rubric of an emptiness of inherent existence—is very
well taken, even though whether this shows that it explicitly
indicates the path structure and so forth is questionable.
Pan-chen So-nam-drak-ba and Jay-dzun-ba hold that the
Treatise does not explicitly indicate the path structure, etc.
See n.295. For more discussion of the title, see n.545.
This section on the two truths is taken mainly from GT, cha
19b.2-36a.2, Ann, dbu 89a.3-108a.4, and Kensur Lekden's oral
commentary.
Kensur Lekden.
Trijang Rinbochay.
GT, cha 21b A.
Dzong-ka-ba, Stages of Instruction From the Approach of the Profound Path of Naropa's Six Practices, P6201, Vol. 160 211.4.2.
812
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
Meditation on Emptiness
GT, cha 32b.5.
GT, c a 4 2 b . l .
GT, ca 32b.2.
GT, cha 20a.5.
GT, cha 20a.8.
T h e following reasonings are based on the Sutra Unravelling the
Thought-, see GT, cha 21b.4 and 21b.8.
This and the next three paragraphs are drawn from the oral
teachings of Kensur Lekden.
P2665 (also P2666), Vol. 61 286.4.1, and GT, 22a.3.
Kensur Lekden.
GT, cha 21b.4.
Ann, dbu 98a.7.
T h e main source for the discussion surrounding the Jo-nangbas is Kensur Lekden.
See Jang, 356.9, for a listing of these three.
Oral teachings of HH the Dalai Lama.
GT, cha 23b.5. T h e surrounding commentary is drawn from
Kensur Lekden's answers to questions.
P5260, Vol. 98 76.2.5. This is in commentary on XXIV.8.
Ann, dbu 92b.4.
Geshe Gediin Lodro.
See Tenzin Gyatso's The Buddhism of Tibet and the Key to the
Middle Way, trans, by Hopkins and Lati Rimpoche (New York:
Harper and Row, 1975), p.74.
See Dzong-ka-ba's Ocean of Reasoning (Varanasi: Pleasure of
Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1973), 406.17.
GT, cha 25a.6.
See Sopa's and Hopkins' Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism (London: Rider and Co., 1976), p.135-6.
This section on the two types of scriptures mainly follows the
corresponding section of Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition
of Tenets in Part Six, chapter two, embellished with the oral
teachings of Geshe Gediin Lodro.
This paragraph is taken from Ann, dbu 91a.8ff.
Ann, dbu 90b.5.
This and the next four paragraphs are taken from Geshe Gediin
Lodro's oral teachings.
See Jang, 144.16ff. T h e commentary is a paraphrase of Jang,
162.6.
Notes
332
333
334
813
Geshe Gediin Lodro.
Paragraph paraphrases Jang, 313.9fT.
T h e parenthetical addition is taken from the oral teachings of
Kensur Lekden.
335 This and the next paragraph are mainly taken from Jang, 162-6163.11.
336 See Dzong-ka-ba's Tantra in Tibet, ed. and trans, by Hopkins
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977), Part T w o , chapter
two, for an extensive discussion of this. Dzong-ka-ba's commentary on the first chapter of Chandrakrrti's Supplement is
even more extensive; see J. Hopkins' Compassion in Tibetan
Buddhism, pp. 150-81.
337 Part Five, chapter one mainly follows the corresponding
section in the translation pp. 586-8, with commentary from Kensur Lekden's oral teachings.
338 Tu-gen, 15.20.
339 Dzong-ka-ba, Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path, P6001.
Vol. 152 151.513.
340 Ann, dbu 59b.3. T h e commentary is from Kensur Lekden.
341 This and the next sentence come from a conversation with the
junior tutor of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Trijang Rinbochay.
342 Obermiller, History of Buddhism by Bu-ston, Vol. II, p. 135.
343 GT, ka 16a.2 and Ann, stod 25a.4ff.
344 This sentence and the rest of the paragraph are drawn from
Ann, dbu 69a.8-70b.2.
345 This sentence and the next are taken from Ann, dbu 67a.367b. 1. T h e rest of the section is drawn from the teachings of
Kensur Lekden.
346 Part Five, chapters two through five are drawn almost entirely
from GM, 224b.5-83a.l. This is Jam-yang-shay-ba's explanation of the controversy between Buddhapalita, Bhavaviveka,
and Chandrakrrti in their respective commentaries on Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way and especially as recounted
by Chandrakrrti in his Clear Words. Throughout this explanation, my work at the Buddhist School of Dialectics in Dharmsala during April, May, and June of 1982 figures prominently.
During that period I attended daily lectures by the Principal,
Lobsang Gyatso of Lo-sel-ling-College, and debated with the
class on an almost daily basis. T h e experience lifted this
814
Meditation on Emptiness
important topic out of the textbooks into a living dilemma of
interpretation, requiring a far greater grasp of the movement of
the controversy than I had previously.
T h r o u g h o u t the explanation, the teachings of Kensur Lekden from Go-mang College who first introduced me to the topic
are important. I have also made extensive use of a textbook on
the topic from the Jay College of Se-ra Monastery by Gom-day
Nam-ka-gyel-tsen: his Settling Difficult Points in the Opposite of
the Consequences, Key to (ChandrakTrti's) 'Clear Words', Written by Jam-bay-yang Gom-day Nam-ka-gyel-tsen (Thai bzlog gi
dka' ba'i gnas gtan la 'bebs pa 'jam pa'i dbyang sgom sde nam
mkha' rgyal mtshan gyis mdzadpa 'i tshiggsalgyi Ide mig) in The
Obligatory Texts (Yig-cha) for the Study of Madhyamika of Byes
Grwa-tshah of Se-ra Monastery, Madhyamika Text Series, Vol.
4 (New Delhi: Lha-mkhar yons-'dzin bstan-pa-rgyal-mtshan,
1973), entire.
In the syllabus of the Gel-luk-ba monastic universities, this
topic surfaces in the Middle Way class during discussion of the
refutation of production from self in Chandrakrrti's Supplement
to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way', Dzong-ka-ba's
Illumination of the Thought which is his commentary on the
former text, and the respective monastic textbook such as Jamyang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of the Middle Way (referred to
here as GM). Since Chandrakrrti treats the topic in his Clear
Words, the material from that text is brought over to this class
which revolves around his Supplement to (Nagarjuna's)
'Treatise on the Middle Way'.
T h e first phase is called Opposite of the Consequences (thai
bzlog)-, this leads into the second phase called Commonly
Appearing Subjects (chos can mthun snang ba). T h e n , the texts
return to the refutation of production from other which leads to
a third phase called T w o T r u t h s (bden pa gnyis). Pertinent here
are the first two phases—centrally important in the Ge-luk-ba
educational system for Prasangika-Madhyamika as they are
used for acquiring a working knowledge of the differences
between Svatantrika and Prasangika. T h i s is our great fortune,
for their training program provides highly developed commentaries on this very difficult controversy.
Jam-yang-shay-ba, Gom-day Nam-ka-gyel-tsen, and so forth
base their expositions on those of Dzong-ka-ba in three of his
Notes
815
works on Madhyamika which in chronological order are as
follows.
1 Dzong-ka-ba's fullest treatment of Commonly Appearing
Subjects is in the 'Great Exposition of Special Insight' in his
Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path. T h i s is pages 525.193.2 in the Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's)
'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path' (The Lam rim chen
mo of the incomparable Tsong-kha-pa, with the interlineal notes of
Ba-so
Chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan,
Sde-drug Mkhan-chen
Ngagdbang-rab-rtan,
'Jam-dbyangs-bshad-pa'i-rdo-rje,
and
Bra-sti
Dge-bshes Rin-chen-don-grub, N e w Delhi: Chos-'phel-legs-ldan,
1972). Dzong-ka-ba's text is translated by Alex Wayman in
Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real (New York: Columbia, 1978), pp. 309-36.
2 Not as full a treatment of Commonly Appearing Subjects as
the former but, presenting a slightly different interpretation
later in his life is found in Dzong-ka-ba's Essence of the Good
Explanations (189.10-201.10 of the Varanasi 1973 edition).
3 Opposite of the Consequences is treated at some length in
Dzong-ka-ba's Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' (52.2-7.13) after which he
refers his readers to the discussion in his 'Essence of the Good
Explanations and so forth' for the topic of Commonly Appearing Subjects, suggesting perhaps a preference for the interpretation there over that in the 'Great Exposition of Special Insight'
(see n.424).
As both aspects of the controversy had been explained in these
works, the topics are mentioned only in passing in Dzong-kaba's Illumination of the Thought (80.16-1.1 in the Tibetan Cultural Printing Press edition, no date) and are not mentioned at
all in his 'Middling Exposition of Special Insight'.
Here I am mainly using Jam-yang-shay-ba's exposition
because (1) it synthesizes Dzong-ka-ba's various presentations,
while using the Essence of the Good Explanations when the
interpretation differs (see n.424), (2) it treats the topics at great
length and detail, and (3) it is fairly late, being around 1700,
and thus has the advantage of having earlier presentations at
hand.
Part Five, chapter two is mainly drawn from GM, 224b.5-
816
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
Meditation
on
Emptiness
6a.4 and a section just preceding it on consequences as noted
below. Buddhapalita's commentary on 1.1 of Nagarjuna's
Treatise is P5242, Vol. 95 75.1.3-2.2, the entire text of which is
translated on pp.460-1.
In explaining ChandrakTrti's interpretation of Buddhapalita,
Jam-yang-shay-ba (GM, 225b. 2) gives as the reason of the first
consequence, 'because of already existing from the time of its
causes' but later (GM, 257b.5) declares, in self-contradiction,
that such an interpretation is unacceptable. He says that Buddhapalita's phrase 'things which already exist in their own
entities'
(svatmana
vidyamananam padarthanam
[Poussin,
14.2], dngos po bdag gi bdag nyid du yod pa mams /a) cannot be
explained as 'things which exist at the time of their causes'
because the passage must indicate a correct other-approved syllogism proving that it is senseless for a sprout, for instance, to
be produced again through the reason that it [already] exists in
its own entity. T h i s is based on ChandrakTrti's statement that
the phrase 'existing in their own entities' holds the reason.
T h e principle at work is that even though an other-approved
syllogism uses tenets asserted by the other party, its members also
must be established in general, whereby it is unsuitable to have as
the reason of such an other-approved syllogism 'because [things]
exist at the time oftheir causes' since things simply do not exist at
the time of their causes. T h u s , for the sake of consistency I have
used 'because of already existing in its own entity' or 'because of
already existing in their own entities' throughout in accordance
with Jam-yang-shay-ba's own later interpretation.
This section on consequences and syllogisms is mainly drawn
from Kensur Lekden's contextualization of the controversy
between the three Madhyamika masters.
Geshe Gediin Lodro.
GM, 222b. 1-3a. 1. T h e explanations are taken from Geshe
Gediin Lodro's oral teachings.
GM, 232b.4. See pp.474-5.
GT, ca la.2.
T h i s and the next sentence are drawn from GT, ca 62a.5.
For the definitions of Svatantrika and Prasangika and so forth,
see Sopa's and Hopkins' Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism (London: Rider and Co., 1976), Part T w o , chapters
seven and eight.
Notes
817
355
Part Five, chapter three is drawn (except as cited in n.372) from
GM, 226a.4-31a.6 (see n.346).
356 GM, 261b.2.
357 P5242, Vol. 95 75.1.3.
358 P5242, Vol. 95 75.2.2.
359 P5242, Vol. 95 75.1.3-2.2.
360 See n.374.
361 Bhavaviveka's text is P5253, Vol. 95 155.4.7-7.5.2. In Bhavaviveka's text, 155.4.7, read 'di la for 'di las in accordance with
Avalokitavrata (Vol. 96 190.2.5) and GM, 262a.6.
362 For discussion of the translation of the third fault see n.375.
363 T h e Tibetan (Vol. 95 155.5.1) lists three points—'things are
produced from other, production is fruitful, and production
has an end' (dngos po mams gzhan las skye ba 'gyur ba dang skye
ba 'bras bu dang bcaspa nyid du 'gyur ba dang skye ba thugpayod
par 'gyur ba'i phyir)— rather than tieing them together, as the
Sanskrit does, into the opposite of the original full statement
(p arasm adutp anna
bhava janmasaphalyat janmanirodhachcheti
[Poussin, 15.1-2]). T h e Tibetan seems to accord more with
Avalokitavrata's serial lay-out of the three (see pp.465-6), but
the mere re-framing of the syllogism in its opposite form leaves
more room for the interpretation that Bhavaviveka's complaint
is not with Buddhapalita's asserting that production is fruitful
but with his holding that the reasoning refuting ultimately
existent production implies something in its place, thus making
it an affirming negation rather than a non-affirming negation as
it should be. For, as Jam-yang-shay-ba (GM, 262a.6-b.4) says,
the three points show that a Madhyamika tenet, according to
Bhavaviveka, has been contradicted; the three points themselves are not the tenet that is contradicted.
' . . . because production has an end (janmanirodhat, skye ba
thug pa yod par 'gyur ba'i phyir)' more literally would be
'because of the cessation of production'. T h e rendering into
Tibetan bothers Poussin (p. 15 n.4), but it seems that the translators wanted to avoid skye ba dgag pa which might be misinterpreted as 'production is refuted' and thus used thug pa, since
thug med means 'endless' as in an infinite regress and hence thug
pa means that it has an end, is finite, or is not repetitive.
364
365
Avalokitavrata's commentary is P5259 Vol. 96 190.2.5-1.2.4.
Seen.361.
818
366
Meditation on Emptiness
Avalokitavrata is referring to the Akutobhaya which he clearly
accepts as authored by Nagarjuna. Dzong-ka-ba and his followers disagree; see p.360 and n.414.
367 T h e Sanskrit is taken from ChandrakTrti's Clear Words (see
n.374).
368 T h e text (Vol. 96 190.5.3) mistakenly repeats the last two sentences.
369 Vol. 96 191.2.1: read skye ba for skye bas.
370 53.9 (Varanasi edition, 1973).
371 GM, 262a.6-b.4.
372 T h i s and the next paragraph are drawn from GM 27 lb.4-273a.3.
373 Kensur Lekden.
374 Part Five, chapter four is drawn from GM, 231a.6-43a.2 (see
n.346). T h e entire text of ChandrakTrti's defense of Buddhapalita's refutation of producton from self and criticism of Bhavaviveka's system, as found in his Clear Words, is cited in sections
throughout this and the next chapter (P5260, Vol. 98
4.4.2-7.3.2; Buddhist Sanskrit Texts N o . 10 5.14-21.23;
Poussin, 14.1-36.2). J.W. De Jong's splendid 'Textcritical
Notes on the Prasannapada', Indo-Iranian Journal 20 (1978),
pp.25-59, has been used throughout. With each citation, the
references to Poussin's edition of the Clear Words in Bibliotheca Buddhica IV and the Tibetan translation in the Tibetan
Publishing House gSung rab gees btus dpar khang edition of
1968 (10.11-25.16) are given in the text in parentheses. Stcherbatsky's very free translation is in his The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, pp.98-125.
Here in ChandrakTrti's citation of Buddhapalita the second
fallacy reads atiprasangadoshachcha, 'and because of the fault of
great absurdity' which is rendered in Tibetan (Vol. 98 4.4.3) as
dang shin tu thai bar 'gyur ba'iphyir, 'and because it would be
very absurd'. T h e Tibetan of Buddhapalita's text (P5242, Vol.
95 75.1.6), however, is slightly different due, most likely, to a
looser translation spelling out the actual absurdity, dang skye ba
thug pa medpar 'gyur ba'i phyir, 'and because production would
be endless'. Since the latter is more to the point and is also the
reading in Bhavaviveka's text (P5253, Vol. 95 155.4.7) and
Avalokitavrata's commentary on Bhavaviveka (P5259, Vol. 96
190.3.1) as well as Dzong-ka-ba's commentary on the Treatise
(Varanasi 1973 edition, 52.4) I have used it throughout.
Notes
375
819
With respect to the third fault prasahgavakyatvachcha, this is
translated in the Peking edition of Bhavaviveka's text (Vol. 95
155.5.1, translation by Jnanagarbha and Lui-gyel-tsen
[gLu'i-rgyal-mtshan])
as:
glags yod pa 'i tshig yin pa 'i phyir te
but in the Peking edition of the Clear Words (Vol. 98 4.4.4, and
in the Shes rig par khang edition, 10.17, these being the same
translation by Mahasumati and Ba-tsap-nyi-ma drak [Pa-tshabnyi-ma-grags]) as:
thai bar 'gyur ba'i tshig yin pa'i phyir
and in Avalokitavrata's commentary on Bhavaviveka (P5259,
Vol. 96 190.3.8) as:
glags yod pa 'i tshig yin pa 'i yang phyir te
Only in the last one is the final cha of the Sanskrit represented
by yang, allowing it to be interpreted as a third reason for the
unsuitability of Buddhapalita's refutation. In his commentary
on the Treatise Dzong-ka-ba (Varanasi 1973 edition, 52.12)
points out the discrepancy in translation, indicating that he
favors glags yod pa 'i tshig yin pa 'iyang phyir te as it is in the edition of Bhavaviveka he had before him and in Avalokitavrata in
the sense of meaning, '[Buddhapalita's interpretation] is also
unsuitable because of having words that afford an opportunity
[to an opponent to expose contradiction within his own system]'. Dzong-ka-ba identifies that this is the interpretation of
Avalokitavrata, and it indeed is as can be seen in translation in
the next citation. (The Tibetan of that, in Vol. 96 190.4.7 is:
gnas rtan buddha pa li tas bshad pa de ni rgol ba gzhan gyi klan
ka 'i glags yod pa 'i tshig yin pa 'i phyir yang rigs pa ma yin noil
yang zhes bya ba 'i sgra nigtan tshigs dang dpe ma brjodpa 'iphyir
dang gzhan gyis smras pa'i nyes pa ma bsal ba'i phyir rigs pa ma
yin par 'ba' zhig tu ma zad gyi/ de ni glags yod pa'i tshig yin pa'i
phyir yang rigs pa ma yin no zhes bya bar sbyar ro).
In this interpretation prasahgavakyatvachcha has the sense of
'because of being a statement that is susceptible to [absurd] consequences' in the sense of affording an opportunity to an opponent to find holes in one's argument, rather than just meaning
'because of being a statement of [absurd] consequences'. T h u s ,
820
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
Meditation on Emptiness
this is not a description of Buddhapalita's commentary as
containing consequences but an indication that it is susceptible
to the absurd consequence of contradicting a basic Madhyamika tenet. T h e remainder of the passage then spells out what
that inner contradiction is. In this interpretation the phrase is
taken as a third reason, not as a reason beginning the next sentence. T h i s is also Jam-yang-shay-ba's opinion {GM, 264b.2-6),
based on Avalokitavrata (see p464-5).
See n.347.
P5229, Vol. 95 15.1.1.
Until the next note, the material is drawn from GM, 273b. 1-2.
This quote, as well as the next four, and the general argument
are taken from Dzong-ka-ba's Great Exposition of the Stages of
the Path, P6001, Vol. 152 156.2.2AF.
T h e source here is the author's own reading in these texts.
T h i s and the next paragraph are drawn from Ann, dbu 59a.7ff.
T h i s is found in Dzong-ka-ba's Essence of the Good Explanations, cited here from GM, 233b.4.
GM, 233b.2, citing Dzong-ka-ba's Essence of the Good Explanations.
T h e Sanskrit is Buddhist Sanskrit Texts N o . 10 5.16-6.5 and
Poussin 15.3-16.10.
Poussin's Sanskrit (15.4) reads ' . . . is enquiring in the following way about the purpose in production of the e x i s t e n t . . . ' ,
but Dr. Vaidya (5.17) drops vidyamanasya punarutpattau
prayojanam in accordance with the Tibetan.
In accordance with J . W . De Jong's 'Textcritical Notes on the
Prasannapada' (p.29, n.15.5)svata itihetutvena tadeva chotpadyata iti should read svata iti vidyamanam hetutvena bravTshi tad
eva chotpadyata iti, which, as he says, is confirmed by the
Tibetan.
About this, Jam-yang-shay-ba (GM, 265a.4-6) says, 'Yod pa
rgyu nyid indicates that with respect to all that involve production their existence acts as a cause, and de nyid skye'o indicates
that all that involve production are produced from their
respective existence.' In that, read rang gi yod pas for rang gi yod
pa'i and yod pa de las for yod pa de in accordance with the Ngawang Gelek edition, 480.5 and 480.6. He cites this passage to
show that the Samkhyas ' . . . assert that a sprout exists from the
time of its causes and that it is produced from that existence.'
Notes
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
821
I have translated the first part of this sentence in accordance
with his interpretation, but not the second part since the Sanskrit tad eva chotpadyata iti does not seem to warrant 'from
that', instead meaning 'and just that is produced'.
See notes 500 and 501 with respect to the quotations from Aryadeva and Nagarjuna.
T h e brackets in the second stanza of the Refutation of Objections
are from the Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's)
'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path' (New Delhi: Chos'phel-legs-ldan, 1972) 477.5-8.2.
GM, 234a. 1.
GM, 229a.6.
This sentence is from a work on the Opposite of the Consequences (thai bzlog) by Gom-day Nam-ka-gyel-tsen (sGom-sde
Nam-mkha'-rgyal-mtshan, 1532-92), Madhyamika Text Series,
Vol. 4 (New Delhi: Lha-mkhar Yons-'dzin Bstan-pa-rgyalmtshan, 1973), 602.5. T h e two previous sentences are deductions from his commentary. He lists five reasons that the
Samkhyas use for proving production from self, all of which
lack their intended force according to the Buddhist.
Ann, dbu 59b.2.
ChandrakTrti also sees another correct other-approved syllogism in Buddhapalita's statements: T h e subjects, objects other
than the person, are not produced from self because of existing
in their own entities, as in the case of the person. See GM,
240b.6.
Or, according to the Sanskrit, 'and [thus] due to being established [for the Samkhyas] here it is held as the example'; the
Tibetan does not translate upadanam (Poussin, 21.10).
De Jong (n.21.13) corrects the Sanskrit to 'numanabadhacodanayam, which would be 'damage', not 'contradiction', but I
have stayed with 'contradiction' 'gal ba simply because it is
easier to follow in translation.
With respect to why cloth, or woolen cloth as the word means
in Tibetan, is frequently used as the second example after a pot,
it strikes me that it is merely because of the similarity in sound
between the two words in Sanskrit, ghata and pata.
GM, 240a. 1 and 240b.5-la.3.
Jam-yang-shay-ba (GM, 240b.6) seems to take 'example' as
referring to an example of another syllogism, whereas it might
822
Meditation on
Emptiness
refer (see Poussin, p.22, n.3) to the example in this syllogism
(the person) which does not have the fault of indefiniteness in
the sense of being overly vast by including everything and thus
incurring the fault that when the example is realized, the main
thesis would also be realized. However, the latter interpretation
does not appear to fit ChandrakXrti's context. Chandrakrrti seems
to be concerned that the subject of the main syllogism, not the
subject of the example, include all phenomena that are produced.
T h i s is probably why Jam-yang-shay-ba, for the most part, interprets the subject as 'things such as a non-manifest pot and so
forth' instead of just as 'things'. In the second syllogism, Chandrakrrti is providing another all inclusive subject; thus it seems
that the matter does not revolve around the example (which in
the first syllogism is a pot already in its manifest form).
399
400
401
402
Dr. Vaidya (Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 10 p.7, n.4) objects to
Poussin's (see p.23, n . l ) editing the text from atha vakyani to
arthavakhyani in accordance with the Tibetan don gyi ngag 'di
dag, but the usage of this same term on 7.22 suggests that Poussin could be right.
This and the next paragraph are my summary.
T h e remainder of the chapter is drawn from GM, 241b.2-3a.2.
T h e Sanskrit (Poussin, 23.4) reads, 'And, due to that, there is
no contradiction with a tenet.'
403 From Gom-day, 617.6.
404 Gom-day, 618.4.
405 GM, 242a.5.
406 T h e bracketed additions in this and the next two sentences are
from Gom-day, 619.2fF.
407 Dzong-ka-ba's Ocean of Reasoning, 55.17.
408 GM,. 242b.4.
409 T h e identification of what is being refuted in these three cases
is from Gom-day, 621. Iff. T h e bracketed additions in the first
citation are from Dzong-ka-ba's commentary, 136.7, Varanasi
1973 edition.
410 GM (242b.5) reads gzugs nigzugs ni rgyu medpar/ thai bar 'gyur
but should read gzugs na gzugs ni, which then would accord
more with the Sanskrit (Poussin, 24.10) rupam prasajyate/
ahetukam and with Dzong-ka-ba's commentary (129.1, Varanasi
1973 edition) than the Peking (Vol. 98 5.5.3) gzugs na gzugs kyi
rgyu med par/ thai bar 'gyur. T h e bracketed additions in the first
Notes
823
citation are from Dzong-ka-ba's commentary, 128.19, Varanasi
1973 edition.Dzong-ka-ba (129.8) says that this implies its
opposite meaning. T h a t the other two do so is my speculation.
411 T h e glosses are from Dzong-ka-ba's commentary, 443.8, Varanasi 1973 edition.
412 T h e source for the material up to the citation from Chandrakfrti is Dzong-ka-ba's Ocean of Reasoning, 56.8-16 (Varanasi
1973 edition).
413 De Jong ('Textcritical Notes' p.30, n.25.3), following Yamaguchi, says that both the first question and the response are
spoken by Bhavaviveka; however, Gom-day Nam-ka-gyel-tsen
(621.3-3.2) divides it as I have, though he does not specify the
disputants. It fits the pattern of the section better to have a
question being put to the hypothetical Bhavaviveka, his responding, and then being cut off based on his response.
414 As Gom-day, (623.1) points out, it is significant that Chandraklrti does not mention the Akutobhaya as an auto-commentary
of Nagarjuna, adding credence to the argument that it is not his.
415 Part Five, chapter five is drawn mainly from GM, 243a.257b.4.
416 T h e Tibetan reads 'are definite as not being produced from self
(bdag las skye ba med par nges te), but this is not represented in
the Sanskrit (see next note). T h e reason could also be translated
as 'because of presently existing' since vidyamana is the present
middle participle; however, later (Poussin, 33.4) ChandrakTrti
cites the reason as sottvad, suggesting that the particular form
makes little difference, this perhaps being why it was translated
into Tibetan merely as yod pa'i phyir instead of da Ita bar yod
pa 'i phyir.
417 T h e Tibetan of the example shes pa yod pa nyid bzhin must be a
mere translation of the Sanskrit chaitanya and not an extension
of it to include the reason ('existing'). In any case, the reference
is to t h e p u r u s h a , the person, or pure spirit, pure consciousness.
Bhavaviveka's syllogism in full is: na paramarthata adhyatmikanyayatanani svata
utpannani vidyamanatvat
chaitanyavaditi, don dam par nanggi skye mched mams bdag las skye ba med
par nges te yod pa'i phyir na shes pa yod pa nyid bzhin no zhes.
418 Dzong-ka-ba's Essence of the Good Explanations, 117.4 in the
Varanasi 1973 edition.
419 For a slightly different citation of this, see p.648; also see n.637.
T h e Tibetan has 'is not produced causelessly' at the end.
824
Meditation on Emptiness
Poussin (p.26, n.3) draws our attention to Shantideva's Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds, IX. 142, and his Compendium of
Learnings 219.10.
420 Poussin identifies this as 210.3-5. ChandrakTrti cites it again in
commentary at the end of chapters two and twenty-one. Poussin
calls our attention to Shantideva's Compendium of Learnings,
238.10, 239.4.
421 Since in Ge-luk-ba the nature of phenomena is permanent, here
'permanent' is interpreted, as usual, as the extreme of inherent
existence.
421a Stcherbatsky (p. 113) translates this clause extremely freely,
adding in considerable commentary as if ChandrakTrti says
such in his text: 'Indeed (Bhavaviveka) himself being a Madhyamika does not admit the transcendental reality of separate
mental phenomena and at the same time he composes a syllogism about this very non-existing thing.' T h e last clause is total
speculation stemming from Stcherbatsky's assumption that
ChandrakTrti does not accept the existence of anything.
422 Following De Jong's correction ('Textcritical Notes' p.31,
n.28.1) of vastusatam to dravyasatam.
423 Most of ChandrakTrti's refutation of Bhavaviveka with respect
to Commonly Appearing Subjects is included in Dzong-ka-ba's
Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path and has been translated by Alex Wayman in Calming the Mind and Discerning the
Real ([New York: Columbia, 1978), pp.309-35. About the first
example, a Buddhist's proof for a Vaisheshika that sound is
impermanent, Wayman (p.309) says, ' . . . in regard to (the
proposition) "Sound is not eternal" (maintained by the Buddhist on the side of the V a i s e s i k a ) . . . t h e r e b y suggesting that
the Buddhist is proving that sound is impermanent on behalf of
a Vaisheshika to someone else. Wayman is clearly drawing from
a mis-reading of bye brag pa'i ngor in the Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of
the Path', 525.5. Though ngo means 'side' or 'face', here with
the ra ending it means, not 'on the side' but 'to the side' and
thus, in English, 'to a Vaisheshika'.
That the conventions (vyavahara, tha snyad) of inference and
object inferred would be non-existent if the subject, predicate,
and so forth were qualified with the particular assertions of one
school simply means that we could not speak of inferring
Notes
825
anything if the terms were so qualified since the process of
inference would get bogged down in merely considering the
subject, etc., for the two parties could not come to agreement.
With respect to the second example, a Vaisheshika's proving
to someone else that sound is impermanent, Jam-yang-shay-ba
( G M , 346a.5) identifies the other party as a Nirgrantha (gCer bu
pa), accepted as another name for Jaina. Stcherbatsky (The
Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, p. 115) identifies the opponent
here as a Mlmamsaka; he inserts the identification into the text
as if Chandraklrti so specified it, but he did not do so. Gomday, 633.2, identifies the other party as a Drpaka (gSalbyedpa)
as does the Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's)
'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 526.4, which says
that Drpaka is a sub-division ofSamkhya. Wayman (p.310) goes
along with Stcherbatsky. In any case, the assertion of the Vaisheshika's opponent is that sound is pre-existent in a nonmanifest state and is made manifest by conditions, something
which the Vaisheshika himself cannot accept.
424
Gom-day, 634.4.1, and Four Interwoven Commentaries, 530.1.
T h e predicate of what Bhavaviveka is proving is an absence or
negation of production (ultimately) with respect to the subject,
eyes and so forth; in this sense, Chandraklrti s a y s , ' . . . when it
is just the case that a negation of production (utpadapratishedha,
skye ba bkagpa) is asserted (abhipreta, 'dodpa) as the predicate
of the probandum (sadhyadharma, bsgrub bya'i chos)...'
Wayman (pp.311-12) misconstrues the sentence to read, 'At the
very time that he denies in this phase (of proof) an arising (in
the absolute sense) and believes in a feature to be proved (the
sadhya-dharma)...' T h e Sanskrit double nominative utpadapratishedho and sadhyadharmo is rendered into Tibetan in a
very clear way as an objective nominative skye ba bkag pa and
an adverbial accusative bsgrub bya'i chos su; the particle su
means 'as' and can in no way be construed as 'and'. T h u s ,
Chandraklrti is giving the context of his following remarks—
that of ultimate analysis, such as in this case when a negation of
production is being asserted as, or taken as, the predicate of
what one is proving. Many Tibetan scholars take this as showing that Chandraklrti is speaking only about occasions of debating about the final mode of subsistence of phenomena and that
826
Meditation on Emptiness
his remarks about no commonly appearing subjects should not
be extended to times when debating about conventional phenomena such as impermanence, since the question of whether the
consciousness certifying the subject and so forth is valid with
respect to the mode of subsistence is relevant only when one is
debating about that mode of subsistence.
Jam-yang-shay-ba's text (GM, 247b. 1) mis-reads de'i tshe de
kho nar (tadatad eva) instead of de'i tshe kho nar (tadaiva) as the
Peking edition (Vol. 98 6.3.3) does and which is confirmed by
the Sanskrit (Poussin, 30.1). He strains to include de kho nar
somewhere in the meaning of the sentence; disregarding syntax, he puts it with the first clause, reading it as referring to a
reasoning consciousness in the face of which production is
refuted. Following this reading, the passage would be:
. . . at this time [of proving that eyes and so forth are without truly established production] when it is just the case
that a negation of production in suchness [that is to say, in
the perspective of a reasoning consciousness] is asserted
as the predicate of the probandum . . .
Dzong-ka-ba's Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path (Lam
rim chen mo) has the same mis-reading (Dharmsala: Shes rig par
khang, 448b.3, and the Four Interwoven Commentaries, 530.3)
but with a different interpretation. There, de kho nar is taken in
a more syntactically appropriate way as going not with the
'when' clause but with what follows. With this placement the
passage reads:
That is not so, because at this time [of proving that eyes and
so forth are without truly established production] when it is
just the case that a negation of production is asserted as the
predicate of the probandum, this one [Bhavaviveka]
himself just asserts that the entity of the subject [an eye]—
the basis of that [predicate, non-production from self]—
which is found by a mere erroneous [consciousness] has
degenerated from [being established] in suchness [that is to
say, is not established ultimately since it is found by a mistaken consciousness]. Erroneous and non-erroneous [consciousnesses] are different.
In this interpretation, (according to the Four Interwoven
Notes
827
Commentaries, 530.5-31.2) once Bhavaviveka asserts that eyes
and so forth are not ultimately established and are not ultimates, it is established that they are falsities. Also, since it
would be very contradictory for a consciousness of reality
which is devoid of dualistic appearance to take such falsities as
its objects in the perspective of its perceiving suchness, they
must be objects found by erroneous consciousnesses and
objects in relation to which a consciousness comes to be considered a mistaken consciousness. However, the Madhyamika is
debating with a Proponent of T r u e Existence who asserts that
valid sense consciousnesses are non-mistaken with respect to
visible forms and so forth. Therefore, it would be very contradictory for that one object to be that in relation to which a sense
consciousness becomes mistaken as in the Madhyamika system
and that in relation to which it becomes non-mistaken [read
tshad ma ma 'khrul ba'iyul for tshad ma 'khrulpa'iyul, 531.2]
as in the system of a Proponent of T r u e Existence. Due to this,
there is no subject commonly established for both the Madhyamika and the Proponen: of T r u e Existence. For, an erroneous,
mistaken consciousness which is polluted by ignorance and a
non-erroneous, non-mistaken consciousness of a Superior's
meditative equipoise perceiving suchness are different, that is,
are mutually exclusive in terms of how they engage their
objects, the one dualistically and the other non-dualistically
(according to Kensur Yeshe Thupten).
In this interpretation the last sentence—'Erroneous and nonerroneous [consciousnesses] are different'—refers to the possible consciousnesses that could certify the existence of objects
that are established by way of their own character, both being
rejected. That which is erroneous—a consciousness to which a
non-inherently existent object appears to be inherently existent
—cannot certify an inherently existent object because that is the
very thing with respect to which it is mistaken. That which is
non-erroneous, a consciousness of meditative equipoise that
does not involve such mistaken appearance, also cannot certify
the existence of a conventionality such as eyes and so forth (the
subject of our syllogism about non-ultimate production)
because conventionalities do not appear to it, even in the case of
a Buddha, in terms of its mode of perceiving emptiness nondualistically since conventionalities can only be perceived in a
828
Meditation on Emptiness
dualistic mode. Also, in this interpretation the 'degeneration'
or non-establishment is taken as referring to Bhavaviveka's
having to assert that eyes and so forth are not established ultimately, that is to say, not established by way of their own character because of being found or certified as existing by erroneous consciousnesses, this in turn being because even he holds
that they are not found by a consciousness of meditative equipoise.
Dzong-ka-ba's Essence of the Good Explanations, written later
in his life than the Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path,
offers another interpretation of this passage. That text says at
the point of explaining ChandrakTrti's response to 'Bhavaviveka's' proposal that the subject and so forth are established
because only generalities are used (191.8-192.10, Varanasi
edition).
Bhavaviveka himself asserts that the entities of the subjects—eyes and so forth—are not found by mere erroneous [consciousnesses], and [ChandrakTrti] refutes him
through demonstrating the reasoning that the erroneous
and the non-erroneous are different, a dichotomy, etc.
T h e meaning of [ChandrakTrti's] statements is this: Mere
eyes and so forth devoid of qualification of the two truths
are not positable as the subjects in the proof that eyes and
so forth are not produced from self because [according to
Bhavaviveka] the valid cognizers comprehending those
subjects are consciousnesses that are non-mistaken with
respect to the nature [inherent existence] of eyes and so
forth but false appearances—in which erroneous objects
of knowledge appear to exist by way of their own character whereas they do not—do not exist among objects
found by non-erroneous consciousnesses that are not
mistaken with respect to the nature.
With respect to [Bhavaviveka] asserting the earlier
reason [—that according to Bhavaviveka the valid cognizers comprehending those subjects are consciousnesses
that are non-mistaken with respect to the nature or inherent existence of eyes and so forth—] in a system [such as
that of Bhavaviveka] which asserts that whatever exists
exists by way of its own entity, if [a consciousness] is
mistaken relative to the appearance of the object's being
Notes
829
established by way of its own character, it cannot be
posited as finding [that is, realizing] its object of comprehension. Therefore, whether a valid cognizer is conceptual
or non-conceptual, it must be non-mistaken about that
with respect to which it is valid, its referent object or
appearing object [respectively]. In that case, it must be
valid about an entity or nature which is the object's own
mode of subsistence and which is not just nominally
designated conventionally, and he also asserts this. It is
contradictory for whatever is an object found by such a
valid cognizer to be an erroneous object of knowledge;
thereby, the latter reason [—that false appearances, in
which erroneous objects of knowledge appear to exist by
way of their own character whereas they do not, do not
exist among objects found by non-erroneous consciousnesses that are not mistaken with respect to the nature—]
is established. Likewise, it is also contradictory for whatever is an object found by a mistaken consciousness to be
a non-erroneous object of knowledge. Therefore, [Bhavaviveka] cannot dispel the fallacy of the non-establishment
of the subject.
In this interpretation, Bhavaviveka is said to assert, not that
eyes and so forth are not established in suchness because of
being found by mistaken consciousnesses, but that these are
not found by mistaken consciousnesses because they must be
certified by consciousnesses that are not mistaken with respect
to the inherent existence of those objects. However, the former
is seen as being forced on him because of his assertions
whereas the latter is presented as his actual assertion; thus, the
change in Dzong-ka-ba's interpretation does not represent an
about-face in terms of delineating Bhavaviveka's tenets and
instead is a different reading of the text. (Also, in this interpretation the last sentence—'Erroneous and non-erroneous are different'—refers not to consciousnesses but to objects of knowledge.)
About the change in interpretation, Dzong-ka-ba himself says
in his Essence of the Good Explanations (195.20-196.2):
Although the two—[my] explanation [of this passage]
elsewhere [in the Great Exposition of the Stages of the
830
Meditation on Emptiness
Path] in terms of [Bhavaviveka's] having asserted that the
basal subjects degenerate from [or are not] established as
[their own] suchness and this mode [of interpretation]—
do not agree, it is not that [my two interpretations] disagree with respect to [the passage's setting forth] the tenet
of refuting autonomy.
It is my guess that since in his Essence of the Good Explanations
Dzong-ka-ba does not use 'in suchness' (de kho nai, the misreading in de'i tshe kho nar) in any way at all, he came to
understand it as a mis-reading and, due to this, changed his
reading of the text, ingeniously making it mean the same thing,
albeit by a very different route. It seems to me that Jam-yangshay-ba makes the mistake of trying to keep 'in suchness' (de
kho nar) when explaining Dzong-ka-ba's new interpretation in
his Essence of the Good Explanations and thus goes through the
verbal gymnastics of moving it, against all sense of syntax, into
the previous clause.
In Dzong-ka-ba's Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' (52.2-7.13), Varanasi 1973
edition), written after his Essence of the Good Explanations he
refers his readers to the discussion in his 'Essence of the Good
Explanations and so forth' for the topic of Commonly Appearing Subjects, suggesting a preference for the interpretation
there over that in the 'Great Exposition of Special Insight';
thus, it may be that in the end he did not hold that these two
radically different interpretations are both correct. In any case,
Jam-yang-shay-ba uses the interpretation in Dzong-ka-ba's
Essence of the Good Explanations for this passage, and hence the
interpretation used here in my translation and commentary is
the same.
425 GM, 249b.2. _
426 For this, see Dzong-ka-ba's Essence of the Good Explanations,
193.13 (Varanasi: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings edition, 1973).
427 This was cited earlier, p.475. See n.388.
428 For this, see the Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-kaba's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 578.5. T h e
summations following are the author's.
428a Wayman (p.312) translates the last line of this citation as, 'You
have no answer to this.' However, the Four Interwoven
Notes
831
Commentaries (533.4) make it clear that the reference is to
'Bhavaviveka's' earlier answer: khyed kyis lan btab pa 'di ni don
dang mthun pa'i lan ma yin pa nyid do ' T h e answer which you
have given is just not an answer concordant with the fact.' Bhavaviveka's earlier answer (see p.507) was that just generalities
are to be used as subject, predicate, and so forth without being
qualified by the particular assertions of the two schools. ChandrakTrti's refutation of this is built around his perception that a
tenet unacceptable to a Madhyamika is automatically attached
to the subject and so forth—inherent existence—because
schools that propound inherent existence hold that the consciousness certifying the subject perforce must certify the
subject's inherent existence.
429 Jam-yang-shay-ba (GM, 250a.2) seems to make this conclusion
since he does not specify 'Buddhists' here as referring to nonPrasangikas.
430 Gom-day, 633.1, sangs rgyas pa 'og mas. A note by Dra-di-geshay Rin-chen-don-drup (Bra-sti-dge-bshes Rin-chen-don-grub)
in the Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great
Exposition of the Stages of the Path' (546.6) identifies the Buddhists here as Svatantrikas and below.
431 Geshe Gediin Lodro and Kensur Yeshe Thupten reported this.
Wayman (p.316) translates the first clause of the second sentence in the following citation as, 'For in that instance (of
example) there is no intention to state a difference between the
sound universal and the impermanence universal.' However,
the reference here is not to a difference between two things but to
mere sound and mere impermanence which are not asserted as
qualified (avivakshitavishesha, khyadpar brjodpar mi 'dodpa)
with the particular tenets of the two schools. T h e Four Interwoven Commentaries (545.6-6.3) says: dpe'i skabs der ni sangs
rgyas pas bye brag pa la sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa dang bye brag
pas gsal byedpa la de Itar sgrub pa'i skabs su rim pa Itar 'byung
'gyur dang nam mkha 'iyon tangnyis dang byaspa dang sngaryod
rkyen gyis gsal bar byas pa gnyis te so so 'i 'dod pas khyad par ma
byas par rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa tsam gyi sgra'i spyi
tsam zhig dang phyis 'byung gi rgyu la Itos pa dang ma Itos pa
ganggis kyang khyad par du ma byas pa'i sgrub bya'i chos rang gi
mtshan nyid kyis grub pa'i mi rtag pa'am 'jig pa nyid kyi spyi
tsam zhig la tshad mar song ba de bkod nas so so'i 'dodpa 'i khyad
832
Meditation on Emptiness
par de dag sbyar nas brjodpar mi 'dodpar gnyis ka 'i lugs la mthun
snang du grub pa zhig brjod par 'dod na nirgol bade gnyis ka'i lugs
la yangyod pa yin... 'On that occasion of the example when
the Buddhist is proving to a Vaisheshika that sound is impermanent and a Vaisheshika is proving the same to a Drpaka, a
mere generality of sound which is just established by way of its
own character but is not qualified by their individual assertions
—respectively, being a derivative of the elements and being a
quality of space or being a product and being something previously existent which is manifested by conditions—and a mere
generality of impermanence or disintegratedness (the predicate
of the probandum) which is established by way of its own character but which is not qualified by either depending or not
depending on later causes are stated within the context that
these have been certified by valid cognition. If, not wishing to
express [a subject and predicate] within affixing those qualifications of their individual assertions, they wish to express [a subject and predicate that are] established as commonly appearing
in both of their systems, there is such in the systems of both disputants.' As Dzong-ka-ba (Four Interwoven Commentaries,
546.6ff) makes clear, 'sound not qualified by being a derivative
of the elements or a quality of space' refers to sound's not being
so qualified for the minds of the two disputants. In other words,
the two disputants can speak of sound without putting in the
qualifications of their systems even though the Buddhist holds
that there is no sound that is not a derivative of the elements
and the Vaisheshika holds that there is no sound which is not a
quality of space. Though the Buddhist holds that sound is
necessarily a derivative of the elements and the Vaisheshika
holds that sound necessarily possesses those attributes (khyad
par dang Idanpa), it is not necessary that sound be qualified for
their minds (bio la khyad par du byaspa) by being a derivative of
the elements or a quality of space. Conceptuality is able to
isolate such generalities. Chandrakirti is saying that even if in
Bhavaviveka's example such generalities are possible, there is
no possibility of such when proving emptiness since the subject
must be certified by valid cognition and a non-Madhyamika
feels that this certification also certifies the inherent existence
of the subject.
T h e commentary, as given above, tacks 'established by way
Notes
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
833
of its own character' onto the generalities, restricting the range
of the example to non-Prasangikas; however, not all scholars
hold that this restriction should be made, for even in the Prasangika system generalities of sound and impermanence are possible
even when debating with non-Prasangikas since the issue of
their being established by way of their own character is not
pertinent.
This and the next paragraph supply background drawn from
Kensur Lekden's oral teachings.
T h e Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great
Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 566.2-7.1.
Gom-day Nam-ka-gyel-tsen ends his commentary at this point.
T h e bracketed material in this sentence is from the Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great Exposition of the
Stages of the Path', 561,4fT.
T h e bracketed material in 1.7 is from Dzong-ka-ba's Ocean of
Reasoning, 77.3fF(Varanasi 1973 edition).
T h e bracketed material in this sentence is from the Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great Exposition of the
Stages of the Path', 562.5.
This and the next sentence are teachings frequently emphasized by Kensur Lekden.
T h e Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great
Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 569.5, identifies this term
as meaning 'something substantially established which is established by way of its own character' (rang gi mtshan nyid kyis
grub pa'i rdzas grub).
Reading ghatasya in accordance with De Jong ('Textcritical
Notes' p.31, n.31.14).
Following the Tibetan gzhan gyis; the Sanskrit is pare which
Stcherbatsky (p.119, n.7) prefers asparaih but De Jong (p.31,
n.31.14) decides should be left as it is.
T h e meaning of this is conjectured from discussion with Kensur Yeshe T h u p t e n , who pointed to a statement in Dignaga's
Compendium of Valid Cognition (P5700, Vol. 130 3.1.3, 1.4ab):
'Because [the sense powers] are the uncommon cause [of their
respective consciousness], that [consciousness] is designated
[with the term 'sense direct perceiver' (pratyaksha, dbangpo'i
mngon sum)] by way of the sense powers.' (asadharana-hetutvad
akshais tad vyapadishyate, thun mong mayin rgyuyiphyir/de'i
834
Meditation on Emptiness
tha snyad dbangpos byed [the Peking mis-reads deyis tha snyad;
de yi would also be suitable; this reading follows Hattori cited
below]. For the Sanskrit and M. Hattori's translation and analysis see his Dignaga, On Perception [Cambridge: Harvard, 1968],
p.26 and pp.86-7 n.1.30 and n.1.32). Kensur Yeshe T h u p t e n
and Hattori also point out that there is a similar statement in
Vasubandhu's Treasury of Knowledge, 1.45: 'Since due to their
changing [that is, becoming duller or clearer, the respective
consciousnesses] change [becoming duller or clearer], the bases
are the eye [sense power] and so forth. Therefore, because of
being the uncommon [cause], the consciousnesses are called by
way of them [that is, a consciousness of visible forms is called an
eye consciousness, not a form consciousness].' (tad-vikaravikartivad ashrayash chakshur-adayah/ato 'sadharanatvach cha
vijnanam tair niruchyate, [Hattori, p.76 n. 1.11]; de daggyurpas
'gyur nyidphyir/rten ni mig la sogspayin/dephyir thun mong ma
yin phyir/de dag gis ni mam shes bstan [148.16, Varanasi 1978
edition].) Thus, a non-Madhyamika is arguing that since the
sense powers are themselves causes, they must be ultimately
produced.
Stcherbatsky (p. 120) translates the passage as:
Thesis: Internal facts, i.e., mental phenomena really arise,
i.e., they have a real existence.
Reason: Because they produce purposive actions directed
towards the same objects as our thoughts have been directed to.
Major premise: Whatsoever is efficient is real.
His translation, though a bit strained, is getting at the same
point.
443 In the Tibetan Cultural Printing Press edition (22.19), read
shes rab kyi mig for shes rab kyis mig in accordance with the
Peking (Vol. 98 6.5.5). It seems to me that the Tibetan would
be better rendered as: dngos po mams kyiyang dag pa ji Ita ba
bzhin nyid mthong ba'i rnal 'byorpa mnyam par bzhagpa'i shes
rab kyi mig gis skye ba dang 'gro ba la sogspa dag don dam paryod
par bsgrub na ni.
444 In the Tibetan Cultural Printing Press edition (23.4) read sgrub
par byed pa layang for sgrub par byed pa layodpa in accordance
with the Peking (Vol. 98 6.5.7). Stcherbatsky (p.121) takes
Notes
835
Bhavaviveka's refutation of going as a refutation of time;
though there is a similarity between space and time, this refutation at least explicitly is concerned with motion, being concerned with the second chapter of Nagarjuna's Treatise, the
'Analysis of Going and Coming'.
445 De Jong (p.31, n.33.1) corrects the Sanskrit rupavat to svarupavat in accordance with Bhavaviveka's Heart of the Middle Way,
III.39ab; thus, the Tibetan would be better translated as rang
gzugs bzhin, 'like its form', meaning the form that the eye sees.
446 Bhavaviveka's Heart of the Middle Way, III.27ab; see De Jong,
p.32, n.33.2.
447 GM, 253.5: read 'diyang for 'di layang in accordance with Vol.
98 7.1.2. Here, Chandraklrti (Poussin, 33.4) gives the reason of
Bhavaviveka's syllogism as sattvat, not vidyamanatvat as he
did earlier (26.1); the Tibetan i s y o d p a ' i p h y i r throughout.
Stcherbatsky's interpretation (p. 123) of the objection is quite
fanciful. As this passage is not cited in the Four Interwoven
Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages
of the Path', or in GM, or in Gom-day whose commentary has
ended, the interpretation of the objection as coming from
Bhavaviveka is mine. It makes sense since Chandraklrti argued
earlier for the all-inclusiveness of Buddhapalita's syllogism (see
n.398).
448 Dzong-ka-ba's Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path, P6001,
Vol. 152 160.4.3.
449 Missing in the Tibetan. T h e Sanskrit (Poussin, 34.5) has asmadanumananam. T h e Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzongka-ba's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 572.4, by
glossing this as referring to the inferences appearing in ChandrakTrti's Clear Words and so forth, interprets the statement as
referring not to all syllogistic reasoning in general but to those
refuting production from self such as those drawn from
Buddhapalita's text. This preserves other-renowned inferences
or syllogisms as a means also for positively communicating
one's own tenets. T h e interpretation seems forced; one is drawn
into wondering why, if Chandraklrti meant to be so specific, he
did not bother to be this specific.
Later in the same text (573.4), the same passage is glossed this
w a y : ' . . . but we [Prasangikas] do not use autonomous inferences because inferences [used by us Prasangikas] have the fruit
836
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
Meditation on Emptiness
[or purpose] of only refuting the [wrong] theses of other [parties].' In this version, the added commentary is not aimed at
preserving the positive use of syllogisms; however, one could
merely say that 'inferences' means not all but some inferences
stated by Prasarigikas. In any case, the Gel-luk-ba position is
clear: other-renowned inferences are used for both positive and
negative purposes.
Poussin (34.6) changes par ash chakshuh to param chakshuh
recognizing (see n.5) that the Tibetan (gzhan) does not confirm
the change, preferring that it read gzhan la; however, Dr.
Vaidya leaves the manuscript as is, and the Four Interwoven
Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages
of the Path', 573.5, follows the same reading, identifying the
term as referring to other parties who assert that the eye sees.
GM, 255b. 1, read nyid duyang khas for nyid du khas in accordance with the Peking, Vol. 98 7.1.7. T h e bracketed material in
this and the next section is from the Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the
Path', 573.6-4.2.
T h e bracketed material is from the Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the
Path', 574.4.
Missing in the Tibetan. T h e Sanskrit (Poussin, 34.11) has
asmadanumanair.
In GM, 254a.6, read gang las for gang la in accordance with Vol.
98 7.2.2.
T h e Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great
Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 578.5.
T h e bracketed material is from the Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great Exposition of the Stages of the
Path', 591.Iff.
T h e Four Interwoven Commentaries on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great
Exposition of the Stages of the Path', 592.2. With respect to 'who
do not know suchness' the Sanskrit (Poussin, 36.1) is merely
tadanabhijna 'who do not know that [or those, which could
refer to "the definitions"]' whereas the Tibetan reads de kho na
mi shes pa'i 'who do not know suchness'. T h e Four Interwoven
Commentaries (592.3) takes it even further: chos kyi de kho na
nyid ma shes pa'i 'who do not know the suchness of
phenomena'. I have followed the Tibetan as it presumably
Notes
458
837
reflects the reading of tad as meaning tattva (see Poussin, p.36,
n.3) by the translators.
T h e rest of the chapter presents the author's reflections on
these topics. This first sentence refers to Aryadeva's famous
statement in his Four Hundred (the Four Interwoven Commentaries, 590.2):
Just as a barbarian cannot be
Approached with another language,
So the world cannot be approached
Except with the worldly.
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
Dzong-ka-ba, Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path, P6001,
Vol. 152 142.3.6.
Kensur Lekden frequently mentioned this as an apparent contradiction; it is from Chandraklrti's Commentary on (Aryadeva's) 'Four Hundred'.
Kensur Lekden.
Part Five, chapter six is mainly a paraphrase of Jang,
291.9-299.8, supplemented with information from the Nyingma Lama Khetsun Sangpo, who in 1972 was working on his
own compilation of biographies of Tibetan yogis at the Library
of Tibetan Works and Archives, Dharmsala. T h e identification
of the orders of particular scholars and yogis is his, as are the
dates with an asterisk. T h e chapter is not intended as a definitive history of the spread of Buddhism to and development in
Tibet, but as a presentation illustrating both the dominance of
Prasangika and the active inter-play between the orders.
This paragraph is mostly drawn from the oral teachings of
Khetsun Sangpo.
Snellgrove and Richardson give the date as 779 in A Cultural
History of Tibet (New York: Praeger, 1968), p.277.
This was reported by Khetsun Sangpo.
Dzong-ka-ba, Middling Exposition, P6002, Vol. 152 184.2.5.
Khetsun Sangpo.
Khetsun Sangpo.
Khetsun Sangpo.
Tibetan Buddhism is usually viewed as having four principal
orders, but Khetsun Sangpo follows a system of eight.
Part Five, chapter seven is mainly drawn from extended conversations with Kensur Lekden, Geshe Gediin Lodro, and Geshe
838
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
Meditation on Emptiness
Lhundup Sopa; the chapter attempts to put the Ge-luk-ba
teachings on valid establishment in context. T h e next sentence
was repeatedly emphasized by Kensur Lekden.
Ann, dbu 9b.5ff.
Ann, dbu 9a.7ff.
This and the next paragraph are mainly drawn from the oral
teachings of Geshe Gediin Lodro.
Dzong-ka-ba, Illumination of the Thought, Extensive Explanation of (Chandraktrti's) 'Supplement to (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise
on the Middle Way'", P6143, Vol. 154 67.5.2ff. T h e next paragraph is from Geshe Gedun Lodro.
Clear Words, P5260, Vol. 98 53.3.7ff.
This and the next paragraph are mainly drawn from the oral
teachings of Kensur Lekden.
See Tenzin Gyatso's The Buddhism of Tibet and the Key to the
Middle Way (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p.74.
GM, 106a.3fT.
Geshe L h u n d u p Sopa.
This paragraph is mostly from Kensur Lekden.
Ornament to Nagarjuna's Thought, Eloquence Containing the
Essence of the Profundities of the Middle Way (Kalimpong: Mani
Printing Works), 14a.6ff. T h e biographical material comes
from his contemporaries, Geshe Wangyal, Kensur Lekden, and
Geshe Gelden.
This was reported by the inner Mongolian scholar Geshe Gelden.
Presentation of the Lack of Being One or Many, Collected
Works, Vol. 1 (New Delhi: Lama G u r u Deva, 1971), 425. Iff.
Part Five, chapter eight is drawn from the sources indicated in
the subsequent notes in an attempt to contrast the Ge-luk-ba
interpretation with other prevalent views on the import of Prasafigika-Madhyamika. T h e quote here is taken from the Shes
rig par khang edition, 435b.3-5, with the answer being from
440a.3-b.l.
(New Delhi: Lama G u r u Deva, 1972), 18b.3-4.
Sopa and Hopkins, Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism
(London: Rider and Co., 1976), p. 137.
IBID, p. 134-5.
See Tenzin Gyatso's The Buddhism of Tibet and The Key to the
Middle Way (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), pp.55-6.
336.4-35b.2.
Notes
839
491 Jang, 419.17-420.9.
492 Sata-Pitaka Series, Volume 28 pp.45-6.
493 Svarasvati has not been edited to Sarasvatibecause the sva spelling occurs consistently in many Tibetan texts and accords more
with the Tibetan translation of the name as dbyangs, 'melody' or
'intonation'. Kensur Lekden mentioned that Svarasvati and
Manjughosha are special deities for authors, the former assisting
with perfect speech and the latter with discriminative wisdom.
494 P6142, Vol. 153 208.5.5 T h e Peking Edition reads mtshan
'dzin instead of mthar 'dzin.
Dzong-ka-ba's Essence of the Good Explanations (Legs bshad
snyingpo) is the ultimate of his works dealing with comparative
schools of tenets. Structured around the topic of the interpretable and the definitive in the Mahayana schools, the text is
primarily concerned with delineating what the final mode of
being of phenomena is according to those schools, on the basis
of which the division into what requires interpretation and
what does not is made. T h u s , the hermeneutical theory of the
Chittamatra, Yogachara-Svatantrika, Sautrantika-Svatantrika,
and Prasarigika schools is ontologically based, that is, their
theories of interpretation of both scripture and objects revolve
around what ultimate reality is in contrast to how Buddha
spoke to certain trainees in accordance with their interests, dispositions, and capabilities.
As Jam-yang-shay-ba says at the beginning of his commentary
on the Essence of the Good Explanations (Buxa edition, 3a.2),
Dzong-ka-ba is presenting the essence of all the good explanations {legs bshad thams cad kyi snyingpo), and thus the title, at
least according to him, does not indicate that Dzong-ka-ba is
saying that his own text has an essence of good explanation or
eloquence but that he is presenting the essence of the marvelous
explanations on the subject of the interpretable and the definitive from Indian treatises. T h e title could be translated as
Essence of Eloquence or Essence of the Eloquent as long as eloquence was understood as referring to the Indian scholars'
discriminative presentation of the subject matter and not to
euphony of expression as in beautiful poetic composition or to
Dzong-ka-ba's own presentation. Undoubtedly, Dzong-ka-ba's
composition comes to be eloquent by way of containing the
eloquence of the Indian scholars, but this does not appear to be
the intention of his title.
840
495
Meditation on Emptiness
Jam-yang-shay-ba would find support in the last two lines of
this quote for his position that Buddhapalita is the founder of
the Prasangika system, but those who say that ChandrakTrti is
the founder would also find support from the statement just
above it that ChandrakTrti 'opened the chariot way' for
Prasangika through clearly differentiating this system from
others. I find Jam-yang-shay-ba's position to be insupportable
in the face of (1) his own statement that even though Saraha
preceded Nagarjuna in holding the Madhyamika view and even
though Vimuktisena preceded Shantarakshita in holding the
Yogachara-Svatantrika view (GT, ca 10a.5-1 la.4), those two are
not posited as the founders of, respectively, the Madhyamika
system and the Yogachara-Madhyamika system because they
did not clearly set off those schools in contradistinction to other
systems and (2) his admission that Buddhapalita did not do that
for Prasangika (GT, ca 9a.5-10a.l) whereas ChandrakTrti did
(see p.584). Jang-gya (288.last line) goes so far as to say that
Jam-yang-shay-ba actually did not hold that Buddhapalita
founded Prasangika for the above reasons. However, the
monastic college that uses Jam-yang-shay-ba's texts, Go-mang,
currently holds that Buddhapalita was the founder and that this
is Jam-yang-shay-ba's view.
T h e four types of Superiors (Aryan) are Hearer, Solitary Realizer, Bodhisattva, and Buddha Superiors. Aryan ('Phagspa) is
translated as 'Superiors' because, according to Kensur Lekden,
these are beings who have risen above the level of common
beings (prthagjana, so sor skye bo) through cognizing emptiness
directly on the path of seeing.
Shravaka (Nyan thos) is translated as 'Hearers' because (GM,
16a.3-5) they hear (nyan) the doctrine, practice it, and then
cause others to hear (thos par byed pa) that they have actualized
their goal (see Hopkins' Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism
[London: Hutchinson, 1980], pp. 102-3). This etymology is
built around active and causative uses of the verbal root for
hearing, shru; one hears and then causes others to hear, in this
case not what one has heard but what one has achieved after
putting into practice the doctrines one has heard by announcing
that 'I have done what was to be done; I will not know another
life,' etc. T h e translation of the term as 'disciples' loses this
etymological meaning which appears to be important in the
Notes
841
tradition as is evidenced by Chandraklrti's citing it in his
Supplement (Tibetan Publishing House edition, 3.11) and
Dzong-ka-ba's including and expanding on Chandraklrti in his
commentary (Compassion, P. 102).
Chandraklrti (Comm, 3.14, cited by Dzong-ka-ba in Compassion, p. 103) gives a second etymology of Shravaka as HearerProclaimer (GM, 16a.5fl) based on the White Lotus of Excellent
Doctrine Sutra (SaddharmapundarTka, IV.53 [P781, Vol. 30
23.3.2; Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, No. 6, p.82] which says:
O Protector, today we have become hearer-proclaimers
(shravakabhuta).
We will thoroughly proclaim the excellent enlightenment
And will set forth the terms of enlightenment.
T h u s we [will be] like formidable Hearer-Proclaimers
(Shravaka).
Jam-yang-shay-ba (GM, 16a.6), expanding on Dzong-ka-ba's
explanation (Compassion, p. 103), interprets this as meaning
that Shravakas are so called because upon hearing (thos nas)
about the supreme fruit of Buddhahood or about its path from a
Buddha they proclaim (sgrogspa) it to others without practicing
it themselves. He says (GM, 17b.4) that at this point in the
Lotus Sutra Bodhisattvas are saying that they are fit to be derided because, like Hearers, they are proclaiming the fruit of the
Mahayana or the profound path proceeding to that state without practicing it themselves. T h e context of the sutra, however,
appears to be slightly different as can be seen in Leon Hurvitz's
very readable translation in the Scripture of the Lotus Blossom of
the Fine Dharma (New York: Columbia, 1976, p.98). T h e
Buddha has told the story of the 'prodigal son' (see Whalen
Lai's fine article ' T h e Buddhist "Prodigal Son": A Story of
Misperceptions', Journal of the International Association of
Buddhist Studies,' Vol. 4 No. 2, pp.91-8), and the former
Hearer, Mahakashyapa, is re-telling the story, relating it to how
he and other Hearers formerly proclaimed the Bodhisattva path
but did not practice it:
T h e Buddha's sons,
Hearing the Dharma from us
And day and night taking thought,
Engaged in cultivated practice; (p.95)
19 Meditation on Emptiness
Also:
So we, though we preached
T h e jewel cache of the Buddhadharma,
Had no hope for it
In the same way. (p.96)
Also:
Although we, for the sake of
T h e Buddha's sons,
Preached the Bodhisattvadharma,
Wherewith the Buddha Path was to be sought,
Yet, with respect to this Dharma,
We never had any hopes, (p.97)
Mahakashyapa then explains that due to having heard that they
have the lot of the Mahayana and thereupon attained the
Mahayana path they, like the son in the parable who was gradually led to recognize that he is the son of a wealthy king, have
gained something extraordinary which they always had in the
sense that they had been preaching it but had no hope to practice it. As Hurvitz translates the stanza in question:
We now
Are truly voice-hearers,
Taking the voice of the Buddha Path
And causing all to hear it.
T h u s , Jam-yang-shay-ba is certainly right in saying that the
Lotus Sutra is indicating a dual etymology of Shravaka as those
who hear about the highest enlightenment of the Mahayana and
then cause others to hear about it (causative in Sanskrit, sgrogs in
Tibetan) without practicing it themselves. However, it seems
that the specific context here in this stanza is that the now
Bodhisattva Mahakashyapa is saying that he and others are now
formidable hearer-proclaimers in that unlike their earlier state
as Hearer-Proclaimers who heard and proclaimed the Mahayana teaching without practicing it, they have put it to practice,
have attained its fruit, and will proclaim it to others. T h u s , at
this particular point Mahakashyapa does not seem to be saying
that 'we Bodhisattvas are fit to be derided' as Jam-yang-shay-ba
says. T h i s is confirmed in the commentary on the Lotus Sutra
Notes
843
by Prthivibandhu (Sa'i rtsa lags), in which in reference to this
stanza he says (The Nyingma Edition of the sDe-dge bKa'-'gyur
and bsTan-'gyur, Dharma Publishing, 1981, Text 4017, Vol.
76 663.6), 'This indicates that, having attained the great fruit,
they are fit to help others who are set as Hearer Superiors.'
Mahakashyapa is rejoicing in their new situation.
How the context is interpreted affects the translation of the
last line of IV.53, steno vayam shravaka bhishmakalpah, de bas
bdag cag nyan thos mi zad 'dra (GM, 16b.2) or de bas bdag cag
sgogspa mi bzad 'dra (P781, Vol. 30 23.3.2), ' T h u s we [will be]
like formidable Hearer-Proclaimers.' T h e term 'formidable'
(ibhishma, mi zad or mi bzad) is missing in Hurvitz's translation
from the Chinese. Louis de la Vallee Poussin (Museon, ns V. 11,
1910 [Vol. 29], p.253) renders the line, 'aussi serons-nous
comme d'irrestibles (Jravakas.' In Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism (p. 103), I translated it as, ' T h u s we are like intractable
Hearers,' assuming that Jam-yang-shay-ba was taking the term
in a negative way. 'Irresistible', like 'formidable', suggests the
might and power (bhishma) of their proclamation now that they
are proclaiming the Mahayana doctrine on the basis of actual
attainment, whereas 'intractable' is a reference to the awful or
frightful (bhishma) state that they were in when they just caused
others to hear about the Mahayana but did not practice it themselves. In either case, there is a play on the contrast with their
former state. T h e translation as 'formidable', however, seems
to fit the context better.
Based on this etymology of shravaka as hearing of the highest
enlightenment and proclaiming it without practicing it, Hurvitz (p. 116) explains that ' . . . b y auditor is meant (italics his)
one who lacks knowledge of Emptiness.' However, as Dzongka-ba (Compassion, pp. 150-60) shows, this is not the position of
Chandraklrti and other Prasafigikas; according to him, in
Prasartgika the subtlest emptiness must be cognized even to be
liberated from cyclic existence and thus Hearers and Solitary
Realizers do so. In Dzong-ka-ba's interpretation of Prasangika,
the path that Hearers hear about and proclaim without practicing would be great compassion, the altruistic intention to
become enlightened, and meditation on emptiness using a
myriad of reasonings rather than just a few. However, with
regard to Chittamatra, Dzong-ka-ba and his followers hold that
844
Meditation on Emptiness
Hearers and Solitary Realizers do not cognize the subtlest
emptiness (see Sopa and Hopkins' Practice and Theory of
Tibetan Buddhism, pp. 117-18), in which case what Hearers
hear about and proclaim without practicing is the emptiness of
a difference of entity between subject and object, as well as the
paths of great compassion and so forth. T h e Chittamatrin interpretation, therefore, accords with Hurvitz's presentation.
Though this second etymology of hearing and proclaiming
without practicing is pejorative, the former is not, as it is frequently reported in sutra itself that upon achieving their goal
Hearers report to others the fact that they have completed their
path with statements such as, 'I have done what was to be done;
I will not know another birth' (Compassion, p. 102). Thus,
given the importance that ChandrakTrti, Dzong-ka-ba, and so
forth give to the term itself, this non-pejorative etymology can
serve as a basis for a literal translation as 'Hearers'.
Jam-yang-shay-ba (GM, 16b.2) views the two etymologies as
built from different roots, but in both cases the Sanskrit seems
merely to be a play between the active arid the causative uses of
shru. In the case of the Lotus Sutra the causative samshravayishyamatha (future causative first person plural) was translated into
Tibetan as sgrogs rather than as thos par byed pa leading to the tradition that there are two etymologies ofshravaka, one as nyan thos
and another as thos sgrogs, whereas it seems that the two are variations of the one play on the active and the causative. In the first
etymology the Hearers proclaim or cause others to hear that they
have actualized their goal whereas in the second they proclaim or
cause others to hear the doctrine that they have heard. Jam-yangshay- ba (GM, 16b.2) says that the Lotus Sutra etymology is built
from the verbal root for 'proclaiming the heard' (thos pa sgrogs
pa 'i hying), but he does not cite the actual Sanskrit. However, in
accordance with his etymology of the ka of madhyamaka as from
the verbal root for proclaiming, kai (meaning 'to sound' according to Apte) following an explanation by Bhavaviveka (GM,
4b.3), we can surmise that he is taking the ka of shravaka as built
from the verbal root for proclaiming and 'the heard' as shruta
from shru. However, though there are two etymologies of shravaka, they are built not around different verbal roots but around
the single root shru treated in active and passive modes with different interpretations both of what is heard (the HlnaySna or
Notes
496
845
Mahayana doctrine) and what is proclaimed (one's own attainment of the Hfnayana enlightenment or the Mahayana doctrine
one has heard but not practiced).
Pratyekabuddha is translated as 'Solitary Realizer' because of
the explanation (Compassion, pp. 103-4) thatpratyekabuddhasare
not Buddhas but are called buddha because of having realization
of suchness. 'Solitary' indicates that in their last lifetime they
practice alone without depending on a teacher in that lifetime.
T h e terms Bodhisattva and Buddha are left untranslated as
they are sufficiently familiar in English.
P5260, Vol. 98 4.5.3, commenting on 1.1. T h e Sanskrit is
Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, Vol. 10, 5.24; Poussin, 16.2, T h e
brackets are from GM, 2 32b. 6.
Prasannapada is translated as Clear Words though it would
be just as suitable as The Lucidly Worded, or The Clear Worded
as Stcherbatsky does in his The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana
(rpt Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), or Lucid Exposition of
the Middle Way as Mervyn Sprung does in his condensation of
the text (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979). It strikes me
that Chandraklrti gave his commentary on Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way (Madhyamakashastra) this title in
contrast to Bhavaviveka's commentary, Lamp for (Nagarjuna 'sj
'Wisdom' (PrajnapradTpa) which, due to its brevity and lack of
elaboration, is often difficult to fathom and thus unclear. As an
example of such difficulty, see Bhavaviveka's refutation of
Buddhapalita's interpretation of the refutation of production
from self on p.461. Also, in the Clear Words ChandrakTrti gives
a very clear picture of the movement of the refutations by citing
the qualm that each step answers, such as in his brilliant
commentary on chapter two.
Stcherbatsky, in his The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, however, indicates that at least for him ChandrakTrti's text is not
clear and that the title seems ironic (p.75 n.l): 'CandrakTrti
has given to his commentary the title of ' T h e Clearworded'
(prasanna-pada) probably not without some dose of irony,
since, as Prof. WassiliefTattests, its extreme dialectical subtlety,
especially in the first chapter, is equalled by no other work in
the whole domain o f N o r t h e r n Buddhist literature.' In the same
vein, Mervyn Sprung (p.xii) says about the first chapter, in
defense of his abridgements of the t e x t , ' . . . [the abridgements]
846
Meditation on Emptiness
are, without exception I believe, concerned with CandrakTrti's
controversy with Bhavaviveka, his rival commentator within
the Madhyamika school, or with his support of Buddhapalita, a
commentator he attempts to follow, or else with traditional
arguments of the Samkhya school having to do with causation.
These controversies are important, obviously. Yet to place
them with all their meticulous, Indian love of syllogistic detail,
in what is otherwise a finely targeted introduction to the entire
Prasannapada, however natural they were to CandrakTrti's contemporaries, is to make access to the work for contemporary
readers difficult and discouraging.' It is interesting to note that
in the Ge-luk-ba scholastic centers of learning this very controversy between the three Madhyamika masters is used as the
means for gaining access to Madhyamika, as it is the first major
topic of debate in the Middle Way class of ge-shay studies at the
point of the sixth chapter of ChandrakTrti's Supplement to
(Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way'. ChandrakTrti's
Clear Words forms the basis of the study with commentaries
such as that by Jam-yang-shay-ba used to unravel its meaning; it
is because of the clarity which I found in using Jam-yang-shayba's commentary that this controversy could be included in
Part Five. T h u s , I am not making any claims that ChandrakTrti's words in that section were clear to me on their own; still,
I think that from his own point of view that section, like the rest
of his text, was a good deal clearer than Bhavaviveka's.
With respect to this citation, the Buddhist Sanskrit Texts
edition by Dr. P.L. Vaidya reads madhyamikasya satah which,
despite his saying (p.5 n.5) that it is not rendered in the
Tibetan, is rendered in the Tibetan by dbu mapayin na ni (Vol.
98 4.5.3). Poussin's edition (Bibliotheca Buddhica IV, 16.2)
reads madhyamikasya svatah which he finds to be missing in
the Tibetan (see n.3); however, the Tibetan suggests that satah
is correct.
Stcherbatsky (p. 100) seems to follow the Tibetan, loosely translating the passage as, 'But according to the Madhyamika method
of dialectics an independent argument is never needed. This
method consists in producing a contrathesis and then balancing
two conflicting views without admitting either of them.'
Sprung (p.37) follows Poussin's mis-reading, 'It is meaningless
for a Madhyamika, because he cannot accept his opponent's
Notes
847
premises, to propound a self-contained argument (svatantraanumana) from his own point of view (svatah).' Nga-wang-belden (Ann, dbu 58a.7) interprets the passage differently, 'Here
"autonomous inference" is a syllogism [literally, application of
a sign] which is established from its own side. "Position" is a
word for probandum or thesis. " A n o t h e r " means [a thesis
which is] other than not established from its own side. Therefore, the meaning of this passage is: It is not admissible [for one
who is a Madhyamika] to assert the statement of syllogisms
which are established from their own side because [Madhyamikas] do not assert probanda or theses which are established from
their own side.' T h u s , for Nga-wang-bel-den the question is not
about asserting something from one's own point of view or
merely playing off others' assertions but about asserting syllogisms and theses that inherently exist.
Jam-yang-shay-ba's interpretation (GM, 232b.5-33a.3) is
slightly more detailed, 'It follows that it is unsuitable for anyone who is a Madhyamika refuting all extremes as in the King of
Meditative Stabilizations Sutra to use autonomous inferences,
that is to say, syllogisms in which the three modes [of the presence of the reason in the subject, the pervasion, and counterpervasion] are established from their own side because [Madhyamikas] do not have assertions of other positions from among
the four extremes and so forth. That [Madhyamikas] do not
have assertions of other positions from among the four extremes
and so forth follows because (1) [Madhyamikas] do not have
positions asserting any extremes—the extreme of existence
which is inherent existence, the extreme of non-existence which
is utter non-existence, the extreme of both existence and nonexistence which is inherent existence and inherent disintegration, or the extreme of a truly established emptiness or middle
that abandons the two extremes of existence and non-existence
and (2) the honorable Superior [Nagarjuna] says that he has no
thesis contradicting the Madhyamika system.' T h e format of
such interpretation is clear: every instance where Prasangikas
seem to say that they have no theses is shown, by context, to
mean that they do not have certain theses, not theses in general.
As is evidenced by Stcherbatsky's and Sprung's translations,
they are inserting a good deal of interpretation into the text in
an admitted attempt to make it clearer. I prefer more literal
848
497
Meditation on Emptiness
translation, resorting frequently to bracketed additions, to
accomplish similar goals but to try to keep the original text
more available. All translation is interpretation, but it seems
appropriate, in the face of radically different interpretations, to
make the original text as identifiable as possible.
According to Jam-yang-shay-ba (GT, ca 6la.3), the Sanskrit
original is svairT. As mentioned earlier, siddha (grubpa) and sat
(yod pa) are often used interchangeably, and thus svabhavasiddha is translated here as 'existing inherently' rather than as
'established inherently' merely because it is a little easier to
understand in English.
It needs to be borne in mind that Bhavaviveka did not call
himself a Svatantrika. T h e term appears to have been coined in
Tibet, perhaps by visiting Indian scholars or Tibetans themselves, based on ChandrakTrti's saying that it is not suitable for
Madhyamikas to use svatantra-anumana, autonomous inferences (with the word 'inference' here not referring to a consciousness realizing a hidden or obscure object of knowledge in
dependence on a correct reason but to the syllogistic statement
itself). Jam-yang-shay-ba here equates svatantra with terms
meaning existing under the object's own power, and thus the
term has been translated as 'autonomous'. However, most
Western scholars and many non-Ge-luk-ba Tibetan scholars
have taken the term just to mean a syllogistic statement that the
stater himself supports and thus is in his own continuum (rang
rgyud). This interpretation is rejected by Ge-luk-ba writers
because then PrasaAgikas would absurdly be Svatantrikas since,
at least in the Ge-luk-ba interpretation, Prasangikas themselves
do use syllogistic reasoning.
Still, it seems to me that the term svatantra (-prayoga) might
refer to the type of syllogism that must on all occasions be stated in
order to generate in another party a consciousness realizing a
thesis. In other words, the very insistence on the statement on all
occasions of a syllogism that oneself supports indicates that
one believes in commonly appearing subjects, predicates,
reasons, examples, and so forth and thus implies that these inherently exist since the basic appearance to sense perception, for
instance, is not being challenged. This meets back to the assertion
that the object of negation in the view of selflessness, according
to Bhavaviveka, does not appear to sense consciousnesses
Notes
849
but according to Chandraklrti does. Through interpreting the
term svatantra in this way, it is not necessary immediately to
equate it with 'existing under the object's own power' or 'inherently existent'; rather, one should see inherent existence as an
implication of the insistence that a syllogism that oneself supports in one's own continuum be stated. To me, it seems that
Chandraklrti, in his long critique of Bhavaviveka, is surmising
that Bhavaviveka's insistence on finding a syllogism in Buddhapalita's refutation of production from self stems from the latter's
feeling that there are commonly appearing subjects and so
forth, and thus his syllogisms are bound by the context of such
insistence and all that it implies—commonly appearing subjects
and, thus, inherent existence.
In this way, the equation of 'autonomy' with 'inherent
existence' is not just on the basis of a flimsy reference to Amarasinha's lexicon (Jang, 325.10; GM, 229a.6; GT, ca 61a.3, rang
rgyud rang dbang bdag dbang 'Autonomy, own-power, [and] selfpower [have the same meaning].'), nor does one have to squeeze
Bhavaviveka's calling for a rang dbang du rjes su dpagpa (a selfpowered or autonomous inference) in his commentary on the
beginning of chapter thirteen of the Treatise as if this directly
indicates that Bhavaviveka himself asserts that 'autonomous'
means 'inherently existent' (GT, ca 61a.7 and Jang, 325.12: da
ni sun 'byin pa 'i lan btab pa dang rang dbang du rjes su dpag pa 'i
mthus 'du byed mams mam pa las ngo bo nyid medpa nyid bstan
pa'i don gyi dbang gis rab tu byed pa bcu gsum pa btsams so
'[Nagarjuna] composed the thirteenth chapter in order to teach
the non-entityness of compositional phenomena through the
force of giving answers to [others'] refutations and self-powered
[or autonomous] inferences.')
In short, Bhavaviveka never openly said that svatantra, autonomy, equals svabhava-siddhi, inherent existence. Rather, it
seems that in such a context he is saying that it is not sufficient
merely to refute another's position negatively—one must positively set forth one's own position. T h e implications of this, as
explained above, are that Bhavaviveka accepts a quality of
objects that appears in direct perception which Chandraklrti
refutes. T h e significance of Chandraklrti's identifying a subtler
object of negation and Bhavaviveka's confusing the existence of
an object with its inherent existence is perhaps more accessible
850
498
499
500
Meditation on Emptiness
when the route of the immediate equation of svatantra and
svabhava-siddhi is not taken.
Brackets are from Ann, dbu 58b. 1.
To speak of a 'thesis which is a position' might seem redundant
since position (paksha, phyogs) and thesis (pratijna, dam bca')
are often synonymous. However, according to Kensur Lekden,
a position of one of the extremes is non-existent because it is an
extreme, whereas an assertion or thesis of an extreme position
does exist.
P5246, Vol. 95 140.2.4, XVI.25. For Chandraklrti's commentary see P5266, Vol. 98, 279.2ff. T h i s is quoted by ChandrakTrti in his Clear Words following the last quote, P5260, Vol. 98
4.5.4 (the Buddhist Text Series Sanskrit is No. 10, 5.25; Poussin, 16.4).
According to Dzong-ka-ba (Ann, dbu 58b.2-59b.6), ChandrakTrti cites this passage in his Clear Words as a source showing
that it is unsuitable for a Madhyamika to assert autonomous
theses because existence in the four alternatives is refuted in
Madhyamika texts. Also, Dzong-ka-ba points out that in his
commentary on the Four Hundred ChandrakTrti says that this
passage indicates that censure cannot be expressed, even over a
long periodof time, to aproponent of emptiness; thus, this passage
certainly does not indicate that Madhyamikas have no assertions at all by way of suggesting that they do not even assert
emptiness. Also, ChandrakTrti cites the same passage in his own
Commentary on the 'Supplement' upon saying, 'This propounding of dualism is just unreasonable for proponents of imputed
existence (*prajnaptivadin, btagspar smra ba); therefore, Madhyamikas cannot be defeated in any way through refutations and
answers dependent on duality.' As Dzong-ka-ba says, '[This
passage] is cited [by ChandrakTrti] as a source showing that
those who assert imputed existence which negates substantial
existence in the sense of [the object's] being established by way
of its own entity cannot be refuted by Proponents of T r u e
Existence (*bhavavadin, dngos po yodpar smra ba) who assert
that [phenomena] are established by way of their own entities
and by the Proponents of No Things (*abhavavadin, dngos po
med par smra ba) who assert a negation of all capacity to perform functions in things such as forms. Therefore, it is not suitable as a source [showing that Madhyamikas] have no system.'
Notes
851
Based on Dzong-ka-ba, Nga-wang-bel-den goes on to identify
the four alternatives here as inherent existence, utter nonexistence, both, and a truly established category that is neither.
T h e fourth alternative is specified as 'truly established' since a
category that is composed of neither of the positions, that is,
that objects are neither inherently established nor utterly nonexistent is affirmed since objects do indeed exist conventionally.
Nga-wang-bel-den cites a passage from Dzong-ka-ba's 'Great
Exposition of Special Insight' in the Great Exposition of the
Stages of the Path that gives a slightly different version of the
four and sets forth the basic Ge-luk-ba perspective on the four
alternatives. With respect to the first alternative, he indicates
that things which are established by way of their own entities
are refuted whether these are asserted to be conventional or ultimate truths, whereas things that are able to perform functions
are not refuted conventionally (though indeed ultimately).
With respect to the second alternative, he says that non-things
(abhava, dngos med), that is to say, uncaused phenomena, are
refuted if they are asserted to be established by way of their own
entities (and not if they are only asserted to exist conventionally). Likewise, a combination of the two and a truly established
position that is neither are refuted. Dzong-ka-ba concludes, 'All
refutations of the four alternatives should be understood in this
way. If the four alternatives were refuted without affixing such
qualification, when [the first two alternatives, that is, that
something is] an existent thing (dngos po yod pa) and a nonthing (dngos po med pa) are refuted and then both are refuted
saying "not b o t h " , it would directly contradict one's own assertion to make the refutation, "not not b o t h " . If you [stupidly]
insist that despite this there is no fault, [I can only say,] "We do
not debate with the insane."'
In the earlier version, the four alternatives were:
1
2
3
inherent existence
utter non-existence
both
4
a truly established category that is neither.
Here the four are:
1
inherently existent thing
29 Meditation on Emptiness
2
3
4
inherently existent non-thing (that is, inherently existent
uncaused phenomenon)
both
a truly established category that is neither an inherently
existent thing nor an inherently existent non-thing.
In the first way, one would be considering whether something
like a chair is inherently existent, utterly non-existent, both, or
some inherently truly established possibility that is neither
inherently existent nor utterly non-existent, such'as that the
chair is inherently established as conventionally existent. In the
second way, one considers whether the chair is an inherently
existent thing, an inherently existent non-thing, both an inherently existent thing and an inherently existent non-thing, or
neither an inherently existent thing nor an inherently existent
non-thing within being inherently existent. In both cases, the
alternatives must be carefully qualified so that conventional
existence is not ruled out. T h e four alternatives, therefore, are
all-inclusive only in the sense of including all possibilities of
inherently existent phenomena—when these are refuted, it can
be decided that phenomena do not inherently exist. They do
not include all possibilities whatsoever. If one does not agree
that such qualification is needed upon being shown the selfcontradictions that are entailed without it, one is considered to
be beyond the pale of sensible discourse; as Dzong-ka-ba says,
'We do not debate with the insane.'
Nga-wang-bel-den identifies another interpretation of the
four alternatives by Dzong-ka-ba's student Kay-drup in his
Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate; there it is considered whether
a chair, for instance, is a truly established existent, a truly established non-existent, a truly established category that is both of
those, or a truly established category that is neither. This version is the most symmetrical in that all four alternatives are
considered as being qualified by true establishment or inherent
existence.
In this tradition of interpretation it is necessary to qualify the
first position as 'inherent existence' or 'true existence' because
it would be absurd to deny first that something exists and then
that the same thing does not exist, for the two are a dichotomy,
excluding any third possibility. (The reason why a third possibility of being both existent and non-existent is included is to
Notes
853
take account of philosophical systems that posit such and probably also to create a sense of the fullness of the refutation in the
meditator no matter how absurd the positions are.) T h u s ,
although it is denied that phenomena are inherently existent,
utterly non-existent, both existent and non-existent, or some
fourth possibility that is neither existent nor non-existent, phenomena are existent, that is to say, conventionally existent. All
possibilities of existence are not denied, only existence that
would be able to bear analysis by a reasoning consciousness,
and a reasoning consciousness analyzing the ultimate cannot
refute conventional existence as that is beyond its province.
A result of this qualification is that there seems to be a lack of
symmetry in the four positions; the fourth position, as given
above in the first two interpretations, is not simply a denial of a
combination of the first two. Although a third position which is
a combination of inherent existence and utter non-existence (or
inherently existent thing and inherently existent non-thing) is
suitable to be refuted, a fourth position which is a mere denial
of them is not, for phenomena are neither inherently existent
nor utterly non-existent since they are conventionally existent.
(Phenomena also are neither inherently existent things nor
inherently existent non-things because they are conventionally
existent things or non-things.) Once the fourth position is qualified as something inherently existent that is neither of those, it
is not a mere denial of a combination of the first two positions.
Through qualifying what is negated, the Ge-luk-ba interpreters maintain the commonsense notion that one cannot say that
something does not exist and then claim that it also is not nonexistent. In this system of interpretation the refutation of four
alternatives is not used to lift the mind to a different, nonconceptual level through shock (or perhaps confusion) but to
penetrate the nature of phenomena through a reasoned, conceptual process of refutation. When the negation of inherent existence is understood, one's understanding is non-conceptual in
the sense of not wandering among many conceptions but
remaining on one. T h e n , through combining that realization
with the force of calm abiding, the ability to remain onepointedly on emptiness is greatly enhanced, but still one needs
to alternate stabilizing and analytical meditation on emptiness
in order to induce special insight, which'in turn is deepened
854
501
Meditation on Emptiness
over the path of preparation, resulting in a totally non-conceptual
realization of emptiness on the path of seeing.
T h u s , even though it is sometimes disappointing to encounter the Ge-luk-bas' conceptual qualifications of scriptural passages that seem to lift one beyond conceptuality, it should not
be thought that somehow their systemization is intended to
intellectualize the profound to a stultifying degree. Rather, they
are seeking to put the intellect in its place, using it in a very profound way in a process leading to direct perception.
In this endeavor, Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations are
invaluable, as they reveal the systematic background of Jamyang-shay-ba's citations which, without this contextualization,
sometimes even seem to be proving the opposite of what he
intends. Until one understands that he intends his text as lecture notes for a teacher competent in Dzong-ka-ba's system,
many of his citations are baffling. Undoubtedly, Nga-wang-belden saw this need and provided the contextualization.
P5228, Vol. 95 15.1.1, stanza 29. T h i s is quoted in the Clear
Words immediately following the last quote, P5260, Vol. 98
4.5.4; Buddhist Text Series No. 10, 6.1; Poussin, 5.7. See K.
Bhattacharya's The Dialectical Method of Nagarjuna (Delhi:
Motilal, 1978), p.23. T h e brackets are from Ann, dbu 59a.6.
For contextualization of this quote see pp.471-3.
With respect to the definition of a Prasangika given just
below, it might be helpful to identify possible English translations for names of the schools of tenets:
Vaibhashika: Great Exposition School (so called because
they follow the text called The Great Exposition [Mahavibhasha])
Sautrantika: Sutra School (so called perhaps because of
their emphasis on sutra rather than on The Great Exposition)
Chittamatra: M i n d Only School (so called because they
propound that all phenomena are of the nature of the
mind)
Madhyamika: Middle Way School (so called because of
propounding a middle that is devoid of the extremes of
true existence and utter non-existence).
With respect to the major sub-divisions, there are:
Notes
855
the Sutra School Following Scripture (identified mainly
as followers of Vasubandhu),
the Sutra School Following Reasoning (identified as followers of Dignaga and Dharmakrrti),
the Mind Only School Following Scripture (these being
the followers of Asanga),
the Mind Only School Following Reasoning (these being
the Mind Only followers of Dignaga and Dharmakirti),
the Autonomous Middle Way School (SvatantrikaMadhyamika),
the Consequential Middle Way School (PrasahgikaMadhyamika).
As school names, the English is quite palatable, but to refer to
persons it is a bit more cumbersome though still manageable:
Vaibhashika: Proponent of the Great Exposition
Sautrantika: Proponent of Sutra
Proponent of Sutra Following Scripture
Proponent of Sutra Following Reasoning
Chittamatrin: Proponent of Mind-Only
Proponent of Mind-Only Following Scripture
Proponent of Mind-Only Following Reasoning
Madhyamika: Proponent of the Middle Way
Autonomist, Middle Way Autonomist
Consequentialist, Middle Way Consequentialist.
I feel that it is important gradually to get beyond the use of
Sanskrit terms whenever possible in order to lift Buddhist studies out of the arcane. There is no need to translate persons'
names, except perhaps in texts such as certain sutras where
some names have great meaning, but the translation of technical
terminology can be very helpful. With respect to this, I stand
directly opposed to the style of the great French Buddhologist,
Louis de La Vallee Poussin, though I do not criticize him for not
trying to do what I am. Scholars have different tastes and perceive
different needs, and the field is wide enough to accommodate
many different approaches. In other words, I disagree entirely
with those who call for only one style of translation.
As Nga-wang-bel-den says (Ann, dbu 59b.2), 'Since consequences must be stated on all [occasions of] generating inferences in
856
503
Meditation on Emptiness
others, they are of greater extent [or usage], but since otherapproved syllogisms do not have to be stated for certain disputants of sharp faculties, they are described as being of less
extent.'
T h e translation of the rest of this sentence and the next is
doubtful, for, more literally, Jam-yang-shay-ba seems to be
s a y i n g , ' . . . but they are not at all mutually exclusive. For, most
statements of other-approved [syllogisms] also appear to be
consequences.' T h e reason for preferring the other, more loose
translation is that consequences and other-approved syllogisms
are indeed mutually exclusive, that is, whatever is the one is not
the other. His point, rather, seems to be that an other-approved
syllogism can be seen as a consequence merely by switching the
format. Or he may be saying that both other-approved syllogisms and consequences are capable of generating an inferential
consciousness and thus in this sense are not mutually exclusive.
His example is a reference to Buddhapalita's refutation of the
Samkhya view of production from causes that are of the same
entity as the effect (see Part Five, chapters 2-5).
P5260, Vol. 98 10.3.1; Buddhist Text Series No. 10, 18.24;
Poussin, 54.11. This is quoted in GM, 282a.2 and in Dzongka-ba's Illumination, P6143, Vol. 154 37.5.3 and 38.3.2. T h e
second quote almost immediately follows the first one.
Since causes are not produced in dependence upon their own
effects, the meaning of 'mere conditionality' is not limited to
just the usual sense of pratyaya, condition assisting in production of an object, but refers to the condition or situation that
allows the positing of an object, whether that be its own basis of
designation or that in relation to which it is posited. A seed is
designated in dependence upon its basis of designation, the two
halves of the seed, as well as in dependence upon its presumed
effect, a sprout. That appearances are posited from the viewpoint of such conditionality 'when there is no analysis and no
investigation' does not mean that conventionalities are beyond
the sphere of analysis in the sense of the usual worldly investigation of an object to make sure it is there. In other words, conventional phenomena are not just figments ofthe imaginationor even
beyond the sphere oflogical reasoning in the sense of undergoing
investigation by reasoned analysis, for this is how a permanent
self and so forth are refuted. Rather, conventionalities cannot
Notes
857
withstand ultimate analysis, analysis into their mode of being,
such as investigation into whether the object is one with its
basis of designation or a different entity from its basis of designation.
504
P5431, Vol. 103 246.5.2. T h e Peking edition wrongly reads
stong pa gnyis instead of stong pa nyid. T h e brackets are from
Ann, dbu 59b.4-7, which confirms the latter reading as does
Jang, 409.10. Nga-wang-bel-den says that since Buddha's
teaching that all phenomena are selfless cannot be defeated by
any opponent, his teaching was proclaimed like the great roar of
a lion (whose roar no other animal dares to answer).
T h e Tibetan scholars with whom I have worked have identified Shura (dPa' bo) as Ashvaghosha. For references to controversy about this, see D.S. Ruegg's The Literature of the
Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India (Wiesbaden: Otto
Harrasowitz, 1981), 119-21.
Jam-yang-shay-ba uses this passage from Shura's Cultivation
of the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment to show that it is admissible to call Prasangikas Non-Abiding Madhyamikas and Thoroughly Non-Abiding Madhyamikas. Since Shura's mere
mention that the middle way does not abide in any of the
extremes does not establish that he used these terms as names
for the school, Jam-yang-shay-ba seems to be saying that these
are suitable names for Prasangika just because Prasangikas set
forth a middle way that does not abide in any of the extremes.
However, in that case it would be suitable to call Chittamatrins
Thoroughly Non-Abiding Madhyamikas as they also claim to
propound a middle way that does not abide in the extremes. In
other words, Jam-yang-shay-ba's evidence is scant.
His position is an attempt to clarify a point made in passing
by Dzong-ka-ba in the latter's Great and Middling Expositions of
the Stages of the Path. Dzong-ka-ba says that earlier Tibetans
mistakenly used the term 'Those Who Hold That Illusion is
Established by a Reasoning Consciousness' (sgyu ma rigs grub)
for Svatantrikas and the term 'Thoroughly Non-Abiding Madhyamikas' (rab tu mignaspa'i dbu ma pa) for Prasangikas' (Middling, 144a.2 in an unmarked edition of 263 folios). Here, Jamyang-shay-ba is trying to show that Dzong-ka-ba's objection
was not to the terms themselves but to the meaning assigned
these by earlier Tibetans. Jang-gya (290.6-12) agrees, citing this
858
505
Meditation on Emptiness
as the opinion of the great scholar and adept Nor-sang-gya-tso
(Nor-bzang-rgya-mtsho) and identifying him as using this quote
from Ashvaghosha for his source. However, other scholars such
as Nga-wang-bel-den hold that Dzong-ka-ba was refuting both
the meaning and the usage of the terms themselves.
Nga-wang-bel-den (Ann, dbu 59b.7-62a.l) gives a fascinating
rendition of the controversy and Sha-mar Gen-dun-den-dzingya-tso
(Zhwa-dmar dGe-bdun-bstan-'dzin-rgya-mtsho,
18521910) an even better one in his Lamp Illuminating the Profound Thought, Set Forth to Purify Forgetfulness of the Difficult
Points of (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great Exposition of Special Insight'
(IHag mthong chen mo'i dka'gnad mams brjed byang du bkodpa
dgongs zab snang ba'i sgron me, [Delhi: Mongolian Lama G u r u
Deva, 1972], 19.4-27.5). T h e extended attention that they give
to the topic is typical of the frequent emphasis on points made
only in passing in Dzong-ka-ba's writing. These become fascinating areas in which scholars try to apply the founder's principles of interpretation to specific problems, thereby coming to
know those principles better through putting them to creative
use. A result is that in literature purporting to be presenting
Dzong-ka-ba's established views, scholars such as Jam-yangshay-ba slip in what is clearly their own opinion on difficult
issues as if it were not a matter of controversy. This tradition is
maintained even in oral teaching nowadays by some Ge-luk-ba
scholars, who will sometimes present a controversial position as
if it is the only position on a topic. I have learned over the years
to presume controversy based on the fervor and amount of repetition of such topics. I do not mean this as a general indictment,
as these same scholars have displayed a remarkable ability on
other occasions to present many views on an issue. Rather, the
tendency to stone-wall probably comes from their long training
in debate, and the resorting to such on certain occasions may
simply depend on their mood. I try to get around the situation
by presenting positions and asking questions in a way that does
not polarize the issue.
In this paragraph Jam-yang-shay-ba paraphrases Dzong-ka-ba's
Essence of the Good Explanations, P6142, Vol. 153 185.4.4.
T h e word phyi mo (matrka) has the sense of a root text or
model. Nagarjuna, in his Precious Garland (stanza 394), uses
the term to refer to the model of an alphabet that a teacher
Notes
859
would first use in instructing his students. Although the term
also means 'grandmother', the translation of it as 'grandmother'
in this context seems a bit inappropriate.
506
507
508
509
510
A student of Chandraklrti, as identified in prayers of supplications.
P6142, Vol. 153 185.4.6ff. T h e quotation was lengthened by
including the second clause.
Nga-wang-bel-den (Ann, dbu 59.6) points out that Dzongka-ba's Quintessential Instructions on the King of Tantras, the
Glorious Guhyasamaja, Lamp Thoroughly Illuminating the Five
Stages (P6167, Vol. 158 179.3.7) says that it appears that
Nagarjuna, having completed the beginning of the second
chapter of The Five Stages (Panchakrama, P2667), had Shakyamitra complete the chapter.
As above, it is my practice to translate the titles of texts in
order to indicate the contents of the text; this, of course, does
not imply that the text has been translated. Major translations
are indicated in the Bibliography.
A commentarial tradition, reported by Geshe Gediin Lodro,
says that the second is Jnanagarbha although it also could be the
second Bhavaviveka, known as the lesser (chung ba) who is the
author of the MadhyamakaratnapradTpa (P5254) which is not
to be confused with the PrajnapradTpa (P5253) by the greater
Bhavaviveka, the founder of the Svatantrika system (see Jang,
283.11). Jnanagarbha is the more likely referent here because
his works are widely cited whereas the lesser Bhavaviveka's are
not.
P5431, Vol. 103 246.4.8. Kensur Lekden pointed out that the
general teaching is that phenomena are like illusions in that just
as the latter appear to be real but are not, so phenomena appear
to exist objectively but do not and that phenomena are like illusions and not just illusions because they can perform functions
whereas illusions cannot.
With respect to this particular quote, Dak-tsang himself
(204.1, T h i m p h u edition) says that this passage ' . . . indicates
that due to [holding that] illusions and so forth are established
[Svatantrikas] do not perceive the inexpressible M a n j u s h n . '
Jam-yang-shay-ba seems to be saying that for him this passage
does not refute Svatantrika at all. He also (GT, ca 77a. 1-4)
argues against Dak-tsang for holding that in Haribhadra's
860
511
Meditation on Emptiness
system ' . . . an ultimate reasoning consciousness of meditative
equipoise establishes [that phenomena are] like illusions and
goes on to say that all real conventionalities are established by
reasoning (rigs grub), meaning reasoning in general and not a
consciousness of meditative equipoise. Jam-yang-shay-ba
thereby suggests that it is suitable to call Svatantrikas sgyu ma
rigs grub, 'Those Holding That Illusory[-Like Phenomena] Are
Established By Reasoning' as long as one understands that it is
not a consciousness of meditative equipoise that establishes
phenomena as like illusions; however, since Prasangikas also
hold that conventionalities are established by valid cognition, it
is unclear why this is a particularly good name for Svatantrikas,
except perhaps that such is emphasized in their literature.
Nga-wang-bel-den (Ann, dbu 59b.7fT) seems to make the absurd
conclusion that Jam-yang-shay-ba agrees with Dak-tsang that
this passage does directly refute the Svatantrikas. In that case,
Jam-yang-shay-ba would be contradicting his own pronouncement that Ashvaghosha is a non-partisan Prasangika. T h e annotator may have missed the meaning of the hypothetical 'if in
Jam-yang-shay-ba's refutation of Dak-tsang.
Showing great independence and intellectual honesty, Ngawang-bel-den often disagrees with Jam-yang-shay-ba, presenting a carefully framed argument in great detail. In the Go-mang
College which uses Jam-yang-shay-ba's works as their basic
textbooks, Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations are sometimes described as 'not their own system' (rang lugs mayin) and denigrated as 'annotations [that point out only] mis-printings' (yig nor
mchan 'grel). For me, they are a necessary key to Jam-yangshay-ba's work through providing contextualization and giving
an example of rigorous, nonpartisan application of scholarly
principles. On this point, however, I do not think that the
evidence merits his criticism of Jam-yang-shay-ba.
In any case, it is abundantly clear that in Ge-luk-ba works
(except for Dzong-ka-ba's Golden Rosary, an early work which
presents the view that even in meditative equipoise phenomena
which are qualified by emptiness appear, this being dismissed
as not Dzong-ka-ba's final position) a reasoning consciousness
does not establish conventionalities as like illusions but only
establishes emptiness and that this holds true for both Madhyamika systems. When one rises from meditative equipoise on
Notes
512
513
861
emptiness, a wisdom consciousness subsequent to meditative
equipoise realizes illusory-like phenomena through the continued force of the earlier realization of emptiness and the appearance of conventional phenomena.
P6142, Vol. 153 185.4.6ff; the quote has been lengthened by
including the first clause. Shakyamitra, Nagabodhi, and Ashvaghosha were students of Nagarjuna according respectively to
Ann, dbu 59b.6, Obermiller's History of Buddhism by Bu-ston,
Vol. 2, p. 132, and Tu-gen, 15.16.
Dzong-ka-ba's statement that their books on Madhyamika
were not translated into Tibetan is challenged by a hypothetical objector. Jam-yang-shay-ba somewhat apologetically
explains that Dzong-ka-ba means that their philosophical
treatises on the Madhyamika view were not translated into
Tibetan, and Nga-wang-bel-den (Ann, dbu 62a. 1-3) explains
that although the t e x t ' . . . is a Madhyamika treatise, it is not a text
on the view from among the division into view, meditation,
and behavior.' We are to understand that Ashvaghosha's Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind of Enlightenment is a short meditation manual on emptiness according to the Madhyamika system
but not a philosophical treatise. Geshe Gediin Lodro explained
that this is similar to Nagarjuna's Collections of Praises (sTod
tshogs), his many praises of the mind vajra and so forth, not
being included among his Collections of Reasonings (Rigs
tshogs) even though they present emptiness by way of limitless
forms of reasoning. T h e premise is that Dzong-kaba's reading was so vast and his writing so free of internal contradictions that he neither could have missed nor could have
forgotten about Ashvagosha's text.
Kensur Lekden reported that there were still more of Ashvagosha's books in Tibetan than Dzong-ka-ba knew because the
Sa-gya-bas kept some translations of Ashvaghosha secret. Ngawang-bel-den (Ann, dbu, 62a. Iff) points out that some scholars
say that the author of this book had the same name as Shura but
was not the Shura, i.e., Ashvaghosha, who was contemporaneous with Nagarjuna. However, Jang-gya (409.13) dismisses the
idea as a proofless thesis and says that the great scholars all
consider the book to be reliably his.
For a discussion of works on practice ascribed to Ashvaghosha, Shura, and so forth see D.S. Ruegg's The Literature of
862
514
515
516
Meditation on Emptiness
the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India (Wiesbaden:
Otto Harrassowitz, 1981), pp.119-21.
T h e seventeen are six mother and eleven son sutras. According
to Kensur Lekden, mother sutras are so called because they
contain discussion of all eight 'clear realizations' (abhisamaya,
mngon rtogs) which are the subject matter of Maitreya's Ornament for Clear Realization. According to Dzong-ka-ba's Golden
Rosary (P6150, Vol. 154 200.3.6ff) the six are the One Hundred
Thousand, Twenty-Five Thousand, Eighteen Thousand, Ten
Thousand, Eight Thousand, and Condensed Perfection of Wisdom
Sutras, and the eleven are the Seven Hundred, Five Hundred,
Three Hundred, Fifty Stanza, One Hundred and Fifty Means,
Twenty-Five Doors, Questions of Suvikrantavikrami, Kaushika,
One Letter, Several Words, and Heart of Wisdom Perfection of
Wisdom Sutras. Dzong-ka-ba's opinion is stated by Kay-drup
who says (p.46), 'Our own system says that the mother and son
sutras are not limited to seventeen because there are many more
than that.' T h u s , Jam-yang-shay-ba's usage of the formula of
seventeen shows that in his opinion Dzong-ka-ba still approved
of the designation, though not of a strict determination, as
seventeen.
No one who can identify these has been found to date.
P5260, Vol. 98 92.2.1, Colophon, stanza 10a. For the Sanskrit
see J.W. de Jong's very helpful article on this Colophon, missing in Poussin's edition of ChandrakTrti's Clear Words, 'La
Madhyamakasastrastuti de CandrakTrti' in Oriens Extremus,
Jahrg. 9, 1962, pp.47-56 (reprinted in J. W. De Jong Buddhist
Studies, pp.541-50 [Rep. of China: Asian Humanities Press,
1979]). This and the next stanza are cited, in pieces, over the
next few pages; together, they read:
10 Having seen the Compendium of Sutra, the Precious Garland of Advice [for the King], the Praises, and with hard
work over a very long time the stanzas propounded in the
Treatise, the Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning, the Finely Woven,
the Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness, and the Refutation of
Objections,
11 And having seen the [Four] Hundred and so forth [by Aryadeva, etc.] and likewise many profound sutras as well as the
commentary done by Buddhapalita, I have gathered
Notes
863
together the good explanations of Bhavaviveka [and those
of these masters] which were transmitted from one to
another [and the texts of Shura, Jnanagarbha, etc.] as well
as what I received from [Nagarjuna's own] analysis [ of the
meaning of his words] and have expounded this in order to
please those of great intelligence.
T h e bracketed material in stanza 11 is from GT, ca 42a.3.
Those who do not say that Chandraklrti was an actual student
of Nagarjuna would not accept Jam-yang-shay-ba's interpretation that Chandraklrti is speaking of analysis gained from
Nagarjuna himself. Instead, they would say that it refers to
Chandraklrti's own analysis. If Chandraklrti is an actual
student of Nagarjuna, it seems strange that he speaks of Nagarjuna's teaching for a long time, his students' teaching for a long
time, and then (in stanza 7) Nagarjuna's teaching degenerating
over a long time to the point where Chandrakrrti needed to
compose his texts.
De Jong (p.549 of Buddhist Studies) takes s'ataka as being a
sutra ('Et apres avoir lu egalement ces nombreux sutra profonds
tels que le Sataka . . . ' ) , but Jam-yang-shay-ba's reading (GT, ca
42a.2) as Aryadeva's Four Hundred is more plausible especially
considering the dang in the Tibetan: rgyapa la sogs de dag dang
ni de bzhin....
517 P5260, Vol. 98 92.2.2.
518 P5260, Vol. 98 92.2.3.
519 This Tibetan translation of the title as dbU ma lag pa'i tshad
refers to a unit of measure from the elbow to the finger-tips, a
cubit, because, as was pointed out by Lati Rinbochay, the text
has twenty-four 'feet' (pada) and a cubit has twenty-four fingerwidths. Another Tibetan version of the title (Cha shas kyiyan
lag) means 'members which are parts', this tying in with the
presentation of the non-ultimate nature of phenomena through
analyzing their parts. T h e first version (P5248) has twenty-four
'feet', whereas the second (P5244) has twenty-eight.
520 P5260, Vol. 98 92.2.3. Brackets are from GT, ca 42a.3. See
n.516.
521 Dak-tsang asserts that one could first attain Buddhahood
through the Perfection Vehicle and then enter the Tantra
Vehicle, finally to become an unsurpassed Buddha of the
Tantra Vehicle. T h o u g h the Ge-luk-bas agree that in order to
864
Meditation on Emptiness
attain the final achievement one must enter the Tantra Vehicle,
they say that the Buddhahood explained in sutra is that explained
in tantra (see Dzong-ka-ba's explanation in Tantra in Tibet,
pp. 139-42). T h e y add that practice only of the Sutra Vehicle
yields only the tenth Bodhisattva ground, npt Buddhahood, for
which one must practice tantra, specifically Highest Yoga
Tantra. The point of difference between Dak-tsang and Jamyang-shay-ba is whether the Buddhahoods described in both
vehicles are the same. As a proof that they are, Jam-yang-shayba (GT, ca 58a.Iff) points to the fact that the sutras themselves
speak of a Buddha as having no inhalation and exhalation and
that the winds (prana, rlung) which are overcome through the
Tantra Vehicle cannot exist without breath.
522 Dzong-ka-ba quotes this in his Middling Exposition of the Stages
of the Path (73b.4 in the 1968 Shes rig par khang edition).
523 Colophon, stanza 6. P5260, Vol. 98 92.1.3. For Obermiller's
translation of this passage, see his History of Buddhism by Buston, II, p. 135. Saraha is identified as Rahulabhadra in Taranatha's History of Buddhism in India (Varanasi: 1964), p.67.
For the Sanskrit, see n.516.
524 P5260, Vol. 98 92.1.6; Colophon, 7.
525 See n.244.
526 According to Geshe L h u n d u p Sopa, the three vows of Bodhisattvas are not actually separate vows but modes of the Bodhisattva vow. T h e y are the ethics of restraining bad deeds, the
ethics which are the composite of virtuous practices, and the
ethics of aiding the aims of sentient beings.
527 According to Kensur Lekden, this does not mean that there are
bad parts in Atlsha's works; rather, Atisha tends to follow the
Yogachara-Svatantrika-Madhyamikas with respect to the path,
their description being renowned as the general Mahayana
explanation.
528 P5260, Vol. 98 7.5._7ff; Poussin, 40.7-2.8. This is partially
quoted by Dzong-ka-ba in his Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation
of (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way' (P6153, Vol. 156
64.2.3).
Interpretation is not limited to scripture as it also applies to
objects. T h e interpretation or hermeneutic of scripture is called
rjod byed drang nges, literally, 'the interpretable and the definitive with respect to means of expression', and the hermeneutic
Notes
865
of objects is called brjod bya 'i drang nges, literally, 'the interpretable and the definitive with respect to objects of
expression'. 'Objects of expression' means objects such as
tables, chairs, bodies, emptinesses, and so forth whch are the
objects or referents of words (means of expression) such as
'table', 'chair', 'body', 'emptiness', and so forth. (From this it is
clear that referential language is not the object of negation by
Madhyamika reasoning.)
In Madhyamika the division of scriptures into the two categories of the interpretable and definitive is made based on the
school's estimation of what final reality is, what the school's
interpretation of emptiness is. It is a task of interpretation to
determine why Buddha taught the non-definitive in terms of
the need, or existential situation, of the listener. T h u s , the
hermeneutic is ontologically based within being inextricably
involved with consideration of the levels of trainees.
With respect to the two classes of objects, emptinesses are
definitive in that they are the final mode of subsistence of
objects whereas conventional phenomena are in need of interpretation to determine their final mode of subsistence. T h u s , a
basic task of all beings is to interpret appearances—to recognize
that what is appearing is not the final mode of being of those
objects and to seek that final nature, not to obliterate the appearance of the object but to know its inner nature and thereby be
better able to respond with respect to it.
529 T h e term bhagavan was translated into Tibetan most frequently as bcom Idan 'das, the first two syllables meaning
'possessing conquest' and the last syllable meaning 'supramundane' ('jig rten las 'daspa), having been added (according to
Kensur Lekden and so forth) to distinguish the Buddhist bhagavan from the non-Buddhist. T h e term is also recognized as
meaning skal Idan, Fortunate One (or Blessed One as it is
usually translated) because of possessing six fortunes. However, since the dominant translation into Tibetan is bcom Idan
'das, I am translating it into English with 'Supramundane Victor'.
530 Missing in the Tibetan.
531 T h e plaintain tree. I assume this to be referring to the trunk of
the tree which, much like an onion, has no core. However, Kensur Yeshe T h u p t e n of Lo-sel4ing College takes it as referring to
866
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
Meditation on Emptiness
the fact that such trees bear fruit only once and are useless
thereafter.
Poussin (p.41, n.8) says that these lines are cited in the
Samyuttanikaya III. 142.
Translation follows the Tibetan.
P5224, Vol. 95 3.1.3, 1.1. This is quoted in brief by Chandrakrrti (P5260, Vol. 98 8.1.7; Poussin, 42.9).
T h e following three quotes are from the Treatise on the Middle
Way (XIII.1, X I . l , and XV.7). T h e y are cited by ChandrakTrti in his Clear Words (P5260, Vol. 98 8.1.8fT; Poussin,
42.10).
T h e bracketed additions in this stanza are from Dzong-ka-ba's
Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on
the Middle Way', 232.2ff, Varanasi 1973 edition.
P5263, Vol. 98 43.5.7; Poussin, 270.3.
P842, Vol. 34 64.3.6ff. This citation and that in Jang (3\3.lift)
agree, but they differ from that in the Clear Words (P5260, Vol.
98 8.2.2; Poussin, 43.4). T h e Peking edition of it is a combination of both.
P842, Vol. 34 64.4.2; see previous note. Brackets are from
Jang, 315.17. Jang-gya (316.1) points out that the long list of
synonyms of self refers also to the instruments and objects
related to the agent, the person. Geshe Gediin Lodro said that
though the addition of 'inherently existent' in brackets to
'owner' is appropriate, it is not necessary because the word
'self carries with it the force of inherent existence. He added
that this still does not mean that all instances of the word 'self
mean either 'inherent existence' or 'inherently existent person',
since it often refers to a nominally existent person. Even a
Buddha is a person, self, and I, but he speaks of his 'self based
on a valid consciousness which perceives a nominally existent
self. His words are not based on a false view of a self as existing
inherently in its basis of imputation.
Nga-wang-bel-den (Ann, dbu 62a.3) finds this paragraph inexplicable; however, Geshe Gediin Lodro explained it as ifwithout
problem. His commentary with the original underlined is:
dgongs gzhi gnas lugs kyi don ni bstan tshul de las gzhan du 'dren_
pa la dpe yodkyang (cing) de dag dgos pa 'i sgo nas drang don du
'grel tshul te drang don gyi mdo sde phal cher la de Itar dgos_
Notes
867
shing brjod bya'i sgo nas drang don du 'grel tshul ni btags don
btsal na mi rnyed pa sogs kyi rigs pas gnod ...
In any case, a passage is said to require interpretation due to
having three factors:
a basis in Buddha's thought (dgongs gzhi): this is not
Buddha's intention or purpose in teaching, for example, a
mind-basis-of-all but the ontological basis in his own
thought, which in this case is emptiness
a purpose
providing
effects for
stand such
(dgos pa): the pedagogical intention, such as
a means for the connection of actions and
those who temporarily are unable to underwithin the context of mere nominal existence
damage to the literal teaching (dngos la gnod byed): contradiction of that teaching by reasoning and scripture. Even
in the case of literally acceptable teachings such as those
of the five aggregates, if one took such to be the final
mode of subsistence of the phenomena discussed, this
would be contradicted by the reasonings proving emptiness and scriptures on emptiness.
540
541
542
543
544
545
Jam-yang-shay-ba is working around this format with the addition of examples that contradict the explicit teaching.
Jang, 317.4.
P795, Vol. 31 281.1.5, VII.5. This is quoted in the Clear Words
(P5260, Vol. 98 8.2.8; Poussin, 44.1).
P763, Vol. 27 238.5.6, chapter 25; Buddhist Sanskrit Texts
No. 1, 286.10. Translation follows the Tibetan. T h e Peking
edition reads rdul bral.
Here svabhava-asiddha is interpreted as meaning svalakshanaasiddha because the Chittamatrins assert that imaginary phenomena are svabhavasiddha but not svalakshanasiddha according
to Gon, 46.7 and 48.8. Thus, 'inherently' in the next sentence
means 'by way of the object's own character'.
P160, Vol. 6 166.2.2.
P5262, Vol. 98 103.3.3, VI.95cd; Poussin's translation is
Museon, n.s. v. 12, p.250. See GM, 459a.6ff, and Jay-dzun Chogyi-gyel-tsen's Par-chin, 149.6 (Indian edition, no pub. data).
The penetrating debates of the monastic courtyards are a cause
868
Meditation on Emptiness
of critical scholarship and a key to Jam-yang-shay-ba's style. As
is the case here, he often introduces a topic, such as the four or
five sutras requiring interpretation, not with a general presentation but with a rejection of an 'incorrect' interpretation of a
minor point. He reports that some say that the number of passages which ChandrakTrti said were to be interpreted are just
four. Jam-yang-shay-ba corrects this, pointing out that ChandrakTrti is referring to four types of passages because these four
teachings were framed in many, many different ways. As sources for these four ChandrakTrti refers only to the Sutra Unravelling the Thought, but Jam-yang-shay-ba includes other sutras of
similar type, the Descent into Lanka Sutra, the Sutra on the
Heavily Adorned, etc., without specifying that these are included by implication.
Without a word of explanation, Jam-yang-shay-ba includes a
fifth type of passage among those which require interpretation,
the teaching of a Tathagata essence (Tathagatagarbha) as in the
Tathagata Essence Sutra. In GM (459a.6ff), however, he
defends the number five, saying that ChandrakTrti was not
necessarily referring only to sutras accepted as literal by the
Chittamatrins. Still, Nga-wang-bel-den (Ann, dbu 63a.5fl) disagrees, citing Dzong-ka-ba who indicates that the passages
referred to by ChandrakTrti are all taken literally by the Chittamatrins, and thus there are only four since they do not take the
teaching of a permanent Tathagata essence literally.
About the translation of Madhyamakavatara as Supplement
to (Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle Way', see pp.399-405.
Kensur Lekden was adamant about taking avatara ('jug pa) as
'add on' (snon pa) rather than 'introduce'. He based this on
statements by Dzong-ka-ba and Jam-yang-shay-ba that ChandrakTrti was 'filling in gaps' (kha skong ba); however, the matter
is not easily settled since the evidence seems to go both ways.
Let us first cite Dzong-ka-ba's explanation in my Compassion in
Tibetan Buddhism (pp.97-9), removing the bias of the translation by adding in 'introduce' at every occurrence of 'supplement':
Question: How does ChandrakTrti's text supplement/
introduce Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way?
A nswer: One person [Jaya-ananda] says that in Nagarjuna's
Notes
869
Treatise conventional and ultimate natures are not taught
extensively, but that Chandraklrti teaches these two
extensively here and in this way supplements/introduces
Nagarjuna's Treatise.
T h i s is not a good explanation because the forms of
reasoning ascertaining suchness are far more extensive in
Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way than in ChandrakTrti's Supplement/Introduction. Our own system on this
is that Chandraklrti supplements/introduces Nagarjuna's
Treatise in two ways, from the viewpoints of the profound and of the v a s t . . . . Therefore, one way in which
this book supplements/introduces the Treatise is through
good determination of the meaning of the Treatise from
the viewpoint of these two purposes [distinguishing the
suchness of the Treatise from the interpretations by Svatantrikas and by Chittamatrins].
It also supplements/introduces the Treatise from the
viewpoint of the v a s t . . . . T h u s , [ChandrakTrti thought
that] it would be very good to fill in the gaps in the paths
explained in the Treatise on the Middle Way
the
second way that this text supplements/introduces Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way is in supplementing/
introducing the paths of the Treatise from the viewpoint
of the vast.
There is no question that ChandrakTrti's text serves to introduce Nagarjuna's Treatise; the question is whether this is the
meaning of his title. Jaya-ananda, author of the only extant
Indian commentary on this text, sees the mode of its being an
avatara as more extensive teaching. At first impression it might
seem unsuitable for an introduction to be longer than what it
introduces, but given the complexity of Nagarjuna's text, it
makes sense that the introduction be longer than the text. What
'extensive' means, however, becomes an issue; Dzong-ka-ba
refutes Jaya-ananda on the grounds that the Treatise, though
shorter, is more extensive than Chandrakrrti's text in terms of
presenting emptiness from many, many viewpoints. It would
seem however, that Jaya-ananda was thinking of 'extensive' as
meaning 'longer' and that he needed correction on just that
point. Given that either an introduction or a supplement could
870
Meditation on Emptiness
be more extensive than the actual text—either in the sense of
length or complexity—we need another avenue of examination.
Tibetan scholars who hold that 'jug pa means 'introduction'
assert that the agent, the 'jugpapo, is the trainee and the means,
ChandrakTrti's text. They mean not that the introducer is the
student reading the text but that the enterer is the student, this
being by means of ChandrakTrti's text, and that the entered ('jug
bya) is Nagarjuna's Treatise. Within the Ge-luk-ba tradition of
the large monastic colleges, there is no question that what is
entered or added onto is Nagarjuna's Treatise, but the question
of the agent is by no means easy. On one side are these points:
1
2
Despite much discussion about the 'special trainees of the
Madhyamakavatara' ('jug pa'i ched du bya ba'i gdul bya)
there is no mention of this topic in connection with the title.
One would think that if the agent, the enterer, were the
student reading the text, a discussion of who this student is
would ensue here, but it does not.
There are several statements by both Jaya-ananda and Jamyang-shay-ba in which the enterer/supplementer can only
be interpreted as ChandrakTrti or his text. Jaya-ananda says:
bstan bcos 'di de la 'jugpar 'gyur ba'o (GM, 6a.3) and bstan
bcos 'di de la 'jugpa'o' (GM, 6b.3), 'This treatise [by ChandrakTrti] supplements/introduces that [one by Nagarjuna].'
Since bstan bcos 'di is in the nominative and not the instrumental case, there is no way to read the sentence as meaning
'a trainee enters that [text by Nagarjuna] through this treatise [by ChandrakTrti].'
3
Dzong-ka-ba does not refute Jaya-ananda on this point, and
he would if he disagreed, given his frequent refutations of
him and the importance of the point.
On the other side is a remark by Dzong-ka-ba: GM, 1 la.2, de'i
phyir gzhung 'di la rten nas dgos pa de gnyis kyi sgo nas rtsa she 'i
don legs par ngespa ni gzhung 'dis dbu ma la 'jug pa'i tshul gcig go.
This was given above as: 'Therefore, one way in which this
book supplements/introduces the Treatise is through good
Notes
871
determination of the meaning of the Treatise from the viewpoint of these two purposes [distinguishing the suchness of the
Treatise from the interpretations by Svatantrikas and by Chittamatrins].' However, it could also be translated as: 'Therefore,
one way in which [a trainee] enters the Treatise through this
book is to determine the meaning . . . ' Furthermore, Jam-yangshay-ba (GM, 10b.5) calls such ascertainment the 'measure of
having entered [or having been introduced to] Nagarjuna's
Treatise by way of this [book by Chandraklrti]' (nges pa de 'di'i
sgo nas rtsa shes la zhugs pa'i tshadyin). There is no way that
this last statement can be construed as not referring to a person,
a trainee, and thus the enterer here is clearly the trainee.
As there is undeniable evidence on both sides, we can conclude that the term avatara in this title has both meanings—as a
supplement filling in holes and as a means of entry. I find the
former to be predominant in the scholastic literature and thus
have chosen 'Supplement', within admitting that the text certainly serves to introduce Nagarjuna's text and that even the
title is sometimes taken as referring to a trainee's being introduced to the Treatise.
546 T h e fifth chapter is one, but the other was not located.
547 P6143, Vol. 154 74.5.2.
548 Ann, dbu 62a.4ff. This differs some from the citation by Ratnakarashanti in his Commentary on (Nagarjuna's) 'Compendium of
Sutra', P5331, Vol. 102 151.4.8ff.
549 P774, Vol. 29 10.4.5, chap. 7. Brackets are from the sutra itself,
just preceding the quote.
550 Brackets are from Ann, dbu 62a.6.
551 P731, Vol. 18 198.1.8, chapter 14. T h e same passage also
occurs in the. Eighteen Thousand Stanza (P732, Vol. 19297.1.6,
chapter 22) and is quoted in Nagarjuna's Compendium of Sutra
(P5330, Vol. 102 101.4.2). Brackets accord with the Chittamatra interpretation. For the fuller quote see p. 606.
552 P744, Vol. 29 10.4.7, chapter 7.
553 P744, Vol. 29 10.4.8, chapter 7. T h e bracketed material is from
Ann, dbu 62a.8. With respect to the translation of arhat or arhan
(dgra bcom pa) as 'Foe Destroyer', I do this to accord with the
usual Tibetan translation of the term and to assist in capturing the
872
Meditation on Emptiness
flavor of an oral tradition that frequently refers to this
etymology. Arhats have overcome the foe which is the afflictions (klesha, nyon mongs), the chief of which is ignorance, the
conception (according to the Prasarigika system) that persons
and phenomena are established by way of their own character.
T h e Tibetan translators were also aware of the etymology of
arhat as 'worthy one' as they translated the name of the
'founder' of the Jaina system, Arhat, as mchod 'od 'Worthy of
Worship' (see GT, ka 62a.3). Also, they were aware of ChandrakTrti's gloss of the term as 'Worthy One' in his Clear Words:
sadevamanushasural
lokat
punarhatvad
arhannityuchyate
(Poussin, 486.5), lha dang mi dang lha ma yin du bcas pa'i 'jig
rten gyis mchod par 'os pas dgra bcom pa zhes brjod la (409.20,
Tibetan Cultural Printing Press edition; also, P5260, Vol. 98
75.2.2), 'Because of being worthy of worship by the world of
gods, humans, and demi-gods, they are called Arhats.' T h u s ,
we are not dealing with an ignorant misconception of a term,
but a considered preference in the face of alternative etymologies—'Foe Destroyer' requiring a not unusual i infix to make
ari-han. Unfortunately, one word in English cannot convey
both meanings; thus, I have gone With what clearly has become
the predominant meaning in Tibet. (For an excellent discussion of the two etymologies of Arhat in Buddhism and Jainism,
see L . M . Joshi's 'Facets of Jaina Religiousness in a Comparative Light', L . D . Series 85, [Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of
Indology, May 1981], pp.53-8.)
It has been objected that 'Foe Destroyer' is offensively militaristic and that in communicating Buddhism to the West we
need to choose terms more suited to our culture. However, we
speak of the 'war on poverty', the 'war on smallpox', and so
forth. Also, as a translator, one's job is to communicate another
culture on its own terms as well as one can, after which readers
can pick and choose what is appropriate in their situation.
A more serious objection is to the basic concept of treating
one's own afflictive attitudes and emotions in an anthropomorphic way as if they were other people. (Shantideva prescribes
such in his Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds when he
addresses his own afflictions as if they were someone else.) T h e
objection is that using such a bifurcating technique rules out
watching the luminous and knowing nature (gsal rig gi rang
Notes
873
bzhin) of a diseased state of mind as a means of causing it to disappear, this requiring intimate closeness with one's own afflictions. However, treating one's own afflictions as foes seems
concordant even with this technique in that it introduces the
possibility of not identifying with those afflictions and thus the
possibility of their disappearance.
A suggested substitute translation is 'saint'; however, one
would not want to limit the main use of the word 'saint' to
Hfnayana. 'Saint' seems more appropriate for arya 'Superior'.
Translation equivalents are by no means easy to come by;
accessibility is very important, but rich meaning after becoming accustomed to terms is also important. Still, I do not deny
that 'Foe Destroyer' is, at first, awkward.
554 P5330, Vol. 102 101.2.3ff. White Lotus of the Excellent Doctrine
Sutra, P781, Vol. 30 10.1.5, chapter 2. Nagarjuna has abridged
it considerably but fairly. Bracketed material is from Ratnakarashanti (P5331, Vol. 102 150.2.8fl). See Hurvitz's translation
in the Scripture of the Lotus Blossom of the Fine Dharma,
pp.30-1.
555 Chapters 2, 3, etc. according to E. Obermiller's ' T h e Doctrine
of the Prajna-paramita as exposed in the Abhisamayalamkara of
Maitreya', Acta Orientalia (Lugduni Batavorum: E.J. Brill,
1932), p.30.
556 P5330, Vol. 102 101.3.8ff. T h e sutra is the SatyakasatyakTparivarta which is not listed in the Peking catalogue but which
is mentioned in Haribhadra's Abhisamaya-aloka according to
Obermiller, IBID, note on p.30. T h e next two bracketed additions are from Ratnakarashanti (P5331, Vol. 102 151.2.7ff).
557 T h e translation of dharmadhatu as 'element of qualities' is
based on a note by Nga-wang-bel-den (Ann, dbu 8b.8): khyod la
dm igs nas sgom pas 'phags chos kyi rgyu byed pas chos dbyings zhes
bya la 'It is called the element of qualities (dharmadhatu, chos
dbyings) because meditation within observing it acts as a cause
of the qualities (dharma, chos) of Superiors (Arya, 'Phags pa).'
Emptiness, being uncaused, is not itself a cause (element), but
meditation on it causes the development of marvelous qualities;
thus, emptiness comes to be called a cause, an element producing those qualities.
558 P5330, Vol. 102 101.3.8ff. The original is P731, Vol. 18
198.1.7ff, chapter 14, and P732, Vol. 19 297.1.6. For Conze's
874
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
Meditation on Emptiness
translation, see p.205 of The Large Sutra, Part II (College Printing and Typing Co., 1964). Brackets accord with the Prasangika interpretation. For Gyel-tsap's commentary, see 145a. 1 of
the Indian folio edition of his Ornament for the Essence.
Source for this and the next set of brackets is Ann, dbu 62a.5.
P5330, Vol. 102 101.4.4ff. Questions of King Dharamshvara
Sutra, P814, Vol. 32 300.5.4ff. Nagarjuna's version is considerably abridged. First brackets are from Ratnakarashanti (P5331,
Vol. 102 151.3.1).
Ratnakarashanti, P5331, Vol. 102 151.4.6.
P5330, Vol. 102 101.5.6. Irreversible Wheel Sutra, P906, Vol.
36 105.3.2ff. Nagarjuna's abridgement is very slight.
T h e five ruinations are decrease of lifespan, degeneration of
views, degeneration of the afflictions, degeneration of beings
(for example, more difficult to tame), and degenerate era,
according to Das's Tibetan-English Dictionary, p.501.
P5330, Vol. 102 102.1.2. For the first part of the original see
P760.48, Vol. 24 255.5.3 or 255.5.6 or 255.5.8 or 256.1.3. The
second part is 258.1.4. The abridgement is considerable. See the
translation by A. Wayman and H. Wayman, The Lion's Roar of
Queen SrTmdld(New York: Columbia, 1974), pp.81-92.
P760.48, Vol. 24 255.5.Iff. See The Lion's Roar (op. cit.),
pp.80ff.
P5330, Vol. 102 1 0 2 . 1 . D e s c e n t into Lanka Sutra, Til5, Vol. .
29 50.2.4ff. Brackets are from Jnanashffbhadra's Commentary on
the 'Descent into Lanka', P5519, Vol. 107 130.3.2, and
Ratnakarashanti, P5331, Vol. 102 152.1.6. Suzuki's translation
is p.l 16.
P775, Vol. 29 37.3.8 and 50.3.2. Suzuki's translation is p.58
and p. 116 (210). For commentary on the second citation, see
Jnanashrrbhadra, P5519, Vol. 107 130.5.8ff.
This quote was not found in the sutra.
P5262, Vol. 98 103.3.3, VI.95cd.
P5263, Vol. 98 136.1.Iff, commenting on VI.95cd; Poussin's
translation is Muse'on, n.s. v. 12, p.250.
P774, Vol. 29 8.2.2, chapter 5.
P775, Vol. 29 34.3.5, chapter 2. Suzuki's translation is p.44
(123).
P775, Vol. 29 39.5.2, chapter 2. See Jnanashrrbhadra, P5519,
Vol. 107 112.3.7. Suzuki's translation is p.68.
Notes
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
875
P761.31, Vol. 25 263.3.8, chapter 6. This is quoted in the
Commentary on the 'Supplement', P5263, Vol. 98 134.1.5, and
in Dzong-ka-ba's Essence, P6142, Vol. 153 196.2.6 as well as in
his Illumination, P6143, Vol. 154 71.5.8.
P5262, Vol. 98 103.1.8, VI.84; Poussin's translation is Muse'on,
n.s. v.12, p.239. Brackets are from his own commentary (P5263,
Vol. 98 134.1.2).
P775, Vol. 29 40.2.6, chapter 2; Suzuki's translation is p.70
(139). See JnanashrFbhadra (P5519, Vol. 107 114.1.6) and
Jnanavajra (P5520, Vol. 107 247.2.4). This is quoted in Commentary on the 'Supplement' (P5263, Vol. 98 134.2.3).
Ann, dbu 65a.8, which is based on Commentary on the 'Supplement' (P5263, Vol. 98 134.3.8).
P761.31, Vol. 25 263.5.6.
P775, Vol. 29 53.4.2, chapter 3; Suzuki's translation is p. 133
(33). See JnanashrTbhadra, P5519, Vol. 107 138.1.8. T h e
bracketed material is from Ann, dngos 104a.8ff.
P5225, Vol. 95 11.5.3. T h e 'basis in Buddha's thought' (dgongs
gzhi) is not Buddha's intention or purpose in teaching mind-only
but the basis in fact that he was working from. According to the
Prasangika system, external objects exist; therefore, the teaching
of mind-only meaning no external objects is not founded itselfin
fact. But on what fact is it founded—what was the basis in
Buddha's thought? According to Nga-wang-bel-den (Ann, dbu
65b.6-6a.2), it was founded on the fact that phenomena are designated by way of their aspect or image (mam pa) being posited in
the consciousness observing them, and in this sense the elements
and so forth are said in Nagarjuna's Sixty Stanzas of Reasoningto
be included in consciousness, for they are only posited by consciousness. With this as the ontological basis in his own thought,
Buddha taught that all phenomena are mind-only, intending to
communicate that there are no external objects to those temporarily unable to realize this deeper fact. Hence, the thought of the
speaker (gsung ba po'i dgongs pa) and the thought of what he said
(gsung rab kyi dgongs pa) differ, as he was not, at that time, communicating his own deeper understanding.
A point to be gleaned from this type of explanation (as found
in Dzong-ka-ba's Essence of the Good Explanations) is that
according to this school of thought Buddha spoke from a basis
of specific understanding; his skill in means wrought changes
876
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
Meditation on Emptiness
in what he said according to his audience, but it is not that there
was no basis in his own thought. T h u s , his word needs to be
interpreted in terms of both the needs of the listener and his
own grounding in actual fact. When the existential need of the
trainee was at odds with the ontological fact, his teaching is
subject to refutation by scripture and reasoning. T h u s , the
interpretation of scripture revolves around the triad mentioned
above—the basis in Buddha's thought (or the ontological fact),
the purpose (or existential need of the trainee), and damage to
the explicit teaching (or refutation by valid sources of knowledge).
P2665, Vol. 61 285.5.6. Gon-chok-den-bay-dron-may (.Explanation., 6a.5) says, 'This book is called Essay on the Mind of
Enlightenment because it explains the meaning of a stanza on
the mind of enlightenment spoken by Vairochana in the second
chapter of the Guhyasamaja.'
P5658, Vol. 129 181.2.2, stanzas 394-6. Brackets are f r o m ^ n w ,
stod 26a.5ff. This is quoted in ChandrakTrti's Clear Words in
commentary on XVIII.6; Poussin, p.359.
P5262, Vol. 19 103.3.2, VI.94; Poussin's translation is Museon,
n.s. v.12, p.249.
P775, Vol. 29 39.5.5ff, chapter 2. Suzuki's translation is p.68.
T h i s is quoted in Commentary on the 'Supplement '(P5263, Vol.
98 136.1.4ff). Brackets are from Jnanavajra (P5520, Vol. 107
246.4.4).
P5262, Vol. 98 102.2.6, VI.43; Poussin's translation is Museon,
n.s. v.l 1, p.322. Commentary is P5263, Vol. 98 127.2.4fF. See
Dzong-ka-ba, P6143, Vol. 154 55.5.8. T h i s quote has its own
history of disputation because in the Ge-luk-ba interpretation
of the Prasangika system the self and the aggregates are asserted
to exist conventionally whereas the basis-of-all does not exist in
any way whatsoever and yet the three are treated similarly here
without seeming to give the self and the aggregates any status
which the basis-of-all does not have.
P778, Vol. 29 152.2.1.
P5263, Vol. 98 127.1.8ff, commenting on VI.42; Poussin's
translation is Museon, n.s. v . l l , p.321. See Dzong-ka-ba,
P6143, Vol. 154 55.5.Iff.
P5262, Vol. 98 103.3.4ff, VI.97; Poussin's translation is
Museon, n.s. v. 12, p.253. Brackets are from Commentary on the
Notes
589
590
591
592
877
'Supplement' (P.5263, Vol. 98 136.3.8ff, and Ann (dbu
66b.4fi).
P731, Vol. 19 189.2.1. This is quoted in Dzong-ka-ba's Essence
(P6142, Vol. 153 203.5.8).
P5263, Vol. 98 136.4.7ff, commenting on VI.97; Poussin's
translation is Museon, n.s. v. 12, p.255. This is quoted in
Dzong-ka-ba's Illumination (P6143, Vol. 154 76.3.6ff) and
Essence (P6142, Vol. 153 204.5.3fl). See Ann, dbu 66b.6ff, and
GM, 464a.2ff. Brackets are from Dzong-ka-ba's Illumination.
Treatise, XV.2cd.
P731, Vol. 19 190.2.8ff. Brackets are mostly from GM,
462a.4ff. This is discussed in Dzong-ka-ba's Essence of the Good
Explanations, P6142, Vol. 153 203.4.6. In GM (461b.5-2b.3),
Jam-yang-shay-ba identifies the qualm behind Dzong-ka-ba's
consideration of this quote as someone's thinking that it is
unsuitable to identify the three natures taught in the Sutra
Unravelling the Thought as requiring interpretation because (1)
this chapter of the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of
Wisdom Sutra presents the three natures and (2) these are
asserted by Ratnakarashanti in accordance with the Chittamatrin presentation. In response, Jam-yang-shay-ba explains that
this chapter presents the three natures in a different way from
the Sutra Unravelling the Thought and that Ratnakarashanti is
not to be followed here. This is because the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra speaks of all phenomena
as not existing ultimately and only existing conventionally
whereas the Chittamatrins say that other-powered phenomena
and thoroughly established phenomena ultimately exist
whereas imaginary or imputational phenomena do not.
Though it might seem that the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza
Perfection of Wisdom Sutra makes a differentiation of status
among phenomena like that of the Sutra Unravelling the Thought
when it says that imagined forms (imaginaries) do not substantially exist whereas imputed forms (other-powered phenomena)
do, 'imagined forms' here refer to the ultimate existence imagined of forms which does not exist at all and 'imputed forms'
refer to forms themselves which exist conventionally and thus it
can be understood that 'substantial existence' here just means
existence, not ultimate existence. Ratnakarashanti is faulted for
not having taken the context of the sutra into proper account.
878
55 Meditation on Emptiness
Therefore, since the necessarily correct presentation of the
three natures in the Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of
Wisdom Sutra is different from that in the Sutra Unravelling the
Thought, the latter is suitable to require interpretation.
593 P731, Vol. 19 190.1.2ff. This is quoted in Dzong-ka-ba's
Essence, P6142, Vol. 153 204.3.8, from which the bracketed
material is taken.
594 P6142, Vol. 153 205.1.7.
595 GM, 461b.1.
596 See n.574.
597 Dzong-ka-ba (Illumination, P6143, Vol. 154 56.2.7) identifies
the quote as the Mahayana-abhidharmasutra which is cited in
Asartga's Compendium of the Mahayana as a source for the
mind-basis-of-all and in Asanga's commentary on Maitreya's
Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle as a source for the
Buddha nature. See E. Lamotte, Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques, troisieme volume (1934-5), p. 171 n.3.
598 GM, 461b.4.
599 P5658, Vol. 129 175.2.6, stanza 99. Brackets are from Ann,
dbu 67a. 1. Dzong-ka-ba quotes this in his Illumination, (P6143,
Vol. 154 33.1.7).
600 P5246, Vol. 95 136.2.1, VIII.3. Brackets are from Chandrakrrti's commentary (P5266, Vol. 98 229.5.3). Dzong-ka-ba
quotes this in his Illumination (P6143, Vol. 154 32.4.2). Gyeltsap quotes this and the next citation in his commentary on the
Precious Garland (edition of 78 folios in library of H . H . Dalai
Lama), 20b.6-21a.2.
601 P5266, Vol. 98 229.5.3, commenting on VIII.3.
602 P760.16, Vol. 23 198.3.8ff, chapter 26. Chandrakfrti briefly
cites it in his Commentary on the 'Supplement' (P5263, Vol. 98
145.2.4fl), commenting on VI. 138-9. Shantideva cites it in his
Compendium of Learnings, chapter 14, as does Prajnakaramati
in his Commentary on the Difficult Points of (Shantideva's)
'Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds', IX.88.
603 According to Geshe Gediin Lodro, nails actually are not considered to be conjoined with consciousness.
604 The term 'Bare Mountains' has been untraceable to date. See
Kosha iii.141 for the mountains. For kitadri, see Kosha iii. 147.
605 P5658, Vol. 129 175.2.6, stanza 80. Dzong-ka-ba quotes it in
his Illumination (P6143, Vol. 154 32.5.1). Jam-yang-shay-ba's
commentary is based on Gyel-tsap's (2 lb. 1-3).
Notes
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
879
As Kensur Lekden emphasized, the terms are only hypothetical
synonyms because synonyms are existent by definition, and no
member of this list exists.
P5246, Vol. 95 139.2.7, XIV.23. Brackets are from Chandraklrti's commentary (P5266, Vol. 98 270.3.6).
P5266, Vol. 98 270.3.6, commenting on XIV.23.
P5272, Vol. 99 260.4.5, IX.140. See GM, 200a.5ff.
P5242, Vol. 95 112.1.7ff.; chap. 18.
P5260, Vol. 98 56.1.6, commenting on XVIII.7; Poussin,
368.4.
' . . . or reliant on causes and conditions' (hetupratyayan prapya,
more literally, 'meeting to causes and conditions') is missing in
the Tibetan. T h e translation of the last sentence follows the
Tibetan.
P760.43, Vol. 24 194.1.2ff. Brackets are from Ann, dngos
77a.7ff and dbu 68b.5ff. There is a similar quote in the Clear
Words (Poussin, 358.10).
P5224, Vol. 95 6.3.7, XV.10.
Ann, dbu 69a. 1.
P5262, Vol.98 103.1.8, VI.83; Poussin's translation is Museon,
n.s. v. 12, p.238. Chandraklrti's own commentary is P5263, Vol.
98 133.5.2. Brackets are from Ann, dbu 69a.4ff. T h e second
quote is P5262, Vol. 98 104.5.6, VI. 159d; Poussin's translation
is Museon, n.s. v. 12, p.321. Chandrakrrti's commentary is
P5263, Vol. 98 147.3.8. T h e third quote is P5262, Vol. 98
101.5.5, VI.24a; Poussin's translation is Muse'on, n,s. v.11,
p.300. Chandraklrti's commentary is P5263, Vol. 98 123.3.4.
P5266, Vol. 98 103.4.4, chapter 12. This is quoted in Dzongka-ba's Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Nagarjuna's)
'Treatise on the Middle Way', P6153, Vol. 156 66.1.4.
Chapters 10 and 22.
P5262, Vol. 98 103.4.4, VI.104ab; Poussin's translation is
Museon, n.s. v. 12, p.267. Chandraklrti's commentary is P5263,
Vol. 98 138.5.4. Kensur Lekden said that this reasoning is
called the 'diamond slivers' (rdo rje gzegs ma) because each of
the four reasons is capable of overcoming a conception of inherent existence just as a piece of diamond has the hardness and so
forth of a diamond. Thus, gzegs ma (kana) means 'piece'; hence
'sliver' should not be thought of as a weak, thin piece but a fragment. According to Apte, the Sanskrit term also means 'facet';
this would seem to be most appropriate when speaking of
880
Meditation on Emptiness
diamonds (and more appropriate to the meaning since each of
the four reasons alone actually is not capable of refuting inherent existence); however, none of my Tibetan sources, oral or
written, has explained it this way. T h e oral traditions that I
have contacted are by no means always accurate; nevertheless,
when put together, the various oral strains are quite full and no
Tibetan scholar to date has given this interpretation (one said
that gzegs ma refers to the points of a vajra).
620 P5343, Vol. 103 21.3.6.
621 GM, 225b.3.
622 P5242, Vol. 95 75.1.6ff, commenting on 1.1. Brackets are from
GM, 225a.6ff.
623 P5262, Vol. 98 101.3.4, VI.8c-13; Poussin's translation is
Museon, n.s. v.11, pp.280-4. Brackets are mostly from ChandrakTrti's own commentary, P5263, Vol. 98 120.3.4ff.
624 Treatise, P5224, Vol. 95 8.1.1, XX.19cd and XX.20cd. These
are quoted in ChandrakTrti's Commentary on the 'Supplement'
commenting on VI.14ab.
625 P5262, Vol.98 101.4.2, VI. 14; Poussin's translation is Museon,
n.s. v . l l , pp.286-7.
626 Ann, dbu 71a.8.
627 Ann, dbu 71b.2.
628 P5224, Vol. 95 3.1.5, 1.5. Brackets are from Clear Words,
P5260, Vol. 98 14.1.6, commenting on 1.5. ChandrakTrti's
other interpretation takes parabhava as meaning production
from other, but the meaning is roughly the same.
629 P5262, Vol. 98 101.4.3ff, VI.15-19; Poussin's translation is
Museon, n.s. v . l l , pp.288-93. Brackets are mostly from ChandrakTrti's commentry, P5263, Vol. 98 121.4.3ff, and Dzongka-ba's Illumination, P6143, Vol. 154 38.3.7ff.
630 This might also be kesara; 'Rottieria intcotira; Mimusops
Elengi, Mesua Ferrara' according to Poussin (Museon, v . l l ,
289 n.4). He (IBID, n.5) identifies kimshuka as 'Butea Frondosa'.
631 Ann, dbu 71b.2.
63^ T 8 7 6 , Vol. 34 304.3.5. This is cited in ChandrakTrti's Commentary on the 'Supplement', P5263, Vol. 98 122.3.7.
633 Source for the brackets is ChandrakTrti's Commentary on the
'Supplement', P5263, Vol. 98 122.4.2.
634 P5262, Vol. 98 101.5.1, VI.20; Poussin's translation isMuseon,
Notes
881
n.s. v . l l , p.295. Brackets are mostly from his own commentary, P5263, Vol. 98 122.4.5.
635 P6143, Vol. 154 37.4. Iff. I have disregarded snga phyi in the
second sentence.
636 GT, ca 37b.4ff.
637 P876, Vol. 34 304.2.8 and 305.4.6, with some variation in the
reading. See p. 502 for a citation of this by Chandraklrti with a
slightly different reading.
638 P5260, Vol. 98 6.1.8, commenting on 1.1; Poussin, 27.4. For
the context of the quote, see p.503.
639 P5262, Vol. 98 102.1.5, VI.32d. His commentary is P5263,
Vol. 98 24.5.8.
640 P5262, Vol. 98 103.3.5, VI.98ab; Poussin's translation is
Museon, n.s. v. 12, p.256 (misnumbered as 95ab). His commentary is P5263, Vol. 98 136.5.5.
641 See p. 150 for a different rendition of this.
642 Artocarpus Lacucha.
642a P5262, Vol. 98 103.3.6, VI.99; Poussin's translation is Museon,
n.s. v.12, p.239. His own commentary is P5263, Vol. 98
137.2.8.
643 P5227, Vol. 95 13.1.7.
644 P5231, Vol. 95 52.5.6ff.
645 P5262, Vol.98 101.5.2, VI. 21; Poussin's translation is Museon,
n.s. v . l l , p.296.
646 P5263, Vol. 98 122.5.2ff. See pp. 152-4 for ChandrakTrti's commentary.
647 P5343, Vol. 103 21.3.5.
648 T h e instrumental bshad pas is not an actual one according to
Geshe Gediin Lodro.
649 This is a paraphrase of Kamalashrla's Illumination of the Middle
Way, P5287, Vol. 101 76.4.2.
650 The Satyadvayavibhahga is not included in the Peking Tripitaka. Brackets, except where noted, are from Ann, dbu 73b.3ff.
651 Ann, dbu 128b.7.
652 P5260, Vol. 98 3.3.7, commenting on the salutation; Poussin,
6.3-.5. See p.668.
653 P5260, Vol. 98 13.3.7, commenting on 1.3; Poussin, 74.3. For
Dignaga's presentation of this, see M. Hattori's Dignaga, On
Perception (Cambridge: Harvard, 1968), p..76 n.1.11 and p.87
n.1.33.
882 59 Meditation on Emptiness
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
P5266, Vol. 98 259.1.5ff, chapter 13. Brackets are from Ann,
dbu 74b.4. See n.653.
P5272, Vol. 99 248.5.3ff, V.15. Brackets are from Gyel-tsap's
commentary, 43b. of a Gan-den edition.
Relics such as teeth and bone are made into powder, molded,
and stamped with a holy image. These are called sachchha, or
sachchha, perhaps from sack meaning 'to be devoted'.
P5272, Vol. 99 248.5.4, V.16. This is quoted in Dzong-ka-ba's
Middling Exposition of the Stages of the Path, 79b.5 (Dharmsala:
Shes rig par khang, 1968).
P5272, Vol. 99 248.1.2, IV.21ab.
P5287, Vol. 101 76.4.2.
P5287, Vol. 101 76.5.2.
' T h e effects are plural because the causes are plural.' Actually,
the inference is based on the cause and not the effect; however,
according to Geshe Gediin Lodro it is the Buddhist logician's
custom to refer even to these as effect-signs.
P5224, Vol. 95 9.3.5, XXIV.19. Brackets are from Ann, dbu
74a.8.
P5246, Vol. 95 136.4.3, IX.2 and IX.5. Brackets are from
ChandrakTrti's commentary, P5266, Vol. 98 236.3.3. This is
quoted in ChandrakTrti's Clear Words, P5260, Vol. 98 78.2.6;
Poussin, 505.
This is quoted in ChandrakTrti's Clear Words, P5260, Vol. 98
78.2.7; Poussin, 505. He also quotes it in his commentary to
the Four Hundred, P5266, Vol. 98 236.5.2.
P5260, Vol. 98 78.2.8, commenting on XXIV. 19; Poussin,
505.14.
P5224, Vol. 95 9.3.4, XXIV. 18. Brackets are from Dzongka-ba's commentary, P6153, Vol. 156 148.3.2ff and 148.5.Iff.
P5260, Vol. 98 78.2.3, commenting on XXIV. 18; Poussin,
504.13.
Ann, dbu 75a.8.
Brackets are from Ann, dbu 75a.7.
P6016, Vol. 153 37.3.5.
P5265, Vol. 98 171.5.Iff.
SeeP5591, Vol. 115 176.2.3ff, and P5593, Vol. 116 175.2.3ff.
T h i s is often called a gerund, not like the English declinable
noun but the Sanskritic indeclinable continuative indicating
often the anterior of two actions.
Notes
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
883
P5767, Vol. 140 5.1.3 Alamkhalvoh pratishedhe ktva va. See
Pa, IH.iv. 18-20. Hereon, the Sanskrit is taken from the Candravyakaranam (Jodhapura, 1967). Usually the continuative
affix is affixed to the former of verbs in a temporal series; 'After
men' indicates an exception.
P5775, Vol. 140 45.3.8.
P5767, Vol. 140 13.4.7. Anansamase ktvah lyap. See Pa,
VII.i.37.
P5775, Vol. 140 45.5.4.
P5767, Vol. 140 11.5.7. Hrasvasya atihi piti tuk. See Pa,
VI.i.71.
P5775, Vol. 140 43.3.8.
P5767, Vol. 140 12.1.4. Akah aki dirghah. See Pa, VI.i.101.
P5767, Vol. 140 6.2.5. Arthamatreprathama. See Pa, II.iii.46.
P5767, Vol. 140 6.1.2. Supah asamkhyad luk. See Pa, II.iv.82.
P5767, Vol. 140 4.3.6. Ghan karake cha. See P a , III.iii.16, 18,
19.
P5775, Vol. 140 45.1.3.
P5767, Vol. 140 6.2.5. Arthamatre prathama. See Pa, II.iii.46.
P5767, Vol. 140 15.5.6. Sasajushah rah. See Pa, VIII.ii.66.
P5767, Vol. 140 12.1.6. Hashi cha atah roh. See Pa, VI.i.113,
114.
P5767, Vol. 140 16.1.7. Virame visarjanTyah. See Pa,
VHI.iii. 15. T h e citing here is doubtful because the Tibetan
quoted and the Peking translation do not, for the first time,
agree.
P5260, Vol. 98 3.2.8ff; Poussin, 5.1-4. See the notes in Poussin
(p.5ff) throughout.
In the Peking catalogue five books are listed as being translated
by Sthiramati (bLo-rtan).
P5260, Vol. 98 3.3.3ff; Poussin, 5.7-8.
See Pa, IV.iv.98.
P5253, Vol. 95 154.1.8.
Avalokitavrata, Commentary on (Bhavaviveka's) 'Lamp for
(Nagarjuna's) "Wisdom"', P5259, Vol. 96 169.5.8ff.
Stcherbatsky (p.90) identifies these others as Hmayanists.
This is a paraphrase of Kalapa's Aphorisms', see n.679.
Ann, dbu 75b.8.
Rice Seedling Sutra, P876, Vol. 34 303.3.4. Here the word
dharma (Tib. chos) equals tathata (Tib/ de kho na nyid)
884
699
700
701
702
703
Meditation on Emptiness
according to Dzong-ka-ba's Illumination (P6143, Vol. 154
147.1.3).
T h e Sanskrit has rupani, whereas the version given here
follows Jam-yang-shay-ba's transliteration into Tibetan letters
(see p.668).
P5260, Vol. 98 3.3.5ff; Poussin, 6.1-7.5.
T h e Sanskrit has only 'eye', not 'eye and forms' in this sentence.
Putting cha between the two words rather than after the second
is irregular but still barely possible; thus, I have left it there.
T h e original reads chakshurcha.
P5253, Vol. 95 154.1.6ff. There are minor differences between
the Tibetan translations of Bhavaviveka's own passage and
ChandrakTrti's citation of it but none of substance.
T h e Tibetan translators adopted a code for handling this
three-part discussion of the formation of pratityasamutpada:
prati = rten cing
i or itya = 'brel bar
samutpada = 'byung ba
Their over-riding concern was with having a three-part translation equivalent that, when together, makes sense in Tibetan.
As a result, the individual equivalents often make no sense
when associated with these various interpretations.
Some Tibetan scholars claim that rten cing and 'brel bar have
different meanings; however, since ChandrakTrti says that prati
(rten cing), which itself means prapti (phrad pa), modifies the
meaning of itya ('brel ba) into meaning prapti (phrad pa), the
two words come to have just one meaning, and thus it seems
that the two were separated out in Tibetan merely in order to
convey, albeit not very well, this discussion of the meaning of
the individual parts. Perhaps a better alternative would have
been to transliterate the individual parts into Tibetan rather
than attempt a translation.
In ChandrakTrti's interpretation, pratTtya has just one meaning as a continuative meaning 'having depended' which in
Tibetan is rten nas as in the commonly used rten nas 'byung ba
or rten 'byung. Strictly speaking, therefore, in Prasangika rten
nas 'byung ba or rten 'byung is the most appropriate general
term, with rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba suitable only as a code
Notes
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
885
equivalent for the three-part discussion, rten 'brel is a common
usage that is neither.
P5260, Vol. 98 3.4.6ff; Poussin, 8.1-3.
T h e Tibetan mis-reads rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba where it
should read rten cing 'brel bar in accordance with the Sanskrit
pratTtya.
P5260, Vol. 98 3.4.7ff; Poussin, 8.3-9.
For Chandrakfrti prati alone means prapti (meeting, phradpa)
as does pratTtya. In its continuative form prapti (phradpa) is
prapya (phrad nas).
Though the Tibetan here is phrad pa, 'meeting', I have rendered
it to accord with Nagarjuna's prapya, 'having met'. T h e alternation in the use of forms is due to Chandrakirti's and Jam-yangshay-ba's using the general term outside of this particular usage
for the more specific term within this usage as a continuative.
T h e significance of Chandrakirti's citation is lost in the
Tibetan translation de dang de brten gang 'byung ba/ rang gi ngo
bor de ma skyes which, nevertheless, is an excellent translation
in general in that it conveys the meaning. However, to convey
the point here it should read de dang de phrad gang 'byung ba/
rang gi ngo bor de ma skyes. (The second line could have been
rendered as de ni rang bzhin gyis ma skyes.) By using brten for
prapya instead of phrad the purpose of Chandrakirti's stunning
citation is lost in the Tibetan.
T h e text is P5225, Vol. 9 5 1 1 . 4 . 1 .
P5260, Vol. 98 3.5.2ff; Poussin, 8.10-9.6. T h e Tibetan reading
is followed in the first two paragraphs of the translation.
Brackets are from Avalokitavrata (P5259, Vol. 96 170.1.6). He
identifies the two interpretations as 'arising upon depending on
and meeting these and those [causes and conditions]' and 'the
arising of those which possess individual disintegration' (de
dang de la brten cing phrad nas 'byung ba 'i zhes by a ba dang/ so
so 'i 'jig pa dang Idan pa mams kyi [text has kyis] 'byung ba zhes
bya ba'i don de gnyi ga med pa'i phyir te).
P5225, Vol. 95 11.4.1.
P5253, Vol. 95 154.2.1.
Rice Seedling Sutra, P876, Vol. 34 303.3.8.
P5260, Vol. 98 3.5.7ff; Poussin, 9.7-10.2. Literally: 'That system which is presented as " W h a t then? T h e m e a n i n g . . . " is
also incorrect.'
886
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
Meditation on Emptiness
Poussin calls attention to Pa, II.i.44.
P5225, Vol. 95 11.4.1.
P5658, Vol. 129 174.4.7, stanza 48ab. T h e Peking edition has:
'di yod pas na 'di byung dper/ ring po yod pas thung ngu bzhin.
Ann, dbu 77b.3 (which is actually 76b.3 due to misplacement
in printing).
P5260, Vol. 98 4.1.Iff; Poussin, 10.3-9.
P5593, Vol. 116 175.2.3.
P5246, Vol. 95 139.2.7, XIV.23. Brackets are from Chandraklrti's commentary (P5266, Vol. 98 270.3.6).
P5225, Vol. 95 11.4.1. ChandrakTrti's commentary is P5265,
Vol. 98 177.1.3.
P5266, Vol. 98 270.3.3, which is commentary preceding
XIV.23. Here in the terms dngos po med par smra ba and dngos
por smra ba (in Sanskrit most likely abhavavadin and bhavavadin) the term dngos po (bhava) has two different meanings in
Dzong-ka-ba's mode of interpretation. In the first it means
'things', i.e., those which are able to perform a function, or
even more widely 'phenomena', whereas in the latter it means
'inherent existence'. T h u s , conceptual sense is made out of
ChandrakTrti's saying that he is neither a proponent of abhava
or of bhava. Instead of such statements being taken as a direct
call away from conceptuality to another level of consciousness
beyond the opposites of abhava and bhava, their different sense
is explicated such that we are left not with paradox but with a
tidy explanation of two extremes and a middle free from them.
In Ge-luk-ba, there is a decided movement away from only
smashing two conceptual poles against each other and thereby
forcing movement to another level of consciousness in the resulting conceptual hiatus. Rather, a complete conceptual map is laid
out with the moves neatly delineated. Still, in order to follow the
map, one must undergo the battering and smashing of misbegotten conceptuality, gain the appropriate conceptual realization and then, through becoming accustomed to it, eventually
arrive at non-conceptual realization. It would be a mistake to
assume that Ge-luk-bas are somehow satisfied with a mere verbal
lay-out of intricate philosophy. There is a basic recognition that
we are controlled by our ideas, and thus re-formation of ideas in a
harrowing process of analytical meditation—involving one's
feelings in the most intimate sense—is of central importance.
Notes
887
724
725
P5682, Vol. 129 237.5.7.
Mahamati, Clear Words, Extensive Explanation of (Nagarjuna's) 'Friendly Letter', P5690, Vol. 129 270.4.3 and 270.4.8.
726 P6016, Vol. 153 38.1.1.
727 GT ca 26b.Iff and 43a. 2ff. For a discussion o f ' a b l e to set itself
up' see Ann, dbu 10a.5ff. Also see Dak, 71b.5ff (215.5 in the
Thim-phu edition). In chapter eleven of G 7* Jam-yang-shay-ba
cites many scriptures that refer to valid cognition, correct perception, truths, and so forth and concludes that to be validly
certified does not necessarily mean to be able to set itself up or
to be inherently existent. In Dak-tsang's system just the opposite holds: If something is validly certified, it must be selfinstituting. Thus, since nothing is able to set itself up in the
Prasarigika system, there can be no valid certification of the
existence of objects for Dak-tsang.
Valid certification for Dak-tsang and for Dzong-ka-ba are different; the former sees it as implying self-institution, whereas the
latter views it, in Prasangika, as implying non-self-institution.
For Dzong-ka-ba the valid certification of an object is itself a
sign that the object does not inherently exist. T h e process of
certification itself cannot bear analysis such as whether, when a
consciousness certifies the existence of an object, the object is
already certified, is being certified, or is yet to be certified. If
the object is already certified, then it perforce is not what is
undergoing present certification. If it is yet to be certified, how
can it be said that it is being certified? If a certifier certifies what
is presently being certified, then two activites are required, one
for the designation of the consciousness as the certifier and
another for the designation of the object as what is being certified. Also, when a certifier begins to certify an object, what is it
acting on? Something already certified? Something being certified? Something yet to be certified? Valid certification of
objects cannot bear such analysis; thus, valid certification even
conventionally does not inherently exist.
Dak-tsang approaches the problem from a different angle; he
probably thought that if it were affirmed that objects are validly
certified, then students would think that objects as they appear
to them would be true, and the knot of cyclic existence would
be tied even tighter. Both Dzong-ka-ba and Dak-tsang agree
that objects do not exist the way they appear, that our assent to
888
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
Meditation on Emptiness
these appearances binds us in cyclic existence, and that to free
ourselves from cyclic existence we must discover the true
nature of these objects. Their means are different.
P5709, Vol. 130 88.3.4, chapter 3.
Brackets in the root text are from Ann, dbu 129a.2.
GM, 464b.2ff.
This is quoted in ChandrakTrti's Commentary on the 'Supplement', P5263, Vol. 98 142.4.8, commenting on VI. 126. It is
also quoted in Dzong-ka-ba's Illumination, P6143, Vol. 154
84.3.7.
P5262, Vol. 98 104.1.7, VI.124b; Poussin's translation is
Museon, n.s. v. 12, p.289. The second quote is P5262, Vol. 98
104.2.6, VI.132cd; Museon, n.s. v.12, p.301.
P5263, Vol. 98 141.2.7, commenting on VI.120; v.12, p.283.
Brackets are from Dzong-ka-ba's Illumination, P6143, Vol. 154
82.2.8.
P5242, Vol. 95 111.1.2, commenting on XVIII.2ab.
P5263, Vol. 98 141.2.3, commenting on VI.120; v.12, p.282.
P5262, Vol. 98 100.2.5, I.3ab; v.8, p.258.
P5263, Vol. 98 109.3.5, commenting on 1.3; v.8, p.258. Brackets are from Dzong-ka-ba's Illumination, Vol. 154 6.5.1.
P6153, Vol. 156 65.5.8ff.
A point of controversy among the Ge-luk-bas is just what is an
illustration (mtshan gzhi) of the 'mine'. Jam-yang-shay-ba says
that it does not refer to the things which are considered to be
mine, such as eyes and ears, but to the person who considers
things to be possessions. 'Mine' is a person, but not a second
person separate from I because the two are the same entity and
different conceptual isolates or opposites of the negatives.
'Mine' cannot be the eyes, ears, tongue, and so forth, because
these are the bases of the designation 'mine', and in the
Prasaftgika system the basis of a designation is not the phenomenon designated. As Kensur Lekden said, if one watches carefully when the thought 'my' or 'mine' appears, this 'my' often
appears more on the subject's side than on the object's. He said
that as a form of I it is more extensive and active than I.
Still, Jam-yang-shay-ba's annotator, Nga-wang-bel-den, disagrees (Ann, dbu 78b.3-80b.5) saying that the eyes, ears, and so
forth which are included within one's own continuum are illustrations of mine but not the objects observed by the false view
Notes
889
of mine. For Jam-yang-shay-ba also, the objects of observation
of the false view of mine are not the eyes, ears, and so forth but
mine itself, which for him is a person, and that person is wrongly
conceived to exist inherently.
T h e problem is largely one of terminology. Since the view of
the transitory collection (sdikayadrshti, 'jig tshogs la Ita ba) as
inherently existent I and mine refers only to a conception of a
self of persons, then even 'mine' would seem to refer only to the
person involved in ownership, the 'my'. It makes some sense in
English to say that my own ear is not an illustration o f ' m y ' , as
'my' is that which makes things into mine, but it is difficult to
say that my own ear is not an illustration o f ' m i n e ' , is not mine,
just because it is not what makes such things into mine. Jamyang-shay-ba tries to make this distinction in Tibetan by saying
that an ear included in one's own continuum is not an illustration of mine (bdag gi ba'i mtshan gzhi), is not mine (bdag gi ba),
but is an illustration of something that is owned (bdag gi yin
rgyu'i mtshan gzhi) and thus something that is owned (bdag gi
yin rgyu). According to Nga-wang-bel-den, however, 'mine' can
refer to phenomena considered to be possessions and included
within the continuum of a person, but those phenomena do not
have to be the object of observation of a false view of mine—the
object of observation perhaps being the I that owns them.
According to Geshe L h u n d u p Sopa, Jay-dzun Cho-gyi-gyeltsen, the textbook author of the Jay (Byes) College of Se-ra
Monastery, avoids the problem by dividing phenomena into
not just two categories, persons and other phenomena, but also
a third, mine. Here in the false view of mine, 'mine' is not the
person and not the eyes, etc., but just the mine itself, technically called the isolate of mine (nga yi ba 'i rang Idog), or opposite
from non-one-with-mine, which means just mine and not its
illustrations, not the things that are mine. T h e object of observation of the false view of mine is this mine, but the false view
of mine is nevertheless a conception of a self of persons since it
is conceiving the I involved in mine to be inherently existent. In
this way, my own ear is an illustration of mine, and thus is
mine, but is not an object of observation of the false view of
mine as this is only the isolate of mine.
In any case, the Ge-luk-ba scholars agree that the conception
of eyes, ears, and so forth included in one's own continuum as
890
Meditation on Emptiness
inherently existent is a conception of the inherent existence of
phenomena, not of persons, and that in the false view of mine
the mine is something different from the person that is conceived to exist inherently in the false view of I. T h e controversy
over what this is draws one into noticing the I as owner.
740
741
P6153, Vol. 156 66.1.2.
Kay-drup's Opening the Eyes of the Fortunate (blockprint in the
possession of Geshe Wangyal), 105a.6ff.
742 P5260, Vol. 98 53.5.8, commenting on XVIII.2cd; Poussin,
347.13.
743 Seen.741.
744 See GM, 471a.3ff, for almost the same presentation. Jam-yangshay-ba attributes this position to Dak-tsang in both GT and
GM, but in neither does he give a source to show that Dak-tsang
actually asserts this position. T h e absence of citation often
means that Dak-tsang does not explicitly assert such but that he
is 'forced' to do so as a consequence of other assertions. As
Geshe Gediin Lodro said, it is necessary to determine, when
Jam-yang-shay-ba cites a 'contradiction' in Dak-tsang's writings,
whether it is an explicit contradiction or whether Dak-tsang is
being forced into a particular assertion by logical pressure (rigs
pas phul ba). As the ascription of fantastic positions explicitly
unfounded in Dak-tsang's writings is a conscious literary device,
it does not constitute inaccurate reporting of Dak-tsang's
positions but does indeed make reading Jam-yang-shay-ba's text
difficult.
My guess on this one is that it stems from a criticism by Daktsang (see GT, ca 47a.8-8b.2) of Dzong-ka-ba for claiming that
reasoning refuting artificial misconceptions does not refute the
innate. In reply Jam-yang-shay-ba first explains that Dzong-kaba should be understood as saying that 'although one refuted
objects imputed by systems of tenets that do not involve the mode
of apprehension by innate [misconceptions], this would not
damage innate [misconceptions] and although one refuted
objects imputed merely and only by systems of tenets, this
would not harm innate [misconceptions].' This means that refuting that the I, for instance, does not depend on causes and does not
change does not refute the innate misconception of the inherent
existence of the I, as the conception that the I is independent and
immutable does not constitute the innate conception that the I
Notes
891
inherently exists or exists in its own right. Rather, refuting such
can be a branch of refuting the innate conception of inherent
existence when it is understood that if things did inherently
exist, they could not depend on causes and could not change.
Having clarified Dzong-ka-ba's meaning, Jam-yang-shay-ba
proceeds to accuse Dak-tsang of therefore holding that all forms
of artificial misconceptions (such as that the person is permanent, unitary, and under its own power) and all forms of innate
misconceptions are exactly the same and that, thereby, refuting
the grossest of the gross would mean one had refuted them all—
a position Dak-tsang obviously does not assert. Perhaps, it is
within this absurd 'extension' of Dak-tsang's views that Jamyang-shay-ba here claims that Dak-tsang holds that the person
and the aggregates always appear as one.
Through studying the points Jam-yang-shay-ba displays in
framing his refutation, one learns, not so much about Daktsang's views, but a great deal about Jam-yang-shay-ba's own
views. This type of polemic is a frequently used technique for
conveying information basic to one's own system and needs to
be milked for that. If one thinks that it is merely polemic to put
down an opponent, a great source of subtle distinctions will be
lost. After holding one's nose for a while, the points—devoid of
the polemic—become fascinating.
T h e opinion being forced on Dak-tsang here is that it is
wrong to refute the existence of a person different from the
aggregates first and then refute a self of phenomena, the reason
behind this patently absurd view being that a consciousness
innately misconceiving the person always views the person as
one with the aggregates. Thus, for 'Dak-tsang' the very refutation of the inherent existence of the I constitutes a refutation of
the inherent existence of mind, body, and so forth which are
phenomena other than the person.
The refutation of this position provides an opportunity to discuss the extremely subtle and intricate topic of the appearance
of an inherently existent I and its relation to the appearance of
mind and body. Jam-yang-shay-ba's response revolves around
considering an innate consciousness apprehending I (ngar 'dzin
lhan skyes) in two ways: valid and invalid. He first points out
that there are valid conceptions o f ' m y mind', 'my body', and so
forth in which I and mind or body are different and then points
892
Meditation on Emptiness
out there is a coarse innate misconception of I in which the I
and the aggregates are viewed as like a master and subjects, the
assumption being that if the I and the aggregates did not appear
to be different such could not be misconceived.
745 P5262, Vol. 98 104.1.7, VI. 124b. Brackets are from Ann, dbu
83a.6.
746 GM, 471b.4. Although when the stomach is sick, persons say,
'I am sick,' they do not innately say, 'I am my stomach.' Jamyang-shay-ba is making the point that even though the appearance of the I is inseparably mixed with that of the mental and
physical aggregates like water in milk, when we conceive the I
to exist inherently, we do not conceive it to be either one with or
different from the aggregates.
747 P5262, Vol. 98 101.2.3, IV.2d; Poussin's translation is Museon,
n.s. v.8, p.311. Brackets are from Dzong-ka-ba's Illumination of
the Thought, P6143,Vol. 154 27.1.1. Rang dultaba dang 'brel is
taken as meaning that what is destroyed is that which is related
to the view of self, not relation with the view of self as Poussin
takes it ('est detruite toute relation avec l'idee de soi'). T h e view
of self is the subtle misconception of the person as being inherently existent; that which is related with it or is produced in
dependence upon it is the coarse view of the person as being
self-sufficient. T h u s , ChandrakTrti is interpreted as saying that
on the fourth ground the Bodhisattva overcomes the corresponding level of the innate coarse misconception of the self in
which the I and the aggregates are conceived to be like master
and subjects. If the I and the aggregates did not appear differently, such a conception could not take place, in which case
ChandrakTrti would absurdly be wrong to say that on the fourth
ground the respective level of that affliction is overcome. See
Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism, p.226.
748 P5263, Vol. 98 118.3.2, end of chapter 4. T h e sutra is P761.31,
Vol. 25 258.2.4. T h e sutra speaks of the fourth ground Bodhisattva's overcoming what is interpreted as this coarser view of
self described in n.747.
749 P5262, Vol. 98 104.1.7, VI.124b; Poussin's translation is
Museon, n.s. v.12, p.289. His commentary is Vol. 98 142.3.4.
Brackets are from Ann, dbu 83a.6.
750 Brackets are from GM, 471b.2.
751 P5262, Vol. 98 104.1.8, VI. 125; Poussin's translation is
Notes
893
Museon, n.s. v. 12, p.290. Brackets in the citation are from Dzongka-ba's Illumination of the Thought, P6143, Vol. 154 84.2.5.
752
Jam-yang-shay-ba {GM, 481 a. 1) identifies this as Dzong-ka-ba
and his spiritual sons (Gyel-tsap and Kay-drup). In colloquial
Tibetan hrang hrang is used to depict someone who is alone,
someone standing on his own. Phob phob seems to mean forthright or concrete, the very sound suggesting the seemingly hard
surface of a bubble.
753 GM, 481a.2ff. For this same refutation, see GM, 481a.1-b.5.
754 Jam-yang-shay-ba seems to be saying that the appearance of the
aggregates is the appearance of the I; however, his Great Exposition of the Middle Way (481b.2) words the same point differently: 'It [absurdly] follows that when an embodied self appears
to an innate [consciousness] it does not have to appear by way of
the appearance of the aggregates' (lhan skyes la lus can gyi bdag
snang ba naphungpo'isnang ba'isgo nas snang midgospar thai).
He is clearly holding the opposite of this absurd consequence,
i.e., that when the I appears, it appears by way o/the appearance
of the aggregates; this does not mean that the appearance of the
aggregates is the appearance of the I. Thus, in this reading he is
saying only that the I appears together with the aggregates and
dependent upon the appearance of the aggregates. This seems
the more credible reading since it is clear that he is holding that
they appear together but that the I, within that context, appears
to be standing by itself and concrete.
When he says that the I and the aggregates appear inseparably, it does not mean that one could not identify the appearance of the I within this conglomerate appearance; it merely
means that they appear together and that the I appears by way
of the aggregates' appearing.
In accordance with the passage cited above, the passage here
might read better as nga'i gdags gzhi phung po'i mam pa shar ba'i
sgo nas nga'i mam pa shar ba ma yin pa'i phyir ('because
[according to you] the appearance of the aspect of I is not by
way of the appearance of the aspect of the aggregates which are
the basis of imputation of " I " ' ) .
?
55 See n.749.
?
56 P5224, Vol. 95 7.2.8, XVIII. led.
?
57 P5260, Vol. 98 53.3.Iff, commenting on XVIII.led; Poussin,
343.8; Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No. 10 146.20ff.
894
758
Meditation on Emptiness
'Suitability as form' (rupana, gzugs su rung ba) is rendered by
J. W. De Jong in his Cinq Chapitres De La Prasannapada (Paris:
Libraire Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1949, 4) as 'le pouvoir
d'etre brise', 'capable of being broken'. T h e latter is how Ajitamitra interprets the term in his commentary on the Precious
Garland (P5659, Vol. 129 notation lost). Therefore, it appears
that the translators into Tibetan were aware of both meanings
and chose 'suitability as form' here. Lati Rinbochay said that
'capable of being broken' is not appropriate as a definition of
form at least in those schools which assert partless particles as
these cannot be broken down either physically or mentally. Perhaps this is the reason why the translation as 'that which is suitable as form', meaning whatever one points to when asked what
form is, was preferred. Still, Geshe Gediin Lodro said that partless particles could not be further reduced without disappearing; thus, if we take their physical disappearance as their susceptibility to being broken, this interpretation of rupana as that
which is susceptible to being broken would be an appropriate
definition of form.
'That which is suitable as form' (gzugs su rung ba) appears to
be almost a non-definition since it repeats the very term being
defined, form; however, it does illustrate the notion that reasoning meets back to common experience in that with form we are
at a level of common experience with little else to come up with
as a definition other than saying that it is what we point to when
we identify form.
759 Blockprint in the possession of Trijang Labrang, 88a.2ff.
760 P6153, Vol. 156 110.3.3, commenting on XI.3.
761 Blockprint in the possession of Trijang Labrang, 89a.6.
762 P5263, Vol. 98 146.1.1, commenting on VI.144; Poussin's
translation is Museon, n.s. v.12, p.312.
763 See ChandrakTrti's Commentary on the 'Supplement', P5263,
Vol. 98 146.1.3ff, commenting on VI.144; v.12, p.312.
764 Clear Words, P5260, Vol. 98 54.5.6fT, commenting on XVIII.5;
Poussin 355.5.
765 This is quoted in ChandrakTrti's Clear Words, P5260, Vol. 98
54.5.7, commenting on XVIII.5 immediately after the last
quote; Poussin, 355.7.
766 Ann, dbu 84b.6.
767 Ann, dbu 84b.5.
Notes
768
895
Jam-yang-shay-ba now states the syllogisms establishing the
emptiness of a person, citing the two subjects which Nagarjuna
used, the self (translated here as 'person') and the Tathagata, as in
chapters eighteen and twenty-two of the Treatise. In this context
'self is the nominally existent person and not 'self in the sense of
inherent existence, and the Tathagata is merely an example of a
person, albeit the most exalted person. T h e implicit point is
that if even the most exalted person lacks inherent existence,
then, of course, ordinary persons lack it.
In this context the term 'Tathagata' refers to a fully developed Buddha, not to the 'potentiality' for Buddhahood which
exists in all sentient beings. T h e emptiness of the mind is the
Tathagata nature or Buddha lineage, which itself is empty of
inherent existence and applies to all persons; however, here the
referent of 'Tathagata' is just the person of a Buddha. Thus,
'Tathagata and s e l f , the dual subjects in Jam-yang-shay-ba's
syllogisms refuting a self of persons, are not synonyms because
there are many selves that are not Tathagatas. Jam-yang-shayba is merely using the dual subject as a convenient means to
establish that not only are persons empty of inherent existence
but also, among persons, even a Tathagata lacks it.
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
Chandraklrti uses this metaphor in his Clear Words P5260,
Vol. 98 35.4.3, commenting on X.14; Poussin, 212-13.
P5224, Vol. 95 8.3.3, XXII. 1. Brackets are from Ann, dbu
85a. Iff.
P5658, Vol. 129 175.2.8, stanza 82. Brackets are from Ann,
dbu 85a.2ff.
Ann (dbu 85a.3) says, ' T h e self is not inexpressible as either one
with or other than the aggregates.' This is the assertion that the
self and the aggregates are not mingled like fire and fuel.
P5242, Vol. 95 120.4.1, commenting on XXII.1.
P5260, Vol. 98 53.1.8, commenting on XVIII. 1; Poussin,
341.8.
T h e Buddhist Sanskrit Texts edition of the Sanskrit (145.22)
emends the text to read, 'due to the consequence of the fault of
manyness'. However, the Tibetan accords with Poussin's Bibliotheca Buddhica edition (p.341) and allows for fallacies other
than manyness.
Supplement, P5262, Vol. 98 104.2.Iff, VI. 127-8; Poussin's
translation is Museon, n.s. v. 12, pp.292-4. Brackets are from his
896
Ill
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
Meditation on Emptiness
own commentary, P5263, Vol. 98 142.5.5fF, and Dzong-ka-ba's
Illumination, P6143, Vol. 154 84.5.4ff.
P5242, Vol. 95 120.4.2, commenting on XXII. 1. Brackets are
from Ann, dbu 86b.8.
P5260, Vol. 98 55.3. Iff, commenting on XVIII. 1; Poussin,
343.8.
P5242, Vol. 95 120.4.4ff, commenting on XXII. 1.
P5263, Vol. 98 145.4.6ff, commenting on VI. 142; Poussin's
translation is Museon, n.s. v.12, p.310. Brackets are from
Illumination, P6143, Vol. 154 89.1.3ff.
P5242, Vol. 95 120.4.5, commenting on XXII. 1.
P5262, Vol. 98 104.3.7ff, VI. 143; Poussin's translation is
Museon, n.s. v.12, pp.310-11. Brackets are from Dzong-ka-ba's
Illumination, P6143, Vol. 154 89.1.7ff.
P5263, Vol. 98 145.5.2ff, commenting on VI. 143; Poussin's
translation is Museon, n.s. v.12, p.311.
P5260, Vol. 98 66.5.4, commenting on XXII. 1; Poussin,
435.3. In the eighteenth chapter of the Treatise Nagarjuna
presents the reasoning which refutes an inherent existence of
persons in abbreviated form. There just two positions are
refuted: a self is shown to be inherently neither the same as nor
different from the aggregates. In the twenty-second chapter on
the Tathagata, the five-cornered reasoning is presented.
P5658, Vol. 129 175.2.7, stanza 81 (for stanza 80 see p.631),
and 175.2.8, stanza 83. Brackets in the first quote are from Ann,
dbu 67b.4-8; in the second, from Ann, dbu 87a.5ff. (In my
translation of the Precious Garland, published as Volume 2 of
the Wisdom of Tibet Series, I used the Sanskrit edition as well
as Ajitamitra's commentary though I cited neither—mea culpa.)
T h e four elements conventionally exist in mutual dependence; the one cannot exist without the others. However, one of
them is not the others because then it would have the character
of the others whereby the character of the elements would
become confused. They also do not inherently depend on each
other, because then they would be inherently existent others,
capable of standing alone whereas they are not. They also cannot subsist without the others. This is the fourfold analysis
(dependence being considered two ways) which establishes that
the elements do not inherently exist, that is, are not established
as their own reality.
Notes
786
787
897
T h e term dngos smra ba (bhavavadin) usually refers to those
schools which assert true existence (bden grub), these being
Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, and Chittamatra, and thus has been
translated as 'Proponents of T r u e Existence' or 'Proponents of
Truly Existent Things'. However, here the term includes the
Svatantrikas, who although they do not propound true existence do assert inherent existence (svabhavasiddhi', rang bzhin
gyis grub pa). That they propound inherent existence is indicated by the fact that they assert the self to be a consciousness,
for instance. In other words, when the object designated as
'person' is sought, something is found—a consciousness. (See
also n.723.)
P5262, Vol. 98 104.4.6, VI.151; Poussin's translation is
Museon, n.s. v. 12, p.316. Brackets are from Dzong-ka-ba's Illumination, P6143, Vol. 154 90.2.4ff. Chandrakirti's own
commentary is P5263, Vol. 98 146.4. Iff.
788 P5262, Vol. 98 105.1.3ff, VI. 166-7; Poussin's translation ends
with VI. 165. Brackets are from his own commentary, P5263,
Vol. 98 148.5. Iff, and Dzong-ka-ba's Illumination, P6143, Vol.
154 93.1.4ff.
789 Dzong-ka-ba (GM, 477a. 1) identifies chags pa (rakta) in this
context as referring to the mind or person that is desirous of an
object—that which is made impassioned by passion, i.e., the
impassioned.
790 'Illustration' (mtshan gzhi) most likely is lakshya in Sanskrit,
which is translated into Tibetan both as mtshon bya 'definiend u m ' and mtshan gzhi 'illustration', the latter being a basis in
which the definition illustrates the definiendum. It seems to
make no difference here whether the term is translated as 'illustration' or 'definiendum'. I prefer the latter for broader symmetry but have deferred to the Tibetan translation and used
'illustration'.
791 Dak, 80b. 1-4 (239.5-40.3 in the Thim-phu edition): '[Dzongka-ba's] explanation that among our own schools only the Vatslputrlyas propound a substantially existent self and [his] assertion that there are Madhyamikas and Chittamatrins such as
Bhavaviveka and so forth who propound the mental consciousness as an illustration of the self are contradictory. Therefore,
our own schools, except for the Vatslputrlyas, disagree about
the basis of the designation which is imputed as the self or
898 Meditation on Emptiness
person—all five aggregates, the mental consciousness, the basisof-all, its continuum, and so forth—but they all only assert the
object designated, the actual person, as either a substantially
existent or imputedly existent non-associated compositional
factor. T h e r e is no one who asserts that there is a common locus
of form or consciousness and p e r s o n . . . '
According to jam-yang-shay-ba (for the corresponding presentation in GM see 474a.2-6a.4), Dak-tsang is saying that the
VatsTputriyas assert that the five aggregates are the basis of the
designation 'person' whereas Bhavaviveka only asserts that the
mental consciousness is such. Jam-yang-shay-ba refutes the
suggestion that for Bhavaviveka the collection of the body and
the senses are not the basis of designating 'I' with a quote from
the Blaze of Reasoning (P5256, Vol. 96 36.4.5) which says the
opposite, 'Thus, [the self] is imputed to the collection of the
body and the senses.'
Jam-yang-shay-ba's basic point is that if for Bhavaviveka the
mental consciousness is just the basis of the designation 'I' and
not the I, then there would be no difference between Bhavaviveka and ChandrakTrti with respect to the nature of the conventionally existent I. He is showing that Bhavaviveka asserts that
the mental consciousness is the I and, thereby, that he asserts
that persons (and other phenomena) exist from their own side
or are established by way of their own character since when
they are sought, something that is them is found. Jam-yangshay-ba (GM, 475b.5-6) clearly makes this point: 'It [absurdly]
follows that those [scholars, Bhavaviveka and so forth,] do not
assert that the self is established from its own side because
[according to you] they do not assert that, when sought, it is
found.' In other words, whoever asserts that when an object is
sought analytically it is found thereby asserts inherent existence.
It is central to the Ge-luk-ba presentation of the four schools
of tenets that only Prasangika asserts an emptiness of inherent
existence and thus that all other schools assert that when an
object is sought one can come up with something that is it. This
is based on comments by ChandrakTrti such as that analyzing
the object designated is not suitable in the context of positing
conventionally existent phenomena (GM, 275b.6) in which he
is seen to be refuting the other schools. It becomes incumbent
Notes
899
then to discover what each school asserts the self and so forth to
be, and thereby what may have been at most a minor topic in
those schools becomes major in the Ge-luk-ba presentation of
tenets. Whereas it would have been unthinkable in Indian Buddhism to compile and correlate (at least in print) the assertions
of the various Buddhist schools on the identification of the person, in the Ge-luk-ba texts this is found in books of tenets under
the topic of 'object-possessors' (yul can) which is sub-divided
into the three topics of expressional terms (rjod byed kyi sgra),
consciousness (shes pa), and persons {gang zag). In the latter
section (see Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism, pp.78,
101, 115, 125, and 136) we learn that:
1
in Vaibhashika, all five aggregates are the person for some
SammitTyas and the mind alone for the Avantakas,
2 in Sautrantika, the continuum of the mental and physical
aggregates is the person for the Sautrantikas Following
Scripture and the mental consciousness, for the Sautrantikas Following Reasoning,
3 in Chittamatra, the mind-basis-of-all is the person for the
Chittamatrins Following Scripture and the mental consciousness, for the Chittamatrins Following Reasoning,
4 in Madhyamika, a subtle neutral form of the mental consciousness is the person for the Svatantrikas whereas the mere
I that is imputed in dependence upon its basis of imputation,
the aggregates, is the person for the Prasangikas.
In the lower schools, the person is designated to the mental consciousness and so forth, meaning that the mental consciousness,
for instance, is the person, whereas in PrasaAgika the person is
designated in dependence upon the mental consciousness and so
forth and thus is not those phenomena.
Just this point is the pivot of Ge-luk-ba commentary, the brilliant discovery of Dzong-ka-ba's analysis, the over-riding organizing principle of their philosophical presentations, their
dazzling insight into the Indian Buddhist schools, the core of
their practice of emptiness, the grindstone for reducing other
interpretations to unintelligible powder, the insight that makes
the presentation of moral behavior in the four systems feasible,
the foundation for making sense out of the controversies
between the Indian schools, the cause impelling the drawing of
900
Meditation on Emptiness
nearly incredible distinctions about the person, the magnifying
glass for discovering hidden assertions of what the person is,
and the foundation for recognition that even in Buddhism with
selflessness as the core doctrine there are selves, there are persons, there are agents, there is a basis for moral retribution,
there is someone to achieve nirvana, there are other sentient
beings not just on a baseless level of pre-wisdom ignorance but
validly established. It is a magnificent stroke.
It is necessary to search thoroughly among the teachings of
each school in order to find its views on the existent self because
most of their attention is paid to the non-existent self, be it selfsufficiency, true establishment, inherent existence, etc. In his
Blaze of Reasoning Bhavaviveka says that to prove to him that
the mental consciousness is the self would be a case of proving
what he already accepted. Bhavaviveka also says that since
the mental consciousness takes rebirth, it is called the self.
Jam-yang-shay-ba takes the latter to mean that for Bhavaviveka
the mental consciousness is the self, not just its basis of designation, since Bhavaviveka says that it is unnecessary to prove to
him that the mental consciousness is the person. Also, Bhavaviveka says that the senses and the body are the basis of the designation 'self. T h u s , (GM, 475a.4) for him there are two types of
selves, a temporary one such as a human merely designated to
the aggregates and a continual one which is a subtle type of
mental consciousness that has travelled ceaselessly in all types
of lives and therefore (according to Kensur Lekden) exists even
during deep sleep, fainting, and meditative absorption in cessation. Still, Bhavaviveka is not teaching that yogis should engage
in a particular type of practice in order to identify this everpresent consciousness as the self; the mental consciousness
which he considers to be the person is subtle, and neither he nor
anyone else puts forth practices aimed centrally at realizing or
making manifest this subtle form of consciousness.
According to Kensur Lekden, Jam-yang-shay-ba told his own
students that if a hypothetical Bhavaviveka asked a Prasangika
why the mental consciousness could not be the self, the Prasangika would have difficulty replying. For the mental consciousness travels from life to life right through to the attainment of
Buddhahood, and even the Prasangikas say that 'mind-only'
sometimes literally means that the mind is the main creator.
Notes
901
However, the Prasangikas say that the reasoning that the selves
would be as many as the many moments of the mental consciousness opposes asserting that the mental consciousness is
the person. T h e person and the mental consciousness are
related as object imputed and basis of imputation; therefore,
the I is not the mental consciousness.
In a similar vein, Dzong-ka-ba and Jam-yang-shay-ba say that
the Chittamatrins following Asanga assert the mind-basis-of-all
(a subtle consciousness much like Bhavaviveka's subtle type of
mental consciousness), which is substantially existent, as the
person and thus as the substantially existent person (dravyasatpudgala, rdzasyod kyigang zag). Like Bhavaviveka, Asanga says
that the person itself imputedly exists, but, in this interpretation, that which is the person substantially exists. (The main
difference between Asanga's mind-basis-of-all and Bhavaviveka's subtle mental consciousness is that the former is the
repository of the seeds which produce the appearance of external objects whereas the latter does not have this function
because for Bhavaviveka there are external objects.) Still, it is
difficult to find any passage in Chittamatrin literature which
proclaims that the mind-basis-of-all is a substantially existent
self. Also, the Sutra Unravelling the Thought {Jang, 206.10) is
often quoted to show that the mind-basis-of-all should not be conceived as a self: 'I do not teach this [mind-basis-of-all] to children
because they would take it as a self.' Jam-yang-shay-ba's commentary is that Buddha is referring to conception of the mindbasis-of-all as a self-sufficient substantially existent person (rang
rkya thub pa'i rdzas yod kyi gang zag). Although the mind-basisof-all is substantially existent and thus capable of being apprehended self-sufficiently (rang rkya 'dzin thub pa'i rdzas yod), it
is not a self-sufficient person like a controller.
Dak-tsang, however, argues that there is no Buddhist school
which says that a mind is the person. Dak-tsang accuses Dzongka-ba of committing the absurdity of saying on the one hand
that the Chittamatrins do not accept that the self is substantially
existent in the sense of being self-sufficient and saying on the
other hand that they accept that the mind-basis-of-all is substantially existent and is the self. T h e Ge-luk-ba answer is that for
the Chittamatrins the person itself is not substantially existent,
but the consciousness which is the illustration of the person is
902
Meditation on Emptiness
substantially existent. Technically (GM, 476.2), the illustrationisolate of the person (gang zaggigzhi Idog) substantially exists,
but the self-isolate of the person (gang zaggi rang Idog) does not.
As Jang-gya (Jang, 190.7) says, ' . . . the Proponents of True
Existence and below [that is, non-Buddhists] assert that there
must be something self-sufficiently substantially existent as the
basis of designation of imputedly existent things . . . ' It is only
the Prasartgikas who do not require this.
T h e gist is that the Chittamatrins do not accept the existence
of the self as it is usually conceived, but do accept the substantial existence of a consciousness which performs all the functions of rebirth and thus is a self. In practice, the Chittamatrins
present a HTnayana path which concentrates on the nonexistence of a substantially existent self and a Mahayana one
which centers around the non-difference of entity between
subject and object; there are no special reasonings aimed at discovering the mind-basis-of-all as the actual self.
Have these distinctions between self-isolate, illustrationisolate, and so forth made it impossible to reflect on the ^ s u b stantiality of the person according to the lower systems? How
could one meditate on the self-isolate of the person and not the
illustration-isolate (the thing that is the person)? Is it possible to
zero in on the person devoid of everything that is it, recognize
that we have been conceiving it to exist substantially, and
realize that it does not? Is the 'self-isolate of the person' so
abstract that it reduces a most profound and emotionally trying
meditation to mere superficial intellectual verbiage? Or is there
something inside us, quite familiar, that corresponds to this
term and the identification of which is aided by such hairsplitting distinctions?
T h e pressing question is: Why not say that the lower schools
present a path to realization of the non-inherent existence of the
person but are not able to extend this realization to other phenomena? One would have to say that they are blocked from
making the extension that everything lacks inherent existence
by views that it would be an extreme of nihilism to go so far and
thus hold that the person does not inherently exist but its basis
of designation must. After all, realizing that the Atlantic Ocean
is deep does not mean that you realize that the Pacific Ocean is
deep!
Notes
903
I believe that the answer to this revolves around what realization of emptiness means. As Aryadeva says, the viewer (or
person realizing the emptiness) of one thing is capable of realizing the emptiness of all things. As the Dalai Lama said in lectures on Dzong-ka-ba's Middling Exposition of the Stages of the
Path in 1972, if you want to test your supposed realization of
the emptiness of the person, switch to another object such as
your head and see if the same realization of emptiness applies to
it. He said that if it does not, you have realized something more
coarse. T h u s , even though, when a yogi realizes that whatever
is not findable in the seven ways is not inherently existent, he
does not at that time realize the absence of inherent existence of
all phenomena, superimpositions contrary to such realization
are removed. Therefore, a person capable of realizing the
emptiness of inherent existence of the person is capable of
realizing the absence of inherent existence of any phenomenon
as long as the functioning of that first consciousness has not
diminished. Also, because the person is imputed in dependence
upon the aggregates, there would be no way to realize the
emptiness of inherent existence of the object imputed (the person) without removing the superimposition that the bases of its
designation (the mental and physical aggregates) inherently
exist. Hence, there is no way to say that the lower schools
realize the emptiness of inherent existence with respect to the
person but not with respect to other phenomena, in which case
what they realize must be coarser. Since the meaning of inherent existence implies that the object can be found under analysis, those schools must be holding that objects, even the self,
can be found under analysis. Even though they make a distinction between imputed and substantially existent objects, the
former must, in the end, have the latter as their basis of designation. Hence, even the self or person has a substantially existent
phenomenon as its basis of designation, and since the person is
findable under analysis, that substantially existent phenomenon must be the person. What they refute is that the person, in
isolation, substantially exists.
792
793
P5256, Vol. 96 36.4.5. Jang, 431.1, has brjodpa for dranpa.
See previous note. In GM (475b. 1-3) Jam-yang-shay-ba says
that this passage posits consciousness as the self that continuously takes rebirth and indicates (1) that the mere collection of
904
794
795
796
797
798
Meditation on Emptiness
the body and senses is the self and (2) that the five aggregates—
the body and so forth—are the basis of designation of the self,
just as, for example, (1) the mere collection of the parts of a
chariot is the chariot and (2) its parts are the basis of designation. Here, he words it slightly differently, indicating that the
collection is the basis of designation and thus is the phenomenon designated.
P5256, Vol. 96 36.4.6. Throughout this series of consequences
Jam-yang-shay-ba is operating based on Dak-tsang's actual
assertions, drawing them out so as to contrast their full import
with Dzong-ka-ba's teachings. This is not a case of pinning a
fancied extension of an assertion on Dak-tsang and then drawing absurd contradictions, as sometimes is the case.
Brackets in the root text are from Ann, dbu 129a.6.
GT, ca 40a.5ff.
It is not that Dak-tsang manifestly asserts that in the Prasangika
system there are autonomous syllogisms. Quite the contrary, he
asserts (Dak, 76a.4, Thim-phu edition 227.4) that it is contradictory to say that there are no autonomous proof statements
and still hold that there is inference. Jam-yang-shay-ba feels
that Dak-tsang must hold that there are proofs, whereby, due to
his own assertion, he is forced to assert that there are even
autonomous syllogisms in Prasangika. It is over-play that, for
me, falls flat.
Prasaiigikas do not accept that the subject, reason, example,
and so forth, of a syllogism appear similarly to a Madhyamika
and a non-Madhyamika. For the Prasaiigikas, a valid cognizer
which seems to an opponent to establish the subject, etc., is
non-existent in the way that the opponent asserts it because a
non-Madhyamika views a valid cognizer as certifying that the
object is inherently existent, but for a Prasangika nothing
inherently exists. In this way, there can be no common establishment.
However, when Prasaiigikas debate among themselves, the
subject, etc., are accepted as appearing similarly to both parties
in the sense that both assert that the subject and so forth are certified by valid cognizers that are not valid with respect to the
inherent existence of the object. As mentioned earlier (p.51112), there is no way to have commonly appearing subjects with
respect to proving emptiness even when Prasaiigikas debate
Notes
905
among themselves, because if they can understand that the subject and so forth are established by a valid cognizer that is not
valid with respect to the inherent existence of the object, they
have come to be able to distinguish between existence and
inherent existence and this can only be done upon having
realized emptiness. In that case, there is no need to prove
emptiness to such a person. As Dzong-ka-ba's Essence of the
Good Explanations (194.17 Varanasi 1973 edition) says:
If the subject is posited as established by a conceptual or
non-conceptual mistaken consciousness which is such
that [the object] does not exist in accordance with how it
appears to be established by way of its own character,
then the meaning of the absence of inherent existence—
the probandum—has already been established. Therefore, how could [such a person] be suitable as another
party for whom that would have to be proved?
T h u s , Jam-yang-shay-ba appears to contradict Dzong-ka-ba
here when he speaks of commonly appearing subjects within
the context of two Prasarigikas' examining emptiness. However, in the Four Interwoven Commentaries (536.5-7.2) he indicates that a Proponent of T r u e Existence who has discarded his
assertion of inherent existence and become a full-fledged second
party about to realize the absence ofinherent existence simultaneously has become someone for whom dependent-arising is a
reason having the three modes of presence in the subject, pervasion, and counter-pervasion. T h u s , that person has ascertained
with valid cognition that whatever is a dependent-arising is
necessarily without inherent existence and is about to realize
the particular subject, such as I, as not existing inherently. Jamyang-shay-ba is saying that at that point the other party has
become a Prasarigika due to realizing that whatever is a dependent-arising is without inherent existence but has not realized
emptiness, though just about to. It is only in such a hair-splitting
situation, however, that he can speak of commonly appearing
subjects within the context of two Prasangikas' examining
emptiness.
799
T h e source for this appendix is mainly the oral teachings of
Kensur Lekden. T h e teaching is standard to that part of the
study of the Collected Topics of Valid Cognition (bsDus grva)
906
Meditation on Emptiness
called 'Awareness and Knowledge' (bLo rig). See Lati Rinbochay's and Elizabeth Napper's Mind in Tibetan Buddhism,
(London: Rider and Co., 1980), for a full discussion.
800 See n.174 for the sources for this appendix.
801 Ann, dngos 16b.
802 Paul Demieville, 'L'origine des sectes bouddhiques d'apres
Paramartha', Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques, premier volume
(1931-2), p.19.
803 GT, kha 6b.
804 Anton Schiefner, Geschichte Des Buddhismus in Indien (St.
Petersburg, 1869), p.206 of text and p.270 of translation.
805 GT, kha 7a.
806 Schiefner (see n.804), p.271 of translation.
807 Blaze of Reasoning, P5256, Vol. 96 68.4.3.
808 GT, kha 6b.5.
809 Bimala C. Law, trans., ' T h e Chronicle of the Island of Ceylon,
or the Dlpavamsa', The Ceylon Historical Journal, Vol. VII
(1957-8), pp.162-4. Wilhelm Geiger, trans., The Mahavamsa,
or the Great Chronicle of Ceylon (London: Pali Text Society,
1934), pp.26-7. For an excellent discussion of the eighteen
schools and the different interpretations of their origins see
Andre Bareau's Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Vehicule
(Saigon: Ecole Fran^aise D'extreme-Orient, 1955).
810 T h e main source for this appendix is Pur-bu-)"ok's (Phur-bu-lcog
Byams-pa-rgya-mtsho, 1825-1901) Presentation of Collected
Topics of Prime Cognition, Revealing the Meaning of the Texts on
Prime Cognition, Magical Key to the Path of Reasoning (Tshad
ma'i gzhung don 'byed pa'i bsdus grva'i mam bzhag rigs lam
'phrulgyi Ide mig), specifically the section on T h e Greater Path
of Reasoning (Rigs lam che ba) [modern blockprint, no publication data], 23a.6-36a.4. Only material concordant with Prasangika has been used. Dzong-ka-ba makes a similar presentation
in his Essence of the Good Explanations, 239.1-41.17, Varanasi
1973 edition.
811 GM 238b.6ff. T h e material in this appendix is taken from the
oral teachings of Geshe Gediin Lodro.
Tibetan Text
for Part Six
Tibetan Text
REMARKS
As mentioned on pp. 567-9, !the basis for this critical edition of Jamyang-shay-ba's text is a hand-written copy made at the Go-mang College of the Dre-bung Monastic University in M u n d g o d , N. Kanara,
Karnataka State, India, in 1970. It was first compared with three other
editions of the same basic edition (see pp. 691-3), and the many source
quotes from Indian Buddhist texts were compared with the Peking edition (Suzuki Research Foundation, Tokyo-Kyoto, 1956) of the canon.
Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations, which identify and correct many
mis-printings, were used throughout. T h e shortened quotations were
restored to full length, mainly using the Peking edition; these are
indicated by a broken underline and brackets in the text. T h e restorations comprise approximately one third of the final text.
Fortunately, the Dra-shi-kyil edition, which is better in many respects than the other basic edition (see pp. 691 -3), was subsequently published with minor corrections by Ngawang Gelek Demo (The Collected Works of 'Jam-dbyans-bzad-pa, Vol. 14, N e w Delhi, beginning in
1972), allowing comparison with it. T h e result is the first corrected edition of these pages of Jam-yang-shay-ba's text with all quotes restored to
full length, making this an anthology of Prasaftgika literature.
T h e numbers beneath lines in the text refer to the emendations and
variant readings given in notes following the text. T h e Tibetan letters
in parentheses under a line indicate a note in Nga-wang-bel-den's
910
Meditation on Emptiness
Annotations (see Bibliography). All poetry is given with a separate
line for each 'foot' beginning from the margin, except for Jam-yangshay-ba's root text which is also indented. T h e bracketed material
without underline was added for the sake of clarification.
With respect to the root text of the Great Exposition of Tenets (written in 1689), there are four versions in the Collected Works:
1 Volume 1, 750-802, with brief annotations which are presumably
by Jam-yang-shay-ba himself but perhaps are notes taken by a student; the section corresponding to that given here is found on
789.1-92.4.
2 Volume 3, 807-52, with brief annotations that differ from the former in many places, perhaps taken down by another student but
done in the same style; the section corresponding to that given
here is found on 840.5-44.1.
3 Volume 14, 1-31, with no annotations; the section corresponding
to that given here is found on 22.4-4.6.
4 Volume 14, scattered throughout 33-1091, this being Jam-yangshay-ba's own lengthy commentary in which he cites the entire
root text. (Differences among these four editions are miniscule
with respect to the portion of the root text relevant here.)
More helpful than these two very brief sets of annotations are the
word commentary to the root text given at the end of each chapter in Ngawang-bel-den's Annotations (the corresponding section being Ann
dbu 176b.8-29.6) and Lo-sang-gon-chok's (bLo-bzang-dkon-mchog)
White Crystal Mirror, Word Commentary on the Root Text of (Jamyang-shay-ba's) 'Tenets' (Grub mtha' rtsa ba'i tshig tik shal dkar me
long) found in Three Commentaries on the Grub mtha' rtsa ba gdon Ina 'i
sgra dbyahs of 'Jam-dbyahs-bzad-pa'i-rdo-rje Nag-dbah-brtson-'grus
(Delhi: Chophel Legden, 1978), the corresponding section being
216.2-42.3. (In the Three Commentaries the first commentary is Losang-gon-chok's text; the second is the elaboration of contents extracted from Jam-yang-shay-ba's own commentary; and the third is Ngawang-bel-den's Annotations.)
T h e text of Jam-yang-shay-ba's commentary, the Great Exposition
of Tenets, corresponding to that part of the twelfth chapter translated
here was written out after the initial editing by Lobsang Dorje
in Madison, Wisconsin, in September, 1971. Alterations were subsequently made upon comparison with the Ngawang Gelek Dra-shikyil edition, finishing in 1983.
968
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Meditation on Emptiness
Page &
Emended to
Line Was
la
las
2.9
kyis
kyi
6.8
la sogs
6.14 las sogs
7.4
{NG 897.4 reads: rim pa gnyis pa'i)
gis
7.5
gi
dpal rnam rol
8.13 dpal rol
9.13 'phreng ba dang phreng dang
10.1
10.9
11.6
11.10
12.9
13.6
13.12
13.14
14.13
15.3
15.14
18.3
21.8
21.11
21.12
22.1
(twice)
28 24.1
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
24.2
26.15
29.1
31.10
35.2
36.9
37.2
37.15
40.2
40.8
40.12
'phreng
las gtan tshigs
legs
kyis
kyi
ces pa'i
kyis
de'i
dris
(NG 901.6 reads:
don gang
rtogs pa
stan
chos kyis
stan
phreng
las bstan tshig
lag
kyi
kyis
ces pas
kyi
'di'i
bris
zin mi)
don gnyis gang
rtog pa
bstan
chos kyi
bstan
gsungs
mas kun btags
rang
dbang
yang
kyis gdung bshad kyi gdung chad
po'i
so so'i
kyis
kyi
kyis
kyi
gyis*
gyi
thug
thugs
brtag
btag
(bracketed addition)
byed po
byed pa
rtogs
rtog
gsung
mas rang
Source
NG 895.1
Jang 285.14
NG 897.3
ed
NG 898.3
GTca 42a.5; Ann
dbu 13b.4
IBID
NG 899.3
Vol. 95 Contents
NG 899.6
NG 900.3
NG 900.5
ed
NG 901.1
NG 901.5
NG
NG
NG
NG
NG
902.2
902.4
904.1
904.2
904.2
NG 904.3
NG 905.3
NG 905.3
Ann dbu 62a.8
NG 907.3
NG 907.4
ed
Vol. 29 50.3.2
NG 908.4
NG 909.1
GL
NG 910.3
Vol. 98 103.1.8
Emendations
Page &
Line Was
Emended to
[ci'i phyir]
40 41.11
41.11 gzugs kyi bkal bar gzugs sogs kyang
41
bkar stsal bar
42.1 su yang
su snang
42
43.2 'phreng
43 43.11,
44
43.12 rten
45 44.7 kyi
brten
kyis
46 44.7
pa'i
pa las
47 44.8
48 44.8
gsung
'das kyi
gsungs
'das kyis
49 44.9 ba de mam
50 46.15 kyi
phreng
ba rnam
kyis
969
Source
Ann dbu 65b.3
NG 911.1
NG 911.2; Vol. 29
53.4.2
see 9.13
Vol. 129 181.2.3
NG 912.2; Vol.
98 131.1.4; Vol.
29 39.5.5
Vol. 98 136.1.4, 5;
Vol. 29 39.5.6
IBID; NG 912.2
Vol. 98 136.1.4,
5; Vol. 29 39.5.6
IBID
Vol. 98 136.2.7;
Vol. 29 40.2.1
51 47.6 (NG 912.5 reads: 'gyur bas drang)
52 48.11 (NG 913.2 reads: rang bzhin du; Vol 98 127.1.8 reads:
rang bzhin rjes)
NG 913.3; Vol.
48.13
rigs
rig
53
98 127.2.1; GM
458b. 1
GM 464a.3
[ltar]
54 51.7
NG
914.4
bshad
do
55 52.6 bshad de
Vol.
153 205.1.8
rdzas
btags
gnyis
56 56.12 rdzas gnyis
NG
915.6;
Ann
ngos
57 58.5 dngos
dbu 127b.7
NG 916.2; see
58 58.11,
59.2, 59.3, etc.
58.13 brtags
btags
NG
916.4; Vol.
rtog
59 59.9 rtogs
95 136.2.1; see
59.13, 59.14
NG
917.1; Vol.
kyis
60 68.15 kyi
23 199.3.4
N G 917.1
61 69.1 gsung
gsungs
970
Meditation on Emptiness
71
72
73
74
75
76
Line
69.4
70.1
70.2
70.5
70.8
70.13
71.4
71.8
72.11,
73.1
74.1
74.7
75.1
75.5
75.8
76.9
77
78
79
80
81
76.12
77.5
77.8
77.11
78.12
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
82 79.6
83 79.13
84
85
86
87
88
89
80.2
80.14
80.14
80.15
81.4
81.6
90 81.10
91 81.15
Source
Emended to
Was
(NG 917.2 reads: zhes pa'i)
lta.ma yin par sher NG 917.4
ltar sher
NG 917.5
rtog
rtogs
NG
917.5
gyis
gyi
NG 917.6
bya ste
byas te
Vol. 98 270.3.7
las grub
las ma grub
(NG 918.2 reads: smos pa)
Vol. 99 260.4.5
de yi
de'i*
Vol. 95 112.2.3,
112.2.4
par shin tu che
par che
NG 919.2
rtog
rtogs
(NG 919.4 mis-reads: bsten)
ed
gyis
gyi
GL
['dra]
(Vol. 98 103.1.8 reads 'dir)
NG 920.3; see
gzegs
gzigs
77.6
Vol. 98 256.1.8
kyi
kyis
NG 920.6
kyi
kyis
NG 921.1
gdags
gdag
NG 921.2
du
tu
NG 921.5; Ann
gyis
gyi
dbu 128a.4
NG 922.1; Vol.
de yi
de'i*
103 21.3.6
NG 922.2; see
thug
thugs
80.12
ed (context)
myu gu
rgyu
NG 922.6
gyis
gyi
NG 922.6
lan
len
ed
nyid las
nyid la
NG 923.1
med par
med pa
NG 923.2; Ann
gu mthong
gu ma mthong
dbu 70b.4
NG
923.3; Vol.
gis
gi
95 75.1.6
Vol. 98 93.4.7,
ni
nyid*
101.3.4
Emendations
Page &
Line
Was
92 83.8 las
93 83.12 rgyu
Emended to
la
rgyud
94 83.13 la
las
95 84.3
bu
bus
96 84.15 (NG 924.2 reads: byed pa)
king
97 85.4 keng
gyis
98 85.6 gyi
99
100
101
102
103
104
85.14
87.9
87.12
88.13
88.14
89.3
gis
na
gyis
105
106
107
108
109
110
89.3
90.4
90.13
91.4
91.8
91.13
gyis
skyer
thugs
gyis
la
gi
nas
gyi
gis
gi
(NG 925.4 mis -reads: 'khrul)
sa
sa
gyi
skyed
thug
yi
gyi
las
yis
111 92.2
grangs
grang
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
gyi
ba'i
skyes
gyis
bas
skye
gis
ma'i
kyi
de nyid
92.5
92.11
94.7
95.8
95.12
95,13
96.6
gi
mas
kyis
de'i rang 'grel
119 96.10 skye
120 98.5 mig gis
121 98.7 ba la
kye
mig gi
ba'i sgra la
971
Source
NG 923.5
NG 923.5; see
85.6
NG 923.6; Ann
dbu 127a.8
NG 924.1, Vol.
95 8.1.1
Vol. 98 121.5.4
NG 924.4; see
85.8
Vol. 95 3.1.6
NG 924.6
NG 925.1
NG 925.4
Vol. 34 p.7
Contents
NG 925.5
NG 926.3
NG 926.5
NG 926.6
NG 927.1
NG 927.2; Vol.
98 137.3.5
NG 927.3; Ann
dbu 128b.4
NG 921A
ed
Go-mang scribe
NG 929.1
ed
ed
ed (still from root
text)
Ann dbu.73b.4
Vol. 98 3.3.7
Vol. 98 3.3.8
972
Meditation on Emptiness
Page &
Was
Line
gnyis
122 98.8
Emended to
nyid
123 98.9
124 98.10
125 98.11
gyis
gcig gis
gis
126 99.10
127 99.12
128 101.1
(NG 931.2 mis-reads: zhan pa'i)
re re i
re l
she
zhe
129 101.15 na
130 102.1 rten
131 102.6 dbu ma snying
po las
132 104.6 gyis
133 104.15 kyi
134 105.1 gi
135 105.2 du
136 105.6 pa las
137 105.8 (NG 933.6 reads:
138 106.6 'jigs
139 106.6, 106.12, 106.15
tsantra'i
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
gyi
gcig gi
gi
la
brten
dbu ma las
gyi
kyis
gis
tu
pa'i 'grel pa las
pa 'di ni)
'jig
Source
NG 930.3; Vol.
98 3.3.8
NG 930.3
ed
NG 930.4; Vol.
98 13.3.8
NG 931.2
NG 931.4; Vol.
101 76.4.3
NG 932.3
NG 932.4
Ann dbu 74a.7
Vol. 98 78.2.3
NG 933.4
ed
NG 933.5
NG 933.6
NG 934.3
Vol. 140 p.l
Contents
(pp. 106-14: In the Ngawang Gelek edition the virama is used
under the final consonant in tuk, nany, yap, lyap, ghany, pad,
samut, k, s, as, and t. However, it is not used with krt, alam,
I, pit, ruj, vish, sprsh, uch, gh, p, am, mut, sam, or sup for no
explicable reason; thus, it has been added to these.)
Vol. 140 45.2.8
106.8 ktva
ktvâ
Vol. 140 45.2.8
106.8 ming
meng
106.10, 106.14, 108.5
Vol. 140 46.2.1
krit
krt
etc.
106.11 kta
ktvä
Vol. 140 45.3.8
106.11 ming
meng
Vol. 140 45.3.8
106.12, 106.13, 106.14, 106.15
ed
ktva
ktva
tsandra'i
Emendations
Page &
Line
Was
147 106.13 nanya
Emended to
nany
ka lä pa'i
148 106.14 ka la pa ltar
149 107.1,
107.3 tu ka
150 107.8 a ka ni a ka la
rings pos
151 107.9, 107.12, 108.4
rtsa ba'i
tsa ba'i
152 107.10 bzhi
bnyis
153 107.12 pa'i por
154 107.12 sus
pa'i dang por
sup'i
tuk
ak'i ak la ring
ngo
155 107.14 (NG 935.3 reads: si)
156 108.1,
108.2 pa da
pad
157 108.4 gha nya
ghany
158 108.5
159 108.6
160 108.8
pad du dza bi
sha u ca
bying sad
phyis a
161 108.8 kyis
162 108.10 po 'os*
pad rudz vish
sprsh uts
byings pad
phyis gh'i srog
gi a
kyi
po'o zhes
163 108.10 (NG 935.5 mis-reads: s sa dzu)
164 108.11 tu'o
ru'os
165 108.11 sa'itu
s ni ru
973
Source
NG 934.5; Vol.
140 13.4.7
NG 934.5
NG 934.6; see
107.4
Vol. 140 12.1.4
NG 935.2 and .4;
'Chandrapa',i.e.,
Chandragomin
ed (location of
source)
NG 935.2
NG 935.2; Vol.
140 6.1.2
NG 935.3
NG 935.4; Vol.
140 4.3.6
NG 935.4; Vol.
140 45.1.3
NG 935.4
NG 935.5
NG 935.5
Vol. 140 6.2.5;
ed for zhes
NG 935.6; Vol.
140 15.5.6 misreads rung go,
but Sanskrit is
obvious
ed; NG 935.6
reads: s .(with
virama) sa ru
974
Meditation on Emptiness
Page &
Was
Line
166 108.11 ha sha la'ng
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
Emended to
hash la yang
Source
ed; NG 935.6: ha
sha l'ng; Vol.
140 12.1.6: has
la yang
NG 935.6
pa'i u rtags
re pha'i)
byas/ sa)
NG 936.2
de
'byung ba la 'jug NG 936.2
NG 936.3
mut
NG 936.4; Vol.
kyi
98 3.3.3
NG 936.4; Vol.
to
110.5 no
98 3.3.3
110.5 (NG 936.4 reads: zhes gsungs so)
110.9, 111.5, 113.15, 116.13, 118.2, 119.1 1, 123.1, 132.13,
136.14, 143.11, 146.2, 149.5
NG 936.5, etc.;
tshig
tshigs
Vol. 98 Contents
NG 936.5
stod
110.9 stong
NG 936.6
kyi
110.13 kyis
Vol. 98 3.3.4
111.2 'jigs
'jig
NG 937.2; Vol.
111.12 'jigs
'jig
96 169.5.8
ed
kvip
112.12 kvis
ed
pas
112.13 kas
ed; NG 937.3
112.13 pa
P
reads: ba
NG
937.3; see
'brel
112.13 'grel
106.5
112.13,
ed
t
112.14 ta
ed
pas
112.14 kas
113.10,
see 113.7
tshig sdud
113.11 tshigs sdus
see 113.8
brten
113.13 rten
NG 938.1; see
te lyap ki
113.14 te kyi
115.10
108.12
108.13
108.14
109.3
109.6
110.2
110.4
pa'i rtags
(NG 935.6 reads:
(NG 935.6 reads:
da
'byung 'jug
mud
kyis
Emendations
Page &
Was
Line
190 114.1 gis
Emended to
191 117.2
192 117.4
par 'byung ba'i
du min
par gyi
du yang min
193 117.6
194 117.8
'brel par
ganga'i
'brel bar
ganga'i
195 119.6 khas mi blang
196 121.13 pa rjod
gi
khas blang
pa yang brjod
[zhes so]
197 121.14
198 121.14 NG 940.3 reads: ci ste yang)
199 122.1 mi lha
ma he
200 122.8
201
202
203
204
122.14
124.6
124.7
124.8
gis
gi
sgra
kyi
tsam ma yin
pa'i 'grel pa las
sgrar
kyis
tsam yin
pa las
205 125.9 gyis
206 125.13 tsangs
207 126.4 rigs pas
208 127.9
209 128.1
210 128.3
gyi
tshang
rig pa
(NG 943.2 reads: ma yin par)
(NG 943.4 reads: pa"di la)
bzhin
gzhan
211 128.4 rten
212 129.7 rten
213 129.13 gis
brten
brten
gi
975
Source
NG 938.1; Vol.
98 3.3.5
See n.705
NG 938.6; Vol.
98 3.4.7
NG 938.6
NG 938.1; Vol.
98 3.3.2
see 120.7
NG 940.3; Vol.
98 4.1.1
ed. (end of quote)
NG 940.4; Ann
dbu 76b. 1
(which is
misnumbered as
77b. 1)
NG 940.5; Vol.
95 11.4.1
NG 940.6
NG 941.3
ed (context)
ed (not the
comm., but the
basic text)
Vol. 98 270.3.5
NG 942.2
Vol. 129 237.5.7;
NG 942.3 reads:
rig pas
NG 943.4; Ann
dbu 129a. 3
Ann dbu 129a.3
NG 944.2
NG 944.4; see
129.14
976 Meditation on Emptiness
Page &
Was
Line
214 129.14 sogs bzhag
215 130.3 'jigs
Emended to
sogs su bzhag
216 130.7 gis
217 130.15 kyi
gi
kyis
218 131.3
kyi
kyis
219 131.4
zag gis
zag gi
220 131.7
221 132.1
222 132.7
rtog
rtogs
(NG 945.5 reads: nga yir)
kyi s
kyi
'jig
223 132.7 (NG 946.1 mis-reads: pa'i)
224 132.9,
skal
132.15 bskal
225 133.7 ngar 'dzin lhan nga yi bar 'dzin
pa lhan
gsungs
226 133.7 gsung
dpyod
227 133.12 spyod
rtog
228 134.2 rtogs
rtsva
229 134.3 rtsa
bzhi
230 134.8 gsum
Source
NG 944.4
NG 944.5; Vol.
98 141.2.3
Vol. 98 109.3.4
NG 945.1; Vol.
156 65.5.8
NG 945.2; Vol.
156 66.1.1
NG 945.2; Vol.
156 66.1.1
NG 945.3
NG 946.1; Vol.
156 66.1.2
NG 946.1, .3
See n.741
NG 946.4
GM 241a.3
NG 947.1
NG 947.1
ed (location of
source)
NG 947.4; Vol.
rtag
231 135.2 bdag
98 104.1.8
GM 481a.5
232 135.14 chos dang gzugs chos nga gzugs
GL
'du
233 136.9 'dus
mtshan mar
NG 948.6
234 137.2 mtshan mor
NG 948.6; Vol.
'du
235 137.3 'dud
98 53.3.2
236 138.3 (NG 949.1 reads: po 'o chu 'dres pa bzhin)
ed (possessive)
kyi
237 139.1 kyi s
NG
950.1
phung
po
ma
140.9
phung
ma
238
med [bdag la
239 141.2 med ces
rnam par shes
pa med] ces
ed (parallelism)
Emendations
Page &
Line
Was
240 141.14 mkhar
241
242
243
244
142.1
142.1
143.6
143.12
245 145.5
246 146.14
247 147.8
248 147.14
249 149.10
250 149.13
251 150.3
Emended to
'khar
977
Source
Vol. 98 145.4.7;
Ann dbu 87a. 1
nyid med pas de nyid kyis de
Ann dbu 84b.8
rten
brten
ed
thai ste
thai ba ste
NG 951.4
rtogs
rtog
NG 951.6; Vol.
98 53.1.8
(add in also inside the bracket with broken underline:
zhes bya ba la sogs pa dbu ma la 'jug pa las rgyas par
rnam par dpyad pa byas pa las khong du chud par
bya ste/ 'dir ni spros pa rgyas par mi brtsam mo//de
ltar re zhig phung po bdag ma yin no//)
la
las
ed
rigs
NG 952.6; Vol.
rig
98 145.4.7
kyi
kyis
ed (see 147.15)
'phreng
phreng
NG 953.6
l'ang
yang
Ann dbu 67b.7;
Vol. 129 175.2.7
reads: l'ang
min pa'i
de yi
Ann dbu 87a.7;
Vol. 129 175.3.1
252 152.9,
153.2 rtogs
rtog
253 153.4
tshogs bdag
tshogs dag
254 153.5
tshogs bdag gis
tshogs pa bdag
255 154.2
256 154.8
gyis
kyis
gi
gyi
kyi
NG 955.2, .4;
Vol. 96 p.l
Contents
Vol. 96 36.4.6;
GM 475a.6
NG 955.5
NG 956.2
NG 956.3
List of Charts
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
Modes of Existence 39
Faults of Meditative Stabilization and their Antidotes 72
States and Factors in Achieving Calm Abiding 81
Path of Seeing 97
Innate Afflictions Forsaken on the Path of Meditation in
Terms of the Three Realms and Nine Levels 105
Eight Levels of Approaching and Abiding 107
Divisions of the Selfless 213
Divisions of Existents 215
Divisions of Permanent Phenomena 217
Divisions of Things 220
Divisions of Forms 221
Divisions of Visible Forms 223
Divisions of Colors 224
Divisions of Shapes 226
Divisions of Sounds 227
Divisions of Odors 228
Divisions of Tastes 228
Divisions of Tangible Objects 229
Divisions of Forms for the Mental Consciousness 233
Divisions of Consciousness 235
Divisions of Minds 237
Divisions of Mental Factors 238
Divisions of Omnipresent Mental Factors 239
980
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
Meditation on Emptiness
Divisions of Determining Mental Factors 246
Divisions of Virtuous Mental Factors 248
Divisions of Root Afflictions 256
Divisions of Afflicted Views 259
Divisions of Secondary Afflictions 262
Divisions of Changeable Mental Factors 267
Divisions of Non-Associated Compositional Factors 268
Divisions of Non-Person Non-Associated
Compositional Factors 270
The Five Aggregates 271
The Eighteen Constituents 273
The Twelve Sources 274
Buddha's Explicit Teaching in the 'Rice Seedling Sutra' of One
Round of a Twelve-Membered Dependent-Arising
279
Principal Objects of Meditation 298
Self 299
Obstructions 300
Selflessness 301
Divisions of Vaibhashika into Eighteen Schools 340
Types of Awareness 702
A Version of Buddha's Implicit Teaching According to
Asanga (two lives, one unit) 708
A Version of Buddha's Implicit Teaching According to
Asanga (three lives, one unit) 709
A Version of Buddha's Implicit Teaching According to
Asanga (two lives, two units) 710
A Version of Buddha's Implicit Teaching According to
Asanga (three lives, two units) 711
Bhavaviveka's First Rendition of the Eighteen
Vaibhashika Schools 714
Bhavaviveka's Second Rendition of the Eighteen
Vaibhashika Schools 715
Vasumitra's Rendition of the Eighteen
Vaibhashika Schools 716
Vimtadeva's Rendition of the Eighteen
Vaibhashika Schools 717
Padmasambhava's Rendition of the Eighteen
Vaibhashika Schools
718
The Rendition of the Eighteen Vaibhashika Schools according
to the 'Drpavamsa' and 'Mahavamsa' 719
Index
Abhayakara, 388
Abhidharmakosha, see Treasury
of Higher Knowledge
Abhidharmakoshabhashya, see
Explanation of the 'Treasury
of Knowledge'
Abhidharmakoshatika, see
Commentary on (Vasubandhu's)
'Treasury of Knowledge'
Abhidharmasamuchchaya, see
Compendium of Knowledge
Abhisamayalamkara, see
Ornament for Clear
Realization
Abhyagirikas, 717, 718
Able to establish itself(tshugs thub
tu grub pa), 36, 172-3, 676
Absolute Truth, unsuitability as
a translation term, 419-20
Absorption of cessation, 207,
269, 270
Achintyastava, see Praise of the
Inconceivable
Action, complete path of, 276
Action Tantra, 112
Activities of mind, eighteen,
627, 628
'Advice to Kätyäyana', 598
Affirming negatives, 133, 459,
467-8, Appendix 4 pp.723-5
Affixing a qualification to the
object of negation, 135-6,
144-8, 159-60, 501-4, 655,
658
Affixing the qualification
'ultimately' in Svätantrika,
500-5
Afflicted mind, 384-5
Afflicted view, 256, 258-61,
Chart 27 p.259
Afflictions, see Root afflictions
and Secondary afflictions
Afflictive obstructions, 297ff,
342-3, see also Obstructions to
liberation
Aggregates, five, 201, 271-2,
984
Meditation on Emptiness
Aggregates (cont.)
Chart 32 p.271, 278, 285
Aishvaras, 239, 318, 613
Akshayamatinirdesha, see Teaching of Akshayamati Sutra
Akutobhaya, 360, n.366 p.818,
_n.414 p.823
Alayavijnana, see Mind-basisof-all
Alayavijnana, etymology, 617
Analysis, 267-8
need for and purpose of,
30-4, 188, 200, 409-10,
529, 555-6, 560
Analytical cessations, 217, 218,
344, 390, n.191 p.806
Analytical meditation, 83,
89-90, 9Iff, 113-15, 557-8
Anavatapatanagarajapariprchchha, see Questions of the King
of Nagas, Anavatapta, Sutra
Anger, 256-7, 261, 263
Annotations for (Jam-yang-shayba's) 'Great Exposition of
Tenets', 12-13, 565-6, 578,
n.500 p.854
Antidotes to faults in
meditation, eight, 71-80,
Chart 2 p.72, 245, 253
Aparashailas, 714, 715, 716,
717, 718
Appearance of inherent
existence, 44-5, 450, 683-5,
see also Object of negation in
Prasangika
Appearing but not ascertained,
702-4
Appearing object, 511, 701
Appearing object of thought,
346-8, 701
Arhan, explanation of etymology
and translation as Foe
Destroyer, n.553 pp.871-3,
see also Foe Destroyer
Arhat, teacher of the Forders,
320, n.553 p.872
Artificial afflictions, see
Misconceptions of inherent
existence, artificial
Artificial false views of an
inherently existent person, 177
Aryadeva, 167, 359, 431, 537,
570, 572, 587, 591, 676
citation of texts by, 30, 33,
291, 555, 585, 627, 632,
660, 674, n.458 p.837
Aryavimuktisena, 594
Asaftga, 236, 359ff, 363, 366,
372, 383, 384, 593, 656,
707-11
Ascertainment of pervasion, 478, 53-4, 57, 62, 63, 65, 146-7,
179
Ashoka, 358
Ashtasahasrikaprajnaparamita,
see Eight Thousand Stanza
Perfection of Wisdom Sutra
Ashvaghosha, 363, 432, 570,
572, 586, 587-8, n.504 p.857,
n.512-3 p.861
Aspiration, 245-6
Affsha, 154, 432, 534-5, 571,
572, 592, 593, 640, 653,
n.527 p.864
Attachment, 275, 280-8 Iff
Attention, see Intention
Autonomous inferences, 452,
456, 480, 523-4, 584-5, n.496
pp.847-9, n.497 pp.848-50
Autonomous reason, 697
Index
Autonomous syllogisms, 431-2,
456, 470-1, 473-4, 475-80,
489, 504, 521-2, 564, 697
Avaivartachakra, see Irreversible
Wheel Sutra
Avalokitavrata, 165-6, 318, 324,
358, 360, 361, 363, 426, 462,
571, 572, 666, 667, n.366
p.818
Avantakas, 714, 717, 718
Awareness to which the object
appears but is not ascertained,
see Appearing but not
ascertained
Awarenesses, types of,
Appendix 1 pp.701-5
Ayatana, see Sources
Ba-kay-gay (Ba-khe-gad, Khegad-'khor-lo-grags), 536
Ba-tsap-nyi-ma-drak-ba (Patshab-nyi-ma-grags-pa), 535
Bahushrutlyas, 340, 714, 716,
717, 718, 719
Bases of contact, six, 627-8
Basis in Buddha's thought,
purpose, and refutation of the
explicit meaning, 602, 616,
n.539 pp.866-7, n.580
pp.875-6
Basis-of-all, see Mind-basis-of-all
Beings of the three capacities,
_ 32, 251
Bel-den-cho-jay (dPal-ldan-chosrje), 565, see also Nga-wangbel-den
Belief, 246
Belligerence, 261, 262, 263
BhadrayanTyas, 340, 714, 715,
716, 719
985
Bhairava, 538
Bhava, 220, see also Things
different meanings of, 391-2,
438, n.723 p.886, n.786 p.897
Bhavaviveka, 320, 321, 339, 358,
360-3, 378, 399, 431,441,449,
450, 455-68, 469-98 passim,
499-530 passim, 570, 571, 572,
574, 575, 587-8, 591, 592,
612, 614, 694-6, 713-17, n.497
pp.848-50, n.791 pp.897-902
citation of texts by, 30-31,
461, 463, 666, 668-9, 695-6
criticism of Buddhapalita,
441, 455-68, 470, 476, 480,
490
founder of Svatantrika, 3613
interpretation of dependentarising, 165-6, 666-73
other names of, 360
Bhikshuvarshagraprchchhasutra,
718
Blaze of Reasoning (Tarkajvala),
320, 321, 571, 575, 695-6, 713,
714, 715
Bodhibhadra, 321
Bodhichittavivarana, see Essay
on the Mind of Enlightenment
Bodhidharma, 536, 537
BodhimargapradTpapanfika, see
Commentary on the Difficult
Points of 'Lamp for the Path
to Enlightenment'
Bodhisattva, 22, 98-109, 111-12,
128, 296ff, 342-3, 379, 417,
426
Bodhisattva grounds, 98-109,
111-15, 302, 345, 404
Bodhisattva Section Sutra, 589
986
Meditation on Emptiness
Bodhisattvacharyâvatâra, see
Engaging in the Bodhisattva
Deeds
Bodhisattvacharyâvatarabhashya, see Explanation of(Shdntideva's) 'Engaging in the
Bodhisattva Deeds'
Bodhisattvapitaka, see
Bodhisattva Section Sutra
Bon,318
Bowl of fluid, example of mind
only, 372, 376-7
Brahman, 186-7
Brahmanas, 318, 564
Brahmdpariprchchha, see
Questions of Brahma Sutra
Bu-don (Bu-ston), 435, 535
Buddha, 22, 237, 288, 342,
379-80, 392-3, 407,417, 423,
529, 542, 572, 604, see also
Shâkyamuni Buddha
Buddha Bodies, 117-23, 285,
see also individual listings for
Form Body, Truth Body,
Nature Body, Emanation
Body, Complete Enjoyment
Body, and Wisdom Body
Buddha lineage, 617, see also
Buddha nature and Tathâgata
essence
Buddha nature, 357, 381-3,
396-7, 535, 617
Buddha's acceptance of what
the world accepts, 502, 526-30
Buddhadeva, 343
Buddhaguhya, 532
Buddhahood, 109, 115, 117-23,
237, 382, 404, 543, n.521
pp.863-4
Buddhapâlita, 29, 165, 359-60,
363, 449, 455-68, 469-98
passim, 570, 572, 587, 588,
633, 637, 668- 70, 676, 685
citation of text by, 455,
460, 558, 633, 641, 678,
689, 690, 691, 692
founder of Prasangika, 35960, 363, 431-2, 584, 587,
n.494 p.840
refutation ofSamkhya, 4413, 455-63, 469-71, 474, 4767, 481-9
Buddhapalita's Commentary on
(Nagarjuna's) 'Treatise on the
Middle Way', 455, 459, 460-1,
558, 570, 591, 633, 641, 678,
689, 690, 691, 692
Buddhapalitamulamadhyamakavrtti, see Buddhapalita's
Commentary on (Nagarjuna's)
'Treatise on the Middle Way'
Buddhavatamsaka Sutra, 590
Buddhavatamsakanamamahavaipulya, see
Buddhavatamsaka Sutra
Buddhist and non-Buddhist, differentiating, 188, 319-20, 335
Buddhist, definition of, 335-6
Buddhist proponent of tenets,
definition of, 336-7
Calm abiding, 67-90, 91, 93,
112-14, 247, 404, 557-8
etymology, 67
nine states in developing,
80-6, Chart 3p.81, 253
objects of, 69-71, 88-9
prerequisites, 68-9
Cataracts example, 509-10
Cause and effect, nonsimultaneity of in Chittamatra,
367-8
Index
Cause and effect (cont.)
simultaneity of in
Vaibhäshika, 139, 339
Certification of objects by valid
cognition, 508-11, 518, 527-8,
539-47, 574, n.727 p.887, see
also Valid establishment of
phenomena
Ceylonese Chronicles, 718, 719
Chaitikas, 340,714,715,716,719
Chandragomin, 569, 572
Chandragomin's [Sanskrit]
Grammar, 569, 662-4
Chandrakirti, 11, 13, 29, 131,
136, 154, 169, 178, 186, 193,
195, 320, 360-2, 363, 399,
403-5,411,420, 422, 449,
497, 538, 541, 542, 569, 571,
572-4, 587, 592-3, 633, 637,
653, 675, 682, 687, 696,
729, n.516 p.863
citation of texts by, 30, 152-3,
170, 182, 184, 192, 200,
469, 472-3, 474-5, 477-8,
480-81, 483-6, 488, 489,
492, 493, 496, 497, 500,
502-3, 504, 505, 507, 50810, 512-14, 517-8, 519-20,
521, 523-4, 525, 526, 541,
554, 556, 558, 586, 590,
591, 592, 596-7, 602, 610,
612, 614, 616, 617, 618,
627, 632, 634, 636, 637,
640, 641, 644, 645-7, 648,
649, 650, 652, 655-6, 660-2,
664-5, 666, 667-8, 669, 670,
671, 672, 673, 674, 678-9,
680-1, 682, 683, 684, 686,
689-93, 694, n.244p.808,
n.516 pp.862-3
987
defense of Buddhapalita, 441,
469-98
differentiation of the
interpretable and
the definitive, 425, 596-7,
602-4,610-11
etymology of samvrtisatya,
417-8
interpretation of mind-only,
377-8, 614
interpretation of
pratuyasamutpada,
164-7,
662-74
opening the way of/founding
Prasangika, 360-2, 431-2,
584, 587, n.494 p.840
presentation of the sevenfold
reasoning, 44, 48, 178-93,
687-96
refutation of Bhavaviveka,
499-530, n.497 p.849
Chandravyakarana, see
Chandragomin's [Sanskrit]
Grammar
Changeable mental factors, 238,
266-8, Chart 29p.267
Chapter of the True One Sutra,
571, 605
Chapter Showing the Three Vows
Sutra, 589
Chariot example, 179-83, 694
Charvakas, 319, 327-33, see
also Hedonists
other names for, 327
Chatuhshataka, see Four Hundred
Chatuhshatakatjka, see
Commentary on (Aryadeva's)
'Four Hundred'
Chittamatra, 38, 39, 128-9, 135,
139, 172, 181, 231, 234, 336,
988
Meditation on Emptiness
Chittamatra (cont.)
344, 359, 361, 365-97, 404,
434, 436, 533, 565, 602, 6223, 639, 641, n.501 pp.854-5
differentiation of the
interpretable and the
definitive, 424, 426-7, 601,
611-12, 615, 623
identification of selflessness,
38-9, 128-9, 296-301, 366,
368-70, 385
interpretation of dependentarising, 38, 167
simultaneity of object and
subject, 367-8
Chittamatrins Following
Asariga, see Chittamatrins
Following Scripture
Chittamatrins Following
Reasoning, 344, 366, 385,
396, n.501 p.855
Chittamatrins Following
Scripture, 366, 383-7, 392,
393-4, 603, 611-12, n.501
p.855, n.791 p.901
Chittavajrastava, see Praise of
the Mind Vajra
Clairvoyances, five, 208, 255
Classification of the Ends of
Actions, 588
Clear Words, 136, 360, 426,
473, 569, 590, 593, 662, 663,
665, 693, n.496 pp.845-8,
n.516 pp.862-3
citation of, 469-70, 474-5,
477-8, 480-1, 483-6, 488,
489, 492, 493, 496, 497,
500, 502-3, 504, 505, 507,
508-9, 509-10, 512-4,517-8,
519-21, 525-6, 525, 526,
Clear Words (com.)
541, 584, 586, 590, 591-2,
593, 596-7, 634, 648, 655-6,
660, 661,664-5,666, 667-8,
669, 670, 671,672,673, 6801, 684, 689-90, 690-91
reason for translation thus,
n.496 pp.845-6
Cloud of Jewels Sutra, 31
Coarse selflessness of the person,
296-304, 341
Cognitions, four, 371-2
Cognizing consciousness, 701,
see also Valid cognizer
Collections of Praises, 588, 590,
n.512 p.861
Collections of Reasonings, 15,
588, 591, 782-3, n.512p.861
Colors, 223-5, Chart 13 p.224,
232, 233
Commentary on (Aryadeva 'sj
'Four Hundred', 192, 570,
593, 627, 632, 637, 656, 674-5
Commentary on (AtTsha's)
'Quintessential Instructions on
the Middle Way', 593
Commentary on (Bhavaviveka 'sj
'Lamp for (Nagarjuna 'sj
"Wisdom"', 462-6, 571, 666
Commentary on (Dignaga's)
'Compendium of Valid
Cognition', 571, 676
Commentary on (Nagarjuna's)
'Friendly Letter', 570, 675
Commentary on (Nagarjuna's)
'Seventy Stanzas on
Emptiness', 593, 652, 675
Commentary on (Nagarjuna's)
Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning',
200, 571, 593, 661-2, 675
Index
Commentary on the Difficult
Points of (Attsha's) 'Lamp for
the Path to Enlightenment',
593
Commentary on the 'Supplement
to (Nagarjuna 'sj 'Treatise on
the Middle Way'", 152-3,
182, 472-3, 569, 602, 603,
604, 610, 617, 618-9, 678,
679, 682, 686, 691, 692-3
Commentary on the 'Sutra on
Dependent-Arising', 662, 674
Commentary on
(Udbhatasiddhasvamin 'sj
'Exalted Praise', 320
Commentary on (Vasubandhu's)
'Treasury of Knowledge',
662
Commonly appearing subject,
450-1, 452, 505-15, 522, 529,
697, n.346 pp.814-5, n.424
pp.825-30, n.798 pp.904-5
Compassion, three types, 404
Compendium of Doctrine Sutra,
571, 589
Compendium of Knowledge, 236,
656
Compendium of Learnings, 589,
593, 657
Compendium of Sutra, 569, 572,
589, 590, 591, 603, 604-9,
657
Compendium of Valid Cognition,
344, 366, n.442 p.833
Compendium on Reality, 575
Concealment, 262, 263
Concentrations, Four, 104fF,
206, 207, 241, 353-4
Conception of a (bad) view as
supreme, 259, 260, 289
989
Conception of (bad) ethics and
modes of conduct as supreme,
259, 260, 289
Conception of inherent
existence, 177-8, 288, 450,
680, see also Misconceptions
of inherent existence, artificial
and innate
Conception that phenomena
exist naturally as bases of
engagement of names, 300,
369-72, 389
Conceptual consciousnesses,
346-9, 701, 704, 722
Conceptuality, use and purpose
of, n.500, pp.853-4, see also
Analysis, uses and purpose of
and Inferential realization of
emptiness
Conditionality, 432-5, 586, 672,
n.503 pp.856-7
Conscientiousness, 248, 252-3
Consciousness, 201, 235-68,
Chart 20 p.235, 271, 272ff,
275, 278
Consciousnesses, eight in
Chittamatra, 366-7, 384-7
Consequences (prasahga), 1345, 360, 431-2, 441-9, 451,
452, 470-1, 479-81, 482, 489,
490-1, 493, 494-7, 529-30,
584-6, 640, 730, 733
and syllogisms, use of as a
means of distinguishing the
Madhyamika schools, 360,
452-3, 497, 733, n.497 p.848
five types, 445-9, 493
Constituents (dhatu), 222, 223,
273-4, Chart 33 p.273
six, 627ff
990
Meditation on Emptiness
Contact, 201-2, 244-5, 275,
280, 386
Contradictory consequences,
446-8, 470, 479, 585, 640
Contrition, 267
Conventional truths, see Truths,
conventional
Conventional valid cognizer,
419, see also Valid
establishment of phenomena
and Valid cognizer
Conventionalities, status of,
435,635-6
Conventionally existent
production, 459-61
Conventionally existent self,
nature of, 189, 315, 380,
385-6, 679
Correct assumption, 701-4
Council of Rajagrha, 713
Creator in Buddhism, 612-13
Cultivation of the Ultimate Mind
of Enlightenment, 570, 586,
588, n.512 p.861
Cyclic existence and nirvana,
non-difference of, 219, 415
Dak-tsang (sTag-tshang), 15,
147, 172-3, 343, 411-12, 53940, 563, 573, 576-7, 588, 592,
648, 655, 676, 681, 683, 6945, 697, n.521 pp.663-4, n.727
p.887
Dalai Lama, 14-15, n.791 p.903
Dashabhumika, see Sutra on the
Ten Grounds
de Jong, J.W., n.374 p.818,
n.516 pp.862-3, n.758 p.894
Debate, purpose and function as
a learning device, 576-8
Deceit, 262, 263-4
Definitive and interpretable, differentiating, 422-8, 595-623
Definitive sutras, 422-8,
595-601
Deity yoga, 113, 115
Den-dar-hla-ram-ba (bsTan-darlha-ram-pa), 545
Dependence, meaning of in
Prasarigika, 37, 432-5
Dependent-arising, 37, 161-73,
432-5, 445-6, 634, 655-6, 65976
applicability to non-products,
167-8, 432-3, 659-61
formation of the Sanskrit
term, 163, 564, 662-7,
n.703 pp.884-5
meaning of the term, 37, 1638, 433, 655-6, 659, 663,
664-74, n.703 pp.884-5
reasoning of, 53-5, 161-2,
168-71, 445-6, 637, 65962, 675
twelve links of, 203, 275-83,
Chart 35 p.279, 287, 423,
Appendix 2 pp.707-11
Dependent-designation, 169
Dependent imputation, 472, see
also Imputation of objects by
thought
Descent into Lanka Sutra, 162,
358, 383, 570, 595, 602, 609,
610-14, 615-6
Desire, 255-6
Desire Realm, 104fT, 236, 277,
353-4
Destruction of the world, 630
Determining mental factors,
238, 245-8, Chart 24 p.246
Index
Devasharma, 360, 361, 462
Dhara n fsh va ra rajapa riprchchh a,
see Questions of King
DharanTshvara Sutra
Dharmadhatu, explanation of
etymology and translation
equivalent, n.557 p.873, see
also Element of qualities
Dharmadhatustotra, see Praise of
the Element of Qualities
Dharmaguptakas, 340, 714,
715, 716, 717, 718, 719
DharmakTrti (the logician), 31,
296, 344, 366, 374, 396, 449,
556, 571, 572, 676, 730
DharmakTrti (not the logician),
532, 533
Dharmapala, 343, 362
DharmasamgTti, see
Compendium of Doctrine Sutra
Dharmottara, 344
Dharmottaras, 340, 714, 715,
716
Dharmottanyas, 719
Dhatu, see Constituents
Dialectician Nihilists, 41, 32830, 436
Diamond slivers, 57-9, 61, 129,
131-50, 151, 169, 637, 63940ff, n.500 pp.851-4, n.619
pp.879-80, see also Refutation
of the four extreme types of
production
Dichotomies, 412
Dignaga, 344, 362, 366, 449,
525, 592, 730, n.442 p.833
DFpakas, 294, n.423 p.825
Dipavamsa, 719
Direct cognition of emptiness,
nature of, 96-105, 128, 133,
187, 188-9, 193-4, 237-8, 290,
991
Direct cognition of emptiness
(cont.)
349, 380, 407, 408-10, 415,
416, 422, 510, 552, 704-5
Direct perceiver (pratyaksha),
ChandrakFrti's explanation of
the term, 656
Direct valid cognizer, 702-5
Discipline, 532
Discrimination, 241-3, 271,
272, 278-9, 386-7
Discrimination of the Two
Truths, 155, 570, 654-5
Dissimulation, 262, 264
Distraction, 262, 266
Doors of liberation, three, 207-8
Doors of retention, four, 208
Dor-jay-day-ba (rDo-rje-bzlaspa), 538
Doubt, 196, 248, 256, 258,
702-4
Dra-shi-kyil (bKra-sh is- 'khyil),
567, 568-9
Dream objects and
consciousnesses, 234
Dre-bung Monastery, 12, 13,
563-4
Dro (Bro, 'Bro Shes-rab-grags),
536
Drok-mi Shakya-ye-shay ('Brokmi Shakya-ye-shes), 536
Drom-don ('Brom-ston), 534,
592
Dualistic appearance, removal
of, 66, 93, 94-6, 118, 416
Dzong-ka-ba, 11, 135-6, 144-8,
182, 186, 194-5, 315, 318,
324, 361, 405, 409, 415, 466,
473, 495, 513, 517, 528, 534,
536, 539-43, 549-551, 567,
570, 571, 572,573-5, 588, 594,
992
Meditation on Emptiness
Dzong-ka-ba (cont.)
648, 686, 687, n.346
pp.814-15, n424 p.830, n.494
p.839
citation of texts by, 31-2, 33,
525, 549-50, 558, 583, 587,
588, 603, 622, 661, 675-6,
679, 680, n.424 pp.828-30
Earth constituent, 628-31
Effort, 73, 81, 85, 245, 248,
251-2, 289
Eight levels of Approaching and
Abiding, 106-8, Chart 6
p.107, 403, 670
Eight Thousand Stanza
Perfection of Wisdom Sutra,
29
Ekavyavaharika, 340, 341, 714,
716,719
Element of qualities, 606, 607,
n.557 p.873
Elements, 203, 229-30, 232,
n.785 p.896
definitions of the four, 230
Emanation Body, 118, 119,
121-3
Embarrassment, 248, 250
Emptiness, 9-11, 17, 29, 33, 356, 38-40, 119-20, 162, 196,
199-201, 214, 216, 217, 21819, 254, 288-9, 292-3, 302,
349, 387, 391, 396-7, 402,
406-11, 415, 418, 420, 433,
722, 725-6, see also Direct
cognition of emptiness, nature
of, and Meditation on
emptiness
and dependent-arising,
synonymity, 170, 219, 415
Emptiness (cont.)
compatibility with
conventionalities, 38-40,
192-3, 401-5, 438-9, 523,
575, 634-5
Emptiness as a non-inherently
existent phenomenon, 33-4,
171-3, 391-2, 406-7, 410, 433,
631
Emptiness of existing naturally
as a basis of a name, 369-72,
389-90
Emptiness of other, 35-6, 326,
415-6, 535
Emptiness of self, 415
Emptiness of the mind as the
Buddha nature, 381-3, 396-7,
616-7, 623
Emptiness that is the nonexistence of subject and object
as different entities, 297ff,
367-74, 388-9
Emptinesses, eighteen, 204-5
Engaging in the Bodhisattva
Deeds, 358, 570, 589, 593,
633, 657,
Enjoyment Body, 118, 119,
121-2, 345, 395
Entwinements, three, 103
Equanimity, 72, 79, 248, 253
Equipoise of cessation, 207,
386, 387, see also Absorption
of cessation
Essay on the Mind of
Enlightenment, 359, 388, 415,
472, 571, 614, n.581 p.876
Essence of the Good
Explanations, 570, 583, 587,
588, 622, n.346 p.815, n.424
pp.828-30, n.494 p.839
Index
Establishment of the Reasoning
and Logic Refuting Error,
591
Evolutes of the elements, 229,
230-31, 232
Example of illusion from sutra,
597
Examples of illusoriness, seven,
132
Examples supporting mindonly, 372-3, 376
Excitement, 72, 74-80, 83-6,
113-14, 253, 262, 265
Exclusion (apoha), 347-8, see
also Negative phenomena
Existence able to establish itself,
36, 37, 172-3
Existence as [its own] reality,
36, 39
Existence as [its own] suchness,
36, 39
Existence from the object's side,
36, 39
Existence from the side of the
basis of designation, 36, 37
Existence in the manner of
covering its basis of
designation, 36
Existence in the object that
receives designation, 36
Existence right in the basis of
designation, 36
Existence through its own
entityness, 36
Existence through its own
power, 36, 37, 156, 175,
584
Existent, synonyms of, 214-15,
721-2
Exorcism, 537
993
Explanation of (ChandrakTrti's)
'Supplement', 571, see also
Illumination of the Thought
Explanation of (Maitreya's)
'Treatise on the Sublime
Continuum of the Great
Vehicle', 594
Explanation of (Nagarjuna's)
'Treatise on thé Middle Way',
570
Explanation of (Shantideva 'sj
'Engaging in the Bodhisattva
Deeds', 593
Explanation of the Conventional
and the Ultimate in the Four
Systems of Tenets, 551
Explanation of the 'Treasury of
Knowledge', 662
Explanation of (Vasubandhu's)
'Commentary on the "Sutra on
Dependent-Arising"', 662
Extensive Sport Sutra, 502, 571,
600-1
External objects, different
schools' assertions on their
existence or non-existence,
362
non-existence of in
Chittamatra, 367-8, 611,
613, 623
Extreme views, 318-9
Extremes, falling to, 11, 40,
195, 402, 451-2
Eye consciousness, three causes
of production, 156ff, 222-3,
647, 654-5
Faith, 72-3, 245, 248-50, 265
'Father and mother are to be
killed', 423, 600, 602
994
Meditation on Emptiness
Faults in meditation, five, 7180, Chart 2 p.72
Fearlessnesses, four, 210-11
Feeling, 203, 239-41, 271, 272,
278-9, 280, 386-7
Fifth Dalai Lama, 43, 45, 571,
572, 573, 685, 686
Final vehicle, one, 366, 396-7,
604-10
Final vehicles, three, 366, 3926, 596, 602, 603-4, 609, 611
Findability under analysis, 173,
406, see also Unfindability of
objects under analysis
Finely Woven, 591
Five Collections of Reasonings,
356
Five-cornered set of reasonings,
129, see also Fivefold reasoning
Five Stages, 587
Five Treatises on the Levels,
359, 366
Fivefold reasoning, 129, 176-8,
637, 687-93
Foe Destroyer, 106-8, 206, 212,
239, 288, 296, 329, 341-2,
344, 393, 417, 603, 604,
606-7, 608, 610
etymology and reason for
translating the term thus,
n.553 pp.871-73
Forbearances, eight, 96-8
Forders, (Tfrthika), 186, 320-1,
347, 615-6
Forgetfulness, 262, 266
Form Body, 113, 117-18
Form Realm, 87, 104ff, 236,
277, 353-4
Formation of the universe,
353-5, 375
Former and future lives,
existence of 40-1, 160, 282,
328-33
Formless Absorptions, Four,
104ff, 187, 207
Formless Realm, 104ff, 236,
277, 278
Forms, 220-35, Chart 11 p.221,
271, 272ff, 278ff, n.758 p.894
Forms for the mental
consciousness, 232-4, Chart
19 p.233
Four alternatives, n.500 pp.85154, see also Refutation of the
four alternative types of
production and Diamond
slivers
Four extremes, see Refutation of
the four extreme types of
production and Diamond
slivers
Four Hundred, 291, 555, 570,
585, 588, 591, 627, 632, 660,
674, n.458 p.837
Four Interwoven Commentaries
on (Dzong-ka-ba's) 'Great
Exposition of the Stages of the
Path', n.423 p.825, n.431
pp.831-32
Friendly Letter, 571, 675
Fundamental Tantra of
Manjushn, 358
Fundamental Treatise on the
Middle Way Called 'Wisdom',
see Treatise on the Middle Way
Ga-dam-ba (bKa'-gdams-pa),
_ 534, 538
Ga-gyu-ba (bKa'-brgyud-pa),
15, 534, 537, 538
Index
Gam-bo-ba (sGam-po-pa), 537
Gan-den Monastery, 566
Ge-luk-ba (dGe-lugs-pa), 11-13,
15-17, 188, 344, 378, 383,
388, 399, 405, 406, 409-10,
415, 416, 492, 534, 538, 549,
567, 574, 576, n.500 pp.85154, n.511 p.860, n.723 p.886,
n.791 pp.898-903
education, 399, 405, 534,
538, 572, n.346 pp.814-5
presentation of valid establishment, 409-10, 539-47
Gen-dün-chö-pel (dGe-'dun-chos'phel), 544, 547
Gen-jak-tang-da, (Gan-jag-thangta), 533
Generic image, 347-9
Ghanavyüha, see Sutra on the
Heavily Adorned
Go-mang, 12, 13, 563-4, 567,
576, n.494 p.840, n.511 p.860
Gö-rin-bo-chay Kuk-ba-hlaydzay ( 'Gos-rin-po-che Khug-paIhas-btsas), 536
Gokulikas, 340, 715, 719
Gom-day Nam-ka-gyel-tsen
(sGom sde Nam-mkha'-rgyalmtshan), 513, n.346 p.814,
n.414 p.823 _
Gön-chok-den-bay-drön-may
(dKon-mchog-bstan-pa 'i-sgron_ me), 287, 291
Gön-chok-j ik-may-wang-bo
(dKon-mchog- 'jigs-med-dbangpo), 12, 552
Grammar, Chandragomin's,
569, 662-4
Grammarians, 164-5, 661
Grasping, 275, 280-8Iff
995
Great Cloud Sutra, 358
Great Drum Sutra, 357, 358,
590
'Great Exposition of Special
Insight', 545, n.346 p.815
Great Exposition of Tenets, 11 14, 17, 343, 563-77
Great Exposition of the
Concentrations and Formless
Absorptions, 553-8
Great Exposition of the Middle
Way, 13, 17, 445, 564
Great Exposition of the Stages of
the Path, 525, 534, 545, 54950, 554, n.346 p.815
Guhyakas, 318, 564
Guhyasamâja Tantra, 362
Gung-tang (Gung-thang), see
Gôn-chok-den-bay-drôn-may
Gunamati, 360, 462, 662
Gunashrr, 360, 462
Gyel-tsap (rGyal-tshab), 324,
594, 675
Haimavatas, 339, 340, 714,
715, 716, 717, 718
Haribhadra, 594
Harmfulness, 262, 264
Harmonies with enlightenment,
thirty-seven, 205-6
Hastavâlaprakaranakârika,
see Length of a Forearm
Haughtiness, 262, 264
Heap of Jewels Sutra, 589
Hearers (Shrâvaka), 98, 99, 1068,114, 128, 195,288,296ff, 342,
366,378-9, 392-3,394-5,427,
601, 603-4, 605, 60.6, 609
etymology of the term, 394,
n.495; pp.840-45
996
Meditation on Emptiness
Heart of the Middle Way, 358,575
Heart of Wisdom Sutra, 413,
423, 424, 571, 601
Heart Sutra, see Heart of
Wisdom Sutra
Heavily Adorned, see Sutra on
the Heavily Adorned
Hedonists (Charvaka), 293,
294, 319, 327-33, 564
Hermeneutics, Buddhist, 422-8,
n.494 p.839, n.528 pp.864-5
Hetuvadins, 714, 716
Highest Pure Land, 121, 395
Highest Yoga Tantra, 11, 75,
112, 113-15, 200, 380
Hinayana, 98, 106-9, 335-51,
358, 359, 378-9, 393, 395,
4 2 6 , 4 2 7 , 601
Hlnayanists, differentiated by
tenet and path, 342, 346,
379-80
Hla-to-to-ri-nyan-dzen (Lha-thotho-ri-gnyan-bstan), 531
Ho-shang Mahayana (Hvashang), 410, 533, 555
Hurvitz, Leon, n.495 pp.841-44
Identifying the object of
negation, 44-6, 53, 54, 57, 62,
63, 64-5, 189, 243, 685
Ignorance, 256, 257-8, 275,
276-8, 416-7, 420, 678
Illumination of the Middle Way,
412, 426, 570, 653, 657-8
Illumination of the Thought,
Extensive Explanation of
(Chandrakirti's)
'Supplement
to (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise'on
the Middle Way'", 405, 571,
603, 648
Illusory body, 115
Illusory objects, 193
Imaginary natures, 388-92,- 601,
610, 611, 618-20
Immeasurables, four, 206
Impermanence in Vaibhashika
and Sautrantika, 350
Imputation of objects by
thought,37-8, 167, 192, 3856, 437-8, 542, 626-7ff, 635-6
Imputed existence, 338, 344
Imputedly existent person, 3034, 308-9
Individual analytical cessation,
n.191 p806, see also
Analytical cessations
Indrabhuti, 361
Indrabodhi, 533
Indriya, 222, see also Sense
powers
Inference, 450, 701-4
way in which it is mistaken,
348-9, 701
Inference for oneself, 526
Inference renowned to oneself,
524
Inferential realization of
emptiness, 47-8, 66, 113, 133,
134, 193, 195, 237-8, 286,
407, 408, 450-1, 552
Inferential valid cognizer, 702-4
Inherent existence, 9-10, 36, 38,
39-40, 55, 65, 133-4, 150,
154, 175, 199, 361, 391, 437,
584, 636-7, 697, n.791 p.903
Innate afflictions, see
Misconceptions of inherent
existence, innate
Innate false view of an inherently
existent person, 177, 679
Index
Innate intellect in Prasafigika,
201, 527-8, 530, 682-4
Innate misconceptions of
inherent existence, see
Misconceptions of inherent
existence, innate
Innate sense of I, 44-5, 303-4,
684-5, n.744 p.891
Intensity of clarity, 74
Intention, 243-4, 386
Intermediate state, 278
Interpretable and definitive,
differentiating, 422-8,
595-623, n.528 pp.864-5
Interpretable sutras, 422-8,
595-623
Introduction to the Two Truths,
593
Introspection, 72, 76,80,83,377
Investigation, 267-8
Investigations, four, 371
Irreversible Wheel Sutra, 571,
_ 608
Ishvara, 149, 239, 322, 325,
326-7
Isolates, 347-9, 368, 390, 413-5
Jainas, 149, 295, 296, 318, 320,
506, 507, 565, 649
Jam-yang-shay-ba ('Jamdbyangs-bzhad-pa), 11-13, 1617, 33, 43, 135, 155, 195,
199, 232, 318, 320, 343, 360,
362, 374, 403-4, 406-13, 421,
431, 445, 461, 467, 477, 487,
490, 492, 494, 500, 552, 56378, 713, 715, 717, 718, 729,
n.298 p.811, n.494 p.840
refutation of Dak-tsang, 147,
171-3, 343, 411-12, 563,
997
Jam-yang-shay-ba (cont.)
573, 576-7, 588, 592, 648,
655, 676, 681, 683, 694-5,
697
Jang-dzay College, 566
Jang-gya (ICang-skya), 17, 155,
191, 193, 320, 374, 533, 545,
558, 563, n.494 p.840
Jay-dzun Cho-gyi-gyel-tsen
(rje-btsun Chos-kyi-rgyalmtshan), 566, n.298 p811,
n.739 p.889
Jaya-ananda, n.545 pp.868-71
Jealousy, 262, 263
Jetavanlyas, 717, 718
Jewel Mine Sutra, 589
Jinba, Geshe, 14
Jiva, 46, 187
Jnanagarbha, 155, 570, 572,
588, 591, 654-5
Jo (gCod), 537, 538
Jo-nang-ba (Jo-nang-pa), 36,
415-6, 535
Jor-druk (sByor-drug), 538
Kalachakra Tantm, 535, 538,
554, n.249 p.809
Kalapa, 570, 572
Kalapa's Aphorisms, 570, 662-4
Kalapasutra, see Kalapa's
Aphorisms
Kamalashlla, 412, 426, 533, .
570, 572, 653, 657-8
Kanakamuni Buddha, 355
Kanakavarman (gSer-gyi-gocha), 535
Kapila, 320, 321, 322, 323
Kapilas, 318, 321, 564
Karma, 22, 160, 239-40, 244,
276-8, 375
998
Meditation on Emptiness
Karma (cont.)
creation of the environment
by, 375
Karmantavibhahga, see
Classification of the Ends of
Actions
Kashyapa Buddha, 355
Kashyapa Chapter Sutra, 571,
589, 635
Kashyapaparivarta, see
Kashyapa Chapter Sutra
Kashyapryas, 340, 714, 715,
716, 717, 718, 719
Kay-drup (mKhas-grub), 43, 45,
318, 362, 546, 571, 572, 594,
680, 681
Kayatrayastotra, see Praise of
the Three Bodies
Kensur Lekden, 12-14, 415,
563, 566, 567, 569, 577, 578
Khetsun Sangpo, 15, n.249 p.809
King of Meditative Stabilizations
Sutra, 31, 408, 471, 554, 555,
570, 589, 599, 600, 610
Klishtamanas, see Afflicted
mind
Knowledge, 248
Knowledges, eight, 96-8
Krakuchchhanda Buddha, 354
Kukkulikas, 716
Kurukullas, 714, 717, 718
Lalitavistara, see Extensive
Sport Sutra
Lamp for (Nagarjuna's)
'Wisdom', 426, 461, 462, 463,
570, 666, 668-9, 672
Lamp for the Path to
Enlightenment, 534, 571, 589,
593, 640, 653
Lang-dar-ma (gLang-dar-ma),
534
Lahkavatarasutra, see Descent
into Lanka Sutra
Laxity, 72, 74-5, 76-8, 83-6,
113,253
Laziness, 71-2, 245, 262, 265
Lectures on the Stages of the
Path, 67, 277
Length of a Forearm, 591, n.519
p.863
Lethargy, 75, 88, 262, 265
Liberation, 29, 30-31
Liberations, eight, 207
Life faculty, 269, 270
Limitation of possibilities, 47,
65, 133-4, 640
Lineages, five, 394
Ling Rinbochay, 43, 45
Lion's Roar of ShrTmaladevT
Sutra, 357, 571, 609
Literal and non-literal,
differentiating, 423ff, 600,
_ 612
Lo-den-shay-rap (bLo-ldan-shesrab), see Ngog, the translator
Lo-sel-ling College, 566
Lodro, Geshe Gedun, 14, 576,
578
Lokachakshu, 328
LokatTtastava, see Praise of the
Supramundane
Lokesh Chandra, 566
Lokottaravadins, 714, 716, 717,
718
Long-chen-rap-jam (kLong-chenrab-'byams), 15
Ma-Ji-lap-dron (Ma-cig-labsgron), 537
Index
Madhyamakahrdaya, see Heart
of the Middle Way
Madhyamakashastra, see
Treatise on the Middle Way
Madhyamakavatara, see
Supplement to (Nagarjuna's)
'Treatise on the Middle Way'
Madhyamakavatarabhashya,
see
Commentary on the
'Supplement to (Nagarjuna's)
"Treatise on the Middle Way"'
Madhyamakopadesha, see
Quintessential Instructions on
the Middle Way
Madhyamakopadeshavrtti, see
Commentary on (AtTsha's)
'Quintessential Instructions on
the Middle Way'
Madhyamika, 11, 13, 16, 135-6,
139, 167, 173, 336, 356, 358,
388, 399-428, 451-3, 565,
572, 574, 639, 641, n.501
pp.854-5, see also PrasarigikaMadhyamika and SvatantrikaMadhyamika
as proponents of dependentarising, 167-71, 634
compatibility of emptiness
and conventional
phenomena, 38-40, 192-3,
401-5, 438-9, 523, 575,
634-5
definition of, 451
differentiated from Nihilists,
40-41, 543, 633-4
having no theses, discussion,
471-3, 492-3, 549-51, n.496
p.847
in Tibet, 13, 531-8, 572
interpretations refuted by
999
Madhyamika (cont.)
Dzong-ka-ba, 16, 135-6,
144-8, 200-1, 471-4,
549-59, 574, 727, n.500
p.850
mode of abiding in the middle
way, 40, 162, 169, 436-9,
451-2, 634-5
modern interpretations, 16,
492-3, 549ff
study of in Ge-luk-ba, 13,
404-5, 563-7, 572-8
view, 193, 523
'Madhyamikas using what is
renowned in the world', 435
Magician's illusion, example of,
372, 417, 436-7
Mahabheriharakaparivarta, see
Great Drum Sutra
Mahagirikas, 340
Mahamati, 570, 572, 675
Mahamegha, see Great Cloud
Sutra
Mahamudra, 538
Mahasamghikas, 339, 340,
713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718,
719
Mahashasakas, 340, 341, 714
Mahavamsa, 719
Mahaviharins, 717, 718
Mahayana, 31, 108-9, 329, 336,
344, 345-6, 349-50, 378-80,
393, 395-6, 426, 427, 601,
605
history of, 353-64
Mahayana Sutra of Knowledge,
623
Mahayanabhidharma, see
Mahayana Sutra of
Knowledge
1000
Meditation on Emptiness
Mahayanasütralamkara, see
Ornament for the Mahayana
Sutras
Mahayanist, differentiation of
by path and tenet, 342, 346,
379
Mahayanottaratantrashastra, see
Sublime Continuum of the
Great Vehicle
Mahay anottaratantrashastravyakhya, see Explanation of
(Maitreya's) 'Treatise on the
Sublime Continuum of the
Great Vehicle'
Mahishasakas, 715, 716, 717,
718, 719
Maitreya, 357, 358, 359, 362,
403, 572, 593, 594, 610
Maitreya Buddha, 355
Maitripada, 537
Mandala, 22
Manjushn, 361
Manjushn mülatantr a, see
Fundamental Tantra of
Manjushn
ManjushrTvikndita, see Sport of
Manjushn Sutra
Manual of Instructions on the
View, 43, 45
Mar-ba, 536, 537
Materials for a History of
Tibetan Literature, 566-7
Matter, Prasangika assertion on
the existence of, 231-2
Meaning-generalities, 347-9,
551
Meditating Nihilists, 41, 328,
330
Meditation on emptiness,
correct form of, 30-4, 38-40,
Meditation on emptiness (cont.)
51, 66, 88-90, 92ff, 468,
724, see also Direct
cognition of emptiness and
Inferential cognition of
emptiness
five stages in, 43ff, 66, 67ff,
80, 88, 91, 96ff, 112, 114
incorrect views of, 30-31, 334, 200-1, 409, 552-8
Meditative stabilization, 245,
247, 289, see also Calm
abiding
Meditative stabilizations, four,
208
Meeting of Father and Son Sutra,
405, 410, 412, 571, 627
Mental engagement, 245, 387
Mental engagements, four,
80-6, Chart 3 p.81, 92
Mental factors, 235, 238-68,
Chart 22 p.238, 272
'Mere I', 185, 189, 308, 315,
386, 387, 686
Mi-gyö-dor-jay (Mi-bskyod-rdorje), 15_
Mi-la-re-ba (Mi-la-res-pa), 537,
538
Middle way, 11, 40, 162, 168,
193, 195, 435-7, 439, 451,
632, 634-5
how different systems claim
to occupy it, 436-7
Mlmamsakas, 318, 564
'Mind apprehending the sign',
733
Mind as creator or main agent
in Buddhism, 374-6, 612-13,
623
Mind-basis-of-all, 359, 366,
Index
Mind-basis-of-all (cont.)
382-8, 396, 595, 602, 611,
612, 616-7, 623, n.791 p.901
Mind of clear light, 114-15
Mind-only, 363, 365, 367-81,
595, 611-14, 623, see also
Chittamatra
Mindfulness, 72-3, 76, 79-80,
83, 247, 289
Minds (chitta), 235-8, Chart 21
p.237, 272
'Mine', 193-4, 678-81, n.739
pp.888-90
Mirror-like wisdom, 384
Misconception of a self separate
from the aggregates, 681-7
Misconceptions of inherent
existence, artificial, 96-9, 114,
177, 687, n.744 pp.890-92
Misconceptions of inherent
existence, innate, 40, 96, 99109, Chart 5 p. 105, 114, 177,
679, 682, 687, n.744 pp.89092
Miserliness, 262, 263
Mode of appearance of I
according to Jam-yang-shayba, 683-7, n.754 p.893
Model Madhyamikas, 359, 431,
587-8, n.505 p.858
Mongolia, 364
Mother sutras, 589, n.514
p.862
Motivation, 32, 111-12, 117,
251, 282-3, 335-6, 379, 530
Mulasarvastivadins, 718
Mulasthaviras, 340
Muruntakas, 714
Myrabola, see Sutra on the
Myrabolan Fruit
1001
Nägabodhi, 69, 363, 432, 587-8
Nagarjuna, 11, 29, 30, 32, 128,
131-2, 154, 166, 168, 177-8,'
388, 399-405, 431, 438, 455,
459, 467, 481, 489, 494-6,
497, 500, 501, 502-3, 531,
538, 558-9, 569, 570, 571,
572-4, 587-8, 590, 592, 596,
603, 604, 614, 637, 653, 657,
675, 676, n.298 p.811
biography, 356-9,364
citation of texts by, 30, 100103, 153, 154, 162, 165,
168, 178, 199, 388, 438,
460, 471, 472, 475, 494,
495, 496, 502-3, 510, 518,
522, 585, 597-8, 604-9,
614,619,626, 631,635, 644,
645, 652, 660, 670-1, 672,
673, 674, 675, 684, 688,
689, 693
differentiation of the
interpretable and the
definitive, 425-6, 596-8,
603
meaning of his statement that
Madhyamikas have no
theses, 471-3, 475, 492-3,
549-51, n.496 p.847
on the meaning of
pratityasamutpada,
166,
670, 672
on the two truths, 400-403,415
Naiyäyikas, 294, 318, 339, 565
Name and form (nämarüpa),
275, 278, 279fF
Naming, process of, 347-8
Näropa, 537
Natural existence, 9, 36, 39,
175, 182
1002
Meditation on Emptiness
Natural lineage, 617
Natural nirvana, 218-9
Nature Body, 118, 119-20, 382
Natures, three, 388-92, 601,
602, 610, 617-20
Negative phenomena, 347-8,
410, Appendix 4 pp.721-7,
see also Non-affirming
negatives and Affirming
negatives
Never Returner, 106-7, 212
Nga-wang-bel-den (Ngag-dbangdpal-ldan), 12-13, 135, 551,
565-6, 569, 578, n.500
pp.851-54, n.511 p.860
Ngog, the translator (rNgog-lotstsha-ba, bLo-ldan-shes-rab),
406-11, 535
Nihilists, 40, 41, 149, 318, 32733, 633-4
Nikayabhedavibhangavyakhyana, 713
Nirgranthas, 318, 565, 649
Nirupamastava, see Peerless
Praise
Nirvana, 22, 31, 94, 218, 288,
337,495, 496, 596, 631
with remainder, 342, 395
without remainder, 342, 393,
394-5, 603, 606
Nirvana Sutra, 381
Nominal existence, 40, 133,
182, 185, 192, 194, 315, 380,
547
Nominal imputation, 626, 631
Nominal production, 133, 15960, 459-61,467-8
Nominally existent self, 678
Non-Abiding Madhyamikas,
435-6, 586-7, n.504 pp.857-8
Non-affirming negatives, 133,
214, 217, 349, 374, 410, 4589, 467-8, 496, Appendix 4
pp.723, 725-7
Non-afflictive obstructions, 342-3
Non-analytical cessations, 217,
218, 285, 344, 390
Non-associated compositional
factors, 268-71, Chart 30
p.268
Non-attachment, 248, 250-1,
253
Non-Buddhist systems, 317-33
Non-cognizing consciousness,
702
Non-conscientiousness, 262,
264, 265-6
Non-deceived consciousness in
Prâsartgika, 510, 511
Non-defective sense
consciousness, 436-7, 449-50,
452
Non-dualism, four types, 416
Non-embarrassment, 262, 264-5
Non-existents, 214
Non-faith, 262, 265
Non-finding of the self, 192, see
also Unfindability of objects
Non-harmfulness, 248, 253
Non-hatred, 248, 250-1, 253
Non-ignorance, 248, 250-1, 253
Non-introspection, 262, 266
Non-mistaken consciousness in
Prasangika, 510, 511
Non-Partisan Madhyamikas,
587-8
Non-Partisan Prâsarigikas, 432
Non-person non-associated
compositional factors, 269-71,
Chart 31 p.270
Index
Non-revelatory forms, 234, 289
Non-shame, 262, 264
Non-valid consciousness, 702
Non-virtues, 255, see also Root
and Secondary afflictions and
Virtuous mental factors
Nor-sang-gya-tso (Nor-bzangrgya-mtsho), n.504 p.858
Not unable, 87
Nyen (gNyan, gNyan Dar-ma_ grags), 536
Nying-ma, 15, 532, 534, 538
Object of negation in
Chittamatra, 128-9, 296-301,
367-74
Object of negation in
Prasangika, 35-40, 66, 127-9,
189, 200-1, 297-304, 549-60,
625-38, see also Identifying
the object of negation
appearing to sense
consciousnesses, 167, 44950, 452, 509-11, 515-6,
529, 552
synonyms, 36-9, 584, 626,
632
Object of negation in the four
schools, Charts 37 and 38
pp.299-300, 341-2, 385-6, 436
Object of negation not
appearing to the sense
consciousnesses in Svatantrika,
450, 516, n.497 pp.848-9
Object of observation of the
view of self, 177-8, 678-9
Object of the mode of
apprehension, 701
Objective existence, 9, 36, 175,
194, 419, 445-6
1003
Objects of meditation in the
four schools, Chart 36
p.298
Obstructions to liberation, 1049, 114, 119, 195, 210, 297,
Chart 38 p.300, 302
Obstructions to liberation and
omniscience in the four
schools, Chart 38 p.300
Obstructions to omniscience,
103-4, 108-9, 111, 115, 11718, 119, 210, 297, Chart 38
p.300, 302, 345, 416
Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation
of (Nagarjuna 'sj 'Treatise on
the Middle Way', 466-7, 679,
680, 686, n.346 p.815, n.424
p.830
Odors, 226, Chart 16 p.228,
232, 273, 274
Omnipresent mental factors,
238-45, Chart 23 p.239, 278,
386-7
Omniscience, 10, 29, 118-23,
302, 331, 407
Once Returner, 106-7, 212
One Hundred Thousand Stanza
Perfection of Wisdom Sutra,
356, 599
Only Appearance Madhyamikas,
432-5, 586
Only-designated, 38, see also
Only-imputed
Only-imputed, 38, 385-6, 626,
see also Only-designated
Opening the Eyes of the
Fortunate, Treatise Brilliantly
Clarifying the Profound
Emptiness, 546, 571, 680,
681, n.500 p.852
1004
Meditation on Emptiness
Opposite of the Consequences,
(thai bzlog), 492, n.346 p.814-6
Opposites of the negatives, see
Isolates
Ornament for Clear Realization,
362, 403, 594
Ornament for the Mahay ana
Sutras, 358
Ornament of the Wisdom
Engaging the Sphere of All
Buddhas Sutra, 357
Other-approved inference, 4789, 481-2, 485, 486-8, 489
Other-approved reason, 478
Other-approved syllogism, 4789, 481-2, 521-6, 525, 586,
n.347 p.816
Other-emptiness, 35-6, 326,
415-6, 535
Other-powered natures, 388-92,
595, 601, 610, 611, 618-20
Other-renowned inferences,
n.449 pp.835-6, see also
Other-approved inferences
Other-renowned reason, 697,
see also Other-approved
reason
Other-renowned syllogism, 5245, see also Other-approved
syllogism
Pa-bong-ka (Pha-bong-kha), 67,
69, 79, 277
Pa-dam-ba-sang-gyay (Pha-dampa-sangs-rgyas), 536
Padmasambhava, 363, 532, 533,
718
Pak-mo-drup-dor-jay-gyel-bo
(Phag-mo-grub-rdo-rje-gyal-po)
538
Pan-chen So-nam-drak-ba (Panchen bSod-nams-grags-pa),
566, n.298 p.811
Panchakrama, see Five Stages,
587
Paramartha, 713
Paramarthabodhichittabhavanakramavarnasamgraha, see
Cultivation of the Ultimate
Mind of Enlightenment
Paramarthasatya, see Truths,
ultimate
Paratantra, see Other-powered
natures
Parikalpita, see Imaginary
natures
Parinirvana, 609, see also
Nirvana
Parinishpanna, see Thoroughly
established natures
Particles, partless, 39, 337-8,
346
Chittamatra refutation of, 373
Partisan Prasangikas, 432, 587-
8
Partless particles, see Particles,
partless
Patanjali, 322
Path, eightfold, 206
Path of accumulation, 94, 111,
205, 206, 379
Path of meditation, 96, 99-109,
Chart 5 p. 105, 111, 296, 407
Path of no more learning, 108
Path of preparation, 93-6, 98,
111, 206, 302-3, 380
Path of release, 96-8, 105ff, 119
Path of seeing, 96-9, Chart 4
p.97, 106, 107, 111, 114,
296
Index
Path structure in Prasangika,
93-109, 111-15, 195, 297-304,
378-80
Path structure in Vaibhashika,
342-3, 392-3
Paths of manifestation, three,
207
Peerless Praise, 590
Perfection of Wisdom Sutras,
11, 29, 33, 173, 201, 220,
356, 423-4, 427, 570, 574,
589, 606, 607, 631, n.298
p.811
Performance Tantra, 112
Permanence, meaning of, 216,
382
Permanent phenomena, 215-19,
Chart 9 p.217, 285, 344, 347,
349, 390, 432-3
Person, 268, 282, see also Self
identification of in the
different schools, Chart 37
p.299, 385-6, 693-4, 695,
n.791 pp.897-903
Perverse view, 259, 260-1, 289
Phat, technique for forceful
removal of laxity, 77
Phenomena, 214-5, 433
as the basis for the division
into positive and negative
phenomena, 721-3
as the basis for the division
into the two truths, 405-15
of the afflicted class, fiftythree, 201-3, 275, 434
of the pure class, fifty-five,
201, 204-12, 434
Phonetic system, 19-22
Pitaputrasamagama, see Meeting
of Father and Son Sutra
1005
Pliancy, 86-7, 88, 93, 245, 248,
252
Positive phenomena, 721-2
Powers, six, 80-6, Chart 3 p.81
Powers, ten, 208-10, 255
Praise of Dependent-Arising,
571, 661, 675-6
Praise of the Element of
Qualities, 590
Praise of the Inconceivable, 590
Praise of the Mind Vajra, 590
Praise of the Supramundane,
472, 590
Praise of the Three Bodies, 590
Praise of What Surpasses Praise,
590
Praises of Reality, 590
Prajnahrdaya, see Heart of
Wisdom
Prajnamoksha, 593
PrajnapradTpa, see Lamp for
(Nagarjuna's) 'Wisdom'
Prajnapradipatika, see
Commentary on
(Bhavaviveka's) 'Lamp for
(Nagarjuna's)
"Wisdom"'
Prajnapti-matra, see Onlydesignated and Only-imputed
Prajnaptivadins, 340, 714, 716,
717, 718, 719
Prajnavarman, 320
Pramana, etymology, 701, see
also Valid cognizer
Pramanasamuchchaya, see
Compendium of Valid
Cognition
Pramanavarttika, see
Commentary on (Dignaga's)
'Compendium of Valid
Cognition'
1006
Meditation on Emptiness
Prasangika-Madhyamika, 9, 11,
36-41, 98, 104, 128-9, 134-5,
144-8, 155, 159-60, 164, 167,
172-3, 182-3, 195, 231, 234,
290, 297fF, 309, 337, 359-61,
367, 385-6, 396-7, 405, 419,
421, 431-9, 441, 445, 449-53,
455, 514-5, 526-30, 539ff,
549ff, 565, 583, 704, 733,
n.504 pp.857-8
acceptance of what the world
accepts, 435, 439, 526, 528,
635-6
accord with the conventions of
the world, 435, 502, 526-30
appearance of the object of
negation to the sense
consciousnesses, 44-5, 167,
449-50,452, 509-11, 514-6,
529, 552
appelation of the name in
Tibet, 497, 530, 586
commentarial sources, 56973, 588-9, 590-94
definition of, 452, 584-6
differentiated from Nihilists,
40-41, 543,633-4
differentiation of the
interpretable and the
definitive, 422-8, 595-623,
n.528 pp.864-5
divisions of, 359-63,431-2,
441, 455, 587-8, n.501
pp.854-5
etymology of, 452-3, 584-6
in Tibet, 11-15, 531-8
interpretation of dependentarising, 163-9, 432-5, 663,
see also Dependent-arising
interpretation of mind-only,
Prasangika-Madhyamika (cont.)
374-8, 61 1-14
interpretation of the three
natures, 391-2, 617-20
mode of abiding in the middle
way, 40, 436-9, 162, 169,
451-2, 634-5
object of negation, 35-40, 66,
127-9, 189,200-1,297-304,
549-60, 584, 625-38
path structure, 93-109, 11115, 195, 297-304, 378-80
presentation of conventional
phenomena, 539-47, 549ff,
574-5, see also Valid
establishment of phenomena
refutation of a mind-basis-ofall, 387-8
refutation of Samkhya, 137-40,
441-5, 455-8ff, 469-71, 474,
476, 479-94, 499-526, 641-3
sutra sources, 569-73, 588-90
synonyms of, 432, 435-6, 5867, n.504 pp.857-8
use of consequences, 134-5,
360, 431-2, 443-5, 449-51,
452, 489, 494-7, 529,
585-6, 733
Prasannapada, see Clear Words
PratTtyasamutpada, see
Dependent-arising
Prautyasa mutpadad ivibha hga niraesha, see Commentary on
the 'Sutra on DependentArising'
Pratyaksha, Chandrakirti's
explanation of the term, 656
Pratyekabuddha, etymology,
n.495 p.845, see also Solitary
Realizers
Index
Precious Garland of Advice for
the King, 15, 30, 100-3, 357,
388, 569, 590, 614, 626, 631,
673, 675, 688, 693
Precious Treasury of the Supreme
Vehicle, 15
Preparations for concentrations,
87
Presentation of conventionalities
in Prasangika, 539-47, 549ff,
574-5
Presentation of Tenets, 17, 563
Presentation of Tenets, Roar of
the Five-Faced [Lion]
Eradicating Error, Precious
Lamp Illuminating the Good
Path to Omniscience, see Root
text, Jam-yang-shay-ba's
Presentation of the Lack of Being
One or Many, 545-7
Pride, 256, 257
Principal, of Sâmkhya, 321-6,
504, 613
Production, non-refutation of
nominal production, 145,
159-60, 162, 183-4, 433
Production, refutation of, 131,
133-4, 150, 161-2, 183-5, see
also Refutation of the four
extreme types of production
and Refutation of the four
alternatives of production
Production that is asserted, 142,
144-5, 148, 185, 501-2, 641
Proof statement, five
membered, 483, 489,
Appendix 5 pp.729-33
Proof statement, twomembered, Appendix 5
pp.730-3
1007
Prophecy about Buddhism in
Tibet, 33
Proponents of True Existence,
n.786 p.897
Pudgalavadins, 385
Pure lands, 375-6, 395
Purpose of the Prasartgika
refutations, 526-30, 539
Purvashailas, 714, 715, 716,
717, 718
Qualifying the object of
negation, 424
Questions of Brahma Sutra, 31
Questions of King Dharamshvara
Sutra, 359, 571, 590, 607
Questions of Sagaramati Sutra,
161, 590
Questions of the King of Nagas,
Anavatapta, Sutra, 161, 162,
589
Questions of the King of Nagas,
Sagara, Sutra, 571, 589, 660
Quintessential Instructions on the
Middle Way, 593
Ra (Rva, Rva rDo-rje-grags),
536
Rahulabhadra, 592
Rajagirikas, 715
Rajaputra Yashomitra, 662, 674
Ratnakara, see Jewel Mine
Sutra
Ratnakuta, see Heap of Jewels
Sutra
Ratnamegha, see Cloud of Jewels
Sutra
Ratnavali, see Precious Garland
Real and unreal
conventionalities, 421, 635-6
1008
Meditation on Emptiness
Realization of subtle
selflessness, need for, 30-1
Reasoned analysis, object found
by, 406, 410, 411
Reasoning, 10, 31-2, 115, 129,
551-3, see also Analysis
Reasoning establishing the lack
of being one or many, 61, 645, 638
Reasoning of dependent-arising,
52-5, 61, 129, 161-73, 637,
639, 659-62ff, 675
Reasonings refuting a self of
persons, 677-97, see also
Fivefold reasonings and
Sevenfold reasonings
Reasonings refuting a self of
phenomena, 693, 694, see also
Diamond slivers, Refutation
of production of the four
extreme types of production,
Refutation of production of
the four alternative types, and
Reasoning of dependentarising
Reasonings refuting inherent
existence, 636-7, 639, 693,
see also specific reasonings as
cross-listed above
Referent object, 701
Refuge, 335-6
Refutation of a self of persons
in Prâsangika, 677-97, see also
Fivefold reasoning and
Sevenfold reasoning
Refutation of a self of
phenomena in Prâsangika,
693, 694, see also Diamond
slivers, Refutation of the four
extreme types of production,
Refutation of a self of
phenomena (cont.)
Refutation of production of
the four alternative types, and
Reasoning of dependentarising
Refutation of causeless
production, 149-50, 649-50
Refutation of inherently existent
mine, 193-4
Refutation of Objections, 471,
472, 473, 475, 497, 510,
550, 551, 571, 585, 591
Refutation of production from
both self and other, 148-9,
649
Refutation of production from
other, 135-6, 140-8, 154, 433,
460, 643-8, 653
Refutation of production from
self, 136-40, 144-8, 441-3,
455-64, 470-1, 474-94, 499505ff, 640-3
Refutation of production from
self, other, etc., see Diamond
slivers
Refutation of the four
alternative types of
production, 61, 63-4, 129,
151, 155-60, 639, 653-8
Refutation of the four extreme
types of production, 61-3,
129, 151-4, 433, 458-61ff,
467-8, 490, 500, 639, 651-3,
see also Diamond slivers
Refutation of the Samkhya
assertion of production from
self, 137-40, 441-3, 455-8ff,
469-71, 474, 476, 479-94,
499-526, 641-3
Index
Reliances, four, 425, 597
Ren-da-wa (Red-mda'-ba), 536
Resentment, 262, 263
Retentions, 208
Rice Seedling Sutra, 143, 279,
501, 502, 570, 646, 648
Rik-bay-ku-juk (Rigs-pa'i-khubyug), 432, 587
Rin-chen-sang-bo (Rin-chenbzang-po), 531-2, 534
Robinson, Richard, 13, 25
Root afflictions, 238, 255-61,
Chart 26 p.256, 287
Root of cyclic existence, 368,
417
Root text, Jam-yang-shay-ba's,
citation of, 565, 584, 586, 587,
588-9, 595-6, 625-6, 632, 637,
640, 640-1, 643-4, 647-8, 649,
651, 654, 655, 659, 676, 677,
697
Rope-snake example, 37, 437-8,
619-20, 626, 627
Ruinations, five, 33, 608, n.563
p.874
1009
Samadhiraja, see King of
Meditative Stabilizations Sutra
Samayabhedoparachanachakre
Nikâyabhedopadeshanasamgraha, 717
Samdhinirmochana, see Sutra
Unravelling the Thought
Samenesses of phenomena,
ten, 131-2
Samghabhadra, 343
Sàmkhya, 35, 239, 294, 295,
318, 320-27, 339, 411, 415,
436, 471, 564, 613, 649
refutation of their assertion of
production from self, 13740, 441-3, 455-8ff, 469-71,
474, 476, 479-94, 499-526,
641-3
Samkrantivâdins, 340, 714, 716,
719
SammitTyas, 340, 341, 694,
714, 715, 716, 717, 719
Samvrtisatya, see Truths,
conventional
Sannagarikas, 340, 715, 716,
717, 719
Saraha, 356, 358, 361, 592
Sa-gya (Sa-skya), 15, 147, 343,
Sarvabuddhavishayavatara534, 535, 536, 538, 573
jnânâlamkdra, see Ornament
Sa-gya Pandita Jam-yang-giinof the Wisdom Engaging the
ga-gyel-tsen, 536
Sphere of All Buddhas Sutra
Sacred Word of Manjushri, 43,
Sarvâstivâda, 339, 340, 532
571, 685, 686
Sarvâstivâdins, 339, 340, 714,
Saddharmapundarika, see White
715, 716, 717, 718, 719
Lotus of the Excellent Doctrine
Satyadvay avatar a, see
Sutra
Introduction to the Two Truths
Sagaramatipariprchchhasutra, see
Satyadvayavibhahga, see DiscriQuestions of Sagaramati Sutra
mination of the Two Truths
Sagaranagarajapariprchchha,
Satyakaparivarta, see Chapter of
see Questions of the King of
the True One Sutra
Nagas, Sagara, Sutra
Sautràntika, 98, 135, 139, 167,
Sam-yay (bSam-yas), 532, 533
1010
Meditation on Emptiness
Sautrantika (cont.)
172, 181, 234, 336, 343-51,
367, 369, 370, 392, 393, 434,
436, 551, 565, 639, 641, 676,
709, 716, 719, n.501 pp.854-5
definition, 351
etymology, 343, n.501 p.854
object of negation, 296-303,
345
Sautrantika Following
Reasoning, 39, 296, 344,
346-51, 366, 385, 551, n.501
pp.854-5
Sautrantika Following
Scripture, 344-6, 350, 351,
385, n.501 pp.854-5
Sautrântika-SvâtantrikaMâdhyamika, 296ff, 361,
362,367, 378, 385, 450
refutation of mind-only, 361,
363, 378
Scale example with regard to
production, 143, 646-7
Scattering, 75, 83, 265
Sciences, four, 211
Se-ra Jay College, 566
Seals, four, 319, 336-7, 345-6
Secondary afflictions, 238, 2616, Chart 28 p.262, 287
Self, 175, 186-9, 268, 307-15,
636-7, see also Selflessness
hypothetical synonyms in
Prâsangika, 36-7, 38, Chart
1 p.39, 584, 626, 632
in the four schools, Chart 37
p.299, 385-6, 693-4, 695,
n.791 pp.897-903
permanent, single, and
independent, 299-302, 341,
385
Self (cont.)
substantially existent, 303-4
307-15, 341-2, 385, see also
self-sufficient person
synonyms, 175, 315
that is negated in Prasangika,
175, 189, 297-304, 307-15,
385-6, 636-7
Self-approved inference, 478,
481-2
Self-approved reason, 478
Self-consciousness, 350-1, 3734, 377
Self-emptiness, 35-6
Self-sufficient person, 296-304,
341-2, 384-5
Selfless, 213-14, C h a r t 7 p . 2 1 3
Selflessness
in the four schools, 296-302,
Chart 39 p.301
of phenomena, 61-5, 127-9,
176, 177-8, 194, 196, Chart 39
p.301, 345, 636-7, 693, 694
of phenomena in Chittamatra,
128-9, 297-301, 367-74,
388-90
of the body, 54-5, 57-9, 176
of the person, 44-66, 127-9,
175-92, 196, 293, 296-304,
307-15, 341-2, 636-7
that is a lack of being a selfsufficient person, 293, 296304, 341-2
Selflessnesses, two, 636-7, see
also Selflessness of persons
and Selflessness of phenomena
Selves, two, 636-7, see also Self
Sense consciousnesses, mistakenness in Prasangika, 449-50,
452, 509-11, 514-6, 529, 552
Index
Sense consciousnesses, nonmistakenness in Svatantrika,
449-50, 452, 508-9, 514-6
Sense perception in Prasangika,
417, 449-50, 452
Sense powers (indriya), 202,
_ 221-3, 232, 273-4, 279-80
Ser-gi-go-cha, see Kanakavarman
Ser-ling-ba, see Suvarnadvipa
Seven Treatises of Higher
Knowledge, 344
Seven Treatises on Valid
Cognition, 344, 366
Seven-cornered set of
reasonings, 129, see also
Sevenfold reasoning
Sevenfold reasoning, 44, 48-51,
54, 55, 61, 66, 169, 170,
176-92, 637-8, 677, 687-97,
see also Fivefold reasoning
Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness,
570, 591, 652
Shaivas, 318, 565
Shakya clan, etymology, 355
Shakyamitra, 363, 432, 587
Shakyamuni Buddha, 342, 355,
358, 392-3, 403
Shakyaprabha, 718
Shalistamba, see Rice Seedling
Sutra
Shamatha, see Calm abiding
Shame, 248, 250
Shang-ba Ga-gyu (Shang-pa
bKa'-rgyud), 538
Shantarakshita, 362-3, 532-3,
575
Shantideva, 31, 358, 422, 432,
570, 587, 593, 633, 657
Shapes, 223, 225-6, Chart 14
p.226, 232, 233
1011
Shar-dzay College, 566
Shariputra, 605
Shatavahana, 357
Shi-jay (Zhi-byed), 536, 537, 538
Shikshasamuchchayakarika, see
Compendium of Learnings
Shravaka, discussion of
etymology and reasons for
translation, n.495 pp.840-45,
see also Hearers
ShrTmaladevxsimhanada, see
Lion's Roar of ShrTmaladevT
Sutra
Shunyatasaptati, see Seventy
Stanzas on Emptiness
Shunyatasaptativrtti, see
Commentary on (Nagarjuna's)
'Seventy Stanzas on
Emptiness'
Shura, 432, 586, 587-8, 591,
n.504 p.857, see also
Ashvaghosha
Siddharthikas, 715
Similarities, five, 236
Similarly appearing subject, see
Commonly appearing subject
Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning, 165,
199, 388, 472, 570, 591, 614,
670-71, 672, 674, 675
Skhalitapramathanayuktihetusiddhi, see Establishment of the
Reasoning and Logic Refuting
Error
Sleep, 266, 267
Snake-rope example, see Ropesnake example
Solitary Realizers, 98, 99, 1068, 128, 195, 212, 288, 296ff,
342, 378-9, 392-3, 427, 605,
609, n.495 p.845
1012
Meditation on Emptiness
Son sutras, 589, n.514 p.862
Song-dzen-gam-bo (Srongbstan-sgam-po), 531
Song on the Practice of the View,
545
Sopa, Geshe Lhundup, 12
Sounds, 226, Chart 15 p.227,
232, 273, 274
Sources, (ayatana), twelve, 222,
223, 273, 274, Chart 34
p.274, 278-9ff
Space, 217, 233-4, 285, 337,
344, 390
Space-like meditative equipoise,
66, 95
Special insight, 67, 70, 88, 89,
91-109, 112-14, 247, 404,
534, 557-8
definition, 92
Spite, 262, 263
Sport of Manjushri Sutra, 589
Spread of Buddhism to Tibet,
531-8
Sprung, Mervyn, n.496 pp.8458
Stabilization, 247
Stabilizing meditation, 89-90,
9Iff, 113-15, 557-8
Stage of completion, 113-15,
200
Stage of generation, 113-14,
380, 409
Stages of Meditation
(Bhavanakrama), 533
States arisen from hearing,
thinking, and meditating, 93
Stcherbatsky, Theodore, n.374
p.818, n.421a p.824, n.423
p.825, n.496 p.845-8
Sthavira-chaitikas, 340
Sthaviras, 340, 713, 714, 715,
716, 717, 718, 719
Sthaviravadins, 719
Sthiramati, 360, 462, 665
Stream Enterer, 98, 106-7, 212
StutyatTtastava, see Praise of
What Surpasses Praise
Sublime Continuum of the Great
Vehicle, 357,359,572,593,610
Substantial establishment, 338
Substantial existence, 338, 344
Substantially existent, 36, 37,
303, 620-2, 632
Suchness, 217, 218-19
Sudden enlightenment, 537
Suffering, three ypes, 286-7
Sugar-Cane-One, etymology, 355
Sugata essence, 617, see also
Buddha nature and Tathagata
essence
Suhrllekha, see Friendly Letter
SuhrllekhatTka, see Commentary
on (Nagarjuna's) 'Friendly
Letter'
Superiors, 98, 289-90, 378-80,
n.494 p.840
Supplement to (Nagarjuna's)
'Treatise on the Middle Way',
13, 131, 320, 399, 400, 403-5,
528, 538, 569, 5/2, 610, 637,
653
citation of, 30, 153, 169, 170,
184, 554, 556, 558, 602,
610, 612, 614, 616, 617,
636, 640, 641, 644, 645-7,
648, 649, 650, 652, 678,
679, 681, 682, 683, 689-90,
692, 694
meaning and translation of
title, n.545 pp.868-71
Index
Sutra, 22
meaning of the term, 423
Sutra citations, unidentified,
596-7, 657, 670, 678, 687,
696
Sutra example of illusoriness,
597
Sutra examples supporting
mind-only, 372-3, 376
Sutra on the Heavily Adorned,
571, 590, 595, 616-7
Sutra on the Myrabolan Fruit,
603, 607
Sutra on the Ten Grounds, 131,
378, 570, 589, 612, 613, 623,
682
Sutra Showing the Inconceivable
Secrets of the Tathagatas, 589
Sutra Showing the Realm of the
Inconceivable Qualities and
Wisdom of the Tathagatas,
589
Sutra Unravelling the Thought,
359, 415, 416, 424, 426-7,
570, 590, 595, 599, 600, 6012, 603, 604, 607, 610, 612,
613, 618, 619
Sutrasamuchchaya, see
Compendium of Sutra
Sutravadins, 715
Suvarnadvlpa (gSer-gling-pa),
535
Suvarshakas, 714, 716
Svabhava, different meanings
of the term, 391-2, 438, see
also Bhava
Svatantrika-Madhyamika, 135,
155, 167, 181, 361-4, 404
431-2, 434, 436, 441, 445-6,
450-3, 455, 636, 646, 693,
1013
Svatantrika-Madhyamika (com.)
695-6, n497 pp.848-50, n.501
pp.854-5, n.510 pp.859-60
definition of, 452
differentiation of the
interpretable and the
definitive, 424
non-mistakenness of sense
consciousnesses, 449-50,
452, 508-9, 514-6
object of negation, 39, 128-9,
296-303, 361-3, 436-7, 450,
574, 631, 635, 636, 847-8
use of syllogisms, 135, 361,
431, 450-2, n.497 pp.848-50
Syllogisms (prayoga), 134-5,
360, 361, 431-2, 444-5, 44951, 489, 491,494, 497, 529,
731
implied, 444-5
Tamrashatlyas, 340, 715, 717,
718
Tang-sak-ba (Thang-sags-pa),
411
Tangible objects, 229-31, Chart
18 p.229, 232, 273, 274,
Tantra, 9, 11, 22, 71, 109,
111-15, 117, 188, 200, 247,
319, 409, 451, 532
Taranatha, 713, 717
Tarkajvala, see Blaze of
Reasoning
Tastes, 228-9, Chart 17 p.228,
232, 273, 274
Tathagata essence, 357, 381,
610, 611, 612, 615-7, 623, see
also Buddha nature
Tathagata Essence Sutra, 357,
359, 381, 590, 610, 611, 616
1014
Meditation on Emptiness
Tathagata Lu-rik-gyel-bo, 356
Tath agatachintyaguhyanirdesha,
see Sutra Showing the
Inconceivable Secrets of the
Tathagatas
Tathagatagarbhasutra, see
Tathagata Essence Sutra
Tathagatagunajnanachintyavishayavataranirdesha, see
Sutra Showing the Realm of
the Inconceivable Qualities and
Wisdom of the Tathagatas
Tattvasamgraha, see
Compendium on Reality
Teaching of Akshayamati Sutra,
425, 570, 589, 598-9, 618
Theravada, 315
Things, 219-20ff, Chart 10
p.220, 27Iff
Thoroughly established natures,
388-92, 410, 596, 601, 610,
611, 618-20
Thoroughly Non-Abiding
Madhyamikas, 435-6, 534,
n.504 pp.857-8
Those Who Hold That Illusion
is Established by a Reasoning
Consciousness, n.504
pp.857-8, n.510 pp.859-60
Thought, see Conceptual
consciousnesses
Three modes of a correct sign,
449, 450, 452, 697, 730-3
Three natures, see Natures,
three
Thu-mi-sam-bho-ta, 531
Tirthika, see Forders
Transliteration system, 19-22
Treasury of Knowledge, 236,
344, n.442 p.834
Treasury of Tenets, 15
Treatise Called 'The Finely
Woven ', see Finely Woven
Treatise of Four Hundred
Stanzas, see Four Hundred
Treatise on the Middle Way, 32,
128, 131, 178, 356, 399-405,
455, 459, 460, 467, 472, 489,
494-6, 500, 501, 538, 558-9,
569, 572, 574, 591, 596, 597,
637, 686, n.298 p.811
citation of, 153, 154, 162,
168, 178, 400-404, 438,
460, 472, 494, 495, 496,
502-3, 518, 522, 597-8,
619, 635, 644, 645, 660,
684, 688, 689
eight Indian commentaries
on, 360, 462
explanation of the title, 399400
Treatise on the Sublime
Continuum of the Great
Vehicle, see Sublime
Continuum of the Great
Vehicle
Tri-song-day-dzen (khri-srongIde-btsan), 532, 533
Trisambaranirdeshaparivarta,
see Chapter Showing the Three
Vows Sutra
Trisvabhâva, see Natures, three
True cessations, 97, 218, 255,
288-9, 294-5, 382, 412
True establishment, 36, 39
True existence, 36, 39
True origins, 97, 287-8, 293-4,
412
True paths, 97, 286, 289, 290,
295-6, 382, 412
Index
T r u e sufferings, 97, 285-7, 288,
292-3, 412
T r u t h Body, 117-19, 382
T r u t h s , conventional, 338, 349,
400-3, 405-21, 422
etymology, 416-8
Truths-for-a-concealer, 405-21,
see also Truths, conventional
etymology, 416-8, 421
T r u t h s , four noble, 96-8, 206,
285-304, 412
etymology, 289-90
meditation on, 292-6
order, 290-1
sixteen attributes of, 292-6
Truths, two, 172, 285, 290,
338, 346, 349, 400-3
as taught by Nagarjuna, 4003, 415, 596
basis of the division, 405-12,
418-9, 420
in Chittamatra, 390
in Madhyamika, 400-3, 40521
in Sautrantika, 346-50
sameness of entity, 413-15
Truths, ultimate, 338, 346,
400-3, 405-21, 422-4
etymology, 416
reason for translating thus,
419-20
Tu-gen, 385
Turnings of the wheel of
doctrine, three, 426-7, 595
Twenty false views of a real
self, 176-8, 687
Twenty-five Thousand Stanza
Perfection of Wisdom Sutra,
603, 618, 620-1
T w o compendiums, 359
1015
T w o disseminations of
Buddhism in Tibet, 531-2,
534
T w o truths, see Truths, two
Ultimate analysis, 144-5, 148,
185
ability to bear, 406, 410, 435
Ultimate existence, 36, 39, 156
Ultimate truths, see Truths,
ultimate
Understanding All Tenets, 15,
563
Unfindability of objects, 144,
136, 170, 173, 192, 195, 380,
437-8, 631, n.727 p.887
Uninterrupted path, 96-8,
104ff, 117ff, 288
Unmoving actions, 277, 288
Unravelling the Thought, see
Sutra Unravelling the
Thought
Unreal and real
conventionalities, 421
Unshared attributes of
Buddhas, eighteen, 211
Unwanted consequences, 441,
493
Uttaratantra, see Sublime
Continuum of the Great
Vehicle
Uttanyas, 714
Vaibhashika, 39, 98, 135, 139,
167, 172, 181, 219, 234, 269,
290, 296ff, 303, 315, 329,
336, 337-43, 344, 350, 367,
392, 434, 436, 565, 676,
n.501 pp.854-5
definition, 351
1016
Meditation on Emptiness
Vaibhâshika (cont.)
eighteen subschools, 339-41,
343, Appendix 3 pp.713-19
etymology of the name, 337,
n.501 p.854
Kashmiri, 337-8, 385
object of negation, 296-303,
315, 341-3
simultaneity of cause and
effect, 139, 339
Vaidakas, 294
Vaidalyasutranama, see Finely
Woven
vaidurya, sutra description of,
607
Vairochana, 533
Vaisheshika, 141, 294, 318,
337, 339, 447, 506, 507, 565,
613, n.423 pp.824-5
Vaishnavas, 318, 564
Vajra, 22
Valid cognizer, 511, 518, 701-5
Valid establishment of
phenomena, 136, 148, 172-3,
194-5, 409-10, 418-9, 420,
518, 539-47, 574-5, 676, 697,
n.727 p.887, see also
Certification of objects by
valid cognition
Vasubandhu, 236, 344, 359,
362, 525, 592, 662, 674,
n.442 p.834
Vasumitra, 343, 716, 718
Vâtsïputrïya, 339, 340, 714,
715, 716, 717, 718, 719
Vedânta, 46, 186-7
Vedântins, 318, 564
Vedas, 320, 321
Vibhajyavâdins, 340, 714, 715
717, 718
View holding to an extreme,
259, 260, 289
View of the transitory
collection, 103, 257, 258-9,
260, 280, 289, 308, 315, 6779, 686-7, 693, n.739 p.889
Views of annihilation, 318, 319,
320
Views of permanence, 318-9,
320
Vigrahavyavartam, see
Refutation of Objections
Vimalamitra, 532
Vimuktisena, 362
Vinrtadeva, 717, 718
Virtues, 254-5, see also Virtuous
mental factors
Virtuous mental factors, 238,
248-55, Chart 25 p.248
Visheshastavatika, see
Commentary on
(Udbhatasiddhasvam in's)
'Exalted Praise'
Visible forms, 223-6, Chart 12
p.223, 232, 273, 274
Vyakaranas, 318, 564, see also
Grammarians
Wangyal, Geshe, 12
Wayman, Alex, n.423 pp.824-5,
n.430a p.830, n.431 p.831
Wheel of doctrine, three
turnings of, 426-7, 595, 599,
601
White Lotus of the Excellent
Doctrine Sutra, 571, 604-5,
n.494 pp.841-44
Wisdom Body, 118, 119, 120,
382
Wisdom of sameness, 385
Index
World, destruction of, 630
Worldly assertion of causation,
501-2, 503
Wrong consciousness, 702-4
Wrong livelihood, 263-4, 289
Wylie, Turrell, 19
Yar-lung-drang-druk (Yar-klunggrang-'brug), 532
Yashomitra, 662, 674
Ye-shay-day (Ye-shes-sde), 533-4
Ye-shay-gyel-tsen (Ye-shes-rgyalmtshan), 115
1017
Yoga Tantra, 112
Yogachara-SvatantrikaMadhyamika, 234, 297ff,
362-4, 367, 378, 385, 388
Yogacharins, 365-6, see also
Chittamatra
Yogi, 22
Yu-mo-ba (Yu-mo-pa), 535
Yuktishashtrika, see Sixty
Stanzas of Reasoning
Yuktishashtikavrtti, see
Commentary on (Nagarjuna's)
'Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning'
Dedication
May whatever merit there is in writing this book bring
freedom and happiness to all sentient beings.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Jeffrey H o p k i n s is Professor of Religious Studies at the
University of Virginia, where he has taught Tibetan Studies
and Tibetan language since 1973. He served as Yehan Numata
Distinguished Visiting Professor of Buddhist Studies at the
University of Hawaii, Spring 1995. He received a B.A. magna
cum laude from Harvard University in 1963, trained for five
"ears at the Lamaist Buddhist Monastery of America (now the
Tibetan B u d d h i s t L e a r n i n g Center) in N e w Jersey, a n d
received a Ph.D. in Buddhist Studies from the University of
Wisconsin in 1973.
Professor Hopkins has published seventeen articles and
twenty-one books, the most prominent being Meditation on
Emptiness and Emptiness Yoga, and the most recent being the
Tibetan Arts of Love a n d Fluent Tibetan: A Proficiency Oriented
Learning System, Novice and Intermediate Levels. At the University
of Virginia he served as Director of the Center for South Asian
Studies for twelve years and founded a program in Buddhist
Studies. From 1979 to 1989 he served as His Holiness the Dalai
Lama's chief interpreter into English on lecture tours in North
A m e r i c a , S o u t h e a s t Asia, Australia, Great Britain, a n d
Switzerland; eight of his books are collaborations with the
Dalai Lama. He is currently writing a three-volume analysis of
Tibetan interpretations of the Mind Only doctrine of emptiness
ranging from the fifteenth to the twentieth centuries.
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