M IPAM ON B UDDHA -N ATURE The Ground of the Nyingma Tradition Douglas S. Duckworth STATE UNIVERSIT Y OF NEW YORK PRESS I NTRODUCTION This book addresses the relationship between presence and absence (emptiness) in Buddhist thought. It focuses on the Nyingma (rnying ma) tradition of Tibet as articulated in the works of Mipam (’ju mi pham rgya mtsho, 1846–1912), a great synthesizer of Buddhist doctrine and Nyingma philosophy. Mipam incorporates an extraordinarily wide range of discourses into his grand, systematic interpretation of Buddhist doctrine. I draw widely from his writings on the Middle Way (dbu ma, madhyamaka), epistemology (tshad ma, pramān.a), and tantra to discuss the significance of an ontological “ground” (gzhi), or Buddha-nature, as the central theme in his overall interpretative scheme. I present Mipam’s view across a range of topics to underscore Buddha-nature and a dialectic of presence and absence as a central thread that runs through his interpretative system. The presence of Buddha-nature as intrinsic within the ground of existence is a predominant feature of the discourses of tantra in the Nyingma tradition of Tibet, and in particular, the Great Perfection (rdzogs chen). The Great Perfection is a textual and meditative tradition that affirms the nature of mind as the Buddha, and offers a radically direct approach to actualizing this reality. The view of the Great Perfection consistently evades systematic analysis and in a fundamental way is antithetical to abstract conceptual determination. While Mipam did not write extensively on the Great Perfection as an isolated topic, he elucidates the view of the Great Perfection in his exoteric writings by creatively formulating the esoteric discourses that have defined the Nyingma tradition—namely, the Great Perfection—in terms of central exoteric discourses of monastic Buddhism: Buddha-nature, the Middle Way, and Buddhist epistemological systems. xi xii MIPAM ON BUDDHA-NATURE He skillfully incorporates esoteric discourses of Mantra (sngags) characteristic of his Nyingma predecessors into his commentaries on Indian śāstras. Buddhist epistemology, a system that delineates the authentic means of knowing reality, plays an important role in Mipam’s exegesis across both domains of esoteric and exoteric doctrines. Mipam integrates aspects of the Buddhist epistemological tradition with a view of Mantra, and associates the view of the Great Perfection with Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka. The Great Perfection is the Nyingma tradition’s highest esoteric teaching and PrāsaṅgikaMadhyamaka is the philosophy commonly accepted in Tibet as the highest exoteric view. By integrating the esoteric teachings of Nyingma tantra with Buddhist epistemology and Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka, Mipam affirms the Nyingma as not only a tradition of tantric exegesis and ritual practice, but also as grounded within the rigorous intellectual traditions of Buddhist exoteric philosophy. While discussing Mipam’s treatment of Buddha-nature, or the ground, across a number of issues in his works, we will address in detail his representation of affirmation and negation. The English terms “affirmation” and “negation” refer to the realm of linguistic representation. To depict the issues at stake in a more meaningful way, I use the words “presence” and “absence,” which have more of an ontological connotation—what is rather than simply its linguistic representation. Presence as such can be understood in two ways: 1. as a reified presence—the realm of conceptual or linguistic knowledge. 2. as an indeterminate presence—the realm of the mystical or divine ground of being. We will see how the former presence is rejected, and discuss implications of the latter presence in Mipam’s interpretation of Buddhist doctrine. In particular, we will look into the tension, or resonance, between the problem intrinsic to formulating such presence conceptually (or linguistically) as well as its fundamental place within the Buddhist tradition. A central concern here is the nature of philosophical reasoning and intellectual inquiry into Buddhist scriptural traditions. P RESENCE AND A BSENCE In the course of this book, we will see how a dialectic of presence and absence is a central theme in Mipam’s works. The relationship between Introduction xiii emptiness and divine presence involves a fundamental tension in Buddhist exegetical discourse. For Mipam, a key to the resolution of this tension is the unity of emptiness and divine presence. The ground, or Buddha-nature, is a focal point around which he articulates this unity. The topic of Buddha-nature spans the domains of metaphysics, theology, and philosophical anthropology. An etymology of the term “Buddhanature” (tathāgatagarbha)1 reflects the variable status and complexity of the subject matter. The Sanskrit compound tathā + gata, meaning “the thus gone one” (i.e., Buddha), is the same spelling as the compound tathā + āgata, meaning “the thus come one”; the term reveals the dual quality of a transcendent Buddha thus gone and an immanent Buddha thus come. Also, garbha can mean “embryo,” “womb,” and “essence.” On the one hand, as an embryonic seed it denotes a latent potentiality to be developed and the subsequent consummation in the attainment of Buddhahood. As a womb, it connotes a comprehensive matrix or an all-embracing divine presence in the world to be discovered. Academic scholars have described Buddha-nature in a number of ways. David Ruegg addresses a dual function of Buddha-nature in a dialectic between a soteriological point of view, in which the absolute is immanent in all beings, and a gnoseological point of view, in which it is altogether transcendent.2 We can see that Buddha-nature is at once transcendent, a future potential, and at the same time immanently present. As such, Buddha-nature functions as a mediating principle spanning both the absolute and phenomenal worlds. Another term for the Buddha-nature is “heritage” (gotra). Ruegg cites three main meanings of the term gotra in Buddhist usage: (1) germ, seed; (2) family, clan, lineage; (3) mine, matrix. He also mentions that the term gotra is designated extensionally as a soteriological or gnoseological category, and intensionally as the spiritual factor or capacity that determines the classification into that category.3 The topic of Buddha-nature also is a basis for promoting “one vehicle” (ekayāna) of the Buddha, an inclusivist system of the Mahāyāna that incorporates all Buddhist traditions. The role of Buddhanature as the single heritage of all beings distinguishes the Buddha-nature from Vijñānavāda (Mind-Only) traditions that accept five distinct heritages within three final vehicles (śrāvaka, pratyekabuddha, bodhisattva). Another scholar, Florin Sutton, delineates three other roles of Buddhanature: from a theoretical point of view, Buddha-nature is an extension of the Self/no-self debate, “providing the Yogācāras with a new, positive platform of defense against both the Hindu Eternalists and the Buddhist Nihilists”; from xiv MIPAM ON BUDDHA-NATURE a didactic (or practical) point of view, it functions as an intermediate step between a narrowly defined notion of Self (ātman) and a more thorough understanding of no-self (anātman); and from an ethical point of view, it provides a philosophical basis for altruism in the Mahāyāna. Sutton also explains Buddha-nature to function in three ways: (1) as an essence, an “underlying ontological Reality, or essential nature behind phenomena”; (2) as an “embryo” or “seed”—a dynamic, evolving potential; and (3) as a “matrix” or “womb,” an “intermediate” meaning (between the first two meanings), equated with the universal ground consciousness (ālayavijñāna).4 The discourse of Buddha-nature, as a pure essence abiding in temporarily obscured living beings, is a considerable diversion from the negative language found in many other Buddhist texts. The unchanging, permanent status attributed to Buddha-nature is a radical departure from the language emphasizing impermanence within the discourses of early Buddhism. Indeed, the language of Buddha-nature is strikingly similar to the very positions that Buddhists often argue against, demonstrating a decisive break from the early Buddhist triad of impermanence (anitya), suffering (duh.kha), and selflessness (anātman). The Uttaratantra (ca. fourth century), the first known commentarial treatise to deal explicitly with this topic, states: “The qualities of purity (śubha), self (ātman), bliss (sukha), and permanence (nitya) are the transcendent results.”5 Such affirmations are conspicuously absent in many other Buddhist texts. However, these terms are found in sūtras such as the Laṅkāvatāra, Gan.d.avyūha, Aṅgulimālīya, Śrīmālā, and the Mahāparinirvān.a, where they are used to describe the Buddha (tathāgata), the Truth Body (dharmakāya), and the Buddha-nature.6 Furthermore, the Laṅkāvatāra uses the term “supreme Brahman” to describe the ultimate state of existence (nis.t.hābhāvah. param. brahma).7 While the Perfection of Wisdom (prajñāpāramitā) Sūtras can be seen to function as an overturning of early Buddhist literature by depicting all phenomena as empty, Buddha-Nature Sūtras mark another radical inversion with the use of ātman in a positive light. This language has been said to have soteriological “shock value,” to uproot reified conceptions of emptiness.8 Nathan Katz has fittingly termed this phenomenon of contradictory claims as “hermeneutical shock.”9 The tension between the discourses of presence, as in the Buddha-Nature Sūtras, and emptiness, in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, is a rich source from which divergent interpretations grew, and one that has a long history in the developments of Buddhist discourse. In an important way, opposed opinions and sectarian debates on this issue create and maintain the dynamic vitality of Buddhist traditions. Introduction xv A lively dialectical tension between Buddha-nature and emptiness has continued in Tibet in terms of the competing doctrines of “other-emptiness” (gzhan stong) and “self-emptiness” (rang stong). The language of other-emptiness—which portrays the ultimate truth in affirming language—explicitly conflicts with the orthodox Geluk (dge lugs) formulation of the ultimate as a mere absence of inherent existence. A central issue concerning the status of other-emptiness is a recurring tension between presence and absence, which in Buddhist terms gets expressed in various ways such as appearance and emptiness, conventional and ultimate truth, Buddha-nature and emptiness, and other-emptiness and self-emptiness. This issue can be seen to have a history extending back to India in the competing depictions of the absolute as qualified (sagun.a) or unqualified (nirgun.a). A major tension in Tibetan thought is found between the positions that the ultimate truth must be a simple emptiness—a negation—in contrast to the positively framed depictions of ultimate reality as a divine presence existing at the ground of all. Across this spectrum we find a wide array of positions. The most famous proponents of other-emptiness are found within the Jonang (jo nang) tradition, and Dölpopa (dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan, 1292–1361) in particular.10 A view of other-emptiness in general involves affirming an ultimate ground of reality as a metaphysical presence that is empty of all phenomena that are extrinsic to it. We will discuss Dölpopa’s view of other-emptiness in chapter 3, as well as look into the views of a Jonang scholar of the last century, Khenpo Lodrö Drakpa (mkhan po blo gros grags pa, 1920–1975).11 Tsongkhapa (tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, 1357–1419) and his Geluk followers were major critics of the Jonang, the emblematic tradition of otheremptiness. In contrast to the Jonang depiction of other-emptiness as a metaphysical presence, Tsongkhapa consistently argued that the ultimate truth is necessarily a mere absence.12 He offered a clear delineation of what ultimate truth is: the lack of inherent existence. We will see how other traditions portray the ultimate truth in more affirming language, and offer a less delimited portrayal of ultimate reality than the one championed by the Geluk tradition following Tsongkhapa. In order to fully appreciate the dialectical tension between presence and absence in Tibetan thought, we need to recognize the central role that the works of Dharmakīrti (600–660) and Candrakīrti (600–650) have played in Tibet. Representations of exoteric Buddhist discourse in Tibet have been dominated by the commentaries of Dharmakīrti and Candrakīrti. It is xvi MIPAM ON BUDDHA-NATURE important to not only recognize this fact, but also to acknowledge its implications for how Buddhism is interpreted. In Tibet, the negative dialectics of the Middle Way are typically identified with Candrakīrti’s interpretation of Nāgārjuna, and systematic epistemology is associated with Dharmakīrti. These two figures are also held to be authoritative commentators on a univocal doctrine of Buddhism. Even though Candrakīrti explicitly criticized Buddhist epistemological systems in his Prasannapadā,13 Buddhists in Tibet have integrated the theories of Candrakīrti with Dharmakīrti’s epistemology in unique ways.14 Within this integration, there is a tension between the epistemological system-building on the one hand, and “deconstructive” negative dialectics on the other. The integration of an epistemological system within the Middle Way is an important part of Mipam’s philosophical edifice. He calls the integration of these two systems “the intertwined necks of the lions of the Middle Way and valid cognition.”15 Along with Candrakīrti and Dharmakīrti, an important Indian figure for Mipam in particular is Śāntaraks.ita (ca. eighth century), who synthesized components of epistemology with the Middle Way in a system of YogācāraMadhyamaka. Mipam explains that Śāntaraks.ita’s Madhyamakālam.kāra is a treatise that demonstrates the essential point of all Mahāyāna, Sūtra and Mantra.16 He states: Such a scripture as this is the universal path of the Mahāyāna, integrating the viewpoints of the scriptures of the two chariot traditions like water mixed with water. In particular, both (1) ultimate valid cognition in the way that Nāgārjuna asserts and (2) conventional valid cognition in the way that Dharmakīrti asserts are combined as one taste in the great ocean of reason.17 Śāntaraks.ita’s system of Yogācāra-Madhyamaka is important for Mipam in significant ways: not only does Yogācāra play a fundamental role in his systematic presentation of exoteric Buddhism, but it plays an important role in the narrative structure of the entire Buddhist path by putting forward wisdom as the ground and fruition of the Buddhist path. Moreover, the synthetic approach of Yogācāra is instrumental to the way that Mipam incorporates various systems of Buddhist thought in Tibet. However, it is the reconciliation of Buddha-nature—particularly the affirmations of presence in tantra and the Uttaratantra—with depictions of emptiness in Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra that is a central part of Introduction xvii Mipam’s exegesis. Mipam weaves together aspects of Dharmakīrti, Candrakīrti, and the Uttaratantra into his unique exegesis of Buddhist doctrine. A number of scholarly works on Mipam have surfaced in the past decade. One example is Karma Phuntsho’s recently published Mipham’s Dialectics and the Debates on Emptiness. He discusses Mipam’s works in light of polemical exchanges with Geluk scholars, and his work is an excellent source for Mipam’s treatment of emptiness. Also, John Pettit’s Mipham’s Beacon of Certainty, which is focused around a translation of one of Mipam’s texts with an annotated commentary, offers biographical information and provides a general background to central issues in Mipam’s writings. Another book-length study of Mipam was done by Paul Williams, whose work deals with the notion of “reflexive awareness” (rang rig) in Mipam’s commentary on the ninth chapter of the Bodhicaryāvatāra.18 In his book, Williams makes a case that Mipam can be understood as a proponent of “other-emptiness.”19 Matthew Kapstein, however, questions the usefulness of the indigenous labels of “self-emptiness” and “other-emptiness” in interpreting Buddhist thought, and cites a danger in overly generalizing these categories. As an alternative, he suggests that it is important to document the precise usages of such terms as they are employed by indigenous traditions.20 In chapter 3, I have tried to document some ways in which “other-emptiness” and “self-emptiness” have been used by the specific Jonang and Nyingma authors I address, in order to further the understanding of how emptiness is represented in these traditions in general, and Mipam’s position in particular. There has been little written directly concerning the topic of Buddhanature in the Nyingma tradition, particularly in Mipam’s works. I intend to clarify the central role of Buddha-nature in his works through a broad-based representation of Mipam’s view of Buddha-nature that takes into account his treatment of epistemology, negative dialectics, and tantra. By drawing upon a wide range of discourses that he treats, my aim is to provide a holistically-oriented account of Mipam’s view of Buddha-nature. H ISTORICAL S URVEY In the nineteenth century, what came to be known as a “nonsectarian” (ris med ) movement developed in the eastern Tibetan province of Kham (khams). Alliances of a ritual, intellectual, literary, and institutional character formed among the traditions of the Kagyü (bka’ brgyud ), Sakya (sa skya), and xviii MIPAM ON BUDDHA-NATURE Nyingma following the political ascendancy of the Geluk tradition in central Tibet. This era of Tibetan history witnessed an intellectual and literary renaissance driven by a wave of creative doctrinal syntheses and new institutional movements toward formalized monastic education. The Nyingma tradition came to play a particularly influential role at this time, and a central figure and primary architect of the era was Mipam. Mipam’s Nyingma tradition identifies its origins within the dynastic period of the eighth century, although a self-conscious Nyingma tradition, known as the “old school,” actually developed in response to attacks on the legitimacy of its translations by the Sarma tradition, the “new schools,” which began to develop in Tibet from the activities of the famous translator Rinchen Zangpo (rin chen bzang po, 958–1055) in the eleventh century. Efforts to affirm the legitimacy, and superiority, of the Nyingma tradition are evident from early on in the works of Rongzom (rong zom chos kyi bzang po, ca. eleventh century) and Nyangrel (myang ral nyi ma’i ’od gzer, 1124–1192). The Nyingma, with a textual tradition of translations dating back to the early dissemination of Buddhism in Tibet, claim a distinctive connection with the imperial age of Tibet—a theocratic polity populated by the enlightened figures of the Dharma King Trisong Detsen (khri srong lde’u btsan) and Padmasambhava—as well as translators who had privileged access to the living tradition of Buddhism in India before its destruction at the hands of Muslim invaders in the eleventh century. The Nyingma have been able to periodically reinvigorate their tradition to serve the contingencies of history through their “close lineage” (nye brgyud ) of revealed teachings. In this close lineage, Buddhist canonical teachings are not limited to a specific set of texts, nor a specific individual in history, but remain within a tradition of an ongoing revelation, that in principle is open to anyone, at anytime. Before Mipam, the Nyingma tradition was largely defined by their esoteric transmissions, particularly those of the Guhyagarbhatantra.21 While many scholars of the Nyingma tradition certainly studied the exoteric texts of Buddhist sūtras and śāstras, they did not commonly write commentaries that focused on such exoteric texts. An important part of Mipam’s contribution to his Nyingma tradition was to provide commentaries on exoteric texts that incorporated a Nyingma esoteric view. Rongzom and Longchenpa (klong chen rab ’byams, 1308–1364) are Mipam’s main Tibetan sources. Rongzom, an eleventh-century Nyingma apologist, composed a commentary on the main tantra of the Nyingma tradition, the Guhyagarbhatantra.22 In his Establishing Appearances as Divine,23 Rongzom notably draws upon Buddhist epistemology, exemplifying a Introduction xix unique relationship between tantra and Buddhist epistemology in Nyingma exegesis. Longchenpa, the fourteenth-century systematizer of Nyingma thought, also wrote a commentary on the Guhyagarbhatantra,24 and is renowned for his writings on the Great Perfection, such as the “Seven Treasuries.”25 Mipam wrote catalogues for the publications of the Collected Works of Rongzom26 and the “Seven Treasuries” of Longchenpa.27 The influences of Rongzom and Longchenpa are prominently reflected in Mipam’s works, particularly Longchenpa and the tradition of the Great Perfection. In many ways, his works can be seen as an extended commentary upon the writings of Longchenpa.28 Another important figure in the Nyingma tradition was Lochen Dharmaśrī (lo chen dharmaśrī, 1654–1717). Lochen and his brother, Terdak Lingpa (gter bdag gling pa ’gyur med rdo rje, 1646–1714), both of whom took ordination from the Fifth Dalai Lama (1617–1682), were important figures in the transmission of the Nyingma canon (bka’ ma).29 Terdak Lingpa founded the Nyingma monastery of Mindröling in 1670.30 Lochen wrote commentaries of the Guhyagarbhatantra,31 as well as a commentary on the three vows by Ngari Pan.chen (nga ri pan. chen padma dbang rgyal, 1487–1542),32 which we will address in the context of discussing the view of “other-emptiness” in contrast to Mipam’s representation of emptiness. We will also look briefly into the works of Getsé Pan.chen (dge rtse pan. chen, ’gyur med tshe dbang mchog grub, 1761–1829), a Nyingma scholar from Kah.tok (kah. thog) monastery, who set forth a view of other-emptiness that he says accords with the Great Perfection.33 An explicit adoption of otheremptiness can be found in the Nyingma tradition affiliated with Kah.tok monastery, which apparently stemmed from the works of Tsewang Norbu (tshe dbang nor bu, 1689–1755) in the eighteenth century. The popularity of other-emptiness in the nineteenth century seems to have been largely due to Tsewang Norbu.34 He told Situ Pan.chen (si tu pan. chen chos kyi ’byung gnas, 1699–1774) that if he upheld the view and practice of other-emptiness, then his activity would be certain to flourish, and he would bring benefit to the teachings and beings.35 Situ Pan.chen was the founder of Pelpung (dpal spungs) monastery and the editor of the Degé (sde dge) edition of the Tibetan translations of the Buddha’s Word (bka’ ’gyur). Gene Smith conveys that Situ Pan.chen blended Mahāmudrā with a view of other-emptiness that he propagated throughout the Karma Kagyü traditions in Kham.36 Kongtrül (kong sprul blo gros mtha’ yas, 1813–1899), one of Mipam’s teachers, was a prominent figure at Pelpung in the following century. Kongtrül took up a view of other-emptiness as a means to unify the various xx MIPAM ON BUDDHA-NATURE sectarian views in Tibet.37 His Encyclopedia of Knowledge38 is a tremendous resource on different views and systems of thought throughout Tibet. Gene Smith credits Kongtrül’s Encyclopedia of Knowledge, finished in 1864, as likely “the earliest statement of nonsectarian thought.”39 Along with Kongtrül, another of Mipam’s teachers, Jamyang Khyentsé Wangpo (’jam dbyangs mkhyen brtse’i dbang po, 1820–1892), was a prolific figure in nineteenth-century Kham. Among the many texts Khyentsé composed in his massive, twenty-four volume Collected Works, he wrote a summary of the other-emptiness view of the Jonang.40 It is significant that the text immediately following this one in the volume is an exposition of the view and philosophy of Tsongkhapa, who is known as the founding father of the Geluk tradition and a prominent critic of the Jonang view.41 Such an eclectic character is a predominant feature of the nonsectarian movement. M ONASTIC E DUCATION AND THE N ONSECTARIAN M OVEMENT Before the nineteenth century, the Nyingma tradition was mainly defined by its practice and exegesis of tantra, in particular, the Guhyagarbhatantra. This central tantra of the Nyingma tradition embraces what may be called a pantheistic vision of the world as an expression of divinity.42 The institutional transformation of the Nyingma tradition in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a complex process of a systematization, or domestication, of the tantric vision of divine unity. Before the developments in monastic education during this time, the Nyingma tradition was more of a meditative, contemplative, and ritual tradition centered on the mystical vision of tantra. Mipam’s work is a product of the synergy between the wild, divine world of tantra and the structured, analytic rigor of monastic education. Mipam’s work can be seen as a synthesis of two polarities that form the contours of Buddhism in Tibet: the esoteric discourses of tantra and the exoteric discourses of monastic education. His treatment of Buddha-nature plays a particularly important role in this synthesis. Through his exegesis of Buddha-nature, Mipam shows the compatibility of esoteric discourses such as the Great Perfection with the exoteric discourses of valid cognition (tshad ma, pramān.a) and the Middle Way, which in his day played a prominent role in monastic education. Earlier in the nineteenth century, Gyelsé Zhenpen Tayé (rgyal sras gzhan phan mtha’ yas, 1800–1855?) had played an important role in the revitalization of Nyingma monasticism. He published the Nyingma canon (bka’ ma) Introduction xxi for the first time in ten volumes, founded Śrī Singha college at Dzokchen monastery, and instituted the rituals for the three foundations of the Vinaya at the monastery: the biweekly ritual of the vows for individual liberation, summer retreat, and the ritual for summer retreat recess. He rebuilt Dzokchen monastery with the support of the rulers of Degé, among others, after it was destroyed by an earthquake in 1842.43 Many large monastic colleges soon followed the model at Dzokchen.44 Along with Dzokchen, another source of Nyingma monasticism comes from Kah.tok, the oldest Nyingma monastic tradition, which stems back to the twelfth century. At Kah.tok monastery, the Norbu Lhünpo (nor bu lhun po) monastic college, or “the tantric college of one hundred scriptures,” was founded in 1906. This college was founded by Mipam, along with Kah.tok Situ (kah. thog si tu chos kyi rgya mtsho, 1880–1923/25), and extending from this college, twenty-five monastic colleges were founded through Kah.tok Situ’s work.45 The hermeneutical principle of other-emptiness, adopted from the Jonang tradition by Kah.tok Tsewang Norbu and Situ Pan.chen Chökyi Jungné, came to be employed by Nyingma scholars at Kah.tok and Kagyü scholars at Pelpung. Nyingma scholars at Kah.tok monastery appear to have drawn upon the exegetical language of other-emptiness more so than those at Dzokchen. Mipam offers a uniquely Nyingma interpretative style that differs not only from other-emptiness, but also from Khenpo Zhenga (mkhan po gzhan dga’, 1871–1927), a prominent professor at Dzokchen and an important figure in the revitalization of monastic education.46 Nyoshül Khenpo (smyo shul mkhan po ’jam dbyangs rdo rje, 1931–1999) delineates two traditions of explanation in the Nyingma tradition: (1) the transmission of Khenpo Zhenga, which is the manner that Indian scriptures such as the thirteen great scriptures are explained, and (2) the transmission of Mipam, which is the manner of explanation mainly based on Tibetan commentaries such as Longchenpa, Rongzom, and Ngari Pan.chen. He states that many from Kah.tok mainly follow the latter tradition.47 Khenpo Zhenga is famous for compiling textbooks for monastic colleges comprising his interlinear commentaries on “the thirteen great scriptures,” Indian treatises that were considered to be the important texts representing the spectrum of major Buddhist discourses—namely, the Abhidharma, the Vinaya, the profound view (of the Middle Way), and the “five treatises of Maitreya.”48 Khenpo Zhenga concerns himself with an exposition upon Indian sources, not the Tibetan layers of commentary, in xxii MIPAM ON BUDDHA-NATURE an attempt to interpret the Indian texts on their own terms.49 His commentaries can be seen as a means to circumvent sectarian disputes by appealing to Indian originals rather than some specific strand of nearly one thousand years of Tibetan commentary.50 His work contrasts not only with Kongtrül, who embraced an explicit other-emptiness interpretation, but also with Mipam. Mipam’s works have a stronger Nyingma sectarian identity. Nyoshül Khenpo quotes Mipam as stating that his own works were composed to ensure the legacy of the Nyingma tradition in future generations, whereas Khenpo Zhenga’s transmission “maintains the viewpoint of Candrakīrti and both Rongzom and Longchenpa as the life-force, and spreads the continuum of explanation and practice in all directions.”51 In this light, Mipam’s works can be seen to maintain a stronger sectarian identity than Khenpo Zhenga’s; Mipam’s own works explicitly draw from the Nyingma works of Rongzom and Longchenpa. In contrast to the uniquely Nyingma identity concerning the commentarial tradition of Buddhist exoteric texts that Mipam had forged for Nyingma monasteries in Kham, several Nyingma monasteries in Amdo (a mdo), including the Dodrup (rdo grub) tradition, adopted Geluk exegesis for their exoteric curriculum while maintaining Nyingma tantric studies as their esoteric base.52 The reliance on Geluk exegesis, however, became a target of Mipam’s polemical works. Although he promoted an inclusivist agenda characteristic of the nonsectarian movement, he affirmed a strong Nyingma identity. Before we turn to Mipam’s life and works, I should mention that what it means to be nonsectarian is complex. It clearly does not mean that all traditions are seen as equal on all levels. Rather, attention to a broad range of interpretations can be seen as a general quality of what it means to be nonsectarian in Tibet. Such attention to a plurality of interpretations does not (necessarily) mean a coercive amalgamation of others’ views with one’s own, but involves a move in the direction of inclusiveness that contrasts with a more insular model of scholarship that frames the boundaries of discourse within a more narrowly delineated tradition of interpretation. A unique quality of Mipam’s form of (non)sectarianism is the level of his engagement in dialogue with his main “opponent,” the Geluk: he appropriates certain aspects of Geluk thought, yet argues against what he finds to be problematic with their system of interpretation. His approach contrasts with four other ways of responding to the dominance of Geluk tradition, such as: (1) a more hostile attitude toward Geluk positions, such as found in the works of Gorampa;53 (2) a more submissive attitude to Geluk authority on exoteric exegesis, such as found in the Dodrup tradition; (3) a more dismis- xxiii Introduction sive attitude that excludes Geluk from the conversation and remains focused solely within one’s own tradition, such as what may be seen in the case of Padmavajra,54 one of Mipam’s teachers; and (4) a fourth alternative—wholesale conversion to Geluk (willed or forced). Mipam forged an alternative response to Geluk dominance by selectively appropriating certain features of the Geluk tradition while contesting others. It is this response that has become the formula for the enduring legacy of non-Geluk monastic colleges. The nonsectarian tradition of Tibet is not univocal, and what it means to be nonsectarian is not so clearly delineated. A broader range of particular texts and traditions needs to be documented before we can understand the nature of a nonsectarian stance of Tibet. Also, further research into the sociohistorical matrix of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Kham will be necessary before we can better assess the (non)sectarian climate of this time period. Because newly formed alliances and shifting territories were characteristics of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Tibet, it may be that it was an ideology of alliance that characterizes the so-called nonsectarian movement. In Kham, the proliferation of incarnation lineages exemplifies this. There, we witness the emergence of a system developing from one recognized incarnation to three (body, speech, mind) and five (quality and activity), as multiple incarnations of deceased teachers were recognized within other sectarian traditions.55 Actively forming alliances between disparate sectarian traditions helped strengthen feeble traditions. After the devastation of the Nyakrong wars in the middle of the nineteenth-century,56 Kham, which is sandwiched between the two dominant forces of China and central Tibet, proved to be a contested territory. It was in this turbulent and creative time that Mipam lived. L IFE AND W ORKS OF M IPAM Mipam was born to an aristocratic family in Degé in eastern Tibet.57 He memorized Ngari Pan.chen’s Ascertaining the Three Vows (sdom gsum rnam nges) when he was about six years old. He also studied Indian and Chinese systems of astrology at a young age. When he was ten, it is said that he was “unobstructed in reading and writing,” and composed a few short texts.58 He became a novice monk when he was twelve, entering the monastery of Jumohor (’ju mo hor gsang sngags chos gling), a branch of Zhechen (zhe chen) monastery connected with the lineage of Mindröling. There, he was a child prodigy, and came to be known as “the little scholar-monk.”59 xxiv MIPAM ON BUDDHA-NATURE After doing a retreat for eighteen months at Junyung (’ju nyung) on Mañjuśrī, the Lion of Speech, it is said that he achieved signs of accomplishment. From then on, he knew the scriptures without studying, and did not need to study other than simply receiving reading transmissions (lung). He went to Golok (mgo log) in 1859, due to the onset of the Nyakrong wars. In 1861, he went to Lhasa on pilgrimage, and studied at the Geluk monastery of Ganden (dga’ ldan) for about a month.60 He studied with a number of prominent teachers of his day, including Khyentsé, Peltrül (dpal sprul o rgyan chos kyi dbang po, 1808–1887), and Kongtrül.61 With Peltrül, he studied the Bodhicaryāvatāra; and later composed a commentary on the ninth chapter of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, the Wisdom Chapter. His commentary became a source of contention with some scholars in the Geluk tradition.62 Mipam studied the common arts, such as grammar, with Kongtrül, as well as various extraordinary practices of ripening and liberation. With Dzokchen Khenpo Padmavajra (padma badzra, 1867–1934), he studied a wide range of scriptures: Sūtra, Mantra, and the arts.63 When Mipam studied the Madhyamakāvatāra with Geshé Ngawang Jungné, he asked for only the reading transmission, saying that he need not bother with a detailed commentary. After hearing the teacher read the text just once, Mipam then explained it all from the beginning. The teacher responded, “Although I have the title of ‘Geshé’ (doctor, professor), I don’t have even a fraction of the intellect of this one!”64 Mipam is a unique figure of his time because he was not endorsed as an incarnate lama (sprul sku), at least not while alive. Also, unlike many other prominent figures of his day, such as Kongtrül, Khyentsé, and Chokgyur Lingpa (mchog gyur bde chen gling pa, 1829–1870), Mipam did not actively promote the new traditions of treasure text (gter ma) revelations; he neither discovered earth treasure texts (sa gter) publicly nor wrote extensive commentaries on them.65 Rather, he wrote numerous commentaries on a variety of diverse topics, ranging from logic, poetics, the Middle Way (both Prāsaṅgika and Yogācāra), medicine, astrology, including a sex manual; in short, he was a polymath.66 He also wrote on Tibetan translations of Indian texts, including tantras from the “new schools” (gsar ma),67 the Guhyagarbhatantra of his own Nyingma tradition, and Buddha-nature, which is the primary focus of this book. Mipam wrote on a variety of subjects. His literary output, which has been reproduced in twenty-seven volumes, is among the largest of any Tibetan author. A catalogue of his works divides his texts into four cycles: (1) Introduction xxv the cycle of narratives and eulogies, (2) the cycle of ordinary arts, (3) the cycle of the inner art (i.e., Buddhism), and (4) the cycle of dedications, auspicious verses, and prayers. The first cycle, which is said to foster faith, has four sections concerning: 1. eulogy 2. narrative 3. worship 4. miscellaneous supplications68 The second cycle of ordinary arts, which is said to foster comprehensive knowledge, has two parts: (1) the four major arts and (2) the subsidiary arts. The four major arts are: 1. linguistics 2. epistemology 3. material arts 4. healing, together with additional topics69 The subsidiary arts are: 1. poetics 2. astrological divination 3. counsel 4. miscellany70 The third cycle is divided into four sections (the first of which is the primary topic of this book). The four sections are: 1. Commentaries on the viewpoint of the Vehicle of Characteristics:71 • Commentaries on the general meaning of scriptures • Commentaries on the specific scriptures 2. The Vajrayāna of the common inner-tantras and outer-tantras72 3. The extraordinary Vajrayāna of the quintessential instructions of the Kālacakratantra73 4. Oral instructions on practice within the unexcelled Nyingma: • Explanatory commentarial notes74 • Ritual accomplishment texts75 xxvi MIPAM ON BUDDHA-NATURE • Quintessential instructions on the activities76 Specific four activities: pacifying enriching magnetizing subjugating Common variety • Oral instructions on practice.77 The last of the four main sections of Mipam’s corpus is the cycle of dedications, auspicious verses, and prayers.78 While we are left with a voluminous corpus of his literary output, Mipam’s life story describes him as not studying very much, and spending a lot of time in retreat. He was encouraged to write commentaries on the major Indian and Tibetan treatises by his teacher, Jamyang Khyentsé Wangpo.79 He states that he wrote the texts to fulfill his teacher’s wishes. Also, he says that he wrote them due to the fact that the teachings of the Nyingma tradition had dwindled to near extinction, and that most people were simply following after what others say.80 Unlike the other prominent sectarian traditions in Tibet, the Nyingma did not have an authoritative commentarial corpus on the central exoteric Buddhist treatises from India before Mipam. His texts have been very influential and many of his works came to be adopted within the curriculum of Nyingma monastic colleges. Mipam’s works have continued to play an important part in the monastic colleges in India, Nepal, and Tibet up to the present day. His texts constitute about 25 percent of the entire course of study at Larung Gar (bla rung gar), which lies in the eastern Tibetan region of Serta (gser rta) and is currently the largest monastic college in the world.81 Also, the curriculum of the Ngagyur Nyingma Institute in Mysore, India, which is currently the largest Nyingma monastic college in exile, includes Mipam’s commentaries on Indian treatises such as the Abhidharmakośa, Madhyamakālam.kāra, Pramān.avārttika, Mahāyānasūtrālam.kāra, the ninth chapter of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, and Kāvyādarśa. Their curriculum also includes his commentaries on Longchenpa’s Wish-Fulfilling Treasury and Guhyagarbha commentary, as well as Mipam’s compositions such as Gateway to Scholarship, Sword of Supreme Knowledge, Beacon of Certainty, and Lion’s Roar: Exposition of Buddha-Nature, among others.82 His works have come to play a prominent role in Nyingma monastic education. Introduction xxvii Two events in Mipam’s life in particular directly relate to the topic of this book. The first is his dream of Sakya Pan.d.ita, a thirteenth-century Sakya scholar, upon his reading of Dharmakīrti’s influential text on Buddhist epistemology, the Pramān.avārttika. In his dream, Sakya Pan.d.ita tells Mipam, “What is to be known about epistemology in the Pramān.avārttika? It is negation and affirmation.”83 He then divided the text in two and told Mipam to put the two parts of the text together. When he did, they became a sword and all objects of knowledge appeared before him. He swung the sword once and cut through them all unobstructedly. Henceforth, there was not a word in the Pramān.avārttika that he did not know.84 Within Mipam’s visionary experience, we get a hint of the import of the all-inclusiveness of negation and affirmation in the system of epistemology set up by Dharmakīrti. Dharmakīrti put forth a binary system of knowledge: (1) the real and (2) the unreal. The real and the unreal correspond to the radical dichotomy of (1) particulars and (2) universals, respectively. These two are validly known by either (1) direct perception or (2) inference; exclusively by means of either (1) nonconceptual, “affirming engagement” or (2) conceptual, “eliminative engagement” (negating contradistinctions). All these dichotomies boil down to negation and affirmation. The dichotomy of negation and affirmation is a central part of the structure of Dharmakīrti’s epistemology. Negation and affirmation constitute the two means of conventional valid knowledge, and understanding this dichotomy is fundamental to understanding Buddhist epistemology, at least as it functions on the ordinary level.85 Another significant moment in Mipam’s life story is when he debated with Japa Dongak (’ja’ pa mdo sngags), with Peltrül acting as moderator. The debate appeared to be even, so Peltrül suggested that they turn to the topic of “the universal form of the Great Perfection” (rdzogs pa chen po’i spyi gzugs) because Japa Dongak had written a commentary on this. It is during the debate on this topic, “the universal form of the Great Perfection,” that Mipam won the debate.86 Here we see that the Great Perfection is not simply an anti-intellectual meditative practice that rejects reasoned inquiry; it can involve analysis and polemical exchange. Indeed, the dialectical inquiry into the Great Perfection has a prominent place in Mipam’s works. Herein we find his significant contribution to Nyingma philosophy, and it is this topic that distinguishes the unique character of his view. The meaning of the Great Perfection, as conveyed through the ground (gzhi) and Buddha-nature, is central to the Nyingma view. xxviii MIPAM ON BUDDHA-NATURE S UMMARY OF C ONTENTS The dialectical unity87 of presence and absence is a theme that runs through Mipam’s works. This central theme can be seen in his treatment of a variety of topics: appearance versus emptiness, authentic versus inauthentic experience, sūtra (the last vs. middle “wheels of doctrine”), śāstra (Yogācāra vs. Prāsaṅgika), an ontology of emptiness (other-emptiness vs. self-emptiness), an epistemology of Buddha-nature (extraordinary logic vs. ordinary logic), Mahāyoga Tantra (purity vs. equality), and the Great Perfection (spontaneous presence vs. primordial purity). The structure of the chapters follows somewhat of a historical progression of the development of these topics; it can also be seen as a dialectical ascent into a deepening ground of subjectivity, which in Buddhist terms is expressed as wisdom. We will also look at how Mipam’s works are interpreted through the writings of Bötrül (bod sprul mdo sngags bstan pa’i nyi ma, 1898–1959), a scholar from the eastern region of central Tibet called Dakpo (dwags po), who was a prominent commentator on Mipam’s works. Bötrül was recognized to be an incarnation of Peltrül by his teacher, Khenpo Künpel (kun bzang dpal ldan, 1870/2–1943), who was Mipam’s direct disciple.88 In his main work, Distinguishing the Views and Philosophies (lta grub shan ’byed ), Bötrül elucidates Mipam’s view on a number of topics discussed below. Chapter 1 discusses Mipam’s interpretation of Buddhist sūtras in terms of the “wheels of doctrine” (chos ’khor, dharmacākra) and the two truths. The chapter begins by looking at how Longchenpa represents the three wheels of doctrine, and then turns to how Mipam integrates the middle wheel and the last wheel of doctrines through his interpretation of Buddha-nature. This chapter introduces Mipam’s important delineation of two models for the two truths. One two-truth model is based on a distinction between appearance and emptiness (snang stong bden gnyis), and the other is in terms of authentic and inauthentic experience (gnas snang bden gnyis). The first model can be seen as dealing with ontology, or what is, and the latter model can be seen as dealing with epistemology, or the way we know. We will see how Mipam shows the compatibility of emptiness and Buddha-nature through these two models of the two truths. The chapter also discusses theories of interpretation based on the categories of “definitive meaning” (nges don, nītārtha) and “provisional meaning” (drang don, neyārtha). We will see how Bötrül describes the two-truth model according to Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra as concerning appearance and emptiness. He aligns this model with the middle wheel of doctrine, for which Introduction xxix the explicit teaching is emptiness. As such, any appearance is necessarily a relative truth. In contrast, he depicts the two truths according to the Uttaratantra as the model of authentic/inauthentic experience, in accord with the two truths in Buddha-Nature Sūtras of the last wheel of doctrine. In this case, the ultimate truth is not only emptiness because appearances that accord with reality are the ultimate truth, as is the subject that experiences reality authentically. Conversely, inauthentic experience and distorted modes of being are relative. Through integrating both models of two truths from the Madhyamakāvatāra and the Uttaratantra, appearance/emptiness and authentic/inauthentic experience, respectively, Bötrül shows how (1) Buddha-nature is the ultimate truth as authentic experience and (2) Buddha-nature is the unity of the two truths of appearance/emptiness. Chapter 2 discusses the Middle Way in contrasting depictions of Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka and Yogācāra-Madhyamaka. It begins by introducing how Mipam distinguishes Prāsaṅgika from Svātantrika. The relationship between Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika, as distinctive approaches to the Middle Way, is a disputed topic in Tibet.89 A key point of Mipam’s delineation of Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika is his distinction between two types of ultimate truth: the “categorized ultimate” (rnam grangs pa’i don dam) and the “uncategorized ultimate” (rnam grangs ma yin pa’i don dam). The categorized ultimate is emptiness that is known conceptually and the uncategorized ultimate is emptiness that is beyond language and thought. In the contexts of language and thought, the two truths are distinct; however, the two truths are not distinguished in the context of nonconceptual meditative equipoise. Mipam delineates the Prāsaṅgika as a discourse emphasizing the uncategorized ultimate, in accord with the perspective of wisdom in meditative equipoise. In contrast, he depicts the Svātantrika as a discourse emphasizing the categorized ultimate, which accords with the contexts of postmeditation when the two truths are divided and the ultimate truth can only be conceptually known. We come to see how he makes a distinction between wisdom (ye shes), as the context emphasized by Prāsaṅgika, and ordinary consciousness (rnam shes), as the context emphasized by Svātantrika. We will also see how in Yogācāra, wisdom is held to be the ultimate truth in contrast to consciousness. Mipam also depicts Prāsaṅgika as an instantaneous means to eliminate conceptual constructs, in contrast to the progressive path emphasized in Svātantrika. Other than different means of approaching the ultimate truth, however, he does not delineate a distinct view for Prāsaṅgika that is different from Svātantrika. He emphasizes the compatibility of Prāsaṅgika and xxx MIPAM ON BUDDHA-NATURE Svātantrika by stating that the unique object of negation for the Prāsaṅgika is only the conception of the two truths as distinct. In this way, Mipam emphasizes the unity of the two truths as a characteristic of Prāsaṅgika discourse. Yogācāra also has an important place in Mipam’s characterization of ultimate truth as the authentic experience of wisdom. Moreover, Yogācāra plays a central role in his formulation of conventional reality as Mind-Only. We will see how Mipam situates the discourse of Prāsaṅgika to represent the nonconceptual unity of the two truths; it functions to deconstruct the distinction between the two truths. Yogācāra, in contrast, plays a constructive role in his systematic representation of two truths. As opposed to Prāsaṅgika, Yogācāra provides a comprehensive structure to his systematic interpretation, within which the conceptual is distinguished from the nonconceptual, and consciousness is distinguished from wisdom. He draws from both Prāsaṅgika and Yogācāra in his characterization of the Middle Way. Chapter 3 explores Mipam’s depiction of emptiness in more detail. In particular, it addresses the categories of “self-emptiness” and “other-emptiness.” The chapter begins by introducing depictions of self-emptiness and other-emptiness in the works of two Jonang scholars: Dölpopa and Khenpo Lodrö Drakpa. Then it looks into the representations of self-emptiness and other-emptiness in the works of a Nyingma scholar, Lochen Dharmaśrī. By discussing these different depictions of emptiness, we are able to provide some contrast with Mipam’s descriptions of emptiness and ultimate reality. We will see that Mipam is a proponent of self-emptiness in terms of the way he characterizes “self-emptiness.” This chapter looks in detail at the way Mipam articulates the view of emptiness. We will see that Mipam emphasizes the unity of emptiness and appearance; he argues against the notions of a non-empty appearance and a non-appearing emptiness. He also consistently emphasizes that emptiness is beyond any conceptual or linguistic referent. He argues that any conception of emptiness is not the genuine emptiness, and represents genuine emptiness as beyond dichotomies such as existence and nonexistence or substance and quality. He also makes an important distinction between conventional assertions—where things appear to be distinct and are said to exist as such—and assertions concerning the ultimate in which no such divisions are made. Chapter 4 addresses the explicit topic of Buddha-nature. Mipam depicts Buddha-nature as the suchness (chos nyid, dharmatā) of mind and reality. Buddha-nature, like emptiness, is the unity of appearance and emptiness. He affirms that the qualities of Buddha are primordially present, but are simply Introduction xxxi not manifest for sentient beings. He distinguishes his view of Buddha-nature from other views and adopts a view of Buddha-nature that reflects Longchenpa’s depiction of the ground of the Great Perfection. Buddhanature thus represents the ground of indivisible truth—empty, or “primordially pure” (ka dag), and “spontaneously present” (lhun grub) from the beginning. Chapter 5 begins with a discussion of Mipam’s use of reasoning to establish the existence of Buddha-nature. The reasoning that he uses draws upon the epistemological tradition of valid cognition. Mipam integrates an epistemological system of valid cognition with what he claims is beyond conceptual frameworks. We will see how he incorporates valid cognition into his exegesis of Buddha-nature and Mantra. In this integration, he portrays consciousness’ ordinary reason as only a provisional means of knowledge; true knowledge is the inner wisdom that is Buddha-nature, which is present from the beginning. His use of reasoning to establish the presence of Buddha-nature is similar to the reasoning he uses to establish the divine nature of appearances in Mantra. This use of valid cognition to establish appearances as divine is a unique quality of the Nyingma tradition, as Mipam states, which he attributes to the works of Rongzom. In this chapter, we will consider Mipam’s treatment of Buddha-nature in light of exoteric Buddhism (Mantra). We will discuss Mipam’s distinction between Sūtra and Mantra as well as see how he integrates them.90 In particular, we will see how he delineates two types of conventional valid cognition, based on “confined perception” (tshur mthong) and “pure vision” (dag gzigs), respectively. His two conventional valid cognitions are similar to his two ultimate valid cognitions, those that concern the categorized and uncategorized ultimate, in that the division is grounded in two distinct modes of understanding: (1) a delimited, conceptual mode of mind and (2) an inconceivable mode of wisdom. In this we see again how he juxtaposes conceptual mind and nonconceptual wisdom. Each of the chapters deals with a distinct dialectical tension in Buddhist doctrine and discusses Mipam’s resolution of each of these tensions: chapter 1 treats the two truths in the middle and last wheels of sūtra—the relationship between emptiness and Buddha-nature; chapter 2 explores the relationship between Prāsaṅgika’s radically negative dialectic and Yogācāra’s substantialist epistemology; chapter 3 deals with the nature of emptiness—as “other-emptiness” or “self-emptiness”; chapter 4 addresses the relationship between appearance and reality in a discussion of the explicit topic of xxxii MIPAM ON BUDDHA-NATURE Buddha-nature, and chapter 5 discusses the relationship between tantra and epistemology, and addresses the fundamental role of subjectivity—reality as grounded within the divine versus a world of ordinary perception. In the course of the chapters, we will see that the monistic91 resolution of duality is central to Mipam’s exegetical system. A common theme in his exegesis is a twofold schema, with an ultimately false dichotomy of two opposed factors and a unified ground that emerges from their dissolution. Two provisionally opposed factors, such as the two truths, sam.sāra and nirvān.a, self and other, appearance and emptiness, and so on, are resolved in a synthesis in which each of the two distinctions is ultimately untrue, because they are actually indivisible from the beginning. His manner of representing the indivisible ground, however, goes through a virtual “detour” of dichotomization. Thus, such a system is not a simple monism but is better understood as a dialectical monism.92 The detour through ultimately unreal dichotomies is a process that involves everything that falls under the rubric of conventional reality—all that can be physically acted upon, verbally spoken of, and mentally thought about. In Mipam’s depictions of the indivisible ground, these provisional divisions are part of a process toward the complete realization of the single ultimate truth of a unified ground— Buddha-nature. T HE E ND OF THE B EGINNING When we inquire into Buddhist thought, it is not hard to see that Buddhist discourse does not sustain such dichotomies as religion versus philosophy, mythos versus logos, the premodern versus the modern, and so on. The topic of Buddha-nature in particular has a meaning that is both objective and subjective or, in other words, it does not fall only within the domain of either “philosophy” or “religion.” We should acknowledge that such categories are bound up with modern (northwest European) cultural traditions; they are not natural categories and thus are not always helpful for reaching an understanding of another cultural tradition. I suggest that Mipam’s work can be more fully appreciated when not seen as a response to an issue in the distant past—of a medieval, “premodern” situation. The presence of a mature epistemological system in Buddhism, its radical suspicion of language, along with its deep-rooted tradition of reasoned critique that incorporates a strong presence of logical and empirical skepticism, are all factors that problematize the categorization of Buddhism as pre- Introduction xxxiii modern. However, Buddhism is not rightfully labeled “modern” either because there is no such appeal to a distinct realm of objective truth within a strict subject-object duality; Buddhist truth is immanently grounded in subjectivity. Furthermore, without the reductionist conception of the world as a mechanistic system, Buddhists like Mipam never detached themselves from the notion of a “sacred cosmos.”93 What alternative is available for this tradition of Buddhism apart from a traditional dichotomy of the premodern mythos grounding being in a sacred cosmos and the logos of a modern critical consciousness? It may be the category of the “postmodern” that is more relevant to Mipam’s late nineteenthand early twentieth-century interpretation of Buddhism than the other two alternatives. I use the category postmodern to refer specifically to a constructive, postcritical consciousness in religious hermeneutics. Here, I follow David Klemm’s characterization of postmodern hermeneutics as a process of negotiating the space between participation in meaning and objectifying critical reflection.94 An important point to this postmodern gesture is acknowledging the role of participation in understanding. Such an approach to meaning contrasts with a precritical approach to meaning as the literal or figurative content of symbols (premodern), or the view that meaning is a distant and distinct object of critical observation (modern). By recognizing that understanding is necessarily participatory, we can appreciate how an inquiry into Buddha-nature presumes the act of participation. That is, we can see how an understanding of Buddha-nature happens within Buddha-nature, and how knowing Buddha-nature is a reflexive act. In this light, our understanding of Buddha-nature in some way entails Buddha-nature knowing itself (oneself).95 For Mipam, knowledge of Buddha-nature is not only via a subjective mystical wisdom, but an intersubjective critical consciousness also plays an important role. We can see this interplay of critical consciousness and wisdom in Paul Ricoeur’s characterization of a postcritical hermeneutics: Thus, hermeneutics, an acquisition of “modernity,” is one of the modes by which that “modernity” transcends itself, insofar as it is forgetfulness of the sacred. I believe that being can still speak to me—no longer, of course, under the precritical form of immediate belief, but as the second immediacy aimed at by hermeneutics. This second naïveté aims to be the postcritical equivalent to the precritical hierophany.96 xxxiv MIPAM ON BUDDHA-NATURE It is useful to see Mipam’s portrayal of Buddha-nature as a postcritical approach to being. The approach is not naïve and uncritical but is something like Ricoeur’s “second naïveté” that incorporates and transcends a critical component. In this light, we can see how Mipam’s representation of Buddhanature can be situated within a central problematic of postmodern religious hermeneutics, in terms of how he configures the relationship between (1) critical consciousness and (2) participation in a meaningful existence within a sacred cosmos. As such, we can recognize how he positions critical consciousness as an integral, albeit provisional, part of meaningful understanding. Also, we can come to appreciate how critical consciousness and religious meaning need not be polarized into a dichotomous relationship of mutual incompatibility. In the following chapters, I will try to present Buddha-nature in a scholarly way that allows for a meaningful encounter with what is arguably the most central topic of Buddhism. My agenda is to present an interpretation of Buddha-nature that can be considered in a way that avoids the pitfalls of a naïve nostalgia for a premodern vision of sacred unity, as well as a cool objectivity of disembodied reason in a modern world of dispassionate truths. N OTES I NTRODUCTION 1. The term sugatagarbha “the essential nature (garbha) of the one gone well (sugata)” is also used as a synonym for the tathāgatagarbha. “Tathāgata” and “Sugata” are synonymous with “Buddha.” 2. David Seyfort Ruegg, “On the Knowability and Expressibility of Absolute Reality in Buddhism,” Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū 20, no. 1 (1971), 1–7. 3. David Seyfort Ruegg, “The Term Gotra and the Textual History of Ratnagotravibhāga,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 39, no. 2 (1976), 341–342. 4. Florin Giripescu Sutton, Existence and Enlightenment in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra: A Study in the Ontology and Epistemology of the Yogācāra School of Mahāyāna Buddhism (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991), 52; 76–78. 5. Uttaratantra I.35: gtsang bdag bde dang rtag nyid kyi/ /yon tan pha rol phyin pa ’bras. In theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos, published in rgyud bla ma rtsa ’grel (Sichuan: Nationalities Press, 1997), 6. 6. Cyrus Stearns, The Buddha from Dolpo: A Study of the Life and Thought of the Tibetan Master Sherab Gyaltsen (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 49. 7. Cited from Hajime Nakamura, A History of Early Vedānta Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983), 154. 8. Sallie King, Buddha Nature (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991), 104–107. 9. Nathan Katz, “Tibetan Hermeneutics and the Yāna Controversy,” in Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist Religion and Philosophy, ed. E. Steinkeller and H. Tauscher (Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, 1983), 110. 191 192 NOTES TO INTRODUCTION 10. An excellent source for the life and works of Dölpopa is Cyrus Stearns’s The Buddha from Dolpo. 11. Khenpo Lodrö Drakpa is from Dzamtang (’dzam thang) in eastern Tibet, where a prominent Jonang monastery has remained active to the present day. 12. See, for instance, Tsongkhapa’s statement that: “The ultimate truth is posited as solely the negation of truth [that is, inherent existence] upon a subject that is a basis of negation.” Tsongkhapa, The Lesser Exposition of the Stages of the Path (lam rim chung ba), 396.6: don dam bden pa ni dgag gzhi chos can la bden pa bkag pa tsam la ’jog pa’i phyir. 13. Nāgārjuna also targets the epistemological systems of pramān.a in his Vigrahavyāvartanī v. 30–51. See Sanskrit edition and English translation of these verses in Kamaleswar Bhattacharya, The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1990), 15–21; 114–124. For a discussion of Candrakīrti’s critiques of epistemology, see Dan Arnold, Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief: Epistemology in South Asian Philosophy of Religion (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 143–183. 14. Georges Dreyfus cites three ways in which Tibetan commentators have integrated Candrakīrti and Dharmakīrti: (1) those who see Dharmakīrti’s view as inferior to Candrakīrti’s, (2) early Tibetan epistemologists who view Dharmakīrti as a proponent of the Middle Way, and (3) those who synthesize Dharmakīrti’s Yogācāra with Candrakīrti’s Middle Way. Georges Dreyfus, Recognizing Reality (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997), 428. 15. Mipam, Words That Delight Guru Mañjughos.a: Commentary on the Madhyamakālam.kāra (dbu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad ’jam dbyangs bla ma dgyes pa’i zhal lung), published in dbu ma rgyan rtsa ’grel (Sichuan: Nationalities Press, 1990), 77. My translation of “dbu tshad seng ge mjing bsnol” follows Karma Phuntsho’s suggestion of “two lions intertwining their necks.” See Karma Phuntsho, Mipham’s Dialectics and the Debates on Emptiness, 18. See also Khenpo Pelden Sherap (mkhan po dpal ldan shes rab, b. 1941), Lamp of the Blazing Sun and Moon: A Commentary on [Mipam’s] Sword of Supreme Knowledge (don rnam nges ’grel pa shes rab ral gri’i ’grel pa shes rab nyi zla ’bar ba’i sgron me), (Varanasi: Nyingmapa Students’ Welfare Committee, 2000), 26. 16. Mipam, Words That Delight, 75: theg chen mdo sngags mtha’ dag gi bzhed pa’i rtsa bar ’gyur ba’i gnad ston pa ni gzhung ’di yin. 17. Ibid., 76: ’di lta bu’i gzhung ni theg chen spyi’i lam po che yin te/ shing rta rnam pa gnyis kyi gzhung dgongs pa chu bo gcig ’dres su sbyar zhing/ khyad par don dam pa’i tshad ma dpal ldan klu yis ji ltar bzhed pa dang/ tha snyad kyi tshad ma dpal chos kyi grags pas ji ltar bzhed pa gnyis rigs pa’i rgya mtsho chen po ro gcig tu skyil. 18. Paul Williams, The Reflexive Nature of Awareness: A Madhyamaka Defence (London: Curzon Press, 1998). 19. See Williams, The Reflexive Nature of Awareness, 199–206. Notes to Introduction 193 20. Matthew Kapstein, “We Are All Gzhan stong pas,” Journal of Buddhist Ethics 7 (2000), 121. 21. The Guhyagarbhatantra was not included in the Buddhist canon compiled in Tibet in the fourteenth century by proponents of the “new schools” of translations. 22. Rongzom, Commentary on the Guhyagarbhatantra (rgyud rgyal gsang ba’i snying po dkon cog ’grel), Rongzom’s Collected Works, vol. 1 (Sichuan: Nationalities Press, 1999), 33–253. 23. Rongzom, Establishing Appearances as Divine (gsang sngags rdo rje theg pa’i tshul las snang ba lhar bsgrub pa), Rongzom’s Collected Works, vol. 1 (Sichuan: Nationalities Press, 1999), 557–568. 24. Longchenpa, Dispelling Darkness in the Ten Directions: Commentary on the Guhyagarbhatantra (dpal gsang ba’i snying po de kho na nyid nges pa’i rgyud kyi ’grel pa phyogs bcu’i mun pa thams cad rnam par sel ba), (reproduction of a ’dzom xylographic edition), (Paro: Ngodup, 1975). 25. The “Seven Treasuries” (mdzod bdun) are: Precious Treasury of Philosophies (grub mtha’ rin po che’i mdzod ), Precious Wish-Fulfilling Treasury (yid bzhin rin po che’i mdzod ), Precious Treasury of the Abiding Reality (gnas lugs rin po che’i mdzod ), Precious Treasury of the Expanse of Phenomena (chos dbyings rin po che’i mdzod ), Precious Treasury of Words and Meanings (tshig don rin po che’i mdzod ), Precious Treasury of the Supreme Vehicle (theg pa’i mchog rin po che’i mdzod ), and Precious Treasury of Quintessential Instructions (man ngag rin po che’i mdzod ). See Longchenpa (klong chen rab ’byams, 1308–1364), Seven Treasuries (mdzod bdun), 7 vols. (Tarthang Tulku ed.). 26. Mipam, Flower Garland: Catalogue of Rongzom’s Collected Works (rong zom gsung ’bum dkar chag me tog phreng ba), published in Rongzom’s Collected Works, vol. 1 (Sichuan: Nationalities Press, 1999), 1–22. 27. Mipam, Precious Mirrorr: Catalogue of the “Seven Treasuries” (mdzod bdun spar du bsgrubs pa’i dkar chag rin chen me long), published in nges don rdzogs pa chen po’i man ngag phyogs bsgrigs zab don nor bu’i mdzod khang (Serta: Serta Buddhist Academy of the Five Arts, n.d.), 7–44. 28. Throughout Mipam’s works we find references to Longchenpa’s writings. Mipam also wrote texts that were explicit commentaries on Longchenpa’s texts, such as three short texts that include commentaries on the twelfth and eighteenth chapters of Wish-Fulfilling Treasury (yid bzhin mdzod ), and an “overview” (spyi don) of Longchenpa’s commentary on the Guhyagarbhatantra. 29. Dudjom Rinpoché (bdud ’joms ’jigs bral ye shes rdo rje, 1904–1988), Dudjom’s History of Buddhism (bdud ’joms chos ’byung), (Sichuan: Nationalities Press, 1996), 399–410; 497. 30. Nyoshül Khenpo (smyo shul mkhan po ’jam dbyangs rdo rje, 1931–1999), Garland of Lapis (rang bzhin rdzogs pa chen po’i chos ’byung rig ’dzin brgyud pa’i rnam 194 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. NOTES TO INTRODUCTION thar ngo mtshar nor bu baidurya’i phreng ba), (Thimphu: Indraprastha Press, 1996), vol. 2, 504.1–504.2. Two important commentaries Lochen Dharmaśrī wrote on the Guhyagarbhatantra are his Ornament of the Lord of Secrets’ Viewpoint (gsang bdag dgongs rgyan) and The Lord of Secrets’ Words (gsang bdag zhal lung). Lochen Dharmaśrī, dpal gsang ba’i snying po de kho na nyid nges pa’i rgyud kyi ’grel pa gsang bdag dgongs rgyan, Collected Works (Dehra Dun: D. Kochhen Tulku, 2000), vol. 8 (nya), 90–337; dpal gsang ba’i snying po de kho na nyid nges pa’i rgyud kyi rgyal po sgyu ’phrul drwa ba spyi don gyi sgo nas gtan la ’bebs par byed pa’i legs bshed gsang bdag zhal lung, Collected Works, vol. 9–10. Lochen Dharmaśrī, Cluster of Supreme Intentions: Commentary on “Ascertaining the Three Vows” (sdom pa gsum rnam par nges pa’i ’grel pa legs bshad ngo mtshar dpag bsam gyi snye ma), (Bylakuppe: Ngagyur Nyingma Institute, n.d.). See Getsé Pan.chen (dge rtse pan. chen, ’gyur med tshe dbang mchog grub, 1761–1829), Ornament of Buddha-Nature (nges don dbu ma chen po’i tshul rnam par nges pa’i gtam bde gshegs snying po’i rgyan), Collected Works, vol. 1, 95.4. Tsewang Norbu gave Situ Pan.chen Chökyi Jungné (si tu pan. chen chos kyi ’byung gnas, 1699–1774) extensive teachings on an other-emptiness view. He also gave transmissions of Jonang teachings to the Thirteenth Karmapa, Düdül Dorjé (bdud ’dul rdo rje, 1733–1797), and the Tenth Zhamar, Chödrup Gyatso (chos grub rgya mtsho, 1742–1792). See Khenpo Lodrö Drakpa (’dzam thang mkhan po blo gros grags pa), History of the Jonang (jo nang chos ’byung zla ba’i sgron me), (Qinghai: Nationalities Press, 1992), 536–537. Ibid., 539. Gene Smith, Among Tibetan Texts (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2001), 250; see also 20, 90. See Smith, Among Tibetan Texts, 265; 338n.888. A text that deals specifically with Kongtrül’s other-emptiness view is Kongtrül, Stainless Light Rays of the Vajra-Moon: Teachings on the View of the Middle Way of Other-Emptiness (gzhan stong dbu ma chen po’i lta khrid rdo rje zla ba dri ma med pa’i ’od zer), published in The Collected Works of ’Jam-mgon Kong-sprul (rgya chen bka’ mdzod ), vol. 8 (Paro: Ngodup, 1976), 581–611. Kongtrül, Encyclopedia of Knowledge (shes bya kun khyab), (Beijing: Nationalities Press, 2002). Smith, Among Tibetan Texts, 237. Kongtrül played an important role in bringing together various compilations of numerous scholars in Tibet. Notably, he compiled the Treasury of Practical Instructions (gdams ngag mdzod ) and the voluminous Treasury of Precious Treasures (rin chen gter mdzod ), which is a sixty-volume compilation of texts gathered from various treasure cycles that had been revealed in Tibet. See Smith, Among Tibetan Texts, 263–264. The first line of this text reads: “To briefly explain the assertion of the great omniscient one of the Jonang, the tradition of the middle way of other-empti- Notes to Introduction 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 195 ness” (kun mkhyen jo nang pa chen po’i bzhed pa gzhan stong dbu ma’i srol cung zad ’chad na). Jamyang Khyentsé Wangpo (’jam dbyangs mkhyen brtse’i dbang po, 1820–1892), Essential Summary of the Presentation of the Middle Way of OtherEmptiness (gzhan stong dbu ma’i rnam bzhag snying por dril ba), Collected Works, vol. 6 (Gangtok: Gonpo Tseten, 1977), 214.4–221.2. Jamyang Khyentsé Wangpo, Brief Sketch of Tsongkhapa’s View and Philosophy (lce btsun blo bzang grags pa’i lta grub kyi bzhed tshul mdo tsam bzhugs so), Collected Works, vol. 6, 221.2–225.3. While not widely used in association with Buddhist tantra, “pantheism” conveys the Nyingma view quite well. Alasdair MacIntyre characterizes pantheism as follows: “Pantheism essentially involves two assertions: that everything that exists constitutes a unity and that this all-inclusive unity is divine.” Alasdair MacIntyre, “Pantheism,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1971), 34. Gyelwang Chökyi Nyima (rgyal dbang chos kyi nyi ma), History of Dzokchen Monastery (mdo khams rdzogs chen dgon gyi lo rgyus nor bu’i phreng ba), (Delhi: Konchhog Lhadrepa, 1986), 138.3–142.2. See also Tulku Thondup, Masters of Meditation and Miracles (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1996), 177; 198–199. For more on the monastic college at Dzokchen monastery and its affiliates, see Tenzin Lungtok Nyima (bstan ’dzin lung rtogs nyi ma, b. 1974), The Great History of Dzokchen (snga ’gyur rdzogs chen chos ’byung chen mo), (Beijing: Nationalities Press, 2004), 304–318. Nyoshül Khenpo, Garland of Lapis, vol. 2, 263.3–265.3. For a description of the monastic college at Kah.tok, see Jamyang Gyeltsen (’jam dbyangs rgyal mtshan), A Short History of Kah.tok (rgyal ba kah. thog lo rgyus mdor bsdus), (Sichuan: Nationalities Press, 1996), 154–162. Khenpo Zhenga taught at Gemang monastery (dge mang dgon), and was invited by the Fifth Dzokchen Rinpoché, Tupten Chökyi Dorjé (thub bstan chos kyi rdo rje, 1872–1935), to be a professor at the Śrī Singha college at Dzokchen around the year 1902, where he taught for about seven years. He later was invited to Pelpung, a Karma Kagyü monastery near Degé, and founded a monastic college there. There is some controversy with regards to Khenpo Zhenga’s tenure as a professor at the monastic college of Pelpung. In contrast to Kongtrül, the luminary of Pelpung in the previous century, Khenpo Zhenga did not teach a view of “other-emptiness.” Khenpo Zhenga reportedly preferred self-emptiness to otheremptiness. Dilgo Khyentsé (dil mgo mkhyen brtse, 1910–1991) is cited as saying that Khenpo Zhenga stated that the bad karma of a hunter is better than someone who holds a view of other-emptiness. See Achim Bayer, “The Life and Works of mKhan-po gZhan-dga’ (1871–1927)” (Master’s Thesis, University of Hamburg, 2000), 33; 173–174. For more on Khenpo Zhenga, see David Jackson, A Saint in Seattle (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2003), 27–28; Georges Dreyfus, “Where Do Commentarial Colleges Come From?” Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 28, no. 2 (2005), 288–292. 196 NOTES TO INTRODUCTION 47. Nyoshül Khenpo, Garland of Lapis, vol. 2, 266.6–267.3: snga ’gyur phyogs ’dir rgya ’grel dang bod ’grel gyi bshad pa’i gsung rgyun chen po khag gnyis bzhugs pa las/ dang po gzhung chen bcu gsum sogs rgya gar mkhas pa’i legs bshad rgya gzhung gi bshad tshul mkhan chen gzhan phan snang bar bka’ babs pa dang/ rong klong rnam gnyis dang mnga’ ris pan. chen sogs bod kyi gzhung ’grel rnams gtso cher ’jam mgon mi pham rin po cher bka’ babs pa las bshad srol phyi ma gtso bor gdan sa ’di nas byung ba mang ngo. 48. The thirteen great scriptures include two Vinaya texts: Vinayasūtra and Prātimoks.asūtra; two Abhidharma texts: Abhidharmakośa and Abhidharmasamuccaya; four texts of the profound view (of the Middle Way): Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Madhyamakāvatāra, Catuh.śataka, and Bodhicaryāvatāra; and the “five treatises of Maitreya” (byams chos sde lnga): Abhisamayālam.kāra, Mahāyānasūtrālam.kāra, Uttaratantra, Dharmadharmatāvibhāga, and Madhyāntavibhāga. Although Khenpo Zhenga’s Interlinear Commentaries on the Thirteen Great Scriptures (gzhung chen bcu gsum gyi mchen ’grel) contains more than thirteen interlinear commentaries, Padma Namgyel (padma rnam rgyal, twentieth century) identifies the ones listed above as the thirteen texts. See Padma Namgyel, Ornament of Speech: A Teaching Manual for the Thirteen Great Scriptures (gzhung chen bcu gsum gyi mchad thabs dang mtshan don ’grel ba blo gsal ngag gi rgyan), (Gangtok: Dodrup Sangyey Lama, 1976), 1.1–1.3. 49. In his colophon of his interlinear commentary of the Madhyamakāvatāra, Khenpo Zhenga states that he wrote his commentary “without mixing even a hair of the individual opinions of the Tibetan masters” (bod gyi slob dpon so so’i ’dod pa dang spu tsam yang ma bsres par), and in his commentary on the Uttaratantra, that he “did not make anything up himself ” (rang bzo med par). Khenpo Zhenga, Interlinear Commentary on the Madhyamakāvatāra (dbu ma la ’jug pa zhes bya ba’i mchan ’grel), published in gzhung chen bcu gsum gyi mchan ’grel, vol. 5 (Dehra Dun: D. G. Khocchen Tulku, 1978), 284.5; and Khenpo Zhenga, Interlinear Commentary on the Uttaratantra (theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos zhes bya ba’i mchan ’grel), published in gzhung chen bcu gsum gyi mchan ’grel, vol. 3 (Dehra Dun: D. G. Khocchen Tulku, 1978), 581.2–581.3. 50. See Smith, Among Tibetan Texts, 232–233. 51. Nyoshül Khenpo, Garland of Lapis, vol. 2, 393.1–393.4: ’jam dgon mi pham rin po ches kho bos gzhung ’grel ’di tsam brtsams pa rnams snga ’gyur pa’i bstan par phyi rabs rnams la rgyal bstan rin po che yun du gnas pa’i pha phog tu bzhag pa yin/ dpal ldan zla grags dang rong klong rnam gnyis kyi dgongs pa srog tu bzung ste phyogs kun tu bshad sgrub kyi rgyun spel ba la gzhan dga’ rin po cher dka’ babs pa ’di rgyal sras gzhan phan pa’i sngon gyi thugs smon dang skye sprul yin pa’i dbang gis yin zhes. 52. Georges Dreyfus, The Sound of Two Hands Clapping, 148; Anne Klein, Meeting the Bliss Queen (Boston: Beacon, 1995), 150; 262n.2. 53. Gorampa (go rams pa bsod nams seng ge, 1429–1489) characterizes Tsongkhapa’s position on the Middle Way as “annihilationism” (chad mtha’). Gorampa, Dis- Notes to Introduction 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 197 tinguishing the Views (lta ba’i shan ’byed ), (Sarnath: Sakya Students’ Union, 1988), 3; English translation in José Cabezón and Geshe Lobsang Dargyay, Freedom from Extremes: Gorampa’s “Distinguishing the Views” and the Polemics of Emptiness (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2007). padma badzra (1867–1934). See Smith, Among Tibetan Texts, 327n.778. See Lauren Hartley, “A Socio-Historical Study of the Kingdom of Sde-dge (Derge, Kham) in the Late Nineteenth Century: Ris-med Views of Alliance and Authority” (Master’s Thesis, Indiana University, 1997), 66. See Smith, Among Tibetan Texts, 249. Most of the information on Mipam’s life and works is drawn from Künzang Chödrak (sa manta bhadra dharma kirti), Mipam’s Essential Hagiography and Catalogue of Works (gangs ri’i khrod kyi smra ba’i seng ge gcig po ’jam dgon mi pham rgya mtsho’i rnam thar snying po bsdus pa dang gsung rab kyi dkar chag snga ’gyur bstan pa’i mdzes rgyan), Mipam’s Collected Works, vol. 8 (hung), 621–732. John Pettit translates a portion of this hagiography in Mipham’s Beacon of Certainty, 23–39. The author of this text is unclear. Pettit attributes the author to Khenpo Künpel, Mipam’s student; however, he states that there is some doubt that Khenpo Künpel is in fact the author. See John Pettit, Mipham’s Beacon of Certainty (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1999), 27, 467n.59. Mipam is reported by traditional Tibetan scholars to have written his Beacon of Certainty (nges shes sgron me) when he was seven years old. See Karma Phuntsho, Mipham’s Dialectics and the Debates on Emptiness (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 226n.22. Künzang Chödrak, Mipam’s Essential Hagiography, 627.4–629.5. Ibid., 629.6–630.4. Details of Mipam’s life can be found in an English translation of Mipam’s hagiography, along with a summary of Mipam’s life and works, in John Pettit, Mipham’s Beacon of Certainty, 19–39. See also Dudjom Rinpoche, The Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism, trans. and ed. by Gyurme Dorje and Matthew Kapstein (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1991), vol. 1, 869–880; Nyoshul Khenpo, A Marvelous Garland of Rare Gems: Biographies of Masters of Awareness in the Dzogchen Lineage, trans. Richard Barron (Junction City: Padma Publishing, 2005), 415–425. In particular, Pari Rapsel (dpa’ ris blo bzang rab gsal, 1840–1910) and Drakar Trülku (brag dkar dpal ldan bstan ’dzin snyan grags, 1866–1928) wrote refutations of Mipam’s commentary. Mipam subsequently wrote rejoinders to their critiques. For a study of the issues at stake in these debates, see Karma Phuntsho, Mipham’s Dialectics and the Debates on Emptiness. Künzang Chödrak, Mipam’s Essential Hagiography, 632.2–632.4. Ibid., 633.6–634.2. Mipam did write a topical outline (sa bcad ) for a treasure text of Chokgyur Lingpa, the zhal gdams lam rim ye shes snying po’i bsdus don, Mipam’s Collected 198 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. NOTES TO INTRODUCTION Works, vol. 8 (hung), 435–462. Another short text Mipam wrote concerning the treasure tradition describes how to tell good treasure revealers from charlatans. See Mipam, gter ston brtag ba chu dwangs nor bu, Mipam’s Collected Works, vol. 14, 475–487. For a critical edition, translation, and analysis of this text, see Andreas Doctor, The Tibetan Treasure Literature: Revelation, Tradition, and Accomplishment in Visionary Buddhism (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 2006). It is noteworthy that Mipam states: “I also have no hope for the fortune of a new treasure doctrine because I know that there is not the slightest thing missing (ma chog pa rdul rtsam med ) from sūtras, tantras, and commentarial treatises.” Mipam, Shedding Light on Thusness (gzhan gyis brtsad pa’i lan mdor bsdus pa rigs lam rab gsal de nyid snang byed ), published in spyod ’jug sher ’grel ke ta ka (Sichuan: Nationalities Press, 1993), 339: gsar du gter gyi chos skal la re ba’ang med de/ mdo rgyud dgongs ’grel dang bcas pa ’di dag gis ma chog pa rdul tsam med par shes pa lags. For a description of the breadth of Mipam’s writings, see Karma Phuntsho, Mipham’s Dialectics and the Debates on Emptiness, 13–19. See also Smith, Among Tibetan Texts, 229–233. For instance, he wrote a massive two-volume commentary on the Kālacakra, as well as composed texts on Hevajra, Guhyasamāja, Cakrasam.vara, et al. See Künzang Chödrak, Mipam’s Essential Hagiography, 668.3–675.1. See ibid., 676.2–678.3. See ibid., 678.3–681.1. See ibid., 681.6–685.1. See ibid., 685.1–687.6. See ibid., 687.6–688.6. See ibid., 689.2–689.6. See ibid., 689.6–696.5. See ibid., 696.5–703.4. See ibid., 703.4–707.1. See ibid., 707.1–708.5. Mipam, Words That Delight, 494: ’jam dbyangs mkhyen brtse’i dbang po zhes snyan pa’i ba dan srid par yongs su grags pa de nyid kyis/ rgya bod kyi ’grel pa’i yig cha rnams gnang nas zhib tu ltos la ’brel bshad cig gyis zhes. Künzang Chödrak, Mipam’s Essential Hagiography, 635.6–636.4. When I stayed at Larung Gar in the summer of 2006, the population there was around 10,000. For further information about Larung Gar, see David Germano, “Re-membering the Dismembered Body of Tibet,” in Buddhism in Contemporary Tibet, ed. Melvyn Goldstein and Matthew Kapstein (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 53–94. The curriculum of the Ngagyur Nyingma Institute is printed in a pamphlet published at the monastery that I got there in the summer of 2004, entitled snga Notes to Introduction 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 199 ’gyur mtho slob mdo sngags rig pa’i ’byung gnas gling gi sgrig gzhi rtsa khrims chen po, 19–33. See also Dreyfus, The Sound of Two Hands Clapping, 128–132. The English translations of Mipam’s biography by John Pettit, Gyurme Dorje and Matthew Kapstein, and Richard Barron all use the terms “refutation and proof ” here, which does not adequately convey the important dichotomy of negation and affirmation in Buddhist epistemology. John Pettit, Mipham’s Beacon of Certainty, 28; The Nyingma School of Buddhism, trans. Gyurme Dorje and Kapstein, vol. 1, 874; A Marvelous Garland of Rare Gems, trans. Richard Barron, 419. Künzang Chödrak, Mipam’s Essential Hagiography, 639.6–640.2. In chapter 5, we will see how Mipam offers “pure vision” as a conventional valid cognition that is an alternative to ordinary “confined perception.” Künzang Chödrak, Mipam’s Essential Hagiography, 644.6–645.5. It is noteworthy that Lochen Dharmaśrī commented on “the universal form of the Great Perfection,” the first line of the first stanza in Ngari Pan.chen’s Ascertainment of the Three Vows, as corresponding to Buddha-nature. See Lochen Dharmaśrī, Cluster of Supreme Intentions, 51.2–53.4. We can see two types of “dialectic” in Mipam’s work: (1) a Hegelian dialectic, in which there is a synthesis in a final resolution (closure), and (2) a Ricoeurian or Derridian dialectic, where the two seemingly opposed sides of the dialectic are not resolved and the dialectical tension remains (open-ended). Mipam’s dialectic is closed in that he affirms a monistic unity as the ontological ground of existence; however, it is open in that he maintains contexts for the deconstruction of reified notions of such a ground. Mipam sustains a tension, or resonance, between an open-ended dialectical inquiry (e.g., in Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka) and the closure of an ultimately indivisible ground. However, when we take into account his esoteric works (e.g., the Great Perfection) and the fact that his dialectic reaches a culminating synthesis (Buddha), it is closer to Hegel’s than to Derrida’s. For a discussion of Ricoeur’s dialectic, see Paul Ricoeur, “Language and Discourse” and “Explanation and Understanding,” in Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), 1–23; 71–95. Tupten Tsültrim Namdak (thub bstan tshul khrim rnam dag), Nourishment for Faith: A Short Hagiography of Bötrül (rje kun gzigs bod sprul bstan pa’i nyi ma’i rnam thar bsdus pa dad pa’i gsos sman), Bötrül’s Collected Works, vol. 1 (Sichuan: Nationalities Press, 2004), 13. For an excellent discussion of this topic, see The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction, ed. Georges Dreyfus and Sarah McClintock (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2003). I capitalize “Sūtra” when it is distinguished as a vehicle in contrast to “Mantra” or “Vajrayāna.” I leave “sūtra,” as a genre of text like “tantra,” in lowercase. 200 NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE 91. Caveat: I use the term “monism” to describe an important aspect of Mipam’s view; however, we should bear in mind a distinction between monism and nondualism. See for instance, Sallie King, Buddha Nature (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991), 99–115. Monism is an affirmation of a single reality (closure) and nondualism is a negation of the entire framework of single/plural (open-ended) without affirming either/or/both/neither. We can thus say that the “non” in nondualism is a non-implicative negation, or an illocutionary negation. Although Mipam’s view certainly has such a nondual character, I use the term “monism” to evoke the important aspect of his emphasis on unity (zung ’jug). Mipam states: “The meaning of unity is the single sphere of equal taste of all dualistic phenomena.” Mipam, Precious Vajra Garland (gnyug sems zur dpyad skor gyi gsung sgros thor bu rnams phyogs gcig tu bsdus rdo rje rin po che’i phreng ba), Mipam’s Collected Works, vol. 24, 743.4: gnyis chos thams cad ro gcig ni zung ’jug gi don. 92. This term is used in a different context by Jean Paul Sartre in Critique de la Raison Dialectique (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1960); English edition translated by Alan Sheridan-Smith in Critique of Dialectical Reasoning (London: NLB, 1976), 1. 93. On the premodern worldview as a “sacred cosmos,” see David Klemm, Hermeneutical Inquiry, vol. 1 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986), 5. 94. David Klemm, Hermeneutical Inquiry, vol. 1, 23. 95. The better phrase here is “Buddha-nature knowing oneself” rather than “itself ” because itself is a third-person abstraction, connoting an objectified thing rather than the subjective agent that hits closer to home in “oneself.” 96. Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, trans. Emerson Buchanan (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), 352; cited from David Klemm, Hermeneutical Inquiry, vol. 1, 24. B UDDHA -N ATURE C HAPTER O NE . U NIT Y OF AND THE THE T WO T RUTHS 1. The articulation of a unified, comprehensive view of Buddhist thought is a daunting task indeed when we consider that the Peking edition of the Tibetan canon of Buddha’s Word in translation (bka’ ’gyur) is 108 volumes, and the translated commentaries (bstan ’gyur) contain 3,626 texts in 224 volumes! 2. P.774 (Peking ed.), vol. 29. 3. Tibetan and English editions printed in John Powers, Wisdom of the Buddha: The Sam.dhinirmocana Mahāyāna Sūtra (Berkeley: Dharma Publishing, 1995), 138–141. This translation, and all subsequent translations unless otherwise noted, are mine. 4. Longchenpa, Responses to Mind and Wisdom (sems dang ye shes kyi dri lan), published in gsung thor bu, vol. 1 (Delhi: Sanje Dorje, 1973), 377.5–378.5: dka’