Monastic Pedagogy on Emptiness in the Geluk Sect of Tibetan Buddhism: Intellectual History and Analysis of Topics Concerning Ignorance According to Svatantrika-Madhyamika in Monastic Textbooks by Jamyang Shaypa Jongbok Yi Seoul, Republic of Korea B.A., Sungkyunkwan University, 1997 M.A., Seoul National University, 2000 M.A., University of Virginia, 2005 A Dissertation presented to the Graduate Faculty of the University of Virginia in Candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Religious Studies University of Virginia May, 2013 Professor David Germano Professor Kurtis Schaeffer Professor Jeffrey Hopkins Professor Karen Lang Professor Dorothy Wong i  Copyright by Jongbok Yi All Rights Reserved May 2013 i Abstract This dissertation is a multifaceted study of an essential genre of Tibetan Buddhist monastic textbooks called Decisive Analysis (mtha’ dpyod) from historical, intellectual, and pedagogical viewpoints. It focuses on the section on the object of negation in Jamyang Shaypa’s Decisive Analysis of the Middle, which is the main monastic textbook on the philosophy of the Middle (madhyamaka, dbu ma) in Gomang Monastic College of Drepung Monastery. Chapter 1 of Part I provides a historical overview of the development of monastic textbooks in Gomang Monastic College from 15th century C.E. to 18th century C.E. The development is presented in three phases: Early Monastic Textbooks, Old Monastic Textbooks, and New Monastic Textbooks. This chapter concludes that these monastic textbooks contribute to organizational identity by providing philosophical distinctiveness and hence enhancing the communal solidarity of the monastic college. Through Chapters 2 – 5, this study looks at the intellectual history recorded in the section on the object of negation in Madhyamaka in Jamyang Shaypa’s Decisive Analysis of the Middle. These chapters discuss how Decisive Analysis not only functions as an authoritive monastic text providing debate skills and strategy, but also is as an arena where historical figures criticize each other through virtual debates conducted in debate style. The pedagogical aspect of Decisive Analysis is explored in Part II. Decisive Analysis mostly consists of debates except for the part on Establishing Our Own System. ii However, if exposition of Jamyang Shaypa’s philosophical points is relatively sparse in Establishing Our Own System, how can such a Decisive Analysis text function as a main monastic textbook? The tabular presenation in Part II demonstrates an effective way of understanding Decisive Analysis in this regard. Using Jamyang Shaypa’s own positions extracted from a series of debates documented in the parts on Refuting Other Systems and Dispelling Objections, this study exposes how these sections implicitly convey Jamyang Shaypa’s own philosophical stances. It demonstrates that the monastic textbooks have an explicit pedagogical goal and function indicated clearly in their detailed account of actual debate format and methodology—they teach monks how to debate but also make arguments promoting specific philosophical points. iii Dedicated to my late father Bangoo Yi (이반구), my mother Sunhee (임선희), and to the memory of my friend and teacher Jungnok Park iv Table of Contents Contents ABSTRACT ··························································································· I Table of Contents ·················································································· iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS····································································· XI INTRODUCTION ·················································································· 1 Overview ····················································································· 1 Previous Research ··········································································· 2 Monastic Textbooks in the Geluk Sect ··················································· 6 Two pedagogical approaches to the use of monastic textbooks in Tibetan Buddhism ···················································································· 18 Monastic Textbooks in the Geluk tradition ············································· 20 Three layers of yig cha in the Geluk tradition and extracurricular materials ······ 25 Chapter Summaries ········································································ 29 PART I ······························································································· 38 Chapter 1: History of Monastic Textbooks in Gomang Monastic College ············ 39 Introduction ······················································································· 39 The Origins and Early Years of Drepung Monastery ······································· 40 The Founder of Drepung Monastery, Jamyang Chöjé ··································· 40 Early history of education in Gomang Monastic College ······························· 45 The 1st Abbot Janglingpa Drakpa Rinchen ············································· 45 v The last direct disciple of Jamyang Chöjé in Gomang Monastic College: the 8th Abbot Penden Lodrö ······································································· 50 The 13th Abbot of Gomang Monastic College, Gungru Rinchen Jangchup ······· 53 The Old Textbooks of Gomang Monastic College by Gungru Chökyi Jungné ········· 57 Gungru Chöjung's life ········································································ 57 The list of the Old Monastic Textbooks ··················································· 78 The New Textbooks of Gomang Monastic College by Jamyang Shaypa ················ 83 Conclusion ························································································ 91 Chapter 2: Tsongkhapa's Identification of the Object of Negation in SvātantrikaMādhyamika ························································································ 94 Introduction ······················································································· 94 The two types of objects of negation in the Mādhyamika School ························ 96 The uniqueness of Kamalaśīla's Illumination of the Middle in the discussion of objects of negation in Tsongkhapa's Svātantrika system ································ 97 The identification of the object of negation in terms of the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence ··························································· 98 Identification of the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence ··················································································· 107 Extracting the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of ultimate/true existence ························································································· 119 Conclusion ······················································································ 124 Chapter 3: The Relation between the Two Types of Object of Negation: Refutation of Taktshang, the Translator ·································································· 126 Introduction ····················································································· 126 How does Tsongkhapa present the two types of objects of negation? ·················· 136 Is the innate mode of apprehension of true existence different from the intellectually imbued mode of apprehension of true existence? ······································ 136 vi Can the refutation of the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence harm the innate apprehension of true existence? ······················································ 146 Jamyang Shaypa's refutation of Taktshang's criticism of Tsongkhapa's thought ·· 156 Does Jamyang Shaypa really convey Taktshang's criticism? ························· 156 Jamyang Shaypa’s criticism of Taktshang··············································· 164 Conclusion ······················································································ 174 Chapter 4: Historico-Intellectual Interaction among Geluk Scholars on the Identification of the Object of Negation from the 15th to 18th Centuries C.E ······· 177 Introduction ····················································································· 177 Jetsünpa and Gungru Chöjung: The Search for the Possible Existence of Another Svātantrika Source Text Identifying the Measure of the Object of negation in terms of the Innate Apprehension of True Existence ················································ 179 Does Jñānagarbha's stanza Identify the Measure of the Object of negation in terms of the Innate Apprehension of True Existence? ········································ 190 Jamyang Shaypa's Presentation ······························································ 191 Jamyang Shaypa's Refutation ································································ 194 Conclusions ····················································································· 198 Chapter 5: Analysis of the Three Spheres of Self-contradiction······················· 203 Introduction ····················································································· 203 The procedure of the refutation of the opponent's misconception ······················ 204 Identifying the three spheres of self-contradiction ('khor gsum) ····················· 212 Application of parallel consequence (1): The nonexistence of the imputational nature as the final mode of subsistence according to the Cittamātra system ··················· 220 Application of parallel consequence (2): The Āyatas' idea about the naturelessness of former and later births is not factually concordant ········································ 228 Conclusions ····················································································· 235 vii PART II ···························································································· 236 I. Identifying the Object of Negation ························································ 238 I.1. Refuting Other Systems: Refuting quasi-identifications by Tibetans of the object of negation in connection with the reasons for identifying the object of negation ······· 238 1st Wrong idea: Many earlier Tibetan elders hold that without having identified the object of negation the non-dawning of any object to one's awareness is realization of reality ························································································· 238 1st refutation: Non-view ignorance would realize emptiness ······················ 239 2nd refutation: The negative of the object of negation would not dawn ·········· 242 3rd refutation: The mere non-dawning of appearances of coarse conventionalities is not sufficient ··········································································· 247 2nd Wrong idea: The Translator Taktshang holds that valid establishment of conventionalities (kun rdzob) is not necessary for realizing emptiness ············· 259 3rd Wrong idea: The Āyatas and the Mādhyamikas have the same view and mode of holding that former and later births are natureless ····································· 271 4th Wrong idea: The Āyatas' view of the naturelessness of former and later births is the same as the Mādhyamikas' view (1) ················································· 282 5th Wrong idea: The Āyatas' view of the naturelessness of former and later births is the same as the Mādhyamikas' view (2) ················································· 285 6th Wrong idea: Gorampa Sönam Senggé holds that any apprehension of forms is an apprehension of the four extremes and hence should be refuted ····················· 287 7th Wrong idea: Taktshang the Translator holds that refuting the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence through reasoning is sufficient ············· 298 Conclusion of the debates from 1st to 7th················································· 305 8th Wrong Idea: Correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag) and correct sign (rtags yang dag) are the same ············································································ 305 9th Wrong idea: A correct reasoning can refutes substratum ·························· 314 2.2. Our Own System ·········································································· 317 viii 2.3 Dispelling Objections ····································································· 322 1st Debate ····················································································· 322 2nd debate ····················································································· 326 Conclusion ························································································· 329 Summary of Jamyang Shaypa’s points of teaching ······································· 331 CONCLUSION ··················································································· 340 BIBLIOGRAPHY ··············································································· 344 Dictionaries························································································ 344 Scriptures ·························································································· 344 Indian and Tibetan Treatises ·································································· 345 Modern Scholarships············································································ 349 APPENDIXES ···················································································· 355 Appendix 1: Monastic curriculum of Gomang Monastic College in Mundgod, Karnataka, India ················································································· 356 1. བསྡུས་ཆུང་འཛིན་གྲྭ ············································································· 357 2. བསྡུས་ཆེན་འཛིན་གྲྭ ············································································· 358 3. རྟགས་རིགས་འཛིན་གྲྭ ··········································································· 359 4. བློ་རིག་འཛིན་གྲྭ ················································································ 361 5. དློན་བདུན་ཅུ་འཛིན་གྲྭ ·········································································· 362 6. གཞུང་འློག་འཛིན་གྲྭ ············································································· 363 7. གཞུང་གློང་འཛིན་གྲྭ ············································································· 365 ix 8. སྐབས་དང་པློ་འཛིན་གྲྭ··········································································· 367 9. བསམ་གཟུགས་འཛིན་གྲྭ·········································································· 369 10. ཕར་ཕིན་འཛིན་གྲྭ··············································································· 371 11. དབུ་གསར་འཛིན་གྲྭ ············································································· 372 12. དབུ་རིང་འཛིན་གྲྭ··············································································· 374 33. མཛོད་འཛིན་གྲྭ ················································································· 375 14. བཀའ་འློག་འཛིན་གྲྭ ············································································· 376 15. བཀའ་གསར་འཛིན་གྲྭ ··········································································· 377 16. བཀའ་སྦུག་འཛིན་གྲྭ ············································································· 378 Appendix 2: Twenty-one Commentaries on Maitreya’s Ornament of Clear Realizations ····················································································· 381 Appendix 3: Non-Tabular Presentation of the Section on the Object of Negation in Madhyamaka ····················································································· 384 I. Identifying the Object of Negation ························································ 384 I.1. Refuting Other Systems: Refuting quasi-identifications by Tibetans of the object of negation in connection with the reasons for identifying the object of negation 384 1st Wrong idea: Many earlier Tibetan elders hold that without having identified the object of negation the non-dawning of any object to one's awareness is realization of reality······································································ 384 1st refutation: Non-view ignorance would realize emptiness ··················· 384 2nd refutation: The negative of the object of negation would not dawn ······· 385 3rd refutation: The mere non-dawning of appearances of coarse conventionalities is not sufficient ··················································· 387 2nd Wrong idea: The Translator Taktshang holds that valid establishment of conventionalities (kun rdzob) is not necessary for realizing emptiness ·········· 391 x 3rd Wrong idea: The Āyatas and the Mādhyamikas have the same view and mode of holding that former and later births are natureless ······························· 393 4th Wrong idea: The Āyatas' view of the naturelessness of former and later births is the same as the Mādhyamikas' view (1)············································ 397 5th Wrong idea: The Āyatas' view of the naturelessness of former and later births is the same as the Mādhyamikas' view (2)············································ 398 6th Wrong idea: Gorampa Sönam Senggé holds that any apprehension of forms is an apprehension of the four extremes and hence should be refuted ·············· 399 7th Wrong idea: Taktshang the Translator holds that refuting the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence through reasoning is sufficient ·········· 402 Conclusion of the debates from 1st to 7th·············································· 405 8th Wrong Idea: Correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag) and correct sign (rtags yang dag) are the same ········································································· 405 9th Wrong idea: A correct reasoning can refutes substratum ······················· 409 2.2. Our own system ···································································· 411 2.3 Dispelling Objections ·································································· 413 1st Debate ·················································································· 413 2nd debate ·················································································· 414 xi Acknowledgements In the summer of 1993, I was finishing an intensive seven day retreat with my friends at Sungkyunkwan University Buddhist Club in the Silsangsa Buddhist temple. At the end of the last day Silsangsa is a historic temple built in 9th century C.E. I lay down on the wooden floor of one of the buildings. Looking at the sky, I saw names of people written under the roofing tiles. The roof of a temple building is covered with numberless people’s wishes, but I did not know that. Then, I started to see names of donors everywhere in the temple. At that moment, I realized that the temple was not built by itself or by a single patron, but by countless persons. In this way, the temple was filled with blessings and wishes accumulated over a thousand years. The same holds good for this dissertation. Without the help of everyone, I could not have completed it. I should first thank Venerable Jikwang and Nungin Foundation in Korea. Venerable Jikwang has supported me financially and encouraged me whole-heartedly. Without his and that of members of the Nungin Zen Center in Korea, I could not have come to the University of Virginia to study. Also, I would express my thanks to Venerable Bupan of Ansim Temple and Venerable Myojang of Dorisa Temple in Korea. As my mentor since 1993, Venerable Pupan has helped me in many ways. Venerable Myojang also helped me when I settled in Charlottesville. Also, since 2011, Boolkwang xii Scholarship Foundation supported my tuition. I thank Mr. Namsoo Kim who helped me to receive the scholarship, and Mr. Jiho Ryu, the editor in chief of Boolkwang Publications who introduced me to Boolkwang Scholarship Foundation. Also, Sungchul Kim at Dongguk Univesity-Gyeongju encouraged me in many ways whenever I visited Korea. My advisor Woncheol Yoon for my M.A. thesis at Seoul National University also gave me much good advice. Also, Sangho Yoo in Medical School at Hanyang University has been my teacher, mentor, and friend. Texts are an important resource of my dissertation. I am indebted to a few specialists. I also want to thank the late E. Gene Smith (1936-2010), former head of the Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center. Gene granted me Tibetan documents that were not only helpful for my dissertation but also future projects. I cannot forget his big laugh when I was presenting the manuscript of my chapters at the International Association of Tibetan Studies in Vancouver, Canada, in 2010. A special librarian, Nawang Thokmey at Tibetan Archive in the University of Virginia Library helped me to find many Tibetan texts that were available in and out of the Archive. Also, Kelsang Lhamo, a Senior Librarian, of the Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center has helped me to read Tibetan texts that I could not retain from the Tibetan Archive at the University of Virginia. Working at Darden Camp Business School Library since 2002 I was helped by many staffs. Particularly, I would like to thank Libby Eschbach for her wisdom and encouragement, Karen for her warm hearted advice and allowing me to comfortably study at the library. xiii When Ānanda told Buddha Śākyamuni that friendship is half of the holy life, Buddha said that having good friends is the whole of the holy life. I would like to thank my friend Jungnok Park (1971-2008) at Oxford University. We had a plan to study in the future on Buddhist precepts, but unfortunately, just a few days later, he gave up this world. Being friend with Dr. Nemoto Hiroshi is my fortune. Not only did Dr. Nemoto help me to understand the system of Gomang Monastic College, his experience at Gomang Monastic College became an invaluable resource for my introduction. Also, Dr. Fumihito Nishizawa sent his four volume thesis which helped me to understand education in other monastic colleges in the Geluk sect. Brenton Sullivan gave me valuable information on the transition of monastic textbooks in the Geluk tradition. Heykyung Jee has helped me by sending me Japanese documents that I could not find at the University of Virginia. I should thank Geoffrey Goble (DePauw University). Geoffrey helped me to properly prepare research papers. When he left for Indiana University, James Graves, the late Julian Paul Green (-2006), Zach Rowinski and then David DiValerio (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee) continued to help me. Then, Alison Melnick helped me through. My editor, Craig Schenck, helped me and gave me valuable lessons about skillful writing. I thank Craig for his help. When I went to Nepal in the summer of 2003, I met Geshe Yeshe Ösel, a.k.a. Yamarāja, from Loseling Monastic College and studied Kamalaśīla’s Illumination of Suchness, and Illumination of the Middle in 2004. And, in the summer of 2004, when I xiv went to Lhasa, Tibet, I met my teacher Jamphel Norbu. Soon thereafter he taught me Jamyang Shaypa’s Awareness and Knowledge (blo rig) and a part of Jamyang Shaypa’s Great Exposition of the Middle (dbu ma chen mo). He introduced me to the late geshe Lozang Tenzin, the abbot of Gomang Monastic College of Drepung Monastery in Lhasa Tibet, and showed me and shared his unique knowledge. The late geshe Tenzin la also gave a copy of Tendar Lharampa’s commentary on Illumination of the Middle and other valuable texts for my future project. I also thank Geshe Lharampa Ken Rinpoche Yonten Damchoe, the 79th Abbot of Drepung Gomang Monastic College in India. With his permission, Ngari Geshe Lharampa Tsewang Thinley helped me to make the first draft of the list of textbooks in Gomang Monastic College. I would like to thank Mr. Migmar Tshering, a secretary of Gomang Monastic College office who helped me to communicate with Ken Rinpoche and other geshes. Geshe Lharampa Losang Gyeltshan helped me to expand the first draft to the present form. Also, I had interviewed Geshe Lharampa Lozang Trashi. He introduced me to the history of Gomang Monastic College. Gen Tenzin Namkha of Jangtse Monastic College of Ganden Monastery taught me Sera Jetsun Chökyi Gyeltshen’s idea of the object of negation whicht became crucial information for Chapter 3 of Part I. When I was not able to interview with Geshe Lharampa Lozang Gyeltshen, Jules Levinson asked Geshe la remaining questions for me. The Abbot of Trashi Choeling Temple in Charlottesville, Ken Rinpoche Khenpo Nawang Dorje of the Jonang tradition gave me tremendous help. With his vast knowledge of different sectarian tenet xv systems and his deep knowledge of Tibetan history, he compassionately and tirelessly helped me to understand difficult Tibetan historical texts, not only texts on tenets of the Geluk as well as Jonang traditions. At the University of Virginia, my advisor David Germano taught me to see the history of a monastery from different perspectives. He led me to focus on the division of monastic textbooks, and patiently supervised the entire dissertation. Kurtis Schaeffer inspired me to read historical texts on the history of monastic textbooks. Without his inspiration and vast knowledge, I could not have written Chapter 1 of Part I. I also thank Karen Lang, Paul Groner, and Dorothy Wong. Their insight, criticism, and encouragement assisted me as well. I wish to thank Professor Emeritus Jeffrey Hopkins. Professor Hopkins has taught me several times a week for many years. During these years, he taught me to carefully translate and understand Chapa Chökyi Sengge’s Commentary on (Kamalaśīla’s) Illumination of the Middle, Tendar Lharampa’s Difficult Points of (Kamalaśīla’s) Illumination of the Middle, and other texts on the philosophy of the Middle, not to mention Jamyang Shaypa’s texts. Professor Hopkins manifested himself in both wrathful and peaceful forms to guide me. Professor Donald Lopez Jr. wrote in his acknowledgement of his Study of Svātantrika School (1987), “It is often the case that after studying with one person for an extended period of time we sadly reach the end of his or her learning. This has not been my experience with Professor Hopkins.” I cannot agree with Professor Lopez more. xvi Lastly, I wish to thank my wife Asami Yi. I could not get through all these days to complete my degree unless she selflessly and patiently helped me. And my three sons, Daehui Dechen Nyingpo, Soohui Lozang Nyima, and Jehui Dorje Gyeltshen, are the joy of my life. I also wish to thank my late father Bangoo Yi (이반구) and my mother, Sunhee Yim (임선희). They are examples of loving-kindness. They have always believed in me and my family. 1 Introduction Overview Tibetan religion was historically dominated by monasteries, and one of the main features of Buddhist monasteries was books. Monasticism in Tibet came to centrally involve “monastic textbooks” (yig cha), formalized books on a standard range of scholastic topics that presented the positions and doctrinal understanding specific to a given monastery or set of monasteries. These textbooks then formed the curriculum for the multi-year study programs that defined the academic side of Tibetan monasteries. As such, sectarian and intra-sectarian controversies are recorded in these texts, which thus provide invaluable insight into the formation of Buddhist doctrines, especially in later years when large monasteries were dominant. The Geluk tradition of Tibetan Buddhism was a pioneer in monastic textbook production, since from the seventeenth century they were home to the rapid expansion of a large network of state sponsored monasteries. The history of these textbooks, and the process of their creation, deployment and replacement, has barely been written in modern scholarship, much less the history of the rich scholarly dialog and contestation that is articulated within them. These textbooks and their content provide invaluable information on the history of philosophy in Tibet, as well as the way Tibetan authors understood, criticized, and revised intellectual positions both within their own tradition and without. One of the most famous of monastic textbook authors in the Geluk tradition was Jamyang Shaypa ('jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje, 1648-1721/1722, P423), who wrote a 2 series of books that came to replace much of the monastic textbook curriculum for Gomang college of Drepung Monastery in Lhasa, Central Tibet. The present thesis examines a rich philosophical controversy in one of his most famous works—the Decisive Analysis of the Middle (dbu ma’i mtha’ dpyod, or Great Exposition of the Middle, dbu ma chen mo), which came to be the normative textbook for the study of Madhyamaka philosophy in Gomang College. We will thus begin with offering a review of monastic textbooks in Tibet, and a sketch of the history of such books in Gomang College in particular, as a crucial background to understanding the institutional and intellectual context of such philosophical disputes and the literature in which they were created. Previous Research Among scholars of monastic education, José Ignacio Cabezón is a leading figure exploring the scholastic tradition in Indian and Tibetan Buddhist traditions.1 He is also the editor of a volume which invites other scholars from other religious traditions to discuss the similarities and dissimilarities among scholastic religious traditions in Scholasticism: Cross-Cultural and Comparative Perspectives. For example, in his article “The First Meeting of Catholic Scholasticism with dGe lugs pa Scholasticism” in Scholasticism: Cross-Cultural and Comparative Perspectives, Robert E. Goss discusses the similar aspects of scholasticism between Catholic and Geluk traditions by looking 1 José Ignacio Cabezón, Buddhism and Language: A Study of Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994). 3 into the way Ippolito Desideri (1684–1733), a Jesuit, was able to immerse himself in Geluk scholasticism. He argues that owing to Desideri’s training of lectio, reading, and disputatio, disputation, in Catholic tradition, he was able to use argumentation to absorb the Geluk tenet system and to introduce Christian doctrine to Tibetans.2 Monastic textbooks have also been studied as genres of Tibetan literature. In Tibetan Literature: Studies in Genre, Jeffrey Hopkins, Shunzō Onoda, Guy Newland, and Donald S. Lopez, Jr. introduce different genres of monastic textbooks such as Doxography (grub mtha’), Collected Topics (bsdus grwa), and so on.3 Monastic debate in the Geluk sect has been also researched by a few scholars from sociological and anthropological viewpoints, such as Kenneth Liberman4 and Michael Lempert.5 The approaches of Georges Dreyfus and Shunzō to monastic education are different from Cabezón’s research. As a former Buddhist monk with the highest degree of Geshe Harampa (dge bshes lha ram pa) in the Geluk sect, Dreyfus critically presents the Geluk monastic education system from emic and etic perspectives. He sees three layers in educational literature therein - Indian scripture, Tibetan commentaries, and monastic textbooks. Elijah Sacvan Ary also presents three layers of monastic textbooks in his dissertation “Logic, lives, and lineage: Jetsun Chokyi Gyaltsen's ascension and the Robert E. Goss, “The First Meeting of Catholic Scholasticism with dGe lugs pa Scholasticism,” in Scholasticism: Cross-Cultural and Comparative Perspectives, ed. José Ignacio Cabezón (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998), 65-90. 3 Cabezón, José Ignacio and Roger R. Jackson ed., Tibetan Literature: Studies in Genre. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 1996. 4 Liberman, Kenneth. Dialectical Practice in Tibetan Philosophical Culture: An Ethnomethodological Inquiry into Formal Reasoning. Lanham, Md. :Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004. 5 Lempert, Michael. Discipline and Debate: The Language of Violence in a Tibetan Buddhist Monastery. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2012. 2 4 ‘Secret Biography of Khedrup Geleg Pelzang’”: Indian text, central commentaries composed by Tsongkhapa, Gyeltshabje and Khédrupje, and monastic textbooks. I interviewed geshes from different monastic colleges, on the basis of which I would suggest another possible category of monastic educational literature, extracurricular texts which are not clearly mentioned in works of Dreyfus and Ary. In addition, Shunzō explores this topic as a continuous development from the scholastic movement in 12th century C.E. to the present, and presents detailed curricula of major monasteries in the Geluk sect. Also, in his recently published four-volume dissertation of thorough research on Buddhist logic from 12th century C.E. in the Sangphu Ne’utok tradition, Fumihito Nishizawa catalogs monastic curricula of major monastic colleges such as Gomang, Loseling, and so on in the appendix. In the relation to the previous studies, this dissertation makes two different contributions. First, in Chapter 1 of Part I, I demonstrate the transition of monastic textbooks from “old” to “new” systems in Gomang Monastic College. Ary presents in his dissertation how Jetsün Chokyi Gyaltsen took over the textual authority of Je Monastic College of Sera Monastery from Lodro Rinchen Sengge, the founder of Je Monastic College. According to Ary, by closely connecting himself to Khédrupje’s philosophical system and by writing Khédrupje’s “secret” biography, Jetsünpa was able to achieve his intended goal. This dissertation provides historical context of monastic education from the early stage in 15th century C.E. and Gungru Chökyi Jungné’s Old Monastic Textbook to Jamyang Shaypa’s innovations in the 18th century C.E. 5 While the above mentioned studies are focused on cross-cultural, historical, and anthropoogical approaches regarding monastic education, another trend of study on monastic education is analyzing the contents of monastic textbooks themselves. In this field of study, in particular, Jeffrey Hopkins has analyzed, translated, and published a series of books based on monastic textbooks of Gomang Monastic College. For example, in his Maps of Profound: Jam-Yang-Shay-Ba's Great Exposition of Buddhist and NonBuddhist Views on the Nature of Reality, 6 Hopkins provides careful translation with annotations on Jamyang Shaypa’s Great Exposition of Tenets (a monastic textbook of Gomang Monastic College). Guy Newland analyzes the concept of two truths based on Jamyang Shaypa’s Great Exposition of the Middle (or, Decisive Analysis of the Middle).7 Derek Maher also presents his dissertation based on the same text.8 In addition, Maher provides thorough research on Jamyang Shaypa’s biography. Chapters 2 to 5 in Part I in this dissertation presents the intellectual history surrounding the topic of the object of negation mainly based on the tabular presentation of the section on the object of negation in Jamyang Shaypa’s Great Exposition of the Middle in Part II. The tabular format translation is designed to display the Tibetan text and its translation in the left column. The right column of the tabular presentation is used to creatively represent Jamyang Shaypa’s own positions as they are outlined through this 6 Hopkins, Jeffrey. Maps of Profound: Jam-Yang-Shay-Ba's Great Exposition of Buddhist and NonBuddhist Views on the Nature of Reality. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2003. 7 Newland, Guy. The Two Truths: In the Madhyamika Philosophy of the Gelukba Order of Tibetan Buddhism. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 1992. 8 Maher, Derek. "Knowledge and Authority in Tibetan Middle Way Schools of Buddhism: A Study of the Gelukba (dge lugs pa) Epistemology of Jamyang Shayba ('jam dbyangs bzhad pa) in its Historical Context." PhD diss., University of Virginia, 2003. 6 series of debates with the threefold structure of a section on refuting others’ systems (gzhan lugs dgag pa), a section on presenting one’s own system (rang lugs bzhag pa), and a section on dispelling objections (rtsod pa spong ba). Monastic Textbooks in the Geluk Sect The Tibetan term for monastic textbooks is yig cha (yikcha). Etymologically, yig cha is composed of two words, yig and cha. According to the Great Tibetan-Chinese Dictionary (bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo) yig is an abridged form of yi ge (yige) meaning letters of alphabets, syllables, words, document, and book, and cha means part, portion, and pair, and thus yig cha is defined as “1) Books and various types of writings (dpe cha dang yig rigs sna tshogs), or 2) books on philosophy (mtshan nyid yig cha).9 With regards to the general meaning of yig cha, both Guy Newland and Sam van Schaik suggest "records" as its translation.10 When the meaning of yig cha is understood in the context of monastic education, in general this term means: monastic textbook(s) and an obligatory curriculum of a tradition or of a monastic institution(s). Ronald Davidson says that yig cha is a compendium of texts collected for the sake of monastic education in a particular religious tradition; 11 also, E. Gene Smith describes yig cha as an obligatory curriculum and bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo, s.vv. “yig, n.,” “yi ge, n.,” “cha, n.,” “yig cha, n.,” 2563, 2566, 772, and. 2567. 10 Guy Newland, “Debate Manuals (Yig cha) in dGe lugs Monastic Colleges,” in Tibetan Literature: Studies in Genre (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion, 1996), 202; Sam van Schaik, “Sun and Moon Earrings: The Teachings Received by ’Jigs-med Gling-pa,” Tibet Journal 25.4 (2000): 26n27. 11 Ronald Davidson says “Ngorchen evidently had access to this alternative text, for he mentions a compendium (yig cha) of material belonging to this tradition…” See Ronald M. Davidson, Tibetan 9 7 obligatory texts.12 Therefore, yig cha in this context means obligatory literature adopted, arranged, or composed for the sake of monastic education in a particular religious tradition in Tibet. Considering that yig cha can mean monastic curricula, Georges Dreyfus’ classification of the three-layer literatures adopted in monastic education might need reconsideration:13 1. Indian scriptures (rgya gsung) such as Maitreya’s Ornament for the Clear Realizations (mngon rtogs rgyan, abhisamayālaṃkāra) and Nāgārjuna’s Treatise of the Middle (dbu ma rtsa ba shes rab, mūlamadhyamakārikā) 2. Tibetan commentaries (bod 'grel) that were composed between the fourteenth century and sixteenth centuries C.E. providing explanation of difficult points such as Tsongkhapa’s Illumination of (Candrakīrti’s) Thought 3. Monastic manuals14 (yig cha) Renaissance: Tantric Buddhism in the Rebirth of Tibetan Culture (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2005), 183. 12 E. Gene Smith, Among Tibetan Texts: History and Literature of the Himalayan Plateau, ed. Kurtis Scahaeffer (Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publications, 2001), 34. 13 Georges Dreyfus, The Sound of the Two Hands Clapping: The Education of a Tibetan Buddhist Monk (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003), 107-109. 14 However, the translation of yig cha as “manual” may not fully convey the traits of yig cha to readers since the definition of “manual” is conventionally limited to a handy and compact textbook and/or instruction that do not require mental exertion. For example, the Oxford English Dictionary defines manual: Adjective:  Of a person or group of people: working with the hands; engaged in work involving physical rather than mental exertion  Of a book, etc.: of the nature of a manual; intended to be kept at hand for reference. Also as a noun it is defined:  Christian Church. A book containing the forms to be observed by priests in the administration of the sacraments, etc. Now hist. 8 Among these three kinds of texts used in the monastic education in Tibetan Buddhism, with regard to the monastic manuals, Dreyfus says: 15 “In the third level are found the monastic manuals (yig cha), which are used quite extensively… They present easily digestible summaries of the most important points as well as the material for debate. Manuals fall into two broad categories: a genre called General Meaning (spyi don) which are effectively summaries and a genre called Decisive Analysis (mtha’ gcod) which function as debate manuals. The Collected Topics (bsdus grwa) examined in the next chapter are a type of debate manual; they are a Ge-luk specialty, though they are certainly not unknown in other traditions.”   gen. A handbook or textbook, esp. a small or compendious one; a concise treatise, an abridgement. Also in extended use. A set of instructions or procedures (not necessarily concise) for using a particular piece of equipment or for carrying out a particular operation. According to these definitions, manual does not seem to be the proper term to indicate the trait of yig cha, considering its massive contents and function. In this sense Lempert suggests that monastic textbooks would be a more proper translation than debate manual: This gloss could be misleading if by “manual” one envisions a portable text-artifact that supplies readers with denotationally explicit instructions. Put another way, “manual” risks ceding too much autonomy to the book itself. At Sera and other Geluk institutions, extensive extratextual mediation is needed. The yig cha literature requires the mediating exegesis of a teacher to render it accessible, and it is enlivened and explored through daily courtyard debate. One should thus view these text-artifacts as one key part of a socially distributed circuit of learning, a circuit that includes oral commentary and daily public argumentation. For these reasons, ‘textbook’ is perhaps a more conservative gloss for yig cha (e.g., Hopkins 1999:11), but even here one should hold in mind a type of textbook that presupposes the mediating authority and exegetical prowess of a teacher (e.g., a book that lacks “summary” sections and “self-tests” at the conclusion of each chapter, sections that presuppose the capacity for individuals to learn through solitary reading). However, Lempert’s criticism might also need reconsideration. Dreyfus employed the term “monastic manual” for the genres of the General Meaning (spyi don) and the Decisive Analysis (mtha’ dpyod). If Lempert suggests “monastic textbooks” referring to the Decisive Analysis, his term “monastic textbook” cannot include texts used for subjects other than Decisive Analysis. See The Oxford English Dictionary, s.vv. “manual,” http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/113735?redirectedFrom=manual#eid (accessed November 25, 2012); Michael Lempert, Discipline and Debate: The Language of Violence in a Tibetan Buddhist Monastery (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2012), 171-172n7. 15 Ibid., 108. 9 According to Dreyfus, monastic manuals include literature in the genres of Collected Topics, Decisive Analysis, and General Meaning, particularly in the Geluk tradition. According to Ngari Geshe Lharampa Tsewang Thinley (tshe dbang 'phrin las), for instance, the classes in Gomang Monastic College are as follows:16 1. bsdus chung 'dzin grwa 2. bsdus chen 'dzin grwa 3. rtags rig 'dzin grwa The Path of Reasoning (rigs lam) 4. blo rig 'dzin grwa 5. don bdun cu 'dzin grwa 6. gzhung 'og 'dzin grwa 7. gzhung gong 'dzin grwa 8. skabs dang po 'dzin grwa The Perfection of Wisdom (phar phyin) 9. bsam gzugs 'dzin grwa 10. phar phyin 'dzin grwa 11. dbu gsar 'dzin grwa 12. dbu rnying 'dzin grwa 13. mdzod 'dzin grwa The Middle (dbu ma) The Treasury of Knowledge (mdzod) 14. bka' 'og 'dzin grwa 15. bka' gsar 'dzin grwa 16. bka' sbug 'dzin grwa 16 For further information, see Appendix I. The Monastic Discipline (’dul ba) 10 Among these sixteen classes, Collected Topics (bsdus grwa), Signs and Reasonings (rtags rigs), and Awareness and Knowledge (blo rig), and monastic discipline do not use Decisive Analysis. If we apply Dreyfus’ three-tier classification of educational literature to the Geluk tradition, and if the texts adopted in these classes in the Geluk monasteries are excluded from the layer of monastic manuals, it seems that the third layer is too narrow to encompass Tibetan indigenous literature adopted for monastic education in the Geluk tradition. Dreyfus also expresses his concern about possible misunderstandings in regards to this narrow definition of yig cha:17 Here again, I am drawing boundaries that are in fact not entirely rigid. Main Tibetan commentaries are sometimes called manuals. For example, members of the Sa-gya tradition often describe Go-ram-ba’s commentary on Madhyamaka as their manual. This shift in terminology corresponds to the increasing importance of manuals (particularly in the Ge-luk tradition), a topic to which I will return. But it should be clear that not all manuals are debate manuals, as some scholars imply; this limited meaning of yig cha could mislead readers to understand that yig cha is only a part of monastic education as opposed to its general meaning as monastic curriculum or monastic textbook(s). I found an interesting aspect of yig cha in the Geluk tradition while interviewing 17 Dreyfus, The Sound of Two Hands Clapping, 358n.28. 11 Geshes from Gomang Monastic College and Jangtse Monastic College of Ganden Monastery. When I interviewed Geshe Lharampa Tenzin Namkha (bstan 'dzin nam mkha') from Jangtse Monastic College of Ganden Monastery, he said: 18 (brackets mine) The reason why we read yig cha is to have a better understanding of Tsongkhapa’s system. For example, in the class for Madhyamaka philosophy, we debate until we reach the extremely subtle philosophical points of Tsongkhapa’s Illumination of (Candrakīrti’s) Thought (dbu ma dgongs pa rab gsal). Then when we face these subtle points which are difficult to decide whether accept them or not, it is the moment we need to rely on the monastic textbooks to decide whether we should accept or refute the philosophical points. [The primary goal of] yig cha [in the third level of its meaning] is not for the sake of sharpening debate skills, but for the sake of understanding Tsongkhapa’s system better. Monastic textbooks consist of general meaning (spyi don) and decisive analysis (mtha’ dpyod) commentaries. According to his explanation, the category of yig cha should be limited to the genres of Decisive Analysis and General Meaning commentaries on Tsongkhapa and his two main disciples’ commentaries. In this sense, his classification of yig cha is very narrow along the lines critizied by Dreyfus. When I asked him if other texts than these two genres of texts should be excluded from yig cha, he did, however, not say that these should not be 18 dge bshas lha ram pa bstan 'dzin nams mkha', personal interview, May 6th, 2012. 12 included in yig cha.19 On the other hand, according to Geshes from Gomang Monastic College, the category of yig cha is quite broad compared to the monastic curriculum of Jangtse Monastic College in Ganden Monastery. When I interviewed Geshe Lozang Trashi (blo bzang bkra shis) of Gomang Monastic College concerning the history of textbooks and the monastic curriculum of Gomang Monastic College, he listed Candrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) ‘Treatise on the Middle’ (dbu ma la 'jug pa, madhyamakāvatāra) and its commentary by Tsongkhapa, Illumination of (Candrakīrti’s) Thought (dgongs pa rab gsal), along with Jamyang Shaypa’s Decisive Analysis of the Middle (dbu ma’i mtha’ dpyod or, Great Exposition of the Middle, dbu ma chen mo).20 When I asked Geshe Lozang Gyeltshen with regard to this disagreement about the categories of yig cha, he said:21 A yig cha is written by an authoritative figure of particular monastic college(s). While Je Monastic College of Sera Monastery and Jangtse College of Ganden Monastery share the same yig cha, for these two monastic colleges, the authoritative author is Jetsünpa Chökyi Gyeltshen (btsun chos kyi rgyal mtshan, 1469-1544/1546, P477). However, he did not write the Collected Topics (bsdus grwa) and the Awareness and Knowledge (blo rig). Therefore, in these monastic colleges, the category of yig cha can be limited to the genre 19 20 21 Ibid. dge bshas lha ram pa blo bzang bkra shis, personal interview, February 7th, 2012. dge bshas blo bzang rgyal mtshan, personal interview, December 23rd, 2012. 13 of General Meanings and Decisive Analyses [on the Perfection of Wisdom (phar phyin), the Middle (dbu ma), and so on]. Thus, from the viewpoint of these two monastic colleges, yig cha should be General Meaning and Decisive Analysis. On the other hand, in the case of Gomang Monastic College, Jamyang Shaypa is the authoritative author. Since he wrote books beyond Decisive Analyses, including the Collected Topics (bsdus grwa), Awareness and Knowledge (blo rig), and Signs and Reasonings (rtags rigs), from the view point of Gomang Monastic College, writings on other topics beyond Decisive Analyses, are also considered yig cha. However, as Nishizawa Fumihito reports in his catalogue of the monastic textbooks in Je Monastic College of Sera monastery, 22 Jetsun Chökyi Gyeltshen also wrote on other topics such as Valid Cognition (tshad ma), Grounds and Paths (sa lam), DependentArising (rten 'brel), Monastic Discipline ('dul ba), and the like. For this reason, I speculate that yig cha in Geshe Tenzin Namkha’s description includes only the genres of the General Meaning and the Decisive Analysis. In this sense, his definition of yig cha seems to be based on two conditions. First, yig cha are text(s) written by an authoritative figure of a particular monastery, for instance, Paṇchen Sönam Drakpa (paN chen bsod nams grags pa, 1478-1554, P101) of Loseling Monastic College, Jamyang Shaypa of Gomang Monastic College in Drepung monastery, Jetsun Chökyi Gyeltshen in Je 22 Nishizawa Fumihito, チベット仏教論理学の形成と展開―認識手段論の歴史的変遷を中心として, vol. 4 (PhD diss., Tokyo University, 2011), 39-62. 14 Monastic College and Khédrup Tenpa Dargyé (mkhas grub bstan pa dar rgyas, 14931568, P996) in Mé Monastic College in Sera monastery. Second, among texts written by the authoritative author of the monastic college, the texts written in the form of General Meaning and Decisive Analysis are classified as yig cha. In this sense, the role of yig cha is to teach monk-students to understand and to resolve subtle philosophical points—as an alternative spelling of the Decisive Analysis, mtha’ gcod, implies—of Tsongkhapa and his two main disciples’ texts, so that they can have a better understanding of Tsongkhapa’s philosophical system. The difference regarding the category of yig cha among Geluk scholars calls for reconsideration of the meaning of yig cha that realizes it varies in different contexts. In response to Dreyfus’s three layers of educational literature: Indian scriptures, Tibetan commentaries, and Monastic manuals, Elijah Ary refines Dreyfus’ three-layer classification of educational literature in the context of the Geluk tradition:23 Elijah Sacvan Ary, “Logic, lives, and lineage: Jetsun Chokyi Gyaltsen's ascension and the ‘Secret Biography of Khédrup Geleg Pelzang’” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2007), 153-154. 23 15 Layers The first layer (outer ring) The second layer (middle ring) The layer third Classifications The classical works of Indian Buddhists such as Nāgārjuna, Vasubhandu, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla Central commentaries considered authoritative only by the Gelukpa tradition such as Tsongkhapa and Gyeltshapje24 and Khédrupje25 Textbooks (yig cha) – commentaries on Tsongkhapa’s works often composed by monastic founders and abbots of particular monastic colleges. Functions A common scriptural basis for philosophical discussion shared by Tibetan Buddhism Doctrinal framework providing the identity of Geluk tradition. Geluk scholars are expected to explore within this framework. These commentarytextbooks provide the basis for learning Tsongkhapa’s system; however, their authority is not accepted by other monastic colleges. According to Ary’s classification, yig cha as monastic textbooks in the context of the Geluk tradition demonstrate certain traits. First of these is Tibetan indigenous commentaries by Geluk scholars. They are mostly centered on central commentaries written by Tsongkhapa and his two main disciples—Gyeltshapje and Khédrupje. Second, the authority of monastic textbooks in a particular monastic college is often exclusive. In other words, other monastic colleges that own their independent monastic textbooks do not accept the authority of any other such textsbooks. This category of yig cha is broad enough to include a meaning of yig cha that monastic colleges can agree with; however, this third layer of yig cha does not cover Indian scriptures and Tsongkhapa’s texts, which are referred to by Geshe Lozang Trashi as yig cha in Gomang Monastic College. 24 25 rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen, 1364-1432, P65. mkhas grub dge legs dpal bzang, 1385-1438, P55. 16 According to Geshe Lozang Gyeltshen, there are two levels of yig cha: common yig cha (mthun mong gyi yig cha) and uncommon yig cha (mthun mong ma yin pa’i yig cha). The common yig cha include the top two layers of Indian scriptures and Tsongkhapa and his two main disciples’ commentaries, while the uncommon yig cha are commentaries composed by an authoritative figure of a particular monastery whose authority is not accepted by other monastic colleges that have their own yig cha. For example, the History of Gomang Monastic College (bkra shis sgo mang chos 'byung) tells us that Gome Drakpa Gyatsho (sgo me grags pa rgya mtsho, fl. 18th century C.E., P3921) 26 sent to Jamyang Shaypa ('jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje, 1648-1721/1722, P423)27 the Twenty Saṅgha (dge 'dun nyi shu) by Gungru Chökyi Jungné (gung ru chos kyi 'byung gnas, ca. mid. 17th century C.E. – early 18th century C.E., P4925) 28 and criticized Jamyang Shaypa saying that Jamyang Shaypa’s position is different from what is said in yig cha, that is, the Twenty Saṅgha, a monastic textbook of Gomang Monastic College. In response, Jamyang Shaypa said that his position is not different from Je Tsongkhapa’s yig cha, that is, his Golden Garland of Eloquence (legs bshad gser phreng).29 As this example illustrates, Jamyang Shaypa separates the yig cha of Gomang 26 The 12th abbot of the Tantric College in Kumbum monastery (sku 'bum byams pa gling, G160) in 1709. The 32nd abbot and the author of the New Monastic Textbooks of Gomang Monastic College (yig cha gsar pa), and the 1st abbot of Labrang Trashikhyil (bla brang bkra shis 'khyil, G162). 28 The 17th abbot and the author of the Old Monastic Textbooks of Gomang Monastic College (yig cha rnying pa). 29 bstan pa bstan 'dzin, chos sde chen po dpal ldan 'bras spungs bkra shis sgo mang grwa tshang gi chos 'byung chos dung g.yas su 'khyil ba'i sgra dbyangs (Mundgod, India: Drepung Gomang Library, 2003), 67. 27 སྨྲ་བའི་ཁྱུ་མཆློག་སློ་མེ་གྲགས་པ་རྒྱ་མཚོས་དགེ་འདུན་ཉི་ཤུ་བཏང་ནས་ཡིག་ཆ་དང་མི་མཐུན་ཟེར་ནས་ངར་ངར་ བྱས་ཀྱང་གནློད་བྱེད་མ་ཐློངས། དེ་དག་ནི། བཀའ་རློམ་ལས། དགུན་ཆློས་ཕར་ཕིན་སློན་མློའི་དམ་བཅའ་ 17 Monastic College which is an uncommon yig cha, and Tsongkhapa’s yig cha which is a common yig cha. In addition, while the texts composed by an authoritative author are called yig cha, there are other texts also used as textbooks in the monastic curriculum. When yig cha is used to refer to all these textbooks in the monastic curriculum, I speculate that these texts that are not written by the main monastic textbook author of the monastic college, but rather are classified as yig cha due to their adoption within the curriculum. For example, in the 3rd class of Signs and Reasonings (rtags rigs 'dzin grwa) in Gomang Monastic College, the Great Treatise on Valid Cognition: Ornament of Reasoning (tshad ma'i bstan bcos chen po rigs pa'i rgyan) written by the first Dalai Lama Gédündrup (dge 'dun grub, 1391–1474, P80) is also adopted. Therefore, these textbooks by other scholastic monks of the monastic college need to be included in the category of yig cha. In this sense, if I restate the meaning and translation of the term, yig cha, along with Ary’s categorization, it has four parts: 1. A monastic curriculum: all three layers including Indian scriptures, Tibetan commentaries by authoritative figures such as Tsongkhapa, and monastic textbooks whose authority is exclusively accepted by particular monastic college(s). སློགས། །རེ་ཡི་ཡིག་ཆ་དང་མཐུན་ཚད་མས་དྲངས། འློན་ཀྱང་འཇིག་རྟེན་རློངས་ཡུས་གནའི་སློལ་གི། །དྲང་མིན་ ཡུར་བར་ཞེན་པའི་ཉལ་འགྲློ་རྒྱུགས། །ཞེས་སློ། 18 2. Monastic textbook(s): the third layer, monastic textbooks other than Indian scriptures and Tibetan commentaries by authoritative figures such as Tsongkhapa 3. The genres of General Meaning (spyi don) and Decisive Analysis (mtha’ dpyod): they are written by a representative figure of a monastic college for the sake of guiding and improving monk-students’ understanding of subtle philosophical points. 4. Other monastic textbooks composed by other authors that are adopted in the curriculum of a monastic college. Two pedagogical approaches to the use of monastic textbooks in Tibetan Buddhism With regard to the development of monastic textbooks in Tibetan Buddhism, Dreyfus explains that there were two major pedagogical approaches: the dialectical approach and the rhetorical or commentarial approach. The dialectical tradition was developed in the late 11th century C.E. by Ngok Lotsāwa Loden Sherab (rngog blo ldan shes rab, 10591109, P2551) and Chapa Chökyi Senggé (phywa pa chos kyi seng ge, 1109-1169, P1404) in Sangpu Ne’utok Monastery (gsang phu ne’u thog dgon pa, G226). This dialectical literature focused on philosophical analyses and classifications of philosophical topics by 19 creating indigenous Tibetan commentaries, summaries (bsdus don) and divisions of topics (sa bcad) of Indian treatises.30 These had the effect of enhancing debating skills.31 Another approach to the monastic textbooks can be found in the works of Sakya Paṇḍita Künga Gyeltshen (sa skya paṇfḍita kun dga’ rgyal mtshan, 1182-1251, P1056). He stood for the rhetorical tradition in monastic education, opposing the dialectical tradition of Sangpu Ne'utok Monastery. According to Dreyfus, Sakya Paṇḍita asserted, by emphasizing the importance of literature and poetry, that monastic education should be geared toward the threefold discipline of composition, exposition, and debate. 32 According to Dreyfus, it is difficult to make a clear distinction based on these two approaches among the four sects of Geluk, Nyingma (rnying ma), Kagyu (bka' brgyud), and Sakya (sa skya). However, it is evident that the Geluk tradition is more inclined to It seems that, at least in the case of Chapa Chökyi Senggé’s writings, they are not distinguishable. For example, Chapa’s Careful Summary of the Meaning of the Ornament of the Middle (dbu ma rgyan gyi don legs par bsdus pa) merely states the subdivisions of the Ornament of the Middle: 30 དབུ་མ་རྒྱན་ལ་དློན་བཞི་སེ༎ མཆློད་པར་བརློད་པ་དང་༎ རང་གི་བཏན་བཅློས་ཀྱི་འབྲས་བུ་དགློས་འབྲལ་དང༎ རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་སྒྲུབ་པ་དང་བཤགས་པའི་བསློགས་ནམས་བསློ་བའློ༎ །བསུམ་པ་ལ་བཞི་སེ༎ རང་བཞིན་མེད་ པར་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་དང་༎ ལུགས་དེ་ལ་བདེན་པ་གཉིས་རྣམ་པར་གཞག་པ་དང་༎ དེ་ལ་བརགས་པ་སྤང་པ་དང་༎ ལུགས་དེ་ཐུན་མློང་མ་ཡིན་པར་བསྒྲུབ་པའློ༎དབུ་མ་རྒྱན་ལ་དློན་བཞི་སེ༎ མཆློད་པར་བརློད་པ་དང་༎ རང་གི་བ་ ཏན་བཅློས་ཀྱི་འབྲས་བུ་དགློས་འབྲལ་དང༎ རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་སྒྲུབ་པ་དང་བཤགས་པའི་བསློགས་ནམས་བསློ་ བའློ༎་ །བསུམ་པ་ལ་བཞི་སེ༎ རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་དང་༎ ལུགས་དེ་ལ་བདེན་པ་གཉིས་རྣམ་པར་གཞག་ པ་དང་༎ དེ་ལ་བརགས་པ་སྤང་པ་དང་༎ ལུགས་དེ་ཐུན་མློང་མ་ཡིན་པར་བསྒྲུབ་པའློ༎ See phywa pa chos kyi seng ge, “dbu ma rgyan gyi don legs par bsdus pa,” in dbu ma’i yig cha, unpublished, 131a.1. 31 Dreyfus, The Sounds of the Two Hands Clapping, 137-138; E. Gene Smith, Among Tibetan Texts: History and Literature of the Himalayan Plateau, ed. Kurtis Schaeffer (Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publications, 2001), 114. 32 Ibid., 138. 20 the dialectical approach than other sects while the Nyingma sect is closer to the rhetorical, or commentarial tradition.33 Monastic Textbooks in the Geluk tradition One trait of the monastic textbooks in the Geluk tradition is that major monastic colleges have their own curricula distinguished from other monastic colleges, and this distinctiveness contributes to the establishment of the identity of the monastic college. 34 Onoda Shunzō says:35 Each grwa tshang has its own set of school manuals (yig cha), which generally speaking comprised works written by a single author. For instance, students in sGo mang college study the works of 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa’i rdo rje or his disciples; in Blo gsal gling college they use the works of Paṇ chen bSod nams grags pa (1478-1554); in Byes pa College of Se ra monastery, the works of rJes btsun pa Chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1469-1546); and in sMad pa college the works of mKhas grub bsTan pa dar rgyas (1493-1568). ?Sar rtse College and Byang rtse college of dGa' ldan monastery use respectively the same yig cha as Blo gsal gling of 'Bras spungs and Byes pa college of Se ra. 33 Ibid., 132-139. However, it does not mean that the uniqueness of monastic textbooks is the only factor establishing the identity of a monastic college. The monastic rules of a monastery (bca’ yig) could be another factor contributing to the identity of a monastic college. For more detailed information, see Ter Ellingson "Tibetan Monastic Constitutions: The Bca' Yig," in Reflections on Tibetan Culture: Essays in Memory of Turrell V. Wylie, ed. L. Epstein and R. F. Sherburne (Lewiston, ID: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), 205-230. 35 Shunzō Onoda, Monastic Debate in Tibet: A Study on the History and Structures of bsDus Grwa Logic, Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde (Wien, Austria: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1992), 26-27. 34 21 Major monastic colleges (grwa tshang) of the Geluk tradition have their own textbooks that constitute distinctive features of that monastic college; however, as Shunzō states, some monastic colleges adopt the same monastic curriculum: Monastery Monastic colleges Drepung Monastery Gomang (sgo mang) Ganden Monastery Sartse (sar rtse) Loseling (blo gsal gling) Jangtse (byang rtse)36 Je (byes) Sera Monastery Me (smad) Main author of monastic textbooks Jamyang Shaypa ('jam dbyangs bzhad pa, 1648-1721/22, P423) Paṇchen Sönam Drakpa (paN chen bsod nams grags pa, 1478-1554, P101) Jetsun Chökyi Gyeltshen (rje btsun chos kyi rgyal mtshan, 1469-1544/6, P477) Khédrup Tenpa Dargyé (mkhas grub bstan pa dar rgyas, 1493-1568, P996) The differences between textbooks among monastic colleges contribute to the establishment of identity, and thus solidarity, of the monastic college. They often contribute both to the establishment of factionalism and to intercollegiate solidarity as Newland demonstrates:37 Intercollegiate solidarity within the large monasteries tends to be weak. Each functioning college has its own chapel ('du khang), staff, and debate manuals. As Goldstein notes, when monks at Se ra Byes revolted against the central 36 Although it is known that Jangtse Monastic College of Ganden Monastery uses the same monastic curriculum as Je Monastic College in Sera Monastery, according to Geshe Tenzinnamkha (bstan 'dzin nam mkha’), the textbook for Awareness and Knowledge (blo rig) is different from that of Je Monastic College. 37 Guy Newland, “Debate Manuals (Yig cha) in dGe lugs Monastic Colleges,” in Tibetan Literature: Studies in Genre, ed. José Ignacio Cabezón and Roger R. Jackson (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 1986), 206, http://www.thlib.org/encyclopedias/literary/genres/genres-book.php#!book=/studies-ingenres/b11/all/#ixzz2DIA0Cklo. 22 government in 1947, Se ra sMad did not help them; when 'Bras spungs Blo gsal gling quarreled with the Dalai Lama in 1921, 'Bras spungs sGo mang did not take their side. A monk's strongest loyalties are to his college and his regional house (khang tshan), a sub-collegiate unit with membership traditionally based on natal province. Factionalism is based on the identity of main author of their monastic textbook, and sometimes becomes hostile as Dreyfus says:38 Jeffrey Hopkins describes one of his teachers, who was so partial to the manuals of his monastery, Go-mang, that he would turn his head away and pretend to spit on the floor at the mere mention of the manual of Lo-se-ling, the rival monastery in Drepung. Hopkins often told me that, due to his teachers’ disdainful reaction, he was, despite his conscious rejection of such partisanship, surrepitiously led to think that the monastic textbooks by Paṇchen Sönam Drakpa—the main author of the monastic textbook in Loseling Monastic College (blo gsal gling grwa tshang)—were not as good as the monastic textbooks of Gomang Monastic College, but he later realized that their textbooks are also equally valuable. 39 In this sense, the monastic textbooks play a symbolic role representing the identity, and increasing the solidarity, of that monastic college. 38 39 Dreyfus, The Sound of Two Hands Clapping, 128. Jeffrey Hopkins, personal conversation, date unknown. 23 The monastic textbooks of the Geluk tradition form a genre of literature structured by a series of debates.40 The monastic textbooks provide basic practical skills that monkstudents can apply in the debating court yard. According to Newland, in the case of the Decisive Analysis for the Madhyamaka philosophy in Gomang Monastic College, the contents can be categorized in four ways: (1) the scholars of rival colleges within the Geluk tradition, (2) Indian scholars, (3) Tsongkhapa’s Tibetan predecessors, and (4) nonGeluk criticism of Tsongkhapa’s system. These topics are debated in order to define one’s own philosophical position.41 The debates are presented in the three parts: Refuting others’ systems (gzhan lugs dgag pa), establishing our own system (rang lugs bzhag pa), and dispelling objections with respect to our own system (brtsod pa spong ba). In this thesis, Part I Chapter 3 demonstrates the way Jamyang Shaypa refutes an obvious faulty explanation by his predecessor, Gungru Chökyi Jungné (gung ru chos kyi 'byung gnas, ca. mid. 16th century C.E.-early 17th century C.E., P4925)—the author of the Old Monastic Textbooks of Gomang Monastic College—and Jetsün Chökyi Gyeltshen (rje btsun chos kyi rgyal mtshan, 1469-1544/1546, P477)—the textbook author of Je Monastic College in Sera Monastery. Also, Part II demonstrates that monk-students can indirectly learn useful information through debates, beyond merely learning debate strategy. It is often said that the goal of the Decisive Analysis (the third layer of yig cha) is to sharpen one’s intellect in order to develop debating skills, as Geshe Lozang Gyeltshen 40 41 Newland, “Debate Manuals (Yig cha) in dGe lugs Monastic Colleges,” 202. Newland, The Two Truths, 24. 24 explained in answer to my question about the goal of studying the monastic textbooks.42 However, the achievement of debating skill seems to be a goal of monastic education in the Geluk tradition, but not the only one.43 The late Geshe Lobsang Gyatsho (phu khang dge bshes blo bzang rgya mtsho, 1928-1997, the founder of the Institute of Buddhist Dialectics, P7771) said that mere knowledge or memorization of texts, or reprises of debates already in the monastic textbooks were not highly respected:44 The community of learned monks did not rate so highly the person who was able to set out in full the divisions of an argument or the exact way that a particular author went through it. The scholar-monk most highly regarded was the one who had grasped the deeper implications of a topic and could explore those implications in a structured debate without feeling lost when moving away from the specifics of a particular presentation. According to him, being good at debate is highly rated when the deeper meaning of a topic is presented through the discourse of debate. It implies that insight on the topic and the ability to present subtle meaning through a given scheme is a central goal of debate. 42 dge bshes blo bzang rgyal mtshan, personal communication, November 20th, 2012. Although Geshe Lozang Gyeltshan (dge bshes blo bzang rgyal mtshan) told me that excellent debating skills are a goal of learning, he did not say that one’s level of debating skill is the ultimate goal of education. See Geshe blo bzang rgyal mtshan, personal interview, November 20th, 2012. 44 Phu-khaṅ dge-bśes Blo-bzang-rgya-mtsho, Memoirs of a Tibetan Lama (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 1998), 86. 43 25 Geshe Lharampa Tenzin Namkha (dge bshes lha ram pa bstan 'dzin nams mkha') of Jangtse Monastic College in Ganden Monastery told me that a clear and thorough understanding of Tsongkhapa’s thought should be the primary goal of the monastic education, and that being skillful in debate is crucial to achieve the primary goal.45 With regard to the function of Decisive Analysis, he explains that, when monk-students reach the subtle philosophical points that require a decision of whether or not to accept the position, they should rely on Decisive Analysis literature for the final decision.46 Three layers of yig cha in extracurricular materials the Geluk tradition and We have seen the three-tier classification of yig cha by Dreyfus and Ary above: Indian scriptures, the works of Tsongkhapa and two main disciples, and commentaries on Indian scriptures or on the works of Tsongkhapa and two disciples. These three tiers of monastic textbooks are standardized by each monastic college, so that all monk-students are obliged to study them. However, there is another layer of texts in the monastic education system: nonstandard or extracurricular texts. According to Nemoto Hiroshi, these extracurricular texts are not listed in the curriculum of a monastic college, and they vary 45 dge bshe bstan 'dzin nams mkha', personal interview, May 6th, 2012. This is an excerpt from an interview with him in order to obtain the list of monastic textbooks of Jangtse Monastic College in Ganden Monastery; at the end of my interview, I asked the meaning of yig cha. At the beginning, he started to explain the goal of yig cha in the third level—General Meaning and Decisive Analysis; however, since his statement does not have to be limited to these two literary genres, I am citing him in general sense. 46 Newland points out that the subtle philosophical positions—which are different between the authors of monastic textbooks—are sometimes not evident enough to call “philosophical.” See Newland, The Two Truths, 24. 26 from teacher to teacher. For example, the obligatory textbooks for the First Category of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras class (phar phyin skabs dang po’i 'dzin grwa) are:47 - Jamyang Shaypa’s Decisive Analysis of the First Chapter (phar phyi skabs dang po’i mtha’ dpyod)48 - Tsongkhapa’s Golden Garland of Eloquence (legs bshad gser 'phreng) - Gyeltshap’s Explanation [of (Maitreya’s) “Ornament for the Clear Realizations” and its Commentaries]: Ornament for the Essence/ Explanation Illuminating the Meaning of the Commentaries on (Maitreya’s) “Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the Perfection of Wisdom, Ornament for the Clear Realizations”: Ornament for the Essence49 - Khédrup’s Illumination of the Difficult to Realize: Explanation Illuminating the Meaning of the Commentaries on (Maitreya’s) “Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the Perfection of Wisdom, Ornament for the Clear Realizations”: Ornament for the Essence50 and the like In studying this First Category, according to Nemoto, his teacher Geshe Lozang Tshültrim (blo bzang tshul khrims) at Gomang Monastic College recommended that he For the full list of the monastic textbooks for the First Chapter of the Mother Sūtras, see Appendix I. bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi mtha' dpyod shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i don kun gsal ba'i rin chen sgron me. 49 rnam bshad snying po rgyan/ shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi 'grel pa don gsal ba'i rnam bshad snying po'i rgyan. 50 rtogs dka'i snang ba; shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi 'grel pa don gsal ba'i rnam bshad rtogs dka'i snang ba. 47 48 27 read other texts in addition to those obligatory textbooks:51 - Carefully Explained Notes Associating the Sūtras with the “Ornament”: the Extensive, Medium-length, and Brief [Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras] and the Root Text, [Maitreya’s] “Ornament for the Clear Realizations”] and its Commentaries Based upon (Haribhadra’s) Clear Meaning Commentary by Gungtang Könchok Tenpé Drönmé (gung thang dkon mchog bstan pa'i sgron me, 1762-1823, P298)52 - The Golden Key: Annotations to Jamyang Shaypa’s Textbook on the Perfection of Wisdom by Harha Chödzé Lama Tenpé Drönmé (har ha chos mdzad bla ma bstan pa’i gron me, P6210)53 These commentaries of annotations (mchan 'grel) are respectively on Haribhadra’s Clear Meaning Commentary ('grel pa don gsal, abhisamayālaṃkāra-nāma- prajñāpāramitopadeśa-śāstravṛtti/ spuṭhārtha) and Jamyang Shaypa’s Decisive Analysis of the First Chapter of the Mother Sūtra; they seem to be chosen on the basis of a specific teacher’s preference. According to Geshe Lozang Gyeltshen, students are not obliged to read these texts. Also, these are recommended only when the teacher thinks that the position in Decisive Analysis is not clear enough to reveal the subtle meaning. 51 Hiroshi Nemoto, personal communication, February 27, 2012. gung thang dkon mchog bstan pa'i sgron me, 'grel pa don gsal gyi steng nas rgyas 'bring bsdus gsum mngon rtogs rgyan rtsa 'grel sogs mdo rgyan sbyar ba'i gzab bshad kyi zin bris, in gsung 'bum/_dkon mchog bstan pa'i sgron me (zhol par ma). TBRC W22112.1: 341-688 (lha sa, Tibet: zhol par khang gsar pa, 2000). 53 har ha bstan pa’i sgron me, 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa’i phar phyin gyi yig cha’i mchan 'grel gser gyi lde mig, TBRC W2CZ8020: 1-558 (New Delhi, India: Mongolian Lama Guru Deva, 1982). 52 28 Therefore, although these unstandardized texts cannot be included in the three layers of monastic textbooks in the Geluk tradition, it is worth noting that there are other extracurricular texts that are studied by the teacher’s recommendation. Adding the extracurricular texts, if we slightly modify the three-tier model of Dreyfus and its adaptation by Ary, the categories of monastic textbooks in the Geluk tradition would be structured in four layers:54 The classical work of Indian Buddhists Common yig cha among Tibetan Buddhist sects Common yig cha within the Geluk tradition Uncommon yig cha to non-Geluk traditions First layer Second layer Central commentaries considered authoritative only by the Gelukpa tradition such as Tsongkhapa and his two main disciples’ works Example: Tsongkhapa’s Illumination of the Thought. Uncommon yig cha among the monastic colleges in the Geluk tradition Third layer Fourth layer 54 Example: Maitreya’s Ornament for the Clear Realizations and Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle Commentaries on Indian scriptures or Tsongkhapa and his two main disciples’ works composed by an authoritative author of a particular monastic college composed by another author of a particular monastic college The extracurricular, nonobligatory, texts recommended by a teacher’s preference Since the fourth layer is not included in the monastic curriculum, I mark it with broken lines. 29 The monastic textbooks of Gomang Monastic College are interesting since their history shows that there was a sequence of monastic textbooks from old to new: The Old Monastic Textbooks (yig cha rnying pa) by Gungru Chökyi Jungné (gung ru chos kyi 'byung gnas, ca. mid-16th century C.E. to early 17th century C.E., P4925) and Jamyang Shaypé Dorjé ('jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje, 1648-1721/22, P423). Chapter Summaries Part I The five chapters in Part I discuss a monastic textbook on the philosophical system of the Middle written by Jamyang Shaypa. Chapter 1 excavates the history of the formation of monastic textbooks in Gomang Monastic College. Chapter 2, 3, and 4 discuss philosophical foundation of the topic of the object of negation, and the intellectual history of inter- and intra-sectarian debates recorded in the main text. Chapter 5 unfolds the condensed meaning of debate terminology. Chapter 1: History of Monastic Textbooks in Gomang Monastic College In order to look into the formation of monastic textbooks in Gomang Monastic College, Chapter 1 divides its history into three phases. The first phase is the early growth of monastic education in Drepung Monastery and Gomang Monastic College. Whether or not Drepung Monastery and Gomang Monastic College had set up formalized monastic 30 curricula in the early 15th century C.E. is still controversial. The second phase is when the Old Monastic Textbook (yig cha rnying pa) was established. Eventually, by the time of Gungru Chökyi Jungné (gung ru chos kyi 'jung gnas, mid. 16th century C.E. – early 17th century C.E.), the oral lectures of Gungru Chöjung were turned into a formalized set of monastic textbooks in Gomang Monastic College in early 17th century C.E. In order to understand historical context, I critically introduce a biography of Gungru Chöjung and explain that despite the symbolic punishment of destroying Gungru Chöjung’s textbooks in Gomang Monastic College and Japhü Monastery in Kham, his textbooks survived and were used until the advent of the New Monastic Textbook by Jamyang Shaypa. In the third phase, in the late 17th century C.E., Gungru Chöjung’s textbooks were replaced by Jamyang Shaypa’s newly composed textbooks. In this third phase after briefly looking over the history of textbooks in Gomang Monastic College at Drepung Monastery, I present the way in which literatures were produced and adopted at Gomang Monastic College. Chapter 2: Tsongkhapa’s Identification of the Object of Negation in SvātantrikaMādhyamika While the first chapter discusses the development of monastic textbooks in Gomang Monastic College in the history of Tibet, this second chapter examines the way Tsongkhapa coins the concept of the object of negation. While putting great emphasis on the topic of the identification of the object of negation, Tsongkhapa asserts that, without 31 clearly identifying what veils suchness (or emptiness) one cannot achieve the view of emptiness. Furthermore, Tsongkhapa declares that Kamalaśīla’s Illumination of the Middle (madhyamakāloka, dbu ma snang ba) is the only Svātantrika-Mādhyamika text clearly identifying the object of negation in Svātantrika-Mādhyamika. In this chapter, I critically examine how Tsongkhapa draws out the definitions of the two types of object of negation in the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika. He claims that he has concrete evidence that Kamalaśīla is implicitly describing the cardinal object of negation—the innate apprehension of true existence—in addition to the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence, in Kamalaśīla’s Illumination of the Middle. However, I found that his way of explaining the passage requires a rather unique and debateable approach. Thus, in this chapter, I present how Tsongkhapa’s (un)intentional modification of the passage leads him to reach his unique conclusion on the passage. Chapter 3: The Relation between the Two Types of Object of Negation: Refutation of Taktsang, the Translator In the previous chapter, I discussed the way Tsongkhapa establishes the two types of object of negation in the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika School by means of creatively arguing for the innate apprehension of true existence being in fact identified by Kamalaśīla in his Illumination of the Middle. Given that, how do these two types of object of negation—the intellectually imbued and innate apprehensions of true existence—relate to each other? Tsongkhapa asserts that the innate apprehension of true existence cannot be undermined 32 by only negating the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence. Regarding Tsongkhapa’s two objects of negation, the Translator Taktshang Sherap Rinchen (stag tshang lotsawā shes rab rin chen, 1405-?) in the Sakya sect (sa skya pa) criticizes this assertion by pointing out two absurdities from his understanding that lay in Tsongkhapa’s system of the object of negation: 1. The two modes of apprehension of true existence—the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence and the innate apprehension of true existence— should be utterly different from each other. 2. Therefore, the reasoning repudiating the intellectually imbued mode of apprehension could not refute the innate mode of apprehension. In this chapter, I examine Taktshang’s criticism from two directions. First, I analyze whether Taktshang’s understanding is correct, and if not, how Tsongkhapa could refute him based on his system. Tsongkhapa’s own presentation of the relationship between these two types of object of negation shows that Taktshang’s criticism is groundless. Tsongkhapa asserts that the innate apprehension of true existence, is repudiated by the same reasoning that repudiates the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existenceHowever, these two types of object of negation are very different from each other in term of how they are identified. Nevertheless, they are not utterly different in the sense that the same reasoning 33 refuting the intellectually apprehended true existence can also repudiate the innately apprehended true existence. Second, I examine the way Jamyang Shaypa refutes Taktshang in his Great Exposition of the Middle (dbu ma chen mo or Decisive Analysis of the Middle, dbu ma’i mtha’ dpyod). When Jamyang Shaypa refutes Taktshang’s obvious misunderstanding, he raises an unwanted consequence to deduce self-contradiction within Taktshang’s own position. Jamyang Shaypa points out that Taktshang’s fault is based on not understanding the significance of “only” in Tsongkhapa’s assertion. Throughout examining Taktshang’s criticism with two possible repudiations by Tsongkhapa and Jamyang Shaypa, I conclude that Taktshang’s failure originated in not seeing that Tsongkhapa employs two standards—what is refuted and by what these two types of object of negation are repudiated—to explain the relation between these two types of object of negation. According to Taktshang’s rigid standards, these two types of object of negation accord with each other, and Tsongkhapa would not have to utterly disagree with this since according to one of the two standards, they accord in terms of the method of repudiation. This sole concordance between the two types of object of negation leads Taktshang to be caught in a logically untenable situation. Chapter 4: Historico-Intellectual Interaction among Geluk Scholars on the Identification of the Object of Negation from the 15th to 18th Century C.E. 34 While Chapter 3 examines the intellectual history of inter-sectarian debate documented in the New Monastic Textbook on the Middle in Gomang Monastic College, Chapter 4 illustrates intra-sectarian debate among different monastic textbook authors recorded in Jamyang Shaypa’s Great Exposition of the Middle. As discussed in Chapter 1, Tsongkhapa is very confident that Kamalaśīla's Illumination of the Middle is the only Svātantrika text to identify the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence. This assertion, however, could be harmful to Tsongkhapa's scholarship if anyone were to find other examples stating the same in another Svātantrika source text; it would show that Tsongkhapa's scholarship is not flawless. This is a provocative issue that Jamyang Shaypa discusses concerning the identification of the object of negation in Svātantrika-Mādhyamika by refuting an anonymous opponent. Jamyang Shaypa politely anonymizes those whom he refutes. However, I will prove that Jamyang Shaypa’s hypothetical opponent is a merging of at least two historical figures within the Geluk sect: Jetsünpa Chökyi Gyeltshen (rje btsun pa chos kyi rgyal mtshan, 1469-1544/1546) of Je Monastic College of Sera Monastery and Gungru Chökyi Jungné (gung ru chos kyi 'byung gnas, mid. 16th –early 17th centuries C.E.)—the author of the old monastic textbooks of Gomang Monastic College. In his General Meaning Textbook (spyi don) commenting on Tsongkhapa’s Illumination of the Thought, Jetsünpa directly confronts Tsongkhapa’s assertion that Kamalaśīla’s Illumination of the Middle is the only text clearly identifying the object of negation in the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika by pointing out that a stanza in Jñānagarbha’s 35 Differentiation of the Two Truths also very clearly identifies the innate apprehension of true existence. In the meanwhile, Gungru Chöjung cites the same stanza from Jñānagarbha’s text and asserts that it explicitly identifies the object of negation. By examining these two different assertions challenging Tsongkhapa’s scholarship, I explain that these two scholars’ assertions are incorrect. That is, these criticisms of Tsongkhapa's erudition are actually meaningless according to Jamyang Shaypa since Jñānagarbha's stanza itself reveals that he intends to explain the two truths, conventional and ultimate, and not conventional establishment and ultimate establishment at all. By finding this mistake in Jetsünpa and Gungru Chöjung's expositions, I conclude that Jamyang Shaypa defends Tsongkhapa's position on the object of negation in terms of innate apprehension of true existence, and thereby his textual authority on this issue. Chapter 5: Analysis of the Three Spheres of Self-contradiction In Chapter 5, I try to unfold the significance of the debate terminology of the three spheres of self-contradiction which Jamyang Shaypa often uses to declare that the three aspects of opponent’s assertion are logical contradictions. The three spheres (of selfcontradiction)—'khor gsum—is a logical term that is often used in the course of actual debate in Tibetan Buddhism to indicate a type of a logical contradiction in the opponent's assertion. In its practical usage, this term is not always used to point out a logical contradiction that the opponent makes; rather, it is used to plainly express any fault in the opponent’s position that the interlocutor finds out. Then can we also presume that the 36 interlocutor, Jamyang Shaypa in our case, does not have to prove how the opponent makes self-contradiction in the three aspects? In the fourth refutation, Jamyang Shaypa repudiates the Āyatas’—an Indian nonBuddhist school—assertion that former and later births are natureless in the sense that they do not exist. If both the Āyatas and the Mādhyamikas use the same term, naturelessness, does it also mean that they are sharing the same philosophical stance? Among the misconceptions Jamyang Shaypa refutes in the general section on the object of negation, I discuss in this chapter how he resolves the following qualm: whether the meaning of the naturelessness of past and future lives is the same or different for the Nihilists and the Mādhyamikas. In unfolding this debate, I explain the meaning of the three spheres of self-contradiction. In the course of debate, Jamyang Shaypa demonstrates a debate strategy of refuting opponents by situating them in an untenable position. Through introducing parallel consequences that are as problematic as the opponent's assertion, he successfully portrays the opponent as involved in obvious self-contradictions. By introducing other topics that can be plugged into the schema of the three spheres of self-contradiction, he elevates his readers' knowledge by utilizing tenets in other systems while also providing topics that can be practiced in the debate courtyard exchanges. Part II 37 Part II provides a complete translation of the general section of the identification of object of negation for the Mādhyamikas in Jamyang Shaypa’s Decisive Analysis of the Middle (dbu ma’i mtha’ dpyod, or Great Exposition of the Middle, dbu ma chen mo). The Tibetan and its English translations are arranged in the format of a table followed by summaries and annotations. The Tibetan text and the translation are highlighted in three colors: black, blue, and red. Blue colored statements present what Jamyang Shaypa considers to be right positions, while red colored statements represent what Jamyang Shaypa considers to be wrong positions. Black words are merely neutral information or function structurally. Throughout this tabulated presentation of Tibetan text, translation, summaries of Jamyang Shaypa’s points, and annotations, I will demonstrate that a series of debates in the genre of Decisive Analysis exists not merely to demonstrate standardized debates, but also to enable monk-students critically acquiring the scholastic stances and skills embedded in those debates. In this sense, the right column displays Jamyang Shaypa’s precise positions on a host of issues. 38 Part I 39 Chapter 1: History of Monastic Textbooks in Gomang Monastic College Introduction Gomang Monastic College (sgo mang grwa tshang) is one of seven monastic colleges initially built in Drepung Monastery ('bras spungs dgon pa) which is one of three major monastic seats (ldan sa gsum) located on a hillside of Mt. Genphel (dge 'phel) near Lhasa, Central Tibet. The formation of monastic textbooks in Gomang Monastic College, Chapter 1 will explain it in three phases. The first phase is the early growth of monastic education in Drepung Monastery and Gomang Monastic College. In this early 15th century C.E., whether or not Drepung Monastery and Gomang Monastic College among the seven colleges in Drepung Monastery had been set up formalized monastic curricula is still controversial. Eventually, by the time of Gungru Chökyi Jungné (gung ru chos kyi 'jung gnas, mid. 16th century C.E. – early 17th century C.E., P4925, Gungru Chöjung hereafter), the oral lectures of Gungru Chöjung were turned into a formalized set of monastic textbook in Gomang Monastic College in early 17th century C.E. In order to understand historical context of the establishment of the first monastic textbook of Gomang Monastic College known in the history, I will critically introduce a biography of Gungru Chöjung. This set of textbooks—teachings of Gungru Chöjung—lasted for over a half of century. 40 In the early 18th century C.E., Gungru Chöjung’s textbook was replaced by Jamyang Shaypa’s newly composed textbooks. In this third phase, this chapter will rather briefly introduce Jamyang Shaypa’s biography since, as I will note later, his biography and the formation of the new monastic textbook written by him is discussed well by Derek Maher in his Ph.D. thesis. 55 In this chapter, briefly looking over the history of textbooks in Gomang Monastic College at Drepung Monastery, I will present the way in which literatures were produced and adopted at Gomang Monastic College. The Origins and Early Years of Drepung Monastery The Founder of Drepung Monastery, Jamyang Chöjé Drepung Monastery has taken a central role in the history of Geluk monastic scholasticism as well as “politics, economy and culture” as Georges Dreyfus aptly notes. 56 The monastery was founded by Jamyang Chöjé Trashi Penden ('jam dbyangs chos rje bkra shis dpal ldan, 1379-1449, P35), a direct disciple of Tsongkhapa Lozang Drarkpa (tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, 1357-1419, P64) in 1416.57 In the beginning, according to Dreyfus, Jamyang Chöjé—the founder of Drepung Monastery—composed commentaries on Indian treatises and used them as textbooks:58 For the biographical schetch of Jam-yang-shay-pa, see Derek F. Maher, “Knowledge and Authority in Tibetan Middle Way Schools of Buddhis: A Study of the Gelukba (dge lugs pa) Epistemology of Jamyang Shayba ('jam dbyangs bzhad pa) In Its Historical Context” (PhD diss., University of Virginia, 2003), 169196. 56 Georges Dreyfus, "Drepung: An Introduction," in Drepung Monastery, http://www.thlib.org/places/monasteries/drepung/essays/#!essay=/dreyfus/drepung/intro/all/, 2006 (accessed May 4, 2012). 57 dge bshes dge 'dun blo gros, "'bras spungs chos 'byung," in Geshichte der Kloster-Universität Drepung (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1974), 138. 58 Georges Dreyfus, "Drepung: An Introduction," Drepung Monastery. 55 41 …'Jam dbyangs chos rje remained at 'Bras spungs for the rest of his life, functioning as its leader, providing teachings and offering guidance. He established the calendar of the debate sessions throughout the year and oversaw the curriculum. He also wrote commentaries on the great Indian texts, commentaries that functioned as the first textbooks (yig cha) of the monastery, though they were later replaced by other texts before being rejected as heterodox…He preferred to devote most of his time to teaching his students at 'Bras spungs. There he gave daily teachings to as many as eight classes per day and hence had numerous students. Despite Jamyang Chöjé's crucial role as the founder, it is said that his textbooks were rejected later on the basis of suspicions that they propounded the doctrine of otheremptiness (gzhan stong), which was completely heterodox for the Geluk tradition, and thus were replaced by textbooks written by later scholars.59 Since Jamyang Chöjé's own writings are not available at present, it is difficult to know whether his Madhyamaka view in particular was truly problematic on these doctrinal grounds for the Geluk tradition, or 59 Ibid. Since Jamyang Chöjé's works are not available at present, it is difficult to know whether his Madhyamaka view in particular is truly heretical, just an ungrounded popular belief, or is made to be seen in that way for some other reasons. The Gomang Monastic College website also introduces that Musépa Lodrö Rinchen Senggé (mu srad pa blo gros rin chen seng ge, fl. 15th century C.E., P4762)—who was the founder of Je Monastic College in Sera Monastery (se ra byes, G155) as well as Jamyang Chöjé’s student—as a proponent of other-emptiness. For further information, see "History," Drepung Gomang Monastery, http://www.gomang.info/ABOUT%20US/HISTORY.htm (accessed April 3rd, 2012). This introduction is based on the History of Gomang Monastic College (sgo mang chos 'byung). For more detailed information about how Musépa left Gomang and established Je Moanstic College of Sera Monastery (se ra byes), see dGe bshes bstan pa bstan 'dzin, chos sde chen pod pal ldan 'bras spungs bkra shis sgo mang grwa tshang gi chos 'byung dung g.yas su 'khyil ba'i sgra dbyangs, vol. 1 (Mudgod, India: dpal ldan 'bras spungs bkra shis sgo mang dpe mdzod khang, 2003), 25-26; Dreyfus, “Drepung: An Introduction.” 42 whether there were other reasons motivating the rejection of Jamyang Chöjé’s textbooks. According to Geshe Lozang Gyeltshen, Jamyang Chöjé’s commentaries on Tsongkhapa’s works are probably records clarifying difficult points of Indian scriptures and Tsongkhapa’s works, and these works of Jamyang Chöjé were banned by Khédrupje Gélek Pelzang (mkhas grub rje dge legs dpal bzang, 1385-1438, P55), one of the two spiritual sons of Tsongkhapa as well as the 3rd Throne Holder of Ganden. 60 Dreyfus reports the existence of tension between Khédrupje and Jamyang Chöjé:61 The evidence suggests that a certain amount of tension existed between these two figures. Such tension is to be expected in a group like the one that surrounded Tsong kha pa…The situation was different for the second generation of students among whom conflicts may have started to develop. This seems to have been the case for Mkhas grub and 'Jam dbyangs chos rje, two gifted and dynamic scholars who could lay legitimate claims to the succession. It is hard to know what happened since most of the evidence has either disappeared or has been actively suppressed, as is the case of ’Jam dbyangs chos rje’s writings, which were sealed at a later date…But one cannot but notice that ’Jam dbyangs chos rje seems to have cut a strikingly different figure from Mkhas grub. Whereas the latter was prone to define and assert forcefully a dominant orthodoxy, ’Jam dbyangs chos rje is presented as 60 61 dge bshes blo bzang rgyal mtshan, personal interview, December 24 2012. Dreyfus, “Drepung: An Introduction.” 43 holding views that are by now considered as heretical within the Dge lugs traditions. In particular, he is described as holding the view of extrinsic emptiness (gzhan stong), a striking position within the tradition of Tsong kha pa, an author who had rejected quite clearly this view in his writings. This tension between these two figures and Khédrupje’s succession to the Throne Holder of Ganden which symbolized the leadership of the Geluk tradition seems to support Geshe Lozang Gyeltshap’s explanation that Khédrupje banned Jamyang Chöjé’s textbooks. A remaining question is whether his philosophical systems had been continued by his direct disciples or not and whether his texts were actually adopted as textbooks in Drepung Monastery. Due to lack of historical records, it is difficult to determine. Regarding monastic education in Drepung Monastery in the early period, the 18th century Gelukpa scholar, Tuken Lozang Chökyi Nyima (thu'u bkwan blo bzang chos kyi nyi ma, 1737-1802, P170) gives a concise history of Drepung Monastery in his Crystal Mirror of Philosophical System (grub mtha' shel gyi me long):62 Blo bzaṅ chos kyi ñi ma, and Roger R. Jackson, The Crystal Mirror of Philosophical Systems: A Tibetan Study of Asian Religious Thought, the Library of Tibetan Classics (Boston, MA: Wisdom Publicatiaons, 2009), 276. In the same vein, Doboom Tulku of Loseling Monastic College describes how Jamyang Chöjé taught and the seven monastic colleges emerged: For thirty-two years, the founder himself maintained the monastery as a great institution by giving extensive discourses on the Three Baskets (sDe-snod gsum, Skt. Tripitaka) with respect to sutra studies and on the four classes of tantra with respect to tantra studies. A great assembly of monks gathered who were interested in these excellent teachings and they divided themselves into seven groups, with each having its own teacher to give discourses. Thus, were established the seven great colleges of Gomang (sGo-mang), Losel-ling (Blo-gsal gling), Deyang (bDedbyangs), Shagkor (Shag-skor), Gyelwa (rGyal-ba) or Tosamling (Thos-bsam gling), Dulwa (‘Dul-ba), and Ngagpa (sNgags-pa). See L. T. Doboom Tulku, A Brief History of Drepung Monastery, tr. by Alexander Berzin and Khamlung Rinpoche, 62 44 The great lord Jé [i.e. Tsongkhapa] said to Jamyang Chöjé Tashi Palden (1379-1440), "You should found a fine monastery; from the mother monastery joy will become greatly widespread among the offspring." And, as Jé himself gave Jamyang Chöjé the Dharma conch that had been taken as a treasure from Gokpa Mountain, Neupön Rinsang became the benefactor, and [in 1416] the great monastery of Drepung was founded. Je Rinpoche told Jamyang Chöjé, "Explain a hundred volumes from memory," so the latter memorized all the words and meanings of the 108 volumes of mantra and definition-vehicle texts and explained them. He gave courses of study continuously on the stainless explanatory system of the tradition of Jé Lama regarding Madhyamaka, valid cognition, the perfection of wisdom, and so forth, so that the disciples produced by the teachings, such as Musepa Lodrö Rinchen, were as numerous as constellations in the sky. Each of seven selected Dharma-expounding masters individually gave courses of study, and because of that there came to be seven monastic colleges: Gomang, Losal Ling, Deyangpa, Shakor, Thösam Ling or Gyalwa, Dülwa, and the tantric college. Later, they merged into four: Gomang, Losal Ling, Deyangpa, and the tantric college. As Dreyfus reports above, the main schema for monastic education in Drepung Monastery was also designed by Jamyang Chöjé. He also set up the yearly schedule for http://www.berzinarchives.com/web/en/archives/study/history_buddhism/buddhism_tibet/gelug/brief_histo ry_drepung_monastery.html, 1974 (accessed May 10, 2012). 45 debate sessions and supervised the curricula of each monastic college. Moreover, according to Tuken Lozang Chökyi Nyima, Jamyang Chöjé initially had selected seven disciples and individually taught them. Then these seven monks taught their disciples according to their own understanding of Jamyang Chöjé’s teaching, and eventually these seven monks’ lineages were developed into the seven monastic colleges as follows:63 Monastic college Gomang (sgo mang) Loseling (blo gsal gling) Shakkor (shag skor) Tösamling (thos bsam gling) or Gyelwa (rgyal ba)64 Deyang (bde dbyangs) Field of study Dülwa ('dul ba) Monastic discipline (vinaya) Ngakpa (sngags pa) Tantra: Guhyasamāja, Yamāntaka, and Cakrasaṃvara in particular The Perfection of Wisdom literature and Madhyamaka philosophy Logic and epistemology Later Shakkor, Tösamling, and Dülwa Monastic Colleges were amalgamated with other colleges and eventually Gomang, Loseling, Deyang, and Ngakpa Monastic Colleges were left. Next, we will examine the history of monastic textbooks in Gomang Monastic College. Early history of education in Gomang Monastic College The 1st Abbot Janglingpa Drakpa Rinchen The field of study in the chart is cited from Dreyfus, “Drepung: An Introduction.” With regard to the field of study of Deyang Monastic College, Doboom Tulku describes how Deyang Monastic College focuses on both Sūtra and Tantra while Dreyfus says that Deyang Monastic College mostly studies Buddhist logic and epistemology. See Doboom Tulku, A Brief History of Drepung Monastery. 64 According to Dreyfus, another name for this monastic college is Gyepa (rgyas pa). See Dreyfus, “Drepung: An Introduction.” 63 46 The first abbot of Gomang Monastic College, Tsenjanglingpa Drakpa Rinchen (byang gling pa grags pa rin chen, fl. 15th century C.E., P8LS12001) was one of the seven direct disciples of Jamyang Chöjé who as a group were responsible for the inauguration of the corresponding seven monastic colleges in Drepung Monastery. As for the lineage of Drakpa Rinchen, the Survey on Drepung Monastery ('bras spungs dgon gyi dkar chag) reports that he was a direct disciple of Jamyang Chöjé.65 The History of Gomang Monastic College reports that he was one of twelve direct disciples of the founder of the Geluk sect, Tsongkhapa Lozang Drakpa:66 The first abbot [of Gomang Monastic College] is Jang-ling-pa Drakpa Rinchen who is included among the eight or twelve direct disciples of Tsongkhapa, the upholders of teachings knowledgeable in many scriptures. In this initial stage of monastic education in Gomang Monastic College, according to the History of Gomang Monastic College, the first abbot of Gomang Monastic College, Jang- 65 Bod ljongs spyi tshogs tshan rig khang gi chos lugs zhib 'jug tshan pa, 'bras spungs dgon gyi dkar chag (Beijing, China: Krung go'i bod rig pa dpe skrun khang, 2009), 92. However, Dreyfus notes that Drak-parin-chen is not listed as Jamyang Chöjé's main disciples. See Dreyfus, "An Introduction to Drepung’s Colleges," http://www.thlib.org/places/monasteries/drepung/essays/#!essay=/dreyfus/drepung/colleges/s/b1. 66 bstan pa bstan ‘dzin, sgo mang chos 'byung, vol. 1, 24: གདན་རབས་དང་པློ་ནི། འཇམ་མགློན་ཙོང་ཁ་པ་ཆེན་པློའི་དངློས་སློབ་གསུང་རབ་མང་དུ་མཁེན་པའི་བསན་ འཛིན་བརྒྱད་དམ་བཅུ་གཉིས་ཀྱིས་ནང་ཚན་བྱང་གིང་པ་གྲགས་པ་རིན་ཆེན་ཞེས་གྲགས་པ་དེ་ཉིན་ཡིན་ལ། As for the lineage of Drakpa Rinchen, the Survey on Drepung Monastery ('bras spungs dgon gyi dkar chag) reports that he was a direct disciple of Jamyang Chöjé; however, Dreyfus notes that Drakpa Rinchen is not listed among Jamyang Chöjé's main disciples. See Bod ljongs spyi tshogs tshan rig khang gi chos lugs zhib 'jug tshan pa, 'bras spungs dgon gyi dkar chag (Beijing, China: Krung go'i bod rig pa dpe skrun khang, 2009), 92; Dreyfus, "An Introduction to Drepung’s Colleges." 47 ling-pa Drakpa Rinchen teaching disciples exactly as Jamyang Chöjé taught:67 Having come to Gomang Monastic College as an instructor (slob dpon), conforming to Jamyang Chöjé's (1379-1449) desire [in terms of teaching content] (dgongs bzhed68 dang mthun), he successively elucidated scriptures and traditions of India and Tibet as extensive as the ocean to vast numbers of students for a long time in the style of setting forth and transmitting the teaching (bzhag gnang mdzad pa). Monks in Gomang Monastic College (sgo mang pa) took [Tsongkhapa's] Golden Garland of Eloquence (legs bshad gser 'phreng) as the key, and the two Illuminations (snang ba gnyis) as the most important Indian commentaries. Furthermore, [their education system] was structured by treatises on Madhyamaka and Pramāṇa of Tsongkhapa and his [spiritual] sons [Gyeltshap Darma Rinchen and Khédrup Gélek Pelzang]. Also, he made students intensively repeat [the content until they were] well- 67 bstan pa bstan ‘dzin, sgo mang chos 'byung, vol. 1, 24: དམ་པ་དེ་ཉིད་སློ་མང་གྲྭ་ཚང་གི་ཐློག་མའི་སློབ་དཔློན་དུ་ཕེབས་ནས་འཇམ་དབྱངས་ཆློས་རེའི་དགློངས་བཞེད་ དང་བསྟུན་འཕགས་བློད་ཀྱི་གཞུང་ལུགས་རྒྱ་མཚོ་ལྟ་བུར་འཆད་ཉན་རྒྱ་ཆེ་ཡུན་རིང་བསྐྱངས་པའི་མཛད་རེས་བ་ མེད་བཞག་གནང་མཛད་པའི་སློལ་ལྟར། སློ་མང་པ་རྣམས་ལེགས་བཤད་གསེར་གི་ཕེང་བས་ལེ་མིག་བྱས་ཏེ་སྣང་བ་ གཉིས་ཀྱིས་གཙོས་པའི་རྒྱ་འགྲེལ་ཉེར་གཅིག་དང་། གཞན་ཡང་རེ་ཡབ་སས་ཀྱིས་མཛད་པའི་དབུ་ཚད་ཀྱི་བསན་ བཅློས་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཁློག་ཕུབ། ཟླ་བའི་འགྲེལ་ཆེན་རྣམས་དང་། ས་སེ་ལྔ་དང་སློམ་རྣམ་གཉིས་སློགས་བྱམས་པ་དང་ འབྲེལ་བའི་རྒྱ་གཞུང་། ཚད་མའི་སྐློར་དང་འདུལ་མཛོད་ཀྱི་རྒྱ་གཞུང་རྣམས་ལའང་ཆེས་འདྲིས་ཆ་ཆེ་བར་མཛད་ པའི་སློལ་ཚུགས་པ་རྒྱུན་ཆགས་སུ་གནས་ཤིང་། མཐར་མཁས་མཆློག་ས་ལེབ་པ་སློབ་དཔློན་དུ་བསྐློས་ནས་རང་ཉིད་ ཟུར་བཞུགས་མཛད་དེ་འཇམ་མགློན་ཙོང་ཁ་པ་ཆེན་པློའི་དངློས་སློབ་ལྷ་གཟིགས་གྲགས་པ་རྒྱ་མཚོས་ཕག་བཏབ་ པའི་མལ་གྲློ་ཆ་དཀར་དགློན་དུ་གདན་ཞུས་ཀྱིས་གནས་དེར་ཡང་འཆད་ཉན་བསྐྱངས་ཏེ་བཞུགས། 68 dgongs pa bzhed pa is explained as blo'i 'dod pa. See bod rgya tshigs mdzod chen mo, s.v. "dgongs bzhed." 48 experienced. This method is established as the style [of study in Gomang Monastic College]. He taught Candrakīrti's Great Commentaries, Indian treatises related to Maitreya—Asaṅga's Five Treatises on the levels and two Summaries, Indian scriptures on the Valid Cognition (tshad ma, pramāṇa), Discipline ('dul ba, vinaya), and Abhidharma (mngon mdzod, abhidharmakośa). In the end, having appointed the profound scholar Galeppa (sga leb pa, fl. 15th century C.E.) as an instructor, he retired. He was invited to Meldro Chakargön (mal gro cha dkar dgon, G3011) which was founded by a direct disciple of Tsongkhapa, lHazik Drakpa Gyatsö (lha gzigs grags pa rgya mtsho) and taught extensively there. Drakpa Rinchen seems not to have composed monastic textbooks for Gomang Monastic College. Instead, according to the History of Gomang Monastic College, he adopted Indian scriptures and commentaries by Tsongkhapa and his two spiritual sons into the curriculum. In addition, this gives us a glimpse of the curriculum of Gomang Monastic College in this early period when the curriculum based on these Five Great Books (gzhung chen bka' pod lnga) was taught: a. Valid Cognition (tshad ma, pramāṇa) b. Perfection of Wisdom (phar phyin, prajñāpāramitā) c. The Middle (dbu ma, madhyamaka) d. Treasury of Knowledge (mngon mdzod, abhidharmakośa) e. Discipline ('dul ba, vinaya) 49 For the study of the Perfection of Wisdom literature (phar phyin, or sher phyin, 69 prajñāpāramitā), it says that Tsongkhapa's Golden Garland of Eloquence70 was the key to understanding the twenty one Indian commentaries on Maitreya’s Ornament of Clear Realizations.71 The Madhyamaka and Pramāṇa curricula were based upon commentaries by Tsongkhapa and his two spiritual sons Gyeltshapje and Khédrupje. Furthermore, Drakpa Rinchen taught Candrakīrti's commentaries for the Madhyamaka course. Also, for the Grounds and Paths (sa lam), Asaṅga's Five Treatises on the Grounds and two Summaries were taught:72 Asaṅga’s Five Treatises on the Grounds: (1) Grounds of Yogic Practice (rnal 'byor spyod pa'i sa, yogācārya-bhūmi) (2) Compendium of Ascertainments (gtan la phab pa bsdu ba, nirṇayasaṃgraha or viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī) (3) Compendium of Bases (gzhi bsdu ba, vastusaṁgraha) (4) Compendium of Enumerations (rnam grangs bsdu ba, paryāyasaṁgraha) 69 sher phyin is an abridged form of shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa. The full title is: Golden Garland of Eloquence: Extensive Explanation of (Maitreya’s) “Ornament for Clear Realization, Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the Perfection of Wisdom”as Well as its Commentaries (legs bshad gser 'phreng / shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan 'grel pa dang bcas pa'i rgya cher bshad pa legs bshad gser gyi phreng ba). According to Elizabeth Napper, Gyeltshabje disagrees with Tsongkhapa’s position stated in the Golden Garland of Eloquence. For example, about Tsongkhapa’s classification of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla as ReasonEstablihsed Illusioninsts (rgy ma rigs grub pa), Gyeltshabje explains that Tsongkhapa’s description of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla as Reason-Established Illusionists should be understood as Tsongkhapa’s report about the previous scholars’ wrong position on this topic. See Elizabeth Napper, Dependent-arising and Emptiness: A Tibetan Buddhist Interpretation of Mādhyamika Philosophy Emphasizing the Compatibility of Emptiness and Conventional Phenomena (Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publications, 2003), 417-418. 71 For the list of twenty one commentaries on the Ornament for the Clear Realization, see appendix II. 72 Tibetan-Saskrit-English Dictionary, ed. Jeffrey Hopkins, s.v. "sa sde." 70 50 (5) Compendium of Explanations (rnam par bshad pa bsdu ba, vivaraṇasaṁgraha) Asaṅga’s Two Summaries: (1) Summary of Manifest Knowledge (chos mngon pa kun btus, abhidharmasamuccaya) (2) Summary of the Great Vehicle (theg pa chen po bsdus pa, mahāyānasaṃgraha) Additionally, Vasubhandu’s Manifest Knowledge (mngon mdzod), Vasubhandu's Treasury of Knowledge (chos mngon pa’i mdzod, abhidharmakośa) was taught. The last direct disciple of Jamyang Chöjé in Gomang Monastic College: the 8th Abbot Penden Lodrö According to the History of Gomang Monastic College, the 8th abbot of Gomang Monastic College was still Jamyang Chöjé’s direct disciple. In his abbotship together with the 9th abbot Shérap Lodrö (shes rab blo gros, fl. 15th century C.E.), the 8th abbot Penden Lodrö (dpal ldan blo gros, fl. 15th century C.E., P34) is recorded as a direct disciple of Jamyang Chöjé as well as Musepa Lodrö Rinchen Senggé (blo gros rin chen seng ge, fl. 15th century C.E., P4762):73 73 bstan pa bstan 'dzin, sgo mang chos 'byung, 29-30: གདན་རབས་བརྒྱད་པ། དཔལ་ལན་བློ་གྲློས་དང་། གདན་རབས་དགུ་པ། ཤེས་རབ་བློ་གྲློས་གཉིས་འཆད་ཉན་སློབ་ དཔློན་དུ་མཉམ་བསྐློས་བྱས་པས་ཕན་ཚུན་འགྲན་བཤད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པས་འཆད་ཉན་གློང་འཕེལ་བྱུང་བའི་གཏན་ ཚིགས་སུ་བུ་སློབ་ཏུ་སློབ་དཔློན་དཔལ་ལན་འློད་ཟེར་དང་སློབ་དཔློན་དཀློན་མཆློག་བཟང་པློ་གཉིས། དཀའ་བཅུ་ 51 The 8th abbot Penden Lodrö and 9th abbot Shérap Lodrö were appointed together as instructors. Therefore, by developing teaching through provoking and explaining to each other, they produced many learned and accomplished geshes such as two of the 11th abbot, Penden Özer (dpal ldan 'od zer) and the 12th abbot Könchok Zangpo (dkon mchog bzang po), the 13th abbot, Gungru Kachupa Rinchen Jangchup, and Nyewar khor (nye bar 'khor), Sönam Lhündrup (bsod nams lhun grub), Ngakwang Jungné (ngag dbang 'byung gnas) and so forth. In particular, the Great scholar Penden Lodrö stayed close to mainly Jamyang Chöjé, and the wise Musepa Lodrö Rinchen Senggé. Many great scholars—the 10th Throne Holder of Ganden Yeshe Zangpo (ye shes bzang po,1415-1498, P28), the 11th Throne Holder of Ganden Dartön Lozang Drakpa ('dar ston blo bzang grags pa,1422/1429-1511, P390), the 8th abbot of Drepung, Lekpa Chöjor (legs pa chos sbyor, 1429-1503, P4352), the 9th abbot of Drepung, Tönpa Chöjé (thon pa chos rje), 74 the founder of the Upper འཛིན་པ་རིན་ཆེན་བྱང་ཆུབ་དང་ཉེ་བར་འཁློར་གཉིས། དཀའ་བཅུ་པ་བརློན་འགྲུས་རྒྱལ་མཚན་དང་། བསློད་ ནམས་ལྷུན་གྲུབ་གཉིས། སློབ་དཔློན་ངག་དབང་འབྱུང་གནས་སློགས་མཁས་ཤིང་གྲུབ་པའི་དགེ་བཤེས་མང་དུ་ཐློན། ལྷག་པར་མཁན་ཆེན་དཔལ་ལན་བློ་གྲློས་ནི། གཙོ་བློར་འཇམ་དབྱངས་ཆློས་རེ་དང་མཁས་པ་མུས་སད་པ་བློ་གྲློས་ རིན་ཆེན་སེང་གེ་གཉིས་བསེན་ནས་མཁས་པ་ཆེན་པློར་གྱུར་ཏེ། ཆློས་ཀྱི་ཁི་ཆེན་པློར་དབང་བའི་སློབ་མ་དགའ་ཁི་ བཅུ་པ་ཡེ་ཤེས་བཟང་པློ་དང་། དགའ་ཁི་བཅུ་གཅིག་པ་འདར་སློན་བློ་བཟང་གྲགས་པ། འབྲས་སྤུངས་ཆློས་རེ་ བརྒྱད་པ་ལེགས་པ་ཆློས་འབྱློར་དང་། དགུ་པ་ཐློན་པ་ཆློས་རེ༑ རྒྱུད་སློད་ཕག་འདེབས་པ་པློ་རྒྱུད་ཆེན་ཀུན་དགའ་ དློན་གྲུབ་སློགས་མཁན་ཆེན་འདི་ཉིད་ལས་དབུ་ཕར་འདུལ་མངློན་ཚད་མ་སློགས་གསན་པ་མང་ངློ་། 74 According to the Survey of Drepung Monastery, the 9th abbot of Drepung Monastery is Khétsün Yönten Gyatso (mkhas btsun yon tan rgya mtsho, 1442-1521, P426). So, Tönpa Chöjé could be his alias. 52 Tantric College (brgyud stod), the Great Tantrika Künga Döndrup (kun dga' don grub, 1419-1486, P995) and so forth—directly learned Madhyamaka, Prajñāpāramitā, Vinaya, Abhidharmakośa, Pramāṇa and so forth. In particular, Penden Lodrö had produced several influential figures such as the Throne Holders of Ganden, abbots of Drepung Monastery, and the founder of the Upper Tantric College, not to mention the abbots of Gomang Monastic College: Table 1. list of Throne Holders and abbots under the influence of Jamyang Chöjé before the 13th abbot of Gomang Monastic College. Place Throne Holders of Ganden Drepung Monastery Gomang Monastic College The Upper Tantric College Abbotship 10th 11th 8th 9th 8th 9th 11th 12th 13th Founder Name Yeshe Zangpo Dartön Lozang Drakpa Legpa Chöjor Tönpa Chöjé Penden Lodrö Shérap Lodrö75 Penden Özer Könchok Zangpo Gungru Rinchen Jangchup Künga Döndrup Date 1415-1498 1422/1429-1511 1429-1503 ? ca. 15th century C.E. ca. 15th century C.E. ? ? ? 1419-1486 As we can see from the list of those who were under the influence of Jamyang Chöjé’s thought, it seems that Jamyang Chöjé’s lineage was very influential during the 15th century C.E. Among these direct disciples, furthermore, the 8th abbot of Gomang Monastic College, Penden Lodrö tutored many influential figures, such as Penden Özer (11th abbot), Könchok Zangpo (12th abbot), and Gungru Rinchen Jangchup (13th abbot) 75 The 10th abbot of Gomang Monastic College, Yéshe Drakpa (ye shes grags pa, P2916) did not stay long despite his excellent teaching of doctrines. See bstan pa bstan 'dzin, sgo mang chos 'byung, 30. 53 together with the 9th abbot Shérap Lodrö. Particularly, as I will explain later, Gungru Rinchen Jangchup is reported to be a teacher of Gungru Chöjung, the author of the Old Textbook of Gomang Monastic College. The 13th Abbot of Gomang Monastic College, Gungru Rinchen Jangchup The 13th abbot, Gungru Kachupa Rinchen Jangchup (gung ru dka' bcu pa rin chen byang chub, fl. 16th century C.E., P4776) is the last person—in the abbatial succession of Gomang Monastic College—who is mentioned to have studied under a direct disciple of Jamyang Chöjé, namely the 8th abbot Penden Lodrö. Since his date gives an important clue to dating the textbook author of the Old Textbooks (yig cha rnying pa) of Gomang, Gungru Chöjung, I will briefly introduce his life. The 18th century C.E. Geluk scholar Tuken Lozang Chökyi Nyima (thu'u bkwan blo bzang chos kyi nyi ma, 1737-1802, P170) describes the renowned scholar-monks during 16th to 17th century C.E. in Drepung Monastery in his Crystal Mirror of Philosophical System (grub mtha' shel gyi me long):76 Were I to write on the line of lamas of each individual monastic college, it would become excessive, so I will discuss just some of the main ones. At Losal ling, as already mentioned, there was the pair of Jamyang Lekpa Chöjor and Panchen Sönam Drakpa; at Deyang, there was Drachung Yonten Gyaltsen; Blo bzaṅ chos kyi ñi ma, and Roger R. Jackson, The Crystal Mirror of Philosophical Systems: A Tibetan Study of Asian Religious Thought, the Library of Tibetan Classics (Boston, MA: Wisdom Publicatiaons, 2009), 277. 76 54 at Shakor there was Narthangpa Rapchok; at Thösam Ling there was Nyenpo Shakya Gyaltsen; those were the especially illustrious ones. At Gomang, there were Rinchen Jangchup, Jampa Lhündrup, Shukhangpa Gelek Lhündrup, Gungru Sangyé Tashi, and in particular, Gungru Chökyi Jungne, whose textbooks and courses of study were better than others. According to the History of Gomang Monastic College, Gungru Rinchen Jangchup was a renowned author of the Great Exposition of the General Meaning of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra (phar phyin spyi don chen mo) and a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika (tshad ma rnam 'grel) and so forth;77 however, according to Tuken’s record, it seems that Rinchen Jangchup’s commentaries were not officially adopted as the monastic textbooks. In addition to his reputation as a famous author-scholar, Rinchen Jangchup was introduced as one who converted Pembar Monastery (dpal 'bar dgon) into the Geluk tradition.78 According to the History of Ganden: Yellow Beryl written by the regent of the Fifth Dalai Lama—Dési Sanggyé Gyatso (sde srid sangs rgyas rgya mtsho, 1653-1705, P421)—this monastery was initially built by Kublai Khan's (1215-1294) order on the advice of Chögyel Pakpa Lodrö Gyeltsen (chos rgyal phags pa blo gros rgyal mtshan, 1235-1280, P1048) when he became Kublai Khan's imperial preceptor in 1260. Thereafter, this monastery was managed by Sakya masters until Rinchen Jangchup took 77 78 bstan pa bstan 'dzin, sgo mang chos 'byung, 31. ibid. 55 over the monastery. 79 Since Pembar Monastery was sponsored by Kublai Khan, the conversion of the affiliated religious sect from Sakyapa to Gelukpa probably required an important reason to do so. This transfer of ownership of Pembar Monastery probably happened in or after 1578 when the Third Dalai Lama, Sönam Gyatso (bsod nams rgya mtsho, 1543-1588, P999) and Altan Khan (1543-1583) revived the relationship of the preceptor and the patron, like Chögyel Pakpa and Kublai Khan.80 Alex McKay explains:81 By the mid-sixteenth century Altan Khan (1543-83), chief of the Turned tribes, had become the most powerful Mongol leader. In 1577, he invited Sonam Gyatso, who had acquired a wide reputation as a scholar and teacher, to his court. There the two leaders reactivated the 'patron-priest' relationship that had 79 sde srid sengs rgyas rgya mtsho, dga' ldan chos 'byung baiDU r+ya ser po, TBRC W8224 (Beijing, China: krung go bod kyi shes rig dpe skrun khang, 1989, 1998 printing), 319-320, http://tbrc.org/link?RID=O1GS97909|O1GS979094CZ1655$W8224: དཔལ་ལན་ས་སྐྱ་པའི་ཆློས་བརྒྱུད་བཟུང་ནས་བ་རབས་ཁ་ཤས་སློང་བའི་ཚེ་གུང་རུ་རིན་ཆེན་བྱང་ཆུབ་པས་འཇམ་ མགློན་ཆློས་ཀྱི་རྒྱལ་པློ་བཙོང་ཁ་པ་ཆེན་པློའི་རིང་ལུགས་ར་མེད་པ་འདི་ཉིད་ལ་ལྕགས་དང་གསེར་འགྱུར་གི་དེཔ་ བཞིན་ལེགས་པར་བསྒྱུར། 80 For detail contents of their meeting, see Shakabpa Tsepon Wangchuk Deden, One Hundred Thousand Moons: An Advanced Political History of Tibet, translated and annotated by Derek Maher, vol. 1 (Leiden, Netherland: Brill, 2010), 298-303. 81 Alex McKay, The History of Tibet, vol. 2 (New York, NY: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 18. McKay states that this event happened in 1577. On the other hand, Dharmatāla gives a different year, 1578: Then Gyalwang Rinpoche went on with the journey. Thumen the eldest son of Tarisan Khuting, who ruled only Hor for 21 years, met the August Lama with appropriate ceremonies, to the sounds of skya-reng and trumpets, and in the company of the highest (Mongolian) nobles, on the 15th day of the 5th month of the Earth Male Tiger Year, the 12 th year of the 10th Rabjung (= 1578). See Damchö Gyatsho Dharmatāla, Rosary of White Lotuses: Being the Clear Account of How the Precious Teaching of Buddha Appeared and Spread in the Great Hor Country, transl. and annot. Piortr Klafkowsky, supervised Nyalo Trulku Jampa Kelzang Rinpoche (Wiesbaden, German: O. Harrassowitz, 1987), 224. 56 been created by Kublai Khan and the Sakya lama Phagpa. In an exchange of titles, Sonam Gyatso was designated as 'Dalai' (a translation into Mongolian of the name Gyatso, meaning 'ocean' in Tibetan), from which came the term 'Dalai Lama', generally translated as 'Ocean (of Wisdom)'82. Besides this political relation between priest and king, their relation is strongly supported by the Buddhist worldview as Thomas Laird describes:83 Altan Khan and the Third Dalai Lama ascribed a singular worldview to their actions as they founded a spiritual empire: belief in reincarnation was an absolute given. The biography of the Third Dalai Lama indicates that his visit to Mongolia was predestined by past karmic connections. Mongolians believe that the Third Dalai Lama, on meeting Altan, said, "The khan and I have the signs that, because we have performed meritorious deeds in our former lives, we will meet and together propagate the religion [in this life]."… The Third Dalai lama publicly proclaimed that he was a reincarnation of the priest Phagpa and that Altan was a reincarnation of Kublai Khan. Laird's description of the strong religious bond between two is also described by Damchö Gyatsho Dharmatāla:84 In particular, in days of old, he was Sakya (Paṇḍita) Kunga Gyentshen and Hopkins commented that it is probable that “Dalai Lama” initially meant the Ocean of Merit. Thomas Laird and bsTan 'dzin rgya mtsho, The Story of Tibet: Conversations with the Dalai Lama (New York, NY: Grove Press, 2006), 145. 84 Dharmatāla, Rosary of White Lotuses, 222. 82 83 57 held the Preceptor-Protector bond with King Chingis the Turner of the Wheel of Power. He thus started the spread of Teaching in the land of Hor. By (the power of) his compassion, this spread has been ever-progressing, greater and greater, and has continued until this day. This process, however, had its ups and downs, as the Mongols continued to worship, and make sacrifices with killing to the Ongkwod. In order to terminate these abominable customs, he took birth as Gyalwa Sonam Gyatsho, went to Hor, and entered the PreceptorProtector bond with king Althan, thus causing a great flourishing of the Teaching. In this way, considering that Pembar Monastery was built by Kublai Khan on the advice of Chögyel Pakpa, this preceptor-protector relationship between the Third Dalai Lama and Altan Khan—with religious support as reincarnations of Chögyel Pakpa and Kublai Khan—probably forced Rinchen Jangchup take over the monastery in 1578 or shortly after. This date enables us to speculate when Gungru Chöjung was flourished. The Old Textbooks of Gomang Monastic College by Gungru Chökyi Jungné Gungru Chöjung's life As the Crystal Mirror briefly explains, Gungru Chöjung (P4925) was a renowned scholar famous for his textbooks adopted in Gomang Monastic College. Also, he could be the first textbook author of Gomang Monastic College who is explicitly documented. According to the History of Gomang Monastic College, Gungru Chöjung was born in Gungru in Kham and studied sūtras and tantras at Japhü Dargäling (bya phud dar rgyas 58 gling) in his youth. Afterwards, he moved to Gomang Monastic College and learned from Gungru Rinchen Jangchup. After mastering the five major sciences and the five minor sciences, he was widely renowned as "the Great Omniscient (kun mkhyen chen po)."85 He was also titled the Leader of Chanters from Gungru (Gungru Yangpön, gung ru dbyangs dpon) by the Third Dalai Lama. When the 4th Dalai Lama Yönten Gyatso (yon tan rgya mtsho, 1589-1617, P177), a grandson of Altan Khan, turned the age of fourteen in 1603,86 he was invited to Tibet for his education.87 Gungru Chöjung was at the tea offering in Chökhorgyel Métoktang (chos 'khor rgyal me tog thang, G4634) near Lhasa.88 At that time according to the History of Gomang Monastic College the Fourth 85 bstan pa bstan 'dzin, sgo mang chos 'byung, 33: གདན་རབས་བཅུ་བདུན་པ། གུང་རུ་ཀུན་མཁེན་ཆློས་ཀྱི་འབྱུང་གནས་ཀྱི་འཁྲུངས་ཡུལ་ནི༑ མདློ་སློད་གུང་རུའི་ས་ ཆར། བར་ཁམས་དཔའ་ཤློད་ཀྱི་མངའ་ཁློངས་རྭ་སེང་གཉིས་པར་གྲགས་པ་བྱ་ཕུད་ཅེས་པ་ཡིན་ལ་གནས་འདི་ཡི་ ཁད་པར་ཟུར་ཙམ་ནི་འློག་ཏུ་འཆད་དློ། །ཁློང་གཞློན་ནུའི་དུས་ནས་བྱ་ཕུད་མདློ་སགས་དར་རྒྱས་གིང་དགློན་པར་ རབ་ཏུ་བྱུང་། དེ་ནས་རིམ་གིས་དབུས་སུ་ཕེབས་ནས་ཆློས་སེ་ཆེན་པློ་དཔལ་ལན་འབྲས་སྤུངས་སློ་མང་གྲྭ་ཚང་དུ་ ཞུགས་ཏེ་ལུང་དང་རྟློགས་པའི་བང་མཛོད་གུང་རུ་རིན་ཆེན་བྱང་ཆུབ་བསེན་ཏེ། མདློ་སགས་རིག་གནས་དང་ བཅས་པར་སྦྱངས་པ་མཐར་ཕིན་ནས་ཀུན་མཁེན་ཆེན་པློ་ཞེས་པའི་སྙན་གྲགས་ཀྱིས་ཁབ། 86 There is disagreement about when the Fourth Dalai Lama was invited to Tibet. According to White Conch Encyclopedia (dung dkar tshig mdzod chen mo), he arrived in Lhasa in 1601; however, other sources such as History of Gomang Monastic College and gangs ljongs lo rgyus thog gi grags can mi sna report that he arrived in Lhasa in 1603. See Dung dkar bLo bzang 'phrin las, Dung dkar tshig mdzod chen mo (Beijing, China, krung go'i bod rig pa dpe skrun khang, 2002), 2328-2329; bstan pa bstan ‘dzin, sgo mang chos 'byung, 33; Don rdor, and bsTan 'dzin chos grags, Gangs ljongs lo rgyus thog gi grags can mi sna (Lha sa, Tibet: bod ljongs mi dmangs dpe skrun khang, 1993), 641. 87 Rachel M. McCleary and Leonard W. J. van der Kuijp, "The Market Approach to the Rise of the Geluk School, 1419-1642," The Journal of Asian Studies, doi: 10.1017/S0021911809991574, Published online by Cambridge University Press 02 March 2010: 171. 88 This monastery is located 90 miles southeast of Lhasa. It was built by the 2nd Dalai Lama, Gendün Gyatso (dge 'dun rgya mtsho, 1476-1542, P84). Shabkabpa describes this: In 1509, the victorious Gendün Gyatso founded the Chökhor Gyel Metok Tang Monastery about ninety miles to the southeast of Lhasa. About five miles to the northeast of that monastery, in the Yatro Mountains, there is a divine lake in which the course of future events is clearly displayed. 59 Dalai Lama recognized him at first sight as the Leader of Chanters from Gungru, as the Third Dalai Lama Sönam Gyatsho (P999) often called him. By request of the Fourth Dalai Lama, Gungru Chöjung chanted the Windmill of [Buffalo-headed] Yamarāja (gshin rje rlung 'khor ma) in the style of melodious chant (rta) which made the Fourth Dalai Lama pleased.89 Moreover, in the Supplication for the Lineage [of the Geluk sect] instead of saying "a profound scholar (mkhas pa'i mchog gyur)" and the like, it says "powerful lord." When it is as mentioned in such-and-such text: When the Fourth Dalai Lama was invited from Mongolia [to Tibet] at the age of fourteen, he arrived at Chö-kor-ling, the place of a series of tea (ja gral) [where] Gungru Chöjung was. At that time, the Fourth Dalai Lama suddenly said "It is wonderful to meet the Leader of Chanters! Please chant with your beautiful voice like before!" When [Gungru Chöjung] offered a chant in a style of melodic chant (rta), 90 the Windmill of See Shakabpa Tsepon Wangchuk Deden, One Hundred Thousand Moons: An Advanced Political History of Tibet, 295. 89 Ibid. 33: བརྒྱུད་འདེབས་ནང་། མཁས་པའི་མཆློག་གྱུར་ཅེས་པ་ལྟ་བུ་མ་སློས་པར་མཐུ་སློབས་དབང་ཕྱུག་ཅེས་འབྱུང་བ་ནི། ཆློས་འབྱུང་ཉིད་རྒྱལ་མཆློག་ཡློན་ཏན་རྒྱ་མཚོ་རྒྱ་ནག་ནས་དགུང་གྲངས་བཅུ་བཞིའི་ཐློག་གདན་དྲངས་སྐབས་ ཆློས་འཁློར་རྒྱལ་དུ་ཇ་གྲལ་གི་སར་ཕེབས་པར་དབྱངས་དཔློན་པ་འབྱློར་བ་ལེགས། སར་གི་དབྱངས་སྙན་པློ་དེ་གིས་ དང་ཞེས་ཐློལ་བྱུང་དུ་གསུངས་པར་གཤིན་རེ་རླུང་འཁློར་མའི་རྟ་ཞིག་ཕུལ་བར། དེ་ག་ཡིན། ངས་ཀྱང་བྱེད་ གསུངས་ནས་ཤིན་ཏུ་བརིད་ཆགས་པ་ཞིག་མཛད། ཅེས་འབྱུང་བ་ལྟར་ན་སྐུ་གློང་མ་༧རྒྱལ་མཆློག་བསློད་ནམས་རྒྱ་ མཚོ་དང་། ཐུགས་ནང་ཤིན་ཏུ་གཤིན་པའི་སློབ་མ་ཡིན་འདུག་ཅིང་། གསུང་ཞབས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་དབྱངས་དཔློན་ མཛད་དམ་གང་ལྟར་དེ་སྐབས་གུང་རུ་དབྱངས་དཔློན་ཞེས་པའི་མཚན་ཡང་ཐློགས། 90 Melodic chant (rta) is a style of chant along with 'don and dbyangs: 60 [Buffalo-headed] Yamarāja (gshin rje rlung 'khor ma)." 91 Then, [the Fourth Dalai Lama said] "As you were!" Having said "I will also chant," [the Fourth Dalai Lama] magnificently chanted. Therefore, [Gungru Chöjung] was the heart disciple of the previous reincarnation, [Third Dalai Lama] Sönam Gyatso. He possibly led the leader of chanting with chanter [of the Fourth Dalai Lama]. At that time, he was also entitled as "the Leader of Chanters from Gungru." Gungru Chöjung was a disciple of the Third Dalai Lama Sönam Gyatsho (1543-1588). In addition, he was also the main disciple of Gungru Rinchen Jangchup who probably took over Pembar monastery around 1578. The Third Dalai Lama was fully ordained in 1563. He might have been able to teach students in between 1563-1577. Also, since the Third Dalai Lama called him the Leader of Chanters, Gungru Chöjung would have been fully grown to be in that position. Therefore, I speculate that Gungru Chöjung was born around the middle 16th century C.E. rta refers to chants with distinct, consciously patterned "melodies" (rta). Unlike 'don, the sound patterns of their intonation are relatively independent of their texts; hence, also unlike 'don, they are considered relatively "melodic" and "musical." However, as with 'don, their manner of performance is called sungs, "speaking." In Tibetan terms, their melodies make use primarily of 'dren pa (especially drang po "straight" tones), with varying mixtures of 'gyur, bkug, and ldeng. In Western terms, the melodies are strophic in organization, and are composed of "scales" of discretely-separated pitches. More simply, rta are much like the "melodies" used in Western and other non-Tibetan performing traditions. See Ter Ellingson, "'Don Rta Dbyangs Gsum: Tibetan Chant and Melodic Categories," Asian Music 10:2 (1979): 112-56. 91 A chant text for Buffalo-headed protector deity DamChen Chögyel (dam chen chos rgyal, Yama Dharmarāja) of the Geluk sect; Damchen Chögyel gyi Kasöl (dam chen chos rgyal gyi skang gsol). 61 The advent of the Fourth Dalai Lama in Lhasa fortified the political power—and religious power—of the Geluk tradition by assuring the patronage of the Mongols in favor of the Geluk tradition. The arrival of a large scale Mongolian army under the pretext of escorting the Fourth Dalai Lama triggered the civil war that lasted about 20 years, and the war between the governor of Tsang and the Geluk tradition continued until Gusri Khan's army defeated Karma Tenkyong Wangpo (kar ma bstan skyong dbang po, P1366) in 1642. Rachel McCleary and Leonard van der Kuijp says:92 The rebirth of the Third Dalai Lama in a great-grandson of Altan Khan raised the political-religious stakes. In 1603, the Fourth Dalai Lama, Yönten Gyatso (1589-1616), was brought at around the age of 14 or 15 from Inner Mongolia to Drepung Monastery by a large Mongol escort. It appears that the Mongols were reluctant to have the Dalai Lama live in Tibet, but the abbots of the Geluk monasteries were concerned over the Lama's education and his potential deviation from monastic celibacy…the ruling family in Shigatse, the so-called Tsangpa dynasty, and its political supporters, in particular the 6th Zhamar incarnate (1584-1630), took steps to consolidate its authority over Central Tibet. From 1603 to 1621, Tibetan politics deteriorated into a civil war. The History of Gomang Monastic College reports that Gungru Chöjung was involved in 92 Rachel M. McCleary and Leonard W. J. van der Kuijp, "The Market Approach to the Rise of the Geluk School, 1419-1642," The Journal of Asian Studies 69.1 (2010): 27-28. 62 this civil war as a fierce tantrika. However, the History of Gomang Monastic College seems to provide a confused timeline:93 A little later, in the 7th month of 1618, the Governor of Tsang, Karma Püntsok Namgyel (karma phun tshogs rnam rgyal, 1597-1632, P1366) and his son, Karma Tenkyong Wangpo (karma bstan skyong dbang po, 1606-1642, P1377) desired to suppress the teaching—that is, religious-political power—of Gelukpa; in the seventh month of the year of Earth Horse (1618), when monks of Sera and Drepung revolted, [they] killed thousands of citizens and monks in Lhasa [discarded their bodies in the foothills of the mountain] behind of Drepung Monastery. When he was [previously] in Sera monastery, he listened many instructions from Paṇchen Lozang Chökyi Gyeltsen (blo bzang chos kyi rgyal mtshan,1570-1662, P719), Taklung Drakpa Lodrö Gyatso (stag lung brag pa blo gros rgya mtsho, 1546-1618, P715) 94 and Gyüchen Sanggyé 93 bstan pa bstan 'dzin, sgo mang chos 'byung, 34: དེའི་རེས་ཙམ་གཙང་རྒྱལ་ཀར་ཕུན་ཚོགས་རྣམ་རྒྱལ་དང་། དེའི་བུ་ཀར་བསན་སྐྱློང་དབང་པློ་བཅས་ཀྱིས་དགེ་ བསན་བསྣུབ་པར་འདློད་དེ། ས་རྟ་ལློའི་ཧློར་ཟླ་བདུན་པར་སེར་འབྲས་གིང་ལློག་བཏང་སེ་ལྷ་ས་དང་འབྲས་སྤུངས་ ཀྱི་རྒྱབ་རིར་མི་སློང་ཕག་དུ་མ་བསད་པ་སློགས་བྱས་དུས། གདན་ས་སེ་རར་རྒྱལ་མཆློག་ཡློན་ཏན་རྒྱ་མཚོ་དང་། གྲུབ་པའི་དབང་ཕྱུག་ལམ་པ་རབ་འབྱམས་པ་བསློད་ནམས་གྲགས་པ་ཞེས་གཞུ་ཁང་རབ་འབྱམས་པ་དགེ་ལེགས་ ལྷུན་གྲུབ་ལས་རབ་ཏུ་བྱུང་བ། པཎ་ཆེན་ཆློས་རྒྱན་དང་། ཁི་སག་ལུང་བྲག་པ། རྒྱུད་ཆེན སངས་རྒྱས་རྒྱ་མཚོ་ སློགས་ལས་གདམས་པ་མང་དུ་གསན་པ་དེས་འཇིགས་བྱེད་ཀྱི་འཕྲུལ་འཁློར་གི་ལས་སྦྱློར་དང་།…མགློན་པློ་ཞལ་ དང་། ཚེ་འཆར་གི་སྒྲུབ་པ་བཙུགས་ཏེ། སྒྲུབ་ཁག་སློ་སློར་གཏློར་ཟློར་འཕེན་ནུབ་དུས་མིན་དུ་རླུང་འཚུབ་དང་ གནམ་ས་རལ་བ་ལྟ་བུའི་ཐློག་སེར་སློགས་མངློན་སློད་ཀྱི་ལྟས་འཕལ་དུ་བྱུང་ཞིང་གཙང་པ་སྤུན་བདུན་གི་ཚེ་སློག་ ལྔ་ལམ་དུ་བཏང་། 94 He is also recorded as Gungru Chöjung's student, so it is probable that Gungru Chöjung and Taklung Drakpa were both teachers and disciples to each other. 63 Gyatso (rgyud chen sang rgyas rgya mtsho, ) 95 and so forth, and then scrutinized thoroughly the instructions from many kha yod lag yod mantra holders such as the fierce ritual of the Circle of Yamāntaka…Therefore, at the time, he [could] perform the sorcery of blue-faced Mahākāla and life shortening ritual (tshe 'char).96 When they cast hurling tormas at night, the omen of fierce activities and so forth, hail and thunderbolts such as unseasonal strong cold storms, [became dark] as if places [like earth and sky] had been torn apart, and [due to that] seven relatives of Tsangpa (gtsang pa spun bdun) were cast away to the fifth path (that is, death).97 The History of Gomang Monastic College describes Gungru Chöjung as performing fierce tantric rituals for revenge on the Governor of Tsang and his son when they invaded Lhasa in 1618. However, Gungru Chöjung probably led the fierce rituals in 1611, not 1618. Furthermore, it is possible that he was not even at Gomang Monastic College in 95 According to Lozang Chökyi Nyima, Gyüchen Sanggyé Gyatsho succeeded in the lineage of Guhyasamāja from Tsongkhapa, Shérap Senggé (shes rab seng ge, 1383-1445, P2093), Dülnakpa Penden Zangpo ('dul ngag pa dpal ldan bzang po, 1402-1473, P3158). Therefore, it is possible that Gungru Chöjung also received the teaching of the Circle of Guhyasamāja Tantra. See bLo bzang chos kyi nyi ma, The Crystal Mirror of Philosophical Systems: A Tibetan Study of Asian Religious Thought, trans. Roger R. Jackson (Boston, MA: Wisdom Publications, 2009), 285-288. 96 It seems that an alternative spelling for tshe 'char is tshe 'chal which literally means to make one lose control of one’s life, and thereby means to shorten one's life. 97 lnga lam—the fifth path—implies death. Ho-Chin Yang explains in his book, The Annals of Kokonor: 1. chastity (tshangs spyod pa) 2. living the life of a householder (khyim na gnas pa) 3. forest dwelling (nags su gnas pa) 4. homeless wanderer (kun tu rgyu ba) 5. death ('chi ba) See gsum pa mkhan po ye shes dpal 'byor, The Annals of Kokonor, trans. Ho-Chin Yang (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, 1969), 67n.64. 64 1618 as I will explain below. In 1605, Yargyapa Düdül Drakpa (yar rgyab pa bdud 'dul grags pa) and Karma Püntsok Namgyel attacked the Mongolian army camped at Kyishö (skyid shod).98 The conflict that raged in Central Tibet had steadily been built up. The 'Brigung-pa, after their "defeat" in providing the Fourth Dalai Lama candidate, had mustered their troops and were assisted by the gTsang forces along with conscripts from Zho-dkar and -nag (i.e. the Zho-rong district of 'Bri-gung gTsang-po) and by that of the Phag-mo-gru-pa. By joint efforts, they defeated the sKyid shod pa army in 1605 in a battle fought in 'Phan-yul and eliminated many of the latter's troops (cf. DL4 41a3f.). At this time, the Paṇchen Lozang Chökyi Gyeltsen (blo bzang chos kyi rgyal mtshan, 1570-1662, P719) sent a letter requesting tantric rituals against Yargyapa and Karma Püntsok Namgyel to the Fourth Dalai Lama, who had returned to Drepung Monastery after receiving many teaching from him. 99 As the Paṇchen Lama stated in his letter, Lampa Rapjampa Sönam Drakpa (lam pa rab 'byams pa bsod nams grags pa, 17th century C.E. P1730) led a series of tantric rituals. It is highly probable that since Gungru Chöjung had already learned many such rituals, he participated in this spiritual war along 98 Per K. Sørensen and Guntram Hazod. Rulers on the Celestial Plain: Ecclesiastic and Secular Hegemony in Medieval Tibet: A Study of Tshal Gung-Thang [in Includes facsimiles in Tibetan.], vol. 1 (Wien: Australia, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007), 536; Sharkabpa, One Hundred Thousand Moons, 314. 99 Damchö Gyatsho Dharmatāla, Rosary of White Lotuses, Being the Clear Account of How the Precious Teaching of Buddha Appeared and Spread in the Great Hor Country, Piotr Klafkowski trans. and Nyalo Trulku Jampa Kelzang Rinpoche supv. (Wiesbaden, Germany: Otto Harrassowitz, 1987), 238. 65 with Lampa Rapjampa Sönam Drakpa and other monks against these two feudal lords:100 Rapjampa Sönam Drakpa conducted the ceremonies. For rituals propitiating deities, several high-ranking monks and scattered senior monks from Pende Lekshelingpa Monastery formed one assembly, performing the Torma Offering ritual. Moreover, Yanggön Rinpoche and others performed many different types of rituals. The loud beating of drums resounded throughout the entire region. One old man called Kaju Akyak who was an expert in philosophy said, "The Subduer Buddha tamed demons by generating a meditative stabilization on love. Whose practice is this, which is like a nomad praying to gods?" Each individual group of ritualists performed the rite in which an offering object is thrown. Many signs emerged from these rites, such as strong tornados in the west. It seems that this description matches with Gungru Chöjung’s powerful rituals noted in the History of Gomang Monastic College:101 When they cast hurling tormas at night, the omen of fierce activities and so forth, hail and thunderbolts unseasonal strong cold storm, [became dark] as if 100 101 Shakabpa, One Hundred Thousand Moons, 314. bstan pa bstan 'dzin, sgo mang chos 'byung, 34: སྒྲུབ་ཁག་སློ་སློར་གཏློར་ཟློར་འཕེན་ནུབ་དུས་མིན་དུ་རླུང་འཚུབ་དང་གནམ་ས་རལ་བ་ལྟ་བུའི་ཐློག་སེར་སློགས་ མངློན་སློད་ཀྱི་ལྟས་འཕལ་དུ་བྱུང་ཞིང་གཙང་པ་སྤུན་བདུན་གི་ཚེ་སློག་ལྔ་ལམ་དུ་བཏང་། 66 places [like earth and sky] were torn, and [due to that] seven relatives of Tsangpa were cast away to the fifth path. This description of hurling torma rituals is analogous to Damchö Gyatsho's record:102 Accordingly, the Rabjamapa was the acting head of the assembly of celebrants of the offerings to the Sixty-Formed One. The monastery's abbot and monks performed the rites of the Lord of Four Arms. At night, all the officiating (monks) threw the offerings up into the air and an untimely hurricane started, terrifying all. Heaven seemed to have been torn apart, and a dragon-like roar and appearances like tongues of fire lit the sky. A heavy hailstorm started. All these (omens) occurred behind the walls of the Potala Castle, indicating that a time of great unrest was to come. The Fourth Dalai Lama's biography by the Fifth Dalai Lama, which is the source text of this description by Damchö Gyatsho, clearly mentions Gungru Chöjung's name as one of tantrikas who participated in the spiritual war against these two kings of Yargyapa and Karma Püntsok Namgyel.103 After the ritual performance, the Fourth Dalai Lama went to Drepung Monastery and performed other tantric rituals. The Fourth Dalai Lama's biography says that when he 102 Damchö Gyatsho, Rosary of White Lotuses, 238-239. ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho, "'jig rten dbang phyug thams cad mkhyen pa yon tan rgya mtsho dpal bzang po'i rnam par thar pa nor bu'i phreng ba (gu Na pA da rnam thar)," in gsung 'bum/_ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho, TBRC W2CZ5990.8 (Dharamsala, India: nam gsal sgron ma, 2007), 42b.3, http://tbrc.org/link?RID=O1GS138506|O1GS1385061GS138542$W2CZ5990. 103 67 was skeptical about the hurling torma ritual for Penden Lhamo Maksorma (dpal ldan lha mo mag sol ma) Gungru Chöjung insisted that the ritual for the Penden Lhamo should be performed:104 Having been skeptical, [the Fourth Dalai Lama] was arguing about whether or not the hurling torma rituals were permissible. [At that time] Yangpönpa [Gungru Chöjung] got upset and said “I have thoroughly scrutinized all quintessential instructions of this protector deity [Penden Lhamo Maksorma] sitting side by the [your] predecessor [Third Dalai Lama] and Baso Jedrung [Lhawang Chökyi Gyeltsen (lha dbang chos kyi rgyal mtshan, 1537-1603, P4362)105]. I have completed the recitation of mantra and meditation practices of this protector deity. I recited the mantra [of the protector deity] over ten million times.... If we do not perform the fierce ritual [for Penden Lhamo] at this time, when can we do? I will guarantee your safety up to three years….” Anonymously citing the Fourth Dalai Lama's biography, the History of Gomang Monastic College states that Gungru Chöjung came back to Drepung Monastery, and performed a series of rituals to curse Yargyapa, Karma Püntsok Namgyel, and Kurrapa 104 Ibid., 43a.5-43b.1. Shakabpa seems to cite the same passage, but the contents are slightly different. See Shakabpa, One Hundred Thousand Moons, 314-315: ཐུགས་ཐེ་ཙོམ་དུ་གྱུར་ནས་གཏློར་ཟློར་འཕངས་པ་འགབ་མི་འགབ་ཀྱི་ཕེབས་སློ་གནང་བས་དབྱངས་དཔློན་པ་ ཐུགས་འུར་ཏེ། ངེས་ཆློས་སྐྱློང་འདིའི་མན་ངག་ཐམས་ཅད་རེ་གློང་མ་དང་བ་སློ་རེ་དྲུང་གི་སྐུ་གཞློགས་སུ་ཞུན་ཐར་ བཅད། བསྙེན་སྒྲུབ་ཚད་དུ་འཁློལ་བར་བྱས། བཟླས་པ་རྐྱང་པ་ཡང་བྱེ་བ་ལྷག་སློང་བ་ཡིན། …ཚོད་འདི་ལ་ལས་ སྦྱློར་མི་བྱེད་ན་ག་ཙ་ན་བྱེད། ལློ་གསུམ་ཚུན་གི་སྐུ་ཁག་ངེད་རང་གིས་འཁུར། … 105 The 4th reincarnation of Baso reincarnation lineage. 68 (skur rab pa):106 Furthermore, at Drepung monastery, the Leader of Chant [Chökyi Jungné] himself performed [a ritual] establishing hurling torma of "throwing a pair of dice (she la 'debs pa)" and "writing [one's name] upon a red tablet (byang dmar la bcug pa)" of Penden Lhamo Maksorma (dpal ldan lha mo dmag zor ma), 107 among the names of commander Yargyapa (yar rgya pa), Tsangpa Gyelpo (gtsang pa rgyal po), and Kurrapa (skur rab pa) written [on the red inscription], the name of Yargyapa Düdül Drakpa (yar rgya pa bdud 'dul grags pa) 108 dropped first. 109 Thus, the sign became clear [who should be punished first]. At this time, [by this event] he was renowned as the Powerful Lord from Gungru, Tutop Sangwé Wangchuk (mthu stob gsang ba'i dbang 106 bstan pa bstan 'dzin, sgo mang chos 'byung, 34; ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho, 'jig rten dbang phyug thams cad mkhyen pa yon tan rgya mtsho dpal bzang po'i rnam par thar pa nor bu'i phreng ba, 43b.1-43b.2: སར་ཡང་འབྲས་སྤུངས་སུ་དབྱངས་དཔློན་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་དཔལ་ལན་ལྷ་མློ་དམག་ཟློར་མའི་གཏློར་ཟློར་སྒྲུབ་པར་ མཛད་དེ་ཤློ་ལ་འདེབས་པ་དང་། བྱང་དམར་ལ་བཅུག་པའི་ལས་སྦྱློར་མཛད་པས་ཡར་གཙང་སྐུར་གསུམ་ཞལ་ངློ་ རྣམས་ཀྱི་མིང་བྱང་ནས་ཡར་རྒྱབ་ཞབས་དྲུང་བདུད་འདུལ་གྲགས་པའི་མཚན་ཐློག་མར་བློར་ཏེ་རྟགས་མངློན་སུམ་ དུ་བྱུང་། དུས་སྐབས་དེར་ཁློང་གི་མཚན་ལ་གུང་རུའི་དབྱངས་དཔློན་མཐུ་སློབས་གསང་བའི་དབང་ཕྱུག་ཅེས་ གྲགས། 107 Penden Lhamo Maksölma is also called Penden Maksor Gyelma (dpal ldan dmag zor ma). According to Khen Rinpoche Ngawang Dorje (ngags dbang rdo rje), the torma of throwing dice is to identify wicked persons and their whereabouts, and writing one's name upon the red tablet is sorcery to curse one to death. In Penden Lhamo's thanka, in general, a pair of dice and a load of red tablets are depicted adjacent to her leg in the form of Maksorma among various forms of Penden Lhamo. ngags dbang rdo rje, personal interview, June 25, 2012; René de Nebesky-Wojkowitz, Oracles and Demons of Tibet: The Cult and Iconography of the Tibetan Protective Deities (Kathmandu, Nepal: Book Faith India, 1996), 26. 108 The king of the Chu ring valley. See "Bamda Dechen Samten Ling Introduction," The Tibetan and Himalayan Library, http://places.thlib.org/features/23564/descriptions/1473. 109 Both Yargyapa and Kurapa are feudal lords of Yar lung valley. See Shakabpa, One Hundred Thousand Moons, 308. 69 phyug), and at that time also the Nyingma sect (rnying ma pa) called him Rindzin Khorlö Wangchuk (rig 'dzin 'khor lo'i dbang phyug). According to this explanation, his tantric ritual revealed that Yargyapa Düdül Drakpa was the one who should be punished first. This description also accords with the Fourth Dalai Lama's tantric rituals performed at Drepung Monastery in 1611:110 (brackets mine) Then he [that is, the Fourth Dalai Lama] went to Drepung and performed numerous purification rites in its Tantric Hall. At one instance, when Yangpönpa was engaged in wrathful rites, the omens became (clearly) visible. The All-Knowing Panchen came to Drepung and gave the initiation of the Thunderbolt Rosary. In that year, many of the (former?) supporters of Tsang came back to this side. The headman and the nobles of Yargyapa had to stay 110 There is disagreement about when the Fourth Dalai Lama performed sorcery at Drepung Monastery. While Shakabpa states it is 1611, Klafkowski translates in the Rosary of White Lotuses that it happened in the same year (1605). With regard to this, Glenn Mullin agrees with the latter with saying: The Panchen Lama sent a letter to the Fourth Dalai Lama in which he stated that the Yarpa and Tsangpa kings were killing Gelukpa monks and destroying monasteries in Tsang, and that the Fourth should do some tantric rituals to mitigate the harm. All the Gelukpa monasteries of central Tibet began an intense regimen of wrathful tantric rituals. The Fourth Dalai Lama's rituals were very successful, and after that he became known as Tutob Yonten Gyatso, or "Yonten Gyatso the Great Shaman." Also, gangs ljongs lo rgyus thog gi grags can mi sna also describes the Fourth Dalai Lama's tantric ritual was performed in 1611: ལྕགས་ཕག་(སི་ལློ་1611)ལློར་འབྲས་སྤུངས་སུ་བཞུགས་ཏེ་པཎ་ཆེན་རིན་པློ་ཆེན་གདན་ཞུས་ཀྱིས་རློ་རེ་ཕེང་བ་ སློགས་ཆློས་འབྲེལ་རྒྱ་ཆེར་གསན། ལློ་དེར་གཙང་པ་དབློན་ཞང་ཐུགས་འདློད་མ་མཉམ་པར་བརྟེན་གཙང་དཔུང་ གཏློད་ཆེ་བ་ཡར་རྒྱབ་ཏུ་འབྱློར། ཡར་རྒྱབ་ཞབས་དྲུང་ངག་དབང་བདུད་འདུལ་གྲགས་པ་དཔློན་བློན་གསློལ་སྐལ་ གི་ཏེང་དུ་བཞུགས་དགློས་པའི་ནང་ཞིག་རྟགས་ཐློན་བྱུང་རྐྱེན་རྒྱལ་བ་རིན་པློ་ཆེའི་མཚན་ལ་མཐུ་སློབས་རྒྱ་མཚོ་ ཞེས་བསྒྱུར། See Glenn H. Mullin, The Fourteen Dalai Lamas: A Sacred Legacy of Reincarnation (Santa Fe, CA: Clear Light Publishers, 2001), 181; Don rdor and bsTan 'dzin chos grags, gangs ljongs lo rgyus thog gi grags can mi sna (lha sa, Tibet: bod ljongs mi dmangs dpe skrun khang, 1993), 642. 70 (in Ü?) to become Sölkal (gsol skal). (Yargyapa) then changed the title of [the Fourth Dalai Lama] to Tutop Gyatsho. Thus, it is clear that Gungru Chöjung returned to Drepung Monastery with the Fourth Dalai Lama, and performed another ritual in 1611. After this series of tantric rituals Gungru Chöjung became the 17th abbot of Gomang Monastic College by the order of the Fourth Dalai Lama in the same year:111 Right after that, by the order of the [4th] Dalai Lama, he came to Gomang Monastic College as the [17th] abbot and taught extensively. There are many wise and renowned disciples [such as] his main disciples Zhungkhang Rapjampa Gélek Lhündrup (gzhung khang rab 'byams pa dge legs lhun grub, the 20nd abbot, P3609) who filled the land with glory, the [30th] Throne Holder of Ganden, Taklung Drakpa Lodrö Gyatso (P715). 112 Particularly, the 30th Throne Holder of Ganden Lodrö Gyatso recorded Chöjung's lectures and made them the monastic textbook of Gomang Monastic College. When his [textbooks] extensively increased the benefit of beings, he was called the Omniscient Chöjung. 111 bstan pa bstan 'dzin, sgo mang chos 'byung, 35: དེ་རེས་ཙམ་རྒྱལ་དབང་མཆློག་གི་བཀས་སློ་མང་གི་མཁན་ཁིར་ཕེབས་ཤིང་འཆད་ཉན་རྒྱ་ཆེར་མཛད། ཉིད་ཀྱི་ སློབ་མའི་གཙོ་བློ་གཞུ་ཁང་རབ་འབྱམས་པ་དགེ་ལེགས་ལྷུན་གྲུབ་ཅེས་སྙན་གྲགས་ཀྱིས་ས་སེང་ཁབ་པ་དེ་དང་། ཁི་སག་ལུང་བྲག་པ་བློ་གྲློས་རྒྱ་མཚོ་སློགས་སློབ་མ་མཁས་གྲགས་ཅན་ཆེས་མང་ཞིང་། ཁད་པར་ཁི་སག་ལུང་བྲག་ པས་ཆློས་འབྱུང་གི་གསུང་བཤད་ཡི་གེར་བཀློད་པ་རྣམས་གྲྭ་ཚང་གི་ཡིག་ཆར་མཛད་དེ་འགྲློ་དློན་རྒྱ་ཆེར་འཕེལ་ བ་ན་ཀུན་མཁེན་ཆློས་འབྱུང་ཞེས་པའི་མཚན་ཆགས། 112 He was a teacher of the Fourth Dalai Lama and the 30th Throne holder of Ganden from 1615-1618. 71 If Gungru Chöjung became Abbot of Gomang Monastic College in 1611 and left soon after that, I speculate that he left at least three years later (1614), two years before the death of the Fourth Dalai Lama, since he said that he would guarantee peace for three years. Also, according to this record, the first textbooks for Gomang Monastic College were adopted around 1611. Furthermore, these first textbooks of Gomang Monastic College were not written down by the author himself, but the 30th Throne Holder of Ganden, Taklung Drakpa Lodrö Gyatso (stag lung brag pa blo gros rgya mcho, 15461618, P715) ordered that Gungru Chöjung's lectures be transcribed.113 Having served as the 17th Abbot of Gomang Monastic College, and despite his reputation as an erudite scholar as well as a powerful tantrika in Central Tibet, according to the History of Gomang Monastic College, he could not endure the reign of the governor of Tsang. He resigned the abbotship and returned to Japhü monastery located in his native town. In Japhü monastery, Gungru Chöjung taught using his textbooks from Gomang Monastic College.114 However, considering that he was brought forward as the 113 According to the History of Gomang Monastic College, he also taught Gungru Chöjung. Therefore, it seems that Gungru Chöjung and Taklung Drakpa were in a mutual teacher-disciple relationship. See bstan pa bstan 'dzin, sgo mang chos 'byung, 34. 114 Ibid., 35: Then, since he was not pleased to endure staying under the reign of Tsang pa [administration—that is, Pün-tsok-nam-gyel and his son, Karma Ten-kyong-wang-po], shortly after he resigned the abbotship [of Go-mang], and having come to his Ja-phü Monastic College in Kham. In the monastic college where he extensively taught the five sciences, he contributed his textbooks which were extensively cherished. What [the passage] "The Powerful Lord Chö-kyi-jung-nä and…" in the supplications to the masters of the lineage means is due to these aforementioned [illustrations]. དེ་ནས་གཙང་པའི་མངའ་འློག་ཏུ་བཞུགས་བཟློད་མ་བདེ་བས་མི་རིང་པར་ཁི་ལས་བཤློལ་ཏེ་རང་དགློན་ཁམས་བྱ་ ཕུད་ཆློས་སེར་བྱློན་ནས་དེར་བཀའ་པློད་ལྔ་ཡི་འཆད་ཉན་རྒྱ་ཆེར་ཡློད་མུས་ཁར་རང་བརམས་ཡིག་ཆ་དེ་ཉིད་ 72 17th Abbot of Gomang Monastic College around 1611, and took the position just for a few years, it is probable that he left Gomang Monastic College even before the Fourth Dalai Lama's death in 1616. In 1618, the Governor of Tsang, Karma Püntsok Namgyel and Karma Tenkyong Wangpo took over Lhasa, and massacred many monks from Drepung and Sera monasteries who revolted against the Governor of Tsang as stated above: A little later, in the 7th month of 1618, the Governor of Tsang, Karma Püntsok Namgyel (karma phun tshogs rnam rgyal, 1597-1632, P1366) and his son, Karma Tenkyong Wangpo (karma bstan skyong dbang po, 1606-1642, P1377) desired to suppress the teaching—that is, religious-political power—of Gelukpa; in the seventh month of the year of Earth Horse (1618), when monks of Sera, Drepung revolted, [they] killed thousands of citizens and monks in Lhasa behind Drepung Monastery. With regard to this massacre in 1618, Shakabpa explains that Karma Püntsok Namgyel attacked the Mongolian army camped in Lhasa in the same year and subdued the revolt of monks from Drepung and Sera monasteries and massacred many citizens of Lhasa and monks from these two monasteries:115 The governor of Tsang, Dési Püntsok Namgyel, was inclined toward the འཛུགས་པར་མཛད་དེ་རྒྱས་པར་བསྐྱངས། གློང་གི་ཚུལ་དེ་ལྟ་བུའི་གནད་ཀྱིས་བ་བརྒྱུད་གསློལ་འདེབས་ལས། མཐུ་ སློབས་དབང་ཕྱུག་ཆློས་ཀྱི་འབྱུང་གནས་དང་། །ཞེས་བྱུང་དློན་དེ་ཡིན། 115 Shakabpa, One Hundred Thousand Moons, 327-328. 73 Dakpo Kagyü School. In particular, having offered to be the principal patron of the Karmapa and his disciple, he built a new monastery for the Kagyüpas and Nyingmapas in between Trashi Lhünpo and Zhikatse…Ultimately, a host of Mongolian Chokhurs who had come to Ü on pilgrimage that year retaliated by stealing all of the Karmapa's herds of cattle. As a result, in the seventh month of 1618, the army of Upper Tsang and large contingents from Dakpo and Kongpo under the leadership of Kurap Namgyel marched on Lhasa. … The following day, the Tsangpas established a military camp even larger than before on the banks of the Kyichu River. The Mongolian forces were frightened and began to flee. Suddenly, there was chaos among the Sera and Drepung monks and the local lay people, including Governor Kyishö. People fled to Penyül and northern Taklung. Dakpo and Tsangpa troops looted Sera and Drepung monasteries, killed countless monks and lay people on the hill behind Drepung, and captured all the Kyishö estates. Even the governor of Kyishö Chöjé and his son had to go to Tsokha. Many Gelukpa monasteries were converted [to Kagyü institutions]. Chöjé Taklung sought a resolution, and thereby Sera and Drepung monks were permitted to live in their monasteries as before. As a ransom for the monasteries, Drepung Monastery was to give two hundred gold coins, and Sera Monastery was to give one hundred. Ganden Podrang's representative, 74 Sönam Chöpel, had to go to Tsang in order to present the ransom. Sera and Drepung monasteries, having been attacked in the war, were unable to pay the ransom because the resources of each had been exhausted. It is said that the gold had to be taken from the previous Dalai Lama's secret treasury in Gyel. Later, the uncle of the Governor of Tsang heard that Gungru Chöjung and Rapjampa Sönam Drakpa had performed tantric rituals against them. According to the History of Gomang Monastic College, the Gevernor of Tsang castigated Rapjampa Sönam Drakpa and then planned to punish Gungru Chöjung. At that time, however, Gungru Chöjung had already left for Khams, Eastern Tibet. Thus, Tenkyong Wangpo gathered textbooks by Gungru Chöjung and buried them underground, and banned monks in Gomang Monastic College from studying his textbooks:116 Again, the Governor of Tsang, Karma Tenkyong Wangpo (P1377) reigned over the whole Ü and Tsang provinces for 20 years. His uncle and the Governor of Tsang heard that fierce rituals were performed by both Lampa 116 bstan pa bstan 'dzin, sgo mang chos 'byung, 35-36: ད་དུང་ཡང་གཙང་རྒྱལ་ཀར་བསན་སྐྱློང་གིས་དབུས་གཙང་ཡློངས་ལ་ལློ་ཉི་ཤུའི་རིང་དབང་བསྒྱུར་སབས། རབ་ འབྱམས་པ་བསློད་ནམས་གྲགས་པ་དང་། གུང་རུའི་དབྱངས་དཔློན་ནམ་མཚན་གཞན་ཀུན་མཁེན་ཆློས་འབྱུང་ གཉིས་ཀྱིས་སར་མངློན་སློད་མཛད་པའི་ཚུལ་དེ་གཙང་རྒྱལ་གི་ཞང་བཀྲ་ཤིས་རེ་པས་ཐློས་ནས་རབ་འབྱམས་པ་ བསློད་ནམས་གྲགས་པའི་སན་དང་ལྗགས་ལ་གནློད་པ་བྱས་ཀྱང་དེ་རེས་ཁློང་ནས་ཐུགས་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་ཡློན་ཏན་ངློམ་ ཆེད་སར་སན་ལྗགས་སློར་ཆུད་པར་མཛད་དེ་ལུང་ཁིད་ཀྱང་ཆེས་ཆེར་གནང་བར་གྲགས། ལས་སྦྱློར་མཛད་པ་པློ་ ལམ་པ་རབ་འབྱམས་པ་གྲུབ་པའི་དབང་ཕྱུག་བསློད་ནམས་གྲགས་པ་དང་། ཀུན་མཁེན་ཆློས་འབྱུང་གཉིས་ཀ་སློ་ མང་པ་ཡིན་སབས་གཙང་པའི་ཞེ་ལ་ཕློག་ཏེ༑ མགློན་པློའི་བ་མཚོའི་ནང་དུ་དུག་བཏབ། བ་རིའི་མགློར་ཨརྒ་ བཅགས། ཆློས་གྲྭ་གློང་མའི་ནང་གི་མགློན་པློའི་བ་ཤིང་ལའང་དུག་བཏབ། ཆློས་འབྱུང་གི་ཡིག་ཆ་བསྡུས་ཏེ་ས་འློག་ ཏུ་སྦས་ནས་ཡིག་ཆ་དེ་ཉིད་ལྟ་མི་ཆློག་པའི་དཔྱད་མཚམས་རྟིང་གནློན་བཏང་། 75 Rapjampa Drupchen Sönam Drakpa (P1730) 117 and the Leader of Chanters from Gungru, or the Omniscient Chöjung, Trashitse (bkra shis rtse), an uncle of the Governor of Tsang [Karma Tenkyong Wangpo], damaged the eyes and tongue of Rapjampa Sönam Drakpa…The fact that both the performers of the fierce rituals—Lampa Rapjampa, Mahāsiddha, Sönam Drakpa and the Omniscient Gungru Chöjung—are from Gomang Monastic College hit the heart of [Karma Tenkyong Wangpo]. Thus [he] scattered poison into the Protector Lake, Lhatsho, broke Arga on the top of the sacred mountain, and put poison into the Protector sacred trees in the upper area of Gomang Monastic College. [And more,] having gathered textbooks written by Chöjung and buried them under the ground, [he] made a rule banning access to his textbooks. The author of the Annals of Kokhonor, Sumpa Khenpo Yeshe Penjor (sum pa mkhan po ye shes dpal 'byor, 1704-1788, P339) records that they changed the doctrines of the Geluk tradition during the three years from 1618 to 1621:118 In the earth-horse year (1618), the King of Gtsang also took over Dbus of Tibet and executed hundreds of monks and laymen on the mountains behind Lhasa and 'Bras-spungs; moreover, he caused the teachings of Dge-lugs-pa to 117 Although bod rig pa'i tshigs mdzod chen mo indicates that one of his student, Lozang Ngakwang (blo bzang ngag dbang, 1591-1663) became an khenpo (mkhan po) of Go-mang Monastic College before 1650 since he became the abbot of Gönlung Jampaling (dgon lung byams pa gling) from 1650 to 1651. The list of the abbots of Gomang Monastic College does not list him as an abbot. 118 ye shes dpal 'byor, The Annals of Kokonor, 31. 76 be changed. This record seems to confirm that Karma Püntsok Namgyel prohibited use of Gungru Chöjung's textbooks in Gomang monastery from 1618 to 1621, severely punished Rapjampa Sönam Drakpa and destroyed Gomang monastery. Since Gungru Chöjung had left Gomang monastery before 1618, they could not take revenge on Gungru Chöjung. Therefore, troops were dispatched to retaliate against Gungru Chöjung who had stayed in Japhü monastery. Having heard the news in advance, Gungru Chöjung fled to Amdo before Karma Tenkyong Wangpo's army arrived there:119 [When] Gungru Chöjung heard [news on] this situation in Khams, he secretly fled for a shelter to Amdo. Then, shortly after, the troops of the governor of Tsang arrived at Japhü monastery, Kham, and killed many commoners and nobles in that area, gathered all of [Gungru Chöjung's] textbooks, put them in a room, sealed it off, and then commanded that this monastery must not study Buddhist doctrines (mtshan nyid), and put a crossed vajra [instead of the wheel of dharma] on the top of the monastery.120 119 bstan pa bstan 'dzin, sgo mang chos 'byung, 36: གནས་ཚུལ་དེ་ཁམས་ཕློགས་སུ་ཐློས་མཚམས་ཆློས་འབྱུང་ཉིད་གསང་སབས་ཀྱིས་མདློ་སད་ཕློགས་སུ་ཉེན་གཡློལ་ལ་ ཕེབས་རེས་མི་རིང་པར་གཙང་སེ་སིད་ཀྱི་དཔུང་དམག་ཁམས་བྱ་ཕུད་ཆློས་སེར་འབྱློར། ཡུལ་མི་གཙོ་དྲག་མང་པློ་ བསད། ཡིག་ཆ་ཐམས་ཅད་བསྡུས་ཏེ་ཁང་པ་གཅིག་གི་ནང་བཅུག་ཅིང་སློ་ལ་དམ་འབྱར་བཡས། ཕིན་ཆད་མཚན་ ཉིད་ལྟ་མི་ཆློག་པའི་བཙན་བཀའ་བཏང་། ཁང་ཐློག་གི་གསེར་འཕྲུའི་རེར་རློ་རེའི་རྒྱ་གྲམ་བཞག It implies that Karma Tenkyong Wangpo’s army took over the monastery and banned studying Buddhist doctrines. 120 77 Then, the army killed the nobles of the village and buried his textbooks and banned using them as was done in Gomang Monastic College. As we can see, the punishment of Gungru Chöjung shows an interesting feature. That is, when he was not present, his textbooks became the object of revenge instead of him. It seems that this punishment of textbooks was not only for the sake of damaging the religio-philosophical system of the Geluk tradition, but also a symbolic execution of Gungru Chöjung in order to abolish Gungru Chöjung’s existence in history. In this sense, the textbooks composed by Gungru Chöjung were regarded as his incarnation. Although the History of Gomang Monastic College does not clearly mention it, the textbooks were probably restored after 1618. In 1618, Mongolian troops counterattacked the Tsang troops in Lhasa. At this time, with the mediation of Paṇchen Lama, Tsang troops and Mongolians made an agreement to leave Lhasa under the jurisdiction of Ganden Palace (dga' ldan pho brang).121 Furthermore, as Chapter 3 of Part I recounts, Jamyang Shaypa's criticism of Gungru Chöjung's challenge to Tsongkhapa proves that Jamyang Shaypa actually read Gungru Chöjung's texts. Thus I speculate that Gungru Chöjung’s Old Monastic Textbooks were restored after 1618 and were used until Jamyang Shaypa’s New Monastic Textbooks gradually replaced them.122 121 Shakabpa, One Hundred Thousand Moons, 330-331. Only Twenty Saṅgha (dge 'dun nyi shu) by Gungru Chöjung is still adopted in the curricula in Gomang Monastic College at present as the Appendix I, the curricula documented by Longdöl Lama Ngakwang Lozang (klong rdor bla ma ngag dbang blo bzang, 1719-1794, P22) still listed Gungru Chöjung's textbooks as the Old Monastic Textbooks. 122 78 Karma Tenkyong Wangpo, the son of Karma Püntsok Namgyel who died from smallpox in 1632, surrendered to the Mongolian army in 1632; 123 his revolt in 1636 was again subdued by Gusri Khan in 1637 and eventually he was executed in 1642. 124 However, according to the History of Gomang Monastic College, Gungru Chöjung did not return to Lhasa, but taught in Amdo extensively and passed away there in the age of 79.125 As I have mentioned above, Gungru Chöjung was probably born in the mid-16th century C.E., and since he lived 79 years, he probably lived till around 1630. The list of the Old Monastic Textbooks The History of Gomang Monastic College lists Gungru Chöjung's textbooks. These are also called "Old Monastic Textbooks of Gomang Monastic College":126 123 Ibid., 333-334. However, Shakabpa does not explicitly note who the governor of Tsang was at that time. On this matter, Franz-Karl Ehrhard reports that Karma Zhamarpa met the ruler Kama Ten-kyongwang-po around 1628. Therefore, it is possible that Karma Ten-kyong-wang-po was the governor of Tsang in 1632. See Franz-Karl Ehrhard, "'The Lands are like a wiped golden basin': The Sixth Zhva-dmar-pa's Journey to Nepal," in Les Habitants Du Toit Du Monde: En Hommage, Alexander W Macdonald, Samten Gyaltsen Karmay, Philippe Sagant and Alexander W. Macdonald ed. (Nanterre, France: Société d'ethnologie, 1997), 127. 124 Damchö Gyatsho describes Gushrī Khan's conquer of Karma Ten-kyong-wang-po and other antiGeluk traditions: In the winter of that same Dragon Year (=1640) the king and his great army entered U-Tsang and defeated the forces of Tenkyong Wangpo, the son of the Governor of Tsang. On the 8 th day of the 1st Horse month of the Water Horse Year (=1642) the chief of Samdrubtse and others, thirteen in all, were taken. On the 25th day of the 11th month the Governor of Tsang was captured. It was not (Gushrī's) original intention to kill him. However, he had set up a Karmapa monastery just by the side of Tashi Lhumpo, built a high enclosure with watch-towers behind it, and named the whole thing "Tashi's Defeat". When he came to know about it, enraged Gushrī had him sewed up in leather. Then he went on to establish the famous thirteen "Jewel" colleges. See Damchö Gyatsho, Rosary of White Lotuses, 136. 125 bstan pa bstan 'dzin, sgo mang chos 'byung, 37. 126 Ibid., 37-38: ༡ ཕར་ཕིན་སྐབས་བརྒྱད་ཀྱི་མཐའ་དཔྱློད་ལ་བསློམས་ཤློག་གྲངས་............༤༨༡ 79 1. Decisive Analysis of the Eight Chapters [of Maitreya’s Ornament for the Clear Realizationsthe Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras] 2. Explanation through the General Meaning of the Middle: The Lamp Illuminating the Meaning of the Thought of (Tsongkhapa’s) Illumination of the Middle 3. Decisive Analysis of the Middle: The Entrance for the Fortunate 4. Decisive Analysis of (Tsongkhapa’s) Differentiating Interpretable and Definitive Meanings: The Essence of Eloquence 5. Note on Oral Transmission of the Interpretable and Definitive Meanings ༢ དབུ་མའི་སི་དློན་གིས་རྣམ་བཤད་དགློངས་པ་རབ་གསལ་གི་དགློངས་དློན་གསལ་བའི་སློན་མེ་སློད་ཆ་ ལ་ཤློག་གྲངས་............༡༩༢ ༣ དབུ་མའི་མཐའ་དཔྱློད་སྐལ་བཟང་འཇུག་ངློགས་སད་ཆ་ལ་ཤློག་གྲངས་............༣༡༩ ༤ དྲང་ངེས་ལེགས་བཤད་སྙིང་པློའི་མཐའ་དཔྱློད་པད་མ་དཀར་པློའི་ཕེང་བ་ལ་ཤློག་ གྲངས་............༡༣༦[vol.1: 38] ༥ དྲང་ངེས་གསུང་རྒྱུན་ཟིན་བྲིས་ལ་ཤློག་གྲངས་............༥༡ ༦ རྟེན་འབྲེལ་གི་རྣམ་གཞག་རིན་ཆེན་ཕེང་བ་ལ་ཤློག་གྲངས་............༣༢ ༧ བསམ་གཟུགས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་མཁས་པའི་མགུལ་རྒྱན་ལ་ཤློག་གྲངས............༤༣ ༨ དགེ་འདུན་ཉི་ཤུའི་རྣམ་གཞག་བློ་གསལ་བུང་བའི་དགའ་སློན་ལ་ཤློག་གྲངས་............༧༧ ༩ ཕར་ཕིན་བསྡུས་པ་ཟེར་བ་ཞིག་ཡློད་འདུག་ཀྱང་དཔེ་མ་མཇལ་བས་དེ་ཙམ་བྱས། དེ་རྣམས་ལ་སློ་མང་གྲྭ་ཚང་གི་ཡིག་ཆ་རིང་པ་ཞེས་ཀྱང་ཟེར། མདློ་སློད་སད་དང་རྒྱ་སློག་གི་ཡུལ་གྲུ་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་ ཁབ་པས་འགྲློ་དློན་ཤིན་ཏུ་ཆེ། 80 6. Presentation of Dependent Arising: The Precious Garland 7. Presentation of the Concentrations and Formless Absorptions: Necklace of the Wise 8. Presentation of the Twenty Saṅgha: Feast for Bees of Clear Intelligence 9. Although there is another text, "Summary of the Perfection of Wisdoms," since I have not encountered an edition, [I] am merely listing [the title]. These are called "The Old Monastic Textbooks." There were greatly beneficial to [Gomang Monastic College as well as monasteries in] Amdo, Kham, China and Mongolia. The scholars who attained perfection relying on these monastic textbooks are: 127  Loppön Sanggyé Trashi (slob dpon sangs rgyas bkra shis, 23rd abbot of Gomang Monastic College, ca. 18th century C.E. P8LS12019)128 127 bstan pa bstan 'dzin, sgo mang chos 'byung, 38: ཡིག་ཆ་དེ་དག་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་མཁས་པའི་ཡང་རེར་སློན་པ་སེ་འདིའི་སློབ་དཔློན་སངས་རྒྱས་བཀྲ་ཤིས་དང་། རྒྱ་ ཡག་པ། བསམ་སང་པ། ས་རུ་པ༑ ཧློར་སིན་གྲློལ་ཆློས་ཀྱི་རྒྱལ་པློ། ཀླུ་འབུམ་ཁི་བློ་གྲློས་རྒྱ་མཚོ། རྒྱ་མཚོའི་མཚན་ཅན་ གཞན་རྣམ་པ་གཉིས། ཀུན་མཁེན་འཇམ་དབྱངས་བཞད་པ་ངག་དབང་བརློན་འགྲུས་སློགས་དང་། གཞན་ཡང་ ཁི་སག་ལུང་བྲག་པ་དང་། ཁི་ཆེན་སྦྱིན་པ་རྒྱ་མཚོ། ལྕང་སྐྱ་ངག་དབང་ཆློས་ལན་སློགས་མཐའ་ཀླས་པ་བྱུང་ཡང་ མཐའ་དག་འབྲི་བར་མ་ལང་། Hopkins found Gungru Chöjung's Decisive Analysis of "(Tsong-kha-pa's)Interpretable and the Definitive: The Essence of Eloquence," Rosary of White Lotus (drang nges legs bshad snying po'i mtha' dpyod pa d+ma dkar po'i phreng ba) in Kumbum Monastery (sku 'bum dgon pa, G160) in Amdo, which was founded by the Third Dalai Lama in 1583. 81  Gyayakpa Gélek Penjor (rgya yag pa dge legs dpal 'byor, ca. 18th century C.E., 24th abbot of Gomang Monastic College, P8LS12020)  Samgangpa Lozang Ngakwang (bsam sgang pa blo bzang ngag dbang, 15911663, 25th abbot of Gomang Monastic College, P1727)129  Garupa Ngakwang Penjor (sga ru pa ngag dbang dpal 'byor, ?-1669. 26th abbot of Gomang Monastic College in 1640, P8LS12021)  Hormindröl Chökyi Gyelpo Trinlé Lhündrup (hor smin grol chos kyi rgyal po 'phrin las lhun grub, 1622-1699, 27th abbot of Gomang Monastic College in 1652, P8LS12022)  Lubum Tri Lodrö Gyatso (klu 'bum khri blo gros rgya mtsho, 1635-1688, 28th abbot of Gomang Monastic College in 1665, 44th Throne Holder of Ganden from 1682-1685, P1574)  Orö Döndrup Gyatso (o rod don grub rgya mtsho, ca. 18th century C.E., 29th abbot of Gomang Monastic College in 1673, P8LS12023)  Naktsang Döndrup Gyatso (nag tshang don grub rgya mtsho, 1655-1727. 30th abbot of Gomang Monastic College in 1682, The Throne Holder of Ganden in 1702-1707, P2757) 128 He was the abbot of Gomang Monastic College when the Fifth Dalai Lama visited Drepung Monastery for the first time. See bstan pa bstan 'dzin, sgo mang chos 'byung, vol. 1, 43-45. 129 He was the abbot of Gomang Monastic College before 1650. See Ko zul Grags pa 'byung gnas, rgyal ba bLo bzang mkahs grub, 'gangs can mkhas grub rim byon ming mdzod (Kansu'u, China: Kan su'u mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1992), 1162-1163. 82  Künkhyen Jamyang Shaypa Ngakwang Tsöndrü (kun mkhyen 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson 'grus, 1648-1721/1722, 32nd abbot of Gomang Monastic College in 1690-1709, P423) and so forth And more,  Taklung Drakpa Lodrö Gyatso (stag lung brag pa blo gros rgya mtsho, 15461618, 30th Thorne holder of Ganden in 1615-1618, P715)  Jinpa Gyatso (sbyin pa rgya mtsho, 1629-1695, 46th Throne Holder of Ganden in 1692-1695, P3451)  Changkya Ngakwang Lozang Chöden (lcang skya ngag dbang blo bzang chos ldan, 1642-1714, P209) This list of direct disciples of Gungru Chöjung contains highly influential figures through the early 18th century C.E. They were the Abbots of Gomang Monastic College and the Throne Holders of Ganden and the like. This demonstrates that Gungru Chöjung was influential until the early 18th century. As we have seen, Gungru Chöjung lived and taught amid volatile political and religious circumstances when the Geluk tradition had been gradually emerging as the religiopolitical center of Tibet. He witnessed the rise of the Geluk tradition with the support of the Mongols and the fall of the Geluk tradition through the hostility of non-Geluk traditions such as Marpa Kagyu (dmar pa bka' brgyud) while he lived in Ü, or Central Tibet. In this unstable situation, Gungru Chöjung's lectures were recorded and turned into 83 the first monastic textbooks in Gomang Monastic College, and these textbooks were used until Jamyang Shaypa's textbooks replaced them. This transition of textbooks from Gungru Chöjung to Jamyang Shaypa demonstrates a different development in the history of monastic textbooks in the Geluk monastic education systems compare to the history of monastic textbooks in Je Monastic College of Sera Monastery.130 The New Textbooks of Gomang Monastic College by Jamyang Shaypa Jamyang Shaypa was a prolific and prominent scholar who wrote the New Textbooks of Gomang Monastic College. He was born in Amdo, Eastern Tibet in 1648 and started to study at Gomang Monastic College in 1668.131 He wrote a series of textbooks that were officially adopted as the textbooks of Gomang Monastic College replacing the previous textbooks written by Gungru Chöjung. Since Derek Maher thoroughly researched the life of Jamyang Shaypa, I will not present his religious and political life at Gomang Monastic College. Instead, I will focus my discussion on the way Jamyang Shaypa wrote the New Monastic Textbooks of Gomang College.132 As I will explain in detail in Chapter 3 of Part I, Jamyang Shaypa criticizes Gungru Chöjung for criticizing Tsongkhapa based on Gungru Chöjung’s Ary, “Logic, lives, and lineage: Jetsun Chokyi Gyaltsen's ascension and the ‘Secret Biography of Khédrup Geleg Pelzang’,” 150-182. 131 bstan pa bstan 'dzin, sgo mang chos 'byung, 64. 132 For the biographical schetch of Jam-yang-shay-pa, see Derek F. Maher, “Knowledge and Authority in Tibetan Middle Way Schools of Buddhis: A Study of the Gelukba (dge lugs pa) Epistemology of Jamyang Shayba ('jam dbyangs bzhad pa) In Its Historical Context” (PhD diss., University of Virginia, 2003), 169196. 130 84 misunderstanding of a passage. According to Newland, the textbook authors had these goals:133 Each individual scholar finds the balance between faith and analysis at a slightly different point, according to personal inclination and the circumstances of the era. In their textbooks on Mādhyamika, Paṇ-chen Sönam-drak-pa, Jay-dzun Chö-gyi-gyel-tsen, and Jam-yang-shay-ba share three main goals: (1) to provide a basis for instruction in the fundamentals of Mādhyamika philosophy, (2) to confirm the fundamental coherence of Tsongkha-pa’s system, and (3) to refute and refute contrary interpretations. Jamyang-shay-ba has at least two additional concerns: (1) to demonstrate Tsongkha-pa’s fidelity to his Indian source, and (2) to reconcile apparent contradictions among Tsong-kha-pa, Kay-drup, and Gyel-tshap. If we expand these goals of textbook composition to all monastic textbooks, textbooks in general are prepared in order to deliver fundamental information of related topics and to present the coherence of Tsongkhapa’s system, and to repudiate criticism by other sects. As Chapter 3 of Part I explains, Tsongkhapa confidently posits that Kamalaśīla’s Illumination of the Middle (dbu ma snang ba, madhyamakāloka) is the only SvātantrikaMādhyamika text identifying the object of negation. However, Jetsün Chökyi Gyeltshen and Gungru Chöjung object to Tsongkhapa’s assertion by proving that two stanzas in Guy Newland, The Two Truths: In the Mādhyamika Philosophy of the Ge-luk-ba Order of Tibetan Buddhism (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 1992), 23. 133 85 another Svātantrika-Mādhyamika text, Jñānagarbha’s Differentiation of the Two Truths (bden gnyis rnam 'byed, satyadvayavibhaṅga), identify the object of negation. However, Jamyang Shaypa disproves them by showing that they misread the context of these stanzas. Jamyang Shaypa’s method of criticism of his predecessors is analogous with Newland’s explanation that Jamyang Shaypa aims to prove Tsongkhapa’s fidelity to his Indian sources. However, Jamyang Shaypa did not always criticize his predecessors. In the section of Establishing Our Own System (rang lugs bzhag pa), after clarifying the difference between the objects of negation by a correct reasoning and by a correct sign, he says:134 Because correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag) and correct sign (rtags yang dag) are not equivalent, the objects of negation by [a correct reasoning and a correct sign] are also not equivalent, and it is proper that, in accordance with statements by the lords of scholars [Gungru] Chökyi Jungné and Taklung Drakpa [Lodrö Gyatsho]135 that the objects of negation by correct signs do not exist because there are the manifold scriptures and reasonings, those [cited] earlier and so forth. 134 See Part II, Our own system: རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་དང་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་དློན་མི་གཅིག་པས་དེ་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡང་དློན་མི་གཅིག་ལ། རྟགས་ ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་མེད་པར་མཁས་དབང་ཆློས་འབྱུང་དང་སག་ལུང་གྲགས་པའི་གསུང་ལྟར་ལེགས་ཏེ། སར་གི་ ལུང་རིགས་དེ་དག་སློགས་མང་བའི་ཕིར་རློ། །འདིར་ཡང་དེའི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་སློ། ། 135 stag lung grags pa blo gros rgya mtsho (1546-1618, P715). He was the 30th Throne holder of Ganden. Gungru Chöjung was his master and the vice versa. 86 Here, he agrees with his predecessors, Gungru Chöjung and Taklung Drakpa on the difference between a correct reasoning and a correct sign, not because they were authoritative figures, but because their positions accorded with Tsongkhapa’s statement. In the 8th wrong idea—namely, that correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag) and correct sign (rtags yang dag) are the same—in the section of refuting other’s system in Part II, after refuting an opponent in the same refutation, he cites Tsongkhapa’s Great Stages of the Path:136 because [Tsongkhapa's] Great Stages of the Path says:137 These also are, for instance, refutations of inherent existence—that is to say, establishment from [the object's] own side—with respect to persons and phenomena by the sign of dependent-arising. This object of negation is necessarily something that does not exist among objects of knowledge because whatever exists cannot be refuted. 136 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa, Decisive Analysis of the Middle, 254-255. Tsong kha pa, The Great Exposition of Stages of the Path (byang chub lam rim chen mo), in gsung 'bum/_tsong kha pa (bkras lhun par rnying / d+ha sar bskyar par brgyab pa/), TBRC W29193.13 (Dharamsala, India: sherig parkhang, 1997), 420a.3-420a.4, http://tbrc.org/#library_work_ViewByVolumeW29193%7C5135%7C13%7C1%7C1080. An alternative translation of this passage is: For instance, dependent-arising refutes the essential or intrinsic existence of persons and phenomena. This latter object of negation cannot be among objects of knowledge because, if it did exist, then it could not be refuted. 137 ལམ་རིམ་ལས། འདི་ཡང་རྟེན་འབྲེལ་གི་རྟགས་ཀྱིས་གང་ཟག་དང་ཆློས་ཀྱི་སེང་དུ་[253]རང་གི་ངློས་ནས་གྲུབ་པའི་ རང་བཞིན་ཡློད་པ་འགློག་པ་ལྟ་བུ་རྣམས་ཡིན་ནློ། །དགག་བྱ་འདི་ནི་ཤེས་བྱ་ལ་མེད་པ་གཅིག་དགློས་ཏེ། ཡློད་ན་ དགག་པར་མི་ནུས་པའི་ཕིར་རློ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕིར། See Tsong-kha-pa, The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment: Volume Three, tr. the Lamrim Chenmo Translation Committee, ed. Joshua W. C. Cutler and Guy Newland, vol. 3 (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2002), 204. 87 As these examples demonstrate, he accepts Gungru Chöjung’s assertion because Gungru Chöjung’s position was correct according to Tsongkhapa’s system. In some cases, Jamyang Shaypa composed his monastic textbook by requests. According to Hopkins, Jamyang Shaypa’s Great Exposition of Tenets was written as his response to the Fifth Dalai Lama’s suggestion:138 Two centuries later, the Fifth Dalai Lama suggested that a scholar refute Taktsang, and the First Paṇchen Lama composed a forty-five folio text, Response to Objections by the Sanskritist Shay-rap-rin-chen: Roar of the Lion of Scripture and Reasoning in which he quotes Tak-tsang’s eighteen indictments one by one and gives his responses, sometimes along with invective, perhaps in response to Tak-tsang’s several outbursts. Jamyang Shaypa, undoubtedly aware of the First Paṇchen Lama’s text, weaves a broader response into the Great Exposition of Tenets, providing a sustained refutation of Tak-tsang’s presentation of tenets, citing various parts of Tak-tsang’s root text and commentary, but then devoting a section that is more than an eighth of his own book to detailing twenty-seven contradictions in Tak-tsang’s own work. Also, the History of Gomang Monastic College narrates why Jamyang Shaypa also wrote his Decisive Analysis of (Dharmakīrti’s)] Commentary on (Dignāga's) “Compilation of Jeffrey Hopkins, Maps of the Profound: Jam-yang-shay-ba’s Great Exposition of Buddhist and NonBuddhist Vies on the Nature of Reality (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2003), 15-16. 138 88 Prime Cognition” (tshad ma rnam 'grel mtha' dpyod):139 In 1700, when he was 53 years old, the regent [of the Fifth Dalai Lama], Seng-ge Gyatsho (seng ge rgya mtsho, 1653-1705, P421), with the intention of refuting Khédrupje, exhorted [Jamyang Shaypa] to compose a textbook on the Master Dharmottara’s The Correct, Commentary on (Dharmakīrti’s) “Ascertainment of Valid Cognition (pramāṇaviniścaya)” based on (Dharmakīrti’s) Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition” (tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa, pramāṇavārttikakārikā). Having composed the Decisive Analysis: The Entrance for the Fortunate on the first chapter, [Jamyang Shaypa] offered [it to the regent Senggé Gyatsho] for review. [However,] because the [textbook] cited many parts from Khédrupje, [the regent Senggé Gyatsho] was not pleased with it [for Jamyang Shaypa agreed with Khédrupje]. Thus, he did not ask him compose any more. It is well known that [Jamyang Shaypa] wrote the full commentary on the second chapter, and the beginning of the Decisive Analysis on the third chapter. 139 bstan pa bstan 'dzin, sgo mang chos 'byung, 73: དགུང་ལློ་ང་གསུམ་པ་ལྕགས་འབྲུག་ལ།…སེ་སིད་སངས་རྒྱམ་ནས་མཁས་གྲུབ་རེ་དགག་འདློད་ཀྱི་བསམ་པས་སློབ་ དཔློན་ཆློས་མཆློག་གི་འཐད་ལན་གཞིར་བཞག་གི་རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ཡིག་ཆ་རློམ་པར་བསྐུལ་བར་རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ལེའུ་དང་ པློའི་མཐའ་དཔྱློད་སྐལ་བཟང་འཇུག་ངློགས་བརམས་ནས་གཟིགས་སུ་ཕུལ། དེར་མཁས་གྲུབ་རིན་པློ་ཆེའི་གསུང་ མང་དུ་དྲངས་པ་ལ་ཁློང་ཐུགས་མ་མཉེས་པར་ལེའུ་ཕི་མ་རྣམས་རློམ་པའི་རྟིང་བསྐུལ་མ་མཛད་ཀྱང་། མུ་མཐུད་ ལེའུ་གཉིས་པའི་མཐའ་དཔྱློད་ཆ་ཚང་དང་། ལེའུ་གསུམ་པའི་མཐའ་དཔྱློད་རློམ་འཕློ་བཅས་མཛད་པར་གྲགས། 89 Jamyang Shaypa started to compose the textbooks on Dharmakīrti’s Ascertainment of Valid Cognition at the request of the Regent of the Fifth Dalai Lama, Senggé Gyatsho. However, despite the expectations of the Regent, Jamyang Shaypa’s Decisive Analysis on (Dharmakīrti’s) Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition,” agreed with Khédrupje on many points. In addition, although the displeased Regent did not ask him to write more, Jamyang Shaypa completed his Decisive Analysis on the second chapter and the beginning of the third chapter. This anecdote also demonstrates that his scholastic stance was not influenced by a political agenda. An interesting aspect of the New Monastic Textbooks is that Jamyang Shaypa did not entirely negate the Old Monastic Textbooks. A striking example of this attitude is reflected in Jamyang Shaypa’s Decisive Analysis of (Tsongkhapa’s) “Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive” (drang ba dang nges pa’i don rnam par 'byed pa'i mtha' dpyod), or Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definitive (drang nges chen mo). By comparing Gungru Chöjung’s Decisive Analysis on the same topic with Jamyang Shaypa’s, Hopkins found that many portion of Gungru Chöjung’s passages were used without any indication of a different author.140 Jamyang Shaypa’s Great Exposition of the 140 gung ru chos kyi 'byung gnas, drang nges mtha' dpyod (Hopkins Collection, unpublished), 4b.5-5a.1; 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje, drang nges mtha' dpyod (Hopkins Collection, unpublished), 13b.2-13b.6: (the same passage between two texts are marked in gray.) a) Gungru Chöjung’s Decisive Analysis Interpretable and the Definitive” [4b.4] of (Tsongkhapa’s) “Differentiating the དང་པློ་ནི། བཅློམ་ལན་འདས་ཀྱིས་རྣམ་གྲངས་དུ་མར་ཕུང་པློ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱང་བཀའ་སྩལ། ཞེས་པ་ནས། དློན་དེ་ཉིད་བཅློམ་ལན་འདས་ལ་བདག་ཡློངས་སུ་ཞུ་ལེགས་སློ། །ཞེས་པའི་བར་གསུངས། གཞན་ [4b.5] ལུགས་དགག་པ། རང་ལུགས་བཞག་པ། རློད་པ་སྤློང་བ་གསུམ། དང་པློ་ལ། ཁ་ཅིག་འདིའི་སྐབས་སུ་དགག་ 90 Interpretable and the Definite looks as though he copied certain portion of Gungru Chöjung’s text and pasted it into his text. According to Hopkins, a substantial portion of Gungru Chöjung’s Decisive Analysis of the Interpretable and the Definite is overlapping with Jamyang Shaypa’s Great Exposition of the Interpretable and the Definite, but Gungru Chöjung’s name is not mentioned at all.141 This early work of Jamyang Shaypa shows interesting points. First, despite the fact that Jamyang Shaypa copied a substantial portion of Gungru Chöjung’s text, Jamyang Shaypa claimed himself as the author of this newly made textbook. Second, བཞག་སྤང་གསུན་ཁས། དང་པློ་ལ་ཁ་ཅིག་གིས། དློན་དམ་ཡང་དག་འཕག་ཀྱིས་སློན་པ་ལ་མདློ་སེ་ལ་འགལ་སྤློང་ གི་དྲི་བ་ཞུས་ཚུལ་ཡློད་དེ། འདིར་བསན་འཁློར་ལློ་དང་པློར་གཟུགས་ནས་རྣམ་མཁེན་[4b.6]གི་བར་གི་ཆློས་རྣམས་ རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་གྲུབ་མཉམ་དུ་གསུངས། འདིར་བསན་འཁློར་ལློ་བར་གཟུགས་ནས་རྣམ་མཁེན་གི་བར་གི་ ཆློས་རྣམས་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་མ་གྲུབ་མཉམ་དུ་གསུངས་པ་འདི་གཉིས་ས་སློར་གཞག་ན་[5a.1]འགལ་ནའང་ སློན་པ་ལ་འགལ་བ་མི་མངའ་བས། བར་བར་དེ་ལྟར་གསུངས་པ་དགློང་གཞི་གང་ལ་དགློངས་ནས་གསུངས་ཞེས་ དངློས་སུ་ཞུས། དང་པློར་དེ་ལྟར་གསུངས་པ་དགློངས་གཞི་གང་ལ་དགློངས་ནས་གསུངས་ཞེས་དློན་གིས་ཞུས་པའི་ ཕིར་ཟེར་ན། འློ་ན། b) Jamyang Shaypa’s Decisive Analysis Interpretable and the Definitive” [13b.2] of (Tsongkhapa’s) “Differentiating the དང་པློ་ནི། བཙོམ་ལན་འདས་ཀྱིས་རྣམ་གྲངས་དུ་མར་[13b.3]ཕུང་པློ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱང་ བཀའ་སྩལ། ཞེས་པ་ནས། དློན་དེ་ཉིད་བཅློམ་ལན་འདས་ལ་བདག་ཡློངས་སུ་ཞུ་ལེགས་སློ། །ཞེས་པའི་བར་ གསུངས། འདིའི་སྐབས་སུ་དགག་བཞག་སྤང་གསུན་ཁས། དང་པློ་ལ་ཁ་[13b.4]ཅིག དློན་དམ་ཡང་དག་འཕག་ ཀྱིས་སློན་པ་ལ་མདློ་སེ་ལ་འགལ་སྤློང་གི་དྲི་བ་ཞུས་ཚུལ་ཡློད་དེ། འདིར་བསན་འཁློར་ལློ་དང་པློར་གཟུགས་ནས་ རྣམ་མཁེན་གི་བར་གི་ཆློས་རྣམས་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་གྲུབ་མཉམ་དུ་གསུང་[13b.5]འདིར་བསན་འཁློར་ལློ་ བར་གཟུགས་ནས་རྣམ་མཁེན་གི་བར་གི་ཆློས་རྣམས་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་མ་གྲུབ་མཉམ་དུ་གསུངས། འདི་ གཉིས་ས་སློར་གཞག་ན་འགལ་ནའང་སློན་པ་ལ་འགལ་བ་མི་མངའ་བས། བར་བར་དེ་ལྟར་[13b.6]གསུངས་པ་དེ་ གང་ལ་དགློངས་ནས་གསུངས་ཞེས་དངློས་སུ་ཞུས་ནས། དང་པློར་དེ་ལྟར་གསུངས་པ་དེ་གང་ལ་དགློངས་ནས་ གསུངས་ཞེས་དློན་གིས་ཞུས་པའི་ཕིར་ཟེར་ན། འློ་ན། 141 Hopkins, personal conversation, May 25, 2011. 91 although it is hardly possible that the community in Gomang Monastic College did not notice this method of writing new textbooks, it seems that Jamyang Shaypa’s authorship was accepted by the monastic community at that time. The facts of Jamyang Shaypa’s method of composition require us to change our definitions of “old” and “new” monastic textbooks. That is, in the case of the sequence of textbooks in Gomang Monastic College, “new” textbooks could also mean improved revisions of “old” monastic textbooks. Conclusion In conclusion, monastic textbooks in Gomang Monastic College are explained as having developed in three phases. The first phase of monastic textbooks was in line with the development of monastic education in Drepung Monastery. As one of the seven monastic colleges, Janglingpa Drakpa Rinchen, the first abbot of Gomang Monastic College, taught monk-students in Gomang Monastic College as the founder and first abbot of Drepung Monastery Jamyang Chöjé instructed. The monastic education of Gomang Monastic College opened a new phase as Gungru Chökyi Jungné’s teachings were established as the first monastic textbooks of Gomang Monastic College. Through examining Gungru Chöjung’s biography, I found that the first monastic textbooks of Gomang Monastic College took form in the middle of volatile religio-political sectarian war raised by Karma Tenkyong Wangpo and his son, Karma Püntsok Namgyel. Gungru Chöjung actively participated in this sectarian war as a powerful tantrika supporting the 4th Dalai Lama. 92 An interesting aspect of the monastic education of Gomang Monastic College is that the education of monk-students continued even in the middle of civil war, during which even the first monastic textbook was dictated from Gungru Chöjung’s oral teachings. I speculate that it is possible that Gungru Chöjung became the 17th abbot of Gomang Monastic College in 1611 and left to Japhü monastery in Kham in 1614, 2 years before the 4th Dalai Lama’s mysterious death. When Karma Püntsok Namgyel took over Lhasa in 1618, he banned Gungru Chöjung’s textbooks in Gomang Monastic College and dispatched his army to Japhü monastery to punish Gungru Chöjung; however, since Gungru Chöjung fled to Amdo beforehand, his textbooks were demolished in lieu of Gungru Chöjung himself. Despite religious persecution and banning of his textbooks for 3 years, it seems that his textbooks were restored as soon as the political situation became stable. However, in the third phase, Jamyang Shaypa replaced Gungru Chöjung’s textbooks by installing his own textbooks. Why were Gungru’s textbooks burnt, buried under the ground, and banned by Karma Püntsok Namgyel in the absence of Gungru Chöjung? Why did monk-students in Gomang Monastic College form their first textbooks in the middle of sectarian war? Why were they restored after enduring the three years of Karma Püntsok Namgyel’s oppression? To understand this, we have to understand that identity of a monastic college cannot be explained by a single aspect. We can divide the aspects of the identity of a monastic college into both functional and symbolic aspects. Particular rules, events, the 93 daily timetable of a monastic college, location, and so forth can be considered as functional aspects of a monastic college. At the same time, monastic textbooks are one of the most central symbolic aspects of the identity of a monastic college, along with the unbroken lineage of teachings from Tsongkhapa and so on. The symbolic persecution and restoration of Gungru Chöjung’s textbooks thus points to how monastic textbooks constitute a crucial part of the identity of a monastic college. 94 Chapter 2: Tsongkhapa's Identification of the Object of Negation in Svātantrika-Mādhyamika Introduction In this chapter, I will present Tsongkhapa’s presentation of the identification of object of negation in the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika. Tsongkhapa (tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, 1357-1419), the founder of the Geluk sect, puts great emphasis on the topic of the identification of the object that should be negated—also known as the object of negation—since, according to Tsongkhapa, without clearly identifying what veils suchness (or emptiness) one cannot achieve the view of emptiness. 142 Moreover, the Geluk sect's presentation of the Svātantrika understanding of the object of negation—that is to say, what is rejected in the view of emptiness—is an important feature providing 142 Tsongkhapa says: With regard to delineating the absence of true existence in phenomena, if you do not understand well just what true establishment is, as well as how [phenomena] are apprehended as truly existent, the view of suchness will definitely go astray. Translated by Jeffrey Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, ed. by Kevin Vose (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2008), 186. The Tibetan is: ཆློས་རྣམས་བདེན་མེད་དུ་གཏན་ལ་འབེབས་པ་འདི་ལ།་བདེན་པར་གྲུབ་ཚུལ་དེ་ཇི་འདྲ་ཞིག་ཡིན་པ་དང།་བདེན་ པར་འཛིན་ཚུལ་ལེགས་པར་མ་ཤེས་ན།་དེ་ཁློ་ན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ལྟ་བ་ངེས་པར་འཕྱུག་སེ། See Tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, Illumination of the Thought of (Candrakīrti's) "Entrance to the Middle" ('jam mgon tsong kha pa chen po'i gsungs dbu ma la 'jug pa'i rgya cher bshad pa dongs pa rab gsal zhes bya ba bzhugs so) (N. Kanara, India: Drepung Loseling Library Society, 1992), 128-29. 95 crucial justification for their division of Mādhyamika into two subschools of SvātantrikaMādhyamika and Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika as Tillemans says:143 Undoubtedly, one of the major issues of Mādhyamika philosophy for Tsong kha pa is the question of precisely what and how much Mādhyamikas should deny if they are to avoid reification of entities, yet preserve conventional truth. How one stands on this matter—in particular, how one 'recognizes the object to be negated' (dgag bya ngos 'dzin)—is argued to have very wide-ranging consequences. In addition to this philosophical aspect, the identification of the object of negation provides a distinctive feature that justifies the Geluk sect’s criticism of other Tibetan Buddhist sects for their negligence of the necessity of precisely and accurately identifying the object of negation. Tsongkhapa introduces the two types of objects of negation in the Svātantrika School through his creative explanation of the meaning of a passage in Kamalaśīla's Illumination of the Middle. He posits his view of the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence first, and then secondly explains the object of negation in terms of the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence. This chapter will analyze Tsongkhapa’s creative interpretation of a certain passage in Kamalaśīla’s Illumination of the Middle, and demonstrate the way Tsongkhapa imputes 143 Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa (1357-1419)." 96 his understanding upon the text while excluding an alternative way of understanding the passage. Through these analyses, I will explain the uniqueness of Tsongkhapa’s, and the Geluk sect’s unique system concerning the object of negation. The two types of objects of negation in the Mādhyamika School Before examining other topics in following chapters, I will introduce Tsongkhapa's presentation of two types of objects of negation in the Mādhyamika School in general. Tsongkhapa speaks of two objects of negation—the object of negation in terms of the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence and the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence:144 Furthermore, mere identification of (1) a true establishment that is superficially imputed by proponents of tenets and (2) [the consciousness] apprehending such true establishment is not sufficient. Because of this, it is most essential to identify well the innate apprehension of true establishment that has operated beginninglessly and exists both in those whose awarenesses have been affected through [study of ] tenets and in those whose awarenesses have not been affected in this way, and to identify the true establishment apprehended by this [innate misapprehension]. དེ་ཡང་གྲུབ་མཐའ་སྨྲ་བས་འཕལ་དུ་ཀུན་བརྟགས་པའི་བདེན་གྲུབ་དང་། བདེན་འཛིན་ངློས་ཟིན་པ་ Adapted from Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 186. The Tibetan is from Tsong kha pa, Illumination of the Thought, 129. 144 97 ཙམ་གིས་མི་ཆློག་པའི་ཕིར། ཐློག་མ་མེད་པ་ནས་རེས་སུ་ཞུགས་པ། གྲུབ་མཐས་བློ་བསྒྱུར་མ་བསྒྱུར་ གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་ཡློད་པའི་ལྷན་ཀྱི་བདེན་འཛིན་དང་། དེས་བཟུང་བའི་བདེན་གྲུབ་ལེགས་པར་ངློས་ཟིན་ པ་ནི་གནད་ཤིན་ཏུ་ཆེ་སེ། དེ་ངློས་མ་ཟིན་པར་རིགས་པས་དགག་བྱ་བཀག་ཀྱང་། ཐློག་མ་མེད་པ་ནས་ ཞུགས་པའི་བདེན་ཞེན་ལ་ཅི་ཡང་མི་གནློད་པས་སྐབས་དློན་སློང་བར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕིར་རློ། 145 A distinctive difference between the intellectually imbued apprehension of true establishment and the innate apprehension of true establishment 146 is, according to the above passage, that the latter commonly occurs both in those who have studied and in those who have not studied; that is to say, at some point everyone is subject to the innate misapprehension while those who apprehend the intellectually imbued ultimate establishment are limited to those who are educated to see in that way. This pair of objects of negation is a dominant framework in Tsongkhapa and later Geluk scholars' presentations of tenet systems. The uniqueness of Kamalaśīla's Illumination of the Middle in the discussion of objects of negation in Tsongkhapa's Svātantrika system Tsongkhapa introduces the two types of objects of negation in the Svātantrika School through his creative explanation of the meaning of a passage in Kamalaśīla's Illumination of the Middle. Tsongkhapa posits his view of the object of negation in terms of the innate 145 Ibid. The repetition of this term is used throughout for the sake of clarity. The term has been coined to explain the two aspects of true existence, as true establishment or existence cannot be explained alone without explaining its connection with consciousness. 146 98 apprehension of true existence first, and then secondly explains the object of negation in terms of the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence. He acknowledges that the latter type of object of negation seems to be more widely discussed among Svātantrikas, including Kamalaśīla, and was dissatisfied with other Tibetans' understanding of Kamalaśīla's passage. For these reasons, here we will examine the two objects of negation in reverse order, starting with the object of negation in terms of the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence. The identification of the object of negation in terms of the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence At the end of Tsongkhapa's description of the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence, a hypothetical opponent challenges Tsongkhapa by referring to another type of ultimate existence that Tsongkhapa himself accepts:147 Implicit to the statement in Kamalaśīla's Illumination of the Middle:148 "Ultimately production does not exist" is to be explained as "these [things] are not established by a correct consciousness149 as produced."150 is an explanation that to be ultimately existent and ultimately produced is to Adapted from Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 192-193. Kamalaśīla, Illumination of the Middle (dbu ma snang ba), in bstan 'gyur (sde dge), TBRC W23703.107 (Delhi, India: Delhi karmapae choedhey, gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 229b.3, http://tbrc.org/link?RID=O1GS6011|O1GS60111GS36145$W23703. 149 yang dag pa'i shes pa might also mean "consciousness of reality." 150 Alternative translation of this passage could be: 147 148 "Ultimately production does not exist" is to be explained as "a correct consciousness does not establish these [things] as produced." 99 be established—as existent and as produced—by a rational consciousness understanding suchness. །…སྣང་བ་ལས། དློན་དམ་པར་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དློ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི། འདི་དག་ཡང་དག་པའི་ཤེས་པས་སྐྱེ་བ་ མ་གྲུབ་བློ་ཞེས་བཤད་པར་འགྱུར་རློ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཤུགས་ཀྱིས་དློན་དམ་པར་ཡློད་པ་དང་། སྐྱེ་ བ་ནི་དེ་ཁློ་ན་ཉིད་ལ་འཇུག་པའི་རིགས་ཤེས་ཀྱིས་སྐྱེ་བར་དང་ཡློད་པར་གྲུབ་པ་ལ་བཤད་པ་…། 151 In this passage, Kamalaśīla explains that "ultimately there is no production" means that "these [things] are not established by a correct consciousness as produced." Thereby, he indicates that "ultimately" means "by a correct consciousness," and that "production does not exist" means that "things are not established as produced." To unpack the meaning of this statement, let us consider the terms used. Ultimately (don dam par). In an earlier statement, Kamalaśīla explains the meaning of ultimate: 152 The statements also that production and so forth do not ultimately exist are asserted to mean the following: All consciousnesses arisen from correct hearing, thinking, and meditating are non-erroneous subjects; hence, they are called "ultimates" because of being the ultimate among these [consciousnesses]. གང་ཡང་་དློན་དམ་པར་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་སློགས་པ་སྨྲས་པ་དེ་ལ་ཡང་དློན་ནི་འདི་ཡིན་པར་ 151 Tsong kha pa, Illumination of the Thought, 132. Adapted from Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 345-46; Kamalaśīla, Illumination of the Middle, 229b.1-229b.2. 152 100 འདློད་དེ། ཡང་དག་པའི་ཐློས་པ་དང་། བསམས་པ་དང་། བསློམས་པ་ལས་བྱུང་བའི་ཤེས་པ་ཐམས་ ཅད་ནི་ཕིན་ཅི་མ་ལློག་པའི་ཡུལ་ཅན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར་དློན་དམ་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་སེ། འདིའི་དློན་དམ་པ་ཡིན་ པའི་ཕིར་རློ། A correct consciousness (yang dag pa'i shes pa) is any of three wisdoms acquired through correct hearing, thinking, and meditating on reality. These correct consciousnesses are qualified as ultimate because they are non-erroneous apprehenders and are supreme among all non-erroneous consciousnesses. Production does not exist (skye ba med do). Right before the above quote from scripture "ultimately production does not exist," Kamalaśīla says:153 (bold mine) Through the power of those [correct consciousnesses], all these things are understood to be only not produced. Therefore, "ultimately production does not exist" is to be explained as "these [things] are not established by a correct consciousness as produced." དེ་དག་གི་དབང་གིས་དངློས་པློ་འདི་དག་ཐམས་ཅད་མ་སྐྱེས་པ་ཁློ་ནར་ཤེས་སློ། །དེས་ན་ འདི་སྐད་དུ་དློན་དམ་པར་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དློ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི། འདི་དག་ཡང་དག་པའི་ཤེས་པས་སྐྱེ་ བ་མ་གྲུབ་བློ་ཞེས་བཤད་པར་འགྱུར་རློ། 153 Kamalaśīla, ibid., 229b.2. 101 By means of "only" he specifies that all things are understood to be only not produced when they are observed through the power of these correct consciousnesses. Conversely, if things are not investigated through the power of these correct consciousnesses, they are misunderstood to be produced. These ('di dag). This statement just quoted also indicates that "these ('di dag)" in "these are not established by a correct consciousness as produced ('di dag yang dag pa'i shes pas skye ba ma grub bo)" means "all these things (dngos po 'di dag thams cad)." Does not exist (ma grub bo). Kamalaśīla glosses "does not exist (med)" in "ultimately production does not exist" with "is not established (ma grub)." "Is not established" here means that production is not confirmed to exist by a correct consciousness. Thus, with regard to the ultimate-non-existence mentioned in the passage "Ultimately production does not exist," Kamalaśīla explicitly explains that all things are only not established by a correct consciousness as produced—that is, by an ultimate consciousness in the sense of a non-erroneous and supreme apprehender arisen from correct hearing, thinking, or meditating. In order to understand this type of ultimate consciousness, it is necessary to understand the two types of ultimate consciousness presented in Bhāvaviveka's Blaze of 102 Reasoning (dbu ma'i snying po'i 'grel pa rtog ge 'bar ba, madhyamaka-hṛdayavṛttitarkajvālā). With regard to the two types of ultimate consciousness, he says:154 The ultimate [that is to say, the highest consciousness] is of two types. One is the uncontaminated supramundane [consciousness] that operates without [conceptual] activity and is without the proliferations [of dualism]. The second is called "mundane pristine wisdom" which operates together with [conceptual] activity, is a concordant [result] of the collections of merit and wisdom, and involves the proliferations [of dualism]. Here, that [latter type] is held as the qualification ["ultimately"] in the thesis [that earth and so forth ultimately do not exist as entities of the elements]. དློན་དམ་པ་རྣམ་པ་གཉིས་ཏེ། དེ་ལ་གཅིག་ནི་མངློན་པར་འདུ་བྱེད་པ་མེད་པར་འཇུག་པའི་འཇིག་ རྟེན་ལས་འདས་པ་ཟག་པ་མེད་པ་སློས་པ་མེད་པའློ། །གཉིས་པ་ནི། མངློན་པར་འདུ་བྱེད་པ་དང་ བཅས་པར་འཇུག་པ་བསློད་ནམས་དང་ཡེ་ཤེས་ཀྱི་ཚོགས་ཀྱི་རེས་སུ་མཐུན་པ་དག་པ་འཇིག་རྟེན་ པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སློས་པ་དང་བཅས་པ་སེ། འདིར་དེ་དམ་བཅས་པའི་ཁད་པར་ཉིད་དུ་བཟུང་ བས་ཉེས་པ་མེད་དློ། The two types of ultimate consciousness are the uncontaminated supramundane Bhāvaviveka, Blaze of Reasoning (dbu ma'i snying po'i 'grel pa rtog ge 'bar ba), in bstan 'gyur (sde dge). TBRC W23703.98 (Delhi, India: delhi karmapae choedhey, gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 19821985), 60b.4-60b.5, http://tbrc.org/link?RID=O1GS6011|O1GS60111GS36103$W23703. Translated by Jeffrey Hopkins, unpublished manuscript. Tibetan and English are also found in Iida Shotarō, Reason and Emptiness: A Study in Logic and Mysticism (Tokyo, Japan: Hokuseido Press, 1980), 86-87. 154 103 consciousness which is the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise (mnyam gzhag ye shes, samāhitajñāna), and the mundane pristine wisdom that is achieved through correct hearing, thinking, and meditating. 155 With regard to the second type of ultimate consciousness that is a correct consciousness (yang dag pa'i shes pa),156 he explains that it is a concordant result of the collection of merit and wisdom and that it involves "activity," the latter being the conceptual activity of ultimate analysis such as the 155 Lopez explains these three wisdoms (shes rab gsum) by citing Zhwamar Gendün Tenzin Gyatsho's (zhwa dmar dge 'dun bstan 'dzin rgya mtsho, 1852-1912) Lamp Illuminating the Profound Thought, Set Forth to Purify Forgetfulness of the Difficult Points of (Tsongkhapa's) "Great Exposition of Special Insight" (lhag mthong chen mo'i dka' gnad rnams brjed byang du bkod pa dgongs zab snang ba'i sgron me): Thus, all wisdom consciousnesses ranging from those of hearing and thinking which analyze suchness through to inferential reasoning consciousnesses in the continuum of a Superior are categorized as concordant ultimates. A wisdom arisen from hearing is produced in dependence on a sign that arises from remembering the three modes due to hearing the statement of another person. Wisdom arisen from thinking refers to an inferential consciousness that understands the meaning to be inferred in dependence on a correct proof which is arrived at through the power of one's own correct thought without relying on its being set forth by someone else. See Donald S. Lopez, A Study of Svātantrika (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 1987), 138. 156 Kamalaśīla explains this type of ultimate consciousness: Also, with regard to the proposition that "[All things are] not ultimately produced," it is asserted that the meaning is this. It is said that because all consciousnesses arisen from correct (yang dag pa'i) hearing, thinking, and meditating are non-perverse subjects/object-possessors (phyin ci ma log pa'i yul can), all these are called ultimate, because of being the ultimate here [in ultimate truth]. There are distinctions created by direct and indirect [cognitions]; all these actualities are cognized as only not produced by the power of those [ultimate consciousnesses from correct hearing, thinking, and meditating.] [D.229b.1] །གང་ཡང་དློན་དམ་པར་[D.229b.2]སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་སློགས་པ་སྨྲས་པ་དེ་ལ་ཡང་དློན་ནི་འདི་ ཡིན་པར་འདློད་དེ། ཡང་དག་པའི་ཐློས་པ་དང་། བསམས་པ་དང་། བསློམས་པ་ལས་བྱུང་བའི་ཤེས་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ ནི་ཕིན་ཅི་མ་ལློག་པའི་ཡུལ་ཅན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར་དློན་དམ་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་སེ། འདིའི་དློན་དམ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར་ [D.229b.3] རློ། །མངློན་སུམ་ དང་བརྒྱུད་པས་བྱས་པའི་ཁད་པར་ནི་ཡློད་དེ། དེ་དག་གི་དབང་གིས་དངློས་པློ་འདི་ དག་ཐམས་ཅད་མ་སྐྱེས་པ་ཁློ་ནར་ཤེས་སློ། See Kamalaśīla, Illumination of the Middle, 229b.1-229b.3. 104 tetralemma (mu bzhi, catuṣkoṭika) and the vajra nodes (rdo rje gzegs ma). Since this second type of ultimate consciousness is any of the three wisdoms (shes rab gsum) of hearing, thinking, and meditating, which are engaged by way of ultimate analysis, it is also called a conceptual rational consciousness by Geluk scholars as opposed to a nonconceptual rational consciousness, which is the ultimate consciousness of the exalted wisdom of meditative equipoise.157 Tsongkhapa is saying that by Kamalaśīla's explicitly explaining that nothing can withstand ultimate analysis by the correct consciousnesses of the three wisdoms stated above, this passage implicitly conveys the meaning of the ultimate establishment that this correct consciousness negates. Kamalaśīla's explicit statement: These [things] are not established by a correct consciousness as produced. implicitly indicates what ultimate establishment means—establishment by a correct consciousness—when the negative is removed: These [things] are established by a correct consciousness as produced. [དངློས་པློ་]འདི་དག་ཡང་དག་པའི་ཤེས་པས་སྐྱེ་བ་གྲུབ་བློ། This establishment is, therefore, a type of object of negation that in Geluk scholarship is described as a thing “being established as withstanding ultimate analysis by a rational consciousness” (rigs shes kyis dpyod bzod du grub pa). 157 For more detailed explanation on the two types of rational consciousness, see Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 346. 105 Up to this point, both Tsongkhapa and those he is criticizing are in agreement. Although Tsongkhapa and his opponents agree that Kamalaśīla's passage implicitly identifies ultimate establishment, their stances on whether or not it is the only ultimate existence differ.158 While the opposing party insists that being able to withstand ultimate analysis by a rational consciousness is the only ultimate existence, Tsongkhapa argues that it is just the kind of ultimate existence that is the object of negation in terms of the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence. Tsongkhapa makes the provocative point that since this type of ultimate existence means a conception that a thing can withstand ultimate analysis by a rational consciousness, it is clear that this type of rational consciousness cannot be a consciousness that ordinary sentient beings innately have from beginningless time. Therefore, from Tsongkhapa's viewpoint, it is just a type of conception of existence that is not subtle enough to explain why all beings innately see things as truly established. For this reason, he describes this type of apprehension of existence as an intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence, because it is acquired through intellectual endeavor:159 Therefore, although whatever exists ultimately in the latter sense [that is, as It seems that although the opponent would agree that Kamalaśīla's passage is implicitly stating an ultimate establishment, it does not appear that the opponent would agree with Tsongkhapa that it is an object of negation that should be refuted by a rational consciousness. Rather, the opponent might posit that that which can withstand ultimate analysis is the mode of existence of emptiness. Further issues on this topic will be discussed in another study. 159 Adapted from Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 193-194. The Tibetan is from Tsong kha pa, Illumination of the Thought, 131-132. 158 106 having an objective mode of abiding not posited through the force of an awareness] would exist ultimately in the former sense [that is, as established for a rational consciousness], the apprehension of the former type of existence is not an innate apprehension of true existence. To have such an [innate] apprehension of true existence, one must apprehend the latter type of existence. Not differentiating these [two meanings of "ultimate"], many have held that the measure of the object of negation is "that which is able to bear reasoned analysis" or "a thing able to bear analysis." །དེས་ན་ཕི་མའི་དློན་དམ་དུ་ཡློད་པ་ལ་ས་མའི་དློན་དམ་དུ་ཡློད་པས་ཁབ་ཀྱང་། ས་མའི་ཡློད་འཛིན་ ནི་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་བདེན་འཛིན་མིན་ལ། དེའི་བདེན་འཛིན་ལ་ནི་ཕི་མའི་ཡློད་འཛིན་དགློས་སློ། །འདི་མ་ ཕེད་པར་དགག་བྱའི་ཚད་འཛིན་རིགས་པས་དཔྱད་བཟློད་དང་། དཔྱད་བཟློད་ཀྱི་དངློས་པློ་ལ་འཛིན་ པ་མང་དུ་བྱུང་ཞིང། དེ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་དློན་དམ་བདེན་པ་གཞི་མ་གྲུབ་དང་། བདེན་གྲུབ་ཏུ་འདློད་ པའི་ནློར་པ་མང་དུ་བྱུང་སྣང་ངློ་། །འདི་ལེགས་པར་ཤེས་ན་གཤིས་ལུགས་ལ་དང་། དློན་དམ་དུ་མེད་ ཟེར་བ་དང་། ཡང་ཆློས་ཉིད་ཡློད་པར་འདློད་ཅིང་དེ་ཉིད་གཤིས་ལུགས་དང་དློན་དམ་ཡིན་པར་སྨྲ་བ་ མི་འགལ་བའི་གནད་རྣམས་ཤེས་པར་འགྱུར་རློ། In this way, Tsongkhapa pushes forward to find a subtler mode of object of negation and eventually discovers it (or creates it)—the object of negation in terms of the innate 107 apprehension of true existence—from another specific passage in Kamalaśīla's Illumination of the Middle. Identification of the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence The source of the controversy centers on Tsongkhapa's declaration that he has found the other wing of the pair—the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence—"clearly" but implicitly stated in Kamalaśīla's Illumination of the Middle. We see here that Tsongkhapa speaks with very strong confidence that only Kamalaśīla's text, among the entire range of treatises composed by Svātantrikas, "clearly" identifies the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence:160 (bold mine) A clear identification of the object of negation [in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence] 161 does not emerge in other reliable sourcebooks of the Svātantrika School, but the existence that is the opposite of the mode of conventional existence described in Kamalaśīla's Illumination of the Middle is to be known as ultimate or true existence, and, therefore, let us explain it that way. རང་རྒྱུད་པའི་གཞུང་ཁུངས་ཐུབ་གཞན་ལས་[བདེན་འཛིན་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་པའི་]དགག་ བྱ་ངློས་འཛིན་གསལ་བར་མི་འབྱུང་ལ༑ དབུ་མ་སྣང་བ་ལས་ཀུན་རློབ་ཏུ་ཡློད་ཚུལ་བཤད་པའི་བཟླློག་ 160 161 Adapted from Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 189. The bracketed material is provided from context. 108 ཕློགས་ཀྱི་ཡློད་པ་ནི་དློན་དམ་པར་རམ་བདེན་ཡློད་དུ་ཤེས་པས་དེ་ལྟར་བཤད་ན། 162 In this short description preceding a passage from Kamalaśīla's Illumination of the Middle, Tsongkhapa makes three points:  Conventional existence: Tsongkhapa asserts that the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence is found in Kamalaśīla's text only in a specific discussion of the mode of conventional existence of phenomena.  Clearly but implicitly: From Tsongkhapa's viewpoint, this type of object of negation is "clearly" stated in this passage, but can only be found by taking the opposite of a specific statement—that is, he sees it as stated implicitly—within the cited passage about conventional existence.  Uniqueness of Kamalaśīla's Illumination of the Middle: Tsongkhapa is very confident that Kamalaśīla's Illumination of the Middle is the only text among all Svātantrika texts that contains a "clear" identification of the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence. These three points constitute all of the necessary conditions for Tsongkhapa to prove that the identification of the innate apprehension of true existence is "clearly" discovered only in Kamalaśīla's Illumination of the Middle. However, Tsongkhapa's research would be undermined if a passage that similarly discusses the conventional mode of existence can be found in any Svātantrika text other than Kamalaśīla's treatise. This potential weakness 162 Tsong kha pa, Illumination of the Thought, 130. 109 of Tsongkhapa's argument is where Jetsünpa and Gungru Chöjung's criticisms and Jamyang Shaypa's argument against them center, as we will see in Chapter 3. Let me explain the source of the dispute by describing how Tsongkhapa adapts the passage from Kamalaśīla's text to his thought about the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence. This is the passage that Tsongkhapa cites from Kamalaśīla's Illumination of the Middle:163 A mistaken awareness that superimposes—on things that in reality [or ultimately] are natureless—an aspect opposite to that [naturelessness] is called an "obscurer" (kun rdzob, saṃvṛti) because it obstructs [itself] from [perception of] suchness or because it veils [other awarenesses] from Adapted from Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 191. The Tibetan is from Tsong kha pa, Illumination of the Thought, 130. The cited passage in Tsongkhapa's Illumination of the Thought is compared with Kamalaśīla, Illumination of the Middle, 228b.1-228b.3. The passage Tsongkhapa cites is slightly different from the passage from Kamalaśīla's Illumination of the Middle in the Dege edition (sde dge) edition (See ibid., 228a.7-228b.3.). I mark Tsongkhapa's unique reading with bracketed inserts. I see two possibilities as to Tsongkhapa's unique citation. First, he may have relied on his memory, producing insignificant changes in the quotation: for example, bzlog pa  ldog pa. Second, he un/intentionally inserted a few words and modified the tense if necessary so that the passage supports his system and helps readers to agree with him. For example, he inserts mthong ba (to see) after nye bar bstan pa and nye bar ston pa, and changes the tense of nye bar ston pa, present tense to nye bar bstan pa, past participle: 163 དངློས་པློ་ཡང་དག་པ་ངློ་བློ་ཉིད་མེད་པ་དག་ལ་ཡང་དེ་ལས་བཟླློག་པ[ལློག༌པ]འི་རྣམ་པར་སློ་འདློགས་པར་ འཁྲུལ་པའི་བློ་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ནི་ཀུན་རློབ་ཅེས་བྱ་སེ། འདིའམ་འདིས་དེ་ཁློ་ན་ཉིད་ཀུན་ཏུ་སིབ་པ་ལྟ་བུར་བྱེད་ འགེགས་པ་ལྟ་བུར་བྱེད་པའི་ཕིར་རློ། །དེ་སྐད་དུ་མདློ་ལས་ཀྱང། དངློས་རྣམས་སྐྱེ་བ་ཀུན་རློབ་ཏུ། །དམ་པའི་དློན་དུ་ རང་བཞིན་མེད། །རང་བཞིན་མེད་ལ་འཁྲུལ་པ་གང། །དེ་ནི་ཡང་དག་ཀུན་རློབ་འདློད། །ཅེས་གསུངས་སློ། །དེ་ལས་ བྱུང་བའི་ཕིར་དེས་ཉེ་བར་བསན་པ་[མཐློང་བ]འི་དངློས་པློ་བརྫུན་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ནི་ཀུན་རློབ་པ་ཁློ་ནའློ་ཞེས་ བྱའློ། །དེ་ཡང་ཐློག་མ་མེད་པའི་འཁྲུལ་པའི་བག་ཆགས་ཡློངས་སུ་སིན་པའི་དབང་གིས་བྱུང་ལ། དེས་ཀྱང་སློག་ ཆགས་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་ཡང་དག་པར་དངློས་པློའ་ི ངློ་བློ་ཉིད་[བདག་ཉིད་]ལྟ་བུར་ཉེ་བར་སློན་ པར༌[ཉེ༌བར༌བསན༌པ་མཐློང་བར]་འགྱུར་ཏེ། དེའི་ཕིར་དེ་དག་གི་བསམ་པའི་དབང་གིས་དངློས་པློ་བརྫུན་པའི་ ངློ་བློ་ཐམས་ཅད་ནི་ཀུན་རློབ་ཏུ་ཡློད་པ་ཁློ་ནའློ་ཞེས་བྱའློ། 110 perception of suchness. [The Descent into Laṅkā] Sūtra also says: The production of things [exists] conventionally/obscurationally (kun rdzob tu, saṃvṛtyā); Ultimately it lacks inherent existence. That [consciousness] mistaken with regard to the lack of inherent existence Is asserted as the obscurer of reality (yang dag kun rdzob, satyaṃ saṃvṛti). All false things seen [by sentient beings] displayed by that [mistaken awareness] due to having arisen from it are called "just obscurational." Moreover, that [mistaken awareness] arises through the maturation of predispositions [established] by beginningless mistake. Also by means of that [mistaken awareness] all living beings see [phenomena] displayed as if they had an inherent nature in reality. Therefore, all entities of false things— [existing] through the power of those [living beings'] mentations—are said "only to exist conventionally/obscurationally."164 དངློས་པློ་ཡང་དག་པར་ངློ་བློ་ཉིད་མེད་པ་དག་ལ་ཡང་དེ་ལས་ལློག་པའི་རྣམ་པར་སློ་འདློགས་པའི་ འཁྲུལ་པའི་བློ་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ནི་ཀུན་རློབ་ཅེས་བྱ་སེ། འདིའམ་འདིས་དེ་ཁློ་ན་ཉིད་སིབ་པ་ལྟ་བུར་ 164 "To exist conventionally" can be read in two ways: Established by conventional valid cognitions or established by ignorance. 111 བྱེད། འགེབས་པ་ལྟ་བུར་བྱེད་པའི་ཕིར་རློ། །དེ་སྐད་དུ་མདློ་ལས་ཀྱང། དངློས་རྣམས་སྐྱེ་བ་ཀུན་རློབ་ ཏུ། །དམ་པའི་དློན་དུ་རང་བཞིན་མེད། །རང་བཞིན་མེད་ལ་འཁྲུལ་པ་གང་། །དེ་ནི་ཡང་དག་ཀུན་ རློབ་འདློད། །ཅེས་གསུངས་སློ། །དེ་ལས་བྱུང་བའི་ཕིར་དེས་ཉེ་བར་བསན་པ་མཐློང་བའི་དངློས་པློ་ བརྫུན་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ནི་ཀུན་རློབ་པ་ཁློ་ན་ཡིན་ཞེས་བྱའློ། །དེ་ཡང་ཐློག་མ་མེད་པའི་འཁྲུལ་པའི་བག་ ཆགས་ཡློངས་སུ་སིན་པའི་དབང་གིས་བྱུང་ལ། དེས་ཀྱང་སློག་ཆགས་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་ཡང་དག་པར་ དངློས་པློའི་ངློ་བློ་ཉིད་ལྟ་བུར་ཉེ་བར་སློན་པར་འགྱུར་ཏེ། དེའི་ཕིར་དེ་དག་གི་བསམ་པའི་དབང་གིས་ དངློས་པློ་བརྫུན་པའི་ངློ་བློ་ཐམས་ཅད་ནི་ཀུན་རློབ་ཏུ་ཡློད་པ་ཁློ་ནའློ་ཞེས་བྱའློ། In this passage, Kamalaśīla uses three terms around which Tsongkhapa bases his creative construction of a subtler object of negation. Mistaken awareness ('khrul ba'i blo). According to Kamalaśīla, this mistaken awareness is congenitally embedded in all sentient beings "through the maturation of predispositions [established] by beginningless mistake." Since this mistaken awareness veils living beings from seeing the suchness of things, it is also named "obscurer" (kun rdzob), and the things falsely superimposed by this obscurer are called "obscurationals" (kun rdzob pa). All false things (dngos po brdzun pa thams cad). Kamalaśīla explains that the false things are "obscurationals" (kun rdzob pa) because their reality has been obscured through the power of mistaken awareness since beginningless time. Hence, he explains that these obscurationals are "displayed as if they had an inherent nature in reality," 112 which is the description of true existence in the system of the Geluk sect. Although it appears that Kamalaśīla discusses the beginningless interactions between obscurer and obscurationals in this passage, the two meanings of "exist conventionally" prompt two quite different explanations of the last sentence. The last statement in the passage from Kamalaśīla's treatise: Therefore, all entities of false things—[existing] through the power of those [living beings'] mentations—are said "only to exist conventionally/obscurationally." is, for Tsongkhapa's Svātantrika system, the crucial part since he brings out the identification of the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence by means of reversing the meaning of this sentence. In order to know the meaning of "exist conventionally" in the above statement, it is essential to know where and in which context the passage is located among the many topics that Kamalaśīla presents in his Illumination of the Middle. According to Ichigō's synopsis, the passage is located at the beginning of a series of discourses regarding the meaning of "conventional,"165 refuting the Cittamātrins who criticize the Mādhyamikas as Jamyang Shaypa also opines that Kamalaśīla examines the meaning of "conventional" in twelve ways. The twelve meanings of "conventional" according to Ichigō's synopsis are: (D. means sde dge edition) 165 1. 2. 3. 4. That all do not ultimately exist [in the sense of not truly existing] is called conventionally existing…D.228a.6-. Existing inherently is called conventionally existing…D.229a.7-. Not having done analysis is called conventional…D.229b.5-. The world's renown [that is, consensus in the world] is called conventional, and established by the world's renown is called conventionally existing…D.230a.2-. 113 nihilists for their assertion "All things do not exist."166 In response, Kamalaśīla explains that the existence of false things, or obscurationals, is acceptable as long as they are not analyzed, when, after the passage cited above, Kamalaśīla goes on to say:167 Also, these [obscurationals] are not natures of actualities in reality because appearances in that manner [that is, as if they had a nature in reality] are not suchness. Furthermore, [obscurationals] are also not utter non-existents, like the horns of a rabbit, because of appearing as acceptable (dga' ba) aspects when not analyzed. [དངློས་པློ་བརྫུན་པའི་ངློ་བློ་ཐམས་ཅད་ (or ཀུན་རློབ་ཏུ་ཡློད་པ་ཁློ་ན་)] འདི་དག་ཡང་དག་པར་ དངློས་པློའི་ངློ་བློ་ཉིད་ཀྱང་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཇི་ལྟར་སྣང་བ་དེ་ཁློ་ན་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར་རློ། །རི་བློང་གི་ 5. Illusion is called conventional, and established as like an illusion is called conventionally existing…D.230a.6-. 6. Mere name and term are called conventional, and merely posited by name and term is called conventionally existing…D.230b.3-. 7. Sound-generalities [or generic images based just on terms] are called conventional, and existing as a sound-generality is called conventionally existing…D.231b.2-. 8. Meaning-generalities [or generic images based on the meaning of a term] are called conventional, and existing as a meaning generality is called conventionally existing…D.232a.6-. 9. Instability due to not remaining for more than a moment is called conventional, and existing that way is called conventionally existing…D.232b.2-. 10. Untrue is called conventional, and existing that way is called conventionally existing…D.232b.6-. 11. Valid cognition or non-valid cognition is called conventional, and established that way is called conventionally existing…D.233a.2-. 12. Forms, feelings, and so forth are called conventional, and existing as them is called conventionally existing…D.233a.6-233b.1. See Jeffrey Hopkins, Maps of the Profound: Jam-Yang-Shay-Ba's Great Exposition of Buddhist and NonBuddhist Views on the Nature of Reality (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2003), 367-368; Ichigō Masamichi, "カマラシーラ著『中観の光』和訳研究(1) (A Study and Annotated Japanese Translation of the Mādhyamaka-Āloka of Kamalaśīla (1))," Acta Humanistica et Scientifica Universitatis Sangio Kyotiensis XX, no. 2 (March, 1991): 265-272. 166 Kamalaśīla, Illumination of the Middle, 228a.6-228a.7. 167 Ibid., 228b.3-228b.4. 114 རྭ་བཞིན་དུ་གཏན་མེད་པའི་ངློ་བློ་ཉིད་ཀྱང་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། །མ་བརྟགས་ན་དགའ་བའི་རྣམ་པར་སྣང་ བའི་ཕིར་རློ། In this passage, Kamalaśīla explains that "exist conventionally/obscurationally" has two ramifications. On the one hand since obscurationals are in a disguised mode of appearance, they are not suchness; on the other hand, they are not utterly non-existent because when they are not analyzed, they are acceptable. Since Kamalaśīla's first response among a series of examinations of the meaning of "conventional" is to refute the Cittamātrins' misunderstanding that the Mādhyamikas deny the existence of anything, this may be a key to seeing why Tsongkhapa creatively reads it the way he does. About “mentations,” he says:168 The "mentations" of those living beings are not just conceptual consciousnesses but also are to be taken as non-conceptual consciousnesses. སློག་ཆགས་དེ་དག་གི་བསམ་པ་ནི་རྟློག་པ་ཁློ་ན་མིན་གི། རྟློག་མེད་ཀྱི་ཤེས་པ་ལ་ཡང་བྱ་སེ། Here, he indicates that mentations are conceptual and non-conceptual awarenesses, and in a later passage he adds that they are not harmed by valid cognitions:169 Moreover, those posited through the force of an awareness that are not damaged by valid cognition are asserted as existing in conventional terms. 168 169 Adapted from Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 192. Hopkins, ibid., 198. The Tibetan is from Tsong kha pa, Illumination of the Middle, 134. 115 །དེ་ཡང་ཚད་མས་མི་གནློད་པའི་བློའི་དབང་གིས་བཞག་པ་རྣམས་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཡློད་པར་འདློད་ཀྱི། Therefore, according to him, mentations are awarenesses that cannot be damaged by valid cognition and are conceptual and non-conceptual consciousnesses. 170 In this way, Tsongkhapa reformulates Kamalaśīla’s last statement: Therefore, all entities of false things—[existing] through the power of those [living beings'] mentations—are said "only to exist conventionally/obscurationally." to reveal what he sees as Kamalaśīla's actual meaning: Therefore, all entities of false things [existing] through the power of those [living beings'] non-conceptual and conceptual awarenesses that are not damaged by valid cognitions are said "only to exist conventionally." 170 Therefore, these awarenesses include prime cognitions (tshad ma, pramāṇa) and subsequent cognitions (bcad shes, paricchinna-jñāna), but whether correctly assuming consciousnesses (yid dpyod) can be valid cognitions needs to be analyzed. A 19th century Mongolian scholar Ngag-wang-khe-drup (ngag dbang mkhas grub, 1779-1838) explains that mentations are: The six collections of consciousness that are undamaged awarenesses positing forms and so forth… །སློག་ཆགས་དེ་དག་གི་གཟུགས་སློགས་འཇློག་པའི་བློ་གནློད་མེད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་ཤེས་ཚོགས་དྲུག་སེ་བསམ་པའི་དབང་ གིས་ See ngag dbang mkhas grub, The Lamp of Words Clarifying the Challenges by the Mind-Only School and Responses by the Middle School Stemming from the Mode of Conventional Existence and Clarifying the Eleven Modes of Conventional Existence Briefly Explained [by 'Jam dbyang bzhad pa] (dbu sems kyis kun rdzob tu yod tshul las brtsams pa'i rtsod lan dbu ma snang ba las byung ba rnams dang bsdus nas bshad pa'i _kun rdzub tu yod tshul bcu gcig gsal bar byed pa'i tshig gi sgron ma), in gsung 'bum/_ngag dbang mkhas grub, TBRC W16912.5 (Leh, India: S. W. Tashigangpa, 1972-1974), 4b.6, http://tbrc.org/link?RID=O1JT599|O1JT5991JT736$W16912. 116 However, it seems that Tsongkhapa's ascription of the meaning of "exist conventionally" differs from Kamalaśīla's thought in his second presentation of the meaning of saṃvṛti (kun rdzob)." Just three sentences later, Kamalaśīla offers this explanation:171 Also, with regard to the proposition that "[All things are] conventionally/obscurationally produced" and so forth [that is to say, "and are not ultimately produced"], it is asserted that the meaning is this: Because the aforementioned mistaken entity—the obscurer (kun rdzob, saṃvṛti)—displays all things as if produced even though in reality they are not produced, it is said that due to the power of [all living beings'] mentations things are conventionally/obscurationally produced. Therefore, the Buddha [in the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra] says "The production of things [exists] conventionally/obscurationally (kun rdzob tu, saṃvṛtyā)." །གང་ཡང་ཀུན་རློབ་ཏུ་སྐྱེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་སློགས་པ་སྨྲས་པ་དེ་ལ་ཡང་དློན་ནི་འདི་ཡིན་པར་བརློད་པར་ འདློད་དེ། གང་གི་ཕིར་ཀུན་རློབ་འཁྲུལ་པའི་ངློ་བློ་ཇི་སྐད་བཤད་པས་དངློས་པློ་རྣམས་ཡང་དག་པར་ སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་ཀྱང་། སྐྱེ་བ་ལྟ་བུར་ཉེ་བར་སློན་པར་བྱེད་པ་དེའ་ི ཕིར་དེ་དག་གི་བསམ་པའི་དབང་གིས་ དངློས་པློ་རྣམས་ཀུན་རློབ་ཏུ་སྐྱེའློ་ཞེས་བྱའློ། །དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཕིར་བཅློམ་ལན་འདས་ཀྱིས། དངློས་རྣམས་སྐྱེ་ བ་ཀུན་རློབ་ཏུ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་སློ། 171 Kamalaśīla, Illumination of the Middle, 229a.7-229b.1. 117 While explaining the meaning of "all things are conventionally/obscurationally produced," Kamalaśīla attributes the meaning of “mentations” and "exist conventionally/obscurationally" quite differently from Tsongkhapa's reading. In the reason clause, Kamalaśīla says that the obscurer—that is, the mistaken entity— deceivingly projects all things as if they are produced, although they are not produced in reality. Because of that, it is said that through the power of the mentations of all living beings, all things are obscurationally seen as if they are produced. He seems to be saying that the validly established existence of all false things—obscurationals—can be denied since he seems to be saying that they exist conventionally (or obscurationally) from only the viewpoint of an obscurer—a mistaken awareness.172 I have found another piece of counter-evidence disagreeing with Tsongkhapa's reading of Kamalaśīla's passage in his Illumination of the Middle; it is from his Difficult Points of [Śāntarakṣita's] Ornament for the Middle (dbu ma rgyan gyi dka' 'grel) where he explicates stanza 63ab in Śāntarakṣita's text: 172 Therefore, these things hold Only the character of the conventional. དེ་ཕིར་དངློས་པློ་འདི་དག་ནི།། ཀུན་རློབ་ཁློ་ནའི་མཚན་ཉིད་འཛིན།། Expanding on the meaning of the stanza, Kamalaśīla says: (emphasis mine) [Someone] thinks: If these things ultimately do not have an inherent nature, well then implicitly what is their character? [Answer: Śāntarakṣita] states "Therefore, these things…" and so forth. Since mistaken awarenesses obstruct the suchness of things, all mistaken awarenesses are obscurers. Because of abiding as entities imputed through the power of mentations that are mistaken awarenesses, those that exist in this way are obscurationals. གལ་ཏེ་དངློས་པློ་འདི་དག་དློན་དམ་པར་རང་བཞིན་མེད་ན། འློ་ན་ཤུགས་ཀྱིས་འདི་དག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཅི་ཞིག་ ཡིན་པར་འགྱུར་སྙམ་པ་ལ། དེའི་ཕིར་དངློས་པློ་འདི་དག་ནི་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་སློགས་པ་སློས་ཏེ། འཁྲུལ་པའི་བློས་དངློས་ པློའི་དེ་ཁློ་ན་ཉིད་བསིབས་པས་བློ་འཁྲུལ་བ་ཐམས་ཅད་ནི་ཀུན་རློབ་ཡིན་ནློ། འཁྲུལ་པའི་བློའི་བསམ་པའི་དབང་ གིས་བརྟགས་པའི་བདག་ཉིད་དུ་གནས་པའི་ཕིར་དེ་ལ་ཡློད་པ་ནི་ཀུན་རློབ་པ་ཡིན་ནློ།། 118 Despite Kamalaśīla's own reading of the statement in his Illumination of the Middle, interestingly enough, Tsongkhapa ignores Kamalaśīla's explanations. Rather, he puts stress on his own presentation which is opposite from Kamalaśīla's stance in his second explanation. For in explaining what he claims is Kamalaśīla's position, Tsongkhapa says:173 False things—that do not exist ultimately but are posited as existing through the force of those two [conceptual and nonconceptual consciousnesses]—exist only conventionally. This is the meaning of the statement in the [Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra], "The production of things [exists] conventionally/obscurationally (kun rdzob tu, saṃvṛtyā)." Moreover, this does not mean that [such falsities] exist conventionally in the sense of existing for an obscurer (kun rdzob, saṃvṛti) that is an apprehender of true existence. དེ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་དབང་གིས་ཡློད་པར་བཞག་པའི་དློན་དམ་བར་ཡློད་པ་མིན་པའི་དངློས་པློ་བརྫུན་པ་ རྣམས་ཀུན་རློབ་ཁློ་ནར་ཡློད་པ་ནི།་དངློས་རྣམས་སྐྱེ་བ་ཀུན་རློབ་ཏུ། ཞེས་པའི་དློན་ཏེ། དེ་ཡང་བདེན་ འཛིན་གི་ཀུན་རློབ་ཏུ་ཡློད་པའི་དློན་མིན་ནློ། Here, Tsongkhapa is warning strongly that the reading of the line of the stanza from the Here again, Kamalaśīla calls "mentations" "mistaken awarenesses" leaving no room for identifying them as "non-conceptual and conceptual awarenesses that are not damaged by valid cognitions" as Tsongkhapa does. For the Tibetan text, see Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, Madhyamakālaṁkāra of Śāntarakṣita: With His Own Commentary or Vṛtti and with the Subcommentary or Pañjikā of Kamalaśīla, critically ed. by Ichigō Masamichi (Kyoto, Japan: Kyoto Sangyo University, 1985), 196-197. 173 Adapted from Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 192. The Tibetan is from Tsong kha pa, Illumination of the Thought, 131. 119 Descent into the Laṅkā Sūtra—that is, "exist conventionally/obscurationally"—should not be read as a description of a false mode of positing the existence of things. Whereas Kamalaśīla in his second explanation identifies mentations as mistaken awarenesses, or obscurers, that display things as produced in reality, Tsongkhapa identifies mentations as conceptual and nonconceptual awarenesses that are not damaged by valid cognitions, perhaps in accord with Kamalaśīla's first explanation where he says that things are not non-existent. Although Tsongkhapa speaks as though his discovery is firmly grounded in passages from Kamalaśīla's Illumination of the Middle, he neither cites nor adopts the meaning of the passage from the Descent into the Laṅkā Sūtra as explained by Kamalaśīla. Rather, muting Kamalaśīla's voice by means of not citing his explanation of this sūtra passage discordant with his own system, now Tsongkhapa can conveniently make the statement in dependence upon his own reading of "mentations" that Kamalaśīla's Illumination of the Middle "clearly" shows exactly what he wants to see. Extracting the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of ultimate/true existence Tsongkhapa is confident that the passage he cites from Kamalaśīla's Illumination of the Middle contains all the conditions necessary to satisfy the description of an innate apprehension of true existence. According to him, only this passage discusses conventional existence such that its implicit reading yields a picture of the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence. This innate mode of 120 apprehension of true existence is not acquired through studying scripture or reasoning, since all living beings innately apprehend things as truly existent "through maturation of predispositions by beginningless mistake," as Kamalaśīla himself puts it. To prove that this passage from Kamalaśīla's Illumination of the Middle states the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence, Tsongkhapa casts the aforementioned controversial statement: All entities of false things—[existing] through the power of those [living beings'] mentations—are said "only to exist conventionally/obscurationally." དེ་དག་གི་བསམ་པའི་དབང་གིས་དངློས་པློ་བརྫུན་པའི་ངློ་བློ་ཐམས་ཅད་ནི་ཀུན་རློབ་ཏུ་ཡློད་པ་ཁློ་ ནའློ་ཞེས་བྱའློ། into his own terms so that the implicit meaning of the statement—that is, the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence—can be articulated. He says:174 Since this is the case, [in the Autonomy School] "existing in the manner of an objective mode of abiding without being posited through appearing to an awareness, or through the force of an awareness" is to truly exist, to ultimately exist, and to exist as [the object's own] reality, and apprehending such is an innate apprehension of true existence. 174 Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom, 192. The Tibetan is from Tsong kha pa, Illumination of the Thought, 131. 121 དེ་ལྟར་བྱས་ན་བློ་ལ་སྣང་བའམ་བློའི་དབང་གིས་བཞག་པ་མིན་པར་དློན་གི་སློད་ལུགས་སུ་ཡློད་པ་ནི། བདེན་པ་དང་དློན་དམ་དང་ཡང་དག་པར་ཡློད་པ་དང་དེར་འཛིན་པ་ནི་བདེན་འཛིན་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་སློ། Tsongkhapa's statement can be explained in two parts: the subject's side and ultimate/true existence. First, when we compare the description of the subject's side from both Kamalaśīla's statement about conventional existence and Tsongkhapa's reformulation about ultimate/true existence as the chart below shows, the way that Tsongkhapa deploys Kamalaśīla's statement to reveal the identification of the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence becomes evident. The subject's side: Kamalaśīla Tsongkhapa དེ་དག་གི་ བསམ་པའི་ དབང་གིས་ X x through the power of those [living beings'] mentations བློ་ལ་སྣང་བའམ་བློའི་ དབང་གིས་ བཞག་པ་ མིན་པར་ X without being posited through the force of appearing to an awareness, or through the force of an awareness Without being posited through the force of appearing to an awareness, or through the force of an awareness (blo la snang ba'am blo'i dbang gis bzhag pa min par). The independence of the object—its true existence—is indicated by "without being posited through the power of appearing to an awareness, or through the force of an awareness." It is as if one's awareness does not influence the existence of the object at all. The word "without (min par)" makes Tsongkhapa's restatement opposite from Kamalaśīla's exposition that things only exist conventionally/obscurationally through the power of mentations. Tsongkhapa understands mentations as Kamalaśīla's prerequisite 122 for explaining all things as conventionally/obscurationally existing; that is, without the power of mentations, nothing would exist conventionally/obscurationally. He does this by changing "through the power of mentations" in Kamalaśīla's statement to "through the power of appearing to an awareness, or through the power of an awareness," thereby emphasizing that mentations are not mistaken awarenesses since they allow things to conventionally exist. True existence is the very opposite of this conventional existence. Conventional existence itself depends upon the force of mentations—conceptual and non-conceptual awarenesses. On the contrary, true establishment seemingly excludes the role of awarenesses from its appearance. In this way Tsongkhapa signifies that true existence is seemingly dissociated from what appears to an awareness.175 By bringing in "posited," Tsongkhapa explains that the role of mentations, or awarenesses, is to posit, or certify things as conventionally existent. It means, on the other hand, that true existence is not certified as valid by an awareness. To construct what ultimate existence would be for Kamalaśīla, Tsongkhapa takes the above meaning of conventional existence and extracts its opposite. Through drawing out the implicit meaning of Kamalaśīla's statement about conventional existence, Tsongkhapa finds a "clear" indication of Kamalaśīla's position on the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence. 175 It does not mean that he excludes all types of consciousness from the appearance of true existence because as Kamalaśīla would agree, true existence appears through the power of an obscurer, or mistaken awareness. 123 Tsongkhapa's reformulation into ultimate/true existence and its innate apprehension: Kamalaśīla དངློས་པློ་བརྫུན་པའི་ངློ་བློ་ཐམས་ ཀུན་རློབ་ཏུ་ཡློད་པ་ཁློ་ ཅད་ནི་ ནའློ་ཞེས་བྱའློ། x All entities of false things… are said "only to exist conventionally." དློན་གི་སློད་ལུགས་སུ་ཡློད་པ་ནི་ Tsongkhapa བདེན་པ….ར་ཡློད་པ་ དང་དེར་འཛིན་པ་ནི་ བདེན་འཛིན་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ སློ་ "existing in the manner of an objective mode of abiding…" is to truly exist…and apprehending such is an innate apprehension of true existence. To exist in the manner of an objective mode of abiding (don gyi sdod lugs su yod pa). Tsongkhapa also converts the status of the object in Kamalaśīla's statement, "All entities of false things… are said 'only to exist conventionally'" into its opposite. He converts "All entities of false things" into the mode of true existence: "existing in the manner of an objective mode of abiding." Also, he converts Kamalaśīla's "only to exist conventionally" into its opposite: "to truly exist." Then, he adds "apprehension of such is an innate apprehension of true existence" to summarize his point. This converted statement underlines the seeming independence of the object—its true existence—by stating that true existence objectively and independently exists by itself. While a pot exists only in dependence upon an awareness, or a mentation according to Tsongkhapa's reading, a truly existent pot would not depend on any valid awareness, or mentation, but on a mistaken awareness, or an obscurer. Thus we can speculate that for Tsongkhapa, the implicit way of strictly reading Kamalaśīla's statement would be: 124 All entities of [non-]false things—[without being posited] through the power of those [living beings'] mentations—are said "only to exist [truly]." [སློག་ཆགས་ཐམས་ཅད་]དེ་དག་གི་བསམ་པའི་དབང་གིས་[བཞག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་]དངློས་པློ་བརྫུན་པ ་[མ་ཡིན་པ]འི་ངློ་བློ་ཐམས་ཅད་ནི་ [བདེན་པར་]ཡློད་པ་ཁློ་ནའློ་ཞེས་བྱའློ། This reading of Tsongkhapa merely reflects just one aspect of the meanings of "exist conventionally" in Kamalaśīla's system, but for Tsongkhapa, this is what Kamalaśīla subconsciously intended to explain by the statement. Unlike the object of negation in terms of the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence that is only apprehended in dependence upon scriptures and/or reasonings, this type of true existence is innately and beginninglessly apprehended by all beings. Due to this, Tsongkhapa says that this innate apprehension of true existence is a subtler mode of misapprehension, and its object can be called the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence. Conclusion To summarize, in Kamalaśīla's Illumination of the Middle Tsongkhapa finds, or creates, a second object of negation in the Svātantrika School through arguing for an implicit meaning of the passage discussed above. As we have seen, Tsongkhapa explains that Kamalaśīla describes the object of negation in terms of the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence as part of an implicit meaning of his statement on the 125 ultimate-non-establishment of things. However, this type of object of negation cannot explain why ordinary sentient beings who do not learn tenet systems cannot achieve full enlightenment. As explained above, Tsongkhapa asserts through his unique reformulation of a particular statement that only Kamalaśīla "clearly" identifies the innate misapprehension of true existence—the cause preventing all living beings from seeing suchness. Tsongkhapa is confident that his examination of Kamalaśīla's Illumination of the Middle is the only place where the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence can be found. This assertion, however, could damage Tsongkhapa's authority if anyone were to find other examples identifying the same concept in another Svātantrika source text; it would show that Tsongkhapa's scholarship was not flawless. This is the issue that three Geluk monastic textbook authors - Jetsun Chökyi Gyeltsen, Gungru Chökyi Jungné, and Jamyang Shaypa—debate through the unique textualeducational traditions preserved in the monastic colleges in Drepung and Sera monasteries. 126 Chapter 3: The Relation between the Two Types of Object of Negation: Refutation of Taktshang, the Translator Introduction In the previous chapter, I discussed the way Tsongkhapa establishes the two types of object of negation in the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika School by means of creatively arguing for the innate apprehension of true existence being in fact identified by Kamalaśīla in his Illumination of the Middle. Given that, how do these two types of object of negation—the intellectually imbued and innate apprehensions of true existence—relate to each other? Is the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence utterly different from the innate apprehension of true existence, or not? In the seventh refutation in the part of refuting others’ system in the general section on the identification of object of negation in the Mādhyamikas, Jamyang Shaypa answers this question through refuting the Translator Taktshang Sherap Rinchen’s (stag tshang lotswā shes rab rin chen, 1405-?). Tsongkhapa asserts that by only negating the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence the innate apprehension of true existence cannot be undermined. Based on Tsongkhapa’s assertion, Taktshang criticizes that if these two types of object of negation are utterly separate, the negation of the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence cannot help to damage the innate apprehension of true existence, and hence, Tsongkhapa’s assertion is not logically feasible. Regarding this criticism, Jamyang 127 Shaypa points out that Taktshang does not understand the significance of “only” in Tsongkhapa’s statement. When a debate is introduced in a treatise written for a particular sect like Jamyang Shaypa’s Decisive Analysis of the Middle, the opponent’s assertion often does not accurately represent the actual position of the opponent. However, by presenting Tsongkhapa’s position and Taktshang’s criticism in each other’s texts, I will examine and demonstrate how Tsongkhapa’s presentation of the object of negation is misunderstood by Taktshang, and how Taktshang’s assertion is accurately dealt with in Jamyang Shaypa’s refutation. Tsongkhapa does not assert that the two types of misapprehension of true existence are utterly different in the sense that the innate apprehension of true existence can be negated by the same reasoning repudiating the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence. However, this is (intentionally or unintentionally) misunderstood by Taktshang. In this seventh debate, which is the focus of this chapter, Jamyang Shaypa points out Taktshang’s logical fallacy stemming from his negligence of “only” in Tsongkhapa’s position. In presenting the course of debate, I will also reveal Jamyang Shaypa’s strategy of logically deducing an unwanted consequence that Taktshang is logically forced to accept from Taktshang’s own assertion. 128 In this seventh refutation of the General Section of the identification of the object of negation, 176 Jamyang Shaypa presents how Taktshang in his Freedom from Extremes through Knowing All Tenets (grub mtha' kun shes nas mtha' bral sgrub pa) incorrectly describes Tsongkhapa's idea of the object of negation:177 Moreover, with respect to the statement in Tsongkhapa's Explanation [of (Candrakīrti's) "Entry to (Nāgārjuna’s) 'Treatise on the Middle'"] and so forth that refutation of objects imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly, the Translator Taktshang [incorrectly] says that this is not logically feasible because even among innate awarenesses there are apprehensions of permanence and of former and later [phenomena] as one. [Our response:] There is no entailment [that if even among innate awarenesses there are apprehensions of permanence and of former and later (phenomena) as one, Tsongkhapa's statement that refutation of objects imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly is not logically feasible,] because there is something eliminated by "only." Well, for 176 This seventh refutation corresponds to Jamyang Shaypa's seventeenth and eighteenth replies in his Great Exposition of Tenets to Taktshang's criticism of Tsongkhapa's system regarding the object of negation. 177 According to Maher, Jamyang Shaypa composed his root text for the Great Exposition of Tenets in 1689 and finished its commentary in 1699. Also the main text of this dissertation, the Decisive Analysis of (Candrakīrti's) "Entry to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle'," is written in 1695. Therefore, it is possible that Jamyang Shaypa composed the Great Exposition of Tenets and the Decisive Analysis simultaneously. See Derek Frank Maher, "Knowledge and Authority in Tibetan Middle Way Schools of Buddhism" (PhD diss., University of Virginia, 2003), 123-126. 129 him, it [absurdly] follows that whatever is an apprehension of permanence is necessarily an apprehension in accordance with the Forders' superimposition that the self is permanent because an innate apprehension of permanence apprehends in that way [that is to say, in accordance with the Forders' superimposition that the self is permanent]. You have accepted the reason [that an innate apprehension of permanence apprehends in that way, that is to say, in accordance with the Forders' superimposition that the self is permanent]. If you accept [that whatever is an apprehension of permanence is necessarily an apprehension in accordance with the Forders' superimposition that the self is permanent], it [absurdly] follows that in the continuums of those who are not involved in tenet systems such as animals and so forth, there is apprehension that the self is permanent in the sense of not being produced from causes and conditions because [in the continuums of those who are not involved in tenet systems such as animals and so forth,] there is apprehension that the self is permanent in the sense of not disintegrating until death. The reason [that is, that in the continuums of those who are not involved in tenet systems such as animals and so forth there is apprehension that the self is permanent in the sense of not disintegrating until death,] is easy [to establish]. If you accept [that in the continuum of animals not engaged in tenet systems, there is apprehension that the self is permanent in the sense of 130 not being produced from causes and conditions], it [absurdly] follows that it is not logically feasible for [Candrakīrti's] the root text [Entry to (Nāgārjuna's) Treatise on the Middle] to say:178 This non-produced permanent [self imputed by Forders] is not perceived By those spending many eons as animals, [Yet consciousnesses conceiving "I" are seen to operate in them. Hence, there is no self other than the aggregates]. Moreover, it [absurdly] follows that although the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas and so forth have not entered the Madhyamaka [view], they can harm the conceived object of the apprehension of true existence because [according to you] your thesis [that Tsongkhapa's statement—"Refutation of objects imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly"—is not logically feasible] is logically feasible. 178 VI.125ab. Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 648. Citation is lengthened in order to contrast two different views of permanence. The whole stanza is: VI.125 །གང་དག་དུད་འགྲློ་བསྐལ་མང་བརྐྱལ་གྱུར་པ། །དེས་ཀྱང་མ་སྐྱེས་རྟག་འདི་མ་མཐློང་ལ། །ངར་འཛིན་དེ་དག་ལ་ཡང་འཇུག་མཐློང་སེ། །དེས་ན་ཕུང་པློ་ལས་གཞན་བདག་འགའ་མེད། See Candrakīrti, dbu ma la 'jug pa, in bstan 'gyur (sde dge), TBRC W23703.102 (Delhi, India: Delhi karmapae choedhey, gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 210a.7-210b.1, http://tbrc.org/link?RID=O1GS6011|O1GS60111GS36114$W23703. 131 །ཡང་རྣམ་བཤད་སློགས་ལས་མུ་སེགས་པ་དང་གྲུབ་མཐའ་སྨྲ་བ་ཁློ་ནས་བཏགས་པའི་ཡུལ་བཀག་ པས་ཐློགས་མེད་ནས་ཞུགས་པའི་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་བདེན་འཛིན་ལ་མི་གནློད་གསུངས་པ་179ལ། སག་ཚང་ པ་ན་རེ། [མུ་སེགས་པ་དང་གྲུབ་མཐའ་སྨྲ་བ་ཁློ་ནས་བཏགས་པའི་ཡུལ་བཀག་པས་ཐློགས་མེད་ནས་ ཞུགས་པའི་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་བདེན་འཛིན་ལ་མི་གནློད་པ་]དེ་མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ༑ ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་བློ་ལའང་ 179 It seems that Jamyang Shaypa summarizes Tsongkhapa's introduction to the object of negation in his Illumination of the Thoughts: With regard to delineating the absence of true existence in phenomena, if you do not understand well just what true establishment is, as well as how [phenomena] are apprehended as truly existent, the view of suchness will definitely go astray. Śāntideva’s Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds says that if the thing imputed, the generality [or image] of the object of negation, does not appear well to your awareness, it is impossible to apprehend well the non-existence of the object of negation: Without making contact with the thing imputed, The non-existence of that thing is not apprehended. Therefore, unless true establishment (which is what does not exist) and the aspect of the object of negation (which is that of which [phenomena] are empty) do not appear—just as they are—as objects of [your] awareness, good ascertainment of the lack of true establishment and of the entity of emptiness cannot occur. Furthermore, mere identification of (1) a true establishment that is superficially imputed by proponents of tenets and (2) [the consciousness] apprehending such true establishment is not sufficient. Because of this, it is most essential to identify well the innate apprehension of true establishment that has operated beginninglessly and exists both in those whose awarenesses have been affected through [study of] tenets and in those whose awarenesses have not been affected in this way, and to identify the true establishment apprehended by this [mind]. For if you have not identified these, even if you refute an object of negation through reasoning, the adherence to true establishment that has operated beginninglessly is not harmed at all, due to which the meaning at this point would be lost. See Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa's Final Exposition of Wisdom, 186. The Tibetan is: ཆློས་རྣམས་བདེན་མེད་དུ་གཏན་ལ་འབེབས་པ་འདི་ལ། བདེན་པར་གྲུབ་ཚུལ་དེ་ཇི་འདྲ་ཞིག་ཡིན་པ་དང་། བདེན་པར་འཛིན་ཚུལ་ ལེགས་པར་མ་ཤེས་ན། དེ་ཁློ་ན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ལྟ་བ་ངེས་པར་འཕྱུག་སེ། སློད་འཇུག་ལས། བརྟགས་པའི་དངློས་ལ་མ་རེག་པར། །དེ་ཡི་ དངློས་མེད་འཛིན་མ་ཡིན། །ཞེས་བརྟགས་པའི་དངློས་པློ་སེ་དགག་བྱའི་སི་ལེགས་པར་བློ་ལ་མ་ཤར་ན། དགག་བྱ་དེ་མེད་པ་ལེགས་ པར་འཛིན་མི་ནུས་པར་གསུངས་པས། མེད་རྒྱུའི་བདེན་གྲུབ་དང་། གང་གིས་སློང་པའི་དགག་བྱའི་རྣམ་པ་བློ་ཡུལ་དུ་ཇི་ལྟ་བ་ བཞིན་མ་ཤར་ན། བདེན་མེད་དང་སློང་པའི་ངློ་བློ་ལེགས་པར་ངེས་པ་མི་སིད་དློ། །དེ་ཡང་གྲུབ་མཐའ་སྨྲ་བས་འཕལ་དུ་ཀུན་ བརྟགས་པའི་བདེན་གྲུབ་དང་། བདེན་འཛིན་ངློས་ཟིན་པ་ཙམ་གིས་མི་ཆློག་པའི་ཕིར། ཐློག་མ་མེད་པ་ནས་རེས་སུ་ཞུགས་པ། གྲུབ་ མཐས་བློ་བསྒྱུར་མ་བསྒྱུར་གཉིས་ག་ལ་ཡློད་པའི་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་བདེན་འཛིན་དང་། དེས་བཟུང་བའི་བདེན་གྲུབ་ལེགས་པར་ངློས་ཟིན་ པ་ནི་གནད་ཤིན་ཏུ་ཆེ་སེ། དེ་ངློས་མ་ཟིན་པར་རིགས་པས་དགག་བྱ་བཀག་ཀྱང་། ཐློག་མ་མེད་པ་ནས་ཞུགས་པའི་བདེན་ཞེན་ལ་ཅི་ ཡང་མི་གནློད་པས་སྐབས་དློན་སློར་བར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕིར་རློ། See Tsong kha pa, Illumination of the Thought, 128-129. 132 རྟག་འཛིན་དང་ས་ཕི་གཅིག་འཛིན་ཡློད་པའི་ཕིར་ཟེར་ན་[ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་བློ་ལའང་རྟག་འཛིན་དང་ ས་ཕི་གཅིག་འཛིན་ཡློད་པ་ཡིན་ན་མུ་སེགས་པ་དང་གྲུབ་མཐའ་སྨྲ་བ་ཁློ་ནས་བཏགས་པའི་ཡུལ་ བཀག་པས་ཐློགས་མེད་ནས་ཞུགས་པའི་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་བདེན་འཛིན་ལ་མི་གནློད་པ་དེ་མི་འཐད་ པས་]མ་ཁབ་སེ། ཁློ་ན་ཞེས་པའི་རྣམ་བཅད་ཡློད་པའི་ཕིར། ཁློ་རང་ལ་འློ་ན་རྟག་འཛིན་ཡིན་ན་ དེའི་ཡུལ་མུ་སེགས་པས་བདག་རྟག་པར་སློ་བཏགས་པ་ལྟར་བཟུང་བས་ཁབ་པར་ཐལ། ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་ རྟག་འཛིན་གིས་[མུ་སེགས་པས་བདག་རྟག་པར་སློ་བཏགས་པ་]དེ་ལྟར་བཟུང་བའི་ཕིར༑ [ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ ཀྱི་རྟག་འཛིན་གིས་མུ་སེགས་པས་བདག་རྟག་པར་སློ་བཏགས་པ་དེ་ལྟར་བཟུང་བར་]རྟགས་ཁས། [རྟག་འཛིན་ཡིན་ན་དེའ་ི ཡུལ་མུ་སེགས་པས་བདག་རྟག་པར་སློ་བཏགས་པ་ལྟར་བཟུང་བས་ཁབ་ པར་]འདློད་ན། དུད་འགྲློ་སློགས་གྲུབ་མཐར་མ་ཞུགས་པའི་རྒྱུད་ལ་བདག་རྒྱུ་རྐྱེན་གང་ལས་མ་སྐྱེས་ པའི་རྟག་འཛིན་ཡློད་པར་ཐལ། [དུད་འགྲློ་སློགས་གྲུབ་མཐར་མ་ཞུགས་པའི་རྒྱུད་ལ་]བདག་མ་ཤི་ བར་དུ་མི་འཇིག་པའི་རྟག་འཛིན་ཡློད་པའི་ཕིར༑ [དུད་འགྲློ་སློགས་གྲུབ་མཐར་མ་ཞུགས་པའི་རྒྱུད་ ལ་བདག་མ་ཤི་བར་དུ་མི་འཇིག་པའི་རྟག་འཛིན་ཡློད་པར་]རྟགས་ས། [དུད་འགྲློ་སློགས་གྲུབ་མཐར་ མ་ཞུགས་པའི་རྒྱུད་ལ་བདག་རྒྱུ་རྐྱེན་གང་ལས་མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་རྟག་འཛིན་ཡློད་པར་]འདློད་ན། ར་བར། གང་དག་དུད་འགྲློར་བསྐལ་མང་བསྐྱལ་གྱུར་པ། །དེས་ཀྱང་མ་སྐྱེས་རྟག་འདི་མ་མཐློང་ལ། །ཞེས་ གསུངས་པ་མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ་ལློ། །གཞན་ཡང་བྱེ་མདློ་སློགས་ཀྱིས་དབུ་མར་མ་ཞུགས་ཀྱང་བདེན་ འཛིན་གི་ཞེན་ཡུལ་ལ་གནློད་པ་ཐུབ་པར་ཐལ། [མུ་སེགས་པ་དང་གྲུབ་མཐའ་སྨྲ་བ་ཁློ་ནས་བཏགས་ 133 པའི་ཡུལ་བཀག་པས་ཐློགས་མེད་ནས་ཞུགས་པའི་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་བདེན་འཛིན་ལ་མི་གནློད་པ་དེ་མི་ འཐད་པའི་]དམ་བཅའ་འཐད་པའི་ཕིར༑ This debate starts with Tsongkhapa's position that undermining the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence is not sufficient to undermine the innate apprehension of true existence. Jamyang Shaypa criticizes an opinion held by the Translator Taktshang: The Translator Taktshang [incorrectly] says that this is not logically feasible because even among innate awarenesses there are apprehensions of permanence and of former and later [phenomena] as one. Taktshang himself says in his Knowing All Tenets:180 Though there are many forms of divisions of others' and our own tenets, when they are collected by way of what are discarded and what are adopted, they are included into two because they are included into (1) those who adhere to extremes of either permanence or annihilation and (2) those who are free from extremes. The reason is that they are included into the two, those who prove and those who refute the mode of apprehension by innate mistaken awareness. Illustrations are Proponents of [Truly Existent] Things among our own and others' schools—these being other than the honorable Nāgārjuna's system— 180 Adapted from Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 646. Brackets are from Taktshang's auto-commentary. See stag tshang lo tsA ba, grub mtha' kun shes kyi rtsa 'grel (Knowing All Tenets) (pe cin, China: mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1999), 1.16-2.2, and 31.16-31.21. 134 and the system itself of the glorious protector [Nāgārjuna]. །རང་[དང་]གཞན་[གི་]གྲུབ་མཐའི་དབྱེ་བ་རྣམ་[པ་]མང་ཡང་། །[བང་བྱ་དང་དློར་བྱའི་ཚུལ་གིས་ བསྡུ་ན་གཉིས་སུ་འདུས་ཏེ། རྟག་ཆད་གང་རུང་གི་]མཐའ་ ལ་ཞེན་དང་མཐའ་བྲལ་སྨྲ་བར་འདུས་ 181 [པའི་ཕིར་ཏེ། རྒྱུ་མཚན་ནི་བློ་]ལྷན་སྐྱེས་འཁྲུལ་བའི་འཛིན་སངས་སྒྲུབ་[པར་བྱེད་པ་དང་]འགློག་ [པར་བྱེད་པ་གཉིས་སུ་འདུས་པའི་]ཕིར་[རློ]། [།མཚན་གཞི་ནི།] ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་ཞབས་[ཀྱིི་ལུགས་ལས་གཞན་ [པ་རང་གཞན་གི་སེ་པ་དངློས་པློར་སྨྲ་བ་རྣམས་]དང་[དཔལ་མགློན་འཕགས་པའི་ལུགས་]དེ་ཉིད་དློ། A little later Taktshang comments:182 This explanation that even all views of the Proponents of True Existence are posited in dependence upon innate mistaken [awareness] refutes well two great wrong conceptions:  the assertion that the two—the innate and the intellectually imbued modes of apprehension—are utterly discordant  and the assertion that the reasoning refuting the intellectually imbued mode of apprehension does not refute the innate mode of apprehension because it is indicated that the main modes of apprehension concord, and it is indicated that repudiating the intellectually conceived object greatly damages 181 182 sogs in his commentary is replaced with a line from the root verse. Adapted from ibid., 646. The Tibetan is from sTag tshang, Knowing All Tenets, 36. 135 the innate[ly conceived object]. དེ་ལྟར་དངློས་པློར་སྨྲ་བའི་ལྟ་བ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱང་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་འཁྲུལ་བ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་བཞག་པར་ བཤད་པ་འདིས་ནི། ལྷན་སྐྱེས་དང་ཀུན་བརྟགས་གཉིས་འཛིན་སངས་གཏན་མི་མཐུན་པར་འདློད་ པ་དང་། ཀུན་བརྟགས་འགློག་པའི་རིགས་པས་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་མི་ཁེགས་པར་འདློད་པའི་ལློག་རྟློག་ཆེན་པློ་ གཉིས་ལེགས་པར་བཀག་སེ། འཛིན་སངས་ཀྱི་གཙོ་བློ་མཐུན་པར་བསན་ཅིང་། ཀུན་བརྟགས་ཀྱི་ཞེན་ ཡུལ་སུན་ཕྱུང་བས་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ལ་ཤིན་ཏུ་གནློད་པར་བསན་པའི་ཕིར་རློ། Here, Taktshang asserts that if all tenets are classified by what is discarded and what is accepted by the Mādhyamikas, there are two, those who cling to the extremes of either permanence or annihilation, and those who are free from extremes. The former is indicated as the Proponents of True Existence who are non-Buddhist schools and Buddhist schools—The Cittamātrins and below, while the latter is called those who follow the teaching of Nāgārjuna—the Mādhyamikas. In his commentary, Taktshang explains that his method of classifying the Proponents of True Existence as being in dependence upon innate mistaken awareness helps to refute two misunderstandings presented by Tsongkhapa, for instance. The first misunderstanding is that the two modes of apprehension of true existence (the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence and the innate apprehension of true existence) should be utterly different from each other. The second misunderstanding is that, therefore, reasoning refuting the intellectually imbued mode of apprehension could not refute the innate mode of 136 apprehension. Taktshang refutes these wrong understandings because "it is indicated that the main modes of apprehension concord, and it is indicated that disproving the intellectually conceived object greatly damages the innately conceived object." That is, according to Taktshang's classification, since the tenets of the Proponents of True Existence are also in dependence upon innate mistaken awareness, refuting their tenets will help to damage the innate mistaken awareness unlike what he thinks Tsongkhapa asserts, and therefore, reasoning refuting the intellectually imbued mode of apprehension also can damage the innate mode of apprehension. How does Tsongkhapa present the two types of objects of negation? Before proceeding to Jamyang Shaypa's refutation, I will explain how Tsongkhapa presents the difference between the two types of objects of negation since it will lead to easier understanding of Jamyang Shaypa's refutation. Is the innate mode of apprehension of true existence different from the intellectually imbued mode of apprehension of true existence? With regard to Taktshang's first presentation that Tsongkhapa asserts that the innate apprehension of true existence is "utterly discordant" from the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence, let us consider evidence in Tsongkhapa's own writings. In his Illumination of the Thought: Extensive Explanation of (Candrakīrti's) "Entry to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle'," Tsongkhapa distinguishes the innate 137 apprehension of true existence from the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence:183 Furthermore, mere identification of (1) a true establishment that is superficially imputed by proponents of tenets and (2) [the consciousness] apprehending such true establishment is not sufficient. Because of this, it is most essential to identify well the innate apprehension of true establishment that has operated beginninglessly and exists both in those whose awarenesses have been affected through [study of] tenets and in those whose awarenesses have not been affected in this way, and to identify the true establishment apprehended by this [innate apprehension]. For if you have not identified these [the innate apprehension of true existence and the true establishment apprehended by this innate apprehension], even if you refute an object of negation through reasoning, the adherence to true establishment that has operated beginninglessly is not harmed at all, due to which the meaning at this point would be lost. །དེ་ཡང་གྲུབ་མཐའ་སྨྲ་བས་འཕལ་དུ་ཀུན་བརྟགས་པའི་བདེན་གྲུབ་དང་། བདེན་འཛིན་ངློས་ཟིན་པ་ ཙམ་གིས་མི་ཆློག་པའི་ཕིར། ཐློག་མ་མེད་པ་ནས་རེས་སུ་ཞུགས་པ། གྲུབ་མཐས་བློ་བསྒྱུར་མ་བསྒྱུར་ གཉིས་ག་ལ་ཡློད་པའི་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་བདེན་འཛིན་དང་། དེས་བཟུང་བའི་བདེན་གྲུབ་ལེགས་པར་ངློས་ 183 Adapted from Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa's Final Exposition of Wisdom, 186. The Tibetan is from tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, dbu ma la 'jug pa rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab gsal (Karnataka, India: Drepung Loseling Library Society, 1992), 129. 138 ཟིན་པ་ནི་གནད་ཤིན་ཏུ་ཆེ་སེ། དེ་ངློས་མ་ཟིན་པར་རིགས་པས་དགག་བྱ་བཀག་ཀྱང་། །ཐློག་མ་མེད་ པ་ནས་ཞུགས་པའི་བདེན་ཞེན་ལ་ཅི་ཡང་མི་གནློད་པས་སྐབས་དློན་སློར་བར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕིར་ རློ། །དེ་ཡང་ཐློག་མར་རང་གི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་བདེན་འཛིན་ངློས་ཟིན་ནས། དེའི་ཡུལ་སུན་འབྱིན་པ་ལ་རིགས་ པ་རྣམས་དངློས་དང་བརྒྱུད་པས་འགྲློ་ལུགས་ཤེས་དགློས་ཀྱི། ཁ་ཕིར་ལྟ་འབའ་ཞིག་གི་དགག་སྒྲུབ་ནི་ ཕན་ཤིན་ཏུ་ཆུང་བའི་ཕིར། This quote establishes that even if these two wrongly conceived modes of existence are both called true existence, they are very different. Tsongkhapa identifies the two modes of apprehension of true existence. If one grasps an object as truly, or inherently, existent based on one's education in tenets and/or scriptures, it should be classified as an intellectually imbued mode of apprehending the object as truly existent. However, identification of this type of apprehension of true existence as an object of negation and refutation of it are not sufficient to harm "the adherence to true establishment that has operated beginninglessly." If this type of misapprehension is the only object to be negated, it would absurdly follow that those who have neither learned any tenets nor any scriptures should have already been liberated. Since this is not the case, there should be a mode of apprehension of true existence that both educated and uneducated sentient beings commonly and beginninglessly have. Thus Tsongkhapa differentiates that this deeply rooted way of apprehending things as inherently established is the innate 139 apprehension of true existence, and thus different from the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence.184 In his Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path, Tsongkhapa also explicates how these two modes of apprehension of true existence differ. After explaining that the innate apprehension of true existence is the root ignorance,185 he says that this innate misapprehension:186 …is not an intellectually imbued apprehension of a self of persons or an intellectually imbued apprehension of a self of phenomena, as in the assertions of the truth of: - a person that is permanent, unitary, and under its own power - external objects of apprehension that are minute particles which are partless in terms of directions—east and so forth—or that are gross objects which are composites of directionally partless minute particles 184 185 However, Tsongkhapa does not explicitly say that one is coarse and the other is subtle. Tsongkhapa says: Hence, he [Candrakīrti] asserts that: - [a consciousness] apprehending an object as truly existent is an ignorance - and this itself is afflictive ignorance. Therefore, between the two modes of positing the apprehension of a self of phenomena as an afflictive emotion or as an obstruction to omniscience, here [in the Prāsaṅgika School] it is the former. ཡུལ་ལ་བདེན་པར་འཛིན་པ་མ་རིག་པ་དང། དེ་ཉིད་ཉློན་མློངས་ཅན་གི་མ་རིག་པར་བཞེད་པས་ཆློས་ཀྱི་བདག་ འཛིན་ལ་ཉློན་མློངས་དང་ཤེས་སིབ་ཏུ་འཇློག་པའི་ཚུལ་གཉིས་ཡློད་པ་ལས། འདིར་ནི་ས་མ་ལྟར་རློ། Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa's Final Exposition of Wisdom, 44. The Tibetan is from Tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa'i dpal, lam rim chung ngu, in gsung 'bum/_tsong kha pa (bkras lhun par rnying / d+ha sar bskyar par brgyab pa/), TBRC W29193.14 (Dharamsala, India: sherig parkhang, 1997), 169a.3-169a.4, http://tbrc.org/link?RID=O2DB2379|O2DB23792DB2518$W29193. 186 Ibid., 169b.6-170a.5. 140 - internal apprehending consciousnesses that are partless moments of consciousness which are temporarily partless—there being no earlier or later portions, and so forth—or a continuum of consciousness which is a series [of temporally partless moments] - self-consciousness which is non-dualistic in the sense of being empty of such apprehended object and apprehending subject these being imputed by the uncommon assertions of the non-Buddhist and [non-Consequentialist] Buddhist systems of tenets. Rather, [the ignorance described above refers to] the two innate apprehensions of self, which all those whose minds are and are not affected by tenets have in common and which have operated beginninglessly without depending on the mind's being affected by tenets. Just that [innate ignorance] is here held to be the root of cyclic existence…[B]ecause artificial ignorance occurs only in proponents of tenets, it is not feasibly the root of cyclic existence. གཉིས་པ་ནི། དེ་ལྟར་བདག་གཉིས་སུ་འཛིན་པའི་མ་རིག་པ་སར་བཤད་པ་དེ་ཡང། ཕི་ནང་གི་གྲུབ་ མཐའ་སྨྲ་བ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་འདློད་པ་ཐུན་མློང་མ་ཡིན་པས་བཏགས་པའི་གང་ཟག་རྟག་གཅིག་རང་ དབང་ཅན་དང་། གཟུང་བ་ཕིར་རློལ་གི་དློན་ཤར་ལ་སློགས་པའི་ཕློགས་ཀྱི་ཆ་མེད་ཀྱི་རྡུལ་ཕ་རབ་ དང་། དེ་བསགས་པའི་རགས་པ་དང་། འཛིན་པ་ནང་ཤེས་རིག་ས་ཕི་ལ་སློགས་པའི་དུས་ཀྱི་ཆ་མེད་ པའི་ཤེས་པ་སྐད་ཅིག་ཆ་མེད་དང་། དེ་འཐུད་པའི་ཤེས་པའི་རྒྱུན་དང་། དེ་འདྲ་བའི་གཟུང་འཛིན་ གིས་སློང་བའི་གཉིས་མེད་ཀྱི་རང་རིག་བདེན་པར་འདློད་པའི་ཀུན་བརྟགས་ཀྱི་གང་ཟག་དང་། ཆློས་ 141 ཀྱི་བདག་འཛིན་མིན་གི། གྲུབ་མཐས་བློ་བསྒྱུར་མ་བསྒྱུར་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་ཐུན་མློངས་དུ་ཡློད་པ། གྲུབ་ མཐས་བློ་བསད་པ་ལ་མི་ལྟློས་པར་ཐློག་མ་མེད་པ་ནས་རེས་སུ་ཞུགས་པ་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་བདག་འཛིན་ གཉིས་ཡིན་ལ། དེ་ཉིད་འདིར་འཁློར་བའི་ར་བར་གཟུང་སེ༏…ཀུན་བརྟགས་ཀྱི་མ་རིག་པ་ནི་གྲུབ་ མཐའ་སྨྲ་བ་དེ་དག་ཁློ་ན་ལ་ཡློད་པས་འཁློར་བའི་ར་བར་མི་འཐད་པའི་ཕིར་རློ། He explains that the innate apprehension of true existence is a way of apprehending the inherent existence of persons and phenomena, and is universally operating in all living beings from beginningless time. Furthermore, it is the root cause of cyclic existence ('khor ba, saṃsāra)—the first of the twelve links of dependent-arising. Tsongkhapa clearly distinguishes the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence from the innate misapprehension, for this acquired ignorance is merely based on "the uncommon assertions of the non-Buddhist and [non-Consequentialist] Buddhist systems of tenets," for instance, seeing a person as "permanent, unitary, and under its own power (rtag gcig rang dbang can)." This type of intellectually imbued misapprehension cannot be the innate ignorance—that is, the root cause of cyclic existence—"because intellectually imbued ignorance occurs only in proponents of tenets." 142 The difference between this innate mode of misapprehension and the intellectually imbued misapprehension is clarified by an explanation in Tsongkhapa's The Essence of Eloquence:187 Question: Then apprehending what constitutes apprehending establishment by way of [the object's] own character? Answer: Concerning this, I will speak first about how proponents of tenets [intellectually apprehend true establishment]. All of our own schools from the Vaibhāṣikas through the Svātantrikas similarly assert that: Upon examining the meaning of the imputation of the convention, person, in the imputation of the [verbal] convention, "This person did this action [and] will undergo this effect," examining whether his/her own aggregates themselves are the person or whether an object other than them is the person, an accumulator of karma (las gsog pa po) and so forth can be posited if a place [or way] of positing the person arises through finding any of the positions—being the same, being a different object, and so forth. If such [that is, being the same, being different, and so forth] is not found, they cannot posit [an accumulator of karma] and so forth. Therefore, when, not being satisfied with just the imputation of the [verbal] convention "person," [the person] is posited upon analyzing and examining the status of 187 Hopkins, Emptiness in the Consequence School of Buddhism: Dynamic Responses to Tsong-kha-pa's The Essence of Eloquence: Volume 4, unpublished manuscript, 24-25. The Tibetan is from Tsong kha pa, drang nges legs bshad snying po, 66b.1-68b.3. 143 the basis of imputation to which that [verbal] convention is imputed, it is being posited that the person is established by way of its own character. All of our own schools from the Vaibhāṣikas through the Svātantrikas similarly assert such. This is similarly the case with compounded phenomena such as forms, feelings, and so forth and is also suitable with respect to uncompounded phenomena [as in] the Sautrāntikas positing the non-affirming negative—that is the mere elimination of obstructive tangible objects—as space, on up [through the positing of other uncompounded phenomena in these systems]. When all that is asserted as established as by valid cognition is posited as existent, if—when they examine how an object that is a basis of the affixing of the respective nominal convention is established—there is no object found by that [examination], they cannot posit it as existent. Hence, they posit the opposite of that as existent [that is, they can posit as existent only something that is findable under such analysis, and thus for them whatever exists is established by way of its own character]. དང་པློ་ནི། འློ་ན་ཇི་འདྲ་ཞིག་ཏུ་བཟུང་ན་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་གྲུབ་པར་བཟུང་བ་ཡིན་ཞེ་ན། འདི་ལ་ཐློག་མར་གྲུབ་མཐའ་སྨྲ་བའི་ལུགས་བརློད་པར་བྱ་སེ། གང་ཟག་འདིས་ལས་འདི་བྱས་ སློ། །འབྲས་བུ་འདི་མློང་ངློ་ཞེས་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་བཏགས་པ་ལ་རང་གི་ཕུང་པློ་འདི་ཉིད་གང་ཟག་ཡིན་ ནམ་འློན་ཏེ་དེ་དག་ལས་དློན་གཞན་ཞེས་གང་ཟག་གི་ཐ་སྙད་བཏགས་པ་དེའི་དློན་བཙལ་ཏེ། དློན་ 144 གཅིག་པའི་དློན་ཐ་དད་ལ་སློགས་པའི་ཕློགས་གང་རུང་ཞིག་རེད་ནས་གང་ཟག་དེ་འཇློག་ས་བྱུང་ན་ ལས་གསློག་པ་པློ་ལ་སློགས་པར་འཇློག་ནུས་ལ། མ་རེད་ན་འཇློག་མི་ནུས་པས་གང་ཟག་གི་ཐ་སྙད་ བཏགས་པ་ཙམ་གིས་མི་ཚིམ་པར་དེའི་ཐ་སྙད་གང་ལ་བཏགས་པའི་བཏགས་གཞི་དེ་ཇི་ལྟར་ཡིན་ དཔྱད་ཅིང་བཙལ་ནས་འཇློག་ན་གང་ཟག་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་གྲུབ་པར་འཇློག་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། རང་ སེ་བྱེ་བྲག་ཏུ་སྨྲ་བ་ནས་དབུ་མ་རང་རྒྱུད་པའི་བར་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱིས་དེ་བཞིན་དུ་འདློད་དློ། །དེ་བཞིན་ དུ་གཟུགས་དང་ཚོར་བ་ལ་སློགས་པའི་ཆློས་འདུས་བྱས་དང་། འདུས་མ་བྱས་ཀྱི་ཆློས་ཐ་ན་མདློ་སེ་ པས་ཐློགས་པའི་རེག་བྱ་རྣམ་པར་བཅད་ཙམ་གི་མེད་དགག་ལ་ནམ་མཁར་བཞག་པ་ཡིན་ཆད་ཀྱང་ རུང་སེ། ཚད་མས་གྲུབ་པར་འདློད་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཡློད་པར་འཇློག་པ་ན་རང་རང་གི་མིང་གི་ཐ་སྙད་ འཇུག་པའི་འཇུག་གཞིའ་ི དློན་དེ་ཇི་འདྲ་ཞིག་ཏུ་གྲུབ་པ་བཙལ་བ་ན་དེས་རེད་པའི་དློན་མེད་ན་ ཡློད་པར་འཇློག་མི་ནུས་པས་དེ་ལས་བཟླློག་པ་ལ་ཡློད་པར་འཇློག་གློ། Tsongkhapa gives as examples of the intellectually imbued misapprehension by Proponents of Buddhist tenets from the Vaibhāṣikas to the Svātantrikas. The theory of karma requires an agent who accumulates and receives karmic retribution; they analyze "whether his/her own aggregates themselves are the person or whether an object other than them is the person." Through this analysis, if they can find a person—that is, the agent of karma—through such analysis, that means that this person is established by way of its own character (rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa). 145 As we have seen, Tsongkhapa clearly presents that the two modes of misapprehension are very different from each other in terms of how they are identified. 188 Here is a summary: Name Innate apprehension of true existence Intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence Holder All living beings Only those who are polluted by learning tenets and/or scriptures Identity Root ignorance (ma rig pa, avidyā) Secondary ignorance (Misapprehension upon analysis by reasoning) 188 A remaining issue with regard to presenting the difference between the innate apprehension of true existence and the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence is about the difference in terms of object of observation (dmigs pa), or the basis of conjuring (sprul gzhi) between the two misapprehensions. For example, Tsongkhapa says in his Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment: Regarding a conception of self that is an intellectually imbued view of the perishing aggregates [as I and mine], it does not appear to be definite, as in the case of some Saṃmitīya schools, which [propound] a conception of self upon observing the aggregates. However, regarding an innate view of the perishing aggregates [as I and mine], Candrakīrti’s Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle Way” refutes that the aggregates are the object of observation and his [Auto]commentary on the Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle Way” says that the dependently imputed self is the object of observation. Hence, [an innate view of the perishing aggregates as I and mine] does not take the aggregates as its object of observation, but rather observes the mere person. འཇིག་ལྟ་ཀུན་བརྟགས་ཀྱི་བདག་འཛིན་ལ་མང་པློས་བཀུར་བའི་སེ་པ་འགའ་ཞིག་གིས་ཕུང་པློ་ལ་དམིགས་ནས་བདག་ཏུ་འཛིན་པ་ ལྟར་ངེས་པ་མི་སྣང་ཡང་འཇིག་ལྟ་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ནི་འཇུག་པར་ཕུང་པློ་དམིགས་པ་ཡིན་པ་བཀག་ཅིང་འགྲེལ་པར་བརྟེན་ནས་བཏགས་ པའི་བདག་དམིགས་པར་གསུངས་པས་ཕུང་པློ་ལ་དམིགས་པར་མི་བྱེད་ཀྱི། གང་ཟག་ཙམ་ཞིག་དམིགས་པའློ། See Tsong kha pa, Selections from The Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment by Tsong-ka-pa Lo-sang-drak-pa: Fulfilling the Prerequisites for Special Insight: Identifying Scripture Requiring Interpretation and Scriptures of Definitive Meaning, the History of Commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Thought, and How to Settle the View of Emptiness, tr. Elizabeth Napper, unpublished manuscript, 208. The Tibetan is from tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, "lam rim chen mo," In gsung 'bum/ tsong kha pa/ bkras lhun par rnying / d+ha sar bskyar par brgyab pa. TBRC W29193.13 (Dharamsala, India: Sherig parkhang, 1997), 426b.5-426b.6, http://tbrc.org/link?RID=O2DB2379|O2DB23792DB25162DB29922DB2993$W29193. Another remaining issue is how to explicate the division between the innate view of the transitory collection of the aggregates ('jig lta lhan skyes) and the intellectually imbued view of the transitory collection of the aggregates ('jig lta kun brtags). 146 Tsongkhapa does indeed hold that the two—innate and intellectually imbued modes of apprehension—are discordant, but are they utterly discordant? Can the refutation of the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence harm the innate apprehension of true existence? In Tsongkhapa's system, the discordance between the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence and the innate apprehension of true existence does not necessarily mean that these two modes of apprehension of true existence are utterly discordant. That is, it is not that negation of the intellectually imbued misapprehension of true existence does not influence the refutation of the innate misapprehension. As cited above, in his Illumination of the Thought, he describes that mere identification of the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence is not sufficient (see page 137):189 Furthermore, mere identification of (1) a true establishment that is superficially imputed by proponents of tenets and (2) [the consciousness] apprehending such true establishment is not sufficient. Yet, in his Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path, Tsongkhapa describes that refuting the intellectually imbued misapprehension is a part of process to stopping the innate misapprehension:190 Just that [innate ignorance] is here held to be the root of cyclic existence: 189 See page 5. Adapted from Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa's Final Exposition of Wisdom, 47. The Tibetan is from Tsong kha pa, lam rim chung ngu, 170a.3-170b.3. 190 147 • because through the reasoning of the statement in Candrakīrti's Entry to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle": This non-produced permanent [self imputed by false systems] is not perceived By those spending many eons as animals, Yet consciousnesses apprehending "I" are seen to operate in them. [it can be understood that] what binds sentient beings in cyclic existence is innate ignorance, and • because artificial ignorance occurs only in proponents of tenets, it is not feasibly the root of cyclic existence. Gaining discerning ascertainment about this is crucial. If you do not understand this, you will not know, when delineating [emptiness] through the view, to hold as chief the ascertainment that objects as apprehended by innate ignorance are non-existent and that the objects of intellectually imbued apprehensions are repudiated as a branch of this [process]. If the two selves are negated within neglecting to refute the mode of apprehension by innate ignorance, you will ascertain merely a selflessness that negates imputations only by proponents of tenets mentioned above. Consequently, even during meditation you will have to meditate only on such, since delineation by way of the view is for the sake of meditation. 148 Therefore, even if [the emptiness of such an artificially apprehended self] were made manifest through meditating on it and even if familiarization with it were brought to completion, it would be subsumed within being only that. And, it would be very absurd to assert that through seeing the nonexistence of the two selves merely as imputed by such intellectually imbued apprehensions, the innate afflictive emotions are overcome. དེ་ཉིད་འདིར་འཁློར་བའི་ར་བར་གཟུང་སེ༏་འཇུག་པ་ལས། གང་དག་དུད་འགྲློར་བསྐལ་མང་བསྐྱལ་ གྱུར་པ། །དེས་ཀྱང་མ་སྐྱེས་རྟག་འདི་མ་མཐློང་ལ། །ངར་འཛིན་དེ་དག་ལ་ཡང་འཇུག་མཐློང་སེ། ཞེས་ གསུངས་པའི་རིགས་པས་སེམས་ཅན་ཐམས་ཅད་འཁློར་བར་འཆིང་བ་ནི་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་མ་རིག་པ་ ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར་དང།་ཀུན་བརྟགས་ཀྱི་མ་རིག་པ་ནི་གྲུབ་མཐའ་སྨྲ་བ་དེ་དག་ཁློ་ན་ལ་ཡློད་པས་འཁློར་ བའི་ར་བར་མི་འཐད་པའི་ཕིར་རློ། །འདི་ལ་ངེས་པ་དམིགས་ཕེད་པར་རེད་པ་ཤིན་ཏུ་གལ་ཆེ་སེ། དེ་ ལྟར་མ་ཤེས་ན་ནི་ལྟ་བས་གཏན་ལ་འབེབས་པའི་དུས་སུ་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་མ་རིག་པས་ཇི་ལྟར་བཟུང་ བའི་དློན་མེད་པར་གཏན་ལ་འབེབས་པ་གཙོ་བློར་བཟུང་ནས་དེའི་ཡན་ལག་ཏུ་ཀུན་བརྟགས་ཀྱི་ འཛིན་པའི་ཡུལ་རྣམས་སུན་འབྱིན་པ་མི་ཤེས་པར་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་མ་རིག་པའི་འཛིན་སངས་སུན་ འབྱིན་པ་དློར་ནས་བདག་གཉིས་འགློག་པ་ན་སར་བཤད་པ་ལྟར་གི་གྲུབ་མཐའ་སྨྲ་བ་རྣམས་ཁློ་ནས་ བཏགས་པ་རྣམས་བཀག་པའི་བདག་མེད་ཙམ་ཞིག་གཏན་ལ་འབེབས་པས། སློམ་པའི་ཚེ་ཡང་དེ་ ཙམ་ཞིག་སློམ་དགློས་ཏེ། ལྟ་བས་གཏན་ལ་ཕབ་པ་ནི་སློམ་པའི་དློན་དུ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར་རློ། །དེའི་ཕིར་ བསློམས་ནས་མངློན་དུ་གྱུར་པ་དང་། གློམས་པ་དེ་མཐར་ཐུག་ན་ཡང་དེ་ཙམ་ཞིག་ཏུ་ཟད་ལ། དེ་ 149 ལྟར་ཀུན་བརྟགས་ཀྱི་འཛིན་པས་བཏགས་པ་ཙམ་གི་བདག་གཉིས་མེད་པར་མཐློང་བས། ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ ཀྱི་ཉློན་མློངས་རྣམས་ལློག་པར་འདློད་ན་ཧ་ཅང་ཐལ་ཏེ། Here, Tsongkhapa describes that the repudiation (sun 'byin pa) of the innate misapprehension is primary, and that the negating of the intellectually imbued apprehension is subsidiary in the process of repudiating the innate misapprehension. With regard to the procedure of repudiating the two selves, he warns not to neglect identifying the innate misapprehension. Otherwise, if only the intellectually constructed self of persons and self of phenomena are negated through analysis and meditation, one will be confined to negating the intellectually constructed misapprehension with the prime target still left to be negated. Thus, one should not be content only with negation of the intellectual misapprehension, but step forward to identify and repudiate the innate misapprehension. Nevertheless, Tsongkhapa sees the repudiation of the intellectually imbued apprehension as a branch of the process of repudiating the innate misapprehension. Thus, it seems that the two are not utterly disconnected. In a similar context, in his The Essence of Eloquence, Tsongkhapa brings up an introductory question based on three points that are crucial to Tsongkhapa's system: That is, (1) since the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence—apprehending objects upon analysis as existing inherently in the sense of being established by way of their own character—is not the innate apprehension of true existence, and (2) since that which binds sentient beings in cyclic existence is just the innate misapprehension, (3) 150 therefore the innate misapprehension of true existence must mainly be what is refuted by the reasoning. Tsongkhapa says:191 Question: Apprehending [objects] as existing inherently in the sense of being established by way of their own character upon analyzing the meaning of conventions is not the mode of apprehension by an innate consciousness apprehending self. Rather, that which binds sentient beings in cyclic existence is just the innate [apprehension of self, that is, objects as existing inherently in the sense of being established by way of their own character]; therefore, just it must mainly be what is refuted by the reasoning. Hence, what is its mode of apprehension? Answer: It apprehends external and internal phenomena as not just posited through the force of conventions but as existing by way of their own entities. Furthermore, when such is apprehended with respect to persons— Devadatta and so forth—it is an apprehension of a self of persons, and when such is apprehended with respect to phenomena—an eye, an ear, and so forth—it is an apprehension of a self of phenomena. Through those, the two selves [of persons and of phenomena] also should be understood [as the inherent existence of persons and the inherent existence of phenomena]. Apprehension in this manner is not apprehension upon analyzing what 191 Hopkins, Emptiness in the Consequence School of Buddhism: Dynamic Responses to Tsong-kha-pa's The Essence of Eloquence: Volume 4, 32. The Tibetan is from Tsong kha pa, drang nges legs bshad snying po, 70a.1-70b.2. 151 the meaning of a convention is; nevertheless, if an object as apprehended by this [sort of unanalytical misapprehension] did exist, it would have to be found by an analytical [consciousness] when it analyzes how the place imputed with that convention exists. Therefore, it is not contradictory that the unanalytical innate apprehension of self as well as its objects is the main object of reasoned refutation but that in the texts only analytical refutation occurs. Hence, do not hold that only intellectually imbued apprehensions as well as their objects are refuted. དེ་ལྟར་ཐ་སྙད་ཀྱི་དློན་ལ་དཔྱད་ནས་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་གྲུབ་པའི་རང་བཞིན་ཡློད་པར་འཛིན་ པ་ནི་བདག་འཛིན་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་འཛིན་ཚུལ་མིན་ལ། སེམས་ཅན་འཁློར་བར་འཆིང་བ་ནི་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ ཉིད་ཡིན་པས་དེ་ཉིད་རིགས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་གཙོ་བློར་དགག་དགློས་པས་དེའི་འཛིན་ཚུལ་ཇི་ལྟར་ ཡིན་ཞེ་ན། དེ་ནི་ཕི་ནང་གི་ཆློས་རྣམས་ཐ་སྙད་ཀྱི་དབང་གིས་བཞག་པ་ཙམ་མིན་པར་རང་གི་ངློ་བློའི་སློ་ནས་ ཡློད་པར་འཛིན་པ་སེ། དེ་ཡང་མཆློད་སྦྱིན་ལ་སློགས་པའི་གང་ཟག་ལ་དེ་ལྟར་འཛིན་ན་གང་ཟག་གི་ བདག་འཛིན་དང་མིག་རྣ་ལ་སློགས་པའི་ཆློས་ལ་དེ་ལྟར་འཛིན་ན་ཆློས་ཀྱི་བདག་འཛིན་ཡིན་ལ་དས་ བདག་གཉིས་ཀྱང་ཤེས་པར་བྱའློ། །འདི་ལྟར་བཟུང་བ་དེས་ཐ་སྙད་ཀྱི་དློན་གང་ཡིན་དཔྱད་ནས་ བཟུང་བ་མིན་ཀྱང་འདིས་བཟུང་བ་ལྟར་གི་དློན་དེ་ཡློད་ན། དེའི་ཐ་སྙད་བཏགས་པའི་བཏགས་ས་དེ་ ཇི་ལྟར་ཡློད་དཔྱད་པ་ན་དཔྱློད་བྱེད་ཀྱིས་རེད་དགློས་སློ། །དེས་ན་མ་དཔྱད་པའི་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་བདག་ 152 འཛིན་ཡུལ་དང་བཅས་པ་རིགས་པའི་དགག་བྱའི་གཙོ་བློ་ཡིན་པ་དང་། གཞུང་རྣམས་ནས་དཔྱད་ ནས་འགློག་པ་ཤ་སག་འབྱུང་བ་ཡང་མི་འགལ་བས་ཀུན་བརྟགས་ཀྱི་འཛིན་པ་ཡུལ་བཅས་ཁློ་ན་ འགློག་གློ་སྙམ་དུ་མི་བཟུང་ངློ་། Tsongkhapa describes that the innate misapprehension is unanalytical as opposed to the intellectually imbued misapprehension. For that reason, phenomena are merely conceived by this innate misapprehension "as existing by way of their own entities." Innately misapprehended true existence is of two types: true existence of persons and true existence of phenomena, which are called a self of persons and a self of phenomena. Although these two types of true existence have discordant substrata, the mistaken consciousnesses apprehending them have the same mode of misapprehension, which is to apprehend these as truly existent. Therefore, these two types of true establishment are differentiated by which substratum is misapprehended. For example, if a person like Devadatta is apprehended as inherently existent, this misconceived inherent existence is a self of persons whereas if an eye, an ear, and so forth are mistakenly apprehended as inherently existent, this misconceived inherent existence is a self of phenomena. In usual circumstances, when, for example, one sees a chariot or a car, one does not analyze whether this chariot is produced from itself and so forth, but, without analysis, apprehends it as truly existent, or inherently existent, or in other words existing by way of its own character. That is, an apprehension of a chariot as an inherent existent does not 153 require analysis to apprehend it in that way; therefore, this mode of apprehension is nonanalytical, and thereby it can be the innate misapprehension. Nevertheless, Tsongkhapa makes nonanalytical analysis relevant to analytical refutation by making the crucial distinction that if the object did exist so concretely, it would have to exist in one of these analytical ways: for instance, produced from self, both, other, or neither; or, be found in one of the seven ways that Candrakīrti lists.192 For example, if a chariot truly exists:193 (1) the chariot should be inherently the same entity as its the parts that are its basis of imputation, or (2) the chariot should be inherently other than its own parts, or (3) the chariot's parts should inherently depend on the chariot, or (4) the chariot should inherently depend on its parts, or (5) the chariot should inherently possess its parts, or (6) the chariot should be just the composite of its parts, or (7) the shape of the composite of the parts should be the chariot. The list of Candrakīrti's sevenfold reasoning is adapted from Jeffrey Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness (Boston, MA: Wisdom Publications, 1996), 178-179. According to Hopkins, this sevenfold reasoning is developed from Nāgārjuna's fivefold reasoning: The fivefold reasoning as stated in Nāgārjuna's Treatise on the Middle Way is: The self does not inherently exist because of (1) not being the aggregates, (2) not being other than the aggregates, (3) not being the base of the aggregates, (4) not depending on the aggregates, and (5) not possessing the aggregates. An example is a chariot. The reason is fivefold, and thus it is called the fivefold reasoning. Chandrakīrti added two more 'corners' to the reason: (6) not being the shape of the aggregates, and (7) not being the composite of the aggregates. 193 Adapted from Hopkins' explanation of the seven fold reasoning. See ibid, 180. 192 154 In this way, Tsongkhapa says that the innate misapprehension—that which binds sentient beings to cyclic existence—is what is mainly refuted by reasoning. In addition, although the intellectually imbued misapprehension as well as its object is not the main object of negation by reasoning, it also is refuted by the same reasoning. This exposition of the two types of object of negation is different from what Taktshang presents as Tsongkhapa's idea. I will cite the second part of Taktshang's characterization of Tsongkhapa's position again for our discussion:  the assertion that the reasoning refuting the intellectually imbued mode of apprehension does not refute the innate mode of apprehension. According to this, Tsongkhapa should assert that this reasoning can negate the intellectually imbued misapprehension, but cannot refute the innate misapprehension; however, Tsongkhapa's own presentation posits the opposite position, namely, that the innate misapprehension is the main object of negation by reasoning, and the intellectually imbued misapprehension is the secondary object negated by reasoning. Therefore, we can conclude that Taktshang's understanding of Tsongkhapa's point here is either defective or deliberately twisted. In summary, Tsongkhapa does not say, unlike Taktshang's claim, that this type of reasoning only refutes the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence because of the discordance between the innate misapprehension and the intellectually imbued misapprehension. Among the two claims that represent how Taktshang understands Tsongkhapa: 155  the assertion that the two—the innate and the intellectually imbued modes of apprehension—are utterly discordant  and the assertion that the reasonings refuting the intellectually imbued mode of apprehension do not refute the innate mode of apprehension Tsongkhapa would likely agree with the former in the limited sense that these two types of misapprehension are discordant, but not utterly. However, it is clear that he would deny the latter; rather, he would agree with Taktshang that the innate misapprehension should be refuted by the same reasoning. To show how the two types of misapprehension are linked, let us present Tsongkhapa's assertion in a chart. Table 2: Discordant aspects of the two types of misapprehension of true existence Mode of apprehension Priority as being refuted by reasoning Identity Bearer of the misapprehension 194 195 Innate misapprehension and its objects Non-analytical: apprehending as not posited through the force of conventions but as existing by way of their own entities194 Main object refuted by reasoning Root ignorance All living beings Intellectually imbued misapprehension and its objects Analytical: apprehending as being able to bear analysis195 Secondary object refuted by reasoning Secondary ignorance (Misapprehension upon analysis by reasoning) Only those who are polluted by learning tenets ཐ་སྙད་ཀྱི་དབང་གིས་བཞག་པ་ཙམ་མིན་པར་རང་གི་ངློ་བློའི་སློ་ནས་ཡློད་པར་འཛིན་པ། རིགས་པས་དཔྱད་བཟློད་དུ་གྲུབ་པར་འཛིན་པ། 156 Table 3: Concordant aspects of the two types of true existence Mode of refutation Necessity to be established as able to bear analysis by reasoning Innately misapprehended true existence Reasoning Despite not being apprehended as being able to bear analysis, if it did exist in the way it is apprehended, it must be established as able to bear analysis196 Intellectually misapprehended true existence Reasoning Since it is apprehended as being able to bear analysis, it must be established as able to bear analysis197 Having identified that Taktshang does not correctly reflect Tsongkhapa's presentation of the connection between the two types of misapprehension, now let us examine how Jamyang Shaypa refutes Taktshang in the seventh refutation. Jamyang Shaypa's refutation of Taktshang's criticism of Tsongkhapa's thought Does Jamyang Shaypa really convey Taktshang's criticism? As quoted at the beginning of this chapter, Jamyang Shaypa briefly presents Tsongkhapa's idea of the two types of misapprehension and Taktshang's criticism of it: Moreover, with respect to the statement in Tsongkhapa's Explanation [of (Candrakīrti's) "Entry to (Nāgārjuna’s) 'Treatise on the Middle'"] and so forth that refutation of objects imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly, the Translator Taktshang [incorrectly] says that this [that is, Tsongkhapa's assertion that refutation of objects imputed only by Forders and 196 197 རིགས་པས་དཔྱད་བཟློད་དུ་གྲུབ་པར་མི་འཛིན་ཀྱང་འཛིན་ཚུལ་ནང་བཞིན་ཡློད་ན་རིགས་པས་དཔྱད་བཟློད་དུ་གྲུབ་དགློས། རིགས་པས་དཔྱད་བཟློད་དུ་གྲུབ་པར་འཛིན་པས་རིགས་པས་དཔྱད་བཟློད་དུ་གྲུབ་དགློས། 157 Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly] is not logically feasible because even among innate awarenesses there are apprehensions of permanence and of former and later [phenomena] as one. Jamyang Shaypa epitomizes Tsongkhapa's system of the two types of misapprehension by saying "Refutation of objects imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly." As I showed above, we find this information in Tsongkhapa's several statements cited above such as from his Illumination of the Thought: Because of this, it is most essential to identify well the innate apprehension of true establishment that has operated beginninglessly and exists both in those whose awarenesses have been affected through [study of] tenets and in those whose awarenesses have not been affected in this way, and to identify the true establishment apprehended by this [mind]. For if you have not identified these, even if you refute an object of negation through reasoning, the adherence to true establishment that has operated beginninglessly is not harmed at all, due to which the meaning at this point would be lost. Tsongkhapa explains that identification of the innate misapprehension and of the true establishment misapprehended in this way is most essential since it is universal to both those who are influenced by tenets and those who are uneducated. Since an intellectually 158 imbued misapprehension is a type of misapprehension only by those whose minds are influenced by tenets, it cannot be universal, and thus even after refuting its object which is a type of falsely imagined true establishment, the actual aim, damaging the innate misapprehension, has not occurred. Reflecting this description, Jamyang Shaypa's statement "Refutation of objects imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly" means that mere refutation of objects imagined by the intellectually imbued misapprehension does not damage the innate misapprehension, since the root ignorance is still active. Thus, if one is satisfied only with refutation of objects imputed by non-Buddhist Indian proponents of tenets (called Forders) and Buddhist Proponents of Tenets lower than the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas and if one stops pushing forward one's reasoning to identify the innate misapprehension and the true establishment apprehended by it, the fundamental misapprehension of phenomena cannot be rooted out. Against this, Taktshang asserts, according to Jamyang Shaypa, that Tsongkhapa's presentation is wrong "because even among innate awarenesses there are apprehensions of permanence and of former and later [phenomena] as one." Let us convert Taktshang's criticism of Tsongkhapa into a thesis and a reason: Jamyang Shaypa's rendition of Taktshang: Thesis: Tsongkhapa's opinion—that is, that refutation of objects imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly—is not 159 logically feasible Reason: because even among innate awarenesses there are apprehensions of permanence and of former and later [phenomena] as one. Does Jamyang Shaypa’s rendition of Taktshang’s criticism reflect Tsongkhapa's position correctly? Tsongkhapa says in his Illumination of the Thought:198 Furthermore, mere identification of (1) a true establishment that is superficially imputed by proponents of tenets and (2) [the consciousness] apprehending such true establishment is not sufficient. Since Tsongkhapa clearly points out that a true establishment superficially imputed by proponents of tenets and its way of apprehension is not sufficient, the word "only" that Jamyang Shaypa interpolates is implied by the context. Therefore, Jamyang Shaypa depicts Tsongkhapa's position well. Then, does Jamyang Shaypa present Taktshang's rendition of Tsongkhapa's position correctly? Jamyang Shaypa claims that Taktshang depicts Tsongkhapa as saying: Moreover, with respect to the statement in Tsongkhapa's Explanation [of (Candrakīrti's) "Entry to (Nāgārjuna’s) 'Treatise on the Middle'"] and so forth that refutation of objects imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly, the Translator Taktshang [incorrectly] says that this [that is, 198 Hopkins, Final Exposition of Wisdom, 186. 160 Tsongkhapa's assertion that refutation of objects imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly] is not logically feasible… Since as mentioned above (see page 134), Taktshang says: 199 This explanation that even all views of the Proponents of True Existence are posited in dependence upon innate mistaken [awareness] refutes well two great wrong conceptions:  the assertion that the two—the innate and the intellectually imbued modes of apprehension—are utterly discordant  and the assertion that the reasoning refuting the intellectually imbued mode of apprehension does not refute the innate mode of apprehension because it is indicated that the main modes of apprehension concord, and it is indicated that repudiating the intellectually conceived object greatly damages the innate[ly conceived object]. Jamyang Shaypa's depiction of Taktshang's position is correct. "Refutes" in Taktshang's statement justifies "not logically feasible" in Jamyang Shaypa's rendition, and the discordance between the two types of true existence in Taktshang's statement justifies "objects imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly." Then, does Jamyang Shaypa correctly present Taktshang's reason for this thesis? Jamyang Shaypa says: 199 Adapted from Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 646. The Tibetan is from sTag tshang, Knowing All Tenets, 36. 161 because even among innate awarenesses there are apprehensions of permanence and of former and later [phenomena] as one Jamyang Shaypa's depiction of Taktshang's reason is correctly reflected in Taktshang's Knowing All Tenets where he says immediately after the previous quote:200 Otherwise, there is much damage because: It [absurdly] follows that a person whose awareness has not been affected by tenets does not have apprehension of last year's self and this year's self as one and does not have apprehension of oneself who went to the east and oneself who went to the west as a partless whole. །གཞན་དུ་ན་གནློད་པ་མང་སེ། གྲུབ་མཐས་བློ་མ་བསྒྱུར་བའི་གང་ཟག་ལ་ན་ནིང་དང་ད་ལློའི་བདག་ གཅིག་ཏུ་འཛིན་པ་དང་། ཤར་དང་ནུབ་ཏུ་ཕིན་པའི་བདག་གཉིས་རིལ་པློ་ཆ་མེད་དུ་འཛིན་པ་མེད་ པར་ཐལ་བ་དང་། In Taktshang's statement, "a person whose awareness has not been affected by tenets" justifies Jamyang Shaypa's depiction of "innate awarenesses," and Taktshang's "last year's self and this year's self as one" justifies Jamyang Shaypa's usage of the same. Thus, at least here Jamyang Shaypa correctly presents Taktshang's position in both thesis and reason. If we convert the reason clause of Taktshang's passage above into Taktshang's position, it becomes: A person whose awareness has not been affected by tenets has apprehension 200 Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 646. The Tibetan is from Taktshang, Knowing All Tenets, 36.11-36.14. 162 of last year's self and this year's self as one and has apprehension of oneself who went to the east and oneself who went to the west as a partless whole. This statement describes that a person who has not studied tenets also has two types of misapprehensions of permanence: 1) temporally permanent "I" and 2) spatially unitary "I" as a partless whole. Beings experience these two types of misconception regardless of influence by tenet systems, and hence, these two types of misapprehensions are innate. Because these two misapprehensions of permanence are innate, Taktshang asserts that "even among innate awarenesses there are apprehensions of permanence and of former and later [phenomena] as one." Jamyang Shaypa undoubtly agrees with this; however, these two innate misapprehensions of permanence would not seem to be innate misapprehensions of true existence. According to Tsongkhapa, the innate misapprehension of true existence in Prāsaṅgika can be identified as it was above:201 (brackets mine) It [that is, the innate misapprehension] apprehends external and internal phenomena as not just posited through the force of conventions but as existing by way of their own entities. དེ་ནི་ཕི་ནང་གི་ཆློས་རྣམས་ཐ་སྙད་ཀྱི་དབང་གིས་བཞག་པ་ཙམ་མིན་པར་རང་གི་ངློ་བློའི་ སློ་ནས་ཡློད་པར་འཛིན་པ་སེ། 201 Hopkins, Emptiness in the Consequence School of Buddhism: Dynamic Responses to Tsong-kha-pa's The Essence of Eloquence: Volume 4, 32. The Tibetan is from Tsong kha pa, drang nges legs bshad snying po, 70a.3. 163 Through this innate misapprehension, from beginningless time all living beings mistakenly apprehend inner and outer phenomena as though they exist by way of their own entities, that is, truly exist without penetrating them as existing merely through the force of conventions. In this light, although Taktshang’s example is two types of innate misapprehension, it cannot be the innate misapprehension of true existence. For, the innate misapprehension of permanence is not the misapprehension of true existence. For instance, even if one perceives oneself today as being the same with yesterday and as a partless whole, this is not the innate misapprehension of oneself as existing by way of one’s own entity. Could it be that Taktshang did not realize the difference in subtlety between the innate misapprehensions of permanence and the innate misapprehension of true existence? It is difficult to think that Taktshang did not recognize the difference. How could Taktshang make this seemingly obvious mistake? But, then what is his purpose in raising these issues about the innate misapprehensions of permanence? There might be two ways to understand Taktshang's thought. First, he might draw a parallel between the repudiation of the innate misapprehensions of permanence and of true existence. Even though Taktshang would recognize that those two types of innate misapprehension of permanence are not the innate misapprehension of true existence, nevertheless just as refuting the intellectually imbued misapprehension of permanence can damage the innate misapprehension of permanence, so refuting the intellectually imbued misapprehension of true existence can also damage the innate misapprehension of true existence. In this way, Taktshang might intend to draw a parallel between the 164 repudiation of the innate misapprehension of permanence and the repudiation of the innate misapprehension of true existence. Second, through linking the innate misapprehensions of permanence to the intellectually imbued misapprehension of true existence as an integral part of it, Taktshang might think that the refutation of the intellectually imbued misapprehension of true existence can greatly damage the innate misapprehension of true existence. However, since Taktshang did not give any further evidence, it is difficult to come to a decision without doing more research which is not possible here. For this reason, I will focus on how Jamyang Shaypa leads Taktshang to contradict himself. We will return to these two possibilities later after walking through Jamyang Shaypa’s refutation of Taktshang. Jamyang Shaypa’s criticism of Taktshang In order to present Jamyang Shaypa’s strategy against Taktshang, I will recount this debate from the beginning: Moreover, with respect to the statement in Tsongkhapa's Explanation [of (Candrakīrti's) "Entry to (Nāgārjuna’s) 'Treatise on the Middle'"] and so forth that refutation of objects imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly, the Translator Taktshang [incorrectly] says that this is not logically feasible because even among innate awarenesses there are apprehensions of permanence and of former and later [phenomena] as one. 165 Jamyang Shaypa starts by presenting Tsongkhapa’s position that the mere refutation of the intellectually imbued misapprehension of true existence does not harm the innate misapprehension of true existence. Taktshang opposes Tsongkhapa’s position because “even among innate awarenesses there are apprehensions of permanence and of former and later [phenomena] as one.” With regard to Taktshang’s objection Jamyang Shaypa responds: There is no entailment [that if even among innate awarenesses there are apprehensions of permanence and of former and later (phenomena) as one, Tsongkhapa's statement that refutation of objects imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly is not logically feasible,] because there is something eliminated by "only." While Jamyang Shaypa accepts that the misapprehensions of permanence and of former and later phenomena as one can be innate, he points out that the possible innateness of the misapprehensions of permanence and the innate misapprehension of former and later phenomena as one does not disprove Tsongkhapa’s position. As Jamyang Shaypa emphasizes, the crucial difference between Tsongkhapa’s and Taktshang’s positions is "only" in Tsongkhapa's statement according to Jamyang Shaypa’s summary: Refutation of objects imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly 166 As indicated above (page 137), Jamyang Shaypa accurately describes Tsongkhapa’s position in his Illumination of the Thought: Extensive Explanation of (Candrakīrti's) "Entry to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle'": For if you have not identified these [the innate apprehension of true existence and the true establishment apprehended by this innate apprehension], even if you refute an object of negation through reasoning, the adherence to true establishment that has operated beginninglessly is not harmed at all, due to which the meaning at this point would be lost. In Jamyang Shaypa’s presentation of Tsongkhapa’s thought, “objects imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets” includes the intellectually misapprehended true existence, and therefore, as Jamyang Shaypa posits, Tsongkhapa states that mere refutation of the intellectually misapprehended true existence cannot damage the innately misapprehended true existence. Then how does Jamyang Shaypa disprove Taktshang with “only”? Jamyang Shaypa develops his argument in two ways. First, he draws Taktshang into an absurd consequence that Taktshang would not want to accept but, according to Jamyang Shaypa, must accept: Well, for him, it [absurdly] follows that whatever is an apprehension of permanence is necessarily an apprehension in accordance with the Forders' superimposition that the self is permanent because an innate apprehension of permanence apprehends in that way [that is to say, in accordance with the 167 Forders' superimposition that the self is permanent]. You have accepted the reason [that an innate apprehension of permanence apprehends in that way, that is to say, in accordance with the Forders' superimposition that the self is permanent]. Jamyang Shaypa takes Taktshang’s objection and reduces it to a statement with which Taktshang would not agree, placing it as the thesis of the unwanted consequence (mi 'dod pa’i thal 'gyur): Well, for him, it [absurdly] follows that whatever is an apprehension of permanence is necessarily an apprehension in accordance with the Forders' superimposition that the self is permanent. Since this is not Taktshang’s own assertion, but Jamyang Shaypa’s logical deduction, I will speculate as to how Jamyang Shaypa extracts it from Taktshang’s objection to refute him. As explained above (page 158), Taktshang’s initial objection according to Jamyang Shaypa’s rendition is: Thesis: Tsongkhapa's opinion—that is, that refutation of objects imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly—is not logically feasible Reason: because even among innate awarenesses there are apprehensions of permanence and of former and later [phenomena] as one. 168 Thus, it seems that Taktshang’s own assertion according to this rendition is: Thesis: It is logically feasible that the refutation of objects imputed by Forders and Proponents of Tenets can also harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly Reason: because even among innate awarenesses there are apprehensions of permanence and of former and later [phenomena] as one. The thesis implicitly means that the mode of innate apprehension and the mode of intellectually imbued apprehension of inherent existence are utterly similar because refuting the latter repudiates the former. This is what Taktshang himself claims about the apprehension of inherent existence as explained above (page 134):202 because it is indicated that the main modes of apprehension concord, and it is indicated that repudiating the intellectually conceived object greatly damages the innate[ly conceived object]. Jamyang Shaypa is using Taktshang’s own assumption that the two modes of apprehension are utterly similar. Thus, by extension, the thesis implicitly means that the mode of innate apprehension of permanence and the mode of intellectually imbued apprehension of permanence are utterly similar. Since Taktshang himself accepts that refuting the one refutes the other and thus implicitly accepts that the mode of 202 Adapted from Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 646. The Tibetan is from stag tshang, Knowing All Tenets, 36. 169 apprehension of the one is exactly the same as the other, and thus the two modes of apprehension are the same, the innate mode of apprehension has to be exactly like the intellectually imbued mode of apprehension. That is, the innate mode of apprehension and the intellectually imbued mode of apprehension are mutually inclusive. Even if Taktshang would not want to accept it, Jamyang Shaypa can logically force him to accept this by pointing out that the reason is proposed by Taktshang himself: You have accepted the reason [that an innate apprehension of permanence apprehends in that way, that is to say, in accordance with the Forders' superimposition that the self is permanent]. It has already been shown above that Taktshang should accept it. Thus, Jamyang Shaypa says: If you accept [that whatever is an apprehension of permanence is necessarily an apprehension in accordance with the Forders' superimposition that the self is permanent], it [absurdly] follows that in the continuums of those who are not involved in tenet systems such as animals and so forth, there is apprehension that the self is permanent in the sense of not being produced from causes and conditions because [in the continuums of those who are not involved in tenet systems such as animals and so forth,] there is apprehension that the self is permanent in the sense of not disintegrating until death. If the misapprehension of the permanent self as asserted by Forders were the innate mode 170 of misapprehension, then by its definition, all living beings such as an animal must also have the misconception of a permanent self in the sense of not being produced from causes and conditions. This however is repudiated by Jamyang Shaypa through scriptural evidence; he cites Candrakīrti’s Entry to (Nāgārjuna's) Treatise on the Middle: This non-produced permanent [self imputed by Forders] is not perceived By those spending many eons as animals, Yet consciousnesses conceiving "I" are seen to operate in them. Hence, there is no self other than the aggregates. Citing Candrakīrti’s stanza, Jamyang Shaypa points out that the misapprehension of a permanent self in the sense of not being produced from causes and conditions is not innate since animals do not perceive themselves as being permanent this way while a delusional apprehension of self is nevertheless still operating in them. In this sense, Candrakīrti indicates that animals have a misapprehension of “I” that is subtler than the misapprehension of a permanent “I” in the sense of not being produced from causes and conditions. Second, Jamyang Shaypa again refutes Taktshang’s neglect of the significance of “only” in Tsongkhapa’s statement by flinging an absurd consequence: Moreover, it [absurdly] follows that although the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas and so forth have not entered the Madhyamaka [view], they can harm the conceived object of the apprehension of true existence because [according to you] your thesis [that Tsongkhapa's statement—"Refutation of 171 objects imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly"—is not logically feasible] is logically feasible. According to this criticism, if "only" is omitted in Jamyang Shaypa’s summary of Tsongkhapa’s statement: Refutation of objects imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly. Taktshang’s assertion means that, if one repudiates the intellectually imbued misapprehensions by Forders and Buddhist proponents of tenets lower than Mādhyamikas, one is also successfully repudiating the innate misapprehension of true existence. The elimination of "only" opens a question. That is, without "only," this could mean that among the proponents of tenets lower than Mādhyamikas, for instance, if the Sautrāntikas refute the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence asserted by Vaibhāṣikas, this refutation of an intellectually imbued misapprehensions of true existence asserted by a lower system than Sautrāntikas could make the Sautrāntikas effectively repudiates the innate apprehension of true existence according to the Madhyamaka view. From this viewpoint, Jamyang Shaypa criticizes Taktshang: 172 It [absurdly] follows that although the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas and so forth have not entered the Madhyamaka [view], they can harm the conceived object of the apprehension of true existence This means that even the Vaibhāṣikas could repudiate the innate apprehension of true existence by refuting intellectually imbued misapprehensions maintained by nonBuddhist tenet systems. However, this is not acceptable even for Taktshang since Taktshang proposes in his Knowing All Tenets:203 Though there are many forms of divisions of others' and our own tenets, when they are collected by way of what are discarded and what are adopted, they are included into two because they are included into (1) those who adhere to extremes of either permanence or annihilation and (2) those who are free from extremes. The reason is that they are included into the two, those who prove the mode of apprehension by innate mistaken awareness and those who refute it. Illustrations are Proponents of [Truly Existent] Things among our own and others' schools—these being other than the honorable Nāgārjuna's system—and the system itself of the glorious protector [Nāgārjuna]. །རང་[དང་]གཞན་[གི་]གྲུབ་མཐའི་དབྱེ་བ་རྣམ་[པ་]མང་ཡང་། །[བང་བྱ་དང་དློར་བྱའི་ 203 Adapted from Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 646. Brackets are from Taktshang's auto-commentary. See stag tshang, Knowing All Tenets, 1.16-2.2, and 33.17-33.23. 173 ཚུལ་གིས་བསྡུ་ན་གཉིས་སུ་འདུས་ཏེ། རྟག་ཆད་གང་རུང་གི་]མཐའ ལ་ཞེན་དང་མཐའ་ 204 བྲལ་སྨྲ་བར་འདུས་[པའི་ཕིར་ཏེ། རྒྱུ་མཚན་ནི་བློ་]ལྷན་སྐྱེས་འཁྲུལ་བའི་འཛིན་སངས་སྒྲུབ་ [པར་བྱེད་པ་དང་]འགློག་[པར་བྱེད་པ་གཉིས་སུ་འདུས་པའི་]ཕིར་[རློ]། [།མཚན་གཞི་ནི།] ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་ཞབས་[ཀྱིི་ལུགས་ལས་གཞན་[པ་རང་གཞན་གི་སེ་པ་དངློས་པློར་སྨྲ་བ་རྣམས་]དང་ [དཔལ་མགློན་འཕགས་པའི་ལུགས་]དེ་ཉིད་དློ། According to Taktshang’s twofold systemization of philosophical systems, the one group that falls to extremes of permanence and annihilation is the Proponents of True Existence among non-Buddhist and Buddhist tenet systems, and they cannot be the followers of Nāgārjuna’s system. More importantly, he says that those Proponents of True Existence prove the innate mode of misapprehension of true existence. That is, according to this assertion by Taktshang, the innate mode of misapprehension of true existence cannot be equivalent to the intellectually imbued mode of misapprehension of true existence. This assertion contradicts another assertion made by him. As explained above, Taktshang asserts that the intellectually imbued mode of misapprehension of true existence and the innate mode of misapprehension of true existence are concordant. (See page 168) If the Proponents of True Existence—that is, the Cittamātrins and below—do not repudiate the innate mode of misapprehension of true existence, but refute the intellectually imbued 204 sogs in his commentary is replaced with a line from the root verse. 174 mode of misapprehension, his criticism of Tsongkhapa—that is, that the two modes of misapprehension of true existence are concordant—will be consequently disproved. Furthermore, for instance, if the Sautrāntikas’ reasoning is capable of repudiating the innate apprehension of true existence, just as the Mādhyamikas do, through repudiating the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence by the Vaibhāṣikas, this position will undermine the foundation of his twofold system, separating all philosophical systems into two—Proponents of True Existence versus Proponents of the Middle following Nāgārjuna. In this way, by indicating the meaning of "only" in Tsongkhapa's assertion of the two modes of misapprehension of true existence, Jamyang Shaypa points out Taktshang's own self-contradiction. Conclusion In this chapter, I examined Taktshang’s criticism of Tsongkhapa’s system of the two types of object of negation, and Jamyang Shaypa’s criticism of Taktshang’s criticism. Tsongkhapa asserts that by only negating the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence the innate apprehension of true existence cannot be undermined. Taktshang criticizes this assertion by Tsongkhapa for having two misunderstandings: 3. The two modes of apprehension of true existence—the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence and the innate apprehension of true existence— should be utterly different from each other. 4. Therefore, the reasoning repudiating the intellectually imbued mode of apprehension could not refute the innate mode of apprehension. 175 However, Tsongkhapa’s own presentation of the relationship between these two types of object of negation shows that Taktshang’s criticism is groundless. Tsongkhapa asserts that the innate apprehension of true existence, is repudiated by the same reasoning that repudiates the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence. In this sense, Tsongkhapa seems to say that one should not be content only with negation of the intellectual misapprehension, but step forward to identify and repudiate the innate apprehension of true existence. These two types of object of negation are very different from each other in term of how they are identified. However, they are not utterly different in the sense that the same reasoning refuting the intellectually apprehended true existence can also repudiate the innately apprehended true existence. When Jamyang Shaypa refutes Taktshang’s obvious misunderstanding, he raises an unwanted consequence to deduce self-contradiction within Taktshang’s own position. Jamyang Shaypa points out that Taktshang’s fault is based on not understanding the significance of “only” in Tsongkhapa’s assertion. Polemic often does not accurately represent the actual position of the opponent, but, in this case, as I indicated, Jamyang Shaypa accurately represents Tsongkhapa’s position as well as Taktshang’s criticism. Taktshang’s failure originated in not seeing that Tsongkhapa employs two standards— what is refuted and by what these two types of object of negation are repudiated—to explain the relation between these two types of object of negation. According to Taktshang’s rigid standards, these two types of object of negation accord with each other, and Tsongkhapa would not have to utterly disagree with this since according to one of the 176 two standards, they accord in terms of the method of repudiation. This sole concordance between the two types of object of negation leads Taktshang to be caught in logically untenable situation. 177 Chapter 4: Historico-Intellectual Interaction among Geluk Scholars on the Identification of the Object of Negation from the 15th to 18th Centuries C.E Introduction As discussed in Chapter 1, Tsongkhapa is very confident that Kamalaśīla's Illumination of the Middle is the only Svātantrika text in which the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence is identified. This assertion, however, could be harmful to Tsongkhapa's scholarship if anyone were to find other examples stating the same in another Svātantrika source text; it would show that Tsongkhapa's scholarship is not flawless. This is a provocative issue that Jamyang Shaypa discusses concerning the identification of the object of negation in Svātantrika-Mādhyamika by refuting an anonymous opponent. As we will see later (page 191), despite Jamyang Shaypa’s polite anonymization of those whom he refutes here, I have found that the opponent is a merging of at least two historical figures within the Geluk sect: Jetsünpa Chökyi Gyeltshen (rje btsun pa chos kyi rgyal mtshan, 1469-1544/1546, Jetsünpa hereafter), the author of the monastic textbooks of Je Monastic College of Sera Monastery, and Gungru Chökyi Jungné (gung ru chos kyi 178 'byung gnas, mid. 16th –early 17th centuries C.E.), the author of the old monastic textbooks of Gomang Monastic College.205 In his General Meaning Textbook (spyi don) commenting on Tsongkhapa’s Illumination of the Thought, Jetsünpa directly confronts Tsongkhapa’s assertion that Kamalaśīla’s Illumination of the Middle is the only text clearly identifying the object of negation in the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika by pointing out that a stanza in Jñānagarbha’s Differentiation of the Two Truths also very clearly identifies the innate apprehension of true existence. In the meanwhile, Gungru Chöjung cites the same stanza from Jñānagarbha’s text and asserts that it explicitly identifies the object of negation. By examining these two different assertions challenging Tsongkhapa’s scholarship, I will explain that these two scholars’ assertions are incorrect. First, I will examine the meaning of the stanza according to Jñānagarbha and his commentator, Śāntarakṣita. Second, I will present the way that Jamyang Shaypa criticizes those two by aptly indicating their misreading through exposing a logical fallacy. 205 According to Derek Maher, Jamyang Shaypa studied the monastic textbook (yig cha) composed by Gungru Chöjung while he resided in Gomang Monastic College; however, Gungru Chöjung's textbook was substituted by Jamyang Shaypa’'s one, and is called “Old textbook (yig cha snying pa).” See Derek Maher, Maher, "Knowledge and Authority in Tibetan Middle Way Schools of Buddhism: A Study of the Gelukba (dge lugs pa) Epistemology of Jamyang Shayba ('jam dbyangs bzhad pa) in its Historical Context" (PhD diss., University of Virginia, 2003), 94: 155n. 179 Jetsünpa and Gungru Chöjung: The Search for the Possible Existence of Another Svātantrika Source Text Identifying the Measure of the Object of negation in terms of the Innate Apprehension of True Existence At the beginning of the section on the identification of object of negation in the Svātantrika School of the old Gomang textbook on the Mādhyamika written by Gungru Chöjung, a hypothetical opponent presents an opinion that is a slightly modified version of a statement from Tsongkhapa: 206 Tsongkhapa: A clear identification of the object of negation [in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence] does not emerge in other reliable sourcebooks of the Svātantrika School, but the existence that is the opposite of the mode of conventional existence described in Kamalaśīla's Illumination of the Middle is to be known as ultimate or true existence. Therefore, let us explain it that way. (emphasis mine) Gungru Chöjung: Someone [incorrectly] says: An identification of the object of negation [in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence] by correct reasoning is not explicitly set forth in other reliable source texts except for [Kamalaśīla's] Illumination of the Middle. (emphasis mine) 206 gung ru chos kyi 'byung gnas, dbu ma'i mtha' dpyod skal bzang 'jug ngogs, vol. 1 (Mundgod disst, Karnataka State, India: Drepung Gomang Gungru Khangtsen, 2006), 199. 180 ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དབུ་མ་སྣང་བ་མ་གཏློགས་རང་རྒྱུད་པའི་གཞུང་ཁུངས་ཐུབ་གཞན་ལས་ རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ངློས་འཛིན་དངློས་སུ་མ་གསུངས་ཟེར་ན། The opponent whom Gungru Chöjung criticizes insists that Kamalaśīla's Illumination of the Middle is the only explicit source identifying the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence among all Svātantrika source texts. The only difference in the opponent's statement is that he switches the term "clear (gsal ba)" in Tsongkhapa's description to "explicitly (dngos su)." In order to disprove the opponent's idea that Kamalaśīla's text is the only Svātantrika text explicitly presenting the identification of the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence, Gungru Chöjung presents another source that explicitly presents the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence: 207 It [absurdly] follows that the statement in [Jñānagarbha's] Differentiation of gung ru chos kyi 'byung gnas, dbu ma'i mtha' dpyod skal bzang 'jug ngogs, 199. For Jñānagarbha's stanza 3cd, see Malcolm David Eckel, Jñānagarbha's Commentary on the Distinction between the Two Truths: An Eighth Century Handbook of Madhyamaka Philosophy, SUNY series in Buddhist studies (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 156. At least, the quote in the Dege and Peking editions are different from what Gungru Chöjung and Jamyang Shaypa quote. The Dege edition reads: 3. 207 །ཀུན་རློབ་དང་ནི་དམ་པའི་དློན། །བདེན་གཉིས་ཐུབ་པས་གསུངས་པ་ལ། །ཇི་ལྟར་སྣང་བ་འདི་ཁློ་ན། །ཀུན་རློབ་གཞན་ནི་ཅིག་ཤློས་ཡིན། With respect to the sage's teaching the two truths, The meanings of conventional and ultimate, Only these in accordance with how they appear Are conventional; the others are the counterpart. 181 the Two Truths: Only these appearances to awarenesses are Conventional; the others are the counterpart. is not logically feasible because [according to you]:208 1. The passage "Only these appearances to awarenesses are [conventional]" does not indicate that “establishment as being only posited through the force of appearing to a non-defective awareness” is the measure of conventional establishment 2. and the passage "The others are the counterpart" does not indicate that existence from the side of the object's own uncommon mode of abiding without being only posited through the force of appearing to [an awareness] that is other than [a non-defective awareness] is "the other," that is, the measure of ultimate establishment… དབུ་མ་བདེན་གཉིས་ལས། བློ་ལ་སྣང་བ་འདི་ཁློ་ན། །ཀུན་རློབ་གཞན་ནི་ཅིག་ཤློས་སློ། །ཞེས་ གསུངས་པ་མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ། བློ་ལ་སྣང་བ་འདི་ཁློ་ན། །ཞེས་པས་བློ་གནློད་མེད་ལ་སྣང་ བའི་དབང་གིས་བཞག་ཙམ་དུ་གྲུབ་པ་ཀུན་རློབ་དུ་གྲུབ་པའི་གྲུབ་ཚད་དུ་བསན་པ་དང་། གཞན་ནི་གཅིག་ཤློས་སློ་ཞེས་པས་ དེ་ལས་གཞན་དེ་ལ་སྣང་བའི་དབང་གིས་བཞག་ཙམ་མ་ 208 gung ru chos kyi 'byung gnas, dbu ma'i mtha' dpyod skal bzang 'jug ngogs, 199. 182 ཡིན་པར་ཡུལ་རང་གི་ཐུན་མློང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སློད་ལུགས་ཀྱི་ངློས་ནས་ཡློད་པ་དེ།...ཕིར་རློ། Since this unwanted consequence (mi 'dod pa'i thal 'gyur) is deliberately stated in a way that neither the opponent nor Gungru Chöjung would ever agree with, when it is restated to indicate Gungru Chöjung's position: 1. The passage "Only these appearances to awarenesses are [conventional]" indicates that “establishment as being only posited through the force of appearing to a non-defective awareness” is the measure of conventional establishment, 2. and the passage "The others are the counterpart" indicates that existence from the side of the object's own uncommon mode of abiding without being only posited through the force of appearing to [an awareness] that is other than [a non-defective awareness] is "the other," that is, the measure of ultimate establishment, because the statement in [Jñānagarbha's] Differentiation of the Two Truths: Only these appearances to awarenesses are Conventional; the others are the counterpart. is logically feasible. In this opposite reading of the unwanted consequence, Gungru Chöjung asserts that because Jñānagarbha's stanza is logically feasible, the first part of the stanza explicitly 183 states the measure of conventional establishment—established through the power of an awareness—and that the second part also explicitly indicates the opposite of the measure of conventional establishment, that is, ultimate establishment—"existence from the side of the object's own uncommon mode of abiding without being only posited through the force of appearing to [an awareness] that is other than [a non-defective awareness]." Since the second part of the stanza reveals the identification of ultimate establishment through being opposite from the first part, a question could arise, why the mode of extraction of the meaning of this part is not considered to be implicit, but let me explain how Gungru Chöjung understands the meaning of "implicitly" and "explicitly" later. (see page 190) Since Jñānagarbha's stanza is another Svātantrika text explicitly stating the meaning of ultimate establishment—the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence—the opponent's assertion that Kamalaśīla's Illumination of the Middle is the only text explicitly stating the measure of that ultimate establishment turns out to be false. Therefore, the opponent has to accept that his position is unfounded. It appears that the opponent whom Gungru Chöjung refutes in this argument can be identified coincidentally or intentionally with Jetsünpa's position on this topic. In the equivalent section on the object of negation in the Svātantrika School in his General Meaning Clarifying the Difficult Points of [Tsongkhapa's] "Explanation of (Candrakīrti's) 184 'Entry to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle,"' Illumination of the Thought": Necklace for Fortunate Ones, Jetsünpa states:(emphasis mine)209 Therefore, this explanation by the foremost [Tsongkhapa] and his spiritual sons [Khédrupje and Gyeltshapje] that: establishment from the side of the object's own uncommon mode of abiding without being posited through the force of appearing to awarenesses is the object of negation of a [logical] sign of [reasoning] analyzing the ultimate is the final thought of Svātantrika texts because it is very clear in Svātantrika texts such as [Jñānagarbha's Differentiation of the Two Truths]: 3cd. Only these in accordance with how they appear Are conventional; the others are the counterpart.210 And, 209 rje btsun chos kyi rgyal mtshan, bstan bcos dbu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad dgongs pa rab gsal gyi dka' gnad gsal bar byed pa'i spyi don legs bshad skal bzang mgul rgyan, Tibetan Buddhist Philosophical Series (Mysore, India: Ser byes dpe mdzod khang, 2004), 200-201. 210 It seems that Jetsünpa and Gungru Chöjung have reason to believe that this half stanza supports Tsongkhapa's view. After stating the conventional existence, Kamalaśīla says: །འདི་དག་ཡང་དག་པར་དངློས་པློའི་ངློ་བློ་ཉིད་ཀྱང་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཇི་ལྟར་སྣང་བ་དེ་ཁློ་ན་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར་ རློ། །རི་བློང་གི་རྭ་བཞིན་དུ་གཏན་མེད་པའི་ངློ་བློ་ཉིད་ཀྱང་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། མ་བརྟགས་ན་དགའ་བའི་རྣམ་པར་སྣང་ བའི་ཕིར་རློ། །ཇི་སྐད་བཤད་པའི་ཀུན་རློབ་པ་ནི་དངློས་པློའི་ངློ་བློ་ཉིད་ཀྱང་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཕིན་ཅི་ལློག་པའི་རྣམ་པར་ ཉེ་བར་འཛིན་པར་སྣང་བའི་ཕིར་རློ། (228b.3-4) 185 21ab. Because of being entity in accordance with how they appear, Analysis does not apply to them. དེས་ན་བློ་ལ་སྣང་བའི་དབང་གིས་བཞག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཡུལ་རང་གི་སློད་ལུགས་ཀྱི་ངློས་ ནས་གྲུབ་པ་དློན་དམ་དཔྱློད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པར་རེ་ཡབ་སས་ཀྱིས་བཤད་ བ་འདི་རང་རྒྱུད་པའི་གཞུང་གི་དགློངས་པ་མཐར་ཐུག་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཇི་ལྟར་སྣང་བ་འདི་ཁློ་ ན། །ཀུན་རློབ་གཞན་ནི་ཅིག་ཤློས་སློ། །ཞེས་དང། ཇི་ལྟར་སྣང་ཞེན་ངློ་བློའི་ཕིར། །འདི་ལ་ དཔྱད་པ་མི་འཇུག་གློ། ཞེས་སློགས་རང་རྒྱུད་པའི་གཞུང་ལས་ཆེས་གསལ་བའི་ཕིར། According to Jetsünpa, the identification of the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence in the Svātantrika School is very clear in Jñānagarbha's stanzas. Given that Tsongkhapa confidently declares that a particular passage in Kamalaśīla's Illumination of the Middle is the only place where he managed to find the identification of the same type of true establishment among all Svātantrika texts, it seems that Jetsünpa refutes and/or supplements Tsongkhapa's research on this topic by providing another example. And more, Gungru Chöjung and Jetsünpa show conflicting ideas about how to understand the way the true establishment is identified in Jñānagarbha's stanza. Whereas Gungru Chöjung says the stanza explicitly shows it, Jetsünpa says it is clearly presented. 186 These opposing ideas between them make us wonder for what they argue. In order to understand how Gungru Chöjung disproves Jetsünpa's position, let me explain how Gungru Chöjung proves the similarities between Tsongkhapa's definition of the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence and Jñānagarbha's stanza and also evidences that Jñānagarbha's stanza explicitly, not clearly, states the identification of the true establishment. Since both Gungru Chöjung and Jetsünpa agree that the stanza states the two establishment, except for the conflicting ideas on explicit versus implicit, let me explain how they see the parallel between Jñānagarbha and Tsongkhapa's identification of the two establishments. The first part of the stanza explicitly states, according to Gungru Chöjung, the definition of conventional establishment that Jetsünpa should agree with: Being only posited through the force of appearing to a non-defective awareness is the measure of conventional establishment བློ་གནློད་མེད་ལ་སྣང་བའི་དབང་གིས་བཞག་ཙམ་དུ་གྲུབ་པ ། When this definition of conventional establishment is compared with Tsongkhapa's, as in the table below, it appears that their assertion could be right since the measure of conventional establishment seemingly does not change much from the stanza. 187 Table 4: Comparison between Jñānagarbha and Tsongkhapa's view on conventional establishment according to Gungru Chöjung's understanding. Conventional establishment (ཀུན་རློབ་ཏུ་ཡློད་པ་)211 Jñānagarbha བློ་ལ་སྣང་བ་ འདི་ཁློ་ན་ ཀུན་རློབ་ Only these appearances to awarenesses are conventional; བློ་གནློད་མེད་ལ་སྣང་བའི་དབང་གིས་ གཞག་ཙམ་དུ་གྲུབ་པ་ [ཀུན་རློབ་ཏུ་གྲུབ་པ་ཡིན།] Tsongkhapa Establishment as being only posited through appearing to an awareness, or through the force of an awareness, is the measure of conventional establishment In this line, according to them, Jñānagarbha says that mere appearances of objects to awarenesses are conventional existences in the first part of the stanza. "Appearing to awareness" is refined by adding "non-defective (gnod med)" in order to show that these sense consciousnesses are free from the four superficial causes of error. 212 Also, the phrase "only these ('di kho na)" is extended to say "only posited through (gzhag tsam du grub pa)" in Tsongkhapa's definition of the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence. This description of conventional establishment reminds us of Kamalaśīla's explanation on conventional existence: All entities of false things—[existing] through the power of those [living beings'] mentations—are said "only to exist conventionally." 211 This definition of conventional and ultimate establishment is effective to both Gungru Chöjung and Jamyang Shaypa. 212 According to Lopez, these four superficial causes of error represent a difference between the Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika Schools. While the proponents of the Svātantrika School accept that sense consciousnesses are able to perceive an object as existent without these errors, the proponents of the Prāsaṅgika School posit that perceiving objects as existing by its own character is erroneous. Thus, this "non-defective" is necessary in the definition of true establishment in the Svātantrika School. See Donald S. Lopez, Jr., A Study of Svātantrika (Ithaca) 67-68. 188 དེ་དག་གི་བསམ་པའི་དབང་གིས་དངློས་པློ་བརྫུན་པའི་ངློ་བློ་ཐམས་ཅད་ནི་ཀུན་རློབ་ཏུ་ ཡློད་པ་ཁློ་ནའློ་ཞེས་བྱའློ། Kamalaśīla says that, if things are seen without interception of mistaken awareness ('khrul ba'i blo), their mode of existence is only conventional. If Jñānagarbha's stanza is read in the same vein, according to them, Jñānagarbha could say that, if appearances of things are merely seen by awarenesses without intervention of mistaken awareness, they merely appear to be conventional existences. Furthermore, if the second part of Jñānagarbha's stanza is compared with the measure of ultimate existence that is discovered by Tsongkhapa in Kamalaśīla's Illumination of the Middle, Tsongkhapa's definition of ultimate existence seems to be just the opposite from the measure of conventional existence as Gungru Chöjung and Jetsünpa find out in Jñānagarbha's stanza. Table 2: Comparison between Jñānagarbha and Tsongkhapa's view on ultimate establishment according to Gungru Chöjung's understanding. Jñānagarbha Tsongkhapa The 2nd line of Jñānagarbha's Ultimate establishment stanza  གཞན་ནི་ཅིག་ཤློས་སློ། བློ་ལ་སྣང་བ་འདི་ཁློ་ན་མ་ཡིན་པ་བདེན་གྲུབ། བློ་ལ་སྣང་བའམ་བློའི་དབང་གིས་བཞག་པ་མིན་པར་དློན་གི་སློད་ལུགས་སུ་ཡློད་པ། Existence from the side of the object's own uncommon mode of abiding without being only posited through the force of appearing to a non-defective awareness "The others are the counterpart," according to Jetsünpa and Gungru Chöjung, explicitly 189 leads us to read the opposite meaning of the first line explaining that the objects do not appear as they are supposedly perceived by the awarenesses. This way of understanding Jñānagarbha's text appears to be very similar to the definition of ultimate establishment. That is, as Gungru Chöjung says, his stanza also states that the object is seen to independently exist apart from the apprehender's apprehension. If Jñānagarbha's text is another text that identifies the measure of the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence as Gungru Chöjung and Jetsünpa insist, the existence of an alternative source could disprove Tsongkhapa's declaration of the uniqueness of Kamalaśīla's passage. As stated above, Jetsünpa criticizes Tsongkhapa by positing Jñānagarbha's stanza as an example clearly stating the definition of the object of negation. Against him, Gungru Chöjung proves that how to identify the true existence is not clear, but explicit. If Jñānagarbha's stanza is an explicit, not clear, source for identification of the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence as Gungru Chöjung asserts, he could give Tsongkhapa a room to make an excuse by means of emphasizing the difference between the meaning of clear identification and explicit identification. That is, one could say that, although Tsongkhapa already knows the existence of the explicit source, Jñānagarbha's Differentiation of the Two Truths, he just states a source clearly identifying the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence. Thereby Tsongkhapa's position is still unharmed. Now, since the issue between them is 190 about the mode of defining the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence: explicit versus clear. Does Jñānagarbha's stanza Identify the Measure of the Object of negation in terms of the Innate Apprehension of True Existence? As mentioned earlier, according to Gungru Chöjung, Jñānagarbha's stanza explicitly poses identifications of both conventional and ultimate establishments. Although both Jetsünpa and Gungru Chöjung would agree that the identification of ultimate existence is given in the second line of the stanza—"The others are the counterpart," they disagree on whether it is very clearly or explicitly identified. I will speculate on why Gungru Chöjung says that Jñānagarbha's stanza explicitly identifies the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence. In Jñānagarbha's stanza, conventional establishment is straightforwardly indicated in the first line. Although ultimate establishment—the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence—is not explained word by word, according to Gungru Chöjung, the stanza explicitly provides clues to find it. As I mentioned earlier, "The others are the counterpart" explicitly leads a reader to see the opposite side of the definition of conventional existence. On the other hand, Kamalaśīla's passage, "All entities of false things—[existing] through the power of those [living beings'] mentations—are said 'only to exist conventionally'," is hard to read as Tsongkhapa does for the identification of the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence since there is no explicit indication or clue for how to delve into this in-depth 191 meaning of the sentence. In short, it seems to me that according to Gungru Chöjung since the passage unambiguously provides a clue ("The others are the counterpart") for how to see the extended meaning, the identification of the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence in the stanza can be called "explicit." In this way, it seems to me that Gungru Chöjung may be criticizing Jetsünpa for his overboard characterization that Jñānagarbha's stanza very clearly indicates the measure of ultimate existence since it is clear and explicit. Both Gungru Chöjung and Jetsünpa may be suggesting that Tsongkhapa missed this identification of the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence in Jñānagarbha's stanza. Nevertheless, this hypothetical discussion on the nature of Jñānagarbha's statement—very clear versus explicit—is entirely inappropriate according to Jamyang Shaypa because he says that it does not indicate the measure of the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence clearly or explicitly at all. Jamyang Shaypa's Presentation Jamyang Shaypa skillfully and carefully merges other thinkers' incorrect presentations of Tsongkhapa's thought into an unwanted consequence:213 It follows that it is not logically feasible that [Tsongkhapa says that] the measure of ultimate establishment is not clearly explained in reliable texts of the Svātantrika School except for [Kamalaśīla's] Illumination of the Middle, 213 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson grus, dbu ma 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs, in kun mkhyen chen po 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje'i gsung 'bum (India: Drepung Gomang Library, 2007), 256. 192 because both the measure of conventional establishment and the measure of ultimate establishment are indicated by this statement in [Jñānagarbha's] Differentiation of the Two Truths: Only these appearances to awarenesses are Conventional; the others are the counterpart. ཡང་གཞན་ཕློགས་པ་ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དབུ་མ་སྣང་བ་མ་གཏློགས་པའི་རང་རྒྱུད་པའི་གཞུང་ ཁུངས་ཐུབ་ནས་དློན་དམ་དུ་གྲུབ་ཚད་གསལ་བར་མ་བཤད་པ་མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ། བདེན་ གཉིས་ལས། བློ་ལ་སྣང་བ་འདི་ཁློ་ན། །ཀུན་རློབ་གཞན་ནི་ཅིག་ཤློས་སློ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་ འདིས་ཀུན་རློབ་ཏུ་གྲུབ་ཚད་དང་དློན་དམ་དུ་གྲུབ་ཚད་གཉིས་ཀ་བསན་པའི་ཕིར་ཟེར་ལ། This opponent's opinion is that Tsongkhapa's assertion that Kamalaśīla's Illumination of the Middle is the only source clearly identifying the measure of true existence is incorrect because Jñānagarbha's Differentiation of the Two Truths also clearly indicates the measure of two establishments. This assertion exactly reflects what Jetsünpa states above. In addition, Jamyang Shaypa chooses a rendition of Jñānagarbha's stanza which is the same as the one Gungru Chöjung cites in his Decisive Analysis (see the table below). Table 3: Different versions of two lines of a stanza from Jñānagarbha's Differentiation of the Two Truths. ཇི་ལྟར་སྣང་བ་འདི་ཁློ་ན། །ཀུན་རློབ་གཞན་ནི་ཅིག་ཤློས་སློ། Jetsünpa Only these in accordance with how they appear are conventional; the others are the counterpart. 193 བློ་ལ་སྣང་བ་འདི་ཁློ་ན། །ཀུན་རློབ་གཞན་ནི་ཅིག་ཤློས་སློ། Gungru Chöjung Only these appearances to awarenesses are conventional; the others are the counterpart. བློ་ལ་སྣང་བ་འདི་ཁློ་ན། །ཀུན་རློབ་གཞན་ནི་ཅིག་ཤློས་སློ། Jamyang Shaypa Only these appearances to awarenesses are conventional; the others are the counterpart. As shown in table 3, it seems to me that Jamyang Shaypa carefully chooses an opinion on which Jetsünpa and Gungru Chöjung would agree, namely that the measure of ultimate establishment is clearly explained in a reliable text of the Svātantrika School other than [Kamalaśīla's] Illumination of the Middle, but quotes a different version of Jñānagarbha's stanza from the same section in the old textbook of the Gomang Monastic College written by Gungru Chöjung. It is hard to know what Jamyang Shaypa originally intended; however, we can speculate that he tries to refute both historical figures' positions by means of combining these together. In addition to those two, Jamyang Shaypa indirectly criticizes one of Jetsünpa's students, Jedrung Sherap Wangpo (rje drung shes rab dbang po, ?-1586):214 Also, Jedrung Sherab Wangpo's [work] on the Middle [that is, dbu ma'i spyi don dgongs pa yang gsal] also says "Such a teaching is good," but some of our own later scholars have said "[This should be] analyzed." Since Jedrung Sherap Wangpo, who is also a textbook author of Jé Monastic College of Sera Monastery, praises Jamyang Shaypa's opponent's position, he could be added to the list of opponents refuted by Jamyang Shaypa. And more, this short statement can be a 214 Ibid. 194 taken as a clue that Jamyang Shaypa criticizes Jetsünpa because Jedrung Sherap Wangpo is a direct disciple of Jetsünpa who supposedly agrees with Jetsünpa's opinion. Also, as we have seen, Jamyang Shaypa cites the stanza as Gungru Chöjung does which is different from what Jetsünpa quotes, and Jetsünpa insists that Jñānagarbha's Differentiation of the Two Truths states very clearly the measure of ultimate existence; therefore, it seems to me that Jamyang Shaypa is refuting at least these three scholars within the Geluk sect: Jetsünpa, Jedrung Sherap Wangpo, and Gungru Chöjung. Jamyang Shaypa's Refutation According to Jamyang Shaypa, these opponents' readings of the stanza are plainly based on misreading the passage. Jamyang Shaypa has three types of evidence showing that this stanza is not about the two establishments, but about the two truths: 1) two lines in the same stanza prior to Jetsünpa's and Gungru Chöjung's citation, 2) Śāntarakṣita's explanation of the stanza, and 3) Jñānagarbha's Auto-commentary: 1) Jñānagarbha's stanza: With respect to the sage's teaching the two truths, The meanings of conventional and ultimate, Only these in accordance with how they appear Are conventional; the others are the counterpart. (emphasis mine) །ཀུན་རློབ་དང་ནི་དམ་པའི་དློན། །བདེན་གཉིས་ཐུབ་པས་གསུངས་པ་ལ། 195 །ཇི་ལྟར་སྣང་བ་འདི་ཁློ་ན། །ཀུན་རློབ་གཞན་ནི་ཅིག་ཤློས་ཡིན། 2) Śāntarakṣita says in his Commentarial Explanation on the Differentiation of the Two Truths:215 With respect to teaching "the meaning of the division of the two truths," the teaching "Only these appearances to awarenesses" is for the sake of indicating that "[These appearances] are not in exact accordance with reasoning (rigs pa)." [Jñānagarbha's] statement of "conventional" means conventional truths (kun rdzob kyi bden pa) because a final term [that is, bden pa] is drawn forth from within it [that is, kun rdzob]. "Others" are other than the mode of appearance. Therefore, this indicates "exact 215 Śāntarakṣita is commenting on Jñānagarbha's auto-commentary. The corresponding passage is: །གཞན་ནི་ཡིད་ལ་བསམས་པ་བཞིན་དུ་རེ་བ་ཡློངས་སུ་རློགས་པར་འགྱུར་རློ། །ཀུན་རློབ་དང་ནི་དམ་པའི་ དློན། །བདེན་གཉིས་ཐུབ་པས་གསུངས་པ་ལ། །མདློ་དེ་དང་དེར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་ཚིག་གི་ལྷག་མའློ། །ཇི་ལྟར་སྣང་བ་ འདི་ཁློ་ན། །ཀུན་རློབ་གཞན་ནི་ཅིག་ཤློས་ཡིན། །དློན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཐ་ཚིག་གློ། (Jñānagarbha, bDen pa gnyis rnam par 'byed pa'i 'grel pa (Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti), Derge ed., vol. Sa, 4a.1-3.) There are discrepancies between Śāntarakṣita's text and Jamyang Shaypa's citation. Śāntarakṣita's text goes as follows: །བདེན་པ་གཉིས་རྣམ་པར་དབྱེ་བའི་དློན་ཀྱང་བྱའློ་ཞེས་སློན་པ་ལ།་ཇི་ལྟར་སྣང་བ་འདི་ཁློ་ན་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་བསྣན་པ་ ནི་རིགས་པ་ཇི་ལྟ་བ་བཞིན་དུ་མ་ཡིན་ནློ་ཞེས་བསན་པའི་ཕིར་རློ། །ཀུན་རློབ་སློས་པ་ནི་ཀུན་རློབ་ཀྱི་བདེན་པ་སེ་ ཚིག་ཐ་མ་ཁློང་ནས་དབྱུང་བའི་ཕིར་རློ། །གཞན་ནི་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི། ཇི་ལྟར་སྣང་བ་ལས་གཞན་པའློ། །དེའི་ཕིར་ འདིས་ནི་རིགས་པ་ཇི་ལྟ་བ་བཞིན་ཉིད་ནི་དློན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པའློ་ཞེས་སློན་ཏློ། (Śāntarakṣita, bDen pa gnyis rnam par 'byed pa'i dka' 'grel (Satyadvaya-vibhaṅga-pañjikā), Derge ed., vol. Sa, 17b.3-4.) 196 accordance with reasoning, ultimate truth." (emphasis mine) བདེན་པ་གཉིས་རྣམ་པར་དབྱེ་བའི་དློན་ཡང་བྱའློ། །ཞེས་སློན་པ་ལ་ཇི་ལྟར་སྣང་བ་འདི་ཁློ་ ན་ཞེས་པ་བསན་པ་ནི་རིགས་པ་ཇི་ལྟ་བ་བཞིན་དུ་མ་ཡིན་ནློ། རློ། །ཞེས་བསན་པའི་ཕིར་ །ཀུན་རློབ་སློས་པ་ནི་ཀུན་རློབ་ཀྱི་བདེན་པ་སེ་ཚིག་ཐ་མ་ཁློང་ནས་དབྱུང་བའི་ཕིར་ རློ། །གཞན་ནི་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་ཇི་ལྟར་སྣང་བ་ལས་གཞན་པའློ། །དེའི་ཕིར་འདི་ནི་རིགས་པ་ཇི་ ལྟ་བ་བཞིན་ཉིད་ནི་དློན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པའློ་ཞེས་སློན་ཏློ༑ 3) Jñānagarbha's Auto-commentary also says: Only these in accordance with how they appear Are conventional; the others are the counterpart. ["The others" (of conventional truth)] is the equivalent of saying ultimate truth. Whatever shepherdesses and above see abide as true conventionally in that way, but not [true] really. (emphasis mine) ཇི་ལྟར་སྣང་བ་འདི་ཁློ་ན། །ཀུན་རློབ་གཞན་ནི་ཅིག་ཤློས་ཡིན། །དློན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པ་ ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཐ་ཚིག་གློ །ཇི་ལྟར་བ་ལང་རི་མློ་ལ་སློགས་པ་ཡན་ཆད་ཀྱིས་མཐློང་བ་དེ་ལྟར་ ཀུན་རློབ་ཏུ་བདེན་པ་རྣམ་པར་གནས་ཀྱི་ཡང་དག་པར་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། 197 The whole stanza and Śāntarakṣita's commentary explain that the two truths are basically indicated, not the two establishments. Also, Jñānagarbha's auto-commentary clearly states that it is about the two truths. So, it is obvious that Jetsünpa and Gungru Chöjung misread the stanza because they did not consider the context. Since all phenomena including ultimate truths are conventionally established, the topics of conventional truths and conventional establishment are not the same. Since ultimate truths are not ultimately established, the topics of ultimate truths and ultimate establishment are also obviously not the same. A Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra that Jamyang Shaypa cites says:216 a Mother Sūtra, [a Perfection of Wisdom (shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i mdo, prajñāpāramitāsūtra),] says that forms and so forth exist terminologically, but not exist ultimately. ཡུམ་གི་མདློ་ལས། གཟུགས་སློགས་འཇིག་རྟེན་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཡློད་ཀྱི་དློན་དམ་པར་མེད་པར་ གསུངས་པའིི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ལས་ཤེས་པའི་ཕིར། Therefore, these two topics are radically different. 216 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson grus, dbu ma 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs, 265. 198 Conclusions To summarize, despite Tsongkhapa's confidence in his discovery that Kamalaśīla's Illumination of the Middle is the only text that clearly identifies the measure of the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence, Jetsünpa writes in his monastic textbook on Mādhyamika that Jñānagarbha's aforementioned stanza very clearly indicates the identification of the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence. This view is also supported by his direct disciple Jedrung Sherab Wangpo. However, this criticism of Tsongkhapa's position itself is criticized by Gungru Chöjung in the old monastic textbook of Gomang Monastic College. According to him, the stanza explicitly identifies the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence. In this way, Gungru Chöjung leaves room for Tsongkhapa's point that Kamalaśīla's Illumination of the Middle implicitly and clearly states the identification, whereas Jñānagarbha's stanza explicitly states it. Nonetheless, these criticisms of Tsongkhapa's erudition are actually meaningless according to Jamyang Shaypa since Jñānagarbha's stanza itself reveals that he intends to explain the two truths, conventional and ultimate, and not conventional establishment and ultimate establishment at all. By finding this mistake in Jetsünpa and Gungru Chöjung's expositions, Jamyang Shaypa defends Tsongkhapa's position on the object of negation in terms of innate apprehension of true existence, and thereby his textual authority. However, Tsongkhapa's identification of that object of negation has its own problem. Let me summarize what was presented at the beginning of this essay. In his Illumination of the Thought [of Candrakīrti's] "Entry to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatises on the 199 Middle'," Tsongkhapa identifies the two types of objects of negation in the SvātantrikaMādhyamika: the object of negation in terms of the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence and the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence. Tsongkhapa explains that apprehensions of such true existence obstruct the view of suchness, and therefore should be negated. Among these two types of what is to be negated, the object of negation in terms of the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence is, as its name implies, dependent upon scripture and reasoning, and if it is the only object of negation in the Svātantrika School, then this implies that those who do not study tenet systems do not have any obstructions to seeing suchness, and such a system cannot answer the serious soteriological challenge why other living beings who do not study tenet systems are not enlightened. The object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence thus has to be subtler and more essential because the system has to explain how all sentient beings falsely apprehend things as if they are ultimately established. Tsongkhapa finds only one passage that clearly satisfies his criteria from Kamalaśīla's Illumination of the Middle: All entities of false things—[existing] through the power of those [living beings'] mentations—are said "only to exist conventionally/obscurationally." Tsongkhapa says that the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence according to the Svātantrika School can only be seen clearly through an implicit reading of this passage which transforms it into: All entities of false things [existing] through the power of those [living beings'] 200 non-conceptual and conceptual awarenesses that are not damaged by valid cognitions are said "only to exist conventionally." In order to present the passage this way, Tsongkhapa fixes meanings of two terms in Kamalaśīla's original statement: "mentations" and "exist conventionally." It seems to me likely that Tsongkhapa, seeing the next passage in Kamalaśīla's text explaining that the meaning of conventional existence is, unlike the horns of a rabbit, not an utter nonexistence, (1) drew out the meaning of "exist conventionally" as a "valid conventional mode of existence of things," and (2) since "exist conventionally" does not mean utter non-existence, took mentations not as mistaken awarenesses or obscurers of suchness, but as conceptual and non-conceptual consciousnesses undamaged by valid cognitions. This way of reading Kamalaśīla's original statement as a description of a valid conventional mode of existence is then converted by Tsongkhapa to present a description of ultimate existence which he describes as: "Existing in the manner of an objective mode of abiding without being posited through appearing to an awareness, or through the force of an awareness" is to truly exist…apprehending such is an innate apprehension of true existence. This statement underlines the independence of the object—its true existence—by stating that true existence objectively and independently stands by itself. Tsongkhapa points out that apprehending things in this way from beginningless time is the innate apprehension of true existence. By reconstructing the implicit opposite meaning of Kamalaśīla's 201 statement, Tsongkhapa discovers a "clear" identification of the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence. In this way, he appears to be successful in finding such an object of negation in Kamalaśīla's text. However, Tsongkhapa's "discovery" is, as Chapter 1 points out, controversial because he seems to deliberately ignore the counter-evidence. That is, just three sentences later, Kamalaśīla identifies the two terms—"mentations" and "exist conventionally"— quite differently from Tsongkhapa's reading. When Kamalaśīla says: Because the aforementioned mistaken entity—the obscurer (kun rdzob, saṃvṛti)—displays all things as if produced even though in reality they are not produced, it is said that due to the power of [all living beings'] mentations things are conventionally/obscurationally produced. he identifies mentations as obscurers, or mistaken awarenesses. Hence, it seems that for him "exist conventionally" means "exist obscurationally." Considering that this statement could damage Tsongkhapa's construction of the Svātantrika object of negation, we can speculate that he might deliberately ignore this counter-evidence that does not fit into his system of the object of negation by decontextualizing the passage so that it only supports the reading of the given passage. Despite this potential evidence that could damage Tsongkhapa's system of the object of negation in the Svātantrika School, to my knowledge it seems that his half-blind 202 evidence has not been questioned in the Geluk tradition.217 Instead, the later generations focus their criticisms on Tsongkhapa's declaration that Kamalaśīla's particular statement is the one and only passage describing the object of negation in terms of the innate apprehension of true existence. In later research, I will examine whether Tsongkhapa reacts Kamalaśīla's commentary on Śāntarakṣita's stanza stating the meaning of "conventional" in his Note Purifying Forgetfulness about [Śāntarakṣita's] "Ornament for the Middle" (dbu ma rgyan gyi brjed byang) and how later Geluk scholars explain this commentary. 217 203 Chapter 5: Analysis contradiction of the Three Spheres of Self- Introduction The three spheres [of self-contradiction]218—'khor gsum—is a logical term that is often used in the course of actual debate in Tibetan Buddhism to indicate a type of a logical contradiction in the opponent's assertion. In its practical usage, as Georges Dreyfus describes, this term is not always used to point out a logical contradiction that the opponent makes. Rather, it is used to plainly express any fault in the opponent’s position that the interlocutor finds out.219 According to Michael Lempert, this term 'khor gsum is often used along with other terms as “taunts.”220 In this causal usage, the interlocutor does not have any obligation to prove what elements of the three spheres conflict with each other in the opponent’s position. 221 Then, can we also presume that the interlocutor, Jamyang Shaypa in our case, does not have to prove how the opponent makes selfcontradiction in the three aspects? In the fourth refutation, Jamyang Shaypa repudiates the Āyatas’—an Indian nonBuddhist school—assertion that former and later births are natureless in the sense that The brackets are used here in order to indicate that “the three spheres” is implied by its meaning. Georges B. Dreyfus, “What is Debate for? The Rationality of Tibetan Debates and the Role of Humor,” Argumentation 22:1 (2008), 50. 220 Michael P. Lempert, Discipline and Debate: The Language of Violence in a Tibetan Buddhist Monastery (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2012), 69-70. 221 mkhan po ngag dbang rdo rje, personal interview, date unknown, 2012. 218 219 204 they do not exist. If both the Āyatas and the Mādhyamikas use the same term, naturelessness, does it also mean that they are sharing the same philosophical stance? Among the misconceptions Jamyang Shaypa refutes in the general section on the object of negation, this chapter will discuss how he resolves the following qualm: whether the meaning of the naturelessness of past and future lives is the same or different for the Nihilists and the Mādhyamikas (4th wrong idea, page 282). In unfolding this debate, I will explain the meaning of the three spheres of self-contradiction. The procedure misconception of the refutation of the opponent's In his Decisive Analysis, Jamyang Shaypa presents a challenge by a fellow Mādhyamika that since both the Āyatas and the Mādhyamikas use the vocabulary that former and later births are natureless, and since for a Mādhyamika the naturelessness of former and later births is the final mode of subsistence, this seems to result in an unwanted consequence (mi 'dod pa'i thal 'gyur) for the Mādhyamika:222 Someone [incorrectly] says: It follows that the view in the Āyatas' [mental] continuum that former and later births are natureless is the Madhyamaka view because the naturelessness of former and later births is the final mode of subsistence. Jamyang Shaypa responds and then gives a parallel absurd consequence: 222 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa, dbu ma 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs, in kun mkhyen chen po 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje'i gsung 'bum (Mundgod, Karnataka, India: Drepung Gomang Library, 2007), 250. 205 [Our response: That the naturelessness of former and later births is the final mode of subsistence] does not entail [that the view in the Āyatas' mental continuum that former and later births are natureless is the Madhyamaka view.] Well then, it [absurdly] follows that the view in the Vaibhāṣikas' [mental] continuum that a [Buddha's] enjoyment body (longs sku, saṃbhogakāya) is natureless is the Madhyamaka view because the naturelessness of a [Buddha's] enjoyment body is the final mode of subsistence. [You have asserted] the three spheres [of self-contradiction]. Likewise, know how to apply [this mode of refutation] to the Cittamātrins' view that the imputational nature is not established by way of its own character. If Jamyang Shaypa applied the mode of reasoning used in his previous refutation (the 3rd wrong idea, see page 271), he could say that because the Āyatas' concept of the naturelessness of past and future lives is nothing but their nonexistence, it cannot qualify as the Mādhyamikas' concept of the naturelessness of past and future lives, and therefore, also cannot qualify as the mode of subsistence in the Madhyamaka system. However, he does not take this tack but causes the opponent to realize his own fault by stating back to him an egregiously unacceptable but parallel consequence. The opponent knows that Jamyang Shaypa accepts the reason (that the naturelessness of former and later births is the final mode of subsistence), and thinks that he should accept the entailment (that the naturelessness of former and later births is the final mode of subsistence entails that the view in the Āyatas' mental continuum that 206 former and later births are natureless is the Madhyamaka view), and hence he would be forced to accept the unwanted "thesis"223 of the opponent's consequence (that the view in the Āyatas' mental continuum that former and later births are natureless is the Madhyamaka view). However, Jamyang Shaypa does not accept the entailment, and therefore, he does not have to accept the unwanted "thesis." Therefore, he responds "ma khyab" which usually means that there is no entailment between the reason and the predicate of the "thesis" of the consequence, but here means the non-establishment of entailment between the reason and the "thesis" of the consequence because there is no separate subject (chos can): That the naturelessness of former and later births is the final mode of subsistence does not entail that the view in the Āyatas' [mental] continuum that former and later births are natureless is the Madhyamaka view. སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་གནས་ལུགས་མཐར་ཐུག་ཡིན་ན་རྒྱང་ཕན་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་བཞིན་ མེད་པར་ལྟ་བ་དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་ཡིན་པས་མ་ཁབ། Jamyang Shaypa only agrees with the reason—that the naturelessness of former and later births is the final mode of subsistence. A consequence is designed to draw an unwanted conclusion from the opponent's reason and entailment as Hopkins explains:224 223 "Thesis" is in quotation marks since it is a quasi-thesis; see the definition of bsal ba in footnote 229. Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness, 444-445. Although 'khor gsum is theoretically used to reveal the self-contradiction in the three aspects so that the opponent is forced to accept the unwanted consequence, 'khor gsum is frequently used to express that the defender of the debate is wrong in the actual debate court yard. 224 207 Consequences (prasaṅga) are used to generate in an opponent a consciousness that infers a thesis. Unwanted consequences that contradict an opponent's position and arise from his position are frequently used. Employing a reason and a pervasion approved by the opponent, a consequence of his views which contradicts another of his views is presented to him. Applying this explanation, if we extract the reason and the entailment from the opponent's consequence, they are: The reason: The naturelessness of former and later births is the final mode of subsistence. རྟགས། སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་གནས་ལུགས་མཐར་ཐུག་ཡིན་པ། The entailment: That that the naturelessness of former and later births is the final mode of subsistence entails that the view in the Āyatas' [mental] continuum that former and later births are natureless is the Madhyamaka view. ཁབ་པ། སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་གནས་ལུགས་མཐར་ཐུག་ཡིན་ན་རྒྱང་ཕན་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་ལྟ་བ་དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་ཡིན་པས་ཁབ་པ། As mentioned above, since Jamyang Shaypa does not accept the entailment, the opponent has failed to refute him. After saying "ma khyab" in response, Jamyang Shaypa uses the opponent's consequence as his own schema to refute the opponent. The opponent's consequence is: 208 It follows that the view in the Āyatas' mental continuum that former and later births are natureless is the Madhyamaka view because the naturelessness of former and later births is the final mode of subsistence. Jamyang Shaypa mimics the opponent's consequence and introduces a parallel consequence that is as problematic and unpersuasive as the opponent's consequence: It follows that the view in the Vaibhāṣikas' mental continuum that a Buddha's enjoyment body is natureless is the Madhyamaka view because the naturelessness of a Buddha's enjoyment body is the final mode of subsistence. If we underline the unshared parts between the case of the naturelessness of former and later births in the Āyata and the Madhyamaka systems and the new case of the naturelessness of a Buddha's enjoyment body in the Vaibhāṣika and the Madhyamaka systems: It [absurdly] follows that the view in (a) the Āyatas' [mental] continuum that (b) former and later births are (c) natureless is the Madhyamaka view because (c) the naturelessness of (b) former and later births is the final mode of subsistence. (a) རྒྱང་ཕན་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་ (b) སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་ (c) རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་ལྟ་བ་དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། (b) སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་ (c) རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་གནས་ལུགས་མཐར་ཐུག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར། The underlined parts can be left blank so that the new case can be applied: 209 It [absurdly] follows that the view in (a) ________ [mental] continuum that (b) ____________ are (c) ________ is the Madhyamaka view because (c) ________ of (b) _________ is the final mode of subsistence. (a) _______རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་ (b) _______ (c) _______ལྟ་བ་དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། (b) _______ (c) __________ གནས་ལུགས་མཐར་ཐུག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར། Conditions:  (a) _______ is a system other than the Mādhyamikas.  (b) _______ is a term that is acceptable to the Mādhyamikas, but is not necessarily acceptable to other party.  (c) _______ is a status that is the final mode of subsistence acceptable to the Mādhyamikas. If we apply the topic of the naturelessness of a Buddha's enjoyment body in the Vaibhāṣika and the Madhyamaka systems to the above schema, it is: It follows that the view in (a) the Vaibhāṣikas' [mental] continuum that (b) a [Buddha's] enjoyment body is (c) natureless is the Madhyamaka view because (c) the naturelessness of (b) a [Buddha's] enjoyment body is the final mode of subsistence. (a) བྱེ་སྨྲའི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་(b) ལློངས་སྐུ་(c) རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་ལྟ་བ་དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ༑ ལློངས་སྐུ་(c) རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་གནས་ལུགས་མཐར་ཐུག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར། (b) 210 In this way, Jamyang Shaypa makes his own consequence as lousy as the opponent's in order to reveal the logical flaw in the opponent's consequence. In Jamyang Shaypa's consequence, since the Vaibhāṣikas do not assert a Buddha's enjoyment body, for them a Buddha's enjoyment body is natureless in the sense that it does not exist.225 Thus, the naturelessness of a Buddha's enjoyment body in the context of the Vaibhāṣika system cannot be considered to be the same naturelessness of the enjoyment body in the Madhyamaka system and therefore cannot be the mode of subsistence in the Madhyamaka system. For this reason, that the view in the Vaibhāṣikas' mental continuum that a Buddha's enjoyment body is natureless is the Madhyamaka view is obviously false. The three bodies of a Buddha are the truth body (chos sku, dharmakāya), the enjoyment body (longs sku, saṃbhogakāya), and the emanation body (sprul sku, nirmāṇakāya). According to Jamyang Shaypa, Khédrupje (mkhas grub rje) says in his Great Commentary on (Dharmakīrti's) "Commentary on (Dignāga's) 'Compilation of Prime Cognition'" that, "In the system of the Hearers [that is, the Great Exposition School and the Sūtra School] a "complete enjoyment body" is utterly not asserted…"; see Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 243-244. However, we should notice that according to Xing, the Sarvāstivāda, one of the Vaibhāṣikas, asserts two bodies of a Buddha: the truth body (chos sku, dharmakāya) and the emanation body (sprul sku, nirmāṇakāya). In addition, according to him, the initial development of the concept of a Buddha's enjoyment body can also be found in the Mahāsaṃgika which is also a Vaibhāṣika school, although they do not use the term "enjoyment body." See Guang Xing, The Concept of the Buddha: Its Evolution from Early Buddhism to the Trikāya Theory, RoutledgeCurzon Critical Studies in Buddhism (London; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 101-135. The question of why the Hīnayānists—the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas—do not accept the enjoyment body of a Buddha is discussed as a part of the reason why the Hīnayānists do not accept the Mahāyāna as a Buddha's teaching. Hopkins explains: 225 Many of the Hīnayāna schools do not even accept the Mahāyāna sūtras as being Buddha's word, thinking that many Mahāyāna teachings contradict the four seals. For instance, the teaching that a Buddha's Enjoyment Body abides forever without disintegrating contradicts the first seal that all products are impermanent. See Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness, 344-345; also, for a full list of why the Hīnayāna denies the Mahāyāna as Buddha's teaching and Ngagwang Peldan's (ngag dbang dpal ldan) eloquent responses, see Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 195-206. 211 In this respect, like Jamyang Shaypa, the opponent who is a fellow Mādhyamika also cannot accept the "thesis" in this consequence. Let us examine Jamyang Shaypa's consequence to see how it triggers the opponent to realize his own fault. Does the opponent accept the reason?: The reason: The naturelessness of a [Buddha's] enjoyment body is the final mode of subsistence. རྟགས། ལློངས་སྐུ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་གནས་ལུགས་མཐར་ཐུག་ཡིན་པ། Yes, the opponent surely accepts the reason—that the naturelessness of a Buddha's enjoyment body (as understood in the Madhyamaka fashion) is the final mode of subsistence. Then, does he accept the entailment? The entailment: That the naturelessness of a [Buddha's] enjoyment body is the final mode of subsistence entails that the view in the Vaibhāṣikas' [mental] continuum that a [Buddha's] enjoyment body is natureless is the Madhyamaka view. ཁབ་པ། ལློངས་སྐུ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་གནས་ལུགས་མཐར་ཐུག་ཡིན་ན་བྱེ་སྨྲའི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་ལློངས་སྐུ་རང་ བཞིན་མེད་པར་ལྟ་བ་དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་ཡིན་པས་ཁབ་པ། No. As Jamyang Shaypa did in the opponent's consequence, the opponent does not accept the entailment in Jamyang Shaypa's consequence. At this point, since the opponent is situated in the exactly same situation where Jamyang Shaypa was, the opponent should 212 also say "ma khyab" just like Jamyang Shaypa did. By using the same schema as the opponent's unsuccessful consequence, Jamyang Shaypa's consequence has a rhetorical function to make the opponent reflect on his own consequence and realize one's own fault. To prompt this, Jamyang Shaypa immediately says "'khor gsum!" (the three spheres of self-contradiction) to declare the absurdity of the opponent's consequence. Identifying the three spheres of self-contradiction ('khor gsum) With regard to the meaning and function of "the three spheres of self-contradiction ('khor gsum, the three spheres henceforth)" in actual debate, Dreyfus reports that:226 There are also gestures used at more particular occasions, such as when, for example, a respondent gives an answer that the questioner holds to be clearly false. The latter must then signal that he understands the mistake by circling three times his opponent's head with his right hand while screaming in a loud and shrill voice "these are the three circles" ('di 'khor gsum). In addition, he explains the two meanings of the three spheres in the actual debate:227 The "three circles" refer to three conditions that the consequence must satisfy to check-mate the respondent. In the example "it follows that the subject the sound is not produced since it is permanent," such a consequence is appropriate only to 226 Georges B. Dreyfus, "What is Debate for? The Rationality of Tibetan Debates and the Role of Humor," Argumentation 22, no. 1 (2008), 50. 227 Ibid., 50n.3. 213 a person who fulfills three conditions: he admits that the sound is permanent, holds that whatever is permanent is not produced and that the sound to be produced. Such a person has completed the three circles and hence cannot give a correct answer without contradicting himself. In practice, the expression is used to signal any mistake in the respondent's answer and not just the ones that satisfy to these three criteria. His explanation highlights the two aspects of the three spheres that we will examine in this chapter: the three elements of the three spheres and the two different functions of the three spheres. First, as he explains, in general, the three spheres are composed of three elements: the (opponent's) assertion of the reason (rtags khas langs pa), the (opponent's) assertion of the entailment (khyab pa khas langs pa), and the (opponent's) assertion of the opposite of "thesis"228 of the consequence (bsal ba'i229 bzlog phyogs khas langs pa). Since the opponent has asserted or is forced to assert the reason and the entailment, the opponent has to accept the consequence; however if the opponent also asserts or is forced to assert the opposite of the consequence, then the opponent is caught in a selfcontradiction. Among these elements of the three spheres, in terms of "you have asserted" (khas blangs pa) in first two elements, the assertions of the reason and the entailment can be 228 "Thesis" is in quotation marks since it is a quasi-thesis; see the definition of bsal ba in footnote 229. There are two ways of spelling "'thesis' of the consequence" in the Tibetan: bsal ba and gsal ba. Hopkins reports that the late Gyume Khensur Ngawang Legden (rgyud smad mkhan zur ngag dbang legs ldan) described a controversy concerning the spelling of this term as to whether or not it should be gsal or bsal. If it is spelled as gsal ba, it means that the "thesis" needs to be clarified or to be made manifest, whereas if it is spelled as bsal ba, it means that the "thesis" should be eliminated. 229 214 varied in accordance with whether or not the reason and the entailment have been explicitly stated by the opponent; therefore a distinction is made between whether the opponent has explicitly asserted them (dngos su khas blangs pa) or has come to assert them (khas blangs song ba). For instance, if a non-Buddhist asserts that a sound is permanent because of not being produced (sgra chos can rtag pa yin te ma byas pa yin pa'i phyir), a possible unwanted consequence (mi 'dod pa'i thal 'gyur) against the opponent would be: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a sound, is not produced because of being permanent. ས་ཆློས་ཅན་མ་བྱས་པར་ཐལ་རྟག་པ་ཡན་པའི་ཕིར། For this unwanted consequence, the reason is the opponent's own assertion that a sound is permanent. In addition, the opponent will accept the entailment that whatever is permanent is necessarily not produced. Since these are explicitly asserted by him, the first two elements of the three spheres can be presented as: The assertion of the reason: You have explicitly asserted the reason—that a sound is permanent. རྟགས་ཁས་བངས་པ། ས་རྟག་པ་ཡིན་པ་དངློས་སུ་ཁས་བངས་པ། The assertion of the entailment: You have explicitly asserted the entailment— that whatever is permanent is necessarily not produced. ཁབ་པ་ཁས་བངས་པ། རྟག་པ་ཡིན་ན་མ་བྱས་པ་ཡིན་པས་ཁབ་པ་དངློས་སུ་ཁས་བངས་པ། 215 Since the opponent accepts the reason and the entailment, he has to accept the consequence that a sound is not a product; however, due to the obvious experience that sound is made from snapping fingers he also has to accept the very opposite of the consequence—that a sound is produced. This untenable situation has led him to face the opposite of one's own argument as stated in the third element of three spheres of selfcontradiction: The assertion of the opposite of "thesis" of the consequence: You have asserted (or, have come to assert) the opposite of "thesis" of the consequence—that a sound is produced. བསལ་བའི་བཟླློག་ཕློགས་ཁས་བངས་པ། ས་བྱས་པ་ཡིན་པ་བསལ་བའི་བཟླློག་ཕློགས་ཁས་བངས་པ་ (ཡང་ན་ཁས་བངས་སློང་བ་)། Since the opponent is forced by commonsense experience to assert the contradictory argument, the third element can be also stated as "you have come to assert, or you have been forced to assert" (khas langs song ba) to clarify that it is not his original assertion, but is irresistibly pushed to assert due to one's own reason and entailment. Among the three spheres, let us also clarify the meaning of "thesis" in the third element—the assertion of the opposite of the "thesis" of the consequence (bsal ba'i bzlog phyogs khas langs pa). Here the Tibetan word translated as the "thesis" (bsal ba) literally means "to be eliminated." Tsongkhapa defines it in his Introduction to the Seven 216 Treatises on Prime Cognition: Clearing Away the Mental Darkness of Seekers (sde bdun la 'jug pa'i sgo don gnyer yid kyi mun sel):230 The definition of that which is to be eliminated (bsal ba, pratyākhyā 231) is a quasi-thesis the opposite meaning of which is established by valid cognition. བསལ་བའི་མཚན་ཉིད་དམ་བཅའ་ལྟར་སྣང་གང་ཞིག་ཁློད་ཀྱི་ལློག་ཕློགས་ཀྱི་དློན་ཚད་མས་གྲུབ་པ། "The opposite meaning of which is established by valid cognition" connotes two aspects. First it means that the "thesis" of the consequence is contradicted by valid cognition. For instance, in the above consequence—that a sound is not produced because of being permanent—the "thesis"—that a sound is not produced—is disproved by the obvious valid experience of making a sound by snapping fingers. Second, it also means that the third element of the three spheres—the opposite of the "thesis" of the consequence, that is, a sound is produced—is proved by valid cognition. As we have seen from the above example, the last element of the three spheres— the opposite of the "thesis" of the consequence—is established by valid cognition according to Tsongkhapa's definition. Nevertheless, there is another usage of the three 230 tsong kha pa, "Introduction to the Seven Treatises on Prime Cognition: Clearing Away the Mental Darkness of Seekers (sde bdun la 'jug pa'i sgo don gnyer yid kyi mun sel)" in gsung 'bum/_tsong kha pa (zhol). TBRC W635.18 (New Delhi, India: Mongolian Lama Guru Deva, 1978-1979), 21b.1, http://tbrc.org/link?RID=O2CZ7209|O2CZ72092CZ7419$W635. Dreyfus translates bsal ba as "pseudo-predicate." He says, "A consequence looks superficially similar to a statement of proof. It has three terms: the subject (chos can), the (pseudo-)predicate (bsal ba; lit., "that which is to be eliminated"), and the reason (rtags, liṅga)." See Georges B. J. Dreyfus, The Sound of Two Hands Clapping: The Education of a Tibetan Buddhist Monk (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003), 208. 231 The Sanskrit for bsal ba is taken from Alex Wayman, A Millennium of Buddhist Logic: Volume One, trans. Alex Wayman (Delhi, India: Motiral Banarsidass Publishers, 1999), 324; see Wayman's flawed translation of this definition in Tsongkhapa's Introduction to the Seven Treatises on Prime Cognition (ibid.) 217 spheres that simply indicates that the opponent's position is mistaken as Dreyfus explained. With this as background, let us examine Jamyang Shaypa's unwanted consequence flung back at the opponent's consequence at the beginning of this chapter (on page 205): It [absurdly] follows that the view in the Vaibhāṣikas' [mental] continuum that a [Buddha's] enjoyment body is natureless is the Madhyamaka view because the naturelessness of an enjoyment body is the final mode of subsistence [of a Buddha's enjoyment body]. བྱེ་སྨྲའི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་ལློངས་སྐུ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་ལྟ་བ་དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ལློངས་སྐུ་རང་བཞིན་ མེད་པ་གནས་ལུགས་མཐར་ཐུག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར། The three spheres of Jamyang Shaypa's consequence are: Assertion of the reason: You have asserted the reason—that the naturelessness of a [Buddha's] enjoyment body is the final mode of subsistence [of a Buddha's enjoyment body]. རྟགས་ཁས་བངས་པ། ལློངས་སྐུ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་གནས་ལུགས་མཐར་ཐུག་ཡིན་པ་ཁས་བངས་པ། Assertion of the entailment: You have asserted (are forced to assert) the entailment—that that the naturelessness of a [Buddha's] enjoyment body is the final mode of subsistence [of a Buddha's enjoyment body] entails that the view 218 in the Vaibhāṣikas' [mental] continuum that a [Buddha's] enjoyment body is natureless is the Madhyamaka view. ཁབ་པ་ཁས་བངས་པ། ལློངས་སྐུ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་གནས་ལུགས་མཐར་ཐུག་ཡིན་ན་བྱེ་སྨྲའི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་ ལློངས་སྐུ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་ལྟ་བ་དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་ཡིན་པས་ཁབ་པ་ཁས་བངས་པ་(ཡང་ན་ཁས་བངས་ སློང་བ་)། Assertion of the opposite of the "thesis" of the consequence: You have asserted (or are forced to assert) the opposite of the "thesis" of the consequence—that the view in the Vaibhāṣikas' continuum that a [Buddha's] enjoyment body is natureless is not the Madhyamaka view. བསལ་བའི་བཟླློག་ཕློགས་ཁས་བངས་པ། བྱེ་སྨྲའི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་ལློངས་སྐུ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་ལྟ་བ་དབུ་མའི་ ལྟ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཁས་བངས་པ་(ཡང་ན་ཁས་བངས་སློང་བ་)། First, the opponent has to accept the reason—that the naturelessness of a Buddha's enjoyment body is the final mode of subsistence because this is a standard Madhyamaka position. According to the Vaibhāṣikas, this means: (c) the nonexistence of (b) a [Buddha's] enjoyment body is the final mode of subsistence. On the other hand, according to the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka system, this reason means: (c) the nonexistence of true existence of (b) a [Buddha's] enjoyment body is the final mode of subsistence. 219 That is, the nonexistence of true existence—naturelessness—of a Buddha's enjoyment body is the final mode of subsistence. Even though the Vaibhāṣika reading of the naturelessness is unacceptable to the opponent, the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka reading is acceptable, and thereby, the opponent has explicitly accepted the reason (dngos su khas blangs pa). Second, although the opponent will not want to accept the entailment—that that the naturelessness of a Buddha's enjoyment body is the final mode of subsistence (of a Buddha's enjoyment body) necessitates that the view in the Vaibhāṣikas' mental continuum that a Buddha's enjoyment body is natureless is the Madhyamaka view—he would have to accept it because it is parallel to the entailment that he used in his original statement: It follows that the view in the Āyatas' mental continuum that former and later births are natureless is the Madhyamaka view because the naturelessness of former and later births is the final mode of subsistence of former and later births. Because the opponent is forced to assert the entailment (khyab pa khas blangs song ba), and the opponent has accepted the reason, he must accept the "thesis" of the consequence—that the view in the Vaibhāṣikas' continuum that a Buddha's enjoyment body is natureless is the Madhyamaka view, that is to say: The view in the Vaibhāṣikas' continuum that (b) a [Buddha's] enjoyment body is (c) nonexistent is the Madhyamaka view. 220 However, the opponent also asserts the opposite of the "thesis" of the consequence—that the view in the Vaibhāṣikas' mental continuum that a Buddha's enjoyment body is natureless is not the Madhyamaka view, and therefore the opponent is caught in a selfcontradiction. Thus, when Jamyang Shaypa declares "The three spheres," it fully performs its goal of locating the opponent in an untenable situation. Furthermore, the opposite of the "thesis" of the consequence is established by valid cognition as Tsongkhapa explains. Therefore, this case of the three spheres of self-contradiction that Jamyang Shaypa presents here is not a case of simply indicating an opponent's mistake. Application of parallel consequence (1): The nonexistence of the imputational nature as the final mode of subsistence according to the Cittamātra system After refuting the opponent by means of throwing back a parallel consequence that he obviously cannot accept, Jamyang Shaypa provides another example: Likewise, know how to apply [this mode of refutation] to the Cittamātrins' view that the imputational nature is not established by way of its own character. དེ་བཞིན་དུ་སེམས་ཙམ་པའི་ཀུན་བཏགས་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་མ་གྲུབ་པར་ལྟ་བ་སློགས་ལ་སྦྱློར་ ཤེས་པར་བྱ༑ Since this example gives three items: (a) the Cittamātrins, (b) the imputational nature, and (c) non-establishment by way of its own character, let us deploy these into the above schema: 221 It [absurdly] follows that the view in (a) ________ [mental] continuum that (b) ____________ are (c) ________ is the Madhyamaka view because (c) ________ of (b) _________ is the final mode of subsistence. (a) _______རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་ (b) _______ (c) _______ར་ལྟ་བ་དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། (b) _______ (c) __________ གནས་ལུགས་མཐར་ཐུག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར། It [absurdly] follows that the view in (a) the Cittamātrins' [mental] continuum that (b) the imputational nature is (c) not established by way of its own character is the Madhyamaka view because (b) the imputational nature's (c) nonestablishment by way of its own character is the final mode of subsistence. (a) སེམས་ཙམ་པའི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་(b) ཀུན་བཏགས་(c) རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་མ་གྲུབ་པར་ལྟ་བ་དབུ་མའི་ ལྟ་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ༑ (b) ཀུན་བཏགས་(c) རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་མ་གྲུབ་པ་གནས་ལུགས་མཐར་ ཐུག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར། In this parallel consequence, Jamyang Shaypa states as the reason—that the imputational nature's non-establishment by way of its own character is the final mode of subsistence. The imputational nature here means the object of negation, the object of negation (dgag bya). As this consequence involves the meaning of the imputational nature in the Cittamātra and the Madhyamaka systems, it is important to identify how these two systems differently view the imputational nature as the object of negation in their 222 respective systems. With regard to the object of negation in the Cittamātra system, Könchok Jikme Wangpo (dkon mchog 'jigs med dbang po, 1728-1791)describes the opposite of the object of negation in the Cittamātra system in his Precious Garland of Tenet (grub mtha' rin chen 'phreng ba). He explains that the final mode of subsistence, that is, the subtle selflessness of phenomena has two meanings:232 Both (1) the emptiness—of a form and a valid cognition apprehending the form—as other substantial entities and (2) the emptiness of form's establishment by way of its own character as the referent of a conceptual consciousness apprehending form are the subtle selflessness of phenomena. གཟུགས་དང་གཟུགས་འཛིན་ཚད་མ་རས་གཞན་གིས་སློང་པ་དང་། གཟུགས་གཟུགས་འཛིན་རྟློག་ པའི་ཞེན་གཞིར་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་གྲུབ་པས་སློང་པ་གཉིས་ཆློས་ཀྱི་བདག་མེད་ཕ་མློར་ འདློད། 233 Since the opposite of those two meanings of the subtle selflessness of phenomena is the object of negation in the Cittamātra system, those two would be: 232 See also the translation in Sopa and Hopkins, Cutting Through Appearances: Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 1989), 271; for more detailed information, see Jeffrey Hopkins, Reflections on Reality: The Tree Natures and Non-Natures in the Mind-Only School: Dynamic Responses to Dzong-kha-ba's The Essence of Eloquence: Volume 2 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press), 42-44 and 393-408. 233 dkon mchog 'jigs med dbang po, "The Precious Garland of Tenets (grub mtha' rin chen 'phreng ba)," in Miscellaneous Word Commentary on the Precious Garland of Tenets (grub mtha' rin chen phreng ba'i tshig 'grel thor bu) (Bejing, China: mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1996), 32-33. 223 (1) The existence—of a form and a valid cognition apprehending the form—as other substantial entities (gzugs dang gzugs 'dzin tshad ma rdzas gzhan234 du yod pa). (2) Form's establishment by way of its own character as the referent of a conceptual consciousness apprehending form (gzugs gzugs 'dzin rtog pa'i zhen gzhir rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa). For instance, a pot falsely appears to an eye consciousness as if it exists as a separate entity from it. Thus, the pot's establishment as a different entity from the eye consciousness is taken to be an imputational nature that must be negated in the Cittamātra system. On the other hand, the object of negation in Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika is different. Könchok Jikme Wangpo says:235 The two subtle selflessnesses [of persons and of phenomena] are differentiated from the viewpoint of the bases that are predicated by emptiness [persons and phenomena]; they are not differentiated from the viewpoint of the object of negation. This is because true existence is the object of negation, and a negative of true existence—the object of negation—in relation to a person as a base of 234 With regard to the first definition, the existence as other substantial entities (rdzas gzhan du yod pa), or the existence as different substantial entities (rdzas tha dad du yod pa) is stated for impermanent phenomena such as a form. For permanent phenomena such as uncompounded space, the existence as other natures (ngo bo gzhan du yod pa) is used instead: the existence—of uncompounded space and valid cognition apprehending the uncompounded space—as other natures ('dus ma byas kyi nam mkha' 'dus ma byas kyi nam mkha' 'dzin tshad ma ngo bo gzhan du yod pa). 235 Adapted from Hopkins, Cutting Through Appearances, 315. 224 negation is a subtle selflessness of persons and a negative of true existence—the object of negation—in relation to a mental or physical aggregate or the like as a base of negation is a subtle selflessness of phenomena. །བདག་མེད་ཕ་མློ་གཉིས་སློང་གཞིའི་སློ་ནས་འབྱེད་པ་ཡིན་གི། དགག་བྱའི་སློ་ནས་མི་འབྱེད་དེ། གཞི་གང་ཟག་གི་སེང་དུ་དགག་བྱ་བདེན་གྲུབ་བཀག་པ་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་མེད་ཕ་མློ་དང་། གཞི་ ཕུང་སློགས་ཀྱི་སེང་དུ་དགག་བྱ་བདེན་གྲུབ་བཀག་པ་ཆློས་ཀྱི་བདག་མེད་ཕ་མློ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར། གང་ ཟག་གི་བདག་མེད་ཕ་མློ་དང་། ཆློས་ཀྱི་བདག་མེད་ཕ་མློ་གཉིས་ལ་ཕ་རགས་མེད་ཅིང་གནས་ལུགས་ མཐར་ཐུག་ཏུ་འདློད་དློ། 236 Since Könchok Jikme Wangpo clearly states here that the object of negation—the imputational nature (kun btags)—is true existence (bden par grub pa), or inherent existence (rang bzhin gyis grub pa) in the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka system, it is very different from the Cittamātrins' identification of the imputational nature. Like Jamyang Shaypa's earlier refutation of the opponent's quasi-consequence by means of a parallel consequence, the current example should also force the opponent to be caught in a self-contradiction. Let us plug into the schema the Cittamātrins’ identification of the imputational nature:237 dkon mchog 'jigs med dbang po, grub mtha’ rin chen 'phreng ba, 45. Although the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas do not use the expression "Established by way of its own character (rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa)," Jamyang Shaypa deliberately uses this expression according to the Sutra Unraveling the Thought ('phags pa dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa zhes bya theg pa che po'i mdo , saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra): 236 237 225 It [absurdly] follows that the view in (a) the Cittamātrins' [mental] continuum that (b) the imputational nature is (c) not established by way of its own character is the Madhyamaka view because (b) the imputational nature's (c) nonestablishment by way of its own character is the final mode of subsistence. (a) སེམས་ཙམ་པའི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་(b) ཀུན་བཏགས་(c) རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་མ་གྲུབ་པར་ལྟ་བ་དབུ་མའི་ ལྟ་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། (b) ཀུན་བཏགས་(c) རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་མ་གྲུབ་པ་གནས་ལུགས་མཐར་ཐུག་ ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར། Just as Jamyang Shaypa declared the three spheres of self-contradiction after flinging the earlier unwanted consequence on the naturelessness of a Buddha's enjoyment body, we can draw out the three spheres of self-contradiction from this example: Concerning that, what are character-non-natures of phenomena? Those which are imputational characters. Why? It is thus: Those [imputational characters] are characters posited by names and terminology and do not subsist by way of their own character. Therefore, they are said to be "character-non-natures." དེ་ལ་ཆློས་རྣམས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ངློ་བློ་ཉིད་མེད་པ་ཉིད་གང་ཞེ་ན། ཀུན་བརྟགས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་གང་ཡིན་ པའློ། །དེ་ཅིའི་ཕིར་ཞེ་ན།་འདི་ལྟར་དེ་ནི་མིང་དང་བརར་རྣམ་པར་བཞག་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་གི། རང་གི་མཚན་ ཉིད་ཀྱིས་རྣམ་པར་གནས་པ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་པས་དེའི་ཕིར། The Sūtra Unraveling the Thought explains that imputational natures are posited by names and terminology and do not subsist by way of their own character (rang gi mtshan nyid kyis rnam par nas pa). Although the Prāsaṅgikas may not say the imputational natures in their system is "not established by way of its own character," it seems that Jamyang Shaypa states imputational natures in that way following the sutra with replacing "subsist (rnam par mi gnas pa)" with a similar but more familiar term, "establish (grub pa). See Sūtra Unravelling the Thought ('phags pa dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa zhes bya theg pa che po'i mdo , ārya-saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra), Toh. 106, mdo sde, vol. ca, 26a.7-26b.1; Jeffrey Hopkins, Emptiness in the Mind-Only School of Buddhism: Dynamic Responses to Dzong-kha-ba's the Essence of Eloquence: I (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), 86. 226 Assertion of the reason: You have asserted—that the imputational nature's nonestablishment by way of its own character is the final mode of subsistence. རྟགས་ཁས་བངས་པ། ཀུན་བཏགས་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་མ་གྲུབ་པ་གནས་ལུགས་མཐར་ཐུག་ ཡིན་པ་ཁས་བངས་པ། Assertion of the entailment: You have asserted (or are forced to assert) the entailment—that the imputational nature's non-establishment by way of its own character is the final mode of subsistence entails that the view in the Cittamātrins' [mental] continuum that the imputational nature is not established by way of its own character is the Madhyamaka view. ཁབ་པ་ཁས་བངས་པ། ཀུན་བཏགས་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་མ་གྲུབ་པ་གནས་ལུགས་མཐར་ཐུག་ཡིན་ ན་སེམས་ཙམ་པའི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་ཀུན་བཏགས་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་མ་གྲུབ་པར་ལྟ་བ་དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་ཡིན་ པས་ཁབ་པ་ཁས་བངས་པ་(ཡང་ན་ཁས་བངས་སློང་བ་)། Assertion of the opposite of the "thesis" of the consequence: You have asserted (or, are forced to assert) the opposite of the "thesis" of the consequence—that the view in the Cittamātrins' [mental] continuum that the imputational nature is not established by way of its own character is not the Madhyamaka view. བསལ་བའི་བཟླློག་ཕློགས་ཁས་བངས་པ། སེམས་ཙམ་པའི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་ཀུན་བཏགས་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ ཀྱིས་མ་གྲུབ་པར་ལྟ་བ་དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་ཡིན་པ་བསལ་བའི་བཟླློག་ཕློགས་ཁས་བངས་པ་(ཡང་ན་ཁས་ བངས་སློང་བ་)། 227 The Cittamātrins assert that the nonexistence, that is, non-establishment by way of its own character, of the imputational nature is its final status, and the nonexistence of the imputational nature is also a Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka position. According to the Cittamātrins, this means: (b) the existence—of a form and a valid cognition apprehending the form—as other substantial entities' (c) non-establishment by way of its own character is the final mode of subsistence. According to the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka this means: (b) true existence's (c) non-establishment by way of its own character is the final mode of subsistence. That is, the nonexistence of true existence is the final mode of subsistence. Even though the Cittamātra reading of the imputational nature is unacceptable to the opponent, the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika reading is acceptable, and therefore, the opponent has explicitly accepted the reason. Second, although the opponent will not want to accept the entailment, he would have to accept it because it is parallel to the entailment that he used in his original statement: It follows that the view in the Āyatas' [mental] continuum that former and later births are natureless is the Madhyamaka view because the naturelessness of former and later births is the final mode of subsistence. 228 Because the opponent is forced to assert the entailment (khyab pa khas blangs song ba), and the opponent has accepted the reason, he must accept the "thesis" of the consequence—that the view in the Cittamātrins' mental continuum that the imputational nature is not established by way of its own character is the Madhyamaka view, that is to say: The view in the Cittamātrins' [mental] continuum that the existence—of a form and a valid cognition apprehending the form—as other substantial entities is not established by way of its own character is the Madhyamaka view. However, the opponent also asserts the opposite of the "thesis" of the consequence—that the view in the Cittamātrins' mental continuum that the imputational nature is not established by way of its own character is not the Madhyamaka view. Hence, again the opponent is in an untenable position of self-contradiction, and thus Jamyang Shaypa can also declare "the three spheres of self-contradiction" with regard to the current consequence. Application of parallel consequence (2): The Āyatas' idea about the naturelessness of former and later births is not factually concordant In the fifth debate, Jamyang Shaypa provides another exercise refuting the difference between naturelessness as understood by the Āyatas and the Mādhyamikas by using a parallel consequence: 229 Moreover, someone [incorrectly] says: It follows that such a view in the Āyatas' continuum [that former and later births are natureless] is a factually concordant conceptual consciousness (rtog pa don mthun) because of the previous reason [that is, that the naturelessness of former and later births is the final mode of subsistence]. [Our response: That the naturelessness of former and later births is the final mode of subsistence] does not entail [that such a view in the Āyatas' continuum that former and later births are natureless is a factually concordant conceptual consciousness]. Well then, it [absurdly] follows that the view in a Vaibhāṣika’s continuum that a [Buddha's] enjoyment body is such [that is, natureless] is a factually concordant conceptual consciousness, the reason is as before, [that is, because the naturelessness of an enjoyment body is the final mode of subsistence.] [You have asserted] the three spheres [of self-contradiction.] This short debate provides another way to disprove the opponent's assertion that the Āyatas' assertion of the naturelessness of former and later births is equal to that of the Mādhyamikas. This refutation is different from the fourth wrong idea (see page 282) in the sense that this refutation mainly focuses on whether or not a Nihilist's view that the naturelessness of former and later births is a factually concordant conceptual consciousness. In this debate, the opponent throws an absurd consequence to Jamyang Shaypa: 230 It follows that such a view in the Āyatas' continuum that former and later births are naturelessness is a factually concordant conceptual consciousness because the naturelessness of former and later births is the final mode of subsistence. In this opponent's consequence, the crucial point that the opponent forces on Jamyang Shaypa is that the naturelessness of former and later births as asserted in the Āyata system is factually concordant. Thus, in order to understand this, it is important to understand what a factually concordant conceptual consciousness (rtog pa don mthun) is. According to Shunzō Onoda, a factually concordant conceptual consciousness is a member of a division of conceptual consciousnesses pairing with a factually discordant conceptual consciousness (rtog pa don mi mthun). 238 With regard to a factually concordant conceptual consciousness, Ann Klein explains:239 238 The conceptual consciousnesses can be explained in the three groups: 1. a. a conceptual consciousness only apprehending sound-generality (sgra spyi kho na ' dzin pa' i rtog pa) b. a conceptual consciousness only apprehending meaning-generality (don spyi kho na 'dzin pa' i rtog pa) c. a conceptual consciousness apprehending both sound-generality and meaning-generality (sgra don gnyis ka ' dzin pa' i rtog pa) 2. a. a conceptual consciousness joined with a name (ming sbyor rtog pa) b. a conceptual consciousness joined with an object (don sbyor rtog pa) 3. a. a factually concordant conceptual consciousness (rtog pa don mthun) b. a factually discordant conceptual consciousness (rtog pa don mi mthun) See Shunzō Onoda, Monastic Debate in Tibet: A Study on the History and Structures of Bsdus Grwa Logic, Wiener Studien Zur Tibetologie Und Buddhismuskunde (Wien, Australia: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1992), 151. 239 Anne C. Klein, Knowledge and Liberation: Tibetan Buddhist Epistemology in Support of Transformative Religious Experience (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 1986), 139. 231 The thought consciousness having an image as its appearing object is factually concordant if its image corresponds with an actual object, or more technically, if the referent object exists. If the conceived object (zhen yul, adhyavasāya, Klein's "referent object"), the actual object, exists, then the conceptual consciousness is considered to be factually concordant, or concordant with its object (don dang mthun pa). The problem is that in the Āyatas' system former and later births are natureless in the sense that they do not exist. (See footnote 258 in page 269) Thus, when the opponent insists that Jamyang Shaypa should accept the consequence: Such a view in the Āyatas' continuum that former and later births are natureless is a factually concordant conceptual consciousness because of the previous reason—that is, that the naturelessness of former and later births is the final mode of subsistence. Jamyang Shaypa only agrees with the reason, that is, that the natureless of former and later births is the final mode of subsistence, and therefore, he denies the entailment between the reason and the "thesis" of the consequence (ma khyab): That the naturelessness of former and later births is the final mode of subsistence does not entail that such a view in the Āyatas' continuum that former and later births is natureless is a factually concordant conceptual consciousness. And immediately after indicating the non-entailment, Jamyang Shaypa flings back a consequence: 232 It [absurdly] follows that the view in a Vaibhāṣika's continuum that a [Buddha's] enjoyment body is natureless is a factually concordant conceptual consciousness because the naturelessness of a [Buddha's] enjoyment body is the final mode of subsistence. བྱེ་སྨྲའི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་ལློངས་སྐུ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་ལྟ་བ་རྟློག་པ་དློན་མཐུན་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ་ལློངས་སྐུ་རང་ བཞིན་མེད་པ་གནས་ལུགས་ཐར་ཐུག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར། For the Vaibhāṣikas, a Buddha's enjoyment body is natureless in the sense that it does not exist, since the Vaibhāṣikas do not assert the enjoyment body of a Buddha.240 Therefore, it is impossible that the view in a Vaibhāṣika's continuum that a Buddha's enjoyment body is natureless is a factually concordant conceptual consciousness. By returning this incisively unacceptable parallel consequence, Jamyang Shaypa declares the three spheres of self-contradiction ('khor gsum). The three spheres of selfcontradiction in this case would be: Assertion of the reason: You have accepted the reason—that the naturelessness of a [Buddha's] enjoyment body is the final mode of subsistence. རྟགས་ཁས་བངས་པ། བྱེ་སྨྲའི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་ལློངས་སྐུ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་ལྟ་བ་རྟློག་པ་དློན་མཐུན་ཡིན་ པར་ཐལ་ལློངས་སྐུ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་གནས་ལུགས་ཐར་ཐུག་ཡིན་པ་ཁས་བངས་པ། 240 See footnote 225 in page 112. 233 Assertion of the entailment: You have asserted the entailment—that the naturelessness of a [Buddha's] enjoyment body is the final mode of subsistence entails that the view in the Vaibhāṣikas' continuum that a [Buddha's] enjoyment body is natureless is a factually concordant conceptual consciousness. ཁབ་པ་ཁས་བངས་པ། སྐུ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་གནས་ལུགས་ཐར་ཐུག་ཡིན་ན་བྱེ་སྨྲའི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་ལློངས་ སྐུ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་ལྟ་བ་རྟློག་པ་དློན་མཐུན་ཡིན་པས་ཁས་པ་ཁས་བངས་པ་(ཡང་ན་ཁས་ བངས་སློང་བ)། Assertion of the opposite of the "thesis" of the consequence: You have asserted (or are forced to assert) the opposite of the "thesis" of the consequence—that the view in the Vaibhāṣikas' continuum that a [Buddha's] enjoyment body is natureless is not a factually concordant conceptual consciousness. བསལ་བའི་བཟླློག་ཕློགས། བྱེ་སྨྲའི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་ལློངས་སྐུ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་ལྟ་བ་རྟློག་པ་དློན་མཐུན་མ་ ཡིན་པ་བསལ་བའི་བཟླློག་ཕློགས་ཁས་བངས་པ་(ཡང་ན་ཁས་བངས་སློང་བ)། First, the opponent has to accept the reason—that the naturelessness of a Buddha's enjoyment body is the final mode of subsistence—because this is a standard Madhyamaka view. According to the Vaibhāṣikas, this means: The nonexistence of a Buddha's enjoyment body is the final mode of subsistence. On the other hand, according to the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka system, this reason means: 234 The nonexistence of inherent nature of a Buddha's enjoyment body is the final mode of subsistence. The nonexistence of inherent existence—naturelessness—of a Buddha's enjoyment body is the final subsistence in the Madhyamaka system. Although the Vaibhāṣikas' reading of the naturelessness of a Buddha's enjoyment body is not acceptable to the opponent, the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka reading is acceptable, and therefore, the opponent has explicitly accepted the reason. Second, although the opponent will not want to accept the entailment—that is, that the naturelessness of a [Buddha's] enjoyment body is the final mode of subsistence entails that the view in the Vaibhāṣikas' continuum that a [Buddha's] enjoyment body is natureless is a factually concordant conceptual consciousness—he would have to accept it because it is parallel to the entailment that he used in his original statement: It follows that such a view in the Āyatas' continuum that former and later births are natureless is a factually concordant conceptual consciousness because the naturelessness of former and later births is the final mode of subsistence. Because the opponent is forced to assert the entailment, and he has accepted the reason, he must accept the "thesis" of the consequence—that is, that the view in the Vaibhāṣikas' idea about the naturelessness of a Buddha's enjoyment body is a factually concordant conceptual consciousness. However, the opponent also asserts the opposite of the "thesis" of the consequence—that is, that the view in the Vaibhāṣikas' idea about the naturelessness of a Buddha's enjoyment body is not a factually concordant conceptual 235 consciousness, and therefore the opponent is caught in a self-contradiction. Because they are irresistibly asserting two mutually contradicting assertions, he is caught in an untenable situation. In this way, as Jamyang Shaypa has demonstrated also in the two cases above, by means of throwing back an equally absurd consequence that the opponent cannot resist accepting and inducing him to be situated in the three spheres of selfcontradiction, Jamyang Shaypa refutes the opponent's original attack. Conclusions Jamyang Shaypa thus demonstrates a debate strategy of refuting opponents by situating them in an untenable situation. Through introducing parallel consequences that are as problematic as the opponent's assertion does, he successfully portrays the opponent as involved in obvious self-contradictions. By introducing other topics that can be plugged into the schema of the three spheres of self-contradiction, he elevates his readers' knowledge by utilizing tenets in other systems while also providing topics that can be practiced in the debate courtyard exchanges. 236 Part II Part II provides a complete translation of the general section of the identification of object of negation for the Mādhyamikas in Jamyang Shaypa’s Decisive Analysis of the Middle (dbu ma’i mtha’ dpyod, or Great Exposition of the Middle, dbu ma chen mo). The Tibetan and its English translation are arranged in the format of a table followed by summaries and annotations. The tabular format translation is designed to display the Tibetan text and its translation in the left column. The right column of the tabular presentation is used to creatively represent Jamyang Shaypa’s own positions as they are outlined through this series of debates with the threefold structure of a section on refuting others’ systems (gzhan lugs dgag pa), a section on presenting one’s own system (rang lugs bzhag pa), and a section on dispelling objections (rtsod pa spong ba). If Jamyang Shaypa positively puts forward his own position, then that is simply repeated in the right column; if he presents an opponent’s position the negative of which is his own position, then the inverse of the opponent’s position is stated in the right column. As will be seen, the information in the part of presenting one’s own system (rang lugs bzhag pa) is actually quite sparse. The section on the presenting one’s own system mainly explains the precise usage of, and distinction between logical terms. The role of the other two sections—refuting others’ systems and dispelling objections—is not merely to demonstrate standardized debates, but also to enable monk-students to critically 237 acquire the scholastic stances and skills embedded in those debates. In this sense, the right column displays Jamyang Shaypa’s precise positions on a host of issues. Also, the Tibetan text and the translation are color-coded in three colors: black, blue, and red. Blue colored statements present what Jamyang Shaypa considers to be right positions, while red colored statements represent what Jamyang Shaypa considers to be wrong positions. Black words are merely neutral information or function structurally. 238 I. Identifying the Object of Negation I.1. Refuting Other Systems: Refuting quasi-identifications by Tibetans of the object of negation in connection with the reasons for identifying the object of negation 1st Wrong idea: Many earlier Tibetan elders hold that without having identified the object of negation the non-dawning of any object to one's awareness is realization of reality THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM སློན་གི་བློད་རྒན་མང་པློ་ན་རེ། དྲི་བ་ལྷག་ བསམ་རབ་དཀར་དུ་གསུངས་པ་ལྟར་ དགག་བྱ་ངློས་མ་ཟིན་ཀྱང་ཡུལ་ཅི་ཡང་བློ་ ལ་མ་ཤར་ཞིང་མ་བསམ་པ་དེ་གནས་ ལུགས་མཐློང་བ་དང་རྟློགས་པ་སློགས་སུ་སྨྲ་ བ་མང་ངློ་། དགག་བྱ་ངློས་མ་ཟིན་ན་ཡུལ་ཅི་ ཡང་བློ་ལ་མ་ཤར་ཞིང་མ་བསམ་ པ་དེ་གནས་ལུགས་མཐློང་བ་དང་ རྟློགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནློ། If one has not identified the object of negation, the non-dawning of any object to one's awareness and not thinking anything is not to see Many earlier Tibetan elders, as and realize the mode of substance. Tsongkhapa's Questions on Points of Virtuous Endeavor: Shining Intention says, propounded that even though one has not identified the object of negation, the nondawning of any object to one's awareness and not thinking anything is to see, to realize the mode of substance, and so forth. In the course of debate, Jamyang Shaypa makes the following point:  If one has not identified the object of negation, the non-dawning of any object to one's awareness and not thinking anything is not to see, to realize the mode of substance. In this general section of the identification of the object of negation in the Svātantrika (rang rgyud pa) and the Prāsaṅgika (thal 'gyur pa) Schools among the Proponents of the 239 Middle (dbu ma pa, mādhyamika), Jamyang Shaypa brings in various issues related with non-dawning of objects as we will see. The section on the refutation of others' systems (gzhan lugs dgag pa) starts with a discussion brought up by Tsongkhapa in his Questions on Points of Virtuous Endeavor: Shining Intention, where the opponents are identified as Tibetan scholastic monks from an earlier period. According to Jamyang Shaypa's depiction of the assertion of this group of earlier Tibetan elders, an identification of any object of negation is not only unnecessary but also is a step that one should not take during meditation because, when no object dawns to one's awareness in meditation, that state can be considered as confirming the true nature of phenomena. Against this stance of considering the non-emergence of any object in meditation as realizing the mode of subsistence, Jamyang Shaypa refutes it from seven different aspects that will lead us to see why Tsongkhapa and later Geluk scholars came to consider the identification of the object of negation momentous. 1st refutation: Non-view ignorance would realize emptiness The first refutation offered by Jamyang Shaypa is the unwanted consequence (mi 'dod pa'i thal 'gyur) that one would realize the reality of all things that she or he does not know: THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM །དེ་དག་ལ་འློ་ན། རང་གིས་མི་ཤེས་པའི་ རང་གིས་མི་ཤེས་པའི་འཇིག་ འཇིག་རྟེན་ཁམས་ཀྱི་བརྟན་གཡློ་དེ་དག་ རྟེན་ཁམས་ཀྱི་བརྟན་གཡློ་དེ་ ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་གནས་ལུགས་ཁློད་ཀྱིས་ དག་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་གནས་ལུགས་ 240 THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM རྟློགས་པར་ཐལ། ཁློད་ཀྱི་བློ་ལ་ཡུལ་དེ་དག་ ཁློད་ཀྱིས་རྟློགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་སེ། not that you realize the mode གི་རྣམ་པ་ཅི་ཡང་མི་ འཆར་ལ། དེ་མ་ Itof issubsistence of all the stable and ཤར་བ་ཡུལ་དེ་དག་གི་གནས་ལུགས་མཐློང་ the moving [that is to say, the inanimate and the animate] in བའི་དློན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར། worldly realms that you yourself Well, for them, it [absurdly] follows that you do not know. realize the mode of subsistence of all the ཁློད་ཀྱི་བློ་ལ་ཡུལ་དེ་དག་གི་རྣམ་ stable and the moving [that is to say, the inanimate and the animate] in worldly realms པ་ཅི་ཡང་མི་འཆར། [248] that you yourself do not know because aspects of those [that is, all the stable and the moving in worldly realms] do not dawn to your awareness and [according to you] the non-dawning of those is the meaning of seeing the mode of subsistence of these objects. Aspects of those [that is, all the stable and the moving in worldly realms] do not dawn to your awareness. དེ་མ་ཤར་བ་ཡུལ་དེ་དག་གི་ གནས་ལུགས་མཐློང་བའི་དློན་མ་ ཡིན། The non-dawning of those is not the meaning of seeing the mode of subsistence of these objects. [རང་གིས་མི་ཤེས་པའི་འཇིག་རྟེན་ཁམས་ ལྟ་མིན་གི་མ་རིག་པ་ཡིན་ན་སློང་ ཀྱི་བརྟན་གཡློ་དེ་དག་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་གནས་ ཉིད་རྟློགས་པས་མ་ཁབ་པར་ཐལ། that whatever is a nonལུགས་ཁློད་ཀྱིས་རྟློགས་པར་]འདློད་ན། ལྟ་ Itviewfollows ignorance (lta min gyi ma rig མིན་གི་མ་རིག་པ་ཡིན་ན་སློང་ཉིད་རྟློགས་ pa) necessarily does not realize emptiness! པས་ཁབ་པར་ཐལ་ལློ། If you accept that [you realize the mode of subsistence of all the stable and the moving, that is to say, the inanimate and the animate, in worldly realms that you yourself do not know], it very [absurdly] follows that whatever is a non-view ignorance (lta min gyi ma rig pa) necessarily realizes emptiness! In the course of debate, Jamyang Shaypa makes the following points: 241  It is not that you realize the mode of subsistence of all the stable and the moving [that is to say, the inanimate and the animate] in worldly realms that you yourself do not know.  Aspects of those [that is, all the stable and the moving in worldly realms] do not dawn to your awareness.  The non-dawning of those is not the meaning of seeing the mode of subsistence of these objects.  It follows that whatever is a non-view ignorance (lta min gyi ma rig pa) necessarily does not realize emptiness! The underlying idea of this opponent's position appears to be that an object of negation does not have to be identified and that non-appearance of anything in meditation is to realize reality. However, according to Jamyang Shaypa's reasoning, the opponent then has to say that the non-dawning of anything to one's consciousness signifies that one has realized its mode of subsistence. Therefore, against the opponent's position, Jamyang Shaypa draws out the absurdity of the opponent's assertion by stating that, in that case, ignorance of specific objects means that one knows the reality of those objects. However, it is obvious that the non-appearance of objects does not mean to see the reality of those objects. For example, if a piece of amber is buried under the ground, according to the opponent's position, since the gem does not appear to one's awareness, this does not mean that one has realized the reality of the amber. Instead, this state of non-appearance of the 242 amber to one's awareness is simply not knowing its existence, but not understanding the mode of existence of the amber under the ground. Hence, Jamyang Shaypa indicates that this state is simply ignorance which is specified as non-view ignorance (lta min gyi ma rig pa)241 because it is not an active misconception. Through this route, Jamyang Shaypa reduces the opponent's position to a type of ignorance instead of being a realization of reality. In this way, Jamyang Shaypa thereby refutes the confusion of the non-dawning of any object as realizing suchness. 2nd refutation: The negative of the object of negation would not dawn In the first refutation, we saw that not seeing any object dawning to one's awareness is criticized by Jamyang Shaypa as being mere non-view ignorance rather than seeing the mode of subsistence. Now, in this second debate, this opposing party changes its position slightly from the first debate in the sense that this one accepts the dawning of the aspect of emptiness; however, the meaning of the appearance of the aspect of emptiness is, as we will see, different from what Jamyang Shaypa understands. THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM །གཞན་ཡང་སློང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པ་འཆར་བའི་ཚེ་ སློང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པ་འཆར་བའི་ཚེ་ རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་བཀག་པའི་རྣམ་པ་མི་འཆར་ རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་བཀག་པའི་རྣམ་པ་ There are the six root afflictive emotions: desire ('dod chags, rāga), anger (khong khro, pratigha), pride (nga rgyal, māna), ignorance (ma rig pa, avidyā), doubt (the tshom, vichikitsā), and afflicted view (lta ba nyon mongs can, dṛṣṭi-saṃkleśa). Among those, non-view ignorance is the fourth. It is any kind of ignorance that is not included among any of the five view ignorances. See Kensur Lekden and Tsong-ka-pa, Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism, trans. and ed. Jeffrey Hopkins (Ithaca, NY: Gabriel / Snow Lion, 1980), 253 n.69; Jeffrey Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness (rev. ed., Boston, MA: Wisdom Publications, 1996), 255-260; The Dalai Lama, Kindness, Clarity, and Insight, trans. and ed. Jeffrey Hopkins, co-ed. Elizabeth Napper (rev. ed., Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2006), 149. 241 243 THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM བར་ཐལ། བློ་ལ་ཅི་ཡང་མ་ཤར་བ་དེ་སློང་ཉིད་ འཆར། the aspect of emptiness dawns རྟློགས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར། [བློ་ལ་ཅི་ཡང་མ་ཤར་ When [to an awareness], the aspect of the བ་དེ་སློང་ཉིད་རྟློགས་པ་ཡིན་པར]རྟགས་ཁས། negative of its object of negation dawns. Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that, when the aspect of emptiness dawns [to an awareness], the བློ་ལ་ཅི་ཡང་མ་ཤར་བ་དེ་སློང་ཉིད་ aspect of the negative of its object of negation རྟློགས་པ་མ་ཡིན། does not dawn because [according to you] the non-dawning of anything to an awareness is a The non-dawning of anything to an realization of emptiness. 242 You have accepted awareness is not a realization of the reason [that according to you the non- emptiness. dawning of anything to an awareness is a realization of emptiness]. [སློང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པ་འཆར་བའི་ཚེ་རང་གི་ སློང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པ་འཆར་བའི་ཚེ་ དགག་བྱ་བཀག་པའི་རྣམ་པ་མི་འཆར་ རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་བདེན་གྲུབ་བཀག་ བར་]འདློད་ན། [སློང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པ་འཆར་ པའི་ཆ་དེ་འཆར། the aspect of emptiness dawns, བ་]དེའི་ཚེ་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་བདེན་གྲུབ་བཀག་ When the factor that is the negative of the པའི་ཆ་དེ་མི་འཆར་བར་ཐལ། [སློང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ object of negation—true establishment—dawns. རྣམ་པ་འཆར་བའི་ཚེ་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་བཀག་ པའི་རྣམ་པ་མི་འཆར་བར་]འདློདློ་པའི་ཕིར། If you accept [that when the aspect of emptiness dawns to an awareness, the aspect of the negative of its object of negation does not dawn,] it [absurdly] follows that at that time [when the aspect of emptiness dawns,] the factor that is the negative of the object of negation—true establishment—does not dawn because you accepted [that when the aspect of emptiness dawns to an awareness, the aspect of the negative of its object of negation does not dawn]. 242 It is questionable whether the opponent would really assert that realization of emptiness requires dawning of the aspect of emptiness. 244 THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM [སློང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པ་འཆར་བ་དེའི་ཚེ་རང་གི་ སློང་ཉིད་བདེན་གྲུབ་བཀག་པའི་ དགག་བྱ་བདེན་གྲུབ་བཀག་པའི་ཆ་དེ་མི་ མེད་དགག་ཡིན། is a non-affirming negative འཆར་བར་]འདློད་མི་ནུས་ཏེ། [སློང་ Emptiness that is a negative of true ཉིད་]བདེན་གྲུབ་བཀག་པའི་མེད་དགག་ཡིན་ establishment. པའི་ཕིར། You cannot accept [that at that time the factor that is the negative of the object of negation, true establishment, does not dawn] because [emptiness] is a non-affirming negative that is a negative of true establishment. [(སློང་ཉིད་)བདེན་གྲུབ་བཀག་པའི་མེད་ དགག་ཡིན་ན་སློང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པ་འཆར་བའི་ ཚེ་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་བཀག་པའི་རྣམ་པ་མི་ འཆར་བར་འདློད་མི་ནུས་པས་]ཁབ་སེ། མེད་ དགག་རྣམས་ཀྱི་དློན་སི་འཆར་བའི་ཚེ་རང་གི་ དགག་བྱ་དངློས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་ཆློས་གཞན་ དངློས་ཤུགས་གང་ལ་ཡང་མ་འཕངས་པ་ གཅིག་དགློས་ལ། དེ་ལ་སློན་དུ་དགག་བྱའི་དློན་ སི་བློ་ལ་མ་ཤར་བར་དེ་བཀག་པའི་དངློས་མེད་ བློ་ལ་མི་འཆར་བའི་ཕིར། There is an entailment [that if (emptiness) is a non-affirming negative that is a negative of true establishment, you cannot accept that, when the aspect of emptiness dawns, the factor that is the negative of the object of negation—true establishment—does not dawn] because when meaning-generalities (don spyi, arthasāmānya, or sāmānyalakṣaṇa) of non-affirming negatives dawn in dependence upon explicitly refuting their objects of negation, it is necessary that སློང་ཉིད་བདེན་གྲུབ་བཀག་པའི་ མེད་དགག་ཡིན་པས་སློང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ རྣམ་པ་འཆར་བའི་ཚེ་རང་གི་དགག་ བྱ་བཀག་པའི་རྣམ་པ་འཆར་དགློས། Since emptiness is a non-affirming negative that is a negative of true establishment, the factor that is the negative of the object of negation— true establishment—must dawn when the aspect of emptiness dawns. མེད་དགག་རྣམས་ཀྱི་དློན་སི་འཆར་ བའི་ཚེ་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་དངློས་སུ་ བཀག་ནས་ཆློས་གཞན་དངློས་ ཤུགས་གང་ལ་ཡང་མ་འཕངས་པ་ གཅིག་དགློས། When meaning-generalities of nonaffirming negatives dawn in dependence upon explicitly refuting their objects of negation, it is necessary that another phenomenon is not projected explicitly or implicitly. 245 THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM another phenomenon is not projected explicitly or implicitly, and with regard to that without the meaning-generality of the object of negation previously dawning to an awareness, the nonexistence that is the negative of that does not dawn to an awareness. With regard to that, without the meaning-generality of the object of negation previously dawning to an awareness, the nonexistence that is the negative of that does not dawn to an awareness. (left side retained) དེ་ལ་སློན་དུ་དགག་བྱའི་དློན་སི་བློ་ ལ་མ་ཤར་བར་དེ་བཀག་པའི་དངློས་ མེད་བློ་ལ་མི་འཆར། སློད་འཇུག་ལས། བཏགས་པའི་དངློས་ལ་མ་ རེག་པར། །དེ་ཡི་དངློས་མེད་འཛིན་མ་ སློད་འཇུག་ལས། བཏགས་པའི་ དངློས་ལ་མ་རེག་པར། །དེ་ཡི་དངློས་ ཡིན། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕིར། མེད་འཛིན་མ་ཡིན། །ཞེས་གསུངས་ This is because Śāntideva's Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds says: པའི་ཕིར། Without making contact with the thing 243 This is because Śāntideva's Engaging imputed, in the Bodhisattva Deeds says: The nonexistence of that thing is not Without making contact with the apprehended. thing imputed, The nonexistence of that thing is not apprehended. In the course of debate, Jamyang Shaypa makes the following points:  When the aspect of emptiness dawns [to an awareness], the aspect of the negative of its object of negation dawns.  The non-dawning of anything to an awareness is not a realization of emptiness. IX. 139ab.; Śāntideva (zhi ba lha, fl. 8th century C.E.), "Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa)," in bstan 'gyur (sde dge), TBRC W23703.105 (Delhi, India: delhi karmapae choedhey, gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 36a.6, http://tbrc.org/link?RID=O1GS6011|O1GS60111GS36127$W23703; see also Shantideva, A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life, trans. Stephen Batchelor (Dharamsala, India: Library of Tibetan Works & Archives, 1979), 161. This stanza is a part of the conclusion of a debate against the Sāṃkhya system. 243 246  When the aspect of emptiness dawns, the factor that is the negative of the object of negation—true establishment—dawns.  Emptiness is a non-affirming negative that is a negative of true establishment.  Since emptiness is a non-affirming negative that is a negative of true establishment, the factor that is the negative of the object of negation—true establishment—must dawn when the aspect of emptiness dawns.  When meaning-generalities of non-affirming negatives dawn in dependence upon explicitly refuting their objects of negation, it is necessary that another phenomenon is not projected explicitly or implicitly.  With regard to that, without the meaning-generality of the object of negation previously dawning to an awareness, the nonexistence that is the negative of that does not dawn to an awareness.  This is because Śāntideva's Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds says: Without making contact with the thing imputed, The nonexistence of that thing is not apprehended. According to Jamyang Shaypa's presentation of the opponent's idea, the non-appearance of anything to the mind constitutes realization of emptiness, and therefore, the negative of the object of negation by emptiness does not appear to that mind. From Jamyang Shaypa's viewpoint, the dawning of the aspect of emptiness means that the negative of true existence—the object of negation—appears. Thus, according to 247 him, realizing emptiness means that the aspect of the absence of the true existence of a selected object dawns to one's awareness. He makes four points: (a) Without the meaning-generality (or generic image, this being a conceptual image) of the object of negation previously dawning to the mind, the nonexistence that is the negative of that object of negation does not appear to the mind. (b) Emptiness is a non-affirming negative that is a negative of true establishment. (c) Therefore, when the aspect of emptiness dawns, the factor that is the negative of the object of negation—true establishment—must dawn. (d) When meaning-generalities of non-affirming negatives appear in dependence upon explicitly refuting their objects of negation, it is necessary that another phenomenon is not projected explicitly or implicitly. 3rd refutation: The mere non-dawning of appearances of coarse conventionalities is not sufficient In the first refutation, Jamyang Shaypa pointed out that in the earlier period Tibetan elders' misunderstanding that nothing dawning to one's awareness is in danger of falling into a category of non-view ignorance realizing emptiness. In the second refutation, Jamyang Shaypa says that those elders hold that the image of the negative of true establishment does not dawn. In that refutation, Jamyang Shaypa indicates that emptiness is a non-affirming negative and that it must dawn as the negation of the true establishment of phenomena which is falsely believed. Now, this third refutation serves to further explain the second by explaining why the mere non-appearance of things is not 248 sufficient. As we will see below, Jamyang Shaypa indicates that the opponent's assertion of the mere non-appearance of coarse conventionalities while denying the need for the appearance of the generic image of the negative of true establishment makes the Mādhyamikas indistinguishable from the Nihilists. THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM གཞན་ཡང་སློང་ཉིད་རྟློགས་པ་ལ་ཡུལ་ཀུན་ རློབ་རགས་པའི་སྣང་བ་མ་ཤར་བ་ཙམ་གིས་མི་ ཆློག་པར་ཐལ། [སློང་ཉིད་རྟློགས་པ་]དེ་ལ་ཡུལ་ དེ་དག་གི་ངློ་བློ་ཉིད་མེད་པའི་རྣམ་པ་ཤར་བ་ གཅིག་དགློས་ཀྱི་དེ་མ་ཤར་བར་ཡུལ་དེ་དག་མི་ སྣང་བ་ཙམ་གིས་མི་ཆློག་པའི་ཕིར། སློང་ཉིད་རྟློགས་པ་ལ་ཡུལ་ཀུན་ རློབ་རགས་པའི་སྣང་བ་མ་ཤར་བ་ དང་ཡུལ་དེ་དག་གི་ངློ་བློ་ཉིད་མེད་ པའི་རྣམ་པ་ཤར་བ་གཉིས་ཀ་དགློས། [(སློང་ཉིད་རྟློགས་པ་)དེ་ལ་ཡུལ་དེ་དག་གི་ངློ་ བློ་ཉིད་མེད་པའི་རྣམ་པ་ཤར་བ་གཅིག་དགློས་ ཀྱི་དེ་མ་ཤར་བར་ཡུལ་དེ་དག་མི་སྣང་བ་ཙམ་ གིས་མི་ཆློག་པ་]དེར་ཐལ། དཔེར་ན་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་ ལྟ་བུ་ལ་དེ་ལྟར་དགློས་པར་སློབ་དཔློན་སངས་ རྒྱས་བསྐྱངས་བཞེད་པ་གང་ཞིག ཟླ་བའི་ཞབས་ ཀྱང་དེ་ལྟར་བཞེད་པའི་ཕིར། སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་གི་སློང་ཉིད་རྟློགས་པ་ལ་ དེ་དག་གི་ངློ་བློ་ཉིད་མེད་པའི་རྣམ་ པ་ཤར་དགློས་པར་སློབ་དཔློན་ སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱངས་ཀྱིས་བཞེད་པ་ གང་ཞིག ཟླ་བའི་ཞབས་ཀྱང་དེ་ ལྟར་བཞེད། With regard to realization of emptiness, both (1) the non-dawning of appearances of coarse conventionalities and (2) a dawning Moreover, it follows that with regard to of an aspect—that is, a generic realization of emptiness, the mere non-dawning image—of the naturelessness of of appearances of coarse conventionalities is not those objects are necessary. sufficient because with regard to that [realization of emptiness] a dawning of an aspect [that is, a generic image] of the naturelessness of those objects is necessary, but without its dawning the mere non-appearance of those objects is not sufficient. (1) Buddhapālita asserts that for realization of the emptiness of It follows that [with regard to that (realization of former and future births, a dawning emptiness) a dawning of an aspect (that is, a 249 THE TEXT generic image) of the naturelessness of those objects is necessary, but without its dawning the mere non-appearance of those objects is not sufficient,] because (1) Buddhapālita asserts that for former and future births, for example, such is needed; and (2) the glorious Candrakīrti also asserts such. JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM of an image of the naturelessness of those is necessary; and (2) the glorious Candrakīrti also asserts such. དང་པློ་[དཔེར་ན་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་ལྟ་བུ་ལ་དེ་ལྟར་ དགློས་པར་སློབ་དཔློན་སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱངས་ བཞེད་པར་]གྲུབ་ཏེ། བུདྡྷ་པཱ་ལི་ཏ་ལས། དེ་ གཉིས་ལ་ཁད་པར་ཆེ་བ་དེ་བཞིན་དུ། འདི་ལ་ ཡང་འཇིག་རྟེན་འདི་མེད་དློ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་ སློགས་པ་དེ་ལྟར་མཐློང་བ་ནི་མ་རིག་པས་ཀུན་ ཏུ་རློངས་པའི་སེམས་པ་དང་ལན་པ་ཡིན་གི་ དངློས་པློ་ཐམས་ཅད་ངློ་བློ་ཉིད་སློང་པའི་ཕིར་ མ་སྐྱེས་པ་དང་མ་འགག་པར་མཐློང་བ་ཅིག་ ཤློས་ནི་ཤེས་པ་སློན་དུ་བཏང་བ་ཡིན་པས་དེ་ གཉིས་ལ་ཁད་པར་ཤིན་ཏུ་ཆེའློ། །ཞེས་ གསུངས་པའི་ཕིར། (left side retained) 244 245 བུདྡྷ་པཱ་ལི་ཏ་ལས། དེ་གཉིས་ལ་ཁད་ པར་ཆེ་བ་དེ་བཞིན་དུ། འདི་ལ་ཡང་ འཇིག་རྟེན་འདི་མེད་དློ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ ལ་སློགས་པ་དེ་ལྟར་མཐློང་བ་ནི་མ་ རིག་པས་ཀུན་ཏུ་རློངས་པའི་སེམས་ པ་དང་ལན་པ་ཡིན་གི་དངློས་པློ་ ཐམས་ཅད་ངློ་བློ་ཉིད་སློང་པའི་ ཕིར་མ་སྐྱེས་པ་དང་མ་འགག་པར་ མཐློང་བ་ཅིག་ཤློས་ནི་ཤེས་པ་སློན་ དུ་བཏང་བ་ཡིན་པས་དེ་གཉིས་ལ་ ཁད་པར་ཤིན་ཏུ་ཆེའློ། །ཞེས་ Buddhapālita (sangs rgyas bskyangs, ca. 470-540), Buddhapālita Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle" (dbu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa buddha pā li ta, buddhapālitamūlamadhyamakavṛtti), Toh. 3842, dbu ma, vol. tsha, 243a.6-243a.7; see also Akira Saito, "A study of the BuddhapālitaMūlamadhyamakavṛtti" (PhD diss., Australian National University, Australia, 1984), 252-253. This passage is a part of Buddhapālita's commentary on stanza 7cd in Nāgārjuna's Fundamental Treatise on the Middle, Called "Wisdom" (dbu ma rtsa ba shes rab, prajñānāmamūlamadhyamakakārikā) in Chapter XVIII, Analysis of Self (bdag brtag pa, ātmaparikṣā) where he first cites the Treatise and then gives his commentary: 244 [243a.1] མ་སྐྱེས་པ་དང་མ་འགགས་པ། ཆློས་ཉིད་མ་དང་འདས་དང་མཚུངས།། 250 … །སྨྲས་པ། གང་འཇིག་རྟེན་འདི་མེད་དློ། །འཇིག་རྟེན་ཕ་རློལ་མེད་དློ། །སེམས་ཅན་རྫུས་ཏེ་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དློ། །ཞེས་བྱ་ བ་ལ་སློགས་པར་[243a.4]ལྟ་བ་དེ་དང་། གང་དངློས་པློ་ཐམས་ཅད་མ་སྐྱེས་པ་དང་མ་འགགས་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་ལྟ་བ་ དེ་གཉིས་ལ་ཁད་པར་ཅི་ཡློད། བཤད་པ། དེ་གཉིས་ལ་ཁད་པར་ཤིན་ཏུ་ཆེ་ན། ཁློད་ནི་སློང་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་དློན་རྣམ་པར་མི་ཤེས་ནས་དེ་གཉིས་འདྲའློ་ སྙམ་དུ་སེམས་སློ། །འདི་[243a.5]ལ་སློ་སློར་མ་བརྟགས་པར་བཏང་སྙློམས་བྱེད་པ་གང་ཡིན་པ་དང་། སློ་སློར་ བརྟགས་ནས་བཏང་སྙློམས་བྱེད་པ་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་གཉིས་བཏང་སྙློམས་བྱེད་པར་ནི་འདྲ་མློད་ཀྱི་སློ་སློར་མ་ བརྟགས་པར་བཏང་སྙློམས་བྱེད་པ་ནི་མ་རིག་པའི་ཀུན་ཏུ་སྦྱློར་བ་དང་ལན་པར་བསན་ལ། བཏང་སྙློམས་ [243a.6] བྱེད་གཅིག་ཤློས་ནི་སངས་རྒྱས་བཅློམ་ལན་འདས་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཀུན་ཏུ་བསན་པ་ཡིན་པས། དེ་གཉིས་ལ་ ཁད་པར་ཤིན་ཏུ་ཆེ་བ་དེ་བཞིན་དུ། འདི་ལ་ཡང་འཇིག་རྟེན་འདི་མེད་དློ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་སློགས་པ་དེ་ལྟར་མཐློང་བ་ ནི་མ་རིག་པས་ཀུན་ཏུ་རློངས་པའི་སེམས་དང་ལན་པ་[243a.7]ཡིན་གི། དངློས་པློ་ཐམས་ཅད་ངློ་བློ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་སློང་ པའི་ཕིར་མ་སྐྱེས་པ་དང་མ་འགགས་པར་མཐློང་བ་ཅིག་ཤློས་ནི་ཤེས་པ། སློན་དུ་བཏང་བ་ཡིན་པས། 245 This is a response against the Nihilists' assertion that nonexistence and emptiness are equivalent. Their assertion and the first part of Buddhapālita's refutation go as follows: [The Nihilists say:] "This world or life does not exist as an effect of past lives. A future world does not exist. Also, spontaneously born sentient beings such as hell-beings do not exist," and so forth. What is the difference between their view and the view of the Proponents of the Middle that all things are not produced and do not cease? [Answer of Buddhapālita:] There is a great difference between these two. Not knowing the meaning of emptiness, you think that these two are similar. Acting with equanimity [that is, indifference] when one has not analyzed [to find that all sentient beings should be valued equally] and acting with equanimity when one has so analyzed are similar only in that both can be characterized as acting with equanimity. However, acting with equanimity but without analysis is involved in the entwinements of ignorance. Acting with equanimity when one has analyzed [is the result of knowledge and] is used by the Supramundane Victors. See Jeffrey Hopkins, Maps of the Profound: Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Buddhist and NonBuddhist Views on the Nature of Reality (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2003), 825. 251 THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM The first [that Buddhapālita asserts that for former and future births, for example, such is the Buddhapālita needed] is established because the Buddhapālita because 246 [Commentary] says: [Commentary] says: Just as these two differ very greatly, so here Just as these two differ very greatly, also the perceptions [found in the texts of the so here also the perceptions [found Nihilists] such as, "This world does not exist," in the texts of the Nihilists] such as, [meaning that this life is not the effect of other "This world does not exist," lives] are thoughts beclouded with ignorance. [meaning that this life is not the However, the others [that is, the Proponents of effect of other lives] are thoughts with ignorance. the Middle]—who see that all phenomena are beclouded not [inherently] produced and do not However, the others [that is, the [inherently] cease because they are empty of Proponents of the Middle]—who inherent existence—have preceded their see that all phenomena are not conclusion with the mind of analysis. [inherently] produced and do not Therefore, these two [Nihilists and Proponents [inherently] cease because they are empty of inherent existence—have of the Middle] are very different. preceded their conclusion with the mind of analysis. Therefore, these two [Nihilists and Proponents of the Middle] are very different. གསུངས་པའི་ཕིར། [བུདྡྷ་པཱ་ལི་ཏ་གིས་འདི་འདྲས་གསུངས་པ་ཡིན་ མེད་ལྟ་བས་དེ་ལྟར་མཐློང་བ་མ་ ན་(སློང་ཉིད་རྟློགས་པ་)དེ་ལ་ཡུལ་དེ་དག་གི་ངློ་ རིག་པའི་དབང་དང་དབུ་མ་པས་ བློ་ཉིད་མེད་པའི་རྣམ་པ་ཤར་བ་གཅིག་དགློས་ དངློས་པློ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་ངློ་བློ་ཉིད་ 246 This is a response against the Nihilists' assertion that nonexistence and emptiness are equivalent. Their assertion and the first part of Buddhapālita's refutation go as follows: [The Nihilists say:] "This world or life does not exist as an effect of past lives. A future world does not exist. Also, spontaneously born sentient beings such as hell-beings do not exist," and so forth. What is the difference between their view and the view of the Proponents of the Middle that all things are not produced and do not cease? [Answer of Buddhapālita:] There is a great difference between these two. Not knowing the meaning of emptiness, you think that these two are similar. Acting with equanimity [that is, indifference] when one has not analyzed [to find that all sentient beings should be valued equally] and acting with equanimity when one has so analyzed are similar only in that both can be characterized as acting with equanimity. However, acting with equanimity but without analysis is involved in the entwinements of ignorance. Acting with equanimity when one has analyzed [is the result of knowledge and] is used by the Supramundane Victors. See Jeffrey Hopkins, Maps of the Profound (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2003), 825. 252 THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM ཀྱི་དེ་མ་ཤར་བར་ཡུལ་དེ་དག་མི་སྣང་བ་ཙམ་ མེད་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་གིས་མ་སྐྱེས་པ་ གིས་མི་ཆློག་པས་]ཁབ་སེ། མེད་ལྟ་བས་དེ་ལྟར་ སློགས་སུ་ལྟ་བས་ཁད་པར་ཆེ་བ་ མཐློང་བ་མ་རིག་པའི་དབང་དང་དབུ་མ་པས་ བཤད། Nihilists and the Proponents of དངློས་པློ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་ངློ་བློ་ཉིད་མེད་པའི་རྒྱུ་ [The the Middle] are very different due to མཚན་གིས་མ་སྐྱེས་པ་སློགས་སུ་ལྟ་བས་ཁད་ the fact that the Nihilists' seeing such is from the power of ignorance and པར་ཆེ་བ་བཤད་པའི་ཕིར་རློ། the Proponents of the Middle see [Buddhapālita's statement] entails [that with regard to the realization of emptiness a dawning of an aspect (that is, a meaning-generality) of the naturelessness of those objects is necessary, but without its dawning the mere non-appearance of those objects is not sufficient] because it explains that [the Nihilists and the Proponents of the Middle] are very different due to the fact that the Nihilists' seeing such is from the power of ignorance and the Proponents of the Middle see [phenomena] as not [inherently] produced and so forth by reason of the nonexistence of the inherent nature of all phenomena. [phenomena] as not [inherently] produced and so forth by reason of the nonexistence of the inherent nature of all phenomena. །གཉིས་པ་[ཟླ་བའི་ཞབས་ཀྱང་དེ་ལྟར་བཞེད་ པར་]གྲུབ་སེ། ཚིག་གསལ་ལས། འདིར་ཁ་ཅིག་ དབུ་མ་པ་ནི ་མེད་པ་བ་དང་ཁད་པར་མེད་པ་ 247 [།གང་གི་ཕིར་དགེ་བ་དང་མི་ ཡིན་ཏེ། དགེ་བའི་ལས་དང༌། བྱེད་པ་པློ་དང༌། འབྲས་བུ་ དང༌། འཇིག་རྟེན་ཐམས་ཅད་རང་བཞིན་གིས་ སློང་པར་སྨྲ་བ་ཡིན་ལ། །མེད་པ་པ་དག་ཀྱང་དེ་ (left side retained) [249] 247 ཚིག་གསལ་ལས། འདིར་ཁ་ཅིག་ དབུ་མ་པ་ནི་མེད་པ་བ་དང་ཁད་ པར་མེད་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། གང་གི་ཕིར་ དགེ་བ་དང་མི་དགེ་བའི་ལས་དང༌། བྱེད་པ་པློ་དང༌། འབྲས་བུ་དང༌། འཇིག་རྟེན་ཐམས་ཅད་རང་བཞིན་ The text reads zhes pa nas which I have replaced with the omitted part of the quote according to Candrakīrti's Clear Words. See Candrakīrti (zla ba grags pa, fl. 7th century C.E.), Clear Words, Commentary on (Nāgārjuna’s) "Treatise on the Middle" (dbu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa tshigs gsal ba, mūlamadhyamakavṛttiprasannapadā), Toh. 3860, dbu ma, vol. 'a, 117b.6. 253 THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM དག་མེད་དློ་ཞེས་སྨྲ་བར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་པ་དེའི་ ཕིར། དབུ་མ་པ་ནི་མེད་པ་པ་དང་ཁད་པར་ མེད་དློ་ཞེས་རྒློལ་པར་བྱེད་དློ།] དེ་ལྟར་ནི་མ་ ཡིན་ཏེ། དབུ་མ་པ་དག་ནི་རྟེན་ཅིང་འབྲེལ་བར་ འབྱུང་བ་སྨྲ་བ་ཡིན་ལ། རྟེན་ཅིང་འབྲེལ་བར་ འབྱུང་བའི་ཕིར་འཇིག་རྟེན་འདི་དང་འཇིག་ རྟེན་ཕ་རློལ་ལ་སློགས་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་རང་བཞིན་ མེད་པར་སྨྲ་བར་བྱེད་དློ། །མེད་པ་བ་དག་གིས་ ནི་དེ་ལྟར་རྟེན་ཅིང་འབྲེལ་བར་འབྱུང་བ་ཡིན་ པའི་ཕིར༑ རང་བཞིན་གིས་སློང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་སློ་ནས་ འཇིག་རྟེན་ཕ་རློལ་ལ་སློགས་པ་དངློས་པློ་མེད་ པར་རྟློགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ ཕིར། གིས་སློང་པར་སྨྲ་བ་ཡིན་ལ། །མེད་ པ་པ་དག་ཀྱང་དེ་དག་མེད་དློ་ཞེས་ སྨྲ་བར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་པ་དེའི་ཕིར། དབུ་མ་པ་ནི་མེད་པ་པ་དང་ཁད་ པར་མེད་དློ་ཞེས་རྒློལ་པར་བྱེད་དློ། 248 The second reason [that is, that the glorious Candrakīrti also asserts such] is established because [Candrakīrti's] Clear Words says:249 Here some say, "The Proponents of the Middle are indistinguishable from Nihilists because because [Candrakīrti's] Clear Words says: Here some say, "The Proponents of the Middle are indistinguishable from Nihilists because they propound that virtuous and nonvirtuous actions, agents, fruits, and all worlds [that is, lives] are empty of inherent existence, and the Nihilists also say that these are nonexistent. Therefore, the Mādhyamikas are indistinguishable from Nihilists." It is not so. "How?" Proponents of the Middle are proponents of dependent-arising; they say that due to arising dependent on, or reliant on, causes Ibid., 117b.4-117b.7. This is Candrakīrti's commentary on Nāgārjuna's Treatise, XVIII.7cd, on which Buddhapālita comments in the above citation. The corresponding passage in Sanskrit is: 248 atraike paricodayasi | nāstikāviśiṣṭā mādhyamikā yasmātkuśalākuśalaṃ karma kartāraṃ ca phalaṃ ca sarvaṃ ca lokaṃ bhāvasvabhāvaśūnyamiti bruvate | nāstikā api hotannāstīti bruvate | tasmānnāstikāviśiṣṭā mādhyamikā iti | naivam | kutaḥ | pratītyasamutpādavādino hi mādhyamikā hetupratyayān prāpya pratītya samutpannatvātsarvamevehalokaparalokaṃ niḥsvabhāvaṃ varṇayanti | yathā svarūpavādino naiva nāstikāḥ pratītyasamutpannatvādbhāvasvabhāvaśunyatvena na paralokādyabhāvaṃ pratipannāḥ | See Louis de La Vallée Poussin, Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapdā Commentaire de Candrakīrti, Bibliotheca Buddhica 4 (Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag, 1970), 368.4368.10. 249 Adapted from Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 826. 254 THE TEXT they propound that virtuous and non-virtuous actions, agents, fruits, and all worlds [that is, lives] 250 are empty of inherent existence, and the Nihilists also say that these are nonexistent. Therefore, Proponents of the Middle are indistinguishable from Nihilists." It is not so. "How?" The Mādhyamikas are proponents of dependent-arising; they say that due to arising dependent on, or reliant on, causes and conditions all—this world, the next, and so forth—lack inherent existence. The Nihilists do not realize251 future worlds [that is, future lives] and so forth as non-things252 because of being empty of inherent existence due to being dependent-arisings. ལུང་ས་ཕི་འདི་གཉིས་ཀྱིས་ལྟ་བ་རྟློགས་ཚད་ ཀྱང་ཤེས་པར་གིས༑ Through these former and latter passages [by Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti], understand the measure of realizing the view! JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM and conditions all—this world, the next, and so forth—lack inherent existence. The Nihilists do not realize future worlds [that is, future lives] and so forth as non-things because of being empty of inherent existence due to being dependentarisings. ལྟ་བ་རྟློགས་ཚད་ནི་རྟེན་ཅིང་ འབྲེལ་བར་འབྱུང་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར། རང་བཞིན་གིས་སློང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་སློ་ ནས་འཇིག་རྟེན་ཕ་རློལ་ལ་སློགས་ པ་དངློས་པློ་མེད་པར་རྟློགས་པ་ ཡིན། The measure of realizing the view is realization that future lives and so forth do not truly exist because of being empty of inherent existence due to being dependent-arisings. 250 Lives as fruits of moral actions. Skt. pratipannāḥ. 252 "Non-things" (dngos po med pa, abhāva) could be translated as "without thingness." Since Candrakīrti states that the Mādhyamikas assert that this world and so forth lack inherent existence when he says, "The Mādhyamikas are proponents of dependent-arising; they say that due to arising dependent on, or reliant on, causes and conditions all—this world, the next, and so forth—lack inherent existence," "non-things" needs to be understood in the context of the previous passage. That is, "non-thing" does not mere nonexistence or non-effective thing, but the absence of inherent or true existence. 251 255 In the course of debate, Jamyang Shaypa makes the following points:  With regard to realization of emptiness, both (1) the non-dawning of appearances of coarse conventionalities and (2) a dawning of an aspect—that is, a generic image—of the naturelessness of those objects are necessary.  Buddhapālita asserts that for realization of the emptiness of former and future births, a dawning of an image of the naturelessness of those is necessary; and (2) the glorious Candrakīrti also asserts such.  because the Buddhapālita [Commentary] says: Just as these two differ very greatly, so here also the perceptions [found in the texts of the Nihilists] such as, "This world does not exist," [meaning that this life is not the effect of other lives] are thoughts beclouded with ignorance. However, the others [that is, the Proponents of the Middle]—who see that all phenomena are not [inherently] produced and do not [inherently] cease because they are empty of inherent existence—have preceded their conclusion with the mind of analysis. Therefore, these two [Nihilists and Proponents of the Middle] are very different.  [The Nihilists and the Proponents of the Middle] are very different due to the fact that the Nihilists' seeing such is from the power of ignorance and the Proponents of the Middle see [phenomena] as not [inherently] produced and so forth by reason of the nonexistence of the inherent nature of all phenomena. 256  because [Candrakīrti's] Clear Words says: Here some say, "The Proponents of the Middle are indistinguishable from Nihilists because they propound that virtuous and non-virtuous actions, agents, fruits, and all worlds [that is, lives] are empty of inherent existence, and the Nihilists also say that these are nonexistent. Therefore, the Mādhyamikas are indistinguishable from Nihilists." It is not so. "How?" Proponents of the Middle are proponents of dependent-arising; they say that due to arising dependent on, or reliant on, causes and conditions all—this world, the next, and so forth—lack inherent existence. The Nihilists do not realize future worlds [that is, future lives] and so forth as non-things because of being empty of inherent existence due to being dependent-arisings.  The measure of realizing the view is realization that future lives and so forth do not truly exist because of being empty of inherent existence due to being dependent-arisings. Jamyang Shaypa proposes two necessary conditions for the realization of emptiness. First, appearances of conventionalities should not dawn, and second, a generic image of naturelessness—emptiness—the negation of true establishment must dawn. The opponent 257 accepts the first as the only necessary condition of the realization of emptiness and denies the appearance of a generic image of the negation of true establishment to one's mind. Jamyang Shaypa suggests that the opponents' understanding is close to the view of the Nihilists. To indicate the fallacy of the opponent, Jamyang Shaypa cites two instances of Indian Mādhyamika scholars’ differentiating themselves from the Nihilists: Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti. First, Buddhapālita propounds the difference between Mādhyamikas and Nihilists with regard to the assertion, "This world does not exist." He points out that the Mādhyamikas realize the non-production and non-cessation of all things through reasoning by analytical thinking, whereas the Nihilists' conclusion of the nonexistence of phenomena is based on ignorance. For Mādhyamikas "does not exist" means "to not inherently exist" whereas for Nihilists it simply means nonexistence. This distinction between the two schools is explained further by Candrakīrti who appears to be elaborating on Buddhapālita's commentary on the same stanza (7cd) of Nāgārjuna's Fundamental Treatise on the Middle, Called "Wisdom" (dbu ma rtsa ba’i tshig le’ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba, prajñānāmamūlamadhyamakakārikā) with regard to the necessity of reasoning to realize emptiness. Candrakīrti responds against the misunderstanding that Mādhyamikas and Nihilists are not different in terms of asserting that virtuous and non-virtuous actions and so forth do not exist by pointing out that the Mādhyamikas ascertain that things exist in a particular way—as dependent-arisings—in order to negate that things are truly existent. That is, they ascertain that: 258 Thesis: Future worlds [future lives] and so forth do not truly exist, Reason: because of being empty of inherent existence, Sub-reason: due to being dependent-arisings. In this way, Candrakīrti shows that Mādhyamikas admit the existence of things in dependence upon causes and conditions unlike the Nihilists. Whereas Buddhapālita merely mentions the necessity of analytical investigation, here Candrakīrti details this very investigation. By means of providing examples from Buddhapālita's and Candrakīrti's accounts on the difference between the two schools, Jamyang Shaypa indirectly argues (1) that the Tibetan elders' assertions in the earlier period have the possibility of diminishing the difference between the Nihilists and the Mādhyamikas and (2) that the generic image of the absence of true establishment, a non-affirming negative, must dawn in order to realize emptiness. Moreover, these series of three refutations on the topic represent, as Jamyang Shaypa will summarize later, the difference between the Geluk presentations of the object of negation versus these other opinions. That is, whereas the Geluk sect delimits a particular mode of appearance as the object of negation, other sects represented by Tibetan elders in the earlier period indiscriminately negate all appearances of conventional phenomena which Geluk sect criticizes as a too broad range of the object of negation. In this sense, the next refutation, that of the Translator Taktshang, is also of a too broad negation. 259 2nd Wrong idea: The Translator Taktshang holds that valid establishment of conventionalities (kun rdzob) is not necessary for realizing emptiness In his refutation of the first wrong idea above, Jamyang Shaypa addressed a precondition for realizing emptiness—the necessity of understanding or identifying what true establishment is. In this second wrong idea, held by the Translator Taktshang Sherab Rinchen (b.1405, Taktshang henceforth) of the Sakya sect,253 Jamyang Shaypa proposes another precondition—that conventionalities should be validly established prior to realizing emptiness. According to Jamyang Shaypa, Taktshang says that the valid establishment of conventionalities is not necessary for realizing emptiness. In response, Jamyang Shaypa makes the case that Taktshang's assertion is similar to Indian materialists. THE TEXT 253 JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM For detailed information on the Translator Taktshang's list of 18 contradictions of Tsongkhapa which is followed by 27 refutations by Jamyang Shaypa, see Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 15-17, 527-694. 260 THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM ཡང་སག་ལློ་ན་རེ། ཐ་སྙད་ལ་ཞིབ་མློ་མི་ཤེས་ ཐ་སྙད་ལ་ཞིབ་མློ་མི་ཤེས་པར་སློང་ ཀྱང་སློང་ཉིད་རྟློགས་ནུས་པས་སློང་ཉིད་རྟློགས་ ཉིད་རྟློགས་མི་སིད། knowing the details with པ་ལ་ཐ་སྙད་ཚད་གྲུབ་མི་དགློས་ཏེ། དློན་དམ་ Without regard to conventions, one cannot པ་ཀུན་རློབ་ལས་གཞན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར་ ཟེར་ realize emptiness. ཐ་སྙད་ཚད་གྲུབ་དགློས། ན། 254 Conventions have to be validly Moreover, the Translator Taktshang says, "Since, established. despite not knowing the details with regard to conventions (tha snyad, vyāvahāra), one can realize emptiness, conventions do not have to be validly established because the ultimate is other than conventionalities (kun rdzob)." The ultimate is other than conventionalities. དློན་དམ་པ་ཀུན་རློབ་ལས་གཞན་ ཡིན། 254 It is hard to know what "other (gzhan)" actually means. If it means different entity (ngo bo gzhan), the Geluk sect would not agree. If it means just other (gzhan), that is to say, different, then the Geluk sect would agree with it because the relation between the two truths is the same entity but different isolates (ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad). 261 THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM ཐ་སྙད་ཚད་གྲུབ་འཇློག་མི་ཤེས་པར་རང་ བཞིན་མེད་པ་རྟློགས་མི་སིད་པར་ཐལ། ཚད་ གྲུབ་འཇློག་མི་ཤེས་པར་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་ བཟུང་བས་སློང་ཉིད་རྟློགས་པར་འཇློག་མི་ཐུབ་ པའི་ཕིར། [ཚད་གྲུབ་འཇློག་མི་ཤེས་པར་རང་ བཞིན་མེད་པར་བཟུང་བས་སློང་ཉིད་རྟློགས་ པར་འཇློག་མི་ཐུབ་པ་]དེར་ཐལ། སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་ལྟ་ བུ་ལ་[ཚད་གྲུབ་འཇློག་མི་ཤེས་པར་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་ རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་བཟུང་བས་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕིའ་ི སེང་གི་སློང་པ་ཉིད་རྟློགས་མི་ཐུབ་པ་]དེའི་ ཕིར། ཐ་སྙད་ཚད་གྲུབ་འཇློག་མི་ཤེས་པར་ རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་རྟློགས་མི་སིད། It follows that without knowing [how to] posit the valid establishment of conventions it is impossible to realize naturelessness because without knowing [how to] posit valid establishment, it cannot be posited that emptiness is realized through holding that [phenomena] are natureless. It follows [that without knowing how to posit valid establishment, it cannot be posited that emptiness is realized through holding that phenomena are natureless] because [without knowing how to posit valid establishment,] with regard to former and later births [it cannot be posited that the emptiness of former and later births is realized through holding that former and later births are natureless]. Without knowing how to posit the valid establishment of conventions it is impossible to realize naturelessness. ཚད་གྲུབ་འཇློག་མི་ཤེས་པར་རང་ བཞིན་མེད་པར་བཟུང་བས་སློང་ ཉིད་རྟློགས་པར་འཇློག་མི་ཐུབ། Without knowing how to posit valid establishment, it cannot be posited that emptiness is realized through holding that [phenomena] are natureless. སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་ལྟ་བུ་ལ་ཚད་གྲུབ་འཇློག་ མི་ཤེས་པར་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་བཞིན་ མེད་པར་བཟུང་བས་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕིའི་ སེང་གི་སློང་པ་ཉིད་རྟློགས་མི་ཐུབ། Without knowing how to posit valid establishment, with regard to former and later births it cannot be posited that the emptiness of former and later births is realized through holding that former and later births are natureless. 262 THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM [སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་ལྟ་བུ་ལ་ཚད་གྲུབ་འཇློག་མི་ཤེས་ དཔེར་ན། རྒྱང་ཕན་པས་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་ པར་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་བཟུང་ རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་བཟུང་བ་དེ་ བས་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕིའི་སེང་གི་སློང་པ་ཉིད་རྟློགས་མི་ སློང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ལྟ་བ་མ་ཡིན། Āyatas’ holding former and later ཐུབ་པ་]དེར་ཐལ། དཔེར་ན། རྒྱང་ཕན་པས་སྐྱེ་ The births as natureless, for example, is བ་ས་ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་བཟུང་བ་དེ་སློང་ not a view of emptiness. ཉིད་ཀྱི་ལྟ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར། It follows that [without knowing how to posit valid establishment with regard to former and later births it cannot be posited that the emptiness of former and later births is realized through holding that former and later births are natureless,] because the Āyata255 holding former and later births as natureless, for example, is not a view of emptiness. [རྒྱང་ཕན་པས་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་ པར་བཟུང་བ་དེ་སློང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ལྟ་བ་མ་ཡིན་ པ་]དེར་ཐལ། དེ་ཆད་ལྟ་ཡིན་ལ་དབུ་མ་པས་སྐྱེ་ བ་ས་ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་བཟུང་བ་དེ་ལྟ་བ་ རྣམ་དག་ཡིན་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་རིམ་བཞིན་དུ་ཐ་ སྙད་དུ་གྲུབ་པ་མི་འདློད་པ་དང་། འདློད་པའི་ དབང་གིས་ཡིན་ པའི་ཕིར་ཏེ། It follows [that the Āyatas' holding former and later births as natureless is not a view of emptiness] because the reason why the [Āyatas' view] is a view of annihilation but the Middle Proponents' holding former and later births as དེ་ཆད་ལྟ་ཡིན་ལ་དབུ་མ་པས་སྐྱེ་བ་ ས་ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་བཟུང་བ་ དེ་ལྟ་བ་རྣམ་དག་ཡིན་པའི་རྒྱུ་ མཚན་རིམ་བཞིན་དུ་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་གྲུབ་ པ་མི་འདློད་པ་དང་། འདློད་པའི་ དབང་གིས་ཡིན། The reason why the [Āyatas' view] is a view of annihilation but the Middle Proponents' holding former and later births as natureless is a pure view is respectively due to [the Āyatas'] not asserting but [the Middle Proponents'] rgyang phan pa (āyata) also called lokāyata ('jig rten rgyang phan pa). According to a Tibetan oral etymology (ngag dbang legs ldan), lokāyata ('jig rten rgyang phan pa) etymologically means "Flung Afar from the world" and is pejorative as Jamyang Shaypa says, "Because they have gone apart from the correct view, they are Ayatas [literally, Those Who Are Flung Afar]." They are moral Nihilists. See Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 96. 255 263 THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM natureless is a pure view is respectively due to asserting establishment in [the Āyatas'] not asserting but [the Middle conventions. Proponents'] asserting establishment in conventions. (left side retained) ཚིག་གསལ་ལས། གལ་ཏེ་དེ་ལྟ་ན་ཡང་དེ་དག་ གི་དངློས་པློའི་རང་བཞིན་གི་ངློ་བློར་ཡློད་པ་ མིན་པ་ཉིད་དུ་རྟློགས་པའི་ཕིར་རེ་ཞིག་ལྟ་བ་ འདིའི་སློ་ནས་མཚུངས་པ་ཡློད་དློ་ཞེ་ན་མེད་དེ་ དབུ་མ་པ་དག་གིས་ཀུན་རློབ་ཏུ་ཡློད་པར་ཁས་ བངས་པའི་ཕིར་ལ། དེ་དག་གིས་ཁས་མ་བངས་ པའི་ཕིར་མི་མཚུངས་སློ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ ཕིར། ཚིག་གསལ་ལས། གལ་ཏེ་དེ་ལྟ་ན་ ཡང་དེ་དག་གི་དངློས་པློའི་རང་ བཞིན་གི་ངློ་བློར་ཡློད་པ་མིན་པ་ ཉིད་དུ་རྟློགས་པའི་ཕིར་རེ་ཞིག་ལྟ་ བ་འདིའི་སློ་ནས་མཚུངས་པ་ཡློད་དློ་ ཞེ་ན་མེད་དེ་དབུ་མ་པ་དག་གིས་ ཀུན་རློབ་ཏུ་ཡློད་པར་ཁས་བངས་ པའི་ཕིར་ལ། དེ་དག་གིས་ཁས་མ་ བངས་པའི་ཕིར་མི་མཚུངས་ སློ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕིར། This is because [Candrakīrti's] Clear Words says: [Objection:] Even if that is the case because [the Āyatas'] realize that the entity of the nature of those is not existent, at this point, they are similar by way of this view. because [Candrakīrti's] Clear Words [Answer:] They are not because the Proponents says: of the Middle assert them as conventionally [Objection:] Even if that is the case existent, and because those [that is, the Āyatas] because [the Āyatas'] realize that do not assert [such]. Hence they are not the entity of the nature of those is similar. not existent, at this point, they are similar by way of this view. [Answer:] They are not because the Proponents of the Middle assert them as conventionally existent, and because those [that is, the Āyatas] do not assert [such]. Hence they are not similar. རེ་རིན་པློ་ཆེས་ལྟ་བ་མ་རེད་བར་དུ་རང་བཞིན་ རེ་རིན་པློ་ཆེས་ལྟ་བ་མ་རེད་བར་དུ་ མེད་པ་དང་མེད་པའི་ཁད་པར་མི་ཕེད་ རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་དང་མེད་པའི་ གསུངས་པས་ཀྱང་ཤེས་སློ།། ཁད་པར་མི་ཕེད་གསུངས་པས་ཀྱང་ Also, from Tsongkhapa's saying that until the 264 THE TEXT view [of emptiness] is found, the difference between naturelessness (rang bzhin med pa) and nonexistence (med pa) is not distinguished, it is known [that without knowing how to posit the valid establishment of conventions it is impossible to realize naturelessness (tha snyad tshad grub 'jog mi shes par rang bzhin med pa rtogs mi srid pa)]. JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM ཤེས་སློ།། Also, from Tsongkhapa's saying that until the view [of emptiness] is found, the difference between naturelessness (rang bzhin med pa) and nonexistence (med pa) is not distinguished, it is known [that without knowing how to posit the valid establishment of conventions it is impossible to realize naturelessness]. In the course of debate, Jamyang Shaypa makes the following points:  Without knowing the details with regard to conventions, one cannot realize emptiness.  Conventions have to be validly established.  The ultimate is other than conventionalities.  Without knowing how to posit the valid establishment of conventions it is impossible to realize naturelessness.  Without knowing how to posit valid establishment, it cannot be posited that emptiness is realized through holding that [phenomena] are natureless.  Without knowing how to posit valid establishment, with regard to former and later births it cannot be posited that the emptiness of former and later births is realized through holding that former and later births are natureless.  The Āyatas’ holding former and later births as natureless, for example, is not a view of emptiness. 265  The reason why the [Āyatas' view] is a view of annihilation but the Middle Proponents' holding former and later births as natureless is a pure view is respectively due to [the Āyatas'] not asserting but [the Middle Proponents'] asserting establishment in conventions.  because [Candrakīrti's] Clear Words says: [Objection:] Even if that is the case because [the Āyatas'] realize that the entity of the nature of those is not existent, at this point, they are similar by way of this view. [Answer:] They are not because the Proponents of the Middle assert them as conventionally existent, and because those [that is, the Āyatas] do not assert [such]. Hence they are not similar.  Also, from Tsongkhapa's saying that until the view [of emptiness] is found, the difference between naturelessness (rang bzhin med pa) and nonexistence (med pa) is not distinguished, it is known [that without knowing how to posit the valid establishment of conventions it is impossible to realize naturelessness]. According to Jamyang Shaypa, Taktshang asserts that it is possible to realize emptiness without validly establishing conventionalities. In the root text Freedom from Extremes through Knowing All Tenets (grub mtha’ kun shes nas mtha’ bral grub pa zhes bya ba’i bstan bcos) and its autocommentary, Explanation of "Freedom from Extremes through Knowing All Tenets": Ocean of Eloquence (grub mtha’ kun shes nas mtha’ bral grub pa 266 zhes bya ba’i bstan bcos rnam par bshad pa legs bshad kyi rgya mtsho), we find that Taktshang classifies four types of nominal Proponents of the Middle (dbu ma pa'i sgras brjod):256 1. The Middle School of Cognition which propounds that the emptiness of duality is truly [established] (stong bden smra rnam rig dbu ma pa) 2. The Middle School of Eliminating Appearance which deprecates appearance (snang la skur 'debs snang sel dbu ma pa) 3. The Middle School of Rational Establishment for which conventionalities are comprehended by valid cognition (tha snyad tshad 'jal rigs grub dbu ma pa) 4. The Middle School of Other-Emptiness for which emptiness is truly established (stong nyid bden grub gzhan stong dbu ma pa) Among these four divisions of the Mādhyamikas, the Middle School of Rational Establishment mirrors an aspect of his criticisms on the Geluk sect:257 The third school of [the Middle School of Rational Establishment for which conventionalities are comprehended by valid cognition] propounds upon 256 Taktshang says: དབུ་]མ་པ་ཡི[་སས་བརློད་]རིགས་ཀྱི[་དབྱེ་བ་ནི་]བཞི་སེ[། གཉིས་]སློང་བདེན་སྨྲ་རྣམ་རིག་དབུ་མ་པ། །སྣང་ལ་སྐུར་ འདེབས་སྣང་སེལ་དབུ་མ་པ། །ཐ་སྙད་ཚད་འཇལ་རིགས་གྲུབ་དབུ་མ་པ། །སློང་ཉིད་བདེན་གྲུབ་གཞན་སློང་དབུ་ མ[་པའློ།། The parts in brackets are from the root text, the parts out of brackets are from its autocommentary. sTag tshang lo tsā ba shes rab rin chen (b.1405), The Root Text and Commentary on Knowing All Tenets (grub mtha' kun shes kyi rtsa 'grel) (Beijing, China: mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1999), 14-15, 144. 257 Ibid., 145. 267 analysis that [all] whatsoever conventionalities are falsities and that among them there are common loci of the two: 1. being a falsity, and 2. being a non-deceptive [phenomenon] that is validly established in the perspective of consciousnesses that are not polluted by superficial causes of mistake even conventionally, and therefore, it [the Middle School of Rational Establishment] has a nature of being a combination of contradictions. Therefore, it is not an actual upholder of an extreme, but, since it does not assert that phenomena withstanding analysis by reasoning are ultimate, it conventionally asserts non-deceptive conventionalities objectively, and hence it is similitude [of an upholder of an extreme]. ལུགས་[གསུམ་པས་]ནི་ཀུན་རློབ་གང་ཡིན་རྫུན་པ་ཡིན་པ་དང་། [དེའི་]་ནང་ནས་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཡང་ འཕལ་གི་འཁྲུལ་རྒྱུས་མ་བསད་པའི་རིག་ངློར་ཚད་གྲུབ་ཀྱི་བསླུ་[མེད་]་གཉིས་[གཞི་མཐུན་དུ། །དཔྱད་ ནས་སྨྲས་པས་འགལ་འདུའི་རང་བཞིན་]་ཕིར། འདི་ནི་དློན་དམ་དུ་རིགས་པས་དཔྱད་བཟློད་ཀྱི་ཆློས་མི་ འདློད་པས་མཐར་འཛིན་དངློས་མ་ཡིན་ཡང་། ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཡུལ་སེང་ནས་མི་བསླུ་བའི་ཀུན་རློབ་ཁས་ བངས་པས་རེས་སུ་མཐུན་པའློ།། 268 According to Taktshang, this sect holds the contradiction that conventionalities are false but at the same time are non-deceptive due to being validly established. Jamyang Shaypa's point in his refutation of the second wrong idea is that conventionalities such as tables, chairs, eye consciousness, and so forth have to be validly established by means of conventional consciousnesses prior to identifying the object of negation. In other words, if one understands those conventional objects to be validly existent, one can also know that some further misapprehended status of them is to be refuted because something that is validly established cannot be refuted. For example, if one knows where a door is in one's room, a practical function can be performed through that knowledge. This valid establishment of conventionalities—knowing the details with regard to conventions—is, according to Jamyang Shaypa, a crucial step to realize emptiness as a precondition to the identification of the object of negation. He explains that without refuting the fraudulent status—that is, the object of negation—and thereby seeing the discrepancy between the misapprehended mode of appearance and the mode of existence, the realization of naturelessness is impossible. And prior to doing that, one has to realize with conventional valid cognition that conventionalities are validly established as existent. Then, what if conventionalities are also taken as objects of negation? Since nothing can withstand ultimate analysis, this absolute negation of all existence without discriminative selection of what needs to be negated could fall into the extreme view of annihilation. That is, all existence will be regarded as the object of negation by ultimate 269 analysis such as the tetralemma (mu bzhi, mtha' bzhi, catuṣkoṭika), neither-one-nor-many (gcig du 'bral gyi gtan tshigs), and so forth. In this vein, Jamyang Shaypa makes the case that Taktshang's assertion could be regarded to be a position similar to that of the Āyatas, the Indian Nihilists.258 According to Candrakīrti, although the Āyatas hold that former and later births are natureless, this should not be considered as a view of emptiness because they do not accept that things exist conventionally. This absolute negation of all conventional existence is, according to Jamyang Shaypa, what Taktshang might reach as his conclusion since he also does not value that conventionalities can be validly established.259 In this way, by filtering out what does not have to be negated, one can According to Jamyang Shaypa, the Āyatas can be divided into three groups:  those who assert former and future lives  those who do not assert former and future lives but assert that since the mind and so forth arise from the four elements, the four elements are the causes of the mind and so forth  those who do not assert former and future lives and do not assert that the four elements are the causes of the mind and so forth although the mind and so forth are produced from the four elements. Among them, the first subdivision of the Āyatas, who are perhaps the Meditators (snyoms 'jug pa, samāpattika) that Jamyang Shaypa mentions separately, should be excluded from this refutation since they believe in former and future lives. The other two groups of Āyatas are likely the Logicians (rtog ge pa, tārtika) who assert that past and future lives, the cause and the effect of actions, and so forth do not exist. See Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 97. 259 Taktshang asserts that the ultimate is established by valid cognition, and is non-deceptive (bslu med), self-instituting (tshugs thub tu grub pa, or tshugs thub tu yod pa), while conventionalities are the opposite: 258 However, [Tsongkhapa and his followers] wrote again and again, not just once, that, unlike this, a fire’s performing the function of burning exists merely conventionally in the context of the object, non-deceptively and self-instituting, due to which those two [emptiness and appearance] must induce mutual ascertainment, whereas if the performance of function were posited merely in the perspective of mistaken [consciousness], it would not be reliable. This is their main contradiction because in the Great Middle Way there is not the slightest inherent nature to be refuted beyond self-instituting performance of function from the object’s side. (579) Objection: We did not say "self-instituting." 270 effectively and precisely face the object of negation and apply ultimate analysis to realize emptiness without falling into the extreme view of annihilation. To enhance his point, Jamyang Shaypa cites Tsongkhapa asserting that the difference between naturelessness and nonexistence is discernable after realizing emptiness. It could be shown as a logical fallacy of circular reasoning. That is, it could be understood that one should discern the difference between naturelessness and nonexistence prior to realizing emptiness with validly establishing conventionalities, but it is only possible to distinguish naturelessness from nonexistence after realizing emptiness. According to Tsongkhapa one does not have to and cannot realize the difference between them without grasping the meaning of. The issue is whether knowing the difference between two is necessary to validly establish conventionalities prior to identifying the object of negation. It seems to me that knowing the difference of them before realizing emptiness is a belief philosophized through education and that knowing Answer: It is contradictory for what is not self-instituting to be established by valid cognition because the meaning of being established by valid cognition is non-deceptive, and the meaning of non-deceptive does not pass beyond self-instituting. (586) See Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 529-530. The Tibetan passage is: འདིར་དེ་ཡང་མི་སྦྱློར་བར་ཡུལ་སེང་ན་རང་བཞིན་ནམ་ངློ་བློ་གང་ཡང་མེད་ལ། མེད་སེག་པའི་བྱ་བ་བྱེད་པ་ལྟ་བུ་ ནི་བློས་བཏགས་རྐྱང་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར། ཡུལ་སེང་ན་ཐ་སྙད་ཙམ་དུ་བསླུ་མེད་ཚུགས་ཐུབ་ཏུ་ཡློད་པས། དེ་གཉིས་ ཕན་ཚུན་ངེས་པ་འདྲེན་པ་དགློས་ཀྱི་བྱ་བྱེད་འཁྲུལ་ངློ་ཙམ་དུ་འཇློག་ན་ཡིད་བརྟན་མི་རུང་ངློ་ཞེས་ལན་ཅིག་མ་ ཡིན་པར་ཡང་དང་ཡང་དུ་བྲིས་པ་ཉིད་འགལ་འདུའི་གཙོ་བློ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དབུ་མ་ཆེན་པློ་ལ་ཡུལ་ངློས་ནས་ཚུགས་ ཐུབ་ཏུ་བྱ་བ་བྱེད་པ་ལས་ལྷག་པའི་རང་བཞིན་དགག་རྒྱུ་ཅུང་ཟད་ཀྱང་མེད་པའི་ཕིར་རློ། །ཚུགས་ཐུབ་མ་སྨྲས་སློ་ ཞེ་ན། རང་ཚུགས་མི་ཐུབ་ན་ཚད་མས་གྲུབ་པ་འགལ་ཏེ། ཚད་གྲུབ་ཀྱི་དློན་ནི་བསླུ་མེད་དང་བསླུ་མེད་ཀྱི་དློན་ནི་ ཚུགས་ཐུབ་ལས་མ་འདས་པའི་ཕིར་རློ། See stag tshang, Knowing All Tenets, 215. Contrary to Taktshang's assertion, in the Geluk sect conventionalities are certified by valid cognition that are non-deceptive with respect to their main object (yul gyi tso bo la mi bslu ba), but mistaken with respect to their appearing-object (snang yul la 'khrul ba). 271 the difference between them after realizing emptiness is the fact that is proven through realization of reality. 3rd Wrong idea: The Āyatas and the Mādhyamikas have the same view and mode of holding that former and later births are natureless This third wrong idea branches out from the refutation of the second wrong idea in order to explain the difference between the Mādhyamikas and the Āyatas; however, the topic of the difference between them is considered in the three subsequent refutations without reference to Taktshang. In the first of these three Jamyang Shaypa distinguishes the Mādhyamikas from the Āyatas by way of citing Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti. THE TEXT དེ་ལ་ཁློ་ན་རེ། རྒྱང་ཕན་པས་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་ བཞིན་མེད་པར་བཟུང་བ་ཆད་ལྟ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ ཐལ། [རྒྱང་ཕན་པ་]དེས་[སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་ བཞིན་མེད་པ་]དེ་ལྟར་མ་རྟློགས་ཀྱང་དབུ་མའི་ ལྟ་བ་དང་བཟུང་ཚུལ་མཐུན་པའི་ཕིར། [རྒྱང་ ཕན་པ་དེས་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་དེ་ ལྟར་མ་རྟློགས་ཀྱང་དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་དང་སྐྱེ་བ་ ས་ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་བཟུང་ཚུལ་མཐུན་ པ་]དེར་ཐལ། སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་ལ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་ JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN OPINION རྒྱང་ཕན་པས་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་ བཞིན་མེད་པར་བཟུང་བ་ཆད་ལྟ་ ཡིན། The Āyatas' holding that former and later births are natureless is a view of annihilation. རྒྱང་ཕན་པ་དེས་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་ བཞིན་མེད་པ་ནི་ཀུན་རློབ་ཚད་མས་ གྲུབ་ཚུལ་ཤེས་པའི་དབུ་མ་པ་རང་ བཞིན་མེད་པ་དེ་ལྟར་མ་རྟློགས། 272 THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN OPINION The Āyatas do not realize naturelessness as the Proponents of the Middle do within knowing how to posit the valid establishment of With regard to the [difference between the conventionalities. Āyatas and the Proponents of the Middle on naturelessness and nonexistence,] someone [incorrectly] says: It [absurdly] follows that the Āyatas' holding that former and later births are natureless is not a view of annihilation because although they do not realize [naturelessness] as [the Proponents of the Middle do within The Middle view and mode of knowing how to posit the valid establishment of holding that former and later births conventions], the Middle view and mode of are natureless do not accord with that holding [that former and later births are of the Āyatas. natureless] accord with [the Āyatas' holding that former and later births are natureless]. It follows that [the Middle view and mode of holding that phenomena are natureless accord with the Āyatas' holding that former and later births are natureless] because (1) former and later births Both of them hold that former and are natureless and (2) both of them hold that later births are natureless. those [former and later births] are natureless. གང་ཞིག དེ་གཉིས་ཀས་[སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་]དེ་རང་ བཞིན་མེད་པར་བཟུང་བའི་ཕིར་ན་ དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་དང་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་ བཞིན་མེད་པར་བཟུང་ཚུལ་རྒྱང་ ཕན་པའི་དེ་དང་མཐུན་པ་མེད། དབུ་མ་པ་དང་རྒྱང་ཕན་པ་གཉིས་ ཀས་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་དེ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་ པར་བཟུང་། [སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་ལ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་གང་ཞིག་ (རྒྱང་ཕན་པ་དང་དབུ་མ་པ་)དེ་གཉིས་ཀས་ (སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་)དེ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་བཟུང་བ་ ཡིན་ན་(རྒྱང་ཕན་པ་)དེས་(སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་ བཞིན་མེད་པ་)དེ་ལྟར་མ་རྟློགས་ཀྱང་དབུ་མའི་ ལྟ་བ་དང་བཟུང་ཚུལ་མཐུན་པ་ཡིན་པས་]མ་ ཁབ་སེ། ཡུལ་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་ལ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་ པར་མཚུངས་ཀྱང་རྟློགས་པ་པློའི་བློའི་ཞེ་ ཕུག་ཐ་དད་པའི་དབང་གིས་དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་ ཡིན་མིན་སློ་སློར་བཞག་པའི་ཕིར། [250] [Our response: That (1) former and later births དབུ་མ་པ་དང་རྒྱང་ཕན་པ་གཉིས་ ཀྱི་ལུགས་ལ་ཡུལ་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་ལ་རང་ བཞིན་མེད་པར་མཚུངས་ཀྱང་ རྟློགས་པ་པློའི་བློའི་ཞེ་ཕུག་ཐ་དད་ པའི་དབང་གིས་དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་ཡིན་ མིན་སློ་སློར་བཞག Although they are similar [in holding that] the objects, former and later births, are natureless, whether it is the Middle view or not is posited separately due to differences in the inner modes of the realizers' awarenesses. 273 THE TEXT do not have nature and (2) both of them hold that those former and later births are natureless] does not entail [that the Middle view and mode of holding that phenomena are natureless accord with the Āyatas' holding that former and later births are natureless] because although they are similar [in holding that] the objects, former and later births, are natureless, whether it is the Middle view or not is posited separately due to differences in the inner modes of the realizers' awarenesses. JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN OPINION [ཡུལ་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་ལ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་ མཚུངས་ཀྱང་རྟློགས་པ་པློའི་བློའི་ཞེ་ཕུག་ཐ་ དད་པའི་དབང་གིས་དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་ཡིན་མིན་ སློ་སློར་བཞག་པ]དེར་ཐལ། དཔེར་ན་མི་རྐུན་ མར་ངློ་ཤེས་མ་ཤེས་གཉིས་ཀས་འདི་རྐུན་མ་ ཡིན་ཞེས་སྨྲས་ཚེ་རྐུན་མ་ཤེས་པས་རྐུན་མ་ངློས་ ཟིན་པ་དང་ཅིག་ཤློས་ཀྱིས་ངློས་མ་ཟིན་པར་ འཇློག་པ་བཞིན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར། དཔེར་ན་མི་རྐུན་མར་ངློ་ཤེས་མ་ ཤེས་གཉིས་ཀས་འདི་རྐུན་མ་ཡིན་ ཞེས་སྨྲས་ཚེ་རྐུན་མ་ཤེས་པས་རྐུན་ མ་ངློས་ཟིན་པ་དང་ཅིག་ཤློས་ཀྱིས་ ངློས་མ་ཟིན་པར་འཇློག་པ་བཞིན་ ཡིན། It follows [that although they are similar in holding that the objects, former and later births, are natureless, whether it is the Middle view or not is posited separately due to differences in the inner modes of the realizers' awarenesses] because it is like, for example, that when both someone who identified a man as a robber and another who did not identify such say, "He is the robber," it is posited that the one who knew the robber identified the robber and the other one did not identify the robber. It is like, for example, that when both someone who identified a man as a robber and another who did not identify such say, "He is the robber," it is posited that the one who knew the robber identified the robber and the other one did not identify the robber. 274 THE TEXT བུདྡྷ་པཱ་ལི་ཏ་ལས། །གཞན་ཡང་དཔེར་ན་ཁ་ ཅིག་རློད་པ་ན་[དློན་བདེན་པར་འགྱུར་བ་ཁློ་ ན་ལ་ཆེ་བཞི་གཉིས་སློན་པར་གྱུར་ལ། དེ་ན་ གཅིག་ནི་དློན་དེ་མངློན་སུམ་དུ་མཐློང་བ་ཡིན་ ལ་གཉིས་པ་ནི་དློན་དེ་མངློན་སུམ་དུ་མཐློང་ བར་གྱུར་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་ནློར་ངློའམ་མཛའ་ ངློས་གཉེར་བ་ཞིག་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེ་གཉི་ག་ཡང་ དློན་དེ་ལ་སྨྲར་བཅུག་པ་ན། དེ་ལ་གཅིག་གིས་ དློན་དེ་ཇི་ལྟར་བདེན་པ་དེ་ལྟར་སྨྲས་སུ་ཟིན་ ཀྱང་དློན་དེ་མངློན་སུམ་དུ་ཡང་མ་གྱུར་པའི་ ཕིར་བརྫུན་དུ་ཡང་འགྱུར་ལ་ཆློས་མ་ཡིན་པ་ དང་མི་སྙན་པ་དང་ཡང་ལན་པར་འགྱུར་ རློ། །ཅིག་ཤློས་ཀྱིས་ནི་དློན་དེ་སྨྲས་པ་ན་དློན་དེ་ མངློན་སུམ་དུ་གྱུར་པའི་ཕིར་བདེན་པར་སྨྲ་བ་ ཡང་ཡིན་ལ་ཆློས་དང་སྙན་པ་དག་དང་ཡང་ ལན་པར་འགྱུར་བ་]དེ་བཞིན་དུ། དངློས་པློ་ ཐམས་ཅད་སློང་པ་ཡིན་ཞིང་སློང་པའི་ཕིར་མ་ སྐྱེས་པ་དང་མ་འགགས་པ་དེ་ཡིན་དུ་ཟིན་ཀྱང༌། དེ་གང་ལ་མངློན་སུམ་གིས་ ཤེས་པ་ཡློད་པ་དེ་ ཉིད་ལེགས་པ་དང་ལན་ཅིང་བསགས་པ་ཡིན་ 260 261 JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN OPINION (left side retained) བུདྡྷ་པཱ་ལི་ཏ་ལས། །གཞན་ཡང་ དཔེར་ན་ཁ་ཅིག་རློད་པ་ན་[དློན་ བདེན་པར་འགྱུར་བ་ཁློ་ན་ལ་ཆེ་ བཞི་གཉིས་སློན་པར་གྱུར་ལ། དེ་ན་ གཅིག་ནི་དློན་དེ་མངློན་སུམ་དུ་ མཐློང་བ་ཡིན་ལ་གཉིས་པ་ནི་དློན་ དེ་མངློན་སུམ་དུ་མཐློང་བར་གྱུར་པ་ མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་ནློར་ངློའམ་མཛའ་ངློས་ གཉེར་བ་ཞིག་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེ་གཉི་ག་ ཡང་དློན་དེ་ལ་སྨྲར་བཅུག་པ་ན། དེ་ ལ་གཅིག་གིས་དློན་དེ་ཇི་ལྟར་བདེན་ པ་དེ་ལྟར་སྨྲས་སུ་ཟིན་ཀྱང་དློན་དེ་ མངློན་སུམ་དུ་ཡང་མ་གྱུར་པའི་ཕིར་ བརྫུན་དུ་ཡང་འགྱུར་ལ་ཆློས་མ་ཡིན་ པ་དང་མི་སྙན་པ་དང་ཡང་ལན་ པར་འགྱུར་རློ། །ཅིག་ཤློས་ཀྱིས་ནི་ དློན་དེ་སྨྲས་པ་ན་དློན་དེ་མངློན་ སུམ་དུ་གྱུར་པའི་ཕིར་བདེན་པར་སྨྲ་ བ་ཡང་ཡིན་ལ་ཆློས་དང་སྙན་པ་ The brackets are from the Buddhapālita Commentary on Nāgārjuna's Treatise of the Middle, the chapter on Analysis of Self, XVIII.12 (Toh. 3842, dbu ma, vol. tsha, 243b.2-243b.6); also see Saito, "A Study of the Buddhapālita," 253-254; Christian Lindtner, "Buddhapālita on Emptiness," Indo-Iranian Journal 23, no. 3 (1981):196. 261 Lindtner prefers gyi. 260 275 THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN OPINION གི། ཅིག་ཤློས་ནི་སློང་པ་ཉིད་མངློན་སུམ་དུ་མ་ གྱུར་པའི་ཕིར་ལྟ་བའི་སྐྱློན་གིས་ཀྱང་གློས་ལ་ མཁས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་སད་པར་ཡང་འགྱུར་བས། དེའི་ཕིར་དེ་གཉིས་ནི་ཁད་པར་ཤིན་ཏུ་ཆེ་སེ་ ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕིར། དག་དང་ཡང་ལན་པར་འགྱུར་ བ་]དེ་བཞིན་དུ། དངློས་པློ་ཐམས་ ཅད་སློང་པ་ཡིན་ཞིང་སློང་པའི་ཕིར་ མ་སྐྱེས་པ་དང་མ་འགགས་པ་དེ་ ཡིན་དུ་ཟིན་ཀྱང༌། དེ་གང་ལ་མངློན་ སུམ་གིས་ཤེས་པ་ཡློད་པ་དེ་ཉིད་ ལེགས་པ་དང་ལན་ཅིང་བསགས་པ་ ཡིན་གི། ཅིག་ཤློས་ནི་སློང་པ་ཉིད་ མངློན་སུམ་དུ་མ་གྱུར་པའི་ཕིར་ལྟ་ བའི་སྐྱློན་གིས་ཀྱང་གློས་ལ་མཁས་པ་ རྣམས་ཀྱིས་སད་པར་ཡང་འགྱུར་ བས། དེའ་ི ཕིར་དེ་གཉིས་ནི་ཁད་ པར་ཤིན་ཏུ་ཆེ་སེ་ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ ཕིར། because Buddhapālita's Commentary says:262 Moreover, for example, at the time of dispute two witnesses testify with regard to what is the true fact. Between them, one directly saw the fact, but the other did not directly see the fact, and is mistaken,263 or is on the side of a friend.264 When both of them are also made to speak with regard to that, the latter has spoken the fact as it is in truth, but because the fact was not even directly [seen, the latter's testimony] is false and also endowed with impropriety and ill repute. When the other one says speaks the fact, then because the fact was directly [seen], it is a true statement and endowed with propriety and repute. because Buddhapālita's Commentary Likewise, although it is a fact that all says: phenomena are empty and because of being Moreover, for example, at empty are not produced and not ceased, those the time of dispute two witnesses who [that is, the Proponents of the Middle] testify with regard to what is the have knowledge by direct perception of it true fact. Between them, one [that is, emptiness,] are endowed with directly saw the fact, but the other goodness and are praised, but because the did not directly see the fact, and is other [that is, the Āyatas] do not directly [see] mistaken, or is on the side of a 262 Without Christian Lindtner's translation, I could not have understood this part. See Lindtner, "Buddhapālita on Emptiness," 206-207. 263 What the mistake is is unclear; it might mean "to be bribed" as Lintner speculates. 264 In a similar context, mdza' in Candrakīrti's Clear Words means friendly. See Candrakīrti, Clear Words, 118a.3. 276 THE TEXT emptiness, they are polluted by the defects of view265 and derided by the wise. Hence, these two are very different. JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN OPINION friend. When both of them are also made to speak with regard to that, the latter has spoken the fact as it is in truth, but because the fact was not even directly [seen, the latter's testimony] is false and also endowed with impropriety and ill repute. When the other one says speaks the fact, then because the fact was directly [seen], it is a true statement and endowed with propriety and repute. Likewise, although it is a fact that all phenomena are empty and because of being empty are not produced and not ceased, those who [that is, the Proponents of the Middle] have knowledge by direct perception of it [that is, emptiness,] are endowed with goodness and are praised, but because the other [that is, the Āyatas] do not directly [see] emptiness, they are polluted by the defects of view and derided by the wise. Hence, these two are very different. [བུདྡྷ་པཱ་ལི་ཏ་ལས་དེ་འདྲས་གསུངས་པ་ཡིན་ ལྟ་བའི་སྐྱློན་གིས་ཀྱང་གློས་ལ་ཞེས་ ན་དཔེར་ན་མི་རྐུན་མར་ངློ་ཤེས་མ་ཤེས་གཉིས་ པའི་དློན་ཡློད། meaning of [his] statement "they ཀས་འདི་རྐུན་མ་ཡིན་ཞེས་སྨྲས་ཚེ་རྐུན་མ་ཤེས་ The are polluted by the defects of view" པས་རྐུན་མ་ངློས་ཟིན་པ་དང་ཅིག་ཤློས་ཀྱིས་ exists. ངློས་མ་ཟིན་པར་འཇློག་པ་བཞིན་ཡིན་ པས་]ཁབ་སེ། ལྟ་བའི་སྐྱློན་གིས་ཀྱང་གློས་ལ་ 265 The view that former and future lives do not exist is the defective view here. 277 THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN OPINION ཞེས་པའི་དློན་ཡློད་པའི་ཕིར་དང་། [Buddhapālita's saying this] entails [that it is like, for example, that when both someone who identified a man as a robber and another who did not identify such say "He is the robber," it is posited that the one who knew the robber identified the robber and the other one did not identify the robber,] because the meaning of [his] statement "they are polluted by the defects of view" exists, ཚིག་གསལ་ལས་ཀྱང་། གལ་ཏེ་དངློས་པློ་[མ་ གྲུབ་པ་] མཚུངས་སློ་ཞེས་ན་གལ་ཏེ་ཡང་ དངློས་པློ་མ་གྲུབ་པ་མཚུངས་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ ལྟ་[ན་]ཡང་རྟློགས་པ་པློ་ཐ་དད་པས་མི་ མཚུངས་པ་ཉིད་དློ། །འདི་ལྟ་སེ། དཔེར་ན་རྐུས་ བྱས་པ འི་མི་ཞིག་ལ༑ [གཅིག་གིས་ནི་ཡང་ 266 267 (left side retained) ཚིག་གསལ་ལས་ཀྱང་། གལ་ཏེ་ དངློས་པློ་[མ་གྲུབ་པ་]མཚུངས་སློ་ ཞེས་ན་གལ་ཏེ་ཡང་དངློས་པློ་མ་ གྲུབ་པ་མཚུངས་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ ལྟ་[ན་]ཡང་རྟློགས་པ་པློ་ཐ་དད་ The brackets here and the next brackets are inserted according to Candrakīrti's Clear Words (Toh. 3860, dbu ma, vol. 'a, 118a.2-118a.3) since this material is omitted in Jamyang Shaypa's Decisive Analysis. I have confirmed that these parts are also left out in two other editions; see 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa, "dbu ma la 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs," in gsung 'bum/_'jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje, TBRC W21503.9 (South India: Gomang College, 1997), 103a.6-103b.1, http://tbrc.org/link?RID=O00CHZ010751|O00CHZ01075100JW501034$W21503; 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa, dbu ma la 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs (Beijing, China, krung go'i bo rig pa dpe skrun khang, 2004), 187. The corresponding passage in Sanskrit is: 266 vastutastulyateiti cet// yathyapi vastuo'siddhistulyā tathāpi pratipattṛbhedādatulyatā/ yathā hi kṛtacauryaṃ puruṣamekhaḥ samyagaparijñyāyaiva tadamitrapreritastaṃ mithyā vyācaṣṭe cauryamanena kṛtamiti/ bhedastathāpi parijñātṛbhedādekastatra mṛṣābādityudyate/ aparastu satyavādīti, ekaścāyaśasā cāpuṇyena ca samyak parīkṣyamāṇo yujyate nāparaḥ/ See Poussin, Prasannapdā Commentaire de Candrakīrti, 368.16-369.3. 267 In the sde ge edition of Candrakīrti's Clear Words, for rkus byas pa read rku byas pa; however, all three editions of Jamyang Shaypa's Decisive Analysis that I refer to read it as rkus byas pa. See Candrakīrti, "dbu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa tshig gsal ba," in bstan 'gyur (sde dge), TBRC W23703.102 (Delhi: Delhi Karmapae Choedhey, gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 118a.3, http://tbrc.org/link?RID=O1GS6011|O1GS60111GS36113$W23703); 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa, dbu ma la 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs, 250; 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa, dbu ma 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod (Beijing, China: pe cin nyug hran shin 'gyig par khang, 2004), 187; Jamyang Shaypa, "dbu ma la 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don 278 THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN OPINION དག་པར་མི་ཤེས་བཞིན་དུ་དེ་དང་མི་མཛའ་ བས་སྦུད་ནས་འདིས་བརྐུས་སློ་ཞེས་དེ་ལ་ལློག་ པར་སྨྲ་བར་བྱེད་ལ། གཞན་ནི་དངློས་སུ་མཐློང་ ནས་སུན་འབྱིན་པར་བྱེད་དློ།] ཞེས་སློགས་ གསུངས་པའི་ཕིར། པས་མི་མཚུངས་པ་ཉིད་དློ། །འདི་ལྟ་ སེ། དཔེར་ན་རྐུས་བྱས་པའི་མི་ཞིག་ ལ༑ [གཅིག་གིས་ནི་ཡང་དག་པར་ མི་ཤེས་བཞིན་དུ་དེ་དང་མི་མཛའ་ བས་སྦུད་ནས་འདིས་བརྐུས་སློ་ཞེས་ དེ་ལ་ལློག་པར་སྨྲ་བར་བྱེད་ལ། གཞན་ནི་དངློས་སུ་མཐློང་ནས་སུན་ འབྱིན་པར་བྱེད་དློ།] ཞེས་སློགས་ གསུངས་པའི་ཕིར། 268 and because Candrakīrti's Clear Words also says: [Objection:] They are the same [in holding] that things are not established. [Answer:] Even if they are just similar in holding that things are not established, they are just dissimilar because the realizers are different. It is as follows (de lta ste): For example, with regard to a man who has and because Candrakīrti's Clear committed robbery, [without correctly Words also says: [Objection:] They are the same [in knowing (who the robber is), one, having holding] that things are not been incited by disliking him, wrongly says, established. "This man stole", but another, actually seeing [Answer:] Even if they are just (the robbery), does identify (that this man is similar in holding that things are the robber)]. not established, they are just dissimilar because the realizers are different. It is as follows (de lta ste): For example, with regard to a man who has committed robbery, [without correctly knowing (who the robber is), one, having been incited by disliking him, wrongly says, "This man stole", but another, actually seeing (the robbery), does identify (that this man is the robber)]. In the course of debate, Jamyang Shaypa makes the following points: kun gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs." In gsung 'bum/ 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje, TBRC W21503.9 (South India: Gomang College, 1997). http://tbrc.org/link?RID=O00CHZ010751|O00CHZ01075100JW501034$W21503. 268 The passage in the brackets is inserted in order to assist understanding. See Candrakīrti, Clear Words, 118a.2-118a.4. 279  The Āyatas' holding that former and later births are natureless is a view of annihilation.  The Āyatas do not realize naturelessness as the Proponents of the Middle do within knowing how to posit the valid establishment of conventionalities.  The Middle view and mode of holding that former and later births are natureless do not accord with that of the Āyatas.  Both of them hold that former and later births are natureless.  Although they are similar [in holding that] the objects, former and later births, are natureless, whether it is the Middle view or not is posited separately due to differences in the inner modes of the realizers' awarenesses.  It is like, for example, that when both someone who identified a man as a robber and another who did not identify such say, "He is the robber," it is posited that the one who knew the robber identified the robber and the other one did not identify the robber.  because Buddhapālita's Commentary says: Moreover, for example, at the time of dispute two witnesses testify with regard to what is the true fact. Between them, one directly saw the fact, but the other did not directly see the fact, and is mistaken, or is on the side of a friend. When both of them are also made to speak with regard to that, the latter has spoken the fact as it is in truth, but because the fact was not even directly [seen, the latter's testimony] is false and also endowed with 280 impropriety and ill repute. When the other one says speaks the fact, then because the fact was directly [seen], it is a true statement and endowed with propriety and repute. Likewise, although it is a fact that all phenomena are empty and because of being empty are not produced and not ceased, those who [that is, the Proponents of the Middle] have knowledge by direct perception of it [that is, emptiness,] are endowed with goodness and are praised, but because the other [that is, the Āyatas] do not directly [see] emptiness, they are polluted by the defects of view and derided by the wise. Hence, these two are very different.  The meaning of [his] statement "they are polluted by the defects of view" exists.  and because Candrakīrti's Clear Words also says: [Objection:] They are the same [in holding] that things are not established. [Answer:] Even if they are just similar in holding that things are not established, they are just dissimilar because the realizers are different. It is as follows (de lta ste): For example, with regard to a man who has committed robbery, [without correctly knowing (who the robber is), one, having been incited by disliking him, wrongly says, "This man stole", but another, actually seeing (the robbery), does identify (that this man is the robber)]. 281 As Jamyang Shaypa's refutation of the second wrong idea pointed out, the Mādhyamikas and the Āyatas both assert that former and later births are natureless; however, the meaning of naturelessness for the Mādhyamikas and the Āyatas is quite different. While for the Āyatas naturelessness means the nonexistence of past and future lives, for the Mādhyamikas it means the absence of truly existent past and future lives. As explained above, the main reason why the Āyatas fall into the extreme view of annihilation is because they assert the nonexistence of past and future lives. In addition to this, in the current discussion, Jamyang Shaypa proposes another reason why the Mādhyamikas should be distinguished from the Āyatas. Jamyang Shaypa's principal point here is that the Mādhyamikas are different from the Āyatas with respect to the view and mode of holding that former and later births are natureless; he supports his points with evidence from Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti. Buddhapālita takes an example of two people testifying to a robbery; while one testifies based upon what he directly saw, the other did not actually see it. Buddhapālita makes the case that if the latter, despite not witnessing the scene, testifies based on various false reasons such as personal affiliation, assumption, and so forth, it should not be accepted to be true testimony. Although their testimonies look similar to each other, their ways of seeing the event and testifying about the fact are very different because what they actually experienced differs. That is, the former's knowledge is acquired through direct encounter with the event, whereas the latter has no such knowledge. Likewise, although the Mādhyamikas and the Āyatas may look similar since both assert naturelessness, only 282 the Mādhyamikas understand by directly perceiving the emptiness of all phenomena that all phenomena are empty and thereby are not truly produced and do not truly cease . On the other hand, the Āyatas' assertion is not reliable since they do not directly experience the emptiness of all phenomena due to being "polluted by the defects of view," which is their view of moral nihilism. Jamyang Shaypa comments that the difference between two schools is in dependence upon "the inner modes of the realizers' awarenesses." Candrakīrti similarly uses the example of two people testifying about a robber. He points out that although the fact of testifying who the robber is could be similar, the motivation of their testimonies cannot be regarded in the same way. That is, being influenced by personal emotion toward one of the suspects, someone could accuse a person whom he dislikes in spite of not having witnessed the robbery, whereas another one testifies who the robber is based on direct experience. In this way, Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti use examples to illustrate that the Mādhyamikas and the Āyatas connote different meanings despite using similar language when they speak of former and later birth as being natureless. 4th Wrong idea: The Āyatas' view of the naturelessness of former and later births is the same as the Mādhyamikas' view (1) While the two previous refutations by Jamyang Shaypa explain that the assertions by the Āyatas and the Mādhyamikas of the naturelessness of former and later births differ with regard to (1) whether or not former and later births are established by conventional valid cognition and (2) the difference of the view and the mode of asserting naturelessness, the 283 next refutation focuses on demonstrating that a view that might look like the Madhyamaka view is actually not the Madhyamaka view by drawing parallels with two opinions that are obviously not Madhyamaka views. THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM ཁློ་ན་རེ། རྒྱང་ཕན་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་ རྒྱང་ཕན་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་ བཞིན་མེད་པར་ལྟ་བ་དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་ཡིན་པར་ བཞིན་མེད་པར་ལྟ་བ་ནི་དབུ་མའི་ ཐལ། སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་གནས་ ལྟ་བ་མ་ཡིན། The view in the Āyatas [mental] ལུགས་མཐར་ཐུག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར་ན་ continuum that former and later births Someone [incorrectly] says: It follows that the are natureless is not the Madhyamaka view in the Āyatas' [mental] continuum that view. former and later births are natureless is the Madhyamaka view because the naturelessness of former and later births is the final mode of subsistence. The naturelessness of former and later births is the final mode of subsistence. སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་ནི་ གནས་ལུགས་མཐར་ཐུག་ཡིན། [སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་གནས་ལུགས་ མཐར་ཐུག་ཡིན་ན་རྒྱང་ཕན་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་ལྟ་བ་དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་ ཡིན་པས་]མ་ཁབ། འློ་ན་བྱེ་སྨྲའི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་ལློངས་ སྐུ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་ལྟ་བ་དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་ ཡིན་པར་ཐལ༑ ལློངས་སྐུ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་ གནས་ལུགས་མཐར་ཐུག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར། བྱེ་སྨྲའི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་ལློངས་སྐུ་རང་བཞིན་ མེད་པར་ལྟ་བ་ནི་དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་མ་ ཡིན། The view in the Vaibhāṣikas' [mental] continuum that a [Buddha's] enjoyment body is natureless is not the Madhyamaka view. ལློངས་སྐུ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་ནི་ གནས་ལུགས་མཐར་ཐུག་ཡིན། [Our response: That the naturelessness of former and later births is the final mode of subsistence] The naturelessness of an enjoyment does not entail [that the view in the Āyatas' body is the final mode of subsistence. mental continuum that former and later births are natureless is the Madhyamaka view]. Well then, 284 THE TEXT it [absurdly] follows that the view in the Vaibhāṣikas' [mental] continuum that a [Buddha's] enjoyment body (longs sku, saṃbhogakāya) is natureless is the Madhyamaka view because the naturelessness of an enjoyment body is the final mode of subsistence. JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM འཁློར་གསུམ། [You have asserted] the three spheres [of selfcontradiction]. དེ་བཞིན་དུ་སེམས་ཙམ་པའི་ཀུན་བཏགས་རང་ དེ་བཞིན་དུ་སེམས་ཙམ་པའི་ཀུན་ གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་མ་གྲུབ་པར་ལྟ་བ་སློགས་ལ་ བཏགས་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་མ་ སྦྱློར་ཤེས་པར་བྱ༑ གྲུབ་པར་ལྟ་བ་སློགས་ལ་སྦྱློར་ཤེས་ Likewise, know how to apply [this mode of པར་བྱ། refutation] to the Mind-Only Proponents’ view that the imputational nature is not established by Likewise, know how to apply [this mode of refutation] to the Mind-Only way of its own character. Proponents’ view that the imputational nature is not established by way of its own character. In the course of debate, Jamyang Shaypa makes the following points:  The view in the Āyatas [mental] continuum that former and later births are natureless is not the Madhyamaka view.  The naturelessness of former and later births is the final mode of subsistence.  The view in the Vaibhāṣikas' [mental] continuum that a [Buddha's] enjoyment body is natureless is not the Madhyamaka view.  The naturelessness of an enjoyment body is the final mode of subsistence. 285  Likewise, know how to apply [this mode of refutation] to the Mind-Only Proponents’ view that the imputational nature is not established by way of its own character. The procedure of Jamyang Shaypa's refutation through a parallel consequence is explained in Part I, chapter 4 (see page 203). 5th Wrong idea: The Āyatas' view of the naturelessness of former and later births is the same as the Mādhyamikas' view (2) This fifth refutation is the last of the series of debates stemming from the refutation of the difference between naturelessness as understood by the Āyatas and the Mādhyamikas. In this refutation Jamyang Shaypa demonstrates another way to refute the same idea with a mode of procedure similar to that above. THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN OPINION 286 THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN OPINION ཡང་ཁློ་ན་རེ། རྒྱང་ཕན་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་[སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་ རྒྱང་ཕན་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་[སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་ རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་ལྟ་བ་]དེ་འདྲ་དེ་རྟློག་པ་ བཞིན་མེད་པར་ལྟ་བ་]དེ་འདྲ་དེ་ དློན་མཐུན་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རྟགས་སར་གི་[སྐྱེ་ རྟློག་པ་དློན་མཐུན་མ་ཡིན། Such a view in the Āyatas' continuum བ་ས་ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་གནས་ལུགས་ [that former and later births are མཐར་ཐུག་ཡིན་པ་]དེའི་ཕིར་ན་ཡང་[སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ natureless] is not a factually ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་གནས་ལུགས་མཐར་ཐུག་ concordant conceptual consciousness. ཡིན་ན་རྒྱང་ཕན་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་དེ་འདྲ་དེ་རྟློག་པ་ དློན་མཐུན་ཡིན་པས་]མ་ཁབ། Moreover, someone [incorrectly] says: It follows that such a view in the Āyatas' [mental] continuum [that former and later births are natureless] is a factually concordant conceptual consciousness (rtog pa don mthun) because of the previous reason [that is, that the naturelessness of former and later births is the final mode of subsistence]. [Our response: That the naturelessness of former and later births is the final mode of subsistence] does not entail [that such a view in the Āyatas' continuum that former and later births are natureless is a factually concordant conceptual consciousness]. འློ་ན་བྱེ་སྨྲའི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་ལློངས་སྐུ་[རང་བཞིན་ བྱེ་སྨྲའི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་ལློངས་སྐུ་[རང་ མེད་པ་]དེ་ལྟར་ལྟ་བ་དེ་རྟློག་པ་དློན་མཐུན་ བཞིན་མེད་པ་]དེ་ལྟར་ལྟ་བ་དེ་རྟློག་ ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། [ལློངས་སྐུ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་ པ་དློན་མཐུན་མ་ཡིན། The view in a Vaibhāṣika's གནས་ལུགས་མཐར་ཐུག་ཡིན་པའི་]རྟགས་ continuum that a [Buddha's] སར་བཞིན། enjoyment body is such [that is, natureless] is not a factually Well then, it [absurdly] follows that the view in a concordant conceptual consciousness. Vaibhāṣika's continuum that a [Buddha's] enjoyment body is such [that is, natureless] is a factually concordant conceptual consciousness, the reason is as before, [that is, because the 287 THE TEXT naturelessness of an enjoyment body is the final mode of subsistence]. JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN OPINION འཁློར་གསུམ། [You have asserted] the three spheres [of selfcontradiction]. In the course of debate, Jamyang Shaypa makes the following points:  Such a view in the Āyatas' continuum [that former and later births are natureless] is not a factually concordant conceptual consciousness.  The view in a Vaibhāṣika's continuum that a [Buddha's] enjoyment body is such [that is, natureless] is not a factually concordant conceptual consciousness. For an explanation of this debate, also see Part I, 4 (see page 203). 6th Wrong idea: Gorampa Sönam Senggé holds that any apprehension of forms is an apprehension of the four extremes and hence should be refuted This 6th refutation discusses an issue by an influential Sakya scholar Gorampa Sönam Senggé (go rams pa bsod nams seng ge, 1429-1489) who, from a Geluk point of view, has a too broad scope of the object of negation. As we will see below, he says that the entire scope of conventional truths is to be negated because nothing can withstand analysis by a rational consciousness (rigs shes). THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM ཡང་གློ་བློ་ན་རེ། རེ་རིན་པློ་ཆེས་རྟློག་པས་གང་ རེ་རིན་པློ་ཆེས་རྟློག་པས་གང་བཟུང་ བཟུང་གི་ཡུལ་ཐམས་ཅད་དེ་ཁློ་ན་ཉིད་ལ་ གི་ཡུལ་ཐམས་ཅད་དེ་ཁློ་ན་ཉིད་ལ་ 288 THE TEXT དཔྱློད་པའི་རིགས་པས་འགློག་པར་འདློད་པའི་ ལློག་རྟློག་ཐམས་ཅད་ལློག་ པར་འགྱུར་རློ་ གསུངས་པ་མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ། ཤེར་ཕིན་གི་ མདློའི་དགློངས་པ་གཟུགས་སློང་མི་སློང་མཐའ་ བཞི་དང་། དེ་དག་བྲལ་བའི་དབུས་གང་དུ་བློས་ བཟུང་བ་མཐར་འཛིན་ཡིན་པས་དགག་དགློས་ པར་བཤད་ལ་ཁེད་རང་བདེན་པ་འབའ་ཞིག་ [251] 269 JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM དཔྱློད་པའི་རིགས་པས་འགློག་པར་ འདློད་པའི་ལློག་རྟློག་ཐམས་ཅད་ ལློག་པར་འགྱུར་རློ་གསུངས་པ་ འཐད། The statement by Tsongkhapa: [When, in that way, you have identified well the apprehension of true existence, you will understand that there are many apprehensions that are not the 269 This passage seems to be from Gorampa's summary of Tsongkhapa's position in his Distinguishing the Views [of Emptiness]: Moonlight [To Illuminate] the Main Points of the Supreme Path (lta ba 'i shan 'byed theg mchog gnad kyi zla zer). It is said: Hence, the mind that understands reality is the apprehension of emptiness alone—that is, of the emptiness of truth [that is arrived at] after having negated truth. If one properly identifies [what it means] to apprehend [things] as true (bden, 'dzin), one will come to understand that there are many conceptual thoughts that are neither of the two forms of the grasping at truth [of self and phenomena]. This counteracts all of the mistaken views (log rtog) that believe that every object that is apprehended by a conceptual thought is negated by means of the reasoning that analyzes reality. དེ་ལྟར་བདེན་འཛིན་ལེགས་པར་ངློས་ཟིན་ན་བདེན་འཛིན་གཉིས་མིན་པའི་རྟློག་པ་དུ་མ་ཞིག་ཡློད་པར་ཤེས་པར་ འགྱུར་བས།་རྟློག་པས་གང་བཟུང་གི་ཡུལ་ཐམས་ཅད་དེ་ཁློ་ན་ཉིད་ལ་དཔྱློད་པའི་རིགས་པས་དགག་པར་འདློད་ པའི་ལློག་རྟློག་ཐམས་ཅད་ཟླློག་པར་འགྱུར་རློ༎ See José Ignacio Cabezón, and Geshe Lozang Dargyay, Freedom from Extremes: Gorampa's 'Distinguishing the Views' and the Polemics of Emptiness Studies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism (Boston, MA.: Wisdom Publications, 2007), 82-83. This passage is a citation from Tsongkhapa's Illumination of the thought: When, in that way, you have identified well the apprehension of true existence, you will understand that there are many apprehensions that are not the two apprehensions of self. Consequently, all wrong ideas of asserting that reasonings analyzing suchness refute all objects apprehended by conceptuality will be overcome. །དེ་ལྟར་བདེན་འཛིན་ལེགས་པར་ངློས་ཟིན་ན།་བདག་འཛིན་གཉིས་མིན་པའི་རྟློག་པ་དུ་མ་ཅིག་ཡློད་པ་ཤེས་པར་ འགྱུར་བས།་རྟློག་པས་གང་བཟུང་གི་ཡུལ་ཐམས་ཅད་དེ་ཁློ་ན་ཉིད་ལ་དཔྱློད་པའི་རིགས་པས་འགློག་པར་འདློད་ པའི་ལློག་རྟློག་ཐམས་ཅད་ལློག་པར་འགྱུར་རློ། See Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa's Final Exposition of Wisdom, 213. The Tibetan is from Tsong kha pa, Illumination of the Thought, 144. 289 THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM two apprehensions of self. Consequently,] all wrong ideas of asserting that reasonings analyzing suchness refute all Moreover, Go-bo (go rams pa bsod nams seng objects apprehended by ge, 1429-1489) says: It follows that the statement conceptuality will be overcome. by Tsong-kha-pa: is logically feasible. [When, in that way, you have identified well the apprehension of true existence, you will understand that there are many apprehensions that are not the two apprehensions of self. Consequently,] all wrong ideas of asserting that reasonings analyzing suchness refute all objects apprehended by conceptuality will be overcome. is not logically feasible; [for] the thought of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras is to be explained as being that howsoever forms are The thought of the Perfection of apprehended—as the four extremes of being Wisdom Sūtras is not to be explained empty or not empty270 or as the middle free from as being that howsoever forms are them—are apprehensions of extremes and hence apprehended—as the four extremes of must be refuted, and [thus] it is not logically being empty or not empty or as the feasible that you [Tsongkhapa,] having solely middle free from them—are refuted truth [that is, true establishment (bden apprehensions of extremes and hence par grub pa),] assert that [forms] abide in the do not have to be refuted. middle. བཀག་ནས་དབུས་ལ་གནས་པར་འདློད་པ་མི་ འཐད་ཟེར་ན༑ ཤེར་ཕིན་གི་མདློའི་དགློངས་པ་ གཟུགས་སློང་མི་སློང་མཐའ་བཞི་མ་ ཡིན་པ་དང་། [མཐའ་བཞི་]དེ་དག་ བྲལ་བའི་དབུས་གང་དུ་བློས་བཟུང་ བ་མཐར་འཛིན་ཡིན་པས་དགག་ དགློས་པར་མི་བཤད། བདེན་པ་འབའ་ཞིག་བཀག་ནས་ དབུས་ལ་གནས་པར་འདློད་པ་ འཐད། It is logically feasible that [Tsongkhapa] having solely refuted truth [that is, true establishment (bden par grub pa),] asserts that [forms] abide in the middle. འློ་ན་དློན་དམ་དཔྱློད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རིགས་པས་རང་ དློན་དམ་དཔྱློད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རིགས་པས་ 270 The four extremes (mtha' bzhi) are, for instance, forms are empty, not empty, both empty, neither empty nor not empty. 290 THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM བཞིན་འགློག་ལ་རྟེན་འབྱུང་སྒྱུ་མ་ལྟ་བུའི་ རང་བཞིན་འགློག་ལ་རྟེན་འབྱུང་སྒྱུ་ གཟུགས་སློགས་མི་འགློག་པའི་ཁད་པར་མི་ཕེད་ མ་ལྟ་བུའི་གཟུགས་སློགས་མི་འགློག་ པར་ཐལ། རིགས་པ་དེས་ཡུལ་གང་ཡིན་ཐམས་ པའི་ཁད་པར་ཕེད་དློ། distinction that reasoning ཅད་འགློག་པའི་ཕིར༑ [རིགས་པ་དེས་ཡུལ་ The analyzing the ultimate refutes གང་ཡིན་ཐམས་ཅད་འགློག་པར་]རྟགས་ཁས། inherent existence but does not refute Well then, it [absurdly] follows that the distinction that reasoning analyzing the ultimate271 refutes inherent existence but does not refute forms and so forth that are illusory-like dependent-arisings is not to be made because [according to you] that reasoning refutes all whatsoever objects. You have accepted the reason [that reasoning refutes all whatsoever objects]. [དློན་དམ་དཔྱློད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རིགས་པས་རང་ བཞིན་འགློག་ལ་རྟེན་འབྱུང་སྒྱུ་མ་ལྟ་བུའི་ གཟུགས་སློགས་མི་འགློག་པའི་ཁད་པར་མི་ཕེད་ པར་]འདློད་ན། ཚིག་གསལ་ལས། ཁློ་བློ་ཅག་ནི་ ལས་དང་བྱེད་པ་པློ་དང་འབྲས་བུ་ལ་སློགས་པ་ མེད་དློ་ཞེས་སྨྲ་བ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། འློ་ན་ཅི་ཞེ་ན་ 271 forms and so forth that are illusorylike dependent-arisings should be made. རིགས་པ་དེས་ཡུལ་གང་ཡིན་ཐམས་ ཅད་མི་འགློག Reasoning does not whatsoever objects. refute all ཚིག་གསལ་ལས། ཁློ་བློ་ཅག་ནི་ལས་ དང་བྱེད་པ་པློ་དང་འབྲས་བུ་ལ་ སློགས་པ་མེད་དློ་ཞེས་སྨྲ་བ་མ་ཡིན་ ཏེ། འློ་ན་ཅི་ཞེ་ན་རང་བཞིན་མེད་ དློ་ཞེས་རྣམ་པར་འཇློག་པ་ཡིན་ནློ་ ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་སློགས་མདློ་དང་ For the reasoning analyzing the ultimate, Thupten Jinpa explains: He (Tsongkhapa) states that any form of reasoning which examines in the following manner—i.e. whether all things and events such as form, etc. exist in a true mode of being or not (bden par yod dam med), or whether they come into being in an essential way or not (rang gin go bo'i sgo nas grub bam ma grub)—is an analysis pertaining to the ultimate status of objects in question. Such types of reasoning can also be called the 'analysis of the final status' (mthar thug dpyod byed). See Thupten Jinpa. "Delineating Reason's Scope for Negation: Tsongkhapa's Contribution to Madhyamaka's Dialectical Method." Journal of Indian Philosophy 26, no. 4 (1988):282. 291 THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM རང་བཞིན་མེད་དློ་ཞེས་རྣམ་པར་འཇློག་པ་ བསན་བཅློས་དུ་མ་དང་འགལ་བར་ ཡིན་ནློ་ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་ སློགས་མདློ་དང་ འགྱུར་རློ། [Gorampa Sönam Senggé] བསན་བཅློས་དུ་མ་དང་འགལ་བར་འགྱུར་རློ། You contradict many sūtras and treatises 272 If you [Gorampa] accept [that the distinction that such as [Candrakīrti's] Clear Words reasoning analyzing the ultimate refutes inherent which says: existence but does not refute forms and so forth We are not propounding that that are illusory-like dependent-arisings is not "Action, doer, effect, and so forth made,] you contradict many sūtras and treatises do not exist." such as [Candrakīrti's] Clear Words which says: Why? We are not propounding that "Action, doer, We posit inherent existence does effect, and so forth do not exist." not exist. Why? We posit that inherent existence does not exist. In the course of this debate, Jamyang Shaypa makes the following points:  The statement by Tsongkhapa: [When, in that way, you have identified well the apprehension of true existence, you will understand that there are many apprehensions that are not the two apprehensions of self. Consequently,] all wrong ideas of asserting that reasonings analyzing suchness refute all objects apprehended by conceptuality will be overcome. is logically feasible.  The thought of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras is not to be explained as being that howsoever forms are apprehended—as the four extremes of being empty or 272 Candrakīrti, Clear Words, 109a.7-109b.1. 292 not empty or as the middle free from them—are apprehensions of extremes and hence do not have to be refuted.  It is logically feasible that [Tsongkhapa] having solely refuted truth [that is, true establishment (bden par grub pa),] asserts that [forms] abide in the middle.  The distinction that reasoning analyzing the ultimate refutes inherent existence but does not refute forms and so forth that are illusory-like dependent-arisings should be made.  Reasoning does not refute all whatsoever objects.  You [Gorampa] contradict many sūtras and treatises such as [Candrakīrti's] Clear Words which says: We are not propounding that "Action, doer, effect, and so forth do not exist." Why? We posit inherent existence does not exist. This refutation starts with Jamyang Shaypa making a reference to Gorampa's description of Tsongkhapa's position. Gorampa draws on a statement at the end of Tsongkhapa's presentation of the object of negation in his Illumination of the Thought:273 273 See Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa's Final Exposition of Wisdom, 213. The Tibetan is from tsong kha pa, Illumination of the Thought, 144. 293 When, in that way, you have identified well the apprehension of true existence, you will understand that there are many apprehensions that are not the two apprehensions of self. Consequently, all wrong ideas of asserting that reasonings analyzing suchness refute all objects apprehended by conceptuality will be overcome. །དེ་ལྟར་བདེན་འཛིན་ལེགས་པར་ངློས་ཟིན་ན།་བདག་འཛིན་གཉིས་མིན་པའི་རྟློག་པ་དུ་མ་ཅིག་ཡློད་ པ་ཤེས་པར་འགྱུར་བས། རྟློག་པས་གང་བཟུང་གི་ཡུལ་ཐམས་ཅད་དེ་ཁློ་ན་ཉིད་ལ་དཔྱློད་པའི་ རིགས་པས་འགློག་པར་འདློད་པའི་ལློག་རྟློག་ཐམས་ཅད་ལློག་པར་འགྱུར་རློ། Gorampa himself in his Distinguishing the Views [of Emptiness]: Moonlight [To Illuminate] the Main Points of the Supreme Path (lta ba'i shan 'byed theg mchog gnad kyi zla zer) describes Tsongkhapa's position this way:274 Hence, the mind that understands reality is the apprehension of emptiness alone—that is, of the emptiness of truth [that is arrived at] after having negated truth. If one properly identifies [what it means] to apprehend [things] as true (bden, 'dzin), one will come to understand that there are many conceptual thoughts that are neither of the two forms of the grasping at truth [of self and phenomena]. This counteracts all of the mistaken views (log rtog) that believe 274 José Ignacio Cabezón, and Geshe Lozang Dargyay, Freedom from Extremes, 82-83. 294 that every object that is apprehended by a conceptual thought is negated by means of the reasoning that analyzes reality. དེ་ལྟར་བདེན་འཛིན་ལེགས་པར་ངློས་ཟིན་ན་བདེན་འཛིན་གཉིས་མིན་པའི་རྟློག་པ་དུ་མ་ཞིག་ཡློད་ པར་ཤེས་པར་འགྱུར་བས།་རྟློག་པས་གང་བཟུང་གི་ཡུལ་ཐམས་ཅད་དེ་ཁློ་ན་ཉིད་ལ་དཔྱློད་པའི་ རིགས་པས་དགག་པར་འདློད་པའི་ལློག་རྟློག་ཐམས་ཅད་ཟླློག་པར་འགྱུར་རློ༎ Jamyang Shaypa accurately paraphrases this with: Moreover, Gobo (go rams pa bsod nams seng ge, 1429-1489) says: It follows that the statement by Tsongkhapa—that he has reversed all of the wrong conceptions asserting that the reasoning analyzing suchness refutes all objects apprehended by conceptual thought—is not logically feasible… According to Gorampa, Tsongkhapa states that if one identifies well the apprehension of true existence, one will no longer think that the reasoning analyzing suchness refutes all objects apprehended by conceptual thought. From Tsongkhapa's point of view, since the apprehension of true existence does not contain all modes of conceptuality, using the reasoning analyzing suchness to refute all conceptualities is way too broad an identification of the object to be negated, as it is stated in his Illumination of the Thought. However, Jamyang Shaypa sees as Gorampa's source that the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras say that the four extremes and even the middle free from these four extremes are 295 apprehensions of extremes, and thereby they should be negated.275 According to Sönam Thakchöe, Gorampa asserts that all conventional truths are objects that should be negated due to falling into one of the four extremes:276 This follows, argues Gorampa, from the fact that the Mādhyamikas' investigation over whether certain things are 'true' (bden pa), 'existent' (yod pa), 'truly established' (bden grub), and so forth, pertains to real phenomena rather than conceptually constructed/reified entities, and that a failure to find the truth/reality of things under such analysis must mean, in Gorampa's view, that the positing of conventional truth is erroneous. Gorampa provides us with, perhaps, the clearest defense of his first argument yet. When his imagined interlocutor asks Gorampa this question: 275 Gorampa severely criticizes Tsongkhapa in his Distinguishing the Views [of Emptiness]: It is perfectly correct [for Tsong kha pa and his followers] to maintain that since the grasping at truth—that is, the grasping at the truth of entities—is the root of all faults, it is necessary to negate (sun phyung) the object that it constructs (zhen yul). However, they believe (a) that emptiness as an absolute negation (med dgag)—that is, as the mere negation (bkag tsam) of truth, the not finding [of something] when it is searched for by means of reasoning—is the real (mtshan nyid pa) ultimate truth, and (b) that thought constructions (mngon par zhen pa) in regard to emptiness are not to be negated. [Both of these views] fall outside of the textual tradition of the Madhyamaka. དེ་ལ་དངློས་པློ་ལ་བདེན་པར་འཛིན་པའི་བདེན་འཛིན་ཉེས་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་ར་བ་ཡིན་པས་དེའི་ཞེན་ཡུལ་སུན་ ཕྱུང་དགློས་པ་ཤིན་ཏུ་འཐད་ཀྱང་། [a] རིགས་པས་བཙལ་བའི་ཆེ་མ་རེད་པའི་བདེན་པ་བཀག་ཙམ་གི་སློང་ཉིད་ མེད་དགག་དེ་ཉིད་དློན་དམ་བདེན་པ་མཚན་ཉིད་པ་ཡིན་པར་འདློད་པ་དང་། [b] སློང་ཉིད་དེར་མངློན་པར་ ཞེན་པ་དགག་བྱ་མ་ཡིན་པར་འདློད་པ་དབུ་མའི་གཞུང་ལུགས་ལས་འདས་ཏེ། … See José Ignacio Cabezón, and Geshe Lozang Dargyay, Freedom from Extremes, 115. The Tibetan is from ibid. 114. For Cabezon's introduction of Tsongkhapa and Gorampa's different views, see ibid., 52-57. 276 Sonam Thakchöe, "Gorampa on the Objects of Negation: Arguments for Negating Conventional Truths," Contemporary Buddhism 9, no. 2 (2008): 272. 296 If indeed that is the case, for you even the conventional truths would become the objects of negation from purview of the ultimate analysis of the reasoning consciousness?’ Gorampa's reply is: 277 Yes, absolutely. Since [conventional truths] are not found at all when subjected to ultimate analysis of the reasoning consciousness. (1969a, 392c; 2002, 178) The fact that conventional truths fail to stand up to the test of logical analyses is, in Gorampa's view, indication that conventional truths are metaphysically eliminated by the rational cognition. Since one cannot find that anything truly exists as a result of its examination by a rational consciousness analyzing the ultimate, nothing can be "true." Not only are the superimposed appearances of things as truly established objects of negation, but also conventional truths are because nothing can withstand the ultimate analysis by a rational consciousness. Therefore, from Gorampa's viewpoint, Tsongkhapa's assertion—that understanding the object of negation removes all wrong ideas that the reasoning analyzing suchness refutes all objects apprehended by conceptual thought—is too narrow 277 The corresponding Tibetan passage that Thakchöe cites in his citation is: འློ་ན་ཀུན་རློབ་བདེན་པའང་མཐར་ཐུག་དཔྱློད་པའི་རིགས་ངློར་དགག་བྱར་འགྱུར་རློ་ཞེན་ཤིན་ཏུ་འང་འདློད་དེ། མཐར་ཐུག་དཔྱློད་པའི་རིགས་པས་བརལ་བའི་ཚེ་མི་རཡནེད་པའི་ཕིར་རློ། See ibid., 279 n.28. 297 (1) since nothing can withstand the analysis of a rational consciousness and (2) since his assertion conflicts with scriptural evidence, specifically the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras. The position established by Gorampa is, however, still logically not feasible according to Jamyang Shaypa since if the reasoning analyzing suchness should negate all conceptual thoughts, then even illusory-like dependent-arising278 should be negated. What is negated by a rational consciousness analyzing the ultimate should not be existence itself, but the superimposition of inherent existence upon a conventionally existent phenomenon. If even an existent itself—a basis of negation (dgag gzhi)—is refuted by a rational consciousness, nothing would be left. If this negation of existence itself were the result of analysis by a rational consciousness, it would be nothing but mere nonexistence which would be an extreme of annihilation, not the absence of true existence. For instance, if one analyzes a cup with a rational consciousness, what one should refute is its false appearance as an inherently existent cup, but not a dependently existent cup. With his emphasis on the necessity of the precise application of a rational consciousness only to wrong conception, Jamyang Shaypa "disproves" Gorampa's position because his overly broad range of the object of negation conflicts with many sūtras including the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras and treatises such as a passage from Candrakīrti's Clear Words which states that what is negated by the Mādhyamikas is the inherent existence of action, doer, effect, and so forth, not doer, effect, and so forth themselves: 278 It is said to be illusory-like because they appear to be inherently existent, but are not inherently existent. They appear one way, but exist in the other way like illusions do. 298 We are not propounding that "Action, doer, effect, and so forth do not exist." Why? We posit that inherent existence does not exist. 7th Wrong idea: Taktshang the Translator holds that refuting the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence through reasoning is sufficient This seventh refutation is based on Taktshang's (Taktshang Lotsāwa Sherab Rinchen) criticism on the two types of object of negation in Tsongkhapa's system. This debate corresponds to Jamyang Shaypa's seventeenth and eighteenth replies in his Great Exposition of Tenets to Taktshang's criticism of Tsongkhapa's system regarding the object of negation.279 THE TEXT 279 JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM According to Maher, Jamyang Shaypa composed his root text for the Great Exposition of Tenets in 1689 and finished its commentary in 1699. Also the main text of this dissertation, the Decisive Analysis of (Candrakīrti's) "Entry to (Nāgārjuna's) 'Treatise on the Middle'," is written in 1695. Therefore, it is possible that Jamyang Shaypa composed the Great Exposition of Tenets and the Decisive Analysis simultaneously. See Derek Frank Maher, "Knowledge and Authority in Tibetan Middle Way Schools of Buddhism" (PhD diss., University of Virginia, 2003), 123-126. 299 THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM །ཡང་རྣམ་བཤད་སློགས་ལས་མུ་སེགས་པ་དང་ གྲུབ་མཐའ་སྨྲ་བ་ཁློ་ནས་བཏགས་པའི་ཡུལ་ བཀག་པས་ཐློགས་མེད་ནས་ཞུགས་པའི་ལྷན་ སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་བདེན་འཛིན་ལ་མི་གནློད་གསུངས་པ་ ལ། མུ་སེགས་པ་དང་གྲུབ་མཐའ་སྨྲ་བ་ ཁློ་ནས་བཏགས་པའི་ཡུལ་བཀག་ པས་ཐློགས་མེད་ནས་ཞུགས་པའི་ ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་བདེན་འཛིན་ལ་མི་ གནློད། Moreover, with respect to the statement in Tsongkhapa's Explanation [of (Candrakīrti's) "Entry to (Nāgārjuna’s) 'Treatise on the Middle'"] and so forth that refutation of objects imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly, Refutation of objects imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly. 280 280 It seems that Jamyang Shaypa summarizes Tsongkhapa's introduction to the object of negation in his Illumination of the Thoughts: With regard to delineating the absence of true existence in phenomena, if you do not understand well just what true establishment is, as well as how [phenomena] are apprehended as truly existent, the view of suchness will definitely go astray. Shāntideva’s Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds says that if the thing imputed, the generality [or image] of the object of negation, does not appear well to your awareness, it is impossible to apprehend well the nonexistence of the object of negation: Without making contact with the thing imputed, The non-existence of that thing is not apprehended. Therefore, unless true establishment (which is what does not exist) and the aspect of the object of negation (which is that of which [phenomena] are empty) do not appear—just as they are—as objects of [your] awareness, good ascertainment of the lack of true establishment and of the entity of emptiness cannot occur. Furthermore, mere identification of (1) a true establishment that is superficially imputed by proponents of tenets and (2) [the consciousness] apprehending such true establishment is not sufficient. Because of this, it is most essential to identify well the innate apprehension of true establishment that has operated beginninglessly and exists both in those whose awarenesses have been affected through [study of] tenets and in those whose awarenesses have not been affected in this way, and to identify the true establishment apprehended by this [mind]. For if you have not identified these, even if you refute an object of negation through reasoning, the adherence to true establishment that has operated beginninglessly is not harmed at all, due to which the meaning at this point would be lost. See Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa's Final Exposition of Wisdom, 186. For Tibetan text, see song kha pa, Illumination of the Thought, 128-129. 300 THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM སག་ཚང་པ་ན་རེ། [མུ་སེགས་པ་དང་གྲུབ་ ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་བློ་ལའང་རྟག་འཛིན་ མཐའ་སྨྲ་བ་ཁློ་ནས་བཏགས་པའི་ཡུལ་བཀག་ དང་ས་ཕི་གཅིག་འཛིན་ཡློད། among innate awarenesses there པས་ཐློགས་མེད་ནས་ཞུགས་པའི་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་ Even are apprehensions of permanence and བདེན་འཛིན་ལ་མི་གནློད་པ་]དེ་མི་འཐད་པར་ of former and later [phenomena] as ཐལ༑ ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་བློ་ལའང་རྟག་འཛིན་དང་ས་ one. ཕི་གཅིག་འཛིན་ཡློད་པའི་ཕིར་ཟེར་ན་ the Translator Taktshang [incorrectly] says that this is not logically feasible because even among innate awarenesses there are apprehensions of permanence and of former and later [phenomena] as one. [ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་བློ་ལའང་རྟག་འཛིན་དང་ས་ཕི་ གཅིག་འཛིན་ཡློད་པ་ཡིན་ན་མུ་སེགས་པ་དང་ གྲུབ་མཐའ་སྨྲ་བ་ཁློ་ནས་བཏགས་པའི་ཡུལ་ བཀག་པས་ཐློགས་མེད་ནས་ཞུགས་པའི་ལྷན་ སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་བདེན་འཛིན་ལ་མི་གནློད་པ་དེ་མི་ འཐད་པས་]མ་ཁབ་སེ། ཁློ་ན་ཞེས་པའི་རྣམ་ བཅད་ཡློད་པའི་ཕིར། ཁློ་རང་ལ་འློ་ན་རྟག་ འཛིན་ཡིན་ན་དེའི་ཡུལ་མུ་སེགས་པས་བདག་ རྟག་པར་སློ་བཏགས་པ་ལྟར་བཟུང་བས་ཁབ་ པར་ཐལ། ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་རྟག་འཛིན་གིས་[མུ་ སེགས་པས་བདག་རྟག་པར་སློ་བཏགས་པ་]དེ་ ལྟར་བཟུང་བའི་ཕིར༑ [ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་རྟག་འཛིན་ གིས་མུ་སེགས་པས་བདག་རྟག་པར་སློ་བཏགས་ པ་དེ་ལྟར་བཟུང་བར་]རྟགས་ཁས། [Our response:] There is no entailment [that if ཁློ་ན་ཞེས་པའི་རྣམ་བཅད་ཡློད། There is something eliminated by "only." འློ་ན་རྟག་འཛིན་ཡིན་ན་དེའི་ཡུལ་ མུ་སེགས་པས་བདག་རྟག་པར་སློ་ བཏགས་པ་ལྟར་བཟུང་བས་མ་ཁབ། Whatever is an apprehension of permanence is not necessarily an apprehension in accordance with the Forders' superimposition that the self is permanent. ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་རྟག་འཛིན་གིས་[མུ་ སེགས་པས་བདག་རྟག་པར་སློ་ བཏགས་པ་]དེ་ལྟར་བཟུང་མེད། An innate apprehension of permanence does not apprehend in that way [that is to say, in accordance with the Forders' superimposition that the self is permanent]. 301 THE TEXT even among innate awarenesses there are apprehensions of permanence and of former and later (phenomena) as one, Tsongkhapa's statement is not logically feasible,] because there is something eliminated by "only." Well, for him, it [absurdly] follows that whatever is an apprehension of permanence is necessarily an apprehension in accordance with the Forders' superimposition that the self is permanent because an innate apprehension of permanence apprehends in that way [that is to say, in accordance with the Forders' superimposition that the self is permanent]. You have accepted the reason [that an innate apprehension of permanence apprehends in that way, that is to say, in accordance with the Forders' superimposition that the self is permanent]. [རྟག་འཛིན་ཡིན་ན་དེའི་ཡུལ་མུ་སེགས་པས་ བདག་རྟག་པར་སློ་བཏགས་པ་ལྟར་བཟུང་བས་ ཁབ་པར་]འདློད་ན། དུད་འགྲློ་སློགས་གྲུབ་ མཐར་མ་ཞུགས་པའི་རྒྱུད་ལ་བདག་རྒྱུ་རྐྱེན་ གང་ལས་མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་རྟག་འཛིན་ཡློད་པར་ ཐལ། [དུད་འགྲློ་སློགས་གྲུབ་མཐར་མ་ཞུགས་ པའི་རྒྱུད་ལ་]བདག་མ་ཤི་བར་དུ་མི་འཇིག་ པའི་རྟག་འཛིན་ཡློད་པའི་ཕིར༑ [དུད་འགྲློ་ སློགས་གྲུབ་མཐར་མ་ཞུགས་པའི་རྒྱུད་ལ་བདག་ མ་ཤི་བར་དུ་མི་འཇིག་པའི་རྟག་འཛིན་ཡློད་ པར་]རྟགས་ས། [Our response:] If you accept [that whatever is an apprehension of permanence is necessarily an apprehension in accordance with the Forders' superimposition that the self is permanent], it [absurdly] follows that in the continuums of JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM དུད་འགྲློ་སློགས་གྲུབ་མཐར་མ་ ཞུགས་པའི་རྒྱུད་ལ་བདག་རྒྱུ་རྐྱེན་ གང་ལས་མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་རྟག་འཛིན་ མེད། In the continuums of those who are not involved in tenet systems such as animals and so forth, there is no apprehension that the self is permanent in the sense of not being produced from causes and conditions. [དུད་འགྲློ་སློགས་གྲུབ་མཐར་མ་ ཞུགས་པའི་རྒྱུད་ལ་]བདག་མ་ཤི་ བར་དུ་མི་འཇིག་པའི་རྟག་འཛིན་ ཡློད། [In the continuums of those who are not involved in tenet systems such as animals and so forth,] there is apprehension that the self is 302 THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM those who are not involved in tenet systems such permanent in the sense of not as animals and so forth, there is apprehension disintegrating until death. that the self is permanent in the sense of not being produced from causes and conditions because [in the continuums of those who are not involved in tenet systems such as animals and so forth,] there is apprehension that the self is permanent in the sense of not disintegrating until death. The reason [that is, that in the continuums of those who are not involved in tenet systems such as animals and so forth there is apprehension that the self is permanent in the sense of not disintegrating until death,] is easy [to establish]. [དུད་འགྲློ་སློགས་གྲུབ་མཐར་མ་ཞུགས་པའི་ རྒྱུད་ལ་བདག་རྒྱུ་རྐྱེན་གང་ལས་མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་ རྟག་འཛིན་ཡློད་པར་]འདློད་ན། ར་བར། གང་ དག་དུད་འགྲློར་བསྐལ་མང་བསྐྱལ་གྱུར་ པ། །དེས་ཀྱང་མ་སྐྱེས་རྟག་འདི་མ་མཐློང་ ལ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ་ལློ། If you accept [that in the continuum of animals not engaged in tenet systems, there is apprehension that the self is permanent in the sense of not being produced from causes and conditions], it [absurdly] follows that it is not logically feasible for [Candrakīrti's] the root text [Entry to (Nāgārjuna's) Treatise on the Middle] to say:281 281 ར་བར། གང་དག་དུད་འགྲློར་བསྐལ་ མང་བསྐྱལ་གྱུར་པ། །དེས་ཀྱང་མ་ སྐྱེས་རྟག་འདི་མ་མཐློང་ལ། །ཞེས་ གསུངས་པ་འཐད། It is logically feasible for [Candrakīrti's] the root text [Entry to (Nāgārjuna's) Treatise on the Middle] to say: This non-produced permanent [self imputed by Forders] is not perceived By those spending many eons as animals, [Yet consciousnesses conceiving "I" are seen to operate in them. VI.125ab. Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 648. Citation is lengthened in order to contrast two different views of permanence. The whole stanza is: VI.125 །གང་དག་དུད་འགྲློ་བསྐལ་མང་བརྐྱལ་གྱུར་པ། །དེས་ཀྱང་མ་སྐྱེས་རྟག་འདི་མ་མཐློང་ལ། །ངར་འཛིན་དེ་དག་ལ་ཡང་འཇུག་མཐློང་སེ། 303 THE TEXT This non-produced permanent [self imputed by Forders] is not perceived By those spending many eons as animals, [Yet consciousnesses conceiving "I" are seen to operate in them. Hence, there is no self other than the aggregates]. །གཞན་ཡང་བྱེ་མདློ་སློགས་ཀྱིས་དབུ་མར་མ་ ཞུགས་ཀྱང་བདེན་འཛིན་གི་ཞེན་ཡུལ་ལ་ གནློད་པ་ཐུབ་པར་ཐལ། [མུ་སེགས་པ་དང་གྲུབ་ མཐའ་སྨྲ་བ་ཁློ་ནས་བཏགས་པའི་ཡུལ་བཀག་ པས་ཐློགས་མེད་ནས་ཞུགས་པའི་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་ བདེན་འཛིན་ལ་མི་གནློད་པ་དེ་མི་འཐད་ པའི་]དམ་བཅའ་འཐད་པའི་ཕིར༑ JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM Hence, there is no self other than the aggregates]. བྱེ་མདློ་སློགས་ཀྱིས་དབུ་མར་མ་ ཞུགས་པས་བདེན་འཛིན་གི་ཞེན་ ཡུལ་ལ་གནློད་པ་མ་ཐུབ། Since the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas and so forth have not entered the Madhyamaka [view], they cannot harm the conceived object of the apprehension of true existence. [མུ་སེགས་པ་དང་གྲུབ་མཐའ་སྨྲ་བ་ ཁློ་ནས་བཏགས་པའི་ཡུལ་བཀག་ པས་ཐློགས་མེད་ནས་ཞུགས་པའི་ ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་བདེན་འཛིན་ལ་མི་ གནློད་པ་དེ་མི་འཐད་པའི་]དམ་ བཅའ་མི་འཐད། Moreover, it [absurdly] follows that although the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas and so forth have not entered the Madhyamaka [view], they can harm the conceived object of the apprehension of true existence because [according to you] your thesis [that Tsongkhapa's statement—"Refutation of objects imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that Your thesis [that Tsongkhapa's has operated beginninglessly"—is not logically statement—"Refutation of objects feasible] is logically feasible. imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly"—is not logically feasible] is not logically feasible. །དེས་ན་ཕུང་པློ་ལས་གཞན་བདག་འགའ་མེད། See Candrakīrti, dbu ma la 'jug pa, 210a.7-210b.1. 304 In the course of debate, Jamyang Shaypa makes the following points:  Refutation of objects imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly.  Even among innate awarenesses there are apprehensions of permanence and of former and later [phenomena] as one.  There is something eliminated by "only."  Whatever is an apprehension of permanence is not necessarily an apprehension in accordance with the Forders' superimposition that the self is permanent.  An innate apprehension of permanence does not apprehend in that way [that is to say, in accordance with the Forders' superimposition that the self is permanent].  In the continuums of those who are not involved in tenet systems such as animals and so forth, there is no apprehension that the self is permanent in the sense of not being produced from causes and conditions.  [In the continuums of those who are not involved in tenet systems such as animals and so forth,] there is apprehension that the self is permanent in the sense of not disintegrating until death.  It is logically feasible for [Candrakīrti's] the root text [Entry to (Nāgārjuna's) Treatise on the Middle] to say: This non-produced permanent [self imputed by Forders] is not perceived By those spending many eons as animals, [Yet consciousnesses conceiving "I" are seen to operate in them. 305 Hence, there is no self other than the aggregates].  Since the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas and so forth have not entered the Madhyamaka [view], they cannot harm the conceived object of the apprehension of true existence.  Your thesis [that Tsongkhapa's statement—"Refutation of objects imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly"—is not logically feasible] is not logically feasible. This seventh debate is extensively analyzed in Part I Chapter 2. Conclusion of the debates from 1st to 7th བློད་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱ་ཁབ་ཆེ་བ་ཐང་སག་པ་དག་དང་ཁབ་ཆུང་བ་དགག་ས། འདི་དག་ནི་ རྣམ་བཤད་ཀྱི་དངློས་ཟིན་ཙམ་མ་ཡིན་པར་དགློངས་པའི་གཙོ་བློ་བཤད་པ་ཡིན་ནློ། It is easy to negate Tibetans whose object of negation is too broad such as [Zhang] Thangsakpa [Shönnu Gyeltshen (zhang thang sag pa gzhon nu rgyal mtshan)] and whose object of negation is too narrow. These [points that I have made here by seven debates] explain the main thought (dgongs pa'i gtso bo) [behind the explicit reading] and not just the explicit reading of [(Tsongkhapa's) Explanation [of (Candrakīrti’s) "Entry to (Nāgārjuna’s) 'Treatise on the Middle'"]. 8th Wrong Idea: Correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag) and correct sign (rtags yang dag) are the same In this debate, Jamyang Shaypa clarifies the confusion between a correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag) and a correct sign (rtags yang dag). 306 THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM །ཡང་སློན་གི་ཁ་ཅིག་ན་ རེ༑ རིགས་པ་ཡང་ རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ལ་ དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ལ་ཡློད་མེད་གཉིས་འཇློག་ལ། ཡློད་མེད་གཉིས་འཇློག are two objects of negation by རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་དང་རྟགས་ There correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag gi ཡང་དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་བཟླློག་ཟླར་གྱུར་པའི་ dgag bya)—existent and nonexistent. རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་དང་ དགག་བྱ་དློན་གཅིག་པར་འདློད། Moreover, someone in an earlier period posited རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་ that there are two objects of negation by correct བཟླློག་ཟླར་གྱུར་པའི་དགག་བྱ་དློན་ reasoning (rigs pa yang dag gi dgag bya)— existent and nonexistent and asserted that object གཅིག་མ་ཡིན། of negation by a correct reasoning (rigs pa yang [252] dag gi dgag bya) and object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum of a correct sign (rtags yang dag gi bsgrub bya'i bzlog zlar gyur pa'i dgag bya) are equivalent. Object of negation by a correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag gi dgag bya) and object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum of a correct sign are not equivalent. དེ་ལ་སློན་གི་གཞན་དག་ན་རེ། བདེན་འཛིན་ ཆློས་ཅན། བདེན་མེད་དུ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་ དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རྟགས་ཡང་ དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར་ན་[རྟགས་ཡང་ དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་ཡིན་ན་བདེན་མེད་དུ་སྒྲུབ་ པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་མ་ཡིན་ པས་]མ་ཁབ་ཟེར། བདེན་འཛིན་བདེན་མེད་དུ་སྒྲུབ་ པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་མ་ ཡིན། The apprehension of true existence is not an object of negation by a correct sign proving the absence of true existence. ]བདེན་འཛིན་[རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་ བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་མ་ཡིན། With regard to this, another early scholar said: [The apprehension of true existence If somebody said to me, "It follows that the is] not a probandum of a correct sign. subject, the apprehension of true existence, is not an object of negation by a correct sign proving [something] as not truly existent because of being a probandum of a correct sign," I would say "[Whatever is a probandum of a correct sign] is not necessarily [an object of negation by a correct sign proving the absence of true [Whatever is a probandum of a establishment]." [རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་ཡིན་ ན་བདེན་མེད་དུ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རྟགས་ ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་མ་ཡིན་ པས་]ཁབ། 307 THE TEXT དེ་ལ་འློ་ན་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་ཆློས་ཡིན་ན་ དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་ཡིན་དགློས་པར་ཐལ། བདེན་འཛིན་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་ ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར། [དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་ཆློས་ ཡིན་ན་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་ཡིན་དགློས་ པར་]འདློད་ན། ངློ་མཚར་ཆེ། JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM correct sign] is necessarily [an object of negation by a correct sign proving the absence of true establishment]. དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་ཆློས་ཡིན་ན་ དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་མ་ཡིན་དགློས། Whatever is the predicate of the probandum in a proof of something is necessarily not the probandum in the proof of that something. བདེན་འཛིན་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་ བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་མ་ཡིན། [Our response:] Well then, with regard to this, it The apprehension of true existence is [absurdly] follows that whatever is the predicate not the probandum of a correct sign. of the probandum in a proof of something is necessarily the probandum in the proof of that something because [according to you] the apprehension of true existence is the probandum of a correct sign. If you accept [that whatever is the predicate of the probandum in a proof of something is necessarily the probandum in the proof of that something,] it is very amazing. ཡང་དམ་བཅའ་དང་པློ་[རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་ དགག་བྱ་ལ་ཡློད་མེད་གཉིས་འཇློག་ལ། རིགས་ པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་དང་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ གི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་བཟླློག་ཟླར་གྱུར་པའི་དགག་བྱ་ དློན་གཅིག་པ་]ལ། བདེན་འཛིན་ཆློས་ཅན༑ རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་བཟླློག་ཟླ་གྱུར་ པའི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རིགས་པ་ཡང་ དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར། [བདེན་འཛིན་ ཆློས་ཅན་རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་ པ་]དེར་ཐལ། བདེན་མེད་དུ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རིགས་ བདེན་འཛིན་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་ བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་བཟླློག་ཟླ་གྱུར་པའི་ དགག་བྱ་མ་ཡིན། The apprehension of true existence is not an object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum of a correct sign. [བདེན་འཛིན་]རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་ གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན། [The apprehension of true existence is] an object of negation by a correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag). [བདེན་འཛིན་]བདེན་མེད་དུ་སྒྲུབ་ 308 THE TEXT པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར། Also, with regard to the first thesis [that is, that it is posited that there are two objects of negation by correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag gi dgag bya)—existent and nonexistent,] object of negation by a correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag) and object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum (sgrub bya, sādhya) proven by a correct sign (rtags yang dag) are equivalent,] it [absurdly] follows that the subject, the apprehension of true existence, is an object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum of a correct sign (rtags yang dag), because of being an object of negation by a correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag). It follows that [the subject, the apprehension of true existence, is an object of negation by a correct reasoning] because of being the object of negation by a correct reasoning proving the absence of true existence. [བདེན་འཛིན་ཆློས་ཅན་བདེན་མེད་དུ་སྒྲུབ་ པའི་རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་ པ་]དེར་ཐལ། [བདེན་མེད་]དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་འཐད་ པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར། [བདེན་མེད་སྒྲུབ་པའི་འཐད་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་ དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་ན་བདེན་མེད་དུ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པས་]ཁབ་ སེ། རིགས་པ་དང་འཐད་པ་དློན་གཅིག་ཡིན་ པའི་ཕིར། It follows [that the apprehension of true existence is an object of negation by a correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag),] because of being an object of negation by correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag) proving the absence of true existence. It follows [that an apprehension of JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM པའི་རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ ཡིན། [The apprehension of true existence is] the object of negation by a correct reasoning proving [something] as not truly existent. [བདེན་འཛིན་དེ་བདེན་མེད་]དེ་ སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་འཐད་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་ བྱ་ཡིན། [The apprehension of true existence] is an object of negation by correct reasoning proving [something] as not truly existent. [བདེན་མེད་སྒྲུབ་པའི་འཐད་པ་ ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་ན་ བདེན་མེད་དུ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རིགས་པ་ ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་ པས་]ཁབ། [Whatever is an object of negation by a correct logicality ('thad pa yang dag) proving the absence of true existence] is necessarily [an object of 309 THE TEXT true existence is an object of negation by correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag) proving the absence of true existence,] because of being an object of negation by a correct logicality ('thad pa yang dag) proving [the absence of true existence. Whatever is an object of negation by a correct logicality ('thad pa yang dag) proving the absence of true existence] is necessarily [an object of negation by correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag) proving the absence of true existence,] because reasoning (rigs pa) and logicality ('thad pa) are equivalent. JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM negation by correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag) proving the absence of true existence]. རིགས་པ་དང་འཐད་པ་དློན་གཅིག་ ཡིན། Reasoning (rigs pa) and logicality ('thad pa) are equivalent. [བདེན་མེད་དུ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་འཐད་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་ [བདེན་མེད་དུ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་འཐད་པ་ དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་ན་བདེན་མེད་དུ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་ན་ རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པས་]མ་ བདེན་མེད་དུ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རིགས་པ་ ཁབ་མཚམས་ཀྱི་[བདེན་འཛིན་ནི་བདེན་མེད་ ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པས་] དུ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་འཐད་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ ཁབ། is an object of negation by ཡིན་པ་]རྟགས་གྲུབ་སེ། [བདེན་འཛིན་]དེས་ Whatever a correct logicality ('thad pa yang བཟུང་བ་ལྟར་མི་འཐད་པས་[བདེན་འཛིན་]དེ་ dag) proving the absence of true is necessarily an object of འཐད་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱར་སློང་བའི་ existence negation by correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag) proving the absence of true ཕིར། existence. At the point of the statement of no entailment [བདེན་འཛིན་ནི་བདེན་མེད་དུ་ [that is, that whatever is an object of negation by a correct logicality ('thad pa yang dag) proving སྒྲུབ་པའི་འཐད་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་ [something] as not truly existent is not necessarily an object of negation by correct དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པ་]རྟགས་གྲུབ། reasoning (rigs pa yang dag) proving the absence of true existence,] the sign [that is to say, that the apprehension of true existence is an object of negation by a correct logicality proving the absence of true existence (bden 'dzin de sgrub kyi 'thad pa yang dag gi dgag bya yin pa)] is established because since [the apprehension of true existence] is not logically feasible in accordance with its apprehension, [the The reason [that is, that the apprehension of true existence is an object of negation by a correct logicality proving the absence of true existence] is established. [བདེན་འཛིན་]དེས་བཟུང་བ་ལྟར་ མི་འཐད་པས་[བདེན་འཛིན་]དེ་ 310 THE TEXT apprehension of true existence] comes to be an object of negation by a correct logicality. JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM འཐད་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱར་ སློང་། Since [the apprehension of true existence] is not logically feasible in accordance with its apprehension, [the apprehension of true existence] comes to be an object of negation by a correct logicality. [བདེན་འཛིན་དེས་བཟུང་བ་ལྟར་མི་འཐད་ པས་བདེན་འཛིན་དེ་འཐད་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་ དགག་བྱར་སློང་བ་]དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ གིས་[འཐད་པ་ཡང་དག་]དེའི་དགག་བྱ་ལ་ བདེན་འཛིན་ཞེན་ཡུལ་དང་བཅས་པ་གཉིས་ ཀ་འཇློག་དགློས་པའི་ཕིར། དེའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་གིས་[འཐད་པ་ཡང་ དག་]དེའི་དགག་བྱ་ལ་བདེན་ འཛིན་ཞེན་ཡུལ་དང་བཅས་པ་ གཉིས་ཀ་འཇློག་དགློས། Both an apprehension of true existence as well as [its] conceived object [that is, true establishment] must be posited as objects of negation It follows [that since (the apprehension of true by [a correct logicality]. existence) is not logically feasible in accordance with its apprehension, [the apprehension of true existence] comes to be an object of negation by a correct logicality,] because for that reason both an apprehension of true existence as well as [its] conceived object [that is, true establishment] must be posited as objects of negation by [a correct logicality]. (left side retained) རློད་ཟླློག་ལས༑ ཡང་ན་ཁ་ཅིག་སྤྲུལ་པ་ཡི། །བུད་ མེད་ལ་ནི་བུད་མེད་སྙམ། །ལློག་འཛིན་འབྱུང་ བ་སྤྲུལ་པ་ཡིས༑ ༑འགློག་བྱེད་འདི་ནི་དེ་ལྟ་ ཡིན། །ཞེས་མི་ཁ་ཅིག་གིས་སྤྲུལ་པའི་བུད་མེད་ བུད་མེད་དངློས་གནས་སུ་འཛིན་པ་སྤྲུལ་པས་ འགློག་པ་ནི། འགློག་བྱེད་ཅེས་པ་ཡན་ཆད་ཀྱིས་ སློན་ལ། འདི་ནི་དེ་ལྟ་ཡིན་ཞེས་པས་ཚིག་སྤྲུལ་ རློད་ཟླློག་ལས༑ ཡང་ན་ཁ་ཅིག་སྤྲུལ་ པ་ཡི། །བུད་མེད་ལ་ནི་བུད་མེད་ སྙམ། །ལློག་འཛིན་འབྱུང་བ་སྤྲུལ་པ་ ཡིས༑ ༑འགློག་བྱེད་འདི་ནི་དེ་ལྟ་ ཡིན། །ཞེས་མི་ཁ་ཅིག་གིས་སྤྲུལ་པའི་ བུད་མེད་བུད་མེད་དངློས་གནས་སུ་ 311 THE TEXT པ་ལྟ་བུས་རང་བཞིན་ཡློད་འཛིན་ཟླློག་པར་ བཤད་པའི་ཕིར་རློ། JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM འཛིན་པ་སྤྲུལ་པས་འགློག་པ་ནི། འགློག་བྱེད་ཅེས་པ་ཡན་ཆད་ཀྱིས་ སློན་ལ། འདི་ནི་དེ་ལྟ་ཡིན་ཞེས་པས་ ཚིག་སྤྲུལ་པ་ལྟ་བུས་རང་བཞིན་ཡློད་ འཛིན་ཟླློག་པར་བཤད་པའི་ཕིར་རློ། because [Nāgārjuna's] Refutation of Objections says: Or, someone's wrong apprehension thinking that a magically emanated woman is a [real] woman Is negated by [another] magical emanation. because [Nāgārjuna's] Refutation of This [that is, the apprehension of true Objections says: existence] is like that [that is, it is refuted by Or, someone's wrong words that are like illusions]. apprehension thinking that a That a man's apprehension of a magically magically emanated woman is a emanated woman as a real woman is negated [real] woman by [another] magical emanation is indicated Is negated by [another] magical by the first three lines, and "This is like that" emanation. explains that words like an emanation This [that is, the apprehension of overcome the apprehension of inherent true existence] is like that [that is, existence. it is refuted by words that are like illusions]. That a man's apprehension of a magically emanated woman as a real woman is negated by [another] magical emanation is indicated by the first three lines, and "This is like that" explains that words like an emanation overcome the apprehension of inherent existence. །ར་བ[་བདེན་འཛིན་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་ བྱའི་བཟླློག་ཟླ་གྱུར་པའི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པ]ར་ འདློད་ན། [བདེན་འཛིན་]དེ་ཆློས་ཅན། མེད་ པར་ཐལ། རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་ བཟླློག་ཟླར་གྱུར་པའི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར༑ [བདེན་འཛིན་དེ་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་ [བདེན་འཛིན་]དེ་ཡློད་པ་ཡིན། [The apprehension of true existence] is existent. [བདེན་འཛིན་]རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་ བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་བཟླློག་ཟླར་གྱུར་པའི་ དགག་བྱ་མ་ཡིན། [The apprehension of true existence] is not an object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum of a 312 THE TEXT བྱའི་བཟླློག་ཟླར་གྱུར་པའི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་ པ་]རྟགས་ཁས། JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM correct sign. If you accept the root [consequence that the apprehension of true existence is an object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum of a correct sign,] it [absurdly] follows that the subject, [the apprehension of true existence,] does not exist because of being an object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum of a correct sign. You have accepted the reason [that is, that the apprehension of true existence is an object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum of a correct sign]. [རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་བཟླློག་ཟླར་ གྱུར་པའི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་ན་མེད་པས་]ཁབ་སེ། [རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་བཟླློག་ཟླར་ གྱུར་པའི་དགག་བྱ་]དེ་ཡློད་ན་དེ་ལྟར་དགག་ མི་ནུས་པའི་ཕིར། [དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་བཟླློག་ཟླ་ དགག་བྱ་ཡློད་ན་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ གིས་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་སྒྲུབ་མི་ ཐུབ་པས་]ཁབ། [If the object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum in the because if [the object of negation that is the proof of something exists,] it is opposite of the probandum proving something] entailed that [the probandum in the exists, such cannot be negated proof of that something cannot be established] [དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་བཟླློག་ཟླ་ དགག་བྱ་]དེ་ཡློད་ན་དེ་ལྟར་དགག་ མི་ནུས། If [the object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum proving something] exists, such cannot be negated (left side retained) ལམ་རིམ་ལས། འདི་ཡང་རྟེན་འབྲེལ་གི་རྟགས་ ཀྱིས་གང་ཟག་དང་ཆློས་ཀྱི་སེང་དུ་ རང་གི་ ལམ་རིམ་ལས། འདི་ཡང་རྟེན་འབྲེལ་ གི་རྟགས་ཀྱིས་གང་ཟག་དང་ཆློས་ཀྱི་ [253] 313 THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM ངློས་ནས་གྲུབ་པའི་རང་བཞིན་ཡློད་པ་འགློག་ པ་ལྟ་བུ་རྣམས་ཡིན་ནློ། །དགག་བྱ་འདི་ནི་ཤེས་ བྱ་ལ་མེད་པ་གཅིག་དགློས་ཏེ། ཡློད་ན་དགག་ པར་མི་ནུས་པའི་ཕིར་རློ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ ཕིར། སེང་དུ་ རང་གི་ངློས་ནས་གྲུབ་ པའི་རང་བཞིན་ཡློད་པ་འགློག་པ་ལྟ་ བུ་རྣམས་ཡིན་ནློ། །དགག་བྱ་འདི་ནི་ ཤེས་བྱ་ལ་མེད་པ་གཅིག་དགློས་ཏེ། ཡློད་ན་དགག་པར་མི་ནུས་པའི་ཕིར་ རློ། །ཞེས་གསུངས [253] because [Tsongkhapa's] Great Stages of the Path says:282 These also are, for instance, refutations of [Tsongkhapa's] Great Stages of the inherent existence—that is to say, Path says: These (should find out what these establishment from [the object's] own side— indicate) also are, for instance, with respect to persons and phenomena by refutations of inherent existence— the sign of dependent-arising. This object of that is to say, establishment from negation is necessarily something that does [the object's] own side—with not exist among objects of knowledge respect to persons and phenomena because whatever exists cannot be refuted. by the sign of dependent-arising. This object of negation is necessarily something that does not exist among objects of knowledge because whatever exists cannot be refuted. In the course of debate, Jamyang Shaypa makes the following points:  There are two objects of negation by correct reasoning: Existent and nonexistent. 282 Tsong kha pa, The Great Exposition of Stages of the Path (byang chub lam rim chen mo), in gsung 'bum/_tsong kha pa (bkras lhun par rnying / d+ha sar bskyar par brgyab pa/), TBRC W29193.13 (Dharamsala, India: sherig parkhang, 1997), 420a.3-420a.4, http://tbrc.org/#library_work_ViewByVolumeW29193%7C5135%7C13%7C1%7C1080. An alternative translation of this passage is: For instance, dependent-arising refutes the essential or intrinsic existence of persons and phenomena. This latter object of negation cannot be among objects of knowledge because, if it did exist, then it could not be refuted. See Tsong-kha-pa, The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment: Volume Three, tr. the Lamrim Chenmo Translation Committee, ed. Joshua W. C. Cutler and Guy Newland, vol. 3 (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2002), 204. 314  Object of negation by a correct reasoning and object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum of a correct sign are not equivalent.  The apprehension of true existence is an object of negation by a correct reasoning. o The apprehension of true existence is not an object of negation by a correct sign proving the absence of true existence. o The apprehension of true existence is not a probandum of a correct sign. o The apprehension of true existence is an object of negation by a correct reasoning proving something as not truly existent. o Reasoning (rigs pa) and logicality ('thad pa) are equivalent. o Both an apprehension of true existence as well as its conceived object— that is, true establishment—must be posited as objects of negation by a correct reasoning, which is also called a correct logicality. o Since the apprehension of true existence is not logically feasible in accordance with its apprehension, the apprehension of true existence comes to be an object of negation by a correct logicality.  The apprehension of true existence is existent.  You cannot negate by means of a correct sign something that exists.  The predicate of the probandum in a proof of something is not to be confused with the probandum in the proof of that something since a probandum has both a subject and a predicate. 9th Wrong idea: A correct reasoning can refutes substratum 315 THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM བྱས་པ་ལ་ཁློ་ན་རེ། རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་ བྱའི་བཟླློག་ཟླ་དགག་བྱ་ལ་མེད་པས་མ་ཁབ་ པར་ཐལ། མྱུ་གུ་མེད་པ་དེ་མྱུ་གུ་ཡློད་པར་སྒྲུབ་ པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་བཟླློག་ཟླ་ དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར༑ [མྱུ་གུ་མེད་པ་དེ་མྱུ་ གུ་ཡློད་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་ བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་བཟླློག་ཟླ་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པ་]དེར་ ཐལ། མྱུ་གུ་ཡློད་པ་[མྱུ་གུ་ཡློད་པར་གྲུབ་པའི་]དེ་ སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར་ན་ རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་ བཟླློག་ཟླ་དགག་བྱ་ལ་མེད་པས་ཁབ། The object of negation that is the opposite of a probandum of a correct sign necessarily does not exist. མྱུ་གུ་མེད་པ་དེ་མྱུ་གུ་ཡློད་པར་སྒྲུབ་ པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་ བཟླློག་ཟླ་དགག་བྱ་མ་ཡིན། Nonexistence of sprout is not the object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum of a correct sign proving that a sprout exists. མྱུ་གུ་ཡློད་པ་[མྱུ་གུ་ཡློད་པ་]དེ་སྒྲུབ་ ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་ཡིན། With regard to that, someone says: It follows that there is no entailment that the object of negation that is the opposite of a probandum of a correct sign necessarily does not exist because That a sprout exists is the probandum nonexistence of sprout (མྱུ་གུ་མེད་པ་དེ་) is the in the proof of that [a sprout exists]. object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum of a correct sign proving that a sprout exists. It follows [that nonexistence of sprout (མྱུ་གུ་མེད་པ་དེ་) is the object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum of a correct sign proving that a sprout exists] because that a sprout exists is the probandum in the proof of that. [མྱུ་གུ་ཡློད་པ་མྱུ་གུ་ཡློད་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་བསྒྲུབ་ བྱ་ཡིན་ན་མྱུ་གུ་མེད་པ་དེ་མྱུ་གུ་ཡློད་པར་སྒྲུབ་ པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་བཟླློག་ཟླ་ དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པས་]མ་ཁབ་སེ། [མྱུ་གུ་ཡློད་ པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་]དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་བཟླློག་ཟླ་ ལ་མྱུ་གུ་མེད་པ་ཡིན་པ་དེ་འཇློག་པའི་ཕིར་རློ། [མྱུ་གུ་ཡློད་པ་མྱུ་གུ་ཡློད་པ་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་ཡིན་ན་མྱུ་གུ་མེད་པ་དེ་ མྱུ་གུ་ཡློད་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་ དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་བཟླློག་ཟླ་དགག་ བྱ་ཡིན་པས་]མ་ཁབ། [That that a sprout exists is the probandum in the proof of that] does [Our response: That that a sprout exists is the not entail [that nonexistence of sprout probandum in the proof of that] does not entail 316 THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM [that nonexistence of sprout (མྱུ་གུ་མེད་པ་དེ་) is the is the object of negation that is the object of negation that is the opposite of the opposite of the probandum of a probandum of a correct sign proving that a correct sign proving that a sprout sprout exists (མྱུ་གུ་ཡློད་པ་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་ཡིན་ན་མྱུ་ exists]. གུ་ཡློད་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་བཟླློག་ཟླ་ དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པས་མ་ཁབ་)] because that a sprout is nonexistent (མྱུ་གུ་མེད་པ་ཡིན་པ་དེ་) is posited as the [མྱུ་གུ་ཡློད་པ་]དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་ བྱའི་བཟླློག་ཟླ་ལ་མྱུ་གུ་མེད་པ་ཡིན་ པ་དེ་འཇློག opposite of the probandum in the proof [that a That a sprout is nonexistent is posited sprout exists]. as the opposite of the probandum in the proof [that a sprout exists]. །ཁློ་རང་ལ་བདག་ཡློད་པ་དེ། རྟེན་འབྲེལ་གི་ རྟགས་ཀྱིས་ཕུང་པློ་བདག་མེད་དུ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་དགག་བྱར་ཐལ་ལློ། །མྱུ་གུའི་འདློད་ ཚུལ་འཐད་པའི་ཕིར། འདློད་ན། ཁད་གཞི་ཡང་ དགག་རིགས་པར་ཐལ་ལློ།། བདག་ཡློད་པ་དེ། རྟེན་འབྲེལ་གི་ རྟགས་ཀྱིས་ཕུང་པློ་བདག་མེད་དུ་ སྒྲུབ་པའི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་དགག་བྱ་མ་ ཡིན། Existence of self is not the object of negation of the probandum in the [Our response:] For him, it [absurdly] follows proof that the aggregates are selfless that existence of self (bdag yod pa) is the object by the sign, dependent-arising. of negation of the probandum in the proof that the aggregates are selfless by the sign, dependent-arising, because [according to you, your] mode of assertion with regard to a sprout [that is, that the nonexistence of sprout is the [Your] mode of assertion with regard object of negation that is the opposite of the to a sprout [that is, that the probandum of a correct sign proving that a nonexistence of sprout is the object of sprout exists] is logically feasible. If you accept negation that is the opposite of the [that existence of self is the object of negation of probandum of a correct sign proving the probandum in the proof that the aggregates that a sprout exists] is not logically are selfless by the sign, dependent-arising,] it feasible. very [absurdly] follows that it is reasonable to refute even the substratum. [ཁློད་ཀྱི་]མྱུ་གུའི་འདློད་ཚུལ་མི་ འཐད། ཁད་གཞི་ཡང་དགག་རིགས་པ་མ་ ཡིན། It is not reasonable to refute even the substratum. In the course of debate, Jamyang Shaypa makes the following points: 317  The object of negation that is the opposite of a probandum of a correct sign necessarily does not exist.  Nonexistence of sprout is not the object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum of a correct sign proving that a sprout exists. o That a sprout exists is the probandum in the proof of that a sprout exists. o That that a sprout exists is the probandum in the proof of that does not entail that nonexistence of sprout is the object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum of a correct sign proving that a sprout exists. o That a sprout is nonexistent is posited as the opposite of the probandum in the proof [that a sprout exists].  Existence of self is not the object of negation of the probandum in the proof that the aggregates are selfless by the sign, dependent-arising.  Your mode of assertion with regard to a sprout—that is, that the nonexistence of sprout is the object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum of a correct sign proving that a sprout exists—is not logically feasible.  It is not reasonable to refute even the substratum. 2.2. Our Own System རང་ལུགས་ལ། 318 སྐབས་འདིར་སློང་ཉིད་ངེས་པ་ལ་ཐློག་མར་དགག་བྱ་ངློས་ཟིན་དགློས་ཏེ། དེ་ངློས་མ་ ཟིན་ན་དེ་བཀག་པའི་སློང་པ་ངློས་མི་ཟིན་པའི་ཕིར། སིར་དགག་བྱ་ལ་ལམ་གི་དགག་ བྱ་དང་རིགས་པའི་དགག་བྱ་གཉིས་ཡློད་པ་ལས་ལམ་གི་དགག་བྱ་ལ་ཡློད་པ་གཅིག་ དགློས་ཏེ། དེ་མེད་ན་སེམས་ཅན་ཐམས་ཅད་རང་གྲློལ་དུ་འགྲློ་བ་དང་། ལམ་སློམ་པའི་ ངལ་བ་དློན་མེད་དུ་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕིར་རློ༑ On this occasion, in order to ascertain emptiness it is necessary initially to identify the object of negation because if [the object of negation] is not identified, the emptiness that negates [the object of negation] is not identified. In general, there are two [types] of objects of negation: objects of negation by the path and objects of negation by reasoning; among them, within the objects of negation by the path, there must be an existent because if there is not [an existent object of negation by the path], all sentient beings would be self-released, and the hardship of practicing the path would be meaningless. ༑རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ལ་ལློག་འཛིན་དང་དེས་བཟུང་བའི་ཡུལ་ལ་དགག་ བྱར་བྱས་པ་གཉིས་ཡློད་དེ། དཔེར་ན་ལྟློས་པའི་རིགས་པའི་དགག་བྱ་ལ་དངློས་པློ་རྒྱུ་ རྐྱེན་ལ་མ་ལྟློས་པར་བཟུང་བ་ དང་དེའི་ཡུལ་གཉིས་ཀ་མི་འཐད་པའམ་མི་རིགས་ པས་ན་དགག་བྱར་མཛད་པ་ལྟ་བུ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར༑ 283 With respect to objects of negation by correct reasoning, two types are taken as objects of negation—wrong apprehensions and the objects apprehended by them—because it is like, for example, the fact that with regard to objects of negation by the reasoning of dependence, since both (1) the apprehension of a thing as not depending on causes and 283 By this, Jamyang Shaypa seems to emphasize the action of negation, not consciousness. 319 conditions and (2) its object [that is, a thing’s not depending on causes and conditions] are not logically feasible and not reasonable, they are taken as objects of negation. རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་ལ་ལྟློས་པའི་དང་འཐད་པ[ར]་སྒྲུབ་པའི་དང་བྱ་བ་བྱེད་པའི་དང་ ཆློས་ཉིད་ཀྱི་རིགས་པ་བཞི་ཡློད་ཀྱང་བསྡུས་ན་གཉིས་སུ་འདུ་སེ། དློན་དམ་དཔྱློད་པ་ དང་ཐ་སྙད་དཔྱློད་པའི་རིགས་པ་གཉིས་སུ་འདུ་བའི་ཕིར། འཐད་པ་དང་རུང་བ་དང་ རིགས་པ་དློན་གཅིག་སེ། རྣམ་བཤད་རིགས་པར་དེ་ལྟར་གསུངས་པའི་ཕིར། Although there are four [types] of correct reasoning—the reasoning of dependence, of logicality, of the performance of function, and of nature (chos nyid)—when summarized, they are included within two [types,] because [these four] are included into the reasoning of analyzing the ultimate and the reasoning of analyzing conventions. 284 Logically 284 For the four types of correct reasonings, Tsongkhapa explains in his Great Exposition of Stages of the Path: Searching for reasoning is of four types: (1) the reasoning of dependence is that effects arise in dependence on causes and conditions. You search from the distinctive perspectives of the conventional, the ultimate, and their bases. (2) The reasoning of performance of function is that phenomena perform their own functions, as in the case of fire performing the function of burning. You search, thinking, "This is the phenomenon, this is the function, this phenomenon performs this function." (3) The reasoning of tenable proof is that something is proven without being contradicted by valid knowledge. You search, thinking, "Is this supported by any of the three forms of valid knowledge—perception, inference, and reliable scripture?" (4) The reasoning of reality gives you confidence in the reality of things as known in the world— e.g., the reality that fire is hot and water is wet—or confidence about inconceivable realities, or confidence about the abiding reality; it does not consider any further reason as to why these things are that way. Hopkins explains: The four reasonings are general Buddhist approaches to knowledge through investigating causation, function, affirmation or contradiction by valid cognition, and the nature of objects. 1. The reasoning of dependence is from the viewpoint that the arising of effects depends on causes and conditions. 320 feasible ('thad pa), suitable (rung ba), and reasonable (rigs pa) are equivalent because (Vasubhandu’s) Principles of Explanation (rnam bshad pa'i rigs pa, vyākyayukti) says such. འཐད་རིགས་དང་བློ་རིག་གི་རིག་པ་དློན་མི་གཅིག་སེ། བློད་སྐད་ལ་ས་མཐའ་ཡློད་མེད་ མི་འདྲ་ལ། རྒྱ་སྐད་ལ་ཡང་ཡློཥིར་འཐད་རིགས་དང་། བིདྱ་བློ་རིག་ལ་འཇུག་པས་ས་ ཡང་མི་ འདྲ་ལ་དློན་མི་དྲ་བ་ཡང་སར་གི་དེས་ཤེས་པའི་ཕིར། དེས་ན་འཐད་པའི་ བཟླློག་ཟླ་ལ་རིགས་པའི་དགག་བྱར་བྱ་སེ། རིགས་པ་བཞིའི་བཟླློག་ཟླ་མི་རིགས་པ་བཞི་ ལ་དགག་བྱར་བྱེད་པར་རེ་ཡབ་སས་ཀྱི་གསུང་རབ་ཀུན་གློ་བསྡུར་ན་ཐློན་པ་དེའི་ཕིར། [254] The [rigs pa of] 'thad rigs ('thad pa dang rigs pa logicality and reasoning)285 and the rig pa of blo rig (awareness and knowledge) are not equivalent because in Tibetan the presence and absence of the suffix sa differ, and in Sanskrit the terms also differ since 2. The reasoning of performance of function is from the viewpoint that phenomena perform their respective functions, such as fire performing the function of burning. 3. The reasoning of tenable proof is to prove a meaning without contradicting valid cognition, direct, inferential, or believable scripture. 4. The reasoning of nature is to examine from the viewpoint of (1) natures renowned in the world, such as heat being the nature of fire and moisture being the nature of water, (2) inconceivable natures such as placing a world-system in a single hair-pore, and so forth. See Tsong-kha-pa Blo-bzaṅ-grags-pa, The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path: four, tr. the Lamrim chenmo translation committee, ed. Joshua W. C. Cuttler and Guy Newland, vol. 3 (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2004), 299; Jeffrey Hopkins, Absorption in No External World: 170 Issues in Mind Only Buddhism (Ithaca, Snow Lion Publications, 2005), 435. 285 rigs pa in the context of 'thad pa, and the other way around. 321 yoṣir286 is used for [the rigs pa of] 'thad rigs (logicality and reasoning) and vidya is used for [the rig pa of] blo rig (awareness and knowledge), and also that the meanings differ is to be known from the earlier [discussion] (the 8th wrong idea, see 305). Therefore, the opposite of logicality is taken as the object of negation by reasoning because when comparing the high speech (gsung rab, pravācana) of Tsongkhapa and his spiritual sons [Khédrupje and Gyeltshapje], it turns out that the four non-reasonables [non-reasonable with regard to dependence, non-reasonable with regard to logicality, non-reasonable with regard to the performance of function, and non-reasonable with regard to nature] which are the opposites of the four reasonings [the reasoning of dependence, of logicality, of the performance of function, and of nature] are taken as objects of negation. རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་དང་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་དློན་མི་གཅིག་པས་དེ་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡང་ དློན་མི་གཅིག་ལ། རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་མེད་པར་མཁས་དབང་ཆློས་འབྱུང་ དང་སག་ལུང་གྲགས་པའི་གསུང་ལྟར་ལེགས་ཏེ། སར་གི་ལུང་རིགས་དེ་དག་སློགས་ མང་བའི་ཕིར་རློ། །འདིར་ཡང་དེའི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་སློ། ། Because correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag) and correct sign (rtags yang dag) are not equivalent, the objects of negation by [a correct reasoning and a correct sign] are also not equivalent, and it is proper that, in accordance with statements by the lords of scholars [Gungru] Chökyi Jungné and Taklung Drakpa [Lodrö Gyatsho] 287 that the objects of The two editions of dbu ma’i mtha' dpyod read yoṣir. See 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa, dbu ma 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal gyi dkar chag in the Collected Works of 'Jam-dbyangsbzhad-pa'i-rdo-rje: Reproduced from prints from Bkra-shis-'khyil Blocks, vol. 9 (South India, India: s.n., 1995). 186a.3; 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa, dbu ma 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod (Beijing, China: pe cin nyug hran shin 'gyig par khang, 2004). 190.3. I was not able to find the corresponding Sanskrit term of yoṣir. It could be yukti. 287 stag lung grags pa blo gros rgya mtsho (1546-1618, P715). He was the 30th Throne holder of Ganden. 286 322 negation by correct signs do not exist because there are the manifold scriptures and reasonings, those [cited] earlier and so forth. རློད་སྤློང་ལ་ 2.3 Dispelling Objections 1st Debate THE TEXT ཁློ་ན་རེ། བདེན་འཛིན་གིས་བདེན་པར་བཟུང་ བ་ཆློས་ཅན། མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ༑ རིགས་པ་ ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར། [བདེན་ འཛིན་གིས་བདེན་པར་བཟུང་བ་རིགས་པ་ཡང་ དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པ་]རྟགས་ཁས། [བདེན་ འཛིན་གིས་བདེན་པར་བཟུང་བ་རིགས་པ་ཡང་ དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པར་]འདློད་ན། [བདེན་ འཛིན་གིས་བདེན་པར་བཟུང་བ་]དེ་ཆློས་ཅན། མེད་པར་ཐལ། [བདེན་འཛིན་གིས་བདེན་པར་ བཟུང་བ་]མི་འཐད་པའི་ཕིར་ན་ Someone says: It follows that the subject, the apprehension 288 of [something] as truly existent by an apprehension of true existence, 289 is not logically feasible because of an object of negation by a correct reasoning. You have asserted the reason [that is, that the apprehension of (something) as truly existent by an apprehension of true existence is an object of negation by correct reasoning]. If you accept 288 289 bzung ba means action. consciousness. JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM བདེན་འཛིན་གིས་བདེན་པར་ བཟུང་བ་མི་འཐད། The apprehension of [something] as truly existent by an apprehension of true existence is not logically feasible. བདེན་འཛིན་གིས་བདེན་པར་ བཟུང་བ་རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་ དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་ཀྱང་། བདེན་འཛིན་གིས་བདེན་པར་ བཟུང་བ་མེད་པ་མ་ཡིན། The apprehension of [something] as truly existent by [a consciousness] apprehending true existence is an object of negation by a correct reasoning; however, it is not that the apprehension of [something] as truly existent by [a consciousness] apprehending true existence does not exist. 323 THE TEXT [that the apprehension of (something) as truly existent by an apprehension of true existence, is not logically feasible,] it [absurdly] follows that the subject, [the apprehension of (something) as truly existent by (a consciousness) apprehending true existence,] does not exist because [the apprehension of (something) as truly existent by an apprehension of true existence] is not logically feasible. [བདེན་འཛིན་གིས་བདེན་པར་བཟུང་བ་མི་ འཐད་པ་ཡིན་ན་བདེན་འཛིན་གིས་བདེན་པར་ བཟུང་བ་དེ་མེད་པ་ཡིན་པས་]མ་ཁབ། ཁློ་རང་ ལ། ཕི་རློལ་པའི་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་ཡློད་པར་ སྒྲུབ་པའི་རིགས་པ་དང་བཤད་ཚུལ་རེ་རེ་ནས་ ཆློས་ཅན། མེད་པར་ཐལ། [ཕི་རློལ་པའི་གང་ ཟག་གི་བདག་ཡློད་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རིགས་པ་ དང་བཤད་ཚུལ་]མི་འཐད་པའི་ཕིར། འཁློར་ གསུམ། Our response: [That the apprehending (of something) as truly existent by an apprehension of true existence (note: apprehension of true existence here is not action apprehending true existence, but consciousness apprehending true existence) is not logically feasible] does not entail [that the apprehending (of something) as truly existent by an apprehension of true existence does not exist]. For him [that is, for the opponent,] it [absurdly] follows that each of the subjects, the Outsiders' reasonings proving the existence of a self of persons and their modes of explanation, do not exist because [the Outsiders' reasonings proving the existence of a self of persons and their modes of explanation] are not logically feasible. You have asserted the three [spheres of self-contradiction]. JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM བདེན་འཛིན་གིས་བདེན་པར་ བཟུང་བ་མི་འཐད་བདེན་འཛིན་ གིས་བདེན་པར་བཟུང་བ་ཡློད་པ་ ཡིན། [The apprehending of something as truly existent by a consciousness apprehending true existence] is not logically feasible, but the apprehension of something as truly existent by a consciousness apprehending true existence does exist. བདེན་འཛིན་གིས་བདེན་པར་ བཟུང་བ་མི་འཐད་པ་ཡིན་ན་བདེན་ འཛིན་གིས་བདེན་པར་བཟུང་བ་དེ་ མེད་པ་ཡིན་པས་མ་ཁབ། That apprehending of something as truly existent by an apprehension of true existence is not logically feasible does not entail that the apprehending of something as truly existent by an apprehension of true existence does not exist. ཕི་རློལ་པའི་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་ཡློད་ པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རིགས་པ་དང་བཤད་ 324 THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM ཚུལ་རེ་རེ་ནས་ཡློད། The Outsiders' reasonings proving the existence of a self of persons and their modes of explanation each exist. ཕི་རློལ་པའི་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་ཡློད་ པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རིགས་པ་དང་བཤད་ ཚུལ་མི་འཐད། The Outsiders' reasonings proving the existence of a self of persons and their modes of explanations are not logically feasible. The three [spheres of self-contradiction] is:  Assertion of the reason: You have explicitly asserted the reason—that, the apprehension of something as truly existent by an apprehension of true existence is the object of negation by a correct reasoning. རྟགས་ཁས་བངས་པ། བདེན་འཛིན་གི་བདེན་པར་བཟུང་བ་རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པ་ དངློས་སུ་ཁས་བངས་པ།  Assertion of the entailment: You have explicitly asserted the entailment—that whatever is the object of negation by a correct sign is not logically feasible. ཁབ་པ་ཁས་བངས་པ། རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་ན་མི་འཐད་པ་ཡིན་པ་དངློས་སུ་ཁས་བངས་ པ།  Assertion of the opposite of “thesis” of the consequence: You have asserted (or, have come to assert) the opposie of “thesise” of the consequence—that it is not 325 that the apprehension of something as truly existence by an apprehension of true existence is not feasible. བསལ་བའི་བཟླློག་ཕློགས་ཁས་བངས་པ། བདེན་འཛིན་གི་བདེན་པར་བཟུང་བ་མི་འཐད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཁས་ བངས་པ་(ཡང་ན་ཁས་བངས་སློང་བ་)། In the course of debate, Jamyang Shaypa makes the following points:  The apprehension of something as truly existent by an apprehension of true existence is not logically feasible. o The apprehension of something as truly existent by a consciousness apprehending true existence is an object of negation by a correct reasoning; however, it is not that the apprehension of something as truly existent by a consciousness apprehending true existence does not exist. o The apprehending of something as truly existent by a consciousness apprehending true existence is not logically feasible, but the apprehension of something as truly existent by a consciousness apprehending true existence does exist.  The Outsiders' reasonings proving the existence of a self of persons and their modes of explanation each exist; however, they are not logically feasible. o The Outsiders' reasonings proving the existence of a self of persons and their modes of explanations are not logically feasible. 326 2nd debate THE TEXT JAMYANG SHAYPA'S OWN SYSTEM ཡང་ཁློ་ན་རེ། བདེན་འཛིན་ཆློས་ཅན། དློན་ བདེན་འཛིན་དློན་དམ་དཔྱློད་པའི་ དམ་དཔྱློད་པའི་རྟགས་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པར་ རྟགས་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱ་མ་ཡིན། apprehension of true existence is ཐལ༑ དློན་དམ་དཔྱློད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རིགས་ཤེས་རེས་ The not an object of negation of a sign དཔག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར་ན་ analyzing the ultimate. Moreover, someone says: It follows that the དློན་དམ་དཔྱློད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རིགས་ཤེས་ subject, the apprehension of true existence, is an རེས་དཔག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན object of negation of a sign analyzing the ultimate because of being an object of negation The apprehension of true existence is of an inference that is a rational consciousness an object of negation of an inference that is a rational consciousness analyzing the ultimate. analyzing the ultimate. 327 [དློན་དམ་དཔྱློད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རིགས་ཤེས་རེས་ དཔག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་ན་དློན་དམ་དཔྱློད་ པའི་རྟགས་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པས་]ཤིན་ཏུ་མ་ ཁབ། [དློན་དམ་དཔྱློད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རིགས་ ཤེས་རེས་དཔག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་ན་ དློན་དམ་དཔྱློད་པའི་རྟགས་ཀྱི་ དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པས་]ཤིན་ཏུ་མ་ཁབ། Our response: There is utterly no entailment [that whatever is an object of negation of an inference that is a rational consciousness analyzing the ultimate is necessarily an object of negation of a sign analyzing the ultimate]. There is utterly no entailment that whatever is an object of negation of an inference that is a rational consciousness analyzing the ultimate is necessarily an object of negation of a sign analyzing the ultimate. འློ་ན་[ཁློད་ཀྱི་འདློད་པ་ལྟར་ན༑] བདེན་མེད་ རྟློགས་པའི་ཤེས་རབ་དེ་བདེན་མེད་དུ་སྒྲུབ་ བདེན་མེད་རྟློགས་པའི་ཤེས་རབ་དེ་ བདེན་མེད་དུ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་ པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱར་ཐལ༑ ་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་མ་ཡིན། [བདེན་འཛིན་དློན་དམ་དཔྱློད་པའི་རྟགས་ཀྱི་ དག་གི The wisdom realizing the absence of དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་]དམ་བཅའ་འཐད་པའི་ true existence is not a probandum of a correct sign proving the absence of ཕིར། true existence. Well then, it [absurdly] follows that the wisdom realizing the absence of true existence is a probandum of a correct sign proving the absence of true existence because [according to you your] thesis [that is, that the apprehension of true existence is the object of negation of a sign analyzing the ultimate,] is logically feasible. In the course of debate, Jamyang Shaypa makes the following points:  The apprehension of true existence is not an object of negation of a sign analyzing the ultimate. o The apprehension of true existence is an object of negation of an inference that is a rational consciousness analyzing the ultimate. 328  There is utterly no entailment that whatever is an object of negation of an inference that is a rational consciousness analyzing the ultimate is necessarily an object of negation of a sign analyzing the ultimate.  The wisdom realizing the absence of true existence is not a probandum of a correct sign proving the absence of true existence. 329 Conclusion In the preceding, I have reformatted Jamyang Shaypa’s Decisive Analysis of the Middle (dbu ma’i mtha’ dpyod) to clearly correlate the elements of his text with the three fundamental aspects of Tibetan debate practice: a refutation of the philosophical positions of others with which he does not agree (“Refuting Other Systems”), a refutation of potential objections that others might raise to his own philosophical positions (“Dispelling Objections to One’s Own Position”), and a finally constructive presentation of his own philosophical positions (“Our Own System”). This tabular presentation has the virtue of disentangling those components form the complex back and forth of the original text. Having done so, not only can we clearly see what those points are, but we can also see the relative extent of each of the three components, by which we can begin to understand what such debate texts are hoping to accomplish. Jamyang Shaypa’s general section on the object of negation for Madhyamaka consists of nine refutations on the part of Refuting Other Systems and two debates on the part of Dispelling Objections. Within these refutations and debates, we can further analytically discern individual philosophical points. As I show in tabular form below, my analysis indicates that Jamyang Shaypa indirectly presents 71 points in Refuting Other Systems and 9 points in Dispelling Objection. On the contrary, the numbers of points that Jamyang Shaypa presents in the part on Our Own System presents is remarkably small— only fourteen. 330 In addition to this discrepancy in numbers, there is also a discrepancy in format. The philosophical points are only indirectly presented in Refuting Other Systems and Dispelling Objections as embedded in debate dialogs, while the part presenting Our Own System involves the direct presentation of philosophical points written in expository prose. As presented below, these points are: (1) justifying the necessity of identifying the object of negation (2) introducing two different ways of discerning the two types of object of negation (3) providing the criteria and subdivisions of the object of negation by correct reasonings (4) clarifying easily confused logical terms When we compare these philosophical points on the identification of object of negation, thus, the difference between indirect and direct presentations is notable. This is characteristic of the genre of Decisive Analysis (mtha’ dpyod) in monastic textbook literatures, and contrasts sharply with the style of other Tibetan scholastic thinking, which focuses on expository prose to go into detail on philosophical systems and points. The monastic textbooks have an explicit pedagogical goal and function indicated clearly in their detailed account of actual debate format and methodology—they teach monks how to debate. However, we would go astray if we were to conclude that the monastic textbooks take no care for arguing for promoting specific philosophical points. 331 I conclude that Jamyang Shaypa’s Decisive Analysis of the Middle aims to teach basic skills and strategies for actual debate practice in the debate courtyard, but also has an additional goal of educating monk-students on crucial philosophical points in the process. Thus the text has a dual focus—on teaching the methodology and practice of debate on the one hand, and then arguing for precise philosophical points on the other hand. While the “Our Own System” section may be relatively modest in extent, when looked at as a whole, all three sections, and the 93 individual points, are tightly marshaled to argue for very specific philosophical positions, while also teaching the students how one goes about debating in general. The remaining table details precisely the 71 individual points in Refuting Other Systems, the 9 points of Dispelling Objections to One’s Own Position, and the 14 points of Our Own System. Summary of Jamyang Shaypa’s points of teaching 1 2 3 4 Jamyang Shaypa’s 71 points in Refuting Other Systems If one has not identified the object of negation, the nondawning of any object to one's awareness and not thinking 1st Wrong idea anything is not to see, to realize the mode of substance. It is not that you realize the mode of subsistence of all the stable and the moving [that is to say, the inanimate and the animate] in worldly realms that you yourself do not know. st 1 refutation Aspects of those [that is, all the stable and the moving in worldly realms] do not dawn to your awareness. The non-dawning of those is not the meaning of seeing the mode of subsistence of these objects. 332 5 6 7 8 9 10 2nd refutation 11 12 13 3rd refutation 14 15 16 17 2nd Wrong idea It follows that whatever is a non-view ignorance (lta min gyi ma rig pa) necessarily does not realize emptiness! When the aspect of emptiness dawns [to an awareness], the aspect of the negative of its object of negation dawns. The non-dawning of anything to an awareness is not a realization of emptiness. When the aspect of emptiness dawns, the factor that is the negative of the object of negation—true establishment—dawns. Emptiness is a non-affirming negative that is a negative of true establishment. Since emptiness is a non-affirming negative that is a negative of true establishment, the factor that is the negative of the object of negation—true establishment—must dawn when the aspect of emptiness dawns. When meaning-generalities of non-affirming negatives dawn in dependence upon explicitly refuting their objects of negation, it is necessary that another phenomenon is not projected explicitly or implicitly. With regard to that, without the meaning-generality of the object of negation previously dawning to an awareness, the nonexistence that is the negative of that does not dawn to an awareness. With regard to realization of emptiness, both (1) the nondawning of appearances of coarse conventionalities and (2) a dawning of an aspect—that is, a generic image—of the naturelessness of those objects are necessary. Buddhapālita asserts that for realization of the emptiness of former and future births, a dawning of an image of the naturelessness of those is necessary; and (2) the glorious Candrakīrti also asserts such. [The Nihilists and the Proponents of the Middle] are very different due to the fact that the Nihilists' seeing such is from the power of ignorance and the Proponents of the Middle see [phenomena] as not [inherently] produced and so forth by reason of the nonexistence of the inherent nature of all phenomena. The measure of realizing the view is realization that future lives and so forth do not truly exist because of being empty of inherent existence due to being dependent-arisings. Without knowing the details with regard to conventions, one cannot realize emptiness. Conventions have to be validly established. 333 The ultimate is other than conventionalities. Without knowing how to posit the valid establishment of conventions it is impossible to realize naturelessness. Without knowing how to posit valid establishment, it cannot be posited that emptiness is realized through holding that [phenomena] are natureless. Without knowing how to posit valid establishment, with regard to former and later births it cannot be posited that the emptiness of former and later births is realized through holding that former and later births are natureless. The Āyatas’ holding former and later births as natureless, for example, is not a view of emptiness. The reason why the [Āyatas' view] is a view of annihilation but the Middle Proponents' holding former and later births as natureless is a pure view is respectively due to [the Āyatas'] not asserting but [the Middle Proponents'] asserting establishment in conventions. The Āyatas' holding that former and later births are natureless is a view of annihilation. The Āyatas do not realize naturelessness as the Proponents of the Middle do within knowing how to posit the valid establishment of conventionalities. 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3rd wrong idea 29 30 The Middle view and mode of holding that former and later births are natureless do not accord with that of the Āyatas. Both of them hold that former and later births are natureless. Although they are similar [in holding that] the objects, former and later births, are natureless, whether it is the Middle view or not is posited separately due to differences in the inner modes of the realizers' awarenesses. It is like, for example, that when both someone who identified a man as a robber and another who did not identify such say, "He is the robber," it is posited that the one who knew the robber identified the robber and the other one did not identify the robber. The meaning of [Buddhapālita’s] statement "they are polluted by the defects of view" [when he says, “Likewise, although it is a fact that all phenomena are empty and because of being empty are not produced and not ceased, those who (that is, the Proponents of the Middle) have knowledge by direct perception of it (that is, emptiness,) are endowed with goodness and are praised, but because the other (that is, the Āyatas) do 334 31 32 33 4th Wrong idea 34 35 36 5th Wrong idea 37 38 39 40 41 42 42 6th Wrong idea not directly (see) emptiness, they are polluted by the defects of view and derided by the wise,”] exists. The view in the Āyatas [mental] continuum that former and later births are natureless is not the Madhyamaka view. The naturelessness of former and later births is the final mode of subsistence. The view in the Vaibhāṣikas' [mental] continuum that a [Buddha's] enjoyment body is natureless is not the Madhyamaka view. The naturelessness of an enjoyment body is the final mode of subsistence. Likewise, know how to apply [this mode of refutation] to the Mind-Only Proponents’ view that the imputational nature is not established by way of its own character. Such a view in the Āyatas' continuum [that former and later births are natureless] is not a factually concordant conceptual consciousness. The view in a Vaibhāṣika's continuum that a [Buddha's] enjoyment body is such [that is, natureless] is not a factually concordant conceptual consciousness. The statement by Tsongkhapa: [When, in that way, you have identified well the apprehension of true existence, you will understand that there are many apprehensions that are not the two apprehensions of self. Consequently,] all wrong ideas of asserting that reasonings analyzing suchness refute all objects apprehended by conceptuality will be overcome. is logically feasible. The thought of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras is not to be explained as being that howsoever forms are apprehended—as the four extremes of being empty or not empty or as the middle free from them—are apprehensions of extremes and hence do not have to be refuted. It is logically feasible that [Tsongkhapa] having solely refuted truth [that is, true establishment (bden par grub pa),] asserts that [forms] abide in the middle. The distinction that reasoning analyzing the ultimate refutes inherent existence but does not refute forms and so forth that are illusory-like dependent-arisings should be made. Reasoning does not refute all whatsoever objects. You [Gorampa] contradict many sūtras and treatises such as [Candrakīrti's] Clear Words which says: 335 We are not propounding that "Action, doer, effect, and so forth do not exist." Why? We posit inherent existence does not exist. 43 44 45 46 47 7th Wrong idea 48 49 50 51 52 53 8th Wrong Idea There is something eliminated by "only" in the statement that refutation of objects imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly. Even among innate awarenesses there are apprehensions of permanence and of former and later [phenomena] as one. Refutation of objects imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly. Whatever is an apprehension of permanence is not necessarily an apprehension in accordance with the Forders' superimposition that the self is permanent. An innate apprehension of permanence does not apprehend in that way [that is to say, in accordance with the Forders' superimposition that the self is permanent]. In the continuums of those who are not involved in tenet systems such as animals and so forth, there is no apprehension that the self is permanent in the sense of not being produced from causes and conditions. [In the continuums of those who are not involved in tenet systems such as animals and so forth,] there is apprehension that the self is permanent in the sense of not disintegrating until death. Since the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas and so forth have not entered the Madhyamaka [view], they cannot harm the conceived object of the apprehension of true existence. Your thesis [that Tsongkhapa's statement—"Refutation of objects imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly"—is not logically feasible] is not logically feasible. There are two objects of negation by correct reasoning: Existent and nonexistent. Object of negation by a correct reasoning and object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum of a correct sign are not equivalent. 336 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 9th Wrong idea The apprehension of true existence is an object of negation by a correct reasoning. The apprehension of true existence is not an object of negation by a correct sign proving the absence of true existence. The apprehension of true existence is not a probandum of a correct sign. The apprehension of true existence is an object of negation by a correct reasoning proving something as not truly existent. Reasoning (rigs pa) and logicality ('thad pa) are equivalent. Both an apprehension of true existence as well as its conceived object—that is, true establishment—must be posited as objects of negation by a correct reasoning, which is also called a correct logicality. Since the apprehension of true existence is not logically feasible in accordance with its apprehension, the apprehension of true existence comes to be an object of negation by a correct logicality. The apprehension of true existence is existent. You cannot negate by means of a correct sign something that exists. The predicate of the probandum in a proof of something is not to be confused with the probandum in the proof of that something since a probandum has both a subject and a predicate. The object of negation that is the opposite of a probandum of a correct sign necessarily does not exist. Nonexistence of sprout is not the object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum of a correct sign proving that a sprout exists. That a sprout exists is the probandum in the proof of that a sprout exists. That that a sprout exists is the probandum in the proof of that does not entail that nonexistence of sprout is the object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum of a correct sign proving that a sprout exists. That a sprout is nonexistent is posited as the opposite of the probandum in the proof [that a sprout exists]. Existence of self is not the object of negation of the probandum in the proof that the aggregates are selfless by the sign, dependent-arising. Your mode of assertion with regard to a sprout—that is, that the nonexistence of sprout is the object of negation that is the 337 71 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 opposite of the probandum of a correct sign proving that a sprout exists—is not logically feasible. It is not reasonable to refute even the substratum. Jamyang Shaypa’s 9 points of teaching in Dispelling Objections The apprehension of something as truly existent by an apprehension of true existence is not logically feasible. The apprehension of something as truly existent by a consciousness apprehending true existence is an object of negation by a correct reasoning; however, it is not that the apprehension of something as truly existent by a consciousness apprehending true existence does not exist. The apprehending of something as truly existent by a 1st Debate consciousness apprehending true existence is not logically feasible, but the apprehension of something as truly existent by a consciousness apprehending true existence does exist. The Outsiders' reasonings proving the existence of a self of persons and their modes of explanation each exist; however, they are not logically feasible. The Outsiders' reasonings proving the existence of a self of persons and their modes of explanations are not logically feasible. The apprehension of true existence is not an object of negation of a sign analyzing the ultimate. The apprehension of true existence is an object of negation of an inference that is a rational consciousness analyzing the ultimate. There is utterly no entailment that whatever is an object of 2nd debate negation of an inference that is a rational consciousness analyzing the ultimate is necessarily an object of negation of a sign analyzing the ultimate. The wisdom realizing the absence of true existence is not a probandum of a correct sign proving the absence of true existence. Jamyang Shaypa’s 14 points in Our Own System In order to ascertain emptiness it is necessary initially to identify the object of negation because if [the object of 338 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 negation] is not identified, the emptiness that negates [the object of negation] is not identified. In general, there are two [types] of objects of negation: objects of negation by the path and objects of negation by reasoning. Among them, within the objects of negation by the path, there must be an existent because if there is not [an existent object of negation by the path], all sentient beings would be selfreleased, and the hardship of practicing the path would be meaningless. With respect to objects of negation by correct reasoning, two types are taken as objects of negation—wrong apprehensions and the objects apprehended by them It is like, for example, the fact that with regard to objects of negation by the reasoning of dependence, since both (1) the apprehension of a thing as not depending on causes and conditions and (2) its object [that is, a thing’s not depending on causes and conditions] are not logically feasible and not reasonable, they are taken as objects of negation. Although there are four [types] of correct reasoning—the reasoning of dependence, of logicality, of the performance of function, and of nature—when summarized, they are included within two [types,] because [these four] are included into the reasoning of analyzing the ultimate and the reasoning of analyzing conventions. Logically feasible ('thad pa), suitable (rung ba), and reasonable (rigs pa) are equivalent because (Vasubhandu’s) Principles of Explanation (rnam bshad pa'i rigs pa, vyākyayukti) says such. The [rigs pa of] 'thad rigs ('thad pa dang rigs pa logicality and reasoning) and the rig pa of blo rig (awareness and knowledge) are not equivalent. In Tibetan the presence and absence of the suffix sa in rigs pa and rig pa differ, and in Sanskrit the terms also differ since yoṣir 290 is used for [the rigs pa of] 'thad rigs (logicality and reasoning) and vidya is used for [the rig pa of] blo rig (awareness and knowledge), and also that the meanings differ The two editions of dbu ma’i mtha' dpyod read yoṣir. See 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa, dbu ma 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal gyi dkar chag in the Collected Works of 'Jam-dbyangsbzhad-pa'i-rdo-rje: Reproduced from prints from Bkra-shis-'khyil Blocks, vol. 9 (South India, India: s.n., 1995). 186a.3; 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa, dbu ma 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod (Beijing, China: pe cin nyug hran shin 'gyig par khang, 2004). 190.3. I was not able to find the corresponding Sanskrit term of yoṣir. It could be yukti. 290 339 10 11 12 13 14 is to be known from the earlier [discussion]. Therefore, the opposite of logicality is taken as the object of negation by reasoning. When comparing the high speech (gsung rab, pravācana) of Tsongkhapa and his spiritual sons [Khédrupje and Gyeltshapje], it turns out that the four non-reasonables [nonreasonable with regard to dependence, non-reasonable with regard to logicality, non-reasonable with regard to the performance of function, and non-reasonable with regard to nature] which are the opposites of the four reasonings [the reasoning of dependence, of logicality, of the performance of function, and of nature] are taken as objects of negation. Correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag) and correct sign (rtags yang dag) are not equivalent. Because the objects of negation by [a correct reasoning and a correct sign] are not equivalent, correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag) and correct sign (rtags yang dag) are not equivalent, the objects of negation by [a correct reasoning and a correct sign] are also not equivalent, and it is proper It is proper that, in accordance with statements by the lords of scholars [Gungru] Chökyi Jungné and Taklung Drakpa [Lodrö Gyatsho] that the objects of negation by correct signs do not exist because there are the manifold scriptures and reasonings, those [cited] earlier and so forth. As can be seen from the table, students learn from the two sections of Refuting Other Systems and Dispelling Objections many more of Jamyang Shaypa’s positions than are in Jamyang Shaypa’s presentation of his own system. 340 Conclusion This thesis focuses on two overarching questions: what is a Decisive Analysis as a genre of monastic texts books and how does it work? In the introduction, in order to answer the first question on the nature of a Decisive Analysis, I explore and categorize the four-tier division of monastic textbooks by comparing different opinions on monastic textbooks. For example, while Lharampa Geshe Tenzin Namkha of Jangtse Monastery of Ganden Monastery claims that Decisive Analysis texts uniquely constitute monastic textbooks as a category, Geshes from Gomang Monastic College include other genres such as General Meaning, Collected Topics, and so on within this rubric. I point out that the different categorization of monastic textbooks between these two monastic colleges is based on whether the main author composed different genres of monastic textbooks or not. In Chapter 1 of Part I, I examine the history of the monastic textbook. Looking into the history of Drepung Monastery and Gomang Monastic College in particular from 15th century C.E. to 18th century C.E., I explain the formation of monastic textbooks in three stages. The first monastic textbooks of Gomang Monastic College were relatively late productions compared to other monastic colleges in the Geluk sect. In addition, the process of the establishment of these “old” monastic textbooks was interesting in the sense that oral teachings of Gungru Chöjung were dictated and adopted as textbooks in midst of political and inter-sectarian war. Subsequently, these Old Monastic Textbooks were replaced by the works of Jamyang Shaypa. However, it is not that Jamyang Shaypa completely erased Gungru Chöjung’s philosophical system in the Old Textbooks. Rather, 341 he critically overhauled Gungru Chöjung’s system by composing and installing his own monastic textbooks in a critical dialog with the older system. I conclude by arguing that the monastic textbooks themselves symbolically contributed to the identity of the monastic college. Through Chapter 2 to Chapter 4, I look into the intellectual history of the genre of Decisive Analysis based on the section on the object of negation in Madhyamaka philosophy in Jamyang Shaypa’s Decisive Analysis of the Middle. In Chapter 2, I prove how Tsongkhapa’s (un)intentional misinterpretation of the Indian source text, Illumination of the Middle by Kamalśīla, forces a specific passage of Kamalaśīla’s Illumination of the Middle to neatly fit into his definition of the object of negation in Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas. In Chapters 3 and 4, I demonstrate that the content of a series of debates in Refuting Other Systems and Dispelling Objections holds refutations of different explanations. I conclude that Decisive Analysis along with other monastic textbooks is not merely designed for the sake of monk-students’ debate skill, but also is a pedagogical instrument for the sake of transmitting the vibrant intellectual history of Gomang Monastic College as well as the Geluk sect. In Chapter 5, I unfold the condensed meaning of the three spheres of self-contradiction (’khor gsum) and demonstrate the relevance of this special debate concept. Part II answers how Decisive Analysis works as a pedagogical tool. Unlike other genres of monastic textbooks, the genre of decisive analysis mostly consists of debates except for the part on Establishing Our Own System. The question arises—if expository 342 explanation of Jamyang Shaypa’s philosophical points are relatively sparse, how can Decisive Analysis function as a main monastic textbook presenting a distinctive position for a group? In Part II, I chart Jamyang Shaypa’s own positions extracted from a series of debates documented in the Refuting Other Systems and Dispelling Objections sections. If Jamyang Shaypa positively puts forward his own position, then that is simply repeated in the right column; if he presents an opponent’s position the negative of which is his own position, then the inverse of the opponent’s position is stated in the right column. Through graphing Jamyang Shaypa’s philosophical points in debate format, I argue that debate is an important pedagogical tool fulfilling two goals: sharpening one’s reasoning through directly learning debate strategies and enriching Jamyang Shaypa’s philosophical system by indirectly teaching the opposite of Jamyang Shaypa’s criticism. * * * This thesis is an initial step towards the study of the intellectual and social history of monastic textbooks in Gomang Monastic College. I could not find enough evidence of the direct and indirect influence of Jamyang Chöjé in the development of monastic textbooks in monastic colleges in Drepung Monastery since Jamyang Chöjé’s texts are unavailable at present. In addition, the history of monastic textbooks in Gomang Monastic College is based on the History of Gomang Monastic College by the late Lharampa Geshe and 71st Abbot of Gomang Monastic College, Tenpa Tenzin. Although this text contains thorough research by exploring various historical resources, as I proved in Chapter 1, some parts are unclear; however, I used his text as the main source for the 343 reconstruction of the history of monastic textbooks in Gomang Monastic College since it is the best source we have available. In the near future, however, I plan to expand the scope of my historical research and reexamine the early history of Drepung Monastery and Gomang Monastic College in that context. Finally, in addition to my present scope limited to the section on the object of negation in Svātantrika-Mādhyamika, I would like to expand to consider how Jamyang Shaypa posits the object of negation in Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika. 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Monastic curriculum of Gomang Monastic College in Mundgod, Karnataka, India 2. 21 commentaries of Maitreya’s Ornament of Clear Realizations 356 Appendix 1: Monastic curriculum of Gomang Monastic College in Mundgod, Karnataka, India List of Textbooks for Individual Classes in Gomang Monastic College of Drepung Monastery ༄༅། །འབྲས་སྤུངས་སློ་མང་གྲྭ་ཚང་གི་ཆློས་རྭའི་འཛིན་གྲྭ་སློ་སློའི་སློབ་གཉེར་གི་གཞུང་ཚན་ཁག་ གཤམ་གསལ།། Complied by Ngari Geshe Lharampa Tsewang Thinley, Geshe Lharampa Lobsang Gyaltsan, and Jongbok Yi291 291 Responding my request for the monastic curriculum of Gomang Monastic College, Revered 79 th Abbot of Gomang Monastic College Venerable Geshe Lharampa Yonten Dhamchoe asked Ven. Geshe Lharampa Tsewang Thinley to complie the first manuscript of the list of monastic textbooks. Venerable Geshe Lharampa Lobsang Gyaltsan and I conducted proofreading and expanded it to the detailed list of textbooks that I am presenting here. I also thank to Dr. Fumihito Nishizawa sent me his dissertation that contains the list of textbooks of monastic colleges in Trashi lHun po Monastery (bkra shis lhun po), Sera Monastery, and invaluable information about monastic textbooks in Gomang Monastic College. I have also accumulated various resources on curricula of monastic colleges in the Geluk sect; however, since these are beyond the scope of the appendix of this dissertation, I refrain from listing them here. 357 སི་གཞུང་། གྲྭ་ཚང་གི་ཡིག་ཆ་ཁག 1. 292 293 294 བསྡུས་ཆུང་འཛིན་གྲྭ :སློད་ཆ། མཛད་པ་པློ། འཇམ་དབྱངས་བཞད་པའི་རློ་རེ། གུང་ཐང་དཀློན་ མཆློག་བསན་ པའི་ སློན་མེ། ཀུན་མཁེན་འཇམ་292 དབྱངས་ བཞད་པའི་རློ་རེ། ཐུགས་སས་ ངག་དབང་བཀྲ་ 293 ཤིས། སློབ་ཚན་ཕག་དཔེའ་ི མཚན། བསྡུས་སྦྱློར་གི་སྙིང་པློ་ཀུན་བསྡུས་རིག་པའི་མཛོད། རིགས་ལམ་འཕྲུལ་གི་ལེ་མིག་ཞེས་བྱ་བ། བསྡུས་གྲྭ་རྣམ་བཞག་ལེགས་པར་བཤད་པ། (སློད་ ཆ།) ཚད་མའི་དགློངས་འགྲེལ་གི་བསན་བཅློས་ཆེན་པློ་ རྣམ་འགྲེལ་གི་དློན་གཅིག་ཏུ་དྲིལ་བ་བློ་རབ་འབྲིང་ ཐ་གསུམ་དུ་སློན་པ་ལེགས་བཤད་ཆེན་པློ་མཁས་ པའི་མགུལ་རྒྱན་སྐལ་བཟང་རེ་བ་ཀུན་སྐློང་། (སློད་ ཆ།) འབའ་ལང་དཀློན་མཆློག་ཆློས་ རིགས་ལམ་ཐློར་བུའི་རྣམ་བཞག་བློ་གསལ་ངང་མློ་ འཕེལ། འགུག་པའི་ལེགས་བཤད་པདྨའི་མཚོ་ཆེན་ཞེས་བྱ་ བ། (སློད་ཆ།) (འདི་ཟུར་ལྟ་ཙམ་ལས་ཡིག་ཆ་མིན) འཇམ་དབྱངས་ ཕློགས་ལྷ་འློད་ ཚད་མ་རྣམ་འགྲེལ་གི་བསྡུས་གཞུང་ཤེས་བྱའི་སློ་ 294 ཟེར། འབྱེད་རྒློལ་ངན་གང་པློ་འཇློམས་པ་གདློང་ལྔའི་ གད་རྒྱངས་རྒྱུ་རིག་ལེ་མིག (སློད་ཆ།) ’jam dbyangs bzhad pa’i rdo rje, 1648-1721/22, P432. ngag dbang bkra shis, 1678-1738, P410. phyogs lha ’od zer, or mchog lha ’od zer, 1429-1500, P4752. ཡློངས་གྲགས་མཚན། བསྡུས་གྲྭ་ར་ཚིག རིགས་ལམ་འཕྲུལ་ལེ། ཀུན་མཁེན་བསྡུས་གྲྭ བསེ་བསྡུས་གྲྭ འབའ་ལང་བསྡུས་གྲྭ རྭ་སློད་བསྡུས་གྲྭ 358 སི་གཞུང་། གྲྭ་ཚང་གི་ཡིག་ཆ་ཁག 2. 295 296 297 བསྡུས་ཆེན་འཛིན་གྲྭ :གློང་གསལ་གཞུང་ཚན་ཁག་གི་སད་ཆ། མཛད་པ་པློ། འཇམ་དབྱངས་བཞད་པའི་རློ་ རེ། གུང་ཐང་དཀློན་ མཆློག་ བསན་པའི་ སློན་མེ། ཀུན་མཁེན་འཇམ་295 དབྱངས་ བཞད་པའི་རློ་རེ། ཐུགས་སས་ ངག་དབང་བཀྲ་ 296 ཤིས། སློབ་ཚན་ཕག་དཔེའ་ི མཚན། བསྡུས་སྦྱློར་གི་སྙིང་པློ་ཀུན་བསྡུས་རིག་པའི་མཛོད། ཡློངས་གྲགས་མཚན། བསྡུས་གྲྭ་ར་ཚིག རིགས་ལམ་འཕྲུལ་གི་ལེ་མིག་ཞེས་བྱ་བ། རིགས་ལམ་འཕྲུལ་ལེ། བསྡུས་གྲྭ་རྣམ་བཞག་ལེགས་པར་བཤད་པ། (སད་ཆ།) ཀུན་མཁེན་བསྡུས་གྲྭ ཚད་མའི་དགློངས་འགྲེལ་གི་བསན་བཅློས་ཆེན་པློ་རྣམ་ བསེ་བསྡུས་གྲྭ འགྲེལ་གི་དློན་གཅིག་ཏུ་དྲིལ་བ་བློ་རབ་འབྲིང་ཐ་ གསུམ་དུ་སློན་པ་ལེགས་བཤད་ཆེན་པློ་མཁས་པའི་ མགུལ་རྒྱན་སྐལ་བཟང་རེ་བ་ཀུན་སྐློང་། (སད་ཆ།) འབའ་ལང་དཀློན་མཆློག་ཆློས་ རིགས་ལམ་ཐློར་བུའི་རྣམ་བཞག་བློ་གསལ་ངང་མློ་ འབའ་ལང་བསྡུས་གྲྭ འཕེལ་ འགུག་པའི་ལེགས་བཤད་པདྨའི་མཚོ་ཆེན་ཞེས་བྱ་བ། (སད་ཆ།) (འདི་ཟུར་ལྟ་ཙམ་ལས་ཡིག་ཆ་མིན) འཇམ་དབྱངས་ ཕློགས་ལྷ་ ཚད་མ་རྣམ་འགྲེལ་གི་བསྡུས་གཞུང་ཤེས་བྱའི་སློ་ རྭ་སློད་བསྡུས་གྲྭ 297 འློད་ཟེར། འབྱེད་རྒློལ་ངན་གང་པློ་འཇློམས་པ་གདློང་ལྔའི་གད་ རྒྱངས་རྒྱུ་རིག་ལེ་མིག (སད་ཆ།) ’jam dbyangs bzhad pa’i rdo rje, 1648-1721/22, P432. ngag dbang bkra shis, 1678-1738, P410. phyogs lha ’od zer, or mchog lha ’od zer, 1429-1500, P4752. 359 རྒྱ་གཞུང་། 3. རྟགས་རིགས་འཛིན་གྲྭ མཛད་པ་པློ། 298 སློབ་དཔློན་ཆློས་གྲགས་ གྲྭ་ཚང་གི་ཡིག་ཆ་ཁག དགེ་ལུགས་སི་གཞུང་ཁག རྒྱལ་ཚབ་དར་མ་རིན་ཆེན་ 298 299 300 301 302 སློབ་ཚན་ཕག་དཔེའ་ི མཚན། ཚད་མ་རྣམ་འགྲེལ་གི་ཚིག་ལེའུར་བྱས་པ།299 300 ཚད་མ་རྣམ་འགྲེལ་གི་ཚིག་ལེའུར་བྱས་པའི་རྣམ་བཤད་ ཐར་ལམ་ཕིན་ཅི་མ་ལློག་པར་གསལ་བར་བྱེད་པ། མཁས་གྲུབ་དགེ ་ལེགས་དཔལ་ ཚད་མ་རྣམ་འགྲེལ་གི་རྒྱ་ཆེར་བཤད་པ་རིགས་པའི་རྒྱ་ 301 བཟང་པློ་ མཚོ། 302 རྒྱལ་བ་དགེ་འདུན་གྲུབ། ཚད་མའི་བསན་བཅློས་ཆེན་པློ་རིགས་པའི་རྒྱན། མཁས་གྲུབ་དགེ་ལེགས་དཔལ་ ཚད་མ་སེ་བདུན་གི་རྒྱན་ཡིད་ཀྱི་མུན་སེལ། བཟང་པློ། རྒྱལ་བ་དགེ་འདུན་གྲུབ། ཚད་མ་རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ལེགས་པར་བཤད་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ཐམས་ ཅད་མཁེན་པ་དགེ་འདུན་གྲུབ་ཀྱིས་མཛད་པ་ལས་རང་ དློན་རེས་སུ་དཔག་པའི་ལེའུའི་རྣམ་བཤད། ཀུན་མཁེན་འཇམ་དབྱངས་ བཞད་པའི་རློ་རེ། ཡློངས་གྲགས་མཚན། རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ར་བ། རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ཐར་ལམ་ གསལ་བྱེད། རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ཊིཀ་ཆེན། ཚད་མ་རིགས་རྒྱན། ཚད་མ་སེ་བདུན། རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ཊིཀ་ཆུང་། ཚད་མ་རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ལེགས་པར་བཤད་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ཐམས་ ཅད་མཁེན་པ་དགེ་འདུན་གྲུབ་ཀྱིས་མཛད་པ་ལས་གཞན་ དློན་རེས་དཔག་གི་ལེའུའི་རྣམ་བཤད། རྟགས་རིགས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་བཞག་ཉུང་གསལ་ལེགས་བཤད་ རྟགས་རིགས་ཡིག་ཆ། གསེར་གི་ཕེང་མཛེས། Dharmakīrti, P6120. Title in Sanskrit: pramāṇavārttikakārikā rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen, 1364-1432, P65. mkhas grub dge legs dpal bzang, 1385-1438, P55. tA la’i bla ma sku ’phreng dang po dge ’dun grub pa, 1391-1474, P80. 360 ཀུན་མཁེན་འཇམ་དབྱངས་ བཞད་པའི་རློ་རེ། །ཚད་མ་རྣམ་འགྲེལ་གི་མཐའ་དཔྱློད་ཐར་ལམ་རབ་གསལ་ རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ཡིག་ཆ། ཚད་མའི་འློད་བརྒྱ་འབར་བ་ལས་ལེའུ་དང་པློའི་མཐའ་ དཔྱློད་བློ་གསལ་མགུལ་རྒྱན་སྐལ་བཟང་འཇུག་ངློགས། 361 བློ་རིག་འཛིན་གྲྭ དགེ་ལུགས་སི་གཞུང་ཁག རྒྱ་གཞུང་ 4. མཛད་པ་པློ། སློབ་དཔློན་ཆློས་གྲགས་ སློབ་ཚན་ཕག་དཔེའ་ི མཚན། 303 ཚད་མ་རྣམ་པར་ངེས་པ། ཡློངས་གྲགས་མཚན། ཚད་མ་རྣམ་ངེས། མཁས་གྲུབ་དགེ་ལེགས་ དཔལ་ བཟང་པློ། རྒྱལ་བ་དགེ་འདུན་གྲུབ། ཚད་མ་སེ་བདུན་གི་རྒྱན་ཡིད་ཀྱི་མུན་སེལ། ཚད་མ་སེ་བདུན། ཚད་མ་རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ལེགས་པར་བཤད་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ཐམས་ ཅད་མཁེན་པ་དགེ་འདུན་གྲུབ་ཀྱིས་མཛད་པ་ལས་ཚད་མ་ གྲུབ་པའི་ལེའུའི་རྣམ་བཤད། རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ཊིཀ་ཆུང་། གྲྭ་ཚང་གི་ཡིག་ཆ་ཁག ཀུན་མཁེན་འཇམ་དབྱངས་ བཞད་པའི་རློ་རེ། ཀུན་མཁེན་འཇམ་དབྱངས་ བཞད་པའི་རློ་རེ། དཀློན་མཆློག་འཇིགས་མེད་ 304 དབང་པློ། ཀུན་མཁེན་འཇམ་དབྱངས་ བཞད་པའི་རློ་རེ། ཀུན་མཁེན་འཇམ་དབྱངས་ བཞད་པའི་རློ་རེ། 303 304 ཚད་མ་རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ལེགས་པར་བཤད་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ཐམས་ ཅད་མཁེན་པ་དགེ་འདུན་གྲུབ་ཀྱིས་མཛད་པ་ལས་མངློན་ སུམ་ལེའུའི་རྣམ་བཤད། བློ་རིག་གི་རྣམ་གཞག་ཉུང་གསལ་ལེགས་བཤད་མཁས་པའི་ བློ་རིག་ཡིག་ཆ། མགུལ་རྒྱན། །ཚད་མ་རྣམ་འགྲེལ་གི་མཐའ་དཔྱློད་ཐར་ལམ་རབ་གསལ་ རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ཡིག་ཆ། ཚད་མའི་འློད་བརྒྱ་འབར་བ་ལས་ལེའུ་གཉིས་པ་དང། གསུམ་པའི་མཐའ་དཔྱློད་བློ་གསལ་མགུལ་རྒྱན་ སྐལ་བཟང་ འཇུག་ངློགས། གྲུབ་མཐའ་རྣམ་བཞག་རིན་པློ་ཆེའི་ཕེང་བ། གྲུབ་མཐའ་རིན་ཆེན་ འཕེང་བ། གྲུབ་མཐའི་རྣམ་པར་བཞག་པ་འཁྲུལ་སྤློང་གདློང་ལྔའི་ས་ གྲུབ་མཐའ་ར་བ། དབྱངས་ཀུན་མཁེན་ལམ་བཟང་གསལ་བའི་རིན་ཆེན་སློན་ མེ། གྲུབ་མཐའི་རྣམ་བཤད་རང་གཞན་གྲུབ་མཐའ་ཀུན་དང་ གྲུབ་མཐའ་ཆེན་མློ། ཟབ་དློན་མཆློག་ཏུ་གསལ་བ་ཀུན་བཟང་ཞིང་གི་ཉི་མ་ལུང་ རིགས་རྒྱ་མཚོ་སྐྱེ་དགུའི་རེ་བ་ཀུན་སྐློང་། Title in Sanskrit: pramāṇaviniścaya ’jam dbyangs bzhad pa sku ’phreng gnyis pa dkon mchog ’jigs med dbang po, 1728-1791, P169. 362 གྲྭ་ཚང་གི་ཡིག་ཆ་ཁག དགེ་ལུགས་སི་གཞུང་ཁག རྒྱ་གཞུང་ཁག 5. 305 དློན་བདུན་ཅུ་འཛིན་གྲྭ མཛད་པ་པློ། སློབ་ཚན་ཕག་དཔེའ་ི མཚན། གློང་གི་གྲུབ་མཐའ་ཁག་གི་སེམས་ཙམ་པ་དང་ཐལ་འགྱུར་པའི་སྐློར། ཡློངས་གྲགས་མཚན། རེ་ཙུན་བྱམས་པ་མགློན་པློ། མངློན་རྟློགས་རྒྱན་སྐབས་བརྒྱད་ཀ མངློན་རྟློགས་རྒྱན། སློབ་དཔློན་སེང་གེ་བཟང་པློ། འགྲེལ་པ་དློན་གསལ་གི་མཆློད་བརློད། འགྲེལ་པ་དློན་གསལ། རེ་ཙོང་ཁ་པ་བློ་བཟང་གྲགས་པ། ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རློལ་ཏུ་ཕིན་པའི་མན་ངག་གི་བསན་ ལེགས་བཤད་ བཅློས་མངློན་པར་རྟློགས་པའི་རྒྱན་འགྲེལ་པ་དང་ གསེར་ཕེང་། བཅས་པའི་རྒྱ་ཆེར་བཤད་པ་ལེགས་བཤད་གསེར་གི་ ཕེང་བ། (ཤིང་རྟ་སློལ་འབྱེད་ཀྱི་སྐློར།) དཀློན་མཆློ305ག་འཇིགས་མེད་ དབང་པློ་ ས་ལམ་གི་རྣམ་བཞག་ཐེག་གསུམ་མཛས་རྒྱན། ས་ལམ་ཡིག་ཆ། འཇམ་དབྱངས་བཞད་པའི་རློ་རེ་ དློན་དློན་བཅུའི་རྣམ་བཞག་ལེགས་པར་བཤད་པ་མི་ དློན་བདུན་ཅུ་ཡིག་ཆ། ཕམ་བ་མའི་ཞལ་ལུང་། ’jam dbyangs bzhad pa sku ’phreng gnyis pa dkon mchog ’jigs med dbang po, 1728-1791, P169. 363 6. གཞུང་འློག་འཛིན་གྲྭ དགེ་ལུགས་སི་གཞུང་ཁག རྒྱ་གཞུང་ཁག ཕར་ཕིན་དང་ལམ་རིམ་ཁག་གི་སྐྱེས་བུ་གསུམ་གི་རྣམ་གཞག་དང་། བྱམས་གཞུང་ནས་ཤེར་ཕིན་ཕར་ཕིན། མཛད་པ་པློ། སློབ་ཚན་ཕག་དཔེའ་ི མཚན། རེ་ཙུན་བྱམས་པ་མགློན་པློ། མངློན་རྟློགས་རྒྱན། (མཆློད་བརློད་དང་དགློངས་འབྲེལ་ངག།) སློབ་དཔློན་སེང་གེ་བཟང་ འགྲེལ་པ་དློན་གསལ། (མཆློད་བརློད་དང་དགློངས་འབྲེལ་ པློ། ངག།) 306 འཕགས་པ་རྣམ་གྲློལ་སེ། འཕགས་པ་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རློལ་ཏུ་ཕིན་པ་སློང་ཕག་ཉི་ཤུ་ ལྔ་པའི་མན་ངག་གི་བསན་བཅློས་མངློན་པར་རྟློགས་པའི་ རྒྱན་གི་འགྲེལ་པ། (མཆློད་བརློད་དང་དགློངས་འབྲེལ་ ངག།) སློབ་དཔློན་སེངེ་བཟང་ འཕགས་པ་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རློལ་ཏུ་ཕིན་པ་བརྒྱད་སློང་པའི་ 307 པློ། བཤད་པ། མངློན་པར་རྟློགས་པའི་རྒྱན་གི་སྣང་བ་ ཞེས་བྱ་ བ། (མཆློད་བརློད་དང་དགློངས་འབྲེལ་ངག།) རེ་ཙོང་ཁ་པ་ ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རློལ་ཏུ་ཕིན་པའི་མན་ངག་གི་བསན་བཅློས་ བློ་བཟང་གྲགས་པ། མངློན་པར་རྟློགས་པའི་རྒྱན་འགྲེལ་པ་དང་བཅས་པའི་རྒྱ་ ཆེར་བཤད་པ་ལེགས་བཤད་གསེར་གི་ཕེང་བ། (བྱམས་ གཞུང་ནས་ཤེར་ཕིན་ཕར་ཕིན་བར་དང་། དགེ་འདུན་ཉི་ ཤུའི་སྐློར།) རྒྱལ་ཚབ་ ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རློལ་ཏུ་ཕིན་པའི་མན་ངག་གི་བསན་བཅློས་ དར་མ་རིན་ཆེན། མངློན་པར་རྟློགས་པའི་རྒྱན་གི་འགྲེལ་པ་དློན་གསལ་བའི་ རྣམ་བཤད་སྙིང་པློ་རྒྱན། (བྱམས་གཞུང་ནས་ཤེར་ཕིན་ཕར་ཕིན་བར་དང་། དགེ་ འདུན་ཉི་ཤུའི་སྐློར།) མཁས་གྲུབ་དགེ་ལེགས་ འགྲེལ་པ་དློན་གསལ་གི་རྣམ་བཤད་རྟློགས་དཀའི་སྣང་བ། དཔལ་བཟང་པློ། (བྱམས་གཞུང་ནས་ཤེར་ཕིན་ཕར་ཕིན་བར་དང་། དགེ་ འདུན་ཉི་ཤུའི་སྐློར།) རེ་ཙོང་ཁ་པ་ ཙོང་ཁ་པ་ཆེན་པློས་མཛད་པའི་བྱང་ཆུབ་ལམ་རིམ་ཆེ་བ། བློ་བཟང་གྲགས་པ། (དགག་བྱ་ཁབ་ཆེ་ཆུང་གི་སྐློར།) རེ་ཙོང་ཁ་པ་ བློ་བཟང་གྲགས་པ། 306 307 Āryavimuktasena. Haribhadra. ཞུགས་པ་དང་གནས་པའི་སྐྱེས་བུ་ཆེན་པློ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་ པར་བཞག་པ་བློ་གསལ་བགྲློད་པའི་ཐེམ་སྐས། ཡློངས་གྲགས་མཚན། མངློན་རྟློགས་རྒྱན། འགྲེལ་པ་དློན་གསལ། ཉི་སྣང། རྒྱན་སྣང་བ། ལེགས་བཤད་ གསེར་ཕེང་། རྣམ་བཤད། ཡང་ན་རྣམ་ བཤད་སྙིང་པློ་རྒྱན། རྟློགས་དཀའི་སྣང་བ། ལམ་རིམ་ཆེན་མློ། ཡང་ན་ བྱང་ཆུབ་ལམ་རིམ་ཆེན་མློ། བློ་གསལ་བགྲློད་པའི་ཐེམ་ སྐས། གྲྭ་ཚང་གི་ཡིག་ཆ་ཁག 364 ཀུན་མཁེན་འཇམ་ བསན་གཅློས་མངློན་པར་རྟློགས་པའི་རྒྱན་གི་མཐའ་དཔྱློད་ དབྱངས་བཞད་པའི་རློ་རེ། ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རློལ་ཏུ་ཕིན་པའི་དློན་ཀུན་གསལ་བའི་རིན་ ཆེན་སློན་མེ (བྱམས་གཞུང་ནས་ཤེར་ཕིན་ཕར་ཕིན་བར།) གུང་ཐང་དཀློན་མཆློག་ ཕར་ཕིན་སྐབས་དང་པློའི་མཐའ་དཔྱློད་ཀྱི་མཆན་འགྲེལ་ བསན་པའི་སློན་མེ་ རློམ་འཕློ། (བྱམས་གཞུང་ནས་ཤེར་ཕིན་ཕར་ཕིན་བར།) གུང་རུ་ཆློས་ཀྱི་འབྱུང་ ཀུན་མཁེན་ཆློས་འབྱུང་གནས་ཀྱི་གསུང་རྒྱུན་དྲི་མ་མེད་པ་ གནས་ བུང་བའི་དགའ་སློན་དགེ་འདུན་ཉི་ཤུའི་རྣམ་གཞག ཕར་ཕིན་ཡིག་ཆ། ཕར་ཕིན་མཆན། དགེ་འདུན་གཉིས་ཤུའི་ ཡིག་ཆ། 365 7. གཞུང་གློང་འཛིན་གྲྭ མཛད་པ་པློ། རེ་ཙུན་བྱམས་པ་མགློན་པློ། རྒྱ་གཞུང་ཁག སློབ་དཔློན་སེང་གེ་བཟང་པློ། འཕགས་པ་རྣམ་གྲློལ་སེ།308 སློབ་དཔློན་སེངེ་བཟང་པློ། དགེ་ལུགས་སི་གཞུང་ཁག རེ་ཙོང་ཁ་པ་ བློ་བཟང་གྲགས་པ། རྒྱལ་ཚབ་ དར་མ་རིན་ཆེན། མཁས་གྲུབ་དགེ་ལེགས་ དཔལ་བཟང་པློ། རེ་ཙོང་ཁ་པ་ བློ་བཟང་གྲགས་པ། རེ་ཙོང་ཁ་པ་ བློ་བཟང་གྲགས་པ། 308 309 Āryavimuktasena. Haribhadra. 309 སློབ་ཚན་ཕག་དཔེའ་ི མཚན། མངློན་རྟློགས་རྒྱན། (སྐབས་དང་པློ་སེམས་བསྐྱེད་ནས་ཡློངས་འཛིན་བར།) འགྲེལ་པ་དློན་གསལ། (སྐབས་དང་པློ་སེམས་བསྐྱེད་ ནས་ཡློངས་འཛིན་བར།) འཕགས་པ་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རློལ་ཏུ་ཕིན་པ་སློང་ཕག་ཉི་ ཤུ་ལྔ་པའི་མན་ངག་གི་བསན་བཅློས་མངློན་པར་རྟློགས་ པའི་རྒྱན་གི་འགྲེལ་པ། (སྐབས་དང་པློ་སེམས་བསྐྱེད་ ནས་ཡློངས་འཛིན་བར།) འཕགས་པ་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རློལ་ཏུ་ཕིན་པ་བརྒྱད་སློང་ པའི་བཤད་པ། མངློན་པར་རྟློགས་པའི་རྒྱན་གི་སྣང་བ་ ཞེས་བྱ་བ། (སྐབས་དང་པློ་སེམས་བསྐྱེད་ནས་ཡློངས་ འཛིན་བར།) ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རློལ་ཏུ་ཕིན་པའི་མན་ངག་གི་བསན་ བཅློས་མངློན་པར་རྟློགས་པའི་རྒྱན་འགྲེལ་པ་དང་ བཅས་པའི་རྒྱ་ཆེར་བཤད་པ་ལེགས་བཤད་གསེར་གི་ ཕེང་བ། (སྐབས་དང་པློ་སེམས་བསྐྱེད་ནས་ཡློངས་ འཛིན་བར།) ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རློལ་ཏུ་ཕིན་པའི་མན་ངག་གི་བསན་ བཅློས་མངློན་པར་རྟློགས་པའི་རྒྱན་གི་འགྲེལ་པ་དློན་ གསལ་བའི་རྣམ་བཤད་སྙིང་པློ་རྒྱན། (སྐབས་དང་པློ་སེམས་བསྐྱེད་ནས་ཡློངས་འཛིན་བར།) འགྲེལ་པ་དློན་གསལ་གི་རྣམ་བཤད་རྟློགས་དཀའི་སྣང་ བ། (སྐབས་དང་པློ་སེམས་བསྐྱེད་ནས་ཡློངས་འཛིན་ བར།) ཡིད་དང་ཀུན་གཞིའི་དཀའ་བའི་གནས་ཀྱི་ར་བ། ཡློངས་གྲགས་མཚན། མངློན་རྟློགས་རྒྱན། འགྲེལ་པ་དློན་གསལ། ཉི་སྣང། རྒྱན་སྣང་བ། ལེགས་བཤད་ གསེར་ཕེང་། རྣམ་བཤད། ཡང་ན་རྣམ་ བཤད་སྙིང་པློ་རྒྱན། རྟློགས་དཀའི་སྣང་བ། ཀུན་གཞི་ར་བ། ཡིད་དང་ཀུན་གཞིའི་དཀའ་བའི་གནས་རྒྱ་ཆེར་འགྲེལ་ ཀུན་གཞི་དཀའ་འགྲེལ། པ། 366 གྲྭ་ཚང་གི་ཡིག་ཆ་ཁག ཀུན་མཁེན་འཇམ་དབྱངས་ བཞད་པའི་རློ་རེ། གུང་ཐང་དཀློན་མཆློག་ བསན་པའི་སློན་མེ་ ཀུན་མཁེན་འཇམ་དབྱངས་ བཞད་པའི་རློ་རེ། གུང་ཐང་དཀློན་མཆློག་ བསན་པའི་སློན་མེ་ གུང་ཐང་དཀློན་མཆློག་ བསན་པའི་སློན་མེ་ བསན་གཅློས་མངློན་པར་རྟློགས་པའི་རྒྱན་གི་མཐའ་ དཔྱློད་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རློལ་ཏུ་ཕིན་པའི་དློན་ཀུན་ གསལ་བའི་རིན་ཆེན་སློན་མེ། (སྐབས་དང་པློ་སེམས་བསྐྱེད་ནས་ཡློངས་འཛིན་བར།) ཕར་ཕིན་སྐབས་དང་པློའི་མཐའ་དཔྱློད་ཀྱི་མཆན་ འགྲེལ་རློམ་འཕློ། རྟེན་འགྲེལ་གི་རྣམ་བཞག་ལུང་རིགས་གཏེར་མཛོད། ཕར་ཕིན་ཡིག་ཆ། ཕར་ཕིན་མཆན། རྟེན་འབྲེལ་ལུང་རིགས་ གཏེར་མཛོད། རྟེན་འགྲེལ་གི་རྣམ་བཞག་ལུང་རིགས་བང་མཛོད། རྟེན་འབྲེལ་ལུང་རིགས་ བང་མཛོད། ཡིད་དང་ཀུན་གཞིའི་དཀའ་གནས་རྣམ་པར་བཤད་པ་ ཀུན་གཞི་ཡིག་ཆ། མཁས་པའི་འཇུག་ངློགས། 367 8. སྐབས་དང་པློ་འཛིན་གྲྭཕར་ཕིན་རིགས་ནས་སྐབས་དང་པློའ་ི མཇུག་བར། : མཛད་པ་པློ། རེ་ཙུན་བྱམས་པ་མགློན་པློ། སློབ་དཔློན་སེང་གེ་བཟང་པློ། རྒྱ་གཞུང་ཁག འཕགས་པ་རྣམ་གྲློལ་སེ།310 སློབ་དཔློན་སེངེ་བཟང་པློ། 311 རེ་ཙུན་བྱམས་པ་མགློན་པློ། ཞི་བ་ལྷ་ དགེ་ལུགས་སི་གཞུང་ཁག རེ་ཙོང་ཁ་པ་ བློ་བཟང་གྲགས་པ། རྒྱལ་ཚབ་ དར་མ་རིན་ཆེན། མཁས་གྲུབ་དགེ་ལེགས་ དཔལ་བཟང་པློ། 310 311 312 313 སློབ་ཚན་ཕག་དཔེའ་ི མཚན། མངློན་རྟློགས་རྒྱན། (སྐབས་དང་པློ། རིགས་ནས་ངེས་འབྱུང་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ བར།) འགྲེལ་པ་དློན་གསལ།(སྐབས་དང་པློ། རིགས་ནས་ངེས་ འབྱུང་སྒྲུབ་པའི་བར།) འཕགས་པ་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རློལ་ཏུ་ཕིན་པ་སློང་ཕག་ ཉི་ཤུ་ལྔ་པའི་མན་ངག་གི་བསན་བཅློས་མངློན་པར་ རྟློགས་པའི་རྒྱན་གི་འགྲེལ་པ། (སྐབས་དང་པློ། རིགས་ ནས་ངེས་འབྱུང་སྒྲུབ་པའི་བར།) འཕགས་པ་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རློལ་ཏུ་ཕིན་པ་བརྒྱད་སློང་ པའི་བཤད་པ། མངློན་པར་རྟློགས་པའི་རྒྱན་གི་སྣང་བ་ ཞེས་བྱ་བ། (སྐབས་དང་པློ། རིགས་ནས་ངེས་འབྱུང་ སྒྲུབ་པའི་བར།) 312 ཐེག་པ་ཆེན་པློ་རྒྱུད་བ་མའི་བསན་བཅློས། (རིགས་ ཀྱི་སྐློར།) 313 བྱང་ཆུབ་སེམས་དཔའི་སློད་པ་ལ་འཇུག་པ། (སེམས་བསྐྱེད་ཀྱི་སྐློར།) ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རློལ་ཏུ་ཕིན་པའི་མན་ངག་གི་བསན་ བཅློས་མངློན་པར་རྟློགས་པའི་རྒྱན་འགྲེལ་པ་དང་ བཅས་པའི་རྒྱ་ཆེར་བཤད་པ་ལེགས་བཤད་གསེར་གི་ ཕེང་བ། (སྐབས་དང་པློ། རིགས་ནས་ངེས་འབྱུང་སྒྲུབ་ པའི་བར།) ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རློལ་ཏུ་ཕིན་པའི་མན་ངག་གི་བསན་ བཅློས་མངློན་པར་རྟློགས་པའི་རྒྱན་གི་འགྲེལ་པ་དློན་ གསལ་བའི་རྣམ་བཤད་སྙིང་པློ་རྒྱན། (སྐབས་དང་པློ། རིགས་ནས་ངེས་འབྱུང་སྒྲུབ་པའི་བར།) འགྲེལ་པ་དློན་གསལ་གི་རྣམ་བཤད་རྟློགས་དཀའི་ སྣང་བ། (སྐབས་དང་པློ། རིགས་ནས་ངེས་འབྱུང་སྒྲུབ་ Āryavimuktasena. Haribhadra. Title in Sanskrit: mahāyānottaratantraśāstra; uttaratantra. Title in Sanskrit: bodhi[sattva]caryāvatāra. ཡློངས་གྲགས་མཚན། མངློན་རྟློགས་རྒྱན། འགྲེལ་པ་དློན་གསལ། ཉི་སྣང། རྒྱན་སྣང་བ། རྒྱུད་བ་མ། སློད་འཇུག ལེགས་བཤད་ གསེར་ཕེང་། རྣམ་བཤད། ཡང་ན་རྣམ་ བཤད་སྙིང་པློ་རྒྱན། རྟློགས་དཀའི་སྣང་བ། 368 པའི་བར།) རེ་ཙོང་ཁ་པ་ བློ་བཟང་གྲགས་པ། བྱང་ཆུབ་སེམས་དཔའི་ཚུལ་ཁིམས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་བཤད་ བྱང་ཆུབ་གཞུག་ལམ། བྱང་ཆུབ་གཞུག་ལམ། རེ་ཙོང་ཁ་པ་ བློ་བཟང་གྲགས་པ། དྲང་བ་དང་ངེས་པའི་དློན་རྣམ་པར་ཕེ་བའི་བསན་ བཅློས་ལེགས་བཤད་སྙིང་པློ། (སེམས་ཙམ་པའི་སྐློར།) ལེགས་བཤད་སྙིང་པློ། རྒྱལ་བ་དགེ་འདུན་རྒྱ་མཚོ། རེ་བཙུན་ཐམས་ཅད་མཁེན་པའི་གསུང་འབུམ་ལས་ དྲང་ངེས་རྣམ་འབྱེད་ཀྱི་དཀའ་འགྲེལ་དློངས་པའི་ དློན་རབ་ཏུ་གསལ་བར་བྱེད་པའི་སློན་མེ། (སེམས་ ཙམ་པའི་སྐློར།) ཐེག་པ་ཆེན་པློ་རྒྱུད་བ་མའི་ཊི་ཀྐ། (རིགས་ཀྱི་སྐློར།) ༸རྒྱལ་བ་དགེ་འདུན་རྒྱ་ མཚོའི་དྲང་ངེས། བསན་གཅློས་མངློན་པར་རྟློགས་པའི་རྒྱན་གི་མཐའ་ དཔྱློད་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རློལ་ཏུ་ཕིན་པའི་དློན་ཀུན་ གསལ་བའི་རིན་ཆེན་སློན་མེ། (སྐབས་དང་པློ། རིགས་ ནས་ངེས་འབྱུང་སྒྲུབ་པའི་བར།) ཕར་ཕིན་སྐབས་དང་པློའི་མཐའ་དཔྱློད་ཀྱི་མཆན་ འགྲེལ་རློམ་འཕློ། དྲང་བ་དང་ངེས་པའི་དློན་རྣམ་པར་འབྱེད་པའི་ མཐའ་དཔྱློད་འཁྲུལ་བྲལ་ལུང་རིགས་བཻ་དཱུར་དཀར་ པའི་གན་མཛོད་སྐལ་བཟང་རེ་བ་ཀུན་སྐློང་། དྲང་ངེས་རྣམ་འབྱེད་ཀྱི་དཀའ་འགྲེལ་རློམ་འཕློ་ ལེགས་བཤད་སྙིང་པློའི་ཡང་སྙིང་། ལེགས་བཤད་སྙིང་པློ་ལས་སེམས་ཙམ་གི་སྐློར་གི་ མཆན་འགྲེལ་རློམ་འཕློ། ཕར་ཕིན་ཡིག་ཆ། རྒྱལ་ཚབ་དར་མ་རིན་ཆེན། གྲྭ་ཚང་གི་ཡིག་ཆ་ཁག ཀུན་མཁེན་འཇམ་དབྱངས་ བཞད་པའི་རློ་རེ། གུང་ཐང་དཀློན་མཆློ314ག་ བསན་པའི་སློན་མེ་ ཀུན་མཁེན་འཇམ་དབྱངས་ བཞད་པའི་རློ་རེ། གུང་ཐང་དཀློན་མཆློག་ བསན་པའི་སློན་མེ་ གུང་ཐང་དཀློན་མཆློག་ བསན་པའི་སློན་མེ་ 314 རྒྱུད་བ་དར་ཊིཀ། ཕར་ཕིན་མཆན། དྲང་ངེས་ཆེན་མློ། དྲང་ངེས་དཀའ་འགྲེལ། དྲང་ངེས་མཆན། gung thang sku ’phreng gsum pa dkon mchog bstan pa’i sgron me, 1762-1823, P298. 369 9. བསམ་གཟུགས་འཛིན་གྲྭ གྲྭ་ཚང་གི་ཡིག་ཆ་ཁག དགེ་ལུགས་སི་གཞུང་ཁག རྒྱ་གཞུང་ཁག མཛད་པ་པློ། རེ་ཙུན་བྱམས་པ་མགློན་པློ། 315 316 སློབ་ཚན་ཕག་དཔེའ་ི མཚན། མངློན་རྟློགས་རྒྱན།(སྐབས་གཉིས་པ་དངགསུམ་པ། ལྔ་པ་ ནས་བརྒྱད་པའི་བར།) སློབ་དཔློན་སེང་གེ་བཟང་པློ། འགྲེལ་པ་དློན་གསལ།(སྐབས་གཉིས་པ་དངགསུམ་པ། ལྔ་པ་ ནས་བརྒྱད་པའི་བར།) 315 འཕགས་པ་རྣམ་གྲློལ་སེ། འཕགས་པ་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རློལ་ཏུ་ཕིན་པ་སློང་ཕག་ཉི་ཤུ་ལྔ་ པའི་མན་ངག་གི་བསན་བཅློས་མངློན་པར་རྟློགས་པའི་རྒྱན་ གི་འགྲེལ་པ།(སྐབས་གཉིས་པ་དངགསུམ་པ། ལྔ་པ་ནས་ བརྒྱད་པའི་བར།) 316 སློབ་དཔློན་སེངེ་བཟང་པློ། འཕགས་པ་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རློལ་ཏུ་ཕིན་པ་བརྒྱད་སློང་པའི་ བཤད་པ། མངློན་པར་རྟློགས་པའི་རྒྱན་གི་སྣང་བ་ ཞེས་བྱ་བ། (སྐབས་གཉིས་པ་དངགསུམ་པ། ལྔ་པ་ནས་བརྒྱད་པའི་བར།) རེ་ཙོང་ཁ་པ་ ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རློལ་ཏུ་ཕིན་པའི་མན་ངག་གི་བསན་བཅློས་ བློ་བཟང་གྲགས་པ། མངློན་པར་རྟློགས་པའི་རྒྱན་འགྲེལ་པ་དང་བཅས་པའི་རྒྱ་ ཆེར་བཤད་པ་ལེགས་བཤད་གསེར་གི་ཕེང་བ། (སྐབས་གཉིས་ པ་དངགསུམ་པ། ལྔ་པ་ནས་བརྒྱད་པའི་བར།) རྒྱལ་ཚབ་ ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རློལ་ཏུ་ཕིན་པའི་མན་ངག་གི་བསན་བཅློས་ དར་མ་རིན་ཆེན། མངློན་པར་རྟློགས་པའི་རྒྱན་གི་འགྲེལ་པ་དློན་གསལ་བའི་ རྣམ་བཤད་སྙིང་པློ་རྒྱན། (སྐབས་གཉིས་པ་དངགསུམ་པ། ལྔ་ པ་ནས་བརྒྱད་པའི་བར།) མཁས་གྲུབ་དགེ་ལེགས་ འགྲེལ་པ་དློན་གསལ་གི་རྣམ་བཤད་རྟློགས་དཀའི་སྣང་བ། དཔལ་བཟང་པློ། (སྐབས་གཉིས་པ་དངགསུམ་པ། ལྔ་པ་ནས་བརྒྱད་པའི་བར།) ཡློངས་གྲགས་མཚན། མངློན་རྟློགས་རྒྱན། འགྲེལ་པ་དློན་གསལ། ཉི་སྣང། རྒྱན་སྣང་བ། ལེགས་བཤད་ གསེར་ཕེང་། རྣམ་བཤད། ཡང་ན་ རྣམ་བཤད་སྙིང་པློ་རྒྱན། རྟློགས་དཀའི་སྣང་བ། ཀུན་མཁེན་འཇམ་དབྱངས་ བཞད་པའི་རློ་རེ། བསན་གཅློས་མངློན་པར་རྟློགས་པའི་རྒྱན་གི་མཐའ་ དཔྱློད་ ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རློལ་ཏུ་ཕིན་པའི་དློན་ཀུན་ གསལ་བའི་རིན་ ཆེན་སློན་མེ། (སྐབས་གཉིས་པ་དངགསུམ་པ། ལྔ་པ་ནས་ བརྒྱད་པའི་བར།) ཕར་ཕིན་ཡིག་ཆ། གུང་ཐང་དཀློན་མཆློག་ བསན་པའི་སློན་མེ་ གྲེལ་པ་དློན་གསལ་གི་སེང་ནས་རྒྱས་འབྲིང་བསྡུས་གསུམ་ མངློན་རྟློགས་རྒྱན་ར་འགྲེལ་སློགས་མདློ་རྒྱན་སྦྱར་བའི་ གཟབ་བཤད་ཀྱི་ཟིན་བྲིས འགྲེལ་པ་ཟིན་བྲིས Āryavimuktasena. Haribhadra. 370 འཇམ་དབྱངས་བཞད་པའི་ རློ་རེ་ དཀློན་མཆློག་ འཇིགས་མེད་དབང་པློ་ བསམ་གཟུགས་ཀྱི་སྙློམས་འཇུག་རྣམས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པར་ བཞག་ པའི་བསན་བཅློས་ཐུབ་བསན་མཛེས་རྒྱན་ལུང་དང་རིགས་ པའི་རྒྱ་མཚོ་སྐལ་བཟང་དགའ་བྱེད། བསམ་གཟུགས་ཆེན་མློ་ལས་མདློར་བསྡུས་ཏེ་བཀློད་ པ་ བསམ་གཟུགས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་བཞག་ལེགས་བཤད་བུམ་ བཟང་། བསམ་གཟུགས་ཆེན་མློ། བསམ་གཟུགས་ ལེགས་བཤད་བུམ་ བཟང་། 371 རྒྱ་གཞུང་ཁག 10. ཕར་ཕིན་འཛིན་གྲྭ སྐབས་བཞི་པ། : མཛད་པ་པློ། རེ་ཙུན་བྱམས་པ་མགློན་པློ། སློབ་དཔློན་སེང་གེ་བཟང་པློ། འཕགས་པ་རྣམ་གྲློལ་སེ།317 སློབ་དཔློན་སེངེ་བཟང་པློ།318 གྲྭ་ཚང་གི་ཡིག་ཆ་ཁག དགེ་ལུགས་སི་གཞུང་ཁག རེ་ཙོང་ཁ་པ་ བློ་བཟང་གྲགས་པ། 317 318 རྒྱལ་ཚབ་ དར་མ་རིན་ཆེན། མཁས་གྲུབ་དགེ་ལེགས་ དཔལ་བཟང་པློ། ཀུན་མཁེན་འཇམ་དབྱངས་ བཞད་པའི་རློ་རེ། གུང་ཐང་དཀློན་མཆློག་ བསན་པའི་སློན་མེ་ གུང་ཐང་དཀློན་མཆློག་ བསན་པའི་སློན་མེ། Āryavimuktasena. Haribhadra. སློབ་ཚན་ཕག་དཔེའ་ི མཚན། མངློན་རྟློགས་རྒྱན།(སྐབས་བཞི་པ་ཆ་ཚང་) འགྲེལ་པ་དློན་གསལ།(སྐབས་བཞི་པ་ཆ་ཚང་) འཕགས་པ་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རློལ་ཏུ་ཕིན་པ་སློང་ཕག་ ཉི་ཤུ་ལྔ་པའི་མན་ངག་གི་བསན་བཅློས་མངློན་པར་ རྟློགས་པའི་རྒྱན་གི་འགྲེལ་པ། (སྐབས་བཞི་པ།) འཕགས་པ་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རློལ་ཏུ་ཕིན་པ་བརྒྱད་སློང་ པའི་བཤད་པ། མངློན་པར་རྟློགས་པའི་རྒྱན་གི་སྣང་བ་ ཞེས་བྱ་བ། (སྐབས་བཞི་པ།) ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རློལ་ཏུ་ཕིན་པའི་མན་ངག་གི་བསན་ བཅློས་མངློན་པར་རྟློགས་པའི་རྒྱན་འགྲེལ་པ་དང་ བཅས་པའི་རྒྱ་ཆེར་བཤད་པ་ལེགས་བཤད་གསེར་གི་ ཕེང་བ། (སྐབས་བཞི་པ་ཆ་ཚང་) ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རློལ་ཏུ་ཕིན་པའི་མན་ངག་གི་བསན་ བཅློས་མངློན་པར་རྟློགས་པའི་རྒྱན་གི་འགྲེལ་པ་དློན་ གསལ་བའི་རྣམ་བཤད་སྙིང་པློ་རྒྱན། (སྐབས་བཞི་པ་ ཆ་ཚང་) འགྲེལ་པ་དློན་གསལ་གི་རྣམ་བཤད་རྟློགས་དཀའི་ སྣང་བ། (སྐབས་བཞི་པ་ཆ་ཚང་) ཡློངས་གྲགས་མཚན། མངློན་རྟློགས་རྒྱན། འགྲེལ་པ་དློན་གསལ། ཉི་སྣང། རྒྱན་སྣང་བ། ལེགས་བཤད་ གསེར་ཕེང་། རྣམ་བཤད། ཡང་ན་རྣམ་ བཤད་སྙིང་པློ་རྒྱན། རྟློགས་དཀའི་སྣང་བ། བསན་གཅློས་མངློན་པར་རྟློགས་པའི་རྒྱན་གི་མཐའ་ ཕར་ཕིན་ཡིག་ཆ། དཔྱློད་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རློལ་ཏུ་ཕིན་པའི་དློན་ཀུན་ གསལ་བའི་རིན་ཆེན་སློན་མེ། (སྐབས་བཞི་པ་ཆ་ཚང་) སྐབས་བཞི་པའི་བསྡུས་དློན་རྒྱལ་མཁན་པློ་གྲགས་པ་ སྐབས་བཞི་པའི་སློམ། རྒྱལ་མཚན་ལ་གནང་བ། གྲེལ་པ་དློན་གསལ་གི་སེང་ནས་རྒྱས་འབྲིང་བསྡུས་ འགྲེལ་པ་ཟིན་བྲིས གསུམ་མངློན་རྟློགས་རྒྱན་ར་འགྲེལ་སློགས་མདློ་རྒྱན་ སྦྱར་བའི་གཟབ་བཤད་ཀྱི་ཟིན་བྲིས 372 11. དབུ་གསར་འཛིན་གྲྭ མཛད་པ་པློ། 319 སློབ་དཔློན་ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་ སློབ་ཚན་ཕག་དཔེའ་ི མཚན། དབུ་མ་ར་བའི་ཤེས་རབ་ཚིག་ལེའུར་བྱས་པ་ཤེས་རབ་ དང་། (རབ་འབྱེད་དང་པློ།) 320 དབུ་མ་ལ་འཇུག་པ་ དང་། དབུ་མ་ལ་འཇུག་པའི་ 321 བཤད་པ། (བདེན་གཉིས་བར།) དབུ་མ་ར་བའི་འགྲེལ་པ་བུདྡྷ་པཱ་ལི་ཏ། (རབ་འབྱེད་ དང་པློ།) དབུ་མའི་ར་བའི་འགྲེལ་པ་ཤེས་རབ་སློན་མེ། (རབ་ འབྱེད་དང་པློ།) 323 དབུ་མ་ར་བའི་འགྲེལ་པ་ཚིག་གསལ་བ། (རབ་ འབྱེད་དང་པློ།) དབུ་མ་ལ་འཇུག་པའི་རྣམ་བཤད་དགློངས་པ་རབ་ གསལ། (བདེན་གཉིས་བར།) དབུ་མ་ར་བའི་ཚིག་ལེའུར་བྱས་པ་ཤེས་རབ་ཅེས་བྱ་ བའི་རྣམ་བཤད་རིགས་པའི་རྒྱ་མཚོ། (རབ་འབྱེད་དང་ པློ།) ལྷག་མཐློང་ཆེན་མློ། ཡློངས་གྲགས་མཚན། དབུ་མ་ར་ཤེས། རེ་ཙོང་ཁ་པ་བློ་བཟང་གྲགས་པ། དྲང་ངེས་ལེགས་བཤད་སྙིང་པློ། (དབུ་མའི་སྐློར་) ལེགས་བཤད་སྙིང་པློ། རྒྱལ་བ་དགེ་འདུན་གྲུབ། དབུ་མ་ལ་འཇུག་པའི་དགློངས་པ་རབ་ཏུ་གསལ་བའི་ འཇུག་ཊིཀ་གསལ་བའི་ མེ་ལློང་། (བདེན་གཉིས་བར།) མེ་ལློང་། ཀུན་མཁེན་འཇམ་དབྱངས་ བཞད་པའི་རློ་རེ། དབུ་མ་འཇུག་པའི་མཐའ་དཔྱློད་ལུང་རིགས་གཏེར་ མཛོད་ཟབ་དློན་ཀུན་གསལ་སྐལ་བཟང་འཇུག་ངློག (བདེན་གཉིས་བར།) དབུ་མ་ལ་འཇུག་པའི་མཐའ་དཔྱློད་ལུང་རིགས་སློན་ མེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་འཇམ་དབྱངས་བཞད་པའི་རློ་རེའི་ གསུང་རྒྱུན། (བདེན་གཉིས་བར།) རྒྱ་གཞུང་ཁག སློབ་དཔློན་ཟླ་བ་གྲགས་པ་ སངས་རྒྱས་སྐྱང་ ལེགས་ལན་འབྱེད་ གྲྭ་ཚང་གི་ཡིག་ཆ་ཁག དགེ་ལུགས་སི་གཞུང་ཁག སློབ་དཔློན་ཟླ་བ་གྲགས་པ་ 319 320 321 322 323 322 རེ་ཙོང་ཁ་པ་ བློ་བཟང་གྲགས་པ། རེ་ཙོང་ཁ་པ་ བློ་བཟང་གྲགས་པ། རེ་ཙོང་ཁ་པ་ བློ་བཟང་གྲགས་པ། དཀློན་མཆློག་འཇིགས་མེད་ དབང་པློ་ Nāgārjuna. Title in Sanskrit: madhyamakāvatāra Title in Sanskrit: madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya. Candrakīrti. Title in Sanskrit: prasannapadā དབུ་མ་འཇུག་པ་ར་བ་ དང་རང་འགྲེལ། བུདྡྷ་པཱ་ལི་ཏ། ཤེས་རབ་སློན་མེ། དབུ་མ་ཚིག་གསལ། དབུ་མ་དགློངས་པ་རབ་ གསལ། ར་ཤེས་ཊིཀ་ཆེན། ལམ་རིམ་ལྷག་མཐློང་ ཆེན་མློ། དབུ་མ་ཆེན་མློ། དབུ་མ་ལུང་རིགས་སློན་ མེ། 373 374 དབུ་རིང་འཛིན་གྲྭགློང་གསལ་གཞུང་ཚན་ཁག་གི་སད་ཆ། 12. མཛད་པ་པློ། 324 སློབ་དཔློན་ཀླུ་སྒྲུབ་ སློབ་ཚན་ཕག་དཔེའ་ི མཚན། དབུ་མ་ར་བའི་ཤེས་རབ་ཚིག་ལེའུར་བྱས་པ་ཤེས་རབ་ དང་། 325 དབུ་མ་ལ་འཇུག་པ་ དང་། དབུ་མ་ལ་འཇུག་པའི་ 326 བཤད་པ། (སད་ཆ།) དབུ་མ་ར་བའི་འགྲེལ་པ་བུདྡྷ་པཱ་ལི་ཏ། དབུ་མའི་ར་བའི་འགྲེལ་པ་ཤེས་རབ་སློན་མེ། 328 དབུ་མ་ར་བའི་འགྲེལ་པ་ཚིག་གསལ་བ། དབུ་མ་ལ་འཇུག་པའི་རྣམ་བཤད་དགློངས་པ་རབ་ གསལ། (སད་ཆ།) དབུ་མ་ར་བའི་ཚིག་ལེའུར་བྱས་པ་ཤེས་རབ་ཅེས་བྱ་ བའི་རྣམ་བཤད་རིགས་པའི་རྒྱ་མཚོ། ལྷག་མཐློང་ཆེན་མློ། ཡློངས་གྲགས་མཚན། དབུ་མ་ར་ཤེས། རེ་ཙོང་ཁ་པ་བློ་བཟང་གྲགས་པ། དྲང་ངེས་ལེགས་བཤད་སྙིང་པློ། (དབུ་མའི་སྐློར་) ལེགས་བཤད་སྙིང་པློ། རྒྱལ་བ་དགེ་འདུན་གྲུབ། དབུ་མ་ལ་འཇུག་པའི་དགློངས་པ་རབ་ཏུ་གསལ་བའི་ འཇུག་ཊིཀ་གསལ་བའི་ མེ་ལློང་། (སད་ཆ།) མེ་ལློང་། ཀུན་མཁེན་འཇམ་དབྱངས་ བཞད་པའི་རློ་རེ། དབུ་མ་འཇུག་པའི་མཐའ་དཔྱློད་ལུང་རིགས་གཏེར་ མཛོད་ཟབ་དློན་ཀུན་གསལ་སྐལ་བཟང་འཇུག་ངློག (སད་ཆ།) དབུ་མ་ལ་འཇུག་པའི་མཐའ་དཔྱློད་ལུང་རིགས་སློན་ མེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་འཇམ་དབྱངས་བཞད་པའི་རློ་རེའི་ གསུང་རྒྱུན། (སད་ཆ།) གྲྭ་ཚང་གི་ཡིག་ཆ་ཁག དགེ་ལུགས་སི་གཞུང་ཁག རྒྱ་གཞུང་ཁག a 324 325 326 327 328 སློབ་དཔློན་ཟླ་བ་གྲགས་པ་ སངས་རྒྱས་སྐྱང་ ལེགས་ལན་འབྱེད་ 327 སློབ་དཔློན་ཟླ་བ་གྲགས་པ་ རེ་ཙོང་ཁ་པ་ བློ་བཟང་གྲགས་པ། རེ་ཙོང་ཁ་པ་ བློ་བཟང་གྲགས་པ། རེ་ཙོང་ཁ་པ་ བློ་བཟང་གྲགས་པ། དཀློན་མཆློག་འཇིགས་མེད་ དབང་པློ་ Nāgārjuna. Title in Sanskrit: madhyamakāvatāra Title in Sanskrit: madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya. Candrakīrti. Title in Sanskrit: prasannapadā དབུ་མ་འཇུག་པ་ར་བ་ དང་རང་འགྲེལ། བུདྡྷ་པཱ་ལི་ཏ། ཤེས་རབ་སློན་མེ། དབུ་མ་ཚིག་གསལ། དབུ་མ་དགློངས་པ་རབ་ གསལ། ར་ཤེས་ཊིཀ་ཆེན། ལམ་རིམ་ལྷག་མཐློང་ ཆེན་མློ། དབུ་མ་ཆེན་མློ། དབུ་མ་ལུང་རིགས་སློན་ མེ། 375 13. མཛོད་འཛིན་གྲྭ གྲྭ་ཚང་གི་ཡིག་ཆ་ཁག སི་གཞུང་ཁག རྒྱ་གཞུང་ཁག མཛད་པ་པློ། 329 སློབ་དཔློན་དབྱིག་གཉེན་ 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 རྒྱལ་པློའི་སས་གྲགས་པའི་བཤེས་ གཉེན་332 འཕགས་པ་ཐློགས་མེད།334 མཆིམས་འཇམ་པའི་དབྱངས་336 རྒྱལ་བ་དགེ་འདུན་གྲུབ། ཀུན་མཁེན་འཇམ་དབྱངས་ བཞད་པའི་རློ་རེ། གུང་ཐང་དཀློན་མཆློག་ བསན་པའི་སློན་མེ། སློབ་ཚན་ཕག་དཔེའ་ི མཚན། 330 ཆློས་མངློན་པའི་མཛོ331ད་ དང་། ཆློས་མངློན་པའི་ མཛོད་ཀྱི་བཤད་པ། (གནས་དང་པློ་གཉིས་པ་ གསུམ་པ་བཅས) ཆློས་མངློན་པའི་མཛོད་ཀྱི་འགྲེལ་བཤད།333 (གནས་ དང་པློ་གཉིས་པ་གསུམ་པ་བཅས) ཆློས་མངློན་པ་ཀུན་ལས་བཏུས་པ།335 ཆློས་མངློན་མཛོད་ཀྱི་ཚིག་ལེའུར་བྱས་པའི་འགྲེལ་པ་ མངློན་པའི་རྒྱན། (གནས་དང་པློ་གཉིས་པ་གསུམ་པ་ བཅས) དམ་པའི་ཆློས་མངློན་པའི་མཛོད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པར་བཤད་ པ་ཐར་ལམ་གསལ་བྱེད། (གནས་དང་པློ་གཉིས་པ་ གསུམ་པ་བཅས) དམ་པའི་ཆློས་མངློན་པ་མཛོད་ཀྱི་དགློངས་འགྲེལ་གི་ བསན་བཅློས་ཐུབ་བསན་ནློར་བུའི་གཏེར་མཛོད་དུས་ གསུམ་རྒྱལ་བའི་བཞེད་དློན་ཀུན་གསལ། ། (གནས་དང་པློ་གཉིས་པ་གསུམ་པ་བཅས) མངློན་པ་མཛོད་ཀྱི་བསྡུས་དློན་ཆློས་མངློན་རྒྱ་མཚོར་ འཇུག་པའི་གྲུ་གཟིངས། (གནས་དང་པློ་གཉིས་པ་ གསུམ་པ་བཅས) Vasubandhu. Title in Sanskrit: abhidharmakośa Title in Sanskrit: abhidharmakośabhāṣya. rgyal sras, yaśomitra Title in Sanskrit: abhidharmakośavyākhyā, or sputārthābhidharmakośavyākhyā Asaṅga. Title in Sanskrit: abhidharmasamuccaya mchims ’jam pa’i dbyangs, or nam mkha’ grags pa, b. 13th century C.E., P6146. ཡློངས་གྲགས་མཚན། མཛོད་ར་རང་འགྲེལ། མཛོད་འགྲེལ་རྒྱལ་སས་ མ། མངློན་པ་ཀུན་བཏུས། མཆིམས་མཛོད། མཛོད་ཊིཀ་ཐར་ལམ་ གསལ་བྱེད། མཛོད་ཡིག་ཆ། མཛོད་སློམ། 376 14. བཀའ་འློག་འཛིན་གྲྭགློང་གསལ་གཞུང་ཚན་ཁག་གི་སད་ཆ། : གྲྭ་ཚང་གི་ཡིག་ཆ་ཁག སི་གཞུང་ཁག རྒྱ་གཞུང་ཁག མཛད་པ་པློ། 337 སློབ་དཔློན་དབྱིག་གཉེན་ 337 338 339 340 341 342 རྒྱལ་པློའི་སས་གྲགས་པའི་བཤེས་ 340 གཉེན་ འཕགས་པ་ཐློགས་མེད། 342 མཆིམས་འཇམ་པའི་དབྱངས། རྒྱལ་བ་དགེ་འདུན་གྲུབ། ཀུན་མཁེན་འཇམ་དབྱངས་ བཞད་པའི་རློ་རེ། གུང་ཐང་དཀློན་མཆློག་ བསན་པའི་སློན་མེ། སློབ་ཚན་ཕག་དཔེའ་ི མཚན། 338 ཆློས་མངློན་པའི་མཛོད་ དང་། ཆློས་མངློན་པའི་ 339 མཛོད་ཀྱི་བཤད་པ། (གནས་བཞི་པ་ནས་བརྒྱད་ པའི་བར།) 341 ཆློས་མངློན་པའི་མཛོད་ཀྱི་འགྲེལ་བཤད། (གནས་ བཞི་པ་ནས་བརྒྱད་པའི་བར།) ཆློས་མངློན་མཛོད་ཀྱི་ཚིག་ལེའུར་བྱས་པའི་འགྲེལ་པ་ མངློན་པའི་རྒྱན། (གནས་བཞི་པ་ནས་བརྒྱད་པའི་ བར།) དམ་པའི་ཆློས་མངློན་པའི་མཛོད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པར་བཤད་ པ་ཐར་ལམ་གསལ་བྱེད། (གནས་བཞི་པ་ནས་བརྒྱད་ པའི་བར།) དམ་པའི་ཆློས་མངློན་པ་མཛོད་ཀྱི་དགློངས་འགྲེལ་གི་ བསན་བཅློས་ཐུབ་བསན་ནློར་བུའི་གཏེར་མཛོད་དུས་ གསུམ་རྒྱལ་བའི་བཞེད་དློན་ཀུན་གསལ། ། (གནས་བཞི་པ་ནས་བརྒྱད་པའི་བར།) མངློན་པ་མཛོད་ཀྱི་བསྡུས་དློན་ཆློས་མངློན་རྒྱ་མཚོར་ འཇུག་པའི་གྲུ་གཟིངས། (གནས་བཞི་པ་ནས་བརྒྱད་ པའི་བར།) Vasubandhu. Title in Sanskrit: abhidharmakośa Title in Sanskrit: abhidharmakośabhāṣya. rgyal sras, yaśomitra Title in Sanskrit: abhidharmakośavyākhyā, or sputārthābhidharmakośavyākhyā mchims ’jam pa’i dbyangs, or nam mkha’ grags pa, b. 13th century C.E., P6146. ཡློངས་གྲགས་མཚན། མཛོད་ར་རང་འགྲེལ། མཛོད་འགྲེལ་རྒྱལ་སས་ མ། མངློན་པ་ཀུན་བཏུས། མཆིམས་མཛོད། མཛོད་ཊིཀ་ཐར་ལམ་ གསལ་བྱེད། མཛོད་ཡིག་ཆ། མཛོད་སློམ། 377 བཀའ་གསར་འཛིན་གྲྭ སི་གཞུང་ཁག རྒྱ་གཞུང་ཁག 15. མཛད་པ་པློ། བསློན་པ་ཤཱ་ཀྱ་ཐུབ་པ 343 སློབ་དཔློན་ཡློན་ཏན་འློད་ སློབ་དཔློན་དྷར་མི་ཏྲས། ཀུན་མཁེན345མཚོ་ན་བ་རིན་ཆེན་ བཟང་པློ། རྒྱལ་བ་དགེ་འདུན་གྲུབ། རྒྱལ་བ་དགེ་འདུན་གྲུབ། རྒྱལ་བ་བསན་འཛིན་རྒྱ་མཚོ། གྲྭ་ཚང་གི་ཡིག་ཆ་ ཁག འཇམ་དབྱངས་བཞད་པའི་རློ་རེ་ གུང་ཐང་དཀློན་མཆློག་ བསན་པའི་སློན་མེ། 343 344 345 སློབ་ཚན་ཕག་དཔེའ་ི མཚན། བསན་པའི་ནང་མཛོད་འདུལ་བ་ལུང་སེ་བཞི། (གཞི་ སློད་) 344 དམ་པའི་ཆློས་འདུལ་བའི་མདློ་ར་བ། (གཞི་སློད་) འདུལ་བའི་མདློའི་རྒྱ་ཆེར་འགྲེལ་པ། (གཞི་སློད་) འདུལ་བ་མདློ་རའི་རྣམ་བཤད་ཉི་མའི་འློད་ཟེར་ ལེགས་བཤད་ལུང་རིགས་ཀྱི་རྒྱ་མཚོ། (གཞི་སློད་) འདུལ་བ་མཐའ་དག་གི་སྙིང་པློའི་དློན་ལེགས་པར་ བཤད་པ་རིན་པློ་ཆེའི་ཕེང་བ། (གཞི་སློད་) ལེགས་པར་གསུངས་པའི་དམ་པའི་ཆློས་འདུལ་བའི་ གེང་གཞི་དང་རྟློགས་པ་བརློད་པ་ལུང་སེ་བཞི་ཀུན་ ལས་བཏུས་པ་རིན་པློ་ཆེའི་མཛོད། (གཞི་སློད་) དགེ་སློང་གི་བསབ་བྱའི་རྣམ་གཞག་མདློ་ཙམ་བརློད་ པ་ཐུབ་དབང་ཞལ་ལུང་ཞེས་བྱ་བ། འདུལ་བའི་དཀའ་གནད་རྣམ་པར་དཔྱད་པ་འཁྲུལ་ སྤློང་བློ་གསལ་མགུལ་རྒྱན་ཙིནྡ་མ་ཎིའི་ཕེང་མཛེས་ སྐལ་བཟང་རེ་བ་ཀུན་སྐློང་། (གཞི་སློད་) འདུལ་བ་རྒྱ་མཚོའི་དཀའ་གནད་མདློར་བསྡུས་པ་ ནློར་བུའི་ཕེང་བ། ཡློངས་གྲགས་མཚན། འདུལ་བ་ལུང་སེ་བཞི། འདུལ་བ་མདློ་ར། འདུལ་བ་རྒྱ་ཆེར་འགྲེལ། འདུལ་བ་མཚོ་ཊིཀ འདུལ་ཊིཀ་རིན་ཆེན་ འཕེང་བ། འདུལ་བའི་གེང་འབུམ་ ཆེན་མློ། དགེ་སློང་གི་བསབ་བྱ། འདུལ་བའི་མཐའ་དཔྱློད། འདུལ་སློམ། Guṇaprabha. Title in Sanskrit: vinayasūtra mtsho na ba rin chen bzang po, or mtsho na ba shes rab bzang po, b. 13th century C.E., P1500. 378 སི་གཞུང་ཁག རྒྱ་གཞུང་ཁག 16. བཀའ་སྦུག་འཛིན་གྲྭ :གློང་གསལ་གཞུང་ཚན་ཁག་གི་སད་ཆ། མཛད་པ་པློ། བསློན་པ་ཤཱ་ཀྱ་ཐུབ་པ 346 སློབ་དཔློན་ཡློན་ཏན་འློད་ སློབ་དཔློན་དྷར་མི་ཏྲས། ཀུན་མཁེན མཚོ་ན་བ་རིན་ཆེན་ 348 བཟང་པློ། རྒྱལ་བ་དགེ་འདུན་གྲུབ། རྒྱལ་བ་དགེ་འདུན་གྲུབ། གྲྭ་ཚང་གི་ཡིག་ཆ་ཁག རྒྱལ་བ་བསན་འཛིན་རྒྱ་མཚོ། 346 347 348 འཇམ་དབྱངས་བཞད་པའི་རློ་རེ་ གུང་ཐང་དཀློན་མཆློག་ བསན་པའི་སློན་མེ། སློབ་ཚན་ཕག་དཔེའ་ི མཚན། བསན་པའི་ནང་མཛོད་འདུལ་བ་ལུང་སེ་བཞི། (གཞི་ སད།) 347 དམ་པའི་ཆློས་འདུལ་བའི་མདློ་ར་བ། (གཞི་སད།) འདུལ་བའི་མདློའི་རྒྱ་ཆེར་འགྲེལ་པ། (གཞི་སད།) འདུལ་བ་མདློ་རའི་རྣམ་བཤད་ཉི་མའི་འློད་ཟེར་ ལེགས་བཤད་ལུང་རིགས་ཀྱི་རྒྱ་མཚོ། (གཞི་སད།) འདུལ་བ་མཐའ་དག་གི་སྙིང་པློའི་དློན་ལེགས་པར་ བཤད་པ་རིན་པློ་ཆེའི་ཕེང་བ། (གཞི་སད།) ལེགས་པར་གསུངས་པའི་དམ་པའི་ཆློས་འདུལ་བའི་ གེང་གཞི་དང་རྟློགས་པ་བརློད་པ་ལུང་སེ་བཞི་ཀུན་ ལས་བཏུས་པ་རིན་པློ་ཆེའི་མཛོད། (གཞི་སད།) དགེ་སློང་གི་བསབ་བྱའི་རྣམ་གཞག་མདློ་ཙམ་བརློད་ པ་ཐུབ་དབང་ཞལ་ལུང་ཞེས་བྱ་བ། འདུལ་བའི་དཀའ་གནད་རྣམ་པར་དཔྱད་པ་འཁྲུལ་ སྤློང་བློ་གསལ་མགུལ་རྒྱན་ཙིནྡ་མ་ཎིའི་ཕེང་མཛེས་ སྐལ་བཟང་རེ་བ་ཀུན་སྐློང་། (གཞི་སད།) ཡློངས་གྲགས་མཚན། འདུལ་བ་ལུང་སེ་བཞི། འདུལ་བ་རྒྱ་མཚོའི་དཀའ་གནད་མདློར་བསྡུས་པ་ ནློར་བུའི་ཕེང་བ། (གཞི་སད།) འདུལ་སློམ། འདུལ་བ་མདློ་ར། འདུལ་བ་རྒྱ་ཆེར་འགྲེལ། འདུལ་བ་མཚོ་ཊིཀ འདུལ་ཊིཀ་རིན་ཆེན་ འཕེང་བ། འདུལ་བའི་གེང་འབུམ་ ཆེན་མློ། དགེ་སློང་གི་བསབ་བྱ། འདུལ་བའི་མཐའ་དཔྱློད། Guṇaprabha. Title in Sanskrit: vinayasūtra mtsho na ba rin chen bzang po, or mtsho na ba shes rab bzang po, b. 13th century C.E., P1500. 379 ༄༅། །འབྲས་སྤུངས་སློ་མང་གྲྭ་ཚང་གི་ཆློས་རྭའི་འཛིན་གྲྭ་སློ་སློའི་སློབ་གཉེར་གི་གཞུང་ཚན་ཁག་གཤམ་གསལ།། ༡ བསྡུས་ཆུང་འཛིན་གྲྭར་སས་བསྡུས་གྲྭ་དང་། ཀུན་མཁེན་བསྡུས་གྲྭ བསྡུས་ར་ཚིག བ་ལང་བསྡུས་གྲྭ་ རིག་ ལམ་འཕྲུལ་སེ། རྭ་སློད་བསྡུས་གྲྭ་བཅས་ཀྱི་སློད་ཆ། ༢ བསྡུས་ཆེན་འཛིན་གྲྭར་གློང་གསལ་གཞུང་ཚན་ཁག་གི་སད་ཆ། རྟགས་རིག་འཛིན་གྲྭར་རྟགས་རིག་ཡིག་ཆ། རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ར་བ། རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ཐར་ལམ་གསལ་བྱེད། རྣམ་ ༣ འགྲེལ་ཡིག་ཆ། རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ཊིཀ་ཆེན། ཚད་མ་རིག་རྒྱན། ཚད་མ་སེ་བདུན། རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ཊིཀ་ཆུང་། བློ་རིག་འཛིན་གྲྭར་བློ་རིག་ཡིག་ཆ། ས་ལམ་གི་རྣམ་གཞག འགྲུབ་མཐའ་ར་བ། འགྲུབ་མཐའ་རིན་ཆེན་ ༤ འཕེང་བ། འགྲུབ་མཐའ་ཆེན་མློ། ཚད་མ་རྣམ་ངེས། ༸རྒྱལ་བ་དགེ་འདུན་རྒྱ་མཚོའ་ི འགྲུབ་མཐའ། ༥ དློན་བདུན་ཅུ་འཛིན་གྲྭར་དློན་བདུན་ཅུ་ཡིག་ཆ། གསེར་འཕེང་མཆློད་བརློད། ཤིང་རྟ་སློལ་འབྱེད། ཕར་ ཕིན་ཡིག་ཆ། རྣམ་བཤད་སྙིང་རྒྱན། ཕར་ཕིན་རྟློག་བཀའི་སྣ ང་བ། ལམ་རིམ་ཆེན་མློ་སློད་ཆ། ༦ གཞུང་འློག་འཛིན་གྲྭར་ཕར་ཕིན་ཕར་ཕིན་སྐྱེས་བུ་གསུམ་གི་རྣམ་གཞག་ནས་ཤེར་ཕིན་ཕར་ཕིན། གསེར་ འཕེང་། རྣམ་བཤད། རྟློག་སྣང་། ལམ་རིམ་ཆེན་མློ། བློ་བཟང་སློན་མེའི་ཐེམ་སྐས། བྱང་ཆུབ་གཞུང་ལམ། ཕར་ཕིན་ མཆན་འགྲེལ། ༧ གཞུང་གློང་འཛིན་གྲྭར་ཕར་ཕིན་སེམས་བསྐྱེད་ནས་ཡློངས་འཛིན་བར། གསེར་ཕེང་། རྣམ་བཤད། རྟློག་ སྣང་། འགྲེལ་བ་དློན་གསལ། རྒྱན་སྣང་། གཉིས་སྣང་། འགྲེལ་བ་ཟིན་བྲིས། རྟེན་འབྲེལ་ལུང་རིག་བང་མཛོད། རྟེན་ འབྲེལ་ཆེན་མློ། སྐབས་དང་པློ་འཛིན་གྲྭར་ཕར་ཕིན་རིགས་ནས་སྐབས་དང་པློའི་མཇུག་བར། གསེར་འཕེང་། རྣམ་བཤད། ༨ རྟློག་སྣང་། དྲང་ངེས་ལེགས་བཤད་སྙིང་པློ། དྲང་ངེས་ཆེན་མློ། དྲང་ངེས་དཀའ་འགྲེལ། དྲང་ངེས་མཆན། ༸རྒྱལ་བ་ དགེ་འདུན་རྒྱ་མཚོའ་ི དྲང་ངེས། རྒྱུད་བ་མ། རྒྱུད་བ་ད་ཊིཀ། སློད་འཇུག་ར་འགྲེལ། བསབ་བཏུས། ༩ བསམ་གཟུགས་འཛིན་གྲྭར་བསམ་གཟུགས་ལེགས་བཤད་འབུམ་བཟང་། བསམ་གཟུགས་ཆེན་མློ། བསམ་ གཟུགས་འབྲིང་། སྐབས་ ༢།༣།༥།༦།༧།༨ བཅས་དང་། གསེར་འཕེང་། རྣམ་བཤད། རྟློག་སྣང་། ༡༠ ཕར་ཕིན་འཛིན་གྲྭར་སྐབས་བཞི་པ། གསེར་འཕེང་། རྣམ་བཤད། རྟློག་སྣང་། འབྲེལ་བ་ཟིན་བྲིས། ཕར་ ཕིན་བར་སློན་དང་དེའི་འགྲེལ་བ། ༡༡ དབུ་གསར་འཛིན་གྲྭར་དབུ་མ་དགློངས་པ་རབ་གསལ། དབུ་མ་ཆེན་མློ། དབུ་མ་ལུང་རིག་སློན་མེ། དབུ་མ་ འཇུག་པ་ར་བ་དང་རང་འགྲེལ། དབུ་མ་ར་ཤེས་དང་རིགས་ཚོགས། དབུ་མ་ཚིག་གསལ། ར་ཤེས་ཊིཀ་ཆེན། དབུ་མ་ བཞི་རྒྱ་བ། དབུ་རྒྱན་ར་འགྲེལ། ལམ་རིམ་ལྷག་མཐློང་ཆེན་མློ། འཇུག་ཊིཀ་གསལ་བའི་མེ་ལློང་། དབུ་བདེན་གཉིས། དྲང་ངེས་ལེགས་སྙིང་གི་དབུ་མའི་སྐློར། ༡༢ དབུ་རིང་འཛིན་གྲྭར་གློང་གསལ་གཞུང་ཚན་ཁག་གི་སད་ཆ། ༡༣ མཛོད་འཛིན་གྲྭར་མཛོད་ར་རང་འགྲེལ། མཆིམས་མཛོད། མཛོད་ཊིཀ་ཐར་ལམ་གསལ་བྱེད། མཛོད་འགྲེལ་ 380 རྒྱལ་སས་མ། མཛོད་སློམ་དང་དེའི་འགྲེལ་བ་བཅས་དང་། མངློན་པའི་གཞུང་གཞན་ཡང་མང་ངློ༌། ། ༡༤ བཀའ་འློག་འཛིན་གྲྭར་གློང་གསལ་གཞུང་ཚན་ཁག་གི་སད་ཆ། ༡༥ བཀའ་གསར་འཛིན་གྲྭར་འདུལ་བ་མདློ་ར། འདུལ་བ་ལུང་སེ་བཞི། འདུལ་བ་མཚོ་ཊིཀ་ འདུལ་ཊིཀ་རིན་ ཆེན་འཕེང་བ། འདུལ་བ་ལེགས་བུམ་ཆེན་མློ། འདུལ་བ་ཀ་རིགས་ཀ་ འདུལ་བ་ལུང་བཞིའི་བར་སློམ། ༸གློང་ས་ མཆློག་གི་དགེ་སློང་གི་བསབ་བྱ། ༡༦ བཀའ་སྦུག་འཛིན་གྲྭར་གློང་གསལ་གཞུང་ཚན་ཁག་གི་སད་ཆ། དགེ་བཤེས་རྣམས་ནས་སགས་ཀྱི་ས་ལམ་དང་། སགས་རིམ་ཆེན་མློ། རྒྱུད་སེ་སི་རྣམ། རློགས་རིམ་རིམ་ལྔ་གསལ་སློན་ སློགས་དང་། ཆློ་ག་ཕག་ལེན་བཅས་ལ་ཐུགས་གཉེར་གནང་བཞིན་པ་བཅས་སློ།། 381 Appendix 2: Twenty-one Commentaries Ornament of Clear Realizations on Maitreya’s 349 I. Correlating the Ornament with specific Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras A. Twenty-five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra 1. 2. 3. 4. Āryavimuktasena (’phags pa grol sde, ca. 6th century C.E.). Commentary on the “Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra,” by taking it to have eight chapters correlated with the eight chapters of the Ornament Bhadanta Vimuktasena (btsun pa grol sde). [Sub]commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the ‘Superior Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra’: Ornament for the Clear Realizations” Haribhadra (seng ge bzang po, ca. 8th century C.E.). [Commentary on the] “Twenty-Five Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra” / The Eight Chaptered Ratnākarashānti (rin chen 'byung gnas zhi ba). Pure Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Ornament for the Clear Realizations” B. One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra 5. Dharmashrī. Explanation of the “One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra” C. Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra 6. 7. 8. 349 Haribhadra. Explanation of the “Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra”: Illumination of (Maitreya’s) “Ornament for the Clear Realizations” Ratnākarashānti. Commentary on the Difficult Points of the “Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra”: The Supreme Essence Abhayākaragupta ('jigs med 'byung gnas sbas pa). Commentary on the “Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra”: Moonlight of Essential Points This list of twenty one commentaries is cited from: Jeffrey Hopkins, Jongbok Yi, The Hidden Teaching of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras: Jam-yang-shay-pa’s Seventy Topics and Kon-chog-jig-maywang-po’s Supplement (VA: UMA Institute for Tibetan Studies, 2013), 26-30. 382 D. Verse Summary of the Perfection of Wisdom 9. 10. 11. Haribhadra. Commentary on the Difficult Points of the “Verse Summary of the Precious Qualities of the Supramundane Victorious [Mother]” Buddhashrījñāna. Commentary on the Difficult Points of the “Verse Summary” Dharmashrī. Key to the Treasury of the Perfection of Wisdom E. One Hundred Thousand, Twenty-five Thousand, and Eight Thousand Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras 12. Smṛtijñānakīrti. 350 Indicating Through Eight Concordant Meanings 351 the Mother Perfection of Wisdom Taught Extensively in One Hundred Thousand [Stanzas], Taught in Medium Length in Twenty-five Thousand [Stanzas], and Taught in Brief in Eight Thousand [Stanzas] II. Not correlating the Ornament with specific Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras 13. Haribhadra. Clear Meaning Commentary / Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the Perfection of Wisdom: Ornament for the Clear Realizations” A. Two commentaries on Haribhadra's Clear Meaning Commentary 14. 15. Dharmamitra (chos kyi bshes gnyen). Explanation of (Haribhadra’s) “Commentary on (Maitreya’s) ‘Ornament for the Clear Realizations’”: Very Clear Words Dharmakīrtishrī (chos kyi grags pa dpal, or gser gling pa). Explanation of (Haribhadra’s) “Commentary on (Maitreya’s) ‘Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the Perfection of Wisdom: Ornament for the Clear Realizations’”: Illumination of the Difficult to Realize B. Three summaries A summary of Haribhadra's Clear Meaning Commentary 16. Prajñākaramati (shes rab 'byung gnas blo gros, 950-1030). Summary of (Haribhadra’s) “Commentary on (Maitreya’s) ‘Ornament for the Clear Realizations’” Tsong-kha-pa wonders whether Smṛtijñānakīrti actually is the author (Sparham, op. cit., 13), “The Teaching that the Three Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras are the Same in Terms of the Eight Clear Realizations is also weak and makes certain mistaken correlations with the Sūtras, [11] so whether or not it is by the great scholar Smṛtijñānakīrti requires further research.” 351 The eight are the eight clear realizations, that is, the eight categories. 350 383 Two summaries of Maitreya’s Ornament for the Clear Realizations 17. Atisha 352 (dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna, mar me mdzad ye shes, 982-1054). Lamp Summary of (Maitreya’s) “Perfection of Wisdom” 18. Kumārashrībhadra (bkra shis rgyal mtshan). Summary of (Maitreya’s) “Perfection of Wisdom” C. Two other commentaries on Haribhadra's Clear Meaning Commentary 19. 20. Ratnakīrti. Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Ornament for the Clear Realizations”: A Portion of Glory Buddhashrījñāna. Commentary on (Maitreya’s) “Treatise of Quintessential Instructions on the Supramundane Victorious Mother Perfection of Wisdom: Ornament for the Clear Realizations”: Wisdom Lamp Garland D. One treatise 21. Abhayākaragupta. Ornament to the Subduer’s Thought, a general explanation of Buddha’s word, the final three chapters of which mainly teach the topics of Maitreya’s Ornament. Tsong-kha-pa also doubts that Atisha is the author of this commentary (Sparham, op. cit., 13), “The Lamp Summary [attributed to Atiśa] is also weak and with many statements originating with Tibetans, so I rather think it is by one of Atisha’s disciples or by some other Tibetan.” 352 384 Appendix 3: Non-Tabular Presentation of the Section on the Object of Negation in Madhyamaka I. Identifying the Object of Negation I.1. Refuting Other Systems: Refuting quasi-identifications by Tibetans of the object of negation in connection with the reasons for identifying the object of negation 1st Wrong idea: Many earlier Tibetan elders hold that without having identified the object of negation the non-dawning of any object to one's awareness is realization of reality སློན་གི་བློད་རྒན་མང་པློ་ན་རེ། དྲི་བ་ལྷག་བསམ་རབ་དཀར་དུ་གསུངས་པ་ལྟར་དགག་ བྱ་ངློས་མ་ཟིན་ཀྱང་ཡུལ་ཅི་ཡང་བློ་ལ་མ་ཤར་ཞིང་མ་བསམ་པ་དེ་གནས་ལུགས་མཐློང་ བ་དང་རྟློགས་པ་སློགས་སུ་སྨྲ་བ་མང་ངློ་། Many earlier Tibetan elders, as Tsongkhapa's Questions on Points of Virtuous Endeavor: Shining Intention says, propounded that even though one has not identified the object of negation, the non-dawning of any object to one's awareness and not thinking anything is to see, to realize the mode of substance, and so forth. 1st refutation: Non-view ignorance would realize emptiness །དེ་དག་ལ་འློ་ན། རང་གིས་མི་ཤེས་པའི་འཇིག་རྟེན་ཁམས་ཀྱི་བརྟན་གཡློ་དེ་དག་ ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་གནས་ལུགས་ཁློད་ཀྱིས་རྟློགས་པར་ཐལ། ཁློད་ཀྱི་བློ་ལ་ཡུལ་དེ་དག་གི་ རྣམ་པ་ཅི་ཡང་མི་ འཆར་ལ། དེ་མ་ཤར་བ་ཡུལ་དེ་དག་གི་གནས་ལུགས་མཐློང་བའི་ དློན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར། [248] Well, for them, it [absurdly] follows that you realize the mode of subsistence of all the stable and the moving [that is to say, the inanimate and the animate] in worldly realms that you yourself do not know because aspects of those [that is, all the stable and the moving in worldly realms] do not dawn to your awareness and [according to you] the non-dawning of those is the meaning of seeing the mode of subsistence of these objects. 385 [རང་གིས་མི་ཤེས་པའི་འཇིག་རྟེན་ཁམས་ཀྱི་བརྟན་གཡློ་དེ་དག་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་གནས་ ལུགས་ཁློད་ཀྱིས་རྟློགས་པར་]འདློད་ན། ལྟ་མིན་གི་མ་རིག་པ་ཡིན་ན་སློང་ཉིད་རྟློགས་ པས་ཁབ་པར་ཐལ་ལློ། If you accept that [you realize the mode of subsistence of all the stable and the moving, that is to say, the inanimate and the animate, in worldly realms that you yourself do not know], it very [absurdly] follows that whatever is a non-view ignorance (lta min gyi ma rig pa) necessarily realizes emptiness! 2nd refutation: The negative of the object of negation would not dawn །གཞན་ཡང་སློང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པ་འཆར་བའི་ཚེ་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་བཀག་པའི་རྣམ་པ་མི་ འཆར་བར་ཐལ། བློ་ལ་ཅི་ཡང་མ་ཤར་བ་དེ་སློང་ཉིད་རྟློགས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར། [བློ་ལ་ ཅི་ཡང་མ་ཤར་བ་དེ་སློང་ཉིད་རྟློགས་པ་ཡིན་པར]རྟགས་ཁས། Furthermore, it [absurdly] follows that, when the aspect of emptiness dawns [to an awareness], the aspect of the negative of its object of negation does not dawn because [according to you] the non-dawning of anything to an awareness is a realization of emptiness.353 You have accepted the reason [that according to you the non-dawning of anything to an awareness is a realization of emptiness]. [སློང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པ་འཆར་བའི་ཚེ་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་བཀག་པའི་རྣམ་པ་མི་འཆར་ བར་]འདློད་ན། [སློང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པ་འཆར་བ་]དེའི་ཚེ་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་བདེན་གྲུབ་ བཀག་པའི་ཆ་དེ་མི་འཆར་བར་ཐལ། [སློང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པ་འཆར་བའི་ཚེ་རང་གི་ དགག་བྱ་བཀག་པའི་རྣམ་པ་མི་འཆར་བར་]འདློདློ་པའི་ཕིར། If you accept [that when the aspect of emptiness dawns to an awareness, the aspect of the negative of its object of negation does not dawn,] it [absurdly] follows that at that time [when the aspect of emptiness dawns,] the factor that is the negative of the object of negation—true establishment—does not dawn because you accepted [that when the aspect of emptiness dawns to an awareness, the aspect of the negative of its object of negation does not dawn]. 353 It is questionable whether the opponent would really assert that realization of emptiness requires dawning of the aspect of emptiness. 386 [སློང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པ་འཆར་བ་དེའི་ཚེ་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་བདེན་གྲུབ་བཀག་པའི་ཆ་དེ་ མི་འཆར་བར་]འདློད་མི་ནུས་ཏེ། [སློང་ཉིད་]བདེན་གྲུབ་བཀག་པའི་མེད་དགག་ཡིན་ པའི་ཕིར། You cannot accept [that at that time the factor that is the negative of the object of negation, true establishment, does not dawn] because [emptiness] is a non-affirming negative that is a negative of true establishment. [(སློང་ཉིད་)བདེན་གྲུབ་བཀག་པའི་མེད་དགག་ཡིན་ན་སློང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པ་འཆར་ བའི་ཚེ་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་བཀག་པའི་རྣམ་པ་མི་འཆར་བར་འདློད་མི་ནུས་པས་]ཁབ་སེ། མེད་དགག་རྣམས་ཀྱི་དློན་སི་འཆར་བའི་ཚེ་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་དངློས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་ ཆློས་གཞན་དངློས་ཤུགས་གང་ལ་ཡང་མ་འཕངས་པ་གཅིག་དགློས་ལ། དེ་ལ་སློན་དུ་ དགག་བྱའི་དློན་སི་བློ་ལ་མ་ཤར་བར་དེ་བཀག་པའི་དངློས་མེད་བློ་ལ་མི་འཆར་བའི་ ཕིར། There is an entailment [that if (emptiness) is a non-affirming negative that is a negative of true establishment, you cannot accept that, when the aspect of emptiness dawns, the factor that is the negative of the object of negation—true establishment—does not dawn] because when meaning-generalities (don spyi, arthasāmānya, or sāmānyalakṣaṇa) of non-affirming negatives dawn in dependence upon explicitly refuting their objects of negation, it is necessary that another phenomenon is not projected explicitly or implicitly, and with regard to that without the meaning-generality of the object of negation previously dawning to an awareness, the nonexistence that is the negative of that does not dawn to an awareness. སློད་འཇུག་ལས། བཏགས་པའི་དངློས་ལ་མ་རེག་པར། །དེ་ཡི་དངློས་མེད་འཛིན་མ་ ཡིན། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕིར། This is because Śāntideva's Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds says:354 Without making contact with the thing imputed, IX. 139ab.; Śāntideva (zhi ba lha, fl. 8th century C.E.), "Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds (byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa)," in bstan 'gyur (sde dge), TBRC W23703.105 (Delhi, India: delhi karmapae choedhey, gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 36a.6, http://tbrc.org/link?RID=O1GS6011|O1GS60111GS36127$W23703; see also Shantideva, A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life, trans. Stephen Batchelor (Dharamsala, India: Library of Tibetan Works & Archives, 1979), 161. This stanza is a part of the conclusion of a debate against the Sāṃkhya system. 354 387 The nonexistence of that thing is not apprehended. 3rd refutation: The mere non-dawning of appearances of coarse conventionalities is not sufficient གཞན་ཡང་སློང་ཉིད་རྟློགས་པ་ལ་ཡུལ་ཀུན་རློབ་རགས་པའི་སྣང་བ་མ་ཤར་བ་ཙམ་ གིས་མི་ཆློག་པར་ཐལ། [སློང་ཉིད་རྟློགས་པ་]དེ་ལ་ཡུལ་དེ་དག་གི་ངློ་བློ་ཉིད་མེད་པའི་ རྣམ་པ་ཤར་བ་གཅིག་དགློས་ཀྱི་དེ་མ་ཤར་བར་ཡུལ་དེ་དག་མི་སྣང་བ་ཙམ་གིས་མི་ ཆློག་པའི་ཕིར། Moreover, it follows that with regard to realization of emptiness, the mere non-dawning of appearances of coarse conventionalities is not sufficient because with regard to that [realization of emptiness] a dawning of an aspect [that is, a generic image] of the naturelessness of those objects is necessary, but without its dawning the mere nonappearance of those objects is not sufficient. [(སློང་ཉིད་རྟློགས་པ་)དེ་ལ་ཡུལ་དེ་དག་གི་ངློ་བློ་ཉིད་མེད་པའི་རྣམ་པ་ཤར་བ་གཅིག་ དགློས་ཀྱི་དེ་མ་ཤར་བར་ཡུལ་དེ་དག་མི་སྣང་བ་ཙམ་གིས་མི་ཆློག་པ་]དེར་ཐལ། དཔེར་ ན་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་ལྟ་བུ་ལ་དེ་ལྟར་དགློས་པར་སློབ་དཔློན་སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱངས་བཞེད་པ་ གང་ཞིག ཟླ་བའི་ཞབས་ཀྱང་དེ་ལྟར་བཞེད་པའི་ཕིར། It follows that [with regard to that (realization of emptiness) a dawning of an aspect (that is, a generic image) of the naturelessness of those objects is necessary, but without its dawning the mere non-appearance of those objects is not sufficient,] because (1) Buddhapālita asserts that for former and future births, for example, such is needed; and (2) the glorious Candrakīrti also asserts such. དང་པློ་[དཔེར་ན་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་ལྟ་བུ་ལ་དེ་ལྟར་དགློས་པར་སློབ་དཔློན་སངས་རྒྱས་ བསྐྱངས་བཞེད་པར་]གྲུབ་ཏེ། བུདྡྷ་པཱ་ལི་ཏ་ལས། དེ་གཉིས་ལ་ཁད་པར་ཆེ་བ་དེ་བཞིན་ དུ། འདི་ལ་ཡང་འཇིག་རྟེན་འདི་མེད་དློ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་སློགས་པ་དེ་ལྟར་མཐློང་བ་ནི་མ་ རིག་པས་ཀུན་ཏུ་རློངས་པའི་སེམས་པ་དང་ལན་པ་ཡིན་གི་དངློས་པློ་ཐམས་ཅད་ངློ་བློ་ 388 ཉིད་སློང་པའི་ཕིར་མ་སྐྱེས་པ་དང་མ་འགག་པར་མཐློང་བ་ཅིག་ཤློས་ནི་ཤེས་པ་སློན་དུ་ བཏང་བ་ཡིན་པས་དེ་གཉིས་ལ་ཁད་པར་ཤིན་ཏུ་ཆེའློ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པ འི་ཕིར། 355 356 Buddhapālita (sangs rgyas bskyangs, ca. 470-540), Buddhapālita Commentary on (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle" (dbu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa buddha pā li ta, buddhapālitamūlamadhyamakavṛtti), Toh. 3842, dbu ma, vol. tsha, 243a.6-243a.7; see also Akira Saito, "A study of the BuddhapālitaMūlamadhyamakavṛtti" (PhD diss., Australian National University, Australia, 1984), 252-253. This passage is a part of Buddhapālita's commentary on stanza 7cd in Nāgārjuna's Fundamental Treatise on the Middle, Called "Wisdom" (dbu ma rtsa ba shes rab, prajñānāmamūlamadhyamakakārikā) in Chapter XVIII, Analysis of Self (bdag brtag pa, ātmaparikṣā) where he first cites the Treatise and then gives his commentary: 355 [243a.1] མ་སྐྱེས་པ་དང་མ་འགགས་པ། ཆློས་ཉིད་མ་དང་འདས་དང་མཚུངས།། …།སྨྲས་པ། གང་འཇིག་རྟེན་འདི་མེད་དློ། །འཇིག་རྟེན་ཕ་རློལ་མེད་དློ། །སེམས་ཅན་རྫུས་ཏེ་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དློ། །ཞེས་བྱ་ བ་ལ་སློགས་པར་[243a.4]ལྟ་བ་དེ་དང་། གང་དངློས་པློ་ཐམས་ཅད་མ་སྐྱེས་པ་དང་མ་འགགས་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་ལྟ་བ་ དེ་གཉིས་ལ་ཁད་པར་ཅི་ཡློད། བཤད་པ། དེ་གཉིས་ལ་ཁད་པར་ཤིན་ཏུ་ཆེ་ན། ཁློད་ནི་སློང་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་དློན་རྣམ་པར་མི་ཤེས་ནས་དེ་གཉིས་འདྲའློ་ སྙམ་དུ་སེམས་སློ། །འདི་[243a.5]ལ་སློ་སློར་མ་བརྟགས་པར་བཏང་སྙློམས་བྱེད་པ་གང་ཡིན་པ་དང་། སློ་སློར་ བརྟགས་ནས་བཏང་སྙློམས་བྱེད་པ་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་གཉིས་བཏང་སྙློམས་བྱེད་པར་ནི་འདྲ་མློད་ཀྱི་སློ་སློར་མ་ བརྟགས་པར་བཏང་སྙློམས་བྱེད་པ་ནི་མ་རིག་པའི་ཀུན་ཏུ་སྦྱློར་བ་དང་ལན་པར་བསན་ལ། བཏང་སྙློམས་ [243a.6] བྱེད་གཅིག་ཤློས་ནི་སངས་རྒྱས་བཅློམ་ལན་འདས་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཀུན་ཏུ་བསན་པ་ཡིན་པས། དེ་གཉིས་ལ་ ཁད་པར་ཤིན་ཏུ་ཆེ་བ་དེ་བཞིན་དུ། འདི་ལ་ཡང་འཇིག་རྟེན་འདི་མེད་དློ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་སློགས་པ་དེ་ལྟར་མཐློང་བ་ ནི་མ་རིག་པས་ཀུན་ཏུ་རློངས་པའི་སེམས་དང་ལན་པ་[243a.7]ཡིན་གི། དངློས་པློ་ཐམས་ཅད་ངློ་བློ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་སློང་ པའི་ཕིར་མ་སྐྱེས་པ་དང་མ་འགགས་པར་མཐློང་བ་ཅིག་ཤློས་ནི་ཤེས་པ། སློན་དུ་བཏང་བ་ཡིན་པས། 356 This is a response against the Nihilists' assertion that nonexistence and emptiness are equivalent. Their assertion and the first part of Buddhapālita's refutation go as follows: [The Nihilists say:] "This world or life does not exist as an effect of past lives. A future world does not exist. Also, spontaneously born sentient beings such as hell-beings do not exist," and so forth. What is the difference between their view and the view of the Proponents of the Middle that all things are not produced and do not cease? [Answer of Buddhapālita:] There is a great difference between these two. Not knowing the meaning of emptiness, you think that these two are similar. Acting with equanimity [that is, indifference] when one has not analyzed [to find that all sentient beings should be valued equally] and acting with equanimity when one has so analyzed are similar only in that both can be characterized as acting with equanimity. However, acting with equanimity but without analysis is involved in the entwinements of ignorance. Acting with equanimity when one has analyzed [is the result of knowledge and] is used by the Supramundane Victors. 389 The first [that Buddhapālita asserts that for former and future births, for example, such is needed] is established because the Buddhapālita [Commentary] says:357 Just as these two differ very greatly, so here also the perceptions [found in the texts of the Nihilists] such as, "This world does not exist," [meaning that this life is not the effect of other lives] are thoughts beclouded with ignorance. However, the others [that is, the Proponents of the Middle]—who see that all phenomena are not [inherently] produced and do not [inherently] cease because they are empty of inherent existence—have preceded their conclusion with the mind of analysis. Therefore, these two [Nihilists and Proponents of the Middle] are very different. [བུདྡྷ་པཱ་ལི་ཏ་གིས་འདི་འདྲས་གསུངས་པ་ཡིན་ན་(སློང་ཉིད་རྟློགས་པ་)དེ་ལ་ཡུལ་དེ་ དག་གི་ངློ་བློ་ཉིད་མེད་པའི་རྣམ་པ་ཤར་བ་གཅིག་དགློས་ཀྱི་དེ་མ་ཤར་བར་ཡུལ་དེ་ དག་མི་སྣང་བ་ཙམ་གིས་མི་ཆློག་པས་]ཁབ་སེ། མེད་ལྟ་བས་དེ་ལྟར་མཐློང་བ་མ་རིག་ པའི་དབང་དང་དབུ་མ་པས་དངློས་པློ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་ངློ་བློ་ཉིད་མེད་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ གིས་མ་སྐྱེས་པ་སློགས་སུ་ལྟ་བས་ཁད་པར་ཆེ་བ་བཤད་པའི་ཕིར་རློ། [Buddhapālita's statement] entails [that with regard to the realization of emptiness a dawning of an aspect (that is, a meaning-generality) of the naturelessness of those objects is necessary, but without its dawning the mere non-appearance of those objects is not sufficient] because it explains that [the Nihilists and the Proponents of the Middle] are very different due to the fact that the Nihilists' seeing such is from the power of ignorance and the Proponents of the Middle see [phenomena] as not [inherently] produced and so forth by reason of the nonexistence of the inherent nature of all phenomena. See Jeffrey Hopkins, Maps of the Profound: Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Buddhist and NonBuddhist Views on the Nature of Reality (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2003), 825. 357 This is a response against the Nihilists' assertion that nonexistence and emptiness are equivalent. Their assertion and the first part of Buddhapālita's refutation go as follows: [The Nihilists say:] "This world or life does not exist as an effect of past lives. A future world does not exist. Also, spontaneously born sentient beings such as hell-beings do not exist," and so forth. What is the difference between their view and the view of the Proponents of the Middle that all things are not produced and do not cease? [Answer of Buddhapālita:] There is a great difference between these two. Not knowing the meaning of emptiness, you think that these two are similar. Acting with equanimity [that is, indifference] when one has not analyzed [to find that all sentient beings should be valued equally] and acting with equanimity when one has so analyzed are similar only in that both can be characterized as acting with equanimity. However, acting with equanimity but without analysis is involved in the entwinements of ignorance. Acting with equanimity when one has analyzed [is the result of knowledge and] is used by the Supramundane Victors. See Jeffrey Hopkins, Maps of the Profound (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2003), 825. 390 །གཉིས་པ་[ཟླ་བའི་ཞབས་ཀྱང་དེ་ལྟར་བཞེད་པར་]གྲུབ་སེ། 358ཚིག་གསལ་ལས། འདིར་ཁ་ ཅིག་དབུ་མ་པ་ནི་མེད་པ་བ་དང་ཁད་པར་མེད་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། [།གང་གི་ཕིར་དགེ་ བ་དང་མི་དགེ་བའི་ལས་དང༌། བྱེད་པ་པློ་དང༌། འབྲས་བུ་དང༌། འཇིག་རྟེན་ཐམས་ ཅད་རང་བཞིན་གིས་སློང་པར་སྨྲ་བ་ཡིན་ལ། །མེད་པ་པ་དག་ཀྱང་དེ་དག་མེད་དློ་ཞེས་ སྨྲ་བར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་པ་དེའི་ཕིར། དབུ་མ་པ་ནི་མེད་པ་པ་དང་ཁད་པར་མེད་དློ་ཞེས་ རྒློལ་པར་བྱེད་དློ།] དེ་ལྟར་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དབུ་མ་པ་དག་ནི་རྟེན་ཅིང་འབྲེལ་བར་ འབྱུང་བ་སྨྲ་བ་ཡིན་ལ། རྟེན་ཅིང་འབྲེལ་བར་འབྱུང་བའི་ཕིར་འཇིག་རྟེན་འདི་དང་ འཇིག་རྟེན་ཕ་རློལ་ལ་སློགས་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་སྨྲ་བར་བྱེད་དློ། །མེད་ པ་བ་དག་གིས་ནི་དེ་ལྟར་རྟེན་ཅིང་འབྲེལ་བར་འབྱུང་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར༑ རང་བཞིན་ གིས་སློང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་སློ་ནས་འཇིག་རྟེན་ཕ་རློལ་ལ་སློགས་པ་དངློས་པློ་མེད་པར་རྟློགས་པ་ མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕིར། [249] 359 The second reason [that is, that the glorious Candrakīrti also asserts such] is established because [Candrakīrti's] Clear Words says:360 Here some say, "The Proponents of the Middle are indistinguishable from Nihilists because they propound that virtuous and non-virtuous actions, agents, fruits, and all 358 The text reads zhes pa nas which I have replaced with the omitted part of the quote according to Candrakīrti's Clear Words. See Candrakīrti (zla ba grags pa, fl. 7th century C.E.), Clear Words, Commentary on (Nāgārjuna’s) "Treatise on the Middle" (dbu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa tshigs gsal ba, mūlamadhyamakavṛttiprasannapadā), Toh. 3860, dbu ma, vol. 'a, 117b.6. 359 Ibid., 117b.4-117b.7. This is Candrakīrti's commentary on Nāgārjuna's Treatise, XVIII.7cd, on which Buddhapālita comments in the above citation. The corresponding passage in Sanskrit is: atraike paricodayasi | nāstikāviśiṣṭā mādhyamikā yasmātkuśalākuśalaṃ karma kartāraṃ ca phalaṃ ca sarvaṃ ca lokaṃ bhāvasvabhāvaśūnyamiti bruvate | nāstikā api hotannāstīti bruvate | tasmānnāstikāviśiṣṭā mādhyamikā iti | naivam | kutaḥ | pratītyasamutpādavādino hi mādhyamikā hetupratyayān prāpya pratītya samutpannatvātsarvamevehalokaparalokaṃ niḥsvabhāvaṃ varṇayanti | yathā svarūpavādino naiva nāstikāḥ pratītyasamutpannatvādbhāvasvabhāvaśunyatvena na paralokādyabhāvaṃ pratipannāḥ | See Louis de La Vallée Poussin, Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapdā Commentaire de Candrakīrti, Bibliotheca Buddhica 4 (Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag, 1970), 368.4368.10. 360 Adapted from Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 826. 391 worlds [that is, lives]361 are empty of inherent existence, and the Nihilists also say that these are nonexistent. Therefore, Proponents of the Middle are indistinguishable from Nihilists." It is not so. "How?" The Mādhyamikas are proponents of dependent-arising; they say that due to arising dependent on, or reliant on, causes and conditions all—this world, the next, and so forth—lack inherent existence. The Nihilists do not realize362 future worlds [that is, future lives] and so forth as non-things363 because of being empty of inherent existence due to being dependent-arisings. ལུང་ས་ཕི་འདི་གཉིས་ཀྱིས་ལྟ་བ་རྟློགས་ཚད་ཀྱང་ཤེས་པར་གིས༑ Through these former and latter passages [by Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti], understand the measure of realizing the view! 2nd Wrong idea: The Translator Taktshang holds that valid establishment of conventionalities (kun rdzob) is not necessary for realizing emptiness ཡང་སག་ལློ་ན་རེ། ཐ་སྙད་ལ་ཞིབ་མློ་མི་ཤེས་ཀྱང་སློང་ཉིད་རྟློགས་ནུས་པས་སློང་ཉིད་ རྟློགས་པ་ལ་ཐ་སྙད་ཚད་གྲུབ་མི་དགློས་ཏེ། དློན་དམ་པ་ཀུན་རློབ་ལས་གཞན་ཡིན་པའི་ ཕིར་ ཟེར་ན། 364 Moreover, the Translator Taktshang says, "Since, despite not knowing the details with regard to conventions (tha snyad, vyāvahāra), one can realize emptiness, conventions do not have to be validly established because the ultimate is other than conventionalities (kun rdzob)." 361 Lives as fruits of moral actions. Skt. pratipannāḥ. 363 "Non-things" (dngos po med pa, abhāva) could be translated as "without thingness." Since Candrakīrti states that the Mādhyamikas assert that this world and so forth lack inherent existence when he says, "The Mādhyamikas are proponents of dependent-arising; they say that due to arising dependent on, or reliant on, causes and conditions all—this world, the next, and so forth—lack inherent existence," "non-things" needs to be understood in the context of the previous passage. That is, "non-thing" does not mere nonexistence or non-effective thing, but the absence of inherent or true existence. 364 It is hard to know what "other (gzhan)" actually means. If it means different entity (ngo bo gzhan), the Geluk sect would not agree. If it means just other (gzhan), that is to say, different, then the Geluk sect would agree with it because the relation between the two truths is the same entity but different isolates (ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad). 362 392 ཐ་སྙད་ཚད་གྲུབ་འཇློག་མི་ཤེས་པར་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་རྟློགས་མི་སིད་པར་ཐལ། ཚད་ གྲུབ་འཇློག་མི་ཤེས་པར་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་བཟུང་བས་སློང་ཉིད་རྟློགས་པར་འཇློག་ མི་ཐུབ་པའི་ཕིར། [ཚད་གྲུབ་འཇློག་མི་ཤེས་པར་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་བཟུང་བས་སློང་ ཉིད་རྟློགས་པར་འཇློག་མི་ཐུབ་པ་]དེར་ཐལ། སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་ལྟ་བུ་ལ་[ཚད་གྲུབ་འཇློག་མི་ ཤེས་པར་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་བཟུང་བས་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕིའི་སེང་གི་སློང་པ་ཉིད་ རྟློགས་མི་ཐུབ་པ་]དེའི་ཕིར། It follows that without knowing [how to] posit the valid establishment of conventions it is impossible to realize naturelessness because without knowing [how to] posit valid establishment, it cannot be posited that emptiness is realized through holding that [phenomena] are natureless. It follows [that without knowing how to posit valid establishment, it cannot be posited that emptiness is realized through holding that phenomena are natureless] because [without knowing how to posit valid establishment,] with regard to former and later births [it cannot be posited that the emptiness of former and later births is realized through holding that former and later births are natureless]. [སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་ལྟ་བུ་ལ་ཚད་གྲུབ་འཇློག་མི་ཤེས་པར་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་ བཟུང་བས་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕིའི་སེང་གི་སློང་པ་ཉིད་རྟློགས་མི་ཐུབ་པ་]དེར་ཐལ། དཔེར་ན། རྒྱང་ཕན་པས་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་བཟུང་བ་དེ་སློང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ལྟ་བ་མ་ཡིན་ པའི་ཕིར། It follows that [without knowing how to posit valid establishment with regard to former and later births it cannot be posited that the emptiness of former and later births is realized through holding that former and later births are natureless,] because the Āyata365 holding former and later births as natureless, for example, is not a view of emptiness. [རྒྱང་ཕན་པས་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་བཟུང་བ་དེ་སློང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ལྟ་བ་མ་ཡིན་ པ་]དེར་ཐལ། དེ་ཆད་ལྟ་ཡིན་ལ་དབུ་མ་པས་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་བཟུང་བ་ rgyang phan pa (āyata) also called lokāyata ('jig rten rgyang phan pa). According to a Tibetan oral etymology (ngag dbang legs ldan), lokāyata ('jig rten rgyang phan pa) etymologically means "Flung Afar from the world" and is pejorative as Jamyang Shaypa says, "Because they have gone apart from the correct view, they are Ayatas [literally, Those Who Are Flung Afar]." They are moral Nihilists. See Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 96. 365 393 དེ་ལྟ་བ་རྣམ་དག་ཡིན་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་རིམ་བཞིན་དུ་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་གྲུབ་པ་མི་འདློད་པ་ དང་། འདློད་པའི་དབང་གིས་ཡིན་ པའི་ཕིར་ཏེ། It follows [that the Āyatas' holding former and later births as natureless is not a view of emptiness] because the reason why the [Āyatas' view] is a view of annihilation but the Middle Proponents' holding former and later births as natureless is a pure view is respectively due to [the Āyatas'] not asserting but [the Middle Proponents'] asserting establishment in conventions. ཚིག་གསལ་ལས། གལ་ཏེ་དེ་ལྟ་ན་ཡང་དེ་དག་གི་དངློས་པློའི་རང་བཞིན་གི་ངློ་བློར་ ཡློད་པ་མིན་པ་ཉིད་དུ་རྟློགས་པའི་ཕིར་རེ་ཞིག་ལྟ་བ་འདིའི་སློ་ནས་མཚུངས་པ་ཡློད་དློ་ ཞེ་ན་མེད་དེ་དབུ་མ་པ་དག་གིས་ཀུན་རློབ་ཏུ་ཡློད་པར་ཁས་བངས་པའི་ཕིར་ལ། དེ་ དག་གིས་ཁས་མ་བངས་པའི་ཕིར་མི་མཚུངས་སློ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕིར། This is because [Candrakīrti's] Clear Words says: [Objection:] Even if that is the case because [the Āyatas'] realize that the entity of the nature of those is not existent, at this point, they are similar by way of this view. [Answer:] They are not because the Proponents of the Middle assert them as conventionally existent, and because those [that is, the Āyatas] do not assert [such]. Hence they are not similar. རེ་རིན་པློ་ཆེས་ལྟ་བ་མ་རེད་བར་དུ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་དང་མེད་པའི་ཁད་པར་མི་ ཕེད་གསུངས་པས་ཀྱང་ཤེས་སློ།། Also, from Tsongkhapa's saying that until the view [of emptiness] is found, the difference between naturelessness (rang bzhin med pa) and nonexistence (med pa) is not distinguished, it is known [that without knowing how to posit the valid establishment of conventions it is impossible to realize naturelessness (tha snyad tshad grub 'jog mi shes par rang bzhin med pa rtogs mi srid pa)]. 3rd Wrong idea: The Āyatas and the Mādhyamikas have the same view and mode of holding that former and later births are natureless དེ་ལ་ཁློ་ན་རེ། རྒྱང་ཕན་པས་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་བཟུང་བ་ཆད་ལྟ་མ་ཡིན་ པར་ཐལ། [རྒྱང་ཕན་པ་]དེས་[སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་]དེ་ལྟར་མ་རྟློགས་ཀྱང་ 394 དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་དང་བཟུང་ཚུལ་མཐུན་པའི་ཕིར། [རྒྱང་ཕན་པ་དེས་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་ བཞིན་མེད་པ་དེ་ལྟར་མ་རྟློགས་ཀྱང་དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་དང་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་ པར་བཟུང་ཚུལ་མཐུན་པ་]དེར་ཐལ། སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་ལ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་གང་ཞིག དེ་ གཉིས་ཀས་[སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་]དེ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་བཟུང་བའི་ཕིར་ན་ With regard to the [difference between the Āyatas and the Proponents of the Middle on naturelessness and nonexistence,] someone [incorrectly] says: It [absurdly] follows that the Āyatas' holding that former and later births are natureless is not a view of annihilation because although they do not realize [naturelessness] as [the Proponents of the Middle do within knowing how to posit the valid establishment of conventions], the Middle view and mode of holding [that former and later births are natureless] accord with [the Āyatas' holding that former and later births are natureless]. It follows that [the Middle view and mode of holding that phenomena are natureless accord with the Āyatas' holding that former and later births are natureless] because (1) former and later births are natureless and (2) both of them hold that those [former and later births] are natureless. [སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་ལ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་གང་ཞིག་(རྒྱང་ཕན་པ་དང་དབུ་མ་པ་)དེ་གཉིས་ ཀས་(སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་)དེ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་བཟུང་བ་ཡིན་ན་(རྒྱང་ཕན་པ་)དེས་(སྐྱེ་བ་ ས་ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་)དེ་ལྟར་མ་རྟློགས་ཀྱང་དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་དང་བཟུང་ཚུལ་མཐུན་ པ་ཡིན་པས་]མ་ཁབ་སེ། ཡུལ་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་ལ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་ པར་མཚུངས་ཀྱང་ རྟློགས་པ་པློའི་བློའི་ཞེ་ཕུག་ཐ་དད་པའི་དབང་གིས་དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་ཡིན་མིན་སློ་སློར་ བཞག་པའི་ཕིར། [250] [Our response: That (1) former and later births do not have nature and (2) both of them hold that those former and later births are natureless] does not entail [that the Middle view and mode of holding that phenomena are natureless accord with the Āyatas' holding that former and later births are natureless] because although they are similar [in holding that] the objects, former and later births, are natureless, whether it is the Middle view or not is posited separately due to differences in the inner modes of the realizers' awarenesses. [ཡུལ་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་ལ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་མཚུངས་ཀྱང་རྟློགས་པ་པློའི་བློའི་ཞེ་ཕུག་ཐ་ དད་པའི་དབང་གིས་དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་ཡིན་མིན་སློ་སློར་བཞག་པ]དེར་ཐལ། དཔེར་ན་མི་ རྐུན་མར་ངློ་ཤེས་མ་ཤེས་གཉིས་ཀས་འདི་རྐུན་མ་ཡིན་ཞེས་སྨྲས་ཚེ་རྐུན་མ་ཤེས་པས་ 395 རྐུན་མ་ངློས་ཟིན་པ་དང་ཅིག་ཤློས་ཀྱིས་ངློས་མ་ཟིན་པར་འཇློག་པ་བཞིན་ཡིན་པའི་ ཕིར། It follows [that although they are similar in holding that the objects, former and later births, are natureless, whether it is the Middle view or not is posited separately due to differences in the inner modes of the realizers' awarenesses] because it is like, for example, that when both someone who identified a man as a robber and another who did not identify such say, "He is the robber," it is posited that the one who knew the robber identified the robber and the other one did not identify the robber. བུདྡྷ་པཱ་ལི་ཏ་ལས། །གཞན་ཡང་དཔེར་ན་ཁ་ཅིག་རློད་པ་ན་[དློན་བདེན་པར་འགྱུར་ བ་ཁློ་ན་ལ་ཆེ་བཞི་གཉིས་སློན་པར་གྱུར་ལ། དེ་ན་གཅིག་ནི་དློན་དེ་མངློན་སུམ་དུ་ མཐློང་བ་ཡིན་ལ་གཉིས་པ་ནི་དློན་དེ་མངློན་སུམ་དུ་མཐློང་བར་གྱུར་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་ ནློར་ངློའམ་མཛའ་ངློས་གཉེར་བ་ཞིག་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེ་གཉི་ག་ཡང་དློན་དེ་ལ་སྨྲར་བཅུག་པ་ ན། དེ་ལ་གཅིག་གིས་དློན་དེ་ཇི་ལྟར་བདེན་པ་དེ་ལྟར་སྨྲས་སུ་ཟིན་ཀྱང་དློན་དེ་མངློན་ སུམ་དུ་ཡང་མ་གྱུར་པའི་ཕིར་བརྫུན་དུ་ཡང་འགྱུར་ལ་ཆློས་མ་ཡིན་པ་དང་མི་སྙན་པ་ དང་ཡང་ལན་པར་འགྱུར་རློ། །ཅིག་ཤློས་ཀྱིས་ནི་དློན་དེ་སྨྲས་པ་ན་དློན་དེ་མངློན་སུམ་ དུ་གྱུར་པའི་ཕིར་བདེན་པར་སྨྲ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན་ལ་ཆློས་དང་སྙན་པ་དག་དང་ཡང་ལན་ པར་འགྱུར་བ་]དེ་བཞིན་དུ། དངློས་པློ་ཐམས་ཅད་སློང་པ་ཡིན་ཞིང་སློང་པའི་ཕིར་མ་ སྐྱེས་པ་དང་མ་འགགས་པ་དེ་ཡིན་དུ་ཟིན་ཀྱང༌། དེ་གང་ལ་མངློན་སུམ་གིས་ ཤེས་པ་ ཡློད་པ་དེ་ཉིད་ལེགས་པ་དང་ལན་ཅིང་བསགས་པ་ཡིན་གི། ཅིག་ཤློས་ནི་སློང་པ་ཉིད་ མངློན་སུམ་དུ་མ་གྱུར་པའི་ཕིར་ལྟ་བའི་སྐྱློན་གིས་ཀྱང་གློས་ལ་མཁས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ སད་པར་ཡང་འགྱུར་བས། དེའི་ཕིར་དེ་གཉིས་ནི་ཁད་པར་ཤིན་ཏུ་ཆེ་སེ་ཞེས་གསུངས་ པའི་ཕིར། 366 367 The brackets are from the Buddhapālita Commentary on Nāgārjuna's Treatise of the Middle, the chapter on Analysis of Self, XVIII.12 (Toh. 3842, dbu ma, vol. tsha, 243b.2-243b.6); also see Saito, "A Study of the Buddhapālita," 253-254; Christian Lindtner, "Buddhapālita on Emptiness," Indo-Iranian Journal 23, no. 3 (1981):196. 367 Lindtner prefers gyi. 366 396 because Buddhapālita's Commentary says:368 Moreover, for example, at the time of dispute two witnesses testify with regard to what is the true fact. Between them, one directly saw the fact, but the other did not directly see the fact, and is mistaken,369 or is on the side of a friend.370 When both of them are also made to speak with regard to that, the latter has spoken the fact as it is in truth, but because the fact was not even directly [seen, the latter's testimony] is false and also endowed with impropriety and ill repute. When the other one says speaks the fact, then because the fact was directly [seen], it is a true statement and endowed with propriety and repute. Likewise, although it is a fact that all phenomena are empty and because of being empty are not produced and not ceased, those who [that is, the Proponents of the Middle] have knowledge by direct perception of it [that is, emptiness,] are endowed with goodness and are praised, but because the other [that is, the Āyatas] do not directly [see] emptiness, they are polluted by the defects of view371 and derided by the wise. Hence, these two are very different. [བུདྡྷ་པཱ་ལི་ཏ་ལས་དེ་འདྲས་གསུངས་པ་ཡིན་ན་དཔེར་ན་མི་རྐུན་མར་ངློ་ཤེས་མ་ཤེས་ གཉིས་ཀས་འདི་རྐུན་མ་ཡིན་ཞེས་སྨྲས་ཚེ་རྐུན་མ་ཤེས་པས་རྐུན་མ་ངློས་ཟིན་པ་དང་ ཅིག་ཤློས་ཀྱིས་ངློས་མ་ཟིན་པར་འཇློག་པ་བཞིན་ཡིན་པས་]ཁབ་སེ། ལྟ་བའི་སྐྱློན་གིས་ ཀྱང་གློས་ལ་ཞེས་པའི་དློན་ཡློད་པའི་ཕིར་དང་། ཚིག་གསལ་ལས་ཀྱང་། གལ་ཏེ་དངློས་ པློ་[མ་གྲུབ་པ་] མཚུངས་སློ་ཞེས་ན་གལ་ཏེ་ཡང་དངློས་པློ་མ་གྲུབ་པ་མཚུངས་པ་ཉིད་ 372 368 Without Christian Lindtner's translation, I could not have understood this part. See Lindtner, "Buddhapālita on Emptiness," 206-207. 369 What the mistake is is unclear; it might mean "to be bribed" as Lintner speculates. 370 In a similar context, mdza' in Candrakīrti's Clear Words means friendly. See Candrakīrti, Clear Words, 118a.3. 371 The view that former and future lives do not exist is the defective view here. 372 The brackets here and the next brackets are inserted according to Candrakīrti's Clear Words (Toh. 3860, dbu ma, vol. 'a, 118a.2-118a.3) since this material is omitted in Jamyang Shaypa's Decisive Analysis. I have confirmed that these parts are also left out in two other editions; see 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa, "dbu ma la 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs," in gsung 'bum/_'jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje, TBRC W21503.9 (South India: Gomang College, 1997), 103a.6-103b.1, http://tbrc.org/link?RID=O00CHZ010751|O00CHZ01075100JW501034$W21503; 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa, dbu ma la 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs (Beijing, China, krung go'i bo rig pa dpe skrun khang, 2004), 187. The corresponding passage in Sanskrit is: vastutastulyateiti cet// yathyapi vastuo'siddhistulyā tathāpi pratipattṛbhedādatulyatā/ yathā hi kṛtacauryaṃ puruṣamekhaḥ samyagaparijñyāyaiva tadamitrapreritastaṃ mithyā vyācaṣṭe cauryamanena kṛtamiti/ bhedastathāpi parijñātṛbhedādekastatra mṛṣābādityudyate/ aparastu satyavādīti, ekaścāyaśasā cāpuṇyena ca samyak parīkṣyamāṇo yujyate nāparaḥ/ 397 ཡིན་པ་དེ་ལྟ་[ན་]ཡང་རྟློགས་པ་པློ་ཐ་དད་པས་མི་མཚུངས་པ་ཉིད་དློ། །འདི་ལྟ་སེ། དཔེར་ན་རྐུས་བྱས་པ འི་མི་ཞིག་ལ༑ [གཅིག་གིས་ནི་ཡང་དག་པར་མི་ཤེས་བཞིན་དུ་ དེ་དང་མི་མཛའ་བས་སྦུད་ནས་འདིས་བརྐུས་སློ་ཞེས་དེ་ལ་ལློག་པར་སྨྲ་བར་བྱེད་ལ། གཞན་ནི་དངློས་སུ་མཐློང་ནས་སུན་འབྱིན་པར་བྱེད་དློ།] ཞེས་སློགས་གསུངས་པའི་ ཕིར། 373 374 [Buddhapālita's saying this] entails [that it is like, for example, that when both someone who identified a man as a robber and another who did not identify such say "He is the robber," it is posited that the one who knew the robber identified the robber and the other one did not identify the robber,] because the meaning of [his] statement "they are polluted by the defects of view" exists, and because Candrakīrti's Clear Words also says: [Objection:] They are the same [in holding] that things are not established. [Answer:] Even if they are just similar in holding that things are not established, they are just dissimilar because the realizers are different. It is as follows (de lta ste): For example, with regard to a man who has committed robbery, [without correctly knowing (who the robber is), one, having been incited by disliking him, wrongly says, "This man stole", but another, actually seeing (the robbery), does identify (that this man is the robber)]. 4th Wrong idea: The Āyatas' view of the naturelessness of former and later births is the same as the Mādhyamikas' view (1) See Poussin, Prasannapdā Commentaire de Candrakīrti, 368.16-369.3. 373 In the sde ge edition of Candrakīrti's Clear Words, for rkus byas pa read rku byas pa; however, all three editions of Jamyang Shaypa's Decisive Analysis that I refer to read it as rkus byas pa. See Candrakīrti, "dbu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa tshig gsal ba," in bstan 'gyur (sde dge), TBRC W23703.102 (Delhi: Delhi Karmapae Choedhey, gyalwae sungrab partun khang, 1982-1985), 118a.3, http://tbrc.org/link?RID=O1GS6011|O1GS60111GS36113$W23703); 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa, dbu ma la 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs, 250; 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa, dbu ma 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod (Beijing, China: pe cin nyug hran shin 'gyig par khang, 2004), 187; Jamyang Shaypa, "dbu ma la 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs." In gsung 'bum/ 'jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje, TBRC W21503.9 (South India: Gomang College, 1997). http://tbrc.org/link?RID=O00CHZ010751|O00CHZ01075100JW501034$W21503. 374 The passage in the brackets is inserted in order to assist understanding. See Candrakīrti, Clear Words, 118a.2-118a.4. 398 ཁློ་ན་རེ། རྒྱང་ཕན་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་ལྟ་བ་དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་ཡིན་ པར་ཐལ། སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་གནས་ལུགས་མཐར་ཐུག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར་ན་ Someone [incorrectly] says: It follows that the view in the Āyatas' [mental] continuum that former and later births are natureless is the Madhyamaka view because the naturelessness of former and later births is the final mode of subsistence. [སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་གནས་ལུགས་ མཐར་ཐུག་ཡིན་ན་རྒྱང་ཕན་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་ལྟ་བ་དབུ་མའི་ ལྟ་བ་ཡིན་པས་]མ་ཁབ། འློ་ན་བྱེ་སྨྲའི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་ལློངས་སྐུ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་ལྟ་བ་ དབུ་མའི་ལྟ་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ༑ ལློངས་སྐུ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་གནས་ལུགས་མཐར་ཐུག་ ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར། [Our response: That the naturelessness of former and later births is the final mode of subsistence] does not entail [that the view in the Āyatas' mental continuum that former and later births are natureless is the Madhyamaka view]. Well then, it [absurdly] follows that the view in the Vaibhāṣikas' [mental] continuum that a [Buddha's] enjoyment body (longs sku, saṃbhogakāya) is natureless is the Madhyamaka view because the naturelessness of an enjoyment body is the final mode of subsistence. འཁློར་གསུམ། [You have asserted] the three spheres [of self-contradiction]. དེ་བཞིན་དུ་སེམས་ཙམ་པའི་ཀུན་བཏགས་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་མ་གྲུབ་པར་ལྟ་བ་ སློགས་ལ་སྦྱློར་ཤེས་པར་བྱ༑ Likewise, know how to apply [this mode of refutation] to the Mind-Only Proponents’ view that the imputational nature is not established by way of its own character. 5th Wrong idea: The Āyatas' view of the naturelessness of former and later births is the same as the Mādhyamikas' view (2) ཡང་ཁློ་ན་རེ། རྒྱང་ཕན་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་[སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་ལྟ་བ་]དེ་འདྲ་དེ་རྟློག་ པ་དློན་མཐུན་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རྟགས་སར་གི་[སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་གནས་ ལུགས་མཐར་ཐུག་ཡིན་པ་]དེའི་ཕིར་ན་ཡང་[སྐྱེ་བ་ས་ཕི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་གནས་ ལུགས་མཐར་ཐུག་ཡིན་ན་རྒྱང་ཕན་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་དེ་འདྲ་དེ་རྟློག་པ་དློན་མཐུན་ཡིན་ པས་]མ་ཁབ། 399 Moreover, someone [incorrectly] says: It follows that such a view in the Āyatas' [mental] continuum [that former and later births are natureless] is a factually concordant conceptual consciousness (rtog pa don mthun) because of the previous reason [that is, that the naturelessness of former and later births is the final mode of subsistence]. [Our response: That the naturelessness of former and later births is the final mode of subsistence] does not entail [that such a view in the Āyatas' continuum that former and later births are natureless is a factually concordant conceptual consciousness]. འློ་ན་བྱེ་སྨྲའི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་ལློངས་སྐུ་[རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་]དེ་ལྟར་ལྟ་བ་དེ་རྟློག་པ་དློན་ མཐུན་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། [ལློངས་སྐུ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་གནས་ལུགས་མཐར་ཐུག་ཡིན་ པའི་]རྟགས་སར་བཞིན། Well then, it [absurdly] follows that the view in a Vaibhāṣika's continuum that a [Buddha's] enjoyment body is such [that is, natureless] is a factually concordant conceptual consciousness, the reason is as before, [that is, because the naturelessness of an enjoyment body is the final mode of subsistence]. འཁློར་གསུམ། [You have asserted] the three spheres [of self-contradiction]. 6th Wrong idea: Gorampa Sönam Senggé holds that any apprehension of forms is an apprehension of the four extremes and hence should be refuted ཡང་གློ་བློ་ན་རེ། རེ་རིན་པློ་ཆེས་རྟློག་པས་གང་བཟུང་གི་ཡུལ་ཐམས་ཅད་དེ་ཁློ་ན་ཉིད་ ལ་དཔྱློད་པའི་རིགས་པས་འགློག་པར་འདློད་པའི་ལློག་རྟློག་ཐམས་ཅད་ལློག་ པར་ འགྱུར་རློ་ གསུངས་པ་མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ། ཤེར་ཕིན་གི་མདློའི་དགློངས་པ་གཟུགས་ [251] 375 375 This passage seems to be from Gorampa's summary of Tsongkhapa's position in his Distinguishing the Views [of Emptiness]: Moonlight [To Illuminate] the Main Points of the Supreme Path (lta ba 'i shan 'byed theg mchog gnad kyi zla zer). It is said: Hence, the mind that understands reality is the apprehension of emptiness alone—that is, of the emptiness of truth [that is arrived at] after having negated truth. If one properly identifies [what it means] to apprehend [things] as true (bden, 'dzin), one will come to understand that there are many conceptual thoughts that are neither of the two forms of the grasping at truth [of self and phenomena]. This counteracts all of the mistaken views (log rtog) that believe 400 སློང་མི་སློང་མཐའ་བཞི་དང་། དེ་དག་བྲལ་བའི་དབུས་གང་དུ་བློས་བཟུང་བ་མཐར་ འཛིན་ཡིན་པས་དགག་དགློས་པར་བཤད་ལ་ཁེད་རང་བདེན་པ་འབའ་ཞིག་བཀག་ ནས་དབུས་ལ་གནས་པར་འདློད་པ་མི་འཐད་ཟེར་ན༑ Moreover, Go-bo (go rams pa bsod nams seng ge, 1429-1489) says: It follows that the statement by Tsong-kha-pa: [When, in that way, you have identified well the apprehension of true existence, you will understand that there are many apprehensions that are not the two apprehensions of self. Consequently,] all wrong ideas of asserting that reasonings analyzing suchness refute all objects apprehended by conceptuality will be overcome. is not logically feasible; [for] the thought of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras is to be explained as being that howsoever forms are apprehended—as the four extremes of being empty or not empty376 or as the middle free from them—are apprehensions of extremes and hence must be refuted, and [thus] it is not logically feasible that you [Tsongkhapa,] having solely refuted truth [that is, true establishment (bden par grub pa),] assert that [forms] abide in the middle. that every object that is apprehended by a conceptual thought is negated by means of the reasoning that analyzes reality. དེ་ལྟར་བདེན་འཛིན་ལེགས་པར་ངློས་ཟིན་ན་བདེན་འཛིན་གཉིས་མིན་པའི་རྟློག་པ་དུ་མ་ཞིག་ཡློད་པར་ཤེས་པར་ འགྱུར་བས།་རྟློག་པས་གང་བཟུང་གི་ཡུལ་ཐམས་ཅད་དེ་ཁློ་ན་ཉིད་ལ་དཔྱློད་པའི་རིགས་པས་དགག་པར་འདློད་ པའི་ལློག་རྟློག་ཐམས་ཅད་ཟླློག་པར་འགྱུར་རློ༎ See José Ignacio Cabezón, and Geshe Lozang Dargyay, Freedom from Extremes: Gorampa's 'Distinguishing the Views' and the Polemics of Emptiness Studies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism (Boston, MA.: Wisdom Publications, 2007), 82-83. This passage is a citation from Tsongkhapa's Illumination of the thought: When, in that way, you have identified well the apprehension of true existence, you will understand that there are many apprehensions that are not the two apprehensions of self. Consequently, all wrong ideas of asserting that reasonings analyzing suchness refute all objects apprehended by conceptuality will be overcome. །དེ་ལྟར་བདེན་འཛིན་ལེགས་པར་ངློས་ཟིན་ན།་བདག་འཛིན་གཉིས་མིན་པའི་རྟློག་པ་དུ་མ་ཅིག་ཡློད་པ་ཤེས་པར་ འགྱུར་བས།་རྟློག་པས་གང་བཟུང་གི་ཡུལ་ཐམས་ཅད་དེ་ཁློ་ན་ཉིད་ལ་དཔྱློད་པའི་རིགས་པས་འགློག་པར་འདློད་ པའི་ལློག་རྟློག་ཐམས་ཅད་ལློག་པར་འགྱུར་རློ། See Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa's Final Exposition of Wisdom, 213. The Tibetan is from Tsong kha pa, Illumination of the Thought, 144. 376 The four extremes (mtha' bzhi) are, for instance, forms are empty, not empty, both empty, neither empty nor not empty. 401 འློ་ན་དློན་དམ་དཔྱློད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རིགས་པས་རང་བཞིན་འགློག་ལ་རྟེན་འབྱུང་སྒྱུ་མ་ལྟ་ བུའི་གཟུགས་སློགས་མི་འགློག་པའི་ཁད་པར་མི་ཕེད་པར་ཐལ། རིགས་པ་དེས་ཡུལ་གང་ ཡིན་ཐམས་ཅད་འགློག་པའི་ཕིར༑ [རིགས་པ་དེས་ཡུལ་གང་ཡིན་ཐམས་ཅད་འགློག་ པར་]རྟགས་ཁས། Well then, it [absurdly] follows that the distinction that reasoning analyzing the ultimate 377 refutes inherent existence but does not refute forms and so forth that are illusory-like dependent-arisings is not to be made because [according to you] that reasoning refutes all whatsoever objects. You have accepted the reason [that reasoning refutes all whatsoever objects]. [དློན་དམ་དཔྱློད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རིགས་པས་རང་བཞིན་འགློག་ལ་རྟེན་འབྱུང་སྒྱུ་མ་ལྟ་བུའི་ གཟུགས་སློགས་མི་འགློག་པའི་ཁད་པར་མི་ཕེད་པར་]འདློད་ན། ཚིག་གསལ་ལས། ཁློ་བློ་ ཅག་ནི་ལས་དང་བྱེད་པ་པློ་དང་འབྲས་བུ་ལ་སློགས་པ་མེད་དློ་ཞེས་སྨྲ་བ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། འློ་ ན་ཅི་ཞེ་ན་རང་བཞིན་མེད་དློ་ཞེས་རྣམ་པར་འཇློག་པ་ཡིན་ནློ་ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་ སློགས་མདློ་དང་བསན་བཅློས་དུ་མ་དང་འགལ་བར་འགྱུར་རློ། 378 If you [Gorampa] accept [that the distinction that reasoning analyzing the ultimate refutes inherent existence but does not refute forms and so forth that are illusory-like dependentarisings is not made,] you contradict many sūtras and treatises such as [Candrakīrti's] Clear Words which says: We are not propounding that "Action, doer, effect, and so forth do not exist." Why? We posit that inherent existence does not exist. 377 For the reasoning analyzing the ultimate, Thupten Jinpa explains: He (Tsongkhapa) states that any form of reasoning which examines in the following manner—i.e. whether all things and events such as form, etc. exist in a true mode of being or not (bden par yod dam med), or whether they come into being in an essential way or not (rang gin go bo'i sgo nas grub bam ma grub)—is an analysis pertaining to the ultimate status of objects in question. Such types of reasoning can also be called the 'analysis of the final status' (mthar thug dpyod byed). See Thupten Jinpa. "Delineating Reason's Scope for Negation: Tsongkhapa's Contribution to Madhyamaka's Dialectical Method." Journal of Indian Philosophy 26, no. 4 (1988):282. 378 Candrakīrti, Clear Words, 109a.7-109b.1. 402 7th Wrong idea: Taktshang the Translator holds that refuting the intellectually imbued apprehension of true existence through reasoning is sufficient །ཡང་རྣམ་བཤད་སློགས་ལས་མུ་སེགས་པ་དང་གྲུབ་མཐའ་སྨྲ་བ་ཁློ་ནས་བཏགས་པའི་ ཡུལ་བཀག་པས་ཐློགས་མེད་ནས་ཞུགས་པའི་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་བདེན་འཛིན་ལ་མི་གནློད་ གསུངས་པ་ ལ། སག་ཚང་པ་ན་རེ། [མུ་སེགས་པ་དང་གྲུབ་མཐའ་སྨྲ་བ་ཁློ་ནས་ 379 379 It seems that Jamyang Shaypa summarizes Tsongkhapa's introduction to the object of negation in his Illumination of the Thoughts: With regard to delineating the absence of true existence in phenomena, if you do not understand well just what true establishment is, as well as how [phenomena] are apprehended as truly existent, the view of suchness will definitely go astray. Shāntideva’s Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds says that if the thing imputed, the generality [or image] of the object of negation, does not appear well to your awareness, it is impossible to apprehend well the nonexistence of the object of negation: Without making contact with the thing imputed, The non-existence of that thing is not apprehended. Therefore, unless true establishment (which is what does not exist) and the aspect of the object of negation (which is that of which [phenomena] are empty) do not appear—just as they are—as objects of [your] awareness, good ascertainment of the lack of true establishment and of the entity of emptiness cannot occur. Furthermore, mere identification of (1) a true establishment that is superficially imputed by proponents of tenets and (2) [the consciousness] apprehending such true establishment is not sufficient. Because of this, it is most essential to identify well the innate apprehension of true establishment that has operated beginninglessly and exists both in those whose awarenesses have been affected through [study of] tenets and in those whose awarenesses have not been affected in this way, and to identify the true establishment apprehended by this [mind]. For if you have not identified these, even if you refute an object of negation through reasoning, the adherence to true establishment that has operated beginninglessly is not harmed at all, due to which the meaning at this point would be lost. See Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa's Final Exposition of Wisdom, 186. The Tibetan is: ཆློས་རྣམས་བདེན་མེད་དུ་གཏན་ལ་འབེབས་པ་འདི་ལ། བདེན་པར་གྲུབ་ཚུལ་དེ་ཇི་འདྲ་ཞིག་ཡིན་པ་དང་། བདེན་ པར་འཛིན་ཚུལ་ལེགས་པར་མ་ཤེས་ན། དེ་ཁློ་ན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ལྟ་བ་ངེས་པར་འཕྱུག་སེ། སློད་འཇུག་ལས། བརྟགས་པའི་ དངློས་ལ་མ་རེག་པར། །དེ་ཡི་དངློས་མེད་འཛིན་མ་ཡིན། །ཞེས་བརྟགས་པའི་དངློས་པློ་སེ་དགག་བྱའི་སི་ལེགས་ པར་བློ་ལ་མ་ཤར་ན། དགག་བྱ་དེ་མེད་པ་ལེགས་པར་འཛིན་མི་ནུས་པར་གསུངས་པས། མེད་རྒྱུའི་བདེན་གྲུབ་དང་། གང་གིས་སློང་པའི་དགག་བྱའི་རྣམ་པ་བློ་ཡུལ་དུ་ཇི་ལྟ་བ་བཞིན་མ་ཤར་ན། བདེན་མེད་དང་སློང་པའི་ངློ་བློ་ ལེགས་པར་ངེས་པ་མི་སིད་དློ། །དེ་ཡང་གྲུབ་མཐའ་སྨྲ་བས་འཕལ་དུ་ཀུན་བརྟགས་པའི་བདེན་གྲུབ་དང་། བདེན་ འཛིན་ངློས་ཟིན་པ་ཙམ་གིས་མི་ཆློག་པའི་ཕིར། ཐློག་མ་མེད་པ་ནས་རེས་སུ་ཞུགས་པ། གྲུབ་མཐས་བློ་བསྒྱུར་མ་ 403 བཏགས་པའི་ཡུལ་བཀག་པས་ཐློགས་མེད་ནས་ཞུགས་པའི་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་བདེན་འཛིན་ ལ་མི་གནློད་པ་]དེ་མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ༑ ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་བློ་ལའང་རྟག་འཛིན་དང་ས་ཕི་ གཅིག་འཛིན་ཡློད་པའི་ཕིར་ཟེར་ན་ Moreover, with respect to the statement in Tsongkhapa's Explanation [of (Candrakīrti's) "Entry to (Nāgārjuna’s) 'Treatise on the Middle'"] and so forth that refutation of objects imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly, the Translator Taktshang [incorrectly] says that this is not logically feasible because even among innate awarenesses there are apprehensions of permanence and of former and later [phenomena] as one. [ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་བློ་ལའང་རྟག་འཛིན་དང་ས་ཕི་གཅིག་འཛིན་ཡློད་པ་ཡིན་ན་མུ་སེགས་ པ་དང་གྲུབ་མཐའ་སྨྲ་བ་ཁློ་ནས་བཏགས་པའི་ཡུལ་བཀག་པས་ཐློགས་མེད་ནས་ཞུགས་ པའི་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་བདེན་འཛིན་ལ་མི་གནློད་པ་དེ་མི་འཐད་པས་]མ་ཁབ་སེ། ཁློ་ན་ཞེས་ པའི་རྣམ་བཅད་ཡློད་པའི་ཕིར། ཁློ་རང་ལ་འློ་ན་རྟག་འཛིན་ཡིན་ན་དེའི་ཡུལ་མུ་ སེགས་པས་བདག་རྟག་པར་སློ་བཏགས་པ་ལྟར་བཟུང་བས་ཁབ་པར་ཐལ། ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་ རྟག་འཛིན་གིས་[མུ་སེགས་པས་བདག་རྟག་པར་སློ་བཏགས་པ་]དེ་ལྟར་བཟུང་བའི་ ཕིར༑ [ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་རྟག་འཛིན་གིས་མུ་སེགས་པས་བདག་རྟག་པར་སློ་བཏགས་པ་དེ་ ལྟར་བཟུང་བར་]རྟགས་ཁས། [Our response:] There is no entailment [that if even among innate awarenesses there are apprehensions of permanence and of former and later (phenomena) as one, Tsongkhapa's statement is not logically feasible,] because there is something eliminated by "only." Well, for him, it [absurdly] follows that whatever is an apprehension of permanence is necessarily an apprehension in accordance with the Forders' superimposition that the self is permanent because an innate apprehension of permanence apprehends in that way [that is to say, in accordance with the Forders' superimposition that the self is permanent]. You have accepted the reason [that an innate apprehension of permanence apprehends in that བསྒྱུར་གཉིས་ག་ལ་ཡློད་པའི་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་བདེན་འཛིན་དང་། དེས་བཟུང་བའི་བདེན་གྲུབ་ལེགས་པར་ངློས་ཟིན་པ་ ནི་གནད་ཤིན་ཏུ་ཆེ་སེ། དེ་ངློས་མ་ཟིན་པར་རིགས་པས་དགག་བྱ་བཀག་ཀྱང་། ཐློག་མ་མེད་པ་ནས་ཞུགས་པའི་ བདེན་ཞེན་ལ་ཅི་ཡང་མི་གནློད་པས་སྐབས་དློན་སློར་བར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕིར་རློ། See tsong kha pa, Illumination of the Thought, 128-129. 404 way, that is to say, in accordance with the Forders' superimposition that the self is permanent]. [རྟག་འཛིན་ཡིན་ན་དེའི་ཡུལ་མུ་སེགས་པས་བདག་རྟག་པར་སློ་བཏགས་པ་ལྟར་ བཟུང་བས་ཁབ་པར་]འདློད་ན། དུད་འགྲློ་སློགས་གྲུབ་མཐར་མ་ཞུགས་པའི་རྒྱུད་ལ་ བདག་རྒྱུ་རྐྱེན་གང་ལས་མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་རྟག་འཛིན་ཡློད་པར་ཐལ། [དུད་འགྲློ་སློགས་གྲུབ་ མཐར་མ་ཞུགས་པའི་རྒྱུད་ལ་]བདག་མ་ཤི་བར་དུ་མི་འཇིག་པའི་རྟག་འཛིན་ཡློད་པའི་ ཕིར༑ [དུད་འགྲློ་སློགས་གྲུབ་མཐར་མ་ཞུགས་པའི་རྒྱུད་ལ་བདག་མ་ཤི་བར་དུ་མི་ འཇིག་པའི་རྟག་འཛིན་ཡློད་པར་]རྟགས་ས། [Our response:] If you accept [that whatever is an apprehension of permanence is necessarily an apprehension in accordance with the Forders' superimposition that the self is permanent], it [absurdly] follows that in the continuums of those who are not involved in tenet systems such as animals and so forth, there is apprehension that the self is permanent in the sense of not being produced from causes and conditions because [in the continuums of those who are not involved in tenet systems such as animals and so forth,] there is apprehension that the self is permanent in the sense of not disintegrating not until death. The reason [that is, that in the continuums of those who are not involved in tenet systems such as animals and so forth there is apprehension that the self is permanent in the sense of not disintegrating until death,] is easy [to establish]. [དུད་འགྲློ་སློགས་གྲུབ་མཐར་མ་ཞུགས་པའི་རྒྱུད་ལ་བདག་རྒྱུ་རྐྱེན་གང་ལས་མ་སྐྱེས་ པའི་རྟག་འཛིན་ཡློད་པར་]འདློད་ན། ར་བར། གང་དག་དུད་འགྲློར་བསྐལ་མང་བསྐྱལ་ གྱུར་པ། །དེས་ཀྱང་མ་སྐྱེས་རྟག་འདི་མ་མཐློང་ལ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ་ ལློ། If you accept [that in the continuum of animals not engaged in tenet systems, there is apprehension that the self is permanent in the sense of not being produced from causes and conditions], it [absurdly] follows that it is not logically feasible for [Candrakīrti's] the root text [Entry to (Nāgārjuna's) Treatise on the Middle] to say:380 380 VI.125ab. Hopkins, Maps of the Profound, 648. Citation is lengthened in order to contrast two different views of permanence. The whole stanza is: VI.125 །གང་དག་དུད་འགྲློ་བསྐལ་མང་བརྐྱལ་གྱུར་པ། །དེས་ཀྱང་མ་སྐྱེས་རྟག་འདི་མ་མཐློང་ལ། 405 This non-produced permanent [self imputed by Forders] is not perceived By those spending many eons as animals, [Yet consciousnesses conceiving "I" are seen to operate in them. Hence, there is no self other than the aggregates]. །གཞན་ཡང་བྱེ་མདློ་སློགས་ཀྱིས་དབུ་མར་མ་ཞུགས་ཀྱང་བདེན་འཛིན་གི་ཞེན་ཡུལ་ལ་ གནློད་པ་ཐུབ་པར་ཐལ། [མུ་སེགས་པ་དང་གྲུབ་མཐའ་སྨྲ་བ་ཁློ་ནས་བཏགས་པའི་ཡུལ་ བཀག་པས་ཐློགས་མེད་ནས་ཞུགས་པའི་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་ཀྱི་བདེན་འཛིན་ལ་མི་གནློད་པ་དེ་ མི་འཐད་པའི་]དམ་བཅའ་འཐད་པའི་ཕིར༑ Moreover, it [absurdly] follows that although the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas and so forth have not entered the Madhyamaka [view], they can harm the conceived object of the apprehension of true existence because [according to you] your thesis [that Tsongkhapa's statement—"Refutation of objects imputed only by Forders and Proponents of Tenets does not harm the apprehension of inherent existence that has operated beginninglessly"—is not logically feasible] is logically feasible. Conclusion of the debates from 1st to 7th བློད་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱ་ཁབ་ཆེ་བ་ཐང་སག་པ་དག་དང་ཁབ་ཆུང་བ་དགག་ས། འདི་དག་ནི་ རྣམ་བཤད་ཀྱི་དངློས་ཟིན་ཙམ་མ་ཡིན་པར་དགློངས་པའི་གཙོ་བློ་བཤད་པ་ཡིན་ནློ། It is easy to negate Tibetans whose object of negation is too broad such as [Zhang] Thangsakpa [Shönnu Gyeltshen (zhang thang sag pa gzhon nu rgyal mtshan)] and whose object of negation is too narrow. These [points that I have made here by seven debates] explain the main thought (dgongs pa'i gtso bo) [behind the explicit reading] and not just the explicit reading of [(Tsongkhapa's) Explanation [of (Candrakīrti’s) "Entry to (Nāgārjuna’s) 'Treatise on the Middle'"]. 8th Wrong Idea: Correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag) and correct sign (rtags yang dag) are the same །ངར་འཛིན་དེ་དག་ལ་ཡང་འཇུག་མཐློང་སེ། །དེས་ན་ཕུང་པློ་ལས་གཞན་བདག་འགའ་མེད། See Candrakīrti, dbu ma la 'jug pa, 210a.7-210b.1. 406 །ཡང་སློན་གི་ཁ་ཅིག་ན་ རེ༑ རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ལ་ཡློད་མེད་གཉིས་ འཇློག་ལ། རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་དང་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་བཟླློག་ ཟླར་གྱུར་པའི་དགག་བྱ་དློན་གཅིག་པར་འདློད། [252] Moreover, someone in an earlier period posited that there are two objects of negation by correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag gi dgag bya)—existent and nonexistent and asserted that object of negation by a correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag gi dgag bya) and object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum of a correct sign (rtags yang dag gi bsgrub bya'i bzlog zlar gyur pa'i dgag bya) are equivalent. དེ་ལ་སློན་གི་གཞན་དག་ན་རེ། བདེན་འཛིན་ཆློས་ཅན། བདེན་མེད་དུ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རྟགས་ ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར་ན་ [རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་ཡིན་ན་བདེན་མེད་དུ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་ དགག་བྱ་མ་ཡིན་པས་]མ་ཁབ་ཟེར། With regard to this, another early scholar said: If somebody said to me, "It follows that the subject, the apprehension of true existence, is not an object of negation by a correct sign proving [something] as not truly existent because of being a probandum of a correct sign," I would say "[Whatever is a probandum of a correct sign] is not necessarily [an object of negation by a correct sign proving the absence of true establishment]." དེ་ལ་འློ་ན་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་ཆློས་ཡིན་ན་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་ཡིན་དགློས་པར་ ཐལ། བདེན་འཛིན་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར། [དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་ ཆློས་ཡིན་ན་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་ཡིན་དགློས་པར་]འདློད་ན། ངློ་མཚར་ཆེ། [Our response:] Well then, with regard to this, it [absurdly] follows that whatever is the predicate of the probandum in a proof of something is necessarily the probandum in the proof of that something because [according to you] the apprehension of true existence is the probandum of a correct sign. If you accept [that whatever is the predicate of the probandum in a proof of something is necessarily the probandum in the proof of that something,] it is very amazing. ཡང་དམ་བཅའ་དང་པློ་[རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ལ་ཡློད་མེད་གཉིས་འཇློག་ལ། རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་དང་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་བཟླློག་ཟླར་གྱུར་ པའི་དགག་བྱ་དློན་གཅིག་པ་]ལ། བདེན་འཛིན་ཆློས་ཅན༑ རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་ 407 བྱའི་བཟླློག་ཟླ་གྱུར་པའི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་ པའི་ཕིར། [བདེན་འཛིན་ཆློས་ཅན་རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པ་]དེར་ཐལ། བདེན་མེད་དུ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར། Also, with regard to the first thesis [that is, that it is posited that there are two objects of negation by correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag gi dgag bya)—existent and nonexistent,] object of negation by a correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag) and object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum (sgrub bya, sādhya) proven by a correct sign (rtags yang dag) are equivalent,] it [absurdly] follows that the subject, the apprehension of true existence, is an object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum of a correct sign (rtags yang dag), because of being an object of negation by a correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag). It follows that [the subject, the apprehension of true existence, is an object of negation by a correct reasoning] because of being the object of negation by a correct reasoning proving the absence of true existence. [བདེན་འཛིན་ཆློས་ཅན་བདེན་མེད་དུ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་ པ་]དེར་ཐལ། [བདེན་མེད་]དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་འཐད་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར། [བདེན་མེད་སྒྲུབ་པའི་འཐད་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་ན་བདེན་མེད་དུ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པས་]ཁབ་སེ། རིགས་པ་དང་འཐད་པ་དློན་ གཅིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར། It follows [that the apprehension of true existence is an object of negation by a correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag),] because of being an object of negation by correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag) proving the absence of true existence. It follows [that an apprehension of true existence is an object of negation by correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag) proving the absence of true existence,] because of being an object of negation by a correct logicality ('thad pa yang dag) proving [the absence of true existence. Whatever is an object of negation by a correct logicality ('thad pa yang dag) proving the absence of true existence] is necessarily [an object of negation by correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag) proving the absence of true existence,] because reasoning (rigs pa) and logicality ('thad pa) are equivalent. [བདེན་མེད་དུ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་འཐད་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་ན་བདེན་མེད་དུ་སྒྲུབ་ པའི་རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པས་]མ་ཁབ་མཚམས་ཀྱི་[བདེན་འཛིན་ནི་ བདེན་མེད་དུ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་འཐད་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པ་]རྟགས་གྲུབ་སེ། 408 [བདེན་འཛིན་]དེས་བཟུང་བ་ལྟར་མི་འཐད་པས་[བདེན་འཛིན་]དེ་འཐད་པ་ཡང་ དག་གི་དགག་བྱར་སློང་བའི་ཕིར། At the point of the statement of no entailment [that is, that whatever is an object of negation by a correct logicality ('thad pa yang dag) proving [something] as not truly existent is not necessarily an object of negation by correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag) proving the absence of true existence,] the sign [that is to say, that the apprehension of true existence is an object of negation by a correct logicality proving the absence of true existence (bden 'dzin de sgrub kyi 'thad pa yang dag gi dgag bya yin pa)] is established because since [the apprehension of true existence] is not logically feasible in accordance with its apprehension, [the apprehension of true existence] comes to be an object of negation by a correct logicality. [བདེན་འཛིན་དེས་བཟུང་བ་ལྟར་མི་འཐད་པས་བདེན་འཛིན་དེ་འཐད་པ་ཡང་དག་ གི་དགག་བྱར་སློང་བ་]དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་གིས་[འཐད་པ་ཡང་དག་]དེའི་དགག་ བྱ་ལ་བདེན་འཛིན་ཞེན་ཡུལ་དང་བཅས་པ་གཉིས་ཀ་འཇློག་དགློས་པའི་ཕིར། རློད་ ཟླློག་ལས༑ ཡང་ན་ཁ་ཅིག་སྤྲུལ་པ་ཡི། །བུད་མེད་ལ་ནི་བུད་མེད་སྙམ། །ལློག་འཛིན་ འབྱུང་བ་སྤྲུལ་པ་ཡིས༑ ༑འགློག་བྱེད་འདི་ནི་དེ་ལྟ་ཡིན། །ཞེས་མི་ཁ་ཅིག་གིས་སྤྲུལ་པའི་ བུད་མེད་བུད་མེད་དངློས་གནས་སུ་འཛིན་པ་སྤྲུལ་པས་འགློག་པ་ནི། འགློག་བྱེད་ཅེས་ པ་ཡན་ཆད་ཀྱིས་སློན་ལ། འདི་ནི་དེ་ལྟ་ཡིན་ཞེས་པས་ཚིག་སྤྲུལ་པ་ལྟ་བུས་རང་བཞིན་ ཡློད་འཛིན་ཟླློག་པར་བཤད་པའི་ཕིར་རློ། It follows [that since (the apprehension of true existence) is not logically feasible in accordance with its apprehension, [the apprehension of true existence] comes to be an object of negation by a correct logicality,] because for that reason both an apprehension of true existence as well as [its] conceived object [that is, true establishment] must be posited as objects of negation by [a correct logicality] because [Nāgārjuna's] Refutation of Objections says: Or, someone's wrong apprehension thinking that a magically emanated woman is a [real] woman Is negated by [another] magical emanation. This [that is, the apprehension of true existence] is like that [that is, it is refuted by words that are like illusions]. That a man's apprehension of a magically emanated woman as a real woman is negated by [another] magical emanation is indicated by the first three lines, and "This is like that" explains that words like an emanation overcome the apprehension of inherent existence. 409 །ར་བ[་བདེན་འཛིན་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་བཟླློག་ཟླ་གྱུར་པའི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་ པ]ར་འདློད་ན། [བདེན་འཛིན་]དེ་ཆློས་ཅན། མེད་པར་ཐལ། རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་ བྱའི་བཟླློག་ཟླར་གྱུར་པའི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར༑ [བདེན་འཛིན་དེ་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ གི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་བཟླློག་ཟླར་གྱུར་པའི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པ་]རྟགས་ཁས། [རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་ བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་བཟླློག་ཟླར་གྱུར་པའི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་ན་མེད་པས་]ཁབ་སེ། [རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ གི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་བཟླློག་ཟླར་གྱུར་པའི་དགག་བྱ་]དེ་ཡློད་ན་དེ་ལྟར་དགག་མི་ནུས་པའི་ ཕིར། ལམ་རིམ་ལས། འདི་ཡང་རྟེན་འབྲེལ་གི་རྟགས་ཀྱིས་གང་ཟག་དང་ཆློས་ཀྱི་སེང་དུ་ རང་གི་ངློས་ནས་གྲུབ་པའི་རང་བཞིན་ཡློད་པ་འགློག་པ་ལྟ་བུ་རྣམས་ཡིན་ ནློ། །དགག་བྱ་འདི་ནི་ཤེས་བྱ་ལ་མེད་པ་གཅིག་དགློས་ཏེ། ཡློད་ན་དགག་པར་མི་ནུས་ པའི་ཕིར་རློ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕིར། [253] If you accept the root [consequence that the apprehension of true existence is an object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum of a correct sign,] it [absurdly] follows that the subject, [the apprehension of true existence,] does not exist because of being an object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum of a correct sign. You have accepted the reason [that is, that the apprehension of true existence is an object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum of a correct sign] because if [the object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum proving something] exists, such cannot be negated because [Tsongkhapa's] Great Stages of the Path says:381 These also are, for instance, refutations of inherent existence—that is to say, establishment from [the object's] own side—with respect to persons and phenomena by the sign of dependent-arising. This object of negation is necessarily something that does not exist among objects of knowledge because whatever exists cannot be refuted. 9th Wrong idea: A correct reasoning can refutes substratum 381 Tsong kha pa, The Great Exposition of Stages of the Path (byang chub lam rim chen mo), in gsung 'bum/_tsong kha pa (bkras lhun par rnying / d+ha sar bskyar par brgyab pa/), TBRC W29193.13 (Dharamsala, India: sherig parkhang, 1997), 420a.3-420a.4, http://tbrc.org/#library_work_ViewByVolumeW29193%7C5135%7C13%7C1%7C1080. An alternative translation of this passage is: For instance, dependent-arising refutes the essential or intrinsic existence of persons and phenomena. This latter object of negation cannot be among objects of knowledge because, if it did exist, then it could not be refuted. See Tsong-kha-pa, The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment: Volume Three, tr. the Lamrim Chenmo Translation Committee, ed. Joshua W. C. Cutler and Guy Newland, vol. 3 (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2002), 204. 410 བྱས་པ་ལ་ཁློ་ན་རེ། རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་བཟླློག་ཟླ་དགག་བྱ་ལ་མེད་པས་མ་ ཁབ་པར་ཐལ། མྱུ་གུ་མེད་པ་དེ་མྱུ་གུ་ཡློད་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་ བྱའི་བཟླློག་ཟླ་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར༑ [མྱུ་གུ་མེད་པ་དེ་མྱུ་གུ་ཡློད་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་བཟླློག་ཟླ་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པ་]དེར་ཐལ། མྱུ་གུ་ཡློད་པ་[མྱུ་ གུ་ཡློད་པར་གྲུབ་པའི་]དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར་ན་ With regard to that, someone says: It follows that there is no entailment that the object of negation that is the opposite of a probandum of a correct sign necessarily does not exist because nonexistence of sprout is the object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum of a correct sign proving that a sprout exists. It follows [that nonexistence of sprout is the object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum of a correct sign proving that a sprout exists] because that a sprout exists is the probandum in the proof of that. [མྱུ་གུ་ཡློད་པ་མྱུ་གུ་ཡློད་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་ཡིན་ན་མྱུ་གུ་མེད་པ་དེ་མྱུ་གུ་ཡློད་ པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་བཟླློག་ཟླ་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པས་]མ་ཁབ་སེ། [མྱུ་གུ་ཡློད་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་]དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་བཟླློག་ཟླ་ལ་མྱུ་གུ་མེད་པ་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ འཇློག་པའི་ཕིར་རློ། [Our response: That that a sprout exists is the probandum in the proof of that] does not entail [that nonexistence of sprout is the object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum of a correct sign proving that a sprout exists] because that a sprout is nonexistent is posited as the opposite of the probandum in the proof [that a sprout exists]. །ཁློ་རང་ལ་བདག་ཡློད་པ་དེ། རྟེན་འབྲེལ་གི་རྟགས་ཀྱིས་ཕུང་པློ་བདག་མེད་དུ་སྒྲུབ་ པའི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་དགག་བྱར་ཐལ་ལློ། །མྱུ་གུའི་འདློད་ཚུལ་འཐད་པའི་ཕིར། འདློད་ན། ཁད་གཞི་ཡང་དགག་རིགས་པར་ཐལ་ལློ།། [Our response:] For him, it [absurdly] follows that existence of self (bdag yod pa) is the object of negation of the probandum in the proof that the aggregates are selfless by the sign, dependent-arising, because [according to you, your] mode of assertion with regard to a sprout [that is, that the nonexistence of sprout is the object of negation that is the opposite of the probandum of a correct sign proving that a sprout exists] is logically feasible. If you accept [that existence of self is the object of negation of the probandum in the proof that the aggregates are selfless by the sign, dependent-arising,] it very [absurdly] follows that it is reasonable to refute even the substratum. 411 2.2. Our own system རང་ལུགས་ལ། སྐབས་འདིར་སློང་ཉིད་ངེས་པ་ལ་ཐློག་མར་དགག་བྱ་ངློས་ཟིན་དགློས་ཏེ། དེ་ངློས་མ་ ཟིན་ན་དེ་བཀག་པའི་སློང་པ་ངློས་མི་ཟིན་པའི་ཕིར། སིར་དགག་བྱ་ལ་ལམ་གི་དགག་ བྱ་དང་རིགས་པའི་དགག་བྱ་གཉིས་ཡློད་པ་ལས་ལམ་གི་དགག་བྱ་ལ་ཡློད་པ་གཅིག་ དགློས་ཏེ། དེ་མེད་ན་སེམས་ཅན་ཐམས་ཅད་རང་གྲློལ་དུ་འགྲློ་བ་དང་། ལམ་སློམ་པའི་ ངལ་བ་དློན་མེད་དུ་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕིར་རློ༑ On this occasion, in order to ascertain emptiness it is necessary initially to identify the object of negation because if [the object of negation] is not identified, the emptiness that negates [the object of negation] is not identified. In general, there are two [types] of objects of negation: objects of negation by the path and objects of negation by reasoning; among them, within the objects of negation by the path, there must be an existent because if there is not [an existent object of negation by the path], all sentient beings would be self-released, and the hardship of practicing the path would be meaningless. ༑རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ལ་ལློག་འཛིན་དང་དེས་བཟུང་བའི་ཡུལ་ལ་དགག་ བྱར་བྱས་པ་གཉིས་ཡློད་དེ། དཔེར་ན་ལྟློས་པའི་རིགས་པའི་དགག་བྱ་ལ་དངློས་པློ་རྒྱུ་ རྐྱེན་ལ་མ་ལྟློས་པར་བཟུང་བ་ དང་དེའི་ཡུལ་གཉིས་ཀ་མི་འཐད་པའམ་མི་རིགས་ པས་ན་དགག་བྱར་མཛད་པ་ལྟ་བུ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར༑ 382 With respect to objects of negation by correct reasoning, two types are taken as objects of negation—wrong apprehensions and the objects apprehended by them—because it is like, for example, the fact that with regard to objects of negation by the reasoning of dependence, since both (1) the apprehension of a thing as not depending on causes and conditions and (2) its object [that is, a thing’s not depending on causes and conditions] are not logically feasible and not reasonable, they are taken as objects of negation. རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་ལ་ལྟློས་པའི་དང་འཐད་པ[ར]་སྒྲུབ་པའི་དང་བྱ་བ་བྱེད་པའི་དང་ ཆློས་ཉིད་ཀྱི་རིགས་པ་བཞི་ཡློད་ཀྱང་བསྡུས་ན་གཉིས་སུ་འདུ་སེ། དློན་དམ་དཔྱློད་པ་ 382 By this, Jamyang Shaypa seems to emphasize the action of negation, not consciousness. 412 དང་ཐ་སྙད་དཔྱློད་པའི་རིགས་པ་གཉིས་སུ་འདུ་བའི་ཕིར། འཐད་པ་དང་རུང་བ་དང་ རིགས་པ་དློན་གཅིག་སེ། རྣམ་བཤད་རིགས་པར་དེ་ལྟར་གསུངས་པའི་ཕིར། Although there are four [types] of correct reasoning—the reasoning of dependence, of logicality, of the performance of function, and of nature (gnas lugs)—when summarized, they are included within two [types,] because [these four] are included into the reasoning of analyzing the ultimate and the reasoning of analyzing conventions. 383 Logically feasible ('thad pa), suitable (rung ba), and reasonable (rigs pa) are equivalent because (Vasubhandu’s) Principles of Explanation (rnam bshad pa'i rigs pa, vyākyayukti) says such. འཐད་རིགས་དང་བློ་རིག་གི་རིག་པ་དློན་མི་གཅིག་སེ། བློད་སྐད་ལ་ས་མཐའ་ཡློད་མེད་ མི་འདྲ་ལ། རྒྱ་སྐད་ལ་ཡང་ཡློཥིར་འཐད་རིགས་དང་། བིདྱ་བློ་རིག་ལ་འཇུག་པས་ས་ ཡང་མི་ འདྲ་ལ་དློན་མི་དྲ་བ་ཡང་སར་གི་དེས་ཤེས་པའི་ཕིར། དེས་ན་འཐད་པའི་ [254] 383 For the four types of correct reasonings, Tsongkhapa explains in his Great Exposition of Stages of the Path: Searching for reasoning is of four types: (1) the reasoning of dependence is that effects arise in dependence on causes and conditions. You search from the distinctive perspectives of the conventional, the ultimate, and their bases. (2) The reasoning of performance of function is that phenomena perform their own functions, as in the case of fire performing the function of burning. You search, thinking, "This is the phenomenon, this is the function, this phenomenon performs this function." (3) The reasoning of tenable proof is that something is proven without being contradicted by valid knowledge. You search, thinking, "Is this supported by any of the three forms of valid knowledge—perception, inference, and reliable scripture?" (4) The reasoning of reality gives you confidence in the reality of things as known in the world— e.g., the reality that fire is hot and water is wet—or confidence about inconceivable realities, or confidence about the abiding reality; it does not consider any further reason as to why these things are that way. Hopkins explains: The four reasonings are general Buddhist approaches to knowledge through investigating causation, function, affirmation or contradiction by valid cognition, and the nature of objects. 1. 2. 3. 4. The reasoning of dependence is from the viewpoint that the arising of effects depends on causes and conditions. The reasoning of performance of function is from the viewpoint that phenomena perform their respective functions, such as fire performing the function of burning. The reasoning of tenable proof is to prove a meaning without contradicting valid cognition, direct, inferential, or believable scripture. The reasoning of nature is to examine from the viewpoint of (1) natures renowned in the world, such as heat being the nature of fire and moisture being the nature of water, (2) inconceivable natures such as placing a world-system in a single hair-pore, and so forth. 413 བཟླློག་ཟླ་ལ་རིགས་པའི་དགག་བྱར་བྱ་སེ། རིགས་པ་བཞིའི་བཟླློག་ཟླ་མི་རིགས་པ་བཞི་ ལ་དགག་བྱར་བྱེད་པར་རེ་ཡབ་སས་ཀྱི་གསུང་རབ་ཀུན་གློ་བསྡུར་ན་ཐློན་པ་དེའི་ཕིར། The [rigs pa of] 'thad rigs ('thad pa dang rigs pa logicality and reasoning)384 and the rig pa of blo rig (awareness and knowledge) are not equivalent because in Tibetan the presence and absence of the suffix sa differ, and in Sanskrit the terms also differ since yoṣir is used for [the rigs pa of] 'thad rigs (logicality and reasoning) and vidya is used for [the rig pa of] blo rig (awareness and knowledge), and also that the meanings differ is to be known from the earlier [discussion] (the 8th wrong idea, see ). Therefore, the opposite of logicality is taken as the object of negation by reasoning because when comparing the high speech (gsung rab, pravācana) of Tsongkhapa and his spiritual sons [Khédrupje and Gyeltshapje], it turns out that the four non-reasonables which are the opposites of the four reasonings are taken as objects of negation. རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་དང་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་དློན་མི་གཅིག་པས་དེ་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡང་ དློན་མི་གཅིག་ལ། རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་མེད་པར་མཁས་དབང་ཆློས་འབྱུང་ དང་སག་ལུང་གྲགས་པའི་གསུང་ལྟར་ལེགས་ཏེ། སར་གི་ལུང་རིགས་དེ་དག་སློགས་ མང་བའི་ཕིར་རློ། །འདིར་ཡང་དེའི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་སློ། ། Because correct reasoning (rigs pa yang dag) and correct sign (rtags yang dag) are not equivalent, the objects of negation by [a correct reasoning and a correct sign] are also not equivalent, and it is proper that, in accordance with statements by the lords of scholars [Gungru] Chökyi Jungné and Taklung Drakpa [Lodrö Gyatsho] 385 that the objects of negation by correct signs do not exist because there are the manifold scriptures and reasonings, those [cited] earlier and so forth. རློད་སྤློང་ལ་ 2.3 Dispelling Objections 1st Debate ཁློ་ན་རེ། བདེན་འཛིན་གིས་བདེན་པར་བཟུང་བ་ཆློས་ཅན། མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ༑ རིགས་ པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར། [བདེན་འཛིན་གིས་བདེན་པར་བཟུང་བ་ 384 385 rigs pa in the context of 'thad pa, and the other way around. stag lung grags pa blo gros rgya mtsho (1546-1618, P715). He was the 30th Throne holder of Ganden. 414 རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པ་]རྟགས་ཁས། [བདེན་འཛིན་གིས་བདེན་པར་ བཟུང་བ་རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པར་]འདློད་ན། [བདེན་འཛིན་གིས་ བདེན་པར་བཟུང་བ་]དེ་ཆློས་ཅན། མེད་པར་ཐལ། [བདེན་འཛིན་གིས་བདེན་པར་ བཟུང་བ་]མི་འཐད་པའི་ཕིར་ན་ Someone says: It follows that the subject, the apprehension 386 of [something] as truly existent by an apprehension of true existence,387 is not logically feasible because of an object of negation by a correct reasoning. You have asserted the reason [that is, that the apprehension of (something) as truly existent by an apprehension of true existence is an object of negation by correct reasoning]. If you accept [that the apprehension of (something) as truly existent by an apprehension of true existence, is not logically feasible,] it [absurdly] follows that the subject, [the apprehension of (something) as truly existent by (a consciousness) apprehending true existence,] does not exist because [the apprehension of (something) as truly existent by an apprehension of true existence] is not logically feasible. [བདེན་འཛིན་གིས་བདེན་པར་བཟུང་བ་མི་འཐད་པ་ཡིན་ན་བདེན་འཛིན་གིས་བདེན་ པར་བཟུང་བ་དེ་མེད་པ་ཡིན་པས་]མ་ཁབ། ཁློ་རང་ལ། ཕི་རློལ་པའི་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་ ཡློད་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རིགས་པ་དང་བཤད་ཚུལ་རེ་རེ་ནས་ཆློས་ཅན། མེད་པར་ཐལ། [ཕི་ རློལ་པའི་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་ཡློད་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རིགས་པ་དང་བཤད་ཚུལ་]མི་འཐད་ པའི་ཕིར། འཁློར་གསུམ། Our response: [That the apprehending (of something) as truly existent by an apprehension of true existence (note: apprehension of true existence here is not action apprehending true existence, but consciousness apprehending true existence) is not logically feasible] does not entail [that the apprehending (of something) as truly existent by an apprehension of true existence does not exist]. For him [that is, for the opponent,] it [absurdly] follows that each of the subjects, the Outsiders' reasonings proving the existence of a self of persons and their modes of explanation, do not exist because [the Outsiders' reasonings proving the existence of a self of persons and their modes of explanation] are not logically feasible. You have asserted the three [spheres of selfcontradiction]. 2nd debate 386 387 bzung ba means action. consciousness. 415 ཡང་ཁློ་ན་རེ། བདེན་འཛིན་ཆློས་ཅན། དློན་དམ་དཔྱློད་པའི་རྟགས་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་ པར་ཐལ༑ དློན་དམ་དཔྱློད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རིགས་ཤེས་རེས་དཔག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕིར་ ན་ Moreover, someone says: It follows that the subject, the apprehension of true existence, is an object of negation of a sign analyzing the ultimate because of being an object of negation of an inference that is a rational consciousness analyzing the ultimate. [དློན་དམ་དཔྱློད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རིགས་ཤེས་རེས་དཔག་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་ན་དློན་དམ་དཔྱློད་ པའི་རྟགས་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པས་]ཤིན་ཏུ་མ་ཁབ། Our response: There is utterly no entailment [that whatever is an object of negation of an inference that is a rational consciousness analyzing the ultimate is necessarily an object of negation of a sign analyzing the ultimate]. འློ་ན་[ཁློད་ཀྱི་འདློད་པ་ལྟར་ན༑] བདེན་མེད་རྟློགས་པའི་ཤེས་རབ་དེ་བདེན་མེད་དུ་ སྒྲུབ་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱར་ཐལ༑ [བདེན་འཛིན་དློན་དམ་དཔྱློད་པའི་ རྟགས་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་]དམ་བཅའ་འཐད་པའི་ཕིར། Well then, it [absurdly] follows that the wisdom realizing the absence of true existence is a probandum of a correct sign proving the absence of true existence because [according to you your] thesis [that is, that the apprehension of true existence is the object of negation of a sign analyzing the ultimate,] is logically feasible.