Philosophical Literature: Tibet Although Tibetan lacks an emic term that might correspond to “philosophy”, there is certainly an indigenous conceptual domain that can broadly be characterized as philosophical. This territory is to some extent demarcated by terms such as lta ba (“view”; Skt. darśana), which has been understood in contradistinction to spyod pa (“conduct”; Skt. caryā). Some basic tenets of faith go unquestioned, including belief in the efficacy of the three jewels (the Buddha, his teachings, and his community), the workings of karma, the existence of past and future lives, and the need to act morally and observe ethical codes. These have generally not been subject to challenge, even theoretically, and exhibit relatively few signs of historical variation. Conversely, the correct “view”, or correct philosophical stance, has represented disputed ground, and served as the subject of controversy and debate. The Tibetan commentarial and debate traditions – deemed principally to be the province of the scholarly community – have been preoccupied with these issues. Philosophical views and interpretations have been questioned and revised, and debate of philosophical issues has been seen as permissible. Trenchant disagreements between scholars and schools have occasionally developed, but these have generally not been seen as impinging upon the aforementioned basic issues of faith and morality. The main exception concerned views that were deemed to be nihilistic, such as those attributed to the Chinese monk Hwa shang Mahāyāna (see below), which have been depicted as undermining crucial Buddhist principles. Furthermore, from an early stage, Tibetan authors have organized non-Tibetan (principally Indic) materials doxographically, distinguishing different schools and traditions in terms of competing or hierarchical systems of philosophical tenets. Historically, a number of topics dominated Tibetan philosophical discussion. These included most centrally the nature and relationship between the two truths, the absolute and conventional (don dam; Skt. paramārtha; and kun rdzob; Skt. saṃvṛti), especially the ontological status, coherence, and verifiability of conventional reality; understandings of the buddha nature or the essence of buddhahood (de bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po; Skt. tathāgatagarbha), © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2015 Also available online – www.brill the innate factor that serves as the basis for an individual’s eventual enlightenment; the relevance to the path of conceptual thought and analytical reasoning; and how freedom from conceptual constructs is to be understood. Despite the more universal themes – such as the exact relationship between philosophy and contemplative practice – that these might be said to address, the fascination with these topics must be seen as the legacy of Tibetan attempts to make sense of the extremely diverse sets of teachings and traditions that entered their lands from India and surrounding territories during the first centuries of the introduction of Buddhism, from the 7th century ce onwards. The Madhyamaka (Dbu ma; “Middle Way”) philosophy of Mahāyāna Buddhism, championed by Nāgārjuna (fl. c. 150–250 ce) and his major commentators, made a major impact at an early stage, and subsequent generations of Tibetan religious authors have almost exclusively claimed some form of allegiance to Nāgārjuna’s system. However, simultaneously, scriptures (such as the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra) and treatises important to the other major branch of Mahāyāna philosophy, the Yogācāra (Rnal ’byor spyod pa), attributed to Maitreya, or composed by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu (fl. 4th cent. ce and c. 350–430, respectively), also became influential. Both these and the varieties of tantric teachings that flowed into Tibet seemed to call for a far more affirmative stance on consciousness, buddha nature, and various aspects of the path than was immediately apparent in the anti-realist approach of the Madhyamaka, with its heavy emphasis upon negation. Ever since, there have been attempts to reconcile the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra systems, whether by presenting some form of syncretized version of their teachings, or organizing them hierarchically, within a doxographical model. A third important aspect of Buddhist philosophy to enter Tibet from India was the Pramāṇa (Tshad ma) or logico-epistemological tradition – as described by Dignāga (fl. c. 500 ce) and Dharmakīrti (fl. c. 625 ce). Discussions about the pertinence and viability of the analytical approach that this topic encouraged began during the formative period of Buddhism in Tibet. Tantra also flourished in India and Nepal BEB, vol. I 622 Philosophical Literature: Tibet during this time, and huge numbers of materials and teachings were imported into Tibet. Meanwhile, from China, Chan Buddhist teachings also made an impression. Both these and the tantric teachings dealt with the spiritual path in a radically different fashion than that advanced by supporters of the analytical approach. The roots of the indigenous system of Rdzogs chen (Great Perfection), with its own notions regarding thought and conceptualization, can similarly be traced back to this time. The aforementioned favored topics of Tibetan philosophical literature grew largely from attempts to organize and resolve apparent conflicts between these different systems, and they furthermore grapple with issues of authenticity and emphasis. Some broad categories of periodization have been proposed for the development of the thought and writings of some of the traditions. D. Seyfort Ruegg divides the Tibetan development of Madhyamaka philosophy into four periods: (1) preliminary assimilation during the 8th and 9th centuries ce; (2) complete assimilation during the 10th to the 14th centuries; (3) the classical period – roughly the 14th–16th centuries; and (4) the scholastic period (16th cent. onward; Seyfort Ruegg, 1981, 207–29). Four phases have also been distinguished for the Pramāṇa tradition: (1) the ancient period (8th and 9th cents. ce); (2) the preclassical period (mainly the 10th and 11th cents.); (3) the classical period (12th to 15th cents.); and (4) the post-classical period (15th cent. onward; van der Kuijp, 1989; 1983 for a broader review of Pramāṇa literature in the 11th to the 13th cents.). This periodization is partly acknowledged in indigenous literature by the use of the terms snga rabs pa (“former generation[s]”) and phyi rabs pa (“later generation[s]”), by means of which Tibetan authors would seek to categorize earlier writers according to historical period and intellectual affinities. These categories would then be contrasted and criticized. Periodization is judged mainly in terms of the perceived innovations introduced by authors, or the critical responses that certain writings provoked. Some works mentioned below seem to have made an almost immediate impact, and interest in them has remained almost constant, while others fell into obscurity for long periods of time, only to reemerge more recently. Yet others perhaps only ever enjoyed limited popularity (either locally or among the religious elites). Tibetan authors often wrote in response to earlier philosophical writings, but frequently remained vague about the identity of the works they had in mind. The historical record also undoubtedly has numerous distortions, due to bipartisan religious reporting, including questionable assertions of continuity. Much work remains to be done to build up a more balanced historical picture of the impact and significance of individual texts and authors. Philosophy within Limits As is the case in Indian Buddhist literature, Tibetan authors have commonly projected the philosophical enterprise as a means of uniting “text” (lung; Skt. āgama) with “intellectual enquiry” or “reasoning” (rigs pa; Skt. yukti). However, perhaps the most important underlying concept and organizing principle in the philosophical literature of Tibet is that of “upholding the tradition.” Authors have neither identified nor advertised the exercise they have been engaged in as one of philosophizing. Instead, they have seen themselves as heirs to a tradition, which could be traced back to the teachings of the Buddha. A general decline in standards and the specificities of circumstance and audience to which the original teachings were delivered have been cited as reasons why the original message became increasingly obscure, and also justified the necessity for a commentarial tradition. Disputes – often focusing upon relatively minor points of philosophy and doctrine – have essentially concerned the question of who held the correct interpretation of the point under debate. Discussions centered less upon canonical than commentarial evidence, with a focus on determining which of the successive generations of Indic (and later Tibetan) writers maintained and transmitted the “correct” position – advertised as the Buddha’s true “intent” (dgongs pa, dgongs don, etc.). In many respects Tibetan philosophical writings remained remarkably faithful to their predecessors, particularly to later Indian traditions. Some Western scholars speak of an Indo-Tibetan tradition. This seems to imply that Tibetan philosophers simply continued where their Indic counterparts stopped, while in reality, there was a considerable amount of philosophical creativity and innovation. However, due to the emphasis upon maintaining the tradition, to propose that someone had produced an “inventive” work (rang bzo) was a serious charge. It was Philosophical Literature: Tibet therefore invariably necessary for Tibetan scholars to disguise innovation as rediscovery. Related to the above principle is the Tibetan urge to present an integrated vision. Partly in an attempt to bring order to the thousands of works from diverse sources absorbed by the Tibetan Buddhist tradition over the centuries, Tibetan thinkers attempted to create an integrated system, in which apparently diverse or even contradictory teachings and traditions, as presented in Indian canonical works, were not only projected as compatible, but as elements of a single, harmonious whole. This has most commonly been presented by the Tibetan tradition as the integrated understanding of sūtra and tantra. It has also been expressed in the creation of canons, most centrally the Kanjur and Tanjur, which involved editorial decisions that occasionally led to works being excluded on the grounds that they were judged corrupt or inauthentic. The pursuit of the integrated vision, in particular, led to a doxographical organization in which Indian Buddhist philosophical schools – despite their sometimes opposing positions – have all been recognized as being based on the Buddha’s teachings. They have, however, often been projected as representing a hierarchical progression, leading to the final philosophical position – the true understanding of reality. The perceived necessity to organize according to the doxographical model and thereby present a unified vision greatly influenced Tibetan scholarly interpretations of scriptural and historical sources. Tibetan philosophical literature can be divided into a number of distinct, but related, areas (exegetical, pedagogical, and polemical) and genres. Commentarial literature, a category that encompasses subgenres such as ’grel ba (Skt. vṛtti) and ’grel bshad (Skt. ṭīkā), is the clearest example of the Tibetan continuity with regard to Indian writings, and includes titles (or subgenres) bearing the Sanskrit or hybrid Sanskrit-Tibetan names of ṭīka and ṭīk chen (“great commentary”). Many of these works, such as the tshig ’grel (lit. word commentary), provide a line-by-line or word-by-word commentary to a text, whereas the don ’grel (lit. meaning commentary), for instance, focuses more upon a text’s import. Others vary from this format, concentrating only upon particular sections, or especially abstruse elements – for example, the dka’ ’grel (“explanation of difficult points”). Still others, bearing titles such as brjed byang (“memorandum”) or zin bris (“notes”), are presented more as personal study aids, but have been treated as commentarial literature by 623 later generations of Tibetan scholars. The extent to which these subgenres represent a continuity or a departure from genres of Indic commentarial literature, and the degree to which the categories represent substantially different – rather than nominally distinct – formats and genres require further investigation. The gradual rise of scholasticism and the debate tradition led to the production of textbook materials with philosophical content, including the large variety of “manuals” (yig cha) used in the monastic colleges (Newland, 1996) and the “summary” format (bsdus pa), which sometimes facilitated memorization. Scholarly discussion and dispute also resulted in a philosophical subgenre called dgag lan: polemical rejoinders, often exchanged between those belonging to different schools (Lopez, 1996). Interest in doxographical organization also spurred the popularity of the grub mtha’ (Skt. siddhānta) genre (Hopkins, 1996). Background: Philosophy and Philosophical Literature The enterprise of translating Buddhist texts, primarily from Indic languages, was first undertaken in the Tibetan imperial era (7th to 9th cents. ce). Translation continued even beyond the demise of Buddhism in India in the 12th century, although it, along with various Buddhist institutions and traditions, was interrupted by the break-up of the Tibetan empire in the mid-9th century. The arrival and spread of Buddhism in Tibet are traditionally referred to in terms of two periods, the so-called “earlier dissemination” (snga dar) and “later dissemination” (phyi dar). In these periods, different schools of Tibetan Buddhism developed. The Rnying ma school (“Old” tradition) traces its roots primarily to the translations and religious figures from the imperial period. Other schools are referred to collectively as Gsar ma (“New” traditions), and associate themselves more directly with translations and founder figures from the post-imperial period. The philosophically significant Gsar ma schools are the Bka’ brgyud, Bka’ gdams, Sa skya, Jo nang, and Dge lugs. The old-new dichotomy, however, is of limited use in understanding divisions between these schools. While there is also a philosophical dimension to these divisions, regional history, political events and alignments, loyalties and resistance histories are often more relevant to understanding their differences. 624 Philosophical Literature: Tibet The Imperial Period, the 8th and the 9th centuries ce The initial introduction of Buddhism into Tibet is usually projected as a state-sponsored exercise. Bsam yas, the first monastery in Tibet, was founded during the reign of the Tibetan ruler Khri srong Lde’u btsan (742– 794? ce). It is celebrated as the site of what is now commonly referred to as the “Samye Debate,” between the Chinese master Moheyan (Hwa shang Mahāyāna) and the Indian master Kamalaśīla (for an early study see Demiéville, 1952). Khri srong Lde’u btsan is reported to have adjudicated, and ruled that Buddhism in Tibet should follow the Indian, rather than the Chinese, model. Some of the earliest known descriptions of Bsam yas’ foundation and the debate are contained in the Dba’ bzhed or Sba bzhed (Testament of Dba’/Sba; Wangdu & Diemberger, 2000). Numerous Tibetan scholars demonize the Chinese protagonist in the debate and attribute to him nihilistic views on philosophy and morality. However, imperial-era writings, such as those discovered in Dunhuang, suggest that the monk’s view was closer to a form of Chan Buddhism (for evidence related to the debate based on Chinese language materials, see Demiéville, 1952; Pachow, 1979; Gómez, 1983). Early debates, although apparently touching upon issues of the respective traditions’ claims to authenticity, seem also to have pitted those who favored a more analytical method against those who were inclined toward a more quiescent approach. The tussle introduced one of the first serious philosophical discussions, with those supporting the Indian “gradualist” (rim gyis; Skt. krameṇa) approach to enlightenment opposing the notion of “sudden” or “simultaneous” (cig c[h]ar ba) enlightenment. This informed later debates, particularly regarding buddha nature and the relationship between the unenlightened and enlightened mind (Seyfort Ruegg, 1989). The gradualist approach generally prevailed, but the influences of the sudden approach remained, particularly in Tibetan Rdzogs chen philosophy (Karmay, 1988). The arrival, during the first dissemination period, of the Indian scholar Śāntarakṣita (c. 725–788 ce), and his disciple Kamalaśīla (c. 740–795 ce), who is reported to have been Hwa shang Mahāyāna’s opponent during the Samye debate, left a significant mark upon Tibetan intellectual thought. Śāntarakṣita, in his seminal work, Madhyamakālaṃkāra (Dbu ma rgyan; Ornament of the Middle Way; D 3884/ P 5284; trans. Blumenthal, 2004), propounds a Yogācāra-Madhyamaka synthesis. This became the standard way of understanding the relationship between the two traditions during the early period, and the text’s presentation of the two truths served as the principal interpretation for the later Rnying ma school. Śāntarakṣita’s position was elaborated upon by Kamalaśīla, in works such as his Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā (Dbu ma’i rgyan gyi dka’ ’grel; Commentary on Difficult Points of the Madhyamakālaṃkāra; D 3886/ P 5286). Early Buddhist narrative (such as that contained in the Dba’ bzhed) concentrated on the heroic exploits of foreign Buddhist masters who arrived in Tibet, and the activities of Tibetan translators. The state was heavily involved in the project of translating mainly Indic Buddhist texts, with Bsam yas as an early center. Attempts were made to standardize translation terminology, through production of official dictionaries, such as the late 8th-early 9th-century Sanskrit-Tibetan lexicon Mahāvyutpatti (Bye brag rtogs byed chen mo; Great Volume of Precise Understanding; D 4346/P 5832; ed. Ishihama & Fukuda, 1989). This includes substantial lists of philosophical terminology, not only related, for instance, to Buddhist Pramāṇa, but also of non-Buddhist schools, such as the Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika. Similarly, as outlined in a related text, the Sgra sbyor bam po gnyis pa (Word Combination in Two Parts; D 4347/P 5833; ed. Ishikawa, 1990), rules were established for the creation of translation teams, comprised of Tibetans working in conjunction with Indian scholars. In addition to historical trends in India, availability of Indian masters and texts was obviously a significant factor determining which philosophical works were translated during this early stage. Long before the finalization of the Kanjur and Tanjur compendia in the 13th-14th century, catalogues that listed text collections at imperial courts, such as the ’Phang thang ma (Halkias, 2004), divided translations of Indian commentaries (śāstra) taxonomically, according to philosophical content, differentiating between the two great branches of Mahāyāna thought, the Yogācāra (also known as Cittamātra, sems tsam) and Madhyamaka. Tibetan translators from the early period are traditionally celebrated (and venerated) primarily for producing faithful renderings of a pre-existing tradition, but clearly they also had a major role in editorship and literary organization, shaping Tibetan understandings of that tradition. The beginnings of what developed into an independent Tibetan tradition of philosophical literature are apparent in the Lta ba’i khyad par (Varieties Philosophical Literature: Tibet of Views), composed by Sna nam Ye shes sde (late 8th–early 9th cent. ce), translator of the aforementioned treatises by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. A version of this work was recovered among the cache of Dunhuang manuscripts (Pelliot 5847), and despite its Tibetan authorship, it was also incorporated into the Tanjur (D 4360/P 5847). The work does not provide exegesis of any specific scripture or treatise, but represents an early foray into commentarial writing. As with later writings, it combines explanation of selected scriptural passages, and engages in cross-textual analyses, establishing principles and hierarchical (doxographical) organization (Snellgrove, 2002 [1987], 439; Seyfort Ruegg, 1981). The work advertises itself as a brjed byang (“memorandum”), rather than a commentary, as though it constituted collected notes from a specific teaching. However, it is obvious that Ye shes sde made a very considered attempt to present a unified vision of the Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrine, path, and philosophy. The Lta ba’i khyad par acknowledges the separate emergence of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra philosophies in India, and the hermeneutical discussions of scripture related to the two. Anticipating a later doxographical division (between the Sautrantrika-svātantrika-madhyamaka and the Yogācārasvātantrika-madhyamaka), Ye shes sde identifies two distinct forms of Madhyamaka, and seems to feel that the latter, the syncretic model of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, has settled the issue of the relation between the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra systems. The 10th to the 12th centuries Traditionally portrayed as the period during which Buddhism was reestablished in Central Tibet, the so-called later dissemination of Buddhism took place in the centuries immediately following the collapse of the Tibetan empire, a period of flux and innovation. A new generation of translators, most notably Lo tsa ba Rin chen bzang po (958–1055), who travelled to India, and Indian teachers, such as Atiśa (980–1054), who arrived in Tibet, gave rise to a new set of translations and teaching lineages, which formed the basis of the various Gsar ma schools, all of which arose during this time, with the exception of the Jo nang and Dge lugs, which developed later. Growing literary confidence saw the development of new literary genres, and translator-authors, such as Rngog Blo ldan shes rab (1059–1109), produced the first wave of indigenous commentarial literature. 625 The roots of Rdzogs chen seem to lie in a system of meditative practice which developed during the imperial era, and drew inspiration and terminology from tantric yoga, as found in the Guhyagarbha­ tantra (Rgyud gsang ba snying po; TBRC W12652; van Schaik, 2004). Already during this time, the features that would later be seen as characterizing Rdzogs chen doctrine were apparent, including the stress upon nonconceptuality and nonduality, and the encouragement of practitioners to recognize the natural state of their own minds, rather than to strive for any “external” enlightenment. As the Rnying ma school was forging a separate identity from the Gsar ma schools, Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po (11th cent.) attempted to place the Rdzogs chen system in some form of philosophical framework. Several of this Rnying ma author’s compositions are overtly doxographical in nature. These include a commentary to the Man ngag lta ba’i phreng ba, a treatise attributed to Padmasambhava (TBRC W24519) – apparently one of the earliest works in Tibet with a truly doxographical character – and his Lta ba dang grub mtha’ sna tshogs pa brjed byang du bgyis pa (Notes on Various Views and Philosophical Systems Set Down as a Memorandum; TBRC W21617). In these, and several other writings, Rong zom referred to what appears to already have become a standard framework, in which Indian Buddhist schools were divided according to their respective philosophies: into the realist Bye brag smra ba (Vaibhāṣika) and Mdo sde pa (Sautrāntika) schools, associated with non-Mahāyāna thought, and the Mahāyāna philosophies of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka. In his Snang ba lhar bsgrub (Establishing Appearances as Divine; trans. Köppl, 2008), Rong zom criticized the Madhyamaka system for what he saw as its failure to appreciate the inseparability of the two truths, and expressed some disdain for what he considered to be the intellectualization of the spiritual path. Frequent references to the primordial (ye nas) understanding indicate that he was sympathetic to the simultaneous approach to enlightenment, one of the two tendencies debated at Bsam yas. Rong zom’s notion of the unified system resulted in his arguing that the vehicle of tantra (mantrayāna) was superior to that of sūtra (sūtrayāna), and that while a correct understanding begins with the tantric system of thought, it could only be fully gained through the embrace of Rdzogs chen. In the Snang ba lhar bsgrub he argued against what he saw as the Madhyamaka tendency for the reification of the relative, proposing that the relative had to be appreciated as a 626 Philosophical Literature: Tibet manifestation of the deity. This blend of sūtra and tantra elements is one that was largely rejected in the scholastic traditions of the Gsar ma, which increasingly sought to understand the philosophical distinctions and commentarial traditions of sūtrarelated systems in their own right (without necessarily endorsing their contents as representing the final view). Developments connected to the monastery of Gsang phu (Gsang phu sne’u thog) of the Bka’ gdams tradition, established in 1073 (the same year as Sa skya monastery) by Rngog Legs pa’i shes rab (fl. early to late 11th cent.) turned out to have a large impact on the state of Tibetan Buddhist philosophy. His nephew and successor as abbot was Rngog Blo ldan shes rab (1059–1109), who has been referred to as the “father of Tibetan scholasticism” (Jackson, 1994, 372; for an account of Rngog Blo ldan shes rab’s life see Kramer, 2007). In addition to his major contributions as a translator, Rngog Blo ldan shes rab promoted the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka synthesis position of Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and Jñānagarbha. His translations of texts from the cycle “The Five Dharmas” of Maitreya (Byams chos sde lnga; TBRC W2CZ8058), attributed to Maitreya (and Asaṅga) and other associated works helped establish the topic of Phar phyin (the exposition of aspects of Prajñāpāramitā sūtras) as a distinct scholastic field in Tibet. In relation to the Abhisamayālaṃkāra (TBRC W3JT13413), one of the aforementioned five dharmas, in particular, his work confirmed the primacy of the commentarial tradition emanating from Haribhadra (Seng ge bzang po, fl. 8th cent.). In Rngog’s Rgyud bla ma don bsdus pa, a “Summary” (commentary) to another of the five dharmas (TBRC W1PD104832), the Mahāyānottaratantra (Theg pa chen po’i rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos, D 4024/ P 5525; also known as the Uttaratantra or Ratnagotravibhāga), he argued that the buddha nature should be identified with emptiness, rather than equated with some variety of consciousness, or a certain quality therein. Crucially, through both his translations and commentaries, Rngog Blo ldan shes rab founded the Tshad ma gsar ma (“New Pramāṇa”) tradition, a fresh approach to epistemology. The earlier tradition attributed to Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla was favorable to the epistemological approach, but Rngog Blo ldan shes rab was far more systematized and more successful in establishing the importance of the topic. His explanations of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya (entitled Tshad ma rnam nges kyi dka’ gnad rnam bshad, in the Rgyud bla ma don bsdus pa, vol. I, 83–389) was one of the first indigenously composed commentaries, and – as with Kamalaśīla’s earlier treatment of Śāntarakṣita’s Madhyamakālaṃkāra – dealt with the work not by line-by-line exposition, but by focusing upon the treatise’s “difficult points” (dka’ gnad). Rngog’s Tshad ma rnam nges kyi bsdus don, however, provided a “topical summary” (don bsdus or bsdus don) of the same text (Kramer, 2007, 109 n. 161). He employed the summary format for dealing with three of the five dharmas of Maitreya: the Uttara­ tantra (Jackson, 1993), the Abhisamayālaṃkāra (see Mngon par rtogs pa’i rgyan gyi ’grel pa’i bsdus don, D 3795/P 5193), and the Madhyāntavibhāga (Dbus mtha’ don bsdus). Despite the disappearance of many of his compositions (a number of which have recently resurfaced in the Bka’ gdams gsung ’bum; TBRC W1PD89051), the reputation of the sixth abbot of Gsang phu (c. 1152–1169), Ph(w)ya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169), remains considerable. He is credited with creating the first general summary (bsdus pa) of Dharmakīrti’s thought in Tibet, in the form of his Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel (Clarifying Ignorance regarding the Pramāṇa Treatises; TBRC W1PD89051, 434–630). He is reported to have composed more than one version of a text bearing this name, and thereby “initiated a literary genre of Summaries that has proven immensely successful” (Dreyfus, 1997, 22). It is uncertain whether Phya pa based himself on an earlier Tibetan text of the same format, but there appear to be no Indian precedents for this sort of work in which topics within Pramāṇa are addressed systematically (van der Kuijp, 2002, 384– 389). Phya pa is also seen as instrumental in transforming debate into a pedagogical tool. Not only are his summaries considered the predecessor of the later Dge lugs bsdus grwa textbooks (see below), but popular tradition says that he was the first to propose that debate should be presented in the form of consequences (thal ’gyur; Skt. prasaṅga) instead of formal syllogisms (Dreyfus, 1997, 22), thereby ensuring that debate was used more for education than public disputation between those holding competing views. Outside the Gsang phu tradition, Pa tshab Nyi ma grags (1055–1145), who took up residence in Rgyal lha khang monastery in Central Tibet, is remembered for his contribution to the understanding of Madhyamaka. He was the first to translate the two major works of Candrakīrti (fl. c. 625), the Prasannapadā (Dbu ma tshig gsal; D 3860/P 5260) and Madhyamakāvatāra (Dbu ma la ’jug pa; D 3861/P 5262), commentaries to Nāgārjuna’s Philosophical Literature: Tibet Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Dbu ma rtsa ba’i shes rab; D 3824/P 5224; Dunne, 2011, 216), and thereby brought Candrakīrti’s interpretations to the attention of Tibetan scholars. Pa tshab was also an author, but only recently a set of texts attributed to him has resurfaced. These are exegetical glosses to Nāgārjuna’s root text and Candrakīrti commentaries (Dreyfus & Drongbu Tsering, 2010) and not expositions of Pa tshab’s own system. They are, however, consistent with the traditional narrative, according to which Pa tshab played a pivotal role in promoting the notion of a dichotomy in Madhyamaka philosophy. There are various opinions regarding the division between the “Syllogistic” school (Rang rgyud pa; Skt. Svātantrika), and “Consequentialist” (Thal ’gyur pa; Skt. Prāsaṅgika) schools (Dreyfus & McClintock, 2003), and questions remain about the exact origins of the distinction. (Some Western scholars treat the names *Svātantrika and *Prāsaṅgika as reconstructions, since they are not actually attested in Indian sources.) Pa tshab clearly endorsed Candrakīrti’s interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s work. This helped popularize the doxographical division, in which the Indian authors Buddhapālita and Śāntideva (fl. 8th cent.) were, like Candrakīrti, classified as adhering to Prāsaṅgika views, whereas Bhāviveka, and more significantly Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, were consigned to the inferior Svātantrika subschool of Madhyamaka. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla had argued for the use of inferential reasoning, and a gradual move from a conception to a perception of emptiness. In line with the epistemological approach, they emphasized the reliability and correctness of perception, especially as pertaining to knowledge in the domain of conventional reality. Conversely, Candrakīrti, in Pa tshab’s tradition of interpretation, was skeptical of any certainty of knowledge in this domain, apparently undermining the epistemological approach. There are some resonances with Rong zom’s criticism of Madhyamaka thought, and disagreements about the status of objects and the reliability of knowledge in the conventional realm have proved among the most abiding themes in Tibetan philosophical literature. Phya pa’s attempt to defend Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla largely failed, in the sense that it was not picked up by later philosophers. Thenceforth Candrakīrti was established as the most popular interpreter and commentator of Nāgārjuna for centuries in Tibet. 627 The 13th and the early 14th Century The Bka’ gdams interpretation of logic seems to have represented the standard until the appearance of the Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter (Treasury of Logic on Valid Cognition; TBRC W11391; partial trans. Fukuda, 1989–1993) by Sa skya Paṇḍita Kun dga’ rgyal mtshan (1182–1251). Sa skya Paṇḍita was a towering figure, who was not just an important author but also instrumental in forging a political alliance with the Mongols and the subsequent Yuan dynasty (1271–1368), in the wake of the initial Mongol incursion into Tibet (1240). These events eventually saw the Sa skya tradition, centered at Sa skya monastery, being handed political stewardship over Tibet (Kapstein, 2006, 110–116). The Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter and its autocommentary are each divided into 11 chapters (rab byed): 1. Objects; 2. Cognition; 3. Generalities and Particulars; 4. Affirmative and Negative (Understanding); 5. Object and Language; 6. Relationship; 7. Incompatibility; 8. Defining Characteristics; 9. Perception; 10. Inference for Oneself; and 11. Inference for Others. Sa skya Paṇḍita also translated the Pramāṇa­ vārttika (Tshad ma rnam ’grel; D4210/P 5709), Dharmakīrti’s major commentary on Dignāga’s “Compendium of Valid Cognition” (Pramāṇa­ samuccaya; Tshad ma kun btus; D 4203/P 5700). While the Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter is not a commentary to any specific Indian treatise, it marks a lasting shift in focus away from Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya (Tshad ma rnam nges; D 4211/P 5710) toward his Pramāṇavārttika. It built upon the topical format of the bsdus pa works, but rather than simply summarizing and clarifying Indian Pramāṇa thinking, it criticized earlier Tibetan interpretations, most notably those of the Gsang phu scholars. This marked a significant step in the development of indigenous scholarly discourse, opening up the way to centuries of disputation and controversy over rival interpretations, conducted through the medium of literature. The Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter also became the center of a commentarial tradition, resulting in the apparently unprecedented situation that a Tibetan work, in contrast to an Indian text, 628 Philosophical Literature: Tibet was seen as a root and a source of authority. This treatise is furthermore credited with providing a “fully-fledged theory of concept formation” (van der Kuijp, 1979, 408). The work specifically attacked Phya pa’s approach to objects of perception. Rejecting idealist interpretations of Dharmakīrti, Phya pa favored a realist model similar to that of the Indian Buddhist Vaibhāṣika school, according to which objects exist simultaneously with their perceptions. Sa skya Paṇḍita instead argued for a causal model, in which objects exist prior to their perceptions. This is closer to the Sautrāntika view (Hugon, 2015). Sa skya Paṇḍita also put forth the point that on a higher scale of analysis, an idealist interpretation was valid. This solidified the notion that the Indian traditions could be organized on a doxographical ascending scale, a view that was enthusiastically developed by later Dge lugs authors. Much important Sa skya literature in subsequent decades relates to Sa skya Paṇḍita’s interpretation of the Pramāṇavārttika. The Sa skya scholar ’U yug pa Rigs pa’i seng ge (c. 1195–c. 1267) produced the first Tibetan commentary on the Pramāṇavārttika, and also possibly the first commentary – other than the autocommentary – to Sa skya Paṇḍita’s Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter (van der Kuijp, 2014, 114). The former was criticized by another Sa skya scholar, Btsun pa Ston gzhon, in his exegesis of the same text (van der Kuijp, 2014). The title of the text, Rnam ’grel gyi rnam bshad gangs can gyi rgyan (Ornament of the Land of Snow: A Commentary to the Pramāṇavārttika; TBRC W20481) is perhaps also significant in terms of a literary awareness, as it is clearly acknowledged, in its use of the epithet for Tibet (“Land of Snow”), that the work is part of an indigenous literary tradition. Meanwhile, the Bka’ gdams monastery of Snar thang had become a major center of learning and literary activity. An author connected to this monastery, Lcom ldan Rigs pa’i ral gri (1227–1305), composed commentaries on the Pramāṇaviniścaya (Tshad ma rnam par nges pa ’i ’grel bshad chen po rgyan gyi me tog; TBRC W11848) and the collection of seven Pramāṇa treatises composed by Dharmakīrti (Tshad ma ’i bstan bcos sde bdun rgyan gyi me tog; TBRC W11847). A successor, Dbus pa blo gsal (also known as Sangs rgyas ’bum; 13th cent.) composed an important text on Indian Buddhist philosophical traditions (Grub pa’i mtha’ rnam par bshad pa’i mdzod; W27218; also known as Blo gsal grub mtha’; Mimaki, 1979, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1992, 1994). Lcom ldan rigs pa’i ral gri and Dbus pa blo gsal are also known for their work codifying and cataloguing a collection of texts at Snar thang which eventually gave rise to the earliest known Tibetan canon. Thereby a lasting separation between the Kanjur and the Tanjur was established (van der Kuijp & Schaeffer, 2009). Bu ston rin chen grub (1290–1364), the 11th abbot of the Sa skya monastery of Zhwa lu, is also mainly remembered for his important work on the formation of the canon, as well as his voluminous writings. His famous treatise on buddha nature written in 1359, entitled De bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po gsal zhing mdzes par byed pa’i rgyan (Ornament Clarifying and Beautifying Buddha Nature; TBRC W22106; trans. Seyfort Ruegg, 1973) is philosophically significant. As did Rngog Blo ldan shes rab, he sought to interpret buddha nature in terms of Madhyamaka philosophy and to identify this essence, shared between buddhas and ordinary beings, as emptiness. The Phyag rgya chen po tradition (“The Great Seal”; Skt. Mahāmudrā) in Tibet was transmitted through the Bka’ brgyud tradition, and popularized by figures such as Sgam po pa Bsod nams rin chen (1079–1153). Like Rdzogs chen, the Phyag rgya chen po system is more phenomenologically and meditatively inclined, and shares with it an emphasis upon nonstriving, nonduality, and upon discovering the natural state of the mind. As with Rdzogs chen, opinions may vary as to when it might be judged philosophical, rather than a purely meditative system. However, Sa skya Paṇḍita’s criticisms of Phyag rgya chen po doctrines such as the Dkar po chig thub (“Self-sufficient White Means”) in his “Clear Differentiation of the Three Codes” (Sdom gsum rab dbye, TBRC W1KG1686; trans. Rhoton, 2002) certainly drew its proponents into a philosophical discussion. Protagonists of Phyag rgya chen po, such as Sgam po pa, made a clear contrast between analytical and meditative approaches. Without dismissing the former, they stressed the importance of experience and meditation from the start, as opposed to philosophical study and reasoning. Unsurprisingly, the system has harboured strains of anti-intellectualism. Sa skya Paṇḍita’s judgement of the Phyag rgya chen po, while perhaps partly responding to these strains, also accused the system of drawing inspiration from Chinese (Chan) influences (Jackson, 1994; Kapstein, 2000, 77). Responses to these criticisms followed in later centuries from authors such as Pad ma dkar po (1527–1592). Rang byung rdo rje (1284–1339), the third Karmapa, composed a text on the theme of buddha nature, De bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po bstan pa (Exposition of Buddha Nature; TRBC W1CZ1094; trans. Brunnhölzl, 2009), in which he equated buddha nature with the key Phyag rgya chen po term “natural mind” (tha mal gyi shes pa; Mathes, 2008, 1). Philosophical Literature: Tibet This work is often posited as a precursor to the theories of Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan (1292–1361), who visited Rang byung rdo rje in his Mtshur phu monastery in 1321. Dol po pa, who belonged to the Jo nang tradition, is perhaps the most controversial author of philosophical literature in Tibet (on his life and works, see Stearns, 1999). He completely rejected Haribhadra and his otherwise standard interpretation of the Prajñāpāramitā, championed by Rngog Blo ldan shes rab. In particular, reversing the hermeneutical understanding of Mahāyāna sūtras, he proposed that those texts belonging to the final (third) turning of the wheel of dharma, rather than teaching a provisional (and inferior) Yogācāra position, often surpassed those of the “Middle Turning” or “Second Wheel” (primarily the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras) in their clarity and definitiveness regarding the Buddha’s final intention. In line with mainstream Madhyamaka thought, Dol po pa held that on the relative or conventional level, objects are “empty of intrinsic nature” (rang stong). His innovatory stance, however, was to assert that in the absolute or ultimate sense, objects are “empty of extrinsic existence” (gzhan stong), this is to say, that realization of the ultimate lay in realizing it as being devoid of the relative. In this way, Dol po pa seemed to construct a far more affirmative understanding of the ultimate than had hitherto prevailed. Without endorsing it as the final view, it was more sympathetic to aspects of Indian Yogācāra interpretations of the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras, such as the three natures espoused by Vasubandhu. It also presented a more unifying picture, which combined the more positive aspects of buddha nature, tantra, the “Great Middle Way” (Dbu ma chen po), and the “Great Seal.” Dol po pa set out his primary positions in his Ri chos nges don rgya mtsho (TBRC W1KG1869; trans. Hopkins, 2006). However, the more positive perspective on the ultimate was severely criticized by subsequent authors, and particularly in the Dge lugs tradition it was essentially judged as heretical (on Dol po pa’s positions, see Kapstein, 2001, 301–316; Sparham, 2001, 193–214). Klong chen Rab ’byams pa dri med ’od zer (1308– 1364), believed by many to be the greatest Rnying ma author on doctrine, is credited with systematizing the Rdzogs chen teachings. Reflecting his preeminence in the field, most of his translated works relate to Rdzogs chen, particularly the Ngal gso skor gsum (Trilogy of Rest; TBRC W1GS60877; trans. Guenther, 1975–1976). Klong chen rab ’byams pa’s writings are set against the historical backdrop of the political 629 redefinition of Tibet which took place at the end of the Yuan dynasty, and his works were partly a counter to the continued rise of the Gsar ma traditions, and the formation of the canon, from which various Rnying ma tantras were excluded. Despite the existence of a work on epistemology (Tshad ma de kho na nyid bsdus pa; TBRC W1KG4003) attributed to Klong chen rab ’byams pa – the authorship of which has been called into question (van der Kuijp, 2003, 381–431) – his principal philosophical work is the collection posthumously designated the Mdzod bdun (Seven Treasures; TBRC W10MS11430). These seven works are called: 1. Wish-fulfilling One (Yid bzhin); 2. Personal Instruction (Man ngag); 3. Expanse of Reality (Chos dbyings); 4. Words and Meanings (Tshig don); 5. Supreme Vehicle (Theg mchog); 6. Tenets (Grub mtha’); and 7. Way of Being (Gnas lugs). In some of these volumes, Klong chen rab ’byams pa systematized the earlier Rnying ma teachings, and in others the focus is placed upon the meditational and empirical aspects of Rdzogs chen and tantra. However, the 6th work, “Tenets”, offers a pioneering doxographical presentation (Butters, 2006; Barron, 2007). The work not only deals with the Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools of India – during the course of which the author appears to reject Dol po pa’s view of extrinsic emptiness, in favor of a position closer to that of the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka (Butters, 2006, 5) – it also presents two different ways of organizing tantric materials hierarchically, namely the nine-vehicle Rnying ma model alongside the fourfold classification of tantras of the Gsar ma traditions (for the latter see Hopkins, 1977). The integration of the Rdzogs chen into the hierarchical doxographical vision promoted by the Gsar ma schools was a way of arguing for its supremacy. Despite the apparently limited immediate impact of these writings, they have greatly influenced subsequent generations of Rnying ma thinkers. The 14th Century: The Rise of the Dge lugs What subsequently became known as the Dge lugs school was originally organized around Dga’ ldan monastery in Central Tibet, for which reason its early adherents were known as the Dga’ ldan pa. Members of the Dge lugs school have on occasion projected themselves as the inheritors of the Bka’ 630 Philosophical Literature: Tibet gdams tradition, which effectively ceased to exist as a separate school by the 16th century (Jinpa, 2002). Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa (1357–1419) is credited with the school’s foundation. His writings, supported by those of his chief disciples, particularly Rgyal tshab Dar ma rin chen (also known as Rgyal tshab rje, 1364–1462) and Mkhas grub Dge legs dpal bzang (also known as Mkhas grub rje, 1385–1438), have served as the philosophical base of the Dge lugs tradition. The school eventually had a massive effect upon monastic education and organization, and the formation of what amounted to the state religion of Tibet. Its philosophical and doctrinal influence has been equally significant (for Tsong kha pa’s contribution to philosophical thought, see Tillemans, 1998; Jinpa, 2002; Sparham, 2014). Tsong kha pa’s writings can be divided between those of his early and mature periods (Sparham, 2014). His distinctive philosophical views only truly emerge in the latter period. Rejecting predominant attempts to syncretize the Yogācāra and Madhyamaka positions, Tsong kha pa depicted these as two distinct schools of thought, with the Madhyamaka as the superior. This hierarchical division pervaded all of his interpretations, including those of tantra and buddha nature, which ultimately had to be understood from the Madhyamaka perspective as presented by Nāgārjuna. Tsong kha pa vehemently opposed Dol po pa’s notion of extrinsic emptiness and his impugning of Haribhadra’s commentary to the Abhisamayālaṃkara. In his Drang nges legs bshad snying po (Essence of Eloquence with respect to Provisional and Definitive Meaning; TBRC W1CZ1011; trans. Thurman, 1984), Tsong kha pa set out his hermeneutical position with regard to the interpretation of the sūtras, paying particular attention to a section of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra (Mdo sde dgongs ’grel; D 0106/ P 0774), in which the Buddha resolves apparent inconsistencies between statements he gave during the three turnings of the wheel of dharma. Tsong kha pa argued that the Buddha explained that it was the Madhyamaka view – rather than the Yogācāra one – that represented his final position. While Tsong kha pa emphasized the centrality of the three nature theory (ngo bo nyid gsum, Skt. trisvabhāva) to the Yogācāra, he refuted Dol po pa’s understanding of that theory. In various works, Tsong kha pa greatly elaborated on other aspects of Yogācāra thought, such as emptiness (Hopkins, 1999; 2002) and doctrines of mind (Sparham, 1993). Expansion upon the distinctiveness of the Yogācāra system supported one of his primary philosophical endeavors, namely, establishing a stratified doxographical vision of Buddhist schools. As in earlier doxographies, going back to at least the 12th century, Tsong kha pa organized the Buddhist schools in ascending order, starting with the realist Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika (posited on the basis of earlier Buddhist sources), followed by Yogācāra, and finally Madhyamaka. Each of the four Buddhist schools was conceived of as having various subdivisions. Tsong kha pa stressed the heuristic value of views ascribed to the lower schools, but dismissed their relevance to the final view. This included the ālayavijñāna (kun gzhi’i rnam shes, “foundation consciousness”) – of which many Tibetan philosophers, presenting a syncretic version of Yogācāra-Madhyamaka, had hitherto accepted the literal existence – and the Yogācāra version of the three natures. One of Tsong kha pa’s most important steps related to the internal division within the Madhyamaka. He reoriented discussion regarding the distinction between the Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika from one of method – whether they rejected or advocated the use of syllogistic formulas – to a fundamental disagreement regarding ontology, arguing that the Svātantrika view failed to penetrate ultimate reality. Tsong kha pa heightened the sense that various historical authors were representatives of distinct philosophical schools, and that the Prāsaṅgika view was not only supreme, but the sole route to higher spiritual goals. As this declared that only the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka school pioneered by Candrakīrti captured the Buddha’s final intention, it countered the assertion that different interpretations could be combined within the so-called “Great Middle Way” (Dbu ma chen po; Mahāmadhyamaka; Sparham, 2001, 193). This position devalued not only the Yogācāra/Cittamātra, but also the philosophical view that had once dominated in Tibet, based on the teaching of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, who, according to the taxonomy developed by Tsong kha pa and his followers, belonged to the Rnal ’byor spyod pa dbu ma rang rgyud pa (Yogācāra-svātantrika-madhyamaka) subcategory. Developing his characteristic position on the two truths, Tsong kha pa proposed that what was refuted by Nāgārjuna was any form of essential or intrinsic existence. This opposed what Tsong kha pa perceived as Dol po pa’s reification of the enlightened state, involving the assertion of a pure and privileged transcendent state of consciousness. Here, the enlightened mind had the same ontological status as other conventional phenomena. While denying instrinsic existence, Tsong kha pa’s unique – and Philosophical Literature: Tibet contentious – understanding of the two truths left the ordinary (conventional) world intact, granting it a degree of coherence and verifiable efficacy that many other commentators of Nāgārjuna believed he had striven to undermine (Tauscher, 1995). Tsong kha pa’s interpretation of Indian texts requires the addition of numerous modal qualifiers, such as “truly” (bden par) and “conventionally” (tha snyad du) (Tillemans, 1998), which seemingly moderate, for instance, statements of negation, such as the denial that adherents of the Madhyamaka school of thought hold specific theses or propositions. Tsong kha pa’s arguments that the Prāsaṅgika was the highest view in the ascending doxographical model, and his assertion that the Prāsaṅgika was a distinct philosophical tradition with its own set of tenets, are set out in four key works: 1. Dka’ gnad brgyad kyi zin bris (Notes on the Eight Difficult Points [of Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika]; TBRC W22272; trans. Seyfort Ruegg, 2002); 2. Dbu ma dgongs pa rab gsal, a commentary to Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra (TBRC W1KG15604); 3. Lhag mthong chen mo (the last section of the Lam rim chen mo; TBRC W466; trans. Lamrim Chenmo Translation Committee, 2004); and 4. Dbu ma rtsa ba’i tshig le’ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba’i rnam bshad rigs pa’i rgya mtsho (also known as Rtsa she’i ṭīk chen), a commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (TBRC W22272; trans. Samten & Garfield, 2006). While ostensibly aligning himself with Pa tshab Nyi ma grags in recommending Candrakīrti as Nāgārjuna’s principal Indian commentator, Tsong kha pa effectively discards the notion that Candrakīrti was skeptical with regard to the certainty of knowledge in the conventional domain, thus distancing himself from what has sometimes been called “Madhyamaka free from extremes” (mtha’ bral dbu ma), or “the view of neither being nor nonbeing” (yod min med min gyi lta ba; Tillemans, 1998). Instead, he supported the position of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla on the necessity of inferential reasoning, and further emphasized the importance of the epistemological approach, suggesting that Dharmakīrti’s philosophy was not incompatible with that of Candrakīrti. His writings on Pramāṇa are relatively few in number, but his position is said to be outlined in the writings of his chief disciples, especially the Tshad ma rnam ’grel thar lam gsal byed, Rgyal tshab Dar ma rin chen’s commentary to the Pramāṇavārttika (TBRC W665; the second chapter is translated by Jackson, 1993). 631 As with his Dka’ gnad brgyad kyi zin bris, this work is reported to be a reworking of the notes Rgyal tshab Dar ma rin chen took during Tsong kha pa’s teaching. The former is included in Rgyal tshab Dar ma rin chen’s “Collected Works” (Gsung ’bum, these are collections of important authors’ writings), while the latter is in those of Tsong kha pa. Aspects of Tsong kha pa’s views on Pramāṇa are also reflected in Mkhas grub Dge legs dpal bzang’s commentary to the Pramāṇavārttika (Tshad ma rnam ’grel ṭīk chen rigs pa’i rgya mtsho; TBRC W321) as well as in his Tshad ma sde bdun gyi rgyan yid kyi mun sel (TBRC W1KG16155; trans. Samuels, forthcoming), and in the Tshad ma rigs rgyan (TBRC W1KG16157), written by another direct disciple of Tsong kha pa, Dge ’dun grub (1391–1474), who was retrospectively designated the first Dalai Lama. Rather than specific commentaries, the latter two works deal with Pramāṇa topically, in much the same way as the Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter and the bsdus pa literature. Tsong kha pa’s views on Madhyamaka are also reflected in, for example, Mkhas grub Dge legs dpal bzang’s Dbu ma stong thun chen mo (TBRC W00EGS1016265; trans. Cabezón, 1992). As with the major work on Pramāṇa, it is the Rnam bshad snying po’i rgyan (The Ornament of the Essence; TBRC W3CN1449), Rgyal tshab Dar ma rin chen’s commentary to Sphuṭārthā, ’Grel ba don gsal (Haribhadra’s Clear Meaning Commentary; D 3793/ P 5191) to the Abhisamayālaṃkāra that later Dge lugs tradition regards as presenting Tsong kha pa’s final thought on the Prajñāpāramitā (Perfection of Wisdom), rather than his own early commentary on the topic, Legs bshad gser phreng (Golden Garland of Eloquence; TBRC W1KG16138; trans. Sparham, 2007–2009). The same later tradition has sought to project a greater degree of philosophical homogeneity between the writings of Tsong kha pa and his chief disciples – and indeed between his early and mature periods – than seems warranted by their content. With regard to Tibet’s earlier intellectual tradition, Tsong kha pa’s “Collected Works” include a brief exposition on Śāntarakṣita’s Madhyamakālaṃkāra, entitled Dbu ma rgyan gyi brjed byang (TBRC W22272). This is also considered to be Rgyal tshab Dar ma rin chen’s notes from teachings by Tsong kha pa on Śāntarakṣita’s text (trans. Blumenthal, 2004, 249–287). More recently, a commentary of Sa skya Paṇḍita’s Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter attributed to Rgyal tshab Dar ma rin chen was discovered (Rgyal tshab rje’i tshad ma rigs gter ’grel pa; TBRC W1KG11902), although some doubts over the attribution have 632 Philosophical Literature: Tibet been raised (Dreyfus, 1993). Issues regarding the authorship, attribution, and inclusion (or exclusion) from volumes of “Collected Works” appear to exhibit some parallels with those related to the formation of the canon. The intellectual development of the works by Tsong kha pa’s disciples and the exact relation between their thought and that of Tsong kha pa require further investigation. The 15th to the 16th Centuries: Critics of Tsong kha pa Tsong kha pa’s theories sparked controversy and stimulated much philosophical discussion among Tibetan authors. Before the Dge lugs was considered to be a distinct school, and perhaps fueled by the sense that Tsong kha pa – whose principal teacher was the Sa skya master Red mda’ ba Gzhon nu blo gros (1349–1412) – had misrepresented their tradition, Sa skya scholars formed the vanguard of the critics disputing Tsong kha pa’s representation of Madhyamaka and the two truths. Prominent detractors included the Sa skya authors Gser mdog Paṇ chen Shā kya Mchog ldan (1428–1507), Go rams pa Bsod nams seng ge (1429–1489), and Stag tshang Lo tsa ba Shes rab rin chen (b. 1405). The eighth Karmapa, Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507–1554?) also composed a refutation of Tsong kha pa’s views on Madhyamaka (Williams, 1983; trans. Goldfield et al., 2006). Although united in their opposition to Tsong kha pa, there are significant differences in their respective positions. Perhaps the most effective critic of Tsong kha pa was Go rams pa. In his major Madhyamaka texts, Lta ba’i shan ’byed (Distinguishing the View; TBRC W1PD1725; trans. Cabezón & Dargyay, 2007; Arguillère, 2008), Lta ba ngan sel (Eliminating Bad Views; TBRC W1PD1725), a commentary on Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra, and Dbu ma’i spyi don (A General Synopsis of Madhyamaka; TBRC W1PD1725) he adopts an overtly polemical stance, especially in criticism of Tsong kha pa, while in the first mentioned work he also disputes Dol po pa’s interpretation of Madhyamaka philosophy. Go rams pa’s critique of Tsong kha pa was perhaps the main factor resulting in the subsequent censoring of his works, which only emerged from relative obscurity in the 20th century. Tsong kha pa had proposed that the distinction between the two truths was to be understood on the basis of the apprehended object (yul). This meant that something might be said to have two natures: one conventional, the other ultimate. Go rams pa argued against this, maintaining that the distinction must be made on the basis of the apprehending subject (yul can). Seeking to reverse Tsong kha pa’s version of the Madhyamaka subdivision, Go rams pa reasserted that the division between Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika lay in their preferred method, and indicated nothing about their understanding of reality. Like Tsong kha pa, Go rams pa espoused that logical reasoning was essential to the path. However, he supported neither Tsong kha pa’s application of logical rules – such as that a double negation implies an affirmation – nor his use of qualification (ultimate or conventional) when interpreting Indian treatises. For Go rams pa, negation, such as that in Nāgārjuna’s famous tetralemma found in the Mūlamadhyamakakārika – in which a thing is said to arise neither from itself, another, both, or neither – was to be taken literally, and such statements represented analytical devices that undermine and dismantle conception, rather than lead to “correct” forms of conception, as might be said to be the case in Tsong kha pa’s view. Although Go rams pa argued that a conceptual method had to be used in order to eventually arrive at a state of nonconceptuality, in his Lta ba’i shan ’byed, he defended himself against accusations that his approach was simply one of nonthinking (for a general description of Go rams pa’s views, see Kassor, 2011; for a comparison of Go rams pa’s differences with Tsong kha pa, see Thakchoe, 2007) Shā kya Mchog ldan’s writings on Madhyamaka include its history in India and Tibet (Dbu ma’i byung tshul rnam par bshad pa’i gtam yid bzhin lhun po; TBRC W00EGS1016899; Tillemans & Tomabechi, 1995; Komarovski, 2000). In his Theg pa chen po dbu ma rnam par nges pa’i chos kyi bang mdzod lung dang rigs pa’i rgya mtsho (Ocean of Scriptural Statements and Reasoning: Treasury of Ascertainment of the Mahāyāna Middle Way; TBRC W23200) he launched a systematic critique of Tsong kha pa. In later writings, Shā kya Mchog ldan moved markedly toward the extrinsic emptiness position expounded earlier by Dol po pa. He challenged the doxographical categories and produced a unique reading of the Yogācāra and Madhyamaka systems, aimed at demonstrating how they could be understood as compatible (Komarovski, 2011). The impact of these works on Tibetan intellectual thought is difficult to judge. Aspects of Shā kya Mchog ldan’s works did not meet with the approval of mainstream Sa skya thinkers, and only reappeared from obscurity in the 1970s. Philosophical Literature: Tibet Stag tshang Lo tsa ba (b. 1405) voiced his critique of Tsong kha pa in a work on doxography (Grub mtha’ kun shes nas mtha’ bral grub pa; TBRC W29895), in which he calls into question the latter’s proposition regarding the role of valid cognition in establishing conventional objects. Probably inspired by G.yag ston Sangs rgyas dpal (1348 –1414) and his commentary on “Treasury of Logic on Valid Cognition” (Sde bdun gyi dgongs ’grel tshad ma rigs pa’i gter gyi de kho na nyid gsal bar byed pa rigs pa’i ’od stong ’phro ba; TBRC W1KG3509), there was a renewed interest in Sa skya Paṇḍita’s work, with Go rams pa and Shā kya Mchog ldan, among others, composing their respective commentaries (Sde bdun mdo dang bcas pa’i dgongs pa phyin ci ma log par ’grel ba tshad ma rigs pa’i gter gyi don gsal bar byed pa and Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter gyi dgongs rgyan rigs pa’i ’khor los lugs ngan pham byed; both texts can be found in TBRC W20402). These works were chiefly aimed at reaffirming Sa skya Paṇḍita’s anti-realist stance. G.yag ston Sangs rgyas dpal especially attacked Phya pa, and his perceived realist position on universals and commonsense objects, as outlined in the “Summaries” (bsdus pa) (Dreyfus, 1997, 24). Current understanding of Phya pa’s works relies partly upon what can be gleaned from Shā kya Mchog ldan’s critical analysis. In these Sa skya works, disapproval of Tsong kha pa’s position is more muted than in texts dealing with the subject of Madhyamaka. However, differing understandings of the roles of language, thought, and logic, and interpretations of Dharmakīrti’s views were still in many respects at variance with those of the Dge lugs school. For an elaboration on these rival interpretations of Pramāṇa, see G.B.J. Dreyfus, 1997. The 16th to the 19th Centuries: The Rise of Scholasticism The aforementioned attacks upon Tsong kha pa’s writings provoked responses by Dge lugs authors. These are regularly cited as examples of what is now generally viewed as a distinct genre, most often designated (often retrospectively) as dgag lan. This term is frequently translated as “polemical literature” (for further discussion, see Lopez, 1996; Viehbeck, 2014), but refers more specifically to a work that sets out to answer or rebut an attempted refutation. In the Dge lugs context these are invariably defences of Tsong khapa’s positions. The tradition of composing rejoinders precedes the Dge lugs era, and writings bearing titles such as rtsod lan (“counter argument”) 633 are by no means limited to philosophical subject matter. However, the systematic and rehearsed approach and the vitriolic language of the Dge lugs defences – such as Rje btsun chos kyi rgyal mtshan’s (1469–1546) Go lan (Response to Gorampa; TBRC W19227; Lopez, 1996, 217) – seem to distinguish them from what came before, and certainly aid in cementing the notion of a distinct genre. Students of Tsong kha pa were inspired to found the monasteries of ’Bras spungs and Se ra in 1416 and 1419, respectively. These, together with Dga’ ldan monastery, formed the “Three Seats” (Gdan sa gsum), the most powerful Dge lugs monasteries. The three eventually became the world’s largest monastic institutions, and their ascendency launched an era of Dge lugs monastic dominance. The monasteries increasingly defined themselves in terms of scholastic activity, specifically laying far greater stress upon group sessions of dialectical contestation and formalized debate than discourse and tutoring (on the concept of scholasticism in relation to the Dge lugs tradition see, Cabezón, 1994). For their part, the non-Dge lugs schools developed commentarial schools (bshad grwa), in which exegesis was stressed (Dreyfus, 2005, 276–292). As Tsong kha pa’s successors systematized his philosophical teachings, and the monasteries steadily grew more organized and successful, there were gradual moves toward tailoring these teachings for pedagogical purposes, within an increasingly standardized curriculum (various aspects of traditional Dge lugs education are explored by Onoda, 1992; Dreyfus, 2003). This brought about innovations in genre, such as the introduction of manuals known as bsdus grwa (“collected topics”), the oldest available instance of which is the Rwa stod bsdus grwa (TBRC W2CZ8044), composed by ʼJam dbyangs mchog lha ʼod zer (1429–1500). The tradition of outlining one’s position within the format of debate was already well established in Tibetan philosophical literature. The bsdus grwa works (Perdue, 1992; Onoda, 1992), which were designed to serve as primers for young monks, take this to another level, dispensing almost entirely with exegesis. The texts consist primarily of a series of debates. The “correct” position on various points is represented by the responses of “our system” (rang lugs) to the arguments of different (usually unidentified) opponents. It might generally be observed, however, that the responses and the positions of the various interlocutors in bsdus grwa and other scholastic literature range from the obvious to the oblique, and the manner of their presentation is certainly intended to fuel debate and exploration. 634 Philosophical Literature: Tibet The “Three Seats” were comprised of various colleges (grwa tshang). The educational evolution of the college system was intimately linked with the growth of scholastic literature. Each college eventually adopted a different author as their main spokesman and interpreter of the legacy of Tsong kha pa and his main disciples. Works by these authors are known as yig cha – textbooks of the respective colleges, serving as the primary materials for the study of philosophical writings. The core yig cha are texts entitled spyi don and mtha’ dpyod. Tending more toward synopsis, the spyi don (lit. general meaning) deal with their respective areas (principally phar phyin [Prajñāpāramitā], dbu ma [Madhyamaka], and tshad ma [Pramāṇa]) more systematically and include numerous divisions and classifications, and sections of exegesis. The mtha’ dpyod (lit. examination of boundaries) consider specific issues, entirely through the aforementioned medium of debate, where the “correct” system has to be deciphered from the author’s responses to the arguments of various opponents. The spyi don and the mtha’ dpyod were sometimes supported by various supplementary works or appendices by later writers, bearing names such as mchan and zur bkol. Spyi don and mtha’ dpyod had already been in use as titles prior to this era, but it is within the Dge lugs scholastic literature that they solidify into clearly distinguished genres. The relatively late beginnings of the Dge lugs tradition and its concentration upon the literary endowment of Tsong kha pa and his main disciples means that, historically speaking, the Dge lugs school maintains the highest degree of philosophical homogeneity. Despite major rivalries between the Dge lugs colleges, and fierce loyalties to their respective yig cha authors, philosophical differences between these authors are minimal. The Dge lugs ascendancy was facilitated by the foundation of the Ganden Podrang (Dga’ ldan pho brang) government, under the fifth Dalai Lama (Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho, 1617–1682), with the support of the Dzungar Mongol leader Gushri Khan (1582–1655). This initially led to an unprecedented period of literary censorship, primarily targeting works of philosophical content. The works of the Jo nang tradition, as well as those of vehement critics of Tsong kha pa, such as Go rams pa and Shā kya Mchog ldan, were banned in Central Tibet, only to be retrieved from Eastern Tibet during the 20th century. Subsequently, under the patronage of the Manchu dynasty, the Dge lugs tradition enjoyed a position verging on that of a state religion. During this era several important treatises on doxography were produced by Dge lugs scholars, beginning with the Grub mtha’ chen mo (Great Exposition of Philosophical Systems; TBRC W21503; partial trans. Hopkins, 2004) by ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa’i rdo rje (1648–1721), followed by Lcang skya Rol pa’i rdo rje’s (1717–1786) Grub mtha’ lhun po mdzes rgyan (Exposition of the Philosophical Systems Beautifying the Axis Mundi; TBRC W28833; partial trans. Klein, 1987; Lopez, 1987; Hopkins, 1995), and the Grub mtha’ shel gyi me long (Crystal Mirror of the Philosophical Systems; TBRC W2124; trans. Sopa & Jackson, 2009) by Thu’u bkwan Chos kyi nyi ma (1737–1802). The last named work is notable for its inclusion of the Bon tradition. More generally speaking, these texts further advanced the Dge lugs version of the hierarchical doxographical model, while moving toward a more inclusive understanding of the philosophical landscape. Dge lugs scholasticism exerted a major influence on the other Tibetan traditions: various non-Dge lugs monasteries adopted an education system modelled upon it, and produced their own versions of monastic educational materials such as bsdus grwa works. Later Dge lugs writings move further toward formulaic representation and rehearsed argumentation, which are characteristic of the scholastic tradition. The strength of the Dge lugs and the perceived absence of serious philosophical challengers – although the writings of non-Dge lugs authors during the 17th and 18th centuries in particular require further study – led to a process of scholastic stultification. Authors turned repeatedly to attacking long-dead scholars, particularly Rong ston Shākya rgyal tshan (1367–1449), Dol po pa, and Stag tshang Lo tsa ba, while increasingly there was a narrowing of philosophical scope, which focused upon the yig cha. Tibetan Philosophy in the 19th Century The Dge lugs supremacy, occasionally manifesting in religious exclusivism, marginalized the other traditions, particularly in Central Tibet, and overshadowed much of the pre-Dge lugs intellectual history. The fortunes of the non-Dge lugs schools were to some extent revived by the advent of what has commonly been referred to as the Ris med (lit. nonpartisan) movement in Kham, Eastern Tibet. Although some questions have been raised about whether it is correct to regard this as a distinct movement (for further discussion, see Gardner, 2006, 112 ff.; Philosophical Literature: Tibet Viehbeck, 2014, 68–74), the Ris med trend is often thought to have arisen to counteract the perceived growing hostilities between the various schools. Ris med was not overtly philosophical, although its most important figure, the prolific author ’Jam mgon Kong sprul blo gros mtha’ yas (1813–1899), did compose some philosophical works, commenting, for instance, on the writings of the third Karmapa, Rang byung rdo rje (Brunnhölzl, 2007). He is, however, generally viewed as an encyclopedist, whose major treatise, the Shes bya kun khyab mdzod (Treasury of Knowledge; TBRC W5488), recorded much that was relevant to Tibet’s intellectual past. Most chapters of this large work have been translated into English (Kalu Rinpoche Translation Group et al., 2003–2010). This process of recording helped to preserve and, in some cases, rescue earlier teachings that were threatened with extinction. The appearance of this work, and the Ris med movement in general, helped foster affinities and encouraged sharing, mainly among the non-Dge lugs schools. Furthermore, ’Jam mgon Kong sprul’s editing, codification, and systemization of the sprawling mass of knowledge eventually provided an impetus to later figures who, with newfound intellectual confidence, developed analytical systems that were hitherto lacking in the Rnying ma and Bka’ brgyud traditions. The most important of these later figures was the Rnying ma scholar, Mi pham Rnam rgyal rgya mtsho (1846–1912), possibly the most original thinker of his time, who was active in the Eastern Tibetan kingdom of Derge (Sde dge), the heart of Ris med activity. Mi pham sought to harmonize the Rnying ma’s Rdzogs chen teachings with aspects of Indian philosophical traditions. This project was aided by his engagement with authors commonly associated with the Ris med movement, and his drawing from the writings of figures such as Go rams pa. Mi pham is particularly known for his works on Madhayamka (described in Phuntsho, 2005). Mi pham’s commentary to Śāntarakṣita’s Madhyamakālaṃkāra (Dbu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad ’jam dbyangs bla ma dgyes pa’i zhal lung; TBRC W30366; trans. Doctor, 2004; Padmakara Translation Committee, 2005) aimed to reestablish the centrality of this Indian text. He also described and contextualized the view of extrinsic emptiness, in works such as Gzhan stong khas len seng ge’i nga ro (TBRC W1PD76231; trans. Pettit, 1999; Kapstein, 2009). In his Nor bu ke ta ka (TBRC W2DB16631; trans. Arguillère, 2004), a commentary to the ninth chapter of Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra (D 3871/ P 5272), he was especially critical of Tsong kha pa’s position on Madhyamaka. This provoked 635 responses from Dge lugs scholars, and drew him into a protracted exchange with Dpa’ ris Rab gsal (1840–1912), which took the form of writings of the dgag lan genre (Viehbeck, 2014). Mi pham’s compositions and his willingness to draw from authors of other traditions left a lasting legacy. A number of his works were studied in monastic colleges of the Rnying ma, Bka’ brgyud, and Sa skya schools. As part of the process of exchange, the writings by Go rams pa, from which Mi pham drew particular inspiration, have also been studied within Rnying ma centers of learning. Tibetan Philosophy in Recent Times Following the revitalization of the non-Dge lugs traditions, including the increased systematization and embracing of scholastic learning, the first half of the 20th century saw little in the way of development in philosophical literature. The Klu grub dgongs rgyan (Ornament of Nāgārjuna’s Intent; TBRC W17210; trans. Lopez, 2006) by Dge ’dun chos ’phel (1903–1951) is perhaps the best known work from the period. Philosophically, it renewed some of the criticisms of Tsong kha pa’s Madhyamaka interpretation, making reference to arguments of Mi pham and other critics. However, the current image of the work bears little relation to its initial impact or its philosophical contribution. It was seized upon by those outside the Dge lugs, who were keen to emphasize that it was composed by someone originally trained within that tradition. Its current high profile derives much from the contemporary fascination (particularly among Western academics) with the author, who was also a figure of controversy for more reasons than his philosophical writings. The decades immediately following the Chinese Communist annexation in the 1950s were the most challenging period for Tibetan literature in general. An effective ban on serious literary activity in the Tibetan language, beginning in the 1960s, was only relaxed during the late 1970s. Writings that emerged prior to this point – and many that appeared subsequently – adopt what purports to be a Marxist-Leninist perspective on Tibetan culture and religion. There is little to suggest serious philosophical reflection: the vast majority of such writings represent ideological (and uninformed) propaganda, intent upon vilifying the ways of thinking associated with “old” Tibet. In the Tibetan regions, genuine attempts to understand Western philosophy perhaps only began in the 1990s, with writings by 636 Philosophical Literature: Tibet young scholars such as the Nub phyogs sher rtogs rig pa’i tshig ’bum by ’Brong bu tshe ring rdo rje (Compendium of Western Philosophy; 1995). In the exile community, at a similar time, the 14th Dalai Lama participated in lively dialogues with non-Tibetan scientists and philosophers. In Tibet, the efforts of Tibetan authors to understand Western philosophers have been hampered by their exclusive reliance upon questionable Chinese translations and sometimes by an imperfect grasp of Tibetan philosophy. Both communities lack any form of standardized vocabulary for dealing with non-Tibetan philosophy, or for bridging the gulf between Tibetan and Western systems. For example, translations for “philosophy” range from sher rtogs rig pa in Tibet, to lta grub, or even simply lta ba (“views”) among members of the diaspora. Tibetan interest – both on an individual and institutional level – in non-Tibetan philosophical systems and comparisons with indigenous philosophy has been limited. This is at least partly attributable to the fact that so much energy of Tibetan scholars is devoted to the rediscovery, conservation, and propagation of the indigenous literary heritage. Their efforts have proved successful in bringing traditional philosophical material to a wider audience. 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