RELIGION IN TAIWAN AT THE END OF THE JAPANESE COLONIAL PERIOD

RELIGION IN MODERN TAIWAN Tradition and Innovation a Changing Society

Edited by Philip Clart & Charles B. Jones

1. RELIGION IN TAIWAN AT THE END OF THE JAPANESE COLONIAL PERIOD

Charles 13, Joncs

MOST OF THE ESSAYS in this collection deal primarily with developments in the religious sphere on the island of Taiwan since 1945, but, since our con- cern is with the modernization process as it has expressed itself throughout the twentieth century, this essay will deal with events prior to that time. By 1945, Taiwan had already been inhabited for several centuries, first by people of Polynesian stock who migrated northward from the South Pacific islands, subsequently by the Chinese, the Japanese, the Dutch, and the Spanish. Thus, religion in Taiwan had been undergoing continuous change even before the modern period, change sparked by the arrival of successive waves of immigrants. The act of emigration itself places the immigrant into new circumstances that call forth new religious responses. Aside from this, however, religious change continued in Taiwan owing to two further factors: political dislocation and social change.

"Political dislocation" refers to the repeated changes in sovereignty that look place as Taiwan went from an independent island peopled by indigenous tribesl to a Dutch and Spanish trade entrepOt, to an independent stale under the Chinese rebel Zheng Chcnggong (also frequently called Koxinga in Western sourcesL to a part of the Qing empil© to a Japanese territory, and, finally, 10 a politically autonomous but not formally pendent part of China. Each of these shifts meant changes for two distinct groups of people: those who arrived in Taiwan as parl of the new ruling minority, who had to cope with living in a new and strange, often hostile and Colonial forbidding land, and those already there, who found themselves living under a new regime and having to cope with sweeping changes in their political circumstances.

"Social change" refers to those developments—modernization, urbanization, and economic and industrial development—that most likely would have taken place regardless of any changes in the political environment. To give but one example, the construction of railways to all parts of the island during the Japanese period linked cultural and economic zones that had viously been separated by the many east-west rivers that cut across the island laterally and the central north-south massif that divides the island longitudinallYL This development enabled temples and deities that had previously been only locally prominent to enlarge their spheres of influence and the deity images or Buddha images from temples with a reputation for spiritual efficacy to go on tours to other parts of Taiwan. Every political regime since the nineteenth century contributed to the construction of this system, so it serves as an instance of modernization that took place independently of changes in government.

Because political dislocation and social change constituted the two main forces impelling religious change, I have structured this essay around the chronological progress of these changes as they affected popular religion, Daoism, Buddhism, and the sects of popular Buddhism that came to be known collectively as Zhaijiao (vegetarian religion). The first factor, political dislocation, will be explored primarily through an examination of policies aimed explicitly at religion that the new regimes adopted in their efforts to consolidate control and govern. The second factor, social change, will be explored through an examination of changes in social conditions, whether these were caused by social movements, technological advances, economic developments, or government policies that, while not specifically targeting religiom still had an indirect effect on it. IN THE ZHENG CHENGGONG AND QING PERIODS

Because the religion of the indigenous peoples will be treated elsewhere in this volume (sec Huang, chapter 10), I take as my point of departure the arrival of large numbers of Chinese immigrants from Fujian and Guangdong provinces. No onc knows when the first Chinese settlers arrived; it appears that, before the seventeenth century; there existed small settlements and bases for Chinese and Japanese maritime traders and pirates. However, since lhc Taiwan strait is treacherous to cross and the island had a reputation

as a land of hardship, disease, and head-hunting natives, the Chinese population was never great. However, during the 1660s, the Ming dynasty had been driven from powerj and the Manchus were consolidating their hold on the empire, causing many Ming loyalists to flee south. One of the staunchest and most powerful of these holdouts, Zheng Chenggong-, attempted to force the Qing government to overextend itself by attacking Nanjing in September 1659 but suffered a disastrous defeat. Finding it too dangerous to keep his forces on the Fujian coast, he sailed into Taiwan in 1661 with a fleet carrying several thousand troops and, in a brief military campaign, drove out the Dutch soldiers and traders from their two main garrisons in present-day Tamsui (Danshui), where they had been since 1624, and Tainan (Jones 1999* 4--5; Mote and Twitchett 1988, 717—724). This marked the first large-scale influx of Chinese settlers into Taiwan.

This first wave of immigrants set up a pattern of immigration that would hold through most of the the Zheng and the early Qing periods. The settlers came from southern Pujian and Guangdong provinces, meaning that, for the most part, they spoke southern Fujianese (also referred to as "N'tinnanhua," "Hokkien," "Holo," "Hoklo,'S or "Taiwanese"), Hakka, and Cantonese. In they were almost all men who came without their families. Even after Taiwan came under the political control of the Qing dynasty in 1683, the authorities continued to restrict immigration to the island, and, for the most part, men could not bring their wives and children with them (Shepherd 1999, With a few brief interludes, this restriction remained in force until 1'88 (Sung 1990, 64—65).

As with any migration, the settlers experienced both continuities and discontinuities with their previous lifestyle, in religion no less than in any other aspect. I examine the continuities and discontinuities in the settlers' religious experience in terms of what Winston Davis (1992, 30—32 h calls the "locative" and the "adventitious" religions of this time. '"Locative" refers to religions that serve to integrate and unify hometowni kinship, and occupation groups and draw members on the basis of their social and familial relationships rather than acceptance of creeds. Hence, these religions neither recruit nor accept "converts." Thus, in this essay "locative" will refer to ancestral cults, temples controlled by trade guilds, and the like. "Adventitious," on the other hand, refers to religions that do not draw members on the basis of their place of birth, trade, family or clan affiliation, or other markers of social location. Rather, members join these religions voluntarily by undergoing a period of training and initiation after accepting a czrtain set of doctrines. They then find themselves in an organization with a ranked of Perica

hierarchy through which they may rise by means of further training, aspiration, and initiation and that transcends ethnic and clan identifications to include (theoretically at least) all of humanity. For our purposes, this category will include Buddhism, Daoism, and Zhaiiiao.2

As an example of the continuity in the realm of locative religion, we can look at the case of the Longshan (Dragon Mountain) temple in Taipei, tòunded in 1738 in what was then the port settlement of Mengiia. The founders of this temple all came from the same three counties in Quanzhou prefecture, Fujian province: )injiang, Nan'an, and Hui'an. Immigrants from these three counties made common cause to promote their interests against immigrants from other regions and came to be known as the Sanyi (Three County) faction. The temple was founded as an offshoot of a temple in Quanzhou prefecture, also called the Longshan temple, and the founders installed the bodhisattva Guanyin, the main object of worship in the original long-shan temple, in the new temple as well (Editorial Committee 10). The residents maintained their connection to the original tempìe by periodically taking the Guanyin image back to the original temple on the mainland to "renew her power* ( Buddhism in Taiwan, n.d„ 19—20).

This case is by no means unique. In reporting on settlement patterns in the area around the modern village of Shulin, Wang (1974, 73—77) records in some detail the importation of deities by specific family groups from specific areas of the mainland: Mazu from Zhangzhou; Qingshui Zushi Gong by the Lan family (provenance not given); Xing Fu Wang-ye bv the Lin family from Quanzhou; and Baosheng Dadi by the Lai family from Zhangzhou (Wang 1974, 73--77). In these cases, temple upkeep and the organization of processions, festivals, and other events were the responsibility of an organization called a shenminghüi, or freligious association." In all these instances, we see continuity in terms of sustained identification with hometown or family gods and reliý)us practices and the establishment of religious associations by and people of the same subethnic group.

However, the very data given above show sources of discontinuity as well. The Qing government regulations, which prohibited men from immigrating with their families, forced the development of new forms of non„ familial social structure in Taiwan, including temples with new constituencies and societal roles. Prior to immigrating, most of these men came from rural agricultural villages that were dominated by a single surname and in which the extended clan was the main form of social organization. The ancestral temple served, therefore, as their primary svmbolic focus and source of local unity and political authoritv. Because these émigrés came to Taiwan alone, however, they had to find new ways of organizing themselves for

mutual aid, protection, and political cooperation. Two of the most common ways of doing this were to organize bv common regional provenance and to organize by trade guild, although often groups organized by both. [t was not until 1790 and afterward that sufficient generations of Chinese families had lived in an area for ancestral temples to appear in appreciable numbers, partially resuming the old patterns of religious affiliation found on the mainland, primarily among landlord families (Chen 1999,

As alreadv immigrants to Taiwan tended to cluster in settlements populated by other people from their hometowns or regions. While the importation of familiar deities and the establishment of new temples as branches of old temples back home provided some sense of continuity, the strong sense of identification with other people according to home region was something new and specific to the situation of the immigrants in Taiwan. For example, in the area now covered by the city of Taipei, people from the Sanyi area settled in Mengiia (now the Wanhua district of Taipei), people from Tong'an in Dadaocheng, and people from Anxi in various pockets (Feuchtwang 1974, 266, table Even though these groups came from counties within the same prefecture, they identified stronglv along subethnic lines and often went to war with other groups that thev thought were encroaching on their territories or trade. Wang (1974, 127) documented settlements similarly divided along subethnic lines in Shulin (see also Shep• herd 1999, 127).

Living in close proximitv, people from the same home region also tended to pursue common trades and organized themselves into trade guilds in order to pursue commerce with their own compatriots back home. For example, the Sanvi people of Mengjia built the area into a maior port for trading ships and traded almost exclusively with merchants in the Sanvi region of Quanzbou prefecture, As the dominant organizations in their areas, these guilds often wielded more political power than the local Qing government establishment did. What makes all this interesting for a studv of religion in Taiwan is that the guild offices usually occupied a back room in the temples dominating particular settlements and that influential members of the guilds also served on the temples' governing boards. As an example of how temples exercised political authority, the Taiwanese historian Lin Hengdao recounts the following episode in the history of the Longshan temple of

During the Qing, Taipei's Longshan temple was a central meeting place for trade guilds from the Sanyi of Jinjians Hui'an, and Nan'an. It had a great deal of economic muscle and :nilitarv

strength, It collected a 5 percent sales tax on anything imported from Quanzhou, At that time, the Longshan temple not only took for Mengjia's municipal government, self-defense, and external relations, but it also provided a center for socializing, education, and entertainment. In this respect, its power was second only to the medieval European trade guilds, It could bring a lot of influence to bear on government policy. Once, during the Guangxu. reign period [1875-19081 , the 'làiwanese provincial governor planned to build a railroad, putting a large bridge across Mengiia. because the authorities at the Longshan temple apposed it, it was moved to another site across a rice paddy as a compromise. -Lin 1976, 42

Thus, the situation of the dominant form of the locative religion of the Zheng and Qing periods can be summarized as follows: As people migrated into Taiwan, they brought with them an image (or some incense ashes) from a particular temple in their home region and installed it, first in their homes or in a temporary thatched hut, and later in a proper templ% as economic circumstances permitted. As the immigrants settled into groups on the basis of common hometown provenance, a few dominant temples became the foci of religious, political, and social life, often eclipsing Qing officials and state-sponsored temples in their influence. As people identified themselves primarily with these small, highly localized, usually geographically isolated enclaves, these dominant temples provided a multitude of services to meet a multitude of needs: entertainment (in the form of opera performances); religious processions and jiao (renewal rituals) in the event of plagues, natural disasters, and economic downturns; office space for local trade guilds; self-defense forces to ward off attacks from rival ethnic and subetbnic groups; and a center for worship and intòrmal socializing.

As for the adventitious religions (i.e., Buddhism and Daoism), there is little evidence that they were very active during these periods or that, where they were active, they functioned differently from the locative religion. Taiwan was a frontier province and not attractive as a destination for eminent Buddhist and Daoist figures. During the Zheng era, many Ming iovalists fled to Taiwan disguised as monks and maintained this pretense even after arriving. 3 A few true monks did arrive, but their numbers were not great, and not all possessed a genuine pietv. The Gazetteer of Taiwan Province (låiwan Provincial Historical Commission 197b 49b) gives few names, most prominent among them the Venerable Canche, the first monk

to make the trip across the strait (in 1675, at the invitation of one of Zheng Chenggong's military staff officers) and renowned for his spirituality (see also Jones 1999, 9—10). Other monks were remembered more for their artistic and literary accomplishments, leading to the suspicion that they might have been former scholar-officials masquerading as monks (Jones 1999, 10, 13). Be that as it may, most scholars agree that the average monk in Taiwan was uneducated, probably had not received the full monastic ordination,4 and functioned as a temple caretaker or funeral specialist for paying clients (Kubo 1984, 49, 53). According to Hubert Seiwert (1992, 33), most monks received ordination simply to obtain the credentials needed to make their living in this way, most were married, and most failed to observe the Buddhist vegetarian diet. Chen Ruitang, the jurist and legal historian, reports that, because of Qing restrictions on women's ordination and the harsh conditions of Taiwan, there were no Buddhist nuns at all in Taiwan by the end of the Qing period (see Chen 1974, 11).

During the mid„Qing period, several sects of popular Buddhism, which Japanese officials later lumped together under the rubric "Zhaijiao," began sending missionaries into Taiwan. Zhaijiao had considerably more success attracting followers and support than did either Buddhism or Daoism. Although Japanese researchers of the early colonial period accepted at face value these groups' self-identification as part of the Linji line of Chan Buddhism originally transmitted specifically to laypeople during a period when the Sixth Patriarch of Chinese Chan, Huineng (638—713), had to hide among laity in a fishing village (Marui [1919] 1993, 79—82), scholars now know that this was actually a millenarian faith centered on a female creator deity called the Unborn Venerable Mother (Wusheng Laomu) and derived more from Luojiao than from Linji Chan. 5 1 have written extensively on the histories, sectarian ramifications, and doctrines of Zhaijiao as well as on its transmission into 'låiwan elsewhere, so I will not go too deeply into these matters here (for details on the Longhua and Jinchuang [Jintong in Seiwert's reading] sects, see Jones 1999, 14=30; or Seiwcrt 1992, 30—45, 46—53).6 At this point, I will give only a brief indication of Zhaijiao defining characteristics to orient the readeG fOcusing on three main features of Zhaijiao faith: independence from Buddhist clerical authority; vegetarianism; and millenarianism.

As independence from clerical authority, Zhaijiao delines itself as a form of Buddhism that exists apart from the ordained clergy. This leads adherents to redefine the meaning of the traditional «three jewels" of Buddhism (the Buddha, his teachings" and the sañgha, the last generally understood as the body of monastic believers), as may be seen from this

extract from a Zhaijiao ritual text for taking the "three refuges" (translated by J. J. M. de Groot early in the twentieth century), which offers its own interpretation of the third refuge: "The Third Refuge! Bow down your heads to the earth and take refuge in the Sangha! This Sangha is not the tonsured clergy who collect subscriptions from house to house; it is composed of all disciples who offer incense and keep temples in the country-hills, and to whose care our Old Patriarch [i.e., Luo Qing (1442—1527), the founder of Luojiao on the mainland] has entrusted the religious books he left" (de Groot 11903—19041 1970, 206). Contemporary Zhaijiao adherents go so far as to contend that theirs is a truer form of Buddhism, superior to the practice of the clergy for three reasons (Lin

and Zu 1994, 229—230): First, it represents the true, esoteric transmission of the Southern School of Chinese Chan BucL dhism, whereas the clergy all stand either in the line of the Northern School or in the exoteric transmission of the Southern School. 7 Second, its adherents may work toward salvation while remaining engaged in family and social life since they are free of the necessity of ordination. Third, they can pass the teachings on to their posterity, whereas the celibate clergy cannot. 8 As for vegetarianism, which gives Zhaijiao its name, this is a form of vegetarianism that eschews, not only meat, but also the five types of pungent roots (onions, chives, leeks, scallions, and garlic), according to East Asian Buddhist custom. It is not necessarily the case that all members observe a vegetarian diet at all times; Lin and Zu (1994, 200—201) report that, at least in the Zhaijiao hall that they observed, there were two levels of initiation. The first was changzhai (permanent vegetarianism), the permanent tion from meat, which entitled the member to learn the secret mantras and teachings of the sect. The second was huazhai (flower vegetarianism), a lower level of initiation that only obliged the member to take vegetarian meals either once a day or on certain days of the month, perhaps analogous to the catechumenate in ancient Christianity: Zheng 77—78) also reports that, during lhc Japanese period, there was even a Longhua Zhaijiao splinter group that dispensed with permanent vegetarianism altogether as antimodern, observing only the partial vegetarianism of the lower initiation.

As for millenarianism, this puts us into the realm of Zhaijiao doctrine, which can be a very tricky area of inquiry. As Zheng 0989, 43, points out (see also Jones 1999, 17—19), Zhaijiao doctrine was very volatile and subject to new currents and emphases depending on local leaders and individual authors. However, all three Zhaijiao sects generally posit the fOllowing picture of humanity's predicament and lhc soteriology thal provides a way out. Behind all reality there is the creator deity Unborn Venerable Mother (she has many other names as well). In (he beginning) the Unborn

Venerable Mother created 9.6 billion living beings, who eventually became separated from her through entrancement by material pleasures and found their way into the present world of suffering. In her mercy, the Unborn Venerable Mother decided to send a series ofthree emissaries to call her lost children back. lists of these three varv, most schemes agree that the first two saviors have already come and gone and that they succeeded in sav„ ing only a small fraction of those originally lost. In the near future, a third emissarv will arrive in the form of Maitreya, the traditional buddha who is to come in the next age. Alternatively, some say that the third savior has already come: Luo Qing, the founder of Luojiao. Thus, while claiming to be Buddhists, Zhaijiao adherents clearly affirm a scheme of fall and redemption vastly different from any soteriology fOund in traditional Buddhism.

This millenarian outlook often translated into an apocalyptic view of history. The advent of the third emissary would the present world to an end in a massive battle in which good would triumph over evil. Both in mainland China and in Taiwan under the Japanese, charismatic individuals claiming to represent or even to be the coming savior led bands of rebels into war, sometimes dispensing amulets purported to render the wearer impervious to bullets. The 1971 Gazetteer (Taiwan Provincial Historical Commission 1971, 58a) lists fourteen rebellions against the Japanese between 1895 and 1915, culminating with the Xilai Hermitage incident in 1915. The leader of this revolt, Yu Qingfang, used a Zhaiiiao hall as his base, couched his plans in religious rhetoric, and distributed amulets to his followers to wear in battle (Cai 1994, 50—51). I will return to this incident in the next section.

The three major sects of Zhaijiao began to filter into 'Taiwan during the I Qing dvnastv period. The Jinchuang sect was the first to arrive, sometime after the Qing court subdued the island in 1683, although the sect's own documents maintain that it had a presence on the island even during the Dutch period, 1624—1646 (Huang 1984, 748). Missionaries from the 1 Æ)ghua sect mav have come to Taiwan as early as 1765, but certainly by the late 1790s (the earlier date is given in Taiwan Provincial Historical Commission [1971, the latter in Zheng [1984, 40-41)). The Xiantian sect was the last to arrive, in the mid-nineteenth century, and, because its discipline was particularly strict and entailed celibacy for all members, it was always the smallest (Huang 1985, 616). During the Qing period, these three main sects felt no sense of connection, and, indeed, only the Longhua sect had any claim to the name "Zhaijiad' (Overmyer 1978, 292). However, during the Japanese period, researchers working tor the Japanese governor-general classed all three sects together under the name "Zhaijiao" for statistical purposes (see Marui [1919] 1993, 79—82), and scholars have regarded them as aspects of the same basic

religious phenomenon ever since. (Readers wanting a more detailed overview of Zhaijiao in Taiwan should consult Seiwert {1985, 1992]. ) This, then, is a general picture of the state of religion in Taiwan up to 1895, the year in which the Manchu government ceded Taiwan to Japan as part of the terms of surrender following the Sino-Japanese War, With this event, the inhabitants of Taiwan, both the incoming Japanese and the Han Taiwanese and indigenous tribes who already lived there, experienced the second great dislocation of their history.

During the fifty-one years of Japanese colonial rule, two main factors affected the condition of religion in Taiwan, as noted in the introductory section. The first was, of course, the policies that the series of governorsgeneral enacted for the regulation of religious activities, which varied in their scope and intent during the early, middle, and late decades of the Japanese Occupation. The second falls under the broad rubric "modernization," referring to the religious side effects of such social changes as improved sanitation, communicafon, and transportation.

The Japanese Government's Religious Policies

Most scholars who have studied Japan}s religious policies during its rule over Taiwan agree that they evolved through three distinct periods, at least in their treatment of "native religions "9 (The Japanese government's treatment of Buddhism proceeded along different lines than did its treatment of other reWons and will, therefore, be treated separately, although Buddhism's relatively favored status was to have repercussions on popular religion, Daoism, and Zhaijiao, as we shall see.) The first period, roughly from 1895 to 1915, was marked by a paternalistic and laissez.faire attitude toward native religion. The second period, from about 1915 to 1937, made a clear break with the earlier attitude as the government tried more vigorously to investigate and regulate local religious institutions and practices. The third period, which coincides with the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and mainland China, saw the government expending great efforts to do away with native religions altogether in an attempt to "Japanize" the local population. Here, the l.nost salient policies were the GJapanization movement" (Jpn.: Köminka undö) and one of that movement's specifically religious manifestations, the "temple.restructuring movemene (Jpn: jibyö seiri undò)«

The First Period, 1895-1915 ents among the natives than either Shintö or Christian missionaries (Chen During the first twenty years or so of Japanese rule on Taiwan, the general had many other things on his mind than investigating or the religious life of the people. The government had to put down resistance on the part of Taiwanese independence fighters and assemble entire infrastructure of government from the ground up as possible (Lamley 1999, 203—208). Therefore, during this time, the ment promulgated very few measures specifically aimed at religion 1994, 18—20). governorregulating armed the quickly as govern-(Cai

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First, beyond with the easier to adher- 1992, 119). Second, several of the most prominent Buddhists of the period, such as Jueli, Shanhui, and Benyuan, founded new temples and subordinated them administratively to the lineages of Japanese Buddhism, the first two to the Sõtöshü, the third to the Rinzaishü (Jones 1999, Even some Zhaijiao halls began regularly inviting Japanese Buddhist missionaries to their meetings to observe and to preach (Taiwan Provincial Historical Commission 1971, 58a).

However, one must be careful not to overstate the amount of influence that the Japanese wielded over Buddhism during this time. As mentioned above, Chinese Buddhism and Japanese Buddhism differ in significant ways: Japanese Buddhist priests marry, eat and drink wine, all of which Chinese Buddhist monastics find repugnant. Furthermore, Japanese Buddhists take only the bodhisattva vows upon ordination, having long ago ceased taking the traditional 250 precepts of the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya (Chn: sifenlü). Not only does this open them to charges of laxity from the Chinese side, but it also casts doubt on the very validity of their ordinations. Therefore, even as the Chinese Buddhists of Taiwan were entering into cooperative arrangements with Japanese Buddhists, they also worked hard to limit the influence of Japanese Buddhist practices and customs. As one example of this countervailing tendency, we see during this period the first monastic ordinations ever held in Taiwan, all performed scrupulously according to the traditional Chinese model.

The Second Period, 1915-1937

The year 1915 marked a watershed as far as Japanese religious policies were concerned. This was the year in which thc Xilai Hermitage incident (Xilai an shijian) almost erupted into a major anti„Japanese uprising. This uprising, lcd by one Yu Qingtáng, had its inception in thc Xilai Hermitage, a Zhaijiao hall, and in spirit-writing halls (luantang) (Iòr further intOrmation on spirit writing, see Clart, chapter 4 in this volume). In addition, Yu and his tOlÆowcrs took up religious practices and rhetoric in preparing tor their uprising. For example, they all adopted a vegetarian pertOrmed rituals to rally lhc Daoisl Celestial Generals and their spirit armies to their cause, wore bulletdeflecting talismans, and so on (Cai 1994, 52). The Japanese government discovered the plot betOre the rebels had a chance to put it into operation, and YO Qingtáng was executed along with ninety-four others after a. speedy trial, while hundreds of others went to prison to serve long scntcnccs, bringing to an cnd the last major uprising in Taiwan. This incident, which, like others bctOre was rooted in the millenarian

Unofficially, however, many Japanese bureaucrats actually popular religion to the point of attending temple celebrations and people time off to plan and attend local festivals and holidays. Scholars imputed both good and bad motives to these officials. Some believe was simply a prudent policy on the part of the government at a time it was trying to win the trust of the local population. However, some journalists of that time saw a more sinister agenda at work. them, Japanese officials reasoned that the people would have less fewer resources for rebellion and resistance if those were squandered on lavish feasts and on festivals (both points of view are recorded [1994, 44—45]).

Whatever the motivations might have been, the net effect was the Japanese government took a benign, "live-and-let-live" attitude local religion. It needed the people's trust and cooperation for development so that the new colony could begin generating revenue homeland. In addition, it saw native religion (especially Buddhism) possible bridge to its projected expansion into Fujian and provinces, the hometown regions of most Taiwanese. Thus, it saw to impose State Shinto or to repress native religious practices and lions during this period (Cai 1994, 43—44). At mosu it contented requiring all temples, shrines, and religious associations 10 register appropriate government office.

Buddhism fared somewhat differently than popular religion and during this time. Unlike these two, Buddhism represented a shared Japanese heritage that, while differing in very significant ways, still somc common ground- IO This had two important consequences development of Buddhism in Taiwan throughout the Japanese period. Buddhists werc among the first to recognize the advantages of going the simple "live-and-lel-live» arrangement into active cooperation Japanese govcrnmcnt. Japanese Buddhist missionaries tOund it gain an audience in Taiwan's temples and had morc success in gaining

fanaticism of some of Taiwan's religious customs" (kyükan shükyö), brought suspicion on all religious groups in Taiwan, with the exception of orthodox, monastic Buddhism (Taiwan Provincial Historical Commission 1971, 59b). The sudden realization that supposedly benign old customs could serve as the rallying point for open rebellion had effects both on the government and on the religious groups themselves, On the government's side, officials realized the urgency of the need to carry out more detailed investigations into the nature of religion in Taiwan, while, on the side of Taiwanese religions themselves, adherents felt the need to tind wavs to distance themselves from seditious movements in order to avert possible government persecution.

Immediately after the uprising, the governor-general issued orders directing that each public school in 'Taiwan conduct a survey of all shrines and temples in its jurisdiction. However, this first effort at investigation, fueled by fear and hastily implemented, proved ineffectual, and the effort was canceled in March 1916. A second round, directed by Marui Keijirö, then bead of the Interior Ministrv*s Shrine Bureau (Shajika), begin shortlv thereafter. This effort met with much greater success. Marui prepared and distributed standard forms and involved not only local schools, but also police stations (Cai 1994, 54—35). The results, published in 1919 (see Marui ! 1919} 1993), promised to be a comprehensive account of the nature of traditional religion in 'Iåiwan, from popular religion through Daoism, Zhaijiao, and based devotional and ancestral societies, While Nfarui's report represents an important resource for research in

Taiwanese religion, one must use its results carefully. The research, carried out by schoolteachers and police in addition to their primary responsibilities and without training in field research methods, uncritically reproduces data supplied by intòrmants and, thus, reports their idealized self-image rather than their reality. For example, the section on Zhaijiao reproduces without comment or criticism the sect's claim that it stands in a direct lineage from Huineng (638—713), the Sixth Patriarch of Chinese Chan Buddhism (Marui 79ff.). Thus* the Japanese governor-general based his religious policies at this time on sectarian ideology, not on the real derivations, beliefs, and practices of Taiwan's traditional religious groups.

However, the investigations did bring Marui into contact with many of Taiwan's religious leaders, who were at the time also coping with the aftereffects of the Xilai Hermitage incident. Ever since the plot was uncovered and the connection with religion noted, many of the ethnic Han people of Taiwan who wished to pursue their religions in peace sought ways to deflect

the suspicion that fell on them as a result of the incident. One of the main methods employed was the formation of islandwide religious associations whose charters included specific requirements of good citizenship and pledges that members would not engage in seditious activities. Several such organizations, such as the Patriotic Buddhist Association (Aiguo Fojiao Hui), the Buddhist Youth Association (Taiwan Fojiao Qingnian Hui), and the Taiwan Friends of the Buddhist Way (Taiwan Fojiao Daoyou Hui), came into being in the vears following 1915. In setting up these organizations, the people of Taiwan hoped to establish organizations membership in which would avert any possible suspicion of rebellious intent (for details on all these organizations, see Jones [1999, 64—81]). Although these groups were islandwide in scope, they also tended to be aligned with one Japanese Buddhist school or another and, thus, became sectarian in character, making them more competitive than cooperative. In carrying out his investigations, Marui saw the need for a religious society that would be truly ecumenical, so, in 1922, he brought together all the leaders of Taiwan Buddhism and Zhaijiao to form the South Seas Buddhist Association (Chn.: Nan Ying Foiiao Hui; Jpn.: Nan'e Bukkyökai; SSBA). This organization endured for the remainder of Japanese rule in Taiwan and provided its members with direct government supervision and credentials, on the basis of which they could remain above suspicion and free from tèar of suppression,

In 1925, the government transferred Marui back to Japan, and responsibilitv for oversight of the SSBA devolved onto the Bureau of Education's Social Affairs Office, For the remainder of the SSBRs existence, its president was always the head of the Bureau of Education and its vice president the head of the Social Affairs Office. [n this way, the adverse effects of the Xilai Hermitage incident on both the government and the people were ameliorated by a single strategy. In pursuing its investigations, the government gained increased contact with and more active supervision over Taiwan's religious groups, and these groups in turn developed organizations and relations with the government that protected them from crackdowns and reprisals.

The SSBA was also significant insofar as it represents the onlv instance in Chinese history in which monastic Buddhism has actively cooperated with what it considered a form of popular Buddhism. However, there was one other organization that formed for similar purposes (protection from suspicion and persecution) but was open only to members of Zhaijiao. This was the Taiwan Buddhist Longhua Association (Taiwan Fojiao Longhua Hui), founded in 1920 by prominent zhaiyou

adherents) from central Taiwan. Although this organization was strongest in the belt from Chiayi (Jiayi) to Tainan, never rivaled the SSBA in size and influence, and shared many of its leaders with the SSBA, it was still a significant religious organization that lasted until the end of the Japanese period and provided a way for members to establish good credentials with the go'& ernment. (On the Taiwan Buddhist Longhua Association, see Wang t 1994]. )

The Third Period, 1937-1945

The year 1937 marked another watershed in the Japanese government's relalionship with the people or Taiwan. This was the year of the Marco Polo Bridge incident and the outbreak of the War of Resistance on the mainland. Japan had always been of two minds in its attitude toward its colonial subjects, never really knowing whether and to what extent they could be assimilated into Japanese culture, and, thus, vacillating in its approach over the years leading up to 1937 (Chen 1994, 31—33). The onset of war made the problem urgent, and directives from Tokyo ordering the rapid acculturation of peoples in all Japan's colonial territories (Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria) replaced local initiatives (Chen 1994, 46—47). The people of Taiwan were Japanese citizens, and Japan needed their sons for their military service and their labor (to maintain wartime production). However, they were also ethnically Chinese, and the government could not be sure that, even after forty-two years of Japanese domination, they might not harbor covert sympathy for their (not so) distant cousins on the mainland and defect on the field of battle. A solution to this quandary was urgently needed.

The plan that carried the day—the "Japanization insofar as such a project was even possible, to turn the Han people of Taiwan into ethnic Japanese. In the secular sphere, this entailed a ban on any Chinese dialect in print or public discourse, the enfOrcement of Japanese-style dress, pressure to renovate homes in accordance with customary Japanese design, inviting loyal families to apply (Or new Japanese names, and a ban on Chinesc cultural activities such as Taiwanese opera (Chen 1991, 502—504). In the religious sphere, this involved efforts to wean people away from traditional Chinese religion and into the nexus of State Shinto.

One example of effort to lure people to State Shinto is the effort on the part of the Japanese government 10 induce citizens to remove traditional family altars from their homes and replace them with deity altars (kamidana) and Buddha altars (bulsudan). In addition, the government dislributed paper amuiels ( taima) consecrated at the Ise branch shrine in Taipei and instituted a unified calendar of religious [eslivais based on the

Japanese model (Cai 1994, 172—201). However, measures such as these are easier to promulgate than to enforce, and I suspect that they affected few people outside large urban areas.

The so-called temple-restructuring movement, in which many traditional temples were razed and their religious images burned, caused much more consternation among the populace and had more far-reaching effects. The historical progress of this movement is very complicated and would constitute an essay in itself; hence, only a very truncated account can be given here.

As people gave thought to appropriate methods of promoting the Japanization movement, some groups turned their attention to the situation of Daoist and folk temples in the island. The first call for reform came from the "Conference on Improving Popular Customs" held in Taiwan in July 1936. At this early stage, far from calling for the razing and consolidation of temples, conference participants merely voted on a series of recommendations for reforming the bad image of popular temple culture then current among the Japanese in general as well as Chinese intellectuals. These reforms included rationalizing the finances and governance of temples; excluding fortune-tellers, geomancers, and their ilk from temple grounds; improving the manner of worshiping deities and the life-cycle rituals; and so on (Cai 1994, 230—231).

The outbreak of open war between China and Japan in 1937 made the task of temple reform more pressing. The authorities immediately moved to proscribe practices deemed wasteful of resources needed for the war, such as burning large quantities of ghost money, which was expensive either to manufacture locally or to import from China (Cai 1994, 232). However, some local officials wanted to take stronger measures. They felt that temples, and the religious culturc centered on them, constituted such an intractable ohstacle to Japanization as to be unredeemable. Any remaining symbol of the Taiwanese population's Chineseness, however residual, was an impediment to full assimilation. Ideological considerations aside, many local officials also noted that the temples' often considerable holdings in cash and and real estate would serve the nation better if confiscated and put to use in educational endeavors and the war eHOr1. Consequently, some local officials began taking the more drastic steps of closing and demolishing temples and Inurning their religious images, a process that they called "sending the gods to Heaven." The governor-general made no response to these extreme measures, leaving local governments to decide for themselves whether and 10 what cx(enl 10 promulgate and enforce them. One official in particular, Miyazaki Naokatsu, the head of Zhongli

(Chung-li) gun (subprefecture), prosecuted these measures with the greatest zeal, destroying almost all Daoist temples, folk temples, and zhaitang (Zhaijiao halls) in his iurisdiction. In other areas, officials took no measures at all, or passed measures but failed to enforce them, or enforced them onlv partiallv (Cai 1994, 271—272).

However erratically the measures were promulgated and carried ouç an outcry nevertheless ensued, both in Taiwan and in the Japanese homeland. In the years many local Chinese and Japanese leaders in Taiwan itself complained both to the governor-general's office and to representatives in the national Diet. Twice the Diet made official inquiries to determine whether the temple„restructuring movement violated the Japanese constitution's freedom•of-religious-beliet- clause. Journalists and social critics assailed the movement relentlessly. The pressure at last forced the governorgeneral to become involved in an attempt to bring some order and uniformity to a heretofore disparate and idiosyncratic policy instituted solely at the local level.

Fortunately for all concerned, a new governor•general took office in November and the change provided a means to bring the movement under control without a loss of face. The new governor-general ordered a halt to all temple-restructuring activities and put together a commission of academics to study the religious situation and determine the best possible course. The commission worked diligently for a year, but, by the time it submitted its report, the war was winding down, and the controversy over temple restructuring had subsided. So the report was quietlv and no further action was taken (Cai 1994, 272—273). Because the Japanization movement was so unevenly introduced and prosecuted, the outcome in terms of temples closed looks unimpressive. According to Japanese

government statistics, between 1938 and 1942 the number of temples had fallen from 39403 to 2,327, zhaitang from 246 to 224, and religious and ancestral associations from 5,345 to 4,CB7 (Chen 1992, 255). One could hardlv make a case that Taiwan's religious scene had been effec-, tively "Japanized," However, I believe that the real significance of the Japanization movement and the attendant temple-restructuring movement lay not so much in its concrete results as in the atmosphere of uncertaintv that it created and the countermeasures that it provoked on the part of the population at large. the movement was at its height, temples, zhaitang, and religious associations stood to lose ail the property they had accumulated, all the money they had saved, indeed, their entire religious wav of life. Many of these groups found ways to adapt in order to ensure their survival.

The Buddhists of Taiwan had long since learned the value of affiliating themselves with the schools of Japanese Buddhism. Now Zhaijiao tried this strategy, and, sensing an opportunity to increase their memberships, the Japanese Buddhist organizations were glad to go along. For example, the Fengtian Gong, a zhaitang in Yangmei village, appealed to the head of the Rinzai mission in Flåiwan, Takabayashi Gentaka, for protection, promising to subordinate itself administratively to the Rinzai school in return. Takabayashi accepted the offer and interceded with the government at all levets (Taiwan Provincial Historical Commission 1971, 68b). Cai (1994, 269) reports that, indeed, membership in Japanese Buddhist schools went up dramati„ cally during the Japanization movement, The movement also strengthened the membership of the South Seas Buddhist Association and the Taiwan Buddhist Longhua Association. Since the leadership of these organizations enjoved good relations with the governor-general's office, temples and zhaitangfrequentlv found that membership in one or the other of these organizations was enough to forestall confiscation or demolition. Polk and Daoist temples, on the other hand, were isolated from such support networks and suffered the brunt of the movement (Cai 1994, 293).

One interesting effect that lasted bevond the life of the movement and probably well into the postwar period was an increase in skepticism in matters of religion. When temples were razed or remodeled into Shintö shrines, the people greatly feared the anger of the deities and braced thernselves for earthquakes, floods; and plagues. For the most part, these divine scourges failed to appear, causing many to lose faith in the whole system of Chinese folk beliefs (Cai 1994, 290—299). The police even reported a decline in public morals as a result of the people's loss of faith in the gods* ability to punish wrongdoing!

Another way to interpret this movelnent, however, is to see it as a dis„ traction from the deeper, more general concern that gave rise to it. The outbreak of war in 1937 introduced exigencies into the situation that impelled drastic action on the part of the government, action that) by its draconian nature, obscured the trends that were already under wav and can be understood as instances of modernization. Remember that, before the war, conferences were already being held in Taipei that brought together both Japanese and Taiwanese urban intellectuals for discussions about pernicious "old customs." As was revealed in these conferences the primary problem with these old customs was, not that they cast doubt on the lovalty of the Taiwanese to the imperial throne (the colonial government's chief concern", but that they were "superstitious" and ('wasteful" (a more general-

ized concern harbored by modernizers both inside and outside the govern- mountain ranges that run all the way from the south to the north and the ment). In a word, they were backward and not modern. rivers that cut across the western alluvial plain, where most of the people live. Hemmed in by mountains and rivers, people found it very difficult to travel

of Modernization on Taiwanese Reiigion to other After parts the Japanese of the island, took over and the few government had anv motivation of the island, even however, to try. they The Effects

The preceding discussion has led us to a consideration of the second major set to work almost immediately building railroads, connecting all parts of factor in religious change prior to 1945 besides Japanese government policy: f Taiwan and creating a single transportation network. The main trunk line modernization. If the people lost faith in the gods when temple restruc- connecting the northern and southern ends of the island was completed as turing failed to provoke divine vengeance, it may be that prior currents of early as 1908 (Lamley 1999, 209). The governors-general also gave high modernization had already prepared the wav for the loss. priority to building and improving roads and bridges. Their intention was Scholars of Taiwanese history have often remarked that the Qing court merely to make it easier to get raw materials to factories and export comtook little or no interest in Taiwan, holding it only so that pirates and other

modities to port, but they also made it easier for people to travel about the national powers could not use it as a base from which to attack the main• island. It is no coincidence, therefore, that this period also saw the developImd (Wills 1999, 102). Chinese government officials generally considered ment of certain temples as islandwide pilgrimage sites. In the world of Bud* assignment to Taiwan a form of internal exile and, therefore, the turnover dhism, this is the period in which we first find temples rising to prominence rate among them was high, and the imperial government's reach did not as ordination sites and drawing enough visitors to rely on them as a extend to bureaucratic levels below that of the county (Sung 1990, 87). Onlv significant source of income (Jones 37—62). In Daoism and popular one Chinese governor* Liu Mingchuan (1836—1896), attempted to make any religion, too, we see temples that grow beyond their local boundaries and improvements in public works, building the first railroad in the island (the begin serving an islandwide clientele. In some cases, the deity enshrined in very one to which the Longshan temple objected, as noted above). However, a temple's precincts gained such a reputation for efficacy that the

image itself he rotated out very soon after, and the railroad quickly fell into disrepair. went abroad to take part in processions in order to bestow its blessings in When the Chinese ceded the island to Japan in 18953 the head negotiator on t other localities for other subethnic groups. Thus, during this time, religion the Chinese side made clear that the Chinese government would not miss in Taiwan lost a great deal of its localized> in-group character. Taiwan at all (Jones 199% 33}' This trend was especially apparent in temples founded during the early After the Japanese took over Ylhiwan in 1895, they quicklv set about colonial period in and around urban areas. For instance, Katz (1996, 226— building up the island's material infrastructute in order to facilitate indus- 227) notes that several temples founded in the first two decades of the twen„ trialization and begin making money for the Japanese government. Efforts tieth century—the Zhinan Gong, the Xingtian Gong, and the Juexiu Gong, at modernization under the Japanese had effects in the world of

religion, of for example—were not built as traditional, community-based temples. which I examine tv..ro in this section: the connection of all areas of the island Rather, they were large, eclectic in the variety of gods enshrined] had access by railroad and the introduction of modern medicine and sanitation. to transportation networks built into their design, and drew devotees and As we saw above, prior to the arrival of the Japanese, Taiwanese society leadership from very wide geographic zones, At the same time, their naturally fell into subgroups based on common provenance or trade guilds practices from the outset excluded elements that would connect them to and centered geographically on temples. 'låiwan lacked a temple or deity of their local communities, such as ritual processions through the neighborislandwide prominence; the cult of a particular deitv or temple tended to be hood or the levying of ritual taxes. In other words, these new temples were connected in the popular imagination with a cult or a temple back on the designed to be pilgrimage sites, their founders favoring features typical of an mainland, not to one elsewhere on the island. Aside from the intense in- adventitious religion over features typical of a locative religious cult.

group cohesion common at that time that made temples significant only for As tar medical advances, the Japanese began to introduce Western medimembers of the local communitv, the geography of Taiwan itself also pre- cine and more modern public-health and sanitation measures shortly after vented any temple from attaining greater than local patronage, Paiwan they gained control of' the island, Such measures were taken in response to naturally breaks into several discrete geographic zones because of the high the outbreaks of the plague, typhus, malaria, and cholera that afflicted the

occupying Japanese army in the years after 1895 (Lamley 1999, 205). Such outbreaks—especially of the plague—were nothing new in Taiwan; the native population had endured them regularlv ever since the Chinese first arrived. Traditionally, the Chinese population conceived of the plague as a gang of ghostiv bandits terrorizing the area, so thev responded to it by calling on a spiritual defense in the form of Celestial Generals and their forces. The people would take the image of the deity from the local temple and parade it as a wav of calling the troops in. If the power of the local deity proved insufficient, they might go farther afield to find a more powerful god to come to their aid. Often, the imported god proved rnore successful than local deities primarily because, by the time the local gods had been tried and found wanting and a new god transported in, the plague had already had time to run its course naturally and was beginning to abate. In this way, the image of Mazu from the Guandu temple became renowned for its efficacy i all over the northern end of Taiwan (Sung 1990, 220—224).

Goto Shimpei, the civil administrator under the fourth governor-general and a doctor himself with Western medical training, worked esoecially hard at introducing modern medical and sanitation practices, and, as early as 1905, his efforts paid off in markedly lower rates of cholera, smallpox, and bubonic plague (Lamley 1999, 210). As time went on, the effect of modern. ization on religion in Taiwan became increasingly profound. At first, as individuals found that treatment by modern methods had a better chance of curing cases of plague and other diseases, they turned to it rather than participating in religious processions. Later» as improved sanitation resulted in a decreased incidence of disease outbreak, the number of processions themselves correspondingly decreased. By 1945, the end of the Japanese period, most of the population, especially in urban areas, had become used to turning to medicine rather than the gods to alleviate the ravages of epidemics (Sung 1990, 224—225).

However, as Katz (chapter 5 in this volume) points out, one must be careful in interpreting such data. In this connection, the Taiwanese scholar Chang Hsun has noted that folk religion has endured in Taiwan alongside the two elite practices of Western medicine and "orthodoxñ Chinese medicine (Chn.: zhengtcng zhonvi). Unlike the latter two, folk and religious rituals do not seek merely to deal with illness technically by providing a cure; I they also deal with it socially and ritually, providing a context within which t to understand what illness means within the community. Thus, modern and "orthodox Chinese" medical practices have proved themselves better at curing disease and, thus, have pushed religious practice to the margins in the technical arena. However, they have not succeeded in givmg meaning to

the experience of disease or in aiding individuals in dealing with treatment failures and death. Thus, Chang notes, these religious and ritual methods persist even in modern, industrial, democratic, and capitalist Taiwan, often functioning as the last resort after Western medicine and orthodox Chinese medicine have been tried and have failed. In the Taiwanese context, ritual works by construing illness as a breakdown in relationships, whether between living members of a family or community or between the living and their ancestors, Precisely because it helps people come to grips with questions of the meaning of illness, it still has a role to play, even if modern practices have forced it to yield its place as a treatment option (see Chang 428—429).

From these two examples, we can see that the effects of Japanese rule on the religious life of Taiwan extended beyond those engendered by policies aimed specifically at religion. Other such examples could be adduced. For instance, the Japanese police force put an end to the feuding and warfare that had long gone on between subethnic groups and instituted new ways of organizing the population that supplanted the old clan, guild, and hornetown associations. In addition, the installation of telephone and telegraph systems, facilitating communication, and the imposition of uniform currency, weights, and measures very likety served both to reduce the likelihood that individual identity would be based on locality, clan, and dialect and to a certain extent, to facilitate a broader, pan-Taiwanese consciousness, one made even sharper by the presence of the Japanese "other." Thus, these developments, coupled with the improvements in transportation and sanitation detailed above, could well have contributed to the formation of panTaiwanese religious groupings, The very measures taken to modernize the island had the unintended side effect of breaking the cults of individual gods and the clientele of individual temples out of their previously narrow parochial bounds while at the same time making people less reliant on them for such worldly goals as ending plagues.

However, purely local or subethnic groupings were not eradicated entirely. Lee (chapter 6 in this volume), for example, demonstrates that the professional domains" of Daoist priestly ñmilies are almost completely coextensive with local linguistic groupings even today. It seems that, at least for the most intimate and emotional life-cycle rituals (e.g., funerals)} the people of Taiwan still feel most comfortable with neighbors who understand them and speak their language. Nevertheless Lee also shows that, in most other domains of their religious life, the Taiwanese place themselves readily into broader groupings that transcend subethnic boundaries, and this trend began under the Japanese.

CONCLUSIONS

By the time Japanese rule in Taiwan came to an end and the island reverted to Chinese sovereignty, many changes had already taken place in the gious spheres New rail links across the island made it possible for religion to transcend its local character and allowed for the establishment of prominent Buddhist and Daoist temples whose reputations drew visitors from around the island. The failure of the gods to avenge the destruction oftheir temples during the Japanization movement, along with evidence that modern sanitation worked better than religious processions to ameliorate epidemics, engendered a new level of skepticism that inaugurated the secularization of society. In order, therefore, to reach a proper understanding of the post-1945 religious developments reported on in the remainder of this volume, the reader must be aware that many of these had been under way since the turn of the century,

NOTES

This and other measures were intended to prevent Talwan from becoming too autonomous by maintaining an incentive for émigrés to return to the mainland to marry. Shepherd (1999, 112) reports that many men crossed over twice each vear, going to Taiwan in the spring for planting and returning to Fujian In the autumn after the harvest.

2. Davis- distinction between "adventitious" and "locative: religions corresponds roughly to Yang's (1961ì distinction between institutional" and '"dtffuse" religions. I prefet Davis terrmnology because it is more precise. As should be evident, locative religions can be highly institutionalized as well as diffuse, Likewise, adventitious religions can be diffuse as well as as is the case with religions organizæd, not into congregations, but into lineages of individual masters and students, Naquin (1985, 255—291) has labeled this latter type "meditation sects," as opposed to the more congregationanv oriented "sutra-recitation sects.

3. Brook (1993, 50) reports that, this period, members of the literati who remained loyal to the Ming court commonly disguised themselves as monks (shaving their heads and wearing monastic robes). However, they never took formal religious vows and so cannot be genuine, 4 Ordination as a Buddhist monk or nun involves two separate steps: the novice's ordination, which may take place as early as age seven and requites the observance of only precepts, and the full ordination, which is restricted to those age twenty or older and involves the observance of 250 precepts.

5. "Luojiao" (Luo teachings) is the name generally given to the religious movements that derived from the teachings Of Luo Qing (1443—1527). For more information, see ter Haar (fi9921 1999) and Overmver (1978). Seiwert (1992, 58—59) cautions that neither

claiming Luo as a patriarch nor even keeping a copy of his scriptural writings implies actual assent to his teachings. Such claims maybe efforts to establish credibility and prestige through association with a well-known n ante rather than a humble submis„ sion to his faith.

6. frequently romanizedas"Jintong" owing to the influence ofthe Hokkien pronunciation. For more information on the genesis of Unborn Venerable Mother mythologv on the mainland during the Ming dynasty, see ter Haar ( 119921 and pasSirn). On other of her devotees in 'Taiwan, see Jordan and Overmyer 0986% 57_63Ž 138—140, and passim).

7. One must understand that, in the context of early Chan history, the identification of any gro up with the so-called Northern School casts aspersions on its understanding of Buddhist doctrine and the efficacy of its practice.

8. This independence from the clergy, in particular the government-approved clerical establishment, marked these sects as "unorthodox" (xiefiao) in imperial eyes, and this imprecation is sometimes carried forward Into a certain type ofscholarfy interpretation that equates monastic" Buddhism with "orthodox" Buddhism. To this, Seiwert (1992, 30) pungently observes that, judged objectively on the basis of sinceritv ofbelief, zeal in practice, and moral rigor, these popular sects come out more orthodox than the monks.

9r In recent years, there have been two monograph studies on Japanese religious policies in Taiwan from 1895 to 1945: Chen (1992) and Cai (1994), Both adopt this three-part scheme in their analysis,

10. It is, of course, well-known that both Daoism and Confucianism entered Japan as well. but the Japanese did not seem to take these as sources Of commonality that could be exploited. For instance, in his report on religion in Taiwan, Marui Keijirò points out the common heritage of Chan Buddhism but makes no such reference the section on Daoism and Confucianism (see Marui [19191 1993' 19)•

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