Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism André Laliberté Subject: Governance/Political Change, Political Values, Beliefs, and Ideologies Online Publication Date: Feb 2019 DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.691 Summary and Keywords Buddhists constitute a majority of the population in peninsular Southeast Asia, but the largest concentration of Buddhists lives in East Asia. The delay between the times the Buddha gave his teachings and they were transcribed in written form and the adoption of the latter through centuries in countries with vastly different cultures hampered the development of a unified Buddhist political thought. Two major trends within Buddhism aspire to influence contemporary politics: “Buddhism for the human realm,” a reform movement originating in Republican China, and “engaged Buddhism,” which is a contemporary international network of activists rather than a systematic body of thought. The three major schools of Buddhism do not differ fundamentally on matters of doctrine, so the variety of Buddhist political orientations has more to do with the historical and national circumstances of the religion’s diffusion. Buddhism has expanded out of its country of origin, India, where it has almost disappeared but remains an important source of soft power. The Mahayana school has spread to China, where it has developed an eschatology that has inspired rebellions through history. The Theravada school has spread to Southeast Asia and has provided a source of legitimation for many rulers. The colonial era brought a key change, as lay Buddhists and monastics inspired many nationalist movements. Only six governments give a “special place” to Buddhism in their constitutions, but other countries with large Buddhist populations feel its influence on politics through the sangha. In countries of the Theravada tradition, monastics play an important role in politics, whereas in countries where the Mahayana school prevails lay associations mobilize Buddhists. Very few Buddhist political parties have emerged and only in Japan has one endured in a coalition government. In Southeast Asia, the politics of Buddhism is often associated with nationalist intransigence, in contrast to the peaceful and tolerant image of the religion’s politics promoted by many of its exiled leaders in the “engaged Buddhist” network. Keywords: Asoka, Buddhism for the human realm, Chakravartin, engaged Buddhism, politics and religion Page 1 of 21 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, POLITICS (oxfordre.com/politics). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 18 March 2019 Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism Introduction Buddhism spread gradually from India, its land of origin, to other countries. It counted among its followers people on all continents at the beginning of the 21st century, with an overwhelming majority residing in Asia. Buddhism emerged more than 25 centuries ago, but historians disagree about the exact circumstances of its beginning, including those of its founder’s life. The only certainty is that it was one of many sramanas, or religious movements, that repudiated the authority of the Vedic tradition in India. Archeological evidence attests to the diffusion of Buddhist scriptures through China and elsewhere in Asia, but much ambiguity remains about the circumstances of this transmission. In China, for example, early Buddhism was indistinguishable from the ritual practice of Daoism. Even today, monastic orders exist and an official Buddhist association manages their temples and ordains state-sanctioned clergy, yet popular beliefs that include devotion to the Buddha and bodhisattvas are not recognized as such by political and religious authorities. As an institutionalized religion with recognized associations, Buddhism represents one of the two main religions of Japan, alongside Shinto, and Mahayana Buddhists comprise a plurality of believers in China, Vietnam, and Taiwan. Elsewhere in peninsular Southeast Asia and in Sri Lanka, Theravada Buddhism represents the religion of the majority.1 The Tibetan form of Buddhist practice has spread to Mongolia, Southwest China, India’s periphery, and the bordering states of Nepal and Bhutan. In Korea and Malaysia, Buddhists represent important minorities. An increasing number of people claim to be Buddhists worldwide, including Asian minorities in other regions and non-Asians. China has the largest concentration of Buddhists on the planet, with more than 200 million people who claim to practice Buddhist rituals, most of whom identify with the Mahayana schools of Chan and Pure Land. About 10 million Chinese Buddhists follow the Tibetan tradition and a few million ethnic minorities are associated with the Theravada school.2 With over 40 million followers, Japan is home to the second-largest concentration of Mahayana Buddhists. Although less than a third of the population identifies as Mahayana Buddhist in Vietnam, South Korea, Taiwan, and Malaysia, these countries count more Buddhists than Laos. Thailand, with over 60 million followers, has the largest percentage of Theravada Buddhists, followed by Burma, with over 40 million. Followers of the Theravada tradition constitute a majority of the population in only three other states: Cambodia, Sri Lanka, and Laos. Outside Tibet, a majority of the population practices the rites of Tibetan Buddhism in Mongolia and Bhutan. A significant number of Tibetan Buddhists live in India, including some refugees from Tibet and indigenous people in the northeast. These populations are distinct from recent converts in Central India, who practice their own version of a reformed Buddhism known as Navayana. Although less than 1% of India’s population is Buddhist, their number exceeds the entire Buddhist population of Taiwan. Likewise, the United States counts more Buddhists than Mongolia. Because the methodologies to count Buddhists differ from country to country, these numbers are just estimates. They nevertheless give a good sense of the importance of the Page 2 of 21 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, POLITICS (oxfordre.com/politics). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 18 March 2019 Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism religion relative to nonbelief and affiliation with other religions within specific countries, as well as the weight of different nations in the global Buddhist population.3 Buddhist Political Theory Buddhism rests on the teachings of the historical figure of Siddhartha Gautama. Various versions of his biography exist, which often conflict, and even the years of his life are disputed: 563–483 BCE or 480–400 BCE. The general agreement is that during his life, he taught his doctrine and founded a monastic order, a trend that was common at a time when many other schools of thought emerged. Most sources depict Siddhartha as a noble in the Republic of Shakya, a region straddling parts of present-day Nepal and Bihar, on the margin of the kingdom of Magadha. He was destined to succeed his father as an oligarch but renounced that fate. After years of ascetic practices, he reached enlightenment in Bodh Gaya and henceforth he became known as the Buddha. He gave a first sermon in Sarnath and passed away in Kushinagar after years of teaching and debating with proponents of other schools of thought. The tradition summarizes the essence of the Buddha’s teaching as the Four Noble Truths: dukkha (sorrow, suffering), the cause of dukkha (samudaya), the end of dukkha (nirhoda), and the path that frees us from dukkha (magga), also known as the Noble Eightfold Path. Most of the Buddha’s teachings serve to elaborate on the Noble Eightfold Path, also known as the Middle Way, to emphasize a balance between the extremes of asceticism and hedonism. A key component of the Buddha’s teaching is the doctrine of dependent origination, which states that all things arise in dependence of all other things. This principle of dependent origination serves to explain the chain of causality that results in the endless cycles of rebirth, or samsara, and dukkha. The soteriology of Buddhism rests on the breaking of samsara through the attainment of nirvana (lit. “blow out,” as in the flame of a candle), the only phenomenon that is not the consequence of dependent origination. The Buddha is depicted as the one who set in motion the Dharmachakra (wheel of the Dharma), and symbolized the chakravartin (wheel turner), the ideal king who rules the universe and that each monarch on earth should emulate. A key belief described in the Digha Nikaya, part of the Pali Canon, states that a chakravarti king appears when people are virtuous.4 Moore (2016) has posited that Buddhist political theory assumes “that human beings are not selves, that politics is necessary but not very important, and that ethics is advice for living wisely but not a system of universal, obligatory rules.” Three issues make defining a Buddhist political theory difficult. First, a significant gap exists between the life of the tradition’s founder and the constitution of an authoritative canon in written form. Second, besides whatever authenticity scholars can attribute to the original teachings of this canon, it has received a variety of changing interpretations over centuries. Third, and in relation to these interpretations of the early tradition, experts on Buddhist studies need to add scriptures written in Sanskrit and Tibetan as well as various recensions of the original to the canon, which is written in Pali. These gaps account, in part, for the Page 3 of 21 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, POLITICS (oxfordre.com/politics). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 18 March 2019 Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism disagreements and the disputes about the teachings of the Buddha. While academics, officials, and others can infer some rudiments of a political Buddhist philosophy out of the key elements of the Buddha’s doctrine, the emergence of the distinctive schools of Theravada, Mahayana, and Vajrayana in the centuries that followed his life explains the differences and diversity in political positions that people label as “Buddhist.” Most scholars believe that the distinction between the three schools represents only a difference in the expression of the same teachings, divergences about monastic life, and variations in the implementation of the teachings rather than discrepancies in their substance. Others note that a key contrast between the Theravada and Mahayana schools rests on their respective soteriology: the Theravada school focuses on the responsibility of the self to attain enlightenment, while the Mahayana school stresses the importance of helping other sentient beings. An important Mahayana belief that is relevant to politics is the devotion to the bodhisattva Maitreya, or the “Buddha of the future,” also known as Milefo in China. According to some of the sutras, the Maitreya will appear in this world to teach the pure dharma and achieve enlightenment. The scriptures announce his arrival at a time in the future when the world experiences decay and the teachings of the dharma have been lost. This eschatology has inspired many political rebellions, mostly in China (Overmyer, 1976). The belief bears a resemblance to messianic beliefs in other religions and it has been adopted by other Chinese religions such as Yiguandao (the Way of Unity). However, the Chinese Buddhist tradition’s emphasis on doctrine stands apart from the Southeast Asian one, which places little importance on scripture and much more on ritual and the political legitimation conferred by the religious authority of monastics (Matthews & Jerryson, 2016). That much is clear when considering the widely different approaches adopted by monastics within Thailand and Burma, for example, which have ranged from opposition to the regimes to support for the rulers. One of the most relevant components of the contemporary Buddhist approach to politics in Chinese societies is the development since the mid-20th century of the trend known as “Buddhism for the human realm” (renjian fojiao), sometimes rendered as humanistic Buddhism. Elaborated by the Chinese monk Taixu (1890–1947), this religious teaching faced rejection by many of his contemporaries, but after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (1949) many monks left the country and transmitted renjian fojiao to Taiwan and throughout the Chinese diaspora. Later, it was reintroduced by the Buddhist Association of China. Among the most important associations that represent that trend are Foguangshan and the Tzu Chi Foundation, which were both established in Taiwan. Branches have been started in North America, Europe, Australasia, and China, and have contributed to the shaping of Taiwan’s social policy via philanthropic activities (Laliberté, 2004). Renjian fojiao promoted the modernization of Buddhism, and to achieve that end Taixu encouraged a downsizing of the Sangha and a greater reliance on lay associations for the revitalization of the religion. One of Taixu’s key goals was to renovate the teaching of the Pure Land school to suggest that it was not a remote abode but a goal to attain in this world through appropriate practices including philanthropy and service to society and, Page 4 of 21 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, POLITICS (oxfordre.com/politics). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 18 March 2019 Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism more broadly, selfless commitment to all (Pittman, 2001). This orientation resonates with the modernizing agenda of the East Asian developmental states, which prefer the practice of charity and family-based care to the provision of social services by a generous welfare state. Chinese-speaking Buddhists see renjian fojiao as the main inspiration behind the growth of large lay associations in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia since the 1960s. China’s Buddhist Association, the largest of its kind in the world, has embraced it. The Soka Gakkai (Society for the Creation of Value), arguably the largest international Buddhist association, also presents its teachings in Japan as “humanistic Buddhism.” The society’s founder was Josei Toda, who was almost a contemporary of Taixu (Metraux, 1994).5 Some commentators have related renjian fojiao to “engaged Buddhism,” but the conflation between the two is problematic. The former preceded the latter by decades and mainly relates to Chinese societies. Moreover, and more important, “engaged Buddhism,” a term devised by Western scholars such as Christopher Queen and Sallie King, does not refer to a doctrine in particular but serves as an umbrella term for an informal and loose network that brings together many movements and people who share the belief that Buddhism lends legitimacy to the causes they promote. Engaged Buddhists stress pressing social and political issues such as liberation from social injustice and gender discrimination and protection of the environment. In contrast to renjian fojiao, they do not shun activism and openly criticize authorities who stand in the way of justice and equality. Authorities in the Buddhist Association of China, most of whom promote renjian fojiao, vehemently disapprove of engaged Buddhist leaders such as the Dalai Lama. Several Euro-American philosophers, from Schopenhauer to Conolly, have engaged with Buddhism, some seeing the germs of a political philosophy. Initially, Westerners who expressed interest in Buddhism looked at it primarily as an alternative spirituality, starting in the 19th century with the work of German scholarship and continuing with the broad popularity of Zen in the 1960s. More recently, however, the popularity of spiritual leaders such as the Dalai Lama and Thich Nath Hanh has led to an inflexion of this interest in political concerns. These religious leaders are efficient communicators who have interpreted and translated their respective traditions for their Western audience. However, they also present an idealized dimension of Buddhism that is not necessarily representative of Buddhism as experienced in most societies where it is the religion of the majority (or a large minority) of the population. A review of the doctrinal diversity among Buddhist thinkers can help to understand the ideational component of Buddhist politics, but to appreciate fully its relevance to contemporary politics, an understanding of its social embeddedness is necessary. This understanding requires an appreciation of the historical trajectory of the religion as a social force, as populations in different cultures have adopted its teachings over time and adapted it to their conditions and elites have appropriated its teachings and at times added to its original content. Page 5 of 21 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, POLITICS (oxfordre.com/politics). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 18 March 2019 Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism Buddhist Early Political History The doctrinal diversity among the three main schools of Buddhism does not reflect the transmission of the teachings in time and space. Merchants and scholars have contributed to the diffusion of the religion and many rulers have let Buddhist teachings spread among those of other religions. The adoption of the religion by a ruler, moreover, rarely meant the conversion of the entire population. Finally, the diffusion of the religion in space has waxed and waned considerably: it has almost disappeared in India, where it first emerged, and experienced the same fate in the Indonesian archipelago. The political influence of Buddhism has contrasted with that of Islam in which the political and religious authorities were mutually constituted from the beginning. Although Gautama Sidharta was born a prince, his disciples and the promoters of what would become Buddhism did not seek to fulfill political roles, and the subsequent evolution of the religion generally bears more resemblance to the slow political rise of Christianity, which emerged at the margins of Roman society before rising to prominence in the late imperial period. It took more than two centuries after the passing of the Buddha for a political ruler to decide that his teachings deserved patronage. As Buddhism spread in different societies with different religious traditions it changed, and different traditions gradually took shape. Under this variety of conditions, the political importance of Buddhism fluctuated accordingly. The historical trajectory of Buddhism across Asia’s main regions can be summarized as follows. After its emergence in India, Buddhism virtually disappeared from most of the subcontinent. The Theravada tradition remained important in Sri Lanka while the Vajrayana gained influence in the Himalayan region to the north. Introduced early on in China, the Mahayana tradition became an important influence that peaked during the Tang dynasty but seldom achieved hegemony or political influence afterward. Transmitted from China, the Mahayana tradition exercised an important influence in Japan, Korea, and Vietnam. The Vajrayana tradition came to prevail and shape polities in Tibetan and Mongolian Inner Asia. The Vajaryana, after gaining political clout in Sri Lanka, spread to Southeast Asian countries when rulers associated the religion’s institutions with their government. From Emergence to Decline in South Asia The conversion to Buddhism of the Mauryan emperor Asoka (273–232 BCE) represented a major milestone for the religion’s political importance. Through his decision to follow the teachings of the Buddha, Asoka signaled the end of warfare in the subcontinent. Although recent scholarship has qualified this interpretation of Asoka’s policies (Jenkins, 2010), he has nevertheless become the paradigm of the Chakravartins. The patronage of Buddhism through the construction of stupas and pillars contributed to the propagation of the religion, and emissaries sent by the emperor to Sri Lanka and Central Asia helped to proselytize these regions. Asoka also sought to spread the religion in the Hellenistic world, issuing edicts in Greek and Aramaic. The conversion of King Menander (r. ca. 160– 135 BCE) to Buddhism represented a rare case of the religion’s influence in the IndoPage 6 of 21 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, POLITICS (oxfordre.com/politics). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 18 March 2019 Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism Greek kingdom. In Sri Lanka, the efforts of Asoka’s son bore fruit, as the Sri Lankan king and the nobility converted to Buddhism. The Shunga dynasty (185–173 BCE) undermined the legacy of Asoka within India, however, and the further expansion of Buddhism outside the country resulted from monastic missions and proselytizing along trade routes. Buddhism expanded again throughout India during the Gupta dynasty (321–550). The first Gupta rulers of the dynasty were orthodox Hindus, but they encouraged Buddhist and Jain institutions as well. Hence, under the patronage of Kumaragupta (ca. 414–455), the Nalanda Buddhist monastery became a major center of learning. After the invasion of the White Huns in the north, however, the religion’s influence waned in the Indian subcontinent for two centuries. It remained important in southern Indian kingdoms and Sri Lanka but almost disappeared in the North. The Pala dynasty, which was influential in North India and Bengal from the 8th century, renewed state patronage of Mahayana and Tantric Buddhism. It renewed support of the Nalanda academy, which became one of the first universities in the world. After the overthrow of the Pala by the Hindu Sena dynasty (1070–1200) and subsequent Turkic invasions, Buddhist influence vanished in the IndoGangetic plain and never recovered. The renewed importance of Buddhism in contemporary Indian politics via the role of Dr. B. R. Ambedkar or the refuge granted to the Dalai Lama constitutes a distant echo of that ancient legacy. Transmission to China and Inner Asia The early translation of the Buddhist canon to Chinese by central Asian monks during the 2nd century is significant to the future of the religion from a global perspective. The religion gradually expanded though China and North Vietnam and by the end of the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) it was part of the Chinese religious landscape, even though it did not receive state patronage. Buddhism reached China in the 1st century CE, when the empire entered into decline and faced peasant uprisings that involved Daoist societies. For many people in these times of trouble, Buddhist teachings offered solace, but they had not yet fully developed eschatological doctrines like their Daoist counterparts with which they were sometimes confused. Conversely, during the period of social instability and economic insecurity caused by the political divisions following the fall of the Han dynasty, Buddhism grew in influence and represented one of the few unifying cultural forces in the various kingdoms of China. The influence of Buddhism took many forms. It was a source of legitimacy to rulers, but was also an inspiration for revolt against them (Demieville, 1957). Emperor Wen of the Sui dynasty (581–618) was aware of Buddhism’s popularity and saw conversion as a way to legitimize his authority. Wen encouraged the spread of the religion and consolidated its role in society. The Tang dynasty (618–907) saw the culmination of that trend, but while emperors promoted Buddhism as a religious system they never did so at the expense of Daoism. Although the latter was the religion promoted by the state, Buddhist monasteries became major actors in the economy. They owned property and employed citizens to help run a wide range of operations, including services such as schools for children (Gernet, 1998). The early Tang dynasty represents the golden age of Page 7 of 21 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, POLITICS (oxfordre.com/politics). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 18 March 2019 Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism Buddhism in China and throughout Asia, when its influence reached its zenith and represented an element of governance in many regions. Chinese political rulers, however, took umbrage at this prominence. The Tang emperor Wuzong saw the tax-exempt status of temples and convents as a drain on the economy and took measures in 805 that drastically reduced the influence of Buddhism in Chinese society for centuries. These constraints were enforced under the Song dynasty (960–1279), as the rulers promoted a revival of Confucianism, whose intellectuals criticized Buddhism as a curse. After the 10th century, Buddhism became both a source of legitimacy and of dissent. This made it an important oppositional political force. After the Maitreyan teachings inspired a revolt in 1047, authorities felt threatened enough to proclaim the Maitreya sect to be heretic and executed tens of thousands of its followers. Although Buddhism lost its ability to represent a credible countervailing source of power, its eschatology was the source of legitimation for dissenting sects for centuries. The religion fared much better in the periphery of the Chinese empire. In Vietnam the dynasties of Din and Le (968–1009) granted it official status and the two dynasties of Ly and Tran (1009–1400) promulgated Buddhism as the state religion. Moreover, as Tibet became integrated into the same polity as China for the first time under Mongol rulers, Tibetan Buddhism experienced a significant expansion through inner Asia during the Yuan dynasty (1206–1368), which promoted the religion but did not grant it official status at the expense of others. In 1351, the Red Turban rebellion broke out against the Yuan, the first of many among what some historians collectively label the White Lotus rebellions, a name drawn from Buddhist teachings. The rebellion contributed to the overthrow of the Yuan and led to the establishment of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) under which the Chan School of the Mahayana tradition rose to prominence. During the Qing dynasty (1644–1911), the rulers reproduced the earlier policies of the Yuan. Tibetan Buddhism remained as one of the established religions and was practiced by Tibetans, Mongols, and Manchus (Tuttle, 2005). Meanwhile, Mahayana institutions prospered in China proper and maintained cooperative relations with the government. The heterodox teachings of the White Lotus and others inspired rebellions against the central government, but none succeeded in overthrowing the regime. Intellectuals such as Kang Youwei (1858–1927) and Liang Qichao (1873–1929) promoted, in vain, the renewal of the nation through the infusion of Buddhist philosophy. Taixu advocated the compatibility of Buddhism with nationalism and socialism. In the 20th century, these two ideologies and the political forces that they inspired largely supplanted Buddhism as a source of political value among the Chinese. The situation was different for Tibetan Buddhists. They were inspired by the Dalai Lama who has acted for decades as both spiritual and political leader. Similar dynamics have unfolded in Vietnam, where Buddhist texts constituted an important contribution to the public debate under colonial rule (McHale, 2004), inspired resistance to authoritarian rulers during the Diem regime, protest against the American intervention, and a critical stance against the socialist regime. Two religious movements emerged when Vietnam came under French colonial Page 8 of 21 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, POLITICS (oxfordre.com/politics). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 18 March 2019 Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism rule: the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao. These groups are seen by their adherents and others as a patriotic appropriation of Buddhism. Appropriation in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan Monks promoting the teachings of the Mahayana tradition introduced them to Korea in 372 and Japan in 552. The religion flourished in Korea and benefited from state patronage during the North and South States Period (688–935), even becoming the state religion in the kingdom of Balhae (698–926). This attitude toward the religion was maintained after unification, when the rulers of the Goeryo period (918–1392) proclaimed Buddhism as the state religion. Under the Joseon dynasty (1392–1910), however, the rulers sought to undermine the power gained by Buddhist institutions in previous centuries. The religion lost political prominence and its capacity to influence society. Buddhism went through a broadly similar experience in Japan, albeit the religion’s influence in the latter proved more enduring. After the Heian period (794–1185), Mahayana Buddhism became a dominant religion for eight centuries. In the Tokugawa period (1600–1868) rulers sought to limit the influence acquired by Buddhist institutions. The nationalist orientations of most Buddhists in Japan took a very different turn. Some of the Buddhist orders, under the name of pan-Asian solidarity against Western colonialism, promoted the imperialist ambition of Japan up to the country’s defeat in World War II (Victoria, 2006). Only a few others, such as the adherents of the Soka Gakkai founded in 1930, refused to adopt that approach and were punished for their dissident attitude. After the war, the Soka Gakkai became a major supporter of pacifist values in Japan. For the postcolonial governments of South Korea and Taiwan, who did not have policies hostile to Buddhism even during periods of authoritarian rule, the international networks and the continued vitality of their respective sangha serve as a demonstration that their governments respected religious freedom, a claim that helped in diplomacy during the Cold War. In South Korea, however, Buddhists were also participants in a movement of social contestation that stressed a critique of the social and economic status quo (Park, 2012). Predominance in Peninsular Southeast Asia After Near-Extinction in the Malay World Buddhism initially thrived in the kingdoms of Shailendra (ca. 650–1250) and Mataram (732–1006), as well as the Srivijaya empire (650–1377), which covered large parts of the Malay world. It gradually reached into peninsular Southeast Asia via trade routes, but the adoption of Hinduism as the religion of the regionally dominant Khmer empire limited its expansion in Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. In the decades before the onset of the colonial era, Southeast Asia would experience a remarkable reversal of situation. Buddhism had declined to near-complete disappearance in the Malay archipelago while it expanded in the continent. After Srivijaya fell in the 13th century, Buddhism lost political support and Islam gradually supplanted it in succeeding thalassocracies. The expansion of Theravada Buddhism in Burma, Cambodia, Thailand, and Laos, was gradual. It first entered Burma in the 7th century and expanded after the Kingdom of Pagan (849–1297) Page 9 of 21 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, POLITICS (oxfordre.com/politics). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 18 March 2019 Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism granted it official patronage. Although Buddhism was present early on in the early Khmer empire (802–1431), it was only in the 13th century that its ruler proclaimed it as the official religion of Cambodia. In Thailand, Buddhism would gain prominence with the emergence of the Sukhothai kingdom (1238–1438). In 1527, Laotian King Photisarath proclaimed Theravada Buddhism as the official religion of the Lang Fang kingdom (1354– 1707). From the 15th century onward, colonialism influenced some societies that had an important Buddhist tradition. In the first stage, Christian missions in the wake of traders and administrators sought to convert people through the establishment of schools to promote literacy in the colonial languages. In the second stage, the transmission to elites of new ideas originating from Western Europe such as the right to self-determination, socialism, and secular philosophy shaped the nationalist movements of South and Southeast Asia. One side effect of Christian missions’ proselytizing via education was to undermine the social role of the sangha, which had provided education in the vernacular languages. The diminished social status of monastics that resulted from such change made them receptive to nationalist ideas, so that by the end of the colonial era they lent their support to Buddhist lay leaders who became major actors in anticolonial struggles. Monastics in Burma and Sri Lanka under colonial rule proved susceptible to these trends, but those in other Southeast Asian countries, whether independent Thailand or colonial Cambodia and Laos, did not experience a comparable decline. Influenced by his knowledge of Western societies, the Thai King Mongkut (r. 1851–1868) and his son Chulalongkorn (1868–1910) sought to transform Thailand into a constitutional monarchy, presenting themselves as patrons of Buddhism and thereby abandoning the notion of divine kingship sanctioned by the clergy. This modernizing agenda, similar in many respects to the contemporary approach adopted by Japan under the Meiji restoration (1868–1912), served to shield Thailand from colonial control. The situation in the societies that had experienced British and French colonial rule varied. Starting from the 1880s, Sinhalese patriots such as Dharmapala sought to identify the Sri Lankan nation as Buddhist in response to early Tamil revivalist movements, thereby sowing the seeds of further confrontation. In Burma, in the years leading to independence in 1948, the sangha took the lead in articulating resistance to colonial rule and advocated a discourse that promoted unity among ethnic groups. But Buddhists failed to prevent ethnic conflicts that would poison the country for decades afterward. A few Buddhist leaders, such as Burmese President U Nu, embraced socialism, but other socialist regimes in the region did not reciprocate. Briefly under the Khmer Rouge (1975– 1979), political leaders aimed for the eradication of all religions as a feudal force. After the overthrow of Pol Pot and the departure of Vietnamese troops from the country, the Truth and Reconciliation reports on the massacre of Buddhist monks during the Khmer Rouge regime inspired political and lay support for Buddhism in the country. In Laos, a more moderate policy by the ruling Pateth Laohas made the continued existence of the religion possible. Evans (1998) has argued that despite the socialist nature of that Page 10 of 21 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, POLITICS (oxfordre.com/politics). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 18 March 2019 Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism regime, the prerevolutionary nexus between the monarchy and Buddhism has continued to shape the worldview of citizens. Buddhists and Contemporary Politics Buddhism represents the religion of the majority in very few states, and even when it is considered the official religion some important nuances reveal that there is no Buddhist equivalent to the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Only four states have established Buddhism as a state religion: the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, the Kingdom of Cambodia, and the Kingdom of Bhutan, whose constitution states that Buddhism is its spiritual heritage. The Constitution of Burma (or Myanmar since 1989) recognizes the special status of Buddhism and Sri Lanka gives Buddhism special privileges. In both countries, where significantly large minorities of non-Buddhists exist, this state patronage of Buddhism under authoritarian rule, combined with the promotion of an aggressive ethnic nationalism that articulate the idea of the Burmese and Sinhala nations under siege, has fueled civil wars and ethnic insurgencies.6 In Cambodia, the Constitution declares Buddhism as the state religion, but a clergy decimated by the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime did not benefit much from this promotion of Buddhism. The same holds true in Laos, where official recognition of Buddhism does not come with particular privilege. In Thailand, the king must be a Buddhist of the Theravada tradition and monks benefit from some privileges such as free passage on public transportation. However, the Constitution proclaims freedom of conscience and there is no state religion. The principle of a Buddhist monarchy perpetuates an ancient tradition in Southeast Asia of state protection of the religion as well as government supervision of temples and clerics. Monks, nuns, and novices cannot run for office or vote. No formal law forbids such participation in politics, but a declaration made by the Council of Ministers of Thailand in 1958 made the rule on the grounds of appropriateness. In the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Mongolia, Buddhist institutions remain under close state supervision, which is the legacy of decades of socialist rule, even though the current regime has opened the political space. In the East Asian liberal democratic countries of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Republic of China (Taiwan), where governments have established to various degrees the principle of freedom of conscience along with separation of religion and the state, Buddhism benefits from a status of legal recognition and the general climate of religious pluralism. This situation, however, came after complicated processes of political transition. Buddhism in Japan recovered after a long period of persecution under a Shinto quasi-establishment that endured from 1900 to 1945. In 1957 the Japan Buddhist Federation was formed. The federation represents the interests of most affiliated denominations and prefectural associations, and is independent from the state. Many Japanese, however, see the participation in coalition governments of the Komeito, a party affiliated with the lay Buddhist association Soka Gakkai, as a breach of the constitutional Page 11 of 21 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, POLITICS (oxfordre.com/politics). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 18 March 2019 Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism provision of separation between religious institutions and the state. In South Korea, the authoritarian ruler Park Chung-Hee (1961–1979) sponsored a national Buddhist association in an attempt to solve a conflict within the Korean sangha between orders of celibate monks and orders of married monks; the latter was a legacy of Japanese colonial rule. Park’s effort failed. Later, during the process of democratization, South Korean presidents Chun Doo-Hwan (1980–1988) and Lee Myung-Bak (2008–2013) could not prevail or manage the divisions between the two main Buddhist orders. In Taiwan, the state oversight of Buddhism through the monopoly of the Buddhist Association of the Republic of China during the period of martial law (1949–1987) gave way to the de jure recognition of the de facto institutional pluralism that had existed since the 1970s. Taiwan does not have a state-sponsored Buddhist association. The Republic of India, which proclaims in its constitution the principle of secularism, has adopted the Dharmic wheel, also known as Asoka’s wheel, in the national flag, but it has not instituted preferential treatment for Buddhism. However, it hosts the Dalai Lama and his government in exile in Dharamsala, and it maintains its territorial claim over the Ladakh, a region of Kashmir populated by Buddhists. Even when coalition governments advocating policies favoring the interests of the Hindu majority ruled India (1998–2004, 2014–), Buddhists did not endure discrimination. The ideology of Hindu supremacy considers Buddhism—along Sikhism and Jainism—as a Hindu tradition because of its Indian origins. However, many of the apologists for the Bharatiya Janata Party, which is the political party that advocates the ideology of Hindu nationalism, or Hindutva, trace one of the sources of their movement to the need to stem mass defection from Hinduism. For example, in 1956 so-called untouchables converted to Buddhism en masse under the leadership of Dr. Ambedkar, who was a secular nationalist. The Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal, the only other nation where Hinduism represents the religion of the majority, was a state with a religious establishment associated with the monarchy until 2006. It has since become a secular state. These changes have favored the development of Buddhism, often indistinguishable from Hindu worship in its practice in Nepal. In the other societies where Buddhists constitute an important part of the population, nominal constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion mean little when governments have deployed a preferential option for another religion or for authoritarian secularism. Hence, in archipelagic Southeast Asia, where significant minorities of Mahayana Buddhists live, the condition of coexistence with Muslim majorities and state protection of religious minorities is fragile. Singapore is an exception. Buddhism represents the largest religion by number of adherents and its devotees are active in philanthropy, but no religion enjoys a distinctive legal status (Kuah-Pearce, 2009). In the Federation of Malaysia, where close to one-fifth of the population claims affiliation to Buddhism, Islam is the only official religion. The Republic of Indonesia’s principle of “Pancasila” implicitly recognizes Buddhism as one of six legitimate religions of the country, but that designation alone may not suffice to protect the small Buddhist minority against the rise of radical Islamist movements. The People’s Republic of China, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea have created systems of multiple religious establishments. Their constitutions officially recognize Buddhism along with a limited Page 12 of 21 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, POLITICS (oxfordre.com/politics). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 18 March 2019 Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism number of other religions. In all three cases, the state has granted national Buddhist associations a regulatory monopoly to administer their own affairs and transmit state directives. These religious institutions and conditions for worship are vulnerable to changes in the ruling party’s views on religious affairs. Buddhist Actors Buddhists can influence politics in many ways, through a variety of channels. As individual voters, they may express their choice according to their conscience, the latter informed by how people decide to interpret Buddhist teachings. However, in the absence of large n-comparative studies undertaken in societies where Buddhists constitute a large proportion of the electorate, conclusions about how Buddhist ideas inspire voters remains pure speculation. We can, however, infer the influence of Buddhism on politics by paying attention to its institutions. The capacity of the latter to mobilize people and the programs these organizations promote are robust indicators of how Buddhism can be a factor in the politics of democratic countries as well as authoritarian regimes. Three types of actors are salient: the sangha, lay associations, and Buddhist political parties. The sangha, as the more religiously inclined of the three, often provides leadership and aspires to the direction of the entire Buddhist community. Lay associations pursue a variety of actions: material support of the sangha, transmission of the religion through education, including propagation of the Buddha’s teachings among non-Buddhists, and training people in the hope that they become involved politically to support Buddhist values in civil society organizations and political parties. Finally, in societies where the main parties are not supportive of Buddhist goals and views, clerics and laypeople have created their own. The Sangha Buddhist ecclesiastic orders are different from those of Christianity and Islam. They are primarily monastic and they are often living on the margins of society. Most countries have sought to establish a national body for the sangha and unify ordination procedures to present a unified front to articulate the interests of the sangha and the broader lay community. The creation of a unified sangha has coincided easily with the objective of party-states such as China, Vietnam, and North Korea, which favor state corporatist arrangements that grant the monopoly of representation to a single association. It has been much more difficult to obtain in other countries with pluralist political culture. There is no unified national sangha for all Buddhists in Japan, so ordination procedures vary and, in contrast to most other Buddhist communities, monastics can marry. Another characteristic of the Japanese sangha is that the authority of its leaders pales when compared with that of lay leaders such as the president of the Soka Gakkai International, Daisaku Ikeda. In South Korea, the divisions of the sangha have emerged as a consequence of Japanese colonialism. It remains split between two monastic orders, the Jogye and Taego, which oppose each other over the issue of married clergy. This opposition, which has even led to violence, has discredited the religion. In Taiwan, Page 13 of 21 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, POLITICS (oxfordre.com/politics). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 18 March 2019 Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism divisions of the sangha are a result of the emergence of clerical entrepreneurs, such as Hsing Yun, Cheng Yen, and the late Sheng Yen, who emerged as influential public personalities. Overall, these clerical leaders tended to favor moderate policies and were not disruptive actors. They have held mostly conservative views on social matters. This prudence reflects the fact that in these societies, where the Mahayana tradition prevails, Buddhists constitute minorities in the population, even if large ones. In countries where a majority of the population identifies with the Theravada tradition, the sway of the sangha carries more weight than in societies where the Mahayana school is dominant, and therefore more is at stake in the struggle to gain authority within the community. In Thailand, the sangha has faced splits caused by reform movements from within for decades. Earlier movements, such as the Dhammakaya, established in 1906, sought mostly religious reform. More politically radical movements have emerged when Thailand entered a period of political uncertainty. In 1989, activist monks founded the Sekhiya Dhamma Sangha to focus on issues such as deforestation, poverty alleviation, and social work. In Myanmar, the previous authoritarian regimes set up corporatist arrangements similar to those found in socialist states. Since 1990, the Myanmar regime has recognized nine monastic orders and the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee, an organ of senior monks appointed by the government, supervises and regulates their activities. Since 2012, an ominous trend has emerged, with the 969 Movement and the MaBaTha (Organization for the Protection of Race and Religion) promoting virulent antiMuslim nationalism. In Cambodia, a division between two factions of the sangha has endured since the colonial era between modernists (Maha) and traditionalists (Dhammayuttika). The former deploys greater influence in the population than the latter, but the government supports the latter, even if it is much smaller group. In Sri Lanka, sectarian divisions within the clergy date from the 18th century. They do not reflect doctrinal divisions, but the different lineages of the founders in Thailand or in Myanmar. In principle, the sangha benefits from its prestige as custodian of the religious tradition, but its political influence depends on the extent of the resources it can mobilize within lay associations. Lay Associations Many religions experienced a major transformation in the early 20th century as lay organizations gained greater prominence, a turn that mirrored the emergence of mass political parties that seek the support of a majority of the population. Large lay associations serve the sangha and seek either to influence society to ensure that the population abides by the precepts of the religion when a majority of the population identifies with Buddhism, or reinforces cohesion within its ranks when a minority of the population adheres to its principles. Some of these associations have a very long history. In colonial Ceylon and Burma, activists adopted the model of the YMCA to promote Buddhist interests and established the Young Men’s Buddhist Association in the late 19th century. While in Sri Lanka it remains active, it has dissolved into other groups in Burma. In Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos, where monks make up a large proportion of the population because of the prevailing expectation that every young man should be Page 14 of 21 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, POLITICS (oxfordre.com/politics). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 18 March 2019 Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism temporarily ordained, lay associations exist as functional branches within existing monastic orders. This situation can lead to tension when reform movements within Buddhism emerge. Hence, the Thai Supreme Sangha Council denounced in 1989 the breakaway Santi Asoke, which is primarily a lay movement, after it attempted to ordain monks. The courts eventually imposed prison term on the group’s leader. Considered by some circles to be a politically radical movement, Santi Asoke, however, joined the opposition to the People’s Alliance for Democracy, the party associated with the populist president Thaksin Shinawatra. Hundreds of lay Buddhist organizations exist in Japan, some of which have played an important role in shaping politics by sponsoring their own party or lobbying the dominant Liberal Democratic Party. The better known among these associations, the Soka Gakkai, has sponsored the political party Komeito, and can ensure constant mobilization outside of the electoral cycle. Other large associations established before the World War II, such as the Rissho Kosei-kai, and Reiyukai, each include more than five million members and have established branches abroad, but they have not sponsored political parties. However, they do exercise political influence. The Rissho Kosei takes part in humanitarian projects, encourages interfaith dialogue, and fosters peace activism. Conversely, the Reiyukai joined the Nippon Kaigi (Japan Conference), a neonationalist group that promotes the revision of the constitution and advocates values that oppose those of Soka Gakkai. In South Korea, lay associations are closely aligned with monastic orders. The popular (minjung) Buddhism movement is an exception. It is affiliated with a broader movement that opposed the dictatorship of former South Korean President Park ChungHee, which is a rare example of left-leaning lay Buddhist activity. While the minjung movement’s advocacy of democratization during the period of martial rule contributed to its growth, the continued advocacy of reunification with North Korea partly explains its decline since the 1990s. In Taiwan, large lay associations founded in the 1960s such as the Tzu Chi Foundation, the Buddha Light International Foundation, and the Dharma Drum Mountain are not involved in formal politics and have intervened in electoral contests to express their views on matters of national interest. They oppose the movement for Taiwan’s self-determination and they indirectly assist the government through their delivery of social services. The nominally socialist states of China, Vietnam, and North Korea allow national Buddhist associations to represent both monastic communities and lay believers. Buddhist lodges (jushilin) have emerged to accommodate the needs of lay devotees, but the law only authorizes one such lodge per provincial or municipal jurisdiction. Buddhist Political Parties Buddhists have formed very few significant political parties and those that have existed promoted generally conservative policies. One of the earliest examples of Buddhist parties in Theravada countries is the Eksath Bhikku Peramuna, founded by monks worried about the decline of Buddhism and Sinhala culture in Sri Lanka. The party promoted a mixture of religious revivalism and ethnic nationalism through the 1950s. Solomon Bandaranaike seized upon this trend and won the 1956 election as head of the Page 15 of 21 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, POLITICS (oxfordre.com/politics). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 18 March 2019 Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism Mahajena Eksath Peramuna (People’s United Front) electoral alliance, implementing a “Sinhala only” language policy that initiated a crisis escalating decades later into civil war. Bandaranaike’s party was a left-of-center organization whose policies have legitimized the growth of parties campaigning on platforms that promote the Buddhist identity of Sri Lanka. The Jathika Hela Urumaya (National Heritage Party), which took part in its first campaign in 2004, has received support from monks and young Buddhist associations, but it also generated divisions among the sangha when some of the clergy denounced monks’ entry into politics. The Jathika became party of the Ratnasiri Wickremanayake government, when the prime minister appointed one of its lay members as cabinet minister in 2007. Other Buddhist political parties, such as the Bodu Bala Sena (Buddhist Power Force) and the Ravana Balaya, emerged in the wake of these events and forged an alliance with the Jathika to facilitate the election to parliament of Buddhist monks. In other countries where the Theravada tradition prevails, this dominance lessens anxiety about the future of the religion and religious activists rely on their lay associations or the Sangha to promote their objectives. The Palang Dharma (Moral Force) Party was a Buddhist-inspired political party in Thailand founded by Chamlong Srimuang in 1988 that was associated with the Santi Asoke. The Palang Dharmahe went into decline when business leader Thaksin Sinawatra gave it to a more secular orientation. The party dissolved in 2007. Through all these travails, the Dhammakaya has remained an important force in Thai politics. As recently as 2017, the army and police officers had to pull back from the siege of its temple when they failed in their case against one of its leaders. In Cambodia, ephemeral parties with a Buddhist ideology have failed to establish a durable presence, such as the Sangkum (1955–1970), which promoted a conservative policy loyal to Prince Sihanouk, and the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (1993–1991), which primarily served as a vehicle for the anticommunist former Prime Minister Son Sann (1967–1968). However, despite these weaknesses, Buddhism remains an important factor as a moral force. The massacre of Buddhist monks during the Khmer Rouges’ rule had an impact on lay support for Buddhism in the country, and moreover, the Buddhist conception of reconciliation, which stresses the importance of “truth” and “healing,” may prove essential in moving forward in the process of transitional justice (Capeloto, 2008). The most successful Buddhist political party is arguably the Japanese Komeito (Party of Fairness), founded in 1962. The party initially faced controversy because the Soka Gakkai openly supported it, a link that the constitutional provision of separation between religion and politics prohibits, albeit ambiguously. The Komeito and Soka Gakkai formally severed links in 1970, but the Soka Gakkai remains a key constituency and continues to support the party. For two decades, the Komeito has campaigned on a platform of pacifism, and has tended to support the Japan Socialist Party. In 1993 it joined a left-of-center coalition government opposed to the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP), which had ruled Japan since 1955. After the coalition failed and following a brief dissolution caused by internal disagreements over whether to team up with the LDP, the Komeito rebuilt in 1998 and within a year joined the LDP in a coalition government that lasted for ten years. They joined forces again in 2012. Although Komeito consistently campaigned for pacifism, in 2015 it approved Prime Minister Abe’s plan to amend the constitution and authorize an Page 16 of 21 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, POLITICS (oxfordre.com/politics). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 18 March 2019 Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism expansion of the self-defense force’s mandate, which would include the right to intervene militarily abroad. In sum, the Komeito started out as a left-of-center party and has recently become conservative. No such organization exists in South Korea or Taiwan, where Buddhists prefer to join existing parties to advocate their views or count on charismatic monastic leaders to do so. The political structure of the socialist systems in China, Vietnam, and North Korea, which allowed the creation of satellite parties representing constituencies based on criteria such as professional affiliation or links with allied prerevolutionary parties, has not allowed for the formation of Buddhist political parties. Policies In peninsular Southeast Asia and Sri Lanka, Theravada Buddhism plays an ambiguous role, as an inspiration for peaceful social change, a source of legitimation for the monarchs of Thailand and Cambodia, and as a foundation of nationalist activism in Myanmar and Sri Lanka. In Thailand, the lay Buddhist and scholar Sulak Sivaraksa, a major promoter of engaged Buddhism, has spearheaded social, humanitarian, and ecological movements since the late 1970s. Sivaraksa advocated environmentally sustainable ways of life but repeatedly faced accusations of lese-majesty for his criticism by the conservative politicians who were targeted by his views. Prominent members of the clergy, however, such as the high-ranking monk Phra Buddha Issara, had an opposite attitude and stood at the forefront of the movement that led to the 2014 military coup d’état in Thailand. Some have even condoned anti-Malay violence in the south (Jerryson, 2011). Buddhist values have inspired opposition to the military regime of Myanmar since the “People Power Uprising” of 1988, when Aung San Suu Kyi emerged as a major figure of engaged Buddhism for her peaceful advocacy of reform, and when monastics protested against the authoritarian government during the so-called Saffron revolution in 2017. Yet Aung San Suu Kyi has been unable to halt the ethnic cleansing of the Royinga minority instigated by extremist Buddhist associations since 2016. Moreover, as Walton (2016) has explained, promoters of democracy in Myanmar have often tried to express their views in terms that appear inherent to Buddhism, with some using that approach to limit rather than legitimate democracy. A similar ambiguity characterizes Sri Lanka, where Buddhist activists have long promoted ideologies of ethnic nationalism based on religious and linguistic markers of identity and even condoned violence to advance their cause. Meanwhile the Sinhalese Sarvodaya movement has promoted nonviolence, comprehensive development, and interethnic reconciliation since 1958. The group also acted as a major provider of relief after the 2006 tsunami. Mahayana Buddhism constitutes a religious system for the majority of East Asians, but it does not shape the political discourse to the extent observed in Southeast Asia, with the notable exception of Japan. The Soka Gakkai, which has branched out across the world, and the political party it supports, the Komeito, offer a version of what Buddhist politics might entail. Viewed from afar, it projects the impression of a tradition that promotes peace and encourages environmental protection. Inside Japan, public opinion remains Page 17 of 21 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, POLITICS (oxfordre.com/politics). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 18 March 2019 Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism divided, as suggested by the limited electoral support the Komeito receives, at just over 13% of the total. A majority of Japanese supports the secular institution of their country and they do not feel comfortable with a religious party in a coalition government. The rapid rise and fall of minjung theology in South Korea illustrates the perils faced by the Buddhist sangha and lay associations when they embrace secular ideologies such as ethnic nationalism. In South Korea, this ideology implies the advocacy of unification with North Korea, which many South Koreans consider naive. For a majority of Taiwanese, the denial by many well-known local Buddhist leaders of their right to national selfdetermination amounts to a betrayal. Outside of Asia, the network of engaged Buddhists, which includes leaders who are exiled from their countries of birth, greatly influences the perception of Buddhism as a progressive source of political guidance. Founded by Thich Nhat Hanh, this informal group of monastics, lay devotees, and academics promotes a view of Buddhism as the source of liberation movements all over Asia, ranging from the emancipation of Dalits in India and the ordination of women as nuns to self-determination for Tibet (Queen & King, 1996). The importance of the Dalai Lama, Thich Nhat Hanh, Sulak Sivaraksa, and other leaders admired in North America, Western Europe, and Australia, is undeniable, even outside of Buddhist communities. Their advocacy of a less materialist culture, nonviolence, greater care for the global common good, and social justice is admirable, but it is not representative of the politics of the Asian societies where most Buddhist devotees live. Asian Buddhists do not always approve of what their very demanding ethics require of them in their daily lives. Conclusion Ontologically, research on the politics of Buddhism remains handicapped by the nature of its subject: the absence of a single definition of policies that outsiders can define as Buddhist and the challenge of defining empirically how Buddhist institutions and ideas shape the evolution of policies. Epistemologically, the focus on the exegesis of Buddhist scripture in the field of religious studies overlooks the connection between the evolution of the doctrine and its political context. Conversely, scholarship in social sciences rarely pays attention to the hermeneutical dimensions of Buddhism. Political scientists seldom pay attention to religion as a dimension of identity, as an institution shaping the evolution of states and regimes, and even less so as an aspect of social life relevant to political economy. The few political scientists who do pay attention to religion in the framing of politics mostly focus on Christianity, increasingly on Islam, sometimes on Hinduism, and rarely on Buddhism. Among the latter, most social scientists who have considered Buddhism as a legitimate object of study have focused on the trend of socially engaged Buddhism, which they interpret broadly as a progressive trend (Jones, 2003; Queen & King, 1996; Queen, Prebisch, & Keown, 2003). Very few have looked at the negative aspects of Buddhist politics (Jerryson, 2011; Tambiah, 1992; Victoria, 2006). Methodologically, researchers who want to arrive at a grasp of Buddhist politics properly contextualized in its historical and sociological dimensions face the challenge of dealing Page 18 of 21 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, POLITICS (oxfordre.com/politics). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 18 March 2019 Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism with textual evidence that emanates from widely different scriptural traditions. Scholars must also find ways to overcome the institutional obstacles imposed by authoritarian regimes that either rejects altogether the politics of any religion as a proper object of scholarly research, or that attempt to shape its conclusions. Further Reading Harris, I. (Ed.). (1999). Buddhism and politics in twentieth century Asia. London, U.K.: Pinter. Harris, I. (Ed.). (2007). Buddhism, power and political order. London, U.K.: Routledge. Lahiri, N., & Singh, U. (Eds.). (2017). Buddhism in Asia: Revival and reinvention. Singapore: Manohar Publishers. References Capeloto, T. V. (2008). Reconciliation in the wake of tragedy: Cambodia’s extraordinary chambers undermines the Cambodian Constitution. Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal Association, 17(1), 103–131. Demieville, P. (1957). Le Bouddhisme et la guerre: post-scriptum à l’Histoire des moines guerriers du Japon’ de G. Renondeau. Reprinted in Choix d’études bouddhiques (1929– 1970) (pp. 216–299). Leiden, The Netherlands: E. J. Brill. Evans, G. (1998). The politics of ritual and remembrance: Laos since 1975. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai‘i Press. Gernet, J. (1998). Buddhism in Chinese society: An economic history from the fifth to the tenth centuries (trans. F. Verellen). New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Jenkins, S. (2010). Making merit through warfare and torture according to the ĀryaBodhisattva-gocara-upāyaviṣaya-vikurvaṇanirdeśa Sūtra. In M. Juergensmeyer & M. Jerryson (Eds.), Buddhist Warfare (pp. 59–75). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Jerryson, M. K. (2011). Buddhist fury: Religion and violence in southern Thailand. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Jones, K. (2003). The new social face of Buddhism: A call to action. Boston, MA: Simon & Schuster. Kuah-Pearce, K. E. (2009). State, society, and religious engineering: Towards a reformist Buddhism in Singapore. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Laliberté, A. (2004). The politics of Buddhist organizations in Taiwan, 1989–2003. London, U.K.: Routledge. Page 19 of 21 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, POLITICS (oxfordre.com/politics). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 18 March 2019 Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism Matthew, W. J., & Jerryson, M. (2016). The Authorization of Religio-political Discourse: Monks and Buddhist Activism in Contemporary Myanmar and Beyond. Politics and Religion, 9(4), 794–814. McHale, S. F. (2004). Print and power: Confucianism, Communism, and Buddhism in the making of modern Vietnam. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai‘i Press. Metraux, D. (1994). The Soka Gakkai revolution. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Moore, M. J. (2016). Buddhism and political theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Overmyer, D. (1976). Folk Buddhist religion, dissenting sects in late traditional China. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Park, J. Y. (Ed.). (2012). Makers of modern Korean Buddhism. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. Pittman, D. A. (2001). Toward a Modern Chinese Buddhism: Taixu’s Reforms. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai‘i Press. Queen, C. S., & King, S. B. (Eds.). (1996). Engaged Buddhism: Buddhist liberation movements in Asia. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. Queen, C. S., Prebish, C. S., & Keown, D. (Eds.). (2003). Action Dharma: New studies in engaged Buddhism. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. Tambiah, S. J. (1992). Buddhism betrayed?: Religion, politics, and violence in Sri Lanka. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Tuttle, G. (2005). Tibetan Buddhists in the making of modern China. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Victoria, B. (2006). Zen at war. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Walton, M. J. (2016). Buddhism, politics, and political thought in Myanmar. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press Notes: (1.) Peninsular Southeast Asia refers to Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. (2.) The numbers for Tibetan and Theravada Buddhists in China are inferred from the numbers for the ethnic minorities who are identified with these two traditions. (3.) These numbers are taken from the Pew Research Center. (4.) This is presented in the Cakkavatti Sutta (the wheel-turning emperor). Page 20 of 21 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, POLITICS (oxfordre.com/politics). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 18 March 2019 Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism (5.) Scholars of Buddhism disagree on placing the Soka Gakkai as “humanistic Buddhism” and prefer to see it as a contemporary variant of Nichiren Buddhism. (6.) Monks are even part of the Sri Lankan government in 2017. André Laliberté Department of Political Studies, University of Ottawa Page 21 of 21 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, POLITICS (oxfordre.com/politics). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 18 March 2019