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2021, Academia Letters
Journal of Indian Philosophy 47, 749−777
From Scepticism to Nihilism: A Nihilistic Interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s Refutations2019 •
On the basis of Nāgārjuna’s works, especially the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, this paper proposes a sceptic presupposition as the departure point of Nāgārjuna’s refutations. This presupposition invalidates perceptual knowledge, and thus the identities of existents (svabhāva) can only be deemed as referents assumed by concepts (nāman, vikalpa, etc.). Then the “confinement principle,” a theorem tacitly applied in Nāgārjuna’s arguments, is justified, i.e., any definition or description of a concept would necessarily confine its assumed referent to an invariable and isolated state. This principle enables Nāgārjuna to deduce contradictions between the static and isolated nature of the assumed referent, and the activity in which it must be involved. Notions of both a static identity and its activity are deep-rooted in all referential mental activities of sentient beings. Hence all concepts are found to be self-contradictory and therefore devoid of referents (niḥsvabhāva), namely, empty (śūnya). Thus, Nāgārjuna is refuting the whole intelligible world, and his position can be identified as epistemological nihilism—nothing within our ken can possibly be.
2019 •
This paper is about relationship between Madhyamika School and Yogacara School on emptiness concept. It is a textual study on Chinese translated sastra: Yogacarabhumisastra. It is arranged from the concept comparative analyses, relationship with Dependent Arising, and Middle Way. With many evident quotations in this sastra, there is a convincing discussion about the relationship between two schools on emptiness concept. This deserves scholars having an overview of emptiness concept to imply the relationship between two schools in this sastra.
This paper will examine the views of the two principal Mahāyāna Schools, the Madhayamaka and Yogācāra School, on the doctrine of the allegedly innate tathāgatagarbha ("womb" or "embryo") of Buddhahood characterizing all sentient beings. The former will argue essentially, that the term refers to a potential for awakening and is a metaphor rather than a "real" entity. Many among the latter school will incline to see this as a "real' entity, a "soul-like" existence "within" each living being. This doctrine will heavily influence East Asian Buddhism traditions.
Journal of Indian Philosophy
Nāgārjuna’s Conception of ‘Voidness’ (Śūnyatā)"The philosophical school Madhyamaka of Mahāyāna Buddhism denies the true existence of the empirical reality in its totality. For this school the empirical reality includes all the beings and things, whatever is an object of human experience and knowledge, that same experience and knowledge, their products without any exception. The empirical reality is only an appearance, a phenomenon, which lacks a true existence, which is like a dream, a mirage, an illusion created by magic. The great majority of the kārikās of the Madhyamakaśāstra composed by Nāgārjuna (2d century A.D.), the founder of Mādhyamika school, is destinated to deny the real existence of the principal manifestations and categories of the empirical reality: birth and destruction, causality, time, the sensorial activity, the elements that constitute man (dharma), passion and its subject, action and its agent, suffering, the consequences of actions (karman), the reincarnations cycle, the ego, Buddha, the saving truths taught by Buddha, the liberation from the reincarnations cycle (mokṣa), being and not being etc. In the same way great part of the intellectual activity of Nāgārjuna’s school had an identical aim. The empirical reality is designated by the Mādhyamika school with the name ‘envelopment reality’ or ‘concealment reality’ (saṃvṛtisatya).This is an appropriate term because, according to the mādhyamika conception, the empirical reality effectively envelops, conceals the true reality (paramārthasatya)."
The interactions between Chinese religions has occupied an enormous amount of scholarly attention in many fields because there have been direct and indirect consequences resulting from the interactions among Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism. These religious traditions have obviously influenced each other in many respects such as rituals, doctrines, textual materials, philosophy and so on. Accordingly, I will, in this paper, critically analyze the implications of the interactions between Buddhism and Daoism by examining Twofold Mystery. Since Twofold Mystery is heavily dependent on Madhyamaka Buddhist concepts, this study will, on the one hand, examine the influence of Madhyamaka Buddhism on the development of Twofold Mystery. On the other hand, it will critically survey how Twofold Mystery remained faithful to the Daoist worldview.
Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion
Śūnyatā and the Zeroing of Being: A reworking of empty concepts2012 •
This paper offers a parallel analysis of the concept of śūnyatā in Nāgārjuna’s philosophy and the concept of zero in mathematics. A historical survey of the development of zero in its Indian origin and an appraisal of its role in contemporary mathematics is undertaken in the first part, while an analysis of Nāgārjuna’s śūnyatā is provided in the second. The third and concluding part considers a possible, speculative parallel configuration of concepts, approached through a philosophical framework inspired by the philosophy of Jacques Derrida and Alain Badiou.
This work examines how one might study religion from a Mahāyāna point of view. It then proceeds to elaborate a much-disputed topic among all schools of Buddhism: the nature of consciousness. This work focuses on the so-called "Cittamātra" section of the siddhānta text of lCang sky II, Mongolian preceptor of the Manchu empire. point of view (as the Gelukpa pejoratively refer to it) and the Madhyamaka counter-perspective. lCang skya II homes in primarily on the Mahāyānasaṃgrāha, but we bring in counter-arguments from a number of other sources. The principle issue homes in on the nature of self-awareness in particular.
Comparative Philosophy
ON WHAT IS REAL IN NĀGĀRJUNA'S "MIDDLE WAY"2020 •
It has become popular to portray the Buddhist Nāgārjuna as an ontological nihilist, i.e., that he denies the reality of entities and does not postulate any further reality. A reading of his works does show that he rejects the self-existent reality of entities, but it also shows that he accepts a "that-ness" (tattva) to phenomenal reality that survives the denial of any distinct, self-contained entities. Thus, he is not a nihilist concerning what is real in the final analysis of things. How Nāgārjuna's positions impact contemporary discussions of ontological nihilism and deflationism in Western philosophy is also discussed.
Journal of Indian Philosophy
On the Nihilist Interpretation of Madhyamaka2016 •
2013 •
In: Word in the Cultures of the East: sound, language, book, ed. P. Mróz, M. Ruchel, A.I. Wójcik, Libron, Cracow 2016
Knowledge and Truth in the Thought of Jizang (549-623)International Journal of Transpersonal Studies
The Buddhist Notion of Emptiness and its Potential Contribution to Psychology and PsychotherapyThe Multiple Dialectics of a Text and Author—A Study on Seng Zhao’s Non-Complete Emptiness (Bu zhenkong lun)
The Multiple Dialectics of a Text and Author-A Study on Seng Zhao's Non-Complete Emptiness (Bu zhenkong lun2021 •
2019 •
Vol. 1 No. 3 (2018): ASEAN Journal of Religious and Cultural Research (AJRCR), ASEAN Studies Center of Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Thailand
Nāgārjūna’s Challenge to Ancient Buddhist Hermeneutics: An Inquiry into Evolving Emptiness (Śūnyatā) Doctrine in Buddhism2018 •
2001 •
Interreligious Relations, No. 22, January/February 2021
Indian Buddhist and Continental Christianate Critiques of Ontology: An Exercise in Interreligious Philosophical DialogueJournal of Chinese Philosophy (U. of Hawaii; Blackwell P., UK)
Nagarjuna and Chi-Tsang on the Value of This World: A Reply to Kuang-ming Wu's Critique of Indian and Chinese Madhyamika Buddhism2004 •
Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory 19, no. 1 (2019-2020): 85-102.
Kenotic Theology, Buddhism, and TimeBrill's Encyclopedia of Buddhism (I: Literature and Languages)
Philosophical Literature South Asia2015 •
2010 •
2016 •