Journal of Chinese Buddhist Studies (2018, 31: 171–222)
New Taipei: Chung-Hwa Institute of Buddhist Studies
171–222
ISSN: 2313-2000 e-ISSN: 2313-2019
Something for Nothing:
Cognitive Metaphors for Emptiness in the *Upade a
(Dàzhìdù lùn)
Matthew Orsborn
Assistant Professor, Department of Buddhist Studies, Fo Guang University
Abstract
While the *Mah prajñ
ramit upade a (
Dàzhìdù lùn), the
extensive commentary of the Pañcavi atis hasrik s tra and traditionally
attributed to N
rjuna, is encyclopedic in its scope, it is perhaps the
teachings on emptiness ( nyat ) that have been most commonly seen as its
philosophical focal point. The accurate presentation of this core doctrine is
fraught with the perils of the audience falling to the two extremes of
eternalism and annihilism, as has been the case since the formation of the
Buddha’s own teachings on not self (an tman).
The author of the *Upade a, following the tra itself, thus chooses the
rhetorical strategy of exegesis through metaphor, arguing that: “Although all
dharmas are empty, there are distinctions between emptiness which is difficult
to comprehend and emptiness which is easy to comprehend. We now use
easily comprehended emptiness metaphors [to comprehend] difficultly
comprehended emptiness.” The
tra and *Upade a give ten metaphors for
emptiness: illusion, mirage, moon [reflected] in the water, empty space, echo,
city of the gandharvas, dream, shadow, image in a mirror, and magical
creation. In the *Upade a, each metaphor is explicated and tailored into its
This paper was first presented as “Something for Nothing: Cognitive Metaphors
for Emptiness in the *Upade a,” during the 1 st Academic Conference on The
Tradition & Development of *Mah prajñ
ramit Upade a Studies (
) at National Taiwan
University in August of 2016. We would like to express our thanks to those who
provided valuable comments and criticisms at the time, in particular Prof. YaoMing Tsai and Prof. Chen-kuo Lin.
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Journal of Chinese Buddhist Studies Volume 31 (2018)
general interpretative strategy of applying Madhyamaka dialectic to interpret
and defend the Prajñ
ramit against all manner of bhidharmika (generic
“H nay na”) and non-Buddhist views of realism and nihilism.
A deeper examination of not only the metaphors so employed, but also
how metaphors function in general, reveals that the matter is perhaps not quite
so “easily” resolved. I will draw upon theories of “cognitive metaphor” from
modern philosophy of language, in particular from Kittay’s acclaimed
Cognitive Metaphor, Its Cognitive Force and Linguistic Structure, Lakoff and
Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By, Ricœur’s classic The Rule of Metaphor (La
Métaphore Vive), and other writings. Kittay’s “perspectival” approach utilizes
analysis of both the semantic fields and syntagmatic structures of the two
sides of metaphor, i.e. the topic (or tenor) and vehicle, to reveal that “the
critical feature of metaphor can be seen as a process in which the structure of
one semantic field induces a structure on another content domain.” With
respect to syntagmatic analysis, due attention will be given to the fact that our
present text of the *Upade a is a Chinese translation of the original Sanskrit,
two languages having radically different grammatical syntax.
The “cognitive” or “conceptual” approach is the most appropriate theory
of metaphor for our study here, because this is exactly what the author of the
*Upade a claims when explaining the use of easy vehicle metaphors to
“comprehend” the difficult topic content of emptiness. A syntagmatic analysis
of the *Upade a’s metaphors enables us to group the text’s ten metaphors in
several ways, as it appears that several of the metaphors are possibly merely
sub-categories of another metaphor, thus providing little new conceptual
comprehension of the topic of emptiness. Furthermore, more thorough
analysis reveals that all ten can be divided into quite distinctive categories,
distinctions which may have serious implications for the *Upade a’s
interpretation of emptiness of which the author himself was perhaps unaware.
One distinction concerns the issue of external agency, as some metaphors have
structures involving active intentional agency, whereas others lack this. A
second distinction relates to the presence or absence of an underlying ultimate
real beyond the empty in the metaphor in question. Both agency and real
ultimates are key issues for the *Upade a’s Madhyamaka methodology and
interpretative standpoint.
While such critical distinctions may possibly be discovered through a very
thorough reading of the *Upade a itself, Kittay and others’ analytic and
synthetic methods for the understanding of cognitive metaphors allow us to
very quickly and clearly make such issues both apparent and accessible for
critical interpretation. Final reflections will be made on the matter of applying
Something for Nothing
173
kataphatic metaphor vehicles for apophatic empty topics, i.e. how to make
nothing out of something.
Keywords:
Prajñ
ramit , *Mah prajñ
metaphor, metaphor
Mah prajñ
ramit
nyat
an tman
Upade a
ramit
upade a,
emptiness,
cognitive
174
Journal of Chinese Buddhist Studies Volume 31 (2018)
cognitive
metaphor
Kittay
Linguistic Structure
Lakoff
Cognitive Metaphor, Its Cognitive Force and
Johnson
The Rule of Metaphor
Metaphor’s We Live By
La Métaphore Vive
Kittay
topic
semantic field
perspectival
vehicle
syntagmatic structure
Kittay
kataphatic
apophatic
Ricœur
Something for Nothing
1. The *Mah prajñ
175
ramit upade a on Emptiness & the
Middle
1.1 Introducing the *Mah prajñ
ramit upade a
The *Mah prajñ
ramit upade a (
Dàzhìdùl lùn), or
“Commentary on the Great Perfection of Wisdom,” is one of the most
important Indian Mah
na works for the Buddhist traditions of East Asia.
Not only is the seminal classic Prajñ
ramit S tra in 25,000 lines
explained through the method and rhetoric of the Madhyamaka, but also a
copious range of teachings on all manner of Buddhist thought and practice are
covered through a range of styles from lofty philosophy to earthy humor and
delightful verse. Traditionally, the authorship of the *Upade a is attributed to
the Madhymaka savant N
rjuna, with the tra itself considered to be the
words of the Buddha. In modern Buddhist studies, much ink has flowed on the
topic of who the the author might be, with arguments supporting the
traditional view—Indian authorship other than N
rjuna—to attribution to
Kum raj va or some member(s) of his translation team.1 Fortunately, however,
that the translator was Kum raj va is largely unproblematic, apart from some
claims that he is the author.
1.2 The *Upade a’s Teachings on Emptiness (
nyat )
It is important to note, however, that whoever the author was, even if it was
not N
rjuna himself, the writer was obviously remarkably intimate with
rjuna’s writings and the Madhyamaka mode of reasoning. Particularly in
1
Respectively: Richard H. Robinson, Early M dhyamika in India and China
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), 35ff. This provides an
overview of some of the earlier suspicions, such as those from Japanese
scholars. Venkata K. Ramanan,
rjuna’s Philosophy as Presented in the
Mah prajñ
ramit
stra, Reprint ed. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers,
1975); Yìnshùn
, Dàzhìdùlùn zh zuòzh jí qí f nyì (Taipei: D ngz ng,
1993); Etienne Lamotte, Le traité de la grande vertu de sagesse de N
rjuna
(Mah prajñ
ramit
stra), vol. I–V (Louvain: Louvain: Bureaux du Muséon,
1944-1980); Edward Conze, The Prajñ
ramit Literature, Bibliographia
Philologica Buddhica: Series Maior, 2d ed. (Tokyo: Reiyukai, 1978); Ry sh
Hikata, Suvikr ntavikr maparip cch
prajñ
ramit -s tra (Rinsen Book
Company, 1983); Po-Kan Chou
, “The Problem of the Authorship of the
Mah prajñ
ramitopade a: A Re-Examination,” Historical Inquiry
34 (2004): 281–327.
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Journal of Chinese Buddhist Studies Volume 31 (2018)
the first 34 fascicles of the text, which are a term-by-term or line-by-line
commentary on the first chapter of the tra, we see a very consistent method
of interpretation. The term or phrase is first stated, along with some basic
(folk) etymologies, and perhaps some verses from such well-known classics as
the Udanav rga (Dharmap da) or Arthakav rga, functioning together as a
kind of dictionary reference. The commentary will then often move into a
Buddhist analysis of the term or concept, using the by then already highly
systematized bhidharmika-type approach. Such an analysis of the dharma(s)
in question is often very detailed, and in the process the author will draw from
pan-Buddhist gama
tras and Vinaya, para-canonical literature such as
takas and Avad nas, popular didactic tales of the day, as well as the
scholastic Abhidharma stras. The author’s expertise in this entire range is
well known. This is by no means the final word, however, and many pages of
analysis are ultimately capped off with a much shorter, more significant
Madhyamaka position. This usually functions to retain the bhidharmika
analysis but relegate it to some kind of conventional truth or functional utility,
with the ultimate truth itself being ultimate emptiness ( nyat ;
ng), the
true nature of dharmas (dharmat ;
xiàng), suchness (tathat ;
rú),
or the like. This hermeneutic process thus matches, even if it does not strictly
follow, the system of the four “proofs” (siddh nta;
tán) that the
2
author gives in the opening passages of the *Upade a. The first three proofs
are conventional, and while useful, do not reveal the truth. Only the fourth and
last, the “ultimate proof” (param rtha-siddh nta;
dìy yì
tán)—inexpressible emptiness—is the final position of the Prajñ
ramit
and its Madhyamaka commentary. 3
1.3 Union of Mystic Prajñ
Madhyamaka
ramit and Philosophic
Much has been written about the centrality of emptiness for both the
Prajñ
ramit
tras and Madhyamaka thought, so much so that one could
refer to the typical understanding as an academic “narrative of emptiness.” 4
The usual description is that the pre-Mah
na Abhidharma and gama
2
3
4
Dàzhìdù lùn (*Upade a), fasc. 1, T 1509, 25: 59b17–20.
*Upade a, fasc. 1, T 1509, 25: 61b9–16.
See Huifeng Shì, Old School Emptiness: Old School Emptiness: Hermeneutics,
Criticism & Tradition in the Narrative of nyat . Humanistic Buddhism Series
(Fo Guang Shan Institute of Humanistic Buddhism
, 2016).
Something for Nothing
177
traditions take a naïve realist position with respect to existent dharmas and the
emptiness of the individual. The early Mah
na s tras, as typified by the
Prajñ
ramit , then further refute this to propose the emptiness of dharmas.
Finally, the Madhyamaka, as represented by N
rjuna and his
lamadhyamaka-k rik in particular, further supports the emptiness of all
phenomena through a relentless rational dialectic. In the Madhyamaka
tradition, it would be the dialectic of pr sa ga, i.e. reductio ad absurdum, that
would reign supreme. For many, such as Murti, Conze and Robinson, the
Madhyamaka treatises of N
rjuna were the rational and philosophical
expression of the religious or mystical Prajñ
ramit , both ultimately
5
espousing the exact same teaching.
2. Ten “Easy” Metaphors for “Difficult” Emptiness
2.1 The *Upade a’s Employment of Metaphor
Not only does the *Upade a employ a rich selection of textual sources in
refuting opponents and establishing its own Madhyamaka interpretation of the
Prajñ
ramit s tra, it also utilizes a wide range of rhetorical strategies to
achieve these aims. If we take “rhetoric” in the broad classic Aristotelian
sense of incorporating the three elements of argumentation (inventio), style
(elocutio) and composition (compositio), 6 we can see the *Upade a’s use of
tight Madhyamaka logic and reasoning as well as arguments based on
bhidharmika premises, appeals to emotion for the compassion of the
bodhisattva, cries of foul against perceived ad hominem attacks (while at
times committing the same offense), appeals to authority, the use of prose,
poetry and verse, earthy jokes and tall tales. Very little scholarship has been
carried out on the rhetoric of the *Upade a as a whole, due perhaps to the
narrative of emptiness and its exclusive focus on rationally demonstrated
insubstantiality.
One type of rhetorical strategy or technê that is very common throughout
the *Upade a is the use of metaphor. Below, in Section §3, we shall more
clearly define our terms, but if for now we are permitted to make a general
5
6
T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, a Study of the
dhyamika System (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1955), 83;
EdwardConze, Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies: Selected Essays (Oxford:
Carrirer, 1967), 144; Robinson, Early M dhyamika, 61ff.
Paul Ricœur, The Rule of Metaphor: Multi Disciplinary Studies of the Creation
of Meaning in Language (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 8–9.
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Journal of Chinese Buddhist Studies Volume 31 (2018)
and loose claim that the term “metaphor” roughly corresponds to the Chinese
characters “
” (pìrú), “
” (pìyü) or just “ ” (yü) within the *Upade a,
a simple digital search using the CBETA Reader software turns up an
astounding 1051 matches for the former term, with 184 and 341 appearances
of the latter two. Rough and ready as this is, it is still indicative of the
pervasive use of such metaphors, similes, and analogies throughout the text.
Many of these figures of speech are standard Buddhist and other Indian
philosophical fare. For example, merely skimming through the first half of
fascicle 1 alone, we find the metaphor of a composite “person” being akin to a
chariot; 7 or the “person” compared to the qualities of milk;8 types of foods
which are used to treat disorders of the three humors used in classical Indian
medical lore for meditations which treat specific mental defilements;9 that a
rotten seed does not bear fruit; 10 the non-existence of hare’s horns and
tortoise fur; 11 a conceited pa ita in debate as like a crazed stampeding
elephant; 12 or the need to hear the Dharma to develop wholesome states just
as the lotus flower requires sunlight to bloom. 13 Even this small sample alone
shows the *Upade a’s fondness for metaphorical rhetoric as it carries out its
goal of convincing the audience of the truth and righteousness of the
Mah
na Buddha Dharma.
2.2 Context & Reasons for Metaphors for Emptiness
That point of union between mystic Prajñ
ramit and philosophic
Madhyamaka, that is, the core teaching of emptiness ( nyat ;
ng), is
no exception to the application of metaphor for the *Upade a. On quantitative
grounds alone, there are two Sections within the commentary on Chp. 1 of the
tra which most heavily utilize metaphor in the exegesis of emptiness and
the prajñ which cognizes it. The first is Section 11 of Chp. 1, in fasc. 6 of the
text, concerning the “ten metaphors” (
shí yü) for emptiness. 14 The
second is Section 43 of Chp. 1, in fasc. 31, which is about “abiding in
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
*Upade
*Upade
*Upade
*Upade
*Upade
*Upade
*Upade
*Upade
a,
a,
a,
a,
a,
a,
a,
a,
fasc.
fasc.
fasc.
fasc.
fasc.
fasc.
fasc.
fasc.
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
1,
6,
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
1509,
1509,
1509,
1509,
1509,
1509,
1509,
1509,
25:
25:
25:
25:
25:
25:
25:
25:
59b25–27.
59c14–60a1.
60a16–21.
60c1.
61a29–b1.
61c8–9.
63a28–29.
101c8–105c18.
Something for Nothing
179
emptiness” (
zhùk ng). 15 Of these two, the former provides an excellent
point of entry for the study of the *Upade a’s use of metaphor for this
doctrine, as the very metaphors themselves are embedded in the
tra itself.
This requires that the *Upade a not only utilize metaphor for interpretation of
the tra, but also provide some meta-discussion on the use of metaphor itself
to justify the tra’s own usage.
We must thus begin from the
tra. In Chapter 1, we find the standard
“circumstances” (nid na;
nyüán) of the text, from “Thus I have heard,
one time, while the Buddha dwelt at Raj ha on Mount G dhak a, together
with the great bhik u Sa gha of five thousand members, …,” and so forth. The
tra then lists over one dozen qualities of the Buddha’s arhat bhik u
disciples. The commentary on these several sentences of the tra are covered
in the first three fascicles of the *Upade a, where there is in-depth analysis
and exegesis on the various terms both one by one and together as a whole.
Then, the bodhisattva mah sattvas are introduced in the tra, and another list
is given of over 30 attributes that they possess. One of these is our focus of
attention here, for it is said that:
16
[the bodhisattvas] comprehend dharmas as like an illusion, like a
mirage, like the moon [reflected] in water, like empty space, like an
echo, like a city of the gandharvas, like a dream, like a shadow, like an
image in a mirror, and like a magical creation.
For the sake of comparison, it is worth also citing the Sanskrit Pañcavi
hasrik version:
ati-
-mar ci-dakacandra-svapna-prati rutk -pratibh sa-pratibimbanirm opama-dharm dhimuktai ; 17
and Conze’s translation thereof:
resolutely intent on dharmas which they held to be like an illusion, a
mirage, a reflection of the moon in water, a dream, an echo, an
apparition, an image in the mirror, a magical creation; 18
15
16
17
*Upade a, fasc. 31, T 1509, 25: 285b6–296b2.
*Upade a, fasc. 6, T 1509, 25: 101c8–9.
Takayasu Kimura, Pañcavi ati-s hasrik prajñ
Sankib busshorin, 2007), 1.
ramit , vol. I-1 (Tokyo:
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Journal of Chinese Buddhist Studies Volume 31 (2018)
It is philologically noteworthy that in addition to a slight change of order, our
present Sanskrit text has only eight metaphors for emptiness, whereas
Kum raj va’s much older translations of the
tra, and thus the *Upade a,
feature ten, with the two discrepant metaphors being “like empty space” (
rú xük ng) and “like a city of the gandharvas” (
rú jiàntápó
chéng). We shall discuss in more detail below, at Section §3.4, some other
more critical linguistic and philological caveats due largely to working with
metaphors across the structurally very different languages of Sanskrit, Chinese,
and of course English.
Returning to the opening of the *Upade a’s commentary, it first merely
states:
The ten metaphors are in order to comprehend the dharma of
emptiness. 19
It is only after a full analysis of each of the metaphors in turn that it gives a
justification of using metaphors in general for the topic of emptiness. The
rationale of the *Upade a is as follows:
Question: If the dharmas of the ten metaphors are all empty without
exception, why merely use ten things as metaphors, and not use
mountains, rivers, rocks, cliffs, etc., as metaphors? 20
Answer: Although dharmas are empty, there are, however, distinctions.
There is emptiness which is comprehended with difficulty, and
emptiness which is comprehended easily. Here, emptiness which is
comprehended easily is used as a metaphor for emptiness which is
comprehended with difficulty. 21
In a sense, the question being asked here is: Why is a metaphor required at all?
If all dharmas are empty, why do we need the metaphor of illusions, etc., are
empty? If all X is Y in the first place, why do we require the metaphor of, say,
Z is Y (when all Z is X)? The reply is one of cognitive need. We shall
18
19
20
21
Edward Conze, The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom, with the Divisions of the
Abhusamay la
ra (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 38.
*Upade a, fasc. 6, T 1509, 25: 101c10; or possibly, but less likely, “… the
emptiness of dharmas.”
*Upade a, fasc. 6, T 1509, 25: 105b28–c1.
*Upade a, fasc. 6, T 1509, 25: 105c1–2.
Something for Nothing
181
examine these more theoretical matters below, when we examine how
metaphor works in general (Section §3).
2.3 Previous Scholarship on Metaphor in the *Upade a
For now, however, a basic review of how several modern scholars have
reflected on the *Upade a’s use of metaphor is in order. Or rather, in many
cases, how they have not. For while the use of the metaphors themselves in
modern scholarship is not at all uncommon, there is little analysis of what
rhetorical function such metaphors have in the process of exegesis.
For example, Ramanan individually takes several of the metaphors in the
*Upade a commentary for discussion in his Chapter III on “Ignorance,” both
as the “Nature and Function of Ignorance” and also “The Sense of ‘I’ and the
False Sense of Self,” namely dream, 22 echo, 23 mirror, 24 and the moon in the
water 25 (which is also covered in his Chapter XI, “Consummation”).
Ramanan’s paraphrasing and explanation between paragraph translations of
the *Upade a text largely also employs the metaphors in the making of
philosophical points. However, there is no critical reflection at all on the role
that the metaphor plays in defining or structuring such philosophical positions.
Ven. Yìnshùn’s citations of this portion of the *Upade a appear in several
of his works. In his earlier Notes on Lectures on the Prajñ [p ramit ] S tras,
the *Upade a’s metaphors are used to flesh out the famous verses at the end
of the Vajracchedik prajñ
ramit (
n’g ng b nruò j ng):
“All conditioned dharmas are like a dream, an illusion, a bubble, a shadow;
like dew and like a lightning flash; one should contemplate [them] thus.” 26
Yìnshùn explains that “… the Dharma method of six metaphors (
yü)
explains the correct view of Prajñ that is nominal designation is exactly
emptiness. This allows trainees to understand the correct intention of the
Tath gata’s teachings on emptiness, on nominal designation, on separation, on
non-abiding, and non-grasping, so that beginners will have a point of entry
22
23
24
25
26
Ramanan,
rjuna’s Philosophy, 93–95.
Ibid., 95–96.
Ibid., 96.
Ibid., 98–99, 311.
n’g ng b nruò j ng (Vajracchedik -prajñ
ramit s tra), fasc. 1 T 235, 8:
752b28–29; “ rak timira d po m
va ya budbuda , svapna ca vidyud
abhra ca eva dra avya sa sk ta ,” in P.L. Vaidya, “Vajracchedik Prajñ
ramit ,” Mah
na-s tra-sa graha , Part 1. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts,
Vol. 17 (Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute, 1961).
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Journal of Chinese Buddhist Studies Volume 31 (2018)
and be able to deeply enter to the ultimate through this.” 27 The metaphors are,
he claims, to demonstrate the “impermanence” (
wúcháng) and “nonsubstantiality” (
wúshí) of all phenomena, due to their “conditionality”
(
yüánq ) and “emptiness” (
xìngk ng). 28 Yìnshùn then turns to the
*Upade a notion of emptiness which is “understood easily” (
yìji ) or
“with difficulty” (
nánji ), and paraphrases the text to explain the
Vajracchedik metaphors as indicating emptiness, despite the fact that the
tra never actually uses the term itself. 29 Elsewhere Yìnshùn has cited the
ten metaphors from the larger Prajñ
ramit S tra, and given a brief
summary of how the later Yog ra tradition would separate the metaphors
apart into indicating one or another of the three natures (trisvabh vat ;
nxìng), even though the
tra itself does not necessarily imply this. Later
still, in one of his final works, An Investigation into Emptiness, Chapter 3.9,
“Emptiness of Dharmas Like An Illusion,” offers more attention to the
metaphors in the Prajñ
ramit S tra, and also the *Upade a commentary. 30
Here again the “easy” and “difficult” passage is cited, as well as the Yog ra
school distinctions, as he gives general and specific explanations of the
metaphors. However, apart from one cautious sentence warning “However,
this is a metaphor, and a metaphor is only able to take its metaphorical
meaning,” 31 there is no discussion at all on how metaphor as a rhetorical
device affects the intended philosophical meaning. The same passages are
cited later in the book, in Chapter 4.8, “Illusory—Dependent Origination
which is Emptiness and Designation.” 32 Here we are told that “metaphors are
one kind of expedient method in Buddha Dharma pedagogy” when the
Madhyamaka
stra gives metaphors to refute opponents’ philosophical
tenets. 33 One is tempted to ask—if metaphors are expedients, does this imply
that they are thus not ultimate? Should we understand this based on the literal
word (vyañjana), or on the meaning (artha) behind it? That they are nondefinitive (ney rtha) statements requires interpretation (
rtha)? If so, how
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
Yìnshùn
,
Prajñ [p ramit ]
author’s own.
Ibid., 140.
Ibid., 141.
Yìnshùn, K ng zh
Zhèngwén, 1985),
Ibid., 197.
Ibid., 261–65.
Ibid., 261.
nruò j ng ji ngjì
(Notes on Lectures on the
S tras) (X nzhú: Zhèngwén, 1971), 139. Translation is the
tànjiù
195–200.
(An Investigation into Emptiness)(X nzhú:
Something for Nothing
183
then are they to be interpreted? I raise this question based on Buddhism’s own
standard hermeneutic principles, 34 not a challenge derived from some other
place or time.
From the above brief review of scholarship which cites the metaphors of
the Prajñ
ramit s tra and their explanation in the *Upade a, it is apparent
that while the metaphors are often utilized by the authors in the same manner
as in the original texts, there is seldom if any attempt to question the
significance or implications of this kind of rhetorical strategy. Why not just
directly explain the meaning of emptiness? Why resort to a figure of speech,
which is admittedly not explicit or ultimate? What is lost, or gained, or
otherwise altered, in the process? How do metaphors influence and structure
our understanding of emptiness, or indeed, any other religious philosophical
tenets which are so expressed?
3. Cognitive Metaphors & Their Analysis
3.1 Understanding & Models of Metaphor
It is thus critical for us to examine the phenomena of metaphors in some depth.
In the disciplines of classics and philosophy, metaphor—under the broader
subject of rhetoric as a kind of trope, i.e., a figure of speech—long lingered
under the dark cloud of a bad name. A figure of speech was, according to the
rhetorician Quintilian, “an expression transferred from its natural and
principal signification to another, for the sake of embellishing speech
(ornandae orationis gratia),” and the most beautiful of these was “transfer,”
or “metaphor.” 35 Plato used the term “image” for metaphor, and contrasted it
negatively against reality, which we see clearly in the “allegory of the cave”—
shadows from candles pale when compared to real things seen in the light of
the sun. 36 For most, metaphors as mere similitudes of reality were thus not to
be trusted, though some philosophers saw in metaphorical writings that the
texts were “saying something else,” i.e., a deeper meaning, and were not
merely cosmetic embellishments.
34
35
36
Donald S. Lopez, Buddhist Hermeneutics, Studies in East Asian Buddhism
(Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1988), 11–27.
G. R. Boys-Stones, Metaphor, Allegory, and the Classical Tradition (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2003), 1.
Ibid., 60.
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In the last century, one of the oft neglected original aspects of rhetoric has
reclaimed ground in our modern understanding of metaphor. That is, the
element of argument, as opposed to figures of speech as mere ornamentation.
In Richards’ The Philosophy of Metaphor, he introduced the “interaction” or
“relational” model, emphasizing that metaphor was not merely the case of
thing A being a metaphor for thing B, but that metaphor was the actual
interaction between the two. These two sides of metaphor he named the
“tenor,” i.e., that which is referred to, and the “vehicle,” i.e., that which
references.37 This system was further refined by Black, who indicated that the
two interactive aspects depended on a “system of associated commonplaces”
which connected them and permitted the metaphor. 38 Historically, after a
brief challenge by the pragmatist Davidson, who famously argued against the
prevailing notion of literal versus metaphorical expression and claimed that
metaphors “mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean,
and nothing more,” 39 scholarship has now largely moved into the “cognitive”
or “conceptual” model for understanding metaphor. We can see the earlier
threads of this cognitive model in Black’s idea that there is a “distinctive
intellectual operation” in understanding the relationship between the two
associated systems of topic (or tenor, see below) and vehicle. 40
3.2 Cognitive Metaphor & Kittay’s “Perspectival Approach”
Among those scholars advocating the cognitive or conceptual model, by far
the most influential writing has been George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s
Metaphors We Live By. 41 Their seminal contribution was in revealing how 42
metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in
thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which
we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.
37
38
39
40
41
42
I. A. Richards, The Philosophy of Metaphor (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1936). See also Eva Feder Kittay, Metaphor: Its Cognitive Force and Linguistic
Structure (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 16.
Max Black, Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), 39–40.
Donald Davidson, “What Metaphors Mean,” Critical Inquiry 5, no. 1 (1978).
M. H. Abrams, A Glossary of Literary Terms, 7 th ed. (Fort Worth: Harcourt
Brace College Publishers, 1999), 156. Emphasis added.
George Lakoff and MarkJohnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1980).
Ibid., 3.
Something for Nothing
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It is worth noting that Lakoff and Johnson are cognitive psychologists, not
linguists or philosophers, showing quite a turn in theoretical underpinnings.
Taking up the basic structural linguistics position that our cognitions of the
world are formed and shaped through our ideas and concepts, and that ideas
and concepts themselves are structured and shaped by the languages in which
we think and communicate those thoughts to others, Eva Kittay has developed
what she calls a “perspectival approach” of cognitive metaphor. In her
Metaphor: Its Cognitive Force and Linguistic Structure, Kittay describes this
approach as follows: 43
To call our theory perspectival is to name it for the function metaphor
serves: to provide a perspective from which to gain an understanding
of that which is metaphorically portrayed. This is a distinctively
cognitive role. Since perspectival implies a subject who observes from
a stance, we can say that metaphor provides the linguistic realization
for the cognitive activity by which a language speaker makes use of
one linguistically articulated domain, and similarly, by which a hearer
grasps such an understanding.
Recalling our cognitive justification for employing metaphor in the *Upade a,
that is, the use of the easily comprehended to convey the difficult, we can see
some clear parallels here. Differing slightly from Richards’s and Black’s use
of “tenor,” Kittay calls the content domain which is to be understood the
“topic,” though the metaphor which is applied to transfer meaning remains as
the “vehicle.” 44 Kittay’s approach is as broad as it is deep, as she works
toward developing a general theory of metaphor applicable to a range of cases.
As such, here we shall only draw upon the most directly relevant elements.
That her model is relational and features clear guidelines for both linguistic
and cognitive aspects gives it particular appeal for our study here. Given that
Kittay’s approach has this commonality with the *Upade a’s own position, it
is worth examining more specifically how her theory can help us here. We
note that other scholars have used Kittay’s approach to examine metaphor in
religious texts, such as Long and Moore with respect to the Hebrew Bible. 45
43
44
45
Ibid., 13ff.
Ibid., 25f.
G. A. Long, “Dead or Alive? Literality and God-Metaphors in the Hebrew
Bible,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 62, no. 2 (1994): 509–37;
Anne Moore, Moving Beyond Symbol and Myth: Understanding the Kingship of
God of the Hebrew Bible through Metaphor. Studies in Biblical Literature (New
York: Peter Lang, 2009).
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Journal of Chinese Buddhist Studies Volume 31 (2018)
Closer to home, use of Lakoff and Johnson’s work has also been applied to
Xüánzàng’s Chinese translation of the Prajñ
ramit H daya S tra (
nruòb luómìdu X n J ng) by Chiang and Lu. 46
3.3 Applied Syntagmatic & Semantic Field Analysis
Several key elements of Kittay’s perspectival approach are useful to us here.
The first is that of grammatical syntax and syntagmatic analysis; the second is
that of semantic fields. It is a structuralist approach, and borrows from de
Saussure’s system of signs, with spoken or written language as signifier, and
with the concepts of this language as the signified. 47
The first type of application that Kittay employs is her analysis of
metaphors through examination of their syntagmatic structures. She takes “the
syntagmatic relations of a field to indicate the basic underlying structure of
sentences that can be formed in a given semantic field or to indicate rules and
relations specifying what collocations are possible given certain semantic
considerations,” model cases of which can be “even a paradigm.” 48 For high
literature, we can see how penetrating such analysis is with Kittay’s work on
Wordsworth’s poem “On the Extinction of the Venetian Republic,” 49 and
philosophically with Socrates’s “midwife” metaphor in the Theaetetus. 50
Syntagmatic analysis shall be very useful to our analysis of the *Upade a,
because, as we shall see below, the text itself in most cases also very clearly
gives at least one, but often more, model syntagmatic structural forms for each
of the ten metaphors.
Second, the theory of semantic fields is explained first in theory and then
demonstrated in application. 51 Semantic fields are comprised of “lexical
fields” and “content domains”: 52 “A lexical field consists of a set of labels,”
where “[s]imple labels are generally ‘word-forms’ of single words,” though
idiomatic expressions and phrases can also be included. Given that meaning is
found not in individual words but in contexts, a “content domain denotes a
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
Wen Yu Chiang and Louis Wei Lun Lu, “Emptiness We Live By: Metaphors
and Paradoxes in Buddhism’s Heart Sutra,” Metaphor and Symbol 23 (2008).
Kittay, Metaphor, 214ff.
Ibid., 245.
Ibid., 258–63.
Ibid., 278–87.
Ibid., Chapters. 5 and 6, respectively.
Ibid., 227ff.
Something for Nothing
187
domain from which we determine the interpretation of an element of the
lexical field.” The lexical field maps onto the content domain, as signifier and
signified, though the signifiers do not necessarily exhaust the entirety of the
signifieds. Semantic fields consist of a set of “contrast sets,” where the
elements of the contrast set are hyponyms for the “covering term,” that is,
specific examples with more limited range than the covering term itself. 53
These contrast sets thus allow for layering and sub-categorization, to whatever
degree required, in theory without any limit. Note, however, that ordered
contrast sets are not required to be exhaustive, and so there may be many gaps,
asymmetries, and indeterminacies within the lexical field. 54 Indeed, the very
fact that the given lexical field may not exhaust the content domain may be
one of the very reasons why a metaphor is coined—that is, there is no word or
term for a given idea or concept. A distinctly different lexical field originally
associated with its own domain may need to be borrowed to cover originally
unmapped terms—thus the birth of a metaphor. This is not the only reason for
the creation of metaphor, however.
In his now classic study on early Chinese Madhyamaka, Robinson has
noted both lexical and syntagmatic elements: 55
The primary operation for abstracting definitions is the collocation of
passages. This, of course, is the technique that lexicographers have
always used, but words are not the only meaningful units, and lexical
meaning is not the only relevant kind of meaning. The technique of
collocation applies equally to words, grammatical structures, rhetorical
figures, figures of syntax, logical structures, citations from other texts,
and abstract philosophical relations between terms. To understand this
kind of text, a knowledge of lexical meaning alone does not suffice.
We can thus see that as a relational or interactive approach, Kittay’s methods
do not consider metaphors as mere words or phrases independent of contexts,
or even on the level of sentence semantics alone. Rather, the entire structure
of the two respective semantic fields enables the shift in meaning that
characterizes metaphorical function. 56 Thus, such semantic fields themselves
must be held in common within a community of language users for the
53
54
55
56
Ibid., 230ff.
Ibid., 239ff.
Robinson, Early M dhyamika, 16.
Kittay, Metaphor, 22ff.
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metaphor to take effect. 57 This latter point warns us that we must naturally
situate our texts within their own sitz im leben in order to understand our
metaphors as in the ancient Indian religio-philosophical community (even
beyond Buddhism alone).
3.4 Linguistic and Philological Caveats
This brings us to some linguistic and philological caveats before we present
the content of the ten cognitive metaphors from the actual *Upade a itself.
These caveats are necessary, because we are going to use our own English
translations of the Chinese text which has been transmitted over the course of
1,600 years, which is in turn a translation from a (potentially Buddhist hybrid)
Sanskrit original. We shall directly use the Chinese text found in the CBETA
system, 58 which has been critically edited and punctuated by Ven. Hoùgu n, a
well-known and published authority on the *Upade a. 59 There are thus issues
on two fronts, the first due to the differences of the languages, in terms of the
lexical fields, i.e., the translated words, and the second due to their grammars,
which influence their syntagmatic structures.
First, regarding the use of particular terms: In the Sanskrit, though we no
longer have the original extant, our “upama”—the term is confirmed by the
tra—are strictly speaking more akin to similes, not metaphors. This is also
shown in the Chinese use of “
pìyü,” “
yü” or just “
rú,” the latter
of which functions as “like” or “as.” We shall continue to thus use the term
“metaphor” in its broadest sense, allowing for the fact that other languages
may not categorize this range of tropes into equivalent types. As Sanskrit
“upama” is often appended to a given term as a suffix, one could be tempted
to use an English suffix form such as “-like,” e.g., illusion-like. Chinese
cannot work in this manner, however, and the translator may either render
compounded binomen forms as basic terms with prefix or suffix, as
hyphenated compounds, or as several words that may qualify each other in
57
58
59
Ibid., 223ff.
Dàzhìdù lùn
(*Mah prajñ
ramit upade a), translated by
Kum raj va
. T 1509, 25. Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text
Association (CBETA)
, 2014.
Hoùgu n Shi
. Dàzhìdùlùn ji ngyì (1)
(*Mah prajñ
ramit Upade a Lecture Notes 1). 7 vols. Vol. 1 (X nzhú:
Yìnshùn Educational Foundation
, 2014).
Something for Nothing
189
various grammatical senses, for example as adjectives or in the possessive
sense.
Second, there is the issue of the differences in the linguistic structures and
grammars of the various languages involved. In modern scholarship, there has
been no small amount of criticism of Chinese translations of Indian texts, and
also of their translators. Sanskrit is typically a Subject-Object-Verb (SOV)
structured language, but allows for a fair amount of flexibility. On the other
hand, both Chinese and English are Subject-Verb-Object (SVO) structured,
with English being somewhat flexible but Chinese heavily dependent on word
order to indicate grammatical role. This difference may appear highly
problematic, given our proposal to undertake syntagmatic analysis on our
metaphors. However, in dealing with early Chinese Madhyamaka texts such as
the *Upade a, Robinson long ago argued that for “the Chinese texts to be
considered in this study, it is not necessary or useful to distinguish figures of
syntax from the normal grammatical apparatus, but it facilitates explanation to
draw attention to certain frequent types of construction.” 60 Kittay, too,
possibly aware of this kind of problem, reasons that the relationship between
lexical and content fields “ensures that when we move from one part of speech
to another (for example, from a noun to a verb, as in from ‘resonance’ to
‘resonate’), we have not thereby moved from one semantic field to another.” 61
Thus, against the naysayers of classical Buddhist Chinese’s ability to
accurately communicate Sanskrit, we also propose that we accept that
Kum raj va and his team as scholars and translators were well aware of these
problems, and skillful enough to render the original Sanskrit lexical units and
structures into natural Chinese forms. While they may have often transformed
grammar and syntax in the process, they were still consistently able to
ultimately preserve the metaphorical function through the relationship
between both the vehicle and topic.
4. The Ten Cognitive Metaphors
4.1 Ten Metaphors in Twenty Forms
It is now high time to present the ten cognitive metaphors from the *Upade a.
What follows are English translations of the specifically metaphorical content
from the *Upade a for each of the ten passages that use a metaphorical
60
61
Robinson, Early M dhyamika, 18.
Kittay, Metaphor, 247.
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vehicle to express the topic of emptiness (with Chinese in footnotes). The
passages selected are not exhaustive, as the text gives other forms and
examples, though the following have been chosen for their more complete
structures and detail. Most of the metaphorical vehicles have more than a
single form, so they have been labeled Mirage(1), Mirage(2), etc., for ease of
reference. There is a total of 20 metaphorical forms. The Chinese source text
is given in the footnotes for each form. Each metaphor and form thereof will
be individually followed by some brief comments. Then we shall proceed
directly into the syntagmatic analysis and then semantic field analysis (in §5).
Only after these two types of analysis derived from Kittay’s perspectival
approach to metaphor shall we engage in a well-founded critical review of
what the text is doing, consciously or otherwise.
A. Illusion (
;
huàn)
The first metaphor is that of “illusion” (
;
huàn). Due to its
importance, I have elsewhere undertaken a diachronic study on this metaphor,
from its pre-Buddhist origins, through early and sectarian Buddhism, into the
earliest Prajñ
ramit literature. 62 The singular form is as follows:
Illusion (1): 63 By metaphor, it is just like illusorily created elephants,
horses and other various things, although they are known to be without
reality, however they have form which is visible, sound which is
audible, and correspond to the six senses, not being mutually
incoherent. Dharmas are likewise, although they are empty they are
visible, audible, and not mutually incoherent.
The metaphor is fairly simple: just as an illusion can be perceived through the
senses but does not exist in reality, so too are phenomena empty; they can be
perceived but have no real existence.
B. Mirage (mar ci;
yàn)
The second example is “mirage” (mar ci;
yàn). Two structured forms are
given, though they are closely connected, and both have more structural detail
than the previous example of illusion.
62
63
Huìf ng Shì
. “Is ‘Illusion’ a Prajñ
ramit Creation? The Birth and
Death of a Buddhist Cognitive Metaphor.” Journal of Buddhist Philosophy 2
(2016).
*Upade a, fasc. 6, T 1509, 25: 101c19–21.
Something for Nothing
191
Mirage (1): 64 A mirage is that by way of sunlight and the wind
moving dust, in the wilderness one sees the resemblance of wild horses;
[when] ignorant people first see it, they claim it is water. The
characteristics of masculinity and femininity are likewise. The sunlight
of the bonds, afflictions, heats up the formation dust, the wind of
perverse conceptual thoughts, which proceed in the wilderness of lifeand-death. The ignorant claim that there is one characteristic, whether
masculine, whether feminine.
In this first form, there is the alignment of vehicle and topic not just for
mirage and dharmas in the narrow sense, but also for the various factors that
go into creating the mirage.
Mirage (2): 65 Moreover, if one sees a mirage from the distance, there
is the perception of water; but from close there is then no perception of
water. Ignorant people are likewise. If they are distant from the holy
Dharma, they do not know not self, do not know dharmas are empty;
and with respect to the aggregates, the elements, and the senses,
dharmas that are empty of nature, they generate the perception of a
person, the perception of masculinity, the perception of femininity. If
they are close to the holy Dharma, they then know the real
characteristic of dharmas. At this time, the various false perceptions
are eliminated.
For the second, rather than dharmas as phenomena, we have the sense of the
Dharma or “real characteristic of dharmas” as the true state of affairs. This is
an important distinction that we shall return to below.
C. Moon [reflected] in the water (dakacandra;
shu zh ngyüè)
Next we have the metaphor of if the “moon reflected in the water”
(dakacandra;
shu zh ngyüè). Again, two forms are given:
Moon (1): 66 The moon is in empty space, its reflection appears in the
water. The moon of the nature of real dharmas is in the empty space of
suchness, the nature of dharmas, the reality limit; however, in the
64
65
66
*Upade a, fasc. 6, T 1509, 25: 102b2–6. Philological note: The use of
xiàng and
xi ng in these passages seems to indicate some correspondence or
conflation, but it is not consistent.
*Upade a, fasc. 6, T 1509, 25: 102b6–10.
*Upade a, fasc. 6, T 1509, 25: 102b11–14.
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water of the minds of common gods and humans appears the
characteristic of self and what belongs to self.
For the first form, the vehicle is the moon’s reflection in water vis-à-vis the
topic of dharmas as perceived as having self or mind. But note that we also
have the moon itself as vehicle for the topic of the nature of real dharmas, and
this is situated in empty space, i.e., suchness, *dharmat , the reality limit, and
so forth.
Moon (2): 67 Moreover, by metaphor, it is just like in still water one
can see the reflection of the moon, on disturbing the water it then
cannot be seen. In the still water of the mind without wisdom one sees
the reflections of me-self, conceit, and the bonds; [using] the staff of
real wisdom to disturb the water of the mind, one then cannot see the
reflections of me-self, etc., the bonds.
This second form continues the first, with wisdom being the force that disrupts
the deceptive reflection of dharmas as self. Note that the staff is of real
wisdom.
D. Empty space (
a;
xük ng)
The fourth metaphor is one commonly used for emptiness or “empty space”
(
a;
xük ng), which does not appear in the Sanskrit
tra. Three
forms are given:
Space (1):68 Empty space is a non-visible dharma. Viewing from a
distance, with the eye and light, there proceeds vision of blue color.
Dharmas are likewise, empty, without existence, a person who is far
removed from influx-free, real wisdom, abandons the real
characteristic, and sees that self, masculinity, femininity, houses, cities,
etc., various assorted things, and the mind becomes attached [to these
things].
In many ways this first form resembles that of the mirage, in that the
deceptive color of blue is only perceived from afar. This is the vehicle for the
topic of dharmas being empty and wisdom, existence. Here again we see the
wisdom of seeing from close up described as being “real.”
67
68
*Upade a, fasc. 6, T 1509, 25: 102b21–23.
*Upade a, fasc. 6, T 1509, 25: 102b25–28.
Something for Nothing
193
Space (2):69 It is like a small child who looks up at the blue sky, and
claims that there is real color. A person flies up to an extreme height,
and yet nothing is seen. By way of seeing from a distance, there is the
claim of blue color. Dharmas are likewise.
The second form is largely the same as the first, albeit adding the child as
agent, which is the vehicle for the foolish common person. Note that the
description of seeing space from a great height is that it is “nothing,” as
opposed to being some real nature of empty space.
Space (3): 70 Moreover, just like the nature of empty space is
constantly pure, and people claim that [due to] clouds it is impure.
Dharmas are likewise, their nature is constantly pure, but due to the
clouds of lustful desire, angry aversion, etc., people claim that they are
impure.
This third form merely adds the structural element of the clouds for the
afflictions. It could effectively be incorporated into the first (or second) form,
above.
E. Echo (prati rutk ;
xi ng)
Our fifth case is that of “echo” (prati rutk ;
xi ng). We shall only use one
of the forms in the text, though it is fairly lengthy.
Echo (1): 71 Whether in a narrow valley in the deep mountains, or in a
deep sheer ravine, or in an empty large building, whether the sound of
a voice, or the sound of striking, there is sound from sound, named
“echo.” Ignorant people claim that the sound is from the voice of a
person; the wise think in their minds, “This sound is not made by a
person, but merely by way of the contact of sound, there is therefore a
further sound, named echo. The thing [named] echo is empty, able to
deceive the ear faculty.”
Whereas the previous four metaphors have all been visual, the case of an echo
is auditory in nature. However, it shares some commonality with the moon
reflected in the water in that this, too, is a reflection of sorts, but an acoustic
one. This means that in addition to the vehicle of the echoed sound, there is
69
70
71
*Upade a, fasc. 6, T 1509, 25: 102b28–c1.
*Upade a, fasc. 6, T 1509, 25: 102c2–4.
*Upade a, fasc. 6, T 1509, 25: 103a11–15.
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also the original sound that creates the echo. While not explicitly stated as
being real, as in previous metaphors, it is implied by the structure of the
vehicle.
F. City of the Gandharvas (gandharva-nagara;
chéng)
jiàntápó
The other example not appearing in the Sanskrit tra, our sixth case, is that
of the “city of the gandharvas” (gandharva-nagara;
jiàntápó
chéng). Two cases are again given, though they largely overlap, and we shall
consider them both together here.
City (1): 72 When the sun first comes out, one sees city gates, towers,
mansions, people walking in and out. The more the sun proceeds to the
zenith, the more it proceeds to cease. This city is merely visible to the
eyes, however there is no reality.
City (2): 73 Some people initially do not see the city of the gandharvas,
[but] at dawn they look to the east and see it, thinking and claiming
there is real pleasure. Swiftly walking toward it, the closer they get the
more it vanishes; the higher the sun, the more it ceases. Hungry and
thirsty and very frustrated, they see the hot air like wild horses, and
claim that it is water; swiftly running toward it, the closer they get the
more it ceases. Exhausted and troubled, they reach the middle of a
narrow valley in the deep mountains, and loudly shout and cry out.
Hearing the responding echo, they claim that there are people living
there. Searching for them, exhausted, they still see nothing at all. On
contemplation, they realize for themselves, and put an end to their
thirsty wishes.
Ignorant people are likewise. With respect to the empty aggregates,
elements, and senses, they see a me-self and dharmas, their minds
grasping with lust and aversion, crazily running about around in the
four directions, seeking pleasure to satisfy themselves, perverse and
deceived, extremely frustrated and afflicted. If, by way of wisdom, one
knows dharmas as being without self, without reality, at that time the
perverted wishes will end.
72
73
*Upade a, fasc. 6, T 1509, 25: 103b2–4.
*Upade a, fasc. 6, T 1509, 25: 103b4–13.
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195
As per the mirage, there is some structuring here with the sun and its position
in the sky, though this is not as detailed as the mirage. More material is given
for its deceptive effect upon the viewer of the city of gandharvas, their
afflictions and sorrows. Just as for illusion, there is the deceptive vehicle of
the city for dharmas wrongly perceived as self, all without explicit or implicit
reference to any reality. That is, there is no real city behind the façade, or
mention of the true wisdom that sees through it.
G. Dream (svapna;
mèng)
The seventh example is that of “dream” (svapna;
mèng), which is the
natural counterpart to that core cognitive Buddhist metaphor of “waking”
(bodhi;
jüé). Three forms are given:
Dream (1): 74 Just as in a dream there are no real things, but one
claims that there are real [things], on awakening one knows that there
are none, and still laughs at oneself. People are likewise. In the
dormant tendencies of the bonds, there is no reality but one still grasps,
and on awakening to the path, one then knows that there is no reality,
and further laughs at oneself.
The dream experiences are the vehicle for the topic of grasping, and waking
from the dream for awakening to the path. The dominance of this metaphor
shows even in this simple statement, where even the topic is already using the
vehicle of “awakening”! The reality of the dream is refuted, and nothing is put
in its place as real.
Dream (2):75 Moreover, due to the power of sleep of the dreamer,
there is no dharma yet one still sees. People are likewise. Due to the
power of the dormant tendencies of ignorance, various things are not
existent, yet one still sees, and claims that there is a self, whatpertains-to-self, masculinity, femininity, etc.
For form two, we have more detail about the process that creates the topic at
hand, i.e., the dormant tendencies, especially ignorance, whereas the vehicle
simply has “the power of sleep.”
74
75
*Upade a, fasc. 6, T 1509, 25: 103b29–c3.
*Upade a, fasc. 6, T 1509, 25: 103c3–5.
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Journal of Chinese Buddhist Studies Volume 31 (2018)
Dream (3): 76 Moreover, just as in a dream there is nothing to delight
in, yet one is still delighted, nothing to be angry at, yet one is still
angry, nothing to be afraid of, yet one is still afraid. Living beings of
the three realms are likewise. Due to [the power of] the dormant
tendencies of ignorance, one should not be angry but is angry, one
should not be delighted but is delighted, one should not be afraid yet is
afraid.
This third form effectively adds no more to the first two, and functions almost
as a combination of the former two.
H. Shadow (pratibh sa;
ng)
Another visual metaphor, the eighth, is that of “shadow” (pratibh sa;
ng). This metaphor is yet another visual one.
Shadow (1): 77 A shadow is merely visible, yet not graspable. Dharmas
are likewise. The eye sense, etc., sees, hears, senses and knows, [but]
in reality is not apprehendable.
Not much need to be said for this first case. Though, it is worth mentioning
the implicit need for an actual thing that has a shadow. This is not a reflection,
unlike the moon and echo, but is structurally very similar.
Shadow (2): 78 Moreover, just like a shadow, [where] the light shines
it is then manifest, [where] it does not shine it is then not manifest.
The bonds, afflictions, cover the light of right view, then there is the
shadow of the characteristic of self, the characteristic of dharmas.
In the second form, more details are provided. There are some problems here,
which may just derive from a corruption in the text. At first, it appears that the
shadow is dependent on light, which is physically true in the vehicle, but then
in the topic light is right view, which would go against the shadow as
metaphor for the deceptive nature of self and dharmas. Literally, this form
contradicts itself, though I would warrant that most readers would only notice
on close analysis, as we all readily know how a shadow works and thus our
minds are drawn into a path of seemingly easy comprehension.
76
77
78
*Upade a, fasc. 6, T 1509, 25: 103c5–8.
*Upade a, fasc. 6, T 1509, 25: 104a9–11.
*Upade a, fasc. 6, T 1509, 25: 104a14–15.
Something for Nothing
I. Image in a mirror (pratibimba;
197
jìngzh ngxiàng)
Our penultimate example is that of an “image in a mirror” (pratibimba;
jìngzh ngxiàng). Here we have another three forms of what is a very clear
visual and reflection-type structure of metaphor:
Image (1):79 Just like the image in a mirror is not created by the
mirror; is not created by the face; is not created by the one who holds
the mirror; and is also not created by itself; and is also not without
causal condition. Dharmas are likewise. They are not created by
themselves; are not created by other; are not created by both [self and
other]; and are not without causal condition.
The structure of the first form is mainly designed, it appears, to fit with the
classic Buddhist tetra-lemma. Though, while the structure of the topic
indicates mutually opposing self vs. other, the vehicle does not.
Image (2): 80 By metaphor, it is just like … a small child seeing the
image in the mirror, their mind delights and they desirously attach to it.
On losing [the image], they break the mirror in search of it, and are
laughed at by wise people. Losing pleasure and further seeking it is
likewise, and one is laughed at by holy people who have attained the
path.
The second form is simpler, and mainly just adds the child as vehicle for the
foolish; for the wise we would have, we assume, a mature adult.
Image (3): 81 Moreover, just like the image in a mirror is empty,
without reality, not generated, nor ceased, deceiving and beguiling the
eyes of common people. All dharmas are likewise, in this way, empty,
without reality, not generated and not ceased, deceiving and beguiling
the eyes of common people.
Our third form merely reiterates the deceptive nature of the reflected image, as
a vehicle for our topic, all dharmas.
79
80
81
*Upade a, fasc. 6, T 1509, 25: 104b18–19.
*Upade a, fasc. 6, T 1509, 25: 104c14–16.
*Upade a, fasc. 6, T 1509, 25: 104c17–19.
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Journal of Chinese Buddhist Studies Volume 31 (2018)
J. Magical creation (nirm
a;
huà)
Last but by no means least, is that of the “magical creation” (nirm a;
huà). This, too, would later become one of the dominant metaphors for
Buddhism, and was often combined together with the first metaphor: illusion.
Here we have two forms that display some differences.
Magic (1): 82 Just like a magically created person is without birth,
aging, disease, and death, without pain and pleasure, and different
from human life. Due to this reason they are empty, without reality.
All dharmas are likewise, all without generation, abiding, and
cessation.
In this first form, we again see the emphasis on the magical creation as being
empty and without reality. There is no corresponding real person juxtaposed
with the magically created one.
Magic (2): 83 Moreover, the generation of the magical creation (/the
magical creator) is no fixed thing, there is merely the generation of
mind; if it has any further activity, it is all without reality. The human
body is likewise. Formerly without any cause (/existence), it is merely
from the mind of the previous life, that generates the body of the
present life; all is without reality.
For the second, the emphasis is rather on the notion that the magical creation
is a product of mind, a vehicle for the topic of the human body as a product of
(mental) karma.
5. Analysis of the Metaphors
5.1 Syntagmatic Analysis
We may now proceed with the syntagmatic analysis of the ten metaphors, each
of which has numerous forms. Following Kittay’s own illustrative examples,
we shall present these via a standardized grammatical sentence structure. We
have summarized each of the forms of the metaphors as given above in strict
and formal translation. These are then parsed out with an agent, a basic
82
83
*Upade a, fasc. 6, T 1509, 25: 105a26–28.
*Upade a, fasc. 6, T 1509, 25: 105a29–b2. There are some variant readings in
the Chinese which we have bracketed off in the English translation.
Something for Nothing
199
primary verb (1), which is enacted upon the object, which in turn may be
modified by adjective(s); the verb may take place through an instrument, or
adverbially (we have combined these for space reasons); and finally there may
be some resultant clause, involving its own verb, object, and so forth. For
example:
[Agent] A person [verb 1 ] sees [adjective 1 ] unreal [object] mirage
phenomena [adjective 2 ] as if they were real, [instrument] due to
sunlight, dust and so forth; [verb 2 ] they chase after the mirage water.
Where these syntagmatic elements are only implied, we have used square
brackets [thus], for example, for many of the agents. While Chinese grammar
does not necessarily require an agent for a grammatically correct sentence,
Sanskrit usually does, or at least implies one through its verb in terms of
gender, number, and so forth. Moreover, sometimes the entire grammar has
been converted from (what could perhaps be a Sanskrit-influenced) passive
voice construction, into the form of a more regular active voice agent-verbobject structure (as justified above at §3.4). We first present each form of each
vehicle of the metaphor, followed immediately by the topic that it represents.
In several cases, no topic is given, and it is entirely implied.
200
Journal of Chinese Buddhist Studies Volume 31 (2018)
Table 1 Syntagmatic Analysis of the Ten Metaphors in Twenty Forms
Summary
A. Illusion (1)
B. Mirage (1)
Illusorily created things are
without reality, but can be
seen, heard, etc., and known
by the senses.
All dharmas are without
reality, but can be seen,
heard, etc., and known by
the senses.
A mirage is created by way
of sunlight, wind and dust;
it resembles wild horses;
people think it is water.
The characteristics of
[dharmas] are created by
way of the bonds,
afflictions, formations and
conceptualization;
they proceed in cyclic
existence;
people think that they really
exist.
Agent
Verb (1)
Adjective
(for
Object)
Object
[People]
see, hear,
sense,
know
without
reality
illusorily
created
things
[People]
see, hear,
sense,
know
without
reality
dharmas
People
see
People
[know]
[not real]
Adverb or
Instrument
Resultant
Action
[illusionist,
mantra, etc.]
mirage
sunlight, wind,
dust
thinks it is
wild horses
characteristi
cs of
[dharmas]
bonds, afflictions,
formations,
conceptualization
proceed in
cyclic
existence
Something for Nothing
B. Mirage (2)
C. Moon (1)
C. Moon (2)
A mirage when seen from a
distance resembles water;
but from close does not.
[People]
see
not water
mirage
distantly
[sunlight, wind,
dust]
The Holy Dharma when
seen from the view of
emptiness, etc.,
[resembles ??];
but from the view of
emptiness, etc., then the real
characteristic of dharmas is
known.
The moon is in empty
space;
its reflection appears in the
water.
The real nature of dharmas
is in suchness, etc.;
the appearance of self and
mine appears in the minds
of ordinary beings.
When the water is still the
reflection of the moon is
seen;
when disturbed it is not
seen.
When the mind is without
wisdom me-self, conceit
and bonds are seen;
when there is wisdom they
are not seen.
[People]
see
real
Holy Dharma
view of
emptiness
[People]
[see]
moon
reflected in water
[The wise]
Ordinary
people
[know]
see
real nature of
dharmas
self and mine
in suchness
[People]
see
water
reflected in water
Foolish
people
Wise people
see
not see
conceit and
bonds
in the mind
resembles
water
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Journal of Chinese Buddhist Studies Volume 31 (2018)
D. Space (1)
Space, when viewed from a
distance, appears blue.
[People]
Dharmas, when viewed
without wisdom appear to
have real characteristics.
Space is seen by a child as
having a real color;
when viewed up close there
is no [color];
when viewed from a
distance there is blue color.
[*None given]
[Foolish
people]
Child
Space is constantly pure,
due to clouds people claim
it is impure.
Dharmas are constantly
pure, due to afflictions
people claim that they are
impure.
An echo is a [reflected]
sound, made in a space
between large objects;
people claim that the
[reflected] sound is real;
the wise know that the
sound is a [reflection] of
sound.
[*None given]
D. Space (2)
202
see
D. Space (3)
space
distantly
appears blue
dharmas
without wisdom
appears real
sees
space
distantly
appears blue
People
[see]
space
clouds
appears
impure
People
[see]
dharmas
afflictions
appear as
impure
People
hear
echo
valley, room,
mountains
laughed at by
the wise
not real
E. Echo(1)
Something for Nothing
F. City(1)
F. City (2)
[A city of the gandharvas]
is seen by the action of the
morning sun;
it is visible but not real; it
ceases as the sun rises.
[*None given]
[A city of the gandharvas]
is seen by the action of the
morning sun;
it is seen but not real;
people run towards it
seeking pleasure, hungry
and thirsty;
they get lost;
it ceases as the sun rises.
Dharmas are seen [due to
what?];
they are seen as me-self and
dharmas;
people run towards them
seeking pleasure, lusting
and averse;
they are deceived and
frustrated;
views of a me-self, reality
and desires cease when
wisdom arises.
203
[People]
see
disappears
towards
midday
[city of the
gandharvas]
sun in the
morning
[People]
see
ceases as
sun rises
[city of the
gandharvas]
sun in the
morning
run toward it
seek pleasure
[Foolish]
people
Wise
[people]
see
dharmas
[afflictions]
wisdom
as me-self
seeking
pleasure
deceived and
frustrated
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Journal of Chinese Buddhist Studies Volume 31 (2018)
G. Dream (1)
G. Dream (2)
G. Dream(3)
In dream no real thing;
claims they are real;
awakens to the fact that
nothing real;
laughs.
In dormant tendencies of
bonds nothing real;
one grasps at things;
awakens to the fact that
nothing real;
laughs.
The dreamer, due to the
power of sleep, sees things.
[Person]
dreaming
[sees]
unreal
things in a
dream
awakens;
laughs
People
[see]
unreal
dharmas
awakens;
laughs
[Person]
dreaming
sees
People, due to the power of
dormant ignorance, see
things that are not real and
claims they are a self, etc.
In a dream there is nothing
delightful but is delighted;
nothing to be angry at but
gets angry;
nothing to be afraid of but
is afraid.
People
see
[Person
dreaming]
dreams
dreams
not real
the power of
sleep
things
dreams
[the power of
sleep]
delights in
nondelightful;
angry at the
nonangering;
afraid of
what is not
fearful
Something for Nothing
H. Shadow( 1)
H. Shadow (2)
84
85
Due to dormant ignorance
one should not be delighted
but is delighted;
should not be angry but is
angry;
should not be afraid but is
afraid.
Ignorant
[people]
[perceive]
A shadow is visible but not
graspable.
[ 84 People]
see
not
graspable
shadow
Dharmas are perceivable but
not apprehendable as real.
[People]
perceive
nonapprehenda
ble
dharmas
A shadow is manifest when
light shines;
not manifest when light
does not shine.
[ 85 People]
see
do not see
shadow
when there is
light
when there is no
light
The characteristics of self
and dharmas are manifest
when right view is covered.
[People]
see
characteristics
of self and
dharmas
right view
covered
things
205
delight in the
nondelightful;
angry at the
nonangering;
afraid of
what is not
fearful
[shadowed thing]
Strictly speaking, this should be in the passive, i.e., the shadow is manifest to the people, rather than the people see the
manifest shadow.
Strictly speaking, this should be in the passive, i.e., the shadow is manifest to the people, rather than the people see the
manifest shadow.
206
I. Image (1)
I. Image (2)
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Journal of Chinese Buddhist Studies Volume 31 (2018)
An image is not created by
the mirror;
is not created by the face;
is not created by the holder
of the mirror;
is not created by itself.
Dharmas are not created by
themselves;
are not created by other;
are not created by both self
and other;
are not created without
conditions.
A child sees the image in
the mirror and becomes
attached;
on losing the image they
break the mirror;
they are laughed at.
[A foolish person sees
dharmas] and becomes
attached;
on losing the dharmas they
seek them;
they are laughed at.
[ 86 People]
[see]
not created
(in any of
four ways)
image
[reflection]
not created
dharmas
by self
by other
by self and other
without cause
[reflection]
Child
sees
image in a
mirror
[Foolish
people]
see
[dharmas]
becomes
attached
breaks mirror
is laughed at
become
attached
seek dharmas
are laughed
at
Strictly speaking, this should be in the passive, i.e. it is the image which is seen by the people, rather than the people which
see the image.
Something for Nothing
I. Image(3)
J. Magic(1)
An image in a mirror is
empty;
is neither generated nor
ceased;
it deceives common people.
Dharmas are empty, without
reality;
are neither generated nor
ceased;
they deceive common
people.
A magically created person
is without birth, aging,
disease, or death;
without pleasure or pain;
not a human life;
empty.
J. Magic(2)
[People]
[see]
empty
not
generated
image in a
mirror
Common
people
[know]
empty
without
reality
neither
generated
nor ceased
not human
empty
without
birth, death
without
pleasure,
pain
without
generation,
abiding or
cessation
not entity
product of
the mind
not real
dharmas
Dharmas are without
generation, abiding and
cessation.
[People]
[know]
A magical creation is not a
fixed entity;
it is a product of the mind;
any activity is not real.
[People]
[know]
The human body is a
product of the mind;
it is without reality.
[People]
[know]
mindproduced
not real
magically
created
person
dharmas
magical
creation
human body
[reflection]
207
deceives
people
are deceived
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Journal of Chinese Buddhist Studies Volume 31 (2018)
5.2 Semantic Field Analysis
Having parsed out the syntagmatic forms for the ten metaphors, let us look at
the various semantic fields that are involved. We shall undertake this based on
the previous grammatical structure, from the semantic fields for the agent, to
the primary verb, and so on. The field analysis features contrasted sets, with
covering term “L” and various hyponyms “E1 , E 2 … En .” We shall work
backwards, in taking the various grammatical terms in the forms as the
hyponyms, and add our own covering term for the entire category itself:
<< L >: E1 , E2 , E3 , … E n >
Let us start from the semantic fields for the agent. This is a relatively simple
affair, given that most are an explicit or implicit “people” or “person,” with a
few examples of the “child” or the “wise.” This is turn has the two contrasted
forms, depending on the correct or mistaken nature of their action (see verb
analysis, next):
<< Agents (of misperception) >: people, common people, ignorant
people, children >
<< Agents (of correct perception) >: the wise >
Note that the term translated into Chinese as “child” (
xia ér) most
likely comes from Sanskrit “ la,” which can be both “child” or “foolish
[person],” implying that children are ignorant and foolish. 87 “Children” can
thus in turn be subsumed under the category of “ignorant people” in this
linguistic context. Note that between the vehicle and topic, there is very little
distinction. That is, the cognitive function of the vehicle is not to introduce an
otherwise unknown topic agent.
Next, consider the primary verb that the agent performs. These are almost
all basic verbs for perception or some kind of knowing. As we have already
noted above, the use of “seeing” is predominant, followed by a general
“knowing,” though there is also “hearing” and “dreaming,” for example.
<< Perceiving >: seeing, knowing, hearing, dreaming, perceiving >
87
See T. W. Rhys-Davids and William Stede, The Pali-English Dictionary (New
Delhi: Asian Educational Services, 1997), 485.
Something for Nothing
209
As for the agents, most of these verbs refer to misperceptions: the state of
being deceived by the object. We could thus make a similar distinction
between verbs for misperception and correct perception, depending upon the
agent and the object that is perceived. For the latter, which are our ten basic
metaphorical vehicles plus the topics that they stand for, this depends upon the
qualifying adjectives such as “real” or “unreal.” As per the agent, there is only
a slight distinction between the verbs for the vehicle and agent. The vehicles
are largely external forms of perception, e.g. seeing, hearing, etc., and the
topic is mainly knowing, although seeing is also used here, but already as a
metaphor itself for knowing. 88
For semantic fields for the objects of perception we thus have two types in
terms of misperceptions and correct perceptions, and we begin to see a clear
distinction between the objects of the vehicle and those of the topics (which
we shall separate with a double bar ||):
<< Objects (of misperception) >: illusions, mirages, reflections of
moons, empty space, echoes, cities of gandharvas, dream
(experiences), shadows, images in mirrors, magical creations ||
dharmas (as things), self, what pertains to self >
<< Objects (of correct perception) >: moons, sounds, things (which
have shadows), things (which are reflected in mirrors) || the Dharma
(as reality) >
The ten vehicles themselves are of course hyponyms of “dharmas (as things),”
but not of the Dharma (as reality). A very important matter we can now clarify,
is that while some of the vehicle metaphors only indicate objects of
misperception, other vehicles also give a potential object of correct perception
or knowledge. This may be explicit, as the statement about seeing the Holy
Dharma, or more often implicit, with the actual moon, the original sound
which causes the echo, the thing which has a shadow, and the thing or face
which is reflected in the mirror.
The semantic fields for the various adjectives describing the objects (of
misperception and correct perception) are as follows:
88
“Understanding is seeing,” in Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 48,
103–04.
210
Journal of Chinese Buddhist Studies Volume 31 (2018)
<< Adjectives (for objects of misperception) >: unreal || unreal, not
self, not pertaining to self, empty, ungraspable, unapprehendable, noncreated, non-abiding, non-ceased, mind produced >
<< Adjectives (for objects of correct perception) >: real || real >
The only explicit example of the latter is the “real Holy Dharma,” though
implicitly the “actual” face, or “true” moon, and so on would also be valid. As
above, here we see quite some overlap between the adjectives “unreal” and
“real” for the vehicle and the topic, though the topic also had quite a number
more as well.
Several of the metaphors—both vehicle and topic—provide details on the
adverbs or instruments through which the perception takes place. Again, of
two types:
<< Means (of misperception) >: sunlight, dust, clouds, water,
reflection, from a distance, in valley or mountain, power of sleep ||
afflictions, lust, desire, grasping, aversion, anger, ignorance >
<< Means (of correct perception) >: close by, awake, light || view of
emptiness, right view, with wisdom >
Finally, we have a resultant clause following the primary statement. This
could be further reduced into its constituent grammatical elements, but we
shall simplify this somewhat by considering that the agent remains the same,
and it is largely the verb and its object that are significant. We have:
<< Resultant action >: think it is water, think it is blue, become
desirous, become angry, run toward it, are laughed at || become
desirous, become angry, grasp at it, continue in cyclic existence >
No doubt this can be extended out to include the usual Buddhist notion of
experiencing various types of dissatisfaction, sorrow, lamentation, and so
forth. Numerous secondary clauses are again repeated in the vehicle and topic,
such as becoming desirous, angry, and so on.
5.3 Discussion of the Analysis
By first breaking down each of the forms of the ten metaphors—both vehicle
and topic—by their syntagmatic/grammatical structures, followed by
rendering these into their respective semantic fields, we can determine a clear
overall picture of how they function to express the notion of emptiness.
Something for Nothing
211
Syntagmatically, we could reduce the vehicle to the following generic
statement:
[Agent] People [verb 1 ] misperceive [adjective1 ] unreal [object]
phenomena of some type [adjective 2 ] as if they were real, [instrument]
due to some natural conditions such as sunlight, spatial situation, etc.;
[verb 2 ] as a result they grasp at an unreal object and experience
frustration.
The topic may be shown such:
[Agent] People [verb 1 ] misperceive [adjective 1 ] empty, selfless [object]
phenomena [adjective2 ] as if they were real, self or what pertains to
self, [instrument] due to the afflictions of desire, aversion and
ignorance; [verb 2 ] as a result they experience dissatisfaction in
continued cyclic existence.
However, to simply say that all the metaphorical forms nicely fit this structure
would be to overlook issues that we have noted. We can see these by the
various ways of grouping the vehicles. I would like to draw attention to four
issues: namely, the mode of sensory perception (the verb), objects which are
reflections versus those which are some kind of creation, and, as an extension
of this last point, objects that have real counterparts as opposed to those which
are entirely fictitious, as well as a distinction between those objects which are
natural phenomena and those which are produced by external agency.
First, mode of sensory perception. With respect to modes of perception in
general, a number of vehicles use the visual: illusion, mirage, empty space,
moon reflected in water, city of the gandharvas, dream, shadow, image
reflected in mirror (and perhaps magical creation). This is nine out of ten
vehicles in total. The odd one out is an auditory vehicle, such as the echo.
This heavy emphasis on the visual, which is an extremely common metaphor
for inner, mental knowledge—“understanding is seeing” 89—should alert us to
the relationship between how visual perception versus mental perception
works. It is entirely assumed and implicit in the rhetorical expression, and not
raised as potentially problematic or at least open to debate. This is despite the
fact that many Mah
na s tras reject the notion of true perception through
the usual external senses and also through the mental, e.g., “The nature of
89
Ibid.
212
Journal of Chinese Buddhist Studies Volume 31 (2018)
Dharma cannot be cognized, it is not able to be cognized,” in the verses of the
Vajracchedik prajñ
ramit . 90
Second, reflected versus non-reflected objects of perception. Two of our
vehicles are clearly a kind of reflection— the moon reflected on the water, and
the image reflected in the mirror. In addition, the shadow is a kind of reverse
reflection (if we may be permitted the expression), in that it too only appears
when there is an object to cast a shadow. These three are all visual, but our
solitary auditory vehicle, the echo, is also a reflection of sorts, a reflection of
a human voice or clapped hands bouncing off the valley walls or mountainside.
These reflective metaphors rely on the notion that the reflection (or shadow,
or echoed sound) is false and unreal, yet we must also note that it implies that
the original actual object is real: the moon, or voice, or face, etc. We shall
return to this, below. The other examples which are not reflections—the
illusion, mirage, empty space, city and magical creation—appear and are
(mis)perceived not due to a singular real equivalent, but due to a number of
other conditioning factors. For example, the mirage is described in detail as
being due to the sunlight, dust, and so forth on the wide open plains; likewise
the city; and elsewhere we understand that in ancient Indian culture an illusion
is a creation through mantra and other ritual acts. 91
Third, objects which have real counterparts. Just as the Vedic form of the
illusion metaphor implied an illusionist (
)—whether as Indra or as the
Vedic seer—so too those metaphorical vehicles here which have real
counterparts to a reflected misperceived object, have implications for the
understanding of emptiness. While all of the vehicles indicate that the various
phenomena of the world are not real, deceptive, and misperceived as self or
pertaining to self, is there some other reality, a true thing, the object of right
view, wisdom and insight? On one hand, the metaphors of illusion, mirage,
90
91
Edward Conze, Buddhist Wisdom: The Diamond Sutra and the Heart Sutra, 1 st
ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), 63. Sanskrit: “dharmato buddho
dra avyo dharmak
hi n yak | dharmat ca na vijñey na s
aky
vij nitum || 2 || 26 ||”, in Vaidya, “Vajracchedik -prajñ
ramit ,” 17.
For example, in the vet vatara Upani ad, vv 4:9–10; Sanskrit Documents,
“Svetasvatara-Upanisad
(Svetasvataropanisad)”.
Svetasvatara-Upanisad
“chand si yajñ
kratavo vrat ni| bh ta bhavya yac ca ved vadanti|
asm n
m
s jate
vi vam
etat|
tasmi
c nyo
m yay
sa niruddha ||SvetUp_4.9||”; “
tu prak ti
vidy n| m yina
tu
mahe vara |
tasy vayavabh tais
tu|
vy pta
sarva
ida
jagat||SvetUp_4.10||” Translation in Patrick Olivelle, Upani ads, Oxford’s
World’s Classics (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 260.
See discussion in Huìf ng Shì, “Is “Illusion” a Prajñ
ramit Creation?.”
Something for Nothing
213
empty space, city of the gandharvas, a dream, and a magical creation would
imply—no! There is a continuous rejection of the real, e.g., in the form city
(2)—“dharmas as being without self, without reality” (
wúw wúshíf zh ); for dream (1)—“no real thing” (
wúshíshì) and “no
reality” (
wúshí); in image (3)—“empty, without reality” (
ng
wúshí); and likewise magical creation (1)—“empty, without reality” (
ng wúshí). But, this rejection of the real is for the specific deceptive object;
does it apply to all objects? For the so-called reflected metaphors, the moon in
the water, the echo, shadow, and image of a face in the mirror, perhaps the
answer may be that some objects are, in fact, real. This is not merely an
implied message, either. Nor is it confined to the reflected metaphors. We see
reference to terms such as in mirage (2)—“real characteristic of dharmas” (
zh shíxiàng); in the moon reflected in water (1)—“the nature of
real dharmas is in the empty space of suchness, the nature of dharmas, the
reality limit” (
); again, in the form moon
reflected in water (2)—“real wisdom” (
zhìhuì); space(1)—“real wisdom”
(
shízhìhuì). We could add the implication of the original face which is
reflected in the mirror, and the sound which produces the echo.
Fourth, the implication of external agency. While many of the vehicle
objects are natural phenomena, this is not always the case. A mirage, the moon
in the water, empty space, an echo, the city of gandharvas, and a shadow are
all obviously or apparently natural. This means that they do not have a single
causal agency, but depend on such things as sunlight, and so forth. Several
other examples are more ambiguous, like a dream—a natural experience, but
potentially able to be influenced by the dreamer; the image in the mirror—also
partly natural, but the mirror itself is a human product, unlike the water which
reflects the moon; and finally the illusion and magical creation—both
necessitate an intentional illusionist or magician, as in the example of Indra
who creates the illusion of the world, just as the Vedic seer invokes mantra to
bring about some effect. Such an external agency would very much counter
the Buddhist notion of dependent origination as a natural phenomenon, and
lean heavily toward the idea of either an external creator god (Brahma, or
what have you), or possibly an internal generative force ( tman, puru a, or
prak ti, etc.). Again, these are but implied, but the shadow of an external
agent does lie upon these particular examples.
When we look at the problems that these implicit issues raise, we may
note that the metaphoric vehicle of “empty space” stands alone. It is not
doctrinally tainted by the implication of a real counterpart in any sense, nor
any act of agency in its creation. In Abhidharma terminology, empty space
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was considered as pervasive and unconditioned, which means that like the
topic of all dharmas, there are no exceptions. It is little wonder that this
particular example became such a powerful, if not understated, vehicle
metaphor for a fully negating emptiness that brooked no exceptions.
6. How Can Metaphors Make Something for Nothing?
6.1 Rhetorical vs Rational Presentations of Emptiness
The question of whether N
rjuna’s Madhyamaka propounds a kind of
absolute emptiness, i.e., a so-called non-affirming emptiness that denies an
own nature (svabh va) without positing anything real, or whether it does in
fact propose some ultimate reality, is a debate that has been taking place for as
long as commentators on N
rjuna have existed. A huge number of books
have taken on this question, and we do not intend to revisit the matter in its
entirety. It needs to be pointed out, though, that the majority of the discussion
has taken place in the mode of philosophical discourse on this question. That
is, through reasoned argument, Madhyamaka logical forms, and so forth, both
classically and also in modern terms. We are told, over and over again, that
the Madhyamaka of N
rjuna and his commentators uses a kind of sharp,
unflinching reason in stripping away of all such essential positions. Little is
said, though, of the role of rhetorical forms such as metaphor in making their
point, such as what we have seen here in the *Upade a. We can see in this that
the classical bias still remains, namely, that metaphor is mere embellishment
and is thus inferior to reason.
While the authorship of the *Upade a is still a matter of debate,
irrespective of the person holding the pen, we do find a particular element to
the Madhyamaka found in the *Upade a that is seldom if ever seen in other
rjunian works. That is the notion of “the true characteristic of dharmas”
(
zh shíxiàng), the Sanskrit of which has been variously
reconstructed as “*dharm
m bh tat ,” “*dharm
m bh ta-lak
a,”
“*dharm
m dharmat ,” “dharm
m tattva,” and so forth, and which we
have seen on several occasions in our ten metaphors for emptiness. With or
without a Sanskrit reconstruction, this term of rather enigmatic origins again
highlights the question of whether or not some reality or true nature exists.
Indeed, elsewhere the *Upade a itself states: 92
92
*Upade a, fasc. 46, T 1509, 25: 396b7–9.
Something for Nothing
215
There are two types of “own nature” (svabh va). One, as per mundane
dharmas, the solidity of earth, etc. Two, that known by the holy ones,
suchness (tathat ), the Dharma element (dharma-dh tu), the reality
limit (bh ta-ko i).
Yìnshùn has covered this matter in detail, showing how a diachronic study
across the history of translation recensions of the Pañcavi ati-s hasrik
prajñ
ramit shows shifts from an affirmation of a real own nature, to a
negation thereof, to finally a synthesis in the form of dharmas “take no nature
as own nature” (
wúxíng weí zìxìng; *abh va-svabh va,
*abh vena svabh va) in the later Tang dynasty translations of Xüánzàng. 93
These statements in the
tra are not reasoned argumentation, but simply
direct assertions, as per our original statement employing the ten metaphors,
i.e. the bodhisattvas “comprehend dharmas as like an illusion, like a mirage,
like the moon [reflected] in water, like empty space, like an echo, like a city
of the gandharvas, like a dream, like a shadow, like an image in a mirror, and
like a magical creation.”
Against the older Western notion of metaphor as sheer adornment without
the rational power of argumentation, Ricœur states, “Metaphor will therefore
have a unique structure but two functions: a rhetorical function and a poetic
function.” 94 While on one hand the casual reader may sense that the ten
metaphors are solely fulfilling the poetic function of providing color and gloss
to what is ostensibly a Madhyamaka rational argument against substantiality, a
more critical reading such as what we present here will also note how the
metaphorical structures provide their own persuasive power.
6.2 Birth & Death of Metaphors for Metaphors
While the *Upade a offers “easy” metaphors for “difficult” emptiness, the
text itself presents a question to challenge this, as mentioned previously: “If
the dharmas of the ten metaphors are all empty without exception, why merely
use ten things as metaphors, and not use mountains, rivers, rocks, cliffs, etc.,
as metaphors?” This insightful question from the text itself deserves some
attention, and answers can also be found from a clear understanding of the
linguistic lives of metaphors.
93
94
Yìnshùn,
ng Zh Tànjiù, 180–88.
Ricœur, Rule of Metaphor, 12.
216
Journal of Chinese Buddhist Studies Volume 31 (2018)
At first glance, and if we read just the *Upade a, it appears as though the
ten metaphors are the vehicles for the concrete topic. However, if we look
more closely, we discover that the term “emptiness” is itself originally a
metaphor, and there is much evidence to show this original linguistic usage of
“emptiness” (
ngxìng, P: suññat , S: nyat ) or “empty” (
ng, P:
suñña, S:
nya). 95 “Empty” was used adjectivally with reference to the
physical abode of the meditator, i.e., a hermitage (P: arañña) or empty hut (P:
suññ
ra) or empty house (P: suññageha). 96 These are literal senses, “empty”
referring to a physical space devoid of some thing or another, most typically
illustrated in the
asuññat sutta. 97 The first metaphorical sense is then
that the meditator’s appeased state of mind is also empty. Together, we then
see the metaphorical notion of the “emptiness abiding” (
ngzhù, P:
suññat -vih ra, S:
nyat -vih ra) which uses the vehicle of the empty
peaceful abode for the topic of the internal meditative calmness. 98 Other
similar metaphorical terms include “devoid” (ritta(ka)), “deserted”
(tuccha(ka)) and “coreless” (as ra(ka)), 99 though none of these later proved
to have the staying power of the “empty” metaphor. The metaphorical use was
simple, and seldom structured, though there were examples, such as with
reference to the fact that the body lacks a self in the Mah hatthipadopama
sutta: 100
Friends, just as when a space is enclosed by timber and creepers, grass,
and clay, it comes to be termed “house,” so too, when a space is
enclosed by bones and sinews, flesh and skin, it comes to be termed
“material form.”
95
96
97
98
99
100
For details of this early material, see Huìf ng Shì, Old School Emptiness.
Ibid., 87–110.
Ibid., 118–27.
Ibid., 91–95.
Ibid., 95–97. Refer also Rhys-Davids and Stede, Pali-English Dictionary, 88,
304, 571.
Ñ namoli and Bodhi, The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A
Translation of the Majjhima Nik ya (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2001), 283.
li text in V. Trenckner and R. Chalmers, Majjhima Nikaya (London: Pali Text
Society, 1888), MN 28 i 190: “Seyyath pi, vuso, ka hañca pa icca valliñca
pa icca ti añca pa icca mattikañca pa icca
so pariv rito ag ra tveva
sa kha gacchati; evameva kho, vuso, a hiñca pa icca nh ruñ ca pa icca
ma sañca pa icca cammañca pa icca
so pariv rito r pa tveva sa kha
gacchati.”
Something for Nothing
217
The term “space” (
sa) is also rendered as “empty” (
ng) in the
Chinese parallel, and the physical sense is very clear. This reminds us of the
work of Lakoff and Johnson when they refer to “orientational metaphors,”
which include the spatial. They argue that, “Most of our fundamental concepts
are organized in terms of one or more spatialization metaphors,” which are
“rooted in physical and cultural experience.” 101 These “so-called purely
intellectual concepts … are often—perhaps always—based on metaphors that
have a physical and/or cultural basis.” 102 Our example of emptiness here also
accords with their notion of “ontological metaphors”: “Just as the basic
experiences of human spatial orientations give rise to orientational metaphors,
so our experiences with physical objects (especially our own bodies) provide
the basis for an extraordinarily wide variety of ontological metaphors—that is,
ways of viewing events, activities, emotions, ideas, etc., as entities and
substances.” 103 To which we would only add that the ultimate form of such
reification is the very “self” ( tman) or “own nature” (svabh va) which
emptiness in the Buddhist sense negates.
If “emptiness” itself is originally also a metaphor, why does it still require
further metaphors for its comprehension? Because it’s a dead metaphor.
Originally the Buddha taught in a religious philosophical context of selves
( tman), life monads ( va) and essential forces (prak ti), persons (purusa,
pudgala) or substances (tattva), etc. In order to present his realization of
dependent origination and the absence of self which it entails, he was
challenged (at least) in terms of vocabulary. No such specific term for the
“absence of self” was in existence at the time, and we may surmise that the
sheer novelty and radical nature of the Buddha’s denial and rejection of such a
core Indian religious notion of self—by this, or any other synonymous term—
was initially an act of catachresis, or “abuse of language.” With the initial
coining of “emptiness” as vehicle for the topic of not self, as Ricœur states,
“The borrowed term, taken in its figurative sense, is substituted for an absent
word… When the substitution corresponds to a real gap in vocabulary, when it
is forced, one speaks of catachresis.” 104 This is how it may have been
perceived by the Vedic Brahmins—an abuse of language; but to the Buddhists,
it became the birth (or perhaps the adoption) of an appropriate metaphor.
101
102
103
104
Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 17.
Ibid., 18–19.
Ibid., 25.
Ricœur, Rule of Metaphor, 51f.
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Journal of Chinese Buddhist Studies Volume 31 (2018)
The “death” of metaphors is well known to those who study them. Ricœur,
paraphrasing Fontanier, states how over time the metaphor “… ‘appears in a
more and more fixed and standardized fashion,’ and, in this sense, can be said
‘to be part of the foundation of language’—that is, it begins to act like a literal
meaning.” 105 This is because the original semantic field of the vehicle
metaphor can extend over time to fully include the topic field, and thus
becomes no longer metaphorical. Semantically, we must therefore keep in
mind that not only do the doctrinal positions of Buddhist and other systems
change, but so too do the metaphors’ lexical elements, words, and other
signifiers that are used to signify them.
We could surmise that when the majority of Buddhists talk about
“emptiness” they are quite unaware of it as a metaphor. In the specific context
of their philosophical discourses, the term “emptiness” functions quite directly
and explicitly—literally, if you will—as meaning absence of self, own nature,
or substantiality. Thus divorced from the cognitive aid that a good rhetorical
metaphor provides in comprehending a concept, the notion of philosophical
“emptiness” becomes “difficult to comprehend.” This is why in the *Upade a,
new metaphors are required—metaphors that are still obviously seen to be
metaphors—in order to understand. No doubt, this process of coining ever
new living metaphors as the older metaphors die away could effectively
continue ad infinitum, as I have elsewhere demonstrated with the metaphor of
“illusion” (
;
huàn). So, too, the notion of “illusion” as a metaphor
moved through the process of birth (or perhaps adoption), youth, maturity, and
to death, i.e., reached a state of literal meaning, over many centuries in
Buddhist thought. 106
6.3 Something for Nothing: Metaphors for Emptiness
An even deeper issue that we face is that while most metaphors are for actual
substantial things, e.g., “But soft, what light through yonder window breaks?
It is the east, and Juliet is the sun,” both the original difficult metaphor of
emptiness and also the ten easy metaphors here refer to an absence of things.
They are apophatic rather than kataphatic statements. After all, do not
words—nouns in particular, but also implicit in verbs through their agents—
refer to things? In Buddhist terms, nama and artha. How does one substitute
some-thing for no-thing, that is, use real metaphorical vehicles to stand for an
105
106
Ibid., 71f.
Huìf ng Shì, “Is ‘Illusion’ a Prajñ
ramit Creation?.”
Something for Nothing
219
unreal empty absence? How does a kataphatic statement do the work of an
apophatic one?
Perhaps another metaphor is required to explain this peculiar phenomenon.
In the contemporary artistic tradition of the “blank canvas”—the question of
the value or meaning of such works aside—we note that something is still
required to distinguish the blank canvas from the very walls of the gallery in
which it hangs. The frame is not the painting, even of a blank canvas, but a
clearly delineated border that somehow magically creates the tabula rasa upon
which the artistic work of the “blank canvas” is performed. Our metaphors for
emptiness take on a similar character. Starting from the non-metaphoric sense
of empty as a spatial quality, the space is defined by its boundaries, such as
the space enclosed by the timbers and clay that is the empty house, as above.
The spatially empty is defined in terms of and in dependence upon the
spatially non-empty. This then transfers to the metaphoric vehicle, for
example, in the cases of the metaphoric vehicles of the mirage or moon
reflected in the water, the real heat of the sun, dust and so forth, the actual
moon in the sky, and the water below, all provide the framework to indicate
that which appears to the senses yet is not in fact real. Likewise, returning to
the metaphorical topic, the so-called person or phenomena appear as such due
to ignorance and linguistic convention, but are ultimately non-existent.
Psychologically speaking, the wheels of our minds fall into ruts in
thinking, grooved patterns which once established are difficult to avoid.
Conditioned into the perceptions of “persons” and “things,” how are we to
avoid falling into this mode of conceptualization, which from the Buddhist
point of view is our fundamental ignorance? The mind cannot but rely on
some model or paradigm of thought while conceptually active. A metaphor for
unreality, whether it be of illusion, a reflection, a dream, or the like, is such
that while we already have patterns for these phenomena established in our
thinking apparatus, we have known all along that they are false. By a
metaphor, we now have another track, but which leads out of the wrong path,
rather than further into it. Speaking on the role of metaphors in the creation of
new paradigms, Kittay points out that: 107
When the new sciences of electricity, magnetism, genetics, and
molecular biology emerged, they were exploring previously
unarticulated content domains. Such an understanding of the content
domain is especially important for the project of understanding the
107
Kittay, Metaphor, 226–27.
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cognitive role of metaphor. It is precisely to provide such an
articulation that we often require metaphor—in the case of metaphor,
the structure of another, articulated or formed content domain is used
to provide the articulation of the as yet unarticulated or unformed
content domain.
As we move from first a misconception about selves and things literally, to
struggling with “difficult” emptiness as we are caught in our patterns, we then
substitute an already well established metaphorical model but one which we
know to be deceptive, and our minds are freed from the aporia of
contemplating a literal not self. We are then informed that the topic of
emptiness works in the same manner as the metaphorical vehicle, and satisfied
that we understand the vehicle, we believe that we understand the topic, too.
Perhaps we do, but there is also the possibility that the vehicle has led us to
tracks of conceptualization that do not parallel our original topic at hand. Or,
multiple metaphors may function in structurally incompatible ways. But our
mental rut is escaped, which may be more important, at least from a
soteriological point of view.
By substituting the vehicle for the topic, and then replacing our
comprehension of the topic with a comprehension of the vehicle, we have
effectively brought about a new paradigm in our thinking. In discussing the
notion of scientific models as metaphoric models, and how Kuhnian changes
of scientific paradigm may be also considered through the underlying
metaphors behind such models, Kittay insightfully asks: “The interests of
linguistic philosophers and philosophers of science converge again on the
question of change of meaning. When one theory replaces another in a
paradigm-shift, do the terms of the second theory which are carried over from
the first theory change in meaning?” 108 By the time of the *Upade a,
Buddhists considered that things were then literally “empty,” metaphorically
“illusory.” As the centuries passed, they too became literally “illusory.” Our
study here shows the reasons behind the necessity of metaphor, and also
reveals the lives of metaphors as they model our thoughts and comprehension
of core Buddhist doctrines, such as those found in the Prajñ
ramit S tra
and its commentary the *Upade a.
108
Ibid., 8; 226.
Something for Nothing
221
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