Styles of thinking
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Styles of Thinking
Prof. Dr. Zwart, Erasmus School of Philosophy, Erasmus University
Rotterdam
2020
Series: Philosophy and Psychology in Dialogue. Berlin/Münster/Zürich:
LIT Verlag. ISBN 978-3-643-96300-0. Series Philosophy and
Psychology in Dialogue. Volume/Band 2.
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Styles of Thinking
Styles of thinking
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Contents
Chapter 1. Styles of Thinking .............................................................. 7
§ 1. Dawns of day ............................................................................... 7
§ 2. Different times, different thoughts ................................................ 8
§ 3. Epistemological epidemiology .................................................... 11
§ 4. Oswald Spengler and the concept of style ................................... 13
§ 5. Kant’s introduction .................................................................... 27
§ 6. Hegelian dialectics..................................................................... 29
§ 7. Other elaborations: Nietzsche, Husserl, Foucault and the
sociological turn ............................................................................... 35
§ 8. Methodology: discerning styles of thinking................................. 40
§ 9. A methodological exercise: Dionysian thinking .......................... 46
Chapter 2. Cosmonauts: Apollonian thinking................................... 55
§ 1. An intensive idyll ........................................................................ 55
§ 2. The School of Athens .................................................................. 57
§ 3. Nostalgia for Plato’s Academy ................................................... 59
§ 4. From φύσις to κόσµος................................................................. 67
§ 5. Nature as κόσµος ....................................................................... 68
§ 6. Apollonian ethics ....................................................................... 71
§ 7. Ridiculing spheres ...................................................................... 72
§ 8. Apollonian thinking as civilization ............................................. 76
§ 9. The morality of the master versus de rural grotesque ................. 80
§ 10. The logic of the grotesque ........................................................ 85
Chapter 3. Waiting for the dawn: Magian thinking ......................... 95
§ 1. What is “world”?....................................................................... 95
§ 2. The coming of the Kingdom........................................................ 97
§ 3. Primordial scenes ...................................................................... 99
§ 4. Jesus versus architecture.......................................................... 100
§ 5. Transubstantiation ................................................................... 103
§ 6. Jesus’ laughter ......................................................................... 106
§ 7. Christianity as civilization........................................................ 108
§ 8. Islam as civilization ................................................................. 110
§ 9. Magian morality ...................................................................... 112
§ 10. Magian love ........................................................................... 113
§ 11. Magian chemistry ................................................................... 115
§ 12. Waiting .................................................................................. 117
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Styles of Thinking
Chapter 4. Scientia experimentalis: Faustian thinking................... 119
§ 1. Onset ....................................................................................... 119
§ 2. Commencement: Paradise lost ................................................. 121
§ 3. Copernicus: how large is the universe? .................................... 122
§ 4. In the beginning was the deed .................................................. 126
§ 5. Newton’s shed .......................................................................... 130
§ 6. A world of supra-human scale: the temporal dimension ........... 137
§ 7. Faustian civilisation: the world according to Jules Verne ........ 139
§ 8. Experiments on a grander scale ............................................... 142
§ 9. Staffing and anxiety.................................................................. 146
Chapter 5. Apollonian, Magian and Faustian thinking: a comparative
diagnostic .......................................................................................... 151
§ 1. Domains of thinking (1): research ............................................ 151
§ 2. Domains of thinking (2): faith, hope and love ........................... 162
§ 3. Categories of thinking .............................................................. 173
§ 4. Sites of truth ............................................................................. 178
Chapter 6. Metropolitan dawn ........................................................ 181
§ 1. Visible and less visible events ................................................... 181
§ 2. The issue of scale ..................................................................... 183
§ 3. Complexity: the year 1989........................................................ 184
§ 4. Globalisation ........................................................................... 188
§ 5. Sexuality and religion .............................................................. 189
§ 6. The year 2000 .......................................................................... 191
§ 7. The metropolis and its inhabitants............................................ 195
Bibliography ..................................................................................... 201
Styles of thinking
7
Chapter 1. Styles of Thinking
§ 1. Dawns of day
Night is dead – we killed her
To find traces of the night, we must travel far. Flying over Northern Canada, from
one metropolis to the next, amidst endless darkness beneath, some sparkling
lights may be discerned, twinkling anthropogenic stars radiating towards us from
the freezing depths – craving for help almost, for communication. It is
undoubtedly very dreary and cold down there. The sight invokes memories of a
past we never experienced, when small bands of humans spent their lives in
clearings of light and rudimentary comfort. Now, we are approaching the moment
when one gigantic global network of light bulbs will cover the earth. We do not
have to experience cold any more. In darkness, we no longer have to wait
desperately for the dawn of day. The day has expanded further and further, at the
expense of the night, and the latter has retreated into inhospitable areas, and even
there she is no longer safe. Our artificial days have marginalized the night, thus
depriving us of a basic experience. Notably city dwellers live continuously in
“enlightened” environments. The night has been eliminated by neon flooding. It
seems impossible to imagine that, until quite recently, historically speaking, night
was still night (Lacan 1991/2001, p. 41). Night became memory, a reserve. We
only see the immensity of the starry sky when we, temporarily and deliberately,
by way of intermezzo, leave the metropolitan ambiance behind. As metropolitan
novelist Michael Crichton phrased it: “Modern city-dwellers cannot even see the
stars at night. This humbling reminder of man’s place in the greater scheme of
things, which human beings formerly saw once every twenty-four hours, is
denied them” (Crichton, 1988/2002, p. xii).
The starry expanses, which inevitably invoke in us a sense of awe and
admiration, have been erased. The morning likewise has died. We now decide for
ourselves when the break of dawn commences. Now that daybreak has been
transformed into an event of relative significance, as a consequence of clocktime, it became all the more difficult to realise that, besides the normal dawns we
know from daily experience, there are also moments of dawn of much greater
significance. Terms like day, night and daybreak do not refer exclusively to the
rotation of the earth around her axis, but also to human culture as a whole.
Moments in history can be pointed out, when a new epoch, a new way of thinking,
suddenly commences.
In Kleine Weltgeschichte der Philosophie, one of the first philosophical
books I myself once read (and which therefore, for me at least, became a book of
dawn, a moment of awakening), Hans Joachim Störig (1961) brought a cultural
daybreak of this type, a philosophical dawn as it were, into the spotlight. About
550 B.C., according to Störig, the world suddenly began to think. At different
locations, in China and India for instance, but also along the shores of Asia Minor
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Styles of Thinking
and Southern Italy, on the edges of the Greek sphere of influence (Magna
Graecia), the world became conscious of itself. In the West, a whole new mindset
emerged that summoned humans to put an end to mythical thinking (i.e. the
tendency to attribute changes and events to supernatural powers). Philosophers
(itinerant sages) hit the dusty roads to articulate fundamental insights in the form
of maxims, such as: “for every change, there is a natural cause” or: “truth is
correspondence between thinking and being”. What was remarkable, however,
was that this awakening was a worldwide phenomenon. Störig emphasises the
global scope of the transition. The rise of Greek thinking was not a stand-alone
event. Buddha, Confucius and Lao-Tse were contemporaries of Parmenides and
Heraclitus, as were Jeremiah and Zarathustra. It was as if thinking as such
suddenly came into existence (Jaspers 1949).
This event, that at several places on earth, more or less simultaneously,
but independently and at great distances, consciousness suddenly seemed to make
a leap, is so miraculous, Störig argues, that we find it difficult to consider this as
mere coincidence (1961, p. 140). Especially because thinking, once spurred into
action, never completely expired again and even managed to reach impressive
heights in a short period of time. In Greece, mathematics was suddenly practiced
on a remarkably advanced level and it was only a thousand years later that Greek
thinking came to a halt. After a whole millennium, its spiritual energy finally
seemed spent. As if a spiritual climate change had occurred that was to last for
about a thousand years and then extinguished. Jacques Lacan, speaking of Greek
thinking, likewise refers to this worldwide intellectual awakening as an
exceptional event without precedent, but above all as a global event, a global
“choir” that arose more or less simultaneously in various cultural regions (Lacan
1991/2001, p. 100). In the history of thinking, of human culture, of consciousness,
there appears to be a limited number of psychic daybreaks, moments of
commencement when a new style of thinking suddenly begins to hold sway over
human consciousness.
§ 2. Different times, different thoughts
The way we experience, investigate and interact with reality has been subject to
drastic changes in the course of history. The world of Plato was different than
that of Jesus, that of Jesus different than that of Newton, that of Newton different
than ours – this seems to speak for itself. Less obvious is how we are to conceive
the dynamics of such changes. Are these changes occurring gradually, or can we
pinpoint radical turns, punctuating periods of relative stability? Is it true that an
increase of pace in the history of thought can be discerned, or is this an optical
illusion? That is, if we have the impression that, in the distant past, things
developed at a much slower pace than in the seemingly turbulent present, this
might be due to the distance in time, so that we observe events with historical
Styles of thinking
9
myopia – with the implication that the apparent stability or tenacity of processes
in the past only exists in the eyes of biased beholders.
Styles of thinking can be discerned in the history of thought. The term
“style of thinking” refers to the way we observe, manage, modify and interpret
reality. “We” refers to human beings in general, although special attention will
be given to certain spokespersons of this “we”, to authors and witnesses who
articulated a particular style of thinking in a recognisable and convincing way,
giving it a voice and a face: scientists, artists, politicians and other actors who left
tangible and documented traces. The concept of style draws attention not to
individual elaborations, however, but rather to the general momentum, the typical
profile pervading individual words, gestures and actions. Each style of thinking
builds on a grounding concept, a basic conviction, which expresses itself in
particular ways of observing, deliberating, building and acting. During a certain
period of time, a particular style manifests itself in a wide variety of cultural
domains: science, philosophy, art, architecture, religion, politics, medicine,
economics, sexuality, ethics, and so on. A style arises in a particular location,
from where (after a period of incubation) it diffuses relatively quickly across a
cultural zone, achieving dominance and persistence, although eventually every
style is bound to expire. At a certain point, a style of thinking will be eliminated
and replaced, although it may briefly resurge in later times. The beginning is a
kind of mental leap, a moment of discontinuity – we recognize truly important
transitions by their dramatic speed (Spengler, 1918/1923, p. 37). It is more than
just a philosophical event, although philosophical insights may provide a concise
articulation of the transitions at hand. This is how we could define the task and
ambition of philosophy: to articulate or question the style of thinking of its own
era in a convincing manner and to work-through its grounding idea, its basic
conception, its key philosopheme.
This study is a thoroughly revised version of a previous effort to develop
a styles-of-thinking perspective on human history, written in Dutch (Zwart
2005a). Again, I will focus on three styles of thinking in particular, namely the
Apollonian, the Magian and the Faustian style, building on Oswald Spengler
book Der Untergang des Abendlandes (1918/1923), who borrowed his ideas
partially from others. My use of his methods and concepts will be non-dogmatic,
however, for the goal is not to duplicate or gloss his work, but to elaborate it
further. The styles-of-thinking concept is a collaborative idea, developed by
multiple authors and thinkers, and although Spengler’s elaboration proves very
inspiring, I will not necessarily follow him in all details.
The basic idea of the Apollonian style entailed that a perfect geometric
structure could be discerned in reality, conceived as cosmos. The world as cosmos
(literally: order or ornament) consisted of concentric spheres at the macro-level
and was composed of perfectly regular three-dimensional shapes (“elements”) at
the atomic level. Σφαίρα is the Greek word for sphere or globe. Politics, ethics,
medicine and art were to act in accordance with nature, seeking to realize this
perfect, spherical, harmonious order in human existence. This basic idea largely
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Styles of Thinking
determined the way in which Greek (Apollonian) mathematics developed, for
instance, but we also recognise it in the way in which leading Greek scientists,
politicians and artists worked and acted. Thinking and acting were “affected” by
Apollonian logic. Its basic phrase or philosopheme can be summarised as “Act in
accordance with nature” (κατά φύσιν), which basically implied that one should
act and think spherically, so as to foster harmony and balance. Political actors
wanted to expand their “sphere of influence”, in a literal and spatial sense,
working towards a final state of stability. The Roman Empire can be seen as the
realisation of the spherical idea in the political domain, but the grounding
Apollonian idea also largely determined the basic experience of space and time.
The cosmos was a universe on a human scale, neither infinite nor immense. The
Apollonian style held sway during a certain period in history, but was never
undisputed. Every dominant style has to compete with antagonistic rivals:
initially the Dionysian style, later the newly emerging Magian style of thinking.
The Magian style can likewise be summarised in a compact formula or
philosopheme, namely: “Prepare thyself for the advent of the great transition (e.g.
the coming of the Kingdom of Heaven)”. Individuals withdrew from the world to
live a life of detachment, in order to optimally prepare themselves, via virtuous
conduct, ascetic practices and spiritual exercises (preferably amidst equallyminded peers) for the dawning of a completely different way of being, a wholly
different world: a decisive event which, however, could not be actively brought
about by the individuals involved. They basically had to wait for it to happen, and
prepare themselves. The central theological category was the idea of grace. At
the political level, Magian thinking produced the so-called two kingdoms
doctrine, not unrelated to the concept of a double (a natural and a spiritual) truth.
Important scholarly Magian practices were numerology, astrology and alchemy.
In fact, Magian mathematics was numerology, Magian astronomy was astrology,
Magian science was alchemy.
The basic formula of the Faustian style can be summarised as “Will to
Power”. In the scientific domain, this energetic style of thinking manifested itself
in the concept of the experiment: a research style which was decidedly more
active, violent and aggressive than the contemplative, respectful consideration of
the perfect κόσµος characteristic of the Apollonian style, or the adoration of the
universe as a mystery, from where signs may speak out to us (considering the
movements of stars and constellations as a divine alphabet), characteristic for the
Magian style. Faustian scientists aim to control natural phenomena. Their will to
know equals will to power: the desire to modify, adapt and exploit. At the political
level, Faustian thinking fuelled the formation of nation states; and on the ethical
level we recognise it in in the interminable conflict between duty and desire.
Finally, we reach the present. Now, the question will be whether, around
the year 2000, we have entered a new era, a new, post-Faustian style of thinking?
And if so, how to characterise its basic profile? In other words, our reconstruction
of previous styles of thinking finally results in a diagnostic of the present.
Ultimately, the significance of a historical retrospect resides in the conviction that
Styles of thinking
11
a new style of thinking has begun to dominate our world of experience. We have
changed, although we may not fully realise it as yet. Compared with, for example,
the 1950s or the 1960s, the conditions for cultural development have dramatically
altered. The nation state gave way to globalisation, while laboratories became
entangled in global data networks. For many people, in the face of the current
crisis, future prospects are becoming increasingly uncertain. The final chapter is
an effort in philosophical anticipation, resulting in a prognostic foresight.
§ 3. Epistemological epidemiology
The style-of-thinking concept suggests that, in the course of history, abrupt and
fundamental changes can be discerned in the way in which reality is experienced,
investigated and depicted, moments in time when reality suddenly manifests itself
in a completely different way. Each style has its own profile, elaborated in various
domains and exemplified by various cultural expressions. A style is especially
recognisable in basic mental functions, e.g. in the ways in which reality is openedup, perceived, categorised, measured, in the way scientists, artists and politicians
allow reality to appear. A style of thinking begins as a local phenomenon, but
may spread remarkably fast. The pattern of diffusion can be described in
epidemiological terms, in the sense that individuals may act as “carriers” of the
cultural epidemic, but also in the sense that a style of thinking can be latent or
virulent. The (comparative) analysis of styles of thinking amounts to a scholarly
practice that can best be described as epistemological epidemiology.
The emergence of a new style cannot be considered a mere effect of
historical causes or influences. Rather it entails a radical rupture with the
foregoing, an intellectual mutation, a quantum leap, a move away from previous
forms of thought, a moment of openness and creativity, but also of despair,
because the whole world suddenly seems out of joint. A new concept takes the
floor to which contemporaries seem remarkably susceptible, an intuitive idea
which suddenly seems remarkably convincing. Once introduced, the style begins
to propagate through various routes. From a limited number of isolated hotspots,
it reaches new plateaus. Initially, a style is something quite marginal, seemingly
coming from elsewhere. Increasingly, however, the new intuition manages to take
root in the folds and margins of the established mindset. Sooner or later, the new
concept affects and is adopted by the socio-cultural elite. The spread extends in
two directions: from below (as a spontaneous revolt) and from above (as a
politico-cultural campaign). Although there will be fierce resistance, and
sometimes even immunity, a new unanimity, a new consensus seems to evolve
amongst a relatively large group of individuals. Something new and foreign
suddenly becomes self-evident and is actively taken up by scientists, artists,
philosophers and politicians.
Yet, the unanimity is never all-embracing. There will always be lingering
discontent in the new culture, a desire for other possibilities, things that once
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Styles of Thinking
were, or thing that are still to come, cultivated by antagonistic authors, who
perhaps are already preparing the way for a future style of thinking, as voices in
the desert, or as nostalgic spirits, curators of a ruined past – or combinations
(coalitions) of multiple forms of recalcitrance. What is important, however, is
that, even in contradiction and resistance, the profile of the dominant thinking
style is inevitably visible, so that they provide a photographic negative as it were.
Each style, in other words, has its antipode, its inverse, its moment of antithetic
negativity. Yet, critics unintentionally reinforce and unwittingly endorse the
evidences of the ruling style, which remains their unescapable horizon.
The chronic friction or struggle between the dominant style and its
recessive rivals may also become an introspective battle. Leading scientists,
artists or politicians rarely identify themselves wholeheartedly with one specific
style. Often it is possible to distinguish a different voice, a latent “alter ego”, in
addition to the dominant (manifest) epistemological “ego” of the person in
question. An epistemological unconscious may follow our intellectual activities
as a shadow. Newton (whose case history will be discussed more extensively
below) not only practiced modern (Faustian) physics and mathematics, but also
devoted years of work to “Magian” practices such as numerology and alchemy –
and he was not the only example. His case is typical rather than exceptional. In
other words, the styles-of-thinking concept is not only of historical, but also of
psychological (and biographical) significance. The internal conflict between
styles of thinking can lead to symptoms of paralysis and “epistemological
neurosis” (Zwart 2008, p. 20), but it may also, under certain circumstances, boost
scientific or other forms of intellectual creativity.
How to identify a certain style or mindset? How can we analyse and
characterise a style? Some provisional methodological guidelines can be
formulated that will be elaborated further in the course of this book. The first
methodological rule indicates that, in order to grasp the epistemic profile of a
particular style, we must take a step backwards and return to the beginning, the
moment of outbreak of the particular style, the decisive radical innovation, a text,
event or practice that can be designated as the birth place of a style. We must
retrace the original context of discovery because it is there that the new style can
be found in its purest form, in statu nascendi, free from exploitation and
contamination. A second methodological indication is that, to clarify the
epistemological profile of a particular style of thinking (and to uncover its
grounding idea), we must confront and compare it with other (former or later)
styles (i.e. comparative epistemology). Thirdly, we need to pay attention to
instances of resistance, to discontent in a particular style, because the spirit of the
dominant style is present there as well. Unwittingly and unintentionally, critics
likewise become infected by the basic evidences of the style they claim to attack.
And a final provisional rule is that we should not limit our research to one cultural
domain, but rather detect the profile of a particular style of thinking in diverse
cultural manifestations, such as research practices, works of art, political
Styles of thinking
13
institutions and literary genres. The manifestation of a style in one domain can
help to clarify its specificity in another domain, and vice versa.
§ 4. Oswald Spengler and the concept of style
As said, Oswald Spengler (1880-1936) is a prominent spokesman for the styleof-thinking concept, to which he devoted his impressive Decline of the West (Der
Untergang des Abendlandes, 1918/1923), a book which describes the
morphology of styles of thinking similar to how Alexander von Humboldt (18451862) characterised the physiognomy (the Gesamtbild) of landscape types. In the
history of the West, three epochs can be distinguished, Spengler argues, the
Greek, the Arab (or Byzantine) and the Germanic period, and each epoch has its
own characteristic style. While in biology “morphology” is defined as the study
of the form and structure of organisms, Spengler’s ambition is to study the forms
and structures (the basic profile or Gestalt) of cultures and civilisations as they
emerge, flourish and decline in the course of history. His comprehensive analysis
aims to discern consistent patterns in their rise, flowering and waning, resulting
in a dialectical genealogy of worldviews. Every culture begins as a robust but
small-scale phenomenon, which will inevitably reach a more extended plateau
and develop into a full-scale civilization, affecting hundreds of thousands of
people. In other words, every true culture tends to expand, to thrive, to urbanise,
and to develop into a world culture. This means that a culture will migrate from
its local context of discovery towards life on a grander scale, where great history
is written and made. Ultimately, however, every style is destined to fall victim to
exhaustion and decadence. The average lifespan of a style is one millennium.
The development of culture into civilization is an inevitable urge,
comparable to the urge to grow in nature, Spengler argues. Apollonian thinking
becomes civilization in the form of the Roman Empire. At the same time, Jesus
of Nazareth already wanders along the dusty roads of a Roman province with a
small number of companions to proclaim the advent of the Kingdom of Heaven,
representing a different style of thinking, referred to by Spengler as Magian, a
style that was experiencing its primal, budding, subliminal stage. However, when
Paul addresses his letters to Christian communities in big cities, Magian thinking
already began to civilise, i.e. to assume urban and global proportions. And when
the Christian Church establishes itself as the “general” (catholic) faith, as the
World Church of Rome, this seals a whole process. The spectacular pace in which
Islam later conquers the Arabic world, according to Spengler, demonstrates that
Apollonian thinking is no longer capable of putting up significant resistance
against this subsequent exemplification of the Magian style.
For centuries to come, Christianity will remain Magian in character. At a
decisive moment, however, in the wake of the year 1000, but notably in the 13th
and 14th century, a Faustian impetus begins to affect the Christian mindset, from
within as it were. The Faustian style begins to take shape in Gothic architecture,
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but also in scholasticism, and this culture will gradually civilise as well. This
process reaches its peak in the 19th century, in the form of the industrial revolution
and the rise of the modern, technological age – the era of the machine. The
civilization process materialises in the rise of world cities: Athens and Rome
(representing Apollonian civilization), Alexandria and Byzantium (representing
Magian civilization), and Paris, London, Berlin and New York (representing
Faustian civilization). Immense metropolises reduce the rest of the landscape
(including cities from previous epochs) to provincial areas. Inhabitants of
Faustian metropolises become the urban working masses. Characteristic of
civilisation, in addition to the rise of large urban centres, is the tendency towards
imperialism, radiating from these immense centres – “Imperialismus ist reine
Zivilisation”, as Spengler formulates it (1918/1923, I, p. 50). While culture was
introvert, civilisation is extravert. Civilisation is driven by an irresistible drive
towards expansion (“Drang zur Ausdehnung”). A civilisation tries to bring the
whole world into its sphere of influence. I will now present Spengler’s
compelling, but at times unsettling views in more detail.
Spengler’s panoramic vision sees history as a sequence of cultures, each
of them driven by a grounding idea, emerging, propagating and dissipating like
majestic waves, while in the course of time, each culture (commencing as a local
phenomenon) inevitably evolves into civilisation (a global phenomenon). A
culture’s grounding idea determines the possibilities of self-expression of those
affected by it (I, p. 21). All cultural expressions convey one and the same
principle or transformative idea, and world history is basically the actualisation
(ἐνέργεια) and unfolding of a series of grounding ideas. The style of a culture
reflects a way of being (“Daseinsart”, I, p. 405), erupting suddenly, announcing
an unexpected transmutation. This moment of eruptive commencement can be
discerned in the history of every culture, occurring without a visible cause or
influence (II, p. 37). Spengler mentions, for instance, the sudden rise of Egyptian
and Babylonian cultures, which he sees as completely unlike their predecessors
(II, p. 40), resulting in a new style of living, and this involves a new language, a
new technique of writing, and sudden population growth. Whereas archaic
cultures were lost in immense natural landscapes, for Chinese, Egyptian and
Babylonian cultures nature suddenly becomes a backdrop. The new style emerges
as a revelation, a destiny, emanating from the primal symbol of this culture (I, p.
506). For Apollonian thinking, Spengler argues, the basic symbol is the human
body (σῶµα). For Magian thinking, it is the world-cavern with its gleaming
ornaments. Finally, trunk-like pillars and pointed arches are the Faustian
leitmotiv, pointing in the direction of its basic symbol: infinite space. The
substitution of the Ptolemaic worldview by the Copernican heliocentric system,
for instance, resulted in a dramatic widening of the spatial horizon. The words
that are used to refer to the prime symbols of a culture (σῶµα, πνεῦµα, force,
mass, Wille, etc.) are pure signifiers (“Wortzeichen”), evoking a very particular
meaning, and basically untranslatable.
Styles of thinking
15
A series of stages must be traversed by all cultures, in an ordered
sequence (I, p. 3). First of all, there is the small-scale beginning, as we have seen,
with its purity of style (I, p. 267). Then, there is the moment of joyous booming
(“Aufschwung”), when the basic form is skilfully mastered. Gradually, we
witness a standardisation of form types. The civilisation stage consists in
conscious megapolitan planning. Contradictions inevitably arise, giving rise to
hostility and resistance. And finally, there is an episode of self-destruction. These
sequential stages basically follow a dramatic curve (Freytag 1863; Zwart 2017a,
p. 230): from exposition (the sudden emergence of a basic form or symbol), via
a rise of dramatic tension, we finally witness disruption, downfall and
denouement. A common idea permeates all cultural domains: politics,
mathematics, ornamentation, philosophy, architecture, drama, craftsmanship (I,
p. 7). Thus, there is an affinity between the Greek city-state and Euclidean
geometry, between differential calculus and absolutism, between contrapuntal
music and early capitalism.
There is no central privileged position: all domains are permeated by the
same style, the same program, the same λόγος, whether it is art, religion or
science, finance, book-keeping or the technology of heating. One single idea
transforms the world-view of anyone affected by it. Civilisation is the fulfilment
or finale of a culture, revealing its inevitable destiny. Civilisations entail a
transvaluation of all values (I, p. 451), affecting and eliminating all rival forms.
Every civilisation remoulds the forms of previous or marginalised cultures, with
the help of technology, politics and industry. Civilisation puts an end to rural
village life, resulting in metropolitan nomadism. In the end, however, the process
of civilisation entails cultural self-destruction through megapolitan decadence,
self-contempt and nihilism.
This transition from culture to civilisation also explains what is
happening today, Spengler argues. Take science, for instance, where small-scale
experimental culture gave way to science as a global enterprise. In the era of
Faustian civilisation, scientists become factory workers (I, p. 457), carrying out
collective scientific projects, while the urban masses become increasingly
sceptical and suspicious about science. On the positive side, however, Spengler
notices how, in late Faustian civilisation, after decades of hyper-specialisation,
research fields are now rapidly converging. This process of convergence
remained unnoticed for quite some time, Spengler argues, because most
philosophers are literati who no longer familiarise themselves with the actual
progress and problems of the natural sciences. In the 19th century, physics and
chemistry were alien to one another, but in the 20th century, they can no longer
be treated individually, as is evident in fields like spectral analysis, radioactivity
and thermal radiation (I, p. 553).1 The chemical elements evaporate into
1
“Die einzelne Wissenschaften … nähern sich mit wachsender Geschwindigkeit. Wir
gehen einer vollkommenen Identität und Verschmelzung entgegen… Man hat diese
Konvergenz nicht bemerkt, weil seit Kant und eigentlich schon seit Leibniz kein
Gelehrter mehr die Problematik aller exakten Wissenschaften beherrschte. Noch vor
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Styles of Thinking
mathematical variables and complex relationships, while physiology is becoming
indistinguishable from organic chemistry. Civilisation entails a shift from
metaphysics to technology, supported by millionaires and wealthy funders, but
mistrusted by the masses, and this is also visible in research, where states and
companies finance large-scale research enterprises, notwithstanding widespread
public discontent.
This difference (between culture and civilisation) is also the difference
between the Greek palaestra and the Roman circus, Spengler argues. While in the
palaestra citizens themselves were the competitors, in the Roman circus the urban
masses became a mass audience. Something similar applies to the art market,
where artworks nowadays are no longer considered as ends in themselves,
produced by tormented geniuses, but as products for the market. Faustian art has
already fulfilled its mission, Spengler argues. After Wagner the composer,
Baudelaire the poet and Van Gogh the painter, we no longer see artists with an
inescapable vocation. Music, poetry and art have ceased to be spiritual necessities
(I, p. 379). They become products of an art industry, where art is produced to
meet the demands of an insatiable global market.
It is no coincidence, Spengler argues, that Marx’s Critique of Political
Economy appeared in the same year as Darwin’s Origin of Species (in 1859).
Both documents articulate one and the same Faustian principle, the Will to Power.
Whilst Magian desire was to know the future, Faustian desire is to shape the
future. Faustian civilisation claims to be tolerant, but on closer inspection it is
rigorously intolerant, overtly hostile towards all traditional cultures, marking
them as provincial, outdated and doomed.
The first wave of culture described by Spengler unfolds during the socalled Achsenzeit, already mentioned above, five centuries B.C. Unfortunately,
Spengler does not have much to say about what came before: archaic culture,
although he does mention that archaic cultural forms (art, dance, music, poetry)
were meant to adjure natural forces or deities (“Beschwörung”). Of the songs and
dances of archaic cultures, hardly anything remains, however, and the little that
remains concerns mostly the ornamental side. He does have something to say,
however, about totem and taboo. Although these two words were derived from
completely different parts of the globe (the term totem was adopted from the
Ojibwa / Chippewa people of North America, while the term taboo came from
Tonga and the Fiji Islands), they become interconnected. While totem refers to
lineage, taboo refers to prohibitions. According to Spengler, these two
dimensions of archaic culture also recur in later epochs. They are connected with
being and thinking, with politics and secret cults, with agora and acropolis, with
villa and shrine, with castle and cathedral (II, p. 137). After Columbus and Cook,
colonialism unleashed unequal collisions between archaic cultures and Faustian
hundert Jahren waren Physik und Chemie einander fremd; heute sind sie einzeln nicht
mehr zu behandeln. Man denk an die Gebiet der Spektralanalyse, Radioaktivität und
Wärmestrahlung” (I, p. 553).
Styles of thinking
17
civilisation, between shamanism and Faustian industry (e.g. Native American
Indians in their resistance against the United States).
Spengler has more to say about Egyptian culture, which he sees as a
sublime precursor of Apollonian thinking, with its huge silent symbols. A
pyramid is a huge, geometrical enclosure of a secret path. And indeed, according
to Spengler, the basic Egyptian symbol is the symbol of the way. Egyptian
existence is that of travellers travelling in one direction: towards death, and the
sacred way leads through pillared rooms into the chamber of the dead, the
processional march of the priests. Egyptian buildings are not temples but paths,
enclosed by giant masonry.
Apollonian, Magian and Faustian culture are the key protagonists of
Spengler’s book. Apollonian culture as a concept was familiarised, although not
coined, by Friedrich Nietzsche, as counterpart of its Dionysian rival. Although
Spengler is clearly influenced by Nietzsche, his attitude towards the latter is fairly
ambivalent. He sees Nietzsche as a romantic, exceptionally weak in mathematics
(I, p. 472), who dwelled in a world of books and “did not dare to look reality in
the face” (I, p. 48). Nietzsche adopted the Apollonian-Dionysian duality from
Richard Wagner, a man of action, impact and boundless creativity, whom
Spengler greatly admired. Wagner’s music addresses the grand challenges of
Faustian civilisation, Spengler argues. The Ring des Nibelungen is about
capitalism, Siegfried is a young worker, Fafnir a capitalist, and Brunhilde an
emancipated woman (I, p. 480). It is no coincidence of course that Wagner’s
contemporary Friedrich Engels was likewise interested in, and likewise wrote
about, Siegfried and the Nibelungen-saga (Engels 1840/1962). Wagner explored
the Apollonian-Dionysian conflict as a historical mirror to probe the Faustian
present. Whereas Dionysian culture entailed intoxication (I, p. 246), Apollonian
culture fostered temperance and κάθαρσις. And while Augustus represented the
transition from Apollonian culture to Apollonian civilisation, Emperor Trajan
(during whose reign the Pantheon was built) represented the turning point from
Apollonian to Magian civilisation (I, p. 527). For Spengler, the Pantheon was not
only a perfect geometrical realisation of the Apollonian idea, but also the first
Magian cavern, the earliest of all Mosque (I, 274). The master-masons of the
Pantheon were in fact Syrians, Spengler emphasises, coming from the East.
Magian thinking arose in the time of Augustus, between Nile and Tigris,
Black sea and South Arabia, resulting in typically Magian cultural activities, such
as algebra, astrology and alchemy. Signature Magian items are mosaics and
arabesques, caliphates and mosques, sacraments and scriptures. Magian thinking
entails a number of key ideas, such as the millennial time-span which evolves
from the creation of the world up to the advent of the saviour, so that calendars
and horoscopes (determining the question when) are important Magian devices.
Magian space is numinous and spiritual, and a key symbol is the Magian copula,
creating a cavernous spatial experience inside. Actually, the Magian church is a
convergence of two forms, combining an Eastern copula with a Western basilica,
giving rise to a domed basilica (I, p. 282). The Magian dome is ornamented with
18
Styles of Thinking
sparkling mosaics and arabesques, drowning the cavern in a seductive fairy-tale
gloom. Another key Magian symbol is the enclosed magical garden. There is only
one Magian God, so that Magian religiosity entails a duality, a profound tension
between light and darkness. Moorish culture in Spain represented the apex of
Magian civilisation, Spengler argues.
The Magian-Arabian wave emerged during the first millennium and
adopted the Greek language as its lingua franca. From Armenia to Arabia, from
Persia to Alexandria, as Spengler phrases it, a uniformity of artistic expression
could be discerned across religious borders, reflecting a homogenous depth
experience: the cavernlike sense of space (“Höhlengefühl”). Although Magian
architecture employed Apollonian means (e.g. columns), it did so to express
something completely antagonistic. The interior is now far more important that
the exterior and the copula encompasses everything. Columns have moved
towards the inside, so that the Magian church is an inversion (“Umkehrung”, p.
233) of the Apollonian temple. Apparently, around the time of Christ’s birth, a
new sense of space emerged, which also expressed itself in the domed chambers
of Caracalla’s baths. In the Magian world-cavern (“Welthöhle”), golden
backdrops created an unearthly gleam. Magian thinking proliferates quite
suddenly from East to West, seeing history as a drama of redemption. It is the
world of alchemy and of thousand and one nights. In the copula domes of
Byzantium and Ravenna, the Magian experience achieved its purest expression,
while Islamic vehemence carried the development to its end, turning Hagia
Sophia into a Mosque. Similar to the cults of Isis, Mithras and gnosis, the
philosophy of Plotinus and other Neo-Platonists were Magian. Plato himself was
already sensitive to ideas coming from the Magian East, as is noticeable in the
Magian atmosphere of the simile of the cave, inhabited by Magian slaves,
fascinated and spellbound by what they see and hear inside.
The Romanesque culture of the early medieval period was a mixture of
Magian and Faustian elements, Spengler argues. A battle was raging between
established Magian motifs and unconsciously active new ones. The Carolingian
Aachen Chapel, for instance, is no longer a Mosque, but not yet a cathedral either
(II, p. 102). The great city of Byzantium exemplified the transition from
Apollonian to Magian (II, p. 104), while the Crusades were Faustian offensives
against their Magian predecessor. In medieval France, the battle between Magian
and Faustian principles culminated in the Grail saga, and in the war against
Catharism. Around 1000, Italy was still under the sway of the Byzantine taste in
the East and the Moorish taste in the South. Yet, the golden backdrop would
inevitably give way to perspective: the artistic technique which expressed the
budding Faustian experience of infinite space. As a result, the temporal horizon
dramatically broadened (II, p. 32). Joachim of Floris (c. 1145-1201) replaces
Magian dualism with the concept of the three world eras. The polarised world of
John and Paul (with the Apocalypse as the great negation) gives way to the idea
of a third epoch: the negation of the negation. Joachim is the first thinker of a
Hegelian stamp who shattered the dualistic worldview of Augustine and
Styles of thinking
19
introduced a new style of thinking, seeing medieval Christianity as a third term
(the age of the Holy Ghost), superseding the Age of the Father and of the Son
(represented by the Old and the New Testament).
There is no history of science as such or of mathematics as such, Spengler
argues, and we can only meaningfully speak about the histories of Apollonian,
Magian and Faustian mathematics (I, p. 60). Doric temples, Magian domes and
Gothic cathedrals are mathematics in stone: they are basic forms, shaping a
world-order. The Faustian cathedral is a forest (“das Wälderhafte der Dome”, I,
512), a view which he shares with Hegel and Wagner. Organ music gives voice
to yearning for the forest, and visiting a cathedral is both a religious and a
mathematical experience. While a temple embodies Apollonian geometry, and a
copula Magian mathematics, Nicolas Cusanus (engaged in Catholic diplomacy
and one of the most influential personalities of his time) introduced two key
principles of Faustian mathematics: the infinitely large and the infinitesimally
small. Faustian mathematics studies things not as they are, but as they become
and behave, with utmost precision, down to the thousandths of a second.
The key principle of Faustian literature is the confession. All great
Faustian artworks (the work of Dante, Goethe’s Faust, Hamlet, Tristan, Parsifal,
etc.) are elaborate confessions. Goethe’s works are fragments of one single
confession (I, p. 14, p. 173). And while every Rembrandt portrait is a biography,
a Rembrandt self-portrait is a confession (I, p. 339). Thus, we notice a sequence:
from nude statue (Apollonian), via enigmatic icon (Magian) to Faustian portrait.
This is also reflected in Faustian grammar, Spengler argues, where the
Apollonian sum gives way to the I am. The Faustian spirit remoulds
(“umprägen”) its own grammatical material. The coming of the “I” (e.g. I have
done in lieu of feci) inevitably results in a dynamic instead of a static (Apollonian)
syntax, preparing the ground for the genre of the confession (I, p. 338). The
grammatical “I” is a portrait in itself, Spengler claims.
There is an obvious connection between Faustian music and infinite
space, Spengler argues, as is exemplified by the organ fugues of Bach, the
nocturnal sonatas of Beethoven and the infinitesimal tone-world of Tristan.
Indeed, for Spengler, Faustian art culminates in Wagner, whose art works entail
a musical bombardment, while he sees ancient Pergamon, with its towering altar
and gigantomachia frieze, as the Apollonian counterpart of Faustian Bayreuth (I,
p. 376). Wagner’s Ring is in the realm of music what the American skyscraper is
in the realm of architecture. Wagner had to go to the limits, exploiting and
spending his full energy and talent on his music. His motifs emerge from the
deepest depths, are briefly touched by a flash of sunlight, and suddenly coming
quite close, to vanish again in a distance of strings: a mixture of brutality and
refinement. But we notice a similar space experience in the metropolitan poetry
of Baudelaire, with its endless streets and avenues, and its synaesthesia of sounds
and colours. While the key symbol of Apollonian art was the nude statue, Faustian
art is exemplified by soaring cathedrals, in combination with the theology of
dogmatism and the diplomacy of Absolutism. Faustian music is steeped in the
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Styles of Thinking
deep midnight broodings of Faust’s study, and one and the same atmosphere is
discernible in Rembrandt’s etches, Beethoven’s tone colours and Wagner’s total
works of art. Parsifal is a cathedral of sounds and voices. Everything Faustian is
pervaded with the adamant will to overcome all resistance. Its counterpoint is the
pastoral sentimentalism of shepherdess operas, Fragonard’s lush garden paintings
and porcelain.
Spengler devotes much attention to the “problem” of the Renaissance.
On the one hand, the Renaissance seems a revolt against Faustian forest-music, a
return of Apollonian temperance, endorsed by a select handful of elitist scholars
and humanists. The Renaissance is anti-Gothic, but not genuinely Apollonian,
however. The apparent Apollonian revival is an illusion, as is indicated by the
fact that the Renaissance sense of space is dominated by the perspective. As a
counter-movement, the Renaissance is vehemently anti-Gothic, but on closer
inspection it is a contradiction in itself, for in the end the Faustian will prevails,
and the Renaissance gives way to Mannerism and the Baroque, with its swelling,
voluminous, powerful, muscular, restless, wrestling male and female bodies:
counter-Renaissance pur sang.
Spengler sees the Baroque as a continuation of the Gothic / Faustian
principle, having become all the more powerful and explosive in its struggle
against Renaissance contempt. It is an outbreak of discordance (“Zwiespalt”),
comparable only to the Dionysian revival against the Apollonian worldexperience in ancient Greece. The Rabelaisian body celebrates the return of a
Dionysian and medieval festive body. In Greece, this had resulted in the bodysquandering orgasms of Dionysus cults. Renaissance art proved a temporary
mask, in accordance with the taste of the elite, a deceptive negation. Now, the
swelling, obtrusive body was brought in again, consciously and deliberatively,
against the flow, but conveying the primal strength (“Urgewalt”) of its Faustian
depths. According to Spengler, the Renaissance is an illusory Apollonian
intermezzo, emphatically anti-Gothic, but in a superficial manner and oblivious
of its own true nature. The Faustian Real resurges in the Baroque, with its
disproportionally large bodies. The Renaissance was a protest (“Auflehnung”, I,
p. 350) against the Faustian West, but unconsciously the Faustian undercurrent
was still very much alive (“der starke Tiefenstrom faustischen Kunstwollens, im
Unbewussten der großen Maler”, I, p. 350). In reality, the Gothic tradition was
never really interrupted. Swelling bodies conveyed a similar message as Jesuit
propaganda, namely the ethos of the Faustian Will to power, through struggle,
impact and proliferation, as expressed by the Faustian state, by Faustian industry
and technology (I, p. 407).
While Apollonian physics is statics, Magian physics is alchemy, with its
mysterious substances, such as philosopher’s mercury, enabling a transmutation,
– the completion of the great work. Secret procedures are performed in nightly
cavernous rooms. Faustian physics involves both dynamics and distance. While
Apollonian objects are conceived as form and matter, Magian objects are
substances endowed with (visible or secret) attributes, but Faustian bodies are
Styles of thinking
21
grasped in terms of force and mass. Faustian physics thinks in terms of “force
field” and “Angriffspunkt” (“point of engagement”, I, p. 494). While Apollonian
science is quiet contemplation, Magian science involves a moment of grace, the
transmission of secret knowledge, but Faustian science is active, experimental
science, starting from a working hypothesis. Apollonian physics sees atoms as
miniature plastic forms, but Faustian physics sees atoms as vibrating and
radiating wave-particles.
The Apollonian cause is the causa finalis: nature striving towards a final
situation of rest and balance. As to the Magian understanding of cause: the
Magian sage in his cavern knows only one cause, God the Almighty (II, p. 293)
and on this a priori conviction, all alchemical techniques are based. Faustian
physics, however, sees nature as determined by causal relationships, an idea quite
incompatible with the ancient idea of ἀνάγκη. While Magian formulae allow
specially gifted individuals to perform miracles, the formulae of Faustian science
provide mastery over nature (“Herrschaft”, I, p. 507). The physics of Faustian
civilisation is basically a system of signifiers (“Kennzeichen”, I, p. 488, p. 535),
allowing scientists and engineers to operate nature as if it were a machine. The
Faustian effort to control nature with the help of signifiers (“eine Zeichensprache,
der nichts anschauliches mehr anhaftet”, I, p. 544) remains an interminable
process, however. Newton himself, for instance, was quite uncomfortable with
the (Magian) idea of gravitation as action at a distance, and experienced profound
“Unbehagen” while articulating it (I, p. 539). He was seized by this idea, and
aspired to master it with the help of his famous formula. And although Julius
Mayer’s sudden insight concerning the conservation of energy struck him like a
numinous, paralysing religious experience (of the Magian type), this idea
inevitably evolved into a rigid concept, cloth in scientific nomenclature.
Ethics likewise reflects the style of a particular culture. Apollonian ethics
is care for the Self, resulting in ἀταραξία and ἀπάθεια, and the ideal Apollonian
master is “willenlos” (I, p. 399). The ideal of Stoicism is statuesque selfmanagement (I, p. 459), a situation of balance, a statuesque pose. The Apollonian
“will” is merely inclination. In sharp contrast to this, Magian ethics urges us to
lose ourselves, to forsake our own Self (τὴν ψυχὴν ἑαυτοῦ, Luke 14:26). While
Apollonian ethics strives for self-mastery, Magian conceptions build on the
distinction between soul (ψυχή) and spirit (πνεῦµα). There are many individual
souls, but the spirit (πνεῦµα) is one and the same. All Magian believers have a
soul, but they participate in the spirit. Thus, besides the individual soul as the
form of the body, there is a cosmic soul or spirit, which we encounter in the
compelling gaze of staring icons, in the big staring eyes of Magian portrayals of
Jesus, the Virgin and the Apostles. According to Spengler, Spinoza was a late
representative of Magian thinking, a stranger to the Faustian style (I, p. 395),
elaborating a world-view with only one substance (God), while thinking and
extension were regarded as God’s attributes.
Faustian morality is the morality of the ego striving upwards, facing
multiple conflicts between reason and will. The Faustian “I” towers up,
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Styles of Thinking
mimicking the verticality of high buildings, embodying the Faustian ethic of
excelsior (I, p. 398). While Apollonian thinking saw the human individual
primarily as a statuesque body (σῶµα), Magian individuals saw themselves as
part of a pneumatic, spiritual “We”. For Magian thinkers, the Faustian conception
of individuals as actively thinking egos would have been something
incomprehensible. In a cavernous, fairy-tale ambiance, protected by amulets and
talismans, Magian individuals were dreaming about mysterious lands, precious
gems, treasure coves, God’s crystal palace, imprisoned apostate stars and the
philosopher’s stone. The basic attitude was one of waiting, and the key question
of the Magian cavern-world was: “when?”. Therefore, astrology (the art of
determining this when) replaced the oracle (basically an advice concerning the
present: how to retrieve a position of rest?). For Magian thinking, all stands
written in the stars. The Apollonian world is a world at rest, consisting of bodily
things (as mergers of matter and form). The Magian world is a cavern, where light
dispels darkness. In sharp contrast to this, the Faustian world is infinite space, an
infinite theatre of energy, force and mass, and the Faustian artwork takes the
spectator into infinite space.
There are three Aristotles, Spengler argues. The Apollonian Aristotle is
the Aristotle who, in Ethics (1926/1982), argues that virtue equals temperance:
the mean between extremes. The Magian (Arabian) Aristotle is the Aristotle who,
in De Anima (1936/1986), hints at the conception of a world-soul (κόσµου ψυχή),
while the Faustian (Gothic) Aristotle is the Aristotle of Physics (1958/1982), who
developed a theory of impetus. These three Aristotles are fundamentally different
(II, p. 67). Likewise, there are three Jesuses. The original Jesus was a Provincial,
anti-Apollonian Jesus, a contemporary of the ancient cynics, an itinerant teacher
whose sayings addressed the provincial lower classes of fishermen and day
labourers. The Magian Jesus is the Jesus of the Apocalypse, seated on His
eschatological throne during Judgement Day. And the Faustian Jesus is the Jesus
of Jesuit exercises, of dogma’s and papal infallibility. Magian thinkers such as
Paul and Augustine, Spengler argues, would reject all contemporary Christian
theology as either incomprehensible or erroneous (II, p. 68). Faustian
Enlightenment is anything but tolerant, for on closer inspection Faustian morality
claims tolerance only for itself. Thus, during the Faustian era, the peaceful
morality of Jesus (I, p. 441) was re-casted into a moral imperative, imposing itself
upon everyone. While Christian morality initially directed itself only to those who
wanted to accept this gift of grace (so that Magian preachers were like Magian
physicians, offering their spiritual arcana to the willing), Faustian morality is like
enforced vaccination. We may likewise distinguish three forms of atheism,
Spengler argues: Apollonian, Magian and Faustian (I, p. 530). While Apollonian
atheism is joyous and witty, Magian atheism is iconoclastic, and Faustian atheism
is dogmatic and intolerant.
For Spengler, the early history of Christianity reflects the transition of
Magian (i.e. anti-Apollonian) culture to Magian civilisation. Jesus himself
addressed a small-scale provincial audience of villagers and itinerant workers,
Styles of thinking
23
but the bigger world of Apollonian civilisation filled him with contempt. The
spirit of megapolitan cities was completely alien to him, this preacher from
Palestine, and the Apocalyptic idea alone was real to him. The fishermen from
Galilee lived far removed from Hellenism, Emperors, circuses and urban noise.
Yet, these two incompatible worlds suddenly collide in one of the most
compelling Biblical scenes: Jesus before Pilate. It is a clash between Apocalyptic
(i.e. Magian) truth and Apollonian reality. Both worlds are profoundly suspicious
and hostile to each other. Jesus’ statement that his Kingdom is not of this
(Apollonian) world means that we have to make a choice: it is Apollonian politics
or Magian religion, the one or the other. Such a phrase needs no glosses, Spengler
argues. For Magian believers, worldly achievements are without lasting value.
Two Jesuses can be encountered in the New Testament. On the one hand
the ambulant preacher, equipped with sayings and proverbs, especially
addressing the lower, powerless classes, advising them on how to survive
Apollonian tyranny and conveying unreserved contempt for Apollonian
architecture and politics (One cannot serve two master; Whenever someone
harasses you, turn your other cheek towards him; Give unto Caesar what is
Caesar’s; Be patient, only the salvation of the soul is what really matters; Give
no heed to riches or poverty; Do not be anxious about tomorrow; etc.). On the
other hand, we witness the Magian Jesus, proclaiming the dawn of the new, postApollonian age, the advent of heavenly envoys, the last judgement, a new heaven,
a new Jerusalem, betokening a world-change: the end of the present Aeon and the
ascension of the redeemed Redeemer. Thus, on the one hand, we read about his
teachings, on the other hand, we read tidings of Him. The itinerant antiApollonian teacher becomes the Arisen: a Magian, Apocalyptic figure. The
apostles themselves were simple folk frequenting the Temple, but John and Paul
transformed the tale of Jesus into a Magian drama, and the whole world was ready
to respond to their apocalyptic message.
As Spengler phrases it, a strange excitement ran through the Aramaean
countryside (comparable to what the Germanic world experienced around 1000):
the awakening of the Magian soul. A moment of arousal, implying that existing
reality suddenly lost its import. While Jesus had wandered from village to village,
Paul brought the message to the cities of the West, to Corinth and Rome. While
the synoptic gospels are predominantly about the anti-Apollonian Jesus (Jesus the
Cynic, if you like), the gospel of John and the epistles of Paul are predominantly
about the Magian Jesus, breathing the atmosphere of the world-cavern. The
Gospel of John suddenly introduces the trinity concept, moreover, revealing that
Jesus (λόγος) is only the second envoy, not the final revelation, for He is to be
followed by the Comforter: an astounding Magian doctrine, proclaimed by Jesus
himself, the final motif of this enigmatic book. What is unveiled here, quite
abruptly, is the Magian faith concerning the coming of a new aeon, symbolised
by the eye and the letter, giving rise to mysticism and scholasticism and
proclaiming the return of the soul to God. This Magian vision is further
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Styles of Thinking
developed, through the systematic transvaluation of the texts of Plato and
Aristotle, by Plotinus, Porphyry and other Magian thinkers.
With the phrase “Give unto Caesar what is Caesar’s”, Jesus distances
himself from the arch symbol of Apollonian economy: the coin (II, p. 610), a
beautiful, spherical body, a merger of matter (gold, silver, nickel) and form (the
imprint: a symbol, a stamp). While rural economy was basically barter, the
Apollonian city was a money market, where life evolved under high tension. In
Apollonian cities, slaves were likewise bodies treated as capital. When Jesus
announces the destruction of urban architecture (Mark 13), this event will not
primarily be caused by active demolishment. The envisioned fall of Apollonian
cities was prepared by abandonment, depopulation and self-destruction. The
archetypal Magian symbol in the domain of finance and economics is the
treasure, preferable consisting of precious stones, and preferably hidden in a
secret cave, conveying a static idea of wealth, completely antithetical to the
Faustian (dynamical) style of money-making, which is based on credit,
investments and exponential growth. The Faustian relationship vis-à-vis gold is
articulated by Ibsen’s Übermensch John Gabriel Borkman, tormented by the
sound of gold hidden in the mountains, idly lying in wait for a goldrush: a
Faustian phenomenon pur sang, thematised by both Wagner and Marx. The
Faustian principle entails a transition from a static to a dynamic (expansive)
economy, exemplified by the Faustian firm.
While Apollonian wealth was associated with contemplation, and
Magian wealth with magical tricks (allowing poor provincials to become
exceptionally rich urbanites overnight), Faustian wealth is closely related with
technological inventions, with machines, with intercontinental travel and an
exponential increase of production. Faustian money is not a coin, but a function,
an upward curve. Likewise, Faustian steamers are mobile cities, travelling across
oceans (II, p. 630), mobilis in mobile (I, p. 213). The first Faustian machines were
already envisioned by late-medieval Gothic monks in their monastic cells (similar
to Faust’s study in Faust I), but Faustian civilisation eventually entails a rigorous
transformation of the world (as in Faust II: I, p. 557), giving rise to three key
Faustian figures: the entrepreneur, the factory worker and the engineer. While the
entrepreneur is the owner, and the worker the servant, the engineer is the “priest”
of the machine. But the true “Herrin” (II, p. 634) of Faustian civilisation is the
machine itself.
Nowadays, machines are becoming increasingly less human, however,
increasingly ascetic and esoteric, adorning the earth in a web of interactions (II,
p. 630), giving rise to global networks of high finance. According to Spengler,
the Faustian metropolis is inherently irreligious (I, p. 531). An interesting
characteristic of civilisation, therefore, – and this includes Faustian civilisation –
is what Spengler refers to as “second religiousness” (“zweite Religiosität”, II
382). After Enlightenment, rationalism and materialism, religiousness
unexpectedly resurges once more (e.g. Swedenborg’s rational mysticism). This
Styles of thinking
25
explains why Faustian civilisation is not only the era of industrialised warfare,
but also of Lourdes, Fatima and immaculate conception.
The profile of these three cultural styles may also be discerned in the
history of writing. Apollonian culture tended not to pay much attention to written
documents, favouring spoked language over written materials. The handwritings
of philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle were not considered a relic. This stood
in sharp contrast to the veneration of sacred script (as the word of God) in Magian
culture. In canonical documents, Magian scholars were searching for secret
indications and revelations, e.g. the cabbalistic obsession with letters and
numbers. For Magian thinkers, the Faustian egocentric concept of intellectual
property and copyright would have been absurd, because it is the spirit who elects
its authors (II, p. 303), while inspiration was seen as a gift of grace. At first glance,
this veneration for ancient script was also adopted by Faustian culture, and a
gothic illuminated book of gospels looked like a little cathedral. A typical
Faustian invention, however, was book printing, Spengler argues. He sees a
definite connection between gunpowder and printing, moreover, between printed
books and guns, and the Faustian printing press resulted in a bombardment of
readers by intellectual artillery. During the 19th and 20th century, an intimate
relationship evolved between warfare and the press. Faustian civilisation gives
rise to a third language type, besides the scholastic and courtly idioms of
monastery and castle, namely the language of the urban bourgeoisie: utilitarian,
megapolitan, intelligent, practical and precise, culminating in stenography as a
writing technique employed in offices and companies.
Although Spengler notably focusses on Apollonian, Magian and Faustian
culture, he aims to develop a global rather than a Euro-centric view of history,
encompassing all continents. As to Chinese culture, for instance, Spengler argues
that its basic symbol is the way, but now conceived as Tao. The Chinese way
wanders through the world, and its space experience is reflected in Chinese
architecture, which is basically garden architecture, with hills, canals, ponds,
stones, roofs, gates and bridges in various positions. The world is a garden, but a
Chinese garden, e.g. a palace garden, a forbidden garden, a park-scape where
garden design, biology, psychology, sculpture and architecture come together.
This is also noticeable in Chinese painting, with its attention to ornament and
detail. The Russian symbol is different again, Spengler argues: the limitless plain,
from which a wooden church with multiple domes suddenly arises. Spengler is
also fascinated by Aztec civilisation, with its highways and multi-lingual
population. The Aztec city of Tenochtitlan was comparable to Augustinian Rome,
he argues. Yet the development of Aztec civilisation was brutally and deplorably
disrupted by Faustian expansionism.
It is the task of philosophy to articulate the principle of a particular culture
in a concise and comprehensive manner, but this does not mean that philosophy
is always up to its task. Notably during civilisation, philosophy tends to regress
into an academic specialty. By philosophy, Spengler means “effective
philosophy”, not academic trifling. At its highest, philosophy may absorb the
26
Styles of Thinking
entire content of an epoch, Spengler argues, realising it within itself and then
passing it over to be developed further: a role played by Hegel for instance.
Preferably, philosophers should not be university professors, however. Rather,
they should be politicians, managers, organisers, like Bonaventura, Cusanus or
Leibniz, individuals with a real standing in actual life, intervening effectively in
higher politics, or advancing the development of technology with their
compelling ideas. Spengler considers it impossible to be a genuine philosopher
without a solid awareness of what is happening in research areas such as
mathematics, physics and governance science. We must not confuse philosophy
with lecture-room jargon. For Spengler, notably Nietzsche failed as a philosopher
because he was too much given to romantic “Schwärmerei” (I, p. 45, p. 444, p
446), withdrawing into his private world of words and images: too much of a
Romantic to face the real-life challenges of metropolitan existence. Nietzsche
was exceptionally weak in mathematics (I, p. 472), while given to dramatization
and absorbed in inner experience, so that his aphorisms failed to achieve what he
himself referred to as “der großen Stil des Denkens” (I, p. 472). Even in his own
field, philology, he only knew the elite ancient world of bookish existence, and
despised and feared the real practical world (I, p. 32), both in antiquity and in his
own epoch. The real Rome, the city of masons and engineers, was beyond his
comprehension. This compared unfavourably with the impact of precisely those
Christian thinkers “grand style” (“Christen großen Stils”) whom he despised so
much, but who were actually far superior to him, such as Luther, Loyola, Teresa
of Ávila or Pascal. For Spengler, even George Bernard Shaw was a more
important philosopher than Nietzsche, because he realised that the Faustian
Übermensch was exemplified by multimillionaires and industrial tycoons (I, p.
480), men of action with a global impact, whilst Nietzsche himself still associated
the will to power with Renaissance daggers and poison.
Philosophy begins as metaphysics, Spengler argues (I, p. 471).
Subsequently, as culture evolves into civilisation, philosophy becomes
increasingly urban and self-critical, until it finally reaches its ethical period, in
which megapolitan existence become problematic for itself, while thinking
becomes a profession (I, p. 474). We notice a similar evolution in drama: from
staging profound insights via episodes of self-criticism, diatribes and propaganda
(p. 463) towards mere moralising debate. A similar development affects gender
relationships. While Dionysian women were dangerous, self-sufficient nomads,
Apollonian women were matrons forced into passivity, sitting in front of their
looms, waiting for their husbands to return. The Magian woman is a powerful
mother, who reigns the splendid cavern-world via her sons. Finally, during
Faustian civilisation, Spengler argues, the battle of the sexes eventually gives the
floor to the emancipated woman of Ibsen’s dramas, to American women and
Parisiennes: professional women, metropolitan nomads who fully belong to
themselves again.
Let this suffice as a summary of Spengler’s views. Although Spengler
counts as a prominent spokesman, the styles-of-thinking concept is not the work
Styles of thinking
27
of one particular author. Various thinkers – e.g. Carl Gustav Jung, Gaston
Bachelard, Jan Hendrik van den Berg, Michel Foucault, Peter Sloterdijk –
contributed to its elaboration, and the latter actually based his Sphären-project
explicitly on Spengler (Sloterdijk 1998; 1999; 2004). There are important
predecessors, moreover, such as Kant, Hegel and Husserl. We are dealing with a
tradition, albeit without name; a school of thought, without any formal status.
Thus, this study is not meant as a commentary on the work of one particular
author. Following in the footsteps of this tradition, my aim is rather to contribute
to the development of the style-of-thinking concept as such.
§ 5. Kant’s introduction
One of the key precursors of the styles-of-thinking concept is Immanuel Kant
(1724 - 1804). In the foreword of the second edition of Critique of Pure Reason
(1781/1975), published in 1787, he discusses two historical turning points, where
decisive insights emerged that fundamentally changed the established way of
thinking (Denkart), enabling completely new forms of intellectual inquiry. The
first “revolution” came about five centuries BC in ancient Greece, Kant argues,
making Greek (Euclidean) mathematics possible. Traditional (artisanal)
mathematics consisted in applying sets of rules whose validity had been proven
in practice. Greek mathematicians introduced the concept of rigorous
mathematical demonstration. This idea emerged more or less simultaneously at
different locations, independently, and was introduced by Thales in the East and
by Pythagoras in the West. Thales was able to prove that the angle of a triangle
defined by a semi-circle is a right angle. This insight was not dependent on
empirical perception or practical experience, and the right angle was not
approximately, but exactly 90˚. Carpenters, surveyors and architects had been
aware of Pythagoras’s theorem, of course, but as a rule of thumb. Now, this
theorem becomes an element in a whole edifice. An abstract formula is a priori
valid, independent of empirical confirmation. A relationship between lines (3: 4:
5) is converted into a relationship between surfaces (32 + 42 = 52), a mathematical
operation undertaken by Apollonian reason. It exemplifies a change in style of
thinking, an epistemological rupture between practical experience and
Apollonian geometry.
At first, this intellectual practice remained unwritten. Masters and
students devoted themselves to mathematical exercises verbally and interactively,
playing (as it were) with sticks and pebbles in the sand. In the context of these
academic intellectual practices, a new science developed. When Euclid composed
his famous handbook entitled Στοιχεῖα (“Elements”, circa 300 BC) it was a
systematic summary of the results of the intellectual work of generations. How
should we envision the beginning of this new mathematics? How did Greek
mathematicians at a certain point discover this royal road leading to true (i.e.
Apollonian) knowledge? According to Kant, we cannot answer this question with
28
Styles of Thinking
certainty because this chapter from history is too sparsely documented. Maybe,
“someone” (someone like Thales or Pythagoras) experienced a sudden, decisive
illumination, Kant suggests. Suddenly, someone had an enlightening experience
(“ging ein Licht auf”, p. 22), and a whole world of possibilities “lighted up”.
Where predecessors and contemporaries were still groping in darkness (Kant here
uses the phrase “bloßes Herumtappen”), a great mind was apparently able to take
the first decisive step. And in this first step, the whole of Greek mathematics was
already implied and outlined. Everything else, all the thirteen books of Euclidean
mathematics, was basically elaboration – more geometrico. The one decisive step
was the insight that we should not derive mathematical propositions from
practical experience, but that we should rather build on an a priori understanding
of what a line, a surface, a triangle or a circle is. Humans do not dwell in an
empirical environment alone. Human cognition adds a whole dimension of
intelligibility to our world of practical experience. And it is here that
mathematical reasoning proceeds and feels at home.
Kant locates a second moment of revelation at the beginning of
modernity, represented by researchers such as Galileo (mechanics), Torricelli
(statics) and Stahl (chemistry). They also were suddenly enlightened, Kant
argues. They also fell under the sway of a fundamental (and fundamentally new)
insight: the insight that science, despite its empirical moment, must be regarded
as an experimental, but not (strictly speaking) as an empirical endeavour.
Deduction is at least as important as induction. The decisive insight of the new
style of thinking is the idea of conducting an experiment: putting your ideas to
the test. The researchers in question understand, according to Kant, that human
reason is actively present in empirical objectivity, that reason encounters itself in
its concepts, models, experimental designs, and so on. Experimental researchers
analyse the outcomes of a rational practice of intervention.
This was different in antiquity. Greek scientists thought and acted κατά
φύσιν, they adjusted themselves to nature. Their Apollonian theories were
expected to reflect the harmonic structure of the cosmos. Now, a dramatic turn
occurs. Human thinking it no longer oriented towards nature, but forces nature to
manifest itself in accordance with a format that is determined by the investigator.
Experimentation means active perception, preceded by intervention, setting the
conditions, defining the scene. That, according to Kant, is the basic idea, the
basic, quasi-self-evident conviction, the fundamental a priori of the new
(Faustian) style. Instead of observing nature in a passive manner, humans now
force nature, in the context of an experiment, to answer our questions. The natural
scientist is no longer a student who patiently follows nature’s moves, listening to
what nature may offer on her own accord, but rather a judge who forces nature to
respond. This is the basic revolution taking place during the dawn of modernity,
and thanks to this crucial insight, centuries of groping around finally give way to
real (Faustian) science, so that the royal road to true knowledge is opened up. In
this understanding, in this disruptive beginning, everything else is already
decided and anticipated. All the rest is merely working through. Scientific
Styles of thinking
29
observation is guided by a grounding idea which determines how objectivity is
constituted and how observations are made. In Critique of Pure Reason, however,
the process of knowledge production is still conceived as something abstract and
pure, independent of actuality and historicity. This dramatically changes in the
work of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) who envisions the
development and self-edification of consciousness in the course of history.
§ 6. Hegelian dialectics
Hegel sees the history of consciousness as a succession of stages (1807/1970).
Every stage has a style and profile of its own. These stages do not see themselves
as mere moments or episodes, of course. Rather, they tend to see themselves as
final, and that is a good thing, because a style of thinking has to take itself very
seriously in order to develop its strengths to the full. It is the philosopher who
discerns dialectical patterns emerging in the history of thought and who
recognises that every stage is a moment (both necessary and temporary) in a grand
dialectical unfolding. The spirit patiently works through all these modes and
episodes of thinking: an immense intellectual achievement. Looking back on
history, we only tend to notice brief summaries of the abundant cultural richness
which these styles of thinking managed to produce.
Currently, we are witnessing another moment of transition, the coming
into existence of a new era (Hegel 1807/1970, p. 18). The spirit is abandoning the
world it had hitherto inhabited and is preparing the ground for a real
transformation, a qualitative leap. The symptoms and forebodings of this
widespread upheaval are omnipresent. A new daybreak is about to illuminate the
features of a renewed world. Initially, new ways of thinking arrive on the scene
in a fragile and unfinished form. While the wealth of previous experience is still
present, the appearance of the new style seems unarticulated and unimpressive.
It still lacks general intelligibility and seems an esoteric practice, in which only a
limited number of individuals are actively involved (1807/1970, p. 19). It remains
a carefully guarded, sectarian possession, as only the grounding concept has
emerged, which still needs to be elaborated. Only a limited number of adepts are
captured by it, literally, for, as Hegel emphasises, in the term concept (Begriff),
the verb greifen (to capture) resonates. This concept sets them apart from others,
from the rest of humanity, as a sect, cultivating inwardness. In the early stage, the
new idea is extremely vulnerable. It lacks precision and its possibilities have not
been fully realised. Yet, in due course, the novum, the new concept will become
increasingly exoteric: accessible and convincing to everyone, affecting
everybody, more or less (p. 20), unfolding into a highway of thinking, readily
available for everyone to use. The new concept will also provide guidance to
scientific research, which will henceforward be conducted in a completely new
manner, on the basis of this new grounding idea.
30
Styles of Thinking
Thus, Hegel is a crucial protagonist of the style-of-thinking concept.
Research practices are guided by an allegedly self-evident conviction. This
conviction or grounding concept has to be developed into a self-conscious idea,
giving rise to an elaborated system of thinking, based on a pervasive truth and on
a logic of its own. As long as a certain style of thinking, a certain mode of
explaining maintains its dominant position, consciousness is primarily involved
in a conversation with itself as it were (thinking as Selbstbefriedigung, a
Selbstgespräch mit sich, 1807/1970, p. 134). The system clings to its guiding
idea, fearing the new truth that already announces itself on the horizon, in the
folds and margins of mainstream discourse, but as negativity, as a destructive
intellectual epidemic, whose positive moment still has to be developed.
Eventually, the persuasive force of the new idea will overcome most of the
resistance, and the new spirit will expand into a productive force. Initially critical
and negative, it will assume responsibility for the whole world and will learn how
to realise and maintain itself, taking possession of the socio-cultural landscape.
Then, the grounding idea has succeeded in realising itself, feeling securely at
home in reality. The grounding idea has upgraded the socio-cultural ambiance. In
actual reality, the new rationality is firmly at work (1807/1970, p. 179). A basic
congruence has been established between being and thinking.
Tensions and conflicts will continue to erupt, of course, but at this stage
they are often due to a lack of self-understanding and self-reflection.
Enlightenment, for instance, attacks religion as a form of superstition and selfdeception, as something utterly irrational, thereby making two fatal mistakes.
First of all, it obfuscates that religion is actually an intellectual practice, involving
immense amounts of intellectual labour. Infected by the same inquisitive spirit,
modern religious institutions are investing increasing amounts of time and
resources in research. Moreover, Enlightenment itself is not a purely rational
endeavour either, far from it. Enlightenment is fuelled by a grounding idea: the
Faustian Will to power. Enlightenment itself is a religion more or less, an
ideology of you like, bent on eliminating its ideological rivals, so that appeals to
“rationality” and “criticism” function as powerful instruments of exclusion, as
instances of violence, meant to silence rival voices. It is the vocation of
philosophy to discern the grounding idea at work in such a struggle.
The transition Hegel is referring to, is the transformation and expansion
of Faustian thinking from an esoteric practice (conducted in monasteries,
workshops, private laboratories, etc.) into a global principle of change, a force on
the global scale of world civilisation. Once the resistance of the final remnants of
the Magian mindset has been broken, the new style reveals its true form. Now it
becomes clear that, for Faustian thinking, the world has only instrumental value,
and should be exploited by “autonomous” individuals. Humans themselves
likewise fall prey to exploitation and the Will to power: Faustian individuals use
others and are themselves exploited by others (“1807/1970, p. 415).
Styles of thinking
31
In the course of his oeuvre, Hegel describes a series of styles. First of all,
archaic thinking. By means of certain words and gestures, shamans try to implore
the inscrutable powers of nature and to move them to pliability, hypnotising
nature as it were (Hegel 1969). It is a powerless form of power over nature. Cults
corresponding to this form of religious experience usually result in collective
states of stupor or frenzy.
But then the spirit awakens. In ancient Egypt, according to Hegel (1969),
the mind becomes an architect. Egyptian architecture produces immense crystals:
geometrical structures consisting of straight lines and smooth surfaces, such as
pyramids and obelisks. A lifeless architecture, whose buildings are not built for
the living.
Ancient Greek religion is the religion of beauty (Hegel 1969). At a certain
point, Dionysian frenzy gives way to the god of the philosophers: the god of the
heavenly spheres. The spherical god of Parmenides and Plato suddenly takes the
floor. Apollonian religious experience expresses itself in spherical geometric
thinking: a pre-eminently scientific style of thinking, based on ancient Greek
geometry. And when Plato, in his dialogue Politeia (1930/1999), outlines the
contours of an “ideal” state, he actually captures the grounding idea of Apollonian
thinking: the geometrical spirit of his era.
Faustian thinking is extensively discussed in Hegel’s oeuvre. Faust
himself is the self-conscious, scientific individual who distances himself from
established knowledge (1807/1970, p. 270). Goethe’s Faust, according to Hegel,
stages the conflict between an ambitious but disappointed scholar on the one hand
and accepted knowledge on the other, between discontent in established discourse
and “die Lebendigkeit des Weltlebens”. In Faust’s view, existing discourse falls
short because it does not grant us any real power, but rather confines us to the
scriptorium, the library. It is an impotent form of knowing and Faust desperately
wants “hinaus”. He desires to conquer the world, as an ersatz for traditional
scholarship (i.e. Magian book reading and Apollonian contemplation). Hegel
analyses the birth of Faustian thinking in the dialectic of Master and Servant,
which will be discussed below, in the chapter devoted to Faustian thinking.
Hegel (1970) distinguishes three types of textual historical sources. First
of all, sources written by authors who share the spirit of the time in which the
events took place. Secondly, sources composed by learned scholars to whom this
no longer applies. Now, there is a contrast between the zeitgeist of the historians
themselves and the spirit of the times recorded by them. Past events are now often
criticised from a normative or political perspective. Their ideals and values are
negated. The third form of history, however, is the philosophical one. Although
historical philosophers are considering epochs whose spirit they no longer share,
they nonetheless aim to capture the idea at work in the recorded events. A basic
logic can be discerned, a basic “energy” of history, and the aim of philosophy is
to come to terms with it. Although the logic thus disclosed represents a different
stage in the history of reason, we can still recognise the inherent consistency of
32
Styles of Thinking
its grounding idea. But this requires a lot of work. We have to traverse a whole
historical field in order to determine the guiding idea that allows us to
contextualise events.
According to Hegel, world history moves in one direction: from East to
West (1970, p. 134), following the sun’s trajectory as it were, meandering and
bifurcating like a grand river of ideas. The history of thinking began in the East,
in China and India, following complicated pathways through Persia and
Mesopotamia, Egypt and the Middle East, and spreading into Greece and Italy,
from where medieval Europa was reached. During the Faustian era, the centre of
gravity shifted towards North-Western Europe, migrating from there to the
United States.2 Whereas the Dionysian principle originated in the East, as
Euripides’ Bacchae explicitly indicates, Apollonian thinking arose in ancient
Greece. The subsequent style of thinking, equalling what Spengler refers to as
Magian thinking, was at home in the Roman empire and in Byzantine and Islamic
civilisations, while Faustian culture reflects a Germanic mindset. Although Hegel
does not use Spengler’s labels (Dionysian, Apollonian, Magian, Faustian), their
profiles are easily recognisable in Hegel’s characterisations.
To characterise the Dionysian (“oriental”) mindset, Hegel often uses the
word “Taumel” (furor, µανία, frenzy). The cults of the great oriental goddesses
(Astarte, Kybele, Diana of Ephesus) adhere to the principle of losing oneself, of
being transported into sensual, sexual (Dionysian) frenzy (p. 238). In Greece,
Hegel argues, this principle incarnated in the bigender deity Dionysus,
accompanied by a train of female devotees. Euripides’ Bacchae provides an
exemplification of this principle κατ’ ἐξοχήν, although we may also recognize it
in Richard Wagner’s Parsifal (the Kundry persona) and in Richard Strauss’
Salome. Frenzy in the aesthetic and religious domain is connected with despotism
in the political domain.
The Apollonian (“Greek”) concept of harmony and stability established
itself in collision with Dionysian disruption coming in from the East, Hegel
argues. In imperial Rome, the Pantheon (1970, p. 139) represented a moment of
transition, as a polytheistic assembly hall was transformed into a monotheistic
dome, thereby representing the dawn of what Spengler refers to as the Magian
era. This transition, the eruption of Magian thinking, occurred precisely when
ancient (Apollonian) civilisation reached its apex and the Roman world became
an Empire. From now on, Hegel argues (concurrent with the principle of Magian
thinking outlined above), a divide was introduced between the worldly and the
spiritual, between mundane reality and the Kingdom of God. Yet, when Julius
Caesar decided to turn his attention the North-Western Europe, he was already
looking ahead to a future epoch, grounding the theatre where Germanic (Faustian)
2
Here again, we notice a movement from East to West, from East Coast to West Coast,
one might add. And in the course of the 21st century, China is likely to become the next
station of thinking, so that history has moved full circle. But this will be addressed more
fully in the final chapter.
Styles of thinking
33
culture was to evolve: in regions which were destined to become the centre of
world history from the “high” Middle Ages onwards (p. 379).
Besides the (westward) direction of cultural proliferation, what is also
important is the manner in which cultures spread. The spread of a particular style
of thinking is not a gradual, continuous process, but rather something which
unfolds in a wave-like manner, Hegel argues. The term Renaissance for instance
literally refers to a resurge of Apollonian thinking which, according to Hegel, is
intimately linked with the rediscovery of Plato in Western Europe, in the wake of
the Fall of Byzantium. Hegel also emphasises the importance of repetition (p.
380). Through repetition, something which at first may seem an accidental
deviance (triggering resistance), is destined to become increasingly plausible and
real. Step by step, by insisting on it, time and again, a new idea is bound to
become something inevitable, something which becomes confirmed by
subsequent events (p. 380). Like Rome and Paris, a style of thinking is not
produced in a single day, and eventually, scepticism and negativity will be
overcome by affirmation and adoption.
According to Hegel (1970), the spread of what Spengler refers to as
Magian thinking entails a particular dialectics of its own. The initial starting point
(the first moment) is a paradisiacal situation, when all the world is a park. The
disruptive event, the fall from grace, however, is an inevitable turn. An
irreconcilable rupture now unfolds between the mundane and the divine. Sacred,
enchanted, mysterious spaces are created (e.g. domes, magical gardens,
hermitages) where the divine can already be experienced and enjoyed under
earthly conditions.
A different dynamic applies to the spread of what Spengler refers to as
Faustian culture. Now, the guiding spirit of history is forced to determine its own
conditions, Hegel argues, and to actively transform its environment. Enchantment
is replaced by labour, and divine rapture by a state of reason and justice. The
(initially “Magian”) concept of the fall becomes incorporated in a Faustian
dialectic, where it assumes a positive function. The fall from grace necessitates
activity and labour, thereby unleashing history as a long-lasting effort of the spirit
towards self-edification (p. 389). The spirit needs negativity and resistance to
engage in this process of self-production.
Visiting a cathedral in a philosophical manner (via κατάσκοπειν) implies
that we see this immense artwork (this total work of art) as a concrete affirmative
answer to a challenging conflict. A cathedral exemplifies the dialectical concept
of ἐνέργεια (realisation, actualisation) on a rather high level of complexity and
elevation. The original idea is realised in such a way that chronic resistance (e.g.
the principle of gravity) is overcome via relentless activity. The natural, cyclical
flow of thing is interrupted by an upward trend. The cathedral negates the
(decidedly “Magian”) idea that there is nothing new under the sun.
Hegel’s philosophy of history presents a comprehensive portrayal of
what Spengler refers to as the transition from Magian to Faustian thinking. With
remarkable frankness (παρρησία, p. 395), Hegel tells us, Jesus preached his
34
Styles of Thinking
message of withdrawal from all worldly ties, looking upon existing reality and its
laws, rules and values with utter indifference. The validity of the worldly
(“Apollonian”) principle was nullified. In his revolutionary speeches, Jesus
summons his audience to follow him in his abrupt transvaluation of all values.
From now on, the spirit withdraws from the mundane world and can only be
encountered within the Christian community, the Christian church. Here, the
Kingdom of God maintains itself in a counter-world. In Islam, Hegel tells us, the
devotion to the One entails an even more radical negation of all otherness.
Although the true faith adorns itself in beauty and knowledge, all other forms of
beauty and knowledge are relentlessly eliminated.
Finally, we recognise what Spengler refers to as the Faustian principle in
Hegel’s portrayal of the actual realisation of Christianity, i.e. the enormous task
of creating a Christian world, thereby sublating the divide between the spiritual
and the mundane. This requires a different (Faustian) attitude, for which,
according to Hegel, the Germanic people of the North were destined to become
the carriers. On the individual level, it entails a fierce internal struggle (“Kampf
mit sich selbst”) between duty and desire, between reason and passion. For Hegel,
the Crusades may count as the decisive turning point between Magian and
Faustian thinking (“Punkt der Umkehrung”). From now on, the West shifts its
focus of attention and begins to invest its (Faustian) energy in the occidental
realm. In Southern France, the campaign against Catharism, with its fanatical
(“schwärmerisch”) ideas of purity, led by Saint Dominic and his order of
Dominicans, was actually a struggle of Faustian Christianity against a tenacious
reviving version of Magian Christianity.
Faustian scientific activity started in theology, resulting in the elaborate
theoretical edifices of scholasticism. Here again, mendicant orders played a
decisive role as “spiritual armies”. Faustian thinking became the dominant
principle in architecture (cathedrals), in theology (scholasticism), but also in
politics, resulting in the drive towards the establishment of nation states. Hegel
especially mentions “Machiavelli’s celebrated work The Prince” in this respect.
Although it has often been thrown aside in contempt, Hegel argues, a profound
consciousness of the necessity of the formation of modern states is at work here,
and the author establishes the principles on which a state can be founded, given
the circumstances of the times. The means which he proposes are the only
efficient ones, and perfectly justifiable, as the feudal nobility, whose power was
to be subdued, could not be handled in any other way. No progress in politics
without relentless struggle.
According to the Faustian principle, humanity should not be freed from
labour and servitude (“aus der Knechtschaft”), but rather through labour and
servitude (“durch die Knechtschaft”). Discipline can have a liberating,
emancipatory impact. It is an indispensable moment in the process of selfedification of the Servant struggling against the Master.
An important step in intellectual history was the discovery of the printing
press as the “desideratum of the age”. Intellectual needs and technological
Styles of thinking
35
innovation mutually stimulate one another, Hegel argues. Rather than seeing
technology as either cause or effect, Hegel’s philosophy of technology
emphasises a dynamic of entgegenkommen between the intellectual and the
technical (1970, p. 490). The intellectual and the technological are mutually
affirmative and responsive to one another: technical applications make their
appearance when their urgency is experienced (“das Technische findet sich ein,
wenn das Bedürfnis vorhanden ist”, p. 491). And now, the Faustian break of day
(“Morgenröte”) firmly announces itself. From this moment onward, Hegel
argues, history has no other work to do than to actively build its principle into the
world. Faustian thinking is destined to realise itself. Labour is no longer looked
down upon with contempt, but is valued in an affirmative manner. Magic and
contemplation (i.e. Magian thinking) give way to a new mode of thinking, which
is active and explanatory (i.e. Faustian thinking, p. 522), giving rise to science as
a system of causal laws. In the practical realm, duty and the will are now the
crucial concepts and in politics, the French revolution was a Faustian event par
excellence, as reality became drastically transformed and governed by rational
thought (p. 529).
In short, in their understanding of history, Hegel and Spengler basically
convey one and the same idea, as the two most important spokespersons of the
style-of-thinking concept. But others have added to it as well. In the next section,
the contributions of others authors will be discussed, starting with Nietzsche.
§ 7. Other elaborations: Nietzsche, Husserl, Foucault and the
sociological turn
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) was already mentioned as an important
precursor who, in Beyond Good and Evil (1980, KSA5, § 23) presented his own
thinking as a “morphology” of the Will to Power. In The Birth of Tragedy, his
first philosophical publication, written when he was still active as a philology
professor, he distinguishes the Apollonian and the Dionysian style, concepts
which he borrowed from Richard Wagner. The latter introduces them in his book
Art and Revolution (1849, p. 10), but this conceptual pair also constituted a key
topic in the discussions which evolved between the composer and the philosopher
during the years of their collaboration (Magee 2000, p. 296; Zwart 2012). The
Apollonian style aspires harmony, right measure, self-control and
proportionality. The Dionysian counterpart, however, is characterized by a desire
for transgression and ecstasy, for turbulence and excess. The Apollonian style is
bent on individualisation, while the individual is bound to perish in Dionysian
furor. However, as Nietzsche himself points out, these two concepts actually
belong together; they reflect and complement each other – like ego and alter ego,
like the right-handed and left-handed aspect of Greek culture. It was precisely in
the chronic struggle with the Dionysian antagonist that the Apollonian style
developed its profile. The Dionysian mentality is like the dark, diffuse
36
Styles of Thinking
background against which the clear, Apollonian style stands out. The concept of
the Dionysian becomes meaningful as the contesting, subverting “other” of the
beautiful Apollonian hegemony. For Nietzsche, however, this struggle primarily
pertains to the field of art. It is a chronic duality between two natural forces,
manifesting themselves in two basic forms of art, namely (Apollonian) sculpture
and (Dionysian) music (§ 1, p. 22).
Although Nietzsche’s distinction as such is highly valuable,3 his
elaboration and interpretation of Wagner’s concept is nonetheless at odds with
the style-of-thinking concept for various reasons. In the first place, Nietzsche
focusses on one domain, namely art (contrasting sculpture with music) and seems
to regard Greek culture either from the perspective of Apollonian sculpture or
from the perspective of Dionysian music. But a style of thinking manifests itself
in all domains, as we have seen. According to Nietzsche, sculpture is essentially
Apollonian, while music is essentially Dionysian, but a styles-of-thinking
approach rather suggests the very opposite, namely that there are Apollonian and
Dionysian forms of sculpture, and Apollonian and Dionysian types of music.
Pythagorean music, for example, with its desire to mimic the harmony of the
spheres, was decidedly Apollonian, while Wagner’s total works of art stand out
as sublime exemplifications and concretisations of the struggle between both
principles, enacted under Faustian socio-cultural conditions. A similar struggle
between the Apollonian and the Dionysian principle can also be found in Greek
politics, as well as in Greek physics, for example in the form of the struggle
between the spherical (Apollonian) universe of Plato and Aristotle (the
academics) and the (Dionysian) universe of the atomists. Moreover, from a
styles-of-thinking perspective, we are not dealing with an “eternal” struggle, as
Nietzsche phrases it, but with phenomena which pervade a particular culture
during a certain period (ancient Greece). Modern (Faustian) art, for instance, can
no longer be conceived in terms of a struggle between Apollonian and Dionysian
forces. Whoever extrapolates a Greek problem to modern (Faustian) conditions,
disavows the importance and disruptive significance of the Faustian principle, of
which we will come to speak.
Perhaps Nietzsche, as a philologist, was too engaged with the world
(more exactly: the words) of the ancient Greeks, paying too little attention to his
own world and time. Significant in this respect is his own introduction to The
Birth of Tragedy entitled “Attempt at self-criticism” (Versuch einer Selbstkritik)
where he explains how the genesis of this book coincided with the FrancoGerman war. While the Faustian principle was demonstrating its disruptive
dominance, Nietzsche was wandering in the Alps, pondering over aesthetic
problems in ancient Greece.4 He was briefly involved in the events, as a troubled
3
For Spengler, there is something comical in the figure of the timid, spectacled,
bourgeois professor of philology, scion of a lineage of pastors, praising Dionysian
frenzy.
4
“Während die Donner der Schlacht von Wörth über Europa weggingen, saß der
Grübler und Rätselfreund, dem die Vaterschaft dieses Buches zuteil ward, irgendwo in
Styles of thinking
37
medical orderly, but proved unable to live up to this brief exposure to Faustian
reality. Nevertheless, his way of reading, paying attention to phenomena of
struggle and birth, and to the productivity of struggle, contain valuable
contributions to the development of the styles-of-thinking concept. We will
reconsider Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy below (§ 9), focusing on his
understanding of Euripides.
Another important contributor to the styles-of-thinking concept is
Edmund Husserl (1859 - 1938). In 1935 he argued, in a famous lecture, that the
European sciences (physics first and foremost) were facing a crisis, a statement
that at first invokes amazement because, during the first decades of the 20th
century, physics had actually been extremely successful. Relativity theory and
quantum physics had been trailblazing, imaginative developments. Husserl’s
crisis does not concern the achievements of science as such, however, but their
meaning for human existence. Notably during the Renaissance and the
Enlightenment, he argues, science had developed a pronounced moral profile.
Science had contributed to the humanization of human existence. But now
science had become neutral: applicable for both positive and negative purposes.
In order to understand the full scope of this crisis, Husserl argued, we must return
to the beginning, and he located the beginning of modern (Faustian) thinking in
the work of Galileo. In this way we can grasp the basic, quasi-self-evident
conviction, the “Selbstverständlichkeit” that motivated modern science and
grounded a style of thought. This grounding conviction (seemingly self-evident)
has become something obvious to us, but it was a remarkable and alarming insight
when Galileo articulated it for the first time. We must rediscover its original
strangeness as it were.
Husserl is not speaking about Galileo as a historical figure, however, as
Husserl is not interested in concrete historical or biographical details. Galileo for
him is an icon, a prototype, an advocate of a particular style of thinking, an
inaugurator of this style. The basic idea introduced by Galileo is that we gain
access to the world via mathematics. However, his mathematics had undergone a
profound development. Traditional practices of measurement and calculation had
always been adjusted towards the natural environment. Galileo’s mathematics,
however, had become detached from its original world-orientation, its
“Bodenständigkeit”. Pure mathematics was the result of a lengthy process of
abstraction, giving rise to an axiomatic system that was subsequently applied to
concrete phenomena. This allegedly “pure” science was driven by the will to
dominate the earth. Applications of the new principle enabled a powerful
mathematical grasp on things. Galileo forced reality to speak this new
mathematical language.
To understand the current situation, conceived as a crisis, i.e. as a decisive
moment, a turn, we must return to the beginning, Husserl argues, the original
einem Winkel der Alpen, sehr vergrübelt und verrätselt, folglich sehr bekümmert und
unbekümmert zugleich, und schrieb seine Gedanken über die Griechen nieder” (1980,
KSA 1, § 1, p. 9).
38
Styles of Thinking
articulation of the basic conviction that inspired this style of thinking which, via
the efforts of Galileo and others, managed to become the dominant style, the very
style which Spengler characterised as “Faustian”. Via this step backwards, we
can come to terms again with the primal conviction, in its original form, and we
re-experience its boldness. Moreover, we will become sensitive to the violence
entailed in this powerful, Faustian form of mathematics.
Another important contributor to the styles-of-thinking concept has been
Michel Foucault (1926-1984). It may seem remarkable to move from Husserl to
Foucault so easily, given the fact that Foucault, notably during the 1960s,
emphatically rejected Husserl’s work. His Words and Things (1966) was actually
meant are a polemics against Husserl. Yet, the styles-of-thinking concept remains
a common ground they share, beyond their differences, although Foucault
represents a completely different take. According to him, the history of thinking
can be described in two ways: in the traditional manner, as the history of great
authors (e.g. master thinkers and their epigones), but also along the lines of the
archaeological method, namely as the history of anonymous discursive
formations. In the latter case, the author’s status barely counts, and this already
points to a difference with Husserl, who focusses on one particular individual,
namely Galileo. For Foucault, however, Galileo’s voice was one among many,
and all contemporary voices count as exemplifications of a particular style.
Beyond the many disputes concerning specific issues arising among voices of a
particular epoch, there is a common vocabulary, a common language.
Foucault is interested in discourse, rather than authors. Not he or she
speaks, but it speaks (“es spricht”, “ça parle”), in the sense that we are spoken,
and that discursive styles proliferate via us. This is how Foucault (1969) intends
to describe history, by signalling the emergence and disappearance of discursive
regularities and by analysing the discourse of a particular period with the help of
remarkable changes in the ways in which reality is described, analysed and
categorised. For an archaeologist, all potsherds or coins discovered in a particular
layer are in principle equally interesting, and Foucault likewise assumes that in
all texts or textual fragments belonging to a certain discursive formation, the same
set of regularities (the same discursive style) can be discerned. Within a certain
layer, all texts seem similar, while there are striking differences between the
layers. That is: in the archives of knowledge, the archaeologist discerns
stratifications. Within layers there is spontaneous unanimity, between layers
abrupt discontinuities abound. There are ruptures in style, while the lingua franca
of a cultural ecosystem may suddenly be eliminated.
Archaeology is a methodological ideal which Foucault not always fully
realises in his studies (Zwart 1995). He often makes concessions in the sense that
he does seem to pay special attention to prominent thinkers such as Socrates,
Descartes, Bentham and Freud. Some textual fragments are more equal (more
typical) than others, as it were. Thus, Foucault discovered a relatively unknown
text from Jeremy Bentham about an architectural structure called the Panopticon,
meant to facilitate surveillance in various social practices (in penitentiary and
Styles of thinking
39
educational institutions, in psychiatric hospitals, in factories and so on).
Subsequently, in a broad array of sources, well known and less well known, he
discovers this same panoptic idea, as a very fundamental way of organising and
monitoring the social realm. We may notice a basic congruence between the
style-of-thinking approach and Foucault’s discursive archaeology. A particular
event or document may serve as a moment of commencement, deserving special
attention. Prominent authors are not seen as geniuses, but as seismographers of
their era. In their texts, significant changes often become visible for the first time
and are articulated in a clear and concise manner (clair et distinct as it were).
Besides philosophers, sociologists have also contributed to the styles-ofthinking concept. Ludwig Fleck (1896-1961) has had an important role in
propagating the concept of thinking style, especially among sociologists and
historians of science. The publication in which he introduces the notion is a study
dedicated to syphilis and the Wasserman test (1935/1979). All concepts in vogue
during a certain period, according to Fleck, reflect the same style. A particular
theory can only survive in a particular cultural environment if it is fashioned in
accordance with this style. Style is a certain tendency or willingness to perceive
the world in a certain way, a receptiveness to thoughts and concepts that are
responsive to the prevailing style. Style is a collective phenomenon that depends
on social reinforcement. Fleck’s study has decisively influenced Thomas Kuhn
(1962), whose famous publication contributed to Fleck’s rediscovery, although
Kuhn does not speak about style, but uses the term paradigm instead.
Although this line of research is certainly inspiring, the philosophical
concept adopted in this monograph differs from the ideas of Fleck and Kuhn in a
number of ways. The difference is first of all a matter of scale in the sense that
the overarching Faustian style (for example) gives rise to a whole series of
“paradigms” (styles in the sociological sense). Also, while Fleck and Kuhn focus
on scientific research, the styles-of-thinking concept is considerably broader, as
we have seen, involving all domains of culture. Finally, Fleck and Kuhn argue
that almost if not all aspects of language and thinking should comply with the
reigning paradigm. Our understanding of style is less restrictive. Even when the
dominant style reaches its climax there is resistance, while elements of abandoned
styles may temporarily resurge (as the return of the repressed) at a later time,
under radically changed conditions.
Historian Alistair Crombie (1915-1996) also deserves to be mentioned in
this respect, because he distinguishes six styles of thinking in the history of
European science. Besides postulation (Greek Apollonian mathematics) and
experimentation (Spengler’s Faustian style), he also distinguishes hypothetical
modelling, taxonomy, probabilistic and statistical analysis and historical
derivation. This approach was taken up by authors such as Ian Hacking
(1982/2002; 1992) and Chunglin Kwa (2011). Starting point is the idea that
various scientific ways of knowing have emerged and stabilised in the course of
history, entailing particular methods, types of objects and criteria of truth
(Sciortino 2017). The focus is on methods and techniques of scientific enquiry,
40
Styles of Thinking
however, rather than on grounding ontologies, and on science and technology,
rather than on the human lifeworld in the wider sense. Hacking (1992) lists a
series of different uses of the term “style” in connection with science, ranging
from fairly personal to increasingly general uses, such as the “Galilean” style, the
“Newtonian” style, the style of a particular laboratory, the style of a social
network, or thought collective, up to the style of a discursive formation (e.g.
Foucault) or style in the Spenglerian sense. According to the “Spenglerian”
approach, adopted in this study, a style of thinking is a fundamental and enduring
way of being-in-the-world, allowing reality the emerge in a certain manner, not
only discernible in research practices, but in all other realms of culture (art,
politics, religion, sexuality, etc.) as well. Thus, whereas the Spenglerian concept
is decidedly more comprehensive, we should acknowledge similarities as well,
for instance when it comes to emphasising continuity between medieval
experimentalism and modern experimental science (Crombie 1952/1959;
Crombie 1953).
§ 8. Methodology: discerning styles of thinking
The ambition of the styles-of-thinking approach is to understand a particular
epoch from within, to enter the tableau as it were, as an effort in retrieval. We
need a point of access, e.g. an art work or a building, and in addition we need a
guide, e.g. an author. Primary sources are produced by authors who were
contemporaries, still sharing the same spirit and adhering to the same style of
thinking, participating in the same cultural ambiance. In most sources, however,
there is a tension between the world of the subject (the author) and the world in
which the recorded events took place, as Hegel already pointed out (above).
What exactly is it that we aim to recover? A particular mood, a particular
experience? Yes, but ultimately, our aim is to discern the epoch’s guiding idea,
its philosopheme, its grounding conviction: an a priori insight which develops
into a full-fledged style. First, there is an initial moment when this guiding
conviction is articulated in its original form, often in a secluded location (e.g.
Plato’s garden, or the apostle’s cenacle). Subsequently, the philosopheme begins
to spread, begins to realise itself, facing opposition, conflict and resistance. Its
validity is challenged and questioned. Via this moment of negativity, however,
the grounding idea will gain in precision, discreteness and strength. Finally, the
basic conviction realises itself in a tangible, affirmative manner, giving rise to
cities and landscapes, buildings and practices, artworks and experiments,
institutions and schools, enabling and encouraging individuals to speak and act.
The style of thinking is the “energy” of an epoch in the Aristotelian sense of
ἐνέργεια, the idea that is actually at work, as an effective and activating source
of inspiration. Its basic logic reveals itself in a drastic reorganisation of the sociocultural environment. It is the spirit (νοῦς) which governs the world during a
particular period and by which this world is made, to some extent. The world
Styles of thinking
41
becomes a theatre where the guiding principle is self-consciously enacted, and
where it proliferates to verify its validity (its truth). Experiences of mismatch,
insufficiency or frustration cannot refute the guiding principle as such. Rather
they function as indications that some obstacles still have to be removed, that
more effort is still required. The guiding, creative and affirmative principle will
never be fully realised, however. Resistance will never completely subside. Even
during periods of maximal dominance, other, recessive (rival) principles remain
active, as countervailing powers, visible in instances of recoil.
Initially, the idea is allegedly pure, but also disconnected. It has to be
adopted, both individually and collectively, to realise itself through human action,
giving rise to contradictory experiences of success and failure. Yet, precisely
when resistance seems eliminated and the final moment of full realisation seems
at hand, a new, equally bold and disconcerting idea already announces itself.
The guiding idea, the spirit of the time, realises itself in particular
practices, in specific events (such as political decisions or scientific discoveries)
or in specific works of art. For us, they provide exemplifications of the guiding
idea, points of access to explore the spirit of a particular epoch, allowing us to
enter a particular ambiance and to explore it from within.
A drama may play this function (Euripides’ Maenads as a window into
the Dionysian world) or a building (the Pantheon as a window into Apollonian
existence). Eventually, the guiding principle creates, governs and organises a
whole world. To understand a particular epoch means to grasp its guiding
organising thought. This guiding thought (initially quite abstract and diffuse)
needs externality, resistance even, to realise itself, and to become increasingly
discrete. In the confrontation with other ideas, it becomes clear that, although the
principle may seem self-evident, a particular worldview is actually entailed in it.
It overcomes resistance and acquires concreteness by incorporating and
materialising itself into a work, be it a building, an institution or an artwork. The
principle is affirmative and productive, but struggle is needed to realise and
express it. The ultimate expression of a guiding idea is a civilisation, a world
order. But even a civilisation is still in need of concrete exemplifications to
become tangible and readable. Concrete exemplifications also materialise the
tension between the realisation and its guiding ideal. They exemplify the idea,
but never fully or completely.
Thus, the guiding idea is an active, energetic principle, evolving into a
style of thinking, realising itself via individual and collective activities of
concrete human beings. Their activities contribute, directly or indirectly, to the
realisation of the idea. Dialectically speaking, whereas the guiding idea initially
emerges as an abstract principle, hard work is required to develop it further and
to overcome resistance, allowing the idea to fully realise itself. Even if individuals
focus on their personal interests and needs, they may nonetheless contribute to
the realisation of the guiding principle. There is a spontaneous adherence, a
collective conversion and convergence if you like. The principle encourages and
42
Styles of Thinking
enables human beings to act in a certain manner. We never write or act in a sociocultural vacuum.
Whereas daily experience tends to foreground differences of opinion, we
underestimate the basic unanimity at work in daily practice and discourse. We
fail to realise that we are actually and collectively under the sway of an a priori
view, although some may be more content with it than others. Rather than being
confirmed by experience, this idea, this ideology makes is possible for us to gain
experience at all. The basic objective of a styles-of-thinking approach is to
recognise and capture the guiding idea of a particular epoch, including our own.
The aim is to see how a particular ideology is always already at work, also in our
own era: the shared ambiance that is noticeable and audible in books and movies,
behaviours and buildings, conferences and conversations, determining the way in
which our deliberations are enacted, our questions and answers are phrased.
To recognise this, we must follow the discourse of a particular epoch as
literally as possible and from an oblique perspective (Zwart 2017b), focussing on
the how, the phrasings, the shared discursive style. Humans are wired to think in
a certain manner. Should we interpret distant events and utterances in terms of
our own style of thinking (e.g. judging history from the point of view of, say, neoliberalism), we fail to recognise the collisions that are unfolding, the
gigantomachia that is raging: the struggles evolving at a fundamental level, not
between political programs or specific artistic ideals, but between incompatible
styles. In every initiative or enterprise, a particular style of thinking is always
already at work.
In order to recognise this, we need to develop an oblique perspective
(intentio obliqua), enabling us to acquire a comprehensive view. When studying
historical figures, we are not so much interested in what they do or what they
believe, but rather in how they act and how they believe. The Greek term for this
is κατάσκοπειν, adopting a side-ways position, a view from within as it were, in
order to study a particular practice, subculture or scene. Being there, so to speak,
albeit as an outsider. Our intention is to study a particular artwork or discourse or
institute in such a way that we are reviewing the style of thinking at work in it,
exemplified by it.
When Pentheus follows Dionysus to investigate the Maenads, this is what
he intends to do: κατάσκοπον µαινάδων (979). But the case of Pentheus also
shows that there are risks involved. Self-analysis is an important prerequisite. We
have to know ourselves (we have to probe our own style of thinking) in order to
be able to appreciate the styles of thinking we encounter, while by studying other
styles we deepen our self-understanding. Pentheus fell victim to his endeavour
because he failed to recognise that the conflict between two styles of thinking
(Dionysian versus Apollonian) was also an internal struggle, raging in his own
psyche. By framing the Dionysian as other, he failed to come to terms with his
own desire, proving more susceptible to Dionysian thinking than he was willing
to acknowledge, – but this will be explained in more detail in the next section.
Styles of thinking
43
To summarize: in the course of its history, a grounding idea gives rise to
a style and is adopted as a guiding principle: tested, elaborated, affirmed and
verified, until it is abandoned and deserted, giving the floor to a novel idea, so
that a wave-cycle starts again. Although there are periods of astonishing bloom
and apparent supremacy, previous styles of thinking may manifest themselves
temporarily again, as a return of the repressed, as intermezzo, in opposition to the
new, offensive style, as “Renaissance”. And yet, this recurrence will always be
tainted with what it aims to oppose. What is high noon from the perspective of
Apollonian thinking, moreover, appears as dead of night from a Magian
perspective. The transition from the Magian to the Faustian style occurred shortly
after the year thousand, which explains why the term “Middle Ages” is
emphatically absent in Spengler’s vocabulary. He sees this label as profoundly
mistaken. As if, during this extended period of time, nothing of significance
happened. What is known as the Middle Ages, covers two completely different
periods, namely the Magian epoch (the “early” Middle Ages) and the Faustian
period (the “high” Middle Ages).
Spengler aims to develop a global framework which also includes
Chinese, Indian and Mexican cultures. This study has a more limited scope,
focussing primarily on Dionysian, Apollonian, Magian and Faustian ideas, not
because other styles are less important, but because of my scholarly limitations,
for these are the cultures which I am able to experience “from within” to some
extent. If Hegel is right, however, that the course of world history moves
Westward, China is likely to become the next station after Silicon Valley, so that
history has moved full circle. In Chapter 6, I will try to amend my Eurocentric
bias somewhat and broaden the scope into a more global view.
How to explore a style of thinking, notably an extinguished one? How to
enter a lost world of thoughts? History moves from past to present, but as scholars
we move in the opposite direction, vade retro, from present to past, starting with
the remnants, so as to reach out to the idea which once inspired their construction.
We begin as illiterates. For those who aim to gain access to Dionysian,
Apollonian and Magian thinking, notably the primary sources, some basic
knowledge of Greek and Latin is a must. If we start with an intuitive
preconception, it will usually prove misguided. Misguided preconceptions must
be sublated via a thorough confrontation, forcing us to explore alternative
possibilities or even to reject our initial view. Via such experiences, we may reach
a more comprehensive understanding: validated and verified. Flashes of insight,
acquired along the way, become incorporated into a coherent view.
When we are studying a particular style of thinking, we are at the same
time studying our own style of thinking, deepening our own self-understanding.
Gradually it dawns on us that what initially seems foreign and other, may actually
be part of our cultural memory. Should this not be the case, we would be overtly
unable to enter these distant worlds. In order to meaningfully confront Dionysian,
Apollonian, Magian or Faustian thinking, we must to some extent become
Dionysian, Apollonian, Magian and Faustian ourselves. We must recognise
44
Styles of Thinking
ourselves in the Dionysian, Apollonian, Magian or Faustian mindset. As Hegel
once phrases it: “Nur der Geist erkennt den Geist” (1970, p. 394). Only insofar
as we are able to experience the conflict and incompatibility of the Dionysian and
the Apollonian principle, we are able to appreciate Euripides’ Bacchae, and only
insofar as we are able to experience the conflict and incompatibility of the
Apollonian and the Magian principle, we are able to understand the spirit that
gave rise to the Pantheon in Rome. We are able to deepen our insight into
Dionysian or Apollonian thinking because we already know these worlds to some
extent. When visiting the Pantheon for the first time, we may feel strangely at
home in such an ambiance. We should not necessarily see ourselves as utter
strangers to a particular logic. There may be a basic affinity to begin with,
something to work from. Still, it requires hard work to comprehend an artwork
from within. This is the difference between reading and rereading, between
sightseeing and κατάσκοπειν.
How to determine the profile of a particular style of thinking? A method
is not readily available. Building on Hegel, Spengler and others, it will have to
be developed along the way. Nonetheless, some methodological guidelines can
be provided. A style of thinking entails a grounding idea (a philosopheme) which
articulates itself in the form of a concise slogan or summons: “Live in accordance
with nature”; “Prepare yourself for the turn” (“Forsake this present world);
“Existence equals will to power”. A style of thinking is a grounding idea which
realises itself in social, cultural and intellectual practices, and embodies itself in
buildings, research programs and artworks. A style of thinking fosters religious,
moral, scholarly or artistic practices and proliferates, affecting both “subjects”
(active human individuals) and “objects (tools, artworks, monuments,
landscapes, institutions, and the like). By realising and embodying itself, it
demonstrates its validity, its inspirational force. It commences as an ideal and
realises itself in the real, but never exhaustingly. The idea or ideal is never fully
realised, never fully identical with the real. It remains a critical norm, giving rise
to the experience of “not yet” (nondum). Therefore, we must discern the ideal in
the real, the rational in the inchoate. A grounding idea affects the whole. It is not
restricted to particular practices, but infects all aspects of human civilisations.
To recognise the grounding idea, we will focus on specific objects of
enquiry, particular intellectual practices or artworks, concrete exemplifications,
speaking out to us as mouthpieces of a whole world. A grounding idea not only
allows individuals to understand their world, but also to shape, transform and
interact with it. Apollonian geometry sees itself not merely as an intelligent tool,
but as the self-conscious awareness of a natural order which can effectively be
brought to the fore with the help of Apollonian geometry. Magian astronomy (i.e.
the effort to determine the opportune moment) is in tune with a world which
emerges as an ambiance for pilgrimage. And the Faustian will to power
experiences its driving “will” (its willing drive) not only as something which
works internally (as a subjective urge), but also as the guiding force through
Styles of thinking
45
which nature shapes itself. A genuine artwork is self-made to some extent,
namely as the realisation of the idea that is guiding human creativity.
A style of thinking cannot be captured merely by reading the sources.
We must go and visit the things themselves. Take a work of art like Raphael’s
fresco The School of Athens. We may study the technical papers, the technical
details, but should also be sensitive to how we are summoned and affected by it.
A work of art calls out to us. An important truth or insight is conveyed by it,
shared with us, entrusted to us. The artwork’s expressiveness is the primal
moment. It is that which forces us to have a closer look. Our analysis remains a
dialogue. In principle, all artworks belonging to a certain style convey the same
idea. Instead of being “disinterested” observers, we should opt for confrontation.
Notwithstanding the body of scholarship that has been accumulated, there is
always a knowledge deficit, a lack of understanding, an omission, a neglect,
something which remained unsaid. The meaning of the artwork is never fully
exhausted. Research means recovering the logic of Apollonian, Magian or
Faustian thinking in such a way that we allow ourselves to temporarily become
Apollonian, Magian or Faustian to some extent. It entails an exercise in
revivification.
The end result of such a process is tested experience. An artwork
becomes a point of entry into a lost world of meaning, so that we begin to feel at
home in this lost world to some extent. Somehow, this world is still alive, as part
of our cultural memory (Assmann 1992). Since the advent of modernity, we have
been negating the pre-Faustian past. These previous forms of existence are not
completely lost to us, however, and may still be retrieved. Scholarship and
“objective archaeology” may be complemented by “inward expeditions”. The
novel Carmen by Prosper Mérimée, for instance, begins as the report of an
archaeological expedition, aimed at pinpointing the exact location of the battle of
Munda, which allegedly took place in what is now Andalusia. Gradually,
however, the novel becomes something rather different: the retrieval of an
obfuscated way of being-in-the-world, marginalised perhaps, but never
completely barred. The author becomes a time-traveller as it were, discovering
remnants of a lost culture in the folds and margins of modern civilisation.
Likewise, while reading Tacitus’ Germania, aspects of it may resurge in later
epochs. Wagner operas may function as acoustic archaeology (Zwart 2012),
aimed at retrieving forgotten Celtic and Germanic, Magian and Faustian
soundscapes. Only as carriers of cultural memories can we meaningfully relate to
Mérimée’s Carmen or Wagner’s Ring.
This phenomenon, that we, outsiders, may still recognise the Geist
which realises itself in a particular cultural ambiance, has been thematised as
“cultural memory” (Halbwachs 1950; Assmann 1988). A similar idea is at work
in the novels of Jack London. We must deepen our understanding of such
phenomena along the way, by actually practicing this type of enquiry. We seem
strangers in unknown worlds, but at the same time we are drawn towards its,
returning natives as it were. We must bracket our 21st century convictions to
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become sufficiently sensitive to the sounds, colours and gestures of the world we
are entering. The once so captivating grounding idea may still be recognisable for
us, as we make our questions and interpretations more precise. Let this suffice as
a guide to help us reconstruct the zeitgeist of past epochs. In the next section, this
methodology will be put to the test, using an ancient Greek tragedy as a window
into a lost world.
§ 9. A methodological exercise: Dionysian thinking
In Birth of Tragedy, Friedrich Nietzsche (1980, KSA1) confronts the balanced,
rational, Apollonian principle with its destructive, de-individuating Dionysian
rival, as we have seen. Greek tragedy, he famously argues, staged a struggle
between two aesthetic styles, represented by Apollo and Dionysus as the divine
patrons of Greek theatre. From an Apollonian perspective, measure,
intelligibility, harmony and self-restraint enable us to manage our passions
without eradicating them. The Dionysian alternative remained very much alive
as cultural backdrop, however, so that Greek tragedy entailed a temporary
exposure to it, in the safe enclosure of the theatre, a dramatic crucible as it were:
a dramatic containment of that which horrifies us (Gish 2016).
According to Nietzsche, Greek understanding of art did not express itself
in concepts (Begriffe) but in powerful images (Gestalten), e.g. Apollo and
Dionysus, representing two incompatible principles: measure versus excess,
individuality versus intoxication (Rausch), self-knowledge versus frenzy
(Taumel), rationality versus the irrational. Greek tragedy enacted a collision
between these principles, so that Apollonian harmony was challenged by a
disruptive intrusion of Dionysian celebration. The subsequent dominance of
Apollonian rationalism, represented by Socrates and his school, resulted in the
death of tragedy, Nietzsche claimed. For Nietzsche, Richard Wagner’s
Gesamtkunstwerk represented a return of the repressed, a reinvigoration of the
ancient contest. I will come back to Nietzsche’s interpretation at the end of this
section. First, I will reread Bacchae as an agonistic force-field, a fascinating
drama which allows both ancient and contemporary audiences to observe how
the battle between the two styles or principles is acted out.
Bacchantes are female followers of Dionysus, whose passions have
become “unregulated”, from an Apollonian point of view. From a Dionysian
perspective, a somewhat different type of choreography emerges: Maenads
celebrate a Dionysian, rather than a formless pattern of expression. They
abandoned their homes to live as nomads in the hills and mountains outside the
city walls, exulting in “lustful” behaviour (again: from an Apollonian
perspective). At first sight, they seem idyllic, peace-loving, pastoral creatures,
living in harmony with nature in the sense that, during ritual dances, they become
one with nature (with their mountainous ambiance), to such an extent that all
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things seem to move as one single being. Yet, their devastating aggression can
easily be aroused.
Dionysus explains in his prologue that time has come to take the stage
himself. He has adopted a human form, posing as an oriental androgynous
“Stranger”, a priest and follower of the god, so that the audience from the very
beginning sees two persons, sees double as it were (Saban 2003), confronted with
two personae: man and god, “Stranger” and “Dionysus”, actor and director.
Dionysus takes the stage to confront Pentheus, a fanatic youthful devotee of
Apollonian thinking, a guardian – φύλαξ – well-trained in apollonian logic. By
staging Dionysus as his antagonist, Bacchae becomes meta–theatre (Segal 1997):
a theatre about theatre as such, a dialectical art form exploring the dynamics of
truth and illusion, combat and surrender. The purpose of Dionysus is to reveal
himself. The sheer impact of his presence, in combination with his psychological
and dramaturgical skills, will drive Pentheus, the god-opposing (θεοµάχος) ruler,
into intoxication and surrender, not by punishing Pentheus directly, but by
bringing the obfuscated, Dionysian aspect of his personality to the fore, thereby
exposing him as a divided subject.
I will reread Euripides’ dramatic masterpiece Bacchae or Maenads as a
case study. To discern what is at stake, we must approach the drama in such a
way that we ourselves may witness the scene from a position of proximity. We
must closely study the events, as literally and physically as possible. Indeed, had
we been there (712), we might have fallen under Dionysus’ demonic spell
ourselves. How to achieve this, how to allow this collision (skilfully staged by
Euripides) to become our experience? How to become eye-witnesses ourselves?
Although it remains a challenge, requiring a combination of hard work
and sensitivity to available materials (to be handled with utmost consideration),
some methodological guidelines have already been provided above. First and
foremost, although the use of translations as auxiliary materials is obviously
allowed, and even inevitable, it is prerequisite to consult the original text as well
and to familiarise ourselves with the exact wordings, the idiosyncrasies of the
language, as intimately and bilingually as possible. We must spell the primary
sources to the letter, word by word, especially the crucial passages.
As indicated, King Pentheus is an Apollonian, iconoclastic youngster
who brashly denies the existence of the god (δαίµων) Dionysus. He refuses to
acknowledge the force of the Dionysian principle, thereby arousing the god’s
outrage. Pentheus, voicing enlightened Apollonian rationality, wants to cleanse
the city of Thebe from “Asian” superstitions. He wants to rid it of Dionysian
frenzy (µανία). The most unsettling symptom is the unruly behaviour of Theban
women, many of whom already left their homes to join the Maenads, a tribe of
marauding female nomads, living in the wild mountains, dancing and chanting in
honour of the new god, while honouring Aphrodite as lesbian lovers as well (225).
Their erotic-religious furor seems impossible to contain. The upsetting influx of
foreign ideas is noticeable inside the city walls as well. Even grandfather Cadmus
is about to join the festivities. He has given in to the effeminate trend, carrying a
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thyrsus in his hand: a ritual spear worn by Bacchae, as a sign of loyalty to the
god. Although wise old Teiresias advises Pentheus to turn “bacchant” himself
(313), the latter proudly refuses to give in to this pandemic craze and its pestilent
rites. He boldly refuses to submit himself.
A gender dimension is clearly involved in this, for he notably refuses to
become the servant or captive of women who, according to his (Apollonian)
logic, are supposed to serve him. He refuses to accept a drastic reversal of roles,
where he, a male, would suddenly be supposed to serve his female servants
(δουλεύοντα δουλείαις, 803). He is determined to fight the Bacchic pestilence,
which is turning women into hunters, hunting down and capturing men, like
beasts (1204), armed with thyrsus-staffs as javelins, catching them in their nets
(847). Roles are reversed as women force armed men to flight (764), but Pentheus
firmly intends to defend the Apollonian principle of harmony and stability which,
for him, logically includes the systemic subjection of women, something which
is considered “natural”: legitimised by the Apollonian understanding of nature.
He intends to avert the disruptive threat as a guardian (φύλαξ) of his principle, by
capturing and re-domesticating the transgressive Maenads, putting a stop to their
nomadic lesbian love-making (958). But his Apollonian understanding of nature
as a balanced harmonious order suddenly finds itself confronted with a
completely different manifestation of nature.
Like an experienced stage director who carefully dresses his actors (Segal
1997; Mueller 2016), Dionysus cleverly leads the antagonists into a “mighty
clash” (εις αγώνα µέγαν, 973), a gigantomachia between two incompatible
interpretations of nature, with dire consequences for inter-gender relationships.
Step by step, we witness how Dionysus lures Pentheus out of his safe Apollonian
entourage and into the trap prepared for him. Pentheus becomes emasculated and
de-domesticated, robbed of his identity. This entails a series of role reversals.
First of all, Dionysus himself, arriving from a journey through Asia with his train
of wildly dancing and chanting women (who perform their revelling rituals
preferably at night), has assumed a mortal human shape (µορφή, 4) as a prophet
of the god. The most dramatic reversal, however, involves Pentheus himself.
Instead of guiding others (into battle, calling them to arms, as was his
original intention), he allows a suspect stranger (Dionysus) to become his guide.
Subsequently, he allows himself to be transformed from a male into a woman (εἰς
γυναῖκας ἐξ ἀνδρὸς, 820), clad in the attire of a Maenad. For in order to secretly
approach them and study their idyllic, bird-like lovemaking, he must
paradoxically become very much like them. He adopts their outfit, acquires their
shape and form, as a true “daughter of Cadmus”. Indeed, he becomes a Maenad
in a remarkably convincingly manner (πρέπεις δὲ Κάδµου θυγατέρων µορφὴν
µιᾷ, 917). Allegedly, he does all this to enter the Maenad’s mountainous world
and spy on them, for that is what he intends to do: to spy them out (πρῶτον εἰς
κατασκοπήν, 838).
The apex of conversion and reversal is Pentheus’ “coming out”, when he
literally steps out of the palace to enter the scene, properly costumed in Maenad
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garb. Rather than serving as a “contraceptive” or immunisation device, the
maenad costume singles him out as prime target (Giegerich 1998), while
Dionysus now overtly controls the situation. Instead of seeing Maenads, he is to
become one himself, ritually dressed and carefully prepared to serve as sacrifice.
The transformation is so convincing, and the experience of exposing
himself to the gaze of the Stranger so intoxicating, that he suddenly sees
everything double: two suns, two cities of Thebe. The Stranger now seems like
an intimidating bull to him (912, ff.), indicating how vulnerable Pentheus has
become, although Dionysus explains that he now finally sees things as they truly
are. Whereas Dionysus is deified, Pentheus is enslaved. While being hustled out
to catch the Maenads, he is in bondage himself. His symptom, seeing everything
twice, may indicate his revelling intoxication, but it also reflects a moment of
metamorphosis, as he finally allows his feminine alter ego to manifest itself, as if
he is combining male and female (or Apollonian and Dionysian) sense organs,
replacing one set by another.
For Pentheus, the very experience of wearing the Maenad costume instils
frantic desire (Mueller 2016). No sooner has he been dressed up, or he already
tosses his head backwards and shakes loose his carefully coiffed hairlocks. Fully
dressed up as a Maenad, he asks Dionysus whether he now really looks like
Agave and her sisters, as if Dionysus is holding up a mirror for him and Pentheus
is exulting in his likeness to the god’s most exquisite followers. We see two
Agave’s, the original one and her feminised copy. Under the sway of the
Dionysian principle, Pentheus’ identity and individuality become fluid and
morphed. The former guardian now wants to be mistaken for a woman. Under
the demon’s spell, the despotic ruler acts like a coquette little girl, for instance
when he asks Dionysus whether he now will become as strong as a real Maenad,
while in reality he has become completely helpless: no match at all for a fearsome
Bacchante. His religious scepticism, which apparently had been overcompensating a secret longing for transgression, has been swept aside by the
dizzying effects of his effeminate dress. The Bacchic cult is a “queer” religion,
involving masculinised females and feminised males, turning women into
huntresses while the emblem of hoplite masculinity becomes a childish coquette,
concerned with his looks (Theodoridou 2008).
Seeing that he has utterly lost the struggle for power, the “wrestling bout”
as he phrases it, Pentheus now fully surrenders himself to Dionysus. He is
completely in the demon’s hands and fully belongs to him (σοὶ γὰρ ἀνακείµεσθα
δή, 934). His mind (φρήν) is drastically reset. The cross-dressing becomes an
initiation rite, a rite of passage, and he experiences a full conversion into a
completely different way of thinking (µεθέστηκας φρενῶν, 944). Dionysus now
fully and literally possesses him and Pentheus encourages him to do whatever he
likes with him (Powell 1990). For Dionysus, having seduced Pentheus into
dressing up and surrendering himself to him, indicates that the decisive step of
the initiation rite has been successfully completed (Mueller 2016). Now, he will
guide Pentheus through the city (to have him mocked and humiliated) and up to
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the mountains. Someone else will bring him back: Agave will lift him high up
and carry him effortlessly in her arms (944), and Pentheus is thrilled by the
prospect, exulting in utter powerlessness and helplessness.
When he summons Pentheus to come forward and reveal his renewed
self, but also later, when Dionysus, with surprising ease, hoists him into a tree,
the accusative form Penthea (913, 1070) suggests that the metamorphosis has
already been successfully completed.
In all these instances of transformation and role reversal, the Greek
wording is important, literally emphasising what is actually happening. Pentheus
transfigures and migrates, from one particular ambiance (the city of Thebe) into
a completely different one (a mountainous wilderness), but also out of the world
of males, into the world of women (εἰς γυναῖκας ἐξ ἀνδρὸς) as we have seen,
assuming a female form (µορφή) as camouflage, in order to spy on the Bacchantes
and to approach them as closely as possible, literally and figuratively: to study
them without being seen. But this role reversal (from male to female) leads to a
series of dramatic additional reversals. Instead of defending the Apollonian order
by opposing the threat (his initial impulse), he is seized by the sudden desire (813)
to stalk their encampment and witness their drunken, entranced, erotic rituals.
Driven by voyeuristic desire to see a “primal scene” (Greco 2016), he becomes
utterly exited over the idea of secretly spying on the Maenads (κατάσκοπον
µαινάδων, 979) with passionate curiosity. Initially, his motive is to acquire
strategic intelligence, but it soon becomes evident that what he really desires it to
witness erotic activities, as a first introductory step towards becoming one of
them. Under the sway of this scopic drive, he allows himself to be clad in female
attire (ἐν γυναικοµίµῳ στολᾷ, 979), giggling, with curly long hair, neatly dressed
up in a woman’s robe by Dionysus, who acts as his tire-maiden, so that heroic
readiness gives way to travesty and parody. The stage becomes a psychic retort,
a vessel (Saban 2003, p. 29) for conducting radical metamorphosis. Crossdressing is not merely a more or less comical and temporary change in outward
appearance. Pentheus has emptied himself for the god and now, bereft of his
previous (masculine, Apollonian) characteristics, he has become a kenotic subject
in a psychic experiment, ready for a reconfiguration into the Dionysian mode.
He abdicates as king, but as Apollonian individual as well. He is both the
target of the intervention and the initiated adept, an assistant to the god, curious
to know whether he has convincingly altered in the right direction, whether his
outward appearance concurs with his psychic experience of transmutation
(changing gender, but also adopting the Dionysian mood). Pentheus, now very
pleased with his costume, asks Dionysus whether he walks and stands like a
woman, while Dionysus carefully arranges his curls, skirt and posture, alluding
that a special fate awaits him. Dionysus also provides him with protocol
instructions: how to hold and handle his thyrsus, how to wear his coif. With his
long and perfumed hairlocks, Dionysus is a bigender transvestite himself: “not at
all a wrestler”, as Pentheus initially characterises him (455), although eventually
he confesses himself to be the weaker wrestler of the two. Initially promising
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Pentheus to secretly lead him through Thebe, Dionysus actually exposes him to
ridicule, morphed into a female shape (γυναικόµορφον, 854). And instead of
spotting Maenads, Pentheus himself is the one who is being spotted. Instead of
targeting them, he himself is the one who is being targeted by them, so that the
hunter (initially determined to “hunt” these women down from their hills and
“trap them in iron”, 228, 231) becomes their prey. Dionysus lifts him into a tree
for optimal view, positioning him in an optimal seat from where he may enjoy
the spectacle. As spectator, he assumes that he will remain himself unseen. The
stranger has guided him to a scene: a performance (θεωρία, 1047), a
gigantomachia between rival worldviews, but at the crucial moment the stage
director disappears from view, so as to allow the action to unfold. Rather than
seeing them, the women discover Pentheus soon enough, seated in his treetop,
wherein he is now trapped. Angry Maenads tear his fir tree to the ground with
brute physical force.
In a previous dialogue with Dionysus, Pentheus agreed that he should not
try to gain victory over these women using physical strength (ου σθένει νικητέον
γυναίκας, 952), but now, as soon as he falls from the tree, Agave physically
attacks him, brutally clutching his left arm in both her hands, setting her foot
against his ribs, like a skilled wrestler, and furiously tearing his arm out of its
joint. After this humiliating defeat, which leaves him helpless, other Maenads
quickly join in to finish him off, while the rest of them cheers aloud. His body is
torn to pieces and Agave triumphantly impales his severed head on her thyrsuspoint, crowning it as it were. She then demonstratively carries her precious war
trophy across the mountain scenery, even taking it home with her, with the
intention of fixing it against the palace wall (1239), as a winners’ prize or hunting
spoil. When Agave regains her Apollonian senses, re-entering the Apollonian
ambiance as it were, she greatly repents her deeds, but these cannot be undone.
As mater dolorosa she now carefully pieces together his scattered bodily remains
as partial objects in their proper order (the compositio membrorum scene).
To follow closely what happens, to enter the scene, we must closely
follow the text, until we ourselves are caught in the act of spying on the Maenads,
albeit without submerging into this Dionysian world completely, that is: without
really becoming Pentheus, sharing his fate. Contrary to Pentheus himself, we are
both insiders and outsiders. Still, for a brief moment in time, the drama allows us
to enter the Dionysian ambiance, so as to partially live up to our methodological
adage of being there. It is as if this same fate could have (or should have) befallen
us, trespassing into these forbidden realms, while refusing to pay our respect to
the god. Euripides’ drama allows readers and audiences to visit the Maenad world
and to experience the Dionysian mood: the violent and furious Dionysian logic,
the Dionysian principle, which enables or forces these women to act, and forces
Pentheus into submission, overpowering him and even tearing him apart. The
brief, uneven wrestling match between Pentheus and Agave, their battle of the
sexes, is actually a clash between two principles, two styles of thinking. By
robbing Pentheus of his guiding principle, Dionysus knows that, in a bacchantic
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setting, he will not stand a chance against his female foe, perfectly adapted to
these unfamiliar surroundings. The drama, culminating in an intergender
wrestling match between Pentheus and Agave, is actually a battle between two
philosophemes, each of them giving rise to two completely different styles of
thinking and acting, namely the Apollonian and the Dionysian style.
These styles are incompatible, but contrary to Nietzsche’s interpretation
the Dionysian principle is not counter-rational per se. It is only from an
Apollonian perspective that the Dionysian mode strikes us as irrational. On closer
inspection, it has an irresistible logic of its own, as demonstrated by Euripides’
tragedy. What is wisdom for some, is folly for others. For Teiresias, siding with
the Dionysian principle, Pentheus is a fool speaking folly (µῶρα γὰρ µῶρος λέγει,
369), while wise insights seem sheer folly to a fool (480). Cadmus adds to this by
pointing out that Pentheus’ rationality is actually the opposite of wisdom, from a
Dionysian perspective (φρονῶν οὐδὲν φρονεῖς, 332). While Dionysus has kept
his reason, he claims that Pentheus has lost his (σωφρονῶν οὐ σώφροσιν, 503).
Whereas Dionysus sees Pentheus as “strange” (δεινός, 971), Dionysus, the
stranger, is depicted as even more “terrible / strange” (δεινότατος, 861) to
disbelievers. Both interpret the conduct of the other as an unacceptable insulting
insolence (ὕβρεις ὑβρίζειν, 247).
While Pentheus believes he is doing his Apollonian duty, Teiresias
accuses him of being a bad citizen (κακός πολίτης, 271). The drama enacts the
various steps in the process of initiation or conversion, luring Pentheus out of his
familiar Apollonian ambiance and into the Dionysian wild, where he is exposed
to a style of acting and thinking which he experiences as intoxicating. While
Pentheus interrogates Dionysus, their dialogue seems remarkably reminiscent of
the famous gospel scene mentioned above: Christ before Pilate, two protagonists
representing colliding principles, and therefore unable to understand each other.
When Pentheus asks him whether the stranger can actually see his god, the latter
replies affirmatively. My god is right beside me, he claims, although you, being
impious, cannot seem him (502), while “I can see him seeing me” (ὁρῶν ὁρῶντα,
470). The exact phrasing is important here, for seeing or conversing with a god
is a privilege of the initiated: only true believers can experience the god’s
presence, only they discern how god is looking at them and after them. Only they
experience themselves as standing in god’s field of vision. Only the initiated are
sufficiently gifted and enabled to experience the existence of their god. To
Pentheus, the last of the unconverted as it were, this experience is initially denied,
until he undergoes his dramatic and fatal transformation. When the stranger, who
actually is Dionysus, is miraculously freed from his dungeon (much like Saint
Peter), he can indeed rightfully claim that he freed himself, effortlessly (αὐτὸς
ἐµαυτὸν ῥᾳδίως ἄνευ πόνου, 613). While Pentheus suffers dismemberment
(σπαραγµός), as a typical, Dionysian punishment, Dionysus arises from the
grave. This is only a temporary outcome, however. The struggle will continue.
Bacchae is not only about gender and power, but also about knowledge.
Dionysus tempts and plays with Pentheus’ desire to see, in the sense of θεωρία:
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watching the forbidden spectacle. He exploits Pentheus’ desire to spy upon the
secret Bacchant rites from a vantage point of Apollonian enlightenment, like a
scholar almost, aiming to see clearly and distinctly, giving in to his desire to
fathom the unknown. Pentheus wants to gaze upon the worshipping Bacchants
with rational precision, without being seen himself, allegedly a form of
espionage. He wants to explore the terrain in preparation of a military operation
against them: his “rationalisation” if you like. His risky escapade (his
scopophilia) is legitimised as part of a campaign, launched to restrain the oriental
craze with military force. Yet, instead of counteracting the Dionysian threat,
Pentheus, the “theoretical hunter” (Gish 2016) goes native and is captured by the
Bacchants as their ultimate prey.
The encounter with the Bacchantes is a play inside a play, not enacted
but vividly narrated (ενάργεια). The vividness was so overwhelming that
spectators of Greek tragedy had the experience of taking part in the events
themselves. By witnessing the fight between two well-trained verbal gymnasts
(Pentheus versus Dionysus, 492) and by observing (κατάσκοπειν) Pentheus
observing the Bacchants, we ourselves become involved in the dialectics, where
roles become dramatically reversed until the architecture of Apollonian
rationality collapses. Dionysus is the winning competitor (αντίπαλος) in this
verbal-dramatic wrestling contest, and wrestling (πάλη) is a key metaphor in
Euripides’ tragedy – although the actual wrestling (in the literal, physical sense
of the term) is relegated to Dionysus’ female retinue, so that the Dionysian
principle regains its dominance.
Let us now reconsider Nietzsche’s view on Euripides Bacchae. As said,
Nietzsche adopted the idea of a tragic rivalry between Apollonian and Dionysian
principles from Wagner, but a number of problems are entailed in his subsequent
handling of these ideas, and his elaboration has been considered problematic from
the very outset. Notably because, as soon as he actually applies these principles
to the Bacchae of Euripides, one of the most impressive works of Greek tragedy,
he confusingly seems to spoil Wagner’s conception. According to Nietzsche,
Euripides was a one-sided “rationalist” in the Apollonian sense, someone who
(again: according to Nietzsche) had wanted to eliminate the all−too–powerful
Dionysian element and to rebuild tragedy as a purely Apollonian world-view.
Towards the end of his life, that is: when he composed Bacchae, Euripides
himself posed the question whether the Dionysian principle should exist at all.
Should it not be eradicated from Greek soil? Of course, we should, the poet says
to us, Nietzsche argues, if only it were possible, but the god Dionysus is too
powerful. His most intelligent opponent, Pentheus, is unexpectedly charmed by
Dionysus and organises his own destruction. Euripides actually sides with
Socrates, Nietzsche claims, although he uses dramatic dialogue rather than
Socratic logic as his means of expression. This is a remarkable view indeed, and
my rereading of Bacchae explicitly contradicts Nietzsche’s interpretation.
Whatever may be said about Euripides, he is decidedly not a one-sided
Apollonian Enlightener, as Nietzsche seems to be suggesting. Rather, I presented
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Bacchae as a dialectical confrontation between two styles of thinking, between
the Dionysian and the Apollonian worldview, rereading Euripides’ tragedy as a
magnificent dialectical highlight. Would it have been possible for Euripides to
compose this tragic masterpiece at all had he not been conscious of and sensitive
to both poles: Apollonian clarity and Dionysian celebration? Why did Nietzsche
revert to such a binary way of thinking, identifying Euripides’ own position as a
playwright with the principle of rational enlightenment, instead of seeing
Euripides as someone who profoundly exposed himself to both dimensions,
exploring their incompatibility on stage? Nietzsche’s characterisation of
Euripides as a rationalist – Nietzsche’s relapse into binary thinking – is both
remarkable and disappointing, given the way in which Euripides stages the
conflict between Apollonian enlightenment and Dionysian celebration, a basic
collision which becomes sublated into tragedy. Even his hero Pentheus is far from
“straight”. What the drama reveals is that there is a Dionysian side to the latter’s
personality as well, making him susceptible to infection. Whether Socratic
immunisation proves a more viable strategy will be further explore in the next
chapter (Chapter 2).
As to the compositio membrorum scene, something similar befell
Euripides’ text as such. A Byzantine text entitled Christus Patiens contains a
great number of lines taken from Euripides Bacchae, notably from lost portions,
as spolia so to speak, botched together as a collage of quotations. This points to
a continuity between the Dionysian an the Magian, between Dionysus and Christ,
and many parallels can indeed be discerned between them: both are good
shepherds, both are benevolent young gods, associated with wine. Nonnus of
Panopolis authored Dionysiaca, an extended tale featuring Dionysus and the
Bacchants in their battles against Indians, but he also composed a hexametric
Paraphrase of the Gospel of John, featuring Jesus as the god of love and wine
(Cavero 2009; Shorrock 2011). This will be taken up in Chapter 3, in my
discussion of Magian thinking.
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Chapter 2. Cosmonauts: Apollonian thinking
The grounding idea of Apollonian thinking is that reality is a perfect geometric
structure, a κόσµος, whose order and harmony can be discerned via
contemplation. Cosmos literally means order or ornament in ancient Greek. This
conviction is not the result of empirical research, but an a priori, self-evident
truth which precedes research and allows certain forms of inquiry to unfold. It is
the starting point, not the result of Apollonian (Euclidean) geometry, elaborated
by Euclid in his manual Elements, but the same idea also guides Apollonian
astronomy, and we find the same conviction at work in Apollonian architecture
and Apollonian politics. To establish a well-proportioned polis, Plato argues, we
must first of all determine the optimal number of citizens (1926/1994, 737C) and
how they should be distributed into sections. The basic schema starts with a
population of 5,040, a number that is optimally manageable because it can be
divided into numbers (2, 3, 4, etc.) up to 10 (737E). Law-making and leadership
require insight into geometric proportionality, i.e. knowledge of the right number
(ἀριθµός). The number 5,040 allows for numerous subdivisions, depending on
the situation, in the sense that warfare, for instance, requires a different
distribution than what is required in times of peace. The number 5,040 is obtained
by multiplying 1 * 2 * 3 * 4 * 5 * 6 * 7. The ratio of societal classes (aristocrats,
artisans, slaves) should be proportional to arrive at a natural situation of stability,
harmony and order.
Like Apollonian politics, Apollonian ethics is an ethic of proportionality:
the middle course (the golden mean), the right measure, while Apollonian
medicine regards health as a state of harmony and balance, for instance between
bodily humours or fluids. We will further explore the profile of the Apollonian
style by allowing two famous artworks to guide us. First of all, the Pompeii
mosaic depicting Plato’s Academy, also used by Peter Sloterdijk in his analysis
of spherical (Apollonian) thinking (1999). Secondly, the School of Athens:
Raphael’s fresco in the Vatican Museum.
§ 1. An intensive idyll
In 1998 and 1999, Peter Sloterdijk published the first parts of his Spheres trilogy,
and in 2004, part three was added. The second part (1999) is entitled Globes and
opens with a Prologue – “An intense idyll”. Here, he discusses a famous Pompeii
mosaic, now in the Archaeological Museum of Naples, depicting a meeting, a
philosophical exchange of ideas. The concentrated attitude is striking. It is as if
an idea, a fundamental thought suddenly overwhelms the scholars involved, as
Sloterdijk phrases it. The artwork immortalises a common fascination (“eine
gemeinsame Bestürzung”). A fundamental insight enforces itself upon them:
something which had never been thought before. Little is said: it is a silent and
contemplative form of conversation. These thinkers, apparently, are facing a
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Styles of Thinking
fundamental truth which is revealed to them and seems to exert an irresistible
intellectual appeal. What the artwork makes visible, according to Sloterdijk, is an
exceptional event (1999, p. 14), a moment of commencement. A collective
enthusiasm engulfs them. And the object of their contemplative admiration is a
geometrical sphere (σφαίρα), representing reality as a whole. This perfect, ideal
object of thought is both honoured and investigated (“verehrende Forschung”).
What is depicted here, according to Sloterdijk, is the reformation of
thinking which took place in Plato’s Academy, the transition from proverbial
wisdom to rational thought. The mosaic captures the birth of a philosophy that is
fundamentally similar to ancient Greek geometry: a rationalistic philosophy –
more geometrico. Only those who are trained in geometry are allowed to enter
Plato’s philosophical garden. On the mosaic, these philosophers (“academics”)
bend in astonishment over a sphere, as if studied for the first time. An intellectual
shiver permeates them. They are confronted with a new insight which will
dominate philosophy for centuries to come, the Apollonian conviction that a
perfect geometric structure can be discerned in the universe as a whole,
intellectually at least. This perfect structure is not an empirical phenomenon, but
an intellectual idea. It becomes visible in the perfect spatiality of a sphere, as a
model of the cosmos as a whole.
Seven philosophers gather around a central sphere, a decisive moment,
according to Sloterdijk, a commencement in the history of thinking, hovering on
the boundary between discourse and cult. They stare thinkingly at the sphere of
being, symbolising the κόσµος, the God of the philosophers – the God who spurs
us into thinking. This globe is an object of admiration, but also of careful analysis,
and measured with precision. Mathematical proofs and logical syllogisms are
formulated. The artwork visualises the Apollonian piety of thought, the devoted
intellect. A form of spatiality (the ancient κόσµος, conceived as a series of
concentric spheres) is uncovered via contemplation. It is, according to Sloterdijk,
a Pentecost of thinking. A new point of departure propagates among intellectuals,
an intimate but powerful thought manifests itself – a decisive experience. A
common consciousness unleashes its intellectual activity. From now on, they are
to devote their lives to studying the spherical truth or whole, the spherical cosmos.
A logical community begins to taken shape, a counter-community, for the time
being, in opposition to the pre-Apollonian Dionysian culture still prevalent at that
time. But it is the beginning of a new thought that will soon conquer the world.
These scholars form a πόλις of thinkers, a mundus academicus, in preparation of
the political realization and implementation of this idea.
The mosaic immortalises the moment when a thought “illuminated”.
Perhaps they experienced this Apollonian momentum for the very first time. Or
maybe it was a ritual celebrating an insight that was already proliferating, so that
the participants commemorate an event that occurred in the past. In any case, this
artwork depicts the moment when, in the words of Kant, mathematics becomes
science – Apollonian science, to be exact. In geometry, human reason
emancipates itself from practical experience. Philosophers-mathematicians look
Styles of thinking
57
away from empirical reality to contemplate mathematical constructs, first and
foremost the perfect sphere. From this moment of commencement onwards,
immortalised by this mosaic, the spherical idea begins to flourish and spread
throughout the world. Soon, this idea will also take root outside this intimate
circle of philosophers. It becomes ubiquitous, and can no longer be ignored.
According to Sloterdijk, the power of the Apollonian idea is exemplified
by the Pantheon in Rome, the Apollonian paradigm building par excellence.
Spherical thinking has finally established its rule in this edifice, erected between
115 and 125 A.D. as the first truly spherical construction on earth (1999, p. 435
ff.), a form of architecture which captures the Apollonian truth in stone. The
Pantheon symbolizes the moment when the whole world becomes absorbed into
the Roman sphere of influence – literally. The world finds shelter in the spherical
space of the Roman power dome. The pantheon is shaped like a sphere because
it aims to absorb and encompass the whole world, as the spherical nucleus of a
spherical empire, extending from this geometric center. That explains why there
is room available for all the gods, even forgotten or unknown ones. The thought
of the sphere underlies, motivates and legitimates Roman imperialism.
The Pantheon embodies spherical, Apollonian building, dwelling,
thinking. While the Greeks contemplate the heavenly spheres, practical Romans
apply spherical geometry to the political and religious world – translatio
philosophiae ad Romanos. Apollonian understanding of Being as a whole is
explicated in a “pan-theological” manner. The Pantheon is a product of
constructive thinking and exemplifies pre-Copernican spatiality. The sphere has
materialised into a building: the concrete ovum of the pax romana, a replica of
the κόσµος in the form of a spherical cavity that provides foreign peoples and
their deities an entrance ticket into the Roman Empire. In the Pantheon, empire
building, cosmological awareness and political theology converge.
§ 2. The School of Athens
The mosaic of Pompeii, commemorating the beginning of Apollonian thought,
was made in the First Century A.D. when Apollonian culture was already at its
peak. The mosaic looks back on its context of discovery, Plato’s Academy,
located in a sports park, just outside the walls of Athens. However exuberant and
impressive this image is, the viewer is not really involved in this thought event,
from which we are separated by such a huge temporal distance.
There is another artwork, however, which emphatically aims to re-evoke
Apollonian thinking and bring it back to life as it were: an interactive artwork
that invites the spectator to engage in a lively discussion with philosophers
depicted large as life – the fresco The School of Athens by Raphael in the Vatican
Museum – an impressive expression of a neo-Apollonian Renaissance, rendering
the idea of the world as κόσµος plausible again, but under drastically changed
conditions. The spectator is invited to participate in this celebration. It is a
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Styles of Thinking
retrospect that forms part of a cultural campaign aimed to rehabilitate the
Apollonian style. Greek philosophers and scientists are depicted as if they are
contemporaries, of each other and of the Pope who ordered the artwork to be
made. In reality, these scholars lived in different times at different locations. They
are united by the artist in an imaginary, utopian location. The Renaissance Pope
wanted to consider himself one of them. This reunion of heroes does not result in
a consensus sapientium, however. Some Dionysian dissidents disdainfully
withdraw from the academic conversations at the centre.
Raphael (1483-1520) produced his masterpiece between 1509 and 1511.
What he portrays is not so much a school as a battle between two schools. What
becomes visible in this artwork is the struggle between two Greek styles of
thinking, the Apollonian and the Dionysian style. The Apollonian style dominates
the artwork, its protagonists control the scene and the fresco mainly depicts
Apollonian teachers and students. Most scholars are engaged in verbal forms of
inquiry, although there is also some reading and writing going on. Plato and
Aristotle are involved in a debate at the centre of this utopian intellectual
microcosm. Plato carries his dialogue Timaeus, while Aristotle carries his Ethics.
In both books, Apollonian philosophy is connected with Apollonian mathematics.
Ethics, however, is also the book in which Aristotle explicitly engages in a critical
debate with his teacher (1926/1982, I vi. 1).
Other protagonists of Apollonian thinking are also represented. Socrates,
the founder of Apollonian logic, literally thinks with his fingers: Human beings
are mortal; Socrates is a human being; ergo: Socrates is mortal. Euclid teaches
math using a wax tablet, and Ptolemy teaches astronomy using a sphere.
However, rival Dionysian thinkers are also represented, demonstrating disinterest
by turning away from the main characters centre stage. Heraclitus, Epicurus and
Diogenes proclaim the idea that reality is a capricious, chaotic Dionysian feast,
while tangible things are nothing but clotting and disintegrating atoms, under the
influence of love and hatred. To articulate this truth, Epicurus developed a
Dionysian physics, entailing a mathematics of its own, based on the concept of
clinamen, i.e. spontaneous deviations giving rise to atomic swerve (Serres 1977).
First and foremost, however, Dionysian thinking is developed through poetry
(Zwart 2014a). Heraclitus (in the foreground) distances himself from Apollonian
debate by writing a poem. And Epicurus (on the left, crowned with grape leaves)
is writing a didactic poem about nature. For the Dionysian style of thinking,
nature is not κόσµος, but unfathomable and uncontainable.
The artwork itself is one of the highlights of the Renaissance, the
temporary rebirth of the Apollonian ideal, albeit under Faustian conditions. The
ambiance has changed: the sports park has been replaced by a palace. The
Apollonian revival aims to distance itself from late-medieval Gothic culture, but
only partially succeeds in doing so. The fresco unequivocally radiates a Faustian
Will into power. The building in which the Apollonian deliberations take place
is, – much like nearby Saint Peter’s dome – a hybrid edifice, a coniunctio
oppositorium, combining Apollonian desire for harmony with Faustian craving
Styles of thinking
59
for height, gravity and perspective. The Apollonian style is engaged in a
polemics5 with Dionysian thinking (voiced and enacted by Heraclitus and
Epicurus), but also with Faustian thinking. The Baroque and its basic geometrical
idea, the ellipse (the mathematical symbol of a world with two focal points:
rationality and religion, science and the Church) is already quite near: a heavy,
expansive, Faustian reclamation of Renaissance tendencies.
§ 3. Nostalgia for Plato’s Academy
However impressive Raphael’s fresco as artwork may be, the image of the
Academy it conveys is quite misleading. Such a location has never existed.
Raphael positions Plato, along with his followers and rivals, in a fictitious,
idealized environment. Apparently, he imagined the Academy to be an immense
theatre for education and research, an ideal university. The architectural ambience
of the philosophers’ conversation reflects the Apollonian thinking style, but in a
mature version – as civilization. His vision of Plato’s school is decidedly
anachronistic. At the time of Plato, Apollonian thinking was still culture: a smallscale thinking practice. How should we imagine the Academy? Let us try to return
to the beginning, the context or discovery.
The Pompeii mosaic offers a more faithful image than Raphael’s fresco.
Seven academics gather together in an outdoors location. There is silence and
concentration. In the background we notice a park (near a stream), a tree
(probably a plane-tree), a sundial and a city. The teacher teaches mathematics.
With his stick, he demonstrates the geometric properties of the sphere. The
Academy was situated in a park landscape. Apart from buildings of modest size,
there were facilities for physical exercise. Such conditions favoured speculation
and reflection, in contrast with the public, metropolitan locations in the city
centre, where Socrates preferably hung about.
Plato’s scholarly practice differed from that of his teacher Socrates. The
latter was decidedly a city dweller, and the same was true for many of his
contemporaries, the sophists. They practiced their intellectual pursuits in the
centre, where public meeting places were located, primarily the market square
(ἀγορά). Plato’s first encounter with his mentor took place near the theatre of
Dionysus, amidst a metropolitan crowd. Plato himself became an agoraphobic
philosopher who wanted to escape the crowds. The elite began to eschew the
public squares and baths. Philosophers played a key role in this exodus away from
the bustle of the city centre. The centre had become too noisy for scholarly debate.
5
That Plato’s and Aristotle’s works have been retained, while the Dionysian legacy
has largely been lost, is no coincidence. Texts were vulnerable and scarce, and
competing schools were out to destroy the output of rivals (Cf. “Platon soll alle Bücher
des Demokrit haben aufkaufen und verbrennen wollen” (Stenzel 1972, p. 60).
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Styles of Thinking
From Socrates, Plato had learned dialectics. On his travels to Southern
Italy he picked up mathematics and became acquainted with Theodorus of
Cyrene, teacher of his renowned colleague Theaetetus. In the dialogue named
after him (Plato 1921/1996), we indeed encounter Theodorus as a maths teacher
tackling the hazardous problem of √2 from an Apollonian viewpoint. The
dialogue stages a conversation between Socrates, Theodorus and Theaetetus.
Socrates (Plato) informs them that many young people travel to Megara to receive
math training – he had been one of them. Shortly after his return to Athens, on
his fortieth birthday, he founded his school (387 BC). Socratic dialectics and
mathematics constituted the elementary principles of knowledge.
Plato founded his school in a park north of Athens whose name referred
to a statue of the hero Academus. Although there were some buildings, including
a µουσεῖον (school and library), it was primarily an open walled area with olive
trees and plane trees, a campus (= field). The park served as a gymnasium, a
facility for physical exercise, supervised by a γυµνασίαρχος. The location was
not only used for sports, but also contained shrines and graves of prominent
Athenians, while religious festivities such as torch parades were organised there
as well. In short, Plato and his followers had to share the park with other visitors
and users, but it was a considerably quieter and more pleasant spot than the urban
spaces within the city walls. Diogenes Laertius (1925/1972) describes the
Academy as a beautiful sports park with trees and fountains (for shade and
cooling), located alongside the road leading from the Athenian Κεραµεικός
(pottery) district to the North. Pausanias remarks that several sanctuaries like this
could be found along Athens’ main roads. He describes the Academy as a leafy
sports park near a river (1971, p. 83): a nice place to be, a perfect meeting ground
for aristocratic youngsters interested in physical and mental exercises, away from
the hustle and bustle – to the extent that this was possible in metropolitan Athens.
In 1966, the sanctuary was uncovered by archaeologists. They found large
numbers of tablets used by students. Plato lived on campus as it were, among his
students, and was buried not far from the main site.
The desire to distance themselves from the crowd must also be
understood in socio-political terms: away from the masses. Conservative
Athenian aristocrats assembled there to express their dissatisfaction with the
democratic regime and to discuss what the ideal education should be for future
leaders. The curriculum would build on mathematics. Athens had not been able
to realise its political ambitions as world-power on the rise and Plato attributed
this to deficient mathematics. This traumatic experience led to a craving for an
“inner reconstruction” (Jaeger 1959, II, p. 2). In their sports park, Plato and his
friends evaded the depressing climate of every-day political practice to ponder
over questions concerning ideal politics and the good life. Mathematics was
regarded as a basic intellectual pursuit. Above the entrance of sanctuaries,
inscriptions usually could be found, such as “Only the honourable ones are
welcome here”, and above the entrance to the Academy there was a similar
caption indicating that only those who were well-versed in mathematics should
Styles of thinking
61
enter. Other intellectual exercises were considered impossible without a sufficient
grounding in maths. Plato worked closely with leading mathematicians such as
Eudoxus and Theaetetus. Eudoxus was poor and lived in Piraeus. To attend
Plato’s lectures, he had to walk eleven kilometres twice every day. He became
famous for his work on the astronomical globe and on propositions (Book V of
Euclid’s Στοιχεῖα), while Theaetetus was responsible for the five regular
polyhedra (Book XIII).
In Πολιτεία (“Republic”), Plato (1930/1999) provided an outline of the
formation (παιδεία) for the guardians of the ideal state. As Werner Jaeger (1959)
emphasised in his tripartite study, mathematical education was the core of the
Apollonian training program that Plato developed. In fact, the ideal education that
Plato outlines, reflects his own academic practice, albeit on a grander scale. In
other words, in order to get a clear picture of how Apollonian practices in Plato’s
Academy were actually conducted, Πολιτεία should be consulted first and
foremost, because it provides the blueprint of Plato’s own school. Plato wrote his
dialogues to advertise his program and to ridicule and discredit his opponents and
rivals. They are literary documents conveying Athenian “urbanity” (Hegel 1971b,
p. 25), notably the competitive debating practices, their style, complexity and
pace. The “intramural” education, conducted within the walls of the Academy,
were probably more formal and systematic in nature. Aristotle, when he mentions
Plato, refers almost exclusively to the more philosophical dialogues, such as
Republic and Laws, closely related to the verbal (esoteric) educational practices
in which he himself participated for many years.
Plato’s dialogues were intended for the outside world. Whoever had
found his way to the Academy would discover another, more “esoteric” Plato
(Wippern 1972). The humorous and playful style would give way to the
seriousness of mathematical research concerning numbers and geometric figures.
Important concepts such as the soul or the good were mathematically defined. At
one point, Plato dared to present a lecture in public, for a wider audience,
concerning the good, in his esoteric style, based on mathematical methods, but
this experiment resulted in a debacle. Mathematics, the language of true
knowledge, apparently was not suitable for spreading ideas outside the safety of
the immunizing walls.
Greek education included two components: musical education and
gymnastics (Jaeger II 284), where physical exercise functioned as military
propaedeutic. The gymnasium was a place where physical education and training
flourished and Plato’s Academy, located in the vicinity of such a gym, was the
perfect entourage for mental exercises, as add-on to the traditional package. To
the classical program of education and training (aimed at a harmonious and
balanced development of body and soul through gymnastics and music), Plato
added mathematics as “gymnastics of the mind” (Plato, 1935 / 2000, 521 C ff.;
Jaeger 1959 III, p. 2). That was the quintessence of the educational innovation
that he idealised in Republic and practiced in his own school. Academics saw
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Styles of Thinking
themselves as intellectual athletes. Especially books V, VI and VII give an idea
of Plato’s own intellectual practice.
Another dialogue that provides insight into Plato’s actual education
practice is Meno (1937/1999). While in Republic the outline of a complete
curriculum is outlined, Meno stages an introductory lesson for beginners. Math
methodology is used to analyse basic concepts at an elemental level, culminating
in the famous mathematical exercise where an untrained student is made to
demonstrate the theorem of Pythagoras. Probably, such an exercise functioned as
an admission examination or intelligence test (Stenzel 1928).
From Plato’s perspective, mathematics was ideally suited to bring about
the mental “reversal” (µετάνοια) he aimed for. The attention had to shift from
unpredictable Dionysian reality to the world of ideal forms, accessible only
through intellectual contemplation, from opportunism to moral virtuosity. The
perfect politicians whom Plato wanted to train would be willing to distance
themselves from the political turbulence of everyday life in order to ground their
political practice in a mathematical conceptualization of the ideal polis.
Apollonian geometry was very suitable for this purpose because it did not focus
attention on empirical objects, but on the properties of ideal forms (spheres,
polyhedra, theoretical entities). Mathematics was the paradigm science and
provided the basic building blocks for philosophical thinking (Stenzel 1972, 286
et seq., 293). As Plato explains in Republic (522 E ff.), Mathematics encompasses
a number of sub-disciplines. First of all, the theory of numbers, not in the sense
of practical arithmetic, but as a fundamental field, seeing numbers as proportions.
Next, geometry as the theory of two-dimensional objects, followed by
stereometry – the theory of the three-dimensional bodies, as static objects – and
ultimately astronomy (the science that investigates the regular movements of
perfect three-dimensional mega-objects). Plato acknowledges that mathematics
may have some applicability and practical value (for example in the context of
warfare), but its true value is educational and concerns the edification of the soul
(Jaeger, 1959, p. 26). As gymnastics awakens the body, pure mathematics evokes
a mental awakening. Mathematics is the tool that allows us to transform mere
opinion into true knowledge.
The importance of mathematics as a core subject of academic
(Apollonian) education is also confirmed, Jaeger argues, because it was a target
of criticism by opponents, who rebuked Plato for encouraging his students not to
engage in useful subjects such as rhetoric, but to squander their time on
mathematical puzzles. This abstract trend, so characteristic of academic practice,
was subsequently extended to other disciplines. Insofar as attention was given to
empirical reality at all, for example to plants and animals, academic research and
education consisted in classifying life forms, but again on the basis of the concept
of proportionality (Plato 1925/1995), and primarily as a mental exercise. Music
education did not mean that students learned to play an instrument, because that
was just “technique”. They were introduced in harmony as a sub-branch of
number theory. Leading Greek mathematicians were familiar faces in Plato’s
Styles of thinking
63
academy. The stereometrics to which Plato exposed his guardians was developed
by Theaetetus. Euclid systematised the mathematical thinking of Plato’s circle.
Although Plato himself was not a mathematician, he was the philosopher who
emphasised its crucial importance.
Socrates is the main character in Plato’s dialogues (with the exception of
Laws). He likes to mingle with non-academics in risky, exoteric exchanges of
views, in the city centre or, even better, in the homes of wealthy Athenians. Such
was the context in which Socrates felt at home.6 Plato’s early dialogues breathe a
metropolitan, not yet academic atmosphere. Other texts depict intellectual life in
a leafy sports park outside the walls, a place of relaxation, of meeting like-minded
people: the mean, as it were, between rural nature and plebeian urbanity.
In fact, we need to distinguish between two types of dialogues, namely
those in which Socrates is truly given the floor, and later dialogues, where Plato
himself is actually speaking and teaching. There are dialogues that take us back
to the past (to the think-shop, the φροντιστήριον, Socrates’ context or discovery),
and dialogues that depict the specificity of Plato’s own intellectual practice, using
the label Socrates merely as a brand. The distinction between both types of
dialogues is quite noticeable. The dialogues in which Socrates really plays a part,
are set in localities he preferred: public places within the city walls, where large
crowds gathered. Others are staged in gymnasiums and sports parks just outside
the walls, with more opportunities for intellectuals to retreat and deliberate, with
only students and colleagues as an audience.
In the opening passage of Republic, Socrates has a recognisable voice.
We discover him amidst a crowd of people on their way back to Athens, after
visiting a festival in Piraeus. Then, the house of a wealthy Athenian citizen serves
as setting for an exchange of views with outsiders. In the course of the dialogue,
however, Socrates gradually disappears from view and Plato himself is placed
frontstage. The entourage changes accordingly, and later chapters provide a
window into Plato’s own Academy. Symposium, on the other hand, is firmly
Socratic (Plato 1925/1996). The story begins in the theatre of Dionysus, which
could host thousands of citizens, but then moves to the house of wealthy Agathon,
who had just won the stage competition as a writer of tragedy. The “Socratic”
dialogue Gorgias begins in a busy street and then moves to the house of Callicles.
And in the dialogue Protagoras, Socrates is lifted from his bed while it is still
dark and taken to a beautiful Athenian house erected around a patio. Menexenos
is set in the busy city centre near the Agora and the dialogue Theages likewise
begins in a busy street near the city centre. Socrates and his interlocutor then go
to a colonnade not far from the Agora to continue the conversation (Plato
1927/1986, 121 A). Other Socratic dialogues also unfold within the walls of
6
“Sein Leben verbrachte er wie viele Athener auf der Straße, auf dem Markt, in den
Gymnasien, mit der Teilnahme an Gastmahlen. Es war ein Leben des Gesprächs mit
Jedermann” (Jaspers 1964/1983, p. 82).
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Styles of Thinking
Athens: the Apology in the courtroom, Crito and Phaedo in prison. Charmides
takes place in a busy school inside the city premises.
These urban locations contrast with the more academic atmosphere of
other dialogues. Whoever wants to develop an impression of Plato’s Academy
should read the first pages of Lysis (1925/1996). Socrates is heading to a sports
park just outside the walls, near a spring, where a new wrestling school has just
been opened. The school is visited by attractive, affluent young men who spend
their free time with wrestling, games and discussions, under the guidance of a
qualified philosopher,7 a convincing portrayal of Plato’s Academy in its early
days. The dialogue Euthydemus takes us to the same location, and also
Theaetetus, in which the math genius appears as youngster, provides a viable
image of the Academy as an environment for thinking and learning. The dialogue
unfolds in a sports park. We see how young men get ready for a wrestling match
(1921/1996, 144 C) on a race track. In addition to sports education, brain
gymnastics is practiced in gymnasiums too. Visitors are introduced in geometry
by Theodorus. A youthful Theaetetus explains what subjects he teaches
(geometry, astronomy, harmony, numerology) and gives a demonstration of these
exercises in a Euclidian style, using line sections and planes to solve
mathematical problems. Sophist is conducted in the same location and also the
mathematical dialogue Statesman, again featuring Theodorus, is situated in an
academic ambiance, where lines are drawn in the sand and intersected in the
middle. As noted, Meno is thoroughly Academic. In the open-air, math problems
are solved, again by drawing lines in the sand. And while the setting of Republic
is initially Socratic, it eventually becomes truly Platonic. Timaeus is a Platonic
seminar from the outset, a continuation of Republic. Such seminars must have
been conducted by Plato on a regular basis. Plato’s final dialogue, Laws, takes us
to Crete, to the road that leads from Knossos to the Ida sanctuary.
In the comedy Clouds by Aristophanes (1962/1988), perhaps the most
prominent critic of Apollonian thinking, the Socratic entourage is also
emphasized. Socrates again plays the leading role here. The portrait which
Aristophanes draws of him is the photographic negative, however, of Plato’s
version, but the contrast between city centre and sports park as locations for doing
philosophy is drawn in a comparable manner. A verbal wrestling match is staged
between two forms of logic: the good and the bad, to determine what the best
education for young men is. The bad logic feels most comfortable in public areas,
such as the agora, disputing in front of large audiences and mingling in loud
conversations; The good logic, on the other hand, flourishes in gymnasiums,
primarily the Academy, which is explicitly mentioned (1962/1988, p. 127 ff.).
There, between plane, poplar and olive trees, young men are trained in wrestling,
running and verbal virtuosity. While the bad logic attracts youngsters to the
7
“He showed me, just outside the wall, a sort of enclosure and a door standing open.
We pass our time there, he went on” (Plato 1925/1996, 203B).
Styles of thinking
65
bathhouses in the centre, the good logic points the way to the academy, to the
sports park, the runway in the shadow of plane trees.
Finally, in Phaedrus, the Academy is presented in statu nascendi, in its
most recognisable form (Plato 1914/1995). When Socrates runs into Phaedrus, a
student, they decide to deliberate about love outside the city walls. The
conversation takes place under a plane tree, on the banks of a stream. This
Arcadian landscape, quite suited as ambiance for love and seduction, as well as
for contemplation and education, is an exact replica of the Park of Academus.
Phaedrus is heading for a walk outside the walls (περίπατον ἔξω τείχους). What
is a young aristocratic Athenian looking for on such a hot day at this particular
location? In the first place, intellectual relaxation. He intends to learn a text by
head which he is carrying in his hand, hoping to find optimal conditions for such
a mental exercise. Secondly, physical effort. Socrates indicates that he is so eager
to deliberate with the attractive Phaedrus that he is willing to follow him even if
he intends to walk all the way to Megara and back (to the wall and back again,
227D). The phrase “to the wall and back again” refers to the physician Herodicus,
whose specialty were physical exercises. Outside the walls of the city, he trained
clients in walking or running (to the wall and back again, his slogan), gradually
increasing distance or pace. In other words, this academic primal scene revolves
around a combination of physical and mental training (a walk outside the walls
to further this learning by head). Teacher and student find a suitable, leafy
location, under a large plane tree near a brook, not far from a sanctuary, an altar
for Boreas. Again, the Academy in statu nascendi. There are other statues in the
vicinity – it is a sacred place (230B). For Socrates, the city-dweller, this is an
unusual situation. His dialogues are usually staged on the market square, as we
have seen, or in homes of wealthy citizens. He leaves the city rarely or never, he
admits. He learns from people, not from trees. Nevertheless, in pursuit of
beautiful young Phaedrus, he now admits that this place is very suitable for
intellectual exchange, thus giving it his blessing as the cradle of what would
become Plato’s own school.
Plato has good reasons to situate this scene in such an Arcadian
environment. This primal scene legitimises his decision to establish his academy
in such an extramural location, not far from a road, not far from a river, near a
sanctuary. The location chosen by Phaedrus and Socrates is the prototype of
Plato’s Academy. Socrates gives the example, Plato follows his master. Or rather,
he presents his own decision (to establish a study centre in a park outside the city
walls) as an endeavour which follows in Socrates’ footsteps. The anecdote serves
to justify his innovation. In the park, he and his followers find a quiet ambiance
for mental and physical exercises. As true aristocrats, they can afford to distance
themselves from the masses. In Phaedrus, Plato allows Socrates to sanction this
intellectual exodus.
When Aristotle establishes his own school, after his return from
Macedonia, he likewise opts for a public exercise park, a gym, the Λύκειον
(Lyceum), an open terrain near a temple dedicated to Apollo with covered paths
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where he lectured in the mornings.8 The “peripatetic” school is named after this
custom of teaching while walking on these covered promenades. There was a
sanctuary for the Muses, a building with maps and a library (µουσεῖον).
Aristotle’s philosophical garden reflects the Apollonian model.
This model contrasts with the gardens where Dionysian rivals did their
thinking. The Dionysian garden of Epicurus, the magister otii, the master of
pleasure, had a different character. Unlike the sports parks of Apollonian thinkers,
it was a real garden, a place for pleasure rather than exercise. Pliny regarded him
as the inventor of the city garden. As a garden philosopher he is portrayed by
Nietzsche. Sitting pleasantly in his city garden, he criticizes his academic rivals.
On the way to Plato’s academy, you would pass the garden of Epicurus.
Why all this attention for the Academy as a location? Because it is not a
coincidence that Apollonian thinking evolved in a sports park. It was the place
where educated individuals spent their leisure time. The emphasis was not on
rhetoric, such as in the city centre, nor on practical skills. In the city park, you
could devote yourself to pure geometry and pure politics, and become involved
in intellectual games and high-brow political discussions, exploring the
geometrical foundations of an ideal polis, led by philosophers who determined
the properties of a perfect city in the same way as mathematicians determined the
properties of a cube or a sphere.
Theaetetus is the dialogue which maximises the distance between public
exercise park and city centre. The prerequisites for academic philosophy,
according to Socrates, – but it is obvious that Plato himself is speaking here – are:
a sufficient amount of spare time (σχολή) or, more preferably even, the absence
of the time dimension as a disturbing factor, and the absence of uninitiated
listeners. In the city centre, discursivity evolved under completely different
conditions. Here, the duration and pace of the debate are constrained by external
factors. The Academy offered discursive freedom (Ελευθερία του λόγου). True
academics have no idea what is happening in the city centre (173 C) and spend
much of their time studying the starry sky. The Academy is the place where
philosophers dwell in proximity of the gods (176B). The absence (or minimal
presence) of the time dimension also allows Plato’s dialogues to involve
representatives of multiple generations (Parmenides, Zeno, Socrates, Theaetetus)
in the debate as if they were contemporaries: the same conscious disregard of the
time dimension so characteristic of Raphael’s School of Athens.
Academic thinking proved a sustainable product. Plato’s Academy
continued to exist for almost a thousand years, although the famous plane and
olive trees were cut during the siege by the Romans, when Apollonian civilization
absorbed Athens within its sphere of influence. Diogenes Laertius describes how
8
“[Aristoteles kehrte] nach Athen zurück als öffentlicher Lehrer und lehrte dort auf
einem öffentliche Plätze, Lyzeum, einer Anlage, die Perikles zum Exerzieren der
Rekruten hatte machen lassen. Sie bestand in einem Tempel, dem Apollo Λύκειος
geweiht, - Spaziergänge (περίπατοι), mit Bäumen und Quellen und Säulenhallen belebt”
(Hegel 1971b, p. 140).
Styles of thinking
67
many generations received their education there as adults. Teachers spent their
days on site, amidst their students. The combination of intellectual and physical
exercise remained a signature feature. Sports were practiced naked and apart from
philosophy, gay eroticism flourished. Socrates likewise seems to be looking for
attractive male bodies as much as for conversation partners, in the places which
Plato makes him visit. Platonic did not mean, as dictionaries phrase it, that the
physical element was absent, but rather that the lover played the role of alter ego.
The lover was a second self, belonging to the next generation. Teachers often had
a favourite pupil, with whom they shared their campus existence and who were
eventually appointed as successors. They formed a trans-generational unit. Gay
erotic love facilitated the relay from one generation to the next. This was the
context of discovery of the Apollonian style of thought.
§ 4. From φύσις to κόσµος
Φύσις was the term used by Dionysian philosophers of nature to refer to being as
a whole. As Aristotle (1958/1982) phrases it, Φύσις meant that which moves,
develops and perishes on its own accord, in accordance with its own principles
of change, without our doing. In those days, human societies were modest
enclaves amidst an immense, ubiquitous, inviolable nature. The impact of human
activity was limited in scope, nature was experienced as awesome, and the basic
experience or attitude invoked by nature was one of awe, a mixture of fear and
respect. Human responsibility was confined to the human sphere. On nature as
such, human action barely seemed to have an influence. Outdoors nature was not
yet a subject of ethical reflection and environmental philosophy did not exist yet.
Nature as φύσις was the primary subject of Dionysian Greek thinking.
These philosophers were physicists. The term φύσις refers to a nature experience
that emphasizes its unpredictable aspects. It is difficult to study nature, as nature
is wont to hide herself (Heraclitus). This experience of the changeability and
fluidity of nature is also reflected in the famous statement that we cannot step into
the same river twice. The visible, changing, natural real cannot provide reliable
knowledge. That is, Greek thinking initially thinks in a Dionysian way. We must
understand nature as the clustering together and breaking apart of invisibly small,
elementary particles named atoms. Under the influence of love and hate,
attraction and rejection, the figures and landscapes we observe with the naked
eye are temporarily formed. Four types of atoms (elements) are distinguished
(fire, air, water and earth). Real nature is made up of hybrid entities: mixtures of
air and water (foam), water and earth (mud), fire and earth (lava), and so forth.
The Greek elements live on in modern science as the so-called aggregation states
(solids, liquids, gas), while fire was comparable to what Faustian thinking would
later call “energy”.
In this Dionysian context a counter-movement developed: Apollonian
thinking. This style aimed to supersede the capriciousness and unpredictability of
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nature. Her science was pure geometry. Protagonists of this new style introduced
a totally different understanding of nature, shifting the focus of attention from
φύσις to κόσµος to emphasise order and harmony in nature. Apollonian
philosophy, but also the mathematics associated with it (the geometry of
Eudoxus, Theaetetus and Euclid) reflected a new basic conviction, namely that a
perfect geometrical structure can be discerned in nature. This conviction (this
basic truth) also provided guidance to politics and ethics. This new thinking style
was destined to become the dominant one, but never uncontested. In the folds and
margins of Apollonian discursivity, the battle continued. Apollonian logic
continued to compete with its Dionysian rival. Dionysian thinking is less well
documented and it is not unthinkable that representatives of the dominant
Apollonian style deliberately tried to destroy its legacy, by literally destroying
texts for instance. Socrates’ negative verdict concerning textuality may have
applied specifically to the Dionysian corpus, which was committed to the flames.
But precisely because it was the counterpart or antithetic negative, however,
surviving instances of Dionysian thinking may help us to specify the exact nature
of the Apollonian thinking style. The opposite is also true, in the sense that
Apollonian textual documents (in which the rival style is represented in a
polemical manner) became a key source of information concerning Dionysian
thinking. Via the confrontation with rival styles, it is possible to gain a deeper
insight into the fundamental logic, the apparent self-evidence, the apparent
Selbstverständlichkeit of Apollonian thinking.
§ 5. Nature as κόσµος
In Timaeus, Plato explains that nature should be understood as an intelligent
design, the work of a mathematically trained craftsman, a demiurge who, at the
beginning of time, created order out of the chaos. Despite the variability and
capriciousness of existing nature, the construction plan (paradigm) of the
demiurge was rational, balanced and stable (29B). In the starry sky, this perfect
order was still visible to some extent for the naked eye. Here, perfect (spherical)
bodies seemed to follow perfect (circular) pathways over the surface of perfect
immense spheres. For Plato, the cosmos is a single, all-encompassing whole in
the form of a sphere (33B), smooth and casted with great exactness (33C), that
contains within itself all beings, including planet Earth and its inhabitants.
Building on this grounding idea, Greek thinkers from Plato to Ptolemy envisioned
the macrocosm as a series of concentric celestial spheres. Over the surface of
these perfect mathematical figures, spherical celestial bodies described their
orbits, their circular paths. The fact that this basic idea could not so readily be
detected in the sky at night was indeed experienced as a problem, but it did not
result in a reconsideration or rejection of the basic conviction as such. The
grounding idea as such was never questioned. Spherical theory was not an
empirical (inductive) theory, but a point of departure, a conviction a priori from
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which reality was brought to the fore, putting everything in a spherical
perspective.
The idea that reality actually reflects a perfect geometric structure also
applied to the microsphere. Plato assumed that the elemental particles from which
reality is composed, should be regarded as perfect three-dimensional shapes: tiny
pyramids, cubes, and so on. At the micro-level, the level of elementary particles,
there should be mathematical perfection as well (32A-32D, 55B-56C). Micronature, Plato claimed, was made up of perfect three-dimensional mathematical
structures. Again, this idea did not result from empirical research (Plato was
suspicious of knowledge coming from the sense organs), but was based on
reflection, on a mental, intellectual vision (θεωρία). The fact that empirically
perceived reality conveyed a rather chaotic, capricious and irregular spectacle had
no effect on the rigidity, the apodictic import of the basic conviction that
dominated Apollonian thinking. The perfect geometric structure of the cosmos as
such was never a point of discussion. It was an object of contemplation, the
central motive of speculative thinking, not the result of observation, but a point
of departure that oriented and stimulated research. The senses were considered
unreliable precisely because they did not clearly and undisputedly reflect the
perfect geometric structure that simply had to be. Uninitiated humans were
apparently unable to see the world in a proper perspective. Instead of developing
instruments that could amplify the reliability of our senses, it was typical of Greek
Apollonian thinking to rather rely on speculative competence. For developing a
more technical and experimental approach, Greek science not only lacked the
necessary technological dexterity, but also the proper logic.
For an Apollonian thinker, to observe meant to admire. Observare in
Latin actually means to respect, to comply with, to regard. The cosmos was
considered with awe. Admiration was the basic attitude or mood, the basic
perspective from which nature was explored, articulated by Ptolemy when he
confessed that he could not look at the starry sky without sliding into a state of
divine inebriety.9 Nature as cosmos differed from real nature, the type of nature
Greek farmers and fishermen were dealing with in their everyday practice: nature
as a recalcitrant environment. Nature as cosmos was the nature of the gentlemen
philosophers, the starry sky far above us and the elemental particles, only
accessible for the initiated mind, trained in geometry. What they admired was a
theoretical construct, an idealisation, projected onto nature.
This style of thinking, this logic, was decidedly unmodern. Faustian
astronomers like Galilei or Newton also attempted to disclose the universe with
the help of mathematics, but in their case a completely different kind of maths
was employed – and a completely different universe emerge, a Faustian universe:
infinite, terrifying, silent. The cosmos of Plato and Aristotle was a closed universe
9
“When I trace at my pleasure the windings to and fro of the heavenly bodies, I no
longer touch the earth with my feet: I stand in the presence of Zeus himself and take my
fill of ambrosia, food of the gods” (Boyer 1968, p. 158).
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of limited size. Infinity for Aristotle was not a physical reality. The Faustian
universe is infinite. Ptolemy could not perceive the cosmos without experiencing
ecstasy, but the Faustian universe is cold and inhospitable. When Faustian
astronomers began to envision the basic structure of their universe, the starting
point was not the sphere, but the three-dimensional coordinate system with its
three axes pointing towards infinity. The way in which Faustian astronomers
perceived the universe differed profoundly from Apollonian thinking. The style
of practicing astronomy changed radically under Faustian conditions.
As an undercurrent of Western thinking, however, the Apollonian style
remained influential even after her demise. Thinking styles may resurge every
now and then, to be driven into oblivion again later on, and a remarkable example
of this is the early work of astronomer Johannes Kepler (1571–1630) who used
Apollonian logic to produce a mathematical model of the universe in his
Mysterium Cosmographicum (dating from 1596). The astronomy of the naked
eye knew five planets (Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn). In 1543
Copernicus introduced the idea that Earth was also a planet, but he continued to
assume that spherical celestial bodies describe circular orbits across concentric
spheres, with each planet circling along the
surface of an imaginary sphere. The
universe is spherical, he argued, because,
of all forms, the sphere is the most perfect,
being a complete whole, best suited to
enclose all things. “Hence no one will
question the attribution of this form to the
divine bodies” (1543/1978, p. 8). This is
Apollonian logic in optima forma.
The discovery that there are six planets,
because Earth is a planet, inspired Kepler
in his attempt to combine Plato’s five
perfect three-dimensional solids with the
six planetary spheres, placing the five
solids (pyramid, cube, etc.) in the
interspaces between the six spheres. In
other words, the universe represented a perfect (harmonic) geometric structure.
For young Kepler, the universe was still a cosmos, a beautiful mathematical
artwork. This mathematical fantasy (a compromise between Apollonian and
Faustian thinking) failed to concur with the facts, however, and had to be rejected,
but became an important step towards Kepler’s ground-breaking discovery that
the orbits described by planets are ellipses, a Baroque idea: the ellipse being a
key element in Baroque architecture.
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§ 6. Apollonian ethics
Apollonian ethics is likewise grounded in geometry. Apollonian ethics operates
more geometrico – in a mathematical fashion. Meno is famous for its treatment
of the theorem of Pythagoras, but it is actually an introductory ethics lesson. The
question is what virtuousness is and whether virtue can be taught. To answer such
a question, Socrates/Plato reverts to maths, starting from a hypothesis “as
mathematicians do” (86E). This same mathematical approach can be encountered
in Aristotle’s Ethics (1926/1982), the Apollonian ethics handbook par excellence.
Contemporary readers such as Martha Nussbaum (1986) read this text from a
quasi-self-evident, but in fact very contemporary viewpoint, positing a distinction
between humanities and exact science, between esprit de finesse and esprit de
géométrie. Nussbaum emphasises the difference between the two, between moral
sensitivity and scientific accuracy (p. 290 ff.). Her characterisation of ethics as
something non-scientific is based on the contemporary distinction between
humanities and science, a distinction which is completely un-Aristotelian,
however, and, when applied to Aristotle, anachronistic, as Nussbaum herself
admits (p. 245). One of the drawbacks of such a reading is that it overlooks the
mathematical dimension of Aristotle’s ethics, whilst that dimension is
emphatically present: it is the core of his approach.
While Aristotle wrote a Physics in which mathematics seems more or less
absent, his Ethics is profoundly mathematical. This is understandable when we
realise that we are dealing with Apollonian ethics. Aristotle admits that ethics
cannot achieve the same level of precision as Apollonian geometry (1926/1982,
I. iii, 1-4), but that does not prevent him from treating ethics mathematically.
Indeed, Aristotle claims that ethics has its own level of precision. Mathematics
and ethics are not incompatible and he emphatically uses Apollonian mathematics
to define core ethical concepts. The good is determined as the middle between
excess (hyperbola) and deficit (ellipse). Bravery relates to recklessness and
cowardice as a circle relates to a hyperbola and an ellipse. Proper action hits the
middle (στοχαστική του µεσου). This determination of the good as the middle
between excess (υπερβολή) and deficit (έλλειψης) builds on Plato – cf. Plato’s
Statesman (283C) or Republic (587C), where he discusses whether happiness is
achievable by employing mathematical means. Aristotle is more willing than
Plato to make concessions to actual practice, however, indicating that the good is
not exactly in the middle. Strict, rigid justice is corrected by equity.
Aristotle’s concept of justice is further elaborated via the mathematics of
proportionality, as developed by Eudoxus, member of the Academy and teacher
of Aristotle, whose work is represented in book V of Euclid’s Elements.
Distributive justice is a matter of proportionality. The distribution of goods must
be tailored to someone’s social rank. Aristocrats are a relatively small group, but
of great social value. It is therefore legitimate that they claim a relatively large
share of assets. During his discussion, Aristotle used a diagram with the lines AA’
and BB’ representing persons and the lines CC’ and DD’ representing their share,
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so that AA’: CC’ = BB’: DD’ (V. iii. 6-8). We find this type of thinking about
distributive justice also in Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae. Justice is
proportionality, geometrically defined.10
Faustian thinking, as we will see in later, entails a reversal of values.
Faustian physics is unthinkable without mathematics, but in Faustian ethics,
mathematics seems virtually absent – if not entirely. Kant (1763/1971), for
example, – a Faustian thinker because the chronic tension between duty and
inclination is his starting point –, attempted to clarify the distinction between
good and evil using a Faustian mathematical invention: negative numbers.
According to Spengler, these numbers are Faustian because they no longer
correspond to things we can touch manually or count with our fingers (as in the
case of natural numbers). Although the insertion of the number 0 (symbolising
the gap that is left behind by an absent thing, e.g. an egg or a pebble) was the
commencement of mathematics proper (disconnecting a number from a tangible
item), negative numbers take this one step further. Logic and mathematics
relinquish the reality principle in order to be transformed into a pure and apodictic
form of λόγος, which is then imposed on reality. Negative numbers exist because
of the existence of mathematical symbols, of the symbolic order. Without the
minus sign (without the signifier), a negative number would not exist. Kant now
states that by using modern mathematical symbols (like +, – and 0), the moral
quality of an action can be determined. If in an individual there are ten units of
desire to violate a duty for instance (–10) and twelve units of willingness to act
in accordance with this duty (+12), while in another individual there are three
units of desire (–3) and seven units of compliance or responsibility (+7), then, in
spite of appearances perhaps, the moral quality of the act is greater in the first
case than in the second. As a Faustian philosopher, the conflict between duty and
inclination is what counts, and in the first case that conflict is tenser than in the
second. However, we are dealing with a completely different ethical logic here.
Proportionality and the golden mean have given way to conflict and struggle as
the basic Faustian starting point.
§ 7. Ridiculing spheres
Apollonian mathematics was an elite pursuit, practiced in locations where young
gentlemen spent their free time without bothering themselves with practical
applications. Politics was likewise conducted to allow mathematically skilled
guardians to function as the inner circle of the spherical state. Apollonian love is
Platonic love, in a spherical sense, and Plato devoted one of his most impressive
literary achievements to Apollonian eroticism, especially apt to illustrate the
importance of spherical thinking, namely Symposium. My discussion builds on
10
“Medium in justitia distributiva sumitur secundum geometricam proportionem…”.
(Aquinas 1922, Pars Secunda Secundae, Questio LXI).
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73
Jacques Lacan’s comments, in one of his seminars under the heading “La
Dérision de la Sphère”: ridiculing the globe (Lacan 1991/2001).
Like other dialogues, Lacan argues, this dialogue is the result of cerebral
registration. Contained in the memory of listeners, it followed the route of verbal
transmission before being put to paper. Place of action is the home of an aristocrat
named Agathon who won a literature prize, in a theatre that could host thousands
of spectators. That is the reason for the meeting. On his way to the party, Socrates
experiences a crisis: he freezes in a porch and does not want to be awakened until
he has processed (“worked through”) his demonic inspiration.
A symposium was a ritual conducted according to certain rules, an
intimate competition between excited gentlemen, between elite scholars, an
intellectual game. The dialogue therefore contains a lot of information about
Athenian aristocratic culture. The rules stipulate that guests make contributions
in the form of an improvised lecture, and refrain from drinking too much. Plato’s
symposium follows this script, but is disturbed by an unforeseen disruption, an
embarrassing event. A drunken Alcibiades (a wealthy political dandy, at one time
Socrates’ pet pupil) enters the house with a train of friends, ignoring all rules of
propriety. He is renowned for his seductiveness, surrounded by followers and
spies, attractive and witty, intelligent, boisterous and adventurous. He claims to
role of chairman to confess some anecdotes concerning Socrates, allegedly his
erotic mentor, who introduced him into the technicalities of Apollonian love.
Alcibiades represents spherical dandyism. He was a political adventurer who put
his energetic drive in service of the spherical desire towards empire formation,
the expansion of the Greek sphere of influence, but his Dionysian personality
proved disastrous, quite unfit for realising Apollonian aspirations.
The subject of the conversation is love; that is, Greek, Apollonian love,
revolving around beautiful boys: the love between friends, the love of Greek
intellectuals and dandies. It was an essential element of their intellectual culture.
Due to the complexities and risks involved in heterosexual love, scholars found
shelter in philosophical exercises as an erotic alibi. Apollonian love was the love
of the school, of scholars. It was what Apollonian geometry was in mathematics:
a simplification or idealisation, a model, compared to the disorderly, complicated
love between men and women. The academy was a school also in this sense: a
school of love. Students received erotic training (ars erotica as erotic exercise).
Aristophanes is a remarkable figure among the guests and his presence
has puzzled experts. Was he not Socrates’ archenemy, the one who ridiculed him
and may even have had a hand in his death sentence? But his presence certainly
has a function. His job is to criticize the spherical worldview which gave rise to
a spherical understanding of love. The dialogue stages a competition between
Apollonian thinking and its intellectual antagonist. According to Apollonian
tradition, contemplation (“contemplation des astres, c’est-à-dire de la sphère”,
Lacan 1991/2001, p. 14) involves intellectual jouissance. The contemplative
view, the geometry of heavenly spheres, brings the observer in a state of ecstasy
and has a pendant in the domain of love: seeing the beloved as your other half,
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Styles of Thinking
your complement. Here too, pleasure is produced by harmony and perfection, in
a spherical sense. It is not all that easy, Lacan argues, for us to grasp the logic of
Apollonian love. Our own ideal or paradigm of love is infused in us by the world
of cinema. Viewed from an Apollonian perspective, however, the cinema is a
dark, deceptive cave beguiling us with phantasms and stories. To understand
platonic love, we must enter a completely different world. Apollonian love
involves a couple: the lover and his beloved, who together form a perfect unity –
in a spherical sense. Aristophanes sees it as his mission to extrapolate the
Apollonian conception (e.g. spherical desire) to precisely that domain where this
way of thinking runs the risk of becoming ridiculous, namely eroticism. What
does the desire for geometric spherical perfection amount to in the realm of love?
Symposium, Lacan argues, transports us to the second century after the
birth of Apollonian discourse. Around 550 BC, a sudden, enigmatic bloom of
thinking had erupted, an intellectual awakening, a moment of discontinuity, an
epistemological leap, a creatio ex nihilo, a commencement, resulting in a
geometrical discourse about nature. Symposium reveals that the struggle between
Apollonian and Dionysian strategies of explanation is still ongoing. Aristophanes
parodies Apollonian thinking by telling an Apollonian myth: a strategy known as
gay science (Zwart 1996). He confronts Apollonian thinking with a consistent
idea, building on Apollonian convictions, but leading to ridiculous consequences,
taking the Apollonian style of thinking ad absurdam. Aristophanes extrapolates
Platonic logic to the realm of eroticism. What is the inevitable consequence of
the spherical idea if used in an Apollonian discourse about sexuality?
Aristophanes’ contribution involves a ridicule of academic discourse by taking
its basic logic too seriously. His parody, his farce, entails a quasi-anthropological
description of imaginary beings that allegedly constitute the missing link in the
history of anthropogenesis. The narrative takes us back to the beginning, the dawn
of human history, and aims to answer the question of the origins of sexual desire.
Once upon a time, Aristophanes tells us, humans had four arms and four
legs. They were two counterparts, two halves, forever united. To punish them,
Zeus sliced them into two, like boiled eggs in an Athenian kitchen, using a hair.
A fatal panic overwhelms them. A frantic search for their lost other half sets in,
but the two halves are no longer able to merge with each other, because of
anatomical constrains. The result is mass extinction. Zeus takes pity on them and
subjects surviving humans to an anatomical procedure, moving their genitals to
the frontal side. In that way, they are still able to experience the pleasure of
spherical fusion, albeit only briefly and occasionally. Because when they slide
and fit into one another, with the help of their genitals, their shapes briefly
reproduce the spherical form. Lacan notes that these bizarre, spherical supercreatures are reminiscent of clowns in a circus, entering the stage as quadrupeds.
In ancient comedies, such clownish creatures were a familiar sight. The grotesque
is employed to attack the core logic of the Apollonian style, making it seem
utterly questionable. With his parody, Aristophanes tries to tear this worldview
Styles of thinking
75
apart. It is difficult to overlook the element of the spherical and circular. In the
Greek original, the spherical form of these creatures is repeatedly emphasised.
Aristophanes ridicules spherical thinking as such. It is not easy for us to
realize the impact which such a story must have had at the time. A globe is the
shape that gives pleasure to the eye. Spherical humans were proportional and
equal to themselves. Only such a being could be truly happy, according to the
Apollonian mindset. Circularity was the only conceivable shape or movement for
a celestial body. Apollonian thinking was only satisfied when something
spherical could be detected, also in the realm of love. But Apollonian thinking
dislikes the unrest entailed in genuine desire. It prefers to be at rest, engaged in
circularity. In Aristotle’s Physics, all bodies aim for a state of rest, which sets in
as soon as they have found their natural place. Whereas in Faustian experience
the emphasis is on desire and restlessness, Apollonian thinking envisions an ideal
state without desire. The sphere is self-sufficient, enclosing everything, perfectly
content and satisfied. It doesn’t need sense organs, it doesn’t need desire. To a
perfect sphere, nothing can be added. By given the floor to comedy, Plato seems
to undermine his own worldview, seems to reveal its vulnerability. The
resemblances between Timaeus and Symposium are no coincidence. Astronomy
plays a part in Aristophanes’ argument as well. There were three types of
spherical beings, male, female and androgynous, each with its own affinity: sun,
earth and moon, a correspondence which suggests a logical connection between
Timaeus and Symposium.
From an Apollonian perspective, however, Aristophanes’ narrative
reflects a misunderstanding. It is half the truth. Yes, an Apollonian lover is
looking for his “other half”, and expects that reunification will be a most joyful
experience. This does not mean that Apollonian lovers move about in clownish
garments to attain happiness and pleasure. The other is an alter ego, someone in
whom a lover recognizes himself. While Dionysian thinking has a tendency of
focussing on female rather than on male desire, the Apollonian lover is usually a
man of around forty, at the height of his intellectual capacities. The beloved is a
male adolescent, a student. Their relationship is intellectual, but also erotic.
Intellectual and erotic desire reinforce each other. Erotic desire functions as a
catalyst for intellectual pursuits. Platonic love is not a form of love in which the
physical element is missing, but a love whose final objective is knowledge rather
than pleasure. In addition, platonic love facilitates the transfer of knowledge from
one generation to the next. The lover falls in love with his successor. Apollonian
thinking associates women with intrusive physicality, boys, on the other hand,
with chastity and purity.
Symposium emphasises the peculiar ambiguity of dialogue as a genre. It
tells half the truth. Aristophanes knows the spherical principle, but he is either
unable or unwilling to apply it consistently. Aristophanes laughs at Plato, but in
the end, the laughter is mutual. This is the result, Plato seems to be saying, when
you vulgarise Apollonian principles: implausible narratives. Those who really
want to be introduced into the intricacies of Apollonian love, must sign up as a
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student. Popular laughter (represented by Aristophanes) laughs at academics, but
these academics subsequently question the validity of comedy as a genre. The
dialogue is a playful introduction into Apollonian thinking. The next day, during
a serious lecture (inside the walls of the Academy, where sober, esoteric genres
flourish) Aristophanes’ amusing mistake will undoubtedly be rectified by the
master thinker. Symposium is self-parody, but it also parodies the parodist.
§ 8. Apollonian thinking as civilization
The smallest miscalculation in the area of politics
annoyed me, as much as did the slightest
imperfection of the pavement at the villa (Hadrian)
The Academy exemplifies apollonian thinking as a culture. According to
Spengler, however, every thinking style inevitably spreads and develops into
civilization. The Villa Adriana (Tivoli) is a complex of buildings in which
apollonian thinking becomes visible as civilization. That is, the Villa is
essentially the Academy, but now under different conditions, during a period of
dramatic increase of scale: a projection of the Apollonian style on a much larger
canvas. In this park, on a hill east of Rome, away from the hustle and the crowds,
various buildings, including a Lyceum and an Academy were erected, as copies
of locations visited by Hadrian during his journey to Greece. In this academic
environment, platonic love was enacted and emperors spent their leisure time in
intellectual forms of relaxation, including philosophical exercises, in the
company of lovers. Stoicism is Academic philosophy, but adapted to living
conditions on a larger scale, to life as it emerged in the context of a global world,
the Empire. Attention has shifted from the metaphysics of the ideal polis to an
ethic for citizens who try to survive, not in an imaginary ideal polis, but in a truly
existing global environment. A process of dramatic expansion has evolved, but
the thinking style is still recognizable. Platonism has been transferred from utopia
to reality. Plato’s Academy was the ambiance of the Apollonian style as culture,
as a small-scale phenomenon, as an idea. Attempts to realise this idea in practice
(by Alcibiades and others) had dramatically failed at the time, but the Apollonian
ideal survived those disasters and finally evolved into civilization in the form of
the Roman Empire.
This section explores the development of the Apollonian style of thinking
from culture to civilization via architecture. The Roman emperor Hadrian (ruling
from 117 to 138 A.D.) was a very prolific builder, responsible for the construction
of two buildings that exemplify the development of Apollonian culture into
civilization, namely the Villa and the Pantheon. The Pantheon is not only the
realization of the spherical thought in stone, but also demonstrates the ambition
of the Empire to assemble and encompass all ethnic subcultures and their deities
in one spectacular building. The Villa can be seen as a reconstruction of the sports
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park of Academus, but on a grander scale. Hadrian himself, more than anyone, is
the emperor philosopher who dedicated his reign to the construction of a
harmonious world order. And he expresses this ambition in his creation (an ideal
city for the guardians of civilisation).
In 1951 Marguerite Yourcenar published her book Memoirs of Hadrian
(1951/1977), based on a large number of written sources (texts about Hadrian and
texts he himself had read), but also on statues and structures such as the Villa and
the Pantheon. Her main method is that of trying to revivify Hadrian’s world and
to experience it from within. Yourcenar enters Hadrian’s lost world. She spent a
quarter of a century working on her masterpiece. The result is a well-documented,
very personal but convincing image of Hadrian from close by. This document
guides our effort to reconstruct Apollonian civilization. We will begin our
reconstruction with the Pantheon, erected as the central building of ancient Rome.
Why is the Pantheon a spherical building? Because it is the nucleus of a
spherical world: politically, astronomically and culturally. In the Pantheon,
according to Sloterdijk (1999), the societal significance of the Apollonian
geometry of the spheres was made immediately visible. For Roman emperors, the
spherical idea was more than just basic science. They faced the immense task of
harmonizing an Empire of gigantic proportions from a central position. The
Pantheon radiates power, but also acts as a theological magnet. It symbolises and
consolidates at the centre what Hadrian sought to achieve at the periphery of the
political artwork entrusted to him with political and military means: the unity and
stability of the Empire as a political dome, including all peoples and cultures,
represented by all the gods that had been granted accommodation in this giant
structure. Court architect Apollodorus officially acted as builder, but Hadrian
decidedly printed his stamp on the construction. It is performative, political
architecture par excellence, meant to
consolidate the Roman power globe.
The dome functions as a tangible and
politically active construction. The
universe is concentrated into a compact
form, a condensation of power. Heaven
and earth are brought together in one
overarching construction. While Plato’s
academy excluded those not versed in
geometry, the visitor of the Pantheon is inevitably drawn into this project of a
global and universal geometry of the spheres (Sloterdijk 1999, p. 443).
The exact division of labour between Apollodorus and Hadrian is a
controversial issue, but in Memoirs of Hadrian the Emperor’s role is strongly
emphasized. He is supposed to have been responsible for the spherical character
of the building. He considered Apollodorus’ plans too moderate and timid and
decided to improve them. More than in any other building, Hadrian expressed
himself, his vision of the world. He was a traveling emperor, often on the road,
from centre to periphery and back, and from one peripheral location to another.
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He moved along the radii of the Roman sphere of influence, which had assumed
global proportions. In this way, the idea came to him that the Empire needed a
sanctuary for all the gods. Yourcenar quotes him as follows: “For the actual style
of the architecture, I returned to the primordial. I wanted this sanctuary of all the
gods to reflect the shape of the earth and of the heavenly globe: the hollow sphere
that contains everything” (p. 155). And yet, it also reflected the form of the
ancestral huts in which the smoke of the primordial human hearth escaped
through an opening in the roof. That is, in the Pantheon, not only the spatial, but
also the temporal dimension of the Empire was condensed: from peasant hut to
metropolis in one go. The circular opening in the roof also functioned as a sundial
for recording celestial movements. It was a building in which the whole cosmos
converged into one spatial construction.
Hadrian was Hellenophile: he aimed to live and think as the Apollonian
Greeks did. In Athens he felt more than anywhere at home and he did a lot for
this city. In Athens he learned to think mathematically, in an Apollonian vein.
Yet there is a distance between the Academia of Athens and Hadrian’s
Apollonian civilization. The academic philosophers were pleased to study reality
“in its pure form” (p. 26), but for Hadrian the spherical world has become reality.
Plato also travelled, but Hadrian founded world cities during his journeys,
ordered the construction of roads and improved legislation. “The city has become
a state” is how Yourcenar has him summarize his achievement (p. 104). Standing
at the tomb of Alcibiades, he realises that the world he governs is infinitely greater
than that in which this famous / infamous Athenian lived (p. 151). Plato wrote
Republic (the program for an ideal state), but it was for Hadrian to actually
transform the Greek city-state into an immense Apollonian empire, notably by
selecting and training a bureaucracy, a well-organised civilian army of guardians,
able to defy and face the ages and to safeguard the essential.
Under civilized, large-scale conditions, Hadrian continues to think in a
decidedly Apollonian mode. During his travels along the borders of the Empire,
along the periphery of his power globe, now on the banks of the Rhine, then again
in a city in Asia, then again on the banks of the Thames, he is strengthening the
robustness of his empire. He commits himself to the Pax Romana, which stretches
out to anyone and everything, like the music of heaven in movement (p. 125). His
dream is a well-ordered, harmonious world, where justice prevails in terms of
balance between the parts, a network of proportioned proportions. Every instance
of unfairness is like a false note in the harmony of the spheres (p. 126).
An important question facing Apollonian emperors was the optimal size
of the sphere, the optimal radius length. Outside the Roman sphere of influence,
an immense barbarous world existed, but the radius of the empire could not be
extended indefinitely without running the risk of collapse. Whilst the politics of
his predecessor Trajan was still focused on expansion, almost as a goal in itself,
Hadrian opted for consolidation. Standing at the border of his empire in Asia he
says: “I envy those who will succeed in going the full 250,000 Greek stadia (so
well calculated by Eratosthenes) which, in their entirety, will lead us back to our
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79
point of departure” (p. 48). Ideally, the Roman Empire coincides with the earthly
sphere, but the confrontation with the immensity of the world, with Asia’s
endlessness, is an unsettling experience. Building the Pantheon is like erecting a
protective screen, an attempt to keep infinity at bay and consolidate the sphere.
As the ultimate embodiment of spherical thinking, the Pantheon is at the
same time a turning point. Sloterdijk quotes Spengler, as we have seen, when the
latter not only defines the Pantheon as the ultimate sphere, but also as the first
“mystical space”, the first, primordial mosque, the archetype of Magian
architecture (Spengler, p. 98; p. 274). The building discloses a new, Magian space
experience and marks the beginning, the rise, the genesis of Magian thinking,
emerging in the form of religious epidemics of Eastern origin (Isis, Mithras), but
eventually resulting in the Christianisation of the Empire. Christianity will
establish its own monumental dome church in Rome. In the mosque or dome
church, a different atmosphere reigns than in the ancient temple. It is an immense,
Magian, enchanted cavity, a mystification of space.
The second major building Hadrian realized was the Villa, an ambiance
for otium and contemplation. While the Pantheon is placed in the city centre, the
Villa is located outside the walls as an Arcadian landscape park in which various
buildings could be found, basically a large-size replica of Plato’s Park. There
were gardens, olive trees, covered lanes, ponds, fountains and sports facilities, as
well as bath houses, libraries, theatres, guesthouses and dining rooms. The Villa
is, in many ways, Pantheon’s counterpart. While the Pantheon wishes to
emphasize the vital importance of the centre, encompassing everything in its
magnetic field, the Villa is an open-air museum in which the provinces are
represented. The Villa was a collage. Hadrian wanted to assemble buildings and
locations he had seen and visited on his travels, to recollect them in one place,
not as exact copies, but as buildings that captured and conveyed the spirit of their
place of origin, the genius loci. The Pantheon is an abstract building,
materialising an abstract, spherical idea. The Villa brings together the various
cultures of the Empire in a harmonious way, on one pleasant location. The
Emperor himself who, during his travels, had founded and restored numerous
buildings, wanted to realize a synopsis of the buildings and locations that had
impressed and affected him. Athenian elements could not be missed, e.g. the Stoa,
the Academy, the Lyceum. A reconstruction of Plato’s Academy, surrounded by
olive trees, was erected not far from the Canopus.
Pantheon and Villa, each in its own way, represent Apollonian
civilization at its peak. However, the supremacy of Apollonian thinking was far
from absolute. Hadrian was philosophically educated and academically minded,
but whenever Apollonian philosophy disappointed him, he was already open to
“magical explanations” (p. 30), and would revert to Magian thinking when he
found that ancient philosophers failed to appeal to him and enlighten him. His
travels brought him into contact with scholars who dedicated themselves to the
study of Magian arts, because the Apollonian style seemed to become
increasingly bookish and was beginning to lose its relevance: increasingly failed
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to articulate new experiences. From Asia, from the East, with its vast territories
and its richness of mysterious cults, an irresistible attraction and enchantment
arose. While the Germanic tribes in the North seemed increasingly willing to
adopt Roman technologies and to nestle themselves in the Roman sphere of
influence, Rome had more difficulties when it came to pacifying Jewish or other
tenacious Eastern elements. These Eastern cultures remained stubbornly opposed
to become absorbed into the empire. The Jewish god was unwilling to accept a
place in the Pantheon among the other deities. Between the Emperor and the East,
a hate-love relationship arose. The East both fascinated and unsettled him. He
was open to oriental modes of thinking, such as reflected in the Mithras cult, but
the chronic and bitter opposition to Roman domination, notably by Jews, revolted
him and resulted in violent conflicts. In Hadrian’s buildings this ambivalence is
discernible. As mentioned, the Pantheon is the first mosque, the paradigm of a
Magian church, and the villa a collage of oriental locations.
At times, he turned his gaze toward the North, to Germania, a wet and
misty realm with a monotonous, grey horizon, an ocean of trees, the reserve of
white and blond people (p. 127). In the Batavian wetlands Romans encountered
desolate dunes, whistling grasses and stilt houses in the border port of
Noviomagus: sad places, shapeless landscapes, a heavy sea, polluted by sand, a
chaotic nature. This entourage was to become the heartland of Faustian culture
many centuries later. For the time being, however, he is preoccupied with the
promises and threats coming from the East. Hadrian is still an Apollonian
traveller, a cosmonaut. He travels from the centre to the periphery, from one
peripheral location to another as we have seen (London, Nijmegen, Cologne,
Trier, Vienna, Jerusalem, Alexandria, etc.). These journeys aim to consolidate the
Empire, improve its laws, correct inequalities, literally and figuratively, add new
cities to the spherical network of urban locations, and absorb reality into the
spherical state (thereby making it increasingly real). Paul is a very different kind
of traveller. He travels from the periphery to the metropolises to spread a new,
anti-spherical truth. Paul travels in the opposite direction, both in the literal and
in the figurative sense.
§ 9. The morality of the master versus the rural grotesque
Apollonian ethics is a particular form of ethics, representing a particular style of
thinking, as we have seen. According to Hegel, the ancient Greeks were not yet
moral in the modern (Faustian) sense: the Greeks had no genuine conscience (cf.
Spengler I, p. 340). Ancient morality did not yet present itself as obligatory for
all, it did not contain a universal imperative or Law. Rather, moral perfection was
considered an achievement of the moral elite: the outcome of conscious exercise
and self-formation (1971a, p. 452). Heroes of Geek morality were “plastic
individuals”, Hegel argues, who had successfully managed to turn themselves
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81
into exceptional works of art.11 They were what they had managed to become.
These virtuous individuals were self-made.
A similar idea resurges in the ethical writings of Michel Foucault (1984a,
1984b) who argues that human subjectivity should not be regarded a
transcendental (extra-temporal, a priori) given, but the outcome of moral
exercises and practices of the self (Zwart 1995). The human subject is not a
constant, but a variable. In the course of history, various styles of moral
subjectivity emerged, one after the other. The modern (Kantian) form of moral
subjectivity (i.e. the conscientious, responsible, autonomous, rational subject
presupposed by Kantian ethics) is the (temporary) outcome of a particular
practice of the self, developed by a particular culture (German Protestantism) and
adopted as a universal norm by a particular civilisation (Faustian civilisation).
And yet, it still is one particular form of moral subjectivity among others, bound
to disappear altogether (“without a trace”) before long, in order to give way to
new and incompatible forms of moral subjectivity, whose basic features are as
yet unknown to us. This process of morality-building is something we individuals
are not in charge of, although in the folds and margins of dominant morality we
may (via practices of the self) prepare ourselves for unprecedented forms of moral
subjectivity: a different ethic, a different style of being.
Nietzsche already emphasised the symptomatic emphasis on obedience
in Kantian ethics. In Kant’s philosophy, Nietzsche claims, morality is articulated
in terms of obedience to a Law. Ethics is about restrictions and prohibitions. In
Morgenröte (Dawn of Day, 1980 KSA3), two conflicting conceptions of morality
are juxtaposed: the Judeo-Christian conception of morality as obedience to an
unconditional Law, and the Greco-Roman conception of morality as ascetic
exercises, fostering self-management and temperance. The first conception
envisions morality as a (Faustian) conflict between bodily inclinations and the
desire to obey, resulting in a chronic sense of guilt. We remain guilty before the
Law, unable to live up to its insatiable demands. According to the ancient
conception, however, morality is an ascetic exercise, a permanent effort to
refurbish body and soul so as to attain mastery over your passions. These are not
to be exterminated, but governed in a prudent manner. By means of exercise and
other forms of self-edification, individuals transform themselves into plastic
individuals, thereby distinguishing themselves from the masses, setting
themselves apart from the lower social stratums – such is the morality of the
master. Later, Nietzsche argues, many of these ancient techniques of moral selfformation were appropriated by slave morality – that is: they were placed in the
11
“Er [Socrates] steht vor uns ... als eine von jenen großen plastischen Naturen
(Individuen) ... wie wir sie in jener Zeit zu sehen gewohnt sind, - als ein vollendetes
klassisches Kunstwerk, das sich selbst zu dieser Hohe gebracht hat. [Z]u dem, was sie
waren, haben sie sich selbständig ausgebildet; sie sind das geworden, was sie haben sein
wollen… Solche Kunstwerke sind die großen Männer jener Zeit. Das höchste plastische
Individuum ist Perikles, und um ihn, gleich Sternen, Sophokles, Thucydides, Sokrates,
usw. Sie haben ihre Individualität herausgearbeitet zur Existenz (Hegel 1971a, p. 452).
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service of a morality of obedience. According to Nietzsche, we presently find
ourselves in an ambiguous situation, a “moral interregnum”. On the one hand,
notwithstanding the efforts of Enlightenment to rationalize morality, obedience
still remains the basic moral mood.12 On the other hand, the Judeo-Christian
conception has declined considerably in strength, has become less self-evident,
and something rather unexpected seems imminent.
During the 1980s, Foucault (1984a, 1984b) addressed the question of
moral subjectivity quite explicitly. Rather than being subjected by disciplinary
and normalizing practices of power, Foucault now allowed for the possibility that
individuals constitute themselves as moral subjects, through self-discipline –
disciplina voluntatis. Self-constitution adheres to the logic of the morality of the
master. Via temperance and exercise, these masters distinguish themselves from
the morality of the human herd (the majority of the people, who remain at the
mercy of their drives and passions). Practices of the self (moral exercises) entail
self-management, turning oneself into a work of art, stylizing and organizing
one’s drives in a certain manner.
In Foucault’s interpretation of ancient morality, we easily recognise
Aristotle’s version of Apollonian ethics as discussed above, with its focus on
temperance and proportionality, entailing a mathematical logic of its own, seeing
virtue as the mean (µέσον) between extremes, as the middle course between
deficit (ellipse) and excess (hyperbola). Self-management entails the ability to
steer one’s actions in the direction of the proportional mean, while exercise
enhances the subject’s ability to hit the right middle.
At the same time, this identification of ancient morality with the elite
morality of the master evidently entails a series of problems. Volumes Two and
Three of Foucault’s History of Sexuality explicitly claim to describe the history of
ancient sexuality, but the validity of his analysis seems restricted to a particular
moral style, namely: Apollonian sexuality, the morality (the life-style, the
dietetics) of the higher echelons, the upper social strata: the male masters of the
ancient Greek and Roman world. There is no confrontation with other styles or
other options, with otherness. The morality of the lower stratums disappears into
the background as something negative. Yet, ancient morality was not a
homogeneous ideological unity. Rather, it was a forcefield, a moral battlefield if
you like, where collisions between incompatible styles unfolded. In ancient
Greece, the counter-culture or counter-style (challenging the elite Apollonian lifestyle) was the Dionysian view of life as we have seen. In ancient Rome, Dionysian
thinking resurged in the counter-culture of the grotesque, not only in the realm of
aesthetics, but also in the realm of morality, dietetics and sexuality. The label
“grotesque” is used here as a common denominator of the moral and aesthetical
logic of this counter-culture, notably endorsed by the lower strata, as the style of
thinking at work in popular morality (the morality of the masses). Whereas from
12
“Auch zu uns noch redet ein “du sollst”, auch wir noch gehorchen einem strengen
Gesetze über uns” (Nietzsche 1881/1980, III, p. 16)
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83
an Apollonian perspective the grotesque is framed as immoral, obscene,
uncivilised and illogical, on closer inspection the grotesque is a genuine style of
thinking in its own right, with a logic and aesthetic of its own.
The Russian philosopher and literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin contributed
significantly to our understanding of the grotesque, via his thorough analysis of
grotesque thinking in Rabelais and his world (1968) and other writings (1988).
During the Renaissance, Bakhtin argued, the grotesque style experienced a revival
(in the writings of Rabelais and others), but it already originated in antiquity, in
the form of grotesque festivals (Saturnalia, Floralia, etc.) and grotesque (Priapic)
poetry, celebrating and singling out obscene body parts (phallus, mouth, anus,
buttocks, belly) as partial objects of carnivalesque ridicule and worship. My
analysis of the grotesque zooms in on one particular case study: Carmina Priapea,
a collection of eighty or so (anonymous) Latin epigrams about, dedicated to or
giving the floor to the Roman garden god Priapus. These epigrams, notoriously
obscene, are probably written by one author at the end of the first century A.D.
There are notable similarities with priapic poetry by other authors from the same
period, e.g. Martial and Catullus (Richlin 1992, Elomaa 2015).
Priapus is a wooden statue, serving as guardian of enclosed gardens,
punishing trespassers and thieves, subjecting them to sexual / corporeal
punishment (notably anal and/or oral rape). Some priapic poems were probably
used as inscriptions, as signs of warning, or as ludic versions of what today would
be something like: “access forbidden for all unauthorised persons”. Whereas the
content of the poetry is emphatically sexual (mostly dealing with the size and
performativity of protruding phalluses), there is another striking feature which is
important here, namely the fact that these poems consistently follow a
recognisable logical scheme. Most if not all of these short poems entail a
syllogism. Grotesque thinking is not illogical, but other-logical (allo-logical).
Inscriptions above the entrance to ancient gardens was far from
exceptional. Remember the famous words “Let no one ignorant of geometry enter
here” (Μηδείς άγεωµέτρητος είσίτω), allegedly inscribed above the entrance gate
of Plato’s academia: geometry literacy as admission requirement. Know your
geometry, or you will be a nuisance to us and likely to make a fool of yourself.
In Priapus’ case, the various degrees of corporeal punishment to which
trespassers would be subjected (increasingly harsh in the case of recidivism) also
served educational purposes and even functioned as initiation rite. Trespassers
would be educated, not by preaching (predicare) but by rape (pedicare), – a
difference of only one letter (“una littera”, a slip of the tongue) as Priapus points
out (in Poem 7). The logical structure of this corrective penal practice is quite
straightforward: if (you are so bold as to enter and plunder this garden), then
(sexual punishment is imminent). Action inevitably implies reaction.
The link between erotic literature and logic is far from remarkable. The
writings of Marquis de Sade were likewise famous for their rigid and irresistible
logic (pushing atheism to its logical conclusions), and the same goes for SacherMasoch’s oeuvre. As Gilles Deleuze (1967/2007) pointed out, the latter’s novels
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and stories follow a strict logical scheme. They should be considered “pornology”
rather than pornography, although in this case the (female) executioner is the one
who is trained and educated. Priapus is likewise a therapist offering treatment to
the betterment of his patients, e.g. dissatisfied women, lusty catamites, impotent
males and thieves. These epigrams entail a warning: all trespassers will be
punished (∀A ⇒ B). Think twice before you enter.
Thus, priapic punitive practices were dictated by a priapic syllogism: in
the case of theft, you will be punished with anal or oral rape (All thieves will be
sodomised; you are a thieve; ergo, you will be sodomised). Notably, the focus
was on the three bodily orifices (mouth, anus, vagina) and on the phallus as an
“orifice-filling” organ (Richlin 1992, p. 131). I will pedicate (sodomise) a boy,
fuck a girl, and reserve the third punishment (irrumation) for adult thieves,
Priapus points out (Poem 13). Poem 22 likewise conveys an anatomy of priapic
punishment. There are three options; if the thieve is a woman, Priapus will stick
his mentula in her vagina; in the case of a boy, he will penetrate the buttocks; in
the case of an adult male, he will thrust his mentula in the trespasser’s mouth.
Poem 28 entails a similar message: theft will be punished with anal rape, but
should this prove insufficient, Priapus will strike higher (i.e. irrumation as an
even heavier punishment, employed in the case of recidivism). In other poems
(23, 58), the curse of Priapus entails that the male thief will never again find a
sexual partner (either woman, catamite or boy). May his erect mentula throb
against his navel in vain! And thieves who point their middle-finger at Priapus’s
threatening figure, thinking his mentula to be merely a piece of painted wood,
will be irrumated by the landlord himself (Poem 56). When Priapus (after having
thrust his phallus into the stoutest thieves) no longer functions, however, he
himself is treated quite disrespectfully: his sickle will be taken away and his
member will be cut off, so that he will resemble an emasculated adept of Cybele
(Poem 55). Finally, his wooden corpus will be cut to pieces (Poem 26).
In her book The Garden of Priapus, Amy Richlin (1992) convincingly
argues that Foucault, in his two volumes on ancient morality, actually wrote a
history of elite male sexuality, focussing on recommendations for lifestyle and
diet, on writings by nutritionists: a dietetic directed at a wealthy, elite, male,
upper-class audience. What Foucault left out, she argues, was the Roman real, the
aesthetic of priapic humour and the obscene: sexuality as it was practiced by the
lower strata. Here, the popular, ithyphallic garden deity Priapus played a crucial
role. Therefore, the Carmina Priapea as a collection of obscene (anti-Apollonian)
little poems (“versiculi”), fit for a garden wall – as low-brow graffiti – not for a
book, constitutes a perfect sample for studying the grotesque.
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§ 10. The logic of the grotesque
“O Priapus, faithful protector of orchards, warn off the thieves
with thy red-painted amulet” (Poem 72)
Priapus was an ithyphallic deity, as we have seen, worshipped in the form of a
wooden statue erected in the middle of a walled garden, with a sickle and an erect
phallus (the embodiment of bellicose pride) as attributes, threatening thieves with
anal or oral rape. Devotees would offer small presents, or short erotic verses,
hoping for something in return (e.g. restored potency or erotic success in dealing
with male clients). The Carmina Priapea consist of poems dedicated to Priapus,
but also poems which give the floor to the god himself, as a “talking phallus”, the
embodiment of what, in post-structuralism, is known as phallogocentrism
(Richlin 1992, p. xvii). In the garden of Priapus, one may speak freely. The use
of obscene terms is not forbidden here (high-brow inhibitions are superseded).
You may call “a cunt a cunt, a prick a prick” (Poem 29).
Priapic statues served multiple functions. First of all, they served as road
signs, guiding travellers through labyrinthian rural landscapes – cf. Poem 30: “O
Priapus, with your sickle and your impressive part, please show me the way to the
fountain” (probably, the traveller needs water to cleanse his mouth after
irrumation). Secondly, priapic statues served as scarecrows, as signs of warning
and as punishing device against thieves, threatening them with sexual harassment.
Finally, they served as objects of worship, placed in the middle of the garden as
an obscene shrine, where worshippers could deposit modest ex-voto offerings,
such as apples (Poem 21, Poem 53, probably as a metaphor for buttocks), but also
wooden phalluses (Poem 34) and waxen apples (Poem 42). Visitors also dedicated
poems to Priapus, as we have seen. Priapic (obscene, jocose) epigrams (“carmina
plena ioci”) could be scrawled on garden walls (as priapic graffiti, comparable
perhaps to the kind of poetry we nowadays encounter in toilets in bars). This
practice is mentioned in one of the two introductory poems to the series (Poem 2):
…quidquid id est, quod otiosus whatever it is that I, in my leisure,
templi
parietibus
tui
notavi, have scrawled on your temple walls,
in partem accipias bonam, rogamus
I request you, accept it in good favour
Such shrines attracted (nightly) visitors (male and female) yearning for phallic
jouissance, or hoping to receive treatment for their impotence. If Priapus answered
their petitions, they would leave signs of gratitude. In Poem 37, a visitor has
injured his penis (during an erotic battle) and asks Priapus for a cure to prevent
amputation (“curatum mentulam sine sectionem”). Priapus grants his wish. Ergo,
he leaves a tablet with a facsimile of an erect, red-coloured penis on the altar. But
the shrine could also function as a low-brow theatre where lovers practiced
intercourse in multiple positions described by famous (mostly female) authors of
sexual manuals, such as Philaenis and Elephantis (let us practice “tot figuras, quas
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Philaenis enarrat”, Poem 63). Although the collection of priapic epigrams became
a book, they were not meant for, nor considered worthy of a book (“horto carmina
digna, non libello”, Poem 2). Priapic poetry forcefully defies its status as literature
(Elomaa 2015). The poetry is not poetry, the book is not a book. This garden
poetry (where garden = a collection of poems) is not (“non”) fit for virgins, and
the Muses were not (“nec”) called upon to assist the poet, for it would have been
improper to lead them to Priapus’ mentula. Therefore (“ergo”), please accept
these low-brow verses for what they are. If Priapus fails to be of help, the
disappointed devotee will turn his back on him (“vale, Priape: debeo tibi nihil”,
as it is phrased in the final poem in the series: Poem 83).
Priapus was also the patron of female erotic performers, such as
Thelethusa, a famous “circulatrix” (itinerant athlete and dancer, Poem 19), or
Quintia, a famous performer at the Circus Maximus, who dedicated her
“weapons” (cymbals, castanet, tambour) to Priapus, hoping they would continue
to bring about erections among her male audience (Poem 27). Such women were
slaves who earned their freedom through erotic performances, and the poetry
informs us that Thelethusa performed at the Via Suburra, a lower-class district in
ancient Rome. To show her gratitude to Priapus, she left an ex-voto on his altar:
a wooden phallus (the partial object of worship) encircled with a golden crown
(Poem 40). In Poem 50, a lover likewise promises to crown Priapus’ mentula with
garlands, if the girl of his dreams will finally grant him her favours.
As indicated, the Priapic syllogism works like this. All thieves sneaking
into this garden will be punished (sodomised); You are a thief, sneaking into this
garden; Therefore (“ergo”), you will be sodomised. This syllogism, often
involving variants produced with the help of negations (“non”, “nec”), is at work
for instance to the first lines of Poem 15:
Commisso mihi non satis modestas Whoever plunders with dishonest hand
quicumque attulerit manus agello, This little field committed to my charge,
Will discover that I’m not a castrate
is me sentiet esse non spadonem.
We also recognise it in other poems, e.g. Poem 31 (If you steal from this garden,
then the weapon of my belly will stretch your anus) or Poem 59 (If you come as
a thief, then you will leave dishonoured: “si fur veneris, inpudicus exis”). A thief
caught for the first time will be sodomised. If caught again, Priapus will irrumate
him (a heavier punishment). If caught for the third time, he will be both sodomised
and irrumated (e.g. Poem 35: semel: pericabo; idem: irrumabo; tertia: et hanc et
illam / pedicaberis irrumaberisque). Indeed, all thieves who are caught repeatedly
(Poem 44) will suffer irrumation ((∀A ⇒ B). Thus, a priapic statue conveys a
straightforward message: beware of the phallus (“Cave mentulam”), thief. If I
catch you, I will pierce you with my pole and stretch your anus (Poem 11). The
task of protecting the garden is entrusted to Priapus, and his “watchman” will
widen your behind and make your anus wider (“laxior”): by entering and exiting,
thereby repeating the illegal treatment of the garden (Poem 52).
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In some of the poems, however, we find Priapus complaining that his
threats have the opposite effect: the prospect of sexual punishment itself attracts
and lures “cinaedi” (catamites) into the garden (“ad poenam”, Poem 51). For
them, anal punishment (rather than fruits or vegetables) is inviting. They adhere
to the (inverted) logic of desire, so that it is not the fruit, but the punishment that
allures them. Therefore, if someone steals just for the love of punishment (“amore
poena”), Priapus will ignore him (Poem 64).
The garden of Priapus may also serve as a site where poetry is written,
and where jocose poets are expected to leave some gay and playful poems
(“versus iocosos”) on Priapus’ altar (Poem 41, Poem 47). In several poems, apples
are interchangeable with, or function as a metaphor for poems (Poem 60), so that
poems are sublimated apples (“poma”). Should the poet involved consider lowbrow priapic poetry beneath his standing, let them mingle with the erudite
(Apollonian) literati, but Priapus will make sure that he will do so with a widened
arse (Priapus will “make him feel”).
Thus, there are various logical scenarios. The visitor may either be a thief
(who wants to steal the forbidden fruits, literally), or a woman (who either seeks
phallic enjoyment directly – using Priapus’s statue as a phallic device – or
indirectly, by making offerings to Priapus, in the hope of attracting lovers or
customers), – or a sodomite (seeking enjoyment, someone for whom the
punishment itself is the enjoyment sought). What these visitors have in common
is that they all suffer from a lack of enjoyment. They are all lured towards a statue
that exhibits what is normally concealed (the object a, psychoanalytically
speaking). The garden is the locus of the rustic god, a place for poetry or offerings,
where short priapic poems are written on walls or tablets, or attached to branches
of apple trees (Poem 2, Poem 49, Poem 61). It is a logic of reciprocity: do ut des,
you gave to me, I gave to you; I will bring you an offering, if you grant my desire.
Unlike other gods, Priapus is ugly. The object of desire, however, is not
his body as such, but a “partial object”, a particular attribute: his protruding
phallus, signalling the phallic enjoyment visitors crave for, while threatening
criminals with impalement. Aristotle’s famous adage that all human actions and
practices seem to aim at some good (∀x ⇒ y), also applies to visitors of Priapus’
garden, albeit in a subverted, parodied manner, as the good is not something
Apollonian (e.g. happiness or virtue), but rather an obscene object. Those craving
for phallic jouissance can either be males – who became impotent or injured their
penis; cuoad castrationem, as Lacan phrases it (1975, p. 47) –, or women (who
either desire sex with a statue or beseech it to enhance their prospects), or
sodomites. Thus, several types of visitors can be distinguished: the adult thief
(“fur”), the married woman (“matron”), the erotic performer, who considers
Priapus her patron, the girl (“puella”), who wants to shed a glance at the phallus,
and the boy (“puer”), who becomes initiated through sodomisation. It is a place
where discourse (text) is produced in the form of prayers or poems.
In short, the grotesque has a logic of its own. This is ascertained by the
frequent use of logical terms in priapic poetry (“non”, “nec”, “ergo”, etc.). Most
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if not all priapic epigrams entail a syllogism, a logical argument as we have seen:
if (you plunder this garden), then (you will be punished); or: all deities (∀x) are
equipped with a weapon, a signature attribute; I am a deity; ergo, I am equipped
with my signature attribute (my ruby wooden phallus). I will now elaborate these
aspects in more detail, using concrete examples to exemplify how the grotesque
(priapic) logic works, starting with the syllogism of deterrence. Subsequently, I
will zoom in on the legal dimension (the logic of property and reciprocity: do ut
des), the logic of joyous comparison, and the logic of phallic desire.
The syllogism of deterrence is discernible in multiple poems, as we have
seen, as a basic scheme which allows for multiple variations with the help of
logical terms. The epigrams scrawled on garden walls entailed a straightforward
rationale. If you enter illegally, this is what will happen. If you intend to steal the
fruit, consider the weight of the mentula which will be thrust into you (Poem 69).
If you plunder the garden, then you will be taught a lesson and become “learned”
(“doctus”, Poem 71), as I pierce my member exactly through your middle (Poem
74) – notice how Apollonian thinking is consistently parodied in all these threats.
If someone profanes this rural piece of property, he knows what logically follows
(“quod sequitur”, Poem 82). It will be his own doing; he asked for it; he himself
wanted this. It is the logic of criminal justice that later became sublated in Hegel’s
Logic (1830/1986, § 140, p. 277): the criminal is entitled to punishment. Criminals
may see the punishment as an infringement on their integrity, but at closer
consideration the punishment is the logical consequence of their own wilful act.
They asked for it. It is not Priapus who is misbehaving, it is the thief’s own doing.
Priapus enacts the logic entailed in the act initiated by the thief himself. Ergo:
think twice before you act! The thief is the Agent, the initiator ⇒ forcing Priapus
into action ⇒ resulting in a product: the punishment “enjoyed” by the thief.
The difference between moral education (“predicare”) and Priapus’
method (“pedicare”) is only one letter as we have seen (Poem 7). When this letter
is obliterated, the priapic syllogism starts to function, and the punishment is
inflicted (preferring actions to words: Facta, non verba). Felony results in
corporeal punishment, as a form of atonement: I will sodomise you, thief
(“Pedicabere, fur,”, Poem 35). In the case of recidivism, the punishment will
become increasingly severe: If you enter for the first time, I will sodomise you
(pedicare). If you enter for the second time, I will punish you more severely, by
forcing my phallus into your throat (irrumare). If you enter for the third time, I
will punish you most severely (pedicare + irrumare: A ⇒ B ⇒ A+B. Other
watchmen are requested not to hinder Priapus as educator. Poem 14:
Quid mecum tibi, circitor moleste?
ad me quid prohibes venire furem?
accedat, sine: laxior redibit.
Why do you bother me, meddlesome watchman?
Why do you hinder the thief from coming to me?
Let him approach: he will return “laxior”
Punishment is a transformative experience. “Laxior” means “wider” (literally,
after anal sex), but also refers to a transformative experience. The thief is not just
chased away. He has learned his lesson, he is converted, in accordance with the
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pedagogy of pedicare. The syllogism can be perverted, however, namely when
the felony is committed because the visitor wants the punishment (considering
himself entitled to it).
The Carmina Priapea constitute a playful exploration and investigation
of the logic of the grotesque. This is confirmed by the ample use of logical
signifiers such as “ergo”. The first Poem in the series puts it like this. Playfully
have I written these verses attesting thee (a pun on testes), o Priapus. These poems
are worthy of a garden, not of a book (i.e. they constitute low-brow, not highbrow literature). Nor have I invoked the Muses to this unvirginal spot. Therefore
(“ergo”), whatever I have idly jotted on the walls of thy temple, please accept it,
I pray. All deities have poems written for them praising them in fitting style by
devotees (∀A ⇒ B); you are a deity; therefore (ergo), you are entitled to poems
in fitting style, please accept them.
In some poems (e.g. Poem 14), we encounter a friendlier Priapus, now
the most hospitable of all gods. Religious restrictions which are normally in place
do not apply to Priapus. Come hither, approach my little altar, even if you have
spent the night with a girl or visited a brothel. I am just a lower-class, rustic, openair deity, fully exposed to inclement weather. Ergo, it is permitted to enter all who
will. In ancient religious culture, those who recently had intercourse or had visited
a brothel were considered unclean. In Priapus’ case, this is not an obstacle at all.
General clause: “All visitors are allowed to enter, except those who recently had
sexual intercourse”. In my case, this clause does not apply, the negation is
negated. Ergo, all visitors are allowed to enter.
The term “ergo” also occurs in Poem 77. Obstacles are put in place to
ward off thieves, therefore Priapus – who used to sodomise trespassers “usque et
usque et usque” (encore and encore and encore) – is suddenly out of employment.
Yet, although Priapus has grown old, he is still able to “perforate” thieves (“ego
perforare possum”, Poem 76). By building high fences, obstructing the passage,
a new generation of gardeners is making it impossible for thieves to enter.
Although this may at first glance seem helpful to Priapus, it actually puts him out
of work. While he had been diligently cleaving the buttocks of thieves, he is now
no longer able to do so, standing there idly day and night. Ergo, he is now the one
who is punished into forced abstinence, no longer able to carry out his duty. The
syllogism “If you enter here unlawfully, then you will be sodomised” no longer
functions, the logical machinery has come to a stop, preventive measures are
blocking the way. The priapic logic is suspended, there is no more room any more
for making up one’s mind. Trespassers are no longer “free” to violate the norm.
The dilemma is no longer in place, and replaced by a physical fence. The guardian
(“circitor”, who literally walks or circles around) hinders thieves from entering
Priapus’ garden (i.e. from falling into the trap). If and only if this obstacle is
removed (if this negation is negated), the thieve will return home “laxior” (with
a wider anus) than he came. Those who prevent thieves from entering the garden
by erecting a big fence, hinder Priapus instead of helping him. Therefore (“ergo”)
the one who was wont to cleave the buttocks of thieves ever and ever and ever,
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now stands unemployed, like an abstinent lute-player. The syllogism has been
obliterated, and although this may seem a more “rational” design, beneficial to
all, involving a minimum of suffering, there is still a price to pay: Priapus and his
logic are now the ones who suffer.
The legal dimension of the Carmina collection addresses violations of
property. Although the owner (master, “dominus”) himself is mostly absent, there
is a steward (warden, curator, “custos”) who employs Priapus as an instrument of
deterrence, a punishment device, barring the entrance. This steward is entitled to
enjoy the fruits (Latin: “usufructus”, cf. Lacan 1975, p. 10) of the property
entrusted to him (although this does not imply a right to destroy or waste that
property). In other words, these poems address the relationship between Law and
jouissance. In Poem 24, for instance, Priapus points out that the warden mandated
the care of this garden to him. And you, thief, shall be punished. Because of a
cabbage? Because of a cabbage! Crime will be punished, even if the punishment
(anal rape) seems disproportional. Priapus will plunge his foot-long phallic
sceptre (Poem 25), which ladies and kings like to hold in their hands and
catamites (“cinaedi”) yearn to kiss, into the thief’s abdomen (“intra viscera
furis”), until Priapus’s testicles (witnesses) reach up to the thief’s anus and the
pole up to his navel.
The legal framing of this treatment is confirmed in Poem 15:
dicat forsitan hoc: 'tibine quisquam
hic inter frutices loco remoto
percisum sciat esse me?', sed errat:
magnis testibus ista res agetur.
Here, in this lonely place among the
bushes. The thief will say to himself, “No
one will know that I have been thrust
through.” He will be mistaken; my
testicles will act as weighty witnesses
While the phallus serves as the instrument inflicting the punishment, the testicles
literally serve as witnesses, for the same Latin word testis means both “witness”
and “testicle”, and Roman comic authors like Plautus liked to play with this
double meaning. Testicles are witnesses: testis. The term testis comes from
“three”, the witness being a “third” party, while testicles give witness of a man’s
virility. The connection with testicles may have been the practice of holding
someone’s genitals while swearing an oath (speak nothing but the truth).
Many priapic poems entail negotiations and transactions, moreover. Take
for instance Poem 3, where a lover is imploring anal intercourse: give me what
Jupiter gave to Ganymede (i.e. anal intercourse), comparing it to what frightened
brides grant their husbands on a wedding night:
quod virgo prima cupido dat nocte marito,
dum timet alterius volnus inepta loci
What on the wedding night the bride gives
to her husband, dreading the hurt that
could be inflicted in a different part.
Richlin (1992, p. 16) cites a similar passage from Seneca the elder. The bride’s
fears on her wedding night result in allowing the husband anal intercourse.
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The marriage bed is a legal site, giving rise to claims and negotiations
about legal entitlements. Think of Lohengrin, for instance, where Elsa claims to
be entitled to know her husband’s name before granting him intercourse. In
priapic poetry these negotiations may involve displacement (“Verschiebung”):
anal intercourse as a compromise or concession, whereby the bride offers the
orifice that is normally offered by boys (serving as sex toys for adult males).
Thus, according to Priapic logic, married women (“matronae”) may concede to
play the role of a boy (“puer”) to forego physical harm or pregnancy.
In Poem 16, a boy places his “apples” (buttocks) on Priapus’s sacrificial
table, expecting something in return. This logic of reciprocity is captured in the
Latin adage Do ut des “I give that you may give”. In ancient Rome, a votum was
a vow made to a deity, conveying the contractual nature of Roman religion. We
often encounter this kind of deal in priapic epigrams, e.g. in Poem 5:
Quam puero legem fertur dixisse
Priapus,
versibus his infra scripta duobus erit:
'quod meus hortus habet sumas inpune
licebit,
si dederis nobis quod tuos hortus habe
The conditions which Priapus and the boy
agreed to, are listed in this distich: You may
freely plunder my garden exempted from
punishment
If you give to me what your garden
(buttocks) contains in return
Or Poem 38:
pedicare volo, tu vis decerpere poma;
quod peto, si dederis, quod petis, accipies
I want to pedicate; you to pluck apples.
If you give what I desire, you will receive
what you desire.
At the same time, it is clear that the legal dimension often involves an element of
parody, as an inherent dimension of grotesque poetry (Zwart 1996; 1999). Priapus
is a deity, albeit not a lofty (Olympic) one, but a lowly and rustic one. A rustic
landscape adorns itself with wooden icons. His sign (attribute, signifier) is the
phallus, a “partial object”, an “organ”, functioning both as an instrument of
deterrence and as an object of desire. He is a guardian protecting a shrine, like
a Dvarapala placed near the entrance to Buddhist or Hindu temples, often
portrayed as a warrior or fearsome giant, usually armed with a fearsome club.
Priapus is part of ancient garden architecture.
In Poem 1 it is explained that neither (“non”) Diana, nor (“non”) Vesta,
nor (“nec”) Minerva (three lofty virgin deities) dwell here. This is the shrine of a
rustic phallic god, represented by a wooden statue (i.e. not a marble one), painted
red (the phallic colour) and equipped with a fully exposed, erect mentula.
Therefore (“igitur”), either cover it up (i.e. close the book) or continue to read
(enter the garden). Two types of deities are distinguished in this poem: the lofty
ones (the Olympians, immortalised by Apollonian sculpture) and the obscene.
Ergo, it is up to you, make up your mind: either enter (i.e. read this shameless
collection of artless verses), or opt out.
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In some poems (e.g. Poem 6), Priapus threatens girls or boys that,
although he is made of wood, he will capture them and keep them captured,
burying his phallus into them, up to the seventh rib (Poem 7, perhaps a parody on
the seven stages of initiation in Dionysian mystery cults). In Poem 10, however,
a girl simply ridicules him and laughs at him. Priapus concedes that he is made
of wood, not sculptured by a high-brow Apollonian artist, but hacked by a lowly
servant from a piece of wood, a forked tree. Still, he is willing and able to initiate
her in phallic jouissance.
In Poem 9, in response to a question addressed to him, Priapus compares
himself with the Olympian gods. Question (“questio”): why are your obscene
parts displayed without cover? Why is your phallus, your mentula, ostensibly
visible? In his reply, Priapus compares his phallus with the instruments which
lofty, Apollonian deities likewise carry with them as their signature attribute. Ten
deities are listed one by one, much like a “catalogue” (Michalopoulos 2017).
Poseidon does not conceal his trident, nor Mars his sword, nor Pallas her spear,
nor Apollo his golden arrows, nor Diana her quiver, nor Alcides his club, nor
Bacchus his Thyrsus. No god (“nullus deus”) conceals his weapon (“telum”).
Why, then, should Priapus hide his mentula? Without his weapon, he would be
unarmed, defenceless (“inermis”). The poem has the form of a “question” and the
syllogism is clear: All gods carry their instrument, visibly on display (∀A ⇒ B);
Priapus is a god (=A); ergo, Priapus is entitled to his instrument (⇒B). Idem in
Poem 34: every god (∀A) is endowed with a distinctive attribute; Priapus is a
god; ergo, Priapus is endowed with his distinctive feature. In fact, no god is
“mentulatior”, better equipped (the hyperbole of parody). We encounter the same
argument in Poem 20: All Gods (Mars, Minerva, etc.: ∀A) have an attribute, a
weapon (“telum”); Priapus is a god; ergo, Priapus is entitled to his obscene
attribute, his weapon, his phallus. Later, in Christianity, martyrs likewise carry
their iron grills and dissected breasts with them. This is Priapus’ attribute:
unpolished and direct, while the attributes of the Olympians (trident, spear, etc.)
may count as phallus Ersatz. Obviously, a phallus is not a weapon in the sense a
trident or spear or quiver is. It is an obscene organ, a partial object, belonging to
his body, yet sticking out, as a detachable part.
In Poem 14, Priapus once again compares himself to other gods, but now
to emphasise his being different. Come hither, no obstacles apply. Other gods
impose all kinds of conditions, not me. Poem 39 contains another variant of the
same syllogism: all deities are beautiful (of pleasant shape: ∀A ⇒ B), Priapus is
a deity, but lacks (“carere”) beauty (¬ B); therefore, he is compensated with a
magnificent phallus (that which all girls and catamites desire most, Poem 43).
Priapus loves to parody the heroes and heroines of Homer and other epic tales.
Should a thief want to know the punishment he will receive, this can easily be
derived from a puzzle, by connecting the first syllables of the names of famous
epic heroines and heroes (Penelope, Dido, Camus, Remus) = pedicare (to
sodomise, Poem 67). The thief may consider himself epically brave and daring
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by entering the garden, but he will be taught that he is not. Priapus is an illiterate
rustic, but he knows his classics: Homer is all about cunts and pricks (Poem 68).
Heraclitus (Fragment 93) states that Apollo neither speaks nor hides (his
message), but gives a sign (οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύπτει ἀλλὰ σηµαίνει). Priapus’
message, however, is rather straightforward. No need of vaticination (“augure
non opus est”): the mentula simply exercises its proper function (Poem 43).
In poems directed at female visitors, a similar syllogism is involved: All
women desire to secretly visit my garden, to glance at my phallus or even use me
(∀A ⇒ B); You are a woman (=A); Therefore, you want to make use of my
phallus (after dusk, unseen, ⇒ B). Maidens who avoid looking at the erect
phallus, cast an askance (“obliquis”) glance at it (Poem 73), averting their eyes
from the very thing they long to feel inside them (“intra viscera habere
concupiscis”, Poem 66). One day it may be of use to them.
Sometimes the oversized wooden phallus is openly on display, but it may
also require an offering before it can be seen sticking out, boasting that this
mentula would have satisfied Penelope (Poem 68). Women, eager to shed a
glance on Priapus’ imposing phallus (“magnam metulam”) are discouraged from
reading the lewd verses (“impudica verba”) inscribed on the wooden statues
(Poem 7). Keep away from these verses, married women, but they eagerly glance
at his mentula (the object a; that which one cannot ignore, Poem 8). They too
have to make a balanced decision. There are pros and cons to consider. There is
a phallus to behold, but also the risk of being exposed to lewd verses. Think twice
before you enter. One female worshipper offers images borrowed from an
obscene volume written by Elephantis, imploring Priapus to imitate with her all
the sexual positions depicted there: please do it like this (Poem 4). Elephantis was
a female poet, author of a famous sexual manual. According to Suetonius,
Tiberius owned a complete set of her works. Old women also come to Priapus for
sex during the night, and engage in a “fight” between two partial objects: mouth
and phallus (Poem 12; Poem 32). If they are willing to pay, Priapus ignores their
age and treats them like a girl (Poem 57). Male visitors may go there to
masturbate, using their hand for a mistress (poem 33).
The Priapus statue functions as an “apparatus of jouissance”: jouissance
is fitted out (appareillée) (Lacan 1975, p. 72) with a device. Although Priapus
first and foremost functioned as a signpost guiding the way, these statues could
also be used for phallic pleasure (after dusk) or corporeal punishment. All these
functions are linked up with language, Lacan argues. The signpost speaks to us,
indicating the right direction, but the statue may also convey a promise or
warning. Direct physical use sublimates into poetry and prayers. Priapus is first
and foremost a signifier. It is a rural production site whose fruits include poetry.
Some poems are directed to thieves, others to sodomites, still others to women:
the Priapic version of an ἐπιθαλάµιον, a song written for the bride to accompany
her on her way to the marital chamber, the bridal bed, one of these apparatuses
for jouissance consolidated with a legal status. According to Aristotle, our needs
are satisfied by activity, by excitation (ἐνέργεια), while activity yields pleasure
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(Lacan 1975, p. 80). Indeed, multiple activities are involved in Priapus’ garden.
First of all, there is pleasure in seeing: seeing phalluses, glancing lustfully at
them, or deriding them. There may also be the pleasure of direct physical contact:
the pleasure of friction, of corporeal activity producing heat. Castration is referred
to on several occasions: “Beware of my phallus, for you will find out that I am
not a castrate”. And yet, there is the fear that his phallus may be cut off. When
thieves steal his sickle, not to use it, but to humiliate the god, this is a symbolic
castration, a cause for laughter. Visitors turn to him because something is
blocking their phallic function, so that there is a gap between desire (the craving
subject: $) and the object (a). More precisely: this is the default, and visitors need
Priapus’ help to make it work, whether they are female performers (Theletusa,
Quintia) or male lovers. This is precisely where poetry comes in. Phallic
jouissance entails the pleasure of reading. Poetry is the product of a particular setup: the garden as a poetry workshop. The poetry is logically consistent: logical
poetry, for that is what poetry should be. Parmenides’ poetry likewise was logical
poetry, a logical discourse on being and nothingness captured in verse, but it was
the discourse of an Apollonian Master (i.e. metaphysics). The Carmina Priapea
contain logical poetry of a more practical nature: dealing with legal and ethical
aspects of horticulture and sexuality. It captures the logic of managing an orchard
which also functions as a shrine, a sex school and a school of obscene poetry.
The Renaissance is considered a problem, as we have seen. Superficially
speaking, it is a resurge of the Apollonian style (an interregnum between the
Magian and the Faustian style), but actually, it is also the return of the grotesque
Apollonian counterpart, from medieval festivals up to Rabelais. The Renaissance
is the return of a collision between incompatible styles. In the history of painting,
the return of the grotesque is known as mannerism, with its carnal lushness and
its fleshy, muscular bodies. Mannerism is an anti-classical (anti-Apollonian)
movement, emphatically challenging Apollonian virtues such as balance and
modesty (Van Tuinen & Meiborg 2015), eventually even culminating in
ecclesiastical obscenities: the corporeal intrusiveness of the Baroque.
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Chapter 3. Waiting for the dawn: Magian thinking
I have come into the world as a light, so that no one
who believes in me should stay in darkness (John 12:46).
In the previous chapter, Apollonian thinking was introduced via an artwork (the
School of Athens), a location (the Academy) and a joint meal (Symposium). The
basic word κόσµος determined the metaphysical profile of this style. We also
payed attention to Apollonian ethics and, after focussing on Apollonian thinking
as culture, attention shifted to the Roman Empire as Apollonian civilization. This
chapter, dedicated to Magian thinking, follows a similar route. We will
characterize Magian thinking via an artwork, a location and a meal. And after
discussing Magian thinking as culture, we will continue with Magian civilization.
We will pay particular attention to the fate of the word κόσµος, undergoing a
striking reversal of meaning, a dramatic devaluation. Cosmos is still translated as
“world”, but what is “world” from a Magian perspective? How does Magian
thinking allow the world to appear?
§ 1. What is “world”?
The archetypal Magian meal, the Magian counterpart of the Apollonian
Symposium, is the Last Supper: an event described in the Gospel of John with
the greatest intensity. It is a Magian event that immediately reflects the distance,
the world of difference between both styles. Five of the twenty-one chapters of
the Gospel of John are dedicated to this event. Jesus is given the floor almost
uninterrupted. At the beginning of His monologue, He immediately pronounces
the word that we have come to regard as a grounding term of Apollonian thinking,
namely, κόσµος: “Jesus knew that His time was coming and that He was about to
return from the world (εκ τοῦ κόσµου) to the Father” (13: 1). The manner in
which the word cosmos is used (pronounced, almost) reflects the profound
distance that separates the Magian from the Apollonian mode of thought. For
Apollonian thinking, the word κόσµος expressed the perfect order that was
intellectually discernible in the universe as an all-encompassing sphere, the very
opposite of a dark and unintelligible chaos. The human intellect could navigate
this sphere via contemplation. In John, however, the term κόσµος still refers to
“world”, but now conceived as a realm of darkness, and this shift of meaning is
symptomatic of the fact that the author is a Magian thinker in a rather outspoken
way. His world is the very opposite of clarity and order, it is a realm of confusion,
contamination and apostasy. In other words, the term κόσµος has been
devaluated, has acquired a negative value. It is a world in which the intellect no
longer feels at home.
In his essay Vom Wesen des Grundes, Martin Heidegger (1929/1967)
already emphasised the significance of this shift. More than any other
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philosopher, Heidegger acknowledged that the world does not always reveal itself
it the same manner. While the Greek term κόσµος expressed a basic experience
of being as a whole, the Christian term κόσµος (“world”) rather tells us something
about the basic mood of those involved. In Saint Paul’s epistles, κόσµος indicates
a particular attitude, namely of a humanity that has distanced itself from God.
And the same goes for the evangelist John, who (as Heidegger notices) uses the
word κόσµος remarkably often, but as an indication of the extent to which
humankind has turned away and became estranged from God. In other words,
κόσµος no longer stands for order in the world, but indicates the disorder which
now holds sway over human existence. The tonality of human existence has
fundamentally changed, as if a dramatic, collective mood swing has affected
humanity as a whole. A sombre shadow has spread over human existence. In other
words, a dual shift in meaning has occurred, not only from positive to negative,
but also from world as clarity to world as a label for the human condition.
Darkness has not obscured the starry sky. Rather, darkness has fallen over
mundane existence. And in this frightening obscurity, a light is suddenly ignited.
For Plato, the cosmos was the gleaming sphere that became visible for whoever
managed to escape from the Dionysian cave of myth. For John, paradoxically,
the cosmos itself has become a dark cave, in which only the word and presence
of Jesus now appears as a shimmering light, spreading a guiding clarity in an
ambiance of confusing obscurity.
Whenever John the evangelist speaks about the world, this shift of
meaning is ostensibly discernible. We must not envision the world as a particular
domain, enclosed by a sphere of larger radius. Although Jesus says, “You are
from below, I am from above” (8:23), these terms should not be understood in a
geometrical, astronomical sense. Heaven cannot be located astronomically.
Rather, the world and the Kingdom of Heaven are described in terms of darkness
and light. During the Last Supper, Jesus explains how the term world must be
understood. He will leave this world and return to His Father (13: 1). He has come
into this world (κόσµος), but the world hates Him (7:7; 15:18). He is the light of
this world and came to save this world (3:17), and whoever follows Him will no
longer walk in darkness, but may follow the light of life (8:12). Before long the
world will no longer see Him, but He asks His disciples to await His return,
sending them out into the world to disseminate the truth. Before Pilate, he speaks
the famous words “My Kingdom is not of this world” (18:36).
There is an artwork that succeeded in capturing the Magian atmosphere,
the mood and ambiance of the Last Supper in a remarkably convincing manner,
as a counterpart of Raphael’s School of Athens. I mean the fresco that Leonardo
da Vinci (1452-1519) painted in the refectory of the Dominican Monastery near
the Santa Maria delle Grazie in Milan. While Raphael wanted to immortalise the
Academy, Leonardo’s fresco revivifies Jesus and His followers as a primordial
spiritual community. The world, visible on this fresco as architecture, is obscure
and non-spherical. The ceiling is flat, though the structure is still reminiscent of
the inside of the Pantheon. It is a flat version of a Pantheon that lost its vertical
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dimension and suffered a spatial bereavement. The Magian, mysterious, dreamy
atmosphere is reinforced by the techniques Leonardo employed. The fresco, as it
seems, was not painted for eternity and is exposed to the undermining impact of
the damaging world. The artwork reflects abandonment. It seems to want to
disappear and to erase itself. As if only care and piety can save it.
The poet Wordsworth visited the fresco during his Italian trip and this
experience served as inspiration for a sonnet (1994, p. 342-343) explaining how,
although damps have marred this work, the Saviour’s calm, ethereal goodness
and grace do not fail to awe, neither the elements nor the beholder. The
annunciation of the truth made to the Twelve survives, in forehead and reposing
hand, but also in the artist’s eternal work. The sonnet enacts the struggle between
the Last Supper as an elevated scene, and the dreary, thawing world. The world
manifests itself as the Real, in the form of damp and moisture, something which
over time severely seems to damage the work’s integrity. In spite of these
encroachments, however, the magical, mysterious aura of the work remains
effective. Face to face with a brutish, entropic environment, Jesus’ hand and gaze
reflect the message that His kingdom is not of this world. The Magian message
itself, discernible as it were in Jesus’ countenance, remains unaffected.
The fresco shows us the precarious and temporary presence of light in
obscurity. The disciples are clearly shocked by Jesus’ announcement that one of
them is about to betray Him. They gather in four groups of three. In a Magian
artwork, such numerical ratios have meaning. In the Last Supper, Da Vinci
succeeded in capturing the Magian mood or spirit in a most lucid and convincing
manner. He worked on this masterpiece between 1495 and 1498. The damage that
was done over time emphasizes the distance between Magian thinking and the
present. It requires some effort to try and enter the lost world of Magian thought.
It has faded – but not beyond recognition or repair. In Da Vinci’s artwork the
mildness of Jesus dominates, but as a Magian figure he also is a shadow blending
into the background. The gospels describe, besides a loving Jesus, also a demonic
Jesus who, when the disciples have embarked and night sets in, meets them as a
spectre hovering over the water, even inviting one of them to come to him, almost
causing him to drown (Mt 14:25-31). Jesus seems to take pleasure in the
conviction that only a few will be saved (Mt 19:25). The Magian style has its
sinister, ghostly aspect.
§ 2. The coming of the Kingdom
The grounding term of Magian thinking is not world (κόσµος), but Kingdom; The
Kingdom of Heavens: Βασιλεία τῶν Οὐρανῶν. The gospel tells us how Jesus
roams Galilee surrounded by followers to proclaim His message. Matthew
describes how one day, he leaves his birthplace Nazareth, where he worked as a
carpenter, to settle in a fishing village on the lake. From that moment on, He
begins His preaching (4:7). But what is it that he actually preaches? His message
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can be condensed into one compact formula: “Repent and convert, the Kingdom
of Heaven is near.” That is what He tells those who cross His path. But what is
meant by “Kingdom of Heaven”? Jesus answers this question by means of
parables. “A farmer went out to sow his seeds...” (13: 3).
He uses two genres. His disciples receive the message in an esoteric
version, although they often find it difficult and struggle to understand. For wider
audiences, He uses a more accessible style, in the form of parables. The fact that
Jesus does not put any of his ideas in writing (except for some words written in
sand) is not all that astonishing. His esoteric teachings could only be transmitted
verbally, to a small group of elect initiates. Moreover, it was a very concise and
simple message: a limited set of compact formulas, explained with the help of
simple stories, taken from everyday life, appealing to and easily remembered by
illiterate listeners. The meaning of these parables is that we need to prepare
ourselves for an event that we cannot bring about ourselves, but which will
thoroughly transform the existing world and puts everything in a completely
different light. What seems important now, such as the worldly question whether
we should pay taxes to the emperor, will prove extremely trivial. A new order is
imminent. Jesus calls upon His listeners to prepare for this event, the coming of
the Kingdom. That is (in short-hand) His gospel. It is especially good news for
those (fishermen, craftsmen, day labourers) who lead a simple life. For the rich
and rulers of this world, the prospects are not so good, because what seems of
value will lose all value.
This devaluation of the existing world in view of the approaching
Kingdom is clearly expressed in Jesus’ dismissive attitude towards architecture.
When one day he leaves the temple of Jerusalem, the largest, most impressive
building in the whole region, of wondrous size, one of his disciples says: Look,
Teacher! What massive stones! What magnificent buildings! (Mc 13:1). It is the
astonishment of a young man from the province who visits (perhaps for the first
time) the big city and is still easily intimidated.13 The temple as an edifice must
really have been very imposing in terms of scale and size. Jesus, however, puts
the building in a different perspective, already envisioning its destruction. He
assures His followers that no stone will remain on top of the other and He will
repeat this message later on, when they have climbed the Mount of Olives later
that day: a shady hill east of Jerusalem overlooking the temple. The catastrophe
which He predicts will first and foremost affect architecture. Jesus is not
impressed by impressive constructions, for He lives in the expectation of a
spiritual Kingdom. When facing architecture, He articulates what Hegel will later
designate as the position of negativity. This negative attitude towards
metropolitan buildings, already negating them before they are actually
13
This confrontation of simple folks with the big city is a repetition of a ‘typical’ event
that repeatedly occurred in the course of history. Sloterdijk describes the origins of this
experience as follows: “Wir mussen uns ganz in das Erstaunen eines Urmenschen
versetzen, der zum ersten Mal inmitten der Landschaft diese Masse von Stein und Holz
erblickt” (1999, p. 106).
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demolished, it clearly a symptom of His renunciation of the world as such, and
deserves our attention. At what locations did Jesus dwell?
Again, we need to distinguish two types of locations: esoteric and
exoteric ones. The temple, despite its religious function, became contaminated by
worldly influences. Therefore, it is a place where polemical dialogues with
outsiders take place. The esoteric, more intimate forms exchange among initiates
took place elsewhere.
§ 3. Primordial scenes
Jesus of Nazareth was an itinerant preacher with a message so simple that it has
become extremely difficult for us to really comprehend its meaning: the Kingdom
of Heaven is at hand. The message was announced on the road. His sect was
initially referred to as the guild or the society of the Way. The gospel was spread
in the open air: on the banks of Lake Galilee, on a hill, in simple homes of friends
in villages alongside the road, where they made a stop. The gospel was a purely
wordy affair without architecture, liberated from all worldly weight.
Jesus and His followers have no source of income. To provide for their
living, they are dependent on others, on invitations, as a company of travelling
vagrants. After many wanderings through the province, Jesus inevitably reached
the end of his journey: Jerusalem, the capital, to face the confrontation of
provincialism with the establishment. In the temple and at other crowded places,
Jesus presents His teachings in a polemical manner. The debates concern issues
related to textual interpretation. How should the Bible be read? But the actual
doctrine is secretly shared and proclaimed, within a much smaller circle of
devotees. The activities notably revolve around two specific locations, namely
Mount of Olives and the cenacle (cenaculum), the room on the upper floor. Mount
of Olives, like the Academy, is a park-scape with olive trees, east of the city, from
where Jesus views the temple complex: a perfect location for someone calling
upon his followers to critically assess the big city with its buildings, a perfect spot
from where to launch His critical comments. His criticism not only concerned the
discourse that flourished at the temple as a public forum for deliberations, but
also the worldly (Apollonian) architecture that made this type of discourse
possible. What was the upper room?
The evangelists Mark (14:15) and Luke (22:12) describe the locality
where the Last Supper took place as ἀνάγαιον, a hall on the first floor of a house.
In the Vulgate this term is translated as coenaculum. After His death, the disciples
still gather there, near Zion Gate, in the southern part of the city. An upper hall
has indeed been found on this very site, which presumably dates from the first
century A.D. and has traditionally been regarded as the place in question. On 23
March 2000 this site was visited by Pope John Paul II.
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The Acts of the Apostles describe how the disciples travel on foot up and
down between Mount of Olives and the upper hall,14 but sometimes they also
expose themselves to the public podiums near the Temple. We can compare this
situation with the habits of the academics. On Mount of Olives and in the upper
room they were among themselves. Here Jesus preached to His own circle of
adepts. At other locations, other genres were practiced: the parable, the
interrogation. In the upper hall, Pentecost took place. The temple, an architectural
achievement of significance, precisely as an architectural highlight, evoked
ambivalent feelings in Jesus and his followers. On the one hand, he explicitly
refers to it as the house of His Father and the building therefore strongly appeals
to him. He realizes that here, the ultimate test (the final tribulation) will take
place. Here he will have to prove his credibility. On the other hand, this hyperbuilding, erected in Apollonian style, fills Him with aversion and revulsion.
§ 4. Jesus versus architecture
Jesus was not at all favourably disposed towards architecture, as a decidedly
worldly art, an expression of leading thoughts captured in marble. This negative
attitude is most clearly noticeable in the gospel of Mark, the oldest of the gospels.
Jesus literally proclaims that large buildings will break down. While staring at
impressive buildings such as the temple, He envisions a future situation in which
they are absent; He already sees their absence, a future in which these monuments
of stone have been wiped away. Jesus is an archaeologist of the future, discerning
ruins instead of buildings. Jesus Himself prefers to dwell in the open air or in
simple houses of ordinary people.
A similar scene is described in the gospel according to Matthew. After
Jesus has left the temple in Jerusalem, He says to His disciples: “‘Do you see all
these things?’ he asked. ‘Truly I say unto you, not one stone will be left on
another; every single one will be thrown down.’” (24:2). A big city means big
architecture, huge Apollonian establishments. The attitude of a Magian itinerant
preacher towards Apollonian architecture is outspokenly negative. Every
building, and especially the building, the temple itself, will be destroyed. He
proclaims it as a catastrophe, but at the same time he clearly takes delight in this
prospect, phrasing it as a ‘good’ tiding. When Jesus adds that He will rebuild this
impressive construction in three days, this doesn’t mean that He sees himself as
an architect or master-builder. That was the ambition of his antagonists, the
Roman governors, the emperors, notably Hadrian. The phrase must be taken
figuratively. Jesus was not a temple builder, and architecture didn’t appeal to
Him. He had given up on it as it were. Rather, the statement quoted referred to
14
“Then the apostles returned to Jerusalem from the hill called Mount of Olives, a
Sabbath day’s walk from the city. When they arrived, they went upstairs to the
room where they were staying [and] joined together in constant prayer” (Acts 1:12-14)
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the temple of His body.15 His church, His religion could do without such
buildings. Yes, Jesus is in the habit of visiting the temple, but at the same time
He already anticipates its obliteration. He looks at the present from the
perspective of the future. The temple functions in the gospel primarily as an
entourage for polemics with the theological establishment. It is not a place where
the message is truly and genuinely proclaimed. Those things happen elsewhere,
in the localities where Magian thinking in statu nascendi originated. Early
Christians visit the city centre primarily for polemics. Esoteric preaching, meant
for an audience of devotees, takes place at different, less splendid sites.
The provocative scorn that Jesus displays in His aversion to architecture
is all the more remarkable when we consider the construction He was actually
dealing with. Herod’s temple was an immense building, a world miracle. The
temple as such, already quite huge, was part of an impressive complex of
buildings covering the whole plateau and made from white stones in Corinthian
style. The structure was dominated by high pillars, about a thousand, decorated
with gilded vines. According to Jewish historian Josephus, visitors were stunned
by the grandeur of the temple and her colonnades (1969, Book XV). Especially
for those who, like Jesus, approached the complex from the East, the building
looked gigantic. On the south side were the peristyles where teachers addressed
their following. Here, too, was Solomon’s portico (στοά), where Jesus conversed
with his opponents and where His followers likewise gathered after His death.16
Just like Stoic philosophers gathered at the στοά ποικίλη in the centre of Athens
near the Acropolis, the Jewish schools and sects gathered in the immediate
vicinity of a sanctuary. In this metropolitan, Apollonian environment, quarrels
between schools and sects were staged. Socrates debated in such a location with
rivalling sophists, Jesus with the Scribes. However, the coming of the Kingdom
was neither determined by nor dependent upon the outcome of such debates. The
spiritual dawn would spread throughout the empire on its own accord. Faith is a
matter of grace, not of arguments or discussions (cf. Augustine, De civitate Dei,
XXII, 7). Still, hearts can be opened by wordings used on such occasions. The
spirit works (as a spiritual infection) via words and deeds.
We must therefore not imagine the Kingdom of which Jesus spoke as an
earthly city with temples and walls, quite the contrary. The temple Jesus wants to
erect is of a spiritual nature, beyond architecture. The existing temple will perish
– from the perspective of the existing world a catastrophe, but from a Magian
perspective the beginning of something completely new. There is no continuity
between the Kingdom and this world. The Kingdom is not a worldly empire (it is
15
The church is built on the foundation of the apostles and prophets, with Christ Jesus
himself as the chief cornerstone (Ephesians 2:10).
16
“And Jesus was in the temple courts walking in Solomon's Colonnade” (John 10:23);
“All the people were astonished and came running to them in the place called
Solomon’s Colonnade” (Acts 3:11); “The apostles performed many signs and
wonders among the people. And all the believers used to meet together in Solomon’s
Colonnade” (Acts 5:12).
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not of this world) and will not take root or feel at home in the buildings of
Apollonian civilisation. In His vision, architecture is lacking. His faith was one
of villages and country roads.
It was Paul who introduced the metropole into Christianity, and
Christianity into the metropole. He dispatched his letters to Christian
communities in metropolitan areas. With him, Christianity became a big city
phenomenon: became civilization. The city of Rome, where Peter and Paul came
to their end, would not have attracted Jesus. Jesus was not drawn to Rome.
Because of this migration to the big city, the attitude of early Christianity (as a
key representative of Magian thinking) towards architecture inevitably began to
change. The civilization of Magian thinking inevitably gave rise to the birth of a
Magian style of building. It is the purpose of this type of architecture to create a
Magian, mystical, awe-inspiring space, where the presence, the divinity of the
divine, can be experienced as shimmering light floating into the darkness. The
primordial Magian building is the Pantheon, as we have seen. Although this
building began as the completion of Apollonian architecture, it is at the same time
the first man-made mystical ambiance. At the time this unique construction was
taking shape, Oriental (Magian) religious movements began to pervade Rome.
Spengler sees the Pantheon as the archetype of Magian architecture, as
“the first mosque” (p. 98, p. 274). Hadrian wanted to copy works he had seen in
the East.17 Centuries later, after the fall of Constantinople, a similar event occurs.
The Hagia Sophia can be transformed into a mosque without destroying the
architectural construction as such. Byzantine and Islamic architecture have the
same ambition: creating a mystical space, referred to by Rudolf Otto as das
Numinöse. The inside of a dome is reminiscent of, and reflects the sublimity of
the starry sky. The Pantheon materialises a Platonic conception, but also
represents a turn towards a radically different style of thinking, which already has
begun its ascent. In these mysterious cavities (spiritual enclaves in a worldly
environment), certain ritual gestures and spiritual experiences become possible.
Conditions are created for unworldly moods to evolve: commemorating the Last
Supper as the primordial experience, the transformative event. Before analysing
the profile of Christian civilisation in more detail, I will first try to find out more
precisely what happened in the localities described above, when the gospel was
still, in the terminology of Spengler, culture. What were Jesus and his followers
doing and experiencing in their cenacle? And what kind of discussions were
staged in the vicinity of the temple?
17
“Das Meisterwerk aber, die früheste aller Moscheen, ist der Neubau des Pantheons
durch Hadrian, der hier sicherlich … Kultbauten nachahmen wollte, die er im Orient
gesehen hatte” (I, p. 274).
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§ 5. Transubstantiation
During the Last Supper, Jesus articulates a Magian worldview. He is about to
leave the hateful world, but at the same time hints at His return. The highlight
event is a simple Magian gesture enacted by Him: take this bread and eat, it is my
body: Hoc est corpus, a phrase which was travestied into Hocus pocus later on.
He likewise offers wine, His blood (Mt 26:26-28; Mc 14:22-24; Lucas 22:17-20).
In the gospel of John, the overall description of the scene is even more detailed
and engaging. Jesus refers to Himself as the bread of life. Whoever eats and
drinks will partake in eternal life (Joh 6:51-56). The philosophical term for what
takes place is transubstantiation, meaning that bread and wine as material
substances undergo a profound ontological transmutation. Although nothing
seems to visibly change, their value and meaning changes dramatically. Their
ontological standing has been altered in a sudden, leap-like fashion. For a Magian
readership, it is a climax, a highlight of intensity and participation. For those who
have distanced themselves from it, it is a bizarre scene, a mystification, a
misunderstanding. Diderot (1769/1951) will remark that the transformation of
wine and bread into flesh and blood is a natural process known as metabolism,
which does not involve any “galimatias”. But Diderot is undeniably a Faustian
thinker, who has lost contact with the world of Magian thinking.
Transubstantiation means that the significance of a certain object
dramatically changes. Another word for transubstantiation is sublimation. An
example of sublimation is money, say: a coin. The value of a coin is not
determined by the materials from which it is produced. As soon as a piece of
metal becomes a coin, it becomes part of a financial (symbolic) circuit, and
changes abruptly. It acquires a value which it did not have as a piece of metal,
which could also have been used for other purposes. Whoever argues that the
symbolic value is fictitious, ignores the reality of the value dimension, the
symbolic order as a crucial dimension of human existence. This dimension
precedes the coming into existence of the coin as a coin, making it possible. Due
to this dimension, a piece of metal becomes a carrier of value. Coins have a
certain intrinsic value (e.g. golden coins), or can be used to produce guns in times
of war, but in order to circulate, currency value differs from material value. The
coin as such is merely a vehicle, the real value is determined by a symbol, a
currency symbol, minted by someone who has the authority to do so and whose
stamp it bears. The tangible coin is never completely identical with its value or
meaning. It carries the portrait of the emperor, sending it out into the world as
His coin, as a piece of propaganda. By using the coin, we acknowledge the
emperor as the rightful ruler of our world. The portrait reinforces the validity of
the coin, while the coin reinforces the sovereign’s sovereignty. According to
Magian thinking, a piece of bread can acquire spiritual meaning only in the
context of a Holy Mass, conducted by a priest, acknowledged by Rome. It takes
Faustian thinkers like Luther to flatly deny or even question such a truth (selfevident, according to the logic of Magian thinking).
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The Roman Empire was the golden age in the history of the coin. The
coin could function optimally in an Apollonian ambiance, as reflected by its
circular shape, allowing it to circulate within (and at the same time delineate) the
political sphere of influence. The coin represented the worldly empire,
determined the radius of its power. All this explains Jesus’ disdain and contempt
for the coin. The Magian coin no longer desires to circulate. Magian coins desire
to become transmuted into a treasure.
Another example of transubstantiation is the artwork, whose value is not
primarily determined by the materials from which it is made (and this even
applies to artworks made from gold or ivory or marble or jade). The artist adds a
cultural surplus, via his signature. The first artists were shamans and a painting
by Leonardo da Vinci still retains something of the miraculous. Value is created
through art. A random coagulation of various types of paint will fail to create
meaning, although this will be challenged by modernism later on. In the hands of
the artist, the material thing undergoes a transfiguration.
Transubstantiation or sublimation also play a decisive role in love,
notably in Magian forms of love, such as courtly love. Physiologically speaking,
human beings are not that different from one another. In principle, all bodies
function more or less in similar ways. Physiologically speaking, apart from
conditions such as age or illness, our anatomies are more or less identical. In
every single human body, the same organs, genes and proteins can usually be
found. But the experience of love points in a different direction, putting the
beloved body in a completely different perspective. Although the beloved body
may not be exceptional in a biochemical way, a lover may exclusively want to
experience intimacy with this particular body, to which some very unique
characteristics are attributed, singling it out from and setting it apart from others.
The beloved body may even be experienced as untouchable or inviolable. Due to
the experience of love, the body’s value increases dramatically. There is
something Magian about falling in love, and something of the Magian tends to
survive in instances of intimacy, for those who are sensitive to it of course.
It is possible to reduce phenomena of love to biochemical or
physiological mechanisms and processes, and this is exactly what Faustian
authors will try to do. In purely physiological or biochemical descriptions, the
Magian dimension is indeed absent, obliterated as it were. In the Magian
experience, physiology only plays a secondary role, and the spiritual dimension
is the decisive one. The object is sublated into something out of the ordinary,
something irreplaceable.
The paradigm of Magian love is courtly love, love from a distance,
romantic yearning. The physical encounter is postponed instead of consumed,
and precisely this deferral, this distance in place and time, increases the value of
the desired object, transfiguring it into something of unspeakable value. The
status of the desired object is decidedly unique. Thus, to the physiology and
biochemistry of love, a mysterious dimension is added, a value which may even
pervade the clothes worn by the beloved, as well as the words he or she utters.
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Everything will share in this mysterious aura. Magian love, ideally, equals
celibacy. Physiology vulgarises the love experience, because the focus of
attention is now drawn towards the merely physiological, or even the obscene,
from which Magian desire tries to immunise the object. Magian love is poetry
rather than biochemistry.
Contemporary readers will probably see the relationship between Jesus
and Mary Magdalena as a sexual relationship. For the Magian reader, the special
value of their relationship resides precisely in the absence of the coital moment.
“Consuming” their love would put the extraordinary value of the intimate
friendship between Jesus and Mary at stake. They sublimate their love. What is
entailed in this is not a marriage but a spiritual bonding.
To all things of value, there is a Magian aspect. Even an author as
unmistakably Faustian as Karl Marx was forced, in a famous section in Das
Kapital, to emphasise the mysterious character of the value dimension, up to the
point of commodities being transformed into a fetish. On the one hand, the use
value of most things is more or less evident, Marx argues. In addition, however,
as market items (commodities), things acquire exchange value as well: the price
paid in the case of purchase. However, that price is not determined in the first
place by its use value. Brand may be important, or particular forms of jouissance
hinted at in commercials. But where exactly does this mysterious value come
from? Marx discovers a moment of discontinuity, a leap from practical value (use
value) to exchange value (market value), as if things undergo a sudden
transfiguration once they are offered on the market for sale. Marx (of all people)
discerns metaphysical niceties that seem to resists rational (Faustian) analysis (p.
85). And this is what he refers to as the fetish character of value. A fetish is like
an object touched by a beloved person, something unreachable, perhaps even
bringing consumers into a pathological state of craving. The object is infected, in
a positive sense. A Magian moment is involved. There is always something, a
value dimension, which is mysteriously added, which puts things in a different
light (the seductive light of the shop window where commodities are on display).
For the art lover, it is the artist who adds value by placing his or her stamp on the
things he or she produces, in the form of a signature, literally and / or figuratively
(as signature may also refer to specific features of technique and style).
This mysterious ability of human beings to discern or introduce value and
meaning into the world, transcends the purely material dimension. Precisely this
is what is at stake during the Last Supper. The wine and bread that Jesus shares
are everyday items that suddenly receive a completely different, symbolic
meaning, creating a spiritual community (still celebrated today during catholic
mass). Whoever emphasises that a biochemical analysis of this transfigured bread
or wine will not reveal any measurable change, misses the point completely. Also,
the chalice on whose surface Jesus leaves His fingerprints, later used by Joseph
of Arimathea during the crucifixion to collect the blood dripping from His body,
becomes an object of worship and desire. The chalice becomes the Grail – at least
for those readers of the gospel who are susceptible to experiencing the Magian
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dimension. This type of event, this transformation or sublimation, plays a crucial
role in Magian thinking, and distinguishes the every-day (profane) from the
sacred. The Magian event is something which befalls us, something that calls
upon us, overwhelms and unsettles us, but which cannot be caused or brought
about by us. Rather, our activity consists in preparing ourselves for such an event:
the readiness is all.
Although the value dimension as such is not a characteristic feature of
the Magian experience, the Magian style intensifies it, pushes it to the extreme.
Jesus was a carpenter, Peter and John were fishermen, while Paul repaired tents,
but in the light of the value dimension, such activities lose their meaning. Those
involved may continue such professions after their moment of calling
(conversion), but the tonality of their existence has changed and from now
something of a completely different order is at stake. The old world has lost its
meaning. Only from this perspective can we understand some of Jesus’ polemical
confrontations with the establishment, discussed in the next section.
§ 6. Jesus’ laughter
…and the scorn of his laugh rang free (Ezra Pound)
While in the upper room the intimate dimension culminates in transubstantiation,
in public places another type of discourse developed. Mark describes a famous
discussion between Jesus and the Pharisees. The colonnade of the temple
complex was a perfect entourage for this type of conversations. His opponents
confronted Him with tricky questions. This probably was a kind of intellectual
game between protagonists of the various sects represented there. Especially
newcomers were tested in this manner. One tricky question was: should one pay
taxes to Rome? This was a classic problem, giving rise to different opinions
among competing groups. With such questions, they tried to corner Him. A
dangerous question, a trap. A denial would bring Him into conflict with the
worldly powers, a confirmation with the religious establishment. Jesus answers
with a witticism, in the style of the ancient Cynics: “Let me see the coin. Whose
portrait does it bear and whose inscription? The Emperor’s? Well, then render to
Caesar what is Caesar’s and to God what is God’s” (Mark 12:14; Matthew 22:21).
The coin derives its value and meaning from the symbolic order wherein it
circulates. The coin already belongs to the Emperor. From the perspective of the
Kingdom, this makes it a meaningless, worthless object; not at all an item of
concern. Use it, but with equanimity, do not attach any value to it. Do not allow
yourself to be trapped by it. Followers of Jesus may pay their taxes, precisely
because such action is irrelevant and trivial. The Kingdom of Heaven devaluates
the value of money put into circulation by worldly powers. This scene contrasts
with what happens during the Last Supper. Here, exactly the reverse movement
is discernible. Simple objects taken from everyday life, such as wine and bread,
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acquire a value (in the light of the coming of the Kingdom) that can no longer be
expressed in terms of worldly coins.
Jesus reveals a whole new value dimension, enacts a transvaluation of
values. The seemingly valuable coin becomes worthless while things which seem
of moderate value (use value) suddenly undergo an increase in value. The coin
devaluates, the everyday item sublimates. During the Last Supper there is an
atmosphere of intimate solemnity, which contrasts with the humour with which
Jesus confronts the scribes. He solves a risky situation with a “formidable” joke
(Lacan 1986, p. 115), masterfully avoiding dialectical pitfalls. Humour certainly
plays a part in debates with outsiders. When it comes to questioning established
truths, the category of the comical plays a decisive role (Zwart 1996). The
dialogues staging Socrates in discussion with the Sophists, are highlights of
comical world literature: philosophical comedies in fact. In the case of Jesus, the
comical dimension is less obvious perhaps. Indeed, there is even discussion
among experts about whether Jesus laughed at all (Morreall 1983, Hyer 1981).
What is laughter?
Kant describes humour as follows (1790/1971, A 222). When someone
becomes entangled in a difficult situation, bystanders catch their breath. They try
to follow the thoughts and actions of the person concerned. Suddenly, because of
a witticism or a joke, the problem is suddenly annihilated. By this unexpected
turn of events, the mental process is interrupted, resulting in a sense of relief.
Thorax and diaphragm relax. The bystanders laugh.
The polemics between Jesus and the Scribes seems to be in accordance
with this scheme. Jesus, who supposedly never laughed, replies to His opponents
in a humorous fashion. However, we are so used to serious readings of the gospel,
that it has become difficult to discern the element of humour at work here. Jesus’
reply must have amused bystanders, they must have laughed. Is it permissible to
pay taxes? At first, they hold their breath. Whoever says A or B puts himself in
trouble, either by opting for collaboration or by stirring resistance. Jesus saves
the situation by annulling the problem, allowing it to disappear, turning a
theological trap into something utterly trivial. The relationship with worldly
powers is presented in a different light. For the true believer, all this is really of
no concern. Truly religious persons are not involved in this. It does not really
matter. An unsettling dilemma has suddenly imploded. A different mood or state
of mind is made possible by jokes. It is precisely because of this joke that His
opponents begin to realise how dangerous Jesus really is.
During Last Supper, witticisms are completely lacking. At esoteric
locations, we enter the realm of solemnity. Plato’s dialogues (staged in public
venues) were more humorous than intellectual deliberations evolving within the
inner circle of mathematically trained scholars. The coin touched by Jesus loses
its value, while bread experiences sublimation. The coin belongs to the Emperor,
and the emperor is this coin, is present in this coin. Without money circulating,
empire-building would be unthinkable. The emperor exists because of the
symbolic order which supports it. The true believer, however, does not belong to
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this world. In the upper room, Jesus and his disciples open up a new dimension
of existence which will become increasingly important during the centuries to
come. They insulate themselves in this fold where the coming of the Kingdom
announces itself. Here, its advent is experienced for the first time. Bread and wine
become important entities. Jesus is this bread and wine. He is present in them.
§ 7. Christianity as civilization
Jesus addressed small groups of people, gathering in a house as confidants,
although sometimes He would face larger crowds, but His preaching remained
culture. The transition from culture to civilization is recorded in the Acts of the
Apostles and accomplished by Paul. The latter no longer addresses the inhabitants
of places like Capernaum, Nazareth, Emmaus or Bethany, as Jesus did. He rather
reaches out to the Christians of Rome, Corinth and Ephesus, Christians living in
ancient metropolises. Jesus spread His message orally, Paul rather opts for
epistolary communication. He preaches via letters. Jesus travelled country roads,
Paul prefers the important routes of traffic and communication, either by land or
by sea. From Corinth he dispatched his letter to the Christians of Rome, while
composing his letter to the Corinthians in Ephesus. Jesus visited His followers in
towns and villages, but in the days of Paul, Christian churches had begun to settle
in big cities, replacing Aramaic as a regional language by Greek as the lingua
franca, the language of scholars. In each and every respect there is increase of
scale. Jesus’ wanderings eventually ended in Jerusalem, a provincial capital.
Those of Paul ended in Rome, the centre of the world. Here, Christianity had to
compete with other religious mass movements of the Magian era, such as Isis and
Mithras cults. Like gnosis, these are truly Magian movements, on the level of
civilisation, no longer constrained by spatial or ethnic attachments. Peter, at the
beginning of the Acts, focuses exclusively on Jews, but at the end of the Acts,
Paul’s outreach coincides with a significant part of the Roman sphere of
influence. Soon, a whole empire becomes spiritually imbued.
The big city is something very different compared to the rural landscape.
World History basically unfolds in cities, on a metropolitan stage, according to
Spengler. In villages, no history is written. Only at the time of Saint Paul,
Christianity becomes history – world history. The big city is the stage where big
politics is enacted, where science, social interaction and finance evolve. Only in
a metropolitan world, Christian literature becomes a subgenre of world literature.
There is a fundamental resemblance, regardless of time and place, between
villages anywhere in the world. Here, a “general human pattern” (Romein 1954)
establishes itself. All villages are similar to some extent. The city, however, is a
phenomenon of a completely different order, e.g. the contrast between the misery
of bad neighbourhoods and the splendour of the city centre. Inhabitants of a world
city are no longer a people, but a multi-ethnic population.
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An important moment in the transition from culture to civilization is
Pentecost. The spirit descends on His followers, and they experience a state of
divine madness: All are filled with the Holy Spirit and begin to speak. At that
time, Jews had settled in various regions and linguistic communities, so that
multiple languages and dialects could be heard in Jerusalem (the city as a social
heteroglossia, as Bakhtin phrases it). But now these illiterate apostles seem to be
infected by this multiplicity, they seem to speak and address bystanders in
multiple languages. An important question in the Acts is whether Christianity has
an ethnocentric or a global mission. Will the good tidings only concern Jews, or
is its scope much broader: is it the onset of a movement of global significance?
What the Pentecost experience makes clear is that the gospel is independent of a
specific language. The gospel is not written in a holy language, but in a lingua
franca, and therefore translatable and transplantable. The gospels are constantly
translated, in Latin, Gothic and so forth, and such translations of the Christian
message even results in a renewal of the language in question. Of several
Germanic languages it can be said that they only became a language, in the sense
of a national language, thanks to the translation of the gospels.
The followers of Jesus were fishermen and farmers of the Aramaic
countryside who passed on these stories and statements verbally. Jesus
apocalyptic message was, that the end of the world was near. In Acts of the
Apostles we read how Peter and John healed a man who had been paralyzed for
forty years. They practice Magian medicine, through haptotherapy, or by uttering
a phrase. Thereupon they are questioned by Jewish scribes, who were astonished
by the boldness (παρρησία) of these uneducated men (ἄνθρωποι ἀγράµµατοί καὶ
ἰδιῶται, Acts 4:13). Paul, however, spoke the metropolitan language of the
literate. Christianity was becoming “civilised”. A final confirmation of this was
the book De Civitate Dei by Saint Augustine. This intellectual, who came of age
in an Apollonian environment, experienced the force of Magian thinking.
Following the example of Paul, his style of thinking is urban, civilised. Augustine
lived in metropolises like Milan and Hippo and De Civitate Dei envisions a divine
metropolis, a city that is ever more splendid than the centres of Apollonian
civilization. Worldly cities like Rome proved vulnerable. By contrast, God’s
metropolis will supersede them. Augustine had been familiar with the Apollonian
worldview during his youth, but never fully identified himself with this doomed
perspective. Eventually he rejects the very concept of a spherical world. In De
Civitate Dei, he rejects the idea that there could be antipodes inhabiting the
southern hemisphere of a spherical earth. This logical and inevitable consequence
of spherical thinking is brushed aside as an absurdity (Book 16, Chapter 9). The
world is a sphere, he “knows” that, and at the same time he no longer really grasps
the implications of this truth. Magian preaching entails a rejection of the spherical
idea. Spherically is no longer endorsed, no longer followed consistently down to
its most radical consequences. Augustine sees the world differently, as a
cavernous space where a battle between light and darkness is raging.
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There are two worlds, according to Augustine: the worldly and the divine
one. The question what the city of God exactly amounts to, is not that easy to
answer. It is a future event, a coming. God’s metropolis is inhabited by the elect.
Eternal bliss reigns there and it is Sunday interminably. Source of inspiration is
the Book of Revelation: I saw the holy city, the New Jerusalem, descending from
heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband (21:2). It is a sublimated,
transfigured Jerusalem, a change far more radical than optimisation: it is a
transubstantiation of the idea of the metropolis as such. Matter becomes
transfigured. The new world consists of precious stones and precious metals.
Matter has undergone a sudden, alchemical change. On the other hand, the city
of God is already among us, within us, present in our faith, in the ethos of true
believers, regardless of whether they are carpenters or fishermen. This invisible
city is a decisive factor in history, providing a sense of meaning and direction (in
this seemingly meaningless theatre of violence and sexual reproduction).
Believers already live their lives in the expectation of the coming of this
Kingdom. A future event already affected the lives of Jesus’ followers. They
already lived under the sway of the dawning Kingdom, and did not want to have
any part in the Pax Romana. They were awaiting the coming of a transfigured
city (Hebrews 13:14). Peter and Paul travelled to Rome to witness the destruction
of the spherical world.
§ 8. Islam as civilization
Christianity arose during a period of disorientation, allowing an influx of oriental
religions into the Roman Empire. Christianity began as a movement of resistance
against global political realism, but became gradually transformed into a
movement that aimed to contribute to restoring political stability. Christianity
became a global movement. Many centuries later, a similar event came about, in
what was even more a hinterland than Galilee. Around 610, an Arab merchant
had an overwhelming religious experience on a mountain near Mecca. Arab tribes
were experiencing a profound transformation process. Their traditional nomadic
existence was giving way to a more lucrative and extended trade economy. This
new culture needed a new ideological superstructure. The traditional ethos was
geared to a situation of permanent struggle for existence. Virility, fate and selfsacrifice constituted important concepts. The ancient tribes acknowledged
multiple gods, with Allah as the chief deity. Mohammed took over some elements
of traditional religion, but transformed this moral culture into a belief system that
not only proved able to unite the Arab tribes, but even constituted the foundation
for a Magian civilization.
Mohammed initially faced the same situation as Jesus and His first
followers. At first, he believed that his message was tailored to his own ethnic
group. Gradually, he began to realize the broader significance of his calling. In a
remarkably short period of time, his new religion developed into a far-reaching
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phenomenon. The rise of Islam occurred relatively late, but the pace of its spread
indicated that the Oriental world was ready for Magian civilization. This explains,
according to Spengler, the spectacular swiftness of Islam’s dissemination across
different continents. He gave the Arabs a spirituality that was consistent with their
traditions, but which at the same time could serve as source of inspiration for a
theocentric empire which reached from the Himalayas to the Pyrenees
(Armstrong 1994, p. 159). Islam spread with unprecedented speed: Syria (634),
Damascus (635), Egypt (641), Carthage (647) and Spain (710) were overrun, and
almost Paris even (732). This phenomenal success, according to Spengler, shows
how much Islam was a timely message, and how much of the East was craving
for the advent of a Magian civilization.
What is a Magian religion? Traditional religions are bound to specific
locations such as mountain peaks, rivers, lakes and springs. The divine is
indigenous. For a Magian religion, this is no longer valid. Where two or three are
gathered in God’s name, a Magian church is present. Rome as the centre of the
Roman Empire became the centre of Magian Christianity, with Constantinople as
its rival. At first, Christianity distanced itself from Rome. There was no rapport
whatsoever between the grand city and the new faith. Magian religion spread via
its rituals, such as baptism or the breaking of bread. These rituals could, in
principle, take place anywhere, in whatever ambiance, but when it comes to
literally replacing previous religions, it makes sense to erect churches on the sites
of former sanctuaries.
In Magian thinking, the battle between light and darkness is central. But
if God is almighty, how can evil pervade the world? It is a temporary condition
of obscurity. Important Magian concepts are resignation, patience, submission,
prayer, spiritual exercises and grace. Islam literally means submission. Not we,
the Almighty brings about the anticipated change. We cannot enforce the
Kingdom’s arrival. In Arabic and Germanic tribes, the Magian conversion
entailed a dramatic break with the heroic morality of unconditional refusal to bow
your head. A Magian religion entails a transvaluation of all values. Only God can
genuinely act.
Mohammed experiences a captivating presence and commences to recite
his verses. He listens, as a recipient of the text. In this way, one of the greatest
spiritual works of all time comes into existence. He was illiterate and recited what
was revealed to him (Armstrong 1994, p. 164). Others wrote it down, compiled
it. A problem for Western readers is that the sublime beauty of Mohammed’s
Arabic is considered untranslatable. The overwhelming power of the language
played a major part in Islamic conversions. Mohammed’s religion incorporates
ancient thoughts, but allows religiosity to unfold on a large scale. New beacons
appear in the landscape, accompanied by a shift of attention towards verticality:
the relationship between believers and their God. The world is a desert, we are
strangers in foreign territory. Through daily prayer, believers keep in touch with
God and with the place where God revealed himself, like a telegraphic
connection. The Word spreads via art, through calligraphy, architecture and
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horticulture, as testimonies of God’s splendid majesty. Instead of the sphere (the
god of the philosophers), the cube-shaped Kaaba (“cube”) provides a sense of
orientation to worshipping Muslims.
§ 9. Magian morality
Magian thinking experiences an unbridgeable distance between good and evil.
The individual plays a passive role, waiting for the dawn. Magian thinking
cultivates this attitude of waiting, awaiting the end of the established order, whose
days are numbered. Magian individuals remain strangers to this obscure
ambiance, under the sway of forgetfulness. The Magian mindset anticipates a
sudden, dramatic change. Individuals can be instrumental to the downfall of the
establishment and the commencement of a new order, but cannot enforce this
event, for history ultimately does not depend on the decisions of individuals.
Involvement of Magian individuals in society remains without any real
commitment. Inwardly they are already citizens of another Kingdom. This idea
inspires Magian politics (waiting for the cataclysm), but also Magian architecture,
aimed at creating sacred enclaves amidst a meaningless world.
In Magian medicine, physicians are benefactors who heal by the touch of
their hands or other Magian techniques (Speak one word only, and I will be
healed), but ultimately it is a matter of grace: your faith has made you well.
Without God’s help, all medical activity is pointless. It comes down to suggestion
and charisma.
In the domain of ethics, Magian thinking manifests itself in an attitude of
Gelassenheit. At first, individuals inhabit a wasteland, obeying rules without
reflection. But then, all of a sudden, conversion sets in. Outwardly, nothing seems
to change, but the inner transition is all the more dramatic. Converted individuals
apparently continue to accept the establishment. Apparently, they take part in the
circulation of goods, but inwardly they have forsaken the world and turned away
from it. They are inconspicuously preparing themselves for the coming of the
Kingdom. Jesus’ confrontations with the established order are symptomatic of
this disdain, for example with regard to food ethics. Jewish food ethics was very
strict. It was only permitted to eat animals with split hoofs that chew the cud.
Everything else is considered unclean (Leviticus 11: 2-6; Deuteronomy 14: 3-8).
The products of unclean animals are symbolically infected. By not consuming
them, the individuals concerned demonstrate their allegiance to their ethnic
Jewish faith. Also for the Sabbath, strict rules applied.
In the preaching of Jesus, we find a very different tone of voice (Zwart
2000). Do not worry about what you eat or drink, that is of no concern, the
Kingdom is more important than food. What goes into someone’s mouth doesn’t
defile him (Matthew 5:11). Whatever enters the mouth goes into the stomach and
is excreted, but the things that come out of a person’s mouth (e.g. evil thoughts)
come from the heart and defile him (Matthew 5:17-18). Jesus transgresses dietary
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laws provocatively. He eats and drinks with prostitutes, tax collectors and sinners
(Matthew 9:11). From the perspective of the Kingdom, dietary laws have no
meaning. The prevailing theological fashion is to emphasize continuity between
Judaism and Christianity and to minimize the distance between Jesus and his
cultural environment. Jesus was a rabbi, of course, that is true, and it is true that
Luther was a monk. The essence of the gospel, however, is precisely the moment
of discontinuity. What Jesus preaches is of a completely different order.
Contemporaries (both followers and representatives of the established order)
acknowledged this. Jesus may not have had the intention of establishing a Magian
world religion, but that is not the point. His preaching brought about the genesis
of a Magian religious movement.
Jesus is also a Magian physician, relying on Magian techniques such as
faith-healing: covering the eyelids of the blind with saliva. One word will suffice
for a miraculous cure. Your faith has healed you. For Jesus, healing is not a
recovery of balance or harmony, nor is it the result of a therapeutic intervention.
It is a matter of faith.
This also applies to his medical ethics. The gospel of John describes a
cure in a bathing facility with a portico. A sick person had been waiting there for
thirty-eight years, but Jesus simply says: Get up, take your stretcher and go. The
man’s health is restored immediately. It happens on a Sabbath, however, and this
makes it a violation, from the perspective of established morality. For Jesus,
however, all this has no meaning any longer, as the advent of the Kingdom is
imminent. Whenever He is attacked, He responds with Magian arrogance. This
is just the beginning: He will revivify the dead, Sabbath or no Sabbath, if God
wills it. This is Magian medical ethics. The doctor is a benefactor, with only one
technique, charisma, suggestion. And Magian patients know what it means to
wait. For a Magian patient, a life spent in waiting is more edifying than healing
as such (Lidwina of Schiedam).
§ 10. Magian love
The gospel of John is the gospel of love. Contemporary readers interpret love
from the viewpoint of contemporary convictions, but evangelical love is of a
different style. When we read that John was the beloved disciple with whom Jesus
associated intimately and confidently (notably during the Last Supper, when John
rested against His breast), contemporary readers may define this in terms of
homosexuality, while the relationship between Jesus and Mary of Magdalen is
easily interpreted as an erotic relationship in the sexual sense. It has become
difficult for us to acknowledge that what we are dealing with here is love in a
Magian sense. The most well-known form of Magian love is courtly love: love at
a distance, under the sway of postponement. Even during the final moment, when
they see each other for the very last time (under earthly circumstances), and Mary
is about to embrace Him, Jesus emphatically tells her not to touch Him (John 20:
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17), as He has not yet risen to the Father. His transubstantiation has not yet been
completed, and would be disturbed by the moistness of her touch.
Courtly love distances itself from any remnants of obscenity or bestiality.
Biochemistry and physiology are transformed into a more exalted love game.
Sexual intercourse must give way to love at a distance, pure desire. Erotic craving
becomes an exercise in abstinence. Love is sublimated into poetry and music, and
gives rise to a culture of chaste gestures, such as kissing someone’s hand or
forehead (courtly gestures par excellence). Love is protected from earthly stains,
while satisfaction and consumption are postponed into a distant future, so that
sincerity can be put to the test and lovers can prove themselves worthy. And when
the moment finally dawns that they may approach each other and experience their
physical proximity and unity, it will be without any hint of obscenity. Courtly
love found its way into monasteries, where it has had a major influence on
mysticism, on mystic poetry, both female and male, transforming fierce longing
(no longer of a corporeal nature) into sublime poetry. Courtly love is sublimation,
a form of enhancement or upgrading. The love object is exalted, and becomes
literally sublime.
In chemistry, sublimation means the transition from a solid to a gas state,
bypassing the liquid stage. In ordinary love, flesh is converted into something
which is moist, literally (vaginal secretion, sperm), but courtly love evaporates as
passion becomes spiritual. This explains Jesus’ chastity during the Noli me
tangere scene. He has not yet risen, is not yet fully cleansed of earthly stains.
Physical contact is too earthly and would infect Him. Their love will never be
consumed. They exert a mutual Magian attraction, something spiritual or
telepathic. Chaste love can also be found in later Magian heroines such as
Hadewijch of Nijvel. It is not carnal sex that they are after, but spiritual
enlightenment which arises from a love that goes much deeper and is more
vibrant, according to these experts, than anything that usually goes under the
name of love. Our frame of reference may be too contemporary to appreciate the
true depth of Magian desire. Modern lovers claim the other. There is always a
moment of taking-possession-of, of physical and mechanical friction, and all this
is inherent in Faustian love. The Magian style is magnetic, telepathic.
As stated, an important aspect of Magian love is the moment of
sublimation, when the loved one is deprived of his or her physiological dimension
and turned into something remote. The evangelical garden scene is the paradigm
of Magian love, while courtly love is a revival. It is an ars erotica, literally, as
love becomes art, a stylisation of desire, a practice of ascetic abstinence, but now
as self-renunciation (Lacan 1986). Those concerned awaits an endless prelude,
an interminable series of tests, to prove their love and dedication. It is a service,
a systematic edification of desire – resulting in the idealization or elevation of the
object, who becomes something increasingly unique, priceless and elusive. The
eventual unification with the object is depicted as a sudden moment of grace,
when the object of desire suddenly gratifies the lover’s craving, but it is union
beyond anatomy. In the meantime, the lover must satisfy himself with courtly
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techniques such as an occasional glance, but most of all with poetry and music:
the love of the troubadour and the monastic nun.
Courtly love found shelter in monastic settings, but it is not something
which definitively belongs to the past. This type of eroticism resurges in
experiences of infatuation (Lacan 1994, p.88, p. 109, p. 122). In the behaviour of
desperate lovers, we find traces of cultivation and regulation, a willingness to
follow certain procedures or rules: techniques of self-containment, of postponing
or relinquishing physical satisfaction, reminiscent of the theatre of courtly love.
The beloved other, the object, is untouchable and inviolable. A touch is already a
risky affair, as the love experience may become tainted with physicality, reduced
to something normal, rather than becoming something exquisite. Falling in love
entails an idealisation and elevation of the object into something decidedly
fascinating, beyond comparison, while satisfaction can only be brought about as
an act of grace, not as something to be expected, but as a sudden gift. Faustian
love revolves around the physiological dimension, so that the object no longer
hypnotises the subject.
§ 11. Magian chemistry
The gospel of John begins and ends with an alchemical operation or
transubstantiation. Jesus performs His first miracle at the wedding in Cana,
although His time has not yet come – and for an alchemist, considerations of
timeliness tend to be crucial: wait until the opportune moment (midnight, full
moon, etc.). Apparently, in the case of Jesus, such a strict observance of
precautionary measures is of less importance. The subject has already achieved
complete purity and is therefore less dependent on external conditions and
constellations. He changes water in wine, almost unnoticeably: an abrupt and
sudden change, not a chemical process involving fermentation. And it is not just
a change, but an amelioration. He turns water into something more valuable,
namely (good) wine. He creates value. During the Last Supper, there is another
miracle: bread becomes flesh, wine becomes blood; sudden, abrupt changes;
occurring without any visible cause or effort. It is not a chemical reaction, but a
matter of grace and faith: a ritual gesture. Jesus adds value, with one simple
gesture: sublimation. It is Magian chemistry, alchemy. What is alchemy?
Alchemy is often considered as the pre-history of modern chemistry.
Alchemists worked with bottles and substances, with vials and ovens. But what
did alchemists do? First of all, they believed that everything in nature is involved
in a process of purification. Nature is striving towards perfection as a final state.
Stones have an inherent desire to change into precious stones, and metals are
striving to become precious metals. Hybrid substances want to become pure,
anything unstable aims to become stable, what is lifeless wants to come alive. In
their laboratories, alchemists attempt to accelerate the process, which is taking
place since time immemorial. This gives meaning to their laborious activities. An
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alchemist is a minister naturae, a servant of nature. Unlike Faustian chemists,
alchemists realise that they are ultimately dependent on grace, on the willingness
of nature to reveal herself. Nature cannot be forced to do so. Patience is of pivotal
importance, and timing is even more important. The experiment can only succeed
when God or nature literally grant the alchemist the privilege, at the decisive
moment. An alchemical experiment is therefore not replicable. It is a unique and
singular event. The alchemist will never be able to accurately indicate which
actions led to the desired outcome. Something else, something extraordinary is
always involved. And there is another important difference. Unlike chemistry,
alchemy is subject-dependent. Chance of success depends on the purity of the
subject. Besides purifying their substances, alchemists must first and foremost
purify themselves. Alchemistic operations are part of a program of selfimprovement. Alchemy is psychotherapy, a spiritual exercise, a practice of the
Self. Everything is aimed at purification, κάθαρσις.
For alchemists and other subjects given to Magian beliefs, fundamental
correspondences can be discerned between the various spheres of reality: between
the mineral, the herbal, the animal, the stellar and the human sphere. Everything
is interconnected, not through causality, but via parallelism and concordance. The
various realms of reality mirror one another. In the alchemical laboratory, purity
of substances and of humans reinforce each other, reflect each other. Alchemy is
a Gesamtwissenschaft. It is not a form of proto-chemistry, it is also astrology,
mineralogy, metaphysics and Bible study.
Everything in nature tends towards sublimation. Whatever is ill, wants to
become healthy, whatever is lifeless wants to come alive. From the perspective
of alchemy, resurrection is not at all an absurd idea. Purity of the subject in
question will be an important factor, but we remain dependent on divine
intervention. To prove themselves worthy, the alchemists quoted the gospels
during their work, crucial formulas borrowed from sacred texts, notably the
gospel of John. Outsiders, lay persons, less fluent in these “dead” languages,
easily got the impression that these practitioners, these adepts, were producing
meaningless phrases. Hocus pocus Pilatus pas comes from Hoc est corpus and
sub Pilato passus, phrases not only uttered during alchemical experiments, but
also by priests during Mass. The miracles of Jesus and alchemical experiments
were both Magian practices.
Another example of a Magian research field is astrology. This is how the
gospel describes this practice: “After Jesus was born in Bethlehem in
Judea, during the time of King Herod, Magi from the east came to Jerusalem and
asked, ‘Where is the one who has been born king of the Jews? We saw his
star when it rose and have come to worship him.’” (Matthew 2:1-2). A
remarkable stellar phenomenon must correspond with, and therefore announces
(not: causes), a similar event in the sublunary human realm. Therefore, the
appearance of an exceptional star signifies the advent of a terrestrial novelty, such
as the birth of Christ. And therefore, this phenomenon is to be investigated with
utmost precision (ἀκριβῶς, Matthew 2:8). The star points the way, as a kind of
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Magian GPS. For these magi, all this is obvious, it does not need an explanation;
their worldview builds on correspondences of this kind.
The final, ultimate miracle is resurrection. What is transient and
perishable gives way to what is pure and immortal. Jesus receives a “glorified”,
transfigured body. His followers will likewise experience resurrection on
judgement day. They will receive a heavenly (transubstantiated) body. What was
transient will become imperishable. Paul says, “We will all be changed, in an
instant (ἐν ἀτόµῳ)”, in a fraction of a second. In a twinkling of an eye, the dead
will be raised unperishable. It is not a process which takes time, but a sudden
transformation, only taking an atom, a quantum leap of time. What is brought to
the fore here (the prospect that is opened up), is an alchemical transfiguration or
transmutation. In Christianity, the alchemical climax is omnipresent. There are
footsteps that can no longer be erased, like the footprint of Jesus in a small church
along the Via Appia (Quo Vadis?). St. Peter’s cathedral in Rome is strictly
speaking the tomb of an illiterate fisherman from Galilee – sublimation. The body
is perishable, but refashioned into an imperishable, priceless building. The
everyday and the corruptible, become inconceivably valuable.
Eventually, however, alchemy will be drawn into a Faustian cultural
climate. What begins as Magian science, become increasingly Faustian in the end.
Alchemists in their laboratories are becoming increasingly active, and begin to
take the initiative. Instead of waiting for nature to unveil herself, they try to
enforce it. Goethe’s Faust enacts this turning point: the moment when alchemy
becomes a Faustian endeavour. Alchemy forms a bridge between Magian and
Faustian thinking, between waiting for the right constellation and scientia
experimentalis.
§ 12. Waiting
The Magian God is omnipotent and even more powerful than the Apollonian
Demiurge who transformed obscure chaos into an ordered cosmos. Nature in the
sense of creatio is a creation out of nothing. God is almighty. Augustine is a more
“Magian” theologian than his opponent Pelagius, who emphasises freedom of
will. The quintessential Magian activity is waiting – waiting for the advent of the
Kingdom, the coming of the groom. However, it is a rather particular form of
waiting, involving a particular attitude towards the time dimension. It is about
readiness, about keeping yourself ready for the inevitable. The earth has been
profoundly damaged, but will undergo transfiguration. Salvation will come at the
appointed time. The Magian mind lives in the expectation of the end. Magian
physics does not think in terms of causal relationships, because there is only one
cause: God (causa sui).
A typical feature of Magian religion is the reliance on sacred scripture,
which, however, has to be deciphered. Only the true believer knows what is
meant. Special techniques are developed to reveal hidden meanings, in the
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context of research practices such as numerology (number mysticism), or Magian
cryptology. Just as alchemy was both a facilitating and an inhibiting factor for
modern chemistry – facilitating because of the development of laboratory
instruments, but inhibiting because Magian thinking blocks the development of a
truly experimental approach –, numerology both facilitated and inhibited the
development of modern (Faustian) algebra. Numerology was a special branch of
biblical interpretation. At the same time, it encouraged the development of new
number systems, such as the logarithmic scale. Michael Stifel (1487-1567), a
supporter of Luther and fascinated by the properties of numbers, used a
logarithmic scale and exponentials to determine the date of the apocalypse on the
basis of the Book of Revelation, replacing letters with numbers: a procedure
explained in Ein Rechenbuchlein vom Endchrist: Apocalyps in Apocalypsim (A
Book of Arithmetic about the Antichrist: A Revelation in the Revelation),
published in 1532 and predicting that the world would end one year later.
The first centuries A.D. were the golden age of Magian movements such
as the Isis cult, the Mithras cult, early Christianity, Gnosis, Kabala (a Magian
form of Judaism, much given to number mysticism) and finally Islam. The basic
message was the assurance that the Kingdom was imminent. What is lacking in
Magian thinking is the concept of an autonomous subject. Only God truly acts.
The Faustian mindset involves a transition from a style of thinking based on
correspondences (between celestial and earthly events, but also between words
and numbers, etc.) to causal thinking, while the cause is, in fact, the researcher
himself, the independent variable who, consciously and actively, manipulates the
object (the dependent variable) in order to control it. In the beginning is the deed:
that is the essence of the experimental method.
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Chapter 4. Scientia experimentalis: Faustian thinking
§ 1. Onset
Faustian thinking is characterized by dynamic unrest and a desire for height. The
cathedral is the Faustian edifice par excellence, according to Spengler: petrified
Faustian mathematics. From the perspective of the styles-of-thinking concept,
one wave connects cathedral building with the Apollo project (Wachhorst 2000).
St. Peter’s Dome, a spherical building, is a product of the Counter-Reformation.
It expresses a desire to hold on to a spherical form, but is at the same time a
reinforcement of the Faustian Will to power, a gigantic and dynamic edifice. The
Faustian principle, once brought to life, seems unstoppable and will continue to
push through – not only in architecture, but first and foremost in the modern
natural sciences.
After the year 1000 A.D., but especially in the 13th and 14th century, a
new style of thinking announces itself, referred to by Spengler as Faustian. Nature
becomes the target of experimental research with the help of technical
contrivances. Science becomes intimately connected with technology. The
experimental method originated in a monastic setting (Grant 1974) and prepared
the way for the modern natural sciences, as well as for modern technology.
Natural science and technology are now inextricably linked, forming a Faustian
alliance. The modern machine, as the embodiment of this energetic, dynamic way
of thinking, was originally conceived in Gothic monastic cells. Members of
mobile monastic orders, such as Albertus Magnus and Roger Bacon, were the
first machine builders and Petrus Peregrinus was fascinated by the phantasm of a
perpetuum mobile: the archetype of mechanics, the one thing which all great
machine builders up to Captain Nemo are trying to achieve. This desire is also
expressed in terms such as “automobile” and “automatic”. Scientists build optical
and mechanical instruments to manipulate nature (technological interventions as
the independent variable), and to measure nature in a precise and reliable way
(the natural phenomenon as the dependent variable). From now on, to observe is
to measure. Faustian physics begin with studying magnetism and gravity: natural
phenomena with a tinge of the magical. Both magnetism and gravity were
experienced as occult phenomena, as mysterious forms of influence. The gradual
obfuscation of this Magian dimension in Faustian research practices (the
disenchantment of magnetism and gravity) required hard work, and perhaps we
should see it as an interminable process which was never really completed.
Quantum physics for instance was fascinating precisely because it mobilised
lingering discontent in Faustian determinism, because it addressed phenomena
which seemed to take us beyond the causality principle, in the deterministic sense
of the term.
The gothic style, Spengler argues, was a restless striving for height, a
proliferation of stone, a desire to emancipate from nature: the childhood stage of
the industrial era. A historical thread unfolds from Notre Dame to Eiffel Tower.
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In mathematics, Faustian thinking gives rise to the concept of infinity. The Greek
cosmos was a world on a human scale. The Faustian universe is inhuman and
frightening in its immensity and emptiness: frighteningly immense. The basic
mathematical concept which allows astronomers to disclose this type of space is
no longer the sphere, but the coordinate system, developed by Descartes: with
axes of infinite length, starting from an arbitrary centre and stretching out into
infinite space.
Another Faustian phenomenon is the modern, industrial city. Before the
dawning of the Faustian era, religious orders such as the Benedictines established
their monasteries in rural areas, in wildernesses, but Dominicans and Franciscans
settle in big cities. In Paris, Oxford and Cologne they build their universities.
Jesuits are city dwellers, attracted by big urban centres to teach and work.
Eventually, the big city becomes the ideal ambiance for typically Faustian human
types: the worker, the bureaucrat, the engineer.
The core concept of Faustian thinking is the will to power. Whereas
Apollonian astronomers admire the perfect geometry of the spheres, Faustian
scientists want to control and manipulate the universe. Faustian science is driven
by the violent ambition to conquer reality in an energetic and aggressive manner.
Research animals and human subjects are subjected to experimental trials which
always entail an element of violence: it is a damaging type of research, bent on
subjection. It is by damaging the body that Faustian scientists strengthen their
sway over bodily existence. The will to know is a manifestation of the will to
power. Medicine does not want to serve but to control the body. Power (rather
than peace or harmony) is the grounding concept of Faustian politics. To establish
a centralistic nation state, to enforce recognition, that is the idea, and the state is
a machinery bent on control and mobilisation of the population. Power is what
Faustian thinking strives for.
For Apollonian thinking, to observe and understand meant to admire, but
this attitude of respect for nature now gives way to an active, manipulative style
of perception and observation, culminating in the development of modern
(Faustian) research laboratories: setups designed by researchers to increase their
power over the real. In their laboratories, nature is forced to reveal itself under
closely monitored circumstances, as a series of causal relationships that can be
captured in measurements, formulas and curves. The primordial Faustian
instrument is the camera obscura, a component that we find embedded in all
optical instruments more or less. All optical contrivances contain (are designed
on the basis of) a camera obscura. The laboratory as such is a camera obscura, a
dark room, designed to keep reality at bay, only allowing tiny samples of light,
matter, life, etc. to enter, samples that can be easily manipulated and controlled.
Rather than being overwhelmed by the glittering, noisy, messy real, scientists
create an artificial ecosystem which they can master, and where they can conduct
their research with the help of precision instruments. Science no longer trusts the
naked eye. Apollonian contemplation displayed a strong dislike of technology.
Tools (indeed: even books) were suspect. The practical interaction with reality
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was delegated to the lower social strata. Faustian science, by contrast, would be
unthinkable without labour and technology. Science and technology enter into a
Faustian pact: they become intimately connected, and the one becomes
inconceivable without the other. In order to really understand what Faustian
thinking is about, however, we have to start at the beginning: Paradise lost.
§ 2. Commencement: Paradise lost
Faustian thinking has a striking interest in Paradise, regardless of religious
denomination, for it applies both to Catholic and to Protestant Faustian thinkers.
The Dominican Thomas Aquinas and the Puritan John Milton both tackled the
Paradise theme, albeit at different stages of the history of Faustian thinking. The
Paradise theme is, among other things, the story of the transition from Magian to
Faustian thinking.
Paradise is an ecosystem in which organisms are optimally adapted to
their environment. Genesis 2 is an oriental fairy tale, set in a miracle garden where
labour and death are unknown and everything is set for pleasure. Naked and
uninhibited, Adam and Eve fully enjoy each other, for they have nothing else to
do. They have nothing on their minds, their lives lack challenges and projects.
The forbidden fruit triggers desire, and as soon as they consume it, the spell is
broken. All of a sudden, they find themselves under radically different
circumstances: on earth as Faustian humans know it, a place of toil, hardship and
labour, of suffering and violence, where existence is experienced as harsh. In his
Summa Theologica, Thomas devotes ample space to the original situation of
innocence in which Adam and Eve once dwelled, as noble savages. He presents
a touching fantasy concerning physical life under paradisiacal circumstances, in
statu innocentiae. Life was innocent, unspoiled. Life was a joy. There was
nothing unbecoming to the human body, neither smell nor sweat, and even
excrements had nothing repulsive about them. Love was enjoyed to the full and
without putting honourableness at stake.
In this miracle garden, this Magian idyll, this product of oriental
imagination, God introduces a new dimension: the ban, the prohibition. When
Adam and Eve finally eat from the forbidden tree of knowledge, they are not
motivated by hunger (for they have plenty to consume), but by sheer desire,
triggered by the ban. The prohibition as such provokes lust, the threat of
punishment is what sparks their desire, as Dutch poet Joost van den Vondel
phrases it in Adam in Exile. Prohibition puts an end to the innocence of pure
pleasure and introduces a contrast between duty and inclination. The magic
garden suddenly disappears to make way for a human-unfriendly, Faustian
landscape where humankind makes a living through hard menial work and
chronic struggle.
But it is also the beginning of progress and humanisation, of history and
freedom, according to Kant (1786/1971). Strictly speaking, Adam and Eve lived
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the life of animals, were guided by their senses, by smell and taste. It was only
when, instead of merely consuming, they were facing a dilemma and had to
determine which path to follow, that their eyes were opened and the world
assumed a completely different face. Humans became aware of rationality and
morality. The exodus from the carefree but onerous garden, the sultry Paradise,
the calm passivity in which the first people were forced to dream away their lives,
was a liberation. The desire for a golden age, a state of simplicity and innocence
where people lose themselves in idleness, is unreasonable, says Kant.
In Paradise Lost, John Milton’s version of the story, we are confronted
with a similar transition: the abrupt emergence of a Faustian universe whose sheer
dimensions are utterly frightening. The migration from the Magian garden to the
challenging Faustian landscape coincides with a sudden change in the experience
of space as such, a dramatic increase of spatiality. Paradise is a garden, a park, an
ambiance of human size. After the Fall, Satan suddenly discovers an immense,
frightening distance between heaven and hell. Overnight, the world has become
unimaginably big. He discovers a terrible, wild and dark abyss, a vast vacuity, a
wasteful depth. It is telling that on the eve of the fall, Adam and Archangel
Raphael engage in a discussion concerning the size of the world. Adam expresses
his discontent in the geocentric universe and has taken an interest in
heliocentrism. He is, as it were, ready for heliocentrism, and already begins to
experience the universe as being extremely large. 18 Raphael tries to discourage
this: the heavens should remain the object of contemplation and admiration. He
admits that the spherical worldview (the desperate attempt to hold onto the sphere
as a basic structure) is laughable from a heavenly perspective, but he urges Adam
to consider the gigantic expanse of the universe as a symbol of God’s sublime
nature. These unfathomable spatial dimensions should not inspire astronomical
research, but rather humility (p. 294). This attempt to calm down his budding
inquisitiveness has a temporary effect (Adam goes to sleep peacefully), but
cannot conceal that his experience of space displays a fundamental change – it is
becoming Faustian. And Faustian space is incomparably larger than the spherical
one – large beyond comparison.
§ 3. Copernicus: how large is the universe?
Copernicus represents a crucial moment in the migration from Magian to Faustian
space, Kant argues. The transition from a geocentric to a heliocentric worldview
was a second Fall, an exodus out of an imaginary, familiar world on a human
scale, the “magic circle” of phenomenological experience (Teilhard de Chardin
18
“When I behold this goodly frame, this World / of Heav’n and Earth consisting, and
compute / their magnitudes, this Earth a spot, a grain / an Atom, with the Firmament
compar’d / And all her numberd Starrs, that seem to roule / Spaces incomprehensible,
for such / Their distance argues…” (Milton, 1962, p.292)
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1959). We still have the sensory impression that the sun revolves around the earth,
but thanks to modern science we are able to withdraw ourselves from the power
of this sensation and bracket immediate experience. Thanks to reason we can put
naive receptivity aside, transcend it. Appearances prove deceptive. Thanks to our
freedom of thought, we can leave the Magian cave of geocentric thinking behind
and acknowledge the sun as the true centre of the solar system. We are able to decentre ourselves as subjects. This Copernican revolution, transcending
empiricism, has major consequences. The spherical, Magian worldview is
doomed, but its heliocentric rival can only hold true if the universe is
unimaginably large. Only when the distance between the sun and the earth,
compared to the distance between the sun and the (other) stars is negligibly small,
can it be true that the earth revolves around the sun. Because otherwise the
circular movement of the earth around the sun would have to be visible in the
position of the fixed stars (the parallax problem).
This does not mean, Spengler emphasizes, that Western humanity
suddenly realises, thanks to Copernicus, how immensely large the universe is.
Quite the contrary, heliocentrism presupposes a Faustian intuition concerning the
infinity of the universe. The Copernican revolution was not yet a real break with
Ptolemy, according to Spengler, but rather a hesitant articulation of a new worldexperience. Aristarchos of Samos had already defended the hypothesis that the
earth revolves around the sun in ancient times, but because he continued to view
the cosmos in Apollonian terms, as a kind of sphere, his hypothesis did not hold.
Copernicus’ thesis confirmed the Faustian sense of the immensity of the world,
the idea of a boundless space. Only in a Faustian-sized universe can the
heliocentric hypothesis survive as a convincing theorem.
In 1543, the Copernican revolution had been an inconspicuous event. His
publication hardly caused a stir. Not only because of the esoteric and
mathematical style of his writing, but also because he was not really the
revolutionary he is so often considered to be. In important respects, his universe
remained spherical. He makes important concessions to the Apollonian sense of
space, as part of the Renaissance as an Apollonian revival, so that he continues
to imagine the universe in terms of perfect circles, concentric spheres and
epicycles. He still endorses the phantasm, as Lacan phrases it, that we should
think the universe as a series of concentric spheres (1991/2001, p. 114).
With Apollonian astronomers, Copernicus shared the basic (quasi-selfevident) conviction that celestial bodies follow perfect orbits. In the early work
of Johannes Kepler, nature as κόσµος was allowed to shine once again, as we
have seen. The “Copernican revolution”, according to Lacan, is a historical
fiction. Copernicus still wanted to reduce the movements of celestial bodies, even
those of a “wandering” planet (ἀστήρ πλανήτης) to circles. His heliocentric thesis
was a desperate attempt to bring the movements of these straying stars in
correspondence with the Apollonian phantasm of a geometrically perfect
universe. The Copernican cosmos still sounded Pythagorean. The silent, icy,
empty universe of Pascal is still very far away. The difference between
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Copernicus’ (in many respects still neo-Apollonian) spatial experience and the
Faustian universe of Galilei and the later Kepler, was the telescope – the powerful
instrument by means of which Faustian investigators gained access into the
depths of the cosmos, forcing the Apollonian veil to be lifted. It was an
instrument, moreover, whose results required Faustian mathematics: an algebra
suitable for calculating immense distances, an algebra which could handle
astronomical numbers.
The spheres were shattered and the universe became infinitely immense.
The famous aphorism by Blaise Pascal concisely expresses this astonishing
experience: “Le silence éternel de ces espaces infinis m’effraie”, – the eternal
silence of infinite space frightens me (1660/1958, 206/201). In one phrase, Pascal
expresses the horror infini by which contemporary astronomers no longer seem
to be bothered at all, but which constituted a disconcerting experience when the
Faustian universe began to emerge. Natural scientists realized that the universe is
infinitely large, empty, silent and cold – that was their epistemological Fall. In a
perfectly harmonious universe, the Creator’s hand had been omnipresent. In the
Faustian Universe, the subject no longer feels at home. It is only thanks to a
compensating religious experience, – the inner certainty that God exists
(compensating for the undeniable Faustian truth) –, that Faustian souls are able
to endure the infinity and loneliness of the universe. The thesis of infinite
spatiality and the complementary thesis of the sublime greatness and
omnipotence of God, are both equally valid for Faustian minds. The Faustian
image of God is likewise characterised by distance and inaccessibility. The divine
presence in natural reality that the Faustian mind-set gave up, returned in Faustian
faith. Stringent and demanding (“heavy”) Faustian theology, with its rigid and
far-reaching normative claims, expressed by a frightening voice of conscience,
by a rigid, demanding Über-Ich, counterbalances the frightening insight that the
earth is only a small , dark, inconspicuous mass, circling through an infinitely
large universe, surrounded by an atmosphere that becomes rapidly thinner as
height increases, as Pascal demonstrated in air pressure experiments he designed,
– eventually giving way to an abiotic, icy, uninhabitable void. The Faustian world
is composed of mass and Mass, of force and faith. The inevitable result is an
extremely strict, Faustian form of religiosity, a theology of rigorous moral
principles and rigid dogmas.
As spiritual explorers, Jesuits were prominent officials in the process of
Faustian globalisation, but at the same time they were paradoxically driven by
the idea that the sphere could be restored, tirelessly striving to rearrange the
scattered geographical points around a re-established spiritual centre. The process
was nevertheless unstoppable. The static sphere became a dynamic network, and
the order of the Jesuits became a paradigmatic embodiment of this. Jesuits gave
an important impulse to processes of globalization (Aveling 1981). They not only
opposed the Reformation (as a symptom of nationalised Christianity), but also
the nationalisation of education. Jesuits preferably taught in Latin. The Societas
Jesu relied on rigorous self-discipline and could do without monasteries, without
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the protective immunisation provided by abbey walls. Through efficient use of
human resources and training programs, this militant society managed to acquire
enormous power and influence. The society was active worldwide, in a wide
range of professions. Education in particular was a domain of conflict between
global Jesuits and the nation states, who wanted to put educational institutions
firmly in the hands of the state, in order to produce a nationalist bourgeois elite.
The Copernican revolution did not immediately put an end to spherical
thinking. Rather, it unleashed a revolution that continued to require a great deal
of intellectual work over the centuries. These efforts must nevertheless be
understood as the result of a moment of commencement, “eine auf einmal zu
Stande gebrachte Revolution” (Kant 1781/1971, p. 25). The new style has to
prove itself, prove its credibility. Kant himself is an important protagonist of the
Faustian style, who mercilessly tries to discredit nostalgia for Magian styles of
thinking, which he dismisses as intellectual infatuation (“Schwärmerei”). In
Träume eines Geistersehers (1766/1968), “Schwärmer” Swedenborg is his main
target, whose rational mysticism constitutes a revival of Magian thinking:
nostalgia for a Magian “Paradise” (p. 923, A3). Swedenborg distinguishes an
outer person (who participates in everyday social intercourse) and an inner person
(who participates in another, spiritual world). This inner person, repressed in most
modern individuals, enables Swedenborg to clarify the hidden meaning of Bible
texts and to develop his parapsychological and telepathic capacities. Kant tries to
show that such a discourse does not meet the rigid criteria imposed by the
Faustian program of intellectual self-discipline. Enlightenment has nothing to do
with tolerance, for it only tolerates that which meets the criteria of reason as
determined by Enlightenment. The tone of Kant’s writings are reminiscent of the
way in which the Dominicans once fought the Magian Cathars a few centuries
earlier, and Thomas Aquinas fought a similar battle in his Summa contra Gentiles.
In Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton (1796/1968) Kant
chooses a more difficult target, the arch-Schwärmer Plato. What disappoints him
in Plato is the atmosphere of admiration and intoxication, as the intellectual mood
this type of thinking sooner or later gives rise to, notably in its Magian (neoPlatonic) version. Kant is annoyed by authors who associate philosophy with
initiation and inspiration, with knowledge of spiritual “secrets” and profound,
divine intuitions. Philosophy is hard, discursive labour, Kant argues, and he is
annoyed by the lofty, exalted tone of voice, already present in Apollonian
thinking, but pushed to its extreme in Magian discourse. Plato is the archSchwärmer, as said, the father of infatuation, because he placed the origin of basic
concepts in a divine intellect, which implies that a philosopher may trust his
intuitions. As a truly Faustian thinker, Kant sees philosophy as intellectual labour
based on strict criteria that encourage self-discipline and austere thinking.
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§ 4. In the beginning was the deed
The Phenomenology of the Spirit by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 –
1831) contains a famous passage, of decisive importance for understanding the
Faustian style of thinking, namely his dialectical analysis of the interaction
between Master and Servant (Herrschaft und Knechtschaft). Hegel’s analysis
clarifies the relationship between lofty, Apollonian, aristocratic knowledge
(contemplation) and the more active style of thinking, the hands-on knowledge
practiced by Faustian workers – that is, by natural scientists working in
laboratories (= workshops). The Master, according to Hegel, does not interact
directly with unruly reality. He leaves the active handling and manipulation of
matter to the Servant. The Master-gentleman devotes himself to enjoyment of
things. This combination of contemplation and pleasure determines the
epistemological profile of his views, of which Apollonian speculation is the
textbook example. It is abstract thinking, not aimed at generating concrete
applications for social practices such as architecture, arable farming or artisanal
production. The Master enjoys beautiful things, the starry skies bring him into
ecstasy, theory is more important than practice. He spends his leisure time in
considering heavenly orbits and the metaphysics of the divine. The actual,
productive handling of matter is avoided, because the material and the concrete
are considered messy and impure.
The mindset of the servant, on the other hand, is pragmatic from the
outset. At first, the servant does not think scientifically. He works on behalf of
the (contemplating) gentleman, who is developing deep insights concerning the
basic structure of being. Initially, the servant does not act on his own initiative.
His practical interaction with reality is primarily based on experiential
knowledge. Genuine scientific knowledge, insight into the how and why, is
lacking. As far as knowledge is involved, it concerns practical insights that can
be transferred via imitation and repetition. Knowledge is accumulated though
incremental innovation – learning by doing.
The quintessence of Hegel’s analysis, however, is that sooner or later, a
shift will inevitably occur. The master alienates himself from material things.
Although he enjoys resting his eye on things, his knowledge remains superficial.
Concrete interaction is missing. He cannot put his views to the test. He consumes
things, they offer no resistance, as resistance and recalcitrance have been crushed
by the work of the servant. The master is confronted with the products of the
latter’s labour and lacks the knowledge gained in a practical context of
conducting hands-on labour. The servant is really involved in things. He works
with matter and thinks with his hands. “Manipulation” comes from manus (hand).
The servant manipulates until the results of his actions manifest themselves (De
Rougement 1936). Perfection and progress are achieved through anonymous
technical improvements.
For a long time, progress remains undocumented, manifesting itself in
concrete optimisations of performance. Instead of consuming things, the servant
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is committed to maintain and improve things. And these things are upgraded by
labour. His knowledge of things is on the one hand more violent (effectively
gaining control over them, grasping and affecting them), on the other hand more
intimate (he becomes familiar with and sensitive to them, his practices become
attuned to them). He observes the consequences of his work as they manifest
themselves in concrete things. Instead of consuming them, he sustains them by
modifying, domesticating and taking care of them. In the context of this
dialectical process, the labouring consciousness develops into a form of thinking
that is considerably more robust, epistemologically speaking, and more effective
than the detached, contemplative mindset of the master. By actively modifying
things, causal relationships become visible in objectivity itself. Practical thinking
begins as servitude, but emancipates and develops into experimental (Faustian)
practice, driven by the Will to Power. Masters and their knowledge become
increasingly irrelevant: useless ballast, like the Palace at Versailles. Absolutism
gives way to liberty, equality and fraternity.
In Hegel’s Phenomenology, Faust himself is described as the scientific
individual who distances himself from established knowledge (1807/1973, p. 270
ff.). According to Hegel, Goethe’s drama deals with the conflict between an
ambitious but disappointed researcher on the one hand and authoritative,
generally accepted forms of knowledge on the other, between epistemological
“Befriedigungslosigkeit” and “die Lebendigkeit des Weltlebens”. According to
Faust, existing science dramatically fails to capture the Real and has become
utterly impotent. Scholarly knowledge became a prison cell. Faust wants to
escape his library, he wants “hinaus”. Science wants to become Faustian, desires
to transform itself into an active, worldly and experimental knowledge practice.
If the goal is to gain real knowledge, we must be prepared to accept significant
risks – that is the Faustian epistemological morale of the story.
The famous Faustian phrase “Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach! in meiner Brust”
(1113) also applies to Goethe himself. On the one hand, he is still fascinated by
a neo-Apollonian (neo-classical) culture, a world of beauty, clarity and harmony.
In addition, as an aesthetic shadow, however, there is a competitive affinity, albeit
more hidden: Goethe’s sensitivity to Gothic culture, as the first stage of Faustian
thinking. When young Goethe (with his neo-classical sense of taste) was first
introduced in Strasbourg to the “monstrous” Gothic style exemplified by the
famous cathedral – which seems to mimic the power and darkness of a primordial
forest – the intimidating construction constituted a test, a challenge. He climbs
the tower to triumph in the struggle against his fear of heights (Safranski
2013/2015, p. 79). The Gothic cathedral with its extravagant decorations at first
repels, but gradually captivates Goethe’s imagination (Williams 1998/2001, p.
10). He manages to overcome his cultural prejudices and he quickly becomes
obsessed with the Gothic (Faustian) style. His lifelong fascination with alchemy
is also part of this Gothic complex. His masterpiece Faust captures the moment
when Magian alchemy becomes Faustian science, a worldly, transformative
knowledge practice.
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The alchemist Doctor Faustus was a contemporary of Paracelsus. Just
like in Milton’s Paradise Lost, God allows the devil the opportunity to put Faust
to the test, to subject him to a moral experiment. The devil (Mephistopheles)
manages to persuade Faust to leave his mysterious cave. It is midnight. Faust is
dwelling in his Gothic, late-medieval cell. He experiences discontent and
struggles with a mid-life crisis. Faust, a renowned scholar, a workaholic, is used
to labouring in seclusion well into the night. Thus, he managed to master all the
disciplines practiced at that time. He made a name for himself, made it to master
and doctor, but when he is honest with himself, he must admit that he actually
knows nothing, that his knowledge is bookish, meaningless knowledge, devoid
of practical relevance. This type of knowledge is literally negated overnight. It is
dead and sterile, fails to provide insight into the real. When his collaborator
Wagner persuades him to take a walk (it is springtime) it becomes clear how deep
the crisis is, how depressed Faust is. The alliance with the devil vigorously
awakens him.
Via his Faustian decision, his willingness to take risks, Faust enacts (and
even serves as a model for) modern science as a Faustian endeavour. Spengler
emphatically identifies the scientific style that Faust represents as Faustian. It is
an extremely ambitious and decidedly violent form of research, first and foremost
dangerous for the researchers involved. Faust is the literary counterpart of the
legendary gothic monk Bertold Schwarz who discovered the diabolical powers
of gunpowder in his late-medieval monastery cell, thereby killing himself, falling
victim to an explosion. Faust is the prototype of the Faustian scientist who is
willing to use violence in order to force a breakthrough.
Faust is a historical drama, but it is not so difficult to update Goethe’s
masterpiece and to connect it with scientific developments in his own era. Faust
is a critical confrontation with the Faustian natural sciences, emerging in the early
19th century. The Faustian pact with the devil becomes a metaphor for the moral
and physical damage that researchers involved expose themselves to. They will
have to pay for their will to know with their health, or even their lives. Galileo
allegedly damaged his eyes with his research into sunspots, – see for instance the
play which Bertolt Brecht (1978) devoted to his case. Historians dispute the truth
of the story, but this does not alter (but rather confirms) its concordance with the
archetype of the Faustian scientist.
A well-documented example is the case of Isaac Newton. Although the
“visible” Newton became best known for his work as a mathematician and
physicist, the “hidden” Newton was active as an alchemist for many years. For
those who are willing to read his life-story clinically rather than hagiographically,
it is not difficult to see that we are dealing with a man who began to behave more
and more strangely as the years went by. Moments of deep crisis are apparent in
his life-story. Very unproductive and sterile years alternate with periods of
extreme productivity and creativity, such as the wonder year 1666. There are
times when a strange intellectual paralysis seems to take hold of him. That has its
reasons. Biographer Westfall (1980) explicitly links Newton’s behavioural
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problems with the way he conducted his research and the risks to which he
exposed himself as a researcher, especially in the context of his alchemical
studies. He used his sense organs, his tongue and nose, his sense of taste and
smell, as instruments for determining substances, even when heavy metals or
other toxic compounds were concerned. He inhaled toxic fumes. For years he
exposed himself to physical dangers. Posthumous research into Newton’s hair
revealed that it contained significant concentrations of heavy metals, many times
higher than normal. Newton had been poisoning himself, with dire consequences
for his health and personality. Driven by the Faustian will to know, he exposed
his body to chronic damage.
Newton was not alone in that respect, far from it. He shared his methods
with other chemists, such as Karl Scheele (1742-1786), who worked in the same
manner and likewise identified chemical compounds (such as hydrogen sulfide)
by tasting and inhaling them, and he also paid the price for it, poisoning himself.
Scheele, Paul Strathern (2000) writes, suffered from extremely painful forms of
rheumatism, along with many other ailments that were almost certainly caused
by his laboratory practices. He attached much importance to identifying the
substances he isolated or produced in his laboratory with his unprotected senses,
without the use of special techniques. He interacted with his object directly. In
his laboratory notebooks, he described how hydrogen cyanide tasted: an
extremely toxic substance. An important discovery of Scheele was the effect of
light on silver compounds. With that, he actually prepared the way for modern
photography, a typical Faustian technology, with allows us to get hold of things,
freezing reality into objectivity, capturing it. However, a high price was paid for
this discovery: he undermined his health (Strathern, 2000, p. 198). Scientists
working under unhealthy laboratory conditions often developed a professional
psychopathology referred to as hysteria chemicorum by Justus von Liebig (Zwart
2005b). Experimental research was far more dangerous than reading books, and
laboratory techniques were not yet very sophisticated. In the 20th century, Marie
Skłodowska-Curie and Rosalind Franklin would succumb to the consequences of
long-term exposure to radioactivity and X-ray radiation in the context of their
fascinating and ground-breaking but toxic research practices.
Bible texts, especially the gospel of John, played a major role in
alchemical research practices as we have seen. Faust attempts to retranslate the
opening lines of this Gospel. At first, he waits for inspiration (illuminatio) by the
holy spirit, hoping for a moment of grace, in accordance with the Magian strategy:
we must wait for the truth to reach out towards us. But then he decides to use a
more active strategy, he violates the text, thus arriving at the most famous
sentence from Goethe’s drama: “Im Anfang war die Tat” (1237) – a bold and
Faustian translation indeed. He then closes the book again – he no longer needs
it. The new science is an active, experimental science. Faust stops reading and
translating and makes a new start, by experimenting: thinking with his hands. The
abrupt, daring translation made this praxis possible, legitimises it.
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Faust is not only about Faustian science, but also about Faustian love.
Faustian desire no longer wants to wait, it is violent and culminates in the
violation of the other, or even in the death of the beloved object. Faustian love is
still in its virulent stage here, and did not have the chance to stabilise as yet. It is
an outbreak, after a long period of ascetic self-renunciation. The will to power
manifests itself as the will to own and consume the object, even if the beloved
one is thereby seriously harmed. Restless desire and damage are indeed part of
the Faustian complex, but other, compensating elements are still missing in the
cascade of pleasure experiences that Goethe’s drama stages. Without a strong
sense of responsibility (and the violent conflicts between duty and desire that
result from this), the image of Faustian love is not yet complete.
In Turgenev’s novel Fathers and Sons, Yevgeny Bazarov is a Faustian
scientist who submits large numbers of frogs to vivisection, considering them as
model organisms for biomedical research. And when he encounters the woman
of his life for the first time, he exclaims: “What a magnificent body ... Shouldn’t
I like to see it on the dissecting-table!” (1861/1965, p. 155). This is Faustian
eroticism pur sang.
§ 5. Newton’s shed
Isaac Newton (1642 – 1727) was an arch-Faustian researcher, although even his
research practice had Magian undercurrents as we have seen. To study the
phenomenon of light, he comes up with a paradoxical design: he withdraws into
a dark, light-proof room, a shed exempted from daylight, and drills a small hole
in the wall. He reduces the phenomenon of light to a minimum, something which
he can fully control and manipulate as much as possible, for example by breaking
it with the aid of a prism so that it diffracts into a spectrum. Instead of leaving the
phenomenon intact (“untouched”), Newton actively investigates it by isolating
and manipulating it. The whole purpose of an optical experiment is to control
light – hold a moonbeam in your hand, as the musical nicely phrases it. Precisely
for that reason, he is criticized by Goethe: he damages the phenomena. Goethe
himself starts from everyday observations, showing more restraint and more
respect for the phenomenon as it reveals itself to us on its own accord.
Kant, however, unequivocally sides Newton. Human reason only
understands what accords with its own principles, Kant claims. Science forces
nature to comply with these principles. Newton is not at all a passive observer.
He forces nature to answer the questions he is asking and to manifest itself under
the conditions he designs, determines and controls. He forces nature to speak his
(mathematical) language, forces her into his format, considers the natural
phenomena in function of circumstances he himself can adjust. On the basis of
this experimental set-up, he is able to control and – therefore – understand the
phenomenon of light. The mathematics he is using in his experiments is no longer
the mathematics of ideal geometrical figures, but a dynamical mathematics, with
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the concept of the function as its core. The horizontal axis indicates what, in
Faustian terms, could be called the deed: the independent variable, the
investigator’s own actions and interventions. The effects of these actions become
visible along the vertical axis. This mathematical understanding of measurement
and experimental design gives the researcher power over the phenomena. What
Newton makes visible is that we can capture enigmatic, apparently Magian
phenomena, from tidal ebb and flow up to the movements of celestial bodies, with
the help of a handful of letters from the alphabet, with the help of one simple
formula. The alchemist awaits the moment of grace, but the Faustian investigator
enforces this moment of revelation and discovery – his experiment is replicable.
From now on, method (procedure) determines the conditions.
And yet, a Magian residue resides in Newton’s research practices. The
cornerstone of his theory of gravity is Magian. Like love, gravity is a mysterious,
inexplicable form of influence that works from a distance (actio in distans), a
strange form of attraction, comparable perhaps to Goethe’s elective affinities
(Wahlverwandtschaften). Ebb and flood are the result of water being attracted by
the moon, as if we are still dwelling in a Magian world. At the same time, this
mysterious influence is now compressed into a formula, so that the phenomenon
of gravity can be calculated and predicted. Isaac Newton is a divided subject,
consisting of two epistemological personalities, just like Faust: “Zwei Seelen
wohnen, ach! in Meiner Brust”. On the one hand, he is the Faustian discoverer of
the differential calculus, a powerful tool for analysing the results of the
experiments he is conducting. On the other hand, he devoted many years of his
life to Magian research practices such as alchemy and Bible cryptology: the latent
epistemological inverse side or back page of his research.
Two works of art by Joseph Wright of Derby (1734-1797) demonstrate
the contrast between the Magian and the Faustian style, namely An Experiment
on a Bird in the Air Pump from 1768 and The Alchemist in Search of the
Philosophers Stone from 1771. The painting from 1771 shows an alchemist in his
Gothic study – similar to Faust’s cell. The disorder in his laboratory symbolizes
the lack of a straightforward methodology. In despair, he uses a multitude of
procedures and instruments, making his experiment utterly non-replicable. We
see the (very old) alchemist precisely at the moment when he (finally) discovers
the element phosphorus – without really knowing what he is doing. He
experiences this event as a moment of grace. Nature finally comes to his rescue.
The researcher has devoted his entire life to this apparently hopeless project,
whose positive outcome seems to seriously damage him, however, for he seems
to be struck with blindness. It will be a difficult task for the young students
observing him to replicate this feat.
The (young) scientist in the painting from 1768 adopts a completely
different style of working. He has his affairs in order and knows exactly what he
is doing. He uses a pump to create a vacuum in a laboratory flask. He creates an
unnatural situation. He uses a test animal, a bird. When the bird almost
suffocates, he can open a flap, so that the animal will probably survive the
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experiment. However, this moment of “compassion” does not diminish the
violent nature of the scheme. Everything is focused on manipulation and control,
on calculated procedures. It is clear that this is not a singular or unexpected event,
but that a validated protocol is closely followed.
The experiment allows truth to appear. Wright’s artwork perpetuates a
truth event. The experiment is a replication of an original discovery preceding it.
It demonstrated the relationship between truth, experimentation and art. The
artwork reveals the moment of truth captured by the experiment. What we see is
not a particular event, but Faustian thinking as such. Martin Heidegger (1889 –
1976) emphasizes the ambiguity of the concept of truth. On the one hand, truth
means correspondence (adequatio) between theory and reality. According to
Heidegger (1927/1986), however, this is a restricted and even obfuscating
interpretation of truth, and his entire oeuvre is one persistent attempt to articulate
a different understanding. In a more original sense, according to Heidegger, truth
means bringing forth. In order for thoughts and propositions to adequately reflect
reality, reality must first of all be opened up. A style of thinking is a fundamental
way of experiencing reality, of bringing reality to the fore.
A style of thinking conveys a fundamental answer to the question
concerning the mode of being as a whole. For the Dionysian style of thinking,
being is φύσις: immense, all-encompassing, impenetrable. For Apollonian
thinking, being is κόσµος, a perfect order. For Faustian thinking, being equals
objectivity. If we see being as an aggregate of things with qualities, we use a
particular grammar, speak in a particular key, pertaining to a particular style of
thinking, allowing us to approach and experience reality in a certain way. At
present, the emergence of a completely new way of perceiving, speaking and
thinking seems imminent – a new way of thinking that will make the world appear
in a completely different light – perhaps a way of thinking that will be more
respectful of things, allowing us to encounter them in a more poetic manner.
Faustian thinking sees all animals as research animals. The laboratory animal is
a form of animalhood that is very closely linked with the Faustian style of
thought, the Will to Power.
A style of thinking implies a certain sensitivity to those aspects of the
world that reveal themselves in such a way that it seems to align with and confirm
this style of thinking. We should not see ourselves as mere recording devices, for
we are imbued with historicity. The way we think and the way reality appears to
us are two dimensions of one and the same interactive process. Heidegger refers
to the moment when reality is brought to light for the first time as ἀλήθεια
(1927/1986). It means “truth”, but in the sense of non-concealment. Before
scientific research allows us to develop theories that correspond to the facts
(objectivity), this objectivity must first be revealed and experienced in a certain
manner: made accessible for research, so that ἀλήθεια precedes adequatio.
Correctness can only be achieved if reality is allowed to reveal itself in a certain
way. There can only be truth in the sense of adequacy when a certain style of
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thinking has already established itself. In the light of this style of thinking, certain
ideas about reality can be adequately demonstrated.
The emergence of a style of thinking, the awareness of its convincing,
converting power is the truth event thematised by Heidegger as ἀλήθεια. A
dimension of reality that was previously inaccessible or hidden, becomes
accessible. It is the moment when we first become aware of the world in this way.
From now on, reality forces itself upon us in this manner. Without a style of
thinking, there would be no world, and it is the world itself that manifests itself
in this way, at a certain point in history. Our way of experiencing the world is
profoundly historical. Things present themselves to us in such a way that they
invite and encourage certain practices of inquiry, and it is our style of thinking
which makes the world light up in front of us in a particular manner. Magian art
does not merely use different techniques than Faustian art. Magian artists
experienced the world in a profoundly different manner.
This also explains why Heidegger pays so much attention to the moment
of commencement of a style of thinking: the beginning, the decisive moment of
ἀλήθεια. Everything that follows from this is mere adequacy: hard intellectual
and manual work, no doubt, to ensure that reality is disclosed on the basis of this
grounding idea. Endless series of experiments will generate adequate statements
about reality, but ultimately, they aim to demonstrate the validity of a particular
way of thinking. The idea of an experiment as such is already grounded in the
conviction that we can produce reliable knowledge about nature by systematically
modifying and objectifying nature. The moment of ἀλήθεια has the character of
an epistemic leap, a moment of discontinuity. It is seeing and thinking at the same
time. All the rest merely amounts to working through. However, as the distance
between the starting point and the subsequent events increases, we become the
victims of forgetfulness: we forget how our way of thinking and perceiving is one
particular way of thinking and perceiving, obfuscating other possibilities. The
original moment (the epistemic leap or fall) gradually falls into oblivion, is no
longer open to reflection and contestation, until a new basic conviction emerges
that challenges it, perhaps resulting in a transvaluation of all values.
From where do these basic convictions, these decisive thoughts
originate? According to Heidegger, being itself invites us at a given moment to
discover and approach reality in a certain way. For example, he states that it is
not true that Greek (Apollonian) thinking destroyed the mythical (Dionysian)
style of thinking. The latter vanished from the scene because mythical nature
herself withdrew herself from us.19 The disconcerting experience that Pan was
dead, enabled a rational way of thinking to take advantage of the situation. On
the other hand, we are the ones who make this event possible by grasping the
“Es ist ein Vorurteil zu meinen, der µῦθος sei durch den λόγος zerstört worden. Das
Religiöse wird niemals durch die Logik zerstört, sondern immer nur dadurch, dass der
Gott sich entzieht” (Heidegger 1954, p. 7).
19
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opportunity provided. It is something which comes over us, overcomes us, but at
the same time it happens via us.
At a certain point, however, from a styles-of-thinking perspective at least,
Heidegger’s understanding of the relationship between science and art becomes
problematic. According to the styles-of-thinking approach, a particular style of
thinking will manifest itself in multiple cultural domains, simultaneously more or
less. These manifestations will mutually enhance and reinforce each other.
Moments of ἀλήθεια can loom up in different domains, also in the realm of
science. When Anthonie van Leeuwenhoek spots microbes and spermatozoa for
the first time through his microscope, an unknown world lights up, a window
looms up in front of him. According to Heidegger (1957) however, art plays a
privileged role here. Only artworks allow moment of ἀλήθεια to occur. The
artwork allows things to appear in a certain manner, reveals a world. Through the
artwork, a world is opened up, things are brought to the fore. In contrast to art,
science is a derivative phenomenon: the systematic development of a truth
already disclosed by art. Rembrandt’s Anatomical lesson of Dr. Nicolaes Tulp
(1632), for instance, should not be seen as a representation of anatomical
procedures, but as an artwork that makes this practice possible. Art reveals a
world for science to explore, while the latter is unable to accomplish this truth
event by itself. True art is a grounding of truth, a moment of commencement,
ahead of science. Science itself does not think, at least not in the genuine sense
of the term (Heidegger 1954, p. 4).
This view, which ascribes to art a more profound and original relationship
to truth, is at odds with a styles-of-thinking approach. According to the latter,
moments of ἀλήθεια may occur in various practices, in various cultural domains,
and research practices are emphatically included. When Charles Darwin reveals,
in The Origin of Species, that the natural world is a struggle, a struggle for
survival, while others were still describing nature as an idyllic environment, he
allowed the world to appear in a new light. He saw nature with very different
eyes, namely as struggle, and this new vision constituted the basis for an
impressive research program, which is still unfolding. The same experience
emerged in other domains. In art, romanticism gave way to realism (e.g. the
naturalistic novel). In politics, conflict and struggle were suddenly seen as
constituting the basic momentum of reality: struggle between individuals
(liberalism), between classes (socialism), between ethnic groups (racism).
Nietzsche likewise discovered that all reality is Will to Power. We cannot say that
art took the lead in this. The new experience of reality was articulated by various
“seismographs”, in multiple contexts, more or less simultaneously.
Thus, when Anthonie van Leeuwenhoek, with a self-made microscope,
spotted microorganisms in ditch water for the very first time, that was a moment
of ἀλήθεια. He did not merely represent what he saw (adequatio). He first had to
bring this new world out in the open, he had to create a window into a microbial
world. He still had to learn to see and portray this new-found objectivity, albeit
relying on technical instruments instead of on the naked eye. Due to this initiative,
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nature was allowed to manifest itself in a completely new way, as a microbial
planet. The beautiful drawings he produced of microorganisms are scientific
artworks, but we cannot say that the eyes or gaze of the artist preceded the eyes
of the scientist. Rather, we discern something like co-originality and proximity.
The artist and the scientist working side by side, as imaginative and inquisitive
individuals. In the novel Girl with a Pearl Earring, Tracy Chevalier (1999)
describes the friendship between Anthonie van Leeuwenhoek and Johannes
Vermeer. They lived in the same neighbourhood (a case of Nachbarschaft
between art and science) and shared their interest in optical experiments.
Chevalier describes how Vermeer uses a camera obscura to analyse colour and
light. Vermeer produced two paintings in which scientific practices are portrayed:
The Astronomer (1668) and The Geographer (1669). In both artworks, the focus
is on making the world accessible. The scientists involved, surrounded by
instruments, are extremely concentrated: they embody intentionality. The light
suggests that they are portrayed at the very the moment when they experience a
kind of revelation, seeing things with new eyes. These artworks portray ἀλήθεια.
It was probably Van Leeuwenhoek who posed for both portraits (Seymour 1964;
Schwartz 1966; Fink 1971; Hockney 2001), – proximity (Nachbarschaft)
between science and art.
While Van Leeuwenhoek and Vermeer were working on their optical
experiments, on the other side of the pond Isaac Newton was experiencing his
wonder year, his annus mirabilis, 1666, almost exactly at the same time. He too
designed experiments involving light, in the same manner as Vermeer more or
less, in accordance with the same basic conviction. Light (optics) was what these
three explorers had in common: a painter, a naturalist and a physicist. Their basic
rapport with light was quite comparable. They were intrigued by the same
phenomena, their intentionality converged. They used lenses and cameras to
modify and diffract light in various ways, analysing it, using it as a point of
entrance, a window into the real. Interestingly, Vermeer’s Geographer displays
a striking similarity with the famous etching of Faust by Rembrandt from 1692
(Wheelock et al., 1995, p. 174). Both works of art perpetuate moments when the
Faustian style of thinking seizes the researcher involved.
Chevalier describes the moment when the maid Griet, the main character
of the novel, stands face to face with the camera obscura as an artefact. Vermeer
invites her to look into the camera, to expose herself to this new way of seeing,
facilitated by optical techniques. “The camera obscura helps me to see in a
different way,” he explains. She accepts the invitation and he asks her what she
sees. Initially, she seems intimidated by this unknown and even perverse,
voyeuristic device. She suspects that it is part of a seduction strategy. The device
brings them, literally and figuratively, closer together. It is an initiation. The
device is indeed perverse and perverting, but in a literal, original sense. The image
that lights up in the camera, is an inverted world. Vermeer explains that what she
sees is an “image” of reality. The camera obscura makes it possible to manipulate
and analyse this image. “What is an image, sir? It is not a word I know” (p. 62).
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The new way of seeing is so new, so esoteric, that words like “lens”, “projection”
and “image” seem a secret language. The new view, with a strange new jargon
accompanying it, has not yet established itself, has not yet entered mainstream
discourse. Griet is not simply shown some images: she is initiated into a new way
of perceiving.
The microbiologist Van Leeuwenhoek and the artist Vermeer, both living
in Delft, were pioneers, their initiatives are equal-original. Vermeer is the Van
Leeuwenhoek of painting, Van Leeuwenhoek the Vermeer of biology.
Chevalier’s novel can be read as an extremely lucid and meticulous description
of the emergence of a new observational style in two different domains, natural
history and visual arts, in the 17th century. Vermeer’s studio is an alethotoop, a
truth site. Scientists and artists both use optical instruments, inviting or forcing
nature to manifest itself in a new way. A new reality appears on these pages and
paintings. They use the same techniques to make this event possible, but we
cannot say that Vermeer had a head start. There is like-mindedness, proximity
(Nachbarschaft), as congruent practices were flourishing in the Netherlands at
that time.
In his later essays about technology, Heidegger (1962) explicitly
concedes that technology is a power that discloses the Real. Moreover, he
emphasizes that technology should not be seen as mere application, as a
derivative of natural science, but that natural science is essentially and inherently
technical. For Heidegger, technology has primacy, which explains the Faustian
profile of the modern science, relying on technicity to overwhelm and completely
control the object. First manipulate, then observe. Without technology, scientific
experiments would be unthinkable. Van Leeuwenhoek’s research starts with
technology: the construction of the microscope. At the same time, however,
Heidegger argues that technology is an exploitative and impoverished style of
disclosure. Nature is reduced to raw materials: a resource, a standing reserve. Our
era is essentially technical, in other words: Faustian, so that we are at the mercy
of technical, Faustian thinking. We cannot realize a turn towards other ways of
bringing forth ourselves, we cannot decide to think differently: we do not have
the authority as it were. We have to wait for a fundamental turn (“Kehre”) when
a new possibility, a less violent (post-Faustian) relationship with the world
presents itself. We have to wait for a new style of thinking and acting, poetical
rather than technical. Quite in line with the styles-of-thinking concept, Heidegger
states that we cannot simply decide to create a new style.
Faustian natural sciences are inherently technical, but does that mean that
they exclusively and necessarily play an obfuscating role? Or can they play a
revelatory role as well? It should be noted, in this context, that Heidegger’s
position towards Spengler is an ambiguous one. He sees Decline of the West as
an elaboration of Nietzsche’s (Faustian) interpretation of being as will to power,
but criticises Spengler for seeing philosophy as one particular expression of the
Faustian spirit among others (architecture, art, science, etc.). And this, Heidegger
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considers an enslavement (“Verknechtung”) of philosophy, symptomatic of
contemporary (Faustian) civilisation (1930, p. 200).
The styles-of-thinking approach does not treat art as a privileged domain
compared to, say, politics, architecture or science. Moments of revelation occur
in other practices as well. And there is technicity in art as well. The moment of
ἀλήθεια which we discern in Vermeer’s artistic experiments, is intimately related
to the world-disclosing activities of Van Leeuwenhoek and Newton. After
Newton’s wonder-year, we see light with different eyes. The element or medium
that reveals everything else, that makes everything visible, assumes a different
role. Van Leeuwenhoek adds a whole new dimension to our world, namely the
microbial dimension, the realm of microbial existence. Similarly, a whole world
of light and space manifests itself in Vermeer’s artworks. These three technologydependent forms of world disclosure mutually elucidate and reinforce each other.
The same style, the same basic conviction speaks to us via these activities, in art,
natural history and optics. The optical instrument opens up and illuminates a new
world. Vermeer’s artistic practices are technology-driven. The style-of-thinking
concept removes Heidegger’s technophobic bias. As soon as we draw attention
to the context of discovery, we discover genuine moments of commencement in
multiple domains, not only in philosophy, and not only in art. While a younger
Vermeer still echoes a Magian experience of being in his artwork Christ in the
house of Martha and Maria (1655), with its diffuse colours and shapes, he
immortalises the Faustian experience of being in his highly accurate, detailed and
discrete artwork The Geographer. In these later works, he not only pays close
attention to technological contrivances and scientific instruments, such as the
compass and the globe, but he also uses scientific technologies to capture (quite
eloquently and convincingly) the style of thinking that is inherent in these
scientific practices, depicted in this work of art.
§ 6. A world of supra-human scale: the temporal dimension
The essence of the Copernican revolution is not the claim that Planet Earth
revolves around the sun, but the realisation that the size of the universe is
unimaginably and incomprehensibly large. Epistemic resistance (discontent in
heliocentrism) was primarily a response to the metaphysical implications of
Copernicus’ thesis. The same applies to another narcissistic offense the Faustian
worldview had in stall for us, as Sigmund Freud (1917/1942) phrases it, the
“second” Copernican revolution, this time emerging in the life sciences: Darwin’s
theory of evolution. Humans are not, as the Paradise story suggests, the crowning
glory of creation, but a temporary outcome of ongoing evolutionary processes:
an animal among animals. Here again, however, the disconcerting truth of
Darwin’s theory does not concern the thesis that, from an evolutionary viewpoint,
humans are naked apes. It may have become difficult for us to experience the
hesitation that seized Darwin and his contemporaries (and not exclusively his
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opponents). The unsettling insight was that Darwin’s theory of evolution can only
be true if nature has enormous expanses of time at her disposal. Like the
heliocentric revolution, the Darwinian revolution was accompanied by a dramatic
increase in scale, this time in the temporal realm. Darwin says it plainly; it is the
philosophical content of his work: nature is unimaginably large – “We
continually forget how large the world is” (1859/1985, p. 309).
For centuries it had been the experience of breeders that, although it is
possible to produce new varieties, we cannot change species. This experience was
extrapolated to nature as such, but where breeders work in time-spans of decades,
or centuries at most, the natural evolutionary process takes place on a different
scale, in a different time dimension – it takes millions of years to sculpt a new
species. The amounts of deep time that nature has at her disposal are
unimaginably large: “Nature grants vast periods of time for the work of natural
selection” (p. 147). They transcend the boundaries of human imagination. These
“incomprehensibly vast periods of time” (p. 293) were far beyond the traditional
temporal horizon. Our world is a world on supra-human scale. What Darwin tries
to impress upon his readers is that evolution is only thinkable if we realise that it
takes place in a completely different time zone than human time: “long intervals
of time”; “long lapses of time”; “vast intervals of time” (p. 299); “enormous
intervals of time” (p. 310); “very long periods, enormously long as measured by
years” (p. 437). This is the basic insight that seized Darwin during his intercontinental journey: “A man must for years examine for himself great piles of
superimposed strata, and watch the sea at work grinding down old rocks and
making fresh sediment, before he can hope to comprehend anything of the lapse
of time, the monuments of which we see around us…” (p. 294); “what time this
must have consumed!” (p. 295).
There is a second insight, no less Faustian, that made the idea of evolution
possible. When Darwin embarked on the H.M.S. Beagle, he was a theologian,
still inclined to discern harmony in nature. Upon returning home, he had learned
to view nature in a completely different way. When he wrote his book, he had
learned to see struggle, fierce competition and violence in nature.20 What he had
discovered was the proliferating urge of nature, expressing itself in competition,
reproductive drives, killing fields and bottle-neck survivals. Darwin’s book
introduces a new way of looking at nature. After some initial hesitation, his point
of view is adopted because it is timely, in accordance with the spirit of the time.
The spirit of competition is in the air, is everywhere. Political movements see
Darwin’s “realism” as a moral justification for their political ideology (Van den
Berg 1984). Capitalists and liberals were enthusiastic about Darwin, but Marxist
20
“We behold the face of nature bright with gladness, we often see superabundance of
food; we do not see, or we forget, that the birds which are idly singing round us mostly
live on insects or seeds, and are thus constantly destroying life; or we forget how largely
these songsters, or their eggs, or their nestlings, are destroyed by birds and beasts of
prey; we do not always bear in mind, that though food may be now superabundant, it is
not so in all seasons of each recurring year...” (1859/1985, p. 116).
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readers as well. Not only Marx and Engels themselves (the latter read Darwin’s
book shortly after it was published). The leading Marxist Karl Kautsky (1907)
explicitly pursued a synthesis of Marxism and Darwinism. He saw class struggle
as a continuation of the natural struggle between species. Darwin’s book also
became a source of inspiration and moral justification for capitalism: a
justification of a view of society based on social competition between individuals,
a struggle for social existence in which the favoured and privileged would
triumph, and rightly so.
National Socialism was also inspired by Darwin. In Mein Kampf, Adolf
Hitler likewise describes history as a struggle for life and death between ethnic
varieties of humans, and he wanted his fellow-Arians to become more aware of
this undeniable fact of history and nature. Bible Book Genesis now becomes a
tale of reproduction, proliferation and multiplication (off-springs that will
multiply until they become as numerous as stars in a desert sky), but also selection
and elimination: God as a breeder and destroyer of human varieties, carefully
selecting favoured strands while consciously eliminating others, as is indicated
by the subtitle of Darwin’s book, and we should notice its Biblical ring
(“Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life”). As was already
indicated, philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche articulated this same Faustian view
when he depicted human civilisation as a merciless, unscrupulous and tyrannical
proliferation, but also as an extremely creative and productive struggle.
§ 7. Faustian civilisation: the world according to Jules Verne
In terms of Oswald Spengler, Newton represents Faustian thinking as culture, a
small-scale phenomenon. Faustian civilization settled in Western metropolises in
the 18th and 19th century, proliferating from there into a global form of existence.
On the one hand, these cities were old strongholds of Gothic (early Faustian)
origin, now undergoing profound transformations and evolving into industrial
cities, such as Paris. On the other hand, we see the rise of new Faustian
metropolises, new urban centres such as Liverpool and Manchester, meticulously
depicted my Friedrich Engels (1845/1962) in his The Condition of the Working
Classes: materialisations of the Faustian principle, monstrous cities that embody
mobility, expansion, productivity, social disruption and massive pollution. At that
point in time we are really entering the Faustian era of mobilization and
globalization. The grounding, enabling condition of this process is the emergence
of the Faustian, fossil-fuelled machine. And the author who saw and expressed
this as no other, Sloterdijk (1999, p. 836 ff.; p. 895) argues, was the hyperproductive novelist who devoted a large part of his extensive oeuvre (92 novels)
to machines and their world-disclosing, globalising and mobilising impact: Jules
Verne. The motto of the anti-imperialist machine builder Nemo concisely
summarises the Faustian experience: Mobilis in Mobili, mobile amidst mobility.
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According to Sloterdijk, this is the epochal formula which captures the essence
of an entire era in words (1999, p. 895).
Jules Verne (1828 - 1905) is an author whose oeuvre entails a systematic
analysis of Faustian civilization. He is sometimes discarded as an author of
children’s books, which is partly the result of adaptations to which his novels
were subjected, although it may also be due to the fact that in his books the
psychological dimension is sometimes underdeveloped. As psychologists of
bourgeois mentality, contemporaries such as Tolstoy (1828 - 1910) and Ibsen
(1828-1906) clearly outcompete him, but Verne is pre-eminently the author who
turned the Faustian machine into a literary subject. His novels revolve around
machines and closely related phenomena such as industry, metropolises,
technoscience and the mentality of the engineer.
Novels by Jules Verne are set in two types of locations. Start and finish
are situated in large industrial centres, in Faustian cities: Liverpool, London,
Paris, Hamburg, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore or San Francisco, large-scale
constellations of labour and capital during the second half of the 19th century.
From there, journeys of adventure are organised into unexplored areas: polar
regions, obscure places in Africa or South America, or even towards the Moon.
In this mobility drive (this urge to explore new forms of mobility across rivers
and oceans, through the air, or even into space) the Faustian desire for expansion
manifests itself. Heroes visit formerly inaccessible and uninhabitable locations
that become accessible and habitable thanks to ships, submarines and airplanes,
thanks to Faustian machines. Verne is fascinated by new forms of energy that
begin to attract a lot of attention in his time: electricity first and foremost.
Verne is the photographic negative of his contemporaries Tolstoy and
Ibsen as it were. In The Lady from the Sea (Fruen fra havet), Ibsen describes how
the unapproachable Norwegian fjords coast is made accessible for tourism by
English steamships: δεινός (tremendous) on the outside, but extremely
comfortable (with bar facilities etc.) on the inside (Zwart 2015a). In his novel
Anna Karenina, Tolstoy likewise describes how Russia is opened-up by the steam
trains that suddenly connect cities such as Moscow and Saint Petersburg. This is
a genuine Verne-novel theme: the train as a Faustian machine (both frightening
and comfortable) that makes completely new forms of mobility possible. This
train is the Α and Ω of Tolstoy’s masterpiece, the starting and ending point of the
story, for the novel begins and ends with the arrival of a train in a train station.
The novel itself, however, is largely devoted to the psychology of modern
marriage, not something Verne was very much concerned with, – although there
are some marriage scenes in some of his novels, such as Kéraban the Inflexible
(1883), a novel about a Black Sea journey, which includes a narrative about a
recently divorced Dutchman.
Something similar applies to Ibsen’s dramas. Arrival and departure of a
Faustian steamship in a Norwegian coastal town is the start and end point of a
play that deals primarily with marital psychology. Verne’s novels are
complementary to this setup. He also describes Victorian couples, but marriage
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psychology is not his greatest talent. Although his novels start and end with
relational problems (deferred engagements, unhappy marriages, etc.), the true
protagonists of his novels are invariably machines. And he usually prefers
celibate men as a crew. Tolstoy expresses fear of the machine. There is fear in
Verne’s books as well, but this fear neither applies to machines nor to women, it
applies to marriage as such: not misogyny but misogamy (Moré 1963).
Prior to the arrival of the machine, journeying through Europe was slow,
time-consuming, laborious and uncomfortable. Thanks to steam trains and
steamboats, it becomes possible to travel around the world in eighty days,
provided the subject is prepared to accommodate his style of thinking, his
experience of time and space to the logic of the machine. In Tolstoy, the demonic
aspect of the machine is the dominant aspect. The train makes the liaison between
Anna and Vronsky possible, but it is first and foremost the monster that destroys
the heroine’s life. We do find this ambivalence in Verne as well. Although
enthusiasm for the machine is dominant, there is a recessive dimension. Verne
does have an eye for the demonic, sinister side. Primarily, he emphasizes that
machines increase mobility, making life more comfortable, enabling
unprecedented forms of transport, but the Faustian aspect of technology also
gives rise to disruption and pollution (Zwart 2005c).
Verne devoted a novel to a mobile machine that he himself got to know,
the Great Eastern, a giant steamship with the dimensions of a floating city that
brought him to the United States (Verne 1871). A sublime machine, also called
Leviathan: immensely large and sophisticated, a ship of oceanic dimensions, that
moved across the oceans with majestic calmness. A fascinating, but also
monstrous phenomenon that literally destroys human lives. Crew members are
killed by the machine and the Faustian creator of this industrial
Gesamtkunstwerk, Isambard Kingdom Brunel, dies of exhaustion a few days
before the first voyage. A mega design, δεινός in all respects, a “metal mountain”,
a “steel mass”, a “mysterious power”, a “floating city”, built to connect
metropolises (Liverpool, New York) and continents (Europe, America) with each
other, transporting thousands of passengers to colonize the frontiers of the
Faustian empire, but also laying transatlantic telegraph cables on ocean bottoms.
A vessel that is more powerful than humans. “I thought machines were made to
serve people,” Verne writes, “but the reverse turns out to be the case.” An
immeasurable yard, a whole army of workmen is needed to manufacture this
machine in Liverpool. It is a synthesis of heavy industry (engine rooms) and
Victorian comfort (a palace-like hotel): an archetypal Faustian machine, the
embodiment of energy and restlessness. In New York, Verne continues his
journey in a comfortable steamship that travels up the Hudson River, a mobile
hotel that visits the land where the heroes of Fenimore Cooper (1826/1992) had
roamed through “impervious forests” on foot, not that long ago.
Verne’s ambivalence towards machines must also be understood in the
context of his relationship with Jules Hetzel, his publisher, whose social program,
in which science and technology played a decisive role in propagating progress,
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was waiting for a workaholic like Jules Verne to exploit. Indeed, “Progrès” was
his key signifier, and Verne was exactly the author he needed. This workhorse,
mercilessly exploited by his liberal and progressive publisher, was forced to
produce two books a year (92 in total), while Hetzel received most of the
revenues. In an early novel about the city and the machine, set in Paris in 1960,
Verne had wanted to reveal the threatening, apocalyptic, dystopian aspects of
modern industrialism (1863/1994), – featuring a main character named Michel
who frantically searches for literature in a world where only books about science
and technology can be found – but this manuscript was resolutely rejected by
Hetzel. In the 1860s, he persuaded Verne to emphasize the progressive aspects of
machines, although the shadow side was never completely absent. After Hetzel’s
death, there is a striking change of mood. Verne becomes a gloomy, pessimistic
author who primarily perceives science and technology as a merciless threat to
human happiness and global ecology. But if we read his books carefully, this
aspect was always there.
§ 8. Experiments on a grander scale
In the ninety or so novels that Verne produced, most of them entitled
Extraordinary Voyages, a Faustian design can consistently be discerned. All these
novels are structured like an experiment. The journey to the moon is literally
described as an “experiment” without precedent.21 The crew members of the
moon capsule are research subjects themselves, while test animals are also on
board (a dog dies during one of the tests). The lunar journey is not only an
experiment, but also makes a large number of experiments possible, for example
concerning weightlessness. The occupants spend an important part of their time
experimenting and carefully record their findings in a scientific notebook.22
Technology creates ideal conditions for lunar science. It enables this team of
researchers to study the moon very closely, from nearby. The moon capsule is an
artefact that makes whole new forms of scientific inquiry possible, enabling the
emergence of a completely new form of scientific experience. It is a machine that
makes a (previously inaccessible) dimension of reality accessible. The pioneers
not only design and build but also inhabit their voyaging optic instrument (their
voyager). Human existence used to be relatively rural and static, taking place
within one dimension, namely on earth. In Verne’s novels, engineers develop
machines that open-up new dimensions and mobilise humanity, represented by
an avant-garde of scientifically trained or autodidactic pioneers. Faustian
machines make sea, air and space accessible, but the same applies to underground
21
“Une tentative scientifique sans précédent dans les annales de la science” (Verne
1870, p. 1).
22
“Ils passaient leur temps à faire des expériences” (Verne 1870, p. 210).
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depths: caves and corridors become accessible to humans, as well as apparently
inaccessible areas in the heart of darkness, the most interior regions of Africa.
The typical Verne machine is a dynamical machine. Most of these
machines are themselves constantly in motion. They are manned mobile
observatories and laboratories, that make innovative research possible.
Researchers imprison themselves in their instruments, and this is how they then
embark on a long, adventurous journey. Scientists are not only the ingenious
developers of these machines, but also the ones who (with a truly Faustian
contempt for lethal dangers) expose themselves to series of novel experiences
that become possible, thanks to these machines. The experiment takes the form
of a journey and the machine that makes the new research practice possible is
usually a vessel (a submarine, a hot air balloon, an aircraft, a rocket). The basic
mood, the basic attitude towards science is enthusiasm, but Faustian desire and
anxiety always play a role, such as fear of Faustian landscapes: cold, dark
emptiness, abiotic nothingness, apparently uninhabitable. Several of his books
are set close to or even beyond the polar circle. In Verne novels, there are always
moments when scientific travellers find themselves in frightening isolation,
trapped in a void, in abiotic darkness, where even Genesis never dawned. “No
living creature animated this vast, dead loneliness,” as Verne phrases it in Hector
Servadac, a story about an incredible space journey (1877a, p. 200).
Science is present in Verne’s stories in two ways. On the one hand,
science makes the experience possible. On the other hand, science is made
possible. To give an example: the journey to the moon is made possible by
ballistics, – a Faustian science par excellence, allowing experts to calculate
exactly how artillery can exterminate as many victims as possible. This same
science can also determine the exact speed the capsule must have to leave Planet
Earth, and which orbit it must describe to reach its goal (the moon) at a specific
point in time. Once the capsule has been launched,
however, a new type of scientific practice becomes
possible, a new form of selenography (moon
cartography). Until then, the moon’s surface had to
be studied and mapped from a distance. Gigantic
telescopes on mountain tops could only partly bridge
the distance between earth and moon. Thanks to
ballistics, the moon can now be approached up to a
few kilometres and the moon’s surface can be
examined very closely and carefully, and from a
comfortable position, because these protoastronauts still look like gentlemen in their Victorian
study. A new form of scientific experience is made
possible. It becomes possible to check mainstream
orographic insights regarding the surface of the
moon and to improve them drastically on the spot if necessary. There are no
authorities for these travelling experts. A more reliable way of observing is
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suddenly practiced, resulting in a more reliable lunar map. The Mappa
Selenographica by De Beer and Moedler from 1830 can be drastically adjusted
thanks to the moon voyage. Ideal conditions (unprecedented physical proximity)
make extreme and unprecedented levels of precision possible. Faustian science
forces itself upon the object. Respectful distance is no longer an issue.
On the one hand, a considerable amount of scientific knowledge and
technical expertise is required to construct Captain Nemo’s Nautilus in Twentythousand Leagues under the Sea (1870). On the other hand, thanks to this
wonderful underwater observatory, new forms of scientific research are possible,
not only in physics, but also in oceanography, marine zoology and archaeology.
Pneumatic knowledge is needed to construct the balloon with which Samuel
Ferguson and his fellow passengers hover over Africa for five weeks, but the
balloon also makes new and more reliable geographical explorations possible.
Thanks to machines (trains, submarines, balloons), humans can observe their
scientific objects more or less directly, from a close distance, with the naked eye
or from behind a screen. These machines are windows into formerly inaccessible
environments, even into the past. Thanks to these machines, the researchers are
able to go “to the things themselves”, as it were. The balloon is both a means of
transport and an observatory: “And the map of Africa is unfolding beneath our
feet” (1863/1992, p. 25). The traditional method of practicing cartography
(exploration on foot) is not only slow, dangerous and uncomfortable, but also
provides less reliable information. Such explorers were swallowed by their object
as it were. Machines makes it possible to optimise the geographic observations
of Burton, Speke and other explorers. In the trip to the North Pole, which Verne
(1866) describes in The Adventures of Captain Hatteras, a new type of scientific
enquiry becomes possible: meteorological and physical research at extremely low
temperatures. Doctor Clawbonny (the scientist on board) describes the polar
regions as “a vast laboratory” where unique and groundbreaking research under
low temperatures can be performed (1866, p. 80).
Around the World in Eighty Days (1873) is likewise an experiment.
Thanks to new Faustian machines (e.g. steam trains and steamboats), it should
theoretically be possible to describe an orbit across the earth’s surface and to
return to the place of departure within exactly eighty days. The question is to what
extent such calculations comply with the practice of Faustian transport. To what
extent do mathematical calculations correspond to physical reality? Can
correspondence be ensured between Faustian thinking and the real world? The
usual view is that “in practice” such a journey will inevitably take more time, due
to so-called “unforeseen circumstances”, but perhaps these can now be reckoned
with as well? Phileas Fogg wants to prove that what is theoretically possible is
also practically feasible, provided that the person involved knows how to behave
like a clockwork or calculator himself, remaining totally indifferent to scenic,
cultural, touristic and erotic attractions. Does time really take as long as we think,
based on mathematical calculations? If we travel long distance at a high speed,
do we indeed arrive exactly on time?
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The outcome of this experiment (somewhat surprisingly perhaps) is that
time is relative, to some extent: time depends on movement, on the mobility of
the observer. Mobility is bound to have an impact on time. Whoever travels long
distances, by making a journey around the globe for instance, in an Eastward
direction, will win 24 hours upon returning home. In The ABC of Relativity,
Bertrand Russell (1925/1969) describes an experiment with two clocks on two
trains that move away from each other at very high speed. The time measurements
will inevitably deviate. This intuition, that new forms of mobility and speed have
an impact on time perception, forms the basis of Verne’s novel, decades before
Einstein came up with this idea. The art of novel writing precedes science.
Thus, the machines designed and manned by Verne’s scientific heroes
are mobile laboratories for conducting experiments, epistemological devices that
make it possible to practice science under optimal conditions. Those involved
constantly carry out observations, while continuously taking notes. Thanks to
Nemo’s submarine, Professor Aronnax has to completely revise the
oceanographic monograph with which he made a name as a scientist. He recovers
from his mid-life crisis, caused by epistemic stagnation, as mainstream
oceanography had reached its limits. Finally, he is able to provide more reliable
information.23 To make genuine progress, we have to submerge ourselves, using
the submarine as a window into the world of marine phenomena. Before joining
the hunt for the Nautilus, Aronnax had experienced epistemological malaise. He
had been wasting his time, giving interviews and offering advice. Thanks to
Nemo’s submarine, he is able to make an epistemological leap, to revolutionise
his field, lift it to a higher plateau, a more comprehensive level of performance.
The Nautilus enforces an epistemic breakthrough. Aronnax no longer needs to
study the deep sea from a great distance, on the basis of sparse and questionable
data, he can now study living nature alive, vis-à-vis as it were, as a living
laboratory, from behind a floating screen, inside a technological eye that allows
him to see in the dark. Thanks to the journey, he is able to publish a scientific
bestseller. The submarine, this ingenious artefact, makes a more advanced and
reliable form of scientific research possible because it opens up a new dimension
for experience and mobility. Nemo’s Nautilus is like a manned and floating optic
instrument, an artificial body, manned by Nemo as a Faustian homunculus.
In Journey to the Centre of the Earth (1864), semiotics (cryptology)
enables scientific travellers to decipher an alchemical cryptogram, while geology
and mineralogy show them the way through the dark interior of Planet Earth.
These sciences make new experiences possible in areas such as evolution theory,
speleology and palaeontology. The main characters want to experimentally prove
the validity of Humphry Davy’s theory, who claimed that the interior of the earth
consists of cavities. They discover lost worlds, inhabited by prehistoric life forms,
that once existed on the terrestrial surface, but became extinct millions of years
ago. They spot plants and animals that were replaced by other life forms. These
23
“J'avais maintenant le droit d’écrire le vrai livre de la mer” (1870, p. 420).
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travellers can directly witness distant phases in the history of evolution, frozen as
it were, with the naked eye. Their journey through the interior of Planet Earth is
in fact a journey back in time, upstream evolutionary history, an introductory
course into palaeontology. An extinguished Jurassic world is preserved in a cavelike time capsule, an underground theatre or cinema, where a Jurassic opera is
unfolding: strange sounds, strange actors, against the backdrop of a strange décor,
– a genre taken up later by authors such as Arthur Conan Doyle (1912) and
Michael Crichton (1990/1991; 1995/2002). Verne’s lively descriptions of the
battles among huge, voracious monsters set a model for these later writers. Under
extreme circumstances, in far-off, isolated, inaccessible places, evolution follows
different pathways, or was even put on hold. And then, all of a sudden, the spell
is broken and the travellers are back on earth.
We find similar “regressions”, similar journeys backward in time, in
several other Jules Verne novels. Besides anticipating the emerging future, they
also allow us to explore the past. On the one hand, Verne’s heroes use advanced
vehicles (fast and comfortable trains, helicopters, luxurious cruise ships), but in
novels such as The Courier of the Czar (1876), we notice a steady regression, in
the sense that the mobility becomes increasingly pre-Faustian, until the
protagonist walks on foot again, struggling through limitless plains, the Russian
arch-symbol (Spengler) – a landscape abandoned by machines.
§ 9. Staffing and anxiety
Verne’s mobile machines are staffed by Faustian types: an engineer, a worker, a
journalist, a banker’s son. Typically, there are three crew members aboard the
machine: the scientist who designed the experiment, his dedicated assistant, and
a critical reviewer, a sceptic who vehemently refuses to believe in the feasibility
of the experiment and who can only be convinced by finding his disbelief
experimentally refuted. He is invited to attend the experiment in person. This will
put a stop to his criticism. And then there is the general public: newspaper readers,
who enthusiastically become acquainted with the set-up of the test and who
respond with massive enthusiasm when the scientific travellers return safely:
well-fed and in good health, ready to publish their report. A Verne voyage results
in a sensational scientific bestseller – a Verne novel.
We find this division of roles in Robur the Conqueror (1886), for
instance. The novel describes an experiment designed to settle an interminable
dispute between two scientific principles. The question is whether the future of
aviation will be based on the principle “Lighter than air” (balloons) or on the
competing principle “Heavier than air” (helicopters and other types of aircraft).
Robur kidnaps two critics and forces them to witness, against their will, on board
his vehicle, how the experiment settles the dispute to his advantage. “What is this
series of tests we have to take part in?”, they exclaim (1886, p. 86). In other
novels, the scientist is actually the sceptic who, together with his faithful
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assistant, is taken on board by a scientific genius, as happens in Twenty Thousand
Leagues under de Sea (1870), where genius Nemo forces his guest – Professor
Aronnax, the most renowned naturalist and oceanographer of his time – into the
role of student. The professor becomes a pupil. Nemo shows him the epistemic
limitations of mainstream science. His ingenious machine makes it possible to
practice various branches of research under optimal conditions. Nemo has long
solved all the major issues that leading scientists are still discussing, and he’s in
need of an elite audience, reduced to a minimum, consisting of one single expert,
accompanied by a faithful servant and a brawny whaler. At the same time, he has
no need to publish his results. The genius doesn’t need recognition, doesn’t have
to defend his insights before the scientific forum. This Faustian Übermensch is
driven by contempt for formal academic reviews, with the exception of Aronnax
perhaps, the most talented and broad-minded of them all, but still handicapped
by the obvious limitations of university research. Whoever wants to study the
oceans must leave urban scholarly environments such as Paris behind, and dive
into the ocean as a living lab.
In Journey to the Centre of the Earth (1864), the main characters discover
how monstrous life forms from bygone eras managed to survive in the earth’s
crust, in a protected environment: a gigantic, womb-like cavity. It is the first
paleontological monster novel, the first dinosaur novel. Two monsters fight each
other: a struggle for life and death. The monster archetype is omnipresent in
Verne. We find various monsters in Twenty Thousand Leagues under de Sea
(1870). First of all, the submarine itself is considered a deep-sea monster. Later,
the people on board come face to face with an octopus, a school of sperm whales,
a giant shell and other deep-sea marvels. The monstrous is always there. In other
novels (1865; 1866; 1877a), protagonists play with monstrous, astronomical
numbers. Scientists enter into a discussion about the weight of planets until
laypersons witnessing them finally exclaim that such numbers are beyond human
comprehension (1866, p. 218). In the lunar voyage (1865) we find similar
versions of this typical scene and in Hector Servadac (1877a), the travelling
companions are literally made mellow by astronomer Rosette’s explanations
bulging with astronomical numbers. Rosette provides a quick course in Faustian
astronomy, lecturing on periodic and non-periodic comets, on chances and risks
of anyone travelling through space, on the history of astronomy and on the
likelihood of the Earth and a comet colliding (1: 281 million). Rosette calculates
during the day, while making acute observations at night. In short, we are dealing
with a scholar who knows how to create optimal conditions for his science, even
under the most unlikely circumstances, who feels perfectly at home among the
most intimidating phenomena, thanks to his fluency in the mathematics of
astronomical numbers. His mathematical skills allow him to decipher cosmic
datasets as if they were a Rosetta Stone. His lectures culminate in expositions
about trillions, quadrillions and sextillions: “The earth weighs six quadrillion
kilograms, a 25-digit number, the sun 2 quintillion, a 31-digit number, Jupiter,
2000 quadrillion kilograms, 28 digits…” – in short: Faustian mathematics.
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The South Pole is the archetype of an immense, silent, freezing,
unapproachable mother. The Faustian desire to conquer this mother is what keeps
the Nautilus moving (like an electric sperm cell) en route through the world’s
oceans. Once the target is reached, she threatens to choke the Nautilus and
swallow it. Blue veins are visible on her spotless white skin. The people on board,
trapped in her icy embrace, run out of breath, of oxygen. In the last moment, they
manage to escape from this claustrophobic intimacy. In the capsule in which the
journey to the moon is made, fired by a giant, phallic cannon, we likewise
recognize a spermatozoon, on its way to a celestial, maternal body, emphatically
and repeatedly referred to as “mother”.
In The Black Indies, about mining in Scotland, the mine is “the corpse of
a pre-worldly monster” (1877b, p. 15), but also an immense maternal body. Mine
corridors are veins. Thanks to the safety lamp, an invention by Humphry Davy,
the mine has become accessible for human presence, even resulting in habitation
and migration. An underground city has evolved. The experimental moment
occurs when a girl, who has spent her entire life in this unworldly environment,
is suddenly exposed to normal conditions (daylight, sea air, urban sights) so that
her supervisors can experimentally determine how her body, her sense organs,
her mental mood, respond to all this. She is consistently presented as a research
subject, whose behaviour is closely monitored.
The Begum’s Fortune (1879) describes a monstrous industrial city that is
developing at an explosive pace, seriously polluting the environment. It is
structured like a panopticon, around a “cyclopean” central construction, from
where the evil genius Schultze permanently monitors the human resources put to
work in his perfectly organised metropolis. His ingenious experiment falters in
the end because one of his heavy bombs explodes prematurely, causing him to
freeze to death on the spot, resulting in the inevitable collapse of the monster city.
Industrialization and nationalist collisions (e.g. between France and Germany)
are converging dimensions of the Faustian process. In an age of nation-building
and expansion, industrialisation inevitably results in large-scale conflicts, armed
confrontations between modern states, and massive killings.
Scientists are heroes in Verne’s novels, but they do have a sinister side.
Technology always casts its destructive shadow. Scientists know how to survive
under extremely difficult circumstances, thanks to their courage, imagination and
expertise, but also their accuracy and reliability. Scientific research is a moral
vocation. Precision, reliability and disinterestedness (never taking their own petty
interests into the equation), those are decisive scientific virtues. The Adventures
of three Russians and three Englishmen in South Africa (1872) emphasises the
extreme precision and meticulousness which persevering scientists manage to
preserve under extreme circumstances, but the collateral damage is immense.
Machines are never an unequivocally liberating force in Verne’s books.
They open up new dimensions for human mobility, for migration and
colonisation, but this usually results in confinement in quasi-monastic research
institutes, where life is spent in celibacy. This is related to Verne’s personal
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situation. Like his heroes, he led a comfortable and well-nourished life in a
lifeworld of limited size, a room where he toiled on his interminable series of
books, day after day. His imagination made him quasi-mobile, but in the end his
heroes end up living in cells remarkably similar to Verne’s own office: a camera
obscura, a cave dwelling in which a workaholic spent his days and nights, as a
manuscript spitting machine.
Besides enthusiasm for science, archetypal anxieties also play a role: fear
of abandonment, claustrophobia, fear of monsters and explosions. Notably, we
notice fear for the astronomical expanses of the Faustian universe, for the utterly
dark, extremely cold, abiotic nothingness that extends beyond our comfortable,
but extremely small and vulnerable terrestrial environment. Verne’s work echoes
Pascal’s aphorism: “The eternal silence of these infinite spaces terrifies me”
(Compère 1991). The mobile machine is a homely microcosm, a temporary
dwelling, a technological cell in the middle of an inclement environment.
Eventually, the machine collapses and supreme nature again takes possession of
an abandoned landscape.
Not only the immensities of the natural environment are threatening. In
the background, an additional threat is unmistakably noticeable, the looming
threat of a massive, violent clash of competing political powers. Their Will to
Power will take possession of continents, but also of scientific achievements.
Scientists will be expropriated in the context of a global arms race. In Verne’s
novels, scientists manage to overstep nationalistic sentiments of envy and
competition by working together. In Facing the Flag (1896), a honest scientist
knows how to prevent a superbomb, developed by a scientific genius, from falling
into the wrong hands, realising that avoiding the inevitable catastrophe will only
be a temporary triumph. Anxiety and unease emphasise the Faustian ambiance
surrounding the technological works of art produced by Verne’s engineers. It is
truly remarkable that Nietzsche and Verne were contemporaries, and that
Nietzsche (born in 1844) was actually so much younger than Verne (born in
1828). Although allegedly a Faustian thinker, coining the adage “Will to Power”,
Nietzsche shunned industrial centres and preferred to dwell in tourist resorts
while rereading ancient Greek texts. Verne analyses precisely those dimensions
that are remarkably underrepresented in Nietzsche’s writings, where the Will to
Power seems to feel most at home: technology, labour, industrialisation. There is
an obvious link between Nietzsche’s aversion towards Gothic, late medieval
monastic culture and his aversion towards the world of the Faustian machine, as
the real embodiment of Faustian power.
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Chapter 5. Apollonian, Magian and Faustian thinking: a
comparative diagnostic
Each style of thinking builds on its own guiding idea, which realises itself in
multiple cultural domains. In the preceding chapters we have outlined the profile
of three styles of thinking. The focus was primarily on the initial moment of
commencement, the “birth of”, the original articulation. In this chapter we opt for
a comparative approach. We will indicate how the three styles actually take
shape. Next, we will focus on how these styles of thinking affect our basic
categories of time, space, causality, subjectivity and objectivity. Finally, we will
return to the beginnings (“vade retro”), to specific moments and locations where
the genesis of a particular style first came to express itself. Following Peter
Sloterdijk (2004), we will analyse these locations as “alethotopes” (ἀληθής +
τόπος), places where fundamental insights were articulated for the first time.
§ 1. Domains of thinking (1): research
Mathematics – Mathematics is considered the “first science”, for it expresses, in
an abstract manner, the experience of time and space entailed in a particular style
of thinking. According to Spengler, we cannot meaningfully speak about the
history of mathematics. The Apollonian number concept differs decisively from
Magian conceptions, and Magian conceptions from Faustian ones. A mutual
comparison reveals the contrast between these styles: a confrontation between
incompatible forms of mathematics.
In archaic or mythical thinking, mathematics is closely linked with
rituals. The mythical number is an ordinal number, indicating a sequence, a
ranking, an arrangement. Geometric patterns play an important role in the staging
of ritual scenes. Mythical thinking distinguishes sacred and profane, female and
male numbers. The number seven is sacred, e.g. the seven Sages who were
involved in the mythical beginnings of Apollonian thought. In very early
Apollonian thinkers (such as Pythagoras), such mythical elements still play an
undeniable role.
In Mesopotamia and Egypt, practical forms of mathematics were
developed, practices of calculation and measurement, involving practical skills
and techniques, suitable for solving specific issues, such as questions of
distribution in the context of agriculture or inheritance (Boyer 1968). This
mathematics supported administrative practices such as taxation and land
distribution. The first truly scientific form of mathematics was Apollonian
(Euclidian) geometry.
Apollonian mathematics is essentially geometry. It does not use numbers,
but letters from the Greek alphabet. Mathematics analyses the properties and
proportionalities of perfect geometric shapes, it is a systematic logic of ideal
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proportions, with the regular polyhedrons and spheres as highlights of perfection.
Regular polyhedrons are therefore discussed in the crowning chapter (Chapter
XIII) of Euclid’s Elements, the handbook of Apollonian geometry. Apollonian
mathematics, like Apollonian ethics, thinks in terms of right measure and
proportionality. Apollonian acoustics investigates optimal harmonic proportions.
Apollonian mathematics only works with natural integers. The limitless, the
infinite is anxiously avoided. The irrational number (the infinite decimal
fraction), such as the perplexing number √2, formed an impregnable obstacle for
Apollonian number thinking. There is a deep metaphysical fear of the infinite, the
Dionysian abyss of limitlessness. It is no coincidence that Dionysian thinking was
fascinated by the non-harmonic, the rhythms of intoxication.
The Apollonian nature of ancient Greek mathematics is also its
weakness. Apollonian mathematics is not based on practical experience, but on
rigorous demonstration. The mathematical proof (Q.E.D.) is an Apollonian
invention. At a certain point, however, Apollonian geometry appears to be
complete. Once the properties of perfect three-dimensional figures have been
exhaustively described, the end has been reached. Apollonian geometry itself
assumes a spherical shape: a closed system of limited size. It will not expand
endlessly, for example by developing new number types. That explains why the
Greeks, as Dijksterhuis phrases it, were unable to further develop a realm of
inquiry “which they had for the most part created themselves, and for which they
had demonstrated an exceptional talent” (1950/1989, p. 54). The Greeks were
able to count, of course, but this was not regarded as genuine science: it was not
something that befitted gentlemen. Making calculations was manual labour, slave
labour, and was called logistics, a practical skill, a technique, something for
Servants, not for Masters to pursue, and it was not seen as resulting in genuine
knowledge. The use of letters as numbers impeded the development of their
mathematical skills, and also deprived the Apollonian Greeks of the possibility
to work with indeterminate numbers, for which we employ letters (a, b, c; x, y,
z). The Greeks, according to Dijksterhuis, were curtailed by their lack of interest
in practical applicability. They were not interested in addressing concrete
problems arising from handling practical issues, from hands-on interaction with
reality, so that they never got to study change mathematically. This lack of
attention to practical issues aligns with the Apollonian aversion of the ephemeral
and the diffuse.
Hellenistic Greek algebra, developed in the metropolis Alexandria, was
of a completely different nature. It was Magian mathematics: number mysticism,
basically. Algebra, an important product of Magian thinking, began its career as
an auxiliary pursuit in service of astrology and numerology – deciphering the
movements of heavenly bodies or canonical texts. Number relationships were
used to decipher hidden messages in sacred scriptures, or to predict the future on
the basis of the apparently meaningless constellations and apparently erratic
movements of planets. The Magian number is a mystical number, but it may also
be a chronological number, the numbered year, where certain years acquire
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special significance. A recent revival of this was the anxiety which spread when
the year 2000 was approaching, an event (the end of an aeon) which was notably
expected to create havoc in computers and computer networks around the world:
a mild version of similar anxieties which arose in a late-Magian ambiance when
the year 1000 was at hand. Important inventions of Magian thinking are the
abacus and the calendar. Magian thinking expresses the age of the cosmos in
terms of millennia, and wants to capture the beginning and end of the world in a
number, starting from a symbolic event, such as the founding of a city, and ending
in a cataclysm. This type of algebra is basically number mysticism, while Magian
astronomy is basically astrology, and Magian chemistry basically alchemy.
Metaphysics becomes theology. Thinking means: ascending and spiralling
towards the sublime.
Faustian mathematics is emphatically non-Euclidean. The core concept
of Faustian mathematics is the function, which expresses a dynamical
relationship, evolving over time, between variable quantities over which the
researcher aims to acquire full control, supported by the function concept. By
modifying the independent variable (along the X-axis), he is able to influence the
dependent variable (a score along the Y-axis). By reducing the emission of
greenhouse gases such as CO2, climate change may be controlled through geoengineering. Faustian thinking is convinced that it is us who determine the
climate on earth. This leads to an enormous expansion of the function of
conscience: we humans, equipped with mathematical equations, are suddenly
responsible for everything that happens.
Faustian mathematics produced entirely new number types, or rather:
number worlds, such as negative and irrational number, exponential numbers and
logarithmic numbers. First and foremost, however, Faustian mathematics is
fascinated and obsessed with astronomical numbers: unimaginably large,
reflecting the unimaginable depth and vastness of a Faustian universe. To that
end, non-Euclidean geometry was created. This fascination for the unimaginably
large is complemented by a similar fascination for the extremely small.
Descartes developed a new form of geometry based on a non-Euclidean
element: the point. What he described was a number world instead of a world of
bodies. Apollonian mathematics repressed infinity, but Faustian mathematics
discerns infinity everywhere, also in the inter-spaces between numbers. Until
then, there had only been one number between 1 and 3, but for Faustian thinking,
the number of numbers between the numbers 1 and 3 is infinitely large. Faustian
mathematics is pre-eminently a mathematics of extremely large or extremely
small numbers. Leibniz called his infinitesimal calculation a mathematical
microscope. It is an active form of mathematics which thinks in terms of
operations, transformations, functions and projections. The Faustian number
expresses an interaction, a dynamical relationship. In the end, Faustian
mathematics results in a hyper-complex and hyper-abstract form of thinking,
giving rise to astonishingly complex number worlds or numberscapes.
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Apollonian mathematics was practiced in broad daylight. Faustian
mathematics is preferably practiced at night. Faustian mathematics transcended
the confines of Apollonian spherical thinking. The Faustian universe is infinite,
and, as Spengler rightly emphasizes, the infinite was already discovered in the
so-called Middle Ages, by Cusanus and others. Cusanus already understood that
a circle with an infinitely large radius is an infinite straight line, and the same
goes for a triangle with an angle of 180 degrees.
The Faustian sense of scale, distance and time also results in accurate
clock-works. Thomas Aquinas already discusses the clockworks (horologia) of
his era (1922, Pars 1a2ae Q XIII 2). The concept of function describes changes
over time, and often requires the use of a clock. The physical experiment studies
change. The boundless, expanding, icy universe is the primordial symbol of
Faustian thinking, according to Spengler. Fundamental Faustian concepts are
power and energy. The Faustian world is a religious world, moreover, and the
Faustian God is an omnipotent sovereign. Prominent Faustian mathematicians
were deeply religious. All major mathematicians (Pythagoras, Plato, Kepler,
Newton, Leibniz) are religious, Spengler emphasizes, and their mathematical
work expresses profound religious intuitions. What is striking in the Faustian
concept of God, however, is the supra-human scale, the rigour, both in questions
of morality and in question of dogma: absolute transcendence. Faustian theology
is dogmatic. We are completely dependent on Divine justice, as Luther, the
Faustian theologian, argued. We cannot mitigate His verdict with the help of good
works or indulgences. But the most Faustian of all Faustian concepts is the
exponential curve, the symbol of human responsibility for global disruption.
Physics – Apollonian physics is basically statics – a form of physics in
which the temporal dimension is absent or irrelevant, and which does not include
time measurements (there is no X-axis as it were). Archimedes experienced his
εύρηκα breakthrough, his epistemological euphoria, in a pre-eminently static
situation: in a bath tub, in a state of immobility. His own body was a laboratory
prop, and subjected to an experiment. His alethotope was a thermotope.
Core themes of Magian physics are phenomena such as magnetism and
ebb and flow. Time is now millennial and cyclical. The grand idea of Magian
physics is influence at a distance, actio in distans, invisible attraction, e.g.
attraction by the moon as a phenomenon of gravity, but also elective affinities in
chemistry. Magian natural science has an eye for the influence that heavenly
bodies exert on each other – and on us. This interest in mysterious forms of
influence also gave rise to astrology, but the same idea is retained in Newton’s
concept of gravity: a fascinating example of how a Magian component is
integrated into a Faustian theorem (focussed on control). Faustian researchers are
divided subjects, as indicated by the famous line from Goethe’s Faust: “Two
souls, alas, are dwelling in my breast”. In spite of Newton’s decisive
contributions to Faustian thinking, he remains a Faustian ego combined with a
Magian, complementary alter ego, persevering in a Magian style of thinking. His
concept of gravity is a Magian “stain” or “scar” if you will on Faustian physics.
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The force of gravity is just as incomprehensible to a truly Faustian mind as the
forms of influence that astrology wanted to study (a Magian research field par
excellence). The idea of gravity is an affront to Faustian thinking, a relapse into,
a concession to, the Magian worldview it wanted to supersede.
Faustian physics is dynamics first of all, closely linked to exact time
measurement and the concept of function (modifying conditions, indicated by the
X-axis, and measuring the effects of these modifications, represented by the Yaxis). The primal aspect of reality that Faustian investigators must try to control
is time, with the help of precision devices. Faustian physics is experimental
physics, and inherently technical: dependent on technical contrivances. Nature is
no longer studied in the open air or with the naked eye. Laboratories are
established: settings for exerting maximal control over nature, embodying the
Faustian will to power. This also applies to the particle collider at CERN, where
the smallest subatomic particles, borderline cases of what might still be
considered matter, are smashed and destroyed. It is a theatre of spectral, ghostly
appearances, spotted at the very moment of their disappearance, leaving a misty
trail in supersaturated vapour: the ultimate Faustian device, although once again
some ghostly, Magian stains or remnants can be detected. On the quantum level,
the behaviour of elementary particles is not completely deterministic, which, of
course, constitutes another affront to Faustian thinking.
According to Carl Gustav Jung, this dual nature of Faustian physics must
be considered as something inevitable (Zwart 2019; Zwart 2020a). Whereas the
Faustian ego is striving for control, by making reality calculable, ensuring the
triumph of determinism, there is always this ghostly shadow of unpredictable
otherness or noise. Even when Faustian consciousness seems to be at the height
of its dominance, the interminable struggle against pre-Faustian (Magian) ideas
continues. Magian ideas may suddenly resurge at the heart of Faustian practices
and theorems. According to Jung, we must remain sensitive to this chronic
collision between the conscious and the unconscious, the visible and the
obfuscated dimensions of scientific research. This already applies to the scientia
experimentalis that emerged during the Gothic (early Faustian) era. While
numerous scholars were still copying and studying and commenting authoritative
texts, there was an intellectual undercurrent of experimental thinking. Albertus
Magnus (1193 – 1280), for instance, commented on Aristotle (his official
teaching assignment, his daily work), but he also practiced alchemy. In the 14th
century, this undercurrent began to surface as experimental scholastics, as Gothic
natural science. In modern times, alchemy gave way to chemistry – on the level
of consciousness. Yet, alchemical ideas (as the unconscious of modern natural
science) continued to exert considerable influence. Not only in the sense that
Kepler, Newton, Boyle and other leading natural scientists secretly practiced
alchemy, but especially in the sense that modern natural scientists, even in the
19th and 20th Century, were influenced by alchemical ideas.
One of Jung’s pet examples is the famous dream reported by Friedrich
August von Kekulé (1829-1896), who discovered the structure of benzene (C6H6)
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after falling asleep while being immersed in this problem, and dreaming about a
snake biting its own tail – a well-known alchemical symbol named Ouroboros.
This led him to the understanding that benzene has a ring structure – a “late
triumph”, Jung writes, of an old alchemical thought that finally reaches its
scientific goal (1946, p. 179). Even in Mendel’s experiments, alchemical ideas
about dominant and recessive factors and transmutation were at work, adopted
from Joseph Gottlieb Kölreuter (1733-1806) and others (Zwart 2008).
The relationship between alchemy and modern science was the central
theme in the correspondence between Jung and Nobel Prize winner Wolfgang
Pauli (Jung 1953/1974; Meier 1992; Lindorff 2004). According to Jung, the
dreams produced by this prominent microphysicist, who was also a prolific
dreamer, reflected a plethora of alchemical reminiscences (Zwart 2020a). Jung’s
friendship with Pauli is important also for other reasons. Around 1900, Jung
argues, an important mutation occurs in the history of thinking. The principle of
causality is being challenged by quantum physics. Faustian determinism no
longer applies on a very small scale. In the period that Freud published Beyond
the Pleasure Principle (1920/1940), physics in the form of quantum physics
moves beyond the principle of causality, or at least beyond its classical,
deterministic interpretation. There is a dimension of the real, beyond the causality
principle, where unpredictability must be accepted as far as the behaviour of
elementary particles is concerned. For Jung, Pauli is the one who exemplifies this
change. On a conscious level, he makes an important contribution to the
emergence of post-deterministic physics, while his unconscious produces an
impressive amount of dreams that indicate how unconscious ideas affect modern
scientific thinking “from a distance” as it were. During periods of transition, when
one style of thinking gives way to another, obfuscated forces resurge to the
surface, Jung argues. During such an interregnum, scholars experience a shortlived moment of intellectual lucidity: an epistemological clearing. The shadowy
side of the intellect, that which had been suppressed by the dominant style of
thinking, now manifests itself. This happened literally in Goethe’s drama Faust.
When the canonical wisdom of the library is about to make way for experimental
science, there is a demonic interregnum, where Mephistopheles is in charge. For
a period of time, scholarly consciousness is under the spell of this “medicine
man”. No wonder that quantum physicists, during a famous gathering at the
Research Institute of Niels Bohr in Copenhagen in April 1932, performed a Faust
parody, with Pauli in the role of Mephistopheles and the “object”, the (almost
weightless) neutrino particle in the role of Gretchen.
The transition from Apollonian to Magian thinking was likewise
accompanied by moral and epistemological turbulence and, according to Jung,
the 1920s and 1930s must be understood in similar terms. He saw National
Socialism basically as a resurgence of the Wotan cult. The ancient god awoke
from his millennial slumber. Archetypes that normally lead a shadowy existence
may suddenly and temporarily seize power, under the influence of “medicine
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man” Hitler. Such moments of euphoria inevitably end in catastrophe: the
collapse of the Roman Empire, the religious wars, the collapse of Hitler’s Reich.
During his second half of his life (after his fortieth year), Jung gave in to
his chronic fascination for alchemy: an obscure and mysterious tradition that had
arisen in a Magian (Hellenistic) context, but continued to exert its influence (both
stimulating and inhibitory) on Faustian science. At the time, alchemy was more
or less completely written out of the official historiography of science. It was
actually not permissible for academics to become seriously involved with such a
theme. It was delisted from the scholarly agenda. Alchemy was either kept in the
dark or referred to in a pejorative sense: the necromancers as an obstacle against
Enlightenment, without really trying to explore this world of thought. Among the
scholars who contributed to a revival of interest in alchemy was Hans-Eduard
Fierz-David, professor of chemistry in Zurich and a friend of Jung, author of a
history of chemistry (1945/1952) in which he paid due attention to alchemy. He
dedicated his study to Jung, with whom he shared this fascination. According to
Jung, dreams of modern scientists reveal that we are still familiar with this way
of thinking, even when conscious familiarity is lacking. Archetypal ideas
continue to be part of the context of discovery of scientific research, especially at
decisive moments of crisis and transition.
An interesting case is Robert Julius Mayer (Jung 1916/1960, p. 76), a
physician who, in his spare time (as an autodidact) practiced natural science and
eventually became famous for discovering the law of conservation of energy, one
of the most important scientific discoveries of the 19th century. Het was seized by
the idea that energy manifests itself in various forms (“transmutes”) but can never
be destroyed, when he embarked as a young physician to the Dutch East Indies.
An experienced sailor informed him that sea water is warmer after a heavy storm.
This comment made him think. The critical moment followed shortly after the
landing in Surabaya where he was overwhelmed by the idea that would change
his life (Ostwald 1909). It was an experience of conversion, similar to the one
Paul experienced on his way to Damascus. The idea which suddenly seized him
resembled an intellectual intoxication, a moment of inspiration and insight, of
jouissance. The new conviction would never let go of him. In fact, the idea
destroyed his life. It became an obsession. It was an “Anschauung”, a
fundamental view which placed everything in a different light, an intuition which
proved difficult to express at first. Recognition would take a long time.
Upon returning home, Mayer continued to further explore and
substantiate his idea. For example, he noted that when we fill a bottle with water
and shake it firmly, the temperature of the water rises. In fact, what he had
discovered was an everyday experience. When we rub our hands in times of frost,
we apply the law of conservation of energy. Movement is converted into heat.
After an earlier manuscript was rejected, his classic publication appeared in 1842
– but no one took notice of it. He started to worry. His wife became increasingly
annoyed by the fact that he only seemed to live for his idea, stubbornly
maintaining that he had made an important discovery which no one seemed
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willing to acknowledge. In 1850 he jumps out of the window during a sleepless
night, seriously injuring himself. He is taken to a psychiatric institution. There,
he refuses to admit that the story of his important discovery is a delusion. He
disappears from view and his publications are ignored. Rumour has it that he died.
His discovery proved absolutely toxic.
What exactly happened to Mayer, Jung wonders. What was the origin of
his idea? Why did this idea, despite the resistance Mayer encountered, continue
to exert such a fatal attraction? Jung answers that it was the resurgence of a timeold idea, which had surfaced before, in the wheel of fire symbol present in many
religions, but also in the Dionysian concept of energy or fire as articulated by
Heraclitus (1916/1960, p. 77), who believed that an eternal fire animates the
world, constantly altering in shape. For Jung, this explains the demonic power of
Mayer’s idea. Under Faustian conditions, the idea was brought to life again, by
chance observations, assuming a new meaning. Not as item of contemplation, but
as the grounding momentum of the Faustian era, intimately involved in all things
Faustian: in labour, steel, machines, fossil fuel and heavy industry.
Chemistry – Building on the work of Jung, Gaston Bachelard (1884 –
1962) distinguishes three styles of thinking in the history of chemistry (Zwart
2019; Zwart 2020b). Modern (Faustian) chemistry is preceded by alchemy, its
Magian predecessor, and succeeded by a new form of molecular chemistry (from
1900 onwards) based on quantum physics and new research techniques such as
spectroscopy. Meanwhile, in the life-world of everyday experience, outside the
laboratory, ideas from previous epochs continue to flourish. Literary authors, the
spokespersons of everyday experience, make ample use of archetypal ideas. The
epistemological rupture that makes Faustian chemistry possible is not only a
historical, but also a biographical concept. Every chemist has to re-enact this
collective conversion which historically took place in the second half of the 18th
century, when chemistry became a modern, Faustian science. Nonetheless, some
alchemical concepts can still be discerned in modern chemistry.
One important idea associated with chemistry is the archetype of the
explosion. In novels and movies about chemists or chemistry, explosions are
likely to occur. Pre-modern chemistry revolves around the idea of fire, situated
in the oven: the heart of the alchemist’s workshop (Bachelard 1938/1949). Fire is
associated with homeliness and familiarity, but also with enthusiasm (bonfires).
Archaic, primordial thinking, according to Bachelard, basically comes down to
free associations (reverie) while staring at a fire.24 To familiarise ourselves with
pre-Faustian forms of thinking, we may travel back in time to our own archaic
period, during childhood, to re-examine our own infantile experience with regard
to the phenomenon of fire.
In early childhood we are confronted with a prohibition, a taboo: we
should not touch the tempting flames. Starting a fire is a privilege of the father,
according to Bachelard. The child wants to appropriate this privilege, wants to
24
“Pour l’homme primitif, la pensée est une rêverie” (p. 44).
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democratise fire, but the social order will offer firm resistance, because fire is not
only fascinating, but also dangerous, for the person concerned, but also for others
involved. Bachelard speaks about the Prometheus complex in this context, the
chemical variant of the Oedipal complex. Fire belongs to the father, who has the
exclusive right to ownership, representing the frightening aspect of humankind
as a most terrible creature (δεινότατον), capable of subjugating this frightening
(δεῖνος) element, fire. The complement of the Prometheus complex is the
Empedocles complex, representing the death drive: the desire to leap into a
consuming fire, preferably from the edge of a volcano, in order to be cleansed
and reborn: the desire for a cosmic death, a fusion with the universe and the
elements. Besides Hölderlin’s Empedocles, the novel She by Rider Haggard
(1887/1991) can also be regarded as a modern rendition of this idea. Fire is the
spark that introduces discontinuity between humans and the rest of nature,
between humans and other animals. During the archaic epoch, the process of
domestication actually begins with the domestication of fire. The selfdomestication of humans literally takes place around the hearth, the camp-fire.
This archaic experience is never extinguished completely and continues to flare
up in later historical epochs.
Another archaic association is the affinity we intuitively perceive
between fire and sexuality, between generating fire and producing children: the
experience of a friction that sets us on fire. In the case of sexuality too, friction
results in a rise of body temperature, a moment of de-freezing. Fire and children
are made in the same way, at least according to the logic of archaic thinking.
Many of these core ideas are still very much alive in Magian chemistry, also
known as alchemy. Here, sexuality is seen as a chemical reaction and vice versa.
In both cases, selectivity is important. Humans are not aroused by anything or
anybody. A mystical rapport has to come about, a secret affinity must be at work,
in reaction to a triggering feature (a particular gaze, a particular gesture, etc.).
The synthesis of a chemical compound in vitro was referred to by alchemists as
a “chemical wedding”, indicating that erotic desire (love as a universal force of
attraction) was guiding the behaviour of chemical substances. Alchemists
postulated the existence of a universal force (love, φιλία) to explain chemical
processes. One particularly interesting example of this association between
chemistry and sexuality is Goethe’s novel Wahlverwandtschaften (“elective
affinities”), whose title indicates that both human individuals and chemical
substances have an intuitive preference to form bonds with certain individuals (or
substances) rather than with others. His novel is an experimental arrangement
(“Experimentalanordnung”, Safranski 2013/2015, p. 508)
It wasn’t until the end of the 18th century that chemistry became a
Faustian science, on a par with Faustian physics. In documents written during the
early 18th century, electricity is still seen as fire and as a mysterious erotic force.
Bachelard quotes a French chemist who developed a sexology of electricity,
describing it as an erotic substance, and the female lower abdomen as a cavity
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filled with electrically charged organs. According to Bachelard, this is still a
product of (Magian) associative thinking: fire = electricity = sexuality.
As indicated, the chances of success of alchemical experiments depended
not only on the purity of the raw materials with which the alchemists worked, but
especially on the moral purity of the alchemists themselves. Chemical operations
were conducted in service of moral self-enhancement. The aim of alchemical
operations was κάθαρσις – purification, both of the object (the chemical
substance) and of the subject (the alchemist). As a Magian practice, alchemy
relied on associations. The various regions of cosmos (the stellar sphere, the
animal kingdom, the vegetable kingdom, the mineral kingdom) mirror each other.
Stars are heavenly flowers, flowers are terrestrial stars. The earth is a body
equipped with orifices and veins. The sunflower is associated with the sun.25 In
everyday language, but notably in poetry, such associations or correspondences
are still very much alive. Poets such as Baudelaire are linguistic alchemists: they
work miracles with words.
Modern Faustian science had to rigorously distance itself from this
associative, intuitive style of thinking. As an epistemological psychotherapist,
Bachelard wants to offer guidance to science. Scientific consciousness had to
cleanse itself of all pre-Faustian associations and alchemical reminiscences.
Where the Id of alchemy was, the ego of modern Faustian science shall be, that
is the credo of the scientific revolution. It is certainly no coincidence that Victor
Frankenstein, the main character of Mary Shelley’s novel, became enthralled by
alchemy (1818/1968). To become a scientist, these alchemical affinities had to be
supressed. The novel describes a failed epistemic therapy, a faltered conversion.
An epistemological prohibition is required to block access to the world of Magian
associations. Only then can the ego be emptied and reborn as a true scientist.
Mary Shelley’s novel depicts the return of the repressed. Alchemical ideas
continue to work and Victor basically decides to use the new powerful
instruments of Faustian chemistry to realise an alchemical idea: the fabrication of
a homunculus in vitro with the help of a flash of lightning.
Meanwhile, around 1900, another scientific revolution sets it, so that the
challenges are getting even bigger. The epistemic rupture between research
laboratory and poetical experience intensifies. As a philosopher of science,
Bachelard criticises Sartre, for instance, who referred to the wave-aspect of
electrons as their “feminine” and the particle-aspect as their “masculine”
dimension (Bachelard 1951, p. 192). Philosophy should put a stop to such
projections, such sexualisations of quantum physics. Philosophers should not act
as belated alchemists, retaining a pre-scientific way of thinking. We must
surgically remove such misguiding preconceptions, Bachelard argues (1953, p.
18), resulting in a reformation of the intellect.
25
Cf. Michel Foucault, 1966, p. 32 ff. An attempt to revive this style of thinking is The
language of herbs by Mellie Uyldert (1961), which lists (the medicinal properties) of
herbs of the sun, the moon, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn.
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Biology – Apollonian biology equals classification, while classification
equals hierarchy. A perfect introduction into Apollonian classification is Plato’s
Statesman (1925/1995). As Plato explains, classification is essentially the cutting
of a line into two halves, preferably intersecting the line exactly in the middle
(262C, 265A) with on the one hand the category that we want to separate (higher
in value), on the other hand the other, less valuable half. Classification thus means
drawing a line in the sand while making a section in the middle. Subsequently,
one of the halves is divided further by again dividing a section through the middle.
For instance, a line representing humans may be divided into two parts, Greeks
and barbarians. Along these lines, we may divide living from non-living entities
by cutting a line right through the middle. Similarly, the class of biped animals
can be divided into featherless and feathered bipeds (with humans being
featherless bipeds), and so forth. Aristotle was a master in classification, but
always on the basis of criteria that nature herself provided. An auxiliary science
of classification was anatomy. Apollonian researchers are not inclined to conduct
research on live animals. The concept of an experiment is alien to Apollonian
thinking. This geometric method differs from Faustian classification: ordering
chaos by introducing criteria adopted by the researchers themselves (e.g. the
number of stamens in flowers), while contrivances (microscopes, etc.) are often
required to determine these characteristics.
The Magian animal is a fabulous animal. Paradise is populated by such
animals, e.g. friendly lions, while the unicorn is perhaps the most typical product
of Magian fabulation. We encounter such animals in mythology, but also in
heraldry. Moby-Dick is a Magian animal, resurging in and disrupting a world
where whaling had evolved into a Faustian industry, with whaleships serving as
mobile slaughterhouses. The maniacal captain who hunts the white whale is a
Faustian hero who embodies the nihilism and negativity of Faustian thinking and
wants to destroy (annihilate) the object of his fascination and aversion, namely
Moby-Dick as a Magian relic: that is his mission and duty, even if this results in
self-destruction. Melville’s novel depicts the merciless struggle between Faustian
civilization and Magian ideas, under Faustian conditions: a brutish struggle for
survival, resulting in exploitation and decimation of both humans and whales,
until only nothingness remains.
Faustian biology is vivisection. A guilty conscience on the side of the
researcher is an inevitable aspect of the constellation, for the experimentalist is a
divided subject, torn between the will to know and a rigorous sense of personal
responsibility for animal suffering. In order to acquire knowledge, he is forced to
do something which is inherently evil, resulting in a conflict between
epistemological demands and the voice of conscience (Zwart 2016). In order to
really understand the animal, the latter must become a research animal.
Performing an experiment inevitably means damaging the animal, killing it even.
The laboratory animal is completely in the hands of the researcher. The animal
lab is a sadistic universe. But increasingly, humans are turned into lab rats as well.
Foucault (1975) describes how thousands of human bodies were brought together
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in army barracks, factories and prisons, where they were to be transformed into a
reliable, productive work force in support of the industrial revolution. These
settings became laboratories of power, where individuals functioned as research
subjects, exposed to the gaze of surveillance, to examinations and measurements,
to training programs and dietary regimes: technologies developed for the purpose
of producing useful, accountable, employable human beings. Georg Büchner’s
drama Woyzeck (written in 1836) stages for the very first time a completely new
type of role played by human beings, namely that of an experimental research
subject participating in a trial explicitly designed to demonstrate a theory, to
systematically examine a hypothesis (Zwart 2013a). The ultimate aim of this
theory is to predict and control human behaviour. Büchner was a biologist who
conducted research on cranial nerves, and in his literary drama he envisioned the
emerging arena of experimental psychological inquiry.
Faustian biology is an active form of thinking. But Faustian biology also
means thinking on a grand scale, seeing living nature are an evolutionary process
spanning billions of years. And like human history, this natural process is driven
by struggle: the struggle for existence. Human history is an intensification of this
struggle for existence, and this intensification and acceleration is due to the
disruptive development of technology. Technology allows the Faustian will to
know to overcome the recalcitrance of the real. Faustian biology is inherently
technical, is biotechnology.
§ 2. Domains of thinking (2): faith, hope and love
Religion – The Apollonian God is an architect, a demiurge who turns chaos into
cosmos: a harmonious paradigm for human architects and politicians, for
mathematically trained aristocrats. When Plato visited the oracle at Delphi, what
was whispered into his ears was a mathematical problem he was able to solve.
The oracle had converted to Apollonian thinking.
The Magian God is a transcendent God who already determined, at the
beginning of time, when the existing world will vanish, to give way to something
completely different: the Kingdom of Heaven. He is also the God of grace, on
whom we completely depend. The Magian attitude to life introduces an
unbridgeable gap between the exterior person (the citizen, dwelling in the
mundane realm) and the interior, spiritual person, devoted God. The gospel of
Luke begins with a census. The initiative is taken by the Emperor. Joseph and
Mary are obedient, but at the same time completely indifferent. They are not
interested in the Emperor at all, they place their trust in God. The census does not
interest them in any way, it is an event bereft of purpose, and only meant to create
optimal conditions so that God’s Will be done (they are transported to the right
location). Precisely at the moment in time when the powers of this world seem at
the height of their power, expressing itself in intimidating buildings, the light
shines into the world and Magian faith begins to spread: the message that the
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advent of the Kingdom of Heaven is imminent. For the Magian subject, worldly
powers are meaningless. The worldly kingdom may destroy the human body, but
this body will be resurrected, by the grace of God, and awake in a glorified state.
Jesus’ message is a very simple one: the kingdom of heaven is at hand, it is within
you. Anyone who understands what this means, has understood the logic of
Magian thinking. This new empire is not of this world. It is a spiritual community
of like-minded people, silently yearning for something which is radically
different. Magian subjects will rejoice upon hearing this message, which is sheer
folly to the wisdom of this world, and it is bad news for the powers of this world.
The star observed by the Magi (Mt 2: 2), did not announce the birth of a king, but
the birth of a style of thinking. They used Magian techniques to announce the
time and place of this dawning moment as accurately as possible.
The Faustian God is defined by dogmas. Unbelievers are heretics.
Faustian theology is essentially dogmatic. The Faustian credo is: Credo quia
absurdum. The Faustian subject is willing to abandon rationalism on the basis of
a Faustian wager: the gamble that God exists. Apollonian gods are gods of the
day: light gods. Faustian gods are forces of darkness. They represent what Hegel
calls the night of the world. The Summa Theologica by Thomas Aquinas has the
structure of a cathedral, not only because of its size and its heavy content matter,
but also because of the vertical orientation, the architecture at work: the central
nave, with side aisles, the strong dogmatic pillars on which its rests. The Faustian
believer is defined by nocturnal yearning: Saint John of the Cross, author of the
spiritual poem Dark Night of the Soul, describing a path through darkness towards
an unknown destiny. We ourselves are this darkness, when we see each other in
the eyes. God dwells in nothingness, and atheism is unmistakably a motif of
Faustian thinking (Hegel, 1807/1970, p. 172), for notwithstanding the triumphal
proclamation that God does not exist, the atheist sooner or later realises that God
is omnipresent, so that he unintentionally but inevitably becomes obsessed with
the God he denies. God becomes his symptom. The Faustian atheist wants to
convert, but his texts continue to be tainted by the name of God, as an ineradicable
stain, a secret symptom of chronic doubt. The Epicurean gay atheist is a figure
which belongs to the Apollonian past.
Architecture – Architecture, according to Spengler, provides an optimal
mirror for studying a style of thinking. Great architectural artworks capture the
spirit of the time (its grounding concept) in stone. A style of thinking is made
tangible when it becomes incorporated in architecture. The archetype of
Apollonian architecture is the Greek temple: Euclidean mathematics
immortalised in stone. The Pantheon is the ultimate Apollonian structure, a
temple that is actually no longer a temple but a mystical, Magian space: a temple
which is at the same time Mosque. The Pantheon is a boundary: an attempt to
capture and reconcile two basic ideas, the Apollonian and the Magian experience
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of space.26 The archetype of Magian architecture is the grand Dome
(Christianity), the grand Mosque (Islam). The Pantheon is the Ω of Apollonian
and the Α of Magian architecture. When Jesus of Nazareth went about preaching,
a Magian architectonic style did not yet exist. He travelled through a landscape
where Apollonian buildings had arisen, the kind of architecture he detested, and
his verdict was a negative, antithetical one. And yet, he discerned in Peter the
“rock” on which the edifice of a new faith would be erected. Even the Jewish
temple in Jerusalem was essentially an Apollonian structure. Therefore, Jesus
predicted that this immense building would soon collapse. The Magian Al-Aqsa
mosque would replace it, creating optimal cavernous conditions for a new type
of religious experience.
The archetype of Faustian architecture is the cathedral: a forest of stone
in which the Faustian desire for height manifests itself. The Magian house of
prayer is cave-like, but Faustian pillars resemble immense tree trunks with
branches. Light enters through stained glass windows, as if filtered by foliage. In
comparison with the Gothic (that is, Faustian) cathedral, Saint Peter’s is a hybrid
construct, a partial return of Apollonian and Magian ideas, but precisely in its
powerful immensity it is unmistakably Faustian – apparently without wanting to
be like that. Saint Peter’s Dome is a style conflict in stone. A truly Faustian desire
expresses itself in the intimidating height and immensity of this building. Even
though the Dome was intended to be spherical, there is a Faustian desire for
height, so that the dome is supra-spherical. Saint Peter is a synthesis if you will
of Magian and Faustian drives, but radiates a Faustian Will to Power. That is why
Paul Rée insisted on writing his anti-encyclicals inside this building, as Lou
Andreas-Salomé informs us in her Lebensrückblick (1968).
A typical Faustian building is the lighthouse, preferably erected on a
gloomy coast, a key element in Verne novels. Faustian architecture expresses a
desire for height, of which structures such as the Eiffel Tower are emblematic
icons. The emphasis is on verticality, on social mobility. Ibsen’s play Masterbuilder Solness is a Faustian drama about desire and anxiety concerning height,
climbing the social ladder by designing tall buildings (Zwart 2014b). Perhaps the
most Faustian of all buildings is the skyscraper, the supreme symbol of corporate
capitalism, of America itself: the Finger of God (Glynn 2001/2011). Manhattan
has always been a skyscraper utopia and in 1989, eight of the ten tallest buildings
were still located in the United States. Yet, today, all of the world’s tallest
buildings have been built elsewhere. Alfred Speer’s art deco Berlin would have
been ultra-Faustian, but remained a Faustian dreamscape.
Politics – Apollonian politics established a polis, a city-state, of
Apollonian proportions. The Roman Empire (Apollonian civilization) aimed to
include the whole world inside its sphere of influence. In the cold, barbaric
regions of the Germanic North, very little could be gained. Germanic visitors of
26
Peter Sloterdijk speaks about architecture as “[Eine Kraft] die nicht so sehr ihre Zeit
in Gedanken fast, sondern die Gedanken der Zeit in Bauwerke” (1999, p. 438).
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ancient Rome, astounded by the city’s wealth, wondered what the murderous
Roman legions came looking for in their dreary regions. The desire of the Empire
was to expand its limits, to increase the radius of its sphere of influence, but this
was not necessarily motivated by considerations of economic gain. It was fuelled
by a basic conviction that could not be called into question.
The basic idea of Magian politics is the Two Kingdoms theorem. The
interior person or interior castle, as Teresa of Ávila phrased it, belongs to another
Empire. The dawning of this Empire is an event that overcomes us, happens to us
– we are completely unable to make it happen. Magian believers are waiting for
and preparing themselves for the demise of the existing and the coming of a
completely different world. In the meantime, Magian believers may do good
deeds, but they cannot bring the great event closer, nor accelerate it. We are not
entitled to the coming of the new dawn. Virtuousness merely increases our own
preparedness for the arrival of the New Jerusalem. This means that Magian
individuals are divided subjects: they are part of two incompatible realms: the
visible realm (doomed to ruin) and the realm of God: the community of true
believers, awaiting what is upcoming: waiting for…
The materialization of the Faustian principle in the political domain is
the Nation State, which became increasingly powerful, centralised and
nationalistic in the 19th century and increasingly began to dominate the daily lives
of citizens via “biopolitics” (Foucault 1976). The state is an immense machinery
for mobilising populations for economic and military purposes. It entails the
nationalisation of education and health care, of art and government, even of
science and religion. Internally, the state becomes a pervasive force and
externally, the state becomes imperialistic. Faustian unrest unleashes mobility,
while fossil fuel machines make new forms of mobility possible. Studies that
Michel Foucault published in the 1970s constitute a genealogy of the Faustian
state. Discipline and Punish (1975), for instance, analyses the technologies of
power that nation states developed to discipline, nationalise and educate the
population via schools, the army and the psychiatric ward (Zwart 2013a).
Foucault meticulously describes multiple techniques for exerting Faustian power
in barracks, factories and classrooms. He describes how Faustian discipline
refashions the bodily movements and motor skills of the individuals involved.
The state even appropriates and redefines basic existential categories such as
time. In coalition with big industry, the nation state determines when the working
day starts and the retirement age sets in. State power proliferates via supervisory
bodies and evolves into bio-power: a set of population policies that considers
humankind as an economic resource, – although the Faustian logic will often only
partially realize itself and will continue to face stubborn populist resistance in
various social practices (Achterhuis 1998, p. 27).
Even language becomes nationalised. Martin Luther embodies (as an
obedient rebel) a paradoxical boundary zone. On the one hand, he represents
resistance and was responsible for introducing the language and vocabularies of
the lower social stratums into written and printed discourse, including a plethora
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of obscene elements. At the same time, he created a unified German language,
thereby unifying Germany in a cultural sense (although political unification in
the case of Germany would be considerably belated). Luther’s intervention is
driven by a Faustian impetus, but at the same time his theology incorporates
Magian components, such as the anthropological theorem of humans entailing
two personae: a worldly (political) subject and a spiritual (converted) one.
Something similar can be noticed in Communism many centuries later
by the way. On the one hand, Communism seems hyper-Faustian, and the
Socialist State aims to determine, pervade and refurbish all aspect of life. At the
same time, there are some Magian moments at work, such as the idea that the
state will wither away once the paradise of justice and salvation has dawned, and
the idea that revolution will be a spontaneous event, especially endorsed by the
more radical branches of communism, e.g. council communism. According to
council communism, the revolution is not something which is actively brought
about in a voluntarist manner by a communist party (as an avant-garde of
professional revolutionaries), as Lenin argued. Rather, it should be envisioned as
an emerging event for which the workers of all countries must prepare
themselves, but which cannot be enforced top-down. It will be brought about by
inner necessity. Political interventions can neither cause nor prevent the coming
of the revolution. Workers employed in Faustian factories are called upon to
prepare themselves for this inevitable event. Therefore, Friedrich Engels was
quite right to emphasise the congruence between Socialism and early
Christianity, in his rereading of the Book of Revelation (Engels 1883/1962).
Although techniques for calculating and predicting Judgement Day have now
become obsolete, Engels argues, the relevance of this book for nineteenth-century
readers consists in that it shows how Christianity took hold of the masses as a
spiritual epidemic, just as modern socialism did. It also indicates how early
socialism still retained some traces of Magian thinking, which became
increasingly obfuscated in later, increasingly technocratic (i.e. Faustian) versions
of State Communism and Social Democracy.
Economy – The most decisive invention of Apollonian economics was
the metal coin. Coins tend to have a perfect geometric shape and the Roman
Empire would have been unthinkable without the use of coins. Once minted, they
spread across the empire, as the emblem of imperial power, and a tangible
testimony of the Pax Romana. Coins symbolised imperial politics, which is why
mendicant teachers such as Jesus of Nazareth detested them. For Jesus, the coin
is a worthless object: render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s, and unto God what is
God’s. Jesus spread the word, the Roman Empire spread the coin.
Do not collect treasures on earth, Jesus tells His followers, but Christian
churches and monasteries later became treasuries, because the treasure is the
archetype, the basic symbol of Magian economic thinking. The Apollonian coin
circulates, but the Magian treasure results from secret accumulation of sublimated
entities in consecrated spaces, with the Holy Grail as ultimate showpiece. Magian
fairy tales (Thousand and One Nights) inevitably lead the way to treasures,
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hidden in Sesame-like cavities. “Talents” are buried in fields. All things of value
are part of a treasure. The Faustian archaeologist who develops a fascination for
Magian cultures, is a treasure hunter. In the Magian archaeological stratum,
treasures are waiting to be found. The Faustian desire is to bring these hidden,
frozen treasures into circulation once again, even if this requires theft.
An important Faustian innovation in the domain of economics is doubleentry bookkeeping: debit and credit, the economic variant of the function concept
in Faustian experimental physics. Here too, numbers express relationships and
operations. The treasure becomes capital, is liberated as it were, so that it can be
circulated and invested. From a Faustian perspective, hidden treasures are
worthless. Capital materialises in ways that reveal its Faustian nature: in the form
of factories and machines. Treasures grow steadily or freeze, but capital increases
exponentially: doubling every so often. The exponential curve or function
symbolises the Faustian thirst for spectacular growth. Karl Marx and Friedrich
Engels revealed the Faustian nature of capital, which expresses itself not only in
relentless exploitation of human resources, but also in various other historical
phenomena, from gold rush up to large-scale environmental pollution.
Exponential curves reflect how capital intensifies the metabolism between
humans and nature.
Medicine – Apollonian medicine urges us to live in harmony with nature:
in accordance with nature, because nature means order, a state of balance and
health that we must also seek to realise in our own physical existence. Apollonian
medicine is exemplified by the doctrine of the temperaments, striving for balance.
The core element of Magian medicine is the search for a panacea: the
substance that heals all ailments. Magian medicine relies on suggestion. Jesus
heals by laying his hand on someone, perhaps after spitting in it, or by uttering a
phrase. Jesus says it, literally: Your faith has healed you.
Faustian medicine aims to dominate the body, healing it by controlling
it. Faustian surgical interventions always lead to damage, causing detrimental
side effects. Faustian medicine exerts medical power. Driven by the Will to
Power, Faustian medicine develops powerful contrivances, such as X-ray
devices, resulting in a full disclosure of the body, making it transparent as it were.
When Nietzsche speaks about philosophising with a hammer, he means: thinking
by using a reflex hammer and a stethoscope: devices for asking questions,
enforcing the body to respond to diagnostic queries.
These differences can also be found in medical ethics. Apollonian ethics
is Hippocratic: an ethic of prudence and restraint. Nature must do the work. In
case of doubt (and this is mostly the case, of course), refrain from action (in dubio,
abstine). Above all: do no harm. It is a passive form of medicine, advising patients
to go on a pilgrimage, or to follow an optimal diet, or to find the right climate.
The Magian doctor is a charismatic benefactor, and the core concept of
medical ethics is caritas. The virtuous patient is someone who can wait patiently,
entrusting his health to caring hands and experiencing suffering as a test of faith.
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Faustian ethics wants to control life at all costs. If death is inevitable,
there is the Faustian will to determine the moment of death ourselves
(euthanasia). The backdrop of medical interventions is a pervasive struggle
between physician and nature. Nature is no longer the source of balance and
health, but the cause of the disease, the enemy (Zwart 1994). The Faustian doctor
wants to act, wants to take risks, assuming the role of a medical hero who dares
to cross boundaries. Faustian ethics must curb the medical Will to Power.
Ethics – Apollonian ethics seeks the good measure: temperance, the
golden mean. Enjoy with moderation. Courage is the middle position between
cowardice and recklessness, while generosity is the middle between thrift and
waste. Justice means a proportional distribution of goods: the wealth of an
individual must be in proportion to his value for the polis. Equity can be
geometrically determined, as Aristotle demonstrates.
The core moral attitude of the Magian style of thinking, however, is
resignation. Christians are expected to imitate Christ. Human existence is an
exercise in resignation. Good deeds and an ascetic lifestyle do not hasten the
advent of the Kingdom of God in any way, that is up to God the almighty to
decide. Asceticism means that the individuals involved are preparing themselves
for the inevitable event, the coming of the Kingdom.
A key characteristic of Faustian ethics is the interminable struggle
between duty and inclination, between responsibility and desire. The Faustian
Über-Ich is extremely demanding and harsh. Faustian ethics is an active form of
ethics, focussed on what we actually do. The crucial question is “what should I
do?”, – with an emphasis on both “I” and “do”. The moral subject is supposed to
act. Even indecision counts as a form of action. It is impossible to fully live up to
a Faustian sense of duty. We cannot realise the categorical imperative in practice.
Faustian ethics entails a struggle for recognition in a competitive arena. The
Faustian subject really wants to make a difference.
Love – Apollonian love is symmetrical. The beloved is our other half, our
alter ego. Beauty is proportional, adheres to the golden ratio as a mathematical
idea, and the fusion with the other puts the phantasm of completion into practice.
Discussions about desire in ancient culture refer to this model. According to
Lacan, this sexual practice (this ars erotica) assumes a pre-established harmony
between what lovers want and what the beloved has to offer (1994, p. 15). By
subjecting ourselves to a training program, by managing our drives, happiness
can in principle be achieved. According to Lacan, what ancient ethics teaches is
that we should moderate, cultivate and manage our drives. Ancient practices of
παιδεία sculpt the natural drives into perfection and entail auto-plasticity,
adapting oneself to the demands of culture, modelling desire, enabling individuals
to function optimally and happily (Lacan 1978, p. 107), a kind of dressage (Lacan
1966, p. 588). Certain segments of body and soul were subjected to special
training programs, much like learning to play a musical instrument. The
Apollonian subject was an ethical virtuoso. Perhaps we still see this in top pianists
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for whom, as Nietzsche phrases it, virtue consists in painstakingly educating each
and every finger: dactylic ethics (1980, KSA2, I, § 196).
Magian love entails the willingness to wait, waiting for a sign of love,
even if this means waiting in vain. The purpose of desire is the unio mystica or
spiritual ecstasy. Magian love has the structure of an endless foreplay and is
similar to alchemy in that it entails a sublimation of the object. To the extent that
the object is impossible to reach, its value, its power of attraction increases.
Magian love requires a lifelong attitude of servitude, but the outcome remains
uncertain, and cannot be enforced, as waiting means waiting for a sign of
benevolence or mercy. Love is an exercise, a test, a “trial” (“épreuve”) allowing
the lover to prove the exceptional qualities of his love (Foucault 1994a). The other
is invisible, exalted, always at a distance: a fabulous, mystical object. The
medium of love is poetry. In each and every poem, this type of love is enacted.
We love the one whom we would not dare to touch. Due to the trial of abstinence,
the beloved Other is transubstantiated into something that is both inviolable and
irresistible. From a distance, the Other exerts a very strong attraction on the
craving subject. Magian love is a spiritualised form of craving for what gradually
becomes unspeakable and unimaginable.
In Faustian love, the physiological dimension is placed upfront, albeit
coupled with a sense of responsibility, with ethical imperatives, so that the
Faustian lover is a divided subject, always in a state of conflict: an artist for
instance who has to choose between his art and his muse. Art is erotic art, and
highly competitive. Wagner’s Tannhäuser stages a contest between Magian
(courtly) and Faustian (physiological) love. The former is represented by
Wolfram von Eschenbach, who sings his hymn of praise to the Evening Star,
while Faustian love erupts in the song that is performed by Tannhäuser himself.
His love is restless and insatiable. During his sojourn in Venus’ Cave, he is too
close to the Thing, and the proximity becomes claustrophobic, but the Magian
ethos of patience and distance is likewise unbearable. The advice is to try a
Magian technique: a pilgrimage, penitence at a distance, but in the end, he cannot
resolve the conflict.
Apollonian love is an exercise in self-restraint, as we have seen, but the
Faustian lover wants to control the beloved Other. Desire inevitably results in a
struggle for recognition, a battle between the sexes. And while the Magian object
is untouchable, the Faustian object is like a laboratory animal, subjected to
physical erotic experiments. Turgenev’s novel Fathers and Sons describes an
erotic “regression”. When the Faustian scientist Yevgeny Bazarov, who subjected
large numbers of frogs to vivisection, for the first time faces the woman with
whom he is destined to fall in love, he exclaims: “What a magnificent body ...
Shouldn’t I like to see it on the dissecting-table!” (1861/1965, p. 155). What this
prototypical vivisectionist does not say, but what he probably wanted to say, is:
during coitus. Gradually, however, despite Bazarov’s Faustian ethos, he falls
completely under the spell of this alluring object. The woman hypnotizes him and
drives him into frenzy. The moment of coitus is postponed again and again and
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finally does not happen at all. The integrity of her body forbids it, her body
becomes sublimated, acquiring a value that is beyond comparison with the bodily
features of other mortals.
A telling chapter in the genesis of Faustian love is Shakespeare’s Hamlet.
Both Jacques Lacan (2013) and Jan Hendrik van den Berg (2003) point to
Hamlet’s puritanism, his aversion to sexuality, his negative attitude towards
women. Freud (1900/1942) also has an eye for this Puritan moment, framing it as
Hamlet’s Sexualabneigung. Hamlet, Lacan says, is not a rebellious teenager, but
remarkably docile (Lacan 2013). He does as he is told, does what others expect
from him. His obedience is feigned, however. In reality, he is waiting for an
opportunity to act. Both Claudius and Hamlet try to restore the symbolic order,
which is temporarily facing a state of crisis after the death of the king. In the early
career of monarchs, there is a precarious moment: the symbolic order has to be
reset, and the young prince is not yet acknowledged as the one who has the power.
Initially, the new monarch looks unreal. A Prince must pass over corpses to
become a legal sovereign. Hamlet will have to kill if he wants to become king
(and the questionable justification of this act of violence is that he is prompted to
do so by a ghost). Princes must commit a crime before they can do good. This is
the political setting.
Hamlet studied in Wittenberg, the cradle of European Protestantism.
Hamlet is not the Renaissance Prince people often take him to be, quite the
contrary, – in Wittenberg, Hamlet became a puritan. The problem is not Hamlet’s
‘oedipal’ desires towards his mother. Rather, Hamlet has problems with his
mother’s desire as such. He wants her to moderate herself. Hamlet preaches
abstinence, imploring her to give up her desires. That is what he tells his mother,
a worldly, Renaissance aristocrat for whom life means pleasure. His mother still
wants to enjoy life for a while. Her son, however, spoils palace parties with
offensive remarks. He hates beer drinking, sex, partying, all things mundane –
and knows only one desire, he is obsessed with death. The following quote clearly
indicates how insultingly he treats his all too worldly mother:
Good night, but go not to my uncle’s bed,
Assume a virtue, if you have it not,
Refrain tonight…
And that shall lend a kind of easiness
To the next abstinence… (III 4)
Thus, the young puritan Hamlet addresses his Renaissance mother. Claudius is
likewise a Renaissance figure, but Hamlet is a completely different type. Not a
feudal wolf who wants to kill a rival. Quite the contrary, he tries to put an end to
feudal games. His desire is to establish a completely different type of power.
Another author to consult when it comes to understanding the logic of
Faustian thinking in issues of love and marriage is Immanuel Kant, who made
two quite telling comments in this respect. First of all, he defined sexual
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intercourse as the reciprocal use of the sexual organs and capacities of another,
thereby reframing marriage (which, from a Magian perspective, is considered a
sacred union) as a transaction. As to erotic desire, Kant argues as follows.
Suppose that someone claims to experience a craving for sexual pleasure of such
intensity that he cannot possibly resist the temptation. Yet, if gallows were
erected outside the bedroom where intercourse is supposed to take place, and if it
is pointed out to him that he will be hanged immediately after satiating his
passions, would he not be able to control his sexual urge? We need not long doubt
what would be his answer, Kant argues, in his Critique of Practical Reason
(1788/1971, A54). Lacan, however, rightly observes that Kant apparently fails to
notice something very important. Why would this lady, this “object”, trigger such
a strong desire in the first place? Isn’t it precisely because the gallows are there
(1986, p. 131)? Isn’t it precisely the prospect of capital punishment which triggers
such a Faustian, self-destructive drive? Whereas the Magian subject respects the
inviolability of the object, Faustian desire is precisely a longing for excess.
Faustian love craves for dangerous liaisons.
Civil marriage, i.e. Faustian love as civilisation, is a synthesis of both
dimensions: of the formal, contractual dimension (as defined by Kant) with
Faustian desire which, without this domestication, would be disruptive or even
life-threatening for both parties involved, as enacted in the story of Faust and
Gretchen. This disruptive dimension is also convincingly articulated by Oscar
Wilde in his Ballad of Reading Goal: “each man kills the thing he loves”. Civil
marriage is based on mutual consent by craving and divided subjects, a dialectical
unity of struggle (for power) and recognition (of each other’s autonomy). The
other is a real other, with a desire of his or her own, so that this marriage results
in a life-long process of conversation and negotiation, a struggle between duty
(responsibility, the stabilising factor) and “inclination” (Faustian desire, the
disruptive factor): a combination of attraction (bonding) and the strive towards
disentanglement. This explains why the dialectic of bourgeois marital existence
is such an inexhaustible source for drama and novels. Ibsen and Tolstoy were
born in 1828, just like Jules Verne. They analysed civil marriage in all its finesses.
In their eyes, marriage is literally a drama. In Ibsen’s female characters, there is
a secret desire for a completely different type of existence. Whereas she seems
able and willing to adapt herself to her bourgeois, Victorian environment, there
is a latent, hidden, “other” other, who tries to liberate herself from these Victorian
restrictions, longing for a completely different type of lover, a completely
different style of life. The turning point is a moment of confession. The bourgeois
drama starts with a situation of discontent and culminates in remarkable
frankness. Marriages tend to be unhappy because it seems impossible to live up
to the other’s desires.
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Verne is the photographic negative of Tolstoy and Ibsen as it were. With
the possible exception of Van Mitten’s unfortunate marriage (1883/1885),27 he
has never been able to describe a credible marriage. In Verne, marriage is either
completely absent (in the sense that his main characters are bachelors) or
extremely cold-blooded (in the sense that the desire seems to be completely
absent). In short, marriage appears to him as an impossible situation.
Psychoanalysis starts with a series of bourgeois love histories: Breuer and
Anna O, the Dora case. The marriage situation raises ambivalence, and is not
wholeheartedly endorsed by the unconscious. Consciously or unconsciously, the
marriage partners continue to crave for a completely different kind of partner, an
unknown possibility that suddenly reveals itself. The manifest position of the
conscientious ego is secretly undermined by unconscious desire.
Foucault (1976) distinguishes two types of discourse concerning
sexuality, namely ars erotica and scientia sexualis. Whereas the former
flourished in Ancient and Oriental (Apollonian and Magian) societies, the latter
is typical of the West. Ars erotica does not distinguish between what is prohibited
or allowed, but rather strives to increase the intensity of pleasure through
stylisation of desire. Modern Western culture, on the other hand, has produced a
scientia sexualis with confession as its main technique. This technique was
developed in a Gothic monastic context and optimised to perfection by the
Jesuits. Later, in the 19th century, it was adapted to the demands of modern
scientific discourse. The psychoanalytic technique of free association is an
intensification of the requirement to tell everything about sex. Freud himself
agrees that analysis is a radicalisation of confessional practice, as patients are not
merely expected to confess what they know about their own desire (avowing their
sins), they must even give away what they do not yet know or do not want to
know about themselves (Freud 1926/1950). In these two models, as fleshed out
by Foucault, we easily recognise the profile of Apollonian and Magian sexuality
(moderation, ascetic exercise, stylisation) versus Faustian sexuality. Apollonian
sexuality is all about measure and moderation: a harmonious use of pleasure,
Magian desire is about rituals, Faustian desire is disruptive.
An important moment in the genesis of Faustian sexuality is the fourth
Lateran Council (in 1215) that turned confession into a general practice.
According to Foucault, it marked the beginning of a sexuality discourse, as a
monastic confessional practice was transferred from monastic culture into
Faustian civilisation. The issue was discussed in close relation with the struggle
against the Albigenses or Cathars, who adhered to Magian ideas, both in
theological and in sexual matters. There is a clear affinity, in terms of style of
thinking, between Cathars and troubadours (spokesmen of courtly love), two
movements that caused havoc in the same region, in Southern France, more or
less at the same time. In other words, during this crucial council, the Church
27
“Look here Van Mitten, frankly now, I think you are very cool about your wife”.
“Cool! The expression is even too warm, if applied to my regard in that quarter”.
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unleashed a polemic against Magian rivals while endorsing a Faustian version of
the true faith. Confession became an instrument in the struggle for self-control, a
technique for disciplining human desire. Confessional practice introduced the
figure of the Faustian priest. While the power of the Magian priest was based on
suggestion (silent forms of influence, involving concise phrases), the power of
the Faustian priest is based on excessive verbalisation of desire by the speaking
subject. When Freud later replaces hypnosis with his famous talking cure, the
Faustian style of thinking had evolved into Victorian civilisation.
§ 3. Categories of thinking
Time – A key characteristic of the Apollonian experience of time, as Spengler
explains, is that it is focussed on the present. In comparison with Magian and
Faustian time, the Apollonian temporal dimension seems under-developed.
Sundials do not lend themselves to exact time measurement, nor do water clocks
(a rarity, by the way, a technical curiosum). Events are dated in terms of the years
in which the Olympic Games took place. A person’s age is indicated in cyclical
terms, in terms of stages of life. When we are able to mention a Greek author’s
date of birth at all, this often required quite some expert research, meticulous
reconstructions by modern historians based on vague indications. Apollonian
historians describe recent events. The past that lies further away is already
mythological. Events that are worth preserving for posterity, are memorised, but
clad in narratives. What applied to the Apollonian dimension of space also
applied to the temporal dimension: it is a world on a human scale. The focus is
primarily on the present. Past and future do not extend into infinity. The cosmos
turns in circles and sooner or later, all celestial bodies will return to their position.
Plato speaks in his Timaeus about the “Platonian” year: the period of time it takes
for celestial bodies to complete their movements in concordance. It may take
thousands of years for celestial bodies (sun, moon, planets) to arrive at the same
positions as they are today (36.000 years, according to Plato: an enormous
expanse of time, for Apollonian thinkers), but it is still a circular movement back
to the beginning. There is no precise timing. In Plato’s dialogues, philosophers of
different generations are presented as contemporaries. Academic activity
involves competition between local schools, but it is never a race against the clock
as is the case in Faustian scientific competitions.
The difference with the Magian experience of time is quite significant.
The present has little meaning for the Magian frame of mind. Past and future are
more important. The temporal horizon stretches from the moment of
commencement (genesis) to the moment of fulfilment (judgement day). The time
dimension is dramatized, moreover. The future is coming towards us, as the
dawning of a new world. Time as we know it will come to an end, will be
abolished. The present is under the sway of preparedness, it is a preparation for
the coming of a major transition. The present is of interest only insofar as certain
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signs announce the coming of the Kingdom of God. The perfection that
Apollonian thinkers aimed to realise in the present is projected onto the future. A
craving for perfection and sublimation is at work, but to exist means to await
salvation. The world is anticipating a divine intervention, a moment of grace.
Alchemists try to accelerate the time-consuming process of sublimation in their
laboratories. Their desire is to compress the time dimension, to make a leap
towards perfection.
The Faustian time dimension is immense. Space and time have now
expanded into infinity. Faustian thinking experiences time as a logarithmic scale:
a process of acceleration is discernible, both in natural and in human history, and
the Faustian symbol par excellence is the exponential curve, reflecting unsettling
growth and growing unrest. The present is a moment of crisis and we are
constantly on the eve of collapse. Magian historians are hagiographers, but
Faustian historiography entails an objective, detailed, meticulous description of
the past, an effort to strengthen our grip on the past through accuracy and
precision. The dramatic increase in scale that characterizes Faustian spatial
experience is also reflected in the Faustian concept of time. Faustian biology is
not only biotechnology (active thinking, producing knowledge via interventions),
but also evolutionary biology. The epistemic condition of possibility for the
concept of evolution is the Faustian sense of time. Human time, the time of human
history, would be insufficient for evolution to be plausible. Evolutionary
processes require incredible amounts of deep time. Compared to evolutionary
time, human time (measurable in years, decades or centuries) is insignificant.
Space – The Apollonian world is a world on a human scale. Distances
between celestial bodies can be expressed in terms of thousands of kilometres.
For the Magian mind-set, the magnitude of the world already increased
dramatically. Precisely in this astonishing magnitude, God’s magnificence stands
out. Notably the vertical dimension of spatiality has increased, as Magian
thinking tends to put less emphasis on the horizontal (worldly) dimension. God
is “in excelsis”, in the heights, and one can be a Christian, Jew or Muslim
anywhere on earth. The Mormons who founded Salt Lake City were looking for
a place so desolate that no one would be interested in claiming it: no man’s land
— anywhere. It is there that the city of God descends from above. The mind of
believers is oriented upwards, along the spiritual axis. This is exemplified by the
position of the stylite (from στῦλος, pillar) or pillar saint, who has already begun
to move upwards, like a human cursor, along the vertical axis (Sloterdijk 1993).
The spherical concept was not undisputed in ancient times. Atomists saw
the universe as a centreless void, in which particles wandered aimlessly about and
clumped together. After Magian thinking had expanded the universe notably in
the vertical direction, the spherical cosmos was finally shattered to give way to
the Faustian concept of an infinite universe. The great globe was dead and the
“Irrfahrt der Punkte” began, as Sloterdijk phrases it (1999, p. 134). The seclusion
of the spherical world gave way to frightening emptiness: das Ungeheure. On
Planet Earth as a concrete terrestrial environment, relentless struggle rages, not
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only between species, but also between camps, between Reformation and ContraReformation, between a modernist (rationalist) conception of nature (as a
reservoir of resources) and a romantic conception of nature (as a sublimely
expanded natural landscape). Nature is constantly both protected and damaged.
Faustian nature is a battleground in all respects, also between visions of nature.
According to Sloterdijk, the current environmental catastrophe must be
seen in the light of this fundamental transition. Humankind had left the protective
sphere and we now create our own climatic conditions. In a Faustian
environment, we are no longer at the centre, no longer “im Mittelpunkt eines
Kreises” (Freud 1917/1942, p. 133). According to Sloterdijk, discontent in
civilisation originates in the decline of spherical spatiality and the collective
experience of “stress” to which this gives rise, as we find ourselves confronted
with a dark, silent, uncanny, aimless universe: a Faustian universe adrift. Lacan
considered “cosmonauts” (Russian space travellers) a misnomer because the
cosmos no longer exists: spacecraft is launched into a decidedly Faustian space
(Roudinesco 1993). Faustian experience entails a dramatic up-scaling of all
dimensions of experience, notably space and time. The universe has become
immensely large. Faustian imperialism goes much further than the Pax Romana,
the desire to include the whole inhabited world into one political sphere of
influence. Faustian imperialism also, or even preferably, appropriates the
unexplored realms. According to the heroes in the novels of Jules Verne, there
are no uninhabitable areas, only uninhabited ones, as yet. Faustian desire wants
to populate the apparently uninhabitable. It is a quest for a Newfoundland,
preferably uninhabited.28
Causality – Archaic thinking does not yet think in terms of cause and
effect, according to Hegel (1969). Nature and consciousness did not segregate as
yet. Nature is not yet “other”. During Archaic prehistory, humans developed
techniques to influence nature, but these were not based on insights into causal
relationships. By means of certain phrases and gestures, shamans conjured the
unfathomable powers of nature. They interacted with nature via songs and music,
creating an acoustic ambiance in which a dialogue unfolded. Hegel speaks of an
imaginary powerless power over nature. The difference between sorcery and
28
As Doctor Clawbonny phrases it: “I can’t believe any land uninhabitable; man, by
many sacrifices, and for generations using all the resources of science, might finally
fertilize such a country … Without doubt! If you were to go to the celebrated countries
of the world, to Thebes, Nineveh, or Babylon, in the fertile valleys of our ancestors, it
would seem impossible that men should ever have lived there; the air itself has grown
bad since the disappearance of human beings. It is the general law of nature which
makes those countries in which we do not live unhealthy and sterile, like those out of
which life has died. In fact, man himself makes his own country by his presence, his
habits, his industry, and, I might add, by his breath; he gradually modifies the
exhalations of the soil and the atmospheric conditions, and he makes the air he breathes
wholesome. So, there are uninhabited lands, I grant, but none uninhabitable.” (Verne
1866)
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superstition is that in the latter case, consciousness is already modern insofar as
it tends to interpret reality in terms of cause and effect. For indeed, superstitious
consciousness perceives causality everywhere. Random events become
connected with each other. Where rationality fails, superstitious consciousness
relies on fantasy and associations.
In Jung’s writings we encounter a like-minded analysis of archaic
thinking. He describes the human psyche as a nocturnal landscape and
consciousness as a cone of light illuminating parts of it. Worlds light up in this
darkness that we left behind without completely renouncing them. At times, we
venture into the twilight. He also compares the human psyche with a house. Each
floor accommodates its own world of thinking. We dwell on the floor of
contemporary thinking, but may descend. The lowest, subterranean floor is the
world of archaic thinking. The archaic mind perceived other connections in
reality than we do, using different methods to fathom the real. When the archaic
mind wonders whether a certain plant is edible or inedible, healthy or unhealthy,
this style of thinking relies on correspondences: “sun plants are healthy”. Archaic
thinking is geared to nature as a wilderness – it is “the science of the jungle” (Jung
1932). Wilderness encourages this type of thinking. Causal or experimental
thinking only works when we have acquired sufficient technical power over
nature. As an archaic explorer, the shaman is an expert of chance events, an
archivist who wants to predict future events on the basis of an extensive data
collection. He discovers hidden patterns in seemingly coincidental events and
circumstances. Another characteristic of archaic thinking is that thoughts and
experiences are projected on the outside world, as powers or demons. Archaic
psychology is demonology.
For Apollonian thinkers, the principle of causality entails that every
change has a natural cause: Apollonian thinking is a priori convinced of that.
However, the main form of causality is of a teleological nature. The perfect order
is implicitly already there and wants to realise itself. The perfection that already
manifests itself in reality, has to achieve its true fulfilment. Things may not yet
have found their natural place. The final state is a situation of stillness and rest,
of circling forever. This situation has yet to arrive, but the world is underway to
balance. Beyond balance, there is no future. This also applies to thinking itself.
The dynamic that emerges in thinking is a desire for a state of contemplation and
completion, of fulfilment and wisdom: epistemic stasis.
Magian thinking acknowledges only one cause for everything, God, the
all-cause. All other forms of causality are illusory. Even our own subjective
actions cannot count as cause, for the central category is divine grace. There is
only one true cause, namely God, who controls everything. From a great distance,
He exerts his decisive influence. And our thoughts, to the extent that they are
meaningful, are the thoughts of an immense pneuma in which we participate.
Faustian thinking is extremely causal, and causation has become a
pervasive force. Faustian causality is deterministic. That is why the will to power
manifests itself as the will to know: whoever knows the laws of the universe has
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real effective power. Laplace’s statement that if we know the laws of nature and
the initial positions of a system, we can predict all future states, is an omnipotence
fantasy. Determinism makes reality manageable and predictable. It is in quantum
physics, in the uncertainty principle and the insight concerning the
unpredictability of reality on an extremely small scale, that a post-Faustian style
of thinking announces itself. In early 20th century physics, Faustian thinking has
reached its boundaries.
Subjectivity – For Apollonian thinking, the subject is a microcosm: a
reflection of the cosmos, but on a small scale. Ideally, the microcosm as well as
the macrocosm are in a state of equilibrium: wisdom, peace of mind. Just like
falling bodies, the soul strives for a natural state of rest, whereby the circular
movement is seen as a perfect final state – also for the subject. Contemplation
means circling. Thinking in this sense is not an activity and should not be seen as
“work”, or as individual achievements of autonomous subjects.
Magian thinking is participation. Only the cosmic spirit really thinks, in
the genuine sense of the word, circling around its own centre. Human individuals
can only participate in this thinking. A thought lights up within us, but this is
actually part of the circular thinking by the cosmic spirit. Not “I” think, but
thinking thinks, in me. Thinking is not an individual achievement. Only the God
of Aristotle really thinks. We think, insofar as we think, his thoughts. The cosmic
spirit thinks in us. And this spirit can only generate consistent thoughts. Our
thoughts are ephemeral moments in the self-contemplation of the cosmic mind.
The birth of the Magian moral subject is the experience of being
summoned. Before that moment, humans are caught up in a cyclical way of life,
focused on production and reproduction: nothing new under the sun, although
some individuals are exempted: the aristocratic elite of contemplative thinkers. A
new dimension of subjectivity opens up in this experience of being addressed.
The typical answer of the Magian subject is: “Here I am, Lord.” Such persons
experience themselves as elected, their calling is an act of grace. And they
become monks, priests or hermits in response. An overpowering awareness takes
hold of them. This idea will henceforth dominate their lives, regardless of whether
this results in benefit or misery.
The starting point of Faustian thinking is the category of the autonomous
subject. Freedom means having the capacity to do your duty, in compliance with
obligations. In Hegel’s philosophy, the activities and achievements of thinking
individuals are actually part of a dialectic of the spirit. Ultimately, only the world
spirit really thinks. Yet, this dialectical process entails hard work in the direction
of progress. Our thinking represents a particular station of thinking that will
sooner or later become outdated. We are temporary voices articulating large-scale
transformative processes. The world spirit is not a circling celestial body (the
“highest sphere”), but realizes itself through arduous intellectual and practical
activities, in which struggle prevails and only the most robust ideas manage to
maintain themselves.
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Objectivity – An apollonian thing is a Grecian temple, proportional and
compete. A Magian thing is a jug, a spherical cavernous cavity, brought into
being in order to collect and preserve precious gifts. In Magian thinking, such
everyday items become sublimated into a Grail, with a capital letter: an elusive,
fabulous thing, a lost object of desire. Magian things light up (omnia quae sunt
sunt lumina), they speak out to us, summon us into reverence, gratitude and
repentance. Thinking (λόγος) does not solely belong to humans, because λόγος is
inherent in being. The things of Creation speak to us, conveying the awareness
that God created them.
The Faustian urge objectifies things, making them calculable. Things
have lost their glamour and voice. The object is a product from now on. For
Faustian thinking, the language of nature is a molecular language. The Faustian
gaze reduces natural phenomena to elementary components such as genes: biomolecular στοιχεῖα that can be represented as letters from the alphabet, as
dominant or recessive genetic factors (Aa, Bb, Cc), as nucleotides (A, C , G and
T) or as elementary particles (e-, P +, H +, Ho, µ). Things no longer speak on
their own accord. Molecules are laboratory entities. Faustian thinking reduces
nature to elementary components with the help of technicity. Meanwhile, it
produces its own kind of thing, the Faustian machine, which ignores, exploits and
transforms nature. Gradually, the earth becomes transformed into a machine park.
The technosphere absorbs the biosphere. Machines spread exponentially.
Faustian technology is disruptive and pervasive. Faustian ontology becomes
philosophy of technology, the ontology of manufactured neo-things. They are
what we try to understand and control. Now that technology had domesticated
nature, the question arises: how to domesticate technology?
§ 4. Sites of truth
An inquiry into styles of thinking tends to focus on the context of discovery, on
the locality where truth originates. An important characteristic of initial situations
is that those involved consciously create optimal conditions for truth to appear.
Heidegger uses the term “clearing” here: an open space which is at the same time
a place of seclusion. Sloterdijk (2004) uses the term alethotope, a site of truth, a
place where humans are exposed to a new experience, suddenly brought to light
(p. 427 ff.). A halo of clarity in a world of darkness, where truth can suddenly be
discerned, where new insights manifest themselves for the first time and where
those involved develop a special sensitivity for this unprecedented event. It is not
a completely spontaneous phenomenon, as its emergence is enabled by particular
practices in particular settings.
The genesis of Apollonian culture in ancient Greece was due not only to
the intellectual competences of Plato and other pioneers, but also to the genius
loci: the ambiance, the gathering site as a condition of possibility. Building on
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Sloterdijk (2004), we will outline several truth-sites: localities where Apollonian,
Magian and Faustian logic came into being; brewing grounds of infection.
A truth-site is a place where a new truth is articulated, a new language is
being forged, and mainstream information is filtered out. It is a place of silence
and seclusion where a new mood settles itself, where epistemic purification can
be practiced, where a new language game can be played and tested relatively
undisturbed, where those involved can practice themselves in their new style of
thinking. It is a fold in the established logic of thinking, where receptivity can
arise for new possibilities of interpretation of key concepts such as “truth” or
“world”. A truth-site is an epistemic clearing. Access is discouraged in the case
of outsiders (Ἀγεωµέτρητος µηδεὶς εἰσίτω, “Let no one ignorant of geometry
enter here”, the words written over the entrance door to Plato’s academy). Silence
is an important precondition for truth to appear. In Phaedrus, Socrates and his
student retreat to a cool and quiet environment. The cenacle room rented by Jesus
and His followers was a location where a new religious dialect could develop,
where it was possible to listen to Jesus without Him raising His voice, and to
exchange fragile thoughts among the initiated. We can compare darkness with
noise, silence with light. The truth-site is a dwelling of silence, a camera silens
(Sloterdijk 2004, p. 384), where those involved could escape the dictatorship of
“das Man” (Heidegger), i.e. endless talk and chatter (“Gerede”).
The alethotope is also a “thermotope”, a cool and comfortable place.
Plato’s Academy was a garden where athletes could cool themselves.
Archimedes’ bath was likewise a site of clearing and cleansing, so that clear
thoughts could emerge. The favourite locality of Jesus and his followers, the
Garden of Olives, was also known as a cool place of relaxation, away from the
heat and bustle. An antithetical site, a contra-place, opposite Jerusalem. In the
upper room, Jesus washed the feet of His disciples, also in a metaphorical sense,
removing the tainted ideas they had acquired along the way through public
spaces. Augustine read Paul’s letters in a garden, the place where Magian
enlightenment took hold of him, where a new type of experience seized him,
without having to compete with other sounds.
Nietzsche’s hypersensitivity to localities, to atmospheric and
meteorological circumstances, his emphasis on issues of clean air and absence of
noise, can be explained as paying due attention to alethotopology, but on closer
inspection something seems to be missing, for an alethotope is also an ergotope,
where those involved devote themselves to common tasks, as guardians of a
message, for instance. This may include addressing specific questions, as a
communal practice. Academics were athletes of logical reasoning, the Stoics
athletes of morality. This could involve games or contests. Those dwelling in a
truth-site were expected to collectively perform certain actions (“Do this to
remember me”). The truth-site makes it possible for those involved to withdraw
temporarily, or for a longer period, from the real world (which remains focussed
on survival and reproduction), to temporarily devote themselves to loftier tasks.
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Truth can survive without biological reproduction, it lives on in books, thoughts
and intellectual or spiritual practices.
Finally, an alethotope is also an erototope, in which new erotic practices
may flourish. In an Apollonian truth-site, the relationship between pupil and
teacher entailed an epistemic-erotic relationship. In the Magian cenacle, where
the gospel of love was preached, a new form of love developed that differed from
worldly love (aimed at reproduction): a shift from eros to caritas. The truth-site
is not a village community, but a brother- or sisterhood, such as the monastery of
Hildegard in Rüdesheim, mapping the cosmic ambiance via music and colourful
illuminations, in order to know the ways of the Lord (scivias). It is a place of love
in the sense of care, collaboration and comfort, where new concepts become the
object of contemplation and devotion, such as Hildegard’s concept of viriditas
(“greenness”) as a symbol for life, health, harmony and divine creation (Zwart et
all 2015); places where new distinctions between true and false manifest
themselves: novel practices of correction, clarification and revelation, places of
gathering for coalitions of the willing, e.g. communities of individuals who seek
out epistemic or spiritual challenges that others (outsiders) prefer to avoid. They
may be guardians of a secret, such as the Magian Cathars, the purified ones – a
name with an alchemical ring to it. Their truth-site excelled in world hostility.
But the truth-site may also be a base-camp, from where a recently retrieved truth
is being proclaimed (as in the case of the Dominicans, for whom the monastery
served as a strategic assembly point preparing the ground for expansion).
Multiple truth-sites can be identified in history, from Archimedes’ bath
via the stove-heated room of Descartes and the divan of Freud to Heidegger’s
Hütte, and although iconic representations may suggest solitary intellectual
activity, these pioneering individuals actually personified emerging
epistemological practices. Apollonian truth sites are connected with physical
exercise, Magian sites entail intimacy and mutual support in facing trials and
tribulations, while in Faustian sites experiments are conducted by teams, and
where research equals education, involving students and trainees. The truth-site
of Faustian thinking par excellence is the laboratory, a place of concentration and
precision, where optimal conditions for producing and reproducing knowledge
can be created, and where the idea may arise that, through methodical interaction,
reality may be controlled.
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Chapter 6. Metropolitan dawn
§ 1. Visible and less visible events
Apollo 11 was launched on July 16, 1969 from the Cape Canaveral launch site in
Florida. The operational management was in the hands of Mission control,
Houston. When looking at images from the control centre (“Houston”), all eyes
are usually focused on the “object” (the astronauts, the moon capsule, the moon),
the focus of public attention and enthusiasm. A philosophical gaze, however, will
opt for an oblique perspective, drawing attention to the scientists sitting behind
their computers. By adopting a tilted perspective, mission control itself comes
into view. Rather than in gravitation as such, we are interested in the way in which
Newton discovered and formulated his law, and this also applies to the moon
landing, one of the most appealing events in the history of recent technoscience.
Our eyes and ears are not so much focussed on the astronauts, not even on
Armstrong’s famous phrase (“One small step for man, one giant leap for
mankind”), but primarily at the control centre itself. Because that is where novelty
is situated, of which the moon voyage is one result among many others.
Bringing this novelty into view requires triangulation involving the
moon, the present and the past. In 1969, humanity was already familiar with the
idea that, one day, human beings would set foot on the moon. Already in 1865,
Jules Verne published his novel about a moon voyage. His novel, based on
extensive research, was a literary thought experiment. Yet, the technology of the
launch as such is the least convincing moment in Verne’s extraordinary voyage.
A giant cannon fires a capsule into space with unimaginable force – a Faustian
climax in the display of power, an incredible amplification of expansion, but the
critical reader inevitably wonders how the moon travellers inside the capsule
could have possibly survived such an event. A launch with such force and at such
a speed must have been accompanied by excessive heat and an enormous shock.
How could they breath and relax in their comfortable capsule during take-off?
More than a hundred years later, the Apollo 11 landed on the moon. There
are remarkable similarities concerning the extent to which Verne’s novel
predicted the future: the shape of the lunar capsule, the material from which the
capsule was made (aluminium), the number of occupants (three), the fact that the
launch took place in Florida (remarkably close to the spot Verne had chosen), the
return voyage towards the Pacific (again: improbably close to where Verne’s
moon capsule also landed), the Americans as winners in the race for the moon,
and so forth. Without denying the importance of these similarities, we should also
pay attention to differences, or rather: the difference. In 1969, Verne’s Faustian
machines (the giant cannon, the giant observatory) had given way to a decidedly
post-Faustian contrivance of a completely different calibre: the computer – the
device that made the lunar journey possible, but also precisely the device that was
absent in Verne’s fictitious version. The heroes who designed Verne’s moon
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voyage were arithmetic geniuses, who could handle complicated equations with
ease, but in the computer age this type of expertise had become redundant.
This is underlined by the fact that the moon landing, as a manifest event,
and as a very visible scientific highlight, was accompanied by a more or less
invisible counter-event, occurring exactly in the same year 1969, the invisible
shadow event as it were, which ultimately would prove much more important
than the moon landing itself. Really important events take place inconspicuously.
In the same year 1969, supercomputers at four universities in the Southwest of
the United States (UCLA, Stanford, University of Utah, UC Santa Barbara) were
connected to each other via a network: the birth of the Internet, initially called
ARPANET. While in Verne’s novel the moon expedition was the work of
military engineers, of cannon builders, suddenly unemployed as the Civil War
had ended, ARPANET was financed by the United States Department of
Defence. The eventual impact of this event was much greater than that of the
Apollo project. Prophets foretold that the Apollo 11 capsule heralded the fact that,
20 years later, in 1989, the Cold War would be decided in favour of the United
States, thereby ending modern (Faustian) warfare between nation states. Since
then, we live in a global world where military conflicts have changed
dramatically. The original ARPANET network was a silent moment of
commencement, an Anfang, where a phenomenon was born that would quickly
spread and would drastically and irreversibly change the world.
Anyone who wants to know what it means to live in the computer age
may pay a visit to a university campus. Probably, there are hundreds of staff and
students working in university buildings, but almost everyone is sitting behind a
computer screen. In fact, when we enter scientific laboratories, it is often
extremely difficult to tell exactly what kind of discipline is being practiced there.
Mathematicians, physicists, chemists, biologists, historians, philosophers,
linguists, psychologists, management studies experts – they all work behind a
computer screen, but this also applies to the janitor, the head of the human
resources department and the Dean. Computers evolved into generic research and
communication tools. The way in which scientific research is conducted, in all
scientific disciplines, has been affected dramatically by the advent of ICT. Book
shelves and racks of test tubes will not altogether disappear, of course, but they
become marginalized and the practices in which they function have undergone
spectacular transitions. Just as mechanical machines such as steam-engines once
symbolised the dominance of the Faustian style, the computer is the symbol of a
post-Faustian style of thinking. A device that was initially developed to function
as a calculator, for which Leibniz and Pascal prepared the ground, became
transformed into a communication device (Licklider and Taylor 1968). The
computer is not a stand-alone entity, of course, but an element in global electronic
networks. The computer indicates how the present world has transformed into a
planetary network, a global metropolis.
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§ 2. The issue of scale
If the claim that we have entered a new, post-Faustian, Metropolitan era is valid,
this must also be reflected in a dramatic expansion of scale. The introduction of
a new thinking style is accompanied by a drastic upscaling of the world as we
know it. In the Apollonian world, the cosmos was experienced as a world on
human scale. Although Apollonian thinking produced fairly accurate estimates
of the size of the Earth, the distance to the stars was measurable in thousands of
kilometres. The Magian universe already extended into a majestic sense of space,
and the Faustian universe was experienced as infinitely large. The post-Faustian
universe has dramatically extended once again. Space as such became dauntingly
complex. The optical telescope became an instrument for amateurs, as
technoscientific instruments now gather terabytes of data. The question what
“observation” means in contemporary astronomy is not that easy to answer. We
“see” the post-Faustian universe mainly thanks to spectacular computer
simulations and visualisations, based on terabytes of computer-generated data,
analysed and interpreted by robots on the basis of algorithms. Galileo could still
invite sceptical cardinals to peer through his telescope, but that is history now.
The new universe is a dynamic universe that bends and expands and is dotted
with black holes.
We notice a comparable change in the realm of the very small.
Apollonian thinkers could only speculate about the world in miniature. Their
science of the naked eye had no access to it, except through speculative thinking.
Faustian thinking revealed molecules, atoms and micro-organisms. In the postFaustian era, attention has shifted to the subatomic level, the nanoworld.
Nanoscience differs from Faustian science primarily, as the name already implies,
because of the scale on which the research evolves. It is about building devices
able to move molecular objects and position them with atomic precision (Drexler
1986). Nanotech is an intervention that is able to play the game of very small
things. The theory of relativity concerns a world on a very large scale, in which
distance is expressed in light-years. Quantum physics, on the other hand,
concerns a world on a very small scale, the realm of photons and electrons. The
history of elementary particle physics (high-energy physics) in the 20th century is
in fact a voyage of discovery in which smaller and smaller “particles” are spotted
and traced, but increasingly this raises the ontological question to what extent we
can still talk about particles or matter. The discovery, first theoretically (Paul
Dirac) and then empirically (Walter Oelert, CERN) of a post-Faustian mirror
world of antimatter (Fraser 2000) is the physics version of Heidegger’s phrase
“das Nichts nichtet”. In other words, we see a drastic change in scale, both large
and small. Making observations has become a completely different kind of praxis.
In CERN’s particle collider, the moment of observation is reduced to a minimum:
a tiny fraction of a second, providing crucial input for long-term research projects.
The rest is computer work. This also applies to life sciences research. Molecular
biology and biotechnology (since 1975) focus directly (rather than indirectly, via
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macroscopic organisms) on genes, genomes and molecular mechanisms such as
CRISPR-Cas9. Miniaturization is rampant also here.
The increase in scale not only affects the object, but also the subject pole
of the knowledge production process. Here we see the emergence of large-scale,
interdisciplinary research programs (the Manhattan project, CERN, the Human
Genome Project, etc.). Computer-based research results in anonymisation of the
researcher-as-author, not only in the sense that terminology, design and
methodology of publications are highly standardized, but also in the sense that
the number of authors per article increased dramatically (multiple authorship). In
many fields of science, publications with hundreds of authors can be found, in
high-energy physics for instance, but also in genomics (Venter et al 2001).
Authorship is a function of thinking style (Zwart 2001a). Apollonian
authors were reluctant to entrust their thoughts to paper: they preferred not to
write at all and opted for an esoteric style of communication, practiced among
initiates. The Magian author was an authority, a privileged medium who acquired
profound insights. The author’s name functioned as a guarantee of truth, a mark
of quality and reliability: Aristotle dixit. All other authors, all normal authors,
were mere commentators, students of Aristotle, the Master. Faustian authors,
however, want to make a name for themselves as individuals. Writing becomes a
struggle for recognition. The Faustian author no longer wants to remain
anonymous, but is hypersensitive to plagiarism. Prominent Faustian authors such
as Newton or Darwin were drawn into priority conflicts. The drive towards
productivity and the need to make impact, resulted in Faustian inventions such as
the scholarly journal and the printing press.
Post-Faustian authorship generates new forms of anonymity. Author
names now assume purely technical functions in the context of information
retrieval, evaluations of research groups and university rankings. In many
scientific domains, the author, if not “dead” (Foucault 1994b) is reduced to a pure
signifier (browsed by robots looking for citations). Post-Faustian authorship does
not affect all fields of science at the same time, however. The epidemic is
spreading from one research domain to another. Quantum physics not only
discovered a reality beyond Faustian determinism, but also stimulated multiple
authorship. In other scholarly fields, the post-Faustian revolution is just arriving.
Instead of post-Faustian, I will adopt the term “Metropolitan” in this study to refer
to the contemporary style of thinking, emerging in all scientific and cultural
domains. Grounding characteristics of this way of thinking (publishing,
communicating, interacting, etc.) are complexity and convergence.
§ 3. Complexity: the year 1989
To some extent, biotechnology, resulting from the biotechnological revolution
(circa 1975), could still be seen as Faustian. Scientists involved aimed to modify
model organisms, more effectively and targeted than ever before. By adding or
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switching off genes, the aim was to adapt the properties of particular organisms
to human requirements. In this way, biotechnology would allow us to re-shape
the world at will, and to adapt organisms to our (exponentially increasing) needs
and demands. The will to know entailed a will to improve. And yet, a new element
is added, namely the fact that the biotechnologies employed are developed by
nature herself, so that gene knock-outs mimic mutations, for instance, while
CRISPR-cas9 employs a protective molecular device developed by microbes
millions of years ago. The microbes are the real bio-engineers, and human
engineers merely mimic the solutions they developed.
This also applies to human self-knowledge. On November 9 1989, as
citizens from East-Berlin flooded into the Western parts of a divided city, Nature
published an article on the Human Genome Project (HGP), announcing that
scientists were developing a joint data-base where they could deposit their
sequencing materials, flanked by an article about societal issues to be addressed.
The final preparations for launching the HGP coincided with the collapse of the
Berlin Wall and the subsequent reunification of Germany and, to some extent, of
Europe as a whole. Convergence was in the air, first and foremost between
research fields, for genomics was a converging enterprise, absorbing expertise
from physics, chemistry, biology, biotechnology, cybernetics, computer science
and multiple other fields to understand complexity (to envision living entities as
complex systems). The HGP wanted to map the human genome in a
comprehensive manner based on the idea that, if only we would know our genes,
we would finally know ourselves.
The HGP resulted in a remarkable experience however (Zwart 2007).
Initially, the scientists involved assumed that the human genome would contain
at least one hundred, but probably more than three hundred thousand genes. The
uniqueness and complexity of humankind as an intelligent and hyper-creative
species, capable of building its own (hyper-complex) environment and able to
survive in a technotope of its own making, should be reflected in our genome.
Step by step, however, the number of genes decreased until something like
22,500. The human genome is modest in size. This “narcissistic offense”, this
“negative” result, had a positive effect as well: apparently, the complexity and
uniqueness of humans is to be found elsewhere, in culture and history.
Paradoxically perhaps, the HGP marked the end of genetic reductionism and
Faustian determinism. Intelligence and creativity are emergent features that
cannot be reduced to a limited number of genes, to a fictitious “factor X” that
makes us human. Human characteristics are the result of a long history of
interactions. We are to a considerable extent self-made, the product of evolving
ways of interaction with the environment, developed long ago, based on language
and tool-use, and now transmuting at a dramatic pace.
In other academic fields, Faustian research strategies likewise gave way
to more holistic approaches, trying to understand reality in terms of complex
processes and systems. The computer is the enabling technology that made this
shift from reductionism (Faustian) to complexity possible. Similar to how Jules
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Verne gave voice to the Faustian era, Metropolitan technoscience also found its
literary representatives in literary authors such as Michael Crichton (Zwart
2015b). A comparative anatomy between the works of Verne and Crichton would
be an interesting exercise. Like Verne, Crichton wrote a series of novels that
constitute a literary encyclopaedia of contemporary technoscience, covering all
the major technoscientific areas of the computer age, such as genomics and
molecular biology in Jurassic Park (1990/1991), where paleontological species
are transformed into research animals, kept in an open-air laboratory, a science
park, intended as a tourist attraction of the Metropolitan era. Under Metropolitan
conditions, technoscience becomes a global enterprise. Crichton not only focuses
on computer-based DNA techniques and security systems, but also on the
dynamics of technological innovation, the challenges of acquiring massive
research funding and the role of governments such as the U.S. Department of
Defence. Disciplines which tended to evolve slowly and incrementally, such as
palaeontology and archaeology (Zwart 2009), suddenly experience a dramatic
increase in pace and scale, due to the advent of new informational machines,
acquiring societal relevance in the context of large-scale research programs
addressing complex issues such as climate change, biodiversity and extinction.
Under Metropolitan conditions, palaeontology radically changes, like every other
research field.29
The epidemiological pathway of the new way of thinking usually starts
in areas such as mathematics, before moving on to physics and from there to other
fields. A versatile protagonist of complexity thinking in physics was Gell-Mann
(1994) for instance. The beginning of complexity thinking is chaos theory – postFaustian mathematics par excellence (Gleick 1987). In Crichton’s books, chaos
theorist Ian Malcolm functions as a critic of Faustian thinking. For complex
systems, containment is impossible. Crichton breaks with the age-old stereotype
of the Faustian mathematician as a hyper-intelligent hermit who practices his
craft of handling astronomical numbers exclusively with pen and paper.
Malcolm’s mathematics is computer-dependent and he himself is remarkably
extravert, outgoing and communicative.30
29
“Grant knew that palaeontology, the study of extinct life, had in recent years taken on
an unexpected relevance to the modern world. The modern world was changing fast,
and urgent questions about the weather, deforestation, global warming, or the ozone
layer often seemed answerable, at least in part, with information from the past.
Information that palaeontologists could provide. He had been called as an expert
witness twice in the past few years” (p. 32); “[If] dinosaurs could be cloned – why,
Grant’s field of study was going to change instantly. The paleontological study of
dinosaurs was finished. The whole enterprise - the museum halls with their giant
skeletons and flocks of echoing school children, the university laboratories with their
bone trays, the research papers, the journals - all of it was going to end” (Crichton
1990/1991, p. 84).
30
“Ian Malcolm was one of the most famous of the new generation of mathematicians
who were openly interested in ‘how the real world works’. These scholars broke with
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This shift is also discernable in our interaction with nature. For Faustian
thinking, nature is a resource: raw materials, exploited by humans in a nonsustainable fashion. This disruptive use of raw materials increases exponentially,
resulting in unsettling, exponential growth curves. It is the job of the Faustian
engineer to transform nature into something that is useful and useable,
systematically manipulating living nature in laboratories, where biology becomes
biotechnology (Pauly 1987). The Metropolitan bio-engineer, however, is aware
of the complexity of nature, which we should use in a much more intelligent
manner, more attuned to nature. Sloterdijk (2001) speaks of homeo-technology,
compatible with nature, taking the place of Faustian allo-technology, hostile to
nature (Lemmens 2005). One may think of developments in the field of
biomaterials and bioremediation, the greening of industry, using microorganisms to run industrial processes with less energy and less waste (Zwart et al
2015). Biotechnological miniaturization makes it possible to interact with natural
processes and systems in a more intimate and considerate way. Faustian medicine
poisons the body, but Metropolitan medicine aims to interact with bodily
processes in more intelligent ways, using nanoscience for drug delivery for
instance, while Metropolitan prosthetics produces embedded protheses, fully
integrated into and compatible with their bio-environment.
The year 1989 was preceded by other important turning points, such as
the year 1969, as we have seen, but also the year 1953, when James Watson and
Francis Crick discovered the molecular structure of DNA, composed of strands
of nucleotides. These nucleotides actually constitute a minimal alphabet
consisting of four letters (A, C, G and T) and these four signifiers were seen as
constitutive of the quintessence of life. The elementary particles of life now
seemed under our control. In that same year 1953, Jacques Lacan launched his
famous seminar to elaborate the idea that the unconscious was structured like a
language, and that life and human desire could be linguistically explained in
terms of symbolic networks of signifiers. Speaking of desire, the Kinsey report
Sexual Behaviour in the human Female was also published in 1953, and the first
colour television went on sale. While 1953 was still saturated with events
pertaining to the Cold War – Stalin’s death, the end of the Korean War, the
Volksaufstand in the German Democratic Republic (DDR), the arrival in West
Germany of a first wave of released prisoners of War (Gulag Archipelago
survivors), President Harry S. Truman announcement that the U.S. had
successfully developed a hydrogen bomb, the awarding of the Nobel Prize for
the cloistered tradition of mathematics in several important ways. For one thing, they
used computers constantly, a practice traditional mathematicians frowned on. For
another, they worked almost exclusively with nonlinear equations, in the emerging field
called chaos theory. For a third, they appeared to care that their mathematics described
something that actually existed in the real world. And finally, as if to emphasize their
emergence from the academia into the world, they dressed and spoke with what one
senior mathematician called ‘a deplorable excess of personality’. In fact, they often
behaved like rock stars.” (1991, p. 72).
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Literature to Winston Churchill – the year 1989 not only seemed to mark the end
of the Cold War as a global Faustian conflict, but even the “end of history”
(Fukuyama 1992) as such, giving rise to globalisation (the one-world concept)
and the hegemony of neo-liberalism.
§ 4. Globalisation
The world became hyper-complex in other respects as well. The manifestation of
Faustian thinking in the political domain was the nation state as we have seen.
Although national sovereignty is formally still in place (citizens are still expected
to pay their taxes, albeit electronically – via the computer – and in Europe in a
new, transnational currency called Euro), its power has been severely thwarted.
Politically, we are entering the Metropolitan era, where all countries become
interconnected and new constellations of power define the scene, not only the
United States and China (and to a somewhat lesser extent Russia and the EU), but
also big global, Metropolitan tech companies, or hyper-companies, such as
Microsoft, Apple, Google, Facebook, Amazon and others, complemented to some
extent by the power of global NGOs and global charities. Such entities tend to be
wealthier, more powerful and more advanced than most nation states can claim
to be. A crisis of representation prevails, as citizens no longer consider politicians
as their representatives. The prestige and influence of the latter has dramatically
decreased, although female politicians (e.g. Angela Merkel, Ursula von der
Leyen) are notable exceptions and prove more professional leaders than their
(often remarkably bizarre or even obscene) male counterparts, e.g. Donald Trump
or Boris Johnson. Most national governments are actors of little import in the
emerging Metropolitan force field. The idea that developments can be directed
by politicians is becoming increasingly questionable, and maybe Trump’s years
in office were one desperate attempt to prove the opposite. In China, however,
the development apparently moves in a juxtaposed direction. Here we witness a
strengthening of central government, an imposing presence of the state, embodied
by an Imperial father figure.
The Faustian nation state was first and foremost a mobilization machine
in times of war. However, warfare has also undergone dramatic changes. Wars
are determined by computers and electronic devices such as drones. Wars are
fought with the help of computer-controlled precision bombardments, but on
closer inspection such victories are often unreal. While civilians pay the prize,
the enemy often diffuses into the background, awaiting a return of the repressed,
through acts of terror if needs be. The supremacy of the United States is an effect
of the computer, of modern communication technologies, but there is a fatal
weakness in this reliance on high-tech prowess, namely the American inability to
“deal with” socio-cultural ambiance. Moreover, ICT is spreading, and China is
superseding the West as the ICT-based superpower. While American intelligence
is pervading the global environment, the U.S. are increasingly targeted by foreign
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disruptive ICT-based offences themselves, while its cynical international policies
(forming a strategic axis with Israel for instance in rolling out a domino strategy
of disruption in the Middle East: Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran) have
irreversibly undermined its moral leadership.
§ 5. Sexuality and religion
Faustian marriage was a struggle between formal responsibilities and latent
desire. What is happening to sexuality and desire under Metropolitan conditions?
One possible starting point is the question raised by Michel Foucault (1976): why
do we so vehemently claim that we should liberate our repressed desires, while
in fact human discourse on sexuality has proliferated during the Faustian era, and
scientists examined sexuality in a prolific manner, encouraging individuals to
confess and express their sexual feelings and identities? Why do we so
persistently claim our sexuality to be subject to repression? What he envisioned
was an alternative way of speaking about and practicing eroticism, namely in
terms of lifestyle and practices of the self. The Freudian interpretation (as the
“highest stage” of Victorianism) continued to emphasise the importance of
repressed desires (homoerotic and otherwise). Lacan represents a Metropolitan
turn, zooming in on the fascination (artistic, cinematic and otherwise) for the
phallus (male or female) as an enigmatic “object a” (Zwart 2019).
In the Metropolitan era, perversions are reframed as “fascinations”, as
part of a lifestyle. Myriads of websites are available for sharing and cultivating
digitised cravings. During the Victorian era, the obscene was located elsewhere,
had to withdraw into specific locations such as brothels, where “aberrations” were
practiced. Or they were projected upon distant historical eras (say, the court of
emperor Nero). The Metropolitan ideal is the inclusive equivalence of all options,
celebrating non-mainstream otherness as LGBT and “queer”. Insofar as
traditional values connected with marriage are still acknowledged by neoliberalist
ideologies, this is motivated by economic, pragmatic or pedagogic arguments.
The family structure has certain economic and psychic advantages and
disadvantages, according to the experts.
What is traditionally referred to as the “emancipation of women” is
reframed as inclusiveness and diversity. In principle all professions are open to
both sexes, including those of professional soldiers or professional boxers.
Statistics indicate a steady growth of women in managerial positions, although
the pace of progress in the direction of gender equality remains an issue of
concern. The heroine of Michael Crichton’s novel Disclosure (1993/1994) is a
female manager who harasses a male subordinate. Patriarchal physicians are
replaced by teamwork. The vast majority of medical students are women, and
male gynaecologists seem increasingly oxymoronic. The real heroes and heroines
of the Metropolitan era are transgenders. Whereas cross-dressing transvestites
may still be regarded a Faustian phenomenon, playing a dangerous game,
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challenging and trespassing boundaries, – an ars erotica which relies on and
therefore continues to endorse those boundaries –, transgenders stretch the
dichotomy into a non-binary continuum where individuals freely position and
recreate themselves, using surgical and endocrinological means to make their
body makeable.
Faustian religion was dogmatic. Doctrinal issues became intertwined
with armed conflicts between emerging powers. Atheism, as a creed and as a
negation, is a dogmatic Faustian position. Atheists armed themselves against
religious temptations – although in some cases dramatic regressions could take
place. The collapse of the Catholic Church, repeatedly predicted by friend and
foe, never materialised. We may even conclude that the Church, as a decidedly
global organisation, has much better prospects than social democracy or even the
nation state, forces which tried to undermine the power of the Church, for instance
by enforcing the separation of church and state. During the early modern period,
churches were nationalised (the Reformation must also be viewed from this
perspective) while the internationalism of the Jesuits (whose organisation
represented an impressive power machine, independent of nation states) aroused
suspicion. Now, the Catholic Church represents global perseverance. The
religious “crisis” is a Western phenomenon. From a global perspective, Planet
Earth is inhabited by billions of religious people. A large majority of the world
population consists of more or less sincere believers. Empty churches are more
than compensated by mass support elsewhere. The Church has often been
considered an “anachronism”, but this did not prevent Pope John Paul II from
contributing to the demise of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union, nor did it prevent Pope Francis from becoming a figure of international
standing, for instance when addressing issues of sustainability or global crises
(from the Syria crisis down to COVID-19). Popes are global “players”, their
voices reach out to global audiences. The remarkable endurance of the Church
relies on her tendency not to adapt too much to the ideologies in vogue. It is not
difficult to draw parallels between the present world and ancient Rome. The
violence of the arenas has shifted to televisions and computer screens, where
“good” and “bad” characters literally shatter each other to pieces in front of a
mass audience (the action movie as an electronic amphitheatre). The erotic body,
carefully hidden from view in oriental cultures, is emphatically present,
emphasised rather than camouflaged in Western commercials. There’s obviously
a role for the Church to play in such a boisterous media environment.
This may explain the aversion which Catholicism continues to instil
among allegedly “left-wing” protagonists of neo-liberalism: notably newspaper
columnists, the preachers of the neo-liberal creed, specialised in spelling out what
is “left” (“good”) and “right” (“bad”) for faithful devotees of ideologies which
were once considered avant-garde (during the 1960s and 1970s) but who are now
perplexed by a rapidly changing world. Especially the role of the Church in its
combat against the sexual revolution, preaching monogamy as prevention, while
at the same time being unable to prevent sex scandals in its own ranks, has been
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heavily criticised. Any sexual restrictions became themselves taboo, although the
sexual revolution is currently counter-acted by the #MeToo movement as its
inevitable recoil. Meanwhile, freedom of expression has eroded into “the right to
insult”. Notably, we are encouraged to insult the devotees of religious creeds.
Thus, paradoxically perhaps, the plea for inclusivity and tolerance reveals itself
to be non-inclusive and intolerant of otherness in the end, as the endorsement of
the principles of neoliberalism becomes a condition for admittance to the debate.
The styles-of-thinking approach may help us to come to terms with this polarising
debate by pointing out that what we are actually facing is a collision between
cultures (trying to redefine themselves in a quickly evolving global environment)
and the nihilistic tendencies of a late-Faustian (neo-liberal) civilisation bent on
eliminating all ideological rivals.
§ 6. The year 2000
The year 2000, also referred to as MM or Y2K, was a remarkable year for various
reasons, first of all because, in terms of the Anno Domini calendar, it constituted
the turning point between the second and third millennium. But the year 2000
proved to be more than just a nice round figure.
Interestingly, a quite remarkable and exceptional astronomical event
occurred in Y2K, namely the alignment of six planets (Mercury, Venus, Earth,
Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn) on May 5, 2000. On that day, these planets found
themselves positioned in a line with the Sun, suggesting that the year 2000
actually marked an epochal divide in the sense that a cultural wave was coming
to an end. To understand the significance of this year, we must first of all take a
step backwards, to the remarkable year – annus mirabilis – 1900, when several
ground-breaking events took place, in physics and biology, but also in philosophy
and psychology. To begin with, Max Planck introduced the quantum concept, and
the work of Gregor Mendel was rediscovered. Sigmund Freud published The
Interpretation of Dreams (although the actual publication date was 1899), while
Edmund Husserl announced the birth of phenomenology, publishing his
philosophy classic Philosophical Investigations. Several other events can be
added to the list, but the four just mentioned already signal the emergence of
completely new areas of scientific inquiry, all of which greatly affected the
intellectual landscape of the 20th century (Zwart 2013b). They herald the birth of
intellectual movements such as quantum physics (inaugurated by Planck),
genetics (inaugurated by the rediscovery of the work of Mendel), psychoanalysis
(inaugurated by Freud) and phenomenology (inaugurated by Husserl).
The year 1900 can be regarded as the new beginning – the Anfang – of
what would be brought to completion in (or around) the year 2000. Mendel, for
instance, had published his ideas (which anticipated the Zeitgeist of the 20th
century) somewhat too early (Foucault 1971; Zwart 2008), namely in the 1860s,
so that they were more or less ignored. The sudden rediscovery of his work, in
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the spring of 1900, by three different scholars, simultaneously, but independently
from one another, inaugurated the birth of what later came to be known as
genetics and the gene concept, thereby also setting the scene for the rise of
molecular biology in the second half of the 20th century, culminating in the
discovery of the molecular structure of DNA (in 1953, during the nadir of the
Cold War) and the sequencing of the human genome (1989-2003), a project
whose beginning coincided with the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 a we
have seen. The symbolic near-completion of the HGP was the Press Conference
organised in the year 2000 (June 26 to be exact). During a carefully orchestrated
event, the draft version of the human genome sequence was proudly presented at
the White House in Washington, before a live audience, while simultaneously
reaching out to a global audience (Urbi et Orbi) by President Bill Clinton and
two prominent scientists, Francis Collins and Craig Venter (Zwart 2018).
In a similar vein, the quantum concept paved the way for the emergence
of elementary particle physics, the discovery of anti-matter and the Large Hadron
Collider (LHC) at CERN, where the epic of quantum physics reached its
completion in the hunt for the illusive Higgs-boson. In synchrony with the HGP,
this hunt likewise began in the late 1980s at CERN, with the help of a very big
machine, the Large Electron-Positron (LEP) collider. In 2000, however, the final
episode set in. In that year, the LEP was shut down to make way for the LHC, an
even bigger machine, but located in the same subterranean tunnel. By now, the
project finally seems to have achieved its goal, as the spectral Higgs-Boson has
finally been detected.
Psychoanalysis, grounded in, but at the same time distancing itself from
late nineteenth-century neurophysiology, also had a significant impact, not only
on psychotherapy, but on the humanities as such, from philosophy up to literature
studies, as well as on human culture and human self-understanding at large. For
decades, psychoanalysis and high-tech neuro-centric experimentalism seemed
worlds apart, but currently we notice the emergence of research programs which
aim to connect psychoanalytic concepts (the unconscious, repression, resistance)
with brain research, cybernetics and linguistics.
The year 1900 represented the resurgence of the discontinuity principle
(Van den Berg 1977; Zwart 2002). The previous epoch (from 1700 to 1900 A.D.)
had been under the sway of the continuity principle, indicating that nature makes
no leaps: Natura non facit saltus, a phrase coined by Leibniz but repeatedly
quoted by Darwin in The Origin of Species. Now, however, scientists discovered
that nature does evolve through leap-like changes. This was notably exemplified
by the quantum leap concept in physics and the mutation concept in biology. As
Erwin Schrödinger phrased it in What is life? (1944/1967), mutations (jump-like,
discontinuous changes in the genomes of living organisms) are remarkably
reminiscent of the quantum jumps studied in quantum physics. Mutations are
leap-like changes in the molecular structure of a gene. Therefore, mutation theory
is the “quantum theory of biology” in a more than figurative way (Schrödinger
1944/1967, p. 36). Both theories (quantum physics and genetics), he argued, not
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only coincide in time (p. 51), but also convey the same basic idea (Zwart 2013b).
In neurophysiology, discontinuity is discernible in the all-or-none principle (first
recognized in the late 19th century) which states that neurons discharge as soon
as (and only if) a certain threshold is reached (regardless of the strength of the
current stimulus). It represents an either/or event: the neuron either discharges or
not (1 or 0; the trigger is either pulled or not).
Dialectically speaking, if the continuity principle is considered the first
moment (the thesis, i.e. the birth of modern rational thinking), then the year 1900
constitutes the emergence of the second moment: the “negation” of the continuity
principle, i.e. the discontinuity principle. And this implies that the year 2000 must
be the third moment, the negation of the negation, seeing both principles as
complementary rather than as contradictory, reconciling them on a higher level
of complexity and comprehensiveness. A perfect example of this dialectical
“third moment” is the punctuated equilibrium theory of evolution, which
combines the Darwinian idea of gradual, incremental change with the postDarwinian concept of sudden, leap-like transitions. Both continuity and
discontinuity can be discerned in nature, as moments of complex systems. In
genomics, a similar “third moment” is discernible in the conviction that the
meaning of a mutation for an organism will depend on the cellular, organismal
and ecological environment in which it occurs, a viewpoint which acknowledges
complexity and interaction, and takes us beyond genetic determinism.
This development emphasises an important ingredient of the Y2K
Zeitgeist, namely “complexity”. The 20th century is a transition process from the
rediscovery of discontinuous change (in 1900) towards the appreciation of
complexity (in 2000). And this transition is visible both at the object-pole and at
the subject-pole of the knowledge relationship. At the object pole, the
development between 1900 and 2000 can indeed be regarded as a research route
leading from basic constituents (e.g. genes, quanta, the basic constituents of
phenomenological experience, etc.) towards complex interacting systems. We see
this in the shift of focus from “genes” to “genomes”, and from genetics to
genomics and similar -omics fields, but we also see it in the shift from energy
quanta (Planck’s discovery) to elementary particle physics (exemplified by
CERN and other big science research settings) where worlds of astounding
complexity (far beyond the reach of human comprehension, and only accessible
via big computers, operated by very large research teams) are disclosed.
A similar development can be discerned at the subject pole, moreover,
namely from discrete discoveries made by individuals (Planck, Mendel, De Vries,
Husserl, Freud, etc.) towards a dramatic increase of scale, involving distributed
intelligence, global collaboration, multiple authorship and world-wide
networking, resulting in scientific knowledge production at a very high pace
(Zwart 2009; Zwart 2013c). This is even evident at the humanities side of the
spectrum, where phenomenology and psychoanalysis have evolved into largescale areas of research and praxis. Although research is often still framed as being
the work of Faustian geniuses, this obfuscates the extent to which research
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actually became the work of large-size consortia involving multiple research
institutes (both public and private) and countless, more or less anonymous experts
(bench-workers, often early stage researchers) distributed across the globe. The
emergence of multiple authorship and citation indexes, even in philosophy, is
symptomatic of this trend.
Let us now consider some remarkable events occurring in Y2K. For the
sake of brevity (for 2000 is indeed an extremely rich and complex year) I will
focus on just three events, although many more could be added to this list. First
of all, on January 6 2000, the last individual belonging to the species Pyrenean
ibex (a mountain goat of the Pyrenees) was found dead, apparently killed by a
falling tree. Secondly, the birth of five cloned piglets was announced on March
5, 2000 at PPL Therapeutics in Edinburgh, named Milly, Christa, Alexis, Carrel
and Dotcom. Finally, on May 5 2000, a computer virus or worm named
ILOVEYOU began to infect and attack millions of Windows personal computers
around the globe, spreading quickly through electronic networks an invoking
serious damage (far more damage than was caused by the anxiously anticipated,
but eventually harmless Millennium bug). Do these seemingly unrelated events
have something in common? Can they be seen as part of a meaningful
Gesamtbild? I believe this is the case. And indeed, by seeing them as
meaningfully related, this will help us to mutually elucidate their meaning. All
three events. I will argue, reflect a common mood or Zeitgeist.
As to the first event, it is important to point out that the extinction of this
wild mammal was not the end of the animal’s tragic story. The last of the
Pyrenean ibexes became the target of a research project, namely the endeavour to
resurrect this extinct species on the basis of its genome. A biotechnology
company announced (on October 8, 2000) its intention to use nuclear transfer
cloning technology in order to clone the Pyrenean ibex back into existence (a
process currently known as de-extinction). And indeed, on July 30 2003, a clone
was born alive, but died several minutes later due to lung defects. Although the
project failed to bring the species back, it did show that, in the era of genomics
and biotechnology, extinction has now become a relative concept. Somewhere in
the future it may work. In fact, Siberian Mammoths are the next species on the
list (Zwart and Penders 2011), while novelist Michael Crichton had already
extended the concept to include Jurassic fauna (1990/1991). De-extinction
became closely connected with genome sequencing, moreover, a research
practice exemplified by the HGP discussed above. Via genomics and other life
sciences research areas, the sway of contemporary technoscience over living
nature has increased dramatically. At the same time, it is clear that the astounding
complexity of living systems still represents a challenge for the technologydriven will to control.
A similar message is entailed in the second example. Genomics-oriented
technologies for cloning are used to make living nature more makeable and
modifiable. The idea is that in the nearby future, cloned animals (notably piglets)
may become available as resources for procuring organs (xenotransplantation).
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The piglets’ names were symptomatic as well. While Alexis and Carrel referred
to a transplantation pioneer and Nobel laureate named Alexis Carrel (Zwart
2001b), Dotcom evidently refers to Internet and the WWW.
This choice of names again indicates that a connection can be discerned
between simultaneous events in different realms (life sciences and computer
sciences specifically). Although organisms and computers initially may seem
completely different things, or opposites even (organisms versus artefacts), they
have become intimately interconnected (a phenomenon known in dialectics as the
interpenetration of opposites). The genome is basically regarded as a program or
code, functionally comparable to computer code. And this is exemplified by the
phenomenon (again typical of the 21st century) of the computer virus, inaugurated
by the launch of the ILOVEYOU virus in 2000. Both organisms and computers
can be infected by viruses: entities which are basically nothing more than
packaged pieces of potentially detrimental and quickly replicating code.
Moreover, computer viruses also exemplify the complexity of the contemporary
world: the interconnectedness of everything via computer networks. A similar
eco-systemic connectedness is discernible in nature. We ourselves are ecosystems
(for our microbiome) dwelling within and interacting with other eco-systems, and
the whole world is basically one interconnected ecosystem of ecosystems, one
cycle of cycles, as Hegel once phrased it.
This, I would argue, is the meaning of the year 2000. A new style of
thinking is emerging. Humans evolved into a planetary species and the world
became a global web (a noosphere) of networks and circuits, of intelligent
systems, increasingly consisting of smart machines, while laboratories function
as local nodes in these globalised and computerised networks. Such global trends
at the same time remain connected with the doings and experiences of concrete
individuals. For instance, although science has become a large-scale
phenomenon, involving huge numbers of researchers worldwide, concrete
individuals (research celebrities or managers of large-scale institutes or programs,
e.g. Francis Collins, Craig Venter, Bill Gates, Steve Jobs, Jennifer Doudna,
Emmanuelle Charpentier, etc.) give these converging research practices a face
(literally). We should continue to pay due attention to details. I already referred
to the playful names given to the cloned piglets (Dotcom) and the name of the
computer virus (ILOVEYOU), suggesting a connection between eroticism and
digital infections (computer sterility). Producers of computer viruses act in
accordance with Freud’s dictum Acheronta movebo: these entities enter the
system via subliminal channels, often using trespassers into the no-go areas of
the Internet as carriers of infection.
§ 7. The metropolis and its inhabitants
Anyone approaching a city like New York, Shanghai, Singapore or Los Angeles
from the air will be hugely impressed by the extraordinary size and complexity
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of the urban phenomenon below: a metropolis on a scale that dwarfs the Faustian
monster cities of the 19th century: forms of urbanity which exceed our
comprehension and which can only be monitored by hyper-computers. How to
oversee, understand or control such complex networks, such hyperobjects
(Morton 2013)? At first sight it is incomprehensible that cities of this size can
function at all. They are the emergent result of myriads of interpenetrating
processes. Without highways, airports and airplanes, such urban networks would
be completely unthinkable (Crichton 1996/1997), which makes the COVID-19
paralysis such a remarkable disruptive event (Zwart 2020c). The metropolis is an
environment whose resilience is continuously challenged by disruptive events,
and this places high demands on its residents. They will have to be mobile and
flexible, willing to accept the credo of life-long learning, constantly acquiring
new skills, new communication techniques, new professions, new forms of
technology. Who can successfully inhabit such “mother cities”? Who is the
metropolitan “we”?
Schelling and Hegel once argued that peoples are taking turns in playing
the leading role in the drama of history (e.g. the Egyptians, the Persians, the
Greek, the Romans, the Goths, etc.). One by one, they all experienced their
Golden Age as chosen people and as carriers of culture. At the beginning of the
20th century, Germany, France and England violently competed to assume this
role. After the catastrophic mega-conflicts that heralded the demise of the nation
state, this idea is no longer credible. First of all, because of the awareness (voiced
by Spengler, among many others) that history is multi-centred, so that various
groups may take a leading role in various regions on various continents. For
instance, during the centuries when the Greeks experienced “their” historical
moment and the Roman Empire came into being, the Bantu speaking people in
Africa were engaged in their southward expansion, reaching KwaZulu-Natal and
Transvaal somewhere between 300 and 500 A.D., while in China the Han dynasty
reigned (202 B.C.–220 A.D.). In modernity, Protestants (notably the more radical
branches, such as the Latter-day Saints or Mormons) considered themselves as
chosen people, allegedly replacing the Jews on the basis of a new covenant, while
in Marxist theory, the working classes were chosen to play the role of the
transformative avant-garde. Should we adopt this line of reasoning, the question
would be which actor will take the lead in the Metropolitan era? Should we think
of a megastate such as China? Or rather of global tech giants such as Microsoft
and Google?
In addition, the crucial question emerges who will be admitted and
included in this emerging “we”. Advocates of neoliberal ideologies are not the
only voices prone to obfuscate the mechanisms of exclusion they actually
support. Hegel (1970) already set the stage when his fascinating dialectics of
convergence derailed and failed to supersede his Eurocentric bias when
discussing the African continent, so that notably these (un-dialectical) sections of
his philosophy of history deserve to be drastically rewritten. While some groups
are insistently invited to join the Ark of history, others are pushed back into
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reservations (from Native Americans up to Palestinians living in Gaza or the
West-Bank) or into metropolitan slums. How to address this challenge? While
Magian thinking implied an ethos of patience (waiting for a divine intervention),
Faustian thinking entailed an ethos of activism and mobilisation. Urban settings
were a harsh industrial environment where struggle for survival reigned, but they
also operated as emancipation machines, while other fantastic machines swerved
like glittering capsules through oceans and landscapes to escape the industrial
miasma. Now, we dwell in a different world.
Some voices suggest that we have arrived at our destination, that we are
there, that history has ended and that the world has become one. But precisely
now we seem to have lost all sense of orientation. We inhabit a global “mother
city” in the literal sense of the word: µήτηρ πόλις, under the sway of unstoppable
communication and hyper-connectivity. The metropolitan ambiance is no longer
an inhospitable environment, but rather a world of unprecedent luxury and
comfort, from a historical perspective. The conditions under which metropolitan
residents exist, are allegedly human-friendly and historically speaking without
precedent. In terms of human husbandry: we are well-protected and well-fed.
This does not mean that we are free from diseases or the consequences of ageing
(we are not beyond biology). A litany of laments can still be heard, but that, of
course, is part of the condition. The Faustian slogan of progress gave way to
technocratic efforts to optimise the quality of life.
This does not mean, however, that everyone is equally connected to the
emerging networks, or that global innovation is as inclusive as advocates of
neoliberalism purport it to be. Quite the contrary, the multiple dichotomies
between participants and non-participants, between adopters and non-adopters
are evidently increasing. Many commentators (journalists, etc.) are still looking
for contradictions of the Faustian type, e.g. between the bourgeoisie and the
proletariat, to explain why the global metropolis is not able to allow everyone to
profit, but this still presupposes the Faustian idea of progress towards a situation
of completion (i.e. the end of history). Somehow, on the political level, such
commentators failed to internalise the implications of the entropy concept,
namely that every increase of productivity and order (e.g. the creation of
interconnected megacities) inevitably results in massive disruption elsewhere,
notably at the outskirts. Thus, globalisation and connectivity gave rise to largescale deforestation, ecological destruction, military conflicts and the emergence
of novel viral threats. While economists continue to believe in growth and the
“good tidings” of a global market, the jungles of the Amazon are destroyed, the
ice-caps of the Arctic are melting, and children in Yemen are starving. Faustian
slave trade has been replaced by a very lucrative immigrant market: human
trafficking, humans as commodity, either involving refugees seeking asylum or
young people looking for a better future, as their countries of origin fall victim to
erosion and disruption, while greedy metropolises keep growing. This is, in short,
the challenge: co-creating a metropolitan world which does not result in massive
exclusion and uprooting.
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In short, we are facing a paradoxical situation. Inside the metropolis, the
technocracies of optimisation go hand in hand with burn-out and fatigue. At the
outskirts, we see destruction and degradation. On the one hand, affluent elderly
and millions of spoiled millionaires, on the other hand viral threats and the
ongoing erosion of education of the young. On the hand, campaigns on behalf of
the rights of LGBT (lesbians, gay people, bisexuals and transgenders), on the
other hand burka’s and segregation between the sexes. Increasingly, the
privileged and the underprivileged seem to live in separate worlds. According to
the view from inside, not everyone is willing to accept the invitation and to
endorse the Metropolitan values, but outsiders rather arrive at the conclusion that
biases and obstacles are endemic. From an insider (elitist) perspective, populist
leaders are considered an obstacle. From a styles-of-thinking perspective,
however, labels such as “populism” and “fundamentalism” are symptomatic of
the inability to grasp what is at stake here, namely the erosion of culture by an
aggressive and expansive global civilisation, adorning itself with epithets such as
“tolerance”, “inclusion” and “diversity”, – slogans which actually obfuscate
global processes of homogenisation and cultural annihilation, quite detrimental
of course for genuine diversity. Besides biological mass extinction, languages,
traditional skills and indigenous knowledge forms are quickly disappearing as
well (“epistemicide”). While cultures, traditions and religions are discarded as
outdated or even as suspect (“intolerant”, etc.), or exploited as tourist attractions
(as thematised by Dan Brown’s novels), all humans are expected to convert to a
new ideology (alleged “neutral”, but remarkably thin in content) and to become
speakers of this new, but in many ways quite toxic and corrosive language.
As to nature as the “backdrop” of the Metropolitan ambiance, exponential
(Faustian) growth has unleashed global disasters, notably in the form of mass
extinction and climate change, resulting in what is seen as a new geological era,
the Anthropocene (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000; Crutzen 2002). According to this
diagnosis, humans still place themselves in the centre as an all-powerful, hyperresponsible actor, instigator of exponential growth curves. Climate change,
however, is a complex process, while a global, institutional form of agency to
counteract the threat is lacking. Can “we” still turn the tide? As a rule,
metropolises are built in vulnerable coastal areas, where the impacts of climate
change are immediately felt. On the basis of the synchronicity principle, it is
inevitable that a change in style of thinking is accompanied by meteorological
and climatic turbulence. Joint hyper-initiatives are needed to foster resilience in
the face of disruption. Besides technoscientific expertise, however, this requires
a deeper understanding of the historical and socio-economic factors at work. In
other words, what is required is convergence, not only in the sense of
collaboration between political actors, but also in the sense of convergence
among research fields. The styles-of-thinking approach aims to contribute to this
from a humanities perspective, seeing current collisions as clashes between local
cultures and global civilisation, and as instances of uneven development (Zwart
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2020c). On the global political level, however, we are currently steering away
from convergence rather than towards it.
A fascinating window into the Metropolitan present is provided by Dan
Brown’s (allegedly “low-brow”) novels. While Inferno addresses the disruptive
consequence of global mobility, exponential population growth and mass tourism
(giving rise to viral threats), Origin (Brown 2017) zooms in on the clash between
technoscientific, ideological globalisation and religious culture (Zwart 2020d).
Iconoclastic hero Edmond Kirsch developed an ultrafast quantum computer to
simulate the origin of life on earth, so as to exterminate the remnants of religious
beliefs about creation. In the prologue of the novel, Edmond pays a visit to the
monastery of Montserrat – about 45 kilometres northwest of Barcelona, famous
for its statue of the Black Virgin, but also for serving as the Grail Castle in
Wagner’s Parsifal – to meet with representatives of world religions. Eventually,
however, it becomes clear that the novel’s main character is actually a building,
namely Antoni Gaudí’s Sagrada Família. On the one hand, it is a cathedral, a
catholic church, the tallest one in Europe, the last of the cathedrals, a psychedelic
forest, a jungle of columns, coloured glass and symbols and, like all cathedrals, a
Gesamtkunstwerk, a total work of art. It is also a syncretic collage, symbolising
the current convergence of spirituality and science, of nature and technology.
Thus, the Sagrada Família symbolises something new, namely biomimetic
architecture with a biological quality. With its cell-like structures, the ceiling
resembles a complex organism viewed through a microscope (Brown 2017, p.
454). The pillars seem to grow out of the earth and Gaudi’s tiles seem to resemble
a primordial sea. It is an evolving building, symbolising technologies of the
future, reconnected with nature (p. 455).
From a styles-of-thinking viewpoint, what is especially noteworthy is
that Sagrada Família is presented as “a flashpoint for transition” and as the
counterpart of the Pantheon of Rome, since both are “buildings with one foot in
the past and one in the future, a physical bridge between a dying faith and an
emerging one” (p. 455). Sagrada Família creates a spatial ambiance where the
Metropolitan attitude can already be experienced: the imminent convergence of
technology and nature, and of science and religion, to supersede the current crisis
of global disruption. Although the novel sets off with the (Faustian) conflict
between religion and science, towards the end (during the denouement stage)
most protagonists seem aware that the contemporary world will need religion,
represented here by Christianity, to come to terms with emerging challenges of
technoscience. Christianity “will survive the coming age of science, using its vast
experience – millennia of philosophy, personal inquiry, meditation, soulsearching – to help humanity build a moral framework and ensure that the coming
technologies will unify, illuminate, and raise us up, rather than destroy us” (p.
455). Indeed, it is as if, “in the struggle between science and religion, a tipping
point has been reached”, as if both antagonists are now circling back from the
farthest reaches of its orbit (p. 456).
200
Styles of Thinking
The styles-of-thinking concept implies that basic convictions “work” in
a convincing manner for an extended period of time, encouraging those involved
to be open to the world in a particular manner, cultivating a particular way of
thinking, speaking and perceiving, and seeing this as a common human
endeavour. The Faustian idea that knowledge equals control is currently being
replaced by Metropolitan ideas with a different morphology, including
convergence, interconnectivity and complexity as key aspects. The identification
and characterization of a particular style is not a matter of empirical “induction”,
however, but rather an encouragement to see emerging developments from this
perspective. The focus is on particular things (e.g. buildings) or events (e.g. the
rise and fall of, say, Donald Trump) that exemplify the current condition.
Notably, we zoom in on moments of commencement, so that Silicon Valley
becomes the Metropolitan counterpart of the park of Academus or the Mount of
Olives, while Gregor Mendel, working in a monastery garden, becomes for
Metropolitan thinking what the pre-Socratics were for the Apollonian style.
Ultimately, however, the ambition of the styles-of-thinking concept is to develop
a diagnostic of the present and a prognostic of the future (as Hegel put it: to
capture one’s own time in thoughts, or rather: to capture the grounding idea
which is energetically realising itself right now). While the identification and
reconstruction of grounding ideas of the past is already a risky task, producing a
diagnostic of the present and a prognostic of the future is even more hazardous.
Thinking, however, is no longer envisioned as the work of solitary heroes (with
Spengler serving as one of the last of the Mohicans as it were), but rather as
“distributed reflection”. The idea that we are currently migrating, more or less
abruptly, into a new style of thinking, is a concept that must realise itself via
collaborative research by multiple scholars across the globe, and this study
aspired to contribute to this emerging task. Spengler’s book articulated a
pessimistic view. Now that we are experiencing a new daybreak, we are again
facing grave concerns. The conviction that a new grounding idea (a new,
pervasive philosopheme) has already presented itself, entails fascinating
opportunities for scholarly work, but eventually needs to prove itself in real life,
rapidly evolving on a metropolitan scale.
Styles of thinking
201
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