THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY
OF CHINA
General Editors
Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank
Volume 5
Part One: The Sung Dynasty and Its Precursors, 907–1279
Work on this volume was partially supported by the National Endowment for the
Humanities, Grant RZ-20535-00, and by a grant from the Chiang Ching-Kuo
Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange (USA).
L I A O
H S I - H S I A
E M P I R E
Western Capital
Ta-t’ung
Southern Capital
Feng-chou
Hsiung-chou Pa-chou
Huo-shan Tai-chou
Pao-chou
Pei-p’ing
Ch’ing-chou
Fu
Ning-hua Chung-shan
Mo-chou
Pao-te
Chi
K’o-lon
Ying-chou
Chin-ning
T’ien-wei
Ts’ang-chou
Teng-chou
Hsien-chou
Hsing-ch’ing-fu
Chen-ting-fu
Ching-chou
Shen-chou
Lan-chou
G
Hsin-chou
Yung-ching
Yin-chou
N Pin-chou
P’ing-ting
Lai-chou
T’ai-yuan-fu
U
NG
T Ti-chou
Ch’ing-yuan-fu Chi-chou
Te-chou
Y
Sui-te
Wei-chou
I
TU
Shih-chou
Chen-wu
En-chou
E
Liao-chou Hsin-te-fu
U
G
Ting-pien
Ch’ing-chou
Fen-chou
Chi-nan-fu
N
N
Hui-chou
MingU
Po-chou
H O - T U N G
Hsi-an
Tz’u-chou
chou
Ting-pien
G
Yen-an-fu Hsi-chou
Huan-chou
Wei-sheng Tz’u-chou
Mi-chou
Lo-chou
Hsi-ning
Ta-ming-fu Yün-chou
C
Ch’ing-tso
C Fu-chouHsiang-chou
Tzu-chou
H
K’ai-te-fu
C
H
I
N
G
Lan-chou
Kuo-chou H
Ch’ing-chou
Ping-yang
Chi-chou Yen-chou
Ü
Chen-jung
’
P’u-chou
Yuan-chou
Tse-chou
Chi-shih
Hua-chou
I
Fang-chou
Wei-chou Ning-chou
I-chou
T U N G
Chiang-chou
Wei-chou
Ho-chou
N
Ts’ao-chou Tan-chou
Ching-chou
Meng-chou Huai-chou K’ai-feng
Hsi-chou
Huai-yang
- Shun-te Lung-chou Pin-chou Yao-chou T’ung-chou Chieh-chou
H S I
Hai-chou
F E
Cheng-chou
Kung-chou
Kung-chou
Ho-chungC
Ying-tien-fu
Li-chou
N G
Ho-nan-fu
CHINGHsü-chou
T’ao-chou
Ch’in-chou
K’uo-chou Shan-chouH
CHI
An-tung
Hua-chou
Feng-hsiang-fu
Min-chou
I
Yang-ch’ang-fu
Ching-chao-fu
H U A I - N A N
Hsi-ho
Su-chou
Ju-chou N
Feng-chou
Ch’u-chou
Hua-ning-fu
G
Po-chou
Ch’eng-chou
Shang-chou
Ch’ing-ho
- H
Huai-an ChaoChieh-chou
hsin T U N G
Mien-chou
Yang-chou
S
Kao-yu
Hao-chou
I
Ssu-chou
T I B E TA N S
Wen-chou
P
T’ai-chou
Yang-chou
Shun-ch’ang-fu
E
C
H
Hsing-yuan
T’ung-chou
ChenI
I
Chen-chou
N
Ta-an
Ts’ai-chou
chiang-fu
G Teng-chou
Ch’u-chou
Chün-chou
Shou-ch’un-fu
L
I
C
H
O
U
T’ang-chou
Lung-chou
Chiang-ning-fu
H
Chin-chou
Li-chou
Ho-chou
Hsin-yang
Ch’angFang-chou Hsiang-yang-fu S
Kuang-chou Liu-an
Lung-ch’ing
I
chou
P’ing-chiang-fu
T’ai-p’ing-chou
N
A
Pa-chou
U Lang-chou
Mao-chou
Hsin-yang
Sui-chou
I
N
K’ai-chou
Wu-wei
A
Hu-chou
HanChia-hsing-fu
Ch’inWei-chou
Te-an-fu
P’eng-chou
Ta-chou
chou
chou
K’uei-chou
U
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Yun-an
T’ung-ch’uan-fu
H
Yüeh-chou
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H
Ming-chou
Lin-an-fu
An-ch’ing-fu
Yung-k’ang
Kuo-chou
Wan-chou
Ch’eng-tu-fu
Huang-chou
Hsia-chou
Liang-shan
EO-chou
Ya-chou Ch’iungLIANG-CHE
N
Ch’i-chou
Shih-chou
ChienCh’ü-chou
Hui-chou
Chiang-ling
P
Shou-ch’ang
Chung-chou
chou
Sui-chou
chou
Fu-chou
Chien-te-fu
Ning-hsi
P’uMei-chou
Ho-chou
C
chou
U
Hsing-kuo
Chiang-chou
T’ai-chou
Fu-chou
Chia-chou
Ch’angH Li-chou
Li-chou
Wu-chou
Nan-k’ang
chou Yü-chou
Tzu-chou
Ch’ü-chou
Yüeh-chou
Ch’ien-chou
Jao-chou
G
Lung-hsing-fu
Nan-p’ing
Ch’u-chou
Hsin-chou
Ch’ang-te-fu
Jung-chou
Lu-chou
Wen-chou
Yün-chou
Chen-chou
Chen-chou
Ch’ing-ning
T’an-chou
Lin-chiang
Fu-chou
Ssu-chou
Yuan-chou
Po-chou
Chien-ning
Ch’ien-ch’ang
Shao-wu
Yuan-chou
Heng-chou
Shao-chou
Chi-chou
Nan-chien
Ching
I
Ch’a-ling
chou
Fu-chou
Wu-kang
E M P I R E
I
CH
S
H O
-
H
IN
G
H
-T
O
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I
-P
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Ch’uan-chou
Nan-an
Shao-chou
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Chang-chou
Mei-chou
Hsün-chou
Ying-te-fu
K U A N G - N A N
Wu-chou
Feng-chou
Ch’ao-ch’ing-fu
Yü-lin
F U - CH I E N
Ting-chou
Nan-hsiung
Lien-chou
Chao-chou
Chia-chou
Yung-chou
Pai-chou
Lien-chou
Yung-chou
Ch’uan-chou N
Kuei-yang-chien
Tao-chou
- N A N
N G
I A
An-hua
Na
N
I
U
A
R
IB
C
P’ing-chou
Ts’ung-chou
S
A
H
V
IO
H
M
R
C
T
-N
I
G
S
U
-T
-
N
N
A
N
G
H
E S
Ch’ao-chou
T U N G
Te-ch’ing-fu
Hui-chou
Kuang-chou
Hsin-chou
En-nan-chou
Hua-chou
H O U - T A
Lei-chou
Principal roads
Y Ü E H
Canals
Ch’iung-chou
Ch’ang-hua
Provincial capitals
Fu
Chen-chou
Yen-te
Wan-an
Chu-yai
0
0
Chou
Prefectures
Chün
Military prefectures
400 km
200 miles
Map 1. Political Map of the Northern Sung, c. 1100. Reprinted by permission from The Times atlas of China, P. J. M. Geelan and Denis C.
Twitchett, eds. (London: Times Books, 1974).
THE CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY OF
CHINA
Volume 5
Part One: The Sung Dynasty and Its
Precursors, 907–1279
edited by
DENIS TWITCHETT and PAUL JAKOV SMITH
cambridge university press
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi
Cambridge University Press
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C
Cambridge University Press 2009
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 2009
Printed in the United States of America
A catalog record for this publication is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
(Revised for volume 5, part 1)
Main entry under title:
The Cambridge history of China.
Bibliography: v. 5, pt. 1, p.
Includes indexes.
1. China – History. I. Twitchett, Denis Crispin. II. Fairbank, John King, 1907–
ds735.c3145
951′ .03
76–29852
isbn 978-0-521-81248-1 hardback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or
accuracy of urls for external or third-party Internet Web sites referred to in
this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such Web sites is,
or will remain, accurate or appropriate. Information regarding prices, travel
timetables, and other factual information are correct at the time of first
printing, but Cambridge University Press does not guarantee
the accuracy of such information thereafter.
In memory of Denis Crispin Twitchett (1925–2006)
Mentor, friend, and inspiration
PREFACE
This volume has been long in the making, many of its authors freshly minted
Ph.D.s when recruited by Denis Twitchett in the late 1980s. Since that time
sinology in general and the field of Sung history in particular have undergone
several significant changes: pinyin has become the most widely used form of
romanization; authoritative versions of key Sung texts have been made widely
accessible online and through the electronic edition of the Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu;
and a punctuated, annotated version of the writings of most Sung authors has
been issued in the 360-volume Ch’üan Sung wen. But the writing of the chapters
in this volume predates those changes, which has influenced the conventions
we have followed.
With respect to romanization, we continue The Cambridge history of China
practice of rendering most Chinese terms and proper names (the names of
persons, places, official titles, bibliographic entries, and so on) in the WadeGiles system. Following the example of previously published volumes, we
use familiar (pre-pinyin ) forms for the names of modern provinces (yielding
Kiangsi rather than Chiang-hsi or Fukien rather than Fu-chien) and principal
cities (such as Peking, not Pei-ching, and Canton rather than Kuang-tung).
Otherwise, all place names are in Wade-Giles, according to the standard set
in Hope Wright, compiler, Geographical names in Sung China: An alphabetical
list (Paris: École Pratique des Haute Études, 1956). For both place names and
personal names, numbers are used to differentiate between homonyms, such as
Chief Councilor Chang Chün and his subordinate General Chang Chün2, or
the prefectures of Ho-chou (in Sung Kuang-nan East circuit, modern Kwangsi
province) and Ho-chou2 (in Sung Hsi-ho circuit, modern Kansu province). We
have sought to ensure that all places mentioned in the text can be found on one
of the volume’s many maps, but for fuller coverage readers should consult T’an
Ch’i-hsiang, compiler, Chung-kuo li-shih ti-t’u chi, volume 6: Sung-Liao-Chin
shih-ch’i (Shanghai: Ti-t’u ch’u-pan, 1982).
Because our authors prepared these chapters prior to the widespread availability of standardized editions or online and electronic text databases and in
xii
preface
varying sinological environments, multiple versions of the same work may
be cited between chapters and occasionally within the same chapter. Variant
editions are all listed in the Bibliography. Translations of terms and official
titles are consistent across chapters, with occasional deference to contextual
differences. In all matters of translation, romanization, and geographic nomenclature, we aim for a high degree of consistency between this and the companion
Volume 5, Part 2. These two volumes, in conjunction with Volume 6 (Alien
regimes and border states, 907–1368), provide a thorough survey of the history
of China and its neighboring states from the tenth through the fourteenth
centuries.
CONTENTS
Preface
page xi
List of Tables and Figures
xvii
List of Maps
xviii
Acknowledgments
List of Abbreviations
Introduction: The Sung Dynasty and Its Precursors, 907–1279
by Paul Jakov Smith, Haverford College
Introduction
Coming Out of the T’ang: State Building in North and South
Founding and Consolidation of the Sung, 960–1000
A Cycle of State Building on the Steppe, Tenth to Thirteenth
Centuries
Sino-Steppe Relations and the Shape of Dynastic Events
1 The Five Dynasties
by Naomi Standen, University of Newcastle
Introduction
Fighting for Allegiances
Allegiance and Alliance
Moving to Consolidation
2 The Southern Kingdoms between the T’ang and the Sung,
907–979
by Hugh R. Clark, Ursinus College
Introduction
From Banditry to State Formation, 875–c. 910
xxi
xxiii
1
1
1
11
15
20
38
38
39
74
112
133
133
140
xiv
contents
Early Political Recruitment
Political Change, 920s–940s
Economic Structures
State Structures and Interstate Relationships
The Close of the Interregnum
Conclusion
3 Founding and Consolidation of the Sung Dynasty under T’ai-tsu
(960–976), T’ai-tsung (976–997), and Chen-tsung (997–1022)
by Lau Nap-Yin, Institute of History and Philology, Academia
Sinica, and Huang K’uan-chung, Institute of History and
Philology, Academia Sinica
T’ai-tsu and the Founding of the Sung, 960–976
The Weak First, Strong Later Strategy
Sino-Liao Relations and the Two Sons of Heaven
A New Type of Emperor: The Diffident Chen-tsung,
997–1022
4 The Reigns of Jen-tsung (1022–1063) and Ying-tsung
(1063–1067)
by Michael McGrath, Adrian College
Jen-tsung’s Early Reign: The Regency of Empress Liu
(1022–1033)
Jen-tsung and Lü I-chien’s Ministry (1033–1043)
The War with Hsi Hsia (1038–1044)
The Ch’ing-li Reforms (1043–1045)
The Southern Frontier Region
The Imperial Women
The Death of Jen-tsung and the Accession of Ying-tsung
Politics from Spring 1065 until the Death of Ying-tsung
in January 1067
5 Shen-tsung’s Reign and the New Policies of Wang An-shih,
1067–1085
by Paul Jakov Smith, Haverford College
Shen-tsung’s Ascension and the Crisis of the Mid-eleventh
Century
Gaining Power
The First Phase of the New Policies: Economic Reform under
Wang An-shih
158
163
171
188
197
205
206
206
220
247
260
279
279
289
300
316
328
334
335
343
347
347
363
383
contents
From Economic Redistribution to Revenue Extraction
The New Policies under Shen-tsung
The Campaign against the Tangut Hsi Hsia
Shen-tsung’s Death and the Ouster of the Reformers
6 Che-tsung’s Reign (1085–1100) and the Age of Faction
by Ari Daniel Levine, University of Georgia
Retrogression: 1085–1086
Political Gridlock: 1086–1093
Resurrection: 1093–1100
7 The Reigns of Hui-tsung (1100–1126) and Ch’in-tsung
(1126–1127) and the Fall of the Northern Sung
by Ari Daniel Levine, University of Georgia
Approaches and Departures: Historiographic Issues
Court Politics during the Ch’in-sheng Regency
Court Politics and State Policy during Hui-tsung’s Reign
Court Culture and State Religion during Hui-tsung’s Reign
Popular Uprisings, Border Conflicts, and the Fall of the
Northern Sung
8 The Move to the South and the Reign of Kao-tsung
(1127–1162)
by Tao Jing-shen, University of Arizona
The Establishment of Kao-tsung’s Rule
Banditry, the Suppression of Local Disorder, and the Power
of the Generals
Government Reorganization
War and Diplomacy, 1131–1141
The Peace Process, 1138–1142
Ch’in Kuei’s Dominance, 1141–1155
Stabilizing Civilian Government
The Economy and Financial Policies
The End of the Ch’in Kuei Era
Abdication
9 The Reign of Hsiao-tsung (1162–1189)
by Gong Wei Ai, University of Malaya
Introduction
xv
414
447
464
478
484
484
509
531
556
556
559
571
602
614
644
644
662
666
672
677
689
694
697
703
707
710
710
contents
xvi
The Peace Settlement of 1164–1165
The Ch’ien-tao Period (1165–1173): Years of Reconstruction
The Ch’un-hsi Period (1174–1189): The Growth of
Absolutism
Foreign Relations after 1174
10 The Reigns of Kuang-tsung (1189–1194) and Ning-tsung
(1194–1224)
by Richard L. Davis, Lingnan University
The Reign of Kuang-tsung (1189–1194)
Bureaucratic Leadership
Royalty at Odds
Autocracy under Ning-tsung (1194–1224)
Han T’o-chou against the Bureaucracy
The Ban on Tao-hsüeh
Rapprochement and the K’ai-hsi War (1205–1207)
Insurrection in Szechwan
The Coup in Lin-an
Shih Mi-yüan in Power
Loyalists of Shantung
Sung-Chin Conflict
Domestic Concerns
An Uncertain Succession
11 The Reign of Li-tsung (1224–1264)
by Richard L. Davis, Lingnan University
Shih Mi-yüan in Isolation
Foreign Policy
Bureaucratic Leadership and the Forces of Opinion
The Rise of Chia Ssu-tao
12 The Reign of Tu-tsung (1264–1274) and His Successors to 1279
by Richard L. Davis, Lingnan University
Dynasty Besieged
A Dynasty in Retreat
The Fugitive Court
Bibliography
Glossary–Index
713
720
737
738
756
758
762
766
773
775
783
789
795
805
812
823
827
830
833
839
839
852
872
890
913
913
929
946
963
1011
TABLES AND FIGURES
tables
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Sung Weights and Measures
page xxiv
Sung Emperors and their Reign Periods
xxx
Chronology of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms
6
Chronology of the New Policies during Shen-tsung’s Reign
385
Percentage of the Population in Active pao-chia Service, 1076
415
Households and Population of Hang-chou (Lin-an)
702
Population Growth for Four Cities from Northern
to Southern Sung
702
figures
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Genealogy of the Later Liang ruling house
Genealogy of the Later T’ang and Chin ruling houses
Genealogy of the Later Han and Later Chou ruling houses
Rulers of the Southern Kingdoms
Outline genealogy of the Sung imperial family
xxv
xxvi
xxvii
xxviii
xxix
MAPS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
Political map of the Northern Sung, c. 1100
The Five Dynasties and the Ten Kingdoms, 907–960
The Sung domain and its neighbors, c. 1100–1291
North China, c. 895–905, showing Chu Wen’s expansion
out of Honan
North China, c. 911–916, showing Li Ts’un-hsü’s conquest
of Hopei
North China under the Later T’ang, c. 926
China under the Later Chin, c. 938
The Sixteen Prefectures ceded to the Khitan in 937
Territorial expansion under the Later Chou, c. 959
Huang Ch’ao’s movements, 878–880
Consolidation of the Sung, 960–979
Liao invasion of the Sung, 1004
The first Sino-Tangut war, 1038–1044
Nung Chih-kao’s uprising, 1049–1053
Annexation of Tibetan territories under Shen-tsung and his
sons, 1072–1109
The Sino-Tangut war of 1081–1082
Revived campaign against the Tanguts, 1097–1099
Hui-tsung’s wars in the northwest, 1103–1117
Uprisings of Fang La and Sung Chiang, 1119–1121
Sino-Jurchen contest for Liao and the Sixteen Prefectures,
1117–1124
The Chin invasions of Northern Sung
Chin raids south of the Yangtze, 1129–1130
The embattled Southern Sung, c. 1130
Yüeh Fei’s incursions into Chin territory, 1140
Southern Sung borders as of 1142
Chin invasion of the Southern Sung, 1161–1162
page iv
2
18
46
63
68
86
88
119
139
225
265
304
330
467
474
550
618
623
631
635
656
668
683
685
705
maps
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
The K’ai-hsi war of 1206
Border situation as of Li-tsung’s succession, c. 1224
Abortive Sung intervention in Honan, 1234
Möngke’s invasion of Szechwan, 1258–1259
Centers of defensive activity, c. 1258–1273
The conquest of the Southern Sung
xix
795
846
857
871
919
943
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Of the many debts that have been incurred in the evolution of this volume
thanks must first be paid to our contributors. They labored long and hard
to produce what were, in many cases, the first English-language narratives of
their assigned periods, and it is through no fault of theirs that it has taken
so long to get their efforts into print. They, and their department chairs and
personnel committees, have shown exceptional forbearance.
Everyone associated with this volume is indebted to the late Denis C.
Twitchett, the visionary scholar, mentor, and friend who brought us all together
and whose guiding hand has shaped The Cambridge history of China. As Denis’s
coeditor from 2001 to his death in 2006, I was a privileged beneficiary of his
profound scholarship and the boundless warmth and generosity of his spirit.
Although this would be a stronger work had Denis still been here to give it
one final inspection, we hope he would be pleased that it is finally out, and
dedicate it to him as a token of our deep esteem.
Many others have helped to bring Volume 5, Part 1, to completion. In working through the various chapters it was always a delight to come across comments and suggestions by the late James T. C. Liu (1919–93), the preeminent
Sung historian, who like Denis was friend and mentor to many of us involved in
this project. Ralph Meyer, long-time project manager for The Cambridge history
of China, brought preliminary order to the chapters and to the union glossary
and bibliography until his retirement in 2002, when he was ably succeeded
by Michael Reeve. John Chaffee and Willard Peterson, editors respectively of
Volume 5, Part 2, and Volume 9, Parts 1 and 2, took time from their own
volumes to offer valuable advice and assistance on this one. Many of the maps
in this volume were initially drafted using Geographic Information System
datasets created by the late Robert M. Hartwell (1932–96) and made available
to the scholarly community by the China Historical GIS Project at Harvard
University; I am grateful to Peter K. Bol and Merrick Lex Berman of Harvard
and to the Academic Computing Center of Haverford College for their help
with this invaluable resource.
xxii
acknowledgments
The East Asian Studies Program at Princeton University, directed during
the relevant years by Martin C. Collcutt and Benjamin A. Elman, has generously supported The Cambridge history of China project in numerous direct
and indirect ways. The Project has been privileged to receive financial support from the National Endowment for the Humanities and from the Chiang
Ching-Kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange. We are grateful
to these institutions for their financial support and the scholarly recognition
it implies.
Paul Jakov Smith
2007
ABBREVIATIONS
CPPM
CWTS
CYYL
HCP
HTC
SHY
SS
TCTC
Tzu-chih t’ung-chien ch’ang-pien chi-shih pen-mo
Chiu Wu-tai shih
Chien-yen i-lai hsi-nien yao-lu
Hsü tzu-chih t’ung-chien ch’ang-pien
Hsü tzu-chih t’ung-chien
Sung hui-yao
Sung shih
Tzu-chih t’ung-chien
Table 1. Sung Weights and Measures
Length
1 li
= 1/3 of a mile
Weight
1 liang
= approx. 1.3 ounces
1 chin (catty) = 16 liang, approx. 1.3 pounds
Volume
1 sheng
1 tou
1 shih (tan)
= approx. .86 quart
= 10 sheng, approx. 2 gallons
= 100 sheng, approx. 2.7 bushels, or 21.5 gallons
Area
1 mou (mu)
1 ch’ing
= approx. 1/7 of an acre
= 100 mou, approx. 14 acres
Currency
1 min (kuan) = a unit of account nominally worth 1,000 cash
Later Liang dynasty, 907– 923
sister
Yüan
Hsiang-hsien
brothers
Yu-yü
d. 912
Yu-wen*
Chu Wen
Liang T'ai-tsu, 907–12
Yu-kui
emperor,
912–13
Yu-chen
Mo-ti,
913–23
Lo Shao-wei Wang Jung
Yu-chang
Yu-ch'ien* d. = s. d. = s.
*adopted
Figure 1. Genealogy of the Later Liang ruling house.
Later T'ang dynasty, 923–936
brothers
Ts'un-hsü (908–)
T'ang Chuang-tsung, 923–6
Chi-chi
sons
Li Ssu-chao*
Li K'o-yung
Prince of Chin, 895–908
sons
Chi-t'ao
adopted sons
6 brothers
adopted sons Ts'ung-ching Ts'ung-jung Ts'ung-hou
d. 923?
Min-ti, 933–4
brothers
Li K'o-ning
Ts'ung-k'o*
Fei-ti, 934–6
Ts'ung-i
947 (Liao)
Yung-ning princess
=
Shih Ching-t'ang
Chin Kao-tsu, 936–42
Later Chin dynasty, 936–947
Chao Te-chün
Ssu-yüan*
Ming-tsung, 926–33
13d.
Hsing-p'ing
princes
= Chao Yen-shou*
sister = Tu Ch'ung-wei
Yang Kuang-yüan
Ch'ung-jui
Ch'ung-kui
Shao-ti, 942–7
Ch'ang-an
princess = s.
*adopted
Figure 2. Genealogy of the Later T’ang and Chin ruling houses.
Later Han dynasty, 947–950
Liu Ch'ung
Shih-tsu, 951– 5
Liu Chih-yüan
Han Kao-tsu, 947–48
= Lady Li
Ch'eng-yu
Yin-ti, 948–50
Ch'eng-chün
Hsiao-ho-ti, 955–68
Li Hung-i
Liu Yün
Later Chou dynasty, 951–959
Kuo Wei
Chou T'ai-tsu, 951–4
sister
Kuo Jung*
Shih-tsung, 954–9
Li Ch'ung-chin
Kuo Tsung-hsün
Kung-ti, 959
*adopted
Figure 3. Genealogy of the Later Han and Later Chou ruling houses.
Chiang-Huai
Liang-che
Yang Family Ch'ien Family
(Wu)
(Wu-Yüeh)
890
Hsing-mi
Fukien
Wang Family
(Min)
Ling-nan
Liu Family
(S. Han)
Hunan
Ma Family
(Ch'u)
Chiang-nan
Kao Family
(Ching-nan)
Szechwan
Wang Family
(Former Shu)
Liu
Ch'ao (892)
(Liu Chien-feng [892])
Shen-chih
(896)
Yin (896)
Chien (891)
900
# (902)
Wo (905)
# (902)
Yin (902)
# (902)
# (907)
Lung-yen (909)
# (909)
Ch'i-ch'ang (907)
@ (907)
# (909)
910
Yen (911)
@ (917)
Yen (918)
920
Pu (921)
@ (927)
(925, to T'ang)
Ts'ung-mei (928)
Meng Family
Hsi-sheng (930)
(Later Shu)
Hsi-fan (932)
Chih-hsiang (934)
Ch'ang (935)
Yen-han (926)
Yen-chün (927)
930
Yüan-hsiang (932)
@ (933)
(937)
Ch'ang (936)
Hsü/Li Family
Hsi (939)
(S.
T'ang)
Hung-tsou (941)
940
Pien (937)
Yen-cheng (943)
Ching (943)
Hung-tsung (947)
(945)
Shu (948)
Ch'üan-Chang Warlords
Liu Ts'ung-hsiao (947)
950
960
Fen (942)
Sheng (943)
Hsi-sheng (948)
Hsi-ngo (950)
(951, to T'ang)
Pao-jung (948)
Chou Hsing-feng (956)
Ch'ang (958)
Pao-hsü (960)
Chou Pao-ch'üan Chi-chung (962)
Ch'en Hung-chin (962)
(962)
(963, to Sung)
(964, to Sung)
(965, to Sung)
Yü (961)
(971, to Sung)
970
(975, to Sung)
(978, to Sung)
(978, to Sung)
Keys: # = adoption of title "king" (wang), marked by heavy line
@ = adoption of title "emperor" (ti), marked by double line
Figure 4. Rulers of the Southern Kingdoms.
T'ai-tsu 927–76
r. 960–76
T'ai-tsung 939–97
r. 976–97
Chen-tsung 968–1022
r. 997–1022
Chao Yüan-fen
Chao Yün-jang
995–1059
Jen-tsung 1010–63
r. 1022–63
Ying-tsung 1032–67
r. 1063–7
Shen-tsung 1048–85
r. 1067–85
Che-tsung 1077–1100
r. 1085–1100
Ch'in-tsung 1100–61
r. 1126–7
Hui-tsung 1082–1135
r. 1100–1126
Kao-tsung 1107–97
r. 1127–62
Hsiao-tsung 1127–94
r. 1162–89
Kuang-tsung 1147–1200
r. 1189–94
Ning-tsung 1168–1224
r. 1194–1224
Chao Hsi-lu
Chao Yu-jui
Li-tsung 1206–64
r. 1224–64
Tu-tsung 1240–74
r. 1264–74
Kung-tsung 1271–1323
r. 1274–76
Tuan-tsung c. 1268–78
r. 1276–8
Ti-ping 1272–9
r. 1278–9
Figure 5. Outline genealogy of the Sung imperial family. Source: For full details see
Arthur C. Moule, The rulers of China, 221 B.C.–A.D. 1949: Chronological tables, with an
introductory section on the earlier rulers c. 2100–249 b.c. by W. Perceval Yetts (New
York, 1957); James M. Hargett, “A chronology of the reigns and reign-periods of
the Song dynasty (960–1279),” Bulletin of Sung-Yüan Studies 19 (1987), pp. 26–34;
and John W. Chaffee, Branches of heaven: A history of the imperial clan of Sung China
(Cambridge, Mass., 1999).
Table 2. Sung Emperors and their Reign Periods
Name
Dates
Temple Name Reigned
Reign Periods
Dates
Northern Sung
Chao K’uang-yin 927–976
T’ai-tsu
960-976
Chao K’uang-I
939–997
T’ai-tsung
976–997
Chao Heng
968–1022
Chen-tsung
997–1022
Chao Chen
1010–1063 Jen-tsung
1022–1063
Chao Shu
Chao Hsü
1032–1067 Ying-tsung
1048–1085 Shen–tsung
1063–1067
1067–1085
Chao Hsü2
1077–1100 Che-tsung
1085–1100
Chao chi
1082–1135 Hui-tsung
1100–1126
Chien-lung
Ch’ien-te
K’ai-pao
T’ai-p’ing hsing-kuo
Yung-hsi
Tuan-kung
Ch’un-hua
Chih-tao
Hsien-p’ing
Ching-te
Ta-chung hsiang-fu
T’ien-hsi
Ch’ien-hsing
T’ien-sheng
Ming-tao
Ching-yu
Pao-yüan
K’ang-ting
Ch’ing-li
Huang-yu
Chih-ho
Chia-yu
Chih–p’ing
Hsi-ning
Yüan-feng
Yüan-yu
Shao-sheng
Yüan-fu
Chien-chung
ching-kuo
Ch’ung-ning
Ta-kuan
Cheng-ho
Ch’ung-ho
Hsüan-ho
Ching-k’ang
960–963
963–968
968–976
976–984
984–987
988–989
990–994
955–997
998–1003
1004–1007
1008–1016
1017–1021
1022
1023–1032
1032–1033
1034–1038
1038–1040
1040–1041
1041–1048
1049–1054
1054–1056
1056–1063
1064–1067
1068–1077
1078–1085
1086–1094
1094–1098
1098–1100
1101
Chao Huan
1100–1161 Ch’in-tsung
1126–1127
Southern Sung
Chao Kou
1107–1187 Kao-tsung
Chao Shen
1127–1194 Hsiao-tsung
1127–1162 Chien-yen
Shao-hsing
1162–1189 Lung-hsing
Ch’ien-tao
Ch’un-hsi
1102–1106
1107–1110
1111–1118
1118–1119
1119–1125
1126–1127
1127–1130
1131–1162
1163–1164
1165–1173
1174–1189
Name
Dates
Chao Tun
Chao K’uo
Kuang-tsung 1189–1194 Shao-hsi
Ning-tsung
1194–1224 Ch’ing-yüan
Chia-t’ai
K’ai-hsi
Chia-ting
1205–1264
Li-tsung
1224–1264 Pao-ch’ing
Shao-ting
Tuan-p’ing
Chia-hsi
Ch’un-yu
Pao-yu
K’ai-ch’ing
Ching-ting
1240–1274
Tu–tsung
1264–1274 Hsien-ch’un
1271–1323
Kung-tsung 1274–1276 Te-yu
c. 1268–1278 Tuan-tsung
1276–1278 Ching-yen
1272–1279
Ti-ping
1278–1279 Hsiang–hsing
Chao Yün
Chao Ch’i
Chao Hsien
Chao Shih
Chao Ping
1147–1200
1168–1224
Temple Name Reigned
Reign Periods Dates
1190–1194
1195–1200
1201–1204
1205–1207
1208–1224
1225–1227
1228–1233
1234–1236
1237–1240
1241–1252
1253–1256
1259
1260–1264
1265–1274
1275–1276
1276–1278
1278–1279
Note: Table 2 follows the conventional approach that treats the Chinese lunar year and the Western solar
year as essentially coterminous, thus preserving the traditional count of years in each reign period. For a
convenient reference see Chung-kuo li-shih nien-tai chien-piao (Peking, 1973), pp. 135–56. Reign periods
were sometimes changed mid-year, to respond to or to influence significant events. For a translation of the
Sung reign-period names, along with a conversion of their inaugural dates to the Western calendar by day,
month, and year, see James M. Hargett, “A chronology of the reigns and reign-periods to the Song dynasty
(960–1279),” Bulletin of Sung-Yüan Studies 19 (1987), pp. 26–34. Emperors are referred to throughout
this volume by their temple names (e.g., T’ai-tsu, Kao-tsung, and so on), although these were conferred
posthumously. The filiation of the Sung emperors is thoroughly documented in John W. Chaffee, Branches
of heaven: A history of the imperial clan of Sung China (Cambridge, Mass., 1999).
INTRODUCTION: THE SUNG DYNASTY AND
ITS PRECURSORS, 907–1279
Paul Jakov Smith
introduction
We present here the first of two volumes on the Sung dynasty (960–1279)
and its Five Dynasties (907–60) and Ten Kingdoms (c. 907–79) predecessors.
Whereas our companion volume (Volume 5, Part 2) takes a thematic approach
to Sung institutional, social, economic, and cultural history, our task here is
to present the political history of China from the fall of the T’ang dynasty
in 907 to the Mongol conquest of the Southern Sung in 1279. Because our
focus is on political events as seen from the perspective of the Sung court,
we recommend that this volume be read in conjunction with The Cambridge
history of China, volume 6: Alien regimes and border states, 907–1368, which
covers the same period and many of the same events from the vantage point of
the non-Chinese regimes and border states that had so momentous an impact
on China in this multistate era of the tenth through the thirteenth centuries.1
This overview will offer a brief introduction to the intersection of political
trends and Sino-steppe encounters during the Five Dynasties and Northern
and Southern Sung that are portrayed in the chapters to follow.
coming out of the t’ang: state building in north and south
The collapse of T’ang power in the final decades of the ninth century unleashed
massive forces of rebellion, warlordism, and territorial fragmentation, giving
way to what traditional narratives depict as a half century of political division
and social turmoil before the reestablishment of unity and order by Chao
K’uang-yin and his new dynasty, the Sung (960–1279). The social turmoil was
powerful enough to sweep away the underpinnings of the old T’ang aristocracy
and usher in new social and political elites. But as the first two chapters of
1
Herbert Franke and Denis C. Twitchett, eds., The Cambridge history of China, volume 6: Alien regimes and
border states, 907–1368 (New York, 1994).
Later Liang (907–923)
Later T’ang (923–936)
H
I
T
A
N
K
H
I
T
A
N
YEN
Yün
Hsia
TINGNAN
P’O
-H
AI
K
Yün
Yu
CHIN
Yu
Hsia
TING-NAN
T'ai-yüan
L AT E R T ’ A N G
CH’I
Lo-yang
Lo-yang
LATER LIANG
Chin-ling
(Nanking)
Yang
FORMER SHU
Ch’eng-tu
ChiangCHING ling
NAN
WU
FORMER SHU
Ch’eng-tu
Hang
(to 925)
ChiangCHING ling
NAN
T’an
CH’U
N
Kuang
S. HAN
A
0
0
Fu
MIN
TA - L I
Kuang
N
WUYÜEH
CH’U
Fu
MIN
A
Hang
T’an
TA - L I
AM
WU
WUYÜEH
600 km
400 miles
N
N
AM
S. HAN
0
0
600 km
400 miles
Later Chin (936–946) and later Han (947–950)
K H I T A N
Later Chou (951–960)
L I A O
K H I T A N
Sixteen prefectures
ceded to Khitan in 937
Sixteen prefectures
Liao
Southern Capital
Southern
Capital
Hsia
TING- NAN
Hsia
TING-NAN
LATER CHIN AND
LATER HAN
Recaptured from
Liao 959
N. HAN
L AT E R C H O U
K’ai-feng
K’ai-feng
Chiang-ning
Chiang-ning
(Nanking)
LATER SHU
Ch’eng-tu
ChiangCHING ling
NAN
L I A O
SOUTHERN
LATER SHU
CHING
NAN
Chiang-ling
Ch’eng-tu
Hang
WUYÜEH
T’an
YIN
CH’U
TA - L I
CH’U
Fu
SOUTHERN
T’ANG
CHANGCH’ÜAN
TA - L I
MIN
Hang
WUYÜEH
T’ANG
T’an
Annexed from
S. T’ang 959
Chang
S. HAN
Kuang
A
N
N
AM
S. HAN
A
0
0
600 km
400 miles
N
N
Kuang
AM
0
0
600 km
400 miles
Map 2. The Five Dynasties and the Ten Kingdoms, 907–960. After Albert Hermann, An historical atlas of China (1935; rev. ed., Chicago:
Aldine Publishing Company, 1966), p. 33.
4
paul jakov smith
this volume demonstrate, the picture of chaos and political disorder that has
long dominated our understanding of the transitional epoch separating T’ang
and Sung must now yield to a view of the Five Dynasties in the north and
nine kingdoms in the south as an era of robust state building that laid the
foundation for unification under the Sung.
The political trajectory over time and across space during the first half of
the tenth century is depicted in Table 3 and Map 2. In terms of territorial
expansion, the successive regimes of north China consolidated their control
along a north-south axis encompassing all of north China and the Central Plains
from the Yellow River south to the Huai and Han rivers, and west along the
corridor formed by the Wei River valley and the north face of the Ch’in-ling
range. Sovereignty over north China was by no means complete during this
period: the T’o-pa-ruled military governorship of Ting-nan, in the southern
Ordos region of the future Hsi Hsia domain, remained beyond effective Five
Dynasties’ dominion; the Sha-t’o stronghold centered on T’ai-yüan (in Sung
Ho-tung circuit, or modern Shansi) slipped the noose of central control in 951;
and – most momentously for later events – the Sixteen Prefectures comprising
the 300-mile barrier between the Central Plains and the steppe were ceded
by the Sha-t’o state of Later Chin to the Khitan in 937. But the overall trend
was toward the deepening of territorial control, culminating under the fifth,
Later Chou, dynasty with the recapture of two of the Sixteen Prefectures (Mochou and Ying-chou) in the north and the annexation of the plains between
the Huai and Yangtze rivers (the region known as Chiang-Huai) from the
Southern T’ang.
The process of territorial consolidation in the north was propelled by the
increasingly effective assertion of centralized political authority. Volume 3 of
this series documents the devolution of T’ang political power to the military governors (chieh-tu shih) and increasingly autonomous generals (many of
Sha-t’o descent) in north China.2 It was these generals, military governors,
and regional warlords (like Huang Ch’ao’s lieutenant and Later Liang founder
Chu Wen) who competed with one another for mastery over the north, and
who sought to recreate their own image of the defunct T’ang order that they
had helped to destroy. Thus the chief challenge facing the successive would-be
dynasts was how to recentralize power from other members of their own kind –
in particular, the military governors – while rebuilding the apparatus of the
centralized, bureaucratic state.
2
See especially Robert Somers, “The end of T’ang,” in The Cambridge history of China, volume 3: Sui and
T’ang China, 589–906, part 1, ed. Denis C. Twitchett (Cambridge, 1979), pp. 682–789. See also Herbert
Franke and Denis C. Twitchett, “Introduction,” in The Cambridge history of China, volume 6: Alien regimes
and border states, 907–1368, ed. Herbert Franke and Denis C. Twitchett (New York, 1994), p. 10.
introduction: the sung dynasty and its precursors
5
The process of recentralization began with the very first Five Dynasties ruler,
when the Liang founder Chu Wen began to systematically replace T’ang-era
military governors with personally appointed prefects loyal to Chu alone.
Although Chu Wen was never able to neutralize the animosity of the major
military governors who were deeply opposed to his imperial aspirations and
ruthless approach to governance, the four succeeding regimes (three Sha-t’o
and one Han Chinese) were able to build on his momentum to impose evergreater centralizing pressure on the military governors. By midcentury the
Later Chou rulers Kuo Wei and his adopted son Ch’ai Jung had begun to win
the war of attrition against the once-autonomous military governors. In this,
they were assisted by the reemergence of civil officials operating through a
regular bureaucracy. But they were also helped by Ch’ai Jung’s recentralization of military authority through a series of reforms that transformed the
two most potent armies – the Metropolitan and Palace Commands – from
unpredictable power brokers to reliable agents of centralized imperial power,
finally relieving the Later Chou rulers from dependence on the allegiance of
the military governors.3 Naomi Standen shows that as a consequence of these
long-term efforts to reestablish the authority of the state in north China “power
had unequivocally moved to the center” by the time the head of the Palace
Command, Chao K’uang-yin, deposed his Later Chou masters.
Meanwhile, throughout this half century of ostensible fragmentation a parallel process of state building was taking place in the south. Whereas northern
state builders came out of the class of military governors with roots in the T’ang
political order, southern rulers emerged out of outlaw elements unleashed by
the massive social dislocation and demographic upheavals produced by the
rebellions that helped topple the T’ang. In chapter 2, Hugh Clark describes
how outlaw adventurers rose to the top of local military confederations and
then flowed opportunistically with the shifting migrant tides to assume power
in troubled regions far from their original homes, where through a balance
of protective and predatory activities they created alliances with the resident
elites. As T’ang political authority was seized by Chu Wen and his Later Liang
regime in the north, the most powerful military entrepreneurs carved out
independent states in the physiographic cores of south China: Wu-Yüeh in
the Yangtze delta; Min in the river valleys of Fukien; Wu (followed by its
successor state of Southern T’ang) in the elongated valley formed by the lower
Yangtze River, P’o-yang Lake, and the Kan River; Southern Han, in the Pearl
River lands of Kuang-nan East and Kuang-nan West (modern Kwangtung and
Kwangsi), traditionally dubbed Ling-nan; Ch’u, encompassing the Hsiang and
3
The most important overview of this process is Edmund H. Worthy, Jr., “The founding of Sung China,
950–1000: Integrative changes in military and political institutions” (diss., Princeton University, 1976).
Table 3. Chronology of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms
Regime
Dates
Founder and Origins
Capital and Core Domain
Five Dynasties
Later Liang
907–923
Chu Wen (852?–912). One-time lieutenant in Huang
Ch’ao’s rebellion who amasses sufficient military might to
capture the T’ang court in 903, murder the last adult T’ang
emperor (Chao-tsung, r. 888–904) in 904, then depose
Chao-tsung’s son and proclaim his own dynasty in 907.
K’ai-feng. North and Central China (Hopei, Shantung, and
Honan) south to the Huai and Yangtse rivers, but Shansi and
the Peking region beyond Liang control.
Later T’ang
923–936
Li Ts’un-hsü (885–926). Son of Li K’e-yung (856–908), a
Shatuo Turk named military governor (and in 895 Prince of
Chin) by the T’ang court who, with Khitan help, resists Chu
Wen’s military advances. Ts’un-hsü carries on struggle
against Later Liang, which he destroys in 923.
Loyang. From core region in Shansi, Later T’ang expands
well beyond Later Liang borders to control most of
intramural north China south to the Huai and Han rivers;
neither it nor the succeeding regimes establish effective
control over the Ting-nan military governorship centered on
Hsia-chou, south of the Ordos.
Later Chin
936–946
Shih Ching-t’ang (892–942). Shatuo Turk and son-in-law of
last Later T’ang ruler Li Ssu-yüan.
K’ai-feng. Controls all of Later T’ang territory except for the
Sixteen Prefectures spanning Yu-chou (renamed Yen-ching
by the Khitan, modern Peking) to Yün-chou (modern
Ta-t’ung), which Shih cedes to the Khitan in 937. This
strategic barrier protecting north China from the steppe,
later termed “The Sixteen Prefectures of Yen-Yün,” becomes
the chief object of irredentist passions during the Northern
Sung.
Later Han
947–950
Liu Chih-yüan (895–948). Shatuo Turk and military
governor of the Shansi region centered on T’ai-yüan who
takes advantage of the Liao emperor’s death following a
punitive invasion of Later Chin to establish his own reign.
K’ai-feng. Same as Later Chin.
Later Chou
951–960
Kuo Wei (904–954). Chinese, son of a local T’ang military
leader, becomes high military official under Later Han, takes
advantage of a military coup to proclaim himself emperor of
the Chou. Succeeded by adopted son Kuo (originally Ch’ai)
Jung (921–959), who governs effectively with the help of
senior military commander Chao K’uang-yin, the Sung
founder.
K’ai-feng. Kuo Jung initiates campaign of territorial
expansion, culminating in 959 with the capture of two of the
Sixteen Prefectures (Ying-chou and Mo-chou) from the Liao
and annexation of the Chiang-Huai plains between the
Yangtze and Huai rivers from the Southern T’ang. But the
Kuo rulers unable to dislodge the Shansi state of Northern
Han.
Ten Kingdoms
Wu
902–937
Yang Hsing-mi (b. 851). Lu-chou (mod. Ho-fei, Anhwei)
peasant turned bandit chieftain; named military governor by
T’ang in 892, then Prince of Wu in 902. Wu rule usurped
from within by Southern T’ang, 937.
Yang-chou, then Chin-ling (mod. Nanking). Controlled
major portions of the lower Yangtze and Kan River valleys
(Huai-nan East and West Chiang-nan East and West circuits
during the Sung, modern Anhwei and Kiangsi provinces).
Former Shu
907–925
Wang Chien (c. 848–918). Butcher, salt smuggler, and
outlaw leader in Hsü-chou–Ts’ai-chou region (Sung
Ching-hsi North, modern Honan), joins T’ang forces against
Huang Ch’ao, named military governor of Western
Szechwan in 891, assumes title of emperor in 907. Region
invaded by Later T’ang in 925.
Ch’eng-tu. Controlled all of the Szechwan basin, the upper
Han River valley, and the corridors between Szechwan and
northwest China (Sung Ch’in-feng Circuit, modern Shensi
and Kansu).
Wu-Yüeh
907–978
Ch’ien Liu (d. 932). Emerges in late 870s as lieutenant to
Eight Battalion militia leader Tung Ch’ang in the Yangtze
delta region of Liang-che (modern Chekiang). Consolidates
power in Hang-chou before turning on Tung Ch’ang in 996
in the name of the waning T’ang court, which names him
Prince of Yüeh in 902, then Prince of Wu in 904.
Hang-chou. Controlled rich Yangtze delta and coastal
regions of Liang-che circuit (modern Chekiang province).
(continued )
Table 3 (continued)
Regime
Dates
Founder and Origins
Capital and Core Domain
Min
909–945
Wang Shen-chih. One of three brothers in control of Fukien
by 890s; outmaneuvers his elder brother to assume civil and
military authority in the northern region centered on
Fu-chou in 898, then title of Prince of Min in 909.
Interfamily strife impedes political unification of the region,
which is largely divided up by Southern T’ang and Wu-Yüeh
by 945.
Fu-chou. Mirroring divisions in the Wang family, political
control fractured along physiographic subregions of Fukien
centered around Fu-chou in the north, the Chien-chou state
of Yin (proclaimed in 943) in the northwest, and
Ch’üan-chou and the coastal prefectures in the south.
Chien-chou/Yin is taken by the Southern T’ang in 945 and
Fu-chou/Min absorbed by Wu-Yüeh in 946, leaving only the
Ch’üan-chou (or Ching-yüan) region – under control of the
warlord Liu Ts’ung-hsiao – to maintain its independence
until submitting to Sung rule in 978.
Southern Han
917–971
Liu Yin. In 894 inherits the positions of his father Liu
Ch’ien, a hereditary tribal chieftain in the region west of
Canton that allied itself with T’ang against Huang Ch’ao. In
902 is rewarded for service to the T’ang court with
appointment as commandant of Canton, then named
military governor of Canton in 905. In 917 succeeded by
brother Liu Yen, who establishes the state as Great Yüeh in
917, then Southern Han in 919.
Kuang-chou (Canton). Controlled the region of modern
Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi (Sung Kuang-nan East and
Kuang-nan West) traditionally designated as Ling-nan;
asserted unenforceable claims to continue T’ang control over
the Red River valley of Annam (modern Vietnam).
Ching-nan (or
Nan-p’ing)
924–963
Kao Chi-ch’ang. Appointed regional military governor of
Chiang-ling by Later Liang founder Chu Wen in 907, then
assumes title of King of Nan-p’ing in 924, just after Later
Liang’s fall. Survives through diplomatic links to successive
Five Dynasties.
Chiang-ling (Ching-chou, modern Sha-shih, Hupei).
Controlled the three prefectures just within and east of the
Yangzte River gorges, including sites of the two modern
cities of I-ch’ang and Sha-shih, as well as the southern bank
of the Han River around Ching-men-chün (modern
Ching-men-shih).
Ch’u
927–963
Ma Yin. Bandit chieftain and adventurer from the same area
of Honan as Wang Chien, uses his military prowess to
occupy a power vacuum in Hunan in 892, leading to control
of all of Hunan by 899. Named Prince of Ch’u 907; state of
Ch’u confirmed by Later T’ang in 927. Internal quarrels
allow Southern T’ang to capture the ruling Ma family in
951, but Hunanese forces drive the occupiers out in 952 and
restore order (under Chou Hsing-feng) in 956. The restored
Hunanese state persists until it and Ching-nan are absorbed
by the Sung in 963.
T’an-chou (Ch’ang-sha). Controlled the region of modern
Hunan (Sung circuits of Ching-hu North and South),
including the Hsiang and Yüan River valleys and Tung-t’ing
Lake.
Later Shu
(Former Shu
successor state)
934–965
Meng Chih-hsiang (874–934). Commands Later T’ang
invasion of Szechwan and remains as military governor until
proclaiming his own state of Later Shu in 934. Succeeded the
next year by his son Meng Ch’ang.
Ch’eng-tu. Same as Former Shu.
Southern T’ang
(Wu successor
state)
937–975
Li Pien (a.k.a. Hsü Chih-kao). Raised as stepson of Yang
Hsing-mi, whose state of Wu he usurps in the name of a
T’ang restoration in 937. Subordinated by Sung in 961, and
fully annexed in 975.
Nanking. Under second ruler Li Ching (r. 943–961)
Southern T’ang expands beyond Wu boundaries to absorb
Fukienese state of Min c. 945 and Hunanese state of Ch’u in
951, but loses Chiang-Huai region to Later Chou in 959.
Northern Han
951–979
Liu Min (a.k.a. Ch’ung). Brother of Liu Chih-yüan, founds
Northern Han as a regional military regime in the wake of
Later Han’s collapse. Liao client state; resists Sung advances
until 979.
T’ai-yüan. Built around the Liu family’s military power base
in Shansi. The only northern polity among the traditionally
designated “Ten Kingdoms.”
Note: Table 3 is based on F. W. Mote, Imperial China, 900–1800 (Cambridge, Mass., 1999), pp. 12–16, supplemented by chapters 1 and 2 in this volume.
10
paul jakov smith
Yüan river valleys and their Tung-t’ing Lake drainage basin; and the successor states of Former and Later Shu, occupying the Szechwan Basin and the
mountain passes through the Ta-pa and Ch’in-ling mountains bisected by the
upper reaches of the Han River valley. The sole exception to these region-sized
states – the tiny kingdom of Ching-nan (or Nan-p’ing) – occupied a 170mile stretch of the Yangtze River from the eastern portal of the Three Gorges
(Kuei-chou, modern Hupei, Tzu-kuei county) downriver past Chiang-ling fu
(modern Hupei, Sha-shih), which it held at the sufferance of its more powerful
neighbors rather than through its own military might.
Despite their outcast origins, the rulers of south China underwent a process
of political maturation that paralleled the evolution of their northern neighbors. Clark documents a shift from military prowess to political effectiveness
as the chief measure of prestige and governance, as once-itinerant bandit chieftains formed stable demilitarized regimes based on political acumen, alliances
with local elites, and the support of refugee literati in search of security and
employment. In fact, state building in the regionalized south was even more
robust than in the wartorn north. For (as both chapters 2 and 3 show) the
greater stability of the south enabled the new regimes to initiate agrarian
projects – especially water control – that enhanced agricultural productivity,
and to sponsor internal, interregional, and international trade over land and
by sea. Thus while the successive northern regimes had to focus on the crucial
political problem of wresting power from other military governors, fending off
each other, and developing workable approaches to the increasingly powerful
Khitan, the southern kingdoms were free to develop sophisticated ways of taxing and even facilitating the growth of the increasingly buoyant commercial
economy. And just like their northern counterparts, the rulers of the southern
kingdoms reintroduced bureaucratic governance into their regions, deploying
a mix of local and refugee literatus lineages as local circumstances allowed.
From a spatial perspective, natural physiographic barriers kept political
boundaries in the south relatively stable. Only one of the southern kingdoms –
the Fukienese state of Min – permanently disappeared during this era, as
discord in the ruling Wang family opened the mountainous region around
Chien-chou to annexation by Southern T’ang and the coastal plains centered
on Fu-chou to absorption by Wu-Yüeh. Similarly, only one of the southern
states – the Southern T’ang – harbored imperial aspirations, openly rejecting
the legitimacy of the northern dynasties in order to promote its own ambitions
to reunify the empire in the name of the T’ang. For a short time in 951
Southern T’ang claimed control (as Clark shows) of over thirty prefectures
on a north-south axis from the Huai River to Ling-nan, and on an east-west
axis from the Wu-i Mountains of Fukien to western Hunan. But soon after
reaching this territorial peak its expansionist momentum was halted and then,
introduction: the sung dynasty and its precursors
11
in 958, resoundingly reversed, as the Later Chou forcibly annexed the fourteen
Southern T’ang prefectures north of the Yangtze River and obliged its rulers
to accept subordinate status. A unification of China was indeed afoot, but as
usual it came from the northern rather than the southern direction.
founding and consolidation of the sung, 960–1000
Chapters 1 and 3 detail the critical contributions made by the Later Chou rulers
Kuo Wei (r. 951–4) and Ch’ai Jung (r. 954–9) toward strengthening bureaucratic governance, centralizing military power, and articulating and enacting a coherent strategy (conquering the south before the north) of territorial
reunification. These measures were all crucial to the success of Chao K’uangyin (927–76) as the founder of the Sung. Both Chao K’uang-yin (or Sung
T’ai-tsu, r. 960–76) and the dynastic consolidator, his brother and successor
Chao K’uang-i (or Sung T’ai-tsung, r. 976–97), emerged from what Edmund
Worthy calls the “militocracy” of the tenth century, for their father, who had
served in the imperial army of each successive northern dynasty except the first,
helped the family make the transition from undistinguished civil officials in
the late T’ang to established members of the Five Dynasties military elite.4
But Chao K’uang-yin was not only a talented soldier who rapidly ascended to
the position of commander of the palace army under Ch’ai Jung, he was also
a keen observer of Chou bureaucratic reforms and a direct participant in Chou
policies of military centralization and territorial expansion. As Lau Nap-yin
and Huang K’uang-chung describe in chapter 3, Chao distinguished himself
in battle against the joint Khitan–Northern Han invasion of Kao-p’ing (Tsechou, Ho-tung circuit, or modern Shansi) in 954, and then helped overhaul
the Palace Command in the military reforms that followed that battle. He
fought with distinction again in the expansionist campaigns against Later
Shu in 955 and Southern T’ang a year later; and by 959, when Ch’ai Jung’s
death put a child on the throne, Chao had earned the intense personal loyalty of a reinvigorated imperial army and its confident military commanders.
It thus came as no surprise when a reported invasion by Khitan and Northern Han forces in 960 provided an opportunity for Chao’s troops to proclaim
their thirty-four-year-old commander as emperor. It is possible to imagine
the new Sung dynasty (named after the eponymous prefecture southeast of
K’ai-feng where Chao K’uang-yin had served in the increasingly vestigial post
4
For a discussion of militocracy and the transition from militocratic to bureaucratic absolutism under
T’ai-tsung, see Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” pp. 295–316; John W. Chaffee traces the history
of the Chao lineage in chapter 2 of John W. Chaffee, Branches of heaven: A history of the imperial Clan of
Sung China (Cambridge, Mass., 1999).
12
paul jakov smith
of military governor) becoming just another placeholder in the succession of
short-lived northern dynasties. But the social turmoil and political fragmentation generated by the collapse of the T’ang had gradually but inexorably
given way to civic order and political stability in both north and south, and
by midcentury the two most powerful states in north and south China had
begun to look beyond their immediate problems to contemplate the possibilities of unification. By the time Chao K’uang-yin assumed the throne of the
sixth northern dynasty since the fall of the T’ang the original 96 prefectures
inherited by the Later Chou had swelled to 118, including 4 prefectures from
Later Shu, 14 from Southern T’ang, and 2 of the coveted Sixteen Prefectures
from the Khitan Liao. Unification had become a realistic ambition, and as a
central player in the Later Chou campaigns of centralization and reunification
Chao K’uang-yin was in an ideal position to capture the great prize. The Sung
founder’s approach to state building continued the measures practiced by his
Five Dynasties predecessors, especially his own mentor Ch’ai Jung. Although
T’ai-tsu was very much a military man, he is best known for subordinating the
military to bureaucratic control.5 Within a year of assuming the throne, T’aitsu famously employed the occasion of a private drinking party to persuade
his generals to exchange their posts for comfortable sinecures as military governors. As Lau and Huang show, by peacefully demobilizing his general staff,
T’ai-tsu severed the personalized links between commanders and their troops
that had made “praetorian coups” – such as the one that brought T’ai-tsu to
power – so common in the post-T’ang era.6 At the same time he subjected the
command hierarchy to more centralized surveillance and control, by vesting
paramount responsibility for military administration in a civilian office, the
Bureau of Military Affairs (Shu-mi yüan). T’ai-tsu’s choice of centralized control over military autonomy – often described by the phrase “emphasizing the
civil and deemphasizing the military” (ch’ung-wen ch’ing-wu) – is sometimes
indicted as a source of the Sung’s putative military weakness.7 But Lau and
Huang conclude that his personal assertion of widespread military authority
“created a new image for his government as a whole, characterized by centralized and absolute authority. This distinguished him from his predecessors and
former military colleagues as a real emperor, not an all-powerful warlord, and
his state as a new-born empire.” T’ai-tsu built on his prestige as absolute military commander to extend bureaucratic control well beyond what his Chou
5
6
7
For a discussion of this militocracy and the transition from militocratic to bureaucratic absolutism under
T’ai-tsu’s brother and successor, T’ai-tsung, see Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” pp. 295–316.
“Praetorian coup” is used in John R. Labadie, “Rulers and soldiers: Perception and management of the
military in Northern Sung China (960–1060)” (diss., University of Washington, 1981), p. 35.
Labadie, “Rulers and soldiers,” pp. 229–32, disputes the notion of Sung military weakness.
introduction: the sung dynasty and its precursors
13
mentors could achieve. Not only was T’ai-tsu able to neutralize the powerbrokering role of the great generals, but he and his successor, T’ai-tsung, finally
eradicated the military governors as a ruling elite. After more than a decade
of slow co-optation, in 977 T’ai-tsung conclusively dismantled the territorial
jurisdictions of the remaining eighteen military governors and replaced them
with civilian officials under direct control of the capital. Thus the era of the
T’ang military governors was finally terminated by its last incumbents, the
Sung founders it had brought to power, and the position of chieh-tu shih turned
into a purely titular office conferred primarily on aboriginal chieftains.8
In other areas of civil administration T’ai-tsu adapted T’ang and Five Dynasties precedents to recreate a network of county, prefectural, and circuit officials
that implanted imperial authority throughout the empire through a growing
bureaucratic apparatus. To staff these offices, T’ai-tsu (and to a lesser extent
T’ai-tsung) employed men associated with or descended from the military
governments of the Five Dynasties era, men of a social class very much like
their own.9 But to supplement his supply of officials T’ai-tsu also revived the
system of civil service examinations. Although (as Lau and Huang point out)
T’ai-tsu recruited no more than four hundred and fifty officials through the
examination system, T’ai-tsung intensified the examination process to certify
over five thousand officials in his twenty-one-year reign. As the chapters in
this and our companion volume confirm, the examination system burgeoned
to become a defining feature of Sung (and indeed all of mid- and late-imperial)
political, intellectual, and cultural life.10 At the same time, it gave rise to
a new, literocentric political elite that however much it may have benefited
from local prestige and the ownership of land was nonetheless defined – by
itself and by others – through its mastery of learning and its prowess in the
examination halls. Individually, the members of this new social class (who
typically designated themselves by the old terms of shih [literati] or shih-tafu [literatus-official]) possessed little of the independent wealth or hereditary
official status of their T’ang aristocratic predecessors. In this sense, they posed
less of a challenge to the absolutist inclinations of some Sung emperors and
(later in the dynasty) their chief councilors.11 Yet while they never challenged
8
9
10
11
Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” pp. 272–9.
It is this group that Robert M. Hartwell calls the “founding elite.” See Robert M. Hartwell, “Demographic, political, and social transformations of China, 750–1550,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 42
No. 2 (1982), pp. 405–8.
For complete studies of the Sung examination system in English, see John W. Chaffee, The thorny gates
of learning in Sung China: A social history of examinations (Cambridge, 1985), and Thomas H. C. Lee,
Government education and examinations in Sung China (New York, 1985).
The issues of imperial and or ministerial absolutism are recurring motifs in this volume. No later emperors
(with the possible exception of Sung Hsiao-tsung, r. 1162–89) ruled with the personalized authority of
the founders T’ai-tsu and T’ai-tsung. On the powers of the early Sung emperors, see Liu Ching-chen,
14
paul jakov smith
the political prerogatives of the throne, the new exam-based literocracy came
to dominate Chinese cultural institutions for the next nine hundred years, as
they “[captured] hauteur from aristocrats, . . . sustained it against merchants,
and . . . grew as much as the monarchs in self-esteem and substance.”12
Political consolidation paved the way for the founders to continue the process of territorial unification that had been initiated by the Later Chou. T’aitsu launched the first reunification campaign in 963 with a swift conquest of
Ching-nan and Ch’u, gaining possession of the middle Yangtze region. This
was followed in 965 by a successful campaign against the upper Yangtze kingdom of Later Shu, although the conquest was so brutal and rapacious that the
resulting wave of rebellions rocked Szechwan for another four decades. Before
his death in 976, T’ai-tsu subjugated Southern Han (in 970–1) and Southern
T’ang (in 975). The remaining southern state of Wu-Yüeh and the Fukienese
military outpost of Chang-Ch’üan capitulated to T’ai-tsung in 978, completing the new dynasty’s consolidation of its rule in south China. But in the north,
T’ai-tsu’s attempt to topple the Northern Han in 969 was foiled by the armies
of the Sha-t’o regime’s patron, the Khitan Liao. In 979, T’ai-tsung launched a
second invasion of Northern Han that Liao forces were unable to repel, bringing the breakaway region of Ho-tung (modern Shansi) back under centralized
control for the first time since 951. But this was as far as the Sung would get
in restoring control over north China. Flush with victory over the Northern
Han, T’ai-tsung pressed his troops on toward the Sixteen Prefectures, where
they were decimated by Liao forces near Yu-chou (modern Peking). T’ai-tsung
launched a second massive invasion of the Sixteen Prefectures in 986, but once
again Liao cavalry and their commanders overwhelmed Sung forces. The Sung
were never to regain the Yen-Yün region, for Sung state building came up
against a parallel process of state formation on the steppe that was to shape
events in China and Inner Asia for the next three centuries.
12
Pei Sung ch’ien-ch’i huang-ti ho t’a-men ti ch’üan-li (Taipei, 1996); on the increasing authority of the chief
councilors over the course of the dynasty, see Lin T’ien-wei, “Sung-tai ch’üan-hsiang hsing-ch’eng chih
fen-hsi,” in Sung-shih yen-chiu chi: Ti pa chi, ed. Sung-shih tso-t’an-hui (Taipei, 1976), pp. 141–70. The
tension between monarchy and bureaucracy is captured in Anthony W. Sariti, “Monarchy, bureaucracy,
and absolutism in the political thought of Ssu-ma Kuang,” Journal of Asian Studies 32 No. 1 (1972),
pp. 53–76. Rudolf Vierhaus traces the rise of the concept of absolutism, which was used to describe a
kind of monarchy in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe characterized by “the concentration of
state power on a monarch who is not encumbered by other persons or institutions, and who can enforce
his or her sovereignty with the instruments of legislation, administration, taxation, and a standing army,
and who is also final arbiter of the courts.” Rudolf Vierhaus, “Absolutism, history of,” in International
encyclopedia of the social and behavioral sciences, ed. Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes (Amsterdam, 2001),
vol. 1, pp. 5–9.
Joseph R. Levenson, Confucian China and its modern fate (Berkeley, 1965), vol. 2, p. 64. Literatus influence
on Chinese cultural institutions is a theme in many of the chapters in The Song-Yuan-Ming transition in
Chinese history, ed. Paul Jakov Smith and Richard von Glahn (Cambridge, Mass., 2003).
introduction: the sung dynasty and its precursors
15
a cycle of state building on the steppe, tenth
to thirteenth centuries
Overviews of Inner Asian state formation by Nicola Di Cosmo and Frederick
W. Mote suggest the magnitude of the challenge that confronted the Sung
from the steppe.13 Over the long term, Inner Asian state formation was often
precipitated by economic, social, or political crises that stimulated the militarization of pastoral societies. According to Di Cosmo, crisis could create social
dislocation within tribes that provided the opportunity for a charismatic leader
to rise to a position of supratribal ruler or khan. This disruption of traditional,
semiegalitarian political relations was characterized by “a replacement of the
clan nobility with a much more powerful, hieratic, and autocratic form of
authority where collegial decisions were restricted to a small group of people.” Political authority was in turn supported by the increased militarization
of society into permanent fighting units placed under the direct control of
the khan or royal clan.14 But this conjoining of permanent militarization and
political centralization within an aristocratic class required far greater economic resources than pastoral society could provide, stimulating the demand
for invasions of wealthier sedentary regions to secure predictable supplies of
external resources. For Di Cosmo, the development of forms of “state appropriation” of economic resources evolved over time: “Cast in a historical perspective, inner Asian state formations . . . display a gradual but sure tendency
to form more and more sophisticated means of access to external resources.”
Moreover, this incremental growth in the ability of Inner Asian states to secure
revenues external to their productive bases “was coeval with the emergence
of the state apparatus and provided the basis for its survival, for foreign relations, for the projection of force beyond its political and territorial boundaries,
and for the domination of different ethnic, linguistic, and economic communities.”15
13
14
15
Nicola Di Cosmo models Inner Asian state building over the imperial era in his “State formation and
periodization in Inner Asian history,” Journal of World History 10 No. 1 (1999), pp. 1–40; Frederick W.
Mote surveys the formation of individual frontier states and empires in the mid-imperial era in Frederick
W. Mote, Imperial China: 900–1800 (Cambridge, Mass., 1999), chapters 2–4, 8–12, and 16–20. See also
Franke and Twitchett, “Introduction,” The Cambridge history of China, volume 6.
Di Cosmo, “State formation and periodization,” pp. 21–3.
Di Cosmo, “State formation and periodization,” p. 27. Because the process of Inner Asian state
formation was fully reversible, with steppe states running the risk of dissolving and returning
to a nonstate condition, Di Cosmo eschews an explicitly evolutionary formulation. This caveat
notwithstanding, the developmental trajectory that he depicts, characterized by increasing sophistication based on explicit borrowing (what Mote, Imperial China, p. 226, likens to technology
transfers) over the long duration from the Hsiung-nü to the Ch’ing, approximates an evolutionary
path.
16
paul jakov smith
In Di Cosmo’s formulation, then, the secular development of technologies
of resource appropriation serves as a marker of Inner Asian state formation.16
And the most intensive period of development and elaboration in the forms of
Inner Asian resource appropriation occurred between the tenth and fourteenth
centuries, when powerful steppe empires bordered and then eradicated the
Sung. During the first millennium of the imperial era, Inner Asian states slowly
progressed from a dependence on tribute during Han times to a combination of
tribute and the systematic control of intercontinental and border trade during
the Sui and T’ang. But the pace of change accelerated in the early tenth century,
when the Khitan Liao (variously dated as 916 or 947 to 1125) pioneered a new
form of governance that Mote describes as dual administration, and that Di
Cosmo deems the beginning of the era of the “dual-administration empires” of
the Liao, Chin, and early Mongol period (907–1259).17 The institution of dual
administration grafted an alien system of civil governance over the conquered
farming families along the Chinese and Korean borders to a native Khitan
state that administered all military and tribal matters and collected tribute
from subordinate peoples like the Jurchen.18 Dual administration did not
displace the collection of tribute from the Sung, for the Khitan Liao used war
or the threat of war to institutionalize tribute into a system of “indemnified
peace” with the Sung that later proved equally profitable for the Tangut Hsi
Hsia (1038–1227) and the Jurchen Chin (1115–1234).19 But by developing
increasingly effective techniques of dual administration, the Liao were able to
supplement trade and tribute with an increasing proportion of revenues from
the direct taxation of sedentary peoples, which helped finance the successful
occupation and defense of the state of Po-hai and the Sixteen Prefectures of
north China. These techniques of dual administration were in turn adopted
by the Jurchen at the very beginning of their ascent to statehood under A-kuta (r. 1115–23) and employed in their governance of the sedentary domains
conquered from the Liao in 1125 and the Sung in 1127.20 The combination of
16
17
18
19
20
Di Cosmo, “State formation and periodization,” pp. 30–7, periodizes the stages of Inner Asian state
formation as follows: tribute empires (209 b.c.e.–551 c.e.), trade-tribute empires (551–907), dualadministration empires (907–1259), and direct-taxation empires (1260–1796).
Mote, Imperial China, pp. 39–40, 72–5; Di Cosmo, “State formation and periodization,” pp. 32–4.
Although neither Mote nor Di Cosmo (both published in 1999) refers to the other, they depict the
phenomenon of dual administration and the process of political evolution through adaptation and
emulation in similar terms.
Mote, Imperial China, pp. 39–40.
Mote, Imperial China, p. 71. As Mote puts it, “The Inner Asian states learned to threaten war, demand
territory, or require other concessions, and the [Sung] learned to resist most of those demands by paying
ever higher indemnities.”
Di Cosmo, “State formation and periodization,” p. 33.
introduction: the sung dynasty and its precursors
17
Chinese and steppe methods of governance pioneered by the Khitan evolved
into what Mote describes as a technology of statecraft that was augmented
by the Jurchen and the Tanguts throughout the twelfth century, adding to
the store of universal governing techniques that the Mongols would draw
on in their sweep through China and Eurasia in the thirteenth century.21 As
Di Cosmo argues, the Mongol Yüan (1271–1368) took the process of Inner
Asian state formation one step further, by circumventing tribute (though not
trade) as a source of revenue and extracting their resources from the conquered
territories through a system of direct taxation. But Di Cosmo, like Mote,
stresses the evolutionary trajectory by which the Yüan emerged as the first of
the direct-taxation empires: “The completion of the conquest of China under
Khubilai is the best example of the confidence achieved by the Mongols to
summon a wide array of political resources derived from the storehouses of inner
Asian, central Asian, northern Chinese (Liao and [Chin]), and Chinese political
traditions.”22
The rapid evolution of Inner Asian statecraft in the tenth to thirteenth centuries allowed states on the northern frontier to support formidable armies that
offset agrarian China’s advantages in wealth and numbers, thereby blocking
Sung from assuming a position of supremacy at the center of a China-dominated
world order and relegating it to a position of equal participant in a multistate
East Asian system.23 Even the Tangut Hsi Hsia, a tribute-trade empire (to follow Di Cosmo’s formulation) occupying the largely unproductive lands of the
Ordos bend and the Kansu Corridor, was able to match the Sung in military
power and confront it as a de facto diplomatic equal, as the chapters in this
volume show. Map 3 depicts how evolving Inner Asian states expanded ever
farther south of the Great Wall frontier that traditionally divided sedentary
China from the steppe, seizing north China in 1127, encircling south China
by the 1260s, and finally absorbing all of China into the vast Eurasian empire
of the Mongol Yüan in 1279. The pages that follow will briefly highlight the
impact of steppe expansion and Sino-steppe relations on the tempo of Sung
dynastic events and the shape of Sung political culture.
21
22
23
Mote, Imperial China, p. 226.
Di Cosmo, “State formation and periodization,” p. 34. For Di Cosmo, the peak of the direct-taxation
model was attained by the Ch’ing, which “achieved a level of social and political integration between
conquerors and conquered far higher than that of earlier inner Asian polities.” Di Cosmo, “State formation
and periodization,” p. 36. For a similar argument, see Paul Jakov Smith, “Introduction: Problematizing
the Song-Yuan-Ming Transition,” in The Song-Yuan-Ming transition in Chinese history, ed. Paul Jakov
Smith and Richard von Glahn (Cambridge, Mass., 2003), pp. 30–4.
This theme recurs throughout the essays in Morris Rossabi, ed., China among equals: The Middle Kingdom
and its neighbors, 10th–14th centuries (Berkeley, Calif., 1983).
Northern Sung and
its neighbors, ca. 1100
0
0
1000 km
600 miles
Southern Sung and
its neighbors, ca. 1200
0
0
1000 km
600 miles
MONGOL
DOMAINS
K H I TA N L I A O
JURCHEN
CHIN
T IBE TA N
T RIBE S
LI
K’ai-feng
TANGUT HSI HSIA
OKA
LI
T IB E TAN
T R IB E S
16 Prefectures
OKA
TANGUT HSI HSIA
NORTHERN SUNG
Hang-chou
(Lin-an)
SOUTHERN SUNG
TA- LI
TA - LI
Southern Sung encircled
by the Mongols, ca. 1270
0
0
1000 km
600 miles
Former Sung domain and its
neighbors under Mongol rule, 1291
0
0
1000 km
600 miles
Ling-pei
Khara Khorum
Khara Khorum
Liao-yang
Hami
Chung-shu sheng
M O N G O L E XPANSION IN E AST ASIA
(Peking)
OKA
Kao-li
(1259)
(1227)
LI
Shan-hsi
Tibet
Ho-nan
Tibet
(1268)
Ssu-ch’uan
Lin-an
Chiang-che
SOUTHERN SUNG
Yun-nan
Ta-li
Hu-kuang
(1254)
(1227)
Dates of Mongol conquest
Targets of protracted Mongol
attack, ca. 1234–1270
Map 3. The Sung domain and its neighbors, c. 1100–1291.
Chia
nghs
i
Hsi Hsia
Ta-tu
Kan-su
Chin
(1234)
Italicized placenames designate former
East Asian states enfolded into a system
of Branch Secretariats (hsing-sheng),
precursors of provinces that were
subordinate to the Central Secretariat
(Chung-shu sheng).
20
paul jakov smith
sino-steppe relations and the shape of dynastic events
Geopolitical equilibrium in the post-Shan-yüan era, 1005–1067
Sung policy makers formally acknowledged the irreversibility of a new multistate system regulated by treaties and the establishment of regular diplomatic
intercourse when they approved the Treaty of Shan-yüan in 1005. As a result of
T’ai-tsung’s failure to dislodge the Sixteen Yen-Yün Prefectures from Khitan
control, advisors to his son and successor, Sung Chen-tsung (r. 997–1022),
instituted an extensive project of defensive construction centered on the fortification of frontier cities and the creation of a network of cavalry-blocking
waterways that diminished Liao military superiority and dashed Khitan hopes
of reestablishing a buffer zone between themselves and the Sung.24 In response,
the Liao launched a massive invasion of China’s Central Plains in 1004, hoping
to use war to achieve an advantageous peace that would bring Sung irredentist
attacks to an end. Although Khitan forces approached to within one hundred
miles of K’ai-feng, their own losses were considerable, and both sides soon
came to appreciate the advantages of a negotiated and dependable settlement.
The ensuing Shan-yüan Treaty of 1005, in which the Sung agreed to make
annual payments to the Liao and to repudiate claims to the Yen-Yün region,
constituted a recognition by the Sung court that the territorial, ritual, and
financial costs of diplomatic parity and a purchased peace were far less onerous
than the social and political costs of mobilizing the country for protracted irredentist war. The diplomatic equilibrium that accompanied Sung suspension
of its irredentist aspirations ushered in a concomitant period of political stability that spanned the remaining seventeen years of Chen-tsung’s life as well
as the reigns of his son Sung Jen-tsung (r. 1022–63) and Jen-tsung’s cousin
Sung Ying-tsung (r. 1063–7). The Shan-yüan settlement coincided with the
transition from battle-hardened dynastic founders to court-nurtured successors, precipitating a shift in political power from an absolutist throne to an
increasingly complex and self-confident bureaucracy.25 The bureaucracy itself
was of course by no means homogeneous: it was staffed by men from different
24
25
In addition to chapter 3 in this volume, see Lau Nap-yin, “Waging war for peace? The peace accord
between the Song and the Liao in ad 1005,” in Warfare in Chinese history, ed. Hans J. van de Ven (Leiden,
2000), pp. 180–221.
The most important study in English of this post-Shan-yüan evolution of the Northern Sung state is
still Edward A. Kracke, Jr., Civil service in early Sung China, 960–1067; with particular emphasis on the
development of controlled sponsorship to foster administrative responsibility (Cambridge, Mass., 1953). Winston
Lo offers a longer perspective, tracing the evolution of the Sung civil (and military) service over the
course of the entire dynasty, in Lo Wen (Winston W. Lo), An introduction to the civil service of Sung China:
With emphasis on its personnel administration (Honolulu, 1987).
introduction: the sung dynasty and its precursors
21
parts of the empire, with potentially conflicting political views, interests, and
affiliations; and it drew on a pool of examination graduates that grew faster
than the number of available government posts, even as entry into government became the most prized avenue of social mobility. Irreconcilable policy
differences and intense competition for office would eventually fracture the
solidarity of the bureaucratic elite under the weight of factionalism and the
concentration of power in increasingly hegemonic ministerial regimes. But
in the decades following the Shan-yüan settlement the shih-ta-fu elite was
still relatively cohesive and the still-evolving bureaucratic apparatus relatively
robust. As a result, the arbitrary exercise of state power was restrained by the
constitutional division of authority over civil affairs (under the SecretariatChancellery), military matters (under the Bureau of Military Affairs), and
economic administration (under the Finance Commission). Furthermore, an
institutionally embedded system of checks and balances prevented a single
chief councilor from dominating the Council of State and subjected all the
state councilors to independent oversight by a fully developed system of policy critics (chien-kuan) and censors (yü-shih).26 At the same time, governance
was characterized by a relatively conciliar approach to decision making, exemplified most graphically by the reliance on broadly staffed interagency ad hoc
committees to advise the emperor on important policy issues.27
But the equilibrium sustained by the Shan-yüan settlement was by no
means unassailable and could be shaken by any combination of internal or
external shocks. Internally, there was always the threat of a domestic challenge to frontier stability, for the consensus on accommodation was pragmatic
rather than principled, offered grudgingly rather than with enthusiasm. Moreover, the very “civilism” of the Sung state marginalized some individuals and
groups who might benefit more from war than from peace, inclining them to
acquiesce in if not agitate for frontier expansion. Externally, equilibrium could
be jolted by the demise of a stabilizing ruler or state, or particularly by the
entry of a vigorous new player on the steppe. Such was the case in the second
decade of Jen-tsung’s reign, when the Tangut ruler Li Yüan-hao (1004–48)
proclaimed himself emperor of the Great Hsia empire in 1038. As Michael
McGrath describes in Chapter 4, in the years following the Shan-yüan Treaty
the Tangut domain had expanded from a handful of towns inside the Yellow
River loop to an extensive cavalry empire that controlled the Ordos region and
26
27
Chapter 3 of Kracke, Civil service in early Sung China. On the structure and political role of Sung
remonstrance and censorial offices, see Chia Yü-ying, Sung-tai chien-ch’a chih-tu (K’ai-feng, 1996)
pp. 155–212.
On this important element of eleventh-century policy making, see Robert M. Hartwell, “Financial
expertise, examinations, and the formation of economic policy in northern Sung China,” Journal of Asian
Studies 30 No. 2 (1971), pp. 281–314, especially p. 293.
22
paul jakov smith
the Kansu Corridor, and thus the most important trade routes linking Inner
Asia and the Sung.28 Sung reluctance to extend diplomatic recognition to the
Hsi Hsia emperor instigated a four-year war (1038–42) that highlighted Sung
deficiencies in strategic planning, tactical execution, and troop battle fitness.
Ultimately, Sung military inadequacies were offset by its vast size and incalculably greater wealth, but even so the court was forced in the treaty of 1044
to purchase from Li Yüan-hao the same kind of indemnified peace with which
it placated the Liao. Moreover, Sung incompetence in this first Sino-Tangut
war exacerbated growing concerns about Sung governance and bureaucratic
morale, catalyzing the Ch’ing-li reform movement of 1043–5 that heralded
(as McGrath explains it) the political coming of age of the exam-dependent
political elite.
Although the Ch’ing-li reforms succumbed to the abrupt withdrawal of
imperial support, the problems of military impotence, bureaucratic demoralization, and growing Tangut power continued to fester. These potential threats
to the post-Shan-yüan equilibrium converged again in the mid-1060s, as Yingtsung’s premature death brought his young son Sung Shen-tsung (r. 1067–85)
to the throne. Internationally, Li Yüan-hao’s son Li Liang-tso (r. 1048–68)
was inspired by the deterioration of Tibetan rule in the Kansu-Tsinghai Highlands to launch expeditionary forces against Tibetan political centers, sinified
frontier tribes, and even Sung commanderies throughout the northwestern
borderlands.29 Domestically, the very primacy of the examination-based civil
service put indirect pressure on frontier stability by producing a surfeit of
potential officials. The numbers of men with ranked civil service status more
than doubled through the reigns of Chen-tsung, Jen-tsung, and Ying-tsung,
from some ten thousand to around twenty-four thousand men. By Ying-tsung’s
death this glut of officials had begun to demoralize the entire civil service, with
far more candidates than the system could absorb clamoring for posts, sponsors,
and promotion from junior to senior status. In a sociocultural environment
dominated by the state, the career aspirations of these supernumerary officials
were best served by expansion in the scope of government activity in either
the domestic or foreign arenas.
Even more direct pressure came from a group increasingly marginalized
by the mid-Sung civil service: the hereditary military families who comprised
28
29
The growth of the Hsi Hsia state is mapped in Ruth W. Dunnell, “The Hsi Hsia,” in The Cambridge
history of China, volume 6: Alien regimes and border states, 907–1368, ed. Herbert Franke and Denis C.
Twitchett (New York, 1994), p. 171.
The following paragraphs draw on Paul Jakov Smith, “Irredentism as political capital: The New Policies
and the annexation of Tibetan domains in Hehuang (the Qinghai-Gansu highlands) under Shenzong
and his sons, 1068–1108,” in Emperor Huizong and late Northern Song China: The politics of culture and the
culture of politics, ed. Patricia B. Ebrey and Maggie Bickford (Cambridge, Mass., 2006), pp. 78–130.
introduction: the sung dynasty and its precursors
23
the core of the Sung general command. For in the half century following the
Shan-yüan Treaty the Chen-tsung and Jen-tsung courts had systematically
excluded the military’s contribution to strategic decision making, replaced
regular troops and effective generals with local militia, and transferred military
authority and even outright field command from the generals to such topranking civilian officials (and Ch’ing-li reform leaders) as Fan Chung-yen (989–
1052) and Han Ch’i (1008–75). Although the general staff was not dismantled,
it was transformed into a bureaucratized and subordinate appendage of the
civilian-dominated state.30
In mid-1067 Tangut incursions supplied the pretext for one military man
to take frontier matters into his own hands, when the frontier commander
Ch’ung O took it upon himself to kidnap a prominent Tanguts general and
wall the Hsi Hsia town of Sui-chou (renamed Sui-te chün), just across the hotly
contested northern border of greater Shan-hsi circuit.31 Civilian courtiers like
the influential Ssu-ma Kuang (1019–86), imbued with the worldview of the
Shan-yüan settlement, demanded that Sui-te be returned to the Tanguts and
urged the newly enthroned Shen-tsung to honor the policy of his predecessors
by treating their Tangut treaty partner with respect and assuming a posture of
compliance to reestablish diplomatic entente. In the past, such sober-minded
exhortations had sufficed to bring frontier adventurism to an end. But the
flame of irredentist longing burned far more brightly in Shen-tsung’s heart
than it had for Chen-tsung, Jen-tsung, or Ying-tsung, and he ascended the
throne determined to “destroy the Hsia Nation and then personally lead the
campaign to subjugate the Great Liao.”32 Fanned as they were by imperial
passion, irredentism and frontier adventure emerged during Shen-tsung’s reign
30
31
32
Labadie, “Rulers and soldiers,” p. 199, chapters 2 and 4.
Greater Shan-hsi circuit denotes the administrative region encircled by (going clockwise) the Tangutheld regions of the Ordos, the eastern loop of the Yellow River, the Ch’in-ling Mountains, and the
frontier zone east of the T’ao River. The circuit was formally established as one of the fifteen civil circuits
of the Sung in 997; in 1041 it was subdivided into the four military circuits of Ch’in-feng, Chingyüan, Huan-ch’ing, and Fu-yen. In 1072 the civil administration of Shan-hsi was divided between
Yung-hsing-chün in the east and Ch’in-feng circuit in the west, with a fiscal and judicial intendant
appointed for each. At the same time the military administration of Shan-hsi was divided into six
military subdivisions – Yung-hsing, Fu-yen, and Huan-ch’ing in the east, and Ch’in-feng, Ching-yüan,
and Hsi-ho (the easternmost sector of the Tibetan domains in Ho-huang) in the west – with a military
affairs commission (ching-lüeh-ssu) and pacification commission (an-fu-ssu) designated for each. The maps
for this volume follow the cartographic convention of dividing greater Shan-hsi into the two circuits of
Ch’in-feng and Yung-hsing-chün even before the split in 1072, without attempting to outline the six
military subcircuits. On this point, see the “Compiling Principles” section of the sixth volume (Sung
Liao Chin shih ch’i) of Chung-kuo li-shih ti-t’u chi, ed. T’an Ch’i-hsiang (Shanghai, 1982). On the evolving
territorial administration of Shan-hsi during the Northern Sung, see Michael Charles McGrath, “Military
and regional administration in Northern Sung China (960–1126)” (diss., Princeton University, 1982).
Shao Po-wen, Shao-shih wen-chien lu (1151; Peking, 1983) 3, p. 26.
24
paul jakov smith
as a potent form of political capital that swept a new constellation of men –
including generals, eunuchs, and hawkish bureaucrats – into power. Moreover,
the political capital generated in Shen-tsung’s reign yielded interest for the
next half century, as Shen-tsung’s own sons Sung Che-tsung (r. 1085–1100)
and Sung Hui-tsung (r. 1100–26) dedicated themselves to completing their
father’s dream, fired by the zeal of what they and their public spokesmen
glorified as virtually a second dynastic founding.
Irredentism and state activism under Shen-tsung and his sons, 1067–1127
Disturbed by the new emperor’s self-image as an activist (yu-wei), expansionist sovereign, his elder statesmen cautioned Shen-tsung to forgo talk of war,
practice fiscal restraint, and rectify his own heart while leaving governance to
the bureaucracy. Only the forty-six-year-old Wang An-shih (1021–86), whose
unease over impending political and cultural crisis had exploded to the surface
in his “Myriad word memorial” of 1058, emboldened his sovereign to believe
that “the time for doing great deeds is right now.” But even Wang argued
that the emperor’s irredentist aspirations must be deferred until political, economic, cultural, and military institutions were thoroughly revamped and the
empire made “prosperous and strong” (fu-ch’iang). As the chapters by Smith on
Shen-tsung and Levine on Che-tsung and Hui-tsung illustrate, the resulting
New Policies (hsin-fa) – the epitome of state activism in the imperial era –
came to characterize the reigns of Shen-tsung and his sons, and to dominate
the agendas of the chief councilors who catered to and in turn manipulated
their emperors’ ambitions.
From an institutional perspective, the New Policies reflected Wang Anshih’s vision that the bureaucracy could be expanded and fine-tuned to intervene in and reshape every aspect of the social, cultural, and (most especially
for Wang) economic landscape. But Wang’s original goal of enriching the
state without overtaxing the people by creating new wealth through statemanaged economic redistribution was soon transformed under the pressure of
Shen-tsung’s expansionist dream into a hydra-headed bureaucratic apparatus
dedicated to extracting revenue for reformist projects and the emperor’s war
chest.
Politically, the New Policies were abetted by the emperor’s willingness to
abandon the system of bureaucratic checks and balances brought to maturity in the post-Shan-yüan decades, just as he was eager to repudiate the
Shan-yüan settlement itself. Persuaded by Wang that the only way to augment imperial authority was to unyieldingly support the reforms, Shen-tsung
allowed Wang to dominate the Council of State, control remonstrance offices,
create new reform-specific agencies that bypassed existing offices, and pack
introduction: the sung dynasty and its precursors
25
the bureaucracy with his followers – young men with demonstrated expertise
in finance and bureaucratic enterprises but low standing in the civil service
whom more established literati denounced as “mean and petty men.” This
newly mobilized cadre of reformers and their sons and brothers would, with
the exception of the eight-year antireform regency during Che-tsung’s minority (1085–94), come to control the government throughout the reigns of
Shen-tsung and his sons.
Such drastic changes in the political landscape were certain to generate
a significant backlash, and from the very start of Wang’s tenure in 1069 a
growing circle of officials inveighed against his abuse of ministerial authority
and the predatory intrusiveness of his New Policies. In Jen-tsung’s reign similar
opposition had led to abrupt suspension of imperial support for the Ch’ingli reforms, but Shen-tsung’s commitment was not so easily shaken. Driven
by the potency of his irredentist dream, Shen-tsung acceded to Wang Anshih’s insistence that dissent against the reforms be suppressed by purging
opponents of the activist agenda, punishing antireform censors, closing the
“roads of remonstrance” (yen-lu), and granting key reform cadre in the field
immunity from censorial impeachment.
Except for brief interruptions, dissent against the New Policies remained
silenced for the duration of Shen-tsung’s reign, especially under the prodding
of Ts’ai Ch’üeh, Wang An-shih’s successor as reform commandant from 1077
to Shen-tsung’s death in 1085. With the enthronement of Shen-tsung’s eightyear-old son, power passed to a coalition of men headed by Ssu-ma Kuang and
the dowager empress Hsüan-jen who were determined to abolish the hated
New Policies and reverse the irredentist adventurism that spawned them. But
despite the transfer of power to prudent, conservative men, political culture had
been too thoroughly transformed by the heated partisanship of Shen-tsung’s
reign to permit a return to the relative collegiality of the post-Shan-yüan
decades, for factional strife during the New Policies era had propagated the
equivalent of a party system, with the victorious party claiming all the political
spoils. Thus while Wang An-shih’s erstwhile foes moved to reverse his policies,
they enthusiastically emulated Wang’s political techniques of capturing the
Council of State and monopolizing the Censorate and the Remonstrance offices.
In particular, the Yüan-yu partisans (Yüan-yu tang), so named for the restoration reign period (1086–94), suppressed opponents with a counterpurge of
New Policies adherents more sweeping than anything in the dynasty to that
point, despite warnings from within their own ranks that perpetuating factional strife could only come back to haunt them. And indeed it did. On
assuming personal rule in 1094, Che-tsung declared fealty to his father’s
achievements by proclaiming the new reign period of Shao-sheng (Continuing Sagacity), while his lieutenants denounced the antireform regency as
26
paul jakov smith
a profound mistake and eliminated its supporters from office. As Levine
demonstrates in chapter 6, “Late Northern Sung politics entered its most
virulent and divisive stage during the personal rule of Che-tsung,” when the
casualty count of factionalism would rise exponentially.
Factional strife and its belligerent discourse reached a peak between 1102
and 1104, when the new emperor Hui-tsung authorized his chief councilor
Ts’ai Ching (1047–1126) to proscribe all members of the “Yüan-yu party” –
whether dead or alive – and extirpate their political and literary legacies.
Although an ominous comet frightened Hui-tsung into rescinding the blacklist in 1106, opponents of the revived, more heatedly revanchist reform agenda
remained effectively silenced by Ts’ai Ching’s license to smother policy dissent. Indeed, as Hui-tsung asserted in 1108, it was Ts’ai Ching’s suppression
of policy opponents that enabled the emperor to fulfill his father’s goal of
annexing the Tibetan domains centered on Ch’ing-t’ang (modern Hsi-ning,
Tsinghai province), intended to be the first step in Shen-tsung’s war with the
Tangut:
Previously my Divine Ancestor began plans for military success by delineating the western
frontier. Although at that time not even [Hsi-chou2] had been recovered he established a
unified circuit in order to bring all [the constituent regions] under a common name and
to show that this great and sacred design must be brought to success . . . In bringing this
plan to fulfillment [We have] relied on my Chief Councilor [Ts’ai Ching]. If he had not
banished the doubting multitudes then how could [We] have fully realized [Our] forbear’s
ambition to spread Our majesty among the caitiffs beyond the borders?33
Through the reigns of Shen-tsung and his sons, then, irredentist ambition and
imperial support for the chief councilors and statist policies that could help
bring that ambition to pass had irreversibly undermined the constitutional
division of authority that checked the arbitrary exercise of state power. The
Sung political system from the New Policies through the end of the Southern Sung saw a growing consolidation of executive authority in the inner
court, comprised above all by the sovereign and his chief councilors, especially
Wang An-shih (in power from 1069–76), Chang Tun (1094–1100), and Ts’ai
Ching (1102–19) in the Northern Sung, and Ch’in Kuei (1128–55), Han
T’o-chou (1194–1207), Shih Mi-yüan (1208–33), and Chia Ssu-tao (1259–
75) after the dynastic move south.34 At the same time purges, suppressions,
33
34
Smith, “Irredentism as political capital,” citing Yang Chung-liang, Tzu-chih t’ung-chien ch’ang-pien chishih pen-mo 140, p. 13b.
The historian Lin T’ien-wei measures the growing power of the chief councilors over the course of
the Sung dynasty by the number of man-years the originally dual positions of “right” and “left” chief
councilors were occupied by a single (and hence preeminent) incumbent. By that measure, 22 percent
of the Northern Sung’s chief councilors served alone, for a total of 63 of the era’s 167 years or 37 percent
of the time. During the Southern Sung, by contrast, 36 percent of the chief councilors served alone for
introduction: the sung dynasty and its precursors
27
and irreconcilable policy differences had fractured the tenuous and inherently
unstable solidarity of the bureaucratic elite, pitting insiders and outsiders
against one another and eventually driving a wedge between the inner court
and the ministerial political machines that dominated it, and the bureaucracy
as a whole.
But what of the revanchist dream that underpinned the New Policies? In
order to mobilize the nation for war, Shen-tsung and Wang An-shih promoted
an intensive project of military strengthening that included revitalization of
the officer corps through reforms in the command structure, establishment of a
national military institute, revival of the national arsenal, creation of a reliable
system of procuring horses for the cavalry, and the institution of mandatory
military drill and review for virtually all members of the new mutual security
(pao-chia) system in north China. In addition, both Shen-tsung and Wang Anshih chose to delegate autonomous authority to their generals in the field. With
this they reversed a century-old policy of military centralization, setting off
a countertrend that reached its peak around 1115 when Hui-tsung promoted
the eunuch general T’ung Kuan (1054–1126) to the position of generalissimo
of Shan-hsi, Ho-tung, and Ho-pei circuits and concurrent head of the Bureau
of Military Affairs, thereby granting one man supreme control over the entire
Northern Sung military apparatus.35
Sung military reforms yielded their most impressive results in extended
campaigns against the weak frontiers of northeastern Tibet (the Ch’ing-t’ang
region) and southwestern Szechwan, where Sung forces showed that with adequate time and massive resources they could dislodge indigenous populations
from their native settlements, fend off their guerilla defenders, and buy off
their chieftains with emoluments and titles. Victory against scattered tribal
forces meant little when it came to doing battle with the far more sophisticated armies of the Tangut Hsi Hsia, however, against whom Sung forces under
Shen-tsung and his sons never gained more than a stalemate when they were
not thoroughly humiliated. Yet by Hui-tsung’s reign so many men had ridden
to power on the banner of Shen-tsung’s irredentist mission that every victory,
real or imagined, was an occasion for promotions and solemn celebrations. And
so, when in 1118 defectors from the north reported that Jurchen invaders had
created havoc on the Khitan frontier, Hui-tsung and his court defied anxious
critics to make a pact with the Jurchen to help them topple the Liao in return
35
63 percent of the era’s 149 years. See Lin, “Sung-tai ch’üan-hsiang hsing-ch’eng chih fen-hsi,” pp. 141–70.
For discussions in English, see Liu Tzu-chien (James T. C. Liu), China turning inward: Intellectual-political
changes in the early twelfth century (Cambridge, Mass., 1988), pp. 81–104, and Gung Wei Ai, “Prevalence
of powerful chief ministers in Southern Sung China, 1127–1279 a.d.,” Chinese Culture 40 No. 2 (1999),
pp. 103–14.
Smith, “Irredentism as political capital.”
28
paul jakov smith
for recovery of the Sixteen Yen-Yün Prefectures. But in 1122, after four years of
negotiating over Yen-Yün as Jurchen armies devoured the Liao domain, T’ung
Kuan’s expeditionary army was routed and humiliated by the putatively impotent Khitan troops. After the Jurchen forces overthrew the last Liao remnants
in 1125 they turned their sights on the Sung, whose panic-stricken emperor
abdicated to his son Sung Ch’in-tsung. But with neither the trained corps
needed to conduct effective diplomacy nor the military discipline and reserves
of political capital required to mount an effective defense, the Sung left itself
open to a Jurchen blitz through north China “as if it were undefended,” belying
the half century of war mobilization and military reform. In the first month
of 1127 K’ai-feng fell to the Jurchen, who marched both emperors and their
royal entourage to exile in the alien north. Shen-tsung’s irredentist dream
had backfired, adding all of north China to the category of terra irredenta and
placing the survival of the dynasty in doubt.
Survival, recovery, and autocracy, 1127–c. 1260
Over the long term, the conquest of north China by the Jurchen ignited political, social, and intellectual changes whose ramifications extended beyond the
Southern Sung (as the surviving dynasty would be called) into the Yüan, Ming,
and even the Ch’ing. Perhaps most crucially, the loss of north China signaled
for many the failure of state activism, and shattered the identity of interest
between the state and the shih-ta-fu elite that had already been strained by
factional warfare under Shen-tsung and his sons. To anticipate a theme developed more fully in our companion volume, with the massive flight of Sung
subjects and officials to the south the bureaucratic elite of the eleventh century was absorbed into a much wider stratum of local lineages who viewed
government service as just one option in an array of mobility strategies, and
the family and local community as a more appropriate focus of institutional
reform than the centralized bureaucratic state. In concert with this change in
orientation, thinkers like Chu Hsi (1130–1200) who were associated with the
Learning of the Way (Tao-hsüeh, or Neo-Confucianism) articulated a new conception of the links between politics, community, and moral transformation
that gradually emerged as the ideological underpinning for an increasingly
self-conscious local gentry well into the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
In spatial terms, the eventual relocation of the new, embattled emperor Sung
Kao-tsung (r. 1127–62) and his court to the “temporary capital” (hsing-tsai)
of Hang-chou (renamed Lin-an) in 1132 superimposed the political center of
the dynasty over its economic core and helped transform the lower Yangtze
region (or Chiang-nan) – the only region during the Sung, Yüan, and Ming
eras to be spared the most extreme depredations of war – into China’s social,
introduction: the sung dynasty and its precursors
29
economic, and cultural heartland from the twelfth through roughly the sixteenth centuries.36
In the short term, however, the Jurchen conquest of north China unleashed
explosive forces of political and social chaos that threatened to topple the
dynasty, as Tao Jing-shen details in chapter 8.37 From the moment the Jurchen
Chin officially deposed the Chao clan in the second month of 1127, it fell to
Ch’in-tsung’s brother (then Prince K’ang) and a small coterie of loyal partisans
to restore the dynasty in a south China that was itself roiled by rebellion,
warlordism, and army mutinies and defections. As late as 1130, after Kao-tsung
had been forced (in 1129) to temporarily abdicate the throne by a rebellious
commander of the Imperial Bodyguard and then driven out of Hang-chou by
a Chin invasion of the lower Yangtze region, the fledgling restoration seemed
very close to collapsing.
As it happened, Southern Sung fortunes began to turn around later that very
year, the same time that the Jurchen created the proxy state of Ch’i (1130–7) to
provide a buffer between the Chin and Sung regimes. Gradually the Southern
Sung court succeeded in co-opting the warlords who had come to dominate
society along the Han, Huai, and Yangtze rivers, taking advantage of their
neutralization to reorganize riverine defenses in the east and (as Tao explains)
institute significant military reforms in the mountainous west. Yet survival
required Kao-tsung to incur political risks, by delegating military authority
to some thirty-nine military governors – many of them former warlords – to
help secure order along the new frontier. In 1135 control over these strategic
areas was consolidated under the “four great generals” (including Yüeh Fei) of
the restoration era, each of whom was put in charge of an extensive garrison
command (tu-t’ung ssu). Although it was these generals and their minions
who were most responsible for quelling internal rebellion and mounting an
effective defense against the Chin, their authority and de facto autonomy
became increasingly worrisome to Kao-tsung and his courtiers, who sought
opportunities to recentralize military control in the hands of the court. Such
opportunities came with increasing frequency from the mid-1130s on, as order
returned to south China, the Sung and Chin courts tired of war, and the death
of the captive emperor, Hui-tsung, in 1135 and return of his coffin in 1137
made war less of a filial imperative. In 1137 the Jurchen abolished their proxy
state of Ch’i, bringing the Chin and Southern Sung face to face along the Huai
and Han river frontier. A year later, Kao-tsung, whom Tao Jing-shen depicts as
36
37
These themes are addressed in Smith and von Glahn, The Song-Yuan-Ming transition in Chinese history.
The most comprehensive study of the Southern Sung restoration is Teraji Jun, Nan-Sō shoki seijishi
kenkyū (Hiroshima, 1988), translated into Chinese as Nan Sung ch’u-ch’i cheng-chih-shih yen-chiu, trans.
Liu Ching-chen and Li Chin-yun (Taipei, 1995).
30
paul jakov smith
overcoming his earlier revanchist inclinations to favor instead the Shan-yüan
approach to foreign relations through rapprochement, publicly proclaimed his
willingness to humble himself in pursuit of peace with the Chin.38
Kao-tsung’s declaration of intent by no means settled the issue of peace,
and impassioned officials, inflamed by a sense of national humiliation at the
loss of the Central Plains heartland, continued to oppose what they saw as
appeasement in the most robust public policy debate since the abdicating
Hui-tsung lifted the ban on remonstrance in 1125.39 At the same time, Sung
generals headed by Yüeh Fei showed surprising strength in fending off Jurchen
forays and launching their own sorties as far north as Lo-yang and K’ai-feng.
But following ten tumultuous years on an embattled throne Kao-tsung was
eager to recapture the equilibrium of the post-Shan-yüan decades, as Tao Jingshen explains, by seeking external security through peace with the Chin and
internal security through control over the military. Both objectives Kao-tsung
entrusted to his chief councilor Ch’in Kuei, whose task it now became to use
on behalf of rapprochement the same political tactics that Wang An-shih,
Ts’ai Ch’üeh, Chang Tun, and Ts’ai Ching had wielded on behalf of war:
centralization of power, suppression of debate, and political intimidation. In
the military sphere, Ch’in Kuei took advantage of the peace treaty concluded
with the Chin in 1141 to strip the great garrison commanders of their positions
and then to execute their one member – Yüeh Fei – whose irredentist zeal
and military prowess could most easily undo the peace plan. In the political
domain, Ch’in Kuei unleashed official censors and private informers against
critics of the peace treaty in a fifteen-year campaign of innuendo, repression,
and literary censorship, all under the same monarchical authorization on behalf
of rapprochement that Hui-tsung had given Ts’ai Ching on behalf of war –
that is, the authority to “smash all who differ.”40
Although the 1141 treaty required the Sung to acknowledge ritual submission and pay annual tribute to the Chin, the peace it secured ushered in an era
of remarkable economic and cultural development. That peace was founded
38
39
40
Hsü Meng-hsin, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (1196; Taipei, 1962), 188, pp. 7b–8a.
Hsü, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien 25, pp. 91a–10b. The San-ch’ao compilation is the best source on the
debates over war and peace during both the fall of the Northern Sung and the Southern Sung restoration.
Hoyt Tillman provides an example of the passions inflamed by the loss of north China in his “Protonationalism in twelfth-century China? The case of Ch’en Liang,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 39
No. 2 (1979), pp. 403–28.
Cited in Charles Hartman, “The making of a villain: Ch’in Kuei and Tao-hsüeh,” Harvard Journal of
Asiatic Studies 58 No. 1 (1998), p. 89. As background to his study of biographical manipulation, Hartman
provides a concise account of Ch’in Kuei’s campaign of political suppression. For further studies, see
Gung Wei Ai, “The usurpation of power by Ch’in Kuei through the censorial organ (1138–1155 a.d.),”
Chinese Culture 15 No. 3 (1974), pp. 25–42; and especially chapters 9 to 13 of Teraji, Nan Sung ch’u-ch’i
cheng-chih-shih yen-chiu, pp. 285–385.
introduction: the sung dynasty and its precursors
31
on a balance of lethal force that gave the advantage to defense over attack;
thus while Sung and Chin went to war three times in the next half century –
instigated by Prince Hai-ling of the Chin in 1161 and by the Sung in 1163 and
1206 – in each case the outcome was disastrous for the aggressor. Indeterminate though war may have been from a strategic perspective, decisions about
war nonetheless continued to serve as a vehicle for emperors and their chief
advisors to consolidate power at the expense of the policy-making, administrative, and censorial agencies of the regular bureaucracy, thereby exacerbating
the autocratic distance between the inner court and the civil service.
In the case of Kao-tsung’s adopted son and successor Hsiao-tsung, political
centralization assumed many of the classic attributes of autocratic rule by a
monarch unencumbered by other persons or institutions. For as Gong Wei Ai
describes in chapter 9, Hsiao-tsung not only bypassed the line bureaucracy but
even his chief ministers to personally assume decision-making authority over
an increasingly wide range of affairs. Hsiao-tsung took personal control of his
government as early as 1163, after court vacillation over war policy induced
him to brush aside his two chief councilors, his Council of State, and his
Bureau of Military Affairs to secretly order his commanding general to attack
the Chin. Nor did the disastrous conclusion of that campaign impel Hsiaotsung to relinquish the reins of state over the next two decades, prompting
outspoken representatives of bureaucratic professionalism such as Chu Hsi to
decry the emperor’s arrogation of civil service powers and the enfeeblement of
his Council of State.
Monarchical autocracy gave way again to ministerial domination when
Hsiao-tsung abdicated the throne to his son Kuang-tsung (r. 1189–94), an act
that deprived the Southern Sung of its last effective emperor. In his three chapters covering the last century of the dynasty, Richard Davis portrays Kuangtsung’s reign as the beginning of a protracted era of political paralysis that
weakened the Southern Sung from the inside even as it was beset by the rise of
the Mongols from without. Moreover, the onset of an era of weak emperors did
nothing to reconstitute the relatively conciliar, professionalized governance
that had evolved under the passive rule of Chen-tsung and Jen-tsung of the
Northern Sung. For the vacuum created by imperial withdrawal was quickly
filled by palace favorites and powerful chief ministers, two of whom – Han T’ochou (1151–1207) and Chia Ssu-tao (1213–75) – were themselves products
of the inner palace quarters rather than the civil service career track.
Han T’o-chou epitomized the palace favorite, as Davis shows, rising to
prominence on the skirts of such prominent palace women as Kao-tsung’s
wife and Han’s own aunt, the dowager empress Wu. Yet when Kuang-tsung’s
unfilial conduct unleashed the fury of Tao-hsüeh partisans inside the court
and out, it was only with Han T’o-chou’s help that the state councilor and
32
paul jakov smith
imperial clansman Chao Ju-yü persuaded the reprobate emperor to abdicate
the throne to his son Sung Ning-tsung (r. 1194–1224). Fully expecting to
be rewarded for his help in engineering a smooth succession, Han instead
found himself boxed out of power by the same Tao-hsüeh statesmen he thought
he had helped, whose continued moralizing not only polarized the political
atmosphere but enraged the new emperor as well. Utilizing his position as
a palace insider, Han capitalized on Ning-tsung’s aversion to the Tao-hsüeh
alliance to gain the emperor’s trust and then, in 1194, win imperial designation
as special councilor. From this position Han drew on the repertoire of tactics
honed by Ts’ai Ching and Ch’in Kuei to keep the professional bureaucracy and
its Tao-hsüeh spokesmen at bay: Han incited his handpicked cadre of censors to
hound officials, issued special palace orders to circumvent the bureaucracy and
fire foes, and most famously, from 1195 to 1199, enacted an outright ban on
the Tao-hsüeh movement for its dissemination of “spurious learning.” When all
this failed to silence his critics Han played his trump card – a war against the
Chin drummed up in an effort to co-opt his Tao-hsüeh detractors by catering to
their revanchist yearnings. But like Prince Hai-ling’s war of 1161 and Hsiaotsung’s campaign of 1163, the K’ai-hsi war of 1206–7 backfired: prominent
irredentist leaders withheld their support, the hereditary commander of Sung
forces in northern Szechwan rebelled, Chin troops humiliated Sung armies
all along the Sino-Jurchen frontier, and Han T’o-chou lost his head to courtsponsored assassins.
The K’ai-hsi war marked the end of active Sung attempts to shape its relations with the steppe: for the next half century or so, events along the frontier
were decided and paced by the Mongols, whose extraordinary rise caught the
entire Eurasian world off-guard. But the end of the K’ai-hsi war also marked
what Davis describes as a new phase in Southern Sung politics, as Tao-hsüeh
moralism and Han T’o-chou’s political intolerance and adventurism gave way
to moderation and compromise under the new, long-serving chief councilor,
Shih Mi-yüan (1164–1233, served 1208–33). Seen from the perspective of
the dynasty as a whole, restraints on political discourse were looser in the
last seven decades of the Sung than at any time since the New Policies. As
the son of a former chief councilor and a civil servant of impeccable credentials, Shih Mi-yüan repaid the support of his fellow literati with what Davis
portrays as a genuine commitment to intellectual pluralism and an abiding
respect for the Tao-hsüeh school, which enjoyed increasing imperial patronage
if no greater political influence from this time on. Moreover, Shih’s tolerance
of public criticism, which became increasingly strident after students of the
Imperial University emerged as a potent political force, survived his death
in 1233; with the exception of a fruitless ban issued in 1158, the post–Han
T’o-chou era never witnessed the same proscriptions or blanket suppression
introduction: the sung dynasty and its precursors
33
of debate over issues of war and peace that characterized Sung political culture from the 1070s to 1207. This absence of purges and bans by no means
heralded a return to the broad-based governance of the early eleventh century, but simply a greater willingness on the part of the governing regime to
manipulate, patronize, and co-opt rather than muzzle its critics. Shih Mi-yüan
came under escalating attacks by Tao-hsüeh partisans for what they viewed as
his humiliating military concessions to a deteriorating Chin regime and for
his usurpation of monarchical authority – in short, his ministerial autocracy.
But even so, Shih chose to frustrate rather than silence his detractors, all the
while monopolizing the ear of his two emperors (Ning-tsung and Li-tsung [r.
1224–64]) and expanding his network of political power.41
Political stagnation and the fall of the Southern Sung
Shih Mi-yüan’s political machine survived until 1251, when the death of his
last close associate created a political vacuum that was filled largely by eunuchs
and consorts until a new palace favorite, Chia Ssu-tao (1213–75), was named
chief councilor in 1259. But by that time the Mongols had conquered the
countries surrounding Sung, including Hsi Hsia (1227), Chin (1234), Ta-li
(1254), and Korea (1259), with Tibet soon to fall (1268), and had laid waste
to Szechwan and the cities along the Han and middle Yangtze rivers.
Despite Chia Ssu-tao’s reputation as the dynasty’s “last bad minister,” Davis
shows (in Chapter 12) that Chia’s administration did everything possible to
defend against the final Mongol assaults, but by then the Mongol military
machine was simply too formidable for the decimated and poorly commanded
Sung forces. Davis rightly highlights the Mongol’s military superiority over the
Southern Sung, but his own chapters, in conjunction with the work of steppe
historians like Nicola Di Cosmo cited earlier, suggest that the Mongols owed
their conquest of China as much to political as to military factors. For even
as the Mongol capacity to synthesize a wide array of institutional resources
from steppe polities and north China reenforced and amplified their military power with political innovation, the Sung political system had begun to
atrophy.
In the realm of financial administration, for example, the centralization of
executive authority in the hands of the emperor, chief councilors, and their minions was offset by the irreversible hemorrhaging of fiscal authority to regional
agencies. According to Robert M. Hartwell, despite continued complaints by
41
For one example of Shih Mi-yüan’s ability to neutralize his critics, see Liu Tzu-chien (James T. C. Liu),
“Wei Liao-weng’s thwarted statecraft,” in Ordering the world: Approaches to state and society in Sung dynasty
China, ed. Robert P. Hymes and Conrad Schirokauer (Berkeley, Calif., 1993), pp. 336–48.
34
paul jakov smith
functionaries of the central government, regional fiscal agencies “supervised
the accounts for nearly sixty percent of total government income and possibly more than seventy-three percent of expenditures” in the late twelfth
century, giving them the power to retain the bulk of state fiscal receipts in
the provinces. As a result, although total government revenues were approximately the same in the late eleventh and late twelfth centuries when north
China is discounted, the Southern Sung court had weaker control over the
empire’s economic resources than its late Northern Sung predecessor had had,
at a time of even greater national peril.42
With respect to frontier policy, a century and a half of arbitrary governance
had undermined the court’s ability to reach broad-based, well-considered decisions about issues of war and peace, paralyzing the Sung policy-making apparatus at the very moment that the dynasty confronted its greatest threat. As
Charles Peterson shows (and Davis’s chapters confirm), Sung frontier policy
in the first decade after the K’ai-hsi war was timid and indecisive, with the
court too fearful of provoking even a deteriorating Chin regime into war to
give support to anti-Jurchen rebels in Shantung or even to undertake military
preparations of its own, despite the urgent pleas of Chen Te-hsiu (1178–1235)
and like-minded Tao-hsüeh revanchists.43 From 1217 to 1224 Sung forces fared
well against a series of attacks launched by Jurchen armies made desperate by
Mongol assaults farther north; but the court’s ambivalence toward the Shantung rebels eventually pushed the most powerful of them, Li Ch’üan, into the
hands of the Mongols in 1226, quite possibly depriving the Sung of “a golden
opportunity to strengthen its position in the northeast and even to lay the basis
for the occupation of parts of Honan, Kiangsu, and Shantung.”44 The Sung
had no direct contact with the Mongols until 1221, but even then fears about
the disastrous Yen-Yün collaboration with the Jurchen a century earlier kept
them shy of further entanglements.45 These fears turned out to be prophetic,
for in 1234 – the year after Shih Mi-yüan’s death – Li-tsung launched an illconsidered preemptive campaign in Honan to wrest Lo-yang and K’ai-feng
from the Mongols despite the warnings of even such fervent irredentists as
Chen Te-hsiu.46 Just as Chen and his cohort predicted, the Honan region and
42
43
44
45
46
See Robert M. Hartwell, “The imperial treasuries: Finance and power in Song China,” Bulletin of SungYüan Studies 20 (1988), pp. 72–91.
Charles A. Peterson, “First Sung reactions to the Mongol invasion of the North, 1211–17,” in Crisis and
prosperity in Sung China, ed. John W. Haeger (Tucson, Ariz., 1975), pp. 215–52.
Charles A. Peterson, “Old illusions and new realities: Sung foreign policy, 1217–1234,” in China among
equals: The Middle Kingdom and its neighbors, 10th–14th centuries, ed. Morris Rossabi (Berkeley, Calif.,
1983), p. 231.
Peterson, “Old illusions and new realities,” pp. 218–31.
Peterson, “Old illusions and new realities,” pp. 218–31. Peterson summarizes the views of Chen and his
allies on pp. 227–8.
introduction: the sung dynasty and its precursors
35
its cities were reduced to a useless and unprovisionable wasteland; the Sung
military lacked the information, leadership, training, and supplies to mount
an offensive campaign; and the Mongols responded to the unilateral provocation with harsh and lethal reprisals. Two years later the Mongols unleashed
a massive campaign against Szechwan that by the end of 1236 had razed
all but four of the region’s fifty-eight prefectural capitals, initiating a long
but inexorable process of conquest that Sung policy makers were helpless to
arrest.
Finally, the Sung dynasty lost the support of its literatus elite just as it
faced its greatest peril. Elite separation from the state was in part a result
of the growing surplus of qualified candidates for the civil service, which
impelled the eleventh-century oligarchy of exam-based bureaucratic lineages
to supplement officeholding with an alternative mobility strategy based on
the accumulation of wealth and property and the strengthening of family,
community, and employment ties at the local level. This emergent localism,
which for Robert Hartwell and Robert Hymes constitutes the most salient
transformation of Southern Sung society, “served to widen and to emphasize a
gap between elite interests and state interests at the local level, and to confirm
and strengthen the independence of elite status and social position from the
efforts of the state to certify, to validate, and so to control it.”47 But this
demographically driven process of social differentiation was transformed into
a more pointed estrangement by the factional warfare of the late eleventh
century and the arbitrary governance of the Southern Sung, which frustrated
and alienated those officials who, in addition to their stress on local initiatives,
continued to take the ideals of professional bureaucratic service to heart. The
most impassioned heralds of that estrangement were the leaders of the Tao-hsüeh
movement, who collectively articulated a critique of absolutist rule whether
monarchical or ministerial and outlined the limits of literati loyalty to an
ethically compromised government.48 As the breach between the state and
the literati hardened, Tao-hsüeh learning came to provide a sense of group
identity “that some [shih] believed could provide moral and social guidance
in their roles as the elite of a local society relative to which they could be
47
48
Robert P. Hymes, Statesmen and gentlemen: The elite of Fu-chou, Chiang-hsi, in Northern and Southern Sung
(Cambridge, 1986), p. 212. See also Hartwell, “Demographic, political, and social transformations of
China.”
For an example of Wei Liao-weng’s critique of Shih Mi-yüan’s absolutist rule and call for a return
to constitutionally divided government, see Liu, “Wei Liao-weng’s thwarted statecraft,” pp. 344–
5; for Chu Hsi’s refusal to serve in a government so politically degraded that it would constitute
“an insult to my person,” see Conrad Schirokauer, “Chu Hsi’s political career: A study in ambivalence,” in Confucian personalities, ed. Arthur F. Wright and Denis C. Twitchett (Stanford, Calif., 1962),
p. 170.
36
paul jakov smith
powerful, and . . . moral and political justification for their autonomy from a
government relative to which they felt powerless.”49
Although the political elite was by no means induced to rebel against the
Sung, their alienation cost the imperiled dynasty both gentry and official support at its moment of greatest danger. While Davis (in chapter 12) highlights
the small but devoted circle of loyalists who stood by to the end and died
with the last Sung emperors – for their story is rich in drama and pathos –
he describes as well the larger picture of political capitulation, as civilian
and military officials relinquished southern cities to the Mongols without a
fight, capital officials absconded in droves, and the once-firebrand university
students fled for their lives. Moreover, once the Mongols consolidated their
control over the Southern Sung domain, former Sung officials and landlords
quickly accommodated themselves to Mongol rule in return for government
protection of their property rights and local posts for themselves and their
children. Even self-described Sung loyalists were induced to abandon the pretense of eremitic withdrawal by a combination of financial necessity, family
interest, and a conviction that cooperation with the evolving Yüan state was
the only way to reestablish local order and security.50 Furthermore, no group
was more closely connected with this accommodation to Mongol rule than the
followers of the once staunchly irredentist Tao-hsüeh movement. For with the
collapse of the Southern Sung dynasty that they had long critiqued, prominent Tao-hsüeh thinkers swiftly moved to put their imprint on the Yüan state
by influencing its social, institutional, and legal policies. At the same time,
their lower-level adherents fanned out into the provinces to found private
academies and staff lineage schools that disseminated Neo-Confucian learning
throughout the local elites of south China.51
In the end, then, the fall of the Southern Sung highlighted two intersecting
trends. In the realm of Sino-steppe relations, an evolving cycle of Inner Asian
state formation that was well under way at the founding of the Sung provided
49
50
51
Peter K. Bol, “Neo-Confucianism and local society, twelfth to sixteenth century: A case study,” in The
Song-Yuan-Ming transition in Chinese history, ed. Paul Jakov Smith and Richard von Glahn (Cambridge,
Mass., 2003), p. 245.
On the adjustment of Sung elites to Mongol rule, see Jennifer W. Jay, A change in dynasties: Loyalism in
thirteenth-century China (Bellingham, Wash., 1991); and Paul J. Smith, “Fear of gynarchy in an age of
chaos: Kong Qi’s reflections on life in south China under Mongol rule,” Journal of Economic and Social
History of the Orient 41 No. 1 (1998), pp. 1–95.
These issues, the subject of a growing bibliography, are addressed in the chapters by Bettine Birge,
“Women and Confucianism from Song to Ming: The institutionalization of patrilineality,” pp. 212–40;
John W. Dardess, “Did the Mongols matter? Territory, power, and the intelligentsia in China from the
Northern Song to the early Ming,” pp. 111–34; and Peter K. Bol, “Neo-Confucianism and local society,
twelfth to sixteenth century,” in The Song-Yuan-Ming transition in Chinese history, ed. Paul Jakov Smith
and Richard von Glahn (Cambridge, Mass., 2003).
introduction: the sung dynasty and its precursors
37
one steppe polity – the Mongols – with a repertoire of organizational means to
draw on as it finally conquered all of China and integrated it into a vast Eurasian
empire. But the fall of the Sung dynasty by no means meant the destruction of
elite Sung society or culture. For by the twelfth century, state formation on the
steppe was matched by a concomitant process of class formation within China.
As a result, the literocentric sociopolitical elite had gained autonomy from the
Sung state that had conceived it, facilitating its swift adaptation to life under
steppe rule and ensuring its continued ability to flourish and to shape Chinese
culture well into the late imperial era.
CHAPTER 1
THE FIVE DYNASTIES
Naomi Standen
introduction
By the early tenth century, political control in the T’ang empire had been
divided among regional governors, commanders, and warlords for some hundred and fifty years. This division of political power resulted chiefly from the
effects of the momentous rebellions (755–63) of An Lu-shan and his followers,
in which the capitals at Lo-yang and Ch’ang-an were seized, and the T’ang
emperor driven into exile. By 907 the remnants of T’ang control of the central
Yellow River valley had been extinguished.1 Over the next fifty-three years,
control of this region, from Ch’ang-an to K’ai-feng, would be seized and relinquished by several successive claimants, each trying, and for the most part
failing, to construct a sustainable base of power – the Later Liang, the Later
T’ang, the Later Chin, the Later Han, and the Later Chou.2 During this time,
known as the Five Dynasties period, regions outside the Yellow River valley
that were once part of the T’ang empire were under administrative control of
different sets of claimants also trying to legitimize and strengthen their rule.
In this period of social instability and near constant warfare, allegiances
among regional commanders drove political events forward. In this chapter
I examine the campaigns and allegiances, internal and external, that framed
political events in the central Yellow River valley – the great center of power in
the T’ang dynasty – and discuss how the development of allegiance strategies
increased a ruler’s ability to administer troops and resources, culminating fifty
years later in a military force strong enough to conquer much of the southern
1
2
The best introductions to these events are the last four chapters of Denis C. Twitchett, ed., The Cambridge
history of China, volume 3: Sui and T’ang China, 589–906, part 1 (Cambridge, 1979), and the references
cited therein.
The founders of each of these dynasties used the name of a previous dynasty as a way of linking their
dynasty to lineages, regions, and successes of the past. Although these states did not, as a rule, refer
to themselves using the prefixes Later, Northern, Southern, etc., it is a long-standing historiographic
practice that helps to distinguish one dynasty from another.
the five dynasties
39
territory once held by the T’ang. This increased capacity, although developed
in the Five Dynasties, would coalesce around the Sung dynastic line after 960.
fighting for allegiances
An Lu-shan was one of ten military governors (chieh-tu shih) appointed by
the T’ang to large frontier commands ideal for defending or expanding the
empire’s borders – and for overthrowing the dynasty. Restoration of the T’ang
dynasty after the An Lu-shan rebellions relied heavily on extending the military governor system from the frontiers to the interior by appointing loyalists
to new governorships created in the heartland of the empire, and at the same
time winning over rebel governors by granting regional commands to those
who surrendered. All of these governors enjoyed greater or lesser autonomy,
and although the T’ang emperors T’ang Te-tsung (779–805), T’ang Hsientsung (805–20), and T’ang Mu-tsung (820–4) recovered the ability to appoint
governors to all but the ex-rebel provinces in the region of Ho-pei in the northeast, the governors – court appointed or otherwise – chose and changed sides
to prevent any one leader (including the emperor) from becoming powerful
enough to threaten the status quo. The former rebel provinces sent no taxes
to the court, and imperial attempts to claw the same returns from fewer people produced widespread banditry from the 830s on, exacerbated by a spate
of severe natural disasters. Some bandit gangs developed into insurrectionary
armies, one of which, led by the failed examination candidate Huang Ch’ao,
seized the capital Ch’ang-an in 880, forcing the emperor to take refuge in
Szechwan. Governors were unwilling to get involved on either side unless it
was to their advantage, so the court eventually sought help from Li K’o-yung,
a Sha-t’o Turkic leader whose father was a T’ang prefect. In 883 Li, leading
a mixed steppe and provincial army, defeated Huang Ch’ao near Ch’ang-an,
and was rewarded with the governorship of Ho-tung (roughly modern Shansi
province).
Although the T’ang dynasty was again restored to its capitals, the emperor
and his court now had no effective power, for they lacked the means to coerce
obedience. Coercion required either control of resources or military strength,
and both were held by the autonomous governors and their armies. The first ten
military governors in the early eighth century had held appointments giving
them full civil and military authority over at least one prefecture, as well as
fiscal and supervisory rights over several others.3 Already a provincial governor
3
What follows draws upon David Graff, Medieval Chinese warfare, 300–900 (London, 2002), pp. 211, 229–
31, 243, as well as on Charles A. Peterson, “The autonomy of the northeastern provinces in the period
following the An Lu-shan rebellion” (diss., University of Washington, 1966); Wang Gungwu, The structure
40
naomi standen
in effect, each commanded all military forces in his region, consisting of longservice professionals who were mostly volunteers. After An Lu-shan’s rebellion
the whole empire was divided into provinces (tao) that became an intermediate
tier of local administration between the prefectures and the capital. They
controlled both military and civil affairs. By the second restoration in 883
there were some fifty governors heading smaller provinces, some as small as
two prefectures.4 After the first restoration several ex-rebel provinces in the
northeast had become hereditary regimes where the governors appointed all
their own provincial and prefectural officials, brought the prefectural militias
under provincial control, sent no taxes to court, and dominated county-level
administration by creating parallel organizations in which the governors’ own
people performed the same functions as the court-appointed magistrates. These
governors were independent but for their demand that the T’ang court formally
confirm their positions. Yet most remained loyal to the T’ang until Huang
Ch’ao’s rebellion, when armies replaced many governors and prefects with
their own choices. From then on the T’ang court received even fewer taxes and
lost its ability to appoint administrators and prefects, while governors became
warlords and fought among themselves over the dismembered carcass of the
empire. Out of this chaotic environment emerged the nine kingdoms of the
4
of power in north China during the Five Dynasties (Kuala Lumpur, 1963); and Edmund H. Worthy, Jr., “The
founding of Sung China, 950–1000: Integrative changes in military and political institutions” (diss.,
Princeton University, 1976), especially pp. 265–71. This work follows the Japanese pioneers, notably
the four-part study by Hino Kaisaburō: “Tōdai hanchin no bakko to chinshō (ichi),” Tōyō gakuhō 26
No. 4 (1939), pp. 1–37; “Tōdai hanchin no bakko to chinshō (ni),” Tōyō gakuhō 27 No. 1 (1939), pp.
1–62; “Tōdai hanchin no bakko to chinshō (san),” Tōyō gakuhō 27 No. 2 (1940), pp. 1–60; and “Tōdai
hanchin no bakko to chinshō (shi),” Tōyō gakuhō 27 No. 3 (1940), pp. 1–40; and, for the Five Dynasties,
Hino’s “Godai chinshō kō,” Tōyō gakuhō 25 (1938), pp. 54–85, and Sudō Yoshiyuki’s, “Godai setsudoshi
no shihai taisei,” Shigaku zasshi 61 (1952), pp. 289–329, 521–39. See also Han Kuo-p’an, “T’ang-mo
Wu-tai ti fan-chen ko-chü,” in Sui T’ang Wu-tai shih lun-chi, Han Kuo-p’an (1958; Peking, 1979), pp.
308–20; and Ou-yang Hsiu, Historical records of the Five Dynasties, trans. Richard L. Davis (New York,
2004).
Owing to the fluidity of events in the last twenty years of the Tang dynasty and the beginning of the Five
Dynasties period, these regimes inherited a confusing range of local offices and institutional nomenclature.
In the early T’ang the central government had dealt directly with the prefectures (chou, renamed chün
briefly under the emperor T’ang Hsüan-tsung). After the An Lu-shan rebellion the province (tao) became a
higher level of authority. These larger administrative units contained a number of contiguous prefectures
under the overriding authority of a military governor (chieh-tu shih) in most of the north China region, or
of a civil governor (kuan-ch’a shih) in most of the south. These provinces varied widely in their degree of
autonomy and their military strength. For a summary of this situation see Denis C. Twitchett, “Varied
patterns of provincial autonomy in the T’ang dynasty,” in Essays on T’ang society: The interplay of social,
political and economic forces, ed. John Curtis Perry and Bardwell L. Smith (Leiden, 1976), pp. 90–109. As
the military strength of the chieh-tu shih increased, and the control of the central government declined,
provinces became increasingly autonomous, and by the 890s chieh-tu shih were the effective rulers of their
districts.
the five dynasties
41
south (discussed in the next chapter), and the five dynastic houses of the north
that were to be founded and destroyed in swift succession.5
The second, third, and fourth of these regimes were established by Sha-t’o
Turkic leaders, and scholars have paid much attention to the cultural differences between the leaders of these regimes and the rulers of apparently
Chinese origin, with some even regarding these three dynasties as a period of
foreign rule.6 While an awareness of cultural differences is certainly visible
in the sources, it is more striking that these differences are so rarely invoked
and even more rarely governed people’s actions.7 It is more helpful to see the
region of north China in the late ninth century as a frontier region in which
groups of varied cultural backgrounds interacted according to considerations
of power that were independent of culture. This northern region was part of
the borderland between the T’ang empire and the steppe, but it also contained
5
6
7
There is no general study of the Five Dynasties in any European language. Wang’s Structure of power and
Worthy’s “The founding of Sung China” deal chiefly with institutions and the locus of power, while Peter
Lorge’s, “War and the creation of the Northern Song” (diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1996) addresses
military issues and relations with the Liao. Wang’s account stops in 947, and the story is picked up
by Worthy and Lorge. In Chinese, see Lü Ssu-mien, Sui T’ang Wu-tai shih (1959; Shanghai, 1984), and
T’ao Mao-ping, Wu-tai shih-lüeh (Peking, 1985). For a basic chronology for all provinces, see Kurihara
Masuo, Godai Sōsho hanchin nenpyō (Tokyo, 1988). For a typology of the fifteen transitions between one
ruler and the next, see Chang Ch’i-fan, “Wu-tai cheng-ch’üan ti-shan chih k’ao-ch’a – chien-p’ing Chou
Shih-tsung ti cheng chün,” Hua-nan shih-fan ta-hsüeh hsüeh-pao: She-hui k’o-hsüeh pan 1 (1985), pp. 22–30.
On the broader context for the period, see Robert M. Hartwell, “Demographic, political, and social
transformations of China, 750–1550,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 42 No. 2 (1982), pp. 365–442.
The historiography of the late T’ang, Five Dynasties, and Sung periods is complex. The dynastic histories
themselves reflect the changing approaches to and control of the dynastic records. During this time the
dynastic histories ceased to be called shu (documents) and took on the new label of shih (histories). Also,
contending versions of the major dynastic records were compiled, in particular the Chiu T’ang shu (The
old [version of the] T’ang documents) and the Chiu Wu-tai shih (The old [version of the] history of the Five
Dynasties), completed in 945 and 974 respectively. They were superseded as standard dynastic histories
during the Sung dynasty by Ou-yang Hsiu’s T’ang shu, called Hsin T’ang shu (The new [version of the]
T’ang documents), and Wu-tai shih-chi, called Hsin Wu-tai shih-chi (The new [version of the] history of the Five
Dynasties), completed in 1060 and 1073. After Ou-yang Hsiu’s versions became prominent, the text of
the Chiu Wu-tai shih suffered from lack of attention. Having lost its status as an official history in 1206,
no copies of the Chiu Wu-tai shih seem to have existed by the mid-fifteenth century. Three hundred
years later, in 1775, Shao Chin-han (1743–96) and other Ch’ing scholars reconstituted the work from
sections of the Yung-lo ta-tien and other sources. Although their reconstruction was incomplete, the Chiu
Wu-tai shih gives a fuller and more faithful rendering of the earlier Five Dynasty documents than does the
Wu-tai shih-chi, despite Shao Chin-han having to work under conditions that were sensitive to the ruling
Ch’ing dynasty’s own historiographical links with the Khitan rulers discussed in the Wu-tai shih-chi. See
the entries on these histories in Yves Hervouet, ed., A Sung bibliography (Bibliographie des Sung) (Hong
Kong, 1978), pp. 61–3, and Wang Gungwu, “The Chiu Wu-tai shih and history-writing during the Five
Dynasties,” Asia Major, new series, 6 No. 1 (1958), pp. 1–22.
The clearest example of this approach remains Wolfram Eberhard, Conquerors and rulers: Social forces in
medieval China, 2nd ed. (Leiden, 1965).
See Naomi Standen, Unbounded loyalty: Frontier crossings in Liao China (Honolulu, 2007).
42
naomi standen
a network of internal borders between provinces.8 In the years following the
second restoration of 883, local leaders of all cultural stripes, from governors
to bandits, fought each other for survival or expansion, and by 895 the number of regimes was greatly reduced. There was greatest scope for ambition in
the regions surrounding the two capitals and the Yellow River valley, dominated by the three governors of Feng-hsiang (west of Ch’ang-an), T’ai-yüan
(in modern Shansi province), and Pien-chou (modern K’ai-feng, in Honan
province).
Those who controlled Feng-hsiang also controlled the western part of the
Kuan-chung region “within the passes,” the eastern part of which also included
Ch’ang-an. The Feng-hsiang provinces were strategic, if not very productive,
since although they did not include the capital province itself, they covered its
western approaches from the Szechwan region. Since 887 the governor of Fenghsiang had been Li Mao-chen, a former imperial general. Li had supported the
emperor until 893, when an attempt to transfer Li to another post turned him
into the court’s most dangerous enemy. After Li’s armies threatened Ch’ang-an
and he forced the execution of three eunuchs and a chief minister, the fifteen
or more prefectures of Feng-hsiang were lost to the imperial camp. In 895, Li
acquired three more prefectures in Ho-hsi (modern Kansu) and appointed his
own governor from among his officers without reference to the court.9
T’ai-yüan was the seat of Ho-tung, lying east of the great northern bend of
the Yellow River and west of the T’ai-hang Mountains, which form the eastern
border of modern Shansi. Ho-tung’s natural topography made it an almost
impregnable and highly strategic location. A combination of agriculture and
pastureland also made it largely self-sufficient. It was well placed to dominate
the east-west stretch of the Yellow River valley. Ho-tung had been granted
to Li K’o-yung as his reward for recovering Ch’ang-an from Huang Ch’ao’s
rebels. He and his father already held other T’ang posts in the region, and by
895 Li had extended his direct control as far north as today’s Ta-t’ung, east
into two prefectures of the southern Ho-pei region, and south almost as far
as the Yellow River. After years of alternately supporting and fighting with
the court, in 895 he prevented the deposition of the emperor T’ang Chaotsung (888–904) by the three Kuan-chung governors led by Li Mao-chen.
8
9
Listed and mapped by Robert Somers, “The end of the T’ang,” in The Cambridge history of China, volume 3:
Sui and T’ang China, 589–906, part 1, ed. Denis C. Twitchett (Cambridge, 1979), pp. 764–5. The
following summary is drawn chiefly from Somers’s chapter and from Wang’s Structure of power, chapters 2–
3, pp. 7–84. The main earlier materials are in Liu Hsü et al., eds., Chiu T’ang-shu (945; Peking, 1975)
19 hsia–20 hsia, pp. 689–814; Hsüeh Chü-cheng et al., eds., Chiu Wu-tai shih [hereafter CWTS] (974;
Peking, 1976) 1–2, pp. 1–43, 25–6, 331–64; and Ssu-ma Kuang, Tzu-chih t’ung-chien [hereafter TCTC]
(1086; Peking, 1956) 255–60, pp. 8287–8482.
For Li’s biography, see CWTS 132, pp. 1737–40.
the five dynasties
43
He received as his reward the title of Prince of Chin, three million strings
of cash to pay his army, and the most beautiful woman in the palace service,
together with the right to bestow noble titles and make appointments to office
in his own districts.10
Between the Huai and Yellow rivers lay the densely citied region of Honan,
divided into about a dozen tiny provinces. By 895 the central provinces,
including Lo-yang, were controlled by the governor of Pien-chou, while two
other provinces in the east were under siege by his armies and would fall in
897. This governor, Chu Wen (or Chu Ch’üan-chung), was from a family of
teachers, but had joined Huang Ch’ao and by 882 was Huang’s commander
in T’ung-chou, guarding the eastern approach to Ch’ang-an. In that year Chu
defected to the T’ang side with his prefecture, greatly easing Li K’o-yung’s
advance to Ch’ang-an. Thereafter Chu was regarded as the chief defender of
the dynasty and received the Pien-chou governorship as his reward, giving
him control of the transportation and storage of grain for both capitals. His
first regional rival was Ch’in Tsung-ch’üan, who was based in Ts’ai-chou (in
modern Honan) and was the last of Huang Ch’ao’s followers. Chu’s survival
remained in the balance until he destroyed Ch’in in 888.11 After this his main
enemy was Li K’o-yung of Ho-tung, whom Chu Wen had tried to assassinate
in 884. Their rivalry was to last two generations.
Several governors located farther from the capitals kept out of the struggle
to control the court, focusing instead on regional expansion or survival. Huainan was a wealthy region south of the Huai River and north of the Yangtze.
Here Yang Hsing-mi fought his way to dominance by 895, but he was continually threatened by his northern neighbor, Chu Wen. In Szechwan, beyond
the Ch’in-ling ranges in the mountains south of Feng-hsiang, Wang Chien
had ruthlessly bludgeoned his way to control of the region by 893.12 These
territories would become two of the nine Southern Kingdoms.
The region of Ho-pei, in the northeast, had been home to effectively independent governors since the rebellion of An Lu-shan, and by 895 four remained.
The most important of their provinces was Yu-chou, formerly prosperous, with
its capital at what is now Peking. In 894 the governor was overthrown by his
brother, and a garrison commander called Liu Jen-kung took a loyalist stance
and removed the usurper with active military backing from Li K’o-yung of
Ho-tung. Li’s sponsorship ensured that in 895 – the year Li saved the emperor
from deposition – Liu Jen-kung was confirmed as the new governor of Yu-chou.
10
11
12
The last of these appointments is reported in 908: TCTC 266, p. 8696.
For Ch’in’s biography, see Liu et al., Chiu T’ang-shu 200 hsia, pp. 5398–9.
On Yang, see CWTS 134, pp. 1779–82; for Wang’s biography, see CWTS 136, pp. 1815–19; and see
the next chapter of this volume.
44
naomi standen
Rather than join in the tussle for supreme power, Liu pursued a regional objective, conducting a relationship of mutual raiding with the nomadic peoples
to his north, chiefly the Khitan (Ch’i-tan).13 Southwest of Yu-chou had once
been the province of Ch’eng-te, now divided into I–Ting, with two prefectures, and Chen-chou with four. Sandwiched between Ho-tung and Yu-chou,
their governors (Wang Ch’u-ts’un and Wang Jung) were concerned only with
survival.14 The last Ho-pei province was Wei–Po, comprising six rich prefectures – known for their silk production – that looked south across the Yellow
River to Chu Wen’s Honan. The capital at Wei-chou (at the southeastern tip of
Ho-pei) was the base of a professional army that had become autonomous after
An Lu-shan’s rebellion and was notorious for choosing its own governors, most
recently in 888. Accordingly, Wei–Po governors had only limited authority.15
The ability of armies to choose their own leaders highlights the importance
of assent in the politics of this period. The major governors of the late T’ang
relied heavily on their military strength for their positions, but that military
strength included numerous separate units, most of which were, of necessity,
not controlled by the governor himself. Prefects, generals, and even relatively
junior officers, in regular contact with the forces they led, could build a personal
following that gave them disproportionate influence over events, for with so
many potential masters to choose from, even a relatively junior leader could
play a significant role in politics by switching his allegiance. In this way,
military advantage not only could be lost, but it could be turned against its
original possessor. While leaders certainly tried to exercise the tightest control
they could – preferably by appointing all their own subordinates – this could
not guarantee that those so controlled would not change sides.
Accordingly, the chief concern of any leader, at any level, was how to
secure the allegiance of his followers. Legitimate title of some kind was necessary – leaders always wanted their posts confirmed by the highest available
13
14
15
For Liu’s biography, see CWTS 135, pp. 1799–1803, 1806. On the history of independent Yu-chou, see
Matsui Shūichi, “Roryō hanchin kō,” Shigaku zasshi 68 (1959), pp. 1397–1432, and on the independent
provinces of the Ho-pei region, see Peterson, “Autonomy of the northeastern provinces.” On raiding
relationships, see Naomi Standen, “Raiding and frontier society in the Five Dynasties,” in Political
frontiers, ethnic boundaries, and human geographies in Chinese history, ed. Donald J. Wyatt and Nicola Di
Cosmo (London, 2005), pp. 160–91.
See Wang Ch’u-ts’un’s biography in Liu et al., Chiu T’ang-shu 182, pp. 4699–4701; and Wang Jung’s
in CWTS 54, pp. 725–31. Where provinces encompass two equally important prefectures, such as I and
Ting or Wei and Po, the en-dash is used (e.g., I–Ting, Wei–Po) to designate the region.
The full story of the professional army of the Wei–Po region is told in Mao Han-kuang, “T’ang-mo
Wu-tai cheng-chih she-hui chih yen-chiu – Wei–Po erh-pai-nien shih-lun,” Li-shih yü-yen yen-chiu-so
chi-k’an 50 (1979), pp. 301–60. For the period down to the Later Liang, see also Hori Toshikazu, “Gi–
Haku Tenyū gun no rekishi – Tō Godai bujin seiryoku no ichi keitai,” Rekishi kyōiku 6 No. 6 (1958),
pp. 65–72.
the five dynasties
45
authority – but title was in itself no guarantee of allegiance from subordinates.
Generosity in the form of plunder, rewards, and appointments was much more
effective, as was entrusting people with important tasks or positions. Trust
involved a risk of betrayal, but a leader unwilling to take that risk ran the
alternative danger of implying a lack of faith in his own leadership. Successful military activity was necessary since it most readily provided the material
benefits and opportunities for bestowing trust, and also demonstrated that the
leader had Heaven’s favor. Leaders also tried to bind their key followers with
marriage alliances and by adopting them as their sons. At the heart of all these
methods were personal relationships between individuals. In the late T’ang
these were the chief methods used to win and maintain the allegiances essential
for power, but they were not the only ones available. As the Five Dynasties
unfolded, other methods came to the fore.16
Regional control through military expansion: Chu Wen’s rise to dominance,
c. 895–907
While some governors may have had considerable political control in the late
T’ang, the emperor still retained the authority deriving from his claim to
the Mandate of Heaven, however much this claim had been challenged.17
The major governors had all received at least their initial posts from the
emperor and usually sought formal confirmation of their gains. There was
no need for them to threaten the existence of the dynasty, and indeed,
much to be lost by so doing. The great rebels had twice overthrown the
T’ang dynasty with dramatic swiftness, having won enough of a following
to overwhelm the immediate opposition, but neither had been able to sustain their new dynasty beyond the short term. Emerging from Huang Ch’ao’s
defeat, the most ambitious governors were careful to build their strength
slowly, nurturing personal relationships and rewarding their followers with
16
17
Allegiance is to be distinguished from loyalty as understood by writers of the Sung and later, who
emphasized undying adherence to a single master. Yuri Pines, “Friends or foes: Changing concepts of
ruler-minister relations and the notion of loyalty in pre-imperial China,” Monumenta Serica 50 (2002),
pp. 35–74, is suggestive of the Five Dynasties situation too. On the topic of allegiance I have benefited
from discussions with Scott Ashley, Bob Moore, Yuri Pines, and Denis Twitchett. There is much concern
among historians of early-medieval Europe with issues related to allegiance, but as yet no comprehensive
discussion. Starting points include R. H. C. Davis, King Stephen, 1135–1154 (London, 1967); Heinrich
Fichtenau, Living in the tenth century: Mentalities and social orders, trans. Patrick J. Geary (Chicago, 1991);
Karl Leyser, Rule and conflict in an early medieval society (Oxford, 1979); and Eleanor Searle, Predatory
kingship and the creation of Norman power (Berkeley, Calif., 1988).
One response to this challenge to authority is discussed by Franciscus Verellen, “A forgotten T’ang
restoration: The Taoist dispensation after Huang Ch’ao,” Asia Major, 3rd series, 7 No. 1 (1994),
pp. 107–53.
naomi standen
0
Imperial capitals
Important provincial capitals
Prefectural capitals
Allied with Chu Wen, 899
Wei
Ting Submitted to Chu Wen, 900
Date of submission to Chu Wen
(898)
Ta-t’ung Modern place-name
in
Ch
300 km
0
200 miles
Liao ho
46
K H I TA N
ho
Ta-t’ung
I
Yu
T’ai-yüan
E
ui
Ting
P sh
T’
ai
- h
an
g
HO-TUNG
Chen H u - t ’
o
K
(898)
A
- C
(898)
(898)
R iv
Yün
er
SHANTUNG
(897)
H
(898)
Pin
Ho-chung
(901)
Feng- T’ung
Loyang
hsiang
-lin
(888)
Hua
gM
t n s Ch’ang-an
h ui
Pien
U
N
HONAN
Su
G
(901)
Han-
sh
(888)
ui
Huai
shui
SHU
HUAI-NAN
Yang
tze
Ch’in
Tse
Po
Wei
H
Lu
N
CH’I
We
is
Ming
U
HO-HSI
(898)
901–2
O
Hsing
Ts’ang
Yello
w
M
tn
s
I
CHING-NAN
(905)
Map 4. North China, c. 895–905, showing Chu Wen’s expansion out of Honan.
the fruits of success, and were concerned not with overthrowing the dynasty
but with controlling the court, usually by assuming the role of the emperor’s
protector.18
In 896, Chu Wen of Pien-chou attacked two independent governors in the
eastern region of Honan. The governors subsequently each asked Li K’o-yung
for help. Li’s army had to cross through Wei–Po, whose leaders in turn sought
help from Chu Wen.19 Li Mao-chen of Feng-hsiang, who had tried to install a
18
19
The following paragraphs draw from Wang, Structure of power, chapters 2–3, pp. 7–84; and Somers, “End
of the T’ang,” pp. 777–84. The basic primary materials for late T’ang events are in Liu et al., Chiu
T’ang-shu 20 shang–hsia, pp. 752–812; CWTS 1–2, pp. 15–42; TCTC 260–5, pp. 8462–8665.
Li K’o-yung’s own records say that his general received permission to cross Wei–Po but that relations
broke down after pasturage was damaged. CWTS 26, pp. 353–4.
the five dynasties
47
new T’ang emperor only the year before, again marched on Ch’ang-an while his
two main rivals, Li K’o-yung and Chu Wen, were fighting each other. Emperor
Chao-tsung was compelled to take refuge in the tiny province of Hua-chou
located on the southern banks of the Wei River about sixty miles east of modern
Hsi-an. When the Hua-chou governor, Han Chien, killed the imperial princes,
Li Mao-chen and Li K’o-yung were unhappy that such a minor governor had
seized such an important role, and their fears for the emperor’s safety led the two
Lis to join up to force the emperor’s return to Ch’ang-an in 898.20 Meanwhile,
Chu Wen had gained two prefectures in southern Ho-pei from Li K’o-yung,
as well as Tse-chou and Lu-chou (modern Ch’ang-chih, Shansi) in southern
Ho-tung. The last two prefectures were located on major routes leading to
both the capitals. Control of this strategic position won Chu Wen an alliance
with Emperor Chao-tsung and his chief minister Ts’ui Yin, who wanted to be
rid of the overmighty eunuchs who controlled the imperial armies and kept an
eye on court-appointed governors.21 The eunuchs were supported by Li Maochen and his Kuan-chung allies, but with Chu Wen’s backing Ts’ui Yin was
now able to remove the two chief eunuchs. This so imperiled the remaining
eunuchs that in desperation they deposed Chao-tsung and offered the throne
to Chu. He refused, and backed the restoration of the emperor in 901, after
which his dominance of the court was unchallenged.
By the end of 901, Chu Wen also had by far the strongest regional position
of all the governors. Liu Jen-kung of Yu-chou had pushed south into Ts’angchou in 898 and resisted Chu Wen’s retaliatory siege until it was abandoned
in 900, but in that same year the governors of I–Ting and Chen-chou offered
their submissions to Chu, giving him allies who threatened the hearts of both
Ho-tung and Yu-chou. The Wei–Po governor, Lo Hung-hsin, had died in
898 and was succeeded by his son Lo Shao-wei, who proved himself one of
Chu Wen’s staunchest allies after Chu helped him ward off an attack by Liu
Jen-kung in 899.22 Chu had already pushed into western Honan, and in 901
he took most of Kuan-chung, including full control of Ch’ang-an. In 899,
Li K’o-yung had recovered the strategic Ho-tung prefectures of Tse-chou and
Lu-chou, but now he lost them again, along with Ho-chung (on the Yellow
River at the southwest tip of Shansi). Chu used Tse-chou and Lu-chou as a
springboard for two sieges of T’ai-yüan in 901–2, and although the city held
out, Li K’o-yung’s fortunes were at such a low ebb that he unsuccessfully
20
21
22
For Han Chien’s biography, see CWTS 15, pp. 203–6.
Ts’ui Yin’s biography is in Ou-yang Hsiu, Hsin T’ang shu (1060; Peking, 1975) 223 hsia, pp. 6355–8.
See Somers, “End of the T’ang,” pp. 766–80; Wang, Structure of power, pp. 9–10, 13, for discussion of
eunuchs and how the power they held was resented at court and in the provinces.
Lo’s biography is in CWTS 14, pp. 187–92.
48
naomi standen
sought peace and then withdrew from the fray, leaving Chu Wen unopposed
to complete his conquest of Honan during 903.23
Chu now had the allegiance of every governor from Ch’ang-an to the tip
of Shantung, and of two prefectures in southern Ho-tung and another two in
southern Ho-pei. He had the friendship or submission of all the independent
Ho-pei area governors except Liu Jen-kung, and another ally had just taken
over the Ching-nan region on the middle reaches of the Yangtze River in what
is now central Hupei. Chu was now the strongest of the governors, and next
he tried to consolidate his control over the court.
That quest was hastened in 903, when Chu Wen installed his troops to
guard the emperor and ordered that all the eunuchs be killed both at court and
in the provinces.24 Chu took day-to-day control of the emperor, which enabled
him to end the maneuvering against him by his erstwhile ally, Chief Minister
Ts’ui Yin, and to have Ts’ui and his cohorts demoted, replaced, and murdered.
The new chief ministers that Chu selected could not stop him from moving
Emperor Chao-tsung from Ch’ang-an to Lo-yang, deeper inside Chu’s area of
control. Ch’ang-an was plundered and left desolate. During the move Chu
gained formal control of the emperor’s own forces, the Six Imperial Armies.
Most of these troops had already been dispersed, and Chu now had the last two
hundred killed and surreptitiously replaced with his own people. The emperor
was now isolated amid household servants all chosen by Chu.
With the eunuchs dead, most of the eunuch-dominated palace commissions
that ran the emperor’s personal administration had ceased functioning, and Chu
now appointed his own followers to fill the nine commissions that remained.
Li Mao-chen of Feng-hsiang, Wang Chien based in Szechwan, and others,
including Li K’o-yung of Ho-tung, Liu Jen-kung of Yu-chou, and Yang Hsingmi of Huai-nan, shelved their differences and planned to bring Chu to heel.
The emperor had appealed to these governors for help, but when Chu marched
west from Pien-chou to face them down, he arranged for Chao-tsung to be
murdered during the campaign, leaving the throne to a twelve-year-old boy,
T’ang Ai-ti (904–7). Chu next had Chao-tsung’s other sons killed, and he
allowed his right-hand man, Li Chen, to procure the demotion, banishment,
or voluntary withdrawal of most of the remaining nobles and gentry in the
bureaucracy, who were subsequently murdered or ordered to commit suicide.25
All that remained was for Chu to take the throne formally, but this proved to
be easier said than done.
23
24
25
TCTC 262, pp. 8549–50. Li’s letter to Chu is reproduced in CWTS 60, pp. 802–4.
On the significance of this, see Wang, Structure of power, p. 87.
For Li Chen’s biography, see CWTS 18, pp. 251–3. The numbers of nobles and gentry had been greatly
reduced by mass executions in 881–2 and 886–7. Wang, Structure of power, p. 98.
the five dynasties
49
In taking over the court Chu had begun by installing his own troops and
ended by replacing almost all the ministers, indiscriminately killing anyone
who appeared to stand in his way. But this was just an extension of his earlier
methods in the provinces, chief of which were straightforward military conquest and territorial domination. Chu worked at the prefectural level, installing
his own military officers in every surrendered district unless it was politically
infeasible, chipping away at a province until he forced the governor’s submission. By 901 he had conquered eleven provinces and twenty-eight prefectures,
and had appointed his own people to all but three. This method was slow, but
it was intended to be thorough; Chu meant to keep what he had gained and
not repeat the failure of his former leader, Huang Ch’ao. Although Chu was
willing to place a degree of trust in those he had appointed to run his conquered
districts, he bolstered their allegiance by the use of force. Resistance always
brought a military response; so, for instance, when Su-chou2 in northwest
Anhwei,26 captured in 888, rebelled against Chu in 890, Chu went in person
to supervise its recapture. And when Li K’o-yung captured Tse-chou and Luchou in 899, Chu’s response was to march on T’ai-yüan. The key to this style
of rulership was obviously Chu’s armies, and especially the provincial units of
Pien-chou that he turned into his personal force. Chu kept a tight grip on his
main army, scattering his personal military retainers or pu-ch’ü through every
unit, tattooing his soldiers, and enforcing a disciplinary code that included
executing all the soldiers in a unit whose officer was killed. Most important,
he reduced the powers of his senior generals after an episode in which Chu
Chen, a trusted commander, gained sufficient strength to challenge Chu Wen
and consequently was executed. Although Chu Wen relaxed his disciplinary
approach slightly after he became emperor, he limited the responsibilities of
his generals for the rest of his life.27
Chu’s preference was to exercise absolute control over his conquests through
violent coercion, but with his own senior followers he also used methods that
solicited rather than enforced support. He used familial bonds but was highly
selective in doing so. He did not employ large numbers of his blood relatives
26
27
Where two prefectures are romanized the same way, they are differentiated here and on the accompanying
maps 4–9 by number, as in Yün (in modern Shan-tung province) and Yün2 (in modern Shansi province).
Wang, Structure of power, pp. 64–7; various sources including TCTC 266, p. 8687. On Chu Chen, see
CWTS 1, pp. 7, 9; 19, pp. 259–61; TCTC 257, p. 8365; 258, p. 8389. On the personal armies of
Five Dynasties governors, see Sudō Yoshiyuki, “Godai setsudoshi no gagun ni kansuru ichi kōsatsu –
bukyoku to no kanren ni oite,” Tōyō Bunka Kenkyūjo kiyō 2 (1951), pp. 3–72, and on Chu Wen’s army
in particular, see Hori Toshikazu, “Shu Zenchū no chōshito,” in Wada Hakushi koki kinen Tōyōshi ronsō:
Shōwa 35-nen 11-gatsu, ed. Wada Hakushi Koki Kinen Tōyōshi Ronsō Hensan Iinkai (Tokyo, 1961),
pp. 819–31. On the development of the imperial armies during the Five Dynasties period, see Chang
Ch’i-fan, Wu-tai chin-chün ch’u-t’an (Hang-chou, 1993).
50
naomi standen
and created only a handful of adopted sons.28 Chu made a number of marriage
alliances, notably with his allies in Wei–Po and Chen-chou, and in 887 he
even made a “fraternal” alliance with the Yün-chou governor, Chu Hsüan,
who was said to be of the same Chu clan. But Chu Wen had most faith in the
personal loyalty of two groups of military retainers, those who either had stayed
with him when he transferred his allegiance from Huang Ch’ao to the T’ang
dynasty or had remained with Huang Ch’ao but subsequently surrendered to
Chu.29 He gave these people command of his armies, senior administrative
posts, and governorships. Trust like this, and its attendant material rewards,
reinforced personal loyalties and offered the promise to his other officers that
they too would receive prefectures or even provinces of their own, with all
the perquisites that such postings brought with them. Constant campaigning
also gave the rank and file many opportunities to enrich themselves through
plunder and to lord it over the general populace, making Chu Wen a good
general to follow.
These methods worked while Chu’s organization was small enough for him
to run with his most trusted followers, and his territory small enough to
dominate with his most reliable troops. But after 901 Chu’s area of control
became so large that it was harder to replace those who surrendered with his
own men; greater expansion meant greater risk of overextending the military
forces needed to support all of his handpicked officials. Chu thus began to
leave in place the officials of conquered regions. But such a compromise could
be dangerous. For example, Chu left Yang Ch’ung-pen of Pin-chou in place
in Kuan-chung but kept Yang’s family hostage. However, because Chu slept
with Yang’s wife, when she was returned to Yang in 904 he promptly rejected
Chu’s lordship.30
There was a limit to how far Chu could impose his will on those who
balked at it. In 905, for example, the governor of Ching-nan, Chao K’uangning, sought peace with his neighbors, Yang Hsing-mi of Huai-nan and Wang
Chien based in Szechwan, and made a marriage alliance with Wang. Chu Wen
feared losing his influence over Ching-nan, and so sent in his armies. Chao
K’uang-ning fled to Huai-nan, leaving Chu to install his own governors in the
28
29
30
On adoptive sons in the Five Dynasties period, see Kurihara Masuo, “Tō-Godai no kafushiteki ketsugō
no seikaku,” Shigaku zasshi 62 No. 6 (1953), pp. 1–30, and his “Tōmatsu Godai no kafushiteki ketsugō
ni okeru seimei to nenrei,” Tōyō gakuhō 38 No. 4 (1956), pp. 61–88.
Wang, Structure of power, pp. 50, 58 for tables of Chu’s oldest followers (a subject given close scrutiny in
Sudō, “Godai setsudoshi no gagun,” pp. 13–19); see also p. 60 for discussion of Chu Hsüan of Yün-chou,
whose biography is in Liu et al., Chiu T’ang-shu 182, pp. 4717–18; CWTS 13, pp. 169–71.
Wang, Structure of power, p. 79; TCTC 264, p. 8626. Biography in CWTS 13, pp. 181–2. On hostages,
see Yang Lien-sheng, “Hostages in Chinese history,” in Studies in Chinese institutional history, ed. Yang
Lien-sheng (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), pp. 43–57.
the five dynasties
51
two Ching-nan provinces. Against advice, Chu tried to follow up his victory
in Ching-nan by marching on two prefectures in Huai-nan, but when they
would not surrender Chu was forced into a costly retreat.31 Here Chu Wen,
unwisely acting on his desire to transform allies into subordinates, had reached
the limits of his southern expansion. By now, however, his chief concern was
to complete his takeover by becoming emperor.
Following the Ching-nan campaign Chu was made marshal of the various
circuits, with command of all provincial military forces. This was a key step in
a gradual buildup to the emperor’s abdication, planned by one of Chu’s close
advisors, Chiang Hsüan-hui, and the ambitious T’ang chief minister Liu Ts’an,
to provide a legitimate pretext for Chu to take the throne for himself. The next
stage was for Chu to be enfeoffed as prince of a “great state” comprising the
twenty-one provinces to which he appointed officials, and to receive the Nine
Gifts, a traditional harbinger of an impending change of dynasty. Only then
should Chu accept the abdication of the emperor. But Chu was enraged by
Liu Ts’an’s gradualist strategy (he eventually executed him) and repeatedly declined the princedom, the Nine Gifts, and even Ai-ti’s statement of his intention to abdicate.32 He wanted the throne itself and nothing less, but having
rejected the gradualist approach he still needed to find a suitable moment.
In the end, it was the limits on Chu Wen’s authority that provided the final
impetus. In 906, Chu had finally responded to the requests from his staunch
ally, Lo Shao-wei of Wei–Po, to act against the autonomous regional army
that had installed Lo’s father as governor but had continued to control the
province. After an officer in the regional army mutinied, one of Chu’s generals
infiltrated a thousand troops into the army’s base at Wei-chou, surprising the
Wei–Po soldiers in the night and slaughtering some eight thousand, together
with their families. But this sneak attack provoked a general uprising against
Chu by various army units across Wei–Po, which was strengthened by support from the Ts’ang-chou governor and his father, Liu Jen-kung of Yu-chou.
Chu Wen marched on Ts’ang-chou, but in response Liu Jen-kung persuaded
Li K’o-yung of Ho-tung to join him in an attack on Lu-chou designed to
draw Chu’s forces back south. Chu’s ability to control the Ho-pei region now
depended upon the continued allegiance of Lu-chou’s governor. This prefecture was so strategically important that Chu had entrusted it to Ting Hui, one
of Chu’s earliest supporters and the first commander of the Pien-chou armies
31
32
CWTS 2, pp. 37–8; TCTC 265, pp. 8643–50.
CWTS 2, pp. 38–9; TCTC 265, pp. 8648–53. The biography of Chiang Hsüan-hui is in Ou-yang, Hsin
T’ang shu 223 hsia, pp. 6360–1. Liu Ts’an’s biography is in Liu et al., Chiu T’ang-shu 179, pp. 4669–71.
On the Nine Gifts, see Howard J. Wechsler, Offerings of jade and silk: Ritual and symbol in the legitimation
of the T’ang dynasty (New Haven, Conn., 1985), pp. 34, and 91–101 to compare the formalities of the
T’ang dynastic foundation.
52
naomi standen
a quarter century earlier. But, according to Ting’s biography, Ting had wept
copiously over the death of Emperor Chao-tsung, and at the end of 906 he
offered his prefecture to Li K’o-yung, allowing Li to advance to just 120 miles
north of Lo-yang. In an attempt to recover control of the situation, Chu Wen
was forced to abandon his attack on Ts’ang-chou and was spurred finally to
accept Ai-ti’s abdication.33 Chu Wen (Liang T’ai-tsu, 907–12) declared his own
dynasty, the Later Liang, and instituted a new reign era in the fourth month
of 907.
The Later Liang regime and the opposition, c. 907–915
Since Chu had already been ruling as if he were emperor for some time, his
taking the throne was largely a formality, and he did not even bother to go
to Lo-yang. He received the letter of abdication at his home base of Pienchou and began holding court there even before the officials arrived from
Lo-yang with the ritual equipment for the accession ceremony. Pien-chou
was renamed K’ai-feng and designated the Eastern Capital, Lo-yang became
the Western Capital, and Ch’ang-an was demoted to a mere province. The
governors appointed by Chu sent gifts to show their acceptance of the new
ruler, and, following convention, Chu gave out titles and reappointed all the
central officials (whom he had himself appointed) to their previous posts.34
Chu Wen had come to the throne as a result of his unquestioned military
superiority, but ironically, the immediate military circumstances of his accession undercut its legitimacy. Military conquest of the previous regime was the
best legitimator for a new dynasty,35 but Chu had founded the Later Liang at
a military anticlimax rather than as a triumphant general. Since the T’ang’s
military forces were negligible and Chu had been adopted as the dynasty’s
protector, clear-cut conquest of the old by the new would have been awkward.
Yet without an unequivocal military victory to demonstrate that he was fulfilling the will of Heaven, Chu’s claim to the throne rested on his control of
the capitals, the T’ang emperor’s abdication in his favor, and above all on the
continuing allegiance of governors who had the troops and resources to defy
him. The historical sources reflect the concern about the importance of legitimacy. Ssu-ma Kuang cites criticism from Chu’s older brother, Chu Ch’üan-yü:
“How can you destroy overnight the T’ang house’s three-century rule and set
33
34
35
Wang, Structure of power, pp. 83–4. CWTS 2–3, pp. 39–45; 26, p. 360; TCTC 265–6, pp. 8656–69.
Ting Hui’s biography is at CWTS 59, pp. 789–90. On the importance of the Wei–Po element in this
event, see Mao, “T’ang-mo Wu-tai cheng-chih she-hui chih yen-chiu,” pp. 320–1.
CWTS 3, pp. 46–53; TCTC 266, pp. 8672–80.
On the importance of accession by conquest of arms, see Wechsler, Offerings of jade and silk, pp. 80–2,
96–7.
the five dynasties
53
yourself up as emperor?”36 Although this admonition did not stop Chu Wen,
his annals are especially noted for their extensive use of supernatural portents
to support the Later Liang claim to be fulfilling the will of Heaven.37 The
annals are also at pains to provide detailed accounts of loyal heroes devoting
themselves to the Later Liang cause in the face of overwhelming odds, such as
two governors who died fighting the Huai-nan forces on the southern border.38
Heavenly signs and examples of undying loyalty had to compensate for the
unambiguous signal that violent conquest would have provided.
Chu’s overthrow of the T’ang dynasty meant that the other independent
governors were confronted with the prospect that one of their number was
overtly claiming supremacy over the rest, and several of them objected to
this. Li K’o-yung of Ho-tung, Li Mao-chen of Feng-hsiang, Yang Hsing-mi
of Huai-nan, and Wang Chien based in Szechwan all continued to use one or
other of the T’ang reign eras, refusing to accept the new dynasty; Wang Chien
even suggested that each make himself emperor locally until the T’ang could
be restored. Li K’o-yung rejected this idea, but in Feng-hsiang only military
weakness prevented Li Mao-chen from declaring himself emperor, although
he adopted all the trappings associated with the imperial title. Wang Chien,
however, followed his own suggestion and declared himself emperor of Former
Shu without any intention of seeking control of the Central Plains.39 With
the notable exception of Li K’o-yung, most of the other princes abandoned the
principle of a single emperor, and over time additional local emperors appeared
in Southern Han (915), Huai-nan (927), and Min (933).40
The opposition of the major governors to the founding of the Later Liang
meant more warfare: the only way Chu Wen could maintain his claim to be
the legitimate successor to the T’ang dynasty was to fight for the allegiances
that were his sole source of practical authority. Even as he ascended the throne,
Chu Wen remained preoccupied with putting down the various mutineers in
Wei–Po. This entailed painstaking military operations against several army
strongholds within Wei–Po, as well as the vital task of recovering Lu-chou from
Li K’o-yung. Possession of Lu-chou was crucial to both sides, and all was nearly
lost for the Ho-tung forces when Li K’o-yung died in 908. The succession of Li’s
son, Li Ts’un-hsü, was almost prevented by Ts’un-hsü’s adopted uncle Li K’oning, who planned to take Ho-tung’s nine prefectures over to the Later Liang
36
37
38
39
40
TCTC 266, p. 8673.
Yao Ying-t’ing, “Lun T’ang Sung chih-chi ti t’ien-ming yü fan-tien-ming ssu-hsiang,” in Sung-shih
yen-chiu lun-wen-chi: 1982 nien nien-hui pien-k’an, ed. Teng Kuang-ming and Li Chia-chü (Cheng-chou,
1984), pp. 370–84.
CWTS 3, pp. 55–6.
TCTC 266, pp. 8675, 8685; CWTS 26, p. 360.
See the discussion in chapter 2 of this volume.
54
naomi standen
and to send Li K’o-yung’s widow and Li Ts’un-hsü to Chu Wen at Pien-chou.
When the plot was discovered, Lu-chou’s commander, Li Ssu-chao, refused to
surrender even when Ts’un-hs’ü ordered him to. Chu Wen responded to Luchou’s continuing resistance by cashiering his own commander and executing
numerous officers and troops, which may well have helped the Ho-tung armies
to win a major victory and relieve Lu-chou that summer. This success was to
mark a revival of the Ho-tung regime’s fortunes and may have prompted Chu
Wen’s enemies to work together more closely, for the Feng-hsiang leader Li
Mao-chen now joined Li Ts’un-hsü (claiming the restorationist mantle) and
Wang Chien of the Former Shu for a counterattack on Ch’ang-an. But when
a Later Liang expeditionary army defeated the Feng-hsiang forces the others
withdrew, and by 909 Chu Wen had gained the submission – sometimes
voluntary – of four of Li Mao-chen’s prefectures in Kuan-chung (what would
become eastern Shensi), though not without the loss of two key followers who
had been alienated by Chu Wen’s suspicions that they were disloyal.41
In the spring of 910 rebellion again presented opportunities in the war
between Chu Wen and the restorationists. The army at Hsia-chou in Tingnan, north of Feng-hsiang and bordering Ho-tung, mutinied and killed their
governor, only to have officers loyal to Chu Wen quell the mutiny and install
the governor’s distant cousin, Li Jen-fu, who was quickly confirmed in office by
the Later Liang court. That autumn, Li Mao-chen organized a joint attack on
Hsia-chou with Li K’o-yung, but Li Jen-fu sent for help and the allied armies
withdrew in the face of Later Liang reinforcements.42 Individual choices of
allegiance were again significant, for it was chiefly Li Jen-fu’s decision to stay
loyal to Chu Wen that prevented the expansion of Chu’s enemies. Li’s display
of allegiance also reinforced Chu Wen’s claims to imperial authority more
cheaply and effectively than had the fighting over Kuan-chung.
At the other end of the Later Liang realm, the continuing allegiance of Ma
Yin, whom Chu Wen had made Prince of Ch’u (in modern Hunan), had also
extended Chu’s authority for a while, but in 908 the Later Liang governor
of Ching-nan clashed with the Ch’u prince, who was victorious wherever he
turned.43 In Huai-nan the Yang family extended its control over the whole of
the Kiangsi region by mid-909, seriously compromising Later Liang claims to
the region. Worst of all, in the Later Liang province of Hsiang-chou (northern
Hupei), the recall of the governor and veteran general Yang Shih-hou to fight in
the planned Lu-chou campaign in 909 led Hsiang-chou and another prefecture
41
42
43
TCTC 266–7, pp. 8681–8709; CWTS 3–4, pp. 362–70. For biographies of Li K’o-ning and Li Ssu-chao,
see CWTS 50, 685–7; 52, 701–6, respectively.
TCTC 267, pp. 8721, 8725–6; CWTS 5, pp. 84–6. Li Jen-fu’s biography is in CWTS 132, pp. 1746–7.
TCTC 266, p. 8674; 267, p. 8704.
the five dynasties
55
to defect to the Former Shu. This rebellion took two months to put down and
may have encouraged Emperor Wang Chien of the Former Shu to proclaim his
independence by establishing his own calendar.44 Overall, Chu Wen’s position
in the south was getting worse, although in the north he was able to neutralize
a threat from the independent region of Yu-chou (modern Peking).45
In cataloging this opposition to Chu Wen, it is right to recall that within
Chu’s own realm, most of his governors stayed loyal.46 Yet the rebellions clearly
showed that Chu could never take the governors’ allegiance for granted, and he
worked to limit their autonomy. His favored method, predating his accession,
was to make direct appointments at the prefectural level, thereby reducing
the governor’s access to resources while increasing his own. But building up
prefects meant more personal allegiances to be maintained, although the fragmentation of the military threat to his regime seems to have compensated for
the increased burden of so many allegiances. Chu Wen also followed the T’ang
dynasty policy of dividing provinces, again to more firmly control access to
resources. He created seven new governorships in the three years to 910. Two
of these resulted from divisions of the rebel provinces of Fu-chou4 and T’ungchou, which had each contained only two prefectures, making four provinces
controlling just a single prefecture each.47 Wherever possible, potentially dangerous provincial armies were also divided. The two thousand troops forming
the personal army of Feng Hsing-hsi, governor of Hsü-chou2, south of K’aifeng, had once been followers of Ch’in Tsung-ch’üan, Chu’s main rival after
the death of Huang Ch’ao. As such, they posed a threat to the regime, but
after Feng died in 910, his army was split up and distributed to other units to
avert that risk. This was thanks to barely veiled threats regarding the consequences of resistance, illustrating the continuing importance of Chu’s military
supremacy even within his own realm. Except where the risks were too great,
coercion remained Chu Wen’s favored method of control.
Nevertheless, Chu Wen remained essentially one ruler among many, reliant
like the others on the uncertain allegiances of his governors. But there was one
important difference between him and his neighbors: when he formally became
emperor, he gained full access to the machinery of the central bureaucracy
in the capitals. Chu clearly appreciated the increase, at least in theory, in
his administrative reach, executive capacity, and access to resources, but he
treated the administrative system, like the rest of his realm, as an extension of
44
45
46
47
TCTC 267, pp. 8714–17.
TCTC 266, pp. 8671–2, 8683–7; 267, pp. 8706–16, 8720; CWTS 4, pp. 59, 62, 70–1; 5, p. 81; T’o-t’o
et al., eds., Liao shih (1344; Peking, 1974) 1, pp. 3–4.
Wang, Structure of power, p. 124, cites twelve governors as loyal and five other governors as potential or
actual threats, not counting members of Chu’s family.
Wang, Structure of power, pp. 130–3, 123–4.
56
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his provincial organization. Conscious of the challenges that could arise from
among the bureaucrats, by 907 he had already removed most of the late-T’ang
officials and installed members of his own retinue in the palace commissions
in place of the eunuchs slaughtered in 903. The palace commissioners ran
the emperor’s personal administration, but now Chu also gave them many
of the administrative duties normally performed by regular bureaucrats. He
thus bypassed the bureaucracy while reproducing institutionally the close
relationships he enjoyed with his followers.
As a governor, Chu had been accustomed to ruling directly over both civil
and military affairs, with the everyday assistance of his chief provincial administrator Ching Hsiang (an unsuccessful chin-shih candidate) and Ching’s wife.
So that Ching Hsiang could retain his access to Chu now that Chu resided
in the inner palace – officially limited to women and eunuchs – Ching was
given an indefinite appointment as head of the Ch’ung-cheng Hall. This office
took on all the duties of the Bureau of Military Affairs (Shu-mi yüan), a palace
commission abolished at Chu’s behest in 905 because of its association with
eunuch power. Ching thus was required to provide advice and discuss policy,
and he controlled all communications between the emperor and his ministers until Chu’s murder in 912; but because Ching also continued to exercise
executive authority at court as he had in Chu’s regional administration, the
powers of the Bureau of Military Affairs began to expand, leaving the chief
ministers with little to do and hence with little influence in affairs.48 Chu’s
provincial followers also largely filled the Court of Palace Attendants (Hsüanhui yüan), whose members worked outside the inner palace performing most
of the functions of their eunuch predecessors but also taking over administrative, diplomatic, and sometimes military tasks from regular bureaucrats
at all levels. The Later Liang court thus shows an almost complete transplantation of provincial personnel into the central administration. The most
effective way to gain influence at the Later Liang court was to be a palace
commissioner.49
48
49
Ching Hsiang’s biography is in CWTS 18, pp. 246–50. On the significance of his wife, see Wang,
Structure of power, p. 90 n. 10. The duties of the Bureau of Military Affairs are described in TCTC 266,
p. 8674, and a large secondary literature exists, including a useful discussion of the bureau’s origins
and powers in Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” pp. 212–21, as well as Saeki Tomi, “Godai ni
okeru sūmitsushi ni tsuite,” Shisō 46 (1989), pp. 1–19; Su Chi-lang, “Wu-tai ti shu-mi-yüan,” Shih-huo
yüeh-k’an 10 Nos. 1–2 (1980), pp. 3–19; Tu Wen-yü, “Lun Wu-tai shu-mi-shih,” Chung-kuo shih yen-chiu
1 (1988), pp. 63–73.
Wang, Structure of power, pp. 89–96, including an important distinction between the politics of military
officials and inner officials, p. 101; Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” pp. 220–4. Comprehensive
treatment of the general point is in Sudō, “Godai setsudoshi no gagun.” For a detailed study of the palace
commissioners and their role in running the army, see Chao Yü-yüeh, T’ang Sung pien-ko-ch’i chün-cheng
chih-tu shih yen-chiu (1) – san-pan kuan-chih chih yen-pien (Taipei, 1993).
the five dynasties
57
Chu Wen removed responsibility for financial affairs from central bureaucratic control and gave it over to a palace commission. The transition was not
easy at first, and there were no fewer than four commissioners (one of them
was even a bureaucrat) before Li Chen took over in 910. It seems that until
then Chu Wen and Ching Hsiang handled the finances directly.50 We know
little about Chu Wen’s early finances, but it appears that provincial resources
(together with local raiding and extortion) had funded Chu’s personal provincial armies and administration, and now state resources were used to fund
Chu’s personal imperial armies and administration.51 Chu had always taken
these matters seriously, so that Chu’s governors had long been appointed for
their administrative rather than their military abilities. This practice paid off,
for by 909 court expenses had been reduced sufficiently for officials to be paid
their full salaries.52 At the same time, unofficial methods of raising revenues
also continued, notably those involving Lo Shao-wei of Wei–Po. From 900
and apparently until his death in 909, Lo tapped his wealthy province to pay
many of Chu’s campaign and imperial armies, and even offered to build three
hundred ships to transport grain to Lo-yang.53
Formal accession as emperor brought not only control of the administrative
apparatus but also possibilities for symbolic legitimation and demonstrations
of the virtue that an emperor was expected to possess. Although the destruction of Later Liang records by the next dynasty means we must be cautious
about what remains to us, the surviving materials suggest that Chu paid little attention to such matters.54 We have already seen his indifference to the
conventions of abdication and dynastic foundation, and he was willing to follow the custom of reemploying all his predecessor’s ministers only because
they were already people he had chosen himself. His approach to the imperial administration was little short of revolutionary, and although there was
symbolic value in promulgating a law code, as Chu did in 910, he retained
nothing of the T’ang code, of which all copies were to be destroyed.55 Paying
full salaries to his officials can be interpreted as a manifestation of imperial
virtue, but it seems likely that Chu viewed this as an entirely practical matter, and one that would reward his own followers more than it benefited the
50
51
52
53
54
55
Wang, Structure of power, pp. 96–7.
Ku Chi-kuang, “Fan-lun T’ang-mo Wu-tai ti ssu-chün ho ch’in-chün, i-erh,” Li-shih yen-chiu 2 (1984),
pp. 26–7.
Wang, Structure of power, p. 120 (administrative abilities); TCTC (1956) 267, p. 8707 (salaries).
Wang, Structure of power, pp. 73–5; CWTS (1976) 14, pp. 188–91.
Wang, “The Chiu Wu-tai shih,” pp. 1–22.
TCTC 267, p. 8730; 272, p. 8908; CWTS 4, p. 67. On the social consequences of this period, at least
some of which can be laid at Chu Wen’s door, there is a large literature in various languages. David
G. Johnson, “The last years of a great clan: The Li family of Chao Chün in late T’ang and early Sung,”
Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 37 No. 1 (1977), pp. 5–102, is a useful introduction.
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few remaining T’ang appointees. His authority rested on the allegiance of his
personal following, and Chu made little effort to extend his appeal beyond
them.
By contrast, Li Ts’un-hsü, Chu’s rival from 908 and founder of the successor dynasty of the Later T’ang, has much fuller records and seems to have
been greatly concerned to present himself as a ruler possessed of imperial
virtue; and although he readily deployed coercive means in his home base of
Ho-tung, he also worked to build a broad base of support. Unlike his father,
Li K’o-yung, who seems to have ignored advice to promote good government, Li Ts’un-hsü commanded that all districts “seek out talent [for official
service], dismiss the greedy and cruel, reduce taxes, comfort the orphaned
and destitute, clear up false accusations and abuses, imprison thieves and robbers,” and generally bring order to the region. After the successful defense
of Lu-chou against Later Liang in 908, the new governor, Li Ssu-chao, further advised Li Ts’un-hsü to encourage mulberry farming (and thus silk production), reduce taxes, and delay punishments – policies that helped restore
Lu-chou to its presiege state.56 These carefully recorded displays of virtuous
rulership were calculated to appeal to those who had doubts about Chu Wen’s
claim to the throne, not just among governors, prefects, and officers but also
at the grass-roots level that would be most affected by any improvement in
governance.
Li Ts’un-hsü further encouraged allegiance in his retinue by adopting several key individuals, but he continued to rely on a handful of the many officers
adopted by Li K’o-yung and his brothers, who were Ts’un-hsü’s adopted brothers or cousins but a generation older than he. Although one such adopted relative had tried to prevent his accession and another would eventually unseat
him, many of the others served him well, chiefly as generals in the central
armies.57 Here Li Ts’un-hsü retained his father’s military organization but
improved training and discipline, which in turn boosted morale.58 The military successes of these troops provided the plunder and provincial postings
that helped to bind Li’s officers and men to their leader. Overall, Li Ts’un-hsü,
starting from a relatively weak base, was much less coercive in his approach
than his rival Chu Wen and much more concerned to win a following by
demonstrating his own worth than to compel one by sheer force.
56
57
58
TCTC 266, pp. 8696–7. See also Tsang Jung, “Lun Wu-tai ch’u-ch’i ti Pien-Chin cheng-heng,” Shihhsüeh yüeh-k’an 3 (1984), pp. 34–40, who assumes that this recovery happens from 901–2.
Wang, Structure of power, p. 135; Kurihara, “Tōmatsu Godai no kafushiteki ketsugō ni okeru seimei to
nenrei,” pp. 75–6; Kurihara, “Tō-Godai no kafushiteki ketsugō no seikaku,” p. 4; Ou-yang Hsiu, Hsin
Wu-tai shih (1073; Peking, 1974), 24, pp. 385–96 (“I-erh” biographies); in TCTC 266, p. 8690, Hu
San-hsing’s note suggests that Li K’o-yung had over one hundred such adoptees.
TCTC 266, p. 8696.
the five dynasties
59
Chu Wen’s accession as emperor did nothing to stop the incessant warfare,
but now the focus shifted to Ho-pei and its independent governors. In 910,
Chu Wen prepared for a new push against Lu-chou in the autumn, and he
also felt confident enough to seek a strategic showdown with Wang Jung of
Chen-chou in central Ho-pei, aiming to directly control the province. Since his
defeat in 900, Wang Jung had maintained his allegiance to Chu Wen. Chu had
married a daughter to one of Wang’s sons and Wang had made regular tribute
payments.59 Despite this history, a suspiciously convenient report suggested
that Wang was now in contact with Li Ts’un-hsü, giving Chu an excuse to
occupy Wang’s two easternmost prefectures. Chu’s aggression not only pushed
Wang Jung to seek help from both Li Ts’un-hsü and the Yu-chou leader Liu
Shou-kuang but also encouraged Wang’s northern neighbor, Wang Ch’u-chih
of I–Ting, to seek his own agreement with Li Ts’un-hsü. The two Wangs
signaled their rejection of their allegiance to Chu Wen by resuming use of the
T’ang dynasty calendar.60 Chu’s opportunism had succeeded in driving two
faithful Later Liang allies into the camp of his greatest enemy, depriving him
of friends in the northeast, where he was most vulnerable, and creating a larger
alliance against him.
Liu Shou-kuang, nominally subordinate to Chu Wen but rightly regarded
as unreliable, was invited to join the new northern alliance. At first he remained
aloof, but when he heard of a heavy Later Liang defeat at the hands of a Ho-tung
army at Po-hsiang (near Chao-chou in the south of Wang Jung’s province),
he sent emissaries to Wang Jung and Wang Ch’u-chih offering himself as
leader of an alliance against Chu Wen. Since this was clearly a challenge to Li
Ts’un-hsü’s leadership of the existing alliance, both governors declined, and
Wang Jung informed Li Ts’un-hsü of Liu’s proposal. Although Li dismissed
Liu’s military strength, Yu-chou’s strategic importance required that Liu be
dealt with right away.61
Honored as Prince of Yen by Chu Wen in 909, in 911 Liu Shou-kuang
asked Wang Jung and Wang Ch’u-chih to call him Shang Fu, a reference to
the councilor traditionally considered the right-hand man of King Wen of
Chou (r. 11th c. b.c.e.). The two Wangs, Li Ts’un-hsü, and three Ho-tung
governors humored Liu Shou-kuang, and in addition called him director of
the Department of State Affairs in reference to T’ang T’ai-tsung (r. 626–
49), who had held this post before becoming emperor. When Liu offered to
pacify Ho-tung and Wang Jung’s province of Chao (based at Chen-chou) for
59
60
61
CWTS 26, p. 357; 54, pp. 727–8; TCTC 262, p. 8534.
TCTC 267, pp. 8728–9; CWTS 6, p. 92; 27, p. 371.
TCTC 267, pp. 8734–9; CWTS 27, pp. 372–5; 135, pp. 1803–4. See also Hu San-hsing’s commentary
in the TCTC, which suggests that Li Ts’un-hsü took the initiative in acting against Liu Shou-kuang.
60
naomi standen
Chu Wen in return for being made commander in chief in Ho-pei, Chu also
played along by giving him the title of Ho-pei investigation commissioner,
a position that had not been used since An Lu-shan’s rebellion. Frustrated
that all his titles still did not permit him to perform the imperial sacrifices,
Liu next demanded the investiture rite appropriate for an emperor, and in
the eighth month declared his own reign era and established the Great Yen
dynasty.62
Chu Wen had been preparing against an attack by the northern allies, but
they now became preoccupied with Liu Shou-kuang, whose invasion of Wang
Ch’u-chih’s province of I–Ting was the signal for thirty thousand Ho-tung
troops to sweep through to beneath the walls of Yu-chou in the first month of
912, where, according to the Liao records, they were soon joined by a Khitan
force under A-pao-chi himself. Liu Shou-kuang, desperate, turned to Chu
Wen, who was prepared to overlook the declaration of the Great Yen dynasty
if it meant he could prosecute his quarrel with Li Ts’un-hsü and extend his
own authority. He therefore attacked Wang Jung’s province of Chao to assist
Liu.63 The war seems to have been marked by greater than usual ruthlessness.
Liu Shou-kuang conducted a registration of his population in which even
the literary classes were tattooed as soldiers, and Chu Wen is said to have
slaughtered all the inhabitants of the first town he took, regardless of age or
infirmity, so that “flowing blood filled the city.”64 By contrast, our sources
highlight the cunning and bravery of a Ho-tung scouting force sent to help
Chao-chou, but in fact they too resorted to brutality when they cut the arms
off some of their Later Liang captives and sent them back to Chu Wen’s camp
with a message that convinced Chu that the main Ho-tung army had arrived.
Accordingly, he withdrew southward, and when he found out he had been
fooled his shame reportedly worsened his health. Shortly afterward, the Yen
border outpost at Wa-ch’iao Pass surrendered to a Ho-tung attack, along with
the neighboring prefecture of Mo-chou, opening up routes into Honan and
the Yellow River plain. As if this were not dangerous enough for Chu, there
followed a mutiny in Liu Shou-kuang’s subordinate province of Ts’ang-chou
in which one Chang Wan-chin killed the governor – Liu’s son – and offered
his submission to both Chu Wen and Li Ts’un-hsü. Li sent a messenger to
“comfort” Chang, and Chu Wen, refusing to lose such a strategic foothold at
such a difficult moment, confirmed Chang as governor without even protesting
the murder of his ally’s son.65
62
63
64
65
TCTC 268, pp. 8742–5; CWTS 27, pp. 375–6; 135, pp. 1804–5.
TCTC 268, pp. 8749–51; CWTS 28, pp. 379–80; T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 1, p. 5.
TCTC 268, pp. 8752–3.
TCTC 268, pp. 8753–4; CWTS 28, p. 380.
the five dynasties
61
Chu’s help was ultimately of little assistance to Liu Shou-kuang, whose
generals, officials, and population had been fleeing his side since he had disregarded the warning of an administrator, Feng Tao, that it was folly to attack
Ho-tung. Some, like Feng, submitted to Li Ts’un-hsü; others to A-pao-chi of
the Khitan. Forces from Ho-tung under General Chou Te-wei received the
surrender of Liu Shou-kuang’s subordinates one by one until in the spring
of 913 they enclosed Yu-chou city from the north, then marched north and
south accepting more submissions. When a final appeal for Khitan help went
unanswered, it was only a matter of time, and Yu-chou city fell after a halfyear siege. In early 914, Liu Shou-kuang and his father, Liu Jen-kung, were
both executed, and Chou Te-wei became governor of Yu-chou.66 With this
conquest, the area under the control of or allied with the Li family in Ho-tung
was now roughly the same size as the Later Liang’s.
Chu Wen did not live to see this setback to his ambitions. He was seriously
ill, and in the summer of 912 his oldest son died and an adopted son, Chu
Yu-wen, became Chu Wen’s favorite to succeed him, with the position of
regent of the Eastern Capital. The following month, however, the emperor
was murdered and the throne usurped by his second son, Chu Yu-kuei, who
had Yu-wen killed too.67 Chu Wen had lived by the sword, and now he died
by it too. But Chu Yu-kuei was unable to win the allegiances he needed, and
in early 913 he was murdered in a coup that brought his brother Chu Yu-chen
(Liang Mo-ti, 913–23) to the throne.68 This took place in the context of an
ongoing war between the Later Liang and Ho-tung. During the many months
of upheavals at court and in the south the Later Liang regime was protected
from Ho-tung attack only by Li Ts’un-hsü’s preoccupation with the conquest
of Yen. Although Li gladly rewarded a Later Liang general who killed his
prefect and brought Hsi-chou, on Liang’s northwestern border, over to Hotung allegiance, Li did not take advantage of the access to the Yellow River
during the brief submission of Ho-chung, nor did he follow up the victory
won defending Ho-chung against Chu Yu-kuei. Distracted by the succession
crisis, Later Liang rulers left Liu Shou-kuang of Yu-chou to his fate until Chu
Yu-chen acceded, just as the final siege of Yu-chou began in 913.69
66
67
68
69
TCTC 268–9, pp. 8747–81; CWTS 8, p. 118; 28, pp. 380–4; 56, pp. 752–3; 135, pp. 1805–6; T’o-t’o
et al., Liao shih 1, p. 6.
TCTC 268, pp. 8755–60. Chu Yu-kuei never received a temple name and has no annals. For what
little survives of his biography, see CWTS 12, p. 165. Chang Ch’i-fan emphasizes that the forces led by
Chu Yu-kui consisted mostly of the Liang palace armies; see Chang, “Wu-tai cheng-ch’üan ti-shan chih
k’ao-ch’a,” p. 25.
TCTC 268, pp. 8761–8 (in which Yu-kuei commits suicide); CWTS 8, pp. 113–15 (where he is killed);
22, p. 297; 59, pp. 797–8; 63, pp. 845–6.
TCTC 268–9, pp. 8764, 8772–84; CWTS 8, pp. 116–19.
62
naomi standen
War for supremacy, c. 915–926
The conquest of Yu-chou had given Li Ts’un-hsü effective control of all of
Ho-pei except the southernmost provinces of Ts’ang-chou and Wei–Po, whose
allegiance Chu Yu-chen badly needed to keep. In the spring of 915, the death
of the Wei–Po governor, Yang Shih-hou, provided an opportunity for Li and
Chu to expand their authority. Yang Shih-hou had seized control of Wei–
Po in 912 and destroyed his predecessor’s personal army, creating his own
professional force and fostering the loyalty of his troops by indulging their
rapacious behavior. Chu Yu-chen was constrained by his debt to Yang for his
help in bringing Chu to the throne, but as soon as Yang died Chu moved to
weaken Wei–Po by cutting off three prefectures to make a new province. This
challenge to Wei–Po’s autonomy prompted Yang’s army to mutiny and to force
one of the new governors, Ho Te-lun, to ask for Li Ts’un-hsü’s help. When
Li arrived at Wei-chou in person with a relief force, he offered the mutineers
not an alliance, but the leadership they needed to survive. Presenting himself
as the savior of the ordinary people of Wei–Po against the excesses of Yang’s
army, Li executed the rebel ringleaders. His firmness won him the allegiance
of the troops, and Ho Te-lun offered him the governorship.70 Almost without
bloodshed, Li Ts’un-hsü had increased his military strength and gained access
to Wei–Po’s economic productivity at Chu Yu-chen’s expense. Winning over
an army offered far more benefits than fighting it.
At this point in the narrative historical sources shift their attention primarily to Li Ts’un-hsü, thanks to the efforts of successor dynasties to eliminate
their predecessors from the record altogether.71 This change of focus gives the
impression that from now on Li’s conquest of the Later Liang in 923 was a
foregone conclusion, but even a moderately careful reading indicates that a
great deal of uncertainty remained. By 915, Li had secured control of Weichou but he had to win the rest of the region prefecture by prefecture in his
continuing war with the Later Liang. The struggle for authority involved an
inglorious combination of localized attrition and the competition for individual allegiances. For example, Li captured Te-chou in Ts’ang-chou province
and Shan-chou on the Yellow River, but at Pei-chou in northern Wei–Po the
prefect, Chang Yüan-te, persisted in his allegiance to the Later Liang and disrupted Li Ts’un-hsü’s supply route from his allies in Chen-chou and Ting-chou.
As Li tried to isolate Pei-chou, his own base of T’ai-yüan came under attack
from Later Liang troops. Pei-chou held out, but Later Liang control there
70
71
TCTC 269, pp. 8786–90; CWTS 8, pp. 120–2; 21, pp. 293–4; 22, pp. 297–8; 28, pp. 384–5; Mao,
“T’ang-mo Wu-tai cheng-chih she-hui chih yen-chiu,” pp. 330–4.
Wang, “The Chiu Wu-tai shih,” pp. 8–10.
the five dynasties
0
Imperial capitals
Important provincial capitals
Prefectural capitals
Sub-prefectural level
(915)
Date of submission to Li Ts’un-hsü
Ta-t’ung Modern place-name
300 km
200 miles
Liao ho
0
K H I TA N
ho
YEN
(est. 911)
Ta-t’ung
Yu
N
- C
Tse
Feng-hsiang
Ho-chung
N
n s Ch’ang-an
sh
E
O
Te
Ming
Po
Wei
(916)
(915)
Li-yang
Shan
Wei2
Hua2
Yün
SHANTUNG
K’ai-feng
Hsü
G
Han-
Pei
Hsing
Loyang
U
gM
t
H
-lin
o
Hsü2
HONAN
ui
Huai
shui
SHU
WU
Yang
tze
A
h ui
Chen H u - t ’
(to Chin,916)
Lu
P sh
u
T’
ai
- h
an
g
U
We
is
Ch’in
T’ai-yüan
Ye ll ow River
K
CH’I
Ting
HO-TUNG
TING-NAN
HO-HSI
M
912
Hsia
911
H
SHUO-FANG
I
Mo
i
tn
s
(913)
I
in
Ch
63
CHING-NAN
Map 5. North China, c. 911–916, showing Li Ts’un-hsü’s conquest of Hopei.
was destabilized when a Ho-tung general offered protection to eight counties
against the predations of Chang Yüan-te’s troops, and then defeated in battle a
much larger Liang army under Liu Hsün. Li gained many prefectures by abandonment and surrender, and Later Liang resistance was further undermined by
an imperial army that mutinied, pillaged K’ai-feng, and attacked the palace.
In the ninth month of 916, Li received the submission of Ts’ang-chou, and
when Pei-chou was finally starved into submission after a year’s siege, Li was
master of the Ho-pei region save for the last Later Liang stronghold at Li-yang,
downstream from Wei-chou2 (near Hsin-hsiang in northern Honan), giving
him extensive access to the Yellow River.72
72
See TCTC 269, pp. 8789–8806; CWTS 8, pp. 123–7; 23, pp. 310–12; 28, pp. 385–9; Ou-yang, Hsin
Wu-tai shih 33, pp. 356–7.
64
naomi standen
While Li Ts’un-hsü was occupied with these successes, the Khitan leader Apao-chi plundered Ho-tung, but withdrew as soon as he heard that a relief force
was on its way. This was one of many Khitan raids in northern China between
902 and A-pao-chi’s death in 926, all aimed at seizing goods and people. While
his southern neighbors struggled for control of the northern Chinese districts
that would give them access to people and resources, A-pao-chi restricted his
expansionist ambitions to the conquest of Po-hai (Parhae) in 926 and sought
only to plunder rather than to rule the Central Plains.73 Victorious in the Hopei region, Li Ts’un-hsü saw the advantages of an alliance with the Khitan.
A-pao-chi had risked a breach with the Later Liang by declaring himself
emperor (Liao T’ai-tsu, 916–26) early in 916 and adopting his own calendar.
Formal relations had continued between the Khitan and the Later Liang, but
a more specific agreement between A-pao-chi and Li Ts’un-hsü is suggested
by Li’s sending his aunt and uncle as hostages to the new Liao court.74
Whatever the agreement, it did not prevent conflict, centered once again on
Yu-chou. In 917, Li Ts’un-hsü’s brother, the governor of Hsin-chou in northern
Yu-chou, was killed by a general who then led his army over to A-pao-chi. Apao-chi appointed the general to take command of Yu-chou, and he besieged
the city and its Ho-tung governor Chou Te-wei for over two hundred days
until a kind of peace was achieved.75 In this instance, A-pao-chi supported
localized ambitions in return for allegiance. As was the case further south, the
general gained legitimation of his local position, but by offering his allegiance
he also reinforced A-pao-chi’s claim to superior authority.
The war between the Later Liang and the Ho-tung regime was now focused
on the Yellow River, Chu Yu-chen’s last line of defense. Although the Liao
siege of Yu-chou lasted until the autumn of 917, Li Ts’un-hsü was able to
maintain continuous southward pressure, thanks to the increasing usefulness
of Ho-tung to the autonomous rulers south of the river. In 916, Li had allied
with the state of Wu to attack the Later Liang and made a peace agreement
with the rulers of Ch’u in Hunan. Southern allies allowed Li Ts’un-hsü to
strike at the Later Liang’s rear without crossing the Yellow River and to
strengthen his bridgehead by capturing four forts on its southern bank. As Li
launched a southern offensive in 918–19, the governor of Yen-chou in western
Shantung, Chang Wan-chin, transferred his allegiance to Li. Nevertheless,
Li’s foothold south of the river remained precarious, and the Later Liang were
73
74
75
On the significance of these raids, see Standen, “Raiding and frontier society.”
T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 1, pp. 10–11; TCTC 269, pp. 8808–10. The Khitan regime used different
designations at different times. For convenience it will hereafter be referred to as the “Liao.”
TCTC 269–70, pp. 8811–19; CWTS 28, pp. 389–90; 56, pp. 753–4; 137, pp. 1828–9; T’o-t’o et al.,
Liao shih 1, pp. 11–12.
the five dynasties
65
able to maintain a year-long siege of Yen-chou while retaining significant
armies in the field. They avoided battle until late in 918, when Li seized
upon infighting between the Later Liang commanders to march on K’ai-feng
with one hundred thousand troops. Substantial losses on Li’s side led to a
stalemate that was broken by a change of allegiance by Chu Yu-ch’ien, who
governed Ho-chung where the Yellow River bends north. Across the river was
T’ung-chou, forming a Ho-tung salient into Later Liang territory, and in 920
Chu Yu-ch’ien seized the city and installed his own son as governor. Since
this appointment challenged Chu Yu-chen’s imperial prerogative, Yu-chen
refused to confirm it, and Yu-ch’ien turned to Li Ts’un-hsü for assistance as
he had done once before. Li was happy to confirm the son’s governorship since
this brought T’ung-chou back to Ho-tung allegiance and also gained him the
active allegiance of Ho-chung, which Li K’o-yung had lost to Chu Wen some
twenty years before.76
Following his success in Ho-chung, Li seized an unplanned opportunity
to turn his attention to Wang Jung’s princedom of Chao, whose capital of
Chen-chou now lay in the middle of Li’s expanding regime. After a series of
engagements in which the Liao were involved, the death of his adopted uncle
Li Ssu-chao, and the defiance of his cousins, Li Ts’un-hsü finally made Chenchou his own in 922.77 As at Wei–Po, Li Ts’un-hsü became governor himself,
apparently at the request of the people. This doubtless bolstered his claims to
the Mandate of Heaven, and he divided the province while he had the chance.78
North of the Yellow River, I–Ting was the last remaining holdout against Li’s
direct authority, and Li was finally free to concentrate all his resources on the
war with the Later Liang.
Like Chu Wen, Li Ts’un-hsü did not rush to claim the throne, but in striking
contrast to Chu, Li paid increasing attention to the symbolic legitimation of
his position. In 913, before the besieged walls of Yu-chou, he had declared
himself a T’ang dynasty restorationist, and immediately after the city fell his
allies in Chao and I–Ting persuaded him to accept the title of director of
the Department of State Affairs (which they had also bestowed on Liu Shoukuang of Yu-chou). Li then set up a Branch Department of State Affairs as
an imperial administration-in-waiting and began to appoint staff.79 In 921,
ostensibly acceding to pleas by the Former Shu and Wu rulers and his own
generals and governors, he ordered imperial insignia made for himself before
76
77
78
79
TCTC 269, pp. 8803, 8807–8; 270, pp. 8821–4, 8830–49; 271, pp. 8850–8; CWTS 9, pp. 135–9; 10,
pp. 143–4; 13, p. 183; 28–9, pp. 391–7; 56, pp. 756–7; 63, pp. 846–7.
TCTC 271, pp. 8859–75; CWTS 10, p. 146; 29, pp. 397–400; 52, pp. 705–7; 54, pp. 730–2; 62,
p. 831; 137, pp. 1829–30; T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 2, p. 17.
TCTC 271, pp. 8876–7; CWTS 10, p. 149; 29, pp. 401–2; 62, p. 831.
TCTC 268, p. 8777; 269, p. 8782.
66
naomi standen
receiving the original T’ang dynasty insignia from a monk who claimed he
had been keeping them safe since Huang Ch’ao’s sack of Ch’ang-an forty years
before. When the long-serving eunuch Chang Ch’eng-yeh remonstrated at this
breach of the Li family’s pledge of loyalty to the T’ang dynasty, Li Ts’un-hsü
replied that it was not his will, but the people’s.80 His intention was, after
all, to restore the T’ang dynasty, and although we must be suitably skeptical
about his explanations, we must also remember that the Mandate of Heaven
was an important concept to him and his peers. In early 923, Li selected chief
ministers and established the “hundred ministers,” an act of state building that
the ambitious Wu-Yüeh ruler Ch’ien Liu was also pursuing in the south.81 In
the fourth month of 923, Li Ts’un-hsü assumed the title of emperor (T’ang
Chuang-tsung, r. 923–6) at his forward base of Wei-chou. He proclaimed a
T’ang restoration regime, known as the Later T’ang, complete with a new
reign era, and established Eastern, Western, and Northern capitals at Weichou, T’ai-yüan, and Chen-chou respectively. Li’s empire contained thirteen
provinces and fifty prefectures, but Honan remained beyond his grasp while
the governors there maintained their allegiances to Chu Yu-chen.82 The war
was not yet over.
Yün-chou (in western Shantung), lying between the two bridgeheads of the
Later T’ang on the Yellow River at Te-sheng and Yang-liu, was the first of the
Later Liang strongholds to fall, but Chu Yu-chen immediately dispatched a
relief force. Outside observers remained unsure of the ultimate outcome, for
when Li Ts’un-hsü sought to ally himself with Hsü Wen of Wu, Hsü declined,
fearing the consequences should Li Ts’un-hsü’s armies be defeated. Chu Yuchen’s new commander in chief, Wang Yen-chang, then seized Te-sheng and
pressed downriver to besiege Yang-liu, inflicting heavy losses. Pressure on the
Later T’ang in the Yellow River basin was relieved only when court rivalries
brought about Wang’s brief recall to K’ai-feng. Farther north, Tse-chou fell
to Later Liang troops just before Li Ts’un-hsü’s belated relief force arrived; at
the same time, the Later Liang troops halted the Later T’ang advance by the
drastic measure of breaching the banks of the Yellow River at Hua-chou2 and
flooding four prefectures. The Later Liang now had two armies in the field and
plans to recover Yün-chou, while the Later T’ang leadership heard proposals
for abandoning their southernmost conquests and withdrawing north of the
Yellow River to regroup before recommencing hostilities. Li, however, felt he
had nothing to lose by pressing toward whatever conclusion fate should decree.
In the tenth month, he dramatically bid his family farewell before defeating
Wang Yen-chang’s army in a brief encounter near Yün-chou. Captured, Wang
80
81
82
TCTC 271, p. 8862; CWTS 72, pp. 952–3.
TCTC 272, pp. 8879–80; CWTS 29, p. 402; 133, p. 1768.
TCTC 272, pp. 8880–3; CWTS 29, pp. 402–4; 52, pp. 707–8.
the five dynasties
67
Yen-chang refused to enter the service of the Later T’ang and was eventually executed. Li declared that Wang’s capture was a sign of Heaven’s favor
and marched swiftly on K’ai-feng – defended by just four thousand troops –
unhindered by the second Later Liang army commanded by Tuan Ning. Chu
Yu-chen persuaded a general to kill him, and the city’s commander opened the
gates to the conquerors. When Tuan Ning surrendered, Later Liang military
resistance effectively ended.83
The establishment of the Later T’ang, 923–926
Unlike Chu Wen, Li Ts’un-hsü had seized the capital in the conventional military manner and the massed Later Liang officials had offered their submission
to his rule. This ritual confirmed Li’s earlier claims to the Mandate of Heaven
and highlighted the renewed importance of the imperial center. In the last
years of the T’ang dynasty, contenders for power had struggled to be puppet masters over the court, with the capitals becoming merely collateral goals.
With the foundation of the Later Liang there had been a shift to an out-and-out
struggle for primacy among equals, in which possession of the capital itself –
with its population registers and organized army of bureaucrats – became the
prime target. For even though many areas remained beyond the effective reach
of the capital bureaucracy, within this system lay resources greater than any
dreamed of by a regional governor. The Later Liang had used their control of
this machinery to reassert central rule over their provinces, and Li Ts’un-hsü
was the beneficiary: once he had taken the capital, all of Honan was his too. The
Later Liang governors – numbering over fifty – all sent tribute and were kept
on in their commands. Whereas Chu Wen had met widespread resistance from
his peers to his accession, Li Ts’un-hsü enjoyed immediate recognition from all
the neighboring powers except the Former Shu. The Li family’s long-standing
ally, Li Mao-chen of Feng-hsiang, sent congratulations followed by tribute and
submission as a Later T’ang subject. When Li Mao-chen died in 924, two of
his sons were allowed to succeed to Feng-hsiang’s two provinces and became
adopted sons of Li Ts’un-hsü, ending Feng-hsiang’s independence. There was
dissent, but nothing unmanageable. The Lu-chou branch of Li’s family – Li
Ssu-chao’s sons – had been dissatisfied for some time, but Li Ts’un-hsü executed several plotters, and easily quelled a mutiny. Kao Chi-hsing (formerly
Kao Chi-ch’ang) of Ching-nan resented his treatment at court and prepared
to rebel, but thought better of it, and a few months later he accepted the title
of Prince of Nan-p’ing.84
83
84
TCTC 272, pp. 8884–900; CWTS 10, pp. 150–2; 21, pp. 291–3; 29–30, pp. 404–12; 73, p. 963.
TCTC 272, pp. 8901–10; 273, pp. 8917–19; CWTS 132, pp. 1740–3; 133, pp. 1751–2. Kao changed
his name while he was at court.
naomi standen
L
I
A
O
ho
Hsin
Yu
Yü
(to Liao, 932)
- h
an
g
ai
N
T’ung
(to Chin, 920)
Shan2
(to Chin
920)
U
-lin
(924)
H
Ch’in
Ho-chung
C
Fenghsiang
h ui
gM
t n s Ch’ang-an
Te-sheng
Tse
Wei2
Meng
Loyang
E
Ts’ang
Hua2
Po
Yang-liu
Yün SHANTUNG
Yen2
P’u2
K’ai-feng
HONAN
N
G
Yang
Hsing-yüan
Wei
(Yeh-tu)
T’
A
Lu
O
Hsing
(to Liang, 923)
t’o
(922)
T’ai-yüan
Ye ll ow River
U
We
is
Chen H u -
H
UT
NG
TA
K
HO-HSI
(928)
HO-TUNG
Hsia
P shu
i
ns
Ting
TING-NAN
(926)
I
Mt
SHUO-
P’ing
I
Yün2
FANG
(est. 918)
PO-H
in
Ch
Shang-chin
200 miles
Han-
sh
ui
Huai
shui
SHU
(925)
WU
Yang
tze
(923)
300 km
(to Liao AI
, 926)
0
Imperial capitals in 923
Imperial capitals in 924
0
Important provincial capitals
Prefectural capitals
Sub-prefectural level
Date of submission to Later T’ang
Liao ho
68
CHING-NAN
(NAN-P’ING, 924)
Map 6. North China under the Later T’ang, c. 926.
Li Ts’un-hsü demonstrated a desire, which others seemed to share, to restore
T’ang traditions. He returned Lo-yang and Ch’ang-an to their status as capitals
and demoted K’ai-feng. His legal officials strove to abolish Chu Wen’s law code
of 910 and restore the laws of the T’ang dynasty.85 The symbolic effectiveness
of such measures was such that Li was even compared to the emperor Han
Kuang-wu-ti, who had restored the Han dynasty in a.d. 25, but in practical
matters Li ended up retaining many of the changes made by the Later Liang
rulers. Li abolished the Ch’ung-cheng Hall and reestablished the Bureau of
Military Affairs, but the two offices had the same functions, and authority
remained in the hands of palace commissioners rather than returning to the
85
Although Chu Wen had ordered all copies destroyed, one apparently survived in a provincial storehouse
and the T’ang laws were restored on the basis of that copy. TCTC 272, p. 8908.
the five dynasties
69
regular bureaucracy. Li demoted or removed Later Liang personnel throughout the capital administration. Restorationists displaced some – but not all –
Later Liang bureaucrats, and most of the Later Liang palace commissioners and
attendants were replaced by eunuchs, who again developed political influence
incommensurate with their official rank and positions. Li is notorious for his
use of imperial favorites in his administration, but in fact the most important offices, as in the Later Liang, usually went to trusted retainers who had
already proven themselves at the regional court – and were entitled to expect
the rewards of success. Li’s highly competent chief provincial administrator,
Kuo Ch’ung-t’ao, headed the Bureau of Military Affairs. Kuo is credited with
wielding immense power throughout Li’s short reign, even though Kuo shared
his post with a leading eunuch and bureaucrat assistants had to guide Kuo
through court protocols. When Li gave Kuo the additional post of chief minister, Kuo initiated the process of taking the Bureau of Military Affairs out
of the palace service and converting it into an office of the regular bureaucracy, but the posts exercising the most authority did not necessarily carry
the highest ranks. Kuo Ch’ung-t’ao appointed three successive commissioners
for state revenue (tsu-yung shih) during 923–4, but the real work was done by
their assistant, K’ung Ch’ien, who had joined Li Ts’un-hsü’s service in Weichou and was finally promoted to commissioner himself. The Commission for
State Revenue had to provide for Li Ts’un-hsü’s persistent overspending on his
armies, an outsized staff, and his many favorites. K’ung’s ruthlessly exploitative methods earned him the epithet of “thief minister” among the people, as
well as the complaints of his ministerial colleagues.86
Apparently wishing to restore aristocrats to a leading role, Li Ts’un-hsü
chose most of his chief ministers from the best families. Kuo Ch’ung-t’ao
also favored pedigree over service in making appointments; but the chief
ministers seem to have remained largely on the sidelines, and there was no
obvious recovery of aristocratic influence at court. Kuo had pretensions to
aristocratic status himself and falsely claimed descent from the eighth-century
T’ang loyalist general Kuo Tzu-i.87 Yet he also instigated an investigation into
the misuse of the certificates issued to those eligible for higher office – most
of whom were aristocrats – that led to the dismissal of at least three-quarters
of the certificate holders and the destruction of their certificates. Displaced
by Chu Wen, the aristocracy was now dishonored as well, and this must have
contributed to the drastic fall in the number of people (of all backgrounds) able
86
87
For this and the following paragraph, see Wang, Structure of power, pp. 106–14 and Worthy, “The founding
of Sung China,” pp. 225–7. The biography of Kuo Ch’ung-t’ao is in CWTS 57, pp. 763–73; K’ung
Ch’ien’s is in CWTS 73, pp. 963–5.
Johnson, “The last years,” p. 57.
naomi standen
70
or willing to serve, for in 925 there were apparently only sixty appointments
to fill two thousand vacancies. The return of the eunuchs notwithstanding, Li
Ts’un-hsü probably did more to consolidate Chu Wen’s revolutionary changes
to the institutions and social composition of the bureaucracy than to undo
them.
Li Ts’un-hsü also adopted a mixture of methods to strengthen his hold
over his governors and their military forces. He appears to have undertaken
a military reorganization, combining the officers from his own armies and
the armies of the Later Liang into a single body in which mutual rivalries
were calculated to counterbalance each other. Li retained significant forces at
the capital and kept them under his personal control until early 924, while
sections of the reorganized armies, with eunuchs as supervisors, were sent to
all provinces. This followed the T’ang system, which Li had revived in Hotung and Ho-pei in 908, except that whereas T’ang army supervisors had
been ineffective because the court controlled no significant military forces of
its own, Li Ts’un-hsü’s supervisors were backed by powerful armies. Their
strong presence made it feasible to play off the governors against each other.
At first the Later Liang governors were all kept on to minimize the risk
of resistance to Li’s rule, and were only gradually replaced with Li’s own
followers. Those governors whom Li had appointed in Ho-tung and Ho-pei
before 923 were mostly the adopted sons of his father and his uncles and,
having won him the throne, now posed the biggest potential threat to his
position. During the fighting the governors had served as generals in Li’s
armies, leaving provincial administration to their subordinates, and after the
conquest Li kept them with him in the capital for significant periods. The
northern governors, separated from their provincial armies, would find it hard
to sustain their military following, but their forces might still be used against
uprisings in Honan. The Honan governors, entrusted with imperial forces
in the central region, might in their turn be enlisted against trouble north
of the Yellow River. Li also continued Later Liang efforts to strengthen the
prefects, reducing the governors’ privileges with a number of edicts in 924.
Governors could now make fewer recommendations to office, and although
they could nominate more of their own staff, so could the prefects. Meanwhile,
K’ung Ch’ien, at the Commission for State Revenue, continued the Later Liang
practice of controlling prefectures directly, even after governors’ complaints
had elicited an edict ordering him to stop.88
In external matters, ongoing localized Khitan raids prompted the appointment of a new Yu-chou governor in 925, but these were just a minor irritant;
88
Wang, Structure of power, pp. 115–16, 134–40.
the five dynasties
71
Li’s chief concern lay with expansion into Former Shu territory.89 In 924 the
Shu emperor, Wang Yen (who had succeeded his father in 918 as emperor),
fearing an attack from Later T’ang troops, garrisoned his strategic places but
was compelled to accept a treaty disbanding or transferring these forces. The
following summer (925), Later T’ang troops began acquiring warhorses for a
major campaign, and while Wang Yen was on a progress around his territory,
Li Ts’un-hsü assembled a combined force of provincial troops under his heir
apparent Li Chi-chi, gave Kuo Ch’ung-t’ao full military responsibility, and
ordered the invasion of Szechwan. The Later T’ang armies had such quick
success that Wang Yen refused to believe the news until he saw defeated
troops returning from surrendered prefectures. When he finally responded it
was too late. Prefectures fell by the dozen, with only one pitched battle in the
campaign. In the end, a Former Shu general, Wang Tsung-pi, took control of
the regime and surrendered. The conquest had taken just seventy days and gave
Li Ts’un-hsü sixty-four prefectures, thirty thousand troops, plus “ten million
measures” of assorted goods.90 He had acquired the means that should have
allowed him to increase his income and continue granting his followers the
rewards they expected.
This triumph was offset by the intrigues against Kuo Ch’ung-t’ao that led
to his murder. A faithful servant of Li’s from the early days, Kuo’s dominance
of the Later T’ang administration had made him many enemies. Objecting
to the revived influence of the eunuchs, he continually warned Li Ts’un-hsü
against them, and allied himself with a concubine (and later empress on Kuo’s
recommendation) to limit and counterbalance their access to Li. Objecting
to the power of the eunuchs made Kuo popular with provincial leaders, but
he also tried to limit the authority of generals such as Li Ssu-yüan, whom
he denied command of the expeditionary army sent to conquer the Former
Shu. After the fall of the Former Shu, eunuch messengers from court were
horrified that Kuo received “gifts” from the Former Shu ruling classes at the
expense of his nominal commander (and the heir apparent), Li Chi-chi. When
Kuo – who had retained his court posts throughout the campaign – became
a candidate for the governorship over the Former Shu territory, the eunuchs
intimated not only that Kuo was about to claim the region for himself but
also that the heir apparent was in danger. Li Ts’un-hsü tried to check the facts
and resolved to test Kuo’s intentions by ordering him home, but the empress
acted faster, and on her orders Kuo was killed in Li Chi-chi’s own quarters.
Thus passed a minister who exemplified the new breed brought to court by
89
90
TCTC 273, p. 8930; CWTS 32, p. 445.
TCTC 273–4, pp. 8934–46; CWTS 33, pp. 454–60; 51, pp. 691–2; 136, pp. 1820–2; Ou-yang, Hsin
Wu-tai shih 63, p. 794.
72
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governors-turned-emperors. Kuo’s antipathy to the eunuchs endeared him to
the regular bureaucracy, who produced a remarkably sympathetic picture of
someone whose illiteracy would normally have won him only their contempt.91
His death has been blamed on the eunuchs and Kuo’s own excessive powers, but
it may also suggest a more general revival of court intrigue that seems to have
been largely absent from Chu Wen’s hands-on world of retinue organization.
Such court intrigue was hard to avoid when the central institutions restricted
the information reaching the emperor. This was a penalty for commanding an
imperial regime.
On the positive side, the victory over the Former Shu prompted A-pao-chi,
the Liao leader, to seek peace and secure the Liao southern frontier while he
attacked his eastern neighbor, Po-hai.92 This left Li Ts’un-hsü free to deal with
a rash of mutinies early in 926, prompted by the murder of Kuo Ch’ung-t’ao
but exacerbated by the governors’ increasing resentment of court efforts to
restrict their authority in their provinces. The first uprising involved part of
the Wei–Po army, returning home to Wei-chou from a stint of garrison duty
in Yu-chou. These troops killed their commander and selected a new leader,
Chao Tsai-li, who led them to occupy and pillage their own city, and to hold
it against a pacification force. Four days later, Li Shao-ch’en, a general in the
campaign against the Former Shu, claimed large areas of the western half of
Former Shu territory and marched on Ch’eng-tu. Although he had been denied
a governorship of Former Shu territory by Kuo Ch’ung-t’ao, Li Shao-ch’en
still claimed to be acting in response to Kuo’s murder. At the end of the same
week, in Hsing-chou, a prefecture north of Wei–Po, a general with only four
hundred troops declared himself governor. And in the capital, a commander in
Li Ts’un-hsü’s bodyguard mutinied in reaction to Kuo Ch’ung-t’ao’s murder.
An expeditionary army was sent to quell the rebel army at Wei-chou, but this
failed and a wave of further mutinies spread from Ts’ang-chou far upstream
along the Yellow River. The provincial rebellions were accompanied by the
murder of the local eunuch army supervisors.93
The Hsing-chou rebels and Li Shao-ch’en in Szechwan were swiftly dealt
with, but Chao Tsai-li’s mutineers in Wei-chou held out. Li Ts’un-hsü no longer
trusted any of his generals and wanted to take over the campaign himself, but
he was persuaded instead to send the Chen-chou governor Li Ssu-yüan, who
was one of Li K’o-yung’s adopted sons and an experienced general, as well
as the subject of hostile rumors fed to Li Ts’un-hsü by his palace favorites.
Li Ssu-yüan marched with what was probably a large part of Li Ts’un-hsü’s
91
92
93
TCTC 273, p. 8916; 274, pp. 8947–55; CWTS 57, pp. 771–2. On the possible overstatement of Kuo’s
role, see Wang, Structure of power, p. 110; and Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” p. 227.
TCTC 274, p. 8956.
TCTC 274, pp. 8955–64; CWTS 74, pp. 967–70; 90, pp. 1177–8.
the five dynasties
73
capital armies and some provincial forces, but when he reached Wei-chou in
the third month of 926 a mutiny spread quickly through the ranks, apparently
in protest at Li Ts’un-hsü’s order that the defending rebels – the same forces
who had surrendered to Li in 915 and fought well for him since – should all be
killed. It is unclear exactly what happened next, but it is claimed that Li Ssuyüan’s army wanted to make him emperor of the Ho-pei region while leaving
Li Ts’un-hsü in control of Honan. When Li Ssu-yüan declined, the mutineers in
his army apparently handed him over to Chao Tsai-li and the mutineers inside
Wei-chou, who are said to have submitted to him. Li Ssu-yüan began to gather
his own following of soldiers from his expeditionary force – now scattered –
and raided the imperial grazing grounds for horses. Li Shao-jung, the punitive
commander at Wei-chou whom Li Ssu-yüan was supposed to be replacing,
neither joined Li nor resisted him, but when Li marched toward Lo-yang to
“explain himself” at court, Li Shao-jung reported this as an act of rebellion and
prevented Li Ssu-yüan’s letters from reaching the capital. With reconciliation
now impossible and a growing army demanding clear leadership, Li Ssu-yüan
dispatched an advance force to K’ai-feng to gauge what support he might find
south of the Yellow River, while in his province of Chen-chou his followers
mobilized his provincial army to march south and were quickly joined by other
northern governors. Li Ts’un-hsü planned to defend the river crossing at Mengchou just north of Lo-yang, but his troops had been underpaid for some time
and angrily rejected the additional payments he now offered them. Meanwhile,
Li Ssu-yüan rewarded his troops with silk taken from boats captured on the
Yellow River. Li Ts’un-hsü now headed east in person while the K’ai-feng city
governor declared that he would submit to whomever reached him first. Li
Ssu-yüan’s advance guard won the race, and Li Ts’un-hsü returned to Lo-yang
amid reports of one provincial defection after another to Li Ssu-yüan. When Li
Ts’un-hsü reached Lo-yang, an officer in the capital armies mutinied and killed
the emperor. Uncontrolled looting followed after Li’s empress set fire to one
of the palace buildings and fled. Li Ssu-yüan’s arrival restored order, and the
chief councilor, Tou-lu Ko, led Li Ts’un-hsü’s officials to offer Li Ssu-yüan the
throne. Li Ts’un-hsü’s designated heir, Li Chi-chi, at first planned to occupy
Feng-hsiang with the expeditionary army used to conquer the Former Shu,
but then killed himself instead, leaving the army to the care of the bureaucratgeneral Jen Huan, who decided to submit to Li Ssu-yüan. After that, what
little opposition remained in the provinces was handled swiftly and locally.94
In stark contrast to Chu Wen and Li Ts’un-hsü, Li Ssu-yüan won his throne
in 926 through consent rather than conquest. Momentum had built up so
quickly behind Li Ssu-yüan that he overthrew Li Ts’un-hsü in the space of a
94
TCTC 274–5, pp. 8960–82; CWTS 34, pp. 469–78; 70, pp. 926–7; 74, pp. 971–2; Wang, Structure of
power, pp. 150–1.
74
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few weeks, with scarcely a blow struck, and was able to take over the empire
more or less intact. It seems likely that nobody was more surprised by this
than Li Ssu-yüan himself. Although Li had seized the capital by military force,
he had not – in contrast to his predecessors – come to power by defeating all
his rivals on the battlefield. Instead, he had won his throne by providing a
convincing alternative to a ruler who had alienated his followers. Li Ts’un-hsü
had been at his best at the head of a conquering army, and so long as his
conquests supplied a constant stream of rewards for generals (who were also
governors), soldiers, and administrators, he had no difficulty in maintaining a
following. But once he became emperor, Li Ts’un-hsü was expected to delegate
tasks that he would sometimes have preferred to do himself and, immured in
the inner palace, he was denied the opportunity to exercise personal leadership
over his followers. His increasing mistrustfulness created resentment among
loyal governors who had once enjoyed Li’s confidence as field commanders and
now chafed at being kept in the capital. Their displeasure was only aggravated
when Li copied Later Liang efforts and sought to impose closer control over
his provinces, but offered nothing in compensation. Li was so extravagant that
even the huge profits from the conquest of the Former Shu were gone by the
time Li Ssu-yüan marched on K’ai-feng, leaving Li Ts’un-hsü unable to pay
his imperial armies, let alone reward his close followers, who were alienated
accordingly. Without the solid backing of the imperial armies, Li Ts’un-hsü
was vulnerable to his governors and their forces. Li Ssu-yüan’s appeal lay in
offering a remedy as one governor and general among his peers, rather than as
someone who might threaten the autonomy the governors so much desired.
As the last survivor of the generals adopted as sons by Li K’o-yung, Li Ssuyüan’s background was impeccable, but he was not an outstanding commander
and his home province of Chen-chou was small. Thrown back on his own
provincial resources, he was never likely to pose a serious threat to his fellow
governors, and they probably calculated that his dependence on their support
would act as a check on how much he could use the imperial institutions to
undermine their authority. For governors whose ideal emperor was an openhanded figurehead, Li Ssu-yüan was the perfect choice of leader.
allegiance and alliance
Winning allegiance, 926–936
Li Ssu-yüan’s first task was to formalize his position as emperor, but because he
was Li K’o-yung’s adopted son and not actually of his bloodline, there was some
controversy over whether he should establish a new dynasty or continue the
Later T’ang restoration. The precedent of T’ang dynasty practice won the day,
the five dynasties
75
and Li Ssu-yüan’s accession ceremony followed the ritual for a son succeeding
his father. Hence Li (T’ang Ming-tsung, 926–33) changed the reign era but
did not establish a new calendar.95
Li Ssu-yüan had come to the throne by winning over the leaders of armies,
and he knew that to retain his position he needed military forces of his own.
Accordingly, one of his first actions was to transform the palace armies into
a powerful personal army that incorporated all other imperial units. Upon
Li’s accession the palace forces consisted of the Six Imperial Armies and the
Imperial Bodyguard (shih-wei ch’in-chün) – commonly referred to collectively
as the Imperial Guard – stationed in various places in and around the capital.
Li quickly incorporated the remaining imperial armies into these two palace
forces by removing the imperial army commanders. Li Ts’un-hsü’s favorite,
Chu Shou-yin, led units stationed in the capital; he was posted to K’ai-feng
and then attacked and killed. Jen Huan, commander of the expeditionary
army sent to conquer the Former Shu, was made a chief minister. Under Li
Ssu-yüan the enlarged Six Imperial Armies and Imperial Bodyguard were
sometimes merged at the command level by appointing a single general to be
the commander of one army and the assistant commander of the other, but one
person never held sole command of both armies. Supreme military command
was always divided between one of Li’s sons and one of his closest retainers.96
This Imperial Guard – now comprising all imperial forces – gave Li Ssu-yüan
the power to quell dissent without having to rely on the allegiance of his
governors or expeditionary generals. Later emperors, however, would find that
the benefit of a personal army with its own palace-appointed commanders
simply displaced the question of allegiance from the provinces to the palace.
With his Imperial Guard at his back it was much easier for Li to freely
appoint his own men to the twelve governorships that lay vacant on his accession. Moreover, during his first year on the throne two edicts limited governors’ and prefects’ rights of nomination, ordered counties and garrison towns
to refuse provincial demands for extra taxes, and decreed that provincial staff
appointed by a governor should follow him to a new posting rather than be
left in his old province to preserve his influence there and thus extend his
authority. By 928, Li was appointing governors to all but nine provinces as
well as claiming the right to choose his governors’ senior administrators. By
930 all but four of the governors had been installed by Li, but thereafter his
95
96
TCTC 275, pp. 8982–3. On the significance of this event, see Wechsler, Offerings of jade and silk, pp. 86,
101–6.
See Wang, Structure of power, pp. 158–9; and Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” pp. 107–25. Worthy
gives the clearest exposition of these developments from the T’ang dynasty onward, with references to
the extensive secondary literature.
76
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authority in the provinces seems to have become less effective, and his earlier
decrees were not always heeded.97
Overall, Li Ssu-yüan gained a tremendous advantage from not trying to
unite northern China but merely to exert his authority over it. His general
approach to rulership was to avoid armed confrontation and focus his efforts
on persuading his governors and people that their interests lay in accepting
his rule. The sources carefully record that in 927 Li conducted a ceremony
dedicated to Turkic gods, but this made him unusual among Five Dynasties
leaders of Sha-t’o origin, and overall he did little that would have been alien to
a leader claiming a culturally Chinese background. Li Ssu-yüan seems to have
adopted as many sons as the Chinese Chu Wen and the Sha-t’o Li Ts’un-hsü,
but – probably because he had at least fifteen daughters – Ssu-yüan also made
extensive use of marriage relations, and as we shall see, the families of his
sons-in-law (Chinese and Sha-t’o) sometimes gained considerable power as a
result of his favor.98
As ruler of a greatly enlarged state, however, Li needed to cultivate his
appeal wider than kinship politics allowed. Accordingly, he followed the lead
provided by Li Ts’un-hsü when he was still governor in Ho-tung and combined
these methods of retinue leadership with those of a claimant to the Mandate of
Heaven. This meant practicing good governance and thereby keeping order in
the world, but good governance was in the eye of beholder, and since the governors’ opinions counted most, some of Li’s first actions were clearly intended
to please them. He dismissed Li Ts’un-hsü’s supernumerary postholders and
ordered the execution of the group the governors hated most – the former
head of the Commission for State Revenue, K’ung Ch’ien, and the eunuch
army supervisors – decreeing that the supervisors would not be used again and
that central finance officials must not interfere in provincial affairs.
But Li Ssu-yüan also had to reward his own followers, and like Chu Wen,
he removed the eunuchs from the palace commissions and replaced them with
his own retainers, who were often transferred directly from their provincial
positions into the equivalent palace commissions. Li’s junior retainers performed the same varied tasks that Chu’s retainers had in the Later Liang and,
as the sons and relatives of governors and generals, also served as a surety for
their families’ allegiance. Li’s chief provincial administrator, An Ch’ung-hui,
headed the Bureau of Military Affairs with wide-ranging powers similar to
97
98
Wang, Structure of power, pp. 178–85, including notes on sources. Most of the documents are at CWTS
37, pp. 507–9; 39, p. 538; 42, p. 581.
On his adoptions, see Kurihara, “Tō-Godai no kafushiteki ketsugō no seikaku,” and Kurihara, “Tōmatsu
Godai no kafushiteki ketsugō ni okeru seimei to nenrei.” On the significance of Li’s Turkish heritage, see
the two-part article by Okazaki Seirō, “Kō-Tō no Minsō ni kyūshū (jō),” Tōyōshi kenkyū 9 No. 4 (1945),
pp. 50–62, and “Kō-Tō no Minsō ni kyūshū (ge),” Tōyōshi kenkyū 10 No. 2 (1948), pp. 29–40.
the five dynasties
77
Kuo Ch’ung-t’ao’s, and like him was given concurrent appointment as a chief
minister. Also like Kuo, An was only semiliterate, so Li Ssu-yüan (who himself could not read) created an office of Tuan-ming Academicians to assist him.
But Li Ssu-yüan also maintained some continuity in government appointments by keeping on some of Li Ts’un-hsü’s palace commissioners and bureaucrats, including Feng Tao, who was promoted to chief minister. By now most
bureaucrats had begun their careers in a provincial administration, yet under
Li Ssu-yüan, as they had under Li Ts’un-hsü, they remained on the sidelines
in terms of political influence, although they could make important administrative contributions.99
Li Ssu-yüan boosted his appeal to the wider populace through practical
measures demanding administrative skills in the central offices. State finances
needed particularly urgent attention, and Li almost immediately abolished
the additional land taxes introduced by his predecessors and attempted to
reduce the cost of supplying the military and running the administration. He
banned excessive favor-seeking gift giving from his officials and greatly limited the frequency of “tribute” from the provinces, explicitly prohibiting the
exploitation of commoners for this purpose. Li then unified the three central
financial offices (responsible for the salt and iron monopolies, population registers, and the budget) and appointed the experienced bureaucrat Jen Huan
as chief minister with responsibility for running the new Finance Commission (San-ssu); according to the sources, “within a year the state coffers were
abundantly filled, both civil and military populations were adequate, and the
rules of the court were basically established.”100 Jen Huan was soon replaced
by a finance expert from Li Ssu-yüan’s retinue, Chang Yen-lang, who continued to improve the financial administration, writing off two million strings
in unpaid taxes in 927, and replacing the (unenforceable) state monopoly on
alcohol production with a general increase in the autumn taxes. Li Ssu-yüan
tried to ban the circulation of iron and tin coins from Ch’u, and to end the
overpriced horse trade with the Tangut. To avoid dependence on the Tangut
for his horse supply Li established state pastures in Ho-tung in 927, although
the horses reared on them proved inadequate in both numbers and quality. In
931 the acreage and fermentation taxes and the iron monopoly were abolished.
Commoners were allowed to make their own iron implements and, as with the
earlier abolition of the alcohol monopoly, their land taxes were increased to
99
100
Wang, Structure of power, pp. 152–5, 180; Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” pp. 227–8. On
Feng Tao’s survival through successive administrations, see Wang Gungwu, “Feng Tao: An essay on
Confucian loyalty,” in Confucian personalities, ed. Arthur F. Wright and Denis C. Twitchett (Stanford,
Calif., 1962), pp. 123–45; for a full biography of Feng Tao, see Tonami Mamoru, Fū Dō (Tokyo, 1966).
TCTC 275, pp. 8983–4; CWTS 67, pp. 895–6. See also Wolfram Eberhard, “Remarks on the bureaucracy in north China during the tenth century” Oriens 4 (1951), pp. 280–99.
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offset the revenue shortfall. The land taxes were themselves equalized shortly
afterward, although local implementation of these changes depended on how
autonomous the prefects were from their governors. While it was recognized
that such technical tasks demanded literacy, the level of education was low,
since a law of 928 declared that candidates only needed to know ten chapters
of the Confucian Classics to pass the examinations.101
Demonstrating that he possessed the qualities of rulership won Li Ssu-yüan
goodwill that made it easier for him to assert his authority over his realm, but
he proved unable to exercise similar control at court. Even as Li was respectfully
burying Li Ts’un-hsü’s ashes, rivalries and intrigue arose at the center of the
regime. The most powerful minister at court, An Ch’ung-hui, resented Jen
Huan’s power, and the men clashed over issues such as the appointment of
senior ministers and the correct office for disbursing salaries. The latter issue
resulted in a furious dispute in 927 between the two ministers in front of the
emperor, an unprecedented breach of protocol. Jen Huan was asked to retire,
and before the year was out An Ch’ung-hui had arranged his execution. But
An went too far when he alienated Consort Wang and the eunuch Meng Hanch’iung, and in 930 he and his wife were killed in his provincial residence and
the murder justified by accusations of collaboration with the Szechwan region
governors and the Wu-Yüeh ruler.102 As with Kuo Ch’ung-t’ao, the sources are
sympathetic – An Ch’ung-hui was overthrown by a classic alliance between a
woman and a eunuch, after all – balancing An’s easily offended nature against
his unrelenting concern to prevent waste of state resources. An’s passing put
an end to the Later T’ang’s initial focus on good rulership, since his successors
tended to place their own concerns before any wider good.
Li Ssu-yüan’s authority was also challenged from outside the court.
Although he received the formal allegiance of all the provinces conquered
by Li Ts’un-hsü, there remained definite limitations on the reach and sustainability of effective Later T’ang authority. Li Ssu-yüan could demonstrate his
strength with a military campaign and appoint most of his own governors,
but he could not necessarily impose his authority in a manner that would last.
Districts often regarded as “border provinces” of the Later T’ang retained a
high degree of autonomy due in part to their own wealth and strategic advantages, but often due to the ready availability of support from their neighbors.
This support could be reversed at any time.
101
102
TCTC 276, pp. 9021 (alcohol taxes), 9028 (coins); 275, pp. 9002–3, and 278, p. 9090 (horses); 277,
pp. 9059, 9061 (land taxes); CWTS 39, p. 543 (examinations); 42, pp. 578, 581 (alcohol regulations),
583–4 (iron); 69, pp. 919–21 (Chang Yen-lang).
TCTC 277, pp. 9045–6, 9055–60; CWTS 72, pp. 955–6. Worthy compares his end to Kuo Ch’ungt’ao’s, “The founding of Sung China,” p. 228.
the five dynasties
79
The first challenge to Later T’ang authority came from the governors in the
Szechwan region, Meng Chih-hsiang and Tung Chang, whose rivalry is detailed
in the next chapter. Fearing Li’s intentions toward the enormous wealth of the
Szechwan region, Meng Chih-hsiang sought to free himself of court control,
wooing his population and enlarging his army units, and then in 927 executing
a Later T’ang official sent to oversee his military affairs. Hoping to keep the
Szechwan region divided, Li initially backed Tung Chang. The two Szechwan
governors allied briefly in 930–1, but when they fell out again Tung proved no
match for Meng, and in 932 Li Ssu-yüan conceded to Meng – now controlling
all of Szechwan – the right to appoint his own provincial staff, from governors
downward. When Li Ssu-yüan died the next year in 933, Meng Chih-hsiang
proclaimed himself emperor of Later Shu.103
Li had more success in the south, where in 927–8 he was able to call on Ma
Yin, whom Li designated “King of Ch’u,” to use his naval forces to prevent Kao
Chi-hsing of Ching-nan from abandoning his fealty to Later T’ang in favor
of an alliance with Wu.104 A similar situation occurred in 928 in the north,
where Li Ssu-yüan successfully quelled an effort by Wang Tu, the long-time
governor of Ting-chou, to organize Ho-pei governors and Liao allies against
the extension of Later T’ang administrative authority.105
Li Ssu-yüan’s success in Ting-chou was one of several that helped him to
consolidate his authority in the regions beyond his own borders. In Shuofang (in modern Ningsia), the death of the Tangut prince in 929 prompted
a local mutiny, and his successor turned to the Later T’ang. An Ch’ung-hui
appointed one of Li’s favorites to the governorship, who wiped out two Tibetan
groups who dared to attack, and dealt with the mutineers. Li’s agent had
“greatly restored the majesty” of the Later T’ang, and thereafter Shuo-fang
accepted court appointees. The reputation of the Later T’ang rose further
when an expedition against Tangut raiders in the northwest captured twentyseven hundred Tanguts and destroyed nineteen “tribes.” Although Tangut
raids continued, Later T’ang success may have encouraged the leadership in
Liang-chou (in present-day Kansu), far beyond Li’s authority, to seek Later
T’ang confirmation of their new governor in 933. The Liang-chou region was
caught between the ambitions of the Liao, the Tibetans, the Tangut, and the
Uighur in western Kansu, and allegiance to Li Ssu-yüan may have offered it
the best chance of preserving some autonomy.106
103
104
105
106
TCTC 276–7 passim; 278, pp. 9074–7, 9102. Biographies at CWTS 136, pp. 1822–3; 62, pp. 831–4.
TCTC 275–7, pp. 8979–9053, 9073; CWTS 133, pp. 1751–2; 134, pp. 1783–4.
TCTC (1956) 276, pp. 9017–27; CWTS 39, pp. 537–41; 40, p. 548; 54, pp. 733–4; 137, p. 1832;
T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 3, pp. 28–9.
Ruth W. Dunnell, “The Hsi Hsia,” in The Cambridge history of China, volume 6: Alien regimes and border
states, 907–1368, ed. Herbert Franke and Denis C. Twitchett (New York, 1994), pp. 164–5; TCTC
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The allegiance of far-flung places improved Li’s standing in relation to his
independent neighbors, of whom the most important was now the Liao state.
According to the Tzu-chih t’ung-chien, the Khitan emperor A-pao-chi sought
advantage from Li Ts’un-hsü’s death by demanding territory under threat
of invasion. However, A-pao-chi’s death in 926 produced several months of
internal tension at the Liao court over the succession until A-pao-chi’s son, Tekuang (Liao T’ai-tsung, 926–47), secured the throne.107 In such a personalized
system, neither major power was in a position to exploit the other’s situation,
but it was an ideal opportunity for lesser leaders. That winter the governor in
Fu-chien briefly seceded from Later T’ang overlordship, while on the northern
frontier Lu Wen-chin, the governor of Liao, who controlled P’ing-chou, killed
his Khitan general and returned to Later T’ang allegiance with an army of
twenty thousand, claiming to miss his homeland.108
Te-kuang, the new Liao ruler, was at least Li Ssu-yüan’s peer: a ruler whose
confirmations of position legitimized regional leaders in conflict with their
neighbors or superiors. Like regimes in the Central Plains, the Liao employed
the diplomatic protocols established in the previous T’ang dynasty. Relations
between Liao and Later T’ang now settled into the routine of audiences and
gift exchanges (with the occasional delicate negotiation), and regular local
plundering raids across both sides of the border.109 In 930 A-pao-chi’s eldest
son, Pei, arrived in Later T’ang territory from the sea with forty retainers.
As former heir apparent, he had found it politic to flee the dangers of his
brother’s court.110 His arrival boosted Li Ssu-yüan’s prestige, but over the next
few years fear of Liao strength and unknown intentions grew at all levels of
leadership in the Central Plains, encouraged by increasing centralization and a
misunderstanding of pastoralist practices. Parts of northern China were used as
107
108
109
110
(1956) 276, pp. 9033–5; 277, pp. 9064–5; 278, pp. 9074, 9082. On relations between the Sha-t’o-led
dynasties and their neighbors, see Wolfram Eberhard, “Die Beziehungender Staaten der T’o-pa und der
Sha-t’o zum Ausland,” Annales de l’Université d’Ankara 2 (1948), pp. 141–213.
TCTC 275, pp. 8989–90. See Yao Ts’ung-wu, “A-pao-chi yü Hou T’ang shih-ch’en Yao K’un hui-chien
t’an-hua chi-lu,” Wen-shih-che hsüeh-pao 5 (1953), pp. 91–112; and Denis C. Twitchett and Klaus-Peter
Tietze, “The Liao,” in The Cambridge history of China, volume 6: Alien regimes and border states, 907–1368,
ed. Herbert Franke and Denis C. Twitchett (New York, 1994), pp. 66–7. Te-kuang’s approach was
very different from his father’s; see Naomi Standen, “What nomads want: Raids, invasions, and the
Liao conquest of 947,” in Mongols, Turks, and others: Eurasian nomads and the sedentary world, ed. Reuven
Amitai and Michal Biran (Leiden, 2005), pp. 129–74.
TCTC 275, pp. 8994, 8997; CWTS 37, p. 511; T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 2, p. 23. Ten years before, Lu
Wen-chin, the P’ing-chou governor, had taken the province as well as his army into Khitan service.
The Khitan recovered P’ing-chou in 928.
For discussion, see Standen, “Raiding and frontier society.” The delicate negotiation stemmed from the
Khitan request for the return of their generals captured in the 928 Ting-chou campaigns.
TCTC 277, pp. 9052–3; CWTS 41, p. 571; T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 3, p. 32; biography in T’o-t’o et al.,
Liao shih 72, pp. 1209–11.
the five dynasties
81
stops in seasonal migrations, and although the movement of people and animals
was not a hostile action, it could look ominous to Later T’ang military patrols,
especially when it was accompanied by raids for plunder. These activities had
been a lesser concern when the Later Liang were the main enemy and the Liao
state was newly founded, but the consolidation of Liao and Central Plains
states now made controlling pastoralist activity a higher priority. Breaches of
the frontier, however customary or innocuous, threatened Li Ssu-yüan’s claims
to legitimacy by throwing doubt on his ability to police his borders. Raids in
Yu-chou were stopped by its governor’s defensive measures, but this maneuver
simply pushed the raiders westward into Yün-chou2 (modern Ta-t’ung). At
court there were fears of a major attack, and late in 932 Li Ssu-yüan’s trusted
retainer Shih Ching-t’ang became governor of Ho-tung and assumed overall
military command in four other frontier provinces.111
Fears of the Liao were confirmed by a report of siege equipment being built
near Yün-chou2, but the real dangers were suggested when a frontier prefect
with a grudge against Shih Ching-t’ang apparently took his district of Yü-chou
(between Yu-chou and Yün-chou2) over to the Khitan.112 Te-kuang’s capacity
to be an alternative source of legitimacy for Later T’ang provincial leaders
threatened the cohesion of the Later T’ang far more than any external military
threat, and accordingly this threat lay behind many responses to events. Early
in 933, the governor at Hsia-chou died and the army installed his son, Li
I-ch’ao, as successor. The Later T’ang court, knowing the father had contacted
Te-kuang, feared a joint attack and tried to transfer Li I-ch’ao, providing his
replacement with an “escort” of fifty thousand troops. Li rebelled, but he was
confirmed in Ting-nan after a siege was deemed too costly. When he died
in 935, the Later T’ang leadership did not contest his brother’s succession.
The irony was that the Liao had in fact refused Li I-ch’ao’s father any help.113
Expending such effort to contest an appointment wasted lives and money,
and worse for the court, damaged its prestige by highlighting its inability to
impose its will. Dangers imagined out of imprecise understanding had a nasty
habit of becoming all too real.
At this point in 933, the greatest threat to Li Ssu-yüan came from inside
the realm. With Li seriously ill, his close advisors faced a challenge from Li’s
ambitious oldest son, Ts’ung-jung. Ts’ung-jung was proposed as heir apparent
but successfully resisted for fear that confinement to the heir’s palace would
remove him from his command of the Six Imperial Armies. As senior ministers
fled the capital, Li Ts’ung-jung was appeased, but the next time he attended
111
112
113
TCTC 278, pp. 9076, 9079–80; CWTS 43, pp. 592, 596; 98, p. 1309.
CWTS 43, p. 596; TCTC 278, p. 9080.
TCTC 278, pp. 9082–5, 9090; 279, pp. 9127–8; CWTS 44, pp. 603–5; 47, p. 644; 132, pp. 1747–9.
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on his father he marched a thousand troops into the capital, whereupon he was
killed as a rebel by the commander of the Imperial Bodyguard, K’ang I-ch’eng.
Ts’ung-jung’s brother Li Ts’ung-hou was summoned from his province of Weichou and became de facto heir apparent. Li Ssu-yüan died shortly afterward,
earning praise from later writers who characterized him as a good ruler in a
difficult time.114 Li had come to the throne as an experienced general and
leader at the age of sixty, and although we might attribute the good harvests
and relative peace of his short reign to fortunate timing, contemporaries took
them to indicate his virtue as a ruler.
Li Ts’ung-hou (T’ang Min-ti, 933–4) acceded without incident late in 933,
but his reign lasted only five months. He seems to have been well intentioned; he ordered instruction for himself in the lessons on rulership to be
gleaned from T’ang T’ai-tsung’s reign (r. 626–49), but he was not yet twenty
years old and his short reign was dominated by Meng Han-ch’iung and Chu
Hung-chao. Their priorities seem to have been to attack their enemies, real
or potential, leaving them little time to address matters of wider import. Li
Ts’ung-hou barely had time to make his initial distribution of posts and titles
before Meng Chih-hsiang, observing Li’s youth and weakness, declared himself independent emperor of Later Shu, rightly calculating that there would
be little response. With hindsight, the most significant act of the reign was
to entrust the Six Imperial Armies and Imperial Bodyguard to the sole command of K’ang I-ch’eng. This rewarded K’ang for his loyalty to Li Ssu-yüan,
which had effectively brought Li Ts’ung-hou to the throne, but it departed
from Ssu-yüan’s practice of dividing the command. Since Li Ts’ung-hou was
too young to have either the sons or personal retainers whom his father had
employed in this job, reliance on K’ang must have seemed entirely reasonable.
Six months later the Six Imperial Armies were formally incorporated into the
Imperial Bodyguard, effectively placing the military power of the empire in
the hands of a single general.115
The next major act of the reign was a general reshuffling of governors
organized by Chu Hung-chao in 934, partly with the intention of bringing
back to court Meng Han-ch’iung, who had taken over Li Ts’ung-hou’s former
province of Wei-chou. Rather than proper imperial commands, the orders
were contained in letters issued by the Bureau of Military Affairs, which
drew attention to the dominance exercised by retainer officials and increased
the governors’ resentment toward them. Still, most governors accepted their
transfers, with the exception of Ts’ung-hou’s adopted brother Li Ts’ung-k’o,
114
115
TCTC 278, pp. 9087–95; CWTS 44, pp. 605–10; 66, pp. 876–7, 879–80.
TCTC 278, pp. 9097–8, 9102, 9099; Wang, Structure of power, p. 160; Worthy, “The founding of Sung
China,” pp. 125–6.
the five dynasties
83
the governor of Feng-hsiang. An earlier run-in with An Ch’ung-hui had left
him isolated at court, and now Meng Han-ch’iung placed Li Ts’ung-k’o among
his chief enemies. The prospect of attending court to accept his new posting
was unwelcome to Li Ts’ung-k’o, but he lacked the troops to make a stand.
He issued a call to arms to his neighboring governors and prefects, offering
handsome payments and seeking their help “to explain the wickedness of those
surrounding the emperor,” but he received only one positive response. Very
soon a section of the Imperial Guard joined up with several provincial forces
at Feng-hsiang, but when one of the commanders forced his troops to assault
the walls at swordpoint they mutinied and soon the whole expeditionary army
had submitted to Li Ts’ung-k’o. K’ang I-ch’eng now marched west with the
greater part of the Imperial Guard while Li headed east, enlarging his army at
K’ang’s expense as the punitive forces deserted and joined the rebel army. Near
Shan-chou2 (Shensi, modern San-men-hsia), some seventy-five miles west of
Lo-yang, K’ang I-ch’eng surrendered with the few troops that remained with
him and was later executed with his family. A general sent Chu Hung-chao’s
head to Li Ts’ung-k’o, and Meng Han-ch’iung fled, later to be summarily
executed by the roadside. Li Ts’ung-hou abandoned the capital, and Shih
Ching-t’ang, en route from Ho-tung to the court, took him into custody as a
bargaining counter for dealings with Shih’s long-standing rival Li Ts’ung-k’o.
At Lo-yang, Feng Tao led the officials to welcome Li Ts’ung-k’o and offer him
the throne, and the dowager empress cleared the way by demoting Li Ts’unghou, who was soon killed. Shih Ching-t’ang was the first governor to attend
on the new emperor, who ascended the throne in Lo-yang using the ceremony
of a son before his father’s coffin (T’ang Fei-ti, 934–6).116
Like Li Ssu-yüan, Li Ts’ung-k’o gained his throne from a weak military
base as the representative of a general feeling of resentment that enabled
him to enter the capital in the required fashion, at the head of an army. But
whereas Li Ssu-yüan had discovered an unexpected following largely among
governors and prefects in the provinces, Li Ts’ung-k’o’s support came mostly
from the Imperial Guard and was based less on dissatisfaction with the old
regime than on the payments he made and promised them. Li Ts’ung-k’o
relied more on material inducements because he lacked the expeditionary
experience and thus the personal standing with the imperial armies that Li
Ssu-yüan had enjoyed.117 Accordingly, his main problem on accession was
a lack of money. Paying military salaries had already caused hardship under
Li Ssu-yüan. Li Ts’ung-hou had paid generous rewards for little return, and
116
117
TCTC 279, pp. 9104–16; CWTS 45–6, pp. 618–32.
See Chang, “Wu-tai cheng-ch’üan ti-shan chih k’ao-ch’a,” pp. 26–7, who argues that the allegiance of
the imperial armies was central to Li Ssu-yüan’s successful takeover.
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Li Ts’ung-k’o had encouraged his following by distributing booty seized in
captured cities, including Lo-yang. When even the robes and treasures in the
palace were inadequate to satisfy the troops, the inhabitants of the capital
yelled abuse at soldiers in the streets, and Li realized that merely purchasing
the military’s loyalty would alienate the civilian population. He therefore made
the hard decision to pay lower rewards than he had promised, knowing that this
would compromise the army’s allegiance. A special investigative commissioner
encouraged Li to write off 3.38 million strings of uncollected taxes to please
the people, who were then suffering the effects of a drought.118
Since almost all the dominant figures from Li Ssu-yüan’s last years and Li
Ts’ung-hou’s reign had died in the rebellion, Li Ts’ung-k’o had to start afresh.
Feng Tao remained chief minister, and Li Ssu-yüan’s retainer Chang Yen-lang
was soon placed back in charge of finances, but most of the senior ministers
were new. Han Chao-yin (briefly military affairs commissioner and chief minister), Liu Yen-lang (promoted to assistant military affairs commissioner via
the finance office), and Hsüeh Wen-yü (participant in the drafting of proclamations) had all been provincial administrators with literati backgrounds before
joining Li Ts’ung-k’o’s court. His reliance on such people has been construed
as a deliberate attempt to increase the influence of bureaucrats over retainers
like Chang Yen-lang.119 But if this was so it did not necessarily produce better
governance. Liu Yen-lang reputedly made appointment decisions in proportion to the size of his bribe, but even when found out he was not punished,
and the bribe taking continued. But despite corruption and personal rivalries,
intrigue of the kind that had felled Kuo Ch’ung-t’ao and An Ch’ung-hui was
absent, precisely because there was no single figure dominating the scene.120
Li Ts’ung-k’o’s position outside the court was insecure as long as the Imperial
Guard commanders and the governors had doubts about his qualifications
for holding the Mandate of Heaven. During Li’s rebellion, the governors of
Yang-chou2 and Hsing-yüan, in the mountainous Han River valley dividing
Szechwan and Shensi, had transferred their allegiance to Meng Chih-hsiang
of Later Shu after their armies joined Li Ts’ung-k’o. This provided a reminder
that credible sources of alternative authority existed in the border regions,
and it may have encouraged Li to keep his adopted brothers and erstwhile
enemies, Li Ts’ung-chang and Li Ts’ung-min, in Lo-yang as private citizens,
where they could do little to build a following. To secure his military position,
Li tried to bring the Imperial Guard under control by appointing one of his
118
119
120
TCTC 279, pp. 9105–24; CWTS 44, pp. 632–6.
TCTC 279, pp. 9118–19, 9120, 9127, 9130–1, 9133, 9137; CWTS 69, p. 922; Wang, Structure of
power, p. 156. Neither Han Chao-yin nor Hsüeh Wen-yü have biographies in the dynastic histories.
TCTC 279, pp. 9133, 9137, 9128–9.
the five dynasties
85
sons to command it, and he rewarded five of his early supporters – army
officers and prefects – by entrusting them with provinces scattered all across
the realm, apparently hoping to keep the older governors separated from each
other. Gradually he managed to transfer or recall all the governors save two:
Shih Ching-t’ang of Ho-tung (Li Ssu-yüan’s son-in-law) and Chao Te-chün of
Yu-chou (whose adopted son was Li Ssu-yüan’s son-in-law).121
Li most feared Shih Ching-t’ang, an old rival from the days when both
had been members of Li Ssu-yüan’s retinue. Li Ts’ung-hou had transferred
Shih from Ho-tung to Chen-chou but, crucially, had left him in charge of
frontier defenses. Li Ts’ung-k’o returned Shih to Ho-tung, whence he requested
more troops and supplies to deal with routine nomad activity and raids. Shih
heard every detail of court affairs because he had sons residing in the palace
and bribed servants of the dowager empress (his wife’s mother) to gather
information, so he knew that such requests compounded court suspicions about
his allegiance. The court was further alarmed when some of Shih’s troops tried
to declare him emperor in 935. Shih executed the ringleaders and reported
these events himself, suggesting that he may have been trying to reassure
the court of his good intentions, but the news doubtless contributed to the
imperial appointment of a deputy city governor for Shih’s seat of T’ai-yüan,
intended to weaken his authority. Shih thus knew the risks when, early in 936,
he collected all his property from Lo-yang and other places and sent it to T’aiyüan to help pay military expenses. Financing armies with private wealth was
common practice, but naturally it heightened fears about Shih’s intentions.
Li Ts’ung-k’o responded by ordering Shih Ching-t’ang’s transfer from Hotung to the tiny province of Yün-chou, south of the Yellow River, a test of
imperial authority that transformed suspicion into reality. Shih had to either
accept a humiliating demotion that marked him as disloyal or rebel against the
throne to defend his political position and maybe his honor. Shih argued that
he had been promised his Ho-tung posting for life, and the Sung chronicler
Ssu-ma Kuang describes an aggrieved letter to Li Ts’ung-k’o accusing him,
as an adopted son, of usurping the throne, and demanding restoration of the
direct bloodline. Several leaders promptly joined Shih with units of troops,
and the Imperial Guard units stationed at Wei-chou mutinied. Shih suggested
to one follower that he was “abandoning the strong and pledging allegiance
to the weak” and was informed in turn that once one had lost the confidence
of superiors one might as well go down fighting.122 Shih Ching-t’ang had
nothing to lose.
121
122
TCTC 279, pp. 9115, 9121–2, 9133; Wang, Structure of power, p. 188.
TCTC 279–80, pp. 9104, 9119–20, 9124–31, 9139–45; CWTS 45, pp. 618–19; 46, pp. 634–5; 47,
pp. 649–50. On private funding for armies, see Ku, “Fan-lun T’ang-mo Wu-tai.”
naomi standen
0
Imperial capitals in 923
Prefectural capitals
Sub-prefectural level
Approximate boundaries of
the Sixteen Prefectures
300 km
0
L
in
Ch
I
A
Hsin
Yu
Yü
ns
(Yen-ching)
Yen
Mt
g
Chen
Ts’ang
Shen
Chi2
T’ai-yüan
Ye ll ow River
NG
Ch’ing2
I
Mo
Ting
HO-TUNG - t’o shui
- h
an
UT
Hsia
TING-NAN
TA
HO-HSI
Hu
Te
Wei Po
ai
FANG
O
ho
Yün2
SHUO-
Shang-chin
200 miles
Liao ho
86
Ch’ing
(Yeh-tu)
T’
Hsiang2
Chin
Lu
Fu
Yün
Kao-p’ing
Te-sheng
Ching
Yen2
Ch’in
Tse
Shan
Wei2
We
Hua2
i sh
Meng
Feng- T’ung Ho-chung
ui
hsiang
K’ai-feng
Ch’in
-lin
Cheng
Loyang
gM
Ch’ang-an
Hsü2
Feng
t
ns
Yang
Ch’u
sh
ui
Huai
Hsiang
shui
Kuang
SHU
An
Shou
Ssu
Hao
Yang2
Yang
tze
Han-
SOUTHERN
Chin-ling
T’ANG
CHING-NAN
Map 7. China under the Later Chin, c. 938.
Shih’s sons and other family members were hunted down and killed, and
his first supporters were defeated and executed. A section of the Imperial
Guard under Chang Ching-ta laid siege to T’ai-yüan, and Shih turned to
the Liao for help. The alliance surprised no one. Indeed, Shih’s inner circle
had discussed this possibility two months earlier. Moreover, Li Ts’ung-k’o’s
court had accepted plans to neutralize the Liao by offering annual payments.
Li’s officials had been attracted by the prospect of saving ninety percent of
frontier expenses, but they abandoned the plans in the belief that the Liao
would demand a princess in marriage – and that Shih Ching-t’ang would
rebel anyway.123
123
TCTC 280, pp. 9141–2, 9145–7; CWTS 48, pp. 660–3; 75, pp. 983–4; T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 3,
p. 38. On the willingness of the Ho-tung regimes to work with the Liao, see Jen Ch’ung-yüeh,
the five dynasties
87
The Liao–Later Chin alliance, 936–942
Shih Ching-t’ang’s agreement with the Liao emperor Te-kuang is probably the
most famous event of the Five Dynasties period, taken to mark the beginning
of the “barbarian” encroachment into northern China that culminated in the
Mongol conquest of the whole country. Shih was only the latest of many who
had turned to the Liao for supplementary forces, but he needed more than
just a few extra cavalry. Li Ssu-yüan had concentrated military power in the
Imperial Guard, and Shih Ching-t’ang had held day-to-day control of this
force until 932, after which the dangers of sharing command with the volatile
prince Li Ts’ung-jung had led Shih to extract himself from court and seek the
Ho-tung command he had held ever since. Shih thus knew better than most
that his own border defense forces were no match for the Imperial Guard,
and accordingly the terms of Shih’s deal with Te-kuang went far beyond what
anyone had offered before. Shih promised annual payments of gold and silk,
but he also undertook to hand over the districts that became known as the
Sixteen Prefectures and to subordinate himself as Te-kuang’s adopted son and
subject.124 The Sixteen Prefectures were Yu-chou (raised by the Khitan to
Nan- or Yen-ching in 938), Chi-chou, Ying-chou, Mo-chou, Cho-chou, T’anchou2, Shun-chou, Hsin-chou, Kuei-chou2, Ju-chou, Wu-chou, Yün-chou2,
Ying-chou2, Huan-chou, Shuo-chou, and Yü-chou.125 Such large promises
imply a determination to succeed in seizing and retaining power, but it is not
clear at this point whether Shih Ching-t’ang sought the throne in the Central
Plains or simply regional autonomy such as that enjoyed by Meng Chihhsiang of the Later Shu. That Te-kuang sent fifty thousand troops suggests his
intention to avoid repeating the ill-fated ventures of 928, whose generals were
still in Later T’ang custody.
The mutiny at Wei-chou tied down a section of the Later T’ang Imperial
Guard for two months and so helped T’ai-yüan withstand a summer siege,
124
125
“Ch’i-tan yü Wu-tai Shan-hsi ko-chü cheng-ch’üan,” in Ch’i-tan shih-lun chu hui-pien, ed. Sun Chinchi et al. (Shen-yang, 1988), vol. 1, pp. 384–8, 368; and on the use of the Liao threat by people who
usurped the throne (from Li Ssu-yüan to Kuo Wei), see Hsing I-t’ien, “Ch’i-tan yü Wu-tai cheng-ch’üan
keng-tieh chih kuan-hsi,” Shih-huo yüeh-k’an 1 No. 6 (1971), pp. 296–307.
The original offer was “the circuit of Lu-lung and all the prefectures north of Yen-men pass” (TCTC
280, p. 9146).
See TCTC 280, p. 9154. On the geography of this region, see the pair of articles by Chao T’ieh-han,
“Yen–Yün shih-liu chou ti ti-li fen-hsi (shang),” Ta-lu tsa-chih 17 No. 11 (1958), pp. 3–7, and “Yen–Yün
shih-liu chou ti ti-li fen-hsi (hsia),” Ta-lu tsa-chih 17 No. 12 (1958), pp. 18–22; and Ho T’ien-ming,
“Shih-lun Liao-ch’ao chieh-kuan Yen-Yün ti-ch’ü,” Liao Chin Ch’i-tan Nü-chen shih yen-chiu tung-t’ai
2 (1986), pp. 14–18; and on its significance, see Ho T’ien-ming, “Lun Liao cheng-ch’üan chieh-kuan
Yen–Yün ti pi-jan-hsing chi li-shih tso-yung,” in Liao Chin shih lun-chi, ed. Ch’en Shu (Peking, 1989),
vol. 4, pp. 100–15.
naomi standen
88
Wu
Hsin
n
-ka
ng
Sa
Yün 2
i
shu
Ju
T’an 2
Kuei2
Shun
Yu
Chi
Yellow River
(Yen-ching)
Yü
Ying 2
Shuo
Cho
Huan
I
Mo
Shu-ch’eng
Hu-t’
o sh
Names in italics are the Sixteen Prefectures
0
0
200 km
ui
Ying
Ting
Ts’ang
Chen
Shen
100 miles
Map 8. The Sixteen Prefectures ceded to the Khitan in 937.
before the Liao armies arrived to relieve the city and in turn cut off the Later
T’ang camp at Chin-an-chai. Shih Ching-t’ang and Te-kuang met during the
long siege that followed, and in the eleventh month Te-kuang invested Shih as
emperor of Later Chin (Chin Kao-tsu, 936–42). The Later T’ang commanders
held in reserve two further sections of the Imperial Guard, which were placed
under Li Ts’ung-k’o’s two most powerful governors: Fan Yen-kuang, who had
quelled the Wei-chou rebellion and been appointed to the governorship, and
Chao Te-chün of Yu-chou. Neither of them was keen to relieve T’ai-yüan. Chao
in particular tried to exploit the situation to get his adopted son appointed
to govern Chen-chou. Dissatisfied with Li Ts’ung-k’o’s angry refusal, Chao
negotiated with Te-kuang to displace Shih Ching-t’ang as emperor in the
Central Plains in return for surrendering his armies and providing generous
payments thereafter. Although sorely tempted, Te-kuang did not abandon Shih
Ching-t’ang, and soon afterward received Chin-an-chai’s surrender from the
Later T’ang general Yang Kuang-yüan, who had killed his stubbornly loyal
commander, Chang Ching-ta. This army was handed over to Shih Chingt’ang, who rewarded Yang Kuang-yüan by leaving him in command. Liao
cavalry pursued and killed many of the last effective fighting forces of the Later
T’ang, before their two commanders, Chao Te-chün and his adopted son Chao
Yen-shou, surrendered. The surviving forces seem to have been taken north
along with their commanders, and Chao Yen-shou was quickly promoted
at Te-kuang’s court. Although benefiting from such changes of allegiance,
the five dynasties
89
Te-kuang pointedly praised Chang Ching-ta’s constancy and reprimanded the
surrendering generals for their disobedience.126
Informed of the Liao victory, only one Later T’ang prefect and one minister
declared continuing allegiance to Li Ts’ung-k’o. The powerful Fan Yen-kuang
did nothing. Te-kuang despatched Shih Ching-t’ang to Lo-yang with an escort
of five thousand troops, and Shih occupied the capital without resistance, while
Te-kuang waited in Ho-tung to ensure a smooth takeover. When Li Ts’ungk’o killed himself, few seemed sorry to see him go, and Te-kuang returned
home.127 Shih Ching-t’ang ordered the punishment of a few key ministers
from Li Ts’ung-k’o’s administration and a return to the ways of Li Ssu-yüan’s
court.
Shih Ching-t’ang’s dissatisfaction with Li Ts’ung-k’o was shared by many
of his peers, but Shih’s own claim to the throne was problematical because of
his relationship with the Liao emperor Te-kuang. The issue was not that Tekuang was not Chinese – Shih and the Later T’ang rulers were themselves all of
Sha-t’o origin – but that Shih Ching-t’ang fundamentally lacked legitimacy as
emperor. Li Ssu-yüan had come to the throne by attracting a wide following,
and Li Ts’ung-k’o by dispensing largesse. Both had taken over the capital at the
head of an army, but with scarcely a blow struck. Shih Ching-t’ang marched
on the capital as the result of much greater military achievement – a victory
in battle, a siege, and a surrender – but this had been gained by reliance on
another leader’s troops and at the cost of Shih’s formal subordination to that
leader. As a result, Shih always struggled to be taken seriously as a ruler. The
difficulty of Shih’s position can be seen in the Later Shu’s hostility toward the
Later Chin envoys announcing Shih Ching-t’ang’s accession, and again, six
months later, when the state of Wu undertook a seaborne mission seeking an
alliance with the Liao to conquer the Later Chin.128 While neighboring rulers
might have coveted each other’s regimes, the usual procedure had been to
acknowledge rival regimes first and fall out with them later. Such antagonism
126
127
128
For this and the next paragraph: TCTC 280, pp. 9147–64; CWTS 48, pp. 663–8; 75–6, pp. 984–94;
70, pp. 933–4; 97, pp. 1296–7; 98, pp. 1309–10; 137, p. 1833; T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 3, pp. 38–40;
Wang, Structure of power, p. 189. Some of the sources suggest that Chao Te-chün had planned his claim to
the throne months before, but on balance this seems unlikely. On Chao Yen-shou, see Naomi Standen,
“Frontier crossings from north China to Liao, c. 900–1005” (diss., University of Durham, 1994), pp.
165–89.
The response of the Wu-Yüeh regime is most striking; see TCTC 280, p. 9164.
TCTC 281, p. 9173. Shih has been subjected to much criticism for giving away territory and for
subordinating himself to another ruler. These points are reassessed by Wei Liang-t’ao, “I-erh, erhhuang-ti,” Li-shih yen-chiu 1 (1991), pp. 164–7; Cheng Hsüeh-meng, “Kuan-yü Shih Ching-t’ang
p’ing-chia ti chi-ko wen-t’i,” Hsia-men ta-hsüeh hsüeh-pao 1 (1983), pp. 57–63; and (from Te-kuang’s
perspective) Standen, “What nomads want.”
naomi standen
90
toward a new ruler at first greeting suggests that Shih Ching-t’ang lacked
credibility.
Objections to the specific terms of Shih’s agreement with the Liao also
came from officials and leaders within the Sixteen Prefectures. Although Tekuang did not receive the maps and registers for these districts until 938,
he took possession straightaway, and he expected submission from the sitting
officials. But even as the Liao withdrew north from Ho-tung in mid-937, an
administrative assistant in Yün-chou2 (Ta-t’ung) closed his city to Te-kuang
and asked Shih Ching-t’ang for help, while another regional general left for
“the south,” apparently ashamed to serve the Liao (whether from xenophobia
or resentment of being given away we do not know). Shih Ching-t’ang could
only ask Te-kuang to lift the siege of Yün-chou2, but resolving the situation
required the offending assistant’s recall to the south. Problems like these may
have been behind Shih’s offer of increased annual payments to buy back the
Sixteen Prefectures, but Te-kuang refused.129
Doubts about Shih’s authority made it harder for him to establish control
over his governors, many of whom showed their uncertainty by being slow to
offer their submission. However, the uncertain relationship of formal subordination that undermined Shih’s position also gave him his major advantage over
any challengers: their success was ultimately limited by the Liao’s support for
Shih. The significance of this quickly became apparent. North of the Yellow
River, the Wei–Po governor Fan Yen-kuang still had with him at Wei-chou
one of the two remaining sections of the Later T’ang Imperial Guard, and the
danger he posed contributed to Shih Ching-t’ang’s decision to move the Later
Chin capital from Lo-yang to K’ai-feng, which was better placed strategically.
Early in 937, Fan Yen-kuang rebelliously sought Liao support against Shih
Ching-t’ang. Te-kuang, however, showed how seriously he took the alliance
between the Liao and the Later Chin by not only refusing to help Fan but
also discussing with Shih Ching-t’ang how he should respond. The conclusion
seems to have been that Te-kuang would leave Shih to handle Fan Yen-kuang
by himself. Shih first tried to appease Fan by giving him a noble title, but in
the sixth month of that year Fan rebelled. Both sides had been maneuvering
for position on opposite banks of the Yellow River, but Fan Yen-kuang now
won over to his banner an imperial general who occupied the recently demoted
capital, Lo-yang, rewarding his troops with the contents of the imperial storehouses. Panic gripped the court as Fan’s army approached the new capital at
K’ai-feng, and Shih Ching-t’ang contemplated fleeing to T’ai-yüan.
129
TCTC 281, pp. 9169, 9175; T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 3, pp. 40–1.
the five dynasties
91
At this crucial juncture, rebellions broke out in major Yellow River cities
downstream from Lo-yang, including an attempt by the troops of Imperial
Guard general Yang Kuang-yüan to acclaim Yang emperor. Yang Kuang-yüan,
crucially, maintained his allegiance to Shih Ching-t’ang, and Yang’s Imperial
Guard, together with a number of provincial forces, began to see some military
success against the rebels. This enabled Shih Ching-t’ang to install demonstrably loyal Later Chin generals in the provinces around the old and new
capitals and in the southern approaches to Ho-tung, while Fan Yen-kuang,
unable to supplement his forces from outside the Later Chin realm, watched
his following begin to dissipate. Nevertheless, Fan, besieged in Wei-chou by
Yang Kuang-yüan, had still not surrendered after a year, at which point in
938 Shih Ching-t’ang offered Fan Yen-kuang a pardon and the governorship
of a province. Shih pardoned all of Fan’s adherents too and gave his generals prefectures, but Fan had to allow the regional troops (ya-chün) under his
command – the core of any governor’s following – to be incorporated into
the Imperial Guard. While it was obviously not an overwhelming military
triumph, Shih had nonetheless contained the rebellion and shown some military competence. Fan’s submission confirmed Shih Ching-t’ang’s superiority as
emperor, and although Shih’s governors never held him in enormous esteem,
his surviving the rebellion – and without active Liao military help – signaled
to them that he did, in fact, have the moral and military capabilities to be
emperor. As a way of reinforcing this point, that winter he struck a military
pose by bearing weapons at a court session.130
Shih Ching-t’ang, like Li Ssu-yüan, had taken over the empire with few
troops of his own. Also like Li, Shih knew that he had to ensure that he controlled stronger military forces than any potential rival. The submission of
Fan Yen-kuang allowed Shih to unite the Imperial Guard, but this placed
all of Shih’s forces under Yang Kuang-yüan, who, while siding with Shih
against Fan Yen-kuang, had also used his military position to arrange for one
of his sons to marry a daughter of Shih Ching-t’ang and to otherwise influence court affairs.131 Immediately after giving Yang Kuang-yüan command of
the surrendered Later T’ang expeditionary army in 936, Shih diluted Yang’s
military authority by appointing two of his own retainers, Liu Chih-yüan and
Ching Yen-kuang, as respectively, cavalry commander and infantry commander; moreover, during the campaign against Fan Yen-kuang another retainer,
Liu Ch’u-jang, “join[ed] in discussions on military affairs” and effectively
130
131
TCTC 280–1, pp. 9165–92 passim; CWTS 76–7, pp. 1002–22; T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 3, pp. 40–1.
CWTS 97, pp. 1290–1; TCTC 281, p. 9186.
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naomi standen
acted as an army-supervising commissioner in all but name.132 When Fan
Yen-kuang surrendered to Yang Kuang-yüan in 938, Shih appointed Yang to
replace Fan in the Wei–Po governorship at Wei-chou, neatly removing Yang
from day-to-day contact with the enlarged Imperial Guard. Two months later,
Shih achieved what none of his predecessors had managed by dividing Wei–
Po province into three, leaving Yang in control of just the city and prefecture
of Wei-chou itself and thus greatly reducing Yang’s resources. Shih worked
throughout his reign to maintain and strengthen the allegiance of the Imperial
Guard, appointing palace commissioners – retainers – to command them and
bestowing honors and privileges upon the officers.133 The army was a crucial
factor in keeping Shih on his throne.
Shih Ching-t’ang paid much less attention to other aspects of government,
content to continue the policies developed by Li Ssu-yüan. Shih was keen
to reemploy his predecessors’ best servants. His reappointments included the
chief minister Feng Tao, who had also served Li Ssu-yüan, Li Ts’ung-hou,
and Li Ts’ung-k’o, and although Feng is singled out for criticism by the
writers of the eleventh-century sources, he was only one of many high-ranking
officials who served in several successive administrations in this period.134
Feng was known for his literary talent, in keeping with Shih Ching-t’ang’s
expanded use of scholars in senior positions to the detriment of the palace
commissioners. Indeed, in 939 Shih abolished the Bureau of Military Affairs
and gave responsibility for administration to the chief ministers under Feng
Tao. This formally restored to the chief ministers their influence over political
and military matters that had been destroyed by Chu Wen two decades earlier.
But Feng Tao was never happy to have military responsibility, and the Bureau
of Military Affairs was revived in the 940s. Literati could now fill the highest
positions, and the court was becoming more subject to the back-and-forth of
group rivalries, but service in an emperor’s retinue was still the key to obtaining
responsibilities in crucial areas. Accordingly, although Shih initially divided
the three financial offices among the chief ministers, in 938 he gave all three
posts to Liu Shen-chiao, a finance expert from Li Ts’un-hsü’s retinue.135
The blended administration faced serious problems, not the least being the
impoverishment of the population by disrupted livelihoods and the depletion
of state granaries. A persistent difficulty was a shortage of coin, but a series
132
133
134
135
Wang, Structure of power, pp. 162–3; CWTS 76, pp. 991–2; 94, p. 1250; TCTC 280, pp. 9158–9; 281,
p. 9192.
TCTC 281, pp. 9191, 9194; CWTS 77, pp. 1019, 1021–2; 97, p. 1291; Wang, Structure of power,
pp. 186, 165–6; Mao, “T’ang-mo Wu-tai cheng-chih she-hui chih yen-chiu,” p. 344.
See Wang, “Feng Tao.” Biography in CWTS 126, pp. 1655–66. He is criticized in Ou-yang, Hsin
Wu-tai shih 54, pp. 611–12, and TCTC 291, pp. 9511–13.
Wang, Structure of power, pp. 157–8, 162, 171–6; Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” pp. 228–30.
the five dynasties
93
of edicts failed to prevent adulteration or the melting down of copper cash to
make other things, or to impose standardized weights and patterns on private
minting, which was banned in 939. Nevertheless, while Shih Ching-t’ang
solicited ideas for relieving the plight of the deserving destitute, his chief
administrator Sang Wei-han – presumably with the assistance of Liu Shenchiao – attended to the revival of farming, sericulture, trade, and manufacturing, prompting claims that “within a few years” Sang’s measures restored
order to the realm. Benefits included the reduction and stabilization of the
price of salt, and the apparent revival of the Silk Road trade. Noneconomic
measures included better administration of the civil service examinations and
periodic general pardons for those in prison.136 Like Li Ssu-yüan, Shih Chingt’ang understood the importance of acting in an exemplary fashion, which
in the circumstances meant running a sound administration and giving the
governors a relatively loose rein. If Shih Ching-t’ang’s control of the army was
crucial to sustaining his rule, producing order in the realm while not imposing
too much on the privileges of the powerful made a less obvious, but just as
essential, contribution.
Although Shih Ching-t’ang behaved like any other emperor of the Central
Plains, he remained in the difficult position of also being formally subordinate
to the Liao emperor. And because he was the autonomous emperor of an
independent regime by virtue of an alliance that was responsible for placing
and keeping him on the throne, he was obliged to stifle any misgivings about
the formalities of rank and familial status. Thus in 938 Shih fired an official
who regarded being an envoy to the Liao as a comedown from his former status,
suggesting an impatience with overplayed sensitivities. Shih Ching-t’ang was
no fool: he knew that his staying on his throne depended – even more than
on his army or on his good governance – on the skill and determination with
which he maintained the Liao alliance, however troublesome its implications.
Accordingly, Shih never forgot his debt to Te-kuang, nor did anything
to risk the relationship, even though this exposed him to criticism for so
fully accepting his subordination. Shih’s envoys reluctantly tolerated arrogant
treatment from their Liao hosts, and the subsidies to Liao were paid regularly.
Compliance over such politically sensitive issues paid off, because when a
Southern T’ang minister arranged for Liao envoys to be treated generously,
but then had them murdered once they were on Later Chin soil, the Liao did
not blame the Later Chin as the minister had intended.137
136
137
On copper, see TCTC 281, p. 9195; 282, p. 9204; on Sang’s measures, TCTC 280, p. 9168. See also
Cheng, “Kuan-yü Shih Ching-t’ang,” pp. 62–3, and his references. For Sang’s biography, see CWTS
89, pp. 1161–9; for Liu Shen-chiao, see CWTS 95, pp. 1392–4.
TCTC 281, pp. 9168, 9188–9, 9190. Wu had become Southern T’ang in 939.
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But Shih’s “good service” did not make him a doormat; he just had to be
subtle in seeking to protect and improve his status. Shih had accepted the
designation “subject,” calling Te-kuang his “imperial father.” According to
Ssu-ma Kuang, “although [the amount of the subsidy] was no more than the
taxes of a few counties, [the Later Chin] often cited the hardships of the people
as an excuse for not being able to fulfill the quota,” which apparently prompted
Te-kuang to insist that Shih drop “subject” and use the less demeaning “imperial son” instead. The contemporary significance of such designations was great,
and so was Shih’s achievement here, but Te-kuang could play the name game
too. After Fan Yen-kuang’s surrender, Te-kuang invested Shih Ching-t’ang
with another imperial title, an ostensible honor that nevertheless highlighted
Shih’s formal subordination.138 Te-kuang sometimes exploited his superior
status (and the military power that backed it), as when he requested that a
refugee at the Liao court should succeed his late father Wang Ch’u-chih to
the vacant governorship of I–Ting, “in accord with the rules in our regime.”
When Shih Ching-t’ang politely objected that “the Middle Kingdom’s rules”
decreed that officials had to work their way up through the ranks, Te-kuang
angrily reminded Shih of his own promotion from governor to emperor. This
worried Shih, but he negotiated a compromise: appointing another of Wang
Ch’u-chih’s descendants, already governor of another Later Chin province, to
the vacancy.139
The sources note that, like any virtuous ruler, Shih Ching-t’ang accepted
good advice. Hence he acknowledged that fostering the Liao relationship
should not mean neglecting frontier defenses. Too much activity might have
provoked aggrieved questioning from Te-kuang, but Shih did, for instance,
strengthen the Yellow River crossing at Te-sheng because of the potential danger from the Liao.140 With the mountain passes now mostly in Liao hands,
the Yellow River had become the first major barrier against northern attack.
Since the capital, K’ai-feng, lay just to the south, such defenses would also be
useful against internal threats; the armies that Shih Ching-t’ang maintained
against challengers at home were available to fight external enemies if need be.
The alliance with the Liao meant that Shih did not have to delegate dangerous
amounts of authority to frontier generals and could concentrate his military
strength closer to his center.
This centralization was important, because Shih Ching-t’ang needed to
keep a watchful eye on the provinces. Upon Shih’s accession Sang Wei-han had
advised him to “act with sincerity and abandon grudges in order to placate
the governors.” Accordingly Shih had left the governors in place, and he
138
139
140
TCTC 281, pp. 9188, 9191; CWTS 108, p. 1658.
TCTC 282, p. 9204; Cheng, “Kuan-yü Shih Ching-t’ang,” pp. 61–2.
TCTC 281, p. 9194.
the five dynasties
95
only gradually adjusted the policies of Li Ssu-yüan that limited governors’
powers over finances and appointments.141 By 940, however, Shih felt ready to
undertake a major gubernatorial reshuffle. This went smoothly in the north,
but in the south, where governors were still able to seek external support, two
governors resisted. An Ts’ung-chin at Hsiang-chou in the middle section of
the Han River valley occupied such a vital strategic position that Shih Chingt’ang was obliged to let An’s defiance pass. By contrast, when An Ts’ung-chin’s
neighbor, Li Chin-ch’üan at An-chou, pledged allegiance to the Southern
T’ang, Shih Ching-t’ang did not hesitate to dispatch an army, retaining the
province and incorporating Li Chin-ch’üan’s Southern T’ang reinforcements
into his own forces. Li fled to the Southern T’ang court but received a cool
reception, and subsequently the ruler there rejected arguments for expanding
north. This success doubtless helped to persuade the Emperor of Later Shu and
the Ching-nan governor to refuse support to An Ts’ung-chin, and henceforth
Shih’s independent neighbors in the south ceased to be a potential source
of assistance for discontented governors in the southern part of Later Chin
territory.142
Most governors serving the Later Chin now had little inclination or ability
to threaten their overlord, but individuals could still cause great trouble,
even if they had received their positions from the emperor. By far the hardest
governor to control was An Ch’ung-jung at Chen-chou. In 939, An apparently
declared that “to become an emperor in these days, you just [need] strong troops
and vigorous horses,” and thereafter he became openly hostile to the regime.
Shih Ching-t’ang did not act against him directly, but transferred away An’s
neighboring governor and relative by marriage, Huang-fu Yü of I–Ting. In
940, An Ch’ung-jung “enticed” a thousand “tents” of T’u-yü-hun tribesmen
to submit to him and settle in his province, but Shih Ching-t’ang, chastised by
Liao envoys, drove them back to their original lands. An Ch’ung-jung hated the
Liao. He was rude to envoys and even had them murdered. Shih Ching-t’ang
could not prevent this, and he found himself “humbly excus[ing]” An whenever
Te-kuang complained about him.143 Although often taken to indicate Later
Chin subservience to the Khitan “barbarians,” these events also show that
Shih Ching-t’ang and Te-kuang were both determined to maintain peaceful
relations between their states. Circumstances quite sufficient in themselves to
provoke hostilities were negotiated away by these two allies, who deployed
enormous patience and considerable creativity.
141
142
143
TCTC 281, p. 9168. See discussion of one example of this tactic and further references in Sudō, “Godai
setsudoshi no shihai taisei,” pp. 398–9.
CWTS 79, pp. 1038–41; TCTC 282, pp. 9211–22.
TCTC 282, pp. 9203, 9219, 9222–3; CWTS 79, p. 1045; T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 4, p. 48. For An
Ch’ung-jung’s biography, see CWTS 98, pp. 1301–4.
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Nevertheless, in 941 An Ch’ung-jung precipitated a crisis in the relations
between the Liao and the Later Chin. Seizing Liao envoys, as well as raiding
over the border into Yu-chou, he demanded a war against the Liao, deploring
Shih Ching-t’ang’s patient submission and claiming that the Liao’s nomadic
subjects and the governors of the Sixteen Prefectures were all calling for an
invasion to strike north. Under Sang Wei-han’s prodding, Shih Ching-t’ang
belatedly apologized to the Liao, but Te-kuang, understandably unsure of
Shih’s intentions, detained the Later Chin envoy. Meanwhile, the Ho-tung
governor (and, until recently, Imperial Guard commander) Liu Chih-yüan
gutted the support An Ch’ung-jung received from nomads by persuading several chieftains to switch their allegiance to the Later Chin, thus acquiring
a force of elite T’u-yü-hun cavalry for his own service. An Ch’ung-jung had
established communications with the troublesome An Ts’ung-chin at An-chou
in the south, and at the end of 941 An Ts’ung-chin struck north, but Shih
Ching-t’ang had anticipated this. An Ts’ung-chin was driven back, and the
Later Chin received naval help against him both from the Ching-nan governor
and from the King of Ch’u in Hunan. Those who previously might have supported the rebels were now lining up behind the recognized holder of superior
authority. Hearing of this, An Ch’ung-jung desperately launched his rebellion
from Chen-chou in the following month, which in Liao eyes demonstrated
Shih Ching-t’ang’s good faith toward them, prompting Te-kuang to release
Shih’s envoy. An Ch’ung-jung was executed by one of his own former generals, and his preserved head was sent in a box to Te-kuang. In the south, An
Ts’ung-chin committed suicide a year later, after his city fell to an assault.144
Outright victories over provincial rebels increased Shih Ching-t’ang’s political capital, even as his policy of external appeasement and internal forgiveness
had brought a certain stability, lacking since the days of Li Ssu-yüan. Although
it could not be said that Shih Ching-t’ang had fully united his domain, he
had quelled repeated and sometimes serious resistance, fostered important
developments in court and military institutions, and begun to rebuild the
economy. Although taking control of the main armies of the realm had played
an important part in this – giving him the military muscle to crush his several
opponents – he had also greatly decreased the likelihood of widespread support
for rebels by ruling in a manner deemed both proper and acceptable to most of
the provincial leaders who were best placed to oppose him. Most important,
the possibility of successful rebellion had been curtailed by Shih’s alliance with
the Liao emperor, which deprived rebels of the external support they needed
144
See TCTC 282–3, pp. 9222–39; CWTS 79, p. 1048; 80, pp. 1054–6; 98, p. 1305; Ou-yang, Hsin
Wu-tai shih 51, pp. 586–7; T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 4, pp. 49–50. See CWTS 89, pp. 1163–6, for Sang
Wei-han’s memorial on the value of the alliance.
the five dynasties
97
to challenge the sitting emperor. This situation in the north created ripple
effects in the south, where Shih was able to use his strength without having
to worry about his northern border at the same time. The alliance thus gave
Shih a monopoly on authority, for there was now no external power, north
or south, willing to act as an alternative source of legitimation for a rebel.
Thus although the relationship with Te-kuang raised the serious problem of
Shih Ching-t’ang’s subordination to an external power, it also enabled him to
safeguard his position so that when he fell ill in 942 his hope of securing an
orderly succession was not unrealistic.
The Liao–Later Chin war, c. 943–947
Shih Ching-t’ang died in K’ai-feng in the sixth month of 942. The chief
minister Feng Tao was entrusted with establishing Shih’s young son Shih
Ch’ung-jui on the throne, but instead installed an adult son, Shih Ch’ungkuei (Chin Shao-ti, 942–7), then serving as city governor at Wei-chou, who
was enthroned immediately. Thus the Imperial Guard was revealed as a new
base for power, because Feng Tao had done the bidding of its chief commander,
Ching Yen-kuang. Ching had been a palace commissioner working for Shih
Ching-t’ang when he had commanded the Six Imperial Armies in the capital
under Li Ssu-yüan, and subsequently Shih appointed him infantry commander
of the Imperial Guard; Ching was to dominate the court for the next four years,
together with other generals of the Imperial Guard.145 Ching seems to have
been particularly exercised about the theoretical inconsistency in Shih Chingt’ang’s relationship with the Liao ruler, and unlike his late emperor showed
no concern at all to maintain peaceful relations with the Later Chin’s northern
neighbors.
Although Shih Ch’ung-kuei quickly informed the Liao of his accession, as
was normal practice between states that maintained envoy relations, Ching
Yen-kuang encouraged the impressionable new emperor to refer to himself
only as the grandson of Te-kuang (since Shih Ching-t’ang had been Te-kuang’s
fictive son), not as his subject. Sang Wei-han lobbied for maintaining peaceful
relations, but Feng Tao sat on the fence, and Ching Yen-kuang got his way, plus
a seat among the chief ministers. When Te-kuang complained of Shih Ch’ungkuei’s breach of protocol and reminded him that his family owed the Liao for
their kingdom, Ching Yen-kuang reiterated the refusal to accept subject status
for Shih Ch’ung-kuei, on the grounds that, unlike his father, he had not been
enthroned by Te-kuang. In the Liao regime such provocative behavior was
145
TCTC 283, p. 9237. See Ching’s biography in CWTS 88, pp. 1143–6.
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seized upon by the governor of the Liao Southern Capital (previously called
Yu-chou), Chao Yen-shou. Chao coveted the throne that his father, Chao Techün, had failed to win in 936 and now argued for an invasion in the hope
that he would be made emperor in Shih Ch’ung-kuei’s place. Despite Ching
Yen-kuang’s provocation, Te-kuang did not rush into war, suggesting again
the extent of the agreement that had been achieved between him and Shih
Ching-t’ang. With greater will from the south, that agreement could have
been institutionalized and peace maintained. As it was, the attitude of Shih
Ch’ung-kuei’s court ensured that the 936 arrangement was interpreted as an
entirely personal deal between two individuals. Any benefits gained from the
alliance now became insignificant compared to the humiliation of accepting
subordination to an external ruler while claiming the supreme and indivisible
position of Son of Heaven.
Normal envoy relations continued for nearly a year, albeit amid rumors
of war, and Sang Wei-han was recalled to court.146 But Ching Yen-kuang
continued to provoke, apparently ordering the killing of all Liao merchants
in Later Chin territory and the delivery of an aggressive message informing
Te-kuang that the Later Chin were ready for any military action the Liao
might take.147 Having destroyed the external alliance so carefully nurtured
by Shih Ching-t’ang, Ching Yen-kuang then turned inward to provoke Yang
Kuang-yüan of Ch’ing-chou in western Shantung. Despite Yang Kuang-yüan’s
efforts to expand his own influence and his complaints to the Liao emperor
about Shih Ching-t’ang, Yang had never actually raised a hand against Shih.
Now, however, Ching Yen-kuang alienated Yang by confiscating three thousand horses given him by the late emperor. The court mollified Yang with
gifts and with permission for his son to hold a prefecture within Ch’ing-chou
province, but it also strengthened the garrison 130 miles away at Yün-chou,
implying that Yang was not trusted. Yang responded as he had once before,
by complaining over Shih Ch’ung-kuei’s head to his Liao overlord Te-kuang
that Shih had “turned his back on morality and broken the treaty.” Yang also
reported on the weaknesses of the Later Chin. In simultaneously provoking
both a loyal governor and a staunch ally, Ching Yen-kuang had ensured a
return to the old pattern of cooperation between a disgruntled governor and
the Liao. Meanwhile, Chao Yen-shou mobilized fifty thousand troops from the
146
147
See TCTC 283, pp. 9242–7; T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 4, pp. 51–3; and CWTS 81, pp. 1068–76, which
reports entirely unexceptional envoy exchanges. Yang Lien-sheng raises some fascinating possibilities
regarding the crucial letter to Te-kuang in “A ‘posthumous letter’ from the Chin emperor to the Khitan
emperor in 942,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 10 Nos. 3–4 (1947), pp. 418–28.
See TCTC 283, pp. 9253–4; especially T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 4, p. 52, where this incident is recorded
under the seventh month of 942; CWTS 88, p. 1144, and 137, p. 1834, allow for both earlier and later
dates.
the five dynasties
99
Sixteen Prefectures, having apparently been promised the emperorship of the
south if he conquered the region.148
Provoked by Ching Yen-kuang, the Liao turned to war to punish Shih
Ch’ung-kuei for repudiating his father’s relationship with Te-kuang, insisting on nothing less than Shih Ch’ung-kuei’s dethronement. The war took
three campaigns spread over four campaign seasons; each campaign was fought
against a background of insect plagues, floods, and famines across much of the
Later Chin domain. In each of the first two seasons (943–4 and 944–5) the
Liao marched almost unhindered toward the Yellow River but withdrew once
any substantial obstacle – an army or a defended fortification – was placed in
their path. At this point in the second season the Later Chin, hoping to force a
conclusion, attacked the Liao Southern Capital. This attack moved Te-kuang
to also seek a decisive encounter to “pacify all-under-Heaven (t’ien-hsia),” but
he was defeated in a dust storm near Ting-chou.149
Gleeful reports that Te-kuang had fled on a camel must have enhanced
Shih Ch’ung-kuei’s prestige, as did the general conduct of the fighting so far.
Other events helped too. In the first season, Yang Kuang-yüan had rebelled to
coincide with the Liao advance, but nobody joined him even though he resisted
a siege of Ch’ing-chou for nearly a year. Eventually, his own son placed him
under house arrest and surrendered the city to the Later Chin. Shih Ch’ungkuei is also credited with sponsoring a rebellion in the Sixteen Prefectures that
captured ten forts.
But the quality of governance had more impact than the war on Shih Ch’ungkuei’s standing with his followers, and Sang Wei-han’s return to power at court
after the war’s first season was crucial. The plague and famine that accompanied
the first season of fighting were compounded with reports of heartless rapacity
by governors such as Tu Ch’ung-wei; any of these events could be taken as
portents of impending dynastic collapse. The Later Chin court under Ching
Yen-kuang’s dominance not only failed to control such excesses but despite
complaints also refused to reduce either taxes or court expenditures. Shih
Ch’ung-kuei already regarded Ching Yen-kuang’s behavior as intolerable, and
in 944 Shih seized upon Ching’s cowardly generalship during the first season
to make him regent of Lo-yang and so remove him from court. This showed
decisiveness and produced practical benefits. Ever since the Bureau of Military
Affairs had been abolished in 939 and the chief ministers saddled with its
responsibilities, Feng Tao had been arguing that the chief ministers lacked both
time and qualifications for such tasks. He wanted the bureau reestablished,
148
149
TCTC 283, pp. 9255–7; T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 4, p. 53; CWTS 97, p. 1292; 98, p. 1311.
The first two seasons of the war are discussed in TCTC 283–4, pp. 9257–90; CWTS 82–3, pp. 1082–
1104; T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 4, pp. 53–6.
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and court opinion increasingly supported this policy. After the bureau was
revived, Sang Wei-han became, initially, its sole commissioner. He worked to
reform excesses at court and apparently won the cooperation of generals and
governors alike. A symbolic new reign era and an amnesty were announced.
These measures signaled some relief to the hard-pressed population. Yet even
as Sang Wei-han took over, disaster struck, as the Yellow River flooded five
prefectures, including the capital district. Other problems had human causes.
The war continued to require levies of soldiers, equipment, and taxes. Militia
numbers reportedly reached seventy thousand. Misappropriation, increasingly
widespread, diverted much tax revenue into governors’ coffers. Sometimes the
only way for the court to collect revenue was to raid the governors’ private
stores in their absence, although this could be hazardous. When an imperial
commissioner seized the illegally acquired grain stocks of Tu Ch’ung-wei,
then governor of Chen-chou, Tu’s fury had to be assuaged with gifts, and the
commissioner was dismissed.150
Although Sang Wei-han’s policies inspired hope that the court could restore
order, his authority was limited: Tu Ch’ung-wei could not be punished because
Shih Ch’ung-kuei dared not risk provoking defections to the Liao by others
who might fear similar treatment because they were just as guilty.151 Worse
still, at court imperial favorites and generals of the Imperial Guard, such
as Li Yen-t’ao, continued to wield excessive influence even in Ching Yenkuang’s absence, with Li apparently making official appointments on his own
authority. Sang Wei-han tried to curb these activities, but early in 945 Shih
Ch’ung-kuei’s brother-in-law, Feng Yü, was appointed as a second military
affairs commissioner to dilute Sang’s authority. The favorites joined forces
with Feng, and early in the third campaign season in 945, after just twenty
months in power, Sang Wei-han was ousted amid rumors of bribe taking. His
replacement, Li Sung, was in Sang Wei-han’s mold but lacked unfettered access
to Shih Ch’ung-kuei. As a result, Li Yen-t’ao and Feng Yü were easily able to
ignore the new commissioner. Large-scale bribery returned and spending was
again uncontrolled.152
Sang Wei-han’s departure made the following season (945–6) the crucial
year of the war, even though there was no official fighting because both states
were gripped by famine. Te-kuang directed no raids himself, so Liao incursions
reported throughout 946 were probably a response to drought. Within the
Later Chin state, famine led to widespread banditry, and bands sometimes
took over county seats and even defeated punitive forces, whose commanders
150
151
152
TCTC 284, pp. 9271–4; 285, p. 9297; CWTS 89, pp. 1166–7.
One such example was Mu-jung Yen-ch’ao. See TCTC 285, p. 9308.
TCTC 284, p. 9285; 285, pp. 9295–6, 9300–1; CWTS 89, p. 1167.
the five dynasties
101
were hampered by Li Yen-t’ao’s mistrustful micro-management. During these
difficult times, many villages and pastoralists switched their allegiance from
the Later Chin to the Liao, including some of the T’u-yü-hun in the Ho-tung
region who, hoping to escape the famine, returned to their old lands in Liao
territory. Te-kuang treated them well to encourage others to come over too, but
the Ho-tung governor, Liu Chih-yüan, who had deployed T’u-yü-hun forces
against the Liao in 943, now engineered the confiscation of the T’u-yü-hun
chieftain’s riches to supply his own armies. A valuable ally had been selfishly
sidelined, and others potentially alienated.153
Shih Ch’ung-kuei’s poor handling of war and famine threw the people onto
their own resources. In the strategic prefecture of Ting-chou, a Buddhist cult
developed at a fortress built by the locals to protect themselves against bandit
gangs. The cult was protected by Sun Fang-chien, who at first fought Khitan
raiders but then became disaffected with the Later Chin court. The court had
been suspicious of his motives and had refused him assistance. Sun then offered
his allegiance to the Liao and apparently incited them to invade south.154
At court, meanwhile, Sang Wei-han’s eclipse allowed Ching Yen-kuang
to return to the field as deputy commander of the expeditionary armies, but
preparations for the 946–7 season were limited. The defences of Chen-chou
in the north and Shan-chou on the Yellow River were strengthened, and an
alliance negotiated with the Koryŏ kingdom, but the Koryŏ army ultimately
proved too weak even for a diversionary attack. The Later Chin were pinning
their hopes on their secret invitation to the Liao commander in chief, Chao
Yen-shou (originally from the Yellow River valley), to change sides. After an
exchange of letters, Chao said that he “would like to come home to the Middle
Kingdom” if an army was sent to meet him. Accordingly, as the season opened,
commanders Tu Ch’ung-wei and Li Shou-chen led north the entire Imperial
Guard, including Shih Ch’ung-kuei’s personal guards, to join up with Chao’s
Liao force and capture the Sixteen Prefectures for Later Chin.155
But the Later Chin had been tricked. Chao Yen-shou had no intention
of surrendering. He had drawn the Later Chin forces out of their defensive
strongholds and dangerously exposed their field army. Later Chin morale
flagged as ceaseless rain bogged them down. Tu Ch’ung-wei, retreating before
the Liao advance, was persuaded to try to hold the Hu-t’o River crossing near
Chen-chou, but in the end he was outflanked. Te-kuang reportedly promised
153
154
155
TCTC 285, pp. 9306–8.
TCTC 285, pp. 9303–4; CWTS 84, p. 1115; 125, pp. 1649–50; T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 4, p. 57.
TCTC 285, pp. 9297–9, 9306, 9311–14. The sources are not clear as to the exact sequence or dating
of the exchange of letters with Chao Yen-shou. See especially CWTS 84, p. 1118; T’o-t’o et al., Liao
shih 76, p. 1248.
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Tu the Later Chin throne in place of Chao Yen-shou, and Tu handed over his
entire army. Allegiance quickly cascaded away from Shih Ch’ung-kuei. Chenchou submitted to the Liao as did several northern governors and prefects.
The intemperate Ching-chou governor Chang Yen-tse joined the Liao and led
an advance force to K’ai-feng, where a letter from Te-kuang convinced the
dowager empress to stop Shih Ch’ung-kuei from killing himself and persuade
him to submit instead. The first casualty of the conquest was Sang Wei-han,
murdered by Chang Yen-tse as he settled scores with his critics. Ching Yenkuang committed suicide. But Te-kuang allowed Shih Ch’ung-kuei to live out
his natural life in Liao territory.156
The Liao occupation of the Central Plains, 947
The Liao emperor did not conquer and govern the Central Plains directly.
His goal had been to punish Shih Ch’ung-kuei for repudiating his family’s
subordination, not to acquire territorial control. However, by dint of military
success, he had become the legitimate emperor of the Central Plains. Familiar
with T’ang protocols, and advised by formally educated ministers from both
Liao and the Later Chin, Te-kuang observed such practices as declaring a new
dynasty, wearing Chinese dress, and reemploying former officials. Crucially,
from the ministers’ viewpoint, Te-kuang consulted with them, and according
to Ssu-ma Kuang it was they who advised against appointing a second emperor
in the south. Like previous conquerors, he promised benefits for the common
people: he would disband the armies, lighten the demands on the people, and
inaugurate a new era of peace. Aware that the Liao had a fearsome image,
Te-kuang sought to reassure the capital’s population, ascending one of the city
wall towers to explain through an interpreter that he too was a human being.
Better still, Te-kuang did what no Later Chin ruler had dared, executing his
recent accomplice, the reviled Chang Yen-tse, in the marketplace, and allowing
the people to eat Chang’s flesh as a mark of their disgust.157
Te-kuang consolidated his military and political position by disarming the
Imperial Guard and receiving the submission of all but a couple of provincial
governors. Indeed, Te-kuang faced less resistance than had Shih Ching-t’ang.
Te-kuang promptly banned governors and prefects from keeping their own
troops or from buying warhorses. He appointed new governors, demoted K’aifeng from its capital status, and established Chen-chou as a capital instead.158
156
157
158
TCTC 285–6, pp. 9313–29; CWTS 85, pp. 1121–6; T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 4, pp. 57–8.
TCTC 286, pp. 9327–30; T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 4, p. 59; CWTS 85, p. 1126; 137, p. 1835. For
discussion of Te-kuang’s motives and the nature of the occupation, see Standen, “What nomads want.”
TCTC 286, pp. 9330–9; CWTS 99, p. 1324.
the five dynasties
103
But Te-kuang did not intend to stay. Accordingly, despite his initial gestures
of reconciliation, he treated the conquest as a very large raid, in which public
relations were irrelevant and only loot mattered. Perhaps most damaging to
Te-kuang’s image was the policy of “smashing the pasture and grain” (ta ts’aoyü), which he later regretted as a miscalculation. The Liao armies devastated the
region around the capital, foraging to supply themselves and practicing the alltoo-common cruelties of soldiers in wartime. To reward his troops, claimed
to number three hundred thousand, Te-kuang demanded from an already
overtaxed population cash and cloth to be stockpiled for transport north. Most
ambitious of all was Te-kuang’s attempt to take north every material element
of the Later Chin imperial institution, including palace women and eunuchs,
the complete contents of the imperial storehouses, and every last bureaucrat.159
In the third month of 947, Te-kuang ordered the capital stripped, and he
departed for home in the fourth, leaving his brother-in-law Hsiao Han in
charge. Formally, Te-kuang was going to pay his respects to his mother, but
his departure conformed to the usual Liao practice of moving north in the
summer to escape the heat. En route, Te-kuang was distressed by the scenes of
devastation, which he blamed on Chao Yen-shou. He apparently wrote to his
younger brother listing his own three faults in this venture: demanding cash
from the people, ordering indiscriminate foraging and plundering, and failing
to return the governors to their provinces in good time. The letter, preserved
in the Liao shih (Official history of the Liao), describes the “foreignness” of the
Khitan: they are raiders (rather than tax collectors) and pastoralists (rather
than farmers), and they keep their governors at court (rather than giving them
active responsibility in their provinces). In the hands of later writers, Tekuang’s mistakes become a warning to Chinese rulers of what to avoid if they
wish to escape comparison with a “barbarian.”160
Renewed independence: Liu Chih-yüan and the Later Han, 947–950
Te-kuang had received the submission of all but a few of the Later Chin
governors, one of whom was Shih K’uang-wei at Ching-chou. His refusal to be
transferred by Te-kuang has been credited with sowing the seeds for a backlash
against Liao rule, but he was not approached to lead a resistance, nor did he
organize one. Leaders in the provinces and in the independent states of the
159
160
TCTC 286, pp. 9334–5, 9348–50; T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 4, pp. 59–60. On the foraging policy,
see Chao Kuang-yüan, “Lüeh-lun Ch’i-tan chün-tui tsai Chung-yüan ‘Ta ts’ao-ku’,” Chung-kuo she-hui
k’o-hsüeh-yüan yen-chiu-sheng-yüan hsüeh-pao 6 (1986), pp. 67–71.
TCTC 286, pp. 9348–54; T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 4, p. 60; see also “The Later Han annals” in CWTS
99, pp. 1325–7, which gives a different cast to the events. See also Standen, “What nomads want.”
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south were all conscious that the most dangerous enemy was not the Liao, but
each other. The expectation of more conflict was everywhere. Liu Chih-yüan of
Ho-tung noted that “when [the Liao] have enough goods they will be certain
to go north,” and the Southern T’ang court heard calls to invade the Central
Plains to provide them with a leader once the Liao had withdrawn.161
Because the Imperial Guard was scattered and its leaders subordinated to
Te-kuang, preparations to cope with the impending power vacuum took place
in the provinces. Liu Chih-yüan – a former retainer of Shih Ching-t’ang – was
by far the strongest remaining governor. Ho-tung was almost impregnable
and – unlike the rest of the provinces – still relatively well resourced. Mutual
distrust between himself and Shih Ch’ung-kuei had apparently kept Liu out
of the war, but Liu had recruited throughout, giving him control, now, of fifty
thousand troops – a large force at any time but compellingly so after the four
years of war in the region. Liu Chih-yüan sent letters congratulating Te-kuang,
but he avoided attending court and claimed that his tribute had been delayed
en route. Te-kuang, nervous about Liu’s ambitions, sent him honorifics, along
with a direct enquiry about how long Liu was going to equivocate, serving
neither north nor south. Less powerful figures also hedged their bets or switched
allegiance. Hence Kao Ts’ung-hui at Ching-nan notified Liu Chih-yüan of his
support while at the same time sending tribute to Te-kuang. The governor of
Ch’in-chou in the far west had already killed Te-kuang’s envoys and taken three
prefectures over to Later Shu, while several southern prefects and “bandits”
offered their allegiance to the Southern T’ang.162
Six weeks after Te-kuang entered the Later Chin capital, K’ai-feng, Liu
Chih-yüan declared himself emperor – apparently shamed into it by a Later
Shu assault in the far southwest. But Liu did not change the dynastic name.
He immediately sought to meet with Shih Ch’ung-kuei, then on his way to
his new home in Liao territory, but Shih managed to escape an encounter
he probably would not have survived. Liu Chih-yüan asserted his claim to
authority by banning collections for the Liao coffers, by promising immunity
to those forced to collaborate, and by commanding all circuits to punish the
Liao, while his wife set a noble tone by promising the goods of the inner palace
to reward the army rather than take yet more from the people.163
Liu expanded his following first to bandits, supporting one leader who
attacked Hsiang-chou2, near Wei-chou, and making him provisional governor.
161
162
163
TCTC 286, pp. 9330, 9333, 9336, 9338. The importance of the power vacuum is noted by Hsing,
“Ch’i-tan yü Wu-tai cheng-ch’üan,” p. 301; and Chang, “Wu-tai cheng-ch’üan ti-shan chih k’ao-ch’a,”
pp. 24–5.
TCTC 286, pp. 9330, 9335–8.
TCTC 286, pp. 9339–43.
the five dynasties
105
A series of revolts then broke out across the Central Plains, with bandits playing
a prominent role. Cities were occupied, Liao envoys were killed, and allegiance
was transferred to Liu Chih-yüan rather than to Later Shu or the Southern
T’ang.164 Te-kuang, preoccupied with removing himself and his plunder north
to the Liao homeland, was largely unresponsive to these events, although he did
make an example of Hsiang-chou2, slaughtering some hundred thousand men
and children, and taking away the women. Liu Chih-yüan now declared his
intention to take control by appointing governors (with concurrent military
commands) to provinces he did not hold, and selecting an entirely new set of
ministers to replace those Later Chin bureaucrats currently on their way to
service in the Liao regime.165
The Liao, for their part, did not vigorously defend the territory they had
conquered. On the few occasions when they did fight, they did not try very hard.
Hence the Liao occupiers in Lo-yang abandoned it for an apparent build-up
against Lu-chou, but after clashing briefly with one of Liu Chih-yüan’s generals
they left Lu-chou behind and headed north. Soon afterward, Te-kuang suddenly
took ill and died.166 But this seems to have made little difference to Liao actions
in the Central Plains, other than forcing Te-kuang’s son Wu-yü (Yüan) to return
more quickly to the Liao Supreme Capital, where he managed to secure his
throne (Liao Shih-tsung, 947–51). This event had important repercussions for
Liu Chih-yüan’s future, because at Chen-chou Wu-yü abandoned all but two
of the Later Chin officials in the entourage, although he did take with him
the palace women, eunuchs, and musicians. Thus a generation of court-based
officials was retained in the Central Plains, preserving an important element
of continuity in the bureaucracy.167
With the new Liao emperor departed, Liu Chih-yüan’s forces quickly occupied Lo-yang, Tse-chou, and the northwestern portion of the Later Chin empire.
Hsiao Han, left to mind the southern realm by Te-kuang, needed to get home
to participate in deciding the succession. At K’ai-feng Hsiao had installed Li
Ssu-yüan’s son, Li Ts’ung-i, to rule the south, but Hsiao and his mother –
reluctant deputies – submitted to Liu Chih-yüan, only to be killed. Liu’s
advance met little resistance. At Lo-yang officials presented him with a letter
of welcome from Li Ts’ung-i’s officials, and as Liu approached K’ai-feng itself
to declare his own dynasty, the Later Han, he received the submissions of the
Later Chin governors. Dispensing pardons to collaborators, the new emperor,
Han Kao-tsu (r. 947–8), confirmed all Te-kuang’s provincial appointees in
164
165
166
167
TCTC 286, pp. 9340–48; CWTS 99, pp. 1324–6.
TCTC 286, pp. 9351–2; CWTS 99, pp. 1326–9.
TCTC 286, p. 9356.
TCTC 286–7, pp. 9352–64.
naomi standen
106
their posts. In 948 a Liao attempt to transfer Sun Fang-chien from Ting-chou
provoked Sun to return his allegiance to the south, and with this move the
last of the districts once held by the Later Chin came under Later Han authority. As usual, ambitious regional officials exploited the situation so that, for
instance, two Liao-appointed generals killed their governor when he submitted
to Liu Chih-yüan, and then themselves submitted, claiming the governor had
rebelled. One got the province, the other a prefecture. South of the Yangtze
the Ch’u ruler accepted titles from Liu Chih-yüan, but Kao Ts’ung-hui in
Ching-nan rejected the Later Han envoys after he was refused a prefecture for
himself. The Southern T’ang, though unprepared for a major expedition, made
plans to attack north but did nothing once they heard that Liu Chih-yüan had
taken the capital.168
None of this disturbed what was essentially a smooth takeover. Liu came
to the throne at the head of the only credible military force remaining in the
region and as the only governor who still controlled significant resources of
his own. This strength, and the fact that the Liao forces had withdrawn from
the Central Plains, had compelled the governors – however reluctantly – to
join him; for they knew that no challenger could stand against Liu without
outside assistance, but that anyone who sought such help would effectively
rule themselves out as a potential emperor since they ran a strong risk of having
to subordinate themselves to an external master. Liu may not have been first
choice for emperor, but there were few credible alternatives. This, however,
did not prevent challengers from arising subsequently, and several of them did
seek Liao help.
Tu Ch’ung-wei, left behind by the Liao withdrawal and still commanding
what was left of the Later Chin expeditionary army of 947, now submitted to
Liu Chih-yüan, but promptly refused a transfer from Wei-chou and occupied
the city, seeking help from a Liao general, Ma-ta. The one region the Liao
seemed concerned to hold was the key strategic city of Chen-chou, which
controlled the main access between the Central Plains and the Liao homeland.
Chen-chou was now a Liao capital, and Ma-ta was garrisoning (and plundering)
it. Ma-ta’s Chinese troops, mistrusted and starved, mutinied with the support
of the residents and the Later Chin ministers abandoned there by Wu-yü. Mata eventually retreated northward to Ting-chou, which at the time was in Liao
allegiance. Ma-ta’s departure halted Liao military activity in the region and
completed the Liao withdrawal. Thus denied Liao help, and with his fellow
governors offering no support either, Tu Ch’ung-wei was besieged in Weichou, finally surrendering four months later after losing three-quarters of his
population to starvation. The remnants of Tu’s army were incorporated into the
168
TCTC 287, pp. 9359–68; 288, p. 9389; CWTS 100, pp. 1331–5, 1338–9, 1347–8.
the five dynasties
107
Later Han Imperial Guard, while Tu himself received senior court positions
so that he could be carefully watched.169
The siege exhausted the Wei-chou region, which could no longer pose a
major threat to Liu Chih-yüan. This made Chao K’uang-tsan, Chao Yen-shou’s
son and the governor at Ch’ang-an, potentially the most serious threat to Liu.
Chao K’uang-tsan feared that Liu Chih-yüan would never trust him because
he was the son of the Liao commander. Accordingly, he submitted to the Later
Shu in the southwest and asked for military support. A Later Shu army of fifty
thousand marched east to Feng-hsiang, where it received the submission of
Chao’s neighbor. Chao now asked the Later Shu to march on to the Wei River
valley provinces of Kuan-chung – which included Ch’ang-an. But Chao had
simultaneously submitted to Liu Chih-yüan, who sent a detachment from his
Imperial Guard to reinforce Chao K’uang-tsan’s provincial troops. When the
Later Shu army heard of Chao’s change of allegiance it began to withdraw,
but it was intercepted by Chao’s joint force with the loss of four hundred
captured.170
Between dealing with Tu Ch’ung-wei and Chao K’uang-tsan, Liu Chih-yüan
reshuffled most of his senior governors without incident. He had already reconstituted an Imperial Guard by recalling the scattered units of Shih Ch’ungkuei’s Guard force from their provincial postings, and when Tu Ch’ung-wei
surrendered, the remnants of the Later Chin Imperial Guard and Imperial
Bodyguard that he had led were incorporated into the Later Han force. Liu
also chose a successor, who unfortunately died just a few weeks before Liu’s
own death early in 948.171
Before dying, Liu Chih-yüan had chosen a new successor, his eighteen-yearold son Liu Ch’eng-yu, but the young man was under the control of his mother
and his regents, including the corrupt chief minister, Su Feng-chi. Keeping
Liu’s death secret, Su Feng-chi publicly executed Tu Ch’ung-wei and his sons,
though carefully sparing his wife, Shih Ching-t’ang’s sister. Only then did
Ch’eng-yu’s succession take place (Han Yin-ti, 948–50).172
However, a regime headed by a minor was open to challenge. But in
948 the only military forces in the region not under imperial control were
two provincial armies in Kuan-chung. Shortly after Liu Ch’eng-yu’s accession these two governors were recalled. Their troops were to be escorted to
K’ai-feng for incorporation in the Imperial Guard. Instead, one of the provincial forces occupied Ch’ang-an, while two other major cites were also taken
169
170
171
172
TCTC 287, pp. 9368–73, 9376–8; CWTS 100, pp. 1336–9; Mao, “T’ang-mo Wu-tai cheng-chih
she-hui chih yen-chiu,” pp. 349–50.
TCTC 287, pp. 9377, 9380, 9382–4. Chao has a one-line biography at CWTS 98, p. 1313.
TCTC 287, pp. 9370–80. On military reorganization, see Wang, Structure of power, p. 195; on the
administration, Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” p. 231.
TCTC 287, pp. 9384–5; CWTS 100, p. 1340.
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over – Ho-chung by the governor and former commander of the Later Chin
Imperial Guard, Li Shou-chen, and Feng-hsiang by a mutinous garrison. From
the time of the last century of T’ang dynasty, Kuan-chung governors had
formed sometimes powerful alliances, and in an echo of those times the rebel
leaders plotted with and encouraged each other. However, the Kuan-chung
provinces were now so much smaller than they had been that the three allies
could not rely solely on their own resources. Accordingly, Li Shou-chen sought
contact with the Liao whom he had so recently fought, despite the risk that he
would end up subordinated to a Liao emperor. Bolstered by predictions that
he would be emperor and a letter from the Ch’ang-an commander offering
him imperial robes, Li Shou-chen assumed the title Prince of Ch’in. The rebels
controlled most of the Wei River valley, depriving the Later Han of two of
its best armies and providing a corridor to the Later Han capital should the
hostile Later Shu regime become involved.173
The response from the Later Han court was hampered by internal wrangling.
Resentment of Su Feng-chi, of his brother, and of the commander of the
Imperial Guard, Shih Hung-chao, led to the concurrent appointment as chief
minister of their rival, the military affairs commissioner Yang Pin. Thereafter
all matters of state were referred to him. Yang dominated the court in the
manner of a Kuo Ch’ung-t’ao or An Ch’ung-hui, but his methods were as
irregular as Su Feng-chi’s. The Sus, displaced, tried to bolster their position
by attacking some former Chin ministers whose property the brothers had
received after Liu Chih-yüan’s victory. Li Sung and fifty family members were
executed on charges of communicating with Li Shou-chen and the Liao, and
of conspiring to “pillage the capital.” The tax exactions of provincial officials
and the arbitrary executions by Shih Hung-chao placed an extreme burden
on commoners. Such poor behavior by Later Han officials only encouraged
the opposition, so that while Yang Pin was appointing generals to fight Li
Shou-chen at Ho-chung in 948, the Feng-hsiang commander was quietly
establishing trade relations with the Later Shu, offering them his submission,
and accepting titles from Li Shou-chen. Many others communicated their
support to Li, but offered no material help. Li did not march on K’ai-feng
and did not have to face an army. The Later Han generals hated each other
too much to fight. Shih Hung-chao, although the obvious choice as Imperial
Guard commander, was not given field command, probably from fear that he
might rebel once he left the capital.174
173
174
TCTC 287–8, pp. 9386–91; CWTS 101, pp. 1343–6; Wang, Structure of power, p. 196. For biographies
of Li and his allies, see CWTS 109, pp. 1437–41 (Li Shou-chen); 1441–4 (Chao Ssu-wan at Ch’ang-an);
Ou-yang, Hsin Wu-tai shih 53, pp. 603–5 (Wang Ching-ch’ung at Feng-hsiang).
TCTC 288, pp. 9390–6; CWTS 101, pp. 1345–9; Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” pp. 232,
139.
the five dynasties
109
Not until the autumn of 948 was the court finally compelled to appoint
the military affairs commissioner Kuo Wei as commander in chief of an expeditionary army. Taking Feng Tao’s advice, Kuo Wei focused all his efforts on
Li Shou-chen in his Shan-hsi stronghold of Ho-chung. Since Li had previously commanded many of the troops that Kuo now led, Kuo offered them
rewards to undercut their loyalty to their old commander, as well as sharing
their hardships and mitigating some of the harsher elements of Later Han
military discipline. Kuo, although not a regular general, won the allegiance
of his expeditionary armies so well that he was able to suppress Li and his fellow mutineers by the end of 949.175 In triumph, Kuo exercised his enhanced
power – he was now a military affairs commissioner in firm control of a veteran Imperial Guard army – by removing without proper authority the city
governor of Lo-yang, whom Kuo Wei felt had insulted him. The court refused
Kuo Wei’s calls to punish the governor but did not reinstate him. Kuo now
made a point of refusing to take sole credit for the success of the western
campaigns, emphasizing the importance of his logistical and administrative
support. His praise seems warranted, but it was also calculated to assuage
court fears that Kuo was becoming dangerously powerful, yet simultaneously
display his virtue. Careful not to provoke Kuo Wei to rebellion, the court tried
to woo top court ministers, the most important provincial governors, and the
leaders of neighboring regimes, including Wu-Yüeh, Ch’u, and Ching-nan,
offering them honors and titles.176
But this strategy was misplaced. There was little to fear from the ministers, who were preoccupied with infighting, and in the summer of 950 the
court rotated most of the governors to different provinces without a murmur,
demonstrating the remarkable extent to which – the recent rebellions notwithstanding – gubernatorial power had been curtailed. In addition to the measures
continued from Li Ssu-yüan’s time, the court was now able to appoint both
administrators and military officers (in the guise of finance officials) directly
to the provincial governments, effectively imposing court supervision. With
military power entirely under court control and sections of the Imperial Guard
patrolling the provinces under court-appointed officers, governors could only
fume.177
Kuo Wei had scarcely reported at court before he was appointed, in the
spring of 950, to be regent and provincial governor at Wei-chou and to lead
a major expedition in retaliation for ongoing Khitan raids. Shih Hung-chao –
formerly aligned with Su Feng-chi – suggested that Kuo should also retain
175
176
177
TCTC 288, pp. 9396–9417; CWTS 101–2, pp. 1346–59; Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,”
pp. 139–40.
TCTC 288, pp. 9412–15; CWTS 110, p. 1452; Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” pp. 232–3.
TCTC 289, pp. 9419–23; Wang, Structure of power, pp. 196–7.
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his post as military affairs commissioner alongside Yang Pin. Military affairs
commissioners had led expeditions before and had held governorships while
residing in the capital, but the combination of ministerial authority with both
expeditionary command and a provincial base set a dangerous precedent. Su
Feng-chi protested the “use of the outside to govern the inside,” but he was
overruled, creating a split between him and Shih Hung-chao and, it is said,
between civil and military officials. Su Feng-chi and Shih Hung-chao were both
regents, and the rift between them grew so deep that Yang Pin had to prevent
Shih from killing Su. As more troops were sent against the Khitan raiders, the
emperor’s personal favorites increasingly obstructed the chief ministers, while
the young emperor, Liu Ch’eng-yu, himself began to chafe at the restrictions
placed on his decision making. Su Feng-chi encouraged one favorite to act
against Yang Pin, Shih Hung-chao, and a third minister, Wang Chang, but
became alarmed when Liu Ch’eng-yu took command and began a bloodbath,
executing not only the three ministers but also their families and followers –
events amounting to a coup d’état. Su Feng-chi was placed in charge of the
Bureau of Military Affairs just as the purge was targeting Kuo Wei and other
important allies of the three ministers. When a warning reached Kuo Wei, he
blamed the young emperor’s companions and decided to march south with his
armies to “explain himself.” His forces included his own governor’s guard (yachün), created during his few months at Wei-chou, as well as the imperial forces
mobilized to deal with the Khitan incursions. Reacting to this impending
confrontation, the court promised rewards to the rest of the imperial armies,
hoping to retain their allegiance, and issued a general summons to nearby
governors, but received little response.178
Liu Ch’eng-yu’s uncle, the governor at Shan-chou on the Yellow River, had
refused to take part in the purge, and he allowed Kuo Wei to cross the river
on his march toward the capital. As more governors and generals joined Kuo,
he continued to declare himself subject to the emperor’s will yet rewarded his
troops in preparation for a fight and promised them ten days of plunder in the
capital at K’ai-feng. In the end, the imperial troops all either defected, fled,
or submitted to Kuo Wei, who had to use harsh methods to limit his army’s
looting.
The Later Han emperor Liu Ch’eng-yu was murdered by mutineers, and Su
Feng-chi and his co-conspirators committed suicide. Kuo Wei had been careful
to show that he did not seek the throne for himself, but he was now without
any rival at court, and as the only surviving regent, he was the sole remaining
power holder. Those who had conspired against Kuo and the three ministers
178
TCTC 289, pp. 9422–34; CWTS 103, pp. 1369–70; 110, p. 1452. Worthy, “The founding of Sung
China,” pp. 139–43, gives a detailed account of Kuo Wei’s rise to power.
the five dynasties
111
were executed, and officials uninvolved in the plot reinstated. The general
who had warned Kuo of the plot against him, Wang Yin, was rewarded with
the position of commander of the Imperial Guard, replacing the murdered
Shih Hung-chao.179 Although Kuo Wei led a powerful military force, there
were enough troops still outside his control to form concerted resistance.
Nevertheless as in the cases of Li Ssu-yüan and Li T’sung-k’o, Kuo’s following
mushroomed rapidly, reflecting a general perception that he had more to offer
than did the incumbent. The capacity to attract allegiance was at least as
important as absolute military strength.
Kuo Wei did not immediately take the throne, but instead consolidated
his hold on power behind the scenes while appearing to observe all the proper
protocols of a loyal regent and army commander. He asked the dowager empress
to choose a successor for Liu Ch’eng-yu, and she asked the officials to discuss
the options. Kuo Wei proposed Liu Yün, Liu Chih-yüan’s nephew and adopted
son, and persuaded the dowager empress to hold court herself until Yün arrived
from his distant province. In the first session of court, those who had shown
early support for Kuo Wei were rewarded with commands in the Imperial
Guard and posts giving them control of the military, palace, and financial
administrations.180
Kuo Wei did not remain long at court. When a large Liao raid attacked
Nei-ch’iu (south of Chen-chou) late in the year, Kuo went to deal with it in
person. Shortly after crossing the Yellow River at Shan-chou, he was proclaimed
emperor by his army, who, having pillaged the capital, now feared the revenge
of the Liu family if they were restored to the throne. This time Kuo Wei made
no protestations of unwillingness, but simply wrote to the dowager empress
asking for permission to pay his respects at the Liu ancestral temple and to
treat her as a mother; in effect, he was asking to be regarded as Liu Chih-yüan’s
adopted son and thus as legitimate an heir to the throne as the adopted sons
Chu Yu-kuei or Li Ssu-yüan in their time. Kuo’s willingness to ignore his
mission and return forthwith to the capital suggests that the Liao raid was not
so very dangerous, and indeed it was easily beaten off by local forces, leading to
a peace request. Kuo Wei’s followers quickly persuaded Liu Yün’s bodyguard
to join Kuo’s side, and thus they effectively took Liu Yün into their custody.
The dowager empress demoted Liu and made Kuo Wei regent, or chien-kuo,
apparently with wide support both at court and in the provinces. Having
done everything with absolute propriety, and without a blow being struck,
179
180
TCTC 289, pp. 9434–40; CWTS 103, pp. 1370–3; 110, pp. 1452–5; Worthy, “The founding of Sung
China,” p. 142.
TCTC 289, pp. 9440–3; CWTS 103, pp. 1373–6; 110, pp. 1455–7. Liu Yün’s biography is in CWTS
105, pp. 1387–8.
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Kuo Wei, in the first month of 951, proclaimed himself emperor (Chou T’aitsu, 951–4) and established the Later Chou dynasty. Liu Yün was murdered,
and his provincial followers in Hsü-chou were eliminated after a two-month
siege.181
moving to consolidation
Later Chou and Northern Han, 951–954
With the Later Chou regime came a return of the expansionism seen in the era
of Chu Wen and Li Ts’un-hsü, twenty-five years earlier. This expansionism was
built upon a much stronger base created by the struggles and consolidations
of the three Sha-t’o-led dynasties. Most Five Dynasties governors had been
content to accept the principle of formal subordination to superior authority
provided they retained effective local autonomy. Later T’ang and Later Chin
rulers from Li Ssu-yüan in the middle 920s onward had made incremental
efforts to undermine provincial powers, but because the dynastic rulers needed
to prevent the governors from offering their allegiance elsewhere, regional
leaders were granted much of the autonomy they desired. By 950, however,
after years of destructive warfare, governors had so few resources left that
subordination was now not merely formal, but actual, for they could no longer
resist court authority and still remain within the realm. Now governors could
attain autonomy only by placing themselves outside Later Chou jurisdiction
altogether. Allegiance with autonomy was no longer possible within northern
China; governors could only be subordinate or independent.
Accordingly, Liu Ch’ung, an old enemy of Kuo Wei and a full brother
of the Han founder (Liu Chih-yüan), was unwilling to accept his family’s
displacement. From his base at T’ai-yüan, he immediately declared himself
the independent successor to the throne of the Later Han dynasty (Han Shihtsu, 951–5). This continuation of the Later Han regime is known as Northern
Han (951–79). Liu controlled twelve Ho-tung prefectures and appointed new
ministers from his governor’s retinue to replace those now working for Kuo
Wei. Despite his declaration, Liu was himself dubious about his regime’s
imperial credentials, declaring to his ministers, “What kind of emperor am I,
and what kind of governors are you!” He did not establish an imperial ancestral
temple or make any sacrifices that distinguished him from a commoner, and
he was only too aware of his financial limitations; his chief ministers were paid
181
TCTC 289–90, pp. 9443–59; CWTS 103, pp. 1376–7; 110, pp. 1457–62; T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 5,
p. 65.
the five dynasties
113
only half the going rate, leading Ssu-ma Kuang to comment that the regime
“lacked incorrupt officials.”182
Unsurprisingly, Liu Ch’ung sought an alliance with Liao, for Ho-tung could
not have survived alone against the Later Chou. Liu offered Liao annual payments and subordination according to the “old ways of the [Later] Chin house”
and received formal investiture from the Liao emperor as his fictive nephew.
An immediate raid by the new allies on Chin-chou (in central Shansi) inside
Later Chou territory prompted Kuo Wei to reinforce his northern defenses,
even as he sought to protect his southern borders by publicly disavowing any
aggressive intentions toward the domains in the Huai-nan region. Although
the Liao sent their congratulations for Kuo Wei’s accession, they subsequently
detained the Later Chou envoys. The governor of Ting-nan, a western neighbor
of the Northern Han, transferred his allegiance to Liu Ch’ung, thus protecting
the new regime from a Later Chou flanking attack through his territory. Liao
assistance was delayed by political unrest culminating in the assassination of
the Liao emperor Wu-yü, but his cousin, Ching (Liao Mu-tsung, 951–69), who
succeeded to the throne, continued the relationship with Northern Han. That
winter an enormous force of Northern Han and Liao troops laid siege to Chinchou until they were driven back by the lack of food and the arrival of Later
Chou reinforcements. The Later Chou armies pursued the fleeing invaders and
claimed to have destroyed a third of the allies’ strength.183
The ripple effects of war worked against Liu Ch’ung and for Kuo Wei. The
Ho-tung region had weathered the 940s better than anywhere in the Central
Plains, but it was economically unproductive and its population small. To
fund his armies and pay the Liao subsidies, Liu Ch’ung imposed such heavy
taxes and corvée demands that many fled to Later Chou territory, thereby
denuding Northern Han of its most important resource – people. The refuge
Kuo Wei provided those fleeing from Northern Han so enhanced Kuo’s power
and attractiveness as a ruler that he managed to transfer Sun Fang-chien,
governor of Ting-chou, without provoking him to defect northward, as Sun
had done under the Later Chin and then Liao when they tried to transfer him
in 946 and 948, respectively.184
Kuo Wei did face challengers. For example, Mu-jung Yen-ch’ao, governor
of Yen-chou in western Shantung, first sent tribute to Kuo Wei, and then
requested help from both Southern T’ang and Northern Han for a planned
182
183
184
TCTC 290, pp. 9452–4; CWTS 110, p. 1464; 135, p. 1811. Ssu-ma Kuang states that Liu Ch’ung
died in 954, TCTC 292, p. 9520; and see also CWTS 115, p. 1535; T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 6, p. 73.
TCTC 290, pp. 9455–71; CWTS 110–11, pp. 1464–79; see also T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 5, pp. 66–7.
TCTC 290, pp. 9462, 9470–1; CWTS 125, p. 1650.
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rebellion. In 952 the Southern T’ang came to help Mu-jung but Kuo Wei
defeated them and, by veiled threats, frightened them into staying out of the
fray. Without allies and besieged in Yen-chou, Mu-jung resorted to savage
extortion to pay his troops, but after four months, the city fell to an assault
led by Kuo Wei in person. Mu-jung Yen-ch’ao committed suicide, and Kuo
Wei made an example of the city, allowing his army to pillage savagely and
to kill nearly ten thousand people, although he was persuaded not to execute
Mu-jung’s officials en masse.185 Subsequent provincial challengers to Kuo
Wei’s authority, notably the governor at Yen-chou2 in the northwest in 953,
and Wang Yin, the governor at Wei-chou, later the same year, were dealt
with quickly and easily.186 While governors outside Ho-tung could still cause
trouble, their lack of military and financial resources made them almost totally
reliant on support from outside the Central Plains, and these allies were rarely
able to withstand the Later Chou imperial armies, over which Kuo Wei was
particularly concerned to secure his control.
Having exploited his own expeditionary leadership of the Imperial Guard
to build a following, Kuo was very conscious of the danger posed to him by
the Guard commander. Wang Yin, the current incumbent, was Kuo’s early
supporter and appointee; nevertheless, Kuo still took the precaution of sending Wang Yin to govern Wei-chou to sever Wang’s personal connection with
his Imperial Guard troops. Following the lead of Yang Kuang-yüan and many
previous Wei-chou governors, Wang Yin established his own governor’s guard
and brought several hundred troops with him when he attended court. But
in 953, when Kuo ordered Wang’s execution on charges of plotting rebellion,
there was no supportive uprising in Wei-chou or rebellion from the Guard.187
Control of armies depended as much as ever on day-to-day contact, but governorships were no longer automatically power bases.
To counterbalance the power of the Imperial Guard in the capital, Kuo Wei
began to strengthen his personal bodyguard by appointing his sister’s son, Li
Ch’ung-chin, as commander in chief to bring the various uncoordinated units
under a single general. When Wang Yin was sent to Wei-chou, someone still
had to handle Guard affairs as his deputy in the capital, and in 952 Kuo gave
this responsibility to Li Ch’ung-chin, who retained command of the personal
bodyguard. As under Li Ssu-yüan, command of the main imperial forces was
divided between an important follower and an imperial relative, but unlike
185
186
187
TCTC 290, pp. 9453–78; CWTS 112, pp. 1479–82; (Mu-jung’s biography is in CWTS 130,
pp. 1716–18); Ou-yang, Hsin Wu-tai shih 53, pp. 608–10; T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 6, p. 69.
TCTC 291, pp. 9489–90, 9493, 9497–8. On the Wei-chou governor, Wang Yin, see Worthy, “The
founding of Sung China,” pp. 143–5, who suggests that the threat from Wang was much greater
because of his formal position as commander of the Imperial Guard.
Mao, “T’ang-mo Wu-tai cheng-chih she-hui chih yen-chiu,” pp. 350–4.
the five dynasties
115
those earlier cases, it was now the relative not the follower who held the
practical authority, and the relative was not a potentially ambitious natural or
adopted son, but a member of the emperor’s natal family.188 Tighter control
of the central armies was accompanied by continued efforts to weaken the
military strength of the governors by restricting their access to armaments: an
order of 952 commanded that governors were to send to court the best of the
weapons they produced rather than the second-rate, and that artisans were to
be moved to the capital.189
Unlike most of his immediate predecessors, Kuo Wei had served mostly
at court rather than as a governor, and so had not developed an extensive
personal retinue. He did, however, have a group of associates at court. Even
before his accession, Kuo had arranged for Wang Chün, his army-supervising
commissioner and deputy at Wei-chou, to be military affairs commissioner.
On becoming emperor, Kuo also appointed Wang to be chief minister, and
made increasing use of several others from his Wei-chou staff. However, while
previously serving at court Kuo Wei had been impressed by the court literati
Li Ku and Fan Chih, both holders of the chin-shih degree, and while Kuo was
at Wei-chou he had them appointed supervisor of the Finance Commission
(san-ssu shih) and vice-commissioner for military affairs respectively. After Kuo
ascended to the throne they took on the additional appointments of chief ministers.190 Kuo Wei also reemployed long-standing figures like Feng Tao, but
administrative continuity was no longer as critical since almost everyone that
Kuo appointed was drawn from the same pool of career bureaucrats. Accordingly, the careers of many of the Later Chou senior ministers show a return to
what had once been the normal pattern of regular transfers between both court
and provincial positions. Among other things, this meant that bureaucrats
were more frequently appointed to be generals or provincial governors.
In addition to his efforts to concentrate military and administrative control
into his own hands, Kuo Wei made a dramatic change in his approach to
governance, bringing a distinctive austerity and vigor to court. Within the
first eight months of his reign Kuo abolished provincial tribute payments,
capped his own income, signaled that he would listen to advice from any
188
189
190
Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” p. 144. For Li Ch’ung-chin’s biography, see T’o-t’o et al., eds.,
Sung shih [hereafter SS] (1345; Peking, 1977) 484, pp. 13975–9. On the advantages of emperors allying
with their sisters, see Jennifer Holmgren, “Imperial marriage in the native Chinese and non-Han state,
Han to Ming,” in Marriage and inequality in Chinese society, ed. Rubie S. Watson and Patricia B. Ebrey
(Berkeley, Calif., 1991) pp. 58–70.
Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” pp. 145–6; CWTS 112, p. 1485 (weapons); 113, p. 1503; see
also SS 484, p. 13975.
For biographies, see Wang Chün, CWTS 130, pp. 1711–16; Li Ku and Fan Chih, SS 262, pp. 9051–6,
and 249, pp. 8793–6, respectively.
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bureaucrat, smashed precious objects from the treasuries in court to symbolize
his attention to matters of state, and publicly consulted with his ministers. He
rewarded households containing multiple generations, buried Liu Ch’eng-yu
as an emperor, and sent home some Northern Han prisoners, perhaps trying
to win over Liu Ch’ung. Although he was restricting his governors’ activities,
he also showed some respect for them by reversing the hated Later Han and
Northern Han policy of directly appointing civil and military officials to
provincial administrations.191
Kuo Wei highlighted the contrast between himself and the wartime Later
Chin and the courts of Later and Northern Han by extending his accession
amnesty back to 936, implying the illegitimacy of those regimes. Proportionate to the length of his reign, Kuo Wei seems to have made far more use
than his Five Dynasties predecessors of symbolic acts of legitimation. In 952
he made obeisance at the Confucian temple, rejecting advice that an emperor
should not prostrate himself before a mere official. Li Ssu-yüan had at least
shown an interest in Confucian learning by ordering new editions of the Nine
Classics, but it was Kuo Wei who benefited from their completion in 953,
sponsoring their printing, sale, and wide dissemination. Kuo also attempted
to ease the pressure at the top of the legal system by refusing to hear matters
at court until local procedures had been exhausted. Kuo’s measure doubtless
reduced the caseload at court, but without reforms to increase accountability
and enforce correct procedure at the lower levels, local events were often still
governed by individual corruption. One example is the case of the Ch’ingchou2 prefect in the northwest whose illegal seizure of livestock provoked
an uprising in 952 that took two prefects and a governor two months to suppress.192 Despite attempts to clamp down on such abuses of authority, imperial
orders still had only limited impact outside the capital.
A more effective local measure was Kuo’s abolition of the ying-t’ien system
of military-agricultural outposts in southeastern Honan, a region that had
suffered the worst of the fighting at the end of the T’ang dynasty. These
outposts were government lands the taxes on which were payable in cattle.
Herds had become depleted, yet the quotas had not changed, driving many to
banditry. However, because these communities were administered directly by
the Ministry of Revenue, the local authorities were not empowered to control
the disorder. Resisting calls for the fertile ying-t’ien fields to be sold off for
191
192
TCTC 290, pp. 9450–62; CWTS 110, p. 1460. See also Han Kuo-p’an, Ch’ai Jung (Shanghai, 1956),
p. 18.
TCTC 290, pp. 9478–9 (temple); 291, pp. 9485–90 (courts and Ch’ing-chou2 rising), 9495 (Classics).
On symbolic legitimation in China, see Chan Hok-lam, Legitimation in imperial China: Discussions under
the Jürchen-Chin dynasty (1115–1234) (Seattle, 1984).
the five dynasties
117
profit, in 953 Kuo Wei ended the cattle levy; bestowed ownership of fields,
homes, and implements on the ying-t’ien households themselves; and placed the
ying-t’ien families under their local administrations, bringing thirty thousand
households onto the registers and increasing agricultural productivity and
thus state revenues. A similar concern for livelihoods had already been seen
in a 952 edict reducing the number of cowhides owed to the court each year,
permitting private possession of hides, and allowing trade in hides provided
they were not sold to enemy states. Leather was a major constituent of armor,
and possessing even a single hide had been made punishable by death under
Later Han law, leaving the people without everyday items that they needed.
Even as Kuo Wei was trying to control weapons production by governors, he
was willing to give the general population a freer hand. These direct appeals
to the people increased Kuo Wei’s stature and further undercut the authority
of local leaders. Thus when, in 953, Kuo restricted governors from sending
their own appointees to collect taxes at county level, he was both limiting
the governors’ authority and displaying his concern over the burdens of his
people.193 Combined with Kuo’s other economic measures, these policies seem
to have contributed to a general economic recovery.
The effects of sound governance extended beyond Kuo Wei’s borders. A
Southern T’ang minister returning from travels on the Huai River reported
that Kuo was perceived to be governing with increasing virtue, and accordingly
might soon present a threat to the T’ang. Moreover, disenchanted examination
candidates from Southern T’ang soon began heading north to seek work from
the Later Chou state. Kuo Wei’s prestige was high enough in the north that
in 952 a Later Chin scholar who had gone north with the Liao ruler Te-kuang
in 947 persuaded the governor of the Liao Southern Capital at Yu-chou, a
member of the Liao consort clan, to offer his allegiance to the Later Chou.194
Kuo Wei also tried to display himself as a sage-ruler to win over the population of his northern borders, where the Northern Han and their Liao sponsors were Kuo’s chief concerns. Confucius had claimed that sage-rulers would
attract followers by their sheer virtue, and Kuo Wei recognized the utility
behind the tradition: meeting current concerns enhanced a ruler’s prestige.
Many in the Liao frontier districts had formerly been ruled by the Later T’ang
and before them by the T’ang dynasty; they clearly had much in common with
their southern neighbors. In 952, Kuo Wei banned those on the Later Chou
193
194
TCTC 291, pp. 9488–9 (ying-t’ien, the edict is in CWTS 112, p. 1488), 9486 (hides); CWTS 113,
p. 1498 (tax collectors). On Kuo Wei’s economic measures, see Han, Ch’ai Jung, pp. 16–17, and on
landholding in particular, see Eberhard, “Remarks on the bureaucracy,” p. 292.
TCTC 291, p. 9490. For the story of this sympathizer, see TCTC 290, pp. 9479–80; T’o-t’o et al., Liao
shih 6, p. 70; and see chapter 6 of Standen, Unbounded loyalty.
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side of the border from raiding the Liao marches for captives and plunder, partly
showing a desire to relieve a burden on the northerners but also demonstrating
his confidence that his will would be obeyed.195 Since the order was apparently not repeated, it may have been successful, enhancing Kuo’s reputation as
a virtuous ruler. When three Liao border prefectures suffered severe flooding,
Kuo Wei provided relief for the refugees entering the Later Chou–held region
of Ho-pei, and thus peacefully increased his own population. When Khitan
raids – probably resulting from the same natural disaster – were not prevented
by the Liao emperor, Kuo Wei’s reputation was only enhanced by the contrast. In the south, too, in the following year, Southern T’ang refugees from
a drought in Huai-nan were allowed to buy grain from the Later Chou, again
showing Kuo Wei’s humane qualities, although his image as a sage-ruler may
have been undermined by subsequent reports of flooding across the eastern
two-thirds of Chou.196
This virtuous behavior accompanied the development of what turned out to
be Kuo Wei’s terminal illness. Advised to exorcise his arthritis by disbursing
charity, Kuo’s immediate concern was to hold sacrifices in the southern suburbs
and bring the state altars and imperial ancestral shrine from Lo-yang to K’aifeng. On the evening after the sacrifices he became seriously ill. He spent
two weeks giving instructions for a simple funeral and tomb arrangements,
working to ensure an orderly succession, and arranging for flood defenses to be
built.197 Before Kuo Wei, only Li Ssu-yüan and Shih Ching-t’ang had attained
sufficient stature and their regimes achieved enough stability for them to die
natural deaths and procure a regular succession. Kuo Wei now successfully
designated his adopted son Kuo Jung (formerly Ch’ai Jung) as his heir, and
in the first month of 954 he tried to secure Jung’s position by conducting the
kind of reshuffle that was normally performed after an accession rather than
before. Kuo Wei transferred several of his governors and gave many of them
princely titles, and also replaced both the infantry and the cavalry commanders
of the Imperial Guard. He left in place the senior commander of the Imperial
Guard, his nephew Li Ch’ung-chin, but Kuo Jung – who already commanded
Kuo Wei’s palace army – received overall control of all military affairs, and
Li Ch’ung-chin was made to bow to Kuo Jung as minister to emperor. On
that same day, Kuo Wei died, and Kuo Jung acceded without incident (Chou
Shih-tsung, 954–9).198
195
196
197
198
CWTS 112, p. 1484. This order also makes it clear that frontier raiding for profit was not a nomadic
prerogative. See Standen, “Raiding and frontier society.”
TCTC 291, pp. 9484, 9489, 9496.
TCTC 291, pp. 9496–9500; see also CWTS 113, pp. 1498–1503.
TCTC 291, pp. 9500–1; CWTS 113, pp. 1501–3; Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” pp. 148–9.
Worthy notes that Li Ch’ung-chin was not given the commander in chief post, which had been vacant
since Wang Yin’s removal in 953.
the five dynasties
119
L I A O
Yu
Sixteen Prefectures
Mo
Fu
Ting-nan
(Hsia)
N.HAN
T’ai-yüan
T’u-fan
Ying
Lu
Kao-p’ing
Tribes
Ch’in
Ch’eng
Chieh
Feng
K’AI-FENG
Lo-yang
Ch’u
L AT E R C H O U
Shou
Kuang
Ch’eng-tu
L AT E R S H U
CHING-NAN
Hao
Ssu
Chin-ling
Annexed from
S. T’ang 959
Yang
Chiang-ling
Hang
Nan-ch’ang
T’an
CH’U
WU-YÜEH
SOUTHERN
T’ANG
Fu
TA - L I
SOUTHERN HAN
CHANGCH’ÜAN
Kuang
ANNAM
Direction of Later Chou campaigns
of expansion
Capitals and key prefectures
0
0
600 km
400 miles
Map 9. Territorial expansion under the Later Chou, c. 959.
We must, of course, be skeptical about the saintly picture of Kuo Wei in
the sources. The historians clearly approved of him, and the sense of a new
order beginning is visible in the earliest sources. At the very least, Kuo Wei
does seem to have avoided the personal failings, such as cruelty and corruption,
that provoked contemporary unpopularity.
The revival of expansionism, 954–958
Kuo Wei had been able to focus on projecting a virtuous image because he
enjoyed overwhelming military superiority within Later Chou territory. His
heir, Kuo Jung, also had military experience, which was just as well, because
120
naomi standen
when the Northern Han ruler Liu Ch’ung heard of Kuo Wei’s death he joined
with his Liao allies to march on Lu-chou with a large army. Inheriting personal
control of the Imperial Guard from his father, Kuo Jung led the Later Chou
armies to a dramatic and closely fought victory at Kao-p’ing, near Lu-chou, in
the third month of 954. This victory was crucial in limiting the Northern Han
forces to sporadic raids after it and in giving Kuo Jung claim to the Mandate of
Heaven not merely by inheritance but by the most powerful of means, his own
military merit. Throughout his reign he reinforced this merit by leading his
armies in person. The elderly Northern Han ruler, Liu Ch’ung, pursued after
the battle by Kuo Jung, nearly died from the exertions of the retreat home, and
was just able to prepare T’ai-yüan’s defenses. The siege prompted numerous
Northern Han districts and one senior commander to submit to Kuo Jung,
but the Later Chou forces swiftly became overextended and halted their siege
after less than two months.199
In this uncertain military environment, the prefect of the northwestern
outpost of Fu-chou2 (at the northern tip of Shensi) – strategically positioned
as a Later Chou enclave outflanking the Northern Han and recently demoted
from provincial status – was able to achieve the reestablishment of the province
with himself as governor. In the captured Northern Han districts, rather than
following the previous practice of retaining the submitted prefects and county
magistrates, Kuo Jung installed his own people, seeking immediate integration of this territory. When he withdrew, he took his appointees with him.200
Mere allegiance was no longer an adequate basis for Kuo Jung’s authority; it
was now all or nothing. If he could not exert complete control in captured
districts, he would abandon them rather than compromise his supremacy.
Kuo Jung had led the Kao-p’ing campaign against ministerial advice. His
success proved him right and revealed the ineffectiveness of the Imperial Guard,
now full of ill and elderly place keepers. Several units of the Imperial Guard
had fled during the battle, and dozens of officers of all ranks were subsequently
executed (including the recently appointed infantry and cavalry commanders),
allowing Kuo Jung to replace them with officers from the palace army, which
Kuo had been leading personally for over twelve months and which had fought
well at Kao-p’ing. With his own people in charge, later in 954 Kuo conducted
a long-needed fitness review that significantly reduced the size of the Imperial
Guard and increased its effectiveness. As a counterweight to the Imperial
199
200
TCTC 291, pp. 9501–10, 9513; 292, pp. 9514–16; CWTS 114, pp. 1511–17; see also T’o-t’o et al.,
Liao shih 6, p. 72. Discussion of the battle of Kao-p’ing and references to the literature can be found in
Peter Lorge, “The entrance and exit of the Song founders,” Journal of Sung-Yuan Studies 29 (1999), pp.
43–62; and Lorge’s “War and the creation of the Northern Song.”
TCTC 292, pp. 9515–16.
the five dynasties
121
Guard, Kuo enlarged the palace army – which until now had functioned chiefly
as the Later Chou emperor’s personal bodyguard – by actively recruiting to
it the finest fighters from all over the region, creating an elite fighting force.
Many of these soldiers were poached from the armies of the governors, thus
weakening them while enhancing Kuo’s own forces. Kuo now monopolized
control over the entire battlefield might of the empire – a dramatic contrast
to the situation fewer than fifty years before. This control meant that Kuo
no longer needed the allegiance of the governors to maintain his position as
emperor. Combined with the Liao defeat at Kao-p’ing, it was now clearly
impossible for any governor, or even an alliance of governors, to stand against
Kuo, and it is striking that throughout his entire reign no Later Chou province
rebelled against his authority. But the concentration of armed strength in the
palace armies also meant that Kuo had altered a useful balance of power in
which governors and palace armies offset each other. This new situation left
Kuo precariously reliant on the loyalty of his commanders.201
Although the military was understandably Kuo Jung’s first concern, he also
followed Kuo Wei’s lead in addressing issues of good governance. He punished
prominent corrupt officials; ruled that degrees should be given only to those
who had actually passed the examinations (and not on the basis of family connections); restored responsibility for local defense and policing to governors,
prefects, and county magistrates (instead of sending central appointees); and
built massive defenses along the Yellow River (deploying sixty thousand corvée
laborers). In 955 he tried to encourage vagrants back onto the manorial estates
(chuang-t’ien) they had fled, allowing the returning refugees to recover a portion
of the land and wealth appropriated by others in their absence. He also ordered
a carefully phased expansion of K’ai-feng’s city walls, followed by the widening
and straightening of the city’s streets.202 Kuo Jung also attempted to regulate the religious orders, whose membership in 954 was recorded as 61,200.
In the fifth month of 955, he restricted entry to the monastic life to those
whose grandparents, parents, and uncles had all died; banned ascetic mutilation; demanded more accurate counts of clergy; and abolished over thirty
thousand temples. Such prohibitions were not intentionally anti-Buddhist:
the main concern was financial. The practices of Buddhism had contributed
201
202
TCTC 292, pp. 9518–19. Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” pp. 148–64, gives a detailed
description of the new structure of the palace army and the Imperial Guard. On the relationship
between the battle of Kao-p’ing and this reorganization, see Lorge, “The entrance and exit of the Song
founders.”
See (provincial defenses) TCTC 292, p. 9519; (examinations) CWTS 115, pp. 1527–8, and Eberhard,
“Remarks on the bureaucracy,” p. 293; (vagrants) CWTS 115, p. 1525; Wang P’u, Wu-tai hui-yao (961;
Shanghai, 1978) 25, pp. 406–7; and Kurihara Masuo, Ransei no kōtei – “Kō-Shū” no Seisō to sono jidai
(Tokyo, 1968), pp. 203–11; (K’ai-feng) TCTC (1956) 292, pp. 9525, 9532.
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significantly to a shortage of cash, as coins were melted down to make religious images. Later in the year, in order to free up the copper supply, Kuo Jung
ordered that apart from statues in the remaining temples, military equipment,
and official insignia, all copper implements and statues “among the people”
must be surrendered, and compensation paid, with the death penalty for concealing more than five chin (6.5 pounds).203 Unlike Shih Ching-t’ang’s efforts
in the same vein, Kuo Jung’s appear to have been effective. Like Kuo Wei,
Kuo Jung was successfully reasserting central authority.
All this organizational and administrative activity was conducted with the
full cooperation of leading ministers who – in contrast even to the preceding reign – showed no sign of seeking overweening authority for themselves.
Like his father, Kuo Jung drew his ministers from the ranks of the regular bureaucracy, yet personal relationships still remained important in guiding the emperor’s choices; hence Kuo Jung’s military affairs commissioners
were already valued advisors before appointment. Cheng Jen-hui, a Wei-chou
administrator favored by Kuo Wei, was made military affairs commissioner
and chief minister immediately after the accession in 954. Cheng was soon
joined at the commission by Wei Jen-p’u, who had helped Kuo Wei to secure
the throne. Cheng Jen-hui died in 955; the following year Wang P’u was
appointed vice-commissioner, and a year after that promoted to commissioner.
He had served under Kuo Jung since 951 and was the architect of Later Chou
territorial expansion. Shortly before Kuo Jung died in 959, he insisted that
Wei also accept the appointment of chief minister, even though Wei lacked
the necessary chin-shih degree. Unlike Kuo Ch’ung-t’ao or Yang Pin before
him, but similar to his former colleague Cheng Jen-hui, Wei Jen-p’u did not
exploit his powerful situation, even when Kuo Jung’s young son came to the
throne soon afterward.204
From 955 onward, Kuo Jung paid increasing attention to his northern borders. He refused to abandon strategic Fu-chou2 when the Ting-nan governor
denied access to Later Chou envoys, instead forcing Ting-nan back into line
by reminding its governor of his economic reliance on Later Chou. He also
dredged the river on a north-south line between Shen-chou and Chi-chou2 in
Ho-pei, improving navigability and making it harder for cavalry to cross; he
established a new walled town and province at Chi-chou2; and further south
203
204
TCTC 292, pp. 9527, 9530. The edicts are in CWTS 115, pp. 1529–31; Wang, Wu-tai hui-yao 12,
pp. 196, 200–2; 27, p. 437. For discussion see Han, Ch’ai Jung, pp. 37–41; Kurihara, Ransei no kōtei,
pp. 214–30. On the general fiscal impact of Buddhism, see Jacques Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese society:
An economic history from the fifth to the tenth centuries, trans. Franciscus Verellen (New York, 1995).
TCTC 291, p. 9499; 292, p. 9517; 293, pp. 9559, 9571; 294, p. 9601; Worthy, “The founding of
Sung China,” pp. 235–6. For biographies of Cheng Jen-hui, see CWTS 123, pp. 1620–1; Wei Jen-p’u,
SS 249, pp. 8802–5; Wang P’u, CWTS 128, pp. 1679–82.
the five dynasties
123
he allowed the energetic prefect of Te-chou a free rein to handle raids. While
strengthening his defenses, Kuo Jung also began to look beyond them. Supposedly prompted by a request from “some people in Ch’in-chou [in Kansu]”
to “restore the old borders,” he ordered senior ministers to propose plans for
territorial expansion.205
Whereas the expansions of Chu Wen and Li Ts’un-hsü had been based
almost entirely on winning allegiance through military prowess, Kuo Jung’s
attractiveness as a ruler rested on military and moral bases. Wang P’u’s famous
memorial to Kuo Jung on how to expand Later Chou control exemplifies this
emphasis on moral and military strategies by declaring that the first task was
to recover the Tao (the Way) by appointing worthy officials and applying law
and taxation fairly. Wang further suggested that military resources should be
concentrated on one front at a time, listing the targets in order of difficulty:
Chiang-pei in Southern T’ang, the far south, the west, and finally the Northern
Han.206 Wang’s proposals to reform the internal before conquering the external
were entirely conventional and practical – an internally strong state is more
likely to expand successfully. But Kuo Jung, unlike his predecessors, was in a
position to act on these expansion plans. He now had close control over large
and powerful military forces, and no longer had to be concerned chiefly with
the survival of his regime. Kuo Jung had built upon Kuo Wei’s consolidation
efforts, and on the progressive centralization of control over provincial resources
begun by Chu Wen fifty years earlier and continued by each successive dynasty.
Kuo’s ambitions were further helped by the incompetence of the current Liao
emperor, Mu-tsung, which greatly reduced the threat posed by the alliance
between the Liao and the Northern Han. Wang P’u’s listing of all the states
surrounding Later Chou territory as targets for conquest indicates how much
the balance of power had changed in only a few years, for the expansionary vision
Wang presented to Kuo Jung denied the legitimacy of Kuo’s fellow emperors
and thus transformed them from tolerated neighbors into mortal enemies. It
was now no longer acceptable for Later Chou subjects to place their allegiance
elsewhere, which left governors and prefects with no recognized method of
seeking outside help.
In what was to prove a warm-up for the later campaign of expansion, at
the same time that Wang P’u was presenting his memorial in the summer of
955, Kuo Jung sent a surprise expedition to seize four prefectures (including
Ch’in-chou) recently taken over by the Later Shu, even though Shu was not the
205
206
TCTC 292, pp. 9520–5; CWTS 115, pp. 1528–9 (Ch’in-chou request).
TCTC 292, pp. 9525–7; CWTS 115, pp. 1529–31; and see translation in Worthy, “The founding of
Sung China,” pp. 15–17. This sequence was not adhered to in practice, for success required a flexible
approach. See Lorge, “The entrance and exit of the Song founders.”
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weakest adversary on Wang P’u’s list. The Later Shu lost eight fortresses before
expeditionary commanders could be appointed, and although they quickly
formed an alliance with the Northern Han and Southern T’ang, no material
help from them arrived, and Ch’in-chou fell in the autumn. Suing for peace,
the Later Shu ruler clung to his prerogative, calling himself “emperor,” but
his letter went unanswered. Feng-chou fell before the end of the year, and
Kuo Jung paid salaries to the surrendered troops and relieved burdens on the
people to win them over. These Later Shu troops marched with Kuo to conquer
Huai-nan.207
Preparing to conquer the wealthy region of Southern T’ang between the
Huai and the Yangtze, Kuo Jung drained the marshland along the Pien River
as far as the Huai and the Southern T’ang border. The Southern T’ang, however,
proved to be no pushover. Late in 955 the Later Chou army under the chief
minister and general Li Ku crossed the Huai River and laid siege to Shouchou just to the south. Kuo Jung sought an alliance with the kingdom of
Wu-Yüeh before setting off to take personal command of the siege early in
956. When the city did not fall quickly, Li Ku, concerned that Southern T’ang
reinforcements would cut off his route of retreat, lifted his siege before Kuo
Jung’s countermand arrived. The Later Chou emperor sent his palace army
commander, Li Ch’ung-chin, to reimpose the siege and to replace Li Ku as
campaign commander. Kuo tried to turn the situation to some advantage by
“comforting” the farmers who had returned briefly to their fields, encouraging
them to resume their livelihoods and hoping to win them over. As the renewed
siege of Shou-chou continued, military successes against the Southern T’ang
navy and towns along the Yangtze and Huai rivers produced two peace offers
from the Southern T’ang ruler, Li Ching. He first offered to make annual
payments to Kuo, yet treat Kuo Jung as an older brother (and thus a near
equal), but subsequently Li surrendered his claims to his imperial title and
submitted as a “subject.”208
Like the Liao emperor Te-kuang, Kuo Jung held out for complete conquest,
and by the third month of 956 Later Chou troops had fought their way to
control of most of the prefectures between the Huai and the Yangtze rivers,
but not of the fortified border towns along the Huai River itself. Helped by
Wu-Yüeh forces, Kuo Jung cut off the Southern T’ang capital of Chin-ling
in a pincer movement; at the same time, Later Chou forces launched a major
attack against Kuang-chou2, near the Huai River west of Shou-chou. Li Ching
207
208
TCTC 292, pp. 9527–33; 293, p. 9569; CWTS 115, pp. 1528–33. For detailed discussion, see Lorge,
“The entrance and exit of the Song founders.”
TCTC 292, pp. 9532–40; CWTS 115–16, pp. 1534–42. On the significance and difficulties of the
Shou-chou campaign, see Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” pp. 34–7.
the five dynasties
125
sent a mission to Kuo apologizing for his tardy acceptance of the Later Chou
mandate, and he offered Kuo six prefectures and annual payments in return for
an imperial title and an end to Chou aggression. But Kuo Jung wanted nothing
less than the entire region north of the Yangtze River. An attempt to persuade
the Southern T’ang ruler to accept these terms was foiled by Southern T’ang
court rivalries, and a courageous Southern T’ang prince led a counterattack that
made Kuo Jung and his generals briefly consider abandoning the campaign;
but a new assault by Later Chou troops in the fourth month destroyed the
Southern T’ang elite forces in battle at Liu-ho, just north of the Yangtze River
near the Southern T’ang capital. The people in these captured territories at
first welcomed Later Chou rule, resenting Li Ching’s levies and especially the
ying-t’ien system in Huai-nan, probably aware that Kuo Wei had abolished
the ying-t’ien system in his own lands. Li Ching wisely followed suit during
956. Accordingly, when pillaging by Later Chou troops disillusioned many of
the conquered, there was nothing to prevent a backlash. During the summer
a spontaneously organized “White Armored Army” (pai-chia chün) brought
many of the Later Chou gains back into Southern T’ang hands.209
For 957 the Southern T’ang threw everything into relieving the siege at
Shou-chou on the Huai River. While Shou-chou remained uncaptured, Kuo
Jung was unable to secure his conquests farther to the south. Consequently,
some hope remained that the Southern T’ang might be able to recover control of the Huai-nan region. Early in the year, Southern T’ang troops linked
a dozen fortresses to create a walled supply route intended to maintain communications between the defenders of Shou-chou and the rest of the Southern
T’ang forces. Kuo Jung, however, had begun to create a navy, building several hundred warships near K’ai-feng and using surrendered Southern T’ang
sailors to train units of the Later Chou. Kuo now sent these forces down a
tributary of the Huai River that ran directly from K’ai-feng to Shou-chou. In
the third month of 957 they cut the Southern T’ang supply link and forced
the surrender of its commanding general and his ten thousand troops. Shouchou continued to hold out, but Kuo Jung swept downstream along the Huai
River basin by land and water, destroying the Southern T’ang relief army,
and allowing the Later Chou forces to build their own walled supply and
reinforcement route. Even with all hope of assistance gone, the commander
at Shou-chou had to be incapacitated by illness before his subordinates could
surrender, and Kuo Jung recognized his steadfastness with rewards and kind
treatment.210
209
210
TCTC 292–3, pp. 9540–58; CWTS 116, pp. 1542–9 (which quotes Li Ching’s letters to Kuo Jung,
pp. 1543–6).
TCTC 293, pp. 9562–7; CWTS 116–17, pp. 1549–57.
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Between campaigns Kuo Jung carefully consolidated his position. In 956 he
had appointed officials to govern his territorial gains, and that year and the next
he attended to affairs of state such as adopting a new calendar, commissioning
new sacrificial vessels, displaying great respect to a senior minister, and refusing
to choose an heir from among his own young children while there were adults
better suited, thereby trying to avoid a destabilizing regency. Other measures
included a decree that taxes would be collected only in the sixth and tenth
months, and not earlier, allowing taxpayers time to gather the harvest and
spin silk. After Shou-chou fell, Kuo issued an amnesty to its inhabitants
and opened the prefectural granaries to feed the starving. He reorganized
the surrendered Southern T’ang forces as the Huai-te army and rewarded the
brilliant commander of the Huai-nan campaigns, Chao K’uang-yin, with a
governorship. Kuo undertook more work on the waterways around his own
capital, and ordered the compilation of the Ta Chou hsing-t’ung (Law codes of the
Great Chou), containing explanations of the law. Crafting his image as a virtuous
ruler, he received a series of memorials on topics ranging from rites and music
to expeditionary logistics. He commissioned scholars from all over Later Chou
territory to examine memorials and the Classics for ideas on military methods
and on the improvement of officialdom.211
Displays of virtue were always reinforced by military success. Late in 957,
Kuo Jung led a major land and water assault on Hao-chou, on the Huai River
east of Shou-chou. The Hao-chou commander, valuing the perception of his
loyalty, would not surrender formally to Kuo until he had consulted with
the Southern T’ang court. Whereas the Shou-chou commander had refused to
accept any commission from the Later Chou, his Hao-chou counterpart was
not reluctant to join the Later Chou ranks.212 Remembering the consequences
of the pillaging of Huai-nan by Later Chou troops, Kuo Jung enforced strict
discipline when Ssu-chou (east of Hao-chou) was captured. However, his most
dramatic successes were on the waterways. At Ch’u-chou, the last city before
the coast, a major advance by Kuo down the Huai River and along both its
banks to Ch’u-chou destroyed or captured the entire Southern T’ang navy.
Further south, Yang-chou on the Yangtze River was simply abandoned by the
Southern T’ang. Kuo Jung wanted to move his navy from the Huai River onto
the Yangtze, but the Southern T’ang still controlled access to the canal that
connected the two waterways near Ch’u-chou. Kuo’s response was to build
a new channel and bypass the blockade. This feat astonished the Southern
211
212
TCTC 293, pp. 9555, 9559, 9562–4, 9567–9, 9571–3.
TCTC 293, pp. 9573, 9575. The province of which Shou-chou was the seat had been renamed Chungcheng, “loyal and upright,” further reflecting the important political use of the virtue of loyalty (TCTC
293, p. 9568).
the five dynasties
127
T’ang forces on the Yangtze, and Kuo won several victories on and along the
river. At Ch’u-chou, the Southern T’ang garrison fought in vain to the last
breath. With both rivers effectively controlled by the ships of the Later Chou,
the Southern T’ang imperial house descended into accusations and scheming
among the princes, and in a final effort to stem the Later Chou advance Li
Ching offered Kuo Jung the last four of the fourteen Huai-nan prefectures if
Kuo would accept the Yangtze River as the border and cease hostilities. Li also
offered to abdicate in favor of his heir apparent. This time Kuo Jung accepted.
In the final agreement Li Ching did not abdicate, but accepted the subordinate
title of kuo-wang (prince of the state), adopting the Later Chou calendar and
surrendering the trappings of imperial status.213
Responding to the imminent Southern T’ang defeat, the ruler of the Southern Han regime had already offered tribute to Kuo Jung (never having accepted
the legitimacy of the Central Plains regimes before), while mournfully preparing against an attack. Wu-Yüeh, employing a strategy of careful diplomacy,
was rewarded for assisting the Later Chou, as was the independent governor of
Ching-nan.214 Southern T’ang itself, though firmly subordinated, was treated
with considerable respect, and a special bureau established in K’ai-feng to
provide diplomatic representation for the Southern T’ang. This institution
resembles later handling of relations with particularly important foreign powers. It also may suggest the nature and significance of the relationship with
Southern T’ang. A flurry of envoys discussing which Southern T’ang ministers
should take the blame for their defeat seems to have established some parameters for relations between the Later Chou and Southern T’ang. Subsequently,
Kuo Jung refused further subordination from Li Ching and permitted him to
repair his defenses.215
The Huai-nan campaign proved to be the longest and most important
campaign of the unification, making Kuo Jung fight at least as hard for his
expansion as Chu Wen and Li Ts’un-hsü had fought for theirs.216 The biggest
gain for the Later Chou was economic, starting with the huge amounts of goods
captured during the campaign and continuing with the large annual tribute
from the remainder of the Southern T’ang regime, amounting to some million
measures a year of silver, silk, coin, tea, and grain. The salt pans of Huai-nan
213
214
215
216
TCTC 293, pp. 9574–81; see also CWTS 117, pp. 1562–70.
TCTC 293, pp. 9576, 9581. On Wu-Yüeh’s strategy, see Edmund H. Worthy, Jr., “Diplomacy for
survival: Domestic and foreign relations of Wu Yüeh, 907–978,” in China among equals: The Middle
Kingdom and its neighbors, 10th–14th centuries, ed. Morris Rossabi (Berkeley, Calif., 1983), pp. 17–44;
and the next chapter of this volume.
TCTC 294, pp. 9584–90, 9599.
See Lü, Sui T’ang Wu-tai shih, p. 694, who attributes Kuo Jung’s victory to T’ang weakness rather than
Chou strength.
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naomi standen
had contributed significantly to making the regional regimes the wealthiest
in the south, and they now greatly strengthened the economic basis for further
Later Chou conquests. More important still, the productive land and dense
population – 226,574 registered households in fourteen prefectures – provided
a rice basket together with an infrastructure of waterways. The population
increase for the Later Chou may have been as much as thirty percent. Kuo
Jung extended dredging and repairs to reopen the major canal system to K’aifeng and allow grain to be shipped from the south. Meanwhile, Later Chou
naval patrols on the Yangtze River, and a reliance on the Later Chou for salt
produced by the pans in Huai-nan, were a constant reminder of Southern T’ang
inferiority and vulnerability.217
Returning to K’ai-feng in triumph, Kuo Jung continued his program of
symbolic legitimation by promulgating his completed law code and promoting the study of rites and music.218 In practical matters, Kuo was particularly concerned about agriculture, and he was at pains to display himself
as its sponsor. His most important agrarian policy was an attempt to equalize the land tax. He sent a treatise to all circuits together with thirty-four
commissioners to enforce the proposals. The intention was to distribute land
equally to landless refugees, thereby settling the population, fostering prosperity, and increasing tax revenue. This measure necessitated a land survey,
completed in a few months, and brought a huge area of land onto the registers.
Some of this land was exempted to reduce resistance from those whose tax
assessments were suddenly raised, but the increase in state revenues must still
have been enormous. We have figures only for K’ai-feng prefecture, but there
the registered land increased from 12,000 to 42,000 ch’ing (approximately
168,000 to 588,000 acres), of which 4,000 ch’ing were exempted.219 Other
economic measures included regularizing salary payments and further improving waterways around the capital. The latter facilitated grain transportation,
producing a threefold increase in land-tax receipts from the capital district
and making it easier to send relief when famine hit Huai-nan. Providing relief
also gave Kuo Jung another opportunity to demonstrate his awareness of his
responsibilities toward the common people, whom he now declared to be his
children.220
217
218
219
220
TCTC 294, pp. 9582–3, 9595; CWTS 118, p. 1570; Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” pp. 38–9.
TCTC 294, pp. 9585, 9591–4. This code provided the basis for the Sung law code of 962. See Brian
E. McKnight, Law and order in Sung China (Cambridge, 1992), p. 334.
TCTC 294, pp. 9587–8, 9595; CWTS 118, p. 1574; Wang, Wu-tai hui-yao 25, p. 402. See also Worthy,
“The founding of Sung China,” pp. 39–40; Han, Ch’ai Jung, pp. 55–7.
TCTC 294, pp. 9589, 9594–5.
the five dynasties
129
The Later Chou assault on the north, 958–959
Kuo Jung now considered his next target for expansion. He sent an expeditionary force to the southwest, but the armies of the Later Shu, having geography and logistics on their side, annihilated them. Kuo then looked north to the
Sixteen Prefectures,221 a region desirable in itself and a means of distracting
the Liao from supporting Northern Han. Liu Ch’ung of Northern Han had
died in 955, and the forces of his successor, Liu Ch’eng-chün (Han Hsiao-ho-ti,
955–68), had reached Lu-chou’s city walls while Kuo Jung was finishing off
Huai-nan. Later Chou retaliation began with the capture of Shu-ch’eng by a
local governor in the summer of 958, and was swiftly followed by the capture of
six fortresses and a city in Northern Han. The Ts’ang-chou governor in southern Ho-pei had improved the waterways heading north toward Ying-chou and
Mo-chou, well inside Liao territory. Using these newly connected watercourses,
Kuo Jung led a land and water force straight to the border without disturbing
the Ho-pei population. The Liao pass of I-chin-kuan surrendered, and Kuo
Jung, abandoning his boats as the river narrowed, captured Wa-ch’iao Pass
and then Yü-k’ou Pass, as well as the Liao prefectures of Ying-chou, Mo-chou,
and I-chou. The southern part of the administrative territory controlled from
the Liao Southern Capital (formerly Yu-chou) had fallen without bloodshed in
less than three weeks, but Kuo Jung withdrew because of illness. As usual, the
gains were incorporated administratively, defenses improved, and garrisons
installed. Later Chou generals continued to nibble at the holdings of Liao’s
ally, the Northern Han, taking cities and fortresses with little resistance, and
that autumn the Southern T’ang governor of Fu-chien at Ch’üan-chou offered
his submission to Kuo.222
Much of Kuo’s appeal derived from the program of expansion itself. Success in war was an important part of this, but the corollaries of the expansion
policy also helped to persuade more people that their interests lay with supporting Kuo and the Later Chou state. War had been an almost constant
feature of the Five Dynasties period, but until now much of the fighting had
occurred within the Central Plains regimes rather than beyond them: Chu
Wen’s conquest of Honan, his wars with Li K’o-yung and Li Ts’un-hsü, the
Liao conquest, and of course, innumerable rebellions, successful or otherwise.
By contrast, although Kuo’s armies brought widespread havoc to neighboring
221
222
TCTC 294, pp. 9587–8.
TCTC 294, pp. 9583–9600; CWTS 118, p. 1572; 119, pp. 1580–2; T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 6, pp. 74–5.
Lü Ssu-mien, in Sui T’ang Wu-tai shih, p. 697, presents a negative view of this campaign in particular
and of Kuo Jung in general.
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regions that had enjoyed significant periods of peace and prosperity, Kuo’s
campaigns did not wreak devastation on his own people, and even brought
benefits to many levels of Later Chou society, in addition to the advantages to
Kuo Jung and his central administration. The absence of war within Later Chou
territory allowed the population to benefit from a sustained economic recovery. This recovery was further stimulated by policies such as the dredging of
waterways, and other infrastructure improvements. Although Kuo’s aim may
have been to improve military communications, commerce benefited as well.
Kuo’s military success depended on the strength of his armies, and continual
victorious campaigning kept those armies and their commanders occupied and
well rewarded. This kept them happy as well and greatly reduced the potential danger they posed to Kuo himself. Kuo’s military might also convinced
the governors and prefects that there was nothing to be gained from resisting
his authority, and the transformation of the Later Chou’s neighboring states
into implacable opponents meant that there was nowhere for the potential
rebels to turn for outside assistance. This development of distinct external foes
positioned Kuo Jung’s subjects – including the governors – on the same side,
and because the imperial armies could now offer a credible defense against
those outside threats, most governors were willing to accept subordination in
return for security. Kuo reinforced the advantages of this trade-off by leaving
most of their privileges intact and consciously placing his trust in these governors.223 He made no attempt to impose his authority on those few governors
who remained effectively autonomous, notably the Ting-nan governors in the
northwest. Kuo’s program of expansion helped significantly in the effort to
win over potential domestic challengers, whose support he then incorporated
into his expansionist efforts, creating a cycle that only increased his appeal as
a virtuous ruler.
Kuo Jung had enlarged the Later Chou empire from 96 to 118 prefectures,
but at the age of thirty-nine he was dying. Despite his earlier rejection of a
child successor, he spent his last few weeks selecting regents for his seven-yearold son, Kuo Tsung-hsün (Chou Kung-ti, 959), who came to the throne in
the sixth month of 959. Although Kuo Jung’s authority had been far stronger
than that of any previous Five Dynasties ruler, its resonance was insufficient to
sustain a child on the throne. That autumn the Southern T’ang began minting
their own coins in response to a shortage of cash and decided to build a new
capital at Hung-chou (modern Nan-ch’ang in Kiangsi province), strategically
stronger than Chin-ling. These moves may have served to test the resolve of
223
TCTC 293, p. 9560.
the five dynasties
131
the Later Chou regency, but more dangerous to Chou was a potential alliance
between the Southern T’ang and Liao. Later Chou subterfuge scuttled this
alliance, however. When a Liao mission arrived in Southern T’ang territory,
a Later Chou prefect in Huai-nan bribed some Southern T’ang officials to
kill the lead envoy, a member of the Liao imperial house, causing the Liao
emperor to sever relations and robbing the Southern T’ang of a much-needed
ally.224
The ultimate test of the regime came six months later, in the new year of
960, with a report from Chen-chou and Ting-chou that the Northern Han and
Liao had launched an attack. It is said that Chao K’uang-yin’s palace army,
which had long served under him, refused to fight against Liao as long as there
was a minor on the throne. The soldiers ostensibly demanded that Chao seize
power and become emperor. As in the case of Kuo Wei and the founding of the
Later Chou, a Liao attack provided the justification for overthrowing the ruling
house, and once again the claimant ignored the danger from the north in order
to march to the capital (twenty miles to the southwest) and declare himself
emperor (Sung T’ai-tsu, 960–76). Only two Later Chou governors resisted:
Li Yün who had helped Kuo Wei take the throne and was now governor at
Lu-chou, and Kuo Wei’s nephew Li Ch’ung-chin, governor at Yang-chou in
Huai-nan. Both were quelled easily, having failed to coordinate their efforts
and rally allies in the face of the loyal and powerful Sung palace army. Li
Ch’ung-chin was denied the Southern T’ang help he sought; Li Yün was slow
to involve the Northern Han, and when he did seek their assistance he specified
that the Liao were not to be involved.225 Li Yün had imperial ambitions of
his own and had no wish to become a second Shih Ching-t’ang, subordinate
to another power. But without the assistance that could only be provided by
another state, a regional rebel stood little chance of success.
Chao K’uang-yin and his brother, Chao K’uang-i (Sung T’ai-tsung, r. 976–
97), continued the expansion begun by the Later Chou and did not cease until
the Northern Han were finally beaten into submission in 979. Both brothers
possessed considerable appeal as rulers, combining political skill with military
leadership, bestowing generosity and trust, requiring propriety of themselves
and their followers, and making direct requests to the common people. The
Sung dynasty founders could rely on their followers to remain loyal partly
because those followers lacked the independent resources to mount a challenge,
and, significantly, because serving the Sung was the best option available for
224
225
TCTC 294, pp. 9601–6; CWTS 119, pp. 1582–4.
For detailed discussion and extensive references, see Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” pp. 42–4,
and chapter 3 of this volume.
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naomi standen
those at court, in the provinces, and at all levels of society. Potential challengers
were now co-opted rather than coerced. This narrowing of alternatives had
taken place in the preceding half century, partly from conscious effort, and
partly from the unforeseen consequences of having to make immediate choices
within highly constrained circumstances. These constrained circumstances
and limited alternatives were themselves the legacy of a much longer period
of uncertainty created by the An Lu-shan rebellion.
CHAPTER 2
THE SOUTHERN KINGDOMS BETWEEN THE
T’ANG AND THE SUNG, 907–979
Hugh R. Clark
introduction
The years between the collapse of T’ang dynastic authority that began in
the mid-ninth century and the establishment of Sung authority in the later
part of the tenth century were a period of great turmoil and change. The
preceding chapter discussed the political history in north China through these
decades. The present chapter focuses on the regions straddling and south of
the Yangtze River. Historians have referred to the states that controlled this
southern territory as the Ten Kingdoms, but this terminology is misleading.
In fact, one of the so-called Ten Kingdoms is the Northern Han, located in
northern Shansi. The Northern Han was a successor state to the Later Han
dynasty of the north and belongs in a discussion of the northern dynasties. Of
the nine kingdoms of the south that are covered in the following discussion,
never more than seven existed at any one time (see figure 4 and table 3).
Four of these southern kingdoms governed their territories for almost the
entire interregnum period: Wu-Yüeh (902–78), located in the Liang-che
region of the Yangtze River delta, was the richest and most stable. Ch’u (907–
64), centered in the region of modern Hunan, controlled the central Yangtze
River valley. Ching-nan (907–63) was a tiny principality at the confluence
of the Han and Yangtze rivers that survived among much larger kingdoms
through diplomatic skill. Southern Han (909–71) occupied territory covered
by the modern provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi. The Min kingdom
(909–45) controlled the Fu-chien region (modern Fukien province) before it
was assimilated by neighboring states after an internal fratricidal orgy of
murder and mayhem. Only an autonomous warlord enclave (Chang-Ch’üan,
945–78) made up from the southern Fu-chien prefectures of Ch’üan-chou and
Chang-chou endured until the close of the era. Chang-Ch’üan is not generally
included among the southern kingdoms because it was nominally subordinate
to the neighboring Southern T’ang. There were also two pairs of successor
states: in the Chiang-Huai region straddling the middle section of the Yangtze
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hugh r. clark
River, the Wu kingdom (902–37) was succeeded immediately by the Southern T’ang (937–75), and in Szechwan, the Former Shu kingdom (907–25) was
succeeded by the Later Shu (934–65).
Much as the Five Dynasties of the north inherited the legacy of the T’ang
dynastic heartland, the southern kingdoms were the product of developments
across the south in the eighth and ninth centuries. As preceding volumes
in this series have explained, these were the centuries when the south was
finally and irrevocably incorporated into the larger Chinese empire. This process began in the latter half of the Warring States period that preceded the
Ch’in dynasty (221–206 b.c.e.) and continued to unfold through the centuries and dynasties that followed. Even as late as the An Lu-shan rebellion
of the mid-eighth century, the long-time dynastic capital, Ch’ang-an, and
the North China Plain and its western extension along the Wei River valley
remained the political and cultural center for the Chinese-speaking world. If
population was gradually expanding in the south, especially in the fertile and
easily tilled river valleys, the vast reaches south of the Yangtze River remained
peripheral and exotic, lands to which losers in political struggles could be
banished in full expectation that they would succumb to the mysterious and
deadly miasmas that northerners so feared. These northern elites continued to
disparage the south as rustic and uncivilized well into the succeeding Sung
dynasty.
However, freed by the destruction of the An Lu-shan rebellion from the
limitations upon movement and relocation imposed by the tsu-yung-tiao (or
grain-labor-materials) tax system of the early T’ang dynasty, large numbers of
dislocated people had moved to the comparatively unaffected south. Through
the later eighth and ninth centuries new networks of settlement and trade
transformed the region. Old cores such as the lower reaches of the Yangtze
valley, the Ch’eng-tu Plain of Szechwan, and the maritime port of Kuangchou (Canton) in the far south were infused with new vitality, while new cores
emerged on the Tung-t’ing and P’o-yang lakes of the central Yangtze River
and along the coast of Fu-chien. The southern kingdoms formed around these
widely separated core regions.
As is so often the case in human history, the upheavals that gave birth
and context to these kingdoms featured an intriguing cast of disreputable
actors. Yang Hsing-mi, founder of the Wu kingdom, first emerged as a local
bandit in Huai-nan and capitalized on the chaos of Huang Ch’ao’s rebellion
to build his own network of followers, who operated as freelancers without
giving loyalty to any cause. In the aftermath of the rebellion, however, as
loyalist forces regained control of the empire, Yang sought protection in the
restorationist armies before finally abandoning the T’ang cause and laying
the foundations of the first Huai-nan kingdom. Wang Chien, who founded
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 135
the Former Shu kingdom in Szechwan, likewise capitalized on the chaos of
Huang Ch’ao’s rebellion to transcend his early career as a bandit. In contrast
to the freelance operations of Yang Hsing-mi, Wang, whose initial sphere
of operations was in the plains south of K’ai-feng, actually joined Huang’s
uprising before the latter abandoned the north in 878. He nevertheless declined
to follow Huang’s subsequent march to the south, instead joining the army of
Ch’in Tsung-ch’üan, one of the great warlords who emerged from the ashes of
the rebellion. After Huang’s rebellion had been suppressed, Wang Chien was
among the loyalist forces who traveled to Szechwan to join the imperial court
in its wartime refuge; when the court returned to the east, Wang remained
in Szechwan where he laid the foundations of his state. The Ch’u founder,
Ma Yin, had more obscure beginnings, but he too wound up joining Ch’in
Tsung-ch’üan, albeit under the autonomous command of Sun Ju, himself one
of the most nefariously intriguing characters of the time. When Sun broke
with Ch’in late in the 880s, Ma Yin stayed loyal to his commander. But when
Sun Ju’s army broke up in factional strife in 892, Ma Yin struck off on his own
on a path that took him to Hunan, where he stepped into a power vacuum and
established his kingdom.
These men are only some of the figures who populate the narrative that follows. For all the morbid fascination they engender they are not what makes the
history of the south through the long century of the interregnum important.
As the following chapter will demonstrate, the tenth century was when the
south emerged as the heart of the larger Chinese polity. Although the southern
kingdoms were not above their own political intrigues and fratricidal strife,
they were spared the regular chaos that so disrupted life in the north. This
made them attractive to the countless men and women of the northern plain
whose lives were uprooted and homes destroyed, and all the southern kingdoms
benefited from the resulting migration of northerners to the south. Population in the region of the warlord enclave of southern Fu-chien, for example,
rose fivefold, from approximately 30,000 households in the eighth century
to over 150,000 in 978, when the enclave submitted to Sung authority; that
of Fu-chou, the metropolitan center of northern Fu-chien, similarly though
less dramatically rose from between 35,000 and 40,000 households in the
eighth century to over 90,000 according to data submitted by the Wu-Yüeh
authorities to the Sung government in 978.1
1
Population data is taken from Yüeh Shih, T’ai-p’ing huan-yü chi [Ch’en Lan-sen 1793 ed.] (c. 980; Taipei,
1963), pp. 101–2. The T’ai-p’ing huan-yü chi is supplemented by the Ying Sung-pen T’ai-p’ing huan-yü chi
pu-ch’üeh (1882–4; Taipei, 1963), which reconstitutes chapters missing from Ch’en Lan-sen’s edition of
T’ai-p’ing huan-yü chi from other sources. The T’ai-p’ing huan-yü chi is one of the earliest extant Chinese
gazetteers and an immensely important source of T’ang, Five Dynasties, and Ten Kingdoms geographical
and economic data.
136
hugh r. clark
The massive infusion of newcomers from the north energized the south.
In many areas, indigenous elite structures were overwhelmed and heretofore
déclassé men and their extended kin thrust into positions of political authority
and the social prominence that goes with it. Throughout the south, moreover,
the restoration of stability that had been accomplished by the first decade of
the tenth century unleashed a surge of economic activity. Land was reclaimed
and paddies extended. New crops such as the drought-resistant, quick-ripening
strains of rice known as Champa rice were introduced, leading to unprecedented
crop yields.2 At the same time, production of textiles and other artisanal crafts
expanded, and trade developed among the southern kingdoms themselves,
between the southern kingdoms and the northern dynasties, and (of greatest
long-term importance) between the coastal kingdoms and the further lands of
southeast Asia and beyond.
These are the issues that will frame our discussion of this period through
the following pages. In order to understand the southern kingdoms, however,
we must begin with the late T’ang, with events that have been covered in
detail by Robert Somers in volume 3 of this series.3 As Somers demonstrated,
the retreat of T’ang power and legitimate authority in the south was underway
at least by the mid-ninth century.4 Perhaps the first major overt sign of the
unfolding process was the revolt of Ch’iu Fu, which devastated the critical lands
of Che-tung (modern Chekiang) in 859–60. This revolt is of interest both for
its causes and for the composition of its leadership.5 Somers pointed to popular
distress caused by heavy governmental taxation as an important though not
the exclusive cause of the revolt. At least as critical to the subsequent history of
the southern kingdoms, however, was the composition of Ch’iu Fu’s following.
2
3
4
5
For discussion, see Christian Lamouroux, “Crise politique et developpement rizicole en Chine: la region
du Jiang-Huai (VIIIe-Xe siècle),” Bulletin de l’École Française d’Extrême-Orient 82 (1995), pp. 145–
83.
Robert Somers, “The end of the T’ang,” in The Cambridge history of China, volume 3: Sui and T’ang
China, 589–906, part 1, ed. Denis C. Twitchett (Cambridge, 1979), pp. 682–789. See also the extensive
Chinese and Japanese secondary literature cited therein. For a recent study of early sources for the period,
see Johannes L. Kurz, “Survey of the historical sources for the Five Dynasties and Ten States in Song
times,” Journal of Sung-Yuan Studies 33 (2003), pp. 187–224. For overviews of the Five Dynasties period
in general, see the previous chapter and its sources.
Somers, “The end of the T’ang.” See also Somers’s unpublished paper “Banditry, militarization, and state
formation in late T’ang: The origins of Sung China,” China Colloquium of the School of International
Studies, University of Washington, Seattle, 31 May 1979.
In addition to Somers’s brief account of Ch’iu Fu’s revolt, studies include Wang Shou-nan, “Lun wan
T’ang Ch’iu Fu chih luan,” Kuo-li Cheng-chih ta-hsüeh hsüeh-pao 19 (1969), pp. 283–308, and Matsui
Shūichi, “Tōdai kōhanki no Kō-Wai ni tsuite – kōzoku oyobi Kō Zentai, Kyū Ho no hanran o chūshin
to shite,” Shigaku zasshi 66 No. 2 (1957), pp. 1–29. See also the synopses “Kyū no ran” in Tanigawa
Michio and Mori Masao, eds., Chūgoku minshu hanran shi (Tokyo, 1978–83), vol. 1, pp. 301–18; and
Chang Tse-hsien, T’ang Wu-tai nung-min chan-cheng shih-liao hui-p’ien, (Peking, 1979), vol. 1, pp. 241–
54.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 137
Ch’iu himself is described as a “bandit leader” (tsei-shuai) in contemporary
sources.6 Although a strongly pejorative term, it actually tells us very little
about him. The surviving official sources are of the kind that tended to describe
rebels in such terms, regardless of their precise background. As Ch’iu Fu’s revolt
gained momentum, other “bandit leaders” rallied around him, bringing their
men to his cause. Ssu-ma Kuang tells us: “Bandits from the mountains and
the sea, ne’er-do-wells and refugees from other provinces, came from all four
directions and gathered like clouds around Ch’iu Fu.”7
This was the first large-scale rebellion of the T’ang period south of the
Yangtze River. This region had generally remained peaceful throughout the
dynasty, although there was an ominous growth of banditry and lawlessness
in the 830s and 840s. Somers maintained that Ch’iu Fu’s rebellion “was the
first revolt in late T’ang times to weld, however briefly, a large number of rural
bandit gangs into a unified military and political force.”8 Of equal significance,
and perhaps more revealing of who Ch’iu Fu may really have been, was Ch’iu
Fu’s apparent ability to find support among the local educated elites, the very
class one would expect to have been most likely to support the T’ang dynasty
and least likely to rally round the apparently quixotic cause of a local bandit.
Among Ch’iu Fu’s principal followers was one Wang Lu, whom Ssu-ma Kuang
identified as a chin-shih degree holder and so a notable member of the regional
elite.9 Although Wang Lu is the only member of the elite whom we know
joined Ch’iu Fu’s rebellion, his participation suggests a growing alienation
not just on the part of the common people but even of the more secure and
protected strata of society.
Although Ch’iu Fu’s revolt was crushed within a year, there is no indication
that the T’ang court sought or was able to undertake steps to resolve the stresses
that lay behind it. Indeed, at the close of the 860s a second major revolt, this
one led by P’ang Hsün, enveloped eastern Huai-nan and Shantung.10 Although
this revolt began as an army mutiny, its rapid spread was the result of complex
social factors, in part traceable to the same economic distress that lay behind the
uprising of Ch’iu Fu. P’ang Hsün’s uprising, like Ch’iu Fu’s, appealed to a wide
range of people, including “bandit gangs from modern Shantung, Huai-hsi,
Huai-nan and even from as far south as Chekiang, and was supported by local
6
7
8
9
10
See Ssu-ma Kuang, Tzu-chih t’ung-chien [hereafter TCTC], (1086; reprint of the 1956 edition, Hong
Kong, 1972) 249, p. 8077; Liu Hsü et al. eds., Chiu T’ang-shu (945; Peking, 1975) 19, p. 650, refers to
Ch’iu as a “rural bandit” (ts’ao-tsei).
TCTC 250, p. 8080.
Somers, “The end of the T’ang,” pp. 688–9.
TCTC 250, p. 8083.
Somers, “The end of the T’ang,” pp. 695–700. See also Robert des Rotours, “La révolte de P’ang Hiun,
868–869,” T’oung Pao 56 (1970), pp. 229–40.
138
hugh r. clark
peasants, and by some members of the educated gentry.”11 Not insignificantly,
except for Shantung, these were all areas that a few decades later would come
under the authority of one or another of the southern kingdoms, revealing a
groundswell of discontent across much of the south that affected all classes
and types of men.
The greatest revolt, and the one that finally destroyed the remaining vestiges
of imperial legitimacy for the T’ang court, was the rebellion of Wang Hsienchih and Huang Ch’ao, which wrought havoc throughout central and south
regions of the empire from 875 until 880, and then devastated the north
and destroyed the T’ang capital, Ch’ang-an, before it was suppressed in 884.
This revolt was truly one of the greatest uprisings in history, and its story
has consequently been told many times.12 The rebellion began in 874–5 in
the same area of southwestern Shantung that had been devastated five years
earlier by P’ang Hsün’s rebellion. In the face of Wang Hsien-chih and Huang
Ch’ao offensives, T’ang forces were incompetently led and acquitted themselves
disastrously. But by 877, government forces stabilized control of the areas
east of the imperial secondary capital, Lo-yang, and forced the rebels south
toward the Yangtze River. Wang Hsien-chih was killed during this retreat, and
leadership fell to Huang Ch’ao alone. Thereupon, Huang Ch’ao unexpectedly
led the rebel army across the Yangtze River and into the heartlands of the south.
Huang Ch’ao and his forces first marauded through the P’o-yang Lake region
northeast to Hsüan-chou (in Anhwei), and then south through the wealthy
port city of Fu-chou (Fu-chien) and on to Kuang-chou, which he sacked with
great bloodshed.13
In the months that followed, Huang Ch’ao, pressured by his men who
had grown unhappy and sickly in the sultry climate of the south, abandoned
Kuang-chou and resumed his marauding. This time he headed back to the
north. After spending the winter months of 879–80 just south of the Yangtze
River, he recrossed the Yangtze in the seventh month of 880 and was never
to bother the south again. But he had done extensive damage. His campaign
through the south left local T’ang administrative structures a shambles. In their
stead, local and regional structures of power began to develop. If the emerging
leadership in the south did not immediately renounce their “loyalty” to the
T’ang, it was mostly because no one else had come forth to fill the political
vacuum and compete for their allegiance. This nominal allegiance to the T’ang
dynasty should not, however, obscure the fact that the structures that arose
11
12
13
Somers, “The end of the T’ang,” p. 699.
My account is based on Somers, “The end of the T’ang,” pp. 727–45, and TCTC 253, as excerpted in
Chang, T’ang Wu-tai nung-min chan-cheng, pp. 462–73.
See map 21 in Somers, “The end of the T’ang,” p. 738.
Map 10. Huang Ch’ao’s movements, 878–880.
140
hugh r. clark
in the wake of Huang Ch’ao’s rampage through the south were independent.
From these independent structures came the new state structures of the tenth
century.
from banditry to state formation, 875–c. 910
Wu-Yüeh
In 875, one Wang Ying, a minor military official in a coastal garrison on
the Yangtze River delta, rebelled, capturing Su-chou and Ch’ang-chou before
taking to the sea to raid as far south as Wen-chou in coastal regions of Chekiang
and Fu-chien. The court, after some delay, sent a large force from various
garrisons in Honan to put down the rebellion and ordered the provinces around
the lower Yangtze to mobilize their naval forces against Wang. They also
directed local officials to recruit troops to suppress him.14 It is in this context
that two of the pivotal figures of the following years in the Liang-che region
emerge: Tung Ch’ang, and his subordinate – and the future Wu-Yüeh founder –
Ch’ien Liu. When faced with Wang Ying’s assault on his home prefecture of
Hang-chou, Tung Ch’ang organized a popular militia (t’u-t’uan) to provide
resistance.15 For his successes in the suppression of Wang Ying, who was finally
cornered and killed in the spring of 877, Tung Ch’ang was named commander
of the Shih-ching Garrison in Hang-chou. The years 878 and 879 were critical
in the emergence of local power structures in the Che-tung (or greater Yangtze
delta) area. In 878, as mentioned earlier, Huang Ch’ao passed through the area,
avoiding any of the major population centers but causing alarm all the same.
But more significantly, in that same year other rebels “swarmed like bees” in
the areas recently affected by Wang Ying.16 In response, each county in the
Hang-chou area organized a militia force of one thousand men under local
leadership. With Tung Ch’ang in charge of the whole structure, these forces
came to be known as the Eight Battalions of Hang-chou (Hang-chou pa-tu).
Ch’ien Liu served under Tung Ch’ang as a cavalry officer.17
14
15
16
17
Regarding Wang Ying’s uprising, see TCTC 252–3, especially pp. 8178–9.
TCTC 253, p. 8210; Fan Chiung and Lin Yü, Wu-Yüeh pei-shih (11th c.; Taipei, 1966) 1, p. 21a. Sakurai
Haruko (following Watanabe Michio) notes that Tung was most likely a prominent local landowner:
“Without a doubt, the leaders of the Eight Battalions of Hang-chou, including Tung Ch’ang, Ch’eng
Chi, Tu Ling, Wu Kung-yüeh and others, provided rural leadership and were from the major landowning class.” See Sakurai Haruko, “Godai Jikkoku no Go-Etsu ni tsuite,” Nara shien 15 (1967),
p. 13.
On the rebels, see TCTC 253, p. 8210, and Fan and Lin, Wu-Yüeh pei-shih 1, p. 3a.
See TCTC 253, p. 8210. On the Eight Battalions, see Tanigawa Michio, “Tōdai no hanchin ni tsuite –
Setsusei no baai,” Shirin 35 No. 3 (1952), pp. 297–8. Fan and Lin, Wu-Yüeh pei-shih 1, p. 3b date the
formal organization of the Eight Battalions to the aftermath of defeating Huang Ch’ao.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 141
Ch’ien Liu, the founder of the Wu-Yüeh state, was born in 852 in a village of
Lin-an county in Hang-chou prefecture to a family of farmers and fishermen.18
The family was poor, and the life it offered apparently had little appeal to
young Ch’ien Liu. Instead, he spent his time with a band of similarly alienated
youth who gathered together under a village tree. As the leader of this band,
Ch’ien Liu would sit on a great rock and direct his friends in war games:
“His orders had the force of law, and his comrades were generally fearful of
him.”19 Although one source tells us that Ch’ien Liu was “a rascal who rejected
all work,”20 it would be more accurate to suggest only that he disdained all
legitimate work. We are told by one source that he engaged in “resolving
disputes and exacting revenge,” and by another that he traded illegally in
salt.21 When he and his friends were not playing war games among the trees,
they were available for hire for an assortment of disreputable tasks that could
perhaps best be summarily described as thuggery, terrorism, and smuggling.
Although Ch’ien Liu may have run his gang through fear, there was apparently a measure of loyalty within it. He is described as “fond of chivalry”
(jen-hsia), a code of martial behavior with ancient roots in Chinese culture
that was applied to the warrior and so contrasted with the civil morality of
the scholar.22 In a story that may be apocryphal but is very revealing of the
values on which Ch’ien Liu’s gang was built, we hear of the Chung brothers, “drinking buddies” of Ch’ien Liu and the sons of Chung Ch’i, a clerk in
the county office of Lin-an county.23 Chung Ch’i, as we can well imagine of
someone anxious to protect a marginal claim to membership in the civil elite,
disapproved of the disreputable Ch’ien Liu and vainly sought to forbid his
sons from seeing him. Their continued loyalty to Ch’ien Liu in the face of
their father’s objections is evidence of the strong ties that bound Ch’ien Liu’s
gang and of the degree to which Ch’ien’s companions elevated jen-hsia over
the civil morality by which the T’ang elite defined itself. Thus when Wang
Ying’s uprising erupted throughout the Yangtze delta in 875, Ch’ien Liu was
18
19
20
21
22
23
There are many biographies of Ch’ien Liu. I have used the following: Hsüeh Chü-cheng et al., eds.,
Chiu Wu-tai shih [hereafter CWTS] (974; Peking, 1976) 133, pp. 1766–72; Ou-yang Hsiu, Hsin Wu-tai
shih (1073; Peking, 1974) 67, pp. 835–41; Fan and Lin, Wu-Yüeh pei-shih 1; Wu Jen-ch’en, Shih-kuo
ch’un-ch’iu (1669; Peking, 1983) 77–8, pp. 1045–1116. On the Ch’ien family occupation, see CWTS
133, p. 1768. See also Sakurai, “Godai Jikkoku no Go-Etsu ni tsuite,” p. 13.
Ou-yang, Hsin Wu-tai shih 67, p. 835. This passage is echoed in TCTC 267, p. 8727. See also Chan
Chieh, I-shih chi-wen (Shanghai, 1927), p. 1a.
Ou-yang, Hsin Wu-tai shih 67, p. 835. The term wu-lai was often used to describe the alienated men
who led the many forces contributing to the collapse of the T’ang. See Somers, “Banditry, militarization,
and state formation,” p. 11.
CWTS 133, p. 1766, and Ou-yang, Hsin Wu-tai shih 67, p. 835, respectively.
CWTS 133, p. 1766.
Ou-yang, Hsin Wu-tai shih 67, pp. 835–6.
142
hugh r. clark
the leader of a band of loyal followers tied by bonds of jen-hsia. It was this
band, not just Ch’ien Liu, that Tung Ch’ang enrolled in his emerging regional
defense alliance, though it was Ch’ien whom Tung Ch’ang made his second in
command.
When Tung Ch’ang and Ch’ien Liu confronted Huang Ch’ao as he
approached Hang-chou in 878, Huang swerved away rather than battle the
Eight Battalions, confirming the potency of Tung Ch’ang and his troops. In
the years that followed, the Eight Battalions ensured local stability. Between
882 and 887, for example, Liu Han-hung, the civil governor of Che-tung,
attempted to consolidate his own power in the Liang-che region at the expense
of the Eight Battalions.24 Tung Ch’ang dispatched Ch’ien Liu to deal with this
threat, allegedly telling Ch’ien that “If you can seize (Liu Han-hung’s base at)
Yüeh-chou, I will then grant you Hang-chou.”25 When Ch’ien eliminated Liu
Han-hung in 887, Tung Ch’ang did indeed name him prefect of Hang-chou.
Tung Ch’ang relocated to Yüeh-chou with the title director of military and
civil affairs (chih chün-fu shih) in Che-tung.26
Ch’ien Liu, over the next few years, consolidated his power in Hang-chou,
where he assumed Tung Ch’ang’s former position as leader of the Eight Battalions, and expanded to the north as well. These advances brought Ch’ien
Liu into conflict with the future Wu founder Yang Hsing-mi in the prefectures surrounding Lake T’ai just as Yang was consolidating his own power
in Huai-nan and adjacent areas south of the Yangtze River. This proximity
was to lead to near constant conflict between Yang Hsing-mi and Ch’ien Liu
in the years to follow. Advancing to the north, however, enabled Ch’ien Liu
to avoid conflict with his erstwhile patron Tung Ch’ang, located to Ch’ien’s
southeast. But in the middle 890s, this inherently unworkable situation broke
down.
Tung Ch’ang had maintained a low and relatively benign profile while he
consolidated his control over the southeastern reaches of Che-tung.27 He soon
24
25
26
27
Liu Han-hung first occurs in our sources in the context of Huang Ch’ao’s rebellion; Ou-yang Hsiu,
Hsin T’ang shu (1060; Peking, 1975) 225 hsia, p. 6451, lists Liu among Huang’s “staff commanders,”
although Somers points out that Liu at times fought against Huang. For Liu’s career, see Somers, “The
end of the T’ang,” p. 726, and the entries concerning him in TCTC 253–6.
TCTC 256, p. 8339. Fan and Lin, Wu-Yüeh pei-shih 1, pp. 6b–7a, says that it was Ch’ien Liu who initiated
the final assault after complaining to Tung that he could not bear the situation. Having defeated Liu
Han-hung, Ch’ien was preparing to straighten out affairs in Yüeh-chou, but the people of Hang-chou
appealed to Tung Ch’ang to name Ch’ien prefect of their city instead.
TCTC 256, p. 8341.
This and the following narrative is drawn from Ou-yang, Hsin T’ang shu 225 hsia, pp. 6466–9; TCTC
259, pp. 8460–1; 260, pp. 8463–5. See also Hsü Hsüan, Chi-shen lu [Hsüeh-chin t’ao-yüan 1805 ed.;
1922] (late 10th c.; Taipei, 1965) 1, pp. 2a–b. Given surviving information, the geographic extent of
Tung’s power can only be surmised.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 143
began to abuse his power, though, courting favor with the desperate T’ang
court by increasing his annual tribute offerings and thereby adding to the
burden on the people. At some point he dedicated a shrine to himself and
ordered the people to worship there, while the court showered him with ever
more grandiose titles. Finally, in the mid-890s, Tung Ch’ang requested that
the T’ang court name him King of Yüeh (Yüeh wang), but the court now
balked. The infuriated Tung Ch’ang ranted that “the Court wishes to belittle
me. I have sent uncounted tribute every year, but now the court will not grant
me the title King of Yüeh!” Sycophants urged Tung Ch’ang on, saying, “Our
Lord is King of Yüeh, but why not Emperor of Yüeh?” In early 895, Tung
Ch’ang proclaimed himself emperor (huang-ti), calling his new state Ta-Yüeh
Lo-p’ing.28
Tung Ch’ang’s presumptuousness spurred Ch’ien Liu to action. After several
months of posturing and negotiating, Ch’ien Liu launched an assault on Tung
Ch’ang in the name of the T’ang court. When Tung Ch’ang appealed to Yang
Hsing-mi, by now the emerging power in the Huai-nan region, for aid, Yang
Hsing-mi attacked Ch’ien Liu’s forces in Su-chou, Hang-chou, and elsewhere,
but it was not enough to stave off Tung’s defeat. In the summer of 896 Tung
Ch’ang was captured and beheaded.
Ch’ien Liu had now established a measure of control across most of Che-tung
and Che-hsi, a control that the ever-weaker T’ang court was able to confirm
only after the fact.29 Ch’ien Liu’s control of the region set the stage for the
founding, a decade later in 907, of the state of Wu-Yüeh, the longest-lived of
all the southern kingdoms.
Wu
A collapse of central authority similar to that in the Che-tung and Che-hsi
region had occurred over the same period and for much the same reasons in
the broad area north and south of the lower Yangtze River known collectively
as Chiang-Huai (now encompassed by modern Kiangsi province). This region
contained two subregions: Huai-nan (an area south of the Huai River, north
28
29
TCTC 259, p. 8460; 260, p. 8464. Somers refers to Lo-p’ing as the first of the southern kingdoms. See
Somers, “The end of the T’ang,” p. 788.
Che-tung and Che-hsi denote the T’ang military commands on either side of the Che River that emptied
into Hang-chou Bay. In 997 the commands were consolidated into the Sung administrative circuit of
Liang-che, but then redivided at the beginning of the Southern Sung into Liang-che East and Liang-che
West circuits. Liang-che West (or T’ang Che-hsi) encompassed the Yangtze River delta, including Lake
T’ai and the wealthy cities of Su-chou and Hang-chou, in Southern Sung, to become the imperial capital;
Liang-che East (or T’ang Che-tung) encompassed what is now part of Chekiang province, with its capital
at Yüeh-chou (later Shao-hsing fu). For the locations of prefectures referred to in this chapter, refer to
map 1 at the front of this volume.
144
hugh r. clark
of the Yangtze) and Chiang-nan (an area south of the Yangtze River).30 Kao
P’ien, a member of a prominent T’ang military lineage and perhaps the foremost T’ang commander at the time of Huang Ch’ao’s rebellion, was the first
to establish an independent governorship in Huai-nan. In late 879 he was
appointed military governor (chieh-tu shih) of Huai-nan and also salt and iron
commissioner, the most powerful financial authority in the southern and central parts of the empire. He was directed to block Huang Ch’ao’s return to
the north.31 When Huang managed to slip through Kao P’ien’s defenses, Kao
lost credibility with the T’ang court. He was, nevertheless, well entrenched in
Huai-nan, and because the court was unable to dislodge him he remained as
an independent governor, with his base at Yang-chou.
Despite Huang Ch’ao’s autonomy during the mid-880s there was an undercurrent of instability throughout Huai-nan that finally culminated in Kao
P’ien’s ouster in 887, engendering a period of incessant conflict.32 In this context, Yang Hsing-mi, the founder of the state of Wu, emerged and consolidated
his own power.
Yang Hsing-mi was born in 851 to a peasant family of Ho-fei county
in Lu-chou2, a prefecture in the heart of the Huai-nan region.33 Yang was
apparently no more attracted to a life of tilling the soil than was Ch’ien Liu,
and he too joined a band of local youth with whom he played war games and
from among whom he found his most trusted initial associates. At least two of
these associates – T’ien Chün and T’ao Ya – were natives of Yang’s natal village.
T’ien Chün, we are told, “was like a brother to Yang as a youth,”34 clearly an
echo of the values of jen-hsia that we have seen in Ch’ien Liu’s gang. Although
T’ien Chün and T’ao Ya are the only two of Yang’s trusted associates that the
sources definitely connect to Yang’s gang, they were surely not the only gang
members to play prominent roles serving Yang Hsing-mi in the years to come.
Among his earliest associates for whom we have surviving biographies, five
30
31
32
33
34
On the rise of the Wu founder Yang Hsing-mi as well as on the subsequent history of both Wu
and Southern T’ang, see Robert Krompart, “The southern restoration of T’ang: Counsel, policy and
parahistory in the stabilization of the Chiang-Huai region, 887–943” (diss., University of California at
Berkeley, 1973).
For this and the following events, see the biographies of Kao P’ien in Liu, Chiu T’ang-shu 182, pp. 4703–
12, and Ou-yang, Hsin T’ang shu 225 hsia, pp. 6391–6405. See also Somers, “The end of the T’ang,”
pp. 742–4. Events are also recounted in TCTC 253–4.
On these events, see TCTC 257, pp. 8351–5.
Biographies of Yang Hsing-mi can be found in Ou-yang, Hsin T’ang shu 188, pp. 5451–61; CWTS 134,
pp. 1779–82; Ou-yang, Hsin Wu-tai shih 61, pp. 747–52; Wu, Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu 1, pp. 1–30. A useful
account in English is the second chapter of Krompart, “The southern restoration of T’ang.”
Ou-yang, Hsin T’ang shu 188, p. 5451. On T’ien Chün, see Ou-yang, Hsin T’ang shu 189, p. 5476; Lu
Chen, Chiu-kuo chih [Shou-shan-ko ts’ung-shu 1844 ed.; 1922] (c. 1000; Taipei, 1968) 3, pp. 3, 35; Wu,
Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu 13, p. 165. On T’ao Ya, see Lu, Chiu-kuo chih 1, p. 3; Wu, Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu 5,
p. 91.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 145
others were natives of Ho-fei.35 Additionally, among later associates – men
who became prominent in the last years of the ninth century or under the
Yang rulers early in the tenth – many were natives of Ho-fei, suggesting that
they or their fathers had been among Yang Hsing-mi’s early associates, surely
including some who had been gang members.
In the years before Huang Ch’ao’s rebellion, Yang Hsing-mi turned his
gang from local thuggery to classic banditry. They broadened their sphere of
activity beyond acts of petty delinquency at the village level to embrace a
wider territory and more brazen behavior. The expanded range of activities
must have included illegal trading in salt and raiding of poorly defended
village storehouses, activities much like those of Ch’ien Liu. At some point in
the early to mid-880s, after operating for a decade with general autonomy, but
now faced with the growing power of Ch’in Tsung-ch’üan to his north, Yang
Hsing-mi enrolled his gang in an emerging regional extraofficial defense force
similar to that formed by Tung Ch’ang.36 The Chiu Wu-tai shih tells us that the
militia officials (chün-chiang) of Lu-chou2 and Shou-chou, who were apparently
trying to maintain some loyalty to the T’ang court rather than succumb to the
growing influence of Ch’in Tsung-ch’üan, recruited “men with military ability
from among the bandits.” Yang Hsing-mi took advantage of this program to
bring one hundred of his bandit followers – very likely his whole gang – into
the extraofficial frontier defense forces of Lu-chou2.37 There, as Ssu-ma Kuang
relates, Yang used his mastery of violence to become prefect of Lu-chou2:
The commanders (of Lu-chou2) all feared Yang, and they persuaded the prefect Lang Yufu to dispatch him to defend the border. As Yang departed, the commanders sought to
appease him with sweet talk, asking if there was anything he needed. Yang replied, “I need
your heads,” whereupon he cut them off. He then seized the several encampments and
proclaimed himself commander of the eight encampments of infantry and cavalry. Lang
Yu-fu was unable to control him, and appealed to Kao P’ien to appoint Yang Hsing-mi
prefect in his stead.38
In the years that followed, Yang Hsing-mi consolidated his position in and
around Lu-chou2, remaining nominally loyal to Kao P’ien although no doubt
retaining a large measure of freedom of action. Thus when the assault on Kao
P’ien began in Yang-chou in 887, Yang Hsing-mi was able to pick and choose
among his friends and enemies depending on where he had the advantage.
By the end of the conflict, early in 888, Yang had emerged in control of
35
36
37
38
See Li Yu in Wu, Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu 6, p. 100. For Li Yü, see Lu, Chiu-kuo chih 1, pp. 7–8; for Luo
Chih-hsiang, Wu, Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu 10, p. 139; for T’ai Meng, Lu, Chiu-kuo chih 1, pp. 6–7; for Wang
Ching-jen (also known as Wang Muo-chang), CWTS 23, p. 317.
It is most likely that this coincided with Ch’in’s proclamation of his own dynasty in 883.
CWTS 137, p. 1779.
TCTC 255, p. 8290. See also Ou-yang, Hsin Wu-tai shih 61, p. 747.
146
hugh r. clark
Yang-chou, where he established his headquarters, and proclaimed himself
commandant (liu-hou) of Huai-nan. He was now one of the two dominant
forces in Huai-nan.
The other dominant force was Sun Ju.39 Sun is yet another example of the
men who had capitalized on Huang Ch’ao’s rebellion to enhance their own
standing. He was a village tough in the Lo-yang area who had enrolled in the
local militia along with his gang. In the rebellion he had adhered to the cause
of Ch’in Tsung-ch’üan, a T’ang officer who joined Huang Ch’ao during the
latter’s final assault on the T’ang capital, Ch’ang-an. Sun Ju stayed loyal to
Ch’in Tsung-ch’üan as he battled with Chu Wen to inherit T’ang power in
the north, even when Ch’in proclaimed himself emperor in 885.40 As Ch’in
Tsung-ch’üan grew increasingly ambitious, however, Sun Ju grew more and
more alienated and finally broke their ties. From his base in Hao-chou, located
on the south bank of the Huai River, Sun Ju led his army against Yang Hsingmi for control of Huai-nan. Thus, with the fall of Kao P’ien, Sun Ju and Yang
Hsing-mi entered a period of struggle for supremacy. Initially, Sun Ju held
the upper hand, seizing Yang-chou in 888 and even campaigning as far south
as Su-chou, where Yang and his proxies had been struggling against Ch’ien
Liu. However, Yang Hsing-mi was finally able to capture and behead Sun Ju
after a skirmish near Hu-chou in 892.41
If the struggle with Sun Ju was over, however, unrest was not. The years of
constant warfare between the two rivals had devastated a huge area. Yang-chou,
once a great and rich city, lay in ruins. There were still many men who had
been loyal to Sun Ju, and they were reluctant to submit to Yang Hsing-mi’s
uncertain benevolence. Their resistance was encouraged by Chu Wen, who was
now the dominant force in the north.42 In 895, Yang Hsing-mi sought to forge
an alliance with a variety of forces, including those of Li K’o-yung, the Sha-t’o
Turk whose armies had occupied large areas of Ho-tung, against Chu Wen.43
Late in 897, attempting to extend his authority into the Huai-nan region, Chu
Wen ordered a major invasion of Yang Hsing-mi’s territory.44 But Chu Wen’s
commander greatly underestimated his adversary and was consequently dealt
a smashing defeat. Of an initial invasion force of seventy thousand, fewer than
a thousand managed to limp home: “Thereafter Yang Hsing-mi controlled the
39
40
41
42
43
44
See Sun Ju’s biography in Ou-yang, Hsin T’ang shu 188, pp. 5466–8.
See the brief discussion in Somers, “The end of the T’ang,” pp. 783–4.
On Sun Ju’s defeat and beheading, see TCTC 259, pp. 8429–31.
On assistance received from Chu, see TCTC 260, p. 8468, with respect to Shou-chou; and TCTC 261,
p. 8502, with respect to O-chou.
See TCTC 260, p. 8463.
On this invasion, see TCTC 261, pp. 8509, 8510–11.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 147
land between the Yangtze and Huai rivers, and Chu Wen could not contest
this.”45
Although Yang Hsing-mi defeated Chu Wen’s efforts to oust him, his own
campaign to expand into western Huai-nan and Chiang-nan required another
two decades of protracted war against Tu Hung in O-chou, which lay at
the critical juncture of the Yangtze and Han rivers (completed 905); against
Chung Chuan and his son in Hung-chou (modern Nan-ch’ang), on the Kan
River south of P’o-yang Lake (completed 906); and finally against Lu Kuangch’ou in Ch’ien-chou (modern Kan-chou), further up the Kan River, which
was not completed until 918.46
Ching-nan
Upstream from O-chou a similar pattern of turmoil raged in the aftermath
of Huang Ch’ao’s passage in 879. In the region known as Ching-nan, encompassing the three strategic Yangtze River prefectures just within and east of
the Yangtze River gorges, there was near-constant turmoil as one adventurer
supplanted another. The contest began to sort itself out in 885, when a man of
violence named Ch’eng Ju took control of Kuei-chou, some forty miles inside
the gorge itself.47 In 888, Ch’eng Ju took advantage of further turmoil in the
regional metropolis of Chiang-ling to seize control of the prefecture and assume
the title commandant (liu-hou) of Ching-nan. Soon after, Ch’eng extended his
authority west into K’uei-chou, one hundred miles into the gorge on the eastern fringe of Szechwan, at which point the T’ang court appointed him military
governor of Ching-nan.48 This arrangement brought some temporary stability
to the region.
Ch’eng Ju remained governor with T’ang recognition until 903, when
he heedlessly agreed to Chu Wen’s request to send troops against Yang
45
46
47
48
Although Yang’s control over Huai-nan was henceforth firm, fighting resumed in 899; see TCTC 263,
pp. 8522–3. For 902, see TCTC 263, p. 8577. The rivalry between Yang and Chu was a factor in
numerous subsequent conflicts even when it did not pit them against each other directly.
On Tu Hung, see Ou-yang, Hsin T’ang shu 190, pp. 5485–6; TCTC 256, p. 8343; 259, pp. 8455,
8459; and 261, pp. 8503–4. On Chung Chuan, see Ou-yang, Hsin T’ang shu 190, p. 5486–7; CWTS 17,
p. 231; and Wu, Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu 8, p. 124. On Lu kuang-ch’ou, see Ou-yang, Hsin T’ang shu 190,
pp. 5493–4, and Ou-yang, Hsin Wu-tai shih 41, pp. 443–4. On the capture of Ch’ien-chou, see TCTC
256, p. 8320.
On the historical and strategic importance of Ching-nan, see Wang Gungwu, “The Middle Yangtse in
T’ang politics,” in Perspectives on the T’ang, ed. Arthur F. Wright and Denis C. Twitchett (New Haven,
Conn., 1973) pp. 193–235. See, for example, TCTC 256, pp. 8319–20. On Ch’eng Ju, see Ou-yang,
Hsin T’ang shu 190, pp. 5483–4; and CWTS 17, pp. 229–30.
TCTC 257, p. 8378.
148
hugh r. clark
Hsing-mi.49 Although Ch’eng Ju had no obligation to Chu Wen, he feared
Chu’s power and also saw a chance to expand his own authority. Ch’eng Ju,
ignoring his advisors, dispatched one hundred thousand marines downriver,
but his forces were routed by Yang Hsing-mi’s besieging army, and Ch’eng Ju
was drowned in the Yangtze River.
With Ch’eng Ju’s death, Chu Wen sought a reliable replacement in Chingnan, finally settling on Kao Chi-ch’ang. Kao was originally the household slave
of one Li Jang, “a wealthy merchant of Pien-chou (K’ai-feng),” the headquarters
of Chu Wen.50 After Li Jang was adopted by Chu Wen, Kao Chi-ch’ang came
to the attention of Chu Wen, who appointed him to a succession of military
posts culminating in defense commissioner of Ying-chou4, a highly strategic
prefecture on the north side of the Huai River confronting the territory of Yang
Hsing-mi.51 This was the post Kao Chi-ch’ang held when Chu Wen summoned
him to assume control of Ching-nan in 907.52 From this appointment the Kao
family was to rule the Ching-nan region until they submitted to the Sung
in 963.
Ch’u
South of Ching-nan, encompassing the basin of the Tung-t’ing Lake and the
adjacent river valleys, was Hunan, the site of the future Ch’u kingdom of Ma
Yin. When Huang Ch’ao left Kuang-chou and began his march back to the
north, he went via the Hsiang River through the heart of Hunan. As always,
he left behind turmoil and the collapse of established authority. The first to
try and restore order was Min Hsü.53 Min was from the Kiangsi region, but
he had been commanding forces sent to defend the T’ang position in Vietnam.
In 881, as he was heading north through rebellion-torn T’an-chou (modern
Ch’ang-sha), he decided to stay in the city and proclaim himself commandant.
In the years that followed he, like so many of the self-proclaimed administrators
49
50
51
52
53
For the events of 903, see TCTC 264, pp. 8606–9.
Ou-yang, Hsin Wu-tai shih 69, p. 855; Wu, Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu 100, p. 1427. Li’s personal name is also
given as Ch’i-lang; see CWTS 62, p. 831; and 133, p. 1751. All sources agree that Li was adopted by Chu
Wen, who changed Li’s name to Chu Yu-jang; see also Lu, Chiu-kuo chih 12, p. 123, and Kurihara Masuo,
“Tō-Godai no kafushiteki ketsugō no seikaku,” Shigaku zasshi 62 No. 6 (1953), p. 6, and especially chart
6 on p. 14. On Kao Chi-ch’ang (also known as Kao Chi-hsing), see CWTS 133, pp. 1751–2; Ou-yang,
Hsin Wu-tai shih 69, pp. 855–7; Wu, Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu 100, p. 1427–36; T’ao Yüeh, Wu-tai shih-pu
(1012; Nan-ch’ang, 1915) 2, pp. 4a–b; and Chou Yü-ch’ung, San Ch’u hsin-lu [Hsüeh-hai lei-pien 1831
ed.; 1920] (Taipei, 1967) 3, pp. 1a–3b.
See TCTC 265, p. 8663; Lu, Chiu-kuo chih 12, p. 123; CWTS 133, p. 1751; and Ou-yang, Hsin Wu-tai
shih 69, p. 856.
See TCTC 265, pp. 8646, 8662; and 266, p. 8680.
On Min Hsü, see Ou-yang, Hsin T’ang shu 186, pp. 5420–3; TCTC 254, p. 8260; 255, pp. 8269, 8299.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 149
around the empire, was granted official titles by the powerless T’ang court in
recognition of his de facto autonomous authority.
Although Min Hsü may have briefly brought some order to the situation,
order in the region did not persist. In 886, Min was attacked by the prefect of
Heng-chou. Min Hsü appealed to a local warlord to come to his aid, but the
warlord instead killed him. The Heng-chou prefect then resumed his assault,
seized T’an-chou, and killed the warlord. In the aftermath of these exchanges
things again settled down, but the quiet was deceptive for Teng Ch’u-na, an
ally of Min Hsü, was plotting to avenge him. Min Hsü had appointed Teng
Ch’u-na prefect of Shao-chou, located on the Tzu River in southern Hunan, as
a reward for many years of loyal service. For eight years following Min Hsü’s
death Teng Ch’u-na trained his troops in preparation. In 893 he launched his
assault, took T’an-chou, and killed the former Heng-chou prefect.54
The instability in Hunan provided a much-needed opportunity for Ma Yin,
then looking for a place to settle with his troops. Ma Yin was a native of Hsüchou2 (in Honan), who wound up in the army of Ch’in Tsung-ch’üan under
the command of Ch’in’s general Sun Ju.55 When Sun broke with Ch’in late in
the 880s, Ma Yin remained loyal to Sun Ju, under whom he had risen to high
command.
In the years that followed, Sun Ju’s army marauded through Huai-nan and
even into the Kiangsi region, seizing and pillaging as it went, behaving as a
bandit army with no fixed territorial base.56 When Sun Ju was captured and
executed by forces loyal to Yang Hsing-mi in 892, this rootless army quickly
broke up and most units switched their allegiance to Yang.57 At this time, Ma
Yin was second in command to Liu Chien-feng of a force dispatched by Sun to
forage for supplies. Faced with the disaster that had befallen their associates,
Liu Chien-feng and Ma Yin opted to strike out on their own with the army of
seven thousand under their command.58 As they traveled west to Hung-chou
and then south along the Kan River through Kiangsi, they continued to act
as one of the many bandit gangs that plagued the Yangtze River and adjacent
valleys. Although they were able to expand their force from the original core of
seven thousand, they were apparently unable to oust more powerful warlords
54
55
56
57
58
See TCTC 259, p. 8451. On Teng Ch’u-na, see Ou-yang, Hsin T’ang shu 186, pp. 5420–1; Lu, Chiu-kuo
chih 11, p. 115.
On the origins and early history of Ma Yin, see Okada Kōji, “Godai So ōkoku no kenkoku seido,” Daitō
Bunka Daigaku kiyō (Jinbun kagaku) 19 (1981), pp. 73–89.
One might note, for example, the comments of two generals in Yang Hsing-mi’s army: “Sun sweeps the
land clean from afar . . . He sends forth light cavalry in order to seize provisions and capture prisoners”;
see TCTC 259, pp. 8424–5.
TCTC 259, p. 8430.
Wu, Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu 67, p. 931.
150
hugh r. clark
in the Kan River valley. Although we have no way of knowing whether they
were aware that political structures in the regions of Hunan were less stable
than in Kiangsi, they nevertheless opportunely turned west, across the rugged
and hostile mountains between Kiangsi and Hunan, appearing on the fringe
of T’an-chou in 894.
Teng Ch’u-na dispatched a small force to confront the intruders, but Ma Yin
warned the local leaders that “My forces number 100,000, and they are highly
trained soldiers. You have only a few thousand village militia. Your situation
is difficult.”59 Ma Yin urged the T’an-chou forces not to fight, but rather
to accept Liu Chien-feng’s overlordship, an offer that the village militiamen
accepted with alacrity. With T’an-chou thus exposed, Liu and Ma marched in
and seized and executed Teng Ch’u-na. Liu Chien-feng then proclaimed himself
commandant, but he proved less able as a governor than as a campaigner, and
he was assassinated by a disgruntled associate in 896.60 After some initial
confusion over who should succeed Liu Chien-feng, Ma Yin inherited the
position, a fact that the virtually irrelevant T’ang court officially confirmed
later the same year.61 Although these events established Ma’s position in T’anchou and Shao-chou, it took another two years to quell the independent rulers
of the five remaining prefectures in the Hunan region (Heng-chou, Yung-chou,
Tao-chou, Ch’en-chou2, and Lien-chou). By the close of 899, “all Hunan was
at peace” and under the unified control of Ma Yin.62
Min
During the upheavals at the center of the T’ang empire that took place after
Huang Ch’ao’s passage through to the beginning of the tenth century, a similar process of displacement unfolded along the southeast and south coasts
that eventually brought the Wang family to power in Fu-chien. When Huang
Ch’ao’s armies entered Fu-chien’s northwest corner in 878, the region was still
lightly settled. As happened elsewhere, Huang’s depredations led to a collapse in the established structures of authority. In the face of the rebel threat,
Ch’en Yen, a local landowner from Chien-chou, the mountainous prefecture
where Huang first entered Fu-chien, capitalized on his formation of a private security army to earn appointment from the T’ang court as surveillance
commissioner (kuan-ch’a shih). This appointment was another symbolic recognition of a situation that by the mid-880s had evolved beyond the court’s
59
60
61
62
TCTC 259, p. 8454.
TCTC 260, p. 8485.
TCTC 260, p. 8493.
TCTC 261, pp. 8515, 8526, 8528.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 151
control.63 At that very same time, a band of migrants from the Huai River
town of Kuang-chou2, led by Wang Hsü, entered Fu-chien via the remote
and undeveloped southwest corner.64 Wang Hsü had been a minor warlord
in northern Huai-nan where he held power at the sufferance of Ch’in Tsungch’üan, Chu Wen’s major rival in the north. In 884, Ch’in Tsung-ch’üan
demanded subsidies from Wang Hsü that the latter was unable to pay. In the
face of pending reprisals, Wang Hsü abandoned his fief with an army of about
five thousand including three brothers who, although apparently unrelated to
Wang Hsü, were also surnamed Wang: Wang Ch’ao, Wang Shen-kuei, and
Wang Shen-chih.65 After a journey of about eight hundred miles that probably followed Huang Ch’ao’s earlier line of march, the band entered Fu-chien
from the southwest. They first seized the remote and undeveloped prefecture
of T’ing-chou, followed by the coastal prefecture of Chang-chou. Shortly afterward, Wang Hsü was ousted by the three brothers, who assumed control of the
band under the leadership of Wang Ch’ao, the eldest. Although Wang Ch’ao
set about returning the group to Huai-nan, their journey was interrupted when
the elders of Ch’üan-chou caught up to them and begged them get rid of their
prefect, Liao Yen-jou. The brothers agreed and directed a siege against that
city that lasted a full year. In the fall of 886, Ch’üan-chou fell.66 Once the
Wangs gained control, they established Ch’üan-chou as their own fief. Wang
Ch’ao formally submitted to the authority of Ch’en Yen, who granted him the
title of prefect (tz’u-shih) from his base in Fu-chou, but this was a proforma
action that did not alter the Wangs’ functional autonomy.
The situation in Fu-chien remained static for the next six years. Wang
Ch’ao and his brothers governed Ch’üan-chou, while Ch’en Yen continued
as warlord in the north. Ch’en Yen’s death in 891, however, brought this
temporary stability to an end and set off a struggle between northern and
southern Fu-chien that ended only after a year-long siege against Fu-chou that
united Fu-chien under the Wang family.67 Unfortunately, the Wang family
itself was not united. Following his victory in the struggle between north and
south, Wang Ch’ao moved his administrative headquarters north, settling in
63
64
65
66
67
See TCTC 256, p. 8316; 256, pp. 8316–17; and Ch’en Yen’s biography in Liang K’o-chia, Ch’un-hsi
San-shan chih (1182; Peking, 1990) 21, p. 22b.
The following discussion of the background to the founding of the Min kingdom of Fu-chien is based on
the third chapter of Hugh R. Clark, Community, trade, and networks: Southern Fujian province from the third
to the thirteenth century (Cambridge, 1991). Readers should also refer to Aoyama Sadao, “The newly-risen
bureaucrats in Fukien at the Five Dynasty–Sung period, with special reference to their genealogies,”
Memoirs of the Research Department of the Tōyō Bunko 21 (1962), pp. 1–48.
On Wang Ch’ao and his brothers, see Ou-yang, Hsin T’ang shu 190, pp. 5491–3; Ou-yang, Hsin Wu-tai
shih 68, pp. 845–7; Wu, Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu 90, pp. 1297–1319; and T’ao, Wu-tai shih-pu 2, pp. 4b–6a.
See TCTC 256, pp. 8320, 8325–6, 8339.
TCTC 258, p. 8423.
152
hugh r. clark
Fu-chou. This was a sound strategic move. Fu-chou had been the center of
opposition to the Wangs as well as the established center of unified regional
government. Wang Ch’ao left the eldest of his brothers, the otherwise unknown
Wang Yen-fu, to administer the south as prefect of Ch’üan-chou. Wang Yenfu died in 894 and was succeeded by Wang Shen-kuei, now the eldest of
Wang Ch’ao’s surviving brothers. By 892 the Wang brothers ruled a central
administration in Fu-chou and a nominally subordinate center in the south,
based in Ch’üan-chou.
Although historians often treat Fu-chien of the ninth century as a single
geopolitical entity, it is among the most topographically fractured regions
of the T’ang empire. Fu-chou, located near the mouth of the Min River and
linked to the interior by the river, was the political and economic center of
the northern part of Fu-chien. Fu-chou and the territory tied to it had been
the region most directly controlled by Ch’en Yen. By contrast, Ch’üan-chou
was isolated from the north by mountains and formed a natural center for
the southern coastal regions because of its excellent natural harbor. This had
been the sphere Wang Ch’ao first controlled. These two geographic subdivisions of the Fu-chien region had been administratively unified since 742
when the southern prefectures were transferred from the jurisdiction of Lingnan circuit to Chiang-nan circuit and a new network of circuit officials was
formed.68
There is no reason to believe that relations between Wang Ch’ao and his
brother Shen-kuei were strained. Wang Ch’ao’s death in 898, however, set
off a crisis. Wang Shen-kuei, as the oldest surviving brother, was in line to
succeed as leader, and would likely have to move to Fu-chou, the established
seat of regional administration. But Wang Shen-chih, the next oldest brother,
was already established there, holding the all-embracing title director of military and civil affairs (chih chün-fu shih). Thus, while Wang Shen-kuei held
uncontested authority in the south, his brother Wang Shen-chih controlled
the entire military and civil apparatus in the north. Not surprisingly under
such circumstances, Wang Shen-kuei declined to abandon his secure southern
base and place himself at his younger brother’s mercy, opting instead to yield
his rights to the northern title to Wang Shen-chih.69 As the tenth century
began, there was a fundamental split in the emerging polity of the Wang
family, a split that was to endure throughout the interregnum until the Sung
unification.
68
69
This division between north and south in Fu-chien is explored in chapter 3 of Clark, Community, trade,
and networks; see also Hugh R. Clark, “Quanzhou (Fujian) during the Tang-Song interregnum 879–978,”
T’oung Pao 68 Nos. 1–3 (1982), pp. 132–49.
TCTC 261, p. 8511.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 153
Southern Han
South of Fu-chien lay Ling-nan, the territory of the Southern Han state. When
Huang Ch’ao returned north after sacking Kuang-chou in 879, he must have
left a shattered city and an absence of authority, as he did everywhere else.
Unfortunately, there are no records of these events. However, the Hsin T’angshu tells us that one Liu Ch’ien occupied Feng-chou2, a small prefecture on the
Hsi River west of Kuang-chou, and that he extended his power as far away as
Kuei-chou3 (modern Kuei-lin). Liu Ch’ien’s administration brought peace to
the region, and refugees flocked to him, providing him with the base to build
a sizable army as well as a navy.70 Liu Ch’ien died in 894 and was succeeded
by his son Liu Yin.71
Liu Yin is certainly unique among the founders of the interregnum states.
He was not Han Chinese, although he was also not from the Middle East as was
once claimed.72 Most sources state that the family was native to Shang-ts’ai
county (Honan). This claim probably derives from an attempt by Liu Yin’s
family to mask their ancestry and enhance their credibility in the Chinese
world of the tenth century. In fact, the Lius were hereditary chieftains of one
of the many non-Chinese tribes that lived in the far south, the people whom
the Chinese lumped together as Man.
The first concrete evidence we have of the family concerns the marriage of
Liu Ch’ien to the niece of Wei Chou, military governor of Ling-nan, during the
Hsien-t’ung era (860–73).73 Wei Chou had been dispatched to Ling-nan at a
critical period in the T’ang struggle to control its southern frontier. In addition
to the problems arising from the rebellions of Ch’iu Fu and P’ang Hsün in
the lands below the Yangtze River, a pattern of local unrest and rebellion
against Chinese rule that had persisted through much of the ninth century in
the Annamese prefectures of the Red River valley was now being aggravated
by threats on the T’ang dynasty’s southwest frontier from the aggressive Nanchao kingdom.74 Wei Chou had earned a reputation for successfully cultivating
cordial relationships with minority peoples,75 and this was no doubt a factor
70
71
72
73
74
75
See Ou-yang, Hsin T’ang shu 190, p. 5493. The Hsin T’ang shu gives Liu’s personal name as Chih-ch’ien;
however, all other sources call him Liu Ch’ien, including TCTC .
On Liu Yin, see CWTS 135, pp. 1807–9; Ou-yang, Hsin Wu-tai shih 65, pp. 809–10; Wu, Shih-kuo
ch’un-ch’iu 58, pp. 835–8.
Fujita Toyohachi, “Nan-Kan Ryū-shi no sosen ni tsuite,” Tōyō gakuhō 6 No. 2 (1916), pp. 247–57.
Fujita’s argument has been thoroughly debunked in Kawahara Masahiro, “Nan-Kan Ryū-shi no kōki,”
in his Kan minzoku Kanan hattenshi kenkyū (Tokyo, 1984), pp. 229–53. The following treatment is based
entirely on Kawahara’s excellent discussion.
Sun Kuang-hsien, Pei-meng so-yen [Ya-yü t’ang ts’ang-shu 1756 ed.] (10th c.; Taipei, 1966) 6, p. 2b.
See Somers, “The end of the T’ang,” pp. 692–5.
See Kawahara, Kan minzoku Kanan hattenshi kenkyū, pp. 134–5.
154
hugh r. clark
in his selection to serve in Ling-nan at this difficult time. Seen in this light,
the marriage alliance Wei Chou forged with Liu Ch’ien was part of his policy
for maintaining the loyalty and quiescence of those peoples, and was proof of
the prominent role Liu Ch’ien played among them. Liu Ch’ien was no doubt
the only figure to exercise any viable authority in the regions west of Kuangchou in the aftermath of Huang Ch’ao’s devastating campaign through the
far south. T’ang authority in the region had been shattered. Thus when the
T’ang court formally recognized Liu Ch’ien’s control of Feng-chou2 early in
the 880s it was a symbolic acceptance of a military reality and an effort to
ensure Liu’s ongoing loyalty to the declining T’ang cause. And although Liu
Ch’ien and his heir, Liu Yin, could surely have rejected the overtures, they no
doubt viewed the imprimatur of the T’ang court as a useful adjunct to their
efforts to extend their control to additional prefectures and the Man who lived
in them.
Liu Yin, in turn, demonstrated his loyalty to the T’ang dynasty in 896.
The T’ang court appointed a prince of the royal family as the new military governor of Kuang-chou to maintain control over the lucrative revenues
derived from the South Seas trade. In response to the T’ang court’s efforts to
reestablish a strong political presence in the region, two local militia leaders
(ya-chiang) attempted to assert their independence and resist the new governor.
The two militia leaders approached Liu Yin to seek an alliance, even promising a daughter in marriage. Liu Yin, however, launched a sneak attack against
the militiamen, overwhelming them, and welcomed the prince to his post. In
return, Liu was named adjutant (hsing-chün ssu-ma) in Kuang-chou.76 In the
years that followed, Liu Yin loyally served a succession of governors dispatched
by the T’ang court.77 Early in 902 he was rewarded again by being appointed
commandant of Kuang-chou. This promotion was the first recognition of his
own growing power.78 Liu Yin’s position was formalized when he was named
military governor of Kuang-chou sometime around the fall of the T’ang and
rise of the first of the northern dynasties, the Liang, in 907.79 But his authority was probably not far-reaching, including just Kuang-chou and his original
base of Feng-chou2, as well as the prefectures in between. To his north he
was threatened by Lu Kuang-ch’ou, who controlled Shao-chou, located on the
south side of the mountains from his base in the southern Kiangsi region,
and by Ma Yin in Hunan, who had seized the northern prefectures of western
76
77
78
79
TCTC 260, p. 8496.
TCTC 262, p. 8533.
TCTC 262, p. 8565.
The first evidence that Liu Yin held the title military governor is in an entry dated 907 in TCTC 266,
p. 8680; it does not tell us when the title was granted.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 155
Ling-nan in 900.80 Nor was Liu Yin’s authority very effective to his west,
which was brought under control only in 911, by Liu Yin’s successor, Liu Yen,
who formally established the Southern Han state in 917.81
Former Shu
The last region to consider in this preliminary survey is Szechwan, home of
the successor states of Former and Later Shu. Even though Huang Ch’ao never
entered the region, Szechwan was uniquely affected by his rebellion. For when
Huang returned to north China and attacked the imperial capital of Ch’angan late in 880, he prompted Emperor T’ang Hsi-tsung (r. 873–88) to flee to
the west and ultimately to Szechwan, where he remained until 885. Thus for
five years Szechwan had to bear the burden of the imperial presence by itself,
a burden that was magnified by the financial claims of the T’ang court and
the rapacious corruption of the officials surrounding the emperor, especially
the eunuch T’ien Ling-tzu and his brother Ch’en Ching-hsüan, the military
governor of western Szechwan.82
Even as the T’ang court cowered in Ch’eng-tu, a pattern of breakdown and
rebellion similar to that occurring elsewhere became manifest in Szechwan.
The largest and most threatening uprising was that led by Ch’ien Neng, but
Ch’ien was only one of several rebel leaders as unrest spread across Szechwan
in the early 880s.83 When imperial forces proved incapable of maintaining
security, local structures led by indigenous leaders such as Wei Chün-ching
evolved in their place.84
The emperor and his court returned to the capital in early 885. Order began
to be restored in Szechwan late in the 880s as new, independent figures emerged
and replaced the corrupt and discredited appointees of the T’ang court. Of
these, Wang Chien was the most important.85 Wang Chien probably was born
80
81
82
83
84
85
On the incursion of Ma Yin into western Ling-nan, see TCTC 262, pp. 8535–6. On Lu Kuang-ch’ou
seizing Shao-chou, see TCTC 263, p. 8589.
See TCTC 267, p. 8733, and 268, pp. 8749–50.
On the difficulties and burdens that Szechwan suffered while hosting the court, see Matsui Shōichi, “Tōdai
kōhanki no Shisen – kanryō shihai to dogōsō no shutsugen o chūshin to shite,” Shigaku zasshi 73 No. 10
(1964), pp. 73–9. For a more general discussion in the context of the history of the Former and Later
Shu kingdoms, see chapter 1 of Yang Wei-li, Ch’ien Shu Hou Shu shih (Ch’eng-tu, 1986), and chapters 5
and 6 of Klaus-Peter Tietze, Ssuch’uan vom 7. bis 10. Jahrhundert: Untersuchungen zur frühen Geschichte einer
chinesischen Provinz (Wiesbaden, 1980).
On Ch’ien Neng, see Somers, “The end of the T’ang,” pp. 748–50. See also Kuo Yün-tao, Shu chien
[Shou-shan-ko ts’ung-shu 1844 ed.; 1922] (13th c.; Taipei, 1968) 7, pp. 5b–7b.
On Wei Chün-ching, see the discussion in Somers, “The end of the T’ang,” pp. 750–1, and the secondary
literature Somers cites.
Sources on the rise of Wang Chien are legion. For a sampling, see Chang T’ang-ying, Shu t’ao-wu [I-hai
chu-ch’en c. 1800 ed.; 1850] (11th c.; Taipei, 1968) shang, pp. 2b–5a; Kuo, Shu chien 7, pp. 8b–14b; Wu,
156
hugh r. clark
in 848, making him very nearly the same age as his fellow brigands Ch’ien
Liu and Yang Hsing-mi.86 Like Ma Yin, Wang was from Hsü-chou2, where
his father was a baker. Wang apparently tried a career as a butcher, but he was
no more attracted to the legitimate life than Ch’ien Liu or Yang Hsing-mi.
When we first hear of Wang Chien’s illegal activities he was already rustling
livestock and trading illegally in salt, and had earned the sobriquet Bandit
Wang Eight (Tsei Wang Pa) from his villagers. By the 870s, however, Wang and
his gang had outgrown the limited sphere of village thuggery and had begun
to operate over a much wider area, a pattern that exactly echoes the evolution
of the careers of Ch’ien Liu and Yang Hsing-mi. Chang T’ang-ying (1029–71),
author of the Shu t’ao-wu, tells us that “Wang Chien and [his close comrade]
Chin Hui were united in banditry. They pillaged around Hsü-chou2 and Ts’aichou, and they hid out in the wastelands.”87 As the group expanded its sphere
of operations, it began to exert a deep influence over the people, as is revealed
in a curious episode that must have occurred in the mid-870s.88 Wang and
Chin had been captured following a raid in Hsü-chou2 and were about to be
executed. In the face of imminent death, however, they were inexplicably freed
by their jailor. Although this escape is attributed to the jailor’s recognizing
that Wang Chien was a remarkable person, more plausibly it was because he
was afraid of offending so powerful a gang.
It is unclear whether Wang Chien formed an alliance with Huang Ch’ao,
but when Huang moved south early in 878, Wang Chien stayed behind in
Honan where he was again free to pursue his own agenda, one that apparently focused on the illegal trade in salt between the Honan and northwestern Hunan regions.89 Yet in 880 when Huang Ch’ao headed north along a
route that aimed directly at western Honan, Wang Chien opted to enroll
his band under Ch’in Tsung-ch’üan, who while remaining loyal to the T’ang
court had emerged as a major force in Ts’ai-chou. Ch’in Tsung-ch’üan placed
Wang and his band under the command of Lu Yen-hung, himself a native of
86
87
88
89
Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu 35, pp. 481–503; and TCTC 257–66. For biographies of Wang, see additionally
CWTS 135, pp. 1815–19; Ou-yang, Hsin Wu-tai shih 63, pp. 783–96; Lu, Chiu-kuo chih 6, p. 51; and
Wu-kuo ku-shih (c. 11th c.; Shanghai, 1921) shang, pp. 9b–10b.
The following discussion of the background of Wang Chien is drawn from the marvelous detective work
of Satake Yasuhiko, “Ō-Shoku seiken seiritsu no zentei ni tsuite,” Tōyō Bunka Kenkyūjo kiyō 99 (1986),
pp. 21–69. On Wang’s early life, see also Yang, Ch’ien Shu Hou Shu shih, pp. 15–49.
Chang, Shu t’ao-wu shang, pp. 12a–b.
This episode is closely examined by Satake, “Ō-Shoku seiken seiritsu,” pp. 27–8. The several references
to this episode (Chang, Shu t’ao-wu shang, pp. 3a, 12b, and T’ao, Wu-tai shih-pu 1, p. 6a), show clearly
that there was a foundation to the story, although, as Satake argues, Wang was anxious to hide it from
later historians.
Satake, “Ō-Shoku seiken seiritsu,” pp. 25–33, may argue too strongly that Wang actually joined Huang’s
rebellion. See also pp. 30–2 and especially the interesting discussion on pp. 42–52.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 157
Hsü-chou2, and when Huang Ch’ao overwhelmed the T’ang capital of Ch’angan, Lu Yen-hung was dispatched with eight thousand troops, including those
led by Wang Chien, to join the Chung-wu army commanded by the eunuch
Yang Fu-kuang in a counterattack. After Huang Ch’ao had been expelled,
Yang Fu-kuang organized these forces into eight regiments of one thousand
troops each, giving Wang Chien one of the eight regimental commands.90
When Yang died in 882, Lu Yen-hung assumed leadership of the eight regiments and set out to the west, ostensibly to join the T’ang court in Szechwan.
Although Lu Yen-hung’s unexpected seizure of Hsing-yüan, the strategic center of the upper Han River valley, estranged him from Wang Chien, Wang
found an even more powerful sponsor in T’ien Ling-tzu, who assigned him to
the Shen-ts’e army – the emperor’s personal guard.
Just as Wang Chien prospered while T’ien Ling-tzu held power, Wang also
suffered when T’ien withdrew from the T’ang court in 886. As part of T’ien
Ling-tzu’s retinue Wang Chien was demoted to serve as prefect of Li-chou2,
which controlled the mountain roads between Hsing-yüan and the Szechwan
Basin. At this point Wang Chien broke with the crumbling order of the T’ang
court and began to operate on his own, a step that earned him the scornful label
of “rural bandit” (ts’ao-tsei).91 Wang Chien proceeded to consolidate his power
over the rest of Szechwan through the remainder of the ninth century. By 891,
Wang had wrested control of Ch’eng-tu and western Szechwan from Ch’en
Ching-hsüan and his former patron T’ien Ling-t’zu.92 Over the next decade
Wang moved against Li Mao-chen in northern Szechwan and Ku Yen-hui in
the east, eventually securing complete mastery over Szechwan and the upper
Han River basin by 902. Szechwan was to remain under Wang family control
until the 920s.93
In its final years, the T’ang court began to ennoble several men who were
carving out autonomous spheres of power. In 902, Ch’ien Liu was enfeoffed as
King of Yüeh (Yüeh wang) and Yang Hsing-mi as King of Wu (Wu wang).94
In 903, Wang Chien was named King of Shu (Shu wang).95 Others did not
receive royal titles from the T’ang, but each was granted honorific titles, such
as joint manager of affairs (t’ung p’ing-chang shih), that were normally granted
to T’ang chief ministers, in addition to their designations as military governor.
When they succeeded to power, the Later Liang court recognized such men
with new titles: Ch’ien Liu was named King of Wu-Yüeh (Wu-Yüeh wang) in
90
91
92
93
94
95
TCTC 254, p. 8252.
Sun, Pei-meng so-yen 5, p. 8b. See also the description in Ou-yang, Hsin T’ang shu 224 hsia, p. 6407.
On Wang’s campaign against Ch’en and T’ien, see TCTC 258, especially pp. 8413–19.
TCTC 259, p. 8438; 260, pp. 8501–9; 263, pp. 8580–1.
See TCTC 263, p. 8575, and 263, p. 8573, respectively.
TCTC 264, p. 8613.
158
hugh r. clark
907; Ma Yin became King of Ch’u (Ch’u wang); Wang Shen-chih was named
King of Min (Min wang) in 909; and Liu Yin was appointed first King of
Ta-p’eng (Ta-p’eng wang) in 907, and then King of Nan-p’ing (Nan-p’ing wang)
in 909.96 Although both the T’ang and the Later Liang title “king” (wang)
might seem to convey the same significance, a note in the Tzu-chih t’ung-chien
explains their import. The earlier T’ang enfeoffments as wang had been as chünwang (commandery king).97 The Later Liang titles were the more prestigious
kuo-wang (nation king). Of the seven southern states, only tiny Ching-nan
(i.e., Nan-p’ing), still in commandery status did not yet have a recognized
kuo-wang.
early political recruitment
The founders of the southern kingdoms were mainly from ordinary backgrounds without strong claims to hereditary privilege. Only Wang Ch’ao,
who established the foundations of the Min kingdom of Fu-chien, had any
claim to standing among the elite, and even that claim appears to have been
quite marginal. Not surprisingly, the early followers of the founders were of
equally common stock. As these founders achieved political and military success they increasingly drew educated men into their service. Earlier, however,
their political recruitment was largely locally based. The founders sought out
and promoted followers who were trustworthy and above all good fighters.
This trend is most readily apparent in the rise of Wang Chien and his
associates.98 For example, the father of Chin Hui, one of Wang Chien’s earliest
and closest comrades, was probably a tradesman in Hsü-chou2 who opted to
join Wang Chien in banditry.99 Many of those who followed Wang Chien
into Szechwan were first tied to him through the Chung-wu army, the force
commanded by the eunuch Yang Fu-kuang into which Wang had enrolled
his gang early in the 880s. No doubt many of these, like Chin Hui, had
been Wang Chien’s comrades even before he enrolled under Ch’in Tsungch’üan, and there are several who specifically traced their ancestry to the Hsüchou2 prefectural city. But the most revealing group is the astonishingly large
96
97
98
99
See TCTC 266, pp. 8674, 8680, 8708.
TCTC 266, p. 8674.
For a similar discussion, see Yang, Ch’ien Shu Hou Shu shih, pp. 55–6.
Wu, Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu 40, p. 595. Lu, Chiu-kuo chih 6, p. 61, tells us that Chin Hui’s father was an
officer (lieh-hsiao) in the Chung-wu army – the force within which Wang Chien, Chin Hui, and others
were enrolled under Yang Fu-kuang. Although possible, this conflicts with the evidence from the more
immediately contemporary Chien-chieh lu (Ho Kuang-yüan, Chien-chieh lu [Hsüeh-chin t’ao-yüan 1805 ed.;
1922] [Taipei, 1965]) as well as with that in the much later Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu. I am inclined to view
the Chiu-kuo chih as reflecting an effort to cover up Chin Hui’s true origins and to accept the evidence of
the Chien-chieh lu. See also Chang, Shu t’ao-wu shang, p. 11a.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 159
number of men whom Wang Chien adopted and honored with his surname
“Wang” and the same generational name “Tsung” as his natural sons. Ssu-ma
Kuang claimed that there were over one hundred and twenty such adoptees.100
Biographical information survives on forty-three of them, although in most
cases it is very scant.101 This group included several of Wang Chien’s kinsmen,
all of whom no doubt shared his social background and had presumably been
members of his band from the early days. Others, such as Wang Tsung-pi
and Wang Tsung-k’an – both of whom were important in the campaigns
to gain control of Szechwan and subsequently held high office in Wang’s
kingdom – were natives of Hsü-chou2, raising the possibility that they too
had served Wang before he joined the Chung-wu army. The majority of this
group have left no trace of their origins, yet it is surely reasonable to conclude
that almost without exception they came from undistinguished backgrounds.
Nevertheless these men functioned at the core of Wang Chien’s administration.
They earned his favor not because of proper family background or because
of scholarship, qualifications of the traditional elite, but because of merit
earned on the battlefield. They represented, in short, an entirely new elite that
had taken advantage of the unique context of the late ninth century and the
emerging order of the interregnum to claim their position.
Similar patterns can be discerned among the early followers of all the
founders. As the new order emerged across the south in the closing decades of
the ninth century it propelled an entirely new elite to the fore. The leadership
of the southern kingdoms was largely composed of men whose families had
never been involved in positions of leadership before. One final specific case
will help complete this point. As has been described in earlier passages, the
Min kingdom was founded by Wang Ch’ao and his brothers after their long
migration from Kuang-chou2 prefecture in Huai-nan. The brothers arrived
in Fu-chien with an army of five thousand men; although we might imagine
that they had picked up new followers and had lost some of their original
ones as they made their way through the hills of the Kiangsi region, the band
that finally settled in Ch’üan-chou in the mid-880s was identified as being
“from Kuang-chou2.” The group was clearly made up of men who were not
native to Fu-chien, men who had abandoned their homes and set off on a
venture, going they knew not where. They were men who could pick up and
go because they had very little to leave behind. But once in Fu-chien, this
100
101
TCTC 267, p. 8728; we know of approximately one-third of the adoptees. For discussions of this
practice in general and as it was carried out by Wang Chien, see Kurihara, “Tō-Godai no kafushiteki
ketsugō no seikaku,” pp. 1–30; and his “Tōmatsu Godai no kafushiteki ketsugō ni okeru seimei to
nenrei,” Tōyō gakuhō 38 No. 4 (1956), pp. 61–88.
This and the following discussion is based on Wu, Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu 40. Where possible, the discussion
is supplemented with additional information from Lu, Chiu-kuo chih.
160
hugh r. clark
band became a reservoir from which a new elite was drawn. In later centuries,
as the tradition of compiling family genealogies became deeply ingrained in
the acutely lineage-conscious society of Fu-chien, many claimed descent from
these migrants. Although modern scholarship has cast doubt on the validity
of some of these lineage claims,102 they would not have been made if there was
not some benefit in doing so. In the society of the Min kingdom and of later
Fu-chien it was socially advantageous to be connected with the migrants; that
can only be because they had established themselves as the core of the local
elite. This is a case where a truly déclassé group – wandering bandits who had
left their homes on an uncertain journey because they had so little at stake to
begin with – took advantage of the social and political upheaval of the period
to completely change their social position and thereby to recast the social order
of a whole region. And significantly, the enduring value of claiming descent
from these migrants despite the passage of decades and centuries argues that
many managed to firmly ensconce themselves in the local elite stratum for
generations to come.
As the southern order took shape and stability returned, and in some cases
even before then, the new rulers, despite their questionable backgrounds,
began to attract men whose own origins placed them among the traditional
elite. This was especially, but not uniquely, true of the three richest and most
prominent states: the Chiang-Huai successor kingdoms of Wu and Southern
T’ang, the lower Yangtze state of Wu-Yüeh, and the Szechwanese states of
Former and Later Shu. Some of those who opted to join the new regimes were
local natives, members of a nationally oriented elite that had gradually emerged
throughout the south during the centuries of the T’ang dynasty that provided
a reservoir of classically trained and traditionally oriented men on whom the
new leadership could draw. Others were migrants from the north, men whose
families had been part of the entrenched and powerful elite lineages that had
dominated China’s empires for centuries but who had now abandoned their
ancestral homes in favor of the greater stability of the south.
As these new recruits joined the hard-edged regimes of the founders, they
began to change the character of their states. Under Yang Hsing-mi, for example, there had been very few men with a civil – as opposed to military – background who held prominent positions in the Wu kingdom.103 However, in the
early years of the tenth century, as the Wu kingdom stabilized and matured
102
103
See Aoyama, “Newly-risen bureaucrats.”
Nishikawa Masao claims there were only two: Yen K’o-ch’iu and Lo Chih-hsiang, both of whom were
more closely associated with Yang Hsing-mi’s advisor Hsü Wen than with Yang himself. All the rest,
Nishikawa argues, had risen through the ranks of the military in Yang’s early campaigns of conquest.
See Nishikawa Masao, “Go, Nan-Tō ryō ōchō no kokka kenryoku no seikaku: Sōdai kokuseishi kenkyū
josetsu no tame ni, sono ichi,” Hōseishi kenkyū 9 (1958), pp. 95–171.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 161
in a process closely tied to the emerging power of Yang Hsing-mi’s advisor
Hsü Wen and his adopted son Hsü Chih-kao, scholastic talent came to be
more appreciated than military genius. As one modern scholar put it: “There
occurred a shift from military prowess to political acumen as the measure for
prestige and from the battlefield to the princely court as the main arena for
action.”104 Or as Ma Ling wrote in his biography of Hsü Chih-kao: “When
the Wu kingdom was first stabilized, local officials were all of military background, and the taxes were levied to aid the military. Only Hsü Chih-kao (who
was appointed a prefectural magistrate in 912) was fond of scholarship. He
welcomed those who practiced Confucian ritual, and was personally able to
promote frugality. His administration was humane, and (people) were attracted
to it from far and near.”105 Later, commenting upon Hsü Wen’s appointment
of Hsü Chih-kao to be his heir apparent, head of the Hsü family, and regent
of the Wu kingdom, Ma wrote: “[Hsü Chih-kao] established a guest hall to
accommodate scholars from every direction, and he promoted Sung Ch’i-ch’iu,
Lo Chih-hsiang and Wang Ling-mou to be ‘scholars in residence’ (kuan-k’o
shih).”106 The changing character of the Wu kingdom is perhaps most clearly
manifested by the reintroduction of civil service examinations in 909, shortly
after Hsü Wen had usurped the power, though not the title, of the Wu throne.
This development reflects Hsü’s emphasis on the demilitarization of administration. Under Hsü Wen, Wu was the first post-T’ang state to revive the
examinations.107
A similar process was underway in the other southern kingdoms. As Wang
Chien in 907 pondered whether to assume the imperial title, for example, the
debate was led by Feng Chüan, who opposed such a move, and Wei Chuang,
who was its leading advocate. Feng Chüan was a native of the Liang-che
region, a recipient of a chin-shih degree in 850, and the grandson of Feng
Su, who had been president of the Board of Personnel early in the ninth
century. Feng Chüan held prefectural office in Szechwan when Wang Chien
was consolidating his state late in the ninth century, and Feng offered his
service to the new order.108 Wei Chuang, a native of Ling-nan, similarly held
a chin-shih degree which he earned in the 890s. His father had been an official
in the T’ang bureaucracy, and his grandfather had been a grand secretary
under Emperor T’ang Hsiuan-tsung (846–59).109 Neither man had been part
of Wang Chien’s military campaigns, and they are representative of a very
104
105
106
107
108
109
Krompart, “The southern restoration of T’ang,” p. 116.
Ma Ling, Ma-shih Nan T’ang shu (1105; Shanghai, 1934) 1, p. 1b.
Ma, Ma-shih Nan T’ang shu 1, p. 3a.
TCTC 267, p. 8709.
Wu, Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu 40, pp. 589–91. See also TCTC (1972) 266, p. 8685.
Wu, Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu 40, p. 592.
162
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important group within Wang’s government. As Ssu-ma Kuang wrote of the
debate, “At this time, many of the families of the great officials (i-kuan chih
tsu) had fled to Shu [Szechwan] to avoid the chaos, and the Lord of Shu [Wang
Chien] treated them with courtesy and utilized them.”110
Similarly, as Ch’ien Liu consolidated his control over the Liang-che region
he began to recruit men of more prestigious background. Wu Ch’eng, who
rose to the pinnacle of the Wu-Yüeh bureaucracy during the tenth century,
was the son of a T’ang chin-shih.111 The father of Yüan Te-chao, who also rose
to the highest ranks of the kingdom’s bureaucracy, served the T’ang dynasty
as prefect in a series of posts across Chiang-nan.112 P’i Jih-hsiu came from an
old family of Hsiang-chou. Like so many others, he fled the turmoil connected
with the late-ninth-century rebellions and wound up in Su-chou, where he
enlisted with Ch’ien Liu.113 T’u Kuei-chih’s family were long-time residents
of Ho-tung. His grandfather had moved to the south for unspecified reasons.
T’u Kuei-chih had tried his luck at the exams several times without success
when Ch’ien Liu came to power. T’u Kuei-chih then abandoned scholarship,
“grabbed a sword, and followed Ch’ien.”114 Shen Sung, a native of Fu-chou
(Fu-chien), was the son of a T’ang magistrate in Fu-chou’s Chang-hsi county. In
895, Shen Sung passed the palace examination in the imperial capital, thereby
earning his chin-shih, and was returning home to Fu-chien in triumph when
Ch’ien Liu detained and imposed offices upon him. Despite this inauspicious
beginning, Shen Sung went on to have a brilliant career in the Wu-Yüeh
bureaucracy.115
Many more examples of this trend in recruitment for the early southern
states could be given. Biographical information survives from every one of the
southern kingdoms on scholars who had fled the chaos of the north for the
greater tranquility of the south and wound up serving a southern lord: Han
Wo116 and Yang I-feng117 in Min, Li Yin-heng118 and Liu Chün119 in Southern
Han, Liu Ch’ang-lu120 and P’ang Chü-chao121 in Ch’u. And as the south
stabilized early in the tenth century, local scholars – men who shared the values
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
TCTC 266, p. 8685. See also the discussion in Yang, Ch’ien Shu Hou Shu shih, pp. 59–63.
Fan and Lin,Wu-Yüeh pei-shih 4, pp. 18a–b.
Fan and Lin, Wu-Yüeh pei-shih 5, pp. 19b–20a.
See TCTC 254, p. 8241; Fan and Lin, Wu-Yüeh pei-shih 3, pp. 3b–4a.
Wu, Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu 84, p. 1231.
Fan and Lin, Wu-Yüeh pei-shih 2, pp. 9a–b.
Ou-yang, Hsin T’ang shu 183, p. 5387; Wu, Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu 95, p. 1371.
Wu, Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu 95, p. 1372.
Wu, Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu 62, p. 889; Ou-yang, Hsin T’ang shu 72 shang, p. 2591.
Wu, Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu 62, p. 890.
Wu, Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu 73, p. 1007; Lu, Chiu-kuo chih 11, p. 11b.
Wu, Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu 73, pp. 1007–8.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 163
of the elite scholarly class rather than the rough-hewn values of the rulers –
emerged to play active roles everywhere. The politics and recruitment practices
of the early interregnum markedly reshaped social structures across the south,
a process that continued through the turnovers of the middle interregnum and
into the Sung dynasty.
political change, 920s–940s
Significant changes occurred in the political landscape as the interregnum
leadership moved into its second and third generations. In 925, Wang Yen,
son and successor to Wang Chien, the founder of the Former Shu kingdom
in Szechwan, was ousted from power by Later T’ang forces, whose campaign
commander Meng Chih-hsiang ten years later officially proclaimed a second, or
Later, Shu kingdom in 935. A smoother transition occurred in Chiang-Huai in
937 when Yang P’u, fourth son of Yang Hsing-mi and fourth to rule the region,
abdicated the throne in favor of Hsü Chih-kao, who took the surname Li and
proclaimed a restoration of the T’ang dynasty, the kingdom that historians call
the “Southern T’ang.” The most fundamental change took place in Fu-chien.
After a succession of increasingly inept rulers, that kingdom collapsed in the
mid-940s in the rubble of ceaseless civil war. In contrast to Szechwan and
Chiang-Huai, where the new regimes generally continued along established
paths, in Fu-chien the old order totally disappeared when the Min kingdom
was divided up among three groups: the predatory forces of the Southern T’ang,
which took the mountainous prefectures of the interior; the defensive forces of
the Wu-Yüeh kingdom, which absorbed Fu-chou; and an independent warlord
who seized control of Chang-chou and Ch’üan-chou prefectures along the coast
south of Fu-chou.122
Historians have traditionally blamed the fall of the Former Shu kingdom
on Wang Yen, whom they portray as a dissolute and cowardly ruler who took
no interest in government, frittered away the kingdom’s wealth, and refused to
acknowledge the threat presented by the Later T’ang: “Yen was young [he was
seventeen on assuming the throne] and given to carnal pleasures. He entrusted
his court to his officials . . . and surrounded himself with boors . . . Every night
he and his cronies drank and cavorted with women.”123 While there may well
be substantial truth to these characterizations, they oversimplify the matter in
the manner of the archetypal “bad last ruler” that is a stock figure in Chinese
122
123
The political changes discussed in this section are depicted in Map 2 in this volume.
Ou-yang, Hsin Wu-tai shih 63, p. 971. For other contemporary biographies of Wang Yen, see CWTS
136, pp. 1819–22; and Chang, Shu t’ao-wu shang, pp. 13a–23a. See also TCTC 270–3; Wu, Shih-kuo
ch’un-ch’iu 37, pp. 531–56, and Yang, Ch’ien Shu Hou Shu shih, pp. 81–94.
164
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historiography. The fact is that much blame must be laid upon Wang Chien
himself.
Although Wang Chien was an extremely able military leader, he seems
to have been less able to judge the civil character of those who allied with
him. This failing was overcome in part by the quality of the civil officials
who flocked to the court in Ch’eng-tu. Many of these men had learned their
craft under the civil traditions of the T’ang dynasty, and they carried those
traditions with them. However, the security of the kingdom was disturbed
several times by rebellions instigated by some of Wang’s own early followers.
These insurrections culminated in a major uprising launched in 912 by Wang
Chien’s designated heir apparent Wang Yüan-yung, whom Ssu-ma Kuang
characterized as violent and uninterested in scholarship.124 Once Wang Yüanyung was killed and his uprising quelled, Wang Chien considered selecting
either his son Wang Tsung-lu, “whose face resembled his own,” or his son
Wang Tsung-chieh, “the most able of his sons,” as the new heir apparent. But
since Wang Chien was “old and infirm,” he could not make the decision. His
favorite courtesan then stepped in and persuaded him instead to name her
son, Wang Yen, the youngest and least prepared of his sons, to be the heir.125
Unwisely, Wang Chien, who had managed to consolidate virtually all power
in his own hands, on his death in the summer of 968 bequeathed that power
to a woefully inadequate successor.
Wang Chien’s administration had continued to pursue an aggressive policy
against his neighbor to the north, Li Mao-chen, the autonomous ruler of the
region that included Feng-hsiang and the upper Wei River valley. While a
series of campaigns that the two fought between 911 and 918 proved inconclusive,126 the conflict did weaken the forces of both Shu and Li Mao-chen. When
the Sha-t’o Turks overthrew the Later Liang and founded the Later T’ang
dynasty in 923, Li Mao-chen quickly submitted to the new order, thereby
removing his realm as a useful buffer between Szechwan and the northern
regime.
Li Ts’un-hsü, the Sha-t’o founder of the Later T’ang, quickly availed himself of this new opening to launch an invasion of Szechwan in late 925.
Popular and elite alienation from Wang Yen led to massive defections and
paved the way for the Later T’ang armies to enter Ch’eng-tu before the end
of the year. After the conquest, the Later T’ang court restored the traditional division of Szechwan into two halves, appointing Meng Chih-hsiang
to be military governor of the west and Tung Chang military governor of the
124
125
126
See TCTC 266, pp. 8689, 8692–3; 268, pp. 8756, 8773–6.
Ou-yang, Hsin Wu-tai shih 63, p. 791.
See Yang, Ch’ien Shu Hou Shu shih, pp. 68–72.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 165
east.127 Meng Chih-hsiang and his father, though of Chinese descent, had both
served in the Sha-t’o court of Li K’o-yung and Li Ts’un-hsü, where they had
been close associates of the rulers and had held high office. Li K’o-yung had
even given his niece to Meng Chih-hsiang to be his wife. But the good relations
between Meng and the Later T’ang court collapsed following the assassination
of Li Ts’un-hsü in 926 and the coup of Li Ssu-yüan, with whom Meng had no
prior relationship. Both Meng Chih-hsiang and Tung Chang feared that the
new emperor resented their control over the fabulous wealth of Szechwan, and
they began laying plans to break away from the new court.128
For awhile, Meng Chih-hsiang and Tung Chang successfully overcame their
rivalry over control of Szechwan salt revenues to form an alliance against the
Later T’ang even as the court laid plans to invade Shu again.129 Late in 930
the Later T’ang launched its forces against Tung Chang in the east, providing
Meng Chih-hsiang an opportunity to assert control over the combined forces
of eastern and western Szechwan. Two years later, Meng’s troops killed Tung
Chang, giving Meng Chih-hsiang control of all Szechwan.130
In the aftermath of Tung Chang’s death and Meng Chih-hsiang’s consolidation of authority, an effort at rapprochement between Meng and Li Ssu-yüan
ensued, but the effort became irrelevant with Li Ssu-yüan’s death late in 933.
On hearing of the emperor’s demise, Meng Chih-hsiang said to those around
him: “The new emperor is young and weak, while those now in charge of the
government are petty clerks and incompetents. We can just wait until everything breaks down.”131 Within a month Meng Chih-hsiang had proclaimed
himself emperor of a revived Shu kingdom, which was to endure under his
family until its eradication by Sung forces in 965.132
In the Chiang-Huai region the new order actually began to take shape long
before the transition from Wu to Southern T’ang in 937. Through the first
two decades of the tenth century, Hsü Wen had emerged as the preeminent
power in the region. Although the children of Yang Hsing-mi continued to
hold the throne of the kingdom in their capital at Kuang-ling (modern Yangchou) following their father’s death in 905, Hsü Wen had used his control over
127
128
129
130
131
132
TCTC 274, pp. 8947, 8949. Biographies of Meng Chih-hsiang, on which most of the following
discussion is based, can be found in CWTS 136, pp. 1822–3; Ou-yang, Hsin Wu-tai shih 64, pp. 797–
803; Chang, Shu t’ao-wu hsia, pp. 1a–3b; Wu, Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu 48, pp. 679–704. See also the
discussion in Yang, Ch’ien Shu Hou Shu shih, pp. 107–8.
Ou-yang, Hsin Wu-tai shih 64, p. 798. See also TCTC 275, pp. 8991–2, for Meng Chih-hsiang’s
organization of defenses.
On the control of salt, see TCTC 276, p. 9015. On the alliance between Meng Chih-hsiang and Tung
Chang, see TCTC 277, pp. 9038–9.
On the conflict and Tung Chang’s death, see TCTC 277, pp. 9068–71.
TCTC 278, p. 9097.
TCTC 278, p. 9102.
166
hugh r. clark
personnel appointments to monopolize power by placing followers – notably
his sons – in strategic positions in Yang-chou and throughout the kingdom.
At his own base in Chin-ling (modern Nanking) he even created a second court
that paralleled in many ways the official court in Kuang-ling.133
In the second decade of the tenth century Hsü Wen confronted perhaps his
greatest challenge: how best to perpetuate the power of his family that he had
so assiduously built up. His problem was that his oldest son, Hsü Chih-hsün,
the designated heir, whom he had assigned to watch over the Wu ruler, Yang
Lung-yen (r. 908–20), at the court in Kuang-ling, was an intemperate and
mean-spirited person who alienated many of those around him. In 918 an
angered courtier assassinated Hsü Chih-hsün.134 Hsü Wen then designated
his adopted son, Hsü Chih-kao, to be his eyes and ears in Kuang-ling. Hsü
Wen returned “to [his own base in] Chin-ling, from where he managed the
general policy of the Wu Kingdom. But the day to day issues of government
were now all decided by Chih-kao.”135 In the decade that followed, the power
of the Hsü family continued to grow. In 920, as Yang Lung-yen’s health failed,
Hsü Wen engineered the rejection of Yang Hsing-mi’s third son, the mature
and vigorous Yang Meng, as the heir apparent in favor of Yang Meng’s younger
and weaker brother, Yang P’u. When Yang P’u succeeded to the throne shortly
afterward, the Hsüs had the most pliable Yang ruler thus far.
Hsü Chih-kao’s rise to power encountered its most serious challenge in the
fall of 927 when his adopted father and patron died. Many who had been close to
Hsü Wen worried that Hsü Chih-kao might usurp the Hsü family patrimony
and deny Hsü Wen’s children and allies the fruits of their successes. In the end,
that is exactly what happened, although it is impossible to be certain whether
Hsü Chih-kao was driven by his desire to exclude his stepfather’s sons and
allies, or by their combined opposition to him.136 By 931, however, following
four years of maneuvering during which he maintained his base in Yang-chou,
133
134
135
136
These and all the following events are discussed in chapters 3–5 of Krompart, “The southern restoration
of T’ang.” I have relied heavily on this work for narrative detail.
TCTC 269, p. 8797; 270, pp. 8827–30.
TCTC 270, p. 8831.
Both Krompart’s “The southern restoration of T’ang” and Nishikawa’s “Go, Nan-Tō ryō ōchō” have
examined the differences between the men who allied themselves with Hsü Wen and those who followed
Hsü Chih-kao. Hsü Wen’s adherents, they conclude, were primarily men of military background who
had risen out of the turmoil of the collapsing T’ang; many had long been allies of Hsü Wen, and
others simply shared his experience. Hsü Chih-kao’s adherents, in contrast, were characteristically of
civil background. Hsü Chih-kao was particularly a magnet to civil officials who had fled the turmoil
of the north and sought shelter in the Chiang-Huai region. It may well be that the break that occurred
between Hsü Chih-kao and his father’s old allies was, in fact, forced by those old allies who had never
looked favorably upon Hsü Chih-kao and had consequently not been included in his inner circle of
advisors.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 167
Hsü Chih-kao had overcome all opposition to his hegemony. He then invoked
the model of his father by retiring to Chin-ling (Nanking) and assuming Hsü
Wen’s old titles. His own son, Hsü Ching-t’ung, remained in Yang-chou to
serve as his eyes and ears, just as he himself had served Hsü Wen.137
While Hsü Chih-kao now held all effective power in the region, the Yang
family remained on the throne. According to Ssu-ma Kuang, as early as 934
“Chih-kao had long planned to accept the abdication [of the Yang family], but
because they had not yet lost their virtue he feared that the masses would not
be supportive.”138 Between 934 and his formal assumption of the throne as
the first ruler of a restored (Southern) T’ang, Hsü Chih-kao and those around
him gradually built up his claim to rule while undermining the authority
and legitimacy of Yang P’u. So successful were they that in 937 Yang P’u
commanded Hsü Chih-kao to accept his abdication and assume an imperial
mandate. Late in that year Hsü Chih-kao proclaimed himself ruler of a kingdom
that he initially called Ch’i. This name was inspired by an honorary title Hsü
Chih-kao had held since Hsü Wen’s death and that Hsü Wen had held for
many years. Henceforth the Wu kingdom ceased to exist.139
Hsü Chih-kao’s final step in his consolidation of power was to claim the
mantle of the defunct T’ang dynasty. It is uncertain when he first conceived
of such a step. No doubt he was influenced by the collapse of the Later T’ang
dynasty in the north in 935 and the absence of any current claimant to the
T’ang mandate. But to take such a step was momentous. The T’ang mandate
was not just to rule a kingdom, a piece of the whole, the T’ang mandate
was to rule the entire empire. By invoking the T’ang mandate Hsü Chih-kao
distinguished his kingdom from all others that ruled in the south throughout
the interregnum. A carefully choreographed campaign to bolster Hsü’s claim
to the mandate got under way almost immediately after Hsü became King of
Ch’i. Portents were cited, pleas that he accept the mandate were orchestrated,
and a line of descent from the dynastic house of the T’ang (surnamed Li)
concocted.140 In 939, Hsü Chih-kao dropped the adopted surname “Hsü” in
favor of “Li,” changed his given name to “Pien,” and changed the name of his
kingdom to “T’ang.” Like the Later Shu, the Southern T’ang empire founded
by Li Pien (Hsü Chih-kao) was to persist until the close of the interregnum.
137
138
139
140
TCTC 277, pp. 9062–3; Ma, Ma-shih Nan T’ang shu 1, p. 3b.
TCTC 279, p. 9103. Krompart, “The southern restoration of T’ang,” appears to assume that Hsü
Chih-kao had resolved to usurp the throne much earlier; see especially pp. 228–37.
Ma, Ma-shih Nan T’ang shu 1, p. 4a. TCTC 281, p. 9182, narrates the event but says that Hsü Chih-kao
named his new kingdom “T’ang” from the beginning.
The legitimacy of the presumed descent has been witheringly scrutinized in Krompart, “The southern
restoration of T’ang,” pp. 272–80, and found wanting.
168
hugh r. clark
Fu-chien was the last area to experience political upheaval. Following the
possibly suspicious death in 925 of the able and popular Wang Shen-chih,
the Min kingdom had been plunged into an era of civil war as Wang Shenchih’s natal and adoptive sons competed for advantage.141 More than any other
kingdom, Min was composed of sharply different geographical regions. These
geographical differences were reflected in its fractured politics. In our earlier
discussion, we have already observed the break between Ch’üan-chou, the major
access point to the region’s south coast, and Fu-chou in the north of Min, where
the central court was located. T’ing-chou, located in the remote and mountainous southwest corner of Min and still today the most isolated part of Fu-chien,
was probably never effectively under the sway of the interregnum courts. Even
Chien-chou, up the Min River from the capital, Fu-chou, and presumably
subject to the court’s constant oversight, was regularly at odds with the rulers
in Fu-chou. The inability of the Min court to extend effective sway over the
kingdom’s nominal territory was compounded by its own instability; from the
mid-930s palace intrigue was chronic, assassination and regicide common.
Early in the 940s events in the region built toward a crescendo. Civil war
between Wang Yen-hsi, based in Fu-chou and the recognized ruler of Min,
and his brother Wang Yen-cheng, based in Chien-chou and the self-styled
emperor of a breakaway state called Great Yin, was devastating. Min’s finances
were desperate. Early in 944 the courtiers Chu Wen-chin and Lien Chungyü, most notable for their previous participation in the assassination of Wang
Ch’ang, fourth ruler of the kingdom, again joined in assassination, this time
against Wang Yen-hsi. Together they then announced to the shocked courtiers
that the heirs to Wang Shen-chih’s legacy were “licentious and cruel” and
should be replaced by a man of virtue. Chu Wen-chin humbly presented
himself as just such a person and took the title “Ruler of Min” (Min chu).142
In the stunned aftermath of Chu Wen-chin’s coup there was a general rally
from beyond Fu-chou supporting Wang Yen-cheng, who was able to briefly
restore his family’s rule. However, the assassination of Wang Yen-hsi opened
the doors to opportunists throughout the land, effectively ending the Wang
family’s control of the region.
In the northwest of Min, the neighboring Southern T’ang empire saw an
opportunity to expand and sent its armies into the mountains of Chien-chou,
141
142
The best account of events in Fu-chien remains Edward H. Schafer’s The empire of Min (Rutland, Vt.,
1954); see especially chapter 3. See also the narrative in T’ao, Wu-tai shih-lüeh, pp. 263–70. The
prefectures named in this discussion can be located on map 1, where Chien-chou is designated by its
alternate name of Chien-ning.
TCTC 284, pp. 9268–9. To consolidate his victory Chu Wen-chin seized all the members of the Wang
family and had them put to death; over fifty were executed in the ensuing carnage.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 169
where they distracted Wang Yen-cheng even as he restored a short-lived unity
to the kingdom. Because Wang Yen-cheng hesitated to return to Fu-chou in
the face of the Southern T’ang threat, the way was open for an unhappy army
leader named Li Jen-ta to seize control of the capital in the spring of 945. In
the southern prefecture of Ch’üan-chou a militia leader named Liu Ts’unghsiao seized and executed Chu Wen-chin’s prefect, and sent his severed head to
Wang Yen-cheng in Chien-chou as a sign of submission. Although Yen-cheng
then named a kinsman to serve as prefect, real power in Ch’üan-chou was now
held by Li Jen-ta and his militia associates.
In the spring of 945, Southern T’ang forces attacked Chien-chou. By the
fall they had gained control of the prefecture and also secured the submission
of Wang Yen-cheng and the prefectural leaders in T’ing-chou, Ch’üan-chou,
and Chang-chou, all of whom had been loyal to the Wang family. Wang family
rule was now over. Only Li Jen-ta in Fu-chou held out against the Southern
T’ang forces. Although the Southern T’ang court refused to authorize an assault
against Li Jen-ta, preferring instead to negotiate his submission, the generals
on the spot were hard to control and through the spring of 946 made their
own plans. The Southern T’ang court learned of their assault, which began
in the late summer of 946, only after the fact. Faced with a fait accompli,
the Southern T’ang court then pursued the campaign vigorously. Li Jen-ta, in
turn, appealed to neighboring Wu-Yüeh for assistance. Despite the opposition
of most of his advisors the Wu-Yüeh ruler, Ch’ien Hung-tsou, opted to assist
Fu-chou against the Southern T’ang forces. Subsequently, Li Jen-ta chafed
under Wu-Yüeh control. He secretly planned to appeal to the Southern T’ang
for help, but was discovered, and he was killed. Fu-chou was then completely
integrated into the Wu-Yüeh kingdom.143
Liu Ts’ung-hsiao, the militia leader who had seized Ch’üan-chou, was nominally subordinate to the Southern T’ang. In early 946, as a reward for his loyal
service on behalf of the Southern T’ang against Li Jen-ta, Liu was named prefect
of Ch’üan-chou.144 But the southeast coast of Fu-chien was beyond the effective
control of Southern T’ang forces. This weakness became clear to the Southern
T’ang court later in 946 when their appointed prefect of Chang-chou, south
of Ch’üan-chou, rebelled. Although Liu Ts’ung-hsiao suppressed the uprising
in the name of the Southern T’ang, he replaced the rebellious prefect with a
long-time ally of his own. Three years later Liu’s brother poisoned that prefect
and took his place. As Ssu-ma Kuang put it: “The lord of T’ang was unable
to control events, so he established the Ch’ing-yüan army in Ch’üan-chou and
143
144
Fan and Lin, Wu-Yüeh pei-shih 3, p. 10a; Wu, Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu 86, p. 1252.
TCTC 285, p. 9303.
170
hugh r. clark
named Liu its commander.”145 As the 940s closed, the Fu-chien region was
divided into three parts: Southern T’ang had gained control of the mountain
prefectures of the interior; Wu-Yüeh had seized Fu-chou, the largest and richest prefecture of the old Min kingdom, which also served as a buffer between
the Wu-Yüeh heartland and the aggressive forces of T’ang; and along the
southern coast a new political entity had arisen, based in Ch’üan-chou, under
the control of Liu Ts’ung-hsiao. This region, all that remained of the defunct
Min kingdom, was able to maintain its independence until it submitted to
Sung rule in 978.
One last change, although not fully part of our narrative, also deserves a brief
discussion: the rise of an independent state in Annam (An-nan), the northern
portion of Vietnam centered around the Red River.146 Annam had been under
varying degrees of Chinese administrative control since the Han dynasty eight
centuries earlier, and the regional elite had been highly sinified, but control
of the Chinese court and of the sinified elite had been seriously threatened by
the invasion of Nan-chao in the mid-ninth century.147 Although the T’ang
forces of Kao P’ien had been able to repel the invasion, T’ang authority was
never again as strong as it had been previously, now having to rely on the
local sinified elite to provide local officials rather than being able to appoint
Han Chinese. When Liu Yin gained control over Ling-nan and established
the Southern Han he claimed Annam as part of his kingdom, but it was an
empty claim. Indigenous, albeit sinified, leadership was able to hold Southern
Han at bay and manipulate the Liang court of the north to maintain their
own autonomy. The politics of the moment, however, prevented those leaders
from formally breaking their nominal dependence upon the Chinese court,
thereby inadvertently giving some legitimacy to Southern Han’s continuing
claim.
But in 930, Liu Yen, who had succeeded his brother Liu Yin on the Southern Han throne, launched a successful invasion of Annam, sweeping away
the sinified leaders. While the Southern Han armies encountered little opposition from those leaders, they were quickly confronted with a very different challenge. In late 931, Duong Dinh Nghe, a native of Ai province, the
southernmost region of Annam and the area where Chinese political and
cultural influence had traditionally been weakest and a sense of a separate
Annamese identity consequently strongest, led an army against the Southern
145
146
147
TCTC 288, p. 9417.
The following narrative is drawn largely from chapters 6 and 7 in Keith W. Taylor, The birth of Vietnam
(Berkeley, Calif., 1983). Also useful is “Godai Sōsho no Reinan to Betonamu dokuritsu ōchō no seiritsu,”
in Kawahara, Kan minzoku Kanan hattenshi kenkyū, pp. 229–70.
See the discussion in Somers, “The end of the T’ang,” pp. 692–5.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 171
Han authorities and routed them. The Southern Han court, unable to offer
any effective resistance to Duong’s force, chose the path of least resistance
and recognized him as a military governor. We can guess that this courtesy meant very little to Duong, for he was assassinated six years later by a
leader of a pro-Chinese faction bent on restoring the sinified leadership he had
displaced.
The brief return of that leadership, however, only prompted the rise of
another native of the same southern reaches of Annam that had produced
Duong Dinh Nghe and the strong sense of local identity that had legitimized
his rule. Ngo Quyen had been a general under Duong and had served him as
governor of Ai province. He was closely connected with the party that had just
been overthrown. Ngo Quyen quickly disposed of the revanchist leaders and
easily repulsed the efforts of Southern Han to defeat him. Two years later, in
939, he proclaimed himself king, a step that even Duong had been reluctant
to take, and abandoned the capital of Dai-la (modern Hanoi), which he felt to
be too closely identified with Chinese interests, in favor of Co-loa, farther to
the south and long identified with Annamese culture. Subsequent Vietnamese
historians have debated whether to acknowledge Ngo Quyen as the founder
of an independent state, because he declined to take an imperial title and so
nominally remained subordinate not only to the Chinese courts of the north
but even to the Liu rulers of Southern Han who had taken that step in 917.148
But the fact is that neither the Southern Han nor the Sung dynasty was able
to project even nominal control over the Red River valley.
economic structures
The new kingdoms that had taken shape by the beginning of the tenth century
all bore the burden of the several decades of turmoil that had wracked their
lands, turmoil that had often been intended as a form of economic terrorism to
destroy the people’s livelihood.149 Peasants had fled, cropland had fallen into
disuse, cities had been besieged, and social and administrative infrastructures
had collapsed. As the new ruling elites surveyed their realms and plotted
courses of action, economic recovery was near the top of their priorities.
Agriculture was the basic source of wealth, and the new elites turned their
attention to the restoration of agricultural productivity and the infrastructures
of distribution. These were critical for the restoration of stability.
148
149
See the discussion in Taylor, The birth of Vietnam, p. 275.
See, for example, TCTC 265, p. 8638, which accuses Chu Wen of deliberately seeking the impoverishment of the peasantry of Huai-nan. For a general survey of immiseration in the Chiang-Huai region,
see Matsui, “Tōdai kōhanki no Kō-Wai ni tsuite,” pp. 1–29.
172
hugh r. clark
The most important step toward restoration of agricultural productivity
and the distribution of goods was simply to restore order, and all areas showed
signs of improvement by the early tenth century as order returned. As the new
kingdoms consolidated, their rulers issued formulaic calls to their populations
to promote agriculture.150 But more concrete steps were possible as well, and
in some combination were pursued almost everywhere. One such step was to
ease tax burdens. In the years after Huang Ch’ao’s campaigns, as the struggle for
collapsing T’ang power unfolded across the south, the numerous contestants
exacted ever-larger revenues from those under their control in order to finance
their war efforts. Continuation of these heavy tax burdens marked the initial
policies of the new states, but after a measure of peace was restored, large
military expenditures were no longer necessary and tended to undermine the
goal of restoring agricultural prosperity. Thus, at least some of the new rulers
took steps to ease these burdens. Ssu-ma Kuang tells us that in 904: “Taxation
under Wang [Chien] was onerous, but none dared to object. Then Feng Chüan
took advantage of Wang’s birthday celebration to mention the sufferings of the
people. Wang was distraught, and thanked him. . . . From that time, the taxes
of [the Former] Shu were eased.”151 Ssu-ma Kuang also tells us that under
Wang Shen-chih “punishments were lenient and taxes were light” in the Min
kingdom of Fu-chien.152
The establishment of peace and the easing of taxes helped to restore conditions that had underlain the prosperity of preceding centuries. Even more
important to the increase of agricultural productivity were the active steps
taken to promote new growth, such as the expansion of water conservancy
networks and the reclamation of arable land. All the southern kingdoms lay
within China’s wet rice regions where irrigation is crucial to the success of the
crop. Throughout the south such networks were already in place well before
the late ninth century, the result of the many decades and even centuries of dramatic demographic and economic expansion that had transformed the Yangtze
basin into the empire’s premier rice basket long before the interregnum. But
the fiscal needs of the new kingdoms demanded increases in agricultural productivity, which could be achieved only by expanding irrigation networks to
support the creation of new paddy land. Irrigation projects were carried out
throughout the southern kingdoms in the early tenth century. In Szechwan,
for example, Chang Lin, prefect of the Ch’eng-tu Plain prefecture of Mei-chou
around the turn of the century, restored the T’ung-chi Dike (yen), providing
150
151
152
For a general survey of these policies, see Cheng Hsüeh-meng, “Wu-tai shih-ch’i Ch’ang-chiang liu-yü
chi Chiang-nan ti-ch’ü ti nung-yeh ching-chi,” Li-shih yen-chiu 4 (1985), pp. 32–44.
TCTC 265, p. 8635.
TCTC 267, pp. 8716–17.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 173
water to 15,000 ch’ing (approximately 210,000 acres) of reclaimed paddy and
earning a popular encomium that went: “Before we had Chang Ch’iu, and after
came Duke Chang [i.e., Chang Lin]. Both expanded our irrigation, so our rice
crops are rich.”153 In Ching-nan, Kao Chi-ch’ang took the lead in promoting
reclamation projects, directing the construction of a dike that extended over
thirty-three miles between the Han and Yangtze rivers and provided security
from flooding to an extensive and highly productive floodplain.154 In Ch’u,
“because there were many springs in the mountains east of T’an-chou, the
Ma family constructed dikes to collect the water and thereby provided irrigation to 10,000 ch’ing.”155 Even as small an entity as the warlord enclave on the
southern coast of Fu-chien undertook projects such as the Ch’en Embankment,
named for Ch’en Hung-chin who succeeded Liu Ts’ung-hsiao as leader of that
domain in the last years before Sung unification; the embankment secured a
coastal strip at the mouth of the Chiu-lung River from tidal encroachment
and thereby opened up extensive new land to settlement and production.
Similar projects were undertaken in all the southern kingdoms,156 but the
state that pursued the expansion of water conservation networks most intensely
was Wu-Yüeh. Although Wu-Yüeh encompassed different terrain – from the
plains surrounding Hang-chou Bay to the highlands of the rugged interior –
the low-lying coastal districts were among the most productive and heavily
settled lands in all of China. The yield from the extensive paddylands was
critical to the prosperity of the new kingdom of Wu-Yüeh. Without coastal
dikes and catchment basins, these lands were subject to regular flooding,
especially at times of storm surges in the spring and fall. The Wu-Yüeh leaders
engaged in ambitious efforts to enhance those defenses. In 910, for example,
the Warding off the Sea Catchment Basin (Han-hai t’ang) was constructed
just outside the Hang-chou city wall to contain waters that were regularly
flooding even the city gates. As Ssu-ma Kuang commented: “Today there are
stone-lined catchment basins all along the city wall, and all were built by the
Ch’ien rulers [of Wu-Yüeh]. . . . From this point, the wealth of Hang-chou was
greatest in all the southeast.”157 The Warding off the Sea Catchment Basin
may have been the most noted construction project of the interregnum, but
153
154
155
156
157
Wu, Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu 40, p. 597. For a brief survey of trends in Szechwanese agriculture during the
imperial era, see Paul J. Smith, “Commerce, agriculture, and core formation in the upper Yangzi, 2 a.d.
to 1948,” Late Imperial China 9 No. 1 (1988), pp. 22–41.
Wu, Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu 100, p. 1430.
T’o-t’o et al., eds., Sung shih [hereafter SS] (1345; Peking, 1977) 173, p. 4183.
As general surveys of this process, see Pien Hsiao-hsüan and Cheng Hsüeh-meng, Wu-tai shih-hua
(Peking, 1985), pp. 76–80, and T’ao Mao-ping, Wu-tai shih-lüeh (Peking, 1985), pp. 180–8.
TCTC 267, p. 8726; Fan and Lin, Wu-Yüeh pei-shih 1, pp. 47b–48a. See the discussion in Cheng,
“Wu-tai shih-ch’i Ch’ang-chiang liu-yu,” p. 37.
174
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many others, each equally important to those who benefited, are mentioned
in surviving accounts.158
Perhaps the most significant innovation of the Wu-Yüeh rulers, however,
was to establish the commissioner of waterways and agriculture (tu-shui yingt’ien shih): “The commissioner of waterways and agriculture was established in
order to manage irrigation. . . . He was directed to establish four corps around
Lake T’ai with a total complement of 7,000–8,000 men to oversee the fields,
to control the rivers, and to maintain the dikes. . . . If there was drought, then
they brought water to the fields; at times of flooding, they drained water away
from the fields.”159 Over a century later, Fan Chung-yen wrote of these men:
The corps specialized in matters pertaining to the fields, such as channeling rivers and
building dikes in order to avoid flooding. At that time, the people could buy a picul
(shih2) of rice for 50 cash. Ever since our dynasty [the Sung] unified the area, whenever the
rice crop has failed in Chiang-nan relief supplies have been sought in Che-yu [the coastal
regions north of the Yangtze River]. When the crop has failed in Che-yu, then relief has
been sought in Huai-nan. [Our dynasty] has been careless about managing agriculture.
The infrastructure has not been maintained, more than half the polders of Chiang-nan and
the dikes of Che-hsi are in disrepair, and we thereby have forfeited the greatest advantage
of the southeast. Today in Chiang-nan and Liang-che the price of a picul of rice is not less
than 600–700 cash, or even 1,000 cash. If we compare it to the days of Wu-Yüeh, the cost
has increased tenfold.160
Fan Chung-yen’s praise for the commission’s work was echoed by a twelfthcentury gazetteer, which stated that “In the one hundred years of Ch’ien family
rule the harvests were always good. Only during the Chang-hsing era [930–4]
was there any flooding.”161
Hand in hand with the restoration of agricultural productivity went the
promotion of commercial agriculture, the expansion of handicraft and industrial production, and the building or restoration of trade networks. Tea, for
example, was an important commodity in private trade. As early as 908, Kao
Yü, a prominent advisor to Ma Yin of Ch’u, commented that “the people
are cultivating vegetables and tea which they sell to northern merchants.”162
158
159
160
161
162
For a brief but specific overview of all the major water conservancy projects of Wu-Yüeh, see Pien and
Cheng, Wu-tai shih-hua, pp. 77–8.
Wu, Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu 78, p. 1090. See also Chu Ch’ang-wen, Wu-chün t’u-ching hsü-chi (1084; Peking,
1990) hsia, p. 1b, and Fan Ch’eng-ta, Wu-chün chih (1192; Peking, 1990) 19, p. 20b. It is not clear
exactly when the Commission on Waterways and Agriculture was first established; there is no mention
of it in TCTC.
T’ao, Wu-tai shih-lüeh, p. 183, quoting the first chüan, “Ta yü chao t’iao-ch’en shih-shih,” in Fan
Wen-cheng kung tsou-i-chi.
Fan, Wu-chün chih, 19, p. 20b.
TCTC 266, p. 8702. See also Ma, Ma-shih Nan T’ang shu 29, p. 2b. See the discussion in Okada Kōji,
“Godai So ōkoku no seikaku,” in Nakajima Satoshi Sensei koki kinen ronshū, ed. Nakajima Satoshi Sensei
Koki Kinen Jigyōkai (Tokyo, 1980–1), vol. 2, pp. 78–9.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 175
Ch’u, of course, was not the only center of tea production. In 965 the Sung
dynasty opened monopoly purchase centers for tea in five prefectures along
the Yangtze and Huai rivers in territory that had just been reclaimed from
the Southern T’ang.163 These monopoly markets clearly reflected an earlier
pattern of tea production in the hill country between the two rivers, land that
in many ways is an extension of the tea country of Ch’u.164 The northwestern corner of Fu-chien was a third center of tea growing as early as the late
T’ang. Although we lack any concrete discussion of the relationship between
the Min government and its tea producers, the references to tea in the notes
on local products of the T’ai-p’ing huan-yü chi confirm that tea production was
widespread at least by the close of the interregnum period.165
Without a doubt the most famous and best-documented center of tea production outside Ch’u was Szechwan, which had long been known for its teas.166
Tea production remained important throughout the interregnum, a conclusion amply demonstrated by the long discussions on local teas in the Ch’a-p’u
(Monograph on tea) of Mao Wen-hsi, an official of both the Former and Later Shu
who was closely identified with Wang Chien.167 Although there is evidence
that the Former Shu kingdom did permit some private trade in the commodity,168 Su Ch’e, younger brother of the famous statesman Su Shih, recalled that
the Wang rulers had implemented a tea monopoly as well: “I have heard that
in the Five Dynasties era when the Wang family ruled the land of Shu, government revenues were constricted and so they implemented a tea monopoly
law.”169
The cultivation of mulberry leaves and rearing of silkworms, sericulture,
was becoming another important activity in many regions. Szechwan had a
long tradition of producing fine silks, and the description of the silkworm
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
Li T’ao, Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien ch’ang-pien [hereafter HCP (1964)] [Che-chiang shu-chü 1881 ed.] (1183;
Taipei, 1961–4) 6, p. 13a. See also the discussion in Kawahara Yoshirō, Hoku-Sō ki tochi shoyū no mondai
to shōgyō shihon (Fukuoka, 1964), p. 322.
On the prior history of tea production in these lands, see Matsui, “Tōdai kōhanki no Kō-Wai,” pp. 20–1,
and Hino Kaisaburō, “So no Ma In to tsūka seisaku to Godai jidai no kinyū gyōsha (jō),” Tōyō gakuhō
54 No. 2 (1971), pp. 28–9.
See Yüeh, T’ai-p’ing huan-yü chi 101, p. 3b, regarding local products of Chien-chou; 100, p. 3b for
Fu-chou; and 100, p. 9b for Nan-chien-chou. Hino, “So no Ma In (jō),” p. 37, also refers to evidence of
tea from Ching-nan.
For a survey of the history of tea in Szechwan, see chapter 2 of Paul J. Smith, Taxing heaven’s storehouse:
Horses, bureaucrats and the destruction of the Sichuan tea industry, 1074–1224 (Cambridge, Mass., 1991).
In addition to his own discussion, Smith makes reference to an extensive bibliography.
See the discussion in Yang, Ch’ien Shu Hou Shu shih, pp. 178–9. On Mao Wen-hsi, see Wu, Shih-kuo
ch’un-ch’iu 41, p. 609.
See Kawahara, Hoku-Sō ki tochi shoyū no mondai, p. 50, which quotes this passage from Ho, Chien-chieh
lu 4.
See Yang, Ch’ien Shu Hou Shu shih, p. 180, which quotes Luan-ch’eng chi 36.
176
hugh r. clark
markets in the Mao-t’ing k’o-hua, an anecdotal collection compiled around the
turn of the eleventh century, gives a feeling for the growing importance of
sericulture under the Former and Later Shu kingdoms: “Shu has silkworm
markets. They meet every year from the first to the third month [early spring]
in the capital city [Ch’eng-tu], and they rotate among fifteen sites. . . . Trade
is conducted in tools for silkworm rearing and agriculture as well as in goods
from orchards and gardens and in medicines of all kinds.”170
The origins of these markets stretch back at least as far as the late ninth
century.171 The Wu-kuo ku-shih adds that Wang Chien visited one such market
and observed that “many are cultivating mulberry.”172 Ch’u was not the only
source of tea among the southern kingdoms, nor was Szechwan the only flourishing producer of silk. In an entry for 925, Ssu-ma Kuang says of Ch’u: “The
people of Hunan had not previously practiced sericulture. Kao Yü ordered the
people to pay their taxes in cloth instead of cash. Soon looms were flourishing
among them.”173 In 918, Sung Ch’i-ch’iu, a minister for the state of Wu,
successfully advocated the policy of allowing people to pay their taxes in cloth
or grain instead of in cash, after which “the lands of Huai were fully planted,
sericulture was widespread, and the state grew rich and strong.”174 A Southern
Sung edict of 1167 recalled that the Ch’ien rulers of Wu-Yüeh levied roughly
one yard of cheap pongee silk (chüan2) on every mou of paddy land, and roughly
four feet of silk on every mou of mulberry orchard. This retrospective evidence
shows that silk cloth was integral to the local tax systems of these regions.175
Although it is generally unstated, it is implicit in all the foregoing passages
that the several kingdoms often sought to promote the production of tea and
silk as a way of enhancing their revenues. Another area of economic activity
that they promoted at least in part for its fiscal advantages was handicraft
and industrial production. Sericulture is, of course, inextricably tied to one
such activity: the production of textiles. Virtually all the southern kingdoms
were widely known for one textile or another, and several had government-run
centers of production.176 As is clear from the many entries that mention them
among the tribute goods the southern kingdoms sent to the northern courts,
textiles were very important commodities in the southern economies. Ceramic
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
Huang Hsiu-fu, Mao-t’ing k’o-hua [Lin-lang pi-shih ts’ung-shu 1853 ed., 1887, 1888] (early 11th c.;
Taipei, 1967) 9, pp. 2b–3b.
See Chü Ch’ing-yüan, “T’ang-Sung shih-tai Ssu-ch’uan ti ts’an-shih,” Shih-huo pan yüeh k’an 3 No. 6
(1936), pp. 28–34.
Wu-kuo ku-shih shang, p. 10b.
TCTC 274, p. 8953. See also Okada, “Godai So ōkoku no seikaku,” p. 78.
TCTC 270, p. 8832.
Hsü Sung et al., Sung hui-yao chi-pen [hereafter SHY (1964)] (Sung, 1809, 1936; Taipei, 1964) shih-huo
70, p. 58a.
See the discussions in Pien and Cheng, Wu-tai shih-hua, pp. 85–6, and T’ao, Wu-tai shih-lüeh,
pp. 188–90.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 177
production was another important craft in the south. Although production
occurred widely and ceramic goods were another frequent tribute item, they
were especially important to Wu-Yüeh, where state-run kilns existed beside
private enterprises. A modern commentator has observed: “The Yüeh kilns at
Yü-yao and Shang-lin Lake [in Chekiang] undoubtedly reached their peak in
the tenth century when, under the Five Dynasties and early Sung, they enjoyed
the direct patronage of the Wu-Yüeh rulers.”177 A third area of wide economic
importance was mining. Not only did the southern kingdoms include large
quantities of metal goods in their tribute to the northern dynasties, but many
also issued their own coinage.
Important as the expansion and diversification of agricultural and craft
production were to all the economies of the south, for several of the states
they were not the key to prosperity or even to economic – and thus political –
survival. These economies developed instead an unparalleled dependence upon
trade. Of course interregional trade has a long history in China. It is well
known, in particular, that the volume of trade, both interregional and local,
expanded greatly through the eighth and ninth centuries. This growth was
in no small part due to the movement of population into the lightly settled
lands south of the Yangtze River, where administrative oversight was thin
and bureaucratic regulation was consequently limited. These were also the
centuries when the volume of overseas commerce increased greatly, stimulating
the growth of coastal port cities such as Kuang-chou, Ch’üan-chou, Fu-chou,
and Yang-chou. Thus trade was not a new variable in the economies of the
lands of the south, nor were the trade patterns of the interregnum new. But the
trade patterns are of particular interest for two reasons: because of what they say
about interstate relationships during the era, and because of the critical role that
trade revenues played in the survival of many of the interregnum kingdoms.
Trade generally was of three kinds: internal trade within a southern kingdom itself; direct trade in domestic goods among the southern kingdoms or
between those kingdoms and the northern dynasties; and transshipment trade
in imported goods from the South Seas. Internal trade within any of the kingdoms is paradoxically both the most self-evident and the most difficult of all
trade patterns to demonstrate. Other than the relatively ample evidence for
Szechwan, as exemplified by the passage on silkworm markets cited earlier,
the references to internal trade in the remaining southern kingdoms are rare
and almost exclusively anecdotal.178
177
178
Basil Gray, Sung porcelain and stoneware (London, 1984), p. 30. See also T’ao, Wu-tai shih-lüeh, pp. 195–7,
and Pien and Cheng, Wu-tai shih-hua, pp. 88–91. On Szechwan, see especially Yang, Ch’ien Shu Hou
Shu shih, pp. 198–201.
For a general discussion of trade in the two Shu kingdoms, see Yang, Ch’ien Shu Hou Shu shih, pp. 202–
10. For two notices of trade (one about rice, the other about firewood) in the Fu-chien region, see Hsü,
Chi-shen lu 3, pp. 7a–b; 5, pp. 11a–b.
178
hugh r. clark
Far more material survives on trade among the southern kingdoms and
between them and the northern dynasties. In his extensive research Hino
Kaisaburō identified three major inland routes of communication for both
trade and official correspondence: the Kan River valley through Kiangsi, the
Hsiang River valley through Hunan; and the Grand Canal.179 Despite its
enduring fame and mystery, the Grand Canal was the least important of the
three routes. The chronic conflict between the kingdom that controlled the
heart of the route and its great port Yang-chou, first Wu and then the Southern
T’ang, and the states linked to the canal, Wu-Yüeh and the successive northern
dynasties, made transit of the entire Grand Canal difficult if not impossible.
There was, of course, one other well-traveled route connecting north and
south: the seaborne route along the coast as far as the ports of the Shantung
peninsula and beyond to the northern lands of the Khitan, Korea, and even
Japan. Because there were too many unpredictable dangers on the open sea,
ranging from pirates to sudden storms, this was not a popular option and so
was resorted to only when other inland routes became less safe. Ssu-ma Kuang
alluded to this kind of difficulty in a comment appended to his account of the
fall of Ch’ien-chou, the prefecture on the upper Kan River in southern Hunan
that had been the center of an independent fief controlled by Lu Kuangch’ou. Under Lu this prefecture had been an important crossroads for both
north-south and east-west communications, a role it held until it was overrun
by Wu in 918: “Prior to this Ch’ien Liu had commonly sent his tribute [to
the Later Liang dynasty] via Ch’ien-chou [i.e., through southern Kiangsi and
into Hunan and points north]. Now [because of the enmity between Wu and
Wu-Yüeh] that route was cut, and so Ch’ien’s envoys began to use the sea
route via Teng-chou and Lai-chou [ports on the Shantung peninsula] to enter
Liang.”180 The Min rulers of Fu-chien had the same problem: “Yang Hsingmi had occupied Chiang-tung and Huai-nan, and thus Min was cut off from
[inland communications with] the Central Plains. Thereafter, when Wang
Shen-chih sent tribute to the northern dynasties, the mission went by sea to
Teng-chou and Lai-chou where they disembarked. But in going and coming
179
180
Hino Kaisaburō, “Godai nanboku Shina rikujō kōtsūro ni tsuite,” Rekishigaku kenkyū 11 No. 6 (1941),
pp. 2–32. See, in addition, Hino’s set of three articles: “Godai jidai ni okeru Kittan to Shina to no
kaijōbōeki (jō),” Shigaku zasshi 52 No. 7 (1941), pp. 1–47; “Godai jidai ni okeru Kittan to Shina to
no kaijōbōeki (chū),” Shigaku zasshi 52 No. 8 (1941), pp. 60–85; and “Godai jidai ni okeru Kittan
to Shina to no kaijōbōeki (ge),” Shigaku zasshi 52 No. 9 (1941), pp. 55–82. See also, the pair of his
articles: “Godai Binkoku no taichūgen chōkō to bōeki (jō),” Shien 26 (1941), pp. 1–50; and “Godai
Binkoku no taichūgen chōkō to bōeki (ge),” Shien 27 (1942), pp. 1–41, and the pair “So no Ma In to
tsūka seisaku” (jō) and “So no Ma In to tsūka seisaku to Godai jidai no kinyūgyōsha (ge),” Tōyō gakuhō,
54 No. 3 (1971), pp. 57–89. See, finally, the comments in his addendum to chapter 8 of Zoku Tōdai no
teiten no kenkyū (Fukuoka, 1970), pp. 416–502.
TCTC 270, pp. 8836–7.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 179
they had to confront the dangers of wind and water, and four or five out of
every ten ships were lost.”181
All of the southern kingdoms except for the Former and Later Shu of Szechwan were tied to each other and to the northern dynasties by one or more of these
routes, while the successive Shu kingdoms were linked to the north by roadways
first cut through the mountains by Ch’in Shih-huang’s engineers a millennium
earlier.182 Consequently, there was a great deal of movement among all the
southern kingdoms and between those kingdoms and the northern dynasties.
The latter trade is the best documented because of the court-oriented nature
of the historical sources and because much of this trade was in the form of
tribute. It would appear that most trade between south and north was directly
controlled by the southern courts, either as tribute or as state-managed trade.
Wu-Yüeh, Min, Ch’u, and Ching-nan all maintained regular tribute relations
with the north, despite some occasional interruptions, and the goods offered
as tribute were all commercially important. Ch’u annually sent two hundred
and fifty thousand catties of tea. Wu-Yüeh sent large quantities of silks and
metal goods. Min and Southern Han offered imported goods from the South
Seas trade.183 Ssu-ma Kuang spoke directly of the commercial importance
of tribute: “Discussions at [the Later Liang] court all noted the great profits
which Ch’ien Liu’s tribute earned in the market. Many felt that it was inappropriate to further reward him with titles [as the emperor, Liang Mo-ti, was
proposing to do].”184 The relationship between tribute and trade is echoed in
the events surrounding the tributary mission of Cheng Yüan-pi, representing
the emperor of Min, Min K’ang-tsung, to the Later Chin emperor Chin Kaotsu (r. 936–42). Cheng Yüan-pi and his company of three hundred and fifty
found themselves imprisoned by the Later Chin emperor in response to the
unacceptably arrogant tone of the Min emperor’s letter that Cheng Yüan-pi
presented to the Later Chin throne. After allowing its members to languish
for several months, the Later Chin court relented and prepared to send the
mission home, at which point the “tributary goods and private merchandise”
(kung-wu ssu-shang) were returned to their rightful owners “according to the
official list.”185 Obviously, most of the large number who accompanied Cheng
181
182
183
184
185
In Hino, “Godai Binkoku (jō)” (1941), p. 20, quoting Ts’e-fu yüan-kuei 232.
On the predominantly northern orientation of Szechwan’s trade until the twelfth century, see Smith,
“Commerce, agriculture, and core formation,” pp. 42–5.
On Ch’u, see TCTC 266, p. 8702. On Wu-Yüeh, see Hino, “Godai nanboku Shina,” p. 8. On Min, see
Clark, Community, trade, and networks, p. 65.
TCTC 269, p. 8803. For the connection between tribute and trade between Min and the northern
courts, see Hino’s “Godai Binkoku” articles, especially “Godai Binkoku (ge),” pp. 12–28.
On Cheng Yüan-pi’s mission, see TCTC 282, pp. 9207–10. See also the discussion in Hino, Zoku Tōdai
teiten no kenkyū, pp. 593–4.
180
hugh r. clark
Yüan-pi did so in pursuit of private trade, not in order to offer tribute, and this
was an acknowledged, even official, part of the tributary process. The southern
courts that pursued tributary ties with the northern dynasties were at least as
interested in the profits they could earn through the relationship as they were
in the ritual submission that it entailed.
Many if not all the southern courts also exercised control over nontributary
trade relationships through court-managed trade outlets. In the early tenth
century, for example, Ch’u initiated a system of state control over the production of tea and then opened a network of trading agencies to regulate its sale
to the northern dynasties. Ssu-ma Kuang wrote that the policy was motivated
by the suggestion of the court official Kao Yü that “the people are selling their
vegetables and tea to northern merchants,” and “if we collect taxes on this,
we can support our army.” Ssu-ma Kuang then says, “In 908 the Ch’u king,
Ma Yin, petitioned [the Later Liang court for permission] to establish trading
agencies (hui-t’u wu) in Pien-chou, Ching-chou2, Hsiang-chou, T’ang-chou,
Ying-chou3, and Fu-chou3. . . . This request was granted, and from that time
on Hunan prospered.”186 The profits that Ch’u agents realized through the
sale of tea in these northern districts, where they had an effective monopoly,
were used to purchase fine textiles and warhorses for the Ch’u court and army,
essentially as Kao Yü had suggested. As Ssu-ma Kuang observed: “The territory of Ch’u produces large quantities of gold and silver, but the profits from
tea are especially great.”187
Wu-Yüeh also sought to control the profits of its trade with the north
through state-sponsored agencies, although in contrast to Ch’u it did not seek
the permission of the northern court to do so and was apparently much more
aggressive in pursuit of profit:
At the time of the Later Han dynasty [947–50], because the route across Chiang-Huai
had been cut, emissaries from Ch’ien Liu commonly came across the sea to the [Later Han
territory]. In the coastal prefectures they established trading agencies ( po-i wu, equivalent
to hui-t’u wu) to carry out trade with the people. When the people failed to meet their debts
on time, the agency officials themselves would seek to enforce them. They even established
their own jails without regard to [the jurisdiction of] the local districts or counties. Because
the [Later Han] officials had been heavily bribed, they tolerated this without question.188
It is clear that traders operating under the official imprimatur of the WuYüeh court were engaged in direct and apparently unregulated trade with
186
187
188
TCTC 266, p. 8702. Hino, “So no Ma In (jō),” pp. 26–7, argues that the textiles were also for military
purposes. See the same essay on the tie between geography and the tea trade. See also the discussion in
Okada, “Godai So ōkoku no seikaku,” p. 77.
TCTC 283, p. 9258.
Ou-yang, Hsin Wu-tai shih 30, p. 335; see also CWTS 107, p. 1415.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 181
private citizens of the north, the “Central Kingdom.” Through a policy of
bribery, they had bought off the local officials of the northern dynasties in
order to pursue their profits without interference, even to the point of jailing
local citizens to enforce the collection of debts.
Trade between the southern kingdoms and the northern dynasties was valuable not only to the participants but also to the states through which it passed.
Ch’u, for example, adopted an ingenious method of indirect taxation on passing
merchants:
Following the plan of Kao Yü, the Ch’u king, Ma Yin, minted lead and iron coins. Yü had
argued that these coins would be useless to merchants outside Ch’u. Before leaving the
kingdom, the merchants would exchange the coins for other goods. Thus Ch’u could barter
what was surplus in Hunan for the myriad goods of the whole empire, and the kingdom
would be rich.189
This obviously relates to the passage of merchants through Ch’u territory
as they traversed the Hsiang River route mentioned earlier; without directly
taxing the merchants, Ch’u had devised a way to make a significant profit nevertheless. Ching-nan was less subtle: “Ching-nan lay between Hunan [Ch’u],
Ling-nan [Southern Han], and Fu-chien [Min]. . . . Since the time of Kao Chich’ang, when envoys carrying tribute from these lands crossed Ching-nan
territory [en route to the northern dynasties], Ching-nan seized a portion of
their goods.”190 The degree to which Ching-nan had become dependent on
these “revenues” is revealed in an incident that occurred in 948: “Ever since
Kao Ts’ung-mei had broken with the Later Han dynasty [in 947], northern
merchants had not come and the land was impoverished. So he sent an envoy
[to the Later Han court] admitting his error and begging restoration of his
tributary status.”191 Ching-nan lay along the one inland route between the
southern kingdoms and northern dynasties that remained open, and it also
commanded Yangtze River traffic between Wu and Nan T’ang, and Szechwan.
This made it possible for Ching-nan to impose heavy transit charges, and the
kingdom became heavily dependent on a system of transit taxes. When traffic
on the route was interrupted, as it was in the year 947–8, the state was quickly
reduced to begging.
In addition to trade between north and south, there was also extensive trade
among the southern kingdoms themselves. An eleventh-century gazetteer of
Su-chou, for example, comments: “Merchants from Fu-chien and Kuang-nan
ride the wind to cross the sea, for there is no risk. Through them precious items
189
190
191
TCTC 274, p. 8953.
TCTC 287, p. 9375.
TCTC 288, p. 9394.
182
hugh r. clark
and things from afar gather in the markets of Su-chou.”192 This is echoed in
a passage from the Wu-tai shih-pu:
One morning [the monk Ch’i-ying] accompanied the King of Wu-Yüeh (Ch’ien Shu, r.
948–78) to the Pi-po Pavilion. At that moment the tide was full and ships were jammed
together so tightly one could not see a beginning or an end to them. The king marveled:
“This place is over 3,000 li from the capital [i.e., the northern court]. Who there could
imagine that there could be so much profit [collected together] in one river?”193
The vibrant trade at the ports of the midcoast, such as Ming-chou and
Hang-chou, and in inland cities on canal routes like Su-chou, was based upon
ties with ports farther south in Min and Southern Han that gave access to the
South Seas trade. Although such trade connections benefited all parties, the
economies of the southernmost kingdoms were internally less developed than
those of the more central kingdoms and were probably very dependent on the
profits derived from these ties. Hu San-hsing, the Yüan dynasty commentator
of the Tzu-chih t’ung-chien, suggested the many places along the midcoast where
traders from the south might stop: “[Following the blockage of the overland
route through Huai-nan, emissaries] had to travel from Fu-chien along the
coast of Wen-chou. On reaching T’ai-chou they passed T’ien-men Mountain
before approaching the coast of Ming-chou at Hsiang-shan. They then passed
Ts’en-chiang and Lieh Harbor before heading out to sea en route to the coast of
Teng-chou and Lai-chou.”194 Clearly the route from Fu-chien hugged the coast
before heading out to the open sea somewhere north of Ming-chou (Ning-po)
en route to Shantung.
In addition to trade ties along the coast, the southern kingdoms traded
with one another along the inland routes. We see the evidence of trade ties
between Southern T’ang and Min when the Southern T’ang court, planning an
invasion of northwestern Fu-chien, turned for advice to the Han-lin academician Tsang Hsün, who had once been a merchant well versed in the topography of Fu-chien, to help draw up a strategy for capturing Chien-chou.195 The
Ch’ing-i lu, compiled as the interregnum closed, mentions the longan (lung-yen)
fruit trade between Ling-nan and Ching-nan,196 while the Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu
tells of the merchant Shen Chia “who frequently passed between [Ch’u] and
192
193
194
195
196
Chu, Wu-chün t’u-ching hsü-chi shang, p. 15a. The author’s casual dismissal of risk stands in contrast
to other claims of high danger on the ocean route. The risk, however, was greatest in the open water
between the ports of Wu-Yüeh and the tip of the Shantung peninsula, a reach that was radically different
from the coast-hugging stretches used farther south. The voyage between Fu-chou or Kuang-nan and
Wu-Yüeh entailed much less danger than the voyage to the north.
T’ao, Wu-tai shih-pu 5, pp. 13b–14a.
TCTC 267, p. 8717.
TCTC 284, p. 9278.
T’ao Ku, Ch’ing-i lu [Pao-yen t’ang pi-chi 1606 ed.] (c. 960–70; Taipei, 1965) 2, p. 12b.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 183
Kuang-chou.”197 All three anecdotes are references to trade along a north-south
axis, reflecting the Kan and Hsiang river routes mentioned earlier. There was
also an important east-west trade, with Ching-nan along the Yangtze River
route that linked Chiang-Huai and Szechwan. In 913, for example, Kao Chich’ang strengthened his local defenses and then announced “to all exiles and
to those in transit between Wu and Shu” that he was no longer beholden to
the northern dynasty.198 The Chiu Wu-tai shih records: “Kao Ts’ung-mei [r.
929–48] abutted Wu to his east and Shu to his west. Both profited from the
goods he sent in return for military supplies.”199 Similarly, Huang Hsiu-fu (?–
c. 1006), in his biographical study of famous artists from Szechwan, recorded
that merchants from the lower Yangtze River often sought to buy notable
works in the local markets of Szechwan:
[In the Wu-ch’eng era (908–11)] the rulers of Ching-nan, Hu-nan, Huai-nan, and Liangche sent men to Shu to scour the markets [for the works of the artist Chang Hsüan] which
they then took back to their own lands. . . . While Shu was under the hegemonic rule [of the
Wang family], merchants from Chiang-nan and Wu[-Yüeh] came to Shu. Many of them
sought the paintings [of Tu Ching-an] which they took back to their own lands. . . . Early
in the Kuang-cheng era (938–65) merchants came to Shu from Ching-nan and Hu-nan to
seek the paintings of Yüan Wei-te. They took them back to their own lands, where they
were deemed remarkable.200
Just as the southern kingdoms sought to maintain control over their trade
with the northern dynasties, there is also evidence that they sought to control the interkingdom trade. For example, the second ruler of the Southern
Han (Liu Yen, r. 917–42) established an official trading post in Ching-nan’s
capital of Chiang-ling in order to recover some of the profits generated by
the transshipment of Southern Han tribute to the northern dynasties through
that city.201 Similarly, Min maintained a trade agency in the Southern Han
capital of Kuang-chou (Canton). After Wang Yen-chün, the third Min ruler
(r. 927–35), married the daughter of Liu Yen, ruler of Southern Han, he “then
sent Lin Yen-yü to open a trade outlet (ti)202 in Fan-yü (the port of Kuangchou) in order to manage diplomacy (chuan-chang kuo-hsin).”203 Once again,
we see that trade was intimately connected to the formalities of interstate
relationships.
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
Wu, Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu 116, p. 1771.
TCTC 268, pp. 8776–7.
CWTS 133, p. 1753.
Cited in Yang, Ch’ien Shu Hou Shu shih, p. 209, from Huang Hsiu-fu, I-chou ming-hua-lu chung.
HCP (1964), vol. 1, reprinting Yung-lo ta-tien 12306, p. 3a.
On the equivalence of ti with hui-t’u wu and other terms, see Hino, Zoku Tōdai teiten no kenkyū, pp. 591–7.
TCTC 279, pp. 9134–5.
184
hugh r. clark
The last of the major trading patterns was the transshipment trade, the
forwarding of imported goods from the South Seas, as the Chinese called the
lands of the Southeast Asian archipelagoes and the coasts of the Indian Ocean,
to the great cities of central and north China by the merchants of the port cities
of China’s south and southeast coasts. This trade cannot be entirely separated
from the patterns of domestic trade just discussed, as its goods were often
an important part of the cargoes of the domestic trade. The transshipment of
South Seas trade nevertheless deserves to be separately recognized for three
reasons: (1) because of the distinct goods that were part of it; (2) because it
represents the continued development of ties between the ports of the south
and southeast coasts and the lands beyond; and, most important, (3) because it
was central to the economic survival of at least two of the southern kingdoms –
Southern Han and Min.
The South Seas trade already had a long history by the ninth century, but
without a doubt the latter half of the T’ang dynasty had seen an expansion in
the volume of trade in the luxury goods that were its staple: aromatics such as
frankincense, camphor, sapanwood, and sandalwood; spices and medicines such
as ground rhinoceros horn (used as an aphrodisiac), pepper, and asafoetida; and
unfinished wares such as ivory and tortoise shell. In return the major exports
were Chinese silks, ceramics, and metalware. By the late ninth century at
least three cities were particularly well established as regular ports of call to
the foreign merchants who dominated the overseas links: Kuang-chou, which
was the oldest and most active; Ch’üan-chou, which had supplanted Fu-chou
as the principle port of Fu-chien; and Ming-chou (Ning-po), where much of
the trade aimed at Hang-chou was off-loaded because Hang-chou Bay was
too shallow to readily permit deep-draft ocean vessels to approach the great
city itself.204 All three ports continued to play important roles through the
interregnum. The Chiu Wu-tai shih, for example, notes that “Kuang-chou
amassed the precious goods of the South Seas . . . that were regularly traded
with merchants from the north.”205 The Wu-kuo ku-shih says of Ch’üan-chou:
“Wang Yen-pin [the nephew of Wang Shen-chih and autonomous governor of
204
205
On the early history of the trade, see Fujita Toyohachi, “Sōdai shihakushi oyobi shihaku jōrei,” Tōyō
gakuhō 7 No. 2 (1917), pp. 159–246; Li Tung-hua, Ch’üan-chou yü wo-kuo chung-ku ti hai-shang chiaot’ung: Chiu shih-chi mo – shih-wu shih-chi ch’u (Taipei, 1986); Wada Hisanori, “Tōdai ni okeru shihakushi
no shōchi,” in Wada Hakushi koki kinen Tōyōshi ronsō: Shōwa 35-nen 11-gatsu, ed. Wada Hakushi Koki
Kinen Tōyōshi Ronsō Hensan Iinkai (Tokyo, 1961), pp. 1051–60; and Kuwabara Jitsuzō, “On P’u
Shou-keng, part 1,” Memoirs of the Research Department of the Tōyō Bunko 2 (1928), pp. 1–82. The three
ports mentioned in the text were not the only major ports of the late T’ang. Fu-chou and Yangchou were also important, but neither maintained prominent roles into the later tenth century. Sung
maritime trade is the subject of a separate chapter by Angela Schottenhammer in the companion to this
volume.
CWTS 135, p. 1808.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 185
Ch’üan-chou] governed for thirty years (904–34). Year after year the harvests
were good and the trading ships of the southern barbarians never failed to
stop.”206 This observation is reinforced by the T’ai-p’ing huan-yü chi, which
was compiled within years of the consolidation of Sung rule in the Fu-chien
region and lists the “spices and medicinals of the overseas trade ships” (haipo hsiang-yao) among the “local products” of Ch’üan-chou and neighboring
Chang-chou.207 The enduring importance of these specific ports was quickly
recognized by the Sung bureaucracy in the immediate aftermath of imperial
consolidation later in the tenth century when a Trade Monopoly Office (Chüeh-i
yüan) was established to control the trade, and monopoly clearinghouses were
opened in all three prefectures.208
Control over the transshipment of imported goods was an important source
of revenue for all of the coastal kingdoms. The T’ang dynasty had accomplished this control via the Office of the Trade Superintendent (Shih-po ssu), a
monopoly purchasing agency established in Kuang-chou: importers sold their
wares directly to the superintendency, which in turn sold them at a profit to
domestic merchants for distribution within the empire. The coastal kingdoms
apparently followed the T’ang model. The biography of Chang Mu, director of
the Monopoly Tax Bureau (Chüeh-huo wu) in Fu-chou under Wang Shen-chih,
relates that “[Mu] was gentle and not extortionate to the foreign merchants
who responded [to Wang Shen-chih’s invitation to trade through Fu-chou].
Thus the state’s revenues daily grew richer.”209 While the passage does not refer
specifically to a trade superintendency, the link between Chang and foreign
traders is clear evidence that one existed in Fu-chou.
Although no such direct evidence of monopoly offices under the Southern
Han or Wu-Yüeh survives, we can be quite sure they too existed. As just noted,
Kuang-chou had been the site of the T’ang office that served as the model for the
southern kingdoms, thus the infrastructure was in place prior to the Southern
Han rulers. It is also apparent that these rulers had extensive access to the
goods of the trade, as is suggested by Ou-yang Hsiu’s later condemnation of
Liu Yen, the second Han ruler, for immoral conduct: “He adored living in
luxury, so he amassed the precious goods of the South Seas to make the Pearl
Pavilion of the Jade Hall.”210 While there had not been a T’ang monopoly
office in any of the ports of Liang-che, it is equally apparent that the Wu-Yüeh
rulers had access to the same goods. As early as 920, Ch’ien Liu sent an envoy
to the Khitan court to present that ruler with gifts of rhinoceros horn and
206
207
208
209
210
Wu-kuo ku-shih hsia, pp. 9b–10a.
Yüeh, T’ai-p’ing huan-yü chi 102, pp. 3a, 6a.
SHY (1964) chih-kuan 44, p. 1b.
Wu, Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu 95, p. 1377.
Ou-yang, Hsin Wu-tai shih 65, p. 811.
186
hugh r. clark
coral, both goods of the South Seas trade.211 Ch’ien Liu and his successors
maintained a regular exchange of envoys with the Khitan; although this is
the only occasion where specific gifts are recorded, it is very likely that such
gifts were normal.212 Years later, when the last Wu-Yüeh ruler, Ch’ien Shu,
negotiated submission to the Sung dynasty, he sent huge quantities of tribute,
prominent among which were the rhinoceros horn, ivory, frankincense, and
a range of spices, medicinals, and aromatics commonly associated with the
South Seas trade.213
Clearly, all three kingdoms exercised some form of control over the trade
through their ports. For Min and Southern Han, neither of which had as
sophisticated an economy as Wu-Yüeh, the revenues they realized from this
control must have been critical to their survival, but even Wu-Yüeh must have
benefited greatly. Benefit from the trade did not stop at state revenues. With
the exception of Wu-Yüeh, none of the coastal kingdoms was an important
consumer of the luxury goods that made up the trade. The market for these
goods was concentrated, as it traditionally had been, in the great cities of the
Yangtze and Yellow river valleys. The goods that entered through Kuangchou, Ch’üan-chou, and the ports of Wu-Yüeh were in turn sent on via the
domestic trade routes and became a critical source of earnings to the merchants
involved, especially those of Min and Southern Han who had comparatively
fewer local goods worthy of being sent to the markets of the north. The transshipment trade had a double advantage: for the administrators of the southern
kingdoms, especially for those of Min and Southern Han, it made independence feasible, and for the merchants of the southern kingdoms, it made up
for the general lack of local goods to trade in the great markets of the north
and so gave them entrée to the north’s domestic trade networks. In addition,
it gave Chinese merchants access to overseas markets where there was tremendous demand for Chinese textiles, especially silks; for metals and metalwork;
and, above all, for ceramics produced in the north as well as in the southern
kingdoms.
Finally, we must consider currency policies, an issue of importance to all the
southern kingdoms for political as well as economic reasons.214 Hand in hand
211
212
213
214
T’o-t’o et al., eds., Liao shih (1344; Peking, 1974) 2, p. 16.
On relations between the Khitan and all the southern kingdoms, see Hino’s “Godai jidai ni okeru
Kittan to Shina to no kaijō bōeki” articles. On the relationship with Wu-Yüeh, see specifically “Godai
jidai ni okeru Kittan to Shina to no kaijō bōeki (jō),” pp. 28–32.
SHY (1964) fan-i 7, pp. 6b–8a.
The most important study of medieval Chinese currency is Miyazaki Ichisada, Godai Sōsho no tsūka
mondai (Kyoto, 1943); a highly abbreviated summary of this is his “Godai Sōsho no tsūka mondai
kōgai,” in Ajia-shi kenkyū dai ni, Miyazaki Ichisada (Kyoto, 1959), pp. 130–9. See also Hino’s “So no
Ma In” articles.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 187
with the expanding commercial economy of southern China in the century preceding the interregnum went a growing demand for cash. As Denis Twitchett
has discussed, throughout the ninth century a constant tension existed between
the T’ang government, which sought to control the circulation of currency,
and producers, merchants, and consumers who required ever-greater supplies
of cash. The gap between supply and demand was increasingly filled by the
illicit production of debased coins of lead, tin, or iron to supplement the
available supplies of the standard copper cash. Twitchett cites evidence that
already by the late eighth century debased coins of lead or tin were in circulation in the Yangtze valley without government authorization, a clear violation
of existing law.215 By the latter half of the ninth century, however, as many
as thirteen of twenty-four official provincial mints were forced to issue iron
coins, an acknowledgment that copper supplies were no longer adequate to
meet society’s need for cash.
Thus as the interregnum unfolded, two related phenomena – a chronic shortage of cash, and the precedent for minting cash from metals other than copper –
combined to propel the southern kingdoms to issue their own coinages, in copper, lead, tin, and iron, in order to meet the expanding demand for cash within
their own commercializing economies as well as to assert their political independence. Hino Kaisaburō has argued that economically backward kingdoms
such as Ch’u, Southern Han, and Min, faced with shortages of the metal itself,
were unable to amass the copper coinage that the monetary demands of their
commercializing economies required. Economic need mandated that they find
a substitute for the copper lest they abort their economic development.216
These kingdoms took the initiative in minting coins of lead, tin, and iron, to
the consternation of the northern dynasties whose markets were soon awash in
the debased specie. In 924 the newly established Later T’ang issued a prohibition against using the lead or tin coins of the south, but the ban had to be
reissued in 929 because “at this time Hunan [Ch’u] was using only tin coins
which traded with copper coins at one hundred to one. These tin coins flowed
into the north, and laws could not put a stop to this.”217
This by no means exhausts references to debased currency circulating among
the southern kingdoms. What is important and very clear is that not only were
the southern economies commercializing, but they were beginning to monetize
as well. While many parts of the south were dependent by necessity on debased
coinage, the transformation that this monetization represented was essential
215
216
217
See Denis C. Twitchett, Financial administration under the T’ang dynasty, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1970),
pp. 66–84.
Hino, “So no Ma In (ge),” pp. 57–9.
TCTC 276, p. 9028; CWTS 146, p. 1948.
188
hugh r. clark
to the commercial development that occurred over much of the south in the
centuries that followed.
state structures and interstate relationships
Political identity
In the closing decades of the ninth century and early years of the tenth, as
T’ang dynastic authority dissolved and a new order took shape across the
south, most of the southern rulers accepted with reservations the claims to
imperial authority of Chu Wen, founder of the first of the northern dynasties,
the Later Liang. Significantly, the most powerful of the southern kingdoms,
the Wu, Wu-Yüeh, and Former Shu, indicated their displeasure by refusing to
adopt the Later Liang reign period for their calendars. Traditionally, a refusal
such as this was considered a sign of rebellion and a reason for war. Both Yang
Wo, who had just succeeded his father Yang Hsing-mi (d. 905) as ruler of
Wu, and Ch’ien Liu of Wu-Yüeh continued to use the final T’ang reign period
as a sign of loyalty to the fallen order. Wang Chien of the Former Shu went
even further, retaining the reign period of the penultimate T’ang emperor,
T’ang Chao-tsung, who had been killed by Chu Wen in 904. Wang Chien was
thereby refusing to acknowledge the legitimacy of the very young successor,
handpicked by Chu Wen, who reigned entirely at Chu’s pleasure.
Over the next few years each of the southern kingdoms took steps to make
its autonomy from the new imperial order more overt. As early as 908 in WuYüeh, Ch’ien Liu proclaimed his own reign period for use within his kingdom,
although he used the Later Liang system in all dealings with the north, a policy
that was generally adhered to by his successors.218 In Wu, Yang Wo and his
successor, Yang Lung-yen, continued to use the last T’ang reign period even as
the Later Liang went through a succession of changes, thus emphasizing Wu’s
break with the north. But the most direct actions were again those of Wang
Chien. In 907, within months of Chu Wen’s usurpation of the T’ang throne,
Wang claimed the imperial title for himself, as a symbolic challenge to Chu
Wen’s legitimacy.219 In 917, after denouncing the Later Liang as an “outlaw
court” (wei-t’ing), the Southern Han ruler Liu Yen followed suit, urging the Wu
leader Yang Lung-yen to do the same.220 Liu Yen, like Wang Chien, was not
motivated by a desire to claim the universal authority previously symbolized
by the title of emperor. On the contrary, he was probably more interested in
218
219
220
Wu, Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu 78, p. 1082.
TCTC 266, p. 8685.
TCTC 269, p. 8799; 270, pp. 8817, 8821.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 189
using the title to further his claims to sovereignty over Ling-nan, including
the Red River delta of modern Vietnam.
The defeat of the Later Liang’s forces by the Sha-t’o forces of the Later T’ang
stimulated a new round of imperial aspirations in the south. In 927, prompted
by the force behind the throne, Hsü Chih-kao, the nominal Wu ruler Yang
P’u joined the roster of competing emperors. There is no reason to think at
this point that Hsü Chih-kao or the Yang rulers were seriously seeking to
challenge the Later T’ang. They seem to have been questioning the legitimate
transmission of the imperial mandate through a non-Chinese ruling order.
When Hsü Chih-kao, himself having taken the throne in 937, changed his
surname in 939 to “Li” and the name of his dynasty to T’ang (i.e., Southern
T’ang), he was making a different statement. From then until 958, when
Southern T’ang rulers abandoned the imperial title and reverted to styling
themselves “king” (kuo-wang) in the face of pressure by the Later Chou,221
the Southern T’ang court claimed to be the sole legitimate heir to the T’ang
mandate and so ruler of its empire. Although Southern T’ang forces never
campaigned against the northern dynasties until the Later Chou invasions of
the mid-950s, its envoys frequently explored alliances with various forces,
especially with the Khitan and Turkic kingdoms farther north, with the goal
of expelling their rivals and controlling the northern plain.222
Bureaucratic governance
However the individual kingdoms of the south chose to acknowledge the
successive dynasties of the north, they each had to confront the challenge of
organizing their own bureaucracies, deploying their own armies, and raising
their own revenues. Establishing the framework of bureaucracy was relatively
easy. Each kingdom inherited a system of local and regional government from
the T’ang dynasty. Although there were shifts in nomenclature over the following years as rulers gave new names to old offices or elevated subcounty
units such as tax stations (ch’ang) to county (hsien) status in response to, for
example, the administrative demands generated by population growth, the
basic structures were continued without fundamental change.223 Although
none of the southern kingdoms inherited a central court or the attendant
organs of bureaucracy, all shared in the T’ang dynastic legacy and each proceeded to replicate the imperial bureaucracy, often creating large and unwieldy
221
222
223
TCTC 294, pp. 9583–4.
See, for example, TCTC 292, pp. 9531–2. See also Hino’s “Godai jidai ni okeru Kittan to Shina to no
kaijō bōeki” articles.
See, for example, Okada, “Godai So ōkoku no seikaku,” pp. 73–6.
190
hugh r. clark
structures far too grandiose for the kingdoms they were designed to administer. The organization of armed forces was a parallel issue. All of the founders
not only headed the armies that brought them to power but also inherited
the T’ang regional militias and warlord forces that had been absorbed in the
course of state consolidation.
Two pressing challenges arose from the establishment of civil and military
structures: how to staff them, and how to fund them. The regions contained by
Ch’u, Ching-nan, the Southern Han, and Min had few families with extensive
high-level experience in government, whereas the advanced regions contained
by Wu-Yüeh, Wu, the Southern T’ang, and the two Shu kingdoms had much
stronger traditions of participation in bureaucratic government. But even they
were challenged by the burdens of staffing their new courts.
One short-term solution was to use bureaucratic appointments to reward
those who had helped the new rulers gain power. Many of the new administrations initially had a strongly militaristic flavor not unlike that found in the
northern dynasties.224 Over time, the new states had to find more enduring
ways to recruit bureaucrats, and this meant either developing a tradition of
service where it did not exist or furthering that tradition where it did. In
some areas, especially Fu-chien, the initial preferences given to the associates
of the founders were transformed into long-term commitments to public service. In the Sung dynasty, when the Fu-chien region became a major source
of bureaucratic and scholastic talent, the descendents of those associated with
the founding Wang family occupied a disproportionately large share of the
province’s chin-shih degree holders. Other kingdoms, notably Southern Han
and the two Shu kingdoms, relied heavily on elite migrants from the north.
This practice may have hurt the development of local elites oriented toward
high-level government service for in the following centuries neither Kuangnan nor Szechwan were prominent sources of chin-shih graduates.225 The kingdoms that most successfully developed their own bureaucratic traditions were
Wu, the Southern T’ang, and Wu-Yüeh. Not incidentally, they also inherited
the most fully developed traditions of training and service and were best able
to perpetuate those traditions. Wu was the first state to revive examinations
for the selection of bureaucrats after the collapse of the T’ang. As early as 909
Wu initiated its own system of examinations.226 Because the Wu-Yüeh rulers
continued to recognize the northern dynasties’ imperial claim, its scholars were
224
225
226
For example, on Wu, see Krompart, “The southern restoration of T’ang,” and Nishikawa, “Go, Nan-Tō
ryō ōchō.” On Shu, see Kurihara, “Tō-Godai no kafushiteki ketsugō no seikaku” and his “Tōmatsu
Godai no kafushiteki ketsugō ni okeru seimei to nenrei.”
See figures 5 and 6 in John W. Chaffee, The thorny gates of learning in Sung China: A social history of
examinations (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 130–1.
TCTC 267, p. 8709.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 191
able to sit for the northern examinations. Wu-Yüeh never took the independent
step of organizing its own examination system. Wu and Wu-Yüeh combined
the judicious use of refugees from the north with the appointment of local
talent to create able bureaucracies that made them two of the best-governed
kingdoms of the era.
Taxation
To meet the fiscal burden of self-administration and defense, all the southern
kingdoms initially relied on tax systems inherited from the T’ang dynasty,
especially the double tax (liang-shui) levied on agriculture, to produce revenues.227 As the era wore on, however, the yields from agricultural taxation
proved inadequate to meet the needs of the courts. This was due at least in
part to the flood of northern migrants to the south. Often these migrants were
unable to find land of their own. As a result they resorted to tenancy or to life
in the fast-growing cities of the south. In theory, of course, tenant production
should have been included as part of the landowner’s double-tax obligations.
In many areas, however, land was increasingly held in the large estates called
chuang-yüan.228 The close ties between estate owners and the ruling elites –
indeed, they must generally have been one and the same – made it very easy to
hide the true yield of these properties, especially since estate owners used tenant labor to open new lands that had never been assessed, making the revenue
from the double tax significantly less than it ought to have been.
In several areas the problem of a shrinking tax base was compounded by
the growing economic power of Buddhist and Taoist institutions and the
difficulty in taxing them. The most extreme example was in the region of Fuchien, where monasteries amassed vast land holdings of what were reported
to be the very best lands.229 But Min was hardly the only kingdom where
monastic holdings grew dramatically. A gazetteer of the city of Shao-hsing,
published at the beginning of the thirteenth century, recalled: “Ever since
the Five Dynasties, Buddhist monasteries have been especially numerous in
Chiang-nan. Wu-Yüeh, Min, and Ch’u all built them in untold numbers, and
227
228
229
The double-tax system, also called the two-tax system, was a basic tax that could be paid in two annual
installments. On the double tax and its implications in the latter half of the T’ang, see Charles A.
Peterson, “Court and province in mid- and late T’ang,” in The Cambridge history of China, volume 3: Sui
and T’ang China, 589–906, part 1, ed. Denis C. Twitchett (Cambridge, 1979), pp. 498–501. See also
Twitchett, Financial administration under the T’ang dynasty.
On chuang-yüan in the interregnum, see Sudō Yoshiyuki, “Tōmatsu Godai no shōensei,” in Chūgoku tochi
seidoshi kenkyū, Sudō Yoshiyuki (Tokyo, 1954), pp. 7–64, and Matsui Shōichi, “Tōmatsu no minshū
hanran to Godai no keisei,” in Iwanami Kōza Sekai rekishi 6 – Kodai 6 (Tokyo, 1971), pp. 274–7.
See SS 173, p. 4191. See also the discussion in Clark, Community, trade, and networks, pp. 60–4.
192
hugh r. clark
one cannot count the number of monks.”230 It is not clear to what degree the
southern kingdoms even attempted to tax the yields of monastic lands, but it is
certain that in practice they were able to tax them very little. The monasteries
also sheltered large numbers of lightly taxed tenants, just as occurred on the
large private estates, a point echoed by the Wu-tai shih-pu: “The Ta-wei t’ungch’ing temple is in Ch’ang-sha. It has many monks and its fields are very
extensive. There are over one thousand tenant households (tien-hu).”231
Not surprisingly, the southern rulers commonly attempted to solve their
fiscal problems simply by raising the revenue generated from the land tax. This
could be done either by improving land registration or by raising tax rates.
In 943, for example, “Ch’u revenues were insufficient, so taxes were increased
and officials were dispatched to survey the fields; they only earned merit if
they could increase the number of ch’ing and mou [on the land registers].”232
Such methods, however, would not allow the state to entirely realize the fullest
revenues from the great estates. These methods could, in fact, exacerbate the
problem, as happened in Ch’u following its just noted efforts to improve
registration and increase yields: “The people could not meet their taxes and
fled. . . . They had only just been able to meet their own needs, and from west
to east many lost their livelihood.”
Although many of the kingdoms resorted to a variety of supplementary
taxes aimed at specific crops, in the long run the only real solution to their
problem was to change the focus of taxes away from land and to more elastic
sources of revenue, especially trade. Most if not all the kingdoms exercised
some kind of control over interstate trade, including the taxation of trade
goods or tribute goods in transit through their territory. Other methods of
raising revenue included the establishment of monopolies over such products
as salt and liquor, the imposition of levies on the wealthy, and the sale of
office for revenue: “[In Ch’u] offices were rewarded according to a person’s
contribution, with rank depending on whether the contribution was great
or small. Wealthy merchants and great traders appear on the lists of those
holding office, and when officials finish tours in the countryside, they must
offer a contribution [to get a new appointment].”233
It was the head tax, however, that in the end was the most significant
innovation of the period.234 The advantage of a head tax over other taxes,
230
231
232
233
234
Shih Su et al., Chia-t’ai Kuei-chi chih (1201; Peking, 1990) 7, p. 1b.
T’ao, Wu-tai shih-pu 3, p. 13a.
TCTC 283, p. 9259. See also the discussion in Okada, “Godai So ōkoku no seikaku,” pp. 78–9.
TCTC 283, p. 9259. For a similar passage regarding Min, see TCTC 281, p. 9176.
The two most thorough discussions of the head taxes of the southern kingdoms are Yanagida Setsuko,
“Sōdai no teizei,” in Sō-Gen gōsonsei no kenkyū, Yanagida Setsuko (Tokyo, 1986), pp. 324–50; and
Shimasue Kazuyasu, “Sōdai shinteizei no shokeitō,” Tōyōshi kenkyū 45 No. 3 (1986), pp. 119–44. Both
provide further citations for this topic.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 193
especially agrarian taxes, was twofold. First, a head tax could be levied on the
urban population; and second, because head taxes are levied on individuals
rather than on property, they could also be imposed directly on the landless
tenants of the great estates, including those of the monasteries. Furthermore,
because these taxes were assessed on the person, not on the land, the individual rather than the landowner was responsible for paying. This meant
that the great landowners could not minimize their own taxes by shielding
their tenants, a problem that undermined all taxes based on land. The head
tax, at least in theory, overcame all the shortcomings of the various agrarian
taxes.
All the southern kingdoms levied head taxes, with the possible exception
of the Former and Later Shu about whose taxation policies little is known.235
Although head taxes could be levied in a variety of goods, and at varying rates,
one constant was to levy them on adult males between the ages of twenty
and sixty. Women, children, and older men were not subject to the head tax.
Ch’u may have been the first of the southern kingdoms to experiment with
this tax: “Ever since the Ma family occupied Hunan they began to collect a
tax in cash, silk, rice, or grain on each adult male in Yung-chou, Tao-chou,
Ch’en-chou2, Kuei-yang chien, and Ch’a-ling county [in Heng-chou].”236 In
the absence of further information, we can only speculate as to why these
prefectures and counties, all of which were clumped together in southeastern
Ch’u, were singled out for the head tax, but a Sung dynasty source states that
the tax was still in effect there in 1059, a century after Chu’s absorption by the
Sung.237 The tax was levied equally on every adult male without distinction
as to wealth or standing: “Under the Ma family, in Ch’en-chou2, Yung-chou,
Kuei-yang, etc., a tax was levied on the people’s produce. The amount was the
same regardless of their wealth.”238
If the tax in Ch’u was collected in a variety of goods – cash, rice, grains,
textiles – this was not the case everywhere. In the Wu kingdom, for example,
the head tax had to be paid in cash:
[Before 918] Wu had had a monetary head tax (ting-k’ou ch’ien) as well as a monetary tax on
land. Thus cash was valued at the expense of goods, and the people were greatly oppressed.
Sung Ch’i-ch’iu advised, “One doesn’t get cash by tilling the land or sericulture. By forcing
the people to get cash [to pay their taxes] we are teaching them to abandon what is basic
[i.e., agriculture] for what is not [i.e., trade]. We should remit the head tax and collect the
rest in grain and cloth.”239
235
236
237
238
239
See the brief comments in Smith, Taxing heaven’s storehouse, pp. 77–9.
Li Hsin-ch’uan, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi [Shih-yüan ts’ung-shu, 1914 ed.] (c. 1202 chia volume,
1216 i volume; Taipei, 1967) 15, p. 1b.
SHY (1964) shih-huo 70, p. 167b.
See SHY (1964) shih-huo 70, p. 8b.
TCTC 270, p. 8832.
194
hugh r. clark
Yang Lung-yen, the Wu king at the time, apparently followed Sung’s advice
and abandoned the head tax, but it was partially revived by the Southern
T’ang in connection with levies on salt, as was explained by Fan Chung-yen
in a memorial he submitted in 1033: “In the five counties of Chiang-ning
the resident and migrant households all pay an annual tax called the ‘adult
male salt cash’ (ting-k’ou yen-ch’ien). . . . This began when these counties were
part of the Southern T’ang under which there was a salt production quota distributed among the population and collected in cash by the officials in T’ungchou2 and T’ai-chou2 [both coastal districts between the Huai and Yangtze
rivers].”240
In Ch’u and Southern T’ang it appears that the head tax was levied only
in selected areas. But in Wu-Yüeh it was collected almost everywhere: “when
men became adults they paid an annual tax of 360 cash. This was called ‘adult
male cash’ (shen-ting ch’ien).”241 When Wu-Yüeh had seized Fu-chou after the
Min kingdom collapsed in the mid-940s, the tax was extended to all men
there as well, although at a slightly lower rate: “In Fu-chou every adult male
paid a tax of 325 cash.”242 In the warlord enclave of Chang-Ch’üan (southern
Fu-chien) a head tax levied in rice was also extended to every adult male.243
And in Kuang-nan, “the head tax began during the Five Dynasties when every
adult male owed ten cash.”244
Although the head tax was widely imposed in several variations it failed
to solve the financial problems of the southern kingdoms, which one after
another fell prey to fiscal crises that wore down the energy and spirit of their
populations and made them vulnerable to the aggressions first of the Later
Chou dynasty, the last and most vibrant of the northern dynasties, and finally
to the Sung. Yet along with the unprecedented reliance on taxes on commerce,
the head tax represents one of the most important and enduring developments
of the southern kingdoms. Both forms of tax continued to be collected during
the Sung dynasty, and while neither ever displaced the land tax as the largest
source of revenue, they proved indispensable to the fiscal survival of the Sung.
Interstate relations
Ambitions for imperial supremacy put the successor kingdoms of Wu and
Southern T’ang at the center of a contentious system of interstate relations.
240
241
242
243
244
Shimasue, “Sōdai shinteizei,” p. 140 n. 24, quoting (Ching-ting) Chien-t’ai chih. See also in Yanagida,
“Sōdai no teizei,” p. 335.
Shimasue, “Sōdai shinteizei,” p. 139 n. 6, quoting Ch’en Shih-tao, Hou-shan hsien-sheng chi. See also
Yanagida, “Sōdai no teizei,” p. 328.
Shimasue, “Sōdai shinteizei,” p. 139 n. 9, quoting Ch’en Fu-lang, Chih-chi wen-chi.
SHY (1964) shih-huo 70, p. 166a.
Shimasue, “Sōdai shinteizei,” p. 141 n. 41, quoting Liu K’o-chuang, Hou-ts’un hsien-sheng ta-ch’üan-chi.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 195
Only the Former and Later Shu kingdoms were isolated enough that they
could remain aloof from other states, and there is no record that the Shu
rulers initiated any exchanges with the other southern kingdoms. They did
accept southern emissaries. On at least one occasion Liu Yen of Southern Han
dispatched an envoy to Ch’eng-tu “to convey friendship,” and in 937 WuYüeh sent an envoy, probably to congratulate the Meng family on assuming
the throne, which prompted Meng Ch’ang to send an emissary back as an
expression of gratitude.245 But if Shu was willing to receive friendly initiatives
from the other kingdoms, it is nevertheless clear that the major focus of Shu
policy was to cultivate ties with the non-Chinese peoples to the west and south
from whom the Shu kingdoms could get horses and so ensure the strength of
their defenses. Ssu-ma Kuang commented: “Wang Chien had originally been
a cavalry general. Thus, after he gained control of Shu he traded for horses
with the barbarians at Wen-chou2, Li-chou3, Wei-chou3, and Mao-chou [all
strung along the kingdom’s western frontier].”246 We do not learn what Shu
offered in these markets in exchange for the horses, although silk had been the
favored commodity during the T’ang dynasty as tea was to become in later
centuries. The cavalry that both Shu kingdoms could put in the field because
of this trade was an integral part of their defense.247
The remaining southern kingdoms interacted regularly if not always amicably with one another. The Liu rulers of Southern Han, for example, sought
to maintain good relations with their neighboring states of Ch’u and Min,
which they cemented through marriage alliances among the ruling houses.248
Relations among the Yangtze River states were generally less cordial, stirred
as they often were by the imperial aspirations of Wu and the Southern T’ang
or the expansionist designs of Ch’u. Through the first two decades of the tenth
century, while the new order of the interregnum slowly unfolded, both Ch’u
and Wu-Yüeh regularly found themselves pitched against Wu, despite the
growing emphasis all the southern kingdoms placed on trade along the shared
Yangtze River corridor. Wu-Yüeh reached a settlement with Wu in 919,
but Ch’u’s relations with Wu were constantly disrupted by Ch’u’s designs
on Ching-nan, which regularly appealed to Wu for help.249 This particular
245
246
247
248
249
TCTC 271, p. 8861; Chang, Shu t’ao-wu hsia, p. 4a.
TCTC 264, p. 8607.
On the horse trade in general and its connection to the Chinese military, see the discussion in Smith,
Taxing heaven’s storehouse, pp. 204–29. On the cavalry in the two Shu kingdoms, see Wu Chih-hao
et al., (Wan-li) Ch’ung-hsiu Ssu-ch’uan tsung-chih [National Diet Library collection] (n.p., 1619) 22,
pp. 52b–53a.
On Southern Han relations with Ch’u, see Tanaka Seiji, “So to Nan-Kan to no kankei,” in Tamura
hakushi shōju Tōyōshi ronsō, ed. Tamura Hakushi Taikan Kinen Jigyōkai (Kyoto, 1968), pp. 359–74. On
Southern Han marriage alliances with Min, see Schafer, The empire of Min, p. 20.
On the foreign policy of Ch’u, see Tanaka, “So to Nan-Kan to no kankei,” and Okada, “Godai So ōkoku
no seikaku,” pp. 79–82.
196
hugh r. clark
irritant was generally put to rest in 928, after a decisive military victory by
Ch’u in which it was prepared to wipe Ching-nan off the map: “Ma Yin urged
his general Wang Huan not to seize Ching-nan. Huan responded: ‘Chiangling [i.e., Ching-nan] lies between the northern dynasty, Wu, and Shu. On all
sides are enemies. It would be best if we permit it to endure as a buffer against
our enemies.’”250 This quieted Ch’u’s desire to conquer Ching-nan, which in
turn lowered the level of tension between Ch’u and Wu until the tumultuous
late-interregnum decade of the 950s.
Neither of the remaining kingdoms, Ching-nan and Min, could readily
afford to offend its neighbors. Ching-nan was especially vulnerable. As Wang
Huan noted, it occupied a critical crossroad, yet it was surrounded by potential
enemies on all sides. Its survival depended in large part on the continued acceptance of Wang’s argument that Ching-nan served as a buffer. The Ching-nan
rulers, in turn, attempted to cultivate their neighbors as a form of protection.
In 947, Kao Ts’ung-mei, the Ching-nan ruler who had been on the throne for
almost twenty years, sent an envoy to the Khitan who had just overthrown
the Later Chin and were about to establish their own short-lived dynasty on
the northern plain. This prompted Hu San-hsing to comment: “For the Kao
family of Ching-nan, there was no more important task than protecting their
kingdom.”251
The interstate relations of Min resembled that of the two Shu kingdoms
in one respect, since both the Fu-chien and Szechwan regions enjoyed the
relative protection conferred by physical isolation. But whereas the two Shu
states could afford to downplay relations with their neighbors Min could
not. Min was much too dependent on revenues derived from trade with and
through its neighboring kingdoms. From the beginning of the interregnum,
the Wang family cultivated good relations with the Ch’ien family of WuYüeh, relations that were cemented through marital exchanges in the 910s.252
Similar ties were cultivated with the Southern Han, although these broke down
briefly in 920 during a border skirmish that neither side apparently wanted.253
Surprisingly, in a step that at first glance seems contradictory, in 909 Wang
Shen-chih permanently broke ties with Wu. The reason was Wang Shen-chih’s
treatment of an envoy whom Yang Lung-yen, having just recently become King
of Wu, had dispatched to establish friendly ties with the Min court. Wang
250
251
252
253
TCTC 276, pp. 9015–16.
TCTC 286, p. 9337.
TCTC 269, p. 8808. On relations between Min and Wu-Yüeh, see Tanaka Seiji, “Go-Etsu to Bin to no
kankei,” Tōyōshi kenkyū 28 No. 1 (1969), pp. 28–51.
TCTC 270, p. 8823. On the border skirmish, see TCTC 271, p. 8876; 273, p. 8919; see also Liu Chün’s
biography in Kuo Fei et al., (Wan-li) Kuang-tung t’ung-chih [Naikaku Bunko collection] (1602; n.p.,
n.d.) 22, p. 20a.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 197
Shen-chih had the envoy beheaded, supposedly for arrogant behavior, but this
was a step that was surely calculated to lead to a break. Wang Shen-chih’s
goal, no doubt, was to enhance his ties with Wu-Yüeh, which was at the time
engaged in conflict with Wu. Wang Shen-chih was far more dependent on
Wu-Yüeh than on Wu because of the critical position Wu-Yüeh held in Min’s
maritime trade ties to the north. Ties with Wu could presumably be broken
with impunity, for Min did not rely on the overland route through Wu, and its
successor the Southern T’ang, to ship its trade goods north, and the mountains
of the Fu-chien interior that formed the mutual border could be relied on
to provide some protection. Min’s with Wu-Yüeh, however, appeared to be
more critical, and any steps that might enhance them, such as establishing
a mutual enemy, could seem advantageous. In fact, once Wang Shen-chih’s
control succumbed to family squabbles, Min proved vulnerable to both WuYüeh and the Southern T’ang, each of which absorbed a major portion of Min’s
domain.
the close of the interregnum
There are two components to the collapse of the southern kingdoms that
marked the closing of the interregnum. One was the growing instability of
many of the surviving kingdoms through the 950s and 960s, an instability
caused by poor leadership and growing fiscal distress. The second, and equally
important factor, was the emergence of stable leadership in the north. This
stability began most conclusively with Kuo Wei and the Later Chou dynasty
that he established in 951 and accelerated under Kuo’s successor, Ch’ai Jung
(Chou Shih-tsung, r. 954–9), culminating with the coup that brought Chao
K’uang-yin to power as the founder of the Sung dynasty. Although only fully
achieved under the Sung, Ch’ai Jung initiated the systematic unification of
the lands south of the Yangtze.
Between the 920s and 940s, a pattern of political upheaval reordered the
southern kingdoms. Two new and initially stable kingdoms, the Later Shu
and the Southern T’ang, emerged outside of the Central Plains, while the least
stable of the original kingdoms, the Min kingdom in Fu-chien, disappeared.
At the same time, the short-lived authority exercised by the Later T’ang in the
north evaporated in the turmoil enveloping the northern regimes during the
930s and 940s. In these middle decades it was the kingdoms of the Southern
T’ang in Chiang-Huai, the Later Shu in Szechwan, and Wu-Yüeh in the lower
Yangtze that seemed to hold the greatest promise for the future.
The death of the King of Ch’u, Ma Hsi-fan, in 947 initiated a second era of
instability that precipitated the collapse of order in the southern kingdoms.
The sequence of events in Ch’u brought about by Ma’s death parallels the
198
hugh r. clark
collapse of Min in the 940s.254 Ma Hsi-fan’s failure to name an heir caused a
split between his brothers, Ma Hsi-o and Ma Hsi-kuang, that was temporarily
resolved when the Later Han court of the north named Ma Hsi-kuang the new
king. Ma Hsi-o resentfully retired to the western shore of Tung-t’ing Lake.
Also living there was a large population of non-Chinese Man tribesmen who
had never been fully included in the Ch’u polity nor felt particular loyalty
to it.255 From his retreat at the lake, Ma Hsi-o plotted rebellion. As part of
his preparations, Ma Hsi-o appealed to the Later Han to partition the Ch’u
kingdom between himself and Ma Hsi-kuang, but the court refused. In a
strategy that echoed Kao Chi-ch’ang’s attempt to play the northern court
against the Wu empire twenty years earlier, Ma Hsi-o, in return for Southern
T’ang’s backing for his rebellion, pledged his subordination to Southern T’ang,
which at the time was nearing the crest of its power and imperial pretensions.
Li Ching, the second Southern T’ang ruler, accepted the bargain.
Late in 950, after almost a year of war, Ma Hsi-o’s forces, heavily bolstered
with Man troops, entered the Ch’u capital of T’an-chou (Ch’ang-sha), where
they indulged in three days of looting and killing so violent that Ssu-ma
Kuang later wrote: “Everything that had been built since the time of Ma Yin
was burned to the ground, and all the wealth he had gathered was seized.”256
Ma Hsi-kuang was forced to commit suicide. Ma Hsi-o was now in control
of Hunan and took for himself the titles that had been held first by Ma Yin
and later by his brother, including King of Ch’u. He then sent an envoy to
the Southern T’ang court, which in turn exercised its privilege as suzerain to
formally acknowledge the titles he had taken. Ma Hsi-o’s envoy, however, also
advised Li Ching that the people of Ch’u were very unhappy with the violent
and capricious administration of their new king: “The people of Hunan have
been exhausted by his arrogance. You could seize it.” And so Li Ching began
preparations to do just that.257
Renewed civil war in the summer and fall of 951, when Ma Hsi-o’s younger
brother and former ally, Ma Hsi-ch’ung, rose against him, spelled the end of the
Ch’u kingdom and of nearly six decades of Ma family rule. Both Mas appealed
to Southern T’ang for help, but Li Ching ordered his forces to seize T’an-chou.
All members of the Ma family were arrested and deported to the Southern
254
255
256
257
These events are narrated in T’ao, Wu-tai shih-lüeh, pp. 270–8, and Okada, “Godai So ōkoku no seikaku,”
pp. 82–90. Both sources rely primarily on TCTC.
On relations between the Man and Ch’u, see the following articles by Okada Kōji: “Godai So ōkoku no
‘Keishū dōchū’ ni tsuite,” Daitō Bunka Daigaku kiyō (Jinbun kagaku) 22 (1984), pp. 123–43; and his
“Tōmatsu Godai Sōsho Konan chiiki no minzoku mondai – toku ni Hō-shi no keifu to Tōcha-zoku to
no kankei o chūshin to shite,” Tōyō kenkyū 71 (1984), pp. 87–132.
TCTC 289, p. 9445.
TCTC 290, p. 9458.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 199
T’ang capital in Chin-ling (Nanking), leaving the lands of Ch’u, minus six
prefectures in the far south that Southern Han had seized for itself, under T’ang
control. This peace was to be only an interlude in the history of Hunan. If the
people were glad to be rid of Ma Hsi-o, the new Southern T’ang administration
did not prove to be much better: “[Southern] T’ang forces seized all the gold
and silk, the precious curios, the stored grain, and even the best of the ships
and boats, the pavilions and courts, and the flowers and fruits; all were shipped
to Chin-ling. Taxes were levied in Hunan to support the occupying troops;
the exactions were harsh, and the people of Hunan lost hope.”258 Quickly the
population turned against the Southern T’ang administration.
Had the attention of those in Chin-ling not been diverted by other matters,
the unrest in Hunan may not have led to anything, but such was not the
case. In 952 the Later Chou was consolidating control over the northern plain
and there were rising tensions along the frontier between the Later Chou and
Southern T’ang. This tension was exacerbated by Li Ching’s support of antiChou forces. In one engagement Southern T’ang forces suffered losses of over a
thousand dead and wounded.259 This distraction between the Later Chou and
Southern T’ang opened the way for new leaders in Hunan, many of whom were
non-Chinese,260 to expel the occupying army. By late 952 the Southern T’ang
occupiers were gone and the land was once again in the hands of Hunanese,
although peace was not fully restored until 956 when Chou Hsing-feng’s forces
invaded the region.
At the moment that Southern T’ang armies had taken control of Ch’u in
951, the power of the Southern T’ang appeared to be rising and the possibilities
for conquest limitless. Despite their previous failure to consolidate control over
Fu-chien, the Southern T’ang empire now embraced over thirty prefectures
stretching from the Huai River in the north, to the mountainous frontier with
Ling-nan in the south, and from the interior prefectures of Fu-chien in the east,
to Tung-t’ing Lake and the river valleys of Hunan in the west. In the words
of one author, writing in the eleventh century, Southern T’ang was “the most
powerful” of all the southern kingdoms. Another wrote: “Compared to all the
other states of that moment, T’ang territory was vaster, its strength greater,
and its population more numerous.” Ssu-ma Kuang added that Li Ching began
to envision uniting the whole empire, daring to dream of the destiny implicit
in the mandate his father had claimed.261
258
259
260
261
TCTC 290, p. 9472. See also Ma, Ma-shih Nan T’ang shu 3, p. 5a.
TCTC 290, pp. 9472–3; CWTS 112, pp. 1479–80.
See Okada, “Godai So ōkoku no seikaku,” pp. 88–9.
CWTS 134, p. 1787; Lu Yu, Lu-shih Nan T’ang shu [Ch’ien Shu-pao handwritten Ming dynasty ed.]
(12th c.; Shanghai, 1934) 2, p. 13a; TCTC 290, p. 9455.
200
hugh r. clark
Yet Southern T’ang power had reached its apogee, and began to wane. Much
of the responsibility for this failure falls on Li Ching, for despite his musings
about achieving a grand imperial ambition, he was plagued by indecision and
hesitation. The best opportunities to realize his ambitions had come in the
940s, when turmoil and instability had enveloped the northern plain and his
advisors had urged him to strike. Instead, he waited, afraid to make such a
large commitment. When he did send out forces – this time to Fu-chien – it
proved an unwise diversion of his resources. As a result of the defeat he suffered
at the hands of the Wu-Yüeh army and the loss of twenty thousand men, the
Fu-chien adventure weakened him at the very moment when, many argued,
his forces should be moving north. Shortly after, as the Later Han collapsed,
creating the power vacuum into which Kuo Wei ultimately stepped as the
founder of the Later Chou, Li Ching sent his forces into Hunan. Hunan was a
valuable prize, to be sure, but less valuable than the northern plain and, like
the campaign in Fu-chien, Li Ching’s campaign into Hunan was a military
disaster.262 By the end of 952, Li Ching was reeling from a succession of defeats.
He announced that he would put an end to all military adventures, a decision
the new dynasts of the north were not going to respect.263
But the inadequacies of Li Ching were not the only problem faced by the
Southern T’ang. Paradoxically, the success of the five decades of Hsü and Li
family control of the Chiang-Huai region had created its own weaknesses.
The military had grown soft and indolent as a result of many years of inaction, its leadership inexperienced in the arts of war. This weakness contributed
directly to the defeats suffered in the late 940s and 950s. More fundamentally,
as Nishikawa Masao has argued, the upper ranks of the bureaucracy continued
to be dominated by the refugee elite from north China who had surrounded
Hsü Chih-kao in the 920s and 930s. This tight grip on power excluded the
increasingly prosperous and sophisticated native population.264 In 952, Li
Ching made a half-hearted effort to address this situation by reinstituting an
examination system for elite bureaucratic recruitment. The first exam yielded
only three graduates. The system was then suspended.265 Although it was
reinstated the following year, over the next two decades many talented candidates did not sit for Southern T’ang examinations. They chose instead to go
north and pursue careers in the bureaucracies of the Later Chou and the Sung.
This movement of talented candidates suggests that alienation between the
262
263
264
265
This is a common argument, see T’ao, Wu-tai shih-lüeh, pp. 283–7.
TCTC 291, p. 9486.
Nishikawa, “Go, Nan-Tō ryō ōchō,” pp. 153–66.
TCTC 290, pp. 9475, 9498. There is no record of when the examination system of the Wu kingdom
had been suspended.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 201
native elite and the entrenched circles around the emperor continued to be a
problem. At the very time the Southern T’ang needed to reach out for support
within its own territory, there was an indifference on the part of those whose
support would have been instrumental in strengthening the kingdom.
The first serious confrontation between Southern T’ang and the northern
dynasties began when the Later Chou emperor, Chou Shih-tsung, launched an
invasion of Huai-nan, which had always been part of the Wu and Southern
T’ang kingdoms. The Later Chou assault was a success. By 958, Li Ching
was forced to surrender all the prefectures north of the Yangtze River and to
acknowledge the Later Chou emperor as his suzerain. Li Ching also relinquished
the imperial title that Southern T’ang rulers had claimed since Hsü Chih-kao in
937.266 These concessions were more than a blow to Southern T’ang prestige.
The surrendered Huai-nan prefectures were the heart of the state-run salt
monopoly that was key to Southern T’ang finances. At the same time that the
Later Chou victory deprived the Southern T’ang court of a major source of
revenue, it claimed that revenue for itself and so enhanced its own coffers. The
balance of power had now taken a major swing to the north.
By all accounts Chou Shih-tsung was intending to carry his campaign farther
into Southern T’ang territory after a brief pause to consolidate his initial gains.
In 959, however, the thirty-nine-year-old sovereign died from a sudden illness, before his plans could be put into action. Briefly, the stability of the north
was disturbed. Within a year the Later Chou general Chao K’uang-yin (Sung
T’ai-tsu r. 960–76) had usurped the Later Chou throne to establish the Sung
dynasty. By 963, Sung T’ai-tsu was prepared to resume Chou Shih-tsung’s campaigns of imperial expansion. Perhaps he would even have launched an invasion
directly into the Southern T’ang heartland, as Chou Shih-tsung was probably
going to do, but events in Hunan made that region a target too inviting to
ignore. (See maps 9 and 11.)
Although Hunan had gone through a half decade of turmoil, by 956 Chou
Hsing-feng had established order. Under Chou Hsing-feng taxes, which had
risen dramatically in the preceding years, were eased and a measure of prosperity returned. His rule, which was stern, uncompromising, and often violent,267
was nevertheless highly charismatic and, as is so characteristic of such rule,
intensely personalized. When he died in 962, his ten-year-old son and heir,
Chou Pao-ch’üan, who inherited neither his father’s charisma nor the loyalties of those around him, was unable to perpetuate his authority, and rebellion
again broke out. Following his father’s deathbed instruction, Chou Pao-ch’üan
appealed to Sung T’ai-tsu for help.
266
267
TCTC 294, p. 9583.
See, for example, TCTC 293, pp. 9555–8.
202
hugh r. clark
To the Sung court, anxious to resume the process of expansion, the turmoil
in Hunan was an opportunity to incorporate the rich lands of the Tung-t’ing
Lake drainage basin, whose wealth could be used to finance further campaigns
against the stronger states in Szechwan and Chiang-nan. The new emperor
Sung T’ai-tsu seized the opportunity without hesitation, gaining not only
Hunan but Ching-nan as well. For when T’ai-tsu requested permission to
send his forces through Ching-nan, Kao Chi-chung, fifth and last in his family to rule independently, was persuaded that while resistance would lead to
death and destruction, compliance would spare his people and provide him
continued wealth and existence. Kao Chi-chung yielded without a fight. He
was the first of the southern rulers to give up his independence, opening a
path for the Sung armies into Hunan.268 By the summer of 963 all resistance in Hunan was overwhelmed and the territory absorbed into the new
empire.269 For the first time since the fall of the T’ang dynasty, a state from
the northern plain had a secure foothold in the rich lands south of the Yangtze
River.
The collapse of the kingdoms at the center of southern China touched off
further reactions among the remaining kingdoms, especially in Szechwan.
Meng Chih-hsiang, who had established the Later Shu kingdom in 934, died
within months of taking the imperial title and was succeeded by his son,
Meng Ch’ang (r. 934–65). Meng Ch’ang’s long reign was initially prosperous
and stable, and he was able to recover the four most northerly prefectures
of Ch’in-chou, Ch’eng-chou, Chieh-chou, and Feng-chou (all in the southern
part of modern Kansu) that had been lost with the fall of the Former Shu.270
But as happened in the central Yangtze valley when Southern T’ang extended
its territorial authority, Meng Ch’ang’s successful reach into new territories
undermined his ability to strengthen his kingdom. Also Meng Ch’ang was
growing less interested in government, and in 951 he turned all responsibility
over to a childhood friend, Yin Fan-cheng. According to Ssu-ma Kuang, “From
this point the government of Shu began to decline.”271 In 955, Chou Shihtsung began his program of unification by easily reclaiming Shu’s four northern
prefectures.272 The cost of the unsuccessful defense of these prefectures was
more than the Later Shu treasury could bear. The resulting fiscal crisis in
Szechwan led to the confiscation of all privately owned iron implements, to be
melted down and recast as debased iron coins.273 The need to increase revenues,
268
269
270
271
272
273
HCP (1964) 4, pp. 3b–4b.
HCP (1964) 4, pp. 4b–6a.
Ou-yang, Hsin Wu-tai shih 64, p. 804.
TCTC 290, p. 9460.
TCTC 292, pp. 9524–5, 9528–33.
TCTC 292, p. 9531.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 203
however, persisted, provoking Meng Ch’ang to intensify the collection of tax
arrears as well as impose new levies.274
The Later Shu was spared from renewed Later Chou attacks when Chou Shihtsung diverted his attention to the Southern T’ang. But then he died, and when
the forces of Sung T’ai-tsu captured the territory of the central Yangtze basin,
Meng Ch’ang grew justifiably afraid, and dispatched a secret message to the
court of the Northern Han kingdom proposing an alliance. His message was
discovered when his envoys passed through the new Sung capital, K’ai-feng,
providing Sung T’ai-tsu with the excuse he sought to renew the campaign
of expansion into Szechwan. Begun in late 964, the Sung assault proceeded
with surprising speed. Within months Later Shu resistance had collapsed and
Meng Ch’ang sued for peace, surrendering his land to the invaders.275 Although
sporadic unrest continued to disturb Szechwan for another quarter of a century,
Meng Ch’ang’s surrender meant that the Sung dynasty now controlled all
southern territory west of Chiang-nan and north of Ling-nan.
It was five years before Sung T’ai-tsu resumed his campaigns in the south,
having turned first to an unsuccessful attempt to subdue the Northern Han.
The next kingdom to fall was the Southern Han. The Southern Han had
experienced many years of stability under its first two rulers, Liu Yin and his
brother Liu Yen, although Liu Yen had already begun the pattern of arbitrary
rule and self-enrichment that was to characterize and discredit his successors.276
Following Liu Yen’s death in 942 the kingdom entered a steady spiral of decline
and misrule. The Southern Han survived only because of the wealth it generated
from its pivotal role in the overseas trade. Liu Ch’ang, the last member of the
Liu family to rule, ascended the throne in 958 following the unmourned death
of his tyrannical father. Liu Ch’ang is described as cruel and corrupt, with
no interest in governing, choosing instead to drink and cavort with Persian
girls.277 Liu Ch’ang allowed the kingdom’s military to deteriorate. Under the
command of cruel and incompetent eunuchs, weapons went untended and
troops unpaid.
Sung T’ai-tsu first turned his attention to the Southern Han in late 968,
even as his unsuccessful campaign against Northern Han was unfolding. It
was said that when Sung forces had retaken Ch’en-chou, a prefecture on the
frontier between the Southern Han and Hunan, one of the eunuch prisoners was
274
275
276
277
HCP (1964) 3, p. 15a; 6, p. 3b.
The Sung campaign is narrated in Yang, Ch’ien Shu Hou Shu shih, pp. 159–63.
The following is based on the account in Ou-yang, Hsin Wu-tai shih 65. See also Edward H. Schafer
“The history of the empire of Southern Han, according to chapter 65 of the Wu-tai shih of Ou-yang
Hsiu,” in Sōritsu nijūgo shūnen kinen ronbunshū [The silver jubilee volume of the Zinbun Kagaku Kenkyusyo,
Kyoto University], ed. Kyōtō Daigaku Jinbun Kagaku Kenkyūjo (Kyoto, 1954), vol. 16, pp. 339–69.
SS 481, p. 13920.
204
hugh r. clark
brought before the emperor. T’ai-tsu asked his captive about the government of
his kingdom, to which the eunuch replied: “It has indulged itself in luxurious
extravagance and merciless cruelty for many generations.” Sung T’ai-tsu then
sighed and said: “I must rescue the people of this place.” The prefect of Taochou, in southern Hunan, then reported to the court that refugees were fleeing
the evil oppressions of Liu Ch’ang’s reign and called on the emperor to launch
an invasion. Although an invasion was not feasible at that moment because
of the ongoing campaign in the north, T’ai-tsu did direct Li Yü (r. 961–75),
ruler of Southern T’ang, to appeal to Liu Ch’ang to desist from his abuses and
to submit to northern suzerainty. Liu Ch’ang ignored the advice.278 Finally in
late 970, the northern campaign over, Sung T’ai-tsu directed his generals to
launch their assault on the Southern Han. The campaign lasted several months,
but Sung forces held the advantage from the beginning and gradually pushed
the defenders back. By the late spring of 971, Liu Ch’ang was dead – the only
one of the southern rulers to actually die in the unification campaigns.
There were now two kingdoms, T’ang and Wu-Yüeh, and the warlord
enclave of Chang-Ch’üan (in southern Fu-chien) that had not yet fallen to
Sung forces. Although they acknowledged the overlordship of the Sung, these
remaining states continued to act independently, a situation T’ai-tsu was not
willing to tolerate. Tributary suzerainty was not the same as imperial authority. Sung T’ai-tsu identified Southern T’ang as the cornerstone of continued
resistance to Sung imperial claims, so it was to that kingdom that he turned
his attention. Li Yü, as ruler of the Southern T’ang, had been a loyal and subservient tributary, regularly sending envoys to K’ai-feng to affirm his subordinate status. But following the successful conclusion of the campaign against
the Southern Han, the Sung began deliberately to reduce Li Yü’s status. Late
in 971 he was directed to change his title from “Ruler of T’ang” to “Ruler
of Chiang-nan,” a demotion that attempted to end the connection between
Li Yü and the imperial heritage of the T’ang dynasty.279 The following year,
Sung T’ai-tsu decided to increase the pressure by detaining Li Yü’s brother,
who had come to K’ai-feng on a tributary mission. Li Yü was greatly alarmed
by this and restructured his bureaucracy to make it appear less imperial.280
All this was in vain, however, for T’ai-tsu had determined that Li Yü would
either yield his kingdom voluntarily or have it taken by force. Through 973
and 974 the two played a delicate minuet. Li Yü was fully aware that resistance
to T’ai-tsu’s appeal would lead to only one outcome, yet he continued to avoid
a showdown. In late 975, T’ai-tsu’s patience ran out and the invasion began.
278
279
280
HCP (1964) 9, pp. 9b–10a.
HCP (1964), 1, reprinting Yung-lo ta-tien 12306, pp. 6b–7a.
HCP (1964), 1, reprinting Yung-lo ta-tien 12306, p. 9a.
the southern kingdoms between the t’ang and the sung 205
Even Wu-Yüeh forces participated, launching an assault from the east at the
same time that Sung forces crossed the Yangtze River and entered Chiangnan from the north. Although Southern T’ang resources and power had been
reduced by the loss of the Huai-nan prefectures nearly two decades before, the
kingdom was still wealthy and its armies strong. The campaign was accordingly slow and difficult. But in late 975, Li Yü accepted the inevitable and
surrendered.281
Neither of the remaining southern rulers, Ch’ien Shu (r. 948–78) of WuYüeh and Ch’en Hung-chin (r. 962–78) (in southern Fu-chien), was under
any illusion about the future. Both were preparing to yield their kingdoms
voluntarily when Sung T’ai-tsu died in 976. The need to observe the formalities
of mourning thus delayed their submission, which was not finalized until 978.
Sung T’ai-tsu’s evaluation of Southern T’ang as the last hurdle to surmount
to accomplish unification was borne out. Neither surviving kingdom could
prolong its conquest by the Sung empire, and the era of the southern kingdoms
was over.
conclusion
The southern kingdoms were critical to the character of the Sung dynasty that
followed. As later chapters in this volume show, the new dynasty was increasingly oriented toward the lands they had conquered. The south was home to
many of the pivotal figures of the first half of the Sung dynasty, including the
great reformers of the eleventh century, Fan Chung-yen and Wang An-shih.
As that century unfolded, southerners, many of whom were descendants of
men who had taken advantage of the unsettled social conditions of the tenth
century to rise from obscurity, increasingly dominated the civil service examinations and the governing bureaucracy. The south was the economic heart of
the Sung in an era that was increasingly commercialized and dependent upon
trade. It was the southern kingdoms that had consolidated the commercial
character of the region and laid the groundwork for the great economic surge
that followed. And as the new dynasty wrestled with what seemed to many to
be unresolvable fiscal problems, the reformers turned to models of state finance
that emphasized revenue sources other than land taxes, specifically models that
had been adopted and refined by the southern kingdoms.
281
The final year of the campaign is narrated in HCP (1964), 1, reprinting Yung-lo ta-tien 12307,
pp. 1a–15a.
CHAPTER 3
FOUNDING AND CONSOLIDATION OF THE SUNG
DYNASTY UNDER T’AI-TSU (960–976),
T’AI-TSUNG (976–997), AND CHEN-TSUNG
(997–1022)
Lau Nap-yin and Huang K’uan-chung
t’ai-tsu and the founding of the sung, 960–976
The last years of the Five Dynasties era
The end of T’ang imperial rule in 907 resulted in seventy-two years of political division, the emergence of nine kingdoms in the south, the Sha-t’o-ruled
kingdom of Northern Han (951–79) (in Shansi), and a succession of five shortlived dynasties located in the traditional center of the Chinese imperium in
the Yellow River valley. While the southern kingdoms (891–979) lasted for
decades in relative peace and prosperity, the north was in a constant state of
war, and each of the so-called Five Dynasties (907–60) rapidly supplanted one
another through regicides, army mutinies, and war. This political fragmentation and instability invited military incursions and sometimes drew into the
region armies of the Sha-t’o Turks and Khitan (Ch’i-tan). Further west, in the
region of Kansu, former T’ang territories were controlled by Tibetan, Uighur,
and Tangut warlord states. The most successful of these frontier groups were
the Khitan, who incorporated the Sixteen Prefectures (a region encompassing
modern Peking) into their own Liao empire (907–1125).
The decline of administrative order in the late T’ang dynasty gave rise to
widespread banditry and separatist regional military governors (chieh-tu shih).
The notorious Chu Wen (r. 907–12), for example, deserted the Huang Ch’ao
rebellion (875–84) to become a T’ang military governor, then murdered and
deposed the last two T’ang emperors to found his own Later Liang dynasty,
which lasted sixteen years (907–23), the longest of the northern dynasties. Chu
Wen’s life, however, was taken in the fifth year of his reign by one of his sons,
who was killed in turn by a half brother after only one year on the throne.1
1
For Chu Wen and his Later Liang dynasty, see chapters 4 and 5 of Wang Gungwu, The structure of power
in north China during the Five Dynasties (Kuala Lumpur, 1963); Robert Somers, “The end of T’ang,” in
The Cambridge history of China, volume 3: Sui and T’ang China, 589–906, part 1, ed. Denis C. Twitchett
(Cambridge, 1979), pp. 781–7.
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
207
In the words of the historian Ma Tuan-lin (c. 1254–1323), the provincial
military governors of the late T’ang empire were either insurgent soldiers
or bandit leaders who had murdered or expelled former military governors
and had their usurpations ratified by the helpless T’ang court.2 The military
governors expanded their territories at one another’s expense in destructive
battles, pillaging and ravaging whether they won or lost. Ch’ang-an (modern
Hsi-an in Shensi) was ruined, Lo-yang (in Honan) was depopulated, and much
of the north was devastated.3 Under such leaders, the lawlessness of the late
T’ang period spread and intensified.
Fragmentation also undermined the foundations of medieval tradition. The
value of loyalty declined as ranking officials, high and low alike, prostrated
themselves before whatever new ruler had just overthrown their old master. Ritually sworn brotherhood often ended in fratricide. Younger generals
adopted as sons by their superiors frequently assassinated their “fathers.” Personal loyalty was rare, loyalty to the state rarer still, since there was no lasting
state. All was in flux, and betrayal motivated by self-interest was frequent. In
determining the succession to the throne, naked force decided the outcome –
emperors were raised to the throne by fellow generals and generals by their
soldiers. Unsatisfied with the rewards accruing to them from such action or
spurred on by their own ambitions, yesterday’s supporters could easily turn
into tomorrow’s usurpers. In this age of constant and unpredictable conflict,
when “emperors were enthroned like clerks and states were replaced like inns,”4
most of the militarist rulers in the north before the Later Chou, even though
they harbored dynastic pretensions, were generally preoccupied with war and
seldom had either the leisure, the means, or the ambition to consider making
changes in institutions, promoting cultural pursuits, or undertaking economic
reconstruction.
However, a limited foundation of wealth and strength was gradually laid
down during the Later Chou dynasty (951–60), the forerunner of the Sung
and the first post T’ang regime able to claim to have been a stable dynasty. To
briefly reprise events narrated in chapter 1, the Later Chou founder, Kuo Wei
(r. 951–4), though himself a usurper, was determined to reform the economy
2
3
4
Ma Tuan-lin, Wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao [Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, 1935–7 ed.] (c. 1308; Taipei, 1965) 276,
p. 2195. The Ch’ing historian Chao I (1727–1814) showed that almost thirty to forty percent of military
governors during the late ninth and early tenth centuries were first appointed by their armies and then
retrospectively confirmed in their posts by the central government. See Chao I, Nien-erh shih cha-chi (1799;
Taipei, 1977) 21, pp. 460–3. His figure may be an underestimate; see Edmund H. Worthy, Jr., “The
founding of Sung China, 950–1000: Integrative changes in military and political institutions” (diss.,
Princeton University, 1976), pp. 104, 132, n. 9. Worthy’s pioneering work remains the best study of the
founding of the Northern Sung.
Liu Hsü et al., Chiu T’ang-shu (945; Peking, 1975) 123, p. 3513.
See the introduction in Ou-yang Hsiu, Hsin Wu-tai shih (1073; Peking, 1974), p. 2.
208
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
and the military but died before he could accomplish much. His adopted son
and successor, Ch’ai Jung (r. 954–9), achieved more. During the nine years
of their reigns, heavy taxes were reduced and taxes imposed more equitably;
vast areas of government land (in particular, the military garrison fields) were
released to the common people, abandoned land was brought under cultivation;
concealed landholdings were registered for taxation; irrigation canals and dikes
were constructed; vagrants and refugees were settled; the selection of officials
was carefully administered; and corruption was reduced. In 955, over thirty
thousand Buddhist monasteries were abolished to free new land and obtain new
taxpayers. The bells and statues from the monasteries were melted down and
cast into coins to feed the rapidly expanding money economy. As a result, tax
returns, economic output, and population all increased.5 While implementing
these improvements, Ch’ai Jung also set about expanding the territory under
his control.
First, however, he had to strengthen the twin pillars of the imperial armies
(chin-chün): the Metropolitan Command (Shih-wei ssu), and the Palace Command (Tien-ch’ien ssu). The ultimate goal was to transform these armies from
“imperial power brokers” into “agents of centralized imperial power.”6 This
process was begun as early as 954, soon after Ch’ai Jung ascended the throne
and found himself fighting a massive invasion by Northern Han and Khitan
troops. In a decisive battle at Kao-p’ing (in southern Shansi), when key units
of the Metropolitan Command fled and defeat loomed, Ch’ai Jung heroically
charged ahead with the Palace Command and saved the day.7 Ch’ai Jung seized
this opportunity to gain firm control over the Metropolitan Command. He
executed commanders in chief and officers in the infantry and the cavalry for
their cowardice and disobedience, and restaffed the Metropolitan Command
with his own men. He then conducted a full-scale fitness review of the imperial
armies, discharging the decrepit and unfit and promoting the ablest of their
troops. This housecleaning reduced wasteful expenditures and revitalized the
strength of the Metropolitan Command. At the same time, a recruitment
campaign throughout Ch’ai Jung’s realm began to draw the fittest stalwarts –
including those serving the provincial military governors – into the Palace
Command, making the Palace Command’s strength and structure parallel
5
6
7
For Kuo Wei’s and Ch’ai Jung’s reforms, see the accounts of their reigns written in 974 by Hsüeh Chücheng et al., eds., Chiu Wu-tai shih [hereafter CWTS] (974; Peking, 1976) 110–19, pp. 1447–1589;
Han Kuo-p’an, Ch’ai Jung (Shanghai, 1956); Ch’üan Han-sheng, T’ang Sung ti-kuo yün-ho (Chung-ching,
1944), pp. 93–4; Kurihara Masuo, Ransei no kōtei – “Kō-Shū” no Seisō to sono jidai (Tokyo, 1968); and
chapter 2 of Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” especially pp. 28, 32, 39.
Quoted from the titles of chapters 3 and 4 of Worthy, “The founding of Sung China.”
CWTS 114, p. 1513.
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
209
to that of the Metropolitan Command.8 Having effectively enacted these
reforms during the first year of his reign, Ch’ai Jung became a strong military
ruler.
The following year, Ch’ai Jung called for his ministers to propose unification
strategies. Wang P’u (?–957), a bureau director in the Ministry of Justice, is
usually credited by the historians with submitting the famous “South before
North” strategy. Wang suggested that the first objective should be the Southern
T’ang (937–75), since weak points along its border with the Later Chou could
easily be penetrated and the riches of its main territories in the lower Yangtze
valley would provide future campaigns with funds for manpower and resources.
Wang further proposed that the Later Chou army should avoid conflict with
the strong states in favor of attacking the weak. Only comparatively small
forces would be needed to finish off the Southern T’ang, the Southern Han
(917–71) in Kwangtung, and the Later Shu (934–65) in Szechwan, thus saving
the major forces for a final expedition against the Northern Han and their allies
the Khitan.9
Because of new and changing opportunities, Ch’ai Jung deviated slightly
from Wang’s proposal. Ch’ai Jung first captured four prefectures from the
Later Shu. Then, in two and a half years, he annexed from the Southern T’ang
fourteen fertile prefectures between the Yangtze and the Huai rivers. This
annexation added 226,500 households and large tax revenues to the Later Chou
coffers. It also provided a transportation route linking the Yangtze River and
the productive Huai River areas to the Later Chou capital at K’ai-feng.10 In
959, however, the southward campaign was diverted to counter an incursion
on the northern frontiers by the Khitan, who were abetted by the Southern
T’ang. The Later Chou counterattack more than halted the Khitan incursion:
it captured three strategic passes and two of the so-called Sixteen Prefectures
of Yen-Yün (Mo-chou and Ying-chou) from the Khitan (see map 9). The
campaign faltered, however, at Yu-chou (the Liao Southern Capital), where
Ch’ai Jung fell mortally ill. Ch’ai Jung returned to K’ai-feng, and one month
later he died at the age of thirty-nine, leaving his five-year-old son on the
throne. The Later Chou empire, enlarged from 96 to 118 prefectures, now
needed strong leadership, and the position of emperor was coveted by powerful men.
8
9
10
Wang P’u, Wu-tai hui-yao (961; Shanghai, 1978) 12, pp. 205–6; CWTS 114, p. 1522. For the political
importance of the Metropolitan Command, see chapter 7 of Wang, Structure of power, especially pp. 205–6,
and chapters 3 and 4 of Worthy, “The founding of Sung China.”
For Wang P’u’s “South before North” strategy, see Chang Chia-chü, Chao K’uang-yin chuan (Nanking,
1959), pp. 27–8, and Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” pp. 14–17.
CWTS 118, p. 1570.
210
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
The Coup at Ch’en-ch’iao
Legend has it that during his expedition against the Khitan, Ch’ai Jung was
presented with a wooden plaque, mysteriously discovered on the ground, that
bore a hexagram and the disturbing message: “The inspector-general is to
be. . . . ” According to the legend, the missing object sounded like the word
“emperor” to Ch’ai Jung, and as a consequence he summarily dismissed the
inspector-general of the Palace Command, Chang Yung-te (927–1000), an
amateur astrologer and the son-in-law of Kuo Wei, and replaced him with the
commander in chief – a military strongman named Chao K’uang-yin (926–76)
who would in fact become the next emperor and founder of the Sung dynasty.11
Born into an official family in Lo-yang, Chao K’uang-yin had joined the
regional army of Ch’ai Jung’s predecessor, Kuo Wei, at the age of twenty-one.
Chao followed in the footsteps of his father, Chao Hung-yin (?–956), who had
served successively in the imperial armies of four dynasties beginning with
the Later T’ang (923–36).12 It did not take long for the receptive young Chao
to learn firsthand how a new dynasty could, once established, turn around
and victimize its subjects by neglecting to restrain its military. For example,
toward the end of 950, the last emperor of the Later Han, Liu Ch’eng-yu
(r. 948–50), had launched a bloody purge against his potential rivals. Three of
the four officials Liu’s predecessor had designated to advise him were executed
with their families and followers, and an assassination plot was set in motion
against another one. The fourth official was Kuo Wei – Ch’ai Jung’s adoptive
father and predecessor. Kuo Wei had just been posted as a military governor
in Ho-pei. In response to the plot, Kuo marched with his troops to the capital,
promising his army ten days of plunder if they took the city. When the city fell
it was pillaged by the rebels, and the Later Han emperor executed. An adopted
imperial relative was summoned from his prefecture of residence to succeed to
the throne, but he never sat on it. In the last month of 950, a Khitan invasion
was reported and Kuo Wei was dispatched to repel it. A few days after leaving
the capital, Kuo was proclaimed emperor by the expeditionary troops. Among
them was Chao K’uang-yin, who was soon promoted an officer.13
Chao K’uang-yin continued to win distinction and promotion under the
new Chou emperor, Kuo Wei. Chao’s talents furthermore endeared him to the
then Prince Ch’ai Jung, who transferred Chao to his own command. The prince
11
12
13
CWTS 119, p. 1583; T’o-t’o et al., eds., Sung shih [hereafter SS], (1345; Peking, 1977) 1, p. 3; 255,
p. 8917. See also Liu Tzu-chien (James T. C. Liu), “Sung T’ai-tsung yü Sung-ch’u liang-tz’u ts’uan-wei,”
Shih-huo yüeh-k’an 17 Nos. 3–4 (1988), p. 1.
For the Chao family, see Chang, Chao K’uang-yin chuan, pp. 1–6.
Chang, Chao K’uang-yin chuan, p. 6; Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” pp. 140–4.
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
211
trusted Chao as though he were his own right arm during various expeditions.
In the battle at Kao-p’ing, Chao distinguished himself by selflessly defending
Ch’ai Jung, who, having succeeded Kuo Wei, was now emperor.14 In the
following year (955), when the Later Chou campaign against the Later Shu
became bogged down in Ch’in-chou, Chao went to inspect the situation. Using
Chao’s recommendations, Ch’ai Jung was able to carry the campaign to victory.
Later, during the invasion of the Southern T’ang in 956, Chao single-handedly
captured an enemy general, earning himself appointment as inspector-general
of the Palace Command.
In contrast to his counterpart in the Metropolitan Command, the highhanded Han T’ung (?–960), Chao K’uang-yin was politically adept and known
to be a commander who was not only brave but also judicious and magnanimous. In the military he was popular with the rank and file. When Ch’ai
Jung reformed the imperial armies in 954, Chao K’uang-yin was assigned
the significant task of selecting the best new recruits for induction into the
Palace Command, training them as a crack force. Through care and effective
discipline, Chao earned the personal loyalty of his troops. In addition, he cultivated the acquaintance of many of his father’s old friends and swore ritual
brotherhood with promising new military commanders, many of them his
subordinates.15 He showed good administrative abilities, but these were less
important than his skills in managing personal relationships and his political
prowess.
As noted earlier, Ch’ai Jung died of illness in 959, leaving the throne to
his young son, Kuo Tsung-hsün (Chou Kung-ti, 959) a small child of about
five years of age. On the first day of the lunar year corresponding to 960, a
joint invasion by Liao and Northern Han forces was reported by two frontier prefectures, Chen-chou and Ting-chou, in Ho-pei. Whether this invasion
actually occurred is doubtful. The Liao had suffered defeats in 959, just before
Ch’ai Jung’s death, losing two strategic prefectures in northern Ho-pei to the
Later Chou, and may have wished to recover them while the Later Chou court
was preoccupied with succession. Acting on these invasion reports, the Later
Chou court quickly mounted a defensive expedition. Despite early warnings
from Han T’ung’s son and other officials that Chao K’uang-yin was already
too influential to be trusted with the overall command of the armies, Chao
was dispatched to head the counterattack. When the army departed, rumors
14
15
Chang, Chao K’uang-yin chuan, p. 7.
See Chiang Fu-ts’ung, “Sung-tai i-ko kuo-ts’e ti chien-t’ao,” Ta-lu tsa-chih 9 No. 7 (1954), pp. 21–36.
Chao was one of a fraternity of “ten brothers,” among whom Chao himself, Shih Shou-hsin (928–84), Han
Ch’ung-yün (?–974), Wang Shen-ch’i (925–74), Liu T’ing-jang (929–87), and Li Chi-hsün (915–76)
were prominent generals. At the time of Chao’s coup, all of them except Li were in the Palace Command.
See Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” pp. 165–8.
212
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
circulated through the capital that the troops were prepared to set up Chao
K’uang-yin as emperor, because the troops feared that with a child on the throne
and power in the hands of a woman (the dowager empress), their services to the
state would not be recognized, and they would receive no promotions. These
rumors brought terror to the capital. In anticipation of relentless plundering
by uncontrollable troops set on king making, the citizens left K’ai-feng in
droves, yet the court seemed indifferent.16
At dawn on the fourth day, in the camp of the expeditionary army at Ch’ench’iao, twenty miles northeast of K’ai-feng, the troops acclaimed the thirtyfour-year-old Chao K’uang-yin as emperor, as rumor had predicted. According
to the version of this event given in the official history, the throne was forced
upon Chao K’uang-yin by a group of mutinous officers who, with drawn
swords, burst into Chao’s tent and robed their half-drunken commander in a
gown of imperial yellow. Supposedly, they had already sent a secret messenger
to inform two of Chao’s sworn brother generals guarding the capital and the
palace about the imminent coup.
The next day, Chao K’uang-yin returned to the defenseless capital K’ai-feng
to seize the throne. General Han T’ung, the only major figure who attempted
to muster resistance to the coup, was killed, and his peers prepared to greet
their new master. The previously chosen child emperor of the Chou was given
an honorary title and died in exile fourteen years later. By the afternoon, Chao
had become the emperor (known posthumously as Sung T’ai-tsu, the Great
Progenitor, r. 960–76) of a new dynasty, the Sung, named after the prefecture
just southeast of K’ai-feng where he had served the Later Chou as military
governor.
Chao’s seizure of the throne appears at first sight to have been a repetition
of Kuo Wei’s earlier coup in 951,17 in which Chao himself had participated.
Most modern historians tend to agree that the coup was jointly engineered by
Chao himself, his brother Chao K’uang-i (939–97, the future emperor Sung
T’ai-tsung [r. 976–97], whose name was later changed to Chao Kuang-i to
avoid the taboo on the new emperor’s personal name), and some key advisors
in his army.18 Even if Chao K’uang-yin was not the prime instigator of the
16
17
18
Ssu-ma Kuang, Su-shui chi-wen (c. 1180; Taipei, 1962) 1, pp. 1–2; 2, pp. 2–3; Li T’ao, Hsü Tzu-chih
t’ung-chien ch’ang-pien [hereafter HCP (1964)] [Che-chiang shu-chü 1881 ed.] (1183; Taipei, 1961–4) 1,
p. 1a.
Chao, Nien-erh shih cha-chi 21, pp. 460–3; Chiang, “Sung-tai i-ko kuo-ts’e ti chien-t’ao,” pp. 21–36.
For example, see Teng Kuang-ming, “Ch’en-ch’iao ping-pien huang-p’ao chia-shen ku-shih k’ao-shih,”
Chen-li tsa-chih 1 No. 1 (1944), pp. 61–8; Chang, Chao K’uang-yin chuan, pp. 13–18; Ch’en Teng-yüan,
Kuo-shih chiu-wen (Peking, 1958–62) 31, pp. 925–8; Wang Po-ch’in, “Sung ch’u erh-ti ch’üan-wei
wen-t’i ti p’ou-hsi,” Ta-lu tsa-chih 32 No. 10 (1966), pp. 16–17; Liu, “Sung T’ai-tsung yü Sung-ch’u
liang-tz’u ts’uan-wei,” pp. 1–2.
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
213
coup he was definitely a willing beneficiary, and adroitly took charge of the
situation.
In a comparable mutiny in 935, Shih Ching-t’ang, the founder of the Later
Chin dynasty (Chin Kao-tsu, r. 936–42), had deemed premature an attempt
by his troops to carry out a unilateral coup and had crushed it immediately
by executing some thirty of the instigators.19 Given his undisputed control
over the army, Chao K’uang-yin also could have refused the imperial yellow
robe and pacified the mutineers had he so wished. Instead, he made a deal
with the mutineers and threatened to refuse the crown unless they promised
their obedience in all matters. Then he demanded that no harm be done to any
member of the imperial house or to any court official; and, in unmistakable
language, he vowed to execute the whole clan of “any officer or soldier who
dared to loot the capital or to molest its inhabitants.” On the other hand, he
promised generous rewards to his obedient followers.
Under strict discipline, the army occupied the capital “without the slightest
disturbance,” so that even the street markets went on trading as usual.20 Both
troops and bureaucrats remained under tight control. This marked a notable
break with the lawless successions during the Five Dynasties, most of whose
rulers entered the capital at the head of plundering armies. Thanks to this
peaceful and orderly takeover, the wealth and strength of the Later Chou was
preserved and the goodwill of the population toward the new regime ensured.
Consequently, T’ai-tsu was able to achieve internal security for his dynasty in
a short time and proceed swiftly to the task of unification.
Legitimacy and internal stability
The founder of a new dynasty was usually concerned to establish a clean break
with an inglorious past and to create a favorable image of himself for posterity.
T’ai-tsu’s orders prohibiting looting and bloodshed had already separated the
Sung from the lawless Five Dynasties period, but his usurpation of the throne,
whether voluntary or compelled, remained to be exonerated, and he needed
quickly to transform himself from a usurper into the legitimate founder of
a new dynasty. This could best be done by claiming he had received the
Mandate of Heaven, which conferred legitimate power and authority on its
bearer. Evidence of the conferral of the mandate was usually established by
retrospective propaganda, in the form of legendary auspicious signs of heavenly
approval.
19
20
CWTS 75, p. 983.
Ssu-ma, Su-shui chi-wen 1, p. 1; HCP (1964) 1, pp. 1a–3b.
214
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
One such legend about the founding of the Sung dynasty was related by
a lieutenant and astrologer accompanying the 960 expedition, who claimed
that when the army was leaving the capital, he saw the sun being eclipsed
by another sun, perhaps symbolizing the advent of a new dynasty.21 As the
person to whom this legend supposedly referred, T’ai-tsu was said to have
been confident of his having been chosen as the bearer of the mandate. When
warned that it was dangerous to go out incognito to survey the state of society
for himself, the newly enthroned emperor laughed at the prospect of danger,
for he accepted the idea that when a person had been chosen by Heaven to be
the true master of the world, no one could harm him; while without Heaven’s
mandate even the guarded doors of a secluded palace could not protect him.22
But T’ai-tsu needed real power to retain the Mandate of Heaven. There
were other potential contenders for the throne as well as disgruntled holdovers
from the ousted Later Chou dynasty to be dealt with. Among the generals and
regional military governors, T’ai-tsu’s enthronement aroused mixed emotions.
Han Ling-k’un (923–68) and Mu-jung Yen-chao (913–63), T’ai-tsu’s longstanding battlefield comrades, welcomed it. On the other hand, Kuo Ch’ung
(908–65) and Yüan Yen (907–72), who had helped establish the Later Chou,
were inclined to resist it, and Li Yün (?–960) in the north and Li Ch’ung-chin
(?–960) in the south were firmly opposed.
Li Yün, who had been instrumental in founding the Later Chou, had since
then been military governor of Lu-chou (modern Ch’ang-chih in Shansi). After
the death of his old master Kuo Wei, Li’s own imperial ambitions grew. He had
begun to act independently and arbitrarily, and to swell his financial reserves
with expropriated taxes and his army with refugees. When T’ai-tsu offered him
a lofty honorary title and munificent gifts, Li refused them. He reluctantly
sought an alliance with the Northern Han, whom he had attacked during
the Later Chou. But his half-hearted overtures were matched by Northern
Han misgivings about his dubious proposed strategy of marching straight
on K’ai-feng. Li’s hope of success was further dampened by opposition to his
insurrection by his son and by some of his generals. As it turned out, the Sung
army took the whole of Lu-chou in less than two months. With his thirty
thousand troops routed, Li committed suicide.23
Li Ch’ung-chin, Kuo Wei’s nephew, was isolated at his headquarters in
Yang-chou, the greatest city in the southern territory and recently annexed
21
22
23
HCP (1964) 1, p. 1b.
Ssu-ma, Su-shui chi-wen 1, p. 3; HCP (1964) 1, pp. 25a–26a. See also Yao Ying-t’ing, “Lun T’ang Sung
chih-chi ti t’ien-ming yü fan-tien-ming ssu-hsiang,” in Sung-shih yen-chiu lun-wen-chi: 1982 nien nien-hui
pien-k’an, ed. Teng Kuang-ming and Li Chia-chü (Cheng-chou, 1984), pp. 370–84.
Wang Ch’eng, Tung-tu shih-lüeh (1186; Taipei, 1967) 22, pp. 1a–2b; HCP (1964) 1, pp. 10b–15a.
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
215
from the Southern T’ang by Ch’ai Jung. When T’ai-tsu was commander in
chief of the Palace Command, Li Ch’ung-chin had held the parallel post of
chief of the Metropolitan Command, a position he lost when the new dynasty
demoted him to regional military governor of Yang-chou. Having decided to
revolt, Li Ch’ung-chin sent an envoy to Li Yün to plan a synchronized pincer
attack from the north and south, hoping to force the Sung forces to fight on
two fronts a thousand miles apart. However, his envoy defected to the Sung
and was induced to return to Yang-chou to delay Li Ch’ung-chin’s offensive.
This sealed Li Ch’ung-chin’s fate. Soon besieged, Li Ch’ung-chin found that
his hopes that the Southern T’ang would come to his relief had been nipped in
the bud by a Sung threat of retaliation. In the eleventh month of 960, less than
two months after his insurgency began, Yang-chou fell and Li Ch’ung-chin
immolated himself and his entire family.24
The subjugation of these two potentially dangerous opponents by an overpowering central army sent a clear warning to other military governors. Even
the unwilling Kuo Ch’ung and Yüan Yen could not but submit to the new
dynasty. In return, T’ai-tsu allowed about four-fifths of the Later Chou provincial military governors (some forty-odd officials) to retain their posts.25 As
Wang Gungwu has pointed out, during the twenty-five years between 926
and 951 the power of individual provinces had gradually fallen “below the
point where [they] could be a threat to imperial authority.”26 T’ai-tsu could
now safely turn his attention to incorporating the territories of the various
independent kingdoms that occupied parts of the former T’ang realm.
Military control and partial unification
The later historical view that T’ai-tsu, once in power, tilted the balance between
military and civil elements in his regime toward civilian control should not
obscure the strong military coloration of the early Sung period. Although
T’ai-tsu certainly acknowledged the importance of the civil bureaucracy, he
never slighted the military. Himself a military man, he needed to maintain
a strong army to obviate any countercoups. Also, in the world beyond Sung
borders, force and the threat of force was needed to achieve reconquest of large
regions now controlled by independent regimes, and to defend against the
persistent Liao threat to the Sung’s northern borders. The survival of T’ai-tsu’s
24
25
26
Wang, Tung-tu shih-lüeh 22, pp. 2b–3b; HCP (1964) 1, pp. 20a–21b, 23b–24a.
Wang, Structure of power, p. 203.
Wang, Structure of power, pp. 191–4. This decrease in power was partly due to the Khitan invasion and
occupation of northern China from 943 to 947, which had sapped the wealth and manpower of most
military governors there to the point that none of them was strong enough to challenge the imperial
government.
216
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
reign and the future of the Sung dynasty necessitated the establishment of
tighter control over the army and improvement of its effectiveness through
strict selection and vigorous training of its personnel.27
T’ai-tsu began to assert his control over the military by depriving all commanders, particularly his own accomplices in the 960 coup, of the ability to
threaten the throne. He first removed from office all but one of these top generals. He then established permanent institutional control over the military
by restructuring its command hierarchy to ensure that no single general could
wield an unacceptable level of power. He also separated the military administration from the military command structure to ensure that no one except the
emperor could exercise overall control of the military.
Immediately upon ascending the throne, T’ai-tsu began to tighten his grip
over the Metropolitan Command, which had never been as responsive to his
influence as had his loyal Palace Command. Within a few months the highest
level of the Metropolitan Command was restaffed either by officers transferred from the Palace Command or by T’ai-tsu’s sworn brothers or his most
trusted generals. After the suppression of Li Ch’ung-chin, its former commander in chief, T’ai-tsu’s control over the Metropolitan Command was practically
unchallengeable. Within another few months, T’ai-tsu reappointed the chiefs
of the Metropolitan Command and the Palace Command, Han Ling-k’un and
Mu-jung Yen-chao, as regional military governors away from the capital. Soon
other, top commanders were also reappointed to different posts.
During the interim between the founding of the Sung dynasty and the first
unification campaign, amid the easy atmosphere of a wine-drinking party held
in the seventh month of 961, T’ai-tsu complained to his top generals about the
discomfort of occupying the throne. He constantly worried that the pampered
subordinates of these top generals would some day force a yellow robe on
one of them, as had been done to him. Startled and disoriented, the generals
begged for the emperor’s advice. T’ai-tsu first pointed out that the essence of
happiness in the short life of man is to have wealth and prestige and to be
able to bequeath them to one’s descendants. Then he persuaded the generals
to relinquish their current military authority in exchange for the wealth and
prestige of appointment as regional military governors and the arrangement
of marriages between their families and the imperial family.
The next day, all these generals offered to resign on the grounds of ill
health.28 True to his word, T’ai-tsu provided each of them with a comfortable
27
28
For a general understanding of the Northern Sung military system, see Lo Ch’iu-ch’ing, “Pei Sung
ping-chih yen-chiu,” Hsin-ya hsüeh-pao 3 No. 1 (1957), pp. 169–270; and Wang Tseng-yü, Sung-ch’ao
ping-chih ch’u-t’an (Peking, 1983).
Ssu-ma, Su-shui chi-wen 1, pp. 6–7; Nieh Ch’ung-ch’i, “Lun Sung T’ai-tsu shou ping-ch’üan,” Yen-ching
hsüeh-pao 34 (1948), pp. 85–106; Ch’en, Kuo-shih chiu-wen 32, pp. 938–42.
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
217
official post and arranged a marriage linking them to the imperial family.
Except for Han Ch’ung-yün (?–974), who was transferred to the Palace Command for the first time, all the top commanders of the imperial armies were
thus pensioned off from their “dangerous” positions, and no longer posed a
threat to the throne.29 These commanders all lived well, until their deaths. For
example, Shih Shou-hsin, the only top commander who retained his original
position in the imperial armies concurrently (even though now in absentia),
until he voluntarily relinquished it in the ninth month of the following year
(962), became notorious for the vast fortune he subsequently amassed during his almost seventeen-year tenure (7/961–12/977) as a regional military
governor.30
As for the promised marriages, except for Lo Yen-kuei, who seems to have
been childless,31 all of these top commanders became T’ai-tsu’s in-laws: Shih
Shou-hsin’s second son, Shih Pao-chi (954–1010), married T’ai-tsu’s second
daughter in 972.32 Chang Ling-to’s third daughter was married to T’ai-tsu’s
second brother in 961.33 Han Ch’ung-yün’s second son, Han Ch’ung-yeh (960–
1001), was married to T’ai-tsu’s niece.34 Kao Huai-te had already married
T’ai-tsu’s widowed younger sister in 960.35 Wang Shen-ch’i’s eldest son, Wang
Ch’eng-yen (951–1003), married T’ai-tsu’s eldest daughter in 970.36 These
marriages evidenced an intimate cordiality between T’ai-tsu and the families
of these retired generals that had not existed between an emperor and his
generals since the Later Han. (T’ai-tsu later adopted similarly conciliatory
policies toward the regional rulers he defeated and their followers.37) At the
same time, a new principle was also established that no regional military
governor could concurrently hold a regular command in the imperial army.38
The purpose behind these institutional maneuvers was to downgrade the
command hierarchy, to divide responsibilities, to break the close and lasting
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
Chao Kuang-i was reappointed governor of K’ai-feng; Shih Shou-hsin (928–84), Chang Ling-to (911–
70), Lo Yen-kuei (923–69), Kao Huai-te (926–82), and Wang Shen-ch’i (925–74) were all sent out to
serve long terms as regional commissioners (chieh-tu shih). HCP (1964) 2, p. 11b; SS 250, pp. 8823–4,
8809–11, 8826–8, 8821–3, 8815–17.
HCP (1964) 2, p. 11a; 3, p. 10a; 18, p. 20b.
SS 250, pp. 8827–8.
SS 248, p. 8772; 250, p. 8812.
SS 250, p. 8826.
SS 250, p. 8825.
SS 248, p. 8771; 250, p. 8822.
SS 248, p. 8772; 250, p. 8817.
SS 244, p. 8676; 248, p. 8772; 251, pp. 8831–6.
But Wang, Structure of power, pp. 204–5, has argued that most of the post-947 commanders of the
Metropolitan Command continued as commanders even though they were designated as regional military
governors. When they were serving in the capital, their provinces were administered by a staff chosen,
or at least approved, by the court. Consequently, both imperial authority and central control over the
provinces were enhanced.
218
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
links between commanders and their troops, and to elaborate the structure of
surveillance and control. To solidify his own powers, T’ai-tsu left important
posts vacant, including the two highest positions of the Metropolitan Command (commander in chief and vice–commander in chief ) and the two highest positions of the Palace Command (inspector-general and vice–inspectorgeneral). Other positions that were rarely or irregularly filled included the
third highest post of the Metropolitan Command (inspector in chief ) and the
remaining three highest posts of the Palace Command (commander in chief,
vice–commander in chief, and inspector in chief).39 When T’ai-tsu did fill
these positions, he chose low-ranked or docile men over people of distinction
and initiative. Not only were the prestige and authority of the army leadership
weakened, the previously unitary command of the Metropolitan Command was
split between its two divisions: the cavalry and the infantry were each now
placed under an independent commander. Therefore, the original dual command of the imperial army became tripartite, coming under the jurisdiction
of the Three Military Bureaus (san-ya), that is, the Palace Command, and
the Infantry and the Cavalry divisions of the Metropolitan Command. Each
group was expected to check the others. The Metropolitan Command took
care of regional defense, while the Palace Command guarded the capital and
the palace. This arrangement was intended to maintain a functional separation of powers. Moreover, although they controlled the military command, the
Three Military Bureaus had no authority to dispatch or transfer their troops.
Military administration became the responsibility of the Bureau of Military
Affairs (Shu-mi yüan), which commanded no troops of its own.40 In addition,
important personnel and administrative decisions, especially those regarding
the appointment, promotion, or demotion of senior officers in the Three Military Bureaus, were handled by the emperor in person, and the appointees were
directly answerable to him.
After the old personal links between officers and their troops had been
severed by the resignation of senior generals, the development of new personal affiliations was averted by the “rotation system” (keng-hsü fa). Under
this system, officers were transferred and soldiers rotated between the capital
and the regions every three years, so that neither bonds between officers and
troops nor relationships between persons and places could become too close
or permanent.41 Furthermore, the precise number of troops serving under
39
40
41
See Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” pp. 174–7.
SS 162, p. 3799.
Ch’en, Kuo-shih chiu-wen 32, pp. 955–7. After 1074, this rotation system was overlapped by the localized
“training command system” (chih-chiang fa) and the “community arms (or mutual security) system of
local defense” (pao chia) initiated by the reformer Wang An-shih (1021–86). See Michael C. McGrath,
“Military and regional administration in Northern Sung China (960–1126)” (diss., Princeton University,
1982), pp. 149, 166–8.
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
219
each high-ranking commander was frequently checked to prevent unauthorized expansion of the forces, and commanders were not allowed to maintain
personal guards.
To ensure that such measures were observed, T’ai-tsu established an independent network of imperial informants (later called the Capital Security
Office, Huang-ch’eng ssu) made up mostly of eunuchs, who were attached to
every army on a campaign, in the capital, and in every region. In early 967,
the chief commander of the Palace Command, though a sworn brother of
T’ai-tsu, was summarily dismissed for allegedly maintaining private troops.42
Another means of imperial control was for the court to withhold all military
maps until the eve of a campaign. In addition, the moves to be made during a
campaign were prescribed by the emperor in advance and operations continued
to be directed by dispatches sent from the capital. After the campaign, the
generals returned to the bureaus and the soldiers to their garrisons, so that
“neither generals nor armies were consistently attached to each other,” and
“neither officers nor troops become familiar with each other.”43
Despite these restrictions, T’ai-tsu knew his soldiers well, and he took
personal care of them to ensure their fighting efficiency. After skimming off
the best troops from the regions to replace the unfit soldiers of the imperial
army, T’ai-tsu expanded the one hundred and twenty thousand men serving
in the Later Chou armies to about two hundred thousand men. This weakened
the regional armies controlled by the military governors and made the central
government armies by far the strongest force in the empire.44 Since the navy
was indispensable to the conquest of the south, especially the Southern T’ang,
T’ai-tsu was also concerned with naval buildup. He periodically inspected his
new shipyards and conducted naval exercises in a new practice basin in K’aifeng. In order to maintain capability and preparedness, to develop loyalty,
and to instill discipline, exercises and imperial inspections of the army were
also held frequently in the capital.45 The distinction between ranks had to be
strictly observed, and no more sworn brotherhoods were permitted. The least
insubordination was punishable by death, to say nothing of failing to obey a
42
43
44
45
HCP (1964) 8, pp. 4a–b. Another example of the use of informants was Ts’ao Pin (931–99), who was
dismissed in 983 after being accused by an informer of falsely informing his border troops that their
special allowance from the emperor actually originated from himself; see HCP (1964) 24, pp. 1a–b;
John R. Labadie, “Rulers and soldiers: Perception and management of the military in Northern Sung
China (960–1060)” (diss., University of Washington, 1981), p. 58. See also Ch’ai Te-keng, “Sung
huan-kuan ts’an-yü chün shih k’ao,” Fu-jen hsüeh-chih 10 Nos. 1–2 (1941), pp. 187–225; Yen Ch’inheng, “Sung-tai tsou-ma ch’eng-shou kung-chih k’ao,” Kuo-li Cheng-chih ta-hsüeh hsüeh-pao 9 (1964),
pp. 319–37.
Ma, Wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao (1965) 152, p. 1327.
Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” pp. 162, 180–2; McGrath, “Military and regional administration,” pp. 143–4, 167–8.
Ma, Wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao (1965) 157, p. 1371.
220
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
superior’s orders.46 Looting and gratuitous killing, though not yet outlawed,
were kept to a minimum.47 At the start of the Southern T’ang campaign,
for example, T’ai-tsu openly authorized the chief commander to execute any
soldier guilty of excessive looting and killing.48 Both in size and in quality, the
Sung army during T’ai-tsu’s reign was stronger than any possible competitors
for the imperial throne.
the weak first, strong later strategy
In early 963, T’ai-tsu was ready to expand his domain. Before him lay two
equally tempting roads. Immediately to the southeast was the weakened Southern T’ang, which had lost some forty thousand troops, the bulk of its navy, and
fourteen rich and productive prefectures north of the Yangtze River during
the Later Chou invasion of 956 to 958. This exhausted dynasty now felt so
vulnerable that it moved its capital from Chin-ling (modern Nanking) in prosperous Kiangsu to Nan-ch’ang (the modern city of the same name) in northern
Kiangsi. Of the remaining lesser kingdoms, the Southern Han and Wu-Yüeh
(895–978) continued to send royal hostages and tribute to K’ai-feng. The Later
Shu in Szechwan had never posed a threat, while Ching-nan (907–63), Hunan
(956–63), and Chang-Ch’üan (946–78), comprising two remnant prefectures
of the Min kingdom in Fu-chien, were even weaker.
To the north, T’ai-tsu took advantage of the Later Chou victories over the
Northern Han and the Liao. The Northern Han ruler, who escaped from the
Kao-p’ing battle with only one hundred horsemen out of an army of thirty
thousand, could no longer threaten the Sung but retained close links with
the Liao. The Liao emperor, Liao Mu-tsung (r. 951–69), depraved and ineffectual, was nicknamed the “sleeping prince” for his habit of sleeping off his
debaucheries rather than attending to government business. Even the loss
of two prefectures and three passes in Ho-pei to Ch’ai Jung in 959 could
not rouse him to take retaliatory action, because he considered the seized
land to have been originally Han Chinese territories. His rule was so ineffective and unpredictable that he was unlikely ever to seriously threaten the
Sung.
46
47
48
Ma, Wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao (1965) 152, p. 1327; Chang, Chao K’uang-yin chuan, pp. 74–5; Wang, Sung-ch’ao
ping-chih ch’u-t’an, pp. 300–3.
HCP (1964) 5, p. 16a. Late in 964, T’ai-tsu granted the expeditionary troops fighting against the Later
Shu the privilege of dividing during conquest all spoils except military equipment and provisions.
This caused such ill feeling and resentment that in his later conquests looting and killing were strictly
forbidden. See HCP (1964) 5, p. 16b; Ch’en Pang-chan et al., Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo (1605; Peking,
1977) 4, p. 18.
Chang, Chao K’uang-yin chuan, p. 49.
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
221
T’ai-tsu seems to have been originally inclined to attack the north first:
to subjugate the Northern Han, which posed a threat to the western flank of
any Sung operations in Ho-pei, and then move to recover the entire “Sixteen
Prefectures of Yen-Yün” ceded to the Khitan in 937, thereby depriving the
Liao of their strategic control of the Sung’s northeastern border. Soon after
establishing his dynasty, T’ai-tsu had asked Ts’ao Han (924–92), a general
with long experience in border warfare, to draw up a battle plan for an attack
northward. Other officials had also forwarded enthusiastic suggestions.49
Yet despite the initial interest in attacking the north, T’ai-tsu decided to
conquer the south first. In a meeting held sometime in 962 or early 963
to decide the plan of conquest, Chao P’u (922–92), T’ai-tsu’s confidant and
commissioner of military affairs, strongly opposed the emperor’s wish to begin
with an attack on the Northern Han.50 His objection was based on the military
consideration that the Sung forces, after conquering the Northern Han, could
be pinned down there and risk a retaliatory pincer attack launched by the
Khitan from the northeast and nomadic tribes from the west. Such a stalemate
would exhaust the new dynasty and force the postponement of its conquest of
the south.51 Chao P’u urged T’ai-tsu to first conquer the southern kingdoms
and acquire their rich economic and human resources before facing the more
formidable northern powers.
The northern threat was a real one. T’ai-tsu was aware that if he attacked
the Northern Han, the Liao might attack the Sung in order to relieve their
allies. The rulers of Northern Han had regularly received Liao investiture and
military aid and, in return, had been serving as the Liao’s forward line of
defense. During the 950s the Liao had repeatedly come to Northern Han aid
in the face of attacks by the Later Chou. Inside the Liao territory, which was
considerably larger than the Sung, pastoralism was the main economic base,
supplemented by flourishing agriculture in the south. The Khitan’s surplus,
along with large quantities of handiwork and other commercial goods, sustained a growing money economy. This territory also produced endless supplies
of the best horses for the 500,000-strong Liao imperial cavalry, which alone
outnumbered the Sung total of 193,000 cavalry and infantry by almost three to
one.52 These figures do not take account of the human and other resources the
49
50
51
52
Sung Min-ch’iu, Ch’un-ming t’ui-ch’ao lu (c. 1070; Peking, 1980) shang, p. 15; Wang, Tung-tu shih-lüeh
22, p. 3b; HCP (1964) 4, p. 27a.
T’ai-tsu enlisted Chao P’u under his command during the Later Chou invasion of the Southern T’ang in
956, when Chao advised T’ai-tsu of a little known route he could use to get behind and launch a surprise
attack upon a military stronghold that T’ai-tsu had been ordered to take. Wang, Wu-tai hui-yao 116,
pp. 1541–2.
HCP (1964) 9, pp. 6a–b.
T’o-t’o et al., eds., Liao shih (1344; Peking, 1974) 25, p. 401; SS 187, p. 4576.
222
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
Liao could mobilize from their vassal states and tribes in Inner Asia.53 With
superior horsemanship, archery, and mobility, Liao mounted warriors attacked
and retreated with lightning speed, putting the Sung infantry, Sung’s major
military force, at a great disadvantage, especially on the flat plains of Hopei, where there were no natural defenses. T’ai-tsu must have calculated the
risks of confronting such a formidable enemy, and it is not surprising that he
decided instead to first subjugate the wealthy but militarily weaker southern
kingdoms.
T’ai-tsu followed the Later Chin, Later Han, and Later Chou in designating
K’ai-feng as his capital. This was a potentially dangerous move, for K’ai-feng
lay without natural defenses in the midst of the North China Plain. The city
was vulnerable to the Liao cavalry, which had briefly occupied K’ai-feng in 946
to crush the Later Chin’s claim of independence from Khitan suzerainty. The
Sung capital was chosen on economic grounds. It was almost three hundred
miles closer to the affluent south than was the old T’ang capital Ch’ang-an to
the west, and shipment of grain to K’ai-feng avoided the difficult stretches
of the Yellow River between the old capital and the rice-producing Yangtze
areas. More important was K’ai-feng’s access to the Grand Canal system. K’aifeng was seated at the northern terminus of the Pien Canal, which linked the
Yellow and Huai river systems into one super transport network extending
into the richest areas of the North China Plain. After the Later Chou partially
reopened the south-to-north supply line by annexing the fourteen Southern
T’ang prefectures between the Yangtze and Huai rivers, K’ai-feng could rely
on the canal system, which now extended to the Yangtze River, to tap the
resources of the lower Yangtze and southeast regions. Along the rivers and
canals, transit granaries and relay stations had been built in the mid-T’ang
dynasty to store the tax grain during the times when the waterways were
unnavigable and to facilitate transshipment of cargo to boats suitable for the
different sections of the canal system.54
Until the reform of the Later Chou, these waterways had fallen into disrepair
because the previous dynasties were either too short-lived or too busy fighting to engage in maintenance projects. Even worse, in order to flood enemy
locations or to destroy their transportation, these dynasties had frequently
53
54
Karl A. Wittfogel and Feng Chia-sheng, History of Chinese society, Liao (907–1125) (Philadelphia, 1949).
For Northern Han–Khitan relations, see Wang Min-hsin, “Liao Sung Shan-yüan meng-yüeh ti-chieh ti
pei-ching (shang),” Chung-kuo shu-mu chi-k’an 9 No. 2 (1975), pp. 38–40.
Chi Ch’ao-ting, Key economic areas in Chinese history – As revealed in the development of public works for watercontrol (London, 1936), pp. 116, 127; Denis C. Twitchett, Financial administration under the T’ang dynasty,
2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 84–96, 182–9; Robert M. Hartwell, “A cycle of economic change in
imperial China: Coal and iron in northeast China, 750–1350,” Journal of the Economic and Social History
of the Orient 10 No. 1 (1967), pp. 124–45.
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
223
breached the dikes of the Yellow River, deliberately causing inundations in
eighteen of the fifty-three years of the Five Dynasties. The drainage and flood
control system in the Ho-pei and Honan regions was subject to hazards at the
best of times. Never before had this destructive tactic been used so frequently
in the catastrophic history of the Yellow River.55 Moreover, able-bodied male
survivors of these wars and man-made disasters were repeatedly conscripted
into the rival armies regardless of their age, and their faces were tattooed
to prevent desertion.56 Just as material resources were spoiled by intentional
destruction of water-control works, human lives were squandered in warfare.
As a consequence, the population of the North China Plain did not recover to
T’ang dynasty levels for many centuries.
Meanwhile in the south, political fragmentation had not impeded economic growth. For example, in Szechwan, evocatively known as the “Land of
Heavenly Abundance,” the Later Shu had become a refuge for poets, artists,
scholars, and officials fleeing from the fallen T’ang capital, who helped to preserve T’ang culture there. The kingdom’s administrative structure and ritual
followed T’ang models, and even its capital I-chou2 (modern Ch’eng-tu) was
an imitation of Ch’ang-an. While its people increased and prospered in a selfsufficient economy, its famous textiles were sold far and wide beyond its easily
defensible frontiers of mountains and torrents.57
The wealth of Later Shu, this western shield of the south, was rivaled by that
of its eastern counterpart, the Southern T’ang in the Huai and lower Yangtze
river valleys (Kiangsu, Anhwei, and Kiangsi). The Southern T’ang predecessor
had been the Wu, whose policy of peace and rest had successfully restored its
wartorn and desolated lands to cultivation and abundance. A glimpse of the
wealth of the Southern T’ang can be seen from the huge indemnity and annual
tribute it paid to the Later Chou: a total of one million units of tea, grain, cash,
silk, and silver.58 The smaller kingdoms also grew rich in their own particular
ways. Ch’u depended on its silk and cloth industries and its mineral wealth
in silver and copper, in addition to its profitable export of tea to the north.
Min and Chang-Ch’üan, Min’s diminutive successor in Fu-chien, isolated by
topography, increased their maritime trade in silk and ceramics by exporting
to the countries of the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, as did the
55
56
57
58
Shui-li-pu Huang-ho shui-li wei-yüan-hui “Huang-ho shui-li-shih shu-yao” pien-hsieh-tsu, Huang-ho
shui-li-shih shu-yao (Peking, 1982), pp. 134–7.
The practice of tattooing the faces of soldiers to discourage desertion was begun as early as the Later
Liang dynasty. See Ma, Wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao (1965) 152, p. 1325. At least on one occasion even educated
men were tattooed on their arms with the phrase i-hsin shih-chu (wholeheartedly serving the master). See
CWTS 135, p. 1801.
See Yang Wei-li, Ch’ien Shu Hou Shu shih (Ch’eng-tu, 1986), pp. 174–265.
Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” p. 38.
224
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
Southern Han in the Kwangtung region.59 The southern kingdoms suffered
far less from warfare than did their contemporaries in the north, and as a result
stability and prosperity were restored, population and production increased,
commerce thrived, classical and Buddhist texts were printed and learning
flourished; the role of south as China’s new economic and cultural heartland
was thus secured.60
Though centered in the north, the Sung dynasty derived much of its character – and ultimately the preponderance of its scholar-officials – from the vibrant
south.61 Through its strategy of unification, the Sung knitted the fragmented
south into one integrated economic bloc, concentrating its scattered wealth,
uniting its most productive areas, and releasing its boundless potential. With
this economic power, the new dynasty first held off and then bought off its foreign enemies,62 and sustained a cultural efflorescence centered on the south,63
which finally enabled its successor, the Southern Sung (1127–1279), to survive
and prosper after the dynasty’s loss of the north.
T’ai-tsu began his efforts at unification in early 963 by annexing the smallest
kingdoms, the middle Yangtze river state of Ching-nan and the Hunanese
kingdom of Ch’u. Ching-nan and Hunan pierced the south like a dagger:
along its edges were the Later Shu on the west and the Southern T’ang on
the east. The dagger’s point was the Southern Han in Kwangtung, and its
hilt was the fledgling Sung. In late 962 the founder of the Hunan kingdom
passed away, leaving his throne to an eleven-year-old son, who faced a revolt
by his general Chang Wen-piao and called for the Sung’s intervention. Seizing
the opportunity, the Sung “relief” army traversed the tiny middle Yangtze
state of Ching-nan and frightened its ruler into submission. Although Chang
Wen-piao’s revolt had already been suppressed by the government of Ch’u, the
Sung army pressed on. Soon the Ch’u capital of T’an-chou (Ch’ang-sha) fell,
amid riots and defections provoked by rumors that Sung soldiers had been
seen practicing cannibalism. With this victory accomplished in less than three
months, the Sung became the first northern dynasty in more than fifty years to
59
60
61
62
63
Edward H. Schafer, The empire of Min (Rutland, Vt., 1954), pp. 75–7.
See Chang Chia-chü, Liang Sung ching-chi chung-hsin ti nan-i (Wu-han, 1957), and Huang Ch’i-chiang,
“Wu-tai shih-ch’i nan-fang chu-kuo ti ching-ying” (M.A. thesis, Kuo-li T’ai-wan ta-hsüeh, 1976).
Yang Yüan, “Pei Sung tsai-fu jen-wu ti ti-li fen-pu,” Hsiang-kang Chung-wen ta-hsüeh Chung-kuo wen-hua
yen-chiu-so hsüeh-pao 13 (1982), pp. 147–211.
In 963, T’ai-tsu had explained to his brother Kuang-i (the future T’ai-tsung) that the new dynasty
needed to replenish its impoverished treasury from the resources of the south before it could deal with
its northern enemies. Two years later T’ai-tsu established new palace treasuries to store the surplus
wealth from the south in the hope of eventually redeeming the Sixteen Prefectures of Yen-Yün from the
Liao. See Wang, Tung-tu shih-lüeh 23, pp. 10a–b; HCP (1964) 19, pp. 14a–b; Li Wei-kuo, “Lun Sung-tai
nei-k’u ti ti-wei ho tso-yung,” Sung Liao Chin shih lun-ts’ung 1 (1985), pp. 192–215.
Ho Yu-sen, “Liang Sung hsüeh-feng ti ti-li fan-pu,” Hsin-ya hsüeh-pao 1 No. 1 (1955), pp. 331–79.
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
225
L I A O
Failed invasion of 16 Prefectures, 979
Tanguts
N.HAN
T’ai-yüan
(979)
T’u-fan
Tribes
K’ai-feng
SUNG
(as of 960)
Ch’eng-tu
Chiangning
CHING-NAN
(963)
L AT E R S H U
Chiang-ling
(965)
Hang
Nan-ch’ang
T’an
CH’U
WU-YÜEH
SOUTHERN
T’ANG
(963)
(975)
(978)
Fu
TA - L I
SOUTHERN HAN
(970–71)
CHANGCH’ÜAN
(978)
Kuang
ANNAM
(963)
Date of conquest or submission
0
0
600 km
400 miles
Map 11. Consolidation of the Sung, 960–979.
have a stronghold of seventeen prefectures and two hundred and forty thousand
households in the middle Yangtze, providing rich resources of fish, rice, tea,
and other agricultural products, and rich silver deposits and copper, tin, and
iron with which to make coins.64 More important, the conquest completed
the Sung’s encirclement of the Later Shu, whose northern border had already
been blockaded after it lost four key prefectures to the Later Chou, and whose
access to the middle Yangtze valley and communications with the Southern
T’ang were now severed.
64
HCP (1964) 4, p. 1a–6a.
226
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
Meng Ch’ang (r. 934–65), the Later Shu ruler, had anticipated a Sung
invasion, and in late 964 he secretly sent emissaries to seek military cooperation
from the Northern Han. Information about the secret mission was sold by one of
these emissaries in K’ai-feng, and the mission was used by the Sung as a pretext
to launch a two-pronged invasion of Later Shu. One column moving southward
through the mountains easily defeated a major counterattack led by the Later
Shu’s privy commissioner, Wang Chao-yüan. It then sealed the Later Shu’s fate
at Chien-men Pass, the difficult last obstacle before the Shu capital, launching
a surprise attack that overwhelmed the Later Shu reinforcements commanded
by Meng Ch’ang’s incompetent son. In just over two months, the Later Shu
had been forced to surrender, even before the second Sung column advancing
westward along the Yangtze River had reached the Later Shu capital. However,
the two Sung armies had behaved brutally, slaughtering surrendered troops,
raping, and looting. Distressed and fearful over what might happen to them
under Sung occupation, over one hundred thousand discontented peasants and
surrendered soldiers rose in rebellion against the occupying forces. Pacifying
this rebellion took the Sung armies almost two years, until the end of 966,
to complete. All the commanding Sung generals except one, Ts’ao Pin (931–
99), who did not permit looting, were discharged from their commands.65
Despite the addition of forty-six prefectures and 534,029 households to the
Sung empire, the ravages caused by the subjugation of the Later Shu cost the
new dynasty a great part of these new resources, and delayed for two years its
next campaign of conquest.66 It also left a legacy of resentment in an important
region. T’ai-tsu, after this costly mistake, always took pains to keep his armies
under tight discipline.
In late 968 the Sung struck out again, but this time to the north. In the
second half of the year, the Northern Han suffered a political crisis in which
a chief minister of its recently deceased ruler assassinated the first successor
to the throne and urged the second one to surrender to the Sung. In early
969, T’ai-tsu was able to surround the enemy capital, T’ai-yüan, and defeat
the reinforcements sent by the Khitan. But an attempt to flood the city failed,
and the ensuing stalemate reduced the Sung army’s morale and depleted its
supplies. Heavy rains brought disease, and as more Khitan relief forces neared
in mid-969, T’ai-tsu reluctantly abandoned the siege that had lasted over three
months. He was to compensate for this setback by renewed conquests in the
south.67
Decades of expansion had enabled the Southern Han to occupy the regions
of Kwangtung, the major half of Kwangsi and Kweichow, and the southern
65
66
67
HCP (1964) 5, pp. 15a–20a; 6, pp. 1a–5b; 8, pp. 1b–2b.
Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” p. 54.
HCP (1964) 9, pp. 8a–9b, 11a–b, 12b; 10, pp. 1b–10a, 11a–b.
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
227
tip of Hunan. However, around the mid-tenth century, the Southern Han was
led by a series of corrupt rulers, the last of whom was Liu Ch’ang (r. 958–71).
He delighted in torture, and even more in extravagance. His thirst for pearls
caused the drowning of numerous divers, and his irrational suspicion cost the
lives of many of his capable generals. The army and the civil government were
left in the hands of eunuchs. Liu also encroached on Hunanese territory after
it was conquered by the Sung, and he flatly rejected a demand for submission
forwarded by the Southern T’ang on behalf of the Sung. In the ninth month
of 970, the Sung started a blanket invasion and within four months reached
the outskirts of the capital Kuang-chou (modern Canton).
After his army with its war elephants had been routed, Liu Ch’ang resorted
to constructing a palisade to halt the invading army, while his eunuchs fancied that destroying the treasures in his palace would dispirit the Sung troops.
When the invaders set fire to the palisade, the defenders reduced Liu’s immense
wealth to ashes. Incensed at this, T’ai-tsu executed the eunuch arsonists.
Despite the loss of the royal treasures, the conquest of Southern Han added
sixty prefectures and 170,263 households to the Sung empire.68
The Southern T’ang had long been the wealthiest of the southern kingdoms, with thirty-three prefectures and 881,000 households at its peak. To
avoid the waste of war T’ai-tsu had hoped for a peaceful annexation, especially
since through his previous conquests he had encircled the Later T’ang in the
north, west, and south, and had brought the Wu-Yüeh kingdom under his
dominance in the east. Faced with this menace the Southern T’ang ruler Li
Yü (r. 960–75) accepted a more subservient yet nontributary status for the
Southern T’ang, observing the Sung calendar and receiving its state messages
as edicts. Beginning in mid-974, however, the Sung increased its pressure on
the Southern T’ang, detaining Li’s younger brother after his diplomatic mission and displaying its naval forces along the Yangtze. After Li declined three
times to go to K’ai-feng and pay respects in person, T’ai-tsu took his refusal
as disobedience and declared war. Based on a careful study of the Yangtze, the
Sung army crossed the river on a precisely constructed pontoon bridge of boats,
arriving at the Southern T’ang capital in the first month of 975. Simultaneously, on T’ai-tsu’s orders, Wu-Yüeh also invaded Southern T’ang, capturing
two of its eastern prefectures. Although limiting the destructiveness of its
attack in order to achieve the least costly conquest, the Sung army set fire to
the entire enemy navy, on which rested the last hopes of Southern T’ang. In the
eleventh month of 975 the Southern T’ang surrendered after fifteen months
68
Wang, Tung-tu shi-lüeh 23, pp. 2b–5a; HCP (1964) 10, p. 10b; 11, pp. 7b–12b; 12, pp. 1a–3a; Edward
H. Schafer, “The history of the empire of Southern Han, according to chapter 65 of the Wu-tai shih
of Ou-yang Hsiu,” in Sōritsu nijūgo shūnen kinen ronbunshū [The silver jubilee volume of the Zinbun Kagaku
Kenkyusyo, Kyoto University], ed. Kyōtō Daigaku Jinbun Kagaku Kenkyūjo (Kyoto, 1954), pp. 364–9.
228
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
of resistance, the longest among the southern kingdoms.69 Its fallen ruler Li
Yü, a lyricist of note, lamented the loss in a poem repenting the gullibility
that led him to kill his own most capable general, who had been framed by
the Sung to appear a defector.70
Prior to the Southern T’ang campaign, T’ai-tsu had also invited Ch’ien
Ch’u (r. 948–78), the ruler of the Wu-Yüeh, to visit K’ai-feng, but he had
declined. Two months after the fall of the Southern T’ang, Ch’ien anxiously
appeared in the capital. He was given a sumptuous welcome and shown the
wonderful mansions housing the former rulers of conquered kingdoms. T’aitsu’s brother Chao Kuang-i (later T’ai-tsung) and many court officials urged
T’ai-tsu to detain Ch’ien Ch’u, but T’ai-tsu honored a previous promise, and
sent Ch’ien home with the demand that he pay tribute in person every three
years. Shortly afterward, Ch’en Hung-chin (914–85, r. 964–78), ruler of the
tiny Chang-Ch’üan state in southern Fu-chien, also set sail for K’ai-feng as a
gesture of submission.
On the fourteenth of November 976 T’ai-tsu suddenly died. Two months
before his death, T’ai-tsu had launched five armies to invade Northern Han
from different directions, but the armies were recalled from their siege of the
capital, T’ai-yüan, upon receipt of the sad news of T’ai-tsu’s death. T’ai-tsu’s
original wish of integrating the north into the empire he had founded was
not accomplished until two years after his death by his brother and successor,
Chao Kuang-i.
The unification T’ai-tsu achieved was remarkable less for the military ease
with which it was accomplished than for the conqueror’s leniency toward
the fallen states. Their people were granted amnesties and relieved of the
most onerous taxes and corvée duties. Their soldiers were mostly returned
to agriculture and the fittest enrolled in the Sung armies. Great numbers
of their officials with proven abilities or special talents were reappointed to
other parts of the empire, and the ruling families of the conquered kingdoms
were given honorary titles, generous allowances, and splendid residences in
K’ai-feng. Some members of former ruling families were even given court
appointments.71
During the campaigns of unification T’ai-tsu, unlike his predecessors, seldom took the field himself, except in the 969 campaign against the Northern
Han, but his presence was ubiquitous in every conquest. As a dynastic founder,
he had great confidence in his prescribed battle plans, his control of generals,
69
70
71
Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien ch’ang-pien, cited in Yung-lo ta-tien (1408; Peking, 1960) 12307, pp. 2a–15a.
The lyric is “The Beautiful Lady Yü,” translated in Cyril Birch, ed., Anthology of Chinese literature (1965;
Harmondsworth, U.K., 1967), p. 357.
Chao, Nien-erh shih cha-chi 24, pp. 513–15; 25, pp. 524–5.
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
229
and his towering authority over his soldiers. Through this undisputed military authority, his government was characterized by centralized and absolute
authority. This distinguished him from his predecessors and former military
colleagues as a real emperor, not an all-powerful warlord, and his state as a
newborn empire.
Centralization and imperial absolutism
At the very start of his reign, T’ai-tsu is reported to have asked his former tutor
and close confidant Chao P’u how to secure his objectives of everlasting stability and peace. “The source of previous troubles was none other than the regional
military governors becoming too powerful, rendering the dynasty weak and
[themselves as] vassals strong,” Chao replied. “The solution is to whittle down
their power, check their revenues, and appropriate their crack troops.”72 Following these guidelines, T’ai-tsu gradually and peacefully imposed centralized
bureaucratic supervision over local government in order to displace its former
overlords, the military governors who were the last obstacle to the vigorous
assertion of imperial power. Perhaps more importantly, at the local and central
levels T’ai-tsu succeeded in embedding absolutist power into the administrative structure, thereby transforming it from something personal and transitory
into a force that was institutionalized and enduring. The resulting Sung mode
of centralization and absolutism became the model for the Chinese state system
for centuries to come.
Although T’ai-tsu owed some of his success in suppressing autonomous
regional authority to his Five Dynasties predecessors,73 the groundwork was
really laid when he used his overwhelming military strength to overpower
his two Later Chou adversaries, Li Yün and Li Ch’ung-chin, in 960. But
rather than depend solely on military muscle, T’ai-tsu was also a master of
political manipulation. His success in attracting the loyalty of subordinates
was facilitated by his display of military strength in smashing the two Lis.
Furthermore, he artfully alternated between conciliatory and ruthless policies.
On the one hand, T’ai-tsu was willing to be generous and conciliatory.
He tolerated the transgressions of dependable military governors, some of
whom were his former colleagues who had helped him found the new dynasty.
T’ai-tsu granted substantial income to those governors he forced into
72
73
Ssu-ma, Su-shui chi-wen 1, pp. 6–7; HCP (1964) 2, p. 10b.
For the control of the provinces during the T’ang and Five Dynasties, see chapters 5 and 7 of Wang,
Structure of power, especially pp. 186–7, and 196; Charles A. Peterson, “The restoration completed:
Emperor Hsian-tsung and the provinces,” in Perspectives on the T’ang, ed. Arthur F. Wright and Denis
C. Twitchett (New Haven, Conn., 1973), pp. 172–86.
230
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
retirement or confined to the capital. To those he deemed especially trustworthy and useful he granted long tenure in their positions, sometimes as long
as five to ten years, while others were even kept in their posts for life.74 New
regional commissioners (chieh-tu shih) were occasionally appointed, including
both military men assigned to defend the northern borders and retired generals given honorific appointments without much real power. Intermarriages
were also arranged between the children of the imperial clan and those of the
military governors. All T’ai-tsu’s empresses and Kuang-i’s second wife were
daughters of military governors.75 Such conciliatory measures helped to induce
military men to give up forlorn hopes of resisting the centralization of power
in his hands.
But, on the other hand, he could also be stern and pragmatic. T’ai-tsu
removed potentially troublesome military governors at the first opportunity.
It was said that during a wine party in 969, he rejected the complaints of
four former Later Chou military governors about their treatment and retired
them the next day.76 While continuing Ch’ai Jung’s policy of pressing the best
regional troops into the imperial army, T’ai-tsu also wrested local control over
civil, fiscal, judicial, and personnel matters away from the military governors
by injecting court-appointed officials into local government.
At the county (hsien) level, civilians were appointed as law enforcement
officials as early as 962, and high-ranking former court officials began to be
appointed as magistrates in early 963.77 By 977, when military governors
could no longer appoint local officials within their jurisdiction, these new
magistrates had already supplanted the personal retainers of the military governors, who had formerly filled most lesser posts in the general field administration. However, as there were still not enough capable men to fill the roughly
fourteen hundred and fifty magistrate posts throughout the empire, “neither
T’ai-tsu nor T’ai-tsung acquired an iron grip” on the county level of local
government.78
74
75
76
77
78
Charles O. Hucker’s assumption that T’ai-tsu had summoned all the military governors (or commissioners, in his rendering) to the capital and retired them with princely pensions, as stated in his A dictionary
of official titles in imperial China (Stanford, Calif., 1985), p. 45, represents the general view about the
early Sung centralization, but this oversimplification has been shown to be incorrect by Worthy in “The
founding of Sung China,” pp. 272–9. Lo Ch’iu-ch’ing has also pointed out that T’ai-tsu continued to
appoint military men as prefects along the northern and northwestern borders, “Pei Sung ping-chih
yen-chiu,” pp. 185–6, 198; see also Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” pp. 190–5.
Ch’en, Kuo-shih chiu-wen 32, pp. 942–6; Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” pp. 273–8. See also
John W. Chaffee, Branches of heaven: A history of the imperial clan of Sung China (Cambridge, Mass., 1999),
pp. 55–6.
HCP (1964) 10, pp. 15b–16a.
HCP (1964) 4, pp. 13b–14a.
Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” p. 281. See also Chang, Chao K’uang-yin chuan, pp. 84–5.
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
231
At the prefectural level, the post of administrator for public order (ssu-k’ou
ts’an-chün), responsible for supervising police activities, was established.79 In
961, civil officials from the capital were dispatched for the first time to regulate
the tax collection and expenditures of the military governors. Two years later,
the new post of controller-general (t’ung-p’an) was created and given extensive powers. Initially, the purpose of this official was to oversee the former
prefects in newly conquered territories and to interpret Sung regulations and
procedures for them. In 964, forty-three controllers-general were appointed
to supervise all aspects of prefectural administration. They were charged with
overseeing taxation and making sure that the full quota of taxes was forwarded
to the capital. A controller-general held the same court rank as a prefect, and
had the right to send confidential memorials directly to the throne. Without
the controller-general’s countersignature, no prefectural directive was considered valid. In 965, the controllers-general were ordered to send all surplus tax
revenues from the prefectures to the capital. At the same time, military governors were prohibited from signing financial documents, and were confined
to the use of revenues from their base prefecture alone.80 Because they were
court officials, some controllers-general tended to be imperious in overseeing
the prefectures. In 966, in order to maintain a system of checks and balances,
the controllers-general were ordered to obtain the prefects’ countersignatures
when issuing orders, and vice versa.81 By that time, at intervals of three years,
court officials were increasingly commissioned as prefects under the title of
manager of the affairs of such-and-such prefecture (chih mou chou-chün shih).82
Most of them were civilians, for T’ai-tsu optimistically thought that their
excesses would be far less harmful than the abuses of military men.83
At the regional circuit (lu) level, similar progress toward centralization
was accomplished by appointing fiscal intendants (chuan-yün shih). As the
first such office established, the fiscal intendants served as the model for later
regional intendants in charge of military and judicial matters.84 The office of
79
80
81
82
83
84
Chang, Chao K’uang-yin chuan, pp. 90–1. For some judicial cruelties of the Five Dynasties period, see
Chao, Nien-erh shih cha-chi 22, pp. 472–3; CWTS 107, pp. 1414–15.
Ch’en, Kuo-shih chiu-wen 32, pp. 951–3.
HCP (1964) 7, pp. 14b–15a; Ou-yang Hsiu, Kuei-t’ien lu (1067; Peking, 1981) 2, p. 31.
Ch’en et al., Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo 2, pp. 7–12.
HCP (1964) 13, pp. 12b–13a. For military men’s abuses, see CWTS 98, pp. 1301–2. For T’ai-tsu’s
determination to suppress corruption, see Chang, Chao K’uang-yin chuan, pp. 108–10.
The Sung territorial administration was organized on three levels: county, prefecture, and circuit. Later
in the Sung period there were four kinds of circuit intendants: military, fiscal, judicial, and supply,
collectively called the Four Circuit Supervisorates, serving as coordinators between prefectures and the
central government while also checking and balancing each other. As James T. C. Liu has suggested,
although some aspects of government were already highly centralized at the very beginning of the Sung,
a distinction must be made “between centralization for the security of the state and the centralization
of financial administration [which] . . . became established only with the coming of the New Policies
232
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
fiscal intendant answered T’ai-tsu’s need for a unified program to provision his
armies and to take logistical matters out of the hands of campaign commanders. In consolidating Sung control over new territories, some of these fiscal
intendants were empowered to act as the representatives of the emperor.85 Once
their utility in implementing central control was proven, the fiscal intendants
were assigned to take over the circuits administered by military governors.
As early as 966, as the only regional-level administrators, the fiscal intendants saw their role expanded from financial management into the general
administration of all civil matters falling between the central and the local
governments. They collected taxes, estimated household populations, requisitioned corvée labor, reviewed judicial cases, supervised prefectural and district
officials, and performed social and educational duties.86 Two of the most important responsibilities were to oversee the transfer to the capital of certain local
tax revenues87 and to settle judicial cases involving death sentences.88 By 973,
central control over local finances had become so successful that a quota of
surplus tax revenues was allowed to remain in the prefectures.89 In 977, the
hitherto provisional jurisdictions of the fiscal intendants were identified with
the fifteen circuits newly institutionalized as the intermediate administrative
85
86
87
88
89
[during Shen-tsung’s reign].” See Liu Tzu-chien (James T. C. Liu), Reform in Sung China: Wang An-shih
(1021–1086) and his New Policies (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), pp. 85–6. Only the fiscal and judicial
supervisorates were established by T’ai-tsu and T’ai-tsung. The military and supply supervisorates were
established respectively by Chen-tsung and Shen-tsung. Michael McGrath has pointed out the differences
in power and authority between the military and the fiscal intendants in the two distinct systems of
regional administration: military intendants dominated military as well as civil affairs in border-zone
circuits where they were needed to defend the borders, to recover lost territories, and to neutralize rival
neighbors, whereas the fiscal intendants were more dominant in core-zone circuits. McGrath, “Military
and regional administration,” pp. 6, 22–4, 29, 32, 38.
For example, T’ai-tsu provided Li Fu (c. 924–c. 983), fiscal intendant of the circuit southwest of the
capital, with a banner reading “Wherever Li Fu goes, it is as if His Majesty goes in person.” See Lo
Wen (Winston W. Lo), “Circuits and circuit intendants in the territorial administration of Sung China,”
Monumenta Serica 31 (1974–5), p. 70.
HCP (1964) 7, pp. 1a–2a. There was a significant degree of coincidence between the early Sung circuits
and the formerly independent states of the Ten Kingdoms; see Lo, “Circuits and circuit intendants,”
p. 56. For a general description of the fiscal intendants’ power and responsibilities, see Lo Wen (Winston
W. Lo), “Provincial government in Sung China,” Chinese Culture 19 No. 4 (1978), pp. 28–37; Hsü Huailin, “Pei Sung chuan-yün-shih chih-tu lüeh-lun,” in Sung-shih yen-chiu lun-wen-chi: 1982 nien nien-hui
pien-k’an, ed. Teng Kuang-ming and Li Chia-chü (Cheng-chou, 1984), pp. 287–318; Cheng Shih-kang,
“Pei Sung ti chuan-yün-shih,” in Sung-shih yen-chiu lun-wen-chi: 1982 nien nien-hui pien-k’an, ed. Teng
Kuang-ming and Li Chia-chü (Cheng-chou, 1984), pp. 319–45.
HCP (1964) 5, p. 20a; 6, pp. 8a–b; Ch’en, Kuo-shih chiu-wen 32, pp. 957–8.
In 1013 capital cases were made the specific responsibility of judicial intendants. See McGrath, “Military
and regional administration,” pp. 54–5. For interintendancy rivalry, see Lo, “Provincial government in
Sung China,” pp. 26–8. See also HCP (1964) 5, p. 20a; 6, pp. 8a–b; Ch’en, Kuo-shih chiu-wen 32,
pp. 957–8.
Chang, Chao K’uang-yin chuan, pp. 184–5; Ma, Wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao (1965) 23, pp. 228–9.
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
233
echelon between the central government and the prefectures.90 In 981, fiscal
intendants were further authorized to evaluate the performance of local officials
throughout a circuit. As a check on the intendants, prefects and vice-prefects
could communicate directly with the court. Since intendants, prefects, and
controllers-general were court officials on what was called ch’ai-ch’ien (duty
assignment), that is, on assignment away from the court, it was not unusual
for a prefect or a controller-general to have a higher rank than the intendant.
This difference in rank may have deterred intendants from encroaching upon
the powers of the prefectures.91 Furthermore, like prefects and controllersgeneral, circuit intendants generally served only three-year terms, a time short
enough to prevent them from establishing their power in the region.
The year 977 marked a decisive point in undercutting the power of military
governors. Within eighteen months after ascending the throne in 960, T’aitsu had transferred almost three-quarters of the remaining forty or so military
governors away from their power base, which usually comprised two to five
prefectures.92 In one stroke in 977, T’ai-tsung ordered the remaining eighteen
regional commissioners (chieh-tu shih) to surrender their forty or so subordinate prefectures to the central government. With few exceptions, they were
reappointed as prefects of their headquarter prefectures under the supervision
of the fiscal intendants.93 At the same time, they were forbidden to conduct
trade either within or outside their jurisdiction.94 In time, military governors
were replaced by court-appointed civil officials, and any new appointment as
a chieh-tu shih was little more than an honorific title.95
The deployment and administration of military forces
The imperial army (chin-chün) was the mainstay of national defense. It guarded
the emperor, secured the capital, garrisoned every circuit of the empire, and
90
91
92
93
94
95
See Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” pp. 285–7, and McGrath, “Military and regional administration,” pp. 43–50. The number of civil circuits – that is, circuits headed by a fiscal intendant –
was steadily expanded through a process of subdivision to eighteen in the 1020s, twenty-three in the
1080s, and twenty-four by the end of the Northern Sung. That number fell to seventeen during the
Southern Sung, when the fiscal intendant was replaced by the military commissioner (an-fu shih) as the
chief administrative official. See the “Compiling Principles” section of the sixth volume (Sung Liao Chin
shih ch’i) of T’an Ch’i-hsiang, ed., Chung-kuo li-shih ti-t’u chi (Shanghai, 1982).
See Lo, “Circuits and circuit attendants” p. 63.
Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” pp. 274–5.
HCP (1964) 18, pp. 16b–17a; Ma, Wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao (1965) 61, p. 557. According to Worthy, “The
founding of Sung China,” p. 278, this was not completed until around 982.
HCP (1964) 18, p. 1b.
For a general understanding of the early Sung military governors, see Furugaki Kōichi, “Sōchō kenkokuki
no kenkyū sono ichi: Sōho no setsudoshi o chūshin to shite,” Chūō Daigaku Daigakuin ronkyū 4 No. 1
(1972), pp. 27–44.
234
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
prepared for foreign expeditions. It was so warily distributed and closely
administered that, throughout the Northern Sung period, the dynasty was
never jeopardized by army insurrections nor was the court ever commandeered
by military men.96
The policy of concentrating the best armies in the capital region at the
expense of all other regions had been used by the Later T’ang dynasty (923–
36), but it was T’ai-tsu who brought this policy to perfection.97 The capital,
K’ai-feng, encircled by concentric walls, comprised an older, inner city and
a newer, outer city. The palace was located within the inner city. Protecting
the palace was the Imperial Elite (Pan-chih), chosen from the best soldiers of
the Palace Command. They were the emperor’s personal guard and were never
stationed away from him or the palace. The Imperial Elite was counterbalanced
by the Capital Security Office (Huang-ch’eng ssu) outside the palace, run by
military officers and eunuchs.98 Overall defense of the capital was assigned to
the Upper Four Armies (shang ssu-chün), selected by the emperor himself: two
armies from the Palace Command were stationed in the inner city, balanced
by two armies from the Metropolitan Command stationed in the outer city.
Each group had approximately thirty thousand troops.99 At the same time, the
two inner Upper Armies were counterbalanced by the palace security forces,
and the two outer Upper Armies were offset by the imperial armies stationed
in Ching-chi lu, the circuit encompassing the capital. When combined, the
Upper Four Armies formed the largest and most powerful of all the imperial
armies. The defense of the capital was primarily the responsibility of the
more powerful Palace Command rather than of the Metropolitan Command.
The selection system that continually siphoned the finest soldiers from the
prefectures into the imperial armies, then into the Upper Four Armies, and
finally into the Imperial Elite guaranteed that the best troops in the empire
would be concentrated in the capital.100
In addition to the imperial army, the Sung military system included (1) the
prefectural armies (hsiang-chün), (2) the local militias (hsiang-ping) provided
96
97
98
99
100
For army rebellions during the Northern Sung, see Chang Ming-fu, “Shih-lun Pei Sung Ch’ing-li nienchien ti ping-pien,” Shan-tung Shih-fan hsüeh-yüan hsüeh pao 2 (1980), pp. 49–54, and Chia Ta-ch’üan,
“Lun Pei Sung ti ping-pien,” in Sung-shih yen-chiu lun-wen-chi: Chung-hua wen-shih lun-ts’ung tseng-k’an,
ed. Teng Kuang-ming and Ch’eng Ying-liu (Shanghai, 1982), pp. 453–65. For overviews of Sung
military administration, see Wang, Sung-ch’ao ping-chih ch’u-t’an, and Koiwai Hiromitsu, Sōdai heiseishi
no kenkyū (Tokyo, 1998).
Wang, Structure of power, p. 187; Chi Tzu-ya (Ch’i Hsia), “Chao K’uang-yin ho Chao Sung chuan-chih
chu-i chung-yang chi-chüan chih-tu ti fa-chan,” Li-shih chiao-hsüeh 12 (1954), pp. 13–18.
Saeki Tomi, “Sōdai no kōjōshi ni tsuite – kunshu dokusaiken kenkyū no hitokoma,” Tōhō gakuhō (Kyoto)
9 (1938), pp. 158–96; Ch’eng Min-sheng, “Pei Sung t’an-shih chi-kou – huang-ch’eng-ssu,” Ho-nan
ta-hsüeh hsüeh-pao: Che-she pan 4 (1984), pp. 37–41.
McGrath, “Military and regional administration,” pp. 145–7.
SS 187, pp. 4570–1; Ma, Wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao (1965) 155, pp. 1325–6, 1351–2.
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
235
by villages and other local organizations for local defense, and (3) the frontier
tribal troops (fan-ping). The combat capabilities of the latter two forces were
generally negligible by the very nature of their composition. But the strength
of the prefectural armies was deliberately kept inferior to that of the imperial
army. The prefectural armies were recruited from four sources: mercenaries,
conscripts from hereditary army families, refugees from natural calamities,
and criminals consigned to serve their sentences in the armies. Because the
prefectural army’s best soldiers were routinely exchanged for unfit soldiers
from the imperial army, the prefectural army’s quality was such that it was
commonly assigned to menial labor, reducing the corvée duties of the agricultural population.101 The prefectural army also was used as a refuge for the
destitute to prevent their becoming bandits or rebels.102 Throughout most
of the Northern Sung, the prefectural armies were smaller than the imperial
army.103 In size and quality, therefore, the imperial army was unchallenged.
A civil office, the Bureau of Military Affairs (Shu-mi yüan), wielded administrative control over the imperial army. During the early Sung the bureau was
usually headed by one commissioner (rank 1B) and one assistant commissioner
(2A). After consulting with the emperor, the bureau issued marching orders to
the armies indirectly, through the agency of the Three Military Bureaus (sanya). Although this system prevented any one bureau from monopolizing both
administrative and command functions, this separation ultimately proved selfdefeating. To begin with, it increasingly impeded communication between
the army commanders and civil administrators, as veteran generals serving
in the Bureau of Military Affairs were gradually replaced by scholar-officials
at the very time that the two military founders of the dynasty were succeeded
by emperors with no military experience. Consequently, these developments
contributed to the declining status of the military. In addition, since the army
commanders were subject to the personnel management of the Bureau of Military Affairs, they became vulnerable to the factional infighting among the
bureau’s ranking incumbents. As one modern historian has pointed out, “In
some cases, a general’s competence was less important than his support or opposition among civil officials.”104 In other words, while the separation of military
administration from command secured civil control over the military, it also
had the undesirable effect of sacrificing much-needed military autonomy.
101
102
103
104
Teng Kuang-ming, “Pei Sung ti mu-ping chih-tu chi ch’i yü tang-shih chi-jo chi-p’an ho nung-yeh
sheng-ch’an ti kuan-hsi,” Chung-kuo shih yen-chiu 4 (1980), pp. 61–77; Wang Yü-chi, “Lun mu-ping
chih-tu tui Pei Sung she-hui ti ying-hsiang,” Chung-kuo che-hsüeh-shih yen-chiu 1 (1987), pp. 81–91.
Shao Po, Shao-shih wen-chien hou-lu, ed. Liu Te-ch’üan and Li Chien-hsiung (1157; Peking, 1983) 1,
p. 1.
For a tabulated comparison of the deployment of imperial versus prefectural troops through Shen-tsung’s
reign, see McGrath, “Military and regional administration,” p. 148.
Labadie, “Rulers and soldiers,” p. 199.
236
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
Military authority held by the Bureau of Military Affairs was also isolated
from the paramount source of civil authority, held by the chief councilors (tsaihsiang) in the Secretariat-Chancellery (Chung-shu men-hsia). This separation was
first intended to protect the integrity of the civil administration. During the
late T’ang and the Five Dynasties, the Bureau of Military Affairs (Shu-mi yüan
or its precursors) was always occupied by illiterate military men who were
relentless in usurping civil authority. Some commissioners from the Bureau of
Military Affairs even held the concurrent title of chief councilor. Civil officials
in the Secretariat-Chancellery, often unversed in military problems, were commonly reduced to powerless functionaries. This situation was changed during
the Later Chou. The authority of the Bureau of Military Affairs, though still
not clearly defined, was mostly exercised in military planning and administration, and the commissioners no longer enjoyed formal association with
imperial army generals. At the same time, despite occasional appointments
of commissioners as concurrent chief councilors, only those passing the civil
service examinations were considered appropriate candidates for the top posts
in the Secretariat-Chancellery.105 Finally, the segregation of civil and military
authority was institutionalized during the Sung by T’ai-tsu.
In common with other dynastic founders, T’ai-tsu dominated the military
administration. There were no assertive commissioners in the Bureau of Military Affairs during his reign.106 Neither did he allow anyone to be both chief
councilor and military commissioner. For example, in 964 he transferred Chao
P’u from the position of commissioner to chief councilor but would not appoint
him to both offices concurrently, even though he continued to consult Chao
P’u on both civil and military affairs. The restriction went further. In 972,
after discovering that children of Chief Councilor Chao P’u and the Bureau of
Military Affairs commissioner Li Ch’ung-chü had married, T’ai-tsu summarily
dismissed Li to prevent the development of patronage ties between these two
highest civil and military officials.107 Referred to as the “Two Administrations” (erh-fu), the Bureau of Military Affairs and the Secretariat-Chancellery
were “completely segregated from each other in the conduct of their affairs”
during the first twenty-five years of the Sung dynasty.108
The separation of civil from military power served three purposes. First, it
prevented military influence from undermining civil administration, replacing
105
106
107
108
Wang, Structure of power, pp. 163–9; Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” pp. 214–37; Su Chi-lang,
“Wu-tai ti shu-mi-yüan,” Shih-huo yüeh-k’an 10 Nos. 1–2 (1980), pp. 3–19.
McGrath, “Military and regional administration,” p. 117.
Liang T’ien-hsi, Sung shu-mi-yüan chih-tu (Taipei, 1981), p. 5; McGrath, “Military and regional administration,” p. 118.
Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” pp. 239, 242. For the responsibilities of the Bureau of Military
Affairs, see McGrath, “Military and regional administration,” pp. 55–6, 119–21, 141–2.
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
237
violence as the main tool of government with regular administrative procedures of the civil service. Second, it prevented the Bureau of Military Affairs
commissioners from accumulating undue power beyond the military sphere.
Third, and most important, this separation gave the emperor absolute control
over the military and its highest officials, while excluding interference in military affairs by the chief councilors. This enhanced imperial power nourished
imperial absolutism, since only the emperor could control the balance as well
as the coordination between the civil administration and the military administration, and only he could simultaneously take charge of military command
and military administration.
The civil service
T’ai-tsu seemed less concerned with reorganizing the civil administration than
with reorganizing the military establishment.109 In some areas that have been
regarded as Sung contributions to the growth of imperial absolutism, such
as reliance on civil service examination, the commission or duty assignment
system, and the division of the chief councilor’s power, T’ai-tsu merely adapted
T’ang or Five Dynasties precedents.110 T’ai-tsu was more a shrewd renovator
than innovator.
T’ai-tsu seems to have had a practical nature, reflected in his insistence
that his sons devote themselves to studying statecraft and not belles lettres.111
However, seeking to increase the number of civil officials with a view to
raising the intellectual standards of the administration, T’ai-tsu, in the second
month of his reign, revived the civil service examinations; he passed a total of
about four hundred and fifty men in fifteen examinations spread over seventeen
years.112 At this time, to increase the availability of examination texts, nine
Confucian Classics and their commentaries were officially printed and widely
promulgated.113 In 962, to prevent nepotism, examiners and examinees were
109
110
111
112
113
This neglect was due partly to the lack of advisors familiar with the organization of civil government;
see HCP 5, p. 8a (commentary); 18, p. 10b; Wang Yung, Yen-i i-mou lu (c. 1227; Peking, 1981) 1,
p. 6.
See Sun Kuo-tung, “Sung-tai kuan-chih wen-luan tsai T’ang-chih ti ken-yüan – Sung-shih chihkuan-chih shu Sung-tai luan chih ken-yüan pien,” Chung-kuo hsüeh-jen 1 (1970), pp. 41–54; Lo Wen
(Winston W. Lo), An introduction to the civil service of Sung China: With emphasis on its personnel administration
(Honolulu, 1987), pp. 51–8.
Ssu-ma, Su-shui chi-wen 1, p. 11.
Different sources give different numbers of successful candidates; see Araki Toshikazu, Sōdai kakyo seido
kenkyū (Kyoto, 1969), pp. 450–2, and John W. Chaffee, The thorny gates of learning in Sung China: A
social history of examinations (Cambridge, 1985), p. 192. See also Chang, Chao K’uang-yin chuan, pp. 112,
114–15.
Ch’en Le-su, “Pei Sung kuo-chia ti ku-chi cheng-li yin-hsing shih-yeh chi ch’i li-shih i-i,” in Sung Yüan
wen-shih yen-chiu, ed. Ch’en Le-su (Kuang-chou, 1988), pp. 66, 83.
238
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
forbidden to claim a patron-protégé relationship. And after the chief examiner
was demoted in 973 for favoritism in passing inferior candidates from his
native place, T’ai-tsu personally conducted a reexamination in the palace, with
an eye to promoting fair competition between the upper and lower classes.114
Thereafter, this palace examination was institutionalized as the third and final
stage of the civil service examination.
The palace examination was inaugurated to validate the metropolitan examination that was supervised by court officials on ad hoc imperial assignment.
The metropolitan examinations were in turn meant to screen those who had
passed the preliminary examination conducted by prefectural officials. From
977, driven by the need to staff thousands of local administrative posts, T’aitsung began to pass candidates in great numbers, producing more than five
thousand new officials during his reign.115 Step by step, the examination system was improved to provide equal opportunity for most male commoners to
enter officialdom,116 and thereby in the long run change officialdom’s character. As the product of an open examination system, the new ruling elite
became far more heterogeneous than before, representing a variety of interests
with little likelihood of uniting against the emperor.117 Few members of this
new governing class possessed the great wealth and hereditary status with
which their aristocratic predecessors had survived imperial suppression. Since
the power of the political elite was derived from the emperor, they were less
willing to challenge his absolutist tendencies.
The commission or duty assignment (ch’ai-ch’ien) system that had originated
in the T’ang dynasty was expanded by both T’ai-tsu and T’ai-tsung to apply
to all important organs of the government. Many offices lost their authority,
and their original functions were taken over by officials on ad hoc assignment
approved or personally designated by the emperor. As such, an official’s titular
office (his formal title) bore little relation to his duties, and indicated only his
rank in the civil service and his emoluments. His titular office was referred to
as his salary or stipendiary office (chi-lu kuan). His responsibilities and corresponding authority were dependent on the duty assignment he obtained. This
dual system of stipendiary office and duty assignment served two immediate
114
115
116
117
HCP (1964) 14, pp. 2a–b.
Chaffee, The thorny gates of learning in Sung China, pp. 49–50.
Araki, Sōdai kakyo seido kenkyū, pp. 207–19; Chaffee, The thorny gates of learning in Sung China, pp. 51–3.
Chang, Chao K’uang-yin chuan, pp. 112–13. Although more than half of the officialdom was occupied
by the beneficiaries of the protection privileges (yin2) that allowed high officials to nominate sons or
relatives for official appointments, most chief councilors, vice–chief councilors, and commissioners of
military affairs possessed the elite (chin-shih) degrees acquired from their participation in the highest
level civil service examinations. See Li Chün, Chung-kuo tsai-hsiang chih-tu (Taipei, 1966), pp. 136–40;
Lo, Introduction to the civil service of Sung China, pp. 85, 93–4.
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
239
and two long-term purposes. It pensioned off Later Chou holdovers by granting them salaried offices but withholding the authority of a duty assignment,
thereby ameliorating the “relaxation of bureaucratic standards” that had beset
governments in Five Dynasties.118 Governmental irregularities and arbitrary
practices had become rife during the Five Dynasties and the Ten Kingdoms,
and not a few civil administrative posts had been occupied by substandard
bureaucrats or by agents who furthered the interests of the military. By preserving these men’s former ranks and emoluments but assigning them only
nominal duties, the dual system facilitated the standardization and demilitarization of the administration. In the long run, it accommodated retired high
officials and imperial relatives in the same way as it had accommodated the
Later Chou holdovers. Most important, it allowed the emperor the utmost flexibility in personnel administration. Since duty assignments were not formally
ranked, the emperor could commission a low-ranking but capable official to
perform the work of a high-ranking office or assign a high court official to
a county office.119 Moreover, the tenure of a stipendiary office was in general
three years, but a duty assignment could be made open-ended as circumstances
warranted.
A vexing problem in early Sung administration was determining how much
power the chief councilor should hold. To understand this problem we must
distinguish between the chief councilor’s personal influence and his institutional power; a chief councilor with force of character and great personal
influence could surmount the limitations of his institutional authority.120 Following Five Dynasties precedents, the powers of the chief councilors were
split into three parts during the early Sung. Civil power was vested in the
Secretariat-Chancellery, which indirectly controlled the six ministries: Personnel, Revenue, Rites, War, Justice, and Works. Military power was vested
in the Bureau of Military Affairs (Shu-mi yüan), and the locus of fiscal power was
in the Finance Commission (San-ssu). Each of the three parts was autonomous in
making and implementing policies in its own field, and each was answerable
only to the emperor. This division of power placed the military and fiscal
administrations under the direct control of the emperor at the expense of the
chief councilors. Moreover, the civil authority of the chief councilors was further reduced in that personnel management ceased to be the responsibility of
118
119
120
Wang, Structure of power, p. 174.
Chang, Chao K’uang-yin chuan, pp. 111–2.
Wang Jui-lai failed to make this distinction in his argument that the early Sung chief councilors were
more powerful than has generally been believed; see Wang Jui-lai, “Lun Sung-tai hsiang-ch’üan,” Lishih yen-chiu 2 (1985), pp. 106–20. For the evolution of the chief councilor’s institutional power, see
Chin Chung-shu, “Sung-tai san-sheng chang-kuan fei-chih ti yen-chiu,” Hsin-ya hsüeh-pao 11 No. 1
(1974), pp. 89–147.
240
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
the Secretariat-Chancellery. Recruitment by means of the civil service examinations, formerly under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Rites, was now administered by court officials commissioned directly by the emperor. Appointments
and evaluations of general officials, formerly the responsibilities of the Ministry
of Personnel, were now handled by independent organs such as the Bureau of
Personnel Evaluation (Shen-kuan yüan).121 Also, the final say of the Ministry
of Justice in critical legal matters was delegated to the Judicial Control Office
(Shen-hsing yüan) established by T’ai-tsung.
Like the palace examination and the duty assignment system, the division of
power into isolated administrative organs without a “prime” minister resulted
in the emperor’s substantial participation in making decisions, coordinating
policies, and even supervising their execution. The emperor’s workload was
increased by the need for separate audiences, especially between the SecretariatChancellery and the Bureau of Military Affairs. Leading officials of these two
offices were not permitted to appear together at imperial audiences in the
State Meeting Hall (Tu-t’ang). This practice allowed the emperor to crossexamine their reports, and to maintain the division of power at top-level
meetings where national policies were formed. Accordingly, the two offices
each kept exclusive records of their separate audiences. Such insistence on
confidentiality was carried further after the mid-Sung. High-ranking officials
were prohibited from receiving guests at home except on national holidays.
All officials involved in formulating policies, particularly the councilors, the
drafters, the censors, and the remonstrators, were prohibited from private
association or communication with one another.122 At the highest level of
governance, the throne was the only point of contact. The emperor was the
linchpin of the empire, arbitrating and making the final decisions on all state
policy.
Did the seventeen years of T’ai-tsu’s reign witness the development of the
civilian-dominated bureaucratic government for which the Sung is famous?
Or to put the question another way, were the approximately four hundred
and fifty most qualified candidates for civil offices sufficient to form such a
government? It seems safer to believe that T’ai-tsu’s government was still
dominated by survivors of the old political elite from the late Five Dynasties,
of whom only a minority had civil or bureaucratic origins, and most of whom
121
122
Edward A. Kracke, Jr., Civil service in early Sung China, 960–1067; with particular emphasis on
the development of controlled sponsorship to foster administrative responsibility (Cambridge, Mass., 1953),
pp. 43–5.
Liu Tzu-chien (James T. C. Liu), “An administrative cycle in Chinese history: The case of Northern
Sung emperors,” Journal of Asian Studies 21 No. 2 (1962), p. 139.
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
241
were of military or clerical (li2) origin.123 Also, the question might be asked,
had T’ai-tsu himself adopted a civilian frame of mind? One answer might be
provided by the fact that T’ai-tsu once asked two finalists of the civil service
examination to resort to boxing to decide who deserved the highest honors.124
Even late in his reign, T’ai-tsu continued to search for civil officials with
military abilities.125 According to some anecdotes, T’ai-tsu demanded that
men of learning should be exempted from capital punishment and that only
they could be appointed chief councilors.126 However, he did not allow civil
officials to replace military governors or to dominate the Bureau of Military
Affairs or the Finance Commission.127 Neither was he eager to revive the
practice of policy criticism or the opinion organs.128 Even if T’ai-tsu had
foreseen a civilian government to which scholar-officials were indispensable,
his unification plans needed substantial participation by military and financial
specialists in the administration. In sum, T’ai-tsu opened up the path that
led from the militarily dominated government he inherited from the Five
Dynasties to the civilian-dominated government his successors consolidated.
T’ai-tsu, for the most part, cleared the civil administration of military
influence and entrusted it to the Secretariat-Chancellery, though he persisted
in giving independence to the Bureau of Military Affairs. He reduced the role
of the military in government and increased that of the civilians, but this
action was intended to balance out the former dominance by the military and
not to create a new imbalance under civilian dominance.129
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
See Sun Kuo-tung, “T’ang Sung chih chi she-hui men-ti chih hsiao-jung,” Hsin-ya hsüeh-pao 4 No. 1
(1959), pp. 246–50, and the chart between pp. 280 and 281. Wang Gungwu, “The rhetoric of a
lesser empire: Early Sung relations with its neighbors,” in China among equals: The Middle Kingdom and
its neighbors, 10th–14th centuries, ed. Morris Rossabi (Berkeley, Calif.,1983), p. 171. Ch’en I-yen, Pei
Sung t’ung-chih chieh-ts’eng she-hui liu-tung chih yen-chiu (Taipei, 1977), pp. 24, 29–30, 34–5, 59, 61,
136. Robert M. Hartwell, “Demographic, political, and social transformations of China, 750–1550,”
Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 42 No. 2 (1982), pp. 405–11.
SS 287, p. 9650; Ssu-ma, Su-shui chi-wen 3, p. 26.
Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” p. 302; Chaffee, The thorny gates of learning in Sung China, p. 48.
HCP (1964) 7, p. 6a; Chang Yin-lin, “Sung T’ai-tsu shih-pei chi cheng-shih-t’ang k’o-shih k’ao,” Wenshih tsa-chih 1 No. 7 (1940), pp. 15–16; Hsü Kuei, “Sung T’ai-tsu shih-yüeh pien-hsi,” Li-shih yen-chiu
4 (1986), pp. 190–2.
Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” p. 275, 304. Hartwell, “Demographic, political, and social
transformations of China,” pp. 408, 410. All four finance commissioners (san-ssu shih) during T’ai-tsu’s
reign were military men. See Ko Shao-ou, “Pei Sung chih san-ssu-shih,” Shih-huo yüeh-k’an 8 No. 2
(1978), pp. 113–15. The ratio of commissioners and assistant commissioners of military affairs with
civil ranks to those with military ranks steadily increased from 40 percent under T’ai-tsu, to 60 percent
or more under T’ai-tsung and Chen-tsung, to over 90 percent from the 1060s through the end of the
Northern Sung. See Liang, Sung shu-mi-yüan chih-tu, pp. 12–14.
Liu, “An administrative cycle in Chinese history,” p. 142.
For a theoretical discussion of these questions, see Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” pp. 299–305.
242
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
War and peace under T’ai-tsung, 976–997
T’ai-tsu died unexpectedly in the fall of 976.130 He was survived by two
sons, the twenty-six-year-old Chao Te-chao (950–79) and the eighteen-yearold Chao Te-fang (959–81), and by their young stepmother, the twenty-fiveyear-old Empress Sung (951–95), but he left no officially designated successor.
Contrary to the tradition of primogeniture, T’ai-tsu’s thirty-seven-year-old
brother Kuang-i (posthumously T’ai-tsung) installed himself as emperor, as
is recorded in the Liao dynastic history.131 Because of the scarcity of evidence,
the bias of the official veritable records (shih-lu) of T’ai-tsu and T’ai-tsung,132
and the hyperbole of the anecdotes relating to it, modern historians are unsure
which version, if any, of these events is credible.
One story hints that T’ai-tsu was murdered by Kuang-i. On one snowy
night, T’ai-tsu invited Kuang-i for a drink and dismissed all the attendants.
From far away Kuang-i was seen by dim candlelight frequently leaving his seat
as if dodging something. Subsequently, T’ai-tsu struck an “axe” against a pillar
and told Kuang-i, “Do it well, do it well.” Then T’ai-tsu went to sleep, snoring
like thunder. Kuang-i stayed in the palace that night. Early next morning,
T’ai-tsu was found dead.133 From this evidence, a Ming dynasty commentator
adduced two further points to speculate that T’ai-tsu was murdered. First, the
new emperor impatiently replaced T’ai-tsu’s reign title only twelve days before
it was due to terminate. Second, the new title, T’ai-p’ing hsing-kuo (Ascendent
State in Grand Tranquility, 976–84),134 implied his transcendency over T’aitsu. Such disrespect for the deceased emperor might suggest that Kuang-i
acquired the throne by wrongdoing.135 But one modern historian assumes that
130
131
132
133
134
135
The cause of T’ai-tsu’s death is unclear. T’eng Kuang-ming suspected illness; see T’eng Kuang-ming,
“Sung T’ai-tsu T’ai-tsung shou-shou pien,” Chen-li tsa-chih 1 No. 2 (1944), p. 192; see also Pi Yüan,
Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien [Te-yü-t’ang tsang-pan ed. 1801] (1792; Peking, 1957) 8, p. 205. However,
there is no evidence of any illness nor any record of T’ai-tsu’s sons being asked to attend in the palace.
Araki Toshikazu suggested alcoholism; see Araki Toshikazu, “Sō Taiso sakekuse kō,” Shirin 38 No. 5
(1955), pp. 41–55, but Chang Ch’i-fan argues that T’ai-tsu had abstained from heavy drinking as early
as 961. Chang’s own inference of poisoning by Kuang-i is based on flimsy evidence; see Chang Ch’i-fan,
“Sung T’ai-tsung lun,” Li-shih yen-chiu 2 (1987), pp. 101–2.
T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 8, p. 96.
See Chiang Fu-ts’ung, “Sung T’ai-tsung shih-lu tsuan-hsiu k’ao,” in Sung-shih hsin-t’an, Chiang Fu-ts’ung
pien-chu, ed. Chiang Fu-ts’ung (Taipei, 1966), pp. 61–72.
Wen-ying, Hsiang-shan yeh-lu (c. 1073; Peking, 1984), p. 74. Teng, “Sung T’ai-tsu T’ai-tsung shoushou pien,” p. 191, has deciphered Wen-ying’s account for hidden suggestions of T’ai-tsu’s unnatural
death.
For translations of reign titles, see James M. Hargett, “A chronology of the reigns and reign-periods of
the Song dynasty (960–1279),” Bulletin of Sung-Yüan Studies 19 (1987), pp. 32–4.
Liu Ting-chih, Tai-chai ts’un-kao [1506–21 ed; Kuo-li Pei-ching t’u-shu-kuan microfilm ed.; Fu Ssunien tu-shu-kuan] (15th c.; Taipei, 20th c.) 5, pp. 2b–3a. Though disagreeing with Liu, Chiang
Fu-ts’ung points out that such a change of reign title was unusual even in the chaotic years of the
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
243
T’ai-tsu confirmed the fraternal succession in that private meeting and that the
“axe” was only an axe-shaped piece of stationery.136 In addition, few historians
believe that Kuang-i would have resorted to violence in the palace.137
Another version attributes the legitimacy of Kuang-i’s succession to his
mother’s assessment of the political situation. Intelligent and shrewd, the
dowager empress Tu (901–61) helped T’ai-tsu make decisions on state affairs
early in his reign. Sixteen years before, on her deathbed, the dowager empress
is said to have asked T’ai-tsu why he became emperor. T’ai-tsu was supposed to
have ascribed his accession to the virtue and blessings she and his ancestors had
bestowed upon him. “No,” his mother is said to have replied, “It is precisely
because the Ch’ai house [of the Later Chou] let a child become master of
all under Heaven.” With this in mind, she instructed T’ai-tsu to leave the
throne to his second and third brothers in succession so that the future of
his own sons could also be secured. T’ai-tsu allegedly promised to do so, and
she was supposed to have asked Chao P’u to sign a special document, which
he was to keep in a golden box in the palace.138 It was said that Chao P’u
revealed this secret document some twenty years later, in 981, to T’ai-tsung to
curry favor with him.139 However, the timing of this supposed revelation is not
credible. First, if these events had really happened, why did Chao P’u not reveal
them in 976, when T’ai-tsung needed to legitimate his own succession?140
Second, why would T’ai-tsung want the issue of succession reopened after
he had already been on the throne for five years? Finally, would T’ai-tsung
have let the court know that the third brother was mentioned in the secret
document when he himself was about to remove this brother from the line of
136
137
138
139
140
Five Dynasties. See Chiang Fu-ts’ung, “Sung T’ai-tsu chih peng pu yü-nien erh kai-yüan k’ao,” in
Ch’ing-chu Chu Chia-hua hsien-sheng ch’i-shih-sui lun-wen-chi, ed. Ch’ing-chu Chu Chia-hua hsien-sheng
ch’i-shih-sui lun-wen-chi bien-chi wei-yüan-hui (Taipei, 1962), pp. 457–60.
Ku Chi-kuang, “Sung-tai chi-ch’eng wen-t’i shang-ch’üeh,” Ch’ing-hua hsüeh-pao 13 No. 1 (1941),
pp. 90–1, and p. 92 n. 9.
See Teng, “Sung T’ai-tsu T’ai-tsung shou-shou pien,” pp. 191–2; Miyazaki Ichisada, “Sō no Taiso hishū
setsu ni tsuite,” Tōyōshi kenkyū 9 No. 4 (1945), pp. 5–8; and Liu, “Sung T’ai-tsung yü Sung-ch’u
liang-tz’u ts’uan-wei,” p. 2.
Ssu-ma, Su-shui chi-wen 1, p. 6. Whether the dowager empress had included the third brother in the
succession line is an important question, but even Li T’ao was puzzled by authoritative but contradictory
sources, such as the original Veritable records (comp. 978–80) of T’ai-tsu, which did not record the secret
will at all; its revised edition (994–9, revised again in 1016), which excluded the third brother; and the
Veritable records (997–8, revised in 1016) of T’ai-tsung and Ssu-ma Kuang’s Su-shui chi-wen (c. 1180),
both of which included the third brother. Therefore, Li omitted the third brother in HCP (1964) 2, pp.
8a–b, but included him in HCP (1964) 22, pp. 11b–12b, with a note that by Ssu-ma Kuang’s time
he was widely believed to be in the succession line. See also Teng, “Sung T’ai-tsu T’ai-tsung shou-shou
pien,” p. 178.
HCP (1964) 22, p. 11b.
Chang Yin-lin, “Sung T’ai-tsung chi-t’ung k’ao-shih,” Wen-shih tsa-chih 1 No. 8 (1941), p. 29; Wang,
“Sung ch’u erh-ti ch’üan-wei wen-t’i ti p’ou-hsi,” p. 22.
244
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
succession?141 Although historians are not unanimous about the authenticity
of this document,142 it seems plausible to believe either that it was fabricated
by Chao P’u with T’ai-tsung’s acquiescence,143 or that the story was fabricated
by the compilers of the Veritable records of T’ai-tsung to justify his succession.144
Whatever the truth of the matter, Kuang-i was the most dominant of all
the potential successors to the throne. Furthermore, the current situation,
complicated as it was by the menacing Northern Han–Khitan alliance, the
problem of recovering the Sixteen Yen-Yün Prefectures, and T’ai-tsu’s highly
centralized government, all required a strong and decisive emperor. No imperial clansman was more experienced than Kuang-i in dealing with the military
and civil measures these protocols demanded.
Kuang-i and Ch’ai Jung (the second emperor of the Later Chou) had shared
the same father-in-law.145 From 954 or so until 961, Kuang-i fought on the
battlefield alongside his father Chao Hung-yin (until his death in 956) and
his brother T’ai-tsu.146 Kuang-i thrived under their aegis, filling a series of
relatively minor but sensitive military positions within the Palace Guard and
the attendant staff. He was believed to have been a chief instigator of the 960
coup at Ch’en-ch’iao.147 As a reward, Kuang-i was made the third-ranking
inspector in chief in the Palace Command, until he was appointed the governor
of K’ai-feng in 961.148 This important post controlled the entire capital area
and had been given only to the most likely imperial successor during the
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
Chang, “Sung T’ai-tsung chi-t’ung k’ao-shih,” p. 30 n. 9.
For believers, see Ku, “Sung-tai chi-ch’eng wen-t’i shang-ch’üeh,” pp. 88–90; Curtis Chung Chang,
“Inheritance problems in the first two reigns of the Sung dynasty,” Chinese Culture 9 No. 4 (1968),
p. 35; Chiang Fu-ts’ung, “Sung T’ai-tsu shih T’ai-tsung yü Chao P’u ti cheng-cheng,” Shih-hsüeh huik’an 5 (1973), p. 7; for dissenters, see Chang, “Sung T’ai-tsung chi-t’ung k’ao-shih,” pp. 28–30; Teng,
“Sung T’ai-tsu T’ai-tsung shou-shou pien,” pp. 178–80; Wang, “Sung ch’u erh-ti ch’üan-wei wen-t’i
ti p’ou-hsi,” pp. 21–2.
Miyazaki, “Sō no Taiso hishū setsu ni tsuite,” p. 14, suggests that T’ai-tsung and Chao P’u cooperated
in the fabrication. Chang, “Sung T’ai-tsung lun,” p. 105, argues that it was done by either T’ai-tsung
or Chao P’u; but we believe that Chao P’u took the initiative, because of the second and third points
mentioned earlier. Wang, “Sung ch’u erh-ti ch’üan-wei wen-t’i ti p’ou-hsi,” pp. 18 and 22, guesses that
the dowager empress Tu might have spoken of “passing the throne to a mature person,” or “passing the
throne to your brothers,” which Chao P’u transformed into a written will.
Teng, “Sung T’ai-tsu T’ai-tsung shou-shou pien,” pp. 179, 185. However, it seems doubtful that the
compilers would dare to fabricate such an important event without some sort of reference from someone
high up.
For its significance, see Liu, “Sung T’ai-tsung yü Sung-ch’u liang-tz’u ts’uan-wei,” p. 1.
This, T’ai-tsung’s own account, contains some temporal errors; see HCP (1964) 29, p. 2b; Chang, “Sung
T’ai-tsung lun,” p. 97.
Wang, “Sung ch’u erh-ti ch’üan-wei wen-t’i ti p’ou-hsi,” pp. 17 and 22, even suspects that T’ai-tsu was
pushed by Kuang-i to stage the coup and then might have reached some sort of agreement about their
succession.
See Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” p. 167, table I.
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
245
Five Dynasties era.149 When T’ai-tsu took to the field himself, against Li Yün
and Li Ch’ung-chin in 960, Kuang-i was appointed chief administrator of the
imperial residence, and when Tai-tsu again left to attack the Northern Han
in 969, Kuang-i was made resident defender (liu-shou) in the capital.150 These
appointments may indicate T’ai-tsu’s intention to elevate Kuang-i’s status, as
well as suggesting his trust in him.151
Kuang-i always held rank superior to T’ai-tsu’s son Chao Te-chao. Though
already in his twenties, Te-chao had never been appointed to any important
post. Moreover, contrary to convention, he was not ennobled as a prince (wang)
when he reached maturity and moved out of the palace. In 973, he was made
an honorary military governor and a grand mentor, a high-sounding sinecure
with a rank equal to chief councilor. At the same time, however, Kuang-i was
ennobled one rank higher than Te-chao and made a prince, the first and only
living prince during T’ai-tsu’s reign, and placed above the chief councilors
in regular audiences.152 It seems clear that by that time Kuang-i was already
T’ai-tsu’s intended successor.153
Kuang-i’s personal entourage was also formidable. During his fifteen years
(961–76) as governor of K’ai-feng, he recruited talented people from all walks
of life, mostly fighters, some fugitives, and a few literati. Also he exchanged
favors with many nobles, court officials, and eunuchs.154 Indeed, following
the dismissed of his archrival, Chao P’u, as the lone chief councilor after nine
years’ service (964–73) because of his corruption and dictatorial tendencies,
Kuang-i became the second most powerful man in the empire.155 Furthermore,
Kuang-i alone had been able to dissuade T’ai-tsu from moving the capital from
K’ai-feng to Lo-yang.
The new emperor worked very hard. He tried to hold daily audiences
and worked late each night, reading every memorial, carefully checking the
accounts of the Finance Commission, handpicking central and local government officials, judging criminal cases in K’ai-feng, and even rectifying the
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
Chiang Fu-ts’ung, “Sung T’ai-tsung Chin-ti mu-fu k’ao,” Ta-lu tsa-chih 30 No. 3 (1965), p. 16.
SS 1, pp. 6–7; 2, p. 28.
Chang, “Inheritance problems in the first two reigns of the Sung dynasty,” p. 15.
SS 3, p. 40; 244, p. 8676; Chang, “Inheritance problems in the first two reigns of the Sung dynasty,”
p. 15.
Chang, “Sung T’ai-tsung chi-t’ung k’ao-shih,” p. 26; Ku, “Sung-tai chi-ch’eng wen-t’i shang-ch’üeh,”
pp. 87–9; Wang, “Sung ch’u erh-ti ch’üan-wei wen-t’i ti p’ou-hsi,” pp. 15–17. Teng, “Sung T’ai-tsu
T’ai-tsung shou-shou pien,” pp. 181–4, disagrees, but his arguments are made only against some
anecdotes rather than against the facts mentioned earlier.
Teng, “Sung T’ai-tsu T’ai-tsung shou-shou pien,” pp. 187–8; Chiang, “Sung T’ai-tsung Chin-ti mu-fu
k’ao,” pp. 15–23; Wang Huai-ling, “Lun Sung T’ai-tsung,” Hsüeh-shu yüeh-k’an 3 (1986), p. 63.
See Chiang, “Sung T’ai-tsu shih T’ai-tsung yü Chao P’u ti cheng-cheng,” pp. 1–14; Chang, “Sung
T’ai-tsung lun,” pp. 98–100; Wang, “Sung ch’u erh-ti ch’üan-wei wen-t’i ti p’ou-hsi.”
246
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
misbehavior of clerical staff.156 To further the development of governmental centralization and imperial absolutism, T’ai-tsung deprived most military
governors of their power bases, replacing the governors and their protégés
with officials selected through civil service examinations, and he also whittled
down the power of the chief councilors and border generals.
Despite an early Sung precedent that required state councilors to submit
memoranda (cha-tzu) on every state affair for the emperor’s approval before
they were drafted into edicts, influential councilors still used council directives (t’ang-t’ieh) to give administrative orders independent of imperial power.
In 996, however, T’ai-tsung ordered that the method of handling major affairs
should follow the memorandum precedent, and that even the council directives
for minor affairs must first pass his scrutiny.157 Moreover, after a suspension
of six years (976–82), T’ai-tsung again appointed assistant councilors of state
(ts’an-chih cheng-shih) with powers roughly equivalent to those of the chief
councilors.158 Also in 996, new measures regarding governmental checks and
balances were imposed: only chief councilors could command the seal of the
Secretariat-Chancellery, and assisting councilors were now required to stand
behind chief councilors at court, though all councilors could deliberate state
affairs in the Council of State.159 As a result, civil authority was no longer
concentrated in the hands of the highest-ranking chief councilors, since they
were always outnumbered by the assisting councilors, who, though very powerful, ranked below them. Then too, most of the chief councilors T’ai-tsung
preferred were quiet, careful, and even timid, carrying no weight in policy
decisions.160
Early in his reign T’ai-tsung reviewed the troops often, as a way of cultivating and securing their loyalty to him. Although the Bureau of Military
Affairs had been entrusted to members of his former entourage, he rated all
officers, himself, first according to their ability to control their subordinates
and then according to their bravery.161 This approach reflected his preference for firm control, particularly over the border generals whose power and
autonomy posed a potential threat to him. The contentious state of Sung156
157
158
159
160
161
Liu, “An administrative cycle in Chinese history,” p. 142; Karl F. Olsson, “The structure of power under
the third emperor of Sung China: The shifting balance after the peace of Shan-yüan” (diss., University of
Chicago, 1974), pp. 46–8; Liu Ching-chen, “Pei Sung ch’ien-ch’i huang-ch’üan fa-chan chih yen-chiu –
huang-ti cheng-chih chiao-se ti fen-hsi” (diss., Kuo-li T’ai-wan ta-hsüeh, 1987), pp. 60–78.
HCP (1964) 40, pp. 5a–6a; Olsson, “The structure of power under the third emperor of Sung China,”
pp. 106–8; Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” pp. 246–8.
HCP (1964) 37, p. 6a.
HCP (1964) 40, p. 7a.
Liu, “An administrative cycle in Chinese history,” p. 142; Liu, “Pei Sung ch’ien-ch’i huang-ch’üan
fa-chan chih yen-chiu,” pp. 102–4.
Chiang, “Sung T’ai-tsung Chin-ti mu-fu k’ao,” pp. 22–3; Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,”
p. 183.
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
247
Liao relations necessitated the elevation of major border posts to the status
of Chief Deployment Commands (tu-pu shu), and their incumbents carried
much higher military rank and commanded many more troops than had been
prescribed under T’ai-tsu. To offset their high rank, T’ai-tsung did not grant
the border generals the same level of privileges and autonomy that T’ai-tsu
had allowed them.162 They were now forbidden to retain personal guards, a
restriction that resulted in the killing of at least one expeditionary commander
by the Khitan.163 Their transgressions were also no longer tolerated. For example, a veteran general was castigated for beating to death a lieutenant found
guilty of malfeasance.164 At the tactical level, the generals’ previous freedom
in military actions was largely circumscribed by T’ai-tsung’s obsession with
control.165 Moreover, frontier commanders were prohibited from trading and
from appropriating local taxes. These prohibition’s prevented self-enrichment
but deprived frontier commanders of revenues to pay spies, grant bounties, or
meet urgent needs.166 In short, T’ai-tsung was unwilling to give the generals
the free rein they needed to cope flexibly with fluid border circumstances.
sino-liao relations and the two sons of heaven
The Sung empire was much smaller than the cosmopolitan T’ang. The Sung
never controlled any part of Central Asia, from which area Indian Buddhism
and the best warhorses had come. It never reincorporated Annam (Northern
Vietnam), its southwestern neighbor, whose independence in 968 ended centuries of Chinese hegemony over the Red River flood plain. Instead, the Sung
was continually humiliated by its neighbors. Attempts to recover the Sixteen
Prefectures of Yen-Yün from the Liao ended in disastrous defeats, and the
policy of i-i chih-i (playing the barbarians off against each other) used against
the Tangut (or Hsi Hsia from 1038) only hastened the Tangut achievement of
autonomy. Given its place in a geopolitical triangle formed by the Sung, Liao,
and Hsi Hsia states, the Sung empire has been described by modern historians
as just one state “among equals.”167
162
163
164
165
166
167
Tseng Kung (1019–83) summarized the essence of T’ai-tsu’s approach to managing border generals as
follows: “Exalt them [the generals] with rewards. Treat them with sincerity. Enrich them with wealth.
Denigrate their titles but elevate their powers. Overlook their minor [faults] and demand their major
[accomplishments]. Prolong their [tenure as] officials and expect their success.” Tseng Kung, Tseng
Kung chi (1078–83; Peking, 1984) 49, pp. 663–4, translated by Worthy in “The founding of Sung
China,” p. 190.
Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” p. 192.
Chang, “Sung T’ai-tsung lun,” pp. 107–8.
Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” p. 188.
Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” pp. 192–5; Chang, “Sung T’ai-tsung lun,” p. 107.
For the term and its many ramifications, see Morris Rossabi, ed., China among equals: The Middle Kingdom
and its neighbors, 10th–14th centuries (Berkeley, Calif., 1983).
248
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
Sung-Liao relations began well. Although T’ai-tsu had not followed the
Five Dynasties’ practice of announcing his enthronement to the Khitan court,
he took great care throughout his reign to avoid direct provocation. In late 974,
after officials suggested that they become “eternal allies,” the Sung and the
Liao entered a relationship of equality, exchanging envoys with state letters on
New Year’s Day.168 For the next four years, their relationship was harmonious.
In 975 alone, the Liao dispatched several missions to the Sung; one was even
sent especially to congratulate T’ai-tsu on his conquest of the Southern T’ang.
The next year, Liao envoys presented condolences for T’ai-tsu’s death and
brought T’ai-tsung congratulations upon his succession. T’ai-tsung was also
conciliatory, sending courtesy missions to the Liao emperor, allowing trade
with the Liao, and arresting troublemakers along the border.169
This cordial relationship with the Liao was shattered by T’ai-tsung’s campaign to conquer the Northern Han. In 979, one year after the submission to
the Sung of the last two southern kingdoms (Chang-Ch’üan and Wu-Yüeh),
T’ai-tsung launched an imperial campaign against the Northern Han. Frustrated in its diplomatic attempts to halt the Sung campaign, the Liao declared
war. Learning from the failure of T’ai-tsu’s invasion of the Northern Han from
the south, T’ai-tsung attacked them instead from the northwest, crushing a
major Liao reinforcement head-on. Isolated, the Northern Han resisted for only
fifteen days before surrendering its ten prefectures and 35,220 households.170
Acting without T’ai-tsu’s leniency, T’ai-tsung downgraded the Northern Han
capital T’ai-yüan from prefectural to county status, and set the city on fire,
killing many of the trapped inhabitants.171
With the reluctant consent of most of his generals, T’ai-tsung, ambitious
to fulfill his plans for a grand unification, immediately advanced toward the
Sixteen Prefectures of Yen-Yün with no regard for the fatigue of his soldiers
or for the shortage of his army’s provisions. The campaign proceeded with
deceptive smoothness until the army was caught between the city of Yuchou (modern Peking, the southern capital of Liao) and approaching Khitan
reinforcements. The disastrous defeat suffered by the Sung at the Kao-liang
River (southeast of Ch’ang-p’ing, Peking), where over ten thousand Sung
168
169
170
171
For basic studies of Sino-Liao relations see: Tao Jing-shen (T’ao Chin-sheng), Two sons of heaven:
Studies in Sung-Liao relations (Tucson, Ariz.,1988); Wang, “Liao Sung Shan-yüan meng-yüeh tichieh ti pei-ching (shang),” pp. 35–49; Melvin Thlick-Len Ang, “Sung-Liao diplomacy in eleventhand twelfth-century China: A study of the social and political determinants of foreign policy”
(diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1983), pp. 97–9; Wang, “The rhetoric of a lesser empire,”
p. 51.
Wang, “The rhetoric of a lesser empire,” p. 51; Tao, Two sons of heaven, p. 13.
Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” pp. 78–9; Tao, Two sons of heaven, p. 13.
HCP (1964) 20, pp. 10a–b.
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
249
troops were killed and T’ai-tsung himself was wounded by arrows,172 ushered
in twenty-five years of warfare between the Sung and the Liao, who now
faced each other directly, without the Northern Han between them as a buffer
state.
In the following six years, the Liao initiated all the attacks, using hitand-run tactics to exhaust the Sung armies. For example, after plundering
the strategic Wa-ch’iao Pass (south of modern Hsiung county in Hopei) in
980, they retreated in the face of a counterattack led by T’ai-tsung in person.
This tactic was aimed at dislocating the economy and sapping the military
strength of the Sung border areas.173 During these years, T’ai-tsung’s continual
requests for military cooperation from Koryŏ and the Parhae (Po-hai) people,
inhabitants of eastern Liaoning who had been incorporated into the Liao state
by the Khitan in the 920s, bore no results. In contrast, the Liao continued
to build up its hegemony in the region south of the Gobi Desert, thereby
securing their western borders before concentrating on attacking the Sung.
According to Liao dynastic history (Liao shih), in early 983 T’ai-tsung had sent
congratulations accompanied by peace overtures to the new emperor of Liao,
the thirteen-year-old Liao Sheng-tsung (r. 982–1031), but to no avail.174 In
early 986 even the Tanguts turned their back on the Sung and submitted to
the Liao.175
Hoping to take advantage of Sheng-tsung’s inexperience and Liao preoccupation with northern expansion, T’ai-tsung launched a new attack in 986.
Nearly two hundred thousand Sung troops invaded the Sixteen Yen-Yün Prefectures from three directions, achieving some victories in the mountain areas.
In the plain of Ho-pei, however, the Sung infantry, commanded by generals
whose tactics were poorly coordinated, were no match for the Liao cavalry led
by seasoned generals like Yeh-lü Hsiu-ko (953–998) and Yeh-lü Hsieh-chen
(?–999), under the capable leadership of the dowager empress Hsiao (?–1009).
172
173
174
175
Tao, Two sons of heaven, pp. 13–14. For a brief description of this defeat, as recorded in the Liao shih, see
Wittfogel and Feng, History of Chinese society, p. 582. Wang Gungwu argues that T’ai-tsung’s confidence
in attacking the Liao was not unjustified, for Sung power had reached its climax in 979, with the envoys
from important non-Chinese states such as Koryŏ, Champa, and the Tanguts arriving with tribute; see
Wang, “The rhetoric of a lesser empire,” pp. 51–2. Sung Ch’ang-lien suggests that a mutiny was possible
and that a large majority of the Sung forces did not participate in the battle; see Sung Ch’ang-lien,
“K’ao-liang-ho chan-i k’ao-shih,” Ta-lu tsa-chih 39 No. 10 (1969), pp. 33–6. Ch’eng Kuang-yü has
documented most of the important primary sources on T’ai-tsung’s battles with the Liao in his Sung
T’ai-tsung tui Liao chan-cheng k’ao (Taipei, 1972).
T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 34, pp. 398–9.
T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 10, p. 108.
Wang, “The rhetoric of a lesser empire,” pp. 52–3. Wittfogel and Feng, History of Chinese society,
pp. 317–25, 405–8. Tao, Two sons of heaven, p. 80, states that a Korean army of twenty-five thousand
had advanced toward the Liao in cooperation with the Sung expedition of 986, but nothing more about
this army is recorded.
250
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
The debacle at Ch’i-kou Pass (southwest of modern Cho county in Hopei),
where some thirty thousand Sung soldiers were reportedly lost, was followed
by further defeats and finally by the total retreat of the expedition. Soon the
Liao took revenge for the invasion at the strategic Chün-tzu Pass (northwest
of modern Ho-chien in Hopei), where they killed several generals and tens
of thousands of Sung soldiers. Having lost most of his crack troops, including a most capable general, Yang Yeh (?–986), T’ai-tsung now had to take a
defensive rather than an offensive stance against the Liao.176
During the 986 expedition, T’ai-tsung conferred only with the Bureau
of Military Affairs, issuing six edicts in a single day without informing the
Secretariat-Chancellery. After the defeat, T’ai-tsung forswore such exclusive
reliance on the Bureau of Military Affairs, but he soon broke his resolution.
In 988, troops were recruited for a campaign without the chief councilors’
knowledge. The next year, however, to ease the councilors’ irritation at not
being informed on military affairs, T’ai-tsung ordered the Bureau of Military
Affairs to send a copy of its log to the Secretariat-Chancellery. One councilor
even dared to stop an assistant commissioner returning from an imperial audience and, on learning that foreign affairs had been discussed, insist on voicing
his own opinions before the emperor.177 This suggests that external crises
may have provided opportunities for the councilors to gain ground in their
tug-of-war with the emperor over the division of civil and military powers.
In fact, councilors would serve as concurrent commissioners in the Bureau of
Military Affairs in 1042–5, during the Sung-Hsi Hsia wars, and again, during
the Southern Sung, as a consequence of ongoing crises with the Jurchen and
later the Mongols.178
T’ai-tsung’s wars against the Liao were very costly. Liao counterraids inside
Sung borders devastated the region’s human and economic resources, forcing
T’ai-tsung to grant years of land tax remissions to landowners in Ho-pei, and
to abandon the recruitment of soldiers in the region of Honan. During this
period T’ai-tsung also lost potential allies. In 991 and 994, after their requests
for military aid were turned down by T’ai-tsung, the Jurchen in the region
of northern Manchuria and the Koryŏ kingdom accepted Liao suzerainty. As
176
177
178
HCP (1964) 27, pp. 1a–b, 18a–19b, 21b–23a; 28, p. 1a; Ang, “Sung-Liao diplomacy in eleventh- and
twelfth-century China,” pp. 68–71, 99–100. For a succinct analysis of the failure of this expedition;
see Chin Yü-fu, Sung Liao Chin shih (1936; Shanghai, 1946), p. 32. T’ai-tsung blamed the defeat on
some commanders’ violation of his prescribed strategy; see HCP (1964) 27, p. 14a.
Olsson, “The structure of power under the third emperor of Sung China,” pp. 110–12; Worthy, “The
founding of Sung China,” pp. 239–41.
Chou Tao-chi, “Sung-tai tsai-hsiang ming-ch’eng yü ch’i shih-ch’üan chih yen-chiu,” Ta-lu tsa-chih 17
No. 12 (1958), pp. 14–15; Lin T’ien-wei, “Sung-tai ch’üan-hsiang hsing-ch’eng chih fen-hsi,” Ssu yü
yen 10 No. 5 (1973), pp. 37–9.
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
251
the hope of victory over the Liao dimmed, advocates of a diplomatic rather
than a military solution began gaining ground at the Sung court. T’ai-tsung
himself became increasingly tired of fighting. Two Sung appeals for peace were
recorded in the Liao dynastic history, but they came to nothing.179
Relations with the Tanguts, or the “western barbarians ”
In contrast to the their attitudes toward the Liao, the Sung usually looked
down on the Tanguts, whether the tribes were subservient or hostile, calling
them “western barbarians,” “recalcitrant caitiffs in the west,” or “western bandits.”180 In the late ninth century, in return for his help in putting down the
Huang Ch’ao rebellion (875–84), the Tangut leader had been rewarded by the
T’ang court with the imperial surname Li, granted the title Duke of the Hsi
Hsia state, and given a hereditary title of military governor of the Ting-nan
army controlling Hsia-chou, Sui-chou, Yin-chou, and Yu-chou2 prefectures on
the southern border of the Ordos Desert (see map 13 in chapter 4). During the
Five Dynasties, the Tanguts strengthened their hold on Ting-nan, while remaining allies of the Later Liang and Later T’ang. Under the Later Han, Tangut
territory increased, and in 954 their leader was enfeoffed as Prince of Hsi-p’ing.
The Hsia-chou regime remained on good terms with both the Later Chou and
the Sung dynasties, for whom they were an important source of horses. In
general, their dependence on trade for salt, food, and consumer goods kept
the Tanguts subordinate. At one point they even assisted T’ai-tsung in his
conquest of the Northern Han.181
From 982 on, with the establishment of an independent Hsia state and
ensuing Tangut encroachment on Sung territory, a hostile relationship emerged
that would last for the duration of the Northern Sung. Li I-yin, who had
governed Hsi Hsia since 935, died in 967, and was granted the posthumous
title King of Hsia. The Sung duly appointed his son Li K’o-jui as king in his
place. But in 978, Li K’o-jui died, and his brother Li Chi-p’eng usurped the
throne. In 979, when the Northern Han state that had formed a buffer state to
the east was annexed by Sung, the Tanguts now had a long frontier with Sung
179
180
181
T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 13, p. 145.
Tao Jing-shen (T’ao Chin-sheng), “Barbarians or northerners: Northern Sung images of the Khitans,”
in China among equals: The Middle Kingdom and its neighbors, 10th–14th centuries, ed. Morris Rossabi
(Berkeley, Calif., 1983), p. 78; Herbert Franke, “Sung embassies: Some general observations,” in China
among equals: The Middle Kingdom and its neighbors, 10th–14th centuries, ed. Morris Rossabi (Berkeley
Calif., 1983), pp. 116–48.
Wang, Wu-tai hui-yao 29, pp. 462–4; Shiba Yoshinobu, “Sung foreign trade: Its scope and organization,”
in China among equals: The Middle Kingdom and its neighbors, 10th–14th centuries, ed. Morris Rossabi
(Berkeley, Calif., 1983), p. 101.
252
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
both to their south and east. After two years as Tangut ruler, the unpopular Li
Chi-p’eng surrendered his land to the Sung in 982. T’ai-tsung, who wanted
to remove the Tanguts as a potential enemy, planned to take control of the
strategic Ordos region in order to establish a northwestern defense against
the Liao and to maintain commercial access to Tangut warhorses.182 However,
while Li Chi-p’eng’s entire clan was in the process of moving to K’ai-feng,
his cousin Li Chi-ch’ien (?–1004) and various Tangut tribes rebelled against
the high-handedness of the Sung occupation forces. They gradually took back
some territory and even outmaneuvered the Sung diplomatically by submitting
themselves to the Liao on the eve of T’ai-tsung’s 986 expedition. In addition,
during the next year, Li Chi-ch’ien married a Liao princess with a dowry of
three thousand horses.
To avoid a two-front war, T’ai-tsung adopted Chao P’u’s policy of divide
and rule, and reinstated Li Chi-p’eng as Tangut ruler.183 Li Chi-ch’ien feigned
submission to the Sung to buy time and eventually induced Chi-p’eng to fight
for autonomy. But Li Chi-ch’ien’s plan backfired. Enraged, the Liao raided and
looted the Tangut territory in 992 to punish them for their apparent submission
to the Sung. In 994 the Sung in their turn deposed Li Chi-ch’ien, destroying
the Tangut citadel of Hsia-chou, and rigidly prohibited the exchange of Tangut
salt for Sung food in the Shensi and Kansu regions.184 Reinforced by a great
number of starving Tanguts, Li Chi-ch’ien defeated a Sung expedition in 996
after intercepting its supply train with its hugh quantities of grain. These wars
encouraged the various Tangut tribes to consolidate, and they began to expand
westward into what is now Ningsia province. In 998, under a new appeasement
policy, the Sung appointed Li Chi-ch’ien military governor in command of all
the Tangut territories. This unwisely legitimized a power base that the Tanguts
steadily expanded. By 1036 they controlled all of the Ordos region, Ningsia,
and almost all of Kansu. Shortly afterward they invaded the Tibetan domains
east of the inland sea known as the Ch’ing-hai (Lake Kokonor). With this
action the Tanguts won a favorable treaty from the Sung in 1044, as described
in the following chapter.185 Thereafter, the Sung were cut off from the land
route across Turkestan to Western Asia and Europe.
182
183
184
185
Ang, “Sung-Liao diplomacy in eleventh- and twelfth-century China,” pp. 25–6.
See Tsutomu Iwasaki “A study of Ho-hsi Tibetans during the Northern Sung dynasty,” Memoirs of the
Research Department of the Tōyō Bunko 44 (1986), pp. 57–132, especially pp. 57–8.
For a discussion of the significance of salt in the Sung–Hsi Hsia relations, see Liao Lung-sheng, “Sung
Hsia kuan-hsi chung ti ch’ing-pai yen wen-t’i,” Shih-huo yüeh-k’an 5 No. 10 (1976), pp. 14–21.
Chin, Sung Liao Chin shih, p. 90, also pp. 93–5 for a succinct analysis of Liao–Hsi Hsia relations. For
a general survey of the Sung–Hsi Hsia relations, see Ch’üeh Hao-tseng, “Sung Hsia kuan-hsi chih
yen-chiu,” Kuo-li Cheng-chih ta-hsüeh hsüeh-pao 9 (1964), pp. 267–317. For a more detailed overview see
Li Hua-jui, Sung Hsia kuan-hsi shih (Shih-chia-chuang, 1998).
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
253
The closure of the northern frontiers accelerated the shift of political and
economic centers to the south and southeast, at the same time that the wars in
the northwest thrust scholar-officials into positions of military command.186
The closure of these frontiers also impeded Sung trade with Central Asia
and confined Sung expansion mostly to the south, turning its attention from
the interior of Asia toward the oceans. Consequently, the Sung developed a
prosperous maritime trade and expanded their overseas relations with Koryŏ,
Japan, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean.187 Whereas in the north the
shortage of warhorses put the Sung at a disadvantage before Tangut and Khitan
cavalry, in the south the sophisticated marine technology and naval strategies
invented during the Sung eventually elevated the empire to the status of a sea
power.188 Maritime trade helped the Sung spread the influence of Confucianism
in Koryŏ and Japan, leaving imprints that exist today.189 However, the decline
of Indian Buddhism and the obstruction of its eastward transmission deprived
the Sung empire of a significant source of stimulation by foreign ideas, although
some contact did continue. Both T’ai-tsu and T’ai-tsung seriously attempted
to revive contacts and continue the translation of Indian Buddhist texts.190
But the program died in the mid-eleventh century; the Indian masters were
few, and Chinese skills in Sanskrit had declined. Besides, Buddhism in India
and China had begun to follow separate paths.
Military defeats reduced the Sung’s supremacy within this multistate environment. Koryŏ transferred the tribute formerly offered the Sung to the Liao,
the Tanguts played the Liao off against the Sung, and the Vietnamese finally
established their independent state of Ta Yüeh.191 Yet residents of the Sung
capitalized on the hard-earned peace to attain economic prosperity and cultural
efflorescence.192 Modern historians have pointed out that the Sung leaders,
though sometimes given to rhetorical excess in their external and internal communications about foreigners, were actually flexible, realistic, and pragmatic
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
Yang Te-ch’uan and Liu Tzu-chien (James T. C. Liu), “The image of scholar-generals and a case in the
Southern Sung,” Saeculum 37 No. 2 (1986), p. 184. For examples of quasi- “scholar-generals” during
the early reigns of the Northern Sung, see Labadie, “Rulers and soldiers,” pp. 194–7.
Lo Jung-pang, “Maritime commerce and its relation to the Sung navy,” Journal of Economic and Social
History of the Orient 22 No. 1 (1969), pp. 57–101.
Lo Jung-pang, “The emergence of China as a sea power during the late Sung and early Yüan periods,” Far
Eastern Quarterly 14 (1954–5), pp. 489–503. On the problem of Sung horse supply, see Paul J. Smith,
Taxing heaven’s storehouse: Horses, bureaucrats and the destruction of the Sichuan tea industry, 1074–1224
(Cambridge, Mass., 1991).
Kenneth K. S. Chen, Buddhism in China: A historical survey (Princeton, N.J., 1964), pp. 389–90, 394–
400.
See the recent study of Sen Tansen, Buddhism, diplomacy, and trade: The realignment of Sino-Indian relations,
600–1400 (Honolulu, 2003), especially pp. 102–39.
Wang, “The rhetoric of a lesser empire,” pp. 61–2.
This is especially so after the peace of 1005; see Tao, Two sons of heaven, pp. 23–4.
254
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
in dealing with foreign states. Recognizing their own military weakness, they
acknowledged the Liao as a diplomatic equal.193
The rewards of peace: Literary pursuits and internal security
Supplied with nearly five thousand men who had passed at least one level of
the civil service examinations,194 T’ai-tsung began producing a bureaucratic
regime dominated by civil officials. Of the top posts in the central government,
all the chief councilors except Chao P’u possessed high academic credentials
and examination degrees. In T’ai-tsung’s reign only six of the twenty-two
finance commissioners came from the military, and twenty-one (or 60 percent)
of the thirty-five commissioners or assistant commissioners of the Bureau of
Military Affairs had civil ranks, of whom eleven held the highest chin-shih
degree.195
Himself a poet and a famous calligrapher,196 T’ai-tsung founded three new
imperial libraries and the Historiography Institute. He also initiated the compilation of what are know as the Four great compendia of the Sung dynasty (Sung
ssu ta shu).197
The first of these four great works, the T’ai-p’ing yü-lan (Imperial encyclopedia
of the T’ai-p’ing hsing-kuo era), in one thousand chüan (chapters), was compiled
over almost six years (977–82) by seventeen officials, of whom at least four
were former officials of the Later Chou and seven of the Southern T’ang.198 In
order to provide a broad foundation of general knowledge, the encyclopedia
was organized in fifty-five categories according to the traditional conception of
193
194
195
196
197
198
Labadie, “Rulers and soldiers,” pp. 90–8; Ang, “Sung-Liao diplomacy in eleventh- and twelfth-century
China,” pp. 72–4; Wang, “The rhetoric of a lesser empire,” pp. 47–65, especially pp. 52–4; Tao,
“Barbarians or northerners,” pp. 66–86, especially pp. 75–9.
Araki, “Sō Taiso sakekuse kō,” pp. 451–2; Chaffee, The thorny gates of learning in Sung China, p. 192.
Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” p. 306; Ko, “Pei Sung chih san-ssu-shih,” pp. 7–10; Liang,
Sung shu-mi-yüan chih-tu. Worthy’s figures differ from Ko’s, but both indicate a large number of civil
officials.
Liu, “Pei Sung ch’ien-ch’i huang-ch’üan fa-chan chih yen-chiu,” pp. 98–9.
The following survey of these four compendia, unsurpassed in scope until the production of the Yung-lo
ta tien (Encyclopedia of the Yung-lo era, compiled in 1408) of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), is based on
Kuo Po-kung, Sung ssu-ta-shu k’ao (Taipei, 1967); John W. Haeger, “The significance of confusion: The
origin of the T’ai-p’ing yü-lan,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 88 No. 3 (1968), pp. 401–10;
Teng Ssu-yu and Knight Biggerstaff, An annotated bibliography of selected Chinese reference works, 3rd ed.
(Cambridge, Mass., 1971); and Yves Hervouet, ed., A Sung bibliography (Bibliographie des Sung) (Hong
Kong, 1978).
The completion date is still not clear, but the work was presented to T’ai-tsung in 982; see Kuo,
Sung ssu-ta-shu k’ao, pp. 8–11; Haeger, “The significance of confusion,” pp. 401–3, 407; and Johannes
L. Kurz, “The politics of collecting knowledge: Song Taizong’s compilations project,” T’oung Pao 87
No. 4–5 (2001), pp. 289–316.
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
255
the world order, beginning with Heaven, and covering such categories as time,
Earth, legitimate sovereigns, medicines, and flowers. The T’ai-p’ing yü-lan is
now the only source for a great number of pre-Sung texts, as nearly eighty
percent of the 2,579 works that it quotes and two of the three collectanea from
which it was compiled are lost today. This compilation was a forerunner of
such later compilations as the Ming dynasty Yung-lo ta-tien (Encyclopedia of the
Yung-lo era, 1408) and the Ch’ing dynasty Ch’in-ting ku-chin tu-shu chi-cheng
(Imperially approved synthesis of books and illustrations past and present, 1726–8).
T’ai-tsung himself read three chüan a day to complete the entire work in one
year, suggesting corrections throughout and proudly comparing himself to a
scholar working hard on ten thousand chüan of books.
The T’ai-p’ing kuang-chi (Extensive records of the T’ai-p’ing hsing-kuo era), in
five hundred chüan, was compiled in one and a half years (977–9) by the same
officials who had worked on the T’ai-p’ing yü-lan. Most of the 475 works
anthologized in the T’ai-p’ing kuang-chi – overwhelmingly historical novels, short stories, and other “unorthodox” writings from the Han dynasty
(206 b.c.e.–220 c.e.), the Six Dynasties (220–589), and particularly the T’ang
dynasty – are lost today. Its ninety-two subject categories included Taoist arts,
Buddhist tales of reward and retribution, tales of immoral acts, dreams, oddities and grotesques, and the like. Aside from its literary value, it is an excellent
source of material on the mythology, religion, ethnology, and natural history
of early China.
The Wen-yüan ying-hua (Finest blossoms from the garden of elegant writing), in one
thousand chüan, was finished in fifty-one months, spanning 982 to 987. Of its
twenty-two compilers, the three from the Later Chou and four of the five from
the Southern T’ang were replaced during their work on the compendium by
new personnel who had passed the civil service examination under the Sung.
As a continuation of the Wen-hsüan (Anthology of literature) compiled in the
sixth century by Hsiao T’ung (better known as Prince Chao-ming, 501–53),
this anthology subsumed, under thirty-seven genres, nearly twenty thousand
pieces of poetry and prose written by 2,200 authors. Ninety percent of these
works were T’ang products.
Conceived by T’ai-tsung and completed under his successor Chen-tsung,
the Ts’e-fu yüan-kuei (Outstanding models from the storehouse of literature), in one
thousand chüan, supplemented these other three great compilations with a
major work of historical synthesis. It was compiled in eight years (1005–
13) by eighteen officials, half of whom were southerners. In order to give
an authoritative account of the histories of pre-Sung emperors and ranking
officials, the compilers took great pains to exhaustively comb the standard
histories and classics, producing an indispensable source for the study of the
256
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
government and political history of the T’ang and the Five Dynasties.199 Chentsung actively participated in the editing, especially in including in the work
overt moral judgments concerning past events, which later influenced Ssu-ma
Kuang (1019–86) in his compilation of the Tzu-chih t’ung-chien (Comprehensive
mirror to aid in government, comp. 1067–84), and which reflected the rise of
imperial absolutism that characterized the Sung period. The book’s thirty-one
sections were arranged in the topical framework similar to that used in the
compilation of the official hui-yao (Compendium of the institutions of the dynasty)
since the T’ang period.
T’ai-tsung’s encyclopedic projects not only satisfied his literary interests
(or what some have termed his “bibliomania”) but also justified his first reign
title, T’ai-p’ing hsing-kuo (Ascendent State in Grand Tranquility), which
implied his superiority to his brother. From the dynasty’s perspective, the
compilation projects also served to provide work and titles for the officials
of the various newly conquered southern states, while also affording a career
path for the rising scholar-officials of the new dynasty. Just as the civil service
examination helped replace holdovers from former dynasties with new Sung
officials, the editing of the encyclopedias allowed Sung scholars and their
emperor to appropriate the achievements of the past, thus paving the way
for the emergence of a new culture that favored literary pursuits over martial
endeavors and values.200
Literary pursuits were interrupted in 993, when the first extensive peasant
rebellion of the Sung dynasty broke out in Szechwan. Ever since its submission
in 965, this remote region had experienced years of popular unrest, first triggered by the brutality of the Sung expeditionary troops during the original
conquest. Their rapacity had provoked an uprising that took almost two years
to suppress, and local resentment was kept alive by taxation of the region’s
salt, brocade, and tea industries and heavy-handed state intervention that seriously disrupted Szechwan’s regional economy.201 The rebels, driven by the
severe drought of 993 and excited by a slogan proclaiming the equalization
199
200
201
Teng and Biggerstaff, An annotated bibliography of selected Chinese reference works, p. 89.
The T’ai-p’ing yü-lan was popular from the eleventh century on; see Haeger, “The significance of confusion,” pp. 406–7. The T’ai-p’ing kuang-chi, because it contained a huge collection of prose narratives,
many of them fictional, was scarcely circulated until 1566; see Kuo, Sung ssu-ta-shu k’ao, pp. 66–73.
The Ts’e-fu yüan-kuei was first printed in 1015, almost two centuries before the printing of the Wen-yüan
ying-hua in 1204; see Kuo, Sung ssu-ta-shu k’ao, p. 95, 129.
This rebellion in Szechwan is generally but wrongly attributed to the governmental monopoly of the
tea business, which in fact did not exist until 1076. See Ssu-ch’uan ta-hsüeh li-shih-hsi “Wang Hsiaop’o Li Shun ch’i-i” tiao-ch’a tsu-pien, Wang Hsiao-p’o Li Shun ch’i-i tzu-liao hui-pien (Ch’eng-tu, 1978),
pp. 126–39; Richard von Glahn, The country of streams and grottoes: Expansion, settlement, and the civilizing
of the Sichuan frontier in Song times (Cambridge, Mass., 1987), pp. 76–7; and Smith, Taxing heaven’s
storehouse, pp. 93–101.
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
257
of wealth, captured city after city, under the leadership of Wang Hsiao-po
(?–993), a small-scale tea planter. Wang died during the fighting. In 994,
however, his brother-in-law Li Shun (?–c. 994) rebelled and proclaimed an
independent Ta Shu state in the regional capital of I-chou2 (modern Ch’engtu), establishing government institutions, a monetary system, and even ties
with its neighbor state, the Nan-chao in Yunnan.
Shaken by the ferocity of the rebellion, T’ai-tsung gave free rein in the pacification campaign to the loyal and battle-experienced eunuch general Wang
Chi-en (?–999), whose eunuch status and proven loyalty reduced the risk of
his creating a personal power base in Szechwan and using the turmoil against
T’ai-tsung. Yet despite Wang Chi-en’s long experience in previous wars, he
nearly reproduced the tragedy of the initial Sung conquest of Szechwan thirty
years before. After crushing the main force of the Wang Hsiao-po rebellion,
Wang Chi-en came close to losing the region again when some prefectures and
counties fell back into rebel hands while Wang indulged himself in feasting
and his troops engaged in an orgy of looting. It was only after T’ai-tsung
assigned some able officials to assist him that Wang finally mopped up the
remnants of the rebellion and restored order in 995.202
Following the Szechwan rebellion some of the most flagrant forms of
misgovernment by local officials were corrected and extortionate taxes were
reduced. At the same time, the number of circuits into which Szechwan was
divided doubled from two to four to strengthen centralized control of the
region. Since tensions were still running high, some of the counterrebellion
measures that had been suspended elsewhere in the empire were reinstituted
in Szechwan. To prevent self-entrenchment, court officials serving there were
not allowed to bring along their families, and until the mid-eleventh century
Szechwan natives were so strictly subjected to the rule prohibiting officials
from serving in their home provinces that the officials were not even permitted to retire to their ancestral homes.203
Tragedy and the problems of succession
When T’ai-tsung died in 997 there was no longer any competition for the
throne from his younger brother Chao T’ing-mei (947–84) or from T’ai-tsu’s
sons Chao Te-chao (d. 979) and Chao Te-fang (d. 981), all of whom were long
dead. Although Te-fang’s death from illness was sad, the death of T’ing-mei
202
203
SS 466, pp. 13602–4.
Lo Wen (Winston W. Lo), Szechwan in Sung China: A case study in the political integration of the Chinese
empire (Taipei, 1982), pp. 25–6; Lo, Introduction to the civil service of Sung China, pp. 204–5; von Glahn,
Country of streams and grottoes, p. 63. For the reversal of the rule prohibiting Szechwanese from serving
in their home region, see Smith, Taxing heaven’s storehouse, pp. 99–108.
258
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
and especially that of Te-chao can be regarded as tragic.204 On the night of
T’ai-tsung’s defeat at the Kao-liang River in 979, some troops, presuming that
the missing T’ai-tsung was lost or dead, speculated that T’ai-tsu’s son Te-chao
should be proclaimed emperor on the spot. T’ai-tsung was infuriated by this,
and when on their return to the capital Te-chao requested the expeditionary
troops be granted their suspended rewards, T’ai-tsung exploded, “It won’t be
too late to grant the rewards when you yourself become [emperor]” (tai ju tzu
wei chih shang wei wan yeh).205 Terrified, Chao Te-chao committed suicide with
a kitchen knife.
Chao T’ing-mei’s elimination was more indirect. Only seven days after T’aitsung’s accession to the throne, T’ing-mei was made a prince and appointed to
T’ai-tsung’s former position as governor of K’ai-feng. In addition, T’ing-mei
was given court standing above the chief councilors, and his children were
officially called “imperial sons” (huang-tzu) and “imperial daughters” (huangnü).206 At least in appearance, T’ing-mei had become T’ai-tsung’s intended
successor.207 In a few years, however, T’ing-mei would lose everything as a
result of accusations against him.
In 981, T’ai-tsung heard rumors that T’ing-mei was hatching a conspiracy,
and the emperor reappointed Chao P’u as chief councilor with the specific
task of exposing the plot.208 Early the next year T’ing-mei was accused of
conspiring to overthrow T’ai-tsung. Instead of being executed, however, he
was transferred from the governorship of K’ai-feng to the regency of Lo-yang.
His “plot” was allegedly kept secret by T’ai-tsung, who even granted him a
generous travel allowance and an official farewell feast.209 But rather than let
the scandal die down, Chao P’u tried to capitalize on it to secure the downfall
both of T’ing-mei and of his own life-long rival, Chief Councilor Lu To-hsün
(934–85), by accusing them of forming a clique. Upon the “self-confessions” of
Lu and some clerks who allegedly had transmitted secrets from the SecretariatChancellery to T’ing-mei, seventy-four court officials found Lu and T’ing-mei
204
205
206
207
208
209
These events are recounted in Chaffee, Branches of heaven, pp. 25–30.
HCP (1964) 20, pp. 15b–16a; SS 244, p. 8676. The ambiguous Chinese original can also be interpreted
as “when you make yourself [emperor].” Perhaps punctuating after “shang,” Curtis Chung Chang
translates the passage as “It would not be too late if some day you could reward them yourself.” See
Chang, “Inheritance problems in the first two reigns of the Sung dynasty,” p. 20.
HCP (1964) 17, pp. 18a, 19a.
Wang, “Sung ch’u erh-ti ch’üan-wei wen-t’i ti p’ou-hsi,” p. 18. Teng, “Sung T’ai-tsu T’ai-tsung shoushou pien,” p. 181, suspects that it was a deal made between T’ai-tsung and T’ing-mei to isolate
Te-chao. Curtis Chung Chang maintains that it was a political gesture showing to the public that T’aitsung’s precedent of fraternal succession was legitimate and thus to be followed; see Chang, “Inheritance
problems in the first two reigns of the Sung dynasty,” p. 23.
HCP (1964) 22, p. 11b.
HCP (1964) 23, pp. 3a–b.
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
259
deserving of execution for their covetousness and for wishing an early death
upon T’ai-tsung. All the clerks were executed, and Lu was exiled to Yai-chou,
on Hainan Island. T’ing-mei was first put under house arrest and, after several
days, having been charged with being unrepentant and resentful, was exiled
to Fang-chou; his sons were demoted to the position of “imperial nephews”
(huang-chih).210
Under the watchful eyes of T’ai-tsung’s special custodians, the thirty-sevenyear-old T’ing-mei died of fear and grief on an unknown date in 984.211 Later,
T’ai-tsung denigrated T’ing-mei to his councilors, claiming that T’ing-mei
had been only his half brother, born to his wet nurse; but this contradicts
Dowager Empress Tu’s biography in the Sung dynastic history (Sung shih).212
The tragedy in the Chao clan continued. T’ai-tsung’s eldest son, Yüantso (965–1027), who alone had remonstrated against T’ing-mei’s exile, was
driven insane by his uncle’s unjust death. While he was recuperating in 985,
he was not invited to the family gathering for the Autumn Festival. Feeling
deserted, he got drunk and set fire to the palace. As punishment he was reduced
in rank to that of a commoner.213 In the same year T’ai-tsung’s second son,
Yüan-hsi (966–92), was made prince and governor of K’ai-feng. Majestic and
self-possessed, his conduct as governor was considered impeccable, and he was
greatly loved by T’ai-tsung. In 992, however, he died of a sudden illness in T’aitsung’s presence, and his father then spent many sleepless nights lamenting his
death and composing elegies.214 For the next two years none of the remaining
six sons of T’ai-tsung was given the K’ai-feng governorship that designated
status as heir apparent. In the meantime, no officials dared memorialize T’aitsung about the succession question. In any event, it is noteworthy that none
of Tai-tsu’s descendants came under consideration. T’ai-tsung had made his
own branch of the family the imperial line. In 994, as the old arrow wounds
of the aging emperor troubled him more and because the thirty-four-year-old
Empress Li (960–1004) remained barren, T’ai-tsung’s third son, Chao Heng
(968–1022), was appointed governor of K’ai-feng at the age of twenty-six
210
211
212
213
214
HCP (1964) 23, pp. 4b–5a, 5b–6a, 8a. There is no extant evidence supporting the accusations, which
were likely to have been invented by Chao P’u and T’ai-tsung’s confidants; see SS 244, p. 8669; Ku,
“Sung-tai chi-ch’eng wen-t’i shang-ch’üeh,” pp. 94–5; Wang, “Sung ch’u erh-ti ch’üan-wei wen-t’i ti
p’ou-hsi,” p. 21; Chang, “Inheritance problems in the first two reigns of the Sung dynasty,” pp. 24–6.
HCP (1964) 23, p. 8a; 25, p. 1b; Wang, “Sung ch’u erh-ti ch’üan-wei wen-t’i ti p’ou-hsi,” p. 20.
HCP (1964) 25, pp. 1b–2a; SS 242, p. 8606. Although Li T’ao loyally believed T’ai-tsung’s account
(HCP [1964] 2, pp. 8b–9a), most historians discount it as a flat-out lie; see Ku, “Sung-tai chi-ch’eng
wen-t’i shang-ch’üeh,” pp. 97–8; Wang, “Sung ch’u erh-ti ch’üan-wei wen-t’i ti p’ou-hsi,” p. 19.
SS 245, p. 8694; HCP (1964) 26, pp. 4a–5a.
This title was later withheld, mainly for the past misbehavior of a concubine of this son; see SS 245,
pp. 8697–8; HCP (1964) 33, pp. 8a–b. The son had once been impeached by a censor and punished
accordingly, but the impeachment is not extant; see HCP (1964) 29, p. 9a.
260
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
and elevated to heir apparent the next year. It is recorded that T’ai-tsung was
initially displeased by the popularity of the new heir apparent, although he
was finally coaxed into accepting it as evidence that he had made the right
decision.215 Two years later, T’ai-tsung died, and Chao Heng (posthumous
name Chen-tsung) succeeded to the throne.
a new type of emperor: the diffident chen-tsung, 997–1022
Compared with the founders as well as the senior officials of the Sung, the
thirty-year-old new emperor, Chen-tsung (r. 997–1022), was indeed a beginner, with merely two years of administrative experience as the governor of
K’ai-feng. His father had once said, “My children are brought up in the seclusion of the palace. Without knowing the affairs of the world, they will need the
advice and guidance of good scholars.”216 While scholars lectured them on the
merits of entrusting the administration to the councilors and of respecting
the opinion of the officials, T’ai-tsung himself taught his sons to be modest,
even ordering the heir apparent to stand below the chief councilors at court;
to treat his tutors with deference; and to respect the counsel of subordinates
during his governorship of K’ai-feng, which indeed was closely watched by
T’ai-tsung himself.217 However, long before he finished providing the guidance he thought his sons needed, T’ai-tsung died of illness in the seclusion of
the inner palace, leaving the heir apparent at the mercy of a conspiracy.
Influenced by Wang Chi-en, Assistant Councilor Li Ch’ang-ling (937–
1008), and drafter Hu Tan (chin shih 978), Empress Li sent Wang Chi-en
to seek agreement from Chief Councilor Lü Tuan (935–1000) to replace the
heir apparent with his eldest brother. Instead, Lü Tuan locked Wang Chi-en
up and protested to the empress that T’ai-tsung’s will could not be reversed
by her claim of primogeniture. In the succession ceremony, to ensure that
the new emperor really was Chen-tsung, Lü Tuan ordered the removal of the
throne screen, approached the throne, looked carefully at the occupant, and
only then led the court to cheer the emperor. In the following two months,
the three conspirators were sent into exile: Hu Tan for improperly drafting
a commemorative edict, Li Ch’ing-ling for lobbying in the court, and Wang
215
216
217
HCP (1964) 36, p. 12b; 38, pp. 1b–2b, which also recorded that T’ai-tsung made the choice in a private
meeting with Assisting Councilor K’ou Chun (961–1023). See also Chang, “Inheritance problems in
the first two reigns of the Sung dynasty,” pp. 31–2.
Quoted from Liu, “An administrative cycle in Chinese history,” p. 142. Liu, “Pei Sung ch’ien-ch’i
huang-ch’üan fa-chan chih yen-chiu,” pp. 137–8.
Liu, “An administrative cycle in Chinese history,” p. 142; Olsson, “The structure of power under
the third emperor of Sung China,” pp. 40–1; Liu, “Pei Sung ch’ien-ch’i huang-ch’üan fa-chan chih
yen-chiu,” pp. 139–41.
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
261
Chi-en for deceit and forming a clique.218 The mystery and details surrounding
this conspiracy, which was recorded by Lü Tuan’s family and by Ssu-ma Kuang,
may never be solved,219 but the banishment of one assistant councilor and one
powerful eunuch was enough to boost Chen-tsung’s authority.
In fact, the new emperor worked hard to appear strong. Twelve days after
his enthronement, when the vice-minister of works, also a respected member
of his royal staff, declined a new appointment, Chen-tsung disallowed the
refusal, telling the state councilors who recommended following precedents
for accepting the refusal that a new emperor should be firm in his orders.220
Early in his reign, Chen-tsung tried hard to emulate almost everything that
his father had done during his prime. Chen-tsung even attempted to interest
himself in military affairs, inspecting the borders as a ceremonial matter and
drawing up diagrams of battle formations with senior generals.221 However,
though giving him energy, his youth, coupled with his inexperience and the
limited training he had received, made Chen-tsung somewhat diffident and
deferential.
The new emperor respected the chief councilors, especially Lü Tuan, whose
style was to pay little attention to small matters, but to focus on big issues
and to emphasize stability in the court and the bureaucracy. Although the
emperor still insisted on separating civil and military authorities, he sanctioned
venues for the Bureau of Military Affairs and the Secretariat-Chancellery to
exchange important information. Chen-tsung was exceptionally tolerant of
private contacts between high officials, allowing them to entertain visitors in
their homes.222 With such a trusting nature, Chen-tsung tended to delegate
more and more authority to his officials.
In a meeting with the state councilors in 1001, Chen-tsung claimed that he
always discussed state affairs, however big or small, with them, and never made
decisions alone.223 In 1003, the three sections of the Finance Commission (the
Salt and Iron Monopoly Bureau, the Tax Bureau, and the Census Bureau), which
T’ai-tsung had separated to increase imperial control over financial policies,
were recombined under the single leadership of the commissioner, so that
Chen-tsung could shed the burden of coordinating the suggestions from each
218
219
220
221
222
223
HCP (1964) 41, pp. 3a–b, 5a, 5b–6b; SS 281, pp. 9516, 9535 n. 2.
HCP (1964) 41, pp. 3a–b; Ssu-ma, Su-shui chi-wen 6, pp. 62–3. Although Ku Chi-kuang in his “Sungtai chi-ch’eng wen-t’i shang-ch’üeh,” pp. 99–104, has attempted to solve the mystery of this alleged
conspiracy, it is almost impossible to do so because of the scarcity of evidence.
Liu, “Pei Sung ch’ien-ch’i huang-ch’üan fa-chan chih yen-chiu,” pp. 142–3.
Olsson, “The structure of power under the third emperor of Sung China,” pp. 48–51; Liu, “Pei Sung
ch’ien-ch’i huang-ch’üan fa-chan chih yen-chiu,” pp. 145–7, 164–6.
Olsson, “The structure of power under the third emperor of Sung China,” pp. 40, 114–15; Liu, “Pei
Sung ch’ien-ch’i huang-ch’üan fa-chan chih yen-chiu,” p. 136.
HCP (1964) 49, p. 2b.
262
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
branch of the commission.224 This tendency to delegate and to consolidate
authority accelerated after the ever-present threat from the Liao was eased by
a peace agreement in 1005.
Appeasement and the peace of Shan-yüan
In 1004 the Liao launched their largest invasion of Sung territory since 946.
The Liao army, under the command of Dowager Empress Hsiao and Emperor
Sheng-tsung, was reportedly made up of two hundred thousand crack troops,
and penetrated Ho-pei in sixty days, reaching the outskirts of Shan-yüan
(or Shan-chou, modern P’u-yang), less than two hundred miles from K’aifeng. The Liao’s objectives, which undoubtedly affected the nature of the
peace agreement of 1005, should be understood from the Liao’s perspective.
After they had taken revenge for T’ai-tsung’s two large-scale invasions, the
Liao had three options in dealing with the Sung: they could continue their
short-range raids across Sung borders; they could immediately try to obtain an
advantageous peace settlement; or, they could try to obtain peace by continuing
and intensifying the war.
The first alternative was increasingly difficult to carry out, since the Sung
had strengthened their defenses by creating swamps and waterways that
bogged down the Liao cavalry.225 In 989, for example, the famous Liao general Yeh-lü Hsiu-ko was so seriously wounded during one foray that he had to
desert his troops.226 In 999, one year after the death of Yeh-lü Hsiu-ko, another
hero in the victories over the last two Sung expeditions, Yeh-lü Hsieh-chen,
also passed away.227 In the three years from 999 to 1001, almost all major
Liao attacks either incurred heavy losses or were turned back without significant gain.228 Moreover, Chen-tsung’s inspection trips to the border and his
exiling of a cowardly commander in chief helped boost Sung troop morale.229
With fewer victories and more defeats, the Liao faced a choice between either
224
225
226
227
228
229
Olsson, “The structure of power under the third emperor of Sung China,” p. 57; Liu, “Pei Sung
ch’ien-ch’i huang-ch’üan fa-chan chih yen-chiu,” p. 148.
Yen Ch’in-heng, “Pei Sung tui Liao t’ang-ti she-shih chih yen-chiu,” Kuo-li Cheng-chih ta-hsüeh hsüeh-pao
8 (1963), pp. 247–58.
HCP (1964) 30, pp. 15b–16a; Ch’en et al., Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo 13, pp. 90–1. Akisada Jitsuzō
[Tamura Jitsuzō], “Sen-en no meiyaku to sono shiteki igi (jō),” Shirin 20 No. 1 (1935), pp. 7–8.
For comments on their contributions, see T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 83, p. 1305.
For details of these battles, see Ch’eng Kuang-yü, “Shan-yüan chih-meng yü t’ien-shu (shang),” Ta-lu
tsa-chih 22 No. 6 (1961), pp. 11–13; Wang Min-hsin, “Liao Sung Shan-yüan meng-yüeh ti-chieh ti
pei-ching (chung),” Chung-kuo shu-mu chi-k’an 9 No. 3 (1975), pp. 46–50. Ch’eng Kuang-yu compares
the Sung shih, the Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien ch’ang-pien, and the Liao shih to give careful accounts of the
Sung-Liao encounters.
Wang, “Liao Sung Shan-yüan meng-yüeh ti-chieh ti pei-ching (chung),” pp. 47–8, 52.
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
263
abandoning their strategy of having a buffer zone between the two states or
paying an unpredictably high price to maintain that buffer. Since either choice
jeopardized Liao security, a different alternative had to be found.230
After T’ai-tsung died, the Liao seemed to be willing to maintain the buffer
zone despite the cost. However, given the danger from the last two Sung
invasions, the Liao considered that any permanent peace should be predicated
upon Sung renunciation of irredentism and should require Sung to recognize
Liao sovereignty over the strategic Yen-Yün region and to return the area south
of the mountain passes – that is, the so-called Kuan-nan (south of the passes)
area in Ho-pei that the Later Chou had reconquered.231 Permanent peace to
the Liao, however, meant permanent menace to the Sung. Even without these
incompatible diplomatic objectives, the door to negotiation was temporarily
closed. Upon ascending the throne, Chen-tsung had ordered Ho Ch’eng-chü
(946–1006), a veteran border official, to inform the Liao of T’ai-tsung’s death
and of Chen-tsung’s desire for peace, but the Sung had received no response.232
The Sung court did not make any further initiative for peace. Fearing Liao
infiltration, the Sung court turned down the suggestion from some officials
to reopen border markets to trade tea with the Khitan. In 1002, perhaps as
a probe, the Liao requested the opening of border markets that had all been
closed in 991.233 Annoyed by intermittent Liao attacks, the Sung court refused.
It was only upon the later insistence of Ho Ch’eng-chü that one market was
opened.234 The next year, to prevent Khitan espionage, the market was again
closed,235 as was the channel to reconciliation.
In the following year (1004), the Liao attempted to resolve their dilemma by
implementing a third alternative – to achieve an advantageous peace by means
of war – but their timing was bad. In the fourth month of the previous year
they had captured Wang Chi-chung (?–1023), a high-ranking border general
and, more important, a long-time confidant of Chen-tsung. Wang’s capture
greatly alarmed the Sung. Assuming that Wang Chi-chung had been killed in
action, Chen-tsung severely punished two chief commanders for their desertion of Wang. Chen-tsung also solicited frontier policies from the court and
from border officials, which enhanced “the visibility and influence enjoyed by
230
231
232
233
234
235
HCP 57, p. 15b, states that Dowager Empress Hsiao “is tired of wars.”
The Liao apprehension of another Sung expedition to recover the Yen-Yün region was an important
component of the 1004 invasion: HCP (1964) 57, p. 16a. For comments on the threat of T’ai-tsung’s
two expeditions to the Liao, see T’o-t’o et al., Liao-shih 83, p. 1305. For a comparison of the strength
of Sung and Liao, see Liao-shih 36, p. 433; 48, p. 828.
SS 273, p. 9329; HCP (1964) 44, pp. 14b–15a.
SS 277, pp. 9420–1. For the closing of the border markets in 991, see SS 186, p. 4562.
HCP (1964) 51, p. 19b.
HCP (1964) 54, p. 16b.
264
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
high-ranking generals in policy discussions.”236 The Bureau of Military Affairs
and the Secretariat-Chancellery were allowed joint discussion on these matters.237 Old strategies were adjusted, new commanders were appointed, and
Chen-tsung was prepared to lead a counterattack in person. From the autumn
of 1003 to late summer of 1004, in anticipation of Khitan invasions, the Sung
went on the highest alert.238
Sung preparedness paid off. At least one month before its start, the Khitan expedition was detected by Sung intelligence units. After conferring with
the Secretariat-Chancellery and the Bureau of Military Affairs, Chen-tsung
accepted the suggestion of Chief Councilor Pi Shih-an (938–1005) to lead
a counterattack in winter, looking forward to a victory that could end the
Liao incursions once and for all. Chen-tsung also ordered close coordination among these officials and sent additional rewards and provisions to the
front.239
No longer a mere episode of border warfare, the Liao invasion force, at the
risk of exposing its rear, penetrated rapidly and deeply into Ho-pei; easily
breaking through the first defensive line on the Sung frontier, the Liao overran
ten prefectures, but captured only two of the ten prefectural cites it attacked.240
Ahead lay no more than a thin deployment of Sung infantry covering a plain
stretching some hundred miles to K’ai-feng.241 Shocked by the Liao approach,
uncertain of its aims, and frightened by the inflow of distress messages (as many
as five on some days), most court officials urged the wavering Chen-tsung to
escape. However, he was eventually persuaded by Chief Councilor K’ou Chun
(961–1023) to personally lead the army at Shan-yüan.
On the battlefield, Liao troops began to meet strong resistance from the
Sung defense forces, headed by Chen-tsung himself, who had been convinced
by some court officials to take the lead. The invasion’s close approach to K’aifeng and the memory that during the Five Dynasties period a Liao army
had occupied K’ai-feng alarmed the Sung court. But in northern Ho-pei an
all-out Liao offensive had failed to capture the strategic strongholds of Tingchou (modern Ting county in Hopei). Then the Liao dowager empress Hsiao
beat the war drum herself to launch day-long attacks on another vital Sung
236
237
238
239
240
241
Labadie, “Rulers and soldiers,” pp. 66–7; see also pp. 62, 204.
HCP (1964) 54, pp. 17b–20a.
Wang Min-hsin, “Liao Sung Shan-yüan meng-yüeh ti-chieh ti pei-ching (hsia),” Chung-kuo shu-mu
chi-k’an 9 No. 4 (1975), pp. 54–7.
HCP (1964) 57, pp. 5b–6a; Wang, “Liao Sung Shan-yüan meng-yüeh ti-chieh ti pei-ching (hsia),”
pp. 57–9.
Wang, “Liao Sung Shan-yüan meng-yüeh ti-chieh ti pei-ching (hsia),” pp. 59–60.
HCP (1964) 57, pp. 13b–14b; 8, p. 7b; Wang Min-hsin, “Shan-yüan ti-meng chih chien-t’ao,” Shih-huo
yüeh-k’an 5 No. 3 (1975), pp. 6–7.
Map 12. Liao invasion of the Sung, 1004.
266
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
military stronghold, Ying-chou (modern Ho-chien in Hopei). She reportedly
lost thirty thousand troops within three weeks, again in vain.242 At about the
same time, Sung border garrisons took the offensive, some closing in on the
rear of the advancing Liao expedition. They succeeded in occasional ambushes,
while other garrisons took the offensive, crossing the frontier and scoring
minor victories against the Liao.243 Meanwhile, Wang Chi-chung’s “personal”
appeal for peace had reached Chen-tsung.
The role in the peace negotiations of Wang Chi-chung is controversial.244
It is certain that Wang revealed to the Liao dowager empress that he had
a close relationship with the Sung emperor. She then appointed him Tax
Commissioner and married him to a woman of her own clan.245 It is very
likely that Dowager Empress Hsiao recognized Wang’s potential usefulness in
initiating peace negotiations with the Sung court, and made use of him. In
any event, the Liao initiated the peace negotiations.246
Chen-tsung, for his part, was willing to buy off the Liao, but not to cede
the Kuan-nan area south of the mountain passes.247 In his second appeal to
the Sung court, Wang Chi-chung emphasized the importance of this area
to the Liao and requested that Chen-tsung send a negotiator first.248 But the
Sung envoy, Ts’ao Li-yung (?–1029), was already on his way when the Liao
again attacked Ying-chou, in an attempt to increase their bargaining power.
Shortly afterward, just as Chen-tsung was leading his army out to confront
the invaders, Dowager Empress Hsiao announced her willingness to negotiate
peace.249
The Liao’s growing anxiousness for a settlement was accelerated by the
accidental death of their leading general, a cousin of Dowager Empress Hsiao,
Hsiao T’a-lan (?–1004), who was struck by an arrow during a reconnaissance
mission.250 In contrast, Sung troop morale was greatly boosted by Chen-tsung’s
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
HCP (1964) 57, pp. 17a–b; 58, pp. 1b–3a, 5a.
HCP (1964) 57, pp. 17a–b; 58, pp. 1b–3a, 5a.
Chiang Fu-ts’ung asserts that Wang Chi-chung’s capture was planned by Chen-tsung and his advisors
as an important step toward peace negotiations; see Chiang Fu-ts’ung, “Sung Chen-tsung yü Shan-yüan
chih-meng (shang),” Ta-lu tsa-chih 22 No. 8 (1961), pp. 26–30; Chiang Fu-ts’ung, “Sung Chen-tsung
yü Shan-yüan chih-meng (hsü),” Ta-lu tsa-chih 22 No. 9 (1961), pp. 27–34; Chiang Fu-ts’ung, “Sung
Chen-tsung yü Shan-yüan chih-meng (mo),” Ta-lu tsa-chih 22 No. 10 (1961), pp. 32–6. But Wang
Min-hsin persuasively discounts this in his “Shan-yüan ti-meng chih chien-t’ao,” pp. 3–5, 8–9; see also
his “Liao Sung Shan-yüan meng-yüeh ti-chieh ti pei-ching (shang),” pp. 43–4.
HCP (1964) 57, p. 16a; T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 81, p. 284.
For arguments about which dynasty took the initiative for peace, see Akisada, “Sen-en no meiyaku to
sono shiteki igi (jō),” p. 19; Wang, “Shan-yüan ti-meng chih chien-t’ao,” pp. 2–5.
HCP (1964) 57, pp. 16a–b.
HCP (1964) 58, p. 5b.
T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 14, p. 160.
HCP (1964) 58, pp. 9b, 11b–12a.
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
267
appearance at the front.251 After two sessions of negotiations failed to reach an
accord on the issue of sovereignty over Kuan-nan, the Liao plundered a nearby
prefecture, but then showed signs of retreating. Chen-tsung, also tired of
fighting, prepared to return to K’ai-feng.252 In the third round of negotiations,
the Liao assertion that their main objective was the recovery of the Kuan-nan
area was again rejected. However, the Liao accepted the Sung offer of annual
payments. They stated their conditions through a confidential petition from
Wang Chi-chung directly to Chen-tsung. The conditions outlined in this
petition became the foundation of the so-called Treaty of Shan-yüan:
1. The establishment of friendly relations between the two states
2. Annual payments to the Liao of one hundred thousand taels of silver and
two hundred thousand bolts of silk
3. The demarcation of borders that would be mutually respected
4. The agreement that both sides would repatriate fugitives from justice
5. The agreement that neither side would disturb the farmland and crops
of the other
6. The agreement that neither side would construct new fortifications and
canals along the border
7. The pledge of a solemn oath whose contravention would bring about
religious sanctions253
The treaty was costly to the Sung, in territory and in long-term security.
Article 3 annulled Sung claims to the land and to jurisdiction over the Han
Chinese in the major part of the Yen-Yün region. It dampened all Sung hopes
of recovering this critically strategic region and precluded the basic military
activity required to do so. It also left a legacy of revanchivism at the Sung
court, which became politically divisive. As the reformer Fan Chung-yen (989–
1052) later exclaimed, “Yen and Yün are lost. This is the greatest insult
inflicted on China by the barbarians in a thousand years, but it has not been
avenged.”254 Article 4 of the treaty prohibited the Sung from accepting into
their service Liao officials, who had been deserting in increasing numbers,
bringing valuable skills and information with them.255 Article 6 undermined
251
252
253
254
255
The Liao shih ascribes the Liao acceptance of the 1005 peace treaty to the death of Hsiao T’a-lan; see
T’o-t’o et al., Liao shih 85, p. 1319. See also HCP (1964) 58, pp. 12b, 15a.
HCP (1964) 58, pp. 13a–14b, 15b. Tao, Two sons of heaven, p. 15, blames the conclusion of the “humiliating” treaty of 1005 on Chen-tsung’s weak leadership, which negated the military advantages of the
Sung.
HCP (1964) 58, pp. 15a–17b, 22a–23b; the translation is taken from Tao, “Barbarians or northerners,”
p. 68; Wang, “The rhetoric of a lesser empire,” p. 51.
Quoted from Tao, “Barbarians or northerners,” p. 79.
See Chiang, “Sung Chen-tsung yü Shan-yüan chih-meng (hsü),” pp. 30–1.
268
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
one of the Sung’s most effective means of defense against the Liao (and later
against the Jurchen cavalry) – the flooding of artificial swamps and waterways
that acted as moats. Except for the exchange of the Kuan-nan area in return
for the annual payments,256 the Liao received everything they wanted, thanks
to the mediation of Wang Chi-chung.
To the lives and economic activities of the people along the Sung northern
borders, Articles 1 and 5 restored peace and normality. It was estimated that
the annual payments amounted to only 1 or 2 percent of the Sung military
expenditures required during war times,257 and to merely 0.3 to 0.5 percent
of the total state expenditures.258 Moreover, these payments were easily offset
by the surpluses acquired from the seven new border markets that were established. On average, Sung official trade annually netted 400,000 to 500,000
strings of cash (one string nominally contained 1,000 cash) out of a total trade
profit of 800,000 strings, more than enough to recoup the costs of the silver
paid to the Liao.259 Enriched by the bargain struck in the treaty, the Liao used
the annual payments to subsidize the construction of their central capital, and
exported the silk in large quantities to Central Asia and to frontier peoples
such as the Tanguts, at a price three to four times higher than the Sung charged
in peacetime and forty times higher than the price during wartime, stimulating a cycle of multistate trade.260 Furthermore, to avoid future conflicts,
a buffer zone was established inside the border prefecture of Hsiung-chou
(modern Hsiung county, northern Hopei). The conditions of the buffer zone’s
neutrality were that its inhabitants would pay no taxes but would provide
labor service to both the Sung and the Liao, and that, being demilitarized, its
inhabitants would maintain neither troops nor local self-defense forces.261 To
both parties, the most important result of the treaty was a century of peace
bought at an acceptable price.
Though this was not stipulated in the treaty, the two parties also treated
each other nearly as diplomatic equals. This exceptional practice was expressed
in diplomacy by the use of a protocol of brotherly kinship between the two
rulers. Immediately after the conclusion of the treaty, Chen-tsung abolished all
place-names that included pejorative terms such as “caitiffs” or “barbarians.”
The Liao, in turn, refrained from calling the annual payments “tribute” in
256
257
258
259
260
261
See Tao, Two sons of heaven, p. 128 n. 12.
HCP (1964) 70, p. 16b; 150, p. 16a.
Wong Hon-chiu, “Government expenditures in Northern Sung China (960–1127)” (diss., University
of Pennsylvania, 1975), p. 158.
Akisada Jitsuzō [Tamura Jitsuzō], “Sen-en no meiyaku to sono shiteki igi (ge),” Shirin 20 No. 4 (1935),
pp. 175–205; Shiba, “Sung foreign trade,” p. 98. See also Wang, “Shan-yüan ti-meng chih chien-t’ao,”
pp. 9, 12 n. 12; Tao, Two sons of heaven, p. 16.
Shiba, “Sung foreign trade,” pp. 93, 99, 100; Tao, Two sons of heaven, p. 24.
Saeki Tomi, “Sōdai Yūshū ni okeru kanshōchi ryōyuchi ni tsuite,” Tōa jinbun gakuhō 1 No. 2 (1941),
pp. 127–56.
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
269
communications with the Sung, though using the term internally to please its
own people and vassals.262 The two dynasties officially addressed each other
as “the northern dynasty,” “the southern dynasty,” “the Great Liao,” and “the
Great Sung.” According to seniority of age rather than of status, Chen-tsung
called Liao Sheng-tsung his “younger brother” and Dowager Empress Hsiao
his “junior aunt.”263 Both states observed a mourning period for a deceased
emperor and made his name a national taboo.264 A special agency, the Office
of Diplomatic Correspondence (Wang-lai kuo-hsin so) in the Court of State
Ceremonial (Hung-lu ssu), was specially established to handle only diplomatic
exchanges with the Liao. Great attention was paid to the proper selection of
capable envoys, may of whom were famous men, several later becoming chief
councilors.265
The restoration of peace enabled Chen-tsung to reestablish the civilianoriented policy of “strong trunk and weak branches.” In 1000, the acting governor of K’ai-feng had already warned against the concentration of troops on
the border at the expense of the rear.266 Twice in 1002, Chen-tsung reminded
the court officials of the danger of delegating undue military power to prefectural officials.267 During the peace negotiations, even the chief councilor, K’ou
Chun, was suspected of using the war for self-aggrandizement, an allegation
that apparently made him so uneasy that he dropped his objections to the peace
treaty.268 As soon as the treaty was concluded, almost all militia in Ho-pei
were demobilized, and a great number of the imperial troops gathered there
were sent back to their home bases. Nearly four hundred military officers were
relieved of their posts, and fifty percent of the Ho-pei garrisons and thirty
percent of the border garrisons were stood down.269 Moreover, just as civilians
made up two-thirds of the top officials in the Bureau of Military Affairs,270
Chen-tsung also began the process of installing civil officials in regional military posts once reserved for soldiers, thereby increasing the predominance of
civilians in the lower levels of military administration and command.271
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
Tao, Two sons of heaven, p. 16.
Tao, Two sons of heaven, pp. 17–18, 107 (Appendix 3).
Tao, “Barbarians or northerners,” pp. 69–70; Tao, Two sons of heaven, pp. 18–20.
See Herbert Franke, Diplomatic missions of the Sung state, 960–1276 (Canberra, 1981), pp. 2–5; Franke,
“Sung embassies,” pp. 120, 122–4. See also chapters 4 and 5 of Ang, “Sung-Liao diplomacy in eleventhand twelfth-century China.”
HCP (1964) 46, pp. 15a–b.
HCP (1964) 52, p. 2b; 53, p. 2b; Liu, “Pei Sung ch’ien-ch’i huang-ch’üan fa-chan chih yen-chiu,”
p. 166.
SS 281, p. 9531.
HCP (1964) 59, pp. 1a, 2b, 3b, 5b, 6a.
Liang, Sung shu-mi-yüan chih-tu, p. 13. See also Labadie, “Rulers and soldiers,” p. 196; McGrath,
“Military and regional administration,” pp. 55–6.
Labadie, “Rulers and soldiers,” p. 204; McGrath, “Military and regional administration,” pp. 24, 32,
55–6, 301.
270
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
Overall, although the Liao were able to use the treaty to gain additional
advantages from the Sung (especially in 1042 and 1075), the pragmatic
approach to foreign relations shown by the Sung recognition of the Liao as
a legitimate empire and diplomatic counterpart makes the Treaty of Shanyüan an “epoch-making event” in Chinese history.272
Burnishing the imperial image with “documents from Heaven”
Only a year after the peace treaty with the Liao, K’ou Chun was dismissed as
chief councilor after Wang Ch’in-jo (962–1025), the head of the Bureau of
Military Affairs, maligned him to the emperor for negotiating a humiliating
treaty. Wang Ch’in-jo’s vilification of the Shan-yüan Treaty and its architect so
demoralized Chen-tsung that he had K’ou Chun cashiered.273 Having undermined the emperor’s confidence, Wang Ch’in-jo (like Chen-tsung, a follower
of Taoism) now sought to build it up again by encouraging the emperor to
perform the feng-shan sacrifices to Heaven and Earth, which would offset the
humiliation of Shan-yüan by “pacifying the Four Quarters and intimidating
the barbarians.”274 Before these sacrifices could be performed however, tradition decreed that Heaven had to provide auspicious omens as a sign of divine
approval of the sacrifices that signified the high point of dynastic success.
Because the appearance of such omens could not be counted on, Wang proposed to fabricate them, as the sage-rulers of antiquity had done when they
created the Yellow River chart (Ho-t’u) and the Lo River text (Lo-shu).275 Chentsung remained uncertain about the legitimacy of fabricated omens, but when
an eminent but unsuspecting classical scholar corroborated Wang’s interpretation, the emperor finally relented.276
272
273
274
275
276
Tao, Two sons of heaven, pp. 23–4. See also Franke, Diplomatic missions of the Sung state, p. 1; Ch’en et al.,
Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo 22, pp. 150–4, 156–9; Ang, “Sung-Liao diplomacy in eleventh- and twelfthcentury China,” pp. 83–91; Chin, Sung Liao Chin shih, pp. 35–7; Tao, “Barbarians or northerners,”
pp. 69, 71, 76.
HCP (1964) 57, pp. 14b–15a; 62, pp. 6a–7a. See also Wolfgang Franke, “Historical precedent or
accidental repetition of events? K’ou Chun in 1004 and Yu Ch’ien in 1449,” in Études Song: In memoriam
Étienne Balazs, ed. Françoise Aubin (Paris, 1976), pp. 200–1.
HCP (1964) 67, p. 10b. This goal is explained in Ssu-ma, Su-shui chi-wen 6, p. 62, and in the comments
appended to Chen-tsung’s annals in SS 8, p. 172. A full translation of the latter appears in Suzanne E.
Cahill, “Taoism at the Sung court: The Heavenly Text affair of 1008,” Bulletin of Sung-Yüan Studies 16
(1981), p. 36.
For an explanation of Ho-t’u and Lo-shu, see Richard Wilhelm, The I Ching or Book of Changes, 3rd ed.,
trans. Cary F. Baynes (1950; Princeton, N.J., 1977), pp. 309–10, 320.
HCP (1964) 67, pp. 10b–11a; Ch’eng Kuang-yü, “Shan-yüan chih-meng yü t’ien-shu (hsia),” Ta-lu
tsa-chih 22 No. 7 (1961), p. 21. For Chen-tsung’s devotion to Taoism, see Cahill, “Taoism at the Sung
court,” pp. 39–41. As Cahill explains, “To a person of Sung, a document purporting to be of divine
origin but made by human hands was not necessarily a forgery; . . . what matters is that the omen be
appropriate, accurate, and legitimate in religious terms. Far from tricking the emperor or advising him
to practice a cynical deception, Wang may in fact have been urging him to follow ancient usages.”
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
271
During the winter and spring of 1008, three Heavenly Texts “appeared”
at auspicious locations in the palace complex. The first one read, “The Chao
have received the mandate and brought it to glory with the Sung. It will
be handed down in perpetuity (heng) [or it could be understood as, ‘It has
been handed down to (Chao) Heng (the present emperor)’].”277 With this
reassurance of the legitimacy of the Sung state and the potency of his own rule,
Chen-tsung changed his reign title to Ta-chung hsiang-fu (Great Centrality
and Auspicious Talisman, 1008–16) and ordered a five-day bacchanal. This
was just a prelude to Chen-tsung’s performance of the most expensive, lavish,
ancient, and prestigious of all the imperial ceremonies, the twin sacrifices
to Heaven and Earth at Mount T’ai in Shantung (performed in 1008) and
followed by those to the Earth deity at the Fen River in Shansi (carried out in
1011).
Every effort was made to portray the rituals as signs of Chen-tsung’s imperial power and efficacy. Chief Councilor Wang Tan (957–1017), for example,
assured the emperor that “Heaven has given Your Majesty the divine talismans of the Grand Ultimate. One cycle is completed and another is about to
begin. There will be eternal peace for the multitude of men.” As one modern
historian points out, these words were intended “to glorify the emperor and
suggest that the dynasty is rejuvenated, a new cycle of history is beginning,
and the Mandate of Heaven is reaffirmed.”278
Chen-tsung’s devotion to Taoism, plainly visible in the Heavenly Texts
affair, was also clearly reflected in Chen-tsung’s paying a special visit to the
temple of Lao Tzu (the traditional founder of Taoism) in Po-chou in 1014,
and in the storage of the Heavenly Texts in the newest and greatest Taoist
temple in the capital. Most conspicuously, when the “earliest ancestor” of the
imperial clan appeared to Chen-tsung in a dream, claiming to be the bearer of
the Heavenly Texts, Chen-tsung rendered the name of his imagined ancestor
taboo and ordered that Taoist temples throughout the empire add a belvedere
(kuan) dedicated to this progenitor.279
Not everyone in the region was impressed by Chen-tsung’s attempt to
manufacture religious charisma. Shortly before the sacrifices on Mount T’ai in
1008, the Liao, in an attempt to test Chen-tsung’s resolve, requested allowances
beyond the annual payments. As a concession, thirty thousand taels of silver and
thirty thousand bolts of silk, amounting to one-fifth of the annual payments,
were “lent” to the Liao for the year, with no expectation of repayment.280
277
278
279
280
HCP (1964) 68, pp. 1a–2a. See also Ch’eng, “Shan-yüan chih-meng yü t’ien-shu (hsia),” p. 22. Translation adapted from Cahill, “Taoism at the Sung court,” pp. 26–7.
Cahill, “Taoism at the Sung court,” p. 38; Ch’en et al., Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo 22, p. 165.
Cahill, “Taoism at the Sung court,” p. 31.
SS 282, p. 9547.
272
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
Cognizant of this precedent, in 1010 the Tanguts – whom the Sung had bought
off four years earlier with military commissions and copious amounts of silver,
silk, cash, and tea – requested ten million additional bushels of grain for
famine relief. Although most officials suggested that the request be dismissed
as an attempt at blackmail, Wang Tan prudently purchased continued peace
by accepting the Tangut petition.281 Ritual claims notwithstanding, it was
obviously the combination of generous concessions and compliant diplomacy
that kept the foreign states at bay, not the religious charisma represented by
the Heavenly Texts.
Nor was Chen-tsung’s domestic audience uniformly impressed. The five
most prominent advocates of the Heavenly Texts affair – Wang Ch’in-jo, Ting
Wei (966–1037), Ch’en P’eng-nien (961–1017), Liu Ch’eng-kuei, and Lin
T’e – were ridiculed as the “Five Devils” by disbelieving contemporaries, and
some officials came out openly against the affair.282 “How could Heaven use
words? How could there possibly be a document?” taunted the edict attendant
Sun Shih (962–1033) in the first of six passionate remonstrations he submitted
between 1008 and 1019.283 In 1015, the minister of rites, Chang Yung (946–
1015), requested in a posthumously presented memorial that one of the Five
Devils be beheaded for deceiving the emperor.284 In 1017, Wang Tan, now
ill and close to death, confessed to his sons that he regretted his involvement
in the affair, which he considered the one mistake that had stained his life. In
contrition, he asked to be buried with his head shaved and clothed in the robes
of a Buddhist monk.285 For a brief time the emperor lost faith in the gush
of heavenly auspices, and in 1016 he forbade the presentation of auspicious
objects as tribute. The next year, however, he changed his mind and ordered
that further concealment of any reports of calamities and visitations would be
considered a crime.286
In 1016, a natural omen shook Chen-tsung’s dream of heavenly favor. A
plague of locusts struck the capital area. At first, Chen-tsung still believed that
his faith could minimize the calamity or even quicken the death of the locusts.
As proof that it could, some councilors presented heaps of dead locusts and
suggested a court celebration. Before the celebration could be held, swarms of
live locusts flew over the audience hall darkening the sky, making it obvious
281
282
283
284
285
286
SS 282, p. 9547; 485, pp. 13989–90. For another incident, see HCP (1964) 73, p. 20a.
See Ch’en et al., Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo 22, especially p. 170.
Hung Mai, Jung-chai sui-pi (1180–1202; Shanghai, 1978) san-pi, 7, pp. 493–5; Ch’en et al., Sung-shih
chi-shih pen-mo 22, pp. 163, 166–9, 171–2, 174–5; Cahill, “Taoism at the Sung court,” pp. 27, 29–30,
34–5.
HCP (1964) 85, p. 9a.
HCP (1964) 90, p. 12b; Cahill, “Taoism at the Sung court,” pp. 33–4.
Cahill, “Taoism at the Sung court,” pp. 33–4.
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
273
that both the emperor and his councilors were mistaken. From then on, Chentsung reportedly began to feel sick.287 In 1022 the Heavenly Texts were buried
with Chen-tsung, putting an end to the hoax. “Ah! How wise!” exclaimed the
compilers of the Sung dynastic history.288 In 1029, all but two small halls of
the greatest Taoist temple in which they had been housed were completely
destroyed in a mysterious fire.
Court politics and intrigue
Chen-tsung had good reasons for delegating more authority than T’ai-tsu or
T’ai-tsung. After the conclusion of the Shan-yüan Treaty, the Sung experienced
a period of peace and prosperity that required a less firm hand on the reins
of government. Despite the immense cost of the feng-shan sacrifices and of
maintaining Taoist establishments, as well as the payments to the Liao and
the Hsi Hsia, Chen-tsung’s reign enjoyed the greatest surplus of income over
expenditure of any period during the Northern Sung. Income was 150,850,100
strings of cash in 1021 – more than double that of 997 – and expenditures
were only 126,775,200 strings.289 But there was an ever-increasing array
of governmental affairs to be overseen, most of which would have seemed
routine in times of peace, but which were still burdensome to an emperor
preoccupied with such other matters as the Heavenly Texts affair.290 And
after half a century of unification, the bureaucracy had grown to an unwieldy
size.
As early as 999, Chen-tsung was receiving no fewer than one hundred
memorials per day. The varied counsel confused him, and the mutual accusations eventually annoyed him. In 1007, inundated with both regular and
sealed memorials, Chen-tsung ordered that an outline be attached to each
memorial to facilitate his selective reading. This did not guarantee the quality
of the memorials, and Chen-tsung continued to complain about the misrepresentation and trifling content found in some of them.291 Also, the frequency of
rotating audiences and deliberative meetings declined, depriving most lowerranking officials of the chance to express their opinions. Between 1004 and his
death in 1022, Chen-tsung issued only one general request for frank remonstrance, a sharp contrast to the three such requests he made in his first two years
287
288
289
290
291
Liu, “Pei Sung ch’ien-ch’i huang-ch’üan fa-chan chih yen-chiu,” pp. 202–3.
Worthy, “The founding of Sung China,” p. 54.
Wong, “Government expenditures in Northern Sung China,” pp. 161–2, table 25.
HCP (1964) 62, p. 6a: “After peace had been concluded with the Khitan, there was a dearth of
important matters at court.” For some administrative difficulties facing ordinary emperors, see Liu,
“An administrative cycle in Chinese history,” pp. 146–50.
Olsson, “The structure of power under the third emperor of Sung China,” pp. 67–8, 75, 149–50.
274
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
as emperor.292 In 1017, the Censorate was enlarged with six new posts and
the Remonstrance Bureau (Chien-yüan) was established. One of the duties of
its six remonstrators was to criticize proposals and policy decisions. Although
this was intended to give criticism greater weight at court, it actually circumscribed the formerly wide participation by officials in the remonstrance
process. For the right to speak on state affairs that all officials had enjoyed
before 1017 was now limited to a mere handful of “opinion officials.”293
Though the numbers of officials and the amount of state affairs requiring
decision increased, imperial audiences were held less and less frequently. After
1018, they were not held on days when banquets were given for departing
or returning officials. They were not held on state holidays after 1019, nor,
after 1020, on alternate days. Prior to this, Chen-tsung had already displayed
signs of lethargy. In a series of proclamations beginning in 1006, the emperor
reduced the number of officials who could attend imperial audiences and circumscribed the types of subjects to be memorialized. In 1010, he ordered the
Finance Commission to make secondary decisions independently or according
to precedents. In 1011, he ordered that officials should, in general, request
audiences only when they had important matters to discuss, and otherwise
make decisions themselves and report these to him.294 This willingness to
delegate imperial power was not necessarily bad, since a power structure too
strongly centered on the emperor might not have benefited the state after the
ratification of the Shan-yüan Treaty. To achieve peacetime goals, the bureaucratic leadership required more independent authority, more autonomy, and
a more hierarchical structure.295 However, this decentralization of executive
power increasingly brought with it conflicts of interests among bureaucratic
leaders.
Chen-tsung retained a very static political leadership at the highest levels;
in the fourteen years from 1005 to 1019, there were only nineteen holders of
the top offices in the Secretariat-Chancellery and the Bureau of Military Affairs.
Power was largely concentrated in the hands of the southerners Wang Ch’injo, Ting Wei, and Ch’en P’eng-nien – all of them members of the so-called
Five Devils.296 As a modern historian persuasively concludes, “Wang Ch’in-jo
and his friends, especially Ting Wei and Ch’en P’eng-nien, were concerned
292
293
294
295
296
See chapter 3 of Olsson, “The structure of power under the third emperor,” especially pp. 63–5, 75–8,
89.
HCP (1964) 89, pp. 4b–5a; Olsson, “The structure of power under the third emperor of Sung China,”
pp. 92–3.
See chapter 3 of Olsson, “The structure of power under the third emperor,” especially pp. 51–2, 56–60.
Olsson, “The structure of power under the third emperor of Sung China,” pp. 94–5.
This conclusion is based on the information in Hsü Tzu-ming, Sung tsai-fu pien-nien lu (early 13th c.;
Peking, 1986), pp. 100–57.
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
275
primarily with their own personal positions, and any views different from
their own, whether those of northerners or fellow southerners, were considered
a threat to their personal power and influence.”297 The stage was set for a
power struggle. The emperor was increasingly lethargic, some top officials were
unscrupulously self-aggrandizing, and bureaucratic power was concentrated in
the hands of a few officials long entrenched in the rival Secretariat-Chancellery
and Bureau of Military Affairs, each of whom was ready to encroach upon their
counterparts’ jurisdiction in order to enhance his own bureaucratic domain.
Of all his officials, Wang Tan was most trusted by Chen-tsung. “Wang Tan
is expert at handling important matters; he is a true chief councilor,” said the
emperor when Wang Tan alone found a solution to an impending army revolt
triggered by a commander’s tough policy of demobilization.298 Quite often,
even for decisions concerning the Bureau of Military Affairs and the Finance
Commission, Chen-tsung first consulted Wang Tan, whom he valued for his
political wisdom. Occupying the paramount post of chief councilor for twelve
years, Wang Tan was the most senior minister in the Secretariat-Chancellery.
The power and importance of the Secretariat-Chancellery was relatively greater
than that of the Bureau of Military Affairs during the long time of peace when
civil matters outweighed military concerns. This eminence notwithstanding,
Wang Tan was cautious at court, keeping a polite distance from subordinates,
refraining from open association with persons he sponsored for promotions,
assuming a low posture before his colleagues, and always deferring to the
imperial will, as in the Heavenly Texts affair.299
In 1016, upon discovering that Wang Tan had decided certain matters
without informing the emperor, the chief councilor’s disgruntled colleagues,
including Ch’en P’eng-nien, complained. They obtained no more than apologies from Wang. Surprised by their complaints, the emperor asked them
whether Wang Tan’s decisions had been fair. Receiving a unanimous yes, the
emperor revealed that, having found no selfishness in Wang after many years
of observation, he had given him plenipotentiary authority over minor matters
from the time of the sacrifices. Accepting his colleagues’ apologies, Wang Tan
explained that he felt it inappropriate to disclose this authorization on his
own, but promised further reliance on their advice in the future.300
Even with this imperial trust, Wang Tan could not save Chen-tsung from
the machinations of Wang Ch’in-jo, who blamed Wang Tan for obstructing
297
298
299
300
Olssen, “The structure of power under the third emperor of Sung China,” p. 182, see also pp. 151,
181–3, 196–8, 217–18.
HCP (1964) 86, p. 1b.
SS 282, pp. 9542–52; Olsson, “The structure of power under the third emperor of Sung China,” pp. 68,
142–4, 188–9, 198–207; Liu, “Pei Sung ch’ien-ch’i huang-ch’üan fa-chan chih yen-chiu,” p. 200.
HCP (1964) 88, pp. 1b–2a.
276
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
his own advancement to the post of chief councilor.301 Wang Ch’in-jo tried to
erode Wang Tan’s influence by removing Wang Tan’s close associates. The first
to go was Chao An-jen (958–1018), a discreet and able assisting councilor. In
1012, Wang Ch’in-jo answered the emperor that the most virtuous person at
court was Chao, because he had always tried to repay a former chief councilor for
his patronage. Alert to the hint of favoritism and unhappy with Chao An-jen’s
reticence during court audiences, the emperor dismissed him.302 To replace
Chao, Wang Tan consulted with Wang Ch’in-jo about recommending a poor
friend of his, Li Tsung-o (964–1012). After telling Wang Tan that he agreed
with his choice, Wang Ch’in-jo secretly told Chen-tsung that Li was heavily
indebted to Wang Tan, who looked forward to getting the official presents that
would be conferred upon Li on his appointment as a new councilor. This, Wang
Ch’in-jo insisted, was not the way to select worthy men for government office.
The following day, when Wang Tan mentioned Li, the emperor got angry and
instead accepted Wang Ch’in-jo’s recommendation of Ting Wei.303 In the same
year, the emperor also accepted the request of the Bureau of Military Affairs
that its monthly record, which previously had been sent to the SecretariatChancellery for compilation, should now be compiled independently and sent
directly to the Historiography Institute.304 Even though the institute was
under the jurisdiction of the chief councilors, by cutting out the SecretariatChancellery this at least structurally enhanced the autonomy of the Bureau of
Military Affairs.
In 1014, Wang Ch’in-jo was suspended for almost a year, largely as a result
of his domineering manner at the Bureau of Military Affairs. As an example of
his high-handedness, Wang Ch’in-jo often discussed only a select handful of
the memorials he had brought to the audience. When the audience ended,
despite his colleague Ma Chih-chieh’s strong objections, Wang alone would
make decisions on the undisclosed memorials, pretending that these decisions
had been made during the audience with the emperor’s assent. Enraged by
Wang’s conduct, Ma Chih-chieh often disagreed heatedly with Wang in the
audiences. This tactic finally backfired.
Chen-tsung, irked by an altercation between Wang Ch’in-jo and Ma Chihchieh, summoned Wang Tan to mediate, but Wang Ch’in-jo kept on protesting. After the audience adjourned, the emperor wanted to send Wang Ch’in-jo
and Ma Chih-chieh to the Censorate for trial, but he was dissuaded by Wang
Tan. The following day, Chen-tsung told Wang Tan that Wang Ch’in-jo and
301
302
303
304
SS 282, p. 9548.
HCP (1964) 78, pp. 15b–16b.
HCP (1964) 78, pp. 16b–17a.
HCP (1964) 78, p. 3b.
founding and consolidation of the sung dynasty
277
Ma Chih-chieh were to be dismissed on the charge of “discourteous wrangling.”
Wang Tan suggested instead that they first be admonished and dismissed only
if the admonition had no effect, lest a scandal harm the imperial image among
foreign states. The emperor agreed.305 Slightly over a month later, Wang Ch’injo and Ma Chih-chieh again deadlocked over meting out appropriate rewards
for a military commander. Extremely angry at their endless squabbling, and
discovering that the Bureau of Military Affairs had made a decision behind
his back, the emperor dismissed the two men and, upon Wang Tan’s recommendation, recalled Wang Ch’in-jo’s archrival, K’ou Chun.306 But K’ou Chun
proved equally domineering and was dismissed the next year; Wang Ch’in-jo
was reinstalled.307 There was no ultimate winner in this see-saw battle.
The death of Wang Tan in 1017 and the deteriorating health of Chentsung ushered in a period of intensified political struggle. Under the influence
of the new chief councilor, Wang Ch’in-jo, the emperor dismissed Assisting
Councilor Wang Tseng (978–1038) and permitted the resignation of another
assisting councilor, Chang Chih-pai (?–1028), who could no longer tolerate
Wang Ch’in-jo’s hostility.308 In 1019, however, Wang Ch’in-jo himself was
dismissed on charges of accepting bribes and of befriending a Taoist who
possessed forbidden books and claimed to have the power to summon heavenly troops (traditionally signs of treasonable intentions).309 Wang Ch’in-jo’s
replacement was K’ou Chun, who had earlier been persuaded by his son-in-law
to report to the court another Heavenly Text found in his jurisdiction, which
actually had been fabricated by a favorite military officer of K’ou’s.310
Chen-tsung’s mental state steadily deteriorated during the 1010s. His sixth
son and heir, Chao Chen (1010–63), was born to a palace attendant surnamed
Li. Chen-tsung’s wife, the empress Liu (969–1033), took over the rearing of
the son and kept his real mother, Lady Li, in obscurity, paving the way for
her own ascent to power as dowager empress and regent. Chou Huai-cheng
(?–1020) was much concerned with the growing influence of the empress,
now stepmother of the heir apparent. Strong-willed, able, and astute, Empress
Liu displayed a great interest in court politics, helping Chen-tsung manage
state affairs in the inner palace, and also having two of her close relatives
appointed commanders of the imperial army. From a humble family with no
political background at court, she had allied herself with Ting Wei and Hanlin academician Ch’ien Wei-yen (962–1034) by forming marriage relations.
305
306
307
308
309
310
SS 282, pp. 9548–9.
HCP (1964) 82, pp. 18b–19b.
HCP (1964) 84, pp. 11a–12b.
HCP (1964) 90, p. 10a; 92, p. 14b.
HCP (1964) 93, pp. 13a–b.
HCP (1964) 93, pp. 6b–7a; SS 466, p. 13615; HCP (1964) 93, p. 6b; 96, p. 6a.
278
lau nap-yin and huang k’uan-chung
Ch’ien Wei-yen’s younger sister was the wife of Empress Liu’s adopted older
brother, and Ch’ien’s daughter was the wife of Ting Wei’s son. When she was
made empress in 1012 at the age of forty-two, her humble background and
barrenness prompted opposition from some senior officials, including K’ou
Chun. Furthermore, some of the elite, mostly the southern scholar-officials,
objected to a female regency reminiscent of the ill-fated T’ang dynasty empress
Wu Tse-t’ien.311 Nonetheless, when Chen-tsung died in the second month of
1022 their objections were disregarded, and Empress Liu assumed power as
dowager empress and the dynasty’s first regent.
311
Chiba Hiroshi, “Sōdai no kōhi – Taiso, Taisō, Shinsō, Jinsō shichō,” in Aoyama Hakushi koki kinen Sōdai
shi ronsō, ed. Aoyama Hakushi Koki Kinen Sōdai-shi Ronsō Kankōkai (Tokyo, 1974), pp. 209–38.
CHAPTER 4
THE REIGNS OF JEN-TSUNG (1022–1063) AND
YING-TSUNG (1063–1067)
Michael McGrath
jen-tsung’s early reign: the regency of empress liu
(1022–1033)
Chao Chen, whose temple name was Sung Jen-tsung, was born 30 May 1010.
He reigned for just over forty-one years, longer than any other Sung emperor.1
His mother was named Lady Li, but Empress Liu (969–1033) claimed him as
her own in 1014 when he was three years old. Pure Consort Yang (Yang Shufei, 984–1036) was another lesser consort of Chen-tsung, and a close friend
of Empress Liu. Pure Consort Yang played an important role in raising and
watching over Jen-tsung. Jen-tsung did not learn his birth mother’s identity
until 1033, when the death of Dowager Empress Liu ended her eleven-year
regency.2
Empress Liu, a capable and ambitious woman of lowly origins from Szechwan who had been appointed Chen-tsung’s empress in 1012, developed the
skills she would need in her regency during the last years of her husband’s
reign. She capitalized on Chen-tsung’s increasing despondency and ill health
following the 1016 locust infestation that terminated the Heavenly Texts affair,
offering advice, reading memorials, and even deciding policy for the emperor.
The future Jen-tsung was designated heir apparent (t’ai-tzu) in 1018, and two
years later Chen-tsung instructed his senior ministers that so long as his son
remained a minor Empress Liu should be relied upon to make decisions with
their advice.3 The primary beneficiaries of that injunction were Empress Liu
1
2
3
Jen-tsung’s original name was Chao Shou-i but was changed to Chao Chen when he was appointed heir
apparent in 1018. He was Chen-tsung’s sixth and last son. Pi Yüan, Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien [hereafter
HTC (1957)] [Te-yü-t’ang tsang-pan 1801 ed.] (1792; Peking, 1958) 34, p. 759.
HTC (1957) 31, p. 698.
HTC (1957) 35, pp. 786–7. Liu Ching-chen, “Ts’ung huang-hou kan-cheng tao t’ai-hou she-cheng –
Pei Sung Chen-Jen chih chi nü-chu cheng-chih ch’üan-li shih-t’an,” in Kuo-chi Sung-shih yen-t’ao-hui
lun-wen-chi, ed. Kuo-chi Sung-shih yen-t’ao-hui (Taipei, 1988), p. 585. For a recent study of Empress Liu
as “the fourth ruler of the Song,” see John W. Chaffee, “The rise and regency of Empress Liu (969–1033),”
Journal of Sung-Yuan Studies 31 (2001), pp. 1–26.
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michael mcgrath
and the chief councilor, Ting Wei, who was relentlessly securing control over
the State Council, and who in the final month of 1020 secured the establishment of the future Jen-tsung as temporary regent on account of his father’s
incapacity, albeit under the strict control of Empress Liu.4 With Chen-tsung’s
death in the second month of 1022, and because Jen-tsung was still a child,
Empress Liu formally assumed the regent’s powers for herself, on the authority
of Chen-tsung’s testament, which the chief councilors drafted into a decree:
“The Heir Apparent assumes the throne, the Empress will be called Dowager
Empress (huang t’ai-hou), the Pure Consort Yang will be called Dowager Consort (huang t’ai-fei). All important matters of state will temporarily be decided
by the dowager empress.”5
Chen-tsung’s testamentary decree gave executive authority to the now dowager empress Liu, who attended the court hidden behind a screen. For the most
part, she ruled unobtrusively and exercised her power through her councilors.
Initially, her dominance did nothing to stop the competition for ministerial
authority swirling around her. Chief Councilor Ting Wei moved first to consolidate his hold on power, by demoting political rivals like Li Ti and K’ou
Chun and K’ou’s associates, and by collaborating with the eunuch Lei Yünkung (?–1022) to commandeer the reins of government.6 But Ting Wei’s
assignment as commissioner of the imperial tomb, responsible for the location
and construction of Chen-tsung’s tomb, gave Ting’s antagonist, Wang Tseng
(978–1038) – a senior minister who showed himself unusually concerned with
the young emperor’s welfare – an opportunity to undo both Ting Wei and Lei
Yün-kung.7 As codirector of construction for the tomb project, Lei Yün-kung
ordered a change in the tomb’s location. But this move threatened to inundate
the burial vault with water. Although Ting Wei tried to cover up for Lei,
other officials reported the fiasco to the dowager empress, who asked Wang
Tseng, along with the K’ai-feng prefect Lü I-chien (978–1044) and Han-lin
academician Lu Tsung-tao (966–1029), to investigate. As a result, Lei Yünkung was charged with unlawfully moving the site of Chen-tsung’s burial vault
and with stealing large quantities of silver, gold, pearls, and imperial burial
accoutrements. As punishment he was beaten to death, his family’s property
was expropriated, and his brother was banished to the region of Hunan.
4
5
6
7
Li T’ao, Hsü tzu-chih t’ung-chien ch’ang-pien [hereafter HCP (1979)] (1183; Peking, 1979–95) 96, pp. 2232–
3; HTC (1957) 35, p. 790; Yang Chung-liang, Tzu-chih t’ung-chien ch’ang-pien chi-shih pen-mo [hereafter
CPPM] (1253; Taipei, 1967) 27, pp. 805–6.
HCP (1979) 98, p. 2271. Liu, “Ts’ung huang-hou kan-cheng tao t’ai-hou she-cheng,” p. 587, emphasizes
that despite the existence of variant texts, this is the first instance where her governing role is legalized.
HTC (1957) 35, pp. 796–8; Liu, “Ts’ung huang-hou kan-cheng tao t’ai-hou she-cheng,” p. 589.
On Wang Tseng, see Tonami Mamoru, “Wang Tseng,” in Sung biographies, ed. Herbert Franke (Wiesbaden,
1976), vol. 3, pp. 1159–61.
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
281
Lei Yün-kung’s downfall provided Wang Tseng with the wedge he needed
to dislodge Ting Wei. In a private audience with Dowager Empress Liu, Wang
charged Ting Wei with conspiring with Lei Yün-kung in shifting the burial
vault to a geomantically forbidden location. Anger and outrage were added to
the dowager empress’s previous annoyance with Ting Wei for objecting to her
holding court without the young emperor in attendance. She demanded Ting
Wei’s execution. Although other senior ministers, including Feng Cheng and
Wang Tseng, were happy enough to see Ting fall, they persuaded Dowager
Empress Liu that dismissal, demotion, and public disgrace would be punishment enough. The dowager empress thereupon promoted Wang Tseng to
senior councilor, brought Lü I-chien and Lu Tsung-tao in as assistant councilors (ts’an-chih cheng-shih), and had Chief Councilor Feng Cheng replace Ting
Wei as commissioner of the Imperial Tomb.8 Although Ting Wei lived for
fifteen more years, his official career was over.
As of mid-1022, the dowager empress was no longer ensnared by Lei Yünkung and Ting Wei, but she also no longer had a Ting Wei to support her
ambitions. As the ranking minister, Feng Cheng longed to emulate Ting Wei,
but could not match his intelligence, learning, or cunning.9 Nor was Feng
Cheng as willing to allow the dowager empress as much latitude. Moreover,
Wang Tseng was strongly opposed to her participation in governance, and in
the seventh month of 1022 he attempted to restore the previous arrangement
for holding court: every five days and always in the presence of the young
Jen-tsung. Three times the dowager empress rejected Wang Tseng’s request
for the change, but when Wang submitted the request to the young emperor,
she gave in and approved it, realizing that if she resisted too much she might
provoke Wang Tseng and the others to push the young emperor to depose
her.10 Not until 1029, when Lu Tsung-tao had died and Wang Tseng was
dismissed, did she again show signs of any grander ambitions.
The dowager empress’s rule soon settled into a routine. She devoted great
care to the governance of the palace but left control of public policy to her
ministers, making few interventions and acting as a figurehead. The composition of the Council of State was stable for the next six years. Lü I-chien and
Lu Tsung-tao were the only assisting civil councilors, Ts’ao Li-yung (?–1029)
was commissioner of military affairs from 1018 until 1029, and Chang Shihhsün (964–1049) served as assistant commissioner of military affairs until
he was promoted to chief councilor in the spring of 1028.11 Chang Chih-po
8
9
10
11
HCP (1979) 98, pp. 2283–7; 35, pp. 800–2.
HTC (1957) 35, p. 803.
HTC (1957) 35, pp. 803–4; HCP (1979) 99, p. 2293; CPPM 27, p. 810.
Ch’ang Pi-te et al., eds., Sung-jen chuan-chi tzu-liao so-yin (Taipei, 1974–6), pp. 2345–6.
282
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(?–1028) served as assistant commissioner of military affairs and joint chief
councilor with Wang Tseng until Chang’s death in 1028.12 Feng Cheng was
dismissed in fall of 1023, and Wang Ch’in-jo (962–1025) was recalled as a
chief councilor.13 Chang Chi,14 one of Chen-tsung’s longest serving officials
and a favorite of Dowager Empress Liu, served as assistant commissioner and
commissioner of military affairs between 1025 and 1033. Yen Shu and Hsia
Sung (985–1051) also served as assistant commissioners of military affairs.15
This was a configuration that generally left the dowager empress hemmed in
by men of talent, probity, and traditional views about dynastic succession and
sovereignty. Nevertheless, her strength of character, the weight of the imperial testament, and Jen-tsung’s youth counterbalanced the efforts of these men
and others to convince her to withdraw from governing and to limit herself
to ceremonial matters. Even so, she exercised her power discreetly, and her
activities were largely confined to the dynastic, ceremonial, and familial: she
had her birthday declared a holiday (ch’ang-ning chieh), three generations of
her ancestors ennobled, and her father’s name declared taboo. She added more
eunuch officials, instituted an exchange of envoys between dowager empresses
of the Sung and of the Liao, and assumed some of the ceremonial trappings
usually reserved for emperors.16
The start of the new lunar year of 1023 was marked by the inauguration
of a new reign title – T’ien-sheng (Celestial Sageness, 1023–32).17 The nine
years of this reign period coincided with all but two years of Dowager Empress
Liu’s regency. During that time, as the dowager empress sought to maintain
her own power, the chief ministers tried to offset her influence by imbuing the
young emperor with Confucian learning and norms. The centerpoint of Jentsung’s education, in which the dowager empress took a close interest, was the
Imperial Seminar (ching-yen), where Sun Shih (962–1033),18 the head of the
Directorate of Education, and Academician Feng Yüan (975–1037)19 would
lecture to the emperor on the Confucian canonical texts and the Analects and
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Tonami Mamoru, “Chang Chih-po,” in Sung biographies, ed. Herbert Franke (Wiesbaden, 1976), vol. 1,
pp. 10–11; Ch’ang et al., Sung-jen chuan-chi tzu-liao so-yin, pp. 2390–1.
Yamauchi Masahiro, “Wang Ch’in-jo,” in Sung biographies, ed. Herbert Franke (Wiesbaden, 1976), vol. 3,
pp. 1105–9; Ch’ang et al., Sung-jen chuan-chi tzu-liao so-yin, pp. 350–1.
Ch’ang et al., Sung-jen chuan-chi tzu-liao so-yin, p. 2267. Originally his personal name was Min. HTC
(1957) 36, p. 830.
Ch’ang et al., Sung-jen chuan-chi tzu-liao so-yin, pp. 1807–8.
HCP (1979) 100, p. 2322; Ch’en Pang-chan et al., Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo (1605; Peking, 1977) 24,
p. 188; HCP (1979) 104, p. 2401.
James M. Hargett, “A chronology of the reigns and reign-periods of the Song dynasty (960–1279),”
Bulletin of Sung-Yüan Studies 19 (1987), p. 32.
Ch’ang et al., Sung-jen chuan-chi tzu-liao so-yin, pp. 1904–5.
Ch’ang et al., Sung-jen chuan-chi tzu-liao so-yin, pp. 2737–8.
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
283
on the histories.20 Initially the seminar was to have been held only on evennumbered days, but Wang Tseng insisted on rigorous daily lecturing and
reading of selected texts, some of them specifically written for Jen-tsung’s
instruction. Wang believed that it was essential for the young emperor to
have a close association with worthy scholars as his teachers. Sun Shih was so
strict that he would not start lecturing or reading until the emperor stopped
squirming in his throne, and when expounding history Sun always repeated
accounts of disorders and dynastic collapse. Jen-tsung was a studious and avid
learner, and was becoming an accomplished calligrapher. He was praised for
listening respectfully and attentively to his teachers.21
There were also more than enough current problems for Jen-tsung’s tutors
to lecture on, had they chosen to do so. Many of these problems concerned
finance, particularly how to pay for a rash of new expenses. Of these, one
of the most pressing was repair of the breach in the long-neglected Yellow
River dikes at Hua-chou2, just north of K’ai-feng, that was caused in 1026 by
torrential rains. These dikes had collapsed previously in 1018. The new breach
had caused widespread flooding throughout the capital and in the floodplain
to the east. In K’ai-feng, soldiers were set to work reinforcing the dike walls.
Officials were also sent out to coordinate relief efforts in the southern portion of
the flood area. By late spring, corvée laborers were drafted from the eastern and
western circuits of Ching-tung, Ho-pei, Shan-hsi, and Huai-nan to transport
fascines of straw and sticks to fill in the break at Hua-chou2. During the
summer Jen-tsung forgave all outstanding arrears of taxes as part of the grand
act of grace (ta-she) promulgated on his accession to the throne. The timing
suggests his action was occasioned by the flooding. Nevertheless, forgiving
all back taxes on the occasion of a grand act of grace became a precedent.22
The breach was not fully repaired until the tenth month of 1027, through
the efforts of 38,000 corvée laborers and 21,000 soldiers, and expenditures of
500,000 strings of cash.23
20
21
22
23
See Robert M. Hartwell, “Historical analogism, public policy, and social science in eleventh- and twelfthcentury China,” American Historical Review 76 No. 3 (1971), pp. 690–727, for an account of its significance. For example, see Wang Tseng’s emphasis on historical guidance, HTC (1957) 37, p. 834 (May
1026), or Jen-tsung’s historical consciousness, HCP (1979) 107, p. 2504 (May 1029).
CPPM 28, p. 849.
HTC (1957) 36, p. 815. Jen-tsung subsequently promulgated grand acts of grace in 1024, 1029, 1032
(twice), 1033 (twice), 1034, 1045, and 1056. Certainly the practice of forgiving back taxes on these
occasions diminished imperial income by some amount, yet its overall effect was probably negligible.
T’o-t’o et al., eds., Sung shih [hereafter SS] (1345; Peking, 1977) 9, pp. 183, 184; and SS 91 and 92, which
detail the flooding of the Yellow River and the various attempts to solve this perennial problem. See also
Klaus Flessel, Der Huang-ho und die historische Hydrotechnik in China: Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung
der Nödlichen-Sung-Zeit und mit einem Ausblick auf den vergleichbaren Wasserbau in Europa (Tübingen,
1974).
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The recent funeral expenses for Chen-tsung, although not borne by the
people directly, merely emphasized the sense of a straitened fisc, attributed
to a combination of Chen-tsung’s profligacy, the growth of the army and
officialdom, the burgeoning numbers of Buddhist and Taoist clergy, and the
peace payments to the Liao. Yü Hsien-ch’ing, a Finance Commission official,
observed that the tax burden was becoming noticeably heavier, especially in
the central circuits along the Huai and Yangtze rivers.24 Following the request
of Finance Commissioner Li Tzu (d. 1036),25 an ad hoc agency, the Chi-chih ssu,
was established under the direction of Chang Shih-hsün, Lü I-chien, and Lu
Tsung-tao to curb excessive expenditures, to examine income and expenditure,
and in particular to increase revenues from the government’s tea monopoly.
Tea, like salt, was used by the government in place of cash to pay merchants
for shipments of grain to the northern frontier. Beginning in the 980s the government employed the so-called provisioning ( ju-chung) method of exchange,
whereby merchants who delivered grain to staging areas in the northern circuits encompassed by modern Shensi, Shansi, and Hopei provinces were paid
with exchange vouchers (chiao-yin) that could be redeemed in the capital for
money, or in the official monopoly markets of the southeast for government
tea. But the linkage of tea to frontier provisioning tended to devalue the worth
of government tea stocks, while the costs of maintaining centralized monopoly
markets grew faster than did overall revenues. To enhance the value of government tea, the 1023 committee recommended severing tea’s connection to the
frontier, while also requiring tea merchants to collect their tea not at high-cost
government warehouses, but in the local tea markets. There they would be
given a certificate of verification – the so-called t’ieh-she certificate – that gave
the reform its name. Advocates of the measure predicted that this decentralization of tea sales would increase government revenues and that the t’ieh-she
certificate would prevent illegal tea sales.26
Although the t’ieh-she reform reduced cash expenditures for the government, it was resisted by merchants whose profits were cut, and it was soon
rescinded as unworkable. In late 1025, Sun Shih and others pointed out that
the thirteen tea plantations had an unsold accumulation of 6,130,000 catties
of tea, and recommended a return to the old system of government purchase
of tea combined with merchant purchase of tea certificates. This remained
the usual procedure until the tea monopoly was abolished in 1059. In early
24
25
26
HCP (1979) 100, p. 2311.
Ch’ang et al., Sung-jen chuan-chi tzu-liao so-yin, p. 913.
There is a substantial literature in Chinese and Japanese on the Northern Sung tea reforms. A good
place to start is Hua Shan, “Ts’ung ch’a-yeh ching-chi k’an Sung-tai she-hui,” in his Sung-shih lun-chi
(Chi-nan, 1982), pp. 55–111.
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
285
1026 the principal officers of the tea and salt monopolies were fined various
amounts. Two Finance Commission accountants were impeached for falsifying
the income generated so as to garner performance bonuses for themselves and
were sent to Sha-men Island. Chang Shih-hsün, Lü I-chien, and Lu Tsung-tao
were required to justify their behavior, and even though Lü strenuously argued
that despite accounting irregularities the reform itself had been a success, all
three men were fined for failures in their oversight of the monopoly reforms.27
Tea policy was not the only sphere that saw reforms begun and aborted
during Dowager Empress Liu’s regency. In personnel management, a shortlived change was attempted in the way officials’ salaries were augmented to
encourage honesty. In 1028 the old system, in which the income from government lands was used to provide supplementary allowances that varied with
the wealth of the individual prefectures, was replaced by a system of uniform
allowances distributed by the central government. Despite the equity of this
new approach, in 1031 it was discontinued as administratively unworkable in
favor of simply assigning officials to rich and poor prefectures in alternation.28
Policy officials had somewhat better success persuading Jen-tsung to authorize a new edition of the imperial orders, which the Han-lin academicians
Hsia Sung and Ts’ai Ch’i and the drafter Ch’eng Lin were assigned to produce in 1026.29 In twelve years, the number of imperial decrees had grown to
6,783. Jen-tsung had expressed his reluctance to change anything, but Wang
Tseng assured him that flatterers had deceived him, mentioning the revision
of T’ai-tsung’s decrees carried out under Chen-tsung in which only ten or
twenty percent of the original number were retained. Wang emphasized that
the recension was done for the good of the people and that each decree would
be examined carefully before discarding or retaining it. A month later comments were solicited concerning the value of any imperial decree. Six months
later, the less learned but more politically and bureaucratically adept Lü Ichien was put in charge. The project was not completed until late in 1029.
Every prefectural administrator was instructed to read the new compilation
and offer comments. If after a year no more changes were found necessary, the
new edition was to be printed and distributed. Even so, the T’ien-sheng era
recension was not implemented as law of the land until the spring of 1032.
Overall, it was politics rather than policy that dominated the court during
Dowager Empress Liu’s regency, particularly the political wrangling between
27
28
29
HCP (1979) 104, pp. 2403–4.
HCP (1979) 108, p. 2520; 110, pp. 2554, 2557; Hsü Sung et al., Sung hui-yao chi-kao (1809, 1936;
Taipei, 1964) chih-kuan 5, pp. 5–7.
HCP (1979) 104, p. 2423; CPPM 32, pp. 989–91; SS 9, p. 183; see also Robert M. Hartwell, “Financial
expertise, examinations, and the formation of economic policy in Northern Sung China,” Journal of Asian
Studies 30 No. 2 (1971), p. 295.
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michael mcgrath
senior ministers and the dowager empress herself. In the second month of 1029,
Lu Tsung-tao, one of the regent’s staunchest opponents, died after seven years’
service in the State Council.30 On several occasions Lu had asked Dowager
Empress Liu to relinquish her rule to Jen-tsung. Once, when the dowager
empress asked the court about Empress Wu Tse-t’ien of the T’ang dynasty, no
one was willing to comment except Lu Tsung-tao. By characterizing Wu Tset’ien as a criminal who almost brought the T’ang dynasty down, Lu undermined
the dowager empress’s attempt to use Wu Tse-t’ien as a precedent for her own
ambitions. On another occasion, following the submission of a memorial by
a low-ranking sycophant requesting that the dowager empress establish seven
ancestral temples for the Liu clan, Lu Tsung-tao commented that if the Liu clan
had seven temples (a practice reserved for the imperial clan), what would be
left for the ruling Chao clan? Lu thereby deftly blocked the dowager empress’s
attempt to secure an imperial prerogative. Once, when she and Jen-tsung were
to visit the Tz’u-hsiao Temple, Dowager Empress Liu wanted her carriage to
precede Jen-tsung’s. When Lu Tsung-tao instructed her that women are subject
to the “three obediences” (san-ts’ung) – obedience to father, to husband, and to
son – she was obliged to order her carriage to follow Jen-tsung’s. Following this
particularly annoying and embarrassing incident, Lu was given the nickname
“Fish-head Minister,” as a pun on the Chinese character for his surname, Lu,
and a reference to one who gives advice that sticks in one’s throat like a fish
bone. However, it seems that Jen-tsung appreciated Lu’s efforts, for at the end
of Lu’s life, as his illness intensified, Jen-tsung visited Lu and gave him three
thousand ounces of silver. Court was suspended for a day after Lu’s death; and
even Dowager Empress Liu attended the funeral.
After Lu Tsung-tao’s death, other officials rallied to check the dowager
empress’s quest for power. During a heavy thunderstorm in the summer of
1029, the Yü-ch’ing chao-ying Palace was struck by lightning and all but a
few buildings burned to the ground. The next day one of the newly appointed
assistant commissioners of military affairs, Fan Yung, suspecting that Dowager Empress Liu intended to have the palace complex rebuilt, said that the
construction of the palace complex had sapped the empire’s strength and that
because the destruction of the Yü-ch’ing chao-ying Palace was not a human
act, to rebuild it would contravene Heaven’s warning.31 Lü I-chien and Wang
Tseng also opposed rebuilding. They crafted arguments based upon the Confucian textual tradition, quoting from the Hung-fan chapter of the Book of documents (Shu-ching) to support their opposition. Wang Shu, the highest-ranking
censor, also opposed rebuilding. Dowager Empress Liu was silent in the face of
30
31
HCP (1979) 107, p. 2494.
HCP (1979) 108, p. 2515.
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
287
this strong opposition to rebuilding the palace complex. Wang Tseng, as the
custodian of the Yü-ch’ing chao-ying Palace, had to take responsibility for
the destruction of the palace, and this provided Dowager Empress Liu with
the opportunity to remove the last of Chen-tsung’s senior ministers from office.
Wang Tseng was widely esteemed for his honesty and fairness. While he
was still living, people even set up shrines containing his portrait. Jen-tsung
clearly held him in high regard, and in 1035, three years before he died, Wang
Tseng was returned to service as a chief councilor. In the early 1050s, Jentsung wrote the calligraphy for the stone tablet for Wang Tseng’s tomb, and
years later, during Ying-tsung’s reign (1063–7), Wang Tseng was enshrined
in Jen-tsung’s temple.
In the fall of 1029, Lü I-chien was confirmed as the new senior councilor,
replacing Wang Tseng. As had now become customary on the winter solstice,
Jen-tsung led his officials to wish Dowager Empress Liu a long life. This time,
the fast-rising Fan Chung-yen (989–1052),32 now a subeditor in the Imperial
Archives, had the temerity to point out that there was no precedent for any
ritual in which the emperor faced north, that such behavior diminished the
imperial office, and that it should certainly not become a precedent for the
future. The memorial was delivered but not answered. Fan’s sponsor, Yen Shu,
was disturbed by Fan’s apparent glory hunting, but Fan Chung-yen replied
that he was unaware that loyal criticism would make Yen Shu culpable. In the
spring of 1030, Fan submitted a memorial asking Dowager Empress Liu to
hand the government over to Jen-tsung. This memorial also went unanswered.
Soon afterward Fan Chung-yen requested assignment out of the capital, and
he was sent as vice-prefect (t’ung-p’an) to Ho-chung fu (Shan-hsi, Yung-hsingchün circuit).
That the emperor would face north – an act symbolizing subordination –
was an invitation for other irregularities, including the deliberate withholding
of memorials from imperial scrutiny. Such violations had not yet occurred in
the Sung.33 Over the next three years, Sung Shou, Liu Sui, Teng Tsung-liang,
Liu Yüeh, Lin Hsien-k’o, and Sun Tsu-te, concerned about the disorder that
her regency was causing, memorialized the throne asking Dowager Empress
Liu to step down.
32
33
See Liu Tzu-chien (James T. C. Liu), “Fan Chung-yen,” in Sung biographies, ed. Herbert Franke
(Wiesbaden, 1976), vol. 1, pp. 321–30; Liu Tzu-chien (James T. C. Liu), “An early Sung reformer:
Fan Chung-yen,” in Chinese thought and institutions, ed. John K. Fairbank (Chicago, 1957), pp. 105–31;
Denis C. Twitchett, “The Fan clan’s charitable estate, 1050–1760,” in Confucianism in action, ed. David
S. Nivison and Arthur F. Wright (Stanford, Calif., 1959), pp. 97–133; Ting Ch’uan-ching, A compilation
of anecdotes of Sung personalities, ed. and trans. Chu Djang and Jane C. Djang (Taipei, 1989), pp. 310–21.
Karl F. Olsson, “The structure of power under the third emperor of Sung China: The shifting balance
after the peace of Shan-yüan” (diss., University of Chicago, 1974), p. 69.
288
michael mcgrath
Sung-Liao relations remained stable and peaceful during the early part
of Jen-tsung’s reign, until 1041 when the war between Sung and Hsi Hsia
threatened to involve the Liao.34 In mid-1031, Emperor Liao Sheng-tsung
died after fifty years of rule and was succeeded by his son, Tsung-chen, later
known as Liao Hsing-tsung (r. 1031–55). As a display of respect, the Sung
court was suspended for seven days and the playing of music was also forbidden for seven days in the Ho-pei and Ho-tung circuits that neighbored
Liao.35 By a curious coincidence, the new Liao emperor was controlled by
the powerful dowager empress Ch’in-ai (r. 1032–9), who was formally recognized by Dowager Empress Liu. Even as Dowager Empress Liu reached out
to a sister female regent she was extending her perogatives into interstate
relations, a realm usually reserved for sovereigns. She was also encroaching
on the emperor’s perogatives in other ways. In the summer of 1031, Han-lin
Academician Sung Shou and two commissioners of the Palace Audience Gate
of the West submitted a newly edited Compendium of rituals and paraphernalia
of the Dowager Empress (Huang-t’ai-hou i-chih) that regularized practices Wang
Tseng had opposed during his term as chief councilor.36 In the absence of a
Wang Tseng or a Lu Tsung-tao the dowager empress supported her favorites
more openly, and late in the year had Sung Shou dismissed for reminding her of
the original limits of Chen-tsung’s testamentary orders. Those orders allowed
the regent to decide on major policy and promotions, but these meetings
were to be held in one of the smaller pavilions with very few officials present.
Sung Shou proposed that Jen-tsung hold a separate court where he might rule
on less important matters. Sung Shou’s advocacy forced the dowager empress
to approve of several much-needed reforms, including giving policy critics
(chien-kuan) their own separate headquarters and an enhanced status.37 The
dowager empress retaliated by forcing the dismissal of three censors and a
censorial staff officer for giving preferment to more than eighty persons on the
death of a court favorite, Liu Ts’ung-te.38 Most conspicuously, shortly before
her death in the spring of 1033, the dowager empress held the imperial clan
34
35
36
37
38
The leading authority on Sung-Liao relations is Tao Jing-shen. Consult Tao Jing-shen (T’ao Chin-sheng),
Two sons of heaven: Studies in Sung-Liao relations (Tucson, Ariz.,1988), pp. 53–67; Tao Jing-shen (T’ao
Chin-sheng), “Yü Ching and Sung policies towards Liao and Hsia, 1042–1044,” Journal of Asian History
6 No. 2 (1972), pp. 114–22; and Tao Jing-shen (T’ao Chin-sheng) and Wang Min-hsin, eds., Li T’ao
Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien ch’ang-p’ien Sung Liao kuan-hsi shih-liao chi-lu (Taipei, 1974). See also Melvin
Thlick-Len Ang, “Sung-Liao diplomacy in eleventh- and twelfth-century China: A study of the social
and political determinants of foreign policy” (diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1983).
HCP (1979) 110, pp. 2559–63; Karl A. Wittfogel and Feng Chia-sheng, History of Chinese society, Liao
(907–1125) (Philadelphia, 1949), p. 588.
HCP (1979) 110, p. 2562.
HCP (1979) 110, pp. 2564, 2570.
HCP (1979) 110, pp. 2571, 2576; 111, pp. 2591–2; 112, p. 2604.
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
289
sacrifice in the Chao clan temple wearing an emperor’s ritual robes. Her two
assistant officiants were Dowager Empress Yang and Empress Kuo. Only the
T’ang empress Wu Tse-t’ien had ever worn the ritual clothing of an emperor.39
Although Dowager Empress Liu was fascinated with the life of Wu Tse-t’ien,
she had no ambitions to overthrow her own son and seize the throne. When
Ch’eng Lin (988–1056) presented her with a painting entitled Empress Wu
Serves as Regent,40 she threw it to the ground, saying that she could never do
what Empress Wu Tse-t’ien had done.41
Despite Dowager Empress Liu’s ascendancy, her position was not secure.
Only a year earlier, in 1032, Jen-tsung’s biological mother, the silent Lady
Li, had died.42 Dowager Empress Liu wished to keep her passing as quiet as
possible, since Jen-tsung still did not realize that the dowager empress was
not his biological mother. And although Lü I-chien’s intercession gained Lady
Li a proper burial, Jen-tsung remained ignorant of his real mother’s identity
until the third month of 1033, when the dowager empress Liu died, garbed
in imperial robes.43 Aged twenty-three, Jen-tsung was at last in a position to
rule on his own behalf.
jen-tsung and lü i-chien’s ministry (1033–1043)
With Dowager Empress Liu’s death, the story of Jen-tsung’s birth mother
finally surfaced. Jen-tsung probably learned of his biological mother from his
paternal uncle, Chao Yüan-yen, Prince of Ching.44 For days Jen-tsung wept
for the mother who had been hidden from him. Recovering somewhat, he had
Lady Li posthumously promoted to dowager empress and ordered that she be
buried with Chen-tsung. To put his mind at rest, Jen-tsung sent his maternal
uncle, Li Yung-ho, to examine the corpse to see if she had died naturally and to
verify that she had been given proper honors. When Li Yung-ho confirmed that
all was as it should be, the surviving relatives of Dowager Empress Liu were
treated generously, confirming the wisdom of Lü I-chien’s advice to Dowager
Empress Liu to bury Lady Li as if she were an empress.
Dowager Empress Liu had left instructions that her old friend, Dowager
Consort Yang, should be appointed dowager empress and regent. Jen-tsung
did not object to the dowager empress’s wishes, and Lü I-chien seemed content
to prolong a weak imperial office managed by a strong chief councilor. But the
39
40
41
42
43
44
HCP (1979) 112, p. 2605.
Ch’ang et al., Sung-jen chuan-chi tzu-liao so-yin, pp. 3011–102.
Ch’en et al., Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo 24, p. 190.
HCP (1979) 111, pp. 2577, 2579.
HCP (1979) 112, pp. 2609–13.
HTC (1957) 39, p. 890; HCP (1979) 112, p. 2610.
290
michael mcgrath
senior censor, Ts’ai Ch’i, confronted the councilors of state and objected to the
new regency, persuading them that the emperor was now of age and should
begin to rule in his own right. The decree based on the Dowager Empress Liu’s
dying testament was quietly suppressed.
Jen-tsung began his personal rule in the spring of 1033. His first act was to
award a prestige title to Lin Hsien-k’o for having asked Dowager Empress Liu
to return the government to Jen-tsung. Over the next two years he honored
eighteen officials for having challenged Dowager Empress Liu to relinquish
her regency in favor of the young emperor.45 In the first month of 1035, he
publicly rewarded more than one hundred and forty men who had served him
while he was heir apparent and during the regency.46 Jen-tsung’s appreciation
of the loyalty shown him extended to his generous posthumous award of high
titular office – generally reserved for imperial princes – to K’ou Chun, one of
his earliest supporters. Some of the men who supported Jen-tsung included Fan
Chung-yen and Sung Shou, whom he recalled within a week. He dismissed
all senior officials closely associated with Dowager Empress Liu – the same
ones who had been willing to allow another regency – including Lü I-chien,
Chang Chi, Hsia Sung, Ch’en Yao-tso, Fan Yung, Chao Chen2, and Yen Shu.
The new Council of State consisted of Chang Shih-hsün, Li Ti, Wang Sui,
Sung Shou, Li Tzu, and Wang Te-yung. This was Jen-tsung’s first opportunity
to act relatively unobstructed. He had moved decisively to rid the court of
Dowager Empress Liu’s followers and the most annoying sycophants. He also
dismissed the powerful eunuchs Chang Te-ming and Lo Ch’ung-hsün, as well
as others, and he eliminated the extra eunuch positions Dowager Empress Liu
had created.47
But any hope of realizing a new vision of government soon foundered.
Jen-tsung’s lack of forcefulness and the inertia of an entrenched bureaucracy
made significant change extremely difficult.48 Although Jen-tsung admired
the renewed Confucian orientation of the senior bureaucrats, he was not resolute enough to force this agenda on the careerists, the conventional, and
the powerful. He seemed to prefer strong chief councilors, and he greatly
expanded the number of scholarly offices and policy critics. He encouraged
both centralization and criticism of the conventional ways of running the
empire. In many instances these tendencies stymied rather than promoted
change.
45
46
47
48
HTC (1957) 39, pp. 891, 893, 897, 899, 901, 906.
HCP (1979) 116, p. 2717.
Liu, “Ts’ung huang-hou kan-cheng tao t’ai-hou she-cheng,” pp. 593–5, citing Jen-tsung’s comment
that he had kept note of who was upright and who was not. See Wang Ch’eng, Tung-tu shih-lüeh (1186;
Taipei, 1967) 56, p. 829.
HTC (1957) 39, p. 891.
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
291
By the summer of 1033, his stepmother’s regency was behind him. Fu Pi
convinced Jen-tsung to burn all the paraphernalia of her regency. Jen-tsung also
removed the official taboo against using the characters in the name of Dowager
Empress Liu’s father. Nonetheless, Fan Chung-yen reminded Jen-tsung that
the dowager empress had acted with the authorization of his father, Chentsung. Dowager Empress Liu had been keenly aware of Jen-tsung’s ambivalence
toward power, and her attempt to pass the regency on to Pure Consort Yang,
who had helped raise Jen-tsung, reflected a possibly genuine belief that Jentsung was too ambivalent to rule effectively.49
Jen-tsung was also a sentimental man and was especially assiduous in
expressing his filial duties. In the fall of 1033 the Feng-tz’u Temple was completed. He visited the coffin of his mother three times that season. In the late
fall of that year, Dowager Empresses Liu and Li were interred at Chen-tsung’s
imperial tomb site. Shortly afterward, Jen-tsung made offerings to their spirit
tablets in the Feng-tz’u Temple. Some three hundred thousand strings of cash
were spent in the construction of their tombs, paid for by a grant from the
Palace Treasury (Nei-tsang k’u). Indeed, that fall the Palace Treasury disbursed
one million strings to the Finance Commission to help cover the expenses of
gifts given during the last Ritual Plowing – the agricultural rite in which
the emperor reaffirmed his link with the earth and the seasons by plowing
and thereby beginning the new growing season. Jen-tsung said to chief councilor Chang Shih-hsün that since there was no fundamental difference between
state and imperial funds he ought to help with expenses. Chang Shih-hsün
responded that this was not so, since officials had not stopped “overfishing”
the people.50
Despite his desire for fiscal discipline and his avowed reluctance to assist
Jen-tsung in overspending, Chang Shih-hsün’s still had to contend with the
political and financial costs of Jen-tsung’s spending. In the summer of 1033
drought and locusts in the capital region and throughout the north, and in
the Huai and Yangtze river valleys, had become so serious that pacification
officials had been sent out to deal with the refugees and starving commoners.51
Various remedies were attempted, including tax remissions and widespread
soup kitchens, but to little avail.52 Fan Chung-yen blamed the crisis on unrestrained imperial spending and urged the emperor to make specific tax and
corvée reductions in the appropriate districts, to reduce the excessive number of troops and officials, to curtail construction, and to limit spending in
49
50
51
52
HTC (1957) 41, p. 972.
HCP (1979) 113, p. 2634.
HCP (1979) 113, p. 2647.
HCP (1979) 114, p. 2661.
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michael mcgrath
the capital district – actions that would increase the availability of grain in
the famine-stricken regions of the Huai and Yangtze.53 Jen-tsung complied,
but he also settled a score with Chang Shih-hsün – who had previously abandoned an imperial ceremony for Dowager Empress Liu to go drinking at the
home of his Bureau of Military Affairs counterpart Yang Ch’ung-hsün – by
blaming Chang for failing to alleviate the effects of drought and famine. As a
result, Jen-tsung cashiered both Chang Shih-hsün and Yang Ch’ung-hsün in
the tenth month of 1033, replacing Chang as chief councilor with Lü I-chien,
whose cooperation and effectiveness Jen-tsung had begun to miss, while Yang
Ch’ung-hsün was replaced as military affairs director by Wang Shu.54
Once Lü I-chien was back in high office, Jen-tsung came to rely on him
almost completely to run the government. But Jen-tsung’s long-standing
problems with his consorts drew Lü into the affairs of the inner quarters.
Late in 1033, Jen-tsung symbolically severed his subordination to the late
Dowager Empress Liu by posthumously appointing his beloved Lady Chang
as empress.55 Nine years earlier, when Jen-tsung was fourteen, Lady Chang
had been his favorite, but Empress Liu had instead chosen Lady Kuo to be
Jen-tsung’s empress. Empress Kuo was a protégé of Dowager Empress Liu and
had assisted her earlier in 1033 at the ceremony where the Dowager Empress
Liu had worn the robes of an emperor. Almost as soon as Dowager Empress
Liu died, Jen-tsung entered into intense sexual liaisons with Lady Shang and
Lady Yang that lasted for about a year and a half. By year’s end, he had dismissed Empress Kuo, committing her to live out her life as a Taoist nun.56
The pretext for this dismissal was that during an argument with Lady Shang,
Empress Kuo, consumed with jealousy, had accidentally scratched Jen-tsung’s
neck when she was trying to slap Lady Shang for her impertinence. After some
effort, the eunuch Yen Wen-ying connived with Lü I-chien and Fan Feng to
convince Jen-tsung to divorce Empress Kuo on the grounds that she had not
produced an heir, that she had struck him, and that she wanted to withdraw
from the world and live as a Taoist nun. The divorce edict outraged Fan Chungyen and the senior censor, K’ung Tao-fu, both of whom led the policy critics
and censors to the palace gate to demand an interview with the emperor.57
Jen-tsung had Lü I-chien tell them the trumped-up reasons for divorcing the
woman who had been forced on him by his stepmother. The next day, both
K’ung Tao-fu and Fan Chung-yen were transferred to regional posts, and the
censors and policy critics were forbidden to ask for an audience as a group.
53
54
55
56
57
Chao Ju-yü, Chu-ch’en tsou-i (1186; Taipei, 1970) 11, pp. 574–5.
HTC (1957) 39, p. 900.
HTC (1957) 36, p. 901; 36, p. 825.
HTC (1957) 39, p. 902.
Chao, Chu-ch’en tsou-i 28, pp. 1083–94.
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
293
Jen-tsung also extended his purge to two hundred palace women, whom he
saw as partisans of Dowager Empress Liu and Empress Kuo.
Jen-tsung’s marital affairs were not effectively settled until the fall of 1034,
after an onslaught of natural disasters, a humbling military defeat, unusual
astronomical portents, mourning for two mothers, debauchery, divorce, and
political in-fighting drove the emperor to his sickbed. Lü I-chien, Sung Shou,
and his other councilors asked him to take care of his health, to ensure that
there would be an heir, and to appoint an empress. In response, Jen-tsung
announced that Pure Consort Kuo (the title given the deposed empress) was
to be housed outside the palace, Lady Shang was to enter Taoist orders, and
Lady Yang was also to be sent to a monastery. Lady Yang was later reinstated
as a lesser consort after Lady Shang’s death in 1050. Lady Yang died in 1072.
In addition, the numerous women who had been sent to the palace by officials
and in-laws in the hopes of winning the emperor’s favor were returned to
their families. Lastly, a proper candidate for empress was to be sought to
restore order to the inner palace. Lady Shang and the young Lady Yang were
blamed for Jen-tsung’s physical collapse, but at first not even Dowager Empress
Yang could convince him to send them away; the indefatigable eunuch Yen
Wen-ying, however, finally succeeded.58 Earlier, Lü I-chien had voiced doubts
that Jen-tsung could manage the women in the palace, and he appears to
have been correct. Lady Shang was the most troublesome. She issued illegal
palace orders, took bribes, arranged official and palace staff appointments,
and allowed unauthorized visitors.59 During Jen-tsung’s illness, the usual
remedies from the palace medical staff were ineffectual. Jen-tsung’s oldest
daughter, the Princess of Wei, finally recommended a Han-lin physician who
was able to help the emperor. Jen-tsung resumed holding court late in the
year.
The first candidate for empress, recommended by Dowager Empress Yang,
was a Lady Ch’en, daughter of a Shou-chou tea merchant who held a minor
official title. Sung Shou, Lü I-chien, Ts’ai Ch’i, and others disapproved. The
emperor sent her back, not so much because her father was a merchant, but
because she had been a servant. Late in the fall of 1034, Lady Ts’ao, granddaughter of Ts’ao Pin, one of T’ai-tsu’s founding generals, was selected empress. The
official investiture of Empress Ts’ao took place a month after the announcement, the necessity of assuring an heir taking precedence over mourning rules.
Empress Ts’ao was a painter, calligrapher, and gardener, and proved a good
choice as empress: unlike Empress Liu, who had lavishly favored her own
family, Empress Ts’ao did not request or permit favors for her relatives.60
58
59
60
HCP (1979) 115, p. 2696.
Chao, Chu-ch’en tsou-i 29, pp. 1101–2.
HTC (1957) 39, p. 921.
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michael mcgrath
The emperor still felt regret about demoting Empress Kuo in a fit of rage
about the dowager empress. Late in 1035 he renewed contact with her, sending
her gifts and asking after her health. By chance she fell ill. The ever-watchful
Yen Wen-ying, who was acting for the emperor, conveyed medicine to her.
Within days she suddenly died, and it was widely believed Yen had poisoned
her. She was buried with the rites proper to an empress, and the episode was
closed.
Jen-tsung’s flawed character made both him and his chief councilor vulnerable to unwelcome criticism. In the last month of 1034, the censor Sun Mien
was dismissed for criticizing Lü I-chien, for criticizing Jen-tsung’s behavior
since his liaisons with Ladies Yang and Shang, for cataloguing the problems for
which the emperor was responsible, and for pointing out that Jen-tsung held
court on barely one hundred days a year.61 Jen-tsung’s apathy toward active
rule and holding court continued throughout his reign. But the emperor did
enjoy the company of learned men and regularly met with close advisors,
Han-lin academicians, and other scholar-officials to appreciate texts, calligraphy, and readings, and to discuss Confucian thought. In the spring of 1035,
Jen-tsung invited Sheng Tu, Chia Ch’ang-ch’ao, and other lecturers, readers,
and close advisors to attend the opening of two new halls, in which Jentsung had calligraphed screens with the “Wu-yi” chapter from the Book of
documents.62
One cultural project initiated by Jen-tsung was a catalogue of the four
imperial libraries. It was begun in 1034 under the direction of Chang Kuan
and with the help of two drafting officials and the directors of the four libraries.
By late 1035, the 8,435 chüan of classics and histories had been catalogued
and edited. The project was completed in 1041 by Wang Yao-ch’en, Wang
Chu, Ou-yang Hsiu, and the others who compiled the annotated catalogue,
modeled on the T’ang dynasty K’ai-yüan ssu-pu lu, and a model, itself, for later
imperial catalogues. The four libraries held 3,445 titles in 30,669 chüan. Books
missing from the collections of the scholarly institutes were to be acquired by
purchase on the open book market.63
Jen-tsung also sponsored significant reforms in the education system. Just
months after Jen-tsung ascended the throne, Sun Shih, Jen-tsung’s tutor and
the director of the Imperial University (T’ai-hsüeh), established the precedent
61
62
63
HCP (1979) 115, pp. 2709–12; SS 289, p. 9687.
HTC (1957) 40, p. 924.
HCP (1979) 114, p. 2681; 117, p. 2760; 118, p. 2783; 134, p. 3206; Yves Hervouet, ed., A Sung
bibliography (Bibliographie des Sung) (Hong Kong, 1978), p. 195; Liu Tzu-chien (James T. C. Liu), Ou-yang
Hsiu: An eleventh century Neo-Confucianist (Stanford, Calif.,1967), p. 102. See also John H. Winkelman,
The imperial library in Southern Sung China, 1127–1279: A study of the organization and operation of the
scholarly agencies of the central government (Philadelphia, 1974).
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
295
of endowing prefectural schools with income land.64 In the first month of 1034,
the Shan-hsi circuit capital of Ching-ch’ao fu (modern Hsi-an) was authorized
to establish a prefectural school, which was provided with an edition of the
Nine Classics and an endowment of five ch’ing (approximately 70 acres) of rental
land to support the school. By mid-1034, Ch’en-chou (Ching-hsi North) and
Yang-chou were also authorized to set up prefectural schools, and were each
given rental land and a set of the Nine Classics. This was the usual practice for
endowing all subsequent prefectural schools during Jen-tsung’s reign.65 By
the end of 1037, it was decided to limit the establishment of schools to only
the most populous prefectures, which in practice meant about one-sixth of the
approximately two hundred and fifty prefectures in the empire.66 Thirty-seven
prefectural schools were established before the Ch’ing-li reforms in 1044. In
all, eighty prefectural schools and eighty-nine county schools were established
during Jen-tsung’s reign.
The civil service examinations were another important element of Sung
education. Early in 1034, Jen-tsung had the selection ratio for the chin-shih
degree increased to twenty percent instead of the usual six to seven percent
of the examinees. This became the standard selection ratio for his reign. That
year yielded 783 new graduates, a result of the extremely generous standards
set. As the number of students involved increased, the number of qualified
graduates far exceeded the posts available, and the problems of unfairness and
favoritism in selection for appointment increased. At the beginning of 1037
it was ordered that the quota for the various prefectures be equalized to restore
the principle of fairness that had been distorted by occasional ad hoc changes.
Also in 1037 the practice of recopying examination papers to ensure that
examiners would not recognize the handwriting of protégés was instituted.67
The rapid, state-sponsored expansion of the education system yielded some
unexpected side effects. The fast-growing group of literati graduates began
64
65
66
67
HCP (1979) 99, p. 2303.
HTC (1957) 39, p. 911. See HCP (1979) 114, pp. 2659, 2677, 2681; 115, p. 2705; 116, pp. 2725, 2728,
2757, 2761, 2767; 118, pp. 2775, 2778, 2783, 2785–7, 2789–91; 119, pp. 2795, 2802, 2810; 120,
pp. 2819, 2822, 2825, 2836, 2840, 2843; 121, pp. 2861, 2867; 122, p. 2875; 123, pp. 2896, 2900; 125,
p. 2941; 145, p. 3516. For a full account of prefectural schools, especially following Jen-tsung’s reign,
see Thomas H. C. Lee, Government education and examinations in Sung China (New York, 1985), pp. 105–
37. See also John W. Chaffee, The thorny gates of learning in Sung China: A social history of examinations
(Cambridge, 1985), p. 75, table 10, which shows that Jen-tsung established more prefectural and county
schools per decade than any other emperor.
Michael C. McGrath, “Military and regional administration in Northern Sung China (960–1126)” (diss.,
Princeton University, 1982), p. 71.
Chaffee, The thorny gates of learning in Sung China, pp. 51, and 53, quoting HCP (1979) 120, p. 2819;
HTC (1957) 40, p. 956; HCP (1979) 114, p. 2661; Lee, Government education and examinations in Sung
China, p.148.
296
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to challenge the lingering ideals of what had been a more rigidly stratified
social order. In 1036, the unprecedented spread of literati culture throughout
society compelled the emperor and scholar-officials to promulgate sumptuary
regulations for the people of the capital district specifying status-appropriate
headgear and clothing, housing, carts and horses, and articles of daily living
for them. Knowledge of decrees and laws was restricted by forbidding private
individuals from copying out collections of legal documents. The number of
scholar-officials, drawn from the ranks of the literati, grew by virtue of the
doubling of the size of the civil service in Jen-tsung’s reign. The ability of the
government to absorb new candidates was quickly saturated. As more men were
recruited, more officials were supported, increasing the number of individuals
eligible for pensions. Privileges of official status were also extended more
widely when, at the end of 1036, all officials, their sons, and their grandsons
were relieved from obligations to serve as village officers, a privilege that had
previously been restricted to officials of rank 7b and up in the nine-tier system
of stipendiary grades. Officials were even allowed to use the official postal
system to send letters to their family.68
To further curtail the political powers of the bureaucratic elite, restrictions
on the socializing of officials were reiterated: officials of the Finance Commission, Censorate, and K’ai-feng prefecture were not permitted to meet officially
with each other’s “guests” or retinue. Between 1039 and 1059 restrictions were
enforced and gradually enlarged to include judicial review officials and senior
Justice Board officials, Han-lin academicians, drafting officials, remonstrators,
and councilors of state; after 1059 the rules were gradually relaxed.69
Another group in Sung society whose wealth and fecundity caused unwelcome side effects was the imperial clan. Because imperial clansmen were scattered all over the capital and because they were forbidden to meet except at
court or at imperial sacrifices, Jen-tsung ordered a Hostel for Imperial Clansmen (Mu-ch’in chai) to be built on the grounds of the burned down Yü-ch’ing
chao-ying Palace. There, members of the ten princely houses could live in proximity to each other. Finance Commissioner Ch’eng Lin oversaw the project,
and the eunuch Yen Wen-ying directed the work, which was completed in
68
69
Edward A. Kracke, Jr., Civil service in early Sung China, 960–1067; with particular emphasis on the development
of controlled sponsorship to foster administrative responsibility (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), p. 164; Kracke also
explains the official ranking system. See also HCP (1979) 118, pp. 2776–7, 2786; Lo Wen (Winston
W. Lo), An introduction to the civil service of Sung China: With emphasis on its personnel administration (Honolulu,
1987), pp. 134–7. See also Brian E. McKnight, “Fiscal privileges and social order in Sung China,” in
Crisis and prosperity in Sung China, ed. John W. Haeger (Tucson, Ariz.,1975), pp. 79–100.
HCP (1979) 118, p. 2776; 125, p. 2945; 143, p. 3449; 160, p. 3873; 189, pp. 4564–5; 193, pp. 4661–2.
See also Gung Wei Ai, “The participation of censorial officials in politics during the Northern Sung
dynasty (960–1126 A.D.),” Chinese Culture 5 No. 2 (1974), pp. 30–4, 41.
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
297
the fall of 1035.70 In the same way that the Mu-ch’in chai was built to accommodate imperial clansmen, a guesthouse complex was built for court officials
while they were in the capital. Twelve years later, in 1047, Jen-tsung had
the Kuang-ch’in chai constructed to house the children and grandchildren of
T’ai-tsu’s youngest son, the Prince of Ch’in, who had outgrown their originally allocated space. By this time there were approximately 1,080 recognized
members of the imperial clan. Jen-tsung apparently achieved a high level of
clan participation in imperial rites, for only sixty of the imperial clansmen did
not practice the austerities necessary to take part in the triennial worship of
Heaven. Yet clan socializing threatened to swell out of control, and within a
few years so many imperial clan members were visiting the imperial palace
that Jen-tsung forbade further unannounced visits.71 In 1036, to help manage
the affairs of the increasingly large imperial clan, Jen-tsung set up a new Chief
Office of Imperial Clan Affairs (Ta tsung-cheng ssu), without eliminating the
older Court of the Imperial Clan (Tsung-cheng ssu). The concern of the new
office was the education and good behavior of imperial clansmen. Jen-tsung
selected his cousin Chao Yün-jang (995–1059) as the first director of the Chief
Office of Imperial Clan Affairs. He was the third son of Chao Yüan-fen and a
grandson of T’ai-tsung, and he had been Chen-tsung’s choice to become heir
after Chen-tsung’s oldest son had died and before Jen-tsung was born.72
Although without Lü I-chien’s energy little would have been accomplished
during these early years of Jen-tsung’s majority, to those on the outside it
appeared as though the chief councilor was usurping imperial authority. In
1036, Fan Chung-yen denounced Lü for blatant favoritism in the selection
and promotion of officials, and also challenged Jen-tsung to take personal
responsibility for managing personnel affairs. Fan went so far as to suggest
that Lü I-chien could be another Wang Mang or Chang Yü, infamous usurpers
of the past. Lü I-chien responded by charging Fan with forming a faction
(p’eng-tang) and with trying to drive a wedge between the ruler and his loyal
minister. Fan Chung-yen’s suggestion that Jen-tsung’s cousin, Chao Yünjang, be designated as heir apparent also had disconcerted the emperor. As the
70
71
72
HCP (1979) 117, pp. 2757–8.
HCP (1979) 117, p. 2762; 161, pp. 3887, 3889. On these issues see John W. Chaffee, “From capital to
countryside: Changing residency patterns of the Sung imperial clan,” Chinese Culture 30 No. 1 (1989),
pp. 21–34.; John W. Chaffee, “The marriage of Sung imperial clanswomen,” in Marriage and inequality
in Chinese society, ed. Rubie S. Watson and Patricia B. Ebrey (Berkeley, Calif., 1991), pp. 133–69. See
also John C. Chaffee, “Two Sung imperial clan genealogies: Preliminary findings and questions,” Journal
of Sung-Yuan Studies 23 (1993), pp. 99–109; Robert M. Hartwell, “The imperial treasuries: Finance and
power in Song China,” Bulletin of Sung-Yüan Studies 20 (1988), pp. 44–5; and Han Ch’i’s memorial in
Chao, Chu-ch’en tsou-i 23, pp. 949–50.
HCP (1979) 119, pp. 2796, 2799; SS 245, p. 8708; Ch’ang et al., Sung-jen chuan-chi tzu-liao so-yin,
p. 3413.
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prefect of K’ai-feng, Fan Chung-yen was not a court official, so his memorial
went beyond his direct administrative purview, and on these grounds he was
removed from K’ai-feng. Even though Fan had shown that it was possible to
criticize Lü I-chien, continued fear of the chief councilor prevented censors
or remonstrance officials from objecting to Fan Chung-yen’s demotion.73 It
was left to Li Hung, Wang Chih, Yü Ching, Yin Shu, and Ou-yang Hsiu,
all junior scholarly officials, to protest against Fan’s punishment.74 All were
themselves demoted and sent out of the capital. Ts’ai Hsiang (1012–67) wrote
a poem praising the stalwarts, and Han Ch’i managed to divert a retaliatory
impeachment launched against Ts’ai Hsiang. But following Lü I-chien’s lead,
a junior censor suggested that officials be forbidden to exceed the authority
of their office by discussing matters outside their specific responsibilities. Su
Yao-ch’in argued unsuccessfully that the restraining order was a bad policy.75
Nonetheless, by 1037 Lü I-chien was no longer as unassailable as he had
been. In the spring of that year he was removed from office in a widespread
reshuffling of the Council of State that also led to fellow councilor Wang
Tseng’s transfer.76 Lü I-chien and Wang Tseng had been unable to get along,
for Wang – who had once been Lü’s superior – could not tolerate Lü’s authoritarian control of the government. When Wang Tseng requested a transfer
and reappointment, Jen-tsung asked him why. Wang replied that Lü abused
his powers and sold favors. Wang Tseng’s criticism of Lü in some sense was
possible only because Fan Chung-yen had already denounced Lü. Nonetheless,
the new chief councilors, Wang Sui and Ch’en Yao-tso, were proxies who had
been secretly recommended to the emperor by Lü himself. Clearly, Lü I-chien
intended Jen-tsung to suffer under ineffectual chief councilors until Jen-tsung
could be persuaded to recall him as chief councilor.
But Lü’s I-chien reputation was further buffeted by an earthquake that
rocked the capital district for five days at the end of 1037.77 Ting-chou and
Hsiang-chou (in Ho-pei West) were also affected. Two weeks later, Pingchou, Tai-chou, and Hsin-chou3 (all in Ho-tung) suffered earthquakes. It was
said that earthquakes continued for several years with as many as four or
five shocks a day. The earth cracked, geysers spouted, and more than twelve
thousand people were killed with some fifty-six hundred people injured and
73
74
75
76
77
HCP (1979) 118, pp. 2783–6, 2788; Liu, “An early Sung reformer: Fan Chung-yen,” pp. 105–31; Liu,
“Fan Chung-yen,” pp. 321–30; and Liu Tzu-chien (James T. C. Liu), “Lü I-chien,” in Sung biographies,
ed. Herbert Franke (Wiesbaden, 1976), vol. 2, pp. 713–19.
Peter K. Bol, “This culture of ours”: Intellectual transition in T’ang and Sung China (Stanford, Calif.,1992),
p. 169.
Chao, Chu-ch’en tsou-i 18, pp. 786–93.
HTC (1957) 40, pp. 952–3.
HCP (1979) 120, pp. 2844–5.
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
299
fifty thousand cattle injured or killed. The day after the report from Hotung, Ch’eng K’an, a censor, was sent to investigate and to manage disaster
relief. Han Ch’i and P’ang Chi memorialized the emperor about the portents
in the past five months, admonishing him to maintain closer control of the
military, to keep palace women and their friends out of official matters, and –
in an indirect reference to Lü I-chien – to prevent despotic government. Han
Ch’i, in particular, expressed concern over the construction of Taoist ritual
spaces in the Ta-ch’ing Pavilion and other places.78 Yeh Ch’ing-ch’en, a scholar
attached to the Historiography Institute, reminded the emperor that for the
two years since Fan Chung-yen, Yü Ching, and the others had been demoted
and dismissed because of speaking out, no one had dared discuss matters of
court or governance. He asked Jen-tsung to hold himself responsible and to
relent in his treatment of loyal but outspoken officials. As a result, Jen-tsung
had Fan Chung-yen, Yü Ching, and Ou-yang Hsiu transferred to posts closer to
the capital. Even this small transfer of Fan Chung-yen made his detractors fear
his return, and they quickly raised false accusations, incurring the emperor’s
wrath. But the polarizing of political discourse that was to poison late Northern
Sung political culture had begun its vogue, and before long any association of
officials could be discredited by calling it a “faction” of Fan Chung-yen’s.
The 1030s were a period of prolonged bad weather and famines. Severe
thunderstorms and heavy rains followed the earthquakes of 1037, and two
days afterward a meteor shower prompted Jen-tsung to lift the prohibition
on discussing public matters. In response, Sung Ch’i, Su Hsün-ch’in, Chang
Fang-p’ing, Han Ch’i, Su Shen, Chang Kuan, and Yeh Ch’ing-ch’en all warned
Jen-tsung against allowing Lü I-chien to dominate the government, suppress
open discussion, or appoint favorites.79 One result of Su Hsün-ch’in’s memorial
was the resumption of the daily court assemblies in the main hall. Because of the
earthquakes and the continuous thunderstorms, fiscal intendants and judicial
intendants were ordered to evaluate their subordinate officials for competence
and to take measures to reduce or discontinue the harsh treatment of the
people. More to the point, collection of the 1037 autumn tax was canceled
for earthquake victims in Ping-chou (T’ai-yüan), Tai-chou, and Hsin-chou3
prefectures in Ho-tung.
The most dramatic outcome from the advice Jen-tsung had received was
a clean sweep of incompetents and of Lü I-chien’s favorites, especially Wang
Sui, Ch’en Yao-tso, Han I, and Shih Chung-li. Jen-tsung was ready for a
steadier, more active Council of State that could repair the damage done by
the ominous portents and withstand the rising tide of political criticism made
78
79
HCP (1979) 120, p. 2842; Chao, Chu-ch’en tsou-i 38, pp. 1368–75.
Chao, Chu-ch’en tsou-i 38, pp. 1379–1424; HTC (1957) 41, p. 964; HCP (1979) 121, pp. 2849–64.
300
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possible by the proliferation of advisory positions. Furthermore, Wang Sui and
Ch’en Yao-tso were so sick that the Secretariat-Chancellery was referred to as
the “Convalescent Room” (indeed, Wang Sui died early in 1039). Jen-tsung
then appointed Chang Shih-hsün and Chang Te-hsiang as his chief councilors,
Wang Tsung and Li Jo-ku as the two assistant executives, and Wang Po-wen
and Ch’en Chih-chung as the two deputies at the Bureau of Military Affairs.
Wang Po-wen, however, died within a month and was replaced by Chang
Kuan, a chin-shih honors graduate, who had earlier recommended Wang Powen as a censor.80 To this team of state councilors fell the initial responsibility
of managing a new crisis: the Sung’s first major war with the Tangut Hsia,
known in Chinese sources as the Hsi Hsia (Western Hsia).
the war with hsi hsia (1038–1044)
From the time of the signing of the Shan-yüan Treaty in 1005 until war with
the Sung in 1038, the Hsi Hsia domain had grown from a handful of towns
inside the loop of the Yellow River to an extensive cavalry empire that spanned
the Ordos region and the Kansu Corridor.81 Li Yüan-hao’s father, the Tangut
leader, Li Te-ming, had acknowledged both the Sung and the Liao as overlords,
but he had systematically expanded into the west. In 1028, Li Te-ming sent his
son to capture Kan-chou2 (near Chang-yeh, Kansu) from the Hui-ku; Li Yüanhao’s success confirmed him as Li Te-ming’s rightful heir. Under Li Yüan-hao
the Tanguts also gained control of Liang-chou, at the eastern side of the fertile
plains area bounded on the west by Kan-chou2, thereby displacing the Tibetan
federation headed by Ku-ssu-lo (997–1065) south to the Huang-shui valley
town of Ch’ing-t’ang, east of Kokonor Lake (Ch’ing-hai).82
As soon as Li Yüan-hao, far less attached to Chinese culture than his father
had been, inherited the rulership of the Hsi Hsia at the end of 1032, he began
to carve out a distinct Tangut political and cultural realm. In his first year and
a half as ruler he consolidated his regime and transformed the Tangut polity
into a militarized state. In 1034, Li Yüan-hao attacked Fu-chou2 (in Ho-tung
circuit) and Ch’ing-chou2 (in what was to become Yung-hsing-chün circuit).
80
81
82
Ch’ang et al., Sung-jen chuan-chi tzu-liao so-yin, p. 2339. Liang T’ien-hsi, “Ts’ung Tsun-yao-lu k’an Sungch’u ssu-ch’ao chih chün-shih yü cheng-chih,” Ta-lu tsa-chih 31 No. 6 (1965), p. 28, sees this purge as
one of the decisive steps in the factional struggles which contributed to the fall of the Sung. See also
HCP (1979) 121, pp. 2864–6.
See Ruth W. Dunnell, “The Hsi Hsia,” in The Cambridge history of China, volume 6: Alien regimes and
border states, 907–1368, ed. Herbert Franke and Denis C. Twitchett (New York, 1994), p. 171, map 10.
See the front endpaper map in Wu T’ien-ch’ih, Hsi Hsia shih-kao (Ch’eng-tu, 1981), and maps 11–402
and 11–403 in Li Chen and Ch’en T’ing-yüan, Chung-kuo li-tai chan-cheng shih (Taipei, 1976), vol. 11.
See Ruth W. Dunnell, “Tanguts and the Tangut state of Ta Hsia” (diss., Princeton University, 1983),
pp. 100, 105–6.
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
301
Earlier, a non-Chinese patrol leader (hsün-chien) had raided Hsi Hsia territory,
destroying fortified settlements there. In reaction Li Yüan-hao defeated the
local district commander (tu-chien), who had ignored an interpreter’s warning
of an ambush. In a demonstration of moral superiority, Li Yüan-hao returned
the captured Sung officers and soldiers. In the fall of 1034, Jen-tsung sent
Chou Wei-te, one of his eunuch troubleshooters, to the Huan-ch’ing military
subcircuit to assess the situation.83 He also sent General Liu P’ing, a prefectural
administrator, as deputy general commandant for Huan-ch’ing. Earlier, Liu
P’ing had warned Jen-tsung that Li Yüan-hao was preparing for cultural and
political independence, but had been ignored. Now Jen-tsung charged Liu
P’ing to take care of the matter, giving him a million strings of cash. At the
time, Jen-tsung was incapacitated by illness and afterward preoccupied with
preparations for the investiture of the new empress in 1034. For a few years
Li Yüan-hao was not regarded as a serious threat. Initially, the only action
taken by the Sung was to cashier various eunuchs and generals in the circuit.
Indeed, Sung Shou, one of the councilors of state, was more concerned about
Jen-tsung’s banqueting, music, and women. Otherwise the empire appeared
to be at peace.84 Normal relations seemed to have resumed by early 1035,
when Li Yüan-hao sent fifty horses to the court and requested a copy of the
Buddhist canon, which was sent to him. Until Li Yüan-hao asked for official
recognition in 1038, the Sung court did not pay close attention to Hsi Hsia
military and political developments; all the while, however, the Tanguts were
solidifying their hold over crucial Kansu Corridor trade routes and developing
their military resources.
Besides establishing a Chinese-style central government for the militarized
kingdom, Li Yüan-hao also designated eighteen military control commissions
spread among five military zones, defended by as many as three hundred
and seventy thousand men under arms.85 These were mounted forces, who
had been stretched thin by hard warfare and whose ranks had probably been
swelled by nonwarrior horsemen impressed to fill the army. Li Yüan-hao also
maintained a six-unit bodyguard of five thousand and an elite cavalry force of
three thousand. It was a fearful concentration of military might overlaying a
shallow economic base. Preparing for campaigns in Sung territory, Li Yüanhao requested permission in early 1038 to send a group to visit the five sacred
Buddhist mountains by way of the transport routes of the official postal system.
83
84
85
For an explanation of the civil and military subdivisions of greater Shan-hsi, see the Introduction,
note 31.
HCP (1979) 115, p. 2694.
For the location of the military control commissions see Dunnell, “The Hsi Hsia,” pp. 184–5 map 12;
HCP (1979) 119, pp. 2813–14, 2845.
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michael mcgrath
Even though everyone knew that his real intention was to reconnoiter Ho-tung,
permission was granted.
Between Li Yüan-hao’s preliminary raids on Lin-chou, Fu-chou2, Ch’ingchou2, and Huan-chou2 in 1034 and his proclamation of the Hsi Hsia empire
in 1038, the Sung had responded by repairing the San-pai irrigation system in
the Wei River valley in Shan-hsi, reestablishing the ju-chung delivery system
to move grain and supplies into the border garrisons,86 and distributing a
compendium on military science. Orders were issued in mid-1037 to conduct
the secret repair and construction of defensive works in Ho-pei and Ho-tung
circuits which were main areas of concern because of the Liao threat. This last
measure was backed up by the expenditure of one and half million liang of
silver and more than three hundred thousand bolts of silk. Throughout the
war with Hsi Hsia, Ho-pei and Ho-tung continued to receive Palace Treasury
support because of their proximity to Liao and to the imperial capital. Not
until mid-fall of 1038 did the Palace Treasury begin disbursing resources for
Shan-hsi, which faced the brunt of the Hsia threat,87 when one million bolts
of silk were allocated for buying supplies.
In late fall the zone commander (ch’ien-hsia) of Fu-yen circuit reported that
Li Yüan-hao’s stepfather, Shan-yü Wei-liang, and others had sent messengers
ahead to request permission to surrender to the Sung. The court ordered the
commander not to accept the surrender, which was induced by Li Yüan-hao’s
execution of chiefs who opposed his plan to attack the Sung. Because Shanyü Wei-liang had tried to stop Li Yüan-hao from taking this course several
times with no success, he feared he would be killed also. As a result, he
kidnapped Li Yüan-hao’s wife and son as hostages in order to escape to the
Sung. But the Sung frontier commander sent him back under military escort
to Li Yüan-hao to face execution by massed archers. At the same time, Yüanhao sent an envoy to request recognition of his rule as Emperor of Hsia (Ta
Hsia huang-ti), on the grounds that he was descended from the Northern
Wei dynasty (386–534); that he had patterned the Tangut script, clothing,
rituals, music, and implements after the Chinese model; that the peoples of
the region all submitted to him; and that his people desired to have their own
state (chien pang-chia). A month before Jen-tsung conducted the worship of
Heaven in late 1038, Li Yüan-hao had already constructed an altar to announce
his self-appointment as Emperor of Hsia. Li had also declared a new reign
title and ennobled his deceased grandfather and father as emperors. Although
86
87
On the ju-chung provisioning system, see Peter J. Golas, “The Sung financial administration,” in The
Cambridge history of China, volume 5: The Sung dynasty and its precursors, 907–1279, part 2, ed. John
W. Chaffee and Denis C. Twitchett (New York, forthcoming).
HCP (1979) 122, p. 2879.
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
303
Li Yüan-hao still accepted subservience to Sung, he requested a patent of
title from his majesty Jen-tsung, the south-facing sovereign, and expressed
hope for good relations. However, the timing of Li Yüan-hao’s ceremonies on
his own altar was a clear affront that was exacerbated by Li’s refusal to send
annual tribute to the Sung as a further means of publicly proclaiming his new
independent status.88
In the four years from Li Yüan-hao’s elevation to emperor to his preliminary
acceptance of peace with the Sung at the end of 1042, the war between Hsi Hsia
and Sung was primarily driven by Li Yüan-hao’s actions and Sung reactions
to them. The war can be divided into five phases: (1) a preparatory phase from
late 1038 to late 1039, culminating in the Hsi Hsia attack on Pao-an chün; (2)
1040 and the consequences of the Hsi Hsia siege of Yen-an fu; (3) 1041 and
the aftermath of the Sung defeat at Hao-shui-ch’uan; (4) an interlude from late
1041 to autumn of 1042, as Sung attention is diverted by the threat of a Liao
invasion; and (5) from the battle of Ting-ch’uan-chai in the autumn of 1042
through the summer of 1044, when Li Yüan-hao agrees to refer to himself as
“subject” (ch’en) when addressing the Sung emperor.89
Phase 1 (late 1038–late 1039)
Consideration of how to respond to Yüan-hao was postponed while Jen-tsung
and his officials organized the triennial cycle of worship of Heaven and Earth
in late 1038. Among the military preparations that were undertaken, the
Ch’ing-t’ang Tibetan ruler Ku-ssu-lo was promoted to chieh-tu shih (military
governor) – by this time an honorary post used largely to reward compliant
native chieftains90 – for his support against Li Yüan-hao. In addition, a reward
of one hundred thousand strings of cash was offered for Li’s capture. Hsia Sung
and Fan Yung were appointed pacification intendants of the circuits along the
Sung–Hsi Hsia frontier. But decisions were made so slowly that the court did
not strip Li Yüan-hao of his ranks, titles, offices, and the Chao surname until the
middle of 1039. To bolster their loyalty, money in varying amounts was given
to troops in Shan-hsi and Szechwan, and pearls and jewels worth three hundred
thousand strings were issued to the Finance Commission to pay for border zone
military provisions, thereby both buttressing military preparations and easing
the burden on local taxpayers. The pattern of spending suggests that Jen-tsung
88
89
90
HCP (1979) 122, p. 2888.
HCP (1979) 149, pp. 3616–17.
See Charles O. Hucker, A dictionary of official titles in imperial China (Stanford, Calif., 1985), p. 144.
Though honorary from the Sung perspective, these titles served as potent sources of political capital for
their native incumbents.
National Capital
Capitals of administrative circuit or military sub-circuit
Sung prefectures (chou) or commmanderies (chün)
Hsi Hsia prefectures
Important battle-sites
Mountain
Approximate Sung-Hsi Hsia border
H S I
H S I A
llow
Ye
Yen-chou
r
Rive
Yin-chou
Shih-chou
Hsia-chou
Ling-chou
Hung-chou Hig
n
Yu-chou
He n
g -s
ha
hl
an
Huan-chou
Huai-yüan
Chen-jung-chün
Ting-ch’uan-chai
Te-shun-chün
Sui-chou
Yen-chou
(Yen-an-fu)
Ch’ing-chou
YUNG-HSING-CHÜN LU
Wei-chou
Ching-chou
Liu-panshan
sh
ui
-c
h’
ua
n
Lung-kan
Pin-chou
H
ao
-
Ch’in-chou
0
250 km
0
150 miles
Wei River
CH’IN-FENG LU
Map 13. The first Sino-Tangut war, 1038–1044.
Ye
ds
Pao-an-chün
[ S H A N - H S I ]
ll o
Hsing-ch’ing-fu
wR
iver
Fu-chou
Lin-chou
Ching-chao-fu
(Ch’ang-an)
HO-TUNG LU
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
305
sought to assert control over the crucial disbursements for a war that was
costing more than the government had in hand. The dual problem of liquidity
and budget balancing once again produced a rash of money-saving measures.
Jen-tsung ordered the release of two hundred and seventy palace women, and
had his close advisors work with the finance commission to discuss how to
reduce excessive and fluctuating expenses. Han Ch’i recommended spending
less money on the imperial women and imperial paraphernalia, and a few
other officials proposed reducing salaries and allowances (which Jen-tsung
opposed) and tightening eligibility for appointing children to official rank
by hereditary privilege.91 In Ho-pei, military and economic oversight were
strengthened simultaneously by giving the Ho-pei fiscal intendant overall
direction of agricultural and military colonies.
Late in 1039 Hsi Hsia attacks on Pao-an chün were repulsed by Lu Shouch’in, zone commander for Fu-yen circuit.92 The Hsia also surrounded Ch’engp’ing-chai with some thirty thousand mounted troops while Hsü Huai-te,
the deputy circuit military commander ( fu-pu-shu) for Fu-yen circuit, was in
the city. Hsü led a thousand or so troops to break through the encirclement
and attack the Hsia, after which the Tangut forces disengaged. Sung troops
then destroyed several Hsi Hsia outposts. Lu Shou-ch’in was promoted for his
victory. Ti Ch’ing distinguished himself so greatly that he was promoted four
ranks, from ordinary soldier to military official.
In the following month, the last of the lunar year, Su Shen offered Jen-tsung
advice, speaking from his junior position at the Historiography Institute.93
Although he warned Jen-tsung to guard his health and to avoid squandering
his energy and treasury on the distractions of luxury and sex, he also urged the
emperor to order his border generals and commanders to submit plans for an
offensive war, because ten years of defense had not paid off. Many others also
submitted recommendations, but no one else advocated taking the offensive.94
The two basic military issues were force concentration and training. The main
frontier districts were in the Kansu region along the Ordos Desert and west of
the Liu-p’an Mountains. Apart from the few river valleys, this area was mostly
sparse grasslands with very low rainfall. Its population, made up of mostly
non-Han pastoralists, was few and scattered. Distances between settlements
were so great that more horses, mounted archers, local militias, tribal allies,
and fortified bases were needed to counter Li Yüan-hao’s ability to bring large
concentrations of mounted forces together for massive raids. The distances,
91
92
93
94
Chao, Chu-ch’en tsou-i 101, pp. 3365–7; HCP (1979) 123, pp. 2902, 2904–6, 2908.
Ch’ang et al., Sung-jen chuan-chi tzu-liao so-yin, pp. 4028–9.
Ch’ang et al., Sung-jen chuan-chi tzu-liao so-yin, pp. 4310–11; HCP (1979) 125, pp. 2950–3.
HCP (1979) 125, pp. 2953–60; Chao, Chu-ch’en tsou-i 132, pp. 4477–80.
michael mcgrath
306
terrain, and enemy tactics required mounted warfare, preparation for which
would need two or three years to train troops and to augment and replace
detrained imperial garrison forces. There were also economic concerns, for Jentsung was informed that support for the military and the court was absorbing
the entire tribute grain delivery from Huai-nan, Liang-che, and Chiang-nan.
Phase 2 (early to late 1040)
The second phase of the war dates from early 1040, when Li Yüan-hao attacked
Chin-ming Fort near Yen-an fu, capturing the local commanding officer and
his son. Li Yüan-hao then moved to encircle Yen-an fu, whose prefect, Fan
Yung, had been duped by the Tanguts into leaving the city unprepared.95
That spring of 1040, Han Ch’i convinced Jen-tsung to restore Fan Chungyen as a junior drafting official, and both Han and Fan were concurrently
appointed deputy military intendants of Shan-hsi. Fan Chung-yen was also
appointed to be prefect of Yen-an fu in the fall. Prior to his appointment,
troops and commanders had been disposed as follows: each regional commandant (or circuit military commander) commanded 10,000 troops, each zone
commander commanded 5,000 troops, and each district commander commanded 3,000. Whenever there was an incursion the lowest-ranking commander was sent to respond. Fan Chung-yen argued that this was a selfdefeating response to military threats, and he redeployed the troops within
Yen-an fu into six commands. Each commander led 3,000 troops, trained them
within their own units, and responded swiftly to Hsi Hsia incursions on the
basis of the number of attackers. Fan’s method, which the entire region later
adopted, was so successful that even the Tanguts were impressed, warning
each other to avoid attacking Yen-an fu “because nowadays Young Master Fan
has several myriads of soldiers and isn’t as easy to dupe as Old Master Fan
[Yung].”96
Fan’s success notwithstanding, the military situation in early 1040 was so
serious that the emperor ordered the Bureau of Military Affairs to deliberate
with the chief councilors concerning the war with Li Yüan-hao, overturning a
long-standing dynastic policy to keep civil and military authority separate. A
few months later, Jen-tsung expanded the deliberative group to include assistant councilors, and had a special meeting room set up by the Secretariat just
south of the Bureau of Military Affairs compound. So desperate was the emperor
for strategic advice that he permitted officials at court and on assignment in
the outlying regions to comment on affairs of state. This was the first time
since Fan Chung-yen had been demoted a little less than four years earlier
95
96
HCP (1979) 126, pp. 2965–70.
HCP (1979) 128, pp. 3035–6.
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
307
that officials were allowed to comment on matters outside the immediate
jurisdiction of their office.97 Several weeks later, Jen-tsung ordered his senior
officials to submit policy recommendations on whether to take a defensive or
an offensive approach in Shan-hsi. By mid-spring, Li Yüan-hao had already
overrun Chin-ming and attacked the An-yan, Sai-men, and Yung-p’ing forts.
Because of these defeats, Jen-tsung reinstalled the old reliable Lü I-chien as
chief councilor, and dismissed his military councilors, Wang Tsung, Ch’en
Chih-chung, and Chang Kuan, replacing them with Yen Shu, Sung Shou, and
Wang I-yung.98 Yen Shu, while serving as finance commissioner, had asked
Jen-tsung to discontinue using eunuchs as military supervisors (referring in
particular to Lu Shou-ch’in), to require his field commanders to follow setpiece battle plans, to draft and train archers, and to relinquish some of the
treasures in the palace to pay for the war. Further advice came from Han-lin
Academician Ting Tu (later, the editor of the Wu-ching tsung-yao [Essentials
of the military classics]), who submitted his Pei-pien yao-lan (Conspectus of border
region defense preparedness), which emphasized paying careful attention to fortifications and protective walls (battlements), long-range patrolling, and the
strict control of critical strategic locations.99 Concerned about the possibility
of an alliance between the Hsia and the Liao, Jen-tsung sent an emissary to the
Liao to announce an impending campaign against Li Yüan-hao. Yet through
the fall the situation continued to deteriorate, culminating in the disastrous
loss of some five thousand men at San-ch’uan near Wei-chou4, the third defeat
of 1040.100 The court, desperate for skilled commanders and troops, recruited
sixty-one new tactical experts for office at various grades. But it was strategy
that was so lacking among Jen-tsung’s military planners. At the end of the
year Han Ch’i’s widely approved policy of aggression was adopted, and Fu-yen
(capital Yen-an fu) and Ching-yüan (capital Wei-chou4) circuits were ordered
to have their troops attack Li Yüan-hao within two weeks. No preparations
were made in advance of the attack, however, and only after the order was
sent down was any thought given to assembling the necessary pack animals:
K’ai-feng, Ching-tung, Ching-hsi, and Ho-tung were ordered to assemble fifty
thousand mules for the campaign in two weeks.101
Phase 3 (early 1041–summer 1041)
Even as war raged the empire was beset by natural disasters and financial crises.
In 1039 famine in the North China Plain left 1.9 million people needing relief
97
98
99
100
101
HCP (1979) 126, p. 2986.
HCP (1979) 128, pp. 2987–8.
HTC (1957) 42, p. 1011.
HCP (1979) 128, p. 3042.
HTC (1957) 42, p. 1021.
308
michael mcgrath
payments. In 1043 2.5 million people in Shansi would require relief. With the
start of the new year 1041, Han-lin Academician Wang Yao-ch’en and fifteen
others were appointed as investigating pacification intendants throughout the
empire to deal with the widespread problems associated with famine, heavy
taxation and corvée service obligations, economic destitution, the war with
Hsi Hsia, border conflicts in the north and south, and uprisings. Jen-tsung
accepted their recommendation to remit taxes for two years, made possible
because a surplus of four million strings had been discovered in the Finance
Commission.102
Despite his battlefield victories, in the first month of the new year Li Yüanhao sent emissaries to Fan Chung-yen in Yen-an fu asking for peace. Fan
dismissed the overture as insincere, but at the same time he convinced Jentsung to postpone counterattacking until the spring thaw, when Yüan-hao’s
cavalry would be at its weakest for lack of fodder.103 Pursuing his long-term
approach of deep defense based on a chain of walled and fortified settlements,
Fan Chung-yen actively walled Ch’eng-p’ing and eleven other outposts where
Chinese and Tibetan tribesmen resumed their interrelated livelihoods.
This third phase of the war was marked by the Sung’s catastrophic loss
in the second month middle of the year of six thousand men at Hao-shuich’uan, in Shan-hsi’s Te-shun commandery (Ch’in-feng circuit). The disaster
began when Han Ch’i, intendant for Huan-ch’ing circuit, tried to preempt
a Tangut attack on Wei-chou4. Han Ch’i sped to Chen-jung chün (about 30
miles north of Wei-chou4) where he enlisted some eighteen thousand local
stalwarts (kan-yung) and placed them under field commander Jen Fu to attack
Li Yüan-hao. Sang I commanded the vanguard. From just outside Hsin-hao,
Jen Fu rushed with several thousand light cavalry to Huai-yüan (about 35–40
miles due west of Chen-jung chün) where they killed several hundred Hsi
Hsia soldiers. Feigning escape, the Hsi Hsia troops abandoned horses, sheep,
and loaded camels. Sang I and Jen Fu divided their troops and gave chase,
recombining their forces at Hao-shui-ch’uan near dusk. Heedless of the Hsi
Hsia ruse, they had dissipated their forces in the chase. When the Hsi Hsia were
north of Lung-kan-ch’eng their advance brigade joined up with a large attack
force following the river; once beneath Liu-p’an Mountain, they attacked the
Sung army. The Sung generals, realizing they had been tricked, were unable
to regroup. Tangut shock troops hit them in front while others ambushed
102
103
HCP (1979) 128, pp. 3037–8; 130, p. 3083; 132, p. 3148.
HCP (1979) 130, pp. 3085–9. See Janet McCracken Novey, “Yü Ching, a Northern Sung statesman, and his treatise on the Ch’i-tan bureaucracy” (diss., Indiana University, 1983), pp. 53–8. Near
the end of the year Chang Fang-p’ing suggested a policy that any offer or communication should
be sent to K’ai-feng for evaluation rather than be rejected outright on the spot. HCP (1979) 134,
p. 3187.
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
309
the Sung flank. When the fighting ended Jen Fu, the field commander for
Huan-ch’ing circuit, a number of his subordinate generals including Sang I,
and more than six thousand troops, died in battle at Hao-shui-ch’uan. This
was the worst Sung defeat since the founding of the dynasty. For ten days the
chief councilors deliberately delayed telling the emperor of the flash reports
sent to the capital from the front. Jen-tsung first learned of the defeat from an
old soldier sweeping a courtyard who had read about it in a letter. The emperor
upbraided his councilors for “trying my patience.”104
Military response to the Hao-shui-ch’uan disaster was indecisive. In keeping
with traditional border practice, Fan Chung-yen, now prefect of Ch’ing-chou2,
asked the court for permission to give gifts and rewards to the various Tibetan
tribal chiefs who had aided the Sung and to make treaties with them.105 But the
policy of attack was now in abeyance, and the Sung went on the defensive. The
Shan-hsi regional commands were alerted to be prepared to resist any incursion,
but not to penetrate Hsi Hsia territory. In addition, Jen-tsung consolidated
twenty battalions from among the best of three infantry regiments into a new
Ever Victorious Army (Wan-sheng chün), which not only transferred some of
the costs out of K’ai-feng but also contributed to the defense against the Liao.
Toward the end of 1041, these twelve thousand troops, originally intended for
the Ho-pei circuits, were assigned to Lin-chou and Fu-chou2 of Ho-tung.106
In Shan-hsi some efforts were made to train border zone garrison troops by
transferring them to interior prefectures.107
Phase 4 (late 1041–autumn 1042)
The year spanning late 1041 to late 1042 was complicated by fears of a Liao
attack and thus a war on two fronts.108 Responding to reports of a possible
Khitan invasion, twenty-one prefectures in Ho-pei were ordered to repair
104
105
106
107
108
Ting Ch’uan-ching, Sung-jen i-shih hui-pien (1935; Peking, 1981) 1, p. 26. This was not the only time
information was withheld from Jen-tsung: reports of Wang Lun2’s uprising in 1043 and of the Nung
Chih-kao insurrection of 1052 were also delayed. See Klaus Flessel, “Early Chinese newspapers (tenth
to thirteenth centuries),” in Collected papers of the XXIXth Congress of Chinese Studies, 10th-15th September
1984, University of Tübingen, ed. Tilemann Grimm et al. (Tübingen, 1988), p. 65.
See Lo Ch’iu-ch’ing, “Pei Sung ping-chih yen-chiu,” Hsin-ya hsüeh-pao 3 No. 1 (1957), pp. 169–270,
and his “Sung Hsia chan-cheng-chung-te fan-pu yü pao-chai,” Ch’ung-chi hsüeh-pao 6 No. 2 (1967),
pp. 223–43.
HCP (1979) 132, p. 3151; 134, pp. 3195–6.
HCP (1979) 132, p. 3149.
See Denis C. Twitchett and Klaus-Peter Tietze, “The Liao,” in The Cambridge history of China, volume
6: Alien regimes and border states, 907–1368, ed. Herbert Franke and Denis C. Twitchett (New York,
1994), pp. 114–23, and the map on pp. 118–19. See also Ang, “Sung-Liao diplomacy in eleventh- and
twelfth-century China,” pp. 83–8; Tao, Two sons of heaven, pp. 53–67; Tao, “Yü Ching and Sung policies
towards Liao and Hsia,” pp. 114–22.
310
michael mcgrath
their walls and moats in the late winter of 1041.109 During the past thirty
years, relations between the Liao and the Sung had been routine and peaceful.
But conflict between Hsi Hsia and Sung provided an opportunity, after the
stunning Hsi Hsia victory over the Sung at Hao-shui-ch’uan, for the Liao to
press for territorial gains. Despite divided opinion among his senior advisors,
the Liao emperor Hsing-tsung ordered his troops to start assembling along
the Sung-Liao border.110 Even though the Sung were ineffective in dealing
with the Hsi Hsia threat in Shan-hsi, they were in a much better geographic
and strategic situation on the Ho-pei frontier. Chen-ting fu, Ting-chou, and
Shan-chou each had reserves of one hundred thousand troops, two years of grain
and fodder, and fifty thousand sets of armor and weapons. Sixty-four battalions
of imperial troops (approximately fourteen thousand men) were assigned to
Shan-chou. Ho-pei’s defense also included five hundred boats that had been
secretly built in Ching-tung and Ching-hsi. One million strings of cash and
two million bolts of silk were allocated for military expenses in Ho-pei.111
In the spring of 1042 two Liao emissaries, Hsiao T’e-mo and Liu Liufu, arrived in K’ai-feng to demand the ten counties south of Wa-ch’iao Pass
(southwest of modern Hsiung county, Hopei). In addition, they pressed for
an explanation as to why the Sung was attacking Hsi Hsia, why they were
violating the Shan-yüan Treaty by building defensive works, and why they were
building up troop strength in Ho-pei. Earlier, Lü I-chien had recommended
that Fu Pi escort the Liao delegation from the northern border to K’ai-feng.
During the escort, Fu Pi challenged Hsiao T’e-mo to make proper obeisances
toward Jen-tsung’s official greeting. Hsiao T’e-mo feigned illness as an excuse
to refuse, but the challenge was so forceful that Hsiao T’e-mo had to abandon
his pretense and he and the others, full of fear, rose and made proper obeisances.
After this, Fu Pi became very forthright and Hsiao T’e-mo responded in kind,
revealing his ruler’s intentions. Fu Pi reported in full to Jen-tsung, who was
willing only to increase the annual tribute or to offer an imperial princess in
marriage to the Liao emperor’s son. While Lü I-chien did not particularly like
Fu Pi, he nevertheless recommended him for the mission to the Liao court to
negotiate for the Sung. Between the time Fu Pi left K’ai-feng and the time
he arrived at the Liao capital, the Liao had assembled troops south of their
Southern Capital (Yu-chou) along the Ho-pei border. By midsummer, Fu Pi
had convinced the Liao to agree to drop their territorial demands and accept
instead an increase in the annual gift, now referred to as tribute (na).112 Fu Pi
109
110
111
112
HCP (1979) 134, p. 3187.
HCP (1979) 134, p. 3208.
HCP (1979) 135, p. 3226.
HCP (1979) 135, pp. 3229–31, 3234–6; 137, pp. 3283–7. See Tao, Two sons of heaven, pp. 60–2.
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
311
and Liang Shih offered the Liao emperor Hsing-tsung an extra one hundred
thousand strings a year if he would convince the Hsi Hsia to negotiate.113
At the same time, at the Sung court, Lü I-chien recommended making Taming (the capital of the Ho-pei East circuit) the Northern Capital of the
Sung to indicate to the Liao that Jen-tsung might personally lead a campaign
against them. Jen-tsung approved, and in the fifth month Ta-ming fu, the
very place where Chen-tsung had encamped during the last conflict between
the Liao and the Sung, was designated the Northern Capital.114 The next
month Wang Te-yung was appointed supervising prefect of Ting-chou and
concomitant general commandant of Ho-pei, with the task of openly training
combat troops in the hope that reports from Liao spies would help dissuade
the Liao from attacking.115
These demonstrations of resolve helped avert a Liao invasion but could not
preserve Sung dignity. In the autumn of 1042 the Liao ambassadors Yeh-lü
Jen-hsien and Liu Liu-fu arrived in K’ai-feng to deliver a treaty of friendship
that obliged the Sung to add 100,000 bolts of silk and 100,000 ounces of silver
per annum to their tribute, bringing the annual total to 200,000 ounces of
silver and 300,000 bolts of silk. The treaty also made Jen-tsung elder brother
to Liao Hsing-tsung.116 These costs, however, paled in comparison with the
level of emergency spending in the Ho-pei circuits at the height of the Liao
threat, when Jen-tsung had allocated the equivalent of twelve million strings
in silks in a single month to assist in border expenses and reward Ho-pei’s
“righteous braves” (i-shih).117
The threat of Liao intervention was averted, but Hsi Hsia remained to be
dealt with. Throughout late 1041 to late 1042 strategies for managing Hsi
Hsia were debated. Han Ch’i, Fan Chung-yen, and P’ang Chi all offered advice
on how to deal with the intermittent war in Shan-hsi. All three were serving as
prefects and military intendants in Shan-hsi, and all three had concluded that
it would require two or three more years of war to wear down Li Yüan-hao.
P’ang Chi noted that Li usually had only ten days of supplies, did not do well
with sieges, and took many casualties. From this he concluded that all fortified
settlements should be prepared to withstand up to ten days of siege, which
would give time for supporting Sung forces to arrive.118 Han Ch’i insisted that
113
114
115
116
117
118
Tao, “Yü Ching and Sung policies towards Liao and Hsia,” p. 116; HCP (1979) 139, p. 3342. Tao Jingshen writes that “From the 1040s onward, the Khitans often intervened in Sung-Hsi Hsia relations.”
See Tao, Two sons of heaven, p. 30.
HCP (1979) 136, pp. 3260–5.
HCP (1979) 136, pp. 3267–8.
Tao, Two sons of heaven, pp. 17, 107.
Hartwell, “The imperial treasuries,” p. 57; HCP (1979) 137, p. 3276.
HCP (1979) 135, p. 3222.
312
michael mcgrath
a long-term defense would eventually defeat Li Yüan-hao and in any case would
be necessary to allow time for generals and troops to gain sufficient combat
experience. He suggested adding thirty thousand more troops for Fu-chou2,
Ch’ing-chou2, and Wei-chou4. Expenses for these troop increases would not
be a problem if the emperor’s own expenditures were kept within bounds.119
Fan Chung-yen deftly redefined attack as what was necessary to consolidate the
empty spaces in Shan-hsi through which Li Yüan-hao had been able to move his
forces. Interlocking fortifications chosen for their control of the strategic space
was the key to defeating the Hsi Hsia. Fan Chung-yen also pleaded with the
emperor to stop issuing secret orders because such interference made the war
impossible to manage. Perhaps as important was Fan’s argument that the Sung
should rely on the strength of its economy to defeat Li Yüan-hao, whose own
economic resources were incomparably smaller. The relatively small size of the
annual tribute he had already extorted from the Sung revealed the narrowness
of his expectations and the limited threat that he represented in the overall
calculus of international power. Lü I-chien sent the advice back for discussion
among the Shan-hsi military intendants.120
Conceding the failure of coordinating its four constituent circuits into one
unified command, in late 1041 Shan-hsi was divided into four military circuits: Ch’in-feng, Ching-yüan, Huan-ch’ing, and Fu-yen, whose seats were
Ch’in-chou, Wei-chou4, Ch’ing-chou2, and Yen-an fu, respectively.121 Shanhsi Agricultural Colony Offices for Ch’in-feng, Ching-yüan, Huan-ch’ing, and
Fu-yen also were established to help reduce military expenses by making the
armies at least partly self-supporting. Each was to be under the joint direction
of the circuit military commander and the fiscal intendant.122 Besides transferring imperial troops from K’ai-feng, locals were drafted into additional militia
battalions of archers.123 According to one reckoning, three million strings of
cash were needed to pay for the additional seventy thousand troops transferred
into Shan-hsi over the preceding year. Southeastern foundries in Chiang-chou,
Jao-chou, and Ch’ih-chou in the Yangtze valley were ordered to mint three
million strings of iron coins to help pay for the military campaign in Shan-hsi,
where there was a cash shortage.124
At the time of the triennial worship of Heaven in winter of 1041, Jentsung retroactively implemented a new reign title, Ch’ing-li (Felicitous
119
120
121
122
123
124
HCP (1979) 133, pp. 3176–8.
HCP (1979) 135, pp. 3216–18.
See HCP (1979) 132, pp. 3146–9; 133, p. 3170.
HCP (1979) 134, pp. 3192, 3197, 3205–6.
HCP (1979) 132, p. 3150; 134, p. 3196; 137, p. 3291.
HCP (1979) 134, p. 3196.
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
313
Chronometry, 1041–8).125 The emperor greatly desired to change the unfavorable circumstances, and he assigned Ting Tu and Liang Shih to work with the
finance commissioner to forgive all outstanding taxes. A few months later, Jentsung ordered censors and policy critics to work with the Finance Commission
to eliminate all nonessential expenses. A preliminary cost-cutting measure
was to halve the gifts distributed to imperial clan members and in-laws at the
annual sacrifices to Heaven.126
Jen-tsung also asked for recommendations of suitable field commanders
from the Palace Command and from the eunuch service agencies. These
were the obvious sources for trustworthy military talent. However, the risk
of patronage, rather than merit, appointments was high. Chang Fang-p’ing,
director of the Remonstrance Bureau (Chien-yüan), observed that in a period of
fifty days some twenty eunuchs, in-laws, and physicians had been given various
appointments and promotions.127 The impulses that created an environment
of favoritism and nepotism within the palace also encouraged regular military
and civil officials to exploit it. The development of familial influence networks
became increasingly institutionalized. At Chang Fang-p’ing’s suggestion, Jentsung had officials study the question of permitting private family temples as a
reward for service to the Sung.128 It would be another decade before this crucial
element of modern Chinese clan organization became an officially sanctioned
practice.
The most distinctive measure taken to deal with the Shan-hsi war was a
short-lived attempt to abolish the Bureau of Military Affairs. Fu Pi had initially
suggested having the chief councilor act concurrently as the commissioner of
military affairs. Jen-tsung said that overall control over military affairs ought
to be brought under the civil bureaucracy because the Bureau of Military
Affairs was not a canonical office. However, he did not wish to abolish the
office, but merely have the councilors of state deliberate with senior officials
at the bureau. When Chang Fang-p’ing suggested abolishing the bureau, Jentsung countered by suggesting that the chief councilors should manage it.
In mid-1042, Lü I-chien was appointed supervisor of the Bureau of Military
Affairs, Chang Te-hsiang was appointed concurrent commissioner, and Yen
Shu was appointed commissioner.129
125
126
127
128
129
HCP (1979) 134, p. 3198.
Hartwell, “Financial expertise, examinations, and the formation of economic policy in Northern Sung
China,” p. 294; HCP (1979) 134, p. 3205.
HCP (1979) 133, p. 3165.
HCP (1979) 134, pp. 3198–9.
HCP (1979) 137, p. 3283.
314
michael mcgrath
Phase 5 (autumn 1042–summer 1044)
The lull in fighting was shattered in late fall of 1042 when 100,000 Hsi Hsia
troops attacked the Ting-ch’uan-chai area (in southern Ningsia) using a mix
of running battles and focused attacks. The deputy circuit military commander, Ko Huai-min, was killed along with thirteen generals and about 9,400
soldiers. From Ting-ch’uan-chai, Li Yüan-hao headed southeast toward Weichou4, plundering the countryside along the way. When Fan Chung-yen, now
prefect of Ch’ing-chou2, arrived at Wei-chou4 with 6,000 troops from Pinchou and Ching-chou, Li Yüan-hao’s troops were forced to withdraw to their
own territory.130 Superior knowledge of the terrain and superior generalship
were on Li’s side, but he no longer enjoyed superiority in numbers. Since
his first victory at Yen-an fu, Li Yüan-hao had lost half his forces.131 On the
Sung side, Fu-Yen circuit now had 68,000 troops, Huan-Ch’ing circuit had
50,000, Ching-yüan circuit had 70,000, and Ch’in-feng circuit had 27,000;
in addition, there were almost 400,000 militia in Shan-hsi to back them up.
Yet despite massive Sung troop strength the strategic initiative remained with
Hsi Hsia, and the Sung military was unable to choose its own battle locations
and still had no well-integrated defensive strategy.132
By early 1043, however, the protracted war had exacted an enormous toll on
Hsi Hsia resources, and a weakened Li Yüan-hao sent an emissary to negotiate
a rapprochement.133 Li Yüan-hao was even willing to refer to Jen-tsung in
correspondence as his father. The Sung had also helped force the peace overture
by sowing dissension among some of Li Yüan-hao’s border officials, who had
ambitions of independence from their ruler. By the time the Liao emissary
informed the Sung court that Yüan-hao was willing to negotiate, the court
had become increasingly weary of the war. Rumors had begun to spread that
Li Yüan-hao had been defeated by the Hsi-fan Tibetans, that the Yeh-li clan
had rebelled, that rats had eaten their grain stores, that there was a great
famine, that Sung gifts and border markets had been suspended for a long
time, that there was no more tea, that cloth was scarce, and that the people
were weary.134 In the spring of 1043, Shao Lang-tso, a staff officer at Pao-an
chün knowledgeable in Hsi Hsia affairs, was authorized to offer enfeoffment to
Li Yüan-hao as ruler of Hsi Hsia, with an annual gift of one hundred thousand
bolts of silk and thirty thousand catties of tea, but only if Li would accept
130
131
132
133
134
HCP (1979) 137, pp. 3300–3; 138, p. 3310.
See Li, Chung-kuo li-tai chan-cheng shih (1976), vol. 11, p. 297.
HCP (1979) 138, p. 3311; 139, p. 3345.
HCP (1979) 138, pp. 3330–3; 139, p. 3343; 140, pp. 3358, 3361–2; 142, pp. 3403–5, 3408; 145,
pp. 3500–1, 3507–8, 3513–15; 146, pp. 3536–7; 149, pp. 3613, 3616.
HCP (1979) 138, p. 3330; Dunnell, “The Hsi Hsia.”
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
315
the subordinate status of subject (ch’en) in diplomatic correspondence with
the Sung court. By this time, Li Yüan-hao had become engaged in a conflict
with the Liao, and could not sustain a two-front war.135 Yet by late summer
of 1043, Li Yüan-hao had still not agreed to terms. The Sung officials Ouyang Hsiu and Han Ch’i, suspicious of Li’s intentions, continued to oppose
détente with Hsi Hsia. Both sides remained ambivalent during the next year,
but in the fifth month of 1144, drawn by the prospect of selling Tangut salt
across the borders to the Sung, Li Yüan-hao formally agreed to call himself
“subject.”136
In general, this first war between the Sung and Hsi Hsia revealed military
strengths and weaknesses that were characteristic of the Sung. Compared to
wars fought under T’ai-tsung, Chen-tsung, and Shen-tsung, Jen-tsung’s loss
of twenty thousand troops to Hsi Hsia was relatively small.137 Spending was
much greater for the Shan-hsi theater than the Ho-pei theater (33.6 million
units compared to 25.4 million units in 1042), but the war with Hsi Hsia was
emotionally more significant because such a small state had held the great Sung
hostage.138 Tangut tactics had demonstrated the effectiveness of horse warfare
in challenging the greater economic power of agriculturally based empires.
The Sung defense was directed by civil officials at the policy level, as well as at
the level of the theater of military operations. Civilian dominance, indifference
to military preparedness, and overreliance on non-Chinese tribal allies had all
reduced Sung military effectiveness. But military deficiencies were offset by
economic resources and large-scale static defenses. An enemy like Li Yüan-hao
lacked the resources to penetrate major geographical obstacles and overwhelm
settled populations in order to conquer and hold central territory. In the four
years of fighting, Li Yüan-hao launched only five major attacks: in late 1039,
mid-1040, early 1041, mid-1041, and late 1042. Jen-tsung, who was easily
impressed by military prowess, was nonetheless intimidated by Yüan-hao’s
limited success.139 Moreover, despite its fear of the Tanguts, the Sung court,
in most cases, quite reasonably continued to be far more concerned about the
threat to it on the more vulnerable Liao border with the Ho-tung and Ho-pei
circuits than about the threat on the Hsi Hsia border in Shan-hsi. This is not
135
136
137
138
139
Dunnell, “Tanguts and the Tangut state of Ta Hsia,” pp. 126–8; Tao, Two sons of heaven, pp. 62–3.
HCP (1979) 149, pp. 3616–17.
Ch’en et al., Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo 13, p. 80, notes losses of ten thousand. See Twitchett and Tietze,
“The Liao,” p. 86.
For Wang Yao-ch’en’s budget report of 1043 comparing income and expenditure in Shan-hsi, Ho-tung,
Ho-pei, and the capital before and during the war, see Chao, Chu-ch’en tsou-i 13, pp. 621–4; HCP (1979)
140, p. 3366.
Dunnell, “Tanguts and the Tangut state of Ta Hsia,” p. 136, observes that “Wei-ming Yüan-hao’s legacy
of prowess haunted the Chinese for generations.”
316
michael mcgrath
surprising considering that during the preceding century the Liao had twice
overrun the border and invaded and occupied much of the Yellow River plain.
As a precaution against such an attack, a Northern Capital was designated
in Ho-pei to be a forward command center, but a Western Capital was not
established at Lo-yang. The difference in annual gifts delivered to the Liao and
to the Hsi Hsia also clearly reveals the priority of interests. Jen-tsung and his
civilian court had dithered away the war, never fully accepting the opportunity
to go on the offensive because of their fear of delegating adequate autonomous
power to regional governments or to the military.140
the ch’ing-li reforms (1043–1045)
The war was just one of several factors that impelled Jen-tsung from 1043
to 1045 to back a reform movement spearheaded by Fan Chung-yen and his
ideological associates. The Ch’ing-li reforms (named after the 1041–8 reign
period), while only a brief episode in Jen-tsung’s reign, were significant far
beyond the two years when the reformers enjoyed the emperor’s backing. For
this was the first Confucian political movement of the dynasty, a manifestation
not only of the revival of Confucian political discourse but also of the political
coming-of-age of a cohort of local and regional elites who owed their success to
the examination system, and to the economic and institutional developments
that made learning, examinations, and government service the premier channel
of social mobility.141 The principal reform advocates, including Fan Chungyen and his younger associates, all in their thirties, Fu Pi, Han Ch’i, and
Ou-yang Hsiu, were prominent representatives of this new political cohort,
but it took Lü I-chien’s illness to give them the chance to put their reform
program into practice.
Jen-tsung’s decision to support reform
War with Hsi Hsia, exacerbated by opportunistic saber rattling by the Khitan
Liao, was the central preoccupation of the Sung court from 1038 until the
beginning of 1043. Adding to this prolonged military crisis were famines and
epidemics in the Szechwan, Liang-che, and Chiang-nan regions, accompanied
between 1040 and 1044 by widespread peasant uprisings, mutinies, and bandit
depredations that spared only the regions of Szechwan and Kwangsi. In 1043
140
141
Li and Ch’en, Chung-kuo li-tai chan-cheng shih (1976), vol. 11, p. 290.
On these developments, see Robert M. Hartwell, “Demographic, political, and social transformations
of China, 750–1550,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 42 No. 2 (1982), pp. 365–442; Bol, “This culture
of ours”; and Chaffee, The thorny gates of learning in Sung China.
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
317
more than 2.5 million people in the eastern plain had to be granted relief
because of famine. In order to address these dangers, Jen-tsung recalled the
sixty-one-year-old Lü I-chien in the spring of 1040. But in the winter of 1042,
Lü suffered a stroke from which he never fully recovered.142 From then on,
critics declared him responsible for failing to prosecute the war more effectively,
for weak government, and for ignoring capable officials.143 When Sun Mien,
fiscal intendant of Shan-hsi, chastised Lü for blocking remonstrance, sowing
dissent, and impeding the careers of men of worth, not only did Jen-tsung not
punish Sun, but the wounded Lü even expressed regret at not having received
such good advice ten years earlier.144 Finally, in the spring of 1043, Lü was
dismissed as chief councilor at his own request and his critics’ insistence.145
This is not to say that Jen-tsung shook off Lü’s influence voluntarily, for the
emperor’s attachment to Lü I-chien and others whom he loved, respected, or
trusted always expressed itself in personal loyalty and sentimental attachment
to that person. Thus when Lü I-chien fell ill, Jen-tsung cut a lock of his own hair
for use in a curative decoction, and when Lü died in the fall of 1044, Jen-tsung
openly wept, grieving for his loyal councilor and mentor of twenty years.146
Jen-tsung now had no choice but to turn elsewhere for advice, and the next
most viable group of advisors were the reform coalition centered around Fan
Chung-yen, Han Ch’i, P’ang Chi, Ou-yang Hsiu, and Fu Pi. By the fall of 1043,
Fan, Han, and P’ang had been appointed to the State Council, Ou-yang Hsiu
was made a policy critic, and Fu Pi (having declined an appointment as deputy
commissioner of military affairs) was assigned to the Han-lin Academy.147 The
way was now clear to proceed with their reforms.148
The reform program
Han Ch’i launched the reform process with a pair of memorials exhorting Jentsung to strengthen overall military preparedness, improve personnel procedures at every level of government, and improve economic performance while
easing the fiscal burdens on the people.149 But it was a joint memorial, submitted by Fan Chung-yen and Fu Pi in the ninth month of 1043, that defined the
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
HCP (1979) 138, pp. 3329–30.
HCP (1979) 138, pp. 3329, 3345–7; 140, pp. 3367–70.
HCP (1979) 139, pp. 3345–7.
Ch’ang et al., Sung-jen chuan-chi tzu-liao so-yin, p. 413; SS 432, pp. 12833–6.
HCP (1979) 138, pp. 3329–30; 152, pp. 3698–9.
HCP (1979) 140, pp. 3359, 3361; 142, pp. 3398–9.
HCP (1979) 143, pp. 3431–44; Liu, “An early Sung reformer: Fan Chung-yen,” pp. 112–22; Liu, Ouyang Hsiu, pp. 40–51; Bol, “This culture of ours,” pp. 171–2; Lee, Government education and examinations
in Sung China, pp. 233–4.
HCP (1979) 142, pp. 3412–15.
michael mcgrath
318
reform agenda.150 In this memorial the two men offered ten major recommendations: (1) improve the merit-rating system for assessing the performance of
those in office; (2) reduce the favoritism created through the widespread use of
the protection privilege (yin2) that allowed sons and other relatives of senior
officials to be appointed to office without having to write the examinations;
(3) purify the examination system by stressing the conduct of candidates and
testing their knowledge of the Classics rather than their skill in literary composition; (4) select officials for local office through sponsorship to ensure competence and honesty; (5) equalize the income from prefectural office lands to
minimize corruption; (6) increase agricultural productivity through land reclamation and water-control works; (7) improve military preparedness by reinstituting the T’ang dynasty militia system of self-supporting farmer-soldiers
( fu-ping); (8) reduce the need for corvée service by consolidating administrative
units; (9) enact imperial decrees of amnesty and grace systematically and properly; and (10) draft regulations and orders using appropriate language, based
on verified precedents, and enact them fully, uniformly, and universally. In a
separate and more provocative memorial, Fu Pi also recommended removing
unqualified circuit intendants and reducing the size of their staffs.
With the exception of the suggested revival of the T’ang system of farmersoldiers, the nonactivist members of the State Council (Chang Te-hsiang, Yen
Shu, Tu Yen, and Chia Ch’ang-ch’ao) were prepared to agree to all other
components of the reform agenda. Three of the proposals – increased land
reclamation and water control, proper implementation of amnesties and acts
of grace, and reevaluation of laws and regulations – resulted in no specific
legislation. Policies meant to address performance review rather than automatic
promotion of officials, examination reform, selection and appointment of local
officials based on recommendations and sponsorship, raising and equalizing
the salaries local officials received from office land, and reducing corvée service
were implemented over the next eight months, only to be aborted in early
1045 when the reformers were ousted by their opposition’s efforts.
Changes in the examination system and in the school system were the most
enduring aspects of the reforms, and these changes were important to the
literati class as a whole. Official local schools were not disestablished with the
rest of the reforms, but continued as undeniably desirable Confucian institutions. In the spring of 1044, Fan Chung-yen, Sung Ch’i, Wang Kung-ch’en,
Chang Fang-p’ing, Ou-yang Hsiu, Mei Chih, Tseng Kung-liang, Wang Shu,
Sun Fu, and Liu Shih recommended establishing schools in every prefecture
and in counties that had an adequate number of students. In contrast with
150
HCP (1979) 143, pp. 3431–44.
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
319
the earlier practice of endowing schools on an ad hoc basis, now every prefecture was allocated five ch’ing (about 70 acres) of school land, a set of the Nine
Classics, and a supervisory educational official. In deference to the reformers’
preference, ku-wen (ancient style of) writing, statecraft discussions, and plain
prose were given temporary precedence over literary style and the writing of
poetry in the civil service examinations.151 Although the debate over competing educational approaches – in particular, proponents of belles lettres, with its
focus on literary embellishment, and cultural entertainment versus advocates
(like the reformers) of a more Confucian approach based on a knowledge of ritual, music, and the Classics – was not yet permanently resolved by the reforms,
the priority given to local schools, examinations, and an Imperial University
(T’ai-hsüeh) continued well beyond the end of the reform movement.
Social and economic problems
One of the concerns of Jen-tsung and the reformers was how to relieve the
populace of the heavy burdens of taxation and service. Sung Ch’i had strongly
urged cutting the size of the civil service and the military in 1039, but nothing
was done. That this proposal was more than inflammatory rhetoric can be
judged from Wang Yao-ch’en’s 1043 fiscal report on revenue and expenditure
in the capital, and the Shan-hsi, Ho-pei, and Ho-tung circuits.152 Revenue
raised from the capital district had risen from 19.5 million strings in 1038 to
a bit more than 29 million strings in 1042; in Shan-hsi revenue had increased
from 19.8 million to 33.9 million between 1038 and 1042; in Ho-pei from
20 million to 27.5 million; and in Ho-tung from 10 million to 11.8 million.
In short, the revenue collected from the taxable populace in these four northern
regions had increased by 33 percent, 70 percent, 38 percent, and 18 percent,
respectively. In 1038 and in 1042 there were revenue surpluses, but at the
same time military spending in 1034 and during the decade from 1038 to
1048 were the highest for the Northern Sung as a whole by margins of 10
million to 20 million strings compared to all other years of the dynasty.153
In their quest for the causes of excessive taxation, the reformers focused
on such perennial problems as the high number of supernumerary officials
and soldiers, expensive gifts lavished on court favorites, tax-exempt Buddhist
and Taoist temples, and the inadequate number (despite the overall surplus)
151
152
153
HCP (1979) 147, pp. 3563–4. See also Bol, “This culture of ours,” pp. 169–75; Chaffee, The thorny gates of
learning in Sung China, pp. 51, 66–77; Liu, Ou-yang Hsiu, pp. 17, 69–70, 87–8, 148–52; Lee, Government
education and examinations in Sung China, pp. 62–4, 70–2, 129–30.
Chao, Chu-ch’en tsou-i 13, pp. 621–4; HCP (1979) 140, p. 3366.
Wong Hon-chiu, “Government expenditures in Northern Sung China (960–1127)” (diss., University
of Pennsylvania, 1975), pp. 182–93.
320
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of truly effective local and regional officials.154 It was thought that war and
defense on two fronts, banditry, trouble with resistant indigenous tribes along
the expanding southern frontiers, and natural disasters would only be more
effectively and justly dealt with by men of good character and education and
that it was basically the lack of such men that had produced all the problems
facing the empire.
Reformers like Ts’ai Hsiang thought that local government was more effective than its central counterpart, especially when it came to prosecuting the war
between Sung and Hsi Hsia.155 The contrast between the inertia of the central
government and the activism of the locally based reformers can be seen in an
incident that occurred in late spring of 1043.156 A crisis was looming because
tribute grain deliveries to the capital were not sufficient to feed the armies
in K’ai-feng through to the next harvest. Fan Chung-yen, newly installed as
deputy commissioner for military affairs, recommended an experienced fiscal and regional official who immediately coordinated the shipments of grain
from seventy-two prefectures spread over six circuits, quickly restoring the
K’ai-feng grain stock. Such individual administrative and reformist activities,
however, were inadequate to provide a long-term solution to extensive and
prolonged lapses in the local and regional management of civil, military, and
fiscal affairs. Moreover, the grain delivery system itself was breaking down.157
In the reformers’ view, the lack of effective local and regional administration left the empire unable to defend itself, to collect taxes effectively, or to
maintain law and order.158 But for all his moral outrage, Fan Chung-yen was
not prepared to struggle against an entrenched bureaucracy. For one thing, he
was able neither to gain Jen-tsung’s complete trust nor to shake the emperor
out of his complacency. More crucially, the reformers committed the tactical
mistake of openly threatening the livelihoods and status of thousands of sons,
nephews, cousins, protégés, and followers of officials, military officers, imperial
kinsmen, and eunuchs, by eliminating or reducing their easy access to office
and promotion. The initial threat to established career interests stemmed from
Ou-yang Hsiu’s requests to evaluate the performance of all local officials by
154
155
156
157
158
On excessive spending, see HCP (1979) 123, p. 2908; 125, pp. 2941–4; 135, p. 3233; 141, pp. 3387–8;
142, pp. 3412–15; 143, p. 3482; 154, p. 3742; 161, pp. 3895–6; on the bloated army, HCP (1979)
154, p. 3742; 159, p. 3839; 161, pp. 3895–8; 163, p. 3923; 163, p. 3930; on supernumerary officials,
HCP (1979) 123, p. 2893; 125, pp. 2941–4; 143, p. 3464; 158, p. 3823; 163, p. 3924; on the shortage
of good local officials, HCP (1979) 116, p. 2732; 141, p. 3386; 163, p. 3932; 166, p. 3985.
HCP (1979) 141, p. 3368.
HCP (1979) 141, p. 3373; HTC (1957) 45, pp. 1086–7.
HCP (1979) 147, p. 3556; Robert M. Hartwell, “Markets, technology, and structure of enterprise in
development of 11th-century Chinese iron and steel industry,” Journal of Economic History 26 No. 1
(1966), p. 30.
HCP (1979) 141, p. 3386; 148, p. 3593; 150, pp. 3622–4.
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
321
appointing fiscal intendants as surveillance commissioners (an-ch’a shih), with
the objective of eliminating incumbent officeholders who were too old, sickly,
corrupt, or incompetent.159 The resistance to this program was so great that it
was allowed to lapse in 1045.160 The zeal of Fan Chung-yen, Fu Pi, Yin Shu,
Shih Chieh, Ou-yang Hsiu, and their followers was not enough to overcome
the resentment of large numbers of officials, including powerful, experienced
politicians who would have lost their powers of patronage. Although officials such as Han Ch’i and P’ang Chi avoided much of this animus through
their restraint and impersonal approach to reform, the reform agenda was too
provocative to escape a backlash from well-entrenched bureaucratic interests.
Ousting the Ch’ing-li reformers
The ideals of the reformers, sustained and expressed intermittently over the
preceding twenty years, reflected the shared vision of an ideological faction. It
was this vision that had moved Jen-tsung to choose these like-minded men to
solve the problems of the empire. But complaints against the reformers were
immediately lodged by senior ministers, local officials, eunuchs, and favorites –
all who feared that customary practices for promotion, grace, and favors would
be limited or eliminated. Personal animosity drove Hsia Sung to oppose the
reforms, for he had been ousted as commissioner of military affairs in favor of Tu
Yen after a strenuous campaign by policy critics and censors in early 1043. Hsia
plotted revenge, particularly against Shih Chieh, a reputation-seeking lecturer
at the Directorate of Education, who had written a poem gloating over the
dismissals of Lü I-chien and Hsia himself, and crowing over the appointments
of Chang Te-hsiang, Yen Shu, Chia Ch’ang-ch’ao, Han Ch’i, Fan Chung-yen,
Fu Pi, Ou-yang Hsiu, Ts’ai Hsiang, Wang Su, Yü Ching, and Tu Yen.161 The
fastidious and brilliant Hsia Sung trained a servant girl to write in Shih Chieh’s
hand, using a note Shih Chieh had written to Fu Pi as a model for the forging of
a more incriminating version that raised the specter of factional plotting. This
forgery exacerbated the doubts already implanted in Jen-tsung’s mind by Fan
Chung-yen’s almost flippant response to the emperor’s question about whether
159
160
161
HCP (1979) 136, pp. 3251–9; 143, p. 3463; 144, p. 3480; 146, p. 3539; 148, pp. 3582–3.
HCP (1979) 155, p. 3772; 157, p. 3803. In 976, Chao P’u, at that point serving T’ai-tsung as chief
councilor, briefly instituted surveillance responsibilities for fiscal intendants to evaluate local officials.
HCP (1979) 17, pp. 385–6.
HCP (1979) 140, pp. 3364, 3370; 148, pp. 3580–2. See Jonathan Chaves, Mei Yao-ch’en and the
development of early Sung poetry (New York, 1976), pp. 71–4; Bol, “This culture of ours,” pp. 181–3, 162,
who make clear that Shih Chieh’s attack is literary as well as political; Liu, Ou-yang Hsiu, pp. 48–9. Even
after Shih Chieh died, Hsia Sung viciously implied that Shih Chieh was still alive and was involved in
a complex plot with the Tanguts and Fu Pi.
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the reformers constituted a faction: “It is for you to decide,” Fan had replied.
“If a faction is good, what harm is done to the state?” Ou-yang Hsiu further
inflamed the matter when he submitted an essay, “On Factions,” that argued
that men of principle working together could not be regarded as criminal,
even if they could be regarded as a faction.
Factionalism was not new to the Sung, but Fan Chung-yen’s reform movement transformed ordinary factional maneuverings into a debilitating crisis in
Sung government.162 If during Jen-tsung’s reign factionalism was a troubling
but passing issue, by the end of the eleventh century it would become the most
incendiary and destructive political trend at court.163 Fan Chung-yen’s role in
this process cannot be ignored, for Fan’s own denunciation of Lü I-chien, using
a chart to show Lü’s favoritism in appointments, brought factionalism into the
open by exposing the practice. It also provoked counterfactional dismissals,
while eliciting support for Fan Chung-yen in Confucian ethical terms.164
The remainder of Jen-tsung’s reign factions, once they had been named, had
to overcome both the weight of opposition and the weight of being identified
with the improper pursuit of self-interest. The reformers themselves practiced
a principled favoritism that set up a putative opposition to the dynasty in the
form of an impersonal loyalty to a set of values that transcended the state.
As Ou-yang Hsiu and others understood, there was no rhetorical escape, and
ideological groupings went underground in the face of careerists’ pragmatic
opposition. Factional conflict did not end, of course, and Jen-tsung and others
periodically decried the harm caused by anonymous factional denunciations
and the damage done to innocent bystanders.165 But factionalism was not
only a sensitive issue for Jen-tsung, it was also a convenient and effective
weapon for the opponents of reform, as Fan Chung-yen and Fu Pi came to
realize. Both were made especially nervous by the forged letter, and they soon
began to ask for appointments outside the capital.166 By the end of 1044,
162
163
164
165
166
For background on factionalism, see Gung, “The participation of censorial officials in politics during
the Northern Sung dynasty,” pp. 30–41. Emperor T’ai-tsung was twice advised to make an effort to
distinguish between factions composed of virtuous like-minded men and factions of those seeking
personal advantage. HCP (1979) 24, p. 547; 42, pp. 896–901.
See Chapter 6 in this volume. Robert P. Hymes, Statesmen and gentlemen: The elite of Fu-chou, Chiang-hsi,
in Northern and Southern Sung (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 1–6, 115–23, expands on the work of Robert
M. Hartwell to explain the shifts in elite patterns of self-advancement and status maintenance whose
roots are to be seen in the intensified factional politics of the reigns from Jen-tsung through Shen-tsung.
HCP (1979) 118, p. 2783; 122, pp. 2881–2.
HCP (1979) 151, p. 3691; 153, p. 3718; 160, p. 3861; 166, pp. 3983, 4001; 174, p. 4212; 176, p.
4268; 177, pp. 4285–9, 4293–4; 191, p. 4627; 192, pp. 4635, 4637–8; 193, pp. 4661–2, 4680–3;
194, pp. 4691–2; 205, p. 4968; SS 285, pp. 9606–7, 9619; Chao, Chu-ch’en tsou-i 13, pp. 642–3; 18,
pp. 793–6; 61, pp. 2247–9; 76, pp. 2668–9.
HCP (1979) 150, p. 3636.
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
323
Wang Kung-ch’en, an opponent of the reforms, was able to implicate Fan
Chung-yen and Tu Yen because of Su Shun-ch’in’s misuse of office money to
hire a dancing girl.167 Chia Ch’ang-ch’ao, one of the chief councilors, secretly
directed Wang Kung-ch’en, Sung Ch’i, and Chang Fang-p’ing against Han
Ch’i. Chang Te-hsiang, the other chief councilor, could not refute the charges,
which further undermined Jen-tsung’s confidence in Fan Chung-yen.168 At
the beginning of 1045, following the recent triennial worship of Heaven, Jentsung let Fan Chung-yen and Fu Pi take up prefectural seats and senior circuit
military intendancies. Tu Yen, who had been their supporter, was dismissed
shortly thereafter. The reformers had all been ousted by the time Han Ch’i
was dismissed in the early spring of 1045. Over the next year almost all the
reforms were either rescinded or allowed to lapse.
The retreat from reform (1042–1045) to inertial administration (1045–1063)
Court government was relatively quiet between 1046 and the deaths of Jentsung (in 1063) and his cousin and successor, Ying-tsung, in 1067.169 Jentsung continued to increase the size of the consultative group at court and of the
entire civil service. The experimentation and rapid turnover of chief officials
that had characterized the period after the end of Empress Liu’s regency in
1032 until 1045 was replaced by institutional stability combined with steady
turnover of smaller numbers of chief officials.170 Between 1045 and 1067,
thirty-nine officials served Jen-tsung and Ying-tsung as councilors of state. Of
these, only fourteen served fewer than three years, while the remaining twentyfive served from three to thirteen years. Wang I-yung was commissioner of
military affairs from 1045 to 1054; P’ang Chi served between 1045 and 1053,
eventually becoming chief councilor; Sung Hsiang, who had previously been
a councilor of state, served again between 1045 and 1051, obtaining the rank
of chief councilor; and Kao Jo-na, who served from 1047 to 1053, reached
the rank of commissioner of military affairs. For almost a decade, these four
men provided stability, but no particular program. Over the next several years
Jen-tsung appointed four more councilors of state – Chang Sheng, Chao Kai,
Ch’en Chiu (aka Ch’en Sheng-chih), and Ou-yang Hsiu – who continued to
serve for several years into Ying-tsung’s reign. A new, stable configuration of
senior officials was created in 1056 with the appointment of Han Ch’i and
167
168
169
170
HCP (1979) 153, pp. 3715–16.
HCP (1979) 154, p. 3740.
Liu Tzu-chien (James T. C. Liu), “An administrative cycle in Chinese history: The case of Northern
Sung emperors,” Journal of Asian Studies 21 No. 2 (1962), pp. 143–4, characterizes Jen-tsung as a
maintenance or normalcy-type emperor.
McGrath, “Military and regional administration in Northern Sung China,” pp. 124, 257.
324
michael mcgrath
Tseng Kung-liang, who each served as chief councilors through to the end of
Ying-tsung’s reign.
Despite episodes of factional conflict, favoritism, and crisis, these high
officials preserved an appearance of administrative order. Officials regularly
pointed out areas of excessive expenditure, but spending was not curtailed.
During the fifteen years from the end of the Ch’ing-li reforms until the end of
Ying-tsung’s reign in 1067, the number of civil and military officials steadily
grew from between 17,000 and 20,000 in the period 1049–53, to 24,000
in the period 1064–67. Four to seven thousand more officials were added to
the imperial payroll in seven years, a growth necessary to accommodate the
men who had passed the civil service exams, the continuation of the hereditary
protection privilege (yin2), and imperial clan official appointments.171
After Fan Chung-yen and his associates had been ousted from office, Jentsung backed away from an activist, programmatic administration with its
attendant factional conflict, and turned instead to a leisurely form of “cultural
glamour.”172 Jen-tsung was instinctively opposed to conflict within his court,
even to the point of dismissing chief and assistant councilors of state for arguing and wrangling.173 Officials became reluctant to discuss issues forcefully.
Factional politics remained at the heart of much of the wrangling, making any
issue at hand an opportunity for politicization. Reforms and programs only
intensified and clarified the lines of factional demarcation. Such was the traditional fear of disorder (luan) in politics, and such was Jen-tsung’s dislike of
discord, that the idealistic programs of the reformers were easily undermined
by claiming that they were the result of the conniving of a political faction.174
But Jen-tsung’s desire for civility and quiet must have rested uneasily with
his sense of obligation to heed frank speech and sincere criticism. Jen-tsung
solicited public advice from the civil service as a whole twelve times in his
reign – once in 1032, once in 1038, twice in 1040, twice in 1042, and once
each in 1043, 1047, 1048, 1049, 1053, and 1056. In contrast, Ying-tsung
“opened up the channels of remonstrance” (k’ai yen-lu) just once, in 1065. The
first time Jen-tsung asked for advice, the dowager empress Liu’s pretensions
were beginning to cause concern, the empire was beset by famine and locusts,
and part of the inner palace had just burned down.175 In 1038, the emperor
171
172
173
174
175
Wong, “Government expenditures in Northern Sung China,” pp. 62–73; Lo Wen (Winston W. Lo),
Szechwan in Sung China: A case study in the political integration of the Chinese empire (Taipei, 1982),
pp. 79–80.
S. A. M. Adshead, China in world history (New York, 1988), p. 102; HCP (1979) 120, p. 2841.
In 1046 and 1047 Jen-tsung shifted and dismissed councilors of state for these reasons. HCP (1979)
160, p. 3865.
HCP (1979) 122, pp. 2881–2; 176, pp. 4264–7; 193, pp. 4680–3.
HCP (1979) 111, p. 3587.
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
325
asked for advice following earthquakes in the capital district and in the Hopei region.176 In 1040, 1042, and 1043, Jen-tsung solicited advice about the
war with Hsi Hsia, the threats from the Liao, mutinies, uprisings, banditry,
famine, massive expenses, currency problems, insufficient grain to supply the
military in the capital, and the need to mobilize hundreds of thousands of
men, militias, and regional and imperial military units.177 In 1047, Jentsung asked for advice concerning the drought in the capital district.178 In
1048, the circumstances were much more dramatic; Wang Tse’s sixty-fiveday rebellion in the heart of Ho-pei had caused major disruptions close to
the capital, and unrest still simmered. Moreover, the palace was hit with a
mutiny, and military spending remained extremely high.179 In 1049, Jentsung must have felt overwhelmed from both the flooding in the Ching-tung
and Ching-hsi circuits and the resulting masses of refugees, and an outbreak of
banditry that had followed an inauspicious solar eclipse in the first month.180
In 1056, Jen-tsung became very ill, and heavy rains had overloaded the Yellow
River, producing widespread flooding and a major shift in the river’s course.181
After his illness in 1056, Jen-tsung continued his gradual withdrawal from
public affairs that had begun after the death of his Precious Consort Chang in
1054. By and large, the advice he received on these occasions was sensible but
predictable, and produced little in positive results.
There were many reasons for the passivity of Jen-tsung’s court following
the failed Ch’ing-li reforms. At the broadest level, growth of the official class
through hereditary protection (yin2), special grace following major ceremonies
and rites, enlargement of the examination quotas, and the establishment and
support of prefectural schools met with complacency among the majority of
officials. Only a few spoke out against the “too many” and the “too much.”182
Moreover, once the war with Hsi Hsia had been resolved and military spending
decreased, most of the social and economic issues sank below the horizon of
official awareness. Administration became increasingly routine, relying on
precedent.183 In particular, few changes were made to the byzantine welter
of regulations and procedures used to govern ritual and sumptuary practices;
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
HCP (1979) 121, p. 2851.
HCP (1979) 126, pp. 2978, 2982, 2986; 136, p. 3250; 143, pp. 3430–1.
HCP (1979) 160, p. 3865.
SS 11, p. 225; HCP (1979) 163, p. 3922.
HCP (1979) 166, p. 3988.
HCP (1979) 182, p. 4416.
See Lo, Introduction to the civil service of Sung China, pp. 29–30. He refers to yin2 as “the institutionalization
of the self-perpetuating propensity of the ruling elite.” HCP (1979) 158, p. 3824; 167, pp. 4018, 4023–
8; 169, p. 4059; 181, pp. 4374–6; 187, p. 4505; 208, pp. 5052, 5058–62; Chao, Chu-ch’en tsou-i 49,
pp. 1864–5; 70, pp. 2499–2502.
HCP (1979) 176, p. 4270.
326
michael mcgrath
management of the imperial clan, harem, and eunuchs; and military, regional,
and local administration.184 Pragmatic institutional memories were compiled
into books of precedents that improved conventional and ad hoc responses to
routine events but did not address issues of goals or purposes – only reformers
raised these issues and usually only when disasters or crises brought them to
the fore.
Although there were few outright crises, the list of problems facing the
Sung at midcentury remained daunting. During Jen-tsung’s reign the clearest
problem in regional and local administration was the persistent shortage of
officials in prefectural and county-level positions despite an abundance of
officials of the correct rank waiting for posts. This shortage was matched by
problems in the north with support services for local officials,185 as well as by
unequal taxation and tax collection, banditry, disaster relief, and the rapacity
of officials and clerks.186 Granaries for price stabilization, disaster relief, and
poor relief were established with regular deposits of grain by late in Jen-tsung’s
reign.187 Disaster relief, however, sometimes meant enrolling disaster victims
into military units.188 Attempts were made right to the end of the Sung dynasty
to resolve unequal taxation, although this was structurally incompatible with
the growth of the estates that reemerged at this time. By contrast, few attempts
were made to control the constant flooding of the Yellow River, even though,
as Klaus Flessel has shown, the technical knowledge and experience available
at the time might have made this possible. What was lacking was imperial
and central government commitment.189 In the absence of large-scale watercontrol measures, flooding routinely beset the Ho-pei and Ching-tung circuits,
and the Yellow River shifted its course with hugh damage and loss of life in
1036, 1048, 1056, 1060, and 1081.190
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
HCP (1979) 157, p. 3805; 160, p. 3861; 161, p. 3887; 181, p. 4380; 184, p. 4447; 185, pp. 4478–9;
186, pp. 4486, 4492; 187, pp. 4509, 4512; 188, p. 4536; 194, p. 4713; 195, pp. 4726, 4730–1; 196,
p. 4744; 205, pp. 4966, 4968; 208, p. 5053.
HCP (1979) 168, pp. 4045–6; 188, p. 4539; 189, p. 4570; 190, p. 4597; 206, p. 5007; Kracke, Civil
service in early Sung China, p. 89.
HCP (1979) 151, pp. 3670–3; 161, p. 3887; 164, p. 3956; 165, p. 3975; 170, p. 4077; 170, p. 4097;
174, p. 4214; 175, pp. 4219, 4227, 4235; 176, p. 4256; 180, p. 4355; 183, p. 4424; 187, pp. 4508–9;
190, pp. 4590–1; 192, pp. 4654–7; 194, p. 4691.
HCP (1979) 175, p. 4219; 179, pp. 4331–3; 186, p. 4488; 189, p. 4570; 199, p. 4841; 202, p. 4901;
204, pp. 4954–5; 206, p. 5014; SS 176, pp. 4275–9.
HCP (1979) 107, p. 2499; 109, p. 2536; 111, p. 2578; 112, p. 2627; 127, p. 3009; 135, p. 3213; 139,
p. 3342; 164, p. 3957; 166, pp. 2985–6; 204, p. 4941; SS 192, pp. 4767, 4773, 4777, 4780–1; 193,
pp. 4799, 4801–6; 199, pp. 4976–7, 4979, 4989, 5015, 5020; 313, p. 10259. See also Lo, “Pei Sung
ping-chih yen-chiu,” pp. 232–5; Chien Po-tsan, Chung-kuo shih kang-yao (1962; Peking, 1979), vol. 3,
p. 13; Ts’ai Mei-piao et al., Chung-kuo t’ung-shih: ti wu ts’e, 5th ed. (Peking, 1978), p. 130; McGrath,
“Military and regional administration in Northern Sung China,” p. 305.
Flessel, Der Huang-ho und die historische Hydrotechnik in China, pp. 128, 140.
HCP (1979) 118, p. 2787; 183, p. 4448; 191, p. 4610; SS 91, pp. 2266–74; 299, p. 9932.
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
327
Tax collection was the essential administrative function necessary to sustain
the state. Prefectures and counties collected the basic land-tax revenue partly
in the form of cash, and partly in grain and other commodities; they arranged
the levying of labor services, and they relied on local sub-bureaucratic service
organizations for commodity delivery, tax collection, and the maintenance of
local defenses. Fiscal and transport intendants insured the delivery of taxes
to K’ai-feng. During Jen-tsung’s reign and especially in the latter half, tax
revenue was increasingly paid in cash and increasingly derived from taxes on
commerce and from the state’s monopolies on tea, salt, and wine. This high
level of reliance on taxing commerce was not seen again until the middle of
the nineteenth century, but it was necessitated by a decline in land-tax revenue
due to the unequal application of the tax.191
Iron currency and paper money were used in Ho-tung, Shan-hsi, and Szechwan to compensate for an unmet demand for currency and to protect the Sung
from the outflow of copper coin from the frontier circuits to Hsi Hsia or Liao,
both of which were deficient in metals. Within the iron currency areas, counterfeiting was a problem. This was usually solved by adjusting the exchange
rate between copper and iron coin. In 1048 the currency systems in the north
were in shambles but were quickly restored to normal.192 Deficits arising during the 1038–45 war with Hsi Hsia were covered directly by the throne from
the Palace Treasuries and repaid later. Fresh deficits built up in 1056 and 1057,
primarily as a result of the remission of taxes, the reinstitution of the Ho-pei
grain delivery, and the breakdown of the grain delivery system.193 Fortunately,
in contrast to the deficits of the 1040s, the deficits of 1056 and 1057 occurred
during a decade of surplus revenue.194 Even so, the problems were significant
enough for Wang An-shih (1021–86), future architect of Shen-tsung’s New
Policies (hsin-fa), to submit a memorial on the subject.195 But given the institutional inertia of the last years of Jen-tsung’s reign, it would take ten more
191
192
193
194
195
Golas, “The Sung financial administration”; Chou Chin-sheng, An economic history of China, ed. and trans.
Edward H. Kaplan (Bellingham, Wash., 1974), p. 91; Edmund H. Worthy, Jr., “Regional control in the
Southern Sung salt administration,” in Crisis and prosperity in Sung China, ed. John W. Haeger (Tucson,
Ariz., 1975), pp. 101–41; HCP (1979) 190, pp. 4590–1; 192, pp. 4654–7; 194, p. 4691; SS 326, pp.
10530–3.
HCP (1979) 164, pp. 3954–6; 183, p. 4441; 189, p. 4552; SS 180, pp. 4375, 4381; 185, p. 4525; Golas,
“The Sung financial administration”; Robert M. Hartwell, “The evolution of the early Northern Sung
monetary system, a.d. 960–1025,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 87 No. 3 (1967), pp. 280–9,
for insight into the workings of the Sung monetary system; Peter J. Golas, “A copper production
breakthrough in the Song: The copper precipitation process,” Journal of Sung-Yuan Studies 25 (1995),
pp. 153–68; Yang Lien-sheng, Money and credit in China: A short history (Cambridge, Mass., 1952),
pp. 153–68.
SS 175, pp. 4252–3; HCP (1979) 176, p. 4271; 181, p. 4382; 182, pp. 4409, 4414; 183, p. 4423;
185, pp. 4472–3; 186, p. 4488; 188, pp. 4531–2; Chao, Chu-ch’en tsou-i 40, pp. 1471–2.
Hartwell, “The imperial treasuries,” p. 62; SS 179, p. 4353.
HCP (1979) 188, pp. 4531–2.
328
michael mcgrath
years before Wang’s suggested reform would be implemented. In 1065 the
government once again was unable to cover all its expenditures, revealing the
depth and pervasiveness of the problems the empire faced.196
the southern frontier region
Jen-tsung’s policy makers also had to confront problems in the regions of the
south. Although the south may have been politically underrepresented until
the latter part of the Northern Sung, it was geographically and economically
an essential part of the empire. By the Ch’ing-li period (1041–8), the circuits along the southwest borders – Tzu-chou, K’uei-chou, Ching-hu South,
Kuang-nan East, and Kuang-nan West – having absorbed immigrants, miners, soldiers, and officials in search of wealth and territory, erupted in a series of
small and large frontier wars, uprisings among the indigenous population, and
banditry.197 The southern frontier districts of Fu-chien and most of Szechwan
were by now more fully incorporated in the empire and went largely untouched
by the upheavals of the late 1030s and early 1040s.198
The Ching-hu and Kuang-nan circuits and Szechwan’s southernmost frontier prefectures of Jung-chou and Lu-chou3 were three regions where conflict
broke out between the Sung and indigenous non-Han populations. In part,
these conflicts resulted from the Sung court’s inclination, despite its tolerance of Buddhism and Taoism, to suppress the heterodox rituals they associated with southern peoples.199 The Sung court dealt with these conflicts by
posting rewards for the capture of bandits, organizing local braves to maintain order, establishing military patrol units (hsün-chien), building walls and
strongholds, bringing in or assembling imperial expeditionary forces, and
196
197
198
199
Wong, “Government expenditures in Northern Sung China,” pp. xxxix, 60–1.
Richard von Glahn, The country of streams and grottoes: Expansion, settlement, and the civilizing of the Sichuan
frontier in Song times (Cambridge, Mass., 1987), pp. 75, 208–9; Peter J. Golas, “Rural China in the
Song,” Journal of Asian Studies 39 No. 2 (1980), p. 295; Hartwell, “Demographic, political, and social
transformations of China,” pp. 369–71, 375–7; Brian E. McKnight, Law and order in Sung China
(Cambridge, 1992), pp. 79–81, 115.
See Hugh R. Clark, “Consolidation of the south China frontier: The development of Ch’uan-chou, 699–
1126” (diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1981), pp. 259–60, 359–77. Fu-chien had three recorded
problems with salt smugglers and bandits in the 1040s, and in 1054 and 1059. Szechwan had one local
uprising in 1028 and two famine-generated local uprisings in 1040 and 1057.
For examples of suppression, see HCP (1979) 24, p. 554; 159, p. 3847; 192, p. 4653; 203, p. 4928; von
Glahn, Country of streams and grottoes, p. 212; McKnight, Law and order in Sung China, pp. 75–9. Chang
Fang-p’ing noted that twenty out of seventy cases he reviewed when he directed the Judicial Control
Office (Shen-hsing yüan) involved questions of heterodoxy. HCP (1979) 163, p. 3928. See Guillaume
Dunstheimer, “Some religious aspects of secret societies,” in Popular movements and secret societies in China,
1840–1950, ed. Jean Chesneaux (Stanford, Calif., 1972), pp. 23–8, for clarification of the concept of
heterodoxy.
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
329
enticing leaders to call off their rebellion or banditry in exchange for local
office.200 But the administration of these regions was difficult and very thinly
spread: local officials often had to confront rugged terrain and tropical diseases, and had inadequate military force at their disposal. Even the frontiers
were ill-defined, with many local communities subject to conflicting influence
not only by Sung but also from the Viet state and the local Ta-li kingdom in
Yunnan.201
The Nung Chih-kao uprising (1049–1053)
During Jen-tsung’s reign there were seven multiyear conflicts with groups
in the south: (1) the native tribes of An-hua county in I-chou3 prefecture
of Kuang-nan West in 1038–9;202 (2) the Yao2 people of Kuei-yang chien,
Ching-hu South, 1043–51;203 (3) locals led by Ch’ü-pu-fan in I-chou3, Kuangnan West, 1044–5;204 (4) aboriginal groups in Yü-ching chien, in Lu-chou3
prefecture of Tzu-chou circuit, 1044–9;205 (5) Nung Chih-kao’s uprising centered on Yung-chou2, Kuang-nan West, 1049–53;206 (6) P’eng Shih-hsi’s
conflict with the Sung in Hsia-hsi-chou in Ching-hu North, 1055–8;207 and
(7) the indigenous peoples of Yung-chou2 in 1058–61.208 Of these, the second disrupted a very important silver-mining center for some years, but most
were of minor importance. Only Nung Chih-kao’s uprising posed a significant
threat to the dynasty on a wider scale. Nung Chih-kao captured dozens of
forts, markets, towns, and cities in Kuang-nan West and East. Based in the
border region between the Sung and the Vietnamese Ly dynasty (Chiao-chih in
Chinese), which was only lightly patrolled by the Sung, Nung brought his two
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
HCP (1979) 145, p. 3514; 146, p. 3541; 148, p. 3591; 149, p. 3616; 151, p. 3665; 158, pp. 3819,
3822; 160, p. 3873; 177, pp. 4292, 4295; 178, p. 4304; 182, p. 4398; 187, pp. 4504, 4514; 188,
pp. 4527–8; 192, pp. 4634, 4652; 194, p. 4687.
Von Glahn, Country of streams and grottoes, p. 105; HCP (1979) 127, p. 2884.
HCP (1979) 122, p. 2886; 123, p. 2892.
HCP (1979) 141, p. 3390; 143, pp. 3430, 3462; 144, pp. 3476–8; 145, p. 3513; 146, pp. 3558–63;
152, pp. 3701–3; 157, p. 3812; 158, p. 3819; 159, pp. 3847–8; 160, pp. 3859, 3873; 161, p. 3869;
170, p. 4098; 190, p. 4595.
HCP (1979) 121, p. 2874; 146, p. 3541; 148, pp. 3578–9; 151, p. 3665; 152, pp. 3701–3; 155,
p. 3760; 156, p. 3777; 157, p. 3812.
HCP (1979) 148, p. 3591; 166, p. 3998; von Glahn, Country of streams and grottoes, pp. 73–5, 80, 86–7,
90, 92–5.
HCP (1979) 167, pp. 4014–5; 168, pp. 4041–2; 170, p. 4078; 172, pp. 4140, 4142, 4147–55; 173,
pp. 4162, 4165, 4170, 4175, 4178, 4182–5; 174, pp. 4190, 4197; 175, pp. 4221, 4239; 180, p. 4355;
186, p. 4493; 192, p. 4647.
HCP (1979) 181, p. 4382; 183, p. 4440; 185, pp. 4468, 4475; 186, pp. 4490–1, 4494; 187, p. 4514;
188, pp. 4525–6; von Glahn, Country of streams and grottoes, p. 99.
HCP (1979) 119, p. 2795; 178, p. 4304; 182, p. 4398; 187, p. 4517; 190, p. 4593; 191, p. 4628; 192,
pp. 4634, 4636, 4647, 4654; 193, p. 4664.
0
Hsia-hsi-chou
Yü-ching-chien
(1055–58)
(1044–49)
300 km
0
200 miles
Prefectures taken by Nung Chih-kao in the
course of his rebellion
Sites of additional uprisings
Site of the Military Pacification Intendant
Path of Nung Chi-kao’s forces in 1052
Kuei-yang-chien
(1043–51)
KUEI
An-hua
(Kuei-lin)
(1038–39)
TA-LI
LIEN
I
HO
(1044–45)
Yu
Riv
e
r
KUNG
Heng-shan Fort
PIN
An-te
KUEI
Kuang-yüan
YUNG
(1049–53)
(1058–61)
WU
FENG
KUANG-CHOU
T’ENG
JUNG
HENG
CHIAO-CHIH
(LY DYNASTY)
Map 14. Nung Chih-kao’s uprising, 1049–1053.
K’ANG
JUI
(Canton)
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
331
greater neighbors into a confrontation in a contested border zone populated
with multiple non-Han and non-Vietnamese groups.209
In the fall of 1049, Nung Chih-kao declared himself ruler of a kingdom
with its own reign title, a direct challenge to Jen-tsung’s authority as the
Son of Heaven. Nung Chih-kao was a distaff descendant of an elite nonChinese lineage in Kuang-yüan-chou, southwest of Yung-chou2. Kuang-yüanchou lay within Sung jurisdiction but was also claimed, but not controlled,
by the Ly dynasty. Yung-chou2 was a large frontier territory of nearly fiftyeight hundred square miles, with two counties, one outpost, one gold market,
and sixty settlements of local non-Chinese with a registered population of
approximately five thousand households. Initially the conflict was local and
did not involve many Chinese residents. Not until some fifty Chinese towns
and cities in Kuang-nan West were attacked or captured by the rebels in the
spring of 1052, did the Sung government react. By year’s end, the high-ranking
eunuch, Kao Huai-cheng, was sent to oversee the capture of the Yung-chou2
bandits.
Caught between the hostile Ly kingdom and a Sung empire unwilling to
accept him as a vassal ruler, Nung Chih-kao started to carve out his own
state in the spring of 1052. This was not the first time a member of his clan
had made such an attempt. In 1038 his father, Nung Tsun-fu, had rebelled
against the Viet kingdom and set up an independent state (Ch’ang-shen kuo).
In 1041, Nung Chih-kao and his mother had tried to set up a Ta-li kingdom
(Ta-li kuo) in Tang-yu prefecture, his father’s base, only to be suppressed again
by Vietnamese forces. In 1048, Nang Chih-kao initiated another unsuccessful
revolt, escaping to An-te prefecture where he set up the Nan-t’ien kingdom
(Nan-t’ien kuo), about 155 miles west of the prefectural seat, Yung-chou2.
With the assistance of Huang Wei and Huang Shih-mi, two chin-shih degree
holders from Kuang-chou, he planned to establish an independent kingdom.
His first step was to move his five thousand followers some 70 miles east
and capture Heng-shan Fort, an important outpost on the Yu River 90 miles
upstream from Yung-chou2.210
On the first day of the fifth month of 1052, Nung captured Yungchou2, declared himself the Jen-hui emperor, and took the reign title of
Ch’i-li (Annunciatory Calendar). In three weeks his forces had advanced
almost 185 miles downriver, capturing Heng-chou2, Kung-chou, T’eng-chou,
209
210
For a monographic study of Nung Chih-kao’s rebellion in the larger context of Sino-Vietnamese relations,
see James A. Anderson, The rebel den of Nùng Trı́ Cao: Eleventh-century rebellion and response along the SinoVietnamese frontier (Seattle, Wash., 2006).
See Araki Toshikazu, “Nung Chih-kao and the k’o-ch’ü examinations,” Acta Asiatica 50 (1986), pp. 73–
5, 82–3; and Ch’en et al., Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo 31, p. 273.
332
michael mcgrath
Wu-chou2, Feng-chou2, K’ang-chou, Tuan-chou, and finally Kuang-chou
(Canton), overrunning a huge territory that had been only lightly garrisoned
by the Sung. Not until the twenty-eighth day of the month did the Sung
emperor respond, by ordering Ch’en Shu, the prefect of the untouched river
town Kuei-chou3 (Kuei-lin, about 150 miles north of Wu-chou2), to lead
an expedition against Nung Chih-kao. Around the same time, the trusted
courtier Yü Ching was appointed both pacification intendant for Kuang-nan
West and prefect of Kuei-chou3 (Kuei-lin), on account of his earlier experience
in Shao-chou2 in Kuang-nan East. Yang T’ien, formerly attached to the Historiography Institute, was appointed investigating pacification intendant and
supervisor of bandit suppression, based on his experience in dealing with the
Man tribes. These field assignments were matched at court by the appointment
of Ti Ch’ing as the deputy commissioner of military affairs. Critics observed
that Ti Ch’ing’s rise through the ranks to become a councilor of state had
been unprecedented and, further, that allowing a military man to become a
councilor of state might make the Sung the object of ridicule. Jen-tsung was
unmoved. The emperor did ask Ti Ch’ing to remove his tattoos, but when Ti
said that they reminded him of his origins and would also encourage other
military men to be proud of their service Jen-tsung’s respect for his general
only increased.211 Nonetheless, there was widespread opposition to Ti Ch’ing’s
appointment when he left for Kuang-nan to supervise the war against Nung
Chih-kao.
Although Nung Chih-kao had captured and looted Kuang-chou, he could
not hold the great city. Yet attempts to stop Nung Chih-kao as he withdrew from Kuang-chou, including the deployment of a river fleet carrying
two thousand locally recruited braves, were unsuccessful. However, Nung’s
forces were prevented from advancing northward into the regions of Kiangsi
and Hunan. In the fall of 1052, Sun Mien, an auxiliary academician of the
Bureau of Military Affairs, was sent to keep the region of Ching-hu South
and Chiang-nan West peaceful and isolated from the Kuang-nan campaign.
During his interview with the emperor, Sun Mien so impressed Jen-tsung with
a correct prediction about the defeat of one of the imperial forces in Kuangnan that Jen-tsung granted him plenipotentiary authority and widened his
jurisdiction to include Kuang-nan. Fearing that Nung Chih-kao might set
his sights northward, Sun Mien transferred some troops and openly repaired
and built fortifications so that Nung would not dare to attack northward.
Meanwhile Nung’s western path of retreat along the Hsi River was blocked by
barricades and troops so that he was forced to skirt north and then head west
211
HTC (1957) 52, pp. 1272–3.
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
333
through the hills to Lien-chou and Ho-chou, and, ultimately, back to Yungchou2.
Now five months into the campaign and with Sung military units still making little headway, Jen-tsung and his councilors decided they needed a different
pacification leadership group: Yü Ching was appointed supervisor of soldiery
and bandit suppression, Ti Ch’ing was appointed pacification intendant for
Kuang-nan and chief supervisor of bandit suppression (tu-ta t’i-chü kuang-nantung-hsi lu ching-chih tao-tsei shih), and Sun Mien was appointed deputy pacification intendant. Two weeks later, Jen-tsung decreed that Ti Ch’ing would be
reappointed deputy commissioner of military affairs upon his return from the
Yung-chou2 campaign. On his return Sun Mien was also appointed a deputy
commissioner of military affairs. The first response to the Sung military problem was to reduce the span of control by dividing Kuang-nan West into three
military circuits, with headquarters in I-chou3, Jung-chou, and Yung-chou2,
coordinated from Kuei-lin by a military pacification intendant. Fifteen thousand northern infantry and cavalry from Shan-hsi were eventually brought into
the campaign. Initially, Ti Ch’ing was criticized for trying to use cavalry in
Kuang-nan, but Kao Jo-na, now commissioner of military affairs, concurred
with Ti Ch’ing’s plan. Sun Mien conscripted more local troops to transport
supplies to the armies, enticing the conscripts with a thirty percent reduction
in their fall tax payment. The Vietnamese ruler, Li T’ai-tsung (r. 1028–54),
offered to send twenty thousand of his own troops to help exterminate Nung
Chih-kao, but his offer was declined.
On the sixth day of the new year 1053, and prior to Ti Ch’ing’s arrival,
the hot-headed Ch’en Shu, hungry for glory, led eight thousand infantry to
K’un-lun Pass, the fastest route from Pin-chou2 to Yung-chou2, where he was
defeated once again. Two days later, Ti Ch’ing arrived at Pin-chou2 with the
combined forces of Sun Mien and Yü Ching. Lack of discipline on the part of
both troops and commanding officers continued to be a problem. No coherent
strategic or even tactical plan could be implemented without reliable troops
and responsive leaders. Ti Ch’ing executed Ch’en Shu and thirty-two reckless
commanders and imperial military officers for acting irresponsibly, effectively
bringing the expeditionary forces under his own control. Even Sun Mien and
Yü Ching were cowed by the violence. Ti Ch’ing absolved Yü Ching for having
urged Ch’en Shu to attack, informing him, “The Drafting Official is a civil
official, so commanding the army is not within his jurisdiction.”212 Ti Ch’ing
then announced, as a ruse, that the army would remain in place for ten days,
but instead he attacked the unsuspecting Nung Chih-kao on the ninth day.
212
HTC (1957) 53, p. 1286.
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Ti Ch’ing’s forces captured Yung-chou2 and beheaded more than five thousand
of Nung Chih-kao’s followers, but Nung himself escaped to the Ta-li kingdom in Yunnan. Immediately, rewards were distributed to all Sung military
units.
As soon as Jen-tsung received word of Ti Ch’ing’s victory, he asked P’ang
Chi to arrange to honor Ti with a promotion to commissioner of military affairs
and chief councilor. P’ang Chi pointed out that T’ai-tsu had never rewarded
a general with so high a civil post, but Jen-tsung insisted. In the wake of
the Nung Chih-kao rebellion the Kuang-nan fiscal intendancy was ordered
to relieve the impoverished population in Yung-chou2 by making a loan of
grain to each household. Following the recommendation of Chou Hang, who
had gone to Kuang-nan after the rebellion as an investigating pacification
intendant, displaced people were given one year to return to their land and
were to be relieved of up to three years of labor service. At the end of the
year, officials in Kuang-nan West reported that Nung Chih-kao’s mother and
his sons and younger brother had been captured. They were kept imprisoned
until the middle of 1055, when they were executed following the news of
Nung Chih-kao’s death in Ta-li. But even now the Nungs were not quelled:
between 1057 and 1062 a bandit named Nung Tsung-tan harassed Yungchou2 until he was finally allowed to submit and was given a Sung official
rank.
the imperial women
Women played an openly influential role in Jen-tsung’s life and also in the
politics of his court, especially during Dowager Empress Liu’s regency.213
Over his forty-year reign, Jen-tsung had four empresses and twelve consorts.
Empress Kuo, his first empress, and Empress Ts’ao, his second, were his only
two actual empresses. The other two were favorites whom he posthumously
elevated to the status of empress. Jen-tsung had thirteen daughters, nine of
whom died in childhood.214 His eldest daughter, the Chou-ch’en Princess
(1038–70), was born to Lady Miao and married to a maternal cousin, Li Wei.
The emperor treated them indulgently. In 1060 and 1061, she and her husband
not only had marital problems, but they also broke the sumptuary laws by
maintaining a household with more than their permitted quota of eunuchs
and low-ranking military officials, many of whom had been given sinecure
monopoly-tax offices. Jen-tsung did little about the complaints, about the
213
214
For a general study, see Priscilla C. Chung, “Political power and social prestige of palace women in the
Northern Sung (960–1126)” (diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1977).
SS 248, pp. 8776–8; Li Chih, Huang Sung shih-ch’ao kang-yao (c. 1213; Taipei, 1980) 4, pp. 126–7.
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
335
couple, and in general allowed his daughters to come and go freely.215 Jentsung had no surviving sons. He fathered only three boys, none of whom lived
for more than three years.216 Jen-tsung’s eventual heir was his cousin, Chao
Tsung-shih, the thirteenth son of Chao Yün-jang, himself the third son of
T’ai-tsung’s third son.217
Jen-tsung was often criticized for his excessive generosity to his relatives and
favorites and their families. For example, when Lady Chang, his favorite during
the Ch’ing-li years, died in 1054, Jen-tsung promoted her to the posthumous
title of Wen-ch’eng Empress (Wen-ch’eng huang-hou). He also bestowed various
posthumous ranks on an unprecedented three generations of her male ancestors;
assigned her brother to office and her paternal uncle, Chang Yao-tso, to a
number of prestigious posts; and granted her mother honorary titles. This
display of favoritism provoked much criticism, which he ignored.218 Favors
also went to palace wet nurses, to princesses, to Lady Miao, to another one of
Jen-tsung’s deceased sons, and to the Chou-chen Princess.219
In contrast, troublesome groups of palace women could always be expelled
on the basis of omens; for example, the day after a partial solar eclipse in
1059, 214 women were released from palace service, and the following month
another 236 women were released, including two particular troublemakers.220
the death of jen-tsung and the accession of ying-tsung
Jen-tsung died at the beginning of 1063, passing the throne on to a cousin,
Chao Tsung-shih, leaving no princely houses of his own. Chao Tsung-shih,
known to us as Ying-tsung (r. 1063–7), was the fifth emperor of the Sung
dynasty and the third palace emperor. Although not born in the imperial palace,
Ying-tsung was raised there and was a palace emperor unacquainted with the
world outside – like his two immediate predecessors, Jen-tsung and Chentsung, and unlike his great-grandfather, T’ai-tsung, and great-granduncle,
T’ai-tsu. Even Jen-tsung traveled further afield than Ying-tsung, traveling
215
216
217
218
219
220
HCP (1979) 124, p. 2924; 192, pp. 4646–7; Chao, Chu-ch’en tsou-i 126, pp. 4281–2; 31, pp. 1170–6;
33, pp. 1221–2; SS 242, p. 8617.
The Prince of Yang, Fang, was born in 1037 to Lady Yü. The Prince of Yung, Chin, was born in 1039
to Lady Chu. The Prince of Ching, Hsi, was born in 1041 to Lady Miao. HCP (1979) 120, p. 2831;
124, p. 2922; 129, p. 3050; 131, pp. 3103, 3109, 3127; 133, p. 3161; SS 245, p. 8708.
SS 245, p. 8708; Po-yang, Chung-kuo ti-wang huang-hou ch’in-wang kung-chu shih-hsi lu (Taipei, 1977).
HCP (1979) 136, p. 3246; 137, p. 3300; 147, pp. 3555–6; 158, p. 3826; 169, p. 4061; Chao, Chu-ch’en
tsou-i 23, pp. 950–1; 34, pp. 1250–6.
HCP (1979) 124, p. 2924; 134, pp. 3189, 3208; 135, p. 3228; 137, p. 3300; 155, p. 3766; 185,
p. 4478; 186, p. 4484.
HCP (1979) 189, p. 4571; 190, p. 4579; Chung, “Political power and social prestige of palace women
in the Northern Sung,” pp. 97–107.
336
michael mcgrath
once to Kung county where the imperial tombs were located, only seventyfive miles from the capital, K’ai-feng. Dowager Empress Ts’ao served as regent
for the first full year of his reign. Ying-tsung died on the 25th of January
1067. His forty-four-month reign was significant only as a transitional period
between Jen-tsung’s reign and Shen-tsung’s reign.
Chao Tsung-shih (the future Ying-tsung), thirteenth of the twenty-eight
sons of Chao Yün-jang (995–1059), was born on 17 February 1032.221 He
was brought into the palace under the care of Empress Ts’ao in 1035, where
he was appointed t’ai-tzu (heir apparent) and given the name Tsung-shih.
It is clear from the advice of Dowager Empress Yang that Chao Tsung-shih
had not been formally designated or chosen as Jen-tsung’s heir.222 In 1039,
when Jen-tsung’s second son was born, Tsung-shih was returned to his father’s
household at the Hostel for Imperial Clansmen. Chao Tsung-shih’s natural
father, Chao Yün-jang, was the third son of Chao Yüan-fen who was a son of
T’ai-tsung. Chao Yün-jang had many years before been brought into the palace
by Chen-tsung as a potential heir before Jen-tsung was born, and became the
inseparable companion of Jen-tsung before Jen-tsung was himself designated
heir. When Chao Yün-jang became ill in late 1059 Jen-tsung visited the
prince and thereafter asked after him daily. When the prince died in midDecember, the emperor personally visited the family to offer his condolences
and suspended court for five days. Chao Yün-jang was posthumously enfeoffed
as Prince of P’u with the posthumous name An-i. He had served as director
of the Chief Office of Imperial Clan Affairs for twenty years. Chao Yün-jang’s
largesse and generosity were matched by a rigorous sternness. His son, the
future Ying-tsung, learned an emotional and punctilious form of filial piety
from him and from his elder cousin, Jen-tsung. At the end of 1060, Jentsung appointed Chao Yün-pi and Chao Ts’ung-ku as director and acting
codirector of the Chief Office of Imperial Clan Affairs.223 One year later, when
Chao Tsung-shih had mourned his father for twenty-four months, Jen-tsung
asked him to take office as head of the imperial clan agency, but he refused
to do so until he had completed the full obligatory twenty-seven months of
mourning. Six months later, in the fall of 1062, Jen-tsung held a solemn
ceremony designating Chao Tsung-shih as heir apparent (t’ai-tzu) and giving
him a new personal name, Shu (dawn light).224 Jen-tsung reported to Heaven
221
222
223
224
CPPM 51, pp. 1627–8; SS 245, pp. 8708–11; Miyazaki Ichisada, “Ying-Tsung,” in Sung biographies, ed.
Herbert Franke (Wiesbaden, 1976), vol. 3, pp. 1257–8; Li, Huang Sung shih-ch’ao kang-yao 7, p. 197;
HCP (1979) 120, p. 2833.
HCP (1979) 119, p. 2811.
For a complete study of the imperial clan, see John W. Chaffee, Branches of heaven: A history of the imperial
clan of Sung China (Cambridge, Mass., 1999).
HCP (1979) 120, p. 2833; 197, pp. 4473, 4776–7.
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
337
and Earth as well as to the ancestors that he had designated Chao Tsung-shih
as his heir, but Chao Tsung-shih accepted this honor with great reluctance, in
part because he was still in mourning for the death of his father. This tension
between his feelings for his father and his duties to the emperor would later
fuel the factionalism that was increasingly complicating all aspects of Northern
Sung political life.
The new heir apparent would be summoned to the throne sooner than
he expected, for by early 1063 the emperor was mortally ill. For six weeks
before his death, Jen-tsung fitfully attended to business of state from his
sickroom in the Fu-ning Pavilion. The week before he died he appeared to
have recovered, but then on the night of 30 April 1063 he rose suddenly from
his bed to seek medicine and called for the Empress Ts’ao. When she arrived
he could only point to his chest. Neither medicine nor moxibustion helped.
Around midnight, Jen-tsung died. Everyone but Empress Ts’ao wanted to
open the gates at once and call the councilors of state. Instead she had them
ordered to come to the palace at dawn. During the night, in Jen-tsung’s
bed chamber, the now dowager empress Ts’ao worked out the details of the
succession with Han Ch’i and Tseng Kung-liang (998–1078). The leadership
group that would work together for the next four years included Han Ch’i,
Tseng Kung-liang, Chao Kai, Ou-yang Hsiu, Chang Sheng, Fu Pi, Hu Su, and
Wu K’uei, many of whom had been active in the Ch’ing-li reforms. The heir
apparent, Chao Tsung-shih, was summoned and informed that he was emperor.
In shock he replied, “I can’t! I can’t!” He then turned to leave. Han Ch’i and
Tseng Kung-liang took hold of him and loosened his hair while someone
else placed the imperial robe on him. All upper-ranked imperial clansmen
and military officers were called in to receive the imperial order establishing
Ying-tsung as the new emperor. Han Ch’i cried as he read the testamentary
decree before the kinsmen and officials assembled in front of the Fu-ning
Pavilion. Then Ying-tsung accepted the obeisance of his assembled officials.
Ying-tsung immediately asked Han Ch’i to take charge of the government
while he himself undertook a three-year period of mourning, but he relented
at the insistence of his councilors.225 In order to assure a smooth transition, four
million strings of cash were paid out as largesse to eunuchs and soldiers in K’aifeng, and some seven million strings were distributed to troops throughout
the empire.226 Funeral arrangements, under Han Ch’i’s supervision, were made
for a modest tomb and for modest expenditures. Some forty-eight thousand
soldiers from various circuits worked on the tomb. Immediately, the Finance
Commission asked to borrow 1.5 million strings, 2.5 million bolts of silk, and
225
226
HCP (1979) 198, pp. 4791–4.
HCP (1979) 198, pp. 4791, 4794.
338
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50,000 ounces of silver to meet the costs of the tomb and various associated
gifts.227
On his fourth evening as emperor Ying-tsung suddenly became ill, losing
the power of speech and the ability to recognize people. The demoted physicians were recalled to examine him. A few days later he was found shouting,
walking about wildly, and unable to control his behavior. Han Ch’i asked
Dowager Empress Ts’ao to serve as regent for the duration of Ying-tsung’s
incapacity, which she did until the spring of 1064, when Ying-tsung’s recovery prompted Han Ch’i to demand that the reins of government be returned to
Ying-tsung.228 Ying-tsung’s three living sons and three daughters were promoted in rank and honors. His eldest son, Chao Chung-chen (later renamed
Chao Hsü) (1048–85), was officially designated heir apparent (t’ai-tzu) in 1064.
The future Shen-tsung was set up in his own household outside the palace.
The separation was tearful and he returned every day to visit.229 Lady Kao,
Ying-tsung’s wife since 1047 and the mother of his three sons, was appointed
empress. She was the maternal niece of Dowager Empress Ts’ao. Eventually,
Empress Kao would become dowager empress and regent during Che-tsung’s
reign, during which time she repealed Wang An-shih’s reform measures, dismissed his followers, and appointed Ssu-ma Kuang and his associates to high
office.
Jen-tsung was entombed in the fall of 1063, and the commemorative service
was held in the spring of 1064.230 Ying-tsung’s absence because of illness and
Dowager Empress Ts’ao’s regency contributed to a relatively subdued nine
months of ceremony and construction work.231 The year of Dowager Empress
Ts’ao’s governance was not disturbed by any major conflicts, invasions, crises,
or issues, and she conducted a very restrained regency. Ying-tsung barely spoke
before the end of the year, and the two chief councilors, Han Ch’i and Tseng
Kung-liang, kept the caretaker administration on an even keel. By the end of
1063, Ying-tsung was well enough to order the writing of the veritable record
of his predecessor’s reign and to announce his own reign title, Chih-p’ing
227
228
229
230
231
HCP (1979) 198, pp. 4794, 4802.
HCP (1979) 198, pp. 4755, 4795, 4802, 4804, 4809, 4812, 4816; 201, p. 4865; Chao, Chu-ch’en tsou-i
26, p. 1039; Yang Lien-sheng, “Female rulers in Imperial China,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 23
(1960–1), pp. 51, 56–7; CPPM 54, pp. 1721–48, provides a succinct account of the dowager empress’s
regency. Ying-tsung was well enough in December to attend his first session of the Imperial Seminar.
HCP (1979) 199, pp. 4839–40.
HCP (1979) 199, p. 4840.
HCP (1979) 199, p. 4829; 200, p. 4851; 204, p. 4953.
Construction for the tomb, the enlargement of the Chao clan ancestral temple, and the funeral cost
about a million and a half strings, two and a half million bolts of silk, and half a million liang of silver.
His burial complex was known as Yung-chao ling. HCP (1979) 198, pp. 4794, 4806, 4809–11; 199,
p. 4829.
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
339
(Ordered Tranquility, 1064–7), which began on the first day of 1064.232 Han
Ch’i was the nominal editorial director of the Jen-tsung veritable record ( Jentsung shih-lu), but Wang Kuei (1019–85) did most of the work. The project
was prolonged because Jen-tsung’s reign was so long, and because Wang Kuei
had to reconstruct the information that would normally have been included
in the Court calendar (chü-ch’i lu) and the Record of current government (shih-ch’eng
chi), neither of which had been kept up between roughly 1049 and 1061.
Han Ch’i finally presented the Jen-tsung veritable record in the summer of 1069,
after Ying-tsung’s death and at the same time as the Ying-tsung veritable record
(Ying-tsung shih-lu) was presented to the emperor Shen-tsung.233
Han Ch’i’s steady governance during the Ts’ao regency did not translate into
harmonious relations with his fellow councilors, especially with the now sixtyyear-old Fu Pi. After the collapse of the Ch’ing-li reforms, Han Ch’i and Fu
Pi, among others, had been demoted to regional posts. Both were reappointed
to positions on the Council of State in the mid-1050s, but in 1061 Fu Pi
had taken mourning leave and refused to return until he had completed the
full period. Fu Pi was appointed commissioner for military affairs as well as
chief councilor in the spring of 1063. Although Fu accepted the position, he
soon asked to be released from ministerial duties because of tensions with the
temperamentally quite different Han Ch’i. Han Ch’i never consulted Fu Pi.
Han Ch’i decided matters quickly, Fu Pi ruminated. Han Ch’i thought Fu
Pi talked too much. Fu Pi thought Han Ch’i was a bit shallow. Under Han
Ch’i, all questions to the Bureau of Military Affairs were handled informally
by his subordinates. When Fu Pi complained about this, Han Ch’i replied
superciliously that if the Bureau of Military Affairs was not consulted, Fu Pi
ought to complain to the dowager empress, not to him. Fu Pi took a strong
dislike to Han Ch’i. Beginning in the fall of 1064, Fu Pi stayed home in bed
on the pretext of a foot ailment. Over the next six months he asked Ying-tsung
some twenty times to send him to a prefectural or circuit appointment. In the
meantime, Han Ch’i and Tseng Kung-liang had been appointed to manage
the affairs of the Bureau of Military Affairs while Fu Pi was on sick leave.
Finally, in the summer of 1065, Fu Pi got his wish and was assigned to a
regional post; a few weeks later Ying-tsung appointed Wen Yen-po (1006–97)
232
233
Another cultural activity that confirmed imperial authority was issuing a calendar. The calendar finally
issued in the spring of 1065 was unworkable as a replacement. SS 74, pp. 1685–1708; 75, pp. 1709–41;
HCP (1979) 204, p. 4951.
HCP (1979) 194, p. 4690; 199, p. 4840; 200, p. 4852; 206, p. 4995; 207, p. 5023; HTC (1957)
65, p. 1589; 66, p. 1617; 67, p. 1650; Ts’ai Ch’ung-pang, Sung-tai hsiu-shih chih-tu yen-chiu (Taipei,
1991), pp. 78–82; Yang Lien-sheng, “The organization of Chinese official historiography: Principles
and methods of the standard histories from the T’ang through the Ming dynasty,” in Historians of China
and Japan, ed. William G. Beasley and Edwin G. Pulleyblank (London, 1961), pp. 44–59.
340
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as commissioner of military affairs, in part because he was grateful to Wen for
supporting him as heir to the throne.234
The controversy over the ritual status of the Prince of P’u
By the spring of 1064 Ying-tsung was healthy enough to resume his duties
as emperor: he read memorials, asked questions, understood implications, and
made decisions. Earlier Ssu-ma Kuang had raised the issue of how to differentiate ritually between Chao Yün-jang, the Prince of P’u and the emperor’s
deceased biological father, and Jen-tsung, Ying-tsung’s deceased adoptive
father.235 The question was raised again when Ying-tsung had resumed direct
rule. But Ying-tsung explicitly postponed all discussion until his mourning
for Jen-tsung was completed in the early summer of 1065. Then the issue
came to dominate the political stage.
Ying-tsung’s reign was largely taken up by the complexities of accession, regency, and mourning, which, under a morose, passive, and withdrawn
emperor, became political fodder for factional conflict.236 Once the regency
was over and the mourning for Jen-tsung completed, Ying-tsung was determined to honor and promote his biological father. These events unfolded in
two phases. The first phase comprised discussions on how Ying-tsung was to
ritually address and behave toward his adopted father and predecessor, the
deceased Jen-tsung, on the one hand, and his deceased natural father, the
Prince of P’u, on the other. These discussions began in spring of 1065 and
were terminated by Ying-tsung’s imperial order in the winter of 1066. The
second phase was marked by conflict over the limits of censorial responsibility
waged between the emperor and chief councilors on one side, and the policy
critics, censors, drafting officials, ritual experts, and Han-lin academicians on
the other. This phase lasted two months in early 1066.237
Ying-tsung’s reign, from the very beginning, was caught up in debates over
ritual. During the regency of Dowager Empress Ts’ao and the completion of
Ying-tsung’s mourning for Jen-tsung, debates swirled around Jen-tsung’s status as ancestral deity (p’ei), Ying-tsung’s filial duties toward Dowager Empress
Ts’ao, and the obligations and requirements of an adopted son.238 During the
234
235
236
237
238
HCP (1979) 201, p. 4866; 205, pp. 4967, 4976–8.
HCP (1979) 199, p. 4837.
See Ch’en et al., Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo 36, pp. 311–22; CPPM 55, pp. 1749–80, and Carney T. Fisher,
“The ritual dispute of Sung Ying-tsung,” Papers on Far Eastern History 36 (1987), pp. 109–38, for
accounts of this episode in Ying-tsung’s reign.
Fisher, “The ritual dispute of Sung Ying-tsung,” pp. 110, 128.
HCP (1979) 199, pp. 4832–5; 200, pp. 4846–51, 4853–6; 201, pp. 4868–9; Chao, Chu-ch’en tsou-i
86, pp. 2983–90.
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
341
course of Ying-tsung’s illness, Ssu-ma Kuang and Lü Hui offered advice to
both Ying-tsung and the dowager empress Ts’ao on filial responsibility within
the adoptive relationship. But the relationship between Ying-tsung and the
dowager empress had become strained by Ying-tsung’s deranged behavior.239
At the same time, Han Ch’i and the other councilors of state pressed Yingtsung to discuss what to do about the Prince of P’u and his three wives, a
discussion that Ying-tsung, as already noted, wished to postpone until he had
completed his mourning for Jen-tsung.240 Two months before that milestone
was reached, Ying-tsung instructed his ritual experts to reengage the question
that Han Ch’i and the other ministers of state had posed about Ying-tsung’s
ritual relationship to his natural father, the Prince of P’u.241 No one responded
during the last two months of mourning, using the time for discussion and
to search for precedents. Ying-tsung then enlarged the circle of discussants to
include censors, policy critics, and Han-lin academicians.242
Discussion swiftly grew into a political controversy that continued for
almost a year. Confucian idealists led by Lü Hui and pragmatic ministers
of state led by Han Ch’i engaged in a struggle that evolved into a constitutional dispute over the role of censors as a counterbalance to the factional
rivalries embodied in imperial and ministerial absolutism.243 Ssu-ma Kuang
proposed that Ying-tsung’s filial obligations ought to be decided according to Confucian values, irrespective of emotional attachments. Representing
the opposite pole, Ou-yang Hsiu insisted that it was precisely these contingent, embodied, human values that ought to decide the issue.244 Throughout the summer of 1065, Policy Critic Ssu-ma Kuang, Policy Critic Lü Hui,
Han-lin Academician Recipient of Edicts Wang Kuei, and Censors Lü Ta-fang,
Fan Chen, Fan Ch’un-jen, Chao Chan, Fu Yao-yü, and Chao Ting2 submitted dozens of memorials individually and as a group. The specific problem of
establishing which titles would be applied to the Prince of P’u and which to
Jen-tsung was paralleled by the debate over which set of criteria should define
familial behavior: natural feelings or universal (if dispassionate) values. Ouyang Hsiu, who had just completed the then-definitive text on court ritual,
joined Han Ch’i in siding with Ying-tsung’s wish to recognize his obligations
to his natural father as well as those to his adoptive father. But Lü Hui, Fan
239
240
241
242
243
244
HCP (1979) 199, pp. 4832–5.
HCP (1979) 201, pp. 4872–7; Chao, Chu-ch’en tsou-i 34, pp. 1265–6; 89, pp. 3031–2.
HCP (1979) 204, p. 4957.
HCP (1979) 205, p. 4968.
Liu, Ou-yang Hsiu, pp. 77–8; Fisher, “The ritual dispute of Sung Ying-tsung,” pp. 113–14; Chao,
Chu-ch’en tsou-i 89, pp. 3034–53; Gung, “The participation of censorial officials in politics during the
Northern Sung dynasty,” pp. 30–41.
Bol, “This culture of ours,” pp. 177, 238, 268.
342
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Ch’un-jen, Ssu-ma Kuang, Wang Kuei, Lü Ta-fang, Fan Chen, Fu Yao-yü,
Chan Ting, and Chao Chan believed that ritual paternity trumped biological
fatherhood: because Jen-tsung had adopted Ying-tsung, bringing him into the
main branch of the dynastic family, Ying-tsung was obliged to honor Jen-tsung
above his natural father, the Prince of P’u. As they saw it, Jen-tsung had to be
referred to as “deceased father” (k’ao), while the Prince of P’u had to be referred
to as “deceased imperial paternal uncle” (huang-po). For the proponents of universal values, the designations “imperial deceased father” (huang-k’ao) or parent
(ch’in) could not be properly applied to the Prince of P’u.245 Even Dowager
Empress Ts’ao rejected the use of k’ao for the prince.
The debate was interrupted by massive floods in K’ai-feng in the fall, as
well as by the efforts of Han Ch’i, Ou-yang Hsiu, and Tseng Kung-liang to cut
off further discussion of the matter.246 With the dowager empress’s consent,
Han Ch’i and his associates convinced Ying-tsung to summarily announce that
henceforth the Prince of P’u would be called emperor (huang), P’u’s wives would
be called empress (hou), and Jen-tsung would be addressed as parent (ch’in).247
Although this was intended to be definitive, the order simply unleashed a new
storm of protest – against using the title ch’in (parent) for both the Prince of
P’u and Jen-tsung, against establishing a taboo for the Prince of P’u, against
setting up a separate memorial garden, and against Dowager Empress Ts’ao’s
meddling.248
At this point, Ying-tsung was unsure what to do. His diffidence, his affection for his natural father, the reluctance with which he had entered into
adoption, the ambiguity of the adoption, and his respect for the opposition
officials left him confused.249 But Han Ch’i successfully pressed Ying-tsung
to choose sides, since the other officials had impeached Han Ch’i, Ou-yang
Hsiu, and Tseng Kung-liang. The opposing faction, including Lü Hui, Fan
Ch’un-jen, Lü Ta-fang, Fu Yao-yü, Chao Ting2, Chao Chan, and Lü Kung-chu,
were transferred to other appointments during the first two months of 1066.
Ying-tsung emphasized that they were not to be treated harshly for their
opposition. Even so, the imperial orders were delivered to their homes directly
rather than through Han Wei, who might have blocked the orders in his
role as drafter or as concurrent controller of the Memorial Forwarding Office
245
246
247
248
249
HCP (1979) 205, pp. 4971–6.
HCP (1979) 206, pp. 4984, 5004, 5010–12; 207, pp. 5020–9; Chao, Chu-ch’en tsou-i 49, pp. 1865–6;
56, pp. 2098–2102; 89, pp. 3054–67; 90, pp. 3069–76.
HCP (1979) 207, pp. 5029–37, 5043.
HCP (1979) 207, pp. 5032–7; Fisher, “The ritual dispute of Sung Ying-tsung,” p. 127.
HCP (1979) 200, p. 4583; 201, pp. 4867–8, 4878; and 204, p. 4946 reveal elements of ambiguity
in Jen-tsung’s adoption of Ying-tsung. In general, the consensus was that Ying-tsung was the adopted
son of Jen-tsung. See HCP (1979) 197, p. 4773; HTC (1957) 60, p. 1470.
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
343
(T’ung-chin yin-t’ai ssu). Nevertheless, Ssu-ma Kuang, Han Wei, Fu Yao-yü,
Chao Chan, and P’eng Ssu-yung continued to criticize the decision.250 Finally,
in the third month of 1066, Ying-tsung issued a personal decree in his own
hand declaring his decision and chiding Lü Hui and others for their intransigence.251 Arrangements were made to promote the lineal descendants of the
Prince of P’u, and to enlarge the memorial garden of his mother, Lady Jen, to
the dimensions of a proper mausoleum.252
politics from spring 1065 until the death of ying-tsung
in january 1067
As the ritual controversy was winding down, the Liao announced in early
1066 that they had upgraded their self-designation to Great Liao (Ta Liao),
and that henceforth they would refer to themselves as the Northern Country in
relation to the Sung Southern Country.253 While this elicited some discussion,
Ying-tsung was not well enough to handle both the Prince of P’u controversy
and this new issue. Ironically, this unilateral change in relative Sung and Liao
status in the regional tributary and diplomatic arena did not attract as much
attention from censors, policy critics, and Han-lin academicians as did the
personal relationship of Ying-tsung to his “fathers.” In general, Sung and
Liao relations had been quite uneventful since the 1042 treaty revision. The
Liao–Hsi Hsia conflict of 1049–54 had been announced at court, as was the
death and succession of the Liao emperor in 1055, but to no great fanfare; and
several minor border problems involving trade and river fishing were resolved
through negotiations and discussions between the relevant military intendants
and their Liao counterparts.254
Few outside events spurred the court to great efforts. Raids led by Liang-tso
(1046–67), the Hsi Hsia ruler, did provoke a massive recruitment of peasants
into the Shan-hsi militia in 1064. In the fall of 1066, Liang-tso mounted
two further raids against the Sung.255 In late September, Liang-tso led attacks
on Ta-shun ch’eng (in Ch’ing-chou2, Yung-hsing-chün circuit), burning and
250
251
252
253
254
255
HCP (1979) 207, pp. 5040–2; Fisher, “The ritual dispute of Sung Ying-tsung,” p. 132.
HCP (1979) 207, p. 5043.
It is worth noting that in the retrospective opinion of Chu Hsi (1130–1200), it was Ou-yang Hsiu
rather than Ssu-ma Kuang who had been wrong, because, as Chu put it, it is “improper to extend
paternity to both a natural and adoptive parent.” See Fisher, “The ritual dispute of Sung Ying-tsung,”
p. 133.
HCP (1979) 207, p. 5021.
HCP (1979) 151, p. 2668; 167, p. 4020; 168, p. 4034; 176, pp. 4281–2; 179, p. 4329; 180, pp. 4363–
4; 182, p. 4399; 186, p. 4492; 187, pp. 4502, 4509; 193, p. 4671; 204, p. 4958; 207, p. 5021; 208,
p. 5057.
HCP (1979) 208, pp. 5062–3, 5067–8.
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michael mcgrath
destroying several fortified settlements. The military pacification intendant for
Huan-ch’ing circuit, having learned that Liang-tso intended to attack, made
preparations to repel him by positioning troops at critical points, especially
at Ta-shun ch’eng. However, Liang-tso’s force of around twenty thousand considerably outnumbered the Sung troops, who were surrounded for three days
before an allied cavalry commander came to their aid. Liang-tso was wounded
by crossbow fire and forced to withdraw. A subsequent Hsi Hsia raid against a
fort defended by a deputy military intendant and military commander failed.
The Sung commander raised three thousand braves to harass the Hsi Hsia
camp at night, scattering the Tangut forces. Liang-tso regrouped at Chint’ang, where, instead of mounting another offensive, he merely traded insults
with the Sung officials. Initially, Han Ch’i suggested withholding the annual
tribute, but Wen Yen-po, the new commissioner of military affairs, said this
would only serve as a pretext for further conflict. Ch’en Chiu (aka Ch’en Shengchih) and Lü Kung-pi cited the example of 1038–9 to convince Ying-tsung not
to provoke Liang-tso. Han Ch’i retorted sarcastically that “the war specialists”
ought to understand the difference between then and now, for Sung preparedness and capability were far greater now, and Hsi Hsia was led by Liang-tso,
a young fool with nothing like the military prowess of Li Yüan-hao.
With the time for the annual tribute payment close at hand, Ying-tsung
chose Han Ch’i’s aggressive strategy. Meanwhile, Liang-tso attacked and surrounded Ta-shun ch’eng again in December. The Fu-yen military intendant,
frustrated by the passive military response to Hsi Hsia, sent a memorial urging the emperor to do something about the raids, but the result was only a
letter of disapproval upbraiding Liang-tso for improper behavior. However,
when a letter was delivered to Liang-tso threatening to withhold the muchdesired annual tribute of tea and silver, Liang-tso backed off, concocting a
story that a Sung border official had started the confrontation. By this time,
Ying-tsung was bedridden. During one morning audience, Han Ch’i tapped
on the screen in front of the emperor’s bed to ask the news from the western
zone. Ying-tsung exerted himself to look at Han Ch’i and told him, “It was as
you predicted.” Even so, Liang-tso’s reply was ambiguous enough that another
emissary was sent to insist on a solemn oath reaffirming his recognition of Sung
sovereignty.
Throughout Ying-tsung’s reign the central government’s growing fiscal
problems showed themselves in various and increasingly insidious ways. One
of the immediate consequences of the already costly recruitment of one hundred
and fifty thousand militia men in Shan-hsi as part of the defensive military
response to Hsi Hsia aggression was an intensified need to transport supplies
into the region. Yet despite the mounting problems with fiscal liquidity and
effective tax collection, the only economic issues chosen for discussion at court
were the excessive numbers of officials and excessive imperial spending on
the reigns of jen-tsung and ying-tsung
345
ritual.256 More far-reaching than establishing limits on the number of officials
that could be appointed to certain ranks was the decision in the fall of 1066
to hold the chin-shih civil service examination only once every three years, a
practice that endured until 1905.257
Ying-tsung’s reign saw no change in the political leadership. The four
leading civil officials – Han Ch’i, Tseng Kung-liang, Chao Kai, and Ou-yang
Hsiu – had all served for at least one year before Ying-tsung came to the throne
and served at least one year after his death. The military leadership was less
settled, and included one unusual appointment, that of General Kuo K’uei
as cosignatory deputy commissioner of military affairs in 1066. Kuo K’uei,
a senior general and a former protégé of Fan Chung-yen, was recommended
by Han Ch’i in place of Chang Fang-p’ing (1007–91), whom Han resented
for refusing to join his coterie.258 Han Ch’i craftily suggested to Ying-tsung
that it had been a long time since a military man had been appointed to the
Bureau of Military Affairs, asserting that Kuo K’uei was a less objectionable
alternative than the other eligible general. Remonstrance officials and censors
pointed out that while other emperors had appointed military men to the
Bureau of Military Affairs, they had been men of substance, like Ts’ao Pin,
Ma Chih-chieh, or Wang Te-yung, and not crafty sycophants like Kuo K’uei.
Whether or not their characterization of Kuo was accurate, Ying-tsung agreed
to Han Ch’i’s proposal to appoint Kuo K’uei. However, just six months later
Kuo was reassigned out of the capital to Shan-hsi.
Significant changes did occur below the top level of bureaucrats. Chang
Fang-p’ing had been appointed Han-lin academician recipient of edicts at the
beginning of 1066, to compensate for the transfer of Wang Kuei to write
Jen-tsung’s veritable record. Chang Fang-p’ing and Ou-yang Hsiu, although
dissimilar in many ways, each appreciated the outstanding talents of Su Hsün
(1009–66) and his sons, Su Shih (1037–1101) and Su Ch’e (1039–1112), and
through their efforts Su Hsün and Su Shih gained recognition and office. In
1060, Ou-yang Hsiu had sponsored Su Shih for a special decree examination,
while Ssu-ma Kuang had sponsored Su Ch’e. Although Ying-tsung was so
impressed that he wanted to appoint Su Shih as a Han-lin academician, Han
Ch’i proposed a less prestigious appointment as an auxiliary in the Historiography Institute (Kuo-shih kuan). Su Hsün died in 1066, just after he and his
sons returned to K’ai-feng from the Ch’eng-tu area, having been in mourning
for his wife and their mother.259 Such links between sponsors and patrons,
256
257
258
259
HCP (1979) 204, pp. 4955, 4957; 205, pp. 4965, 4968; 206, pp. 4992–5; 208, pp. 5052, 5058–61.
HCP (1979) 208, pp. 5063–4.
SS 290, pp. 9722–6; HCP (1979) 208, pp. 5051–2, 5064; HTC (1957) 64, pp. 1572, 1579.
HCP (1979) 192, pp. 4639–40; 207, p. 5039; 208, pp. 5054–6; Ting, Compilation of anecdotes of Sung
personalities, pp. 391, 475–94; George C. Hatch, “Su Hsün,” in Sung biographies, ed. Herbert Franke
(Wiesbaden, 1976), vols. 2–3, pp. 885–968; Ch’ang et al., Sung-jen chuan-chi tzu-liao so-yin, pp. 4304–5.
346
michael mcgrath
and their protégés and followers, were important social and political ties,
and they were reinforced by formal measures to nurture talented men from
among whom the upper echelons of advisors and councilors of state would be
drawn. In late 1066, Han Ch’i, Tseng Kung-liang, Chao Kai, and Ou-yang
Hsiu recommended twenty men for assignment to the imperial academies
and institutes.260 But at the same time that potential future ministers of state
were being identified and appointed to such low-ranking but prestigious posts,
attempts were made to slow down the overall growth in the number of men
on the roll of officials. One such measure was the extension of the civil service
examination cycle to once every three years.261
In order to perpetuate the Chao clan’s dynastic line, a suitable marriage partner for Ying-tsung’s eldest son, Chao Hsü (formerly named Chao Chung-chen),
was sought among proper official families. In April 1066, the granddaughter
of Hsiang Min-chung was married to Chao Hsü. It was not long before the
status of the new couple would change dramatically. Throughout his reign
Ying-tsung had been sick, recovering, or feeling unwell, and between November 1066 and his death on 25 January 1067 he was terminally ill.262 As was
the usual practice, prayers were offered at the Ta-ch’ing Pavilion – the location
for the Ming-t’ang rituals and the other formal great state ceremonies. One
day, as Han Ch’i and others were withdrawing from a visit to ask after the
emperor’s health, Chao Hsü asked Han Ch’i if there was anything he could do.
Han Ch’i replied that he hoped His Highness would stay with the emperor
day and night. The young man replied that this was his duty, and Han Ch’i
told the prince that that was not what he had meant. The succession was still
technically unsettled, and since Ying-tsung could no longer talk, he could
only write his instructions or gesture in reply to questions. Between Han Ch’i
and Chang Fang-p’ing, the Han-lin academician who drafted major decrees
of state, Ying-tsung was coaxed to specify in his weak handwriting that Chao
Hsü was his heir apparent. Before the formal ceremony of investiture could be
held, Ying-tsung died at age thirty-six.
260
261
262
HCP (1979) 208, pp. 5064–5.
HCP (1979) 204, p. 4957; 208, pp. 5052, 5058–64.
HCP (1979) 208, pp. 5063, 5066, 5068.
CHAPTER 5
SHEN-TSUNG’S REIGN AND THE NEW POLICIES
OF WANG AN-SHIH, 1067–1085
Paul Jakov Smith
shen-tsung’s ascension and the crisis
of the mid-eleventh century
The nature of the midcentury crisis
In 1067 the nineteen-year-old Chao Hsü (1048–85) ascended the throne with
an acute sense of shame for his country’s foreign humiliations and a fierce
ambition to redress the crises that beset his empire.1 The young Shen-tsung
emperor and his ministers had many reasons to feel uncertain, for the death of
his father, Ying-tsung (r. 1063–7), after only three and a half years on the throne
could be taken only as a bad omen. But the sense of crisis that pervaded Shentsung’s empire had been brewing throughout Jen-tsung’s reign (1022–63),
1
Shen-tsung’s reign and the New Policies spearheaded by his chief minister, Wang An-shih, have inspired
a vast and growing literature. For background information and a guide to the sources, the first places to
go are the two encyclopedic works by Higashi Ichio, Ō Anseki shinpō no kenkyū (Tokyo, 1970), and Ō Anseki
jiten (Tokyo, 1980). Three of the most useful interpretations are Ch’i Hsia, Wang An-shih pien-fa, 2nd ed.
(Shanghai, 1979); Liu Tzu-chien (James T. C. Liu), Reform in Sung China: Wang An-shih (1021–86) and his
New Policies (Cambridge, Mass., 1959); and Wang Tseng-yü, “Wang An-shih pien-fa chien-lun,” Chungkuo she-hui k’o-hsüeh 3 (1980), pp. 131–54, which set off a wave of revisionist critiques in China of the New
Policies. For a recent biography of Shen-tsung, see Chung Wei-min, Sung Shen-tsung (Ch’ang-ch’un, 1997).
The most important primary source for Shen-tsung’s reign is Li T’ao’s Hsü tzu-chih t’ung-chien ch’ang-pien,
which supplements the official record with a rich array of diaries, memoirs, and unofficial histories, many
of them no longer extant. The punctuated edition, Hsü tzu-chih t’ung-chien ch’ang-pien [hereafter HCP
(1979)] (1183; Peking, 1979–95), is supplemented by the Shang-hai ku-chi ch’u-pan-she reprint, Hsü
Tzu-chih t’ung-chien ch’ang-pien [hereafter HCP (1986)] [Che-chiang shu-chü 1881 ed.] (1183; Shanghai,
1986), of the once standard 1881 edition. Because the HCP chapters for the period from the second month
of 1067 through to the third month of 1070 have been lost, the first three years of Shen-tsung’s reign must
be reconstructed from the Southern Sung historian Yang Chung-liang’s Tzu-chih t’ung-chien ch’ang-pien
chi-shih pen-mo [hereafter CPPM] (1253; Taipei, 1967), which has been rearranged, along with many other
sources, into chronological order by Ch’in Hsiang-yeh et al., Hsü tzu-chih t’ung-chien ch’ang-pien shih-pu
[hereafter HCP (1986) shih-pu], published as volume 5 of the Shang-hai ku-chi ch’u-pan-she edition.
In addition to the HCP, this chapter relies primarily on Hsü Sung et al., Sung hui-yao chi-pen [hereafter
SHY (1964)] (1809, 1936; Taipei, 1964), and T’o-t’o et al., eds., Sung shih [hereafter SS] (1345; Peking,
1977).
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paul jakov smith
ever since the Sino-Tangut war of 1038–44 had exposed troubling weaknesses
in the fundamental pillars of the dynastic system itself – the military, the
financial system, and the bureaucracy.
The four-year war with the Tangut Hsi Hsia had demonstrated that the
Sung’s mercenary armies were unfit for active combat. Although the Sung
mustered some 1.25 million men against 826,000 Tangut troops, the aged
and inexperienced Sung soldiers, hired from among the flotsam of the marketplace, were likely to scatter at their first sight of a Tangut soldier. The
war confirmed the status of the Tangut state as a major Asian power, even as
the cessation of hostilities exacerbated defensive pressures on the Sung as just
one of several players in a multistate geopolitical setting. With the Tanguts
solidly entrenched in the Ordos, and the Khitan Liao sitting implacably along
the northern borders of Ho-tung and Ho-pei, Sung ministers saw little shortterm alternative to maintaining their huge if unreliable standing armies in the
north. Efforts were made to pare the size of the regular, imperial troops, but
by the mid-1060s the court still had 1,162,000 men on the rolls, over half of
whom (663,000) were costly imperial troops.2
Of course, the war had exacted an enormous toll on the Sung state, which
was in turn forced to raise taxes by fifty percent in the three northern circuits of
Shan-hsi, Ho-pei, and Ho-tung to meet emergency needs.3 But what dismayed
contemporary observers even more was that the end of the war brought no
financial relief. The need to pay, outfit, and provision troops stationed along
the resource-poor northern frontier forced the Sung state to dig ever deeper
into the commercial and agrarian economies, transforming the Sung fisc into
what the historian Sogabe Shizuo has referred to as a perpetual “wartime
economy.”4 As routine defense costs absorbed an increasing portion of the
state’s income, official efforts to generate more revenues undermined trade in
the state’s two most important monopolized commodities, tea and salt. Yet
even so it was impossible to keep up with the costs of a cumbersome but
2
3
4
On the origins and characteristics of the Sung’s troops during the war, see SS 187, p. 4574; on the
war itself, see Wu T’ien-ch’ih, Hsi Hsia shih-kao (Ch’eng-tu, 1981), pp. 59–68; Li Hua-jui, Sung Hsia
kuan-hsi shih (Shih-chia-chuang, 1998), pp. 40–57; Feng Tung-li and Mao Yüan-yu, Pei Sung Liao Hsia
chün-shih shih (Peking, 1998), pp. 248–61; Ruth W. Dunnell, “The Hsi Hsia,” in The Cambridge history
of China, volume 6: Alien regimes and border states, 907–1368, ed. Herbert Franke and Denis C. Twitchett
(New York, 1994), pp. 154–205. Wang Tseng-yü discusses the weaknesses of the Sung armies in the
mid-eleventh century in his Sung-ch’ao ping-chih ch’u-t’an (Peking, 1983), pp. 90–5; for a contemporary
assessment, see “Shang huang-ti shu” in Su Ch’e, Luan-ch’eng chi (1541; Taipei, 1965–6) 21, pp. 7b–10a.
Expenditures in the three northern circuits rose from 42.3 million to 72.1 million mixed units between
1038 and 1043, forcing an increase in taxes from 50.3 to 73.1 million units. See HCP (1979) 140,
p. 3366.
See Sogabe Shizuo, Sōdai zaiseishi (Tokyo, 1941), p. 3. The most frequently cited contemporary analysis
of the impact of war on the midcentury Sung economy is by the two-term finance commissioner Chang
Fang-P’ing (1007–91) in his memorial “Lun kuo-chi ch’u-na shih,” in Chang Fang-P’ing, Le-ch’üan chi
[Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu, Wen-yüan ko 1779 ed.] (c. 1100; Taipei, 1969) 23, pp. 2b–5a.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 349
ineffective system of defense: by 1065 defense expenditures consumed fifty of
the state’s sixty million strings of cash income – eighty-three percent – while
the government registered its first overall financial deficit.5
Defense was not the only budgetary item that had swelled out of control
by midcentury. The state’s financial capacity was also stretched thin by what
contemporaries called the problem of jung-kuan, supernumerary officials. The
numbers of men with ranked civil service status (including civil and military officials) almost tripled during the reigns of Chen-tsung (997–1022),
Jen-tsung, and Ying-tsung, from 9,785 to roughly 24,000 individuals. All
of these men drew salaries commensurate with their civil service rank, or
stipendiary grade (chi-lu kuan), even if they held no active post (ch’ai-ch’ien).
And starting sometime during Chen-tsung’s reign the number of ranked civil
servants increased well beyond the number of available posts, a trend that
only continued to worsen. This glut of officials had several unfavorable consequences: in order to maintain a large enough candidate pool to ensure elite
loyalty to the dynasty and at least a minimum flow of new blood into government, the state had to pay men for whom it had no jobs. This resulted in a
large, though unspecified, financial burden. But poor career prospects and the
long waiting period between posts undermined the morale of the civil service,
especially the majority of civil servants in the junior, or executory (hsüan-jen),
division. The professional spirit of these men could erode if they were kept
too long in lowly provincial posts or were forced to go without posts altogether. Yet the court had to be wary of promoting too many junior men to the
much smaller senior, or administrative, division (ching-ch’ao kuan) – the critical
kai-kuan promotion – where appropriate posts were even rarer. By the 1040s
the problem of job competition and underemployment had expanded beyond
the executory division into the upper reaches of the administrative class as
well, inducing powerful members of the bureaucracy to unduly manipulate
the personnel system to favor their relatives and protégés.6
5
6
For a recent survey of the secular increase in taxes that began in Jen-tsung’s reign, see Ch’i Hsia, Sung-tai
ching-chi shih (Shanghai, 1987–8), vol. 1, pp. 393–410. Shiba Yoshinobu discusses military spending in his
“Sōdai shiteki seido no enkaku,” in Aoyama Hakushi koki kinen Sōdai shi ronsō, ed. Aoyama Hakushi Koki
Kinen Sōdai-shi Ronsō Kankokai (Tokyo, 1974). Ch’eng Min-sheng disputes the standard interpretation
that the figures preserved in SS 179, p. 4353, for 1065 demonstrate a chronic fiscal deficit. See Ch’eng
Min-sheng, “Lun Pei Sung ts’ai-cheng ti t’e-tien yü chi-pin ti chia-hsiang,” Chung-kuo shih yen-chiu 3
(1984), pp. 33–4. These doubts are amplified by Ji Xiaobin, “Pei Sung chi-p’in hsin-chieh – shih-lun
‘kuo-yung pu-tsu’ yü Wang An-shih hsin-fa chih cheng,” in Kuo-shih fu-hai k’ai-hsin-lu: Yü Ying-shih
chiao-shou jung-t’ui lun-wen-chi, ed. Chou Chih-p’ing and Willard J. Peterson (Taipei, 2002), pp. 283–300.
On the reasons for and problems spawned by the growth of the Sung civil service, see Furugaki Kōichi,
“Sōdai no kanryō sū ni tsuite,” in Sōdai no shakai to shūkyō, ed. Sōdai-shi Kenkyūkai (Tokyo, 1985),
pp. 121–58; Lo Wen (Winston W. Lo), An introduction to the civil service of Sung China: With emphasis on
its personnel administration (Honolulu, 1987), pp. 60–2, 158–65; and Umehara Kaoru, Sōdai kanryō seido
kenkyū (Kyoto, 1985), chapter 1 and pp. 249–66.
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Responses to the midcentury crisis
The Sino-Tangut debacle forced leading thinkers to reevaluate the state of
Sung rule eighty years after the founding, and prompted the first major reform
movement of the dynasty, the Ch’ing-li reforms of 1043 to 1045. Under the
leadership of Fan Chung-yen (989–1052) the reform partisans insisted that
the only way to reverse the military deterioration that the war had exposed was
to undertake a comprehensive campaign to dismantle privilege and promote
efficiency in the bureaucracy, rejuvenate the agrarian economy, and revive
peasant participation in national defense.7 But, as documented in the previous
chapter, in little more than a year the Ch’ing-li reform movement was abruptly
suppressed, after highly placed opponents convinced Jen-tsung that the reform
faction under Fan Chung-yen, Fu Pi (1004–83), and Han Ch’i (1008–75)
constituted a threat to both imperial power and well-entrenched bureaucratic
interests. Indeed, it was the failure of the Ch’ing-li reforms that paved the
way for the more radical reforms of Shen-tsung’s reign, for despite Jen-tsung’s
volte-face, public-spirited men grew increasingly uneasy. Or so at least the
Yüan-yu partisan Liu An-shih (1048–1125) thought, as he tried to account for
Shen-tsung’s reforms to his student Ma Yung-ch’ing (chin-shih 1109). Relating
what he must have learned from his own teacher Ssu-ma Kuang (1019–86), Liu
explained that “Between the time of the founders, who ruled the world with
loyalty and benevolence, and the end of the Chia-yu era [1056–63], the affairs
of the world appeared to unravel, and all were dispirited and lackluster. The
scholarly elite (shih-ta-fu) of the time deplored this state of affairs, and many
of them wrote about it.”8 It was in this very period, in 1058, that Shen-tsung’s
future chief councilor, Wang An-shih (1021–86), submitted his manifesto
for achieving dynastic greatness through comprehensive reform, the so-called
Myriad word memorial; three years later, Ssu-ma Kuang followed with a set
of memorials that offered an alternative approach to the problems of the day,
rooted in prudence and a conservative eschewal of adventurism.9 Nevertheless,
7
8
9
See Liu Tzu-chien (James T. C. Liu), “An early Sung reformer: Fan Chung-yen,” in Chinese thought and
institutions, ed. John K. Fairbank (Chicago, 1957), pp. 105–31. For Fan’s ten-point call for reform,
issued in the ninth month of 1043, see Fan Chung-yen, Fan Wen-cheng kung cheng-fu tsou-i (1053; Taipei,
1967) shang, pp. 176–82. The text is reproduced in substantially complete form in HCP (1979) 143,
pp. 3431–44.
Ma Yung-ch’ing, Yüan-ch’eng yü-lu, quoted in Ch’i, Wang An-shih pien-fa, p. 63. Ch’i Hsia discusses the
political responses to the midcentury crisis on pp. 57–97. For a sense of the intellectual ferment of these
times, see chapter 6 of Peter K. Bol, “This culture of ours”: Intellectual transition in T’ang and Sung China
(Stanford, Calif., 1992).
Wang’s memorial, “Shang Jen-tsung huang-ti yen-shih shu” in Wang An-shih, Wang Lin-ch’uan ch’üanchi, 2nd ed. (c. 1100; Taipei, 1966) 39, pp. 217–27, is discussed more fully later. For Ssu-ma’s “Five
Guidelines,” see Ssu-ma Kuang, Ssu-ma Wen-cheng kung ch’uan-chia chi (mid-12th c.; Shanghai, 1937) 21,
pp. 307–14, analyzed in Bol, “This culture of ours,” pp. 220–1.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 351
despite heated debate about the problems of the day, it was impossible to
undertake major initiatives without an emperor dedicated to change, and Jentsung no longer was. Some efforts were made at the top to tinker with those
fiscal and military institutions that were dangerously close to collapsing, such
as the tea and salt monopolies and the cavalry horse procurement system.10 But
the really significant reforms in the post-Ch’ing-li era were initiated by local
and provincial officials to address problems faced by the people of their own
jurisdictions. These localized measures included at least two preharvest loan
measures, one of them by the magistrate of Yin county (Liang-che, modern
Ning-po), Wang An-shih; a service exemption fee for supply masters (yach’ien); and two prototypical mutual security systems (pao-chia) established by
local administrators to quell banditry in Ts’ai-chou and K’ai-feng.11 Although
without imperial support none of these experiments spread very far, they all
served as precedents and prototypes for the New Policies (hsin-fa) promulgated
under Shen-tsung’s reign.
What Shen-tsung faced
When Jen-tsung died with no male heir in 1063, his nephew Chao Shu was
elevated to the throne at age thirty-one. Although contemporaries such as
Tseng Kung (1019–83) thought the new emperor Ying-tsung was eager for
change and reform, Ying-tsung’s short reign was so paralyzed by factionalism
and an acrimonious ritual controversy that little was accomplished.12 Thus
when Ying-tsung abruptly died in the first month of the new lunar year
(1067) his nineteen-year-old son Chao Hsü inherited all the problems that
had bedeviled the Ch’ing-li reformers, but in even more intensified form.
On the financial front, the imperial coffers were still empty from the huge
costs of Jen-tsung’s interment, and now another imperial funeral impended.
Although the young emperor ordered that expenditures on his father be kept
to one-third the cost of Jen-tsung’s funeral, Chief Councilor Han Ch’i was
still forced to borrow three hundred thousand strings of cash from the Inner
10
11
12
See, for example, Saeki Tomi, “Sōsho ni okeru cha no senbai seido,” in Chūgoku-shi kenkyū, Saeki Tomi
(Kyoto, 1969), vol. 1, pp. 377–408; Tai I-hsüan, Sung-tai ch’ao-yen chih-tu yen-chiu (Shanghai, 1957); and
chapter 1 of Paul J. Smith, Taxing heaven’s storehouse: Horses, bureaucrats and the destruction of the Sichuan tea
industry, 1074–1224 (Cambridge, Mass., 1991).
For these and additional examples of reforms initiated locally between the late 1040s and early 1060s
see Ch’i, Wang An-shih pien-fa, pp. 67–70.
On the ritual dispute over whom Ying-tsung should call his father, see Bol, “This culture of ours,” p. 213,
citing Carney T. Fisher, “The ritual dispute of Sung Ying-tsung,” Papers on Far Eastern History 36 (1987),
pp. 109–38; and Liu Tzu-chien (James T. C. Liu), Ou-yang Hsiu: An eleventh century Neo-Confucianist
(Stanford, Calif., 1967), pp. 76–9. For Ying-tsung’s abortive “activism” (chih tsai yu-wei) see Tseng
Kung, Yüan-feng lei-kao (c. 1038; Taipei, 1968) 30, p. 330, cited, among other examples, by Ch’i, Wang
An-shih pien-fa, p. 96.
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paul jakov smith
Treasury and to conscript into service thirty-five thousand laborers and four
thousand stonemasons.13 More fundamentally, official morale seemed to be at
a nadir as the surplus of officials began to affect the entire civil service. Many
commentators lamented that the glut of executory grade officials had worsened
over the years, with far more men than the system could absorb clamoring for
posts, sponsors, and promotion to senior administrative status.14 And now the
need to accommodate the demands of junior men had also produced a surfeit of
administrative-grade officials: in 1068 a censor complained that there were ten
times more administrative-grade officials than there had been under the first
two emperors, forcing the Bureau of Personnel Evaluation (Shen-kuan yüan) to
furlough senior- as well as junior-grade officials.15 Moreover, according to the
great scholar Ou-yang Hsiu (1007–72), the choicest senior-level positions –
those in the Three Institutes (San-kuan, of History, Literature, and Worthies),
the training ground for future chief councilors – were no longer assigned to
the most talented chin-shih graduates, but rather to those men with technical
experience in finance, law, and defense. As Ou-yang saw it, learning and good
reputation no longer mattered, leaving the most steadfast members of the civil
service dispirited.16
But perhaps the most immediately troubling problem inherited by the
new emperor was the growing aggressiveness of the Tanguts under Liangtso (r. 1048–67), son and successor of the Tangut state builder Li Yüan-hao
(r. 1032–48). Liang-tso’s ambitions were aided and inspired by the political
deterioration of the Tibetan federation in the Kansu and Ch’ing-hai borderlands that had long been the Sung’s only northern ally. Disaffected tribal leaders occupying the vulnerable northwestern perimeter of the Lung-hsi basin
that divided the Tanguts, the Sung, and the Ch’ing-hai federation had begun
defecting to the Hsi Hsia side from the late 1050s on, encouraging the Tanguts
to launch an expansionist campaign throughout the unstable border region.
Starting in 1063 the Tanguts repeatedly sent large expeditionary forces against
Tibetan tribal capitals, against the sinified border tribes, and in 1066 against
Chinese commanderies themselves. These Tangut probes presented an immediate threat to the always fragile Sung horse-supply system, but in the long
term they threatened the Sung state itself. Ying-tsung’s chief ministers had
been confused about how to deal with Liang-tso and the Tanguts, and could
still not agree on a plan to present to Shen-tsung.17
13
14
15
16
17
HCP (1979) 209, pp. 5074–6.
HCP (1979) 208, pp. 5052, 5058–60.
HCP (1986) shih-pu 3 shang, pp. 11b–12a.
HCP (1979) 208, pp. 5064–5.
See SS 485, p. 14002; 492, p. 14162; and HCP (1979) 208, pp. 5067–8. For a discussion and sources,
see Smith, Taxing heaven’s storehouse, p. 43.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 353
Shen-tsung and the old guard
Shen-tsung, however, had his own ideas about what needed to be done, for
he saw himself as the heir to the founders’ dreams of recovering the sixteen
prefectures of Yen-Yün occupied by the Khitan Liao in the north, and the Ordos
prefecture of Ling-chou lost to the Tanguts in 1001. He came to the throne
“determined to wipe away generations of shame,” not by relying on conciliation
and passive defense, as had every predecessor since T’ai-tsung (r. 976–97),
but by redefining the political map through conquest and expansion.18 This
irredentist dream also shaped Shen-tsung’s attitude toward his empire’s fiscal
crisis: very simply, the state needed riches to finance its wars, for as Shen-tsung
told his war minister Wen Yen-po (1006–97), “if we are to raise troops for
our frontier campaigns, then our treasuries must be full.”19 And finally, Shentsung’s ambitions were animated by a vision of himself as an activist, hands-on
ruler. Although it was not until Wang An-shih’s ouster in 1076 that Shentsung took direct control of the affairs of state, he ascended the throne with
an expansive sense of imperial power and an abiding dissatisfaction with the
absolutist powers built up over the years by the great ministers – particularly
Han Ch’i, still in the chief councilor’s office he had held under the last two
emperors.20
Shen-tsung had reason to expect an enthusiastic response to his goals from
his leading officials, since many of them had spearheaded the reform movement
of 1043. But time and prominence had dulled their edge, and many of the
emperor’s “venerables” (yüan-lao) had turned conservative. Chu Hsi (1130–
1200) stressed this point to his students a century later, commenting that
when such men as Han Ch’i and Fu Pi came to power again following the
failure of the Ch’ing-li reforms, “they had forgotten [the excitement of] those
early days. Master Fu was afraid of acting, and wanted only to read the classics
and recite Buddhist sutras.”21 Fu Pi, who “knew the emperor was devoted
to activism (yu-wei),” made a special point of counseling restraint at every
opportunity, especially on matters of war. When in 1068 the emperor asked
him about border affairs, Fu replied that “Your Majesty has not been [on the
throne] for very long; it would be best if you spread virtue and act benevolently,
and not speak of war for twenty years.”22
18
19
20
21
22
SS 16, p. 314.
Ma Tuan-lin, Wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao [Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan 1935–7 ed.] (c. 1308; Taipei, 1965) 24,
p. 232c.
HCP (1986) shih-pu 1, p. 2a.
Chu Hsi, Chu-tzu yü-lei, cited in Ch’i, Wang An-shih pien-fa, p. 97.
SS 313, p. 10255.
354
paul jakov smith
Fu Pi’s homily was not especially useful at a time when the country was
drifting into a war with the Tanguts, and Shen-tsung received it in “stony
silence.” But Fu was hardly alone in resisting the emperor’s desire to confront
the Tanguts. In 1066, after three years of Tangut attacks on Chinese surrogates and military installations, the Shan-hsi fiscal intendant Hsüeh Hsiang
had sent up a comprehensive plan for border defense that emphasized setting
Tangut surrogates against their masters. In mid-1067 Hsüeh’s plan assumed
greater urgency when the border official Ch’ung O kidnapped Tangut general
Wei-ming Shan and his followers, unleashing an escalating spiral of violence
punctuated by the Tangut execution of a Sung emissary and Ch’ung O’s walling
of the Tangut town of Sui-chou (Shan-hsi, renamed Sui-te chün).23 All agreed
that Ch’ung O had acted without authorization, but Shen-tsung dismissed
calls that he and Hsüeh Hsiang be punished to placate the Tanguts and bring
the matter to an end.24 For Shen-tsung was desperate to launch an offensive
campaign, and the Ch’ung O fiasco was all he had. Perhaps for this reason
he was especially incensed by a memorial that his new chief censor, Ssu-ma
Kuang, sent up in the ninth month of 1067. Although Ssu-ma allowed that the
emperor’s desire to recover the territories of the Kansu Corridor (held by the
Uighurs and Tibetans), the Ordos (held by the Tanguts), and the sixteen prefectures (held by the Khitan) were laudable goals, they could not be achieved
by Ch’ung O’s policy of turning Liang-tso’s allies against the Tanguts. First of
all, insisted Ssu-ma, since the Chinese people were by nature and livelihood
ill-equipped to do battle with the war-loving barbarians, the only sage policy
was to seek a stable border through diplomacy and compliance – literally by
embracing them and being soft (huai-jou). Every Sung emperor who pursued an
offensive policy against the Tanguts, such as T’ai-tsung in 1001 and Jen-tsung
in the 1040s, saw his troops cut down in battle, his people killed off by the
exhaustion of transport duty, and his coffers emptied by war and the annual
bounties paid to the barbarian victors. Second, although Liang-tso may have
transgressed from time to time, he never openly cut off relations with the Sung;
he still called himself “vassal” (ch’en). Thus from a diplomatic standpoint it
would be humiliating to break faith with a vassal by suborning his ministers.
And finally, if the destabilizing plan failed and the country found itself in an
outright war with the Tanguts, its resources would be stretched beyond capacity, for the Sung was not at all ready for war. On the contrary, stressed Ssu-ma,
23
24
Ch’ung O had bribed Wei-ming Shan’s younger brother into turning in Wei-ming, and then preemptively kidnapped Wei-ming when it looked like the plan was unraveling. See CPPM 83, pp. 2627–39,
and the useful synopsis in Pi Yüan’s late-eighteenth-century reconstruction of the Sung and Yüan
chronicles, the Hsü tzu-chih t’ung-chien [hereafter HTC (1957)] (Peking, 1957) 65, p. 1609.
HCP (1986) shih-pu 2, pp. 18b–21a.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 355
to the extent that the emperor’s revanchist goals were at all laudable, they
could be realized only after a thorough revamping of the imperial bureaucracy,
the fiscal system, the army command structure, the system of military recruitment and training, and the arsenal. Since none of these had been attended to,
to go on the offensive prematurely could lead only to disaster.25
Because of their antipathy toward offensive war, Shen-tsung’s early advisors
were also lukewarm about creating a national war chest. Although all agreed
that the nation was in the midst of a financial crisis, they continued the
tradition of indicting irresponsible spending for impoverishing the people and
the state, and proposed cost-cutting measures that were more appropriate for
a minimalist approach to government than to the activist ambitions harbored
by the new emperor. Early in 1067, for example, Chang Fang-p’ing urged
that the emperor first reduce the size of his armies, and then seek to cut
costs in the imperial household and the bureaucracy by eradicating everything
that conflicted with “plainness and simplicity.”26 A year later Ssu-ma Kuang
declined a post in the new Office of Economizing (Ts’ai-chien chü), which
he thought was itself a wasteful bureaucratic accretion, by admonishing the
emperor that “the current deficits in the national treasury have been caused by
wasteful administrative expenditures, unrestrained bestowal of emoluments
and rewards [attendant on the deaths of two emperors in four years], an overly
lavish imperial household, a bloated bureaucracy, and an inefficient army.”
Ssu-ma cautioned that reducing expenditures had to be a long-term project,
and he wondered why it could not be assigned to the Finance Commission,
rather than to yet another wasteful office. Although Shen-tsung did dutifully
institute a campaign to trim expenses in the imperial household, he declined,
despite Ssu-ma’s advice, to dismantle the new cost-cutting agency.27
The issue that most provoked Shen-tsung’s dissatisfaction with his elder
statesmen was not war or finance, but the scope of monarchical power. Within
months of Shen-tsung’s accession prominent officials sought to curtail the new
emperor’s ambition to initiate and direct reforms from the throne, and to press
on him the importance of leaving the management of affairs of state to his
bureaucracy. In a memorial of the second month of 1067 the academician Han
Wei (1017–98) begged Shen-tsung not to intervene directly in the governing
process: “The hundred affairs of government each have their appropriate officials, who exercise their utmost skills to fulfill their duties. There can be no
25
26
27
“Lun Heng-shan shu,” in Ssu-ma, Ssu-ma Wen-cheng kung ch’uan-chia chi 41, pp. 525–9. Shen-tsung
fumed about Ssu-ma Kuang’s memorial to his war minister, Wen Yen-po, and demanded to know how
Ssu-ma knew about the deliberations in the first place. See HCP (1986) shih-pu 2, p. 7b.
HCP (1979) 209, p. 5091.
“Ts’u-mien ts’ai-chien kuo-yung cha-tzu,” in Ssu-ma, Ssu-ma Wen-cheng kung ch’uan-chia chi 42, pp. 533–
5, and Ma, Wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao (1965) 24, p. 232c.
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greater sacrifice of the essence of government than for the monarch to take over
from his officials in the management of affairs.” Han Wei urged Shen-tsung
to confine his decision making to only the most important issues, and only
when his officials were stalemated; and above all he stressed that the ruler
could not hasten to do great things, but must proceed systematically and with
great caution.28 As Anthony Sariti has argued, it was Ssu-ma Kuang who
most forcefully contended that the emperor should act as a final arbiter who
stood aloof – and sequestered – from the actual process of bureaucratic decision
making.29 Two months after Han Wei’s memorial, Ssu-ma Kuang inaugurated
his appointment as chief censor by urging Shen-tsung to eschew “the many
bothersome details of government” in favor of first rectifying his own heart
(hsiu-hsin), and then selecting and motivating the best men to govern the
nation (chih-kuo).30 It was just this division between imperial and bureaucratic
spheres of influence that Shen-tsung was disinclined to honor, however, and
four months later Ssu-ma Kuang was forced to complain that the emperor was
interfering in the normal process of government by sending out his own agents
(nei-ch’en) to investigate affairs and line officials in the field.31
It must be stressed that although Shen-tsung did not get the encouragement
he wanted from such men as Fu Pi and Ssu-ma Kuang, he did not on that
account want them out of his way. On the contrary, he continued to value the
opinions of the most fervent critics of his revanchist, reforming ambitions, and
sought to keep the critics by his side. Shen-tsung kept Fu Pi in the capital
until 1072 despite the old man’s opposition to change, for example, because
he felt that Fu Pi’s “prominence helped to hold together all under Heaven.”32
And Ssu-ma Kuang remained Shen-tsung’s closest confidant – perhaps even
closer intellectually than Wang An-shih – despite his intransigent opposition
28
29
30
31
32
HCP (1979) 209, p. 5077.
See Anthony W. Sariti, “Monarchy, bureaucracy, and absolutism in the political thought of Ssu-ma
Kuang,” Journal of Asian Studies 32 No. 1 (1972), pp. 53–76.
“Ch’u ch’u chung-ch’eng shang-tien cha-tsu,” in Ssu-ma, Ssu-ma Wen-cheng kung ch’uan-chia chi 38,
pp. 493–4, and HCP (1986) shih-pu 1, pp. 9b–10a. The first part of Ssu-ma’s injunction is translated in
Sariti, “Monarchy, bureaucracy, and absolutism in the political thought of Ssu-ma Kuang,” p. 62.
“Yen Wang Chung-cheng ti erh cha-tzu,” in Ssu-ma, Ssu-ma Wen-cheng kung ch’uan-chia chi 39, p. 511, and
HCP (1986) shih-pu 2, pp. 1a–2b. Anthony Sariti is right to conclude (contra James T. C. Liu) that this
question of the delegation of authority to the bureaucracy does not distinguish between conservatives and
reformers. Once he was in power Wang An-shih made many of the same arguments as Han Wei and Ssuma Kuang had made. The dividing line comes over what kind of power (extractive and entrepreneurial
versus ameliorative and advocatory) and to what kinds of officials (special-function fiscal agents versus
regular line officials).
HCP (1979) 231, pp. 5614–16, citing the Yeh-shih of Lin Hsi (c. 1035–c. 1101), compiler in the
mid-1090s of the Veritable records of Shen-tsung’s reign. For capsule biographies of Lin and many of the
individuals mentioned in this chapter, see Sung-shih chüan pien-tsuan wei-yüan-hui, Chung-kuo li-shih
ta tz’u-tien: Sung-shih chüan (Shanghai, 1984).
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 357
to every facet of the emperor’s reform agenda. For as Shen-tsung told Lü Kungchu (1018–81) in the tenth month of 1067, “I want Ssu-ma Kuang by my
side not for his opinions on affairs of state [for as they both agreed Ssu-ma,
like Wang An-shih, was rather impractical] but because of his moral power
(tao-te) and learning.”33
Thus it was not simply over ideas about how to rule that Shen-tsung turned
away from the leading midcentury intellectuals to Wang An-shih, but also
because of politics. More importantly, Shen-tsung resented what he perceived
as the autocratic powers built up over three reigns by his chief councilor
Han Ch’i. Shen-tsung’s resentment was fanned by his former tutor, Wang
T’ao (1020–80), who repeatedly charged that “since the end of the Chia-yu
era [1056–63] Han Ch’i has monopolized the handles of government, with
the result that the monarch’s position is weak and the minister’s position is
strong.” Starting in the third month of 1067 Wang T’ao used his post as head
of the Censorate to launch an impeachment campaign against Han Ch’i and
his co-councilor Tseng Kung-liang (998–1078) for taking advantage of a new
emperor to violate the rules of office protocol. Shen-tsung himself quashed the
impeachment process, but a political free-for-all between Wang T’ao and the
assistant civil councilor, Wu K’uei (1010–67) ensued that revived the factional
animosities of the 1060s and undermined the power of the old leadership.
On the one hand Han Ch’i, seriously compromised by Wang T’ao’s attacks
and the public perception of Shen-tsung’s displeasure with him, repeatedly
begged permission to resign his post. On the other hand, Tseng Kung-liang,
corespondent in the impeachment memorials, sought to distance himself from
Han Ch’i by forcefully sponsoring a new and as yet unaffiliated rising star –
Wang An-shih. Shen-tsung finally accepted Han Ch’i’s resignation in the
ninth month of 1067, by which time he had become obsessed with the idea of
meeting and using Wang An-shih.34
Shen-tsung and Wang An-shih
In many ways Wang An-shih was typical of the men who moved into the
bureaucratic elite during the second half of the eleventh century. The Wangs
were part of the wave of sojourners who migrated from the old northern heartland (in their case from T’ai-yüan) to the new political and economic centers of
33
34
HCP (1986) shih-pu, 2, pp. 13a–15b.
The basic sources on Han Ch’i’s resignation and Tseng Kung-liang’s promotion of Wang An-shih are
anthologized in HCP (1986) shih-pu 2, pp. 8a–11a. See also Henry R. Williamson, Wang An-Shih, a
Chinese statesman and educationalist of the Sung dynasty (London, 1935–7), vol. 1, pp. 101–2. Williamson’s
chief narrative source is Pi Yüan’s Hsü tzu-chih t’ung-chien.
358
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the south during the upheavals of the Five Dynasties era.35 The family settled
in Fu-chou5 (Chiang-nan West), a region that was just beginning to rise in
economic and political significance during the early eleventh century.36 With
Wang’s father, Wang I (993–1039), a chin-shih graduate of 1015, the family
entered the bureaucratic stream: Wang I held a series of local offices culminating as vice-prefect (t’ung-p’an) of Chiang-ning fu (modern Nanking), where
he died in 1039 and which Wang An-shih came to regard as home. Between
the beginning of the century and 1068 the Wang lineage produced eight chinshih graduates, including An-shih (chin-shih 1042). In conjunction with their
migration out of their native place to Chiang-ning, this achievement reflects
the kind of academic focus and geographic mobility characteristic of families
specializing in government service during the eleventh century. Known from
his youth as a dazzling scholar (he placed fourth in his chin-shih class), Wang
earned early recommendations from such luminaries as Ou-yang Hsiu and
Wen Yen-po. Nonetheless, Wang spurned opportunities to break into official
circles in the capital, preferring to serve in local posts in Chiang-nan where
he could better discharge his family and financial responsibilities. In 1147 he
took a post as magistrate of the coastal Yin county (modern Ning-po), where
he promoted the kinds of agricultural policies he would apply empirewide
during the New Policies, including irrigation and land reclamation projects
and an early version of an agricultural loan measure that provided grain in the
off-season to be paid back with interest at harvest time.37
In 1058, after a decade of staff positions in prefectural and central government earned him the judicial intendancy of Chiang-nan East circuit, Wang
sent to Jen-tsung the “Myriad word memorial” that was to become Wang’s
35
36
37
Wang reviews his family’s history in a short biographical notice for his father called “Hsien ta-fu shu,”
in Wang, Wang Lin-ch’uan ch’üan-chi 71, pp. 448–9. The basic source for Wang’s life remains Ts’ai
Shang-hsiang, Wang Ching kung nien-p’u k’ao-lüeh (1804; Shanghai, 1974). Ts’ai reconstructs Wang’s
life and career from a wide variety of sources, including literary collections and local gazeteers. H. R.
Williamson’s biography of Wang An-shih, in Williamson, Wang An Shih, vol. 1, pp. 1–388, is based
largely on Ts’ai Shang-hsiang and on Wang’s biography in SS 327, pp. 10541–51. For modern studies
of Wang’s early life and career, see Saeki Tomi, “Ō Anseki,” in Chūgoku-shi kenkyū, Saeki Tomi (Kyoto,
1969), vol. 3, pp. 365–81; Higashi, Ō Anseki shinpō no kenkyū, pp. 924–33, and Higashi, Ō Anseki jiten,
pp. 129–35; and Liu, Reform in Sung China, pp. 1–4. For a parallel study of the evolution of the careers
and thought of Wang An-shih and Ssu-ma Kuang, see Bol, “This culture of ours,” pp. 212–53.
The political and demographic trends exemplified by Wang and his family are outlined in Robert M.
Hartwell, “Demographic, political, and social transformations of China, 750–1550,” Harvard Journal of
Asiatic Studies 42 No. 2 (1982), pp. 365–442. For an examination of those trends in Wang An-shih’s
home region, see Robert P. Hymes, Statesmen and gentlemen: The elite of Fu-chou, Chiang-hsi, in Northern
and Southern Sung (Cambridge, 1986).
Higashi devotes a special section to Wang’s tenure in Yin county. See Higashi, Ō Anseki shinpō no kenkyū,
pp. 930–3, and SS 327, p. 10541. The parallel chronologies of the lives and careers of Wang and Ssu-ma
Kuang are conveniently tabulated in Higashi, Ō Anseki jiten, pp. 221–35. See also Saeki, “Ō Anseki,”
pp. 439–50.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 359
reform manifesto.38 Wang’s memorial exemplifies the alarm intellectuals felt
as they saw their country head toward crisis in the decades following the
Sino-Tangut war:
Within the empire the security of the state is a cause for some anxiety, and on our borders
there is the constant threat of the barbarians. Day by day the resources of the nation become
more depleted and exhausted, while the moral tone and habits of life among the people
steadily deteriorate. On all sides officials who have the interests of the nation at heart are
fearful that the peace of the empire may not last.39
The underlying cause of the crisis, for Wang, was that men of the present
had moved too far from the laws and institutions of the ancient kings. At its
heart, Wang’s memorial is an indictment of the prevailing political culture, a
culture dominated by self-serving and convention-mired men selected by the
examination system for their strong memories and literary skills rather than
for the practical experience essential for good government. It was these men,
Wang may well have thought, who had suppressed the Ch’ing-li reforms; and
it was certainly these men who would ensure that even when emperor and court
did promulgate the right kinds of measures, either they would not be acted on
or they would be turned against the people. Consequently, Wang insisted, “the
most urgent need of the time is to secure men of talent,” for only then will it be
possible to transform the decadent institutions that cause human suffering and
approach the ideals of the ancient kings. And the only way to secure such men
is to follow the example of the ancients – that is, to create a nationwide school
system “to mold and train them” through a four-stage process: Instruction,
nurturance, selection, and employment. This process would produce activist,
practical-minded men, trained and experienced in the specialties for which
they were best suited, who could be given great latitude to carry out their
projects “without being hampered by this or that regulation.”40 Wang did not
expect his new bureaucrats to forgo their own interests; on the contrary, he
proposed to cement their interests to the well-being of the state by paying them
well enough to keep them honest. But he did expect them to all share the same
values – “to be uniformly instructed in the way of the ancient kings,” as were
the scholars of old, when “the heterodox learning of the hundred schools was
all rejected, and no one dared study them.” And he insisted on a return to that
38
39
40
“Shang Jen-tsung huang-ti yen-shih shu” in Wang, Wang Lin-ch’uan ch’üan-chi 39, pp. 217–27. For
English translations, see Williamson, Wang An Shih, vol. 1, pp. 48–84; and Wm. Theodore de Bary
et al., eds., Sources of Chinese tradition (New York, 1960), pp. 413–19. Wang’s memorial is analyzed in
Higashi, Ō Anseki shinpō no kenkyū, pp. 921–77; see also Bol, “This culture of ours,” pp. 216–18.
Wang, Wang Lin-ch’uan ch’üan-chi 39, p. 218, translation from de Bary et al., Sources of Chinese tradition,
p. 414.
Wang, Wang Lin-ch’uan ch’üan-chi 39, p. 220. For an interpretation of Wang An-shih’s memorial as a
call for the mobilization of bureaucratic entrepreneurs, see Smith, Taxing heaven’s storehouse, pp. 117–18.
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ancient shih ideal that held the civil and military arts to be inseparable, so that
the defense of the borders and the palace would be in the hands of the scholarly
elite (shih-ta-fu), rather than sloughed off on the most corrupt, ruthless, and
irresponsible elements of society, men who could not even maintain themselves
in their native villages but had to leave their families to muster in the army.41
In Wang An-shih’s view, then, the only way to meet the challenges of the
day was to revitalize the bureaucracy by creating the widest possible pool of
like-minded, action-oriented specialists who were devoted to the civil and
military interests of the state. But even a revitalized bureaucracy did not mean
that reform would proceed automatically or that the emperor could remain
aloof from the political process. On the contrary, Wang warned that activist
rule (yu-wei) could proceed only if the emperor himself was firm and resolute
and enforced political discipline. In the past – and again Wang must have had
the Ch’ing-li reforms in mind – whenever some “vulgar opportunist” (liu-su
chiao-hsing chih jen) disliked and opposed reform, “the court just called a halt
and would not dare to proceed.” The sage-kings of antiquity, by contrast, never
failed to push relentlessly forward:
Whenever the ancients aspired to great deeds they never failed to exterminate (cheng-chu)
[their opportunist opponents] as a prelude to attaining their goals. Thus the Book of poetry
says “By punishment and extermination we eliminate opposition.” In this way did King
Wen [the Chou progenitor] first exterminate his opposition and only then achieve his goals
for the world.42
Because they inhabited an especially corrupt world the ancient kings had
to overcome their reluctance to exterminate their adversaries, “for they knew
that otherwise they could not accomplish great deeds.” Wang assured Jentsung that his own task would be easier, since opportunistic nay-sayers were
far outnumbered by the many who would welcome reforms. But this made
it all the more ignoble for the emperor to allow himself to be swayed from
the imperative to reform officialdom and the world. “If Your Majesty sincerely
hopes to bring the world’s talents to the fore then this minister urges that you
decide once and for all.”43
Although his imagery would become less sanguinary, this was the same
message that in his six years as chief councilor Wang would repeat over and over
again to Shen-tsung: be resolute, crush dissent, and disregard the murmuring
opposition of vulgar opportunists. And although Jen-tsung had had his one
chance at reform and was not about to try again, under Shen-tsung “when
41
42
43
Wang, Wang Lin-ch’uan ch’üan-chi 39, pp. 221, 223. See Bol, “This culture of ours,” p. 218 and his sources
for further examples of Wang An-shih’s stress on the need for unity of values and customs.
Wang, Wang Lin-ch’uan ch’üan-chi 39, p. 226.
Ibid.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 361
An-shih came to the head of the country, all his proposals found their origins
[in the “Myriad word memorial”].”44
Following the submission of his memorial, Wang was appointed to a series
of capital posts, including staff supervisor in the Office of Funds (san-ssu tu-chih
p’an-kuan) of the Finance Commission, auxiliary in the Academy of Worthies
(Chi-hsien yüan), and in 1061 drafting official (chih-chih-kao) for the Secretariat.
During this period Wang’s mother had resided in the capital, but when she died
in the eighth month of 1063, five months after the death of Jen-tsung, Wang
An-shih returned to bury her in Chiang-ning. Yet even though Wang spent all
of Ying-tsung’s reign in Chiang-ning, his name was constantly brought to the
future emperor Shen-tsung’s attention by Shen-tsung’s tutor, Han Wei. For
whenever Han’s discourses met with the young prince’s approval Han would
say, “This is not my idea, it is the idea of my friend Wang An-shih.”45 When
Shen-tsung ascended the throne his interest in Wang was fanned by Tseng
Kung-liang as well, who insisted that Wang was “ministerial material”; and
although Wang refused an imperial summons for an audience in the third
month of Shen-tsung’s reign (1067), he surprised even his friend Han Wei
by accepting at the same time an appointment as prefect of Chiang-ning. But
Wang was still out of the capital and out of sight of the emperor who wanted to
meet him. Shen-tsung kept pressing his ministers for their opinions on Wang –
Wu K’uei and Han Ch’i both thought Wang appropriate for an academic
post but not for a position on the Council of State – and when Han Ch’i
resigned as chief councilor in the ninth month of 1067, Shen-tsung appointed
Wang to the Han-lin Academy, along with Ssu-ma Kuang. Seven months later,
burning with impatience, Shen-tsung ordered the “newly appointed Han-lin
Academician Wang An-shih to appear for an audience immediately.”46
That first meeting between the twenty-year-old emperor and the fortyseven-year-old political maverick must have convinced Shen-tsung that here
was an advisor whose activist ambitions matched his own. Wang An-shih
even counseled the emperor to abandon T’ang T’ai-tsung as his model, and to
reach back to the sages Yao and Shun, heretofore thought by “the scholars of
this decadent age” (mo-shih hsüeh-shih tai-fu), content to accept the ordinary
as their goal, to be beyond the reach of men of today.47 Shen-tsung replied
that perhaps with Wang’s help he could attain such heights; but he did probe
for the cause of Wang’s sense of urgency, by asking how his predecessors had
44
45
46
47
SS 327, p. 10542. For the self-protective rerouting of dissent into art and poetry during Shen-tsung’s
reign, see chapter 2 of Alfreda Murck, Poetry and painting in Song China: The subtle art of dissent (Cambridge,
Mass., 2000), pp. 28–50.
Ts’ai, Wang Ching kung nien-p’u k’ao-lüeh 9, pp. 143–5; SS 327, p. 10543.
CPPM 59, p. 1888.
CPPM 59, p. 1888; Williamson, Wang An Shih, vol. 2, p. 34.
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managed to hold all under Heaven for one hundred years “without a major disaster.” Wang’s response, presented following the audience in a formal memorial
entitled “[Why] this dynasty has enjoyed a hundred years without disaster,”
supplied just the rationale for action that Shen-tsung had been seeking.48
In essence, Wang argued that the survival of the dynasty had heretofore
depended on the imperial virtues of care for the welfare of the people, openmindedness toward the opinions of officials, fairness in the application of the
laws, prudence and compliance toward the barbarians, and above all good
fortune. But fortune and imperial virtue just barely offset the “the problems of
slavish conventionality typical of a period of decline (yin-hsün mo-su chih-pi).”
In the court, Wang charged, the ruler spends his time surrounded by eunuchs,
women, and nit-picking bureaucrats, and “has not yet emulated those activist
rulers of old who discoursed with learned scholars on the methods used by the
former kings to order the world.” At the institutional level, no changes had
been made in the methods of training, selecting, and employing officials, and
consequently the few capable men who did rise through the bureaucracy were
so outnumbered by selfish, obstructionist mediocrities that nothing could be
accomplished by government. Meanwhile, the peasantry was being destroyed
by the burdens of labor service, yet no effort had been made to offer them
relief, or to create offices devoted to improving irrigation and agricultural
productivity. Similarly, the army was still mustered from among the sick and
aged dregs of society, with no provisions made for training and drilling them
or for putting them under the long-term command of dedicated generals.
In sum,
There is no method to the management of resources, so that even if the government
economizes the people will not prosper; even if we worry and strive the nation will not
become strong. The reason the empire has suffered no great calamity is because the time
has not yet arrived for the barbarians to explode on the scene, and we have not yet been
visited by great floods or droughts. Although it is attributed to the doings of men, it is in
fact because of the aid of Heaven. . . . I beg Your Majesty to aim for the highest sageliness
and to lay claim to the unending strand [that links you to the ancient kings]. You must
know that the aid of Heaven cannot be counted on, nor can the affairs of men be idly left
to their own. The time for doing great deeds (ta yu-wei chih shih) is right now.
However much Shen-tsung might disagree with certain elements of Wang
An-shih’s advice in the coming months, no other advisor so excited the emperor
with a vision of great achievements – achievements he announced that only
Wang An-shih could help him realize.49 From this time on, Shen-tsung
48
49
Wang, Wang Lin-ch’uan ch’üan-chi 42, pp. 242–3; “Pen-ch’ao pai-nien wu-shih cha-tzu,” anthologized
in CPPM 59, pp. 1888–92.
CPPM 59, p. 1894.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 363
determined to bring Wang An-shih into the Council of State as an assisting civil
councilor (ts’an-chih cheng-shih), but he met strong opposition from the incumbent assisting councilor T’ang Chieh (1010–69), a man with a formidable
reputation as a “straight speaker.” T’ang Chieh rejected Wang as stubborn and
impractical, and he predicted publicly to the emperor and privately to Wang’s
sponsor Tseng Kung-liang that “if Wang is made a councilor he will change
many things and disrupt the empire . . . and everyone already knows this.”50
But Shen-tsung could not be dissuaded, and in the second month of 1069 he
offered the assistant councilor’s post to Wang with the command that he could
not turn it down.
For his part, Wang responded that it was indeed his hope to “assist the
emperor to accomplish great deeds.” But he cautioned that it would be difficult,
for the court was filled with mediocrities (yung-jen) and outright villains (chienjen), who through jealousy or sheer ignorance would conspire to block the few
clear-thinking and independent men in office from accomplishing anything
of merit, by overwhelming them with dissenting opinions (i-lun).51 Therefore
in his answer to Shen-tsung’s question about the first task before them, Wang
An-shih replied that it was to “transform customs and mores and establish
laws and institutions,” by “strengthening the superior men and eliminating
the petty ones (ch’ang chün-tzu, hsiao hsiao-jen),” with their pernicious power to
corrupt the people and preclude all possibility of moral rule. The first step in
Wang’s reform vision, in short, was to eliminate all those – like T’ang Chieh –
who opposed him. And with this “the emperor agreed.” Wang’s appointment
to the council was announced in the second month of 1069, and the very next
month he began to systematically neutralize his opponents.
gaining power
While discussing possible appointments in the fall of 1070, Tseng Kung-liang
urged the emperor to heed Chen-tsung’s belief that “it is important to have
people of different opinions stirring each other up, so that no one will dare
to do wrong.” But Wang An-shih forcefully disagreed: “If everyone at court
agitates one another with different opinions then how will it be possible to
govern? This minister humbly believes that if the court ministers in charge of
affairs of state do not share one mind and one morality (t’ung-hsin t’ung-te) nor
cooperatively strive for unanimity, then none of the tasks facing the empire can
be accomplished.”52 For Wang, nothing so impeded progress as the constant
50
51
52
Shen-tsung’s discussions with and about Wang An-shih are reported in CPPM 59, pp. 1894–5.
See CPPM 59, pp. 1895–6, for the exchange between Wang and Shen-tsung.
HCP (1979) 213, p. 5169.
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babble of contending opinion, and therefore change could be founded only on
unanimity of opinion and the elimination of dissent. In the long run the most
effective way to eliminate disagreement was to imbue the next generation of
officials with “moral unity” (i tao-te), or a common ideology.
This quest for ideological uniformity underlay almost all of Wang’s educational measures, including his proposals for the creation of a national school
system, his reform of the examination system, the promulgation of his own
commentaries to the Classics as the key to passing the exams, and his attempt
to pack such leading educational institutions as the Directorate of Education
(Kuo-tzu chien) and the new Bureau for the Interpretation of the Classics (Ching-i
chü) with his own relatives and followers.53
But ultimately, Wang insisted, it was the emperor’s responsibility to silence
the critics of change, by exercising the imperial prerogative (jen-chu chih ch’üan)
to decide issues of substance. In 1070 the emperor, torn as ever between Wang’s
insistence on uniformity and the remonstrances of such senior statesmen as
Ssu-ma Kuang and Ou-yang Hsiu, wondered at the continuing controversy
surrounding the reforms. Wang, as he would throughout his tenure as head
of government, blamed the persistence of dissent on the emperor himself:
“Although Your Majesty is far more sagacious than his predecessors, because
you are insufficiently resolute (kang-chien) you have not yet succeeded in transforming civic culture by unifying morality (i tao-te i pien feng-su). As a result
the cacophony of opinions continues.”54 In Wang’s view, it was up to the
emperor to
awe and intimidate the multitudes into compliance, so that the court can attend to
affairs. . . . It is just like Heaven itself, which uses the yang-ch’i to activate the myriad
things. Heaven does not let the different things saturate one another, but rather conceives
53
54
After Wang An-shih’s San-ching hsin-i (New Meaning of the Three Canons [the Chou-li, Shih-ching, and Shuching]) was made the basis of the civil service examinations in 1075, Pi Chung-yu (1045–1119) observed
that “if a candidate’s interpretation of the classics did not accord with Wang An-shih’s, then no official
would dare choose him.” See Pi’s “Li-hui k’o-chang tsou-chuang” in his Hsi-t’ai chi 1, quoted in Wang,
“Wang An-shih pien-fa chien-lun,” p. 145. On packing educational institutions, see HCP (1979) 228,
pp. 5545–6; 243, p. 5917; on efforts to canonize Wang An-shih’s commentaries, see HCP (1979) 215,
pp. 5245–7; 265, pp. 6514–16. Wang An-shih first proclaimed the need to promote a uniform morality
or ideology in his Ch’i kai k’o t’iao-chih cha-tzu [Request to reform the examination system] in Wang, Wang
Lin-ch’uan ch’üan-chi 42, p. 245. For this and for Wang An-shih’s educational reforms in general, see
Thomas H. C. Lee, Government education and examinations in Sung China (New York, 1985), pp. 239–43.
John W. Chaffee, The thorny gates of learning in Sung China: A social history of examinations (Cambridge,
1985), pp. 76–84, examines the consequences of Wang An-shih’s school reforms, which took root in the
postreform era under Ts’ai Ching and Hui-tsung. For sources and more specific treatment, see Kondo
Kazunari, “Ō Anseki no kakyo kaikaku o megutte,” Tōyōshi kenkyū 46 No. 3 (1987), pp. 21–46. The
intellectual foundation of Wang An-shih’s educational reforms and the debate they spawned are discussed
in Peter K. Bol, “Examinations and orthodoxies: 1070 and 1313 compared,” in Culture and state in Chinese
history: Conventions, accommodations, and critiques, ed. Theodore B. Huters et al. (Stanford, Calif., 1997),
pp. 29–57.
HCP (1979) 215, p. 5232.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 365
them all with the one essence. Just so, if the imperial resolve is strong, then all under
Heaven will comply without being commanded; if not, the factions of the vast party of
conventionalists (liu-su ch’un-tang) will strengthen by the day, while the imperial authority
will daily wither.55
The exercise of imperial prerogative meant two things for Wang: the steadfast enactment of imperial decisions, and unwavering support for reform
activists. Wang continuously pressed Shen-tsung to stick to decisions he had
made or approved, lest the power of imperial authority fall to the “factionalists” – the reform opponents – within the government. One key arena for
the exercise of imperial power was the promotion and demotion of officials,
which became increasingly politicized during the 1070s as the fulfillment
of reform goals came to dominate personnel decisions. New Policies opponents who invoked procedural and ethical precedents to protect their own
members from demotion and block the unilateral ascent of reform partisans
inevitably encountered Wang’s imperial prerogative argument. In mid-1070,
for example, Wang denounced critics of an imperial order appointing his
protégé Li Ting (1028–87) to the Censorate by warning the emperor that “if
Your Majesty . . . revokes the order appointing Li Ting . . . then your majesty’s
authority to appoint and dismiss (yü-tuo chih ch’üan) will have been compromised, and straight-speaking officials will no longer dare rely on your majesty
as their leader.”56 In a separate incident a short time later, an imperial rescript
demoting K’ung Wen-chung (1038–88) for an allegedly impertinent examination essay was repeatedly returned by officials in the Memorial Forwarding
Office (T’ung-chin yin-t’ai ssu), with the support of the prominent reform opponent Han Wei. Wang An-shih charged K’ung with slandering the emperor,
and successfully convinced Shen-tsung that if he did not enforce his decision
“then the authority of the emperor will be usurped by the multitude of evil
[factionalists], and the conventionalists will so incite one another that in the
future there will be nothing that we can do.”57 But Wang urged the emperor
55
56
57
HCP (1979) 214, pp. 5206–7.
HCP (1979) 213, p. 5174. Critics attacked Li Ting not directly for his policy views, but for his failure to
mourn as mother the concubine who had nursed and possibly even bore him. For an analysis of the case as
one example of the anxieties provoked by the intrusion into scholarly elite life of the market in women,
see Patricia B. Ebrey, “Women, money, and class: Ssu-ma Kuang and Sung Neo-Confucian views on
women,” in Chung-kuo chin-shih she-hui wen-hua-shih lun-wen-chi, ed. Chung-yang yen-chiu-yüan li-shih
yü-yen yen-chiu-so ch’u-pan-p’in pien-chi wei-yüan-hui (Taipei, 1992), pp. 629–30.
HCP (1979) 215, pp. 5245–7. Wang An-shih was apparently gaining revenge for the demotion of one
Hou P’u for a sycophantic exam essay on natural disasters that quoted Wang’s own commentary to the
Hung-fan. According to an excerpt from Lin Hsi’s Yeh-shih, the demotion of K’ung Wen-chung had
ramifications that chilled officialdom. K’ung’s younger brother Wu-chung declined a lecturer’s post,
further fueling the court’s anger; then K’ung’s father, Yen-chih, turned down the post of prefectural
judge of K’ai-feng out of fear of residing in the capital, requesting a provincial post instead. He was
granted the same position in Yüeh-chou (Liang-che), but when salt returns there fell below quota he was
impeached for “defying the New Policies” (wei-pei hsin-fa). K’ung Yen-chih was subsequently transferred
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to be unyielding on broader policy issues as well. For example, when Shentsung worried that the Bureau of Military Affairs (under Wen Yen-po) would
reject Wang’s proposal to replace mercenaries with a popular militia, Wang
responded that “if the emperor genuinely wishes to enact a militia policy
then who will be able to oppose it? This is for the emperor to decide.”58
In the end, ideological uniformity came down to a question of obedience to
the emperor’s (and Wang’s) decisions, for as Wang insisted to Shen-tsung in
1072, “one may see an issue as right or wrong, but if one sees it as wrong
when the court disagrees and deems it right, then one must obey the court’s
commands.”59
As long as Wang had the emperor’s ear and support, the exercise of imperial prerogative provided the best possible protection for Wang’s own reform
policies. But it was equally important to extend that protection to Wang’s
lieutenants in the field, by immunizing them from outside criticism and interference. In his “Myriad word memorial” Wang had insisted on granting broad
discretionary authority to field officials, arguing that “there has never been
a single case in history that has shown it possible to obtain good government even with the right man in power if he is bound by one regulation or
another so that he cannot carry out his ideas.”60 But where those ideas were
as controversial and disruptive as the reform measures there was inevitable
resistance against carrying them out, and it was precisely the most successful
agents of reform who were most bitterly attacked as cruel and mean-spirited
seekers of profit for the state and rewards for themselves (hsing-li chih ch’en,
chü-lien chih ch’en). As a young man with a keen sense of mission and imperial
responsibility, Shen-tsung took these charges very much to heart, but Wang
An-shih saw every such expression of imperial concern as an abandonment of
the reform cause. In the fourth month of 1072, for example, Wang complained
about the continued attacks on his chief water-control engineer Ch’eng Fang,
chiding the emperor for investigating every charge made by “villainous, selfinterested” partisans against the loyal and diligent officials working hard for
the reforms.61 Two months later, in one of his many tirades against the detractors of the border official Wang Shao, Wang An-shih warned the emperor
that the multitude of evil-doers were in danger of blocking the reforms and
overwhelming the few real activists (chien-kung chin-li-che) in government with
their baseless rumors and slander. Wang charged that by punishing reformers
58
59
60
61
to Hsüan-chou (Chiang-nan East), where he was cashiered in the middle of his term. See HCP (1979)
215, p. 5247.
HCP (1979) 213, pp. 5171–2.
HCP (1979) 230, p. 5605.
Wang, Wang Lin-ch’uan ch’üan-chi 39, p. 224.
HCP (1979) 232, pp. 5634–5.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 367
for the slightest misstep while letting slander and rumormongering go unquestioned the emperor was not only chilling the ardor of his most effective reformers, he was also encouraging factionalism. Wang appreciated that the emperor
tolerated critics and dissenters out of a desire to “broaden what he hears and
sees,” but he insisted that by opening himself to lies and falsehoods the emperor
was only blocking the path to knowledge. The solution, Wang concluded, was
to honor the emperor’s desire for accurate information by punishing the purveyors of slander and lies.62
In the end, Wang was enormously successful in garnering Shen-tsung’s
support for his policies and his men, and the entire New Policies era was characterized by an unusual devolution of authority and autonomy to agents in
the field.63 But Shen-tsung never lost his respect for the many prominent critics of reform tactics and policy, and these men battled endlessly with Wang
for the mind and heart of the emperor. At moments of natural disaster or
political turmoil Shen-tsung often heeded the urgings of his senior statesmen “to open up the channels of remonstrance” (k’ai yen-lu); but inevitably
those channels would be reclosed. For Wang was relentless in his campaign
to stamp out dissent, which he made a fundamental feature of his political vision. Even Lü Hui-ch’ing (1032–1110), Wang’s closest associate until
their falling out in 1075, was appalled by Wang’s obsession with quelling
dissent:
Wang An-shih is fond of saying that in the management of troops it is essential to enforce
ranks, so that even those with the will to differ will not dare give voice to their opinions,
and unanimity will be maintained. But in fact An-shih acts this way not only towards
the army but towards the entire nation. Wang regards all under Heaven as an enemy –
but even if he can manage to silence those close to him, can he really silence all under
Heaven?64
However intolerant Wang may have been he did still adhere to longestablished rules of political competition, which meant that he could not
silence all dissent. But he could hound all dissenters out of office, and that is
precisely what he did. The successful enactment of the New Policies was predicated on a threefold political coup: capturing the Council of State, ousting all
opponents of reform from office, and appointing his followers to all key policy
and remonstrance agencies.
62
63
64
HCP (1979) 234, pp. 5678–9.
The question of decentralization of authority is discussed in Paul J. Smith, “State power and economic
activism during the New Policies, 1068–1085: The tea and horse trade and the ‘Green Sprouts’ loan
policy,” in Ordering the world: Approaches to state and society in Sung dynasty China, ed. Robert P. Hymes
and Conrad Schirokauer (Berkeley, Calif.,1993), pp. 76–127.
HCP (1979) 268, p. 6574.
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Capturing the Council of State
The Ch’ing-li reforms demonstrated that no reform program could be mounted
unless its advocates gained firm control of the government. After his appointment as assistant councilor in the second month of 1069, Wang An-shih
moved swiftly to monopolize power for the reform coalition. Within weeks
of receiving the emperor’s mandate Wang launched a systematic campaign to
wrest control of the Council of State, neutralize the Censorate, create a reformspecific bureaucratic apparatus, and place his followers in key posts throughout
the government.
The key to creating a political apparatus dedicated to reform was to monopolize the Council of State, the paramount policy organ of government, with
control over administration and policy making for both civil and military
affairs. The council was headed by one to three chief councilors (tsai-hsiang,
or more formally t’ung chung-shu men-hsia p’ing-chang shih), who were concurrently the heads of the Secretariat-Chancellery (Chung-shu men-hsia). The chief
councilors were joined on the civil side by one to three assistant civil councilors (chih-cheng, or ts’an-chih cheng-shih). On the military side the council
included the commissioner of the Bureau of Military Affairs (shu-mi shih),
which was paired with the Secretariat-Chancellery as the “two authorities”
(liang fu). Joining the commissioner on the council were the administrator or
coadministrator (chih shu-mi yüan shih, t’ung-chih shu-mi yüan shih) and one or
two assistant commissioners (shu-mi fu-shih).65 As an advisory committee to
assist the emperor, who needed to approve all its measures, the council was
designed more to facilitate sharp differences of opinion than to foster unanimous political action. But if one of the contending groups within government
could pack the Council of State with its own adherents, it was then possible
to ostracize political opponents from the capital, capture the Censorate and
the Remonstrance Bureau, and push government in a single direction;66 and
it was just this strategy that Wang An-shih pursued.
When he was appointed assisting civil councilor in the second month of
1069, Wang joined a body that had no unified plan of action, headed by
two men (Fu Pi and Tseng Kung-liang) who “want only not to offend the
65
66
Edward A. Kracke, Jr., Civil service in early Sung China, 960–1067; with particular emphasis on the development
of controlled sponsorship to foster administrative responsibility (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), pp. 30–9. Despite the
functional division into civil and military spheres, all councilors were drawn from the civil bureaucracy
and many incumbents passed through all or some of the four levels. For a convenient table of incumbents
in the Council of State from 1041 to 1125, see Higashi, Ō Anseki jiten, pp. 211–20. For more detail, see
Hsü Tzu-ming, Sung tsai-fu pien-nien lu chiao-pu, ed. Wang Jui-lai, (c. 1220; Peking, 1986).
This paraphrases Kracke’s discussion of monopolizing the ear of the emperor; see Kracke, Civil service in
early Sung, p. 30.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 369
‘conventionalists’ and have no interest in reforming our corrupted institutions.
I am afraid that [with men like this in power] we cannot long rely on peace nor
look forward to improving governance.”67 Armed with an imperial mandate for
change, Wang immediately began to arrogate to himself powers of command
that conventionally belonged to the chief councilors and even to the emperor,
and to intimidate his fellow councilors. After just two months in office Wang
pressed his point on a legal issue with such vehemence that when Shen-tsung
sided with Wang against (as Wang put it) T’ang Chieh and his clique, the
infuriated T’ang Chieh abruply died at age fifty-nine. Contemporaries regarded
T’ang as the only councilor with the courage to oppose Wang, and with his
death “Tseng Kung-liang (age 71) begged to retire because of age, Fu Pi (age
65) begged to be excused from attending to affairs because of illness, and Chao
Pien (age 61), lacking the strength [to withstand Wang], just spent his days
sighing. . . . As a result people said of the Secretariat that it included ‘the quick
(Wang), the old (Tseng), the sick (Fu), the dead (T’ang), and the embittered
(Chao).”68
Although T’ang’s death opened a potential opportunity for Wang it also
unleashed the hostility of officials who resented his hold on the emperor, and
especially his creation (in the second month of 1069) of a separate base of power
in the Finance Planning Commission (Chih-chih san-ssu t’iao-li ssu). That hostility exploded in the fifth month of 1069, when Executive Censor Lü Hui (1014–
71) sent up a ten-point memorial of impeachment. Among a wide-ranging
list of abuses past and present, Lü accused Wang of nepotism; of suborning
the emperor during illicit private conferences (liu-shen chin-shuo); of usurping
chief ministerial powers of appointment in order to oust his adversaries; and of
using the Finance Planning Commission to circumvent established agencies
(such as the Finance Commission and the Council of State itself ) and monopolize control over military and financial affairs. Wang reacted to Lü’s charge
as he would many times in the future, by threatening to resign. But Shentsung dissuaded Wang by issuing a personal edict reiterating his support and
allowing Lü to be cashiered from the Censorate.69 In the tenth month of 1069,
Fu Pi was allowed to resign as chief councilor, and was replaced by Wang’s
67
68
69
CPPM 58, p. 1871.
See Hsü, Sung tsai-fu pien-nien lu chiao-pu 7, p. 377, citing the Ting-wei lu. Wang An-shih’s specific battle
with T’ang Chieh was over the issue of whether a Teng-chou2 woman who tried but failed to kill her
abusive husband should suffer the death penalty, as T’ang and most members of the court agreed, or be
more leniently penalized under the statutes for “injury committed in an attempt to kill” (mou-sha shang),
as Wang insisted. See also CPPM 59, pp. 1896–7, and SS 327, p. 10544.
For the affair, see CPPM 58, pp. 1867–77; for the text of Lü’s memorial, see HCP (1986) shih-pu 4,
pp. 22a–23a, and Ts’ai, Wang Ching kung nien-p’u k’ao-lüeh 14, pp. 204–6. The memorial is summarized
in Williamson, Wang An Shih, vol. 1, pp. 127–30.
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own candidate, the administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs and Wang’s
cochief of the Finance Planning Commission, Ch’en Sheng-chih. As bureau
administrator, Ch’en had sat on the council since 1065, but as soon as he was
promoted to chief councilor, he tried to break free of Wang, inciting a feud
that culminated in his ouster one year later (see shortly). At the time, however, Ch’en’s promotion testified to Wang’s growing ability to shape council
membership to his needs.70
In order to fully control the council, Wang not only had to persuade Shentsung to appoint Wang’s associates, he also had to dissuade the emperor from
promoting Wang’s rivals. It was especially important to Wang to keep potential dissenters out of policy-making positions during his first year in office,
when such critical measures as the “green sprouts” rural credit act (ch’ing-miao
fa) and the agricultural lands and irrigation policy (nung-t’ien shui-li fa) were
taking shape (see Table 4). Thus in the first month of 1070, Wang persuaded
the emperor to post Chang Fang-p’ing to the provinces despite Shen-tsung’s
desire to have him at hand in the capital.71 But Wang scored an even greater
coup by dissuading Shen-tsung from appointing Wang’s chief ideological rival,
Ssu-ma Kuang, to the Council of State. Whereas Shen-tsung valued Wang as
an instrument of dynastic revival he reserved his warmest personal admiration
for Ssu-ma Kuang, whom he would have liked always to keep by his side.72
Though Wang too had enormous respect for Ssu-ma, whom he regarded as a
man of great distinction, Ssu-ma’s views were the antithesis of his own, and for
the moment Wang convinced Shen-tsung that putting Ssu-ma on the council would hinder the emperor’s own program: “Although Ssu-ma Kuang is
disputatious (hao wei i-lun) his own talents would prevent him from harming
government policy. But if he is employed in high office then he will become
a ‘red banner’ (ch’ih chih) for other disputatious men,” including the Szechwanese luminaries Su Shih (1037–1101) and Su Ch’e (1039–1112), and their
followers.73
But even though Wang An-shih exerted enormous influence over the
emperor, Shen-tsung was by no means his pawn, and imperial support could
be shaken by adverse public and political opinion. A crisis of confidence
was incited in the second month of 1070 by Han Ch’i’s denunciation of
70
71
72
73
Hsü, Sung tsai-fu pien-nien lu chiao-pu 7, pp. 409–10.
CPPM 63, pp. 2026–7.
See, for example, HCP (1979) 220, pp. 5338–41.
CPPM 63, pp. 2028–9; on Wang An-shih’s praise of Ssu-ma Kuang the man, HCP (1979) 213, pp. 5167–
9. For an analysis of the many points of intersection and divergence in the careers and ideas of Wang and
Ssu-ma, see Peter K. Bol, “Government, society, and state: On the political visions of Ssu-ma Kuang
and Wang An-shih,” in Ordering the world: Approaches to state and society in Sung dynasty China, ed. Robert
P. Hymes and Conrad Schirokauer (Berkeley, Calif.,1993), pp. 128–92.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 371
the “green sprouts” policy that almost toppled Wang An-shih from power.
Han Ch’i’s charge that the government set out to raise revenues by forcing
or enticing poor peasants into taking loans that they couldn’t repay shook
Shen-tsung’s faith in the measure, which was then the cornerstone of Wang’s
reforms. When Wang retired to his sickbed in fury at the emperor’s vacillation, the door was opened to a political revolt. Ssu-ma Kuang, in his
capacity as Han-lin academician, composed an imperial rescript stating that
owing to the reforms “the world is in ferment and the people are distressed”;
and though Shen-tsung apologized to Wang for the unfortunate wording,
he nonetheless took advantage of Wang’s self-imposed removal to appoint
Ssu-ma Kuang to the council, as assistant commissioner of military affairs.
Shen-tsung simultaneously ordered his councilors to abolish the green sprouts
measure, prompting the chief councilors Tseng Kung-liang and Ch’en Shengchih to mount the growing anti-Wang, anti-ch’ing-miao bandwagon by altering
the original green sprouts edict to exclude Wang’s own prohibition against
forced loans. At this point the reform movement was very close to collapsing. But faced with Wang’s melodramatic but effective threat to resign, the
emperor capitulated: Shen-tsung admitted to Wang that he had been deluded
by the mass uproar over the green sprouts measure, and agreed to put the
weight of his authority against the “conventionalists” who sought to block the
reforms.74
Once again Wang emerged from a crisis with renewed influence. Thwarted
in his efforts to reverse the green sprouts policy, Han Ch’i requested assignment
to a relatively minor post in the north; at the same time Ssu-ma Kuang realized
that with Wang back in power his own position was untenable, and he insisted
that his appointment to the Bureau of Military Affairs and the council be
annulled.75 Shen-tsung continued to urge Ssu-ma to play a role at court, but
Ssu-ma protested that there was no point in his remaining at court when the
emperor would neither heed his advice nor give him real power; he even argued
that with Wang An-shih setting his brother-in-law, Hsieh Ching-wen, on his
adversaries like a dog, remaining in the capital was unsafe. In the fourth month
of 1071, Ssu-ma Kuang retired to Lo-yang, the opposition capital for the next
fourteen years.76
74
75
76
For Han Ch’i’s memorial, see CPPM 68, pp. 2165–9. On the efforts to undermine Wang, see CPPM 68,
pp. 2172–3, 2176–7. For a synopsis, see SS 327, p. 10545.
CPPM 63, p. 2029. Han Ch’i was reassigned from pacification commissioner of Ho-pei to the single
subcircuit of Ta-ming fu.
HCP (1986) shih-pu 7, pp. 35a–36a; HCP (1979) 214, pp. 5201–2; and Ssu-ma Kuang’s nien-p’u,
appended in Ssu-ma, Ssu-ma Wen-cheng kung ch’uan-chia chi, p. 1068. On Lo-yang as the opposition
capital, see Michael D. Freeman, “Lo-yang and the opposition to Wang An-shih: The rise of Confucian
conservatism, 1068–1086” (diss., Yale University, 1973).
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paul jakov smith
With his chief ideological competitors neutralized Wang turned on those
one-time supporters who had sided against him in the green sprouts imbroglio:
Tseng Kung-liang, Ch’en Sheng-chih, and Chao Pien. Chao, Wang’s fellow
assistant councilor, was the only one of the three men to urge that no action
on green sprouts be taken while Wang was out of office; but his disagreements
with the policy, and his abomination of Wang’s custom of dismissing all
criticism as “prattle of the conventionalists,” forced him to resign his post
in the fourth month of 1070.77 Chao was replaced by the fifty-eight-year-old
Han Chiang (1012–88), a chin-shih classmate and ardent supporter of Wang,
who was (as the censor Ch’en Hsiang complained) the second man in a row to
move from co-leadership of Wang’s Finance Planning Commission, with its
focus on revenue gathering rather than on good governance, to a post as civil
councilor.78
Though Chao Pien resigned his post in the council voluntarily, Tseng Kungliang and Ch’en Sheng-chih were driven out by the venom of Wang’s animosity.
Immediately after resuming his duties Wang had vehemently denounced the
two men for scheming against the green sprouts measure, so shaking them
that they in turn “withdrew because of illness.”79 Ch’en had particular reason
to fear Wang, whose enmity he had earned by contemptuously abandoning
his co-leadership of the Finance Planning Commission as soon as Wang had
him named chief councilor. One month after the green sprouts affair (the third
month of 1070) Ch’en took advantage of his mother’s illness to beg permission to resign, but to forestall gossip Shen-tsung forced the now ineffective
man to stay on until his mother’s death in the tenth month of 1070.80 Tseng
Kung-liang – the man most responsible for getting Wang appointed to the
Secretariat – was completely unnerved by Wang’s vituperative attack, and
by the defamation campaign waged against him by Wang and his followers. As Wang assumed an increasingly despotic hold on government, Su Shih
berated Tseng for not “saving the court.” But Tseng replied that “the emperor
and Wang An-shih are like one man; that is Heaven’s doing.” Tseng withstood Wang’s abuse as long as he could – gossip maintained that he held out
long enough to secure a career for his son – but after he fell prostrate before
77
78
79
80
HCP (1979) 210, pp. 5101–2. Chao Pien accepted the post of prefect of Hang-chou.
HCP (1979) 210, pp. 2102–3. Han, like his Finance Planning Commission predecessor Ch’en Shengchih, was also already in the council as an executive of the Bureau of Military Affairs. Han’s younger
brother Wei (1017–98), though a trusted advisor to the emperor, was a staunch opponent of the reforms.
For capsule biographies of Wang An-shih’s relatives and associates, see Higashi, Ō Anseki jiten, pp. 94–
119; for biographies of those adversaries later termed the “Yüan-yu clique,” see Higashi, Ō Anseki jiten,
pp. 149–211. For greater detail, consult the sources listed in Ch’ang Pi-te et al., eds., Sung-jen chuan-chi
tzu-liao so-yin (Taipei, 1974–6).
CPPM 68, p. 2181.
CPPM 66, pp. 2102–3; 68, p. 2183; HCP (1979) 215, p. 5234; 216, p. 5261.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 373
Shen-tsung in the ninth month of 1070 the emperor allowed him to retire.81
With Ch’en out of office the following month, the way was cleared for Wang’s
elevation to chief councilor. In the final month of 1070, Wang and his older
protégé, Han Chiang, were both promoted to the chief position, but three
months later Han was cashiered for errors made on an assignment along the
northwestern frontier.82
Thus, from 1071 to his first resignation in the fourth month of 1074, Wang
was the unrivaled chief of government. Most of the empire’s elder statesmen –
including Ou-yang Hsiu (age 65), Ssu-ma Kuang (age 50), Wang T’ao (age
50), Fan Chen (age 63), Lü Hui (age 58), and Fu Pi (age 68) – had been forced
into retirement at the height of their powers.83 Meanwhile, in the council itself
only Feng Ching (1021–94) and the Bureau of Military Affairs chief Wen Yenpo could stand up against Wang, but their influence was limited. Feng Ching’s
protests carried no weight, and Wang systematically emasculated the Bureau of
Military Affairs by putting reform advocates such as Han Chiang and Wang’s
relative Wu Ch’ung into the assistant bureau positions; by overwhelming Wen
and his associates in council deliberations; and most important by aggrandizing
the authority over military financing, personnel, and war making for the Wang
An-shih coalitions in the Finance Planning Commission, in the Secretariat,
and in the field.84
Controlling remonstrance offices
Yet even capturing the Council of State did not guarantee Wang a free hand
in promoting his policies, since under a division of responsibilities that by
Sung times was accepted as conventional, the arbitrary exercise of power by
the chief councilor – or even by the emperor – was intended to be checked by
independent remonstrance agencies. The two most important remonstrance
organs, the Censorate (Yü-shih t’ai) and the Remonstrance Bureau (Chien-yüan),
were responsible for informing the emperor and the central authorities of local
conditions and government effectiveness throughout the empire, for providing
81
82
83
84
HCP (1979) 215, pp. 5238–9. Tseng’s son Hsiao-k’uan was named assistant commissioner of the
Bureau of Military Affairs in 1075, but Li T’ao dismisses the claim that this was Tseng Kung-liang’s
motive.
HCP (1979) 218, p. 5301; HCP (1979) 221, pp. 5389–91. Han Chiang was brought back as chief
councilor from the fourth month of 1074 to the eighth month of 1075.
Or so charged the censor Yang Hui, himself a victim of Wang’s climb to power. See HCP (1979) 224,
pp. 5449–50.
For examples, see HCP (1979) 211, pp. 5138–9; 213, pp. 5166–7; 244, pp. 5944–5. As one indication of
how the reformers circumvented Wen Yen-po, until 1075 the pao-chia militia system was controlled by
the reform-dominated Court of Agricultural Supervision rather than by the Bureau of Military Affairs.
See SS 192, p. 4770.
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a channel for complaints and suggestions from all sources, and for criticizing
policy recommendations and, where deemed necessary, returning them to the
council for reconsideration. According to Edward Kracke, “The institutional
expression of the information and rectification functions, and the protection
afforded those performing the functions, formed the closest Chinese parallel
to the constitutional separation of powers.”85
But however autonomous the Censorate and the Remonstrance Bureau were
intended to be in theory, in practice their privileged status emanated from an
emperor whose respect for their independence was buttressed only by convention and public opinion, and not by law. In a regime as determined to flout
convention as that of Shen-tsung and Wang An-shih, officials who actually
exercised their remonstrance prerogative could expect very little protection.
With Lü Hui’s ouster as executive censor in mid-1069 the precedent was set
for removing any remonstrance official who dared attack Wang’s policies or
his tactics. In the eighth month of 1069 three censors (Liu Shu, Liu Ch’i, and
Ch’ien I) were cashiered for denouncing Wang’s reckless, ruthless tampering
with time-honored institutions, signaling an all-out war by Wang’s forces
against the remonstrance bureaus.86
Wang An-shih and the emperor sought to exempt reform policies and
personnel as appropriate targets of remonstrance. In the early months of 1070,
Probationary Censor Chang Chien, youngest brother of the philosopher Chang
Tsai, joined the chorus of green sprouts opponents with a series of memorials
denouncing the Finance Planning Commission and all its enterprises; Wang
An-shih and his fiscalist confederates Lü Hui-ch’ing and Han Chiang; and
the timorous accomplices to Wang’s crimes, Tseng Kung-liang, Ch’en Shengchih, and Chao Pien. In the fourth month of the year, with Wang firmly
returned to power, an imperial edict charged Chang Chien with “insulting
state ministers and laying false charges,” and demoted him to a post as county
magistrate.87 Although Shen-tsung was deeply distressed by the uproar over
the green sprouts measure, Wang An-shih convinced him that the Censorate
was at the center of a conspiracy against the emperor’s reform program: “It is
the role of remonstrance officials to uphold the policies of the court. Where
then is the justice in [their] banding together with the ‘conventionalists’ like
this?” Shen-tsung agreed with Wang, later adding that the reason for all the
85
86
87
Kracke, Civil service in early Sung, p. 33.
CPPM 63, pp. 2025–6; HCP (1986) shih-pu 5, pp. 3b–4a.
HCP (1979) 210, pp. 5107–8. Chang’s colleague Wang Tzu-shao was also demoted for “giving the
appearance of rectitude while secretly embracing an evil clique” by condemning the green sprouts policy
even though he had recommended his own brother to be one of its administrators.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 375
agitation over the rural credit measure was because “I have put the wrong
men in the Censorate and the Remonstrance Bureau.” Thus just a few days
before dismissing Chang Chien the emperor cashiered the executive censor
Lü Kung-chu, Chang’s superior and the spearhead of censorial remonstrance
against the policy.88
In essence, then, Wang and the emperor viewed the Censorate as an administrative arm of the court rather than as an independent political entity. Consequently, censorial opposition to any regime decisions constituted grounds for
dismissal. Indeed, in the fifth month of 1070, Shen-tsung even authorized the
use of preemptive dismissals, cashiering the acting director of the Censorate,
Ch’en Chien, simply on the expectation that he would “veto” the controversial
promotion of Wang’s protégé Li Ting from a junior position as civil aide to
a position as investigating censor.89 This restrictive view of censorial power
applied equally to regime members who crossed Wang. In the sixth month of
1070, Shen-tsung took the initiative in dismissing Hu Tsung-yu (1029–94)
from his concurrent posts as chief of the Remonstrance Bureau and codirector
(with Lü Hui-ch’ing) of the Court of Agricultural Supervision, the successor to
the Finance Planning Commission as the nerve center of reform economic policy (see later discussion). In an angry denunciation before his state councilors,
the emperor lashed out at Hu for obstructing court policy, citing in particular Hu’s opposition to the transfer of personnel powers from the Bureau of
Military Affairs to the West Bureau of Personnel Evaluation of the Secretariat.
Han Chiang chimed in that it was the responsibility of remonstrance officials
to adhere to imperial directives, and Wang An-shih capped the denunciation
by adding that though it was not wrong for censors to disagree with a given
measure, it was totally unacceptable for them to harbor evil designs to obstruct
policy.90 For it was the enactment of policy that was paramount for Wang and
the emperor, and there were few constitutional principles that they would not
bend to ensure that reform policies were vigorously prosecuted. It was this
imperative that Wang invoked in mid-1071 when he urged that Executive
88
89
90
CPPM 68, pp. 2188–9; HCP (1986) shih-pu 7, pp. 33b–34b; HCP (1979) 210, pp. 5095–9.
HCP (1979) 211, p. 5121. This was just the opening salvo in a war between Wang and the established
civil service over the emperor’s prerogative to make appointments based on skills (and ideological
conformity) rather than formal civil service status. The entries from the HCP are anthologized in CPPM
61, pp. 1997–2004.
HCP (1979) 212, pp. 5159–60. According to Hu’s biography in the Sung shih, Hu earned Wang’s
enmity by opposing the appointment of Li Ting; see SS 318, p. 10370. Another regime member to
be ousted from the Censorate for crossing Wang was Wang’s brother-in-law Hsieh Ching-wen. Hsieh
was put in the Censorate specifically to attack Su Shih, but when, in 1071, he began to attack Hsüeh
Hsiang and Wang Shao as well, Wang An-shih had him dismissed; HCP (1979) 219, pp. 5321–2; 230,
pp. 5085–6.
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Censor Yang Hui be dismissed for his opposition to the hired service (or service
exemption) measure (mu-i fa):
If I commit transgressions in the service of Your Majesty none of the great ministers will
want to conceal them, so there is no need for a Yang Hui to keep watch on my actions.
But with a man such as Hui occupying the path of remonstrance then those officials in
the provinces who should exert themselves to administer the laws will [hold back on the
assumption] that the policies are going to be blocked, and then how will anything get
completed? . . . The court has been prosecuting the reform program for years now without
accomplishing very much, because each time our initiatives have been stalled; therefore I
fear that we are unlikely to see any results.91
The very next month (the seventh month of 1071) Yang Hui and his staff
member Liu Chih were demoted out of the Censorate, completing the purge
of Wang’s opponents from key remonstrance positions.92 As surveyed by the
fourteenth-century authors of the Sung dynastic history, Wang’s coup seemed
quite stunning: seventeen censors, four policy critics, and three drafting officials (chih-chih-kao) ousted from office in Wang’s first two years in office.93 With
most other spokesmen for the opposition driven into retirement or assigned
to the many temple posts that were created as sinecures for dissenters, Wang’s
purge of the government was virtually complete.94
Of course, with every opponent expelled from a critical post room was made
for a Wang An-shih supporter. Wang’s open campaign to pack the government
with his followers gave rise to his reputation for “exclusively employing mean
and petty men” (chuan yung hsiao-jen), and it naturally precipitated charges of
factionalism.95 But the force of such accusations diminished as Wang strengthened his grip on government. In mid-1070, for example, Wang’s opponents
complained that he was appointing fresh chin-shih holders to editorial positions
in the Institute for the Veneration of Literature (Ch’ung-wen yüan), including
a disciple (Lu Tien), a “guest” member of his entourage (Chang An-kuo), and
a finance expert who was notoriously incompetent in the classics (Lü Huich’ing’s younger brother Lü Sheng-ch’ing). But by this time Wang controlled
91
92
93
94
95
HCP (1979) 224, p. 5439.
HCP (1979) 225, pp. 5487–8.
SS 327, p. 10546. The number of censors includes Lü Hui and Lü Kung-chu.
On the temple posts created for dissidents, see HCP (1979) 211, p. 5128.
CPPM 64, pp. 2053–71, devotes a chapter to Wang’s “mean and petty men,” among whom are included
Li Ting, Tseng Pu, Teng Wan, Chang Tun, Lü Chia-wen, and many more. Fan Tsu-yü (1041–98)
delivered a postreform diatribe against Wang’s “promotion of petty men to mislead the nation” that
indicted all the chief financial specialists and border officials of Shen-tsung’s reign, including one of
the most brilliant scientific minds of his day, Shen K’uo. See SS 337, pp. 10798–9. On Shen K’uo
as an example of the quintessential New Policies reformer, see chapter 3 of Paul C. Forage, “Science,
technology, and war in Song China: Reflections in the Brush talks from the Dream Creek by Shen Kuo,
1031–1095” (diss., University of Toronto, 1991).
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 377
the Remonstrance Bureau through his brother-in-law Hsieh Ching-wen, who
transformed the complaint into an attack on a fourth newcomer to the post
(Hsing Shu), a protégé of Wang’s opponent Lü Kung-chu who was demoted
out of the institute while Wang’s followers all remained.96 One month later
Wang’s longtime associate Hsüeh Hsiang (1016–81) was named edict attendant in the Han-lin Academy, and when Feng Ching complained about the
appointment of an amoral fiscalist – for Hsüeh was known above all as a financial expert – to so delicate a post, Emperor Shen-tsung personally intervened
with a rescript of praise for Hsüeh proclaiming that “among those things that
are foremost in the governance of affairs, finance is the most urgent.”97 Occasionally, a follower of Wang’s would refuse an assignment that appeared too
blatantly political. In the ninth month of 1070, for example, the rising star
Tseng Pu (1036–1107) cited his low rank as a reason for declining a lectureship in the Hall for the Veneration of Governance (Ch’ung-cheng tien), where
Wang wanted to put him to control Classics Mat debates before the emperor
and scrutinize the flow of memorials from the opposition.98 But in a career
environment that had become increasingly competitive most men were eager
to accept all the spoils of the conservatives’ political defeat, and in a few short
years Wang had thoroughly consolidated his hold on power. As the memoirist
Wei T’ai (c. 1050–1110), a friend of Wang’s and a brother-in-law of Tseng
Pu, observed:
Wang [An-shih] grasped the reins of state and dedicated himself to transforming the world.
Since through their memorials and opinions the old men of accumulated virtue refused
to cooperate with Wang, he instead reached down to employ men newly advanced [into
the civil service], appointing them to posts without regard for formal rank. Thus in no
time at all the policies that were to characterize the entire period were all launched, and
in the forbidden recesses of the Han-lin Academy, [in] the halls of the Censorate, and in
the strategic positions at court and in the provinces, there were no vacancies that were not
filled by these newly advanced scholars.99
Ssu-ma Kuang viewed the situation even more ominously just before retiring to Lo-yang in the fourth month of 1071. By this time, as Ssu-ma saw
it, Wang’s hold on government was complete: his own party of friends and
96
97
98
99
HCP (1979) 211, p. 5129. On Lü Sheng-ch’ing’s shortcomings as a classical scholar, see HCP (1979)
253, pp. 6196–7.
HCP (1979) 212, pp. 5155–7.
HCP (1979) 215, p. 5236. Until the seventh month of 1071, when he accepted a post as provisional
proclamation drafting official (shih chih-chih-kao) in place of a man who refused to do Wang’s bidding,
Tseng Pu preferred to occupy low-ranked but extremely powerful positions at the top of such New
Policies nerve centers as the Office for the Compilation of Secretariat Regulations (pien-hsiu chung-shu
t’iao-li-ssu) and the Court of Agricultural Supervision (Ssu-nung ssu). For Yang Hui’s review of Tseng Pu’s
meteoric rise, see HCP (1979) 225, pp. 5480–1.
Cited in HCP (1979) 260, p. 6336.
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paul jakov smith
relatives were in power, all those who disagreed with him were purged, and
the emperor had become such a slave to Wang’s views that imperial authority
really emanated from Wang himself.100
Creating a reform apparatus
By commandeering existing posts for reform partisans Wang could suppress
dissent, control the flow of documents and information, and dominate routine administrative affairs. But the routine administrative apparatus, with its
checks and balances, multiple and often mutually conflicting responsibilities,
and elaborate chain of command, was never intended to foster rapid decision
making or flexible implementation of policy. Therefore, in order to meet the
extraordinary demands of the New Policies, Wang and his colleagues preferred
to circumvent the existing administrative structure altogether by creating new
institutions to carry out specific reform tasks.101
At the top of this reform-dedicated administrative apparatus sat the Finance
Planning Commission (Chih-chih san-ssu t’iao-li ssu), established in the second
month of 1069 to “dominate and restrain the engrossers, equalize wealth
and assist the poor, and liberate the flow of wealth through the world.”102
On a more mundane political level, the Finance Planning Commission was
created as a vehicle for excluding potentially obstreperous state councilors,
particularly Fu Pi, Tseng Kung-liang, and Wen Yen-po, from reform deliberations. Headed directly by Wang and his closest associates – Han Chiang,
the “Propagating Abbot” (ch’uan-fa sha-men) of the New Policies, and Lü
Hui-ch’ing, their “Divine Protector” (hu-fa shan-shen) – the Finance Planning
Commission assumed the status of “a mini-secretariat within the Secretariat,”
and “anything Wang needed to accomplish he enacted directly out of the
commission.”103
It was through the Finance Planning Commission that Wang assembled
his reform cadre and launched his first reform measures, including the “tribute transport and distribution act” (chün-shu fa, the seventh month of 1069),
100
101
102
103
HCP (1979) 220, pp. 5338–41.
Lo Wen (Winston W. Lo), “Circuits and circuit intendants in the territorial administration of Sung
China,” Monumenta Serica 31 (1974–5), pp. 39–107, especially p. 89. For a good example of the
cumbersome and inflexible administrative process, see Ssu-ma Kuang’s description of the prereform
price-control system managed by the Ever-normal Granaries, HCP (1979) 384, pp. 9350–2.
HCP (1986) shih-pu 4, p. 5b. The chief study of the Finance Planning Commission is Higashi, Ō Anseki
shinpō no kenkyū, pp. 264–327.
CPPM 66, p. 2105; Higashi, Ō Anseki shinpō no kenkyū, p. 335. Han Chiang and Lü Hui-ch’ing earned
their sobriquets when they kept the reforms in motion during Wang’s first retirement, in 1074. See SS
327, p. 10548.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 379
the “green sprouts act” (ch’ing-miao fa, the ninth month of 1069), and the
“agricultural lands and irrigation policy” (nung-t’ien shui-li fa).104 The executive affairs of the commission were entrusted to an Executive Secretariat
(chih-chih-ssu chien-hsiang wen-tzu kuan), charged with collating reports from
the provinces and planning policy initiatives. The first incumbents were Lü
Hui-ch’ing, a Chou-li (Rites of Chou) scholar whom Wang regarded as one of the
finest thinkers in memory, and Su Ch’e, the Szechwanese finance expert and
brother of Su Shih. Su’s philosophy of fiscal restraint proved wholly incompatible with the expansionist thrust represented by the Finance Planning
Commission, and he left his post and his dalliance with the reformers in the
eighth month of 1069.105 Lü Hui-ch’ing was assigned to a court post one
month later, but as Wang’s most trusted lieutenant he continued to dominate
the commission and its appointees, whom Lü Kung-chu (no relation) charged
were all his sycophants.106
The basic information necessary for policy planning was supplied to the
Executive Secretariat by a contingent of special “commissioners for the consideration of benefit and harm” (hsiang-tu li-hai kuan), who were dispatched
throughout the empire to conduct on-the-spot investigations of agriculture,
irrigation, taxes, and labor service. Despite Lü Kung-chu’s charge of sycophancy, the eight men appointed to the investigative post (including Ch’eng
Hao, who was to break with Wang over the issue of interest on the “green
sprouts” loans) were chosen largely for their interest and experience in agriculture and water control, and to a lesser degree finance.107 The policies that
came out of the Finance Planning Commission planning process, particularly the green sprouts rural credit program, the agriculture and water-control
measure, and later (under the direction of the Court of Agricultural Supervision) the service exemption (mien-i) act, were executed by a new addition to
the Sung circuit administrative structure previously dominated by the fiscal
104
105
106
107
Unless otherwise specified, the following discussion is drawn from Higashi, Ō Anseki shinpō no kenkyū,
pp. 264–363. For a clear synthesis of Higashi and other Japanese scholars on the structure, personnel,
and responsibilities of the Finance Planning Commission, see Mira A. Mihelich, “Polders and the
politics of land reclamation in southeast China during the Northern Sung dynasty (960–1126)” (diss.,
Cornell University, 1979), pp. 48–60.
HCP (1986) shih-pu 5, pp. 13b–19a, anthologizes Su Ch’e’s memorials on the Finance Planning Commission, including his “Chih-chih san-ssu t’iao-li ssu lun-shih chuang,” in Su, Luan-ch’eng chi 35,
pp. 1a–5a.
CPPM 66, p. 2106. For capsule biographies of all incumbents in the Executive Secretariat, see Higashi,
Ō Anseki shinpō no kenkyū, pp. 284–302.
Higashi, Ō Anseki shinpō no kenkyū, pp. 336–7; for capsule biographies see pp. 304–15. As Mihelich
points out, the eight investigators were characterized by men who had demonstrated a strong disposition
toward activism in water control and agricultural affairs in low-level offices, with more experience in
their home regions than in the capital. See Mihelich, “Polders and the politics of land reclamation,”
p. 55.
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paul jakov smith
intendant (chuan-yün shih) and the judicial intendant (t’i-tien hsing-yü): the
intendants for Ever-normal Granaries, agriculture, and water conservancy (t’ichü ch’ang-p’ing nung-t’ien shui-li kuan).108 By late 1069 forty-one intendants
or assistant intendants (kuan-kou kuan) had been dispatched to virtually every
circuit of the empire, filled by men at the lower levels of the civil service
(including at least three from executory-class posts as civil aides) who fit the
typical Finance Planning Commission profile of proven skills in finance and
agricultural improvement.109 The intendants supervised a network of officials
designated from among the existing administrative staff of every prefecture
and county to manage the Ever-normal Granaries (a traditional mechanism
for stabilizing grain prices and supplies), and to collect the enormous sums of
money generated by the green sprouts loans and the service exemption fees.
This new command structure, extending from the Finance Planning Commission chiefs through the intendants to their designated functionaries in local
government, circumvented the traditional financial nerve system dominated
by the Finance Commission and the circuit fiscal intendants, and channeled
surpluses from the new revenue-generating enterprises directly to Wang and
his reform coalition in the State Council.110
The creation of a parallel administrative apparatus devoted purely (as opponents saw it) to generating revenues inspired a barrage of outraged criticism.
A memorial submitted by Su Shih in late 1069 captures the flavor of the complaints voiced by Ssu-ma Kuang and Lü Kung-chu, and by his own brother,
Su Ch’e:
From the founding of the dynasty to the present, the fiscal administration of the empire has
been entrusted solely to the commissioner, assistant commissioners, and the supervisors
of the Finance Commission, who for more than one hundred years have left no matter
untended. Now, for no cause, another commission has been set up in the name of “Coordinating the regulations of the Finance Commission.” Six or seven young men are empowered
to discuss fiscal policies day and night within the bureau, while more than forty emissaries
have been sent out to enact their policies in the provinces. The vast scale of their initial
108
109
110
For the evolution of the Sung system of circuit administration, see Lo, “Circuits and circuit intendants.”
For an analysis of the professional traits of seventy-one of the men appointed intendant or assistant
intendant between 1069 and 1086, see Smith, “State power and economic activism during the New
Policies.” For capsule biographies of the first wave of intendants, see Higashi, Ō Anseki shinpō no kenkyū,
pp. 317–34.
Smith, “State power and economic activism during the New Policies”; Wang Tseng-yü, “Pei Sung ti Ssunung-ssu,” in Sung-shih yen-chiu lun-wen-chi: 1987 nien nien-hui pien-k’an, ed. Teng Kuang-ming et al.
(Shih-chia-chuang, 1989), pp. 8–35, especially p. 9; Robert M. Hartwell, “The imperial treasuries:
Finance and power in Song China,” Bulletin of Sung-Yüan Studies 20 (1988), p. 65. For Winston
Lo’s model of the Sung system of dual control over county magistrates see his “Circuits and circuit
intendants,” pp. 92–5.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 381
operations has made people frightened and suspicious; the strangeness of the new laws
adopted has made officials fearful and puzzled. Worthy men seek for an explanation, and
failing to get any, cannot relieve their anxiety; small men simply conjecture as to what
is going on at court and give voice to slander, saying that Your Majesty, as the master
of 100,000 chariots, is interested in personal profit, while the state councilor [Wang Anshih], acting as chancellor of the Son of Heaven, is concerned only with managing wealth
(chih-ts’ai).111
The uproar raised against the Finance Planning Commission convinced
Shen-tsung to abolish the office in the fifth month of 1070, sooner than Wang
An-shih had wanted.112 But the entire planning and administrative apparatus
was simply transferred to a moribund but long-established – and therefore
more legitimate – agency, the Court of Agricultural Supervision (Ssu-nung
ssu). The Court of Agricultural Supervision inherited the Finance Planning
Commission’s position as financial command center of the reforms, amassing
huge surpluses through the course of Shen-tsung’s reign while the routine
fiscal apparatus under the finance commissioner slid ever deeper into debt.113
The top posts in the Court of Agricultural Supervision were filled by the
chief reform policy makers, including Lü Hui-ch’ing and Tseng Pu; these men
occupied the Court of Agricultural Supervision directorship in conjunction
with their concurrent assignments in key policy, remonstrance, and drafting
positions, creating an interlocking directorate that merged advisory and operational functions in the reform leadership and subordinated the government’s
most important operations to the fiscal imperatives of Shen-tsung and Wang
An-shih.114
The financial apparatus created by Wang and his associates by no means
exhausted the new reform-dedicated organizations. Reformers consolidated
their power with the creation of other new agencies at the central and provincial
levels. The most important new policy-making agency was the Subcouncil for
111
112
113
114
See “Shang Shen-tsung huang-ti,” in Su Shih, Ching-chin Tung-po wen-chi shih-lüeh (c. 1173; Taipei, 1967)
24, pp. 141–2, translation revised from de Bary, Sources of Chinese tradition, p. 481. HCP (1986) shih-pu
6, p. 19b, argues persuasively that the correct date of this memorial is the twelfth month of 1069, and
not the second month of 1071 as indicated in the original text. Other influential denunciations of the
Finance Planning Commission include Su Ch’e’s, cited earlier; Lü Kung-chu, HCP, 210, pp. 5095–9;
and Ssu-ma Kuang; see “Ch’i pa t’iao-li-ssu ch’ang-p’ing-shih shu,” in Ssu-ma, Ssu-ma Wen-cheng kung
ch’uan-chia chi 44, pp. 559–63.
HCP (1979) 211, p. 5122.
Wang, “Pei Sung ti Ssu-nung-ssu,” pp. 26–7.
On the concurrent posts, see Wang, “Pei Sung ti Ssu-nung-ssu” pp. 10–11. It was this subordination
of government to finance that most outraged the opponents of the reforms, as reflected in outgoing
censor Ch’en Hsiang’s charge (in the fourth month of 1070) that “ever since Your Majesty has put Wang
An-shih in charge of the government he has done nothing but plot to raise revenues.” HCP (1979) 210,
pp. 5102–3.
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paul jakov smith
the Compilation of Secretariat Regulations (pien-hsiu chung-shu t’iao-li-ssu),
established in mid-1069 as a reform “think tank” within the Secretariat to
consider issues of policy and administrative restructuring. The subcouncil was
answerable directly to Wang An-shih and helped him consolidate his power visà-vis the other state councilors and the emperor himself.115 The executive level
of Wang’s special agency was staffed by five secretariat examiners (chien-cheng
chung-shu wu-fang kung-shih) – one for each division ( fang) of the Secretariat.
These five examiners and their staff were under the overall supervision of a
chief examiner (tu chien-cheng). The chief and divisional positions were filled by
the most promising members of the reform clique, including Lü Hui-ch’ing,
Tseng Pu, Shen K’uo, Teng Wan, and P’u Tsung-meng, and always included the
director of the Court of Agricultural Supervision on concurrent assignment.116
In addition, the administrative range and authority of the secretariat examiners
were enhanced by sending many of them into the field on ad hoc assignments as
investigative commissioners (ch’a-fang shih), a New Policies trouble-shooting
post that enabled reform policy makers to directly monitor the progress of
policy initiatives and the compliance of officials in the field.117 As Yang Hui
complained in the second month of 1071 in reference to Tseng Pu, the new
bureau facilitated Wang’s domination of the government by allowing him to
settle all matters pertaining to the Secretariat with his chief examiner, without
reference to the other civil councilors.118 When Shen-tsung assumed direct
control of the government after Wang’s final retirement in 1076, however, he
began recouping executive power from the Secretariat, reducing the secretariat
examiners to little more than clerks.119
At the regional level, the administrative reach and extractive capacity of the
reformers were extended by the creation of new multicircuit superintendancies,
in particular, the Superintendancy for Tea and Horses (tu-ta t’i-chü ch’a-ma-ssu)
that dominated the economies of Szechwan and Shan-hsi, and the Superintendancy for State Trade (tu t’i-chü shih-i-ssu) that presided over state wholesale and credit operations in the capital and the provinces. Unlike the Evernormal intendancies, which were linked through a direct chain of command to
the central government, these two superintendancies were autonomous state
115
116
117
118
119
Higashi, Ō Anseki jiten, p. 79; SHY (1964) chih-kuan 5, pp. 8b–9a.
On the secretariat examiners, see Kumamoto Takashi, “Chūshoken seikan – Ō Anseki seiken no ninaitetachi,” Tōyōshi kenkyū 47 No. 1 (1988), pp. 54–80, especially the table of incumbents, pp. 62–3.
Secretariat examiners who served concurrently as investigative commissioners included Li Ch’eng-chih,
Chang Tun, Hsiung Pen, Lü Hui-ch’ing, P’u Tsung-meng, and Shen K’uo. See table in Kumamoto,
“Chūshoken seikan,” pp. 62–3; HCP (1979) 251, p. 6116. On the post itself, see SHY (1964) chih-kuan
42, pp. 62a–63a.
HCP (1979) 220, pp. 5346–7.
Kumamoto, “Chūshoken seikan” pp. 75–7.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 383
enterprises that traded revenues for independence, operating under the protection, but not the direct supervision, of the reform leadership.120 And other
circuit intendancies, such as the pao-chia (mutual security) militia intendants,
were also created in the course of the New Policies. In conjunction with the
expansion of traditional circuit positions, the new network of regional intendancies tightened the reformers’ control over the people and the resources of
the empire, as Ssu-ma Kuang lamented just prior to his death in 1086:
When Wang An-shih got hold of the reins of government he wanted to press forward
vigorously with his New Policies. In every circuit he set up an intendant of Ever-normal
and Universal Charitable granaries and Farming Lands and Irrigation. Afterward he added
intendants’ positions for every type of affair; moreover, investigators (an-ch’a kuan) were
also appointed [for each of these new functions], all of whom wielded the same authority
as a [regular] circuit official. At the same time, he also increased the number of fiscal
vice-intendants and fiscal supervisors. And for each post he selected young, low-ranked,
frivolous officials, with seniority status no higher than vice-prefect, county magistrate, or
market inspector. . . . Officials such as these showed no concern for the affairs of state nor
sympathy for the plight of the common people, but just devoted themselves to collaborating
in schemes aimed at gaining promotions [for themselves] and revenues [for the state].121
It is to this search for revenues under Wang An-shih that we now turn.
the first phase of the new policies: economic reform under
wang an-shih
Their effective control of all the major organs of policy making, implementation, and remonstrance allowed Wang’s coalition to mount a sweeping program
of political, economic, and military reform. Under the banner of “activist statecraft” (ta yu-wei chih cheng), the reformers enacted a wide array of educational,
administrative, and legal measures designed to reshape the outlook of the civil
service, improve administrative efficiency, and extend government control over
the populace.122 But for reformers and opponents both, it was the measures
120
121
122
On the Superintendancy for Tea and Horses, see Smith, Taxing heaven’s storehouse; on the Superintendancy
for State Trade, see Liang Keng-yao, “Shih-i fa shu,” Kuo-li T’ai-wan ta-hsüeh li-shih hsüeh-hsi hsüeh-pao
Nos. 10–11 (1984), pp. 187–8.
HCP (1979) 368, pp. 8875–7.
The chief administrative measure enacted before Shen-tsung’s Yüan-feng administrative reforms was the
Granary System (ts’ang-fa) or “increased clerical salaries” (tseng li-lu), promulgated in 1070 as an effort
to professionalize the clerical service. Salaries were followed by the introduction of examinations and
merit promotions to move effective clerks into minor offices, and the opening up of clerical positions
to irregular executory-class officials and military servitors with the appropriate experience. See Liu,
Reform in Sung China; Miyazaki Ichisada, “Ō Anseki no rishi gōitsu saku – sōhō o chūshin to shite,”
in his Ajiashi kenkyū (Kyoto, 1957), vol. 1, pp. 311–64; and Liu K’un-t’ai, “Wang An-shih kai-ke
li-chih te she-hsiang yü shih-chien,” in Sung-shih yen-chiu lun-wen-chi, ed. Teng Kuang-ming and Hsü
Kuei (Hangchou, 1987), pp. 282–96. From 1071 on, to contain the persistent unrest that accompanied
384
paul jakov smith
devoted to “enriching the nation and strengthening its military power” (fu-kuo
ch’iang-ping) that came to define the substance – and the tragedy – of the New
Policies.123
Wang An-shih’s own focus was on the economy. In his “Myriad word memorial” of 1058, Wang had identified bureaucratic rejuvenation as the key to
social, military, and economic renascence: create a bureaucracy of ideologically
uniform but highly motivated specialists drawn from all segments of the society, and all the other problems facing the empire will fall into place. By the
time he assumed power under Shen-tsung, however, a decade of fiscal crisis had
altered the balance to make the “management of resources” (li-ts’ai) the defining feature of the art of government, and economic rejuvenation the paramount
concern of the day. This was the bridle Wang repeatedly used to restrain Shentsung from precipitately pursuing his own ambition – an irredentist war: “The
reason we have not yet begun our [great] enterprise (chü-shih),” Wang advised
the emperor in 1071, “is because our financial resources are inadequate. That
is why I say that the management of resources (li-ts’ai) is our most urgent
priority.”124
Wang An-shih’s economic thought
Wang’s emphasis on finance was not surprising. By the late 1060s even men
who were to part company over the New Policies could agree that both the
123
124
the enactment of the New Policies, the government began expanding the regions in which it applied
the “heavy laws” (chung-fa), which made punishments more severe, extended liability on the part of
accomplices and kin further, and offered rewards that were greater than under ordinary penalties. In
addition to the frontier war zones where they were routinely invoked, the government ultimately
extended the “heavy penalties” to selected counties of K’ai-feng, parts of Ching-hsi, and all of Huainan, Ho-pei, and Ching-tung. See Wang, “Wang An-shih pien-fa chien-lun,” p. 143, and Saeki Tomi,
“Sōdai ni okeru jūhō chibun ni tsuite,” in Chūgoku-shi kenkyū, Saeki Tomi (Kyoto, 1969), vol. 1, pp.
464–8.
For Ssu-ma Kuang the definitive components of the New Policies were the green sprouts (ch’ing-miao),
hired service or service exemption (ku-i, mu-i, mien-i), state trade (shih-i), and mutual security (pao-chia)
measures; the large-scale irrigation projects; and the disruptive frontier campaigns. See, for example,
his “Ying chao yen ch’ao-cheng ch’üeh-shih chuang” (Memorial in response to the Court’s order for
criticism of its failures) of 1074, in Ssu-ma, Ssu-ma Wen-cheng kung ch’uan-chia chi 45, pp. 574–5. The
authors of the Sung shih identify the “new policies” as nung-t’ien shui-li (agricultural lands and irrigation),
ch’ing-miao (green sprouts), chün-shu (equalized tribute and transportation), pao-chia (mutual security),
mien-i or mu-i (service exemption or hired service), shih-i (state trade), pao-ma (mutual security horse
pasturage), and fang-t’ien (square-fields land survey). See SS 327, p. 10544.
HCP (1979) 220, p. 5351. For other statements on the primacy of finance, see also “Ta Tseng Kung-li
shu” in Wang, Wang Lin-ch’uan ch’üan-chi 73, p. 464, cited in Liu, Reform in Sung China, p. 50. As Ch’i
Hsia points out, Wang An-shih ascribed his emphasis on finance to the Rites of Chou (Chou-li), “half of
which,” wrote Wang, “is concerned with the management of resources.” See Ch’i, Sung-tai ching-chi shih,
vol. 2, p. 1149. Ch’i Hsia analyses Wang An-shih’s economic thought in general at Sung-tai ching-chi
shih, pp. 1142–52.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 385
Table 4. Chronology of the New Policies during Shen-tsung’s reign
1067 (Chih-p’ing 4)
1st month
Ying-tsung dies; Shen-tsung enthroned.
1069 (Hsi-ning 2)
2nd month
6th month
7th month
9th month
11th month
12th month
1070 (Hsi-ning 3)
3rd month
5th month
8th month
12th month
1071 (Hsi-ning 4)
2nd month
3rd month
10th month
1072 (Hsi-ning 5)
3rd month
5th month
8th month
10th month
1073 (Hsi-ning 6)
3rd month
6th month
8th month
Wang An-shih appointed assistant civil councilor.
Finance Planning Commission established.
Subcouncil for Compilation of Secretariat Regulation (Pien-hsiu chung-shu
t’iao-li-ssu) established.
Tribute transport and distribution measure (chün-shu fa)
announced for six circuits of Huai basin and Chiang-nan, under
Transport Intendant Hsüeh Hsiang.
“Green sprouts” rural credit policy (ch’ing-miao fa) promulgated.
Policy to promote land development and irrigation (nung-t’ien
shui-li fa) promulgated.
Hired service (mu-i; or service exemption, mien-i ) proposal submitted.
Reforms of the examinations to emphasize policy issues, the
classics, and later law begin.
Court of Agricultural Supervision (ssu-nung ssu) replaces Finance
Planning Commission as policy nerve center.
Granary system (ts’ang-fa) of salaries for government clerks in the
capital and the provinces established. (HCP 214/5223; other sources say
the 12th month).
Wang An-shih and Han Chiang named chief councilors.
Mutual security (pao-chia) experiment begins in Kaifeng.
Revised examination curriculum based on classics and policy issues
promulgated.
Han Chiang cashiered as chief councilor.
Hired service policy promulgated (HCP 227/5521-24).
State trade policy (shih-i fa) promulgated.
Local horse-pasturage system (pao-ma fa) promulgated in the north
to graft horse pasturage onto the mutual security system.
Land survey and equitable tax measure (fang-t’ien chün-shui fa)
promulgated.
Hsi-ho circuit established in the Tibetan tribal lands of the T’ao River
valley, Kansu.
Bureau for the interpretation of the classics (ching-i chü)
established under Lü Hui-ch’ing and Wang Pang.
Directorate of Armaments (chün-ch’i chien) established.
Pao-chia made universal.
(continued)
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paul jakov smith
Table 4 (continued)
9th month
10th month
1074 (Hsi-ning 7)
4th month
7th month
1075 (Hsi-ning 8)
2nd month
6th month
8th month
10th month
11th month
1076 (Hsi-ning 9)
7th month
10th month
Guild exemption tax (mien-hang ch’ien) introduced to commute guild
assessments in kind to cash.
Plan to straighten the Yellow River begun.
Wang An-shih resigns, forced out by Cheng Hsia’s memorial on drought
and the destructiveness of the New Policies. Replaced by Lü Hui-ch’ing
(assisting civil councilor) and Han Chiang (chief councilor).
Self-registration measure (Shou-shih fa) enacted.
Wang An-shih reappointed chief councilor.
New Interpretations (hsin-i) of the Shih-ching, Shu-ching, and Chou-li
presented to the throne for use by education officials.
Han Chiang resigns.
Lü Hui-ch’ing cashiered.
Chiao-chih (Vietnam) invades, resolved in the tenth month of 1076.
Wang Pang dies.
Wang An-shih resigns, replaced by Wu Ch’ung and Wang K’uei.
1079 (Yüan-feng 2)
5th month
Ts’ai Ch’üeh appointed assistant councilor of state.
1080 (Yüan-feng 3)
3rd month
Wu Ch’ung resigns.
8th month
Shen-tsung begins his administrative reforms (kai-kuan).
1081 (Yüan-feng 4)
8th month
Shen-tsung launches campaign against Tangut Hsi Hsia.
1082 (Yüan-feng 5)
9th month
Campaign against Tanguts ends in disaster at Yung-le, though hostilities
simmer.
1085 (Yüan-feng 8)
3rd month
Shen-tsung dies, Che-tsung enthroned under Dowager Empress
Hsüan-jen as regent. New Policies gradually rolled back.
1086 (Yüan-yu 1)
int. 2nd month
4th month
9th month
Ts’ai Ch’üeh forced out, replaced as chief minister by Ssu-ma Kuang.
Wang An-shih dies.
Ssu-ma Kuang dies.
finances of the state and the prosperity of the economy were imperiled.
Just after Ying-tsung’s death in 1067, Han Chiang and Chang Fang-p’ing,
soon to be in opposite political camps, sent up a joint memorial declaring
that to ensure the livelihoods of the people and the very foundation of the
state nothing was more essential than getting the nation’s financial affairs in
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 387
order.125 But the relatively large arena of shared economic opinion that characterized the 1050s and 1060s was to shrink with the onset of the New Policies,
when disagreements became much more sharply pronounced.126
As the reform agenda began to take shape, a conservative fiscal position
emerged that clustered around three main points. First, conservatives such
as Ssu-ma Kuang held that “the production of Heaven and Earth is constant”; that is, despite increases in the size of the population (as Ssu-ma Kuang
acknowledged) the size of the economic pie remained relatively fixed.127 Second, although fate, natural endowment, and the inelasticity of economic output
induced great inequalities in wealth, conservatives such as Ssu-ma Kuang, Su
Hsün, Su Ch’e, Cheng Hsia, Fan Chen, and others insisted that the relationship
between rich and poor was both benign and mutually beneficial: the wealthy
served as the pillars of local society and the state and as the providers of capital
(land and credit) and security to the poor, who in turn assisted the wealthy with
their labor.128 And third, the fixed size of the economic pie defined the proper
relationship between the economy and the state: the economy functioned best
when it was least burdened by the government.
Although conservatives acknowledged that economy and finance were both
in crisis, then, in their view that crisis was caused solely by the irresponsible
spending of the state. Because of the inelasticity of economic output, there
was no way to increase government revenues beyond traditional limits (which
Chang Fang-p’ing defined as the land tax, taxes on the products of the mountains and the marshes, and commercial taxes assessed on goods in transit and
at the point of sale129 ) without in turn decreasing the incomes of the people.
In fact, the way to increase the prosperity of the nation, wrote Su Ch’e in
the memorial that earned him a temporary position on the Finance Planning
Commission, is not to demand more wealth (in the form of taxes), but rather
to root out those things that harm the formation of wealth in the first place:
excess officials, excess troops, and excess expenditures.130 Ssu-ma Kuang made
the same point even more forcefully in a debate with Wang An-shih before the
emperor, where he reiterated his view that “the output of the world in money
and goods is of a fixed and definite amount. If it is in the hands of the state
125
126
127
128
129
130
HCP (1979) 209, pp. 5074–5.
During the 1060s, Ssu-ma Kuang promoted many of the same ideas on finance as Wang An-shih,
and even anticipated key aspects of the reforms. See, for example, his memorial on finance from 1062
entitled “Lun ts’ai-li shu” (On wealth and profit), in Ssu-ma, Ssu-ma Wen-cheng kung ch’uan-chia chi 25,
pp. 353–62, analyzed in Bol, “Government, society, and state.”
Ssu-ma, Ssu-ma Wen-cheng kung ch’uan-chia chi 25, p. 361.
For a survey of conservative views on the harmonious relationship between rich and poor, see Ch’i,
Sung-tai ching-chi shih, vol. 2, pp. 1163–8.
See Chang Fang-p’ing’s memorial “Lun lu-ch’ien mu-i shih,” quoted in HCP (1979) 277, p. 6787.
CPPM 66, p. 2096.
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then it is not in the hands of the people.” And he reminded Shen-tsung of
the lesson learned by the emperor Han Wu-ti (r. 141–87 b.c.e.) when he let
himself be deluded by his economic minister Sang-hung Yang: when the state
extracts wealth from the people, “bandits swarm like wasps.”131
The reformers harbored an entirely more robust view of the economy. By
the mid-eleventh century China could no longer be characterized by the relatively closed natural economy envisioned by the conservatives. Particularly
in south China, commerce had increasingly transformed economic relations,
breaking down self-sufficiency and fostering regional specialization and household production for and reliance on the market. And with commerce came a
concomitant expansion in the role of money as a medium of exchange for
goods and services. Although Northern Sung finance officials may have been
relatively slow to recognize the distinctive properties of money, which they
lumped with such commodities as grain and textiles in their statistical summaries of national income and expenditure, by Shen-tsung’s reign the reformers
seemed more attuned to the unique role of money as an exchange medium and
a unit of value.132 If anything, the reformers exaggerated the role of money
in the Chinese economy, mesmerized as they were by the ways that money
multiplied itself through commercial transactions and interest on loans. And
it was this very multiplication that caught their attention and distinguished
the reformers from the conservatives: for whereas conservatives viewed the
economy as static, the reformers saw the economy as dynamic and expanding.
In yet another strict contrast with the conservatives, who saw the state as the
greatest single threat to economic well-being, the reformers held that economic dynamism could be sustained only by the involvement of the state. As
early as 1058, Wang insisted that it was the responsibility of public finance
(chih-ts’ai) “to utilize the energy of all under Heaven to produce wealth for all
under Heaven, and to use the wealth of all under Heaven to meet the needs
of all under Heaven.”133 Just one year later Wang memorialized that “If the
state improves its institutions so as to make the [productive] base grow strong
and the [consumer] end diminish, then the wealth of the country will be so
great that no matter how much the state uses it cannot possibly exhaust all
131
132
133
“Er-ying tsou-tui,” in Ssu-ma, Ssu-ma Wen-cheng kung ch’uan-chia chi 42, pp. 543–5; CPPM 57,
pp. 1840–5.
The locus classicus on commerce in Sung China remains Shiba Yoshinobu, Sōdai shōgyōshi kenkyū (Tokyo,
1968), which should now be supplemented by his Sōdai kōnan keizaishi no kenkyū (Tokyo, 1988), and
Ch’i, Sung-tai ching-chi shih. The importance of commerce and monetization to understanding the New
Policies is discussed in Higashi, Ō Anseki shinpō no kenkyū, pp. 113–71. On the propensity to lump money
with other commodities, see Miyazawa Tomoyuki, “Hoku-Sō no zaisei to kahei keizai,” in Chūgoku sensei
kokka to shakai tōgō, ed. Chūgokushi Kenkyūkai (Kyoto, 1990), pp. 281–332.
Wang, Wang Lin-ch’uan ch’üan-chi 39, pp. 222–3.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 389
of it.”134 And in his debate with Ssu-ma Kuang before the emperor, Wang
argued that in a fiscal system run by “men who are skilled at finance (shan
li-ts’ai che)” it was possible to “secure a surplus for the state without increasing
the tax burden on the people.”135
Skilled financial officials were needed to counter the aggrandizing instincts
of the rich and powerful. This too was a key distinction between conservative
and reform visions of the economy, for instead of the benign, mutually beneficial relationships between rich and poor identified by the conservatives, the
reformers saw the economic landscape as dominated by coercive and predatory “engrossers” (chien-ping), magnates who preyed on the poor and usurped
the fiscal prerogatives of the state. Wang had associated himself with this
antiengrosser sentiment, which reached all the way back to Hsün-tzu (fl. 298–
238 b.c.e.), as early as 1053, in a poem denouncing the “wicked engrossers”
who had ensnared the wealth of the empire and encroached on the authority of
the monarch, thus shattering the ancient unity between public (kung) and private (ssu) wealth.136 In the idealized Chou dynasty that served as Wang’s model,
the former kings delegated the protection of the public interest from private
encroachment to their treasury officers (ch’üan-fu), who “controlled and regulated would-be engrossers, measured and equalized the differences between
rich and poor, transformed and circulated the wealth of all under Heaven, and
caused the benefits to all flow from a single source.”137 For Wang, the contemporary analog of the treasury officer was the well-trained, virtually heroic
financial specialist, upholding the power of the state to protect the common
good. Nowhere did he make this clearer than in an encomium of about 1060
to the officers of funds (tu-chih fu-shih) of the past:
Now it is wealth that holds all the people of the world together, laws that bring order to the
empire’s wealth, and officials who uphold the empire’s laws. If the officials are inadequate
then though there are laws they will not be upheld; if the laws are not good then though
there is wealth it won’t be put in order. And if there is wealth but it is not regulated, then
churlish people in the villages and towns will all be able to capture the power to collect
and disburse for themselves and to usurp the benefits of the myriad things, in competition
with the monarch. . . . Not even Yao and Shun of high antiquity could avoid making it
their most urgent priority to improve the laws and appoint officials to uphold them in
order to regulate the wealth of all under Heaven.138
134
135
136
137
138
Wang, Wang Lin-ch’uan ch’üan-chi 70, p. 444; “I ch’a-fa,” quoted in Liu, Reform in Sung China,
p. 50.
CPPM 57, p. 1843. Ssu-ma Kuang predicted that it was these very finance experts who would drive
the people into poverty and banditry.
See Wang’s poem “The engrossers” in Wang, Wang Lin-ch’uan ch’üan-chi 5, p. 22.
HCP (1986) shih-pu 4, pp. 5a–b.
Wang, Wang Lin-ch’uan ch’üan-chi 82, pp. 521–2, “Tu-chih fu-shih t’ing-pi t’i-ming chi,” cited by
Liang, “Shih-i fa shu,” p. 178.
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But the task of regulating wealth and restraining the engrossers was made more
difficult by the engrossers’ ubiquity. In 1072, for example, Wang complained
that: “In each and every district and prefecture there are ‘engrosser’ families
who do nothing but collect interest of tens of thousands of strings of cash each
year. Aside from violating and devouring the masses and tax-paying households
to enhance their spendthrift extravagance, what do they do for the country to
deserve such rich rewards?”139
Because there were too few officials trained in the techniques of economic
management, the state had forfeited its regulatory authority to the ubiquitous
predatory rich. Wang highlighted this point in the second month of 1069, in
his plea for establishing the Finance Planning Commission that inaugurated
the New Policies. There Wang emphasized that because incompetent officials
relied on an outmoded and inflexible command structure to siphon off goods
and services from a complex market-oriented economy, “most of the commodities used by the court are levied from places where they are not produced, or
demanded before their season. Wealthy merchants and great traders have taken
advantage of the crises this causes both public and private interests to usurp
control over the ratios of exchange (ch’ing-chung) and the collection and disbursement of money and goods.”140 Because Sung financial institutions lagged
behind changes in the economy, well-capitalized merchants were handed rich
opportunities to profit from the gap between outmoded quotas and economic
reality.
To close this gap and reestablish “public authority over the ratios of exchange
and the collection and disbursement of money and goods,” Wang proposed
to use the new Finance Planning Commission to spearhead intensified state
participation in the market economy. This commitment to expanding the
scope of state power was doubly controversial. First, in direct contrast with
Shen-tsung’s conservative advisors, Wang openly counseled expanding rather
than pruning the bureaucracy as a means of stimulating economic activity and
generating greater revenues. In his very first month on the Council of State,
Wang wrote that “only with many officials can essential tasks be accomplished.
So long as these tasks are accomplished there is nothing wrong with official
activity. And large expenditures will stimulate the production of wealth. So
long as they stimulate prosperity, what is the harm in great expenditures?”141
139
140
141
HCP (1979) 240, p. 5829, for the eleventh month of 1072.
“Ch’i chih-chih san-ssu t’iao-li,” in Wang, Wang Lin-ch’uan ch’üan-chi 70, p. 445.
Wang, Wang Lin-ch’uan ch’üan-chi 62, p. 391; “K’an-hsiang tsa-i” (A series of responses to imperial
queries), quoted in Liu, Reform in Sung China, p. 48. Wang repeated his argument in 1074, when he
instructed Shen-tsung on the economic benefits of appointing additional officials to administer the
labor exemption funds: “The number of [county-level] officials in charge of distribution and collection
of the labor exemption and Ever-normal funds does not exceed 500 men, with combined salaries of no
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 391
As proof of Wang’s intent, under his direction the number of qualified officials registered the greatest increase of the entire dynasty, jumping forty-one
percent, from twenty-four thousand men in 1067 to over thirty-four thousand
men in 1080.142
Second, if the state were to compete successfully with powerful private interests in the expanding marketplace, then it was not enough simply to make
government larger: the agents of the state had to think and act not like rulebound bureaucrats, but like innovative entrepreneurs. As Wang had argued in
1058, this meant selecting men for office based on their skills rather than for
their formal credentials, and then granting them the authority and autonomy
they needed to perform their intended tasks free of bureaucratic interference.
Shen-tsung must have found Wang’s argument persuasive, for as the author of
the Tzu-chih t’ung-chien ch’ang-pien chi-shih pen-mo wryly observed: “the emperor
tested talented men from all over the empire in governmental affairs, even
reaching down to the most distant commoners. If a prefectural or county
clerk made a few useful remarks, without even knowing him [the emperor]
would pluck him up and in less than a day he would be appointed an imperial attendant.”143 Even more galling to the New Policies critics was Wang’s
employment of “anyone with an opinion on finance, from traveling merchant
to market trader to butcher.”144 These potential bureaucratic entrepreneurs –
or “mean-minded practitioners of profit,” as their opponents called them –
were assigned to the panoply of new intendancies created to extend the economic power of the state and were granted unusual autonomy over their own
operations. In the case of such price-equalizing institutions as the Ever-normal
Granaries, officials were encouraged “to imitate the activities of the [very merchants whose price-gouging they were seeking to break] and call it ‘the art
of enriching the nation.’”145 And in the new state-run commercial enterprises
that were spawned by the New Policies, especially the state trade agency,
merchants were routinely given official positions.146
142
143
144
145
146
more than 100,000 strings annually. This year profits [from the two accounts] reached three million
strings, at a [total administrative] cost of but 300,000 strings. Establishing new offices does not lead
to unnecessary expenses.” HCP (1979) 250, p. 6095.
See Chaffee, The thorny gates of learning in Sung China (1985), p. 27, table 4.
The editorial comment is appended to an order promoting an imperial affine, Hsiang Ching. See CPPM
81, p. 2596.
HCP (1979) 225, p. 5484. The complaint was by Liu Chih, as he was driven from the Censorate because
of his opposition to the hired service policy. In 1075 even Han Chiang complained when Wang An-shih
appointed the “mean-minded practitioner of profit” Liu Tso to head the state trade agency. But Wang
responded, “If a state trade official is not expert in matters of profit, how then can he manage [the affairs
of the agency]?” HCP (1979) 264, p. 6468.
Author’s introduction in Ma, Wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao (1965), p. 5a.
The state trade agency is discussed below.
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Wang charged his expanded corps of financial specialists with two specific tasks: rationalizing the state’s financial operations, and displacing the
engrossers from their monopolistic positions. The key element of financial
rationalization was to put money at the center of the relationship between
the state and the economy. The first policy to come out of the Finance Planning Commission, the tribute transport and distribution measure (chün-shu fa),
proposed to replace the clumsy command extraction of goods with a marketoriented procurement system that authorized the transport intendant ( fa-yün
shih) to buy necessities and sell surpluses on the market.147 Although the policy was in the end aborted, other key measures, including state trade, hired
service, and green sprouts, inherited its monetizing thrust.
This fiscal accommodation to the role of money in the economy was also
meant to promote the state’s second objective, displacing the engrossers. Under
Wang’s prodding, “smashing the engrossers” (ts’ui chien-ping) became the ideological foundation of the New Policies, and the magic key to enriching the
state. In one exhortation after another Wang urged Shen-tsung to see smashing the engrossers as the very foundation of his reforms: “Heaven devolved
the Nine Continents and Four Seas on the emperor just so he could suppress
the great and the powerful, raise the poor and the weak, and enable poor and
rich alike to enjoy the benefits [of his rule].”148 In particular, he insisted that
suppressing the engrossers was the key to financing Shen-tsung’s longed-for
frontier campaigns. For just as financial reforms were the prerequisite to subduing the Tanguts and the Liao, revitalizing the peasant economy lay at the heart
of financial reform, “and in order to eradicate the burdens on the peasantry
we must suppress the engrossers.”149 Yet while the rewards of smashing the
engrossers were great, Wang warned that completely destroying their power
would be difficult:
The Ch’in was able to unify the Six Kingdoms but even they could not control the
engrossers, and in fact they even erected a memorial to the rich Widow Ch’ing. From
the Ch’in to the present no one has known how to smash and control the engrossers. But
[I] believe that if the engrossers could be smashed and controlled then the state’s revenues
would meet its needs and there would be no need to worry about inadequate resources.150
Enacting the economic reforms
At its broadest, then, Wang’s economic policy was animated by the conviction
that by charging financial specialists to rationalize and expand the presence of
147
148
149
150
Ch’i, Wang An-shih pien-fa, pp. 153–7; Liang, “Shih-i fa shu,” pp. 180–1.
HCP (1979) 232, p. 5641.
HCP (1979) 220, p. 5351.
HCP (1979) 262, p. 6407, for the fourth month of 1075; Liang, “Shih-i fa shu,” p. 223.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 393
the state in the monetized, commercialized economy, government agents could
appropriate the illicit profits of the engrossers and thereby assist the poor, stimulate production, and enhance government revenues without increasing the tax
burdens on the people. Under the direction of the Finance Planning Commission and its successor, the Court of Agricultural Supervision, Wang’s economic
corps did realize several significant successes. The many water-control projects
pursued as part of the policy to promote land development and irrigation
(nung-t’ien shui-li fa) certainly provided a direct stimulus to agricultural productivity. Between 1070 and 1076 the reform administration initiated 10,793
water-control and land reclamation projects around the empire, reclaiming a
total of 361,178 ch’ing 88 mu (approximately 38,829,779 acres) of agricultural
land. In addition, such directors of waterways (tu-shui chien) as Ch’eng Fang
and Hou Shu-hsien contributed to both productivity and fiscal solvency by
remedying conservancy and flood control problems along the Yellow River
and the Pien Canal.151
The redistributive goal of the reformers was most closely approximated
in the “land survey and equitable tax policy” ( fang-t’ien chün-shui fa) enacted
in the “five [northern] circuits” (wu-lu) (Ho-tung, the two Ho-pei circuits,
Yung-hsing-chün, and Ch’in-feng). Initiated in the eighth month of 1072,
the new measure sought to redistribute some of the tax burden that had been
sloughed off onto small, politically powerless landowners by the powerful
“official families and families of substance” (kuan-hu hsing-shih-hu) whose large
landholdings were protected by tax exemptions. In a concession to powerful
landowners that would later be followed by early Ch’ing dynasty (1644–1911)
rulers, the reformers traded the promise of readjustment but no total tax
increase for the right to institute a new series of cadastral surveys. Although
this concession preempted any increase in the total land tax from the five
northern circuits, by the time the policy was rescinded in 1085 a reported
2,484,349 ch’ing (c. 34.7 million acres) of land – fifty-four percent of the
national total of 4.6 million ch’ing as of 1082 – had been revealed. And while
the overall impact of the measure is difficult to assess, it is quite possible that
the exposure of these previously untaxed lands allowed some shifting of the
tax burden away from poor northern households already encumbered by the
severe labor service ( fu-i) burdens occasioned by militarization of the borders
with the Liao and Hsi Hsia.152
151
152
For sources and discussion of New Policies water-control measures, see Higashi, Ō Anseki shinpō no
kenkyū, pp. 394–509, and Mihelich, “Polders and the politics of land reclamation,” pp. 48–118. For
a tabulation by region of the figures on reform water-control projects (from SHY [1964] shih-huo 61,
pp. 68a–70b), see Higashi, Ō Anseki shinpō no kenkyū, p. 509.
Ch’i, Wang An-shih pien-fa, pp. 144–7; Higashi, Ō Anseki shinpō no kenkyū, pp. 815–88; Sudō Yoshiyuki,
“Ō Anseki no shinpō to sono shiteki igi – nōmin seisaku o chushin to shite,” in Sōdai-shi kenkyū, Sudō
Yoshiyuki (Tokyo, 1969), pp. 11–14. Wang, “Wang An-shih pien-fa chien-lun,” p. 146, doubts the
394
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Ultimately, however, the redistributive and productivity goals that gave the
New Policies their moral persuasiveness were overwhelmed by the state’s fiscal
imperatives. One after another, policies that began as efforts to rationalize the
mobilization of goods and services, assist poor peasants, equalize tax burdens,
or break commercial monopolies were metamorphosed into the claws of a
predatory bureaucracy whose sole purpose was to gouge new revenues out of
the economy. These policies did indeed enrich the state, but only at great
political and economic cost. For not only did the fiscalization of the reforms
undermine broader economic objectives, it also produced a sharp backlash
that turned reformers as well as conservatives against the New Policies, first
bringing down Wang An-shih and then the reform movement as a whole.
Because this transformation of redistributive policies into unbridled revenue
extraction shaped the final outcome of the reforms, it is worth examining in
detail the four measures most thoroughly tarred with the fiscalist brush: green
sprouts, hired service, state trade, and mutual security – a local militia system
that was ultimately turned by exigency and opportunity into the tax collection
arm of the state.
Rural credit (ch’ing-miao) and hired service (mu-i or mien-i)
New Policies economic reforms as a whole drew heavily on experiments undertaken locally during Jen-tsung’s reign, and Wang An-shih had himself devised
a prototype of the green sprouts rural credit measure. The green sprouts policy
took aim at the inequalities created by the progressive monetization of the
economy. As land and the entire agrarian regime were drawn deeper into the
commercial vortex, the peasant’s ability to hold onto his land came to depend
increasingly on his access to money and credit. The enveloping cash nexus
fostered a cycle of rural debt and propertylessness that seemed to be intensifying throughout the eleventh century. By midcentury roughly eighty percent
of the ten million rural landowning households (that is, resident – chu-hu –
versus “guest” or tenant – k’o-hu – households) were ranked in the lowest two
grades (4 and 5) of a hierarchy consisting of five grades of commoners and a
single grade of officials, and possessed only about twenty-two percent of the
empire’s cultivated lands. With average holdings of just fifteen mu (c. two
acres), roughly three mu less than was needed to feed a family of five, these
validity of the figure of over 2.4 million ch’ing. Higashi, Ō Anseki shinpō no kenkyū, pp. 869–70, takes
another tack, by noting that Wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao’s author, Ma Tuan-lin, doubted the validity of the
figure for total acreage of 4.6 million ch’ing, suspecting that the real arable amount was more like 30
million ch’ing. See Ma, Wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao (1965) 4, p. 59b. If Ma Tuan-lin is correct, the amount of
land uncovered in the north suggests what kind of inroads the state might have made had it been able
to extend its policy to the south as well.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 395
households lived at the margins of economic dependence: not only were they
often forced to supplement their incomes as hired laborers or tenants on other
people’s lands, but “[m]any of them were chronically in debt, and mounting
debts led all too often to forced sale or foreclosure of their land.”153
Forced sales and debt foreclosures presented problems for the state as well
as for the peasantry, since propertylessness and the concentration of land ownership increased the possibilities of rural unrest and diminished the state’s
access to the taxes and labor of the peasantry. Up through the eighth century the principal lever utilized by the state to protect peasant solvency and
independence involved periodic land redistribution, but even Wang An-shih
admitted that the state no longer possessed the power to reestablish the old
land-equalizing measures.154 Instead, Wang and like-minded reformers came
to view rural credit as the fulcrum through which state power could best
protect the peasantry.
The most vulnerable time for peasants fell in the lean months between
consumption of the previous year’s crop and the planting and harvest of the
new crop, when peasants were forced to borrow food and seed grain or the
cash to buy them. Sometime in the 1040s the Shan-hsi finance official Li Ts’an
devised a policy that incidentally filled this credit gap by making advance
payments of “green sprouts cash” (ch’ing-miao ch’ien) to peasants in the offseason for the purchase of grain at harvest time. Although Li Ts’an’s measure
lent its name to the later measure, his was intended more to assure a reliable
supply of grain for the army than to remedy rural distress.155 But Wang Anshih did target the credit squeeze during his term as magistrate of Yin county
(Liang-che) around 1049, though instead of paying cash for future crops he
lent grain for immediate needs, allowing lenders to redeem their loans with
interest at harvest time.156 Wang An-shih’s measure was well received locally,
and he revived the plan very soon after joining the Council of State in early
1069, this time replacing grain with interest-bearing loans of “green sprouts
cash.” With Wang and his coalition not yet in firm control, Su Ch’e was
able to block this first green sprouts proposal. But shortly thereafter Wang
Kuang-lien, a managing supervisor in the Ho-pei Fiscal Intendancy, requested
153
154
155
156
Peter J. Golas, “Rural China in the Song,” Journal of Asian Studies 39 No. 2 (1980), pp. 302–4. As of
1075, the population consisted of 10.6 million chu-hu and 5 million k’e-hu. See Ch’i, Sung-tai ching-chi
shih, vol. 1, p. 47. The household categories raise a number of descriptive and analytical problems and
have spawned a considerable literature, which Golas surveys in “Rural China in the Song,” pp. 305–9.
Much of this discussion of the green sprouts policy is drawn from Smith, “State power and economic
activism during the New Policies.”
HCP (1979) 223, p. 5419.
SS 330, p. 10619; Higashi, Ō Anseki shinpō no kenkyū, pp. 546–8.
SS 327, p. 10541; Higashi, Ō Anseki shinpō no kenkyū, pp. 548–50.
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permission to sell several thousand ordination certificates in order to capitalize
a green sprouts loan policy in Shan-hsi, and this time Wang and his lieutenant
Lü Hui-ch’ing were strong enough to force adoption of the “Shan-hsi green
sprouts loan act” on a regional, experimental basis.157
By the ninth month of 1069 the reformers were ready to push for empirewide
enactment of the measure, which they advertised as an attack on the monopoly
over agricultural credit enjoyed by the rural “engrossers”: “The reason people
are burdened by deficits is because in that seasonal gap separating the old
harvest from the new, engrossing households take advantage of the crisis to
demand interest rates of 100 percent. Consequently, would-be borrowers are
often denied the funds they need.”158
In order to break this private credit monopoly the reformers proposed to
create a state-run rural credit system, to be capitalized by liquidating the
fifteen million piculs of grain and strings of cash that sat idly in the moribund
system of Ever-normal (Ch’ang-p’ing ts’ang) and Universal Charity (Kuang-hui
ts’ang) granaries. Traditionally, the Ever-normal Granaries were authorized to
buy up grains when prices were cheap for resale when prices were dear, or
in times of natural disaster. By the onset of Shen-tsung’s reign however the
system had become so cumbersome that the mechanism had ceased to work
effectively, and stocks were rarely circulated.159 Nonetheless these idle grain
reserves represented an enormous capitalizing potential, and in its directive
the Finance Planning Commission proposed a simultaneous solution to the
problems of price equalization, disaster relief, and seasonal credit crises that
transformed the nation’s granary stocks into a green sprouts fund for rural
investment. Control of the granaries was transferred from the circuit judicial
intendants to the new satellites of the Finance Planning Commission – the
circuit intendants for Ever-normal Granaries – who were empowered to convert
the reserves into a liquid loan fund that would be administered by county
magistrates and local village officers.160 The loans were to be made in the
spring and repaid in two installments after taxes in the summer and fall, and a
series of rules were established to protect borrowers against unfair manipulation
by officials. For example, loans could be repaid in either currency or grain, with
exchange rates set to ensure only that the government lost none of its basic
capitalization (pen-ch’ien); forced loans (i-p’ei) were expressly prohibited.
157
158
159
160
SHY (1964) shih-huo 4, p. 17a–b; Higashi, Ō Anseki shinpō no kenkyū, pp. 550–2.
SHY (1964) shih-huo 4, p. 16a. This key text, which comprises the basic legislation for the green sprouts
policy, is analyzed in Sudō Yoshiyuki, “Ō Anseki no seibyoho no shiko katei,” Tōyō Daigaku Daigakuin
kiyō 8 (1972), pp. 172–4.
On the granary systems, see SS 176, pp. 4275–91.
For details of the administration, see SHY (1964) shih-huo 4 and 5, and Smith, “State power and
economic activism during the New Policies.”
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 397
Nothing less than a complete rejuvenation of the agrarian economy was
expected from the new measure, which was perceived as a means of rationalizing
the distribution and collection of grain and money to equalize commodity
prices, minimize the unequal geographic distribution of resources, and ensure
adequate supplies of relief grain. The policy’s authors likened it to the measures
by which the ancient kings “aided agriculture, equalized wealth, and prevented
the powerful from plundering the people,” for by supplanting private landlords
and moneylenders as the principal source of rural credit, the state could “enable
the peasants to hasten to the management of their affairs so that monopolist
households will be unable to take advantage of their crises.” Above all, the
Finance Planning Commission disavowed any fiscal interest in the measure,
insisting that “the loan policy is for the sake of the people; the government
(kung-chia) will claim no benefit from its receipts.”161
The stated objectives of the green sprouts policy, then, were explicitly
redistributionist: the establishment of a state-run rural credit system that
would keep the two poorest grades of landowning peasants solvent, by breaking
their dependence on usurious rural moneylenders. But poor property owners
were not the only endangered segment of the landed population. By the mideleventh century the three highest grades, comprising the same middle to
wealthy peasants who in other contexts could be labeled “engrossers,” were
also showing signs of vulnerability. For while the roughly twenty percent of all
landed peasants in these three upper grades might enjoy adequate lands and
financial resources, their very prosperity made them eligible for a variety of
burdensome and often ruinous government obligations. Because the traditional
Chinese state never had the financial or organizational resources to expand
its bureaucratic tendrils below the county level it was forced to conscript
local villagers into fulfilling those functions on which its survival depended,
especially tax collection and local security. On the eve of the New Policies,
the principal village positions included the household chiefs (hu-chang) and
canton scribes (hsiang shu-shou), responsible for tax assessment and collections,
and the village elders (ch’i-chang) and stalwart men or guardsmen (chuangting), responsible for local security. Incumbents for these posts were mustered
through the “drafted service system” (ch’ai-i fa), which conscripted villagers
for fixed terms into posts requiring resources appropriate to their household
grade.162
161
162
SHY (1964) shih-huo 4, p. 16b.
Though the periodical literature on local government service during the Sung is growing steadily,
among the standard works that still demand attention are Sogabe Shizuo, “Ō Anseki no boyakuhō,” in
Sōdai zaiseishi, Sogabe Shizuo (Tokyo, 1966), pp. 143–98; and Sudō Yoshiyuki, “Ō Anseki no boyakusen
chōshū no sho mondai,” in Sōdai-shi kenkyū, Sudō Yoshiyuki (Tokyo, 1969), pp. 189–259, the main
points of which are summarized in Sudō, “Ō Anseki no shinpō to sono shiteki igi,” pp. 1–26; Nieh
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Although the tax officials, particularly after 1055 the household chiefs,
were obliged to make up shortfalls below quota out of their own incomes, on
the whole village service did not become especially onerous until the financial
and military collapse of the Northern Sung. Much more burdensome was
the stipulation that after completing their local duties village servicemen
could be drafted into “government service” (chih-i) attached to the county
and prefectural yamen. These official posts, which numbered over a million at
any one time, included office messengers (ch’eng-fu) and miscellaneous servants
(san-ts’ung kuan), bookkeepers (tien-li) and scribes (shu-piao shih), a wide variety
of granary and supply functionaries and laborers (k’u-tzu, t’ou-tzu, jen-li),
and yamen police for the arrest of thieves (kung-shou) and people charged in
law suits (yü-hou). But the most onerous post was that of supply master (yach’ien).163 Drafted from the wealthiest households, the supply masters were
responsible for managing government granaries, hosting prefectural guests,
and two functions that required extensive travel: accompanying civil officials to
and from office and overseeing the transmission of taxes and tribute goods from
their local yamen to designated destinations throughout the empire, including
the capital.164 During the course of the eleventh century the supply master’s
post became semiprofessionalized in the most commercially advanced regions
of the empire, such as Chiang-nan and parts of Szechwan; there volunteers
(called t’ou-ming ya-ch’ien or ch’ang-ming ya-ch’ien) were reimbursed with the
rights to manage government ferry crossings (ho-tu) and wine-mash franchises
(fang-ch’ang), and might profit handsomely from their enterprises. But in most
parts of the country the post was filled by unremunerated conscripts who were
ill-prepared to finance their long trips to the capital, bribe clerks to accept
their shipments, or cover the costs of goods lost or damaged in transit.165
Shen-tsung’s accession was accompanied by a flurry of memorials calling for
reform of the government service draft, especially the supply master system.
163
164
165
Ch’ung-ch’i, “Sung i-fa shu,” rpt. in his Sung-shi ts’ung-k’ao, (Peking, 1980), pp. 1–70; Liu, Reform
in Sung China, pp. 98–113; and Brian E. McKnight, Village and bureaucracy in Southern Sung China
(Chicago, 1971), pp. 20–37. For a more recent example, see Yü Tsung-hsien, “Lun Wang An-shih
mien-i fa,” in Sung-shih lun-chi, ed. Chung-chou shu-hua-she (Cheng-chou, 1983), pp. 107–23.
Liu, Reform in Sung China, pp. 100–1; McKnight, Village and bureaucracy, pp. 23–5; Sudō, “Ō Anseki
no shinpō to sono shiteki igi,” pp. 4–5.
Sudō, “Ō Anseki no shinpō to sono shiteki igi,” p. 4. See also his “Sōdai shuken no shokuyaku
to shuri no hatten,” in Sōdai keizaishi kenkyū, Sudō Yoshiyuki (Tokyo, 1962), pp. 661–704. For a
more recent discussion, see Wang Tseng-yü’s “Sung ya-ch’ien tsa-lun (1),” Pei-ching shih-yüan hsüeh-pao
No. 3 (1986), pp. 76–82; and “Sung ya-ch’ien tsa-lun (2),” Pei-ching shih-yüan hsüeh-pao No. 1 (1987),
pp. 49–57.
McKnight, Village and bureaucracy, p. 26. On volunteers, see Sudō, Sōdai keizaishi kenkyū, pp. 662 ff. For
a useful summary of how the government controlled the manufacture and distribution of wine during
the Sung, see Ch’i, Sung-tai ching-chi shih, vol. 2, pp. 875–904.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 399
Early in 1067, Han Chiang, as finance commissioner, memorialized that the
supply master conscription was the single greatest threat to peasant productivity. A single term, lasting two to three years, could prove so costly to the
incumbent (up to one thousand strings of cash in one report) that eligible
household heads would commit suicide, break up their families, or sell or
abandon their lands in order to lower their household grade. More important, the threat of conscription was a disincentive to agricultural investment:
“people rely on the productivity of the land for their livelihoods. But now if
they exhaust themselves to succeed, once they have attained a certain level
of prosperity they are hit with drafted service. If we want to encourage more
people to farm and more lands to be opened, then how can this situation be
tolerated?”166 A year later Wu Ch’ung described how once an upper-grade
family was assigned supply master duties an official arrived at their door to
register all their belongings, from cups and pestles to baskets and chopsticks,
to be counted against losses incurred in service. Wu Ch’ung complained that
it even gets to the point that when household property is exhausted, but the debts not yet
requited, then the children and grandchildren are in turn impoverished and neighboring
guarantors sought out. Therefore in order to avoid ruinous draft service the people do not
dare to cultivate much land so as to avoid high household rank, and men of the same bones
and flesh do not dare live together out of fear of raising their eligibility for corvée.
Wu emphasized that since supply master service was destroying the uppergrade families the duties had to be pushed down onto poorer households even
less able to bear the costs, a process that inevitably squeezed peasants out of
farming and even into vagrancy.167
Reports such as these from his father’s senior officials moved Shen-tsung
to call for urgent action on the government service draft. Drafted service had
received far more attention than rural credit over the years, and Shen-tsung’s
policy makers could draw upon a long if ultimately unsuccessful history of
reform precedents. In 1022, for example, a group of officials recommended
that limits be placed on the amount of land officials could keep exempt from
financial obligations, in order to expand the tax base for local services and
restrict official families’ (kuan-hu) engrossment of land.168 The 1030s saw the
first local attempts to levy special taxes to subsidize the hiring of volunteer
supply masters, including the imposition in 1041 of a service exemption fee
(mien-i ch’ien) in the Ching-hu South circuit.169 And in the decade prior to the
166
167
168
169
SHY (1964) 65, pp. 1a–b. The figure of one thousand strings per term is supplied by Teng Wan; see
HCP (1979) 227, pp. 5522–3.
SHY (1964) shih-huo 65, pp. 2a–b.
McKnight, Village and bureaucracy, pp. 27–8; Ma, Wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao (1965) 12, pp. 128c–129a.
McKnight, Village and bureaucracy, p. 30; Ma, Wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao (1965) 12, p. 129a.
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paul jakov smith
New Policies both Tseng Kung and Ssu-ma Kuang – who was to vehemently
oppose the service exemption (mien-i) policy – proposed utilizing income from
the wine monopoly, supplemented by imposts on the rural or urban rich, to
create a fund for compensating hired government servicemen.170
But government service reforms encountered far more opposition than did
reform of the rural credit system. For whereas the green sprouts credit mechanism competed with private moneylenders, it did not impose any new costs on
the wealthy – indeed, wealthy families soon became eligible for loans themselves. All of the proposed solutions to the drafted service problem, however,
shifted part of the burden to families who had previously been exempt by law,
such as officials and town dwellers, or by practice, such as the powerful local
families whose influence over government clerks gave them de facto immunity
from conscription.171 Consequently, reform of the drafted service system was
touted as an antiengrosser issue, even though the beneficiaries of reform were
in the highest household categories.172
Precisely because drafted service reform did challenge powerful entrenched
interests in a way that the green sprouts measure did not, it took a much
longer time to enact a workable policy. In the last month of 1069 – a year
and a half after Shen-tsung’s first calls for action – the Finance Planning
Commission produced a proposal to replace government service conscripts
with paid volunteers.173 The funds to pay this new semiprofessionalized corps
were to come from three sources: a tax on the households eligible for drafted
service, called either a service exemption (mien-i) or hired service (mu-i) fee,
graduated according to their assessed wealth; the auctioning off of franchises
to manage the state’s twenty-six thousand wine and ferry installations for a
fixed period;174 and the imposition of a tax, called a “service assistance fee”
170
171
172
173
174
McKnight, Village and bureaucracy, p. 31, citing SS 319, p. 10390; HCP (1979) 196, pp. 4755–6.
See Teng Wan’s description in HCP (1979) 227, p. 5522.
For Wang An-shih’s comments, see HCP (1979) 220, p. 5351; 223, p. 5427.
The directive is excerpted in SS 177, p. 4299, and Ma, Wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao (1965) 12, pp. 129a–130c,
but the fullest version, from the original shih-huo chih, is anthologized in Li T’ao’s commentary in HCP
(1979) 227, p. 5521. Li T’ao’s notes, HCP (1979) 227, pp. 5521–4, are the best source for recreating
the history of the mien-i policy up to its universal enactment in the tenth month of 1071.
The old method of granting these franchises to supply masters as compensation for their services had
cost the state the market value of an important financial operation at a time of commercial expansion.
By selling the franchise rights to the highest bidders, the state acquired a buoyant revenue source, worth
three million strings of cash by 1076. Total returns by region to the 26,341 stations as of 1076, as part
of the total revenue stream produced by the green sprouts and service exemption measures as tabulated
in the Chung-shu tui-pei, are preserved in Yung-lo ta-tien (repr. Peking, 1960), 7507, pp. 3360–2, and
tabulated in Sudō “Ō Anseki no boyakusen chōshū no sho mondai,” pp. 200–2; the entire revenue
package is tabulated by Miyazawa, “Hoku-Sō no zaisei to kahei keizai,” pp. 327–32. For a description
of the sealed-bid procedure used to auction off franchises in Shan-hsi in the eleventh month of 1070,
see HCP (1979) 217, pp. 3274–5.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 401
(chu-i ch’ien), on all households with property and wealth but not themselves
liable for service. This last innovation was the most politically daring, although
it too had been raised before. Some of those now taxed in this new category,
such as households with no taxable males (ting2), or only a single taxable male,
or headed by a woman, did not necessarily wield much power on their own.
But the inclusion of all urban households, households of Buddhist and Taoist
temples, and particularly the households of ranked officials directly challenged
a very influential constituency. In addition to putting government service
on a paid, volunteer basis, the commissioners called for an overall reduction
in the number of service positions needed in long-distance transport, and a
prohibition on the many abuses and expenses to which supply masters in transit
were liable.
The commission’s proposal contained all but two elements of the final
policy – the k’uan-sheng ch’ien (surplus emergency fee) surtax and an explicit
levy on the lowest-grade households – but it was only an “instruction,” sent
to Ever-normal Granary intendants, fiscal intendants, and prefects and county
magistrates for discussion. The proposal had still not been enacted half a year
later when the Finance Planning Commission was abolished and all its functions, including the rural credit program, irrigation, and the persistent drafted
service dilemma, were transferred to the Court of Agricultural Supervision
under the leadership of Lü Hui-ch’ing.175 Although Lü fervently agreed that
conscription for prefectural and county service was the most urgent problem
facing rural society, he feared that the Finance Planning Commission proposal
made too many enemies among the powerful who could evade service and the
local functionaries who benefited from its abuses.
Those who receive the most liberal benefits from the proposal are the poorest peasants, who
as the simplest members of their villages are unable to represent their own interests; while
those who are selected [to pay for service] include the baronial families of officials and
engrossers who can easily get others to speak for them. Moreover, if the policy is enacted
uniformly then prefectural legal aides and county clerks will not be able to exploit the
people and will therefore oppose the measure, making it very difficult to enact.
Lü argued that it was because of this alliance between elites and local officials
that the policy was so slow to take shape, writing that because of the powerful
opposition to the measure “officials are not able to view the intent of the
policy clearly, and are confused by the many different opinions of those who
plot [against it] behind their walls. Therefore it will be difficult to bring the
measure to fruition.” As a result, Lü counseled that the government should
175
HCP (1979) 211, p. 5130; SHY (1964) shih-huo 65, pp. 3b–4a.
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slowly experiment with the policy in one or two prefectures, and then if
successful there expand to the rest of the country.176
Under Lü and (after Lü’s leave for mourning) his successor, Tseng Pu, experimental programs were mounted in Shan-hsi, Szechwan, and Ho-pei.177 But
the most influential experiment was in K’ai-feng itself, where sometime in late
1070 the commissioner-general for K’ai-feng (t’i-tien fu-chieh kung-shih), Chao
Tzu-chi, submitted what was to become the prototypical service exemption
policy.178 As approved and enacted by the Court of Agricultural Supervision
in the first month of 1071, Chao’s proposal followed the original Finance
Planning Commission outline. First, in order to calibrate each household’s
fee fairly, all rural households were subdivided into fifteen subgrades and all
urban households into ten grades, with the poorest rural grades (4 and 5) and
poorest urban grades (6 through 10) exempt from payment. Second, in order
to neutralize the opposition of those propertied classes previously exempt from
service, the households of ranked officials, households headed by women, families without taxable males, and temple households were required to pay only
half the rate for their assessed grade.179 Finally, the fees collected from these
176
177
178
179
Taken from Lü Hui-ch’ing chia-chuan and quoted with notes on dating in HCP (1979) 215, p. 5237;
227, p. 5522.
All three were reported in the eleventh month of 1070; HCP (1979), 217, pp. 5274–5, 5283–4. For
Ssu-ma Kuang’s opposition to the Shan-hsi experiment, see “Ch’i mien Yung-hsing-chün Lu mien-ich’ien cha-tzu,” in Ssu-ma, Ssu-ma Wen-cheng kung ch’uan-chia chi 44, pp. 565–6. As all sources repeat,
without explanation, after taking over in the ninth month of 1070 Tseng Pu earned Lü Hui-ch’ing’s
enmity by changing chü-i (service assistance) to mien-i (service exemption). What this may mean is that
Tseng wanted to charge exemptees in full, which Lü – and Wang – thought would destroy political
support for the measure. See, as an example, HCP (1979) 215, p. 5237.
The sources preserve only the response to Chao’s proposal by Tseng Pu and his new co-leader of the
Ssu-nung ssu, Teng Wan. See Li T’ao’s appended notes in HCP (1979) 227, pp. 5522–3, and SS 177,
p. 4300.
Although Wang An-shih admitted the need to compromise with the privileged rich, it galled him. If
the service exemption fees for official families and urban dwellers were not reduced, he admitted to the
emperor, “official households would block and undermine the measure, while urban households would
congregate into mobs and beat the drums to intimidate the state councilors. Not even the emperor
would be able to move their hearts.” But Wang did hold the emperor partly to blame: “If Your Majesty
were truly able to plan for benefit and harm, to distinguish true from false, and to clearly distinguish
good and evil with rewards and punishments so that everyone would be awed, then [no one] would dare
speak evil talk or rumor nor put forth wild and malicious plans, and powerful and cunning officials
and commoners would naturally be stilled. If this were the case, then without doing any harm even
more could be extracted from the engrossing magnates (chien-ping hao-ch’iang) in order to assist the
poor.” See HCP (1979) 223, p. 5427. Information on overall rates is spotty. In K’ai-feng county, 22,600
households were charged 12,900 strings of cash annually as of 1071, or about 570 cash each per year;
HCP (1979) 227, p. 5522. Teng Wan estimated that the richest families would be charged 250 strings
every decade – the typical cycle for reconscription under the old system – or 25 strings annually, while
middle households would pay 80 to 90 strings each decade. Teng claimed that the fees were half of what
families would have to pay as draftees; HCP (1979) 227, pp. 5522–3. But, in 1082, the Ever-normal
Granary intendant of Chiang-nan, Liu I, estimated that the richest families in Liang-che paid up to
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 403
two sources – draft-liable and draft-exempt households – would be used exclusively to hire volunteers from households of grade 3 and higher – the middle
and rich peasantry – for the three most important government-service posts:
supply masters, who had to put up property as collateral; county militiamen
(literally, “bowmen,” kung-shou), who had to be tested in martial arts; and
scribes (tien-li), who had to be tested in accounting. Terms of service were set
at two to three years, and actual salaries were to vary with the labor market
in each locale, and the difficulty and number of workdays required by each
position.
Even the K’ai-feng prototype was experimental, and in the fifth month of
1071 local citizens and censors rallied against the plan. By this time, however,
Wang An-shih had solidified his hold on government, and despite the temporary embarrassment of the “Tung-ming affair” (discussed later), in the tenth
month of 1071 the service exemption policy was made the law of the land.180
State trade (shih-i)
Taken as a whole, the green sprouts and hired service measures were intended
to revive an agrarian economy that was endangered by rural credit markets
controlled by the rich and a regressive service burden that favored the powerful.
But the rural rich were not the only targets of the reformers’ redistributionist zeal: Wang An-shih’s “Request for a Finance Planning Commission” had
launched the New Policies with an attack on “the wealthy merchants and
great traders” who manipulated the market for commodities to their own
advantage. Wang’s memorial had spawned the “equalized tribute measure”
(chün-shu fa), which charged Transport Intendant Hsüeh Hsiang to close the
gap between local quotas and a supply manipulated by engrossers, by replacing
tribute quotas with government purchases of necessities and sales of surpluses
on the market. Although the measure was never enacted, reformers continued
to worry that by using their powers to manipulate prices, dominate access
to markets, and control the supply of goods, the great urban merchants had
created commercial monopolies that locked out small traders and harmed the
consumers, and they sought a policy that would open up bottlenecked markets
and free the circulation of goods.181
180
181
800,000 cash (nominally, 800 strings) annually in service exemption fees; eight times more than the
draft had cost them. See HCP (1979) 324, p. 7798.
HCP (1979) 227, p. 5521.
On the chün-shu fa as progenitor of the state trade measure, see Hartwell, “The imperial treasuries,”
p. 69. For studies of the state trade measure see Liang, “Shih-i fa shu,” and Miyazawa Tomoyuki, “Sōdai
no toshi shōgyō to kokka – shiekihō shinkō,” in Chūgoku kinsei no toshi to bunka, ed. Umehara Kaoru
(Kyoto, 1984), pp. 321–58.
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paul jakov smith
The reformers’ prototype was supplied by Wang Shao’s state trade policy
(shih-i fa), an openly revenue-oriented measure that eyed merchant monopolies
not as an evil to be eradicated but as an opportunity to be admired and appropriated. In early 1070, in the midst of his campaign to colonize the Tibetan
tribal lands between the Ch’ing-hai Lake and Ch’in-feng circuit, Wang Shao
recommended that the thriving private Sino-Tibetan trade be appropriated
and monopolized by the state in order to subsidize the frontier campaign.
Wang Shao complained that although hundreds of thousands of strings of
cash worth of Tibetan goods were imported into China each year, “the profits created by these merchant travelers all revert back to the people [rather
than go to the state]. I wish to establish a state trade agency in [Ch’in-feng
circuit] that will use government funds as capital [to buy domestic goods for
trade to foreign merchants], in order to capture for the state the profits that
now flow to merchants and traders.” Wang anticipated returns of two hundred thousand strings of cash on the monopolized trade, which he promised
would be enough to finance the frontier campaign without further government
funds.182
As Wang Shao’s chief patron in the capital, Wang An-shih strongly promoted the plan as an effective way of bolstering Tibetan loyalties, while at the
same time providing crucial revenues for the troop buildup and campaigns in
the northwest.183 Shen-tsung was also much taken with the idea, which he
envisioned as a lucrative source of cash, generating endless revenues through
the magic of interest. As the emperor saw it,
The government uses its funds to buy up goods brought to market by Tibetan merchants,
saving them the trouble of waiting around for a buyer. The officials then resell these goods
to resident merchants on credit, [saving them the trouble of having to have cash on hand.
In addition to its markup on the sale] the government also collects interest on the credit
transaction. And that is why the plan is advantageous.184
Although Wang Shao proposed to commandeer the wholesalers’ profits
from private merchants, his plan was neither antiengrosser in tone nor redistributionist in intent. But the basic outline of his policy meshed with the
antiengrosser zeal of the more radical reformers, and within two years of its
enactment in 1070 in the northwest frontier a more redistributionist version
of Wang Shao’s measure was introduced in K’ai-feng. The new version was
182
183
184
SHY (1964) shih-huo 37, p. 14a; HCP (1979) 226, p. 5502.
HCP (1979) 214, p. 5205; 224, p. 5460; “Yu Wang Tzu-ch’un (Shao) shu,” in Wang, Wang Lin-ch’uan
ch’üan-chi 73, pp. 464–5.
SHY (1964) shih-huo 37, p. 14b. This imperial endorsement is an early indication of the fascination
with the power of usury as a fiscal tool that suffused New Policies economic planners.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 405
proposed in early 1072 by the self-described commoner Wei Chi-tsung in
response to a growing trade crisis in the capital caused by price fixing and
monopolistic hoarding.185 In the memorial that launched the state trade venture in K’ai-feng, Wei Chi-tsung lambasted the “rich men and great families”
( fu-jen ta-hsing) who took advantage of temporary imbalances in supply and
demand to buy up and hoard the commodities brought into the city by traveling merchants at deflated prices, then waited until demand peaked before
releasing them onto the market at inflated prices. Faced with these monopolistic tactics, provincial merchants had stopped transporting essential goods to
the capital, depriving the city’s consumers of these goods and the state of necessary revenues. In keeping with reform rhetoric, Wei Chi-tsung invoked the
ancient adage that the true way to rule all under Heaven required the ability
“to confiscate from the rich in order to be able to give to the poor,” an ability
he lamented that officials had lost. As evidence, Wei noted that although the
capital’s Bureau of Monopoly Goods (Ch’üeh-huo wu) was overflowing with
surplus cash and commodities, because of official incompetence none of this
surplus was used to equalize prices.186 In a recommendation that merged the
credit and wholesalers’ functions of Wang Shao’s frontier trade bureau with
the price-equalizing function of the Ever-normal Granaries, Wei Chi-tsung
called on the government to use surplus Bureau of Monopoly Goods funds to
capitalize an Ever-normal State Trade Agency (Ch’ang-p’ing shih-i ssu) in the
capital, managed by financial officials assisted by “worthy merchants” (liangku). Like its Ever-normal Granary prototype, the state trade agency would
pay relatively generous prices to buy unmoved goods in a stagnant market, to
the advantage of the traveling merchants, and would charge relatively cheap
prices to sell high-demand goods in a robust market, to the advantage of the
consumer. In this way the state could equalize commodity prices, break the
private monopolies held by the rich, stimulate commerce, and protect the consumption needs of the people – yet still obtain a modest profit to meet the
financial needs of the state.
Wang An-shih and his men in the Secretariat heartily endorsed the antiengrosser thrust of Wei Chi-tsung’s memorial, agreeing that “when merchants
from around the empire bring goods to the capital, they are often exploited
by the engrosser houses of the city. Everywhere livelihoods are lost, and guild
shops and petty traders are being drained and exhausted by the need to eke
185
186
HCP (1979) 231, p. 5622; SHY (1964) shih-huo 37, pp. 14b–15a.
The Bureau of Monopoly Goods was subordinate to the Court of the Imperial Treasury (T’ai-fu ssu).
It managed the resale or exchange of commodities collected through the commercial operations that
financed the privy purse; see SS 165, pp. 3907–8.
406
paul jakov smith
out even a small profit.” Arguing that in order to equalize prices and stimulate
trade it was necessary to emulate the ancients by suppressing the engrossers,
the reformers called for the establishment of a state trade bureau (shih-i wu)
that would make the state an active partner in commerce in the capital.187
The Metropolitan State Trade Bureau was established in the third month
of 1072 under the direction of Lü Chia-wen, a talented young financial expert
who had earned Wang An-shih’s patronage – and the hand of his daughter –
by informing on the antireform views of his granduncle, Lü Kung-pi (1007–
73).188 Lü was assisted by three senior managers, although actual commercial
transactions were entrusted to a consortium of brokers and guild members
drawn from the K’ai-feng commercial community. These brokers were authorized to use the government’s funds to purchase slow-moving commodities
either for themselves or for the state. In the first instance, the government
used the power of credit to induce guild merchants to purchase stagnating
commodities: loans were made to guild merchants (who put up collateral and
formed a five-man guarantee group or pao) who agreed to purchase depressed
commodities from traveling merchants, at a price negotiated among the merchant, guild member, and broker. The size of the loans was limited by the
amount of collateral, offered at an interest rate of twenty percent per annum.
Even at these terms not all goods could find a guild buyer, and in such cases
the proposal authorized the state trade functionaries to purchase those commodities that might realistically be warehoused for later government sale at
appropriate market prices.189
Because it aimed at the intersection of K’ai-feng’s commercial and political
elite, including (said Wang) the empress’s family, the state trade measure
ignited controversy from the very start.190 Within months of its enactment,
complaints that state trade functionaries harassed merchants, encroached on
the sale of essential commodities, and drove up the price of such staples as
sesame, hair combs, and cooking oil swamped the worried emperor. With his
typical bravado, Wang blamed all the charges on engrossers, middlemen, and
hangers-on who because they were disadvantaged by the new policy sought to
187
188
189
190
SHY (1964) shih-huo 37, p. 14a.
See Lü Chia-wen’s biography in SS 355, pp. 11187–90. For his act of “family treason” (chia-tsei), as
the Lü family called it, the Sung shih authors separated Chia-wen’s biography from the rest of the Lüs,
p. 11190.
The operating principles are described in SHY (1964) shih-huo 37, pp. 15a–b, and HCP (1979) 231,
pp. 5622–3. Wang firmly believed in authorizing merchants to manage state trade affairs, telling the
emperor in the eleventh month of 1072 that “it is just because state trade matters are detailed and
picayune that the bureau employs merchants to serve as its managers (kuo-tang-kuan).” See HCP (1979)
240, p. 5827.
HCP (1979) 251, p. 6125.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 407
reverse it through slander. To illustrate his point, Wang related the price-fixing
practices of the tea merchants guild:
In the tea merchants guild (hang), there are more than ten engrosser firms (chien-ping chih
chia). When traveling merchants bring tea to the capital, the engrossers first invite them to
a feast where they arrange to buy their tea at a set price so low that it includes no markup;
the engrossers then sell the tea to poorer members of the tea guild at double the price, out
of which they take enough profit to reward [the traveling merchants as well]. Now that
the state trade act is in effect, these engrosser firms have to buy tea at the same price as the
poorer members of the guild, and so they slander the new law as inappropriate. I learned
this from the deposition of a tea guild member, but the other guilds are all like this as
well.
Wang then asked rhetorically if the purpose of the new law was to equalize
wealth, or to allow treacherous engrossers to profit from and encroach on the
working poor as before. “If it is to equalize profits,” Wang concluded, “then
those engrossers who because of the new law might lose their livelihoods are
not worth pitying.”191
Shen-tsung could not easily ignore the complaints of either his relatives or
of such reform leaders as Tseng Pu, who eventually repudiated the state trade
measure, and periodic doubts about the policy helped force Wang into his
first retirement in the fourth month of 1074. But Shen-tsung’s worries were
always overcome by that fascination with the power of interest to generate
revenues that he had expressed in 1070, and the emperor himself became one
of the policy’s biggest investors, providing massive subventions from the Inner
Treasury to seed the state trade agency and help it grow.192
Mutual security system (pao-chia)
The mutual security system (pao-chia), the fourth major reform, originated in
response to heightened violence and banditry in the capital and was not originally conceived of as an economic measure at all. The formal security apparatus
of the Sung was clustered at the level of the prefecture, under the control of
the military inspector (hsün-chien) with the assistance of local troops (pingshih); the county, under the jurisdiction of the sheriff (wei) assisted by bowmen
(kung-shou) conscripts; and the canton (hsiang), the largest sub-bureaucratic
administrative unit, under the control of the conscripted elder (ch’i-chang) and
his stalwart (chuang-ting) underlings. Below the canton level, villages formed
191
192
HCP (1979) 236, p. 5738.
Shen-tsung provided a subvention of 1 million strings to establish the Metropolitan State Trade Bureau
in K’ai-feng, and another 2 million strings in late 1074 to help it expand its operations. See SHY
(1964) shih-huo 37, p. 15b; shih-huo 55, p. 32b; HCP (1979) 257, p. 6280; and Hartwell, “The imperial
treasuries,” p. 69.
408
paul jakov smith
into a variety of voluntary defense organizations to foster local security, including the “neighborhood mutual guarantee group” (lin-chü-hsiang-pao) and the
“local elder–stalwart township plan” (ti-fen ch’i-chuang lin-li).193 Over time,
these voluntary associations tended to deteriorate, opening the way for local
banditry and unrest. In 1070, the K’ai-feng commissioner-general Chao Tzuchi reported that when he had served as a civil aide in K’ai-feng residents had
blamed local unrest on the collapse of the old, voluntary “pao-chia organization, in which rural families organized to keep watch on evil and treacherous
activities, and to put a stop to banditry.” At just the same time that he was
formulating his service exemption plan, Chao also called for a state-sponsored
resuscitation of the mutual security system, “so that the wealthy can live in
peace, without fear of thieves, by grouping together with the poor for survival,
while the poor can live securely on the land by relying on cooperation with
the wealthy for their livelihoods.”194
Building on Chao Tzu-chi’s proposal, Wang An-shih and Tseng Pu
announced in the last month of 1070 a complete set of pao-chia regulations
for K’ai-feng and its subordinate counties. The regulations imposed a formal
leadership and organizational structure over the local population: every ten
(later reduced to five) households were organized into a small guard, headed
by a capable landowner as the small guard chief (pao-chang). At the next level
of organization, every five small guard units formed a large guard (ta-pao),
headed by the most capable and wealthiest landowner as large guard chief
(ta-pao-chang). Finally, every five large guard units formed one superior guard
(tu-pao), headed by two influential landowners as superior guard leader (paocheng) and assistant leader (fu pao-cheng). The rank and file were drawn from
the remaining families, irrespective of wealth: all master or guest (landlord
or tenant) families with two mature males or more could be called upon to
supply a guardsman (pao-ting), and all other families were regarded as “auxiliaries to the local guards” (chiu-chin fu-pao). Both guardsmen and auxiliaries
were allowed to train with bows and arrows and any nonproscribed weapons.
In contrast to the older system recalled by Chao Tzu-chi, participation in the
new mutual security apparatus was compulsory. County officials in the capital
supervised the formation of guard units, and in order to ensure compliance
and population control each unit had to erect a tablet listing all its members, by household, individual, and designated guardsmen, and to report all
families moving into or out of its territory. The responsibilities of the guard
193
194
The clearest discussion of the pao-chia system during the Sung is still Sogabe Shizuo, “Ō Anseki no
hokōhō,” in Sōdai seikeishi no kenkyū, Sogabe Shizuo (Tokyo, 1974), pp. 1–63, which can be usefully
supplemented by McKnight, Village and bureaucracy.
HCP (1979) 218, pp. 5298–9.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 409
units were all connected with security and social control, and included nightly
patrols; pursuit of thieves; and informing on bandits, murderers, arsonists,
rapists, practitioners of unorthodox religious cults, and anyone who might
harbor such evildoers.195
As the authors of the Sung shih emphasize, the initial pao-chia proposal
was concerned entirely with banditry and social control; it had no links to
larger military objectives, and was under the control of the Ssu-nung ssu rather
than the Bureau of Military Affairs.196 Moreover, geographic expansion of the
mutual security system was quite slow: it was over a year before the pao-chia
regulations were extended to six prefectures surrounding the capital, in the
seventh month of 1072; and they were only made universal in the eighth
month of 1073.197 By that time, however, Wang An-shih had begun to push
the mutual security measure toward his ultimate goal – replacing the regular
mercenary army. From the very beginning Wang had envisioned pao-chia as
the cornerstone of his plan to rejuvenate the Sung military, by replacing the
mercenaries (mu-ping) on whom the dynasty had come to rely with a people’s
army (min-ping) drawn from the peasantry. Wang had only contempt for the
hirelings who made up the backbone of the Sung army, whom he derided as
shiftless and unruly riffraff “who cannot even see to their own safety.” Peasants,
in contrast, Wang glorified as “simple, strong and single-minded men who
know how to obey commands. From this perspective it is clear that in a crisis,
there is nothing so useful as a people’s army.”198
Beyond the strategic effectiveness of militarizing the peasantry, Wang was
also convinced that it was the irreducible foundation of fiscal solvency. In
contrast to his typical belief in expanding government spending as a way to
stimulate the economy, Wang felt that military costs had to be cut sharply by
replacing hired mercenaries with the kind of people’s army that the militarists
of the Five Dynasties had used so effectively: “If we are unable to reform our
195
196
197
198
HCP (1979) 218, pp. 5297–8. By 1075 five households, including tenants (k’e-hu), had become standard
for the small guard, yielding household ratios of 5 (small guard):25 (large guard):250 (superior guard).
See HCP (1979) 267, p. 6553.
SS 192, p. 4768.
HCP (1979) 235, pp. 5710–11; 246, pp. 5999–6000. The spread of pao-chia often induced panic among
the citizenry. In the seventh month of 1072 the Ssu-nung ssu reported that people outside K’ai-feng’s
Feng-ch’iu county were shaking down potential pao-ting conscripts who had not yet registered, and
Shen-tsung worried that the panic might spread to the newly targeted prefectures. Wang as usual
dismissed the emperor’s fears, blaming the problem on criminals who had already been driven to
outlying counties by the pao-chia system; now that these counties too were being organized – thus
threatening their criminal livelihoods – the hoodlums had taken to shaking down potential pao-ting
conscripts. On the whole, Wang assured the emperor, pao-chia registration had gone quite smoothly,
and out of hundreds of thousands of families registered in K’ai-feng’s seventeen counties only twenty
or so individuals had come to the capital to complain.
HCP (1979) 236, p. 5743.
410
paul jakov smith
army so that it is more like their system [of peasant soldiers] then there will be
no hope of enriching and strengthening the Middle Kingdom.”199 In Wang’s
view, pao-chia was the key to creating a peasant-based army that would cost
only ten or twenty percent of the current mercenary system.200
As it happened, the principal economic benefit of the pao-chia system was
an unintended consequence of militarization, for by tightening up the pao-chia
organization to enhance its military readiness, the reformers created a command
structure that could take over the very functions the state now paid for through
the hired service policy. The consummation of this latent opportunity had to
await the transformation of the service exemption fees into an outright source
of unencumbered funds, which is discussed in greater detail later. Here we will
survey the two paths Wang took to militarize the mutual security apparatus:
the system of detached service (shang-fan), which rotated pao-chia guardsmen
into paramilitary service under the prefectural military inspector or county
sheriff, and the system of military drill and review (chiao-yüeh), which trained
pao-chia members for service as a form of national guard, or for absorption into
the regular military.
In early 1071, even as he sought to calm Shen-tsung’s worries about reports
that some K’ai-feng residents had mutilated themselves to avoid pao-chia duty,
Wang expressed his ultimate hope of rotating pao-chia troops into active service
under the prefectural military inspectors (hsün-chien) and eventually mixing
them into the national army.201 A year later the first part of Wang’s hope had
crystallized in the detached service system, which was enacted in K’ai-feng in
the seventh month of 1072. The detached service system appended the local
pao-chia structure to the prefectural military inspector: property-owning (chuhu) guardsmen who volunteered to serve under the military inspectors were
organized into squads of fifty guardsmen and placed under a rotating command of two large guard chiefs (ta-pao-chang) and one superior or deputy superior guard leader (tu-fu pao-cheng).202 Guardsman volunteers received monthly
compensation in grain and “sustenance cash” (hsin-ts’ai ch’ien), in return for
199
200
201
202
Ma, Wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao (1965) 153, p. 1334a.
Ma, Wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao (1965) 153, p. 1335c; HCP (1986) shih-pu 5, pp. 22b–23a.
HCP (1979) 221, pp. 5380–1; 5391–2. Likening laws to medicine – “without some dizziness there
cannot be a cure” – Wang reluctantly agreed that there might be a few cases of self-mutilation, but he
blamed them on rumors that pao-chia participants would be tattooed and impressed into militia service
along the northern border. His solution was to offer rewards to those who informed on rumormongerers.
For the regulations, see HCP (1979) 235, pp. 5697–9. After Wang An-shih first outlined the measure
in the fifth month of 1072, the court apparently experimented with a more stringent set of controls
that included tattooing of participants and month-long terms of active duty; see HCP (1979) 233,
pp. 5650–1. By the seventh month of 1072 Wang An-shih argued for abolition of the tattoos and a
reduction in the term of service in order to make the policy more attractive. Wang Tseng-yü discusses
both the shang-fan and chiao-yüeh policies in his Sung-ch’ao ping-chih ch’u-t’an, pp. 122–6.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 411
which they served detached service rotations of ten days duration. Off-duty
guardsmen who participated in bandit sweeps were also eligible for fees, and
received time off their next detached service terms. While on detached service
guardsmen received three sheng of rice and between 10 and 80 cash per diem.
Payments for supervisors were far more generous: 3,000 cash per term for the
large guard chiefs, and 7,000 cash for the superior guard leaders and assistant leaders.203 All volunteers for detached service were obliged to undergo
military training, and those guardsmen who achieved the top three (of eight)
levels of skill were eligible for grants of between three and fifteen piculs (tan) of
relief grain in times of dearth. In addition to their training in the martial arts,
while on duty the civilian guardsmen and their large guard and superior guard
supervisors were all subject to a strict schedule of military discipline that put
them directly under the command of the military inspectors and mandated
corporal punishments for any acts of insubordination.204
Financial considerations certainly entered into Wang’s promotion of the
detached service plan. In preliminary discussions of the measure, Wang estimated that by replacing six thousand local troops permanently attached to the
military inspectors in the K’ai-feng region with one hundred thousand guardsmen (pao-ting) on ten-day terms of detached service, the court could save one
hundred thousand strings of cash annually.205 Wang even hoped to use pao-chia
to cut the costs of the labor service system, by assigning pao-chia units to the
county sheriff to replace the bowmen, only recently put on salary by the service exemption reforms.206 But Wang also hoped that the combination of cash
incentives, grain, tax exemptions, and relief-grain credits built into the system
would heighten the military readiness of the entire population, by driving the
populace to “compete toward greater levels of military skill, so that they will
not even have to go on detached service to learn satisfactorily. . . . In a few years
time not only will the pao-chia guardsmen exceed the skills of righteous brave
militia, they will even surpass the regular troops . . . who are not driven in their
203
204
205
206
Compensation for supervisors is stated explicitly in HCP (1979) 235, p. 5699. Wang An-shih estimated
that guardsmen would be paid 80 cash a day for a ten-day rotation, but in 1084, Fan Ch’ün-ts’ui reported
that under the “old regulations” – presumably those of 1072 – guardsmen received only 10 cash per
day. See HCP (1979) 233, p. 5651, and HCP (1979) 343, pp. 8235–6.
HCP (1979) 237, pp. 5769–70. As the system spread, terms of detached service came to vary by place
and season, with ten days to half a month being standard; see Wang, Sung-ch’ao ping-chih ch’u-t’an,
p. 123.
HCP (1979) 233, p. 5651. The annual compensation bill for the six thousand military inspectorate
troops (hsün-chien ping-chi) came to 180,000 strings. If an apparent textual corruption is disregarded,
Wang An-shih’s figures work out to a cost of 30 strings per soldier per year (or 82.19 cash per diem), as
opposed to 800 cash per rotation (or 80 cash per diem) for each guardsman. It should be noted that as
of 1076, K’ai-feng had only 73,718 men on active pao-chia duty. See SHY (1964) ping 2, pp. 12b–15a.
HCP (1979) 235, p. 5697.
412
paul jakov smith
hearts like the guardsmen.” Tseng Pu added that the tax and cash incentives
would induce commoners to use their leisure time to practice martial arts:
“without exhortation everyone will compete to improve their skills, and soon
no one, including the bandit gangs in the capital, will be able to withstand
[the guardsmen on detached service].”207
Wang and Tseng Pu had enormous confidence in the new system, for they
immediately ordered military inspectors to replace all but a handful of the
hsiang-chün prefectural troops necessary for corvée duty with pao-chia men.
Four months later, the eleventh month of 1072, the system was extended to
county sheriffs as well.208 By the eighth month of 1073 pao-chia guardsmen
had replaced one-third of the assorted troops under the control of the military
inspectors in K’ai-feng and were deployed as supplements to the bowmen
assigned to the county sheriffs. Though somewhat slower to take root in the
north, where the emphasis was on military drill rather than bandit control, by
mid-1075 the detached service system was enacted throughout the empire.209
The detached service system represented the court’s attempt to pare administrative costs by shaping pao-chia into the primary mechanism for social control
at the county and prefectural levels. In K’ai-feng and the five circuits of the
north, the reformers also pushed for outright militarization of the pao-chia
system, through the institution of a military “drill and review” (chiao-yüeh)
program. Like detached service, the new program, when it was first tried
out in K’ai-feng in the ninth month of 1071, was described as purely voluntary, driven by an incentive system. During the slack season guardsmen
(pao-ting) could undergo testing in archery, horsemanship, and foot-soldiery,
with rewards that included imperial review and an official post for the most
accomplished, and two thousand cash and one month’s corvée exemption for
the second rank. The government made a special effort to bring superior guard
leaders and assistant leaders – by law the wealthiest and most able members
of their communities – into the procedure: even leaders with no particular
military skills could be “benevolenced” (en-shih) into the highest grade if their
guardsmen showed particular zeal in training, or if the level of bandit activity
in their guard unit was low.210 By the eighth month of 1073 drill and review
had become standard in the five northern circuits of Ho-pei East, Ho-pei West,
Ho-tung, and the two subcircuits of Shan-hsi as well, making it a fixture of
rural life at the capital and throughout the entire region of north China that
bordered the Liao and the Tanguts.211
207
208
209
210
211
HCP (1979) 235, p. 5698.
HCP (1979) 237, p. 5669.
HCP (1979) 246, pp. 5999–6000; SHY (1964) ping 2, p. 10a.
HCP (1979) 226, p. 5516. See also SS 192, p. 4768.
HCP (1979) 246, pp. 5999–6000.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 413
Two years later, in 1075, the pace of militarization was heightened when
control over pao-chia was transferred from the Court of Agricultural Supervision to the Bureau of Military Affairs.212 That same year the size of pao-chia
units in K’ai-feng and north China was halved to tighten the density of control,
guest households with two adult males were made full rather than auxiliary
members of a regular unit, and pao-chia drill and review procedures were standardized and merged with those of the i-yung (righteous brave) militia.213 Then
in mid-1076 the court sought to transform the pao-chia organization into tight
tactical fighting units in the event of war, by superimposing over the large
guard units a new “squad structure” (tui-fa), developed only two years earlier
for troops on the Sino-Tangut border.214 But no complex tactical reorganization could be undertaken without intensifying the drill and review procedures
for guardsmen and their leaders, and in the eleventh month of 1079 the drill
program was put under higher-order supervision with the designation of intendants for military drill and review (t’i-chü chiao-yüeh-shih) for K’ai-feng and for
each of the five circuits of north China.215 The new drill regimen brought the
pao-chia organization into direct contact with the regular military: drill chiefs
(chiao-t’ou) drawn from the imperial troops and military servitors (shih-ch’en)
were assigned to train the large guard chiefs (ta-pao-chang) in archery, crossbows, and horsemanship, who in turn divided their local pao-chia guardsman
into drill “teams” (t’uan). This “team drill measure” (t’uan chiao-fa) not only
buttressed the power of the already wealthy and influential men who stood
at the top of the pao-chia hierarchy but also made participation in military
drill and review virtually compulsory for pao-chia men in K’ai-feng and north
China.216
212
213
214
215
216
SS 192, p. 4770.
HCP (1979) 267, p. 6553; SHY (1964) ping 2, p. 10a. I-yung militiamen, conscripted from among
the peasantry of Ho-pei, Ho-tung, and Shan-hsi, were tattooed on the hand and obliged to undergo
military drill in the off-season. In 1081 the i-yung militia were absorbed into the pao-chia system. See
Ma, Wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao (1965) 153, p. 1335; SHY, ping 2, pp. 17a–23b. For the impact of drill and
review reforms on the provincial armies, see Koiwai Hiromitsu, Sōdai heiseishi no kenkyū (Tokyo, 1998),
pp. 171–201.
SHY (1964) ping 2, pp. 11a–b; HCP (1979) 275, p. 6723. See Sogabe, “Ō Anseki no hokōhō,” p. 14;
on the new “squad structure,” see Wang, Sung-ch’ao ping-chih ch’u-t’an, p. 108.
HCP (1979) 301, pp. 7324–5; SS 192, p. 5770.
SS 192, pp. 4770–1; Sogabe, “Ō Anseki no hokōhō,” p. 23. In 1084, Fan Ch’un-jen reported that
in Ho-chung fu, in eastern Shan-hsi (Yung-hsing-chün circuit), not only were drills and inspections
conducted during the summer agricultural season but “no one not old or weak was allowed to remain
at home.” Fan added that “these days most relatively healthy peasants must serve as guardsmen and
drill for five days. When the travel time [to the drill site] is included, it can be seen how this seriously
interferes with the harvest.” See HCP (1979) 345, pp. 8289–90. Fan exaggerates somewhat: as of 1083,
Yung-hsing-chün circuit had 155,536 men in the pao-chia system, of whom 103,865 were guardsmen.
This equals roughly one pao-chia member for every 5.4 households (at a total population of 836,759
households) – close to the statutory number – and one guardsman for every eight households. See HCP
(1979) 337, pp. 8121–4.
paul jakov smith
414
How deeply did the pao-chia system reach into local Chinese society? According to the statistical portrait of the pao-chia system preserved in the Essential
regulations of the Sung (Sung hui-yao), as of 1076 there were 6.9 million men
on the active pao-chia rosters. If we assume that no family supplied more than
one pao-chia member, then almost half (46 percent) of the empire’s fifteen million households supplied an active pao-chia member overall. Of course, there
was great regional variation in pao-chia participation, as is shown in table 5.
Excluding Kuang-nan West, it may appear as though the capital of K’ai-feng
and the five circuits of north China were the least affected by the pao-chia
system, which drew only 25.7 to 31.3 percent of the northern population.
But more significant than total membership is the percentage of members
involved in formal drill and review: virtually all pao-chia conscripts in north
China and the capital were subject to military drill. Elsewhere the total numbers of households in pao-chia were much higher: 70 percent of the populations
of Ching-hsi and Huai-nan were organized in pao-chia, probably reflecting the
high incidence of banditry south and west of the capital; and in the rest of
China some 45 percent of the population was enfolded into the pao-chia system. But outside of K’ai-feng and north China none of the population was
put under drill and review, suggesting that whereas the goal in the north
was tilted toward military preparedness, in the south it was social control.
Moreover, as the reformers became ever more obsessed with generating new
revenues, the huge organizational capacity of the pao-chia system could be used
to help squeeze out financial surpluses as well, as we will see.
from economic redistribution to revenue extraction
Rural credit
In a policy-making environment dominated by the quest for funds to finance
new state initiatives and the emperor’s northern campaigns, the redistributionist rationale that justified the new economic policies was soon sacrificed to
the need for revenues. The green sprouts policy was the first measure to succumb to the hunger for revenues, despite the government’s explicit disavowal
of a fiscal interest in the loan fund. In the eyes of critics of the policy, fiscalization was signaled by the imposition of interest charges on the green sprouts
loans. No provisions were made for interest charges in the original directive
of the ninth month of 1069, but within a few months rates of twenty to thirty
percent annually were imposed in order to finance the plan.217 Critics such
as Han Ch’i, Ou-yang Hsiu, and Ssu-ma Kuang denounced the unseemliness
217
SHY (1964) shih-huo 4, p. 19a; CPPM 68, pp. 2164–9.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 415
Table 5. Percentage of the population in active pao-chia service, 1076
Circuit
Ho-pei E. & W.
Shan-hsi
(Yung-hsing &
Ch’in-feng)
Kuang-nan W.
Ho-tung E. & W.
Capital Region
(K’ai-feng)
K’uei-chou
Kuang-nan E.
Li-chou
Cheng-tu Fu
Liang-che
Tzu-chou
Ching-tung
Fu-chien
Chiang-nan W.
Chiang-nan E.
Ching-hu Nan
Ching-hu Pei
Huai-nan
Ching-hsi
Total
a
b
Pop. in
1080, hu a
Total
pao-chia in
1076,
individualsb
Total
drill/review
(chiao-yüeh)
Percentage
in pao-chia
Percentage
in drill/
review
984,195
962,318
252,647
272,253
200,568
184,419
25.7
28.3
20.4
19.2
242,109
450,869
235,599
69,994
135,638
73,718
115,196
70,642
28.9
30.1
31.3
25.5
30.0
246,521
565,534
301,991
771,533
1,830,096
478,171
1,370,800
992,087
1,365,533
1,073,760
811,057
589,302
1,079,054
651,742
15,002,271
91,172
213,780
115,382
310,512
810,770
219,355
629,993
487,507
674,806
568,813
443,161
344,052
751,356
467,535
6,932,444
37.0
37.8
38.2
40.2
44.3
45.9
46.0
49.1
49.4
53.0
54.6
58.4
69.6
71.7
570,825
Pi Chung-yen, Chung-shu tui-pei in Ma, Wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao (1965) 11, pp. 114–16, supplemented by Wang
Ts’un, Yüan-feng chiu-yü-chih (1089; Peking, 1984), pp. 2, 320–34, 363–74 for figures in italics.
Pao-chia figures for 1076, from SHY (1964) ping 2, pp. 12b–15a, tabulated by Sogabe, “Ō Anseki no hokōhō,”
pp. 17–20.
of government usury, and predicted that the collection of interest fees would
soon supersede rural credit relief as the primary operations goal of the farming
loan policy. Wang countered that although charging interest on the government loans was by no means ideal, the practice, which was sanctioned by the
canonical Chou-li, was the only way to keep the loan fund solvent.218
But Wang’s critics were right in that the imposition of interest charges
opened the door to government profit seeking, for maximizing the revenue
potential of the loan fund soon became the first priority of the green sprouts
218
HCP (1986) shih-pu 7, pp. 24a–29b, for the debate on interest rates, drawn primarily from Han Ch’i’s
Chia-chuan. For Wang An-shih’s argument, see “Ta Tseng Kung-li shu,” in Wang, Wang Lin-ch’uan
ch’üan-chi 73, p. 464.
416
paul jakov smith
measure. In evaluating the performance of officials connected with the green
sprouts measure, from the Ever-normal Granary intendants down to the local
officials who actually transacted the loans, much greater emphasis was placed
on meeting the quotas for loan distribution and collection than on effective
administration of the disaster-relief operation. As Ou-yang Hsiu pointed out
in mid-1070, despite government pronouncements against forced loans (ip’ei), officials up and down the chain of command knew that they would be
penalized if funds went undistributed or loans uncollected.219
This pressure to maximize financial returns to the loan fund inevitably
prompted officials to make as many loans as possible, which led to a predictable
array of abuses, including (in the eyes of opponents) the seduction of poor
peasants into an escalating cycle of debt and extravagance.220 But it was just
these poor peasants who were least able to repay their loans, making both them
and their guarantors subject to confiscation first of their collateral, and then
of their immovable property. These properties could be sold by the state, and
as of 1071 the returns from these debt sales were funneled back into the rural
loan fund, where it could generate more revenue.221 Indeed, it was this seizure
and sale of property from the very segment of the population that the loan
policy was intended to aid that underscored the conflict between the social and
fiscal objectives of the green sprouts measure. To balance these competing aims
the government attempted to create a consistent policy on payment deferrals
(i-ko), but through the very end of the New Policies, Ever-normal Granary
officials were caught between the court’s reluctance to press poor peasants too
hard and its insistence that repayments not fall below quota.222
Ultimately, the most effective way to maximize green sprouts revenues
without undermining the poor peasantry was to disregard the targeted beneficiaries of the measure and make loans to anyone who could be counted on to
repay them. Consequently, in early 1070 the Finance Planning Commission
pegged loan limits to the household grading system, and extended eligibility
to virtually all residential (as opposed to itinerant, fou-lang) families. The new
order entitled grade 5 and guest households to 1,500 cash; grade 4 to 3,000
cash; grade 3 to 6,000 cash; grade 2 to 10,000 cash; and the highest grade,
219
220
221
222
See, for example, HCP (1979) 211, p. 5133.
Su Shih’s retrospective denunciation of the green sprouts loans is typical of the conservative efforts to
extol the natural, demonetized economy: “Peasant households balance expenditures against income,
and economize in clothing and food, so that even if they are poor they still meet their basic needs.
But when the peasants get more money than they need their expenses naturally increase, and there is
nothing they will not do to get more money still.” See HCP (1979) 384, p. 9360.
HCP (1979) 228, p. 5547. See also HCP (1979) 279, p. 6845; HCP (1979) 294, p. 7170.
SHY (1964) shih-huo 4, p. 16b. For further discussion, see Smith, “State power and economic activism
during the New Policies.”
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 417
grade 1, to 15,000 cash. The order then added that “if there are remaining
funds, county officials are authorized to assess the situation and offer additional loans to households of grade three and above; if there are still surpluses,
then interested households from the urban wards and suburbs with property
and businesses to offer as collateral will be allowed to form into five-family
guarantee groups and obtain loans under the green sprouts statutes.”223
This extension of loans to anyone who could pay immediately inflamed
opponents of the green sprouts measure. In his plea of the second month of
1070 to abolish the policy, Ssu-ma Kuang predicted that the new ruling would
encourage administrators to force loans on the rich:
Now county officials are issued interest funds to lend to the people in spring and fall. None
of the wealthy people want the loans, but the poor people do. Because administrators want
to distribute loans on a wide scale in order to accumulate official merit, they just force
loans on the people according to their household grade, without inquiring into their actual
circumstances. The wealthy are assigned relatively large loans, the poor somewhat smaller.
Large loans go up to fifteen strings, small ones not less than 1,000 cash. Prefectural
and county officials and clerks fear getting stuck with the responsibility of absconders
and defaulters, so they order the poor and rich to array themselves together in pao-chia
guarantee groups. The wealthy are made the chiefs (k’uei-shou), the poor obtain money,
and in no time at all the money is gone. In the future if the millet or wheat harvests are
inadequate, the people will not even be able to pay their twice yearly tax, let alone the
interest payments. Since they cannot repay, the fears of the clerks will be spread to all four
quarters and, inescapably, the wealthy will have to repay the accumulated debts of the
many households.224
At the same time, Han Ch’i embarrassed the reformers by insisting that by
making loans available to everyone, the court was providing public monies to
the same group – the engrossers – that the green sprouts measure was intended
to suppress:
It is the rural households of grade three and above and the propertied urban and suburban
households that have heretofore been the “engrossing families.” Now they are all given
loans and charged 1,300 cash for every 1,000. The government is simply chasing after
interest payments. This measure absolutely contradicts the stated intent of the policy to
suppress engrossers and aid those in need.225
223
224
225
SHY (1964) shih-huo 4, p. 19a.
“Ch’i pa t’iao-li-ssu ch’ang-p’ing-shih shu,” in Ssu-ma, Ssu-ma Wen-cheng kung ch’uan-chia chi 44, p.
560. Ssu-ma Kuang then goes on to outline a scenario for disaster in which the poor will be exhausted,
the rich made poor, and the state forced to forgo its revenues through widespread payment deferrals.
“And once the wealthy are completely exhausted, if the nation (kuo-chia) should have the misfortune of
a border emergency, and have to raise many troops, then from whom will the monies for grain, cloth,
and military provisions be raised?”
SHY (1964) shih-huo 4, p. 19b.
418
paul jakov smith
Wang An-shih tried to downplay the ideological contradiction, countering
that even wealthy families could encounter hard times and be forced into
ruin by private lenders. “How can they all be ‘engrosser families’?” Wang
asked, insisting that lending them surplus funds was exactly what was meant
by repressing engrossers.226 But Han Ch’i utterly rejected Wang’s response,
contending that “everyone under Heaven” knows that these wealthy rural,
urban, and suburban families are engrossers. “The only reason the Finance
Planning Commission denies that they are engrossing households is because
they want to push even more green sprouts funds on them in order to generate
still more interest.”227
The government’s effort to wring as much money as possible out of the
rural credit measure also threatened to undermine a basic function of the Evernormal Granary system, disaster relief. Critics drew the emperor’s attention
to granary officials who withheld relief grain from the hungry poor in order
to build up the size of the loan fund. In 1074, Shen-tsung complained that
although loan revenues were substantial, over seventy percent of the total
Ever-normal Granary reserves in cash and grain had been distributed as loans,
at a time when widespread drought and famine made adequate relief grain
essential. From this point on, the granaries were ordered to hold half their
resources in reserve.228
In the end, however, all Shen-tsung’s doubts about the rural credit program were overwhelmed by its revenue potential. For example, when in
1074 Shen-tsung worried that local loan officials might be violating the
laws, Wang An-shih recommended creating five hundred new county-level
recorder’s posts to keep the loan accounts. Any anxiety Shen-tsung had about
the additional expense evaporated when Wang An-shih assured him that by
spending 100,000 strings of cash to hire five hundred new recorders, the court
could protect its annual profits of 3 million strings of cash from the loans.229
From 1071 to 1085 the green sprouts loan fund was paired with the service
exemption fees as the chief source of money for reform projects, including flood
and famine relief, irrigation works, and border provisioning and defense; and in
1082, two years after Shen-tsung built the Yüan-feng Treasury (Yüan-feng k’u)
to hold the growing New Policies bounty, 8 million strings in surplus farming
loan funds from around the country were deposited in its vaults.230 Overall,
the farming loan system operated under a minimum quota of 13.9 million
226
227
228
229
230
SHY (1964) shih-huo 4, p. 23a.
SHY (1964) shih-huo 4, p. 27b; HCP (1986) shih-pu 7, pp. 26a–27b.
HCP (1979) 256, p. 6263; 272, pp. 6663–4.
HCP (1979) 250, p. 6095.
HCP (1979) 330, pp. 7958–9. The HCP contains extensive material on farming loan subventions to
other agencies.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 419
strings collected on loans of 11 million strings, for a net-profit quota of 26.5
percent. Individual officials were in turn judged for promotion or demotion
primarily (though not exclusively) on the basis of their success in meeting local
loan targets, which were not abolished until 1086.231 Although social welfare
ideals could not be ignored in an agency ostensibly dedicated to agrarian relief,
it is clear that for the duration of the New Policies making money became
the chief objective of the farming loans measure, and economic welfare was
delegated to a secondary role.
Hired service and pao-chia
Because of philosophical antipathy to state usury, the green sprouts measure
encountered immediate and strident opposition from officials at court and in
the field, but was welcomed by a populace hungry for new sources of cash.
The hired service measure met less strident opposition from acting officials,
many of whom supported its basic goals; instead, it provoked an immediate
reaction from politically aware and well-connected sectors of the public, who
saw the service exemption fees as nothing more than a new and obnoxious
tax. The first outpouring of discontent took place in Liang-che circuit in the
fourth month of 1071, when local residents learned that two circuit administrators had been recommended for promotion for proposing an exemption-fee
quota that was twice what the services would actually cost. Their outrage was
seized on by Vice–censor in chief Yang Hui as evidence that revenue gathering (chü-lien, or “fiscalism” ) had already begun to supplant tax equitability
as the main goal of the measure. Shen-tsung initially added the imperial
voice to Yang Hui’s concerns, but his anxiety gave way to anger when Wang
An-shih gave the incident a more insidious spin: for Wang, the episode just
proved that even though they had not yet been greatly harmed by the measure, the “engrossers” were powerful enough to manipulate the opinions of
the scholarly elite (shih-ta-fu), and even to confuse the emperor with their
babble.232
A second incident of public protest against the hired service measure was
harder for Wang An-shih to gloss over. In the fifth month of 1071, eleven
hundred residents of K’ai-feng’s Tung-ming county marched on the prefectural yamen to complain that their household grades had been arbitrarily
231
232
HCP (1979) 226, p. 5506; for the memorial by Ssu-ma Kuang that heralded the suspension of the
green sprouts measure, see HCP (1979) 368, pp. 8875–8.
HCP (1979) 223, pp. 5421, 5433–4. Liang-che residents reacted against a reform initiative more
publicly in early 1073, when two hundred residents of Su-chou confronted the waterworks intendant
Chia Tan, leading to his dismissal. See Lin Hsi’s report in HCP (1979) 240, pp. 5824–5, excerpted and
analyzed in Mihelich, “Polders and the politics of land reclamation,” pp. 96–101.
420
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raised in order to increase their service assistance fees. Whipped into a fury
by the yamen’s refusal to hear their case, the crowd converged on Wang
An-shih’s residence to vent their anger. Though Wang succeeded in driving them away he was emotionally shaken by the incident, which he tried to
portray as a provocation incited by the Tung-ming county magistrate, Ku Fan.
Ku Fan was ultimately impeached, but not before the censors Yang Hui and
Liu Chih denounced the transformation of the service exemption fees into a
new layer of taxes on the entire population, including the lowest classes explicitly excluded by the original order. For Liu Chih in particular, the Tung-ming
affair illustrated the inevitable consequence of “activist statecraft” (ta yu-wei
chih pi): that “the petty men who actually administer the policies will devote
themselves to raising revenues in order to earn rewards, thereby transforming
the best-intentioned of measures into outright fiscalism.”233
Although the attack by Yang Hui and Liu Chih embarrassed the reformers
into reiterating the prohibition against manipulation of the household registration process, Wang and Tseng Pu launched a counterattack that drove Yang and
Liu to lesser posts outside the capital.234 Their ouster marked the end of pointed
censorial opposition to the reforms and enabled Wang to extend the hired service measure to the entire nation in the tenth month of 1071.235 Between 1071
and Wang’s resignation in 1076, the hired service policy was transformed from
a progressive attempt to professionalize county- and prefectural-level service
and equalize the financial burden it imposed on middle- and upper-grade
households, to a regressive cluster of fees and surcharges imposed on the entire
population in order to swell revenues.
The first great departure from the original progressive, egalitarian rhetoric
of the hired service policy came with the extension of service exemption fees to
the poorest property-owning peasants, those ranked grades 4 and 5. Initially,
fees were collected only from those households that were directly liable for
government service – the service exemption fee (mien-i ch’ien) – or those households that possessed adequate resources but were exempt from service because
of privilege – the service assistance fee (chu-i ch’ien) charged to officials, widows,
and urban dwellers. Although rural households of grades 4 and 5 were still
liable for conscription as local patrolmen, or “stalwarts” (chuang-ting), by the
233
234
235
HCP (1979) 224, pp. 5442–3. See also HCP (1979) 223, pp. 5425–30; 224, pp. 5439–40, 5444–8;
225, pp. 5479–88.
As a parting shot, Liu Chih denounced Wang An-shih and his followers for “summoning to government
every proponent of ‘finance,’ including merchants, tradesmen, and butchers, and employing every
possible way of making money, including selling calendars on the streets.” See HCP (1979) 225, p.
5484. For Tseng Pu’s detailed rebuttal of the two censors’ charges, see HCP (1979) 225, pp. 5469–74;
also in SHY (1964) shih-huo 65, pp. 8b–11a.
HCP (1979) 227, p. 5521.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 421
terms of the original statutes of the hired service policy they were exempt from
paying any fees.236 By the time the measure was universally enacted, however,
the imposition of service exemption fees of between 200 and 1,000 cash on
grade 4 and grade 5 households had become routine.237
In 1072, Shen-tsung asked that grade 5 families be exempted, but demurred
when Wang An-shih pointed out the fiscal utility of those fees:
Although families in grade five do not pay very much, in Liang-che circuit we have collected
40,000 strings of cash despite exempting the lower half of the grade five category. If there
are poor harvests in Liang-che, this money might be enough to assist the hard-working
peasants by hiring them for water-control projects or to replace ponds and drainage ditches.
As long as your majesty does not use this money frivolously, then it is not cruel to collect
it.238
Although collecting fees from poor households to fund local relief programs
may not have been cruel, it certainly did not meet the original goals of the service exemption measure. And observers inside and outside the reform administration agreed that however insignificant, the new fees placed an unwarranted
burden on the poorest households. The size of the cash fee varied from place to
place, but even the smallest sum could be a burden. In Liang-che circuit as of
1073, the roughly one million grade 5 households (out of a total population of
1.8 million households) paid an average of fifty to sixty cash in service fees per
family, for services they themselves were not liable to perform.239 Although
fifty cash might seem insignificant, Chang Fang-p’ing asserted that in Honan’s
Ying-t’ien-fu (Ching-tung West) fifty cash might be all the money a peasant
family saw in a year.240 And in Kuang-nan West, the Ever-normal Granary
Intendant Liu I reported in 1082 that even a service exemption fee of five or
eight cash could be ruinous, since it forced timid and isolated peasants to come
up with cash and then, at the height of the growing season, travel to the yamen
to pay.241 Finally, though in less rustic places the yamen officials came to the
peasants, for the poor peasants of Hang-chou, as Su Shih points out, this was
not necessarily any cheaper:
[Prior to the service exemption measure] families of grade 4 and below were not liable
for government service at the county and prefectural level, but merely served as stalwart
men. . . . Once the measure was established, however, they all had to pay service fees.
Although the fees were not great, even the poorest people had to come up with 300 to
236
237
238
239
240
241
SHY (1964) shih-huo 65, pp. 4b–5a; on extension of fees to lower households, see Sudō, “Ō Anseki no
boyakusen chōshū no sho mondai,” pp. 241–56.
HCP (1979) 227, pp. 5526–7.
HCP (1979) 237, p. 5779.
HCP (1979) 248, p. 6055.
HCP (1979) 277, p. 6789.
HCP (1979) 324, pp. 7797–8.
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500 cash for no reason. Before they were even ready the clerks and soldiers would be at
their doors, and it would take 100 cash just to avert disaster; even before they had paid
the government, the cost was heavy.242
Even as service exemption fees were being extended to all property owners, a second assault on the progessivity of the hired service measure was in
the offing: the introduction of new surcharges. When service exemption quotas were first being estimated for the entire country, in late 1071, officials
were ordered to add a percentage to the anticipated annual wage bill for each
locale, to serve as an emergency fund to offset arrearages caused by famine or
drought. This additional charge, called the “surplus emergency fee” (k’uansheng ch’ien), was calculated as an increase in the total fee quota assessed each
locale, which was then distributed among all the households based on their
grade and status as rural or urban.243 Officials were initially instructed to allow
10 percent for the emergency fund, but the first set of quotas (in turn the basis
for individual assessments) was considerably higher: out of a total quota of
12,343,670 strings of cash, 9,258,585 strings were earmarked for distribution, and 3,085,022 designated as surplus. By this reckoning, the “surplus”
emergency fund constituted 33.3 percent of the wage bill, or 24.9 percent of
the total collection quota. Moreover, in many circuits the percentage of total
collections set aside as “surplus” – to take the second approach – was considerably higher: Ching-tung East and Ching-tung West stood at 39.1 and 38.3
percent respectively, and Ho-tung and Ching-hu South circuits were at 42.1
percent and 44.8 percent.244
In 1074 service exemption fees were raised further with the addition of a
new surtax, the t’ou-tzu head surtax of 5 cash per 1,000 levied on all mien-i
payments. This new fee was meant to pay for those local services, such as
maintenance of official buildings, porterage, and the provision of implements,
242
243
244
HCP (1979) 435, p. 10480, cited in Sudō, “Ō Anseki no boyakusen chōshū no sho mondai,” p. 244.
SHY (1964) shih-huo 65, p. 12b; SS 177, p. 4300; for discussion, see Sudō, “Ō Anseki no boyakusen
chōshū no sho mondai,” pp. 203–22.
The figures come from the Chung-shu tui-pei enumeration of returns to the green sprouts, service
exemption, and winery and ferry installation funds for 1076, as preserved in the Yung-lo ta-tien entry
for ts’ang (granaries), 7507, pp. 3357–66. For the service exemption funds, the Chung-shu tui-pei first
gives each circuit’s quota for receipts, expenditures, and surplus emergency fees (k’uan-sheng ch’ien).
Sudō Yoshiyuki tabulates the surplus emergency fee figures by circuit in Sudō, “Ō Anseki no boyakusen
chōshū no sho mondai,” pp. 216–17. Following the quotas, the actual returns for 1076 are given,
broken down into four categories of income flow: receipts (shou), expenditures (chih), current balance
(hsien-tsai), and “earmarked funds” (ying-tsai), which Sudō interprets as funds earmarked but not yet
spent, a measure of the progressive transfer of control over tax revenues from the local and regional to
the central government; see Sudō, “Ō Anseki no boyakusen chōshū no sho mondai,” pp. 221–2. The
figures are aggregated by circuit, and each category is further broken down by exchange medium. Sudō
tabulates the circuit figures on pp. 218–19; Miyazawa Tomoyuki tabulates the entire set of accounts
by circuit and exchange media in his “Hoku-Sō no zaisei to kahei keizai,” pp. 327–32.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 423
that had formerly been the responsibility of draftees.245 In practice, however,
it simply joined the “surplus emergency fee” to help swell the total mien-i
fund well beyond what might be needed for the service wage bill under any
circumstances. For example, according to the perceptive Szechwanese reform
opponent Lü T’ao, in 1076 the most prosperous region of his province, Ch’engtu-fu circuit, spent only 66 percent of its service exemption fund on salaries.246
At the same time, the country as a whole spent only 60.7 percent of its hired
service funds on wages, or 6,487,688 out of 10,414,553 strings.247
What became of the remaining forty percent? The fiscal success of the
green sprouts measure suggested one use to cash-hungry administrators. In
the third month of 1072, just a few months after universal promulgation of the
service exemption policy, K’ai-feng administrators were ordered to use their
surplus-fee fund to make interest-bearing loans to the public. Five months
later, beguiled by the service exemption surplus already building up in northern Szechwan, Wang An-shih declared that the interest collected on all unused
service exemption funds could be diverted to finance clerical salaries, and
thereby promote his program to professionalize the clerical service and merge
clerical and official streams.248 By 1075 the interest generated by hired service
funds had joined the income from wineries, ferry crossings, and other fees as
a source for the roughly 1.1 million strings needed annually for the salaries
of clerks in the capital (413,400 strings) and in circuit and prefectural offices
(689,800 strings).249
Not surprisingly, the revenue potential of the service exemption accounts
induced officials to maximize financial surpluses by drawing funds away from
the funds’ designated purpose – the hiring of service personnel. Between 1070
and 1076 mien-i administrators experimented with a variety of ways to spend as
little of their service funds as possible. One such experiment, the “land in return
for service” policy (kei-t’ien mu-jen), was enacted by Lü Hui-ch’ing in mid-1074,
while he was standing in for Wang An-shih. The new plan (devised by Lü’s
brother Lü Wei-ch’ing) was designed to preserve the liquidity of the service
exemption fund by continuing to collect the fees without actually using them
to pay service agents; in their place, the government would pay agents with
245
246
247
248
249
HCP (1979) 251, p. 6113. These services were collectively termed yüan-jung.
That is, 406,024 strings out of 615,673 strings. See “Tsou wei mien-i-ch’ien ch’i-chuang er-fen chünpei chih-yung chuang,” in Lü T’ao, Ching-te chi (c. 1100; n.p., 1899) 1, pp. 2a–3b. Lü’s memorial is
analyzed in Sudō, “Ō Anseki no boyakusen chōshū no sho mondai,” pp. 214–15.
Chung-shu tui-pei, in Yung-lo ta-tien 7507, p. 3357. For tabulations of the circuit figures see Sudō, “Ō
Anseki no boyakusen chōshū no sho mondai,” pp. 218–19, and Miyazawa, “Hoku-Sō no zaisei to kahei
keizai,” p. 329.
HCP (1979) 231, p. 5614; 237, pp. 5764–5.
HCP (1979) 248, p. 6052, cited in Sudō, “Ō Anseki no boyakusen chōshū no sho mondai,” p. 208; SS
177, p. 4306.
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tenancies on official lands. Although the government actually tried the policy
in a few places it turned out to be too costly, and Wang An-shih peremptorily
abolished it when he returned to office in the second month of 1075, thereby
exacerbating the tension between him and his closest lieutenant.250
Other stratagems were more successful in accumulating service exemption
surpluses. Most important, by either reducing the number of government
service positions needed or transferring the responsibilities to civil service
and military personnel, financial officials reduced the number of functionaries paid out of hired service funds even as the officials increased the total
amount of money collected. Reform of the drafted service system was always
intended to reinforce market mobilization with a reduction in the number of
functionaries, especially supply masters, that would be needed. The original
reductions were aimed more at administrative efficiency than revenue production, and they were quite successful. In the eleventh month of 1070, the
fiscal intendant of Tzu-chou circuit, in central Szechwan, was commended by
Wang An-shih and the emperor for consolidating tribute shipments out of
his circuit by 136 convoys, for a savings of 283 supply master posts and 501
service personnel (kung-jen).251 A month later Han Wei, the prefect of K’aifeng and no supporter of the reforms despite being Han Chiang’s brother, was
also praised for abolishing 835 rural supply master posts (hsiang-hu ya-ch’ien)
in the capital prefecture.252 Even after unnecessary supply master positions
were squeezed out of the system, further savings were made by replacing
the protoprofessional supply masters – the generic t’ou-ming ya-ch’ien – with
civil and military officials. In early 1072, the concurrent judicial and Evernormal Granary intendant of Chiang-nan, Chin Chün-ch’ing, realized substantial savings on the shipment of spice and silks from Chiang-nan to the
capital by hiring fifty “officials whose replacements had arrived” (who would
have had to return to the capital anyway) and military servitors to muster
porters and lead the convoys, all at prices below what former local supply masters were willing to accept. Wang An-shih immediately seized upon Chin’s
plan as a prototype for transferring supply master responsibilities to replaced
or cashiered officials, whom he insisted “would compete for transport duty
250
251
252
Because the fiscal rights to government land, including pastureland and abandoned plots, belonged to
the fiscal intendant of each circuit, the fiscal intendants had to be reimbursed the amounts of money
they would have earned through sale or rental of the property. In areas where the value of land was
high, such as Liang-che circuit, mien-i administrators spent more money on the land transfers than
it would have cost to pay their wage bill. See HCP (1979) 253, p. 6198; 260, p. 6345; SHY (1964)
shih-huo 65, p. 14b; SS 177, pp. 4306–7. For a discussion, see Higashi, Ō Anseki shinpō no kenkyū,
pp. 727–35.
HCP (1979) 217, pp. 5283–4.
HCP (1979) 218, p. 5301.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 425
without cease” if they were given cash incentives to escort convoys back to the
capital.253
It was also common to replace supply masters with military personnel, a
recommendation made early in the hired service policy debates.254 Even military men had to be paid something for their services: in Ching-hsi North’s
Hsü-chou2 prefecture in 1071, military functionaries (rank not specified)
were paid a “sustenance fee” of three thousand cash per month to manage
the prefecture’s public storehouse (kung-shih-k’u) in place of civilian supply
masters, who one after the other were being sucked dry by the position’s vulnerability to clerical corruption.255 On the whole, however, replacing civilian supply masters with soldiers allowed the government to shelter its wage
fund and “deposit” (chuang) or “stockpile” ( feng-chuang) the surplus for other
purposes.256
In general, then, professionalization of the supply master position and the
concomitant shift from command to market mobilization was at least partly
supplanted by a parallel effort to save money by absorbing the supply master
functions into the civil service and military bureaucracies. The expansion of
pao-chia organizations throughout the country had a similar effect on reform
of the bowman (kung-shou) or county militiaman’s position, the second post
targeted by the hired service measure. Wang An-shih had always hoped that
the system of detached service under the county sheriff would enable the court
to replace hired bowmen with conscripted pao-chia guardsmen.257 By 1076
Wang’s hope had been partially realized. According to a report by the censor
Teng Jun-fu, in the five circuits of north China bowman strength had been cut
by seventy or eighty percent, from a range of 70 to 140 bowmen per county
down to a mere 15 or 30. The remaining troop strength was made up by the
pao-chia guardsmen and i-yung militia men, rotated in from the outside for
half-month tours of detached service (shang-fan). Though Teng deplored the
extent to which reducing the number of bowmen undermined local security,
from the fiscal perspective the replacement of hired bowmen by conscripted
pao-chia guardsmen allowed the government to save even more of its hired
service funds.
Inevitably, the reduction of government service personnel and replacement
of civilians by civil and military officials prompted calls for a parallel reduction
253
254
255
256
257
HCP (1979) 229, pp. 5576–7. Chin offered 100 full strings of cash for every 10,000 bolts of silk
transported, and 70 full strings for each 10,000 strings of cash. An earlier official had proposed 500
full strings for every 10,000 count of either silk or cash.
HCP (1979) 227, p. 5523.
HCP (1979) 222, p. 5399.
HCP (1979) 268, p. 6569.
HCP (1979) 235, p. 5697.
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in the various service exemption fees.258 But the whole point of reducing the
number of hired civilians, from the perspective of the New Policies planners,
was to free up the service funds for other, potentially more remunerative, uses.
In the ninth month of 1075, after it boasted about the success of the hired
service policy in cutting supply master positions, paring costs, and regaining
control over ferry and winery profits, the Ssu-nung ssu was ordered to “deposit”
(chuang) one part of its surplus, lend out a second part to the public as interestbearing loans, and distribute a third part – one million strings of cash a year in
winery and ferry installation fees – to state trade bureaus around the country
to finance their purchase of commercial goods for resale in the capital.259 One
year later the revenue stream from both the wineries and ferries and the entire
surplus-fee fund were formally severed from the hired service policy; transformed now into unencumbered revenue, they were to be pumped back into
the Ever-normal Granary system, where they could beget still more money.260
By the end of Wang An-shih’s tenure the service exemption funds, like
the green sprouts loans, had become a robust source of revenues. In 1076 the
government spent only 6.4 million strings of the 10.4 million strings it collected in service exemption fees, for a surplus of 4 million strings. At the same
time, the fund contained 8.5 million strings of unused “current funds” (hsientsai) – in some circuits equal to an entire year’s income – built up through
underspending and the accumulation of surplus emergency fees (k’uan-sheng
chien) up to 1076. The winery and ferry account was equally well capitalized, with an income of 2.1 million units (primarily cash) over expenditures
(1.7 million units).261 Nor did the fiscalization of the hired service funds end
with Wang An-shih’s retirement. Despite the efforts of officials such as Chou
Yin and Shen K’uo in late 1076, Lü T’ao in 1077, and Liu I in 1082 to
reduce hired service collections to the actual wage bill or relink the wine and
ferry fund to hired service, both accounts continued to grow as the number of
civilian government service agents hired shrunk or stayed stable. In 1084 the
government collected or held 18,729,300 million strings in service exemption
fees, and 5,050,090 strings in wine and ferry fees. The transformation of the
hired service policy into a mechanism of revenue extraction was complete.262
258
259
260
261
262
For examples by Chou Yin and Shen K’uo, see HCP (1979) 279, pp. 6825–6. The Court of Agricultural
Supervision (Ssu-nung ssu) insisted that such calls were misguided, since they ignored the expense
incurred in hiring soldiers to replace service men; HCP (1979) 268, p. 6569.
HCP (1979) 268, p. 6569.
SHY (1964) shih-huo 65, p. 16a.
Miyazawa, “Hoku-Sō no zaisei to kahei keizai,” pp. 329–32; Sudō, “Ō Anseki no boyakusen chōshū no
sho mondai,” pp. 218–19.
HCP (1979) 350, p. 8397; SS 177, p. 4310; Sudō, “Ō Anseki no boyakusen chōshū no sho mondai,”
p. 222. For Lü T’ao’s complaint, see Lü, Ching-te chi 1, p. 2b; for Chou Yin, Shen K’uo, and Liu I, see
HCP (1979) 279, pp. 6825–6, and HCP (1979) 324, pp. 7795–801.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 427
It is doubtful whether this transformation could have proceeded so far had
not the entire population been organized into pao-chia mutual security units,
thereby providing administrators with a relatively cheap system of conscription.263 For not only did expansion of the pao-chia system enable the government to replace county-level bowmen with cheaper pao-chia guardsmen on
detached service; it also reversed the trend toward putting the village-level
posts of elder (ch’i-chang), household chief (hu-chang), and stalwart (chuang-ting)
on a hired basis.
Because the trend toward monetizing village service never went beyond an
ad hoc, localized movement, its full extent is impossible to trace. But from two
Southern Sung sources it is clear that as early as 1069 some parts of the country
began to hire rather than conscript men for the village posts of household chief
(hu-chang), with responsibility for tax collection, and the elder (ch’i-chuang) and
his subordinates, the stalwarts (chuang-ting), with responsibility for bandit and
fire control.264 The experiment was short-lived, however, for between 1071
and 1074 hireage was abandoned in favor of a return to the conscription of
men for all three posts.265
Why the monetization of village posts lapsed just as hireage was being
pushed at the county and prefectural level is unclear, but the spread of pao-chia
certainly provided both incentive and opportunity. The pao-chia system was
made universal in 1073, and one year later the court abolished the positions of
household chief and its urban counterpart, the neighborhood headman (fangcheng), and transferred their tax-pressing duties to the pao-chia organization.266
Then in 1075 the regulations were tightened up and the mutual security
apparatus made the unified representative of the state at the village level
responsible for all local public functions: in all counties where pao-chia was
in effect, all elder and any remaining household chief and stalwart positions
were abolished, and their collective duties subsumed into the pao-chia system.
The pao-ting guardsmen were designated as the primary collection agents of
263
264
265
266
The critical links between pao-chia and the hired service measure are stressed in Sudō Yoshiyuki, “Sōdai
gōsonsei no hensen katei,” in Tō-Sō shakai keizaishi kenkyū, Sudō Yoshiyuki (Tokyo, 1965), pp. 561–644,
especially pp. 577–96, and in Sudō, “Ō Anseki no shinpō to sono shiteki igi,” pp. 2–10; and by Higashi,
Ō Anseki shinpō no kenkyū, pp. 691–812.
The two sources are the 1182 Fu-chou gazeteer by Liang K’o-chia, Ch’un-hsi San-shan chih (1182; Taipei,
1980) 14, p. 7744, and a memorial by Ch’en Fu-liang (1137–1203), “Chuan-tui lun i-fa cha-tzu,” in
Ch’en Fu-liang, Chih-chai hsien-sheng wen-chi (Taipei, 1979) 21, pp. 119–20. For analysis, see Sudō,
“Sōdai gōsonsei no hensen katei,” p. 578.
In place of salaries, the elder, stalwarts, and household chief received tax and mien-i fee exemptions
during their term of service. See Ch’en, Chih-chai hsien-sheng wen-chi 21, p. 120.
HCP (1979) 257, pp. 6277–8. Tax pressers (ts’ui-shui chia-t’ou) were mustered from among master
households and were obliged to keep up the tax lists and to supervise one tax collection, in addition to
their security service. See Sudō, “Sōdai gōsonsei no hensen katei,” pp. 579–80.
428
paul jakov smith
the state, responsible for collecting all taxes, service exemption fees, and green
sprouts repayments. At the same time the tasks of the elder, including fire
control and bridge and road repair as well as security, were transferred to the
top echelons of the pao-chia system – the superior or deputy superior guard
leaders (tu-fu pao-cheng) and the large guard chiefs (ta-pao-chang). One new
position, termed the “messenger” (ch’eng-t’ieh jen), was created to assist the
local pao-chia leaders in their new tasks. Each superior guard leader – who was
responsible for 250 households – was allowed to hire two messengers, who
were charged with managing the unit’s documentation and communication.
The fact that messengers were hired made them the sole exception to the
return of command mobilization at the village level, but because the position
required literacy it was not easily subject to conscription.267
Shen-tsung did worry that because service exemption fees were now universal, the people would view the transfer of tax-collection responsibilities
to the pao-chia guardsmen as a breach of trust; moreover, he felt that it was
improper to require superior guard leaders to take on new tasks in addition
to overseeing military training. But Wang An-shih minimized the impact of
the tax-collection burden on the guardsmen and, at the same time, revealed
his basic ambivalence toward relying on the market to mobilize labor for government functions. In the times of the former kings, Wang insisted, everyone
in the population performed multiple tasks; “if [now] the people are ordered
to do nothing more than military drill, I do not know who could be counted
on to perform the remaining tasks [of local government].”268
In the end, the reformers were unable to backtrack completely on enlisted
local service. In 1081, an official of the Bureau of Military Affairs reiterated
Shen-tsung’s complaint about foisting tax-pressing duties on men who had
paid service exemption fees, and reported that in the K’ai-feng region, poorer
guardsmen proved powerless to compel rich households to pay their taxes
and fees. As a result, in K’ai-feng, drafted guardsmen were replaced as tax
pressers by paid “messengers.” But in a compromise that embedded market
mobilization within the pao-chia command structure, overall supervision of
tax collection still rested with the superior guard leader.269
Because of lacunae in the records there is no way of knowing whether the
spread of the pao-chia system subverted plans by the reform leadership to
267
268
269
The messengers were paid with funds that would otherwise have gone to the elder and stalwart, either
as maintenance fees or as vestiges of their hired service wages. For the entire reform, see HCP (1979)
263, pp. 6436–7. Every ten to thirty master households had to put up their own guardsmen to collect
taxes, but any single guardsman had to undertake the responsibility for only a single tax period and,
according to Wang An-shih, do so only once every decade or so; HCP (1979) 263, p. 6451.
HCP (1979) 263, pp. 6450–1.
HCP (1979) 311, p. 7536.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 429
extend the voluntary, marketized provisions of the hired service measure to
village- as well as county-level service. But contemporaries and nearcontemporaries assumed, with Shen-tsung, that the payment of service exemption fees ought to confer immunity from village-level service, and hence that
pao-chia undermined the progressive aspects of the service exemption policy and exacerbated its fiscalist potential. In 1076, for example, the censor
Chou Yin urged the court to sever the ties between pao-chia and village-level
administration, and to return to the hiring of elders and household chiefs, as
specified in the original service exemption regulations.270 Nine years later,
as Shen-tsung’s death put the reforms under attack, the county magistrate
Shang-kuan Kung-ying protested that the replacement of village-level posts
by the pao-chia system contravened the goal of the service exemption policy
“to collect money from the people exclusively to provide wages for service, and
not to meet the ordinary financial needs of the nation,” and he insisted that if
the posts of elder, stalwart, and household chief were no longer necessary, then
the service exemption fees should be commensurately reduced.271 But perhaps
with hindsight the Southern Sung observer Ch’en Fu-liang saw the situation
most clearly: from the perspective of the reformers, the pao-chia system provided an opportunity “to make profits on and stockpile ( feng-chuang) the hired
service wage fund.”272
State trade
The state trade act was less hampered by competing and contradictory goals
than were the green sprouts, hired service, or pao-chia policies, and despite
its resounding redistributionist rhetoric it was the most thoroughly transformed into a mechanism for generating revenues. Early on, Wang An-shih
had assured the emperor that the interest payments generated by commercial
loans would provide ample funds for the state’s financial needs.273 Despite
sharp resistance that jeopardized even the emperor’s support of the reforms,
Wang and Lü Chia-wen resolutely expanded the organizational domain, geographic range, and operational scope of the State Trade Bureau, transforming
it from a capital-centered regulatory agency intended to promote commerce,
270
271
272
273
HCP (1979) 279, p. 6825.
HCP (1979) 360, pp. 8620–1. Shang-kuan was serving in An-fu county, Chiang-hsi, at the time.
Ch’en, Chih-chai hsien-sheng wen-chi 21, p. 120. During the Southern Sung, the pao-chia system developed
into the basic unit of rural administration, while the service exemption fee joined the list of local taxes
that were funneled out of their region to finance the military budget. See Sudō, “Sōdai gōsonsei no
hensen katei,” pp. 600–23; Sogabe, “Ō Anseki no hokōhō,” pp. 33–63.
“Shang wu-shih cha-tzu,” in Wang, Wang Lin-ch’uan ch’üan-chi 41, p. 239, cited in Liang, “Shih-i fa
shu,” p. 185. This section draws heavily on Liang Keng-yao’s sources and analysis.
430
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to an empirewide credit and wholesaling operation dedicated to amassing
revenues.
Demonstrating a keen understanding of organizational power, Lü Chia-wen
quickly asserted control over all the government’s commercial operations in
the capital. In the single month of June (the fifth month of 1072) the state
trade bureau gained dominion over the Bureau of Monopoly Goods (Ch’üeh-huo
wu), the Central Commercial Tax Bureau (Tu shang-shui yüan), and the General
Sales and General Purchase Markets (Tsa-mai ch’ang, Tsa-mai wu). With these
acquisitions the state trade bureau ruled over the sale of commercial permits
for the trade in government-controlled tea, salt, and imported incense and
medicinals; the collection of commercial taxes in the capital; and the procurement and resale of commercial goods acquired for the court.274 The state trade
bureau’s control over commerce in the capital also increased the funds available
to it for investment in interest-bearing loans, for as chief collector of commercial taxes in the capital, the bureau inherited the market usage surtax (shih-li
ch’ien) of six cash that was added to every hundred cash of commercial taxes.275
This revenue stream was further augmented by the imposition in mid-1073
(the fifth month of 1073) of the “guild exemption fee” (mien-hang ch’ien), a
cash fee paid by all of K’ai-feng’s commercial guilds in lieu of providing actual
goods or services to the government. Although intended like its model, the
service exemption fee, to be progressive, the guild exemption fee ended up as
a flat levy imposed on all vendors, including such petty traders as the water
sellers (t’i p’ing-che), who despite having had no previous responsibilities to the
state now had to form into guilds before they could ply their wares in K’aifeng.276 To provide an outlet for its expanded supply of cash, the state trade
bureau took over the Central Collateralized Loan Bureau (Ti-tang so), a unit
of the K’ai-feng prefectural financial administration that accepted valuables
from the public as security for interest-bearing cash loans. The bureau soon
opened five installations around the city to lend out surplus market usage and
guild exemption funds. By the fourth month of 1074 the credit operation had
been pushed out to the suburban county of Hsiang-fu, where, according to
Assisting Councilor of State Feng Ching, officials encouraged ignorant poor
folk to pawn their grain in addition to valuables to get emergency cash loans.
“They just see that the government is handing out money,” Feng complained,
274
275
276
SHY (1964) chih-kuan 27, pp. 8b, 38a; Liang, “Shih-i fa shu,” p. 187.
See Cheng Hsia, Hsi-t’ang chi [Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu, Wen-yüan ko 1779 ed.] (Taipei, 1973) 1, pp. 9a–10b;
Liang, “Shih-i fa shu,” p. 190. The surtax was initially designated for the pool of funds used to pay
clerical salaries under the new ts’ang-fa measure; but by 1073, Lü Chia-wen had raised the surtax to
ten cash per transaction, regardless of the size of the basic commercial tax, in order to swell overall
revenues.
Cheng, Hsi-t’ang chi 1, pp. 8a–9a; HCP (1979) 245, p. 5962; Liang, “Shih-i fa shu,” p. 191.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 431
“and there are none who can turn it away. So they pile up debts, and when the
time comes they cannot repay.”277
The financial success of the state trade bureau in K’ai-feng, as well as of its
progenitor in western Shan-hsi, encouraged Wang An-shih and Lü Chia-wen
to open branch bureaus throughout the country. In the tenth month of 1073
the K’ai-feng state trade bureau was upgraded to the status of Superintendancy
of State Trade (tu t’i-chü shih-i-ssu) and all provincial branches placed under its
authority. By the end of the first phase of expansion in 1074, seven provincial
bureaus were in operation around the empire; by the end of Shen-tsung’s reign
at least twenty provincial bureaus had been opened, providing access to every
commercial center except western Szechwan, which was dominated by the
Superintendancy for Tea and Horses.278
Geographic expansion provided an irresistible temptation to Lü Chia-wen
to enlarge the agency’s role from passive recipient of commercial goods in the
capital to active buyer, and finally seller, of goods in the provinces. Any move
away from the agency’s original designation as a mediating agent between
resident and traveling merchants drew censure, and in late 1072 Wang Anshih had to defend the direct sale of fruit in K’ai-feng by explaining that fruit
was the medium in which some peddlers wanted to repay their commercial
loans, and so state trade officials had to resell the fruit to consumers.279 But
this was still an ad hoc method of disposing of a surplus; at the end of the year
Lü Chia-wen made the agency’s involvement more active by financing private
contractors to go out into the provinces to buy up marketable commodities
for the State Trade Bureau.280
This use of commoners and merchants to act as agents of the state was of
course controversial, and on several occasions Wang An-shih had to intercede
with the emperor.281 But the state trade agency incurred even greater censure
277
278
279
280
281
SHY (1964) chih-kuan 27, p. 65b; Liang, “Shih-i fa shu,” p. 192. For Feng Ching’s comments, see
HCP (1979) 252, pp. 6155–6. Smith, “State power and economic activism during the New Policies,”
misidentifies the green sprouts loans as the target of Feng’s criticism.
SHY (1964) shih-huo 37, p. 17b. For sources on and the distribution of provincial state trade bureaus,
see Liang, “Shih-i fa shu,” pp. 188–90, 206, and Higashi, Ō Anseki jiten, pp. 54–7, tables 15 and 16. On
the battle between the state trade agency and the tea and horse agency for dominion over the lucrative
Ch’eng-tu market, see Smith, Taxing heaven’s storehouse, pp 154–5.
The original complaint was made by Wen Yen-po, who blamed the collapse of a mountain in Hua-chou
(eastern Shensi) on cosmic anger at the government’s intrusion in the fruit market. See HCP (1979)
239, pp. 5810–11; 240, pp. 5826–8.
HCP (1979) 241, p. 5874; Liang, “Shih-i fa shu,” p. 192.
In the eleventh month of 1072, Wang An-shih told Shen-tsung that “it is precisely because state trade
matters are detailed and picayune that the bureau employs merchants to serve as its managers.” In the
eighth month of 1073, he insisted that a commoner-broker sent out on behalf of the state trade agency
to trade with the Liao was no less trustworthy or decorous than any of the emperor’s intimates. See HCP
(1979) 240, p. 5827; 246, pp. 5995–6.
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paul jakov smith
by sending out officials to trade directly in the provinces. In 1074, after Tseng
Pu himself complained about officials buying tea in Hunan, salt in Shan-hsi,
and silk in Liang-che, Shen-tsung demanded to know where in the state trade
legislation it authorized sending officials into the provinces to trade.282 But
the imperial pique was somewhat disingenuous, for it was Shen-tsung’s own
hunger for revenues, as manifested in the rewards and promotions granted Lü
Chia-wen and his associates for exceeding revenue quotas, that encouraged the
bureau’s growing expansion into provincial commerce.283 The lure of funds
finally moved Shen-tsung to openly embrace the revenue goals of the state
trade agency, and in late 1074 he lent the agency two million strings of cash
from the Inner Treasury to send out “men of special talent” to buy up salt
permits and grain in the provinces.284 Four months later, in the second month
of 1075, the agency extended its reach by opening purchase stations (chü) in all
commercially strategic places throughout the country.285 Now, in the eyes of
reform opponent Su Ch’e, “there were no goods [the state trade agency] would
not stoop to buy, no profits it would not seek to commandeer, as it ordered
officials and dispatched commoners to buy and sell goods in north and south,
and to hand out loans in search of interest.”286
Up through the end of Wang An-shih’s tenure the agency focused on purchasing goods that could be resold to small merchants, but the scope of its
operations continued to expand even when Shen-tsung took over the reins of
state. By 1078 the state trade agency had acquired such a stockpile of commodities that the court authorized it to begin retailing its stocks in the provinces
for cash (pien-chuan), with an incentive schedule for officials pegged to specific
sales targets.287 This explicit intervention into local consumer markets was
followed by the expansion of Collateralized Loan Stations (Ti-tang so) throughout the country, to generate funds for Shen-tsung’s war on the Tanguts. New
loan stations were opened in K’ai-feng and in the capital region in 1081 and
282
283
284
285
286
287
HCP (1979) 252, p. 6159; 253, p. 6188. Tseng Pu’s complaint was part of a wider uproar, dealt with
in the next section, that forced Wang An-shih into temporary retirement.
HCP (1979) 245, p. 5962; 256, p. 6256; Liang, “Shih-i fa shu,” p. 194.
HCP (1979) 257, p. 6280; Liang, “Shih-i fa shu,” p. 208. By repurchasing salt permits at extremely
low prices from merchants who had already paid cash for the licenses, the state increased the amount
of money it squeezed out of the merchants by devaluing the permits.
HCP (1979) 260, p. 6331.
“Tzu Ch’i-chou hui lun shih-shih shu,” in Su, Luan-ch’eng chi 35, p. 14a. Su Ch’e dates the memorial at
seven years after his resignation from the Finance Planning Commission, in the eighth month of 1069.
In the last month of 1075 the agency was authorized to buy three million catties worth of tea a year
for resale on credit to itinerant peddlers who hawked it throughout Ho-pei and Shantung, earning a
rebuke from Lü T’ao; see “Tsou ch’i pa Ching-tung Ho-pei lu she-fang ta-fang ch’a chuang,” in Lü,
Ching-te chi 3, pp. 9b–10b; SHY (1964) shih-huo 37, pp. 23b–24a.
HCP (1979) 294, pp. 7174–5.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 433
1082, and then in every circuit in 1083, when they were capitalized by green
sprouts and service exemption funds. Even as late as the fifth month of 1085,
two months after Shen-tsung’s death, the Ministry of Finance recommended
that loan stations be set up in all but the most commercially backward areas
of the empire.288 By the end of Shen-tsung’s reign an agency that was meant
to curb the power of the engrossing monopolists had itself turned into the
largest engrosser in the empire, “stockpiling any goods the people might use,
monopolizing any transaction that might bring them profit . . . and forcing
merchants to a halt.”289
Like all monopolies, however, the state trade agency was extremely profitable. For the single year of the tenth month of 1076 to the tenth month of
1077, the state trade agency reported net returns (hsi-ch’ien) of 1.41 million
strings of cash, a return of 28 percent on its basic capitalization of 5 million
strings at that time.290 By 1085 the basic capitalization had more than doubled, to 12.26 million strings, which at the same rate of return should have
yielded 3.45 million strings in interest. But by then the state trade agency and
its debtors were overextended, forcing the court to issue reductions or cancellations on the interest owed on loans and credit purchases, while seeking to
protect its principal.291
We can be more precise about the profitability of the New Policies as
a whole, which very significantly enriched government coffers. One historian
estimates that in 1077 the major revenue measures – state trade, green sprouts,
and hired service – added an extra 18 million strings, or 33 percent, to the
54 million strings of cash obtained through traditional currency sources.292
Other than state trade, this new currency stream was collected almost entirely
from the agricultural sector of the economy.
In the absence of comparable data on net returns for the rest of the reign
period, the surviving figures on cash surpluses can serve as a surrogate measure
288
289
290
291
292
Liang, “Shih-i fa shu,” p. 225; HCP 322, p. 7770; 332, pp. 8000–1; 356, p. 8515.
The quote is from Censor Chao Ju-li (1041–94), in Yang Shih-ch’i, Li-tai ming-ch’en tsou-i (1416; Taipei,
1964) 269, pp. 15a–b. Chao’s memorial, written around 1077, focuses on the Chiang-nan region, where
he claims that state trade agents had undermined the tea, silk, and manufacturing trades that local
people relied on for their livelihoods.
SHY (1964) chih-kuan 27, pp. 39a–b; HCP (1979) 282, p. 6907. SS 186, p. 4551, reports a lower
figure of 1.3 million strings, made up of interest payments and shih-li fees. The profits earned a bonus
of 300,000 cash for director Lü Chia-wen. See also Liang, “Shih-i fa shu,” p. 205.
See SHY (1964) shih-huo 37, pp. 31b–32b.
Miyazawa, “Hoku-Sō no zaisei to kahei keizai,” p. 300, table 4. The traditional cash sources were the
cash portion of liang-shui (5.59 million strings), commercial taxes (8.07 million strings), the wine
monopoly (12.28 million strings), the salt monopoly (22.3 million strings), and new currency (5.95
million strings). Of the new measures, state trade provided 1.41 million strings, service exemption
10.17 million strings, wine and ferry stations 3.87 million strings, and Ever-normal Granaries – that
is, the interest on green sprouts loans – 2.3 million strings.
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of the revenue-generating powers of the New Policies. By the end of 1076,
the Court of Agricultural Supervision (Ssu-nung ssu) had built up a surplus of
unspent reserves (hsien-tsai ch’ien) from the rural credit, service exemption, and
winery and ferry franchise funds totaling 49.9 million mixed units, including
27.7 million strings of cash.293 These and later surpluses were used to fill
Shen-tsung’s treasuries: in 1079 the Ssu-nung ssu was instructed to deposit
one million strings of winery franchise funds annually in Shen-tsung’s Inner
Treasury; three years later 13 million strings of accumulated funds from the
green sprouts, service exemption, and winery and ferry franchise accounts were
transferred to the Yüan-feng Treasury, established in 1080 specifically to house
profits from enterprises controlled by the Ssu-nung ssu.294 For Shen-tsung these
hoards were to be the life’s blood of his campaign against the Tanguts. And
though the Tangut war of 1081–3 exacted an enormous toll in money and
men, New Policies revenues were so robust that imperial treasuries remained
full into the next reign period. In 1087 the head of the Ministry of Finance,
Li Ch’ang, reported:
Our former emperor labored year after year to build up a surplus for border defense. As
of now, the green sprouts, service exemption, and winery franchise accounts have yielded
surpluses of 56 million strings, while another ten million strings worth of money, goods,
and precious metals have accumulated from the sales of rice and salt in the capital and
funds stockpiled in the Yüan-feng Treasury. Moreover, another half [of] this amount was
spent on the frontier [war].295
In sum, the surviving figures on surplus revenues suggest that the key
reform financial policies generated in the range of one hundred million strings
of cash for Shen-tsung and the reformers, though little of this money was
seen by mainstream budgetary agencies.296 But did reform financial measures
“multiply the state’s revenues without adding to the people’s taxes,” as Wang
An-shih had promised? Contemporaries thought not. Yang Shih (1053–1135),
a disciple of the Ch’eng brothers who received his chin-shih degree when Wang
293
294
295
296
See the Chung-shu tui-pei figures tabulated in Miyazawa, “Hoku-Sō no zaisei to kahei keizai,” pp. 327–32.
SHY (1964) chih-kuan 26, p. 13a; SHY (1964) shih-huo 52, p. 14a; Wang, “Pei Sung ti Ssu-nung-ssu,”
p. 26.
HCP 407, p. 9904.
Shen-tsung and his chief ministers controlled revenues generated by the New Policies, through the
Ssu-nung ssu, and, after 1082, the Agency of the Right of the Board of Revenue (hu-pu yu-ts’ao). The fiscal
agencies in charge of routine budgetary matters, such as the Finance Commission and its successor, the
Agency of the Left of the Board of Revenue (hu-pu tso-ts’ao), were short of cash throughout the reform
era. In the specific case of state trade revenues, Chao Ju-li complained that everything the agency
gained through its monopolistic practices came at the expense of commercial taxes lost to the Finance
Commission; Yang, Li-tai ming-ch’en tsou-i 269, p. 15b. For general discussions, see Wang, “Pei Sung
ti Ssu-nung-ssu,” p. 26, and Hartwell, “The imperial treasuries,” pp. 70–2.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 435
An-shih was at the height of his power, lamented what he saw as the unintended
slide into confiscatory revenue gathering: “Although the idea behind the New
Policies was laudable, in less than a decade even though imperial treasuries
overflowed with revenues, the people were put in terrible distress.”297 Another
observer, Pi Chung-yu, was less willing to give the reformers, including Shentsung, the benefit of the doubt. Just after Shen-tsung’s death had revived
hopes for a conservative restoration, Pi wrote to his mentor, Ssu-ma Kuang,
that “Wang An-shih stirred the late emperor’s heart with his talk of great
deeds. But although the late emperor believed in Wang he feared that funds
would be inadequate, so he distributed green sprouts loans, set up state trade
bureaus, collected service exemption fees, and changed the salt laws. There
was no method that might get money out of the people that the government
would not employ.”298 Throughout the fifteen years of the reforms, opponents
argued that although in the short term the New Policies did enrich the state,
they did so only by sacrificing the long-term stability and productivity of the
economy. Critics catalogued a wide range of abuses perpetrated by the reforms
but focused on three issues that especially highlight the unintended consequences of state activism: opponents collectively asserted that reform financial
measures sundered the bonds of the natural community, confronted the natural
economy with the demands of a hypermonetized state, and wound up harming most the relatively poor and unprotected classes they were intended to
assist.
The impact of the New Policies: The opposition critique
In contrast to Wang An-shih, who depicted rural life as an arena of unbridled domination and mutual antagonism, many other contemporary observers
believed that rural society was held together by bonds of communal solidarity
and mutual interdependence that were stronger than the centrifugal forces
of inequality. Ssu-ma Kuang was perhaps the most persistent advocate of the
belief that “although bitterness and happiness are not equally distributed, at
least rich and poor mutually aid one another in order to guarantee their livelihoods.”299 But he was by no means alone. Cheng Hsia, a one-time protégé
of Wang An-shih’s who became disenchanted with the reforms, reported that
297
298
299
Yang Shih, K’uei-shan chi 15, cited in Liang, “Shih-i fa shu,” p. 171.
“Shang men-hsia shih-lang Ssu-ma wen-kung shu,” in Pi Chung-yu, Hsi-t’ai chi (c. 1117; Taipei, 1986)
7, p. 92.
See “Ch’i pa t’iao-li-ssu ch’ang-p’ing-shih shu,” in Ssu-ma, Ssu-ma Wen-cheng kung ch’uan-chia chi 44,
p. 562.
436
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he was told the same thing in 1074 when he interviewed refugees from the
prolonged drought that had plagued north China for years:
Families rich and poor, great and small, all rely on one another for survival. The poor
and small depend on the rich and great for nurturance in the face of their poverty and
powerlessness, while the rich and powerful depend on the poor to complete their wellbeing. The rich and powerful possess property and grain, whereas the weak own no land
or dwellings. They must serve as the tenants of others, and there is nothing that they need
for peddling or cultivating that they do not obtain through interest-bearing loans from
the rich and powerful. The rich in turn prosper daily, and exert themselves on behalf of the
tenants who rent their houses and their land.300
According to men who observed the impact of the reforms on the local level,
by projecting state power more deeply into local society, the New Policies fractured time-honored relationships of mutual dependency, at great cost to the
people and ultimately to the state itself. They were especially adamant about
the disruptive effect of the green sprouts loan policy, arguing that instead of
protecting poor peasants from the avarice of the rich, the collection of government loans subjected poor peasants to the coercive powers of the state. In one
of the flood of critiques that emerged as the reforms were being rolled back in
mid-1086, the censor Shang-kuan Chün (1038–1115) asserted that although
before the green sprouts reform private lenders had charged nominally high
interest rates, when it came time to collect they were at least relatively flexible
and benign. By the time a peasant finished off paying the ruthlessly efficient
agents of the state, however, the price of a loan had risen from the statutory
twenty percent to fifty or even one hundred percent of the principal.301 At the
same time the left policy critic Wang Yen-sou (1043–93) graphically depicted
the many minions of the state that a green sprouts borrower had to confront:
first, in order to register for a loan, he had to pay off the local pao-chia leaders,
including the large guard chief, tax-pressing chia-tou, and notary for household registrations. Then at the other end of the process, if he fell behind on
his payments a government clerk would appear at the door, who had to be
bought off with food and drink. But even the clerks could not be bought off
forever, and eventually the collection agents would arrive to seize the debtor’s
property and drag him off to be beaten. Moreover, Wang did not assume that
the maliciousness perpetrated by the green sprouts measure was intentional;
it was simply the unavoidable consequence of government interference in the
rural economy: “To strive intentionally for the benefit of the peasantry is not
as good as bringing them benefit by leaving them alone.”302
300
301
302
“Liu min” in Cheng, Hsi-t’ang chi 1, p. 13a.
HCP (1979) 378, pp. 9192–4.
HCP (1979) 376, pp. 9131–2.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 437
The disruption of communal solidarity was even more insidious in the case
of the hired service policy, in the eyes of critics, since here the attempt to
replace community-based service agents with semiprofessional mercenaries
also undermined the interests of the state. According to Wang Yen-sou, the
old system of drafted service was built on a solid communal foundation, in
which “households on duty” (ying-tang men-hu) with propertied roots in the
community were kept afloat during their period of service by neighbors who
came to their aid with labor and material assistance. Under the hired service
system, however, well-established local families were replaced by “vagrant riffraff from the marketplace” who used their positions as guardians and scribes
at the government’s granaries, tax stations, treasuries, and financial bureaus to
intimidate local citizens and embezzle state property. Wang Yen-sou was just
one of many conservatives who doubted that the marketplace could provide
reliable and responsible professionals. For Wang, as for Ssu-ma Kuang, Chang
Fang-p’ing, Liu Chih, and Yang Hui, only local men with property in the
region could be trusted to manage the government’s property; no bond or
collateral could prevent sojourning mercenaries from engaging in graft or
absconding with the government’s property, then changing their names and
volunteering for work elsewhere.303
The hired service measure was also held responsible for subverting the
communal focus of the pao-chia system, which if anything was intended to
reinforce communal organizations by transforming them into compulsory,
bureaucratized units. In 1076 the censor Teng Jun-fu (1027–94) charged that
the use of local pao-chia guardsmen on detached service to replace countylevel bowmen, one of the mien-i hiring categories, had shattered a natural
defense and surveillance network built on personal relationships, leaving local
communities powerless to control rising banditry in the Shantung and Fuchien regions. Teng memorialized that
under the old system [prior to hired service and pao-chia] a large county claimed about
140 bowmen, a medium county one hundred, and a small county not less than seventy to
eighty bowmen. Although in name only one person was drafted into service, in fact when
it came time to quell bandits all the remaining men rose up as well. The rural compatriots
and relatives all acted as the eyes and ears [of the bowmen]. . . . People were at peace in
their old villages and did not lightly dare to leave them, and it was this that allowed them
to control banditry.304
Although critics no doubt exaggerated the harmoniousness and solidarity of rural communities prior to the reforms, their anecdotal portraits do
303
304
HCP (1979) 364, pp. 8703–6. The last charge is by Ssu-ma Kuang; see “Ch’i pa mien-i i chiu ch’ai-i
cha-tzu,” in Ssu-ma, Ssu-ma Wen-cheng kung ch’uan-chia chi 49, pp. 626–8. For Yang Hui and Chang
Fang-p’ing, see HCP (1979) 224, pp. 5444–6; 277, pp. 6787–91.
HCP (1979) 279, pp. 6834–5.
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highlight the disruptive intrusiveness of the state under the New Policies.
Moreover, there was a broad consensus that the disruption of local communities was exacerbated by what may be termed the hypermonetized demands
of the state under Wang An-shih and Shen-tsung. Despite the considerable
spread of commerce and market relationships that characterized the eleventhcentury economy, money was distributed very unevenly through Sung society.
During the momentary flowering of criticism that the emperor allowed in
1074, Ssu-ma Kuang offered a widely shared view of the limited place of
money in the economy:
There are some rich merchants and great traders who possess great stores of cash, but among
the peasantry wealth is measured by the possession of more land and larger stocks of grain,
[and is acquired by] maintaining better buildings and dwellings and working their oxen
without cease. Nowhere do peasants amass tens of thousands of cash in their homes As
for the poor peasants, their tattered rags do not even cover their bodies, nor does their
coarse fodder fill their bellies. In the fall they hope their crops will ripen in the summer;
come summer they look towards the harvest in the fall. Some of them must even work as
share-cropping tenants for others. Surely there are none among them with any knowledge
of money.305
Ssu-ma’s contention was shared by Chang Fang-p’ing, who in 1076 wrote
that in the poor hamlets of Ying-t’ien-fu (Ching-tung West), “at the time of the
winter sacrifices the poor peasants carry their firewood and straw into the town
market, a round trip of ten li, where they sell it for 50 or 70 cash. With this
money they buy some onions, eggplant, salt, and vinegar, and young and old
regard it as sweet and beautiful. Throughout their days, what do they know
of a single [extra] cash?” Even the reform lieutenant Teng Wan (1028–86)
described an autarkic rural economy in which stubborn and fearful peasants
raised silkworms for their clothes, worked the land for their food, and from
youth to old age never passed through a market gate or saw a government
yamen.306
By contrast, Shen-tsung, Wang An-shih, and their followers were obsessed
with the idea of money, whose role in the economy they seem to have seriously exaggerated. The reformers valued money because it was liquid, and
could be exchanged for goods and services when and where they were needed;
because it was indestructible, and could be stored in treasuries with no fear of
spoilage; and because it was expandable, and could be made to grow through
minting, of course, but also through government control over commutation
305
306
“Ying chao yen ch’ao-cheng ch’üeh-shih chuang,” in Ssu-ma, Ssu-ma Wen-cheng kung ch’uan-chia chi 45,
p. 575. In 1086, Ssu-ma Kuang insisted that “even the richest landowner never has more than several
hundred strings of cash at most.” See “Ch’i pa mien-i,” in Ssu-ma, Ssu-ma Wen-cheng kung ch’uan-chia
chi 49, pp. 626–8.
HCP (1979) 277, p. 6789; 269, p. 6605.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 439
rates between money and goods, and by the seemingly inexhaustible power of
interest on money constantly recirculated into the economy. The government’s
obsession with the idea of turning goods into cash and pumping cash into the
economy was no more clearly manifested than in the Szechwan tea monopoly,
where official placards enjoined tea market functionaries to “expedite the rapid
purchase and sale of tea, prevent the stagnation of capital.”307
If Wang An-shih was obsessed with increasing the flow of revenues to the
state, the fundamental rationale of his reform program was that he could do
so without diminishing the resources of the people. To recapitulate Wang’s
argument, under the stimulation of the state, goods and money would circulate freely, unimpeded by either private monopolies or bottlenecks from
outmoded quotas for command-mandated goods and services; this free circulation of goods and money would in turn produce new wealth for the state
without increasing fiscal claims on the people. According to his opponents,
however, Wang’s policies led to a very different set of outcomes: in their view,
the confrontation between a cash-hungry state and an imperfectly monetized
economy resulted in increased monetary taxes, a currency crisis, and economic
dislocation and stagnation.
The chief contributor to the rise in taxes came from the service exemption
fees and the surplus emergency fee (k’uan-sheng ch’ien) surtax. Although by
monetizing government service the reformers hoped to minimize the burden
borne by upper-grade households, critics adduced statistics to prove that the
annual fees on rich households were far higher than the cost of periodic service
had ever been before. In 1082, Liu I, the Ever-normal Granary intendant for
Chiang-nan, estimated that the richest households in neighboring Liang-che
circuit paid up to eight hundred thousand cash annually in service exemption
fees, eight times more than the periodic draft had cost them prior to the
reforms.308
Critics were divided on how harmful the hired service policy was to the
rich in general, since in counties with low overall mien-i quotas spreading out
the costs of government service could work to the advantage of the wealthy.309
But they all joined Chang Fang-p’ing in condemning the extension of service
307
308
309
“Tsou wei ch’a yüan-hu an-che san-fen chia-ch’ien . . . ,” in Lü, Ching-te chi 1, p. 11a. For a recent article
on the manipulation of commutation rates, see Chang Hsi-wei, “Sung-tai che-pien-chih t’an-hsi,”
Chung-kuo shih yen-chiu No. 1 (1992), pp. 26–33.
HCP (1979) 324, p. 7798.
When Chang Tun tried to halt the rising tide against the hired service policy in early 1086, he seized on
the fact that Ssu-ma Kuang himself was not sure whether the measure was good or bad for the wealthy.
See HCP (1979) 367, p. 8822, which also cites Ssu-ma’s arguments. Some critics, such as Wang Yensou, thought that the hired service policy might work well if the exemption fees were limited to those
families that were liable for the service. See HCP (1979) 364, pp. 8703-6.
440
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exemption fees to lower-grade households as a way of “taxing those too poor
to meet their needs in order to subsidize the powerful who possess more than
they need.”310 The intrinsic regressivity of the measure was exacerbated by
the practice of arbitrarily upgrading lower-grade households in order to meet
or surpass revenue quotas. As the hired service policy spread from K’ai-feng to
the rest of the country after its universal promulgation in the tenth month of
1071, officials in each county were required to set collection quotas based on
the distribution of households in the five-grade hierarchy. This initial grading
was the specific job of clerical staff, whom Chang Fang-p’ing charged were
spurred by a court-issued incentive schedule to set collection quotas as high
as possible. As a result, “the grasping clerks counted everything as property –
land, huts, ox-tackle, produce, mulberry and jujube trees, even down to the
tools, spades, kettles, dogs, and pigs of the most downtrodden families. Since
the clerks were aiming for rewards and bonuses, everything was given a cash
value [in order to maximize the amount of money each family would have to
pay].”311 Nor did a peasant’s problems end with the first grading. As Liu Chih
pointed out on his return to the Censorate in 1086, once the richest families
were ruined by annual service exemption burdens of hundreds of strings of
cash, officials passed their fees onto the remaining population by arbitrarily
upgrading the poorer households. Liu’s colleague Wang Yen-sou provided a
specific example: in Ting-chou’s An-hsi county (Ho-pei West), some sixteen
hundred out of a total of thirteen thousand households were ranked in grade 4
prior to the hired service measure. But because upper-grade households could
not continue to meet their disproportionate share of the total county quota,
officials simply moved everyone up the ladder: thirty-four hundred households
were upgraded from rank 5 to 4, and over seven hundred rank 4 families were
upgraded to rank 3. And unlike past times, when regrading was predictable
and realistic, now “the poorest households can get upgraded at any time even
if there is no increase in the value of their meager property, in order to make
them pay more in service exemption fees.” In every county in the land, Wang
Yen-sou declared, the poor were being reassessed to provide mien-i and even
more spurious fees that government functionaries ground out of them through
the power of the lash.312
By increasing the amount of money taken out of an economy that was
only partially monetized to begin with, Wang An-shih’s reformers decreased
310
311
312
HCP (1979) 277, p. 6788.
HCP (1979) 277, pp. 6789–90.
HCP (1979) 364, pp. 8700, 8704. At least in some places, arbitrary upgrading provided the same
disincentive to agricultural expansion that drafted service had; in 1073, Shen-tsung complained that
because of fear of the mien-i assessor, peasants were refusing to plant mulberry trees. See HCP (1979)
245, p. 5969.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 441
rather than increased the volume of money in circulation, thereby depressing
agricultural production. Clearly this was not their intention: during Shentsung’s reign, Sung mints pumped more copper currency into the economy
than at any time before the eighteenth century – an annual quota of 5.06
million strings, or about 60 cash per capita annually as of 1080.313 This
was supplemented by currency introduced into the economy by the green
sprouts rural credit measure, which distributed a quota of 11 million mixed
units annually, about half of which was in cash.314 But despite these annual
injections of currency into the economy, more still was taken out by the service
exemption fees, the twenty percent surplus emergency fee (k’uan-sheng ch’ien)
surtax, the nominal twenty percent interest charged on the green sprouts loans,
and the welter of nuisance fees and surtaxes, such as the t’ou-tzu and shih-li
fees, that proliferated during Shen-tsung’s reign.315 This outflow of currency
from the local economy hit peasant producers especially hard, for by assessing
these new fees in cash the government forced peasants to sell their produce
at disadvantageous rates to obtain currency to pay their taxes. Yet as local
currency became increasingly scarce, the value of a peasant’s produce declined.
In the parlance of the time, money became dear and goods cheap (ch’ienchung huo-ch’ing). As Chang Fang-p’ing, a close observer of the deflationary
phenomenon, described it: “Because of the green sprouts and service assistance
measures, peasants all sell their grain and textiles so they can pay their fees in
cash. But cash has become increasingly hard to get, driving down the price of
grain and cloth and putting the people in even greater distress. They all call
it the ‘cash famine’ (ch’ien-huang).”316
In principle, a significant portion of these funds was supposed to be recirculated back into the local economy: service exemption fees in the form of
313
314
315
316
Yüan I-t’ang, “Pei Sung ch’ien-huang: ts’ung pi-chih tao liu-t’ung t’i-chih ti k’ao-ch’a,” Li-shih yen-chiu
No. 4 (1991), pp. 129–40, especially p. 131. By contrast, Ming dynasty mints produced 3 copper cash
per capita in 1393, and Ch’ing dynasty mints produced 4.3 cash per capita in 1721. I have adjusted
Yüan’s figures to reflect a household:individual ratio of 1 to 5.
For distribution and collection quotas and the actual figures for 1080 and 1081, see HCP (1979) 332,
p. 8006. The percentage represented by specie is not given, and no obvious surrogates are available.
In 1077 currency constituted around half of the discretionary funds (hsien-tsai ch’ien) account for the
rural credit operation, or 15.5 million strings out of a total of 37.3 million mixed units. See Miyazawa,
“Hoku-Sō no zaisei to kahei keizai,” p. 328, table 2, citing Yung-lo ta-tien.
On the proliferation of fees, see “Tsou ch’i fang-mien k’uan-sheng i-ch’ien chuang,” in Lü, Ching-te
chi 1, pp. 1a–2a. In 1076, Chang Fang-p’ing reported that although the green sprouts measure added
83,600 strings of cash to the Ying-t’ien-fu economy every year, after interest charges there was a net
loss of 16,600 strings. See HCP (1979) 277, p. 6789.
Quoted in Yeh T’an, “Lun Pei Sung ‘ch’ien-huang,’” Chung-kuo shih yen-chiu No. 2 (1991), pp. 20–
30. As Yeh Tan points out, Chang Fang-p’ing also indicted Wang An-shih’s relaxation of the prohibitions against the private sale of copper and the export of copper coins as causes of the cash
shortage.
442
paul jakov smith
wages, surplus emergency fee (k’uan-sheng ch’ien) surtaxes in the form of collateral for shortfalls, and even the green sprouts interest payments as payment
for the administration of the Ever-normal Granary operation. But as we have
seen, the government made every effort to divert these new revenue streams
from their intended purposes, drawing local funds out of the place of collection to government repositories in the capital and the provinces. Some of this
money was pumped back into the economy in the form of clerical salaries
and still more interest-bearing loans. But the interest frenzy that overtook
Shen-tsung and the reformers was matched by an irrepressible instinct for
government hoarding, and much of the cash collected from the peasantry sat
uselessly in imperial treasuries. In 1077, Lü T’ao warned that because half of
the currency collected in service exemption and surplus-tax fees in the Szechwanese prefecture of P’eng-chou (Ch’eng-tu-fu circuit) was siphoned out of
the economy by the government, there was little currency left to circulate
in local markets.317 A decade later Lü’s fellow Szechwanese Su Ch’e reported
that the cash famine threatened to stall the once-robust southeastern economy: “Ever since the Hsi-ning period the people have had to pay out cash for
service exemption fees and the interest on green sprouts loans. Now strings
of cash just pile up uselessly in government storehouses, while officials scour
for more cash among the people until there is nothing left. In the markets
people have taken to using privately minted small cash, but even so goods
do not move and peasants and their wives cannot sell what they grow or
spin.”318
Even without a cash shortage the monetization of agricultural taxes was
destabilizing, since it forced poor peasants to produce for the market in order
to obtain cash for their taxes. When coupled with the deflation brought on
by the currency shortage, monetization could be ruinous, forcing peasants to
sell their meager working capital – land, oxen, the firewood created by dismantling their houses or cutting down their mulberry trees – to get cash for their
taxes. And here, for conservatives, was the most ironic consequence of Wang
An-shih’s economic reforms. For the direct beneficiaries of these forced sales
was the very class of “engrossers” that the reforms were intended to suppress:
families wealthy enough to pay their own new taxes and yet still have enough
cash left to buy up the property of poorer peasants at vastly reduced rates, or to
provide usurious loans so they could pay their green sprouts interest. Thus as
Ssu-ma Kuang, Liu Chih, Wang Yen-sou, and their associates all agreed, rather
317
318
Lü, Ching-te chi 1, pp. 1a–b.
“Ch’i chieh ch’ang-p’ing-ch’ien mai shang-kung chi chu-chou chün-liang chuang,” in Su, Luan-ch’eng
chi 37, p. 13a, quoted in Yeh, “Lun Pei Sung ‘ch’ien-huang,’” p. 22.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 443
than suppressing the rural engrossers, Wang An-shih’s two agrarian reforms
wound up working to the engrossers’ advantage.319
Although opponents singled out green sprouts and hired service as the most
pernicious of the New Policies, they were no less quick to condemn the state
trade and pao-chia measures for subjecting the very categories of people they
were meant to protect to the disruptive powers of a state apparatus driven
beyond legitimate bounds by the frenzy for revenues. The state trade policy,
justified as a way to protect small merchants and itinerant traders from the
grip of the great guild monopolists, soon mirrored the regressivity of the
hired service act by charging nonguild vendors a guild exemption fee (mienhang ch’ien) and exacting the market usage surtax (shih-li ch’ien) on transactions
too small even to warrant a commercial tax.320 Perhaps even more damaging
to small traders and their customers was the concerted effort by state trade
officials to insert themselves into the place once held by private commercial
monopolists. State trade functionaries violated the original intent of the policy
so egregiously that in 1074 both its originator – Wei Chi-tsung – and its chief
sponsor – Tseng Pu – turned against the agency:
Lü Chia-wen and his minions devote themselves solely to taking in profits in order to
garner rewards. All traveling merchants must sell their wares to the state trade agency, all
vendors in the markets must buy what they need from the agency. Moreover the agency
buys cheap and sells dear in order to swell its income and pare down its expenditures, so
as to bring in profits from every quarter. As Wei Chi-tsung has said, this is nothing less
than using the power of the government to act just like the engrossers.321
As already shown, the charges by Tseng Pu and Wei Chi-tsung were just
a part of the widespread denunciation of state trade agents who monopolized
(lung) commerce in the provinces and the capital. By mimicking the monopolistic practices of the private engrossers, state trade agents could have the same
depressing effect on trade that the engrossers were accused of. This was illustrated by the trade in glutinous rice (no-mi). Around 1074 the agency monopolized all the glutinous rice shipped by merchants to the capital, a monopoly
that it protected by offering rewards of up to three hundred thousand cash to
residents who informed on violators. The agency in turn sold the glutinous
rice on credit to the city’s wineries, who were its principal consumers. By
1075, however, rice importers reacted against the state trade agency’s unrealistically low prices by cutting off K’ai-feng’s supply, so undercutting the wine
319
320
321
See Ssu-ma, Ssu-ma Wen-cheng kung ch’uan-chia chi 47, pp. 608–9, 626–8; HCP (1979) 364, p. 8700;
376, pp. 9131–2.
See Cheng, Hsi-t’ang chi 1, pp. 8a–10b.
HCP (1979) 251, p. 6134.
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paul jakov smith
industry that local winemakers were unable to meet the interest payments for
their earlier purchases.322
Like its counterpart measures in the countryside, the state trade agency also
enforced its financial claims in a far more draconian way than could private
monopolists. The K’ai-feng winemakers were relatively fortunate, for faced
with the disruption of an essential industry the court was obliged to forego
half the interest accrued by the wineries. Left to its own, the state trade agency
could be relentless in collecting its fees. In 1073, Cheng Hsia saw state trade
debtors wearing cangues around their necks, their hands laden with house
beams and tiles, being led off to the public market to sell the remains of their
dismantled homes in order to requite their debts to the state.323 And finally,
the state trade act shared one further trait with its rural counterparts – its
utility to the same rich and influential “engrossers” it was meant to suppress.
In 1075, Wang An-shih boasted that because of the success of the state trade
act in “smashing engrossers,” the only occupation left for the “great names”
of the capital was to open pawnshops.324 But as the historian Liang Keng-yao
argues, these pawnshops were probably financed by state trade agency loans.
For having shut the rich merchants and residents of K’ai-feng out of commerce,
agency officials then clamored to swell revenues by lending these same people
money at interest. Despite periodic efforts to exclude the most influential
people, including officials and members of the imperial clan, from taking
state trade loans, prudence often succumbed to greed, as state trade officials,
in their eagerness for revenues and rewards, became the principal financiers of
the rich and powerful. Among the chief beneficiaries of this largesse were state
trade officials themselves and their kin, who were among the most prodigal
borrowers of agency funds. By 1078, for example, the maternal relatives of Chi
Feng, the state trade intendant for the lucrative frontier bureaus in Ch’in-chou
and the recently created Hsi-chou2 (Ch’in-feng circuit), had amassed a debt
of 120,000 strings of cash; one year later the one-time state trade official and
Szechwan tea and horse intendant Liu Tso owed 180,000 strings of cash.325
And the rich and powerful continued to amass debts to the state trade agency
throughout the 1080s. By mid-1085, when the restoration government began
discounting the loans, a total of 27,155 K’ai-feng families owed combined
322
323
324
325
HCP (1979) 260, pp. 6329–30.
See “T’u-hui ch’eng-wai min chi K’ai-feng jen-hu che-wo mai-wa mu teng shih,” in Cheng, Hsi-t’ang
chi 1, pp. 14a–b. A year later Shen-tsung also complained about the borrowers of state trade agency
loans having their property confiscated and their necks placed in the cangue. See HCP (1979) 251,
p. 6117.
HCP (1979) 262, p. 6407. See Liang, “Shih-i fa shu,” pp. 222–5.
HCP (1979) 294, p. 7168; 298, p. 7251.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 445
debts of 2.37 million strings of cash to the State Trade Superintendancy.
Sixty-five percent of this debt was owed by only sixty-two families – thirtyfive “great names” (ta-hsing) and twenty-seven winemakers – who averaged
24,838 strings of cash per borrower. The remaining 830,000 strings of cash
were distributed among 27,093 “small names” (hsiao-hsing), at an average of
30 strings per borrower.326
Finally, the pao-chia system, the last piece in Wang An-shih’s program to
expand state control over society and the economy, also wound up impeding
economic productivity and enhancing the power of rural magnates. The chief
cause of both problems was the extension of the program of military drill
and review (chiao-yüeh). Originally, the drill program for K’ai-feng and the
circuits of north China was voluntary and was timed for the slack months of
late fall and winter. During the 1080s, however, under the pressure of war with
the Tanguts, military drill became compulsory in practice if not in law, and
it increased in frequency to one training session every five days throughout
the agricultural season.327 In 1084, Fan Ch’un-jen described the impact of
compulsory drill on agriculture in eastern Shan-hsi:
In Shan-hsi this summer’s wheat and barley are about to ripen, and all hands are needed to
harvest and store it. Otherwise if bandits swarm or winds and rain hit before the harvest is
in, then most of it will be lost. . . . But now, because all the strongest men must serve in the
pao-chia units and drill once every five days, agriculture is hampered. . . . Every commoner
family with two adult males must send one into pao-chia, thereby losing the labor they
need to see to their livelihoods. This is especially trying for poor families with little
land.328
Observers such as Wang Kung-ch’en, Ssu-ma Kuang, and Wang Yen-sou confirm Fan’s claim that compulsory drill drew scarce labor out of the fields at
critical agricultural times.329 They confirm also that the training procedures
subjected the pao-ting guardsmen, who were mustered from the poorest households, to the whims of the pao-chia leaders, who were selected by law from
326
327
328
329
“Ch’i fang shih-i ch’ien-ch’ien chuang,” in Su, Luan-ch’eng chi 38, pp. 11a–13a; Liang, “Shih-i fa shu,”
p. 222. In the fourth month of 1085, the Secretariat ordered the state trade agency to forgive seventy
percent of the interest owed by the great names and all of the interest owed by the small families. See
HCP (1979) 354, p. 8472.
Though no statute can be found supporting either change, descriptions by Fan Ch’un-jen and Ssu-ma
Kuang indicate that by the end of Shen-tsung’s reign military drill was constant and compulsory. See
HCP (1979) 345, pp. 8289–90; “Ch’i pa pao-chia chuang,” in Ssu-ma, Ssu-ma Wen-cheng kung ch’uan-chia
chi 46, p. 592.
HCP (1979) 345, p. 8290. Compare this with the regulations of 1072 that put the guardsmen under
the power of their pao-chia superiors and the military inspectors; HCP (1979) 237, pp. 5769–70.
In addition to Ssu-ma, Ssu-ma Wen-cheng kung ch’uan-chia chi 46, p. 592 and 47, pp. 606–8, see HCP
(1979) 343, p. 8242; 361, pp. 8641–2.
446
paul jakov smith
the richest and most powerful families of each neighborhood. In 1085, Wang
Yen-sou described some of the most exploitative demands made on the pao-ting
guardsmen by their pao-chia and official superiors:
During training, the large guard chief and the superior guard leader will beat [the
guardsman], then the military inspector and his sergeant (chih-shih) will take turns flogging him, followed by the lieutenant (chih-hui shih) and civilian administrator (kan-tang
kung-shih) of the pao-chia intendant, who will whip him, and then perhaps another lashing
by their superior. And if the guardsman tries to flee then he will be flogged by the county
magistrate as well. . . . Beyond [this physical abuse] he must make his own garb, buy his
own headgear and bow, and repair his own arrows. . . . Moreover, even when at their leisure
in their homes, the superior guard leader and assistant leader and the large and small guard
chiefs all demand gifts for weddings and funerals, as well as tributes of silk, hemp, rice,
and wheat at the autumn and summer harvests; or they demand that the guardsman treat
them to a drink and a meal in the walled markets. Yet even though the guardsman fears
falling into the clutches of these men he dare not refuse to do their bidding, for if even one
thing is not as they want it then he will be charged with violating the regulations, and be
subjected to unlimited thrashing and humiliation.330
Wang Yen-sou and his fellow conservatives warned that training the guardsmen in military skills while filling them with hatred for their superiors could
only foment rather than suppress banditry. This is precisely how Southern
Sung critics viewed the consequences of the pao-chia system. Hu Shun-chih
(1083–1143), just a child when Shen-tsung died, wrote in 1135 that “Bandits
swarmed everywhere during the Yüan-feng period, and it was pao-chia men
who were responsible. The policy intended to prevent banditry instead promoted it.”331 Nor did training peasants for military service save much money
in military expenses. According to the historian Sogabe Shizuo, although in
1081 the pao-chia system allowed the government to save 1.3 million strings
of cash in wages and maintenance for soldiers, the court paid almost the same
amount, one million strings of cash, in incentives and rewards for the drill and
review program.332 Even more critically, under the successors to Shen-tsung
and Wang An-shih, especially Hui-tsung and his chief minister, Ts’ai Ching,
reliance on pao-chia at the expense of the regular mercenary troops eviscerated
the nation’s defenses. When the Jurchen threatened in 1126, a rattled court
was forced to scour the markets for riff-raff to hire to supplement its ill-trained
and panic-stricken pao-chia brigades.333
330
331
332
333
HCP (1979) 361, p. 8642.
Li Hsin-ch’uan, Chien-yen i-lai hsi-nien yao-lu (1253; Peking, 1956) 96, p. 1585.
Sogabe, “Ō Anseki no hokōhō,” pp. 17–22; Ma, Wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao (1965) 153, p. 1335.
Ma, Wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao (1965) 153, p. 1440. For a review of pao-chia policy under Che-tsung and
Hui-tsung, see Sogabe, “Ō Anseki no hokōhō,” pp. 27–33.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 447
the new policies under shen-tsung
Although the conservative portrayal of a rapacious fiscal administration preying on Shen-tsung’s hapless subjects may not represent the entirety of Wang
An-shih’s economic measures, its credibility is reenforced by the number of
reformers who themselves renounced the policies. Such renunciations must be
seen in the context of a political environment heated to the boiling point by
the competition for the extraordinary career leaps made possible by the reforms
and by the smouldering resentments of those who were passed over. Yet even
so, it was often differences over economic policy that served as the lightning
rod for political defections, sparking such tensions within Wang’s inner circle
that in 1076 the coalition finally collapsed, putting Shen-tsung himself at the
helm of the reforms.
The collapse of Wang An-shih’s coalition
After Wang ousted Tseng Kung-liang and Ch’en Sheng-chih from the Council
of State in late 1070 internal dissent against the reforms was muted. But in
the fall of 1072, T’ang Chiung, a young man who had earned Wang’s approval
by recommending that Han Ch’i be beheaded for opposing the green sprouts
measure, turned against his patron when he was passed over for a promotion to the Remonstrance Bureau (Chien-yüan). T’ang retaliated with a flurry
of memorials condemning the reforms, but when these were all ignored he
boldly seized upon a general audience before the emperor to publicly humiliate Wang An-shih. Ignoring Shen-tsung’s efforts to make him desist, T’ang
read out a memorial denouncing Wang, Tseng Pu, and their circle as despots,
and lambasting the pao-chia, service exemption, and state trade measures for
embittering the people.334
T’ang Chiung’s attack, for which he was demoted to a minor post in Kuangnan, was deeply embarrassing to Wang, but it was so obviously tied to personal
ambition that it had little further effect. Moreover, Wang was then at the height
of his influence over Shen-tsung, who had just reaffirmed his trust in Wang
by demoting and rusticating an imperial favorite outside the reform circle
whose relentless criticisms had triggered another Wang resignation threat.335
But two years later the situation had changed dramatically, prompting doubts
and defections from Wang’s followers, his lieutenants, and even the emperor
himself. The chief cause of the change was a prolonged drought in north
334
335
HCP (1979) 237, pp. 5778–82; Williamson, Wang An Shih, vol 1, pp. 271–3.
The official was Li Ping, chief edict recorder in the Bureau of Military Affairs. The Li Ping affair is
summarized in HCP (1979) 235, pp. 5712–15.
448
paul jakov smith
China, a drought so severe that Wang’s efforts to minimize it earned him an
imperial rebuke. Thousands of refugees fled the parched, famine-ridden north
for relief in the capital, where they congregated as a direct reproach to the
emperor. Shen-tsung was persuaded by his Han-lin advisor Han Wei that the
disaster was Heaven’s punishment for the economic exploitation and military
adventurism that characterized the reforms, and in the third month of 1074
the emperor “opened the route of remonstrance,” calling on all officials to
memorialize him personally on the failings of his government.336
In Lo-yang, seat of the opposition, Shen-tsung’s call for remonstrance was
greeted with tears by Ssu-ma Kuang, who sent up his first comprehensive
critique of the New Policies since his vow of silence in 1070.337 Far more
damaging to Wang An-shih, however, was a shocking portrait of the victims
of the drought, of tax-gouging, and of military mobilization that was secreted
into the court through illicit channels by Wang’s erstwhile protégé Cheng
Hsia (1040–1119). Acknowledged as a disciple by Wang around 1065,
Cheng was appointed to a staff position in the Kuang-chou2 (Huai-nan West)
prefectural administration at the start of the reform era. On his return to the
capital in late 1073, Cheng sought to convince his mentor that despite their
good intentions the economic reforms, exacerbated by military adventurism,
had turned into cruel and oppressive burdens on the people. Meeting nothing
but silence from Wang, Cheng Hsia decided to take his case directly to the
emperor. With the encouragement of Wang’s younger brother Wang An-kuo,
an associate of the Lo-yang opposition who resolutely opposed the New
Policies, Cheng Hsia vividly portrayed the weak, sick, and naked refugees who
thronged the roads out of the northeast with their families and possessions in
tow, driven along by the wind and sand. Though the ostensible cause of this
panicked migration was drought and famine, the real source of the misfortune
was Heaven’s anger at a government that filled its storehouses to overflowing
through such rapacious policies as the green sprouts, state trade, guild
exemption, and service exemption measures. The only solution was to placate
Heaven, by opening the nation’s granaries to the people, abolishing Wang Anshih’s oppressive fiscal policies, and cashiering Wang himself: “The drought
is Wang An-shih’s doing; cashier him, and the heavens will give rain.”338
336
337
338
HCP (1979) 251, pp. 6137–8; 252, pp. 6147–8.
See “Ying chao yen ch’ao-cheng ch’üeh-shih chuang,” in Ssu-ma, Ssu-ma Wen-cheng kung ch’uan-chia chi
45, pp. 571–8.
The basic source is Cheng Hsia’s composite “Shang Huang-ti lun hsin-fa chin liu-min t’u,” in Cheng,
Hsi-t’ang chi 1, pp. 1a–16b, which includes the eight points of Cheng’s exposé and a synopsis of the
explosion at court; it was based on information that the reform clique charged Cheng came by illegally.
For this charge, and for Wang An-kuo’s involvement, see HCP (1979) 259, pp. 6310–15. In late 1071,
in an audience with the emperor that slowed down his career, Wang An-kuo lamented the fiscalist
orientation that his brother and the reforms had taken, and he warned Wang An-shih that the enmity
engendered by the New Policies would endanger the family. But An-kuo placed most of the blame not
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 449
Despite Shen-tsung’s vow to read every criticism personally, it was only after
Cheng’s memorial was routed past reform henchmen to the Office of Transmission (Yin-t’ai ssu) controlled by Han Wei that it even got to the emperor.339 Its
impact on the emperor was made more acute by the fact that it coincided with a
dispute over the state trade policy that involved the reform leadership itself. At
the heart of the dispute stood Lü Chia-wen, who with Wang An-shih’s support
had turned the state trade agency into a fiscal empire that made Lü even more
powerful than his nominal superior, the finance commissioner Hsüeh Hsiang.
In early 1074, Hsüeh launched an investigation into charges that state trade
agents routinely beat and imprisoned brokers and merchants who bypassed
the agency. Lü Chia-wen convinced Wang An-shih that the charges were false,
but rumors of abuses in the state trade operation, and especially in the collection of guild exemption fees, continued to surface. When Tseng Pu replaced
Hsüeh Hsiang as finance commissioner in the third month of 1074, Shentsung secretly urged him to press on with the inquiry, and that month Tseng
and Wei Chi-tsung issued their denunciation of Lü Chia-wen and his minions as reward-seeking usurious monopolists (as noted earlier). Though Wang
continued to defend Lü Chia-wen to the emperor the affair was getting out of
control, and toward the end of the month Wang tried to neutralize the issue by
appointing his closest trustee, Lü Hui-ch’ing, to co-opt the state trade inquiry
from Tseng. Lü Hui-ch’ing had long resented Tseng because of changes Tseng
made in the service exemption measure, and he now joined with Lü Chia-wen
to undermine Tseng and kill the affair, not least by intimidating clerks and
merchant witnesses, altering their depositions, and seeking to suborn Wei
Chi-tsung.340 But any hope of suppressing the state trade affair was dashed
by Cheng Hsia’s exposé, whose lurid portrayal of petty traders hauled off in
cangues for defaulting on their state trade fees confirmed Shen-tsung’s worst
fears about the reforms in general. The day after reading Cheng’s memorial,
Shen-tsung ordered reductions in the guild exemption and market usage fees,
temporary suspension of the green sprouts and service exemption measures,
and a halt to new registration for pao-chia and the “square-fields” (fang-t’ien)
cadastral survey then in progress. When the promised rain fell within a week,
339
340
on his brother, but on Tseng Pu and Lü Hui-ch’ing. See HCP (1979) 227, pp. 5531–42, citing Lin
Hsi’s Yeh-shih. For Cheng Hsia’s letter denouncing the green sprouts, service exemption, state trade, and
guild exemption policies see “Shang Wang Ching-kung shu,” in Cheng, Hsi-t’ang chi 6, pp. 1a–10b, as
well as HCP (1979) 252, pp. 6152–4; 254, p. 6206; and Williamson, Wang An-Shih, vol. 1, pp. 281–2.
See Cheng, Hsi-t’ang chi 1, p. 4b. Cheng was later charged with abusing the emergency horse-relay
postal route. According to Cheng’s biography, as cited in HCP (1979) 252, p. 6168, very few of the
remonstrance memorials ever got through Wang’s gatekeepers to the emperor.
The state trade affair, which runs through HCP 251 and 252, is examined by Li Han, “Ts’ung Tseng
Pu ken-chiu shih-i wei-fa-t’iao ti fen-cheng k’an hsin-tang nei-pu ti mao-tun yü wen-t’i,” in Sungshih yen-chiu lun-wen-chi: 1984 nien nien-hui pien-k’an, ed. Teng Kuang-ming et al. (Hang-chou, 1987),
pp. 267–81.
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paul jakov smith
Shen-tsung divulged Cheng’s memorial to his shaken state councilors. Wang
An-shih had no choice but to proffer his resignation, while for his part Shentsung was so pressed by his brother and the two dowager empresses to drop
Wang that he had no choice but to accept. Thus in the fourth month of 1074
Wang was relieved of his post as chief minister, and reassigned as prefect of
Chiang-ning fu (Nanking).341
Wang An-shih’s departure put the reform policies in peril, but in the end
Shen-tsung reversed himself on overturning the reforms. Shen-tsung left the
choice of a successor to Wang himself, who selected Han Chiang as chief minister, and Lü Hui-ch’ing as Han’s replacement as assisting civil councilor. It was
Lü Hui-ch’ing who had personally crafted much of the actual reform legislation, and he quickly mobilized reform supporters throughout the bureaucracy
to close ranks against the many conservatives who hoped to see the New Policies
dismantled in the wake of Wang’s ouster. Shen-tsung came down firmly on the
side of the reforms, and though he issued an edict promising to rectify shortcomings in the New Policies, at the same time he warned that any attempt by
the scholarly elite (shih-ta-fu) to “capitulate to conventionality and try to undermine his laws” would be treated as an unpardonable offense.342 This provided
the signal Lü needed to reverse the emergency policy of open remonstrance.
His first target was the audacious Cheng Hsia, who since Wang’s removal had
immediately begun an attack on Lü. As the bearer of bad tidings, Cheng Hsia
earned Shen-tsung’s wrath, and although the emperor balked at having Cheng
executed he did allow Lü Hui-ch’ing to banish him to administrative arrest in
Kuang-nan.343 Shen-tsung also let Lü Hui-ch’ing bring the state trade affair
to a conclusion, by silencing the principals: in the eighth month of 1074,
Tseng Pu, who had been as instrumental in bringing the reforms to life as Lü,
was demoted from finance commissioner to prefect of Jao-chou (Chiang-nan
East), on a charge of falsifying financial statistics and merchant depositions;
Wei Chi-tsung, the real founder of the state trade measure, was cashiered. Lü
Chia-wen also received a demotion, to forestall public censure, but in eight
months he was back at the helm of the state trade agency.344
It was because of his devotion to the New Policies that Lü Hui-ch’ing
earned from his contemporaries the derisive sobriquet “Divine Protector”
341
342
343
344
See especially HCP (1979) 252, pp. 6168–70, and SS 327, pp. 10547–8.
HCP (1979) 252, pp. 6168–70, 6172.
HCP (1979) 254, pp. 6207–8; 259, pp. 6310–15. As late as 1077, Shen-tsung punished four officials
who recommended that Cheng Hsia’s punishment be lightened; see HCP (1979) 284, p. 6953. Another
victim of the change in political wind was Li Shih-chung, who was rusticated to Huai-nan West for
demanding the return to high office of Ssu-ma Kuang and the Su brothers; see HCP (1979) 253,
pp. 6187–8.
HCP (1979) 255, pp. 6237–8; 262, pp. 6407–8.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 451
(hu-fa shan-shen), while the senior but less powerful Han Chiang was termed
the “Propagating Abbot” (ch’uan-fa sha-men). Lü Hui-ch’ing sought not only
to save the reforms, however, but also to displace Wang An-shih as the reform
leader. As the contemporary political observer Wei T’ai noted, once men of
ambition saw that Lü had gained the ear of the emperor and a chance to topple
Wang, they all began to attach themselves to Lü,345 who actively promoted
his own cause by destabilizing the Wang An-shih faction. On the one hand,
Lü tried to co-opt Wang’s dissatisfied affinal kinsmen, men whose marriages to
Wang’s relatives had not advanced their careers as far as they had hoped. One
month after Wang’s resignation, for instance, Lü Hui-ch’ing tried to promote
Chu Ming-chih to a lectureship in the Imperial University; this was the same
position that Chu, who married two Wang women (Wang’s sister, and when
she died, Wang’s niece), had lost in 1071, when it was given instead to Wang’s
brilliant but imperious son, P’ang. Shen-tsung rejected the promotion out of a
personal dislike for Chu, but he allowed Lü Hui-ch’ing to give the position to
another dissatisfied Wang brother-in-law, the classicist Shen Chi-chang, who
had also incurred Wang P’ang’s hatred.346 On the other hand, Lü also fomented
attacks on Wang An-shih’s reputation, first by attacking Wang An-kuo for his
role in Cheng Hsia’s memorial, and then by unleashing Teng Wan to play up
Wang An-shih’s relationship to the Szechwanese Taoist and fortune-teller Li
Shih-ning, who was implicated in a seditious plot that reached into the imperial family.347 And of course Lü used his new position to build up a private
clique (ssu-tang) of his own by demoting enemies and promoting his favorites,
especially his brothers Lü Wen-ch’ing, Lü Sheng-ch’ing, and Lü Ho-ch’ing
and his in-laws, the P’u-t’ien Fangs.348
Lü Hui-ch’ing’s bid to supplant Wang An-shih sundered the fragile coalition of patron-client relationships that had come together under a single
unquestioned leader, and turned policy debate into the unfettered instrument
of political ambition. The two adjustments to the service exemption policy
that Lü Hui-ch’ing advocated were universally denounced, but whether on
their merits or because Lü’s fortunes had begun to decline is impossible to
ascertain. In the fifth month of 1075, Lü introduced the “land in return for
345
346
347
348
HCP (1979) 260, p. 6336. For a credible attempt to refurbish Lü Hui-ch’ing’s reputation, see Chou
Pao-chu, “Lüeh-lun Lü Hui-ch’ing,” in Sung-shih yen-chiu lun-wen-chi: Chung-hua wen-shih lun-ts’ung
tseng-k’an, ed. Teng Kuang-ming and Ch’eng Ying-liu (Shanghai, 1982), pp. 335–49.
See HCP (1979) 226, pp. 5507–10, citing Lin Hsi’s Yeh-shih on the Chu Ming-chih tale; and HCP
(1979) 253, pp. 6196–7.
For the case of Li Shih-ning and Chao Shih-chü, see especially HCP (1979) 260, pp. 6336–8; 262, p.
6403; 264, pp. 6459–62; 271, p. 1775.
See especially the twenty-one-point indictment and retrospective assessment of Lü Hui-ch’ing by the
resolutely independent censor Ts’ai Ch’eng-hsi, in HCP (1979) 269, pp. 6584–90; 280, pp. 6874–6.
452
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service” (kei-t’ien mu-jen) measure, which aimed at building up surpluses in
the mien-i fund by letting certain counties pay government service agents with
land rights rather than with cash; two months later he tried to address the
household registration system that made the service exemption policy so controversial, by experimenting with a system of self-registration (the shou-shih
fa) that let households report their own wealth according to a set of universally promulgated formulas, enforced by rewards for local informants. These
reforms can never have been enacted very extensively, but they quickly earned
widespread condemnation and are said to have undermined support for Lü.
Wang An-shih memorialized against the land for service measure from his
home in Chiang-ning, even as popular outrage against the measures “made
everyone under Heaven think once again of Wang Ching-kung.” By early
1075, Han Chiang, the nominal head of state, could no longer tolerate Lü
Hui-ch’ing’s policy – and political – machinations, and he begged Shen-tsung
to bring Wang An-shih back. This was just the opening Shen-tsung needed to
recall his mentor, who was more than ready to return: after receiving his summons in the second month of 1075, Wang made the trip from Chiang-ning
to K’ai-feng in a remarkable seven days.349
But some of the bloom was off the reform movement during Wang Anshih’s second term as chief minister. For one thing, the long-term problems
of drought and famine still plagued north China, forcing the government to
cut back on some lucrative reform programs. So many officials advocated food
handouts and debt amnesties that Wang An-shih complained that everyone
was “competing to indulge the commoners with sympathy,” without thinking
about the long-term solvency of the economic policies.350 There was also a
change in Shen-tsung’s attitude, for the twenty-five-year-old emperor was no
longer as ready as he had been to accept the often facile arguments of his fiftyfour-year-old mentor. In the tenth month of 1075, Shen-tsung was shaken by a
series of astronomical portents, culminating in the appearance of a comet in the
constellation chen that was traditionally interpreted to betoken a sweeping away
of the old order. The fearful emperor responded with a fast and seclusion from
the public, and he issued another call for frank criticism of his government that
elicited memorials from Fu Pi, Chang Fang-p’ing, Lü Kung-chu, and Wang’s
younger brother, the reform opponent Wang An-li. Wang An-shih disparaged
the significance of astronomical phenomena, and urged Shen-tsung to once
349
350
HCP (1979) 260, pp. 6336–8.
Ironically, one of the officials singled out by Wang was Li Chi, a man so reviled by the public for his
cruelty that he was compared in a popular ditty to the black death. See HCP (1979) 297, p. 7234.
Further instances of Li Chi’s cruelty are noted later. Wang An-shih also opposed Shen-tsung’s plan to
give famine victims in Ting-chou cooked rice gruel (chu) instead of uncooked rice, out of a fear that
cooked gruel would make victimization overly attractive. HCP (1979) 264, p. 6458.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 453
again crush critics of the reforms. But this time Shen-tsung refused, retorting
that “the people are seriously troubled by the New Policies.” Again Wang
tried to minimize the problem: “The people resent all manner of things, like
intense cold, heat, and rain. Why does their resentment of the New Policies
merit special sympathy?” And once again Shen-tsung demurred: “I wish they
did not even have these to resent.”351
Shen-tsung’s temerity drove the melodramatic Wang to his sickbed for
thirteen days. Ssu-ma Kuang thought that after Wang returned from seclusion at the urging of Wang’s nervous followers, Shen-tsung was even more
compliant toward his chief minister than before. But in fact Shen-tsung was
growing weary of his mentor and of the disorder in Wang’s faction. In the
seventh month of 1075, Han Chiang, who despite his position as the head of
state had endured five years of self-abnegation and humiliation on behalf of
the New Policies, resigned in protest over Wang’s selection of a man charged
with an administrative offense to head the state trade agency.352 More destructively still, Wang’s return signaled that Lü had been eclipsed, and forced Lü’s
partisans to scramble to protect themselves. Under the prodding of Wang’s
son P’ang, whom Southern Sung historians blamed for all the most despotic
traits of Wang An-shih’s regime, the one-time Lü supporter Teng Wan and
Teng’s client Lien Heng-fu began a widespread attack on Lü Hui-ch’ing’s family, especially Lü’s brother Sheng-ch’ing, and on such “evil associates” of Lü
as Chang Tun.353 Late in the year they were joined by Ts’ai Ch’eng-hsi, who
charged Lü with factionalism and with conspiring to use his influence in a land
purchase. By the ninth month of 1075, Lü Hui-ch’ing had had enough: he
beseeched the emperor for a complete investigation of all the charges, and he
was allowed to resign to an outside post as prefect of Ch’en-chou while the case
progressed. Although indictments continued to pour in, the evidence of real
wrongdoing was scanty, and in the sixth month of 1076, Lü Hui-ch’ing counterattacked with a scathing denunciation of Wang An-shih, who had tried to
remain above the fray. When Wang sought an explanation from his son, Wang
P’ang admitted that in order to prosecute Lü he had pushed Teng Wan, Lien
Heng-fu, and Lü Chia-wen into manipulating the evidence. Wang reproached
351
352
353
HCP (1979) 270, p. 6628; Williamson, Wang An Shih, vol. 1, pp. 357–9. See also HCP (1979) 269,
pp. 6596–6600.
The official was Liu Tso, later to head the Szechwan Tea Market Agency. Shen-tsung was extremely
puzzled by Han Chiang’s intransigence over the Liu Tso affair. See HCP (1979) 264, pp. 6467–8; 266,
pp. 6530–1.
For examples, see HCP (1979) 264, pp. 6480–1; 266, pp. 6532–4; 268, pp. 6563–7; 269, pp. 6598–
6600. Williamson, Wang An Shih, vol. 2, pp. 251–6, recapitulates Liang Ch’i-ch’ao’s argument that
Southern Sung observers sought in Wang P’ang a scapegoat for Wang An-shih, just as they used Wang
as a scapegoat for the emperor.
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his son, who worked himself into such a fury that a boil broke out on his back,
from which he died the following month. Distraught over the death of his
son and in fear for his position, Wang turned on his proxies Teng Wan and
Lien Heng-fu, but the emperor’s patience had come to an end: in a line that
echoes in every source, “the emperor was increasingly weary of Wang An-shih’s
behavior.” In the tenth month of 1076, Shen-tsung let Wang An-shih retire
to Chiang-ning.354
Shen-tsung and Ts’ai Ch’üeh
More than in 1074, conservatives now had reason to hope that the emperor’s
exasperation with Wang An-shih and the entire reform coalition heralded a
reversal of Wang’s policies. For in the tenth month of 1076, unlike two years
earlier when Wang was replaced by his closest lieutenants, Shen-tsung filled the
chief minister’s post with Wu Ch’ung, a man who despite affinal connections to
Wang and long service in the reform-dominated State Council was a persistent
critic of the New Policies. Wu Ch’ung made it his mission to reform if not
abolish the New Policies, and he excited the conservative party by calling for
the return to court of many of Wang’s most prominent victims, including
Ssu-ma Kuang, Lü Kung-chu, Han Wei, Ch’eng Hao, and Su Sung. For their
part, conservatives outside and moderates inside the government welcomed
Wu’s appointment with public memorials denouncing the New Policies and
with private communications to Wu Ch’ung lending him support.355 Ssu-ma
Kuang sent Wu Ch’ung a letter from Lo-yang portraying north China as a
land where rich and poor alike had been uprooted by the reforms, spawning
swarms of bandits who openly attacked walled cities and murdered officials;
and he urged Wu Ch’ung to help awaken Shen-tsung to the evils of the New
Policies, sweetening his exhortation with the flattering claim that travelers
returned from the capital with Wu Ch’ung’s name on their lips.356
354
355
356
SS 327, pp. 10549–50, translated in Williamson, Wang An Shih, vol. 2, pp. 51–3. For greater detail,
see HCP (1979) 266, pp. 6532–4; 268, pp. 6563–7, 6570–9; 269, pp. 6582–90; 276, pp. 6742–3;
278, pp. 6797–8, 6803–4.
SS 312, pp. 10238–41. The HCP entries for 1077 are replete with denunciations of the reforms by
censors such as Chou Jun-fu and Chou Yin and by prefects such as Lü T’ao, Chang Fang-p’ing, Wen
Yen-po, and even Han Chiang and Wang Shao (now vice-director of the Bureau of Military Affairs), who
declared that the exploiter Lü Chia-wen “should be boiled alive to show thanks to Heaven”; HCP (1979)
280, p. 6866. The jockeying for position caught Shen K’uo, then provisional finance commissioner, in
the middle, when he was impeached by Censor Ts’ai Ch’üeh for covertly turning against the service
exemption measure once it became clear that political currents were running against the New Policies.
See HCP (1979) 283, pp. 6933–5. Wu Ch’ung’s son An-ch’ih resigned his post as intendant of the state
trade agency as soon as his father was appointed chief minister; see HCP (1979) 278, p. 6808.
“Yü Wu ch’eng-hsiang Ch’ung shu,” in Ssu-ma, Ssu-ma Wen-cheng kung ch’uan-chia chi 61, pp. 735–7;
HCP (1979) 286, pp. 7002–5.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 455
Hopes for a conservative restoration were short-lived, however, thwarted by
Shen-tsung’s own autocratic aspirations and the opportunities autocracy provided to political opportunists more interested in riding the emperor’s agenda
to power than in advancing reform. For despite Shen-tsung’s willingness to
give conservatives a place at court, he was not ready to abandon his reformist
ambitions. On the contrary, he was more resolved than ever to be the activist
ruler, running his own government from the throne. As Chu Hsi retrospectively explained to a disciple, having acquired all he needed in the way of
political skills from Wang An-shih in the Hsi-ning period, Shen-tsung was
eager during the new Yüan-feng era (1078–85) to manage affairs by himself,
using officials only to do his bidding.357 Indeed, in the fifth month of 1077, less
than a year after Wang An-shih’s resignation, departing censor Ts’ai Ch’enghsi charged officials with abetting the drift toward bureaucratic paralysis and
autocracy:
Why is it that despite the emperor’s abundant virtue, the world is still not well governed? The reason for this tragedy is that the hundred officers do not perform their duties.
[In particular,] the Secretariat-Chancellery [headed by Wu Ch’ung] has abrogated to the
emperor its duty to promote and select men of talent, while the Bureau of Military Affairs
[under Feng Ching] has forfeited its responsibility for managing troops and selecting generals. Decisions on all matters now come from the emperor alone, and if those decisions
do not accord with public opinion, then officials simply say that “It was all decided by his
majesty.”358
One reason that officials were so compliant was fear: by mid-1077 the “road
of remonstrance” was again being closed, once more endangering the careers of
New Policies critics. The assault on remonstrance came from many quarters –
in 1077 the head of the Szechwan tea monopoly alone had four prominent
critics of its revenue-gathering practices transferred or dismissed from office –
but they all reflected Shen-tsung’s own decision to take up the mantle of
reform leader. The man most responsible for chilling the political debate was
the forty-year-old Ts’ai Ch’üeh (1037–93), who used his facility for reading
political winds and manipulating weaker men to quash Wu Ch’ung and the
restorationists. The first of the Sung dynastic history’s “evil ministers,” Ts’ai had
earned an appointment to the Censorate by criticizing his mentor Wang Anshih’s punishment of a dutiful palace guard in the Hsüan-te Gate incident of
1073.359 Following Wang’s retirement, Ts’ai used his censorial powers to check
357
358
359
Chu Hsi, Chu-tzu yü-lei 130, quoted in Ch’i, Wang An-shih pien-fa, p. 223.
HCP (1979) 282, pp. 6908–9.
In the first month of 1073, when Wang tried to escort the imperial chariot through the Hsüan-te
Gate on horseback, a palace guard hailed Wang and beat back his horse. Though Shen-tsung let the
guard and his some nine other men be cudgeled to placate Wang, he was also pleased by Ts’ai Ch’üeh’s
remonstrance. The event is given a line each in SS 327, p. 10546, and SS 471, p. 13698, but for the
full story and its restorationist interpretation, see HCP (1979) 242, pp. 5898–5901.
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the rise of potential rivals, such as Acting Finance Commissioner Shen K’uo,
who had tilted in the direction of Wu Ch’ung; and to impeach men whose
posts Ts’ai coveted, such as the drafting official and director of the Ssu-nung
ssu, Hsiung Pen. Ts’ai’s attacks had the implicit approval of the emperor, who
in late 1077 rewarded Ts’ai with Hsiung Pen’s two posts as well as with the
concurrent post of director of the Remonstrance Bureau, making Ts’ai by far the
most powerful of those officials who “did his bidding”: as head of the Ssu-nung
ssu Ts’ai Ch’üeh “presided over the New Policies,” while as chief remonstrator
and drafting official he could monitor people and communications to root out
remaining opponents of Shen-tsung’s management of affairs.360
Ts’ai Ch’üeh’s effectiveness was enhanced by a cruel streak that helped him
intimidate opponents: in early 1078, Ts’ai took charge of a case in which
two officials of the Court of Judicial Review (Ta-li ssu) were accused of taking
bribes to cover up a provincial murder case. Ts’ai had the two men cangued and
exposed in the sun for fifty-seven days, to the horror of both Chief Censor Teng
Jun-fu (who imagined he heard their screams at night) and Teng’s assistant,
Shang-kuan Chün. Teng and Shang-kuan took their concerns about the case to
the emperor; but despite their convincing evidence of wrongdoing Shen-tsung
eventually sided with Ts’ai Ch’üeh. The two censors were demoted and forced
to write confessions admitting to malfeasance and factionalism, while Ts’ai
was rewarded with Teng Jun-fu’s post as chief censor to add to his quiver.361
By mid-1078, Ts’ai Ch’üeh had managed to use the bribery case to taint Wu
Ch’ung’s son An-ch’ih and Wu’s son-in-law Wen Chi-fu as well, and both men
were cashiered with the original defendants. When Ts’ai Ch’üeh complained
that Wu An-ch’ih had been treated too leniently Shen-tsung finally realized
that the real target of Ts’ai’s campaign was Wu Ch’ung himself; but although
the emperor berated Ts’ai, he was captivated by the logic of Ts’ai’s defense:
“If one man (Ts’ai) cooperates to bring what His Majesty has founded to
completion, and another man (Wu) bears grudges and tries to destroy that
foundation, how will the people know where to put their hands and feet?”362
Ts’ai’s attack on Wu Ch’ung bore its first fruit in the fifth month of 1079, when
Ts’ai was named to the State Council. Wu Ch’ung was still chief minister, but
five months later Wu lost his closest ally with the death of the dowager empress,
spearhead of the anti–New Policies faction at court. Broken and bereft, Wu
Ch’ung was finally allowed to resign in the third month of the new year, and
360
361
362
SS 471, pp. 13698–701. For the war of Ts’ai Ch’üeh on Shen K’uo, whom he denounced as a “devious
character,” see HCP (1979) 283, pp. 6933–5; 291, pp. 7114–15, and Forage, “Science, technology, and
war in Song China,” p. 56. On his acquisition of Hsiung Pen’s posts and the remonstrance directorship,
see HCP (1979) 286, pp. 6999–7000; 287, pp. 7015, 7019; 288, p. 7053.
HCP (1979) 289, pp. 7059–63; 7066–8.
HCP (1979) 290, pp. 7090–1; HCP (1979) 298, p. 7249.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 457
one month later he was dead. In four years he had gone from being the hope
of the conservatives to an object of pity, commended for his upright character
but held in derision for his weakness and his refusal to stand up for his beliefs
by resigning earlier.363 Meanwhile, though Ts’ai Ch’üeh remained only an
assisting councilor of state, the chief minister Wang Kuei (1019–85) was a
man of weak character whom Shen-tsung held in contempt.364 Ts’ai Ch’üeh
completely dominated the fearful older man, whom he manipulated like a
puppet in the service of both his own political ambitions and Shen-tsung’s
agenda.
The Yüan-feng administrative reforms
Shen-tsung’s agenda was dominated by two paramount objectives. Of course,
his most abiding goal – the one that had preoccupied him since before ascending the throne – was to recover the northern territories. But by the time of his
new Yüan-feng reign period, the emperor was also convinced that the structure
of his government itself was badly in need of reform.
The Sung bureaucracy was an amalgam of two very different administrative
systems, both inherited from the T’ang and Five Dynasties periods. On the one
hand, the Sung founder, Chao K’uang-yin (T’ai-tsu), inherited the elaborate
bureaucratic apparatus of the high T’ang: the three departments (san-sheng),
six ministries (liu-pu), nine courts (chiu-ssu), and five directorates (wu-chien)
that in theory covered every aspect of civil administration. Because it located
the dynasty’s new officials – many of them holdovers from the T’ang and Five
Dynasties regimes – in a familiar pyramid of job descriptions and authority
relations, this formal T’ang model served the needs of political consolidation.
But even by the eighth century many of these offices had lost their functional importance, supplanted by a welter of ad hoc organizations such as the
Bureau of Military Affairs (Shu-mi yüan), the Finance Commission (San-ssu),
the censorates, and the increasing number of circuit intendancies that assumed
the primary responsibilities for defense, finance, law, and regional administration.365 In contrast to the formal T’ang model, which strengthened ministerial
authority at the expense of the ruler, the system of ad hoc organizations could
be used to enhance monarchical power, by siphoning away responsibilities
363
364
365
HCP (1979) 300, pp. 7313–15; 303, pp. 7374–5.
See HCP (1979) 291, pp. 7115–16.
This section draws heavily on Lo, Introduction to the civil service of Sung China, pp. 35–78, and Kung Yenming, “Pei Sung Yüan-feng kuan-chih kai-ko lun,” Chung-kuo shih yen-chiu No. 1 (1990), pp. 132–43,
and on the assistance of Professor Wang Tseng-yü. For a comprehensive study of the Yüan-feng reforms
in the broader context of the late Northern Sung administrative change, see Chang Fu-hua, Pei Sung
chung-ch’i i-hou chih kuan-chih kai-ko (Taipei, 1991).
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of the formal bureaucratic structure and serving as a direct extension of the
imperial will. Because each administrative model met a different need, the
Sung founders retained both, creating the characteristic Sung system of dual
appointments. In order to consolidate their control over newly conquered territories, “respectable holdovers” from the preceding regime were retained in
their positions in the formal bureaucratic hierarchy, but the positions themselves were stripped of functional importance: they became purely titular or
stipendiary offices (chi-lu kuan) that conferred rank and salary. Those officials
who won the confidence of the new rulers were additionally granted functional commissions (ch’ai-ch’ien) or offices (chih) in the still vital prefectural
and county bureaucracies or in the ad hoc organizations, where the real work
of the empire was conducted.366 Thus every active official held at least two
(though possibly more) concurrent appointments: a purely titular appointment in the formal bureaucracy, such as grand master of remonstrance of the
Secretariat (yu chien-i ta-fu), and an active assignment or commission, such as
fiscal intendant-general of the Ho-pei circuits.367
The Sung system of dual appointments served the useful purpose of differentiating an official’s civil service rank, which was ideally a function of his
seniority and merit, from his actual job at a given time, which shifted with
his own special skills and the needs of the court. But the use of actual if moribund office titles simply to designate rank and to provide sinecures to officials
awaiting active assignments proved confusing and expensive. For to mollify
the large surplus of conquered scholarly elite (shih-ta-fu) and their families
the court continued to fill the quota of officials in the departments, ministries,
courts, and directorates, even as parallel organizations absorbed more and more
of their functions, fostering the proliferation of redundant offices (ch’ung-san
tie-ssu). For example, in finance, although officials were appointed to the Ministry of Finance (Hu-pu) and its subordinate bureaus, such as the Accounting
Bureau (Tu-chih ssu), they performed no function; meanwhile, in the Finance
Commission, where the real fiscal administration took place, a different set of
officials were assigned to the Accounting Bureau (Tu-chih ssu) and the Census Bureau (Hu-pu ssu). And a similar redundancy of offices characterized the
parallel personnel, judicial, and military administrations.368
366
367
368
Lo, Introduction to the civil service of Sung China, pp. 59–60.
These were the positions held by the first fiscal intendant-general (tu chuan-yün-shih), Fan Chih-ku, in
988. See HCP (1979) 29, p. 657. Note that by this time membership in the senior or administrative
class of officials – that is, officials designated as worthy of posts in the capital and the court (ching-ch’ao
kuan) – no longer denoted actual service in the capital or the court.
There were times when an official actually performed the function associated with his titular office. In
those case his title was prefaced with such terms as “acting” (ch’uan), “managing” (kou-tang), “supervising” (p’an), and others. See Kung, “Pei Sung Yüan-feng kuan-chih kai-ko lun,” pp. 132–3.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 459
Over the course of the eleventh century, officials charged that the growth of
these parallel bureaucracies – one mostly titular and one entirely functional –
promoted turf wars, administrative inefficiency, and above all a glut of supernumerary officials and clerks. But up to the Yüan-feng era few solutions had been
offered. Even Wang An-shih showed little interest in administrative reform
for its own sake. To promote his own reforms Wang was perfectly willing to
create such new agencies as the Finance Planning Commission, the Commission for Reform of the Secretariat, and Secretariat examiners, as well as a host
of new intendancies, or to revitalize such old T’ang vestiges as the Court of
Agricultural Supervision and, to administer pao-chia militia training, the Ministry of War. Yet however much these new agencies streamlined the pursuit
of reform objectives, their addition to the existing structure just compounded
the larger problem of bureaucratic redundancy. Thus Shen-tsung made it his
own mission to overhaul Sung government and to untangle the bureaucratic
chaos that in his eyes had become an embarrassment to the memory of the
founders.369 Moreover, until he was ready to announce his reforms in 1080
he kept his mission private: according to Wang An-shih, who witnessed the
Yüan-feng reorganization of government with some alarm from his retirement
post in Chiang-ning fu, whereas Shen-tsung had never before done anything
without prior discussion, in this most important matter he proceeded with no
consultation at all.370
At the core of his administrative reforms, Shen-tsung aimed to reorganize the Sung central government according to the T’ang statutes of government
(T’ang liu-tien), whose departments, ministries, courts, and directorates provided the hollow shell of the Sung’s titular, stipendiary offices. The first stage
of the reform, announced in the eighth month of 1080, involved the “rectification of office titles” (cheng kuan-ming). This “rectification” involved two
steps. First, the functional responsibilities of the entire T’ang roster of offices
were revived, except for those with no current applicability, which were abolished outright.371 With this change the six ministries, and to a lesser extent
the courts and directorates, took over the administrative tasks of the central
government, either displacing their counterpart ad hoc organizations completely or reducing them to their original functions. For instance, the financial
affairs of the central government, which had been divided between the Finance
Commission and since 1070 the Court of Agricultural Supervision, were now
centralized in the Ministry of Finance (Hu-pu): the Finance Commission was
369
370
371
HCP (1979) 307, p. 7462.
Kung, “Pei Sung Yüan-feng kuan-chih kai-ko lun,” p. 141, citing Chu Hsi, Chu-tzu yü-lei (Taipei,
1962) 128, p. 3070.
HCP (1979) 307, p. 7462; HTC (1957) 75, p. 1880.
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abolished completely, and its financial concerns shifted to the Left Section (tsots’ao) of the Ministry of Finance; at the same time the Court of Agricultural
Supervision was reduced from its powerful role as financial center of the New
Policies to its original task as manager of the government’s granaries, while its
revenue-generating operations were transferred to the Right Section (yu-ts’ao)
of the Ministry of Finance.372 Similarly, the personnel functions of the civil and
military bureaucracies, which had been scattered among four separate agencies
answering to as many oversight boards, were all centralized in the Ministry
of Personnel.373 In the same manner the entire roster of ministries, courts,
and directorates were revived as the administrative apparatus of the central
government.
The second step in the “rectification of office titles” aimed at creating a new
set of titles to designate rank and salary level, now that the old set had been
turned into functioning offices. For this purpose Shen-tsung’s Administrative
Reform Commission (Hsiang-ting kuan-chih so) employed the so-called prestige
titles (chieh-kuan) in vogue during the T’ang and early Sung. In the ninth month
of 1080 the commission submitted a roster of twenty-five new stipendiary
titles, organized in a hierarchy of nine major steps (kuan-p’in) and arrayed for the
sake of continuity in a one-to-one relationship with the old stipendiary offices.
The new roster had two distinct benefits: it was elegant, with all lower titles
ending in the suffix lang (gentleman) and all but the two highest titles ending
in the suffix ta-fu (grandee); and it was unambiguous, since none of the titles
had ever been associated with functional offices.374 The virtues of the reform
can be illustrated by the changes in the titles of Fan Ch’un-jen’s stipendiary
rank: just before the reform Fan held the stipendiary title of gentleman of
the interior of the Ministry of Justice (shang-shu hsing-pu lang-chung) – a grade
6B office in the middle of the hierarchy – with the functional assignment as
prefect of Hsin-yang Commandery. When the reform took effect Fan kept his
assignment, but acquired the new stipendiary title of ch’ao-san ta-fu, also grade
6B; meanwhile his old stipendiary title had become a functioning post in the
Ministry of Justice.375
372
373
374
375
SS 163, pp. 3846–8; 165, pp. 3904–5; Wang, “Pei Sung ti Ssu-nung-ssu,” pp. 30–1.
Kung, “Pei Sung Yüan-feng kuan-chih kai-ko lun,” pp. 136, 138; Lo, Introduction to the civil service of
Sung China, p. 71. Executory class officials were administered by the Bureau of Executory Personnel
(Liu-nei ch’üan) under the Board of Personnel; administrative class officials were administered by the
Bureau of Personnel Evaluation (Shen-kuan yüan) under the Secretariat-Chancellery; military servitors
were administered by the Hsüan-hui yüan under the Three Echelons (San-pan yüan); and senior military
officers were administered directly by the Bureau of Military Affairs (Shu-mi yüan).
Lo, Introduction to the civil service of Sung China, p. 71.
See “Fan Ch’un-jen kai-kuan ming-chih,” in Wang An-li, Wang Wei kung chi (Nan-ch’ang, 1915–20),
p. 3. For tables of equivalencies, see Miyasaki Ichisada, “Sōdai kansei josetsu,” which introduces Saeki
Tomi’s Sō-shi shokkanshi sakuin Dai 2-han (Kyoto, 1974); or see Chung-kuo li-shih ta t’zu-tien: Sung-shih
chüan, pp. 158–60.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 461
The Yüan-feng reforms were limited to the central government, and had
little impact on the structure of circuit, prefectural, and county administration.
Initially the “rectification of office titles” affected only the stipendiary titles of
senior civil officials – that is, of officials in the administrative class (ching-ch’ao
kuan) – since at the probationary executory (hsüan-jen) level there was much
less discrepancy between titular office and the actual function performed as
a staff member of local government. But there were some exceptions, and
consequently during Hui-tsung’s reign new stipendiary titles were adopted
for the seven grades of executory officials as well.376 Overall, the first phase
of the reforms solved the most vexing problems of the Sung’s dual system
of classificatory rank and functional office, and helped reduce the number of
redundant offices and supernumerary officials – though according to some
contemporaries not as much as the abolition of the courts and directorates,
which duplicated functions of the six ministries, would have done.377 In this
respect, the first phase of the Yüan-feng reorganization did foster Shen-tsung’s
explicit goal of administrative rationalization. But Shen-tsung also aimed at
a second, less explicit, objective, which was to strengthen the authority of
the emperor over his ministers.378 One way he chose of maintaining imperial
authority was to preserve the Bureau of Military Affairs, despite its overlap with
the Ministry of War. The Sung founders had used the Bureau of Military Affairs
to maintain imperial control over military matters by segregating military
policy making from the civilian bureaucracy. Despite pressure from many
officials to maintain the consistency of the reforms by transferring all military
matters to the Ministry of War, Shen-tsung refused to abandon the “household
regulations” (chia-fa) of his dynastic forebears. Consequently, only relatively
routine matters were routed to the Ministry of War, while major policy-making
authority – and seats on the Council of State – were reserved for the director
and vice-director of the Bureau of Military Affairs.379 But if preserving the
bureau constituted a step back from the principle of administrative reform,
Shen-tsung also pushed the reforms forward to consolidate his power over the
bureaucracy: in the second phase of the Yüan-feng reorganization, in mid1082, Shen-tsung turned his attention to the top echelon of the bureaucracy,
the “three departments” (san-sheng).
376
377
378
379
Lo, Introduction to the civil service of Sung China, pp. 72–3. Lo also describes the creation of new
titles for military officials during the Yüan-feng period, which “imposed a uniform terminology on the rank systems of both the civil and military officials and brought them under the
same personnel agency,” thereby reducing the psychological distance between the two services. See
p. 73.
For the views of Ssu-ma Kuang, Liu An-shih, and Chu Hsi, see Kung, “Pei Sung Yüan-feng kuan-chih
kai-ko lun,” p. 139.
See Kung, “Pei Sung Yüan-feng kuan-chih kai-ko lun,” p. 139.
Kung, “Pei Sung Yüan-feng kuan-chih kai-ko lun,” p. 139.
462
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The three departments – State (shang-shu sheng), the Chancellery (Menhsia sheng), and the Secretariat (Chung-shu sheng) – had stood as the collective
pinnacle of government since the post-Han period of division. By the eighth
century, however, functional distinctions among them had become blurred.
This led to the formation of a combined Secretariat-Chancellery (Chung-shu
men-hsia) whose heads normally served as the chief councilors (tsai-hsiang),
supported by a structure of staff offices (fang) that duplicated and supplanted
the six ministries of the Department of State Affairs. By the early Sung the
Secretariat-Chancellery controlled all civilian affairs except remonstrance, and
with the Bureau of Military Affairs comprised the two administrations (liang
fu) – civil and military – of government.380
Intent as he was on running his own government, Shen-tsung saw the
three departments as a way of breaking up the concentrated power of the
Secretariat-Chancellery and its chief ministers, by dividing the single unified
civil authority into three separate components. In new administrative protocols
announced in the fourth and fifth months of 1082, the three departments were
revived in a way that diluted their overall authority as much as possible: rather
than making each department responsible for a particular set of issues, all
three departments were made to share different aspects of every issue: the
Secretariat was to consider and deliberate, the Chancellery was to investigate
policy alternatives, and the Department of State Affairs – pinnacle of the six
ministries – was to put the final policy decisions into effect. Except in the
most unusual circumstances each department was required to perform and
memorialize about its own function alone.381
Only under the guidance of a superordinate coordinator could such an
extreme division of responsibilities function effectively. Under the T’ang
Statutes of Government that paramount position would have been filled by the
Secretariat director (chung-shu ling), often the de facto chief councilor (ch’enghsiang) to the emperor and the man most directly responsible for civil and
military governance.382 But it was just this paramount chief official that
Shen-tsung wanted to avoid, and in this he was assisted by the wily and
ambitious Ts’ai Ch’üeh, still an assisting civil councilor of state under the
ineffective Wang Kuei. In Ts’ai Ch’üeh’s eyes, the absence of a superordinate
minister provided the opportunity he needed to attain supreme power in the
380
381
382
For useful background information, see the Introduction and relevant entries in Charles O. Hucker, A
dictionary of official titles in imperial China (Stanford, Calif., 1985).
HCP (1979) 325, pp. 7823–4; 326, pp. 7837–8; 327, pp. 7871–2. See also the “San-sheng tsunglun,” in Yüan-feng kuan-chih [Kyoto University photocopy of T’ai-pei kuo-li chung-yang t’u-shu-kuan
holding] (1081; n.p., 1972).
Hucker, Dictionary of official titles, p. 193, item 1616; Li Lin-fu et al., comps., Ta T’ang liu-tien [1515
ed.] (738; Taipei, 1974), 9, p. 7a.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 463
bureaucracy. When the new departmental structure was enacted in the fourth
month of 1082, Wang Kuei’s post was changed from chief executive of the
Secretariat-Chancellery (t’ung chung-shu men-hsia p’ing-chang-shih) – the de facto
chief minister – to left codirector of the Department of State Affairs (shang-shu
tso p’u-yeh); Ts’ai’s post was changed from assisting civil councilor (ts’an-chih
cheng-shih) to right codirector (yu p’u-yeh) of the Department of State Affairs.
Just after the change, it is reported, Ts’ai instructed the credulous Wang Kuei
that since under the old system he had been chief minister, then under the new
one he should be named director of the Secretariat. But to Shen-tsung, Ts’ai
insisted that no such position was needed: the same level of coordination could
be achieved by naming the left codirector a concurrent vice-director (shih-lang)
of the Chancellery, and the right codirector a concurrent vice-director of the
Secretariat. Since this suited Shen-tsung’s plan to keep political authority
divided, the emperor agreed. As a result, Ts’ai Ch’üeh came to be known as
the “second chief councilor” (tz’u hsiang), although “in reality it was Ts’ai who
monopolized the handles of government, while Wang Kuei could only fold
his hands in deference.”383
Although Ts’ai Ch’üeh found additional ways to benefit from the new
departmental structure – including having documents routed to his domain
in the Secretariat marked shang or “submitted up” – Shen-tsung emphasized
his own authority by playing up the subservience of his chief councilors. In
sharp contrast to his relationship with Wang An-shih, which was marked by
genuine friendship and the respect of a disciple for his mentor, Shen-tsung
publicly humiliated Ts’ai and Wang Kuei, fining them sums of gold for the
smallest infractions and then obliging them to thank the emperor for their
punishment (men-hsieh). Although Ts’ai Ch’üeh was no favorite of officialdom,
many were embarrassed by this unprecedented imperial discourtesy, which the
new censor Huang Lü warned would erode official morale.384
Although the strict division of administrative tasks mandated for the three
departments may have enhanced imperial authority, it also prompted an immediate decline in administrative efficiency. Within a month of promulgating
the new rules, in the fifth month of 1082, Shen-tsung himself complained
that government had become paralyzed by a dangerous administrative backlog. The emperor seemed on the verge of reviving the old system, in which
functionally specialized agencies, such as the Finance Commission and the
Court of Agricultural Supervision, reported to a paramount Secretariat. But
383
384
SS 471, p. 13699. The remaining civilian councilors were Chang Tun and Chang Tsao as men-hsia
and chung-shu shih-langs; P’u Tsung-meng as shang-shu tso-ch’eng; and Wang An-shih’s brother An-li as
shang-shu yu-ch’eng. See HCP (1979) 325, p. 7825.
SS 471, pp. 13699–700; HCP 325, p. 7825; 335, p. 8079.
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Ts’ai Ch’üeh, whose power if not his dignity had been significantly enhanced
by the reform, convinced Shen-tsung that the new system saved over twenty
thousand strings of cash monthly in official salaries.385 Nonetheless the strict
departmental division of labor proved the least successful aspect of the Yüanfeng administrative reforms: routing every policy initiative through each of
the three department, then down to the ministries, and then back up to the
departments, was just not conducive to administrative efficiency. Moreover,
after Shen-tsung’s death in 1085 the problems became insuperable. For as Lü
Kung-chu pointed out in the seventh month of 1085, under Shen-tsung the
flaws in the system could be overcome, since he essentially made policy himself
and then his chief ministers did what he ordered; but with Shen-tsung’s eightyear-old son on the throne there was a critical need for a strong unified council
of ministers, working and memorializing on all aspects of policy in concert.
As a result of Lü’s memorial the three departments and the Censorate were
given permission to cooperate and to memorialize jointly on policy issues.386
Ssu-ma Kuang wanted to go even further, by recombining the Secretariat and
the Chancellery as before and giving the chief minister more latitude to decide
issues directly.387 Certainly Hui-tsung’s chief councilor, Ts’ai Ching, lacked
no opportunity to decide matters on his own, but that was because power
flows as much from personality as it does from institutions. Institutionally,
the three departments were not formally recombined until right after the fall
of the Northern Sung, in 1129, nor were their chief officers abolished until
1172. Until then, the three departments survived as another redundant layer,
a residue of Shen-tsung’s attempt to lead the reform movement on his own.
the campaign against the tangut hsi hsia
If Shen-tsung’s administrative reforms enjoyed only limited success, his war
policy was an unmitigated disaster: the debacle at Yung-lo ch’eng in the ninth
month of 1082 not only sapped the emperor’s faith in his reforms, it also cut
short his life at age thirty-seven.
Foreign policy under Wang An-shih
As a young man Shen-tsung was fixated on recovering the northern territories
occupied by the Tanguts and the Khitan, and he ascended the throne in 1067
385
386
387
HCP (1979) 326, p. 7848.
HCP (1979) 358, pp. 8561–2.
“Ch’i he liang-sheng wei-i cha-tzu,” in Ssu-ma, Ssu-ma Wen-cheng kung ch’uan-chia chi 57, pp. 685–7,
quoted in Kung, “Pei Sung Yüan-feng kuan-chih kai-ko lun,” p. 138.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 465
eager to wage offensive wars. In Shen-tsung’s mind, recovering the northlands
was the raison d’être of the New Policies, and so it is ironic that only Wang
An-shih, the architect of the New Policies, was able to restrain the emperor’s
irredentist ambitions. But unlike Fu Pi and Ssu-ma Kuang, who admonished
the emperor for even thinking about conquest, Wang An-shih fed the emperor’s
hopes of “mastering the Hsia state and recovering the old borders of the Han
and T’ang” – but only after essential reforms had been completed.388 For
as Wang demonstrated in a court debate of 1071, he was keenly aware of
the power of Sung’s northern neighbors, and of the folly of engaging them
prematurely:
There are projects that we should pursue but for which our power is still inadequate.
For example quelling the barbarians and opening up the frontier, however desirable they
seem at the moment, are still beyond our capacity. His majesty must deeply consider that
our financial resources are inadequate and reliable men of talent rare. For the moment,
therefore, we should concentrate on quieting down border affairs. If we can quiet things
down on the border so that the barbarians cannot harm us then we can put our internal
affairs in order; once our internal affairs are in order, there is an adequate supply of talented
men, and we are prosperous and strong (fu-ch’iang), then there will be nothing that we
cannot do.389
Wang believed that of the two northern states the Sung had more to fear from
the Liao, which he described as the most vast, most populous barbarian nation
in many generations; and he warned Shen-tsung that if he did not first devote
himself to “establishing order throughout society,” then there could be no hope
of encompassing and controlling the Khitan.390 Wang put this prudent view
to effect in a series of border issues that embroiled the two empires between
1072 and 1076, when he consistently sought to preserve peace, even where
peace meant adopting a compliant attitude toward the Liao.391
It sometimes seemed that Wang took a much more defiant attitude toward
the Tangut Hsi Hsia, who because of the accession of a child ruler (Ping Ch’ang,
r. 1067–86) and their political disarray could appear relatively vulnerable.392
388
389
390
391
392
HCP (1979) 230, p. 5605. On Wang An-shih’s cautious approach to war, see Liu, Reform in Sung China,
p. 57, and Tao Jing-shen (T’ao Chin-sheng), Two sons of heaven: Studies in Sung-Liao relations (Tucson,
Ariz., 1988), p. 68.
HCP (1979) 221, p. 5371.
HCP (1979) 236, pp. 5725–6.
See Tao, Two sons of heaven, pp. 72–8. The principal issues were the border incursion of 1072, the Khitan
establishment of observation posts in Sung territory in 1073, and Sung fortification of the border and
renegotiation of the Sung-Liao boundary between 1074 and 1075, an issue on which Wang was less
inclined to be submissive. Although traditional historiography charges Wang with the abandonment
of land to the Liao in the final settlement of 1076, Tao Jing-shen argues that Wang probably played
little role in the final decision.
HCP (1979) 236, p. 5752.
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But in practice Wang preached a cautious approach to the Tanguts as well.
Wang’s real views were revealed in 1070, after Sung incursions into Tangut
territory had provoked retaliatory attacks in Ching-yüan circuit:
What if we show a strong front to the [Tanguts] and they decline to obey; how will the
court then deal with them? We are not now strong enough to match troops (chiao-ping)
with them; and if we do not match troops, then what else can we do? It would be most
inappropriate if we first put up a show of strength and are then forced to humble ourselves.
Under the current circumstances, we should make a point of being accommodating (jou)
toward [the Hsia]; by being accommodating we are least likely to miscalculate.393
What then did Wang offer an emperor whose motivating ambition was to
recover the lost territories of the north? In brief, he offered Shen-tsung a policy
of expansion, colonization, and economic exploitation in the frontier regions
of Hunan and Szechwan, and in the Tibetan tribal lands of the Tsinghai and
Kansu region.394 This long border between the Sung and the tribes of the forest, mountains, and steppe contained abundant natural resources, including
war horses, and hosted a wide range of lucrative foreign trades that could be
exploited for the eventual campaign against the Tanguts. The prototype for
Wang An-shih’s policy of conquest along the weak frontier was created by
the frontier adventurer Wang Shao. In 1068, Wang Shao sent up a proposal
to colonize the Tibetan tribal lands between Hsi-ning2 (in modern Tsinghai
province) and the T’ao River valley (in soutwestern Kansu), then highly unstable and vulnerable to Tangut annexation, and to finance the conquest with a
state monopoly over the region’s substantial foreign trade. Wang Shao offered
his policy as the first step in creating a Sino-Tibetan alliance that would surround the Tanguts from front to rear, and put the Hsia state “in the palm of
[Sung] hands.”395 As an expression of his commitment to employing any man
who could get things done the emperor immediately charged Wang Shao with
393
394
395
HCP (1979) 214, p. 5197.
For overviews and sources on Wang An-shih’s policies in the northwestern and southwestern frontiers,
see Smith, Taxing heaven’s storehouse, pp. 41–7; Richard von Glahn, The country of streams and grottoes:
Expansion, settlement, and the civilizing of the Sichuan frontier in Song times (Cambridge, Mass., 1987),
pp. 98–104; and (on Hunan) Richard von Glahn, “The country of streams and grottoes: Geography,
settlement, and the civilizing of China’s southwestern frontier, 1000–1250” (diss., Yale University,
1983).
For Wang Shao’s “Three part proposal for pacifying the Western Barbarians,” see SS 328, p. 10579,
translated in Williamson, Wang An Shih, vol. 1, pp. 305–6. The fullest study of Wang Shao’s frontier
policy is Enoki Kazuo, “Ō Sei no Kasei keiryaku ni tsuite,” Mōko gakuhō 1 (1940), pp. 87–168. For its
continuation under Che-tsung and Hui-tsung, see Paul Jakov Smith, “Irredentism as political capital:
The New Policies and the annexation of Tibetan domains in Hehuang (the Qinghai-Gansu highlands)
under Shenzong and his sons, 1068–1108,” in Emperor Huizong and late Northern Song China: The politics
of culture and the culture of politics, ed. Patricia B. Ebrey and Maggie Bickford (Cambridge, Mass., 2006),
pp. 78–130.
HSI HSIA DOMAIN
Da
to
ng
Ch’ing Hai
ve
r
Ri
Cho-lo
Fortress
Huang-chou
(1104)
ng R
i v er
Hui-chou
(1099)
K’uo-chou
w
llo
Ye
R iv
er
(1104)
Chi-shih-chün
(1109)
Lan-chou
Yellow Riv
er
(1081)
Ho-chou
(1073)
Hsi-chou
HSI-HO
MILITARY CIRCUIT
(1072)
iver
CH’IN-FENG
CIRCUIT
(Shan-hsi)
T’ung-yüan-chün
(1072)
(Est. 1072)
oR
T’a
fro
nti
er
Hsi-ning
(Ch’ing-t’ang) Hua
Pre-e
xpan
sion
(1104)
Wei Riv
e
T’ao-chou
r
(1108)
Ch’in-chou
Min-chou
Pei
-lo
(1074)
ng R
iver
(1073)
Dates of Sung annexation
0
Chieh-chou
0
Map 15. Annexation of Tibetan territories under Shen-tsung and his sons, 1072–1109.
150 km
100 miles
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paul jakov smith
putting his proposal into action. Fervently supported by both Shen-tsung and
Wang An-shih, Wang Shao’s Tibetan campaign bore fruit with the establishment of the new Sung military circuit of Hsi-ho in 1072 and the defeat of the
Tibetan leader Mu-cheng in 1074.396
Whenever the policy of expansion in the weak frontiers provoked nervous
countermeasures by the Tanguts and the Khitan, Wang An-shih acted to
restrain his more bellicose emperor from responding impetuously. Wang’s
only serious strategic miscalculation involved the Annamese state of Chiaochih, in modern Vietnam. In late 1075, Annamese troops attacked walled
towns across the border in Kuang-nan West, searching for rebels harbored
by the Chinese. In addition, the Annamese claimed they were on a mission
of mercy, “to save the people from the green sprouts and service exemption
policies of the Middle Kingdom.” Taking this as a personal affront, Wang
An-shih persuaded the emperor to launch a punitive expedition, for which he
personally wrote the proclamation.397 But from the beginning the expedition
went badly: in the first month of 1076 the Annamese launched an attack on
Yung-chou2, the site of Nung Chih-kao’s uprising twenty-five years earlier;
and despite Wang’s insistence that the city would hold, the Annamese troops
overcame stiff resistance to breach the city’s walls and slaughter thousands
of functionaries, troops, and residents.398 Ten months later, with Wang now
out of office, the court retaliated by sending one hundred thousand soldiers
and twice as many labor consripts deep into Annamese territory. This force
was massive enough to frighten the Annamese leader into suing for peace,
but the victory was a costly one; for in the tropical climate of the south
over half the Sung troops and porters died from the heat and “swamp fever”
(she-chang).399
396
397
398
399
Two constituent prefectures of Hsi-ho circuit, Ho-chou2 and Min-chou, were not taken until 1073,
in battles that brought down on Wang Shao the charge of genocide against Tibetan tribals. Wang’s
chief Tibetan adversary, Mu-cheng, did not submit until 1074. See HCP (1979) 239, p. 5818; 243, pp.
5912–16, 5945–56; 252, p. 6160. When he retired in 1077, after his relations with Wang An-shih had
soured over the war with Annam, Wang Shao claimed that because of the cost he had never wanted to
create a separate circuit of Hsi-ho, but that Wang An-shih had insisted. See HCP (1979) 280, p. 6865.
HCP (1979) 271, pp. 6650–1; 273, pp. 6674–5. On the Sino-Vietnamese war, see James A. Anderson,
“Treacherous factions: Shifting frontier alliances in the breakdown of Sino-Vietnamese relations on the
eve of the 1075 border war,” in Battlefronts real and imagined: War, border, and identity in the Chinese
middle period, ed. Donald J. Wyatt (New York, 2008); and chapter 4 of James A. Anderson, The rebel
den of Nùng Trı́ Cao: Eleventh-century rebellion and response along the Sino-Vietnamese frontier (Seattle, Wash.,
2006). Anderson argues that the Vietnamese Ly court was prompted to invade the Chinese side of the
frontier out of fear that Sung authorities were overly successful in cultivating relations with the upland
followers of Nung Chih-kao and his clan.
HCP (1979) 272, pp. 6664–5.
HCP (1979) 279, pp. 6843–4.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 469
Shen-tsung’s Tangut wars
The Annam campaign further exacerbated the political turmoil of Wang
An-shih’s second term as chief minister, driving a wedge between him and
Wang Shao and further alienating the emperor.400 But if conservatives thought
that Wang’s departure would bring an end to frontier expansion and war mobilization they were deeply disappointed. With no one left to speak to Shen-tsung
as an equal, the emperor was finally free to pursue the linchpin of his plan to
recover the northern territories, the conquest of the Tangut Hsi Hsia.
Shen-tsung had to know that the conquest would be difficult, for the
Tanguts had already demonstrated how formidable they were at the beginning of his reign. In 1067 the Sung general Ch’ung O captured the Tangut
town of Sui-chou, a strategic key to the river valleys leading southeast to the
Yellow River and the Sung heartland.401 When a deal to exchange Sui-chou
for Sung stockades held by the Tanguts fell through in 1069 the Sung court
tightened its hold by walling the old town and renaming it Sui-te Commandery (Sui-te chün). The Tanguts responded in the fifth month of 1070 by
throwing “one hundred thousand” troops southwest of the contested zone into
Shan-hsi’s Huan-ch’ing military circuit, in a probe that exposed the incompetence of the Sung generals and the lack of discipline among their troops, who
slaughtered hundreds of Tibetan residents of the area long after the Tangut
troops had withdrawn.402 Tangut forces took one Huan-ch’ing stockade after
another, at the same time diverting twenty thousand men against Sui-te, but
even at this point the hostilities could have been stepped down, as Wang
An-shih recommended. Arguing that the Tanguts were just trying to provoke
the Sung into wasting men and provisions, Wang urged Shen-tsung to let the
Tanguts keep the small stockades and not to make a show of massive retaliation before Sung troops were ready. But Shen-tsung was not yet willing to
abandon the prospect of an offensive campaign, and in the ninth month of
1070 he dispatched State Councilor Han Chiang to Shan-hsi to oversee war
preparations.403
In a campaign that served as a dress rehearsal for the debacle at Yung-lo
ch’eng in 1082, Han proposed mixing a defense based on “strengthening the
walls and clearing out the countryside” (chien-pi ch’ing yeh) with an offensive
tactic of political and military provocations that would incite the Tanguts into
400
401
402
403
HCP (1979) 273, p. 6684; 280, p. 2865.
For descriptions of the border terrain, see Forage, “Science, technology, and war in Song China,” p. 71;
and Li, Sung Hsia kuan-hsi shih, pp. 158–63.
HCP (1979) 214, pp. 5203–5; SS 486, pp. 14007–8.
HCP (1979) 214, pp. 5195–7, 5203–5; 215, pp. 5236–7. The emperor had wanted to send Wang,
who had no military expertise at all, but Han Chiang requested the assignment for himself.
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overcommitting themselves.404 The cornerstone of Han’s plan was to build a
line of stockades along the border from Heng-shan to the Yellow River, despite
the warnings of court officials and field commanders that the arid, grassless
wasteland would be difficult to provision and impossible to defend.405 In
the last month of 1070, Han armed Ch’ung O with twenty thousand troops
and a license to behead uncooperative commanders, and ordered him to wall
Luo-wu-ch’eng just south of the Tangut outpost of Yü-lin. In the next month
Ch’ung O secured the area and threw up walls around Luo-wu, using wood
from buildings and watchtowers farther south that he had dismantled and carried in. Before he could move on to the next site, however, logistical problems
began to intrude: Luo-wu had no wells, the fifty-mile provisioning road was
indefensible, conscription of Chinese and Tibetan men left only women available to carry grain, and the enormous provisioning needs of the campaign had
begun to suck up the scarce resources of a twenty-prefecture regional economy
that was already exhausted by drought. On top of the logistical problems, the
command structure had been short-circuited by Han Chiang and Ch’ung O,
leaving field generals in complete confusion.406 In the second month of 1071
Tangut troops moved in to take advantage of the misconceived campaign,
meeting no significant opposition. Once the first stockade fell the Sung court
ordered Luo-wu-ch’eng abandoned, while Ch’ung O “panicked so badly that
he could not even hold a brush” to write for help. Moreover, the confusion
spread into neighboring Ch’ing-chou2, where a former Tangut slave whom
Han Chiang had promoted to commander led a mutiny of some two thousand
men, humiliating Han and further exposing the disorder within the Sung
armies.407
The Luo-wu-ch’eng fiasco, for which Han Chiang was cashiered, ended
Shen-tsung’s first attempt to conquer the Hsi Hsia. Although the Tanguts
did not recover Sui-te, the campaign and related military activities cost the
Sung over seven million strings of cash, and further destabilized a north Chinese population already buffeted by drought and famine.408 The debacle also
underscored the need for fundamental reforms before Shen-tsung could realize
his irredentist ambition. In addition to militarization of the pao-chia system,
reform leaders enacted other significant military reforms. In mid-1072 the
court reestablished a national military institute to improve the training of
404
405
406
407
408
HCP (1979) 215, pp. 5241–2. The Sung court cut off yearly payments to the Hsi Hsia and closed down
the mutual trade (ho-shih) markets.
HCP (1979) 217, p. 5273; 219, p. 5324.
HCP (1979) 218, pp. 5305–6; 218, pp. 5312–15; 220, pp. 5337–8, 5343–6.
SS 486, p. 14009; HCP (1979) 220, pp. 5361–2.
For Ssu-ma Kuang’s “Chien Hsi-cheng shu” (Admonition against the western campaign), see Ssu-ma,
Ssu-ma Wen-cheng kung ch’uan-chia chi 45, pp. 569–71, quoted in HCP (1979) 218, pp. 5312–15.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 471
Sung military leaders, for whom Wang An-shih had little respect.409 Wang
An-shih also tried to alleviate the odium of military service, which he saw
as a cause of unrest and potential rebelliousness, by abolishing the practice
of branding soldiers and by reducing the punishments for desertion.410 And
in an effort to improve troop training and cooperation, the court introduced
the “combined battalion” and “cohesive squad” measures (chiang-ping, chiehtui fa).411 On other fronts, reformers crafted a reliable horse-supply system
to help offset the Tangut and Liao advantage in cavalry mounts. Starting in
1074, administrators of the Szechwan-Shan-hsi Tea and Horse Agency took
advantage of Wang Shao’s extension of the northwest frontier to create a marketing system that regularly traded Szechwanese tea for over ten thousand
Tibetan cavalry horses annually for the remainder of the Northern Sung.412 At
about the same time Wang An-shih and his followers dismantled the expensive attempt to maintain a national herd in government pastures radiating
out from K’ai-feng, and instead stabled a small number of horses throughout the north Chinese population through the pao-ma (pao-chia horse), hu-ma
(household horse), and chi-ti mu-ma (land in return for a horse) measures.413
In addition, Wang P’ang and Lü Hui-ch’ing established the Directorate of
Armaments in 1073 in order to extend China’s overall advantage in military
technology.414 And of course throughout the 1070s the reformers built up
Shen-tsung’s war chest with surplus cash and grain generated by the green
sprouts and service exemption funds, as well as through more local measures
like the Szechwan tea monopoly.
409
410
411
412
413
414
HCP (1979) 234, pp. 5689–91. For examples of Wang’s contempt for the Sung general staff, see HCP
(1979) 232, pp. 5631–2; 234, p. 5675.
HCP (1979) 223, p. 5420; 235, pp. 5704–5. See also Teng Kuang-ming, “Wang An-shih tui Pei
Sung ping-chih ti kai-ko ts’o-shih chi ch’i she-hsiang,” in Sung-shih yen-chiu lun-wen-chi: Chunghua wen-shih lun-ts’ung tseng-k’an, ed. Teng Kuang-ming and Ch’eng Ying-liu (Shanghai, 1982),
pp. 318–20.
These two measures sought to regularize military training and to institute greater troop solidarity by
combining imperial troops, and in frontier regions the Tibetan soldiers and “archers” from different
commands (chih-hui), into mixed battalions (chiang) of several thousand to ten thousand men, subdivided
into companies (pu) and squads (tui) under a hierarchy of officers charged with upgrading overall training.
See Wang, Sung-ch’ao ping-chih ch’u-t’an, pp. 107–14; Ch’i, Wang An-shih pien-fa, pp. 283–5; and, for
an overall survey of Shen-tsung’s military reforms, Feng and Mao, Pei Sung Liao Hsia chün-shih shih, pp.
277–312.
Smith, Taxing heaven’s storehouse, pp. 264–5.
See Sogabe Shizuo, “Sōdai no basei,” in his Sōdai keizaishi no kenkyū, pp. 77–91; SS 198, pp. 4946–50;
Ma, Wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao (1965) 160, pp. 1391a–1392c; CPPM 75, pp. 2381–93; 109, pp. 3443–54.
The numbers involved were relatively insignificant: pao-ma operated under a quota of 8,000 head; hu-ma
distributed 11,662 head by 1080 but stopped replacing animals after 1084; and chi-ti mu-ma placed a
total of 23,500 horses under the care of 87,000 households by 1124.
HCP (1979) 245, pp. 5972–4. Paul Forage discusses the relationship between Shen-tsung’s expansionism and military technology in his “Science, technology, and war in Song China.”
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As the military reforms took shape and the funds poured in, only Wang
An-shih stood between Shen-tsung and a new expedition against the Hsi
Hsia. When in 1074 the emperor demanded to know why now was not the
time to attack the Tanguts, Wang urged him to let Wang Shao complete his
pacification of the Tibetans, lest the Tanguts take advantage of the Sung’s preoccupation to combine forces with the Khitan.415 Once Wang was out of office,
however, Shen-tsung was surrounded by ineffective men like Wu Ch’ung, too
weak to restrain the emperor, or by opportunists like Ts’ai Ch’üeh, willing
to say anything the emperor wanted to hear. And all the emperor did want
to hear, lamented Chang Fang-p’ing in 1077, was talk of war.416 Ambitious
men in and out of government knew that the best way to advance their careers
was to promote Shen-tsung’s war goals. Thus Ts’ai Ch’üeh goaded Wang Kuei
into supporting the Tangut expedition, in order to put the out-of-favor chief
minister in Ts’ai’s debt by saving his position; while Shen K’uo circumvented
Ts’ai Ch’üeh’s efforts to keep him out of government by presenting the emperor
with an actual expedition plan.417
Meanwhile, as officials fed the emperor’s irredentist yearnings, Shen-tsung
made his own preparations for war. In the eleventh month of 1077, the Directorate of Armaments announced that weapons had been stockpiled in the five
circuits of north China.418 A year later Shen-tsung renamed the thirty-three
treasuries that had grown out of T’ai-tsu’s original war chest, and commemorated them with a poem: “In succession the Five Dynasties lost their bearings,
while the northern dogs flourished. T’ai-tsu founded our nation, and with the
aim of disciplining the barbarians he established an inner storehouse to pay for
raising troops. [This dream] his descendant must honor; could I dare forget
his ambition?”419
Now all Shen-tsung needed was an appropriate opportunity to launch his
new campaign.
The collapse of the Yüan-feng invasion
The Hsia dowager empress Liang, who in early 1081 imprisoned her son Pingch’ang, the emperor Hsia Hui-tsung, for drifting ritually and diplomatically
415
416
417
418
419
HCP (1979) 250, pp. 6103–4.
HCP (1979) 286, pp. 7005–9. Li T’ao attributes this memorial, which ranks bellicosity as destructive
as an addiction to sex, to Su Shih.
HCP (1979) 291, pp. 7115–16; HCP (1979) 313, pp. 7593–4. On the connections between Ts’ai
Ch’üeh, Shen K’uo, and the Yüan-feng expedition, see Forage, “Science, technology, and war in Song
China,” pp. 56–8.
HCP (1979) 285, p. 6989.
HCP (1979) 295, p. 7192. This poem is also translated, following Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, in Williamson,
Wang An Shih, vol. 2, p.160.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 473
toward the Sung provided Shen-tsung with the opportunity he needed to
justify his new compaign.420 The coup was reported to Shen-tsung by none
other than Ch’ung O, who had survived the Luo-wu-ch’eng embarrassment
to become commandant of Fu-yen military circuit. To restore the rightful
ruler Ch’ung O recommended launching a “punitive expedition” against the
Tanguts in Ling-chou and their capital of Hsing-chou2. Ch’ung was ordered to
draw up a battle plan with Shen K’uo, then serving as Fu-yen military commissioner (ching-lüeh an-fu shih), and after Ch’ung boasted that he would conquer
the leaderless Hsia nation and bring the child Ping-ch’ang back to K’ai-feng,
Shen-tsung could be restrained no longer: in the sixth month of 1081, all
circuits of Shan-hsi were ordered to prepare for the arrival of expeditionary
forces.421
The battle plan called for a five-pronged attack on the Tangut capital, led
largely by men who had served in Wang Shao’s Hsi-ho campaign: in addition to Ch’ung O, the commanders included the eunuch generals Li Hsien,
Wang Chung-cheng, and Liu Ch’ang-tso, and Shen-tsung’s maternal uncle,
Kao Tsun-yü. These five men commanded combat troops of about three hundred and seventy thousand men, supported by about the same number of
transport troops, arrayed to converge on the Tangut capital from the south,
southeast, and southwest.422
The logistical demands of the expedition were enormous, requiring the
tactical expertise of individual commanders, smooth communication among
all the commanders, and the rapid coordination of forces and provisions across
the vast, inhospitable terrain bounded by the southern half of the Yellow River
loop. Coming on the tenth anniversary of Ch’ung O’s Luo-wu-ch’eng disaster,
which had failed on just these same criteria, the Yüan-feng expedition would
test how much the offensive capacity of the Sung armies had improved over
ten years of reform.
The campaign was launched in the eighth month of 1081, and at first
it enjoyed quite stunning success. The next month Li Hsien’s troops took
Lan-chou, which had been in Tibetan or Tangut control for four centuries,
giving him access to the Yellow River routes up to the Tangut capital.423
Ch’ung O, heading in from the western side of the loop, took Mi-chih, Shihchou, and Hsia-chou in the tenth month of 1081, thus gaining control of the
420
421
422
423
HCP (1979) 312, p. 7578. Ping-ch’ang had replaced Tangut with Chinese ceremony and allegedly
planned to turn over the southern Ordos to the Sung. See Dunnell, “The Hsi Hsia.”
HCP (1979) 313, pp. 7593–4; Forage, “Science, technology, and war in Song China,” p. 59.
For a discussion of troop strength and the ratio of combat to transport troops, see Forage, “Science,
technology, and war in Song China,” pp. 59–60, 65–6.
HCP (1979) 316, pp. 7638, 7641. The battles are summarized in SS 486, pp. 14010–11; and analyzed
in Forage, “Science, technology, and war in Song China,” pp. 61–73; and Li, Sung Hsia kuan-hsi shih,
pp. 180–93.
Hsi Hsia Capital
Hsi Hsia prefectures and sites
Sung prefectures
Yung-le battle-site
Heng-shan
Sung lines of attack
Hsi Hsia counterattack
H S I A
Shih-chou
Hsia-chou
Yin-chou
Yen-chou
r
Rive
low
Yel
Wu
-tin
R. g
Ling-chou
Ling-chou defensive perimeter
Yu-chou
Luo-wu-ch’eng
Mi-chih
Sui-te-chün
Pao-an-chün
Huanchou
LUI CH’ANG TSU
Chen-jung-chün
(1081.9)
Y
Yung-le
Heng-shan
WANG CHUNG-CHENG
Lan-chou LI HSIEN
Yü-lin
(1082.9)
el
TANGUT COUNTERATTACK
HSING-CH’ING-FU
lo w
Rive
r
H S I
Yüan-chou
Wei-chou
Ching-chou
CH’UNG O
Yen-an-fu
HSÜ HSI
KAO TSUN-YÜ
Ch’ing-chou
FU-YEN
MILITARY CIRCUIT
HUAN-CH’ING
MILITARY CIRCUIT
Ning-chou
CHING-YÜAN
MILITARY CIRCUIT
Ch’in-chou
0
250 km
0
150 miles
Wei River
Map 16. The Sino-Tangut war of 1081–1082. After Paul Forage, “Science, technology, and war in Song China: Reflections in the Brush
talks from the Dream Creek by Shen Kuo, 1031–1095,” (diss., University of Toronto, 1991), Map 4, p. 61.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 475
Heng-shan highlands where he had fared so poorly a decade earlier.424 At the
same time Kao Tsun-yü and Liu Ch’ang-tso, leading armies from Huan-ch’ing
and Ching-yüan respectively, fought their way north toward Ling-chou.425
The Tangut court was caught off guard by the initial Sung victories, which
cost thousands of Tangut lives. Desperate for a strategy to save the capital, the
dowager empress Liang rejected the plea of her younger generals to confront
the Sung forces directly in favor of a plan to “strengthen the walls and clear
the fields” advocated by one of her older generals: to concentrate Tangut forces
around Ling-chou in the west and Hsia-chou in the east and to let the Sung
armies penetrate deeply into Tangut territory, then attack their supply lines
with light cavalry to cut off their provisions.426 Whether or not this account of
the Tangut war council is apocryphal, it accurately summarizes the fate of the
Sung invasion. Supply problems soon beset Kao Tsun-yü and Liu Ch’ang-tso
at one end of the campaign in Ling-chou, and Ch’ung O and Wang Chungcheng at the other end in the Heng-shan highlands, sowing discord among
the generals and between them and their civilian supply masters. In the east,
shortages kept Ch’ung O from advancing from Hsia-chou to Ling-chou, and
precipitated the grizzly slaughter of hundreds of labor conscripts at the hands
of the Fu-yen circuit fiscal intendant Li Chi, who personally joined his troops
in slicing through the foot tendons of fleeing porters and left them to crawl
helplessly to their deaths.427 At the same time, two other Fu-yen fiscal officials
had sold off provisions intended for Wang Chung-cheng and his troops in Yuchou2, compounding Wang’s sense of dread at the eerie emptiness of an area
completely abandoned by the Tanguts. Because of his fear that lurking Tangut
soldiers would spy on his encampment Wang forbade his soldiers from lighting
fires, forcing the men to eat their dwindling supply of rice uncooked. Already
weakened by exhaustion and exposure to the cold, many of the soldiers got sick
from the dirty, raw rice, provoking angry calls to murder their commander and
the two fiscal officials. Wang Chung-cheng barely escaped with his life before
his troops were ordered to retreat back to Yen-chou2, losing twenty thousand
soldiers to starvation and Tangut harassment.428
In Ling-chou, supply problems were exacerbated by poor communications
and sheer incompetence: neither Kao Tsun-yü nor Liu Ch’ang-tso were able
to coordinate their arrival at Ling-chou, and when Kao did begin to attack
424
425
426
427
428
Ch’ung O was joined in Hsia-chou by Wang Chung-cheng. HCP (1979) 316, p. 7653; 317, p. 7669;
318, p. 7682.
HCP (1979) 319, p.7699.
SS 486, p. 14011. Forage suggests that the event is a “post facto historical reconstruction.” See Forage,
“Science, technology, and war in Song China,” p. 65 n. 74.
HCP (1979) 319, p. 7702. Li Chi was seconded from the Szechwan Tea and Horse Exchange, where he
had been superintendant.
HCP (1979) 319, pp. 7700–2, 7705. Half of the civilian transport conscripts fled.
476
paul jakov smith
in the eleventh month of 1081 he discovered that his troops had brought no
siege equipment. After eighteen days of their ineffective siege, punctuated by
squabbles between Kao and Liu and threats of mutiny from the troops, the
Tanguts cut the irrigation canals that watered the city and inundated the Sung
camps. The Sung forces were ordered by the court to withdraw, but Tangut
harassment turned their retreat into a rout.429
In four short months the Tangut invasion, for Shen-tsung the capstone of
the New Policies, had gone from stunning success to humiliating defeat. But
despite the rout, the northern armies were still geared up for war, and in the
spring of 1082 many officials called on the emperor to continue his campaign.
In the fourth month of 1082, Li Hsien, whose capture of Lan-chou was one
of the few successes of the expedition, advocated a new expedition against the
Tangut capital; when Lü Kung-chu resolutely opposed repeating the earlier
mistake an irritated Shen-tsung let him resign as codirector of the Bureau of
Military Affairs.430 The next month Shen K’uo and Ch’ung O recommended
an alternative plan to wall Wu-yen-ch’eng, on the headwaters of the Wu-ting
River, in order to control the strategic resources of the Heng-shan highlands
(salt, iron, pastures, and war-loving locals) and gain access to the southern
Ordos. It was this more limited proposal that Shen-tsung endorsed. But rather
than delegating it to Shen K’uo and Ch’ung O, who at least knew the terrain,
he placed it in the hands of Hsü Hsi, a cunning political manipulator who
had won the emperor’s favor by denouncing Sung generals as too cowardly
to conquer the Tanguts.431 Hsü Hsi reached Yen-an fu and the campaign
staging ground in the eighth month of 1082, and immediately revised the
original proposal. Instead of focusing on Wu-yen and the arc of sites north
of Heng-shan, which he rejected as too close to the prefectures that Ch’ung
O had lost the previous fall, Hsü Hsi proposed to wall Yung-lo ch’eng to
the south of Heng-shan, which overlooked the Wu-ting River valley leading
southeast to Sui-te. But Yung-lo ch’eng was just across a stream from Luo-wu,
the site of Ch’ung O’s first disaster, and Ch’ung O forcefully opposed Hsü
Hsi’s choice with the same argument he himself had ignored in 1071: Yung-lo
ch’eng had no independent water supply, it was indefensible, and walling it
could only lead to carnage. Hsü Hsi remained obdurate, however, and after
ordering Ch’ung O to return to Yen-chou2 he himself undertook the walling
of Yung-lo ch’eng, which Shen-tsung elevated with the title of “Yin-ch’uan
Fortress.”432
429
430
431
432
HCP (1979) 320, p. 7720; Forage, “Science, technology, and war in Song China,” p. 69.
HCP (1979) 225, pp. 7828–9. For court discussion of the plan, see HCP (1979) 327, pp. 7868–71.
HCP (1979) 330, pp. 7955–6.
CPPM 89, pp. 2757–9; SS 486, p. 14011. The HCP entries on Hsü Hsi’s campaign are anthologized
in CPPM 89, pp. 2757–67. General Kao Yung-heng also criticized the project, for which he was
dispatched to Yen-chou2 and placed under arrest. See HTC (1957) 77, p. 1929.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 477
Official opinion held that because of Yung-lo ch’eng’s strategic importance
the Tanguts would have to contest it, but Hsü Hsi welcomed their arrival,
proclaiming that it would be his moment of glory. When in the ninth month of
1082 the Tanguts actually converged, however, Hsü Hsi’s braggadocio turned
to horror: for as he looked out over his new walls to the west, there stood
three hundred thousand Tangut troops stretched out as far as the eye could
see. And now the fates of his thirty-five thousand troops were sealed, for Hsü
Hsi’s stubbornness was compounded by incompetence. Twice he refused to
heed his generals when they begged him to attack before the Tanguts, with
their awesome armored cavalry called the Iron Hawks (t’ie-yao), could get into
formation; and twice he refused to let his troops retreat before the Tangut
onslaught, one time even forcing them to stand outside the gates and take the
Tangut attack head on. Half of the troops who made it back inside the walls
died of thirst, as Tangut control of the water supply forced parched soldiers to
drink what liquids they could wring out of horse manure. When heavy rains
did fall it was too late for the exhausted troops, who were cut down or fled
as the Tanguts swarmed the walls. Li Chi and Hsü Hsi’s eunuch lieutenant
Li Shun-chü were killed by the panicking soldiers, as was Hsü Hsi himself
thought to have been, although some reported sighting him alive.433
The tragedy at Yung-lo ch’eng brought an end to Shen-tsung’s irredentist
ambitions. From a military perspective, the costs had already been too high:
in return for Lan-chou and six Tangut border towns, the Sung lost 230 officers
and 12,300 troops at Yung-lo ch’eng, and an estimated 600,000 officers,
Chinese and Tibetan regulars, and militia for the Ling-chou and Yung-lo
ch’eng campaigns combined.434 Emotionally, the debacle broke Shen-tsung’s
spirit. After receiving the report of Yung-lo ch’eng’s fall in the tenth month
of 1082 he appeared in tears before his state councilors, berating them for not
giving him better advice. “Not a single one of you said that the Yung-lo ch’eng
campaign was wrong,” the emperor charged, casting about for a scapegoat. It
is true that ever since Wang An-shih’s departure officials had tried to advance
their own careers by urging the emperor on to war, even after the Ling-chou
rout had “caused all under Heaven to yearn for the court to bring an end to
war.” Yet by the emperor’s own admission there were men who had counseled
against war, including the state councilors Lü Kung-chu and Wang An-li –
who had also warned that Hsü Hsi would destroy the nation – and the field
commander Chao Hsieh. Shen-tsung had simply chosen not to listen. It was the
failure of the Yüan-feng invasions that finally forced Shen-tsung to confront
433
434
HCP (1979) 329, pp. 7935–7; SS 486, p. 14012.
HCP (1979) 330, p. 7945; SS 486, p. 14012. Although the figure of 600,000 is undoubtedly exaggerated, it suggests how stunning the actual losses must have been.
478
paul jakov smith
the limitations of his armies: after Kao Tsun-yü was routed at Ling-chou
and Hsü Hsi was overwhelmed by a Tangut army whose strength he had
completely underestimated, “the emperor began to realize that his frontier
officials could not be trusted; moreover he had become weary of war, and had
no more ambition to conquer the Western (Hsia).”435
After a decade of military reform the Sung army was no more able to project
power out into the desert and the steppe than before. Of course, the Tanguts
had also suffered devastating losses and could no longer be regarded as an
offensive threat. But in the eyes of such Yüan-yu critics as Su Shih, Su Ch’e,
and Ssu-ma Kuang they never had been an offensive threat; it was the Sung that
constituted the threat, driven on by “ambitious and provocative ministers” who
started the wars for territory and personal glory.436 In the aftermath of the fall
of Yung-lo ch’eng, hostilities continued to simmer, as the Tanguts sought to
regain Lan-chou and their six border towns. Neither side had the strength for
an extended offensive campaign, however, and a stalemate persisted between
the two countries until Che-tsung’s majority in 1094, when (as described in
the next chapter) Chang Tun, Ts’ai Ching, and T’ung Kuan gradually returned
to a more aggressive strategy.
shen-tsung’s death and the ouster of the reformers
The collapse of his Tangut expedition sapped Shen-tsung’s reforming zeal and
pushed him increasingly toward the “old-party” (chiu-tang) men. In fact, Shentsung had planned to use the second stage of his administrative reforms, the
reestablishment of the T’ang table of offices in 1082, as a vehicle for mixing
conservatives in with the “new” men. He had hoped to start by appointing
Ssu-ma Kuang to the resuscitated position of censor in chief (yü-shih ta-fu),
unfilled for at least three reigns, but bowed to the objections of Ts’ai Ch’üeh
and Wang Kuei.437 After Yung-lo ch’eng, however, Shen-tsung was much less
tolerant of what he saw as the reformers’ obsession with keeping Ssu-ma Kuang
out of court, and in the eighth month of 1083 he gave vent to his frustration
by cashiering State Councilor P’u Tsung-meng for railing against Ssu-ma
Kuang’s “perverted views.”438 Soon after, the emperor began to bring Ssuma Kuang’s associates back into the government. In the first month of 1084,
Shen-tsung ordered that Su Shih be allowed to move to the lively Yangtze delta
435
436
437
438
HCP (1979) 330, pp. 7945, 7955.
For representative memorials, see HCP (1979) 380, pp. 9221–2 (Ssu-ma Kuang); 381, pp. 9278–83
(Su Ch’e); and 405, pp. 9862–6, 9872–5 (Su Shih); cited by Wu, Hsi Hsia shih-kao, pp. 84–5.
HCP (1979) 350, pp. 8390–2. On the censor in chief, see Kracke, Civil service in early Sung, p. 36.
HCP (1979) 338, pp. 8148–9.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 479
city of Ch’ang-chou from the backwater river town of Huang-chou (Huai-nan
West) where Wang Kuei had banished him under “administrative restraint”
(an-chih) for writing an allegedly seditious poem.439 Four months later the
emperor also revived the career of the prominent New Policies opponent Fan
Ch’un-jen, blocked like Ssu-ma Kuang from a new office under the Yüanfeng administrative reforms; Shen-tsung appointed Fan prefect of Shan-hsi’s
Ho-chung fu, the critical transport center at the intersection of the Wei and
Yellow rivers, where he immediately began detailing the disruptions caused
by pao-chia mobilization.440
By the autumn of 1084, Shen-tsung turned with even greater urgency to
the old-party men, for though only thirty-six-years old he was ill and sensed he
was dying. It was time, the emperor announced to his ministers, to designate
an heir, whose training and protection he would entrust to Ssu-ma and Lü
Kung-chu. To Ts’ai Ch’üeh, always good at reading the emperor’s mind, it
was clear that Ssu-ma Kuang could no longer be kept from court; so rather
than squandering his influence trying to oppose Ssu-ma Kuang, Ts’ai sought
instead to ingratiate himself with him.441 This he could not do directly, for
Ssu-ma would be unlikely to deal directly with a man like Ts’ai Ch’üeh; an
intermediary was needed. For this purpose Ts’ai chose Hsing Shu, in the 1060s
a disciple of Ch’eng Hao, Lü Kung-chu, and Ssu-ma Kuang himself. Hsing
Shu had also attracted the attention of Wang An-shih, who tried to mould
him into a New Policies partisan. When factional lines began to form Hsing
Shu chose the conservative side, deprecating the reforms to Wang An-shih and
his son, but Hsing paid a heavy price for his principled stand, spending most
of the Hsi-ning years wandering around Lo-yang with no employment. Wu
Ch’ung brought him back to court in an academic position, which he valued
all the more because of his years out of office. Ts’ai Ch’üeh’s purge of Wu
Ch’ung’s men filled Hsing Shu with dread, but he was saved from expulsion
by the emperor’s favorable notice. But Ts’ai must have sensed that Hsing Shu
had become accustomed to office and hence was easy to suborn. As soon as
Ts’ai approached Hsing Shu in late 1084, Hsing offered to put his connections
with the conservative luminaries at Ts’ai’s service, and transmitted a message
from Ts’ai Ch’üeh to Ssu-ma Kuang’s son K’ang urging K’ang to encourage his
father to accept an academic post at court – an act of fawning servility that Ssuma Kuang dismissed with a laugh. Hsing Shu even used his connections with
439
440
441
HCP (1979) 342, pp. 8228–9. Wang Kuei had succeeded in enforcing the banishment despite Shentsung’s protestations against overinterpreting poetry, suggesting that one key element of imperial power
was simply how committed the emperor was to exercising his will.
HCP (1979) 345, pp. 8289–90.
HCP (1979) 350, pp. 8390–2.
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the dowager empress’s nephews to try to alter the imperial succession from
Shen-tsung’s eight-year-old son, Chao Hsü2, to an older collateral prince, who
might be inclined to exercise his independence from the imperial family by
favoring Ts’ai Ch’üeh. Although Hsing Shu and Ts’ai Ch’üeh were not punished
for their interference until 1089, Hsing’s scheme was immediately denounced
by the two nephews.442 In the second month of 1085, with the emperor
nodding weakly from his sickbed, Chao Hsü2 was named heir apparent and
his grandmother designated as temporary regent, “until the emperor should
recover.”443
Shen-tsung’s strength was spent, however, and in the third month of 1085
he died. Chao Hsü2 was proclaimed the new emperor, and authority over all
national and military affairs was transferred to Shen-tsung’s mother, Yingtsung’s empress Kao and now the regent and dowager empress Hsüan-jen.444
As the two chief ministers, Ts’ai Ch’üeh and Wang Kuei controlled official
ceremonial in their capacity as the masters of imperial interment (shan-ling
shih), but they were powerless to control the unofficial demonstrations set off
by the emperor’s demise. Ssu-ma Kuang was again in Lo-yang mulling over
the offer of a court post when he learned of Shen-tsung’s death, and despite his
reluctance to be sucked into the politics of an imperial transition he let Ch’eng
Hao persuade him to go to the capital to pay his respects. As it happened, Ssuma’s welcome was even more tumultuous than he could have imagined: the
palace guards alerted the populace to Ssu-ma’s arrival by saluting him as “Prime
Minister Ssu-ma.” The thousands of people who thronged the palace gates at
the passing of an emperor pressed in to embrace Ssu-ma’s horse, shouting
“Please do not return to Lo; stay here to assist the Son of Heaven bring the
people back to life.” Ssu-ma Kuang took fright at the demonstration and,
making his excuses, rushed directly back to Lo-yang.445
At sixty-seven and in poor health, Ssu-ma Kuang was understandably reluctant to leave the quiet of Lo-yang; but from a distance he was ready to advise
the dowager empress on how to repair the damage done by the reformers. And
first priority, he insisted, must go to “opening up the route of remonstrance” to
officials and commoners, and to keeping it open with placards in the provinces,
drum calls in the capital, and punishments for anyone who stood in the way.446
442
443
444
445
446
HCP (1979) 350, p. 8391; SS 471, pp. 13702–3. Hsing Shu’s perfidy earned him a position among the
biographies of the evil ministers.
See HCP (1979) 351, pp. 8409–14. For detailed contemporary accounts, see HCP (1979) 352,
pp. 8417–50.
HCP (1979) 353, pp. 8456–9.
HCP (1979) 353, p. 8465.
“Ch’i k’ai yen-lu cha-tzu,” in Ssu-ma, Ssu-ma Wen-cheng kung ch’uan-chia chi 46, pp. 585–6, quoted in
HCP (1979) 353, pp. 8465–7.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 481
Yet the response to Ssu-ma Kuang’s memorial illustrates the resiliency of the
reform faction, which still controlled the State Council and the key organs
of government. Two months after Che-tsung’s accession the government did
issue a call for criticism, but to Ssu-ma Kuang’s chagrin it was so limited in
scope as to be useless. For Ts’ai Ch’üeh had intervened in the drafting process to prohibit on pain of punishment any real criticism of the government’s
leaders or policies, in order to stem the personal attacks against him that had
proliferated since Shen-tsung’s death.447 If the conservatives were to reverse
the policies they so abhorred more would be needed than the support of the
dowager empress; they would have to oust the new-party men from power and
take over the government themselves.
The battle for political power took a full year. In the first months of the new
reign the dowager empress assembled her forces: Ssu-ma Kuang accepted a post
as prefect of Ch’en-chou, just south of K’ai-feng, while Lü Kung-chu, Su Shih,
and Ch’eng Hao all came to the capital directly.448 Then in the fifth month of
1085 she could make her first big move, for after sixteen undistinguished years
as a state councilor Chief Minister Wang Kuei finally died, letting Hsüan-jen
put her own stamp on the State Council.449 Since Ts’ai Ch’üeh’s power was still
intact he could not be kept from assuming Wang Kuei’s post as left codirector
of the Department of State Affairs, but in the ensuing cabinet shuffle Hsüanjen did win two major victories: she prevented Ts’ai from elevating his own
candidate, Chang Tun, to the cochief ministership, or right codirector of the
Department of State Affairs, obliging Chang to become head of the Bureau of
Military Affairs instead; and she convinced Ssu-ma Kuang that for the sake of
the nation and the boy emperor he had to take the Chancellery position (menhsia shih-lang) vacated by Chang, even though that meant serving in the State
Council under Ts’ai Ch’üeh.450 Two months later Dowager Empress Hsüanjen’s hand was strengthened even further when Lü Kung-chu was appointed to
the council as an assistant director of the Department of State Affairs (shang-shu
tso-ch’eng).451
447
448
449
450
451
“Ch’i kai ch’iu-chien chao-shu cha-tzu,” in Ssu-ma, Ssu-ma Wen-cheng kung ch’uan-chia chi 47, pp. 602–3;
HCP (1979) 356, pp. 8508–11.
HCP (1979) 356, pp. 8508, 8513–14.
HCP (1979) 356, p. 8517.
The cochief minister’s position went to Han Chen, which Hsüan-jen found preferable to having Ts’ai’s
man in power even though she personally disliked Han. Chang Tun’s move still constituted a promotion,
from the equivalent of assisting civil councilor to chief military councilor. The reshuffling of the State
Council also prompted changes in the academic institutes and the six boards: Wang An-li returned from
Chiang-ning fu to serve in the Han-lin Academy, Lü Hui-ch’ing returned to court as an academician
in the Hall of the Aid to Governance (Tzu-cheng tien); and Tseng Pu was named director of the Board
of Revenue. See HCP (1986) 356, pp. 8520–5.
HCP (1986) 358, pp. 8561–2.
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paul jakov smith
Ssu-ma Kuang’s presence in the council had a dramatic impact on conservative efforts to overturn the New Policies, for as leader of the opposition
throughout Shen-tsung’s reign he was the only man with the prestige needed
to offset the entrenched power of the reformers. Much as Wang An-shih had
defined the horizons of the reforms fifteen years earlier, Ssu-ma Kuang defined
the scope of the conservative restoration. Indeed, it was Ssu-ma Kuang who
assured Hsüan-jen that a conservative restoration was ritually appropriate –
that it was legitimate, in short, to reverse a deceased emperor’s policies and
expel his ministers even before the three years of mourning had passed, if that
was the only way to save the nation and its people.452 Ssu-ma Kuang’s passionate memorials lay the foundation for the conservative critique of activist
government and opened a floodgate of denunciations of the policies it had
spawned. But as Pi Chung-yu argued in a letter to Ssu-ma Kuang on his mentor’s return to office, critiques and denunciations could accomplish little in
the absence of political power:
Now we would move to abolish green sprouts, suspend state trade, remit service exemption
taxes, and eradicate the salt monopoly laws – all those so-called profitable measures that
harm the people. But as soon as we try to weed them out or change them then those men
who managed the New Policies will become unhappy; and they will not only complain
that “we cannot abolish green sprouts, suspend state trade, remit service exemption taxes,
or eradicate the salt monopoly,” but will also manipulate the emperor’s fears that financial
resources are inadequate, and harp on the issue, in order to sway the emperor’s mind. . . . And
because of this, [even if we eradicate the New Policies fiscal measures] the green sprouts
funds will be distributed again, state trade will be reestablished, remitted exemption funds
will be recollected, and the salt monopoly will be revived.
How then, asked Pi Chung-yu, could the fiscalist policies be irrevocably
eradicated? In the long term, it was necessary to remove the fear of fiscal shortages by slowly building up surpluses through prudent economic policies that
measured expenditures against income, and by returning funds and resources
to the regions from which they were collected. In the short term, however, it
was necessary to extirpate the agents of the New Policies who still controlled
the government:
When Wang An-shih was in office there was no one in office at court or in the provinces who
was not his follower, and that is why he could enact his policies. Now we wish to undo the
shortcomings of those days, yet out of every ten senior court officials, circuit intendants and
departmental directors, and military officers, seven or eight are Wang An-shih’s followers.
Although we have raised two or three venerables to power, and have put six or seven men
of virtue in office, there are still tens of their men throughout the hundred offices. Where
then is the power to accomplish our objectives?453
452
453
“Ch’i ch’ü hsin-fa chih ping-min shang-kuo che shu,” in Ssu-ma, Ssu-ma Wen-cheng kung ch’uan-chia chi
46, pp. 588–91.
SS 281, pp. 9525–6.
shen-tsung’s reign and the new policies of wang an-shih 483
Ssu-ma Kuang did not himself have the ruthlessness to wrest political
power the way Wang An-shih had done, nor did he have the energy – for he
like Wang was now tired and old. Yet by serving on the State Council Ssu-ma
Kuang could advise Hsüan-jen on whom to use, and recruit men who did
have the drive and energy to purge the reformers and build up a conservative
power base. Neither Wang An-shih, who died in the fourth month of 1086,
nor Ssu-ma Kuang, who died five months later, lived to fully comprehend the
consequences of that purge, which is taken up in the following chapter.
CHAPTER 6
CHE-TSUNG’S REIGN (1085–1100) AND THE AGE
OF FACTION
Ari Daniel Levine
retrogression: 1085–1086
Turning back the clock: The coming of the Hsüan-jen regency
As Emperor Shen-tsung (1048–85, r. 1067–85) lay dying at the age of thirtyseven, an era of relative political stability was fading along with him.1 Long
held dormant by the force of Shen-tsung’s will, the personal and political
animosities of his past and present ministers were stirring, now that their
emperor’s untimely death would effect a new political alignment. Since his
heir apparent was an eight-year-old boy, after the emperor’s passing executive powers would be wielded by a regent for the foreseeable future. Upon
assuming the regency, Dowager Empress Hsüan-jen, a longtime opponent of
Shen-tsung’s New Policies, would become the dominant force at court, throwing her support behind the conservative opposition and dooming the current
reformist ministerial coalition. In the early spring of 1085, the specter of factional infighting was casting its shadow upon the corridors of power, as two
1
Compared to the burgeoning field of studies of Shen-tsung, Wang An-shih, and the New Policies, the
political history of the Che-tsung reign remains largely uncharted territory. For a recent biography of
Che-tsung, see Wang Han, Sung Che-tsung (Ch’ang-ch’un, 1997). For a condensed introduction to the
political history of the Che-tsung reign, see Liu Po-chi, “Yüan-yu tang-cheng chih yen-pien yü liu-tu,”
in Shih-hsüeh lun-chi, ed. Chung-hua hsüeh-shu yüan (Taipei, 1977), pp. 240–66. For a more recent and
in-depth study of factional politics in the late Northern Sung, see Lo Chia-hsiang, Pei Sung tang-cheng yenchiu (Taipei, 1993). The most important primary source for the Che-tsung reign is Li T’ao’s Hsü tzu-chih
t’ung-chien ch’ang-pien [hereafter HCP (1979)] (1183; Peking, 1979–95), which provides a day-by-day
account of events at court from 1086 to 1101, supplemented by a near-limitless variety of unofficial
sources. This Chung-hua shu-chü punctuated edition of HCP is preferable to the reprint of the standard
1881 Che-chiang shu-chü edition (1183; Shanghai, 1986). Also indispensable to the historian is Yang
Chung-liang’s Tzu-chih t’ung-chien ch’ang-pien chi-shih pen-mo [hereafter CPPM] (1253; Taipei, 1967), a
thematic compilation of and companion to HCP. A three-year lacuna exists in the HCP, between the
seventh month of 1093 and the fourth month of 1097, and was reconstructed from various chapters of
CPPM. Other essential sources are T’o-t’o et al., eds., Sung shih [hereafter SS], (1345; Peking, 1977), the
official dynastic history of the Sung, and Hsü Sung et al., Sung hui-yao chi-kao [hereafter SHY (1997)]
(1809, 1935; Peking, 1997), a compendium of official court documents.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
485
hostile court coalitions readied themselves for a protracted and acrimonious
struggle for dominance. When the conflict ended a year and a half later, after
the most sweeping political purge thus far in the history of the dynasty, a new
conservative ministerial regime would establish firm control over policy and
polity and would reverse – they thought for good – the reform policies of the
Shen-tsung reign.
In the second month of 1085, cracks were already beginning to show in the
current coalition government, in which advocates and adversaries of the New
Policies (hsin-fa) maintained an edgy truce. Wang Kuei (1019–85), the elderly
éminence grise of the Yüan-feng era, clung to the senior ministerial post of
chief councilor of the left (tso-p’u-yeh) for dear life.2 Despite the semihostile
yet ineffectual presence of Wang at the head of the Council of State, the
reformists still controlled the central government machinery. Real decisionmaking power over the details of administration had been wielded for several
years by Ts’ai Ch’üeh (1037–93), the reformist chief councilor of the right ( yup’u-yeh) and a former disciple of Wang An-shih.3 For the past six years, Wang
Kuei and Ts’ai Ch’üeh had uneasily shared power at Shen-tsung’s behest; the
emperor had played Wang and Ts’ai off against each another, while maintaining
his personal dominance over state policy.4
Shen-tsung had ensured the continued survival of the New Policies by
deflecting criticism from the antireform coalition, to whom he had partially
extended the olive branch in the last years of his reign. While holding the
brunt of opposition to the New Policies at bay, Shen-tsung had attempted to
co-opt the conservatives into the Yüan-feng regime, partially rehabilitating
such prominent opponents of reform as Ssu-ma Kuang (1019–86), Lü Kungchu (1018–89), and Su Shih (1037–1101).5 While such moves had contained
the antireform opposition, they could not conciliate it. Now that Shen-tsung
was on his deathbed, some opponents of the Hsi-ning reforms were hesitantly
preparing to return to the capital, after having spent more than a decade in
exile. Although the New Policies remained in force and the reform faction
(hsin-tang) still dominated the Council of State, with the monarch in critical
condition the political situation at court was becoming ever more fluid and
2
3
4
5
For Wang Kuei’s exceptionally undistinguished biography, see SS 312, pp. 10241–7. Also see Shiba
Yoshinobu, “Wang Kuei,” in Sung biographies, ed. Herbert Franke (Wiesbaden, 1976), pp. 1115–17.
SS 471, pp. 13699–700.
Although Wang and Ts’ai had shared power for six years as the emperor’s chief councilors, the partisan
and personal rivalry between the two men was so intense that they “changed colors merely looking at
each other.” See SS 312, p. 10242.
Unwilling to entrust the education of his heir apparent to Wang Kuei and Ts’ai Ch’üeh, Shen-tsung even
considered appointing Ssu-ma Kuang and Lü Kung-chu as tutors to the crown prince. See HCP (1979)
350, p. 8930.
486
ari daniel levine
uncertain, as long-simmering policy disputes and personal rivalries came to a
boiling point.
Ministers on both sides of the partisan divide understood that a tectonic
shift in court politics was at hand, and that the impending imperial succession
would not bode well for the reform faction. Late in the second month of 1085,
Dowager Empress Hsüan-jen – the widow of Ying-tsung (r. 1063–7), the
mother of Shen-tsung, and the grandmother of the future Che-tsung – was
officially declared regent and vested with full monarchical authority in the
ailing emperor’s stead.6 A representative of the dynastic old guard, the newly
invested regent was a member of the Kao lineage, one of the leading military
clans of the Northern Sung. Hsüan-jen’s political sympathies and antipathies
were no secret. As far back as 1074, she had implored her son to abolish the
Hsi-ning reforms and to break free of the baleful influence of Wang An-shih,
and her opposition to the New Policies and the reformists had never wavered.7
Hence, upon the sudden death of their imperial patron, the reformists
faced uncertain prospects in a court dominated by Hsüan-jen and her trusted
conservative ministers-to-be, Ssu-ma Kuang and Lü Kung-chu. Fighting for
his political life, Ts’ai Ch’üeh mobilized his faction for a preemptive counteroffensive. Long-dormant personal animosities came to the forefront, as Ts’ai
mounted a campaign of character assassination against Wang Kuei, portraying
him as Hsüan-jen’s shameless lackey. Failing to discredit Wang or engineer
his dismissal as chief councilor, Ts’ai and his cohort turned to more desperate measures, attempting to alter the imperial succession itself in an abortive
palace coup.
Hastily named heir apparent mere days before Shen-tsung’s death on the fifth
day of the third month of 1085, Chao Hsü2, the Prince of Yen-an, the future
Emperor Che-tsung, was only eight years old, far too immature to be trusted
with the reins of imperial power.8 Ts’ai Ch’üeh and his co-conspirators Chang
Tun, Hsing Shu, and Ts’ai Ching hatched a plot to depose Chao Hsü2, and
replace him with his younger brother, Chao Hao, the Prince of Yung.9 But the
6
7
8
9
HCP (1979) 351, pp. 8409–10. When Wang Kuei urged Hsüan-jen to take up the regency, she declined
a customary three times before accepting with calculated and ritualized reluctance.
HCP (1979) 252, pp. 6169–70. For an anecdotal account of a debate between Dowager Empress Hsüan-jen
and Shen-tsung over Wang An-shih and the New Policies, which transpired some time in the mid-1070s,
see Shao Po-wen, Shao-shih wen-chien lu (1151; Peking, 1983) 3, p. 25. In Shao’s account, the dowager
empress actually succeeded in persuading Shen-tsung to dismiss Wang as chief councilor.
SS 17, p. 317.
HCP (1979) 351, pp. 8411–12. Ts’ai Ch’üeh and Hsing Shu attempted to enlist the assistance of Hsüanjen’s nephews, Kao Tseng-kung and Kao Chi, to place the Prince of Yung upon the throne. See SS 471,
pp. 13702–3, for Hsing Shu’s biography, which was classified under the ignominious rubric “Traitorous
Ministers” (chien-ch’en). Also, the youthful Ts’ai Ching, the future chief councilor of the Hui-tsung reign,
participated in the plot, an act of political treachery that would prefigure his later career, if we take the
moralistic biases of the HCP at face value. Not surprisingly, Ts’ai Ching’s biography can also be found in
the “Traitorous Ministers” section of the Sung shih; see SS 471, pp. 13721–8.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
487
reformists’ plot to alter the imperial succession failed; their futile palace coup
only aggravated Hsüan-jen’s animus toward reformists and further incited the
wrath of their political adversaries. Thus began a far-reaching transformation
within the realm of court politics, one of the most extensive political changes in
the history of the dynasty. The regency of Hsüan-jen was now a fait accompli,
since the dowager empress could not be casually shoved aside by a reformist
minister on the pretext of restoring a juvenile emperor’s personal rule. Once
the regent chose her prospective ministers, the current reformist-dominated
Council of State, along with the New Policies, would not long survive the
interregnum.
Caught beneath a landslide: The conservative takeover of 1085
Engaging Dowager Empress Hsüan-jen as their monarchical patron, the conservatives seized the opportunity of Che-tsung’s accession to orchestrate a
political comeback, bringing their lengthy political exile to an end. Ssu-ma
Kuang, the most visible and audible opponent of the New Policies in the
early years of Shen-tsung’s reign, was certain to be at the core of Hsüan-jen’s
ministerial cabinet. After his resignation from court in 1070, the conservative
statesman and eminent historian had spent fifteen years in exile in Lo-yang.
There, Ssu-ma had supervised the compilation of his comprehensive history of
China, the Tzu-chih t’ung-chien, and had forged a sort of government-in-exile
with other like-minded opponents of the New Policies.10
When he heard the news of Shen-tsung’s death, Ssu-ma was at home in
Lo-yang, contemplating whether to return to court and accept an academic
office. After fifteen years of painstaking historiographic labors, Ssu-ma Kuang
was physically and mentally spent at the advanced age of sixty-six, and was
understandably reluctant to dive back into the political fray in the capital.11
But Ch’eng Hao, the Confucian fundamentalist theoretician and an intellectual progenitor of what would later become the Tao-hsüeh movement, persuaded Ssu-ma to return to K’ai-feng, if only to attend the imperial funeral
rites.
10
11
For a detailed portrait of Ssu-ma Kuang’s years in exile, and an analysis of the transformation of Confucian
conservatism to meet the threat of the New Policies of Wang An-shih, see Michael D. Freeman, “Loyang and the opposition to Wang An-shih: The rise of Confucian conservatism, 1068–1086” (diss., Yale
University, 1973). Also see Ko Chao-kuang, “Lo-yang yü Pien-liang: Wen-hua chung-hsin yü chengchih chung-hsin ti fen-li – kuan-yü shih-i shih-chi pa-shih nien-tai li-hsüeh li-shih yü ssu-hsiang ti
k’ao-ch’a,” Li-shih yen-chiu 267 (2000), pp. 24–37.
For an intellectual and political biography of Ssu-ma Kuang, see Ji Xiaobin, “Conservatism and court politics in Northern Song China: The thought and career of Ssu-ma Kuang (1019–1086)” (diss., Princeton
University, 1998).
488
ari daniel levine
Arriving in the capital, Ssu-ma Kuang received a fervidly enthusiastic welcome from a crowd of several thousand who vied to embrace his horse, and was
even saluted by overeager palace guardsmen as “Prime Minister Ssu-ma.”12
Alarmed by this excessive show of popular adulation, he returned to Loyang, remaining noncommittal about returning to court and assuming the
post of chief councilor. A few days later, Ssu-ma submitted a memorial in
which he entreated Hsüan-jen and her ministers “to open wide the roads of
remonstrance. Whether they are officials or private citizens, those who possess
an understanding of the court’s failures and of the people’s suffering should
present factual memorials, with utmost feeling and emphatic words.”13 By
bringing grievances against the New Policies into the open, Ssu-ma Kuang
hoped to bypass Ts’ai Ch’üeh, who still possessed sufficient residual power to
block any antireform memorials. Indeed, remonstrance would later serve as
the conservatives’ main weapon in their campaign to win over the imperial
bureaucracy and change the direction of state policy.
Within a week of Shen-tsung’s death, it was clear that the winds were shifting, when the first edict of the regency expressed veiled criticism of the New
Policies and Ts’ai Ch’üeh’s role in executing them in recent years.14 Not long
after, Ssu-ma Kuang finally committed himself to leading the opposition to
the New Policies, and to sacrificing his own health for that of the dynasty.
Late in the fourth month of 1085, Ssu-ma fired off a series of scathing memorials, petitioning for the immediate “abolition of the New Policies which have
ravaged the people and injured the state (ping-min shang-kuo).” Through the
power of his rhetoric, Ssu-ma manufactured a villain with which to contrast
his self-styled heroism, launching into a vitriolic ad hominem attack on the
architect of the reforms,Wang An-shih:
[He] was self-satisfied and self-righteous, and considered himself to be unparalleled by
figures past and present. . . . Often, he recklessly reformed the old statutes, substituting
them with his own ideas, which he called the New Policies. Whatever this man wanted to
do, the ruler could not prevent him from doing so. . . . He assisted those who agreed with
him to ascend to the skies, while he banished those who disagreed with him, casting them
into the ditch.15
12
13
14
15
According to the HCP, the K’ai-feng crowds pleaded with Ssu-ma Kuang, crying: “Please do not return
to Lo-yang. Remain here to serve as minister to the Son of Heaven, in order to bring the common people
back to life.” See HCP (1979) 353, p. 8465.
HCP (1979) 353, pp. 8465–7.
See HCP (1979) 354, pp. 8473–4.
See HCP (1979) 355, pp. 8489–8501. Also see “Ch’i ch’ü hsin-fa chih ping-min shang-kuo che shu,”
in Ssu-ma Kuang, Ssu-ma Kuang tsou-i, ed. Wang Ken-lin (T’ai-yüan, 1986) 46, pp. 588–91. Ssu-ma
followed this general memorial with more specific attacks on the mutual security (pao-chia) and hired
service (mien-i) policies. See Ssu-ma, Ssu-ma Kuang tsou-i 46, pp. 591–4; 47, pp. 608–9.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
489
In the harshly moralistic worldview of Ssu-ma Kuang, Wang An-shih was the
very model of the deceitful and self-serving minister, and Shen-tsung was to
blame for employing him and granting him carte blanche to enact his illconsidered schemes. It followed, then, that the New Policies were nothing but
pernicious, as Wang had
relinquished what was right and embraced what was wrong, and promoted what was
harmful and rejected what was beneficial. In name alone, he loved the people, but in
fact he brought them harm. In name alone he benefited the state, but in fact he brought
injury to it. He created the green sprouts (ch’ing-miao), hired service (mien-i), and state
trade (shih-i) policies in order to illegally amass wealth and to mercilessly exploit the
people.16
And not only had the activist domestic policy of the reformists been a complete debacle, but their belligerent border policy had carelessly incited an
unwinnable war with the Hsi Hsia in 1081–3, a war in which hundreds of
thousands of troops had perished for nothing. After the debacle at Yung-lo
ch’eng, the Sung-Tangut border remained heavily militarized, and was the
scene of the occasional deadly skirmish. As Ssu-ma viewed it, the carnage and
insanity were spawned by
officials on the border who recklessly pressed their luck and spoke arrogantly with baldfaced lies. They negligently went into battle and needlessly disturbed the northern barbarians. Deploying troops is a weighty matter of state; its rise and fall hang in the balance. But
these men carelessly sought glory and advancement for themselves, regardless of the deaths
of the common people. They planned thoughtlessly and plotted recklessly, regardless of
whether this would benefit or harm the state. . . . They caused the corpses of hundreds
of thousands of soldiers to litter the wasteland, and they abandoned untold millions of
weapons in a strange land.17
For Ssu-ma Kuang, the New Policies had brought the empire to the edge
of certain collapse: “Everyone in the empire – the high and low, the wise and
the ignorant – knows of the evils of the New Policies . . . [for they] ravage
the people and injure the state.” Three separate memorials followed, assailing
what Ssu-ma Kuang considered to be the most noxious of the New Policies:
the mutual security (pao-chia) and hired service measures.
Casting himself as the savior of the dynasty, Ssu-ma Kuang believed he possessed the key to delivering the Sung from the brink of destruction from within
and without: the immediate abolition of the New Policies. Tragically quixotic,
Ssu-ma persisted in his political crusade even as his health deteriorated and his
rationality deserted him. During his brief tenure as Hsüan-jen’s chief councilor,
Ssu-ma pushed through a negative and reactionary policy agenda, advocating
16
17
HCP (1979) 355, p. 8490.
HCP (1979) 355, p. 8490.
490
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the complete rollback of the reforms of the Shen-tsung reign and the reversion to the policies of Jen-tsung and Ying-tsung. Instead of creating new
institutions, Ssu-ma advocated a moral renewal of preexisting institutions,
and the restoration of proper hierarchy within the imperial bureaucracy.18
By recruiting moral exemplars into the civil service and employing them in
a well-delineated chain of command, the Sung regime could be revived, to
triumph over internal insolvency and external hostility. Moreover, although
abolishing Shen-tsung’s policies at the beginning of mourning would be a
gesture of unbridled unfiliality on Che-tsung’s part, it was the lesser of two
evils, forgivable when compared to the alternative: allowing the New Policies
to remain in effect. In Ssu-ma’s failing eyes, the new emperor’s duty to the
dynasty as a whole outweighed his duties as a son. In a famous oration, Ssu-ma
placed himself in a near-messianic role, describing the immediate abolition
of the New Policies as a necessary and heroic undertaking: “If what Wang
An-shih. . . . established has injured the empire, and was not in accordance
with the intentions of the former emperor, then eliminating them is like
extinguishing a fire or rescuing the drowning.”19
But overblown and extremist rhetoric alone could not abolish the New Policies while the reformists still controlled access to the roads of remonstrance
and still dominated the major policy-making positions at court.20 The antireformers would need to emulate Wang An-shih’s own approach fifteen years
earlier and mount a hostile takeover of the central government. This entailed
monopolizing the Censorate and other remonstrance offices, purging their
major antagonists from the capital, and then abolishing the reform statutes
one by one. This battle for power at court proceeded at a nearly glacial pace,
requiring more than a year, and incurring many prominent casualties, before
the antireform faction finally succeeded. Ssu-ma Kuang and Lü Kung-chu
were the first of their cohort to establish a beachhead at court in the fourth
18
19
20
For an adept analysis of the political and ethical thought of Ssu-ma Kuang and Wang An-shih, see
Peter K. Bol, “This culture of ours”: Intellectual transition in T’ang and Sung China (Stanford, Calif., 1992),
pp. 212–53. For an expanded version of this chapter, see Peter K. Bol, “Government, society, and state:
On the political visions of Ssu-ma Kuang and Wang An-shih,” in Ordering the world: Approaches to state
and society in Sung dynasty China, ed. Robert P. Hymes and Conrad Schirokauer (Berkeley, Calif., 1993),
pp. 128–92. Also see Anthony W. Sariti, “Monarchy, bureaucracy, and absolutism in the political thought
of Ssu-ma Kuang,” Journal of Asian Studies 32 No. 1 (1972), pp. 53–76.
Wang Ch’eng, Tōto jiryaku [Shinshūkan 1849 ed.], ed. and ann. Nagasawa Kikuya (1186; Tokyo, 1973)
87 hsia, p. 2a. Also see Lü Chung, Sung ta-shih-chi chiang-i [Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu, Wen-yüan ko 1779 ed.]
(Taipei, 1983) 18, pp. 3a–b.
When a call for criticism of the New Policies and the current ministerial regime was finally issued,
Ts’ai Ch’üeh, facing a barrage of personal attacks, had rendered the new remonstrance policy toothless,
emending the edict so that all who dared criticize the chief councilor or his policies would be punished.
See HCP (1979) 356, pp. 8507–8.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
491
month of 1085, and others soon followed them into the Censorate and other
critical positions.21 Serving as vice–censor in chief (yü-shih chung-ch’eng) in the
first years of Shen-tsung’s reign, Lü had been forcibly dismissed from his post
in 1070 for his opposition to the green sprouts agricultural loan policy. Now
that the balance of power had shifted in favor of Hsüan-jen and the antireform
cause, the Censorate and Remonstrance Bureau could again be employed as
weapons against the New Policies. And by monopolizing remonstrance and
surveillance posts, newly appointed conservative censors hoped to impeach
reformists from the Council of State, or at least to forestall their nomination
as high ministers.22
Yet when Wang Kuei died in the fifth month of 1085, after serving as a
councilor for more than a decade without any notable distinction, the antireformists were powerless to prevent Ts’ai Ch’üeh from ascending to the post
of chief councilor of the left.23 Ts’ai would prove difficult to dislodge as the
new emperor’s prime minister, retaining his lofty position despite a year-long
torrent of censorial indictments that clamored for his dismissal. However, the
antireform faction was successful in denying the junior councilorship to Chang
Tun, Ts’ai’s lieutenant, who had to settle for the post of administrator of the
Bureau of Military Affairs (chih shu-mi yüan shih).24 The same day, Ssu-ma
Kuang entered the Council of State as the vice-director of the Chancellery
(men-hsia shih-lang), a position that to his great dismay was subordinate to that
of his archenemy Ts’ai Ch’üeh. Although the conservatives had lost the first
battle, they would eventually win the war, chipping away at the foundations
of Ts’ai’s authority until his position became indefensible.
Once he was ensconced in the Council of State, Ssu-ma Kuang wasted
little time in facilitating the high-level appointments of his allies, in preparation for an assault on the upper echelons of the imperial bureaucracy. In
an audience with Hsüan-jen in the sixth month of 1085, he recommended
the names of Liu Chih, Wang Yen-sou, Fan Ch’un-jen, Fan Tsu-yü, Su
Ch’e, Su Shih, and the elder statesmen Lü Kung-chu and Wen Yen-po as
possible candidates for an antireformist-dominated Council of State.25 One
month later, Ssu-ma’s recommendations were already being heeded, when
Lü Kung-chu was appointed assistant director of the left in the Department
21
22
23
24
25
HCP (1979) 354, p. 8476. For a brief biography of Lü Kung-chu, see Michael D. Freeman, “Lü Kungchu,” in Sung biographies, ed. Herbert Franke (Wiesbaden, 1976), pp. 719–22.
The prominent antireformists Sun Chüeh, Wang Yen-sou, and Liu Chih were all appointed to high
censorial posts in 1085 and set about making life at court extremely uncomfortable for the reformists.
See HCP (1979) 354, p. 8476; 357, p. 8537; 359, p. 8597.
HCP (1979) 356, pp. 8517, 8520.
HCP (1979) 356, p. 8521.
HCP (1979) 357, pp. 8552–4.
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of State Affairs (shang-shu tso-ch’eng), giving the conservatives another powerful voice in the Council of State.26 Throughout the summer and autumn
of 1085, Ssu-ma and his factional allies built up their political capital at
court. Remonstrance and surveillance posts were packed with conservatives,
who issued an unceasing barrage of memorials that harshly criticized the
reforms of the Shen-tsung reign and recommended their immediate abolition.27 Intended as a check on ministerial prerogatives, the powers of the Censorate (Yü-shih t’ai) and the Remonstrance Bureau (Chien-yüan) had been sharply
curtailed under the reformist administrations of Wang An-shih and Ts’ai
Ch’üeh.28
But after the death of Shen-tsung, censors and remonstrators assumed their
customary privileges with a vengeance, using their offices as a pulpit from
which to fulminate against the ministers of the reform coalition, whose members and policies had long been immune from criticism. Lü Kung-chu memorialized to abolish the jurisdictional limits that had governed the Censorate
and Remonstrance Bureau ever since the Yüan-feng administrative reforms
of 1082. By removing remonstrators from under the thumb of the Council of
State, and by expanding their purview to encompass broad-based criticism of
state policy and the Council of State, Lü hoped to utilize them as a weapon
against the New Policies and the ministerial regime of Ts’ai Ch’üeh: “Let
there be an edict that censors and remonstrance officials will jointly remonstrate without taboos, advise the ruler on his shortcomings, enumerate the
flaws of the court, point out the treacherous faction among officialdom, and
manifest the suffering of the common people.”29
After Lü’s wish had been granted, a flood of indictments followed, revealing
the fatal flaws of the New Policies and excoriating the reformists. For example,
in a single day in the eighth month of 1085, the censor Fan Tsu-yü argued
that it was ritually appropriate to abolish Shen-tsung’s reforms even at the
start of the three-year imperial mourning period for him, and Wang Yensou described the suffering of the common people under the New Policies
in heartbreaking detail.30 But with their foes maintaining an obstructionist
stance, the antireformists would have to attack each of the New Policies one
26
27
28
29
30
HCP (1979) 358, p. 8561.
For an example of Ssu-ma’s invective, see HCP (1979) 358, pp. 8563–6, for his attack on the pao-chia
policy.
For more information on the curtailment of censorial powers during the Shen-tsung reign, see the
preceding chapter. Also see Shen Sung-ch’in, “Pei Sung t’ai-chien chih-tu yü tang-cheng,” Li-shih yenchiu 254 (1998), pp. 32–5. For details on the restructuring of the remonstrance system during the
Che-tsung reign, see Tiao Chung-min, “Lun Sung Che-tsung chih Kao-tsung shih-ch’i chih t’ai-chien
chih-tu,” Ssu-ch’uan ta-hsüeh hsüeh-pao 105 (1999), pp. 61–9.
HCP (1979) 357, pp. 8546–7.
HCP (1979) 359, pp. 8592–4.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
493
at a time, a war of attrition that would require the better part of a year.
For if the reformists could not prevent the ascendancy of their foes, who
were now packing the Censorate and the Council of State, they could at least
obstruct them at every turn, in an effort to bring the political process to a
standstill. When Ssu-ma Kuang and Lü Kung-chu nominated five of their
allies to censorial posts in the tenth month of 1085, Chang Tun protested the
move as a hostile conspiracy to monopolize the remonstrance organs of the
central government. In a heated debate with Hsüan-jen and Ssu-ma Kuang,
Chang charged that the recommenders were of insufficient rank to nominate
officials to the Remonstrance Bureau. Chang succeeded in overturning the
appointments of Fan Ch’un-jen and Fan Tsu-yü, but he was unable to block
the appointments of Chu Kuang-t’ing and Su Ch’e to remonstrance posts.31
More important, Chang’s obstructionist schemes only fanned the flames of
resentment and did little to endear him to the regent or to the ministers of her
shadow cabinet.32 By this point in the factional struggle, remonstrance and
surveillance offices were under the sway of the antireformists, who would be
certain to retaliate against the chief targets of their wrath – Ts’ai Ch’üeh and
Chang Tun.
But even as the censorial offensive against them increased in force and
frequency in the winter of 1085–6, the leaders of the reformist ministerial
regime remained more or less untouchable. Month after month, memorials
of impeachment were drawn up, indicting both Ts’ai and Chang for their
ritual irreverence and administrative incompetence, but none succeeded in
dislodging the chief councilor of the right and his lieutenant from the Council of State. Liu Chih denounced Ts’ai Ch’üeh for violating ritual protocol as
the master of imperial interment (shan-ling-shih), and Wang Yen-sou chastised Chang Tun for his irreverence toward Hsüan-jen during the debate over
censorial nominations.33 And countless memorials simply clamored for the
dismissal of the so-called three traitors (san-chien) Ts’ai Ch’üeh, Chang Tun,
and Han Chen, and then urged the promotion of the “three worthies” (sanhsien) Ssu-ma Kuang, Lü Kung-chu, and Han Wei.34 While Ts’ai and Chang
survived the storm for more than a year, many of their junior comrades were
31
32
33
34
HCP (1979) 360, pp. 8606–8. Chu Kuang-t’ing was successfully appointed exhorter of the left (tsocheng-yen), and Su Ch’e exhorter of the right (yu-cheng-yen).
Six days later, on the ninth day of the tenth month of 1085, Liu Chih would retaliate by overturning
the nominations of two second-generation reformists, Ts’ai Pien and Lu Tien, to academic posts in
the Dragon Diagram Pavilion (Lung-t’u ko) of the Han-lin Academy. They were replaced with Chao
Yen-jo and Fu Yao-yü, both of whom Ssu-ma Kuang had recommended earlier. See HCP (1979) 360,
pp. 8616–17.
HCP (1979) 360, p. 8629; 361, pp. 8650–1.
For a typical example of the genre by Chu Kuang-t’ing, see HCP (1979) 363, pp. 8674–6.
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caught in the undertow.35 By the beginning of 1086, the conservatives managed to monopolize the Ministry of Personnel, gaining complete control over
the bureaucratic appointment process. Now that the rank-and-file members
of the reform faction were being exiled to regional administrative posts, the
antireform opposition could pack the central government with its own men.
It was only a matter of time before the takeover would be accomplished and a
new conservative ministerial regime would consolidate its hold on power.
Tabula rasa: Eradicating the New Policies, 1085
Meanwhile, the New Policies were being abolished one by one, with only
token resistance, in the second half of 1085. Ssu-ma Kuang was managing to
unite his antireform coalition behind a policy agenda that was simplistically
negative: the immediate and total eradication of the New Policies and the
revival of the old policies of the Jen-tsung and Ying-tsung reigns in their
entirety. Realizing that Ssu-ma’s conservative juggernaut was unstoppable, the
dwindling number of reformist ministers at court allowed several elements of
their policy agenda to fall by the wayside. Perhaps Ts’ai Ch’üeh and Chang
Tun were occupied with fending off censorial indictments, or perhaps they
were saving their strength for a final showdown on the core New Policies –
the hired service and green sprouts (ch’ing-miao) measures – frameworks that
they believed were worth salvaging. In either case, reformist recalcitrance
was remarkably limited, and intriguingly nonideological. While Ts’ai Ch’üeh
was fighting tooth and nail to retain his chief councilorship, Chang Tun was
disputing the abolition agenda on practical grounds. The death knell of state
activism, with its intrusive mechanisms of bureaucratic entrepreneurship and
revenue extraction, had been sounded.36
The first of the New Policies to be abolished was the mutual security (paochia) system, which arguably penetrated deeper into Sung society than did any
other reform measure. Across the empire, nearly seven million men – from
close to half of the empire’s fifteen million households – were enrolled in the
system by 1076.37 In the eyes of Ssu-ma Kuang, there was no question that
the militarization of the peasantry should be immediately put to an end: “The
mutual security (pao-chia) and horse-pasturage (pao-ma) policies are harmful
35
36
37
HCP (1979) 360, pp. 8630–2; 362, pp. 8670–1; 363, pp. 8683–8. Ts’ai Ching was dismissed from his
post as prefect of K’ai-feng for alleged dirty dealings with the Central Buddhist Registry. Hsing Shu
was punished for assisting Ts’ai Ch’üeh in his plot to meddle with the imperial succession.
For application of the concept of bureaucratic entrepreneurship to the late Northern Sung, see Paul J.
Smith, Taxing heaven’s storehouse: Horses, bureaucrats and the destruction of the Sichuan tea industry, 1074–1224
(Cambridge, Mass., 1991).
SHY (1997) ping 2, p. 12b.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
495
without a single benefit, and the people of the empire all know this. Your
servant does not understand why the court is so reluctant, and has taken so
long to abolish them!”38 Under the compulsory pao-chia system, farmers were
prevented from performing necessary agricultural tasks and, moreover, had
learned martial skills that could make them a potential threat to the peace
they were intended to maintain.
In the seventh month of 1085, an imperial edict abolished the mutual
security (pao-chia) system in the K’ai-feng area and the surrounding circuits
in the north (Ho-pei, Ho-tung, and Shan-hsi) where the policy had had its
greatest negative impact.39 For the past ten years, participation in military
drills and reviews had become compulsory for almost every man on the paochia rolls in the north and the capital region. If a memorial by Ssu-ma Kuang
can be believed, for several years those enlisted as pao-chia militiamen were
required to participate in training every fifth day, which would have represented an enormous drain of labor from agricultural pursuits.40 Investigating
Censor (chien-ch’a yü-shih) Wang Yen-sou had also violently objected not to the
intrusiveness of the militia training regimen, but to its unnecessary brutality,
which would only increase peasants’ resentment of their superiors, and would
make the men potentially dangerous as trained bandits and rebels.41 With a
single brushstroke, an onerous obligation for hundreds of thousands of men
was ended. As of the first month of 1086, the “team drill” (t’uan-chiao) program that had been enacted throughout the north and capital region would be
replaced by the old i-yung militia system, with a more lenient drill and review
program (chiao-yüeh) of one month a year.42 Late in 1086, the poorest (grade 5)
households, and those with landholdings under twenty mou, were exempted
from militia training altogether, on the request of the palace censor (tien-chung
shih yü-shih) Lü T’ao.43
Although the pao-chia system was the military cornerstone of the New Policies, there is a dearth of evidence of reformist opposition to its abolition.44 Now
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
HCP (1979) 358, pp. 8563–5.
HCP (1979) 358, p. 8562. For a more detailed discussion of the legal and institutional intricacies of the
pao-chia system as they existed during the Shen-tsung reign, see the preceding chapter.
HCP (1979) 355, p. 8494. These figures were possibly distorted for rhetorical effect.
HCP (1979) 361, pp. 8641–5; SS 192, pp. 4783–5.
HCP (1979) 358, p. 8562.
SS 192, p. 4786.
The historiographic record of the early Yüan-yu period tells only one side of the story: that of the
antireformists. The primary sources for the study of late Northern Sung political culture are themselves
deeply suffused with political culture. Blatant airbrushing has occurred at both stages of the compilation
of the period’s most crucial source, HCP. First, the source material for the HCP, the veritable records
(shih-lu) of the Shen-tsung and Che-tsung reigns, was reedited long after the fact in the early years of
the Southern Sung by those sympathetic to the antireform cause. Second, the HCP itself is suffused
with the political biases of Li T’ao, its compiler. As a result, the prominent reformists of the period
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that Ts’ai Ch’üeh and Chang Tun were treading water just to retain their posts
for another day or two, their objections to the elimination of the New Policies were pragmatic rather than ideological. In a debate with Ssu-ma Kuang,
Chang Tun objected not to the conservatives’ determination to eliminate the
mutual security system, but to the haste and heavy-handedness with which
they planned to do so, to say nothing of their lack of any detailed framework for
its replacement. Endeavoring to accommodate himself to Ssu-ma and remain
on the Council of State, Chang pleaded for moderation, maintaining that no
administrative structure as complex and pervasive as the pao-chia system could
be dissolved within a five-day limit, at least not without precipitating massive
bureaucratic chaos.45 Chang’s arguments were apt, for Ssu-ma Kuang’s immediate abolition of the mutual security system would indeed cause massive
headaches for regional administrators in the months and years to come.
The next of the New Policies to be eliminated, without as much as a
whimper from the reformists, was the land survey and equitable tax policy
(fang-t’ien chün-shui fa), in the eleventh month of 1085.46 Unlike other planks
in the reformist policy program, which had begun as redistributive measures
but were quickly transformed into instruments of revenue extraction, the fangt’ien policy successfully realized Wang An-shih’s vision of redistributing capital
from wealthy “engrossers” (chien-ping) to the poor and powerless. Implemented
in 1072 in five northern circuits, the policy initiated a large-scale cadastral
survey, which divided lands into standard units, graded them for quality, and
determined their actual ownership.47 The fang-t’ien surveys were intended to
reveal tax abuses by large landowners, who had employed tax exemptions
and various other subterfuges to make vast swaths of land “disappear” from
the registers. By uncovering lands that had previously gone untaxed, Wang
hoped to make the map correspond to the terrain – to make state tax registers
correspond more closely to rural socioeconomic realities. This entailed shifting
the burden of land taxes away from small farmers, perhaps offsetting the
45
46
47
have been silenced – very few of the memorials of Ts’ai Ch’üeh and Chang Tun have survived in this
period’s documentary record. For more information on the political forces that influenced the revision
of the shih-lu, see Ts’ai Ch’ung-pang, Sung-tai hsiu-shih chih-tu yen-chiu (Taipei, 1991), pp. 82–102. For
more information on the compilation of the HCP, see Sudō Yoshiyuki, “Nan-Sō no Ri Tō to Zoku Shichi
tsugan chōhen no seiritsu,” in Sōdai-shi kenkyū, Sudō Yoshiyuki (Tokyo, 1969), pp. 469–512.
Chang Tun’s urging moderation in the abolition of pao-chia represents one of the two prominent exceptions to the silencing of the reformists in the HCP. Perhaps Chang’s statements were included for their
relative political inoffensiveness, as some prominent antireformists like Fan Ch’un-jen and Su Shih were
also opposed to the immediacy with which Ssu-ma Kuang planned to eradicate the New Policies. For
Chang’s arguments, see HCP (1979) 367, pp. 8821–30.
HCP (1979) 360, p. 8618.
See the previous chapter, as well as SS 174, pp. 4199–4200; Ch’i Hsia, Wang An-shih pien-fa, 2nd ed.
(Shanghai, 1979), pp. 145–7; Higashi Ichio, Ō Anseki jiten (Tokyo, 1980), pp. 70–2.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
497
onerous labor and military service obligations they would endure under the
mutual security (pao-chia) and hired service (mien-i) policies. Once the fang-t’ien
system was abolished, farm lands would again be accumulated by the powerful,
and tax burdens would again be shifted from the wealthy to the poor. But for
Ssu-ma Kuang and his allies, who believed that the state should not interfere
in local society or expand the peasant economy, traditional – and necessary –
socioeconomic divisions in the countryside would be restored at last. As for
the actual repercussions of the abolition of the land survey and equitable tax
policy in the Sung countryside, impressionistic conclusions are all that can be
drawn.
The rollback of the New Policies gathered further momentum in the twelfth
month of 1085, when the state trade (shih-i) policy was stricken from the statute
books.48 Designed to break the commercial cartels of wealthy merchants, who
aggrandized themselves through hoarding and price gouging, the state trade
system had created an extensive government monopoly that gave the engrossers
a run for their money. By buying products cheap and selling them dear, the
state trade agency (shih-i ssu) had cornered the market in staple goods. Under
the financial expertise of Lü Chia-wen, a disciple and son-in-law of Wang Anshih, the agency spread its tentacles almost everywhere, reaping vast profits.49
Branch trade bureaus spread into every corner of the empire and had been a
major source of revenue to finance the protracted border war with the Hsi Hsia
in 1081–3.50
Over the course of 1085, the authority of the state trade agency was slowly
whittled away by a series of executive orders. First, in the fourth month of
the year, the Secretariat ordered the state trade agency to forgive 70 percent
of the interest owed by great families, and a full 100 percent of interest owed
by commoners, in order to rescue K’ai-feng’s commercial community from
permanent indebtedness.51 Next, in the eighth month of 1085, two imperial
edicts abolished the agency’s loan bureaus at the prefectural and county levels, as well as those in northern border outposts.52 Still, a steady trickle of
memorials warned the emperor and his regent that piecemeal measures were
48
49
50
51
52
SHY (1997) shih-huo 37, pp. 32a–b.
For an in-depth analysis of the state trade policy, see Liang Keng-yao, “Shih-i fa shu,” in Sung-tai she-hui
ching-chi shih lun-chi, ed. Liang Keng-yao (Taipei, 1997), pp. 104–260.
In 1084, a state trade bureau was established even in the newly occupied territory of Lan-chou, which
had recently been gained through a war of conquest with the Hsi Hsia to monopolize cross-border trade.
See SS 186, p. 4553. For a quantitative assessment of the regional penetration of the state trade system,
see Higashi, Ō Anseki jiten, pp. 54–7 (tables 15 and 16).
HCP (1979) 354, p. 8472. The balance of the interest owed to the state trade agency by the “great
names” (ta-ming) was forgiven on the eighteenth day of the eleventh month of 1085. See HCP (1979)
361, p. 8647; SHY (1997) shih-huo 37, p. 32a.
SS 186, p. 4553.
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insufficient, urging the complete termination of the state trade policy, which
was finally decreed in the last month of 1085. As punishment for his corrupt
administration of the state trade policy, not to mention his inept bungling of
border relations with the Hsi Hsia, Lü Chia-wen was dismissed from court
in the first month of 1086 and demoted to a humiliating prefectural-level
post. The Censorate had indicted Lü for his corrupt direction of the state trade
agency, which had out-engrossed the engrossers and had pushed millions to
the edge of poverty.53
By the end of 1085, Ssu-ma Kuang and his factional allies had reached the
turning point of their political war. Although more than half of the reform
agenda was now eradicated, the hired service and green sprouts policies, the core
of Wang An-shih’s agrarian reform agenda, remained in force. Half the Council
of State was occupied by Ts’ai Ch’üeh and his lieutenants, who were still
in high places, even as the ground beneath their feet was giving way. The
reformist resistance had been neutralized but not eliminated, and its remaining
ministers would fight to the last man against overwhelming odds to ensure
their political survival first, and the continuation of the New Policies second.
One last push: The fall of Ts’ai Ch’üeh and Chang Tun
The year 1086, the first of the newly proclaimed Yüan-yu era, began on an
ambiguous note, indicative of the current situation at court, where the conservative ascendancy was not yet complete. Even the selection of the new reign
title was a consequence of a political compromise between the reform and
antireform coalitions.54 The name Yüan-yu itself was representative of the
schizophrenic character of the current ministerial regime of winter 1085–6,
suggesting that the reforms of the Yüan-feng era (1078–85) would survive
somehow, balanced by the stolid conservatism of the Chia-yu era (1056–63) of
Jen-tsung’s reign.55 But such a state of political indeterminacy would not persist for long; by the early spring, the partisan stalemate would be conclusively
resolved in favor of the antireformists.
Sung political culture was governed by ritual practices, and politics and
policy were inextricably linked to cosmological phenomena. Despite recent
53
54
55
According to the censor Sun Sheng’s indictment: “When the [state trade] policy was initially enacted,
Lü Chia-wen had jurisdiction over its affairs. . . . He selfishly and cunningly recommended the disciples
of engrossers, and put an end to the profits of merchants. He deceived the emperor and destroyed the law,
and practiced treachery and deceit.” See HCP (1979) 364, p. 8707; SHY (1997) shih-huo 37, pp. 32b–33a.
For Liu Chih’s and Ssu-ma Kuang’s suggestions on what to name the new reign period, see HCP (1979)
362, pp. 8663–5. As for the reformist side of the story, HCP has (predictably) preserved none of their
proposals on this matter.
For Lü Tao’s explanation, see the commentary to HCP (1979) 364, p. 8697.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
499
changes in monarchs, ministers, policy, and reign devices, which were intended
to recenter an age of political, ritual, and cosmological imbalance, K’ai-feng
remained in the grip of a lengthy drought in the winter of 1085–6. In the eyes
of antireform ministers, the snowless winter was a direct consequence of the
unsettled situation at court, and of the continued presence of Ts’ai Ch’üeh and
his cronies in the Council of State. Two querulous censors went so far as to argue
that Che-tsung’s reluctance to dismiss his father’s treacherous chief ministers
had thrown the seasonal cycle out of kilter, and was directly responsible for
the drought that had plagued K’ai-feng all winter long.56
When conservative remonstrators were not blaming the current drought on
the reformists, they were engaging in that old standby of political discourse:
character assassination. Su Ch’e, the exhorter of the left, repeatedly argued that
moral defects or sheer incompetence or both made Ts’ai and Chang unfit to
remain on the Council of State: “Ts’ai Ch’üeh’s obsequious streak runs deep;
he must be punished. . . . Chang Tun possesses the talent to perform his duties,
but his character makes him unemployable.”57 Policy disputes also figured into
the equation, as remonstrators such as Liu Chih continually indicted Ts’ai not
just for being treacherous and disloyal but also for obstructing the abolition
of the hired service system.58 Su Ch’e continued to rail against Ts’ai and his
reformist colleagues in the Council of State, arguing that their administrative
talent was “so insufficient as to make them unemployable, and their wicked
transgressions numerous.”59 Continually on the defensive against censorial
indictments, Ts’ai Ch’üeh had been pushed to the end of his tether. In the
intercalary second month of 1086, he resigned as chief councilor of the right,
and was appointed administrator of Ch’en-chou, close to the capital.60 Much
to the chagrin of his critics, Ts’ai managed to retain his full rank and his
academic position at court, despite having been demoted to this humiliating
prefectural-level post. Ssu-ma Kuang was now awarded the prize his eyes had
been set on for decades, and he assumed the post of chief councilor of the
left, from whence he could finally dictate state policy, free from opposition or
obstruction.
But even in a conservative-controlled Council of State, Ssu-ma’s triumph was to be short-lived. Afflicted by an increasingly debilitating illness,
56
57
58
59
60
These memorials, authored by Chu Kuang-t’ing and Wang Yen-sou, link the microcosm of court
politics to the macrocosm, opening a window onto the ritualized mentality and political cosmology
which prevailed in the Northern Sung. See HCP (1979) 365, pp. 8745–6; 364, pp. 8711–13.
HCP (1979) 367, pp. 8818–20; “Ch’i hsüan-yung chih-cheng chuang,” in Su Ch’e, Su Ch’e chi, ed. Ch’en
Hung-t’ien and Kao Hsiu-fang (Peking, 1990) 36, pp. 634–5.
HCP (1979) 364, pp. 8716–24, 8729–30.
HCP (1979) 368, pp. 8849–51.
HCP (1979) 368, p. 8854.
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Ssu-ma was not equal to the physical or intellectual demands of his court duties.
On account of his worsening condition, he made a show of refusing the chief
councilorship, recommending his senior colleague Wen Yen-po (1006–97) for
the post, and beseeching Hsüan-jen for a sinecure instead.61 His request was
refused, and Ssu-ma Kuang would spend the last eight months of his life as the
regent’s prime minister. To his horror, Ssu-ma had ascended the political stage
too late to save the empire from its “four perils,” as the green sprouts, hired
service, and military reforms remained in force, and the Sung war with the Hsi
Hsia continued. During the first month of 1086, he lamented: “the four perils
have not yet been eliminated, and I will die discontented.”62 Even worse, the
conservative coalition began to splinter apart during the months-long debate
over the hired service policy, the next of the New Policies on the Ssu-ma’s
abolition agenda.
Eradicating the hired service system and reviving the old drafted service
(ch’ai-i) regulations had formed the cornerstone of Ssu-ma Kuang’s antireform
platform. The hired service policy, enacted empirewide in 1071, had supplanted the state’s conscripted service labor force with a professional corps of
laborers, who were remunerated with state funds, drawn from service exemption fees (mien-i ch’ien) assessed upon eligible rural households.63 For the purpose of assessing these fees in an equitable fashion, rural households were
divided into five grades, with the poorest households in grades 4 and 5 exempt
from payment. As with the state trade policy, the hired service system was
originally designed to alleviate savage socioeconomic inequalities with massive state intervention. But in practice, mien-i had mutated into a mechanism
of revenue extraction, after a series of executive orders expanded both the
number of fees to be paid and the number of households that were required to
pay them. Not surprisingly, these extra surcharges swelled the coffers of the
central government, which in 1076 directly received almost forty percent of
the service exemption fees.64
Needless to say, Ssu-ma Kuang and such fellow members of the antireform coalition as Wang Yen-sou could not tolerate the extent to which the
hired service system and its associated service exemption levies had expanded
state revenue extraction. In a memorial presented not long after his return
to court in mid-1085, Ssu-ma argued that the arbitrary surcharges and fees
of mien-i had impoverished millions of households by monetizing the rural
61
62
63
64
HCP (1979) 368, pp. 8854–5.
Lü, Sung ta-shih-chi chiang-i 18, p. 4b.
See the previous chapter and SS 177, pp. 4299–4301; Ch’i, Wang An-shih pien-fa, pp. 133–8; Higashi,
Ō Anseki jiten, pp. 61–2.
SHY (1997) shih-huo 66, p. 40b; Ch’i, Wang An-shih pien-fa, p. 144.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
501
economy.65 Forcing all peasants to pay service exemption fees in cash had
thrown them at the mercy of the market and the seasons, driving many into
abject penury. The extractive state brought into being by Wang An-shih had
utterly destroyed Ssu-ma Kuang’s illusory ideal of a self-sufficient agrarian
order. But Chang Tun laid his political career on the line to defend the hired
service system against the censorial and ministerial onslaught. On the twentyeighth day of the third month of 1086 he memorialized the throne with a
point-by-point rebuttal of Ssu-ma Kuang’s plan to abolish hired service and
revive drafted service.66 Notably, his defense of hired service was less ideological than it was pragmatic.
Even so, for Chang to stand alone against Ssu-ma and to reveal the glaring
logical inconsistencies in the chief councilor’s rhetoric was to invite certain
disaster.67 In one memorial, Ssu-ma Kuang had claimed that rich peasant
households would benefit from the revival of drafted service, since they suffered
from the yearly imposition of hired service fees; half a month later, he argued
that these same households enjoyed preferential treatment in the hired service
system.
In Chang’s words:
Your servant examines the contents of Ssu-ma Kuang’s memorial of the third day of the
first month, which claims that: “upper-grade households (shang-hu) will consider drafted
service to be advantageous, and will consider hired service payments to be harmful.” But in
his memorial of the seventeenth day of the first month, he claims: “Although hired service
payments make lower-grade households (hsia-hu) suffer hardship, upper-grade households
enjoy preferential treatment.” Within a dozen days, in two memorials, what he has said
about the benefits and harm to upper households is contradictory.68
In an earlier memorial, Ssu-ma had parried detailed policy critiques with crude
generalizations, claiming that the hired service system was causing extreme
suffering for all peasants everywhere: “Officials and commoners have offered
up reports which state that the people are suffering. Of the several thousand
statements which have been offered, not one has not said that hired service was
harmful. From the above, we can conclude this is indubitably a peril to the
empire.”69 But Chang took exception to the expedience with which Ssu-ma
65
66
67
68
69
HCP (1979) 355, pp. 8497–9. See “Ch’i pa mien-i chuang,” in Ssu-ma, Ssu-ma Kuang tsou-i 32,
pp. 345–6.
HCP (1979) 367, pp. 8821–30.
This statement represents the second exception to the complete exclusion of the reformists from the
documentary record of the period. For an expanded explanation of the hired service–drafted service
debate between Chang Tun and Ssu-ma Kuang, see Teng Kuang-ming, Wang An-shih: Chung-kuo shih-i
shih-chi ti kai-ko-chia, rev. ed. (Peking, 1975), pp. 174–6.
HCP (1979) 367, p. 8822.
HCP (1979) 365, p. 8759.
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wished to abolish hired service and revive drafted service, arguing that such
complex policy problems could not be solved within a mere five days:
Your servant sees that today’s policy proposals are concerned with their benefit and harm
to living people. The hired service and drafted service policies are indeed important,
but they must be carefully examined, and cannot be changed lightly. . . . In five days
from now, how can the various county magistrates make an assessment of its benefit and
harm? . . . Although Kuang has a heart which commiserates with the state and loves the
people, [his] methods of reforming [hired service] have not been discussed, no plan exists,
and it will be implemented recklessly.70
Chang was dismissed twenty-one days after Ts’ai Ch’üeh, but went down
with far more fighting spirit than his factional patron. In a feverish debate on
hired service held in front of the dowager empress’s screen, Chang offended
Hsüan-jen with his irreverence, and was immediately dismissed from the
Council of State and demoted to a prefectural-level post.71 Now that Ts’ai
Ch’üeh and Chang Tun were out of the way, the conservatives enjoyed unchallenged control of the Council of State. On the day of Chang’s dismissal, Wang
Yen-sou celebrated his coalition’s conquest of the central government, arguing
that “now that Ch’üeh and Tun have been dismissed, no more great malefactors remain.”72 In Wang’s judgment, the remaining reformist nonentities
at court were “obsequious and malleable, and can be easily managed.” Two
months later, the reform coalition would be bereft even of its founding figure,
making its regeneration all the more unlikely. For in the spring of 1086 an
embittered Wang An-shih died in retirement at the age of sixty-five, not long
after hearing of the repeal of the New Policies.73 After a year-long struggle,
the Council of State was the sole province of the antireform coalition, but this
coalition would itself become increasingly unstable in the months to come,
fracturing over personal and policy disputes.
The seeds of disunion: Eradicating the New Policies, 1086
As the debate over hired service raged on, the antireform coalition began to
fissure, foreshadowing the factional infighting that would paralyze the court
for the remainder of the regency.74 While Ssu-ma Kuang myopically and
70
71
72
73
74
HCP (1979) 367, p. 8827.
Chang was appointed prefect of Ju-chou2 (Ching-hsi North). He was replaced as director of the Bureau
of Military Affairs by his former assistant director, the reformist An T’ao. The prominent conservative
Fan Ch’un-jen took An’s place as assistant director. See HCP (1979) 370, p. 8934.
HCP (1979) 370, pp. 8935–7.
SS 327, p. 10550; HCP (1979) 374, pp. 9069–70.
For a detailed discussion of how the antireform coalition fractured over the hired service issue, see Lo,
Pei Sung tang-cheng yen-chiu, pp. 112–21.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
503
unyieldingly insisted upon the immediate eradication of the evils of the hired
service measure, a considerable number of high-placed conservatives urged
caution. The moderate wing of the conservative coalition shared many points of
agreement with the recently dismissed reformist Chang Tun. Arguing that an
entire system could not be abolished overnight without serious repercussions,
these dissenters demanded that a detailed scheme for the reimplementation of
drafted service be formulated first. As Su Ch’e put it: “Since the court enacted
hired service close to twenty years have passed, and officials and private citizens
have long been accustomed to it. Now, if we begin to implement drafted
service, there will unavoidably be some disagreements and disparities.”75 For
Su Ch’e, the countless details of the revived drafted service system would need
to be worked out first.76
In the rancorous debates at court that ensued during the intercalendary second month of 1086, other prominent antireformists shared Su’s skepticism.
Even Lü Kung-chu, a longtime conservative stalwart since the 1060s, memorialized that Ssu-ma’s plan was strong in theory, but weak on details, and
many other remonstrators, including Wang Yen-sou and Liu Chih, also urged
restraint.77 Another notable dissenter was Fan Ch’un-jen, who agreed that
while hired service was not without its negative aspects, “it also has aspects
which should not be immediately abolished, for the way of governance consists
of only eliminating the most extreme” failings of hired service. But Ssu-ma
Kuang would brook no dissent from within the ranks, and responded with
characteristic ideological fervor, accusing Fan and his associates of heel dragging and apostatizing.78 After service exemption payments were ultimately
abolished in the third month of 1086, a ministerial commission was at last
appointed to flesh out the details of drafted service, including local and regional
quotas, and worked through the summer and autumn.
With the antireform camp already divided into hard-liners and moderates
on the issue of corvée policy, Su Shih broke ranks with what remained of
the conservative coalition, proposing a compromise between hired service and
drafted service.79 While his younger brother Su Ch’e was a more mainstream
figure at court, Su Shih’s principled iconoclasm made him a constant source
75
76
77
78
79
CPPM 108, pp. 3393–6; “Lun pa mien-i-ch’ien hsing ch’ai-i-fa chuang,” in Su, Su Ch’e chi 36,
pp. 626–7.
For a more specific policy memorial by Su Ch’e, see HCP (1979) 369, pp. 8895–8, 8901–2.
HCP (1979) 367, p. 8837.
In Ssu-ma Kuang’s rebarbative words, “Certainly, there are ministers who owe their advancement to the
New Policies, who are taking advantage of this opportunity to argue that hired service fees should not
be abolished.” See HCP (1979) 367, pp. 8838–9.
For a literary and political biography of Su Shih, see Ronald C. Egan, Word, image, and deed in the life of
Su Shi (Cambridge, Mass., 1994). For an intellectual biography of Su Shih, see Bol, “This culture of ours,”
pp. 254–99.
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ari daniel levine
of irritation to those in power. One of the most outspoken and persistent
opponents of Wang An-shih in the 1070s, Su Shih had undergone something of
a political change of heart, relenting in his antagonism to the New Policies and
questioning the self-righteous extremism of Ssu-ma Kuang.80 Su had belatedly
come to understand the positive aspects of hired service, which he now hoped
to combine with the strong points of drafted service. Memorializing the throne
in the fourth month of 1086, Su Shih noted that the surplus emergency fee
(k’uan-sheng ch’ien) that had been extorted through the hired service system had
remained unspent since its inception. In the sixteen-odd years since the fee
was arbitrarily imposed upon every commoner, he wrote, “it has accumulated
to as much as 3 million plus strings of unused cash. . . . Your servant states that
these monies came forth from the people’s labor, and in principle they should
return to the people’s use.”81 Su proposed that this surplus be used to buy up
public lands, which could be granted to volunteer laborers in lieu of paying
them wages, thereby cutting state payroll expenditures and reducing service
exemption fees. When his proposals went unheeded, Su became a source of
irritation to the rest of the drafted service working group, from which he was
dismissed in the seventh month of 1086.82 Su Shih’s defiance of the political
consensus would make him a constant irritant at court and would result in his
eventual dismissal in 1089. Until then, his dissent from the antireform bloc
would only intensify, as he formed a splinter group with his brother Su Ch’e
and his fellow Szechwanese Lü T’ao. Su Shih’s nonconformity foreshadowed a
broader political trend: the fissuring of the conservative coalition into factions
that would square off over both personal disagreements and policy issues for
the remainder of the regency.
The abolition of the green sprouts policy, the second of Ssu-ma Kuang’s
“four perils,” became another source of dissension at court, but, compared
with the paralyzing debates over hired service, the disputes over green sprouts
were rather mild. As described in chapter 5, although the policy was redistributive in intent, it quickly became yet another instrument of revenue extraction
once annual interest rates of twenty to thirty percent were assessed upon green
sprouts loans and the loan fund was opened up to people from all classes of
rural society. Given the previous hostility of Ssu-ma Kuang and his coalition
toward hired service, the extractive nature of green sprouts policy naturally
roused their ire.83 The antireformist forays against green sprouts were roughly
80
81
82
83
See Su Shih’s letter to his friend Teng Fu, “Yü T’eng Ta-tao pa,” in Su Shih, Su Shih wen-chi, ed. K’ung
Fan-li (Peking, 1986) 51, p. 1478.
HCP (1979) 374, pp. 9071–5; “Lun chi tien mu-i chuang,” in Su, Su Shih wen-chi 26, pp. 768–71.
HCP (1979) 382, pp. 9299–9300; “Tsai ch’i pa hsiang-ting mien-i chuang,” in Su, Su Shih wen-chi 26,
p. 781.
For Ssu-ma Kuang’s memorial on green sprouts, see HCP (1979) 368, pp. 8875–7; “Ch’i pa ti-chü-kuan
cha-tzu,” in Ssu-ma, Ssu-ma Kuang tsou-i 36, pp. 389–91.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
505
coterminous with criticism of hired service, extending through the spring
and summer of 1086. In a memorial of the fourth month of 1086, Wang
Yen-sou voiced the mainstream view that government expansion into loansharking had succeeded in enriching the state and impoverishing the peasantry. And another conservative remonstrator maintained that even private
moneylenders were more lenient than government agents, who raised interest on farm loans from an acceptable twenty percent to an extortionate sixty
percent.84
Compared to the protracted hand-wringing over hired service, court opinion against green sprouts loans was far more unified. Even Su Shih fell into
line with the political mainstream, memorializing against the evils and abuses
of the green sprouts system: “For the past twenty years, these policies have
grown more harmful by the day, the people have grown more impoverished,
penalties have grown more bothersome, graft has grown more intense. . . . To
detail and number its numerous harms would be impossible.”85 Apparently,
the sole dissenting voice within the conservative camp was Fan Ch’un-jen, then
serving as assistant director of the Bureau of Military Affairs. Perhaps the most
significant voice of moderation within the antireform coalition and the son of
the eminent 1040s statesman Fan Chung-yen, Fan Ch’un-jen would later be
promoted to chief councilor of the right in 1088. By expressing his qualms
over the abolition of green sprouts, arguing that interest from the loans would
benefit the state’s bottom line, Fan enraged Ssu-ma Kuang, who nearly dismissed Fan from court for disobedience.86 At this point, Ssu-ma alone could
not enforce factional discipline; when Wang Yen-sou and others vouched for
Fan’s integrity, Fan managed to retain his post. By the summer of 1086, an
ailing Ssu-ma Kuang could no longer be assured of the loyalty of his allies,
and his coalition began to fracture over each and every major policy issue that
came to the table.
Peace in our time: Rapprochement with the Hsi Hsia
Border tensions with the Tangut Hsi Hsia represented the last great peril
Ssu-ma Kuang needed to eliminate before he could die in peace. After the conservative takeover of 1085–6, conciliation and vacillation became the guiding
principles in Sung foreign policy, supplanting the expansionism and militarism
of the reform era. During Shen-tsung’s reign, the conflict with the Hsi Hsia
had been prosecuted but at a prohibitive cost. While the total war of 1081–3
84
85
86
HCP (1979) 378, pp. 9192–4.
HCP (1979) 384, pp. 9359–61; see “Ch’i pu chi-san ch’ing-miao-ch’ien chuang,” in Su, Su Shih wen-chi
27, pp. 783–5.
HCP (1979) 384, pp. 9366–7.
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ari daniel levine
had neutralized the offensive threat of the Hsi Hsia, the Sung had squandered
innumerable lives and vast quantities of resources to win a few small plots of
land. The painful lesson of the Sung army’s disastrous defeat at Yung-lo ch’eng
in 1082, in which two hundred thousand troops had been massacred, remained
fresh in the collective memory of everyone at court.87 After the mass carnage
of the early 1080s campaigns, the conflict continued on a smaller scale along
the heavily militarized northwestern border, where the Hsi Hsia conducted
pinprick raids on Sung positions but failed to regain them. For the ascendant
antireform faction who now dictated military and border policy, all that the
Sung required was an exit strategy, and this stalemated conflict could be ended
once and for all.
An opportunity for a lasting peace came in the summer of 1086, when a
Tangut embassy arrived in K’ai-feng to initiate peace negotiations, following
the death of the Hsi Hsia ruler Wei-ming Ping-ch’ang (Emperor Hsia Huitsung, r. 1068–86). The terms of the truce were costly, for the Hsi Hsia envoys
demanded the immediate return of territories that the Sung had occupied in
the war of 1081–3: Lan-chou plus four stockades in the Heng-shan highlands
on the Hsi Hsia–Shan-hsi border (see map 17).88 Both of these areas formed the
bulwark of Sung defenses along the northwestern marches, controlling access
to the upper Yellow River valley. Under the reformists, who had pursued
a policy of militant irredentism, surrendering even a square inch of hardwon borderland would have been inconceivable. But now that the antireform
coalition held sway over the Sung court, the pacific overtures of the Tanguts
met with an enthusiastic reception.
As with the eradication of the New Policies, Ssu-ma Kuang approached
border relations with bold strokes and grand gestures, hoping to accomplish
an abrupt and permanent reversal of what the reformists had wrought. In the
sixth month of 1086, Ssu-ma Kuang spoke out in favor of rapprochement with
the Hsi Hsia, forcefully arguing that the loss of a few small plots of distant
land was a small price to pay for a lasting peace.89 In Ssu-ma’s eyes, reformist
irredentism and adventurism represented a far greater threat to the multistate
balance of power than did the Tanguts themselves. Even Su Shih concurred
with the chief councilor, arguing that the reformists alone had destabilized the
northwestern border by instigating a futile war with the Hsi Hsia in an act
87
88
89
For the political and military history of the Hsi Hsia empire in this period, see Ruth W. Dunnell, “The
Hsi Hsia,” in The Cambridge history of China, volume 6: Alien regimes and border states, 907–1368, ed.
Herbert Franke and Denis C. Twitchett (New York, 1994), pp. 154–214, and Wu T’ien-ch’ih, Hsin Hsi
Hsia shih (Taipei, 1987). The most thorough monograph on Sung-Tangut relations is Li Hua-jui, Sung
Hsia kuan-hsi shih (Shih-chia-chuang, 1998).
SS 486, p. 14015.
HCP (1979) 380, pp. 9221–2.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
507
of vainglorious folly.90 In the early Yüan-yu consensus, now that a dangerous
internal enemy – the reformists – had been purged from the Sung court, the
last barrier to peace with an external enemy had fallen.
While many at court concurred with Ssu-ma Kuang, the debates over ceding
Lan-chou and the four border stockades were especially prolonged and intense.
Several sources indicate that prominent conservatives, including Lü Ta-fang
and Wang Ts’un, protested the cession of territory to the Tanguts.91 But
the most outspoken opponent of a negotiated peace was An T’ao, one of the
remaining reformists on the Council of State, and currently the director of the
Bureau of Military Affairs, who refused to relinquish hard-won territories to
the Tanguts.92
However, many antireformists took exception to An T’ao’s invocation
of Shen-tsung’s memory. The brothers Su Ch’e and Su Shih insisted that
the occupation of Lan-chou and the five border stockades “was originally not
the sagely intention of the former emperor,” but rather the consequence of the
incompetence and cowardice of the eunuch general Li Hsien, so that “abandoning them would not violate his [Shen-tsung’s] testament.”93 By the end of the
debate, the cession of the occupied territories had become a thinkable option at
court. Lan-chou (established in 1081) had been decoupled from Shen-tsung’s
legacy and rendered into non-Sung territory through the smoke and mirrors
of rhetoric. But the case for abandoning these areas was not just academic, for
they had originally belonged to the Tibetans and had not been under Chinese
rule since the T’ang. In the vivid words of Su Ch’e, the northwestern border was “a wilderness littered with bones, not worthy of begrudging.”94 With
most figures at court favoring appeasement as the only way out of an untenable
situation, a costly truce would ultimately be pushed through.
Ssu-ma Kuang did not live to see the conclusion of the Sung–Hsi Hsia
peace treaty, which was finally signed in the sixth month of 1089. For the
time being, negotiations remained deadlocked over the final status of Lanchou, which the Sung adamantly refused to relinquish. Even when the Sung
90
91
92
93
94
HCP (1979) 405, pp. 9872–5; “Yin ch’in kuei-chang lun hsi-ch’iang Hsia-jen shih-i cha-tzu,” in Su, Su
Shih wen-chi 28, pp. 798–800.
No memorials opposing the truce agreement have survived in HCP (1979), but other sources reveal that
many in the antireform coalition opposed the cession of territory. A 1094 memorial by Kuo Chih-chang,
preserved in the CPPM, claims that Sun Chüeh and Wang Tsun opposed the deal; see CPPM 101,
pp. 3124–6. According to Lü Chung, Lü Ta-fang opposed ceding Lan-chou to the Hsi Hsia; see Lü,
Sung ta-shih-chi chiang-i 19, p. 4a. And other antireformists were far more wary than Ssu-ma Kuang in
accepting the terms of the truce agreement. For a voice of caution, see Liu Chih’s memorial in HCP
(1979) 382, pp. 9307–9.
HCP (1979) 382, pp. 9311–12.
HCP (1979) 382, pp. 9304–5.
HCP (1979) 381, p. 9280; “Lun Lan-chou teng ti chuang,” in Su, Su Ch’e chi 39, pp. 684–8.
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ari daniel levine
conceded four stockades in Shan-hsi’s Yung-hsing-chün circuit – Mi-chih,
Chia-lu, Fu-t’u, and An-chiang, all crucial positions without which the Hengshan highlands were untenable – their boundaries were never clearly delineated.95 In exchange for these four border forts, the Sung received the approximately one hundred and fifty prisoners of war who had survived the Yung-lo
ch’eng massacre.96 Clearly, this was not the lasting peace that Ssu-ma Kuang
had expected, for the limited and sketchy terms of the truce would probably
not have met with the chief councilor’s approval. For the rest of the Yüan-yu
era, Lan-chou and the Heng-shan region remained points of contention along
an unstable boundary line dividing the Sung and the Tanguts. Throughout
the regency, the Sung court would generally respond to Hsi Hsia raids with
characteristic inaction, and no further efforts were made to peaceably resolve
the border conflict. To a certain extent, Ssu-ma Kuang and his successors had
succeeded in overturning the irredentist border policies of Wang An-shih and
Ts’ai Ch’üeh, but a permanent peace remained beyond their grasp. The fragile
truce between the two empires would hold until 1096, when the restored
reformist regime of Chang Tun would launch a full-scale assault upon the
Tanguts.
The end of an era: The death of Ssu-ma Kuang
Having vanquished the empire’s great perils and succeeded in his quixotic
mission to turn back the clock to the 1060s, Ssu-ma Kuang could at last die in
some semblance of peace. Under the aegis of Dowager Empress Hsüan-jen and
the domineering influence of Ssu-ma Kuang, a negative policy agenda had been
pushed through court, substituting conservatism for activism, withdrawal for
expansionism. But the antireformist victory was to be ephemeral, for on the
first day of the ninth month of 1086 their leader, Ssu-ma Kuang, succumbed to
lingering illness at the age of sixty-seven. In a eulogistic memorial, Wang Yensou acknowledged that the passing of such a singularly dedicated statesman
as Ssu-ma Kuang had left behind a void at court that could never be filled by
mere mortals:
When Your Majesty assumed the throne, the empire hoped that You would employ Ssu-ma
Kuang to administer the government, and that You would trust his counsel in order to
eliminate the harm which has been done to the empire. Only Kuang possessed a sincere
95
96
For the terms of the truce, see SS 486, p. 14016; and HCP (1979) 429, p. 10370. Mi-chih corresponds to
modern-day Mi-chih county in Shensi, and Chia-lu corresponds to modern-day Chia county in Shensi.
Fu-t’u lies to the west of modern-day Sui-te county, Shensi, while An-ch’iang is located to the northwest
of modern-day Ch’ing-yang county, Kansu.
For more details on the prisoner exchange, see SS 17, p. 330; HCP (1979) 432, pp. 10425–6; 434,
pp. 10467–9; 435, p. 10489; and 438, pp. 10533–4.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
509
heart which sympathized with the state and cherished the people. . . . Who will again
take the empire’s heart as his own, the people’s intentions as his own? Who will toil to
exhaustion all night long and sacrifice himself as Kuang did?97
Even for Su Shih, who had acrimoniously broken ranks with his patron
over the issue of hired service, the death of Ssu-ma Kuang was an epochal
moment that “touched the hearts of men, and shook Heaven and Earth.”98
According to the Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien ch’ang-pien, Ssu-ma’s death incited
a great popular outcry among the inhabitants of K’ai-feng, who snapped up
huge quantities of his printed portrait and mourned him as if he were their own
kinsman.99 The death of Ssu-ma Kuang was acknowledged by contemporaries
to be an irreparable loss, and by later historians to be a watershed moment in
political life. In the following years of the regency, and for the remainder of
the Northern Sung, the antireform coalition would never surpass the heroics
of the early regency. Dominated by the stellar figure of Ssu-ma Kuang, 1085
and 1086 would be known as the golden years of the conservative coalition, a
brief but spectacular event. The chief councilor had managed to temporarily
short-circuit the deep divisions within the antireform coalition, which erupted
to the surface soon after its moment of triumph.
political gridlock: 1086–1093
The splintering of the antireform coalition: Shuo versus Lo versus Shu
Left without a paramount leader to guide them and without an organized resistance to fight, and already partially disunited by protracted policy debates,
the members of the antireform coalition began to attack each other. As far
as domestic policy was concerned, the remainder of the Hsüan-jen regency
was relatively eventless. Policy debates were few and far between, and only
incremental adjustments were made to the policies established in 1085–6.
What did occupy the attentions of courtiers was the endless cycle of indictments and recriminations that gridlocked the imperial court for the next
eight years. Even before the death of Ssu-ma Kuang, fissures had developed
within the coalition, but they now threatened its very foundations. Annals
of the years from 1087 to 1093 read like a litany of political infighting, in
which ministers and remonstrators volleyed polemics at each other, seeking
to purge the court of their political and personal adversaries. The traditional
historiography of the Yüan-yu period identifies three discrete regional court
97
98
99
HCP (1979) 387, pp. 9416–17.
HCP (1979) 387, p. 9416.
See n. 12 and HCP (1979) 387, p. 9415.
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ari daniel levine
factions (tang): the Shuo faction, comprised largely of men from Ho-pei; the
Lo faction, associated with Lo-yang; and the Shu faction, headed by men
from Szechwan. When these three coalitions were not contending for power
and jockeying for position, they were besieging a fourth faction: the defeated
reformists, who were assumed to be waiting in the wings and poised for a
comeback.
Dominant at court throughout the regency, the Shuo faction claimed to be
the ideological heirs of Ssu-ma Kuang, and boasted such stalwart antireformist
remonstrators as Liu Chih, Liang T’ao, Wang Yen-sou, and Liu An-shih within
its ranks. Political pragmatists who sought truth from facts, the men of Shuo
viewed statecraft through the prism of historical analogy. Over the course of
the regency, its members managed to control the commanding heights of the
bureaucracy, with Liu Chih and Liang T’ao ensconced in positions of administrative authority, and Wang Yen-sou and Liu An-shih placed in powerful
censorial and remonstrance posts. Occupying the political mainstream, the
men of Shuo would subdue their rivals by expelling the most voluble dissident elements – the iconoclasts of Shu and the zealots of Lo – from court. At
the same time, the leaders of the Shuo faction would co-opt more pliant political figures into its patronage organization. By the early 1090s, the governing
coalition of Liu Chih would ultimately absorb many members from both the
Lo and Shu factions.
To the right of the Shuo faction stood the Lo faction of Ch’eng I, who
would earn himself a place of honor in Southern Sung historiography as the
progenitor of the Tao-hsüeh movement, and his supporters Chia I and Chu
Kuang-t’ing. Serving in prominent academic and remonstrance posts, Ch’eng
and his lieutenants were in the ascendant in the early years of the regency. Their
fundamentalist approach to ethics and ritual – and their eventual persecution
by the reformist ministry of the Hui-tsung reign – would earn them a place of
honor in the twelfth- and thirteenth-century histories of the Tao-hsüeh movement. While the Shuo faction were pragmatic historicists, the men of Lo were
classical ideologues, radicals in the original sense of the word, envisioning the
revival of the Way of antiquity through ritual practice and textual exegesis.
But in the context of the late eleventh century, the men of Lo were generally
considered to be extremists.100 Ch’eng I himself was out of his element in the
world of politics; he would fail to establish himself as a lasting presence at
court, serving only a year and a half as Che-tsung’s principal tutor. But Chia
I and Chu Kuang-t’ing would survive the infighting of early Yüan-yu, as the
100
For an intellectual biography of Ch’eng I and an adept analysis of his central role in Sung intellectual history as a transitional figure between ku-wen and Tao-hsüeh, see Bol, “This culture of ours,”
pp. 300–42.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
511
remaining men of Lo would gradually merge into the Shuo coalition of Liu
Chih by the end of the regency.101
Ch’eng I’s principal antagonist was the political iconoclast and literary lion
Su Shih, who had been accused of forming a Shu faction with his brother Su
Ch’e and his fellow Szechwanese Lü T’ao and K’ung Wen-chung. Due to their
preeminent positions in Sung intellectual history, Su Shih’s bitter contention
with Ch’eng I has become the stuff of legend. During the Hsüan-jen regency,
Su Shih’s position at court was extremely precarious. Caught up in a series
of literary inquisitions for alleged slanders against the throne, Su was exiled
from the capital nearly every other year, only to be rehabilitated after serving
a single tour of duty outside the capital. Su Ch’e and Lü T’ao, in contrast,
were adept political survivors, remaining in high positions at court for most
of the regency, and continuing to launch reprisals against Chia I and Chu
Kuang-t’ing, their counterparts in the Lo faction. And when the brothers Su
or Lü T’ao were denounced by their antagonists from Shuo or Lo, they were
frequently accused of being closet reformists. Traditional historiography has
maligned the Shu faction, accusing them of instigating factional discord, but
their political tenacity throughout the regency would suggest otherwise.
The internal dissension that plagued the antireform coalition during the
Yüan-yu era, and diverted attention from the real business of governing, was
far less destructive than the preceding (and succeeding) hostilities between the
reformists and antireformists. The gates of the imperial court became revolving
doors, as those who were purged from court for one reason or another – whether
men of Shuo, Lo, or Shu – invariably found their way back to K’ai-feng after
a year or two. Only members of the Yüan-feng reformist coalition, or those
suspected of being reformist sympathizers, were the prominent exceptions to
this rule. Once the antireform coalition had first purged and then pardoned its
own for two or three years, they began to unite against a manufactured enemy.
While they were scapegoating such exiled and powerless reformists as Ts’ai
Ch’üeh and Chang Tun, prominent antireformists from all three cliques lived in
constant fear of a reformist comeback. Hence, most of the casualties of Yüanyu factionalism were actual reformists or those members of the antireform
coalition who were suspected of concealing reformist sympathies.
Although useful as a heuristic device, the historiographic division of the
antireform coalition into three discrete factions belies the chaos and complexity
of political life in the late Northern Sung. First of all, the members of these socalled factions and cliques (tang and p’eng-tang) would never have applied those
words to describe their own court coalitions. While councilors and censors
101
Ch’eng I had been appointed tutor to Che-tsung in the third month of 1086, from near obscurity, on
the recommendation of Ssu-ma Kuang and Lü Kung-chu. See HCP (1979) 373, p. 9029.
512
ari daniel levine
constantly accused their opponents of the egregious offense of factionalism,
no one at court would ever have admitted to actually having formed a faction.
In late Northern Sung political discourse, factions were seen as inherently
inimical to the primary ministerial virtue of public mindedness (kung), and
as the embodiment of nefariously self-serving behavior (ssu).102 Only one’s
political enemies deserved the appellation tang. In countless indictments of
the Yüan-yu period, the accused were invariably charged with the heinous
crime of having formed factions.
Second, during the Yüan-yu era, factional battle lines were not as clearly
drawn as traditional historiography would have its readers believe. For these
political divisions were by no means hard and fast, and perhaps court factions
should be conceptualized as constantly shifting coalitions rather than as monolithic party blocs. Nor were they either discrete regional groupings of northeasterners, northwesterners, and Szechwanese or representatives of distinct
regional socioeconomic interests, such as northwestern magnates or southeastern merchants. Furthermore, not everyone joined coalitions, for several notable
figures at court, such as Lü Ta-fang, Fan Ch’un-jen, and Fan Tsu-yü, remained
neutral and nonaligned. Moreover, Yüan-yu factions were unstable, readily
fissioning into smaller agglomerations of scholar-officials, as policy debates
and personal animosities drove their members apart. In the absence of major
debates over policy after 1086, factional infighting tended to revolve around
personality clashes. Perhaps the infighting between Lo and Shu would be better thought of as an extension of the personal animosity between Ch’eng I
and Su Shih. These were not tightly disciplined political machines, but rather
loose affiliations that clustered around central figures.
Third, traditional and modern historians have associated the Shuo, Lo, and
Shu factions, as well as the reform group, with discrete regional traditions of
intellectual production and learning. The clash between Lo and Shu has been
depicted as an ideological schism between northeastern Tao-hsüeh (Learning of
the Way) and the “Szechwanese learning” (Shu-hsüeh) of the brothers Su.103 A
broad chasm indeed separated the philosophies of Ch’eng I and Su Shih, and
their most fundamental point of disagreement revolved around the relationship
of culture and values. The most prominent literatus of his time, Su Shih
102
103
For an analysis of factional discourse during the Yüan-yu era, see chapter 5 of Ari D. Levine, “A house
in darkness: The politics of history and the language of politics in the late Northern Song, 1066–1126”
(diss., Columbia University, 2002).
See Lei Fei-lung, “Pei Sung hsin-chiu tang-cheng yü ch’i hsüeh-shu cheng-ts’e chih kuan-hsi,” Kuo-li
Cheng-chih ta-hsüeh hsüeh-pao 11 (1965), pp. 201–44. Also see Ho Man-tzu, “Yüan-yu Shu-Lo tangcheng ho Su Shih ti fan Tao-hsüeh tou-cheng (shang),” Sung-liao hsüeh-pao: She-hui k’o-hsüeh pan 2
(1984), pp. 1–7; Wang Tseng-yü, “Lo, Shu, Shuo tang-cheng pien,” in Chin-hsin-chi: Chang Cheng-lang
hsien-sheng pa-shih ch’ing-shou lun-wen-chi, ed. Wu Jung-tseng (Peking, 1996), pp. 351–69.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
513
viewed the literary (wen) as the embodiment of moral values, and cultural
forms as the articulation of the sagely Way. Denying the centrality of literary
expression, and severing the link between culture and ethics, Ch’eng I preached
that true values could be found within, through a rigorous process of selfcultivation.104 However, while the ideologies of Ch’eng I and Su Shih were
diametrically opposed, one would be mistaken to characterize Su Shih as a
vociferous opponent of Tao-hsüeh, which did not exist as a clearly defined
philosophical system until the Southern Sung.105 Since the boundaries between
Shuo, Lo, and Shu learning were drawn and rigidified long after the fact, it
makes far more sense to describe the factional infighting of the Yüan-yu era
as primarily a political rather than an intellectual phenomenon. Though the
collision between Ch’eng I and Su Shih did indeed take on philosophical
overtones, it was basically a personal struggle for power between two extreme
personalities.
Fourth, to complicate matters even further, overall political discord was
exacerbated by the separation of powers between the Council of State and
the Censorate, which inevitably kindled hostilities between councilors and
remonstrators.106 During the late 1080s and early 1090s, chief councilors
and censors engaged in a drawn-out game of tug-of-war, whose players were
not divided by factional battle lines. Throughout the Hsüan-jen regency,
remonstrance and surveillance organs remained firmly under the thumb of
chief councilors. Councilors succeeded in manipulating the Censorate and
the Remonstrance Bureau into vilifying their political enemies and shielding
themselves from hostile remonstrance. When individual censors remonstrated
against ministerial high-handedness or called attention to the failings of court
policy, councilors would frequently have them dismissed and purged for what
they perceived as slander. As the three factions battled each other, an institutional conflict simultaneously unfolded, as councilors consolidated their dominance over the workings of the central government by increasing their control
over remonstrance and surveillance.
Hence, the constant state of political flux during the Hsüan-jen regency
defies any historiographic attempt to extract signal from noise, to impose a
rational analysis upon chaos. To be sure, the nine years of the Yüan-yu era
(1086–94) witnessed protracted hostilities between three coalitions, and this
factional infighting paralyzed the imperial court. But one must be careful not
to overdraw the boundaries between these coalitions, and not to describe them
104
105
106
See Bol, “This culture of ours,” pp. 254–345.
See Lo, Pei Sung tang-cheng yen-chiu, pp. 181–4.
For an analysis of the central role played by the Censorate and the Remonstrance Bureau in the factional
conflict of the late Northern Sung, see Shen, “Pei Sung t’ai-chien chih-tu yü tang-cheng,” pp. 27–44.
514
ari daniel levine
as stable entities with regionally exclusive memberships and distinct ideologies. When the men of Shuo attempted to purge the men of Shu from the
metropolitan bureaucracy, and when the men of Shu launched invective at the
men of Lo, their rivalry was primarily personal and political. The political history of these nine years is extremely convoluted and involuted, and limitations
of space prevent anything but a summary of its highlights.
Missing the mark: Su Shih versus Ch’eng I
According to the received narratives of Yüan-yu era political history, the death
of Ssu-ma Kuang marked the official starting point of factional infighting. As
the thirteenth-century commentator Lü Chung described the unsettled situation at court in late 1086: “Ssu-ma Kuang died one day, and the factional
disputes began the next. If Ssu-ma Kuang were still alive, then the true gentlemen (chün-tzu) would still have remained, and the calamity of factions certainly
would not have occurred.”107 In traditional historiography, the point of origin of the Lo-Shu feud was Ssu-ma Kuang’s funeral, where the animosity
between Ch’eng I and Su Shih first reared its ugly head. According to most
retellings, Ch’eng I was responsible for administering protocol at the funeral,
where his punctilious adherence to ancient ritual forms provoked a burst of
mockery from Su Shih. Before attending the funeral, Su had participated in
an amnesty-conferral ceremony, at which music had been played and sung.
Ch’eng adamantly refused to admit Su to the funeral hall, citing the Analects
passage “On the day the Master mourned, he never sang.” Su struck back with
the witty epigram, “I have heard of not singing after you mourn, but I have
never heard of not mourning after you sing,” after which all assembled mocked
Ch’eng I for being ridiculously inflexible.108
While Su Shih had clearly made a laughingstock of Ch’eng I, it is doubtful
that nine years of vicious infighting could have begun with a single jest at Ssuma Kuang’s funeral. The antireform coalition had already been cracking apart
for a year, and it is unlikely that Su Shih cast the final stone that shattered
its fragile unity. Such accusations were made long after the fact, after the
intellectual lineage of Ch’eng I had triumphed over that of Su Shih in the
twelfth century. Moreover, Su Shih was not alone in criticizing Ch’eng for
107
108
Lü, Sung ta-shih-chi chiang-i 19, p. 11b.
For an extended narrative of Su Shih’s personal, political, and ideological disputes with Ch’eng I, see
Egan, Word, image, and deed in the life of Su Shi, pp. 93–8. For a discussion of the discrepancies between
each of the retellings, see Lo, Pei Sung tang-cheng yen-chiu, pp. 180–1. For one version of the story, plus
extensive commentary, see HCP (1979) 393, pp. 9569–73. Also see Shao Po, Shao-shih wen-chien hou-lu,
ed. Liu Te-ch’üan and Li Chien-hsiung (1157; Peking, 1983) 20, pp. 159–60; and Ch’eng Hao and
Ch’eng I, Erh Ch’eng chi, ed. Wang Hsiao-yü (Peking, 1981) 11, pp. 415–16.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
515
his rigidly dogmatic approach to classical texts and ancient ritual. Even so
mainstream a political figure as Liu Chih, a leader of the Shuo faction, had
expressed his doubts about Ch’eng I’s approach to classical hermeneutics, and
questioned his harsh approach to tutoring Che-tsung.109 Many at court, from
both the Shu and Shuo factions, resented the meteoric rise of Ch’eng I –
who two years before had been a commoner with no history of bureaucratic
service whatsoever – to the lofty (and to some, undeserved) position of the
emperor’s principal tutor. Almost immediately, Ch’eng had attracted several
well-placed followers, including Chia I, Chu Kuang-t’ing, and Wang Yensou; his formation of a clique naturally aroused the suspicion of many at court.
Moreover, his rivals were apprehensive about the way Ch’eng was discharging
his tutorial duties, believing that he was abusing his privileged position at
court to isolate and manipulate the young emperor and thus to further his own
career. Clearly, then, Su Shih was not the only one who suspected Ch’eng I of
treachery and factiousness.
Whatever the origins of the strife between Lo and Shu, Su Shih’s alleged
mockery of Ch’eng I did not go unpunished. The factional infighting began
in earnest in the final month of 1086, when Chu Kuang-t’ing remonstrated
to have Su Shih dismissed from his post as Han-lin academician (Han-lin
hsüeh-shih). Chu accused Su Shih of having slandered the deceased Emperors
Jen-tsung and Shen-tsung in this examination question:
The court wishes to model itself after the loyalty and magnanimity of Jen-tsung, but is
concerned that bureaucrats would not perform the duties for which they are responsible,
and that this would result in laxity. On the other hand, it wishes to make laws with the
dedication and determination of Shen-tsung, but fears that the supervisory and prefectural
officials would not understand the intent behind them, and that this would result in
harshness.110
In Chu’s forced interpretation, Su Shih was supposedly denigrating Jentsung for “laxness,” and Shen-tsung for his “harshness.” Censors and remonstrators of the Shuo faction, including Wang Yen-sou and Fu Yao-yü, also
concurred that Su Shih had blasphemed the memory of the late emperors,
urging Su Shih’s dismissal from court.111 Ironically, many members of the
antireform coalition had employed far more polemical and offensive language
to describe the reign of Shen-tsung as a time of misrule and corruption.
Events soon turned in Su Shih’s favor, when Palace Censor Lü T’ao came
to his defense, unable to remain silent while his comrade (and fellow Szechwanese) was being victimized by factional collusion. Quite convincingly, Lü
109
110
111
HCP (1979) 373, pp. 9031–3.
HCP (1979) 393, pp. 9564–6.
HCP (1979) 394, pp. 9598–9601.
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claimed that Chu’s indictment of Su Shih was a factionally motivated frame-up,
a misguided attempt to avenge Su’s insult of Ch’eng I.112 In his own defense,
Su Shih denied any intention of slandering the former emperors, explaining
that he had used the terms “laxity” and “harshness” to allude to ministerial
incompetence in the present court. Eloquently rising to the occasion, Su proclaimed his innocence, accusing his accusers of deliberately misinterpreting
and misrepresenting his words: “The pattern of the writing is extremely clear,
as plain as black and white – how could there even be a single hair which merits
suspicion?”113 Convinced by Su Shih’s arguments in his own defense, Hsüanjen exonerated him in the first month of 1087 of the trumped-up charges.114
A few weeks later, Chu Kuang-t’ing was dismissed from the capital and sent
to supervise disaster relief in Ho-pei, a move that was not entirely unrelated
to his assaults upon Su Shih.115 Disappointed with Hsüan-jen’s ruling, the
enemies of Su Shih continued to call for his dismissal. In the third month of
1087, a censorial cabal comprised of Ch’eng I’s allies branded Su a traitor for
his stubborn opposition to drafted service, but again did not succeed in forcing
his resignation.116
Meanwhile, there were increasing calls from several remonstrators, including Supervising Secretary (chi-shih-chung) Ku Lin, for the resignation of Ch’eng
I as imperial tutor. Ch’eng attributed the hostility of his aggressors to the general depravity and ignorance of a fallen age, portraying himself as the savior
of the Way of antiquity, and accusing them of precipitating a general crisis of
culture and values.117 The political writings of Ch’eng I, marked by moralistic severity and fundamentalist messianic fervor, inhabit an entirely different
discursive universe than those of his contemporaries, who would never have
accused their accusers in such terms. At any rate, Ch’eng still possessed sufficient influence at court to move against his accusers, engineering Ku’s dismissal
from his remonstrance post, a move that met with broad-based protest from
such representatives of the Shuo and Shu factions as Liang T’ao and Su Shih.118
But the time would soon come when Ch’eng I could no longer defend himself
from his adversaries, who were more powerful and better protected than the
hapless Ku Lin.
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
HCP (1979) 393, pp. 9568–9.
HCP (1979) 394, pp. 9594–8; “Pien shih-kuan chih ts’e-wen cha-tzu,” in Su, Su Shih wen-chi 27,
pp. 788–93.
HCP (1979) 394, p. 9607.
HCP (1979) 395, p. 9626.
HCP (1979) 397, pp. 9681–2.
HCP (1979) 397, pp. 9674–9; “You shang Taihuang Taihou shu,” in Ch’eng and Ch’eng, Erh Ch’eng
chi 6, pp. 549–52.
HCP (1979) 398, pp. 9703–5. Ku Lin was dismissed from the capital and appointed fiscal commissioner
in chief (tu chuan-yün shih) of Ho-pei.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
517
Institutional tensions: Councilors versus remonstrators
As illustrated by the forcible dismissal of Ku Lin, the tripartite Lo-Shuo-Shu
struggle was intertwined and concurrent with an institutional conflict between
the Council of State and the Censorate. During the Hsüan-jen regency chief
councilors restricted the ambit of remonstrance, continuing an organizational
trend that originated during the ministerial regime of Wang An-shih.119
Despite the antireformists’ professed desire to open the roads of remonstrance
during their takeover of the bureaucracy in 1085, their ministerial regime
in fact seriously infringed upon the independence of remonstrators. But by
1087, free and autonomous remonstrance had become a political liability for
the antireformist regime, which could no longer tolerate dissent from within
its own ranks. Those unfortunate members of the Censorate and Remonstrance
Bureau who dared speak out against ministerial abuses of power were summarily dismissed, thereby provoking the outrage of their fellow remonstrators,
regardless of their factional affiliations.
A case in point was the dismissal of the investigating censor (chien-ch’a
yü-shih) Chang Shun-min in the fourth month of 1087. Chang had issued an
outspoken critique of the border policies and the patronage system of Wen Yenpo, the elderly conservative who had replaced Ssu-ma Kuang as chief councilor
of the left.120 When Wen and Lü Kung-chu ordered Chang purged from the
Censorate, howls of protest immediately erupted from his fellow remonstrators,
who objected to the arbitrary circumstances behind his dismissal. Fu Yao-yü
and Wang Yen-sou, the acting administrators of the Censorate, spoke valiantly
in defense of Chang Shun-min: “Censors are Your Majesty’s eyes and ears. If
chief councilors are harboring treachery, embracing wickedness, and forming
cliques, then [censors] must speak out about their crimes and call for their
dismissal.”121 According to Fu and Wang, the Council of State had abrogated
the autonomy of remonstrance organs, a high-handed move to obstruct the
censure of ministerial malfeasance.
In the days to follow, nearly the entire Censorate and Remonstrance Bureau
memorialized the throne to demand Chang’s return, chastening the Council
of State for their high-handedness. Chang’s supporters were a diverse group,
comprising members of all three factions – Liang T’ao, Fu Yao-yü, and Wang
Yen-sou of Shuo; Chu Kuang-t’ing of Lo; and Lü T’ao of Shu – all of whom
would be dismissed and demoted before long. After his demotion to a prefectural post in the fifth month of 1087, Liang T’ao went down fighting,
119
120
121
Shen, “Pei Sung t’ai-chien chih-tu yü tang-cheng,” pp. 32–6.
HCP (1979) 399, pp. 9722–3.
HCP (1979) 399, pp. 9723–5.
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ari daniel levine
offering a spirited defense of censorial prerogatives in “rectifying institutions
and revering the court,” which were being undermined by state councilor
interference.122 But despite his factional loyalties to his fellow men of Shuo,
Liu Chih, the influential assistant director of the right of the Department of
State Affairs (shang-shu yu-ch’eng), could not prevent the demotion of Liang
T’ao. Nor could he intervene when his comrades Wang Yen-sou and Fu Yaoyü were both demoted to similarly humiliating posts outside the capital mere
days later.123 In the process of purging Chang Shun-min and his supporters from the metropolitan bureaucracy, the Council of State had reestablished
its control over remonstrance organs. While the Censorate and the Remonstrance Bureau could be employed in a lateral fashion by political antagonists
to indict one another, vertical remonstration against chief councilors was now
out of bounds.
The widening chasm: Lo versus Shu
The defenders of Chang Shun-min had spanned factional fault lines in a failed
effort to protect the autonomy of remonstrance organs from ministerial interference. But this spirit of cooperation was extremely short-lived, giving way to
renewed bickering between Lo and Shu. Both sides manipulated the Censorate
and the Remonstrance Bureau for partisan advantage, using allied remonstrators to fire off broadsides against their rivals. In its first phase, from 1087
to 1088, the Lo-Shu factional feud claimed all of the prominent members of
both sides (with the sole exception of the moderate Su Ch’e) as casualties.
These years would witness a progressive polemicization of political culture,
as mean-spirited debates and character assassinations permanently fractured
what remained of the antireform coalition.
Even though such members of the Lo faction as Chu Kuang-t’ing had rallied to the defense of Chang Shun-min, Ch’eng I and his lieutenant Chia I
apparently exploited the case for partisan gain. After their efforts to prosecute a literary inquisition against Su Shih proved fruitless, the Lo faction
utilized the last of their dwindling political capital to strike against Lü T’ao,
Su Shih’s staunchest supporter. In the seventh month of 1087, Lü was belatedly
indicted for his opposition to Chang’s dismissal, sacked from the Censorate, and
demoted to a circuit-level post in Ching-hsi. Firing off parting shots against
the Lo faction, Lü represented himself as the innocent victim of a factionally
122
123
HCP (1979) 401, pp. 9761–2. Liang was demoted to the post of prefect of Lu-chou.
For Liu Chih’s condemnation of Liang Tao, see HCP (1979) 401, pp. 9763–5. Fu Yao-yü and Wang
Yen-sou were demoted to the posts of administrator of Ch’en-chou and Ch’i-chou, respectively. See
HCP (1979) 401, p. 9780.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
519
motivated frame-up, naming Ch’eng I and Chia I as the hidden agents who
initiated his expulsion from court, and issuing a blanket denial of any personal
participation whatsoever in partisan hostilities. According to Lü, Ch’eng and
Chia were the agents provocateur who had initiated his expulsion from court,
and the true perpetrators of factional treachery, for they had exploited the
Censorate to avenge a private vendetta.124
Such subterfuges would not go unpunished, and Ch’eng I and Chia I soon
met with their retribution. Once the Shuo faction became involved, political
momentum slipped away from the men of Lo and into the hands of its enemies.
Early in the eighth month of 1087, Chia I was dismissed from his censorial
position, banished from the capital, and appointed prefect of Huai-chou.125
After failing in his bid to indict Su Shih for having written a slanderous examination question, Chia had accused Wen Yen-po, the venerable chief councilor
of the right, of protecting Su and of being the real leader of the Shu faction.
Understandably, Wen was enraged at these allegations, as were Lü Kung-chu
and Hsüan-jen, who arranged for Chia I’s dismissal from the Censorate.126 By
accusing Wen Yen-po of factional collusion, Chia I had aroused the ire of the
Shuo faction and sealed the fate of the men of Lo. Censorial attempts to impeach
chief councilors could not be tolerated, especially not careless mudslinging.
The very same day, Ch’eng I was expelled from his post as chief tutor to
Emperor Che-tsung, and demoted to an inconsequential post in the Lo-yang
branch of the Directorate of Education (Kuo-tzu chien). Su Shih’s ally K’ung
Wen-chung, the grand master of remonstrance (chien-i ta-fu), had indicted
Ch’eng I on several counts. K’ung first charged Ch’eng with exploiting his
position as Classics Mat lecturer for personal gain, and with attempting to
brainwash and isolate the young and impressionable emperor.127 Moreover, he
questioned Ch’eng I’s scholarly pedantry and assailed his approach to classical
hermeneutics as rife with misinterpretations. Even worse according to K’ung,
Ch’eng had formed a faction with his cronies Chu Kuang-t’ing and Chia I to
impugn righteous men like Lü T’ao and to mount a hostile takeover of the
state apparatus. Another censor linked to Su Shih further elaborated upon the
shortcomings of Ch’eng I, recommending Cheng’s immediate expulsion from
court. His political career was over. For the rest of his life, Ch’eng would not
return to K’ai-feng, and would serve only intermittently in Lo-yang. He had
failed to single-handedly halt the moral decline of the empire, to change the
system from within. Ch’eng I’s fall from grace at court would lead him to
124
125
126
127
HCP (1979) 403, pp. 9814–16.
HCP (1979) 404, p. 9828.
HCP (1979) 404, p. 9828.
HCP (1979) 404, pp. 9829–31.
520
ari daniel levine
permanently distrust political solutions to what he considered to be a fundamental cultural crisis and would influence the Tao-hsüeh movement to assume
an oppositionist stance toward the state.
Su Shih managed to survive the partisan friction for another year, but he was
ultimately forced to request his own dismissal from court after being constantly
hounded by remonstrators. While the Lo faction no longer represented a serious
threat to his political survival, he had made many enemies in the course of
his political career, with his iconoclastic views and combative personality.
Evidently, Su Shih’s clashes with Ssu-ma Kuang over drafted service had earned
him the everlasting scorn of the Shuo faction. In a memorial to Che-tsung, Su
protested the lockstep political conformity of Ssu-ma’s successors: “The various
censors and remonstrators all desired to conform to Kuang’s intentions, in
order to seek advancement. . . . They formed a faction and blocked dissenting
opinions. . . . They never understood that Kuang had devoted himself to the
people with extreme sincerity, and did not intend for men to conform with
him.”128
Furthermore, Su Shih and Lü Tao had recently been denounced as a Szechwanese faction by Han Wei, the current vice-director of the Chancellery.129
Su’s words and actions in recent years had done little to endear him to the
political mainstream, and it was no great shock when various remonstrators
set upon him. In the twelfth month of 1087 and the first month of 1088,
two conservative remonstrators accused Su of exhibiting favoritism toward
certain degree candidates before they had even sat for examination.130 Later
in 1088, Chao T’ing-chih, a long-standing enemy since the Yüan-feng era,
sought revenge against Su Shih, repeatedly demanding Su’s dismissal from
the Han-lin Academy.131 Chao fabricated slander charges against Su, bringing back his examination question of 1086, and also accusing him of having
slandered Emperor Che-tsung by citing a line from the Book of poetry (Shihching) that alluded to the suffering of the common people. Su dismissed Chao’s
128
129
130
131
HCP (1979) 415, pp. 10077–80; “Ch’i chün cha-tzu,” in Su, Su Shih wen-chi 29, pp. 827–30.
In the seventh month of 1087, Lü T’ao and Su Ch’e were involved in a successful plot to dismiss Han
Wei from the Chancellery and demote him to the post of prefect of Teng-chou2. For more details, see
HCP (1979) 403, pp. 9807–19.
HCP (1979) 407, p. 9914; 408, pp. 9922–3.
Chao T’ing-chih’s enmity toward Su Shih had many roots. First, during the late Yüan-feng era, when
Chao T’ing-chih had served as vice-prefect (t’ung-p’an) in Te-chou (Ho-pei East), Su Shih’s protégé
Huang T’ing-chien criticized him for his excessive zeal in implementing the state trade policy in an
area where the peasantry was already impoverished. Second, in early Yüan-yu, when Chao T’ing-chih
was summoned to court as an examination official (shih-kuan), Su Shih memorialized to overturn the
appointment, arguing that Chao was ignorant and petty. Third, Su Shih’s brother Su Ch’e had once
memorialized against Chao T’ing-chih’s father-in-law, Kuo Kai. For Su Shih’s explanation, see HCP
(1979) 415, p. 10078; “Ch’i chün cha-tzu,” in Su, Su Shih wen-chi 29, pp. 827–8.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
521
charges as utterly laughable: “If Chao T’ing-chih considers this to have slandered the emperor, this is like saying black is white and west is east. His
accusations are without even the slightest semblance of truth.”132 Unable to
endure an unending censorial assault, and without defenders in the Council
of State, Su made frequent requests for a transfer away from the capital. In
the third month of 1089, Su was appointed prefect of Hang-chou, where he
enjoyed a well-deserved respite from his legion of detractors.133
By early 1089, the Lo-Shu factional conflict had run its course, and the
principal combatants from both sides had been expelled from the capital.
But their sentences would be commuted in the very near future, when all but
Ch’eng I would be politically rehabilitated and returned to influential academic
and censorial positions. Lü T’ao would be the first to return to court, after his
reappointment to the Censorate in the summer of 1089. Chia I worked his way
back into the Censorate by mid-1090, and Su Shih would be reappointed to
the Han-lin Academy early in 1091. Of course, the backbiting between Lo and
Shu would continue in more subdued form for the rest of the regency. But after
several years of purging each other from court on various trumped-up charges,
members of the ruling coalition would find their chief enemies elsewhere. The
first half of the Yüan-yu era had been wasted with partisan infighting, but
political life in the succeeding years would be marked by antagonism of a
different kind.
The cultivation of hatred: The banishment of Ts’ai Ch’üeh
There was one cause that could unify nearly everyone at court during the
Hsüan-jen regency: fear and loathing of the reformists. No longer distracted
by infighting at court, remonstrators sought hard-to-miss targets outside the
capital. Upon their dismissal in 1086, both Ts’ai Ch’üeh and Chang Tun had
been permitted to retain their honorary titles, a fact that still rankled their foes.
Thus, no one was taken aback when the censor Liu An-shih accused Chang
Tun of having coerced Su-chou commoners into illegal land deals in the final
month of 1088, and Chang was subsequently demoted one titular rank.134
Compared to his factional patron, Chang Tun got off with a mere slap on the
wrist in this darkly farcical purge of the purged.
For Ts’ai Ch’üeh, the exiled leader of the reformists, stood as the embodiment of the collective hatred of the governing coalition. Although Ts’ai was
132
133
134
HCP (1979) 415, p. 10080; “Ch’i chün cha-tzu,” in Su, Su Shih wen-chi 29, pp. 829–30. For an extended
narrative of this episode see Egan, Word, image, and deed in the life of Su Shi, pp. 100–1.
HCP (1979) 424, pp. 10251–3.
HCP (1979) 420, pp. 10174–81; 464, p. 11085.
ari daniel levine
522
conveniently out of the way far from the capital, and hence no longer a threat
to the survival of the current regime, many lived in constant (and irrational)
apprehension of his possible return to the capital. In a memorial of early 1089,
Liu An-shih, ever the alarmist, issued a general warning to his comrades about
the ever-present danger of a reformist comeback: “The greater part of Ts’ai
Ch’üeh’s faction remains at court,” and await their chance to “seize power and
make chaos of governance.”135 The next month, Liu Chih warned Hsüan-jen
that the followers of Ts’ai Ch’üeh and Chang Tun had formed a fifth column,
waiting for their chance to strike at the heart of the empire.136
The collective hatred of Ts’ai Ch’üeh would take on concrete form once word
reached court of his scandalous and seditious activities in exile. In the fourth
month of 1089, Wu Ch’u-hou, the administrator of Han-yang chün (modern
Wu-han), memorialized the throne to accuse Ts’ai of having slandered and
satirized Hsüan-jen. Wu offered a critical reading of a cycle of ten quatrains
(chüeh-chü) entitled “Ascending the Carriage Canopy Pavilion in Summer,”
written while Ts’ai was serving as prefect of neighboring An-chou (Ching-hu
North). He alleged that two of these pieces of verse were “slanderous in the
extreme,” possessing “nuanced meanings, of which Ch’üeh desired the reader
to be oblivious.”137 According to Wu, the most abominable poem in the cycle
bemoaned the plight of Hao Ch’u-chün, a loyal minister who had served T’ang
Kao-tsung during the 670s and had once resided in An-chou:
Peerless was the famed minister Hao Ch’u-chün
During the Shang-yüan era, his words were loyal and his conduct just.
His fishing platform is overgrown with weeds, and none know its whereabouts;
Sighing in contemplation of this, I look down upon the jade bay.
In Wu’s interpretation of the quatrain, by associating himself with Hao,
Ts’ai was also drawing an analogy between Dowager Empress Hsüan-jen and
the T’ang dynasty empress Wu Tse-t’ien, the most infamous female usurper in
history. When the sick T’ang Kao-tsung wished to appoint the empress rather
than the heir apparent as temporary regent, Hao Ch’u-chün had protested
the move as an act of feminine encroachment upon the masculine sphere of
legitimate rulership. Thus, by honoring the memory of Empress Wu Tset’ien’s famed detractor, Ts’ai Ch’üeh was held to be casting aspersions at the
legitimacy of the Hsüan-jen regency.
An uproar ensued at court during the fifth month of 1089, with remonstrators falling over themselves to censure Ts’ai for his crime of blasphemy.
135
136
137
HCP (1979) 422, pp. 10222–3.
HCP (1979) 423, pp. 10239–45.
HCP (1979) 425, pp. 10270–3.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
523
Liang T’ao averred that Ts’ai deserved the ultimate punishment for his vicious
slanders: “Ch’üeh admires Hao Ch’u-chün, and I observe that his intention
was to claim that Hsüan-jen should not be ruling as regent. . . . Your servant
has repeatedly memorialized on the crimes and wickedness of Ts’ai Ch’üeh,
begging for his punishment according to the statutes. But this has not yet
been accomplished, and public-minded opinion is seething.”138
Many other hard-line members of the Censorate and the Remonstrance
Bureau, including Liu An-shih, Wang Yen-sou, Wu An-shih, and Fan Tsuyü, asserted that these poems were sufficient evidence of the overwhelming
treachery of Ts’ai Ch’üeh, and an indication that the reformists were waiting
for their chance to overthrow Hsüan-jen. The consensus at court urged the
application of the strictest penalty in the book to Ts’ai Ch’üeh: permanent
banishment to the malarial wastes of Kuang-nan, a rarely applied punishment
that amounted to a virtual death sentence.139
Facing certain punishment, Ts’ai Ch’üeh valiantly defended himself with
solicitous denials, but his words fell on deaf ears. First, he denied harboring
any ill will toward the current regime or the regent, claiming that his selfappointed poetry critics were seeing only what they wanted to see:
Your servant wrote several short poems, but neither a single verse nor a single character touched upon current affairs. . . . Officials have offered several commentaries that are
extraneous to these poems, and they arbitrarily consider them to be slanderous, ascribing
hidden meanings to them. If this is so, when everyone opens his mouth or sets down his
brush, even though these are unrelated to a certain matter, anyone can be incriminated for
a certain matter by those who claim that it has hidden meanings.140
Adhering to a literalist interpretation of his own verse, Ts’ai denied that his
allusion to Empress Wu Tse-t’ien was a veiled slander of Dowager Empress
Hsüan-jen, and affirmed his support for the legitimacy of her regency. His
poems, he professed to an incredulous audience, were purely evocative of natural scenes and allusive of past events, with no political implications whatsoever.
While they too refused to believe Ts’ai’s casuistic arguments in his own
defense, several major court figures voiced their principled defiance of the
bloodthirsty chorus who demanded his banishment to Kuang-nan. Su Shih,
recently exiled to Hang-chou and no stranger to literary inquisitions, begged
clemency for Ts’ai. While his crimes were indeed heinous, Su argued that
throwing the book at Ts’ai Ch’üeh would only harshen the current political
138
139
140
HCP (1979) 425, pp. 10273–6.
HCP (1979) 426, pp. 10305–7; 427, pp. 10315–16, 10319–20.
HCP (1979) 426, pp. 10301–5.
524
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climate and intensify the proscription of dissent.141 Fan Ch’un-jen, who
replaced the recently deceased Lü Kung-chu as the chief councilor of the left,
was appalled by the lack of evidence that Ts’ai Ch’üeh had even formed a faction
at court.142 Fan’s protests were quickly overruled by Hsüan-jen, assisted by
Lü Ta-fang, Wen Yen-po, and Liu Chih, who maintained that Ts’ai was indeed
the leader of a hidden faction at court. In this show trial atmosphere, it is no
wonder that the prosecution prevailed, and that Ts’ai received the maximum
sentence allowed by law. When the matter was debated before Hsüan-jen,
who was out for blood against her long-standing foe, the vengeful elements
at court rode roughshod over the voices of moderation. Plagued by fears that
a reformist conspiracy had penetrated the ranks of the metropolitan bureaucracy, and united by a common hatred of Ts’ai and his past machinations, the
Council of State achieved near unanimity on the issue.
Fan Ch’un-jen and Wang Ts’un – the assistant director of the right in the
Department of State Affairs – jeopardized their own careers to voice their loyal
opposition, a move that ultimately cost them their positions. Fan expressed
his deep anxiety that the regent’s decree would set a disastrous precedent
for the future of court politics.143 If a former minister could be entrapped
in a literary inquisition after a change of regimes had swept his adversaries
into power, then the members of the current regime would be liable to face
similar charges in the not-so-distant future. Whether good or evil, all who
were accused of factional intrigue would suffer a similar fate as Ts’ai Ch’üeh.
Moreover, pronouncing a virtual death sentence upon a former chief councilor
could not cure the epidemic of factionalism but would help perpetuate it, and
make rational political discussion impossible.144
Regardless of Fan’s impassioned arguments, Dowager Empress Hsüan-jen
decreed that Ts’ai Ch’üeh would be banished to Hsin-chou, Kuang-nan East
circuit (present-day Hsin-hsing, Kwangtung). Wang Ts’un and Fan Ch’unjen both begged for clemency for Ts’ai, pleading that “It is not permissible to
send Ts’ai Ch’üeh to a place of death.”145 When the regent and Wen Yen-po
refused to hear their appeals, Fan stood his ground, offering prescient words of
protest: “This road has been overgrown by thorns for seventy years. Why should
it be opened now? I fear that we will not avoid walking it ourselves.”146 To
permanently exile Ts’ai to the miasmic tropics would break with many decades
141
142
143
144
145
146
HCP (1979) 425, pp. 10277–8; “Ch’i hsing-ch’ien Ts’ai Ch’üeh cha-tzu,” in Su, Su Shih wen-chi 29,
p. 837.
HCP (1979) 426, p. 10298.
HCP (1979) 427, p. 10323.
HCP (1979) 427, pp. 10323–5.
HCP (1979) 427, p. 10326.
HCP (1979) 427, p. 10326.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
525
of dynastic tradition. When compared to past and future regimes, the Sung was
lenient as far as capital punishment was concerned. Court executions were all
but unknown in the Sung, and ministers had not been banished to the miasmic
fringes of the empire since Jen-tsung’s reign, when chief councilor Ting Wei
had also been banished to the far south. Hence, in the history of Northern Sung
politics, the banishment of Ts’ai Ch’üeh represented a crossing of the Rubicon,
ushering in an age of unprecedented brutality. If the reformists ever returned
to power, they would never forgive the current regime for ordering the death of
their leader on trumped-up charges, and the ministers of the Yüan-yu regime
would certainly be the first to be similarly punished.
Thus despite the eloquent pleas of Fan Ch’un-jen, the antireform era’s most
outspoken moderate, Ts’ai Ch’üeh was forcibly exiled to Kuang-nan. But he
was not to be the only political casualty of the day, as the same censorial
clique who had impeached Ts’ai Ch’üeh then turned on Fan Ch’un-jen and
Wang Ts’un as well. Liang T’ao and Liu An-shih memorialized that Fan and
Wang were closet reformists, somehow in league with Ts’ai.147 On the first
day of the sixth month of 1089, after Wen Yen-po and Lü Ta-fang insisted
to Hsüan-jen that Fan and Wang were key members of the nefarious faction
of Ts’ai Ch’üeh, Fan and Wang were dismissed from the Council of State and
demoted to prefectural-level positions. Fan and Wang would both return to
high positions in the capital after spending a few years away, but Ts’ai Ch’üeh
was not so fortunate. Having lived nearly four years in Hsin-chou, Ts’ai Ch’üeh
died in the first month of 1093, at the age of fifty-six. In a cruel irony, the
reformists would indeed stage a political comeback the next year, and, as
predicted by Fan Ch’un-Jen, they proved not to be kindly disposed toward the
men who had orchestrated their former leader’s show trial.
Conciliation and provocation: Politics in the late regency
The final years of the Hsüan-jen regency witnessed continued political gridlock
and renewed factional infighting. In the second month of 1090, when Wen
Yen-po retired as chief councilor at the age of ninety-one, having been forced
from office by Liu Chih and Wang Yen-sou, the old guard of the antireformists
was succeeded by a younger and more pragmatic generation. Even after the
more extreme elements were purged from court in the late 1080s, and the
conflict between Lo and Shu had petered out, long-term unity proved an
elusive goal for the conservative coalition. During the early 1090s, a rivalry
of sorts was slowly simmering between Lü Ta-fang and Liu Chih, the chief
councilors of the left and right. A caretaker figure at court who considered
147
HCP (1979) 428, pp. 10348–2.
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ari daniel levine
himself above petty partisanship, Lü resented the increasing power of Liu
Chih’s clique, but tacitly condoned Liu’s actions.148 Building upon the core
membership of the Shuo faction, Liu secured the allegiances of several of the
principal men of Lo to create a broad political coalition, not to mention a
serviceable patronage machine. Liu endeavored to further expand the reach of
his faction, and to palliate the enmity of the followers of Ts’ai Ch’üeh, however
belatedly, by recruiting reformists back into the metropolitan bureaucracy. Not
surprisingly, Liu Chih’s policy of reconciliation, an issue about which Hsüanjen remained indecisive, became a lightning rod for reproof from the militant
wing of the antireformists. Somewhere along the line, Lü Ta-fang broke ranks
with Liu and sided with his detractors, precipitating Liu’s dismissal from the
Council of State. Embodying both the conciliatory and provocative aspects of
court politics, Liu Chih affords a central figure around which to recount the
history of the late regency, a time in which the political system was afflicted
with paralysis and myopia.
When Liu Chih initiated his policy of factional détente in 1090, with the
implicit approval of Lü Ta-fang, it offered too little and came too late to assuage
the resentment of the reformists. Liu’s policy also alienated the more militant
elements at court, men who counted themselves outside of his governing
coalition. Owing to the resistance of militantly antireformist remonstrators,
the campaign of propitiation was brought to a near standstill. When Yüan-feng
partisans were summoned back to court, their appointments were invariably
overturned, only exacerbating the alienation of reformists. Regardless of how
badly they had failed in conciliating opposition from both without and within
court, the chief councilors of the late regency would draw the scorn of Li
T’ao, the compiler of the Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien ch’ang-pien: “Lü Ta-fang
and Liu Chih desired to promote and employ the Yüan-feng faction in order
to pacify old grievances, calling it ‘conciliation’ (t’iao-t’ing), and Hsüan-jen
was somewhat deluded by this.”149 However, the comments of Li T’ao must
be received with a certain skepticism, for Lü Ta-fang merely condoned this
political triangulation maneuver, which was in all likelihood the brainchild of
Liu Chih, who monopolized control over bureaucratic appointments.
When the conciliatory process began in early 1090, it met with resistance
from the right flank of the Censorate. The first reformist sympathizer to be
co-opted into the metropolitan bureaucracy was Teng Wen-po (also known
148
149
For biographical accounts of the two chief councilors of the late Yüan-yu era, see Michael D. Freeman
and Chikusa Masaaki, “Lü Ta-fang,” in Sung biographies, ed. Herbert Franke (Wiesbaden, 1976), pp.
735–8, and Michael D. Freeman and Chikusa Masaaki, “Liu Chih,” in Sung biographies, ed. Herbert
Franke (Wiesbaden, 1976), pp. 634–6.
HCP (1979) 443, p. 10669.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
527
as Teng Jun-fu), a former associate of Ts’ai Ch’üeh. Almost immediately after
Teng was appointed Han-lin academician in the third month of 1090, an
outcry arose from such unreconstructed antireformists as Wang Yen-sou, Liu
An-shih, and Liang T’ao. The three remonstrators not only considered Teng to
be of dubious scholarly merit, but also linked him with the unholy reformist
trinity of Wang An-shih, Lü Hui-ch’ing, and Ts’ai Ch’üeh.150 Soon thereafter,
Liu An-shih and Liang T’ao were removed from their remonstrance posts for
their defiant stance against Teng’s appointment.151 Without a doubt, the most
impassioned and articulate opponent of partisan conciliation was Su Ch’e, the
current vice–censor in chief, who drew a line in the sand between the noble
antireformists and such petty men as Teng Wen-po. For Su Ch’e, to incorporate
reformists into the ruling coalition was to flirt with certain disaster:
If true gentlemen are brought close and if petty men are banished, then the ruler will be
honored and glorious and the polity will be peaceful and joyous. If true gentlemen are
alienated and distanced and petty men are promoted and entrusted, then the ruler will be
anxious and disgraced, and the state will be imperiled and precarious.
If men like Teng were allowed to gain a beachhead in the capital, they would
soon be back to their old dirty tricks:
Disputers have deluded with glib words, intending to invite and include [the reformists]
to jointly administer affairs, desiring to conciliate (t’iao-t’ing) their faction. Your servant
claims that if these men return. . . . they will certainly harm and bring ruin to righteous
men.152
Intransigent antireformists like Su Ch’e were fighting a lost cause, however,
as Teng Wen-po could not be dislodged from his new post without the assent
of the chief councilors, which was not forthcoming.153
The campaign of propitiation continued through the remainder of the
Hsüan-jen regency, as the chief councilors attempted to rehabilitate a considerable number of reformists. But such forced and calculated moves of factional
détente were only marginally successful, and many appointments were overturned by the Censorate and the Remonstrance Bureau, and infrequently by
the regent herself. Hence, the most prominent Yüan-feng partisans were forced
to add a few more years onto their half-decade in ignominious exile, a fact that
would have drastic repercussions in the near future. The first and foremost
150
151
152
153
HCP (1979) 439, pp. 10577–8; 441, pp. 10612–17.
Liang was appointed minister of revenue, and Liu was demoted to the post of secretariat drafter. See
HCP (1979) 442, p. 10640.
HCP (1979) 443, pp. 10669–72; “Tsai lun fen-pieh hsieh-cheng cha-tzu,” in Su, Su Ch’e chi 43,
pp. 760–2.
Despite the opposition of Sun Sheng, Chu Kuang-t’ing, and Su Ch’e, Teng Wen-po was promoted and
appointed minister of rites in the second month of 1091. See HCP (1979) 455, p. 10902.
528
ari daniel levine
potential beneficiary of factional appeasement was Ts’ai Ch’üeh, who had
already served two years in Kuang-nan. But in the eighth month of 1091,
Liu Chih and Lü Ta-fang failed in their bid to grant Ts’ai amnesty after a deafening chorus of disapproval arose from the obstinate Hsüan-jen and several
unyielding censors such as Su Ch’e and Chu Kuang-t’ing.154 Simultaneous
efforts to restore Chang Tun to his previous honorary rank also met with
hostility from Chu, who would not countenance the pardoning of “such a
treacherous, wicked, base, corrupt and lawless man.”155 Subsequent attempts
to transfer reformists back to the capital failed repeatedly, as Ts’ai Ching, Lü
Hui-ch’ing, Tseng Pu, and a host of minor Yüan-feng partisans were denied
positions in the metropolitan bureaucracy in 1091 and 1092. Aside from Teng
Wen-po, the only other reformist of note to establish a brief foothold in the
capital during the late regency were Yang Wei and Li Ch’ing-chen, who would
both play a pivotal transitional role once Che-tsung began his personal rule.156
All of Liu Chih’s efforts to mitigate the destructiveness of a future reformist
takeover came to naught.
Hence, Liu Chih’s precipitous fall from power after censorial denunciations
intensified in late 1091 could not be called unexpected. Exasperated by his
efforts to co-opt reformists into the metropolitan bureaucracy, more ideologically minded antireformists accused Liu of a heinous crime against the state:
factional treachery. In the tenth month of 1091, Cheng Yung, the current vice–
censor in chief, accused Liu of constructing a factional patronage machine that
monopolized control over the bureaucratic appointment process for private
gain:
Liu Chih has long occupied the corridors of power. . . . He and those who agree with him
control the promotion and demotion of men. . . . Since Chih has wielded authority, his subordinates have been promoted to crucial positions, either to the Secretariat and Chancellery
or to the roads of remonstrance. Those with whom Chih is displeased are attacked by the
Secretariat drafters and supervising secretaries, or indicted by remonstrators.157
Cheng, a man apparently without factional allegiances to Lo or to Shu, proceeded to name names, listing thirty men as members of Liu Chih’s faction.158
154
155
156
157
158
In Hsüan-jen’s words: “Ts’ai Ch’üeh [was punished] not because of his slanderous poems, but only
because he was detrimental to the state and dynastic altars. If the state and dynastic altars are to
flourish, then Ch’üeh must die.” See HCP (1979) 464, pp. 11088–9.
HCP (1979) 464, p. 11085.
Yang Wei was appointed palace censor in the fourth month of 1091, on the recommendation of Liu
Chih, and remained in the Censorate for the duration of the regency. After being repeatedly denied
a transfer from his regional post to the capital in 1091–2, Li Ch’ing-ch’en was appointed minister of
personnel in the fourth month of 1094 and transferred back to a regional post the following month.
See HCP (1979) 457, p. 10948; 484, p. 11493.
HCP (1979) 467, pp. 11151–2.
HCP (1979) 467, p. 11152.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
529
This curious miscellany seemed to include nearly every major and minor figure
at court, with the exceptions of Lü Ta-fang and Su Ch’e. Among the ranks of
Liu Chih’s so-called faction, Cheng Yung included not only stalwart members
of the Shuo-dominated ruling coalition like Liang T’ao and Wang Yen-sou but
also such men of Lo as Chia I and Chu Kuang-t’ing. More problematic was
Cheng’s inclusion of such opponents of factional reconciliation as Liu An-shih
and Wang Ti, not to mention several men who were opposed to banishing
Ts’ai Ch’üeh. While Cheng’s list was clearly a politically motivated document
in its linkage of strange bedfellows, perhaps one can discern therein a certain
blurring of boundaries between the Shuo and Lo factions by the end of the
regency.
For the rest of 1091, Liu Chih was the subject of several months of indictments and ad hominem attacks upon his character. As if the crime of factional
treachery were insufficient reason to dismiss Liu as chief councilor, remonstrators further accused him of having deceitfully quashed the criminal investigation of a kinsman.159 Speaking in his own defense, Liu Chih accused his
accusers of being covert reformists, and of obeying the orders of their sinister handlers, Chang Tun and Hsing Shu.160 Liu’s political position became
untenable, however, and he resigned from the Council of State in the eleventh
month of 1091 to be appointed prefect of Yün-chou (Ching-tung West).161
The rise and fall of Liu Chih was indicative of the paralytic state of the state in
the late regency. Liu’s dismissal in late 1091 did little either to rouse the court
from its paralysis or to promote the formation of a stable coalition government.
Su Sung and Fan Ch’un-jen, Liu Chih’s successors as chief councilor of the
left, fared little better; the former was implicated in a guilt-by-association
scandal, and the latter was deposed by the resurgent reformists. No matter who
made up the Council of State, the court remained walking in circles, caught
up in a recurrent cycle of personal recriminations that precluded political
unity.
With a whimper: The end of the Hsüan-jen regency
The last years of the Yüan-yu era were a time of extreme and protracted
inaction, in which the successes of 1086 were never truly consolidated or built
upon. While the antireform coalition had succeeded in turning back the clock
to the 1060s and repealing the New Policies, their policy agenda was basically
reactionary; Hsüan-jen had restored peace to the empire and reestablished the
status quo. And as the antireform coalition fractured into warring factions, its
159
160
161
HCP (1979) 467, p. 11152.
HCP (1979) 467, pp. 11158–60.
HCP (1979) 468, p. 11167.
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members became preoccupied with political infighting. Ch’eng I would later
bemoan the degradation of political life and the ensuing partisan struggles that
crippled the regency: “During the Hsi-ning era the struggle against the New
Policies emerged from differing views of the public need but during Yüanyu [these factional struggles] were based on pure selfishness.”162 Whether
purging their own or calumniating their often imaginary foes, the men of
Yüan-yu had practiced a brand of politics that lacked any long-term vision,
remaining narrowly focused upon immediate and expedient objectives. And
their attempts to conciliate their opposition after the show trial of Ts’ai Ch’üeh
were ultimately abortive. Thus, when the inevitable reformist backlash came,
no member of the antireform coalition would be spared, regardless of his
factional alignment or political inclination.
Even worse, the antireformists had taken no account of the political threat
to their dominance posed by the young emperor himself, and had never formulated a viable fallback plan for their political survival after Hsüan-jen’s death.
Che-tsung idolized his late father and had been forced to swallow his bitterness toward his grandmother and her ministers throughout his adolescence.163
When they were not entirely ignoring the presence of the teenage emperor, as
was their usual practice, members of the Council of State had only alienated
him with their tactless meddling. Che-tsung clearly detested his tutors, whose
ranks included such intellectual luminaries as Ch’eng I and Fan Tsu-yü, for
their moralistic pedantry. Moreover, the regent and her ministers had intervened in the choice of his consort in 1091–2. Hsüan-jen, seconded by Wang
Yen-sou, had vetoed Lady Ti, Che-tsung’s choice as empress, substituting Lady
Meng, a candidate whom they deemed more politically amenable. This further
estranged the emperor, who was sixteen at the time of his betrothal to Empress
Meng.164 Unfortunately for the ruling coalition at court, Che-tsung’s obvious
antipathy toward the antireformists could be contained only for a brief span
of time.
Once Hsüan-jen had passed away, no one could obstruct Che-tsung from
beginning his personal rule upon attaining his majority. By the autumn of
1093, Emperor Hsüan-jen’s health had deteriorated, but her callous grandson would not even visit her sickbed.165 When the councilors paid their final
162
163
164
165
Lü, Sung ta-shih-chi chiang-i 20, pp. 3a–b.
For anecdotes about Che-tsung’s resentment of the antireformists and Hsüan-jen, see Ts’ai T’ao, T’iehwei shan ts’ung-t’an, ed. Feng Hui-min and Shen Hsi-lin (c. 1130; Peking, 1983) 1, p. 5. Also see the
biography of Su Sung in SS 340, p. 10867.
See HCP (1979) 457, pp. 10945–8; CPPM 113, pp. 3565–8.
CPPM 91, pp. 2821–2. Because of the three-year lacuna in HCP, for which the chapters for the
seventh month of 1093 through the third month of 1097 (Yüan-feng 8, seventh month through Shaosheng 4, third month) have not survived, the narrative of the early personal rule of Che-tsung had to
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
531
respects to the dying regent, she offered them some portentous last words,
sensing that her death would have drastic repercussions for the antireformists:
“After my old self has died, there will certainly be many who will toy with
Che-tsung. You should not listen to them, and you should seek early retirement.”166 As with the death of Shen-tsung, the coming dynastic transition
would precipitate a sweeping political realignment at court. After Hsüan-jen
finally succumbed to the ravages of old age in the ninth month of 1093, the
antireformists did not stand a chance, and their political dominance simply
evaporated. Despite the bang with which it began, the Hsüan-jen regency
would end with a whimper.
resurrection: 1093–1100
The pendulum swings back: The personal rule of Che-tsung
In a major reversal of fortune, after the death of dowager empress Hsüan-jen, the
tide swiftly turned against the forces of conservatism. As the unfolding history
of the late Northern Sung would demonstrate, the nine years of the regency
were an isolated instance of reaction and regression in the midst of six decades of
reformist experimentation. The beginning of Che-tsung’s personal rule (ch’incheng) witnessed the resurrection of the reform coalition, and the next three
decades would represent its undisputed political heyday. By consolidating their
political gains, constructing a relatively stable court coalition, and maintaining
an enduring patronage machine, the reformist regimes of the Che-tsung and
Hui-tsung reigns acquired nearly unstoppable momentum. In the 1090s, the
surviving disciples of Wang An-shih and Ts’ai Ch’üeh would restart unfinished
business, reviving the New Policies with greater reach than ever before and
initiating a thorough transformation of society and the economy. Moreover,
preliminary evidence indicates that the resuscitated reform measures of the
Che-tsung reign were not as extractive and intrusive as those of the Hsi-ning
and Yüan-feng eras had been.
However, the expanded reform agenda of the Shao-sheng era (1094–8) could
not have been enacted without the wholesale elimination of the conservative
opposition. Late Northern Sung politics entered its most virulent and divisive
stage during the personal rule of Che-tsung. The purges of 1093–4 and their
166
be reconstructed from entries in relevant chapters in CPPM, which boasts far less detail than HCP
and provides only attenuated descriptions of crucial events. Even more frustrating to the historian, the
CPPM, is not without its own gaping lacunae. Chapters 113 to 119, which offer a topical reorganization
of the annals of the late Che-tsung reign, have been missing for centuries.
CPPM 91, pp. 2822–3.
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aftermath made the bloodless palace coup of 1086 look like a dress rehearsal.
Soon after their takeover at court, the reformists retaliated with a vengeance
against their past victimizers, forcing them to walk the thorny path toward
banishment in Kuang-nan. Blacklisting their political enemies, the reformists
officially excluded hundreds of men and their immediate kin from officeholding
altogether. Reigning unchallenged, Che-tsung and his reformist councilors
redrew the political landscape ruthlessly and irrevocably.
When Che-tsung began his personal rule late in 1093, the leaders of the
antireformist regime, fearful of losing their positions, apprehensively waited
for the end, in the calm before the storm. For the time being, the roads of
remonstrance remained occupied by conservatives, who would endeavor to
belatedly convert the emperor to their cause. Days after the death of Hsüanjen, Fan Tsu-yü desperately admonished Che-tsung to resist the blandishments
of the reformists:
Now there certainly are petty men who will advance to say, “The dowager empress should
not have altered the governance of the former emperor, and should not have expelled the
former emperor’s ministers.” These rift-widening words cannot but be investigated. In the
days when Your Majesty first ascended the throne and the dowager empress took control
of governance, the officials and commoners who memorialized the throne numbered in
the tens of thousands, and they all said that governmental directives had disadvantageous
aspects. Because the hearts of the men of the empire intended to alter them [i.e., the New
Policies], the dowager empress and Your Majesty together altered them, and did not do so
with her own selfish intentions.167
The next month, Lü T’ao pleaded with Che-tsung to ignore the siren song of
the reformists and to maintain the political settlement of the Yüan-yu era:
Ever since the dowager empress began her regency, the ferocious and the wicked have been
banished. . . . Of the hearts of petty men, none does bear resentment. When they speak
treacherously and wickedly, it is only to confound Your Majesty. . . . The matters that the
dowager empress reformed were all beneficial to the common people. All of the ministers
whom she expelled were the malefactors of the empire. How could anyone ever doubt
this?168
In the conservatives’ judgment what the reformists had wrought during
Shen-tsung’s reign had been a sheer abomination, and rehabilitating these
known malefactors would push the empire back to the brink of ruin. Swimming against the current of history and sealing their own fates, Fan Tsu-yü
and Lü T’ao were not only addressing their monarch but also leaving behind
testaments for posterity. In the next century, their principled opposition to the
167
168
CPPM 91, pp. 2824–5.
CPPM 101, pp. 3113–15.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
533
resurgent reformists would ultimately earn Fan and Lü pride of place in the
pantheon of political martyrs.
The era of personal rule was inaugurated early in 1094, when the first batch
of reformists were rehabilitated and a new reformist manifesto was promulgated. Perhaps to forestall an outcry from the Censorate and the Remonstrance
Bureau, Li Ch’ing-ch’en and Teng Wen-po, two malleable and accommodating reformists, were appointed to the Council of State in the second month
of 1094.169 A moderate member of the Yüan-feng reform ministry, Li had
recanted his political views and paid lip service to the antireform cause during
the early regency, which now made him a politically acceptable candidate as
vice-director of the Secretariat-Chancellery.170 Another active participant in
the Hsi-ning and Yüan-feng reforms, Teng Wen-po, had broken ranks with
Ts’ai Ch’üeh over border military strategy, which made Teng a palatable choice
as vice-director of the Bureau of State Affairs.171 An apparent sleeper agent for
the reformist cause, Palace Censor Yang Wei was responsible for recommending the two to the Council of State, and for facilitating the return of Chang
Tun and An T’ao to court.172 Serving as Che-tsung’s transition team, Li and
Teng acted as standard-bearers for the mass return of the reformists to court
and paved the way for the sweeping political changes to come. Soon thereafter,
Lü Ta-fang was permitted to resign as chief councilor of the left in the third
month of 1094, leaving the top post in the bureaucracy open for Chang Tun,
the ranking member of the reform coalition.173
Year zero: The reformist takeover of 1094
In political discourse and practice, the first year of the new era represented a
complete rupture with the past eight years of antireformist domination. The
first verbal indication that Che-tsung would revive his father’s policies came
in the third month of 1094, in a palace examination question purportedly
authored by Li Ch’ing-ch’en. Illuminating the intellectual underpinnings of
169
170
171
172
173
CPPM 100, p. 3085. There is no textual evidence that these appointments met with irate opposition
from the antireformists. Given the sparseness of the documentary record in the CPPM, not to mention
the fact that the veritable records of the reformist regimes were continually subject to historiographic
revisionism, the absence of evidence should not be construed as the evidence of absence.
SS 328, p. 10562.
SS 343, p. 10912.
Back in 1091, Fan Ch’un-jen had adamantly opposed the appointment of Yang Wei to the Censorate,
and Wang Yen-sou had accused Yang of being a crony of Lü Hui-ching. See CPPM 100, pp. 3093–6;
HCP (1979) 468, pp. 11161–3.
CPPM 101, p. 3120. Lü was demoted to the post of prefect of Ying-ch’ang fu but was permitted to
retain both his honorary rank and his former academic position.
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the new order, Li’s question lionized the emperor’s dearly departed father as
the exemplar of righteous rule:
The virtue of Emperor Shen-tsung was numinous and enlightened, and he possessed the
learning of Shun and Yü. . . . For the nineteen years of his rule, rites and music, policies
and institutions, were all benevolently bequeathed to the empire. We consider his methods
and will to have been sincere and diligent. Day and night, We do not dare forget this.174
For the first time in almost a decade, after having been slanderously portrayed
as an overly suggestible and tragically flawed monarch, the former emperor
had become the subject of unqualified and glowing praise. In a series of linked
rhetorical questions, the text proceeded to heap obloquy upon Hsüan-jen and
her ministers, presenting a scathing indictment of the Yüan-yu regime as a
time of reaction and inaction:
During the ten years of the regency, although official selection by poetic examination
has been revived, gentlemen have not increased in ability. Although the Ever-normal
Granary officials have been abolished, farmers have not increased in wealth. Although
there have been a variety of arguments on whom to hire and whom to draft, corvée policy
is still faulty. . . . Although territory has been ceded to mollify those from afar, the Tangut
barbarians’ incursions have not yet ceased. Although profit making has been rescinded in
order to be advantageous to the common people, merchants’ routes go untraveled. Why
have matters come to this, when clerical personnel are rampant and numerous, when
military preparations have been trimmed and deficient, when hunger and famine is so
acute that grass is eaten, when rebels and felons still increase?175
A manifesto of reformism, the examination question clearly indicated that
the pendulum had begun to swing back toward reform, and official ideology
had shifted 180 degrees almost overnight. Outside the sphere of rhetoric,
the text was not without far-reaching practical consequences for bureaucratic
recruitment. The question just quoted was explicitly designed as a political
and ideological litmus test to incorporate like-minded reformists into the civil
service and to weed out the opponents of reform, for whom this question would
have been all but unanswerable.
Such an unsubtle statement of vision naturally drew last-ditch resistance
from conservatives in the Council of State. In another act of calculated defiance,
seeking the judgment of future historians rather than that of his contemporaries, Su Ch’e voiced his opposition to this examination question in particular
and to the reformist revival in general: “Your servant sees that the palace examination question slandered the policies enacted in recent years, and had the
intention of reviving the policies of the Hsi-ning and Yüan-feng eras. . . . Your
174
175
CPPM 100, pp. 3086–7.
CPPM 100, pp. 3086–7.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
535
servant cannot but remonstrate against this.”176 Su distinguished himself from
the reformists, painting himself as a steadfast councilor: “It is said that for petty
men, love of the ruler depends upon expediency, and that for loyal ministers,
love of the ruler is for the sake of the security of the dynastic and state altars.
This is the situation at hand.”177 He launched into a litany of the most flagrant abuses of the reformist regimes of Hsi-ning and Yüan-feng, describing
the New Policies as an utter debacle. For sticking his neck out so conspicuously, Su Ch’e became the first notable victim of the purge of 1094. Enraged,
Che-tsung sacked Su from his post as vice-director of the Chancellery (menhsia shih-lang), and demoted him to the post of prefect of Ju-chou2 (Ching-hsi
North).
In the first year of Che-tsung’s personal rule, political culture underwent a
dramatic and abrupt revolution, a disjuncture that was reflected in the realm
of symbol and ritual. As with other transformative moments in recent political
history, a change in regimes was marked by a change in reign titles. In the
fourth month of 1094, after the auspicious sighting of a white halo around
the sun, the current reign title was retroactively changed; the ninth year of
Yüan-yu was decreed to be the first year of the Shao-sheng era.178 Meaning
“Continuing Sagacity,” the name of the new era clearly evoked the policies of
Shen-tsung, the eponymous sage to whom Che-tsung and his newly appointed
councilors were paying metaphorical homage. Hence, 1094 represented a year
zero, in which the intervening years of the regency could be bridged as if they
had never occurred at all. As the symbolic center of the new era, Che-tsung
could bask in the reflected glow of his father’s achievements, which were being
polished to a sheen by the new historical revisionism.
The reformist takeover of 1094 was accomplished at unprecedented speed.
Within the span of a single month, remonstrance posts were packed with
loyal men, the upper echelons of the metropolitan bureaucracy were purged
of antireformists, and the Council of State was commandeered by Chang Tun
and his factional allies. Early in the fourth month, five reformists – Chai Ssu,
Shang-kuan Chün, Chou Chih, Liu Cheng2, and Chang Shang-ying – were
appointed to the Censorate and the Remonstrance Bureau.179 The very same
day, these newly appointed reformist remonstrators began to mount a vitriolic
offensive against their political enemies. Chang Shang-ying memorialized the
throne with a blanket critique of the past nine years, blaming the regent for her
inaction and inattention to governance: “Dowager Empress Hsüan-jen. . . . was
176
177
178
179
CPPM 100, pp. 3087–8.
CPPM 100, pp. 3087–8.
CPPM 100, p. 3096; SS 18, p. 340.
CPPM 101, p. 3120.
536
ari daniel levine
convinced to entrust her ministers and to consign supervision of the Censorate
and Remonstrance Bureau. Under their influence, she was beset by a swarm of
flatterers, sycophants, and opportunists.”180
In dismissal after dismissal, the reformist-dominated court expelled the
leaders of the Yüan-yu faction to regional posts, regardless of where they stood
on the political spectrum. Steadfast conservatives such as Fan Tsu-yü, Chetsung’s despised tutor, were purged from court alongside more accommodating
figures such as Fan Ch’un-jen, one of the few defenders of Ts’ai Ch’üeh.181 At
this point, the antireformists had simply been demoted from the Council of
State and sent down to prefectural-level posts. The real bloodletting would
be postponed for a few months, until the reformists and their imperial patron
had consolidated their control of the bureaucratic machinery.
In a mere thirty days, the antireform regime of the regency had simply
evaporated, and the corridors of power had been cleansed of the opposition.
The path had been cleared for the return of Chang Tun, who swept back into
power as Che-tsung’s chief councilor of the left in the fourth month of 1094.182
As the most eminent survivor of the Yüan-yu purges, Chang earned himself
a place by the emperor’s side as the architect of the revived New Policies.
Back in K’ai-feng after an eight-year enforced absence, Chang moved quickly
to appoint his junior reformist comrades to high positions, incorporating Lin
Hsi and the brothers Ts’ai Ching and Ts’ai Pien into his ruling coalition. By
the sixth month of 1094, the basic cabinet of the Shao-sheng era had taken
shape, with the appointment of Tseng Pu as assistant director of the Bureau
of Military Affairs. With the central government under his directorship, and
with the emperor hanging on his every word, Chang Tun and his reformist
comrades could now settle some old scores, exacting their revenge upon all
those who served in the antireform ministerial regime of Yüan-yu.
Measure for measure: Persecuting the Yüan-yu faction
Back in 1089, the forced exile of Ts’ai Ch’üeh to the malarial wastes of Kuangnan had been a rare and isolated instance of political brutality, an act that the
reformists could neither forgive nor forget. In such a sharply polarized political climate, factional reconciliation was simply unthinkable. Under the new
regime, what Ts’ai had suffered would be visited tenfold upon his persecutors.
The ministers and remonstrators of Shao-sheng would avenge the death of
180
181
182
CPPM 101, pp. 3120–1.
CPPM 101, pp. 3121–2. Fan Tsu-yü was made prefect of Hsia-chou, and Fan Ch’un-jen was made
prefect of Ying-ch’ang fu.
CPPM 101, p. 3122.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
537
their departed leader by banishing not just a handful of scapegoats but rather
the entire Yüan-yu ministry to the lethal borderlands of the far south. Thus
the vicious circle of political practice, in which violence simply bred more
violence, remained unbroken.
By the 1090s, political discourse had become so degraded that factions
would condemn each other for the cardinal sin of factional treachery (chien),
while maintaining their own sacrosanct innocence. The remonstrators of early
Shao-sheng censured the Yüan-yu partisans for high treason, for selfishly and
willfully abandoning the glorious reform legacy of Shen-tsung. In the fifth
month of 1094, a censorial indictment blamed such sacred cows of the antireform ministry as Ssu-ma Kuang and Wen Yen-po for having pursued a weakkneed policy of accommodation toward the Hsi Hsia and deceiving the young
Che-tsung into abandoning the martial glory of his father.183 The next month,
a formidable onslaught upon the Yüan-yu ministry began in earnest, when
the remonstrators Huang Lü and Chai Ssu condemned such prominent antireformists as Liu Chih, Liu An-shih, and Liang T’ao for arrogating their authority to pronounce a virtual death sentence upon Ts’ai Ch’üeh.184 Lü Ta-fang,
the long-serving conservative chief councilor of the late regency, was named
as the foremost malefactor of Yüan-yu, for “monopolizing the governance
of the state,” “cherishing wickedness and shamelessly delighting in profit,”
and “abandoning himself to treachery and evil.”185 Similar opprobrium was
heaped upon the other chief councilors of the regency, as Ssu-ma Kuang, Lü
Kung-chu, and Liu Chih were also indicted (the first two posthumously) for
“promoting their own faction, acting willfully, and arguing slanderously,” and
for going to such treacherous extremes as arbitrarily abolishing hired service
and packing remonstrance posts with their malicious followers.186 The torrent of censorial indictments pronounced against the antireformists in 1094
bore an odious resemblance to those that had been issued eight years earlier
against the reformists in the purges of 1086. While both factions subscribed
to radically divergent conceptions of statecraft, the discourse they employed to
attack each other was remarkably similar, employing the same black-and-white
distinctions.
As far as political practice was concerned, however, the reformists went
several giant steps beyond their rivals. Beginning in mid-1094, the surviving members of the Yüan-yu ministry were forcibly exiled to distant prefectures, and their deceased colleagues were posthumously stripped of honors.
183
184
185
186
CPPM 101, pp. 3124–5.
CPPM 101, pp. 3125–7.
CPPM 101, pp. 3126–7.
CPPM 101, pp. 3127–8.
538
ari daniel levine
Lü Ta-fang was the first to go; deprived of his prestige titles, he was banished
to the post of prefect of Sui-chou2 (Ching-hsi South). Liu Chih and Su Ch’e
were also dismissed from their honorary academic posts, demoted several ranks
in the hierarchy of prestige titles, and given administrative posts in similar
hinterland prefectures. Su Shih, a perpetual irritant to any ministerial regime,
received an even harsher punishment, commensurate with that of Ts’ai Ch’üeh:
banishment to Hui-chou2, in the far south of Kuang-nan East.187 This second
round of personnel transfers effectively neutralized the antireform opposition,
from whom little more was heard for the rest of the Che-tsung reign. In the
seventh month of 1094, the remonstrators Chou Chih and Chang Shang-ying,
seconded by Chang Tun, urged that Lü Ta-fang and his cronies be dismissed
as regional administrators and banished to even more distant territories.188
Moreover, the Shao-sheng purges extended to the deceased as well as to the
living members of the Yüan-yu regime. Denouncing Ssu-ma Kuang and Lü
Kung-chu for their sinister and factious words and deeds as chief councilors, an
imperial edict rescinded the posthumous honors they had been granted by the
regency upon their deaths in 1086 and 1089, respectively.189 Once regarded as
the first among equals of the antireform coalition and as the foremost statesman
of his age, Ssu-ma Kuang was now blamed for all the failings of the Yüan-yu
regime, accused of treacherously monopolizing power, arbitrarily overturning
the New Policies, intolerantly purging the loyal opposition, and deceiving the
dowager empress.
Purging and punishing the conservative opposition was only one tactic
employed during the reformist offensive, which also entailed a sweeping revision of recent history. To the victors of the factional conflict went the spoils of
writing its chronicles. Portrayed as nefarious villains in Yüan-yu era political
discourse, the reformists now were described as the noble victims of the treacherous antireformists; the long-maligned New Policies were now described in
the most glowing of terms. But the official history of the reform era was still
stained by the broad brush of regency politics. Compiled in the early years
of the Hsüan-jen regency, the Veritable records (shih-lu) of Shen-tsung’s reign
represented the Hsi-ning reforms as extractive and destructive, and depicted
the reformists as traitorous ministers.190 Under the personal rule of Che-tsung,
official history would have to be revised to conform to the new political realities. In the sixth month of 1094, control over the Historiography Institute
187
188
189
190
CPPM 101, p. 3129.
CPPM 101, pp. 3134–6.
CPPM 101, pp. 3138–40.
For a textual history of the Shen-tsung shih-lu, see chapter 2 of Levine, “A house in darkness.” Also see
Ts’ai, Sung-tai hsiu-shih chih-tu yen-chiu, and P’eng Chiu-sung, “Pei Sung ‘Shen-tsung shih-lu’ ssu hsiu
k’ao,” Wen-shih 24 (1985), pp. 179–88.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
539
was wrested away from the antireformists upon the dismissal of the institute’s
directors Fan Tsu-yü, Chao Yen-jo, and Huang T’ing-chien.191 Soon thereafter,
Ts’ai Pien, a junior member of the Yüan-feng ministry and the son-in-law of
Wang An-shih, was entrusted with the recompilation of the official history
of the reform era.192 The antireform biases of the original compilers of the
Shen-tsung shih-lu would be erased, and the record supplemented by entries
from Wang An-shih’s personal diaries.193 Harsher punishments awaited the
three antireformist historiographers at the end of 1094, when Fan, Chao, and
Huang were summarily dismissed from the civil service, and exiled to distant south-central prefectures.194 After the first year of Che-tsung’s personal
rule, factional reconciliation became a thing of the past, following the first
of a series of purges that escalated the brutality of court politics beyond the
previous high-water mark set during the regency.
And far worse was yet to come. After a debate before the throne in the eighth
month of 1095, in which Chang Tun urged the emperor to deny amnesty
to Lü Ta-fang and his cronies, Che-tsung promulgated an edict that permanently banned the leaders of the crushed antireform coalition from bureaucratic
service. Ever the voice of caution and moderation, an exiled Fan Ch’un-jen
protested the edict, pleading clemency for his partisan comrades, but he only
succeeded in infuriating Chang, who had Fan stripped of his academic honors
and transferred to Sui-chou2.195 The reformist governing coalition similarly
squelched dissent from within the ranks of the metropolitan bureaucracy,
cleansing the Censorate and the Remonstrance Bureau of the defiant and the
disloyal. Under the personal rule of Che-tsung, prevailing institutional trends
continued, as councilors brooked no opposition from remonstrators. When
Investigating Censor Ch’ang An-min spoke out against the nepotism and factionalism of Chang Tun, he was dismissed from his post in the ninth month of
191
192
193
194
195
CPPM 101, pp. 3131–2.
CPPM 120, p. 3601.
For the historian, frustratingly little information on the revision of the Shen-tsung shih-lu can be found in
the standard primary sources for Northern Sung political history. The first three years of the Shao-sheng
era have been swallowed up by a gaping lacuna in HCP. Even worse, chapter 114 of CPPM, “Hsiu
shih-lu,” which purports to chronicle the revision of the Shen-tsung veritable records, also falls within a
seven-chapter lacuna. But according to the memorialist Shao Po-wen, whose Shao-shih wen-chien lu reads
like a hagiography-cum-martyrology of the Yüan-yu faction, when Ts’ai Pien seized the Wang An-shih
diaries to revise the official history of the Shen-tsung reign, “he falsified entries from the diaries, and
the text was rife with treacherous falsehoods. Above, Shen-tsung was insulted. Below, the old ministers
of Yüan-yu were slandered. The official history of the Shen-tsung reign, compiled during the Yüan-yu
era, was completely amended”; see Shao, Shao-shih wen-chien lu 12, p. 128. Shao Po-wen’s account is
corroborated by Ts’ai Pien’s Sung shih biography; see SS 472, p. 13729.
Fan Tsu-yü was exiled to Yung-chou, Chao Yen-jo to Feng-chou2, and Huang T’ing-chien to Ch’ienchou. See CPPM 101, p. 3141.
CPPM 101, p. 3144.
540
ari daniel levine
1095 on Chang’s orders.196 But Ch’ang An-min would not go quietly. Mustering one final broadside against the chief councilor and his coterie, Ch’ang
insisted that the revival of Shen-tsung’s way of governance was a mere smokescreen for ministerial absolutism: “Those who have pressured Your Majesty
for a restoration only desire to employ the former emperor as a pretext to
implement their treacherous schemes. . . . They desire to advance their selfish
enmity and entrap the virtuous, in order to distract Your Majesty’s intentions.
This must be investigated.”197
Unlike its Yüan-yu predecessor, the reformist ministry of Chang Tun
evinced remarkable party discipline, quashing dissent from within its own
ranks. By the second year of the Yüan-yu era the antireform faction had been
crippled by infighting, but all available sources indicate that the restored
reform coalition remained a united and potent political force until the late
1090s.
Simply neutralizing and displacing the opposition was not enough for the
leaders of the revived reform coalition. By the third year of his personal rule,
Che-tsung was becoming more dependent upon his chief councilors, who were
granted free reign to eliminate the Yüan-yu faction once and for all. Earlier in
the Shao-sheng era, the purge of the antireformists had been conducted on a
case-by-case basis. Now that Chang Tun and his comrades had achieved neardictatorial powers, political persecution was becoming formalized and systematized, with the creation of institutional mechanisms to prosecute crimes
against the state. In the winter of 1095–6, Chang Tun and Tseng Pu persuaded
the emperor to approve a comprehensive investigation and classification of
Yüan-yu memorials for sedition and slander, targeting those antireformists
who had heretofore escaped punishment.198 The process of justice became
recursive in the sixth month of 1098, when the attendant censor (shih yü-shih)
An Tun memorialized the throne to investigate the Investigation and Prosecution Bureau (Su-li so), which had been created back in 1086 to vet the
political content of memorials that had been submitted during Shen-tsung’s
reign. During the early Yüan-yu era, the bureau had investigated the words
and deeds of officials who served in the reformist administrations of Hsi-ning
and Yüan-feng, resulting in the forced dismissal of many followers of Wang
An-shih and Ts’ai Ch’üeh.199 In An Tun’s judgment, the treacherous factionalists of the Yüan-yu era had exploited the bureau’s investigations to purge
196
197
198
199
CPPM 106, pp. 3311–12.
CPPM 106, pp. 3313–14.
CPPM 101, pp. 3145, 3148–9.
SHY (1997) chih-kuan 3, pp. 75–6. For the most thorough institutional history of the Su-li so, see Lo
Chia-hsiang, P’eng-tang chih cheng yü Pei Sung cheng-chih (Wu-han, 2002), pp. 186–7.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
541
reformists from the imperial bureaucracy as a false faction.200 Only weeks after
the bureau’s establishment, Tseng Pu extravagantly claimed, the Yüan-yu-era
bureau had investigated the remonstrance of 897 individual reformist officials, but the actual total was probably closer to one hundred.201 Later, in the
third month of 1099, An Tun memorialized the throne to implore Che-tsung
to punish the entire Yüan-yu-era staff of the Investigation and Prosecution
Bureau, all the way down to the minor paper pushers who had survived Liu
Chih, the project’s mastermind.202 Regardless of the total casualty count, the
activities of the Investigation and Prosecution Bureau illustrate the extent to
which political persecution during the regency had become almost an end in
itself, a bureaucratized final solution to a protracted factional conflict.
In the ultimate act of revenge, the conservative coalition of the Hsüan-jen
regency would not only be decimated but decapitated, incapable of ever again
posing a threat to reformist hegemony. An official ministerial report of the
second month of 1097 perfectly encapsulated the vengefulness of the factional
proscription campaign:
Ssu-ma Kuang and Lü Kung-chu initiated treacherous schemes. They deluded and flattered
the former emperor, modified policies and institutions, and their crimes and evil were
extremely profound. . . . [This] malignant faction united in evil for mutual benefit. Some
of its leaders and followers have been fated to die by now, so they are unable to receive
the appropriate punishment. But even after death. . . . their surviving sons, grandsons,
kinsmen, and associates who survive will be punished, regardless of the severity of their
crimes . . . and future generations will know these men as rebellious ministers and felons.203
An appended imperial edict stripped Ssu-ma and Lü – along with Wang
Yen-sou, who had passed away in 1094 – of all remaining prestige titles, and
banned their descendants from officeholding in perpetuity.204 The surviving
leaders of the antireform coalition were far less fortunate than those who
predeceased them. Also promulgated in the second month of 1097, an official
blacklist cited the names of thirty-seven members of the Yüan-yu ministry, all
of whom were deprived of their honorary titles and their descendants similarly
barred from bureaucratic service.205
Perhaps the most salient example of the politics of revenge was the Korean
Relations Institute (T’ung-wen kuan) case of 1097, which was nearly the mirror image of the Ts’ai Ch’üeh poetry inquisition. With the emperor under
their thumb and the wheels of justice turning according to their whim, the
200
201
202
203
204
205
SHY (1997) chih-kuan 3, p. 76.
HCP (1979) 499, pp. 11886–7.
HCP (1979) 507, p. 12079.
CPPM 102, pp. 3156–8.
CPPM 102, p. 3158.
CPPM 102, pp. 3158–63.
542
ari daniel levine
reformists had finally arrived at payback time to avenge Ts’ai’s wrongful death.
As had happened in 1089, charges of high treason were trumped up against the
banished leaders of the opposition on the basis of the flimsiest of circumstantial
evidence and hearsay, and the charges were prosecuted with extreme prejudice.
In a finger-pointing memorial of the eighth month of 1097, Ts’ai Wei, the
eldest son of Ts’ai Ch’üeh, alleged that his colleague Hsing Shu had received a
letter from Wen Chi-fu, the son of Wen Yen-po, that alluded to the existence
of a nefarious plot to depose Che-tsung in the first months of the Hsüan-jen
regency.206 As if the bare outlines of the case were not complicated enough,
the affair grew ever more entangled. Enraged by the allegations, Che-tsung
ordered Ts’ai Ching and An Tun to interrogate Wen Chi-fu at the Korean Relations Institute, where it was somehow revealed that the putative leaders of the
purported and abortive palace coup were none other than Ssu-ma Kuang, Liu
Chih, Wang Yen-sou, and Liang T’ao.207 As far as the historian can discern,
the current accusations were sheer fictions; while a plot was indeed afoot to
depose Che-tsung back in 1085, it is possible that Ts’ai Ch’üeh, Hsing Shu,
and Ts’ai Ching had been its masterminds. However, by appealing to Chetsung’s deeply ingrained sense of victimization, the reformists of Shao-sheng
managed to launch a baseless inquisition against their old adversaries. When
the emperor ordered Ts’ai Ching and a eunuch to carry out a joint investigation
of the charges, they did not uncover any more corroborating evidence. Even
so, the Korean Relations Institute inquisition became a pretext for a renewed
offensive against the Yüan-yu faction.
In a mordantly ironic instance of retributive justice, Liu Chih, Liang T’ao,
and Liu An-shih, the chief instigators of the Ts’ai Ch’üeh poetry inquisition,
were banished to lethal places themselves. Exiled to Kuang-nan, Liu Chih and
Liang T’ao died in Hua-chou3 and Hsin-chou, respectively, in the eleventh
and twelfth months of 1097, while Liu An-shih survived his banishment to
Mei-chou2.208 Moreover, Lü Ta-fang, the leading figure of late regency politics,
and one of the chief objects of reformist resentment, died of illness en route
to his place of mandated exile in Hsün-chou. The ignominy of exile awaited
the defeated leaders of the shattered antireform coalition. Su Ch’e, Su Shih,
206
207
208
HCP (1979) 490, p. 11628.
One nagging question remains: why did Wen Chi-fu accuse Liu Chih and others of being the chief
instigators of the alleged cabal to dethrone the young Che-tsung, if no evidence exists linking Liu to
the reform faction? According to HCP (1979) 490, p. 11628, Wen bore a longtime resentment against
Liu Chih for slighting his father by urging his retirement from the Council of State in 1090.
CPPM 102, p. 3175. Hua-chou3 was located in Kuang-nan West circuit (present-day Hua-chou3,
Kwangtung). Hsin-chou (present-day Hsin-hsing, Kwangtung) had also been Ts’ai Ch’üeh’s place of
death. An imperial edict in the fourth month of 1098 forbade the return of Liang Tao’s corpse to his
home county for burial. See CPPM 102, p. 3177.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
543
Chu Kuang-t’ing, Fan Tsu-yü, and Ch’eng I were all sentenced to extended
stays in the miasmic far south, a fate that befell even Fan Ch’un-jen, one of
Ts’ai’s sole defenders back in 1089, when virtual death sentences were still
an outrageous rarity. And a staggering number of their lieutenants, including
K’ung Wen-chung, Wang Ti, Ch’in Kuan, and Chia I, were also shipped off
to the fringes of the empire. Fan’s grim prophecy had been realized at last; the
men of Yüan-yu were all forced to walk the thorny path that they had cleared
not long ago.
The Korean Relations Institute case concluded with yet another proscription
against the sons and grandsons of the Yüan-yu councilors.209 Their descendants
and kinsmen were also banned from officeholding for life, effectively alienating
a large number of elite lineages from court politics for the remainder of the
Northern Sung. In an ever-widening vicious circle, political brutality produced
ever more political brutality. Twelfth-century historiographers, influenced by
the ascendant Tao-hsüeh movement, would portray the Shao-sheng partisan
proscriptions as the height of treacherous infamy. Moreover, North American historians of the late twentieth century have hypothesized that the sheer
destructiveness of factional politics made bureaucratic service such a risky
prospect for the shih-ta-fu class that it caused a sea change in elite orientation
and mobility strategies from national politics to local activism.210 The forced
exile of Ts’ai Ch’üeh to Kuang-nan had come back to haunt the surviving
members of the Yüan-yu ministry, who were systematically persecuted with
great vindictiveness. Memories of brutality would tarnish the history and historiography of the restored reform regime and the personal rule of Che-tsung,
with far-reaching consequences for the future of the Sung dynasty.
Continuing Sagacity: Resuscitating the New Policies
While persecuting its political adversaries with unprecedented ruthlessness,
the reformist ministerial regime of Shao-sheng pursued a comparatively moderate policy agenda. When they spearheaded the revival of the New Policies of
the Shen-tsung reign, Chang Tun and his fellow councilors endeavored to alleviate the measures’ most extractive aspects and eliminate their most flagrant
209
210
CPPM 107, pp. 3378–9.
See Robert M. Hartwell, “Demographic, political, and social transformations of China, 750–1550,”
Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 42 No. 2 (1982), pp. 420–5, and Robert P. Hymes, Statesmen and
gentlemen: The elite of Fu-chou, Chiang-hsi, in Northern and Southern Sung (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 121–
3. The Hartwell-Hymes hypothesis has recently been critiqued by Beverly Bossler, who argues that
the elite transformation from Northern Sung to Southern Sung was more a historiographic than a
historical phenomenon. See Beverly J. Bossler, Powerful relations: Kinship, status, and the state in Sung
China (960–1279) (Cambridge, Mass., 1998), pp. 203–10.
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abuses. During the early years of the Hsi-ning era, Wang An-shih originally
proposed the trinity of hired service, green sprouts, and state trade as a means
of alleviating socioeconomic inequalities, but these core New Policies had been
expediently and expeditiously transformed into tools of wealth extraction. By
their return to court in 1094, the remaining reformists had mellowed in their
ideological fervor and had come to a realization that the opposition critique of
the New Policies was not entirely off base. Chang Tun, the chief councilor of
the left throughout the period of Che-tsung’s personal rule, was by no means
an ideological extremist. Back in 1085–6, Chang had attempted to prevent
the abolition of the Hsi-ning and Yüan-feng reform measures with remarkably
pragmatic arguments, acknowledging their failings while resisting their arbitrary elimination. Once in power, Chang Tun and his factional allies ushered
in a new era of fiscal reform, preserving the pump-priming aspects of the New
Policies while curbing the policies’ widespread excesses.
In the fourth month of 1094, when Chang Tun assumed the chief councilorship, his newly installed reform ministry quickly seized the initiative on
the policy-making front. The first order of business for the new regime was
the revival of the hired service policy, which Ts’ai Ching, the newly appointed
minister of revenue, convinced Chang to move to the top of the reformist
agenda. Notorious in official historiography for his cynical opportunism, Ts’ai
had performed a complete about-face on the issue of corvée policy within the
span of eight years. While serving as prefect of K’ai-feng in 1085–6, Ts’ai had
curried favor with Ssu-ma Kuang by implementing drafted service (ch’ai-i fa)
in the capital region within a five-day deadline; now that the reformists had
recaptured the Council of State, he hoped to impress Chang Tun with his zealous advocacy of hired service.211 At any rate, when summoned before the throne
on the fourth day of the fourth month of 1086, Chang and his fellow ministers
announced their intention to radically restructure the empirewide corvée system according to the abolished Yüan-feng guidelines. Che-tsung assented to
his ministers’ entreaties, agreeing that the people of the empire would benefit
from the revival of hired service, but on one condition: that the notoriously
exorbitant surplus emergency fees (k’uan-sheng ch’ien) be reduced.212 Moreover,
the reformists attempted to exempt grade 5 households from the obligation of
paying service exemption fees entirely, a glaring injustice that Ssu-ma Kuang
himself had singled out for elimination in 1085. Token words of disapproval
211
212
According to Ts’ai Ching’s biography in the Sung shih, “[Chang] Tun and [Ssu-ma] Kuang disagreed
about the two corvée policies [i.e., drafted service and hired service]. Within the span of ten years,
Ts’ai had twice faced this issue, but he had backed down, when both councilors relied upon him for
assistance. Those who knew him saw his treachery.” For the whole story, see SS 472, pp. 13721–2.
SHY (1997) shih-huo 65, pp. 63a–b.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
545
came from Fan Ch’un-jen, soon to be purged, who argued that reviving hired
service on an empirewide scale would neglect the irregularities of local conditions and the welfare of the masses.213
In the charged political atmosphere of the early days of Che-tsung’s personal
rule, all such dissent was effectively stifled, and the change in corvée policy
was accomplished in a matter of weeks, a feat that had taken Ssu-ma Kuang
and his bickering comrades six months to achieve. The official revival of hired
service was hastily enacted by an imperial edict of the twenty-sixth day of the
fourth month of 1094, without any more recorded opposition from within
the reform coalition.214 Despite the high-handed manner with which they
were implemented, the Shao-sheng hired service regulations did indeed mitigate the most glaring failures of the Yüan-feng system, at least on paper.
Surplus emergency fees, the most exorbitantly extractive aspect of the old system, were capped at a maximum of ten percent, and exemptions were granted
to the poorest grade of rural households.
But no matter how expeditiously Chang Tun orchestrated its revival, hired
service still met with bureaucratic resistance from below. Seven months later,
in the eleventh month of 1094, Ts’ai Ching, the current minister of revenue
(hu-pu shang-shu), reported that local administrators in the capital region were
still enforcing Yüan-yu-era drafted service regulations.215 Ignoring the specific difficulties in adapting hired service to varying conditions in localities
across the empire, the reformist ministry of Shao-sheng apparently utilized
the Censorate and the Remonstrance Bureau to coerce regional officials into
obeying mandated deadlines and quotas.216 Whereas the antireform coalition had foundered over drafted service in 1086, the Shao-sheng reform faction possessed far greater discipline and unity, and internal dissent on policy
issues was simply quashed. When a lone remonstrator attempted to break
ranks with the factional consensus, he was summarily dismissed. After critiquing the bureaucratic overreach of hired service in a memorial of the fifth
month of 1096, the exhorter of the right Sun O was immediately purged
from the ranks of remonstrators. Ts’ai Ching, the hired service advocate,
indicted Sun for treachery and engineered his dismissal to a prefectural-level
post.217
213
214
215
216
217
SHY (1997) shih-huo 65, p. 63b.
SHY (1997) shih-huo 65, p. 63b.
SHY (1997) shih-huo 65, p. 69a.
In the first month of 1095, the palace censor Kuo Chih-chang memorialized the throne urging stricter
discipline for circuit-level officials who failed to implement the new hired service guidelines. See SHY
(1997) shih-huo 65, pp. 68a–b.
SHY (1997) shih-huo 65, pp. 69a–70b; CPPM 100, p. 3105. Sun O was appointed prefect of Kuang-te
commandery.
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All the available evidence indicates that the empirewide imposition of
hired service reaped some tangible successes, but that even factional discipline
and top-down coercion could not counter the widespread inertia of regional
administrators. And one must wonder whether the ten percent cap on surplus
emergency fees and the fee-exempt status of grade 5 households were actually
maintained in practice, even though both restraints remained on the statute
books throughout the Che-tsung reign. No matter how the Council of State
attempted to enforce compliance by running roughshod over local officials,
bureaucratic abuses and extractive excesses must have occurred. Still, without
any solid quantitative data on the collection of hired service fees and their
impact upon the balance sheet of the imperial treasury, conclusions on the
policy’s short- and long-term effects must remain largely presumptive and
impressionistic.
Once hired service was pushed through, the Shao-sheng ministry turned
its attention to reviving the green sprouts policy, the next item on its reform
agenda. As he had with hired service, the ubiquitous Ts’ai Ching directed
every stage of the fast-track implementation of the green sprouts policy, which
took all of two months. In a memorial of the seventh month of 1095, Ts’ai
sang the praises of Shen-tsung’s agrarian loan measure, which, he argued, had
been enacted with the most noble of intentions: to benefit small farmers at the
expense of exploitative engrossers (chien-ping). Ever since the abolition of green
sprouts by the misguided ministers of Yüan-yu, Ts’ai maintained that rural
magnates had flourished, to the detriment of poor agricultural households.
Claiming that “the way of making money (sheng-ts’ai chih tao) will benefit the
common people of the state,” he made a case for extending government credit
to farmers, “the foundation of the empire.”218 A series of concurrent memorials
followed from loyal members of the reformist rank and file, one of whom urged
the imposition of a ten percent limit on yearly compounded interest, so that
the state would not out-engross the engrossers.219 When Che-tsung assented
to the measure on the fourteenth day of the ninth month of 1095, no contrary
voices were recorded in the Sung hui-yao, but given the attenuated state of the
documentary record of Shao-sheng fiscal policy, the absence of evidence should
not be assumed to be the evidence of absence. Even more frustrating for the
historian, no tangible information whatsoever remains on the implementation
of green sprouts on the local level for the entire Che-tsung reign, so not a single
conclusion about its administration or maladministration can be surmised.
State trade (shih-i) represented the final piece of the puzzle, the last of the
New Policies to be revived by the Shao-sheng reform ministry. Starting in the
218
219
SHY (1997) shih-huo 5, pp. 15b–16a; CPPM 110, p. 3103.
SHY (1997) shih-huo 5, p. 17a.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
547
first year of Che-tsung’s personal rule, the various components of the Yüanfeng commercial regulation and monopoly system gradually fell into place.220
First, in the seventh month of 1094, Chang Tun prompted the emperor to
initiate the process of state intervention into the private sector by reimposing
“guild exemption fees” (mien-hang ch’ien) within the capital area. All mercantile
guilds in K’ai-feng were now required to remit these monies to the central
government, commensurate with the value of provisions that the state would
now purchase for itself. While the guild exemption fee had been employed
as a coercive tool of revenue extraction during the Shen-tsung reign, efforts
were made to limit the collection of interest to a far from usurious ten percent,
in similar fashion to the surplus emergency fee assessed upon hired service
payments.
Full implementation of the remainder of the Yüan-feng commercial
monopoly system did not occur until the twelfth month of 1097. A ministerial
report recommended the revival of state trade bureaus (shih-i wu) to enhance
commerce, to “restrain engrossers,” and to rescue the common people from
the “suffering” that had ensued after the bureaus’ abolition.221 Promulgated
at the very end of 1097 by an amenable Che-tsung, an imperial edict approved
the empirewide reestablishment of branch trade bureaus, which would purchase bulk staple goods cheap and sell them dear, and plow the profits back
into the issue of loans to merchants.222 As with hired service fees and green
sprouts interest, strict limits were enforced upon interest payments for state
trade loans, and capped at twenty percent. However, given the paucity of the
historical record with reference to fiscal policy during Che-tsung’s personal
rule, the question of whether these controls over officially sanctioned usury
were ever enforced must go unanswered.
Pitiably scant as it is, all available evidence suggests that the revival of the
New Policies was a qualified success. First, the expeditious implementation
of hired service, green sprouts, and state trade suggests that the Shao-sheng
ministry was a tightly disciplined political machine, attaining its policy goals
while silencing dissent and crushing resistance. Whereas the Yüan-yu coalition had agonized and bickered for the better part of a year over the abolition
of the Shen-tsung reform agenda, the restored reform regime reimplemented
the Yüan-feng systems of labor management, agricultural loans, and commercial monopolies from scratch in a matter of months. Moreover, the policy
achievements of the resurgent reformists would have been unthinkable without
220
221
222
For an analysis of the state trade policy during Che-tsung’s personal rule, see Liang, “Shih-i fa shu,”
pp. 212–15.
HCP (1979) 493, p. 11720.
SHY (1997) shih-huo 37, p. 33b; HCP (1979) 493, p. 11720.
548
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the patronage of Che-tsung, a pliant and dependent emperor who shared the
reformists’ vision of statecraft. Second, on paper at least, the revived New Policies were intended to stimulate the economy and enhance state revenue, while
reining in the extractive excesses of the Yüan-feng era. Although no quantitative data can corroborate this impression, the Shao-sheng reform agenda
attempted to strike some sort of pragmatic compromise, alleviating the most
glaring of the abuses by the bureaucratic entrepreneurs of the 1080s. Regardless
of (or perhaps despite) the maximum legal limits placed upon the extraction of
hired service fees, and the reduction of green sprouts and state trade interest,
the Sung court was able to finance a renewed offensive against the Tanguts
in 1095–9. Any further conclusions on the consequences of state policy during Che-tsung’s personal rule would be unwarranted speculation based on a
disappointingly inadequate documentary record.
Turning the tide: Renewed war against the Hsi Hsia
During the personal rule of Che-tsung, the resurgence of reformist statecraft
extended beyond fiscal policy into the long-disputed realm of border relations.
From the very beginning of the Shao-sheng era, remonstrators had excoriated the regency ministry of Ssu-ma Kuang and his successors for pursuing a
fragile détente with the Hsi Hsia, a weak-kneed policy of appeasement that
had erased the military legacy of Shen-tsung. Even after the four outposts of
Mi-chih, Chia-lu, Fu-t’u, and An-chiang had been ceded in 1089, the Tanguts
had taken advantage of the Sung court’s passivity and docility to advance across
the frontier. Since its final status had not been conclusively settled by the end
of the Hsüan-jen regency, the Hsi Hsia had made every effort to redraw the
northwestern border in its favor. Abandoning the conciliatory stance of their
factional adversaries, the reformists contended that a renewed military offensive would stabilize the deteriorating border situation. In 1095, Chang Tun
convinced the increasingly dependent emperor to continue the expansionist
policies of his father, devising a new “advance and fortify” (chin-chu) plan to
tilt the balance of power back toward Sung dominance.223 By seizing strategic
positions along the frontier – along the Hu-lu River valley and in the T’ien-tu
and Heng-shan plateaus – and rendering them impregnable to assault, the
Sung exploited its military superiority to effectively destroy the power position of the Hsi Hsia. When the Tanguts sued for peace in 1099, Che-tsung’s
reform ministry had accomplished what Shen-tsung’s best and brightest never
could: the projection of Sung hegemony into the northwest.
223
For a well-documented analysis of the Sung-Tangut wars of the 1090s, see Wu, Hsin Hsi Hsia shih,
pp. 110–15; and Li, Sung Hsia kuan-hsi shih, pp. 91–6, 193–7, 221–31.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
549
The revival of irredentism was accompanied by a more bellicose turn in
political discourse. Reformist remonstrators portrayed the leaders of the Yüanyu ministry not only as nefarious traitors but as cowardly weaklings who had
bought an inconclusive peace by surrendering Sung territory to the Tanguts. In
the fifth month of 1095, the palace censor Kuo Chih-chang issued a strident and
scathing condemnation of the regency’s border policies, which had needlessly
forsaken the patrimony of Shen-tsung:
The former emperor opened lands by pushing forward and choking the throats of the
western barbarians. An-chiang, Chia-lu, Fu-t’u, and Mi-chih were occupied under his
lofty governance, and their redoubts were assaulted. At the onset of the Yüan-yu era,
the ministers who were then employed abandoned the four outposts, thereby manifesting
weakness to the exterior, and emboldening the hearts of the barbarians.224
Kuo demanded both the punishment of all those who had supported the
cession of the four border outposts in the Heng-shan highlands and the assumption of a more aggressive stance toward the Hsi Hsia. But it was only after the
New Policies had been resurrected, providing sufficient revenue for rearmament, that the reform ministry could turn from bellicose rhetoric to action.
Over the course of 1095 and 1096, Chang Tun persuaded Che-tsung to abandon the Yüan-yu policy of appeasement and to adopt an offensive posture
toward the Tanguts. Annual tribute offerings to the Hsi Hsia were abruptly
cut off, and orders were given to mobilize armed forces for deployment along
the northwestern frontier. In 1097 a two-pronged “advance and fortify” strategy was devised, based on an assessment of the weak points in the Hsi Hsia
defenses. Learning from the debacle of Yung-lo ch’eng, in which entire legions
of Sung troops had perished in the defense of the indefensible, the general
Chang Chieh (1027–1102) proposed a campaign of lightning attacks against
the most strategic positions in the Heng-shan range and the Hu-lu River valley, which could be heavily fortified against any desperate Tangut offensive.225
The supreme commander of Sung forces in Hsi-ho, Ch’in-feng, and Huanch’ing circuits, Chang Chieh argued that the Sung offensive into the disputed
frontier territories would force the Hsi Hsia to retreat north: “Recently, the
court has developed and constructed walled cities and fortifications, thereby
expanding its territory. The first objective has been to seize territorial gains,
and to topple the rebel lairs.”226
As they systematically expanded into Tangut-occupied areas, the Sung
forces proceeded from strength to strength. By the fourth month of 1097,
Chang Chieh’s troops occupied Hung-chou2 and Yen-chou3, and had wrested
224
225
226
CPPM 101, pp. 3124–5.
HCP (1979) 485, pp. 11518–19; SS 328, pp. 10589–90.
HCP (1979) 505, pp. 12034–5.
Sung prefectural level sites
Hsi Hsia capital
Hsi Hsia prefectural level sites
Hsia prefectures captured by Chang Chieh in 1097
Other sites seized or recaptured in 1097
Four stockades ceded back to Tanguts in 1089
Sino-Tangut borders as of 1080, for reference
SHIH
HSIA
LING
R
-lu
Hu
ive
r
Ling-p’ing
AND
ANCE
’A D V
F O RT
WEI
CHING-YÜAN
CH’IN
250 km
0
150 miles
ION’ ZO
PAO-AN
An-chiang
SUI-TE
NE
YEN-AN
FU-YEN
HUAN-CH’ING
YUNG-HSING-CHÜN LU
CH’IN-FENG LU
0
IF I C AT
CH’ING
LAN
HSI-HO
Mi-chih
HUNG
Fu-t’u
HSI-AN P’ing-hsia
T’ien-tu-shan
YIN
Heng-shan
YU
YEN
r
Rive
llow
Ye
Ye
l
Yü-lin
HSING-CH’ING-FU
Wei River
Map 17. Revived campaign against the Tanguts, 1097–1099.
lo w
Chia-lu
NG
Rive
r
H S I A
HO-TU
H S I
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
551
Yu-chou from the hands of the Hsi Hsia. Moreover, the Chin-cheng pass in
Hsi-ho circuit had been seized and fortified, and the Chia-lu and An-chiang
stockades in Yung-hsing-chün and Ho-tung circuits, ceded in 1089, had been
recovered.227 Soon thereafter, Chang Chieh led his troops to seize and refortify
P’ing-hsia and Ling-p’ing, crucial positions on either bank of the Hu-lu River
that would enable the Sung troops to strike the very heart of the Tangut empire:
its capital city of Hsing-ch’ing.228 Between the autumn of 1097 and the winter of 1099, at least forty separate fortifications were constructed in the four
circuits of Fu-yen, Huan-ch’ing, Ching-yüan, and Ho-tung, thereby cementing Sung hegemony over the northwestern frontier. With the occupation of
the T’ien-tu range and the establishment of Hsi-an prefecture, several vital
supply lines and key horse-producing areas now belonged to Sung, furthering
the progress of its war machine.
The “advance and fortify” strategy was put to a final test in late 1098, when
Dowager Empress Liang of the Hsi Hsia dispatched more than a hundred
thousand troops in what became a suicide mission to recapture P’ing-hsia.
Having learned from the fatal lessons of 1082, the Sung armed forces held the
high ground to soundly defeat the Hsi Hsia besiegers, capturing the famed
Tangut generals Wei-ming A-mai and Mei-lo-tu-pu in the process.229 The
broken siege of P’ing-hsia was the massacre of Yung-lo ch’eng in reverse, a
ruinous loss that at least temporarily eliminated the Hsi Hsia as a threat to
Sung hegemony. Backed into an increasingly untenable position, Emperor
Hui-tsung of the Hsi Hsia had no choice but to sue for peace through a Liao
intermediary in the ninth month of 1099, a move that was welcomed with
much celebration by the Sung court.230 The bellicose irredentist policies of
Che-tsung had been brought to fruition, achieving what all of Shen-tsung’s
horses and men could not: blotting out the stain of the defeat at Yung-lo
ch’eng.
Broken stalemate: Politics in the Yüan-fu era and the interregnum
As the most disciplined political organization of its time, the Shao-sheng
coalition had achieved great triumphs in the spheres of fiscal and border policy,
not just consummating but surpassing the attainments of Shen-tsung and
his ministers. When they swept back into power in 1094, the reformists
227
228
229
230
SS 18, p. 347.
SS 18, pp. 347–8.
Wang, Tōto jiryaku 128, p. 3b; SS 328, p. 10590.
HCP (1979) 515, pp. 12234, 12240.
552
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enjoyed both an exceptional degree of unanimity and unqualified imperial
support. Throughout the mid-1090s, the ministry of Chang Tun functioned as
a well-lubricated political machine, uniting behind clear-cut policy objectives
and silencing dissent from the bureaucratic rank and file. With Che-tsung
increasingly shut out of the loop, the reform ministry possessed virtual carte
blanche, unchecked by imperial oversight. But after the members of the “Yüanyu faction” had been persecuted, the New Policies had been renovated, and the
northwestern borderlands had been all but pacified, the reform coalition was
riven asunder by personal rivalries within the Council of State. By 1098, the
first year of the new Yüan-fu era, the tacit agreement that had once prevailed
among the reform cabinet of Chang Tun, Tseng Pu, Ts’ai Ching, and Ts’ai Pien
gave way to incessant backbiting. Unlike the tripartite conflict of Lo, Shuo,
and Shu a decade earlier, this bout of political infighting pitted man against
man rather than faction against faction.
These internal rivalries were mostly personal rather than political in nature,
grounded in spitefulness, jealousy, and resentment. When Ts’ai Pien was
appointed assistant director of the right in the Department of State Affairs
(shang-shu yu-ch’eng) in the tenth month of 1096, his older brother, Ts’ai Ching,
succumbed to sibling rivalry, resenting that he himself had been passed over
for a promotion. After being refused a seat on the Council of State yet again
in early 1097, Ts’ai Ching became permanently estranged from Chang Tun
as well, but Ts’ai’s bureaucratic expertise rendered him immune from dismissal.231 Apparently, Chang could not control the bureaucratic machinery
without Ts’ai’s assistance, and could not risk dismissing him from office. Once
a loyal lieutenant to Chang Tun, Ts’ai Pien also fell out with his factional
patron.232 As Chang Tun increasingly delegated de facto authority to Ts’ai
Pien, the two were bound together by mutual dependency and enmity, and
neither could succeed in dislodging the other from court. Hence, the chief
councilor and two of his leading protégés were caught up in an unwinnable
struggle that remained stalemated to the end of Che-tsung’s personal
rule.
Whereas personality conflicts had alienated both Ts’ai Ching and Ts’ai
Pien from Chang Tun, Tseng Pu took a principled stance of opposition to
the chief councilor. Long loyal to Chang Tun, Tseng Pu broke away from
his former patron to oppose Chang’s absolutist rule as chief councilor. On
many occasions in the Shao-sheng era, Tseng Pu had adamantly refused any
hope of amnesty for the purged Yüan-yu partisans, and had coordinated and
231
232
HCP (1979) 490, p. 11621; 492, pp. 11688–9.
HCP (1979) 506, p. 12062; SS 472, p. 13729.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
553
systematized the bureaucratic aspects of the factional proscriptions. But as
the factional persecution campaign continued, Tseng could no longer stomach
its brutal consequences, and experienced what appears to have been a serious
change of heart. Making a calculated effort to triangulate his way through
political life, Tseng Pu broke with the mainstream of the reform coalition and
its leaders, striking out upon a solitary middle path between the extremes of
Yüan-yu and Shao-sheng. In mid-1097, he begged for a measure of clemency
for the banished Lü Ta-fang and Liu Chih; five months later, he advocated the
rehabilitation of Ch’en Kuan, a banned member of the antireform coalition.233
The same year, in a series of private audiences with Che-tsung, Tseng Pu
further distanced himself from the reformist ministerial regime by casting
aspersions on Chang Tun and Ts’ai Pien, accusing them of monopolizing power
and stifling all dissent.234 In a later dialogue in 1099, the final year of the
emperor’s reign, Tseng insisted that the factional persecutions had gone too
far: “When Chang Tun and Ts’ai Pien enacted [the persecution] of the Yüanyu faction, their assembled arguments were entirely excessive, and when they
slandered the former court, it was mostly to avenge their selfish grudges.”235
By regretfully rejecting the darkest aspects of the reformist past, Tseng Pu had
offered himself as a politically viable alternative to Chang Tun, employing a
strategy of compromise that would, in the short term, prove to be both shrewd
and prescient.
But Che-tsung suddenly died of an unspecified illness in the first month
of 1100, at the age of twenty-four. The latent hostilities within the reformist
leadership now burst to the surface. When Dowager Empress Ch’in-sheng
(1045–1101), the widow of Shen-tsung and a steadfast opponent of the New
Policies, assumed the role of regent, the political climate was abruptly transformed. In the ensuing debate over the imperial succession, Chang Tun invoked
the dynastic ritual code to advocate the enthronement of the Prince of Chien,
Che-tsung’s younger brother of the same mother. But the dowager empress
and Tseng Pu begged to differ, arguing that Chao Chi, the Prince of Tuan,
was truly next in line for the throne, maintaining that his robust health and
filial benevolence would make him an ideal emperor. When the remainder of
the Council of State, including Ts’ai Pien, sided with the dowager empress,
and the Prince of Tuan was enthroned as Emperor Hui-tsung at the age of
seventeen, Chang Tun was stunned into silence.236
233
234
235
236
HCP (1979) 487, p. 11563; 492, p. 11686.
HCP (1979) 491, p. 11654.
HCP (1979) 506, p. 12062.
HCP (1979) 530, pp. 12356–8.
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Having chosen the losing candidate in the succession controversy, Chang
Tun incurred the permanent enmity of the newly enthroned emperor. And
despite having supported Hui-tsung’s succession, Ts’ai Pien was guilty by
association with Chang, a definite political liability in the new regency. The
only viable contender to the councilorship was now Tseng Pu, who had effectively distanced himself from the reformist mainstream. Tseng swiftly seized
the advantage of the mounting tensions between Chang Tun and Hui-tsung
to begin rehabilitating such banished antireformists as Fan Ch’un-jen, Han
Chung-yen, and Ch’en Kuan. Packing the Censorate with Yüan-yu sympathizers in the summer of 1100, Tseng Pu opened the roads of remonstrance to begin
the process of dislodging Chang Tun and the brothers Ts’ai from the Council
of State. Drawing upon the support of his new allies in remonstrance posts,
Tseng Pu engineered the dismissals of Ts’ai Ching and Ts’ai Pien in the third
and fifth months of 1100.237 After repeatedly bearing the brunt of censorial
indictments for “monopolizing power . . . betraying the state, and misleading
the court,” Chang Tun was cashiered and demoted to a regional post in the
ninth month of 1100, effectively eliminating the Shao-sheng faction from the
corridors of power for the time being.238
With his rivals for power finally dispensed with, Tseng Pu ascended to the
councilorship in the tenth month of 1100, serving alongside the rehabilitated
antireformist Han Chung-yen in a bipartisan ministry. Symbolic of Tseng Pu’s
attempts to transcend factionalism, the reign title was changed to Chien-chung
ching-kuo (Establishing the Mean and Stabilizing the State) early in 1101.
But this conciliatory experiment in establishing a middle path between the
excesses of Yüan-yu and Shao-sheng was to prove ephemeral. And Tseng Pu’s
attempts to be everything to everyone were ultimately abortive, for he was
too deeply implicated in the Shao-sheng persecutions to ever appeal to the
Yüan-yu survivors, and too much of a betrayer and apostate to ever endear
himself to the reformists.
Upon the sudden death of the dowager empress in the first month of 1101,
Hui-tsung began his personal rule, bringing the experiment in factional conciliation to an end. Having lost faith in Tseng Pu and his coalition government, Hui-tsung expressed his desire to continue the policies of Shen-tsung
and Che-tsung. The reign title was changed again to Ch’ung-ning (Revering
the Hsi-ning Era) in 1102. The implications were clear: the reform coalition
would regain its dominance over politics and polity, and Tseng Pu’s bipartisan coalition would be doomed to failure. When Ts’ai Ching was appointed
chief councilor of the right in the seventh month of 1102, he immediately
237
238
CPPM 120, pp. 3616, 3620.
CPPM 120, pp. 3618–19, 3624.
che-tsung’s reign and the age of faction
555
unleashed another series of severe proscriptions against the Yüan-yu faction
and its recent sympathizers. The short-lived reconciliation campaign of 1101–
2 came to a crashing halt, as it became abundantly clear that factional conflict
could not be conciliated by imperial fiat. Under the ministry of Ts’ai Ching,
a new political alignment would take shape, and reformist dominance would
remain unchallenged until the end of the Northern Sung.
CHAPTER 7
THE REIGNS OF HUI-TSUNG (1100–1126) AND
CH’IN-TSUNG (1126–1127) AND THE FALL OF THE
NORTHERN SUNG
Ari Daniel Levine
approaches and departures: historiographic issues
Ensconced within his palace pleasure gardens, a dissolute aesthete-emperor
paints exquisite birds and flowers, even as the empire rots from corruption
within and succumbs to invasion from without. Such is the classical historiographic image of Emperor Hui-tsung (1082–1135, r. 1100–26), the penultimate monarch of the Northern Sung.1 Occupying a tantalizingly ambiguous
position in history, he has been simultaneously celebrated as a magnificent
patron and practitioner of the arts and reviled as a negligent ruler who nearly
doomed the dynasty. For centuries of Chinese historians, Hui-tsung has functioned as a metonymic figure, embodying the contradictions of the Sung
dynasty as a whole, symbolizing the ascendancy of wen, the refinements of
culture, over wu, the arts of war. Rich in tragedy and irony, the contradictions
and contrasts of Hui-tsung’s reign have been suppressed by historians, who
have reconstructed a fragmentary corpus of primary sources into a didactic and
moralistic narrative.
Judgments of the Hui-tsung era have tended toward high levels of generalization, for the documentary record of his reign poses a minefield of historiographic problems. Foremost of these issues is the moralistic praise-and-blame
bias of traditional Chinese historiography. In the standard dynastic histories
of the Sung, and in privately compiled works of historiography, Hui-tsung
and his long-serving chief councilor Ts’ai Ching (1046–1127) have been held
responsible for a litany of crimes against the moral and territorial integrity of
1
The most critical primary source for the Hui-tsung reign is Yang Chung-liang’s Tzu-chih t’ung-chien
ch’ang-pien chi-shih pen-mo [hereafter CPPM] (1253; Taipei, 1967). CPPM is a thematic compilation of
and companion to Li T’ao’s Hsü tzu-chih t’ung-chien ch’ang-p’ien [hereafter HCP (1979)] (1183; Peking,
1979–95), the surviving edition of which contains only the first month of Hui-tsung’s reign. Other
essential sources are T’o-t’o et al., eds., Sung shih [hereafter SS] (1345; Peking, 1977), the official dynastic
history of the Sung. The motherlode of administrative documents for the Hui-tsung reign is Hsü Sung
et al., Sung hui-yao chi-kao [hereafter SHY (1997)] (1809, 1935; Peking, 1997). Another crucial collection
of documents for political history is Hsü Tzu-ming, ed., Sung tsai-fu pien-nien lu chiao-fu (Peking, 1986).
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
557
the state. Ts’ai and his fellow state councilors, pejoratively referred to as the
“Six Felons” (liu tsei), were blamed for prosecuting the most sweeping factional
purge in Sung history, allowing governmental corruption to run rampant, and
pushing the subjects of the empire toward impoverishment and rebellion. In
the judgment of posterity, the greatest crime of these so-called felonious ministers was their bungling of border diplomacy and military strategy, which
precipitated the Jurchen Chin invasion, the sack of K’ai-feng, and the fall of
the north.
Moral outrage has pervaded the primary and secondary sources of the Huitsung reign so deeply that it has become a challenge for present-day historians
to strip away these layers of revisionism and to separate events from interpretation. For example, the Sung shih biographies of the leading statesmen of
the Hui-tsung reign have been placed under the rubric “treacherous ministers” (chien-ch’en), portraying Ts’ai Ching and his colleagues in an unfailingly
negative light.2 The surviving unofficial chronicles of the period have been
deliberately arranged to indict the failures and crimes of Hui-tsung’s state
councilors. Historians can attempt to correct for the biases of our late-imperial
predecessors, but moralistic judgments pervade the very fabric of the historiography, turning primary sources into secondary sources.
The traditional ideals of moralistic historiography not only have determined
the composition of the primary sources for the history of the Hui-tsung reign,
they have also determined the sources’ distribution and survival. In other
words, few sources that deviate from the trend of condemnatory historiography have survived. The moralistic biases of traditional historians have influenced which primary sources they deemed worthy of recopying and reprinting.
Hence, nine centuries later, almost no counterhistories of the Hui-tsung reign
have been preserved. Only a very limited number of texts veer in the opposite interpretational direction from the standard histories to try to glorify the
emperor and his most prominent courtiers.3 Perhaps the most authoritative
chronicle of this period could be mined and reassembled from the Sung hui-yao,
a topical compendium of administrative documents. At any rate, the so-called
2
3
SS 472, pp. 13271–8, for the “treacherous minister” biography of Ts’ai Ching. For a textual archeology of
this historical narrative, see Charles Hartman, “A textual history of Cai Jing’s biography in the Song shi,”
in Emperor Huizong and Late Northern Song China: The politics of culture and the culture of politics, ed. Patricia
B. Ebrey and Maggie Bickford (Cambridge, Mass., 2006), pp. 517–64. For an analysis of the moralistic
strain of official Sung historiography, see also Charles Hartman, “The making of a villain: Ch’in Kuei and
Tao-hsüeh,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 58 No. 1 (1998), pp. 59–146.
For example, one of the most valuable primary sources for the history of the Hui-tsung reign is Ts’ai
T’ao’s T’ieh-wei shan ts’ung-t’an, ed. Feng Hui-min and Shen Hsi-lin (c. 1130; Peking, 1983), a slender
volume of pi-chi anecdotes which provides access to the imperial court. Since Ts’ai T’ao was the son of the
chief councilor, Ts’ai Ching, his narratives tend to eulogize Hui-tsung and his ministers with self-serving
glorification.
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primary sources of the Hui-tsung reign must be read with a skeptical eye, for
what they can and cannot recount.
In both quantity and quality, the documentary record of the Hui-tsung era
pales in comparison to the reign chronicles of the emperor’s immediate predecessors, Shen-tsung and Che-tsung. The exact reason for the disappearance
of major source texts pertaining to the Hui-tsung reign remains unknown.
Doubtless, some portions of the pertinent dynastic chronicles were destroyed
during the Chin conquest and the subsequent southbound flight of the imperial court. Because of the paucity of the documentary record, the compilation
of the Veritable records (shih-lu) of the Hui-tsung reign occupied Southern Sung
court historiographers for several decades, starting in the late 1130s. This text
was not completed until 1177, and its compilation was undertaken during the
Kao-tsung and Hsiao-tsung reigns, at a time when political circumstances had
dramatically changed.4 By the middle of the twelfth century, the official interpretation of recent history blamed the ministry of Ts’ai Ching for the collapse
of the Northern Sung. Documents that might have portrayed the achievements
of the Hui-tsung reign in a positive light were systematically excluded from
both the pertinent Veritable records and the State history (kuo-shih). These works
of official history were collated into the Sung shih, the standard dynastic history,
and the unofficial chronicles that survive. Hence, the present-day disposition
of the documentary record has been skewed by the condemnatory attitudes of
historians in the Southern Sung and later.
The most basic source for Northern Sung political history, the Hsü tzu-chih
t’ung-chien ch’ang-pien (1183) of Li T’ao (1115–84), is now missing all but a
month of the Hui-tsung reign. Compiled from the basic annals of the Veritable
records and State histories of the Northern Sung, this text is an indispensable
chronicle of prior reigns, but extends only as far as the month after Hui-tsung’s
enthronement. A fraction of entries from the Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien ch’angpien has been collected and classified in a shorter topical compilation, Yang
Chung-liang’s Tzu-chih t’ung-chien ch’ang-pien chi-shih pen-mo (1253), but this
text is problematic as well, for its entries present an uncertain quantity of
selections from the Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien ch’ang-pien, and it fails to devote
much space to the history of state policies and institutions. The Chi-shih penmo devotes a preponderant amount of space to the early and final years of
Hui-tsung’s twenty-six year reign, leaving a gap that must be filled by other
sources. These include the aforementioned Sung hui-yao and Hsü Meng-hsin’s
4
For an extended textual history of the official historiography of the Hui-tsung reign, see chapter 2, Ari
D. Levine, “A house in darkness: The politics of history and the language of politics in the Late Northern
Song, 1066–1126” (diss., Columbia University, 2002). Also see Ts’ai Ch’ung-pang, Sung-tai hsiu-shih
chih-tu yen-chiu (Taipei, 1991), pp. 100–4.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
559
(1126–1207) San-chao pei-meng hui-pien (1196), a collection of documents
chronicling the Sung court’s wars and treaties with the Liao and Chin.
Presenting another set of problems, in both primary and secondary sources,
the history of the late Northern Sung has inevitably been narrated in teleological fashion. With the benefit of hindsight, later historians have portrayed
the Hui-tsung era as a period of inevitable decline and fall, conceptualizing nearly three decades – the second longest reign of the Northern Sung –
as a slippery downward slope toward humiliation and disintegration. To replicate such a teleological narrative is to elide the random and fortuitous factors that precipitated the collapse of the Northern Sung and to ignore the
moments of stasis and equilibrium that punctuate its history. The primary
sources and secondary literature for the period offer little guidance to the historian who seeks to write a narrative that does not assume that the “Calamity of
Ching-k’ang” – that is, the Jurchen conquest of north China in 1126–7 – was
a foregone conclusion.
To bring the problem of sources back into the picture, in traditional historiography the decadence and dissolution of a ruler and his court are portrayed as
harbingers of dynastic collapse. Since the primary sources for the penultimate
reign of the Northern Sung have been subject to historiographic revisions,
present-day historians cannot entirely avoid reiterating the interpretations of
their predecessors. Standard historiography has determined the conventional
interpretation of the Hui-tsung reign, as well as the composition and distribution of the documentary record. Even if such a thing were desirable,
this chapter is not a rehabilitation project, an attempt to peel away historiographic accretions to discover what lies beneath. The story narrated here does
not deviate from the documentary record, but it will interrogate it at every
opportunity, revealing the extent to which it has been compromised by the
moralistic agenda of traditional historiography.
court politics during the ch’in-sheng regency
If it had not been for his older brother’s premature death, Chao Chi, Shentsung’s eleventh son, would never have been enthroned as emperor.5 Unburdened by the demands of rulership and excluded from involvement in court
politics, this imperial prince surely would have devoted his life to artistic
patronage and production. A connoisseur and practitioner par excellence, the
future Emperor Hui-tsung was infatuated with painting, calligraphy, and
other refined aesthetic pursuits. His skill with the brush has been described as
5
For a recent biography of Hui-tsung, which offers a detailed history of his reign, see Jen Ch’ung-yüeh,
Sung Hui-tsung Sung Ch’in-tsung (Ch’ang-ch’un, 1996).
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prodigious, and he has joined the art-historical canon as a creator, organizer,
and patron.6 With the passing of the heirless Emperor Che-tsung (1077–1100,
r. 1085–1100), his younger brother Chao Chi was thrust into a role he had
not been prepared to play. Compared to his activist predecessors Shen-tsung
and Che-tsung, both of whom immersed themselves in the quotidian affairs
of governance, Hui-tsung was largely a hands-off monarch, setting the general direction of state policies and delegating broad powers to his ministers to
formulate and implement them.7
According to the traditional interpretation of his reign, the emperor Huitsung allowed himself to be manipulated by his chief councilor, Ts’ai Ching,
surrendering his oversight of governance in return for a constant supply of
luxuries. Accused of buying Hui-tsung’s compliance with art objects and garden supplies, Ts’ai Ching enjoyed the perquisites of the councilorship for
twenty-five years, with minimal interruptions. Long maligned in classical historiography as a “treacherous minister” (chien-ch’en), Ts’ai succeeded in maintaining political stability at a court that had been a factional battleground for
more than thirty years. Perhaps his ministerial regime endured because Ts’ai
Ching was politically astute enough (or, as his biographers alleged, ruthless
and cynical enough) to succeed where his predecessors had failed. Granted, he
marginalized political dissenters from the imperial bureaucracy and formed an
enduring factional patronage network at court. As long as Hui-tsung remained
upon the throne, Ts’ai Ching and his affiliates could dictate state policy as
they saw fit. Caught up in a web of mutual dependence, the emperor’s ministers clung to power until they were ultimately brought down by a military
crisis of their own making. By instigating the Chin invasion of 1126–7, Huitsung’s ministers earned themselves the scorn of traditional historians, who
reinterpreted the emperor’s entire reign as a downward spiral, heading inexorably toward dynastic collapse.
But few who attended his enthronement could have foreseen that Huitsung and his ministers would have pushed the Sung dynasty to the brink
of extinction. In fact, in the first month of 1100, when Emperor Che-tsung
died at the age of twenty-four under suspicious circumstances, Hui-tsung
assumed the throne to nearly unanimous acclaim from his Council of State.
6
7
For three recent art-historical studies of Hui-tsung, see Maggie Bickford, “Emperor Huizong and the
aesthetic of agency,” Archives of Asian art 53 (2002–3), pp. 71–104; Peter C. Sturman, “Cranes above
Kaifeng: The auspicious image in the court of Huizong,” Ars Orientalis 20 (1990), pp. 33–68; and Maggie
Bickford, “Huizong’s paintings: Art and the art of emperorship,” in Emperor Huizong and late Northern
Song China: The politics of culture and the culture of politics, ed. Patricia B. Ebrey and Maggie Bickford
(Cambridge, Mass., 2006), pp. 453–513.
For a brief analysis of court politics and state policy during the Hui-tsung reign, see Wang Tseng-yü,
“Pei Sung wan-ch’i cheng-chih chien-lun” Chung-kuo-shih yen-chiu 4 (1994), pp. 82–7.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
561
In the crowded field of Shen-tsung’s surviving heirs, Chao Chi had emerged
as the leading candidate for enthronement. And in the first year of his reign,
during which he shared power with Dowager Empress Ch’in-sheng, the new
monarch took an activist approach to governance. Hui-tsung assented to a
balanced policy of factional reconciliation, steering a middle course between
the reformist extremism of the Shao-sheng era and the antireform fervor of the
Yüan-yu regency. From the standpoint of the early Hui-tsung reign, a time
of contingency and uncertainty at court, the fall of the Northern Sung was by
no means inevitable.
Long live the king: The enthronement controversy of 1100
The controversy over the imperial enthronement brought an end to politics
as usual as it had been practiced during the previous two decades of factional
conflict. With the young monarch’s death came the abrupt fall of the reformist
Chang Tun (1035–1105) and the rise of his moderate rival Tseng Pu (1036–
1107). Breaking ranks with his old patron and the political mainstream in the
final years of Che-tsung’s reign, Tseng had opposed the partisan proscriptions
that Chang’s ministry had orchestrated in the mid-1090s. Nevertheless, Tseng
Pu failed to convince the monarch that the brutal excesses of factionalism had
jeopardized any hope of political stability at court.8 In audiences with the
previous emperor, Tseng had repeatedly attacked Chang and his lieutenant
Ts’ai Pien (1058–1117), accusing them of monopolizing power and silencing
dissent at court.9 By breaking with the darkest aspects of the reformist past,
Tseng Pu offered himself as a politically viable alternative to Chang Tun, if
only the monarch would listen.
In a political culture where the survival of a ministry was dependent upon
monarchical patronage, Che-tsung’s death loosened Chang’s grip on ministerial power and granted Tseng Pu an opportunity to stage a challenge for the
councilorship. As had happened with the death of Shen-tsung in 1085, the
monarchical transition of 1100 tipped the balance of power in favor of the opponents of the reformists’ New Policies. Shen-tsung’s consort, Dowager Empress
Ch’in-sheng (1045–1101), assumed the regency, influencing the imperial succession and the direction of state policy. Like Dowager Empress Hsüan-jen
before her, Ch’in-sheng was a critic of the New Policies and rehabilitated
antireformist councilors and remonstrators almost as soon as she was named
8
9
As Tseng argued in an audience with Che-tsung held in 1099: “When Chang Tun and Ts’ai Pien persecuted
the Yüan-yu faction, their arguments were entirely excessive, and when they slandered the former court,
it was mostly to avenge their selfish grievances.” See HCP (1979) 506, p. 12062.
HCP (1979) 491, p. 11654; 492, p. 11686.
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regent.10 As had occured at the beginning of the Hsüan-jen regency, when
the reformist councilor Ts’ai Ch’üeh was deposed, the early months of the
Ch’in-sheng regency initiated a dramatic shift in court politics that ended the
long-lived reform ministry of Chang Tun.
Adjudicated by the dowager empress, the ensuing debate over the imperial
succession provided a pretext for Chang’s dismissal from the Council of State.
Since Che-tsung had died without issue and had not nominated an heir apparent, one of his brothers would be nominated to succeed him as emperor. But
which brother? For nearly every prominent figure at court but Chang Tun, the
choice of whom to enthrone was unequivocal. When the regent summoned her
councilors to debate the succession in the ninth month of 1100, Chang spoke
first, presumably without having canvassed the opinions of his colleagues.
Such presumption might have gone unquestioned when Che-tsung occupied
the throne, but it now threatened Chang’s political survival.11 Rigidly interpreting the ritual code of the dynasty, which postulated consanguinity as
the principle for a fraternal succession, Chang supported the enthronement
of Chao Ssu, the Prince of Chien, Che-tsung’s younger brother by the same
mother.12 The dowager empress sternly objected to Chang’s efforts at king
making, asserting that at age nineteen, Chao Chi, the Prince of Tuan, enjoyed
the advantages of seniority and maturity over Chao Ssu.13 In the ensuing
debate, she overrode the increasingly desperate protestations of Chang Tun,
who insinuated that the Prince of Tuan was too frivolous to be an acceptable
choice as ruler. The chief councilor’s judgment might have been borne out by
future events, but his casting of aspersions at Chao Chi was a reckless maneuver
at the time. Ultimately, the regent prevailed in arguing for the enthronement
of Chao Chi, whose “longevity, benevolence, and filiality” she claimed distinguished him from his brothers. All of Chang’s colleagues in the Council of
State, Tseng Pu and Ts’ai Pien among them, seconded the dowager empress’s
choice. Speaking for the other assembled ministers, Tseng affirmed the Prince
of Tuan’s candidacy, denouncing Chang for attempting to dictate the imperial
succession.14 Later that day, Chao Chi assumed the throne as Emperor Huitsung, an event that was witnessed by a speechless Chang Tun, who could no
longer take monarchical patronage for granted.
10
11
12
13
14
According to Dowager Empress Ch’in-sheng’s Sung shih biography, she supported the antireform policies
of the Hsüan-jen regency. See SS 243, p. 8630.
Such was the moralistic interpretation of the compilers of the Sung shih. See SS 471, p. 13713.
HCP (1979) 530, pp. 12356–8.
Chao Pi, the Prince of Shen, was Shen-tsung’s eldest surviving son, but he was rejected as a
serious candidate for enthronement because of his poor vision. For his biography, see SS 246,
p. 8722.
HCP (1979) 530, pp. 12356–8.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
563
Shifting winds: The return of the antireformists and the fall of Chang Tun
During the first months of Hui-tsung’s reign, Chang Tun’s political position became increasingly untenable. The new monarchical regime, guided
by Dowager Empress Ch’in-sheng, made preliminary moves to rehabilitate
prominent antireformists who had endured the factional proscriptions that
had been advanced during Che-tsung’s personal rule. Fearing his impending
dismissal and the elimination of the New Policies, Chang sought to convince
the dowager empress and Emperor Hui-tsung to retain his ministerial regime
by appealing to the reforming legacy of Shen-tsung.15 His entreaties fell on
deaf ears, since the regent firmly grasped the reins of power. In the early months
of 1100, the surviving members of the antireform coalition and their secondgeneration supporters returned to the capital, after almost a decade of being
marginalized by Chang Tun’s reform ministry.
As Tseng Pu continued to maneuver toward the political center, reformist
dominance of the Council of State was further undermined. With the regent’s
approval, surviving opponents of the New Policies began to return to court.
Two potential leaders of the antireform opposition emerged, when Fan Ch’unjen (1027–1101) and Han Chung-yen (1038–1109), prominent members of
the antireform coalition of 1085–93, were rehabilitated and summoned back to
the capital in the first month of 1100.16 Both men had exceptional pedigrees,
both political and familial, that could make them the standard-bearers of a
restored antireform ministry. Frequently the lone voice of moderation during
the Hsüan-jen regency, Fan Ch’un-jen had notably opposed the forced banishment of Ts’ai Ch’üeh, the former chief councilor and leader of the reformist
opposition, in 1089. Even so, Fan had suffered political persecution during
Chang Tun’s regime, enduring years of exile in the far south. The son of
Jen-tsung’s famed chief councilor Fan Chung-yen, Fan would have been the
natural standard-bearer of the resurgent antireform coalition of 1100, but his
ill health and advancing blindness forced him to decline the councilorship.17
15
16
17
See memorials by Chang Tun and Ts’ai Pien, both presented days after Hui-tsung’s enthronement, in
HCP (1979) 520, pp. 12368, 12371.
In the first month of 1100 a messenger was sent to Yung-chou2 (in Kuang-nan West), to summon
Fan Ch’un-jen back to the capital. See the topical history by the Southern Sung compiler P’eng Paichuan, T’ai-p’ing chih-chi t’ung-lei (c. 13th c.; Taipei, 1966) 24, p. 30a. Han Chung-yen was officially
recommended to the Council of State in the first month of 1100, along with several other nonmainstream
political figures: Kuo Chih-chang and Huang Lü, both moderate reformists loyal to Tseng Pu; and Lu
Tien, Kung Yuan, and Tseng Chao, all of whom were individualists who had served under both factions.
See HCP (1979) 520, p. 12378.
According to his Sung shih biography, Fan Ch’un-jen’s forced exile to Yung-chou (Ching-hu South circuit)
was ended after Dowager Empress Ch’in-sheng intervened to restore his honorary official rank and to
arrange for his transfer to Cheng-chou, much closer to the capital. Imperial boons of medical herbs
564
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Han Chung-yen, another scion of the antireform movement, took Fan’s place as
the formal leader of the antireform opposition. The son of Han Ch’i (1008–75),
a renowned councilor of the 1050s and 1060s, Han Chung-yen also opposed
the New Policies but was more amenable to serving under a bipartisan ministerial regime. In the third month of 1100, Han was appointed chief councilor
of the right (yu-p’u-yeh), a move that foreshadowed the impending dismissal
of Chang Tun.18
In the meantime, other survivors of the antireform coalition were making
their way back to K’ai-feng to form the nucleus of an opposition movement
at court. By the second month of Hui-tsung’s reign, such stalwart antireformists as Liu An-shih, Ch’eng I, Su Shih, and Lü T’ao were released from
their exiles and restored to the ranks of officialdom.19 But because most prominent members of the antireform coalition of the 1080s were deceased, infirm,
or simply unwilling to serve at court, younger associates took their places.
By the spring of 1100, both the Censorate and the Remonstrance Bureau
were packed with a second generation of Yüan-yu sympathizers. The most
voluble conservatives at court during the first year of the Hui-tsung reign
were the remonstrators Ch’en Kuan (1057–1122), Tsou Hao (1060–1111),
and Kung Kuai (n.d.).20 Long barricaded under Chang Tun’s ministry, the
roads of remonstrance were reopened by an edict affirming that in the new
monarchical regime, “upright words will be heeded, with no restrictions.”21
With the promulgation of this edict, antireformist remonstrators were granted
permission to clamor for Chang’s dismissal, which the dowager empress had
sought ever since the enthronement debates.
Chang Tun was soon buried beneath a heap of hostile indictments from
the Censorate and the Remonstrance Bureau. Ch’en Kuan, the exhorter of the
left (tso-cheng-yen), led the resistance, inspiring his colleagues in remonstrance
posts to demand the chief councilor’s summary dismissal. In a memorial of
the fourth month of 1100, the likes of which had not been read for more
than a decade, Ch’en attacked Chang with extreme viciousness and moralistic
fervor: “Chang Tun has monopolized power as chief councilor for eight years
18
19
20
21
and tea could not save Fan’s health, which had sharply deteriorated during his exile. In 1101, a year
after declining the councilorship, Fan died at the age of seventy-five. See SS 314, p. 10292. For a brief
English-language biography, see Michael D. Freeman and Chikusa Masaaki, “Fan Shun-jen,” in Sung
biographies, ed. Herbert Franke (Wiesbaden, 1976), pp. 334–7.
P’eng, T’ai-p’ing chih-chi t’ung-lei 24, p. 30b.
P’eng, T’ai-p’ing chih-chi t’ung-lei 24, pp. 30a–b. Another ten antireformists, mostly rank-and-file members of the Yüan-yu coalition, were rehabilitated in the second month of 1100.
P’eng, T’ai-p’ing chih-chi t’ung-lei 24, p. 30b. Ch’en Kuan was appointed exhorter of the left (tso cheng-yen),
Tsou Hao was appointed exhorter of the right (yu cheng-yen), and Kung Kuai was made palace censor
(tien-chung shih yü-shih).
CPPM 123, pp. 3708–9.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
565
running. He has confused the state and misled the court, and his crimes cannot
be concealed. All of the resentment and anger in the empire is focused upon
him.”22
But Ch’en’s words failed to sway the mind of Hui-tsung, who refused to
allow Chang to retire from the Council of State on several occasions. The
emperor’s ambivalence on this issue cannot be easily explained away, since
he did not lack a reason to dismiss the sole opponent of his enthronement
from the councilorship. Nonetheless, when it came to dismissing Chang’s
lieutenants from the Council of State, Ch’in-sheng and Hui-tsung were much
less hesitant. Largely responsible for the revival of the New Policies and the
brutal purge of the antireformists during Che-tsung’s personal rule, Ts’ai Pien
was the first to fall from grace. In mid-1100, the palace censor Kung Kuai
railed against Ts’ai, employing polemical and language reminiscent of the
days of the Yüan-yu regency: “[Your servant] observes that Ts’ai Pien’s heart
is profoundly venomous, and his nature is endowed with wickedness. . . . If he
was not loyal to the Former Emperors [i.e., Shen-tsung and Che-tsung], then
how can he possibly be loyal to Your Majesty?23
Soon thereafter, Ts’ai was cashiered as the assistant director of the left in the
Department of State Affairs (shang-shu tso-ch’eng), and demoted to a prefecturallevel administrative post in the Yangtze Delta.24 With the subsequent dismissals of Hsing Shu and Ts’ai Pien’s older brother Ts’ai Ching, the reformist
majority on the Council of State collapsed. Yet although his maneuvering
it managed to win him the councilorship, Tseng Pu’s move to eliminate his
former comrades in the reform faction would come back to haunt him. As an
apostate to the reform cause, Tseng had cut off a bloc of potential supporters on
the left, and he would be the first to be purged from court if an unreconstructed
reformist ever returned to power.
Set free by Tseng Pu, conservative remonstrators stepped up their campaign
to remove Chang Tun from the councilorship. Ch’en Kuan and his colleagues
indicted Chang for a slew of crimes against the state: absolutism, favoritism,
factionalism, blasphemy, heresy, and irredentism.25 Hui-tsung finally heeded
the calls of his censors and granted Chang’s requests for retirement in the ninth
month of 1100, dismissing him from the Council of State and demoting him
to a post in prefectural administration.26 Even after his dismissal to Yüeh-chou
(Liang-che), where he was appointed prefect, Chang was still singled out for
22
23
24
25
26
CPPM 120, pp. 3618–19.
CPPM 120, pp. 3619–20.
Ts’ai was appointed prefect of Chiang-ning fu. See CPPM 120, p. 3620.
For a series of censorial indictments against Chang Tun, see CPPM 120, pp. 3622–4.
Chang was initially appointed prefect of Yüeh-chou in the ninth month of 1100, but he was soon
stripped of his honorary ranks and was banished to T’an-chou the next month. See CPPM 120, p. 3627.
566
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further punishment, for his dismissal failed to satisfy his enemies in either the
Censorate or the Remonstrance Bureau. The subject of an unceasing stream
of indictments, Chang Tun was stripped of his honorary rank and ultimately
banished to the far south by imperial fiat in early 1101. As the victim of what
his future biographers would deem retributive justice, Chang received the
same sentence as he had arranged for his own political adversaries during the
factional purges of the 1090s.27 After his former protégé Ts’ai Ching ascended
to the councilorship in 1102, Chang remained unwelcome at court.28 Never
to return to the capital, Chang Tun died in 1105, during a period of exile to
the southern fringes of the empire generically known as Ling-nan, just like the
antireformists whom he had systematically purged during his councilorship.29
Broken stalemate: The failure of factional conciliation
Chang Tun’s dismissal paved the way for Tseng Pu’s ascendancy to the councilorship the next month, causing the court to drift closer to the political
center.30 While formally subordinate to Han Chung-yen as chief councilor of
the right, Tseng (as the Sung shih compilers claimed) in fact wielded the reins
of governance, influencing Hui-tsung to implement a policy of bipartisan conciliation.31 An imperial edict of the tenth month of 1100 officially initiated an
era of centrist politics in that political pragmatism and centrism, not factional
or ideological extremism, would serve as the guiding principles of governance:
“From now on, those managing the government who use distorted scholarship
to be biased and who make unreasonable changes will be publicly rejected.”32
Aware of the excesses of factional politics during the Hsüan-jen regency and
the personal rule of Che-tsung, Tseng Pu convinced Hui-tsung that the good
of the dynasty required putting an end to the destructive partisanship that had
divided the court for the past thirty years. A bifactional unity government,
presided over by Tseng, was formed to palliate both reformists and their opponents. By co-opting more moderate elements from both sides of the factional
27
28
29
30
31
32
For a textual archeology of Chang Tun’s “treacherous minister” biography in the Sung shih, see the third
chapter of Levine, “A house in darkness.”
Chang Tun was even listed prominently in the factional blacklist of 1104. For his “disloyalty as a state
councilor,” see CPPM 122, p. 3699.
For the documents pertaining to Chang’s dismissal, see CPPM 120, pp. 3632–3. For the somewhat
ironic circumstances of Chang’s exile to Lei-chou and Mu-chou, see SS 471, p. 13713.
CPPM 130, p. 3939. According to the compilers of the Sung shih: “When the reign title was changed to
Chien-chung ching-kuo, those who controlled the state desired to harmonize the men of Yüan-yu and
Shao-sheng; hence the use of the character chung (centrality) in the reign title.” See SS 345, p. 10965.
According to Tseng’s biography in the Sung shih: “Although Chung-yen held the higher post, he was
weak and pliant, and the majority of decisions were Pu’s.” See SS 471, p. 13715.
P’eng, T’ai-p’ing chih-chi t’ung-lei 24, p. 33b.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
567
struggle into the center of court politics, Tseng sought to defuse tensions
and alleviate grievances, and to prepare for an eventual return to governance
as usual. But traditional historiography has maligned this policy of factional
conciliation as a cynical political ploy.33 Indeed, perhaps the idealistic language of Tseng Pu’s public pronouncements had been a calculated political
move to position himself to the right of Chang Tun and transform himself into
a viable alternative candidate for the councilorship, although in the long run
this repositioning maneuver undermined his long-term political survival.
Signaling a break with the preceding age of faction, Hui-tsung decreed that
in the coming new year of 1101 the reign title would be changed to Chienchung ching-kuo (Establishing the Mean and Stabilizing the State, 1101).34
However, Tseng Pu’s attempt to palliate political grievances did not meet
with any real success beyond the realm of signs and symbols. After thirty years
of unending bitterness, factional hatreds were too profound to be conciliated
by imperial fiat, and partisan rivalries had been passed on to a new political
generation. Leaders of both factions had been forcibly deported to Ling-nan in
ever-larger numbers, and such breaches of “civilized” political practice could
never be healed. Escalating in fervor ever since the 1070s, political rhetoric
and practices had been polemicized and degraded to the point where civility,
let alone basic tolerance, could no longer be restored.35
While Tseng Pu had co-opted some junior members of the antireform coalition into his court coalition, he could not manipulate them to ensure his own
political survival. Soon to be threatened on his right flank, Tseng lacked any
effective means of damage control. Once unleashed upon Chang Tun, the pack
of conservative remonstrators could not be tamed to spare Tseng Pu. Whatever his current political leanings, he was too deeply implicated in the policies
and purges of the 1090s to remain acceptable as a chief councilor in a unity
government. Conservative elements at court distrusted Tseng and believed
that his conversion to the cause of factional conciliation had been duplicitous.
In an indictment of late 1100, an attending censor (shih-yü shih), Chen Tz’usheng, tarred him with the same brush as Chang Tun: “Tseng Pu’s character
is treacherous and wicked; his heart harbors fiendishness and venom. . . . Since
he was recently elevated to the councilorship, he has monopolized state power
and slighted his bureaucratic colleagues.”36 The extremism of antireformist
remonstrators, expressed in a flood of hostile memorials, would frustrate Tseng
33
34
35
36
Such are the aspersions cast by Tseng’s Sung shih biography. See SS 471, p. 13716.
P’eng, T’ai-p’ing chih-chi t’ung-lei 24, pp. 33b–34a.
For a discursive analysis of political rhetoric from 1070 to 1104, see chapter 5 of Levine, “A house in
darkness.”
See CPPM 130, pp. 3939–40.
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Pu’s attempts at bifactional government, regardless of whether they were motivated by sincerity or by cynicism.37
Knowing that his councilorship was being jeopardized by hostile remonstrators, Tseng Pu appealed to Hui-tsung to maintain a conciliatory policy and
to continue to steer a centrist course. In the seventh month of 1101, during
an audience before the throne, he urged the emperor to continue with this
experiment in bipartisanship:
Your Majesty desires to uphold impartiality and employ centering to break through the
discourse of factionalism, which will conciliate and unify the empire. Who would dare
consider this [policy] to be incorrect? Men with biased views and deviant opinions each
privately favors his own faction. . . . I wish Your Majesty would deeply consider this, and
not allow either of these factions to succeed. Thereafter, harmony and tranquillity will
prevail, and the empire will be without incident.38
On the surface, Tseng’s attempt at consensus building evinced a spirit of
magnanimity, but he was actually moving to silence his most vocal critics on
the right, who had intensified their ad hominem attacks against his councilorship. Throughout 1101, conservative remonstrators presented a united front
of resistance to Tseng Pu’s councilorship, seeking his dismissal and replacement. For Ch’en Kuan, Tseng’s involvement in the restored reformist regime
of the 1090s, notably his participation in the factionally motivated revision of
official historiography, proved that he was little different from the pernicious
reformist Chang Tun.39 In the end, Hui-tsung sided with Tseng, ordering
Ch’en Kuan’s dismissal from the Remonstrance Bureau, and his demotion to
a regional post in the eighth month of 1101.40 Several months earlier, Tseng
had also arranged for the summary dismissal of Tsou Hao, another of his most
outspoken adversaries.41 By purging his most recalcitrant critics from court,
Tseng managed to shore up his sagging position as councilor in the short term,
but he soon met with even more damaging opposition from a former colleague.
37
38
39
40
41
Most private accounts of the early Hui-tsung reign, written by antireformist sympathizers, consider
that Tseng Pu’s move to co-opt conservatives into a bipartisan government was motivated by selfserving cynicism, and that he was an opportunistic reformist to the core. See Yeh Meng-te, Pi-shu lu-hua
[Ts’ung-shu chi-ch’eng ch’u-pien 1935–7 ed.] (1135; Peking, 1985) hsia, pp. 52–3.
CPPM 130, pp. 3942–3.
In 1094, Tseng had served for several months in the Historiography Institute, and had argued for the
inclusion of Wang An-shih’s Diaries in a newly revised edition of the Veritable records of Emperor Shen-tsung
(Shen-tsung shih-lu). As chief councilor, Tseng had resisted Ch’en Kuan’s calls to recompile these Veritable
records to exclude the writings of Wang An-shih. For the text of Chen’s attacks, see CPPM 129, pp. 3892–
5. For more information on the influence of court factionalism on official historiography, see chapter 3
of Levine, “A house in darkness.”
For the text of the court debate over Ch’en Kuan’s dismissal, see CPPM 129, pp. 3896–8.
CPPM 129, p. 3910.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
569
Expedient means: The rise of Ts’ai Ching
Now embattled on both sides, Tseng Pu alienated both conservatives and
reformists by maneuvering himself into the councilorship as a conciliating centrist. The precariousness of Tseng’s situation was exacerbated by the emperor’s
vacillation. Beginning his personal rule in the first month of 1101, after the
death of Dowager Empress Ch’in-sheng, Hui-tsung increasingly asserted his
own prerogatives. He ceased pursuing the politics of conciliation by midyear,
when he officially expressed his desire to continue the reform legacy of Shentsung and Che-tsung. After supporting the rehabilitation of the antireformists,
and then purging them when they grew obstreperous and unmanageable,
Tseng had undermined his credibility with his imperial patron, who now
ruled unchecked. By agreeing to another change in the reign title from Chienchung ching-kuo to Ch’ung-ning (Revering the Hsi-ning Era), Hui-tsung
symbolically sanctioned a return to the reformist course of the Shen-tsung
reign.42
Han Chung-yen, the figurehead chief councilor of the left, resented sharing
the councilorship with Tseng. Doubting that Tseng Pu’s co-optation of the
antireformists had been a sincere move to heal political divisions, Han considered his rival to be an unreconstructed reformist to the core and frequently
disagreed with Tseng in court debates.43 Han repeatedly requested retirement
from his official duties, but Hui-tsung would not grant him that wish, thereby
intensifying divisions within the Council of State.44 Powerless to move against
Tseng from the right, perhaps Han sought to undermine his rival from the
left by encouraging the emperor to rehabilitate the reformist Ts’ai Ching. An
alternate interpretation of the documentary record is that Tseng Pu, not Han
Chung-yen, was responsible for Ts’ai Ching’s return to court, by abandoning
his efforts at factional reconciliation and casting his lot with the reformists.
Recently cashiered from the metropolitan bureaucracy by Tseng Pu as a
“treacherous” and “disloyal” reformist minister, the Fukienese arriviste Ts’ai
Ching has become known to history as an exceptionally unscrupulous political
operator.45 Since the primary sources for the Hui-tsung reign have been distorted by moralistic revisionism, historians have found it difficult to describe
42
43
44
45
SS 19, p. 363. The Hsi-ning era (1068–77) of Shen-tsung’s reign had witnessed the implementation of
Wang An-shih’s New Policies.
According to one source, “[Han] Chung-yen resented [Tseng] Pu. He said: ‘Pu is selfishly plotting to
restore Shen-tsung’s reforms (shao-shu). I have been employed so that he can accomplish this.’” See Hsü,
Sung tsai-fu pien-nien lu chiao-pu 11, p. 701.
CPPM 130, p. 3949.
See Hartman, “A textual history.” For a detailed social history of Ts’ai and his extended lineage, see
Hugh R. Clark, “An inquiry into the Xianyou Cai: Cai Xiang, Cai Que, Cai Jing, and the politics of
kinship,” Journal of Sung-Yuan Studies 31 (2001), pp. 67–101.
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Ts’ai Ching as anything but the apotheosis of ethical and political depravity. His biographers asserted that Ts’ai had distinguished himself from his
reformist colleagues by his naked pursuit of political power throughout his
bureaucratic career, when he served under the ministries of Ts’ai Ch’üeh and
Chang Tun. The compilers of his standard biography asserted that he sacrificed
his reformist principles to accommodate himself to Ssu-ma Kuang during the
debates over the abolition of the New Policies in 1085–6.46 In what later
historians deemed another expedient volte-face, when Chang Tun had been
rehabilitated as chief councilor in 1094 Ts’ai pressured him to revive the
New Policies, with no questions asked.47 If the traditional histories are to
be believed, Ts’ai Ching was willing to discard his political principles and
personal integrity to advance his own career at every turn.
According to the conventional interpretation of his rise to the councilorship,
Ts’ai Ching cunningly manipulated Hui-tsung by appealing to the emperor’s
insatiable craving for aesthetic pleasure. During his exile from court in 1101,
Ts’ai had been posted to the Yangtze delta as a regional administrator. In
Hang-chou, Ts’ai encountered the eunuch T’ung Kuan, who had been dispatched south to collect scrolls and paintings for the imperial collection.48
The compilers of the Sung shih allege that by appending persuasive memorials
to T’ung Kuan’s daily shipments of art objects to the palace, Ts’ai managed to
win the emperor’s unconditional trust. While Tseng Pu and Han Chung-yen
were working at cross-purposes, Ts’ai broke through the bipartisan gridlock
at court, swaying Hui-tsung to appoint him to the councilorship. Sources
indicate that the emperor decided to reappoint Ts’ai to the Council of State
by the end of 1101. Once he was rehabilitated at court, Ts’ai could not be
contained or controlled by those who opposed his rapid ascent to the councilorship. Returning to the capital in an academic capacity in the third month
of 1102, Ts’ai was appointed to his old post of assistant director of the left in
the Department of State Affairs (shang-shu tso-ch’eng) two months later.49 Han
Chung-yen was the first to be pushed aside, earning dismissal from bureaucratic
46
47
48
49
According to Ts’ai Ching’s Sung shih biography: “When Ssu-ma Kuang controlled governance, he revived
the drafted service policy. [Ts’ai] and his colleagues were compelled [to implement it] within a span
of 5 days, but only Ching was able to entirely change the capital district and the surrounding county
over to drafted service, without a single violation.” See SS 472, p. 13722. This was the first chapter in
traditional historiography’s condemnation of Ts’ai Ching as a “treacherous minister.” See Hartman, “A
textual history.”
According to the compilers of the Sung shih, “[Chang] Tun and [Ssu-ma] Kuang disagreed about the
two corvée policies. Within the span of ten years, Ts’ai Ching had twice faced this issue. But he turned
over his hand, and both councilors relied upon him for assistance. Those who knew him witnessed his
treachery.” See SS 472, p. 13723.
SS 472, p. 13722.
CPPM 131, p. 3983.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
571
service even before Ts’ai’s return to the capital. But Tseng Pu went down fighting, attempting to salvage his policy of factional conciliation and hoping to
forestall the reformist revival that Ts’ai would likely spearhead.
Yet Hui-tsung had already made up his mind about whom to trust. In
mid-1102, Ch’ien Yü, a censor loyal to Ts’ai impeached Tseng Pu for having
been a turncoat to the cause of reform and for having abetted the conservative opposition.50 Ultimately, Tseng’s efforts to resolve the factional deadlock
palliated neither the reformists nor the antireformists, paving the way for his
downfall. In the intercalary sixth month of 1102 Tseng was dismissed from
court and demoted to a regional post. He was banished (an-chih) to Ling-nan
three months later.51 With Tseng Pu joining Chang Tun in banishment, Ts’ai
Ching’s appointment as chief councilor of the right in the seventh month of
1102 was assured. During the first three years of the Ts’ai Ching ministry, the
factional conflict would be resolved through systematic proscription. For most
of the remainder of the Hui-tsung reign, Ts’ai established an unchallenged
power, inaugurating an era of political stability at court. Perhaps even his
detractors would admit that the chief councilor was a masterful political operator, able to build lasting coalitions and to implement radical policy initiatives
where his predecessors had failed.
court politics and state policy during hui-tsung’s reign
Traditional historians have claimed that Ts’ai Ching manipulated Hui-tsung
into dependency and submission, usurping monarchical prerogatives to dictate state policy unchallenged. There are elements of truth to this moralistic
interpretation of political history, in which Ts’ai was portrayed as an absolute
villain and scapegoated for the collapse of the Northern Sung. He was far
from blameless, but he was not culpable to the extreme extent claimed by his
biographers. It is undeniable that Ts’ai Ching was responsible for eliminating
all of his potential rivals and proscribing an enemies list of hundreds. During
his councilorship, the rank and file of officialdom was packed with loyal members of Ts’ai Ching’s patronage machine, men who were recruited through an
expanded state educational system that replaced the civil service examination
system. Through institutional restructuring, the chief councilor granted himself enhanced powers over the workings of the imperial bureaucracy. Reviving
the New Policies, Ts’ai transformed the fiscal administration of the state into a
mechanism of revenue and resource extraction. Historians have further alleged
that the empire was ransacked to construct and stock Hui-tsung’s extravagant
50
51
See Palace Censor Ch’ien Yü’s indictment in CPPM 130, pp. 3958–9.
CPPM 130, pp. 3959–62.
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pleasure gardens, sparking several destructive and widespread popular rebellions. According to the traditional historiography, the emperor and his ministers strayed far from the ethical path of governance, thereby precipitating the
collapse of the dynasty.
A more nuanced reading of the documentary record of Hui-tsung’s reign
tells a more complex and ambiguous story, painted in shades of gray. Opponents
of reform (the so-called Yüan-yu faction) were not the only victims of the
partisan purges, whose victims also included Ts’ai Ching’s reformist rivals for
the councilorship. Moreover, these factional bans were lifted after only two
years, shielding the antireformists from further damage, and allowing their
descendants to survive into the Southern Sung. Reformed and restructured
educational institutions succeeded in channeling loyal men into the imperial
bureaucracy to implement the chief councilor’s reforms. But once opposition
had been nearly eliminated from the ranks of officialdom, state schools became
hotbeds of political protest and dissent, as students memorialized the throne
to criticize the Ts’ai Ching ministry and its policies. And the chief councilor’s
monopoly on political power was neither guaranteed nor unchallenged, since
his adversaries pressured the emperor into dismissing Ts’ai from court several
times.
Where state policy was concerned, Hui-tsung walked in the footsteps of
his imperial predecessors. Like those of the Shen-tsung and Che-tsung reigns,
the reform measures of the Hui-tsung reign were initially meant to improve
the livelihoods of the poor and dispossessed and to restrain the dominance of
socioeconomic elites. Although the revived New Policies became prone to corruption and malfeasance by local officials, similar abuses of power had occurred
under the reformist regimes of the 1070s, 1080s, and 1090s. The reform program of the Ts’ai Ching ministry represented a coherent and systematic set of
institutional mechanisms, conceived of and administered by the central government, that were designed to uplift public morality and to accomplish the
moral revival of the empire. To further complicate the traditional interpretation of state policy, the early twelfth century was notable for the creation and
elaboration of a comprehensive network of institutions that promoted social
welfare and public health. When viewed from a more balanced perspective,
the history of the Hui-tsung reign appears less anomalous, and the Ts’ai Ching
ministry appears less cynical, than traditional-minded historians have asserted.
The factional proscriptions of 1102–1104
During the first three years of Ts’ai Ching’s tenure as chief councilor, a wave of
political proscriptions pushed the political system of the late Northern Sung
close to its breaking point. The factional proscriptions of 1102–4 extended the
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
573
blacklists of the 1090s, banning the political opposition from officeholding
and exiling them en masse to the fringes of the empire. In a radical departure
from past political practice, Ts’ai ensured that all potential contenders for
power were not just marginalized or indicted on an ad hoc basis but were
systematically excluded from the imperial bureaucracy.
The political persecution of the so-called Yüan-yu faction (Yüan-yu tang)
became the first order of business for the new ministerial regime.52 Ts’ai Ching
convinced Hui-tsung that his earlier policy of partisan conciliation had been an
abortive failure, and the two openly discussed the imposition of a series of partisan proscriptions. After his first audience with Hui-tsung in the fifth month
of 1102, Ts’ai presented an anonymous memorial to the throne denouncing
the antireform ministry of the Hsüan-jen regency (1085–93). He urged the
immediate investigation of the earlier generation of antireformists, accusing
them of committing crimes against the state and of poisoning the glorious
memory of Emperor Shen-tsung.53 In the words of this blanket indictment,
the ministers of the Yüan-yu era had “formed a treacherous clique which
deluded the emperor” and “committed crimes against Shen-tsung.”54
Shortly thereafter, Ts’ai presented the emperor with a follow-up memorial
in which he denounced the perfidy of the antireformists who had served at
court under the Ch’in-sheng regency, accusing them of “uniting into a faction
and harboring disloyal discourse.”55 The chief councilor, searching for what
he deemed seditious content, initiated a thorough investigation of all the
memorials submitted during the interregnum of 1100–1. After Hui-tsung’s
enthronement, the roads of remonstrance had been unblocked for the purpose
of purging Chang Tun and his fellow reformists from court. Just a year later,
these solicited memorials had become a political liability for their authors,
now that the antireformists had become targets of official persecution yet
again. Hundreds of remonstrators were officially categorized into two blocs:
the “correct” (cheng) and the “wicked” (hsieh), which had by now become thinly
veiled code words for “reformist” and “antireformist.”56
In moving to eliminate his rivals for power, Ts’ai Ching manipulated political language to serve his own purposes, widening the ironic gulf between
52
53
54
55
56
The most thorough scholarly account of the factional proscriptions of 1102–4 is Lo Chia-hsiang, Pei
Sung tang-cheng yen-chiu (Taipei, 1993), pp. 287–97. Also see Ari D. Levine, “Terms of estrangement:
Factional discourse in the early Huizong reign,” in Emperor Huizong and late Northern Song China: The
politics of culture and the culture of politics, ed. Patricia B. Ebrey and Maggie Bickford (Cambridge, Mass.,
2006), pp. 131–70.
Immediately after the submission of Ts’ai Ching’s first anonymous memorial, a number of antireform
sympathizers were dismissed from court. See CPPM 121, p. 3641.
CPPM 121, pp. 3639–41.
CPPM 121, pp. 3641–2.
CPPM 123, pp. 3712–22.
574
ari daniel levine
political discourse and practice. Only 41 men were deemed to have submitted
proper memorials, while a total of 542 men were classified under the rubric
of the “wicked,” and were subsequently indicted and prosecuted. The investigation and categorization of recent memorials for seditious content paved the
way for the mass banishment of antireformist ministers and remonstrators. In
this phase of the factional conflict, the members of the conservative coalition
were prosecuted for the crime of factionalism itself. The rhetoric justifying
the Ch’ung-ning purges promised a solution to the recurrent problem of factionalism. In the utopian language of reformist remonstrators, an everlasting
age of ideal governance awaited Hui-tsung in the near future if he committed
himself to banishing the Yüan-yu faction from court.
Exiling members of the political opposition to the far south had become an
increasingly common practice during the Shen-tsung and Che-tsung reigns.
At the beginning of the dynasty, Emperor T’ai-tsu had issued an injunction
against the legal execution and corporal punishment of high officials, but
this tradition of restraint was honored in the breach by shipping ministerial
offenders off to the far south of the empire, where it was hoped they would
die.57 During the 1080s and 1090s, this extreme sentence was pronounced
only on a case-by-case basis, after extensive investigation and deliberation;
the ranks of the condemned were usually limited to the leaders of a previous
ministerial regime. In contrast, the factional purges of 1102–4 were broader
in scale, involving the systematic prosecution of hundreds of antireformists,
both living and dead.
The first members of the Yüan-yu faction to be persecuted were deceased,
having already succumbed to either the advance of old age or the political
purges of the mid-1090s. An imperial edict of the fifth month of 1102 stripped
dozens of prominent antireformists – including the former chief councilors Ssuma Kuang, Lü Kung-chu, Lü Ta-fang, and Liu Chih – of all honors and prestige
titles they had received posthumously during the Ch’in-sheng regency.58 The
text of the edict rhetorically exhumed these deceased ministers of the Hsüanjen regency and defiled their reputations, censuring them for “monopolizing
the state, commanding a wicked faction, and slandering the former emperor.”59
But the deceased leaders of the conservative coalition of 1085–93 were the
fortunate ones. Their descendants and kin were permanently banned from
service in the metropolitan bureaucracy by a series of imperial edicts; later
57
58
59
Liu Tzu-chien (James T. C. Liu), “An administrative cycle in Chinese history: The case of Northern Sung
emperors,” Journal of Asian Studies 21 No. 2 (1962), p. 139.
CPPM 121, pp. 3642–6.
CPPM 121, pp. 3648–9. According to the CPPM, the edict was authored by Tseng Pu, thereby implicating him in the factional proscriptions before his dismissal from court in the intercalary sixth month
of 1102.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
575
on, they were even prohibited from entering the gates of K’ai-feng.60 In 1105
these bans were extended to five circles of kinship, excluding the kinsmen of
the “treacherous faction of Yüan-yu” from bureaucratic officeholding, which
denied the privileges of elite status to thousands of men.61 The purges of
1102–4 were intended to systematically uproot the entire antireform faction
so that they could never again stage a political comeback. Reformist dominance
was achieved by excluding thousands of members of the political opposition
from the imperial bureaucracy, perhaps contributing to a sea change in elite
orientation from national service to local involvement in the Southern Sung.62
In the ninth month of 1102, the first partisan blacklist (tang-chi) was
imposed, officially proscribing 117 men, naming nearly every official who
had served in the highest echelons of the antireformist ministerial regime of
the Hsüan-jen regency. Whether dead or alive, every state councilor of the
Yüan-yu era (1086–94) was included, as was every prominent academic and
remonstrance official.63 Their blacklisted names were written personally by
Hui-tsung in his renowned calligraphy and inscribed into a stele placed outside the Tuan-li Gate of the imperial palace.64 The ranks of the blacklisted
were summarily dismissed from bureaucratic service, and many were placed
under strict surveillance and virtual house arrest in their native places.65 A
literary inquisition soon followed, with the banning and destruction of the
collected works (wen-chi) of such noted antireform literati as Su Shih, Fan
Tsu-yü, and Huang T’ing-chien, and the prosecution of Ch’eng I for scholarly
heresy.66 Furthermore, a subsequent imperial edict officially banned Yüan-yu
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
CPPM 121, pp. 3652–3, 3661–2.
CPPM 121, pp. 3661–4. This ban on officeholding was so thorough that it included the adopted
descendants of blacklisted eunuchs.
Both Robert M. Hartwell and Robert P. Hymes have hypothesized that the increasing casualty count
of court factionalism was one primary cause of a shift in elite orientation from the Northern Sung
to the Southern Sung, causing national officeholding to be perceived as a risky prospect by members
of the elite. See Robert M. Hartwell, “Demographic, political, and social transformations of China,
750–1550,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 42 No. 2 (1982), pp. 416–25, and Robert P. Hymes,
Statesmen and gentlemen: The elite of Fu-chou, Chiang-hsi, in Northern and Southern Sung (Cambridge, 1986),
pp. 210–18.
Among the twenty-two state councilors named were Wen Yen-po, Ssu-ma Kuang, Lü Kung-chu, Lü
Ta-fang, Liu Chih, Liang T’ao, Wang Yen-sou, Fan Ch’un-jen, and Wang Kuei. Among the thirty-five
subordinate officials were Su Shih, Fan Tsu-yü, K’ung Wen-chung, Chu Kuang-t’ing, Liu An-shih, Tsou
Hao, and Chang Shun-min.
The actual extent of Hui-tsung’s involvement in the factional proscriptions is unknown, given the
extensive revision of the historical record to portray him as a benevolent monarch led dangerously astray
by treacherous ministers. It remains debatable whether the emperor was actively involved in the blacklist
or simply manipulated by Ts’ai Ching, but no evidence survives to corroborate either theory.
CPPM 121, p. 3661.
CPPM 121, pp. 3663–4; 122, p. 3675. This attempt at a burning of the books was unsuccessful, since
complete editions of all of these collected works are still extant.
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learning (Yüan-yu hsüeh) as “heterodox discourse” (hsieh-shuo).67 In the eleventh
month of 1102, eighty men whose recent memorials had been categorized as
“extremely wicked” were exiled to remote border prefectures. The memorial
justifying this decision equated and implicated the antireformists of both
regency regimes.68 By the middle of 1103, the majority of the blacklisted
antireformists were on their way to Ling-nan.
As if the widespread fallout from the first blacklist had been insufficient to
destroy the antireform coalition, a second edition was promulgated in the ninth
month of 1103. Ninety-eight men (nearly half of them deceased) were named
as members of the Yüan-yu faction, including every one of Ts’ai Ching’s major
adversaries and omitting only minor figures who had been included in the
first blacklist. Immediately before the second blacklist edict was announced,
an anonymous remonstrator (probably Ts’ai himself) implored Hui-tsung to
disseminate it throughout the empire:
Even though the court has promulgated their names, going so far as to carve them with
imperial calligraphy, this is still not widely known. . . . [Your servant] implores Your
Majesty to promulgate an enlightened pronouncement, arraying all the names of the
treacherous faction which have been inscribed with imperial calligraphy upon the Gate
of Rectified Ritual, and to disseminate it to the offices of the highest officials in exterior
circuits and prefectures, who should set up steles with an inscribed record to manifest
[their names] for a myriad generations.69
The public humiliation of the antireform coalition, whose names were to be
carved into steles prominently placed in every prefectural seat, was supposed
to be abject, total, and eternal.70 These political purges were also extended
to the realm of court ritual and to the state cult, as another edict ordered
the removal of the images of the Yüan-yu faction from imperially sponsored
temples and shrines in the capital and across the empire.71 The deportation of
the conservative coalition continued, and by the beginning of 1104, several
hundred former officials had been banished to the southern fringes of the
empire.
Issued in the sixth month of 1104, the third round of blacklists was an exercise in overkill, marginalizing an already broken and discredited opposition.
67
68
69
70
71
SS 19, p. 366.
CPPM 123, pp. 3722–3.
CPPM 121, p. 3668.
A copy of one of these steles remained incised into the surface of a cliff outside Kuei-lin, Kwangsi
province, for nine centuries, until its destruction during the Cultural Revolution of 1966–76. See Ch’en
Le-su, “Kuei-lin shih-k’o ‘Yüan-yu tang-chi,’” Hsüeh-shu yen-chiu 61 No. 6 (1983), pp. 63–71. Another
stele reportedly remains standing in the Miao autonomous region of Kwangsi.
CPPM 121, p. 3671.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
577
Literally carved into stone in steles erected across the empire and upon the
west wall of the palace precincts, the names of three hundred and nine former
officials were permanently condemned as “wicked” (hsieh) and “treacherous”
(chien).72 These included the usual suspects from the first two blacklists – the
prominent members of the ministerial regime of the Yüan-yu regency and
the antireformist remonstrators of the Ch’in-sheng regency. To these names
were added two hundred more supernumeraries, drawn from the lower reaches
of the bureaucracy.73 And whereas earlier blacklists had consisted solely of
known antireformists, the “treacherous faction of Yüan-yu,” the 1104 edition
represented the personal enemies list of Ts’ai Ching.74 It included prominent members of the reform coalition who had either challenged Ts’ai for the
councilorship or had refused to join his ministry, among them Tseng Pu and
Chang Tun, both of whom were singled out for their “ministerial disloyalty.”
By including the names of his major reformist rivals on the third and final
blacklist, Ts’ai Ching was able to liquidate all potential rivals for power from
within his own faction.
With the ranks of the antireformists sentenced to administrative detention
in Ling-nan, alongside his former reformist allies, Ts’ai succeeded in consolidating his hold on the councilorship. The partisan proscriptions of 1102–4
represented not only the most extreme phase of the late Northern Sung factional conflict but also its endgame. Ts’ai conclusively ended the struggle for
power at court between reformists and their opponents by proscribing the former. And while the antireformists were also being purged from the imperial
bureaucracy, silencing the opposition to the New Policies, Ts’ai Ching’s ministry had the breathing room to pursue its policy goals unchallenged. Between
1102 and 1104, the chief councilor and his subordinates pushed through a
series of domestic and policy initiatives that surpassed those of the Shen-tsung
and Che-tsung reigns in scale and ambition. For almost the entire Hui-tsung
reign, Ts’ai monopolized the councilorship (with occasional interludes) and
established an era of political stability.
72
73
74
CPPM 122, pp. 3692–9.
The names of many of these men are now difficult to discern, and biographical information on hundreds of
them no longer exists. Two Southern Sung commentators have claimed that a majority of the blacklisted
did not belong there. According to both Fei Kun and Wang Ming-ch’ing, only seventy-eight (or ninetyeight) “superior men” (chün-tzu) were truly members of the “Yuan-yu faction,” while the remainder were
“wicked men” (hsieh-jen). See Fei Kun, Liang-hsi man-chih [Ts’ung-shu chi-ch’eng ch’u-pien, 1935–7 ed.]
(1192; Peking, 1991) 3, pp. 5b–6a; see “Hui-chu hou-lu,” in Wang Ming-ch’ing, Hui-chu lu (1194;
Peking, 1961), pp. 64–5.
Lo Chia-hsiang, Pei Sung tang-cheng yen-chiu, pp. 301–5. For a Ming dynasty investigation of the partisan
blacklist, see Hai Jui, Yüan-yu tang-chi pei-kao [Ts’ung-shu chi-ch’eng ch’u-pien 1935–7 ed.] (c. 1570;
Peking, 1985). For a detailed analysis of the 1104 blacklist, also see Helmolt Vittinghoff, Proskription
und Intrigue gegen Yüan-yu-parteiganger (Bern, 1975).
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However, one can only surmise whether these proscriptions and prohibitions were ever rigorously or widely enforced. No matter how permanently
they had been intended to stand as a warning against factionalism, the factional
blacklist steles were demolished in 1106, less than two years after the third
series of proscriptions. While many major figures of the antireform coalition
(not to mention two reformist councilors) died in exile, many antireformists
and their descendants survived into the Southern Sung. Even so, the purges of
1102–4 succeeded in excluding the antireformists from the imperial bureaucracy, and the relaxation did not bring about their rehabilitation. The partisan
proscriptions of the Ch’ung-ning era should not be anachronistically conflated
with twentieth-century forms of political warfare, but they did represent the
most virulent outbreak of factionalism in the history of the Northern Sung.
Political stability: The long-lived ministry of Ts’ai Ching
In many ways, the history of the Hui-tsung reign is the history of the Ts’ai
Ching ministry. From any perspective, Ts’ai Ching was indisputably a master politician, able to perpetuate his power against all odds and at all costs.
Punctuated by occasional interruptions, he managed to cling to the chief councilorship from 1102 to 1124, longer than any ministerial predecessor from the
Shen-tsung and Che-tsung reigns.75 Sheer persistence and skill are insufficient
to explain Ts’ai Ching’s longevity at court, which was ultimately dependent
upon continued imperial patronage and trust. Yet Hui-tsung’s confidence in
his long-serving chief councilor was not unconditional. Cosmological portents and political considerations compelled the emperor to dismiss Ts’ai from
court on three occasions, but each time Ts’ai managed to claw his way back
into power, despite his advancing infirmity and blindness. Even from his pampered exile, the chief councilor continued to exert an influence over court policy
from afar, while his trusted subordinates remained in control of the imperial
bureaucracy, which was virtually devoid of opposition. Although some of Ts’ai’s
reform measures were abolished after his repeated dismissals from court, these
were invariably revived and expanded upon his return. During the extended
councilorship of Ts’ai Ching, the rules of court politics changed irrevocably,
as the alternating factional regimes of the late eleventh century were replaced
by a stable bureaucratic machine that endured for more than two decades.
After the third factional blacklist was promulgated in 1104, Ts’ai Ching
ruled the commanding heights of the imperial bureaucracy, and with no
75
This section draws heavily on John W. Chaffee, “Huizong, Cai Jing, and the politics of reform,” in
Emperor Huizong and late Northern Song China: The politics of culture and the culture of politics, ed. Patricia B.
Ebrey and Maggie Bickford (Cambridge, Mass., 2006), pp. 31–77.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
579
discernible opposition he pushed through a comprehensive package of fiscal, educational, and welfare reform policies. Having served as sole councilor
for three years, with most of his political and policy initiatives accomplished,
Ts’ai recommended the political veteran Chao T’ing-chih (1040–1107) to
assist him as chief councilor of the right in the third month of 1105.76 Several years before, during the Tseng Pu ministry, Chao had been unstinting in
his partisan attacks upon the antireformists, and perhaps his promotion was
a well-deserved plum for past assistance rendered to Ts’ai Ching. But almost
immediately after he was installed Chao apparently sought to dislodge Ts’ai,
repeatedly accusing him of treachery and duplicity and refusing to serve alongside him.77 When Hui-tsung sided with Ts’ai Ching, Chao T’ing-chih was left
to dangle, and his desperate requests for dismissal were not granted until the
sixth month of 1105. Even if Ts’ai had emerged unscathed from this minor
squabble with an outmatched opponent, it demonstrated that his political
survival was dependent upon the emperor’s continued favor.
While the sweeping political purges of 1102–4 and the revival of the New
Policies had been designed to harmonize and stabilize the realm, such idealistic visions of everlasting order were invalidated by a cosmological portent of
imminent disaster. When a long-tailed comet was sighted in the first month
of 1106, a terrified emperor read the ominous skies above as a sign of heavenly
disapproval of Ts’ai Ching, his reform policies, and his ruthless proscription
of the opposition. According to the Sung shih account, Hui-tsung immediately ordered the destruction of the factional blacklist steles. He issued an
edict to restore the banished to the ranks of officialdom and to assure that
remonstrance would no longer be censured or obstructed.78 Soon thereafter,
the emperor promulgated an empirewide amnesty, and lifted the prohibitions
against the blacklisted members of the Yüan-yu faction. He invalidated two
crucial components of the New Policies agenda by ordering the abolition of the
land survey and equitable tax measure and the restoration of the Ever-normal
Granary system.79 And for the first time, Hui-tsung signaled his extreme
displeasure with Ts’ai Ching by dismissing him from the councilorship. The
emperor reappointed Chao T’ing-chih as chief councilor of the right, praising
his powers of judgment and conceding to him that “everything that Ching
did was just as you said it was.”80
76
77
78
79
80
SS 351, p. 11094; CPPM 131, p. 3985.
For an excerpt from Chao’s official obituary (hsing-chuang), see CPPM 131, pp. 3985–7.
For a condensed account of these events, see SS 20, p. 375. The most detailed account of comet-sighting
matters is Chao Ting-chih’s (1040–1107) official obituary, portions of which were cited in CPPM 131,
pp. 3985–7. Also see Chaffee, “Huizong, Cai Jing, and the politics of reform,” pp. 44–5.
SS 20, pp. 375–6.
CPPM 131, p. 3986; SS 351, p. 11094.
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ari daniel levine
During Ts’ai Ching’s first absence from the councilorship, Chao shared
ministerial power with Liu K’uei. Like Chao T’ing-chih, Liu had previously
been one of Ts’ai’s most loyal supporters, but he seized upon the comet sighting to remonstrate against his mentor’s policies and to urge the demolition
of the blacklist steles.81 Rewarded with a promotion to vice-director of the
Secretariat, Liu K’uei actively collaborated with Chao. But according to his
Sung shih biography, Liu’s arbitrary manner and lust for glory made enemies
at court, who charged him with monopolizing state power.82 These accusations of malfeasance were not lodged by disinterested parties, but by Cheng
Chü-cheng and Liu Cheng-fu, two of Ts’ai Ching’s loyal lieutenants. Evidence
exists that prior to his abrupt departure from court, Ts’ai had ordered his
subordinates to memorialize in praise of their factional patron and in support
of the New Policies; they ostensibly succeeded in convincing Hui-tsung that
Liu K’uei had rashly suspended the reform program and forsaken the legacy
of Shen-tsung and Che-tsung.83 The emperor bowed to pressure, dismissing
Liu K’uei from the Council of State at the end of 1106.
After spending a single year in exile, Ts’ai Ching swept back into court
at the start of 1107. Little in the way of evidence has survived to document
his second term as chief councilor. For reasons unexplained, Ts’ai regained his
rapport with Hui-tsung, almost as if he never had left. During the first half of
1107, the emperor entertained his chief councilor in his palace gardens, the two
engaged in poetic composition, and Ts’ai was awarded an ornate jade belt as an
imperial boon.84 More important, the Ts’ai Ching ministry moved to expand
its educational reform program with implementation of the Eight Conduct
(pa-hsing) policy in government schools in the sixth month of 1107.85 To be
discussed in detail later, this policy ensured greater ideological conformity
among students, and created a fast track for the promotion of loyal men from
regional schools into the imperial bureaucracy. To further confirm reformist
dominance of the central government, the imperial court relaxed the ban
against the now harmless members of the Yüan-yu faction in 1108, granting
an amnesty to the majority of them and formally erasing ninety-five names
from the blacklists.86 Presumably, Ts’ai Ching would not have assented to such
a move if he believed the discredited antireformists still posed a threat to his
81
82
83
84
85
86
SS 351, p. 11109.
SS 351, p. 11109.
SS 351, p. 11103; Ch’in Hsiang-yeh and Huang I-chou, Hsü tzu-chih t’ung-chien ch’ang-pien shih-pu (1881;
Taipei, 1964) 26, p. 10b.
CPPM 131, p. 3988.
CPPM 126, pp. 3791–8.
Pi Yüan, Hsü tzu-chih t’ung-chien [Shih-chieh shu-chü 1935 ed.] (c. 1880; Shanghai, 1987), pp. 472b,
473a.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
581
unchallenged dominance. In any case, opposition to the chief councilor had
been driven outside the bureaucracy or emerged from among activist students
at the Imperial University.87 The only ones who stood any chance of dislodging
Ts’ai from court were opportunistic members of his court coalition who could
exploit circumstances to depose their patron.
Ts’ai Ching’s second fall from power in 1109 was a more overdetermined
affair than his first, combining a rebellion in the Censorate with the sighting of another inauspicious portent in the heavens. Shih Kung-pi, who had
been awarded the position of censor in chief for enabling Ts’ai to return to
court in 1107, along with the censor Mao Chu, repeatedly memorialized the
throne to urge the chief councilor’s dismissal.88 In mid-1109, the Imperial
University student Ch’en Ch’ao-lao submitted a memorial indicting Ts’ai on
fourteen counts of political crimes, including deluding the monarch, promoting a faction, and perverting state policy.89 Confirming these caustic critiques
was the Bureau of Astronomy, which announced the sighting of sunspots that
an alarmed emperor interpreted as an omen of celestial disapproval. Now sixtythree years old, Ts’ai Ching petitioned Hui-tsung for retirement on grounds
of ill health. Although the emperor granted this request, he also assented to
what were extraordinary demands for a dismissed state councilor. Ts’ai was
permitted to remain in the capital, to attend court audiences, and to supervise
the compilation of the Veritable records of Emperor Che-tsung, the authoritative
documentary record of the preceding reign.90 In the meantime, only minor
aspects of the reform program were scaled back. Even after he was officially
dismissed, Hui-tsung’s favorite minister was proving extremely resilient, and
his patronage network was still entrenched at court.
What finally persuaded the emperor to remove Ts’ai Ching from court was
the sighting of another comet in the fifth month of 1110, after which more
hostile memorials reached the throne.91 Among these was a searing indictment
by the censor Chang K’o-kung, who accused Ts’ai of all manner of political
corruption and influence peddling: “His power makes all inside and outside
court tremble. He has frivolously bestowed honors to corrupt the state, and
has seized upon salaries and emoluments to traffic in private favors. . . . He
87
88
89
90
91
For a treatment of political activism at the Imperial University, see Thomas H. C. Lee, Government
education and examinations in Sung China (New York, 1985), pp. 186–92.
Hsü, Sung tsai-fu pien-nien lu chiao-pu 12, pp. 747–9; CPPM 131, pp. 3990–1.
SS 472, p. 13725; CPPM 131, pp. 3989–90. It is likely that Ch’en was an obscure figure whose
remonstrance was not apt to be heeded by the throne. His role in history was no doubt magnified by
the compilers of the standard histories, who sought to incorporate as much condemnatory material as
possible into their narrative of Ts’ai Ching’s councilorship. See Hartman, “A textual history.”
CPPM 131, pp. 3989–91. For a textual history of the Veritable records of Shen-tsung, Che-tsung, and
Hui-tsung, see chapter 2 of Levine, “A house in darkness.”
SS 20, p. 382.
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has promoted petty men to form a faction.”92 Arguing that this dismissed
councilor was continuing to meddle with court affairs to disastrous effect,
Chang implored Hui-tsung to remove Ts’ai from the capital entirely. Issuing
an edict whose condemnatory language echoed that of Chang K’o-kung, the
emperor transferred Ts’ai Ching to Hang-chou, where he would serve as prefect,
not exactly a hardship assignment.93
Filling an enormous void and signaling a major shift in court politics, Chang
Shang-ying (1043–1122) ascended to the councilorship in the sixth month of
1110. A rough contemporary of Ts’ai Ching, Chang had served with distinction
in two reformist ministerial regimes; he had been a prominent lieutenant of
Chang Tun as well as a leading member of the Advisory Council. His name
had been added to the Yüan-yu faction blacklist after running afoul of Ts’ai,
but his opposition to the chief councilor and his support of the New Policies
made him a clear candidate for rehabilitation, not to mention promotion to the
Council of State.94 In an audience with Hui-tsung, Chang Shang-ying voiced
his desire to follow the reforming legacy of Shen-tsung even as he thoroughly
assessed the success and failure of each reform policy on a case-by-case basis.95
During his tenure as chief councilor Chang abolished the land survey and
equitable tax policy and initiated a series of austerity measures that limited
the expansion of social welfare institutions, the state educational system, and
imperial clan residences.96 Chang Shang-ying faced considerable opposition
in downsizing the New Policies, and this was used as ammunition against him
by those who sought Ts’ai Ching’s return to court. The state councilors Ho
Chih-chung and Cheng Chü-chung unstintingly attacked Chang for his policy
initiatives, as well as for his unsavory personal connections with Buddhist
monks and imperial astronomers.97 Facing increasing bureaucratic opposition,
Chang Shang-ying was demoted to a regional post in the autumn of 1111,
a move that left the councilorship wide open for Ts’ai Ching’s return in the
spring of 1112.98
Back in Hui-tsung’s good graces and with naysayers out of his way, Ts’ai
had all the room he needed to dictate state policy yet again. During his third
term as chief councilor, Ts’ai Ching not only overturned Chang Shang-ying’s
limited austerity program but also pursued the expansion of the New Policies,
to which he committed large sums from the imperial treasury. Social service
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
SS 472, p. 13725; CPPM 131, pp. 3991–2.
SS 472, p. 13725; CPPM 131, pp. 3992–3.
SS 351, pp. 11096–7.
SS 351, p. 11097.
SS 20, pp. 383–4.
SS 351, p. 11097.
CPPM 131, p. 3979.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
583
and public health institutions were placed under tighter supervision by fiscal
intendants and granted a mandate to provide care on the basis of need instead
of quotas.99 The emperor also expanded the number and scope of state-funded
schools, and devoted increased largesse to the imperial clan. Perhaps these
institutional expansions were linked to the growth of Ts’ai Ching’s patronage
machine, increasing opportunities for graft among the bureaucratic rank and
file.
Moreover, the Cheng-ho era (1111–17) was a time of profligate imperial
spending on pleasure gardens and religious patronage, so these institutional
enhancements and funding increases were not out of place. The second decade
of Hui-tsung’s reign represented a definite break with what had gone before,
as the emperor shifted his focus from reviving the New Policies to promoting
Taoist religion and ritual. Analyzing a set of palace examination questions
from the Hui-tsung reign, Peter Bol has asserted that these texts reflected the
monarch shifting his attention from fiscal reform to Taoist rulership, “depicting the emperor as the agent producing change in society and nature, eliding
the mediating role of government institutions.”100 In a sense, however, Huitsung’s religious initiatives represented a parallel instance of state penetration
into society through the establishment of a centralized hierarchy of regulatory systems, through which a sage-ruler could revive antiquity and morally
revitalize the body politic.
Over the course of the 1110s, Ts’ai Ching gradually retreated from active
involvement in court policy, allowing his lieutenants to formulate policy and
his patronage machine to implement it. According to his Sung shih biography,
the chief councilor aided and abetted the emperor’s efforts to reform court rites
and music, to promote Taoist institutions, and to expand the imperial palace.101
This standard history also recounts that Ts’ai Ching’s sons and grandsons were
showered with imperial favor (his son Ts’ai T’iao even married an imperial
princess), and received appointments as court academics and high officials.102
At the age of seventy-three, Ts’ai was visibly failing and a spent political force.
In the sixth month of 1120, Hui-tsung granted him the last of many requests
to retire from official service, thus ending Ts’ai Ching’s third term as chief
councilor.103
99
100
101
102
103
SHY (1997) shih-huo 60, pp. 6a–b. Cited in Chaffee, “Huizong, Cai Jing, and the politics of reform,”
p. 51.
Peter K. Bol, “Emperors can claim antiquity too – emperorship and autocracy under the New Policies,”
in Emperor Huizong and late Northern Song China: The politics of culture and the culture of politics, ed. Patricia
B. Ebrey and Maggie Bickford (Cambridge, Mass., 2006), p. 199.
SS 472, p. 13726.
SS 472, pp. 13726–7.
CPPM 131, pp. 4002–3.
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A new generation of loyal men, whose entire official careers were coextensive with the Ts’ai Ching ministry, now controlled the Council of State and
the imperial bureaucracy. Wang Fu (1079–1126) had been an early beneficiary of the Three Halls policy in the early years of Hui-tsung’s reign, and
was the leading figure at court in the early 1120s. Maligned in the Sung
shih as a “sycophant” (ning-hsing), Wang first rose to prominence in 1111 by
attacking Chang Shang-ying, thereby enabling Ts’ai Ching’s rehabilitation
and return to the councilorship.104 But Wang Fu’s obsequiousness and loyalty must have been exaggerated; once Ts’ai retired from court and Wang
was sole councilor, he ordered the comprehensive rollback of the New Policies agenda. In 1120–1, Wang abolished the land survey and Three Halls
policies, curtailed the salt and tea certificate programs, and cut back social
welfare institutions.105 The fortuitous timing of these moves indicates that
the reforms were clearly linked with Ts’ai Ching himself, and their continuation required his presence at court. And given the potent military threats
the Sung empire was facing in the year 1120, Hui-tsung and his ministers
were pressured to make difficult budgetary choices. The New Policies were
consuming revenues that were needed elsewhere, since the imperial court had
to simultaneously prosecute military campaigns on two fronts, quashing the
Fang La rebellion while attempting to reconquer the Sixteen Prefectures from
the Liao.
In the midst of a diplomatic and military crisis, Ts’ai Ching ascended to
the councilorship for a brief fourth term in 1124, replacing Wang Fu. Almost
blind and a virtual figurehead, he relied on his son Ts’ai T’ao to attend to his
governmental paperwork and to compose memorials in his name.106 The Sung
shih alleges that Ts’ai the younger abused his position utterly, dominating
court affairs and siphoning state funds, which eventually led to demands for
his father’s dismissal. Under pressure from the state councilor Pai Shih-chung
and the commander in chief T’ung Kuan, Ts’ai Ching retired in disgrace in
the fourth month of 1125, heading south with his family and retinue. But
military and diplomatic events had long since escalated beyond the control
or competence of anyone at court. With the Chin invasion force preparing to
overrun the Sung empire, the feeble former councilor and his reform policies
were blamed for the increasingly desperate predicament of the imperial court.
A thorough assessment of the expansion of the New Policies during the Ts’ai
Ching ministry demonstrates that the collapse of the Northern Sung was by
no means inevitable, even after Ts’ai’s reform agenda had been abolished.
104
105
106
SS 470, p. 13681.
SS 470, p. 13682.
SS 471, p. 13727.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
585
In their own image: Educational policy and elite orientations
After marginalizing the political opposition with blacklists and banishments
in 1102–4, the Ts’ai Ching ministry asserted intellectual control over the
imperial bureaucracy through institutional reform. In John Chaffee’s analysis, Ts’ai’s educational reforms were designed for the purpose of “propagating
the reformers’ political vision while chastising [Ts’ai’s] enemies.”107 By radically restructuring the recruitment of scholar-officials, and by dramatically
expanding the state educational system, Ts’ai planned to create a new political
elite almost from scratch.108 His ministry abolished the examination system and replaced it with a unified system of county and prefectural schools,
designed both to educate students and to recruit bureaucrats. By employing
state-financed schools to force-feed state-approved teachings to prospective
officials, his educational reforms sought to ensure political and intellectual
uniformity within the bureaucracy. Peter Bol has suggested that the “New
Policies educational program sought to inculcate in the literati a vision of
an activist state that would transform society.”109 The Ts’ai Ching ministry’s
educational policies remade political culture in its own image, packing the
bureaucratic rank-and-file with loyal reformists. Building a patronage network
through institutional reforms, Ts’ai ensured political stability at court while
perpetuating his ministry’s hold on power.
The educational reforms of the Ts’ai Ching ministry were built upon foundations laid during the Shen-tsung reign by the first generation of reformists. In
the early 1070s, the chief councilor Wang An-shih had implemented a reform
package that dramatically expanded the state educational system. By establishing state-sponsored schools as bureaucratic recruitment mechanisms, Wang
sought to impose intellectual orthodoxy upon the scholar-official elite.110
Endeavoring to create, mold, and recruit like-minded bureaucrats, Wang
restructured the form and content of civil service examinations to emphasize
statecraft over poetic composition. Wang An-shih’s ministry also enacted the
Three Halls policy (san-she fa), which divided the Imperial University (T’aihsüeh) into three grades; graduates of the highest grade, the “Superior College”
107
108
109
110
John W. Chaffee, The thorny gates of learning in Sung China: A social history of examinations, new ed. (1985;
Albany, 1995), p. 79.
For a balanced treatment of the educational reforms of the Ts’ai Ching ministry, see Chaffee, The thorny
gates of learning (1995), pp. 77–84. Also see Kondo Kazunari, “Sai Kei no kakyō – gakkō seisoku.”
Tōyōshi kenkyū 53 No. 1 (1995), pp. 25–49.
Peter K. Bol, “Whither the emperor? Emperor Huizong, the New Policies, and the Tang-Song transition,” Journal of Sung-Yuan Studies 31 (2001), p. 121.
For an analysis of the examination policies of Wang An-shih, see Peter K. Bol, “Examinations and
orthodoxies: 1070 and 1313 compared,” in Culture and state in Chinese history: Conventions, accommodations,
and critiques, ed. Theodore B. Huters et al. (Stanford, Calif., 1997), pp. 29–43.
586
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(shang-she), were promoted directly into the bureaucratic ranks. Hampered by
funding constraints, efforts were made to promote prefectural schools (chouhsüeh) across the empire and to appoint executory-class officials to supervise
them. After Shen-tsung’s death, Wang An-shih’s educational reforms had been
overturned during the Hsüan-jen regency. Poetic composition was restored as
a requirement for civil service examinations, and the expansion of state-funded
schools was brought to a standstill. During Che-tsung’s personal rule, composition of poetry was again eliminated as an examination subject, and the restored
reform regime of Chang Tun oversaw a slight expansion of the state educational
system by extending the Three Halls hierarchy to prefectural schools.111
Directly benefiting from Wang An-shih’s reforms of the examination system, Ts’ai Ching was a graduate of the chin-shih class of 1070, the first civil
service examinations to emphasize statecraft skills over poetic composition.112
Soon after his ascent to the councilorship in 1102, Ts’ai Ching spearheaded
a comprehensive educational reform program that dramatically expanded the
institutional innovations of the Shen-tsung reign. In the eighth month of
1102, he convinced Hui-tsung that “schools were today’s foremost order of
business,” successfully petitioning the emperor to order the establishment of a
unified network of state-funded schools in every county and prefecture of the
empire.113 This state educational system assumed not only the responsibility
of educating students but also the political purpose of training and recruiting prospective bureaucrats. Extending Wang An-shih’s Three Halls policy
from the Imperial University to county schools (hsien-hsüeh), each level of the
educational system was divided into three “halls” or grades: the “outer” (wai),
“inner” (nei), and “upper” (shang).114 Students advanced from grade to grade
and were transferred upward from county school to prefectural school to the
Imperial University by passing a regular cycle of examinations and receiving character recommendations from educational officials. Moreover, the Ts’ai
Ching ministry entirely abolished the graduated system of civil service examinations. Only graduates of the upper level of the Imperial University were
permitted to sit for the chin-shih degree examinations; if they passed, they were
promoted directly into the lower ranks of the imperial bureaucracy. Once these
institutional innovations took hold, establishing an empirewide hierarchy of
schools, an entire generation of hopeful scholar-officials was required to work
their way up into the bureaucracy through local schools.
Later in the Hui-tsung reign, the Three Halls policy was amended to ensure
ideological conformity within state schools and the imperial bureaucracy. Since
111
112
113
114
SHY (1997) ch’ung-ju 2, p. 7a.
SS 472, p. 13721.
See CPPM 126, pp. 3978–80; passage cited in Chaffee, The thorny gates of learning (1995), p. 77.
SHY (1997) ch’ung-ju 2, pp. 7b–9a.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
587
the institutional reforms of 1102 did not mint degree candidates quickly
enough, Hui-tsung’s ministers created a fast-track exception to the Three
Halls policy. In 1107, the emperor promulgated an edict implementing the
pa-hsing (Eight [kinds of virtuous] Conduct) system.115 Students who were
judged to embody the eight cardinal virtues were selected to receive an expedited prebureaucratic education and were rapidly promoted from their home
villages into prefectural schools. After spending a year there, these exemplary
scholars were permitted to bypass several levels of examinations and were sent
up to the upper hall of the Imperial University. After being investigated to
determine that they held correct views, they were granted chin-shih degrees
and official ranks. In practice, moral virtue was equated with ideological conformity, and the pa-hsing system was exploited to pack the civil service with
men loyal to Ts’ai Ching’s ministry. At the same time, students with dissenting
words and deeds were investigated and sometimes imprisoned in “self-criticism
rooms” (tzu-sung chai) where they could reflect upon their ethical transgressions and ideological lapses. Students who received “eight punishments”
(also pronounced pa-hsing2, but written with a different second character) for
immoral (i.e., dissident) behavior were summarily expelled from the Imperial
University.116
By educating prospective bureaucrats and inculcating them with reformist
ideology, the Ts’ai Ching ministry created a new bureaucratic elite and inserted
it into the power structure. But educating this new elite was extremely expensive, and supporting a vastly expanded educational system came at high price
for the central government. Vast quantities of resources were allocated to
finance county and prefectural schools, each of which required salaries and
upkeep, as well as students’ room and board fees. Regional administrators were
ordered to seize uninherited land, as well as to siphon the proceeds from Evernormal Granaries to endow schools with plots of agricultural land.117 Across
the empire, income from more than one hundred thousand ch’ing (nominally,
1.4 million acres) of farmland was reserved for the support of prefectural and
county schools, which educated, housed, and fed approximately two hundred
thousand students.118 However, these massive outlays of resources were an
invitation to corruption, as local officials were tempted to embezzle education
115
116
117
118
CPPM 126, pp. 3791–5.
Ma Tuan-lin, Wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao [Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan 1935–7 ed.] (c. 1308; Taipei, 1965) 42,
p. 433. Cited in Chaffee, The thorny gates of learning (1995), p. 78. Also see Chaffee, “Huizong, Cai Jing,
and the politics of reform,” p. 47.
See SHY (1997) ch’ung-ju 2, p. 7b; passage cited in Chaffee, The thorny gates of learning (1995),
p. 78.
According to John Chaffee’s calculations, this figure represented approximately 0.4 percent of the male
population of the Sung empire, which totaled around one hundred million in 1100. See Chaffee, The
thorny gates of learning (1995), p. 78.
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funds.119 Official corruption became so rampant that few protested the abolition of the Three Halls policy in 1121.
To supplement the Imperial University, the Ts’ai Ching ministry established a number of technical and specialty schools in the capital to educate
bureaucrats who would be expert in medicine and mathematics, as well as to
train masters of painting and calligraphy to serve at the imperial court.120
Placed under the aegis of the Directorate of Education (Kuo-tzu chien), some
of these schools were built upon earlier precedents, but several were new creations of the Hui-tsung reign. Each was organized according to the Three Halls
model, in which passing examination scores permitted students to progress
through three grades and, finally, to graduate with a certificate entitling them
to employment by the central government. The continued existence and funding of these institutions were dependent upon the patronage of Ts’ai Ching, and
the schools were invariably abolished when he was forced out of the councilorship in 1109 and 1120. The School of Medicine (I-hsüeh), reorganized in 1103,
was designed to raise the status of imperially licensed physicians to parallel
that of Imperial University graduates.121 Progressing through the Three Halls
hierarchy by examination, physicians-in-training mastered the medical canon
and received clinical experience, qualifying them to serve in the expanding
state medical bureaucracy and government-funded clinics. Founded in 1104,
the School of Mathematics (Suan-hsüeh) was structured according to the Three
Halls system, and channeled experts directly into bureaucratic posts, generally
those involving state finance.122 The brainchild of Hui-tsung, himself a master
with the brush, the School of Painting (Hua-hsüeh) and the School of Calligraphy (Shu-hsüeh2) trained and certified practitioners to serve at court, where
they participated in the emperor’s collective artistic enterprises.123 All of these
schools were centralized and hierarchical institutions designed to select and
train human talent, experts who would serve the empire.
It is possible that the dramatic enlargement of the state educational system
encouraged a degree of upward socioeconomic mobility in the short term. But
since the Three Halls policy was in force only for twenty years, and was not
revived in the Southern Sung, its overall influence was probably negligible.
119
120
121
122
123
SHY (1997) ch’ung-ju 2, p. 18a.
For an institutional history of these technical schools, see Lee, Government education and examinations in
Sung China, pp. 91–101.
See SHY (1997) ch’ung-ju 3, pp. 12a–b; passage cited in Asaf Goldschmidt, “Huizong’s impact on
medicine and on public health,” in Emperor Huizong and late Northern Song China: The politics of culture and the culture of politics, ed. Patricia B. Ebrey and Maggie Bickford (Cambridge, Mass., 2006),
pp. 285–6.
See SHY (1997) ch’ung-ju 3, pp. 2a–b; passage cited in Lee, Government education and examinations in Sung
China, p. 94.
See SHY (1997) ch’ung-ju 3, pp. 1a–2a; passage cited in Lee, Government education and examinations in
Sung China, p. 100.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
589
In the long term, the expansion of local schools adversely affected the bureaucratic prospects of both preexisting and emerging elites. The sheer numbers
of degree candidates increased exponentially in the early twelfth century,
but the imperial bureaucracy did not grow commensurately. Hence, competition for bureaucratic posts became more intense as increased numbers of
degree candidates vied with one another to fill a more or less fixed number
of bureaucratic positions.124 By expanding the state educational system to
ensure the ideological control of officialdom, Hui-tsung’s ministers exacerbated the already intense competition for bureaucratic posts. Robert Hartwell
and Robert Hymes have hypothesized that the increase in competition for
bureaucratic posts encouraged elites to turn away from national officeholding to embrace a localist strategy.125 While intended to make the shih-ta-fu
elite shift their orbit ever closer to the state, the Three Halls policy had the
reverse effect, contributing to an epochal change in elite orientation from court
politics to local involvement.
Institutionalized rapacity: Fiscal policy and revenue extraction
With all traces of opposition eliminated from court, Ts’ai Ching controlled
state policy unchallenged.126 Not long after his appointment as Hui-tsung’s
chief minister, Ts’ai moved to expand substantially the executive powers of
the chief councilorship. Following the precedent of Wang An-shih’s Finance
Planning Commission (Chih-chih san-ssu t’iao-li ssu), which had concentrated
ministerial powers over state policy in order to override the resistance to the
New Policies, Ts’ai Ching established the Advisory Office (Chiang-i ssu) in
the seventh month of 1102.127 On paper, this administrative body was meant
to provide a mechanism for the expeditious discussion of policy issues by the
Council of State and the chief administrators of a wide range of government
organs. Staffed by twenty-seven officials, the Advisory Office was granted
oversight over such wide-ranging matters as the imperial clan, supernumerary
officials, state expenditure, itinerant merchants, livestock management, and
the salt monopoly.128 Ts’ai himself was appointed director of the office, which
he packed with “bright but junior officials loyal to him and without vested
124
125
126
127
128
See Chaffee, The thorny gates of learning (1995), pp. 187–8; also see Peter K. Bol, “The Sung examination
system and the Shih,” review of The thorny gates of learning in Sung China: A social history of examinations,
John W. Chaffee, Asia Major, 3rd series, 3 No. 2 (1990), pp. 151–5.
See Hartwell, “Demographic, political, and social transformations,” pp. 420–5, and Hymes, Statesmen
and gentlemen, pp. 121–3.
This section draws on Chaffee, “Huizong, Cai Jing, and the politics of reform,” p. 36.
SHY (1997) chih-kuan 5, p. 13a; CPPM 132, pp. 4009–10. For an extended analysis of the structure
and function of the Chiang-i ssu, see Lin T’ien-wei, “Ts’ai Ching yü chiang-i ssu,” Shih-huo yüeh-k’an 6
No. 4 (1971), pp. 137–43.
SHY (1997) chih-kuan 5, pp. 12a–13b.
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interests of their own.”129 Since all dissenting voices had already been forcibly
eliminated from court, the Advisory Office served as a conduit through which
Ts’ai Ching could practically dictate the formulation and implementation of
state policy. Once the office was staffed, Ts’ai expeditiously enacted a coherent
program of reforms, which took shape in the second half of 1102. Having
served its purpose in expediting the formulation of state policy, the Advisory
Office was abolished in the fourth month of 1104, at a time when Ts’ai Ching’s
control of the bureaucracy had been assured through partisan proscription and
factional patronage.130
Endeavoring to restore and extend the New Policies (hsin-fa) of the Shentsung and Che-tsung reigns, Ts’ai Ching transformed state fiscal policy into
a blunt instrument of extortion. Although originally designed to restrain
the influence of “engrosser” (chien-ping) landlords and plutocratic merchants,
and thereby assist poor farmers, the fiscal reform policies of Wang An-shih
had been manipulated since their inception in the early 1070s to squeeze
revenue from both the agricultural and mercantile sectors.131 But during the
councilorship of Ts’ai Ching, resource extraction reached astronomical heights.
Corrupt regional administrators succeeded in swelling state coffers to the
bursting point and along the way feathered their own nests. According to
the standard historical accounts, the New Policies initiatives of Hui-tsung’s
reign drove legions of farmers into bankruptcy and pushed some rural areas
to the brink of rebellion. Salt and tea monopolies were substantially expanded
to enhance state revenue, strangling the commercial sector of the economy.
Hui-tsung’s government bled the private sector to enrich the state, and the
monarch and his courtiers.
During the Hui-tsung reign, tax revenues from agricultural landholdings
were increased through bureaucratic and extrabureaucratic means. The first of
the New Policies to be restored was the land survey and equitable tax policy (fang-t’ien chün-shui fa). The measure had been enacted during the early
Shen-tsung reign to ameliorate inequalities in the land-tax structure, but had
been abolished early in the Hsüan-jen regency. An imperial edict of the seventh month of 1104 revived the fang-t’ien policy, and ordered an empirewide
cadastral survey.132 By uncovering previously untaxed farmlands that had been
removed from the registers by engrossing magnates and redistributing them
129
130
131
132
Chaffee, “Huizong, Cai Jing, and the politics of reform.”
SHY (1997) chih-kuan 5, pp. 13b–14b.
For an interpretive survey of the New Policies, see Paul Jakov Smith’s chapter on Shen-tsung’s reign in
this volume.
For the text of the edict and the memorial that prompted the implementation of fang-t’ien policy, see
CPPM 138, pp. 4155–7; SS 174, pp. 4200–1. Also see Chaffee, “Huizong, Cai Jing, and the politics
of reform,” pp. 40–1.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
591
to impoverished households, it was hoped that rural socioeconomic disparities
could be ameliorated.133 In practice, however, corrupt local administrators
were frequently bribed by large landholders to remove productive lands from
the registers. Moreover, small and large landholders were burdened with supplementary fees and taxes assessed on uncovered lands.134 Acknowledging that
“many fang-t’ien officials throughout the empire had not realized the court’s
intentions, stopping at nothing to harass good people,” the court issued an edict
that effectively abolished the fang-t’ien policy in 1110.135 After attempting to
redress the grievances of remonstrators who complained that the tax structure
in many rural areas remained inequitable, the court formally abandoned the
policy as a dismal failure in 1120.136
Starting in the mid-1110s, Hui-tsung and his ministers employed extrabureaucratic means to orchestrate a massive land grab. A series of eunuchcontrolled agencies, such as the Western Wall Bureau (Hsi-ch’eng so), were
created to confiscate vast swaths of cultivated and fallow lands in several northeastern circuits. In 1116, the eunuch Yang Chien2 established a Public Lands
Bureau (Kung-t’ien so) in Ching-hsi to seize wastelands and tax-exempt lands,
forcing commoners to become tenant farmers and to pay rent for farming
these public fields.137 According to the Sung shih, those who dared to resist
being ensnared in such an oppressive arrangement were cangued and jailed.
After Yang’s death, the eunuch Li Yen redoubled Yang’s efforts, confiscating
more than thirty-four thousand ch’ing of land in circuits around the capital.138
Rent proceeds from these public lands were remitted directly to the emperor
for his own personal use. Available evidence indicates that during the Huitsung reign, state penetration into the agricultural sector increased revenue
extraction and heightened inequalities in the rural socioeconomic order.
In reimplementing the hired service policy (mu-i or ku-i fa, also known
as the service exemption policy, mien-i fa), Ts’ai Ching’s ministry, as well as
local administrators, went overboard in their effort to extract revenue from the
rural economy. A cornerstone of Wang An-shih’s New Policies, the hired service measure required rural households to make cash payments (mien-i ch’ien,
or service exemption fees) in lieu of providing state labor service. During
133
134
135
136
137
138
CPPM 138, pp. 4155–7; SS 19, p. 370.
For example, in Hui-ch’ang county (in Ch’ien-chou, Chiang-nan West circuit) the fang-t’ien system was
used to extract tax revenue at exorbitant rates. See SS 174, p. 4202.
For the text of the edict, see CPPM 138, pp. 4160–1.
For memorials critical of the unequal implementation of the fang-t’ien chün-shui fa, see CPPM 138,
pp. 4157–9; SHY (1997) shih-huo 4, pp. 11a–12b. For the text of the edict which abolished the policy,
see CPPM 138, p. 4165.
SS 174, p. 4212; 468, p. 13664.
The Public Lands Bureau and its successor organizations administered lands in Ching-hsi, Ching-tung,
Ho-pei, and the capital region. For more information, see SS 174, p. 4212: 468, p. 13664–5.
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Che-tsung’s personal rule, the extractive excesses of the policy had been
restrained, at least on paper, as strict limits were imposed on the assessment of
the service exemption levy. In 1101, during the Ch’in-sheng regency, the pros
and cons of the hired service policy were debated, and regional administrators
were permitted a degree of flexibility in implementing labor service policy.139
However, this period of pragmatic moderation was too ephemeral to result in
the full-scale rollback of the hired service policy.
After Hui-tsung began his personal rule, local administrators were no longer
granted flexibility in administering the labor service regime. When it was
revealed that some district-level officials had adopted the drafted service policy
that had prevailed during the Yüan-yu regency, strict central government control of labor service policy was reasserted. In 1102, the hired service guidelines
of the Shao-sheng era were reimposed by imperial edict, and local administrators were required to adhere to them.140 Following the precedent of the
mid-1090s, efforts were made in the early years of the Hui-tsung reign to
prevent extractive abuses by local administrators eager to enhance revenue
collection. In 1103, a ten percent cap was imposed on the assessment of surplus emergency fees (k’uan-sheng ch’ien), and fee increases were limited to once
in a decade.141
It cannot be ascertained from available evidence whether these mandated
limitations actually succeeded in curbing excessive revenue extraction by local
administrators during the first five years of Hui-tsung’s personal rule. But
later entries in the documentary record indicate that in the following years,
the hired service system became rife with official corruption and abuses. In
1107, an imperial edict scrapped the Shao-sheng-era hired service regulations and revived the Yüan-feng-era rules of the early 1080s.142 This measure
most likely abolished the ten percent rate caps imposed in 1103, freeing local
administrators to extract supplementary fees without limit. Incomplete evidence indicates that the hired service system was transformed into a mechanism
of revenue extraction, as it had been during the first phase of the New Policies.
And a reading of the fragmentary documentary record suggests that in the
middle years of the Hui-tsung reign, hired service fees were assessed at astronomical rates, far surpassing the extortionate sums that had been collected
during the 1080s. In the northwestern prefecture of Kung-chou2 (Ch’in-feng
circuit), the only area for which numerical data survives, the annual collection
of service exemption fees had been capped at four hundred strings of cash
139
140
141
142
SHY (1997) shih-huo 65, p. 72b; SS 178, p. 4331.
SHY (1997) shih-huo 65, p. 73a; SS 178, p. 4331.
SHY (1997) shih-huo 65, pp. 73a–b; SS 178, p. 4332.
SS 187, p. 4332.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
593
around 1080, but almost thirty thousand strings of cash were collected in
1111.143 After this report came to light, further moves were made to limit the
collection of service exemption fees in the mid-1110s, but the efficacy of these
regulations cannot be ascertained.144 The hired service policy remained on the
books until its abolition in 1127, and the admittedly scanty evidence suggests
that throughout Ts’ai Ching’s tenure it was employed to exact extraordinary
sums from the rural economy.
Aside from the service exemption levy, agricultural tax revenues also
increased significantly, placing further strain upon farmers. Before Hui-tsung’s
reign, the central government was responsible for shipping several million
bushels of tax grain from the various circuits to the capital. Each circuit in
the southeast, the rice bowl of the empire, shipped its quota of tax grain to
K’ai-feng, storing the surplus in granaries to compensate for future shortfalls.
During the first decade of Hui-tsung’s reign, the court ordered the seizure of
these surplus reserves from circuit granaries, and the circuits remitted several
million strings of cash as tribute to the emperor.145 Established in 1109, the
direct networking (chih-ta wang) system required regional administrators to
assume the responsibility for financing annual grain transport to the capital.146
Indicative of a manifold increase in revenue extraction from the most productive agricultural areas of the empire, circuit granaries were overflowing, with
surpluses estimated at millions of piculs a year. It can be argued, then, that
the Hui-tsung reign witnessed the extensive taxation and exploitation of the
agricultural economy for the benefit of the state treasury and the imperial purse.
Just as changes in state fiscal policy squeezed the agrarian sector dry, government monopolies on salt and tea were transformed into mechanisms for
extorting vast sums of revenue from the mercantile sector. State mercantile
monopolies fell under the purview of the Advisory Office, through which Ts’ai
Ching wielded control over fiscal policy. In 1102, Ts’ai succeeded in expanding
the state salt monopoly to include sea salt produced along the southeastern
coast.147 Henceforth, merchants who desired to trade in salt were required to
143
144
145
146
147
SS 187, p. 4332. Given the fragmentary nature of fiscal data for the Hui-tsung reign, it cannot be
known whether the numbers for Kung-chou2 were the most egregious example of extortionate revenue
extraction in the empire or were representative of a general empirewide pattern.
SHY (1997) shih-huo 65, pp. 74b–75b.
SS 175, p. 4257.
SS 175, pp. 4255, 4258–9.
SHY (1997) shih-huo 24, p. 37b. The most thorough English-language study of the Sung salt monopoly
is Edmund H. Worthy, Jr., “Regional control in the Southern Sung salt administration,” in Crisis and
prosperity in Sung China, ed. John W. Haeger (Tucson, Ariz., 1975), pp. 101–41. For an exhaustive
treatment of the salt certificate policy during the Hui-tsung reign, see Tai I-hsüan, Sung-tai ch’ao-yen
chih-tu yen-chiu (1957; Taipei, 1982), pp. 318–30. Also see Ch’i Hsia, Sung-tai ching-chi shih (Shanghai,
1987–8), pp. 841–9.
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buy salt certificates (yen-ch’ao) from the government, which they could then
exchange for salt when they arrived in the salt-producing areas of the southeast.148 To dramatically enhance the revenues it could collect from the salt
monopoly, the central government continually printed additional salt certificates. Since older certificates were devalued, more certificates were required to
buy the same quantity of salt.149 To make matters worse, the price of salt was
subject to continual inflation, reducing the mercantile sector to near penury.
According to the purple prose of Ts’ai Ching’s biography in the Sung shih: “Rich
merchants and great magnates, who had once wielded hundreds of thousands of
strings of cash, suddenly were transformed into drifters and beggars. . . . Some
went so far as to drown or hang themselves.”150 Although such impressionistic
evidence can be somewhat discounted, it can be conclusively proved that the
new salt certificate policy quickly became a phenomenally successful source of
state revenue. In the five months from the twelfth month of 1103 to the fourth
month of 1104, more than five million strings of cash entered state coffers as
a result of the expansion of the sale of salt certificates.151 State revenues from
the salt monopoly have been estimated at ten to twenty million strings per
annum in the middle of the Hui-tsung reign.
Paralleling the expansion of the salt monopoly in the southeast, the tea
monopoly was similarly enlarged to increase state revenue and to enrich the
emperor and his ministers.152 In 1102, soon after his ascent to the councilorship, Ts’ai Ching memorialized to revive the state monopoly over southeastern
tea and prohibit growers and merchants from participating in private trade.153
Ts’ai argued that the abolition of the tea monopoly in seven southeastern circuits had resulted in the loss of millions of strings, and that this long-dormant
source of wealth could be tapped.154 Under the new southeastern tea monopoly,
prospective tea merchants were required to buy tea certificates (ch’a-yin) from
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
SS 182, pp. 4444–5.
SS 181, p. 4425; 182, p. 4445.
SS 471, p. 13723.
This figure represented the total revenues collected through the sale of salt certificates in Shan-hsi and
Ho-pei circuits. SHY (1997) chih-kuan 27, pp. 18a–b.
Since the 1070s, a parallel state tea monopoly had existed in Szechwan. For an analysis of state intervention in the Szechwanese tea trade in the Northern and Southern Sung, see Paul J. Smith, Taxing heaven’s
storehouse: Horses, bureaucrats and the destruction of the Sichuan tea industry, 1074–1224 (Cambridge, Mass.,
1991).
For an extended treatment of the expansion of the state tea monopoly during the Hui-tsung reign, see
Ch’i, Sung-tai ching-chi shih, pp. 788–94.
Ts’ai claimed that annual state proceeds from the southeastern tea monopoly (in Ching-hu, Chiangnan, Huai-nan, Liang-che, and Fu-chien circuits) had once exceeded 5 million strings of cash, but had
recently dwindled to only 500,000 strings. For a précis of his memorial to revive the monopoly, see SS
184, p. 4502.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
595
the central government and then to use these certificates to buy tea from teagrowing households.155 Like the salt monopoly, the tea monopoly quickly
became a phenomenally profitable means of revenue extraction. Estimates of
annual central government revenue from the sale of tea certificates in the mid1110s range from two million to four million strings of cash.156 A substantial
portion of these profits – more than one million strings of cash per annum –
were remitted directly to Hui-tsung’s imperial purse. Moreover, the Sung shih
alleges that a million strings a year were redirected to Ts’ai Ching and his
coterie as an imperial boon.157 The southeastern tea monopoly became a tool
of mercantile exploitation, and a large share of the profits were siphoned off
by the emperor and his courtiers.
Thus, the fiscal policies of the Hui-tsung reign and the Ts’ai Ching ministry entailed the active state penetration of the agricultural and commercial
economy for the sole purpose of revenue confiscation. During the early twelfth
century, the extraction of revenues from the private sector far surpassed the
already sizable sums exacted by the reformist ministries of the Shen-tsung and
Che-tsung reigns. Initially designed to ameliorate socioeconomic inequalities
in the countryside, the land survey and hired service policies were abused
by corrupt local administrators, who employed these fiscal reforms as instruments of revenue extraction. In the final stage of their implementation, these
two elements of the New Policies enabled the central government to parasitically feast upon the rural economy. Moreover, the expansion of the salt and
tea monopolies seems to have crippled the commercial sector of the economy
and to have impoverished once wealthy merchant households. Bureaucratic
expansion into the commercial sector diverted untold millions of strings of
cash into the state treasury, and into the private purses of the emperor and his
ministers. As Paul J. Smith has concluded, “By the twelfth century the Song
state was draining far more out of the economy than it was contributing to
society as a whole. . . . Economic activism degenerated into confiscatory taxation.”158 Primarily extractive rather than ameliorative, the fiscal policies of
Hui-tsung and his ministers continued the growth of state activism that had
begun during Shen-tsung’s reign. Led by Ts’ai Ching, Hui-tsung’s reformist
155
156
157
158
SS 184, p. 4502.
According to the Sung shih, between 1112 and 1116, revenues from the tea monopoly totaled more
than ten million strings of cash. See SS 184, p. 4503. According to Li Hsin-ch’uan, annual revenues
during the Cheng-ho era (1111–17) could be estimated at 4 million strings of cash. See Li Hsin-ch’uan,
Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi [Shih-yüan ts’ung-shu 1914 ed.] (c. 1202 chia volume, 1216 i volume;
Taipei, 1967) chia 14, pp. 197–8.
SS 184, p. 4303.
Smith, Taxing heaven’s storehouse, p. 313.
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councilors promoted intrusive policies that expanded revenue collection and
resource extraction far beyond the wildest dreams of Wang An-shih and his
immediate successors.
Imperial munificence: The expansion of social welfare institutions
The reform policies of Hui-tsung’s reign and Ts’ai Ching’s ministry were not
motivated solely by exploitation, extraction, and embezzlement. Some elements of the reform program evinced an idealistic concern for the public
welfare, and these aspects of state policy have been overlooked by many historians of the period. Portions of the vast sums that flowed into the imperial
treasury as a result of extractive fiscal policies were not misappropriated by
Hui-tsung and his courtiers, but were redistributed to fund institutions that
benefited some of the neediest subjects of the empire. The Hui-tsung reign was
a time of massive state intrusion into the agrarian and commercial economy,
but it also witnessed state intervention in local society through the creation of
a centralized and comprehensive system of regulatory institutions that actively
promoted public health and welfare.
Rather predictably, the Sung shih compilers accused Ts’ai Ching and his subordinates of exploiting and corrupting this network of charitable institutions
and of squandering large sums from the imperial treasury.159 Even if this were
the case, the creation and expansion of state welfare programs remained an integral aspect of the ministry’s package of reforms. In funding and establishing
poorhouses, charitable clinics, and paupers’ cemeteries, the emperor’s public
pronouncements manifested a reforming zeal.160 In the words of one imperial
edict, social welfare institutions such as “clinics, poorhouses, and cemeteries
were the chief aspect of humane governance,” and were established for the
relief of the destitute of the empire.161 Each of these relief institutions had
precedents in the latter half of the eleventh century but had never before been
integrated into a single, wide-ranging, state-funded system. By improving the
well-being of the emperor’s subjects, these centralized networks of institutions
were intended to revitalize popular morality, and ultimately to usher in an era
of perfect governance. Building upon foundations laid during the Ying-tsung
and Shen-tsung reigns, these institutions represented the high point of direct
state involvement in social welfare in early modern Chinese history. While little
159
160
161
SS 178, p. 4339.
This section draws heavily upon Goldschmidt, “Huizong’s impact on medicine and on public health,”
pp. 275–323. For a treatment of public welfare institutions, see Hugh Scogin, “Poor relief in Northern
Sung China,” Oriens Extremus 25 No. 1 (1978), pp. 30–46.
SHY (1997) shih-huo 68, p. 134b.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
597
hard quantitative evidence exists, it is probable that establishing and supporting these empirewide networks of social welfare and public health institutions
required substantial sums. More important, the empirewide implementation
of these programs indicates that during Hui-tsung’s reign the state was making, in John Chaffee’s assessment, “a radical assumption of responsibility for
at least minimum levels of welfare for the poor.”162
One of the first actions of Ts’ai Ching’s Advisory Office was to mandate
the establishment of Security and Relief Clinics (An-chi fang) in every prefecture and county of the empire in the eighth month of 1102.163 Three
years later, similar institutions were established within the capital, completing an empirewide state-funded hospital network.164 During the late T’ang
and the late eleventh century, a limited network of poorhouses had served as
all-purpose social welfare institutions for providing food, shelter, and health
care. The charitable clinics of the Hui-tsung reign were apparently modeled
after a similar institution that had been founded as a public-private partnership by Su Shih in 1089, when he was serving as prefect of Hang-chou.165
The functional specialization of state-funded hospitals, maintained separately
from relief homes, represented an institutional innovation of the early twelfth
century. Providing free medical services to the poor and needy, these charitable clinics were established to save the lives of commoners and to combat the
spread of epidemics. Patients were divided into separate wards according to the
severity of their illness to minimize cross-contamination, and salaried physicians were awarded bonuses on the basis of positive treatment outcomes.166
Paralleling the Security and Relief Clinics, a network of Public Pharmacies
(Ho-chi chü) was extended beyond the capital into the circuits in 1103, and was
designed to provide physicians with medications, thereby serving as a second
line of defense against contagion.167 During the Hui-tsung reign, the central
government actively involved itself in public health as no prior Sung monarch
had done, assuming a new mandate to control the outbreak of epidemics.168
Founded with a similar reforming mission as charitable clinics, poorhouses
(chü-yang yüan) were the second system of social welfare institutions to be
implemented by the Ts’ai Ching ministry. Hui-tsung and his councilors’ efforts
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
Chaffee, “Huizong, Cai Jing, and the politics of reform,” p. 41.
SHY (1997) shih-huo 68, pp. 129a–130a.
See SHY (1997) shih-huo 68, pp. 130b–131a; passage cited and translated in Goldschmidt, “Huizong’s
impact on medicine and on public health,” p. 295.
See SHY (1997) shih-huo 68, p. 130a; passage cited in Scogin, “Poor relief,” p. 32. For an assessment
of Su Shih’s promotion of social welfare as prefect of Hang-chou, see Ronald C. Egan, Word, image, and
deed in the life of Su Shi (Cambridge, Mass., 1994), pp. 108–27.
SHY (1997) shih-huo 68, pp. 131b–132a.
SHY (1997) chih-kuan 27, p. 17b.
Goldschmidt, “Huizong’s impact on medicine and on public health,” p. 295.
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to establish a system of relief homes across the empire followed earlier precedents in government aid to the destitute. During the late T’ang, an attenuated
system of poorhouses had existed on paper, and small-scale homeless shelters
had been established in K’ai-feng during Ying-tsung’s reign. What differentiated the new social welfare institutions from their predecessors was the
systematic and pervasive manner in which they were implemented. In 1103,
the Poorhouse policy (chü-yang fa), first enacted by Che-tsung in 1098, was
extended from the capital to the prefectures. Managed by prefects and county
magistrates, the relief homes were to be financed with property confiscated
from subjects who died without heirs and from interest and fees from the
Ever-normal Granary system; they operated on a permanent rather than ad
hoc basis.169 The chief beneficiaries of government aid were the most vulnerable members of society: the elderly (over 50 years of age), widows, orphans,
and abandoned children. Aid grants of food were calculated to match local
conditions and the age of the recipient, and sometimes included such items as
fuel, clothing, bedding, and cooking utensils.170 Elderly aid recipients were
conferred special grants of food and clothing according to a sliding scale, and
wet nurses were employed to care for infants. To wrestle with bureaucratic
paperwork and to handle increased caseloads in winter, the imperial court
appointed petty officials to render extra clerical assistance.
But given the unwieldy nature of the poorhouse system and its sweeping
mandate, not to mention the piles of money and the warehouses of goods it
was intended to disburse, maladministration became endemic. Like the land
survey and hired service measures, the Poorhouse policy had been established
to improve the lives of the lower socioeconomic orders, but soon fell prey to
the corruption of local officials. In 1105 the first reports of fraudulent record
keeping and the padding of welfare rolls were submitted in memorials to the
throne from several regional administrators.171 Responding to these repeated
allegations of malfeasance, an imperial edict dispatched additional officials to
ensure that aid truly reached the needy rather than be pocketed by officials
or the undeserving.172 When investigators could not prevent embezzlement,
austerity measures to decrease official opportunities for graft were imposed
under the short-lived councilorship of Chang Shang-ying. An edict of 1110
imposed aid quotas to shrink the number of relief homes in the capital (these
quotas were later relaxed) but left the poorhouse system outside the capital
169
170
171
172
SHY (1997) shih-huo 68, pp. 128b, 130a–b.
Such presumably nonessential items as mosquito nets were sometimes issued to poorhouse residents, a
fact seized upon and amplified by this policy’s critics. See Scogin, “Poor relief,” pp. 33–4.
SHY (1997) shih-huo 68, pp. 131a–b.
SHY (1997) shih-huo 68, p. 132a.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
599
virtually untouched.173 In the succeeding years, more reports of official mismanagement reached the court, which inevitably responded by reiterating
social welfare regulations and sending investigators to ferret out corruption
on the local level. Nevertheless, the temptation to exploit the system for the
benefit of administrators and undeserving aid recipients was too great ever to
be countered by central government regulation and surveillance. In 1120 the
imperial court announced cutbacks in aid that revived the Yüan-feng social
welfare regulations, forbade relief administrators to dispense anything but
food and money to their charges, and set a minimum age of sixty years for
the receipt of assistance.174 The expanding ranks of the urban homeless were
hardest hit by the curtailment of state aid institutions, and the Poorhouse
policy was revived in 1125 and remained on the statute books until the end of
the Northern Sung.175 From the attenuated documentary record that survives,
it is difficult to ascertain whether this system of relief homes benefited the
destitute or those who exploited it.
The third social welfare system to be expanded during the early Hui-tsung
reign was the Pauper’s Cemetery (Lou-tse yüan), established in the second month
of 1104.176 This policy followed a precedent of the Shen-tsung reign, when
prefects were ordered to establish public cemeteries for the destitute and to
subsidize their funeral rites.177 Providing proper burials for the indigent and
itinerant, these cemeteries were places of interment for the urban poor who
had died without family or far from home. And like the charitable clinics
established two years earlier, paupers’ cemeteries were meant to control the
spread of contagious diseases in areas of high population density. Prefects were
instructed to set aside a plot of infertile public land to serve as a cemeter and
to provide a grave site, a coffin, and a carved headstone for each person to be
buried.178 A central shrine was to be constructed in each cemetery to provide
a place for ancestral sacrifices to be made. Hugh Scogin has suggested that
paupers’ cemeteries served as a means of ensuring the proper performance of
death ritual in an increasingly mobile, commercialized, and urbanized society
in which kinship connections were fraying.179
The New Policies enacted by the Ts’ai Ching ministry have traditionally
been described as tools of economic exploitation, which enhanced the powers
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
SHY (1997) shih-huo 68, pp. 133b–134a.
SS 178, p. 4340; SHY (1997) shih-huo 68, pp. 137a–b.
SHY (1997) shih-huo 68, p. 137b.
SHY (1997) shih-huo 68, p. 130b.
SS 178, p. 4339.
SHY (1997) shih-huo 68, pp. 130a–b.
Scogin, “Poor relief,” pp. 35–7; Goldschmidt, “Huizong’s impact on medicine and on public health,”
pp. 302–3.
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of the state at the expense of society. Even worse, the reform measures gave
rise to widespread corruption among local administrators as well as among
state councilors. The ministry’s fiscal reforms were indeed prone to official
malfeasance, and similar abuses no doubt occurred in the empirewide network
of social welfare institutions, at least within the poorhouse system. Yet despite
its widespread corruption and abuses, the system did provide a safety net for the
destitute and dispossessed, and aid must have reached some deserving recipients in county seats and prefectural capitals.180 In the official pronouncements
which justified these institutional innovations, Hui-tsung portrayed himself as
an exemplar of humane governance and as rightful heir to the reforming legacy
of Shen-tsung and Che-tsung. By expanding the central government’s mandate
to provide for the health and welfare of the poor, the emperor was demonstrating his benevolence and munificence toward his subjects, especially toward
the urban poor, who benefited most from these policy initiatives. Furthermore, social welfare and public health policies were clearly conceived as part
of a comprehensive system to improve the lives of the dispossessed, sparking a
chain reaction that would result in nothing less than the moral resurgence of the
empire. Through a series of institutional innovations, Hui-tsung took an active
interest in improving the health, education, and welfare of his subjects, creating
programs that surpassed those of his imperial predecessors in scope and ambition. Through its fiscal policies, the imperial bureaucracy extracted large sums
from rural commoners, but only a fraction of these revenues were redistributed
to the urban poor through poorhouses, charitable hospitals, cemeteries, and
dispensaries. Examining the creation and expansion of social welfare and public
health institutions provides a corrective to the interpretation that the emperor
and his ministers presided over a dark and dissolute age. During the reign of
Hui-tsung and the Ts’ai Ching ministry, idealism and munificence coexisted
in ironic tension with corruption and cynicism.
Recovering the satellites: Expanding imperial clan institutions
Aside from the urban poor, Hui-tsung’s court extended its munificence to
a less numerous, albeit burgeoning, group of beneficiaries: members of the
imperial Chao clan.181 Through the establishment of the Advisory Office in
180
181
Recent excavations in Shan-chou2 (Yung-hsing-chün circuit) show that local paupers’ cemeteries provided interment for indigent commoners and soldiers well to the west of the capital. See San-men-hsiashih wen-wu kung-tso tui, comp., Pei Sung Shan-chou lou-tse-yüan (Peking, 1999). Cited in Goldschmidt,
“Huizong’s impact on medicine and on public health,” p. 303.
This section draws heavily on John Caffee’s comprehensive treatment of imperial clan institutions
during the Hui-tsung reign. See John W. Chaffee, Branches of heaven: A history of the imperial clan of Sung
China (Cambridge, Mass., 1999), pp. 95–111.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
601
1102, Ts’ai Ching granted the Council of State broad powers to formulate and
implement policies to reform imperial lineage institutions. As John Chaffee has
explained the situation, in the second century of the house of Chao, “the clan
was undergoing a fundamental reorientation resulting from a crisis in numbers,
money, and attenuated genealogical relationships.”182 Entire branches of the
lineage now fell outside the five circles of mourning (wu-fu), and an increasing
number of clansmen were dispersed outside official residences in the capital,
left to their own devices. Thousands of sixth- and seventh-generation imperial
descendants required state support through living allowances, which were
placing an ever-greater burden upon state finances, even as many clansmen
were moving outside state control.
In a memorial of late 1102, Ts’ai Ching urged Hui-tsung to address clan
problems, and to provide clan members with enhanced access to education,
examinations, and bureaucratic posts that would allow some clansmen to better support themselves.183 For Ts’ai, a true believer in large-scale institutional
initiatives, the solution was to grant land to imperial kinsmen beyond the
five circles of mourning. In the Western Capital of Lo-yang and the Southern Capital of Ying-t’ien-fu, local administrators were ordered to assemble
unsold parcels of government land (kuan-t’ien), a portion of rent proceeds from
which would be used to endow and support residences for imperial clan members.184 Called Halls of Extended Clanship (Tun-tsung yüan), these residential
centers in secondary capitals were intended to house those without official
stipends, and their numbers grew to several hundreds. Seven years later, not
long before Ts’ai Ching’s second fall from the councilorship in 1109, an imperial edict abolished the halls and evicted clan members, claiming they were
incorrigible and lawless.185 Perhaps these institutions were regarded as revenue drains, like the state-funded educational and social welfare institutions
that were scaled back around the same time by Chang Shang-ying’s short-lived
councilorship.
After Ts’ai’s return to office in 1112, the Halls of Extended Clanship were
revived and augmented, coinciding with a parallel expansion of the state’s
mandate to provide for the health, education, and welfare of commoners.
Over the Cheng-ho era, a time of profligate spending by Hui-tsung’s court,
residential complexes grew at an astounding rate, fueled by funding from large
swaths of public lands. In 1120, the two secondary clan centers in Lo-yang
and Ying-t’ien-fu encompassed a total of more than twenty thousand rooms,
182
183
184
185
Chaffee, Branches of heaven, p. 91.
See Chaffee, Branches of heaven, p. 97; also see SHY (1997) chih-kuan 20, pp. 34a–b; ti-hsi 5, pp. 15b–18a.
Chaffee, Branches of heaven, p. 98.
See Chaffee, Branches of heaven, p. 100; also see SHY (1997) chih-kuan 20, pp. 35a–b.
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and were endowed with 44,000 ch’ing (615,560 acres) of fields.186 Chaffee
estimates that approximately ten thousand clan members resided in the halls,
meaning that each resident was supported by proceeds from more than 4
ch’ing (about 56 acres) of land.187 When compared to the government school
system, which housed and educated more than one hundred and sixty thousand
students on a land endowment of 100,000 ch’ing, this represented a generous
subsidy indeed. With the growth of the Halls of Extended Clanship in the
second half of Hui-tsung’s reign, the central government earmarked resources
and established institutions to support even distant branches of the imperial
clan in perpetuity. In creating these secondary clan centers, Hui-tsung and his
ministers inadvertently ensured the continuation of the imperial lineage, not
to mention a pool of potential imperial heirs, after the fall of K’ai-feng, when
the emperor and almost all of his kinsmen residing in the capital were taken
prisoner by the Jurchen.188
court culture and state religion during hui-tsung’s reign
In traditional historiography, the extravagance of Hui-tsung’s court and his
promotion of religious Taoism are interpreted as harbingers of dynastic collapse. Hui-tsung is portrayed as a Neronic figure who frolicked in his sumptuous pleasure gardens while the empire was impoverished, eventually succumbing to rebellion from within and conquest from without. And by declaring the
Divine Empyrean sect of Taoism to be the state religion, the emperor invited
the moralistic scorn of later historians. Moreover, the standard accounts of the
reign accuse Ts’ai Ching and his ministerial colleagues of distracting Huitsung from the responsibilities of rulership by feeding his appetite for luxury
and encouraging his ritual and religious initiatives. It has been alleged that the
political stability of Ts’ai’s ministry was ensured by Hui-tsung’s complicity and
collusion, which allowed the councilor and his cronies to remain entrenched
in near-absolute power for two decades. No assessment of Hui-tsung and his
times would be complete without detailing the exceptional extravagance in
which the emperor lived, and without documenting his imperial ritual and
religious initiatives. The source materials for these aspects of Hui-tsung’s reign
are extremely fragmentary, as well as riddled with the moralistic biases of their
compilers, who sought to portray the emperor’s court as depraved and dissolute.
And since the authors of these colorful anecdotes were prone to exaggeration,
it is difficult to corroborate any of these narratives. To summarize this limited
186
187
188
See Chaffee, Branches of heaven, p. 101; also see SHY (1997) chih-kuan 20, pp. 37a–b.
Chaffee, Branches of heaven, p. 101.
Chaffee, Branches of heaven, pp. 110–1.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
603
corpus of source texts without echoing their condemnatory tone poses an even
greater challenge.
An embarrassment of riches: Imperial extravagance and corruption
Extracted through fiscal reforms and extraordinary levies, unknown millions
in state revenues were directly channeled into the imperial purse to finance
the emperor’s aesthetic pursuits. Some regions of the empire were ransacked
to build and stock a park for Hui-tsung’s personal enjoyment. After a critical
reading of the documentary record, it is undeniable that Hui-tsung’s reign
witnessed imperial extravagance on a grand scale. Whether this extravagance
was a cause of dynastic decline, as traditional historiography asserts, is another
story altogether.
As a young prince, Hui-tsung was “learned in painting, skilled in brushwork, and delighted in ancient vessels and mountain rocks.”189 During his
period of exile in Hang-chou in 1101, Ts’ai Ching trafficked with palace
eunuchs and commoners who were well positioned to satisfy the emperor’s
aesthetic cravings. At the beginning of his reign, Hui-tsung had dispatched
the eunuch T’ung Kuan (d. 1126) to Hang-chou and Su-chou, the wealthiest
cities of the Chiang-nan region, to confiscate exceptional examples of painting and calligraphy for the imperial collection. It is alleged that by attaching
memorials and missives to these shipments, Ts’ai won Hui-tsung’s unconditional trust, rising to the councilorship from exile. T’ung also quickly rose
into the emperor’s inner circle as a result of his successful procurement missions, which forcibly acquired and manufactured art objects and curios to fill
Hui-tsung’s palaces. In early 1102, Fabrication Bureaus (Tsao-tso chü) were
established in Hang-chou and Su-chou, under T’ung Kuan’s direction, to fabricate luxury items for the palace.190 Large-scale protoindustrial operations,
these workshops employed several thousand workers, who crafted jewels and
textiles from confiscated materials. Luxury items produced in these imperial
ateliers filled a vast new complex of palace halls, the ironically named Palace
of Extended Blessings (Yen-fu kung). Built in 1114, this parklike compound
extended the palace precincts to the north.191 The complex encompassed more
than thirty buildings, surrounded by a pleasure park, including an artificial
mountain and lake, that housed thousands of birds and beasts.192 If the standard
189
190
191
192
For an excerpt from Ts’ai T’ao’s personal memoirs of Hui-tsung, see CPPM 128, p. 3881–4.
Ch’en Pang-chan et al., Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo (1605; Peking, 1977) 50, p. 505.
Patricia Ebrey, “Taoism and art at the court of Song Huizong,” in Taoism and the arts of China, ed.
Stephen Little and Shawn Eichman (Chicago, 2000), p. 100.
Ch’en et al., Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo (1977) 50, p. 506. For an anecdotal account of Hui-tsung’s palaces,
see Hung Mai, Jung-chai sui-pi (1180–1202; Shanghai, 1996) san-pi, 13, pp. 568–9.
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histories are to be believed, this great construction project only whetted the
emperor’s appetite for extravagance.
In the following years, a wide-ranging transshipment network was established for the sole purpose of conveying strangely shaped rocks, exotic trees, and
flowering plants to stock Hui-tsung’s pleasure gardens. In 1105, two Imperial
Provisioning Bureaus (Ying-feng chü) were established in Hang-chou and Suchou to stock the emperor’s palaces with trees and flowers. These bureaus were
supervised by the commoner Chu Mien (1075–1126), who had been lifted
from regional obscurity to join Ts’ai Ching’s ministerial retinue.193 Late in
Hui-tsung’s reign, Chu’s name would be included among the “Six Felons.”
Initially, Chu Mien’s shipping operation was comparatively small in scale;
before 1110, he seized exotic plant specimens from private gardens and presented them as tribute several times a year.194 By the year 1111, the operation
had grown too large and complex to keep secret, as fleets of riverboats were
required to ship the volume of specimens to the capital. Employing thousands
of laborers, the Provisioning Bureaus procured and transported huge quantities
of rocks and flowers up the Grand Canal to K’ai-feng. The entire operation was
unofficially referred to as the “flower and rock network” (hua-shih wang), and
its jurisdiction expanded throughout the south and southeast of the empire.195
The transportation network required an enormous outlay of capital; according
to one anecdotal account, it cost several hundred thousand strings of cash to
ship a single boulder from the Liang-che region to the capital.196
By the middle of the 1110s, the network extended throughout the empire.
From Fu-chien to Szechwan to the Kuang-nan circuits, the extraction of
resources by imperial fiat began to affect the regional economies of the southeast, southwest, and far south.197 Merchant vessels and grain boats were pressed
into service to join the tribute convoys, which proceeded to the capital inland,
up the Grand Canal, or by sea. District and prefectural administrators were
required to finance the shipment of these rocks and flowers from their own local
treasuries, which were emptied by these extraordinary exactions. Battalions of
193
194
195
196
197
CPPM 128, p. 3882; Ch’en et al., Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo (1977) 50, p. 505. In 1100–1, when Ts’ai
Ching had been banished to Chiang-nan, he built a Buddhist temple hall in Su-chou, enlisting the
apothecary Chu Ch’ung to supervise the project. Ts’ai was so pleased with Chu Ch’ung’s work that he
enlisted his son Chu Mien to join his retinue. When Ts’ai was appointed chief councilor, he placed Chu
in charge of the Provisioning Bureau. For Chu Mien’s biography, see SS 470, p. 13684.
SS 470, p. 13684.
According to the memoirs of Ts’ai T’ao, “All the flowers and stones were moved in several tens of ships,
forming a fleet (wang).” See CPPM 128, pp. 3883–4.
Ch’en et al., Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo (1977) 50, pp. 505–6.
CPPM 128, p. 3884. For an extended treatment of the “flower and rock network” and the construction
of Hui-tsung’s pleasure park, see James M. Hargett, “Huizong’s magic Marchmount: The Genyue
Pleasure Park of Kaifeng,” Monumenta Serica 38 (1988–9), pp. 11–15.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
605
troops were enlisted to accelerate the progress of the treasure fleet to K’aifeng. Furthermore, the expansion of the “flower and rock network” allegedly
wreaked havoc on the economic infrastructure of the empire. According to
one anecdotal source, “some of the articles of tribute were so excessively large
that river dikes had to be breached, bridges destroyed, and city walls bored
through” in order to transport them to the capital.198 Perhaps resorting to
hyperbole, Ts’ai Ching’s second son, Ts’ai T’ao, claimed that exotic flowers were
shipped to the palace so expeditiously – in a matter of three or four days –
that their scent remained fresh.199 The logistics of the system were simply
staggering: available sources indicate that colossal boulders, some fifty feet
high, were swiftly shipped to the capital by thousands of conscript workers.
These organized depredations incurred popular resentment, and the network
temporarily ceased operations in 1120, after the outbreak of a major popular
rebellion.200 Fang La and his comrades took up arms to protest the tax burdens
that had impoverished the peasants of Liang-che circuit, the area most directly
affected by the “flower and rock network.” After T’ung Kuan led more than a
hundred thousand troops to suppress the uprising in 1121, the Provisioning
Bureaus were revived, and the transshipment network resumed operations.201
Under the continued direction of Chu Mien, goods were transported to the
capital, until K’ai-feng’s supply chain was interrupted by the siege in 1126.
Laboriously transported to the imperial capital, these cargoes of flowers, trees, and stones were assembled within the palace precincts to form
Hui-tsung’s personal pleasure park. Supervised by the eunuch Liang Shihch’eng (d. 1126), another of the “Six Felons,” work on the project began in
1118 and was completed four years later, possibly delayed by the Fang La
rebellion.202 The garden originally referred to as the Myriad Years Mountain
(Wan-sui shan), was formally renamed Northeast Marchmount (Ken-yüeh) in
1122, after a Taoist verse that described an auspicious convergence of cosmic forces.203 The park occupied an area several miles in circumference in
the northeastern quadrant of K’ai-feng and ostensibly displaced entire residential neighborhoods.204 Its centerpiece was an artificial minimountain that
towered nearly one hundred feet high, assembled from boulders transported
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
CPPM 128, p. 3883.
CPPM 128, p. 3883.
Ch’en et al., Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo (1977) 50, p. 507.
CPPM 128, pp. 3886–7. Fang La’s rebellion is treated in greater detail later.
Wang, Hui-chu lu 2, p. 72; Ch’en et al., Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo (1977) 50, p. 508.
CPPM 128, pp. 3877–9. The name Ken-yüeh (Northeast Marchmount) derived from the verse “The
Northeast Marchmount is aligned in the vacuous empyrean.” The mountain peak at the center of the
park represented Emperor Hui-tsung, a “high center” whose divine influence ordered the world.
Hargett, “Huizong’s magic Marchmount,” p. 16.
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by the “flower and rock network.” Representing the world in microcosm, the
Ken-yüeh garden was stocked with exotic flora and auspicious fauna. Its visitors
proceeded through scenic vistas of streams, cliffs, and groves that replicated the
natural splendors of the empire. After an expenditure of enormous sums from
the imperial treasury, the park survived for only four years. It was plundered
and disassembled in the early months of 1127. During the Jurchen siege, the
desperate citizens of the besieged capital tore down its wooden structures for
firewood, and its stones were used as shot for catapults.205
According to the traditional interpretation, the wealth of the empire was
plundered to support Hui-tsung in sumptuous splendor. Moreover, the construction of these palace halls, ritual complexes, and pleasure gardens was
financed through fiscal reforms and outright confiscation, provoking some
subjects of a restive empire into rebellion. Doubtless, these grand projects
undermined the regime of the emperor and his “felonious” ministers. And
arguably these initiatives drained the imperial treasury at a time when these
financial resources were most needed for the defense of the empire against
Jurchen aggression. However, it must not be forgotten that Hui-tsung’s grand
projects were not motivated by mere aestheticism; even the Ken-yüeh pleasure
park formed part of a unified ritual and ideological program. By recreating the
rites and music of antiquity, and by building a splendid pleasure garden, the
emperor sought to harmonize his realm with the primal forces of the cosmos.
Despite these noble hopes, ritual and ideology alone could not bring peace and
prosperity to Hui-tsung’s empire, even as it was threatened from without and
collapsed from within.
Harmonizing the realm: Reinventing ritual and promoting Taoism
In their postmortem search for the causes of the fall of the Northern Sung,
historians past and present have condemned Hui-tsung and his advisors for
undertaking a radical transformation of court ritual and state religion, which
began almost as soon as Hui-tsung became monarch.206 Starting in 1104, the
first of a series of “wonder-workers” or “occult masters” (fang-shih) persuaded
Hui-tsung to initiate a series of sweeping changes to the sacrificial ceremonies
of rulership. The rites and music of antiquity were reconstituted to ensure the
longevity of the monarch and the perpetual glory of the dynasty. During the
205
206
SS 85, p. 2102.
This section draws heavily on Patricia Ebrey’s study of Hui-tsung’s promotion of and involvement
in religious Taoism. See her “Taoism and art,” pp. 94–111. For a well-documented overview of Huitsung’s promotion of Taoism, also see Sun K’o-k’uan, Sung-Yüan tao-chiao chih fa-chan (Taichung, 1965),
pp. 93–122.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
607
Cheng-ho era (1111–17), alternative ideologies were adopted to legitimize the
Sung court and delegitimize its alien adversaries, as Divine Empyrean (Shenhsiao) Taoism was proclaimed the official state religion. Seeking enhanced
sanction for his reign, Hui-tsung portrayed himself as the incarnation of a
powerful deity in the loftiest reaches of the Taoist heavens. In an unprecedented
and exceptional development, monasteries and temples across the empire were
endowed with imperial funds to perform Taoist rites that were designed to
glorify Hui-tsung as a god-emperor.207
Traditional historians of the Northern Sung claimed that Hui-tsung’s
involvement with Taoism and experimentation with ritual had hastened the
end of the dynasty. They compared him to Emperor T’ang Hsüan-tsung (r.
712–56) of the T’ang dynasty, drawing parallels between the tragic historical circumstances of their respective reigns. A Taoist patron and believer, as
well as a great supporter of the performing and occult arts, Hsüan-tsung was
accused of negligence that provoked the An Lu-shan rebellion, which nearly
destroyed the T’ang dynasty. Ever since the “Calamity of Ching-k’ang” and the
fall of the Northern Sung, historians have condemned Hui-tsung’s promotion
of religious Taoism as an aberration and abomination and have blamed Taoist
practitioners for leading the emperor down the road to ruin. To be fair, only
some of the blame was laid upon the emperor’s shoulders; Ts’ai Ching and his
clique were accused of using Taoism as a smokescreen to distract Hui-tsung
from active involvement in government. Historians who accepted the NeoConfucian (Tao-hsüeh) movement’s privileged claims to doctrinal supremacy
situated Taoist religion beyond the pale of their exclusionary conception of
ethical and political thought. Furthermore, they portrayed the emperor’s
efforts to reconstruct and revive the rites and music of antiquity as quixotic
and overwrought attempts to bring peace and prosperity to a dynasty in
collapse.
These deviations from Confucian forms of political culture antagonized
those who constructed the historical narratives of Hui-tsung’s reign. Reading
past the moralistic and teleological biases of standard historiography, it is clear
that Hui-tsung’s imperial religious and ritual initiatives represented essential aspects of his reign. From our contemporary historiographic perspective,
the fall of the Northern Sung resulted largely from strategic and diplomatic
blunders, not from any ideological heterodoxy of the emperor and his court
establishment. Despite the tragic consequences of his border and military policies, Hui-tsung was convinced that his policies were reviving his empire and
207
See Chao Shin-yi, “Huizong and the divine Empyrean palace temple network,” in Emperor Huizong and
late Northern Song China: The politics of culture and the culture of politics, ed. Patricia B. Ebrey and Maggie
Bickford (Cambridge, Mass., 2006), pp. 338–48.
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permanently ensuring its integrity. Through his patronage of Taoist religion
and his ritual reform program, the emperor was seeking to harmonize his
realm with Heaven and Earth, thereby ensuring the eternal dominance of the
imperial house of Chao. In a time of conflict with hostile border regimes, he
and his political and religious advisors sought to assert Sung hegemony and
legitimacy and to proclaim its possession of heavenly favor.
Early in his reign, Hui-tsung encouraged the formulation of a new court
ritual program, which was developed to revive the rites and music of the ancient
sage-kings.208 In the political culture of the imperium, the performance of rites
and music served as a means of morally and spiritually legitimizing a dynasty.
Moreover, proper performance of ritual was part of the proper performance
of emperorship, ensuring that a monarch embodied the ethical and cosmic
principles of rulership. Ritual officials and practitioners at Hui-tsung’s court
claimed that court music had declined and decayed in recent centuries. Tones
and scales, they argued, required rectification in order for the emperor to rival
the achievements of the ancient sage-kings by bringing everlasting harmony
to the empire. All the while, the Sung was contending with the border regimes
of Liao and Hsi Hsia for hegemony, and ritual served as an affirmation of Sung
legitimacy.
In 1105, the occult master (fang-shih) Wei Han-chin, Hui-tsung’s personal
chaplain for a time, designed a new system of musical intervals, based on
the lengths of the emperor’s fingers, called ta-sheng (“great brightness”).209
Reviving classical designs from the Eastern Chou, a new set of bells was cast
to play the scales Wei had invented and was employed in conjunction with a
newly improvised regimen of imperial rites. Under Wei’s influence, Hui-tsung
ordered the casting of nine colossal ritual tripods (ting), which required the
astronomical amount of more than two hundred thousand catties of copper.210
These vessels symbolized sovereignty over the subcelestial realm, “providing
a direct line of communication with the utopian age of the sage-kings.”211
The emperor employed the nine tripods in imperial sacrifices that revived
and recreated the royal rites of antiquity. Keyed to resonate with an elaborate
correlative cosmology, they involved offerings to such mythic and ancient
exemplars of rulership as the Yellow Emperor and the Duke of Chou, whom
Hui-tsung sought to emulate.
208
209
210
211
For a brief treatment of Hui-tsung’s ritual program, see Sturman, “Cranes above Kaifeng,” pp. 40–1.
SS 128, pp. 2998–9; CPPM 135, pp. 4098–4100. For more on Hui-tsung’s reform of rites and music,
see Joseph S. M. Lam, “Huizong’s dashengyue: A musical performance of emperorship and officialdom,”
in Emperor Huizong and late Northern Song China: The politics of culture and the culture of politics, ed. Patricia
B. Ebrey and Maggie Bickford (Cambridge, Mass., 2006), pp. 395–452.
CPPM 128, pp. 4102–3.
Sturman, “Cranes above Kaifeng,” p. 43.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
609
Sacrificial vessels were part of a larger effort to restore the rites and music
to the standards of antiquity. A voracious collector of antiquities, Hui-tsung
noted the disparity in design between the bronzes currently used at court and
those unearthed from ancient Shang and Chou dynasty tombs. Proclaiming in
an edict of 1113 that “We are distant from antiquity, and the transmission of
rites has been lost,” the emperor officially stated his intention to bring court
rituals into line with classical norms.212 He formally established the Ritual
Regulations Office (Li-chih chü) within the Department of State Affairs to
standardize ritual protocol. Until its abolition in 1120, bureaucrats attached to
the service reformed nearly every aspect of imperial rites and music; correlative
cosmology influenced the casting of new vessels, the redesign of altars, and
the sequence of activities. Accordance with ancient models guaranteed the
correct sacrificial ceremonies. By extension, Hui-tsung’s ritual reforms would
ensure the legitimacy and supremacy of the Sung dynasty’s challenge to the
competing claims of border empires.
Coinciding with the emperor’s revival of ancient rites and music, massive
palace building projects were also undertaken as ritual stages. First, a colossal
palace pavilion, called the Palace of Nine Movements (Chiu-ch’eng kung), was
constructed to house the newly cast bells and tripods. In 1106, each circuit
intendant was required to purchase and ship large quantities of timber to
the capital, and tens of thousands of laborers were conscripted to erect an
imposing new sacrificial hall, based on classical precedents, called the Hall of
Enlightenment (Ming-t’ang).213 Constructed in the final years of his reign, Huitsung’s Ken-yüeh pleasure park was designed to rectify a perceived imbalance
of cosmic forces within the capital, and to ensure the integrity and survival
of the polity.214 Essential elements of Hui-tsung’s transformation of imperial
ideology and practice, each of these grand ritual projects was either informed
by the ideas of religious Taoism or initiated by Taoist practitioners.
In the annals of imperial history, Hui-tsung’s reign earned notoriety as an
era in which religious Taoism was extolled to the exclusion of Confucianism
and Buddhism. However, the penultimate emperor of the Northern Sung was
not the first of his lineage to have granted imperial patronage to Taoist religion.
Both T’ai-tsung (r. 976–97) and Chen-tsung (r. 997–1022) also employed the
arcane and wondrous talents of fang-shih. Emperor Chen-tsung committed
imperial funds to the construction of a grand Taoist temple in K’ai-feng,
which was probably the most elaborate building project sponsored by any
Sung monarch, even exceeding Hui-tsung’s construction programs.
212
213
214
CPPM 134, pp. 4061–2.
CPPM 125, p. 3766; SS 101, pp. 2473–4.
For a study of Hui-tsung’s pleasure park, see Hargett, “Huizong’s magic Marchmount,” pp. 1–48.
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According to one anecdotal account, the emperor’s infatuation with things
Taoist began before his enthronement, when he was visited in his dreams by one
of several divinities, who nominated him as the bearer and reviver of teachings
of the Tao.215 Perhaps encouraged by these nocturnal visions, Hui-tsung began
to grant imperial patronage and subsidies to Taoist religious institutions and
practitioners. In 1103 the emperor received Liu Hun-k’ang (1035–1108), the
twenty-fifth patriarch of the Highest Purity (Shang-ch’ing) sect, and granted
him funds for the reconstruction of his sect’s central monastery at Mao-shan.216
A Taoist ritual hall and a splendid monastic residence were built within the
palace precincts, where Liu engaged in a series of sacrificial ceremonies for the
preservation of the empire. Soon thereafter, he and other Mao-shan practitioners
were granted imperial titles. When the abbot returned to his own monastery in
Liang-che circuit, he continued to correspond with Hui-tsung, encouraging
him to reject Buddhism and embrace Taoist teachings for the sake of the
imperial polity.217
In 1107, state promotion of Taoist religion began in earnest, when an imperial edict mandated that Taoist clergy would be superior in rank and honors to
their Buddhist counterparts.218 The following year, Hui-tsung promulgated
an edict establishing an examination system for Taoist clergy to receive state
accreditation, with an annual recruitment quota set at seventy priests. Also in
1108, the emperor ordered that copies of the liturgy for Rites of the Golden
Register (chin-lu chiao), a ceremony of fifth-century origin, be distributed to
temples in every prefecture and county to ensure the preservation of the imperial house of Chao. In the words of Michel Strickmann, the codification and
performance of these rites would “ensure that a vast chorus of supplication
in the interests of the Sung would rise from every corner of the empire.”219
Increasingly, preexisting Taoist liturgies and institutions were employed to
advance and articulate the interests of the empire and its ruler.
By sponsoring the first printed edition of the Taoist canon (Tao-tsang), Huitsung established himself as a preeminent figure in the revival and dissemination of Taoist textual learning in the Sung.220 He was following in the footsteps
of Emperors T’ai-tsung and Chen-tsung, who had sponsored the collection and
215
216
217
218
219
220
CPPM 127, pp. 3841–2.
CPPM 127, pp. 3839–40. For a brief history of the Shang-ch’ing school of Taoism, see Isabelle Robinet,
Taoism: Growth of a religion, trans. Phyllis Brooks (Stanford, Calif., 1997), pp. 115–20.
Ebrey, “Taoism and art,” p. 99.
CPPM 127, p. 3817.
Michel Strickmann, “The longest Taoist scripture,” History of Religions 17 Nos. 3–4 (1978), pp. 343–4.
The most authoritative English language study of the Taoist canon’s compilation is Strickmann, “The
longest Taoist scripture.” Also see Judith M. Boltz, A survey of Taoist literature: Tenth to seventeenth
centuries (Berkeley, Calif., 1987), pp. 5–6; and Edward L. Davis, Society and the supernatural in Song China
(Honolulu, 2001), pp. 34–44.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
611
collation of Taoist texts into a small number of hand-copied exemplars of an
earlier version of the Taoist canon.221 In 1114, Hui-tsung ordered that Taoist
scriptures should be searched out and forwarded to the capital, where invited
religious scholars would begin collating them into an authoritative canonical
edition.222 Submitted texts included earlier Taoist scriptures from the Lingpao and Shang-ch’ing schools, as well as scriptures of more recent provenance
from the Celestial Heart (T’ien-hsin) and other religious movements that had
originated and developed in the Northern Sung.223 Also included were Divine
Empyrean (Shen-hsiao) texts dating from Hui-tsung’s own reign and several
canonical commentaries and hymn collections attributed to the emperor himself. Completed in 1116, the manuscript of the Taoist canon of the longevity of
the Cheng-ho reign (Cheng-ho wan-shou Tao-tsang) was engraved and printed in
Fu-chou, Fu-chien circuit, between 1118 and 1120. For scholars who have
focused on the textual foundations of Chinese religion, this publishing project
represented Hui-tsung’s greatest contribution as an imperial patron of Taoism.
Meanwhile, the expanded state educational system became a conduit for
channeling Taoist scholars into court positions, and a medium for the promotion of Taoist learning. Instructorships in canonical Taoist texts were established at the Imperial University and at prefectural schools, and a separate
examination track was created to award civil service degrees to Taoist adepts.224
Regional administrators were ordered to employ the Eight Conduct (pa-hsing)
system to recruit Taoist scholars and practitioners into official posts. A number
of classical Taoist texts became part of the curriculum of government schools
in 1118, and early Taoist sages were incorporated into the state cult. For a
brief time, Taoist learning was placed on an equal footing with Confucian
education, and supported with state resources, a fact that no doubt rankled
the Neo-Confucian historians of the Hui-tsung reign.
While he was promoting Taoist textual scholarship, the emperor became
entangled with wonder-workers and ritual experts. Both the spirit medium
Wang Lao-chih and the faith healer Wang Tzu-hsi temporarily won his favor
before their hasty departures from court. By far the most influential practitioner was the Thunder Rites (lei-fa) master Lin Ling-su, who arrived at court
from coastal Wen-chou (Liang-che) in 1114.225 When Lin gained access to
221
222
223
224
225
Boltz, Survey of Taoist literature, p. 5.
CPPM 127, p. 3819.
For more information about Celestial Heart Taoism, see Davis, Society and the supernatural, pp. 21–4,
and Robert Hymes, Way and byway: Taoism, local religion, and models of divinity in Sung and modern China
(Berkeley, Calif., 2002), pp. 26–8.
CPPM 127, pp. 3825–7.
For a study of the relationship between Hui-tsung and Lin Ling-su, see Miyakawa Hisayuki, “Rin Reiso
to Sō no Kisō,” Tōkai Daigaku kiyō: Bungaku bu 24 (1975), pp. 1–8. See also Strickmann, “The Longest
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the emperor, the Sung court’s promotion of religious Taoism reached unprecedented heights. Originally invited to K’ai-feng to participate in the compilation of the Taoist canon, Lin brought with him a new set of revelations and
claimed supremacy over all previous forms of religious Taoism. He purported
to possess exclusive access to the uppermost layer of the heavens, the Divine
Empyrean, a realm that superseded all other levels in the celestial hierarchy.226
The new Shen-hsiao scriptures foretold that an age of purification was imminent, and that the world would soon be transformed through the perfection
of the true Tao, embodied by a sage-ruler. When summoned before the throne
in 1117, Lin Ling-su proclaimed that Hui-tsung himself was the incarnation of the Great Emperor of Everlasting Life (Ch’ang-sheng ta-ti), the eldest
son of the Jade Emperor and the brother of the current governor of Heaven,
the Sovereign of Ch’ing-hua (Ch’ing-hua wang).227 Moreover, these imperially
sanctioned shrines, and the deities worshipped therein, were decreed to rank
above all local temples and shrines. As Robert Hymes explains the significance
of this association of Hui-tsung and a powerful Divine Empyrean deity, “Lin
and the emperor had managed, for the only time in Sung history, to establish
a living emperor as a god, and a very high god indeed.”228
The patronage of Shen-hsiao Taoism was not limited to court and capital, but
radiated out from the capital to affect local religious institutions and practices,
at least for a short time. An edict of 1117 mandated the establishment of
Divine Empyrean temples in every prefecture of the empire for the worship
of the Great Emperor of Everlasting Life, ordering the forcible conversion and
Taoicization of Buddhist temples in areas without Taoist temples.229 Huitsung’s glorification of Taoism – and his self-glorification through Taoism –
coincided with prohibitions against Buddhist institutions and practitioners.
Ten years earlier, Buddhist monks had been formally declared to be inferior to
Taoist priests in the eyes of the state, and an edict of the seventh month of 1117
urged Buddhist monks empirewide to convert voluntarily to Taoism.230 In the
first month of 1119, the emperor officially prohibited Buddhist monasteries
226
227
228
229
230
Taoist scripture.” Davis, Society and the supernatural, pp. 61–6, examines the role of spirit mediums
during the Sung.
For an analysis of the earliest Divine Empyrean liturgical and ritual texts dating from this period of
the Hui-tsung reign, see Boltz, Survey of Taoist literature, pp. 26–30.
CPPM 127, pp. 3819–20.
Hymes, Way and byway, p. 120.
CPPM 127, pp. 3823, 3836. Michel Strickmann and Patricia Ebrey have both found evidence in
Southern Sung memorabilia literature (pi-chi) that Buddhist temples were indeed converted to Taoist
temples around this time. See Strickmann, “The longest Taoist scripture,” p. 246 n. 44; Ebrey, “Taoism
and art,” p. 104.
See Pi, Hsü tzu-chih t’ung-chien (1987) 93, p. 485c; passage cited in Strickmann, “The longest Taoist
scripture,” p. 346.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
613
and temples from enhancing or expanding their landholdings, buildings, or
financial assets. Henceforth, Buddhist monks would be known as “clergy of
virtue” (te-shih), and were ordered to dress and behave like Taoist clergy (taoshih); in another official name change, Buddhist temples and monasteries (ssu2,
yüan) were renamed as Taoist temples and monasteries (kung3, kuan2).231
Rather than banning Buddhism outright, these changes subsumed it within
the structure and nomenclature of Taoism, in what Strickmann deemed a “rectification of names” rather than a “wholesale persecution of the Sangha.”232
Most likely, Hui-tsung’s promotion of Taoism represented an attempt to delegitimize the Liao, whose state religion was Buddhism, just as the Sung was
embroiled in efforts to wrest back the disputed Sixteen Prefectures from the
Khitan.233 In any case, the forced Taoicization of Buddhist institutions met
with criticism from the heir apparent and from the chief councilors Ts’ai Ching
and Chang Shang-ying. Most of these official prohibitions were overturned
early in 1120, not long after Lin Ling-su was forced to return to Wen-chou
in order to placate his critics at court.234 But Lin’s departure did not mean
that Hui-tsung severed his connection with the Divine Empyrean sect, nor did
it mean that the court ceased to patronize religious Taoism. Supplanting Lin
Ling-su, his affiliate Wang Wen-ch’ing (1093–1153) led the imperial Taoist
establishment in the early 1120s and completed several major textual and
liturgical projects before his sudden departure from court.
By granting imperial patronage to Taoism, Hui-tsung was not radically
breaking with dynastic tradition, since both T’ai-tsung and Chen-tsung had
pursued some similar projects, albeit on a much smaller scale. When imposing
restrictions upon Buddhist clergy and religious institutions, Hui-tsung’s shortlived policies did not match the persecutions of the late T’ang. Still, they
were extreme moves for a Sung monarch whose predecessors had supported
institutional Buddhism. His attempted subordination of Buddhism into a
state-approved hierarchy of Taoist deities and temples was an unprecedented
development. As a patron and practitioner of Taoism, Hui-tsung transformed
state religion and transformed court ritual in radical ways, even if his initiatives
were ultimately abandoned.
Furthermore, Hui-tsung’s promotion of Taoism represented a departure
from the reforming legacy of his immediate imperial predecessors, Shen-tsung
and Che-tsung. The majority of the emperor’s religious and ritual initiatives were initiated during the second half of his reign, a decade after he
231
232
233
234
SS 22, p. 403; CPPM 127, p. 3830.
Strickmann, “The longest Taoist scripture,” p. 347.
Strickmann, “The longest Taoist scripture,” p. 349.
CPPM 127, pp. 3848–50. Also see Ebrey, “Taoism and art,” p. 107.
ari daniel levine
614
had revived and extended the New Policies.235 Perhaps similar structuring
impulses informed the reform policies and religious transformations of Huitsung’s court, since both programs represented parallel instances of state intrusion into society through the creation and elaboration of regulatory systems.
Enshrining Shen-hsiao Taoism as the state religion, Hui-tsung and his advisors created an empirewide hierarchy of Divine Empyrean temples to glorify
the monarch and the dynasty, and employed the state educational system as
a means of disseminating Taoist learning. By the second decade of his reign,
Hui-tsung had deviated from the political legacy of his father and brother,
but he was guided by equally idealistic impulses to develop new institutions
to accomplish similar reforming aims. The emperor’s extension of the New
Policies and his patronage of religious Taoism were both informed by similar
impulses: to become a sagely ruler who brought order to his empire by radiating virtue into society through centralized state institutions, which gave him
the power to revive the ethical and political orders of antiquity.
popular uprisings, border conflicts, and the fall of the
northern sung
Contrary to the teleological narrative of traditional history, neither the profligacy of Hui-tsung’s court nor the policies of the Ts’ai Ching ministry were
responsible for the fall of the Northern Sung. What doomed the dynasty was
a concatenation of diplomatic and military crises, into which the emperor and
his ministers blundered, and from which they proved incapable of extricating themselves. While the Sung armed forces were not outnumbered by their
adversaries, they were ineptly commanded from the center, by an imperial
court overconfident of certain victory. Unaware of their own strategic and tactical blind spots, Hui-tsung’s unaccountable councilors and generals could not
marshal and coordinate the necessary fiscal and human might to defend the
empire. More than any inherent disadvantages, a lack of will and leadership
caused the collapse of the Northern Sung.
From the beginning of his personal rule, Hui-tsung pursued an aggressive expansionist military and diplomatic policy against the empire’s border
adversaries, with ephemeral successes followed by total failures. In a series
of ultimately fruitless campaigns against the Tangut Hsi Hsia, in 1103–6
and 1113–19, Hui-tsung pursued the conquest of territories that had already
been gained and lost by Shen-tsung and Che-tsung. While they did succeed
in destroying the Tanguts’ preeminent position on the northwestern frontier,
235
Chaffee, “Huizong, Cai Jing, and the politics of reform,” p. 53.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
615
Sung commanders overextended themselves, snatching defeat from the jaws
of victory.
If the imperial armed forces could not hope to defeat the Hsi Hsia after
years of campaigns, they were clearly outmatched by the declining Khitan Liao
empire, which occupied the Sixteen Prefectures coveted by Sung emperors since
the dynasty’s inception. In 1119, tempted by the desire to reconquer this terra
irredenta, Hui-tsung’s court entered into a diplomatic pact with the Jurchen,
whose emerging and expansionist Chin empire threatened the Liao from the
north. Planning to mount concerted attacks upon the Liao, the Sung and Chin
leadership agreed to split the conquered territories between them. But the need
to suppress the massive popular rebellions of Fang La in 1120 prevented the
Sung court from fully mobilizing its forces against the Liao, and when they
finally proceeded with their invasion plans a year later the imperial troops
suffered severe setbacks. After the Jurchen conquered the Liao dynasty with
little assistance from the Sung, Hui-tsung’s diplomats repeatedly enraged the
Chin leadership with their excessive demands for more territory. Late in 1125,
the Jurchen launched a punitive invasion of the Sung empire, breaking through
border defenses and capturing strategic cities in the north. Although symbolic
of renewed imperial resolve, Hui-tsung’s abdication in favor of his son Ch’intsung in the twelfth month of 1125 could not stave off disaster, for the new
emperor and his revolving-door councilors vacillated between appeasement
and resistance. Concluding peace at any price in 1126, the Sung extricated
itself from its first war with the Chin only to have its diplomatic incompetence
provoke a second, fatal conflict. In the second month of 1127, Jurchen forces
invaded the North China Plain, sacked K’ai-feng, and took both Hui-tsung
and Ch’in-tsung prisoner, effectively decapitating the dynasty. The dynasty
fell because Hui-tsung’s councilors and commanders failed to acknowledge
the military might of their adversaries or to accept accountability for their illconceived schemes, causing them to overconfidently stumble into war against
an invincible foe.
All for nothing: The final phase of the Sung-Tangut conflict, 1101–1119
When he ascended the throne, Hui-tsung succeeded to a legacy of aggressive
expansionism along the northwestern frontier.236 In the 1070s, Shen-tsung
236
For the political and military history of the Hsi Hsia empire in this period, see Ruth W. Dunnell,
“The Hsi Hsia,” in The Cambridge history of China, volume 6: Alien regimes and border states, 907–1368,
ed. Herbert Franke and Denis C. Twitchett (New York, 1994); Wu T’ien-ch’ih, Hsin Hsi Hsia shih
(Taipei, 1987); and Li Hua-jui, Sung Hsia kuan-hsi shih (Shih-chia-chuang, 1998). For an analysis
of military policy during the reformist ministries of the Shen-tsung and Che-tsung reigns, see Chao
616
ari daniel levine
had initiated Sung military incursions into Tangut territory, only to be mired
in an inconclusive war of attrition. The premature end of Shen-tsung’s reign
was perhaps hastened by the bloodbath of Yung-lo ch’eng in 1082, which
broke the emperor’s spirit and ruined his health. However, during his personal
rule, Che-tsung and his ministers had overturned Dowager Empress Hsüanjen’s policy of appeasement, ultimately succeeding in undermining the power
position of the Hsi Hsia. Pursuing an “advance and fortify” (chin-chu) strategy
of occupying enemy territory and holding it with strategic fortifications, Sung
forces had soundly defeated the Tanguts in the climactic battle of P’ing-hsia
in 1099.
But even if Hui-tsung desired to follow in the footsteps of his father and
older brother, his hands were tied. He was constrained not only by a peace treaty
concluded in the last months of Che-tsung’s reign but also by the pacifistic
presence of Dowager Empress Ch’in-sheng and the ascendant antireformists.
In the first years of the Hui-tsung reign, opinion at court turned against the
adventurism of the Chang Tun ministry and favored a return to the accommodationist border policy of the Yüan-yu regency. When Chang was indicted
for political crimes and dismissed from the councilorship in 1101, the conservative censor Ch’en Kuan accused him of “delighting in the deployment
of troops and opening up great border rifts.”237 Perhaps the greatest military failure of Chang’s ministry was the collapse of an invasion of the Tibetan
stronghold of Ch’ing-t’ang (modern Hsi-ning2) in the Huang-shui valley east
of Lake Kokonor (Ch’ing-hai), which left Sung troops stranded deep behind
enemy lines.238 In the third month of 1101 the Sung court admitted defeat
in the Ch’ing-t’ang campaigns by completely withdrawing from the Huangshui valley, which policy makers had hoped to annex as part of Hsi-ho military
circuit, and returning it to the Tibetans. After Chang Tun fell from power, an
increasing number of remonstrators were emboldened to memorialize against
the misguided irredentism of his ministry. True to form, this peace lobby
argued that the campaigns of the late 1090s had wasted the empire’s limited
military and fiscal resources to occupy an empty and unproductive swath of
mountainous territory in the far northwest.239
237
238
239
Ti-hsien, “Shih-lun Pei Sung pien-fa-p’ai chün-shih kai-ko te ch’eng-kung,” Li-shih yen-chiu 250 (1997),
pp. 143–60.
Hsü, Sung tsai-fu pien-nien lu chiao-pu 11, p. 668.
The following discussion is based on Paul J. Smith, “Irredentism as political capital: The New Policies
and the annexation of Tibetan domains in Hehuang (the Qinghai-Gansu highlands) under Shenzong
and his sons, 1068–1108,” in Emperor Huizong and late Northern Song China: The politics of culture and the
culture of politics, ed. Patricia B. Ebrey and Maggie Bickford (Cambridge, Mass., 2006), pp. 99–105.
For memorials by Fan Ch’un-ts’ui and Chang Shun-min which criticize the “advance and fortify”
strategy, and for Che-tsung’s border policies in general, see Chao Ju-yü, Sung-ch’ao chu-ch’en tsou-i
(1186; Shanghai, 1999) 140, pp. 1583–5.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
617
But once Hui-tsung began his personal rule, he adopted the expansionist border policy of his imperial predecessors. With the death of Dowager
Empress Ch’in-sheng and the banishment of the antireformists from court,
he and his ministers were unrestrained to make further incursions into Hsi
Hsia territory. When Ts’ai Ching was appointed chief councilor in 1102, he
convinced the emperor to commit to military campaigns without end on the
northwestern frontier. The next year, troops were mobilized for a revival of the
Ch’ing-t’ang campaign, to be commanded by Wang Hou, the son of Shentsung’s onetime military advisor Wang Shao. Wang had devised a two-pronged
invasion strategy, simultaneously pushing into the valleys of Ch’ing-t’ang and
the highlands of Heng-shan. Rising meteorically from collecting artwork for
Hui-tsung to commanding his majesty’s armed forces, the eunuch T’ung Kuan
was appointed Wang’s second-in-command.240
In the valleys of Ch’ing-t’ang, Wang and T’ung pursued a blitzkrieg strategy, committing a massive force to besiege and reoccupy strategic outposts that
had been surrendered several years before. In the sixth month of 1103, Sung
forces recaptured Shan-chou3 (the old Ch’ing-t’ang) and Huang-chou2 and
dozens of attached fortifications.241 Wang claimed that this move had pacified
an area of fifteen hundred square li (about 65 square miles), which supported
a population of a hundred thousand, belonging to more than twenty different tribes.242 By the end of 1104, native resistance was extinguished, and
the independent rulers of K’uo-chou and Ch’ing-t’ang (soon renamed Hsining-chou) surrendered.243 Hui-tsung honored Wang Hou and T’ung Kuan
for conquering the region, which afforded the Sung control over the southern
border of the Hsi Hsia and brought an estimated seven hundred thousand
subjects under direct imperial administration. In 1104 and 1105, Hsi Hsia
forces reacted defensively to the Sung invasion, which threatened their southwestern border and cut off their empire from Tibetan territory. Launching
pinprick attacks on Sung stockades, and later sending armies of a hundred
thousand men to besiege fortifications in Huang-chou2 and Lan-chou, the
Tanguts failed to wrest Ch’ing-t’ang away from Sung domination. Most of
the credit for this military triumph went to T’ung Kuan, who replaced Wang
Hou as supreme commander over the entire northwestern frontier in the first
month of 1105.244 In many ways, T’ung Kuan’s rise to power at court resulted
240
241
242
243
244
CPPM 140, pp. 4217–18.
Huang-chou2 corresponds to modern Lo-tu, and Shan-chou3 to modern Hsi-ning2, both in Tsinghai
province.
CPPM 139, pp. 4182–6.
CPPM 140, pp. 4227–8.
Li Chih, Huang Sung shih-ch’ao kang-yao (c. 1213; Shanghai, 1995) 16, p. 23a. T’ung was appointed
pacification commissioner (ching-lüeh an-fu chih-chih-shih) of Ch’in-feng and Hsi-ho-Lan-Huang circuits.
Hsi Hsia prefectures
Sung prefectures
Hsi Hsia outposts (location approximate)
Sung outpost of Chen-wu (location approximate)
Major battle theaters
Borders as of 1080, for reference
H S I
H S I A
Hsing-chou
Failed Sung attack, 1116–17
Yin-chou
1105
Heng-shan
Ling-chou
Hsi-liang-fu
(Shuo-fang)
Jen-to-ch’üan
1116
–17
bat
tle
t
Ch’ing Hai
Hsi-ning
(Ch’ing-t’ang)
Tsang-ti-ho
Ku-ku-lung
hea
ter
1114–16 theater
Chen-wu
Pao-an
Raided, 1113
Huang-chou
Huan-chou
Annexed by Sung, 1103–04
Chen-jung
Lan-chou
K’uo-chou
HUAN-CH’ING
Wei-chou
Hsi-chou
CH’IN-FENG
CHING-YÜAN
YUNG-HSING-CHÜN
Ch’in-chou
250 km
0
150 miles
FU-YEN
Hsia attack, 1104
HSI-HO
Ho-chou
0
Yen-an
Map 18. Hui-tsung’s wars in the northwest, 1103–1117.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
619
from his victorious involvement in the Ch’ing-t’ang campaigns, which, in Paul
Smith’s assessment, “promoted Hui-tsung’s continuing dream of pursuing his
father’s irredentist vision.”245
Farther east, in the main theater of battle against the Tanguts, Sung troops
mobilized for a second-wave offensive that would push into the Heng-shan
highlands. In retribution for the Sung conquest of Ch’ing-t’ang, Hsi Hsia
troops went on a rampage in northwestern Ch’in-feng circuit in the ninth
month of 1104, killing tens of thousands of civilians in the two border prefectures of Wei-chou4 and Chen-jung chün. Alarmed at these atrocities, Ts’ai
Ching appointed the general T’ao Chieh-fu as pacification commissioner (chinglüeh an-fu shih) of Fu-yen circuit, entrusting him with defending the eastern
stretch of the Sung–Hsi Hsia frontier.246 Like his former commander Chang
Chieh, T’ao formulated an “advance and fortify” strategy to defend the Hengshan highlands from future Tangut incursions and reprisals by establishing a
solid defense perimeter. In the spring of 1105, Sung forces captured and fortified the strategic walled city of Yin-chou, later staving off a large-scale Hsi
Hsia offensive to recapture the surrounding area.247 By projecting Sung military power ever closer to the heartland of the Hsi Hsia empire, T’ao Chieh-fu
managed to bring the Tanguts back to the bargaining table. After his troops
were defeated in the battle over Yin-chou, Emperor Ch’ung-tsung of the Hsi
Hsia sued for peace through a Liao emissary.248 A cease-fire was proclaimed in
the seventh month of 1106, but diplomatic negotiations soon bogged down
over the issue of ceding captured territory. In the end, a compromise treaty
was reached, in which the Sung retained its hegemony over the Ch’ing-t’ang
region, but returned Yin-chou as a concession to the Tanguts. Through the
demotion of T’ao Chieh-fu to a prefectural post, the Sung court demonstrated
its willingness to abandon its “advance and fortify” strategy for the foreseeable
future.
The truce held for seven years, while Hui-tsung’s court remained divided
between proponents of aggression and appeasement. Frustrated by his demotion and the cession of hard-won territory to the Tanguts, T’ao Chieh-fu advocated extreme measures. Apparently, he managed to convince several members
of the Council of State that the only way to stabilize the border and to prevent
further incursions was to decapitate the Hsi Hsia regime with an all-out assault
245
246
247
248
Smith, “Irredentism as political capital,” p. 123.
SS 348, p. 11039.
CPPM 140, pp. 4239–40.
In the standard sources of Sung history, which refuse to acknowledge the Hsi Hsia as a legitimate
empire, Emperor Ch’ung-tsung is known as Wei-ming Ch’ien-shun. At the beginning of the twelfth
century, the Hsi Hsia empire concluded a diplomatic alliance with the Liao, cemented by the marriage
of Emperor Ch’ung-tsung of the Hsi Hsia to an imperial princess of the Liao in 1104.
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upon its heartland of Hsing-chou2 and Ling-chou.249 Chao T’ing-chih, who
briefly served as chief councilor in 1107, after Ts’ai Ching’s first departure
from court, opposed T’ao’s invasion plan as costly and imprudent. Unswayed
by the hawks at court, Hui-tsung was either unwilling or unable to commit
troops and resources on another prolonged border campaign. A few years later,
external pressures finally tipped the balance, providing the emperor with a
legitimate casus belli. Starting in 1109, a series of escalating disagreements
over the demarcation of the unfixed Sung–Hsi Hsia frontier brought the rulers
of both empires to the brink of war. In 1113, in an attempt to convince the
Sung to agree on a redrawn borderline, the Hsi Hsia ruler Ch’ung-tsung
resumed the construction of fortifications in the disputed frontier territory.
To further destabilize an already precarious situation, the Ch’iang chieftain Li
O-to switched allegiance to the Hsi Hsia and began raiding Sung positions in
Huan-chou2.250 The Tanguts continued to buttress their position in Hengshan, in 1114 building a strategic fortification at Tsang-ti-ho, on the northern
edge of the Sung commandery of Pao-an.251 After this provocation, bellicose
elements at court convinced Hui-tsung to commit tens of millions of strings
of cash and hundreds of thousands of soldiers to a renewed offensive in the
northwest.
At the onset of hostilities in the fourth and final Sung-Tangut conflict,
Hui-tsung appointed T’ung Kuan supreme commander of the imperial forces
in all six border circuits. For the next five years, T’ung overcommitted Sung
forces to fight in a conflict with unattainable objectives. Just as they had a
decade before, Sung troops made simultaneous incursions into Ch’ing-t’ang
and Heng-shan. Never achieving the final breakthrough they had expected,
the emperor’s generals squandered massive resources and caused the deaths
of (according to one estimate) several hundred thousand imperial troops. In
1115, a force of one hundred and fifty thousand soldiers under the command of
Liu Fa moved north from Huang-chou2 to reoccupy the Ch’ing-t’ang region.
Pushing deep inside enemy territory, Liu’s army slaughtered a Tangut garrison
to conquer the stockade at Ku-ku-lung, on the Tibeto-Tangut border.252 The
same year, the Chin-feng military commissioner Liu Chung-wu and a man
identified as Wang Hou led imperial troops from four circuits to besiege the
newly constructed Tangut fort at Tsang-ti-ho, where nearly half of them – more
than a hundred thousand men, by one estimate – were massacred. According to
the Sung shih account, Wang bribed T’ung to conceal these massive casualties
249
250
251
252
SS 348, p. 11039.
SS 356, p. 11221; 486, pp. 14019–20.
SS 486, p. 14020.
SS 486, p. 14020. Ku-ku-lung is located to the northeast of modern Hsi-ning2 in Tsinghai province.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
621
in his reports to the emperor.253 In 1116, Liu Fa and Liu Chung-wu united
two circuit armies to penetrate farther into the Hao-tan valley, forcing the
surrender of Jen-to-ch’üan, a Hsi Hsia walled town upstream from Ku-kulung.254 Undaunted by the carnage of the previous year, a hundred thousand
Sung troops conquered the strategic fortress at Tsang-ti-ho, the original bone
of contention in this final phase of the Sung-Tangut conflict.
But after these promising initial victories, the tide of battle turned against
the Sung, as mounting casualties forced the court to admit defeat. Seeking
to even the score, the Tanguts staged a successful surprise attack on the Sung
walled town of Ching-hsia during the relatively snowless midwinter of 1116–
17.255 In the final analysis, what forced the Sung court to abandon the campaign
was T’ung Kuan’s strategic incompetence, which impelled him to commit
what remained of his armies to an impossible mission. Plotting to eradicate
the Tangut menace once and for all, T’ung forced an unwilling Liu Fa to lead
an invasion of Shuo-fang, at the core of the Hsi Hsia empire.256 Leading two
hundred thousand troops into what quickly became a suicide mission, Liu was
attacked by a massive contingent of Tangut forces outside the walled city of
T’ung-an.257 Walking into a deadly trap with no escape route and short of
food and water, Liu’s armies were encircled by three hundred thousand Hsi
Hsia infantry and cavalry, commanded by the Hsi Hsia prince Ch’a-ko. A
hundred thousand Sung troops survived, fleeing some twenty miles under the
cloak of night, only to be pursued and ambushed the next day, when Liu was
beheaded. Soon thereafter, Ch’a-ko’s forces besieged the Sung cliffside fortress
at Chen-wu, and Liu Chung-wu and his remaining garrison were decimated.
As with prior defeats, T’ung Kuan covered up these massacres, preventing the
news from reaching Hui-tsung; as late as 1119 he was claiming continued
victories in his reports to the throne.258
After these bloodbaths, whose casualty count exceeded that of the Yung-lo
ch’eng debacle of 1082, T’ung Kuan had no choice but to concede defeat. When
T’ung suggested a cease-fire to the Tangut command, the Hsi Hsia extracted
an apology from Hui-tsung, who promulgated an edict that abolished the
military command structure in the six northwestern military circuits. In its
253
254
255
256
257
258
SS 486, p. 14020. The Sung shih authors have apparently misattributed these events to Wang Hou, for
all other sources (including his Sung shih biography, SS 328, pp. 10582–4) suggest that Wang died
around 1106.
Jen-to-ch’üan roughly corresponds to the seat of modern Men-yüan county in Tsinghai province.
SS 486, p. 14020. Aside from this single mention in the Sung shih, the fortress of Ching-hsia was not
referred to elsewhere. While it was likely located in Ching-yüan circuit, its present-day coordinates are
unknown. See Li, Sung Hsia kuan-hsi shih, p. 247.
SS 468, p. 13659. Shuo-fang corresponds to modern Ling-wu in Ningsia province.
SS 486, p. 14021. The exact location of T’ung-an is now unknown.
SS 468, p. 13659; 22, p. 404.
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ari daniel levine
final and most brutish phase, the Sung-Tangut war had proven a huge waste of
financial resources and human life. Sacrificing hundreds of thousands of soldiers
to briefly recapture a barren stretch of land, T’ung Kuan had miscalculated the
strength of the Hsi Hsia military. Following the conclusion of the Sung-Tangut
peace agreement, Hui-tsung’s court shifted its attentions from the northwest
to the northeastern frontier. In the early 1120s, the empire was shaken by
popular uprisings in the southeast, which forced the court to divert military
resources to quell domestic unrest. The massacres at T’ung-an and Chen-wu
foreshadowed the carnage in years to come, when the emperor and his ministers
embroiled the Sung in a near-fatal conflict with the Jurchen. In retrospect, the
sacrifice of imperial troops in the Shuo-fang offensive was rendered meaningless
by the Chin conquest of 1127, after which the truncated Southern Sung empire
would no longer even adjoin Tangut territory. Judging from their abject failure
to subdue an adversary of lesser strength, the Sung armed forces would never
stand a chance against the Jurchen, who were swallowing everything in their
path, as they stormed to dominance over the territories on both sides of the
Great Wall. As with the Tangut conflict, the ignominious Sung defeat in the
next series of border wars did not result from any quantitative disadvantage,
but from strategic, tactical, and diplomatic ineptitude.
Immiseration and insurrection: Popular uprisings, 1119–1121
As the court became embroiled in armed conflict with border states, it was
simultaneously placed on the defensive by internal rebellion. Immiserated
and dispossessed by confiscatory taxation and extraordinary levies, bands of
commoners took up arms, and the empire convulsed with large-scale popular
uprisings. In 1119 and 1120, the rebellion of Fang La ravaged entire circuits, until it was extinguished by a massive deployment of imperial troops.
Diverting armed forces and military resources from the border to the interior,
these uprisings also destabilized border relations with the Jurchen Chin at an
extremely vulnerable moment. On the home front, after the damage was done,
the economy of one of the empire’s most productive regions was crippled, and
the legitimacy of the Sung court was threatened.
The most highly commercialized area of the Sung empire, the riceproducing Liang-che circuit was an unlikely crucible for a full-blown popular uprising.259 But during the Hui-tsung reign, the region’s economy was
sapped by the imperial court’s fiscal parasitism. Its inhabitants suffered disproportionately from the confiscatory exactions imposed by the “flower and rock
259
For an expanded treatment of the Fang La uprising, see Kao Yu-kung, “A study of the Fang La rebellion,”
Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 24 (1962–3), pp. 17–63.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
CHING-TU
NG
E
CH’ING
CH’I
WEI
623
.
SUNG CHIANG’S
1119–1121
P’U
Yellow River
YÜN
UPRISING,
Sung Chiang’s
Liang-shan lair
CHING-TUNG W.
TAN
K’AI-FENG
HAI
Pien Canal
CH
AN
GNA
N
EA
ST
r
Rive
Huai
er
Riv
tze
g
n
Ya
HSI
Liang-shan
Fang La’s home base
Sites involved in
the uprisings
0
0
100 km
FANG LA’S
REBELLION
1120–1121
HSIN
SU
HSÜAN
HSIU
HANG
Ch’ing-ch’i
LIANG-CHE LU
MU
T’AI
CH’Ü
CH’U
75 miles
Map 19. Uprisings of Fang La and Sung Chiang, 1119–1121.
network,” whose tentacles penetrated into the circuit’s remote areas as well
as its major cities.260 With an untapped reservoir of dispossessed commoners,
Liang-che became a breeding ground for the popular uprising of Fang La. In
three short months in 1120–1, Feng’s small band of backcountry brigands
swelled into a formidable guerrilla army. The epicenter of Fang’s rebellion
was Mu-chou, a ruggedly mountainous and densely wooded hinterland on the
circuit’s western border, an area of tea, lumber, and lacquer production. Many
local tea-growing households had been bankrupted by the court’s tea certificate
260
According to Ts’ai T’ao’s historical narrative, the “flower and rock network” affected Liang-che the most
directly: “From Lake Tai, there were numinous jades; from Tz’u-hsi and Wu-k’ang there were various
rocks. From Liang-che, there were flowers, bamboo, assorted trees, and sea delicacies.” See CPPM 128,
p. 3884.
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policy. The prefecture’s forests had been felled to fill Hui-tsung’s gardens and
to build his palaces.
Fang La experienced the depredations of the “flower and rock network”
firsthand, and his economic grievances impelled him to organize a guerrilla
resistance in Mu-chou. Fang’s family had once owned a lacquer plantation in
Ch’ing-ch’i county, which had been forcibly seized by Chu Mien’s Imperial
Provisioning Bureau.261 Swearing vengeance upon the emperor’s “Six Felons,”
Fang La assembled a bandit gang. While the vicissitudes of political economy provided the impetus for rebellion, a millenarian ideology united Fang’s
followers into a congregation of religious believers. Syncretizing aspects of
Manichaeanism, Buddhism, and Taoism, Fang preached to his believers that
the path to salvation would be cleansed with the blood of imperial officials
and soldiers. In the tenth month of 1120, Fang and his sect arose in open
revolt, first murdering a large landowner in the county seat of Ch’ing-ch’i.262
Fleeing west, he and his fellow brigands hid out in a vast network of caves, a
base from which they staged ever-larger raids and attracted increasing numbers of adherents. The next month, Fang issued a direct challenge to imperial
hegemony by displaying the symbols of sectarian rebellion and manifesting
imperial pretensions. Proclaiming himself a “Sagely Lord” (sheng-kung) with
the reign title of Yung-lo (Everlasting Joy), he ordered his followers to don red
turbans, an old symbol of millenarian rebels.263 On the last day of the eleventh
month, he and several thousand followers captured Ch’ing-ch’i county. A few
days later, his force of twenty thousand men was strong enough to subdue a
garrison of a thousand government troops and to conquer the prefectural seat
of Mu-chou.264
Incorporating followers from smaller opportunistic uprisings, the ranks
of Fang’s armed forces swelled. Seizing the opportunity to renew the world,
several outlying sectarian communities were subsumed under Fang’s banner,
as well. Partitioned into three separate marches, rebel forces occupied Liangche circuit and most of neighboring Chiang-nan East circuit. Garrisons of
imperial troops offered scant resistance, and local administrators fled in panic,
abandoning county after county to the rebels. By the first month of 1121, the
boundaries of Fang La’s kingdom stretched north to the Yangtze River and
south to the seacoast. From Mu-chou, one division of the rebel army advanced
west to penetrate into the neighboring circuit of Chiang-nan East, killing a
261
262
263
264
Ch’en et al., Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo (1977) 54, p. 555. Ch’ing-hsi county corresponds to modern
Tun-an county in Chekiang province.
CPPM 141, pp. 4273–4.
SS 468, p. 13659.
CPPM 141, p. 4274.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
625
contingent of government troops in Hsi-chou (in 1121 renamed Hui-chou).265
Another force split off to the southeast, conquering Ch’u-chou and T’ai-chou
with little resistance, and subsequently seizing Ch’ü-chou and Hsin-chou2.
At the same time the main rebel force, led by Fang La himself, headed east
from Mu-chou to conquer the regional metropolis of Hang-chou. When they
sacked the emptied city, the home base of the Imperial Provisioning Bureau,
the rebels chanted the slogan “Kill Chu Mien!”266 One anecdotal source alleged
that Fang even dispatched his followers to desecrate the graves of Ts’ai Ching’s
ancestors, in a potent illustration of their extreme hatred of the emperor’s
ministry of “Six Felons.”267
By the time the imperial court took decisive countermeasures against the
uprising, Fang La’s kingdom had succeeded in engulfing nearly the entire
circuit of Liang-che in the span of two months. Meanwhile, Hui-tsung’s ministers and generals were distracted by their plans for the expedition to attack
the Liao Southern Capital. There is some evidence that a cover-up occurred at
the highest levels of the Council of State. Wang Fu, the current chief councilor and another of the “Six Felons,” prevented the circuit intendants’ reports
from Liang-che from reaching the emperor.268 Finally, the situation forced the
court to act in the first month of 1121. T’ung Kuan was appointed pacification commissioner (hsüan-fu shih) of several southeastern circuits and entrusted
with the mission of exterminating the rebels.269 Hui-tsung apparently granted
T’ung Kuan’s request to abolish the “flower and rock network,” which had in
all likelihood sparked the rebellion in the first place.270 Some one hundred
and fifty thousand crack troops intended for the northern front were hastily
rerouted south to Liang-che circuit. This massive diversion of troops came at
an inopportune juncture, postponing the Sung attack on the Liao capital and
jeopardizing the fragile Sung-Chin alliance.
While imperial forces never succeeded in conquering the Liao, they did
move expeditiously to crush the Fang La rebellion before it could spread any
further. In recent years, Sung armed forces had been outmatched by the Hsi
Hsia, but poorly armed and armored rebels proved relatively easy opponents
for the soldiers under T’ung Kuan’s command. Their victory was assured when
Fang La committed a grave tactical error. Instead of occupying the south bank
265
266
267
268
269
270
CPPM 141, pp. 4274–5.
SS 470, p. 13686.
Tseng Min-hsing, Tu-hsing tsa-chih [Ts’ung-shu chi-ch’eng ch’u-pien 1935–7 ed.] (c. 1175; Peking, 1985),
p. 7.
SS 470, p. 13682.
T’ung Kuan was granted command of imperial forces in the southeastern circuits of Liang-che, Chiangnan, and Huai-nan. See CPPM 141, p. 4276.
CPPM 128, pp. 3886–7.
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of the Yangtze, and employing the river as a natural defensive boundary, he
concentrated his forces to besiege the city of Hsiu-chou (modern Chia-hsing),
where they were caught and defeated by a pincer movement of converging
imperial troops.271 Retreating south in the second and third months of 1121,
what remained of the main rebel contingents were routed at Hsüan-chou and
Hang-chou.272 In the fourth month, Fang La and a small rebel remnant were
surrounded in the caves west of Ch’ing-ch’i, where their uprising had originated. Other rebel offshoots continued to move through Liang-che and Chiangnan East circuits, where mopping up the remnants of the uprising occupied
another year. The Sung court did not declare final victory over the rebels until
the third month of 1122, seven months after the execution of Fang La.
In the last analysis, the rebellion and its aftermath had devastated Liangche, laying waste to six prefectures and fifty-two counties, and resulting in
the deaths of one or two million civilians.273 Commoners were massacred
indiscriminately by the guerrilla forces as well as by imperial troops. It is
likely that counterinsurgency units beheaded innocent civilians in order to
fulfill imposed quotas.274 To compound the tragedy, Wang Fu revived the
flower and rock network in the first month of 1121, before the insurrection
had even been quelled. Concealing the extent of popular discontent from Huitsung, Wang informed the emperor that the sole cause of the uprising had been
the salt and tea monopolies. Wang overrode the objections of T’ung Kuan, who
urged the monarch to cease the extraction of resources from war-torn Liangche.275 Until the end of Hui-tsung’s reign, booty was shipped to K’ai-feng
by reestablished Imperial Provisioning Bureaus, supervised by a rehabilitated
Chu Mien.276 Clearly, the imperial court had learned no lessons from the Fang
La rebellion, as Wang Fu still monopolized executive power and the state
continued to extract resources from a restive society.
While the Fang La rebellion was devastating Liang-che circuit, smallerscale popular uprisings raged elsewhere in the empire. The most historically
significant of these was the uprising of Sung Chiang, a Robin Hood of popular
memory who would be celebrated in the Ming dynasty novel The water margin
(Shui-hu chuan). Surrounded by a ring of mountains, the marshes surrounding
Liang-shan Lake in Yün-chou (Ching-tung West circuit) had long been a
bandit stronghold.277 As with the Fang La rebellion, the penetration of the
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
CPPM 141, pp. 4277–8.
CPPM 141, p. 4279.
This casualty count is extremely unreliable and was most likely inflated. SS 468, p. 13660.
Tseng, Tu-hsing tsa-chih, p. 7.
CPPM 128, pp. 3886–7.
SS 470, p. 13686.
The area corresponds to the Tung-ping marshes in western Shantung. During the Shen-tsung reign,
P’u Tsung-meng, who had served as prefect of Yün-chou, employed such brutal methods to subdue
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
627
state into the rural economy ignited another popular uprising. When their
farms were seized as “public lands” (kung-t’ien) by the court in the mid-1110s,
local peasants in Ching-tung were forced to remit extortionate rent payments
to the imperial treasury. The connection between economic oppression and
the emergence of the rebellion is unclear, since no extant document explains
when, why, or how Sung Chiang’s insurrection arose.
The paper trail begins after the rebels had become a sufficiently potent force
for their existence to be acknowledged in court documents. Toward the end of
1119, Hui-tsung ordered the arrest and conviction of the “Ching-tung rebel”
Sung Chiang.278 Government troops did not confront this small bandit gang,
which ranged freely across the countryside, spreading through four prefectures
(P’u-chou, Tan-chou, Ch’i-chou, and Ch’ing-chou) in the Ching-tung circuits
by the end of 1120.279 The court made half-hearted efforts to order local
administrators to apprehend Sung, but he and his growing band repeatedly
evaded capture. When the rebels reached the coastal prefecture of Hai-chou
in the winter of 1121, Prefect Chang Shu-yeh received imperial orders to
suppress the rebellion once and for all. Infiltrating the bandits’ lair with spies,
Chang learned that the rebels controlled a fleet of boats, the nucleus of a
pirate navy.280 Imperial troops surrounded the bandits on the beaches, and
forced Sung Chiang’s surrender. But back on the shores of Liang-shan Lake,
bands of commoners continued to rebel against the seizure of “public lands,”
a government initiative that was supervised by the eunuch Li Yen, another of
the “Six Felons.” Hui-tsung’s ministers obtusely refused to learn any lessons
from the Fang La and Sung Chiang rebellions. Even as their fiscal policies
provided tinder to be sparked into armed uprisings, which were quashed at
great human and financial cost, the central government continued to extort
revenues and resources from the countryside.
Using barbarians to control barbarians: Concluding the Sung-Chin alliance,
1115–1123
Since the founding of the Sung, its monarchs had desired to complete their
reunification of the empire by reclaiming the so-called Sixteen Prefectures
from the Liao, but bitter experience had shown that these lost territories could
not be reconquered unless the Sung court found an ally to counterbalance
278
279
280
a popular uprising that he received a censorial impeachment. According to P’u’s Sung shih biography,
“bandits had been numerous” in the Liang-shan area. See SS 328, pp. 10571–2.
Li, Huang Sung shih-ch’ao kang-yao (1995) 18, p. 10b.
Sung Chiang occupied these four prefectures in succession. One contemporary observer claimed that
Sung Chiang’s gang numbered thirty-six men. See Hou Meng’s memorial in SS 351, p. 11114.
SS 353, p. 11141.
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Khitan military power. When the Jurchen, a vassal tribe of the Liao, rebelled
against Khitan hegemony and founded the Chin dynasty in 1115, the Sung
court saw its chance to recover the Sixteen Prefectures. Commanded by the
chieftain Wan-yen A-ku-ta, who was enthroned as Emperor Ch’in T’ai-tsu
(r. 1115–23), Jurchen forces stormed across the eastern fringes of the Liao
empire, in present-day Manchuria. After decisively defeating more than one
hundred thousand Liao troops in battle, A-ku-ta’s troops went from strength
to strength, conquering the Liao Eastern Capital of Liao-yang in 1116.281
Seriously threatening Khitan dominance, the Chin appeared to be the ally
the Sung court required, if it was ever to fulfill dynastic aspirations to regain
the Yen-Yün region. In the parlance of the times, the Sung would be “using
barbarians to control barbarians” (i-i chih-i).
The Sung-Chin alliance underwent a lengthy and painful gestation, stalled
by halting negotiations between the two parties, as well as by simultaneous
Liao-Chin diplomatic efforts.282 First reports of the Chin rebellion began to
trickle into K’ai-feng in 1115, when Ma Chih, a Liao subject from Yen, defected
to the Sung. Granted the imperial surname and renamed Chao Liang-ssu by
court decree, he informed Hui-tsung and his ministers that Chin incursions
had rendered the Liao vulnerable to attack. Chao’s reports of Liao weakness
rekindled hopes of reconquering the Sixteen Prefectures, and the chief councilors Ts’ai Ching and Wang Fu persuaded Hui-tsung to open diplomatic
channels with the Jurchen.283 Even while he was mired in a losing war of
attrition with the Tanguts in 1118, T’ung Kuan formulated plans for an invasion of the Sixteen Prefectures, indicating that the court had begun to heed
Chao Liang-ssu’s advice.284 After an abortive embassy of 1117 never even
reached the Jurchen homeland, a secret mission of 1118 was welcomed by
the Chin court. Since ambassadors could not cross Liao territory, Sung-Chin
diplomacy was conducted by diplomats who sailed across the Po-hai Gulf from
the Shantung peninsula into Jurchen territory. Broaching the possibility of a
military alliance, the Sung ambassadors were accompanied back to K’ai-feng
by Jurchen envoys.285 When they were received at the Sung court, the Jurchen
281
282
283
284
285
T’o-t’o, ed., Chin shih (1344; Peking, 1975) 2, p. 29. The Chin conquest of the Liao is depicted on map
8 of Denis C. Twitchett and Klaus-Peter Tietze, “The Liao,” in The Cambridge history of China, volume
6: Alien regimes and border states, 907–1368, ed. Herbert Franke and Denis C. Twitchett (New York,
1994), p. 145.
This section draws heavily upon Tao Jing-shen (T’ao Chin-sheng), Two sons of heaven: Studies in Sung-Liao
relations (Tucson, Ariz.,1988), pp. 87–97. Also see Wu Ching-hung, “Sung-Chin kung Liao chih waichiao,” in Sung-shih yen-chiu chi: ti shih-erh chi, ed. Sung-shih tso-t’an-hui (Taipei, 1978), pp. 169–83.
For Chao Liang-ssu’s biography, see SS 472, pp. 13733–5.
Wu, “Sung-Chin kung Liao chih wai-chiao,” pp. 169–74.
Hsü Meng-hsin, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (1196; Shanghai, 1987) 2, p. 11a.
Hsü, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (1987) 2, pp. 11a–13b; T’o-t’o, Chin shih 2, p. 30.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
629
ambassadors declared that if a joint invasion was launched against the Liao, the
victors would divide the spoils, taking whatever territories they conquered.286
Such vague diplomatic pronouncements emboldened Hui-tsung and his
ministers in their bid to recover the Sixteen Prefectures, but the collapse of the
Liao was not yet imminent. In 1119, Sung-Chin negotiations were forestalled
by abortive Chin-Liao peace talks, which broke down when A-ku-ta refused to
accept inferior diplomatic status as a vassal king of the declining Liao.287 After
the Jurchen rejected an alliance with the Khitan, a Sung-Chin alliance became
a possibility. In the spring of 1120, leading a Sung embassy to the Chin court,
Chao Liang-ssu sought to formalize the terms of the deal and petitioned for the
return of the Sixteen Prefectures after victory in a joint assault on the Liao.288
A-ku-ta orally assented to the Sung-Jurchen alliance, but he demanded that
the Sung court transfer its tribute payments from the Liao to the Chin to
help defray his military expenditures.289 Jurchen envoys returned to K’aifeng with Chao’s embassy in the fall and presented a formal declaration that
promised the cession of the Yen-ching region to the Sung.290 In the eleventh
month of 1120, Sung ambassadors to Chin agreed to divert annual tribute
payments of two hundred thousand taels of silver and three hundred thousand
bolts of silk from the Liao to the Chin. For the Sung court, switching one
disadvantageous diplomatic relationship for another was considered a necessary
evil, if the Sixteen Prefectures could be recovered in the end. Making annual
payments to the Jurchen seemed eminently reasonable, considering that they
were shouldering the brunt of the military burden against the Liao.
Since the Chin court was negotiating from a position of strength, having
conquered the Liao Supreme Capital of Lin-huang in mid-1120, the terms of
alliance became ever more disadvantageous for the Sung.291 A-ku-ta refused
to allow the return of all Sixteen Prefectures to the Sung, reserving three
eastern coastal prefectures (P’ing-chou, Lüan-chou, and Ying-chou6), along
with the Liao Western Capital of Ta-t’ung, for himself.292 In the first month
of the following year, a Chin embassy announced that the Sung would not be
permitted to reclaim Ta-t’ung unless they committed their forces to conquer
the city.293 Hui-tsung and his ministers could not simply recover the Yen-Yün
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
T’o-t’o, Chin shih 2, p. 30.
T’o-t’o, Chin shih 2, p. 33.
Hsü, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (1987) 4, pp. 3a–b; T’o-t’o, Chin shih 2, p. 33.
Hsü, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (1987) 4, pp. 3b–7b.
Hsü, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (1987) 4, pp. 7b–8b.
T’o-t’o, Chin shih 2, p. 34.
Hsü, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (1987) 4, pp. 12a–b. These three prefectures correspond to modern
Hu-lung, Lüan, and Ch’ang-li counties in Hopei province.
Hsü, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (1987) 4, pp. 16a–b.
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region in return for transferring their annual tribute payments to the Chin. The
Sung-Chin alliance would have to be backed up with a military commitment,
and the Sixteen Prefectures would have to be paid for with a concerted assault
on the walled city of Ta-t’ung.
However, the Sung court’s hands were tied, even as the Chin launched a
war on all fronts, conquering the remnants of the Liao empire. For instead
of assaulting the Liao Western Capital, the key to recovering the Sixteen
Prefectures, one hundred and fifty thousand crack imperial troops under T’ung
Kuan’s command had been diverted from the Liao border south to Liang-che
to suppress the Fang La rebellion. By the time the Sung court could commit
itself to military action against the Khitan, the Chin had already defeated the
main Liao army in battle, capturing the Liao Central Capital of Ta-ting in
the first month of 1122.294 The surviving Khitan forces were scattered and
fragmented. Emperor Liao T’ien-tso, the last of the Liao imperial clan, fled
to safety in the Western Capital, and a splinter regime, the Northern Liao,
was established in the Southern Capital of Yen-ching. Although the Sung and
Chin had agreed to a diplomatic and military alliance against the Liao, no
formal treaty had yet been signed. By conquering the Liao empire on its own,
the Jurchen managed to gain the spoils of war before diplomatic negotiations
began, and before the Sung court could claim the disputed Liao territories for
itself.295
Seeing their chance to regain the Sixteen Prefectures slip away, Hui-tsung
and his ministers mobilized an assault upon the remaining Liao strongholds.
No longer squandering its resources upon crushing popular uprisings, the Sung
court could now shift the focus of its military efforts to the northern border.
In the fourth month of 1122, T’ung Kuan commanded one hundred thousand
imperial troops in an assault upon the Liao Southern Capital of Yen-ching, from
whence the Liao nobleman Yeh-lü Ch’ün ruled the rump state of Northern
Liao.296 Apparently, the Sung court intended to compel Yeh-lü to submit as
a vassal; if his expeditionary forces could not capture Yen-ching, T’ung was
instructed to retreat. But imperial troops proved incapable of fulfilling any of
these mission objectives, and were soundly defeated by Yeh-lü Ch’ün’s army
the following month.297 Even after the Northern Liao had pledged its fealty
as a Sung vassal, a second assault was launched in the fall of 1122, which failed
to conquer the city yet again.298 These strategic and tactical debacles ensured
294
295
296
297
298
T’o-t’o, Chin shih 2, p. 36.
Jing-shen Tao suggests that the “Jurchen were trying to capture as much Liao territory as possible
before sitting down at the negotiating table with the Chinese.” See Tao, Two sons of heaven, p. 90.
Hsü, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (1987) 5, pp. 8b–10b.
Hsü, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (1987) 7, pp. 4b–6b.
Hsü, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (1987) 10, pp. 1a–4a; 11, pp. 1a–6a.
Map 20. Sino-Jurchen contest for Liao and the Sixteen Prefectures, 1117–1124.
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that the Sung court would henceforth conduct diplomatic negotiations with
the Chin on even more unfavorable terms. After the first defeat at Yen-ching,
A-ku-ta changed the terms of the proposed alliance, promising only Yen-ching
and six prefectures to the Sung, and dismissing Sung demands to receive Tat’ung and three coastal prefectures.299 No match for even the Northern Liao,
the Sung court had displayed its military weaknesses to a far superior ally.
Further indignities awaited the Sung court and its commanders. In the
twelfth month of 1122, when A-ku-ta’s army reached Yen-ching, the city’s
Han Chinese administrators unconditionally surrendered to the Chin before
the battle had even begun.300 Having failed to uphold its part of the bargain,
the Sung court’s continued demands for the cession of the Sixteen Prefectures were perceived by the Jurchen leadership as laughable. Occupying an
unassailable position after conquering four of the five Liao capitals, A-ku-ta
proceeded to dictate the terms of the formal Sung-Chin treaty of alliance.
Sung negotiation tactics led to acrimony, and talks frequently broke down
over territorial boundaries and indemnity payments. Concluded in the third
and fourth months of 1123, the pact was decidedly disadvantageous to the
Sung court. The Chin ceded Yen-ching and six surrounding prefectures to
the Sung (Cho-chou, I-chou, T’an-chou2, Shun-chou, Ching-chou3, and Chichou) and their twenty-six subordinate counties. In return, the Sung would
provide annual tribute payments of two hundred thousand taels of silver and
three hundred thousand bolts of silk, and a one-time payment of one million
strings of cash, in lieu of tax payments from the Yen region.301 Furthermore,
the border between the two states was decreed to be impermeable, and both
sides were forbidden to harbor defectors, a provision that the Sung court soon
violated. In the fourth month of 1123 Sung troops led by T’ung Kuan and Ts’ai
Ching’s eldest son, Ts’ai Yu (1077–1126), triumphantly entered Yen-ching,
proclaiming the recovery of a city that had been under Khitan rule for two
centuries. Two months later, the retired councilor Ts’ai Ching submitted a
congratulatory memorial to Hui-tsung, praising the emperor for realizing the
glorious martial legacy of his imperial progenitors by ensuring the extension of
Sung hegemony.302 But the reality beneath this overheated rhetoric was sobering. Before ceding the city, the Jurchen had looted its wealth and enslaved its
citizens, rendering this so-called victory both literally and figuratively hollow.
299
300
301
302
Hsü, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (1987) 11, pp. 6b–12a; 12, pp. 1b–3b.
Hsü, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (1987) 12, pp. 4b–6a.
For the Chin version of the treaty, see Hsü, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (1987) 15, pp. 11b–12b. For an
English translation of the document, see Herbert Franke, “Treaties between Sung and Chin,” in Études
Song: In memoriam Étienne Balazs, ed. Françoise Aubin (Paris, 1970), pp. 60–4.
Hsü, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (1987) 17, pp. 5a–6b.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
633
Incapable of conquering the Sixteen Prefectures on its own, the Sung army
had contributed little to the defeat of the Liao. Resigning themselves to the
Jurchens’ engulfing the greater part of the Liao empire, Hui-tsung and his
ministers were fortunate to have recovered a mere six of the Sixteen Prefectures. By buying peace with the Chin and playing a minor role in the conquest
of the Liao, the Sung concluded a Faustian bargain with an ally they could not
defeat, let alone control. In their failed assault upon the Liao, the Sung revealed
its feeble military capabilities to a potential adversary that had stormed across
the steppe in a matter of years, and was still consolidating and expanding its
dominion. And instead of ensuring peace along the northern border and stable
diplomatic relations between the two empires, the Sung-Chin alliance quickly
foundered.
Playing with fire: The first Sung-Chin war, 1123–1126
After the conclusion of the treaty of 1123, the Sung court soon provoked a
renewed war with the Jurchen. Before the detailed terms of the pact could
be implemented, the Sung apparently violated the spirit and the letter of the
agreement. The Sixteen Prefectures were a politically unstable region, where
spheres of influence were still undefined, and the loyalties of local administrators were uncertain. In the fifth month of 1123, Chang Chüeh, the onetime
Liao military governor of P’ing-chou, assassinated the Chin regional commander and rebelled against Jurchen domination.303 Commanding a formidable
army, Chang transferred his allegiance to the Sung empire, which subsequently
reappointed him to his former position.304 Under their new monarch Wu-ch’imai (1075–1135), who succeeded his brother A-ku-ta and ascended the throne
as Emperor Chin T’ai-tsung in 1123, the Chin dispatched a punitive expedition to P’ing-chou, defeating Chang’s rebel army.305 When Jurchen forces
reconquered the renegade territories in the eleventh month of 1123, Chang
Chüeh fled to Yen-ching, where he sought asylum. Deeming Chang a rebel
and a traitor, Wu-ch’i-mai demanded his execution, and the Sung complied
by sending his severed head to the Chin court. However, it was already too
late to appease the Chin emperor; by harboring this defector, the Sung had
broken its peace agreement with the Jurchen leadership, which exploited the
unstable border situation to reassert direct control over the occupied territories. Two years later, Chang Chüeh’s defection would provide Wu-ch’i-mai
with a pretext for invading the Sung empire.
303
304
305
CPPM 144, pp. 4349–51.
CPPM 144, pp. 4352–5.
CPPM 144, p. 4355.
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In the meantime, Hui-tsung’s courtiers were conducting border diplomacy
with an arrogance above their station. The final status of the Yen-Yün region
remained disputed and unsettled. In early 1124, with boldness that belied
its military capabilities and diplomatic status, the Sung court demanded
the cession of nine prefectures just north of the Liao border with Ho-tung
circuit (modern Shansi). Dissent raged within the Jurchen inner circle over
how to respond to these Sung demands. Wu-ch’i-mai favored ceding at least
some of these disputed territories to the Sung, as he believed A-ku-ta might
have done.306 The Jurchen warrior princes Wan-yen Tsung-han and Wan-yen
Tsung-wang vehemently opposed their new ruler’s intentions, arguing that
the Sung deserved no such reward.307 Unwilling to divide his forces, which
were committed to defeating Emperor Liao T’ien-tso, Wu-ch’i-mai granted
two prefectures, Wu-chou3 and Shuo-chou (Shansi), to the Sung.308 But this
diplomatic feint represented the Chin court’s final territorial concession to
Hui-tsung and his ministers. Enraged by persistent Sung demands for more
of the Sixteen Prefectures, the Jurchen leadership embraced military solutions
in order to teach Hui-tsung and his ministers a lesson in humility.
Before it engaged the Sung in total war, the Jurchen commanders eliminated
the remaining independent forces. To free their southwestern flank, the Chin
court imposed a peace treaty upon the Hsi Hsia in the spring of 1124. In
the northeast, Jurchen troops chased Emperor Liao T’ien-tso and his small
personal army to Ying-chou6, where he was captured early the next year,
thereby extinguishing the Liao dynasty. In the tenth month of 1125, Wuch’i-mai announced that the time had finally arrived to mobilize for a massive
assault upon the Sung empire.309 In his declaration of war, the Chin emperor
announced his intention to punish the Sung court for its violation of the treaty
of 1123. He chastised Hui-tsung and his ministers not only for harboring the
fugitive rebel Chang Chüeh but also for falling behind in tribute payments
and for failing to repatriate Chin refugees. Endangering a fragile alliance, the
Sung court had been playing with fire, and the insolence of Sung diplomacy
and the weakness of its military impelled the Jurchen to invade the Yellow
River valley.
Chin forces stormed the northern fringes of the Sung empire, swiftly bringing the imperial court to its knees. In the eleventh month of 1125, Chin
forces began a two-pronged southward assault, dividing into two marches.
306
307
308
309
T’o-t’o, Chin shih 3, p. 49.
T’o-t’o, Chin shih 74, p. 1695.
Wu-chou3 and Shuo-chou correspond to modern Shen-chih and Shuo counties, respectively, in Shansi
province.
T’o-t’o, Chin shih 3, p. 53; 74, p. 1704.
Map 21. The Chin invasions of Northern Sung.
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The western army, under Wan-yen Tsung-han, swept south toward T’ai-yüan
and Lo-yang, while the eastern army, under Wan-yen Tsung-wang, targeted
Yen-ching and K’ai-feng. Without the Sixteen Prefectures to protect it, the
entire North China Plain presented few obstacles to invasion from the north.
By the end of 1125, Sung border garrisons in Ho-tung had fallen in quick
succession to Tsung-han’s forces.310 When the western march laid siege to the
Sung Northern Capital of T’ai-yüan, an alarmed T’ung Kuan deserted his post
and fled back to the capital. In his absence, defenders under the general Wang
Ping offered staunch resistance, and the strategic garrison valiantly held out
until the ninth month of 1126, preventing the western march of Chin forces
from reaching the Western Capital of Lo-yang.311 Meanwhile, Tsung-wang
and his eastern march met with little resistance in their lightning offensive.
At Yen-ching, the former Liao general Kuo Yao-shih betrayed the Sung when
he surrendered and defected to the Chin.312 Using Kuo’s inside information,
the eastern march conquered the plains of Ho-pei unopposed, capturing the
strategic garrisons of Chung-shan and Chen-ting by the end of 1125.313 In
the first days of the new year, the Jurchen army approached the banks of the
Yellow River, reaching within striking distance of K’ai-feng.
As disaster reports arrived from both fronts, the Sung court was thrown
into panic and turmoil, and Hui-tsung made belated and half-hearted efforts to
manage the crisis.314 In a bid to regain the loyalty of his disgruntled subjects, he
assented to the abolition of the flower and rock network, which had been revived
right after the quelling of the Fang La rebellion. Foreseeing certain disaster, the
state councilor Yü-wen Hsü-chung convinced the emperor to assume personal
responsibility for the dire military situation. In a self-incriminatory edict
issued at the end of the year, Hui-tsung voiced his profound regret for failing
to preserve the legacy of his imperial progenitors, and summoned a loyalist
citizen army to the rescue of the dynasty.315 But the time for noble and empty
words had passed, as Jurchen forces threatened K’ai-feng, only a week’s march
away. Scared witless by these events beyond his control, Hui-tsung informed
his councilors that he desired to vacate the capital and flee to safety in the south.
Led by Wu Min and Li Kang, the emperor’s inner circle of ministers persuaded
him that such a course was tantamount to surrender, and asserted that his only
alternative was to abdicate the throne in favor of the heir apparent. Departing
310
311
312
313
314
315
T’o-t’o, Chin shih 3, p. 54; Hsü, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (1987) 23, pp. 10a–11b.
T’o-t’o, Chin shih 3, pp. 54–5; Hsü, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (1987) 53, pp. 1a–3a.
SS 472, p. 13739.
T’o-t’o, Chin shih 3, p. 54.
For an English-language treatment of the “tragedy of Ching-k’ang,” see John Winthrop Haeger, “1126–
27: Political crisis and the integrity of culture,” in Crisis and prosperity in Sung China, ed. John Winthrop
Haeger (Tucson, Ariz., 1975), pp. 143–61.
CPPM 146, pp. 4416–9.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
637
K’ai-feng with his retinue to establish a separate court in the relative safety of
the Southern Capital of Ying-t’ien-fu, Hui-tsung retained the title Emperor
Emeritus (t’ai-shang huang-ti), with ritual authority but no political power. On
the twenty-third day of the twelfth month of 1125, his eldest son, Chao Huan
(1100–61), assumed the throne as the last monarch of the Northern Sung, and
would be known to history as Emperor Sung Ch’in-tsung (r. 1126–7).316 An
unprecedented event in Sung imperial ritual, Hui-tsung’s abdication (nei-ch’an)
apparently elicited little criticism from the Council of State, who rationalized
that an abdicated ruler was eminently preferable to a defunct dynasty.
While he was a more activist monarch than his father, Ch’in-tsung was not
the determined ruler the dynasty required, and he proved to be overly impressionable. Easily swayed by the counsel of an ever-changing cast of ministers,
Ch’in-tsung vacillated between appeasing the Jurchen and provoking them.
However, not even a resolute sovereign could have saved the dynasty at this
juncture. With a vastly superior enemy approaching the capital, the symbolic
revitalization of the monarchy and the installation of Ch’in-tsung could not
extricate the Sung from its disastrous entanglement with the Jurchen.
When Jurchen forces crossed the Yellow River early in the new year, the
first year of the Ching-k’ang era, the court was sharply divided between hawks
and doves. Opposing the appeasers Pai Shih-chung and Li Pang-yen, Li Kang
convinced the timorous Ch’in-tsung to mount a resolute defense of K’ai-feng.
Li and his allies gained the emperor’s trust for the time being, and an imperial
edict of the seventh day of the first month of 1126 admonished K’ai-feng’s
soldiers and citizens to prepare siege defenses.317 That evening, when the vanguard of Jurchen troops approached the walls of K’ai-feng, Li Kang led a small
contingent to repel them, forcing the invaders to momentarily withdraw.318
But when an entire Chin army encircled the capital, the divided Sung court desperately decided to pursue diplomacy instead. Ch’in-tsung dismissed Li Kang
from court and authorized his ministers to begin peace negotiations with the
Chin commanders. Hesitant to incur huge casualties during a protracted siege,
the Jurchen commanders made Sung envoys an offer they could not refuse. During the negotiations, Ch’in-tsung’s younger brother Prince K’ang (the future
Emperor Kao-tsung) and the accommodationist minister Chang Pang-ch’ang
were held as hostages. With reinforcements far from the capital and the enemy
at the gates, the Sung court was caught in a painfully vulnerable position.
The withdrawal of the Jurchen army would come at an astronomically high
price: cession of the three strategic prefectures of T’ai-yüan, Chung-shan, and
Ho-chien, which lay directly south of the Sixteen Prefectures and constituted
316
317
318
CPPM 146, pp. 4423–8; SS 23, p. 421.
Hsü, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (1987) 28, pp. 5a–6a.
Hsü, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (1987) 28, pp. 7b–9a.
638
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the Sung empire’s northeastern defensive perimeter. Further exacerbating the
situation, annual tribute payments to the Chin court would be substantially
increased to three hundred thousand taels of silver, three hundred thousand
bolts of silk, and one million strings of cash.
Debate raged at court over whether Ch’in-tsung should accept the terms of
this dictated peace. Pai Shih-chung and Li Pang-yen deemed these sacrifices
necessary to save the dynasty. To Li Kang and other intransigents like him,
this hard bargain appeared extortionate, a violation of the territorial and moral
integrity of the empire. As the bulk of Sung forces reached the capital from
the northwestern border at the end of the first month of 1126, recalcitrant
elements gained the upper hand at court. In an audience before the throne
held on the twenty-seventh day of the first month of 1126, Li Kang advocated the deployment of crack troops against the Chin forces, who remained
encamped outside the city walls. Li convinced the emperor that since Sung
forces outnumbered the adversary three to one, they would be assured victory.319 Recently returned from the northwestern front, the general Ch’ung
Shih-tao concurred with Li Kang’s prognosis. Ch’ung articulated a plan to
stubbornly defend K’ai-feng until the Chin troops were fatigued and their
provisions were exhausted, after which Sung forces would intercept the withdrawing Jurchen army. His colleague Yao P’ing-chung suggested a nighttime
ambush on the Chin encampments, but when it was carried out the mission
was a complete fiasco, further enraging Prince Tsung-wang.320 Under duress
to apologize to the Jurchen, Ch’in-tsung dismissed Li, Ch’ung, and Yao from
their posts, and reappointed the appeasers Chang Pang-ch’ang and Li Pang-yen
to his Council of State.
This forced concession precipitated a popular outcry among the residents of
K’ai-feng, led by the Imperial University student Ch’en Tung, who has been
lionized by traditional historiography as a loyalist hero and martyr.321 Ch’en
repeatedly memorialized the throne to demand the execution of Hui-tsung’s
ministers Ts’ai Ching, T’ung Kuan, Wang Fu, Liang Shih-ch’eng, Li Yen, and
Chu Mien, whom he condemned as the “Six Felons” (liu tsei).322 He alleged
that the corrupt and sinister regime of these “treacherous ministers” had enervated the empire from within while recklessly opening rifts with neighboring
319
320
321
322
Hsü, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (1987) 32, pp. 3b–4a. Sung troops numbered two hundred thousand,
while approximately seventy thousand Chin troops were encamped at K’ai-feng.
Hsü, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (1987) 33, pp. 1a–2b.
For Ch’en Tung’s official biography as an exemplar of “loyalty and righteousness” (i-chung), see SS 455,
pp. 13359–62. For a brief English-language biography of Ch’en Tung, see Edward H. Kaplan, “Ch’en
Tung,” in Sung biographies, ed. Herbert Franke (Wiesbaden, 1976), vol. 1, pp. 124–32. Also see Richard
L. Davis, Wind against the mountain: The crisis of politics and culture in thirteenth-century China (Cambridge,
Mass., 1996), pp. 126–7.
Ching-k’ang yao-lu [Ts’ung-shu chi-ch’eng ch’u-pien 1935–7 ed.] (c. 1165; Peking, 1985) 2, pp. 24–8.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
639
states. In later memorials, Ch’en implored the emperor to replace the current
proappeasement ministers with Li Kang, whom he deemed a suitably intransigent candidate for the councilorship. On the fifth day of the second month
of 1126, Ch’en Tung led a massive political demonstration that turned into
a near-revolt, when irate commoners stormed the palace gates on a rampage,
slaughtering dozens of eunuchs. The murderous crowd dispersed after the court
announced that Ch’en’s demands would be met.
Succumbing to popular pressure, the emperor ordered the execution of
these “treacherous ministers” who had brought the empire to the brink of
destruction. Now elderly and blind, Ts’ai Ching was banished from court in
the second month of 1126, dying under house arrest in T’an-chou (modern
Ch’ang-sha) five months later; his sons and grandsons were either executed
or exiled to the fringes of the empire.323 After escaping with the abdicating
Hui-tsung, T’ung Kuan was dismissed from service, banished, and ultimately
decapitated, signaling the end of eunuch domination of the inner court. Punished as scapegoats for the Chin invasion, the remaining “Six Felons” were also
sentenced to death the same year. After monopolizing power for twenty-five
years, Hui-tsung’s “treacherous ministers” did not live to see the dynasty fall,
but would be subject to the everlasting condemnation of history.
With a restive city still under siege, Ch’in-tsung finally decided to accommodate the invaders rather than his protesting subjects. Some of their demands
had been met: the “Six Felons” were punished, but Li Kang was not reinstated.
The appeasers who dominated the Council of State persuaded the emperor to
avoid any further provocation by signing the dictated peace agreement and
authorizing the cession of the three garrisons to the Chin. When the emperor
officially apologized, and his councilors voiced their commitment to uphold
the treaty, the Chin army withdrew from the capital on the tenth day of the
second month of 1126. Returning Prince K’ang and Chang Pang-ch’ang to
the Sung court, Tsung-wang’s eastern march proceeded north with the Prince
of Hsiao, the emperor’s younger brother, as its hostage. The Jurchen had been
appeased with territory, and if a lasting peace had not been achieved, at least
disaster had been staved off and time had been bought.
The tragedy of Ching-k’ang: The second Sung-Chin war and its aftermath,
1126–1127
After the Jurchen lifted their siege of K’ai-feng and returned north, Ch’intsung rehabilitated the prowar faction and committed himself to a policy of
armed resistance. But by shifting again from accommodation to provocation,
323
SS 472, pp. 13727–8; CPPM 131, pp. 4007–8.
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the emperor incited a second war with the Jurchen. For most of the next eight
months, the Council of State and command structure were dominated by ministers and generals who rejected the recently concluded Sung-Chin treaty. On
the twenty-fifth day of the second month of 1126, the appeasers Li Pang-yen
and Chang Pang-ch’ang were ousted from court, to be replaced by Li Kang
and Wu Min.324 Ch’ung Shih-tao was also reappointed to the emperor’s war
cabinet, commanding imperial troops to resist Jurchen domination of Ho-pei
and Ho-tung circuits. Before Prince Tsung-wang’s eastern march reclaimed
Chung-shan and Ho-chien, they met with staunch resistance from Sung
defenders.
With both sides unaware of the peace agreement, the conflict raged on in
the valleys of mountainous Ho-tung circuit (Shansi), where the western march
of the Chin armed forces continued on the warpath, butchering the defenders
of Lung-te, who had dared to resist the invaders.325 When Tsung-han’s main
force withdrew north to Ta-t’ung in the third month of 1126, he left a smaller
force behind to continue besieging T’ai-yüan. Between the second and seventh
months of 1126, several Sung forces were dispatched to Ho-tung to rescue the
city. Time and again, these relief divisions were isolated and defeated by the
Chin before they could reach T’ai-yüan. Ch’in-tsung’s court did not completely
lack glimmers of hope, but scattered Sung victories at Shou-yang and Yü-tz’u
in mid-1126 merely postponed the inevitable.
Not surprisingly, the Jurchen leadership interpreted the resolute Sung
defense of the three ceded prefectures as a violation of the recently signed
armistice. In the eighth month of 1126, Wan-yen Tsung-han and Tsungwang committed themselves to a punitive assault on the Sung empire, again
dividing their troops into eastern and western marches.326 Tsung-han’s forces
proceeded south to mount a ferocious attack upon T’ai-yüan. Stubbornly holding out for more than two hundred fifty days, its defenders exhausted all their
provisions, and approximately ninety percent of the city’s residents died of
starvation or disease.327 On the third day of the ninth month of 1126, the
last pockets of Sung resistance were eliminated, when the intransigent general
Wang Ping died in battle and the defeated city’s prefect surrendered to the
Jurchen.328 Not only had Sung troops failed to lift the siege, but the remaining crack divisions had been annihilated in the process, rendering K’ai-feng
indefensible in the face of the oncoming Jurchen onslaught.
324
325
326
327
328
SS 23, p. 425.
SS 23, p. 425; T’o-t’o, Chin shih 3, p. 54. Lung-te fu corresponds to modern Ch’ang-chih city, Shansi
province.
T’o-t’o, Chin shih 3, p. 55.
Hsü, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (1987) 53, pp. 6a–8b.
SS 23, p. 430; T’o-t’o, Chin shih 3, p. 55.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
641
All of the north was now theirs for the taking. After pacifying T’ai-yüan,
Tsung-wang’s western march swept southward, conquering the major garrisons of southern Shansi in the eleventh month of 1126. Soundly defeating
a contingent of Sung forces at the Yellow River crossing, they proceeded to
force the surrender of the Western Capital of Lo-yang and then marched east
to K’ai-feng. Under Tsung-han’s command, the eastern wing of the Chin
army also conquered everything in its path, meeting with minimal opposition from beleaguered Sung reserve forces. By the end of the eleventh month,
they recaptured the key Ho-pei cities of Chen-ting and Ta-ming, crossed the
Yellow River, and reached the walls of the capital.329 Early in the following
intercalary month, imperial troops emerged from the threatened capital to
engage the Jurchen in a disastrous battle. A few days later, the two marches
of the Chin army were reunited outside the gates of K’ai-feng, which they
encircled for the second time that year.
In the intervening months, Ch’in-tsung’s court had undergone yet another
change of ministerial regimes. The fall of T’ai-yüan was the turning point of the
Sung-Chin wars, revealing the futility of continued resistance and resulting in
the fall of the war faction. Led by T’ang K’o and Keng Nan-chung, advocates
of appeasement regained the emperor’s ear. Panicked peace overtures to the
Jurchen commanders resumed in the tenth month of 1126 and continued for
another month. A series of envoys, which included the emperor’s brother Chao
Kou, Prince K’ang, opened diplomatic channels with the Jurchen commanders
in a desperate attempt to save the dynasty from certain collapse. As they had
twice before, the Sung negotiators offered land for peace, but the return of the
three previously ceded prefectures of T’ai-yüan, Chung-shan, and Ho-chien
was by the Chin high command rejected as a mere token gesture.330
By the beginning of the eleventh month, the Chin marches crossed the
Yellow River and closed in on K’ai-feng, making the conclusion of peace at
any price an urgent matter for Ch’in-tsung and his councilors. But because the
Sung court had (from the Chin perspective) repeatedly negotiated in bad faith
and its armed forces were all but powerless, the Jurchen were in a position
to demand staggering territorial sacrifices. To prevent the imminent Jurchen
conquest, the Sung court would have to authorize the cession of all territories north of the Yellow River, which would be demarcated as the new
interstate boundary.331 To help seal the pact, an imperial edict of the seventh
day of the eleventh month of 1126 ordered the millions of imperial subjects in
329
330
331
T’o-t’o, Chin shih 3, p. 56. Chen-ting and Ta-ming correspond to modern Pao-ting and Ta-ming in
Hopei province.
Hsü, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (1987) 58, pp. 6a–7a.
Hsü, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (1987) 63, pp. 13b–14b.
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Ho-pei and Ho-tung to open their gates to the invaders and surrender without
a fight.332 The next day, the cession of territory was intensely debated at court,
but the emperor overrode opposition from the war faction to resume peace
talks.333 While the court remained divided between advocates of surrender
and resistance, the negotiations continued, even after the battle for the capital
had begun.
Toward the end of the year, the two Jurchen armies began their siege of
K’ai-feng, meeting with heavy resistance for more than twenty days, with
severe casualties on both sides.334 But before long the capital’s defenders were
virtually annihilated and its inner defenses severely compromised. The first
wave of Chin troops broke through the walls under the cover of a snowstorm.335
Ch’in-tsung emerged from the defeated city to discuss terms with the princes
Wan-yen Tsung-han and Wan-yen Tsung-wang at their encampment, and his
official declaration of unconditional surrender was issued on the second day of
the last month of 1126.336 Four days later, representatives of the imperial court
officially ceded Ho-tung and Ho-pei circuits in their entirety to the Chin; an
imperial edict ordered Sung subjects in these territories to surrender to their
new masters. In celebration of their momentous victory, Jurchen soldiers looted
K’ai-feng. In the first days of the new year, Ch’in-tsung and his councilors were
summoned to the Chin field headquarters and held hostage while the city was
plundered, yielding massive quantities of gold, silver, and silk.
In the final tragic act of the “Calamity of Ching-k’ang,” the physical and
living symbols of the dynasty and monarchy were captured and stripped of their
potency. Raiding the palace precincts, the Jurchen emptied the palace treasure
houses of imperial seals, jewels, antiquities, rare books, art objects, and ritual
implements, and captured hundreds of members of the imperial retinue.337
Chin forces also captured Emperor Hui-tsung, interrupting his flight to safety
in the south, and delivered him as a prisoner to the Jurchen commanders at
K’ai-feng. On the sixth day of the second month of 1127, the Chin court
issued an edict that symbolically decapitated the dynasty by stripping both
Ch’in-tsung and Hui-tsung of imperial status.338 With these brushstrokes,
embodied by its monarchs, the Northern Sung government effectively ceased
to exist. Its demise had been hastened by negligent and vacillating monarchs,
whose irredentist ministers and generals had dragged the empire into two wars
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
Hsü, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (1987) 62, pp. 8b–10a.
Hsü, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (1987) 62, pp. 10b–13a.
SS 23, pp. 433–4.
Hsü, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (1987) 69, pp. 1a–6b.
Hsü, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (1987) 71, pp. 3b–5a.
Hsü, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (1987) 77, pp. 12b–14a.
Hsü, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (1987) 78, pp. 9a–11b; T’o-t’o, Chin shih 3, p. 56.
the reigns of hui-tsung and ch’in-tsung
643
with the Jurchen. With duplicitous diplomacy and strategic negligence, the
courts of Hui-tsung and Ch’in-tsung had squandered their resources in border
entanglements.
When the Jurchen commanders triumphantly returned north to the Jurchen
homeland, they were trailed by a caravan filled with treasures from the imperial
palace. Humiliated by the sack of K’ai-feng, the two former Sung emperors
and an entourage of three thousand followed behind as captives. Their number
included almost the entire imperial clan, comprising consorts, princes, and
princesses, as well as eunuchs, entertainers, artisans, and servants. After a long
and arduous journey, Hui-tsung and Ch’in-tsung spent the rest of their lives as
prisoners in the alien forests of modern Heilungkiang, their retinue enslaved.
In 1135, Hui-tsung passed away at the age of fifty-four; his son and successor
Ch’in-tsung would spend more than half of his life in captivity, before dying
in 1161.339
After the fall of K’ai-feng and the capture of the two emperors, the Sung
dynasty’s fate dangled by a slender thread. Across their occupied territories in
Ho-pei and Ho-tung, the Jurchen conquerors faced widespread noncompliance
from armed Sung loyalists. Instead of immediately incorporating them into
the Chin empire, the Chin leaders relinquished former Sung territories north
of the Yellow River to a puppet regime headed by the former chief councilor
Chang Pang-ch’ang, who was enthroned as emperor of the newly created state
of Ta Ch’u in the third month of 1127.340 Alone among Hui-tsung’s progeny,
Chao Kou, Prince K’ang, had escaped the siege of K’ai-feng and was able to
to command resistance efforts in Ho-pei. In the fifth month of 1127, Chang
Pang-ch’ang was persuaded to relinquish his throne to Chao Kou, who was
proclaimed emperor of the Sung at its Southern Capital of Ying-t’ien-fu. Under
the rule of Kao-tsung, the Sung polity was restored in the south as a rump
state with its temporary capital at Lin-an (present-day Hang-chou). After its
refounding, the Sung court’s armed forces waged a protracted war against the
Chin empire until a peace was negotiated in 1142. But in the immediate
aftermath of the “Calamity of Ch’ing-k’ang,” it remained to be seen whether
Kao-tsung’s resuscitated imperial regime could rescue the empire from the
brink of ruin.
339
340
SS 22, p. 417; 23, p. 436.
Hsü, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (1987) 84, pp. 5a–6a; SS 475, pp. 13790–1; T’o-t’o, Chin shih 3, p. 56.
CHAPTER 8
THE MOVE TO THE SOUTH AND THE REIGN
OF KAO-TSUNG (1127–1162)
Tao Jing-shen
Chao Kou (1107–87), known by his posthumous temple name as Kao-tsung
(r. 1127–62), was the ninth son of Emperor Hui-tsung (r. 1100–26) and
a younger brother of Emperor Ch’in-tsung (r. 1126–7). Kao-tsung was the
emperor who led the restoration of the Sung dynasty and inaugurated what
is known as the Southern Sung dynasty (1127–1279). Resisting the Chin
dynasty’s attempts at further conquest, the Southern Sung dynasty lasted more
than one hundred and fifty years and enjoyed decades of economic and cultural
prosperity. In traditional Chinese historiography the Southern Sung is considered a weak dynasty, humiliated as a vassal state by the Chin (Jurchen) dynasty
(1115–1234). Kao-tsung is criticized for being a weak ruler unable to avenge
Sung’s humiliation at the hands of Chin and unable to recover the Sung’s former northern territory. Kao-tsung is also criticized because he and his vilified
chief councilor, Ch’in Kuei (1090–1155), were responsible for the death of
general Yüeh Fei (1103–41), who, because of his efforts in resisting Chin,
came to be regarded as a “national hero.” Despite these criticisms, Kao-tsung
is perhaps better to be remembered as the young emperor who reigned through
a period of disastrous military defeats and near-terminal political crises as the
Sung dynasty faced oblivion, and yet later oversaw two decades of resistance,
stability, and recovery.
the establishment of kao-tsung’s rule
In the winter of 1125, the Chin sent two armies to attack the Sung. The Chin
accused the Sung of not observing the treaty of 1123, which had specified
the terms of the alliance between the two states against the now vanquished
Liao. The western Chin army, under the command of Wan-yen Nien-han
(also known as Wan-yen Tsung-han, 1079–1136), laid siege to the important
northern fortress city of T’ai-yüan (Shansi). The eastern Chin army, under the
command of Wan-yen Wo-li-pu (or Tsung-wan, d. 1127), met little resistance
as it advanced from the former Liao Southern Capital (modern Peking) toward
the move to the south and the reign of kao-tsung
645
the Central Plains. In early 1126, Wo-li-pu’s army crossed the Yellow River
and laid siege to the Sung capital, K’ai-feng. The Sung emperor, Hui-tsung,
after hastily abdicating the throne to his son Ch’in-tsung, had already fled
south. Many officials now encouraged Ch’in-tsung also to escape, but Li Kang
(1083–1140), vice-minister of war, who along with others had urged Huitsung to abdicate, convinced the new emperor to remain and resist the Chin
invasion.
Ch’in-tsung relied heavily on Li Kang to organize the capital’s defenses, and
Li sent officers to summon reinforcements from other Sung armies.1 The Sung
court also sent a diplomatic mission to negotiate with the Jurchen leadership.
The Sung proposed a peace treaty stipulating that the Sung would send vastly
increased annual payments to Chin as they had done with Liao, and the Sung
would cede three strategic frontier prefectures, Chung-shan and Ho-chien in
Ho-pei, and T’ai-yüan in Ho-tung, possession of which would permit Chin to
dominate the northeastern regions of Ho-pei and Shansi. The Sung government
dispatched a royal prince as a hostage to accompany the Chin army on its
return to the north, and also a chief councilor to see that the three Sung
prefectures were duly handed over.2 Ch’in-tsung’s younger brother, Chao Kou,
who then held the title Prince K’ang, volunteered to go to the Chin camp to
negotiate. However, soon after he and Chief Councilor Chang Pang-ch’ang
(1081–1127) arrived at the Jurchen headquarters, Yao P’ing-chung (b. 1099),
a Sung military officer, launched an unauthorized surprise attack on the Jurchen
encampment in an abortive attempt to capture Wan-yen Wo-li-pu and free
Prince K’ang. The attack enraged Wo-li-pu, but he nevertheless concluded the
treaty. The Sung court in K’ai-feng held Li Kang responsible for the military
fiasco and had him dismissed. Disgusted with this decision by the government,
students of the Imperial University (T’ai-hsüeh), led by Ch’en Tung, staged a
demonstration in front of the imperial palaces in K’ai-feng, where they were
1
2
For the siege of K’ai-feng and the role of Li Kang, see John W. Haeger, “1126–27: Political crisis and
the integrity of culture,” in Crisis and prosperity in Sung China, ed. John W. Haeger (Tucson, Ariz., 1975),
pp. 143–61. See also the preceding chapter.
The principal historical source for Kao-tsung’s reign is the Chien-yen i-lai hsi-nien yao-lu [hereafter CYYL
(1936)] [Shih hsüeh ts’ung shu 1899–1902 ed.] (1253–8; Shanghai, 1936) by the Szechwanese historian
Li Hsin-ch’uan (1166–1243). The three most useful overviews of Kao-tsung’s reign are Liu Tzu-chien
(James T. C. Liu), China turning inward: Intellectual-political changes in the early twelfth century (Cambridge,
Mass., 1988); Teraji Jun, Nan-Sō shoki seijishi kenkyū (Hiroshima, 1988), translated into Chinese as Nan
Sung ch’u-ch’i cheng-chih-shih yen-chiu, trans. Liu Ching-chen and Li Chin-yun (Taipei, 1995); and Ho
Chung-li and Hsü Chi-chün, Nan Sung shih-kao: Cheng-chih, chün-shih, wen-hua (Hang-chou, 1999), pp.
3–197. The clearest account of the Chin conquest in English is Herbert Franke, “The Chin dynasty,” in
The Cambridge history of China, volume 6: Alien regimes and border states, 907–1368, ed. Herbert Franke
and Denis C. Twitchett (New York, 1994), pp. 215–320. For a discussion of the treaty between the Sung
and the Chin, see Herbert Franke, “Treaties between Sung and Chin,” in Études Song: In memoriam Étienne
Balazs, ed. Françoise Aubin (Paris, 1970), pp. 54–84.
646
tao jing-shen
joined by more than one hundred thousand citizens. A riot ensued in which
several eunuchs were killed. To appease the protestors, the new emperor, Ch’intsung, restored Li Kang’s official title and gave him the additional position of
grand commissioner of defense (shou-yü shih).
In the spring of 1126, Chin forces raised their siege of K’ai-feng and their
armies returned north. The abdicated emperor, Hui-tsung, returned to K’aifeng in the fourth month of 1126. Everything seemed to return to normal.
Li Kang was again dismissed. His defense plans were laid aside, and the government canceled all the orders he had issued summoning reinforcements to
bolster the defenses of K’ai-feng. But the Sung court also refused to give up
the three strategic prefectures to Chin as had been agreed. In the autumn of
1126, charging that the Sung court had breached the treaty, the Jurchen generals renewed their attacks. T’ai-yüan fell in the ninth month of 1126, and the
western and eastern Jurchen armies advanced, converging on K’ai-feng. On
the ninth of January 1127, the capital fell after weeks of heavy fighting. The
city was plundered by the Chin army. The Jurchen captured the two emperors,
Hui-tsung and his son Ch’in-tsung, and in May 1127 removed them to the
north together with many members of the imperial clan and their entourage
of palace ladies, eunuchs, musicians, artisans, and officials, and the palace treasures. This tragic incident has become known as the Calamity of Ching-k’ang
(Ching-k’ang chih-nan), Ching-k’ang being Ch’in-tsung’s reign title.3
At this stage of the invasion it seemed that the Jurchen were not considering the conquest of the whole of the Sung empire. Jurchen forces, although
formidable in battle, were comparatively small in numbers, and were still
engaged in establishing firm control over the extensive former territories of
Liao that they had just acquired. They, therefore, decided to establish a buffer
state under their own control to rule over the conquered Sung territory, and
employed a policy of what was called “using Chinese to control the Chinese.”
Before Chin forces left K’ai-feng to return north, they set up the new puppet
regime called Ta Ch’u (Great Ch’u) to rule over most of the occupied territories, with the former Sung chief councilor, Chang Pang-ch’ang, enthroned as
its emperor. They then withdrew most of their forces north from the K’ai-feng
region.
Chang Pang-ch’ang, while enticed by the prospect of being an emperor, did
not dare to assume full Sung imperial regalia or to exercise full powers. Only
when he had to meet his Jurchen masters would he put on an emperor’s yellow
3
For a discussion of some of the historiographical implications of the fall of the Northern Sung, see
Chao Hsiang-en (Samuel H. Chao), “The day Northern Sung fell,” Chung-yüan hsüeh-pao No. 8 (1979),
pp. 144–57, and Charles Hartman, “The reluctant historian: Sun Ti, Chu Hsi, and the fall of Northern
Sung,” T’oung Pao 89 Nos. 1–3 (2003), pp. 100–48.
the move to the south and the reign of kao-tsung
647
robes. To give some legitimacy and stability to his new regime, he enlisted the
support of Dowager Empress Yüan-yu (1077–1135), whom he entitled the
Dowager Empress of Sung. The former wife of Emperor Che-tsung (r. 1085–
1100), the dowager empress had escaped capture by the Chin army with the
rest of the imperial family only because in 1096 Che-tsung had demoted her
from her rank as empress, and in 1126 she was residing outside the palace in
a private mansion.4
Survival
When Chin forces had first besieged K’ai-feng in 1125–6, Prince K’ang
(the future Kao-tsung) volunteered to serve as a hostage, but Sung leaders
instead sent his more tractable older brother, Prince Su (Hui-tsung’s third
son, d. 1129). When Chin attacked the capital for the second time in 1126,
Prince K’ang was again sent by the Sung court to negotiate with the invaders.
But the prince never reached his destination. On the way north, he was detained
by the people of Tz’u-chou (modern Tz’u county, Hopei), who were enraged
about the situation. From the besieged city of K’ai-feng, Emperor Ch’in-tsung
sent an order appointing Prince K’ang as the overall commander of the armed
forces in Ho-pei. Prince K’ang was the only imperial prince not in K’ai-feng
when the city came under siege and thereby escaped capture by the Chin army
when they finally took the capital at the end of 1126.
After the Jurchen armies withdrew, the remaining Sung officials persuaded
the Ta Ch’u “emperor,” Chang Pang-ch’ang, to relinquish his throne in favor
of Prince K’ang, who had not returned to K’ai-feng during or after the siege
and did not arrive in Ying-t’ien fu (at Kuei-te, the present Shang-ch’iu in
Honan), the site of the Sung’s provisional Southern Capital, until the twentyfourth of the fourth month 1127. Chang Pang-ch’ang offered no objections,
and on the first of the fifth month of 1127 at Ying-t’ien fu Dowager Empress
Yüan-yu proclaimed Prince K’ang as the new Sung emperor. The state of Ta
Ch’u had lasted for barely one month. The proclamation of the succession
observed: “After nine generations the house of Han met with misfortune; then
there came Han Kuang-wu-ti’s restoration [in 25 c.e.]. Among the nine sons
of Duke Hsien [of the state of Chin during the Spring and Autumn period],
Chung-erh alone survived. This was ordained by Heaven, and was not the
work of human beings.”5
The enthronement of Prince K’ang was thus compared to the restoration of
the Liu family with the enthronement of Emperor Han Kuang-wu-ti (r. 25–56)
4
5
T’o-t’o et al., eds., Sung shih [hereafter SS] (1345; Peking, 1977) 243, pp. 8633–5.
CYYL (1936) 4, p. 107.
648
tao jing-shen
of the Eastern Han dynasty (25–220). Moreover, the number “nine” was used
by the new regime to show cosmic symmetry between Prince K’ang and the
Sung dynastic line, as there had been nine previous emperors in what would
be known as the Northern Sung, and Chao Kou, Prince K’ang, was the ninth
son of Hui-tsung.
Now Chao Kou unexpectedly found himself on the throne facing the enormous responsibilities of saving and rebuilding the dynasty. He was only
twenty-one years old. There had been little or no prospect of Chao Kou’s ever
becoming emperor, and he had never been trained for the exercise of power as
heir apparent, although he was well educated and a fine calligrapher. Over the
previous year and a half he had already experienced many hardships, and had
twice narrowly escaped death. During his brief diplomatic mission with Chin
generals in 1126, he had conducted himself with courage and dignity. When
Yao P’ing-chung launched his surprise attack on the Chin army encampment,
while Chao Kou was hostage there, the Jurchen general, Wan-yen Wo-li-pu,
was furious at Prince K’ang and Chang Pang-ch’ang for the disruption of
the negotiations, but he spared their lives and released them. Chao Kou was
reported to have been “very alarmed.”6 It must have been a terrifying experience, especially when Chao Kou realized that the Jurchen could have held him
forever. Again, when Chao Kou was on the second diplomatic mission, had he
not been detained by the people in Tz’u-chou but proceeded to the Jurchen
camp to negotiate as planned, he might never have been released by the Chin
forces.
As the new emperor, Kao-tsung appointed Li Kang as his first chief councilor, and also created the new office of commissioner of the imperial encampment (yü-ying shih) for him. Without a large imperial army readily available, Li
Kang suggested that the new court immediately concentrate on strengthening
the defenses in the north. Li appointed Chang So and Fu Liang to manage military affairs in Ho-pei and Ho-tung, respectively, and recommended that the
elderly Tsung Tse (1059–1128) be placed in charge of defending the capital,
K’ai-feng, and of planning a northern counteroffensive against Chin. However,
the new emperor at this point had no intention of returning with his court to
K’ai-feng, which was vulnerable to renewed Chin attacks. Instead, he was in
favor of retreating to the southeast, a policy quite contrary to Li Kang’s idea,
which was to move west to Teng-chou2 (Nan-yang) or still farther west to
6
According to Hsü Meng-hsin, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien (1196; Taipei, 1962) 33, pp. 8a–10, “the Prince
was very alarmed.” However, SS 24, pp. 439–40, indicates that Chang Pang-ch’ang was frightened,
whereas Prince K’ang was not, and that this was why Wo-li-pu asked for his replacement with the more
tractable Prince Su. This version of events is supported by Li Kang’s personal memoir of the Ching-k’ang
reign.
the move to the south and the reign of kao-tsung
649
the key strategic stronghold of Hsiang-yang. Moreover, Li Kang took a hard
line that opposed negotiating with the Chin, and he also insisted that Chang
Pang-ch’ang be punished as a usurper and traitor.7 Eventually Kao-tsung gave
in, and the unfortunate Chang Pang-ch’ang was executed.
Although he gave in to Li Kang on this issue, Kao-tsung came to put more
confidence in Huang Ch’ien-shan (d. 1129) and Wang Po-yen, who were among
the first officials to join him when he was raising an army of resistance.8 Huang
and Wang were said to have treated Kao-tsung “like nursemaids protecting a
baby.” Kao-tsung especially liked Huang, and years later the emperor praised
him for his great contributions to the establishment of the new regime at a
time when Kao-tsung himself admitted that he had not had the slightest idea
what to do.
Kao-tsung soon showed the independent and decisive side of his character,
however, when after only seventy-five days in office Chief Councilor Li Kang
was dismissed and Kao-tsung formally replaced him with Huang Ch’ien-shan
and Wang Po-yen. Both men shared the emperor’s reluctance to return to K’aifeng and advised him to plan instead to move his court farther south. On their
advice he also decided to execute Ch’en Tung and Ou-yang Ch’e, two student
leaders who had organized the antigovernment demonstration in K’ai-feng in
1126. After Kao-tsung’s enthronement, the two student leaders had criticized
the emperor’s appointment of Huang Ch’ien-shan and Wang Po-yen and the
dismissal of Li Kang, and had even gone so far as to question the legitimacy
of Kao-tsung’s succession. They claimed that the emperor should not have
ascended the throne but should have waited for the return of Ch’in-tsung
from captivity in the north. Enraged, Kao-tsung accepted Huang and Wang’s
suggestion that the student leaders should be executed, an act he later came
to regret, remorsefully admitting that this severe punishment was a result of
his own youthful intemperance.9
The Chin regime, realizing that the Sung was reneging on the terms of the
treaty with the abolition of their puppet regime of Ta Ch’u and the execution
of its “emperor,” Chang Pang-ch’ang, prepared to launch a renewed attack
on Sung. The Sung general, Tsung Tse, had hastily strengthened the defenses
around K’ai-feng, and had established a frontline network of defenses along
the Yellow River by organizing local militia forces as well as bandit groups.
Together with Chang So, he enlisted capable young officers such as Yüeh Fei
7
8
9
For the Chang Pang-ch’ang regime, see Chu Hsi-tsu, Wei Ch’u lu chi-pu (Taipei, 1955).
Hu Yin, Fei-jan chi [Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu, Wen-yüan ko 1779 ed.] (12th c.; Shanghai, 1934–5) 16, p. 3b;
CYYL (1936) 99, p. 1633. For a discussion of Kao-tsung’s personality, see Tao Jing-shen (T’ao Chinsheng), “The personality of Sung Kao-tsung (r: 1127–1162),” in Ryū Shiken hakuse shōju kinen: Sō-shi
kenkyū ronshū, ed. Kinugawa Tsuyoshi (Kyoto, 1989), pp. 531–43.
CYYL (1936) 112, p. 1812.
650
tao jing-shen
and Wang Yen2 (1090–1139) to assist in organizing the resistance. Tsung
submitted a stream of more than twenty memorials to Kao-tsung, desperately
urging the emperor to return to K’ai-feng and head the defense effort, but to
no avail. The emperor had set his mind on removing his court to the south.
In the ninth month of 1128, Kao-tsung sent orders to the governor of Yangchou to repair the defenses of the city in preparation for his arrival, and to begin
the training of the naval forces on the Huai and Yangtze rivers. On the first of
the tenth month, Kao-tsung left Ying-t’ien fu and set off in a great flotilla of
barges down the Grand Canal. Passing through Ssu-chou and Ch’u-chou, he
arrived in Yang-chou on the twenty-seventh day.
In the following months the Chin gradually regained control of most of
the Ho-pei circuits and the Central Plains, as Jurchen forces overran much
of the north. Denied the reinforcements he so desperately needed, Tsung Tse
organized the best defense he could but he died, frustrated, late in 1128 after
heavy fighting. He was succeeded in K’ai-feng by a lackluster commander, Tu
Ch’ung.
Legitimacy and the establishment of authority
The legitimacy of Kao-tsung’s regime was precarious despite Dowager Empress
Yüan-yu’s declaration in his favor. In those chaotic years from 1126 to 1132,
there was criticism of his enthronement and several rival claimants to the
throne emerged.10 Moreover, the new regime’s military and administrative
capabilities were in disarray as it tried to consolidate power and resources.
Kao-tsung had left Kuei-te in the tenth month of 1127 to move south,
and in early 1129 he was still in Yang-chou, preparing to cross the Yangtze
River to move even farther south. Chin armies were making inroads into the
Huai River valley, and another Chin force was poised to fight its way south
down the Grand Canal to Ssu-chou and Ch’u-chou. The speed of their advance
surprised Kao-tsung. A Jurchen vanguard detachment reached the outskirts
of Yang-chou and attacked the imperial entourage. In the ensuing confusion,
the emperor escaped on horseback, accompanied by only a few officials. He
was able to cross the river in a small boat and made his way south to Hangchou.11
The emperor had barely settled at Hang-chou when he faced an uprising.
In the third month of 1129, Miao Fu and Liu Cheng-yen, two officers of
the Imperial Guard who were disgruntled over Kao-tsung’s appointment of
10
11
CYYL (1936) 112, p. 1812.
An account of this escape is given in Frederick W. Mote, Imperial China: 900–1800 (Cambridge, Mass.,
1999), pp. 292–6.
the move to the south and the reign of kao-tsung
651
Wang Yüan as their commanding officer and fearful of the pursuing Jurchen
army, mutinied. Miao and Liu killed Wang Yüan and many of the eunuchs,
including K’ang Lü, Kao-tsung’s favorite. The mutineers demanded that the
court negotiate a peace settlement with the Chin, and they declared that
Kao-tsung should never have been made emperor. If the rightful emperor,
Ch’in-tsung, were to return from captivity, they asked, what would Kaotsung do about him? The question echoed the criticism that had been voiced
by the student leader Ch’en Tung. Probably wishing to be rid of the new Sung
emperor in order to work out their own peace settlement with the Chin, the
officers forced Kao-tsung to abdicate in favor of his infant son. They installed
Dowager Empress Yüan-yu to rule “behind the screen” as regent, and the reign
title was changed to Ming-shou.
In the ensuing confusion, the recently appointed chief councilor, Chu Shengfei (1082–1144), who had earlier played an important part in Kao-tsung’s
enthronement in Ying-t’ien fu, was the key figure at the court. He appeased
the two officers, Miao and Liu, and persuaded them to accede to Kao-tsung’s
return to the throne. Meanwhile, Lü I-hao (1091–1139), pacification commissioner of Chiang-tung (an-fu chih-chih shih) and governor of Chiang-ning (also
known as Chien-k’ang, modern Nanking), and Chang Chün2 (1086–1154), an
official in the office of the commissioner of the imperial encampment, called
on the powerful generals Han Shih-chung (1089–1151) and Chang Chün
(1097–1164) to move their troops to Hang-chou. Without much fighting, the
generals arrested the rebel leaders and summarily executed them.12 Although
the mutiny was suppressed within a month, the fact that the two officers had
deposed Kao-tsung and endangered his life must have had a profound impact
on him, and apparently strengthened his determination to develop policies to
centralize power, especially military power, in his own hands. This determination manifested itself in the frequent changes of chief councilors during the
first decade of his reign, as he sought chief executives with aims and policies
congruent with his own.13
During the crisis, the deposed emperor’s title had been reduced to that of
grand marshal (ta yüan-shuai), and after Kao-tsung’s restoration, he was apparently embarrassed to continue Chu Sheng-fei’s appointment as chief councilor because Chu had temporarily been his peer. Chu Sheng-fei was therefore
allowed to retire and given a prestigious regional appointment; he was replaced
12
13
For the Miao-Liu mutiny, see Hsü Ping-yü, “Sung Kao-tsung chih tui Chin cheng-ts’e” (M.A. thesis,
Kuo-li T’ai-wan ta-hsüeh, 1984), pp. 58–60. Also her “Yu Miao-Liu chih pien k’an Nan-Sung ch’u-ch’i
ti chün-ch’üan,” Shih-huo yüeh-k’an 16 Nos. 11–12 (1988), pp. 446–59.
On Kao-tsung’s relationships with his chief councilors, see the analysis in Liu, China turning inward,
pp. 81–101.
652
tao jing-shen
by Lü I-hao. Chang Chün, a native of Szechwan, emerged as an important military figure, serving as deputy commissioner of military affairs.
The consolidation of the new regime
Soon after Kao-tsung was restored to his throne in 1129 after the Miao-Liu
mutiny, several measures were carried out to reestablish his credibility as
monarch. First, the regnal title Chien-yen was restored, and as was customary at the beginning of a new reign a general amnesty was declared. Second,
a prohibition was announced forbidding eunuchs to meddle in court affairs,
and any eunuch disobeying this order was to be punished under military law.
This prohibition reinforced the strong actions taken against the eunuchs under
Ch’in-tsung that had culminated in the execution of the baleful eunuch and
senior military commander, T’ung Kuan (1054–1126).14 Third, Kao-tsung
moved from Hang-chou northwest to Chiang-ning as a gesture of defiance
toward the Chin. His cortège left Hang-chou on the twentieth of the fourth
month of 1129 and, after stopping at Ch’ang-chou and Chen-chiang, arrived
in Chiang-ning on the eighth of the fifth month. The city was renamed Chienk’ang, its name when it had been the capital of the southern dynasties in
the fifth and sixth centuries. It was a more central base for government and
military operations than Hang-chou had been, and an excellent communications center, well placed on the Southern Sung’s main artery, the Yangtze
River. Accommodations for the emperor and his court and government had to
be hurriedly improvised, and Kao-tsung moved into his “temporary palace”
(hsing-kung) on the twenty-seventh of the fifth month of 1129.
Most important to consolidating the new regime, a beginning was made
in reorganizing the new government structure to remedy its military and
administrative weaknesses. In the fourth month of 1129, a reform of the
bureaucratic structure of the Sung central government was carried out. This
reform, proposed by the chief councilor, Lü I-hao, simplified the structure
of the bureaucracy in order to better cope with emergencies. The traditional
three departments, the Secretariat (Chung-shu sheng), the Chancellery (Men-hsia
sheng), and the Department of State Affairs (Shang-shu sheng), were merged into
a single organization, still called the Department of State Affairs (Shang-shu
sheng). It was headed by two chief councilors serving the emperor directly,
whose titles were chief councilor of the left vice-director of the Department
of State Affairs (Shang-shu tso-p’u-yeh t’ung chung-shu men-hsia p’ing-chang-shih)
and chief councilor of the right vice-director of the Department of State Affairs
14
See the previous chapter, and Brian E. McKnight, “T’ung Kuan,” in Sung Biographies, ed. Herbert Franke
(Wiesbaden, 1976), vol. 3, pp. 1090–7.
the move to the south and the reign of kao-tsung
653
(Shang-shu yu-p’u-yeh t’ung chung-shu men-hsia p’ing-chang-shih). The chief councilor of the left also concurrently held the position of commissioner of the
imperial encampment, which gave him control of the imperial army.15 This
measure greatly broadened the power of the chief councilors, who for most of
the Northern Sung period had not participated in military decisions.
Lü I-hao was responsible for another important administrative change, when
in 1131 Kao-tsung ordered him to restore the central government’s authority
over the fragmented local administration in financial matters and the appointment of officials. Although this change was not widely accepted, it established
the emperor’s determination to restore central authority and to consolidate his
own power.
Another event that would have long-term repercussions was the death, on
the eleventh day of the seventh month of 1129, of Kao-tsung’s three-year-old
and only son, his heir apparent Chao Fu.16 The emperor’s own succession was
already questionable and the appointment of a potential successor was thus
a matter of urgency for his dynasty’s continued stability and survival, but
Kao-tsung at first refused even to consider the matter. The first official who
raised the issue was promptly exiled to his native place. Later, however, in
1130, the emperor ordered that a number of young sons within the imperial
clan be selected and raised in the palace. In the same year, however, Lou Yinliang, a county magistrate, memorialized suggesting that a number of the
young descendants of Emperors T’ai-tsu and T’ai-tsung should be selected to
be brought up under the care of the government. His proposal was accepted by
the emperor. Dowager Empress Yüan-yu and Chief Councilor Fan Tsung-yin
made similar suggestions. As a result, some ten boys of Emperor T’ai-tsu’s
lineage were found and raised by ladies in the palace.17
A further series of administrative changes affected the circuit bureaucracy
and especially the role of the military. We shall discuss them later. But in
general the new emperor was still only beginning gradually to get a grasp on
the institutions through which he would have to govern and establish order
in the territories he still ruled.
Chin troops cross the Yangtze
The Sung’s military situation meanwhile was deteriorating. Although the
Sung still occupied K’ai-feng, Tsung Tse’s death in mid-1128 had seriously
15
16
17
CYYL (1936) 32, pp. 631, 645; 34, p. 658.
Pi Yüan, Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien [Te-yü-t’ang tsang-pan 1801 ed.] (1792; Peking, 1957) 105, p. 2776.
See Lau Nap-yin, “The absolutist reign of Sung Hsiao-tsung (r. 1163–1189)” (diss., Princeton University,
1986), p. 10; Tao, “The personality of Sung Kao-tsung,” p. 539.
654
tao jing-shen
weakened the defense of the Central Plains. In the late summer of 1129 Chin
forces were preparing for a decisive assault against the south, and in the sixth
month Tsung Tse’s mediocre successor, Tu Ch’ung, decided to withdraw from
the former capital, K’ai-feng, despite the protests of his generals, especially
Yüeh Fei, who believed with some reason that the Central Plains could be
successfully defended. As a result, having been in Chien-k’ang for only three
months the emperor decided to return to Hang-chou for safety. Leaving Chienk’ang in the hands of Tu Ch’ung, placing Han Shih-chung in charge of the
delta area at Chen-chiang, and giving Liu Kuang-shih command of the area
upstream from Chien-k’ang, Kao-tsung left Chien-k’ang on the twenty-sixth
of the eighth month. After staying in Chen-chiang for six weeks he traveled
on to Hang-chou (which had been renamed Lin-an on the fourteenth of the
seventh month), where he arrived on the eighth of the tenth month. The
dowager empress had been dispatched for safety to Hung-chou (in Kiangsi),
and she eventually retreated to the south of the region. Kao-tsung himself
still felt vulnerable, and after staying in Lin-an for only seven days, on the
seventeenth of the tenth month, he crossed the Che River and proceeded south
to Yüeh-chou (renamed Shao-hsing three days later), and then to Ming-chou
(modern Ning-po) where he arrived on the second of the twelfth month. He
had left in the nick of time.
In the eleventh month of 1129, the crisis became acute. The Chin army
and its Chinese detachments invaded Huai-nan in two columns, one of which,
under general Wan-yen Wu-chu (d. 1148), rapidly advanced through Hochou3 and Huang-chou and forced a crossing of the Yangtze at Ma-chia-tu,
upriver west of Chien-k’ang, inflicting a smashing blow to the defending
forces.18 Although Yüeh Fei fought a desperate rearguard action to halt the
Chin advance on the city, Tu Ch’ung decided to abandon Chien-k’ang, and
surrendered to the Chin, whose army occupied the city. At the same time
another column made a crossing at Chiang-chou, still farther upstream, and
struck south into Kiangsi, where the dowager empress had been sent for safety.
They took the major city of Hung-chou on the fourteenth of the eleventh month
and continued to move south down the Kan River valley.
The main Chin army set out from Chien-k’ang in pursuit of Kao-tsung.
The Jurchen cavalry advanced at great speed, meeting no opposition to speak
of. They forced Han Shih-chung to retreat from his base at Chen-chiang to
Chiang-yin in the Yangtze delta, and took Ch’ang-chou on the seventh of the
18
James Liu notes, “The Jurchen were the first steppe or pastoral-nomadic nationality in Chinese history
to cross the Yangtze.” See Liu Tzu-chien (James T. C. Liu), “The Jurchen-Sung confrontation: Some
overlooked points,” in China under Jurchen rule: Essays on Chin intellectual and cultural history, ed. Hoyt C.
Tillman and Stephen H. West (Albany, N.Y., 1995), p. 39.
the move to the south and the reign of kao-tsung
655
twelfth month; only four days later, the garrison in Lin-an abandoned the city
to the enemy. On the twenty-fourth the Chin took Shao-hsing. They pressed
on until they were finally held back by General Chang Chün2 in the battle
of Ming-chou (modern Ning-po), allowing Kao-tsung time to board ship and
escape by sea just one day ahead of his pursuers. He sailed south to safety in
T’ai-chou and then to Wen-chou. Wan-yen Wu-chu commandeered ships and
pursued Kao-tsung by sea for over a hundred miles before abandoning the
chase.19
Wan-yen Wu-chu had advanced too far and too fast, making scant attempt
either to occupy territory or to secure his line of retreat. Only when he decided
to abandon the chase and turn his forces back north did he meet serious
resistance. On the third of the second month his army left Ming-chou. Ten
days later they pillaged and abandoned Lin-an; on the twenty-fifth they took
the rich city of P’ing-chiang (Su-chou), which suffered the same fate. On the
first of the third month they left P’ing-chiang and were challenged near Lake
T’ai by an army under Ch’en Ssu-kung (dates unknown). The Chin were now
being harried by various Sung forces, including those of Yüeh Fei. On the
tenth, the retreating army entered Ch’ang-chou, which had been reoccupied
by Sung troops. Pressing on toward Chen-chiang, they encountered Han Shihchung’s main army and suffered a heavy defeat. Wan-yen Wu-chu, however,
persevered in his attempt to force a crossing of the Yangtze River at Huangt’ien-tang, near Chen-chiang on the lower Yangtze. To prevent the Chin forces
from crossing to safety, Han Shih-chung had assembled a fleet of sea-going
ships handled by seasoned troops, and he deployed them at anchor across the
river. Wan-yen Wu-chu was at first frustrated by this stratagem but finally
defeated Han Shih-chung by using archers firing incendiary arrows to attack
Han’s vastly superior ships, setting fire to their sails and thus immobilizing
them. Wan-yen Wu-chu’s army was then able to cross the Yangtze in their
small boats. The Chin forces regrouped at Liu-ho in Huai-nan, opposite Chienk’ang.
Early in the fifth month, Wan-yen Wu-chu unexpectedly recrossed the
Yangtze farther upstream, apparently to retrieve the plunder that had been
left behind in Chien-k’ang. The Sung had left the city undefended, and the
Chin invaders looted Chien-k’ang and its environs before crossing back and
successfully retiring to the north. But Sung naval strength and mobility had
so surprised the Chin forces that Wan-yen Wu-chu never again ventured to
cross the Yangtze.
19
As both James Liu and F. W. Mote note, this was the first time a Chinese ruler had fled to the open sea
to avoid capture. See Liu, “The Jurchen-Sung confrontation,” p. 40; Mote, Imperial China (Cambridge,
Mass., 1999), p. 297.
Map 22. Chin raids south of the Yangtze, 1129–1130.
the move to the south and the reign of kao-tsung
657
At about the same time, Chin’s western invasion forces penetrated the
Kiangsi region as far south as Lu-ling. They then swept west into the area of
northern Hunan, where at the beginning of the second month of 1130 they
took T’an-chou (modern Ch’ang-sha), the administrative seat of the Ching-hu
South circuit, sacked the city and massacred its population, who had put up
a strong defense. The army then turned north to take Yüeh-chou2 (modern
Yüeh-yang) before crossing the Yangtze River to attack Ching-chou2 (modern
Chiang-ling). Meanwhile, Jurchen raiding parties penetrated the region of
southern Hunan as far as the silver-mining center of Ch’en-chou2, and other
Chin troops raided the area south of the Tung-t’ing Lake, taking Ting-chou2
and Li-chou4. At the end of the fourth month this invading force was also
ordered to withdraw north to Chin territory after creating widespread havoc
and a breakdown of authority in the central Yangtze region.
Chin armies north of the Yangtze River had meanwhile not been idle.
On the thirteenth day of the second month of 1130 they finally took K’aifeng. The Sung provisional governor, Shang-kuan Wu, took flight and was
killed by bandits. Under the leadership of Wan-yen Ta-lan, Chin troops also
began to drive southward down the Grand Canal from Ssu-chou. In early
1131 they attacked Ch’u-chou, which was staunchly defended by its prefect,
Chao Li, and eventually relieved by Liu Kuang-shih. Bypassing the city, the
Chin continued to advance toward Yang-chou, taking Ch’eng-chou2 (Kao-yu),
and then moving into the coastal area north of the Yangtze mouth, attacking
T’ai-chou2 and T’ung-chou2. In T’ai-chou2, Wan-yen Ta-lan’s forces came up
against a well-organized bandit army led by Chang Jung, who defeated them.
The Sung court rewarded Chang by appointing him prefect of T’ai-chou2.20
The establishment of Ta Ch’i
The most powerful Chin generals were Wan-yen Tsung-han in the Shansi
region and Wan-yen Ta-lan in the Shantung and Ho-pei regions. Wan-yen
Ta-lan had found a promising collaborator in Liu Yü (1073–1143), the former
Sung prefect of Chi-nan in Shantung who had defected to Chin in 1128 and
won the personal favor of its emperor, Chin T’ai-tsung (r. 1123–35) Wanyen Wu-chi-mai. Chin was still determined to rule most of the conquered
Sung territory through surrogates, and established a second puppet regime.
Liu Yü secured Wan-yen Tsung-han’s backing and, at the end of 1129, the
Chin emperor’s permission to set up another puppet state in 1130, called Ta
Ch’i (Great Ch’i), with Liu Yü as its emperor. The Ta Ch’i capital was first
established at Ta-ming (in Ho-pei) but was later moved to Tung-p’ing (in
20
CYYL (1936) 43, p. 781.
658
tao jing-shen
Shantung). In 1131, Liu Yü was also given control of the Shensi region, and in
1132 he transferred his capital to K’ai-feng. Ta Ch’i’s domain covered presentday Hopei, Shantung, Honan, and Shensi, and all the land between the Yellow
River and the Huai River. Ta Ch’i, unlike Ta Ch’u, had all the trappings of
an independent state, with its own reign title, Fu-ch’ang; a bureaucracy with
its own Department of State Affairs and Six Ministries; its own armies; a new
tax system; new laws; and its own coinage and paper currency. But it was
created as a vassal state of Chin, and the Chin emperor and Liu Yü had a fictive
“father-son” relationship. Chin generals made all decisions for Liu Yü, and
Chin troops were sent to garrison some key posts and keep an eye on him.
Chin used the puppet regime both to restore order and as a frontline Chinese
force to continue fighting against the Southern Sung.21
The area Liu Yü nominally ruled as Chin’s surrogate was very large, but this
territory was in a state of military and political chaos, with many isolated Sung
army units still in place. There also were bandit forces, some of considerable
size, and some of them self-proclaimed Sung loyalists, conducting guerilla
warfare everywhere and especially in the Shantung region. Liu Yü spent much
of his effort trying to restore some degree of civil order in the war-ravaged
Central Plains and in the Shantung region, but he was also expected to mobilize
his armies to fight whenever needed as auxiliaries of Chin. These armies of Ta
Ch’i carried the burden of much of the fighting from 1130 to 1138.
In the south, Kao-tsung and his ministers realized that they could not
restore control of the north by conquest in the near future. Instead, they
decided to rely on diplomacy. From 1127 to 1129, thirteen missions were sent
to Chin to request the return of Hui-tsung and Kao-tsung’s mother, and to
explore the possibility of a peace settlement. But no reply to these missions was
given.22 Having survived the Chin invasions in 1129–30, the southern regime
devoted most of its strength to stabilizing its authority in the southeast. The
establishment of the state of Ta Ch’i in the north somewhat reduced direct
Chin pressure on the Sung, and for some time the Southern Sung treated
Ta Ch’i as an equal in order to buy time for its own political, financial, and
military reorganization. In the early 1130s the Southern Sung was able to pacify
many local rebels and bandits who had grown stronger during the turmoil in
their own territory with a carrot-and-stick approach that first lured the rebels
and bandits to surrender, and then organized their followers into government
military units.23 Some of these groups fled to the north, where most of them
21
22
23
For the Liu Yü regime, see Chu Hsi-tsu, Wei Ch’i lu chiao-pu (Chung-ching, 1944).
See Hsü, “Sung Kao-tsung chih tui Chin cheng-ts’e,” pp. 179–80.
The metaphor of stick and carrot is also used by James Liu. See Liu, “The Jurchen-Sung confrontation,”
p. 43.
the move to the south and the reign of kao-tsung
659
were eventually incorporated into the Ta Ch’i army. The rest were wiped out
by the Sung generals Chang Chün2, Han Shih-chung, and Yüeh Fei.
The western campaign
In early 1129, Kao-tsung appointed Chang Chün as pacification commissioner
of the Shensi region and his native Szechwan. He was given this post because
Chang had emphasized that the eventual task of restoration should begin in the
west. The strategic objective was clear and remained an important element in
Sung defense policy for the remainder of the dynasty. Not only was Szechwan
a rich and prosperous region whose loss the dynasty could ill afford, but if the
Chin seized the southern Shensi and Szechwan regions, it would be extremely
difficult to defend the southeast against an enemy invading downstream along
the Yangtze River. At the beginning of the dynasty Sung T’ai-tsu (r. 960–76)
had begun his conquest of the south by first conquering the Szechwan kingdom
of Shu, and later in the thirteenth century the Mongols would employ the same
grand strategy against the Southern Sung. Retaining military control of this
region was all important. Chang Chün was a loyal official who had emerged
as the leader of the war faction at the Sung court, but he was apparently an
idealist without much experience in military affairs and inept at handling
subordinates. He took a dislike to Ch’ü Tuan, one of his most able generals,
and paid no heed to the advice of the other generals or the civil officials under
his command.
As early as 1128, the Sung had sent an envoy, Hsieh Liang, to the Hsi
Hsia state in the northwest to attempt to forge an alliance with the Tanguts
to contain the power of the Chin. But having already submitted to the Chin
as a vassal state in 1124, the Hsi Hsia leadership had taken advantage of the
Sung-Chin conflict to occupy a few of the remaining Sung border prefectures
in the northwest. The Hsi Hsia had then become disillusioned with their
situation because Chin had promised to give them part of the newly acquired
Sung territories but had reneged on the agreement. After Chang Chün took
charge in 1129 in Szechwan, he sent Hsieh Liang once again to the Hsi Hsia
to exploit this disillusionment and attempt to negotiate an alliance, but once
more the talks failed.
When, in the autumn of 1130, Chin forces invaded the northern Kiangsu
region, they overcame fierce resistance by the prefect Chao Li, who died at the
siege of Ch’u-chou. The attacking forces took the city and drove south, threatening to cross the Yangtze River near Yang-chou. The Sung court was shocked
by the swift advance of the Chin troops and made preparations to escape by sea.
Earlier the court had urged Chang Chün to launch an attack on Chin in the
west to relieve pressure in the east. In the ninth month of 1130, Chang Chün
660
tao jing-shen
assembled a huge army, said to number four hundred thousand men, against
Chin, but it was defeated by Wan-yen Wu-chu at Fu-p’ing (northeast of modern Hsi-an). Chang Chün had his subordinate general Ch’ü Tuan executed for
disobeying orders, and submitted himself to Kao-tsung for punishment for
the defeat. But Kao-tsung was unable to find anyone to replace Chang and
retained him in overall command of the troops in the Szechwan region.
Chin forces continued to advance in the northwest, penetrating to Chiehchou (modern Wu-tu, Kansu), near the border of Szechwan. When the Chin
forces finally ceased their military operations, they occupied the regions of
Shensi and a large part of eastern Kansu. The Sung retained control of only five
prefectures in the southern Kansu region: Chieh-chou, Ch’eng-chou (T’ungku), Min-chou (Min county), Feng-chou (Liang-ch’uan), and T’ao-chou (Lint’an), and the two strategic areas of Ho-shan yüan in Feng-chou and Fang-shan
yüan in Lung-chou (Lung county, Shensi). But Szechwan remained safe.
In 1131–2, the main military operations between the Sung and the Chin
continued in the western theater, where Chin’s southwestward advances were
checked by Sung generals Wu Chieh, Wu Lin, and Liu Tzu-yü (1097–1146).
In the fifth and tenth months of 1131, Wu Chieh defeated Chin forces at
Ho-shan yüan. Unable to penetrate into Szechwan, Wan-yen Wu-chu himself
returned to his headquarters in Yen-ching (modern Peking).
Early in the following year, 1132, Chin forces invaded the northwest Hupei
and southern Shensi regions, capturing Chin-chou2 (An-k’ang, Shensi) and the
Jao-feng Pass (near Chen-fu county in Shensi east of Yang county). Wu Chieh
and Wang Yen2 retreated with their armies to Szechwan. Although Wang Yen2
recovered Chin-chou2 in the fifth month of 1133, the Chin general Wan-yen
Wu-chu captured Ho-shan yüan later in the year. The following spring, in
the third month of 1134, Wu-chu advanced from Pao-chi, trying to cross the
Ch’in-ling Mountains and enter Szechwan. However, he was stopped by Wu
Chieh and Wu Lin at the Hsien-jen Pass. After this battle, stalemate resulted
in the west, and the Chin leaders launched no further large-scale attacks there
during the remaining years of the 1130s.
Kao-tsung returns to Lin-an
In the east, following the withdrawal north by the Chin invasion forces, Kaotsung remained in his provisional capital Shao-hsing until the beginning of
1131 when, after celebrating the new year, and leading the court in making
obeisance in absentia to the two captive Sung emperors in Chin hands, he
changed the regnal title to Shao-hsing, and issued a grand act of grace offering
the remission of outstanding taxes, the restoration of the examinations for
office, and pardons for any rebels who willingly submitted. In the first month
the move to the south and the reign of kao-tsung
661
of 1132 he and his court returned to Lin-an. He still apparently regarded the
city as his “temporary capital” (hsing-tsai), even though during the early years of
the Southern Sung most officials favored moving permanently to Chien-k’ang
(Nanking).24
The choice of a permanent seat of government was crucial. Security ruled
out any city (such as Yang-chou) north of the Yangtze. The lower Yangtze River
and the delta region contained several great cities: Chen-chiang at the junction
between the southern section of the Grand Canal and the Yangtze River, the
administrative center of Che-hsi in the late T’ang dynasty (618–907); the
flourishing cities of Su-chou and Ch’ang-chou in the rich agricultural basin
around Lake T’ai; Chien-k’ang (Nanking), farther upstream on the Yangtze
and with excellent communication links; and Lin-an (Hang-chou) on the coast
at the southern edge of the delta region. Chien-k’ang had an ancient aura of
political authority. It had been capital of the Eastern Chin and the succeeding
southern dynasties from 317 to 589, a period when it was the undisputed
center of Chinese high culture, and more recently, from 937 to 975, it had
been the capital of the Southern T’ang dynasty, the only southern state of
the Five Dynasties period with imperial pretensions. Chien-k’ang also had an
extensive city site. Hang-chou was probably the richest of all these cities as a
result of its having been from 907 to 978 the capital of the Wu-Yüeh state, the
longest lasting, most successful, and wealthiest of the Ten Kingdoms, ruling
over the area of modern Chekiang. Hang-chou was well defended, surrounded
by triple walls, but compared with Chien-k’ang it had the disadvantage of
being a cramped site, between the coastal estuary of the Che River and the
famous Western Lake, which put strict limits on its development and physical
expansion, and meant the city was always congested. This space limitation
became more pressing in the 1130s when the city became packed with refugees
from the north and Huai-nan. Hang-chou’s location was also less central both
for communications and for strategic command.25 But Hang-chou was famous
for its natural beauty, and it had the attraction of being on the coast with the
possibility of escape by sea in case of an invasion, as Kao-tsung had already
discovered in 1130.26 Hang-chou was clearly Kao-tsung’s personal preference,
24
25
26
Making Chien-k’ang the permanent capital was suggested in 1131 by Liao Kang, CYYL (1936) 48,
p. 861; in 1132 by Hu An-kuo, CYYL (1936) 53, pp. 934–5; in 1136 by Chang Chün, CYYL (1936)
102, p. 1668; in 1138 by Chang Shou (1084–1145), CYYL (1936) 116, p. 1898; and in 1139 by Chang
Hsing-ch’eng, CYYL (1936) 128, p. 2079. In each case the opinion was ignored.
For a discussion of Hang-chou’s site and its suitability as a dynastic capital, see Chye Kiang Heng, Cities
of aristocrats and bureaucrats: The development of medieval Chinese cityscapes (Honolulu, 1999), pp. 139–50,
and the map on p. 142.
Shortly after the move a detailed registration of all sea-going ships in the coastal ports was ordered, in
part with this in mind.
662
tao jing-shen
but it was not designated as the capital of the Southern Sung until 1138, and
even after that it was still known as the “temporary capital.” Kao-tsung never
traveled west of Chien-k’ang in his entire reign.
Hang-chou’s large prefectural official residence, once the Wu-Yüeh royal
palace, was adapted and expanded as the royal palace, and some further building
works were undertaken piecemeal in the 1130s and 1140s. Various ministries
and other offices were established in the larger monasteries and great mansions
of the city, but the palace and government buildings were always inadequate
compared with those of Northern Sung K’ai-feng, with many of the buildings
being used for more than one function, under different names.
banditry, the suppression of local disorder,
and the power of the generals
Aside from the need to defend Southern Sung territory against Chin invasions, the government also relied upon the military to pacify and suppress
the numerous rebel and bandit groups that had arisen during the collapse
of Northern Sung military and civil authority in the crisis of 1126–7. This
collapse resulted in complete chaos, with units of Sung troops left scattered
all over former Sung territory in the north. Some of these troops were organized by their officers or by local strongmen into self-defense units; others
became roving bands of warriors, sometimes allied with the regular local government, living as predators in one locality after another; still others became
simple bandits. Following the Chin invasion of the south in 1130, banditry by
army deserters mushroomed in the Huai-nan region and south of the Yangtze
River. Banditry emerged often as the result of the ravages of war and the
burden of heavy taxation that was imposed to finance the establishment of
the Southern regime, which were aggravated by the depredations of government troops now forced to live off the land. Many local people joined the
bandits out of desperation when they found that it was difficult or impossible
for them to make a normal living. The constant flood of refugees from the
north and from war zones further destabilized the safety and security of local
populations.
Army mutinies were widespread, and bands of wandering unpaid soldiers
(i-ping) roamed the border regions, living off the land. For example, when Kaotsung took refuge in Wen-chou, the nearby Fu-chien prefecture of Chien-chou
was in the throes of such an uprising. At the same time, during the invasion of
the south, Dowager Empress Lung-yu (the new title given to Dowager Empress
Yüan-yu), who had been sent to Chi-chou3 (modern Chi-an, Kiangsi) for safety,
barely escaped with her life when the Sung troops escorting her mutinied and
the move to the south and the reign of kao-tsung
663
deserted. Her treasury was looted, and one hundred and sixty of her attendant
palace women were abducted.27
Co-option of bandits and the organization of “righteous” armies
The Southern Sung policy of appeasing different bandit groups resulted in the
organization of bandits into regular military units. Fan Ch’iung, a recalcitrant
general who was executed during the Miao-Liu mutiny in 1129, had claimed
that he had recruited one hundred and ninety thousand soldiers from various
groups of bandits in this way.28 The standard policy for the Sung was to
separate large bodies of surrendered bandits into several manageable groups
and attach these to different armies.
In the process of suppressing and pacifying the bandits, the Sung government also revived efforts to organize irregular i-chün (“righteous” armies) as
loyalist troops along the borders and even inside Chin territory. As early as
1127, Tsung Tse and Li Kang had begun to organize local self-defense forces
and bandits into military units to act as insurgent forces inside Chin territory.
For a while some of these units were active far behind enemy lines. Wang Yen2’s
pa-tzu chün (Army of Eight Characters) (the eight characters being ch’ih-hsin
pao-kuo, shih-sha Chin tsei, “serve the country with passion; swear to kill the
Chin bandits”) was active in the T’ai-hang Mountains of Shansi. In another
instance, Ma K’uo met with Prince Hsin (d. 1140), who had escaped from the
Chin army on its way north to the Chin heartland (Manchuria). Together they
established a stronghold in the Wu-ma Mountains near Chen-ting (northern
Ho-pei) and held out for several months in 1128 until, as they were far beyond
the reach of any assistance or reinforcement from Sung, Chin troops eventually
were able to wipe them out and recapture Prince Hsin.
In the battle for K’ai-feng in the sixth month of 1128, Tsung Tse died, and
was succeeded by the inept Tu Ch’ung (d. 1140), who was unable to rally the
support of the righteous armies. These insurgent groups began to disintegrate,
and many of their members fell into simple banditry.
In time, however, the new Sung regime realized that the so-called “righteous” armies operating in Chin-held territory, particularly in the Shantung
and Honan regions, could be useful, and began again to support and subsidize their activities. One advantage in supplying them with funds was that
this enabled their organizations to provide intelligence and help the operations of the Sung regular army. In addition, their mountain fortresses and river
27
28
CYYL (1936) 29, p. 577.
CYYL (1936) 25, p. 509.
664
tao jing-shen
hideouts could be very effective bases for conducting guerilla warfare, since the
Chin cavalry was at a disadvantage operating in mountainous terrain and their
water forces were not as good as those of the Sung. By far the most impressive
of the insurgent operations was that led by Chai Hsing (1073–1133) and his
son Chai Ts’ung (dates unknown). Using a mountain fortress in I-yang (in
southwestern Honan) as their base, they once even briefly captured Lo-yang.
They were able to hold out in their mountain stronghold until 1133.29
Banditry and rebels in the south
Some of the more powerful and well-organized bandit groups were located
along the Huai River frontier and the coastal area east of Yang-chou, and
in the central basin of the Yangtze River (modern Hunan and Hupei). In
1129, numerous small groups of bandits were reported in Huai-nan, each
comprising a few thousand men, and also larger groups numbering in the tens
of thousands.30 Among their leaders, Hsüeh Ch’ing and Chang Jung were
especially powerful. As we have seen, in 1131 Chang Jung established a river
base near T’ai-chou2 (modern T’ai county, Kiangsu) where he was able to
defeat Chin forces under the command of Wan-yen Ta-lan, and was rewarded
by the Sung court with the appointment of prefect of T’ai-chou2.
In 1130 it was again reported that bandits were rampant in the Huai-nan,
Hunan, and Hupei regions. Powerless to suppress them by force, the Sung
court continued its policy of appeasement, enticing some bandits with offers
of government positions. The great Southern Sung chronicler Li Hsin-ch’uan
describes the situation as follows:
At that time, more bandits rose in the circuits north of the Yangtze, and in Ching-hu
(Hunan and Hupei). Large groups among them had several tens of thousands of men each,
and occupied many prefectures. The court was powerless to control them. In places where
there were no bandits, powerful local men, scattered military officers, or acting officials
were appointed to take charge. The government only exercised loose control (chi-mi) over
them.31
It was mainly on account of the court’s inability to control banditry that
Fan Tsung-yin proposed appointing some of their leaders to regional military
posts. As a result, in the northern Hupei region in late 1130, Sang Chung,
a rebel with more than one hundred thousand men under his command, was
appointed prefect of the strategic city of Hsiang-yang.32 In Fu-chien another
29
30
31
32
Huang K’uan-ch’ung, Nan Sung shih-tai k’ang Chin ti i-chün (Taipei, 1988), pp. 1–101.
CYYL (1936) 25, p. 508.
CYYL (1936) 33, pp. 639–40.
For Sang Chung’s appointment, see CYYL (1936) 36, p. 698.
the move to the south and the reign of kao-tsung
665
bandit leader, Fan Ju-wei, was also given an official title before he proved
recalcitrant and caused further trouble. Eventually he was killed by Han Shihchung in 1132.
The most important and dangerous uprising centered on a rebel leader
in the Hunan-Hupei region. In 1131, after the Chin invasion of the south,
it was reported that throughout the region from Kiangsu to Hunan, Chin
invaders and regional bandits had continued to devastate towns and countryside. Around the rivers and marshes surrounding Tung-t’ing (northern
Hunan), a charismatic local sectarian leader called Chung Hsiang had built
up a large following and dominated large tracts of countryside since the early
1120s. The area had been ravaged by the Chin invasion of 1129–30, and
the regional capital T’an-chou (modern Ch’ang-sha) had been sacked and its
inhabitants slaughtered. Most of the local officials were killed, and the apparatus of local government was destroyed. The area had then been pillaged by
various roving groups of soldiers and deserters. In this atmosphere of lawlessness, Chung Hsiang finally rebelled in 1130, calling himself Great Heavenly
Sage and King of Ch’u, and announced his own regnal title as a further symbol
of independence. His followers wrecked the prefectural city of Ting-chou2,
killing officials, members of the educated elite, and rich merchants. Although
after a “reign” of only thirty-five days he was captured and subsequently killed
by K’ung Yen-chou (1107–61), himself a surrendered bandit leading a small
personal army, Chung’s followers, led by Yang Yao, escaped to occupy the
waterworld of marshes and rivers around Tung-t’ing Lake. They built a number of stockades and a fleet of large boats with paddlewheels, which were
escorted by smaller and more mobile boats (“sea eels”). Yang Yao and his men
raided far and wide, preying upon the shipping on the major rivers that discharged into the lake.33 Nineteen counties were affected. Because the seat of
regional government lay in ruins and communications in the area had broken
down, word of the rebellion took several weeks to reach the Sung court. Several
serious government attempts to deal with Yang Yao’s group failed, and, as will
be discussed later, they were not suppressed until their defeat by Yüeh Fei in
1135.34
Also at this time, north of the Yangtze River in Huai-nan another powerful
rebel, Li Ch’eng, a former military officer who had mutinied once before in
1128 and was later given amnesty, had taken advantage of the chaos following
the Chin invasion in 1130 to occupy six or seven prefectures in Huai-nan
33
34
CYYL (1936) 41, p. 759; 59, p. 1026.
See Edward H. Kaplan, “Yüeh Fei and the founding of the Southern Sung” (diss., University of Iowa,
1970), p. 621; John W. Haeger, “Between north and south: The lake rebellion in Hunan, 1130–1135,”
Journal of Asian Studies 28 No. 3 (1969), pp. 469–88.
666
tao jing-shen
West. In 1131, Li Ch’eng crossed the Yangtze River and captured Chiangchou (modern Chiu-chiang in Kiangsi). Another bandit leader, Ts’ao Ch’eng,
also moved into the Kiangsi region at this time. As a result, the whole area
from Hunan to Hsiang-yang in eastern Hupei had become ungovernable.
Generals Chang Chün2, Yüeh Fei, and Yang Ch’i-chung (1102–66) attacked
and pursued Li Ch’eng to Hupei, where Li was defeated and fled to surrender
to the Ta Ch’i regime, under which he became an important general.35
The bandit leader Ts’ao Ch’eng then moved south. The Sung court
appointed the former chief councilor Li Kang as commissioner of the regions
of Hunan and Kwangtung, and Li Kang, with the help of generals Han Shihchung and Yüeh Fei, quashed Ts’ao Ch’eng and his bandit forces. Yüeh Fei
routed Ts’ao Ch’eng in the far south in Ho-chou (modern Ho county, Kwangsi)
and chased him back to Hunan, where he was eventually subdued when Li
Kang successfully lured him to surrender with the offer of an official title in
1132.36
The Ta Ch’i regime, for its part, eagerly continued to subvert Sung military
officers with lavish rewards and offers of high official positions. In the summer
of 1132, the Sung general, K’ung Yen-chou, whose own depredations had
helped produce administrative collapse in the Tung-t’ing area, became another
such defector, taking his troops over with him. In the next year, Hsü Wen2, a
naval officer, also joined the Ta Ch’i regime.37
government reorganization
From 1127 until 1130 the Southern Sung regime had only one objective, survival, and it was touch and go whether they would achieve it. Government
was largely a matter of ad hoc decisions. Ministries lacked trained staff, permanent premises, records, and information from outlying regions. Many local
government posts were vacant. The same was true of the military. Generals led
what mostly amounted to private armies. There was no strong formal chain of
command and no organized logistical support for the individual forces, whose
troops lived off the country and were constantly left unpaid.38
In 1130 the position of commissioner of the imperial encampment was abolished, and the chief councilor began to hold the concurrent position of commissioner of military affairs. In an emergency, the chief councilor sometimes
35
36
37
38
CYYL (1936) 41, pp. 755–7, 760; 44, p. 806.
CYYL (1936) 51, p. 903; 60, p. 1037.
CYYL (1936) 55, p. 970; 64, p. 1097.
James Liu claims that the defeat of the Northern Sung was brought about by conscious neglect of the
military by Sung emperors because of their “fear of an internal coup.” See Liu, China turning inward,
p. 55.
the move to the south and the reign of kao-tsung
667
even became a military commander. For example, in 1132, when Lü I-hao
was planning a northern expedition, he was given the position of commander
in chief (Tu-tu) of all army units on the lower Yangtze River. The Office
for Emergencies (Chi-su fang) also handled important and urgent matters
and was empowered to ignore or even to override many established procedures and protocols.39 Kao-tsung together with the chief councilors made
decisions and formulated policies without paying due attention to the checks
and balances that had existed during the Northern Sung. In these years of
emergency, the lines of authority were confused. On the one hand, this way
of governing gave the chief councilors more centralized political and military
authority; on the other, the emergency delegation of authority to generals and
regional officials promoted decentralization.
Control of the military
During the early years of the new regime, the government struggled not only
against the unpredictable military pressure and incursions from Chin forces
but also against widespread internal disturbances and rampant lawlessness
caused by its own instability. As early as 1127, just after Kao-tsung ascended
the throne, Li Kang suggested that the court establish a number of military
governors, patterned after those in the late T’ang dynasty, to control the most
vulnerable regions of Ho-pei and Shansi, and to deploy a series of powerful
army units along the Yellow, Huai, and Yangtze rivers, with military commanders stationed at strategic posts. Although Kao-tsung agreed to this plan
in principle, it was difficult to implement because of a lack of trained troops
and limited financial resources.40
After the new Sung regime moved south, the Chin threat and widespread
banditry and lawlessness continued to beset the dynasty for some years. In
1130, the emperor adopted a proposal by Fan Tsung-yin (1098–1136) similar
to Li Kang’s earlier suggestion to establish a system of so-called military governors (chieh-tu shih), which delegated power to a number of regional officials
who could enjoy long tenure in their posts and full authority within their
respective domains.41 The plan was to be implemented only on the northern
frontier, where these posts and their armies would serve as a first defensive line.
Accordingly, the Sung court appointed a few top-ranking civilian officials and
military officers as pacification commissioners (hsüan-fu shih) to control larger
39
40
41
CYYL (1936) 68, p. 1157; 74, p. 1223.
See the “Memorial on national affairs” in Li Kang, Liang-hsi hsien-sheng ch’üan-chi (Taipei, 1970) 58,
pp. 3a–4b.
CYYL (1936) 33, p. 640. See also Hsü, “Sung Kao-tsung chih tui Chin cheng-ts’e,” pp. 64–6.
tao jing-shen
668
0
600 km
0
400 miles
C H IN
H S I
T’ao
Fu
Chung-hsing-fu
Po-hai
Fu-p’ing
Min
Ch’eng
Chieh
We s t
Ch’u
STATE OF CH’I (1129–35)
(Approximate boundaries)
Hsing-yüan
T
Chin
Lung h e a t
er
eg
io
T’ai
Hsiang-yang
R
Szechwan
K’ai-feng
Loyang
Feng
Yang
ern
Ch’eng-tu
Yen-ching
HSI A
n
of
en
Huai-nan
de
Te-an
Hupei
LIN-AN
mi
cb
an
Tung-t’ing Lake ditry
Hunan
Chiang
an
P’o-yang
dw
Lake
arl
or Kiangsi
dis
m
SOUTHERN SUNG
Chi-chou
Fukien
Ho-chou
Kwangtung
Kwangsi
Approximate boundaries of the
Chin client state of Ch’i
Western Theater
Region of endemic banditry
and warlordism
Political capitals
Prefectures and other key points
Map 23. The embattled Southern Sung, c. 1130.
key areas.42 These measures ran counter to the Northern Sung policy of centralizing military authority. In Northern Sung times, to protect against the
emergence of overly powerful military commanders, the government had not
permitted generals to have their own armies or to exercise full authority over
the areas under their command.43
42
43
Li Hsin-ch’uan, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (c. 1202 chia volume, 1216 i volume; Shanghai, 1935–7)
chia 11, pp. 3139–40.
See Chapter 3 of this volume.
the move to the south and the reign of kao-tsung
669
During this initial phase of the Southern Sung period, a chief councilor
would sometimes be given the title of commander in chief (tu-tu) and would
function as a military commander.44 The implementation of Fan Tsung-yin’s
plan for military reorganization in 1130 was so important that Fan was made
chief councilor of the right at the age of thirty-two. As a result of the military
reorganization, a number of local officials and military officers, as well as
some former bandit leaders, lured by offers of government largesse, received
appointments as military commissioners (chen-fu shih) to defend important
prefectures. Between 1130 and 1135, thirty-nine such posts were established
in the northern border areas.45 In 1130 a second, similar rank at the circuit
level was created with the title of pacification commissioner in chief (an-fu
ta-shih).46
Although the position of military commissioner was abolished in 1135,
the larger strategic areas under the control of the pacification commissioners
evolved into the famous “four garrisons” of the early Southern Sung. These
were the four regional posts commanding the main strategic sectors of the
frontier that were assigned to generals Chang Chün2, Han Shih-chung, Liu
Kuang-shih, and Yüeh Fei. In theory, these garrison forces were under the
control of the central government and they were named as if they were units
of the central army, but in practice they all enjoyed a large degree of autonomy
and their troops operated over broad areas as needed.
In addition, the regions of Szechwan and the southern part of Shensi in
the west, which were too far from Hang-chou for the central government
to exercise effective direct control, were also placed under the authority of a
pacification commissioner. The armies there, first under the command of Wu
Chieh (1093–1139), and later of his brother Wu Lin (1102–67), enjoyed the
same autonomy as the four garrisons in the northeast.
The commanders of these garrisons grew so powerful that members of the
court suggested ways to keep them under control, for the matter was of pressing
concern for Kao-tsung and the civil officials. As early as 1130, when Fan Tsungyin proposed the establishment of military governors, many officials opposed
this reversal of a basic policy of the Northern Sung period. In the next year,
Wang Tsao (1079–1154), a Han-lin academician, proposed several ways to
control the generals, who should be strictly disciplined and not permitted to
44
45
46
For the reorganization of this institution, see CYYL (1936) 22, p. 474. For their control over military
affairs, see Li, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (1935–7) chia 10, pp. 290–1. The post of tu-tu was abolished
in 1134. See CYYL (1936) 73, p. 1213; 74, p. 1223.
Huang K’uan-ch’ung, “Nan-Sung tui ti-fang wu-li ti li-yung ho k’ung-chih: i chen-fu shih wei-li,” in
Chung-yang yen-chiu-yüan ti erh chieh kuo-chi Han-hsüeh hui-i lun-wen-chi: Ch’ing-chu Chung-yang yen-chiuyüan yüan-ch’ing liu-shih chou-nien, ed. Chung-yang yen-chiu-yüan pien-yin (Taipei, 1986), pp. 1047–80.
CYYL (1936) 34, p. 666.
670
tao jing-shen
take part in policy making. He also urged the government to control corrupt
practices in the military, such as the generals’ inflating the numbers of soldiers
under their command (so as to increase payments from the government), and
the pilfering of local government funds. In addition, Wang suggested that
the emperor should not grant further autonomous powers to the generals
because autonomy was easy to confer but difficult to take back. Wang’s most
important suggestion was that instead of having just a handful of overpowerful
generals, there should be many of them so that no single general would have
too many soldiers under his command and enjoy too much autonomy. The
generals resented Wang’s criticisms and wrote a rebuttal, claiming that the
civil officials alone bore the responsibility for the collapse of the Northern
Sung and for the deplorable situation now facing the new regime.47
In 1131, Liao Kang (1071–1143), an official in the Ministry of Personnel,
proposed strengthening Kao-tsung’s Imperial Guard, arguing that it was the
tradition of the dynasty to have a strong central army, and that the court should
try to adhere to the Sung tradition of “strengthening the trunk and weakening
the branches” (ch’iang-kan jo-chih).48
Much later, in 1137, when Chang Chün was chief councilor (1135–7), the
problem of overly powerful generals persisted, and Chang tried to replace
the military commanders with civil officials. Although his own disastrous
attempt at reorganizing the military command structure would lead to the
defection of the general Li Ch’iung and his army of forty thousand to the
Ta Ch’i and frustrate Kao-tsung’s grand plan for a counteroffensive against
Chin, Chang’s failure did not change the mind of the emperor, who became
even more convinced that the most urgent task was to achieve more central and
civilian control of the military. In 1138, on the eve of the return of K’ai-feng by
Chin, Chang Chieh2 (chin-shih 1124) suggested that a number of lesser officers
be appointed to take command of portions of the troops of the great generals,
thereby subdividing their forces.49 Even the warlike Wang Shu2 (d. 1142),
deputy commissioner of military affairs, who was against peace negotiations,
realized the danger of generals’ having too much autonomy and made efforts
to reestablish the authority of central command.50
During the first decade of Kao-tsung’s reign, one policy to deal with the
dilemma of generals with too much autonomy was to assign civilian officials to
supervise them. To defend against the Chin, Kao-tsung needed the strongest
armies and generals he could muster, but at some point a general’s strength
47
48
49
50
CYYL (1936) 42, pp. 771–3.
CYYL (1936) 46, p. 838.
CYYL (1936) 119, p. 1124.
CYYL (1936) 118, pp. 1910–11.
the move to the south and the reign of kao-tsung
671
could become so great that the general could be a threat to the vulnerable
emperor. This tension was dynamic. As the Chin threat waxed and waned so
did Kao-tsung’s need for strong generals, but the speed with which the Chin
threat could increase meant that Kao-tsung had to err on the side of granting
the generals more power than they would need at a given moment so that
the Sung could respond quickly. This command structure kept the situation
highly unstable for Kao-tsung. The generals with great power and mobility
were potential rivals to the throne, as well as great prizes to be lured away
by the Chin. It is not surprising that Kao-tsung was interested in a peace
settlement as one of the few ways he could regain internal political control
of his empire. The protracted war weakened Kao-tsung’s control of his realm.
The assignment of chief councilors as commanders in chief was done exactly for
the purpose of bolstering the emperor’s control. Another way for Kao-tsung
to retain control was for him to appoint trusted and loyal generals in areas
close to the capital, and to strengthen the Imperial Guard so as to guarantee
that he always had at his disposal a powerful fighting force of proven loyalty
close at hand. Among the generals in whom Kao-tsung especially put his trust
were Chang Chün2 and Han Shih-chung, who had suppressed the Miao-Liu
mutiny in Hang-chou in 1129 at the beginning of his reign.
A more drastic solution was simply to strip the generals of their personal
armies and sweeping military powers. This measure, however, could be taken
only when there was no longer the need to maintain strong regional military
forces. This was exactly what Ch’in Kuei and Kao-tsung did in 1141, after
the peace treaty with Chin was concluded. Acting on an earlier suggestion
by Fan T’ang (1097–1134), the emperor and Chin Kuei stripped the three
most powerful autonomous generals of their field commands and promoted
the generals to be commissioners of military affairs and thus part of the central
command. Command of the generals’ field armies was given to their former
seconds in command.51 Kao-tsung often worried more about his recalcitrant
generals than about Chin. In 1136, when the report of a major victory over
the Ta Ch’i puppet regime reached the court, Kao-tsung remarked that he
was less gratified by the reported victory than by learning of the loyalty of
his generals.52 After peace had been concluded with the Chin, Kao-tsung was
pleased that he could now change the generals’ appointments at will, just as
he could with civil officials.53 In 1146 he commented that he was at last able
to exercise full control over his generals.54
51
52
53
54
CYYL (1936) 140, p. 2247.
CYYL (1936) 106, p. 1731.
CYYL (1936) 147, p. 2372.
CYYL (1936) 155, p. 2515.
672
tao jing-shen
Kao-tsung and his councilors
Kao-tsung was not only suspicious of his generals. At first he was also very
careful to prevent his councilors and ministers from gaining too much power.
Kao-tsung was even worried about Lü I-hao, who had helped him to take up
his duties as emperor in 1129, and who had suggested that Kao-tsung escape
by sea when Chin troops attacked Lin-an and Ming-chou. Lü I-hao served as
chief councilor twice, but the first time he had been dismissed for aggressively
monopolizing political and military power. The second time he was granted
retirement on the grounds that he had failed to report natural calamities to the
throne, a rather minor yet fungible offense that could be used as a reason for
dismissal. Similarly, Fan Tsung-yin, entrusted with the task of reorganizing
the military, was later accused of forming a clique and dismissed.55
During the early years of his reign, Kao-tsung frequently changed his chief
councilors.56 He had the largest number of chief councilors in Sung history, but
he eventually came to put all his trust in Ch’in Kuei, who was chief councilor for
eighteen years, second only to Shih Mi-yüan’s (1164–1233) tenure of twentythree years, the longest serving chief councilor of the Sung period. However,
before Ch’in Kuei helped Kao-tsung make peace in 1141, the emperor was constantly looking for someone he could trust, and even Ch’in’s first appointment
as chief councilor (1131–2) lasted for less than two years.
war and diplomacy 1131–1141
Although Chin inflicted major defeats against the Sung, it was unable to
destroy the regime. If the Chin could not terminate the Sung, and the Sung was
powerless to dislodge the Chin, the political alternative of peaceful coexistence
seemed possible. At this juncture a new figure emerged at the Sung court who
was to be pivotal in the clash between the unrealistic aggressive revanchists
and those seeking a peaceful accommodation with the Chin. This was Ch’in
Kuei (1090–1155). A chin-shih graduate of 1115, Ch’in was from the region
of modern Nanking and was married to a granddaughter of Wang Kuei, an
associate of Wang An-shih. Ch’in Kuei had passed the advanced placement
examination in 1123 and was made an instructor at the Imperial University,
and later a censor. During the siege of K’ai-feng he was promoted to head
55
56
For a biography of Fan Tsung-yin, see SS 362, pp. 11325–6, and Satake Yasuhiko, “Fan Tsung-yin,”
in Sung biographies, ed. Herbert Franke (Wiesbaden, 1976), vol. 1, pp. 345–7. For the biography of Lü
I-hao, see SS 362, pp. 11319–24. See CYYL (1936) 47, pp. 850–1, for Shen Yü-ch’iu’s attack on Fan’s
“twenty crimes.”
See Liu, China turning inward, pp. 81–115.
the move to the south and the reign of kao-tsung
673
the Censorate. When K’ai-feng fell in 1127 and much of the Sung imperial
family was captured by the Chin army, many Sung officials protested against
the occupying Chin forces. A few officials were killed, and numerous others
were detained. Among the latter group was Ch’in Kuei, who after his capture
acted as secretary to the deposed emperor Ch’in-tsung. He also won the favor of
the Chin general Wan-yen Ta-lan, a younger brother of the Chin emperor, who
retained him in his army. In the tenth month of 1130, Ch’in Kuei and his wife
escaped under suspicious circumstances from the Chin army in Kiangsu, and
fled to the Sung court, where Ch’in Kuei gained the attention and favor of Kaotsung by making his first proposal for peace. No details of this proposal survive,
except for Ch’in Kuei’s famous statement suggesting a peaceful coexistence of
the northern and southern regimes: “If it is desirable that there will be no
more conflicts under Heaven, it is necessary for the southerners to stay in the
south and the northerners in the north.”57
Kao-tsung did not follow Ch’in Kuei’s advice immediately, but Ch’in was
appointed minister of rites, and within a year was promoted to assistant councilor. In the second month of 1131, he replaced Fan Tsung-yin, an old friend
who had vouched for him when he escaped from Chin, as chief councilor of
the right. At that time, however, Ch’in Kuei’s influence at court was overshadowed by that of Lü I-hao, who became chief councilor of the left in the
ninth month. It may be that Ch’in Kuei had antagonized the emperor, who is
reported to have angrily snapped, “Ch’in Kuei advocates a policy of sending
the northerners back to the north. I am a northerner. Where should I go?”58 It
is also possible that Ch’in Kuei was removed because of his disruptive rivalry
with Lü I-hao, who accused him of forming a faction.59 In any case, in the
eighth month of 1132, Ch’in Kuei was dismissed and appointed to a sinecure.
He was replaced by Chu Sheng-fei.
Also in 1132, the Chin court returned to the south a captive Sung envoy,
Wang Lun (1084–1144), who had been detained since 1127. Wang Lun carried
a Chin message of peace that requested the sending of ambassadors to Chin. The
Sung court dispatched two missions in 1133, conveying diplomatic messages
couched in language humble enough to indicate Kao-tsung’s willingness to
57
58
59
CYYL (1936) 38, pp. 718–21; 57, pp. 999–1000. Li Hsin-ch’uan suspects, with good reason, that Ch’in
had been deliberately released by Wan-yen Ta-lan. Ch’in’s proposal is in CYYL (1936) 29, pp. 733–4.
For a review of Ch’in Kuei’s influence, see Liu Tzu-chien (James T. C. Liu), “Ch’in Kuei ti ch’in-yu,”
Shih-huo yüeh-k’an 14 No. 7–8 (1984), pp. 310–23. See also his Liang Sung shih yen-chiu hui-pien (Taipei,
1987), pp. 143–71. The most important English-language study of Ch’in Kuei is Charles Hartman,
“The making of a villain: Ch’in Kuei and Tao-hsüeh,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 58 No. 1 (1998),
pp. 59–146.
CYYL (1936) 57, pp. 999–1000.
See Hartman, “The making of a villain,” p. 63.
674
tao jing-shen
submit as a vassal to the Chin emperor, Chin T’ai-tsung. When the second
mission returned to Lin-an, it was accompanied by two Chin envoys. Nothing
was achieved by these peace overtures, however, because of Chin’s demand that
the Yangtze River constitute the border between Sung and the puppet state
of Ta Ch’i.
In the tenth month of 1133 the Ta Ch’i ruler Liu Yü ordered the newly
defected Sung general Li Ch’eng to lead an army to invade Sung. In the
tenth month Li succeeded in capturing the strategically vital fortress city of
Hsiang-yang on the Han River (northeastern Hupei) and the surrounding
prefectures of T’ang-chou, Sui-chou2, and Yang-chou, and he began to set a
civil administration in place. This victory, by opening the main route for an
advance into the middle Yangtze River valley, threatened to cut the Southern
Sung territory in half, giving the Chin armies easy access to the Han River
valley and to the central circuits of Ching-hu (modern Hunan and Hupei). In
response, in the fifth month of 1134, the Sung court ordered General Yüeh Fei
to recover Hsiang-yang and to prevent Li Ch’eng from establishing ties with
powerful bandits led by Yang Yao, who was based around Tung-t’ing Lake
(northern Hunan). Yüeh Fei drove back Li Ch’eng’s Ta Ch’i army in a pitched
battle to recapture Hsiang-yang, forcing Li to withdraw his troops north into
the region of Honan. Yüeh Fei also recovered the neighboring prefectures
of T’ang-chou, Sui-chou2, and Teng-chou2, giving Hsiang-yang defense in
depth. This greatly strengthened the Sung’s strategic position and freed the
central Yangtze region from the immediate threat of invasion. Yüeh Fei was
emerging as one of the best and most successful Sung generals, and he won
the emperor’s approbation.
But in the ninth month of 1134, Chin and Ta Ch’i forces followed up their
unsuccessful initial assault on Hsiang-yang with a major invasion farther to the
east into the Huai River valley. Although it was suggested in Lin-an that the
armies should withdraw to the Yangtze and that Kao-tsung should take flight
once again, Chief Councilor Chao Ting (1085–1147) persuaded the emperor to
face down the threat and move to Chien-k’ang (Nanking) instead. Kao-tsung’s
edict showed courage by announcing that he would lead the armies in person
to attack the puppet Ta Ch’i regime. This edict, promulgated in 1134, was the
first time that he had publicly denounced Ta Ch’i and Liu Yü as a rebel traitor.
Acting on Chao Ting’s proposal, Kao-tsung traveled west toward Chien-k’ang
as far as P’ing-chiang (modern Su-chou) on the twenty-third day of the tenth
month, and remained there until the second month of 1135. At one point,
Kao-tsung wanted to cross the Yangtze River to fight a decisive battle with
the Chin forces himself, but was dissuaded by Chao Ting. Again accepting
Chao’s recommendation, Kao-tsung appointed Chang Chün as commissioner
of military affairs.
the move to the south and the reign of kao-tsung
675
In the ensuing conflict, the Chin and Ta Ch’i invading forces at first advanced
down the Grand Canal almost to Yang-chou and took several major cities in
the Huai valley, but the tide turned against them. They were defeated by the
armies of Han Shih-chung at Ta-i (to the northwest of Yang-chou), and also
the forces of Yüeh Fei at Lu-chou2 (modern Ho-fei). Then, at the end of 1134,
the emperor Chin T’ai-tsung died suddenly and the Jurchen generals were
obliged to return to the capital to elect a successor. Their armies and the Ta
Ch’i forces fell back to the north of the Huai River.
These military conflicts did not stop diplomacy. When Ta Ch’i and Chin had
begun military operations in the ninth month of 1134, Sung envoys were still
being dispatched to the Chin court. Kao-tsung’s instructions were clear. He
was not opposed to sending annual tribute to Chin. His main objective was to
negotiate a settlement under which his parents could be returned to the south.
Having crossed the battlefield near Yang-chou, the Sung envoys were received
by Wan-yen Ta-lan, who said that it was possible to negotiate, pointing out
that Ch’in Kuei understood the Chin position well. The Sung mission returned
in the twelfth month, but nothing was accomplished because the Chin made
no promises to return Kao-tsung’s parents. In addition, the Chin leaders again
insisted on the unacceptable condition that the Yangtze River constitute the
border between the two states. In any case, Chao Ting was, at the time, opposed
to making peace.60
With the Chin and Ta Ch’i threat temporarily at an end, in 1135 Kao-tsung
decided to eliminate the Tung-t’ing rebels. Chang Chün, who had just been
made a chief councilor, was sent to take charge of the war zone. He arranged the
surrender of many of the rebel leaders while Yueh Fei prepared the ground for
a meticulously planned strike that he executed in the sixth month, crushing
the last rebel strongholds in only eight days.61 Yueh Fei then supervised the
restoration of civil order and made plans to remove the causes of the rebellion. In
many regions peace and internal security were steadily strengthening the Sung
state, civil administration was becoming firmly reestablished, and revenue
was coming in. These military successes also strengthened Kao-tsung’s hand
in negotiations. However, the existence of the Ta Ch’i state seemed to be an
obstacle to peace. In early 1135, Kao-tsung appointed Chao Ting and Chang
Chün as joint chief councilors, ordering them to plan for a more positive defense
strategy. Chao Ting, a northerner whose teacher Shao Po-wen (1057–1134) had
been a follower of the teachings of the Ch’eng brothers, had served Kao-tsung
since the beginning of the Southern Sung, and had recommended Chang Chün
60
61
CYYL (1936) 80, pp. 1311, 1315; 81, p. 1340; 82, p. 1357; 83, p. 1359. For details, see Hsü, San-ch’ao
pei-meng hui-pien, pp. 161–3. See also Liu, China turning inward, pp. 114–18.
CYYL (1936) 89, p. 198; 90, p. 199.
676
tao jing-shen
to handle military affairs. Chang, who had succeeded in bringing Szechwan
under some measure of central control and in stopping the westward expansion
of Chin military forces, continued to hold the position of commissioner of
military affairs as well.
In the autumn of 1136, Ta Ch’i renewed its attacks on the Sung in Huainan, but in the tenth month its main army was defeated by Yang Ch’i-chung
in the battle of Ou-t’ang (northwest of Ch’u county, Anhwei). Based on this
success, Chang Chün suggested that the government adopt a more aggressive
stance against Ta Ch’i. With this in view, Kao-tsung left Lin-an for Chienk’ang in the ninth month of 1136, stopping at P’ing-chiang. Eventually, in the
third month of 1137, he made it to Chien-k’ang, where the city’s fortifications
were repaired. Kao-tsung and Chang Chün began to prepare a counteroffensive
and assemble an army to launch a northern expedition. Earlier in 1136, Chao
Ting, who was more cautious and had opposed Chang’s aggressive strategy, had
been dismissed. Chao had suggested that rather than launch an offensive, the
court should order Yang Ch’i-chung, Liu Kuang-shih, and others to prepare
strong defenses against the enemy along the Yangtze. Once Chao Ting was
out of office, Chang Chün was left with full authority to carry out his more
aggressive plans. One of his first measures was to replace Liu Kuang-shih,
whom he felt was too timid, with Wang Te (1087–1154), one of Liu’s own
subordinates, while Lu Chih, a civilian official, was appointed to command
the army units of Liu Kuang-shih and to oversee the transition of command.
However, these arrangements proved ill-considered. Wang Te and another of
Liu’s officers, Li Ch’iung, were bitter enemies, and when Li heard that the
court had chosen to replace Liu with Wang, he murdered his civilian superior,
Lu Chih, and in the eighth month defected to Ta Ch’i with his forty thousand
soldiers.62 The northern expedition was canceled even before it had begun.
This disastrous incident marked a turning point in Kao-tsung’s attitude
toward the Chin. Frustrated, Kao-tsung canceled the planned counteroffensive
and decided to return to Lin-an. There, in the ninth month of 1137, he replaced
Chang Chün, who was exiled to Yung-chou in Hunan, with the more cautious
former chief councilor, Chao Ting. Chao was teamed with Ch’in Kuei, who was
recalled to the capital. Chang was exiled to a remote area of southern Hunan
and was left permanently in retirement. From 1137 on, Kao-tsung paid more
attention to controlling his own generals than to fighting Chin.
62
CYYL (1936) 113, pp. 1826–7. Appraising the career of the Szechwanese scholar and military organizer Chang Chün, historians in general have not paid enough attention to his efforts to centralize
military power. An example is Yang Te-ch’uan, “Chang Chün shih-chi shu-p’ing,” in Sung-shih yen-chiu
lun-wen-chi: 1982 nien nien-hui pien-k’an, ed. Teng Kuang-ming and Li Chia-chü (Cheng-chou, 1984),
pp. 563–92.
the move to the south and the reign of kao-tsung
677
At this time, the Chin government again began to make peace overtures.
When the Chin emperor T’ai-tsung died in the first month of 1135, he was
succeeded by a young grandson of A-ku-ta who would reign as the emperor
Chin Hsi-tsung from 1135 to 1150. Hsi-tsung was suspicious of Liu Yü,
whom he suspected of secretly negotiating with Yüeh Fei. Despite Li Ch’iung’s
defection to Ta Ch’i with his large army, some Chin ministers and generals,
with Wan-yen Ta-lan as their leader, had been disappointed at the poor results
of Liu Yü’s military adventures, and instead favored establishing peaceful
coexistence with the Sung. These reassessments were reflected in the change
in Chin foreign policy.
In early 1137, Ho Hsien, a Sung envoy who had been detained at the Chin
court for more than a year, was released and returned south to Lin-an, carrying
with him the official news of the deaths of Emperor Hui-tsung and his empress.
(Hui-tsung had died two years earlier, in 1135.) The Sung court immediately
responded by sending Wang Lun to Chin, asking for the return of Hui-tsung’s
coffin. In his talks with Wan-yen Ta-lan and Wan-yen Wu-chu, Wang Lun was
able to drive a wedge between the Chin generals and Liu Yü, convincing the
generals that in order to end the conflict it would be necessary to abolish Liu
Yü’s Ta Ch’i regime. To the complete surprise of many Sung officials, in late
1137 Chin abolished Ta Ch’i, removed Liu Yü from his throne, confiscated
the enormous wealth he had accumulated, and sent him into comfortable
exile in the region of Inner Mongolia. The Chin government then renewed
negotiations with the Sung. The Chin tentatively agreed to return the coffin
of Hui-tsung and to hand back to the Sung their captured territory south of
the Yellow River, including K’ai-feng.63
the peace process, 1138–1142
In the next year, 1138, Kao-tsung reappointed Ch’in Kuei, who had been
prefect of Wen-chou in Fu-chien, as chief councilor of the right, and made
him responsible for negotiating with Chin. His fellow councilor Chao Ting,
who insisted that Kao-tsung reject the Chin demand that Kao-tsung become
a tributary king subject to the Chin emperor, resigned in the twelfth month
of 1138 and was appointed to a sinecure. In his last audience with Kao-tsung,
Chao Ting warned that after his dismissal some might try to persuade the
emperor to seek peace on grounds of filial piety, in other words, suggest that
the emperor might try to hasten the return of his father’s remains and of his
mother regardless of the cost to the Sung regime. Wang Shu2, the deputy
63
For Chin policy toward Sung, see Tao Jing-shen (T’ao Chin-sheng), The Jurchen in twelfth-century China
(Seattle, Wash., 1976), p. 35.
678
tao jing-shen
commissioner of military affairs, who was also opposed to peace negotiations,
proposed that no more envoys should be sent to Chin, and that the court should
concentrate on military preparations. Wang even offered his resignation, saying
that his duty was to fight against the enemy, not to participate in any scheme
to sue for peace. General Han Shih-tsung also submitted several memorials
warning the court about the unreliability of the Chin offer, and the general
worried that entering into peace talks would damage the morale of the military.
Despite these cautionary admonitions, and having heard that the Chin peace
mission had crossed the border, Kao-tsung announced that he would be willing
to submit to the Chin if this would alleviate the suffering of his people caused
by the war. He issued an edict in the eleventh month of 1138 announcing
his intention to submit to the Chin in exchange for the return of Hui-tsung’s
coffin and of his own mother (Wei Kuei-fei). Kao-tsung asked officials and
censors to express their opinions on the best way to proceed. A heated debate
ensued. In response to the edict, a large group of officials opposed the opening
of negotiations.64 In their arguments they pointed out that the Jurchen had
inflicted a great insult on the Sung and that there was no reason whatsoever
for negotiations.65 Several officials cited the passage from Li-chi (Book of rites)
that “one could not bear to live under the same sky with an enemy who had
inflicted insults on one’s parents” – the standard canonical justification for
vengeance and retribution. The emperor should not submit to the Jurchen
and thus invite even more humiliation and insults both for himself and for his
subjects. Even if peace were restored, the Chin might make further demands
and might fail to return Hui-tsung’s coffin, Kao-tsung’s mother, or other
imperial family members. They emphasized that the court should never trust
an enemy’s proposals, and that there were many reasons to distrust the Chin
leadership in particular. Since ancient times, they contended, barbarians had
never wanted peaceful coexistence with the Chinese except when the empire
was powerful, and the Sung was certainly not powerful enough to force the
Chin to negotiate. In their view, the Chin were using the peace talks simply
as a tactic to frustrate the Sung, and to diminish the Sung martial spirit, so
that in the future the Chin could again invade the south.
The officials further pointed out that the argument that Kao-tsung should
submit on the grounds of his own filial obligations to his parents was fallacious.
Filial piety, they claimed, was a virtue that could be practiced by a sovereign
64
65
These included Chang T’ao (1092–1166), Yen Tun-fu (1071–1145), Hu Ch’üan (1102–80), Tseng K’ai
(chin-shih 1103), Fan Ju-kuei (1102–60), Li Kang, Li Mi-hsun (1089–1153), Wei Chiang (chin-shih
1121), Chu Sung (1097–1143), Ling Ching-hsia (d. 1175), Hu Ch’eng (chin-shih 1121), Ch’ang T’ung
(1090–1149), Liang Ju-chia (1096–1154), and Chang Shen.
CYYL (1936) 123, p. 1989; 124, pp. 2018–20, 2015–16. For these arguments, see CYYL (1936) 122–4;
Hsü, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien, pp. 183–90.
the move to the south and the reign of kao-tsung
679
only in times of peace. In times of war, however, the emperor should give
priority to the security of the dynasty and of the people over his duties to his
own family. Also, he should listen to the opinions of the people, his generals,
and the soldiers. This last point was put forward because the generals Han
Shih-chung and Yüeh Fei were strongly opposed to a peace settlement and
public opinion agreed with them. If the emperor ignored this opinion and
went ahead with the humiliating peace plan, he would lose the support of the
people, and invite unpredictable disorders. The officials advised the emperor
to be patient and to wait for a better time to avenge Chin insults.
Finally, officials tried to convince Kao-tsung that he should not naively
believe in the efficacy of demilitarization. They stressed that the conclusion
of a peace treaty would not necessarily lead to disarmament, because without
military force the Sung would be unable to maintain peace. Even if a settlement
were reached, the Sung would still have to be ready to take military action
against the Chin in the future if and when the Chin made any unreasonable
demands.
By far the strongest of the arguments against a peace settlement came from
Hu Ch’üan, a former local militia leader and current Bureau of Military Affairs
functionary who criticized the court’s willingness to accept the Chin’s terms
both as adding further insult to the injury the Chin had already inflicted on the
imperial ancestors and as submitting to a barbarian culture. Insult should be
avenged, Hu stressed, and advocates of peace such as Wang Lun, Ch’in Kuei,
and the assistant councilor Sun Chin (chin-shih 1103) should be executed. Hu’s
memorial was widely copied and even printed among the people in the capital.
Hu became very popular, but the emperor continued to place his trust in Ch’in
Kuei.
In contrast, those who favored peace talks were few, and included Mo Chiang
(chin-shih 1138), Kou-lung Ju-yüan (1093–1154), and Feng Chi (d. 1152).
They argued that submission for the sake of the emperor’s parents and brother,
and for the recovery of the temples and cemeteries of the imperial ancestors,
was motivated by the emperor’s kindness and filial piety, and that there had
been many historical precedents for expedient submission to buy time for
later revenge. Once peace was restored, territories might be recovered without
fighting. On a more practical level, despite the recent Sung victories, it seemed
impossible to conquer the enemy, and finally achieving peace would enable
the government to deal with its pressing financial problems, and to bring
prosperity to the people.
In the midst of the debate, Wang Shu2, who had submitted seven memorials
and had had six audiences with the emperor arguing against peace negotiations,
was transferred away from the capital and appointed to a prefectural post.
Kao-tsung criticized the hawks for their “irresponsible” comments on his
680
tao jing-shen
conduct, which he claimed represented a “corruption of customs.” Sun Chin
suggested using the threat of severe punishments to deter them. To counter
the opposition, Ch’in Kuei had his supporter Kou-lung Ju-yüan appointed as
vice–censor in chief (yü-shih chung-ch’eng) and another supporter, Shih T’ingch’en (chin-shih 1121), as investigating censor (chien-ch’a yü-shih), and employed
them to denounce all those who opposed his policies.
Ch’in Kuei’s control of the Censorate was the key to his establishment of
personal dominance at court. He had briefly held the highest office in the
Censorate under Ch’in-tsung in 1126, and his failure to control the censors
during his first short term as chancellor in 1131–2 had made it possible for
Lü I-hao to engineer his dismissal on charges of forming a faction. Chang
Chün had also misused a packed Censorate as a political weapon in 1136–7.66
Ch’in Kuei used the Censorate now to enable him to denounce, impeach, or
arrange the demotion of any official who crossed him, and he was to exploit
this technique to the full. One of the first victims was Hu Ch’üan, who was
banished.
After this purge Kao-tsung said that he had never wanted to be emperor, and
his sole objective in making peace had only been to serve his mother. But he
remained in control in the background without objecting as Ch’in Kuei forced
through the policies and personnel changes of which the emperor approved. But
severe criticism of Kao-tsung continued, and he then issued an edict banning
slander by the court. Chao Ting, the most influential of the opponents of
peace, had already been posted away from K’ai-feng, having been appointed
governor of Shao-hsing earlier in 1138. Forced to seek retirement after 1138,
Chao Ting was subjected to a series of false charges, demotions, and finally exile,
first to Ch’ao-chou in 1140, and finally to Chi-yang chün (modern Yai-chou,
on Hainan Island) in 1144. He was kept under rigorous surveillance by Ch’in
Kuei’s agents; nobody dared to communicate with him, and in 1147 he starved
himself to death, fearing that his family would also be persecuted.67 Other
purges quickly followed. Later in 1138, Tseng K’ai and Wang Shu2 were forced
to retire.68 In their place, Ch’in Kuei, initially against Kao-tsung’s advice,
recommended Li Kuang (1077–1155) as an assistant councilor. A leading
scholar-official from the south, Li Kuang’s main concerns were the serious
financial situation of the goverment, the rural impoverishment resulting from
wartime destruction, and the heavy tax burden caused by military expenses. Li’s
66
67
68
See CYYL (1936) 115, p. 1860. Ironically, at the time of Chang Chün’s fall his successor, Chao Ting, had
asked to remove and replace Chang’s tame censors, but he was refused by the emperor because allowing
every new councilor to make such changes would lead to factionalism. See Hartman, “The making of a
villain,” p. 137 n. 165.
CYYL (1936) 155, p. 2537. Also Liu, China turning inward, pp. 114–27.
CYYL (1936) 123, pp. 1997–8.
the move to the south and the reign of kao-tsung
681
appointment seemed to reflect the aspirations of people from the south, who
were in general less enthusiastic than those people who had been displaced from
the north about continuing the war. However, Li proved to be an unsuitable
choice. He unexpectedly opposed the peace policy and lost his position as
assistant councilor after only one year, in 1138, for criticizing Cheng I-nien,
a relative of Ch’in Kuei who had served under the Ta Ch’i puppet regime.
In banishment, Li Kuang was trapped into writing verse critical of Ch’in
Kuei, and he too was exiled to faraway Hainan Island. He wrote a hsiao shih
(little history), breaking the ban on private histories, and was ordered never
to be pardoned and reemployed. In 1150 his son was banished, and his friends
were demoted.69 These cases exemplify Ch’in Kuei’s relentless vindictiveness
toward those he believed were a threat to him.
When Ch’in Kuei had Shih T’ing-ch’en promoted to the rank of attendant
censor (shih yü-shih), many in the bureaucracy became seriously alarmed. Two
staunch peace opponents, Chang T’ao (1091–1165) and Yen Tun-fu (1071–
1144), requested that the emperor punish Kou-lung Ju-yüan and Shih T’ingch’en, but their requests went unheeded. Later, when peace was about to be
restored, the emperor bitterly complained to Kou-lung Ju-yüan and Li I (chinshih 1124) that the scholar-officials cared only about themselves, and that even
if he, the emperor, had kowtowed a hundred times to the enemy when the
Jurchen were attacking Ming-chou (in 1130), these officials would not have
cared. Ch’in Kuei told Tseng K’ai that all the critics wanted was great fame for
themselves, whereas all he wanted was to resolve the problems of the dynasty.70
Despite the protests from those opposed to peace, Kao-tsung ordered that
peace negotiations proceed. But among the issues to be resolved was the difficult matter of protocol. The head of the Chin mission was entitled to an
investiture envoy (chao-yü shih), since Kao-tsung had expressed himself as
willing to be invested to serve the Chin emperor as a subject. Kao-tsung was
therefore now required to perform a ceremony formally accepting investiture
by the Chin emperor. This humiliation caused deep concern at court and unrest
in the capital, Lin-an. One court official, Lou Chao (1088–1160), suggested
that the emperor could avoid taking part in the investiture ceremony by using
the excuse that when in mourning for his father a man should not speak to
anyone. The emperor followed this suggestion, and thus it was Ch’in Kuei
who accepted the Chin investiture on Kao-tsung’s behalf.71
69
70
71
CYYL (1936) 160, p. 2599; 161, pp. 2604, 2607–8; 168, p. 2747. See also Teraji, Nan-Sō shoki seijishi
kenkyū, pp. 177–90, 301–2, 315–16; Teraji Jun, Nan-Sō seiken kakuritsu katei kenkyū oboegaki: Sō-Kin
wagi, heiken kaishū, keikaihō no seijishiteki kōsatsu (Hiroshima, 1982), pp. 8–51; Hartman, “The making
of a villain,” pp. 99–101.
CYYL (1936) 124, p. 2024. For the biography of Tseng K’ai, see SS 382, pp. 11769–71.
CYYL (1936) 124, pp. 2024–5, 2027–8.
682
tao jing-shen
To the surprise of those opposed to peace, and in a large measure due to
the temporary domination of the Chin court by its own peace faction, the two
states concluded their peace treaty in the tenth month of 1138. The treaty
stipulated that Kao-tsung would style himself as a “subject” (ch’en) of the Chin
emperor, and that the new border between the two states was to be the latest
course of the Yellow River. The Sung authorized Wang Lun to take over the
territory controlled by the Chin, and Wang was appointed governor of K’aifeng. However, there were strong objections to the settlement on both sides,
which quickly undermined the treaty’s promise of a lasting peace.
In a power struggle at the Chin court in 1139, Wan-yen Ta-lan, the chief
architect of the peace settlement on the Chin side, was ousted and executed,
along with several of his propeace colleagues, by Wan-yen Wu-chu in the name
of the sixteen-year-old Chin emperor Hsi-tsung. In 1140, Wan-yen Wu-chu
broke the peace treaty. Renewed attacks on Sung penetrated into the Honan
region and recaptured K’ai-feng. Fierce fighting broke out again. Wan-yen
Wu-chu was defeated in a decisive battle at Shun-ch’ang (modern Fo-ch’ang, in
Anhwei) by the Sung general Liu Ch’i2, whose infantry employed a new tactic
to counter the formidable Jurchen cavalry by using long pikes like scythes
to hack at their horses’ legs. Further Chin advances were held in check by
Yüeh Fei, who won battles at Yen-ch’eng and Ying-ch’ang (present-day Hsüch’ang in Honan). Liu Ch’i2 then took the initiative and, despite repeated
calls from the emperor to abandon his advance and withdraw, drove deep into
enemy-held territory to recapture Lo-yang and reach the outskirts of K’ai-feng.
However, without the government’s support, and denied the reinforcements
he required to capitalize on his victories, Yüeh Fei was overextended, and
he was finally forced to withdraw, as had his fellow generals. In early 1141,
Yang Ch’i-chung defeated Chin forces at Che-kao (east of modern Ho-fei), but
Wan-yen Wu-chu regrouped and captured Hao-chou (Feng-yang, in Anhwei).
The fighting now reached a stalemate, and Wang-yen Wu-chu was ready to
negotiate. He took the initiative by sending diplomatic letters and returning
detained Sung envoys. Ch’in Kuei again convinced Kao-tsung to write humble
letters begging for the restoration of peace.
Probably as a gesture to show the Chin that the Sung court was sincere
in seeking peace, in mid-1141 Kao-tsung suddenly ordered his chief generals
Han Shih-chung, Chang Chün2, and Yüeh Fei to attend an audience at the
court to receive rewards for their victories. Han and Chang were promoted to
be commissioners of military affairs, and Yüeh was made a deputy commissioner of military affairs. But the generals, now safely seconded to the central
government establishment, were stripped of their personal commands, which
were divided up and assigned to civil officials. With the three great generals
stripped of their personal military power, the peace negotiations proceeded
0
200 km
0
100 miles
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K’ai-feng
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Chu-hsien-chün
Ying-ch’ang-fu
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LIN-AN
The path of Yüeh Fei’s
forces, 1140
Map 24. Yüeh Fei’s incursions into Chin territory, 1140.
tao jing-shen
684
smoothly. Unlike the situation in 1138, in 1141 the majority of the court officials remained silent about the negotiations. Most of the opponents of Ch’in
Kuei had been ousted, and the few who remained dared not speak out against
Kao-tsung and Ch’in Kuei. Only Han Shih-chung openly opposed the peace
plan, and he was allowed to retire from public life.
In the winter of 1141, a new treaty was concluded between the Sung and
the Chin. The treaty declared the Sung a vassal state of the Chin as before,
with Kao-tsung referring to the Chin as shang-kuo (superior state), and his own
dynasty as pi-i (insignificant fiefdom). In state letters to the Chin, Kao-tsung
referred to himself as “subject” and he was not recognized as “emperor” by the
Chin government. The Sung was committed to sending the Chin an annual
tribute (kung2) of a quarter million taels of silver and a quarter million bolts
of silk. The border between the two states was to follow the Huai River in
the east and to run south of the prefectures of T’ang-chou and Teng-chou2
in the west. This new border was considerably south of the one negotiated in
1138, and left K’ai-feng and the Honan region in Chin hands. The two states
would exchange envoys regularly to celebrate the New Year and the birthdays
of their respective emperors. Kao-tsung eventually accepted this humiliating
investiture document on 11 October 1142, and the imperial coffins and Kaotsung’s mother were duly returned to Lin-an.72
Soon after the Sung acceptance of the treaty in 1142, the two states, Sung
and Chin, established a number of border markets to revive mutual trade.
Exports from the south included tea, spices, drugs, silk, cotton, coins, cattle,
and rice. The export of the last three items was forbidden by the Sung government, but large quantities of these commodities were smuggled north. Imports
from Chin to Sung included hides, pearls, ginseng, silk, and horses. The Chin
government banned the export of horses, but smuggling went on regardless. In this trade the Sung government enjoyed an export surplus and consequently gained an influx of silver that more than compensated for the tribute
payments.
The execution of Yüeh Fei
During the treaty negotiations, in the seventh month 1141, Yüeh Fei was
indicted by the censors under the control of Ch’in Kuei, arrested, and charged
with treason. His trial at the Court of Judicial Review (Ta-li ssu) dragged
on inconclusively for weeks; neither the president of the court nor his two
vice-presidents thought Yüeh Fei was guilty. But Ch’in Kuei was determined
to rid himself of his adversary. The blunt Yüeh Fei had been outspoken and
72
On these events, see Franke, “Treaties between Sung and Chin,” pp. 76–81.
Yen-ching
HSIA
C H I N
(Southern Capital)
iver
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Han River
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Map 25. Southern Sung borders as of 1142.
600 km
400 miles
686
tao jing-shen
undiplomatic, and evidence was either fabricated or misinterpreted to uphold
the charges. Before the treaty was concluded, on the last day of the twelfth
month of 1141, Yüeh Fei was either executed or forced to commit suicide in
prison by order of Ch’in Kuei. It is disputed whether Kao-tsung himself was
involved in the decision.
This flagrant act of injustice, the execution of Sung’s most successful commander and a national hero in order to achieve a humiliating peace, became
the “defining act” of Kao-tsung’s reign, and has provoked violently partisan
controversy in the ensuing centuries. Yüeh Fei became a folk hero, eventually
canonized as one of the gods of war, together with his own hero, Kuan Yü,
making it doubly difficult for a historian to make a dispassionate judgment of
his case. In contrast, Ch’in Kuei was vilified after his death to such an extent
that it is difficult to assess the politics of his long period of political dominance
that followed these events.
Ever since Yüeh Fei’s death, historians have argued that Yüeh Fei was
framed and deliberately killed by Ch’in Kuei in order to remove the most
prominent and outspoken obstacle to peace negotiations. Some have gone further and suspected that Ch’in Kuei had Yüeh Fei eliminated at the request
of the Chin commander, Wan-yen Wu-chu, who wished to be permanently
rid of his most dangerous military adversary. There is no doubt that Yüeh Fei
was a victim of Kao-tsung’s policy to restore the central government’s control
of its overly powerful generals, and that he was also a principal obstacle to
the peace settlement for which both Kao-tsung and Ch’in Kuei were obsessively striving. Yüeh Fei had the misfortune to fall victim to the process of
centralizing military power just when, ironically, he and the other generals
had obtained a military stalemate against Chin forces. His execution, which
followed the removal of himself and his fellow generals from their commands,
was a stark warning to other military men that they were no longer an irreplaceable pivotal force in the survival of the Sung state.73 Yüeh Fei was not
the only great commander with whom Ch’in Kuei was at odds; Ch’in Kuei
was also on difficult terms with Kao-tsung’s most trusted general, Han Shihchung.
The argument that Ch’in Kuei was an agent acting for the Chin lacks all
credibility and was probably an unfounded attempt to blacken Ch’in Kuei’s
73
For appraisals of Yüeh Fei, see Hellmut Wilhelm, “From myth to myth: The case of Yüeh Fei’s biography,”
in Confucian personalities, ed. Arthur F. Wright and Denis C. Twitchett (Stanford, Calif., 1962), pp. 146–
61; Liu Tzu-chien (James T. C. Liu), “Yüeh Fei (1103–1141) and China’s heritage of loyalty,” Journal
of Asian Studies 31 No. 2 (1972), pp. 291–7. See also “Yüeh Fei” in his Liang Sung shih yen-chiu hui-pien,
pp. 185–207. Liu, China turning inward, pp. 98–105. See the critical appraisal in Hartman, “The making
of a villain,” pp. 59–146.
the move to the south and the reign of kao-tsung
687
reputation. Although Ch’in Kuei has been accused by many historians of
being a traitor, there is no substantial evidence to prove that he ever actively
collaborated with the Chin. He had relatives who had served in the Ta Ch’i
puppet regime, and through them he might have obtained important information about the political and military situation in the north. But this hardly
constitutes treason.
Kao-tsung too has been severely criticized by some historians as cowardly
for not openly challenging the demands of the Chin and for selfishly wanting
to preserve his throne at all costs. These historians point out that the Chin not
only threatened to conquer the Southern Sung but also used their captive, the
former emperor Ch’in-tsung, as political leverage against the younger brother,
Kao-tsung. If the Chin had chosen to return Ch’in-tsung to the Southern
Sung, it would have created political confusion since Kao-tsung’s legitimacy
would have been seriously compromised. Ch’in-tsung’s return also would have
threatened Ch’in Kuei’s dominance. There is no record that Kao-tsung ever
asked for the return either of Ch’in-tsung, or of his own wife, Empress Hsing
(who died in 1138), either before or after 1141. Thus these historians conclude
that neither Kao-tsung nor Ch’in Kuei really wanted Ch’in-tsung back, and
that this was a major reason for Kao-tsung’s failure to take an aggressive stand
against the Chin. However, when Kao-tsung’s mother, the Dowager Empress
Hsien-jen, was returned to the south in 1142, she carried a message from Ch’intsung, who asked only to be allowed to live in retirement if he was released
from captivity.74 Again Ch’in Kuei seems to have been closely involved with
this matter. In 1143, Chang Shao (1096–1156), a Sung envoy, reported to
Ch’in Kuei that the Chin seemed to be willing to return Ch’in-tsung, and
suggested sending a special ambassador to request Ch’in-tsung’s release. Ch’in
Kuei became angry and demoted Chang.75 Clearly, Ch’in Kuei considered
74
75
See Ch’ao-yeh i-chi (13th c.; Taipei, 1964), vol. 1, p. 1199. For critical views of Kao-tsung and Ch’in
Kuei, see “Kao-tsung” in Wang Fu-chih, Sung lun (c. 1690–2; Peking, 1964) 10, pp. 167–202; Miao
Feng-lin, “Sung Kao-tsung yü Nu-chen i-ho lun,” Kuo-feng pan-yüeh-k’an 8 No. 2 (1936), pp. 39–44; Chu
Hsieh, “Sung Chin i-ho chih hsin fen-hsi,” Tung-fang tsa-chih 33 No. 10 (1936), pp. 65–74; Miyazaki
Ichisada, “Nan-Sō seijishi gaisetsu,” in Ajia-shi kenkyū dai ni, Miyazaki Ichisada (Kyoto, 1959), pp.
174–7; and Teng Kuang-ming, “Nan Sung tui Chin tou-cheng chung ti chi-ko wen-t’i,” Li-shih yenchiu No. 2 (1963), pp. 21–32; also Teng Kuang-ming, Yüeh Fei chuan, rev. ed. (Peking, 1983); Tseng
Ch’iung-pi, Ch’ien-ku tsui-jen Ch’in Kuei (Cheng-chou, 1984). For revisionist views, see Chao I, Nien-erh
shih cha-chi (1799; Taipei, 1968) 26, and Ch’en Teng-yüan, “Ch’in Kuei p’ing,” Chin-ling hsüeh-pao 1
No. 1 (1931), pp. 27–46. Other traditional views are cited in Kuan Lü-ch’üan, Liang Sung shih-lun
(Cheng-chou, 1983), p. 250. For Southern Sung patriotism, see Hoyt C. Tillman, “Proto-nationalism
in twelfth-century China? The case of Ch’en Liang,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 39 No. 2 (1979),
pp. 403–28.
CYYL (1936) 150, p. 2410.
688
tao jing-shen
the return of Ch’in-tsung, conveniently for the emperor and himself, a dead
issue.
In fairness to Kao-tsung, his policies toward the Chin during the early
years of his reign were not simply those of passive appeasement, even though
envoys were constantly sent to the Chin court requesting the return of Emperor
Hui-tsung and Kao-tsung’s mother, the dowager empress Hsien-jen (d. 1159).
When Ch’in Kuei first became chief councilor in 1131, he proposed peaceful
coexistence with the Chin, but Kao-tsung had not yet come either to accept
the situation or to trust Ch’in Kuei completely. Thus when Lü I-hao wished to
have Ch’in Kuei replaced with Chu Sheng-fei as chief councilor, Lü attacked
Ch’in Kuei on the grounds that by advocating peace with the enemy he was
blocking plans for recovering the lost territories. Lü also charged that Ch’in
Kuei had formed a clique and was attempting to monopolize political power.
Kao-tsung gave in and dismissed Ch’in Kuei. In those early years, however,
Ch’in Kuei was by no means alone in promoting peace, and five years later, in
1136, even Chao Ting was in favor of peace.76
The turning point from a proactive, aggressive military policy to a passive,
defensive one was Kao-tsung’s abortive attempt to carry out a northern expedition in 1137. The defection to Ta Ch’i of one of Kao-tsung’s key generals with
his powerful army dealt the war faction a serious blow. From that time on,
Ch’in Kuei gradually won the complete trust of Kao-tsung, serving as chief
councilor from 1138, and concluding a peace settlement with Chin. After the
final treaty was concluded in 1142, Ch’in Kuei was granted the august title of
senior preceptor (t’ai-shih), and became the dominant figure in government.
He was regarded by some as a sage chief minister (sheng-hsiang), by others as a
tyrant.
It was apparently Kao-tsung’s own determination that led him to put such
unquestioning confidence in Ch’in Kuei. There is an anecdote about how
Ch’in Kuei secured Kao-tsung’s trust in 1138. When Kao-tsung was inclined
to accept a peace settlement, Ch’in asked him to consider the issue for three
days, and after three days, he asked the emperor to consider it for three more
days. After that he asked Kao-tsung to give him full authority to go ahead
with the peace plan, free of interference from any other minister.77 Years later,
in 1148, Kao-tsung recalled Ch’in Kuei’s first proposal for peace (in 1131),
saying that even at that time Ch’in had already made up his mind to make
peace. But when Kao-tsung attributed the achievement of peace to Ch’in
Kuei, Ch’in replied: “The decision to make peace was entirely Your Majesty’s.
76
77
CYYL (1936) 106, p. 1727.
Hsü, San-ch’ao pei-meng hui-pien 184, pp. 5b–6b.
the move to the south and the reign of kao-tsung
689
Your servant only carried it out; what achievement was there in this for
me?”78
ch’in kuei’s dominance, 1141–1155
Kao-tsung was a serious and diligent ruler who wanted to make all important
decisions on state affairs by himself. He was committed to a strict daily routine.
Kao-tsung met with his officials in the morning, and spent much of the
afternoon and evening reading. He was fond of the Shih-chi (Records of the
historian), the Shu-ching (Book of documents), the Ch’un-ch’iu (Spring and Autumn
annals), and especially the Tso-chuan (Tso tradition), which he would go through
every twenty-four days. It seems that Kao-tsung’s interest in the Spring and
Autumn annals was as a political tool. He not only studied it diligently himself
but also encouraged his ministers to do the same, aiming to enhance his
authority by association with the kingly and sagely tone of the work. In
addition to reading, he practiced archery and calligraphy, and attended to
memorials in the evening.
The driving objective of Kao-tsung’s early years on the throne was the
restoration of strong central control of the different branches of government,
centering on the control of the military. He was ruling a society that had been
militarized at every level after nearly twenty years of conflict. This objective
continued, but the style of his rule changed somewhat after 1141. Before
1141 he had admired Emperor Han Kuang-wu-ti (r. 25–57) of the Later Han
dynasty, who had restored the Han dynasty after it had been overthrown. He
contrasted Han Kuang-wu-ti’s reign with that of the T’ang dynasty emperor
T’ang T’ai-tsung (r. 626–49), saying that T’ang T’ai-tsung had loved fame
too much and was not as direct and honest as Han Kuang-wu-ti had been.
After 1141, however, Kao-tsung began to admire the Han dynasty emperor
Wen-ti (r. 180–157 b.c.e.), who had attempted to adhere to the principle of
nonaction (wu wei) to attain peace and prosperity, and to establish the primacy
of civil government over the military and the use of force. While the apparent
reason for Kao-tsung’s attempt to emulate Wen-ti’s style of governing was to
preserve the peace concluded between the Sung and the Chin, a consistent
new theme emerged in his discussions with his ministers. Kao-tsung said that
he preferred a “soft” (jou) approach to politics, and that he liked Emperor
Han Kuang-wu-ti’s “soft” policies and admired the Sung emperor Jen-tsung’s
(r. 1022–63) benevolent rule. Kao-tsung cited the peace that had been made
with the Liao as a good precedent and one that, if followed, would benefit the
78
CYYL (1936) 158, p. 2564.
690
tao jing-shen
people. Kao-tsung once said that the emperors in the Northern Sung period
had never wanted war and that like them he employed the “way of softness”
(jou-tao) to “control” (yü) the Jurchen Chin.79
Ch’in Kuei’s monopoly of power
When he allowed his chief minister, Ch’in Kuei, freedom to direct state affairs
after 1141, Kao-tsung was emulating the emperor Han Wen-ti. However,
Ch’in Kuei, who may have been an advocate of peace, could hardly be called
an exponent of “soft government.” Having already purged most of the war
party from central government, he systematically replaced his political enemies
with his own relatives and trusted followers. Born in the south, Ch’in Kuei
did not come from a great clan, but his wife was from a famous branch of
the Wang lineage, which originally came from Szechwan. They had settled
in K’ai-feng when her grandfather Wang Kuei (1019–85) had become an
important minister and eventually chief councilor in the 1070s and 1080s.
Ch’in’s father-in-law, Wang Chung-shan, and Wang’s younger brother, Wang
Chung-i, were sons of Wang Kuei, and both had surrendered in 1129 to the
Chin army during its invasion. When Ch’in Kuei became chief councilor,
the Wang brothers as well as Cheng I-nien, a cousin of Ch’in Kuei’s wife
who had served the short-lived Ta Ch’u regime of Chang Pang-ch’ang in
the north, were all pardoned and given official appointments in the Sung
administration. Wang Huan2 and Wang Hui, Ch’in’s brothers-in-law, were
also made officials of the middle rank. Through these personal connections and
through envoys like Wang Lun, Ch’in Kuei may have gained important and
detailed information about the political and military situations in the north.
Ch’in Kuei also established close relationships with Chang Ch’u-wei, a eunuch,
and with Wang Chi-hsien (1098–1181), Kao-tsung’s favorite physician, who
was also a “sworn brother” of Ch’in’s wife. Through them, Ch’in Kuei and his
adopted son, Ch’in Hsi (d. 1161), obtained inside personal information about
Kao-tsung and his opinions.80
During Ch’in Kuei’s period in control of the state Chin Kuei remained the
only chief councilor. A large number of assistant councilors were appointed,
usually with some specific policy in mind, but most of them enjoyed tenures
of a year or less, after which they were either posted far from the capital where
79
80
Tao, The Jurchen in twelfth-century China, pp. 192–3, 195.
See Liu, “Ch’in Kuei ti ch’in-yu,” pp. 310–23, and Teraji, Nan-Sō shoki seijishi kenkyū, pp. 348–67. For a
valuable study of the creation of Ch’in Kuei’s historical image, see Hartman, “The making of a villain,”
pp. 59–146.
the move to the south and the reign of kao-tsung
691
they could have little influence on policy, or they were simply impeached by
the censors at Ch’in Kuei’s bidding.81
Ch’in Kuei’s tampering with the dynastic record
Ch’in Kuei was concerned that the historical record show in the most favorable
light his role in the controversial events of Kao-tsung’s reign. The early Sung
emperors established arrangements for an official from the History Office to
compile what would become a Veritable record (Shih-lu) of each reign, garnered
first from the Court diary of activity and repose (Ch’i-chü chu), and then from
the Daily calendar (jih-li). The compilation for a reign’s Veritable record had
been modified in Hui-tsung’s time, when the History Office was left unstaffed
and the collection of the record entrusted to the editorial secretaries of the
Palace Library (Pi-shu sheng). The Veritable record of Shen-tsung’s reign (r. 1067–
85) had been revised repeatedly in later reigns because of the contemporary
political implications of the policies of Shen-tsung’s chief councilor, Wang Anshih (1021–68). The Veritable record for Shen-tsung was revised in 1135 and
again in 1138 under the chief councilors Chang Chün and Chao Ting. Under
Ch’in Kuei, the History Office was abolished in 1140. All of its projects
were entrusted to staff in the Palace Library who had been specially assigned
by the chief councilor, the official who was effectively in complete control
of the compilation of the dynastic record. After 1143 no court diarists were
appointed, and the compilation of the Court diary of activity and repose was in
abeyance. This left the collection and preservation of the other relevant archival
materials on state policy in the hands of the chief councilor, that is to say, in
the hands of Ch’in Kuei himself. In 1142, Ch’in Kuei had Ch’in Hsi, who had
just earned a chin-shih degree, appointed to the Palace Library; subsequently
Ch’in Hsi was made the library’s vice-director. In 1144, Ch’in Hsi was given
a newly created post as supervisor of all the library’s business, a position he
held until Ch’in Kuei’s death in 1155, shortly before which a grandson was
also appointed to a library office.
Ch’in Hsi and two colleagues began by completing retroactively a new Daily
calendar of the years since the Chien-yen reign period to replace the existing
Daily calendars for 1127–42. They gave Ch’in Kuei’s version of events in place of
the contemporary accounts of the court diarists. They also compiled a Sung lun,
a general discussion of the events leading to the peace of 1142. Moreover, Ch’in
Kuei had altered or suppressed much of the archival material about his first
81
For a list, see Gung Wei Ai, “The role of censorial officials in the power struggle during Southern Sung
China, 1127–1278” (M.A. thesis, University of Malaya, 1971), pp. 308–12.
692
tao jing-shen
tenure as a councilor in 1131–2. After his death these distortions were further
confounded by later, mostly “Learning of the Way” (Tao-hsüeh), historians,
anxious to reverse Ch’in Kuei’s version of events and to present a negative view
of him and his policies. These distortions piled upon distortions have left the
historiography of Kao-tsung’s reign a minefield for later historians, who have
been trying gallantly since the twelfth century to sort out the obfuscations.82
This problem was further complicated by the imposition of a ban on the private
writing of histories and by the institution of what amounted to state control
over books and publication.
When the Palace Library was opened in grand new premises in 1144, Kaotsung remarked on the small size of its collection. The original Sung palace
libraries had been lost when the Chin captured K’ai-feng, and a great effort
was made to locate and solicit the gift of works to fill the lacunae. In 1143
standard rates to be paid for copies of missing works were set, and when this
failed to persuade owners to meet the library’s needs, all local jurisdictions
were ordered to appoint officials to take copies of rare works in the hands of
local scholars. To encourage officials to take this task seriously, an order was
issued in 1146 that the local authorities were to be paid rewards as well as the
owners.
At the same time, private publishing of all sorts continued to grow, especially in Fu-chien and Szechwan. By law, depository copies of all newly printed
books, printed on special yellow paper, were required to be sent to the Palace
Library. Local authorities were empowered to prevent the printing of and
destroy the printing blocks for any works deemed not “beneficial to learning.”
This escalated into an attempt to impose strict censorship, and it was applied
with great severity to all unofficial writing of histories and political memoirs,
though at first the ban was widely disregarded. Apprehension about the draconian way these standards were applied by local petty officials caused the loss
or voluntary destruction of the writings of many scholars and the scattering
of important collections. There is no doubt that Ch’in Kuei envisaged these
rules as a form of heavy censorship – even thought control.83
The worst aspect of this control on books, printing, and open discourse was
that people were encouraged to send in denunciations (kao-chieh) of others for
antigovernment views expressed in their private papers, correspondence, or
even conversation. Such denunciations, coupled with Ch’in Kuei’s systematic
use of the Censorate as a mechanism to purge officialdom of all his opponents, poisoned the atmosphere of politics, which became more oppressive
82
83
See the account in Hartman, “The making of a villain,” pp. 68–80.
The term “thought control” is used in Liu, China turning inward, p. 100. Liu’s use is quoted in Hartman,
“The making of a villain,” p. 61.
the move to the south and the reign of kao-tsung
693
and sharply polarized. Ch’in Kuei saw signs of dissent everywhere, and became
increasingly suspicious and vindictive as the years passed. To suppress dissident opinions, especially any criticism of the treaty with the Chin, ever more
stringent measures of censorship, the banning and burning of literature, and
the encouragement of personal impeachment and denunciations were imposed,
leading to a reign of terror in which many officials and scholars who had been
critical of Ch’in Kuei or his policies were branded members of hostile cliques,
banished, and even killed. Their followers and associates were also demoted
or banished. Just before his death in 1155, Ch’in Kuei arranged for the mass
treason trial of fifty-three suspect literati, who escaped death only because
Ch’in Kuei died before he could sign their death warrants. The list of Ch’in
Kuei’s victims is impressive, but the greatest victim was the atmosphere of
collegial trust among the court officials.
Ch’in Kuei and the “Learning of the Way”
Peace and economic development not withstanding, the political atmosphere
under Ch’in Kuei was repressive. A vindictive politician, he practiced nepotism
on a wide scale, and hounded opponents remorselessly. But these persecutions
were not purely acts of personal vengeance. There was also an ideological
issue involved in many of Ch’in Kuei’s attacks on his opponents. Since the
establishment of the Southern Sung, the reputation of Wang An-shih and his
followers had been under attack as part of blaming the debacle of 1126–7
on the revival of Wang’s New Policies (hsin-fa) under Hui-tsung’s powerful
chief councilor, Ts’ai Ching (1046–1127). Ch’eng I (1033–1107), one of the
founders of Tao-hsüeh learning and an opponent of Wang An-shih’s reforms,
had been granted posthumous honors by Hui-tsung. However, Ch’in Kuei
and his followers disliked the use of Tao-hsüeh learning to criticize Kao-tsung,
Ch’in himself, or the peace treaty of 1141. Sporadic attacks on the founders
of Tao-hsüeh learning from a generation earlier, Ch’eng I and his followers,
began throughout the 1130s and expanded in the 1140s, when Ch’in Kuei
denounced Ch’eng I’s “specialist learning” (chuan-men hsüeh). Chao Ting, the
former chief councilor and Ch’in Kuei’s bitter political rival, was an advocate
of Ch’eng I’s teachings, which were tainted when Chao was forced out of the
government.84 Another friend of Tao-hsüeh learning, Li Kuang, was forced
from office in 1138 and also sent to Hainan Island. In 1155, Ssu-ma Kuang’s
famous notebook, Su-shui chi-wen (Record by the Su River), was banned at the
84
Conrad Schirokauer, “Neo-Confucians under attack: The condemnation of wei-hsüeh,” in Crisis and prosperity in Sung China, ed. John W. Haeger (Tucson, Ariz., 1975), pp. 163–98. These themes are also
addressed in detail in Hartman, “The making of a villain,” pp. 117–46.
tao jing-shen
694
request of his own great grandson for fear of possible political persecution.85
After Ch’in Kuei’s death in 1155, Kao-tsung reversed many of the orders
that had persecuted Ch’in Kuei’s political enemies and their families. Some
of the men, even such controversial figures as Chao Ting and Yüeh Fei, were
posthumously rehabilitated.
stabilizing civilian government
The stress placed by Kao-tsung and Ch’in Kuei on civilian control of the
government and the military was accompanied by a general increase in state
support for education. In 1134, Kao-tsung had been pleased that the Imperial University was reestablished, but he commented sadly that only after the
restoration of peace would the people be able to begin turning again to the
pursuit of learning.86 Ch’in Kuei himself was a distinguished chin-shih graduate, and his first post was as an instructor at the university in K’ai-feng during
the last years of Hui-tsung’s reign, from 1123 to 1126. When Ch’in Kuei
came to power as chief councilor he decided to promote education and culture.
In an act that had political implications, the university was granted a new site
in what had been Yüeh Fei’s great mansion in Lin-an, and new premises were
built and gradually expanded.
The school system also benefited. After Kao-tsung visited the new site of the
Imperial University in 1144, he told Ch’in Kuei that had it not been for Ch’in’s
efforts to make peace, it would have been impossible to improve the schools.87
Subsequently, it was required that every newly appointed local official should
visit the local Confucian temple, where the school was normally located, before
taking up any government administrative matters.88 Twice in Northern Sung
times, all prefectures and counties had been ordered to build schools, but these
orders had not been followed everywhere and many places still did not have
schools in early Southern Sung times. Moreover, quite a few existing schools
had been destroyed during the war years, and it took some time to rebuild
them. Schools were continuously being built during the Southern Sung, using
local government funds, income from school land worked by tenant-farmers,
donations from the rich, and labor from the poor.
The “school land” (hsüeh-t’ien) system had been an innovation in Northern
Sung times. Under this system, the government granted an endowment of
land to a prefecture or county, the income from which was to be used either
to build a new school or to support an existing one. The first “school land”
85
86
87
88
CYYL (1936) 154, p. 2477.
CYYL (1936) 149, p. 2403.
CYYL (1936) 151, p. 2429.
CYYL (1936) 152, p. 2454.
the move to the south and the reign of kao-tsung
695
was established in Yen-chou (modern Yen county, Shantung) in 1022. The
same arrangement was followed in many prefectures, with the school property
ranging from several tens of mou to over a thousand mou. The maintenance
and expansion of hsüeh-t’ien in a prefecture required long-term efforts by local
officials with local support. For example, under the Northern Sung the “school
land” endowment in Yün-chou (modern Tung-p’ing county, Shantung) had
been established by Fan Chung-yen (989–1052). Later, T’eng Yüan-fa (1020–
90) obtained 2,500 mou of land for the prefectural school, which yielded an
annual income of one million cash. In the south, the hsüeh-t’ien endowment
of the Wu-hsing school began with 500 mou of land, which was increased
by the prefect Pao K’o to 1,200 mou, bringing in an income sufficient to
support one hundred students. The Chien-k’ang prefectural school started with
a government land grant of 10 ch’ing (1,000 mou) in 1029. This was increased
to 38 ch’ing and 57 mou (3,857 mou), including three wineries, and by the early
1130s it still had a total of 1,915 mou. In 1158, the school acquired 1,890
mou, and in the 1260s it had a total of 9,380 mou. In Ch’ih-ch’eng (modern
Lin-hai, Chekiang), the six prefectural and county schools possessed 2,814.2
mou of arable land in Southern Sung times. The establishment of schools in
every prefecture and county definitely helped to promote Confucian education
widely, even in remote border areas.89 A weakness of the public schools was that
they trained students almost exclusively for the civil service examinations. In
Southern Sung times private schools and academies also proliferated. In many
of these, Tao-hsüeh (Learning of the Way) masters taught disciples who were
not primarily interested in official civil service careers.90 As part of the effort to
promote schools and control school curricula, by the end of Kao-tsung’s reign
the government had published complete sets of the classics and the standard
histories.91
As in the Northern Sung, the Southern Sung government relied on the
civil service examinations for bureaucratic recruitment. These examinations
were held every three years and produced a large number of chin-shih degree
holders. In Northern Sung times, the pass rate for candidates for the chinshih degree varied between one in ten and one in fifteen. During the early
years of the Southern Sung, the success rate was one in eight. This disparity
reflected the urgent need to replace the many officials lost with the Chin
conquest of the north and from the destruction of war. During Kao-tsung’s
reign, the government could recruit potential officials only from the south, and
89
90
91
See Tao Jing-shen (T’ao Chin-sheng), “Sung Chin miao-hsüeh yü ju-chia ssu-hsiang ti ch’uan-pu,” in
Kuo-chi K’ung-hsüeh hui-i lun-wen-chi, ed. Chung-hua min-kuo K’ung-Meng hsüeh-hui et al. (Taipei,
1988), pp. 536–7.
See Thomas H. C. Lee, Government education and examinations in Sung China (New York, 1985); Linda A.
Walton, Academies and society in Southern Sung China (Honolulu, 1999).
Li, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (1935–7) chia 4, pp. 63–4.
696
tao jing-shen
enlisted an average of 336 chin-shih per triennial examination, which compares
favorably with the averages of the first four reigns in the Northern Sung. The
average number of chin-shih per examination during the later reign of Hsiaotsung (1162–89) was 429.5, surpassing the average of 400 during Shen-tsung’s
reign (1067–85). One characteristic of the early Southern Sung civil service
examinations was that the majority of chin-shih recruits came from nonofficial
families, on the evidence of the extant list of chin-shih of 1148. Another feature
was that the chin-shih were selected by local government authorities in the
early years of Kao-tsung’s reign. Later this form of local selection continued
to be practiced in Szechwan, because it was very difficult for the Szechwanese
candidates to travel to Lin-an.92
Kao-tsung’s realization that the restoration of control over the north was
temporarily unattainable can also be seen in his decision to make Hang-chou
rather than Chien-k’ang (Nanking) the capital. In T’ang times Hang-chou had
been a major regional city, important as the southern terminus of the Grand
Canal. At the end of the T’ang it was the capital of the richest, most stable
and enduring, regional state of the Five Dynasties, Wu-Yüeh. Situated on
the northern bank of the Che River a few miles before it reaches Hang-chou
Bay, the city had been heavily fortified, with a triple line of walls, and the
narrowing terrain was also favorable for defense. Other possible choices in the
lower Yangtze region to be a temporary capital were Su-chou, the center of
the burgeoning rice-producing plain around Lake T’ai, and Chien-k’ang, once
the capital of the southern dynasties, which had the advantage of being more
central, and a more convenient place to exercise military command over the
upper Yangtze valley. During the Chin invasion in 1130 it had been Kaotsung’s first choice as the temporary capital, but Hang-chou was close to the
sea, and Kao-tsung had fled by sea in early 1130 when Wan-yen Wu-chu tried
to capture him. Although Kao-tsung never announced that Hang-chou (after
1133, renamed Lin-an) was his permanent capital, from 1133 the construction
there of the imperial ancestral temple and a ming-tang (Hall of Enlightenment)
clearly revealed his long-term intentions. In 1135, when he was more confident about his ability to fight the Chin, he commented: “If the enemy dare
come, I will personally lead the armies to meet the challenge and destroy
them, and then we would be able to recover the Central Plain. If we again
consider the policy of escaping by sea, how would we be able to maintain the
nation?”93
92
93
Edward A. Kracke, Jr., “Family vs. merit in the civil service examinations during the empire,” Harvard
Journal of Asiatic Studies 10 No. 2 (1947), pp. 105–23; Araki Toshikazu, Sōdai kakyo seido kenkyū (Kyoto,
1969), pp. 224, 450–9; Chapter 5 of John W. Chaffee, The thorny gates of learning in Sung China: A social
history of examinations (Cambridge, 1985).
CYYL (1936) 84, p. 1378.
the move to the south and the reign of kao-tsung
697
From 1130 to 1137 the court was constantly on the move between
Lin-an and Chien-k’ang. When the Sung were taking the initiative Chienk’ang was the better command center. When the Sung were hard-pressed by
the Chin and T’a Ch’i, Lin-an offered a safer refuge. Suggestions to make Chienk’ang the permanent capital had been made by Wang T’ao2 (1074–1137)
in 1135, by Chang Chün in 1136, by Chang Shou in 1138, and by Chang
Hsing-ch’eng in 1139. All were ignored.94 In 1161, when the ambitious Chin
emperor Wan-yen Liang (r. 1149–61; known also as Prince Hai-ling) began
his military campaign against the Sung, Kao-tsung again planned to escape
by sea, although this proved unnecessary. During his reign, Kao-tsung never
traveled west of Chien-k’ang.
Kao-tsung sponsored efforts to restore and improve court ceremony. When
the Southern Sung was established, the imperial ceremonial implements were
transported south from K’ai-feng but were lost or burned when Kao-tsung fled
Yang-chou in 1129. Not much was done with respect to ritual and court ceremonies before 1141, although the Imperial Bureau of Music (Chiao-fang) had
been restored in 1134, employing 416 musicians, with eunuchs in charge.95
After the 1141 treaty with the Chin, the Sung gradually restored imperial
ceremonies and ritual practices, and a school for imperial family members was
also reestablished. Many instruments necessary for ritual were made in 1146.
A “great audience” ceremony was finally performed for the first time in the
Southern Sung period on New Year’s Day 1155.96 The next year, the requisite
new ceremonial implements and regalia were ready for use, including the papao (“the eight treasures,” or “the eight imperial seals”). In 1157, the Imperial
Ancestral Temple (T’ai-miao) was built in Lin-an. On this occasion Kao-tsung
personally wrote out the Hsiao-ching (Book of filial piety), which was then copied
and inscribed on steles in many prefectures.97
the economy and financial policies
The financial administration of the early Southern Sung differed from its northern predecessor in two fundamental ways. First, the emergencies caused by the
war required a substantial part of the tax revenue from many areas to be retained
by local fiscal intendants to fund military units there. This was especially true
in Szechwan, where the central government’s control was limited, and the
94
95
96
97
Liao Kang had suggested in 1131 that Chien-k’ang be made the capital; see CYYL (1936) 48, p. 861.
Other Chien-k’ang proponents were Hu An-kuo in 1132, CYYL (1936) 53, pp. 934–5; Chang Chün,
CYYL (1936) 102, p. 1668; Chang Shou, CYYL (1936) 118, p. 1898; and Chang Hsing-ch’eng, CYYL
(1936) 128, p. 2079.
CYYL (1936) 151, p. 2426; Li, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (1935–7) chia 3, pp. 52–3.
CYYL (1936) 153, p. 2461; Li, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (1935–7) chia 3, p. 47.
CYYL (1936) 155, p. 2517. Li, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (1935–7) chia 3, p. 46.
698
tao jing-shen
region was almost completely financially independent. Szechwan was too far
away to risk sending its tax revenues across ungoverned or enemy-controlled
stretches to the central government in Lin-an. The same trend toward decentralization that was apparent in military and political administration was also
dominant in the field of finance. Second, the Southern Sung was in severe
financial difficulties in its early years, which forced the introduction of new
taxes. By the end of Kao-tsung’s reign, however, the government seems to
have managed to achieve financial stability. From the estimates of government
revenues it seems that the regime was fairly rich. For most of the early Southern Sung the government relied mainly upon the wealth of the southeast and
of Szechwan. The bulk of government revenues came from taxes on salt, tea,
liquor, and silk, in addition to the new taxes created in the early years for
supporting the military. Government income around 1130, generated largely
in the southeast, reached the figure of almost 30 million mixed units (one
“unit” of copper cash was equivalent to one thousand cash).98 This figure surpassed the 16 million units of the early years of the Northern Sung, when taxes
were collected over the whole of the empire. Although in the first five years
of Kao-tsung’s reign the regime suffered from a severe shortage of financial
resources to meet its military needs, by the end of the 1130s the situation had
improved as more effective government control was reestablished over a larger
part of the regions south of the Yangtze River. These regions had provided
the bulk of state revenue in late Northern Sung times. By the early 1160s,
the government’s annual income had surged to 80 million units. Successful
financial policies and administration played a great part helping prevent further Chin invasions. Kao-tsung’s financial policies contributed to the success
of the restoration.
The Southern Sung government continued the policy of imposing salt and
tea monopolies. In Northern Sung, income from such monopolies constituted
a significant part of total state revenues. In the early years of the Southern
Sung, there was a reform of the monopolies in Szechwan, an important area
of both salt and tea production. Chao K’ai (1066–1141), who proposed the
reform, was sent to Szechwan to administer it. The local government began to
sell salt and tea certificates to merchants who purchased salt and tea directly
from the producers and resold it elsewhere. The government sought to control
the trade more firmly and curtail smuggling more effectively. Tea was essential
98
“Mixed units” refers to the strange convention used in finance of lumping together bushels of grain,
lengths of silk, strings of cash, and ounces of silver to give one number. Some people call these “units of
account” or “mixed accounting units.” For discussion, see Peter J. Golas, “The Sung financial administration,” in The Cambridge history of China, volume 5: The Sung dynasty and its precursors, 907–1279, part
2, ed. John W. Chaffee and Denis C. Twitchett (New York, forthcoming).
the move to the south and the reign of kao-tsung
699
to procure horses from nomadic tribesmen in the western frontier and foreign
states. The government therefore needed to secure a constant supply of tea to
send to the western frontier. To do this, the government had to maintain more
stringent control of the tea trade.99
During the war years of the 1120s and 1130s, many regions of Huai-nan,
Hupei, and areas south of the Yangtze River were devastated by the conflict.
Death, disease, famine, and lawlessness led to a massive migration of people
from north to south. In particular, the populations of the war zones in Huainan and Hupei were greatly reduced, and agricultural production and thus tax
revenues there did not recover for many decades. As late as 1159 the central
government received no tax rice from the Huai-nan region. Nevertheless,
government spending on defense was such that eighty percent of government
revenue was needed to maintain armies equal in size to those fielded during the
Northern Sung. Even after the peace of 1141, the number of troops continued to
increase, and during the reign of Hsiao-tsung (r. 1162–89) it reached 418,000,
double the figure of 1141.100
To generate more tax revenue, the government made efforts to increase
arable land and redistribute uncultivated land. As an incentive to encourage people to resume farming, agricultural taxes were temporarily exempted.
Land was distributed in three major ways. First, as a measure to encourage people who had fled from their home district to return, the government accepted
applications from returning refugees for outright grants of land. In other cases,
people rented land from the government in the expectation that ownership
would be transferred to them after a specified period of time. Refugees from
Chin-held territory and veterans were also granted land by the government. In
many cases, the government lent (or with the veterans and northern refugees,
simply gave) the farmers and tenant-farmers capital, seeds, tools, and even
oxen at low or no interest. However, the government sometimes had difficulty
finding land to assign for the huge numbers of refugees. Second, the government itself employed tenant-farmers to engage in agricultural production on
state land. A system called ying-t’ien (land management) was implemented,
under which the government contracted with the tenants to farm the land on
favorable terms. These tenant-farmers were often organized to work in groups.
Third, the military organized soldiers to work on state-run farms (t’un-t’ien)
in the border areas during lulls in military activity. Government land was also
sold to raise emergency funds. Sources of government land included land in
border areas that had been abandoned by people fleeing south during wartime
99
100
See Paul J. Smith, Taxing heaven’s storehouse: Horses, bureaucrats and the destruction of the Sichuan tea industry,
1074–1224 (Cambridge, Mass., 1991).
Liang Keng-yao, Nan Sung ti nung-ti li yung cheng-ts’e (Taipei, 1977), pp. 66–7.
700
tao jing-shen
and land that the government had forcibly purchased or confiscated. Both the
tenant farms of the civil government and the military-operated farms were
well organized, and eventually the land was sold or given to individuals.
By the end of Kao-tsung’s reign in the 1160s, government efforts to increase
revenues through land distribution were generally successful. Taking advantage of the favorable terms offered by the government, large numbers of
people had returned to their native places. Many others migrated from the
more densely populated southeast regions inland to Hunan and Hupei. Consequently, from the last years of Kao-tsung’s reign through the reign of Hsiaotsung, the population in these two regions grew rapidly. Agriculture in these
newly resettled regions recovered and not only produced enough food for the
local population but also began to contribute grain as tax revenue to the central
government by the end of the late 1180s.101
These new measures also had a downside. Throughout the early years of
the Southern Sung, influential men increased their landholdings through the
process called engrossment (chien-ping). Local strongmen and men with official
status, some making use of their connections with local officials, took advantage
of the government’s resettlement plans to obtain large parcels of land for
themselves or simply seized land. Many of them were able to avoid paying
taxes, which resulted in the loss of tax revenues for the government. During
this time, several officials complained that half of the land south of the Yangtze
was owned by big landlords, many of them connected in some way to the
government. Buddhist and Taoist temples also owned large estates, worked by
tenants, that were second in size only to the lands owned by imperial relatives.
From 1142 to 1149, the government tried to equalize taxes by investigating
ownership of cultivated land and assessing proper taxes, but the efforts had
only limited success.102
The total amount of property owned by government schools was dwarfed
by the landholdings of Buddhist temples. For example, in contrast to the
school property in Ch’ih-ch’eng, the local Pao-en Temple there had twice as
much, more than sixty-five hundred mou. It is recorded that in 1143 there
were two hundred thousand monks and nuns in Southern Sung territory. In
Fu-chien, Buddhist temples not only were the largest owners of land, they
possessed the best land. In addition to donations from laymen, members of
the imperial family donated land to the temples. The temples also acquired
101
102
Liang, Nan Sung ti nung-ti li yung cheng-ts’e, pp. 69–102.
Liang Keng-yao, Nan Sung ti nung-ts’un ching-chi (Taipei, 1984), pp. 116–19. Ch’i Hsia, Sung-tai chingchi shih (Shanghai, 1987–8), chapter 6, discusses estate formation during both the Northern and the
Southern Sung.
the move to the south and the reign of kao-tsung
701
land from farmers, and purchased and developed land. In southern Fu-chien
the temples owned an average of one hundred and fifty ch’ing of land, whereas
a rich landlord only had five to ten ch’ing.103
In the field of state finance, an important policy was implemented in 1142
at the suggestion of Li Ch’un-nien (d. 1159). Li pointed out ten problems in
collecting land tax. Among these, the most serious was that powerful landlords
paid less in taxes than did free farmers, which overburdened the peasantry and
deprived local governments of needed revenue. Under the newly initiated “land
survey measure” (ching-chieh fa), every three years local governments were to
survey and register all cultivated land and assess tax appropriately. The measure
aimed at increasing government income, and a bureau carried out the work
until 1149.104
Southern Sung cities benefited from peace. The Chin invasion sent massive waves of refugees from the north and the Central Plains into Southern
Sung territory, especially to the southeast. Officials, soldiers, and rich families began to settle in Hang-chou, Su-chou, Chien-k’ang, and Chen-chiang
areas, stimulating commerce. The growth of trade brought merchants and
artisans to urban areas, generating additional commercial taxes that were collected by the government in local, regional, and central market towns. Income
from commercial taxes in Lan-ch’i county (near modern Chin-hua, Chekiang),
which had been little more than 8,342 units of account in 1077, increased to
13,819 units during the reign of Kao-tsung. Government income from commercial taxes in Yen-chou4 increased from 35,316 units in 1139 to 38,275
units during the Ch’un-hsi era (1174–89) of Hsiao-tsung. Available data from
local gazetteers show a spectacular growth of commercial tax revenue from the
Northern Sung to the Southern Sung period. Commercial tax revenue from
foreign trade along the southern coast also increased, from 1,101,000 units in
the last decades of the Northern Sung to 2,000,000 units near the end of Kaotsung’s reign. These figures indicate a rapid recovery in commercial activity
during Kao-tsung’s reign. This increase in commercial activity was related to
the growth of urban populations,105 which are exemplified by the figures in
Table 6 for the capital city of Hang-chou (Lin-an).106
103
104
105
106
Huang Min-chih, Sung-tai fo-chiao she-hui ching-chi shih lun-chi (Taipei, 1989), pp. 19–89, 119–27, 352.
Teraji, Nan-Sō seiken kakuritsu katei kenkyū oboegaki, pp. 78–108. See also his Nan-Sō shoki seijishi kenkyū,
pp. 343–5, 392–416. For early Southern Sung finance and this measure, see Ch’i, Sung-tai ching-chi
shih, pp. 422–50.
Liang Keng-yao, “Nan Sung ch’eng-shih ti fa-chan (shang),” Shih-huo yüeh-k’an 10 No. 10 (1981),
pp. 420–6.
Sogabe Shizuo, Sōdai zaiseishi (1941; Tokyo, 1966), pp. 45–6. Also Liang, “Nan Sung ch’eng-shih ti
fa-chan (shang),” pp. 434–5. Ch’i, Sung-tai ching-chi shih, pp. 1009–10.
tao jing-shen
702
Table 6. Households and population of Hang-chou (Lin-an)
Period
No. of Households
Population
70,465
202,816
205,369
261,692
381,335
391,259
–
–
–
552,607
767,739
1,240,760
Early Sung
Mid–Northern Sung
Early Southern Sung
1165–1173
1241–1252
1265–1274
Table 7. Sung population growth of four Southern cities
City
Fu-chou
Hui-chou
Kuang-chou
Wen-chou
a
1078–1085
1165–1173
Percentage
increase
211,546
105,984
143,259
121,916
321,284
122,014
185,713a
170,035
52
13
23
34
For 1174–89.
Aside from Hang-chou, there were three other cities in the Southern Sung
that had 50,000 to 100,000 households: O-chou (Wu-ch’ang, Hupei), Ch’engtu (Szechwan), and Ch’üan-chou (Fu-chien). Twelve cities had from 5,000 to
50,000 households, and there were many towns with 1,000 to 5,000 households. Table 7 gives rates of population growth for four cities.107
A good example of the growth of small towns is T’ing-chou (modern Ch’angt’ing, Fukien). The walls of T’ing-chou were built in the mid-eleventh century
with a circumference of slightly over five li. By Southern Sung times, only three
of its wards (fang2) were inside the old city walls and no fewer than twentythree were outside them. T’ing-chou also expanded to include a satellite town
five li outside the walls. At the same time,108 T’ing-chou’s urban population
grew from 5,285 households in the Northern Sung to 73,140 households in
the 1250s. In the prefecture as a whole, the number of registered households
increased from 81,456 in the period 1078–85 to 218,750 by 1190, an increase
of 168 percent in a little over a century.109
107
108
109
Liang, “Nan Sung ch’eng-shih ti fa-chan (shang),” pp. 424–6.
Shiba Yoshinobu, Commerce and society in Sung China, trans. Mark Elvin (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1970),
pp. 136–7. Also Shiba Yoshinobu, Sōdai shōgyōshi kenkyū (Tokyo, 1968), p. 310.
Liang, “Nan Sung ch’eng-shih ti fa-chan (shang),” pp. 433, 437. These figures show urban growth and
imply that the increase in rural population had its limits.
the move to the south and the reign of kao-tsung
703
This robust population growth was replicated throughout the new Southern
Sung domain during Kao-tsung’s reign. But despite the concerns of some in
government, the destabilizing process of land engrossment (chien-ping) and
estate formation continued in the Southern Sung.110 Powerful officials either
received land from the imperial court as a reward, or used their influence to
acquire it. For example, the court granted nine hundred and sixty ch’ing of land
to Ch’in Kuei. Wang Chi-hsien, Kao-tsung’s physician, seized several hundred
houses and built mansions in Lin-an. The great generals also had large estates.
Some, like General Chang Chün2, had them in several prefectures. He and his
family members also engaged in overseas trade.111
the end of the ch’in kuei era
On the twenty-first of the tenth month of 1155, Kao-tsung went to Ch’in
Kuei’s residence to make a sick visit. That same night Ch’in Kuei died. A new
political alignment quickly emerged at the Sung court. Kao-tsung reversed
Ch’in Kuei’s practice of persecuting political enemies and their families. Some
of Chin’s victims, notably Chao Ting and Yüeh Fei, were posthumously rehabilitated, and many of Ch’in’s relatives and partisans were sent into exile.
Kao-tsung declined to make use of Ch’in’s son, Ch’in Hsi, who had served as
commissioner for military affairs, and when Ch’in Hsi maneuvered to try to
succeed his father as chief councilor he was dismissed.112
But the peace policy continued. After the death of Ch’in Kuei, Kao-tsung
commented that Ch’in Kuei had advocated peace and had emphasized that
the peace settlement should be faithfully observed.113 In 1156, when a report
about the possibility of a Chin invasion reached the court, Kao-tsung did not
believe it. He issued an edict to the effect that he alone had decided to conclude
the peace with Chin. Reiterating that the late chief councilor Ch’in Kuei had
only assisted him in carrying out that policy, he forbade the spreading of
rumors about a Chin breach of the treaty and reaffirmed his continued belief
in the settlement with Chin.114 Kao-tsung’s main consideration was security.
He was able to obtain external security by concluding a peace settlement with
Chin, and he achieved internal security by exercising complete control over
the military.115
110
111
112
113
114
115
Li, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (1935–7) chia 17, p. 257.
Ch’i, Sung-tai ching-chi shih, pp. 259–62.
CYYL (1936) 173, p. 2847.
CYYL (1936) 170, p. 2794.
CYYL (1936) 172, p. 2827.
See Liu, China turning inward, p. 99.
tao jing-shen
704
The peace established in 1141 lasted for twenty years. Not only had Kaotsung pursued a policy of coexistence, his contemporary, the emperor of Chin
(Hsi-tsung, r. 1135–50), was a weak ruler, unbalanced, and preoccupied by
relations with the emerging power of his northern neighbors, the Mongols.
The peace was finally broken by the Chin ruler Wan-yen Liang (r. 1150–
61), better known as Prince Hai-ling, who ruled for twelve years but was
denied a temple name by his successors.116 His ambition was to establish a
unified Chinese-style dynasty that also controlled the south. Prince Hai-ling
seized power in 1149, leading a coup in which his cousin the emperor Hsitsung was assassinated. Prince Hai-ling carried out purges of those who either
opposed him or advocated continuing the policy of coexistence with the Sung.
In 1152 he began to reconstruct the former Sung capital K’ai-feng, which
became his own Southern Capital. In 1161 he moved the Chin capital there
from Yen-ching. Despite opposition from the Jurchen tribal nobility and from
their recently conquered Khitan subjects, who rebelled in 1161, he pressed
ahead with his grandiose plans to conquer the Sung, recruiting a huge, mainly
Chinese, army and building a navy. In the fifth month of 1161, the Chin court
sent a diplomatic mission to the south, charging the Sung with breaking the
treaty by accommodating refugees from the north and by smuggling horses
from Chin territories. Chin also maintained that the Huai River was not a
proper border, and demanded that the Sung court dispatch its chief councilors
to negotiate a new settlement. The Sung tried to relax the tension by sending
an envoy to congratulate Prince Hai-ling on moving the Chin capital to K’aifeng, but the Chin emperor refused to receive him.
The battle of Ts’ai-shih and the treaty of 1165
Many in the south suspected for some years that war was coming. Reports by
Sung envoys called the attention of the Sung court to the developments in
the north, and persuaded it to make defensive preparations in 1160. Because
of Kao-tsung’s hesitation, however, only three military garrisons along the
Yangtze River were hastily set up in 1161 to strengthen defenses.
In the autumn of 1162, Chin mobilized four armies, reportedly comprising
a million men in all, to destroy the Sung. Three armies were dispatched to
invade the present regions of Kiangsu, Anhwei, northern Hupei, and Shensi.
In addition, a naval force was sent down the coast to make sure that this time
Kao-tsung could not escape by sea. Commanding the central army in person, Prince Hai-ling invaded the Anhwei region. His armies crossed the Huai
116
On Prince Hai-ling, see Franke, “The Chin dynasty,” pp. 239–43.
HAI
K’AI-FENG
Ch
in
TENG
lin
eo
Sung
counterattacks
fa
tta
ck
T’ANG
Sino-Jurchen border
SHOU
SSU
CH’U
HO
LU
YANG
CHEN
CHEN-CHIANG
CHIEN-K’ANG
Sung counterattacks
Ts’ai-shih
Yü Yün-wen’s
naval victory
E
LIN-AN
Chin line of attack
Sung counterattack
CHIANG
Four Chin prefectures
captured by Sung in the
course of the war, returned
in 1164
Site of Yü Yün-wen’s naval
victory at Ts’ai-shih
0
0
Map 26. Chin invasion of the Southern Sung, 1161–1162.
200 km
100 miles
706
tao jing-shen
River on 28 October 1161. He did not meet any significant resistance, and
Chin troops reached Ho-chou3 on the northern bank of the Yangtze River.
On 26–27 November, they attempted to force a crossing of the Yangtze at
Ts’ai-shih (south of modern Ma-an Shan). But Hai-ling’s fleet of barges and
small boats, carrying hundreds of soldiers trying to cross the river, were routed
by the Southern Sung commander, Yü Yün-wen’s, superior naval force, which
included paddle wheel warships. Yü Yün-wen was a civilian official sent to
supervise the army, which at that crucial moment had no single overall commander. After the river battle, Hai-ling moved his army east toward Yangchou, planning to launch another attack there to cross the Yangtze River.
But on 15 December near Yang-chou, Prince Hai-ling was assassinated in a
mutiny by his own officers. They supposedly were fearful of the Sung navy
that had annihilated the Chin fleet on the Yangtze at Ts’ai-shih. Hai-ling’s
fate was sealed in any case. After he had left K’ai-feng with his army on 15
October, and just prior to his launching his attack on the Southern Sung, Hailing’s cousin, Wan-yen Wu-lu (Emperor Chin Shih-tsung, r. 1161–89) had
taken control of Chin and enthroned himself on 27 October as the new Chin
emperor.
The battle of Ts’ai-shih was mostly fought on the Yangtze River, and the
small number of Chin soldiers who managed to land on the southern shore
were either killed or captured. While Chin records indicate that their losses
were minimal, Sung historians exaggerated Chin casualties. The Chin dynastic
history (Chin shih) recorded Chin casualties as ranging from one meng-an (unit
of 1,000 men) and 100 soldiers to two meng-an and 200 soldiers.117 In sharp
contrast, a Sung source indicates that “24,000 Chin warriors perished in the
engagement. The Sung army captured five meng-an and 500 soldiers.” A more
reasonable contemporary account gives the following figures: twenty Chin
boats with a total of 500 soldiers reached the south bank of the Yangtze River,
and the soldiers were either killed or captured by Sung forces.118
The pivotal battle of Ts’ai-shih appears to have been fought on a surprisingly small scale. The reasons were twofold. First, Prince Hai-ling apparently
underestimated the strength of the Sung army and the landing operation was
not well planned. Although the Sung troops at Ts’ai-shih were dispersed,
Yü Yün-wen was able to organize the soldiers and naval units into an army
117
118
On the meng-an system of military organization, see Franke, “The Chin dynasty,” pp. 275–6.
The biographies of Li T’ung and Wu-yen P’u-lu-hu in T’o-t’o, ed., Chin shih [Po-na-pen 1930–7 ed.]
(1344; Peking, 1975), pp. 129 and 80, indicate that only two military officers and 100 to 200 men
were lost. Sung sources record Chin casualties from several hundred to half a million. I follow the
most conservative Sung figure because Chin boats were small and after the Jurchen lost in the initial
encounter, Hai-ling stopped military operations. See Tao Jing-shen (T’ao Chin-sheng), Chin Hai-ling-ti
ti fa Sung yü Ts’ai-shih chan-i ti k’ao-shih (Taipei, 1963), pp. 150–67.
the move to the south and the reign of kao-tsung
707
of eighteen thousand and used rewards to inspire his forces to fight bravely
against the invaders. Had Yü Yün-wen not shown up at that critical moment,
Hai-ling would have succeeded in crossing the river. Second, the small and
poorly constructed boats limited the number of Jurchen soldiers that could
take part in the operation. One source has it that Hai-ling ordered the building
of the boats by using materials from razed houses, and that his army hastily
made them within seven days. Contrasting these poor boats to the professional
Sung navy, there is little reason to doubt the eyewitness description that Sung
warships sank or smashed many Chin boats.
The battle of Ts’ai-shih stopped the large-scale Chin invasion, gave new
confidence to the Sung armies, and stabilized the southern dynasty. It also
ensured the continued coexistence of the two rival states. The battle taught
Chin leaders that it was difficult for their cavalry to maneuver in the Sung’s
southeastern territory, where the terrain was full of rivers and lakes. The Chin
never again made any serious attempt to cross the Yangtze. Early in 1162,
Shih-tsung ordered the Chin armies to withdraw from the Yangtze front and
sent envoys to request the resumption of normal relations. But fighting went
on in both Huai-nan and Szechwan until a peace treaty was negotiated in
1165.
abdication
The latest peace treaty between the Sung and the Chin was not made by Kaotsung. Nine months after the Sung victory at Ts’ai-shih, Kao-tsung unexpectedly abdicated the throne in favor of his adopted son and heir apparent, Chao
Yüan (originally named Chao Po-ts’ung). After the death of Kao-tsung’s infant
son in 1129, the emperor did not have any more children. Rumors concerning
the imperial childlessness swirled throughout the empire. One source claims
that in order to improve the emperor’s virility, his physician Wang Chi-hsien
gave him an overdose of drugs that actually aggravated the problem. A more
popular story has it that a rather bizarre incident occurred in 1129 at Yangchou, where Kao-tsung was so shocked by hearing of a Chin surprise attack
while indulging in intercourse that he lost his sexual potency.119 Whatever the
cause, it is a fact that Kao-tsung paid much attention to medicine. He trusted
Wang Chi-hsien to such an extent that the doctor continued to meddle in
state affairs until 1161. Soon after Wang’s dismissal in that year, Kao-tsung
abdicated the throne, apparently convinced of the hopelessness of his fathering
another son.
119
Li, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (1935–7) i 1, p. 688; Lau, “The absolutist reign of Sung Hsiao-tsung,”
pp. 9–10. See also Liu, Liang Sung shih yen-chiu hui-pien, pp. 162–6.
708
tao jing-shen
In 1129, not long after the death of Kao-tsung’s son, a memorial had
been submitted suggesting the establishment of an “acting” heir apparent.120
Pressure to secure an heir was intensified because in the rival state of Ch’i,
an official, Lo Yu, proposed that Ch’i launch a military expedition to destroy
the southern dynasty. One of the reasons why the Sung could be conquered,
according to Lo, was that the Sung ruler did not have an heir, and thus his
regime was unstable.121
In 1135, when Kao-tsung was twenty-nine years old, one of these children,
Chao Po-ts’ung (1127–94), was promoted to the rank of kuo-kung (Duke of
State), and began receiving a formal education to prepare him to rule. There
were subsequently several requests for the designation of Po-ts’ung as heir
apparent. Among these, by far the most famous was made by Yüeh Fei. This
request probably enraged Kao-tsung, as military men were not supposed to
interfere in such matters. In 1142, Po-ts’ung (or Yüan, the personal name given
him by Kao-tsung) was given the title of Prince P’u-an. Much later, in 1153,
Ch’in Kuei also urged Kao-tsung to confirm the designation of Po-ts’ung
as heir apparent (t’ai-tzu). However, the final decision to appoint Po-ts’ung
heir apparent was delayed until 1160, several years after Ch’in Kuei’s death.
Probably Kao-tsung did not want Ch’in Kuei to have anything to do with the
settlement of the succession problem. Two years later, Kao-tsung abdicated
in favor of the heir apparent, and on 24 July 1162 Chao Po-ts’ung, known
as Emperor Hsiao-tsung, succeeded Kao-tsung. Po-ts’ung’s succession had for
some time been complicated by the claims of another candidate, Chao Pochiu, a young boy adopted by a consort and favored by Kao-tsung’s mother,
the dowager empress Hsien-jen, until her death in 1159.122 In addition to
this competition, Kao-tsung’s delay in making his final decision seems to have
been the result of his hope of producing another son.
In Kao-tsung’s official statements establishing Chao Po-ts’ung as heir and
then abdicating in his favor, he observed that now that the frontier was at peace,
he could finally retire after thirty-six years of hard work as emperor. After the
ceremony of abdication was completed, Kao-tsung said that he was old. He
was sick and had long yearned for retirement. He was in fact in his mid-fifties
and would live for another twenty-seven years.123 Aside from these personal
feelings, there seem to have been two major political reasons for Kao-tsung’s
act of abdication (shan-jang). First, Kao-tsung appears to have lost credibility
120
121
122
123
For the death of Kao-tsung’s only son, see Lau, “The absolutist reign of Sung Hsiao-tsung,” p. 10; Tao,
“The personality of Sung Kao-tsung,” p. 539.
CYYL (1936) 78, p. 1286.
CYYL (1936) 183, p. 3065; 184, pp. 3079–80. See also Lau, “The absolutist reign of Sung Hsiao-tsung,”
p. 10.
CYYL (1936) 200, pp. 3382–4.
the move to the south and the reign of kao-tsung
709
in 1161 when he chose to continue to believe in the peace with Chin, despite
reliable reports of an impending invasion. Second, when Kao-tsung finally
realized that the Chin invasion was not just a rumor, he found himself illprepared for war, and reportedly was so frightened that he contemplated a
last-ditch plan to escape from Lin-an by sea. After the Chin army was defeated
in the battle of Ts’ai-shih in 1161, and the Chin ruler, Hai-ling, assassinated
in a mutiny, Kao-tsung may have thought that the moment marked the end
of an era.
Choosing Chao Po-ts’ung as heir apparent marked an important change in
the dynastic line of succession. Instead of selecting a successor from among
the descendants of Emperor T’ai-tsung (the second Sung emperor), Kao-tsung
decided to switch back to the imperial line of Emperor T’ai-tsu, the founder of
the Sung dynasty and elder brother of T’ai-tsung. Kao-tsung and his ministers
involved in the decision praised Emperor T’ai-tsu’s designation of his brother
T’ai-tsung (Kao-tsung’s ancestor) as heir, rather than one of his own sons. They
compared the new emperor’s succession with the case of Shun’s succession to
the ancient sage-king Yao – Yao, eschewing his own sons, had abdicated in
favor of Shun.124 Instead of clinging to the throne until death, Kao-tsung chose
to abdicate, perhaps hoping that he would go down in history as a virtuous
ruler comparable to those ancient sage-kings Yao and Shun. His honorific title
included the term kuang Yao, or “Glorifying the tradition of Yao.”125
124
125
Li, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (1935–7) i 1, p. 690.
Li, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (1935–7) chia 3, pp. 149–50.
CHAPTER 9
THE REIGN OF HSIAO-TSUNG (1162–1189)
Gong Wei Ai
introduction
Relative to the entire Southern Sung period, Hsiao-tsung’s reign (1162–89)
stands out as the most tranquil and prosperous. Inheriting the throne in 1162 at
the mature age of thirty-five, Hsiao-tsung proved himself a worthy descendant
of T’ai-tsu, the founding Sung emperor. As an able and responsible ruler, Hsiaotsung consolidated the Southern Sung regime on the foundations laid by his
adoptive father, Kao-tsung. Politically, the reign was free from the upheavals
and intense power struggles that had characterized his father’s reign. Militarily,
the empire became stronger than it had been for some time. After the 1165
treaty was concluded, Hsiao-tsung’s administration maintained peace with
Chin in the north. Peace fostered economic recuperation and general prosperity
while Hsiao-tsung’s policy of frugal government spending added further to the
wealth of his state. As a consequence of his strict administrative control over
both central and regional governments, general order and stability prevailed
in domestic policies. The period was a time of great intellectual development,
noted for the emergence of a large number of learned men in the fields of
philosophy, poetry, and classical studies. For these reasons Hsiao-tsung is often
singled out as the best of the Southern Sung monarchs,1 and his reign is
depicted as the “golden age” of the Southern Sung dynasty.2
Hsiao-tsung’s accomplishments were built to some degree on foundations
laid by Kao-tsung, but there were important differences between the reigns of
these two emperors. Kao-tsung’s reign had been, for the most part, an unstable
period filled with external threats and internal political struggles, whereas
overall Hsiao-tsung’s reign was peaceful and orderly. Kao-tsung’s reputation
as a good Confucian monarch had been impaired by his excessive reliance on his
1
2
See the annals of Hsiao-tsung in T’o-t’o et al., eds., Sung shih [hereafter SS] (1345; Peking, 1977) 35,
p. 692. For a detailed study of Hsiao-tsung’s reign, see Lau Nap-yin, “The absolutist reign of Sung
Hsiao-tsung (r. 1163–89)” (diss., Princeton University, 1986).
Wang Te-i, “Sung Hsiao-tsung chi ch’i shih-tai,” Kuo-li pien-i-kuan kuan-k’an 2 No. 1 (1973), p. 4.
the reign of hsiao-tsung
711
long-term chief councilor, Ch’in Kuei, who had been heavily criticized for his
policies of appeasement, especially for ratifying the treaty of 1141, which had
granted Chin concessions some saw as humiliating to the Sung.3 In contrast,
Hsiao-tsung appointed no such ill-famed councilor that tarnished his imperial
image. The reign of Hsiao-tsung was the only period in Southern Sung history
not marked by the presence of an all-powerful and notorious chief councilor.
Enhancement of imperial authority was the notable feature of court policies
during Hsiao-tsung’s reign. Imperial control seems to have spread to all levels
of the administration and imperial influence to every corner of Sung territory.
During his twenty-seven years on the throne, Hsiao-tsung assumed, as his
personal responsibility, the three major tasks involved in dynasty building:
founding it (ch’uang-yeh), reviving it (chung-hsing), and preserving it (shouch’eng).4 Though the task of founding the Southern Sung dynasty had largely
been accomplished by Kao-tsung, Hsiao-tsung considered it necessary to further the work of his father. The task of restoration, or reviving a dynasty after a
major disaster, which had been carried out by Kao-tsung, was similarly continued by Hsiao-tsung. Hsiao-tsung’s most outstanding contribution, however,
was in the realm of consolidation, or imperial retrenchment, as the means to
perpetuate the dynasty’s social, economic, military, and cultural strength.
To consolidate the gains made during his father’s reign, Hsiao-tsung seems
to have had as his primary objective to strengthen and stabilize his regime
by enhancing his own imperial authority. This objective was his overriding
consideration in formulating policies and implementing reforms. Hsiao-tsung
sought to preserve previous gains and to strengthen the Sung by concentrating
political, military, and financial powers not just under the control of central
government but into his own hands. As a result, the imperial authority he
wielded rose to new heights compared to that of previous Sung emperors. Such
a concentration of power in the hands of a strong and capable monarch like
Hsiao-tsung was an effective means of rule. It had the positive consequence
of stabilizing the regime and bringing about general order throughout the
administration. But although the enhancement of imperial authority during
Hsiao-tsung’s reign contributed to his own success in solidifying the empire’s
security and strength, under less capable or more irresponsible successors this
new level of imperial absolutism inevitably led to a power vacuum at the
highest levels of government, and to serious consequent abuses.
3
4
The great Ch’ing commentator on Sung history, Wang Fu-chih, besides criticizing Kao-tsung for his
policy of appeasement, also censured the emperor for his “reliance on evil men.” See Wang Fu-chih, Sung
lun (c. 1690–2; Peking, 1964) 10, p. 200.
For Hsiao-tsung’s reference to these three mammoth tasks of founding, reviving, and preserving a dynasty,
see Liu Cheng et al., Huang Sung chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng [Hsüan-yin wan-wei pieh-ts’ang 1935
ed.] (c. 1200; Taipei, 1967) 50, pp.15b–16a.
712
gong wei ai
Hsiao-tsung’s autocratic powers were limited in one important respect,
however. Kao-tsung, though abdicated, retained the position of Supreme Emperor. Hsiao-tsung visited him at his palace four times a month, treating him
with the utmost respect, and discussed all important decisions and appointments with him. Kao-tsung continued to press for peaceful relations with Chin
and made it all but impossible for Hsiao-tsung to adopt any aggressive policy.
He also lived in luxury far exceeding Hsiao-tsung’s own simple lifestyle, and
his palace and court were a huge expense. It is clear that this relationship
affected Hsiao-tsung’s policies well into the 1170s.5
Hsiao-tsung’s personal character played a decisive role in making him a
major architect of the Southern Sung empire. He was a conscientious, practical,
and efficient administrator. He worked tirelessly day and night, carrying a
heavy workload attending court, reading memorials, interviewing officials,
and even holding discussions with his ministers in the evenings after normal
court sessions. He kept everything under his own supervision and was reluctant
to delegate authority to his assistants. His assertive and autocratic attitude
characterized his style of governing.
During the later part of the Southern Sung the political climate became
increasingly conservative in its outlook. This trend can already be seen during Hsiao-tsung’s reign by comparing his earlier Ch’ien-tao (1165–73) reign
period with his later Ch’un-hsi period (1174–89). The vigor and optimism
prevailing at court during the Ch’ien-tao period gave way to a less healthy
political atmosphere marked by a spirit of acceptance, conservatism, and pessimism in the Ch’un-hsi period. This change in political climate owed a great
deal to the emperor’s increasingly autocratic approach to governing, which
tended to suppress political criticism and induce conformity. Although highranking officials and political elites felt a justifiable pride in the domestic
achievements, this was accompanied by a sense of frustration and inadequacy
regarding foreign relations, which served to entrench conservative attitudes.
This growing conservatism led to an eventual political stagnation effectively
slowing the rate of societal change during the last century of the Southern Sung.
Ironically, the stagnation of Chinese society after the thirteenth century can be
traced to some extent to the political consolidation of the empire and to the
stability attained during Hsiao-tsung’s reign.6 In this regard, Hsiao-tsung’s
5
6
Lau, “The absolutist reign of Sung Hsiao-tsung,” pp. 36–55.
Although the stability brought about by Hsiao-tsung’s consolidation greatly strengthened the Southern
Sung empire and enabled it to withstand both internal strains and external threats for almost another
century, it should nevertheless be recognized that “it was a stability that suffered from a political standstill,
even creeping deterioration.” For the preceding quotation, see Liu Tzu-chien (James T. C. Liu), “Sung
roots of Chinese conservatism: The administrative problems,” Journal of Asian Studies 26 No. 3 (1967),
p. 457.
the reign of hsiao-tsung
713
reign was a crucial phase, not only for Sung history, but for Chinese history in
general.
the peace settlement of 1164–1165
When Hsiao-tsung ascended the throne in the sixth month of 1162, the Sung
and Chin states were still at war. After the Chin defeat at Ts’ai-shih and
the death of the Chin emperor, Wan-yen Liang (Prince Hai-ling), in late
1161, the Sung army had rapidly recovered the territories that had recently
fallen into enemy hands. As fighting continued, the Sung troops were even
able to recapture some of the prefectures and counties that had come under
Chin control after the treaty of 1141. These included the four prefectures
of Hai-chou (modern Tung-hai county, in Kiangsu), Ssu-chou (southeast of
modern Ssu county, in Anhwei), T’ang-chou (T’ang-ho, Honan), and Tengchou2 (modern Teng county, in Honan) in the Huai and Hsiang regions. Also,
just before Hsiao-tsung ascended the throne, the pacification commissioner of
Szechwan, Wu Lin (1102–67), had recovered a number of prefectures along
the northwestern frontier.7 Chin was unhappy with these developments, and
these territories would become an important source of contention between the
two states.
Following Wan-yen Liang’s death, envoys went back and forth between the
Sung and Chin courts to negotiate peace. Initial negotiations failed. The Sung
refused to accede to Chin demands to restore the terms of the 1141 treaty.
Hsiao-tsung initially hoped for an advantageous peace settlement; he was a
more aggressive negotiator than his predecessor, Kao-tsung, and did not give
in easily. One of his first acts as emperor was to summon to court the renowned
war advocate from Szechwan, Chang Chün (1097–1164). This appointment
signaled Hsiao-tsung’s determination to keep the newly recovered territories.
Hsiao-tsung expressed great confidence in Chang by granting him the honorary
titles of Duke of National Guardians (wei kuo-kung) and court mentor (shao-fu),
and by appointing him pacification commissioner of the Yangtze and Huai
regions.8 Besides Chang, Hsiao-tsung also summoned back to court another
well-known war advocate, Hu Ch’üan, who had suffered persecution under
Ch’in Kuei.9 Hsiao-tsung further declared his position on the peace issue by
granting posthumous honors to the most prominent victim of Ch’in Kuei’s
7
8
9
See Shen Ch’i-wei, Sung Chin chan-cheng shih-lüeh (Wu-han, 1958), p. 152.
Li Hsin-ch’uan, Chien-yen i-lai hsi-nien yao-lu [hereafter CYYL (1956)] (1253–8; Peking, 1956) 200,
p. 3391. For the imperial audience granted to Chang Chün in 1162, see the hsing-chuang (biographical
account) of Chang Chün in Chu Hsi, Hui-an hsien-sheng Chu Wen kung wen-chi [Ming Chia-ching 1522–66
ed.] (1245; Shanghai, 1929) 95 hsia, p. 1696.
Hu Ch’üan’s biography appears in SS 374, p. 11583.
714
gong wei ai
administration, Yüeh Fei – a repudiation of the pacifist Ch’in that signaled an
endorsement of aggressive policies.10
Hsiao-tsung appears to have been impressed by Chang Chün. During their
first interview, seeing that the emperor was inclined to favor war advocates,
Chang seized the opportunity to encourage him to adopt a more aggressive
foreign policy. Despite his personal inclinations, however, Hsiao-tsung was
cautious in dealing with the Chin state. Undoubtably he was to some extent
influenced in this direction by Shih Hao (1106–94), his powerful former tutor,
who had played a large part in preparing him for the throne and had been
promoted to assistant councilor soon after Hsiao-tsung’s accession. Shih was to
become Chang Chün’s chief opponent in a number of subsequent controversies
at court.11
One clash between the two men concerned the question of defense. Shih
Hao was in favor of fortifying Kua-chou and Ts’ai-shih, located on the Yangtze
River, but Chang Chün opposed this on the grounds that it would reveal
Sung weakness. As an alternative, Chang proposed fortifying Ssu-chou, farther
north.12 The pacifists at court were, on the whole, in favor of consolidating the
Sung position along the Yangtze, while those in favor of retaking formerly held
territory in the north were more ambitious and insisted that defenses should
be built up along the Huai River. The question of where to concentrate Sung
defenses – on the Yangtze or farther north on the Huai River – was to become
a matter of intense debate during the next few years of war against Chin.
The Sung court was confronted with two other major foreign relations
problems. In the autumn of 1162, responding to Chin demands for peace,
Hsiao-tsung had called upon his ministers to discuss two urgent matters.
They were to discuss whether to submit to Chin demands for restoration of
the territory agreed to under the treaty of 1141 or whether to refuse and keep
on fighting. Next, they were to discuss the problem of the many refugees (kueiching jen) who were fleeing into Sung territory from the north. These refugees
placed the Sung in a dilemma: to accept them would impose a heavy financial
burden upon the Sung state; to refuse them would risk the loyalty of the people
of the Central Plains (chung-yüan) living under Chin rule.13 In the discussions
at court, most officials appear to have been in favor of accepting the refugees.
Most officials were also opposed to giving up control over the four recently
recovered prefectures of Hai-chou, Ssu-chou, T’ang-chou, and Teng-chou2 that
10
11
12
13
CYYL (1956) 200, p. 3392.
For a discussion of Shih Hao, see Richard L. Davis, Court and family in Sung China, 960–1279: Bureaucratic
success and kinship fortunes for the Shih of Ming-chou (Durham, N.C., 1986), pp. 54–67.
For Chang Chün’s memorial regarding the importance of defending Ssu-chou, see Fu Tseng-hsiang,
comp., Sung-tai Shu-wen chi-ts’un (1943; Hong Kong, 1971) 43, pp. 6a–b.
Li Hsin-ch’uan, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi [Shih-yüan ts’ung-shu 1914 ed.] (c. 1202 chia volume,
1216 i volume; Taipei, 1967) chia 20, p. 6a.
the reign of hsiao-tsung
715
Chin demanded. However, a note of caution was sounded by Shih Hao: “To
first prepare ourselves for defense is the best strategy. Whether to have war or
peace does not depend on us but on the enemy. . . . We should fortify the walls
to defend against the enemy onslaught and await for an opportune time to
carry out a campaign of reconquest.”14 Shih went on to accuse his opponents
of irresponsibly advocating aggressive action, saying that much misery would
be caused if their proactive policies were implemented.
Shih Hao’s view on the refugee question also differed from that of most
officials at court. After the military campaigns of 1161, a great number of
refugees had crossed into Sung territory from the north. Sung policy toward
them had been lenient, and the Sung authorities treated them well. Humanitarian considerations aside, some officials argued that acceptance of these
refugees ensured the loyalty of former Sung subjects still living in enemy
territory. Shih Hao, however, regarded the refugees with great suspicion and
opposed accepting them because of the burden that their resettlement placed
on the local populations.15 Shih further argued that, since the Sung were not
ready to launch an offensive that could succeed against Chin, it was useless
to recruit the refugees as a means of ensuring the loyalty of the people of the
Central Plains. Nevertheless, the war advocates believed that retaking the lost
territory was imminent and that for reconquest to succeed it was essential to
obtain the cooperation of Sung loyalists in the north.
During the first few months of his reign, Hsiao-tsung seemed undecided
about this aspect of foreign policy. While putting his trust in Chang Chün to
prepare for military action, he did not regard the counsel of Shih Hao lightly.
Early in 1163, he promoted Shih to the position of chief councilor of the right,
while Chang was appointed commissioner of the Bureau of Military Affairs
and general superintendent of the armies in the Yangtze and Huai regions.
Hsiao-tsung apparently intended their simultaneous appointments to these
important posts as a means of maintaining balance between war and peace
advocates during this time of indecision. Although the two chief councilors,
Ch’en K’ang-po (1097–1165) and Shih Hao, were both opposed to war, the
court increasingly became dominated by a group of outspoken militants who
were ardent supporters of Chang Chün.
The abortive campaign of 1163 and the treaty of 1165
In 1161, during the first year of his reign, the Chin emperor Chin Shih-tsung
had been troubled by uprisings in various parts of his own territory. However,
14
15
Shih Hao, Mou-feng chen-yin man-lu [Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu, Wen-yüan ko 1779 ed.] (c. 1181; Taipei, 1971) 8,
p. 1b.
See Shih Hao’s memorial in his Mou-feng chen-yin man-lu 7, pp. 8b–11a.
716
gong wei ai
by the autumn of 1162, having secured his own power and suppressed the
rebels, the Chin emperor turned his attention to the Sung. Over the next few
months, Chin began to mobilize troops in preparation for a southern expedition
against the Sung. In the spring of 1163, the assistant commander of the Chin
army, Ho-shih-lieh Chih-ning, sent Chang Chün a letter demanding the return
of the prefectures that had fallen into Sung hands after 1161. He further insisted
that former borders and all terms of the 1141 treaty be observed. Though Hoshih-lieh threatened war if these demands were not met, Chang refused to
submit to the pressure.16
While these diplomatic exchanges were occurring, Chin troops were being
deployed in Hung county (modern Ssu county) and Ling-pi in northern
Anhwei. Chang Chün, who felt that Sung forces were ready for war, decided it
was time for them to begin a preemptive attack against Chin. In the summer
of 1163, Chang Chün was summoned to court where he presented his proposal
for a northern campaign against Chin. Chang’s plan was vigorously opposed by
Shih Hao, who tried to dissuade Hsiao-tsung from undertaking the campaign.
In his memorial, Shih declared that although he fully understood the desire
of the emperor to avenge the wrongs done by Chin, the fact had to be faced
that the Sung state was simply not prepared for such a large-scale military
campaign. He proposed instead building up the defenses of the country and
attempting a campaign against Chin in another ten years’ time.17
Shih Hao stressed the need to develop the nation’s internal strength rather
than seek to expand its dominions. Unfortunately, his advice was not adopted.
Chang Chün is said to have told the emperor that Shih was too stubborn and
that a golden opportunity might be lost on account of Shih’s inflexibility.
Chang Chün also stressed that Chin would certainly attack that autumn and
that the Sung should surprise them by launching a preemptive offensive.18
Despite his father’s previous warnings not to heed Chang Chün,19 Hsiao-tsung
decided to launch the northern expedition. Because both chief councilors,
Shih Hao and Ch’en K’ang-po, opposed the decision, Hsiao-tsung proceeded
without going through the regular channels of the Three Departments and the
Bureau of Military Affairs. Instead, secret orders were issued to Chang Chün to
oversee mobilization of Sung troops in the Huai valley in preparation for the
northern offensive. The campaign was launched in the summer of 1163 when
16
17
18
19
Pi Yüan, Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien [hereafter HTC (1957)] [Te-yü-t’ang tsang-pan 1801 ed.] (1792; Peking,
1957) 138, pp. 3661–2.
For Shih Hao’s memorial against the northern campaign, see his Mou-feng chen-yin man-lu 7, pp. 13b–
14b.
Ch’en Pang-chan et al., Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo (1605; Peking, 1977) 77, p. 811.
It is said that when the retired Kao-tsung heard of the intended campaign he asked Hsiao-tsung to
ignore Chang Chün, whom he felt would bring more harm than good to the empire. See Chou Mi,
Ch’i-tung yeh-yü (late 13th c.; Shanghai, 1922) 2, p. 14a.
the reign of hsiao-tsung
717
Chang Chün ordered his two generals, Li Hsien-chung and Shao Hung-yüan,
to attack Ling-pi and Hung-hsien, respectively.20
This attack was the first offensive that the Sung had mounted since the
beginning of Sung-Chin hostilities nearly two years before, and they had considerable initial success. Less than ten days after the campaign was launched,
Sung forces captured Ling-pi and Hung-hsien from the enemy. In another
week’s time they also succeeded in dislodging Chin troops from Su-chou2,
north of the Huai River in northern Anhwei. Hsiao-tsung was overjoyed when
he heard about these victories. In the meantime, however, Shih Hao had indignantly submitted his resignation in protest against the emperor’s decision to
launch the campaign without his knowledge. Despite his high regard for
Shih, Hsiao-tsung accepted his resignation since Shih’s uncompromising attitude would obstruct rather than help the emperor’s aggressive foreign policy,
which at that moment appeared successful. The subject of severe denunciation
by prowar censors, Shih Hao spent the next several years away from court in
retirement.21 He nevertheless remained on good terms with Hsiao-tsung.
The triumph of the hawkish elements at court was short-lived. Less than a
month after the offensive began, Sung forces suffered a disastrous defeat at Suchou2. The rapidity of the Chin counterattack in response,22 combined with
the jealousy and lack of cooperation between the two principal Sung generals,
Li Hsien-chung and Shao Hung-yüan, contributed to the Sung defeat. The
animosity between the two commanders affected the morale of troops who were
already unhappy with the paltry rewards they had received for recapturing Suchou2.23 Given this unease in the ranks, it is not surprising that demoralized
officers in both Li’s and Shao’s commands fled with their troops at the approach
of Chin reinforcements. Li was able to withstand the enemy assault for a while,
but, because he received no assistance or support from Shao, he eventually had
no choice but to flee as well. Consequently, Chin forces under Ho-shih-lieh
Chih-ning retook Su-chou2, and went in pursuit of the retreating Sung armies.
Sung forces were trapped at nearby Fu-li and suffered heavy losses. Many
soldiers were killed, captured, or executed, and others drowned in the Huai
River while attempting to escape.24 Chin troops had scored a decisive victory
20
21
22
23
24
Ch’en et al., Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo (1977) 77, p. 811.
On this episode, see Davis, Court and family in Sung China, pp. 53–67.
It is said that after their defeat at Su-chou2, the Chin sent a select army of one hundred thousand men
to fight the Sung forces at Su-chou2; in addition, a cavalry force of one hundred thousand men was
dispatched from K’ai-feng for the counterattack. See HTC (1957) 138, p. 3668.
The dissatisfaction of the Sung troops was regarded as the chief cause for the Sung defeat. See the tomb
inscription for Chou K’uei in Chou Pi-ta, Wen-chung chi [Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu, Wen-yüan ko 1779 ed.]
(c. 1206; Taipei, 1971) 63, p. 9b.
HTC (1957) 138, p. 3669. During the disaster at Fu-li, besides the countless number of soldiers who
were drowned, the Chin decapitated more than four thousand men and confiscated thirty thousand sets
of armor.
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after their initial losses, which were minor compared with those inflicted on
the Sung at Fu-li. Chin forces, however, did not follow up their victory at
Su-chou2 and Fu-li with a sustained offensive against the Sung. Rather, a lull
in the fighting ensued.
The Sung defeat must have been a shock and humiliation for Chang Chün
and for the emperor. Chang submitted his resignation but was persuaded by
the emperor to stay on and fortify the Sung defenses in the Huai region. Even
though Hsiao-tsung put a brave face on the matter, the abortive attempt to
recover lost territory was a great setback. Hsiao-tsung’s subsequent actions
showed that he was beginning to waver in his determination to continue the
war. He soon appeared anxious to begin peace negotiations. The following
month, Chang Chün was demoted from his post as general superintendent
back to his former post of pacification commissioner in the Yangtze and Huai
regions.25 Chang’s demotion was followed by the resignation from court of
a number of prominent officials protesting the change in government policy
from favoring war to favoring peace.
Though the proponents of peace carried more weight at court after the
abortive campaign, their ascendancy was not total. In the autumn of 1163
Hsiao-tsung reinstalled Chang Chün as general superintendent of the ChiangHuai armies.26 While anxious to achieve peace, the emperor was nevertheless
determined to negotiate with Chin from a position of strength and to strike a
good bargain. If those negotiations failed, he felt he would still be able to rely
on Chang Chün to carry on the war.
Soon after Chang’s reinstatement, the Chin commander, Ho-shih-lieh Chihning, once again sent a letter to the Sung government demanding the return
of the four prefectures of Hai-chou, Ssu-chou, T’ang-chou, and Teng-chou2; a
resumption of annual payments; the submission of the Sung as a vassal state
to Chin; and the return of refugees who had fled the Chin-held Central Plains.
Ho-shih-lieh threatened to continue the war if these conditions were not met.
Though Chang Chün opposed submitting to the demands, the court’s general
opinion favored pursuing negotiations with Chin, as it was believed that peace
would enable the Sung state to put its own house in order before undertaking
further military action.27
Over the next year and a half, several missions were sent to Chin in an
attempt to arrive at mutually acceptable conditions for peace. After much
bargaining and several breakdowns in negotiations, peace efforts began to
gather momentum after Chang Chün’s final dismissal in the summer of 1164
25
26
27
HTC (1957) 138, p. 3670.
Chu, Hui-an hsien-sheng Chu Wen kung wen-chi (1929) 95, p. 1700.
Ch’en, Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo (1977) 77, p. 814.
the reign of hsiao-tsung
719
and his death that autumn. An agreement was reached between the two states
in the winter of 1164. The Sung agreed to return the prefectures demanded
by Chin. They also agreed to return Chin captives, but not those who had
renounced Chin on their own initiative, a group that included the refugees.
On the question of relative diplomatic status, both states agreed to adopt a
pseudofamily relationship of “younger uncle and nephew” (shu-chih) instead of
the former lord-vassal relationship. The ‘uncle’ in this equation was the retired
emperor Kao-tsung, the nephew, the Chin emperor Shih-tsung. Chin, for its
part, granted the Sung request that the annual payments of silver and silk be
reduced by fifty thousand units each, and that the humiliating term “annual
tribute” (sui-kung) for these levies be changed to “annual payments” (sui-pi).28
Early in 1165, a Sung diplomatic mission under the junior lord of imperial
sacrifices, Wei Ch’i, was sent to the Chin court with a cordial letter from Hsiaotsung confirming the treaty provisions. Meanwhile, an official announcement
was made within the Sung empire that the peace negotiations had succeeded.
The imperial proclamation stated: “As a result of the negotiations, the status
of the Sung emperor is rectified with the establishment of the ‘uncle-nephew’
relation, the annual payments are reduced by 100,000 units, and the borders remain the same as before. . . . Because of humanitarian reasons, it is also
decided not to deport the fugitive rebels on both sides.”29 The proclamation
marked the conclusion of the peace settlement, although it was only in the
following month that Wei Ch’i arrived in Chin and presented Hsiao-tsung’s
letter to the emperor, Shih-tsung, who then agreed to the terms of the treaty
and declared that the war was over.30
The conditions imposed on the Sung by the peace settlement of 1165 were
an improvement on those of the treaty of 1141. The humiliation of being a
Chin vassal, as had been the Sung’s status for the previous twenty years, was
removed although the Sung still had to acknowledge the superior status of
Chin. The reduction in the annual payments from 250,000 to 200,000 taels
of silver and bolts of silk and the Chin agreement on the refugee question
represented sizable concessions. However, the fact that the former borders of
the 1141 treaty were reinstated meant that not a single inch of territory had
been recovered by the Sung despite the costly efforts of the previous three years.
Indeed, it seems Shih Hao and the other peace advocates had been right on this
point. For the time being, Hsiao-tsung had to be content with maintaining
28
29
30
HTC (1957) 138, p. 3670.
Ch’en, Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo (1977) 77, p. 823. This proclamation, however, represented a much
shortened version of the original text of the treaty, which has not been preserved in any of the sources.
See Herbert Franke, “Treaties between Sung and Chin,” in Études Song: In memoriam Étienne Balazs, ed.
Françoise Aubin (Paris, 1970), p. 81.
Ch’en, Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo (1977) 77, p. 823.
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gong wei ai
the status quo and putting his own state in order while awaiting another
opportunity to pursue his life-long ambition of restoring former territories to
the empire.
the ch’ien-tao period (1165–1173): years of reconstruction
After the peace settlement in 1165 was concluded, the Southern Sung dynasty
experienced four decades of military stalemate and a continued uneasy coexistence with Chin. With the immediate threat of Chin invasion removed,
the friction between the war and the peace advocates, which had dominated
court politics over the previous two years, was largely terminated. The year
1165 saw not only the end of the war but also the beginning of a new era
in domestic politics. Hsiao-tsung marked the occasion by changing the reign
title from Lung-hsing (Eminent Ascendancy, 1163–4) to Ch’ien-tao (Supernal
Way, 1165–73), the latter title being adopted at the beginning of 1165 and
lasting for the next eight years. During the Ch’ien-tao period, the emperor
and his ministers embarked on new tasks aimed at rebuilding the empire by
strengthening defenses, improving the standards of central and local administrations, developing economic resources, and tending to the livelihood of the
people. It was the court’s objective to put the empire in order (tzu-chih) before
actively considering any ambitious scheme or military campaign to reconquer
territory. Although the long-term objective of recovery of lost territory (hui-fu)
was constantly in the minds of the emperor and his officials, the court generally refrained from bellicose gestures after the disastrous campaign of 1163.
Shih Hao was showered with royal gifts and regularly granted high-ranking
sinecures, and he continued to recommend promising young candidates for
office and to communicate with Hsiao-tsung.
During these years of reconstruction, major tasks that the court faced
included administrative reforms and issues of finance, defense, and foreign
policy. How the emperor and his officials dealt with these matters provides a
picture of court politics and indicates that concern for internal development
often emerged in the formulation of domestic and foreign policies. An examination of the relations between Hsiao-tsung and his ministers on the one hand
and between him and his inner court favorites on the other affords insight into
his character, his continued personal ambition to recover lost territory, and
his desire to concentrate power into his own hands. His ability to concentrate
power contributed to the growth of imperial absolutism in the Sung, especially
during the latter part of his reign.
Historians have generally regarded Hsiao-tsung as a wise and responsible monarch embodying the Confucian virtues of filial piety, frugality, diligence, and willingness to seek the advice of his ministers on matters related to
the reign of hsiao-tsung
721
government and administration. Nevertheless, beneath the apparent peace
and tranquility of the period, Hsiao-tsung’s court was not free from tensions,
strains, and even outright conflict between Hsiao-tsung and his ministers,
among the ministers themselves, and between outer court bureaucrats and
inner court attendants. Disagreements occasionally arose over some issue or
policy, but despite these disputes, Hsiao-tsung was generally broad-minded
enough not to hold a grudge against ministers who openly criticized him.
Throughout his reign, despite these disagreements, the court remained largely
free from truly divisive bureaucratic factionalism. It is to Hsiao-tsung’s credit
that he managed to keep everything under control and at the same time hold
political tensions to an acceptable level.
Hsiao-tsung and his ministers
Hsiao-tsung’s reign was one of the few during the Southern Sung that was
not dominated by powerful councilors. The emperor’s power held supreme
and unchallenged. Hsiao-tsung was a demanding emperor who dismissed his
ministers without hesitation if they failed to meet his expectations. The frequent dismissals of councilors and other officials led to much criticism of the
emperor’s personnel policy. In 1166 the lesser lord of agricultural supervision,
Mo Chi, said to the emperor:
The way of government depends on the appointment of [the right] personnel, while the
appointment of personnel depends on the fulfilling of responsibilities [by the personnel
concerned]. If we appoint the officials but do not keep them in office for a sufficiently long
period, we will not be able to judge the excellence of the good and the capable, while on
the other hand, the evil and unworthy officials manage to go unpunished.31
Mo Chi criticized the emperor for dismissing councilors and other officials
after they had served only a few months. Although Hsiao-tsung commended
Mo for his criticism, he carried on as before. In addition to being dissatisfied
with individual performances, it could well be that having personally witnessed the great power wielded by the chief councilor, Ch’in Kuei, during his
father’s reign, Hsiao-tsung was especially careful that no minister achieve such
dominance during his own reign. A convenient way to restrict the growth of
ministerial power was to limit the ministers’ tenure of office, so that great
ministers would be denied the opportunity to build a power base at court that
could threaten the emperor’s power.
Besides frequently removing councilors, Hsiao-tsung also sought to control
them by curtailing their due authority. Early in 1167, the emperor had finally
31
Liu et al., Huang Sung chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng 29, p. 5b.
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filled every vacancy in the Council of State by appointing chief councilors of
the left and right and two assistant councilors. The bureaucracy was generally
pleased with the appointments of these key officials, but the remarks of the
vice-minister for war, Ch’en Yen-hsiao, reveal a certain skepticism: “Your
Majesty’s recent appointments of the left and right chief councilors and the
assistant councilors have led to much jubilation among the officials, who
rejoice that the right men have been found to lead the government. However,
in my opinion, the councilors should be given more power so that they can
exercise the responsibility of governing the empire.”32 Clearly some officials
were already concerned about the lack of authority granted to councilors.
Although Hsiao-tsung is said to have heard Ch’en out, he never put Ch’en’s
advice into practice. Throughout Hsiso-tsung’s reign, a chief complaint among
the officials remained his tendency to impinge on their authority.
Hsiao-tsung appears to have realized the importance of placating his councilors by treating them with dignity and giving them full executive authority in principle, if not in practice. Ironically, during Hsiao-tsung’s reign the
councilors nominally were given widespread powers, but Hsiao-tsung’s participation in all major decisions greatly limited their authority. Early in 1163,
the chief councilors were appointed to the concurrent positions of commissioners of military affairs, by which appointment military authority was also
formally assigned to them.33 A few years later, in early 1167, the chief councilors were further granted financial authority when given the concurrent title
of controller of national finance (chih kuo-yung shih).34 This concentration of
civil, military, and financial power into the hands of the chief councilors was
to become an important factor in the rise of powerful councilors later in the
Southern Sung, perhaps because of their long periods of tenure.35 However,
this was not the case during Hsiao-tsung’s reign.
Hsiao-tsung intended that his ministers exercise their powers in ordinary
administrative affairs, but the emperor was in the habit of jealously guarding
32
33
34
35
Liu et al., Huang Sung chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng 29, pp. 12a–b.
During the Northern Sung there were a few occasions, during times of emergency, when the chief
councilors were appointed to concurrent positions in the Bureau of Military Affairs, but it was not until
1130 that they were appointed on a regular basis. However, after the death of Ch’in Kuei in 1155, the
concurrent appointment of chief councilors to the post of commissioner of military affairs was again
discontinued. The title was restored to the chief councilors after the accession of Hsiao-tsung. See Ma
Tuan-lin, Wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao (c. 1308; Shanghai, 1936) 58, p. 528.
Hsü Tzu-ming, Sung tsai-fu pien-nien lu [Ching-hsiang-lou ts’ung-shu 1929 ed.] (early 13th c.; Taipei,
1967) 17, p. 1545. For an account of the office of controller of national finance, see Li, Chien-yen i-lai
ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (1967) chia 10, pp. 3b–4a.
See Lin T’ien-wei, “Sung-tai ch’üan-hsiang hsing-ch’eng chih fen-hsi,” Ssu yü yen 10 No. 5 (1973),
pp. 30–40; see also Liang T’ien-hsi, “Lun Sung tsai-fu hu-chien chih-tu,” in Sung-shih yen-chiu chi: Ti ssu
chi, ed. Sung-shih tso-t’an-hui (Taipei, 1969), p. 294.
the reign of hsiao-tsung
723
his overriding imperial prerogatives and frequently exercised them, especially
in military matters. Hung Mai (1123–1202), the Secretariat imperial recorder,
remarked in 1167 that imperial orders issued to the Bureau of Military Affairs
frequently went straight to the Imperial Chancellery, bypassing the Imperial
Secretariat. This meant that the orders were issued without the knowledge or
approval of the councilors, who were the heads of the Secretariat. Hung Mai
requested that henceforth all orders issued to the Bureau of Military Affairs
should go through the proper channels.36 Though Hsiao-tsung promised to
rectify this, orders on matters of great urgency still were dispatched directly
to the Chancellery without going through the Secretariat. These were referred
to as “confidential orders” (mi-pai).37 Besides the use of “confidential orders,”
Hsiao-tsung employed similar methods to enhance his power in other areas.
Notable among these were the use of “palace orders” (nei-p’i) and “imperial
decrees” (yü-pi), which were issued directly from the palace without prior
consultation with the councilors.38
The emperor’s disregard for routine procedure caused great concern among
the officials. Ch’en Chün-ch’ing (1113–86), one of Hsiao-tsung’s former tutors,
was also one of his most outspoken ministers and frequently confronted
Hsiao-tsung over issues regarding national policies and the emperor’s personal conduct. Ch’en was noted for his vigilant opposition to any infringement of bureaucratic powers by the emperor. On the eve of his appointment as
chief councilor in 1168, Ch’en had a serious disagreement with Hsiao-tsung
over the matter of secret orders directly issued to the army without going
through the regular channels of the ministers at court. Ch’en and his colleagues
in the Council of State presented a request that all departments, upon receiving
imperial orders issued directly from the palace, should first memorialize the
court for verification before implementing them. Hsiao-tsung initially agreed
to this, but two days later changed his mind, much to his ministers’ frustration.
The emperor, unwilling to give up imperial prerogatives, tried to evade the
issue by remarking that, “Doing this would mean that even when the palace
wishes to get a drink or some food, it would have to obtain court verification.
Now, would that not be overrestraining!” Ch’en Chün-ch’ing countered that
the ministers were concerned with much more important matters, such as
requesting that the Bureau of Military Affairs be notified on military matters, and that on financial matters the Three Departments be informed. Ch’en
36
37
38
Liu et al., Huang Sung chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng 29, pp. 11b–12a.
Liu et al., Huang Sung chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng 29, pp. 11b–12a.
Both nei-p’i and yü-pi were imperial orders issued directly from the palace. These direct orders were
traditionally known as nei-p’i, but the latter term yü-pi had been used since the time of Hui-tsung. These
orders were not necessarily written by the emperor himself and were therefore different from “personally
written decrees” (ch’in-pi). See Li, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (1967) i 11, p. 1a.
724
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argued that, after all, the court belonged to the emperor, and the ministers
were merely carrying out the emperor’s orders, and that therefore, court verification of all matters meant that ultimate decisions still lay in the hands of the
emperor. Finally, Ch’en expressed his fear that the emperor had changed his
mind after being influenced by elements within the palace.39 Such strongly
worded criticism angered Hsiao-tsung, but Ch’en was unwilling to yield.
Subsequently, Ch’en Chün-ch’ing submitted a self-impeaching memorial
for having offended the emperor, but Hsiao-tsung refused to accept his resignation. Though frequently offended by Ch’en’s criticism, the emperor recognized Ch’en to be a righteous and responsible minister. A few days after this
exchange, Ch’en was promoted to chief councilor of the right. In so doing,
Hsiao-tsung indicated that though he was not completely indifferent to criticism, he could reward ministers for their loyalty even though what they said
sometimes displeased him.
Despite his autocratic tendencies, Hsiao-tsung tried to project the image of
an enlightened and open-minded monarch. He often encouraged his officials
to speak their minds and even invited criticism of himself. In 1166, the Chancellery imperial recorder, Chiang Fei, who was a newly appointed drafting
official of the Secretariat on probation, told Hsiao-tsung apologetically that,
as a drafting official who had veto power, he was afraid he might occasionally
offend the emperor in the course of his official duties. Hsiao-tsung replied
that this was exactly what he expected from the drafting official, and that
Chiang should not confine himself to commenting on political matters and
appointments but could also criticize the ruler if the latter had committed any
faults.40 But although Hsiao-tsung tried to be receptive to criticism, he did
not always live up to this ideal.
Hsiao-tsung made it a point to keep in close touch with his ministers. In
the summer of 1165, he expressed his regrets to the councilors that he could
not afford more time with them during morning court sessions and proposed
inviting them to the palace in the evenings to discuss the “way of government”
(chih-tao).41 Hsiao-tsung and his ministers frequently held policy discussions
in the Hsüan-te Hall in the palace.42 Relations between the emperor and his
ministers were especially cordial during the period of Yü Yün-wen’s (1110–
74) tenure as chief councilor, from 1169 to 1172. On one occasion in 1171,
Hsiao-tsung said to the councilors: “During the time of the founding ancestors,
39
40
41
42
For an account of this episode, see the hsing-chuang of Ch’en Chün-ch’ing in Chu, Hui-an hsien-sheng Chu
Wen kung wen-chi (1929) 96, pp. 1716–17.
Sung-shih ch’üan-wen Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien (early 14th c.; Taipei, 1969) 24, p. 1911.
Sung-shih ch’üan-wen Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien 24, p. 1902.
See “Hsüan-te-tien chi,” in Chou, Wen-chung chi 104, p. 10b.
the reign of hsiao-tsung
725
the councilors had frequently been invited to join in various leisure activities
by the emperor. . . . On the days when I am free, I would like to invite you
over for an archery match and to wine and dine together.” When Yü and his
colleagues praised Hsiao-tsung for his willingness to spend time with them,
the emperor replied that it was important for the ruler and the ministers to be
close and thus able to communicate with one another. He again emphasized
that since the morning court sessions were too short for detailed discussion of
government, he wished to spend more time with his ministers so that they
could carry on their discussions in a relaxed manner.43
In an attempt to streamline the administration and bring about more effective government, Hsiao-tsung initiated a number of political reforms in 1172.
In the spring of that year, the titles of the chief councilors were changed from
left and right executives of the Department of Ministries (shang-shu tso-yu p’uyeh) to left and right chief councilors (tso-yu ch’eng-hsiang).44 The emperor’s
ostensible reason for this change was that he was unhappy with the ancient
term p’u-yeh. Hsiao-tsung’s objection to this term was that although it was
originally a minor office during the Ch’in dynasty (221–206 b.c.e.), and did
not carry much responsibility, after the Eastern Han dynasty (25–220) and
into the T’ang, it had became increasingly important, but the holders of this
post had not been heads of the bureaucracy.45 Hsiao-tsung felt that, as heads
of the bureaucracy, the chief councilors should be properly addressed, and
the term ch’eng-hsiang (which is a close equivalent to the term “prime minister”) seemed more appropriate and respectful. Thereafter, the designation
ch’eng-hsiang remained in use for the duration of the Southern Sung dynasty.
In addition, Hsiao-tsung reorganized the civil administration by eliminating
the top administrative posts in the Three Departments and delegating their
former responsibilities to the chief councilor, or sometimes jointly to both
chief councilors. This proved to be a more important structural change than
the renaming of the chief councilor’s title.46
Though in principle these reforms expanded the authority of the councilors,
in practice Hsiao-tsung exerted such rigorous control over the councilors that
most were reduced to virtual sycophants. Councilors with strong views such as
Shih Hao and Ch’en Chün-ch’ing soon left office and were replaced by others
more amenable to the emperor’s wishes. With the top offices occupied by men
easily manipulated by the throne, Hsiao-tsung managed to maintain effective
personal command over the entire bureaucratic machine.
43
44
45
46
Sung-shih ch’üan-wen Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien 25, p. 1980.
Liu et al., Huang Sung chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng 51, p. 3b.
For the evolution of the office of p’u-yeh, see Ma, Wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao (1936) 51, pp. 470–1.
Liu et al., Huang Sung chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng 51, p. 4a.
gong wei ai
726
Hsiao-tsung and the inner court
Another method that Hsiao-tsung employed to enhance his personal power
was to use inner court personnel as a counterweight to the regular bureaucracy.
Because of their proximity to the throne and the tendency of the emperor to
regard them as his confidants, palace attendants were a constant source of
anxiety for the ministers of the outer court. Hsiao-tsung showed great favor
to certain members of the inner court and occasionally used them to bypass
the normal operations of the bureaucracy. It is therefore not surprising that
imperial favors given the so-called close attendants (chin-hsi) in the inner court
frequently led to protests from the officials.
During Hsiao-tsung’s reign there were several occasions when outer court
officials quarreled with inner court attendants. Soon after his ascension in 1162,
Hsiao-tsung appointed Lung Ta-yüan and Tseng Ti, two of his favorite palace
attendants, to important positions in the Bureau of Military Affairs. Both
Lung and Tseng had won Hsiao-tsung’s confidence while he was still crown
prince, but they were extremely unpopular among the regular bureaucrats, who
regarded them as petty men and sycophants. As a result of censorial impeachments in 1163, Hsiao-tsung decided to appoint them instead as audience
commandants in the Office of Audience Ceremonies (Ko-men ssu), a position
lower in rank but nonetheless important as it gave them easy access to the
emperor and the opportunity to influence imperial decisions. This appointment immediately led to further protests from the officials in the outer court.
Among those opposed to the appointments of Lung and Tseng were censors,
drafting officials, and an assistant councilor. Hsiao-tsung, angered by this
combined attack on his favorites, commented to Chief Councilor Shih Hao
that the officials would not have dared do such a thing during the reign of
Kao-tsung.47 Suspecting the officials of factionalism, he had them dismissed
one by one. Although Hsiao-tsung temporarily withdrew the appointments of
Lung and Tseng, two months later he appointed them as audience commandants, and they remained in these posts for the next few years despite frequent
criticism against them.
Among outer court ministers, Ch’en Chün-ch’ing in particular was noted
for his opposition to the emperor’s favorites. In 1167, just two months after
becoming associate administrator in the Bureau of Military Affairs, Ch’en
had his first confrontation with the emperor over this issue. The incident
was sparked when Ch’en heard that Lung Ta-yüan and Tseng Ti had leaked
information regarding official appointments. Ch’en immediately informed his
colleagues in the Council of State of this disclosure of confidential matters
47
Li, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (1967) i 6, pp. 1a–2b.
the reign of hsiao-tsung
727
by Lung and Tseng, whereupon all the councilors agreed that they should
bring this matter before the throne. Still unable to contain his indignation,
Ch’en personally questioned Hsiao-tsung, who denied that he had ever consulted Lung and Tseng regarding official appointments. The emperor further
commended Ch’en for his loyalty and promised that he would have the two
attendants dismissed. Consequently, Lung and Tseng were both given prefectural appointments away from court, much to the joy of the officials.48 On
this occasion at least, the councilors had scored a victory against the emperor’s
favorites. Hsiao-tsung probably considered it unwise to go against the wishes
of the ministers, since they had obtained evidence against his favorites. He
might also have felt that the palace attendants had gone too far in abusing
their power and decided to teach them a lesson.
Despite demoting Lung and Tseng, Hsiao-tsung still had a soft spot for
them. After Lung’s death in 1168, Hsiao-tsung took pity on Tseng and considered summoning him back to court. He was admonished against doing so
by both the assistant councilor Ch’en Chün-ch’ing and the associate administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, Liu Kung (1122–78), who shared
Ch’en’s intense dislike and distrust of the inner court favorites.49 Faced with
this opposition from his ministers, Hsiao-tsung decided not to summon Tseng.
However, soon after Ch’en Chün-ch’ing left office in 1170, Tseng was reappointed to court, and no one dared to speak against his reappointment. Tseng
once again rose in power, as the emperor bestowed numerous favors and honorary titles on him over the next decade.
In addition to opposing Tseng Ti, Ch’en Chün-ch’ing was also vigilant in
his opposition to inner court personnel gaining undue power by other means.
He was especially concerned about palace attendants coming into contact with
generals. In 1167, the commander of the Chen-chiang army, Ch’i Fang, was
dismissed for oppressing his soldiers by employing them for forced labor services. Ch’en Chün-ch’ing brought to the emperor’s notice that certain members
of the inner court had close connections with Ch’i Fang. Subsequently, two of
the inner court attendants were charged with having received bribes from Ch’i
and were demoted and exiled. An edict that threatened severe punishment for
future offenders was then issued prohibiting military officials from befriending
inner court attendants.50
Besides Tseng Ti and Lung Ta-yüan, another prominent palace favorite of
Hsiao-tsung was Chang Yüeh, who was the husband of the dowager empress’s
48
49
50
For an account of this incident, see Li, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (1967) i 6, pp. 5a–b.
For Liu’s protest, see Chu, Hui-an hsien-sheng Chu Wen kung wen-chi (1929) 97, p. 1929, and for Ch’en
Chün-ch’ing’s admonition, see 96, p. 1716.
Sung-shih ch’üan-wen Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien 24, p. 1934.
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younger sister. In 1171, Chang Yüeh was promoted from audience commandant to notary official at the Bureau of Military Affairs. The appointment of
a minor palace official to such a high-ranking office led to great controversy
at court. The imperial lecturer, Chang Shih (1133–80), submitted a memorial admonishing Hsiao-tsung. At the same time, Chang reproached Chief
Councilor Yu Yün-wen for allowing this to happen.51 The drafting official at
the Secretariat, Fan Ch’eng-ta (1126–93), also opposed the appointment and
refused to endorse it.52 The emperor was obliged to compromise by giving
Chang Yüeh a sinecure and the honorary title of military governor (chieh-tu
shih).
In the following year, another attempt was made to appoint Chang Yüeh
as notary official at the Bureau of Military Affairs. By this time both Chang
Shih and Fan Ch’eng-ta had left court and were holding prefectural positions.
Although Hsiao-tsung may have believed that there would not be any strong
opposition to the appointment, this was not the case. When Chang’s appointment was announced, it was again opposed by various censorial and drafting
officials.53 The emperor was undeterred by their opposition, however, and the
officials were either dismissed or demoted for their defiance. Throughout the
incident Chief Councilor Yü Yün-wen remained noncommittal, and his tolerance of the emperor’s favorites and support for the emperor’s policies must
have been noted by Hsiao-tsung as Yü served for a longer period than most of
his colleagues.
Owing to the strong opposition to the undue influence of palace personnel
by ministers such as Ch’en Chün-ch’ing and Liu Kung, during the eight years
of the Ch’ien-tao period Hsiao-tsung was, on the whole, more restrained than
he later would be in bestowing favors on personal attendants. However, toward
the end of his reign, palace favorites became more influential as they faced less
opposition from top civil officials in the government.
Financial policy
In addition to the consolidation of the emperor’s hold over the court, the Ch’ientao period also witnessed consolidation in other fields. Like his predecessor,
Kao-tsung, Hsiao-tsung realized the importance of finance in strengthening
51
52
53
HTC (1957) 142, p. 3795. Chang is said to have told Yü Yün-wen, “The appointment of eunuchs to
councilor positions started with Ts’ai Ching and Wang Fu (bad last ministers of Northern Sung), while
the appointment of close attendants to councilor positions began with you, sir!”
Tomb inscription for Fan Ch’eng-ta in Chou, Wen-chung chi 61, pp. 18b–19a; HTC (1957) 142,
p. 3796.
HTC (1957) 143, p. 3811.
the reign of hsiao-tsung
729
the Southern Sung regime. One of his first acts after his ascension to the
throne was to examine the accounts of the Ministry of Finance.54 His thorough investigation of the ministry’s income and expenditures led to a protest
by its vice-minister, Chou K’uei, in 1163. Chou, in his memorial, referred to
the emperor’s queries into the “minor details” of financial matters and suggested that the imperial inquiry was instigated by “petty elements” at court
(an obvious attack on Lung Ta-yüan and Tseng Ti).55 Besides worrying about
the influence these imperial favorites were having on the emperor, Chou K’uei
and other officials, in opposing Hsiao-tsung’s interest in the details of financial administration, implied that the emperor should concern himself with
more important tasks than examining mundane financial records. This was
clearly a difference of opinion between the emperor and scholar-officials on
the significance of administrative details. Hsiao-tsung was unhappy with the
general indifference shown by the scholar-officials toward financial administration and criticized them for their attitude. In 1167, the emperor voiced
his concern about the ignorance of scholar-officials, trained in the Confucian
textual tradition, in financial and agricultural matters, and expressed his wish
that they should devote more attention to specific aspects of these areas.56
Again, in 1171, Hsiao-tsung severely criticized the scholar-officials for not
discussing finance and agriculture, even though these formed the basis of the
well-being of the state.57
Strongly endorsing the view that agriculture was the foundation of the state,
Hsiao-tsung on numerous occasions admonished prefectural officials to play a
more active role in promoting farming. In the autumn of 1164 he ordered the
administrators of various prefectures in the Yangtze and Chekiang regions to
look into the irrigation and farming conditions of their respective territories
with a view to increasing farm productivity.58 Irrigation projects were subsequently initiated in prefectures in the region. Hsiao-tsung also expressed
his personal interest in agriculture by following Kao-tsung’s example of practicing ritual grain cultivation and sericulture within the palace compound.59
On many occasions he genuinely expressed joy over good harvests and anxiety
when adverse weather conditions threatened his crops.
54
55
56
57
58
59
Hsiao-tsung frequently summoned finance officials to the palace and carefully examined the finances and
revenues of the government. He also personally checked the accounts books of the various treasuries. See
Li, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (1967) i 3, p. 6a.
HTC (1957) 138, p. 3689.
Liu et al., Huang Sung chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng 46, p. 1a.
Liu et al., Huang Sung chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng 50, pp. 17a–b.
Hsü Sung et al., Sung hui-yao chi-kao [hereafter SHY (1997)] (1809, 1936, 1957; Peking, 1997) shih-huo
61, p. 116; HTC (1957) 138, p. 3689.
Liu et al., Huang Sung chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng 59, p. 13a.
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gong wei ai
In addition to promoting agriculture, Hsiao-tsung sought to strengthen the
empire’s economy through a series of financial reforms, some of which were
aimed at achieving more effective control of the central government’s expenditures. In 1167, in response to an earlier proposal by a remonstrance official,
Ch’en Liang-yu, that national expenditures should be properly controlled, the
emperor appointed the chief councilor and assistant councilor respectively to
concurrent positions of controller and co-controller of national finance.60 By
so doing, Hsiao-tsung intended that his councilors play a more effective role
in financial administration, but he also intended to impose a more centralized control on national finance by placing it under the supervision of the
chief ministers of state. Another measure to control government expenditures
was introduced in the spring of 1167, when the emperor ordered all officials,
whether civil or military and whether in the inner or outer court, to submit on
the fifth day of every month to the Bureau of State Expenditure (Kuo-yung fang)
statements of their official spending. This regulation did not apply only to officials in the capital. Government personnel in all prefectures were required to
submit these monthly accounts.61 The purpose of the measure was to enforce
more careful spending by government personnel and to reduce the misappropriation of funds. An additional reform to strictly control state finance was
introduced in 1168, when in accord with a proposal by the supervisor of public
revenue, Chao Pu-ti, a centralized Register of Public Revenue (Tu-chih tu-chi)
was established. The purpose of this register was to easily verify the accounts,
as well as to prevent abuses by corrupt clerks.62
In addition to emphasizing stricter fiscal control, Hsiao-tsung also sought
to reduce expenditures. The theme of frugality often emerged in policy discussions, and calls for retrenchment were repeatedly promulgated during the
early years of the Ch’ien-tao period. In an imperial decree issued in 1163,
Hsiao-tsung ordered the Ministry of Finance and the censorial officials to discuss ways to cut excessive spending.63 This was followed by a decree in 1164
announcing the emperor’s decision to reduce expenses in the performance of
religious ceremonies.64 Besides reducing unnecessary or excessive expenses
in ritual matters, Hsiao-tsung and his court also sought to decrease military
expenditures, which constituted the largest item in the state budget.65 The
60
61
62
63
64
65
Sung-shih ch’üan-wen Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien 24, p. 1923; SHY (1997) chih-kuan 6, pp. 20–1.
Sung-shih ch’üan-wen Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien 24, p. 1926.
Liu et al., Huang Sung chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng 47, pp. 3a–b; SHY (1997) shih-huo 51 p. 46.
HTC (1957) 138, p. 3665.
HTC (1957) 138, p. 3679.
The termination of war with the Chin did not mean the relaxation of national defense, and eighty percent
of the empire’s income continued to be allotted to the army. See Chou Pi-ta’s tomb inscription in Lou
Yüeh [Yao], Kung-k’uei chi [Wu-ying tien 1736–95 ed.] (c. early 13th c.; Shanghai, 1929) 93, p. 887.
the reign of hsiao-tsung
731
large number of soldiers enlisted during the Ch’ien-tao period, estimated at
no fewer than four hundred thousand men,66 prompted various proposals for
military reform to reduce costs and improve troop quality.
Hsiao-tsung’s frugality has often been commended as one of his greatest virtues. The emperor himself claimed he had never spent a single cash
extravagantly.67 In 1170 he discussed his frugality publicly in a conversation
with Hsiao Kuo-liang, the collator of the Palace Library. Hsiao was reiterating a long-held criticism of Han Wu-ti (r. 141–87 b.c.e.), an expansionist
emperor during the Han dynasty (206 b.c.e.–220 c.e.) whose extravagance
had irreparably weakened the dynasty. To this, Hsiao-tsung responded: “It
was not only Han Wu-ti. Since antiquity rulers have always observed frugality
during times of difficulties, but after the establishment of peace few have not
become extravagant. I have no other accomplishment apart from frugality.”68
Frugal himself, the emperor disapproved of the extravagant practices of the
populace, especially those of the more well-to-do farmers. In the autumn of
1172, he criticized the people for lavish spending during times of good harvests
and advised them to save for times of emergency.69
Despite all his attempts to reduce expenditures, Hsiao-tsung found that
he had to continue to impose heavy taxes. During his reign, supplementary
and commercial taxes previously introduced by Kao-tsung continued to contribute greatly to state income.70 The heavy tax burden borne by the people led
to numerous criticisms against oppressive taxation by prefectural authorities,
whose chief concern was to meet the tax quotas imposed by the central government. Though Hsiao-tsung was troubled by the problem of heavy taxation
and frequently expressed his desire to abolish all the irregular and supplementary taxes, he found that he could not do away with them because of
the regime’s extremely heavy military expenses. However, Hsiao-tsung did
attempt to lessen the burden on taxpayers through such measures as tax remission and the prohibition of oppressive taxes. While his predecessor, Kao-tsung,
had sought to increase state income by introducing many new taxes, Hsiaotsung stressed instead the importance of systematically reducing expenditures
as the means to balancing the government’s budget and strengthening its
finances.
66
67
68
69
70
See Li, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (1967) chia 18, pp. 4b–5a.
Hsiao-tsung made this claim in 1168, in response to an official’s request that taxes should be reduced
to lessen the people’s burden. See Liu et al., Huang Sung chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng 47, p. 5a.
Liu et al., Huang Sung chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng 48, p. 6a.
Sung-shih ch’üan-wen Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien 25, p. 2003.
Li, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (1967) chia 15, pp. 4b–5a. Government income from commercial tax
amounted to 14.4 million strings (min) of cash, which represented about twenty percent of its annual
revenue from the southeastern region.
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Defense and foreign policy
Despite the conclusion of the peace settlement with the Chin in the north, military and defense preparations constituted a major item in Hsiao-tsung’s reconstruction program. Military recruitment was a matter of primary importance.
In 1165, Wang Chi-chung2, the Secretariat’s imperial recorder, raised the
issue by pointing out that descendants of military officials appeared ashamed
to keep up the military tradition of their families. He added that although the
country was at the moment free of disturbances, it was a good time to recruit
military personnel so that the Sung would not be caught unprepared in the
event of war. Wang Chi-chung2 proposed selecting from among the families of
former generals those men capable of a military career, and encouraging them
to continue the family’s military tradition by awarding them special honors.71
Hsiao-tsung agreed with both the proposal and that this should be the urgent
task of the day. Thus, the peace settlement did not result in slackened Sung
efforts at defense.
Military preparation also involved building and fortifying walls in strategic locations. Wall repairs were carried out in Chien-k’ang (Nanking) after
the war in 1165.72 Particular attention was paid to the defenses of the region
north of the Yangtze in 1167 and 1168. Wall repair projects were also implemented in Hsiang-yang and in the Huai region in 1169 and 1170. These
fortification projects were opposed by some officials on the grounds that such
defense measures might arouse Chin suspicion and provoke renewed hostilities. Hsiao-tsung, though, felt safe in carrying out these defense preparations
and complained that some officials were being inflexible.73
Apart from their fear of provoking Chin, officials may also have opposed
some defense projects because of financial considerations. Since the bulk of
governmental expenditures were on defense, Hsiao-tsung and his ministers
often debated how best to strengthen the empire without overtaxing the people. Though he was obliged to reduce the number of soldiers in certain areas in
order to curtail military expenditures, Hsiao-tsung did not neglect the need for
defensive preparedness in either the Yangtze or the Huai regions. The government also gave high priority to defending the northwestern frontier. After the
famous Sung general Wu Lin died in 1167, the administrator of the Bureau
of Military Affairs, Yü Yün-wen, was sent to take his place as pacification
commissioner of Szechwan. Yü began building up defenses in the Szechwan
and Shensi regions. He personally recruited new generals, and he improved
71
72
73
Sung-shih ch’üan-wen Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien 24, p. 1899.
SHY (1997) fang-yü 9, p.13.
Sung-shih ch’üan-wen Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien 24, p. 1930.
the reign of hsiao-tsung
733
the army’s efficiency by discharging unfit and overage soldiers.74 One of Yü
Yün-wen’s outstanding contributions to northwestern frontier defense was the
reorganization of the local defense corps known as i-shih (loyalist soldiers). A
kind of militia, these loyalist soldiers were meant to defend their own localities
without incurring heavy costs to the imperial treasury. Instead of maintaining a
regular army, Yü advocated the use of these i-shih, who could be trained during
the slack winter seasons of the farming year in preparation for an emergency. In
the 1130s, the i-shih had been a considerable force, numbering around seventy
thousand, but by 1161 it had dwindled to a mere six thousand. After Yü’s
recruitment efforts in 1167, the number of i-shih in the northwestern prefectures came to around twenty-four thousand men.75 These i-shih were given
regular military training and contributed in no small way to local defense.
The i-shih system was now extended to other parts of the empire. Militia
recruitment and training also took place in the Huai and Yangtze regions and
in Hupei and Hunan. Rewards were given as incentives to outstanding men
among the trainees.76 In order not to impose too heavy a burden upon the
farmers, the court’s policy was to assemble the militia for a training period of
only one month per year in late autumn or in winter, during which time their
needs were provided for by the state.77
Besides the use of local militia, the establishment of military farms, selfsupporting military settlements sometimes called colonies (t’un-t’ien), was also
a policy designed to strengthen defenses and save costs. Under this military
colony system, farms were to be worked by soldiers and militia stationed at
the colony. Although normally they farmed, these men were also regularly
trained and kept in readiness to take up arms at short notice during times
of emergency.78 This system was seen as an inexpensive way of defending the
borders, since the soldiers were to be self-supporting. However, these farm
colony projects were not always successful owing either to poor management
or to other factors such as regional depopulation. In 1165, various generals,
military commanders, and circuit attendants were assigned responsibility for
the military farms in different parts of the empire.79 Subsequently, the scheme
was abandoned in those areas where the colonies ran at a loss, with the land
allotted for military farms either leased to members of the public or used to
resettle refugees.
74
75
76
77
78
79
See Yü’s memorials in Fu, Sung-tai Shu-wen chi-ts’un (1971) 57, pp. 9a–10a, 13a–b.
Fu, Sung-tai Shu-wen chi-ts’un (1971) 58, pp. 18b–19a.
SHY (1997) ping 1, p. 33.
SHY (1997) ping 1, p. 36.
For an account of the t’un-t’ien of Southern Sung, see Li, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (1967) chia 16,
pp. 1b–3a.
HTC (1957) 139, p. 3698.
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Hsiao-tsung’s concern about national defense also found expression in his
interest in the practice of warfare. He personally took part in five major
military maneuvers. Three of these were carried out during the Ch’ien-tao
period, in 1166, 1168, and 1170. On each occasion, he donned armor and
directed the maneuvers. It was a grand spectacle, and all participants were
richly rewarded.80 The emperor also regularly practiced horsemanship and
archery. His enthusiasm for the military arts and the tactical aspects of war
was not, however, shared by his ministers, who feared he might injure himself
and who also doubted that his interest in practical warfare would contribute
much to the dynasty’s long-range preparations for the reconquest of its lost
northern territories. In 1169, after Hsiao-tsung injured an eye while practicing archery, he was admonished by Chief Councilor Ch’en Chün-ch’ing that
his top priority was to govern the country well, and that it was unnecessary
for him to engage in personally fighting an enemy.81 Ch’en believed that to
achieve the goal of retaking the lost territories long-term planning was far
more important than the war games and martial training so esteemed by the
emperor.
The emperor found himself restrained by his ever-cautious ministers not
only in his participation in the military arts and physical sports but in the
broader area of foreign policy as well. He was constantly being reminded not
to act rashly. During the early years of the Ch’ien-tao period, the court’s policy
was to maintain an unaggressive posture in relations with Chin. In 1167, in
a court debate on reconquest, the associate administrator of the Bureau of
Military Affairs, Liu Kung, said that though revenge against Chin should be
the major objective, he believed that the Sung should make no rash move
until internal reforms had been undertaken for ten years.82 Liu Kung’s views
reflected the general opinion at court, since most officials also favored a period
of internal reconstruction and development before embarking on an aggressive
foreign policy against Chin.
Nevertheless, long before the end of the ten-year period advocated by Liu
Kung, Hsiao-tsung began to show signs of impatience with the court’s cautious
attitude. During the summer of 1167, when the chief remonstrance official,
Ch’en Liang-yu, told Hsiao-tsung that the officials did not regard the recent
repairs to the walls in Yang-chou as beneficial, the emperor rejoined, “How
can defense preparations not be beneficial?” Ch’en replied: “Supposing the
enemy were to attack us and we failed to defend the city [of Yang-chou],
80
81
82
For an account of the five military inspections carried out by Hsiao-tsung, see Li, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh
tsa-chi (1967) i 4, pp. 12a–14b.
Sung-shih ch’üan-wen Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien 25, p. 1950.
Liu et al., Huang Sung chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng 46, pp. 15a–b.
the reign of hsiao-tsung
735
we would have fortified the city for them. Now that we have sent twenty to
thirty thousand men across the Yangtze [for wall-repairs and defense of Yangchou], fresh hostilities might break out if the enemy came to know about
it.” Unconvinced, Hsiao-tsung commented, “Such measures should indeed
not be carried out [even farther north] in the Huai region, but what is the
harm of doing so in an internal area?” Ch’en still insisted that the emperor
be cautious. He concluded his objection by referring to the empire’s need for
further internal strengthening, emphasizing that the essential requirements
for defense were to select military personnel, accumulate resources, see to the
people’s well-being, and provide for the soldiers.83
The emperor at this point appeared to possess more zeal than his ministers in
matters of defense and foreign policy. He occasionally adopted a more militant
attitude in foreign relations. This became especially noticeable in the later
years of the Ch’ien-tao period, during which he found a great supporter in Yü
Yün-wen, who also favored a more aggressive foreign policy. On becoming
chief councilor of the right in 1169, Yü suggested sending envoys to Chin
to request retrocession of territory that included the Sung imperial tombs in
Honan. The chief councilor of the left, Ch’en Chün-ch’ing, strongly opposed
this action on grounds that it might put the Chin on alert or even provoke
them into attacking the Sung, who were far from ready to fight.84 Because of
Ch’en’s opposition, Hsiao-tsung postponed sending envoys that year (1169),
but he adopted Yü’s proposal and sent them the following year.
In the summer of 1170, at Yü Yün-wen’s recommendation, the Chancellery
imperial recorder, Fan Ch’eng-ta, was appointed envoy to Chin. While Fan
Ch’eng-ta’s major assignment was to request the return of the territory containing the Sung imperial tombs, he was given the additional duty of requesting
an alteration in the rites with which the Sung emperor received Chin letters
of state. The 1141 treaty had required the Sung emperor to descend from his
elevated throne when receiving letters of state from the Chin envoy. The same
procedure was required under the 1165 treaty. Hsiao-tsung felt that this practice was degrading, and for some time he had wanted to change the ceremony,
but he had been discouraged from trying to do so by Ch’en Chün-ch’ing. Fearing that this request might provoke Chin, Hsiao-tsung omitted it from the
state letter, and instead verbally instructed Fan Ch’eng-ta to raise the matter.85
In the autumn of 1170, Fan Ch’eng-ta returned from Chin. Although the
request to alter the rites had not been included in the Sung state letter, Fan
had managed to submit a memorial on the issue to the Chin emperor. Chin
83
84
85
Sung-shih ch’üan-wen Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien 24, p. 1931.
Chu, Hui-an hsien-sheng Chu Wen kung wen-chi (1929) 96, p. 1718.
See the biography of Fan Ch’eng-ta in SS 386, p. 11868.
736
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rejected the requests both to return territory and to alter the rites, but the
initiative shown by Fan in negotiating the Sung case was deeply appreciated
by Hsiao-tsung.86 Despite the failure of Fan’s mission, Hsiao-tsung did not
give up trying to persuade Chin to grant the two requests. During the winter
of 1170, when Chao Hsiung, the drafting official at the Secretariat, was sent
on an official mission to greet the Chin emperor on his birthday, he carried a
letter that again asked to alter the rites for receiving Chin state letters.87 The
Chin court rejected this appeal as well.
Hsiao-tsung’s ambition to reincorporate former territory became more
apparent during the last years of the Ch’ien-tao period. Following Fan Ch’engta’s mission, many opportunists presented plans for how the reconquest might
be achieved. More than ten men were rewarded with official positions for having impressed the emperor with their proposals.88 During the ninth month of
1172 the emperor decided to send Yü Yün-wen (who had resigned his position
as chief councilor) once again to Szechwan as its pacification commissioner.
The grand farewell given Yü indicates the importance Hsiao-tsung attached
to Yü’s assignment.89 It is said that before Yü left for Szechwan, the emperor
discussed with him a plan to attack the Central Plains by having Yü move the
Szechwan army eastward from Szechwan while the emperor led the imperial
army northward from the Yangtze valley. He even ordered Yü to set a time for
such a joint military action to invade Honan.90 Hsiao-tsung’s parting instructions to Yü indicated his intention to play a personal role in the military
campaign. It was Hsiao-tsung’s cherished dream to personally lead his army
to victory.
During this second appointment as pacification commissioner of Szechwan,
Yü Yün-wen further strengthened Szechwan’s defensive capability by selecting
able generals, raising the soldiers’ morale with higher pay, increasing the supply
of horses, and reorganizing the troops for better coordination in the event of
war.91 Hsiao-tsung, however, became dissatisfied because Yü, after having been
in Szechwan for more than a year, still had not set a date for the joint attack.
Becoming impatient, the emperor sent confidential messages to Yü urging him
86
87
88
89
90
91
HTC (1957) 142, p. 3785.
HTC (1957) 142, p. 3789.
Chou, Wen-chung chi 61, p. 18b.
Yü Yün-wen was allowed to leave with great honor. Hsiao-tsung presented him with valuable gifts
consisting of sacrificial vessels from the imperial temple and personally wrote Yü a poem. It is said
that the grand treatment given to Yü was unprecedented in the farewell given to any of the chief
councilors since the beginning of the Southern Sung. See Li, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (1967) i 12,
pp. 5a–b.
HTC (1957) 143, p. 3821.
See the tomb inscription for Yü Yün-wen in Yang Wan-li, Ch’eng-chai chi (c. 1208; Shanghai, 1929)
120, pp. 1072–3.
the reign of hsiao-tsung
737
to get on with the plans for reconquest of the north. When Yü replied that the
army was not yet ready for an offensive campaign, Hsiao-tsung was displeased.
When Yü died the following year, it is said that the emperor refused to grant
him any posthumous honors. However, Hsiao-tsung’s disappointment with
Yü’s efforts vanished upon seeing the high quality of the Szechwan troops in a
subsequent military exercise. Hsiao-tsung then gave Yü posthumous honors,
as due credit for his painstaking efforts in selecting and training the soldiers.92
In addition to his growing optimism regarding reconquest, Hsiao-tsung
became more persistent in bargaining for a more equal diplomatic relationship
with Chin. The fact that he felt confident enough to adopt a more aggressive
foreign policy by the end of the Ch’ien-tao period in 1173 indicates that after a
decade of reconstruction, the Southern Sung had rebuilt its military and could
face Chin with greater confidence.
the ch’un-hsi period (1174–1189): the growth of absolutism
At the beginning of 1174, Hsiao-tsung changed his reign title from Ch’ientao to Ch’un-hsi (Pure Serenity, 1174–89). Although the Ch’ien-tao period
had been one of revival and restoration after the 1161–4 war, the emperor did
not appear satisfied with his accomplishments. He was troubled that the Sung
was still militarily far weaker than the Han and T’ang dynasties had been at
their peaks. One of his greatest regrets was his inability, during the Ch’ien-tao
period, to reconquer lands in the north formerly held by the Sung. By the end
of 1173, however, given his increasingly aggressive stance in foreign relations,
the emperor appears to have intended to create a militarily glorious reign in
the ensuing years.
The Ch’un-hsi reign period lasted sixteen years, until Hsiao-tsung’s abdication in 1189. During this time, in foreign policy, the Sung government
sought to improve its status with Chin. Domestically, the Sung empire enjoyed
political stability and economic prosperity. The years of reconstruction of the
previous period had borne fruit. The populace lived more comfortably and
even enjoyed some luxury. As a result of Hsiao-tsung’s frugality, the imperial
treasuries were filled to the brim. Politically, the emperor was the unchallenged
apex of power, and he exercised this power in an assertive manner. Prompted
by his success in domestic politics and ever more confident in himself, Hsiaotsung, who had already shown autocratic tendencies during his early years
on the throne, manifested them more distinctly after 1174. As his grip over
the bureaucracy tightened, officials became more submissive to his authority.
Most of the chief councilors who served during the Ch’un-hsi period were men
92
HTC (1957) 143, p. 3821.
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gong wei ai
whose political views seldom differed from the emperor’s and who were more
compliant about imperial conduct and court policy. Court politics became less
marked by the tensions and in-fighting that had occasionally occurred during
the preceding reign period. In these ways, the Ch’un-hsi period witnessed a
growth in the emperor’s absolute power. This absolutism was not necessarily
a negative development. It appears to have brought a further period of order
to the Southern Sung.
foreign relations after 1174
During the last years of the Ch’ien-tao period, Hsiao-tsung became more
persistent in negotiating to improve the Sung’s status in diplomatic relations.
At the beginning of 1174, Hsiao-tsung adopted his most aggressive posture
on relations with Chin. The Chin envoy Wan-yen Chang, who delivered New
Year’s greetings to the Sung court, was initially prevented from seeing the
emperor because of a disagreement over the protocol for receiving Chin letters
of state. Hsiao-tsung, who had always been unhappy about having to descend
from his throne to receive the state letters from Chin, again attempted to alter
the ceremonies stipulated by the 1165 treaty. The envoy was given an imperial
audience after the retired emperor, Kao-tsung, intervened, persuading Hsiaotsung to observe the required ceremonies for the time being.93 However,
on his return to Chin in the second month of 1174, Wan-yen Chang was
severely punished for having brought dishonor to the Chin government during
his mission.94 Though the Sung records are silent about the incident, the
indignation of Chin suggests that the proper ceremonies had not been observed
during Wan-yen Chang’s embassy. Hsiao-tsung’s apparent lack of concern over
the possible consequences of his action probably demonstrated his confidence
in Sung ability to confront Chin.
Following Wan-yen Chang’s punishment, rumors arose among Chin officials
that hostilities between the two states might be renewed. Nothing happened,
however, as neither the Chin nor the Sung were eager to go to war. Nevertheless,
Chin sent a special mission to the Sung in the spring of 1174 inquiring about
the Sung failure to adhere to the stipulated ceremonies during the previous
embassy. When the Chin envoy arrived at the Sung court, Hsiao-tsung saw
how offended Chin was, and decided to comply with its wishes by rising from
his throne to receive the letter of state.95 Hsiao-tsung seems to have avoided
93
94
95
HTC (1957) 143, p. 3836.
Wan-yen Chang was accused of allowing the Chin state letter to be taken from him in an improper
manner and of succumbing to bribery by the Sung. See T’o-t’o, ed., Chin shih [Po-na-pen 1930–7 ed.]
(1344; Peking, 1975) 61, p. 1453; HTC (1957) 144, p. 3838.
See the biography of Liang Su in T’o-t’o, Chin shih 86, pp. 1983–4.
the reign of hsiao-tsung
739
war by doing so. Another factor that might have influenced the emperor to
back down from his aggressive stance was Yü Yün-wen’s death in the second
month of 1174. The loss at this crucial moment of his strongest foreign policy
supporter must have disheartened Hsiao-tsung and might have prompted him
to placate Chin. This setback did not mean he was willing to drop the issue,
for he made several more attempts to have the ceremonies changed. During
the fourth month of 1174, the minister of works, Chang Tzu-yen, was sent
to Chin to respond to the Chin inquiry and, at the same time, to formally
request again an alteration in the ceremony for receiving Chin state letters.
The request was once again denied by the Chin emperor, who insisted that the
Sung continue to observe the established protocol.96
Apart from the issue of protocol, the fact that the Sung imperial tombs
remained in Chin hands continued to disturb Hsiao-tsung. Despite the failure
of Fan Ch’eng-ta’s mission in 1170 to negotiate the return of the territory
containing the imperial tombs, Hsiao-tsung refused to give up hope. Five
years later in the autumn of 1175, he sent the remonstrance official T’ang
Pang-yen on a similar mission to Chin. The boldness of T’ang, a protégé of Yü
Yün-wen, in voicing criticism had initially impressed the emperor. However,
T’ang turned out to be a great disappointment to Hsiao-tsung. While at the
Chin court, T’ang, so trusted by the emperor, failed to utter a single word
advocating the Sung cause.97 When T’ang returned south in the spring of
1176, the angry emperor ordered him exiled for failing to preserve Sung
honor. From then on, Hsiao-tsung dropped the issue of the imperial tombs
and sent no more envoys on such futile missions.
The emperor also continued to try to improve the Sung’s diplomatic status
by attempting to weaken the provisions of previous treaties with Chin. Early
in 1182, the Chin envoy on a New Year’s greetings mission to the Sung was
involved in yet another controversy over the ceremonies for receiving the Chin
state letter. Hsiao-tsung once again insisted that he would remain seated on his
throne when the letter was handed over to him. He sent Wang Pien, a trusted
inner court attendant and the chief recipient of edicts at the Bureau of Military
Affairs, to speak to the Chin envoy in an attempt to influence the latter to
agree to the alteration in the ceremony. Wang, however, failed in his task and
instead gave in to Chin demands by consenting that the protocol be followed.98
The emperor was displeased and had Wang dismissed the following month.
This was the last occasion on which the issue of the receipt of state letters
was raised.
96
97
98
HTC (1957) 144, p. 3842.
Liu et al., Huang Sung chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng 54, p. 16a.
Liu et al., Huang Sung chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng 56, p. 9a; HTC (1957) 148, p. 3954.
740
gong wei ai
Because Hsiao-tsung’s many attempts to upgrade the diplomatic status of
the Sung with Chin did not achieve the changes he wanted, it is understandable
that he felt frustrated in the area of foreign diplomacy and frequently expressed
his regret over the Sung’s military weakness. In 1176, when he was praised
by his ministers for his financial frugality in the palace, Hsiao-tsung replied,
“The domestic laws in our dynasty are far superior to those of Han and T’ang;
the only thing in which we lag behind is military achievement.”99 In 1184, in
a conversation with his chief councilor, Wang Huai (1127–90), Hsiao-tsung
again commented that the Sung’s military power was less than that of the
Han and T’ang dynasties, and he attributed Sung victories in certain battles
to Heaven’s help. Wang agreed, replying supportively that the benevolence of
the Sung rulers would lead to victories not through force, but through moral
justice. The emperor then consoled himself by recalling Han Wu-ti’s failure:
“During the reign of Han Wu-ti the military power of the empire caused awe
and trembling thousands of miles away, but what had it accomplished? Instead,
the losses incurred were much too great!”100 Hsiao-tsung’s comments in these
conversations underscore the contention that although he was unhappy over
his lack of military success, he was undoubtedly proud of his achievements in
domestic affairs.
Despite Hsiao-tsung’s personal disappointment, under his reign the Sung
gained a stronger diplomatic position with Chin than it had enjoyed before.
This was a result of the consolidation of military power and the constant defensive preparations initiated by the emperor and his court. During the Ch’un-hsi
period two large-scale military exercises were held, in 1177 and 1185. Military
training of archers was frequently held in the palace, and archery contests also
took place in conjunction with palace feasts.101 To encourage scholar-officials
to cultivate an interest in the military arts, Imperial University students and
successful chin-shih candidates were required to take part in archery contests
and were rewarded according to their skills.102
Despite the various efforts made during the Ch’ien-tao period to reduce military expenditures, the number of soldiers in the imperial army remained at
about four hundred thousand and their maintenance alone cost eighty million
strings of cash annually.103 Training militia, procuring and tending calvary
horses, and the management of military colonies further increased governmental expenses. These heavy military expenditures imposed a great drain on the
taxpayers.
99
100
101
102
103
Liu et al., Huang Sung chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng 54, p. 23b.
Liu et al., Huang Sung chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng 61, p. 7a; HTC (1957) 149, p. 3988.
Liu et al., Huang Sung chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng 53, pp. 2b, 13a.
Liu et al., Huang Sung chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng 59, p. 19b; Ma, Wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao (1936) 32,
p. 301.
Li, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (1967) chia 18, pp. 4b–5a.
the reign of hsiao-tsung
741
As a consequence of Hsiao-tsung’s vigilance in matters of defense, it was
said that the Chin feared that the Sung might one day launch an attack against
them.104 Hsiao-tsung’s attempts to upgrade Sung’s diplomatic position were
not in vain, since they had the effect of keeping Chin on their guard and
prolonging the diplomatic tension. Although Hsiao-tsung never achieved his
lifelong ambition of retaking former Sung territory in the north, he was able
to provide resistance against Chin that kept the peace through stalemate.
The absolute monarch
In the early years of the Ch’un-hsi period Hsiao-tsung had behaved autocratically toward his ministers. Ruling without the assistance of a chief councilor,
he administered the bureaucracy largely by himself. From 1175 until 1178,
Hsiao-tsung left the position of chief councilor vacant and functioned both as
head of state and as chief administrator of his empire. These conditions greatly
enhanced his personal authority.
The dismissal of Assistant Councilor Kung Mao-liang in 1177 and its aftermath illustrates the development of imperial absolutism during this period. An
efficient administrator, zealous in performing his duties, Kung was not afraid
to offend other officials or inner court personnel, some of whom were imperial
favorites. This may have been one of the reasons the emperor was reluctant to
promote him to the position of chief councilor. In any event, Kung’s refusal
to ingratiate himself with inner court officials led to a quarrel with Tseng Ti,
who brought about Kung’s dismissal. After Tseng Ti had returned to court in
1170, he enjoyed seemingly boundless imperial favor and became increasingly
powerful.105 In the fourth month of 1177, confident of the emperor’s support, and in disregard of the civil service regulations on appointments, Tseng
intended to ask that his descendants be permitted to hold civil (instead of
military) ranks. But his request was circumvented by Kung, who insisted that
civil and military officials were allowed to have their descendants sponsored
only into that service to which they themselves had belonged.106 Soon after
that, an angry Tseng Ti sought revenge. At Tseng’s instigation, officers under
him behaved disrespectfully toward Kung by deliberately blocking his way
while he was leaving court. When ordered by a street patrol to move aside,
the officers defiantly rejoined, “How much longer can the assistant councilor
remain in his position?” Kung reported the incident to the emperor, stating
that although the insult did not matter to him personally he was afraid the
honor of the entire court was at stake. Hsiao-tsung then attempted to reconcile
104
105
106
SS 35, p. 692.
For the numerous honors awarded to Tseng Ti, see his biography in SS 470, p. 13690.
HTC (1957) 145, p. 3882; biography of Kung Mao-liang in SS 144, p. 11845.
742
gong wei ai
them by asking Tseng to apologize to Kung Mao-liang. Tseng did so, but Kung
rebuffed the apology with the terse reminder, “An assistant councilor is a councilor of the court.” Seeing that Kung was still indignant, the emperor warned
him not to act rashly. Kung Mao-liang, however, proceeded further. He issued
an order for the officers involved to be flogged and dismissed. Hsiao-tsung was
displeased that Kung had disregarded his warning and faulted him for being
too quick to punish the officers concerned.107
Kung Mao-liang soon suffered the consequences of his action. Hsiao-tsung
apparently did not want to create the impression that he was taking sides
in this quarrel so he resorted to using the censors against Kung. A month
after the incident, Hsieh Kuo-jan, a friend of Tseng Ti, was appointed palace
censor on a direct order by the palace. Immediately upon taking office in the
Censorate, Hsieh impeached Kung, accusing him of feigning an imperial order
in sentencing the officers under Tseng Ti.108 Kung Mao-liang was obliged to
resign with a plea of illness, and he was dismissed as assistant councilor. He
was then appointed administrator of Chien-k’ang. Hsieh Kuo-jan, however,
refused to leave him alone, and Kung was removed from his new post after being
accused of usurping authority and cultivating factions at court. In the seventh
month of 1177, as a result of further accusations by Hsieh, Kung was exiled
to Ying-chou5, where he died the following year. Such severe punishment of
a high-ranking official was very rare during Hsiao-tsung’s reign. Nonetheless,
though Kung Mao-liang’s downfall has generally been attributed to Tseng
Ti’s machinations, had Kung not displeased the emperor it is unlikely that he
would have suffered such a tragic fate. Kung’s quarrel with Tseng Ti would not
have annoyed Hsiao-tsung to the extent that it did had Kung not rejected the
emperor’s advice. To an absolutist emperor like Hsiao-tsung, such an offense
was unforgivable.
Hsiao-tsung’s reaction to the incident extended beyond Kung’s dismissal.
An imperial edict issued in the sixth month of 1177, immediately after Kung’s
removal, required the Three Departments and the Bureau of Military Affairs to
resubmit imperial orders (chih2) that they had received after court assembly for
final confirmation by the emperor before they could be permitted to implement
them.109 This edict was a direct response to Kung Mao-liang’s having issued
an imperial order that the emperor disapproved of. The edict made doubly
sure that all imperial orders were genuine and that no future councilor could
act on his own authority to issue imperial orders. By insisting on imperial
verification of all matters, Hsiao-tsung sought to insure that there would be
no loopholes bureaucrats could manipulate.
107
108
109
HTC (1957) 145, p. 3883.
HTC (1957) 145, p. 3884.
Chou, Wen-chung chi 181, p. 4a.
the reign of hsiao-tsung
743
In 1177, Hsiao-tsung seems to have decided to end his attempt to rule
without a chief councilor. After an absence of more than thirteen years, in
1177 the emperor’s former tutor and chief councilor, Shih Hao, now seventyone years old, was summoned back to court and appointed reader-in-waiting;
the next year, he was again appointed chief councilor of the right. But as before,
Shih Hao’s upright and unyielding character made it difficult for him to serve
under Hsiao-tsung, who was equally strong willed and uncompromising. It
was not long before they fell into a serious disagreement.
The rift between Hsiao-tsung and Shih Hao arose from Shih Hao’s dissatisfaction with the way the emperor had dealt with a legal case involving a fight
between civilians and palace guardsmen. During the tenth month of 1178,
Wang Pien, the chief recipient of edicts at the Bureau of Military Affairs,
asked permission to impress six thousand men to fill vacancies in military
units in the capital. To accomplish this, a commander of the Palace Guard
used force to press men into service. This caused a great commotion in the
capital, and some potential conscripts mutilated themselves to avoid being
drafted. Resisters were intimidated, with unruly soldiers even seizing some
civilians’ property. Riots erupted and many were arrested. At the ensuing trial
death sentences were imposed on one of the soldiers and on one civilian accused
of inciting the riot. Other rioters were released.110
Shih Hao argued that the sentences were ill advised. While agreeing that
the soldier deserved capital punishment, Shih advised against imposing the
same sentence on the civilian on the grounds that the latter had acted in selfdefense. Shih now raised the political stakes by criticizing the emperor for an
error of judgment in trying to placate the military by diluting responsibility
for the violence. Shih warned the emperor that the consequences of allowing
the military to run rough-shod over citizens were serious, and he alluded
to the story of two peasants, Ch’en She and Wu Kuang, who in 209 b.c.e.
precipitated the overthrow of the Ch’in dynasty because they were unable to
report on time for conscript labor service, an offense punishable by death under
Ch’in law.111 The implied criticism infuriated Hsiao-tsung, who accused Shih
Hao of comparing him to the second Ch’in dynasty emperor, Ch’in Erh-shih
huang-ti (r. 210–207 b.c.e.). Shih Hao remained adamant, even in the face
of the civilian’s execution, and in the eleventh month of 1178 tendered his
resignation. The emperor later remarked that he “regretted the circumstances
110
111
For an account of this incident, see the biography of Shih Hao in SS 396, pp. 12067–8; Lou, Kung-k’uei
chi (1929) 93, p. 880.
For the allusion, see Ssu-ma Ch’ien, Shih chi [Po-na-pen 1930–7 ed.] (c. 90 b.c.e.; Peking, 1972) 48,
pp. 1949–50, and Michael Loewe, “The Former Han dynasty,” in The Cambridge history of China, volume
1: The Ch’in and Han empires, 221 B.C.–A.D. 220, ed. Denis C. Twitchett and Michael Loewe (Cambridge,
1986), pp. 112–13. This passage of the SS is also discussed in Davis, Court and family in Sung China,
p. 70.
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under which Shih left.”112 Despite their disagreement, the emperor showered
Shih Hao with gifts and treated him with the utmost respect by appointing him
to various sinecures and ranks of nobility and by making him junior mentor
and, for a while, keeping him as reader-in-waiting. Now in his seventies,
however, Shih Hao retired to his home in Ming-chou, but he continued to
exert influence at court by sponsoring a group of brilliant and able younger
men.
This affair highlights Hsiao-tsung’s complex behavior as a monarch and
also his indulgence of the military. Hsiao-tsung seems to have adopted a more
favorable attitude toward the military than Kao-tsung. In the selection of
prefectural administrators, an office generally held only by civilian officials,
Hsiao-tsung held that, as long as candidates from the military were capable,
they too could be appointed regardless of their status as military officials.113
Furthermore, Hsiao-tsung, in keeping with his autocratic style, held the armies
under his direct command by appointing the generals himself, in consultation
with his close attendants. He sent confidential orders to the army by employing
palace attendants as his messengers. This direct control over military personnel was an imperial prerogative that Hsiao-tsung guarded jealously against
all encroachment.114 Nevertheless, for the most part he treated his generals
liberally.115
The emperor augmented the trend toward absolutism by relying on his
palace favorites, most of whom had military links, to offset bureaucratic power.
As a result, Hsiao-tsung’s ministers frequently criticized both his favoritism
toward the military and his indulgence of inner court personnel. Strangely
enough, just before his appointment as councilor Shih Hao had memorialized protesting about this. Hsiao-tsung’s inclination toward holding absolute
power was even more noticeable during the Ch’un-hsi period, as the “close
attendants” of the emperor became more powerful through his support and as
opposition from high-ranking ministers at court diminished.
Among the most notorious palace attendants were Tseng Ti, Wang Pien,
and Kan Pien. Hsiao-tsung’s employment of and favoritism toward Tseng
Ti and Wang Pien, men rapidly advanced from lowly military backgrounds,
has already been described. The third attendant was a eunuch, Kan Pien,
who had been recommended by Kao-tsung, and was already influential in the
capital during the Ch’ien-tao period.116 During the late 1170s and early 1180s
112
113
114
115
116
SS 396, p. 12068.
This was stated in an imperial decree issued in the eleventh month of 1176. See Liu et al., Huang Sung
chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng 54, p. 26b.
See the tomb inscription for Chou Pi-ta in Lou, Kung-k’uei chi (1929) 93, p. 887.
Li, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (1967) i 2, p. 10a.
See the biography of Kan Pien in SS 469, pp. 13672–3.
the reign of hsiao-tsung
745
this trio is said to have collaborated with one another in exercising control.
Their increasing power encouraged some ambitious officials unconcerned with
bureaucratic protocol and integrity to seek their collaboration.117
The activities of the three favorites led to protests by outer court officials.
One of the severest criticisms came from the renowned scholar-official Chu
Hsi (1130–1200).118 In 1180, while serving as administrator of Nan-k’ang
(Nan-ch’ang, in modern Kiangsi), Chu Hsi responded to an imperial proclamation by submitting a sealed memorial in which he criticized Hsiao-tsung
for relying on his personal associates. Chu Hsi alleged that the emperor did
not allow his ministers to exercise their proper authority but instead discussed
matters only with one or two of his close personal associates. According to Chu
Hsi, these few vicious men were guilty of misleading the emperor, manipulating appointments, and robbing the emperor of his wealth. Chu Hsi even
claimed that the emperor’s authority was being usurped by these unscrupulous
sycophants:
As these people establish their power and influence, the whole nation bows before them.
As a result, Your Majesty’s decrees and orders, promotions and demotions are no longer
issued from the court but from the residences of these one or two persons. The so-called
personal decisions of Your Majesty are in fact the doing of this handful of men who secretly
exercise your power of control.119
Hsiao-tsung was enraged by this memorial but was persuaded by Chief Councilor Chao Hsiung to ignore it, and Chu Hsi was allowed to remain in his
post.
This criticism and the many other protests against inner court favorites
expressed the anger felt by officials at the emperor’s placing his trust in close
attendants rather than in ministers of the regular bureaucracy. Having obtained
their positions through the civil service examinations, the scholar-officials
regarded themselves as representatives of long-held administrative traditions.
In their opinion, palace attendants lacked both credentials and moral authority because they had not been vetted by the regular civil service system.
The officials were extremely concerned that the emperor was allowing his
authority to be usurped by these favorites and sycophants. However, although
Hsiao-tsung was indulgent toward his favorites, he never allowed them to
get out of control. Contrary to the officials’ objections, Hsiao-tsung made
use of these palace personnel to achieve his own purposes and did not simply
117
118
119
Liu et al., Huang Sung chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng 56, p. 8b.
For an account of the political career of Chu Hsi, see Conrad Schirokauer, “Chu Hsi’s political career: A
study in ambivalence,” in Confucian personalities, ed. Arthur F. Wright and Denis C. Twitchett (Stanford,
Calif., 1962), pp. 162–88.
Chu, Hui-an hsien-sheng Chu Wen kung wen-chi (1929) 11, pp. 167–8.
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comply with their plans. Inner court functionaries would carry out Hsiaotsung’s wishes without question, whereas ministers might oppose and obstruct
the emperor if they disagreed with his policies or decisions. Since the advice
of the scholar-officials was frequently unpalatable to him, it is understandable
that an autocrat like Hsiao-tsung would prefer to consult his attendants rather
than seek his ministers’ opinions.
At the heart of Chu Hsi’s memorial was the concern that the emperor did not
trust his ministers and would not let them fulfill their proper responsibilities.
In another memorial addressed to the throne in 1181, Chu Hsi stated that
while Hsiao-tsung had once made an effort to appoint capable officials to serve
in government, because of his dissatisfaction with the results and an abiding
fear of ministerial usurpation of power, he had given up looking for good and
virtuous men and was content to appoint men he could more easily control.
For Chu Hsi, the emperor’s actions were directly responsible for the declining
authority of the chief councilors,120 a weakness that accompanied the expansion
of imperial power during the Ch’un-hsi reign period. Apart from Shih Hao,
who lasted just over a year in the highest office, the chief councilors appointed
after him during this period were generally more passive and conforming, and
less noted for opposing the emperor in matters of policy.121 This passivity
may explain why the chief councilors during this period were able to serve
comparatively longer terms than their more troublesome counterparts of the
Ch’ien-tao period.122
Hsiao-tsung’s autocratic approach to his ministers also elicited an admonition from Yang Wan-li (1127–1206), the division chief in the Ministry
of Personnel. In 1185, in response to an imperial proclamation requesting
memorials commenting on public policies after the occurrence of an earthquake, Yang memorialized that “a ruler should refrain from exercising all the
responsibilities himself. . . . By assuming authority in all matters, the ruler is
depriving the ministers of their functions.”123 As Yang saw it, the emperor was
making decisions on all matters by himself and using the councilors merely to
carry out his orders.124 Chu Hsi reiterated this theme in 1188. He argued that
because of the emperor’s policy of appointing timid and submissive men as
councilors and then refusing to entrust them with important responsibilities,
120
121
122
123
124
Chu, Hui-an hsien-sheng Chu Wen kung wen-chi (1929) 11, pp. 167–8.
A good example of this category of ministers is Chao Hsiung. For his official biography, see SS 396,
pp. 12073–5.
The chief councilor who served the longest term during Hsiao-tsung’s reign was Wang Huai. His
tenure in office lasted for almost seven years, from 1181 to 1188. For an account of his career, see his
hsing-chuang in Lou, Kung-k’uei chi (1929) 87, pp. 800–10; SS 391, pp. 12069–72.
For Yang Wan-li’s memorial, see his Ch’eng-chai chi 62, pp. 500–4.
HTC (1957) 150, p. 4003.
the reign of hsiao-tsung
747
the so-called chief ministers were reduced to the status of functionaries
expected to obey imperial orders without question.125 Although the ministers considered such autocratic behavior an obvious violation of traditional
standards, Hsiao-tsung certainly thought otherwise. From his viewpoint, his
policies ensured the orderly conduct of government, with the emperor controlling the bureaucracy as he should. He therefore did not heed Yang’s or Chu’s
advice.
Administrative and financial control
The emperor’s ability to eliminate factions from court contributed to achieving
political order in the central government. Hsiao-tsung took pride in the fact
that factions never became a problem during his reign. In a conversation
with Chief Councilor Shih Hao in 1178, he commented that chief councilors
should refrain from forming factions, but that the ruler should also refrain
from charging his ministers with factionalism because such accusations would,
in effect, force them to enter into factions. He stated that his policy was
to dismiss bad officials and appoint good ones, even if the good ones had
been recommended by ministers who were later disgraced. He went on to
attribute the prevalence of factionalism in previous dynasties to the ruler’s
lack of discernment.126 Hsiao-tsung’s resulting personnel policy and his astute
administrative practices freed the court from a major problem that had plagued
the dynasty during late Northern Sung and during Kao-tsung’s reign.
A further benefit of the absence of factionalism was that censors did not
participate in power struggles at court. Unlike their counterparts during other
periods of the Southern Sung, censors dutifully performed their tasks as the
“ears and eyes” of the emperor, but did not actively engage in any political
infighting at court. But their comparatively quiet role during Hsiao-tsung’s
reign may also have been because the office of the chief official of the Censorate
was left vacant during the fourteen years from 1169 to 1183.127 An obvious
implication of this unusual circumstance is that the emperor did not want
the Censorate to become too influential and took the preventive measure of
not providing it with a chief executive who could act as its spokesperson.
This tactic was similar to the approach he used to control the chief councilors.
Moreover, Hsiao-tsung chose to appoint quiet and upright officials to the other
censorial positions – a policy that also contributed to tranquility at court.128
125
126
127
128
Chu, Hui-an hsien-sheng Chu Wen kung wen-chi (1929) 11, p. 173.
For their discussion on factions, see Shih, Mou-feng chen-yin man-lu 10, p. 1b.
Liu et al., Huang Sung chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng 60, p. 1b.
See the tomb inscription for Hsieh O in Chou, Wen-chung chi 68, p. 15b.
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In addition to imposing order on the central bureaucracy, Hsiao-tsung also
successfully extended imperial control to the circuits and prefectures of the
empire. He was concerned about proper administration at the prefectural level
and personally selected circuit intendants (chien-ssu) and prefectural administrators (chün-shou). He made it a point to interview all new appointees before
they took up their posts in the prefectures. As Kao-tsung had done before him,
Hsiao-tsung had a screen set up in his palace on which was listed the names of
all the circuit intendants and prefectural administrators for the entire realm.129
The screen enabled him to keep check on the officials assigned to the different
administrative units of the empire and signaled to the administrative officials
that their names were known to the emperor. Hsiao-tsung also sought to keep
circuit and prefectural administrations under the close supervision of the central government. Administrators at the circuit (lu) level, namely, the military
intendants (shuai-ch’en) and circuit intendants, were required regularly to assess
the performance of the prefectural administrators under their jurisdiction and
to submit reports to the central government.130 The system of merit evaluation
of prefectural administrators was strictly enforced during the mid-Ch’un-hsi
period. In 1181, an imperial decree was issued ordering circuit intendants
and military intendants to submit annual evaluation reports on the prefectural administrators under their supervision. These circuit authorities were
required to investigate subordinates’ performance carefully before submitting
their reports. Those who failed to give unbiased reports on their subordinates
were to be impeached by the censors.131 In 1183, several prefectural officials
were promoted or dismissed on the basis of the reports made by their administrative superiors. Two years later, two circuit intendants were demoted for
submitting their evaluation reports late. Though the merit-evaluation system
was not completely free of abuses,132 its successful implementation during the
Ch’un-hsi period resulted in an efficient system of administration away from
the capital that enabled the central government to exercise unprecedented
control over the imperial domain.
In financial matters Hsiao-tsung stressed proper control and careful management of the state’s economy. His monetary policy was prudent and included
strict control over the circulation of paper money. The main paper currency of
129
130
131
132
Chou, Wen-chung chi 104, p. 10b; Chu Hsi, Chu-tzu yü-lei [1473 ed.] (1270; Taipei, 1962) 127, p. 4962.
Hsiao-tsung issued this edict in late 1162, but it was not implemented then because of war. See Li,
Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (1967) chia 5, p. 11b.
Liu et al., Huang Sung chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng 59, pp. 4b–5a; Li, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi
(1967) chia 5, p. 11b.
Although the system of merit evaluation resulted in a less corrupt administration, circuit authorities
could still be bribed into giving favorable reports on their subordinates. The evaluation system was
abolished in 1199 during the reign of Ning-tsung. See Li, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (1967) chia
6, pp. 4a–b.
the reign of hsiao-tsung
749
the Southern Sung, known as hui-tzu, had first been issued by the government
in 1160 during Kao-tsung’s reign.133 Its convenience was widely recognized,
but, in a few years time, its unit value began to drop because of overissue.
In 1167, in an attempt to remedy the situation, Hsiao-tsung released two
million taels of silver from the imperial treasury to be exchanged in the markets for hui-tzu notes that were then destroyed.134 This strict control of the
amount of paper currency issued and the money’s popularity, especially among
the merchant community, led to a shortage of notes in the Liang-Huai region
(modern Kiangsu-Anhwei) in 1175, and more notes had to be issued to meet
the demand. In 1175, a half million strings worth of hui-tzu was designated for
circulation in the Huai region in exchange for copper coins.135 The emperor
continued to manage paper currency with extreme care. In 1183, on seeing
the number of notes that had been newly issued, Hsiao-tsung expressed concern that the increase might lead to a drop in value. In 1185 he reiterated
his policy that the paper money should not be issued in large numbers and
that its circulation should be curtailed once military expenses were reduced.136
Hsiao-tsung sought to check the devaluation of the hui-tzu by guarding strictly
against overissuing paper money, a policy that contributed to stability in the
Southern Sung economy.
One of Hsiao-tsung’s greatest satisfactions was that, through his frugality, he was able to increase greatly the wealth in his own palace treasuries.
But some of the government’s regular treasuries were meagerly stocked. The
emperor’s policy was to channel easily collected sources of revenue into treasuries serving as his privy purse while leaving the state treasuries to collect
more difficult items, even though as a result the State Treasury might suffer
frequent deficits.137 This policy appears to have been motivated not only by
selfish interest but by Hsiao-tsung’s pragmatism. Seeing the scholar-officials’
reluctance to contemplate recovery of the lost territories, Hsiao-tsung probably realized that if he were ever to attain this goal he would have to build up
133
134
135
136
137
For an account of the hui-tzu and other paper currencies of the Sung period, see Yang Lien-sheng,
Money and credit in China: A short history (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), pp. 51–61. The Sung financial
administration is discussed in greater detail in Peter J. Golas, “The Sung financial administration,” in
The Cambridge history of China, volume 5: The Sung dynasty and its precursors, 907–1279, part 2, ed. John
W. Chaffee and Denis C. Twitchett (New York, forthcoming).
See Jung-chai san-pi 14, pp. 584–5, in Hung Mai, Jung-chai sui-pi (Taipei, 1981).
See Liu et al., Huang Sung chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng 54, pp. 1b–2a.
Liu et al., Huang Sung chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng 60, p. 1b; 62, p. 8a.
This asymmetry was pointed out by Chu Hsi, who alleged that while the palace treasuries obtained
their revenue from easily collected, well-recorded items, the state treasuries were left trying to obtain
income from items that were more difficult to collect or that might exist only on paper. See Chu,
Chu-tzu yü-lei 111, p. 6b; see also Chu Hsi’s sealed memorial of early 1189 in Chu, Hui-an hsien-sheng
Chu Wen kung wen-chi (1929) 11, p. 175.
750
gong wei ai
his own personal resources so he could be ready to launch a military campaign
against the north when the right moment arrived. This policy of diverting revenues into treasuries under his personal control was first implemented when
Yü Yün-wen was chief councilor.138 Yü shared the emperor’s vision of reconquest of the north and thus did not oppose this policy of building up financial
reserves controlled by the emperor to prepare for such future contingencies.
But while Hsiao-tsung’s intention in increasing the store of privately controlled funds was closely linked to his ambition to retake territory, his gaining
personal management and control of the empire’s treasuries is yet another
aspect of the deliberate increase in the emperor’s absolute power at the expense
of the central administration during the Ch’un-hsi period.
There were two major types of treasuries during the Sung dynasty: the State
Treasury (Tso-tsang k’u) controlled by the Ministry of Finance (Hu-pu), and the
Palace Treasury (Nei-tsang k’u) located in the inner court, which served as the
emperor’s private treasury. The Palace Treasury became increasingly important
during the Sung, for it not only functioned as the emperor’s privy purse, but
since Hui-tsung’s time it had also played a significant role in government
finances under the new political system that Hui-tsung had initiated.139 The
Palace Treasury was a source of the emperor’s personal power, for, though part
of the empire’s public wealth was stored in it, the details of its contents were
kept confidential and dispersals were made by the emperor. By the time of the
Southern Sung, the Palace Treasury had acquired still greater significance, for
by then half the government’s revenues were channeled into it.140 Whereas the
State Treasury was responsible for handling most of the state’s regular recurrent
expenditures, such as providing salaries for civil and military personnel, funds
from the Palace Treasury were withdrawn only occasionally, for specific military
expenses and for emergencies such as relief measures necessitated by natural
calamities.
Besides the Palace and the State treasuries, a third type of treasury also
developed during the Sung to meet the need to spend unusually large amounts
of money on military expenses and on maintaining an enlarged bureaucracy.
To meet these heavy expenses, funds had sometimes been withdrawn from
the palace treasuries as a temporary measure to relieve the government of its
financial difficulties. As such borrowing became more frequent, a separate office
was set up to keep track of these funds that were being constantly withdrawn,
and a new type of treasury was designated to store them. From this, the empire’s
138
139
140
Chu, Hui-an hsien-sheng Chu Wen kung wen-chi (1929) 11, p. 175.
For two studies of the treasuries of the Sung dynasty, see Umehara Kaoru, “Sōdai no naizō to sazō,” Tōhō
gakuhō (Kyoto) 42 (1971), pp. 127–75, and Robert M. Hartwell, “The imperial treasuries: Finance and
power in Song China,” Bulletin of Sung-Yüan Studies 20 (1988), pp. 18–89.
CYYL (1956) 193, p. 3420.
the reign of hsiao-tsung
751
original two-level treasury system evolved into three levels.141 This new third
kind of treasury became important during the reign of Hsiao-tsung, who was
responsible for establishing both the Southern Storehouse of the State Treasury
(Tso-tsang nan-k’u) and the Sealed Treasury (also known as the Storehouse for
Reserves of the State Treasury [Tso-tsang feng-chuang k’u]). Though their names
suggest they were subordinate sections of the state treasury (Tso-tsang k’u), they
were different from the state treasuries under the direct control of the Ministry
of Finance. They fell under the emperor’s control and were thus similar to the
palace treasuries in function, although they were located and administered by
the outer court, not the palace.
The Southern Storehouse was a special treasury set up for the payment of
military expenses. It had been established in 1162 by transferring one of the
palace treasuries, the Imperial Treasury of Awards (yü-ch’ien chuang-kuan chishang k’u), to the State Treasury. Although it was attached in theory to the State
Treasury, in practice it remained a palace treasury. It continued to be used to
meet military expenses, and its revenues came directly from the court (ch’aot’ing) rather than through the Ministry of Finance.142 During the Ch’ien-tao
period, the Southern Storehouse was considered one of the richest treasuries of
the empire. On occasion, it provided loans to the State Treasury when the latter
was in serious financial difficulty.143 During the Ch’un-hsi period, however,
another treasury, the Sealed Treasury (Feng-chuang k’u), began to overshadow
the Southern Storehouse in importance and to assume a more significant role
than the Southern Storehouse by serving as the emperor’s privy purse.
Hsiao-tsung established the Sealed Treasury in 1170 with the specific proviso that no funds should be withdrawn from it except those used to pay
military expenses and the sizable allowances of the retired emperor and dowager empress.144 After its establishment, Hsiao-tsung made it a repository for
the state’s reserves. The date of its creation is significant. During 1170, with
the support and encouragement of Chief Councilor Yü Yün-wen, the emperor
began pursuing a more aggressive policy in foreign affairs. The attention given
the Sealed Treasury indicates the importance Hsiao-tsung attached to his twin
objectives of reconquest and filial devotion. In a reform implemented in early
1176, a main section of the Southern Storehouse was incorporated into the
Sealed Treasury.145 As a result, the holdings of the Southern Storehouse were
drastically reduced and those of the Sealed Treasury rapidly increased. The
141
142
143
144
145
See Umehara, “Sōdai no naizō to sazō,” p. 142.
Li, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (1967) chia 17, p. 4a.
For example, in 1171 Hsiao-tsung inquired about the four million strings (min) of cash borrowed by
the Ministry of Finance from the Southern Storehouse of the State Teasury. See Liu et al., Huang Sung
chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng 50, pp. 9a–b.
Wang Ying-lin, Yü-hai [1337 ed.] (1266; Taipei, 1964) 183, pp. 26a–b.
Liu et al., Huang Sung chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng 54, p. 13b.
752
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Sealed Treasury became so rich that in 1179 it was even reported (in the words
of a Han dynasty cliché) that the strings used for tying cash were rotting after
having been kept there for so many years.146 In 1183 the total value of goods
and cash stored in the Sealed Treasury was said to amount to over thirty million
strings of cash.147 This was no small sum, as it represented half the annual revenue received from the wealthiest region of the empire – the lower Yangtze valley – and was equivalent to more than a third of the annual military budget.148
In 1183, Hsiao-tsung decided to transfer the less important Southern Storehouse back to the State Treasury, claiming this would save him the trouble of
overseeing the treasury himself.149 It soon became apparent that there were
other reasons why the emperor decided to yield control of the Southern Storehouse. The minister of finance, Wang Tso, pointed out that because of the
deficits incurred by the Southern Storehouse, transfer of control to the ministry of finance would bring more harm than good to the ministry.150 Wang
proposed instead that the Southern Storehouse be incorporated into the Sealed
Treasury, but Hsiao-tsung found this proposal unacceptable. He obviously
attached great importance to the Sealed Treasury, which functioned as his
personal treasure-house for the rest of his reign. Although it was supposed
to store reserves for use in emergencies, during the final years of the Ch’unhsi period, funds from the Sealed Treasury were frequently transferred to the
palace treasuries for the manufacture of military equipment or under the pretext of rewarding the troops,151 and the Ministry of Finance was unable to do
anything about it. By the end of Hsiao-tsung’s reign, the Sealed Treasury had
evolved into an important organ that augmented the throne’s power, bypassing
the supervision of the Ministry of Finance.
Hsiao-tsung’s abdication
A crucial moment in Hsiao-tsung’s political career came when his adoptive
father, Kao-tsung, died, in the tenth month of 1187. Having served the retired
emperor to the full extent of his filial responsibilities for the previous twentyfive years,152 Hsiao-tsung was left grief stricken by Kao-tsung’s death. Despite
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
Liu et al., Huang Sung chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng 57, p. 6a.
Liu et al., Huang Sung chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng 60, p. 11a.
By the end of the Ch’un-hsi period, the annual revenue from the southeast is said to have been around
65.3 million strings (min) of cash. See Li, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (1967) chia 14, p. 1a.
Liu et al., Huang Sung chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng 60, p. 10a.
Wang, Yü-hai 183, p. 26a. According to the calculation made by Wang Tso, the deficit came to a total
of 440,000 strings (min) of cash. See Li, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (1967) chia 14, p. 1a.
Li, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (1967) chia 17, p. 4b; Wang, Yü-hai 183, p. 26b.
Hsiao-tsung’s extraordinary devotion to the retired emperor was a significant feature of his behavior
within the imperial family and in court politics. For his entire reign he played the dual role of emperor
the reign of hsiao-tsung
753
the counsel of his ministers, he insisted on observing the mourning rites for the
full three years.153 Though he may have considered abdicating immediately, as
a responsible emperor he found it necessary to provide the forty-two-year-old
heir apparent, Chao Tun, with a period of intensive training to prepare him
for the throne.
In the month after Kao-tsung died, Hsiao-tsung issued a decree authorizing
the heir apparent to participate in the empire’s administration. He told the
councilors that, from then on, the heir apparent would discuss state matters
with them. The emperor’s decision caused consternation among the officials,
who feared this action might promote political instability since it implied
having two rulers at the same time.154 The heir apparent himself was fearful and
declined to take up his newly assigned responsibilities. Hsiao-tsung, however,
had already made up his mind to familiarize his son with governmental matters
and rejected his son’s refusal. In fact, he accelerated Chao Tun’s training.
Early in 1188, a new office called the Policy Deliberation Hall (I-shih t’ang)
was established in the palace. There the heir apparent met the councilors on
alternate days to discuss state matters.155 Almost immediately, the emperor
announced to his ministers that, having participated in policy discussions, the
heir apparent was becoming well acquainted with affairs of the empire. Hsiaotsung also declared his intention that the heir would attend future sessions of
court.156
Hsiao-tsung was grooming Chao Tun to take over the throne as soon as possible. His decision to grant more and more responsibility to the heir apparent
made his ministers more anxious. They repeatedly submitted requests that the
emperor return to his duties at court. Hsiao-tsung, however, had decided to
fulfill the three-year mourning period for his father and would not change his
mind. He made it clear in an order issued in the spring of 1188 that he would
have no peace of mind if he failed to carry out the mourning rites fully. He
ordered the officials not to present any more requests on the matter.157
Meanwhile, Hsiao-tsung continued to educate his son about important
affairs of state and the administration of the empire. From the advice he gave,
it is evident that even until the last days of his reign, finance and defense
remained Hsiao-tsung’s main concerns. Before stepping down, Hsiao-tsung’s
153
154
155
156
157
and filial son, and occasionally he compromised his own ideals for the sake of filial obligation. For
example, although frugal himself, he submitted to the requests of his extravagant father, whose monthly
stipends amounted to forty thousand strings of cash. See Chou, Wen-chung chi 164, pp. 1a–b, 2b.
Liu et al., Huang Sung chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng 63, p. 15b.
See, for example, Yang Wan-li’s memorial in his Ch’eng-chai chi 62, pp. 509–11.
Sung-shih ch’üan-wen Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien 27, p. 2199.
Sung-shih ch’üan-wen Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien 27, p. 2200.
Liu et al., Huang Sung chung-hsing liang-ch’ao sheng-cheng 64, p. 5a.
754
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last important act was to fill the top positions of the bureaucracy with dependable men who could assist his son in running the government. In the first
month of 1189, he appointed Chou Pi-ta (1126–1204) chief councilor of the
left and Liu Cheng (1129–1206) chief councilor of the right, and assigned the
blunt-spoken Wang Lin (?–1201) the position of assistant councilor.158 Hsiaotsung felt that he could retire in peace only after everything was put in good
order. Before the end of the month, Kao-tsung’s former residence, the Te-shou
Palace, was renamed the Ch’ung-hua Palace and prepared for Hsiao-tsung’s
occupation in retirement. In the second month of 1189, in an abdication ceremony similar to Kao-tsung’s in 1162, Hsiao-tsung left his throne after having
reigned for twenty-seven years.
Hsiao-tsung’s belief that he had left everything in government in good
order was to prove an illusion. Hsiao-tsung’s style of governance demanded
a powerful and immensely committed emperor. Chao Tun, for all his father’s
training, had such serious character defects that he made a disastrous ruler,
and very soon he withdrew from public life and broke off all relations with his
father. The court passed from an autocratic rulership to total lack of leadership.
Within five years, Hsiao-tsung had died and soon after the high officials and
courtiers forced Kuang-tsung to abdicate.
Both during Kao-tsung’s lifetime and after his death, Hsiao-tsung demonstrated the filial devotion that earned him his posthumous title Hsiao-tsung –
the “Filial Ancestor.” His filial devotion was one of his most-praised virtues,
and greatly impressed historians. But the most important achievement of his
administration, his development of the Southern Sung dynasty’s economic and
military strength, is sometimes overlooked.
Wang Fu-chih (1619–92), the Ch’ing dynasty (1644–1911) author of the
Discourse on the Sung (Sung lun), criticized Hsiao-tsung for his inability to
reconquer lost territory and for his lack of fighting spirit after the Sung defeat
at Fu-li in 1163.159 Wang Fu-chih saw Hsiao-tsung as a frustrated emperor
who had accomplished little for his empire after failing in his first attempt
to recover the northern territories. Similarly, the late Ming dynasty (1368–
1644) commentator on the Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo, Chang P’u, stated that
at the beginning of Hsiao-tsung’s career there were ample opportunities to
reconquer the lost territories, but the emperor had failed to make good use of
them.160 Even the Yüan period compilers of the Sung dynastic history, Sung
158
159
160
Sung-shih ch’üan-wen Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien 27, p. 2219.
Wang, Sung lun (1964) 11, pp. 179–81.
Ch’en Pang-chan et al., Sung-shih chi-shih pen mo (1605; Taipei, 1963) 78, p. 172. (The text used for
this note is that published by San-min shu-chü, Taipei, 1963, as the Peking edition cited in the other
notes does not contain the comments of Chang P’u.)
the reign of hsiao-tsung
755
shih, while recognizing Hsiao-tsung as the best of the Southern Sung rulers and
commending him for bringing about improvements in Sung foreign relations,
seem apologetic for Hsiao-tsung’s failure to recapture the north, commenting
that it was the will of Heaven that the northern territories had not been
recovered.161
These historians, all writing under foreign domination in their own day, so
concentrated their attention on the issue of reconquest of the north that they
overlooked the outstanding contributions Hsiao-tsung made to his empire’s
economic, military, and cultural strength. Moreover, Wang Fu-chih’s criticism
is not accurate, as the defeat at Fu-li did not dampen the emperor’s enthusiasm
for reconquest. After the abortive campaign of 1163, the consolidation of the
empire’s cultural, military, and economic strength began. The dynastic goal
of reconquest continued to spur Hsiao-tsung and his court to greater efforts to
reconstruct and strengthen their empire to the point where reconquest might
have become possible. Hsiao-tsung admittedly had faults. His management
of personnel was often overindulgent, he manipulated his ministers, and he
governed his empire autocratically. Yet by building up the Southern Sung’s
strength, Hsiao-tsung succeeded in protecting the war-shaken regime he had
inherited from his father. He also gave the regime a stronger political order,
a robust economy, and defenses sufficiently solid to enable the dynasty to last
another ninety years under increasingly difficult circumstances.
161
SS 35, p. 692.
CHAPTER 10
THE REIGNS OF KUANG-TSUNG (1189–1194)
AND NING-TSUNG (1194–1224)
Richard L. Davis
Southern Sung prosperity struck turbulent waters in the late twelfth century.
During his twenty-six-year reign, Hsiao-tsung (r. 1162–89) was a conscientious and strong ruler, yet when his adopted father, the retired emperor
Kao-tsung, died in 1187, Hsiao-tsung had a very difficult time coping with
the loss. Although suspending court was normal under the circumstances,
when Hsiao-tsung did not resume audiences for over a month, pressure on
him from officials mounted. Hsiao-tsung returned, but reportedly was able to
walk only with the aid of a cane, a sign of his physical and emotional frailty.
Once the epitome of political activism, Hsiao-tsung now turned to the heir
apparent to assist him in managing state affairs.1
The heir, Chao Tun (1147–1200), found himself cast in the role of auxiliary
emperor. Chief ministers were instructed to consult Chao Tun every two days,
and his presence was expected at court audiences. This arrangement troubled
officials from the outset. Reader-in-waiting Yang Wan-li (1127–1206) took
the arrangement to imply the existence of two rulers and warned of potential
instability. Ignoring the warning, Hsiao-tsung spurned Chao Tun’s own offer
to take a diminished role at court.2 Hsiao-tsung also insisted on performing
to their fullest mourning rites for Kao-tsung. Most previous Sung emperors
had accepted a less rigorous mourning regime, and officials proposed as much
for Hsiao-tsung. The emperor would hear nothing of it, and ordered audiences
to be held in the inner palace. Hsiao-tsung never seemed to appreciate the
officials’ dilemma of seeking to serve two political authorities without the
1
2
On the last years of Hsiao-tsung, see chapter 9 of this volume. Also see Miyazaki Ichisada, “Hsiao-tsung,”
in Sung biographies, ed. Herbert Franke (Wiesbaden, 1976), pp. 400–1; Liu Li-yen (Lau Nap-yin), “Nan
Sung cheng-chih ch’u-t’an: Kao-tsung yin-ying hsia ti Hsiao-tsung,” in Sung-shih yen-chiu chi (Taipei,
1989) 19, pp. 203–56; see chüan 35–6 in T’o-t’o et al., eds., Sung shih [hereafter SS] (1345; Peking,
1977); Pi Yüan, Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien [hereafter HTC (1958)] [Te-yü-t’ang tsang-pan 1801 ed.] (1792;
Peking, 1958), chüan 151; Sung-shih ch’üan-wen Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien (early 14th c.; Taipei, 1969), chüan
27–8.
HTC (1958) 151, p. 4030.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
757
certainty as to which authority was more important, the seated emperor or the
already influential heir apparent.
In the late 1180s, the bureaucracy was headed by Chou Pi-ta (1126–1204)
and Liu Cheng (1129–1206). Chou was born to a family from the north,
but raised in Lu-ling, Chiang-nan West. The son of an erudite at the Imperial University, he earned his chin-shih degree in 1151 and the prestigious
“erudite literatus” (po-hsüeh hung-tz’u) credentials six years later. Chou Pi-ta
had served Hsiao-tsung in various capacities, including that of Han-lin academician, before becoming assistant councilor in 1180 and chief councilor of
the right in 1187.3 Hsiao-tsung appears to have held him in high esteem,
as did his colleagues in the bureaucracy, for the sixty-one-year-old Chou Pita stood as a successful official with sound scholarly credentials. Liu Cheng
was of comparable stature and influence. A native of Ch’üan-chou, Fu-chien,
he was descended from Liu Ts’ung-hsiao, an official who had made a name
for himself two centuries earlier at the court of Sung T’ai-tsu, the dynasty’s
founder. Liu Cheng received his chin-shih in 1160, the last examination held
under Kao-tsung.4 In addition to his extensive service away from the capital,
Liu Cheng accumulated metropolitan experience as master of remonstrance,
vice-minister of war, minister of personnel, and assistant councilor. Like Chou
Pi-ta, Liu Cheng commanded the respect of colleagues and the confidence of
the throne. The two also shared a common sense of urgency in resolving the
current political crisis.
In late 1188, Chou Pi-ta had spoken with Hsiao-tsung about abdication.
The idea reportedly won the endorsement of Kao-tsung’s widow, Dowager
Empress Wu (1115–97), and it may have been under her influence that Hsiaotsung signaled his approval to Chou Pi-ta.5 In the interim, Hsiao-tsung elevated Chou Pi-ta to councilor of the left and Liu Cheng to councilor of the
right. On 18 February 1189, less than a month after Chang-tsung had become
emperor of Chin in the north, Chao Tun ascended the throne as the future
Kuang-tsung (r. 1189–94). Hsiao-tsung, now retired, moved into his father’s
former residence, renamed the Ch’ung-hua Palace. There Hsiao-tsung secluded
himself for the remaining five years of his life.
3
4
5
On Chou Pi-ta, see Kinugawa Tsuyoshi, “Chou Pi-ta,” in Sung Biographies, ed. Herbert Franke (Wiesbaden,
1976), vol. 2, pp. 675–7; SS 391, pp. 11965–72; Huang Tsung-hsi et al., Sung Yüan hsüeh-an (1838;
Taipei, 1973) 35, p. 702; Chou Pi-ta, Chou I-kuo Wen-chung kung chi nien-p’u (n.p., 1848), p. 26a; Lou
Yüeh [Yao], Kung-k’uei chi [Ssu-pu ts’ung-k’an ch’u-pien 1929 ed.] (c. early 13th c.; Taipei, 1979) 93,
pp. 19b–32a; 94, pp. 1a–24b; Fu Tseng-hsiang, comp., Sung-tai Shu-wen chi-ts’un (1943; Taipei, 1974)
75, pp. 14a–27b.
On Liu Cheng, see Conrad Schirokauer, “Liu Cheng,” in Sung biographies, ed. Herbert Franke (Wiesbaden,
1976), pp. 624–8; SS 391, pp. 11972–7; Huang et al., Sung Yüan hsüeh-an 97, pp. 1816–17.
Chou, Chou I-kuo Wen-chung kung chi nien-p’u, p. 26a; SS 243, pp. 9646–8; HTC (1958) 151, p. 4051;
Sung-shih ch’üan-wen Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien 27, pp. 51a–b.
758
richard l. davis
the reign of kuang-tsung (1189–1194)
A court in turmoil
Chao Tun was the third but only surviving son of Hsiao-tsung and his first wife,
Empress Kuo2 (1126–56), who had died when he was a child of nine. Hsiaotsung is said to have loved the empress deeply, which may explain his attention
to the child despite the boy’s secondary position in the line of succession.6
Hsiao-tsung’s eldest son and original heir apparent had died in 1167, but
Hsiao-tsung did not rush to name a replacement. Perhaps he feared that too
early a selection might leave the candidate arrogant and complacent; more
likely, his hesitancy reflected doubts about Chao K’ai2 (1146–80), his second
son and next in line of succession. Only under mounting bureaucratic pressure
did Hsiao-tsung overcome these concerns, and bypass Chao K’ai2 to designate
the reputedly more precocious Chao Tun as heir in 1171. Approaching twentyfour years of age at the time, Chao Tun would be forty-one before taking the
throne in 1189.
Prior to the accession, many had considered Chao Tun ideal as a prospective ruler. Hsiao-tsung regarded him as most “exquisite” in character and
took a personal interest in his education. The Confucian luminary Chu Hsi
(1130–1200), attributed to Chao Tun the gifts of intelligence and wisdom,
the virtues of filial devotion and quiet reverence, the temperament of extensive
humaneness and universal love, and the majesty of the supernaturally martial
without violence. Palace lecturer P’eng Kuei-nien (1142–1206) characterized
him as pure and dedicated.7 When Kuang-tsung became emperor, he initially
discharged his responsibilities with the same conscientiousness as his predecessor. He held regular audiences and seriously weighed ministerial advice.
But beneath the facade of composure lay an intensely distressed personality,
and it did not take long for his troubles to surface and affect the functioning
of the court.
Kuang-tsung, like most imperial sons, had lived secluded within the palace.
The ideal in previous dynasties had been to appoint imperial sons to some
regional post while they were in their teens, which provided them with administrative experience and removed the young men from the secure walls of the
6
7
SS 36, pp. 693–4; 243, pp. 8650–1; 246, pp. 8732–4. For detailed overviews of the reign, see Liang-ch’ao
kang-mu pei-yao [Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu, Wen-yüan ko 1779 ed.] (1228–33; Taipei, 1970), chüan 1–3; Liu Shihchü, Hsü Sung chung-hsing pien-nien tzu-chih t’ung-chien [1522–66 ed.] (13th–14th c.; Shanghai, 1927),
chüan 11.
SS 36, p. 694; Chu Hsi, Hui-an hsien-sheng Chu Wen kung wen-chi [Ming Chia-ching 1522–66 ed.; Ssu-pu
ts’ung-k’an ch’u-pien 1929 ed.] (1245; Taipei, 1979) 12, p. 1a; P’eng Kuei-nien, Chih-t’ang chi [Ssu-k’u
ch’üan-shu, Wen-yüan ko 1779 ed.] (12th c.; Taipei, 1975) 4, p. 12a.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
759
palace, thereby freeing them from the grip of powerful palace personalities and
exposing them to life outside the capital. With the exception of the first three
emperors, this opportunity was never afforded to Sung emperors. In the case of
Chao Tun, his administrative experience was confined to the capital as nominal
vice-prefect and then prefect of Lin-an.8 His father once contemplated giving
him a regional appointment farther away from court, but for unnamed reasons
did not order it. Throughout his life, Chao Tun remained deeply dependent
on the old palace friends among whom he had grown up.
These personalities around him intensified his insecurity. His father was a
stern, intimidating character with strong opinions and an intolerant streak, and
during his adolescence Chao Tun lacked a maternal figure. After his mother,
Empress Kuo2, died when he was nine, his father delayed taking a second
wife until Chao Tun was sixteen. There is no mention of Chao Tun having had
close ties to his paternal grandfather, the retired Kao-tsung, either, despite the
physical proximity of their palaces. The young prince was under the constant
influence of palace attendants and, beginning in his teens, his wife.
The future Empress Li2 (1145–1200) was the daughter of Li Tao, an accomplished military figure of the early Southern Sung.9 Betrothed to Chao Tun
during the last years of Kao-tsung’s reign, when the two were still teenagers,
she gave birth in 1168 to his second son and heir, Prince Chia. By then,
Chao Tun was already in his twenty-second year. Kao-tsung and Empress Wu
were probably responsible for the match, but they lived to regret it. Even
as a princess Lady Li2 proved politically insensitive and selfishly indulgent,
insufferably arrogant and violently jealous. Hsiao-tsung was at one point so
piqued by her that he threatened her with deposition. This would have been
an extreme act, especially for a princess who had already given birth to a male
heir. Hsiao-tsung nevertheless approved her installation as empress in 1189,
no doubt reluctantly. Yet Hsiao-tsung’s threat of deposition had incurred the
undying enmity of his daughter-in-law, who proceeded to poison the relationship between father and son. Meanwhile, she drove her weak husband to
virtual insanity.
Kuang-tsung was never an altogether healthy man. Even before his accession, he received medication on a regular basis. The exact nature of his infirmity is uncertain; historical records simply allude to some malady of the heart.
Conceivably, this may have been a physical disorder. Contemporary documents
clearly imply the problem was largely a reaction to a domineering wife. There
are numerous incidents of her overbearing and ruthless personality. Toward the
8
9
SS 36, pp. 693–4; Chu, Hui-an hsien-sheng (1979) 12, p. 1a.
SS 36, p. 706; 243, pp. 8653–5; 391, p. 11974; 398, p. 12114; HTC (1958) 151, p. 4053; 152, p. 4079;
152, p. 4090.
760
richard l. davis
close of 1191, Kuang-tsung was reportedly washing his hands in the palace and
noticed the delicate hands of a palace lady. He commented, casually, on their
attractiveness. Presently, while sitting down to a meal he opened a container
of food and found the two hands inside, a reminder from a jealous wife that
she would tolerate no infidelity. Prior to this, Kuang-tsung had coped with his
overbearing wife through the company of consorts. Kao-tsung had reportedly
been concerned about the youth’s noticeable lack of sexual diversion. Consort
Huang, a gift to Kuang-tsung from his grandfather, had met a sudden death.
The emperor’s favor was apparently her undoing.10 It was alleged to have been
the handiwork of Empress Li2, and the death of this favorite forced Kuangtsung to avoid other women. After 1191, his mental condition took a turn
for the worse and he withdrew within the palace. There he took to drinking
heavily, adding to his many other problems. He rarely held court and refused
to undertake all but a few imperial responsibilities.11
Kuang-tsung’s emotional isolation and domestic unhappiness were aggravated by growing tension between him and his retired father. In part, this
stemmed from the influence of Empress Li2. Her embitterment had several
apparent sources. First, there were Hsiao-tsung’s earlier threats to divest her
of her rank as princess. Second, even after his son Kuang-tsung’s accession,
Hsiao-tsung refused to endorse the nomination of Empress Li2’s son, Prince
Chia (Chao K’uo, r. as Ning-tsung 1194–1224), as his heir apparent. This
refusal could be interpreted as an act of spite, and perhaps even as a veiled
threat to deny the prince his inheritance. Finally, when Kuang-tsung became
bedridden in 1191, his father and stepmother paid him a courtesy call. Attendants blamed Empress Li2 for Kuang-tsung’s emotional problems, and at
hearing this, Hsiao-tsung harshly reprimanded her.12 In doing this, Hsiaotsung compounded private threats with public insults. To protect the position
of the vulnerable Prince Chia, and also to avenge such indignities, Empress
Li2 provoked tension between the two emperors.
Before the ascendency of his wife, Kuang-tsung as a prince had been subject
to the influence of palace eunuchs and attendants. Hsiao-tsung was himself
known to favor certain dutiful attendants, but Hsiao-tsung’s strength of character precluded dominance by any one favorite. Not so for Kuang-tsung, who
was often blindly loyal and recklessly indulgent to palace friends. Eunuch
Ch’en Yüan, for example, was favored by Kao-tsung and Hsiao-tsung for
10
11
12
SS 36, p. 701; HTC (1958) 152, p. 4079.
On the emperor’s problem, see Conrad Schirokauer, “Neo-Confucians under attack: The condemnation
of wei-hsüeh,” in Crisis and prosperity in Sung China, ed. John W. Haeger (Tucson, Ariz.,1975), pp. 163–98,
especially p. 175; P’eng, Chih-t’ang chi 1, p. 20a; SS 393, p. 12008; HTC (1958) 151, p. 4053.
Fu, Sung-tai Shu-wen chi-ts’un (1974) 71, p. 1b; HTC (1958) 152, p. 4079.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
761
many years. Yet, when remonstrance official Chao Ju-yü (1140–96) exposed
the eunuch’s illicit intrusion into military affairs, Hsiao-tsung banished Ch’en
Yüan to the far south.13 Kuang-tsung, apparently on close personal terms with
Ch’en Yüan since boyhood, brooded over the decision and upon taking the
throne, ordered the eunuch’s return. Once back in Lin-an, Ch’en Yüan came
to be suspected of intentionally planting the seeds of distrust between the two
emperors as revenge for Hsiao-tsung’s earlier treatment of him. Although the
veracity of the suspicion cannot be determined, many court officials believed
it to be true, and this prompted their demands for the eunuch’s dismissal.
Kuang-tsung chose instead to promote him. Drafting secretary Ch’en Fu-liang
(1137–1203), a representative of bureaucratic opinion, refused to compose the
promotion edict. His protest had no effect. Ch’en Yüan remained a palace
fixture for the rest of Kuang-tsung’s reign.
Dominated, voluntarily or involuntarily, by a vengeful Ch’en Yüan and by
Empress Li2, Kuang-tsung’s relationship with his father deteriorated rapidly.
Early in his reign, Kuang-tsung reduced audience visits to Hsiao-tsung’s
Ch’ung-hua Palace from six per month to four and then to one. Within a
year, formal audiences were downgraded to official visits, and their frequency
diminished. After two years, visits became so infrequent and tensions so apparent that officials began to denounce inner court influence. In spring 1191, the
capital was hit by strong winds, followed immediately by snow, then sunlight, and more snow. To officials, such irregularities signaled Heaven’s angry
response to an imbalance on the earth, with the implication of imperial misconduct. Officials such as Assistant in the Palace Library Huang Shang (1146–94),
Investigating Censor Lin Ta-chung (1131–1208), and Imperial Diarist P’eng
Kuei-nien were but a few of the critics who related changes in weather to the
ascendancy of yin over yang.14 Yin, representing petty men and women, was
usurping the dominant position of yang, the emperor. If yang was not restored
to its normal supremacy, if the emperor did not assert control over the palace,
the outcome, it was believed, could be disastrous. With such warnings came
remonstrances that Kuang-tsung curtail his indulgence in feasts and alcohol. But nothing changed. The controversial eunuch Ch’en Yüan remained.
Empress Li2’s appetite for self-indulgence grew. Toward the close of 1192,
the empress arranged for three recent generations of her own ancestors to be
enfeoffed as princes, and, on the occasion of her visiting her family’s elaborate
ancestral temple, special imperial favors were extended to 26 of her relatives,
13
14
On Ch’en Yüan, see SS 393, p. 11996; 469, p. 13672; HTC (1958) 151, p. 4055; 152, pp. 4089–90;
153, p. 4097; P’eng, Chih-t’ang chi 4, p. 18a.
SS 393, p. 12013; HTC (1958) 152, pp. 4071–2; P’eng, Chih-t’ang chi 1, pp. 7a–21a; Lou, Kung-k’uei
chi (1979) 99, p. 7b.
762
richard l. davis
and official rank was conferred on another 172. This extravagance of imperial
favor infuriated the bureaucracy. Vice-Minister of Rites Ni Ssu (1147–1220)
would later portray Empress Li2 as a threat to Sung stability comparable to
Empress Lü of the Han dynasty and Empress Wu Tse-t’ien of the T’ang, the
most vilified women in Chinese history.15
bureaucratic leadership
During the final years of Kuang-tsung’s brief reign, the chief councilor, Liu
Cheng, began to be eclipsed by two other men, initially collaborators but later
rivals. The first of these, Han T’o-chou (1152–1207), while identified as a
native of Hsiang-chou2, near K’ai-feng, was born and raised in the south.16
His great grandfather Han Ch’i (1008–75) had served nobly as chief councilor
under both Jen-tsung and Ying-tsung. His father, Han Ch’eng, had an undistinguished political career but an enviable set of marriage relations. Himself a
maternal grandson of Shen-tsung, Han Ch’eng was married to the younger sister of the influential Dowager Empress Wu, wife of Kao-tsung. Han T’o-chou
was married to a niece of the same empress, a union cut short by the woman’s
premature death, but one that served its purpose nonetheless as a confirmation
of imperial favor.17 Further cementing the ties of Han T’o-chou’s family to the
palace was the betrothal of the daughter of Han T’o-chou’s nephew to Chao
K’uo, heir to Kuang-tsung’s throne, a marriage arranged by Dowager Empress
Wu. In this way, men of the Han clan had been linked by marriage with the
royal family for more than a century, yet at no time did those links yield as
much political power as during the late twelfth century.
Dowager Empress Wu, the lifelong spouse of Kao-tsung, wielded considerable power in her own discreet way even after her husband’s abdication. It was out of deference to her that Hsiao-tsung had appointed her two
brothers, Wu I (1124–71) and Wu Kai (1125–66), to high-level bureaucratic posts and had conferred on them various honorific titles, culminating in their enfeoffment as princes. Wu I’s son and nephew of the empress,
Wu Chü, had similarly received numerous coveted posts under Hsiao-tsung
and Kuang-tsung, among them prefectural vice-administrator of Lin-an and
15
16
17
SS 243, p. 8654; 398, p. 12114; HTC (1958) 152, p. 4090.
On Han T’o-chou, see Herbert Franke, “Han T’o-chou,” in Sung biographies, ed. Herbert Franke (Wiesbaden, 1976), pp. 376–84; Richard L. Davis, Court and family in Sung China, 960–1279: Bureaucratic
success and kinship fortunes for the Shih of Ming-chou (Durham, N.C., 1986), pp. 84–92; SS 474, pp. 13771–
8; Ch’en Teng-yüan, “Han P’ing-yüan p’ing,” Chin-ling hsüeh-pao 4 No. 1 (1934), pp. 89–149; Chiba
Hiroshi, “Kan Takuchū – Sōdai kanshinden sono ni,” in Yamazaki sensei taikan kinen Tōyō shigaku ronsō,
ed. Yamazaki Sensei Taikan Kinenkai (Tokyo, 1967), pp. 279–89.
Liang-ch’ao kang-mu pei-yao 10, p. 28b.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
763
prefect of Ming-chou. For a non–degree holder, these were significant achievements.18 The Empress Wu’s extraordinary network of family contacts, combined with her status as grand dowager empress since her husband’s death,
virtually ensured that court officials would turn to her during the major crisis for the imperial family when Kuang-tsung became emotionally debilitated. This crisis also placed her nephew Han T’o-chou in a highly opportune
position.
Despite a prestigious family background and impressive array of palace
contacts, Han T’o-chou held no great promise as a civil servant. For him, no
less than for his father, the lack of examination credentials meant that access to
the bureaucracy came through the hereditary privilege accorded to kinsmen of
great officials or from favor derived through marriage ties with palace women.
Except for brief stints as regional sheriff and keeper of the imperial insignia and
seals, Han T’o-chou’s own bureaucratic experience was confined to the Office
of Audience Ceremonies (Ko-men ssu), where under Hsiao-tsung he had served
as audience usher, attendant, and commandant. He had also served twice as an
emissary to the Chin, first in 1189, shortly after Kuang-tsung took the throne,
and again in 1195, following Ning-tsung’s accession.19
It was common practice in Southern Sung times to send two chief envoys,
one a ranking civilian official and another representing the military. Ceremony
officials such as Han T’o-chou were responsible for the access through the doors
of the palace and for announcing visitors; they had security duties and were thus
attached to the military bureaucracy, although in function they lay somewhere
between the civilian and military services, with neither the literary skills of
credentialed scholars nor the martial skills of ordinary guardsmen.20
The Office of Audience Ceremonies also included men such as Wu Chieh
(1093–1139), brother of Szechwan military magnate Wu Lin, who became
audience attendant in recognition of his distinguished military record, and
Chiang T’e-li, Han T’o-chou’s predecessor as audience commandant, who had
received the assignment by recommendation after successfully suppressing
pirates off the coast.21 These assignments were often a reward for martial valor,
yet the ceremonies office also contained many individuals with no record of
military service. Often the assignment was a special act of imperial favor. Wang
Pien (d. 1184), for example, had become audience commandant under Hsiaotsung as reward for negotiating a favorable treaty with the Jurchen. A doctor
of Kuang-tsung had been assigned to the office in 1190 due to his effective
18
19
20
21
SS 465, pp. 13591–2.
T’o-t’o, Chin shih (1344; Peking, 1975) 61, p. 1450; 62, p. 1464.
Lou, Kung-k’uei chi (1979) 29, p. 9a; 30, p. 12a.
SS 366, p. 11414; 470, p. 13695.
764
richard l. davis
medical treatment.22 Many others made their way to the office through ties
with influential palace women, most often empresses. The appointment of
Chang Yüeh (d. 1180) had stemmed from his marriage to Dowager Empress
Wu’s younger sister. Yang Tz’u-shan (1139–1219), brother of Ning-tsung’s
empress, had become commandant following the installation of his sister as
imperial concubine; subsequently, his son inherited the same post. Han Ch’eng,
son of Emperor Shen-tsung’s daughter, and Han T’o-chou, closely related
to two different empresses, similarly owed their appointments to prominent
women.23 There are so many cases of audience officials being linked to palace
women that the office may well have been dominated by the maternal side of
the ruling family, not professional military men. A comment by Chou Pi-ta
in 1189 is quite revealing in this regard. When approached by Chiang T’eli, the quasi-military figure with no known blood or marriage ties to palace
consorts, for information about Hsiao-tsung’s forthcoming abdication, Chou
Pi-ta responded, “This is not something the maternal side should dare to
learn.”24 The statement suggests that Chiang T’e-li, merely by serving in the
Office of Audience Ceremonies, was automatically identified with the interests
and power of palace women. The reasons for entrusting consort relatives with
control over palace doors are not entirely clear, although one could speculate
that a brother would guard his sister differently than a stranger might, but the
preference for relatives, as a matter of policy, is undeniable. It was precisely
this policy that facilitated the rise of Han T’o-chou.
Another emerging figure of the Liu Cheng era who would later eclipse
Han T’o-chou was the imperial clansman Chao Ju-yü. A descendant seven
generations removed from Emperor T’ai-tsung’s eldest son Chao Yüan-tso,
he was born and raised in Jao-chou, Chiang-nan East.25 Like many distant
members of the dynasty’s massive imperial clan, and especially those who
had migrated south in the chaos of the Jurchen takeover, Chao Ju-yü was
no stranger to adversity. His father and grandfather had both held posts of
local, but not national, importance.26 This humble condition made him a
man of simple needs, who was devoted to his family. Chao Ju-yü was filial to
a fault. At the death of his mother, contemporaries report, he wept so bitterly
as to cough blood and later became emaciated by mourning. The account
may be somewhat exaggerated, but it illustrates a widespread perception of
22
23
24
25
26
SS 470, pp. 13693–4; HTC (1958) 152, pp. 4065–6.
SS 392, p. 11982; 465, pp. 13595–6; 474, p. 13771.
HTC (1958) 151, pp. 4050–1.
On Chao Ju-yü, see Herbert Franke, “Chao Ju-yü,” in Sung biographies, ed. Herbert Franke (Wiesbaden,
1976), pp. 59–63; SS 392, pp. 11981–90; Fu, Sung-tai Shu-wen chi-ts’un (1974) 71, pp. 1a–15b.
John W. Chaffee, Branches of heaven: A history of the imperial clan of Sung China (Cambridge, Mass., 1999),
p. 189.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
765
Chao Ju-yü as an exemplar of Confucian virtue. He was no less committed to
classical studies. Passing civil service qualifying examinations with distinction,
he had placed first in the chin-shih examination of 1165. Court policy denied
this honor to imperial clansmen, however, and he was demoted to second place.
A poet in his own right, his literary interests included more than poetry. He
collected books on a wide range of topics, boasting a personal library of fifty
thousand chüan.
Chao Ju-yü was an imposing presence at the court of Hsiao-tsung. Colleagues in the Palace Library knew him as a man of exceptional integrity who
refused to flatter the influential merely to advance his own career. He confirmed
this in 1171 when the audience commandant Chang Yüeh was named notary
official at the Bureau of Military Affairs. Advancement from the disesteemed
Ceremonies Office to the second highest rung of the military bureaucracy was
highly irregular. To Chao Ju-yü and many others, Chang Yüeh was undeserving. Fully aware of Chang Yüeh’s close relationship with the emperor and
cognizant of Chang’s potential value as a political ally, Chao Ju-yü nevertheless
insulted him by refusing to offer traditional courtesies. Later, Chao Ju-yü even
joined others in the campaign against Chang Yüeh that culminated in Chang’s
dismissal. Another audience official denounced by Chao Ju-yü was Wang Pien.
As vice-minister of personnel, Chao charged Wang Pien with exploiting political divisions to enhance his own standing. No less critical of Hsiao-tsung’s
appointment of the eunuch Ch’en Yüan to a high-level military post, Chao
warned of the danger of entrusting eunuchs with such power.27 More than any
other prominent official of the late twelfth century, Chao Ju-yü persistently
denounced the special privileges and influence of palace eunuchs and audience
officials – always aware that his candor might well offend their patron, the
emperor. Yet the risks to Chao’s career never dampened his commitment to
high bureaucratic standards.
Chao Ju-yü held regional posts during Hsiao-tsung’s last decade in power
in the 1180s, and also served in the capital as lecturer-in-waiting and chief
advisor to the heir apparent, the future Kuang-tsung. These posts gave him
considerable exposure to Chao Tun, who in 1191 summoned him from Fu-chou
to head the Ministry of Personnel. In light of Chao Ju-yü’s well-established
reputation as a critic of the inner court, the appointment must have easily
won the endorsement of, if it was not originally initiated by, Chief Councilor
Liu Cheng. In office, Chao Ju-yü denounced petty men in high places, and
challenged the emperor’s personal conduct. At the request of colleagues, he
discussed privately with Kuang-tsung the crisis created by the estrangement of
27
On these incidents, see SS 392, p. 11982; 469, p. 13672; 470, p. 13692, p. 13694; HTC (1958) 142,
pp. 3795–6; 148, pp. 3942, 3955–6; Fu, Sung-tai Shu-wen chi-ts’un (1974) 71, p. 9a.
766
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the two palaces. As a member of the imperial clan, his intercession carried special weight and contributed to temporarily improved relations between father
and son.28 Kuang-tsung’s visits to his father in early 1193 are attributed chiefly
to Chao Ju-yü’s mediation. The ultimate failure of that effort at reconciliation
was a personal setback for Chao Ju-yü.
Adding to the intensity of the court crisis during the 1190s was the untimely
death of a notary official at the Bureau of Military Affairs, Hu Chin-ch’en (d.
1193). Hu was a close confidant of Liu Cheng, and his death coincided with
Liu’s 140-day “political strike,” which created a serious leadership vacuum.29
The secondary chief councilor at the time, Ko Pi, proved timid and was virtually paralyzed by the court tensions. Soon after Liu Cheng returned, Ko’s
ten-month tenure came to an end.30 In the interim, Chao Ju-yü had risen to
second spot at the Bureau of Military Affairs, a position from which he would
ultimately overshadow an increasingly demoralized Liu Cheng.
royalty at odds
Officials were ineffective at swaying the emperor, a situation that may have
been exacerbated by Kuang-tsung’s viewing them as annoying extensions of
his retired father’s influence. After all, Chou Pi-ta and Liu Cheng had each been
named councilors under Hsiao-tsung. Only a few months into Kuang-tsung’s
reign Chou Pi-ta fell victim to an indictment by Ho Tan, a remonstrance officer,
who allegedly acted against Chou Pi-ta out of personal spite. Given that Ho
Tan had been sponsored for office by Liu Cheng, the possibility of collusion is
great. Chou Pi-ta did not resist, having been repeatedly frustrated by the dual
demands of the palace and the bureaucracy.31 Chou’s departure enabled Liu
Cheng to emerge as sole councilor and chief decision maker, a role he retained
for much of Kuang-tsung’s reign. Like Chou Pi-ta, Liu Cheng had once served
as an advisor to the prince before his accession. This gave Liu Cheng personal
access to the emperor, but the two were hardly close. Liu Cheng had spent
much of the 1180s, the decade directly preceding Kuang-tsung’s accession,
away from the capital. Liu Cheng’s retention of the chief councilorship after
the departure of Chou Pi-ta reflects not so much the emperor’s special favor
as his reservations about alternative candidates. This ambivalence would not
augur well for the Liu Cheng administration.
28
29
30
31
SS 392, p. 11983; HTC (1958) 152, pp. 4089–90.
HTC (1958) 153, p. 4096; SS 391, p. 11978.
SS 385, pp. 11827–9.
SS 391, p. 11971; 394, p. 12025; Fu, Sung-tai Shu-wen chi-ts’un (1974) 75, p. 25b.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
767
Chief Councilor Liu Cheng’s difficulties are best illustrated by Liu’s inability to resolve two troubling political crises: the timely nomination of Prince
Chia as heir apparent, and the mending of relations between the two imperial
palaces. Officials had good reason to press for the speedy designation of an heir.
The education of the heir apparent was very important, and an early appointment gave tutors valuable time to mold the future emperor’s personality and
inculcate him with Confucian attitudes toward governance and personal conduct. Early appointment of the heir apparent also enabled officials to supervise
the transfer of power with minimal input from palace eunuchs and consorts,
avoiding the aggressive political power plays that accompanied an uncertain
succession. From the outset of his councilorship, Liu Cheng pressed for Prince
Chia’s installation as heir. As the emperor’s eldest surviving son and the child
of his primary wife, Prince Chia held a very strong claim to the succession.
Postponement of his appointment seemed senseless. Empress Li2 also lobbied
on her son’s behalf. But it was Hsiao-tsung, not Kuang-tsung, who opposed
the appointment. The former emperor was apparently on good terms with his
grandson, and historical documents do not allude to an alternative heir backed
by Hsiao-tsung. There is no indication that Hsiao-tsung genuinely intended
to deny Prince Chia this privilege. Rather, Hsiao-tsung probably held out
merely to frustrate his ill-tempered daughter-in-law, by retaining some leverage to use against her. In any case, Kuang-tsung did not force the issue, which
meant that Liu Cheng could not achieve this major objective of training an
heir apparent during Hsiao-tsung’s lifetime.
Liu Cheng faced an even greater challenge in trying to convince Kuangtsung to make amends with his father. Beginning in 1193 and continuing
through the next year, Liu Cheng and many other officials repeatedly requested,
indeed begged, Kuang-tsung to visit the Ch’ung-hua Palace, only a few buildings away. But Kuang-tsung paid official visits only four times in 1193, once
in the company of his empress. Three of the four visits occurred in the first
three months of the year, when the influence of court officials enjoyed a brief
rally. In the fall, when the emperor seemed to be capitulating to official prodding, Empress Li2 interceded and had the visit canceled. A visit planned a
month later was similarly canceled, with Kuang-tsung professing illness. Liu
Cheng, his patience stretched to the limit and his resignation having been
refused, abruptly fled the capital in protest. He would stay away a hundred
and forty days, returning only after he had obtained Kuang-tsung’s promise to
visit Hsiao-tsung, which occurred before year’s end, followed by another visit
on the first day of the 1194 lunar new year. This would be their last meeting. In midspring, Hsiao-tsung fell ill, and Liu Cheng, joined by countless
others, pleaded for a visit of compassion. Imperial Diarist P’eng Kuei-nien,
768
richard l. davis
having recently memorialized the throne on three separate occasions, appeared
at court. He hit his forehead against the floor while performing an unending
series of kowtows, until his blood covered the tiles. He won the emperor’s
attention, but no change of heart.32 To court observers, Kuang-tsung’s persistent refusal to visit his dying father showed a total disregard for filial piety,
which reflected poorly upon him as a ruler. The emperor’s failure to resolve
this affair eroded confidence in Liu Cheng’s authority and statesmanship.
The crisis peaked in June 1194, as Hsiao-tsung’s condition deteriorated and
his death approached. Censors intensified their attacks on petty men who tried
to provoke rifts between the two palaces. Liu Cheng, in the company of other
high officials, assembled at the palace to plead with Kuang-tsung. Attendants
shut the door in their faces as they wept outside. Prince Chia, who was in
regular contact with his dying grandfather throughout this difficult time, is
reported similarly to have shed tears as he tried, in vain, to reunite his family.
The rift between the two emperors had irreparably widened, seemingly the
result of Kuang-tsung’s sensitivity to his father’s meddling and exacerbated
by court officials, eunuchs, and family members who exploited the rift for
personal gain. When death came to him on 28 June 1194, Hsiao-tsung had
not seen his son for six months. Worse yet, Kuang-tsung adamantly refused to
perform the funeral rites for his father. Prince Chia and his great grandmother,
Dowager Empress Wu, were obliged to preside over the wake in Kuang-tsung’s
place.33
Even before the death of Hsiao-tsung, Liu Cheng’s success as councilor was
undermined by precisely the influential palace personalities he was committed to uprooting. Prominent among these was Chiang T’e-li, a non–degree
holder whose entry into the civil service had come through hereditary privilege (yin2).34 Chao Ju-yü, who had lauded Chiang T’e-li’s suppression of
pirates along coastal Fu-chien, recommended his promotion to the capital.
Once there, Chiang T’e-li had served Hsiao-tsung as audience attendant and
herald of the heir apparent’s palace. Hsiao-tsung even employed him in 1187
as Sung emissary to the Chin court. The posts themselves carried only modest
prestige, but Chiang T’e-li had exploited these offices to establish powerful
political connections. One such connection included Hsiao-tsung’s heir apparent, and soon after his accession in 1189 Kuang-tsung promoted Chiang to
commandant of the Office of Audience Ceremonies.
32
33
34
SS 393, p. 11997; HTC (1958) 153, p. 4105. Also see SS 393, pp. 1195–6; Lou, Kung-k’uei chi (1979)
96, pp. 1a–14b.
See Chaffee, Branches of heaven, p. 192, for a description of the funeral. HTC (1958) 153, p. 4108.
Additional information is available in SS 470, pp. 13695–6; T’o-t’o, Chin shih 61, p. 1447; HTC (1958)
151, pp. 4050–1; 151, p. 4055; 153, pp. 4096–7; 153, p. 4101; 156, p. 4190.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
769
Chiang T’e-li, however, was not so favored among the high officials. Chou Pita complained of his attempted interference in the abdication of 1189, a serious
breach of etiquette for a petty palace attendant. Liu Cheng criticized Chiang’s
excessive influence over Kuang-tsung. Only days after Chou Pi-ta resigned,
an increasingly confident Liu Cheng demanded the dismissal of Chiang T’e-li,
whom he charged with coveting political power and accepting bribes. Kuangtsung reluctantly consented but insisted on a respectable reassignment for
Chiang T’e-li to a post nearby and a provision of traveling money for him
totaling two thousand strings of cash. In the summer of 1193 the emperor
reversed his decision and ordered Chiang T’e-li’s recall. In protest against this
reversal, and against Kuang-tsung’s stubborn refusal to visit his father, Liu
Cheng staged his dramatic 140-day absence from the capital. Kuang-tsung
acquiesced by ordering a second reassignment for Chiang T’e-li. This was only a
modest victory for the chief councilor. Under crisis conditions, he could wring
out of Kuang-tsung a few face-saving concessions, but could never thwart
in any lasting way the excessive privileges that Kuang-tsung granted palace
favorites. Chiang T’e-li subsequently received further promotions.
Liu Cheng led an unrelenting, often solitary, struggle against the emperor’s
granting unwarranted appointments in the palace and his disregard for imperial obligations, and this difficult task earned Liu the sympathy of some. However, these two issues of unwarranted appointments and dereliction of imperial
duty became the foci of an expanding polarization at court, brought about by a
campaign by moralistic statesmen to curtail the ascendancy of the inner court
over the outer court, and of palace favorites over civil officials. The intensity of
the conflict resulted largely from the dramatic rise in stature of the intellectual
movement called “Learning of the Way” (Tao-hsüeh). Under Kuang-tsung, a
growing number of its adherents, and their sympathizers came to hold high
offices, from which they influenced court politics in Lin-an as never before.
Leading the late-twelfth-century ascent of Tao-hsüeh was Chu Hsi, a native of
Kiangsi. His bureaucratic record may have been unimpressive and his political
exposure limited, but his scholarship and teaching earned him an unmatched
reputation. His fame was so widespread that a Sung emissary on an official visit
to Chin in 1193, in token deference, had been asked about the health of Master
Chu.35 Chou Pi-ta held Chu Hsi in particularly high esteem and had sought
his appointment to a metropolitan post in 1188. Bureaucratic opposition to
35
HTC (1958) 153, p. 4103. Also see Conrad Schirokauer, “Chu Hsi’s political career: A study in ambivalence,” in Confucian personalities, ed. Arthur F. Wright and Denis C. Twitchett (Stanford, Calif., 1962),
pp. 162–88; Brian E. McKnight, “Chu Hsi and his world,” in Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism, ed. Wingtsit Chan (Honolulu, 1986), pp. 408–36; Hoyt C. Tillman, Confucian discourse and Chu Hsi’s ascendancy
(Honolulu, 1992), pp. 133 and throughout.
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the appointment had forced a retreat, and Liu Cheng chose not to press the
issue, but he demonstrated his goodwill toward the Tao-hsüeh movement by
appointing to high office individuals who, if not personally identified with
the movement, at least were sympathetic toward it. These included, to name
but a few of the more prominent members, P’eng Kuei-nien, who rose from
executive aide at the Directorate of Education to imperial diarist; Lou Yüeh
(1137–1213), who was advanced from vice-director of education to drafter
in the Secretariat; Ch’en Fu-liang (1137–1203), the judicial commissioner of
Che-hsi, who joined the Secretariat in a similar capacity; Yeh Shih (1150–
1223), a Palace Library executive who moved on to the Ministry of Personnel;
and Chao Ju-yü, the former prefect of Fu-chou who became minister of personnel and eventually chief councilor.36 Through such men, the Tao-hsüeh
movement developed an influential presence at court. Liu Cheng facilitated
the movement’s political prominence, and also came under its influence.
Despite the growing stature of Chu Hsi and the generous patronage of
Liu Cheng, the Tao-hsüeh movement with its stress on personal conduct held
unique appeal in the early 1190s due to the combustible political climate. The
emperor’s excessive drinking, emotional frailty, disregard for filial devotion,
and irresponsibility toward his imperial duties, compounded by his indulgence
of a brutish spouse and shameless palace attendants, all contributed to the
politicization of personal conduct, especially imperial conduct, at the court
and among intellectual elites. Within this milieu Liu Cheng struck an alliance
with the Tao-hsüeh proponents and their sympathizers against the emperor and
his favorites. Liu Cheng does not seem to have been intentionally promoting
factionalism, for the court critics that he allied himself with represented a
community whose boundaries were never clearly defined and whose objectives,
apart from enlightening the throne, were otherwise ambiguous. Liu Cheng
brought together concerned scholars of varied intellectual pedigrees to rally
around a common cause in the hopes of bringing official and moral pressure
to bear upon a recalcitrant ruler.
As Hsiao-tsung’s health deteriorated in early 1194, over a hundred officials
threatened to resign en masse unless the emperor met his filial obligations.
Liu Cheng and Chao Ju-yü applied additional pressure by abruptly leaving
the capital. They were soon summoned to return. Yet the catalyst for decisive
action came on the ninth day of the sixth month with the death of Hsiao-tsung.
Previously, officials had hoped that Kuang-tsung would somehow overcome
the evil influences surrounding him and regain his senses. His shockingly
unfilial response to his father’s death proved that this hope was in vain. Court
36
On the intellectual background of Chou Pi-ta and Liu Cheng, see Huang et al., Sung Yüan hsüeh-an 35,
p. 702; 97, pp. 1816–17.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
771
officials felt that Kuang-tsung had gone completely insane and was unfit to
govern. They began to entertain seriously the need for Kuang-tsung’s abdication. Both Liu Cheng and Chao Ju-yü, to varying degrees, supported the
move, as did a growing number of their colleagues.37
Abdication in this instance, compared to Hsiao-tsung’s abdication in 1188–
9, was far more complex. Most important, this time there was no heir apparent.
Chao K’uo had yet to be installed. Hsiao-tsung’s death in the summer of 1194
had removed the only serious obstacle to Chao K’uo’s nomination and freed
high officials to act independently. But they were in no position to do so on
their own authority. The palace had to be involved, and Kuang-tsung’s instability forced them to involve the leading palace women. Dowager Empress
Wu was reportedly reluctant to become involved in so sensitive an affair, especially when other powerful palace women, such as Empress Hsieh, Kao-tsung’s
stepmother, might be drawn into a bitter conflict over the issue. Only after
lengthy exchanges and much prodding from Liu Cheng and Chao Ju-yü did she
agree.38 But a serious rift had developed between the two leading bureaucrats.
The cautious Liu Cheng would have been satisfied with simply elevating Chao
K’uo to heir apparent, for Liu’s immediate concern lay in removing uncertainty about the succession. The less patient and more pessimistic Chao Ju-yü
insisted that Chao K’uo be named heir and appointed emperor in a single
stroke; Chao had no delusions about Kuang-tsung’s prospects for recovery.
No official, in advancing a prince to the throne, needed to act with greater
circumspection than Chao Ju-yü. Denying imperial clansmen any significant
role in matters of succession was a hallowed Sung tradition, which sought
to avoid the contention among clansmen so common under other dynasties.
Imperial kin, living away from the capital and without autonomous armies,
were intended to be powerless to challenge court policies and actions. Further
weakening royal kin, the Southern Sung government had denied them, as a
matter of policy, access to councilor-level posts, in an attempt to preclude the
manipulation of the succession using the civil service. In 1193, Kuang-tsung
had made an exception with Chao Ju-yü’s appointment, reflecting perhaps
Chao’s extraordinary credentials and the high esteem accorded him by many
of his civil service colleagues. This appointment placed the clansman Chao
Ju-yü, as a proponent of abdication, in an exceedingly sensitive position, and
it explains the special care he took to muster support from eminent colleagues
37
38
SS 434, pp. 12890–1; HTC (1958) 153, pp. 4108–11; Lin Jui-han, Sung-tai cheng-chih shih (Taipei,
1989), pp. 353–7; Harold L. Kahn, Monarchy in the emperor’s eyes: Image and reality in the Ch’ien-lung reign
(Cambridge, Mass., 1971), pp. 220–5; Chaffee, Branches of heaven, pp. 190–5.
Liang-ch’ao kang-mu pei-yao 3, pp. 5a–7b; SS 243, p. 8648; 391, pp. 11975–6; 392, p. 11984; 465,
p. 13592; HTC (1958) 153, pp. 4108–11.
772
richard l. davis
and senior palace women, despite the rules of meticulous seclusion that left
palace women highly inaccessible.
The complexities of the succession crisis, however, presented a singular
opportunity for Han T’o-chou. Related by marriage to Dowager Empress Wu,
and uncle to Empress Li2’s daughter-in-law, he stood in a unique position
to influence the two women whose cooperation was most critical in the plan
to replace Kuang-tsung as emperor. As audience commandant, Han T’o-chou
controlled the palace doors and gates. Communication between court officials
and palace women required his assistance. At the same time, noncastrated men,
which included Han T’o-chou, were expressly prohibited from direct dealings
with consorts. Eunuchsm, who often had special influence over consorts, being
their only male companions,39 had to assist as intermediaries. By enlisting the
services of the eunuch Kuan Li, Han T’o-chou was able to win the support of a
reluctant Dowager Empress Wu. Although Kuan Li had done most to persuade
her, Han T’o-chou took most of the credit. After Chao Ju-yü had won Dowager
Empress Wu’s support, Liu Cheng again left the capital, Lin-an, intending by
this move to disassociate himself from the potentially controversial actions of
his military commissioner.40 With Dowager Empress Wu personally affixing
the imperial seal to the documents naming Chao K’uo emperor, Kuang-tsung,
powerless to reject the pressure to abdicate, passively stepped down and retired.
This political coup had swiftly resolved an intolerable situation and came
as a triumph for all involved. Han T’o-chou had proven himself a valuable
link between the inner palace and the outer court, considerably enhancing
his reputation and political power. A day after the accession, and at the recommendation of Dowager Empress Wu, Han T’o-chou’s grandniece became
empress to the new emperor. With the accession, Kuang-tsung’s wife, Empress
Li2, must have sighed in relief, the old cloud of uncertainty gone and her son’s
inheritance secured. Court officials must have taken quiet delight at witnessing the end of a reign that, with all the tension and emotion it generated,
proved the least productive in Sung history. Even greater consolation derived
from the retirement of Empress Li2, whose crude antics had created endless
embarrassment.
The succession proceeded smoothly and without challenge for two reasons.
First, it resulted from the close cooperation of the inner and outer courts. Liu
Cheng and Chao Ju-yü insisted on the involvement of the empresses, an important source of dynastic legitimacy, and kept their own colleagues well informed
of developments. They publicized the emperor’s private communications, in
which he reportedly affirmed his willingness to abdicate, thereby forestalling
39
40
SS 469, pp. 13674–5; HTC (1958) 153, pp. 4109–10.
HTC (1958) 153, pp. 4108–9.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
773
charges of acting without imperial consent or of overriding proper authority.
In addition, members on the paternal and maternal sides of the ruling house
joined in supporting the initiative. Historically, these two camps were more
often at odds, with officialdom preferring to deal with neither. Overcoming
these animosities and conflicting suspicions was no mean accomplishment and
was successful largely owing to the contributions of Han T’o-chou and Chao
Ju-yü. Despite their vastly different backgrounds and motives, the two had
a single objective in resolving the succession crisis, and they maintained a
degree of cordiality. The cooperation established during the succession crisis
would not, however, last.
autocracy under ning-tsung (1194–1224)
Chao K’uo (1168–1224), posthumously known as Ning-tsung (r. 1194–1224),
the second and only surviving son of Kuang-tsung, was scarcely a man of the
world.41 A pampered child, he had remained at home even after coming of age,
the royal family being unwilling to part with him.42 He had held no bureaucratic posts and had no experience of official responsibilities. A life spent in
the palace had denied him exposure to the outside world, and tensions within
his family must have made for a stressful youth. His great grandfather, Kaotsung, who had lived to see Chao K’uo reach eighteen years, had spent many
hours with him. His grandfather, Hsiao-tsung, saw him reach twenty-five;
they, too, were close. Yet both emperors represented authority figures who
expected filial submission from Chao K’uo. In light of Hsiao-tsung’s aggressive and stern character, he must have been especially exacting on the grandson. Kuang-tsung was surely too preoccupied with his own personal problems
to scrutinize his son’s behavior, but where he proved slack, his overbearing
empress compensated by keeping a tight rein on the young man. Chao K’uo’s
anguish, additionally, in being caught in the crossfire between his mother and
grandparents can well be imagined. Dowager Empress Wu, more compassionate than Empress Li2, was no less meddlesome: the marriage of Chao K’uo,
her great grandson, to Lady Han was her handiwork, proof that she had not
lost her knack for managing the personal lives of family men. Navigating
such tempestuous waters would strain even the strongest of characters, but
Chao K’uo was noticeably short on fortitude and emerged from the experience
deficient in both self-confidence and emotional stability. Passivity, his primary
41
42
SS 37, p. 713, cites Ning-tsung as the second son; Chaffee, Branches of heaven, p. 192, cites genealogical
sources that place him as a third son.
SS 39, p. 713; 391, p. 11974; Chao Hsi-nien, Chao-shih tsu-p’u [Academia Sinica, Fu Ssu-nien Library,
rare edition] (Hong Kong, 1937) 1, pp. 65b–66b.
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means of coping with a conflict-riddled family, became his greatest single fault
once he was on the throne.
Chao K’uo possessed few of the character traits of a great ruler, but his
personal inadequacies were aggravated by the actions of a thoughtless family. Prominent personalities acted on his behalf, frequently without bothering
to consult or even inform him, as though he were a mere pawn in a complex
play for power that needed no explanation. Dowager Empress Wu’s decision to
endorse his elevation to the throne reached his ears only as the ceremony began.
His imperial robes were ordered without his knowledge; the accession ceremony was kept secret. Chao Ju-yü had expected, according to official sources,
that the timid prince would not countenance any effort to deprive his father of
the throne. Chao Ju-yü had no time to persuade him, and so at the appointed
hour, Chao Ju-yü lured the prince to the palace and announced, before the
coffin of Hsiao-tsung, the impending accession. The prince declined on the
grounds of filial devotion, but the imperial robe was suddenly thrust upon his
shoulders. Civil officials then rushed in to do obeisance as the new emperor
wept in fear and disbelief. Such an account, so incredibly melodramatic, may
well have been embellished by later historians seeking to vindicate Ning-tsung
of complicity in his father’s abdication; it would not be the first time that the
sensitive circumstances surrounding a succession were contorted in the interest
of image building. Yet this particular portrayal probably contains more than a
kernel of truth. Sources other than the official history confirm that Chao K’uo
never coveted the throne.43 After coming to power, he was aloof and easily
manipulated by those around him, appearing almost timid and frightened,
and he deferred decision making to others. Reluctance to make decisions was
a trait he shared with his father. In the case of Kuang-tsung, it resulted from
serious physical and emotional problems. With Ning-tsung it grew out of a
frail, feeble personality.
Politically aloof perhaps, Chao K’uo could also be a highly sensitive individual, one who developed a genuinely personal commitment to those he worked
closely with. He so revered his former tutor Huang Shang that a high-level
appointment was planned for him soon after the accession. But, Huang Shang
died before the emperor could act. This coincided in 1194 with the death
of another respected tutor, Lo Tien, only recently appointed notary official at
the Bureau of Military Affairs. Ning-tsung’s attachment to the two men was
remarkably personal, for he later spoke quite emotionally about mourning
their loss.44 Their untimely deaths had a significant political impact. Being
43
44
HTC (1958) 153, p. 4115.
Chen Te-hsiu, Hsi-shan hsien-sheng Chen Wen-chung kung wen-chi [Ming Cheng-te 1506–21 ed.; Ssu-pu
ts’ung-k’an ch’u-pien 1929 ed.] (13th c.; Taipei, 1979) 43, p. 12a.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
775
irreplaceable as the emperor’s most trusted advisors, their departure signaled
the decline of the outer court and Ning-tsung’s increased reliance upon palace
figures. His relationship with aides could be close at least on a personal level, yet
this made a poor basis for administrative policy. Ning-tsung did not inherit
the unique balance that Hsiao-tsung struck between reverence for talented
advisors and autonomy in decision making. Ning-tsung could not separate
political from personal judgments. His humane side became a liability when
it blinded him to the faults of those he trusted and cared for. Consequently, his
ties to the two men he came to trust most, Han T’o-chou and Shih Mi-yüan,
were severed only by death.
han t’o-chou against the bureaucracy
Immediately after Ning-tsung’s accession, the emperor summoned Liu Cheng
to resume responsibilities as councilor of the left. The recall reportedly came
at the recommendation of Chao Ju-yü, who apparently held no grudge over
Liu Cheng’s untimely desertion. Still, Liu Cheng returned to Lin-an with a
severely impaired reputation.45 In his ten-day absence, a new emperor had
been enthroned and, perhaps more unsettling, a junior colleague had now
come to eclipse him. As a reward for resolving a difficult crisis, Ning-tsung
was fully prepared to name Chao Ju-yü as councilor of the right. However, fear
of bureaucratic resistance to an imperial clansman’s appointment to the post,
combined with Chao’s concern that his motives for interceding in the accession
should not appear selfish, forced Chao to decline. Instead, he accepted the top
position at the Bureau of Military Affairs, rising from associate administrator
to administrator. Chao Ju-yü’s new appointment and the eroded stature of Liu
Cheng gave rise to the eventual tensions between the two men, despite their
once cordial ties. The catalyst for their hostility was the selection of the burial
site for Hsiao-tsung.46
Controversy over the emperor’s burial originated with a recommendation
by the eminent Confucian scholar and Tao-hsüeh proponent, Chu Hsi. Sponsored by Chao Ju-yü, Chu Hsi had been summoned recently to Lin-an to serve
as academician and expositor-in-waiting. Chu Hsi apparently visited the proposed grave site in the suburbs of K’uai-chi (modern Shao-hsing). Because of
the shallowness of the soil, which sat on a bed of waterlogged gravel, Chu
45
46
SS 37, p. 715; 391, p. 11976; 392, p. 11987; HTC (1958) 153, pp. 4111–12.
On the controversy, see SS 392, p. 11987; 397, p. 12100; 429, pp. 12763–5; HTC (1958) 153, p. 4115;
Wing-tsit Chan, Chu Hsi: New Studies (Honolulu, 1989), p. 120. For Chu Hsi’s broader interest in
divination, see the chapter “Chu Hsi and Divination,” in Kidder Smith, Jr., et al., Sung dynasty uses of
the I Ching (Princeton, N.J., 1990), pp. 169–205.
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richard l. davis
concluded that the location was geomantically undesirable and requested a
new divination. Chao Ju-yü concurred, but not the chief councilor, Liu Cheng.
Perhaps not so meticulous about matters of ritual, Liu Cheng considered relocation unnecessary, and he had the support of many colleagues. This created
a deep rift in the bureaucracy, and Ning-tsung, preoccupied with mourning
and funeral-related rites, allowed the divisions to deepen.
A compromise could have been reached relatively easily if indeed the sole
issue had been Hsiao-tsung’s grave site. But much more was at stake. The dispute illustrated the enhanced standing at court of Tao-hsüeh proponents such as
Chu Hsi, individuals profoundly sensitive to matters of ritual and increasingly
identified with Chao Ju-yü. The group had no personal vendetta against Liu
Cheng, who had long been on cordial terms with them, but Liu’s willingness
to sacrifice ritual probity for political expedience was, in this instance, intolerable to them. This dispute was cleverly exploited by the audience officer
Han T’o-chou, who hoped to magnify differences between the two factions
to weaken the outer court. Han harbored a special enmity for Liu Cheng, so
rumor has it, stemming from the councilor’s long-standing campaign against
palace favorites, and took delight in the recent challenges to Liu’s authority.
Eventually, the burial controversy lost steam, and the emperor was buried as
planned, but the political contest ended in a short-term victory for those who
wanted to move the burial site. Only a month after his recall, Liu Cheng was
dismissed and Chao Ju-yü became chief councilor of the right. But this dispute
within the bureaucracy was to prove less threatening to Chao Ju-yü and his
supporters than the political fissure developing between the bureaucracy and
the inner court.
With Liu Cheng’s departure, Chao Ju-yü lost a potent ally in the increasing
struggle against the inner court, a loss made all the more acute by Chao’s special
vulnerability as an imperial clansman. His appointment to the Bureau of Military Affairs in 1193 had already attracted censorial attention, the court being
reminded of the long-standing exclusionary policy toward clansmen.47 Kuangtsung had ignored the remonstrance, probably out of deference to Liu Cheng,
and Ning-tsung out of gratitude for securing his accession, but not everyone in the capital shared their indifference to precedent. The scrutiny Chao
Ju-yü received made his attempt to consolidate power exceedingly difficult.
For example, although he utterly despised Han T’o-chou, his own political
insecurity precluded direct confrontation with the well-connected audience
officer. Chao opted to minimize differences and cooperate.48 He had been
warned, even before becoming councilor, of the need to rein in Han T’o-chou
47
48
SS 36, p. 705; 392, p. 11983, 393, p. 12002; HTC (1958) 153, p. 4094.
SS 392, p. 11987; HTC (1958) 153, pp. 4113–14.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
777
and remove his foothold in the palace. However, political expediency forced
Chao to involve Han T’o-chou in the succession talks, even though Chao knew
that such involvement might have undesirable repercussions. Moreover, Chao
Ju-yü erred in refusing to reward Han T’o-chou for assisting in the succession. In light of Chao’s own promotion to chief councilor, an esteemed if only
nominal promotion for Han T’o-chou was doubtlessly expected. When it did
not come, the audience officer was left understandably bitter. He had been
outmaneuvered.
With methodical caution, Chao Ju-yü sought to undermine Han T’o-chou.
By promoting to top offices individuals who shared his high standard of political conduct, Chao hoped eventually to create the political will necessary to
subdue the inner court. For example, Chu Hsi was already in place as Han-lin
expositor-in-waiting, a post that gave him a platform from which to influence
the throne. Chao Ju-yü, with the help of Liu Cheng, had won a substantial
increase in the number of Han-lin expositors and readers. Heading the list of
recent appointees were Ch’en Fu-liang, Huang Shang, and P’eng Kuei-nien.
Lin Ta-chung had been recalled from regional service to become drafter at the
Secretariat. Lou Yüeh, whose elegant prose had graced Kuang-tsung’s abdication rescript, was promoted from the Secretariat to master of remonstrance.
Liu Kuang-tsu (1142–1222), summoned from the distant southwest, filled
vacancies in the Censorate and the Imperial Diary Office. Yüan Hsieh (1144–
1224) and Huang Tu (1138–1213) also moved from regional to metropolitan posts, the former as instructor at the Imperial University and the latter
as policy monitor.49 Despite their widely disparate regional and intellectual
backgrounds, they all shared two common traits. At some point, each had
asserted the prerogative of the outer court to guide and direct governmental
decision making, thereby challenging the influence of Han T’o-chou and other
prominent members of the inner court. And each had also shown strong convictions about how the emperor should conduct himself. These men figured
prominently among those who had criticized the antics of Empress Li2 and
had beseeched Kuang-tsung to visit his dying father.
After five years of imperial dereliction during Kuang-tsung’s reign, Chao
Ju-yü sought to revitalize a demoralized political climate by promoting Confucian standards, especially those promulgated by Tao-hsüeh proponents. Han
T’o-chou recognized the impending threat and responded by extending his
49
On these various movements, see SS 393, pp. 11998, 12004, 12010, 12014; 395, pp. 12046–7; 397,
p. 12100; 400, p. 12146; 429, p. 12763; HTC (1958) 153, pp. 4121–2; 154, pp. 4124–7; Lou,
Kung-k’uei chi (1979) 30, pp. 11a–13a; 96, p. 2a; 98, pp. 6a–7a; Yeh Shih, Shui-hsin hsien-sheng wenchi [Ming Chia-ching 1522–66 ed.; Ssu-pu ts’ung-k’an 1929 ed.] (13th c.; Taipei, 1979) 16, pp. 4a–7a;
Yüan Hsieh, Chieh-chai chi [Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu, Wen-yüan ko 1779 ed.] (c. 12th c.; Taipei, 1975) 11,
pp. 17a–20b.
778
richard l. davis
influence from the palace to the Censorate. Exploiting ties in the bureaucracy,
he won appointment to surveillance agencies for Liu Te-hsiu and Hsü Chichih (d. 1201). The sudden rise of both men from minor to major posts left
them permanently indebted to Han T’o-chou, and they were not alone. One
contemporary insists that already by the end of 1194, Han T’o-chou held the
censorial agencies firmly in his grip.50 This was possible only because Han had
astutely garnered the support of more than minor lackeys; neutral elements
turned to him as well. Ho Tan (chin-shih 1166), who owed his early advancement to Liu Cheng, subsequently had differences with Liu’s supporters and, as
censor, became a severe critic of them. Ching T’ang (1138–1200), a respected
statesman who replaced Lo Tien as notary official at the Bureau of Military
Affairs, similarly joined the Han T’o-chou camp after having a falling-out with
Chao Ju-yü. Perhaps most surprising was Han T’o-chou’s successful courting
of Hsieh Shen-fu (chin-shih 1166), an individual once highly critical of eunuch
power and positively disposed toward Chu Hsi.51 The conversion of neutral
elements did not reflect a newfound loyalty to the inner court or affection for
Han T’o-chou; rather, it reflected their contempt for Liu Cheng’s ideological
supporters, who were in the ascendant. Han’s faction was a marriage of convenience, one powerful enough to enable him to secure the dismissal of Chao
Ju-yü’s supporters and thereby pave the way for Han’s own court dominance.
Han T’o-chou had not initially been regarded favorably by the emperor in
1194. Directly following the accession, Ning-tsung honored Chao Ju-yü and
others with highly esteemed posts and titles, while offering Han T’o-chou only
a minor post in the Bureau of Military Affairs. This slight is attributed to Chao
Ju-yü, who insisted that kin of the ruling house deserved no special reward for
assisting their family in time of need.52 Nevertheless, by year’s end, a radical
change had occurred. According to the expositor-in-waiting P’eng Kuei-nien,
the court began to make wide-ranging decisions on the advice of Han T’ochou without consulting the chief councilor. Worse yet, an otherwise critical
bureaucracy had been effectively silenced through intimidation.53 P’eng Kueinien, warning of the threat to dynastic stability posed by inner court influence,
demanded Han T’o-chou’s dismissal, to which Ning-tsung responded: “I trust
T’o-chou with the utmost sincerity. There is confidence and no doubt.”54
Clearly, Han T’o-chou’s standing had improved dramatically during the first
crucial months of the Ning-tsung reign, enabling him quickly to overshadow
50
51
52
53
54
SS 392, p. 11988; 394, p. 12042; 474, p. 13772; Lou, Kung-k’uei chi (1979) 96, p. 12a.
On such neutral figures, see SS 394, pp. 12024–6, 12036–8, 12038–41; HTC (1958) 153, pp. 4116–17.
SS 474, p. 13772; HTC (1958) 153, p. 4112.
See Lou, Kung-k’uei chi (1979) 96, pp. 1a–14b, especially p. 12a; P’eng, Chih-t’ang chi 5, pp. 16b–20b,
especially pp. 18a and 19a.
SS 393, p. 11998; HTC (1958) 153, p. 4121.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
779
Chao Ju-yü. This meteoric rise, coinciding with one of the largest assaults
on palace influence in Southern Sung history, seems paradoxical. Perhaps the
new Empress Han exploited her intimacy with Ning-tsung to win favor for
her uncle. Yet the character of the empress suggests otherwise. In contrast
to the notorious Empress Li2, she was a woman of considerable reserve who
meticulously shunned political involvement. Her mere presence must have
enhanced the stature of her uncle, but there is no indication that she aggressively advanced his interests. A more likely reason for Han T’o-chou’s ascent is
Ning-tsung’s changing attitude toward Chao Ju-yü and his supporters, whose
demands on his conduct the emperor found unreasonably burdensome. The
new emperor lacked Hsiao-tsung’s admiration of self-discipline and personal
standards. Ning-tsung was skeptical about moralistic judgments and probably suspicious of the motives of those who made them. Before the accession,
instructor P’eng Kuei-nien had advised Ning-tsung to shun petty men. He
responded: “But in the end, how are we to know? Superior men consider petty
men to be petty men, petty men similarly consider superior men to be petty
men. I fear they will be indistinguishable from each other.”55 Prone to such
skepticism, Ning-tsung probably rejected as utter chicanery Chao Ju-yü and
his cohort’s denigration of Han T’o-chou as a petty man. Indeed, the more
they pressed this seemingly senseless issue, the greater became the emperor’s
disaffection.
Chao Ju-yü’s limited exposure to Ning-tsung prior to the accession was
another decisive factor in his ultimate political defeat. Before Kuang-tsung
had ascended the throne Chao had served him as expositor-in-waiting and
chief secretary. In the process, Chao had earned Kuang-tsung’s respect and
confidence. As emperor, Kuang-tsung had bypassed tradition and appointed
his clansman to a councilor-level post. Unfortunately, Chao Ju-yü had never
served Ning-tsung in an official capacity before his accession. Ning-tsung had
named him chief councilor not out of close personal ties, but in recognition
of his role in the succession. This lack of familiarity denied Chao Ju-yü the
additional leverage he needed to displace Han T’o-chou. The only members of
the outer court who could have wielded sufficient personal influence, Huang
Shang and Lo Tien, had both died in 1194. At their deaths, Chao Ju-yü
commented: “The misfortune of these two officials is the misfortune of the
entire realm.”56 It was an astonishingly prescient assessment.
In late 1194 and early 1195, Chao’s faction launched a bitter assault against
the inner court, hoping to reverse fortunes that had declined steadily over the
past half year. Triggering the assault was the dismissal of the policy monitor
55
56
Lou, Kung-k’uei chi (1979) 96, pp. 6b–7a.
SS 393, p. 12009; HTC (1958) 153, p. 4115.
780
richard l. davis
Huang Tu, a prominent critic of Han T’o-chou.57 An imperial edict, allegedly
forged by Han, ordered Huang Tu’s transfer to a regional post. An incensed
Chu Hsi denounced the arbitrariness of the dismissal and cautioned against
trusting individuals who seek to encroach upon the imperial sway and jeopardize the empire’s security. The allusion to Han T’o-chou was unmistakable.
In retribution Chu Hsi was then also reassigned to a regional post. Chao Juyü pleaded for recision of the order and threatened to resign. Ning-tsung
rejected both his resignation and his advice. Secretariat official Ch’en Fu-liang
and Imperial Diarist Liu Kuang-tsu, among others, similarly protested Chu
Hsi’s reassignment. They too were demoted. P’eng Kuei-nien, an old foe of
Han T’o-chou, who was also disinclined to sacrifice candor for diplomacy,
soon joined the defense of Chu Hsi, a close friend. P’eng predicted imminent
disaster should Han T’o-chou be retained. When he too received a transfer,
Policy Monitor Lin Ta-chung and Secretariat official Lou Yüeh joined the fray,
defending P’eng Kuei-nien’s integrity and genuineness of heart. They proposed either the recall of P’eng Kuei-nien to the capital or the reassignment
of Han T’o-chou to regional service. The compromise was rejected. A succession of remonstrances and ultimatums followed, gambits intended to pressure
the throne. Few could have imagined that they would backfire and that the
emperor would sacrifice a galaxy of prestigious officials simply to retain one
favorite. Han T’o-chou was commonly equated with the vilified eunuch Ch’en
Yüan, prominent during the reigns of Kao-tsung and Hsiao-tsung; politically,
he proved far more indestructible.58
As the campaign against Han T’o-chou progressed, the court grew ever
more polarized. In theory, this should have united the outer court against
the palace favorites. Regardless of political allegiance, civil officials shared a
common concern for the regular functioning of the bureaucratic machinery
of government, and Han T’o-chou presented a grave threat to its integrity.
The recent rash of dismissals, for example, was highly irregular. The chief
councilor had not approved them, as was customary, and the Secretariat had
not drafted the necessary rescripts. The dismissal notices were special palace
orders that had never passed through regular bureaucratic channels. Even
more curious, Ning-tsung had spent much of late 1194 away from court at
the former palace of Hsiao-tsung, apparently performing funeral rites. This
absence raised serious questions about the origin of the rescripts. In Sung
times, bypassing the bureaucracy to conduct government business by imperial
57
58
SS 393, pp. 11998, 12010–11, 12015; 395, p. 12047; 429, p. 12766; 434, p. 12888; HTC (1958) 153;
Lou, Kung-k’uei chi (1979) 30, pp. 11a–13a; 96, pp. 1a–14b; 98, pp. 6b–7a; Yüan, Chieh-chai chi 11,
p. 20b.
SS 40, p. 781.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
781
favorites was unusual; when done with any regularity, it generally presaged
the emergence of autocratic leadership by the emperor or, more commonly,
by some imperial favorite. Tao-hsüeh proponents in the bureaucracy, fearing
an institutional crisis, supported Chao Ju-yü. Most notably, even Ch’en K’uei
(1128–1203), an executive at the Bureau of Military Affairs, who so hated Chao
Ju-yü that the two refused to attend the same audience, defended the councilor’s
close ally P’eng Kuei-nien in the crisis and was himself banished. However,
other bureaucrats proved less courageous. Censor Hsieh Shen-fu, Assistant
Councilor Ching T’ang, and Bureau of Military Affairs executive Yü Tuan-li
(1135–1201) were among those who abandoned the Tao-hsüeh proponents.59
The anticipated consensus against Han T’o-chou never materialized. Not all
bureaucrats could agree on the seriousness of Han T’o-chou’s political threat,
nor were all sympathizers with the Tao-hsüeh movement willing to sacrifice
their short-term personal interests for the long-term welfare of bureaucratic
governance.
Soon after the accession of Ning-tsung, Chao Ju-yü was reportedly advised
by Yeh Shih and Chu Hsi to reward Han T’o-chou but keep him at a safe
distance, on the assumption that a petty man can readily be bought but never
trusted. Chao allegedly gave little thought to the advice, confident in his own
ability to prevail.60 But Chao seriously underestimated the wiles of his political
opponent. By January 1195, the most ideological of Chao’s supporters had been
removed from posts of power. For Chao Ju-yü, demoralized at having to fight
a lone battle and frustrated by Han T’o-chou’s circumvention of bureaucratic
authority, dismissal must have come as a relief. Li Mu, a policy monitor and
political crony of Han T’o-chou, again brought forward the issue of the longstanding policy that imperial clansmen were to be excluded from high office
and the throne used this as a pretext for Chao’s dismissal. This dismissal
confirmed again the emperor’s confidence in Han T’o-chou. Yang Chien (1140–
1226), a professor at the Directorate of Education, and Lü Tsu-chien (d. 1196),
an executive aide at the Court of Imperial Treasury, each denounced the decision
and were banished for their audacity. Students at the Imperial University in
Lin-an staged a sizable demonstration of protest. The court, clearly annoyed
at the students’ political action, made an example of six instigators. Rounded
up by the prefect of Lin-an, they were exiled to the remote south.61 Dozens of
others suffered similar punishment for defending Chao Ju-yü and his associates.
The final sweep against the critics of Han T’o-chou came as an anticlimax. By
this time, most of their energy had been spent.
59
60
61
SS, 394, pp.12036–8, 12038–41; 398, pp. 12103–6; HTC (1958) 153, pp. 4121–2.
SS 392, p. 11987; 434, p. 12871; HTC (1958) 153, p. 4112.
SS 407, pp. 12289–92; 455, pp. 13368–71, 13373–5; 474, pp. 13772–3; HTC (1958) 154, pp. 4126–
29.
richard l. davis
782
With the departure of Chao Ju-yü from government in the early part of
1195, Han T’o-chou moved quickly to realign the bureaucracy. The new councilor of the right was Yü Tuan-li, who would serve for only a year, followed by
Ching T’ang, who held the post from 1196 until his death in 1200. Both men
were established scholars and competent officials. The two have fared poorly at
the hands of later historians, who despised them for their cooperation with Han
T’o-chou; but they were more than mere sycophants. As for Han T’o-chou,
honors came in steady succession. Within two years, he rose from regional
surveillance commissioner (kuan-ch’a shih, 5a) with titular honors to regional
commissioner (chieh-tu shih, 2b) and then to supreme commandant (k’ai-fu it’ung san-ssu, 1b), the highest rank of sinecure posts. Subsequent honorific titles
were granted him, including junior mentor, junior preceptor, grand mentor,
and grand preceptor, and, finally, he received his ennoblement as a prince.
Han’s father, whose career had hardly extended beyond the Office of Audience
Ceremonies, was posthumously honored with the title “loyal and fixed,” a title
normally reserved for only the most accomplished of officials. The emperor
spared little when it came to honors and accolades, yet the highest civil service
post initially given to Han T’o-chou was assistant recipient of edicts in the
Bureau of Military Affairs. This makes him the only statesman in Southern
Sung times to control the bureaucracy, indeed the empire, without holding an
executive post to legitimize that control.
Ning-tsung hesitated to advance Han T’o-chou to a councilor-level post for
the same reason that the outer court resented Han’s intrusion into decision making – he lacked civil service credentials. Han T’o chou held no official degree
and had passed no recruitment examination. His bureaucratic experience was
very limited. Men of military background who distinguished themselves at
war were often rewarded with prestigious office, yet the hostilities witnessed by
Han T’o-chou never extended beyond those at the court. He had entered government service through family privilege and had risen through marriage ties.
Prior to the accession of Ning-tsung, his administrative talent was untested.
During the high degree of cooperation between inner and outer courts that
culminated in the 1194 abdication, he had served as liaison, conveying messages from Chao Ju-yü, through the eunuch Kuan Li, to Dowager Empress
Wu. He had provided a vital link in communication, but his own input
appears to have been negligible. Han T’o-chou lacked intellectual achievements as well. He was identified with no major thinker or school of thought,
save for having received childhood instruction from Ch’en Tzu-ch’iang, an
obscure individual who later became a professor at the Imperial University.62
Neither steeped in classical literature nor immersed in traditional values,
62
SS 394, p. 12034; 474, p. 13774; HTC (1958) 155, p. 4166; 155, p. 4181.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
783
Han T’o-chou represents the exact antithesis of the Sung civil servant ideal.
For the quintessential scholar and bureaucrat Chao Ju-yü, who had faced great
obstacles in his own rise to power, the astonishing success of this mediocre
audience officer must have been galling. Chin-shih credentials had come to be
expected of those holding councilor-level posts. Despite the emperor’s high
regard for Han T’o-chou and special favor for his niece, the Empress Han,
Ning-tsung did not violate bureaucratic precedent and give Han a councilorlevel post. This left Han T’o-chou’s position highly irregular. His policies
were often shaped by a curious combination of arrogance and insecurity, the
arrogance being a function of pedigree, and the insecurity a product of powers
that lacked the authority of office.
the ban on tao-hsüeh
After eliminating all serious opposition in the capital and procuring for himself an impressive string of court titles, Han T’o-chou sought to justify the
dismissal of his opponents on more substantial grounds, such as disloyalty to
the throne or breach of official conduct. Beyond bolstering his own status as
the individual who rid the empire of a grave menace, this move would additionally discredit the opposition so as to make their political revival next to
impossible. Han T’o-chou also longed to undertake some courageous exploit,
an opportunity to prove his worth and perhaps justify his appointment as chief
councilor.
In pursuit of the first set of objectives – to discredit the opposition – Han
began a political campaign so disastrous that he would be compelled, in the
end, to undo his own deed. Writing in late 1194, P’eng Kuei-nien, quoting
Ou-yang Hsiu, noted: “Since antiquity, petty men who wish to empty the
empire of [talented] men have always resorted to talk about factions and
parties.”63 It was a forecast of the line of attack that would be chosen by
Han T’o-chou to pummel and humiliate his already weakened critics. His
impatient ambition far exceeding his political craft, Han T’o-chou would not
settle for denunciation of individual critics as factionalists. For him, the Taohsüeh movement seemed somehow conspiratorial. With Chu Hsi such a popular
figure within that group, it seemed only logical to identify the movement he
represented as the source of factional strife. Han T’o-chou declared war on the
movement.
But the history of the Tao-hsüeh movement was complex. Even a hundred
years earlier, by the mid-eleventh century, a discernible schism had developed
between traditional Confucianism (Ju-hsüeh) and the Learning of the Way
63
P’eng, Chih-t’ang chi 4, p. 18a. For the original citation, see Ou-yang Hsiu, Historical records of the Five
Dynasties, trans. Richard L. Davis (New York, 2004), p. 294.
784
richard l. davis
(Tao-hsüeh) (often referred to as Neo-Confucianism). Both groups aspired to
revive antiquity and restore the simplistic beauty of ancient literary styles long
displaced by abstruse new forms; resuscitate ancient rites and institutions long
debased by vulgar conventions; and celebrate proper human relationships in
the face of competition from the otherworldliness of Buddhism. Traditional
Confucianism stressed the spirit or essence of antiquity, while the Tao-hsüeh
movement took a more literal approach to the imitation of the old. As James
T. C. Liu has noted, this new Confucian movement insisted on strict adherence to the rituals and lifestyle of the past, an attitude widely criticized by
contemporaries as pretentious and unrealistic.64
In the twelfth century, Tao-hsüeh practices continued to irritate fellow
bureaucrats and, increasingly, the throne. The sanctimonious frugality of Taohsüeh adherents could often appear excessive. At one point, Palace Library
executive Hu Hung paid a social call upon Chu Hsi at Fu-chou. He received
memorably wretched meals, about which he later commented with indignation, “There’s not that much shortage in the mountains!”65 His miserly host,
Hu concluded, lacked decorum in treating friends. In a similar vein, Chu Hsi
was once accused of feeding coarse food even to his mother, an accusation that
implied great filial impiety. Such complaints may seem petty minded, but
they reveal in Chu Hsi a distinctive set of values that many contemporaries
did not appreciate and indeed found personally offensive. The liberties taken
by Chu Hsi in criticizing others, and his apparent lack of restraint, also came
at great cost to his career. As a regional official, he denounced corrupt and negligent bureaucrats with uncommon frequency. His scrutiny often extended
beyond subordinates to include their superiors. This was highly irregular conduct for a noncensorial official and raised questions about his motives – were
they professional or political? Later historians may have drawn inspiration
from his dedication to bureaucratic integrity and his moral courage, but his
contemporaries commonly regarded Chu Hsi as self-righteous and excessively
contentious.66 Memorializing the throne in 1180, he astonished all by openly
criticizing the emperor’s unhealthy reliance on a small coterie of men, and predicting imminent calamity. Quite understandably, an infuriated Hsiao-tsung
64
65
66
Liu Tzu-chien (James T. C. Liu), “How did a Neo-Confucian school become the state orthodoxy?”
Philosophy East and West 23 No. 4 (1973), pp. 483–505, especially p. 497; Ch’en, “Han P’ing-yüan
p’ing,” pp. 123–8.
SS 394, p. 12023; Li Hsin-ch’uan, Tao ming lu (1239; Shanghai, 1937), pp. 58–9, 67–9. For related
information on Chu Hsi’s eccentric lifestyle, see Chan, Chu Hsi, pp. 44–89, and Julia Ching, “Chu
Hsi on personal cultivation,” in Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism, ed. Wing-tsit Chan (Honolulu, 1986),
pp. 273–91.
Sung Hsi, “Chu Hsi ti cheng-chih lun,” in Sung-shih yen-chiu chi: Ti shih chi, ed. Sung-shih tso-t’an-hui
(Taipei, 1978), pp. 355–69.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
785
took this as an evil wish, not constructive advice, and withdrew his former
sympathies for Chu Hsi.67 Chu Hsi also came under fire for ostentatiously
declining public office, especially metropolitan posts, despite repeated offers.
To many, Chu Hsi’s refusals reflected patent arrogance, a ploy to enhance his
reputation by appearing unavailable even to the throne.68 Liu Kuang-tsu, an
imperial diarist and a man sympathetic to Tao-hsüeh, summarized the reasons
for the unpopularity of the movement stating: “The superior men of today
do not comprehend the Great Way. They regard themselves too highly while
castigating others as too base.”69
At court, exaggerated stress on moral purity wore thin the welcome for Taohsüeh proponents, for their criticism extended even to the emperor. Worse yet,
their criticism often appeared totally unjustified. Tao-hsüeh proponents idealized an austere lifestyle and impugned indulgence in wine or women, especially
by the Son of Heaven, as he should personify the noblest of human virtues. The
Tao-hsüeh movement’s animosity toward Han T’o-chou grew in part out of his
indifference to moral standards. Ignoring the custom of taking only one primary wife, he reportedly had a total of four, all of whom he insisted on calling
“Madame” (fu-jen). In addition, he kept ten secondary wives – a small harem –
plus many other women.70 Alcohol and frivolity inevitably accompanied
female entertainment, and Han T’o-chou was notorious for drinking late into
the night. When Kuang-tsung had developed similar habits, palace favorites,
perhaps eunuchs, were presumed responsible. When Ning-tsung now fell into
the same vices, the influence of Han T’o-chou seemed undeniable.
Both Kuang-tsung and Ning-tsung were negatively predisposed against
Tao-hsüeh, resenting its intrusion into their personal lives, especially the heavy
ceremonial obligations of filial devotion. Kuang-tsung hated his father with
intense passion, and moralist pressure to visit Hsiao-tsung in the Ch’unghua Palace only incited Kuang-tsung further. Ning-tsung had still greater
reason to be bitter. By the end of 1194, having performed, on his father’s
behalf, the stressful funeral rituals for Hsiao-tsung, the emperor prepared to
observe a shortened and less rigorous period of mourning. The heavy demands
of governing made this a perfectly proper decision; indeed, the same had been
proposed for Hsiao-tsung’s mourning of Kao-tsung, and the father-son relationship was more formalized than that of grandfather-grandson. Nevertheless,
Chu Hsi pressed for strict adherence to ritual. Given Hsiao-tsung’s precedent
of compliance to the requirements of these rituals, as new emperor Ning-tsung
67
68
69
70
SS 429, p. 12754; Chu, Hui-an hsien-sheng (1979) 11, pp. 11a–18a.
SS 394, p. 12031; Li, Tao ming lu, pp. 47–8.
Chen, Hsi-shan hsien-sheng Chen Wen-chung kung wen-chi 43, p. 8a.
SS 474, p. 13777; Ting Ch’uan-ching, Sung-jen i-shih hui-pien (1935; Taipei, 1982) 17, p. 886.
786
richard l. davis
could hardly do otherwise without drawing heavy criticism.71 The death of
the eighty-three-year-old Dowager Empress Wu in 1197 raised the issue of
Ning-tsung and mourning rites once again. Han T’o-chou is said to have proposed that funeral rites be simplified and expenses reduced. This incensed Liu
Kuang-tsu. Memorializing the throne from a regional post, he charged Han
T’o-chou with treating the emperor’s great-grandmother as a petty woman.72
Ning-tsung consented to a full year’s mourning, having only recently concluded observances for his grandfather. In the year 1200, as a cruel fate would
have it, both his mother and father died. There was no question that formal
and full-length observances were in order. In this way, Ning-tsung devoted
much of a decade to the rigors of mourning. The strict demands dictated by
Tao-hsüeh proponents made the emperor’s mourning unduly protracted, and
he appears never to have forgotten, or forgiven, them.
Against this background, Han T’o-chou’s proposal to proscribe Tao-hsüeh
adherents drew no noticeable objection from the emperor. The idea was hardly
original. Earlier in the century, under Hui-tsung, a ban had been imposed
on antireformists of the Yüan-yu era (1086–93). Implemented in 1102 under
Chief Councilor Ts’ai Ching (1047–1126), the ban had sought to discredit
anti–Wang An-shih elements at court. The names of alleged partisans, initially ninety-eight, but later over three hundred in number, were inscribed
in stone. In punishment, offenders and their descendants were excluded from
metropolitan posts and prohibited from entering the capital; their literary
productions were proscribed, and, in certain cases, printing blocks of their
works were reduced to ashes.73 A second ban had occurred under Councilor
Ch’in Kuei. Beginning in 1136 as an injunction against using the classical
exegesis of Ch’eng I for civil service examinations, the ban was broadened
eight years later to include any “specialized and obscure learning” (chuanmen ch’ü-hsüeh).74 Ch’in Kuei’s proscription of the 1140s was in many ways
similar to Ts’ai Ching’s, but it differed in one important respect: it focused
on intellectual, not just political, associations. Ts’ai Ching had directed his
ban against political opponents, including men of vastly different intellectual
backgrounds. Ch’in Kuei, by identifying and attacking his political opponents
on the basis of their intellectual association, had established the model that
Han T’o-chou would use sixty years later.
71
72
73
74
SS 429, p. 12766; HTC (1958) 153, p. 4120.
SS 397, p. 12101; HTC (1958) 154, p. 4153.
On the ban, see Chapter 7 of this volume; SS 472, pp. 13721–8; HTC (1958) 88, pp. 2244–5; 88,
p. 2252; Li, Tao ming lu, pp. 15–9; and references to it in Huang et al., Sung Yüan hsüeh-an, chüan 96.
SS 473, p. 13760; Huang et al., Sung Yüan hsüeh-an, chüan 96; Li, Tao ming lu, pp. 37–9; also see Huang
K’uan-ch’ung, “Ch’in Kuei yü wen-tzu yü,” in Sung-shih ts’ung-lun, Huang K’uan-ch’ung (Taipei, 1974),
pp. 41–72.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
787
The political influence of the Tao-hsüeh adherents had been, for most of
the early twelfth century, appreciated little under Hsiao-tsung. Hsiao-tsung’s
assertive leadership curtailed special favor being given to any one group. In
addition, Hsiao-tsung’s highly eclectic attitude toward ideas, and his belief in
the Three Teachings (Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism) as being complementary and deserving of equal attention, alienated the more adamant
Tao-hsüeh proponents.75 Only under Kuang-tsung did the Tao-hsüeh movement’s fortunes improve markedly, a development in which not everyone took
delight.
Competitive examinations were the cornerstone of the Sung civil service,
and a candidate’s understanding and interpretation of the classics affected his
success. Intellectual associations profoundly influenced careers and livelihoods.
Hermeneutics, the interpretation of texts, and one’s intellectual disposition
were not just an academic issue in this competitive environment, and this
partly explains the controversy triggered by the advancement of Tao-hsüeh
adherents under Chou Pi-ta, Liu Cheng, and Chao Ju-yü. The balance sought
by Hsiao-tsung, where no single teaching was to achieve preeminence, had
begun to shift. This emerging realignment was closely followed by those who
had been taught and supported different intellectual traditions.
Being outside the civil service mainstream, Han T’o-chou would have been
disconnected from the academic dispute, but in this case his political interests
coincided with the political and academic concerns of others. Most likely at his
prompting, censors began, in 1195, to attack Tao-hsüeh partisans and denounce
Tao-hsüeh ideas as “spurious teachings” (wei-hsüeh). Indictments against Chu
Hsi himself and many others soon followed. Had it not been for the intervention of Dowager Empress Wu, the court may well have imposed a general
proscription from the outset. As the oldest living member of the royal family, she probably remembered better than others the lasting ill effects of such
intolerance in the past. The alleged partisans were initially excluded only from
the metropolitan bureaucracy.76 After her death in 1197, with no powerful
sponsor to oppose them, the sanctions were extended and formalized. Officially imposed in 1198, the ban, called the Tao-hsüeh chin, directly affected
fifty-nine individuals.77
In scope and severity, the ban of 1198 scarcely compared to the Yüan-yu
ban of Ts’ai Ching a hundred and ten years earlier. Apart from affecting far
75
76
77
Li Hsin-ch’uan, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi [Shih-yüan ts’ung-shu 1914 ed.] (c. 1202 chia volume,
1216 i volume; Taipei, 1967) i 3, pp. 8a–b; Chen, Hsi-shan hsien-sheng Chen Wen-chung kung wen-chi 11,
pp. 37b–38a.
HTC (1958) 154, p. 4140.
SS 394, p. 12033.
788
richard l. davis
fewer people, the ban was also far less drastic. Proscribed scholars found it
difficult to publish their scholarship, yet the government appears not to have
burned books or printing blocks. In fact, this limited and short-lived attempt
at political revenge may have deserved no more than a historian’s footnote
were it not for the eminence of its targets. Three former chief councilors, Chou
Pi-ta, Liu Cheng, and Chao Ju-yü, headed the list. Also stigmatized were
the philosopher Chu Hsi, the renowned essayist Lou Yüeh, the outspoken
professor Ts’ai Yu-hsüeh (1154–1217), the accomplished classicist Yeh Shih,
the nonpartisan censor Liu Kuang-tsu, and Tao-hsüeh luminaries such as Ch’en
Fu-liang, Lin Ta-chung, Lü Tsu-chien, Liu Yüeh2 (1144–1216), Yang Chien,
and Yüan Hsieh.78
Those who supported the ban denounced all fifty-nine proscribed scholars
as Tao-hsüeh adherents who advanced strictly partisan interests to the detriment of the government. The charge was preposterous. Some of those banned,
including Lou Yüeh, Yang Chien, and Yüan Hsieh, held close ties to Lu Chiuyüan, a leading rival of Chu Hsi’s. Others, Ch’en Fu-liang, Ts’ai Yu-hsüeh,
and Yeh Shih, identified themselves with the Yung-chia School centered at
Wen-chou.79 Chou Pi-ta, Liu Cheng, and Chao Ju-yü had no discernible ties
to Tao-hsüeh partisans either, even though they may have sympathized with
the views of individual adherents. The persecuted were from several regions
of the empire, and there are no indications of their having a regional association. The only common ground appears to have been their concern for strict
ethical standards and conduct in government; their only consensus on practical policy appears to have been on the need to bring palace favorites under
control. The entire suppression effort would seem to have been intellectually
baseless.
The ad hoc political nature of the Tao-hsüeh ban is further illustrated by
its poorly defined ideological objectives. Suppression began two years after
the purge and death of Chao Ju-yü, by which time Tao-hsüeh proponents no
longer posed a serious threat. The ban had lost its political utility. Were ideological conformity its objective, one would expect some effort to destroy the
writings of proponents, as under the Yüan-yu ban. This did not occur. Nor
did Han T’o-chou promote some rival school, which would have been another
means of ideologically undermining Tao-hsüeh. Even simple revenge cannot
fully explain the ban. The proscription was far from comprehensive, affecting
78
79
A complete listing is to be found in Huang et al., Sung Yüan hsüeh-an, chüan 97; HTC (1958) 154,
pp. 4153–4; Li, Tao ming lu, pp. 81–3; see also Schirokauer, “Neo-Confucians under attack.”
See Schirokauer, “Neo-Confucians under attack,” and Lo Wen (Winston W. Lo), The life and thought of
Yeh Shih (Gainsesville, Fla., 1974). For a thorough study of the Yung-chia School and its influence on
the examination curriculum, see Hilde de Weerdt, Competition over content: Negotiating standards for the
civil service examinations in imperial China (1127–1279) (Cambridge, Mass., 2007).
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
789
only prominent critics, not their many teachers, disciples, and associates. Neither was the ban strictly enforced. Most men remained free to travel; they
retained bureaucratic status and salary; they continued to teach; their writings
continued to be read; and as one historian has demonstrated, they continued
to pass the civil service examinations.80 That Han T’o-chou did not resort to
violent intimidation similarly implies a restrained malice. The chief impetus
behind the ban, it appears, was an anti-intellectualism that went along with
a desire to silence the most moralizing of court critics. Both Ning-tsung and
Han T’o-chou held no special reverence for intellectuals, and the hounding
they received from the Tao-hsüeh supporters over the issue of mourning rites
may have spurred them to react, however clumsily.
The entire effort at imposing a ban ended in embarrassing failure. A poorly
defined target group made the ban appear ill considered and irresponsible.81
Guided by emotion and personal animosity, it was neither comprehensive
nor strictly enforced. The restrained support of the bureaucracy, especially
Ching T’ang and Hsieh Shen-fu, also undermined its effect.82 By the end of
1199, less than two years after the ban’s imposition, it was relaxed at the
recommendation of Chief Councilor Ching T’ang. Rumor had it that even
Han T’o-chou had come to regret the action. When Chu Hsi died a few
months later, his well-attended funeral vividly illustrated that the proscription
had neither discredited the teacher nor intimidated his students.83 On the
contrary, by victimizing so many well-respected men, the ban had legitimized
the objectives of Tao-hsüeh, winning it a new respectability and a broader
spectrum of sympathetic support.
rapprochement and the k’ai-hsi war (1205–1207)
With the decision to relax the 1198 ban, the court gradually restored offices and
titles to the once-disgraced officials. Liu Cheng, the first to be honored, became
junior guardian. Other restorations were delayed because of the indiscretion
of Lü Tsu-t’ai, a disciple of Chu Hsi, who in late autumn 1200 presented a
memorial to the throne that viciously denounced Han T’o-chou and demanded
his execution.84 Lü Tsu-t’ai was a first cousin of Lü Tsu-chien, also a critic of
Han T’o-chou, who had suffered banishment in 1195 and had died a year
later. In 1200 there had been a string of deaths of notable persons involved in
80
81
82
83
84
Schirokauer, “Neo-Confucians under attack,” p. 193.
Chiba, “Kan Takuchū,” pp. 283–4.
See SS 394, pp. 12036–8; 394, pp. 12038–41; HTC (1958) 154, p. 4144; 155, p. 4172.
SS 429, p. 12768; HTC (1958) 155, p. 4176.
SS 455, pp. 13371–2; HTC (1958) 155, pp. 4181–2.
richard l. davis
790
the incident: Chu Hsi in the spring; Chief Councilor Ching T’ang, Emperor
Kuang-tsung, and Empress Li2 in the summer; and Empress Han in early
winter. Lü Tsu-t’ai may have reasoned, erroneously it turns out, that these
events had weakened Han T’o-chou’s political influence, but censors loyal
to Han T’o-chou turned against Lü and called for his execution. The court
decided on flogging with a hundred blows of a heavy stick – an unusually
cruel punishment by Sung standards – and exile to the remote southwest. The
court also chose to suspend the rehabilitation of other officials proscribed in
the Ch’ing-yüan ban.
However, rapprochement began in earnest in 1202. Chu Hsi was posthumously restored as academician-in-waiting, Chao Ju-yü was made an academician of the Tzu-cheng Hall, and the seventy-six-year-old Chou Pi-ta was
reinstated as grand academician of the Kuan-wen Hall. Preproscription rank
was also restored to Liu Kuang-tsu, Ch’en Fu-liang, Yeh Shih, and Ts’ai Yuhsüeh, among others. A year later, P’eng Kuei-nien was reinstated in the civil
service, and the exiled Lü Tsu-t’ai was given a special pardon.85
Still, the hostilities between Han T’o-chou and the opposition were not
easily forgotten. Most of those who had their rank restored never resumed
office. Chou Pi-ta and Liu Cheng, both elderly at this point, formally retired.
P’eng Kuei-nien, Lou Yüeh, and Lü Tsu-t’ai accepted rank but not office. Ch’en
Fu-liang and Liu Kuang-tsu were offered regional appointments but opted for
sinecures instead. The only prominent critics to accept metropolitan assignments were Ts’ai Yu-hsüeh, who became drafting official at the Secretariat,
and Yeh Shih, subsequently vice-director at the Ministry of War, the Ministry
of Works, and the Ministry of Personnel. Most critics preferred to boycott the
administration. Han T’o-chou’s rapprochement was no more successful than
the ban had been. By drawing men of integrity back into participation in the
regime he still controlled, he hoped to restore and enhance his own political
reputation. But he failed, and his critics remained too powerful to ignore.
Unsuccessful in this attempt to bolster his power by ideological restrictions,
he turned to foreign policy as an alternative arena in which to demonstrate his
effectiveness as a political leader.
Sung and Chin had been at peace since the early 1160s and relations were
cordial. In the north, the Chin emperor Chin Shih-tsung (r. 1161–89), known
by admirers as a “second Yao or Shun,” was the most humane of Jurchen
rulers. Much of the same held for the Sung emperor Hsiao-tsung in the south,
whose reign (1162–89) has been dubbed the golden age of the Southern Sung.
While both publicly laid claim to parts of the other’s territory, neither ruler
85
HTC (1958) 156, pp. 4198, 4203, 4205, 4213; Lou, Kung-k’uei chi (1979) 96, p. 12b.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
791
dared risk what they currently controlled in costly and uncertain military
adventures. Hsiao-tsung had expressed a firm commitment to restoration of
the north, whereas Kuang-tsung and Ning-tsung appeared indifferent. Thus,
when Ning-tsung chose to resume hostilities against the Chin, responsibility
for this plan was inevitably attributed to the wiles of Han T’o-chou.
Signs of an impending shift in foreign policy had already appeared by the
turn of the century. In the summer of 1201, a minor official had recommended
the elevation of Han T’o-chou to manager of national security (p’ing-chang
chün-kuo shih), an ad hoc post generally awarded only in times of war that had
been conferred upon a total of four men in the dynasty’s past, all during the
Northern Sung. It gave sweeping authority over the civilian, military, and fiscal
bureaucracies. Understandably, appointees had to be impeccably trustworthy.
All previous nominees had been distinguished chief councilors.86 The 1201
recommendation to revive the post must have been prompted by Han T’ochou himself; no minor official acting on his own initiative would have dared
to be so bold, especially in a time of peace. Han T’o-chou declined, but the
mere proposal was an indicator that a military venture was in the making.
There were other indicators. In 1202 the court named Su Shih-tan (d. 1207),
a crony of Han T’o-chou, as chief recipient of edicts at the Bureau of Military
Affairs. This appointment put control of all military communications into
Han’s hands. In the same year the Szechwan military magnate Wu Hsi became
prefect for strategic Hsing-chou3, in the heart of the northwestern Li-chou
circuit, strengthening the leadership in the west for a possible attack from that
direction. These appointments were soon followed by Han T’o-chou’s titular
promotion to grand preceptor.
That these military-related moves coincided with Han T’o-chou’s rapprochement with his court critics was no accident. Given the revanchist orientation of Tao-hsüeh thinkers and sympathizers, a militant foreign policy, if not
successful at winning their favor, might at least succeed in stealing their thunder. It also made good sense from a military standpoint. As early as 1200, the
Chin court, worried about the growing Mongol menace, had begun to reinforce
military installations along their northern border.87 For the first time since
its seizure of power in 1115, Chin strategic concerns had shifted from south
to north. Worse yet, in Chin the new Mongol pressure and increased military
expenditures had coincided with a period of repeated large-scale natural disasters and a dramatic decline in state revenues. The destitute took to banditry,
and the Chin government faced the dual threats of domestic insurrection and
86
87
See, Lin T’ien-wei, “Sung-tai ch’üan-hsiang hsing-ch’eng chih fen-hsi,” in Sung-shih yen-chiu chi: Ti pa
chi, ed. Sung-shih tso-t’an-hui (Taipei, 1976), pp. 141–70, especially pp. 154–9.
HTC (1958) 155, p. 4180.
792
richard l. davis
foreign invasion. In 1203, as Sung ambassador Teng Yu-lung was making
his way to the Chin capital, he observed the impoverished state of the countryside and held clandestine meetings with informants. In his report to the
court on his return to Lin-an, he portrayed the north as more vulnerable than
ever before. Two years later in 1205, envoy Li Pi (1159–1222), vice-minister
of rites, filed a similar report. Support for aggression also came from Hsin
Ch’i-chi (1140–1207), the renowned poet serving as military commissioner
in Che-tung. Hsin predicted an imminent demise for Jurchen rule.88 Many
concurred with this assessment of Chin’s new vulnerability. There was less of
a consensus, however, about Sung military strength.
As early as 1203, the Chin began reinforcing their defenses along the Sung
border. The objective was probably to contain bandits and to prevent refugees
from seeking sanctuary in the south, as commonly happened in times of internal
disorder. These border reinforcements were not primarily directed against the
Sung. In 1203, Wan-yen A-lu-tai, the Chin envoy to the Sung, traveling to
Lin-an through the lower Huai and Yangtze regions, observed military drills
being conducted regularly and an abnormally high demand for horses, both
unmistakable signs of preparations for an impending war. When he informed
the Chin court of this on his return, he was flogged because his comments
were considered inflammatory.89 Again, when a Sung spy was captured in
1205 and informed the Chin of troop movements in Sung territory, his captors
were staggered in disbelief.90 The Chin emperor, Chang-tsung (r. 1189–1208),
continued to react with caution, hoping to avert conflict. Natural disasters,
infrequent in the first decade of his reign, had become endemic in the second.
Shantung was especially hard-pressed and had required massive relief.91 There
was also serious domestic unrest in the face of widespread poverty. In this
context, Chang-tsung decided to respond to the potential Sung threat by
further strengthening his own border defenses and by using diplomacy to
dissuade the Sung leaders from attacking. In all previous conflicts with the
Sung, hostilities had been initiated by the Chin. A reversal of roles must have
required Chin to rethink its strategic goals and reassess its defensive tactics.
Apart from troop movements in the Huai region, heightened Sung military
activity took place in the strategic Ching-hsi circuit centered in the northwest
corner of modern Hupei. Military commands were also restructured throughout the Sung domain. The Sung court entrusted command of the Huai-nan
88
89
90
91
For these various views, see SS 398, p. 12106; HTC (1958) 156, pp. 4214, 4216–17. Also see Ch’en,
“Han P’ing-yüan p’ing” p. 108; Kinugawa Tsuyoshi, “Kaiki Yōhei o megutte,” Tōyōshi kenkyū 36 No. 3
(1977), pp. 128–51.
T’o-t’o, Chin shih 11, p. 261; HTC (1958) 156, p. 4214.
T’o-t’o, Chin shih 12, p. 271; 62, p. 1475; HTC (1958) 157, p. 4227.
T’o-t’o, Chin shih 12, p. 272.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
793
East circuit to Assistant Councilor Chang Yen, command of the Huai-nan West
circuit to Bureau of Military Affairs executive Ch’eng Sung, and command of
Liang-che East circuit to Chief Minister of Justice Hsin Ch’i-chi. Ministry of
Works executive Ch’iu Ch’ung (1135–1208) became custodial prefect of the
strategic port city of Ming-chou.92 Clearly, by 1203 at the latest, the Sung
court had begun to lay the foundation for a major offensive. The court deliberately chose to staff its military commands with prominent civilian officials,
thereby ensuring central government control over regional armies, especially
in the east.
Extensive preparations and precautions notwithstanding, the Sung court
was slow to undertake war. Han T’o-chou was determined first to strengthen
his hand at home. To appease his former critics, he arranged high honors for
the recently deceased Chou Pi-ta, another posthumous advancement for onetime critic Chao Ju-yü, and dismissal for Liu Te-hsiu, the censor who had been
directly responsible for the purge of Tao-hsüeh partisans, and who now became
a scapegoat for Han T’o-chou. There were posthumous honors for Yüeh Fei,
an icon of irredentism in the Kao-tsung reign, and demotion for his nemesis,
the reviled pacifist Ch’in Kuei. The court also ordered the compilation of
several historical works on earlier Sung reigns. These publication projects were
designed to legitimize aggression and encourage revanchist zeal, and all bore
the name of Han T’o-chou as project director.93 Meanwhile, it was essential,
assuming that he would direct the war effort, for Han T’o-chou to hold a
post of appropriate overall authority. This came in 1205 with his appointment
as manager of national security. Even with his new appointment, Han T’ochou proved exceedingly cautious. Deciding first to probe enemy strength,
he sponsored bandit raids in which Sung agents harassed towns and villages
along the border to gather information on the size, disposition, and readiness
of enemy forces.94 The Sung court also began underwriting loyalist groups in
Chin territory, mostly northern brigands who declared nominal fealty to the
Sung in exchange for provisions and occasional refuge. Such groups were most
active in Shantung, where a weak government presence and marginal living
conditions resulting from years of natural calamities had badly affected the
region. The Sung risked little by supporting such nominally “loyalist” armies
operating almost entirely within Chin territory. Moreover, the difficulties the
Chin faced in suppressing the rebels provided the Sung with some measure of
its enemy’s military effectiveness. Chin efforts at suppression were feeble, and
the Sung drew the appropriate conclusions but did not act.
92
93
94
HTC (1958) 156, p. 4214.
SS 38, pp. 735, 738–9; Liu, Hsü Sung chung-hsing pien-nien tzu-chih t’ung-chien 13, pp. 4b, 6a.
T’o-t’o, Chin shih 12, pp. 272–3.
794
richard l. davis
The policy of aggression aroused substantial criticism. Vice-Minister of
Public Works Yeh Shih, among the most prominent proponents of aggression
at this time, nevertheless concluded that the vulnerability of Sung border
defenses made conflict highly risky. Another staunch irredentist, Liu Kuangtsu, drew the same conclusion, prompting him to resign from his high-level
post in Li-chou circuit. Both men, despite persecution under the Ch’ing-yüan
ban, had subsequently cooperated with the Han T’o-chou administration.
Mere partisanship cannot explain their newfound caution. Similarly, Ch’iu
Ch’ung, custodial prefect of Ming-chou, another recent recruit once known
for his strident militancy, now voiced his opposition to war against the Chin.
For one enraged student at the Military Academy (Wu-hsüeh), the war policy
was so fraught with potential peril that Han T’o-chou, its witless architect,
deserved death; for his temerity, the student was banished. In spring 1206,
the greatest political setback to the plans to attack Chin came when Assistant
Councilor Ch’ien Hsiang-tsu was compelled to resign because of his differences
with Han T’o-chou over border management.95 It seems that throughout the
bureaucracy many questions remained both about Han T’o-chou’s motives and
about his competence to direct the war effort. Once hostilities erupted, these
questions would multiply.
Despite the objections and resignations, in May 1206 the Sung offensive
began in earnest. The commander Pi Tsai-yü was especially impressive in
battle. He quickly captured the Chin prefecture of Ssu-chou, just north of
the Huai River in modern Anhwei province. Soon, Sung forces took several
counties in the southern part of Chin’s Nan-ching circuit, in modern Honan.
Although neither of these attacks had received official sanction by the court,
which still sought to fully test enemy strength before committing Sung armies,
the aggressive commanders had clearly been urged on by the court. Events to
the west unfolded less impressively for the Sung. An offensive centered on
Ts’ai-chou (Honan), ended in resounding defeat, as did another in Szechwan
led by the pacification commissioner Ch’eng Sung. This somewhat weak initial
showing did not dampen the enthusiasm of Han T’o-chou, and an official
declaration of war soon followed within weeks. Already, the bureaucracy began
to resist the war policy. Academician Yeh Shih, given the dubious honor of
drafting the declaration of war, refused. This came as a considerable political
embarrassment, but no more so than the military developments along the
border. Following the brief capture of Ssu-chou in the east, the Sung scored
only one other notable victory in 1206: local militia in the west seized control
95
For these several opinions, see SS 243, p. 8657; 398, p. 12111; 434, pp. 12892–3; Huang et al., Sung Yüan
hsüeh-an 54, pp. 985–8; HTC (1958) 157, pp. 4228, 4231–2, 4236, 4239; Chen, Hsi-shan hsien-sheng
Chen Wen-chung kung wen-chi 43, p. 14b; Yeh, Shui-hsin hsien-sheng wen-chi 1, pp. 19b–21a.
0
400 km
0
CHIN
200 miles
Hsi-ho
Southern Capital
Ch’in
T’ien-shui
Ch’eng
Chieh
(K’ai-feng)
Ho-shang Plain
Hsü
Feng
Hsing
Hsing-yüan
Ch’u
Su
Teng
Kuang-hua
Hsiang-yang
Ching-men
T’ang
Ts’ai
Shou
Kuang
Hsin-yang
Tsao-yang
Hao
Lu
Ssu
Yang
Chen
Ho
Te-an
Han-yang
Ch’eng-tu
LIN-AN
Chiang-ling
SOUTHERN SUNG
Sung lines of attack
Chin lines of counter-attack
Prefectures temporarily ceded to the Chin
in Wu Hsi’s rebellion of 1207
Sino-Jurchen border
Map 27. The K’ai-hsi war of 1206.
796
richard l. davis
of the Ho-shang Plain, a hotly contested area in the Li-chou circuit. Offensives
against Su-chou2 and Hsü-chou in the east, and T’ang-chou, Shou-chou, and
Ts’ai-chou in the central border region, all ended in defeat. The Sung drive
lasted a mere three months, the time required for Chin forces to launch a
counterattack.
Not only did the Chin succeed in promptly repulsing Sung armies, by late
fall it was responding with an offensive of its own. A reputed seventy thousand
Chin troops led by Ho-she-li Chih-chung (d. 1213) descended on the border
town of Ch’u-chou, in modern Anhwei province. Chin troops outnumbered
Sung defenders ten to one and were staved off only through the extraordinary
resourcefulness of Pi Tsai-yü, now prefect of nearby Hsü-i. Apart from delivering desperately needed reinforcements to Ch’u-chou, Pi also cleverly managed,
under the guise of darkness, to penetrate enemy lines and set fire to the Chin’s
provisions. The mere presence of Pi Tsai-yü, who was known for his ferocity in
battle, did much to strengthen the resolve of Sung troops. The siege of Ch’uchou continued for three months before the weary Chin forces retreated.96
The encirclement of Ch’u-chou was only one leg of a massive nine-pronged
Chin offensive that reputedly involved hundreds of thousands of troops and
affected most of the twelve hundred–mile border separating the two empires.
In addition to the campaign to the east, which resulted in penetrations deep
into the eastern and western Huai-nan circuits, Chin forces also attacked commanderies along the central border. The Chin military leader Wan-yen K’uang
led assaults on Tsao-yang, Kuang-hua, Te-an, and Hsiang-yang. The first two
of these commanderies readily knuckled under, but Te-an and Hsiang-yang
doggedly resisted massive three-month encirclements before the Chin forces
withdrew.97 To the west, Chin armies commanded by Fu-ch’a-chen delivered
a severe blow to Sung defenders at T’ien-shui, Hsi-ho-chou, Mien-chou, and
the Ho-shang Plain, all in northwest Li-chou circuit. Within less than a half
year, Chin forces, by seizing the initiative, had managed to expose Sung vulnerability. The speed with which the tide had turned demonstrated that the
Sung effort had been based on a serious underestimation of Chin capability.
By year’s end, the Sung court was prepared to try to restore peace.
insurrection in szechwan
In its war with Chin, Sung setbacks in the east were overshadowed by the
calamity that struck the Sung forces in their defeats in Szechwan in 1207.
96
97
SS 402, pp. 12186–7; HTC (1958) 157, p. 4247.
See HTC (1958), chüan 157–8; Herbert Franke, “Siege and defense of towns in medieval China,” in
Chinese ways in warfare, ed. Frank A. Kierman, Jr., and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge, Mass., 1974),
especially pp. 179–88.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
797
The Sung battle plan seems to have rested upon two major simultaneous
offensives, an eastern thrust from Huai-nan East circuit into Shantung and
a western thrust from Li-chou circuit into Ching-chao and Feng-hsiang in
the Wei valley. A strong showing in the west could have pressured the Chin
into transferring troops currently fighting in the east to the western front. This
transfer was imperative if the Sung were to defend the Huai region successfully.
Unfortunately, the Sung offensive in the west relied too heavily on a single
commander.
That commander, Wu Hsi (d. 1207), hailed from a long line of eminent
military leaders. Two generations earlier, the orphaned brothers Wu Chieh
(1093–1139) and Wu Lin (1102–67), natives of Te-hsün, modern Kansu, had
served in the armies of the late Northern Sung at the height of the Tangut
and Jurchen invasions. With the loss of the northern part of the Sung empire
the brothers had fled south. Wu Chieh became pacification commissioner of
Szechwan and eventually military governor of Li-chou circuit. The younger
brother, Wu Lin, had inherited that post, and groomed his own son, Wu T’ing
(d. 1193), as his successor. Wu Lin and Wu T’ing were not altogether undeserving of the rewards they had been given. During the Chin invasion of 1161,
father and son had performed impressively in frustrating the enemy’s sixty-day
siege of the Ta-san Pass, winning for Wu T’ing the military commissionership
for western Li-chou circuit.98
Sung control over the military establishment in the west had always been
tenuous. Maintaining long-distance control of the western regions by the
Sung government in Lin-an had entailed a careful distribution of military
authority to prevent any one commander in Szechwan from becoming too
powerful. Regular transfers, a hallmark of the civilian bureaucracy, were less
common in the military, so regional political autonomy was held in check by
summoning commanders to the capital for regular audiences and by assigning
civilian commissioners to supervise their activities at home. Additionally, the
Sung sometimes housed a commander’s family in the capital, the equivalent
to holding them as hostages. In this way, the younger son of Wu T’ing, Wu
Hsi, had spent much of his youth in Lin-an.99
By the late twelfth century, Wu Hsi had held an array of military titles; he
had even served, in 1186, as an ambassador to the Chin. He had held posts
with important responsibilities, including militia commander for Hao-chou
98
99
On the Wu family, see SS 366, pp. 11408–14, 11421–4; 475, pp. 13811–14; Ihara Hiroshi, “Nan-Sō
Shisen ni okeru Go Shi no seiryoku – Go Ki no ran zenshi,” in Aoyama Hakushi koki kinen Sōdai shi
ronsō, ed. Aoyama Hakushi Koki Kinen Sōdai-shi Ronsō Kankokai (Tokyo, 1974), pp. 1–33; Yamauchi
Seibaku, “Nan-Sō no Shisen ni okeru Chō Shun to Go Kai – sono seiryoku kōtai no katei o chūshin to
shite,” Shirin 44 No. 1 (1961), pp. 98–124.
HTC (1958) 156, p. 4192.
798
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and commander of Chien-k’ang. It is no coincidence that both these assignments were in the east. Even in the later years of Hsiao-tsung’s reign, officials
had expressed concern about the Wu family’s growing might in Szechwan and
urged the court to assert itself. Chao Ju-yü had warned that continued tolerance
of such autonomy threatened to undermine the dynasty. Hsiao-tsung apparently had shared this apprehension, despite his usual inclination to indulge
the military, and named Chao Ju-yü military commissioner in chief of Szechwan and prefect of the circuit capital, Ch’eng-tu. Similarly, Vice-Minister of
Finance Ch’iu Ch’ung, a man with extensive experience in the region, had later
cautioned Kuang-tsung against permitting the sons of Wu T’ing to inherit
their father’s military machine. Investigating Censor Huang Tu also argued
that further indulgence of the Wu family would spell imminent disaster.
These reservations were reiterated by Liu Cheng, who had preceded Chao Juyü as commissioner in chief of Szechwan. “Of the three generals of the west,”
he noted, “only the Wu house has inherited power for generations. Theirs is
known as the ‘Army of the Wu House’ and they are oblivious to the commands
of the court.”100 When Wu T’ing died in 1193, Liu Cheng intentionally named
an outsider as military commissioner for Li-chou. As Wu Hsi assumed his own
post at a distant Hao-chou in Huai-nan, the prospect of his returning to his
home region must have seemed dim.
Later historians, with the advantage of hindsight, are quick to portray
Wu Hsi as a typical renegade, arrogant and insubordinate from the outset.
The views of contemporaries were initially not so damning. Sung officials,
in warning the government against tolerating one-family military dominance
in Szechwan, were not accusing a particular Wu kinsman, Wu T’ing or Wu
Hsi, of treasonous intent. They were concerned with preventing hereditary
control over regional armies, a practice that ran against the Sung tradition
of centralized, civilian control. Strong personal links between generals and
their armies undermined the authority of the central government, and regional
control weakened the empire’s ideal of fiscal interdependence. In the vicinity of
Ta-san Pass, half of the revenues generated by government-leased landholdings
(ying-t’ien) were siphoned off by Wu T’ing and Kuo Kao (d. 1200), the two
leading military magnates in the region. Their economic clout was backed
by their broad popular support. The people of Szechwan, finding security
in continuity of leadership, reportedly “looked with necks outstretched” at
learning of Wu Hsi’s imminent return.101 Chao Ju-yü and Liu Cheng were
sensitive to the problem of Szechwan regionalism owing to their many years of
100
101
On these views, see SS 391, pp. 11974–5; 392, pp. 11982–3; 383, p. 12010; 398, pp. 12110–11; HTC
(1958) 152, p. 4083; Fu, Sung-tai Shu-wen chi-ts’un (1974) 71, p. 10a.
HTC (1958) 155, pp. 4186–7; 156, p. 4193.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
799
experience in the west. Lack of such experience partly explains why Han T’ochou in mobilizing men and matériel for a major military initiative took the
risk in the summer of 1201 of naming Wu Hsi prefect and general commander
of the strategically important Hsing-chou2.102 Some of Han’s closest associates
criticized the decision, including executives at the Bureau of Military Affairs.
Official historians suggest that Wu Hsi received the appointment only by
bribing high-level bureaucrats, but this may well be malicious gossip, without
merit.103
Wu Hsi’s vanity and ambition, if not previously apparent, became so upon
his return to Szechwan. He immediately constructed a temple in honor of his
grandfather, Wu Lin, spending a hundred thousand strings of cash on the main
hall alone, probably using government funds. He then engineered the dismissal
of Wang Ta-chieh, second in command at Hsing-chou2, whose considerable
influence threatened his own autonomy.104 The Sung court responded in 1205
by transferring Ch’eng Sung from Huai-nan West to Szechwan as military
commissioner in chief, and thus Wu Hsi’s superior. The presence of a trusted
leader from the outside was to provide an important check on Wu Hsi, but
unfamiliarity with the region placed Ch’eng Sung at a serious disadvantage.
Troop levels presented an even greater problem. As assistant pacification commissioner for Szechwan, Wu Hsi directed an army of roughly sixty thousand;
Ch’eng Sung commanded only half that number.105 This disparity left the
Sung court with little leverage to use against the Szechwan general. Much
rested on simple good faith and mutual benefit.
In their 145,000-man counterattack in the winter of 1206, the Chin
assigned over 100,000 troops for the campaign in the east and central border regions, committing only a small force to the western front. The Sung
court worked from an opposite strategy. Its armies at Ch’u-chou, Te-an, and
Hsiang-yang often contained no more than 10,000 men, and were sometimes outnumbered by the enemy ten to one, whereas in the west Ch’eng
Sung and Wu Hsi commanded over 90,000 trained soldiers plus countless
militia. The decision to invest troop strength heavily in Szechwan was strategically justifiable. By confining early combat to faraway Szechwan, the Sung
court minimized the chance of retaliatory threats to its political and economic center in the east. And with Chin forces concentrated in the east,
the center of previous wars, Chin’s western flank was potentially vulnerable. But war had broken out in the Huai region, where the fighting had not
102
103
104
105
HTC (1958) 156, pp. 4192–3.
SS 394, pp. 12026, 12035; HTC (1958) 156, p. 4192.
SS 475, p. 13812; HTC (1958) 156, pp. 4192–3.
HTC (1958) 157, p. 4236.
richard l. davis
800
gone well for the Sung. This prompted Han T’o-chou to embrace new battle
plans.
Despite their considerable military forces in the west, the Sung scored no
notable victories there. A sizable offensive commanded by Wu Hsi, his only
offensive, was launched in the summer of 1206. It was an ill-timed assault on
the Yen-ch’uan garrison, and Wu’s forces were ultimately routed by Wan-yen
Wang-hsi. After regrouping, Wu Hsi led fifty thousand men against the strategically vital Ch’in-chou (on the south bank of the Wei River, about 150 miles
west of Chin-held Ch’ang-an [Hsi-an]). Although the Chin were probably outnumbered, the Sung forces made a poor showing and were forced to retreat.106
Later that summer, the Sung commissioner Ch’eng Sung personally directed an
offensive to capture the Fang-shan Plain, a hotly contested area subordinate to
Feng-hsiang. Chin forces prevailed here too, and they followed up their victory
by capturing the Ho-shang Plain. This Chin victory opened the Sung’s western flank to enemy attack; before long, the prefecture of Hsi-ho-chou, scarcely
sixty miles from Wu Hsi’s base at Hsing-chou2, was being attacked. The Sung
response was inexplicably weak. Even the Chin strike against T’ung-ch’ing,
a scant thirty miles from Hsing-chou2, did not provoke a counterattack. By
fall 1206, Wu Hsi had clearly withdrawn active support for the war effort and
meticulously tried to avoid any serious engagement with the enemy, allowing
Chin forces to overrun much of Li-chou circuit. Wu’s reluctance to fight, in
turn, immobilized his superior, Ch’eng Sung, who relied heavily upon him to
provide both manpower and arms.
The reason for Wu Hsi’s reluctance to fight the Chin cannot be easily
assessed; official accounts are uniformly unsympathetic to him. Yet to assume,
as do traditional historians, that he had always harbored seditious aims ignores
his contribution to the midsummer offensive. The investment of fifty thousand
men, the backbone of his army, in one assault at Ch’in-chou can hardly be
dismissed as a token gesture, even if it was repulsed. At some point during
or before the war, circumstances had forced Wu Hsi to reassess his role in the
geopolitical struggle between the Sung and the Chin. Perhaps, after initially
engaging Chin armies, he simply realized that he could not defeat them.
Perhaps he wanted to avoid high-risk conflict and preserve his army and his
command by taking a low-risk defensive posture in the mountainous terrain of
northern Szechwan. Maybe tensions emerged between him and either his local
superior, Ch’eng Sung, or the remote Sung court, leaving Wu Hsi disillusioned.
By the end of 1206, Chin forces had defeated Sung armies from Ch’in-chou
in the west to Ch’u-chou in the east. The greatest blow to the Sung came on
106
T’o-t’o, Chin shih 12, pp. 276–7.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
801
the lunar new year in 1207, when Wu Hsi renounced his fealty to the Sung and
accepted Chin ennoblement as Prince of Shu. He adopted his own reign title
and elevated his palace at Hsing-chou2 to an imperial residence. According
to Chin records, the astonishing coup was brought about through simple
bribery.107 Yet Wu Hsi may have switched sides to stem the further advance
of Chin forces into his area of control. The Chin had already seized Ho-shang
Pass and were beginning assaults on Ch’eng-chou to the northwest of Hsingchou2 and Feng-chou to the northeast. Chin forces had also begun to besiege
Chieh-chou, Hsi-ho-chou, T’ung-ch’ing, and Feng-chou. These prefectures,
surrendered to the Chin by Wu Hsi, provided an important foothold in Sung
territory in the northwest. Chin control over these four prefectures also formed
a convenient cluster around Hsing-chou2 and made it easy for Chin to contain
Wu Hsi, should he, through inflated ambition or recklessness, choose to turn
on his new patrons. The Chin had good reason for concern about the ambitions
of Szechwan’s overlord. Soon after betraying the Sung, Wu Hsi had promised
to join forces with the Chin in a major offensive against the Sung, one that
would focus on the strategically important Hsiang-yang (in Hupei) on the Han
River.108 Already under siege for over a month and vastly outnumbered by
the enemy, Hsiang-yang looked certain to crumble under such heavy pressure.
Fortunately for the Sung, the crisis caused by Wu Hsi’s defection and the loss
of the court’s control over Szechwan would soon be resolved by further regional
political upheavals in Szechwan, which would result in new pressures on Chin
in the west.
Wu Hsi’s extended absence from Szechwan prior to 1201 had limited his
ability to quickly create strong bonds with subordinates and keep these men in
line. During the crisis, Wu Hsi had to contend with several regional military
leaders, including An Ping (d. 1221), a former protégé of Wu T’ing and the
military intendant of Ta-an commandery, about thirty miles south of Hsingchou2. After his break with the Sung, Wu Hsi invited An Ping to serve
as his senior chief councilor. Whether An Ping accepted is not known. The
reward of office does not seem to have swayed him, and he was to prove
thoroughly duplicitous in his later dealings both with Wu Hsi and with the
Sung court.109 Another potential foe whom Wu Hsi needed to win over was his
erstwhile superior Ch’eng Sung. Wu Hsi had betrayed him at the close of 1206
by reneging on a promise to join in the defense of Feng-chou. Nevertheless,
Ch’eng Sung had accepted a post under Wu Hsi in his new Szechwan regime,
but he did so only under duress, trapped between the Jurchen to the north and
107
108
109
T’o-t’o, Chin shih 12, p. 279.
SS 475, p. 13813; HTC (1958) 158, p. 4257.
SS 38, p. 744; 402, pp. 12189, 12195, 12198.
802
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Wu Hsi to the south. He was a prisoner, unable to flee to Sung-held territory.
Wu Hsi could not be sure of Ch’eng’s loyalty, especially in light of Ch’eng’s
close ties to the Sung court as one-time executive at the Bureau of Military
Affairs. Wu Hsi’s arrangement with Ch’eng did not endure, and he impatiently
ordered Ch’eng Sung’s assassination. Unwittingly, Wu Hsi’s actions triggered
a coup that would lead to his own death.110
Before the order to kill Ch’eng Sung had been given, a conspiracy against Wu
Hsi had been hatched by two men, Yang Chü-yüan (d. 1207), a minor inspector
of military supplies at Hsing-chou2, and Li Hao-i (d. 1207), a commander
there. It seems that both were motivated by loyalty to the Sung, but Wu Hsi’s
stinginess in sharing the spoils may also have alienated them.111 Whatever
their motives, Yang Chü-yüan and Li Hao-i moved quickly to mobilize military
support. They established a liaison with the intended assassin of Ch’eng Sung,
Li Kuei, from early on. Having additionally won the assent of An Ping, the two
mutineers led a small contingent of seventy men under the cover of darkness
to Wu Hsi’s “imperial residence” at Hsing-chou2. A thousand guards were
reportedly assigned to the palace, but they were neutralized by instructions
from An Ping. Trapped in his bedchamber, Wu Hsi was seized and decapitated;
as a further humiliation his corpse was cut in half at the waist. Only forty-one
days after its official inauguration, the “Shu government” ceased to exist. Upon
learning of Wu Hsi’s death, the people of Hsing-chou2 are said to have rejoiced
to the point of “shaking Heaven and Earth.” The head of Wu Hsi was hung in
the marketplace as a grim reminder of the risks of duplicity. Wu Hsi’s wife,
close relatives, and supporters were all put to the sword.
The assassination of Wu Hsi was planned and carried out by members
of the military establishment in northern Szechwan, apparently without any
involvement by the Sung court. In fact, Han T’o-chou had only recently written
to Wu Hsi with offers of Sung ennoblement, in an effort to outbid the Chin for
Wu’s loyalty.112 Yet Wu’s attempt to gain full autonomy and his subsequent
assassination underscored, if nothing else, the inability of the Sung court to
control men and events in distant Szechwan. Over the next months, the Sung
court would handle the Szechwan situation with extreme care, seeking to
strengthen its own hand without inciting the regional power brokers who
could easily undo everything. The court dismissed Ch’eng Sung for failing to
control Wu Hsi and replaced him with Yang Fu, the prefect of Ch’eng-tu. Yang
110
111
112
On the coup against Wu Hsi, see SS 402, pp. 12189, 12194–6, 12198–9; 475, pp. 13813–14; HTC
(1958) 158, pp. 4260–1.
SS 402, p. 12194.
SS 402, p. 12189; 475, p. 13813; Liu, Hsü Sung chung-hsing pien-nien tzu-chih t’ung-chien 13, p. 10b;
Liang-ch’ao kang-mu pei-yao 10, pp. 4b–5b.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
803
Fu had years of service in the west and possessed an uncompromised loyalty to
the Sung court. He seemed the ideal choice as pacification commissioner.113
For additional control, the court named a special imperial commissioner for
Szechwan and appointed the impeccably credentialed Hsü I (1170–1219).
Hsü, first in the chin-shih list of 1199, was also, by no coincidence, a native
of Chien-chou2, near Ch’eng-tu. More than a reliable civilian official, he was
familiar with the region and commanded local respect as a distinguished degree
holder.114 After dismissing Ch’eng Sung, the court might have moved against
another prominent Szechwan leader, An Ping. Instead, the court promoted him
from military intendant to assistant pacification commissioner of Szechwan.
An Ping had been given Wu Hsi’s old post. This controversial decision may
well have been in reward for An Ping’s collaboration in Wu Hsi’s overthrow.
It seems the Sung court had very few options. Having inherited much of Wu
Hsi’s military machine, An Ping was too powerful to challenge outright.
An Ping’s elevation to assistant pacification commissioner was no guarantee
of his loyalty; neither would the appointments of Yang Fu and Hsü I provide
fail-proof checks. Developments after the coup only underscored how dangerously autonomous the west had become. In April 1207, Li Hao-i, a former
conspirator in the overthrow of Wu Hsi, retook Hsi-ho-chou, followed by
Ch’eng-chou, Chieh-chou, Feng-chou, and the Ta-san Pass. All territory ceded
to the Chin by Wu Hsi had been regained and was now nominally controlled
by the Sung. Chin forces, caught off guard, retreated north with unexpected
haste. The success so intoxicated Szechwan leaders that Li Hao-i went on
the offensive, attacking Ch’in-chou, the Chin border town that Wu Hsi had
attacked the previous summer in 1206. The campaign helped to invigorate
Sung armies and won Li Hao-i an appointment as assistant commandant of
Hsing-chou2 and later as prefect of Hsi-ho-chou. Yet at the moment of these
successes, the military leaders in Szechwan began to turn on one another.
Within months, mutiny erupted. Coalitions formed within the Hsingchou2 military establishment following the demise of Wu Hsi began to break
apart. After the overthrow of Wu Hsi, some factions within the Szechwan
leadership had acquiesced to a tenuous cooperation under An Ping, but Li
Hao-i’s prominent role in the overthrow, and his recent military victories,
fostered dangerous rivalries. Commanders Wang Hsi and Liu Ch’ang-kuo
turned against the increasingly powerful Li Hao-i. Wang Hsi had never been
on good terms with Li Hao-i, and the enmity between them was now so
strong that Wang Hsi had Li Hao-i poisoned by Liu Ch’ang-kuo. To the Sung
court this revenge killing was a senseless act, depriving them of a prized
113
114
HTC (1958) 158, pp. 4258–9, 4262.
SS 406, pp. 12267–71; HTC (1958) 158, p. 4262.
804
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commander at a difficult time. The execution of Wang Hsi would have been
appropriate punishment; instead, the Sung court only transferred Wang Hsi to
be commandant for eastern Ching-hu North.115 Apparently too intimidated
by Wang’s military power to act more decisively, the court had to be content
with simply removing him from Szechwan.
Within two weeks of Li Hao-i’s death, another prominent commander met a
violent end. Yang Chü-yüan, as a minor supplies inspector, had masterminded
and carried out the coup against Wu Hsi, yet court honors seem not to have
adequately recognized his contributions. While An Ping, Li Hao-i, and even
the treacherous Wang Hsi had won prestigious appointments, Yang Chü-yüan
was only promoted to military consultant to the pacification commissioner, a
paltry reward for a leading rebel suppressor. Yang Chü-yüan may well have
attributed such parsimony to An Ping, for tensions between the two had
heightened soon after Wu Hsi’s assassination, prompting An Ping to question
Yang’s loyalty. In a clever move to discredit Yang Chü-yüan, An Ping secretly
ordered him to execute a disfavored commander charged with cowardice in
the defense of the Ta-san Pass. This order seemed to be a test of Yang Chüyüan’s loyalty and Yang had to act, yet in so doing his reputation suffered.
Yang’s dissatisfaction with Szechwan’s military leadership was well known,
and his participation in a second notable execution gave an impression of
uncontrolled ambition. An Ping quickly had Yang Chü-yüan arrested and
then informed the Sung court of Yang’s suicide. Despite An Ping’s efforts to
cast the dead man as a rebel, Commissioner in Chief Yang Fu and others were
not easily deceived.116 The Sung court was warned by Yang Fu and others
against further indulging An Ping’s lawlessness, but Han T’o-chou turned a
deaf ear. He could not risk the dangerous vacuum certain to accompany any
further significant restructuring of the Szechwan leadership. Instead, An Ping
was promoted to grand military commissioner in chief.
Admittedly, An Ping had played a critical role in eliminating Wu Hsi and
restoring Sung authority in the west. Although he never betrayed the court’s
trust, he still acted out of arrogance and self-interest. Many died at his hands
or those of his agents. Yang Chü-yüan was the victim of his superior’s jealousy
and suspicion; like Li Hao-i, a rival to An Ping, Yang was too successful
for his own good. His elimination served An Ping’s personal interests, and
perhaps even the short-term interests of a distant Sung court concerned with
survival and stability, rather than with the long-term interests of the dynasty.
Loyalist soldiers in Szechwan reportedly broke into tears at learning of the
death of Yang Chü-yüan. His and Li Hao-i’s valor had inspired countless
115
116
SS 402, pp. 12200–1; HTC (1958) 158, pp. 4264–6.
SS 402, pp. 12190, 12196–8; HTC (1958) 158, pp. 4264–5.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
805
troops. The intrigue and turmoil surrounding their deaths must have taken
its toll on morale. The consolidation of military power under An Ping did
not strengthen the western front, as might be expected, for the emerging
atmosphere of suspicion, treachery, intimidation, and alienation left Szechwan
divided within and vulnerable from outside.
the coup in lin-an
Within a month of its official launch in the summer of 1206, the Sung offensive
against the Chin in the east had degenerated into a humiliating retreat. The
Chin had begun their own advance in late autumn, in some places pushing
ninety miles into Sung territory. Still, the Chin were unable to establish a firm
foothold in the south. Sung armies, under the command of Pi Tsai-yü along
the coast and Commissioner Chao Fang (d. 1221) in the central border regions,
defended their territory with a dogged determination absent earlier when they
had fought on unfamiliar terrain. In the west, Chin forces all too easily surrendered territory acquired through the Wu Hsi defection. Having unwisely
committed up to three hundred thousand men in the protracted sieges of
Ch’u-chou, Hsiang-yang, and Te-an, the Chin had precious few reserves for
deployment in the west, and Wu Hsi was assassinated before the Chin could
consolidate their new holdings in northern Szechwan.117 At the same time,
Sung-affiliated armies in Szechwan, aggressive in recovering lost territory,
seemed powerless to expand their limited defensive success into a more general offensive. Sung and Chin forces continued to clash throughout much of
1207, yet neither side could claim the upper hand. Fighting gave way to
negotiation.
Already in late 1206, the Sung court had initiated peace overtures, authorizing the general commander for the eastern flank, Ch’iu Ch’ung, to approach
Pu-sa K’uei (var. P’u-san K’uei, d. 1207), Chin commander for the central Huai
region.118 The proposed Chin terms were harsh: reducing the diplomatic status of Sung to vassal state of Chin, increasing the annual tribute paid to Chin,
and surrendering the culprit responsible for starting the fighting.119 The Chin
were negotiating from a position of strength, and their initial demands were
excessive. The Sung broke off negotiations. Toward year’s end, with Wu Hsi’s
defection to the Chin already certain, Pu-sa K’uei had dispatched his own
envoy, Han Yüan-ching, to the camp of Ch’iu Ch’ung. The envoy, reputedly
a descendant of Han Ch’i and thus a distant younger cousin of Han T’o-chou,
117
118
119
HTC (1958) 158, p. 4261.
T’o-t’o, Chin shih 12, p. 278. Only Chin shih attributes the initiative to the Sung court.
HTC (1958) 157, p. 4249.
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pleaded for a peace pact with the Sung on the personal grounds that the
current conflict had made protection of their common Han family ancestral
tombs at Hsiang-chou2 exceedingly difficult.120 Han Yüan-ching never met
his cousin in person, but the Sung court ordered Ch’iu Ch’ung to conduct
negotiations at the border. These efforts proved inconclusive. The Chin were
insistent upon imposing some sort of punitive ransom, and the Sung were
adamant in refusing.
Negotiations resumed in late spring 1207, when the Sung dispatched Fang
Hsin-ju (1177–1222) to K’ai-feng, where he met with Councilor of the Left
Wan-yen Ch’ung-ho (d. 1207). The Chin, sensing that the Sung court was
desperate for a pact, toughened their demands: new territorial concessions and
an unacceptably large increase in annual tribute. They also demanded, for the
first time quite specifically, the head of Han T’o-chou. In summer and early
fall, Fang Hsin-ju made three trips north. Ch’iu Ch’ung had, by this time, been
replaced as chief commander of the eastern flank by Chang Yen, a concurrent
assistant councilor and Bureau of Military Affairs executive.121 It was Chang
Yen who advised Fang Hsin-ju, and the two appear intentionally to have kept
Han T’o-chou uninformed about specific Chin demands. These were divulged
to Han T’o-chou only when Fang Hsin-ju returned in defeat to Lin-an, in late
September. A furious Han T’o-chou not only dismissed the envoy but also had
Chang Yen removed from his border command.
By this time, Han T’o-chou had become isolated at court. This isolation had
its roots in dismissals made in summer 1206, when he had begun impulsively
to replace military leaders who had failed to achieve victories. Teng Yu-lung
(chin-shih 1172), a former censor serving as special commissioner for the Huai
region, was dismissed after only three months, his defeats being too numerous.
A similar reason had been given for the dismissal of the chief commander of
Chien-k’ang, Li Shuang, and the assistant commander for the Ching-hsi North
circuit, Huang-fu Pin. The records show that both had fought valiantly and
won praise from their fellow commanders, but Han T’o-chou it seems was
more concerned with the final outcome than with the special circumstances
of particular battles.122 Wang Ta-chieh’s offensive against Ts’ai-chou (also in
Ching-hsi North) had also been courageously fought, yet defeat resulted in his
banishment to Ling-nan (in modern Kwangtung province), on the southern
fringes of Sung civilization. For the same reason, Li Ju-i, chief commander for
Huai-nan West, was also banished. Thus, early on in the war, Han T’o-chou had
120
121
122
SS 398, p. 12112; T’o-t’o, Chin shih 93, pp. 2067–71; HTC (1958) 157, p. 4253.
On these negotiations, see SS 395, pp. 12059–62; T’o-t’o, Chin shih 93, pp. 2072–80; HTC (1958)
158, pp. 4262, 4266–9.
HTC (1958) 157, pp. 4251–64.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
807
brought about a sweeping reorganization of military commands. By abruptly
entrusting military leadership to inexperienced officials, Han T’o-chou came
to appear impulsive and unpredictable.
Han T’o-chou’s increasing isolation also resulted from his calculated removal
of once trusted supporters. He had assisted Su Shih-tan, a longtime associate,
in rising to the post of general recipient of edicts at the Bureau of Military
Affairs in 1201 and subsequently an audience commandant.123 Yet the protégé
was not popular within the bureaucracy, and he was denounced as blatantly
corrupt. As war fortunes began to dip, Han T’o-chou distanced himself from
Su Shih-tan and appeared to be blaming the entire policy on Su, a once vocal
advocate of aggression. To appease critics while absolving himself of responsibility, Han T’o-chou permitted Su Shih-tan to be stripped of official status,
banished to distant Shao-chou2, and further humiliated by official confiscation
of his family property.124 Such scapegoating must have left other of his associates apprehensive. Equally unsettling was Fang Hsin-ju’s return to Lin-an.
The emissary to Chin had been unsuccessful in negotiations, and speculation
arose that an angry Han T’o-chou planned to break the diplomatic impasse
by escalating the fighting. This brought one-time supporters and neutral elements at court into an alliance that spelled doom for Han T’o-chou. Central
to this alliance was Shih Mi-yüan (1164–1233).
A native of Ming-chou, modern Ning-po, Shih Mi-yüan was the third son of
Shih Hao, Hsiao-tsung’s trusted tutor and chief minister.125 During Han T’ochou’s twelve years of dominance, Shih Mi-yüan had risen from legal examiner
at the High Court of Justice to vice-minister of rites. His ascent to power,
uncommonly smooth for the time, stems partly from the goodwill of Chief
Councilor Ching T’ang; yet Ching’s death in 1200 had no noticeable effect
upon Shih Mi-yüan’s further advancement. Shih was apparently quite skillful
at avoiding confrontation by steering a clear path through politically troubled
waters. His attitude toward the Tao-hsüeh movement, much like his father’s,
was conveniently ambiguous, and this probably explains his political survival
during the purges of the early Ning-tsung era. In 1205, by which time he
was already well entrenched in the bureaucracy, he offered his first known
criticism of Han T’o-chou.126 In a carefully worded memorial, he labeled the
war policy venturesome. Shih Mi-yüan stressed the importance of defending
123
124
125
126
On Su Shih-tan, see SS 38, p. 741; 398, pp. 12107–8, 12115; 474, pp. 13774–7; HTC (1958) 156,
pp. 4197, 4210; 157, pp. 4229, 4243–4; 158, p. 4271.
SS 398, p. 12107–8.
On Shih Mi-yüan, see Davis, Court and family in Sung China, pp. 81–117; SS 414, pp. 12415–18; Yüan
Chüeh, Yen-yu Ssu-ming chih (1320; Taipei, 1978) 5, pp. 10b–12a; Tai Mei et al., Hsin-hsiu Yin-hsien
chih [Academia Sinica, Fu Ssu-nien ed.] (n.p., 1877) 14, pp. 26b–34a.
Yang Shih-ch’i, Li-tai ming-ch’en tsou-i (1416; Taipei, 1964) 235, p. 6a.
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richard l. davis
the south and protecting the lives of its tens of millions. He never mentioned
Han T’o-chou by name, never exploited this policy difference to denounce the
chief policy maker, and never protested government actions by withdrawing
from office. Han T’o-chou apparently appreciated the courtesy, for Shih Miyüan was subsequently enfeoffed as Baron of Yin county. Policy differences
notwithstanding, there is no evidence of personal animosity or political tension
between Shih Mi-yüan and Han T’o-chou. The former typified the neutral
element at court, namely, individuals who had long cooperated with Han’s
administration, but now, under new and unbearable pressures, felt compelled
to act against its leader.
In 1206, Assistant Councilor Ch’ien Hsiang-tsu resigned. He had never
been enthusiastic about the war policy and resigned as the policy’s disastrous
outcome became increasingly apparent. Resuming responsibilities in spring
1207, Ch’ien did so with no confidence in Han T’o-chou. Li Pi, a fellow
assistant councilor, had from the outset proposed inciting the Chin to war
and responding in full force instead of initiating hostilities on foreign soil,
as the court planned. This would have lent greater legitimacy to the Sung
court’s cause and augmented popular support.127 Li’s counsel was rejected;
nevertheless, he supported the war cause, until Han T’o-chou threatened an
escalation of the fighting.
Action by the disaffected officials came on the morning of the twenty-fourth
day of the eleventh month in 1207. En route to court and reportedly frazzled
after a long night of drink and merriment, Han T’o-chou was intercepted at
the Sixth Platoon Bridge, within the walls of the imperial city and near an
audience chamber. Palace Guard commander Hsia Chen, in the company of
several hundred elite guardsmen, informed him of an imperial rescript ordering his dismissal. Permitting no more than a brief curse from their victim,
Hsia Chen’s men dragged Han T’o-chou outside the wall of the imperial city
to the Yü-chin Garden, where they bludgeoned him to death.128 The assassination was unprecedented. Civility had been the hallmark of Sung politics,
and contemporaries took pride in the unique Sung tradition of venerating
scholar-officials. Chief ministers might suffer banishment for improper conduct or misguided policies, but never had a chief minister been assassinated
while in office. Worse yet, enacting this brutal scenario in the emperor’s own
precincts suggested complicity at the highest levels.
127
128
On their views, see SS 398, pp. 12107–8; HTC (1958) 157, p. 4236.
For a more thorough treatment, see Davis, Court and family in Sung China, pp. 84–92. Also see Liu, Hsü
Sung chung-hsing pien-nien tzu-chih t’ung-chien 13, pp. 11a–12a; Li, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (1967)
i 10, pp. 6b–10a; Chou Mi, Ch’i-tung yeh-yü (1291; Peking, 1983) 3, pp. 45–52; SS 243, pp. 8656–7;
HTC (1958) 158, pp. 4269–71.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
809
It is difficult given the plethora of contradictory sources to understand the
major events surrounding Han T’o-chou’s assassination. Shih Mi-yüan undeniably played an important role in the conspiracy, and he certainly reaped great
political benefit from Han T’o-chou’s demise. Many sources have portrayed
him as chief conspirator.129 But these sources ignore the issue of motive. Shih
Mi-yüan’s only grievance against Han T’o-chou related to war policy. In the
absence of evidence to suggest personal or even professional conflict between
the two, it is doubtful that he was powerful enough to inspire such a dangerous
act. A far more likely suspect is Empress Yang2 (Yang Mei-tzu, 1162–1232).
Tensions between Han T’o-chou and Ning-tsung’s second empress can be
traced to Empress Yang2’s installation. Han T’o-chou’s niece, Empress Han,
had died in 1200, three years after the death of his influential aunt, Dowager
Empress Wu. These deaths must have gravely troubled Han T’o-chou, for so
much of his own influence had rested upon the standing of these two women
within the palace. The only empress still alive by late 1200 was Hsiao-tsung’s
third wife, Dowager Empress Hsieh2, an exceedingly servile and politically
detached personality. In the absence of a strong dowager empress to arrange
a marriage, Ning-tsung had the rare privilege of personally selecting a new
spouse. This opportunity did not augur well for Han T’o-chou. Ning-tsung,
at the time, had become enamored with Consort Yang, a woman of humble
birth but many talents, and he elevated her to imperial concubine shortly
before the death of Empress Han. Han T’o-chou must have appreciated that
the native intelligence and self-assertiveness of this commoner-turned-consort
could jeopardize his own dominance, and this prompted him to recommend
a more pliant woman, Lady Ts’ao, to succeed his niece. Two full years passed
before the emperor acted, suggesting tensions over the nomination, but he
ultimately installed his favorite, Empress Yang2, in 1203. Empress Yang2
is said never to have forgiven Han T’o-chou for his interference. Relations
between the two had started off poorly and never improved.130
The Sung dynastic history (Sung shih), while not altogether consistent, does at
times identify Empress Yang2 as a prime mover in the assassination conspiracy.
Empress Yang2 had prompted her twelve-year-old stepson, Chao Hsün (1192–
1220), to appeal to the emperor to end the war. In the summer of 1207 she
offered her own criticisms, a vituperative assessment of court policy and a
personal excoriation of Han T’o-chou.131 She exploited the occasion, so rumor
129
130
131
SS 394, p. 12035; 398, p. 12108; 474, pp. 13776–7; Liu, Hsü Sung chung-hsing pien-nien tzu-chih t’ungchien 16, pp. 6b–7a; Liang-ch’ao kang-mu pei-yao 10, p. 28b; Yüan, Yen-yu Ssu-ming chih 5, pp. 10b–11a.
On conflict between the two, see SS 243, pp. 8656–7; Chou, Ch’i-tung yeh-yü (1983) 3, p. 47; HTC
(1958) 156, p. 4204.
Shih Mi-yüan may have prodded the child as well, see SS 246, pp. 8734–5.
810
richard l. davis
has it, to rally bureaucratic support. Through her adopted brother, Yang Tz’ushan, she established links with sympathetic officials that drew Shih Mi-yüan
and others into the conspiracy. The imperial rescript ordering dismissal for
Han T’o-chou is considered by some to have been her handiwork.132 Later,
Empress Yang2 ordered the public flogging of one of Han T’o-chou’s four
widows, undeniable proof of a deep animosity and of the empress’s contempt
for Han T’o-chou.133
However, other sections of the Sung dynastic history ascribe to the empress
a passive role in the conspiracy and portray Shih Mi-yüan as the chief villain.
This conflicting emphasis probably reflects the bias of Yüan historians, the
compilers of the Sung shih, who had no great esteem for Shih Mi-yüan. Yet
Shih Mi-yüan had neither sufficient motive nor the political clout to carry out
this shocking coup alone. Empress Yang2 would continue to prove herself the
most politically astute empress of the Southern Sung, more daring than most
men around her. She would also be remembered as a great patron of the arts and
an accomplished calligrapher.134 Active involvement by an empress in affairs
of state ordinarily evoked official censure, but in this case it did not, perhaps
because she camouflaged her actions with consummate skill and allowed praise
and blame to fall on the men who did her bidding.
A still thornier issue in Han T’o-chou’s assassination is Ning-tsung’s role. By
some accounts, Empress Yang2 and Shih Mi-yüan, whether alone or together,
acted entirely on their own and presented an astonished Ning-tsung with a
fait accompli. By other accounts, the emperor ordered the dismissal of Han
T’o-chou, but was uninvolved in his murder. A third position charges that the
emperor issued a secret directive ordering the execution of Han T’o-chou. All
three versions appear in different sections of the Sung dynastic history,135 implying that historians in the Yüan dynasty with access to a wide range of court
documents were unable or unwilling to discern the emperor’s role in the coup.
Near contemporaries of the event tended also to be inconsistent. Historian Li
Hsin-ch’uan (1167–1244) places responsibility for the assassination squarely
upon the shoulders of Ning-tsung. Anecdotist Chou Mi (1232–1308) insists
that the emperor learned of the coup only after the fact.136 But most writers
agree on one point: Ning-tsung, not an original party to the conspiracy, was
taken into confidence only when it was in the process of being carried out.
132
133
134
135
136
Ting, Sung-jen i-shih hui-pien (1982) 17, p. 876.
Ting, Sung-jen i-shih hui-pien (1982) 17, p. 877.
Wen C. Fong, Beyond representation: Chinese painting and calligraphy, 8th–14th century (New York, 1992),
pp. 234–7.
Compare accounts in SS 38, p. 746; 243, p. 8657; 414, p. 12416; 474, pp. 13776–7; also see Davis,
Court and family in Sung China, pp. 89–92.
Li, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (1967) i 10, pp. 6b–10a; Chou, Ch’i-tung yeh-yü (1983) 3, pp. 45–52.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
811
Being kept in the dark, if Ning-tsung was, appears not to have troubled the
emperor, for he immediately responded with a generous round of promotions.
Assistant councilor Ch’ien Hsiang-tsu was promoted at the Bureau of Military
Affairs and eventually named chief councilor of the right; Li Pi was advanced
at the same bureau; Vice-Minister of Rites Shih Mi-yüan became minister of
rites; Yang Tz’u-shan, advanced from grand marshal to junior guardian, was
enfeoffed as a prince; even the emperor’s adopted son, Chao Hsün, was rewarded
for his precocious advice with installation as heir apparent. Conversely, those
who had been closely associated with Han T’o-chou’s irredentist policies were
uniformly punished. Heading the list was Han’s former instructor, the reviled
Ch’en Tzu-ch’iang, who was exiled to Kuang-chou (Canton). Dismissals also
awaited many lesser officials, but only one other official shared with Han T’ochou the ultimate humiliation. Su Shih-tan, a crony who was under banishment
in Kuang-chou, was executed at court order. As for the family of Han T’o-chou,
the court banished his son Han Kung to a distant offshore island.
With new political leadership, the Sung court revived the deadlocked peace
talks with Chin. Their chief envoy was a scholar at the Directorate of Education, Wang Nan (1158–1213), grandson of Wang Lun (1084–1144), a former
emissary killed sixty-three years earlier on a mission for Kao-tsung.137 Wang
Nan had initially been dispatched by Han T’o-chou, and the new administration ordered a second envoy to join him, no doubt with new instructions. The
second envoy was Hsü I, commissioner for Szechwan. Under pressure to strike a
speedy accord, Wang Nan made concessions that his predecessor Fang Hsin-ju
had rejected outright. Wang agreed to increase the Sung court’s annual subsidy
from 250,000 to 300,000 units of account calculated in ounces of silver and
bolts of silk, an unhealthy precedent according to Fang Hsin-ju.138 Wang Nan
and Hsü I also offered the heads of Han T’o-chou and Su Shih-tan, whom the
Chin had previously alleged were the Sung court’s chief instigators of war.139
The Chin dropped their demand for territorial concessions and adjustments in
diplomatic status, but the Sung still had to endure the indignity of the corpse
of its high minister being publicly defiled by the “foreign occupiers” of their
lost northern lands.
The unusual demand for the heads of Han and Su by the Chin seems to
have been less intended to humiliate the Sung than to obtain retribution for
humiliation the Chin themselves had suffered when, following the mutiny by
pro-Sung elements in Szechwan, the head of the Chin confederate Wu Hsi
had been hung on display in the marketplaces of Hsing-chou2 and Lin-an.
137
138
139
SS 395, p. 12062; HTC (1958) 158, pp. 4268, 4275–8.
SS 395, p. 12061.
SS 395, p. 12062; HTC (1958) 158, p. 4275.
812
richard l. davis
The Chin had taken this as a personal insult, and Sung officials interpreted the
Chin request as a matter of injured pride. Before complying, however, the Sung
court ordered the bodies of Han T’o-chou and Su Shih-tan exhumed and their
heads placed on public display. Thoroughly repudiating them at home would
presumably diminish the symbolic impact of shipping their remains north.
Many endorsed the concession. Minister of Personnel Lou Yüeh represented
perhaps the majority at court in stating, “The peace negotiations represent
an important matter which awaits only this to be resolved. Why should the
already putrefied heads of treacherous traitors merit our concern?” But others
demurred. Responding to Lou Yüeh, the envoy, Wang Nan, retorted, “The
head of Han T’o-chou may not be worthy of our concern, but the empire’s status is of concern!”140 Minister of War Ni Ssu decried the act for similar reasons.
Vice-Minister of Imperial Sacrifices Huang Tu portrayed the accommodation
as tantamount to insulting the Sung state. Chen Te-hsiu (1178–1235), a professor at the Imperial University, was joined by students in denouncing the
concession as an unprecedented shame.141 Interestingly, Huang Tu and Chen
Te-hsiu, although they had been persecuted under the Tao-hsüeh ban, opposed
the posthumous humiliation of their persecutor. They did so in defense of the
empire’s dignity, not on humanitarian grounds nor out of compassion for the
dead individual.
shih mi-yüan in power
Compromise and conflict
Although the new peace treaty was crafted by Wang Nan and other on-site
negotiators, responsibility for accepting its controversial terms lay with two
men: Ch’ien Hsiang-tsu, chief councilor and concurrent head of the Bureau of
Military Affairs, and his counterpart as administrator at the Bureau of Military
Affairs, Shih Mi-yüan. Whatever their personal feelings about the agreement,
the two wasted no time before implementing it. Three months after exhuming
the bodies of Han T’o-chou and Su Shih-tan, they forwarded the two heads
to the Chin under the escort of Wang Nan. By some accounts, the remains
were hung in a public thoroughfare, then embalmed and stored in a military
warehouse. Others allege that the Chin, considering Han T’o-chou to have
been a loyal official, provided an honorable burial alongside his ancestor Han
140
141
SS 395, pp. 12047, 12062; HTC (1958) 158, p. 4275.
On their views, see Ting, Sung-jen i-shih hui-pien (1982) 17, p. 878; SS 398, p. 12115; 393, p. 12011;
437, pp. 12957–8; HTC (1958) 158, p. 4281.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
813
Ch’i.142 Control over Ta-san Pass in the west and Hao-chou in the east, two
areas still in Chin hands in mid-1208, was restored to the Sung.
A new era in Southern Sung politics
The end of war also marked the beginning of a distinctive era in Southern Sung
politics. Under Kuang-tsung, statesmen with ties to the Tao-hsüeh movement
and access to influential posts had touched off an impassioned campaign to
promote their political agenda in government, a campaign that ultimately
backfired and facilitated the ascendency of the inner court. The inner court,
led by Han T’o-chou, subsequently launched its own campaigns: first, the inner
court tried to cow Tao-hsüeh proponents through proscription and intimidation, and when this failed, they tried to win glory through an ambitious
recovery of the north. Various defeats awaited the more extremist elements
of both groups, for some of the Tao-hsüeh supporters were too dogmatic, and
some of the inner palace group too self-serving to create lasting coalitions.
With the restoration of peace in 1208, philosophical hauteur and political
bravado gave way to moderation and compromise as new leaders emerged to
reconcile political divisions.
Ch’ien Hsiang-tsu remained chief councilor through 1208, yet his time
in favor was on the wane. The emperor increasingly placed his confidence
in Shih Mi-yüan. This transfer owed something to the special relationship
Shih had developed with Empress Yang2. The coup against Han T’o-chou had
demonstrated the effectiveness of their collaboration. In time, Shih Mi-yüan
proved sufficiently assertive to keep the forces of hostile opinion in line, yet he
was sufficiently diplomatic to avoid dangerous confrontation. Such a balance,
a very difficult one to achieve, had completely eluded Han T’o-chou. Also
unlike Han, Shih Mi-yüan did not take Empress Yang2’s political astuteness
as a personal threat. She on her side deferred daily administration to him. In
this way, under Shih Mi-yüan’s leadership the combination of a weak emperor
and a strong inner court did not create the sort of political tension that had
been so pronounced in the two preceding decades. Further enhancing Shih
Mi-yüan’s political stature was his close relationship with the heir apparent.
In his capacities as instructor and, later, as lecturer at the several schools for
imperial princes, Shih Mi-yüan came to know Chao Hsün when Chou was a
small child. Upon Chao Hsün’s nomination as heir apparent in 1208, Shih
Mi-yüan became his chief advisor and the general supervisor of his household.
142
T’o-t’o, Chin shih 12, p. 284; HTC (1958) 158, p. 4278; Chou, Ch’i-tung yeh-yü (1983) 3, pp. 45–52;
Li, Chien-yen i-lai ch’ao-yeh tsa-chi (1967) i 7, p. 10a.
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richard l. davis
The throne also honored Shih Mi-yüan as junior mentor to the heir, additional
confirmation of its confidence in him. With Ning-tsung long accustomed to
relying heavily upon Han T’o-chou and lesser palace favorites, Shih Mi-yüan’s
close ties with the two most powerful palace personalities served him well.
In summer 1208, Shih Mi-yüan rose to be assistant councilor and soon
became chief councilor of the right with concurrent authority over the Bureau
of Military Affairs. Ch’ien Hsiang-tsu served briefly as councilor of the left,
but was dismissed by year’s end. Reasons were not given, but the dismissal
appears to have been part of a much broader policy of eliminating holdovers
from the Han T’o-chou administration. Li Pi, another holdover, had already
been dismissed the previous year in 1207. The military commissioner in chief
Yeh Shih similarly was demoted, his irredentist views being fundamentally
at odds with current pacifist policies. Within a year’s time, the purge that
began with Han T’o-chou’s death ended in the elimination of all serious rivals
to Shih Mi-yüan, who emerged as the key link between the throne and the
bureaucracy. However, Shih was sufficiently astute not to rely exclusively on
imperial favor. He aggressively courted Tao-hsüeh proponents in and away from
the capital, men who had been alienated under the preceding administration,
in the hope of enhancing his image and support within the civil service.
Lin Ta-chung, a former censor persecuted under the Ch’ing-yüan ban, was
restored to metropolitan service in 1208 as notary official at the Bureau of Military Affairs. Another persecuted censor, Liu Kuang-tsu, returned to Lin-an
as court compiler, his first metropolitan post since 1194. Lü Tsu-t’ai, another
alleged partisan, ended his exile with a prestigious sinecure. Lü unfortunately
soon after died of pneumonia, and an image-conscious Shih Mi-yüan commissioned the distinguished envoy Wang Nan to accompany the coffin to its
burial place. Two others also persecuted under the old ban, Lou Yüeh and
Yang Chien, accepted metropolitan assignments for the first time in a decade.
Yang Chien became vice-minister of war and Lou Yüeh assistant councilor.
Posthumous honors were given to many of the deceased. P’eng Kuei-nien,
Chu Hsi, and Chao Ju-yü, only partially rehabilitated under Han T’o-chou’s
limited amnesty, received full honors under the new councilor.143
In his long career, Shih Mi-yüan’s father, Shih Hao, had recommended many
men for office who later appeared on the list of banned Tao-hsüeh partisans,
including Chu Hsi, Yeh Shih, Yang Chien, and Yüan Hsieh. Although Shih
Hao had shown respect for Tao-hsüeh thinkers and sympathizers, he was not
himself involved in the movement. Shih Mi-yüan had inherited from his father
143
On these actions, see SS 393, p. 12016; Chen, Hsi-shan hsien-sheng Chen Wen-chung kung wen-chi 43,
p. 15a; SS 455, p. 13372; 395, p. 12047; 407, p. 12290; HTC (1958) 158, p. 4277; SS 429, p. 12758;
392, pp. 11989–90, respectively.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
815
a political tradition of nonpartisanship, although the younger Shih had also
developed his own brand of political skills. Shih Mi-yüan had matured during the time when the Confucian teachings of Lu Chiu-yüan (1139–93) (also
known as Lu Hsiang-shan), Chu Hsi’s most compelling rival, had dominated
the intellectual landscape of Shih’s native Ming-chou. Differences between the
two sets of teachings, which originally had seemed uncontentious, became so
sharply articulated and tendentious that the loose, accommodating stance of
Shih Hao and others during the Hsiao-tsung era was not easily sustained in
succeeding reigns. The intellectual pedigree of Shih Mi-yüan himself may be
difficult to establish, but it is common knowledge that he and his kinsmen frequently associated with proponents of Lu Chiu-yüan’s teachings.144 Although
he lacked any identifiable links to Tao-hsüeh, his extension of court honors to
these proponents was apparently intended to create a reputation for himself as
a sponsor of talent, no less than his father, and to symbolically break with the
parochialism and intolerance of the recent past. Shih also appointed men from
his native Ming-chou to several important posts: Lou Yüeh, Lin Ta-chung,
Yang Chien, and Yüan Hsieh. These men were not simply fellow provincials
sharing common interests, but were also respected thinkers sympathetic to, but
strictly speaking not adherents of, Tao-hsüeh. They were men who enhanced
the intellectual diversity of the metropolitan bureaucracy and helped Shih
deny any one group unchallenged supremacy. Shih Mi-yüan’s refusal, in the
face of considerable pressure, to officially endorse Chu Hsi’s commentaries on
the Four Books (Analects, Mencius, Chung-yung, and Ta-hsüeh) or to honor the
founders of the Tao-hsüeh movement in the Temple of Confucius, demonstrates
his initial commitment to maintaining intellectual diversity.145
Restoration of peace and the veneration of learning, the hallmarks of Shih
Mi-yüan’s early years in power, rapidly earned him the confidence of the throne.
When Shih’s mother died within a month of his elevation to councilor, this
event should have entailed Shih’s resignation from office and three years of
mourning. Yet although Shih did return home, he stayed for only five months
before the emperor interceded, in early 1209, waiving the mourning obligation
and recalling Shih Mi-yüan to office.146 In his absence, Ning-tsung had refused
to appoint an interim councilor and probably relied heavily upon Assistant
Councilor Lou Yüeh, a man with close ties to Shih Mi-yüan. Upon returning
to Lin-an, Shih received a handsome official residence, a sign that the emperor
intended him to stay awhile. Shih Mi-yüan held onto the councilorship for
nearly twenty-five years, the longest uninterrupted tenure in Sung history.
144
145
146
Huang et al., Sung Yüan hsüeh-an 74.
HTC (1958) 159, p. 4309.
HTC (1958) 158, p. 4288.
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richard l. davis
Although he began as a popular executive, Shih Mi-yüan quickly acquired a
growing chorus of critics. Minister of War Ni Ssu was among the more acrid of
these early detractors. A precocious scholar who had gained the chin-shih when
he was only nineteen and the prestigious Erudite Literatus degree at thirty-two,
Ni Ssu was a prolific writer and one-time professor at the Imperial University.
Dismissed during Han T’o-chou’s administration for his criticism of policies,
Ni Ssu had returned to the capital after Han’s death only to find the one-man
dominance he had denounced was now revived under a new favorite, Shih Miyüan. Ni Ssu was alarmed at Shih Mi-yüan’s growing authority; even before
Shih’s advancement to chief councilor, Shih would replace key officials without
consulting or even informing the senior councilor, Ch’ien Hsiang-tsu – a tactic
formerly employed by Han T’o-chou to undermine the bureaucratic chain of
command. Signs of nepotism by Shih in appointing close associates or relatives
to prominent posts all pointed to political realignment and consolidation, and
provided yet another bone of contention.147 Ni Ssu also complained about
the government’s humiliating concessions to Chin. Differences between the
two men were so great that Ni Ssu requested a reassignment away from the
capital. Ni Ssu’s conflicts with bureaucratic chiefs dated back to Chou Pi-ta and
Chao Ju-yü, reflecting his unusually testy character. Were he alone in casting
aspersions on Shih Mi-yüan, he might have been dismissed as pugnacious and
eccentric. He was not alone.
Less acidic but equally ruffled by Shih Mi-yüan were Wei Liao-weng and
Chen Te-hsiu. Wei and Chen, who had both passed the chin-shih examination of
1199 at the height of Han T’o-chou’s persecution of Tao-hsüeh partisans, served
together as editors at the Palace Library, subordinates of the then vice-director
Shih Mi-yüan. The two had differed sharply with Han T’o-chou over policy,
but nevertheless at first served under him. Wei Liao-weng, a native of Szechwan, appears to have been more negatively disposed toward Shih Mi-yüan,
which prompted him to decline metropolitan appointments for some seventeen
years.148 Chen Te-hsiu tended to be more accommodating, although he was no
less disillusioned with Shih Mi-yüan, especially regarding foreign policy. The
peace concessions of 1208, in Chen’s view, had only increased the possibility
of future conflict, since implicit signs of Sung weakness would invite more
enemy exploitation. Chen Te-hsiu also opposed the emerging trend of military
retrenchment, which undermined the empire’s preparedness for war. Overall, Chen believed that Shih Mi-yüan’s foreign policy was excessively naive,
and that in handling civil officials, Shih was disrespectful and manipulative
147
148
SS 398, pp. 12113–16; HTC (1958) 158, pp. 4274–5, 4280–1; Wei Liao-weng, Ho-shan hsien-sheng ta
ch’üan-chi [Ssu-pu ts’ung-k’an ch’u-pien 1929 ed.] (1249; Taipei, 1979) 85, pp. 1a–12b.
SS 437, pp. 12965–71.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
817
by controlling bureaucrats through strict apportionment of their rank and
salary.149 This manipulation implied political intolerance, and an unwillingness to acknowledge the contributions of his colleagues. More personally, Chen
Te-hsiu and Wei Liao-weng, both Tao-hsüeh sympathizers, resented Shih Miyüan’s resistance to officially endorsing the movement’s teachings. These fundamentally different views of governing prompted Chen Te-hsiu from time to
time to withdraw from metropolitan service, yet he generally stayed on, optimistically hoping to have some influence, however modest, on border policy
and other decision making.
Other prominent statesmen who expressed similar concerns left the capital
voluntarily or involuntarily. Hsü I, who had assisted Wang Nan in negotiating
the recent peace treaty with Chin, criticized the emperor’s special treatment
toward Yang Tz’u-shan and Shih Mi-yüan, a protest that resulted in Hsü’s
reassignment away from the capital. Regional transfer also awaited Ts’ai Yuhsüeh, a once-persecuted Tao-hsüeh proponent whose reservations about the
new administration closely resembled those of Chen Te-hsiu and Wei Liaoweng. Yüan Hsieh presents a parallel case: a victim of the Tao-hsüeh ban and
politically rehabilitated under Shih Mi-yüan, he subsequently was pressured
to leave the capital. He too had denounced the controversial peace pact.150
Some such critics were demoted or retired by censorial indictment, and others
left of their own volition. Most officials, however, were like Chen Te-hsiu,
who remained in Lin-an, despite the challenges of swaying someone who often
seemed indifferent. For his part, Shih Mi-yüan was for most of his tenure tolerant of his critics, not vindictive or arbitrary like Han T’o-chou. Although there
were some important resignations, no mass exodus from government service
occurred. By monopolizing imperial favor and administrative authority, Shih
did not silence so much as frustrate his critics, ushering in an era characterized
by administrative efficiency yet lacking innovation and adaptability.
Foreign policy
The extraordinary duration of Shih Mi-yüan’s tenure does not imply uneventful
tranquility. On the contrary, these years from 1208 to 1233 represent some
of the most tumultuous of the Southern Sung, a time of profound political,
economic, and social change. Nowhere is this upheaval more apparent than
in foreign affairs. Previously, the only menace to the Sung had come from the
149
150
SS 437, pp. 12957–65; HTC (1958) 158, p. 4281; Chen, Hsi-shan hsien-sheng Chen Wen-chung kung
wen-chi 2, pp. 1a–7b.
On these criticisms, see SS 406, p. 12269; HTC (1958) 158, p. 4276; Wei, Ho-shan hsien-sheng ta
ch’üan-chi 69, p. 14b.
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richard l. davis
Jurchen Chin. The Tangut–Hsi Hsia kingdom in the northwest shared no
common border with the Southern Sung and had not engaged Chin armies in
over eighty years. As for the Chin, it maintained friendly tributary relations
with the Hsi Hsia and with Koryŏ. Although Chin occasionally came into
conflict with the Sung, their two recent wars had lasted scarcely two years and
had no significant effect upon the balance of power. For several generations,
the two sides had known mostly peace, a situation that did little to enhance
the preparedness of their armies. With no one state able to impose its military
will upon the others, the three states came to accept the political division while
enjoying general stability. This accommodation, revived somewhat after the
Sung-Chin conflict in 1208, was now shattered by the Mongols. Sweeping
across central and northern Asia, they began pillaging the Hsi Hsia border
in spring 1209. Hsi Hsia, a Chin tributary state, turned to the Jurchen for
assistance. The Chin refused, fearing Mongol retaliation, but in the process
incited the embittered Hsi Hsia to open hostilities against Chin, a war that
benefited no one more than the Mongols.
The Chin, having already provoked Chinggis khan (Temüjin) by supporting
rival tribes in Mongolia against him, desperately sought neutrality in the
expanding Tangut-Mongol contest. They had only recently concluded war
with the Sung, and Emperor Chang-tsung, who died at the close of 1208,
bequeathed his throne to the half-witted seventh son of Shih-tsung, Prince
Wei (r. 1208–13). Bandits in Shantung continued to make mischief with
local authorities, while severe drought and continued famine in 1210 strained
the resources of the government. The Chin simply could not risk war with
the Mongols. Yet if they considered neutrality a means of preserving peace,
they were tragically mistaken. The Mongols moved with unanticipated speed
and, within a year, began raiding the northern Chin border. With the formal
commencement of hostilities in 1211, the Chin found themselves fending
off two enemies, the Tanguts and the Mongols. Over the next two years, the
Mongol inroads into Chin territory were such that the Mongols were able to
lay siege to the Chin capital at Chung-tu (modern Peking), a grave political as
well as economic challenge. The initial Mongol thrust had concentrated on the
Chin Western Capital Hsi-ching (Ta-t’ung, in northern Shansi province), and
it soon extended east as far as central Pei-ching circuit (Peking) and south into
Ho-tung North (central Shansi) and Ho-pei West (central Hopei province).151
Chin armies, despite their numerical superiority, were outmatched. In addition
151
On these developments, see T’o-t’o, Chin shih 13; SS 39; HTC (1958) 159; Hu Chao-hsi et al., Sung
Meng (Yüan) kuan-hsi shih (Ch’eng-tu, 1992), pp. 1–17; H. Desmond Martin, The rise of Chingis Khan
and his conquest of north China (Baltimore, 1950), pp. 113–54; Thomas J. Barfield, The perilous frontier:
Nomadic empires and China (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), pp. 197–202.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
819
to the extraordinary martial prowess of their horsemen, the Mongols had an
unbeatable strategy. In wars against the Sung, the Chin armies had proven most
effective when they overwhelmed the Sung with massive attacks against a few
strategic areas, creating a shock that often paralyzed the defenders. In contrast,
the Mongols preferred to scatter their armies and conduct a large number of
smaller campaigns. This diminished the risk of large, decisive battles, while
helping to identify and exploit the enemy’s vulnerable points. The Chin could
not develop a suitable defense.
The defeats inflicted by invading cavalry were made more painful by the
increasing instability of Chin internal politics. Incompetent as he was unpopular, the Chin ruler Prince Wei, Wei Chao Wang (r. 1209–13), responded
to the ever closer Mongol assaults with self-imposed isolation, which in turn
sparked mass hysteria in the capital. In the summer of 1213, Prince Wei was
assassinated in a coup led by a highly decorated veteran of the K’ai-hsi war and
now assistant supreme commander, Ho-she-li Chih-chung. Ho-she-li installed
the elder brother of Chang-tsung as the emperor, Chin Hsüan-tsung (r. 1213–
23). Many military and civilian leaders resented the domination of Ho-she-li
Chih-chung, and some even suspected him of conspiring to usurp the throne
himself; within months, Ho-she-li Chih-chung was assassinated. This assassination coincided precisely with the Mongol encirclement of Chung-tu. The
summer assault on Chung-tu was so frightful that to forestall a mass exodus the Chin government prohibited all males from leaving the city. A Sung
embassy within thirty miles of the capital was ordered to return south, without
delivering its precious tribute. The siege lasted three months and effectively
made Chin Hsüan-tsung a prisoner in his own capital. When the Mongols
withdrew at the beginning of 1214, the Chin paid them with offerings of
servants, horses, gold, and silk.152 This withdrawal gave Chin Hsüan-tsung
an opportunity to flee his vulnerable capital. When he did this in the summer
of 1214, he angered the Mongols, who resumed hostilities. Chung-tu fell to
them the next spring.
Developments in the north moved with such astounding speed that the
Sung court and Shih Mi-yüan in particular were unable to develop a coherent
response. Despite widespread chaos in the north, the Sung remained unrelentingly loyal to its commitment to pay biannual tribute to Chin. No mission had
reached its destination since 1210–11, yet Shih Mi-yüan chose not to risk war
by interrupting the tribute payments, so embassies set out punctually for the
next three years only to be turned back before reaching Chung-tu in the north.
Shih Mi-yüan was insistent that tribute items be kept in storage, rather than
152
T’o-t’o, Chin shih 14, p. 304; HTC (1958) 160, p. 4334.
820
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returned to the government exchequer for government use. This implied that
the tribute payments would be resumed later. The image of timidity that this
unseemly accommodation presented disturbed no small number of Sung officials. As with this diplomatic crisis, Shih Mi-yüan’s response to the impending
military crisis was frustratingly indecisive. He ordered the reinforcement of
border defense installations, but no general mobilization for war. As early as
1211, Chen Te-hsiu, the most articulate and perhaps best-informed critic of
court policy, a former ambassador with firsthand knowledge of conditions in
the north, predicted the imminent demise of the Chin and urged his government to prepare for an inevitable showdown with the Mongols.153 After
the Chin court had moved its capital to K’ai-feng in 1214, it demanded the
immediate delivery of the three years of outstanding peace payments. Chen
Te-hsiu pleaded for the tribute’s formal termination. Convinced that the Sung
would at some point be drawn into the conflict between the Chin and the Mongols, Chen thought it senseless to cling to an outdated policy of restraint and
maintain the illusion of cordial relations. Chen Te-hsiu’s stand on the tribute
controversy was pragmatic, for a large sum of back payments was involved, but
it was also emotional. Now that the Chin court had moved to K’ai-feng, the
Sung envoys would have to present themselves before alien rulers in the palace
where earlier Sung emperors had once sat enthroned. This was a deep humiliation for them, and an unpardonable indignity to the dynasty’s illustrious
ancestors.154
Many others shared Chen Te-hsiu’s views. Yüan Hsieh, a somewhat militant
statesman from Ming-chou, joined in calling for the termination of the peace
payments.155 The much less militant Liu Kuang-tsu, prefect of T’ung-ch’uan,
agreed. In addition to the issue of the Chin court’s receiving Sung envoys in
former Sung palaces, Liu was livid at the short-sightedness of current policies.
Writing in 1215, he stated: “We and the Jurchen have an enmity that cannot
permit coexistence under Heaven. Heaven [wishes to] eliminate these bandits
and has sent them to die at Pien-liang [K’ai-feng]. Your Majesty, although
Son of Heaven, does not comprehend the plan which it has devised. Not
to take what Heaven offers is known as abandoning Heaven. Never can one
abandon Heaven without Heaven becoming angry.”156 Coinciding as it did
with widespread natural disasters, Liu’s warning packed a powerful punch.
Liu Kuang-tsu, like Chen Te-hsiu, hoped to accelerate the demise of the Chin,
153
154
155
156
SS 437, p. 12959; Chen, Hsi-shan hsien-sheng Chen Wen-chung kung wen-chi 2, pp. 19b–22a; Wei, Ho-shan
hsien-sheng ta ch’üan-chi 69, p. 14a.
SS 437, p. 12959; HTC (1958) 160, pp. 4338–9; Chen, Hsi-shan hsien-sheng Chen Wen-chung kung wen-chi
3, p. 17b.
Chen, Hsi-shan hsien-sheng Chen Wen-chung kung wen-chi 47, p. 13a.
Chen, Hsi-shan hsien-sheng Chen Wen-chung kung wen-chi 43, p. 16b; SS 397, p. 12101.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
821
and terminating the peace payments was an important first step. One of the
few opposing views on record came from Ch’iao Hsing-chien (1156–1241),
an official with extensive regional experience then serving as fiscal overseer
in Huai-nan West. Ch’iao preferred deferring any policy response until the
outcome of the conflict in the north was more certain. He urged Shih Mi-yüan
to resume the gift offerings, thereby assisting the Chin in their fight against
the far greater threat to stability in the region, the Mongols. The proposal,
novel for the time and eminently pragmatic, was so poorly received in Lin-an
that irate students at the Imperial University demanded Ch’iao Hsing-chien’s
execution.157
Shih Mi-yüan, although sensitive to official opinion, was too cautious to
abandon the current policies and provoke the Chin. Twice in 1214 the Chin,
desperately in need of funds, sent missions to Lin-an to expedite the delivery
of peace payments. They even recalled an envoy to protest against the Sung’s
procrastination.158 To ignore the Chin protest would have threatened to escalate into a military response. Our sources make no mention of payment being
made, but the exchange of envoys was resumed by year’s end, which suggests
that Shih Mi-yüan may have quietly done so. By ignoring the opinion of influential colleagues and trying to maintain normal diplomatic relations with the
Chin by appeasement, Shih Mi-yüan was endangering his support at home.
The Sung was the only major power of the time to maintain its tributary relations with the beleaguered Chin. The Hsi Hsia and Koryŏ (Korea) had both
severed their tributary ties with the Chin over the preceding five years.
The peace payment controversy was not the only source of dissatisfaction with Shih Mi-yüan’s foreign policy. As early as 1214, the Hsi Hsia had
approached the Sung to discuss a possible alliance against the Chin. A cautious Shih Mi-yüan ignored the overtures and lost, in consequence, a unique
opportunity to expand his empire’s influence in the northwest. A year later
in 1215, the Sung requested a reduction in its tribute offering. The Chin
court in Pien-liang (K’ai-feng) balked, and the Sung court gave in. In 1216,
when an army of reportedly a hundred thousand Ch’in-chou “loyalists” from
the west of Chin sought asylum in Sung territory, they were turned away, the
Sung being still unwilling to jeopardize relations with the Chin.159 Ironically,
such extraordinary accommodations coincided with the further decline of Chin
power. The Mongols, having seized Chung-tu in spring 1215, led their armies
to within seven miles of K’ai-feng. The Chin were demoralized, beset with
defections throughout the north and conspiracies directed at the throne. But
157
158
159
SS 417, p. 12489; HTC (1958) 160, pp. 4339, 4341.
SS 39, p. 760; HTC (1958) 160, pp. 4333, 4339.
See SS 39, p. 760; T’o-t’o, Chin shih 62, p. 1483; SS 39, p. 763.
822
richard l. davis
although the situation within Chin had deteriorated, Shih Mi-yüan remained
committed to neutrality. Ultimately, only a hostile initiative from the Chin
would force a change in policy.
In the spring of 1217, the Chin declared war against the Sung. Chin assaults
on targets in the central border region – Kuang-chou2, Tsao-yang, Kuanghua, and Hsin-yang – were accompanied by a sizable drive in the west against
Ta-san Pass, Hsi-ho-chou, Chieh-chou, and Ch’eng-chou. Ostensibly, the Chin
attacks were in response to the Sung’s alleged incitement of bandit activity
along the Huai River border in the east. The charge was not entirely baseless.
The Sung-Chin border had witnessed various incidents of provocation for
some time, responsibility for which partly lay with the Sung. In early 1214,
a small force of irregulars from Szechwan had crossed the border and attacked
Ch’in-chou, spurred on by the military commissioner An Ping.160 The action,
perhaps a test of Chin strength, had not been sanctioned by the Sung court,
and when the band returned south, its members were rounded up and executed
by the Sung commander at Hsing-chou2. An Ping was then summoned to the
capital and named associate commissioner at the Bureau of Military Affairs, in
effect, being reprimanded with a promotion. Subsequent regional assignments
in the central or southwest part of the empire, away from northern Szechwan,
further demonstrated Shih Mi-yüan’s disavowal of the venture at Ch’in-chou.
The Chin certainly understood this, for they took no immediate retaliation.
On the eastern front, however, where the Sung court theoretically exercised far
better control, frequent skirmishes along the border and the proliferation of
bandit groups were much more suspect. Instability in Chin territory gave rise to
banditry and insurrection. Many of the insurgents, by identifying themselves
culturally with Han Chinese rule in the south, appeared to be agents of the
Sung, even if many, perhaps most, had no such backing. At other times, Sung
border officials had surreptitiously aided rebels and refugees, violating court
policy and treaty commitments. The Sung court never condoned the practice,
and occasionally as an act of good faith it punished officials found guilty, but
the Chin held the Sung accountable all the same.
More important than Sung provocation, the motive for the Chin attacks
against the south was their need to prepare an escape from further defeat by the
Mongols in the north. Since 1215, the emperor, Chin Hsüan-tsung, had come
under the influence of Chu-ho-lo Kuo-le-ch’i (d. 1219), the privy councilor and
later chief minister.161 Chu-ho-lo, with every justification, feared the Mongols,
and desired a twofold strategy for dealing with them. First, he proposed the
160
161
SS 402, pp. 12191–2; Sung-shih ch’üan-wen Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien 30, p. 16a; HTC (1958) 160,
p. 4332.
HTC (1958) 160, pp. 4345, 4350–1, 4356–7, 4359–61; 161, pp. 4378, 4383–4.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
823
concentrated defense of strategic cities, lest scarce military resources be spread
too thin. This left lesser cities to fend for themselves. Second, rather than
risk direct, probably suicidal, confrontation, he preferred to protect the court
through higher and stronger walls and, of course, distance. By attacking the
Sung, the Chin could avoid confrontation with the Mongols while expanding
its influence south of the Huai in preparation for further retreat. The insecure
Chin Hsüan-tsung initially rejected this counsel. It appeared foolhardy to open
another front, in light of declining revenues and the current heavy fighting
in the north.162 A brief rally against the Mongols in 1216, combined with
considerable pressure from Chu-ho-lo, finally swayed Chin Hsüan-tsung.
The Sung response to the Chin attacks was intentionally weak. Hoping
to contain the conflict, the Sung court instructed border officials to confine
themselves to defensive actions. Shih Mi-yüan waited two months to declare
war. He did so then only after much prodding by Chao Fang, the distinguished
military commissioner of Ching-hu.163 Shih’s indecision hardly endeared him
to military commanders, but they had further reason to be irritated. Unlike
Han T’o-chou, and perhaps learning from his negative example, Shih Mi-yüan
had permitted individual commanders to exercise substantial independence in
conducting the war effort in their respective theaters. Interference from Lin-an
was minimal. The approach certainly had its merits: commanders in the field
were better able to assess a region’s strengths and mobilize its resources rapidly
in response to attack than were officials in the distant capital. By delegating
greater discretionary authority to regional leaders, Shih Mi-yüan could relieve
himself of personal responsibility for the outcome of any specific battle or
campaign.
loyalists of shantung
Another telling sign of Shih Mi-yüan’s inadequacies as a decision maker is his
treatment of “loyalist armies.” In many parts of Chin territory ever since the
Chin conquest of the north, rebels, often claiming loyalty to the Sung, had
attempted to overthrow the Jurchen. In some cases, these insurrections had
coalesced around a desire on the part of Han Chinese to restore Sung rule as
an expression of their cultural self-awareness and their wish for political selfdetermination. In other cases, rebels sought to advance their personal interests,
and swore allegiance to the Sung simply to attract material support from Linan or to lend a veneer of legitimacy to what otherwise was simple banditry.
Commonly known in the south as “loyal and righteous armies” (chung-i-chün),
162
163
Lin Jui-han, “Wan Chin kuo-ch’ing chih yen-chiu,” Ta-lu tsa-chih 16 No. 7 (1958), pp. 22–6.
SS 403, pp. 12203–7; HTC (1958) 160, p. 4362.
824
richard l. davis
such bands were most active in the Shantung circuits.164 Geographically isolated, impoverished, and with a long tradition of insurgency, the region had
suffered heavily from frequent natural disasters, the most common stimulus for
outbreaks of banditry. These loyalists – or rebels, from the Chin perspective –
were most active and threatening to authorities in times of military conflict.
Treaty commitments prohibited the Sung court from supporting such groups,
but in wartime there were no such restrictions. If these domestic upheavals
did not win the Sung a foothold in the north, at least they forced the Chin to
divert some attention from their external to their internal enemy. Moreover,
the Sung risked little by supporting loyalists, for loyalist armies lived and
operated almost entirely in Chin territory.
Among the more prominent of Shantung loyalists had been Yang An-erh
(var. Yang An-kuo, d. 1214), a former saddle maker from I-tu, the capital
of Shantung East circuit. During the K’ai-hsi war of 1206 to 1208 he had
joined other marauders in pillaging the countryside, where they acquired the
sobriquet “Red-jacket bandits” (Hung-ao tsei). Chin authorities were unable to
suppress the rebels by force, and after the war they had offered titular posts
to Yang An-erh and his confederates in exchange for their promises of fealty.
However, once the Mongols had begun their invasion, the Red-jackets returned
to brigandry. About fifty miles east of I-tu, at Wei-chou5, there emerged
another brigand leader, Li Ch’üan (d. 1231).165 Of peasant stock, he and his
brother reportedly turned to banditry after their mother and eldest brother
were killed by Mongol invaders.166 The war had led to increased taxation, and
natural disasters had so strained the regional economy that Li Ch’üan had little
problem attracting recruits; his band soon grew to be several thousand strong.
Yang An-erh had died in 1214, killed by greedy boatmen who sought the
bounty of one thousand ounces of gold that the Chin government had offered
for his head. His younger sister, Yang Miao-chen, herself a skilled rider and
archer, assumed command of the rebel remnants. Before long, she married Li
Ch’üan, and their two bands merged to create a force of some fifteen thousand
to twenty thousand.
During the K’ai-hsi era (1205–7), Yang An-erh had assisted the Sung in
temporarily controlling parts of Shantung, but his own dynastic ambitions
164
165
166
See Huang K’uan-ch’ung’s series of two articles, “Lüeh-lun Nan Sung shih-tai ti kuei-cheng-jen
(shang),” Shih-huo yüeh-k’an 7 No. 3 (1977), pp. 111–20; and “Lüeh-lun Nan Sung shih-tai ti kueicheng-jen (hsia),” Shih-huo yüeh-k’an 7 No. 4 (1977), pp. 172–83, and Huang’s Nan Sung shih-tai k’ang
Chin ti i-chün (Taipei, 1988), pp. 1–30, 171–223.
SS 476–7; HTC (1958) 159, p. 4307; 160, pp. 4336–7, 4341, 4343; 161, pp. 4364–5; also see the
chapter “Nan Sung Chin Yüan chien ti Shan-tung chung-i-chün yü Li Ch’üan,” in Sun K’o-k’uan,
Meng-ku Han-chün chi Han wen-hua yen-chiu (Taipei, 1958), pp. 11–43.
SS 476, p. 13817; HTC (1958) 160, p. 4336.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
825
later proved far stronger than any professed fealty to the Sung. Li Ch’üan, in
contrast, apparently began with few personal ambitions and maintained close
ties to the south. When the Chin attacked the Sung in 1217, Li’s increased
stature in Shantung and his commitment to the Sung cause made him attractive
to border officials, who saw Li’s disruptive activities as a valuable counter to
Chin influence in the Huai region. Ying Ch’un-chih, the prefect of Ch’u-chou,
was one such optimist. He believed that with the Chin pressed by the Mongols
to the north, a thrust from the east by Shantung loyalists might lead to Sung
recovery of the entire north. Another border official, Chia She (d. 1223), evinced
similar enthusiasm and helped Ying Ch’un-chih in supporting and organizing
loyalist armies in Chin territory. The insightful Chen Te-hsiu worded his
support for these plans somewhat differently. He thought assistance to such
groups was morally obligatory and, should the Sung court fail to provide aid,
the consequent ill will might ultimately end in disaster, and provoke anti-Sung
hostility.167 Shih Mi-yüan shared neither the optimism of regional officers nor
the sense of obligation to the loyalist rebels of Chen Te-hsiu, but he did not
entirely ignore bureaucratic opinion. When Sung-Chin hostilities resumed,
Ying Ch’un-chih extended massive aid to Shantung, apparently without court
authorization, but without its opposition either. Shih Mi-yüan later approved
the action, but only in secret correspondence, thereby distancing himself from
what must have seemed a risky venture.168
In the absence of an empirewide policy toward loyalist armies, regional
civilian and military leaders formulated their own. Support for insurrections
had been relatively modest in central and western regions of Chin-held territory, where northern rebels were less organized and Sung border officials more
cautious in backing them. In the east, not only did rebel bands have strong,
competent leadership, but the Sung regional officials who dealt with the rebels
wielded more influence at court and came, in time, to affect its attitude. Toward
the close of 1217 and with substantial assistance from the south, Li Ch’üan and
his brother Li Fu2 laid claim to Chü-chou and I-tu, two strategic prefectures
in the central and northern parts of the Shan-tung circuits. For the first time,
Shih Mi-yüan publicly acknowledged his endorsement of loyalist activity by
honoring Li Ch’üan with the title commander in chief of Shantung.
In the coming years, Li Ch’üan became a valued Sung ally. In addition to
gradually acquiring additional territory in Shantung, he occasionally assisted
Sung regular armies in campaigns in central China. He also helped recruit
other rebels to the Sung cause. The 1219 defection of the Chin commander
167
168
On their views, see HTC (1958) 161, p. 4364; SS 403, pp. 12207–10; Chen, Hsi-shan hsien-sheng Chen
Wen-chung kung wen-chi 34, pp. 18a–20a, respectively.
SS 403, pp. 12207; HTC (1958) 161, pp. 4363–4.
826
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Chang Lin2 is a prominent example; with this one stroke, the Chin lost twelve
prefectures.169 Defections and defeats in the Shantung region were so pervasive
that by 1221 Chin authority was confined to only a few pockets. The Sung
court subsequently committed itself to strengthening ties with loyalists in the
hope of annexing the entire region. To Shih Mi-yüan, cautious and suspicious
of loyalists’ motives, the goodwill and loyal service that were so critical to the
plan’s success could best be won through generously conferring official rank
and material wealth on the successful loyalist leaders, essentially the same
policy he applied at court in Lin-an to harness the bureaucracy. Shih named Li
Ch’üan first as regional supervisor and then regional commander, two sinecures
of considerable prestige, and by 1224 Sung subsidies for this single Shantung
army rose to three hundred thousand strings of cash.170
Officials, many of whom had once criticized Shih Mi-yüan for inadequate
support for “loyalists,” found his new enthusiasm for Li Ch’üan even more
unsettling. Greater status and wealth, they feared, might turn the head of
the loyalist leader by stoking his personal ambitions. Chia She reportedly
commented in 1222: “The court knows only that office and rank can be used
to obtain one’s heart. Does it not also know that arrogant commanders, in the
end, cannot be controlled?” Chia later resigned in frustration over Li Ch’üan’s
insubordinate arrogance. Chia She’s replacement as prefect of Ch’u-chou, Hsü
Kuo (d. 1225), quickly became even more incensed, and accused Li of seditious
intentions.171 There was good reason for their suspicions. To tighten his grip on
the Shantung region, Li Ch’üan had begun as early as 1220 to conspire against
rival leaders, a move that alienated both fellow loyalists and Sung border
officials. Among Li Ch’üan’s first notable victims was an assistant commander
for militias in southern Shantung, the influential Chi Hsien (d. 1220). A
jealous Li Ch’üan convinced Chia She of Chi Hsien’s duplicity and brought
about Chi’s execution in the summer of 1220. Later that year, Li engineered the
purge of Chi Hsien’s court-appointed successor, Shih Kuei (d. 1220), another
individual whose popularity among rival leaders presented a personal threat
to Li. Similarly charged with duplicity, Shih was assassinated.172 Li Ch’üan
also bore indirect responsibility for the 1221 defection to the Mongols of
Chang Lin2 whom he had himself won over to the Sung side only two years
earlier. Chang Lin2 publicly indicted Li Ch’üan for forcing his defection to the
Mongols. But he was most likely motivated by opportunism, since he returned
169
170
171
172
SS 476, p. 13820; HTC (1958) 161, p. 4382.
HTC (1958) 162, p. 4421.
SS 403, p. 12209; HTC (1958) 162, pp. 4412, 4418.
SS 476, pp. 13821–2; HTC (1958) 161, pp. 4386–7, 4391.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
827
to the Sung cause only a year later.173 The incident confirmed the wisdom
of Chia She’s counsel and the injudiciousness of Shih Mi-yüan’s indulgence
of Shantung rebel agents. But once the policy had been set, Shih Mi-yüan
refused to acknowledge his mistake and continued to indulge Li Ch’üan until
Li himself forced a change.
sung-chin conflict
However hesitant decision making at the Sung court may have appeared, the
Sung military leadership at the border offered a clear contrast. In the first
year of the war, 1217, the Chin twice attempted to capture strategic Tsaoyang and Sui-chou2, access to which would expose Hsiang-yang, the capital of
Ching-hsi2 circuit, to a westward attack. Hsiang-yang was the strategic pivot
of Sung defenses in its central territory, and Chin forces had to be stopped.
Under the general direction of Chao Fang, commanders Meng Tsung-cheng
and Hu Tsai-hsing inflicted heavy casualties upon the advancing Chin, forcing
their retreat from both Tsao-yang and Sui-chou2. The second Chin campaign
in early 1218, chiefly targeting Sui-chou2, involved an estimated one hundred
thousand Chin troops and represented a crucial test of strength for the two
powers. Some seventy battles and three months later, the encirclement of Suichou2 had been broken and the Chin troops again withdrew. Undaunted, Chin
forces resumed their attack a year later. This time the blockade lasted eighty
days and cost the north thirty thousand men.174
The Chin also did not make significant inroads farther east, in the Huai
River region. Chin offensives in 1219 were launched against Ch’u-chou, Haochou, and Kuang-chou2, where again they committed a huge force, said to
number one hundred thousand troops; each offensive failed to yield a lasting
foothold in Sung territory. During these attacks, loyalist armies had been
deployed by Chia She with remarkable success. The Shantung loyalists Chi
Hsien, Shih Kuei, Li Ch’üan, and Li Fu2 all cooperated in defense operations
and proved that loyalists could be deployed on the Huai frontier as well as
in the interior of Shantung.175 In the west, the Chin managed to temporarily
capture the Ta-san Pass and Hsi-ho-chou, but these were their only noteworthy
victories.
The performance of the Sung troops decidedly outclassed and frightened
the Chin. Not only did the Sung succeed in repulsing repeated massive
173
174
175
SS 476, pp. 13823–4; HTC (1958) 162, pp. 4401–2, 4415.
SS 403, pp. 12205, 12210, 12211–12; HTC (1958) 160, p. 4361; 161, pp. 4369, 4375, 4380–1.
SS 403, p. 12208; 476, pp. 13819–20; HTC (1958) 161, pp. 4376–7.
828
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enemy invasions, but they launched some retaliatory strikes that permanently
shattered the old myth of Jurchen invincibility. Outside the Shantung theater,
southern armies joined by loyalists attacked the strategically vital Ssu-chou,
just north of the Huai River, in the spring of 1218. Another Sung offensive
followed three years later. Neither ended in lasting success, but Sung casualties
appear to have been modest. In the central border region of the Sung, where
they faced heavy and sustained Chin onslaughts, Sung armies still mustered the
strength to turn from defense to mounting a counteroffensive. In the summer
of 1219, troops directed by Chao Fang crossed the border to raid T’ang-chou
and Teng-chou2 in modern Honan, subsequently turning back to attack from
the rear Chin encampments threatening Hsiang-yang and Tsao-yang. Having masterfully executed the campaign, Chao Fang felt sufficiently confident
to order another assault on T’ang-chou and Teng-chou2 toward year’s end,
this time reputedly employing sixty thousand men. Chin losses, again heavy,
were compounded by the deaths of several valued commanders. The Sung had
no intention of holding the two cities, merely to destroy stores of provisions
and exert pressure on the Chin. Having achieved these objectives, Sung forces
withdrew from T’ang-chou and Teng-chou2.
In the west, Sung armies fought with similar confidence and determination.
An Ping had probed enemy strength at Ch’in-chou as early as 1214 and paid for
this unauthorized initiative with losing his command and reassignment in the
east. He subsequently returned to Szechwan in an unofficial capacity, forming
a secret liaison in 1218 with the Hsi Hsia for a joint campaign against the
Chin. The bold plan fell through, however, when Tangut armies failed to reach
the target cities of Ch’in-chou and Kung-chou2. The Sung invaders, unable
to hold out on their own, lost tens of thousands in the retreat. A few months
later, the Sung conducted another offensive against Ch’in-chou, employing an
estimated one hundred thousand men, both regulars and loyalists. Ta-san Pass,
then in Chin hands, was retaken en route to Ch’in-chou, but the campaign
was aborted on instructions from the capital. Sung casualties again mounted
as troops retreated under enemy pressure. In both offensives, optimistic Sung
generals considered victory had been within their grasp and many blamed
the failure to back them up on Tung Chü-i, the military commissioner for
Szechwan since An Ping’s dismissal in 1214. In consequence, back at the Sung
court a movement developed to restore An Ping to leadership of the western
front, a move that was supported by impartial statesmen such as Wei Liaoweng, a Szechwan native, and Chao Fang, a commander with experience in
the region. Both of these men viewed An Ping as the only leader capable of
harnessing the forces in the west. But given An Ping’s checkered past, it may
have been the need to quell the growing problems of rebellion in Szechwan,
rather than the need for a more offensive-minded commander, that led to An
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
829
Ping’s return and appointment as pacification commissioner of Szechwan. In
the end, regional problems, specifically rebellion, prevented An Ping from
reviving the offensive, but at a time of acute vulnerability he succeeded in
stabilizing the Sung position and frustrating enemy advances.176
These Sung victories do not mean that the Chin had suddenly become an
inept fighting force. Their initial attacks in the west may have foundered
disastrously, yet they launched an awesome second western offensive in late
1217. This enabled them to capture, if only temporarily, several strategic
outposts and towns south of the border, including Ta-san Pass. Repeated raids
in the west in late 1217 and early 1218 reportedly furnished the Chin with
ninety thousand bushels of grain, tens of millions in strings of cash, and
unknown quantities of military supplies.177 Clearly, plunder was the chief
motive for the aggression here. But this appears not to have been the case with
the raids in the spring of 1219, which culminated in victories as far south
as Ta-an commandery, in the heart of Li-chou circuit ninety miles from the
border. Northern armies also overwhelmed Sung defenders at nearby Hsi-hochou, Hsing-yüan, and Yang-chou2. Fortunately for the Sung, these enemy
gains were not permanent. Moreover, Chin’s victories in the west were largely
offset by its defeats to the east.
The third and final Chin offensive during Ning-tsung’s reign occurred in
the spring of 1221. Focusing on the central border region, the Chin shocked
the Sung by penetrating over one hundred and twenty miles into its heartland
and overcoming the defenders of Ch’i-chou2, north of the Yangtze, in Huainan West. The Sung, through the daring leadership of Hu Tsai-hsing and Li
Ch’üan, nonetheless battled back and repelled them.
The overall failure of the Chin military campaign stemmed, in part, from
an exceptional Sung defense. Perhaps more crucial, however, was the diminishment of Chin morale. From the outset, the Chin emperor had opposed the
plan to take the offensive against the Sung. Only under mounting pressure did
Chin Hsüan-tsung reluctantly agree, and the tally after a year’s effort proved
it to have been a disastrous decision. At the close of 1218, Chin Hsüan-tsung
dispatched a peace envoy to the south. Public opinion in Lin-an, however, was
now vehemently opposed to an accommodation with the Chin. Indeed, one
minister was cruelly humiliated by angry students at the Imperial University
for airing what the students considered pacifist views.178 Public sentiment
was unmistakable; Shih Mi-yüan unceremoniously rebuffed the Chin envoy.
176
177
178
See SS 40; 402, pp. 12192–4; 403, pp. 12204–13, 12207; 476, p. 13818; T’o-t’o, Chin shih 15; HTC
(1958), chüan 160–2.
T’o-t’o, Chin shih 15, p. 336; HTC (1958) 161, p. 4370.
HTC (1958) 161, pp. 4378.
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Defeated in their initiatives at war and at peace, the Chin were beset with
other problems, including court intrigue and defections abroad.
In 1218 in northern Shantung, Assistant Fiscal Supervisor Ch’eng Chien
planned to defect to the Sung, but did not succeed. However, the plans of
commanders Chang T’ien-i and Chang Lin2 went ahead a year later. Slightly
to the west, regional leader Yen Shih and others defected in 1220, giving the
Sung nominal control over a cluster of prefectures north and east of the Chin
capital, K’ai-feng. Leaders in Ta-ming fu renounced the Chin in 1224. These
are but a few of many such incidents. Defections to the Mongols were even more
numerous. There were also plots and high-level intrigues at the capital. Chin’s
chief councilor Kao Ch’i (d. 1220) was imprisoned in 1219 and subsequently
executed, the victim of intrigue. Military affairs executive Pu-sa An-chen
(d. 1221) suffered a similar fate, charged with rebellious intentions by political
rivals. The loss of distinguished statesmen and the political infighting behind
it signaled and exacerbated the rapid weakening of the Chin dynasty.
domestic concerns
As a whole, the Sung period commonly inspires images of extraordinary material wealth and domestic tranquility, images that reflect some measure of the
historical record, even though the dynasty was hardly immune to natural disasters and human crises. Scholar-official discontent with political leadership
notwithstanding, the Kuang-tsung and early Ning-tsung years represent the
last era of genuine prosperity during the Southern Sung; natural disasters were
comparatively infrequent, and domestic order largely prevailed. With the rise
of Shih Mi-yüan, and to the fault of no one individual or policy, the prolonged
good fortune of the dynasty began to languish.
One major area of concern for officials was the economy. In the aftermath
of the K’ai-hsi war, rampant inflation had reduced many affluent families to
bankruptcy, prompting the court to take responsibility in compensating for
losses incurred.179 At the same time, natural disasters impeded the restoration of economic stability. The Che-hsi and Che-tung circuits were especially
hard-hit. Severe droughts had parched that area in 1208, 1214, and 1215;
floodwaters had hit in 1210, 1212, 1213, and 1217; invasions by plagues
of locusts had come in 1208, 1209, 1210, and 1215; and massive fires had
erupted in the crowded Sung capital in 1208, 1211, and 1220, destroying
tens of thousands of private homes and large sections of the imperial city. In
179
HTC (1958) 158, p . 4286. Also see Ch’üan Han-sheng, “Sung-mo ti t’ung-huo p’eng-chang chi ch’i
tui-yü wu-chia ti ying-hsiang,” in Sung-shih yen-chiu chi: Ti erh chi, ed. Sung-shih tso-t’an-hui (Taipei,
1964), pp. 283–325.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
831
the west, earthquakes had struck Szechwan in early, middle, and late 1216.
The tremors, extending from the eastern to western extremities of the region,
must have inflicted much human suffering, not to mention material loss. Luckily, the worst of these natural disturbances occurred before the Chin resumed
hostilities.
The Kuang-tsung and early Ning-tsung years also were largely free of insurrection, except for two insignificant and readily suppressed army mutinies and
a few minor raids on the southwest border by neighboring tribes. However,
the first major outbreak had begun in 1208 in Ch’en-chou2, an important
mining center in southern Ching-hu South circuit. The insurgency was led
by Lo Shih-ch’uan (d. 1211),180 a man of Yao2 extraction, who was probably reacting to long-standing tensions between an expanding Han Chinese
population and local ethnic groups who were being displaced. Suppression of
Lo’s forces did not take long. The insurgents were few in number and poorly
organized. Armies from northern Ching-hu South and neighboring Chiangnan West, commanded in part by Shih Mi-chien (1164–1232), the prefect of
T’an-chou (modern Ch’ang-sha) and brother of the chief councilor, pressed Lo
Shih-ch’uan to capitulate in exchange for government stipends and provisions.
Another insurgent, Li Yüan-li (d. 1210), who had perhaps been encouraged
by the precedent of compromise and unsteady government resolve, led an
uprising in the same region in early 1210. This uprising was far more serious
than that of Lo Shih-ch’uan. The outlaws numbered several tens of thousands
and raided east into Chiang-nan West. Whether Li represented a specific group
is not clear, but the discontent that Li Yüan-li tapped into extended beyond
ethnic tensions as the uprising took on rebellious dimensions. In response,
Sung reinforcements from as far north as Ch’ih-chou, in central Chiang-nan
East, were ordered to assist in the suppression. Still, the outlaws multiplied
with unexpected speed and dealt some devastating blows to government forces.
The Sung proved incapable of halting the eastern thrust of Li Yüan-li, and its
great fear was an alliance between Li and Lo Shih-ch’uan. This never materialized, their differences being too numerous. Meanwhile, the Sung court had
appointed Wang Chü-an (chin-shih 1187), prefect of Lung-hsing2, to lead the
suppression. By recruiting local militia, a resourceful Wang Chü-an managed
to stem the tide. He was also successful at undermining the enemy through
intrigue. Wang had carefully planted the seeds of mistrust among the rebels,
which culminated in the execution of Li Yüan-li by Lo Shih-ch’uan toward
the close of 1210. This intensive feuding eliminated the government’s most
180
On these rebellions, see SS 405, pp. 12253–4; 493, pp. 14195–6; HTC (1958) 158, pp. 4275, 4289–90;
159, pp. 4296–4300, 4304; Li Jung-ts’un, “Hei-feng-tung pien-luan shih-mo,” Chung-yang yen-chiuyüan li-shih yü-yen yen-chiu-so chi-k’an 41 No. 3 (1969), pp. 497–533.
832
richard l. davis
serious threat, Li Yüan-li. Shih Mi-yüan then intervened, extending to Lo
Shih-ch’uan various titles and ranks in a bid for his loyalty, but Lo Shih-ch’uan
himself fell victim to an assassin in 1211, most probably also at the instigation
of Wang Chü-an. Still, Councilor Shih insisted on having the last word: the
rank awarded to Lo Shih-ch’uan would pass to his assassin.
The mutiny in 1219 led by Chang Fu (d. 1219) and Mo Chien (d. 1219) was
smaller in scope and duration. Chang Fu and Mo Chien, both military men
from Hsing-yüan prefecture, northern Szechwan, commanded supposedly over
ten thousand men in a self-proclaimed Red Turban (Hung-chin) uprising.181
Although it lasted only from spring to summer, this rebellion presented a far
greater challenge to the Sung court than those in the southwest nine years
earlier. Erupting during wartime, the proximity of the rebels to the Chin
border must have heightened fears of a possible alliance with the north, in
effect, a repeat of the Wu Hsi fiasco twelve years earlier. The insurgents moved
with astounding speed and precision. They appear not to have captured Hsingyüan, the capital of Li-chou circuit, but the prefecture Li-chou2 did fall, forcing
a hasty retreat by the military commissioner of Szechwan. Rebels executed
Szechwan’s fiscal supervisor and pillaged Lang-chou and Kao-chou. Within
a month they had advanced a hundred and eighty miles from Hsing-yüan.
The shock reverberated throughout Szechwan, reportedly exceeding in impact
the earlier Wu Hsi defection, and prompted the Sung court to reappoint An
Ping as pacification commissioner. Chang Fu soon captured Sui-ning and, after
destroying much of the city, moved on to P’u-chou2, in the central part of
T’ung-ch’uan circuit. Surrounded there by Sung forces led by An Ping, the
rebels, Chang Fu, Mo Chien, and over a thousand confederates were captured
and put to death. An Ping emerged from the suppression a hero, his reputation
restored after having been severely tarnished by his unauthorized raids against
the north in 1214. He was appointed prefect of Hsing-yüan and regional
commander. Although army mutinies and bandit activities continued to erupt
at intervals, most were confined to Szechwan and speedily suppressed.
Other signs of instability, less imposing in scale perhaps, nonetheless proved
unsettling, for they directly threatened Shih Mi-yüan. In 1209 a commander
of loyalist armies who had been closely associated with Han T’o-chou, Lo
Jih-yüan (d. 1209), hatched an elaborate conspiracy against Shih Mi-yüan,
apparently out of dissatisfaction with the harsh terms of amnesty granted him
following Han T’o-chou’s death.182 Lo’s plan involved the assassination of
Shih Mi-yüan and his retinue of high officials during their procession toward
181
182
SS 40, pp. 772–3; 402, pp. 12192–3; 403, p. 12215; HTC (1958) 161, pp. 4376–80.
SS 39, p. 752; HTC (1958) 158, p. 4288.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
833
Lin-an in the sixth month of 1209, and the seizure of power at court, no
doubt to purge it of remaining Shih Mi-yüan elements. Shih was returning
to the capital after briefly mourning his mother’s death, and Ning-tsung, as
a sign of special favor, had arranged an elaborate ceremony to welcome him.
The occasion probably drew most government notables, with the crowds and
festivities providing a convenient cover for the perpetrators. However, the
wildly ambitious plan was never put into action. A fellow conspirator had
turned government informer, and Lo Jih-yüan was executed. Another attempt
against Shih Mi-yüan was reported soon thereafter, this time concocted by a
self-righteous, if not insane, student at Lin-an’s military academy. It too was
exposed and the man executed.183 This was the last known conspiracy against
the controversial councilor.
Not so easy to suppress was the uprising of the Man ethnic groups. Living
in the region of southwest Szechwan, the Man had raided Li-chou3 in 1195
and Ya-chou in 1206, but the uprising led by Hsü Pu in 1208 easily dwarfed
the others. The inaccessibility of the southern part of the Li-chou circuit
inhibited the deployment of government troops from the north, which left
the court dependent on informal local militia to restore order. In practice,
when a militia failed to do its job, political and monetary concessions often
provided the right incentive for the insurgents to disband. The first strategy,
coercion, had failed disastrously in the case of Hsü Pu, whose lawlessness
continued sporadically for the next six years, but in the end he surrendered in
exchange for a handsome government stipend. While he was active, Hsü Pu’s
defiance encouraged others in the region to rebel. An uprising in 1211 had
struck nearby Hsü-chou, and another had hit Chia-ting in 1213, and there
were outbreaks at Ya-chou in 1217 and 1220.184 The relatively small scale and
geographic remoteness of Man and Yao2 insurgencies limited their impact on
the political fortunes of Shih Mi-yüan, yet when viewed within the broader
contexts of Sung domestic instability and foreign invasion, they were surely
interpreted as signs of Heaven’s dissatisfaction with the court at Lin-an.
an uncertain succession
After a decade in power, Shih Mi-yüan had alienated many inside and outside the capital. His prominent role in controversial court decisions, his
183
184
Wang Chien-ch’iu, “Sung-tai t’ai-hsüeh yü t’ai-hsüeh-sheng” (M.A. thesis, Fu-jen T’a-hsüeh, 1965),
p. 305.
On these various outbreaks, see SS 37–40; 494, pp. 14195–6; HTC (1958) 154, p. 4124; 157, p. 4236;
158, pp. 4285, 4290–1; 159, pp. 4304, 4311–12; 160, p. 4329.
834
richard l. davis
manipulative approach to dealing with colleagues, his caution in conducting
foreign affairs all detracted from his original appeal and left him increasingly
isolated from the bureaucracy. Still, the emperor maintained an unwavering
confidence in him. The chief councilor’s policies, although widely assailed,
were hardly unsound. They maintained a high level of order while holding at
bay the empire’s various enemies, domestic and foreign, in difficult circumstances. Moreover, those bureaucrats who disapproved of Shih Mi-yüan had no
single issue around which to rally, that is, until the emperor’s death.
Before assuming the throne in 1194, Ning-tsung had fathered two sons,
both of whom died young. At least seven other sons would follow, but they too
would all die within months of birth. The emperor’s sole daughter suffered a
similar fate. In none of these cases is the maternity recorded, for all the mothers
were apparently lesser consorts. No reasons for their deaths are given, and there
is no suggestion of foul play. Lacking an heir, in 1197 the emperor adopted
the four-year-old Chao Hsün (1193–1220), a descendant of Sung founder T’aitsu’s second son, Chao Te-chao.185 The youth became heir apparent at sixteen
and spent the next decade in training for the throne. As a mark of his favor,
the emperor permitted Chao Hsün occasionally to join in court audiences.
The heir was no less favored by Empress Yang2 and Shih Mi-yüan, especially
the latter, who served the prince in various capacities, including lecturer and
chief advisor. When the twenty-eight-year-old Chao Hsün died in the early
autumn of 1220, the loss to Shih Mi-yüan was personal no less than political.
The death raised the difficult problem of the succession. Three generations
earlier, an heirless Kao-tsung had adopted two sons from the imperial clan
and eventually selected the more promising one as heir. Ning-tsung did not
follow this farsighted precedent. By adopting only one child in 1197, he had
no alternative heir when Chao Hsün died in 1220, and the highly charged
process of identifying a suitable candidate had to begin anew. At fifty-two,
the emperor’s age seemed to preclude adoption of a young child, although this
was the normal ideal, to avoid the succession of a child emperor and a regency
after his own death. The nominee also had to be closely related to the royal
family. In the context of such limitations, Ning-tsung selected Chao Hung
185
On the succession, see Richard L. Davis, “Evolution of an historical stereotype for the Southern Sung
– the case against Shih Mi-yüan,” in Ryū Shiken hakuse shōju kinen: Sō-shi kenkyū ronshū, ed. Kinugawa
Tsuyoshi (Kyoto, 1989), pp. 357–86; Chaffee, Branches of heaven, pp. 202–5; SS 41, pp. 783–4; 243,
pp. 8656–7; 246, pp. 8733–8; 419, pp. 12551–2; 465, p. 13596; Sung-shih ch’üan-wen Hsü Tzu-chih
t’ung-chien 31, pp. 1a–2a; HTC (1958) 158, pp. 4269, 4271; 161, p. 4387; 162, pp. 4395–7, 4399,
4406–7, 4422–4; Liu K’o-chuang, Hou-ts’un hsien-sheng ta ch’üan-chi [Ssu-yen t’ang 1304 ed.; Ssu-pu
ts’ung-k’an ch’u-pien 1929 ed.] (1270; Taipei, 1979) 170, p. 2b; Chao I, Nien-erh shih cha-chi, ed. and
ann. Tu Wei-yün (1799; Taipei, 1975) 23, pp. 496–7.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
835
(d. 1225), the adopted son of the deceased Chao Kai,186 himself the son of
Chao K’ai2 (1146–80), at one time heir to Hsiao-tsung.187
In view of his preeminence at court, Shih Mi-yüan certainly played some
role in choosing Chao Hung, yet problems emerged from early on. The selection required nearly a year’s consideration, suggesting both the complexity of
the process and the existence of serious reservations about the candidate. Moreover, Chao Hung proved, as prince, to be exceedingly abrasive and rebellious.
Making no secret of his enmity for Shih Mi-yüan, he threatened him with
future banishment to the remote south. The councilor is said to have learned
of Chao Hung’s animosity through a young beauty surreptitiously planted in
the palace, but Shih hardly needed an informant, for Chao Hung was not in
the least discreet and his feelings became common knowledge in the capital. Empress Yang2 found the youth equally offensive. Having arranged his
marriage to Princess Wu, her grand-niece, she was allegedly infuriated by the
prince’s neglect of his wife and devotion to several favored concubines, and
concluded that he was undeserving of the throne.188 The alienation of both
the empress and chief councilor is evidenced by Chen Te-hsiu’s admonition
to the prince in the summer of 1222, which warned him: “If Your Highness,
the emperor’s son, can be filial to Your beneficent mother and reverent to high
officials, then Heaven’s mandate will be vested in You. If not, You can imagine
the serious consequences!”189 The force of the statement, the warning about
“serious consequences,” suggests a conflict of considerable intensity soon after
Chao Hung’s adoption. Chen Te-hsiu’s admonition also alludes to the prince’s
association with persons of ill-repute and the notoriety of various unnamed
indiscretions.190 Understandably, the emperor did not rush to install him as
heir apparent.
186
187
188
189
190
Chao Hung’s birth father was Chao Hsi-ch’ü. See SS 246, p. 8735.
It is noteworthy that Chao Hsün and Chao Hung both descended from the line of Chao Te-chao,
second son of T’ai-tsu. All Northern Sung emperors descended from T’ai-tsung, brother of T’ai-tsu,
as did Kao-tsung of the Southern Sung. But the next three emperors – Hsiao-tsung, Kuang-tsung,
and Ning-tsung – descended from T’ai-tsu’s fourth son, Chao Te-fang, effectively restoring the throne
to the line of T’ai-tsu, the dynasty’s founder. Chao Hsün and all subsequent heirs to the Sung throne
descended from the same line, but, as just noted, from a different son, the second son of T’ai-tsu,
not the fourth. Reasons for the shift are obscure, owing as much to adoption patterns established
two generations earlier as to contemporary policy. Still, the decision would prove politically sensitive in time. See Chao, Chao-shih tsu-p’u 1, pp. 41a, 66a–67b; Chaffee, Branches of heaven, pp. 25–
30.
Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih [Hsüeh-chin t’ao-yüan 1806 ed.; 1922 ed.] (c. 1298; Taipei, 1965) hou,
pp. 28b–29a.
HTC (1958) 162, p. 4406.
Chen, Hsi-shan hsien-sheng Chen Wen-chung kung wen-chi 37, pp. 6a–12a.
richard l. davis
836
Only months after the adoption, Ning-tsung had named Chao Yün (1205–
64), an obscure scion of the imperial clan, who like Chao Hung was a descendant
of T’ai-tsu’s second son Chao Te-chao, to replace Chao Hung as heir to the line of
Chao Te-chao. Chao Yün was a native of Shao-hsing. The youth reportedly came
at the recommendation of Yü T’ien-hsi, a one-time teacher of Shih Mi-yüan
who considered Chao Yün promising.191 The nomination was significant, for
the line of Chao Te-chao had already produced one heir to the throne and might
be called upon for a second, should the need arise. The nomination also gave
Chao Yün exposure to influential court and palace figures. He struck a handsome image, it is said. He was regarded as a serious youth of few words, pure and
refined, fond of learning. He immediately appealed to Shih Mi-yüan, whose
disappointment with Chao Hung had already prompted thought of a switch.
In the interim, the education of Chao Yün was entrusted to Cheng Ch’ingchih (1176–1251), Shih’s protégé and fellow Ming-chou provincial. For the
next three years, the court took no further action concerning any change in
succession.
Ning-tsung fell ill in the summer of 1224, and died on 17 September at age
fifty-six. An edict, dated only days before, elevated Chao Yün to imperial son,
a status equal to that of Chao Hung. On the night of the death, in accordance
with the emperor’s will, Chao Yün succeeded as heir to the throne. At the
last minute, Chao Hung had been passed over. Both the final edict and the
dying testament of Ning-tsung were drafted by Shih Mi-yüan, as was standard
practice in Sung times, yet whether the change represented the dying wish of
the emperor or was the illicit deed of his councilor is controversial. By official
accounts, Empress Yang2 learned of the impending switch only upon her
husband’s death and initially demurred; only under Shih Mi-yüan’s sustained
pressure did she consent. Shih Mi-yüan then summoned Chao Yün to the
palace late that night and supervised, under heavy guard, the nineteen-yearold’s accession as the new emperor. With assistance from the Palace Guard
commander Hsia Chen, who had been the assassin of Han T’o-chou seventeen
years earlier, Shih Mi-yüan disarmed Chao Hung’s guards and read out the
imperial testament (i-shu) that disinherited Chao. Shih Mi-yüan then made
Chao Hung make obeisance to the new emperor. There was no violence, and no
resistance from the empress or from the divested prince, who was immediately
exiled to Hu-chou, some sixty miles from the capital. Shih Mi-yüan’s tight
grip on the court had precluded open confrontation.
Shih Mi-yüan has been widely assailed for Chao Hung’s last-minute disinheritance. Many contemporaries and later historians charge that Shih Mi-yüan
191
HTC (1958) 162, pp. 4396.
the reigns of kuang-tsung and ning-tsung
837
had imposed his will upon the emperor and empress – in effect usurping
imperial authority.192 However, the charge is not supported by substantial
evidence, and it disregards the special position of Empress Yang2 at court,
including her involvement in the earlier conspiracy against Han T’o-chou, her
consequent close ties with Shih Mi-yüan, and her continued prominence over
the next seventeen years of Li-tsung’s reign. She was hardly one to be easily
cowed, and the chief councilor, knowing her better than most, surely recognized her importance as arbiter of palace matters involving the imperial family.
She must have been at least consulted, if indeed she did not join Shih Mi-yüan
in initiating the switch. That she should be called upon, after the accession,
to govern from “behind the bamboo screen” as regent confirms her political
stature at the time, although it was an honor she declined. In addition, Shih
Mi-yüan had built his reputation upon caution and prudence, and this did not
change after Ning-tsung’s death.
Had the succession’s legitimacy been seriously questioned, the Sung bureaucratic leadership would certainly have inundated the court with memorials of
protest, vehemently attacking Shih Mi-yüan for his arrogation of authority.
This did not occur in the months directly following the incident. It seems
most likely that all concerned knew that Chao Hung would be a disaster as
emperor and willingly accepted the fait accompli. It is noteworthy that Chao
Hung’s highly regarded tutor, Chen Te-hsiu, returned to Lin-an soon after the
accession and was appointed as vice-minister of rites. In light of his history
of tension with Shih Mi-yüan and his close association with Chao Hung, he
would never have accepted the post had the succession of Chao Yün appeared
to him in any way improper. However, the transition of power, which went so
smoothly at first, would create difficulties with lasting consequence for Shih
Mi-yüan, and for the dynastic line.
During the thirty-five years of Kuang-tsung’s and Ning-tsung’s reigns the
Southern Sung was confronted with some of its greatest challenges. The Sung
endured periods of intense factionalism at court and two major border wars
with the Chin. It suffered through a succession of natural disasters and contended with several large uprisings. It endured imperial leadership that was
at best inattentive and at worst mentally incompetent. Although people of
the time may have looked back nostalgically to the reign of Hsiao-tsung,
the possibility of the imminent demise of the Chin presented unforeseen and
unpredictable opportunities. These included regaining territory lost a century
before, the possible termination of peace payments, and a prospective end to
192
For a fuller analysis, see Davis, “Evolution of an historical stereotype,” and Davis, Court and family in
Sung China, pp. 95–105.
838
richard l. davis
the diplomacy of humiliation. The Mongols, at this point, were openly determined to annihilate the Chin, and they seemed to have had no quarrel with
the Sung. Decisions made over the next few years would profoundly affect
whether the Mongols and the Sung emerged after the elimination of Chin as
friends or foes.
CHAPTER 11
THE REIGN OF LI-TSUNG (1224–1264)
Richard L. Davis
shih mi-yüan in isolation
The sudden elevation of Chao Yün (1205–64) to imperial son only five days
before the death of Emperor Ning-tsung and the replacing of Chao Hung
as heir to the throne might have turned the Sung court into a battlefield of
warring factions. Instead, this irregular transfer of power took place initially
without incident. No mutiny erupted among the guards assigned to protect
Chao Hung. The guards were forcibly detained outside the palace on the night
of Ning-tsung’s death and thereby denied any opportunity to interrupt the
accession. Imperial clansmen living away from Lin-an raised no armies to lead
against the capital with a pledge to restore the throne to its rightful occupant.
The bureaucracy was also muted in its response. No one attempted to assassinate the chief councilor, Shih Mi-yüan, for his leading role in the controversial
succession. There was no repeat of the Han T’o-chou incident. Students at the
Imperial University proved uncharacteristically quiet. No indictments were
submitted against powerful ministers exceeding their authority. The political elite, if not regarding the succession as legitimate, found it expedient to
confine its suspicions and gossip to private quarters. Even the hot-tempered
Chao Hung seems to have passively accepted his fate. He made no attempt to
turn the bureaucracy against Shih Mi-yüan, its increasingly unpopular chief.
The new emperor, known to history as Li-tsung, opted against a distant exile
for his adoptive brother. Chao Hung was quickly moved to the quiet, scenic
fishing town of Hu-chou, where he probably enjoyed considerable freedom of
movement. His noble status was elevated from duke to prince. The indecorous
succession proceeded with face-saving civility, or so seemed the intent of the
parties involved.
840
richard l. davis
The fate of Chao Hung
The nineteen-year-old Li-tsung, acceding to the throne on 17 September 1224,
occupied himself for the next five months with routine matters of state, as Chao
Hung settled into his new home away from the capital. The northern border,
in uncommon placidity, seemed to be mirroring the climate at court. Then
suddenly, and apparently without the slightest warning or provocation, an
incident that threatened rebellion occurred at Hu-chou.1 In the second month
of 1225 three local men – P’an Jen, his brother P’an Ping, and a cousin, P’an
Fu – led a motley band of fishermen and local militia to the prefectural government offices, enumerated the crimes of the chief councilor, and demanded Chao
Hung’s prompt installation as emperor. Claiming the allegiance of some two
hundred thousand crack troops and the support of the prominent Shantung
loyalist Li Ch’üan, they threatened to march on the capital if their demands
were not met. Whether the P’an threesome were themselves fishermen is not
clear. Reports of their attempting, sometime before the outbreak, to contact
Li Ch’üan suggests some familiarity with the complex array of power among
Lin-an, K’ai-feng, and Shantung and their determination to exploit it. Such
astuteness can hardly be expected of ordinary commoners, yet their amateur
effort implies that the rebels were neither realistic nor experienced in highstakes political affairs. With a relatively small force and a remote hope for
assistance from a far-off dissident, the three men dared to challenge the awesome might of an imperial government only sixty or so miles away.
Contemporary documents and later histories absolve Chao Hung of complicity in the affair, although his presence at Hu-chou may have inspired the
action. When the rebels came searching for him, it is rumored that he hid
himself in a drainage ditch. When captured and forced to don the yellow robes
of the throne, he consented only after soliciting promises to harm neither the
empress nor “officials,” an apparent allusion to Shih Mi-yüan. Subsequently,
the prince allegedly accepted the entire effort as doomed and voluntarily led
prefectural troops in suppressing the outbreak, and killing P’an Ping and P’an
1
On the uprising, see T’o-t’o et al., eds., Sung shih [hereafter SS] (1345; Peking, 1977) 246, pp. 8735–8;
476, pp. 13826, 13829; Pi Yüan, Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien [hereafter HTC (1958)] [Te-yü-t’ang tsang-pan
1801 ed.] (1792; Peking, 1958) 163, pp. 4426–7; Chou Mi, Ch’i-tung yeh-yü (1291; Peking, 1983) 14,
pp. 252–9; Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih [Hsüeh-chin t’ao-yüan 1806 ed.; 1922 ed.] (c. 1298; Taipei, 1965)
pieh-chi, pp. 38b–39a; Richard L. Davis, Court and family in Sung China, 960–1279: Bureaucratic success
and kinship fortunes for the Shih of Ming-chou (Durham, N.C.,1986), pp. 95–105; John W. Chaffee, Branches
of heaven: A history of the imperial clan of Sung China (Cambridge, Mass., 1999), pp. 202–4; Charles A.
Peterson, “Old illusions and new realities: Sung foreign policy, 1217–1234,” in China among equals: The
Middle Kingdom and its neighbors, 10th–14th centuries, ed. Morris Rossabi (Berkeley, Calif.,1983), pp. 204–
39. For an interesting but questionable account, see Sung-chi san-ch’ao cheng-yao [Shou-shan ko ts’ung-shu
n.d. ed.] (Taipei, 1968) 1, pp. 1a–b.
the reign of li-tsung
841
Fu. He promptly informed the court of the affair. Shih Mi-yüan, however, had
already dispatched the Palace Guard to Hu-chou with specific instructions, so
it is alleged, to execute Chao Hung. Chao Hung was captured and died by
strangulation. From beginning to end, the incident scarcely lasted two weeks.
Virtually all extant source materials are highly biased against Shih Mi-yüan.
Most writers, especially those from the Ming dynasty, denounced Shih as an
assassin and go to great lengths to extol the moral virtues of Chao Hung.2 These
writers, pointing to the spontaneous character and small scale of the rebellion,
as well as noting the duress involved in Chao Hung’s initial submission to the
rebels and his voluntary role in their suppression, present Shih Mi-yüan’s drastic response as savagely inhumane and unjustified. But these critics emphasize
only one side of the story. There is also evidence implicating Chao Hung. First,
although responsibility for the outbreak is placed solely with the P’an cousins,
once imperial robes were thrust upon Chao Hung, the prefect of Hu-chou
reportedly led a sizable entourage of official colleagues to the prefectural office
to submit their congratulations to the would-be emperor. By their conduct,
they too became implicated in the rebellion. If they had believed the incident
was truly hatched by a tiny band of politically insignificant actors who lacked
the enthusiastic support of the prince, such high-level endorsement would
have been inconceivable. Second, the outbreak is portrayed as spontaneous,
but the rebels by their own admission were in contact with Li Ch’üan some
three hundred to four hundred miles away in central Shantung. Such distant
communication also involved crossing the Sung-Chin border at a time of war,
so the rebels must have established a link with Li Ch’üan long before the
incident.
If the rebels were in contact with Li Ch’üan, then the spontaneity claimed
in later accounts is not credible. Nor is support from an eminent Li Ch’üan a
reasonable expectation for illiterate fishermen without some advance encouragement from Chao Hung. The prince must have given the rebels at least tacit
support from early on. However, Chao Hung is presented as a moderating force
among the rebels, one whose concern for the well-being of Empress Yang2 and
Shih Mi-yüan is remarkably noble, especially in the context of their having
aggressively intervened to deny him the throne only a few months earlier. Such
magnanimity completely contradicts Chao Hung’s character prior to this. As
noted in the preceding chapter, his uncontrollable temper and lack of discretion as imperial son, which included threats to banish Shih Mi-yüan and
conflicts with Empress Yang2, had made influential enemies for him. Neither
2
On Ming and Ch’ing dynasty interpretations of the succession controversy, see Richard L. Davis, “Evolution of an historical stereotype for the Southern Sung – the case against Shih Mi-yüan,” in Ryū Shiken
hakuse shōju kinen: Sō-shi kenkyū ronshū, ed. Kinugawa Tsuyoshi (Kyoto, 1989), pp. 357–86.
842
richard l. davis
moderate nor forgiving, Chao Hung had despised the chief councilor, whose
intervention in the accession could only have deepened Chao Hung’s enmity
toward him. To be sure, a glaring contradiction exists between depictions of
Chao Hung’s extreme personality prior to 1225 and accounts of his “moderate”
role in the rebellion.
In effect, Chao Hung in death appears far nobler than he did in life. For
the first time, he won sympathy from many men who had said nothing in his
defense five months earlier, when his royal inheritance was snatched away.
Differing accounts of the incident in Hu-chou rushed through the capital like floodwaters. Memorials of protest inundated the court. One rumor
blamed Chao Hung’s death on a retainer of Shih Mi-yüan, someone specifically instructed by the councilor to assassinate the prince.3 One youthfully
intemperate scholar, Teng Jo-shui (chin-shih 1220), submitted an impassioned
memorial accusing the councilor of outright sedition and demanded his execution. Not incidentally, Teng also charged Shih Mi-yüan with forging Ningtsung’s testament (i-shu) on the eve of the emperor’s death.4 This was an issue
no other official dared to raise, let alone publicize, owing to its implications
concerning the legitimacy of Li-tsung himself.
Most official protests, while less offensively worded, were nonetheless
scathingly critical. The complaints of Wei Liao-weng, a Tao-hsüeh proponent
with a long history of conflict with Shih Mi-yüan, focused not on the legitimacy of the succession itself, but on the moral and political implications of
the conflict in Hu-chou. Wei stressed that events at Hu-chou reflected a much
larger problem, the political instability resulting from Shih Mi-yüan’s dominance and seemingly interminable tenure as chief councilor.5 For those who
agreed with Wei Liao-weng, Shih Mi-yüan had become more than a political
liability for the court – he was a bad moral influence on the impressionable
new emperor. But perhaps the most incisive criticism came from Chen Te-hsiu,
then vice-minister of rites, an individual known for cooperating with Shih Miyüan despite policy differences. Sharing with Wei Liao-weng a firm moralistic
outlook, Chen Te-hsiu was troubled by Li-tsung’s cold indifference toward his
stepbrother in refusing to appoint an heir for Chao Hung following the death
of Chao’s only son so that Chao Hung’s lineage would not be extinguished
and ritual sacrifices to the dead prince could be performed. Chen felt that this
refusal betrayed an alarming deficiency in the fraternal affection that was a
cardinal virtue of Confucian morality.6 This theme of fraternal devotion, and
3
4
5
6
Chou, Ch’i-tung yeh-yü (1983) 14, p. 253; HTC (1958) 163, p. 4427.
SS 455, pp. 13378–81; HTC (1958) 163, pp. 4435–6.
SS 437, pp. 12967–8.
SS 437, pp. 12961–2; HTC (1958) 163, pp. 4427–8, 4439–41.
the reign of li-tsung
843
the role of the emperor as paragon of that virtue, runs through many other
memorials, and overshadows all concern for the rebellion at Hu-chou or even
for the death of Chao Hung. Clearly, this issue had been seized upon by opponents of Shih Mi-yüan and politicized to implicate the new emperor as well.
Chen Te-hsiu had pressed for an open investigation of the Hu-chou incident.
His request was firmly denied.
Rather than placate the critics, Li-tsung aggravated them. On first learning
of Chao Hung’s death, he suspended court for a day and considered posthumous
honors. Yet within months, not only was Chao Hung posthumously demoted
to duke, his old titular status, but he was buried without honors on a straw
mat. Chao Hung’s demotion coincided with the elevation of Shih Mi-yüan to
grand preceptor. Li-tsung, no doubt, intended the latter move to demonstrate
his continued confidence in the councilor. In the view of Shih Mi-yüan critics,
however, to demote Chao Hung, a perceived innocent victim of circumstance,
while bestowing high honors upon his executioner, appeared morally unacceptable. Shih Mi-yüan declined the tribute, but this did not appease those in
the outer court, who continued their denunciations. Two memorials from Hu
Meng-yü (1185–1226), then a minor executive at the Ministry of Personnel,
drew much sympathy.7 In justifying his appeal for compassion, Hu compared the court’s treatment of Chao Hung to the treatment afforded another
ill-fated Sung prince, Chao T’ing-mei (947–84), brother of T’ai-tsu and T’aitsung. Chao T’ing-mei had been suspected of sedition, exiled to Fang-chou,
and demoted in rank from prince to duke. When news of Chao T’ing-mei’s
death reached the capital, T’ai-tsung was moved to restore his princely status.
Reflecting on this early precedent of magnanimity, Hu Meng-yü’s memorials, without the malice of many other petitions, made a strong plea for
compassion.
Despite such appeals, the court’s response was rigid. Shih Mi-yüan had
always been a man of compromise, not inclined to confrontation, so this new
firmness may reflect the emperor’s wishes. With the now twenty-year-old Litsung attempting to prove his worth, compromise with the forces of opinion
was untimely: the emperor could not afford to appear weak lest the bureaucracy
become unmanageable. In consequence, the court used the Censorate to silence
the critics. By the end of 1225, Teng Jo-shui, Wei Liao-weng, and Chen Tehsiu were all censured and demoted. The forty-one-year-old Hu Meng-yü,
stripped of official status, was exiled to a distant Kwangsi, where he died
the next year of dysentery. His death was widely thought unjust within the
civil service and cost Shih Mi-yüan many supporters. Ch’iao Hsing-chien, for
7
Hu Meng-yü and Hu Chih-jou, Hsiang-t’ai shou-mo (1225; Taipei, 1965–70); SS 244, pp. 8666–70.
844
richard l. davis
example, had served under Shih in various capacities prior to 1225 and the
two were apparently quite cordial, yet Ch’iao Hsing-chien joined those in the
outer court protesting the posthumous humiliation of Chao Hung. Members
of Shih Mi-yüan’s own kin group similarly voiced their opposition. A cousin,
Shih Mi-kung, demanded that the spirit of Chao Hung be given rest through
proper burial and adoption of a male heir.8 In effect, the Chao Hung incident
provided moralists long opposed to Shih Mi-yüan with precisely the issue
they needed to mobilize official opinion against him. The incident had in turn
shattered the broad alliance established by Shih Mi-yüan following the death
of Han T’o-chou, an alliance of politicians and Tao-hsüeh proponents that had
weakened over the years but had still been alive. Relying on only a handful of
close friends, Shih Mi-yüan became “isolated on high.”
In the end, dissidents could not be silenced by demotion and exile. They
would soon be emboldened by other events. The early years of the Li-tsung
reign were visited by natural disasters of every variety: floods in Huai-nan
and Che-hsi, devastating fires at Ch’u-chou and Ch’i-chou2, an earthquake
not far from Lin-an, and massive flooding in Szechwan following the rupture of a mountain. The heavens proved equally disquieted. Falling stars were
frequently reported, and the path of Venus (chin-hsing) was described as inconstant. Many officials, making the traditional assumption that disruptions in
nature reflect disharmony among humans, were quick to suggest a connection
between the natural events and Chao Hung’s posthumous treatment. According to Yeh Wei-tao (chin-shih 1220), later named a professor at the Imperial
University, Chao Hung’s ch’i (life force) had not dispersed, owing to Chao’s
improper burial and the absence of an heir to conduct ritual sacrifices to him,
and this ch’i was wreaking havoc throughout the empire. Others concurred
and pleaded for appropriate atonement.9 The court refused, at least for Shih
Mi-yüan’s remaining eight years, and the controversy continued to smolder.
Such inflexibility may appear petty minded, but there was more at stake. The
naming of an heir for Chao Hung could lead to a future crisis if the adopted
son proved politically ambitious and coveted the throne denied his adopted
father. The cautious Shih Mi-yüan could not bring himself to take that risk.
For the sake of the young emperor, if not for his own political security, he
made a decision that cost his reputation dearly. He would go down in history
as the councilor whose main accomplishment was the murder and humiliation
of a royal prince. Shih Mi-yüan’s reputation might well have been salvaged by
an imaginative, successful border policy, but Sung’s foreign enemies proved
unaccommodating.
8
9
SS 417, pp. 12489–92; 423, p. 12637.
SS 438, pp. 12986–7; 434, p. 12900; HTC (1958) 163, p. 4434.
the reign of li-tsung
845
The loyalist outbreak
Border hostilities had subsided somewhat when Li-tsung took the throne. The
Chin braced themselves for a final showdown with the Mongols after striking
a peace agreement with the Hsi Hsia in late 1224 that ended their foolhardy
war. The Mongols had withdrawn briefly from the region, but were again in
full force at Hsi Hsia borders by early 1226 to begin their final assault on
that empire. With Temüjin (Chinggis khan) in personal command of Mongol
armies, the Hsi Hsia capital fell within a year.10 The concentration of Mongol
energies on the Hsi Hsia gave the Chin a respite of sorts. The death of Temüjin
in the summer of 1227 in the midst of the Hsi Hsia campaign must also have
come as welcome news. Beyond a lull in fighting, it brought the prospect of
a succession dispute that might set contending Mongol camps against one
another. The Chin made new peace overtures, and the Mongols, by ignoring
them, implied an inevitable resumption of hostilities. For the Sung, which
in the mid-1220s had squandered valuable energy on domestic issues, recent
developments were ominous. Mongol acquisition of the Hsi Hsia domain
placed them in proximity to northern Szechwan. Worse yet, any hiatus in
fighting to the north might free the Chin to resume hostilities against the
south. Conflict with either the Chin or Mongols was seen as inevitable by
many Sung statesmen, but Shih Mi-yüan, clinging to his old ambivalence in
foreign affairs, simply chose to reinforce border defenses while denying that
there was a serious military challenge.
The beleaguered Chin posed only a modest threat to the south by this time,
but Sung China had other menaces to confront. In the preceding chapter,
mention was made of the preponderance of rebel bands in Shantung, some
claiming allegiance with Sung, and others asserting their autonomy from the
Chin in the aftermath of Mongol incursions. With the Chin seemingly on the
verge of extinction, the Sung could not but reassess its policies toward these
loyalists in Shantung. To exclude the Mongols from the northeast and perhaps
even reclaim the territory for itself, the Sung court needed an early foothold
in the region and loyalists could provide the means.
Shantung activists, anxious to procure material assistance from the south and
to legitimate their own activities, were happy to acquiesce to the Sung court,
and the court had much to gain from the arrangement. Apart from providing
10
For details, see H. Desmond Martin, “The Mongol wars with Hsi Hsia (1205–1227),” Journal of the
Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland Nos. 3–4 (1942), pp. 195–228; Li Tse-fen, Yüan-shih
hsin-chiang (Taipei, 1978), vol. 1, pp. 491–510; and Ruth W. Dunnell, “The Hsi Hsia,” in The Cambridge
history of China, volume 6: Alien regimes and border states, 907–1368, ed. Herbert Franke and Denis C.
Twitchett (New York, 1994), pp. 205–14.
0
600 km
0
Rebel Liao
Vassals
of the Mongols
1211–33
400 miles
Strategic prefectures
UNDER MONGOL
HSI HSIA
CONTROL
KORYO
(Conquered
by Mongols
1227)
AS OF 1223
Li Ch’üan/Red Coat
Domain
(1215–33,
Li killed 1231)
CHIN TERRITORY
Ch’in
K’AI-FENG
AS OF 1223
Hsing-yüan
Teng
Hsiang-yang
Ch’eng-tu
Ch’u
T’ang
Shou
Hao
Ssu
Kuang
Sui
Te-an
SO U TH ERN
LIN-AN
SU N G
Map 28. Border situation as of Li-tsung’s succession, c. 1224.
the reign of li-tsung
847
nominal Sung authority over the Shantung region, the arrangement enabled
the Sung to deploy loyalists in the south, as in the case of Li Ch’üan, to assist
in defending the Sung-Chin border. Although Shih Mi-yüan showed little
interest in venturesome military undertakings and extended aid only under
pressure from border officials, the limited assistance would steadily expand.
By the late 1220s, conferral of handsome subsidies and lofty titles on loyalists
in the north became established policy. The court honored Li Ch’üan, whose
territory now stretched from I-tu in a southeasterly direction along the coast,
as regional commandant, and P’eng I-pin (d. 1225) became military director,
with control centering on western Shantung and extending toward Ta-ming.
The total cost of loyalist subsidies is uncertain, yet official records indicate
that in 1224, as court support began to increase, the armies of Li Ch’üan and
P’eng I-pin drew subsidies of some three hundred thousand strings of cash.11
In exchange for its largesse, the Sung court expected loyalists to defer to the
authority of Sung border commanders, a demand that irritated some loyalists.
For the Sung court, the most difficult loyalist was Li Ch’üan.12 Under
Ning-tsung, through a clever combination of conquest and alliance, Li Ch’üan
had proven himself a valued asset to the south, but his own ambitions had
undermined his usefulness to the Sung. As early as 1222, he began trying to
eliminate neighboring loyalists in the northeast, which forced some wouldbe loyalists into the arms of the Mongols. Li also proceeded to harass Sung
border authorities. Among the numerous military supervisors from the region
of the eastern Huai River, Chia She had achieved greater success than most at
coordinating loyalists and subordinating them to Sung command. Chia She
was realistic about the loyalties of such groups. He once complained of Shih
Mi-yüan’s excessive generosity toward Li Ch’üan, and in this way implied
that loyalists in general, but especially Li Ch’üan, were scarcely better than
brigands, of potential value to be sure, but also a potentially dangerous source
of future trouble.13 Chia She’s death in 1223 curtailed the Sung’s limited
success with the loyalist movements. Succeeding supervisors were sometimes
contentious and at other times ingratiating toward loyalists, in either event
weakening the hand of the Sung court. Hsü Kuo (d. 1225) who had been a
minor officer before becoming a military supervisor, lacked Chia She’s extensive
experience in negotiations, and his hostility toward Li Ch’üan was a matter of
11
12
13
HTC (1958) 162, p. 4421.
Davis, Court and family in Sung China, pp. 107–10; the chapter “Nan Sung Chin Yüan chien ti Shantung chung-i-chün yü Li Ch’üan,” in Sun K’o-k’uan, Meng-ku Han-chün chi Han wen-hua yen-chiu (Taipei,
1958), pp. 11–43; Sun K’o-k’uan, Yüan-tai Han wen-hua chih huo-tung (Taipei, 1968), pp. 65–83; SS
476–7; Chou, Ch’i-tung yeh-yü (1983) 9, pp. 157–64; Ch’ien Shih-sheng, Nan Sung shu (c. 1590; n.p.,
1792) 44, pp. 1a–10b; 54, pp. 3b–4a.
SS 403, p. 12209.
848
richard l. davis
public record. Chia She had perceived the Shantung activist as arrogant and
unruly, but not altogether disloyal; Hsü Kuo, however, considered Li Ch’üan
totally self-serving and treacherous. Shih Mi-yüan seems to have reasoned that
the forceful personality Hsü Kuo commanded at the border might intimidate
and perhaps humble Li Ch’üan, which would explain his appointment of Hsü
Kuo. If this was the case, Shih was gravely mistaken. As tension between Hsü
and Li increased, Li Ch’üan instigated a mutiny in the border town of Ch’uchou, and Hsü Kuo died in flight. This challenge to Sung authority on Sung
territory occurred in early spring of 1225, only a month after the uprising of
the deposed Chao Hung at Hu-chou.14
Even before the Ch’u-chou mutiny, the Li Ch’üan threat must have been
apparent. The rebels at Hu-chou, in turning to Shantung for assistance against
the Sung court, had demonstrated that the possibility of Li Ch’üan’s duplicity
was common knowledge. Several months after the Hu-chou uprising, one of
its leaders, rebel P’an Jen, surfaced at Ch’u-chou, apparently en route to Shantung. His cover exposed, he was captured and sent to Lin-an for execution. The
linkage between Li Ch’üan and the Hu-chou insurgents increased pressures in
Lin-an to act against the Shantung leader. Chao K’uei (1186–1266) and Chao
Fan, sons of the eminent commander Chao Fang, had boldly advocated a northern expedition even before 1225. Ch’en Hsün, nephew of Shih Mi-yüan and
erudite of ceremonials, now similarly demanded firm action. Even the ordinarily moderate Ch’iao Hsing-chien took a militant stand in this case, recognizing
that further indulgence of Li Ch’üan might undermine Sung authority on a
much larger scale. Finally, the military director of the main insurgent group
in western Shantung, P’eng I-pin, outraged at Li Ch’üan’s duplicity, joined
Sung authorities in conspiring against his neighbor, Li Ch’üan. But, the conspiracy ended with P’eng I-pin’s untimely death later in the year 1225.15 As
had occurred with Wu Hsi’s uprising of 1207 in Szechwan, Shih Mi-yüan may
have hoped that P’eng I-pin would succeed in resolving the loyalist threat
internally, which would have spared Shih the risks of direct intervention.
When Peng’s death ruled this out, Shih Mi-yüan settled for an unseemly but
convenient appeasement. He appointed accommodating commanders to the
strategic post at Ch’u-chou and continued to provision the armies of Li Ch’üan.
However, Li Ch’üan’s position in the region was not stable. In the spring
of 1226, the Mongols trapped Li Ch’üan at I-tu, his base in central Shantung.
The encirclement, lasting over a year, permitted the Sung court to strengthen
14
15
SS 476, pp. 13825–7; HTC (1958) 162, p. 4418; 163, pp. 4430–2.
References are in SS 417, pp. 12499–500, 12505–6; 423, p. 12639; 417, p. 12492; 476, p. 13828; HTC
(1958) 163, pp. 4436–7; Sun K’o-k’uan, Meng-ku ch’u-ch’i chih chün-lüeh yü Chin chih peng-k’uei (Taipei,
1955), pp. 65–81; Hu Chao-hsi et al., Sung Meng (Yüan) kuan-hsi shih, (Ch’eng-tu, 1992), pp. 36–41.
the reign of li-tsung
849
its hand in southern Shantung, where the remnants of Li Ch’üan’s army had
taken refuge. The time seemed right for confrontation. Halting provisions to
Li Ch’üan from the south, the new prefect of Ch’u-chou, Liu Cho (d. 1227),
moved quickly to mobilize opponents of Li Ch’üan against Li’s remnant forces.
The ploy failed because of the resourcefulness of Yang Miao-chen, the wife
of Li Ch’üan, who had temporarily taken command of Li’s armies and who
outmaneuvered Liu Cho and forced him to flee Ch’u-chou under cover of
night. His garrison went over to the rebels. Meanwhile, the year-long siege of
Li Ch’üan at I-tu had reduced the city’s population to a fraction of its original
several hundred thousand, yet cleverly Li Ch’üan was spared imminent defeat
by striking a deal with the Mongols. In exchange for formally relinquishing
the city, he received appointment as regional administrator (hsing-t’ai shangshu sheng) of Shantung. Shih Mi-yüan in response named Yao Ch’ung (d. 1227)
to be prefect of Ch’u-chou. Rather than attack, Yao tried to ingratiate himself
with Li Ch’üan. The gesture did not appease Yang Miao-chen or Li Fu2,
brother of Li Ch’üan. Within six months, Yao Ch’ung was driven out of Ch’uchou, fleeing an assassination plot hatched by Yang Miao-chen and Li Fu2. In
effect, the rebels had overrun a vital city on the Sung border and they posed a
growing menace to the lower Huai region and especially to the strategically
vital Yang-chou, less than sixty miles to the south.
The mutiny at Ch’u-chou could not be sustained by Yang Miao-chen and
Li Fu2. A son and a concubine of Li Ch’üan had been killed in the fighting,
and when Li Ch’üan returned to retake the city in the early autumn of 1227,
he wore Mongol vestments as symbols of his new allegiance. The abortive
Ch’u-chou mutiny had been led by Shih Ch’ing (d. 1227), a former Li Ch’üan
subordinate, with the aid of a local Sung commander. Li Ch’üan quickly won
back the city, ending its month-long autonomy, and Shih Ch’ing died at his
hands. The overconfident Li Ch’üan now began to assemble a naval force in
preparation for war against the Sung. For the next two years, Shih Mi-yüan
tried to use lofty titles and royal stipends to appease the Shantung leader;
he continued to ignore the appeals of colleagues to take up arms against Li
Ch’üan. For his part, Li Ch’üan rejected the Sung court’s offers, showing that
he was fixed in his commitment to the Mongols. The inability of the Sung
court to control Li Ch’üan’s ambitions was most glaringly apparent in the early
1230s, as Li Ch’üan expanded his territory in the direction of Yang-chou, and
Shih Mi-yüan still did not abandon the policy of provisioning him.16
By late 1230, Li Ch’üan began a siege of T’ai-chou, sixty miles into Sung
territory and only twelve miles east of Yang-chou. The sixty-six-year-old
16
SS 477, pp. 13842–3; HTC (1958) 165, pp. 4492–3, 4496.
850
richard l. davis
Shih Mi-yüan still did not declare war himself, but deferred the honor to
Cheng Ch’ing-chih, his close confidant and assisting executive at the Bureau of
Military Affairs. Once the decision to act was made, the court moved swiftly,
entrusting the brothers Chao K’uei and Chao Fan with general command of the
punitive campaign. The showdown occurred at Yang-chou, where the rebels
reportedly numbered several hundred thousand. Even assuming the induction
of nearby residents into military service, this is not a believable estimate; the
armies of Li Ch’üan appear never to have exceeded thirty thousand men. Even
so, a force of thirty thousand was not to be taken lightly, and the Chao brothers,
no doubt with a force of equal if not greater size, broke the rebel blockade and
destroyed much of Li’s army. Defeat for Li Ch’üan was resounding. He died
on 18 February 1231. Sung armies moved north, recapturing border towns
such as Ch’u-chou and Huai-an and purging them of Li Ch’üan partisans. The
remnants of the Shantung army returned north, and were never again a serious
threat.
The speed with which Sung armies eradicated the Li Ch’üan menace reflected
poorly on the judgment of Shih Mi-yüan by making his earlier reluctance to
act appear unwarranted. Some might conclude that the military folly of Han
T’o-chou a generation earlier had left Shih Mi-yüan a prisoner of historical precedent, unable to grasp the differences of past and present and to act
accordingly. But the issues confronting Shih Mi-yüan went far beyond the old
choices of aggressive intervention or passive neglect.
Beyond the Chin response to Sung actions in Shantung, the Sung had to
consider Mongol reactions as well. Early on in their conquest of Chin, the
Mongols held territory along the western border of Shantung and aggressively
encouraged the activities of local rebels to undermine Chin authority. By 1221
the Mongols had won the favor of Chang Lin2, a rebel lured by Li Ch’üan into
the Sung camp two years earlier, who abruptly abandoned the Sung when personal rivalry divided the two men. Chang Lin2’s base of operations centered on
northwest Shantung and extended into Ho-pei East circuit. In 1223, however,
Chang Lin2 abandoned the Mongols and submitted once more to the Sung.
The Sung court could hardly turn him away, although entering into a bidding
war with the Mongols in Shantung could have costly repercussions. Sung relations with another loyalist, P’eng I-pin, proved even more sensitive. With a
base south of Chang Lin2’s, P’eng I-pin repeatedly engaged Mongol armies as
he expanded his territory north into Ta-ming. Holding Sung rank and firmly
committed to the Sung court, he could only be viewed by the Mongols as a
Sung agent. Chang Lin2 and P’eng I-pin may have brought the Sung into
indirect conflict with the Mongols, but the use of Sung regular troops in the
suppression of Li Ch’üan risked, for the first time, direct conflict between the
Mongols and the Sung. In this context, Shih Mi-yüan had good reason to act
the reign of li-tsung
851
with caution, for the Sung could ill-afford to incur another powerful enemy
and trigger yet another war.
However defensible, Shih Mi-yüan’s caution may have forced Li Ch’üan into
the waiting arms of the Mongols. The Yüan dynasty (1260–1368) compilers
of the Sung dynastic history (Sung shih) have no high regard for Li Ch’üan. An
uncommonly long biography, subsumed under “treasonous officials,” portrays
Li Ch’üan as a self-serving traitor from the outset. The modern historian Sun
K’o-k’uan has challenged this view, demonstrating rather convincingly that
official chroniclers were biased against loyalist groups in general. They even
denied a biography to the one Shantung activist who remained loyal to the
Sung court until the end, P’eng I-pin, seeking to exclude any loyalist who
failed to fit their Li Ch’üan stereotype of duplicity. Sun K’o-k’uan and others
characterize Shantung loyalists as more than just opportunists; they see them
as patriots imbued with “ethnic consciousness” and seeking to restore majority
rule to China. The failure of the loyalist mission may relate, in part, to the
destructive tensions among rivals in Shantung, but the transformation of Sung
loyalists into traitors is blamed largely upon Shih Mi-yüan.17 More committed
to securing the south than regaining the north, and distrustful of armies not
directly responsible to him, Shih Mi-yüan sought simply to harness loyalist
armies for the Sung’s advantage. Li Ch’üan, quite simply, found the terms
unacceptable.
Notwithstanding the need to reassess the loyalist question independent
of court historians, Sun K’o-k’uan’s view appears as yet another extreme. Li
Ch’üan may have begun as a source of loyalist unity, but after 1221 his preoccupation with his own territorial expansion and dominance of the Shantung
region made him the principal source of division. Ambition of this sort cannot
be easily blamed on the Sung court. Moreover, Li Ch’üan’s submission to the
Mongols and his war against the Sung are curious moves for an “ethnically
conscious” individual. Autonomy, after all, was not altogether unfeasible in
an area as isolated as Shantung. Yüan historians may have treated Li Ch’üan
harshly because of the duplicity of his adopted son, Li T’an, several decades
later, rather than judging Li Ch’üan on his own merits. It would also be equally
erroneous to portray Li Ch’üan as a tragic hero. Better suited for that role is
perhaps P’eng I-pin, the hapless loyalist who, in the face of many hardships,
died while trying to oust the Mongols from Ho-pei West. Trapped between
Li Ch’üan to the east, the Chin to the west, the Mongols to the northwest, and
the Mongol puppets Yen Shih and Chang Lin2 to the north, P’eng’s position
was far more tenuous, yet never once did he abandon the Sung, even in the face
17
Sun, Meng-ku ch’u-ch’i chih chün-lüeh yü Chin chih peng-k’uei, pp. 65–81; Huang K’uan-ch’ung, Nan Sung
shih-tai k’ang Chin ti i-chün (Taipei, 1988), pp. 224–33.
852
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of the Sung’s annoyingly short-sighted policies. Li Ch’üan, a totally different
character, was ruined by his own uncontrolled arrogance and ambition.
foreign policy
The strategic see-saw
During the Ning-tsung era, Sung-Mongol relations were characterized more
by ambivalence than by relations between friend or foe. Despite long-standing
Sung-Chin tensions, few Sung officials promoted an alliance with the Mongols
against the Jurchen. A forceful performance in the brief K’ai-hsi war that had
been concluded only a few years before, in 1208, had clearly demonstrated
that Chin military power was far from spent. The expectation that the Chin
could arrest the Mongol advance was not totally fanciful. Few in the Sung
capital had seriously entertained the ominous prediction of Chen Te-hsiu in
1214, who warned that the Mongol menace would likely become the future
Sung peril. Shih Mi-yüan had not departed from his long-standing policy of
noninvolvement. Even the reopening of hostilities along the Sung-Chin border
did not substantially affect Sung-Mongol relations. The Mongols had initiated
overtures to the Sung as early as 1214, although it was not until 1221 that
the Sung court conducted its first successful mission to their encampments.
Coinciding with a massive Chin offensive against the Sung, the mission was
intended to remind the Chin of the risks of fighting on two fronts. The next
serious effort at dialogue occurred in 1225, in the midst of a major Mongol
drive against Li Ch’üan.18 Outside of this, the Sung made, at most, only halfhearted efforts to expand its dialogue with the Mongols and put pressure on
the Jurchen. However, in 1231, when a Mongol envoy arrived at the Sung
border to negotiate the passage of their armies through Huai-nan en route to
the Chin capital K’ai-feng, he was killed by Sung patrols.19 The action, while
probably not sanctioned by the court, represented a provocation requiring
military retaliation. An ambivalent Sung court, it appears, did not bother
with an apology.
The retaliation that followed was not the first time that Mongol and Sung
armies had clashed.20 In their conquest of the Hsi Hsia in the summer of 1227,
the Mongols had attacked the Chin empire’s western flank at strategically
vital Feng-hsiang and Shang-chou, only miles from the Sung border. Nearby
18
19
20
Sung Lien et al., Yüan shih [Po-na-pen 1930–7 ed.] (1370; Peking, 1976) 1, pp. 21, 23; Hu et al., Sung
Meng (Yüan) kuan-hsi shih, pp. 17–26; Peterson, “Old illusions and new realities,” pp. 218–19.
Sung et al., Yüan shih 2, p. 31; HTC (1958) 165, pp. 4501–2.
Li T’ien-ming, Sung Yüan chan-shih (Taipei, 1988), pp. 38–45, 75–86.
the reign of li-tsung
853
Sung prefectures of Feng-chou, Hsi-ho-chou, and Chieh-chou were also hit.
No rationale was given for entering Sung territory. On his deathbed, Temüjin
reportedly acknowledged that speedy annihilation of the Chin required attacking K’ai-feng from the south, because the swift, wide Yellow River protecting
the Chin capital on the north made a direct north-to-south frontal assault
unmanageable for his cavalry forces.21 Temüjin’s lieutenants may have forced
their way through Sung lands for lack of time or patience to win a negotiated
passage, but this cannot explain their attacks as far south as Chieh-chou and
Mien-chou, some sixty miles into the Sung domain. Perhaps the Mongols,
having depopulated and destroyed most of the Tangut empire, merely came
for booty. Whatever their motives, they soon returned home to battle over the
succession to Temüjin.
Ögödei (r. 1229–41), Temüjin’s successor, has been portrayed as a man of
sound judgment and impressive administrative talent, more committed to
political consolidation than his father the warrior had been.22 Despite the
execution of Li Ch’üan by Sung armies, Ögödei chose not to resume hostilities
against the Sung. In the summer of 1231, just months after Li Ch’üan’s death,
Ögödei dispatched an emissary to Lin-an to negotiate the passage of Mongol
troops through Sung territory. That the mission ended in failure was bad
enough, but during the return trip home the envoy was killed by an assassin,
allegedly a Sung commander at Mien-chou. In response, Mongol armies overran
Szechwan and penetrated as far south as Lang-chou, some one hundred and
eighty miles into the interior of Sung territory. The rapid strike, which cost
the Sung countless civilian lives, lasted no more than a month and appears to
have been largely a show of force, perhaps even a forage for booty, but certainly
not a serious effort at conquest. This is implied by the commissioning of a
second Mongol envoy who specifically sought provisions. The Mongols must
have assumed that the Sung would relent only under duress. What is most
perplexing about these developments in 1231 is Shih Mi-yüan’s intransigence.
For a councilor who favored accommodation over confrontation, he seems
hardly the type to forgo an opportunity to patch up differences. Anti-Mongol
sentiment in the south may have been a factor: Shih Mi-yüan had always been
more responsive to critics at home than to enemies abroad. With popular
passions running high against the Mongols in the aftermath of the Li Ch’üan
affair, the time was not right for a rapprochement.
Mounting tensions along the border and the emotional pressures they created left the aging Shih Mi-yüan, according to some contemporary accounts,
21
22
Sung et al., Yüan shih 1, p. 25.
Thomas T. Allsen, Mongol imperialism: The policies of the Grand Qan Möngke in China, Russia, and the Islamic
lands, 1251–1259 (Berkeley, Calif., 1987), pp. 18–44.
854
richard l. davis
so depressed that he attempted suicide.23 Court gossip of this sort should
always be viewed with skepticism, but it is known that the emperor, in January 1231, had reduced court attendance for Shih Mi-yüan to once every ten
days, an unmistakable sign of diminished vigor. Li-tsung also restored rank
and salary to prominent critics Chen Te-hsiu and Wei Liao-weng, men who
had been demoted six years earlier for challenging the posthumous treatment
of Chao Hung. It seemed to many that Shih Mi-yüan had begun to fall from
grace and that the emperor was on the verge of asserting himself. But it was not
so. Although politically revived, the critics received no appointments in the
capital. Nor did Li-tsung appoint a second councilor to share power with Shih
Mi-yüan. Routine administrative chores fell increasingly upon the shoulders of
Cheng Ch’ing-chih, assistant councilor since January 1231. As the chief councilor’s protégé and handpicked successor, Cheng represents largely an extension
of Shih Mi-yüan’s influence. Only death, which came in the autumn of 1233,
would end Shih’s marathon tenure as chief councilor.
Shih Mi-yüan’s legacy engendered hostility, not deference, from many of
his contemporaries, and malicious denunciation from later historians. Policy
failures aside, Shih Mi-yüan’s extraordinary tenure made unpopularity virtually
inevitable. In 1231 a collator at the Palace Library wrote:
[Your Majesty] has held the throne eight years now, but one never hears of things being
done [by You]. In the promotion and demotion of talent, initiation and renunciation of
political matters, all in the realm say, “This is the chief councilor’s will.”. . . . You may be
the Son of Heaven, lord of the people, yet starting with the court and extending throughout
the realm, all speak of the councilor and do not speak of the ruler.24
The memorialist does not attack specific policies, merely the dominance
that Shih Mi-yüan represented, overshadowing the throne. This theme figures
prominently in the criticisms of others as well. Wei Liao-weng, soon after
the councilor’s death, composed an emotional excoriation of Shih Mi-yüan’s
“eight failures.” The memorial, focusing principally on the recent trend toward
all-powerful ministers, concludes by advocating a division of bureaucratic
powers.25 Scant attention is paid to the councilor’s foreign policy or to his role
in the 1224 succession of Li-tsung; such issues are more compelling to critics
of the Ming and Ch’ing periods. Observers, contemporary and modern, rarely
credit Shih Mi-yüan with maintaining an enduring stability along the SungChin border and rarely commend him for successfully evading a premature
23
24
25
On Shih Mi-yüan’s last years, see Davis, Court and family in Sung of China, pp. 110–17.
HTC (1958) 165, pp. 4504–5.
Wei Liao-weng, Ho-shan hsien-sheng ta ch’üan-chi [Ssu-pu ts’ung-k’an ch’u-pien 1929 ed.] (1249; Taipei,
1979) 19, pp. 1a–18a.
the reign of li-tsung
855
clash with Mongol armies.26 As neighboring empires crumbled around it, the
Sung retained a semblance of order and this owes much to the policies of Shih
Mi-yüan. He introduced no significant reforms to address the chronic military
and fiscal problems besetting the empire. He lacked either the imagination or
courage to do so. Reflecting his preoccupation with security and predictability,
the times were characterized by moderation, not by progress. A moderate Shih
Mi-yüan left no dramatic political legacy, yet his policies would affect the
dynasty for many years to come.
An unpropitious alliance
Mongol entreaties to the Sung to cooperate in exterminating the Jurchen
regime may have appealed to some in the south. But the alliance of a century
earlier between the Sung and the Jurchen against the Khitan had cost the Sung
the northern part of its empire. Mongol incursions into the south in 1227 and
1231, not to mention their devastation of Hsi Hsia and much of the north,
inhibited an entente, yet the Mongols wanted Sung cooperation and threatened
to use military action, if necessary, to coerce an otherwise recalcitrant Sung
court into an alliance.27 In the early months of 1232, having conquered the
Chin-controlled city of T’ang-chou, the Mongols advanced north to K’ai-feng
and encircled the Chin capital. The siege lasted nearly a year. High casualties
and cannibalism caused by famine were enough to undermine Chin resolve, but
the siege also produced an epidemic of massive proportions, allegedly claiming
over a million lives. Victory must have seemed imminent to the Mongols, yet
the Chin valiantly held on. K’ai-feng would eventually fall two years later,
but to accelerate their conquest the Mongols approached the Sung court at the
close of 1232 with a view to collaboration.
In anticipation of hostilities in the central border region, the Sung had reorganized their military commands. The accomplished Meng Kung, a native of
Tsao-yang, became supreme commander of Ching-hsi circuit, and Shih Sungchih (1189–1257), a nephew of Councilor Shih Mi-yüan, became military
commissioner in chief for the Ching-hsi and Ching-hu circuits. Shih Sungchih’s views on border security closely resembled those of his uncle: a preoccupation with stability that precluded adventurist intervention in the north.
His appointment at this critical juncture suggests the Sung court’s reaffirmation of the essentially defensive policies of his uncle. Still, in late 1232,
26
27
The exception among modern historians is Li T’ien-ming; see his Sung Yüan chan-shih, pp. 203–4.
Hu Chao-hsi, “Lüeh-lun Nan Sung mo-nien Ssu-ch’uan chün-min k’ang-chi Meng-ku kuei-tsu ti toucheng,” in Sung-shih yen-chiu lun-wen-chi: Chung-hua wen-shih lun-ts’ung tseng-k’an, ed. Teng Kuang-ming
and Ch’eng Ying-liu (Shanghai, 1982), pp. 374–409, especially p. 376.
856
richard l. davis
the Sung court authorized talks between its border officials and the envoy
Wang Chi, a Chinese literatus in the service of the Mongols. Shih Sung-chih
and Meng Kung directed the exchange near Hsiang-yang. The talks inspired
lots of fanfare and superficial goodwill but no agreement resulted. The details
are shrouded in secrecy, but in all likelihood the talks failed because of Sung
tactics of delay and evasion. In the interim, the Chin court had abandoned a
besieged K’ai-feng, and took refuge by late summer 1233 at Ts’ai-chou, a mere
forty miles from the Sung border. For Mongol decision makers, the move made
assistance from the south all the more pressing, if only to block the further
retreat of the Chin ruler (Ai-tsung, r. 1223–34). Negotiations intensified and
resulted in an informal agreement.28 The Mongols received some three hundred thousand piculs of rice, twenty thousand fresh soldiers, and the Sung’s
commitment to join in the assault on Ts’ai-chou. In exchange, the Sung court
received vague promises of restoration of some territory in southern Honan. It
was a lopsided agreement, the Sung receiving nothing more for their valued
men and supplies than indefinite promises about the future.29
Sung and Chin armies clashed in late summer 1233 after nearly a decade of
relative inactivity along the border, and initial exchanges reflected well upon
Sung preparedness. Rumor had it that the Chin regional secretariat, Wu Hsien
(d. 1234), planned to open a southwesterly path to Szechwan as an escape
route for Emperor Ai-tsung. Wu crossed the Sung border near Teng-chou2
and attacked the nearby Kuang-hua commandery, a foray handily repulsed by
Meng Kung. In the interim, Shih Sung-chih led an offensive against T’angchou, effectively isolating remaining Chin forces at Ts’ai-chou from reserves
at Teng-chou2. Inadequate men and provisions precluded a sustained Chin
resistance, and T’ang-chou collapsed. Shou-chou, to the east, fell to Sung
armies in late summer, giving the Sung a solid foothold in Honan. The Chin,
now trapped, were also denied the option of a negotiated settlement. Chin
envoys sent to discuss a possible truce with the Sung were turned back at
the border, an emphatic demonstration of the Sung court’s confidence in its
newfound strength.
The Sung campaign against Ts’ai-chou, launched in early November, was
commanded by Meng Kung.30 Mongol armies had attacked Ts’ai-chou in
28
29
30
On the negotiations, see Sung et al., Yüan shih 2, p. 32; 153, p. 3613; SS 412, pp. 12370–3; HTC
(1958) 166, p. 4528; 167, pp. 4546–7; Peterson, “Old illusions and new realities,” pp. 218–25; Hu,
“Lüeh-lun Nan Sung mo-nien,” p. 376; Hu et al., Sung Meng (Yüan) kuan-hsi shih, pp. 48–55; Li, Sung
Yüan chan-shih, pp. 129–42, 162–4.
See Peterson, “Old illusions and new realities,” pp. 222–4, concerning the problems in the historical
record and attempts to understand Sung reasons for forming the alliance.
On the Ts’ai-chou conflict, see T’o-t’o, ed., Chin shih [Po-na-pen 1930–7 ed.] (1344; Peking, 1975)
18, pp. 400–3; SS 412, pp. 12369–80; Li Yü-t’ang, Chin-shih chi-shih pen-mo (1893; Peking, 1980),
pp. 787–97; Huang K’uan-ch’ung, “Meng Kung nien-p’u,” Shih yüan 4 (1973), pp. 79–135, especially
pp. 95–104; Li, Yüan-shih hsin-chiang, vol. 1, pp. 558–70.
0
400 km
0
200 miles
Chin territories laid w
aste b
Mongol ambush of
y Mo
ngol
Sung troops, fall 1234
s, 12
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w Riv
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fter
Ying-t’ien
119
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K’AI-FENG
Lo-yang
re
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Flight of
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e
Ts’ai
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Hsiang-yang
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Prefectures captured 1233–34
Teng
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Movement of Sung troops
Flight of Chin court from
K’ai-feng to Ts’ai-chou, late
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CHAO K’UEI Sung commanders
CHAO K’UEI
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CH’ÜAN TZU-TS’AI
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Map 29. Abortive Sung intervention in Honan, 1234.
SUNG
858
richard l. davis
October, but heavy casualties forced them to wait for the arrival of reinforcements from the Sung. Ts’ai-chou, only half the size of K’ai-feng, contained precious few human and material resources, making protracted resistance impossible. Within three months of its arrival there and only weeks after the Mongol
siege began, the Chin court had depleted their provisions and the population
was reduced to cannibalism. After filling a lake near the city walls with bundles
of sticks and reeds, invaders stormed Ts’ai-chou in full force. Mass desertions
followed, and the city fell on 9 February 1234. Emperor Ai-tsung committed
suicide, while the loyal few made their last stand in the city’s streets and alleys.
Meng Kung retrieved the Chin imperial seals and part of Ai-tsung’s charred
corpse, testaments to his victory, which he turned over to Shih Sung-chih. The
Sung quickly established military garrisons at T’ang-chou and Teng-chou2.
With the exception of Shou-chou, this was the only Chin territory acquired
by the south.
Before the Chin demise at Ts’ai-chou, and even before conclusion of the
Sung-Mongol alliance, an ambitious few in Lin-an had begun to speculate
about the limits of their government’s involvement in the north. In September 1233 and a few weeks before Shih Mi-yüan’s death, the court received a
memorial from Wu Yung (chin-shih 1208), a Szechwan native with midlevel
metropolitan experience under Shih Mi-yüan. The narrative leaves little doubt
that some considered an alliance with the Mongols as merely the first step in
a general reconquest of the northern territory. Wu Yung, who dismissed the
notion as foolhardy, compared it to “squandering what our empire has stored
away to acquire land of no use.”31
In the aftermath of the Ts’ai-chou victory, the speculations of a few flared
into heated debate over the wisdom of further expansion. The source of the
proposal cannot be determined, but by early 1234 the Sung court began to seriously entertain the notion, preposterous though it may seem, of dispatching
troops to capture the three former capitals of the Northern Sung, K’ai-feng,
Ying-t’ien, and Lo-yang.32 If implemented, this plan would represent a dramatic departure from the cautious foreign policy of the past. The inclination
to intervene reflects, to some historians, Li-tsung’s misguided effort to assert
himself after nearly a decade of domination by his excessively pragmatic councilor Shih Mi-yüan. Others consider intervention to reflect the fundamentally
incompatible views of Shih Mi-yüan and Cheng Ch’ing-chih, the latter being
less preoccupied with political entrenchment and more committed to the irredentist cause. Neither explanation is wholly convincing. With the legitimacy
of his succession in question, Li-tsung may have seen in the move a grand
31
32
Wu Yung, Ho-lin chi [Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu, Wen-yüan ko 1779 ed.] (early 13th c.; Taipei, 1969) 18,
pp. 8a–12a, especially p. 10b; 19, pp. 12b–20a.
Hu et al., Sung Meng (Yüan) kuan-hsi shih, pp. 87–91; Li, Sung Yüan chan-shih, pp. 170–81.
the reign of li-tsung
859
opportunity to prove himself deserving of the throne, but there is not the
slightest shred of historical evidence to suggest that the emperor genuinely
cared to assert himself. For the duration of his reign, Li-tsung delegated most
decision making to chief ministers, essentially sanctioning whatever policies
they recommended. As for Cheng Ch’ing-chih, his differences with Shih Miyüan should not be exaggerated. There is nothing to document serious rifts
between the two over border policy. Admittedly, it may have been politically
expedient to distance himself from his highly unpopular predecessor, and a
more ambitious foreign policy might provide a convenient vehicle for so doing,
but Cheng Ch’ing-chih could have devised some less risky action to accomplish
the same objective. There is yet another reason to suspect that the emperor
and his new councilor, although perhaps tantalized by revanchist aspirations,
did not originally favor military intervention. Returning south immediately
after the Chin defeat, the troops of Meng Kung made little effort to retain a
military presence in southern Honan. Only a half year later, though, the Sung
court ordered troops north once again. A stunning reversal of court policy had
occurred.
Later chroniclers, with the advantage of historical hindsight, are intentionally generous in recording the views of moderates while neglecting the
proponents of aggression. Even after accounting for historical bias of this sort,
we must still conclude that the vast majority of officialdom, and especially
court officials, opposed aggression.33 Assistant Councilors Ch’iao Hsing-chien,
Tseng Ts’ung-lung (chin-shih 1199), and Ch’en Kuei-i (1183–1234), all of
whom held concurrent appointments at the Bureau of Military Affairs, were in
complete agreement about the injudiciousness of sending troops north. Ch’en
Kuei-i, realizing that his council would go unheeded, resigned in protest.
Joining those who objected was Investigating Censor Li Tsung-mien (chin-shih
1205), who pointed to the tactical difficulty of provisioning troops in the north
where local supplies of food, strained by years of war, were almost nonexistent. In candor, he exclaimed that “at this time it is impossible even to defend
[the south]. How is it possible to attempt invasion [of the north]?”34 His
fellow censor Tu Fan (1182–1245) concurred. Fiscal Overseer for Huai-nan
West, Wu Ch’ien (chin-shih 1217), commented, “Seizing [the north] may be
easy, but defending it will prove difficult.”35 A succession of other memorialists reminded the court of the vulnerability of Sung forces, the uselessness
33
34
35
On the abortive campaign, see SS 405, p. 12234; 412, pp. 12374, 12381; 417, pp. 12492–4; 418,
pp. 12516–17; Chou Mi, Ch’i-tung yeh-yü (1983) 5, pp. 77–80; Ch’en Pang-chan et al., Sung-shih chishih pen-mo (1605; Peking, 1977) 92, pp. 1037–42; Huang Tsung-hsi et al., Sung Yüan hsüeh-an (1838;
Taipei, 1973) 73, p. 1278; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 53, pp. 3b, 6b; Peterson, “Old illusions and new realities,”
pp. 225–30; Li, Sung Yüan chan-shih, pp. 181–8; Li, Yüan-shih hsin-chiang, vol. 2, pp. 176–82.
SS 405, p. 12234.
SS 418, p. 12516.
860
richard l. davis
of gaining barren land and depopulated cities, and perhaps most important,
the need to retain cordial relations with an unpredictable new northern neighbor, the Mongols. Many of these memorialists possessed extensive experience,
as well as personal ties to the new councilor Cheng Ch’ing-chih, and their
arguments were well reasoned. Why then did the court support the minority
position in favor of an offensive and, in the process, annoy a sensitive bureaucracy at home and provoke a dangerous ally abroad? The change in policy
apparently stemmed from a rift between metropolitan advisors and regional
administrators.
Among advocates of aggression, the most vocal appears to have been Chao
K’uei, a commander of the army that had triumphed over Li Ch’üan in 1231.
In addition to an illustrious family background and distinguished record of
military service, Chao had personal credibility with Cheng Ch’ing-chih, his
one-time teacher. Chao K’uei was on equally good terms, it appears, with Chao
Shan-hsiang (chin-shih 1196), a highly decorated military leader whose status
as imperial clansman with affinal ties to the house of Shih Mi-yüan provided
an unusually wide array of contacts.
Chao K’uei advocated a firm, even aggressive, border policy. Long before Li
Ch’üan had presented a serious menace, Chao had urged the Sung court to use
force against the Shantung leader. Subsequently, Chao K’uei came to exemplify
the opinion of many within the military establishment, and especially among
commanders in the eastern part of the Yangtze River basin, where Chao had
gained his experience. Ch’üan Tzu-ts’ai, another prominent military figure who
had extensive experience in the northeast, also endorsed the interventionist
position.36 The Sung dynastic history identifies Tu Kao, prefect of the border
commandery of An-feng, as the only regional official who dared to oppose Chao
K’uei’s adventurism.37 Although the group typified by Chao K’uei were unlike
their colleagues in the capital in supporting a less timid and more aggressive
border policy, they were not all in agreement. Meng Kung, a commander in
the central part of Sung territory, refused to endorse the change in policy.
Even Chao Fan, elder brother of Chao K’uei, disassociated himself from the
aggressive proposal and later criticized his brother for having endangered the
empire.38 Thus neither a united military establishment nor a solid block of
36
37
38
The eminent Ch’ing historian Ch’ien Ta-hsin (1728–1804) insists that Chao K’uei and Ch’üan Tzu-ts’ai
were scapegoats for Cheng Ch’ing-chih, their political standing having been too modest to effect a
redirection of court policy. However, this ignores, first, the special influence derived from Chao K’uei’s
personal ties with the councilor, and, second, the important role of regional officials and commanders as
policy consultants for the court. See Ch’ien Ta-hsin, Nien-erh shih k’ao-i (1806; Ch’ang-sha, 1884) 80,
p. 10b.
SS 412, p. 12382.
SS 41, p. 803; 417, p. 12502; HTC (1958) 167, p. 4567.
the reign of li-tsung
861
regional officials supported Chao K’uei and Ch’üan Tzu-ts’ai; the support they
did have apparently came from outside the capital, not from the court, and
largely from the eastern Yangtze region, not from central and western parts of
Sung territory. This is hardly coincidental.
Armies of the eastern Yangtze, in particular those of Chao K’uei and Chao
Fan, were probably not involved in the final campaign against the Chin at Ts’aichou; they had no personal exposure to conditions in the region. Furthermore,
with the Mongol military presence weakest in the east, precisely where Sung
strength was greatest, Chao K’uei may have underestimated Mongol ability
to counter Sung aggression. Chao seems also to have reasoned that troops from
the south, once they moved north, would receive generous assistance from
the local Chinese populace, much as in Shantung. Perceptions such as these
may have inspired revanchists to press for a northern expedition. The euphoria
accompanying victory at Ts’ai-chou in early 1234 must have helped their case
as well.
Decision makers at the Sung court were confronted with new opportunities
suddenly available to them. In the eighth lunar month, the Sung sent a delegation to offer sacrifices at the Eight Tombs, the burial place of Northern Sung
emperors in a remote spot northeast of Lo-yang. Having conducted no ritual
sacrifices there for over a century, the Sung court did not know the condition
of the tombs. Upon returning south, the delegates informed the court that
the tombs were in serious disrepair and that water inundated the surrounding
land. As Li-tsung listened, so chroniclers say, he heaved a deep sigh and fought
back tears.39 In this emotionally charged context, the court, surrendering to
sentiment, decided to dispatch armies north to recover the three capitals. The
decision was not calculated; it reflected in some measure the naive optimism
that the ancestral spirits would intervene on the side of humanity. Just two
months before the campaign, the emperor restored titular honors to his stepbrother, Chao Hung, and authorized sacrifices at his grave site. He honored
the widow of Chao Hung, living incognito as a nun in Shao-hsing, with an
esteemed title and, for good measure, a generous monthly stipend. Clearly,
Li-tsung wanted all the spirits, including the spirit of his disgraced brother,
to support this sacred mission.
In the summer of 1234, either in the sixth or eighth lunar month, the
Sung unleashed its armies.40 Ch’üan Tzu-ts’ai led a reported ten thousand
men from Lu-chou2 to K’ai-feng, encountering no significant resistance. En
39
40
SS 41, p. 803.
SS 41, p. 803, gives the eighth month of 1234 as the date of troop deployment; Chou Mi in Ch’i-tung
yeh-yü (1983) 5, p. 77, gives the sixth month, as does Sung-shih ch’üan-wen Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien (early
14th c.; Taipei, 1969) 32, pp. 14a–b.
862
richard l. davis
route, he passed through Shou-chou and Hao-chou, where he found onceflourishing cities reduced to a few hundred inhabitants and the surrounding
countryside rendered a wasteland, the outcome of more than two decades of
war. In K’ai-feng, where six hundred to seven hundred local militia were on
hand to greet the Sung army, surviving inhabitants numbered only a thousand
households. Sword and lance were not the sole causes of the depopulation. A
year earlier, Mongol invaders had breached several dikes on the Yellow River,
inundating K’ai-feng and flooding lands as far south as Shou-chou, near the
Sung border.41 Communities in the north, a fraction of their former size, could
scarcely feed themselves, leaving Ch’üan Tzu-ts’ai with no local supplies of
food to requisition. After a two-week, two-hundred-fifty-mile-trek, his forces
urgently awaited provisions from the south. Chao K’uei soon arrived with
a reported fifty thousand additional men. The original plan had envisioned
combining the two armies, adding available conscripts in the north, and then
proceeding to Lo-yang. With provisions so scarce, troops were disinclined to
move on. Roughly one-fourth did, but hunger-induced exhaustion rendered
them useless. In the interim, a smaller Sung force had already taken Lo-yang,
birthplace of the Sung founder. Here as well, most of the population was
either dead or scattered when reinforcements arrived from the east. Lo-yang
had expected provisions from K’ai-feng and when the only arrivals were hungry
soldiers the men started eating their horses. Worse yet, by one account, Mongol
armies had learned of Sung designs well in advance and had laid a lethal trap.
They lured southern troops into seemingly undefended northern cities and
launched surprise strikes from the suburbs.42 The rout was decisive and Sung
armies retreating from Lo-yang lost eighty to ninety percent of their men
to injury or death. Forces at K’ai-feng withdrew at virtually the same time,
aborting the month-long campaign.
Returning south, Ch’üan Tzu-ts’ai blamed Shih Sung-chih for the reversal.
As commissioner in chief for the central border region, Shih had allegedly
withheld supplies in order to undermine intentionally an operation he opposed.
Regardless of the merit of the allegation, the delay in provisioning Sung armies
was not the decisive factor in their defeat. As Chao Fan later admitted, the
heavy losses related also to the confusion accompanying the retreat, with Sung
troops exhibiting poor discipline. Even more critical, it would seem, was the
glaring lack of planning by the campaign’s proponents. Earlier visitors to
the north had reported, often in grim detail, the widespread devastation and
41
42
Chou, Ch’i-tung yeh-yü (1983) 5, p. 78. The Sung dynastic history (Sung shih), compiled in 1345 under
Mongol auspices, attributes flooding to the natural collapse of dikes along the Pien River; see SS 417,
p. 12502.
Hu et al., Sung Meng (Yüan) kuan-hsi shih, p. 92.
the reign of li-tsung
863
starvation in the region. With this intelligence, dispatching a force of sixty
thousand men on a major campaign with no more than two week’s provisions
was wildly irresponsible. It was naive, moreover, to expect them to prevail
without encountering significant resistance, either from the Mongols or their
surrogates. The small contingent initially sent to Lo-yang – fewer than ten
thousand men – suggests precisely this naive assumption. With most of the
men and supplies for the Lo-yang campaign expected to come from K’ai-feng,
progress in one area was entirely dependent upon success in another. There is no
mention of contingency plans. Owing to poor planning, the Sung leadership
dispatched too few soldiers to Lo-yang, where the enemy was strong, and too
many to K’ai-feng, where it was weak. Curiously, even with the advantage
of numbers of troops at both cities, the Sung still suffered defeat. The hasty
retreat suggests that the Sung armies were unenthusiastic about the venture,
which mirrored divisions within the command. The campaign, over by late
summer in 1234, reflected poorly upon leadership in Lin-an.
Protracted confrontation
Up to one hundred thousand soldiers and civilians, according to the Sung dynastic history, were lost in the occupation effort during the summer of 1234.43 This
is an unlikely number for so limited a venture, but the war that was triggered
by this campaign lasted nearly forty-five years and claimed innumerable lives.
The Mongol leadership was initially slow in responding to the Sung invasion,
although it knew of Sung intentions well in advance.44 Ögödei, then convening with commanders in the Altai Mountains, over nine hundred miles away,
had matters beyond the Sung to deliberate. Not until year’s end did he dispatch
Wang Chi, the envoy who had negotiated the 1233 alliance, to reprimand the
Sung. In turn, the Sung court sent several envoys of its own, which signaled a
desire to avoid a dangerous confrontation. The court’s entreaties fell upon deaf
ears, for Sung transgressions did not go unpunished. With Ögödei personally
committed to conquest of the regions of what was to become eastern Russia,
he entrusted the punitive expedition against the Sung to his sons Köten and
Köchü.45
Relative to earlier assaults on Koryŏ (Korea) in 1231 and the current campaign pushing eastward past the Volga River, the operation against the Sung
43
44
45
SS 407, p. 12281.
SS 412, p. 12374; Luc Kwanten, Imperial nomads: A history of Central Asia, 500–1500 (Philadelphia,
1979), p. 133.
For a discussion of this campaign, see Thomas T. Allsen, “The rise of the Mongolian empire and
Mongolian rule in north China,” in The Cambridge history of China, volume 6: Alien regimes and border
states, 907–1368, ed. Herbert Franke and Denis C. Twitchett (New York, 1994), pp. 368–72.
richard l. davis
864
seemed to have received low priority. But in the summer of 1235, Mongol
armies struck with a force that suggested otherwise. Focusing on central Sung
territory, they first expelled occupying forces commanded by Ch’üan Tzu-ts’ai
from T’ang-chou, territory seized by the Sung a year earlier. Crossing the Sung
border, they then raided Tsao-yang and Ying-chou3 in late autumn. When
they chose to withdraw, the Mongols carted off all that their horse transport
could carry. Köchü supervised activity in the east and the center of Sung territory, while Köten moved against Szechwan with an assault on Mien-chou,
in the center of Li-chou circuit. With only a small defense force, and relying
on the natural barrier of mountains for protection, the unwalled prefecture
fell quickly. Ts’ao Yu-wen (chin-shih 1226) directed a spirited sortie launched
from T’ien-shui and succeeded in expelling the invaders. The Mongols, content at this point with harassing the Sung and pillaging when circumstances
permitted, likely did not consider their retreat a defeat.
The Mongols returned to menace the Sung the next spring, in 1236.46
Köchü, now with reinforcements, lashed out at Sui-chou2, and Ying-chou3,
both in Ching-hsi circuit. Crossing the Han River, he advanced against Chingmen commandery, nearly one hundred and twenty miles into the Sung interior. This attack coincided with the eruption of a mutiny at Hsiang-yang,
creating chaotic conditions in this strategically vital prefecture before a successful suppression. The Mongols resumed hostilities along the central Sung
border in late summer, but this was overshadowed by developments in the west.
Commanding a half million men – Mongol, Tangut, Jurchen, and Uighur –
Köten initiated a formidable offensive against Ta-an commandery, south of
Mien-chou and deep in Szechwan. These numbers were certainly exaggerated, but the force was still large enough to overwhelm Sung armies. Within
weeks Ta-an capitulated. The Sung commander, Ts’ao Yu-wen, and his brother
perished in Ta-an’s defense. The Mongol forces subsequently moved against
Chieh-chou and Wen-chou2 on the western fringes of Li-chou circuit. Sung
troops and subjects died by the tens of thousands. Even Ch’eng-tu, some
three hundred miles south of the border, temporarily fell into hostile hands. In
November at this critical moment in the campaign fate intervened. Köchü, the
designated heir to Ögödei, died suddenly, which prompted Köten to withdraw
in the west.
The southern offensive continued during the close of 1236 without Köten.
Focus now shifted to the central Huai region, placing the Mongols closer to
the Sung empire’s political center. Interruption of hostilities out west and
reassignment of troops from that theater to reinforce their armies in the Huai
46
HTC (1958) 168, pp. 4585–94; Li, Sung Yüan chan-shih, pp. 301–20.
the reign of li-tsung
865
region may explain the Mongols’ initial success against the Sung in the two
Huai-nan circuits. At the battle of Chen-chou2, Mongol combatants reportedly outnumbered Sung troops ten to one and in the end claimed a hundred
thousand Chinese lives, military and civilian.47 However, a sound strategy of
defense by Shih Sung-chih, Meng Kung, and Ch’iu Yüeh enabled the Sung to
recoup most of its territorial losses, including a devastated Chen-chou2.48 After
the fighting subsided and the Mongol forces left, only Hsiang-yang remained
in hostile hands. A half year later, in the autumn of 1237, the Mongols reapplied pressure against the central Huai region, harassing Kuang-chou2 and
Shou-ch’un. For a while, they even seized Fu-chou3, some one hundred and
twenty miles into Sung territory. The loss of Fu-chou3 seriously threatened
Chiang-ling, the capital of the Ching-hu North circuit. The Sung successfully
counterattacked, with Meng Kung again contributing the most to pushing
the northern intruders out of the region.
By early 1238, the Mongols had withdrawn from much of Sung territory,
and they approached the Sung court about a truce. The annual tribute of silver
and silk that they demanded was no more than what had been given to Chin,
and seemed acceptable under the circumstances.49 The Mongols had exposed a
weakness in the Sung’s ability to defend its borders, but they had also learned
a lesson about Sung tenacity. Sung territory was easier to seize than to retain
because the Sung had been able to regroup after each setback. In a larger
context, the Mongol empire was also in the midst of an intense struggle in
the region of eastern Russia, having recently taken Moscow and Vladimir, and
this may have made material goods momentarily more valuable to the needs
of their campaigns than additional territory. Unfortunately for both sides,
no agreement was reached. In response to Mongol overtures, the Sung court
dispatched a mission of its own. They apparently refused peace payments but
sought to improve relations. Official opinion on the Sung side left negotiators
with little latitude. A high-level executive at the Bureau of Military Affairs
and future chief councilor, Li Tsung-mien, opposed even modest concessions.
Beyond the issue of implicit humiliation, he feared that an initially small
sum might well grow, to become an enormous burden. Commander Meng
Kung similarly rejected peace proposals, as did Chief Councilor Ts’ui Yü-chih
(1158–1239). For the latter, an abrupt change in policy might undermine
the morale of border troops, which would leave the Sung vulnerable should
fighting resume.50 Others questioned whether Mongols could be trusted when
47
48
49
50
Hu, “Lüeh-lun Nan Sung mo-nien,” p. 378.
HTC (1958) 168, p. 4596.
HTC (1958) 169, p. 4611.
On these views, see SS 405, p. 12237; 406, p. 12263; 412, p. 12374; HTC (1958) 169, p. 4611.
866
richard l. davis
their deeds suggested a brutal indifference to their own promises. The court’s
chief advisor for the Huai region, Shih Sung-chih, is portrayed in primary
sources as the only prominent proponent of negotiated settlement. He did not
prevail.
In the summer of 1238, Sung forces recovered some lost territory, most
crucially Hsiang-yang, where a defection in the Mongol camp played into
Sung hands. Late 1238 and early 1239 brought two major confrontations. The
first was a large Mongol offensive against Lu-chou2, in the east. The second was
an assault in the west on K’uei-chou.51 In both instances, the invading forces
consisted of some eight hundred thousand men. Even a large fraction of that
number would have overwhelmingly outnumbered defenders at Lu-chou2, a
city of less than a half million residents. Defenses must have been strong, for the
enemy voluntarily withdrew. Mongol incursions into the K’uei-chou region
proved equally fruitless. Indeed, the significance of the maneuvers of 1238–9
lies not so much in the territory gained as in the arms invested. The Mongols,
clearly offended by Sung resistance to their peace offer, deployed vast numbers
of men to attack the Sung. Some of these men were no doubt deflected from the
campaign in Koryŏ, where the Mongol conquest was winding down; others
represented recent Chinese and Central Asian conscripts, for the Mongols
enforced mandatory military service and every household in its territories had
to surrender at least one male. Their ability to conscript manpower from a
seemingly inexhaustible pool made the Mongols more formidable than any
alien menace before them.
For the Sung, the only source of additional troops was North China’s refugee
population. This left southern armies at a numerical disadvantage.52 Even more
alarming was the Mongols’ adaptability. Early campaigns against the Chin had
been largely confined to cooler months, for the winter-hardened Mongols did
not perform well in the heat of summer. By the 1230s, partly because of
their now more ethnically diverse armies, their movements became far less
predictable. A brief assault in mid-1239 on Ch’ung-ch’ing, a city infamous
for its dreadfully humid summers, must have caught Sung defenders off guard
as the historic pattern for Mongol armies was to retreat northward at the
peak of summer. In the face of the enemy’s growing strength and adaptability,
continued Sung success at repulsing Mongol attacks suggests that Sung forces,
regarded even at home as no match for the Mongols, were not so weak after
all. Moreover, maintaining their superior command of rivers and tributaries
to the east, the Sung were able to move troops and provisions with relative
speed along efficient lines of communication. Mongols would require decades
51
52
Li, Sung Yüan chan-shih, pp. 345–54, 363–70.
Li, Sung Yüan chan-shih, pp. 363–5, 368–70.
the reign of li-tsung
867
to make this additional adaptation. Finally, to avoid suicidal confrontations,
the Sung commonly took recourse to tactical retreat and regrouping, thereby
saving precious lives. Unfortunately, because of unrelenting enemy pressure
the Sung court was never able to seize the military initiative, and this left it
reacting to intrusions rather than initiating counterattacks.
Despite their campaigns against the Sung, the Mongols did not abandon
peace negotiations. Envoy Wang Chi conducted five missions on their behalf
between 1233 and his death in 1240.53 Even as late as 1241, the Mongols did
not appear committed to conquest of the south. The assaults against Ch’engtu and Han-chou, toward the close of 1241, did not end in the acquisition
of territory or great wealth. When Han-chou fell after prolonged siege, the
attackers carried out a general massacre and then unexpectedly withdrew. With
this awesome show of force, the Mongols accomplished little militarily, save
for humiliating the Sung. At the outset of 1242, months after the death of
Ögödei and the Szechwan offensive, the Mongols dispatched a large delegation
of seventy for Lin-an to reopen talks. Approaching from the west, the chief
envoy, and perhaps the entire delegation, was jailed at Ch’ang-sha by a Sung
regional commander, ostensibly angered by the envoy’s arrogance. The Sung
court apparently offered no formal apology for the incident, and the envoys
advanced no farther. Nothing developed from the northern initiative. The
extent of Sung intransigence is difficult to understand. The chief councilor
at the time, Shih Sung-chih, held Li-tsung’s complete confidence and acted,
infamously so, as the most articulate spokesperson for peaceful coexistence
between the Sung and the Mongols. A possible explanation is intransigence at
the Sung court. Sung leadership may have misread the struggle over the Mongol succession following Ögödei’s death, which was so intense as to threaten a
deadly civil war. Instability in the Mongol leadership contrasted sharply with
Sung accomplishments in the south, where the two-year lull in fighting had
enabled the Sung to replenish their armies and recover a good measure of lost
territory. Some credit for this southern rally belongs to Shih Sung-chih, but it
may have left him overconfident.
For the next ten years, fighting continued sporadically.54 In the west, the
Mongols raided cities deep inside Szechwan: Sui-ning (1242), Tzu-chou2
(1243), and Shu-chou (1242), all in T’ung-ch’uan circuit. Along the central Sung border, the Mongols raided targets in Huai-nan West in 1244 and
again in 1246. For the first time it appears, the Mongols struck against targets
53
54
Ch’en Kao-hua, “Wang Chi shih Sung shih-shih k’ao-lüeh,” in Ryū Shiken hakuse shōju kinen: Sō-shi kenkyū
ronshū, ed. Kinugawa Tsuyoshi (Kyoto, 1989), pp. 103–11; Hu et al., Sung Meng (Yüan) kuan-hsi shih,
pp. 119–21, 142–5.
On these, see Li, Sung Yüan chan-shih, pp. 406–502; Li, Yüan-shih hsin-chiang, vol. 2, pp. 183–219.
868
richard l. davis
along the eastern Sung border, for example, T’ung-chou2 in 1242, a city
located near the mouth of the Yangtze River and within easy reach by sea
of the Sung capital. Still, peace more than conflict characterized the decade,
as the Mongol leadership was plagued by persistent squabbling. Ögödei had
died in 1241, but opposition to the accession of his infant grandson, the heir
apparent, delayed for five years the crowning of Güyük (r. 1246–8), Ögödei’s
younger son. Almost immediately Güyük found himself at war with the politically ambitious Batu, a descendant of Chinggis khan. In 1248, Güyük died
in the vicinity of Samarkand, in his war against Batu. This gave the Mongols
another succession to fight over, a contest requiring three years to resolve. In
the interim, North China suffered a severe drought that destroyed vegetation
and depleted the horse and cattle population by ninety percent. Nor were the
people spared, leaving Mongol forces short on men no less than horses. For the
decade following Ögödei’s death, little diplomatic contact is recorded, save
for half-hearted overtures in 1247, when both sides spurned envoys owing to
mutual distrust.55
Having ruled out peaceful coexistence, the Sung government took advantage of this respite to strengthen its military defenses, especially in the west,
where years of war had taken a heavy toll. A major shift of military commands
came in 1242, when the Sung court transferred its prized general, Meng Kung,
from the central border region to Szechwan, to become military commissioner
in chief and prefect of K’uei-chou2. Joining Meng Kung as Szechwan commissioner was the former overlord of Huai-nan East, Yü Chieh (d. 1253), who
served concurrently as prefect of Ch’ung-ch’ing. The Sung also managed in
some places to strengthen border fortifications by organizing informal regional
militia. At the same time, the relative tranquility of the decade allowed the
disbanding of some border militia that were perceived as a threat to local
order.56 The number of government regulars declined as well. In better times,
Szechwan had been defended by up to eighty thousand men. This number fell
to less than fifty thousand by the 1240s.57 The quality of military leadership
in Szechwan may have been enhanced, but the quantity of material resources
invested by the Sung court was minimal. Commissioner Yü Chieh, for all the
court’s goodwill, had to rely largely on local capital and initiative to strengthen
defenses, and Szechwan was abjectly short of both. In effect, Li-tsung recognized the strategic importance of the west, but undermined its security by his
excessive parsimony in the allocation of the empire’s wealth.
The Sung did not enjoy the respite from Mongol attacks for long. By 1251,
the Mongols had a new ruler, Möngke (r. 1251–9), a shrewd and disciplined
55
56
57
Hu et al., Sung Meng (Yüan) kuan-hsi shih, pp. 166–7, 182–3, 193–4.
HTC (1958) 173, p. 4725.
SS 411, p. 12357.
the reign of li-tsung
869
man now resolved to conquer the Sung. He entrusted supervision of the China
theater to his younger brother Khubilai. Möngke devoted his own energies to
the invasion of Persia. The earlier raids of the 1230s and 1240s may have sought
to weaken and demoralize the Sung, but after 1253, Mongol objectives in East
Asia became focused on long-term conquest.58 Khubilai first eliminated the
Ta-li empire, in modern Yunnan, and within three years he had reduced all of
the autonomous groups of the distant southwest to vassal status. He initially
launched no major campaign against the Sung heartland, and border flare-ups
remained minor. Instead, the agenda of the early 1250s entailed a calculated
encirclement of the southern Sung empire by developing the southwest, a
region long neglected by the Sung, as a base of operations. The same maneuver
used to destroy the Chin was being used for the Sung: secure neighboring lands
to the north and south in preparation for the lethal squeeze from all sides. The
battle plan was not lost on the Sung court, which transferred a reputed one
hundred thousand troops from the northeast to Szechwan in early 1257. These
reinforcements had scarcely arrived when the Mongols, in full force, lunged
into the area.
Ch’eng-tu, with a population of nearly one million and the cultural center of
Szechwan, fell to the Mongols in early 1258 after offering a spirited resistance.
A half-dozen nearby prefectures capitulated swiftly. Before long, the Mongols’ forces held much of the Ch’eng-tu Plain, from which they moved north
into Li-chou and west into T’ung-ch’uan circuits. Complementing the western thrust were lesser raids on targets in eastern and central Sung territory,
providing just enough pressure to inhibit the Sung court from transferring
troops from the east to Szechwan. Möngke personally joined in the Szechwan
campaign toward the close of 1258. From Khara Khorum he moved directly
south with an army reported to be forty thousand strong. Skirting Li-chou,
the circuit closest to the Mongol border, he joined his men at Han-chou, central Szechwan, where he helped consolidate existing holdings before moving
against Li-chou. Ya-chou and Lung-chou2 in the far southwest, along with
Li-chou and P’eng-chou in the heart of Szechwan, are but a few of about ten
prefectures to come under Mongol control, all within a month or two. The
Szechwan campaign proceeded with the ease that the Mongols confidently had
expected and that the Sung woefully had feared, that is, until the battle at Hochou4.59
58
59
Hu et al., Sung Meng (Yüan) kuan-hsi shih, pp. 208–17; Li, Sung Yüan chan-shih, pp. 583–703, 713–97;
Li, Yüan-shih hsin-chiang, vol. 2, pp. 192–3.
Hu et al., Sung Meng (Yüan) kuan-hsi shih, pp. 217–33; Li, Sung Yüan chan-shih, pp. 723–6; Wang Ich’eng, Wang Chien shih-chi k’ao (Hsin-ying, 1983); Yao Ts’ung-wu, “Sung Meng Tiao-yü-ch’eng chan-i
chung Hsiung-erh fu-jen chia shih chi Wang Li yü Ho-chou huo-te pao-ch’üan k’ao,” in Sung-shih
yen-chiu chi: Ti erh chi, ed. Sung-shih tso-t’an-hui (Taipei, 1964), pp. 123–40.
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richard l. davis
In March 1259, Möngke laid siege to Ho-chou4 (modern Ho-ch’uan, in
central Szechwan), a city of roughly one hundred and fifty thousand in the
heart of the T’ung-ch’uan circuit. Defense of the city was led by Wang Chien2
(d. 1259), an individual whose resolve would not be shaken despite a siege
that went on for five months. Apart from a committed populace, Wang Chien2
was also assisted by nature. Heavy rains during the early months of the siege
seriously sapped the morale of Mongol besiegers housed in tents. At the same
time, an epidemic broke out among the Mongol ranks. Apparently, this disease claimed the life of Möngke, who died outside Ho-chou4 on 11 August.
Khubilai, disbanding his army, hastened to Khara Khorum for the upcoming
elective assembly khuriltai, which took place on 5 May 1260.60 The offensive
against the Sung was postponed indefinitely.
Again, the Sung was afforded a reprieve despite meager investment in
the southwest. The loss of two prized commanders, Meng Kung in 1246
and Yü Chieh in 1253, had heightened the Sung sense of vulnerability, and
Sung morale was further weakened by intense court factionalism. Nonetheless,
the battle at Ho-chou4 vividly demonstrated the hardened resistance that
the Mongols could expect if they proceeded east toward the Sung capital.
The mountains and the Yangtze gorges in the west and the rivers in central
Sung territory presented formidable obstacles to the Mongols. Perhaps their
recognition of these obstacles explains why the Mongols dispatched, just prior
to the 1260 installation of Khubilai as khaghan, a new peace envoy, followed
soon by two more. The Sung court rebuffed all such initiatives, apparently
unconvinced of its adversary’s genuine intent.
Mongol demands probably included only the payment of annual tribute
in exchange for peace, yet in 1260 the Sung court seemed intentionally set
on provoking the Mongols when they imprisoned the northern envoy, Hao
Ching. It is not altogether clear why the Sung, keenly interested in peace
talks in the 1240s, became unresponsive by 1260. By some accounts, the Sung
court considered Hao Ching to be a spy. By others, the chief councilor, Chia
Ssu-tao, had personally ordered the envoy’s incarceration to conceal unseemly
promises that Chia had made to Hao Ching a year earlier when the threat of
Mongol invasion was imminent.61 Nevertheless, the arrest had signaled the
Sung’s unwillingness to placate the Mongols. At this point in the negotiations
it seemed as if the two powers were speaking at cross-purposes. The Sung
saw peace as the simple absence of belligerency. The Mongols saw peace as an
60
61
Morris Rossabi, “The reign of Khubilai khan,” in The Cambridge history of China, volume 6: Alien
regimes and border states, 907–1368, ed. Herbert Franke and Denis C. Twitchett (New York, 1994)
p. 423.
SS 474, p. 13782; Sung et al., Yüan shih 157, pp. 3708–9; HTC (1958) 176, p. 4802.
0
200 km
0
100 miles
Hsing-yüan-fu
Li-chou
r
ive
gR
lin
iaCh
P’eng-chou
Han-chou
Ch’eng-tu
K’uei-chou
S z e c h w a n
(falls 1258)
Min River
Ya-chou
Pa-chou
Chien-chou
Lung-chou
Ho-chou
(Möngke d.1259)
Tzu-chou
Fu-chou
Ch’ung-ch’ing
Nan-p’ing
Hsü-chou
Po-chou
Advance of Möngke and his forces
Map 30. Möngke’s invasion of Szechwan, 1258–59. After Ch’en Shih-sung et al., Sung-Yüan chan-cheng shih (Ch’eng-tu,
1988), p. 143.
872
richard l. davis
alliance between the two.62 The Sung court also may have hoped that conflicts
over succession would preoccupy the Mongols and buy the Sung more time.
This was not total fancy, for soon after his accession in 1260, Khubilai found
himself engaged in a three-year war for the throne against his younger brother
Arigh Böke.63 These events coincided with a rebellion in Shantung led by Li
T’an, adopted son of Li Ch’üan, whose defection to the Sung gravely threatened
Mongol authority in the northeast.64 Further, economic devastation in the
wartorn northeastern region brought on by locusts and drought must have
made the Mongol position there even more tenuous.
bureaucratic leadership and the forces of opinion
The besieged emperor
Li-tsung may well be the most unfathomable of the Southern Sung emperors.
The paucity of late Sung source material is part of the problem, but so is the
complexity of the man. Few emperors match his compassion and charity, as
evidenced by his unprecedented establishment of the Child Benevolence Service (Tz’u-yu chü) to care for unwanted children in the capital and a medical
service (Yao chü) to distribute medicine to the needy.65 He was compassionate
and had an unalterable loyalty to trusted officials, regardless of political pressures. More than once, Li-tsung was compelled to dismiss a trusted official, but
this did not affect imperial favor and such men were never made scapegoats to
exonerate the throne. Malicious campaigns against Shih Mi-yüan, for example, did not prompt the emperor to placate influential critics by posthumously
humiliating him. Nor did Li-tsung respond to an ill-conceived, ultimately
disastrous, foreign policy by punishing its architect, Cheng Ch’ing-chih. Litsung’s steadfastness distinguished him from Kao-tsung, whose posthumous
mistreatment of Ch’in Kuei displayed a reluctance to deal with court critics
and accept personal responsibility for the actions of surrogates.
Li-tsung was generally sensitive to the forces of opinion. When opposition
to a certain policy or bureaucratic leader threatened the political stability, he
tended to compromise rather than risk confrontation. Moreover, he could be
magnanimous in the face of censure, as revealed in his response to the acrimony
of one overly zealous remonstrator: “[The official’s] words are exceedingly
direct. How could I ever be angered by direct words?”66 Valuing candor over
62
63
64
65
66
Hu et al., Sung Meng (Yüan) kuan-hsi shih, pp. 119–21, 166–7, 181–2, 193–4.
See Rossabi, “The reign of Khubilai khan,” p. 422.
Kwanten, Imperial nomads, pp. 146–7; Sung et al., Yüan shih 206, pp. 4591–6; Li, Yüan-shih hsin-chiang,
vol. 2, pp. 267–9.
SS 43, p. 840.
SS 421, p. 12593.
the reign of li-tsung
873
obsequiousness, Li-tsung often advanced his most vocal critics to prominent
posts. Trusting the judgment of leading advisors, he refused to challenge
or overturn their policy decisions. Such tolerance and support distinguished
him from Hsiao-tsung, whose frequent rejection of ministerial advice left an
indelibly autocratic imprint on an otherwise estimable reign.
Li-tsung also managed the imperial household better than most Sung
emperors. His empress, Hsieh Ch’iao (1210–83), although attuned to the
politics of the day, maintained a low profile for the duration of her husband’s
reign. She was not Li-tsung’s first choice as empress nor his favored companion, but this emotional distance generated no perceptible tensions within the
royal family. She gave no public display of indignation at his intemperance,
sexual and otherwise. Domestic discipline is also evinced in the rearing of his
adopted son and eventual successor, Tu-tsung, from whom Li-tsung expected
serious attention toward his studies and submissiveness toward authority. Such
circumspection within the royal family offers a sharp contrast to the chaos of
the Kuang-tsung years.
Li-tsung had few scholarly pretenses, unlike Hsiao-tsung, yet he presents
an image of thoughtfulness, even wit, certainly not characteristic of his betterregarded predecessor Hsiao-tsung. Li-tsung often responded, when he chose to
respond, with meticulous care and cogency to the remonstrance of officials. In
deliberation and articulation, he easily surpassed Ning-tsung, the “tranquil,”
whose unopinionated silence seemed almost depersonalized.
As emperor, Li-tsung combined his native intelligence with the two Confucian ideals of compassion for the ordinary people and respect for scholarofficials. Never was he so smug as to tire of improving himself, nor so vain
as to deny his personal shortcomings. A man of immense potential, Li-tsung
might have ushered in a golden age for the southern empire. He did not, and
the fault was not entirely his.
From the outset of his reign in 1224, the nineteen-year-old emperor faced
the perennial threat of war. The conflict with Chin he inherited, but he triggered the Mongol war. He was censured by later writers for starting a war
that his empire stood no chance of winning. The assessment seems unduly
harsh. Mongol and Sung armies had clashed long before 1234. Had the Sung
remained a submissive ally, it would have been only a matter of time before the
Mongols turned a covetous eye toward it. Recognizing this threat, the advocates of war at the Sung court sought to seize the initiative by acting before the
Mongols could consolidate power and mobilize resources in the north. Once
unleashed, war imposed an immense strain on already overextended military
and economic systems. Li-tsung and his ministers never developed a satisfactory means of financing the protracted conflict, nor did they ever develop a
coherent long-term strategy to win it. But the reproach of later historians does
not rest exclusively on Li-tsung’s failures in foreign policy.
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richard l. davis
Li-tsung also had to engage with the political forces of prominent intellectual movements. Li-tsung was the first emperor to endorse parts of the tenets
of the Tao-hsüeh movement articulated by Chu Hsi. Li-tsung also was not one
to slight traditional rituals. Within two months of assuming the throne, he
performed the elaborate Ming-t’ang (Hall of Brilliance) rituals, and continued
this tradition once every three years for nearly the duration of his reign. He
may have inherited this habit from his predecessor, for Ning-tsung was even
more meticulous about performing this and other sacrifices. Recurring natural
disasters and the traditional assumption that these reflected the dissatisfaction
of Heaven may also explain Li-tsung’s special concern with mollifying the
spirits. The high cost of new temples to imperial ancestors and the elaborate
feasts accompanying ritual sacrifices irritated many critics, with some concluding that the sacrifices served merely as pretexts for merriment. “In praying to
Heaven one employs sincerity, not excess,” warned one official, who viewed
imperial extravagance as inappropriate at a time of national adversity.67 But
historians’ reproof of Li-tsung does not rest upon his excessive dedication to
ritual, either.
The emperor’s one shortcoming that most irritated contemporary and later
observers was the immodesty of his amorous indulgences.68 Some blame Shih
Mi-yüan, insisting that he had intentionally “poisoned” the emperor’s mind
through an abundance of female companions intended to preoccupy him within
the palace. The placing of responsibility with Shih Mi-yüan is questionable,
but Li-tsung’s inclination toward sexual intemperance appears undeniable, and
it persisted for the duration of his reign. Consort Chia (d. 1247), daughter of
Commissioner Chia She, became imperial consort in 1232 after winning the
emperor’s affections. Li-tsung so doted on her that one disapproving official
compared this to the infamous affair of Emperor T’ang Hsüan-tsung and Yang
Kuei-fei, a romance that nearly toppled the T’ang dynasty in the 750s. After
Chia’s death, Li-tsung took to another consort, née Yen (d. 1260). Neither
woman cared much for politics, and so official concern would have been moderate had the emperor confined his energies to such liaisons with his recognized
consorts. He did not. In his middle years, he took to entertaining Taoist nuns
in his palace. Their comings and goings were repeatedly criticized in official memorials and sparked unending innuendo and scandal. Li-tsung drew
even more criticism in 1255, by summoning common street prostitutes to the
palace for his new year’s entertainment. Officials were quick to condemn such
67
68
SS 44, p. 852; 405, p. 12247; 411, p. 12358; 418, p. 12521; 438, p. 12985.
On Li-tsung’s personal life, see SS 44, p. 854; 243, pp. 8658–60; 407, pp. 12279–89; 418, p. 12515;
421, pp. 12586, 12588; 438, p. 12985; 474, p. 13780; Ting Ch’uan-ching, Sung-jen i-shih hui-pien
(1935; Taipei, 1982) 18, p. 915.
the reign of li-tsung
875
conduct but were generally not interested in understanding the factors contributing to it.
Contemporaries portrayed Li-tsung, prior to his accession, as mildmannered, serious, and stable, with greater promise than the irascible Chao
Hung. His youth was spent in a secluded area of Shao-hsing. He moved to the
capital, Lin-an, only two years before becoming emperor. He never received
the extensive training and political exposure commonly afforded candidates
for the throne. Then, literally overnight, he became imperial son and emperor,
all arranged by the chief councilor, Shih Mi-yüan, and Dowager Empress Wu.
Becoming emperor seems to have changed him. Although never hopelessly
indolent like most stereotypical last rulers in the Chinese historiographic
tradition, Li-tsung was criticized early on for holding court irregularly. His
withdrawal, and his cynicism about the conduct of government, grew more
acute with time. During Li-tsung’s first eight years in power, Shih Mi-yüan was
on hand to advise the youth on political matters and Dowager Empress Yang2
to supervise his personal life. By their mere presence, these two discouraged
the emperor from asserting himself, rendering him deferentially detached. Litsung never overcame this detachment, even after the deaths of the empress in
1232 and Shih in 1233 and the “era of change” (keng-hua) that he proclaimed in
their wake. Imperial indifference, it would seem, related also to pressures from
the bureaucracy. The question of the posthumous status of Chao Hung, for
example, appeared and reappeared in official memorials for decades. Officials
seemed indifferent to Li-tsung’s insecurity as an upstart and to the possibility
that their persistent criticisms might drive the emperor from the court at a
time when the empire most needed a strong, unified leadership.
The sway of Ming-chou favorites
Although Ch’in Kuei and Han T’o-chou each held power for a significant period
of time and were able to cow the civil service into submission, eventually
their unpopularity overwhelmed them and their deaths brought retaliation
from opposition groups. Loss of posthumous honors, persecution of kin, and
confiscation of family property were their long-term reward. Shih Mi-yüan,
while considerably more powerful and controversial than either Ch’in Kuei or
Han T’o-chou, did not suffer similar humiliation. The emperor was steadfast
in his favor. Two decades after Shih Mi-yüan’s death, Li-tsung composed a
tomb inscription in his memory. Those opposed to Shih’s policies tirelessly
attempted to undermine that favor, but failed. Nor could they uproot the dead
councilor’s influence, a result related in part to the emperor’s character but also
to the shrewd political maneuvering of Shih Mi-yüan himself. Not content
merely with his own personal entrenchment, Shih Mi-yüan had built up a
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richard l. davis
younger generation of talent and had helped place them in key bureaucratic
posts. His associates held impeccable scholarly credentials and occasionally
voiced critical opinions of him. They were not mere lackeys. Some, like Shih
Mi-yüan himself, came from Ming-chou (modern Ning-po, also referred to
as Ch’ing-yüan in some Sung texts), but not all. Their appointments did
not rest exclusively on provincial ties. Interestingly, none was Shih’s relative,
despite the proliferation of credentialed officials among his kin. Shih Mi-yüan
cultivated patronage, not nepotism. His protégés were well qualified and well
connected, and their continued presence at court long after his death helped
moderate any political backlash toward Shih and his policies.
The most notable of these protégés was Cheng Ch’ing-chih.69 A Ming-chou
native who had studied at the Imperial University beginning in 1202, Cheng
later held various teaching posts in and away from the capital before returning
to the university as a professor. Cheng was appointed personal tutor to the
future Li-tsung nearly two years before Li-tsung’s accession, and Cheng Ch’ingchih may have assisted Shih Mi-yüan in arranging Chao Yün’s controversial
installation as son and then successor. Named assistant councilor in 1230,
Cheng became chief councilor just days before Shih Mi-yüan’s death, a position
Cheng held for the next three years.
Cheng Ch’ing-chih owed much to Shih Mi-yüan’s patronage, yet his willingness to speak out on the Li Ch’üan affair, urging the use of force, and
the subsequent success of the 1230 suppression contributed significantly to
his own independent political capital. Official acquiescence in Cheng Ch’ingchih’s rise to power relates also to his support for the Tao-hsüeh proponents,
Wei Liao-weng and Chen Te-hsiu. Restoration of rank and salary to the two,
occurring in Shih Mi-yüan’s last years, was attributed to Cheng’s influence.
As the new councilor in 1233, Cheng promoted these once-alienated intellectuals to high-level metropolitan posts. Chen Te-hsiu was made an assistant
councilor and Wei Liao-weng an executive at the military bureau. Cheng
Ch’ing-chih also restored to office other one-time opponents of Shih Mi-yüan,
while removing some of the less esteemed partisans. Already holding the confidence of the throne, Cheng apparently made such moves to generate goodwill outside the palace and thereby consolidate his influence within the civil
service.
The Cheng Ch’ing-chih years were characterized by reconciliation within
the bureaucracy. Apart from politically reviving the careers of many Taohsüeh proponents, the court approved a modest elevation in the posthumous
status of Chao Hung, a continuing cause célèbre for critics of Shih Mi-yüan’s
69
SS 414, pp. 12419–23; Richard W. Bodman and Charles A. Peterson, “Cheng Ch’ing-chih,” in Sung
biographies, ed. Herbert Franke (Wiesbaden, 1976), vol. 1, pp. 156–63.
the reign of li-tsung
877
legacy. Another bid for support from Tao-hsüeh proponents came from Ch’iao
Hsing-chien, a close associate of Cheng serving as an executive at the Bureau
of Military Affairs. Ch’iao proposed offering state sacrifices at the imperial
Confucian temple to the five Tao-hsüeh masters (Chu Hsi, Chou Tun-i, Ch’eng
Hao, Ch’eng I, and Chang Tsai). A shrine to Chao Ju-yü, a popular figure
among contemporary thirteenth-century Tao-hsüeh proponents, was proposed
for the temple of Ning-tsung. For the first time, the ideas and instructions
of the Learning of the Way (Tao-hsüeh), officially persecuted less than four
decades earlier, were granted government approval, and became in stages the
cornerstone of the curriculum at the Imperial University and hence throughout
the empire. To the modern researcher, such changes in the ideological direction
of the bureaucracy may appear as scarcely more than window dressing, changes
in form, not substance. The test of innovation on the part of the administration
under Li-tsung was whether it could substantially alter the widely assailed
tradition and practices of one-man dominance that had been reinforced by the
twenty-five-year tenure of Shih Mi-yüan.
During Hsiao-tsung’s reign, the government had moved toward a twocouncilor system. The councilor of the right, although the junior position, was
where power rested. The position of councilor of the left tended to be reserved
for elder statesmen, who often lacked the vitality to actively engage in decision
making. However, after the death of Han T’o-chou in 1207, there was only one
councilor. Ning-tsung never bothered to name a second councilor, and Shih
Mi-yüan did not insist that another councilor serve with him. Within a week
of Shih Mi-yüan’s death in 1233, Wei Liao-weng requested restoration of the
dual councilorship and that bureaucratic authority be divided in such a way
as to forestall the emergence of future autocrats.70 Li-tsung responded, albeit
a year and a half later, by naming Ch’iao Hsing-chien councilor of the right
and elevating Cheng Ch’ing-chih to be senior councilor. The move did not
imply Li-tsung’s confidence in such a division of power, however. No sooner had
Li-tsung appointed Ch’iao Hsing-chien than he commented: “I employ Ch’ingchih quite exclusively, but owing to the many affairs of the realm being too
much for one councilor to manage, Hsing-chien is named assistant.”71 The dual
councilorship persisted for five years, yet there occurred no reorganization of
the metropolitan bureaucracy along the lines recommended by Wei Liao-weng
and others. Perhaps sweeping institutional change appeared too dangerous in
a time of war; but even an extended peace might not have changed things. In
1236, when the prefect of Lin-an raised the issue of lengthy terms of office, a less
than subtle allusion to Shih Mi-yüan’s marathon tenure, Li-tsung responded:
70
71
SS 437, p. 12968; HTC (1958) 167, pp. 4550–1; Wei, Ho-shan hsien-sheng ta ch’üan-chi 19, pp. 1a–18a.
HTC (1958) 168, p. 4577.
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“In utilizing men, it is unnecessary to change them frequently.”72 Maintaining
a high turnover, especially in the bureaucracy’s upper echelons, was precisely
the method employed by Hsiao-tsung to prevent his executives from becoming
too powerful. Li-tsung took an antithetical approach to governing. He was
never convinced that domination by one man was destabilizing, that lifelong
tenures were politically unsound, or that powerful ministers were a threat to
the imperial sway. To him, good government rested upon employing the right
men, not a complex array of institutional controls.
The tenure of Cheng Ch’ing-chih lasted three years and ended in autumn
1236, but not because the emperor sought to infuse new blood into the bureaucracy. Nor was imperial confidence shaken by charges of grossly unethical conduct, including charges that Cheng had accepted bribes and allowed his status
to be exploited by his son for their personal profit.73 The most vocal critic of
Cheng Ch’ing-chih was Tu Fan, an eloquent Tao-hsüeh proponent then serving as attending censor. Although the Tao-hsüeh intellectuals had won initial
appointment to such high metropolitan posts through the councilor’s patronage, they were the first to criticize him. When the Mongols launched their
massive assault on Hsiang-yang in 1236, Cheng Ch’ing-chih almost by necessity submitted his resignation, which was often intended as a ceremonious
gesture; the emperor unceremoniously accepted it.
The departure of Cheng Ch’ing-chih, however, had a negligible effect on
court policy. Ch’iao Hsing-chien replaced him as councilor of the left, and Ts’ui
Yü-chih was appointed councilor of the right. Both men supported the previous
administration’s rapprochement with the Tao-hsüeh proponents, even though
they had no close personal links to those involved in the movement. Both men
embraced a conciliatory policy toward Mongol aggression in the aftermath
of the Sung’s failed attempt to recapture K’ai-feng two years earlier in the
summer of 1234. They preferred peace while preparing for war. According
to Ts’ui Yü-chih, peace was feasible only “if in negotiating a peace, we can
also have security.”74 The new councilors shared with Cheng Ch’ing-chih the
experience of serving under Shih Mi-yüan during his last turbulent decade.
All three were on cordial terms, despite differences on the specifics of foreign
policy, and they followed, in some measure, Shih’s tactic of moderation. At
least in domestic policies, the late 1230s were years of continuity.
Such continuity helps explain the rise of yet another Shih kinsman from
Ming-chou to prominence in the capital. Shih Mi-yüan hailed from an
72
73
74
HTC (1958) 168, p. 4587.
On these charges, see SS 407, p. 12282; 409, p. 12333; 415, p. 12458; 424, pp. 12659–60; 437,
p. 12964; 438, p. 12987; HTC (1958) 168, p. 4595; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 53, p. 7a.
SS 406, p. 12263.
the reign of li-tsung
879
exceedingly accomplished kin group, with some sixty nephews and cousins
holding civil service rank in the thirteenth century. He probably did not know
most of them well, having spent the bulk of his adult years in Lin-an, but
his influence affected the careers of some. Shih Sung-chih, for example, a collateral nephew who received his chin-shih degree in 1220, won appointment
to a number of influential military-related posts through his uncle’s intervention.75 He earned recognition as an innovative administrator in his own
right. By streamlining and making self-sufficient the military organizations
in strategically vital Hsiang-yang and Tsao-yang, for example, Shih Sung-chih
helped prepare these two prefectures for the deadly conflict ahead. Later, he
served as prefect of Hsiang-yang and military commissioner in chief for the
Ching-hsi and Ching-hu circuits of central Sung territory, which made him the
most influential military figure in the empire. Shih Sung-chih also supervised
the talks that culminated in the anti-Chin alliance with the Mongols of 1233.
He commanded the offensive against T’ang-chou, directed the final assault
against Ts’ai-chou, and forwarded to Lin-an the Chin imperial paraphernalia
that he retrieved from the defeated Chin emperor.76 A grateful court rewarded
him with appointment as minister of war.
Shih Sung-chih had vehemently opposed Cheng Ch’ing-chih’s ill-fated military offensive to retake K’ai-feng. He had denounced the 1234 action much
as Shih Mi-yüan had denounced the initiatives of Han T’o-chou. By then
commissioner for the central Huai River region and with fifteen years of
military experience there, Shih Sung-chih noted that recent floods and crop
failures had left the region too impoverished to support an offensive. “People with no home to return to will join together as bandits; soldiers suffering from hunger and starvation will be defeated even before combat.”77 His
warnings, however prophetic, were ignored. The outcome of the campaign
in the north was that with their provisions exhausted, Sung troops returned
south having accomplished nothing, save inciting the Mongols. Revanchists
charged Shih Sung-chih with intentionally withholding provisions to ensure
the Sung defeat. Shih Sung-chih may have boycotted the effort in the north
for fear of endangering his own troops or simply in response to pressures
from other commanders, Chao Yen-na for example, who also boycotted the
campaign.78 Such acts of insubordination were not isolated, but the censure
of Shih Sung-chih was the most strident. He responded by surrendering his
war ministership, a largely nominal post in Sung times.
75
76
77
78
On his career, see Davis, Court and family in Sung China, pp. 142–57.
Li, Sung Yüan chan-shih, pp. 162–6.
SS 414, p. 12424.
SS 413, p. 12400.
880
richard l. davis
In the mid-1230s, Shih Sung-chih continued to receive high-level regional
appointments, a clear sign of imperial favor, despite perceptible tensions
between him and Cheng Ch’ing-chih. Although he never resided in Lin-an, his
input on border policy was assured through memorials on various topics, from
troop morale to fiscal management. Shih Sung-chih’s credibility was further
enhanced by his success in routing major Mongol assaults on Kuang-chou2
and Huang-chou in 1237, which led to a reduction in fighting and new peace
overtures from the north. A grateful court responded by naming him assistant
councilor in 1238 and, a year later, chief councilor of the right. This made him
the third chief councilor to emanate from his Ming-chou clan, Shih Hao and
Shih Mi-yüan having preceded him.
Shih Sung-chih initially shared power with Li Tsung-mien, councilor of
the left, and Ch’iao Hsing-chien, distinguished military councilor (p’ing-chang
chün-kuo chung-shih). It seemed an odd threesome. The new councilor was a
prominent proponent of peace, and his elevation to the high post, coinciding
with the arrival of a Mongol emissary, appeared to represent the emperor’s
official endorsement of propeace advocates and policies. Advancement of Yü
T’ien-hsi (chin-shih 1223), another Ming-chou native closely identified with
Shih Mi-yüan, to assistant councilor suggests the same. Yet Li Tsung-mien and
Ch’iao Hsing-chien shared none of Shih Sung-chih’s commitment to peace.
They opposed on principle all significant concessions. Perhaps this was still
a time of indecision for Li-tsung, or maybe he was unwilling to sacrifice an
older generation of trusted officials to accommodate the new. Whatever the
emperor’s motives, this contradictory set of appointments ensured no abrupt
change in policy. The deaths of both Li Tsung-mien and Ch’iao Hsing-chien
in early 1241, however, left Shih Sung-chih with undisputed authority at
court. For the next four years, he remained the only chief councilor, effectively
reviving, for better or worse, one-man dominance.
Shih Sung-chih was never popular among his colleagues. As early as 1234,
Investigating Censor Wang Sui2 (chin-shih 1202) accused him of imperiling
the empire to advance his personal reputation. Wang Yeh (chin-shih 1220), a
minor official at the Bureau of Military Affairs, charged that Shih’s propeace
sentiments undermined the empire’s defense effort. Attendant Censors Hsieh
Fang-shu (chin-shih 1223) and Wang Wan (chin-shih 1223) questioned Shih
Sung-chih’s overall competence and advised against his further advancement.79
The charges, made while Shih Sung-chih was assistant councilor, reveal not
just disesteem, but outright contempt. These feelings seem especially curious
for a man whose advice on border policy and conduct of the war proved, in the
79
On early criticisms, see SS 41, p. 801; 415, p. 12461; 416, pp. 12984–5; 417, p. 12510; 420,
p. 12575.
the reign of li-tsung
881
long run, to be sound. Justified or not, critics continued their reproofs after
he became councilor. Countering them was not easy.
As chief councilor, Shih Sung-chih retained general command of the Huai,
Ching-hu, and Szechwan armies. It was a privilege enjoyed by few councilors
of the Southern Sung, not even the powerful Shih Mi-yüan. The prestige of the
dual appointments notwithstanding, the responsibilities were too much for
one man. Shih Sung-chih spent his first year as chief councilor monitoring the
volatile border in the west, and returned to Lin-an in the spring of 1240. In
his absence, the capital was hit with a famine so severe that ordinary citizens
disappeared in broad daylight as the marketplace traded daily in human flesh.
Never in Li-tsung’s long reign, before or after, did calamity hit so close to
home. Shih Sung-chih’s presence in Lin-an could hardly have forestalled natural
disaster or alleviated the human suffering, but his conspicuous absence implied
an indifference that antagonized many.
Subsequently, Shih Sung-chih spent more time in the capital. The border
situation had largely stabilized after 1241, but the empire’s domestic problems seemed as intractable as ever. Tu Fan twice memorialized the throne in
1240 about crises of unprecedented proportions.80 Natural disasters extended
from the lower Huai to Fu-chien, bringing with them and exacerbating soaring prices, bandit outbreaks, alien invasions, empty granaries, and widespread
vagrancy. There was disorder in the heavens and turbulence on earth. Despite
these upheavals, Shih Sung-chih’s defensive achievements were numerous.
Beyond denying the Mongols a foothold in Sung territory, he presided over
the restoration of territory that had been regained. He also devised a highly
imaginative scheme of regional defense by providing refugees with land to till
with guaranteed low rents, while organizing them into militia reserve units for
use in times of emergency.81 Reminiscent of Wang An-shih’s pao-chia system,
its objective was to curtail military expenditures while strengthening regional
defense. However, Shih Sung-chih’s record contained no notable accomplishments beyond military policy. He had not managed to reach a peace accord
with the Mongols, a failure that ensured prolonged instability and hardship
along the empire’s border. Nor had he developed a coherent economic policy
in the face of spiraling defense costs and declining revenues. Finally, he never
developed a close working relationship with the civil service as a whole, never
acquired the political adeptness needed to manipulate groups and individuals
who held differing views, and never built a solid base of support within the
bureaucracy. Focused on regional service, his career had not given him exposure
80
81
SS 407, pp. 12282–6; Tu Fan, Ch’ing-hsien chi [Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu, Wen-yüan ko 1779 ed.] (Taipei, 1971)
9, pp. 2b–11a; Davis, Court and family in Sung of China, pp. 131–2.
SS 176, p. 4275.
882
richard l. davis
to the management of the metropolitan bureaucracy. Critics often referred to
him with contempt, as a “powerful councilor,” yet his career left him more
vulnerable within the government than other powerful men of Southern Sung.
Shih Sung-chih was rarely so rash or so secure as to dismiss or demote critics outright. In the case of Tu Fan, for example, he reportedly “gave an outer
expression of forbearance while detesting him inside.”82 Shih made no apparent effort to block Tu Fan’s appointment to an executive post at the Bureau of
Military Affairs, where he also had a seat. The nomination may well have been
initiated by him in the hope of mollifying critics, a tactic in the tradition of
Shih Mi-yüan. Cooperation between Shih Sung-chih and Tu Fan nonetheless
proved impossible. Tu Fan, following his 1244 promotion to second spot in the
military bureaucracy, threatened to resign if Li Ming-fu (chin-shih 1209), an
assistant councilor with close ties to Shih Sung-chih, was not dismissed. Challenging one superior and insulting another, the demand betrayed a profound
arrogance. Students at the Imperial University, no doubt prompted by professors sympathetic to Tu Fan, joined in attacking Li Ming-fu and ultimately
the chief councilor himself. Realizing that Tu Fan would accept nothing short
of his own resignation, Shih Sung-chih orchestrated the dismissals of both Tu
Fan and Li Ming-fu. The emperor, detesting the unseemliness of confrontation,
supported Shih’s decision. The dismissal of Tu Fan roused others to speak out,
including Huang Shih-yung (chin-shih 1226) and Liu Ying-ch’i, to name but
two. The dismissals also served to polarize much of the bureaucracy against
Shih Sung-chih, which set the stage for another conflict.
In the autumn of 1244, tensions between Shih Sung-chih and the prominent forces of opinion finally exploded into political battle. The death of Shih’s
father led the opposition to believe that Shih Sung-chih would step down and
observe the traditional three years of mourning expected of a son. However,
Li-tsung intervened, waiving the customary mourning obligation and retaining Shih in office. There were abundant precedents for the emperor’s action.
Ning-tsung had waived mourning for commanders Chao Fan and Chao K’uei
following the death of their father in 1222, and that of their mother in 1230.
The two waivers for the Chao brothers went virtually unnoticed. Shih Sungchih’s uncle had received a similar waiver in 1209, while Shih’s own unique
qualifications as civil and military leader offered similarly compelling reasons to forego ritual and retain his services. The reaction by many officials to
this simple restoration directive was unusually strident. Memorials of protest
flooded the court, the most notable coming from the metropolitan student population. Signing petitions were 144 students at the Imperial University, 67 at
the Military Academy, 94 at the Lin-an Academy, and 34 at the Imperial Clan
82
SS 407, p. 12286.
the reign of li-tsung
883
Academy (Tsung-hsüeh). The most widely publicized of these petitions came
from the Imperial University, where students refused to conceal their contempt
for Shih Sung-chih. They attacked him on moral grounds. By orchestrating
his own recall, they charged, he was being shamelessly unfilial. He was accused
of bribing his way to the councilorship and then exploiting the privileges of
the office for personal profit. Apart from issues of personal morality and political ethics, students warned that three consecutive generations of councilors
from one family posed a grave threat to dynastic stability. “Since antiquity,
when high officials [from families] which, for as many as three generations,
monopolized imperial favor and exploited the power [vested in them], they
were inevitably [responsible for] the collapse of their empires. . . . Alas, the
Shih house has held onto power now for three generations!”83
The opposition’s large numbers and cogent arguments did not easily shake
the emperor’s resolve. Within a month of his father’s death, Shih Sung-chih
was ordered to hasten his return to Lin-an. He delayed, perhaps out of frustration, and this only strengthened the hand of the opposition. In the interim,
the throne summoned Tu Fan to the capital, ostensibly for consultation. The
emperor appointed Liu Han-pi (d. 1244), a vocal critic of Shih Sung-chih,
as censor, and named two other prominent men of Tao-hsüeh convictions, Li
Hsin-ch’uan (1167–1244) and Ch’en Hua (chin-shih 1205), to executive posts
in the bureaucracy.84 These moves are commonly interpreted as signs of the
emperor’s coming to his senses about his unworthy councilor, an interpretation
totally unjustified, for the councilor’s seat remained vacant. Li-tsung’s gesture,
it appears, had the limited objective of silencing the opposition without sacrificing his favorite. However, Shih Sung-chih’s narrow political base continued
to erode and, after three months of relentless pressure, his resignation was
accepted by the emperor.
Shih’s resignation was not enough for his opponents; only a permanent
discrediting of Shih Sung-chih could guarantee no future revival. The throne
restored the dual councilorship. The senior position went to Fan Chung (chinshih 1208), a former chancellor at the Imperial University and a professor at
the Military Academy. This was certainly a concession to students. Succeeding
Shih Sung-chih as councilor of the right was Tu Fan, which was another victory
for Tao-hsüeh proponents. With a more favorable bureaucratic leadership, the
opponents of Shih pushed their assault. The summer of 1245 brought the
sudden death of Hsü Yüan-chieh (chin-shih 1232), a one-time chancellor at
83
84
On the dismissal of Shih Sung-chih, see Davis, Court and family in Sung China, pp. 150–4;
Wang Chien-ch’iu, “Sung-tai t’ai-hsüeh yü t’ai-hsüeh-sheng” (M.A. thesis, Fu-jen Ta-hsüeh, 1965),
pp. 306–7.
SS 406, pp. 12275–7; 419, pp. 12560–4; 438, pp. 12984–6; HTC (1958) 171, pp. 4660–1.
884
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the university whose opposition to Shih Sung-chih was well known. Hsü had
dined the night before he died with Fan Chung, a man close to Shih Sung-chih,
and many suspected foul play. Two other critics of Shih Sung-chih, the censor
Liu Han-pi and Shih’s own nephew Shih Ching-ch’ing, died under similarly
suspicious circumstances.85 Tu Fan had died earlier in 1245 of natural causes,
but the rash of deaths among prominent critics appeared more than coincidental. Seventy-three students at the Imperial University, exercising their
new political might, seized on such rumors and demanded an open investigation. The emperor graciously granted the demand. He even offered an unusual
reward of one hundred thousand strings of cash for information pertaining
to the cases. No evidence was ever found to support the assassination theory
or to implicate Shih Sung-chih, but the damage to his reputation had been
done. When Li-tsung considered reappointing him in 1246, resistance from
Shih’s opponents forced the emperor’s retreat. Shih Sung-chih never returned
to public life.
The fall of Shih Sung-chih did not, however, end the dominance of Mingchou favorites. The former chief councilor, Cheng Ch’ing-chih, returned from
retirement in 1245 as palace lecturer. In the spring of 1247, Councilors Fan
Chung and Yu Ssu (chin-shih 1220) retired. The emperor promptly replaced
them with Cheng Ch’ing-chih. Cheng remained in power for the next four and
a half years, sharing it, albeit only briefly, with Commander Chao K’uei. The
potentially controversial decision to restore Cheng Ch’ing-chih, already in his
seventies, to power encountered surprisingly little resistance, which suggests
that Cheng enjoyed some measure of respect among court critics despite his
former failures. The late 1240s were generally tranquil years, the border and
the bureaucracy relatively free of conflict, except for the occasional opposition
to some of the councilor’s high-level appointments.
One of Cheng’s rising favorites was Shih Chai-chih (1205–49), the son of
Shih Mi-yüan. Shih Chai-chih appears to have been on especially good terms
with the emperor, the two being roughly the same age and frequently in one
another’s company. On the eve of his father’s death in 1233, Shih Chai-chih
had received honorary chin-shih status and a high-level sinecure. Having never
passed the examinations on his own, these extraordinary acts symbolized the
emperor’s enduring goodwill toward that branch of the Shih clan. As early as
1240, Li-tsung had sought to have Shih Chai-chih return to the capital. The
opportunity finally came in 1248, and Shih Chai-chih emerged as minister of
personnel and subsequently associate chief at the Bureau of Military Affairs.
Whether the promotion was initiated by the emperor or by his chief councilor,
85
On the incident, see SS 414, pp. 12426–7; 415, pp. 12454–9; 424, pp. 12660–2; HTC (1958) 171,
pp. 4656–9; Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, vol. 6 pieh-chi, pp. 18a–20a.
the reign of li-tsung
885
Cheng Ch’ing-chih, we do not know. In the light of old debts to Shih Mi-yüan,
no doubt both men endorsed the move despite the younger Shih’s unpopularity
among court critics. With such support, Shih Chai-chih may well have risen
even higher, but he died prematurely the next year.
Another Ming-chou native advanced to high office under Cheng Ch’ingchih was Ying Yao (chin-shih 1223), a former professor at the Imperial University. His sound official record and good overall reputation may explain why his
advancement to assistant councilor in 1249 encountered no notable opposition,
despite overtones of regional favoritism. Not so readily accepted, however, was
the nomination of Pieh Chih-chieh (d. 1253) to assistant councilor in the summer of 1247. An individual closely identified with the administration of Shih
Sung-chih, Pieh was forced to resign within a year. Cheng Ts’ai (d. 1249),
named to an executive post at the Bureau of Military Affairs, encountered
similar opposition and for the same reason: he had been a partisan of Shih
Sung-chih. He was dismissed. Such selections suggest that Cheng Ch’ingchih, in choosing high-level subordinates, gave clear preference to Ming-chou
provincials or to individuals identified with the Shih Sung-chih administration. The opposition to Cheng’s appointments contrasts significantly with the
success of Shih Mi-yüan, who commonly employed fellow provincials, but did
so less blatantly and rarely made objectionable appointments. The resistance
encountered by Cheng Ch’ing-chih implies that the lengthy dominance of
Ming-chou scholars at court, having made too many enemies on all sides, was
nearing its end.
Cheng Ch’ing-chih’s greatest shortcoming was not regional favoritism, but
his indulgence of family members. His wife and son were notorious for their
political deal making and profiteering.86 Already seventy when recalled to
office, Cheng should have been provided by the emperor with a second councilor to assist in routine administration. The lack of a second man created a
vacuum. During his long tenure in power, Shih Mi-yüan had consciously nurtured a younger generation of talent capable of winning the emperor’s trust and
the bureaucracy’s respect. Cheng Ch’ing-chih did not do so, perhaps because
he had been out of power for a decade, or perhaps because he lacked foresight,
or perhaps because border problems and constant bickering with a vexatious
bureaucracy sapped too much of his energy. He left no well-placed protégés
to whom the throne could turn. As an older generation of statesmen died
off, the political vacuum became more serious. From 1248 to 1251, Cheng
Ch’ing-chih petitioned at least five times asking to retire, but each time his
request was denied. With few reliable associates, the aging councilor looked to
his family to assist him in routine matters. The combination of nepotism and
86
SS 414, p. 12423.
886
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graft stemming from this arrangement discredited not only him personally,
but the entire Ming-chou group.
The death of Cheng Ch’ing-chih in 1251 marked the end of an era in
Sung history. By a combination of sheer coincidence and clever orchestration,
Ming-chou natives had been an influential political force for nearly a half
century, surviving Shih Mi-yüan by nearly two decades. Never before had
the region known such political stature, and it never would again. Until
the end of the dynasty, Ming-chou provincials continued to produce great
numbers of metropolitan and regional officials, but they no longer dominated
the court. Responsibility for this lies squarely with Shih Sung-chih and Cheng
Ch’ing-chih. Shih Mi-yüan may have been censured for encroaching upon the
privileges of the emperor, but he had never been known for corruption or graft.
He may have indulged in political favoritism, but he did not give his wife and
children a free run of the court. His successors from Ming-chou proved far less
scrupulous, which gave public opinion grounds to denounce them and make
future advancement difficult for others from Ming-chou.
Filling the vacuum
When Cheng Ch’ing-chih died in 1251, the emperor reportedly contemplated recalling Shih Sung-chih.87 Either in response to or in anticipation
of widespread opposition, he instead selected Hsieh Fang-shu as councilor
of the left and Wu Ch’ien as councilor of the right.88 A native of western
Szechwan’s Wei-chou6, Hsieh Fang-shu had received Shih Sung-chih’s initial recommendation for office, but Hsieh had tended to be critical of his
sponsor and sympathetic toward the moralist opposition. His relations with
Cheng Ch’ing-chih had been more cordial, which enabled him to rise to assistant councilor, and placed him in a position to be made Cheng’s successor. Wu
Ch’ien, a native of Ning-kuo (in modern Anhwei province) and the top-ranked
chin-shih in 1217, had also served under Cheng Ch’ing-chih as assistant councilor. Although he had opposed the military offensive of 1234, this did not
preclude his collaboration with Cheng Ch’ing-chih in the late 1240s.
That Cheng Ch’ing-chih’s successors were to be his own handpicked subordinates may partly reflect imperial confidence in the senior statesman’s good
judgment; Cheng had been the emperor’s tutor, after all. The selection of
Hsieh Fang-shu and Wu Ch’ien also reflects the emperor’s desire to maintain
administrative continuity at a time of military and economic upheaval. The
empire might have fared better, however, with discontinuity, for the old policies were neither insightful nor flexible. In border affairs, even ten years after
87
88
HTC (1958) 173, p. 4718.
SS 417, pp. 12510–12; Wu Ch’ien’s biography is in SS 418, pp. 12515–20.
the reign of li-tsung
887
the initial Mongol victories, the Sung was no closer to security with peace or
preparedness for war. Although the court lavished retrospective honors on the
Tao-hsüeh masters of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the moral message
these intellectuals had advocated had no noticeable impact upon the personal
lives of the emperor or of his trusted ministers. As Wu Ch’ien lectured Litsung on curbing his sensual indulgences and reining in palace favorites who
encroached upon the imperial authority, his colleague Hsieh Fang-shu had
sabotaged the effort by routinely permitting members of his own family to
intrude into political matters. Under censorial indictment, Wu Ch’ien fell
from power after scarcely a year in office. The emperor’s patience was no doubt
worn thin by Wu’s annoying diligence in scrutinizing affairs within the palace.
Hsieh Fang-shu dominated the bureaucracy for the next three years. His personal influence over the throne, however, was never significant, and he fell,
uneventfully after censorial indictment, in the summer of 1255. Both councilors had failed in their commitment to deliver Li-tsung from the grip of
well-entrenched and resourceful eunuchs serving in the inner palace.
To the outer court, the eunuchs Tung Sung-ch’en and Lu Yün-sheng were
the palace figures most responsible for the throne’s indifference to the details of
governance.89 The most hated eunuch of the thirteenth century, Tung enjoyed
the emperor’s favor for the last two decades of the reign. Court officials accused
Tung Sung-ch’en of accepting bribes for political favors, arranging choice
appointments for relatives of palace women, and encouraging the emperor
in his theatrical amusements and carnal indulgences, including the notorious summoning of local prostitutes to the palace in 1255. In times of severe
economic hardship, Tung allegedly confiscated privately owned lands to erect
pleasure pavilions for the emperor. Tung even dared, according to critics, to
participate in ceremonies at the Imperial Ancestral Temple (T’ai-miao), a profound insult to royal ancestors that implied treacherous ambitions.90 Such
charges were probably exaggerated if not altogether fabricated and may only
reflect later historians’ condemnation of eunuch power. Nonetheless, they signal an ascendency of the inner court over the outer court. By this stage of both
Li-tsung’s reign eunuchs and consorts, two groups more frequently political
competitors than collaborators, had learned to cooperate, an inauspicious development from the perspective of outer court officials. This was the first time in
Li-tsung’s reign that he placed his trust not in bureaucratic executives but in
eunuchs. Most of the political infighting in the 1250s centered on the contest
between eunuch power and bureaucratic authority.
89
90
SS 469, pp. 13675–6; Chou Mi, Ch’i-tung yeh-yü (1983) 7, pp. 120–5.
On these charges, see SS 411, p. 12358; 474, p. 13782; HTC (1958) 174, p. 4748; 174, pp. 4750–63;
Hsü Ching-sun, Chü-shan ts’un-kao [Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu, Wen-yüan ko 1779 ed.] (13th c.; Taipei, 1976) 1,
pp. 27a–31b.
888
richard l. davis
Wu Ch’ien had cautioned the court against the influence of inner court staff,
but to no avail. In 1255, Censor Hung T’ien-hsi (chin-shih 1226) denounced
eunuch power as well, and resigned when the emperor was unresponsive. Students at the Imperial University and prominent officials rushed to the censor’s
defense, which further polarized the court. Hsieh Fang-shu maintained a low
profile during the controversy, and this led to accusations, unsubstantiated but
also difficult to refute, that he had formed some secret liaison with eunuchs. His
credibility shattered, Hsieh stepped down. The conflict between bureaucratic
professionals and imperial favorites festered.
The emperor appointed Tung Huai (chin-shih 1213), a native of the border
city of Hao-chou, to be Hsieh’s successor. Like some earlier councilors, Tung
Huai had close ties to the Tao-hsüeh movement; unlike most, his lengthy career
had been devoted largely to regional office, with his first appointment in the
capital coming only six years before his elevation to the councilorship. This
proved a serious handicap. Probably close to seventy, Tung Huai’s candid yet
tactful approach to counseling the throne earned him the emperor’s respect
but not necessarily his confidence. The problem of eunuch power persisted,
compounded by imperial indulgence of various other favorites. Male relatives
of the empress, favored consorts, even Taoist nuns received special conferrals
of bureaucratic rank and office. One Tao-hsüeh proponent at the Ministry of
Works, Mou Tzu-ts’ai (chin-shih 1223), resigned in outrage at such improprieties. His departure and that of Hung T’ien-hsi, which roughly coincided, left
Tung Huai alone in the struggle against palace favorites. Unfortunately, his
enemies were not confined to the inner court.
The one figure in the outer court who incurred the wrath of the civil service
more than did the palace favorites was the knavish Ting Ta-ch’üan (chin-shih
1238). A native of Chen-chiang (near the Yangtze River in Kiangsu), Ting held
various regional posts prior to entering the metropolitan bureaucracy in the
early 1250s. According to traditional accounts, Ting’s advancement to policy
monitor and palace censor derived directly from the relationships he cultivated
with the imperial concubine Yen and the eunuchs Tung Sung-ch’en and Lu
Yün-sheng. However, Ting Ta-ch’üan possessed examination credentials and
had a long record of regional service. He was not altogether unqualified to
participate in government. His association with palace favorites appears undeniable, but whether the liaisons occurred before or after his political ascent is
unknown.
Ting’s undisguised ambition and political maneuverings were widely criticized, and no bureaucrat was more incensed by them than the chief councilor
Tung Huai. From early on, Tung admonished the throne to advance talented
men and curb the influence of relatives, and by implication their confederates.
Ting Ta-ch’üan allegedly made friendly overtures, but Tung Huai responded
in mid-1256 by denouncing him as vile and threatening to resign if the censor
the reign of li-tsung
889
remained in his post. Li-tsung preferred inaction, but not Censor Ting, who
in an unprecedented display of arrogance led a hundred palace guardsmen to
the councilor’s home. Under the cover of darkness, Tung Huai was dragged
off to the law enforcement office, no doubt threatened with torture, and then
crudely deposited outside the city walls. More than just a humiliating insult to
an elder statesman, this also represented an outrageous affront to bureaucratic
authority. The emperor officially ordered the councilor’s dismissal a day later,
in effect justifying after the fact Censor Ting’s excess. This was no consolation
for Tung Huai’s many sympathizers, who launched a major political campaign
against Ting. At its forefront were students at the Imperial University, who
demanded exile for the insubordinate censor. The emperor, ordinarily inclined
to compromise, must have been unusually piqued. He ordered eight students
at the university and seven at the Imperial Clan Academy, the alleged provocateurs, to be rounded up and banished to the far south. He also instructed
university officials to restore order to the campus and curb political activism
there.91 These actions by the emperor represented a major political setback for
Tung Huai’s supporters and a reassertion of the imperial will.
The successor of Tung Huai was Ch’eng Yüan-feng (chin-shih 1228), a Huichou (Anhwei) native with professorial status at both the Imperial University
and the Imperial Clan Academy.92 Having applied the stick, the emperor
may have used Ch’eng’s appointment as a carrot to appease the disaffected.
When Ch’eng Yüan-feng had been an investigating censor, he was critical of
the moribund Cheng Ch’ing-chih administration and the political decadence
it tolerated. Such views ensured Ch’eng’s support by Tao-hsüeh proponents.
Yet Ch’eng Yüan-feng clearly anticipated stormy waters, for he declined the
councilorship several times before submitting to imperial pressure.
Beginning in the summer of 1256 and for nearly two years after, Ch’eng
remained the court’s sole councilor; yet as long as Ting Ta-ch’üan held Litsung’s confidence, Ch’eng would never function as chief policy maker. The
decision to banish university students, coinciding with the fourth month of
Ch’eng Yüan-feng’s term, must have come as a personal, not just a political, setback. As a former professor and current chief councilor he was unable to shield
defenseless students from intimidation by his subordinates. This inability
to act constituted an embarrassing image of political impotence. Conditions
along the border inspired no optimism either. Under Ch’eng Yüan-feng, Sung
and Mongol armies clashed with greater frequency and intensity, as Möngke
prepared for a renewed Mongol offensive. The Mongol assault on Szechwan
that began in 1258, and lasted nearly two years, represented by far the most
91
92
On the incident, see SS 44, p. 857; 405, p. 12242; 414, p. 12432; 474, pp. 13778–9; HTC (1958) 174,
pp. 4761–2, 4764.
SS 418, pp. 12520–3.
890
richard l. davis
intense fighting in two decades. From the outset of his tenure in 1256, Councilor Ch’eng had aggressively promoted the strengthening of border defenses,
no doubt having anticipated an escalation of fighting. Yet his only notable
achievement was augmenting the standing army by a hundred thousand men.
He devised no imaginative scheme for financing an expanding war, no new
strategy to counter the Mongol initiative in Szechwan, and no peace alternative should the fortunes of war turn unfavorable. Immersed in petty court
squabbles, he lost sight of these far more pressing issues.
Only a few months into the new conflict, in the spring of 1258, Ch’eng
Yüan-feng stepped down. His replacement was Ting Ta-ch’üan, an unfortunate
choice. Despite the Mongol offensive in the west, which grew progressively
more ferocious during the Ting Ta-ch’üan years, Ting is charged by traditional
historians with being oblivious to the crisis. Initially refuting his predecessor’s
warning about inadequate defenses, he later imposed a ban on all discussion
of the border situation.93 The effort to silence the war debate, whether it was
motivated by political intolerance or by concern over troop morale and popular
support, proved unproductive and unenforceable, another blemish on Ting’s
already tarnished reputation. Even allowing for historical bias, Ting Ta-ch’üan
was the most imprudent of Li-tsung’s fifteen councilor appointees. He had
negligible exposure to military affairs, inexperience that an empire at war
could ill afford. Ting’s appointment was unwise for another reason. His crude
insolence in the ouster of Tung Hai and unseemly ties to the inner court ensured
that Ting Ta-ch’üan, as councilor, was perpetually at odds with moralist critics.
The Sung court faced new internal conflicts that were additional drains on
valuable resources. Unfortunately, the arrogant use of power and disinclination
to tolerate criticism influenced Li-tsung as well. After decades of conflict within
the intellectual and political communities, a weary Li-tsung lost his former
political tolerance.
the rise of chia ssu-tao
The emperor finally dismissed and abandoned Ting Ta-ch’üan in November of 1259. Censorial indictments provided the pretext, and serious military setbacks in Szechwan the occasion. The elderly Wu Ch’ien returned to
Lin-an as councilor of the left, but he held the post for only a half year. Court
attention instead focused on the new councilor of the right, Chia Ssu-tao
(1213–75).94 A native of T’ai-chou, in coastal Chekiang, he was the son of
93
94
SS 438, p. 12988; 474, pp. 13778–9; HTC (1958) 175, pp. 4776–7.
Biographical information can be found in Herbert Franke, “Chia Ssu-tao (1213–1275): A ‘bad last
minister’?” in Confucian personalities, ed. Arthur F. Wright and Denis C. Twitchett (Stanford, Calif.,
the reign of li-tsung
891
Shantung commissioner Chia She and the brother of Li-tsung’s once favored
Consort Chia. Even though he lacked chin-shih credentials, by all indications
he had held the high regional posts of prefect, pacification commissioner, and
fiscal overseer, all while still in his thirties. These promotions were rare even for
degree holders, and Chia Ssu-tao’s meteoric rise can be explained only by his
natural talent, backed by family privilege, most probably the favor enjoyed by
Consort Chia. But he was an unusually experienced official. Most of his early
career was spent in regional offices, but his extensive exposure to military
matters resulted in an appointment as associate administrator at the Bureau
of Military Affairs in 1254, his first executive post in the capital. The timing
was more than coincidental.
From early on, Li-tsung had apparently been on close personal terms with
Chia Ssu-tao, who was eight years his junior. In the mid-1230s, when both
men were in their twenties, the emperor had commented, with envy, on Chia
Ssu-tao’s amorous escapades. Rumor had it that they subsequently caroused
together.95 Following the death of Cheng Ch’ing-chih in 1251, the emperor’s
only notable close acquaintance from his early years still alive and politically
active was Chia Ssu-tao. Employing him in high office must have seemed only
natural to an emperor known for his loyalty to old friends.
In assessing the reasons for Chia Ssu-tao’s advancement, it would be unfair,
as Herbert Franke demonstrates, to focus exclusively on Chia’s personal ties
and ignore his official record. In the decade preceding his appointment to the
Bureau of Military Affairs, Chia Ssu-tao served as commissioner for Chiang-nan
West, Ching-hu, and the Yangtze region – all strategically vital areas that gave
Chia valuable professional experience. Increasingly, Chia Ssu-tao identified
himself with the military bureaucracy. This may reflect the influence of his
father, who similarly lacked examination credentials and exploited military
service to win quasi-military posts ordinarily beyond the reach of those without
the chin-shih degree. Yet the appointment had plenty of recent precedents.
Shih Sung-chih and Chao K’uei had both acquired councilorships through
their distinction as military leaders, although Shih had obtained examination
degrees as well. Because of the military crisis at hand, Li-tsung needed to place
an unusually high premium on military expertise, in some ways countering
the Sung dynasty’s practice of disdaining martial skills. This may be also seen
in Li-tsung’s frequent advancement of military men to eminent civilian posts,
95
1962), pp. 217–34; Fang Chen-hua, “Wan Sung cheng-cheng tui pien-fang ti ying-hsiang,” Ta-lu tsachih 88 No. 5 (1994), pp. 19–31; Miyazaki Ichisada, “Ko Jidō ryakuden,” Tōyōshi kenkyū 6 No. 3 (1941),
pp. 54–73; Herbert Franke, “Chia Ssu-tao,” in Sung biographies, ed. Herbert Franke (Wiesbaden, 1976),
vol. 1, pp. 203–7; SS 474, pp. 13779–87; Ting, Sung-jen i-shih hui-pien 18, pp. 1006–18.
Ting, Sung-jen i-shih hui-pien 18, pp. 1006–18.
892
richard l. davis
and in the temporary revival of the special military councilorship in the 1230s.
Moreover, Li-tsung’s high regard for Chia Ssu-tao appears to have been shared
and reinforced by others. Shih Yen-chih (fl. 1217–60), prefect of Lin-an and
brother of Shih Sung-chih, had once remarked to the throne, “Although Ssutao has the habits of youth [in being so carefree], his talents are capable of
extensive use.”96 At the time, Chia Ssu-tao was still in his early twenties and
already marked for advancement.
There was never a political honeymoon for the new councilor. Many bureaucrats, considering him an extension of inner court influence in the tradition of
Ting Ta-ch’üan, held Chia Ssu-tao in profound contempt from the outset. But
his favored sister, the Consort Chia, had died in 1247 over a decade before his
nomination as councilor, and the emperor had since taken up with other consorts. Chia’s great civil service attainments cannot be explained simply with
reference to her influence. Nor is there evidence to document Chia Ssu-tao’s
alliance with any specific court faction. His appointment to the Bureau of Military Affairs occurred under Hsieh Fang-shu, and to assistant councilor under
Tung Huai and Ch’eng Yüan-feng. These were all men highly regarded for
their professional integrity. If not personally responsible for his advancement,
at least the three did nothing to block it. Eight months into the tenure of
Ting Ta-ch’üan, Chia Ssu-tao was appointed as supreme commander for the
Huai region. His return to regional military service may reflect heightened
concern over the worsening border situation, yet it may also imply an unharmonious relationship with Ting Ta-ch’üan. Upon becoming councilor, Chia
Ssu-tao moved to eliminate the political cronies of Ting Ta-ch’üan and Tung
Sung-ch’en,97 and he intentionally distanced himself from earlier favorites and
their policies. For example, contemporary critics allege that when Tung Sungch’en had proposed, in the wake of a threatening enemy offensive in 1259,
that the capital be moved to Ming-chou, an action that Councilor Wu Ch’ien
endorsed,98 Chia Ssu-tao reportedly rejected such defeatism and insisted on
a firm stand at the border, to project an image of fortitude and resolve. Still,
his bold determination did not dispel the shadow of official criticism or the
rumors of spineless pacifism.
Fiscal crisis and land policy
The empire under Li-tsung was beset with difficult problems, but none more
intractable than the economy. Accumulation of land by the wealthy, commonly
96
97
98
SS 474, p. 13780.
HTC (1958) 175, p. 4788; 176, p. 4798.
Huang Kan, Mien-chai chi [Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu, Wen-yüan ko 1779 ed.] (Taipei, 1971) 38, p. 29a; SS 173,
pp. 4179–80.
the reign of li-tsung
893
designated as “monopolists” (chien-ping chih chia), had plagued Sung society since the early eleventh century, a problem frequently mentioned but
never resolved. Land accumulation inevitably affected government revenues,
for influential landowners, legally or otherwise, could claim exemptions and
evade taxation more effectively than could simple peasants. In the thirteenth
century, new strains on the economy created new pressures for government
intervention. Early in the tenure of Shih Mi-yüan, Li Tao-ch’uan (chin-shih
1196), brother of famed historian Li Hsin-ch’uan and a professor at the Imperial University, had demanded the imposition of strict limits on landholding.
Hsieh Fang-shu had also made a similar recommendation in 1246, a few years
before becoming councilor.99 The devastation imposed by natural disasters and
the revenues consumed by prolonged war left the court with few alternatives
besides coercive action. After several years of deliberation, Chia Ssu-tao’s first
move was to conduct a massive land survey (probably in 1262). By correcting
tax registers that no longer reflected the rural landholding, Chia hoped to
identify tax evaders and increase revenues. This was followed, in 1263, by the
public fields (kung-t’ien) measure.
Public fields was a policy that had been put forward during the last years of
the Northern Sung and originally was devised to defray military expenditures.
It had the same basic function in the 1260s.100 Chia Ssu-tao also abolished
the old Harmonious Grain (ho-ti) levy, which compelled farmers to sell grain
to the government at artificially low prices for use as army provisions. Abolition of the practice, a source of considerable discontent, must have been
welcome, but Chia Ssu-tao did not act out of charity. Large landholdings in
the hands of powerful landlords able to claim exemptions made even ordinary
land taxes formidably difficult to collect and must also have radically reduced
procurement of supplementary taxes such as the Harmonious Grain levy. The
government seemed to have only two options: redistribute land among poor,
tax-paying peasants, an administratively onerous task, or seize private lands for
the state. Chia Ssu-tao took the second path. He restricted the landholdings of
tax-exempt officials and mandated that the state purchase one-third of all holdings in excess of two hundred mu (approximately thirty acres). Initially, this
program was implemented near the capital; later, it was extended to most of
the southeast. It was applied first to official households and then was expanded
99
100
SS 417, pp. 12510–11; 425, pp. 12670–1.
On land tenure and reform for the era, see Franke, “Chia Ssu-tao (1213–1275),” pp. 229–31; Chao
Ya-shu, “Sung-tai ti t’ien-fu chih-tu yü t’ien-fu shou-ju chuang k’uang” (M.A. thesis, Kuo-li T’ai-wan
ta-hsüeh, 1969), pp. 85–94; Chang Yin-lin, “Nan Sung wang-kuo shih pu,” in Sung-shih yen-chiu chi:
Ti erh chi, ed. Sung-shih tso-t’an-hui (Taipei, 1964), pp. 105–22, especially pp. 117–22; Ch’en Tengyüan, Chung-kuo t’u-ti chih-tu (Shanghai, 1932), pp. 195–200; Liang Keng-yao, Nan Sung ti nung-ts’un
ching-chi (Taipei, 1984), pp. 83–150; SS 173, pp. 4194–5; HTC (1958) 177, p. 4837; Chou, Ch’i-tung
yeh-yü (1983) 17, pp. 313–17; Hsü, Chü-shan ts’un-kao 3, pp. 15a–17a.
894
richard l. davis
to cover all landowners. Moreover, the two hundred mu exemption was soon
cut in half. Because the government lacked the financial resources to offer adequate compensation, some landowners received as little as five percent of their
land’s market value. There were other inequities as well. Payment for larger
holdings was generally made not in cash, but in progressively larger quantities
of inflated paper currency, tax remission certificates, or worse yet, certificates
conferring official status. This policy made the state the largest landowner in
the empire. For example, the government claimed a reported twenty percent of
all arable land in Che-hsi circuit.101 Although many officials appreciated the
seriousness of the financial crisis facing the Sung, few endorsed Chia Ssu-tao’s
overhaul of the entire landowning system. Such objections by officials may
have reflected their self-interest, for officials constituted a significant share of
the landowning population, but genuine policy differences were also at work.
The most difficult aspect of the public fields initiative was implementation. Local officials, pressured by the Sung court, often confiscated more land
than stipulated while compensating the owners with less than the regulations
obliged. In their misguided enthusiasm, some local officials went so far as to
threaten noncomplying landowners with mutilation and other illegal punishments. Critics charged that the program “disturbed the people” (jao-min).102
By “people,” they seemed to have meant rich landlords and officials, those
with the most wealth to lose. When the government confiscated up to twenty
percent of a region’s arable land, when it attempted to manage vast state
holdings without substantially augmenting its civil service, when it flagrantly
undercut the interests of precisely the group responsible for implementing
its measures, during a time of military conflict, political disruption of some
sort was inevitable. Had Chia Ssu-tao redistributed land among poor peasants rather than claiming everything for the state, the program may have won
greater acceptance. Instead, he strengthened the state at the expense of the
people, alienating rich landlords and landless peasants alike. Moreover, as the
Sung court lacked the resources to supervise state lands, mismanagement and
neglect were unavoidable. The public fields program lasted, at least nominally, for twelve years, an exceedingly long life for such a contentious and
ill-conceived policy.
Success or failure of the public fields policy aside, Chia Ssu-tao faced an
old and difficult problem of revenue shortfall that less courageous predecessors
had evaded. He also showed courage in curtailing the privileges of the ruling
elite and landowning class to which he himself belonged, scholar-officialdom.
Later writers often compared Chia Ssu-tao to Wang Mang, a minister and then
101
102
Franke, “Chia Ssu-tao (1213–1275),” p. 230.
Ch’en et al., Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo (1977) 98, p. 1087.
the reign of li-tsung
895
emperor (r. 9–23) who ended the Western Han dynasty (206 b.c.e.–8 c.e.).
Wang Mang undertook drastic land reform and impoverished the wealthy.103
However, this comparison is exaggerated.104 The Sung government confiscated
only one-third of excess holdings and offered compensation, however modest.
It also provided tax relief through the abolition of the Harmonious Grain
system. All this suggests intentional moderation on Chia’s part. However,
Chia Ssu-tao and Li-tsung were viewed as hypocrites for demanding sacrifice
from others while spending lavishly on themselves. In 1262, a year before the
public fields measure, the emperor had built, at state expense, a private home
and ancestral temple for Chia Ssu-tao. Costing a million strings of cash, the
buildings probably rivaled even imperial structures in their sumptuousness.105
This extravagance, compounded with the emperor’s lavish expenditures within
his own palace, must have left many dispossessed landowners embittered,
certain that revenues earned from their former lands would only be squandered
on imperial frivolities.
Bureaucratic discontent was also directed toward Chia Ssu-tao’s conduct
of foreign policy. As noted earlier, the armies of Khubilai had largely withdrawn from the south following Möngke’s death in 1259. At that point, they
decided to test the diplomatic waters, sending a peace envoy, Hao Ching, to
the Sung in the spring of 1260. Sixty miles into Sung territory, at Chen-chou2,
a border official arrested him. This arrest was allegedly made on orders from
the chief councilor without the emperor’s knowledge.106 In light of the acute
vulnerability of its southwest, the Sung could scarcely afford to offer such
provocation to the enemy. Moreover, with the Sung having apparently made
peace overtures to the Mongols only a year earlier, the sudden change in attitude is rather baffling. Hao Ching was suspected, by some reports, to be a spy.
If true, a more responsible court would have simply turned him away at the
border, rather than further provoke the Mongols by incarcerating their envoy.
Other reports allude to some secret understanding between the councilor and
the Mongols, concluded during the pressures of the 1259 offensive, which
had offered what in retrospect represented politically awkward concessions.
For fear of these concessions being made public, Chia Ssu-tao isolated Hao
103
104
105
106
See Hans Bielenstein, “Wang Mang, the restoration of the Han dynasty, and Later Han,” in The Cambridge
history of China, volume 1: The Ch’in and Han empires, 221 B.C.–A.D. 220, ed. Denis C. Twitchett and
Michael Loewe (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 232–51.
Franke, “Chia Ssu-tao,” p. 231 n. 61.
Ting, Sung-jen i-shih hui-pien 18, p. 924; SS 45, p. 880. See also Richard L. Davis, Wind against the
mountain: The crisis of politics and culture in thirteenth-century China (Cambridge, Mass., 1996), pp. 42–6.
Sung et al., Yüan shih 206, pp. 4591–4; HTC (1958) 176, p. 4802; Franke, “Chia Ssu-tao (1213–
1275),” pp. 226–9; Morris Rossabi, Khubilai Khan: His life and times (Berkeley, Calif., 1988), pp. 56, 81;
Hu et al., Sung Meng (Yüan) kuan-hsi shih, pp. 260–9; Li, Yüan-shih hsin-chiang, vol. 2, pp. 266–7.
896
richard l. davis
Ching. As demonstrated by Herbert Franke, documents given to the envoy
contain no reference to tribute payment or to any previous concessions.107 The
only feasible explanation for Sung intransigence in this case is the weight of
revanchist bureaucratic opinion.
For much of the thirteenth century, the Sung bureaucracy had favored
arms over negotiation, activism over passivism, and had taken a dim view of
appeasement: Shih Mi-yüan had been criticized by Chia She for using wealth
and office to buy the loyalties of Li Ch’üan, Shih Sung-chih had been denounced
for compromising revanchist idealism in the base pursuit of peace, Ting Tach’üan had been criticized for doing too little to strengthen border defenses,
and Tung Sung-ch’en had come under fire for proposing a tactical retreat by
relocating the capital farther southeast. In this general atmosphere of militancy,
Chia Ssu-tao, as a councilor still new to the office, could not afford to incur
the bureaucracy’s wrath. His apparent indifference to the threat posed by
the Mongols may also relate to his doubts about Mongol intentions. Having
rebuffed Sung overtures a year earlier, the Mongols’ sudden interest in talks
would naturally have aroused suspicion.
In the early part of 1261, Chia Ssu-tao faced a new challenge caused by the
loyalists of Shantung. Thirty years before, in 1231, Sung armies had killed Li
Ch’üan, following his abortive invasion of the south. Li Ch’üan’s wife, Yang
Miao-chen, had then led her remnant armies in retreat to the northeast, never
again to threaten the south. Li T’an, the adopted son of the two, had inherited their base at I-tu (near modern Ch’ing-chou, in central Shantung). The
Mongols subsequently entrusted Li T’an with control over much of Shantung, hoping eventually to unleash the Shantung armies upon the Sung. With
expanded aid from Khubilai, Li T’an began to harass the Sung border in 1261.
His intention, however, must have been to obtain, by coercion if necessary,
support from the Sung, for in March 1262, in the most stunning defection
of the Li-tsung reign, Li T’an turned on the Mongols and declared fealty to
the Sung.108 The move was perhaps inspired by greed, as Li had been disappointed with Mongol aid, or perhaps by opportunism, with Li seeking to
exploit Mongol preoccupations in the west to assert his control in the east, or
perhaps by fear, with Li apprehensive about his place in the long-term Mongol
plans for Shantung. Whatever his motives, the decision to ally himself with
the Sung, the government responsible for his father’s death, rather than declare
107
108
Franke, “Chia Ssu-tao (1213–1275),” pp. 226–9.
On the Li T’an affair, see Sung et al., Yüan shih 206, pp. 4591–6; HTC (1958) 176, pp. 4819–24; Li,
Sung Yüan chan-shih, pp. 863–74; Li, Yüan-shih hsin-chiang, vol. 2, pp. 267–73; Otagi Matsuo, “Ri Tan
no hanran to sono seijiteki igi – Mōkōchō chika ni okeru Kanchi no hōkensei to sono shūkensei e no
tenkai,” Tōyōshi kenkyū 6 No. 4 (1941), pp. 1–26.
the reign of li-tsung
897
independence from both the Mongols and the Sung, suggests that Li T’an had
been given a substantial incentive. The Sung court must have made an irresistible bid for his loyalty. As bureaucratic chief, Chia Ssu-tao would deserve
some credit for this. But the risks in this venture turned out to be too great
for Chia Ssu-tao.
In contrast to his father, Li T’an commanded an unimpressive army of
roughly twenty thousand men, which posed no serious military challenge to
Khubilai. For Li to become a serious challenger, the Sung would have had to
commit to Shantung, on short notice, a very large army of reinforcements,
weakening their defenses elsewhere. Chia Ssu-tao had no manpower to do
this, even if he wished to do so, and refused to take advantage of Li T’an’s
offer. Consequently, the Li T’an uprising lasted scarcely a month. The Sung
accomplished nothing in the venture, save for further provoking the new
Mongol ruler. Only one year earlier, a prominent commander at Lu-chou3,
Liu Cheng, had defected to the Mongols, thereby strengthening their hand
in the west in Szechwan. The rebellion of Li T’an, by forcing the Mongols to
assert their authority in the Shantung region, brought new pressure against
the Southern Sung on another front.
Tao-hsüeh and the Imperial University
Perceiving failures in Sung political leadership and the increased foreign military threat, the students at the Imperial University (T’ai-hsüeh) emerged in
Li-tsung’s reign as a potent political influence. In the last years of the Northern
Sung, students had been vocal critics of government policy, but their activism
erupted in a brief and violent episode that held no prospect of sustaining itself.
Activism in the Southern Sung dated from the early Ning-tsung years, when
students had protested the dismissals in 1195 of Li Hsiang (chin-shih 1163) and
Yang Chien (1140–1226), men identified with Chao Ju-yü and openly hostile
toward Han T’o-chou. Li Hsiang, then chancellor (chi-chiu) of the Directorate
of Education (Kuo-tzu chien), held professorships at both the Imperial University and the Directorate. No less distinguished was Yang Chien, a professor
at the university and an eminent philosopher. The 1195 protest had helped
polarize officialdom when Han T’o-chou responded by banishing the student
ringleader to distant Ling-nan. Eight years later, when one brazen youth at
the Military Academy had verbally accosted Han T’o-chou, his temerity was
rewarded with arrest and exile.109 These arrests had hardly endeared Han
109
On these incidents, see SS 407, pp. 12289–90; 455, pp. 13369, 13372–8; Wang, “Sung-tai t’ai-hsüeh
yü t’ai-hsüeh-sheng,” pp. 260–1, 298–306; Thomas H. C. Lee, Government education and examinations in
Sung China (New York, 1985), pp. 186–96.
898
richard l. davis
T’o-chou to students, but the coercion had succeeded in keeping university
campuses relatively quiet.
Shih Mi-yüan’s approach to handling student critics was entirely different.
Avoiding confrontation, he courted men popular at the university, especially
Tao-hsüeh proponents. He appointed, for example, Chen Te-hsiu, an individual
with impeccable moralist credentials, as university professor. There was always
an element of tension between the pacifist councilor and the revanchist university leaders, but such tension never escalated into confrontation. Despite
his long and controversial tenure, Shih Mi-yüan drew no more than minor
criticism from students.110
Compromises made by Shih Mi-yüan should not cloud the fact that he was
a clever manipulator who apparently controlled students through their professors. With roughly sixteen hundred students and only three professors, not
counting many more lecturers, at the university, such manipulation was feasible. University appointments required special examination credentials, yet
approval of appointments rested with the chief councilor, and Shih Mi-yüan
exploited this prerogative.111 In this way, Cheng Ch’ing-chih, the chief councilor’s closest confidant, received appointments to the Imperial University, the
Directorate of Education, and the Imperial Clan Academy. As a university
official at the time of Li-tsung’s controversial succession, Cheng’s presence,
more than any other single factor, explains the lack of student criticism of the
affair. Other Ming-chou natives or close associates of the councilor also received
teaching or administrative assignments at the university, including Ying Yao,
Hsüan Tseng, Yüan Hsieh, Ch’iao Hsing-chien, and many of Shih Mi-yüan’s
own kinsmen. At least eight of Shih Mi-yüan’s collateral nephews were identified with the university in or around the time of his councilorship.112 Not all
these kinsmen approved of their uncle, and some even criticized him publicly,
but as a whole they probably had a generally moderating effect on student
opinion.
The successors of Shih Mi-yüan, lacking his skills in political manipulation,
were often humbled by pressures from the university. The first major clash of
the Li-tsung reign between the bureaucratic leadership and university students
occurred during the years of Shih Sung-chih’s dominance, from 1241 to 1245.
The younger Shih’s elevation to chief councilor in 1239 was poorly received at
110
111
112
SS 419, pp. 12555–6; 420, pp. 12572–4; 423, p. 12629; Ch’en Teng-yüan, Kuo-shih chiu-wen (Peking,
1958) 35, p. 378.
SS 246, p. 8736; 400, pp. 12146–7; 419, p. 12543; 420, p. 12571; Huang et al., Sung Yüan hsüeh-an
73, pp. 1278, 1388.
SS 423, pp. 12637–8; Lou Yüeh [Yao], Kung-k’uei chi [Ssu-pu ts’ung-k’an ch’u-pien 1929 ed.] (c. early
13th c.; Taipei, 1979) 105, p. 11b; Tai Mei et al., Hsin-hsiu Yin-hsien chih (1877) 20, p. 35a; Hsiao-shan
Shih-shih tsung-p’u [Columbia University copy] (n.p., 1892) 5, pp. 31b, 32b, 41a, 45a.
the reign of li-tsung
899
the university, and complaints arose early on. Students later criticized Shih’s
pacifist inclinations and found fault with the Shih family’s domination at
court.113 These issues did not suddenly emerge under Shih Sung-chih; it is
merely that students had won, for the first time in three or four decades, the
courage to address their political concerns in a public, confrontational manner.
Their courage stemmed from the new councilor’s background. For virtually
his entire career, Shih Sung-chih had served away from the court. Even as
chief councilor, various military responsibilities often took him away from
Lin-an. Unlike his uncle, Shih Sung-chih did not have the extensive network
of contacts within the metropolitan bureaucracy and the university necessary
to manipulate or influence political opinion in the capital. Shih Sung-chih
had also struck an unseemly image of a professional bureaucrat, an unscholarly
official with scant interest in the ethical concerns of philosophers and students.
Never bothering to court Tao-hsüeh proponents as his uncle had done, he
probably underestimated the group’s importance in shaping political opinion.
Nothing incensed students more about Shih Sung-chih than his apparent pacifism, for irredentism had an extraordinary appeal at the university.
This tradition drew some inspiration from the late Northern Sung, but it was
strengthened by the distinctive conditions of the diminished southern empire.
Tao-hsüeh ideas fueled such idealism. The leading Southern Sung thinker, Chu
Hsi, was a vocal proponent of an aggressive policy against the north. In his
1163 memorial to Hsiao-tsung, for example, he had endorsed the revanchist
policies of Councilor Chang Chün. Despite the councilor’s ultimate defeat in
battle, Chu Hsi appears not to have changed his position, as evidenced by the
militancy of his later writings.114 Other statesmen and scholars, such as Yeh
Shih, Hsin Ch’i-chi, Ch’en Liang, and Chang Shih2, although coming from
quite different intellectual traditions, shared a radical militancy with Taohsüeh proponents. Quite unlike the intellectuals, wielders of political power
tended toward pragmatic moderation, if not pacifism, in foreign policy, which
caused the two groups to clash often at court. For Tao-hsüeh proponents, these
differences went beyond policy convictions. Having achieved unparalleled
supremacy in the realm of thought, they felt they had consistently been denied
a share of political power commensurate with their intellectual standing.
113
114
Huang Hsien-fan, Sung-tai t’ai-hsüeh-sheng chiu-kuo yün-tung (Shanghai, 1936), pp. 73–8.
Chu Hsi, Hui-an hsien-sheng Chu Wen kung wen-chi [Ming Chia-ching 1522–66 ed.; Ssu-pu ts’ung-k’an
ch’u-pien 1929 ed.] (1245; Taipei, 1979) 11, pp. 1a–40b; 13, pp. 1a–8a. Also see Conrad Schirokauer,
“Chu Hsi’s political career: A study in ambivalence,” in Confucian personalities, ed. Arthur F. Wright
and Denis C. Twitchett (Stanford, Calif., 1962), pp. 162–88; Brian E. McKnight, “Chu Hsi and his
world,” in Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism, ed. Wing-tsit Chan (Honolulu, 1986), pp. 408–36, especially
pp. 422–5; Lo Wen (Winston W. Lo), The life and thought of Yeh Shih (Gainsesville, Fla., 1974),
pp. 57–74; SS 429, pp. 12751–70; Ch’en, Kuo-shih chiu-wen, pp. 374–9.
900
richard l. davis
But with the thirteenth-century court dominated by entrenched councilors and
their cliques, the prospects for effecting change, compared with the eleventh
and twelfth centuries, were diminished. To be sure, conflicting views on war
and peace often fell along outer and inner court lines, but militancy among
Tao-hsüeh proponents and their sympathizers also resulted from the group’s
profound sensitivity to the Sung dynasty’s crisis of legitimacy.
The Sung loss of its northern territories, including the Central Plains in
1126, to the Chin conquerors had dealt a severe blow to the Sung ruling house.
Descent from the Chao lineage offered Southern Sung rulers some legitimacy,
yet the raison d’être of any government-in-exile is the promise of eventual
return to full powers and restoration of lost lands. The harsh realities of Chin
strength and Sung weakness, however, left Sung statesmen and intellectuals
alike scrambling to address legitimacy issues, often using scholarship to serve
their political agenda. The compilation, Outline and details of the comprehensive
mirror (Tzu-chih t’ung-chien kang-mu), written under the auspices of Chu Hsi’s
students and published in 1172, offers a prime example.115 In their digest of
Ssu-ma Kuang’s massive history The comprehensive mirror for aid in government
(Tzu-chih t’ung-chien), the authors devoted much space to assessing the legitimacy of past dynasties. Their objective was to develop rules of legitimacy
that would firmly place the Southern Sung in a more favorable light than the
Chin.116 In addition to employing historical arguments, those using scholarship to serve their political agenda also exploited philosophical legacies to augment the Sung dynasty’s political status. Southern Sung Tao-hsüeh proponents,
because of their close intellectual links with the distinctive Northern Sung
tradition of Chou Tun-i and the Ch’eng brothers, boldly declared a connection
between political succession and “Succession to the Way” (tao-t’ung), reasoning
that where philosophical orthodoxy lies, so does political legitimacy.117 This
ideological commitment to defending the dynasty came with a political agenda
of incessant pressure to recover the north. These revanchists often argued for
the restoration of the Sung’s former boundaries, but they had a scant appreciation of the practical limits to state power. To a throne obsessed with its own
legitimacy, Tao-hsüeh proponents may have had irresistible appeal, but each
emperor who was temporarily won over to support their militancy – Hsiaotsung, Ning-tsung, and Li-tsung in turn – paid dearly for those sympathies.
115
116
117
Conrad Schirokauer, “Chu Hsi’s sense of history,” in Ordering the world: Approaches to state and society in
Sung dynasty China, ed. Robert P. Hymes and Conrad Schirokauer (Berkeley, Calif., 1993), p. 200.
Schirokauer, “Chu Hsi’s sense of history,” pp. 195–206; Jao Tsung-i, Chung-kuo shih-hsüeh-shang chih
cheng-t’ung lun: Chung-kuo shih-hsüeh kuan-nien t’an-t’ao chih i (Hong Kong, 1977), pp. 35–7; Ch’en
Ch’ing-ch’üan et al., Chung-kuo shih-hsüeh-chia p’ing-chuan (Cheng-chou, 1985), vol. 2, pp. 600–21.
Wing-tsit Chan, Chu Hsi: New studies (Honolulu, 1989), pp. 320–5; Richard L. Davis, “Historiography
as politics in Yang Wei-chen’s ‘Polemic on legitimate succession,’” T’oung Pao 69 Nos. 1–3 (1983),
pp. 33–72, especially pp. 40–2, 48, 69–70.
the reign of li-tsung
901
In the end, moderates generally prevailed, but to do so the court had to sacrifice
the abstract enhancement of the legitimacy that the revanchists offered it for
the tangible maintenance of peace.
During the Sung, the influence of the Learning of the Way (Tao-hsüeh) at the
Imperial University fluctuated immensely. On the rise in late Northern Sung,
it entered a dramatic decline in the early Southern Sung due to the hostility
of power brokers at court such as Ch’in Kuei. Its fortunes improved modestly
under Hsiao-tsung, one of few emperors whose personal lifestyle came close to
the high moral standards set by the movement, but then declined again under
Ning-tsung. Of the most notable disciples of Chu Hsi listed in the Sung dynastic history (Sung shih), only two can be identified with the university system.
Most of them apparently preferred to teach at state or privately run regional
academies, where they cultivated a growing body of followers.118 Initially
underrepresented at metropolitan institutions, and short on influential court
officers and university professors, the Tao-hsüeh movement figured prominently
in regional education; it was unmatched in the zeal with which it propagated
its ideas at the local level.119 By the early thirteenth century, the school’s
influence, once concentrated in the Fu-chien region, had spread throughout
the south. Men originally independent of the movement – Chen Te-hsiu and
Wei Liao-weng, to name two illustrious examples – came to sympathize with
its persecuted leaders and their moral message.120 Tao-hsüeh values were also
favorably received by some powerful bureaucrats, such as Cheng Ch’ing-chih
and Tung Huai, natives of Liang-che whose intellectual pedigrees differed radically from those of the Fu-chien school. The movement’s influence on education
ensured that it would eventually alter, however indirectly, the empire’s leading educational institution, the Imperial University. This expanded influence
also came about owing to a generally sympathetic leadership at court beginning with Shih Mi-yüan.
The growing stature of the Tao-hsüeh at the Imperial University was related
to the curriculum. During the Northern Sung, the university had tended to
stress poetry. In the Southern Sung, it stressed the classics.121 The effect of
118
119
120
121
SS 429–30.
Hoyt C. Tillman, Confucian discourse and Chu Hsi’s ascendancy (Honolulu, 1992), pp. 37–42, 133–44,
231–4; Linda A. Walton, “The institutional context of Neo-Confucianism: Scholars, schools, and shuyüan in Sung-Yüan China,” in Neo-Confucian education: The formative stage, ed. Wm. Theodore de Bary
and John W. Chaffee (Berkeley, Calif., 1989), pp. 457–92.
Liu Tzu-chien (James T. C. Liu), “Wei Liao-weng’s thwarted statecraft,” in Ordering the world: Approaches
to state and society in Sung dynasty China, ed. Robert P. Hymes and Conrad Schirokauer (Berkeley,
Calif., 1993), pp. 336–48; Wm. Theodore de Bary, “Chen Te-hsiu and statecraft,” in Ordering the
world: Approaches to state and society in Sung dynasty China, ed. Robert P. Hymes and Conrad Schirokauer
(Berkeley, Calif., 1993), pp. 349–79.
Chao T’ieh-han, “Sung-tai ti t’ai-hsüeh,” in Sung-shih yen-chiu chi: Ti i chi, ed. Sung-shih yen-chiu-hui
(Taipei, 1958), pp. 317–56.
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richard l. davis
this difference in emphasis is unmistakable. Since the Tao-hsüeh movement
produced the most prolific classicists of the thirteenth century, candidates
preparing for civil service examinations, including university students, were
almost certain to come under its influence. At the end of 1212 the university
formally adopted Chu Hsi’s commentaries on the Analects and the Mencius as
canonical, officially confirming the preeminence of Tao-hsüeh scholarship as an
intellectual force and also as the key to examination success.
The transfer of Tao-hsüeh ideas into political action owes something to the
emperor. Li-tsung bestowed court honors on leaders of the Tao-hsüeh movement
with extraordinary generosity. In 1227, Chu Hsi’s compilation of commentary on the Four Books (Analects, Mencius, Chung-yung, and Ta-hsüeh) received
imperial sanction. In 1230 a descendant of Confucius was favored with a government post. In 1241 the posthumous ranks of Chou Tun-i, Chang Tsai, the
Ch’eng brothers, and Chu Hsi were all elevated and tablets for them placed
in the Temple of Confucius. Their teachings in effect were sanctioned as state
orthodoxy. But as demonstrated by James T. C. Liu, imperial goodwill was
hardly divorced from pragmatic politics.122 With his own succession shrouded
in controversy and with a new military power menacing the northern border,
Li-tsung exploited rapidly evolving intellectual and ideological traditions of
the Confucian canon to enhance the image of himself and his administration.
At the same time, he continued to indulge his material and sensual impulses in
flagrant violation of the high moral expectations of the Tao-hsüeh movement.
His hypocrisy angered many, Tu Fan being the most notable critic, yet most
aspiring officials could ill afford such candor. Unable to risk indicting the
emperor personally, they focused on his chief advisors instead, blaming them
for everything from enemy victories along the border, to irregularities in the
heavens, and even to the emperor’s sexual appetites.
Shih Sung-chih rose to the councilorship in the early 1240s, an exceedingly
troubled time. Natural disasters reduced hungry residents of the capital to cannibalism; heavenly portents foretold a grim future for the ruler and the ruled;
the Mongol offensive, though largely arrested, left a vast trail of devastation
and human suffering; and scandalous rumors about the emperor’s personal life
circulated widely. The spreading conviction that dynastic fortunes were taking
a turn for the worse, combined with Shih Sung-chih’s generally low standing at
the Imperial University, emboldened the students. The thrust of their indictments was that Shih Sung-chih, by orchestrating his own recall following his
father’s death, had exhibited a lack of the important Confucian virtue of filial
piety. Being disloyal to his own father, how could he be loyal to his ruler?
122
Liu Tzu-chien (James T. C. Liu), “How did a Neo-Confucian school become the state orthodoxy?”
Philosophy East and West 23 No. 4 (1973), pp. 483–505.
the reign of li-tsung
903
It was a moral indictment, and may well have been orchestrated by moralist
teachers or their associates in the capital. Certain university chancellors and
professors at the time were indirectly linked to the Tao-hsüeh movement, and
contemporary documents occasionally refer to students being encouraged in
their attacks by their teachers.123 Students and teachers in Lin-an interacted
freely, contravening the rules restricting such interaction in force during the
Northern Sung. At the same time, moralist elements had hardly overrun the
university. The most prominent chancellor under Shih Sung-chih, Chin Yüan
(chin-shih 1214), had no known ties to Tao-hsüeh.124 In all likelihood, students
were influenced by individual professors and administrators, but they were
more than mere pawns in a power struggle between bureaucratic insiders and
outsiders. On the contrary, once stirred by political events in the capital, they
quickly seized the initiative and became a vigorously independent force.
The confrontation between Shih Sung-chih and the Imperial University
students added a new dimension to Southern Sung politics. For the preceding
century, student outbursts had been infrequent and largely unfruitful. But as
the university grew in the early Southern Sung from a few hundred students
to over sixteen hundred by the early thirteenth century, numbers that were
augmented by the formation of the Military Academy and the Lin-an Academy
in the late twelfth century, so did the students’ potential to have an influence.125
Reflecting in part the confidence that comes with greater numbers, and by
sheer persistence, they won the resignation of Assistant Councilor Li Mingfu, a close associate of Shih Sung-chih, in early 1244.126 This victory, more
than any other factor, explains the students’ belligerence later in the year,
when controversy erupted over the recall from mourning of Shih Sung-chih.
Rather than act as individuals, as in the past, they acted as a group. One
hundred and forty students at the Imperial University, almost ten percent
of the student body, petitioned for Shih’s dismissal. With support from the
other metropolitan academies and from many officials in the civil service, they
immobilized the throne. Li-tsung yielded to their demands after three intense
months, and replaced Shih Sung-chih with Tu Fan, a favorite among the critics.
Student pressure had, almost on its own, destroyed a chief councilor, a victory
that legitimized student opinion while enhancing the university’s status. It
also, more importantly, exposed the chief councilor, and even the emperor, as
vulnerable to the forces of opinion. Li-tsung’s decision in 1245 to investigate
the questionable deaths of several of the critics of Shih Sung-chih, again a
123
124
125
126
SS 409, p. 12323; 418, p. 12529; 419, pp. 12553–5; 422, pp. 12614–15.
SS 419, pp. 12558–9.
SS 157, pp. 3685–6.
Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 53, pp. 8a–b.
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richard l. davis
concession to student demands, only confirmed this. No longer, it seemed,
would the university be cowed by bureaucratic chiefs, bought off by petty
favors, or humbled by the imperial will.
Students played little part in politics for the next decade, however. The
calm at the university related to the recall in 1247 of Cheng Ch’ing-chih to
serve as councilor. Cheng Ch’ing-chih fared better than most owing to his
close association with Tao-hsüeh proponents and his many years of service at
the various university campuses, where he seems to have made many allies.
The late 1240s had more than its share of political problems, but students did
not attempt to intervene. They offered no resistance to the nomination of Shih
Chai-chih, son of Shih Mi-yüan, as minister of personnel and later as executive at the Bureau of Military Affairs, despite his reputation for corruption
and mediocrity. Students held their silence about Cheng Ch’ing-chih’s blatant
indulgence of a politically manipulative wife and a criminally larcenous son.
Even when they came out in support of Ch’eng Kuang-hsü (chin-shih 1211),
a drafter at the Secretariat whom the councilor wished to dismiss, students
carefully avoided offending Cheng Ch’ing-chih personally.127 Such unusual
pliability owed something to the strong ties of Councilor Cheng to the university, but also to his skill at steering opinion. For example, when making
the potentially controversial nomination of Shih Chai-chih to the Bureau of
Military Affairs, he appointed Ying Yao, a former university professor, as the
younger Shih’s superior and subsequently as assistant councilor. Similarly, the
elevation of the experienced frontier commander Chao K’uei first to assistant councilor and then to chief councilor would placate irredentist students
inclined to challenge the appointment of Shih Chai-chih. The strategy proved
exceedingly successful.
The death of Cheng Ch’ing-chih in 1251 and the dismissal of Wu Ch’ien in
1252 compounded by the ascendancy of royal favorites and eunuchs at court and
the impotence of the succeeding councilors to curb their excesses, prompted a
new generation of students to take the offensive again. They were apparently
inspired to do so by Investigating Censor Hung T’ien-hsi. Allegations that
the eunuch Tung Sung-ch’en had illegally confiscated private property, which
coincided with the promotion of the notoriously unscrupulous Ting Ta-ch’üan
to a censorial post, so incensed Hung T’ien-hsi that he resigned in protest.
His resignation generated widespread censure of the chief councilor, Hsieh
Fang-shu, whose failure to defend his respected colleague implied his support
for the inner court. University students demanded Hsieh’s resignation. In
response, the eunuch Tung Sung-ch’en resorted to bribing a student at the
university to dispute the other students’ criticism. The ploy failed and the
student, denounced by his peers, was dismissed from the university, while
127
SS 415, p. 12459.
the reign of li-tsung
905
Hsieh Fang-shu resigned.128 The students failed to win the recall of Hung
T’ien-hsi, but they had succeeded in having a second councilor driven from
office and in reasserting their political influence, a feat made easier by Tung
Sung-ch’en’s misguided effort to bribe one of their own.
This new victory added fire to the student movement. When the notorious
Ting Ta-ch’üan, in liaison with prominent eunuchs and consorts, forced Chief
Councilor Tung Huai out of the capital, a group of students led by Liu Fu
(b. 1217) and Ch’en I-chung (chin-shih 1262) protested. Ignoring imperial
instructions to refrain from criticizing court policy, they agitated for the dismissal of Ting Ta-ch’üan, and sustained their pressure for most of 1256. The
result was far from favorable for the students. Fifteen activists at the Imperial
University and the Imperial Clan Academy were rounded up, expelled from
the schools, and banished to the south to live under surveillance.129 The university’s vice-chancellor responded by organizing a massive demonstration, in
the hope of forcing a compromise. But Li-tsung not only refused to reverse his
decision, he ordered a stone tablet to be erected on the campus inscribed with
a permanent injunction against the “irresponsible discussion of state affairs”
by students. Additionally, Li-tsung instructed university officials to scrutinize all student memorials before releasing them, a futile attempt at reviving
the censorship tactics that had been used by Han T’o-chou. School officials
demurred, for the most part, so the directive was chiefly ignored. Imperial
pressure, meanwhile, did not halt the student campaign of protest against
Ting Ta-ch’üan, which ended in his removal three years later.
After 1259, university influence improved only modestly. With Wu Ch’ien
as councilor of the left, the banished students were permitted to return to
the capital, and in a gesture of goodwill, the throne even exempted them
from departmental examinations in qualifying for chin-shih status. In this way,
Ch’en I-chung, a figure destined for later prominence, gained second place in
the palace examination of 1262. Calm returned to the campus for the next
several years, despite the emperor’s continued support for the eunuch Tung
Sung-ch’en and the nomination of Chia Ssu-tao as councilor. Much of the credit
for this stability belongs to Chia Ssu-tao. Through increased student stipends,
larger university enrollments, and special gifts to lesser school officials, he
garnered university support.130 In other circles, Chia was increasingly despised
and assailed, but not at the university. In the early 1260s several audacious
students criticized Chia Ssu-tao’s tight control of the court. Chia instructed
the prefect of Lin-an to round up the agitating students and tattoo them like
128
129
130
SS 417, pp. 12511–12; 424, pp. 12655–6; HTC (1958) 174, pp. 4752–3; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 53,
pp. 10a–b.
SS 474, p. 13778; HTC (1958) 175, p. 4764.
Wang, “Sung-tai t’ai-hsüeh yü t’ai-hsüeh-sheng,” p. 206.
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richard l. davis
common criminals.131 Chia’s severe order did not provoke the usual stir at
the university. Not until the councilor’s final years, in the early 1270s, did
students reassert themselves.
In explaining the heightened student activism in the Li-tsung era, modern
Chinese scholars often relate it to the “nationalism” or “national consciousness”
that emerged as a spontaneous emotional response to developments, largely
but not exclusively in foreign relations, that threatened the Sung dynasty.
Student activism during the Northern Sung had been most pronounced under
Hui-tsung and in the Southern Sung under Li-tsung, both periods characterized by a faction-riddled court, an exploitative government, and the ravages
of border warfare. Yet student censure was by no means confined to issues of
foreign policy. Students at the Imperial University may have resented Shih
Sung-chih’s perceived pacifism, but their 1244 indictment had focused specifically on his personal ethics and, to a lesser extent, on the dangers associated
with one-family political dominance. Student criticisms of Tung Sung-ch’en
and Ting Ta-ch’üan during the early 1250s had addressed the threat to political
stability posed by eunuchs and families of the inner court; deteriorating conditions along the border were of secondary importance. To portray the external
threat of foreign invasion as the essential stimulus to student activism ignores
the unique character of thought and politics in late Sung. It implies that had
either the Chin or Mongol armies not menaced the south, students at the
Imperial University would have remained tranquil despite the presence, at
various times, of eunuch power, consort influence, and imperial laxity. This
scenario underestimates the role of Tao-hsüeh teachings in inspiring student
idealism, the role of political tolerance in encouraging dissent, and the distinct character of individual decision makers who, at different times, inspired,
incited, patronized, and pressured different centers of power within the capital
and throughout the empire.
Domestic concerns
During Li-tsung’s reign, criticism of imperial conduct and government policies
was heightened by an onslaught of natural disasters. In Li-tsung’s long reign,
official records report seven major droughts in 1239, 1240, 1241, 1245, 1246,
1247, and 1254, and seven years of serious floods in 1229, 1236, 1242, 1251,
1252, 1255, and 1259; most of these occurred in central Sung territory. The
magnitude of these disasters was enormous. The floods of 1259 reportedly took
the lives of millions in Che-hsi circuit.132 Other disasters had human causes.
Major fires struck Lin-an in 1231, 1235, 1237, 1252, 1257, 1263, and 1264.
131
132
SS 474, p. 13782.
SS 409, pp. 12326–7.
the reign of li-tsung
907
The overcrowded, urban living conditions of the capital, the narrowness of the
city’s streets, and the incendiary quality of building materials all made fires
difficult to prevent and easy to spread. They often continued for days and caused
incalculable loss.133 A sizable part of the Imperial City was ravaged by fire in
1231; in 1237 fires affected vast numbers of buildings spread through most of
the capital. Severe earthquakes were reported in the west in 1240 and 1255,
devastating invasions of locusts in the east in 1240 and 1242, and scattered
epidemic outbreaks in 1251. These disasters in turn caused famine and death on
a massive scale. Mongol-held territory in the north was not spared these types
of natural disasters either, and many northerners, receiving no meaningful
relief from their Mongol occupiers, chose to flee south. In 1239, the numbers
of refugees swelled to over a hundred thousand.134 Such calamities, coinciding
with military confrontations that dragged on for decades, further strained the
resources of a hard-pressed government.
As illustrated by Sogabe Shizuo, the Southern Sung empire still produced
an unprecedented level of wealth. With only half the territorial expanse, the
total government revenues during the late twelfth century roughly equaled
those of the Northern Sung at its height.135 Revenues from the salt and wine
monopolies were not negatively affected by the loss of territory either. This
phenomenon owes something to continuing population growth during the
Southern Sung period and to increased productivity in a generally prosperous
southern environment, but no less important to government revenues were
the proportionately higher tax rates and the imposition of a wide array of new
imposts and surcharges. Sung taxes may well have exceeded those imposed
during the Han and T’ang dynasties by ten times, and the Southern Sung taxes
were most often justified on the grounds of military preparedness.136 Military expenditures notwithstanding, the Sung empire’s exchequer had boasted
sizable surpluses for most of the twelfth century. Such good fortune did not
persist under Kuang-tsung and Ning-tsung. Years of border conflict claimed a
growing share of the empire’s budget as tax revenues began to decline. From a
height of sixty-five million strings of cash under Hsiao-tsung, revenues plummeted to roughly thirty-five million by Ning-tsung’s reign. The plunge is often
attributed to the corruption of local clerks, under whom a progressively larger
share of taxes failed to reach the capital.137 Another factor was the growing
133
134
135
136
137
Jacques Gernet, Daily life in China on the eve of the Mongol invasion, 1250–1276, trans. H. M. Wright
(Stanford, Calif., 1962), pp. 34–8.
SS 414, p. 12429. Northern refugees were joined by a growing stream of migrants fleeing Mongol
assaults on Szechwan. See Paul J. Smith, “Family, landsmann, and status-group affinity in refugee
mobility strategies: The Mongol invasions and the diaspora of Sichuanese elites, 1230–1330,” Harvard
Journal of Asiatic Studies 52 No. 2 (1992), pp. 665–708.
Sogabe Shizuo, Sōdai zaiseishi (Tokyo, 1941), pp. 37–75.
Ch’en, Chung-kuo t’u-ti chih-tu, pp. 168–200, especially p. 191.
SS 41, p. 791; 42, pp. 815–16.
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richard l. davis
tendency of regional governments to retain local tax revenues to cover the
escalating costs of regional defense. In effect, unbridled defense expenditures
fostered the decentralization of Sung fiscal authority.
By Li-tsung’s time, the fiscal pinch had become an acute crisis. The Mongol
invasion depopulated and left a wide expanse of border territory agriculturally
unproductive, causing a mammoth forty-five-year drain on revenues. In scale
and intensity, the new war easily dwarfed earlier Sung conflicts with the Tangut
and Jurchen. Szechwan, the center of many Mongol offensives, reportedly sent
no revenues to Lin-an after 1234; in better days it had annually provided
as much as twenty to thirty million strings of cash.138 The empire’s vast
storehouse of reserves shrank to a fraction of their former size. Intensification
of Mongol military activity in the 1250s only added more economic pressure.
At the height of the 1259–60 conflict, the Sung court disbursed an extra one
hundred and sixty-five million strings of cash, largely in the form of paper
currency, to pay for extraordinary military expenses. Efforts made to control
the spiraling military budget, such as forcing soldiers to till nearby fields and
adopting the local community defense system (pao-chia), appear to have netted
little savings for the government.139 Military expenditures, clerical corruption,
and disaster relief were not the only strains on the imperial exchequer. More
intrusive government policies had to be enforced, and this required more and
more officials to supervise each scheme. And the increasing population added
to the pressure. The Sung government was succumbing to the weight of its
own bureaucracy. As one censor observed in the 1250s, the Northern Sung
government had required only ten thousand officials to administer its 320odd administrative counties. The late Southern Sung empire, reduced to only
100 counties, employed in excess of twenty-four thousand officials.140
Rising expenditures and declining revenues left the Sung court little alternative to issuing massive amounts of paper money. According to Ch’üan Hansheng, the printing of paper currency began under Ning-tsung to subsidize
the K’ai-hsi war in 1206. From a circulation of paper notes with a total nominal value of 24 million strings of copper cash in the late twelfth century,
the issue had increased to 140 million by 1207. Issues subsequently grew
to 230 million strings in 1224, 320 million strings in 1234, and by 1247
to an astonishing 650 million strings.141 Within a half century, the annual
amounts of paper currency issued had increased by a factor of twenty-five. No
138
139
140
141
SS 422, p. 12614; HTC (1958) 171, p. 4649.
SS 44–5.
SS 44, p. 858.
Ch’üan Han-sheng, “Sung-mo ti t’ung-huo p’eng-chang chi ch’i tui-yü wu-chia ti ying-hsiang,” in
Sung-shih yen-chiu chi: Ti erh chi, ed. Sung-shih tso-t’an-hui (Taipei, 1964), pp. 263–325, especially
pp. 286–7; SS 423, pp. 12634–6.
the reign of li-tsung
909
statistics exist for the 1250s, but in light of the government’s extraordinary
expenditures, a circulation of paper notes nominally worth in excess of a billion
strings of copper cash is quite likely. There was rampant inflation. The Sung
court apparently spent much of its stock of precious metals, which supposedly
had been set aside to back the paper currency. In 1259–60 the government
released over 150,000 ounces of silver, in addition to vast quantities of silk
and other valuables, to subsidize defense costs.142 Some of this may have come
from the emperor’s private treasury, which still contained sizable reserves, but
most apparently did not.
High taxes and soaring prices were enough to enrage bureaucrats living
on fixed salaries, city dwellers victimized by an unstable money supply, and
peasants unable to afford marketplace essentials. The high-handedness of a
hard-pressed government only compounded the problem. In 1238 under Shih
Sung-chih, for example, the Sung court printed a new issue currency and
required an unwilling populace to exchange five of the old for one of the new
notes. Shih Mi-yüan had done much the same nearly thirty years before, but at
a less onerous two-to-one exchange rate.143 Even more unsettling for ordinary
people was the collection of taxes years in advance, a practice introduced early
in Li-tsung’s reign. One censor writing in 1248 noted that taxes had already
been collected for 1254, six years in advance.144 In subsequent decades, as
dynastic fortunes continued to decline, such abuses grew worse.
It is easy to denounce Li-tsung’s court for its fiscal irresponsibility and
insensitivity to the plight of an overtaxed population. If Li-tsung had been
more conscientious as a ruler, more frugal in his personal use of dwindling
resources, and more insightful in his selection of chief ministers, could things
have turned out differently? The first economic crisis for the Southern Sung had
stemmed from military expenditures, and the subsequent deterioration of the
economy was related also to war. Perhaps the K’ai-hsi war of 1206 could have
been averted and confrontation with border military threats could have been
delayed, yet the Sung court had, in the final analysis, no means of predicting
Mongol actions in the north nor Mongol designs on the south. Restraint in the
printing of unbacked paper notes would have been more fiscally responsible,
but a government in desperation rarely practices such rational restraint. The
Sung was the first dynasty to experiment with paper currency, and having little
experience to draw upon, it had scant appreciation of the long-term economic
impact of its politically expedient measures. The curbing of local bureaucratic
142
143
144
SS 44, pp. 867–8.
Ch’üan, “Sung-mo ti t’ung-huo p’eng-chang chi ch’i tui-yü wu-chia ti ying-hsiang,” pp. 297, 308; SS
42, p. 816.
SS 174, p. 4221.
910
richard l. davis
corruption would probably have offered some fiscal relief, yet the problem of
local bureaucratic misconduct was as old as the dynasty itself, and years of
experimentation had yielded no easy solutions. Corruption was probably the
rationale behind substantially increasing the size of the sub-bureaucracy, but
more clerks did not necessarily produce better administration, and whatever
graft the government, through additional clerks, managed to curtail, the extra
income derived was ultimately spent on the salaries of an enlarged bureaucracy.
Action to reduce tax evasion and land accumulation, if introduced early on,
probably would have eased the pinch, yet sweeping reforms were certain to
meet bureaucratic resistance. Most inhibiting with regard to efforts to save the
dynasty was the conviction by Tao-hsüeh proponents that the emperor’s moral
example was more critical than were legal reforms and pragmatic institutional
changes. A political climate that stressed ethics at the expense of methods
became an administrative impediment. When political reform finally came in
the 1260s, it was too late.
The combination of rampant inflation, bureaucratic corruption, inequitable
landownership, incessant war, and a long succession of natural disasters had
under past dynasties brought about widespread domestic unrest. The Southern
Sung was hardly immune to the consequences of such conditions. Excluding Li
Ch’üan and his confederates, who were banished and operated largely beyond
the Sung border, the first noteworthy outbreak of banditry under Li-tsung
had occurred in 1229–30. For years prior to this, small marauding bands had
pillaged the countryside; an edict in the spring of 1230 alludes to scattered
banditry throughout the Chiang-nan West, Ching-hu South, and Fu-chien
circuits, extending into Kuang-nan. The most ominous threat came initially
from coastal Fu-chien.145 These outbreaks must have been serious, for the Sung
court offered a general amnesty to all bandits who agreed to lay down their
arms. It also promised official rank to locals who contributed substantially
to any suppression efforts and granted tax exemption to the affected areas.
The government dispatched a small contingent of the Palace Guard and the
imperial navy to assist in the suppression, apparently fearing local forces would
be insufficient. Scarcely two months later, in the late spring of 1230, regional
armies at Chang-chou suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of bandits. At
the urgent request of Shih Mi-chung, a minor supervisor in Fu-chien and the
father of the future councilor Shih Sung-chih, the Sung court appointed Ch’en
Hua prefect of Nan-chien-chou and chief director of the suppression effort. A
145
On these outbreaks, see SS 419, pp. 12553–4, 12561–4; 420, pp. 12575–6; 437, p. 12963; 449,
p. 13227; 453, p. 13337; HTC (1958) 164, p. 4473; 165, pp. 4488–9, 4499; Hua Shan, “Nan Sung
Shao-ting, Tuan-p’ing chien ti Chiang, Min, Kuang nung-min ta ch’i-i,” Wen shih che No. 43 (1956),
pp. 41–8.
the reign of li-tsung
911
disciple of Yeh Shih, Ch’en Hua was a native of Fu-chien whose familiarity
with local topography and customs the court hoped to exploit. Ch’en’s mission
was not easy. Having been neglected for years, the region’s bandits allegedly
numbered in the tens of thousands. T’ing-chou, Shao-wu, and the wealthy
part of Ch’üan-chou all were centers of bandit activities, as indeed was most
of Fu-chien, from its coastal ports to its western inland frontier.146
In mid-1230, a major confrontation between government forces and insurgents occurred at T’ing-chou, the inland refuge in southwestern Fu-chien for
weary bandits from coastal Chang-chou and Ch’üan-chou. Order was restored
by year’s end in large part by local defenders organized by the redoubtable
widow of a magistrate. Confrontations the next year occurred to the north,
in the vicinity of Shao-wu (in northwest Fukien province). In his efforts at
suppression, Ch’en Hua journeyed as far south as Ch’ü-chou, in western Chetung, which is some indication of the difficulty he experienced containing
the outbreak. Another front in southern Fu-chien was commanded by Hsü
Ying-lung (chin-shih 1208), formerly a distinguished professor at the Imperial University and another Fu-chien native. Named prefect of Ch’ao-chou
(Kuang-nan East near Fu-chien circuit), Hsü Ying-lung challenged the forces
of “Three-Spear” Ch’en (Ch’en san-ch’iang), a bandit operating out of Kanchou (southern Kiangsi province) who supposedly butchered people over a
wide area. With assistance from Ch’en Hua, now prefect of Lung-hsing2, and
armies from western Fu-chien, Hsü Ying-lung launched a devastating threepronged offensive. Three-Spear Ch’en and his confederates were pursued into
Hsing-ning county, northern Kuang-nan East, captured there, and returned
to Lung-hsing2 for execution in 1234. This marked the end of major bandit
activity in the southeast. A grateful court later awarded Ch’en Hua with an
appointment as assistant councilor.
The suppression of banditry involved mobilization of thousands of crack
troops and tens of thousands of militia, plus over four years of fighting. To
prevail, the Sung government implemented a variety of unpopular measures,
including revival of the local community defense system (pao-chia) and conscription for local militias. The desperation of Sung tactics and the duration
of the suppression effort suggest an imposing bandit force, but the outlaws
generally appear to have lacked organization and competent leadership. Had
the Sung not been at war with Chin, and had the bulk of its army not been tied
down along the northern border, such motley bands would probably have been
eliminated more quickly. Contemporaries attributed the bandit activity of the
era chiefly to bureaucratic corruption, excessive taxation, and pirate activity
146
See HTC (1958) 165, p. 4499.
912
richard l. davis
along the coast.147 The insurrections remained diffused and weak, and without
higher political aims to record.
Despite the deteriorating fiscal health of the Sung empire, only two bandit outbreaks are recorded after 1234.148 Despite repeated military setbacks,
only three notable army mutinies erupted and these were easily quelled.149
Despite uninspiring political leadership, no bureaucratic challenge to the
throne emerged in the form of a coup. Indeed, more bandit outbreaks and army
mutinies are recorded for Ning-tsung’s twenty-five years, a time of greater relative stability, than in Li-tsung’s tumultuous forty years.
Li-tsung’s death was sudden and unexpected. On 14 November 1264 he was
too sick to attend court. Two days later he was dead. His formal testamentary
edict appointed his nephew and adoptive heir, Chao Ch’i (Tu-tsung, r. 1264–
74), as his successor, and the succession passed without incident. Chia Ssutao remained firmly in control at court, enjoying a sumptuous lifestyle and
accumulating lavish treasures, and firmly supported by the new young emperor.
For the moment the Mongol pressure on the empire was eased. In 1259
the death of Möngke had led to Mongol civil conflict, and Khubilai, who
was responsible for the eastern Mongol domains, was temporarily preoccupied
with developments in Inner Asia. But Khubilai’s position remained strong. In
1254 he had carried out a campaign to outflank the Sung by driving down the
mountains on the western border of Szechwan to conquer the Ta-li realm in
Yunnan, and to subjugate northern Vietnam. He had overrun much of Szechwan, and although the Sung had restored control over much of it, the Mongols
were still in a powerful position along the Sung western and northern borders. The Sung military had not been overwhelmed, even though the Mongols
always held the initiative. In the east, Sung forces had maintained control
of the Huai frontier, and they tenaciously held on to the two vital strategic
fortresses of Ho-chou3, the key to an eastern advance down the Yangtze River,
and Hsiang-yang, which defended against advances from the north into the
Hupei region and down the Han River valley.
147
148
149
SS 437, p. 12963.
SS 421, p. 12591; HTC (1958) 173, pp. 4725–6. One writer attributes the infrequency of rebel activity
to poor documentation for the last half century of Sung rule. However, the Veritable records (shih-lu)
for the Li-tsung reign, compiled in 1268, were certainly available to historians compiling the Sung
dynastic history; therefore, poor documentation alone cannot explain the dearth of references in official
sources to popular rebellions after 1230; see Li Jung-ts’un, “Sung-tai Hu-pei lu liang-chiang ti-ch’ü ti
man-luan,” Pien-cheng yen-chiu-so nien-pao 9 (1978), pp. 131–81.
SS 417, p. 12508; 454, p. 13346.
CHAPTER 12
THE REIGN OF TU-TSUNG (1264–1274) AND HIS
SUCCESSORS TO 1279
Richard L. Davis
dynasty besieged
As it approached its end, the Southern Sung dynasty had been weakened
by spendthrift emperors, disabled by squabbling bureaucrats, and stretched
to the brink of bankruptcy by the costs of wars that had lingered for six
decades. By the 1260s a certain disillusionment and fatalism hung over Linan. The emperor, Li-tsung (r. 1224–64), seemed to be evading despair by
escaping into lechery. His high officials evaded responsibility for their failures
by engaging in political vendettas. Attempts at reviving economic prosperity
through government initiatives had lost their appeal after several disastrous
failures. The active pursuit of peace was similarly abandoned. Adding to this
malaise was the inability of the Chao imperial line to provide suitable heirs
on a regular basis.
Three of the six Southern Sung emperors before 1275 did not produce a
son who survived him, and this lack of patrilineal succession necessitated the
adoption of sons from less prestigious branches of the imperial clan. Kaotsung, Ning-tsung, and Li-tsung all had lengthy reigns that began in early
adulthood and continued for three decades or more, yet they all died without
sons to succeed them. Hsiao-tsung, Kuang-tsung, and Tu-tsung (r. 1264–74)
were succeeded by infant sons who were ineffectual rulers. Historical records
provide few clues as to why sons were in short supply. What is known is that
the absence of a proper heir, namely the son of the emperor’s primary wife,
created political instability at the time of succession.
Li-tsung was infamous for his unruly passions. His special favor toward consorts Chia and Yen may have been, for court observers, pardonable excesses. His
indiscretions such as cavorting with common street prostitutes and entertaining Buddhist nuns in the palace were not. These liaisons reflected an obsession
with the opposite sex and compromised the majesty of the throne. The obsession did not yield its usual fruit, an abundance of sons who would have been
potential heirs. No children were born to him and Empress Hsieh. Lesser
914
richard l. davis
consorts gave birth to four boys, but they all died relatively young.1 Li-tsung
had a daughter, born to his favored Consort Chia, whom he reportedly loved
immensely, but the daughter died at age twenty-one.
In the 1240s, roughly twenty years into the reign and as Li-tsung approached
his forties, pressure emerged from the bureaucracy for Li-tsung to adopt one
or several imperial clansmen in preparation for the eventual nomination of
an heir. The emperor had agreed to bring selected young clansmen into the
palace for special instruction. He would go no further. Apparently still in
good health, he probably felt no compelling reason for haste. In 1253, as he
approached fifty, the pressure for an heir intensified. He elevated one of those
youths, the only one known to have entered the palace in the 1240s, to the
status of imperial son (huang-tzu). The nomination generated tension at court.
The nominee, Chao Ch’i (b. 1240), was the emperor’s nephew, born to his
younger brother, Chao Yü-jui. Li-tsung and Chao Yü-jui shared a common set
of parents, so the blood ties between Li-tsung and Chao Ch’i were close. The
adoption of nephews was common within the Chao imperial family, and there
was precedent for the action. Yet questions about the legitimacy of Chao Ch’i
detracted from his desirability as a candidate.
Chao Ch’i was probably born to one of Chao Yü-jui’s secondary wives, and
adopted by another, no doubt Chao Yü-jui’s primary wife.2 With concubines
generally of lower social standing, their offspring tended to have a diminished
status. Genealogy also posed problems in that Chao Ch’i descended from the
line of Chao Te-chao, the Sung founder T’ai-tsu’s second son, like Li-tsung
himself and in contrast to the preceding three rulers, who had descended from
Chao Te-fang, T’ai-tsu’s fourth son. Some at court may have preferred, to the
extent that adoption was necessary anyway, for the emperor to revert back
to the line of earlier emperors, which in effect would undo the intervention
by Shih Mi-yüan in 1224. This would require the emperor to abandon his
own nephew in favor of more distant kin descended from earlier emperors. Litsung did not do this. There also were other more sinister concerns. The Sung
dynasty had experienced several cases of familial struggles over the throne,
either between father and son or between brothers. With Chao Yü-jui still
living in nearby Shao-hsing, there was the potential threat of conflict should
he develop greater political ambitions and seek to overthrow his son Chao Ch’i.
1
2
On the succession affair, see T’o-t’o et al., eds., Sung shih [hereafter SS] (1345; Peking, 1977) 42,
pp. 817, 820; 43, p. 847; 248, pp. 8789–90; Chao Hsi-nien, Chao-shih tsu-p’u [Academia Sinica, Fu
Ssu-nien Library, rare edition] (Hong Kong, 1937) 1, pp. 41a, 69a; John W. Chaffee, Branches of heaven:
A history of the imperial clan of Sung China (Cambridge, Mass., 1999), pp. 216, 243.
K’o Wei-ch’i, Sung-shih hsin-pien (1557; Shanghai, 1936) 14, p. 52b; Ch’ien Shih-sheng, Nan Sung shu
(c. 1590; n.p., 1792) 6, p. 1a. Most sources intentionally avoid discussion of the emperor’s maternity;
see SS 46, p. 891; Chao, Chao-shih tsu-p’u 1, p. 69b; Pi Yüan, Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien [hereafter HTC
(1958)] [Te-yü-t’ang tsang-pan 1801 ed.] (1792; Peking, 1958) 178, p. 4853.
the reign of tu-tsung and his successors to 1279
915
Some officials had suggested that adopting the son of a dead clansman would
be a safer choice. Li-tsung dismissed the idea that Chao Yü-jui posed a threat,
no doubt concluding that he understood his brother’s character better than
the bureaucrats. With historical hindsight, we know his faith to be justified,
for Chao Yü-jui never developed imperial ambitions.
The bureaucracy was also concerned about the abilities and training of
the next emperor. Chief Councilor Wu Ch’ien, with reference to the succession, is reported to have said: “I lack the talent of Shih Mi-yüan and Prince
Chung [Chao Ch’i] lacks the good fortune of Your Majesty.”3 The statement,
made while the now adopted son, Chao Ch’i, had yet to be installed as heir
apparent, came without explanation. But we can see that Wu Ch’ien had
created a complex reference that compares his own humility with respect to
the long-deceased Shih Mi-yüan, still highly regarded by Li-tsung, and the
expectation that Chao Ch’i would be ill equipped, either by nature or by circumstances, to confront the difficulties of succession in a way that Li-tsung
was not. However it was interpreted at court, the quote leaves little doubt
that Wu Ch’ien anticipated an uneasy transfer of power following Li-tsung’s
death. Four decades earlier, on the eve of Ning-tsung’s death in 1224, Chief
Councilor Shih Mi-yüan had engineered, reportedly at the emperor’s instructions, the last-minute replacement of Ning-tsung’s adopted son, Chao Hung,
and elevated Ning-tsung’s nephew, the future Li-tsung, to the throne. The
switch might have precipitated a civil war had Shih Mi-yüan not acted with
consummate political skill, inasmuch as the emperor was not around to verify
the decision. Traditional historians have interpreted Wu Ch’ien’s statement
a generation later to imply that he opposed the elevation of Chao Ch’i. This
would be rather curious. Wu Ch’ien had pressed Li-tsung to name an heir
at a time when the only available candidate was Chao Ch’i. The same Wu
Ch’ien, by disassociating himself from Shih Mi-yüan’s activism, was showing
he had no interest in tampering with the line of succession. In this context,
Wu Ch’ien may have regarded Li-tsung’s procrastination in installing an heir
as a threat to the succession of Chao Ch’i, just as decades earlier Ning-tsung’s
procrastination in the elevation of Chao Hung left him vulnerable to the possible overreach of Shih Mi-yüan. Wu Ch’ien may have wanted to preclude
interference in an orderly succession, whether of Chao Ch’i or anyone else.
Chao Ch’i was finally appointed heir apparent (t’ai-tzu) in the sixth month
of 1260, and his training seems to have been very strict.4 The councilor of
the right, Chia Ssu-tao, is portrayed as fully supportive of the Chao Ch’i
nomination, even to the point of personally imploring Li-tsung to act. For
3
4
On the statement and its significance, see SS 418, pp. 12517–19; 45, p. 873; 425, p. 12669; 474,
p. 13781; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 43, p. 12a; 56, p. 2b.
HTC (1958) 176, p. 4801.
916
richard l. davis
the eminently practical Chia Ssu-tao, nothing mattered more than a smooth
transfer of power. Chao Ch’i, whom Chia had served as tutor, had proven himself
both deferential and submissive. By aggressively supporting the young man’s
advancement, Chia Ssu-tao sought to win his lasting favor, just as Shih Miyüan’s 1224 intervention won him the enduring goodwill of Li-tsung. Li-tsung
suddenly died on 16 November 1264 after only two days of illness, just shy of
sixty years old. His throne passed without incident to the twenty-four-year-old
Chao Ch’i, known to history as Tu-tsung.
Chao Ch’i is described by authors of the Sung dynastic history (Sung shih), as
being bright, perceptive, and earnest in his studies. These traits had convinced
Li-tsung of Chao Ch’i’s worthiness to inherit the throne.5 Such assertions may
be little more than perfunctory, a reflection of later historians’ unquestioning
commitment to defending the imperial institution, a commitment that often
entailed compromises in the interest of image building. Nothing in Tu-tsung’s
later conduct suggested the total absence of such traits, so we may grant some
kernel of truth to the description. Nonetheless, much like Li-tsung before
him, Tu-tsung’s conduct took a bad turn soon after he assumed the reins
of power. The once-disciplined Tu-tsung was subsequently accused, among
other things, of unconscionable extravagance.6 He regularly held court feasts
on an elaborate scale, paid for increasingly with public funds rather than from
his private treasury. Equally alarming was his indiscriminate advancement of
meritless kinsmen, his own and those of his empress, to honored titular posts.
Such advancements sometimes involved over a hundred individuals at once.
Tu-tsung held the elaborate Ming-t’ang (Hall of Brilliance) ceremonies at least
twice during his ten-year reign. The cost of the ceremonies, though considerable, was dwarfed by the cost of the great feasts and generous round of civil
service promotions that invariably accompanied the events. Such extravagance
implied irresponsibility, an emperor out of touch with the times, insensitive
to the plight of his overtaxed and war-weary people.
Tu-tsung also drew censure from later historians and contemporaries for his
dependence on Chia Ssu-tao. Chia was a holdover from the previous reign. As
councilor of the right since 1259 and the sole councilor after 1260, he was
well entrenched before the Tu-tsung accession. Even allowing for any political
debt associated with Chia’s supporting his 1260 nomination as heir, Tu-tsung’s
attachment to his councilor seemed excessive. In the case of Li-tsung, favor for
Chia Ssu-tao seems to have grown out of his affection for a favorite consort,
who was Chia Ssu-tao’s elder sister. The two men, being of comparable age
5
6
SS 46, pp. 891–2.
SS 46, pp. 895, 897, 898, 900, 903, 904, 918–19; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 6, p. 5b; HTC (1958) 179,
p. 4893; 180, pp. 4926–7.
the reign of tu-tsung and his successors to 1279
917
and sharing the same passion for sensual indulgence, had become fast friends.
Circumstances surrounding Tu-tsung’s favor shown to Chia were entirely different. Twenty-seven years Tu-tsung’s senior, Chia Ssu-tao had served him as
grand preceptor for four years prior to the 1264 accession. Lacking examination credentials, Chia Ssu-tao had struck most of officialdom as deserving of
neither the position nor the respect shown by his imperial student. Tu-tsung,
however, attached no importance to Chia’s lack of credentials. He had set the
entire court on edge by referring to Chia Ssu-tao as teacher, not servant, by
rising when Chia Ssu-tao made court appearances, and by kneeling in tears to
beseech him to remain in office.7 This gave Tu-tsung, and indeed the throne
itself, an image of subservience. So complete was Tu-tsung’s confidence and
reliance on Chia Ssu-tao that in 1267 he promoted Chia to esteemed special
military councilor (p’ing-chang chün-kuo chung-shih), a post Chia retained for
the duration of the reign.
Extravagance and dependence aside, perhaps Tu-tsung’s most unfortunate
shortcoming, by traditional historical accounts, was his overall ambivalence
toward the ever-present Mongol threat.8 The cost of ambivalence was high.
Compared with the previous decade, the Tu-tsung years (1264–74) were tranquil. Border hostilities persisted, but on a smaller scale. Natural disasters
occurred, but with less damage. Expenditures for war and extravagances undermined the economy, but without completely exhausting imperial treasuries.
If Tu-tsung, by making the most of these tranquil times, had made significant
progress toward either defeating the Mongols or striking a peace accord with
them, or had he solicited and applied solutions to the Sung empire’s mounting pile of persistent problems, then his decade-long reign may have renewed
confidence in the dynasty and stimulated loyalty among its officials. This is
the view of traditional critics, but the reality is that war, peace, conservation,
and reform had all been attempted only a few years earlier. The results had
been unimpressive at best, and at times were disastrous. Perhaps the conflict
and divisiveness of the recent past, more than the emperor’s timid personality,
explain why Tu-tsung chose to do nothing dramatic in seeking to reverse the
situation. These were largely years of maintenance, not years entirely wasted.9
Military confrontation: Setting the stage
The overriding concern of the era, for the emperor and officials alike, was
border stability. Tu-tsung’s decision to retain the services of Chia Ssu-tao may
7
8
9
SS 418, p. 12524; 474, pp. 13783–4; HTC (1958) 178, p. 4879; 179, p. 4897.
SS 46, p. 918; K’o, Sung-shih hsin-pien 14, p. 54a.
Hu Chao-hsi et al., Sung Meng (Yüan) kuan-hsi shih (Ch’eng-tu, 1992), pp. 281–96.
918
richard l. davis
partly have been due to Chia’s extensive military experience. The son of a
distinguished commander, Chia Ssu-tao himself had emerged late in the Litsung reign as civil and military commissioner in the central Sung territories.
He had led armies there against the Mongols. His promotion to chief councilor
in 1260 was, in theory, a reward for directing the successful defense of Hsiangyang. Chia Ssu-tao’s critics, past and present, have dismissed him as a fraud,
someone who exaggerated or misrepresented military feats merely to enhance
his political status when, in fact, he cared little for the empire’s defense.10
In this way, an empire that should have been preparing for war was allowed
to drift. This charge is similar to the one leveled against Shih Sung-chih a
generation earlier, and it is equally groundless.
The Chia Ssu-tao administration invested substantially in the defense of
strategic areas. The “Basic Annals” section of the Sung dynastic history reports
that under Tu-tsung some fourteen million strings of cash were allocated for
defense of the Ching-hu region (mostly for Hsiang-yang), another ten million
strings for Szechwan (largely its eastern regions, which were still administered
by the Sung), and another four million strings for the Huai border area to
the east.11 Concentrated between 1269 and 1273 and apparently intended as
a supplement to regional defense allocations, these appropriations were earmarked for either compensating soldiers or fortifying cities. The court also
made a special effort, according to the “Basic Annals,” to provide extraordinary commendations and material rewards for meritorious service along the
border, to heighten the morale of troops. As for military installations, regional
governments, often at directives from the Sung court, prepared for war at a
frenzied pace.
In the west, administrators at Ho-chou4 were determined to increase agricultural productivity and directed soldiers to till the land. They reinforced city
walls to reduce vulnerability and built palisades along the Chia-ling River to
defend Ho-chou4 against boats approaching from the north. At Ching-chou2
(modern Chiang-ling, Hupei) storehouses were filled with provisions and the
able-bodied men recruited for military training. At nearby Ying-chou3, where
a new city had been built on the southern side of the Han River, walls were
heavily fortified and the riverbanks planted with trees to make access to the
shore difficult. The court ordered new walls to be built around Lin-an to
10
11
SS 474, pp. 13780–1; Herbert Franke, “Chia Ssu-tao (1213–1275): A ‘bad last minister’?” in Confucian
personalities, ed. Arthur F. Wright and Denis C. Twitchett (Stanford, Calif., 1962), pp. 217–34, especially
pp. 224–5; Richard L. Davis, Wind against the mountain: The crisis of politics and culture in thirteenth-century
China (Cambridge, Mass., 1996), pp. 42–9.
SS 46; Hu et al., Sung Meng (Yüan) kuan-hsi shih, pp. 320, 331–7.
Yellow Ri
ver
K’ai-feng
Huai Riv
Fan-ch’eng
gion
r Re
Hsiang-yang
(falls 1273)
iver
nR
Ha
Ch’eng-tu
er
g Riv
lin
iaCh
T’ung-ch’uan
r de
er B o
Chiang-ling
Ying-chou
Han-yang
n
Ya
ze
gt
Ri
r
ve
Ho-chou
Lu-chou
Jao-chou
Strategic centers of defensive activity during
Chia Ssu-tao’s ministerial tenure, 1259–1275
Approximate direction of Mongol attacks
ca. 1258 to the fall of Hsiang-yang in 1273
0
0
400 km
200 miles
Map 31. Centers of defensive activity, c. 1258–1273.
LIN-AN
920
richard l. davis
enhance the security of the emperor and court.12 The Sung did not stand idly
by as the Mongols began to tighten their hold on already conquered territory
or heavily besieged border towns. The Mongols’ encirclement of Hsiang-yang
was maintained for five years, yet the Sung managed repeatedly to penetrate
Mongol lines to deliver desperately needed provisions to defenders. In the
west, again at Ho-chou4, the Sung frustrated Mongol efforts to build a nearby
wall designed to protect its armies from Sung counterattacks.13 Sung defensive
measures were complemented by offensives attempting to regain lost territories. Their counteroffensives against Mongol-held Ch’eng-tu, Lu-chou3, and
T’ung-ch’uan in the west of Szechwan, and Jao-chou (in Kiangsi) yielded some
gains.14 These activities reveal not only the Sung court’s anticipation of military conflict but also its commitment to doing everything possible to defeat
the Mongols. As special military councilor and chief decision maker at court,
Chia Ssu-tao deserves some credit for this.
The Sung’s problem lay not so much with a lack of preparation as with an
inability to keep pace with the preparations being made by a resourceful enemy.
The Mongol military machine was formidable, especially under the direction
of its shrewd new ruler. Prior to the 1260 accession of Khubilai, the Mongol
court, recognizing that its strength lay in cavalry, had attempted a conquest
of the Sung from the west, by overrunning Szechwan. This bold strategy had
seemed sound, yet conquering the mountainous southwest proved far more
exacting than had been envisioned, a struggle underscored by the long and
fruitless siege of Ho-chou4, where the previous Mongol ruler, Möngke, had
died in 1259. Upon accession, Khubilai initiated a major policy change. The
Mongols now focused their resources on central Sung territory and exploited
the waterways there to menace Lin-an at closer range.15 Khubilai chose largely
to ignore the Szechwan theater. Indispensable to this new strategy was building
a sizable naval force, a somewhat novel idea for the horse-loving Mongols, but
an excellent tactic nonetheless. The Yüan dynastic history (Yüan shih) reports
that by the late 1260s the Mongols had begun to train a navy of their own.
Recruiting some seventy thousand men from its territory along the Yangtze
River, the Mongols built a sizable arsenal of ships and weapons, and collected
12
13
14
15
SS 451, pp. 13280–3; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 59, p. 14b; 60, p. 3a; Sung Lien et al., Yüan shih [Po-na-pen
1930–7 ed.] (1370; Peking, 1976) 127, p. 3100; HTC (1958) 179, p. 4895; Hu Chao-hsi et al., Sung-mo
Ssu-ch’uan chan-cheng shih-liao hsüan-pien (Ch’eng-tu, 1984), p. 156; Li T’ien-ming, Sung Yüan chan-shih
(Taipei, 1988), pp. 945–52, 965–7.
HTC (1958) 179, pp. 4886, 4895; 180, pp. 4915, 4921.
Hu et al., Sung-mo Ssu-ch’uan, pp. 138, 547; Li, Sung Yüan chan-shih, pp. 1040–2; SS 451, p. 13272;
HTC (1958) 178, p. 4862.
Hu et al., Sung Meng (Yüan) kuan-hsi shih, pp. 313–17; Li, Sung Yüan chan-shih, pp. 925–30; Sung
et al., Yüan shih 128, p. 3125; HTC (1958) 178, pp. 4875–6.
the reign of tu-tsung and his successors to 1279
921
provisions from as far as K’ai-feng to store along the central border region.16
Allocation of more men and matériel followed. To meet the growing need for
manpower, Mongol commanders had no hesitation about pillaging. Mongol
armies repeatedly descended the Han River and attacked cities and counties
in the vicinity of Hsiang-yang, taking in each foray as many as fifty thousand prisoners and hundreds of ships, all, of course, later to be used against the
Sung.17 Men were also snatched up in Szechwan, probably with the same objective.18 The Mongols acknowledged their own inexperience in naval warfare
by incorporating more and more Chinese into their armed forces. Drawing
increasingly upon the vast numbers and technical knowledge of the Han
Chinese majority, the Mongols waged campaigns in which the Han Chinese
in their armies outnumbered Mongols five to one.19
Forced assimilation into the Mongol military presented an agonizing challenge to the Sung court. As Mongols carted off a growing number of Han
Chinese from the south, the Sung found itself short of prospective soldiers and
taxpayers, a problem that undermined the empire’s military and economic
viability. The immediate military threat proved easier to address than the economic crisis, but the Sung response was desperate. In the case of Hsiang-yang,
large numbers of children, probably teenagers, were inducted into regional
armies.20 In Lin-an and its vicinity, all males fifteen and older were pressed
into service.21 Armies contained large numbers of older men as well, as the
Sung was forced to delay retirement of soldiers. According to the prefect of
Chiang-ling, at least twenty percent of the Sung army was either too young
or too old.22 This is, in all likelihood, a conservative estimate. Another shortterm solution to the shortage of men was to shift responsibility for regional
defense to informally recruited militias (min-ping) or, as was common farther
south, to draw upon the large pool of non–Han Chinese groups.23 The resort
to popular militias occurred largely in the early 1270s, toward the close of
the dynasty, by which time government fears about controlling such armies
were overcome by its desperate need to survive. In its last years, the court of
Tu-tsung moved to pardon rather than reprimand deserters. It offered high
office and generous rewards in the hope of winning back some of the martial
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
Sung et al., Yüan shih 7, pp. 128, 131, 133; 128, p. 3120; HTC (1958) 178, pp. 4879–80; 179, p. 4894;
180, p. 4917.
Sung et al., Yüan shih 6, pp. 115, 121; 128, p. 3119; HTC (1958) 178, p. 4873; 179, pp. 4885, 4902.
Sung et al., Yüan shih 7, p. 129.
Sung et al., Yüan shih 8, p. 160; HTC (1958) 178, pp. 4879–80.
SS 422, p. 12619; HTC (1958) 180, p. 4920.
SS 418, p. 12531.
Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 59, p. 7b.
SS 47, p. 935; 418, p. 12534; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 60, p. 4b; 61, p. 7b; K’o, Sung-shih hsin-pien 175,
pp. 8b–9a.
922
richard l. davis
talent lost to the enemy.24 Nothing worked. A practical solution would have
involved adoption of enemy tactics by harassing the northern border region,
carting off provisions, and snatching up young men for induction into the
armed services. The Sung did not do this.
For virtually the entire Tu-tsung reign, both Sung and Mongol military
efforts centered on controlling the area surrounding Hsiang-yang, along the
central border. The reason was simple. If the Mongols captured the cities
along the Han River, the one hundred and eighty–mile stretch from Hsiangyang to Han-yang, then they could easily gain access to the Yangtze River.
Command of the Yangtze would in turn leave Lin-an vulnerable to assault
from the west. With the dynasty’s fate so closely tied to the fate of Hsiangyang, the Sung invested heavily in reinforcing cities along the Han River. The
Mongols responded with an increasingly unbreakable encirclement of Hsiangyang in 1268 that continued for another five years.25 Sung tactics consisted
largely of building stronger walls and sabotaging Mongol efforts to navigate
the Han River. However, the Mongols were more aggressive and innovative.
In addition to a major expansion of naval power that yielded an additional
seventy thousand men and five thousand boats, the Mongols built observation
towers in the riverbed and forts along the shores, isolating the city from outside
information and supplies.
Directing the Mongol offensive was A-chu (Aju, 1234–87), a commander destined to rise to great heights after his stunning successes against the
Sung. Fully surrounding Hsiang-yang posed immense obstacles, for the heavily defended city sat on the southern bank of the Han River and, when cut
off by land from the south, could often turn for assistance to Fan-ch’eng, a
town directly opposite on the Han River’s northern bank. The Mongols began
a blockade of Fan-ch’eng in 1268 by building more walled barriers and settlements. The Sung responded with more men, and assigned to the defensive
campaign three of its most esteemed commanders, Chang Shih-chieh (d. 1279),
Hsia Chen, and Li T’ing-chih (d. 1276). It even dispatched, at one point, the
assistant commander of the Palace Guard, Fan Wen-hu, to join in the defense.
Investments on both sides reached the extent that in 1271 the Sung deployed
over a hundred thousand men for a single naval maneuver. Despite investments
24
25
SS 46, p. 913.
On the Hsiang-yang conflict, see SS 450, pp. 13248–9; 451, p. 13272; Sung et al., Yüan shih 128,
pp. 3119–20; HTC (1958) 178, pp. 4875–6, 4881; 179, pp. 4883, 4886, 4888, 4890, 4898–4909;
180, pp. 4911–17; Fang Chen-hua, “Chia Ssu-tao yü Hsiang Fan chih chan,” Ta-lu tsa-chih 21 No. 90.4
(1995), pp. 31–7; Hu et al., Sung Meng (Yüan) kuan-hsi shih, pp. 317–30; Li, Sung Yüan chan-shih,
pp. 945–1133; Li Chen et al., Chung-kuo li-tai chan-cheng shih (Taipei, 1968), vol. 11, pp. 416–22;
Morris Rossabi, Khubilai khan: His life and times (Berkeley, Calif., 1988), pp. 82–6; Davis, Wind against
the mountain, pp. 48–59.
the reign of tu-tsung and his successors to 1279
923
of this magnitude, most battles in the region were won by the northern armies.
In late 1272, the Mongols intensified their assaults on Fan-ch’eng while diligently patrolling Han waters to stop the flow of reinforcements from the
south. Early in 1273 Fan-ch’eng was overrun and its inhabitants slaughtered.
In the third month, Hsiang-yang escaped the same fate when its governor
surrendered. With these victories, the Mongols gained their long sought-after
objective of gaining easier access to the Hupei region and the south. This loss
triggered panic among officials in Lin-an.
Changing political currents at court
The chief councilor, Chia Ssu-tao, dominates most narratives of late Southern
Sung history. He was the strongest single political figure at Tu-tsung’s court;
however, other prominent men were emerging at the time who, disillusioned
with Chia Ssu-tao, joined ranks and attempted to terminate his fifteen-year
grip on power. Of the elder statesmen who worked to remove Chia from
power, Chiang Wan-li (1188–1275), Wang Yüeh (d. 1276), and Wang Yinglin (1223–96) are the most noteworthy.26 All three men had held metropolitan
posts under Li-tsung, which had given them valuable experience and political
exposure. Chiang Wan-li, a graduate of the Imperial University, served at
various censorial organizations before returning to the university to become
its chancellor. Tu-tsung promoted Chiang to assistant councilor in early 1265,
and he rose, in 1269, to serve for roughly a year as chief councilor. For the most
part, Chiang Wan-li cooperated with Chia Ssu-tao, rather than boycotting
Chia’s administration as many others did, but there were tensions between
the two men. When Chia Ssu-tao tendered his resignation in 1269, it was
perceived as a political ploy designed to enhance his status in the capital. As
the weeping emperor began to kneel down to beg him to stay, an astounded
and angry Chiang Wan-li forcibly propped up Tu-tsung and spoke harshly
to Chia Ssu-tao. Chiang also differed with the special military councilor over
Chia’s defense plans for Hsiang-yang, which to Chiang contained too much
caution and too little commitment. Few in the capital presented as great a
political threat to Chia Ssu-tao as Chiang Wan-li. His high-level association
with the Imperial University placed Chiang Wan-li in a position to mobilize
the influential institution against Chia Ssu-tao, should the need arise.
26
On their careers, see SS 418, pp. 12523–5, 12525–8; 438, pp. 12987–91; HTC (1958) 179, p. 4893;
Davis, Wind against the mountain, pp. 83–92; Jennifer W. Jay, A change in dynasties: Loyalism in thirteenthcentury China (Bellingham, Wash., 1991), pp. 13–60; chapters 3 and 4 of Charles B. Langley, “Wang
Yinglin (1223–96): A study in the political and intellectual history of the demise of Song” (diss., Indiana
University, 1980).
924
richard l. davis
Wang Yüeh, who had received his chin-shih in 1219, possessed even better
bureaucratic credentials than Chiang Wan-li, having served in several regional
as well as metropolitan posts. Wang enjoyed the esteem that came with service
to three consecutive emperors over the course of sixty years. A one-time advisor
to Tu-tsung before his accession, Wang Yüeh quickly rose after the accession to
assistant councilor. Historical records reveal nothing about his relationship
with Chia Ssu-tao, but in light of the respect Wang later enjoyed among Chia
Ssu-tao’s detractors, it is safe to assume that the two were not close political
allies.
The third in this group of elder statesmen, Wang Ying-lin, was the most
imposing. Having earned his chin-shih degree in 1241 and obtained the distinction of passing the “erudite literatus” (po-hsüeh hung-tz’u) examination in 1256,
he had served as managing officer at the Directorate of Education (Kuo-tzu
chien), as professor at the Military Academy, and as tutor to the heir apparent,
during Li-tsung’s reign. Aside from a political career that included distinguished secretarial appointments, he also was one of the most prolific scholars
of late Sung times. He was an accomplished lexicographer, classicist, and historian. Like Chiang Wan-li, Wang Ying-lin’s dissatisfaction with Chia Ssu-tao
stemmed chiefly from the councilor’s perceived indifference to the military
crisis unfolding at Hsiang-yang.
The presence at court of these highly independent and eminently qualified
and experienced officials denied Chia Ssu-tao the political monopoly that his
critics often associate with his tenure. But although Tu-tsung always had
alternative sources of advice, in the end he gave greatest credence to the counsel
of the individual who was least qualified academically. Yet after 1268, Chia
Ssu-tao, the man most trusted by the emperor, was in semiretirement, and
was required to attend court only once every six days and only once every ten
days after 1270. Given this arrangement, it is easy to see how the court gave
the appearance of being indifferent to the military menace in the north. Such
perceptions may have tormented the elder statesman, but they incited great
passions among the younger generation of aspiring officials. In many cases,
these passionate officials were men born and raised under conditions of war,
men who, after nearly forty-five years, still saw no end in sight.
Among the more prominent, and eventually most controversial, within this
younger group was Ch’en I-chung (chin-shih 1262).27 Ch’en, whose father was
a clerk, was born in humble circumstances in modern Wen-chou. He studied
at the Imperial University until 1256, when he was banished from the capital
for having joined five other students in publicly denouncing the authoritarian
27
SS 418, pp. 12529–32; HTC (1958) 175, p. 4764; Davis, Wind against the mountain, pp. 63–94.
the reign of tu-tsung and his successors to 1279
925
Ting Ta-ch’üan. Permitted to return during Chia Ssu-tao’s administration,
Ch’en I-chung then placed second in the palace examination of 1262, and was
conferred chin-shih status. He served for most of Tu-tsung’s reign away from the
capital, but as a once-persecuted critic of an unpopular autocrat, Ch’en enjoyed
a considerable reputation in Lin-an and played a leading role in political affairs
in the last five years of the Sung dynasty.
Also commanding a considerable measure of respect among officials in the
capital was Ch’en Wen-lung (1232–77).28 A Fu-chou native who had studied
for a time at the Imperial University, Ch’en Wen-lung had taken top honors among the chin-shih graduates of 1269. Serving as a censor under Chia
Ssu-tao, he maintained a good measure of independence thanks to the deference accorded to him for his high ranking in the examinations. After the fall
of Hsiang-yang in early 1273, tensions among high-ranking officials mushroomed into confrontation. Ch’en Wen-lung, as censor, questioned the chief
councilor’s judgment in appointing inexperienced men to important military
posts and in pardoning cowardly commanders who had recently abandoned
their posts under enemy pressure. When Chia Ssu-tao had Ch’en banished
in the summer of 1273, Ch’en departed Lin-an with the sympathy of many
colleagues, for he had dared to express precisely the lack of confidence in Chia
Ssu-tao’s leadership that many felt.
Also among this list of passionate officials was Wen T’ien-hsiang (1236–
83), a native of Chi-chou3 (modern Chi-an in Kiangsi).29 Wen had earned
his chin-shih credentials, also with top honors, in 1256, and had impressed
Chief Examiner Wang Ying-lin with his stunning sense of history and civic
duty. Wen was imbued with idealism and a zeal to revitalize the dynasty,
but from the outset of his career he was on a collision course with the men
who dominated the court. In Wen’s view, these men were pragmatists prone
to compromise. In 1259, when the eunuch Tung Sung-ch’en proposed that
the capital be moved to a safer location along the coast, a furious Wen T’ienhsiang demanded Tung’s immediate execution. Wen T’ien-hsiang resented
the favored standing of Chia Ssu-tao at court. New tensions surfaced in the
1260s, and Wen T’ien-hsiang, under censorial indictment, was relieved of his
28
29
SS 451, pp. 13278–80; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 59, pp. 5a–6a; HTC (1958) 180, p. 4919; Chao chung lu
[Shou-shan ko ts’ung-shu 1922 ed.] (c. 1290; Taipei, 1968), pp. 31a–32a.
For biographical information, see SS 418, pp. 12533–40; Chao chung lu, pp. 17a–22b; HTC (1958)
175, p. 4789; 179, pp. 4895–6; Wen T’ien-hsiang, Wen T’ien-hsiang ch’üan-chi, ed. Lo Hung-hsien,
(1560; Shanghai, 1936) 17, pp. 443–68; William A. Brown, Wen T’ien-hsiang: A biographical study of
a Sung patriot (San Francisco, 1986), pp. 95–225; chapter 5 of Davis, Wind against the mountain; Horst
Huber, “Wen T’ien-hsiang, 1236–1283: Vorstufen zum Verständnis seines Lebens” (diss., Universität
zu München, 1983), summarized in Horst Huber, “Wen T’ien-hsiang,” in Sung biographies, ed. Herbert
Franke (Wiesbaden, 1976), vol. 3, pp. 1187–201.
926
richard l. davis
metropolitan responsibilities and for most of Tu-tsung’s reign served in various
regional posts. His reputation for no compromise in domestic politics and no
capitulation in foreign affairs made him a popular figure among Chia Ssu-tao’s
critics.
All six men, each eminently qualified for high office, were respected
within Lin-an’s growing cohort of disgruntled officials, and especially within
the Imperial University. The younger three tended to be more vociferous.
Throughout their careers, Ch’en I-chung and Wen T’ien-hsiang petitioned for
the execution of officials who, in their estimation, had betrayed the throne
through their ill-conceived advice. Execution was not in Sung times the usual
punishment for poor political counsel, the precedent of Han T’o-chou’s overthrow notwithstanding. That radical views of this sort gained greater currency
in these last years of Tu-tsung’s reign reflects the desperation that prevailed.
There was a growing conviction among the idealists that, after years of toying
with grave problems, only radical measures could save the dynasty. Under these
conditions, Chia Ssu-tao became an easy scapegoat. Defeats on the borders were
blamed on ministerial neglect, not on the superiority of the enemy forces and
tactics. Defections of military and civilian officers in outlying regions were
blamed on ministerial misuse of rewards and punishments, not on fatigue following decades of fighting. The emperor’s inclination toward licentiousness
was blamed on his councilor’s evil influence, not on the predilections of the
emperor himself.
This is not to say that this dissatisfaction was unjustified. Chia Ssu-tao may
not have set out to destroy the dynasty, but certain of his actions had precisely
that effect and can be explained only in terms of gross lack of judgment.
For example, the peace envoy Hao Ching, dispatched south by Khubilai soon
after his accession as khaghan in 1260, was taken captive at the border and
remained in captivity for over fifteen years. The act is viewed by traditional
historians as having been a ploy by Chia Ssu-tao to conceal the terms of a secret
agreement containing embarrassing concessions he is alleged to have struck
with the Mongols at the height of their 1259 campaign against the Sung. The
charge is hard to credit and has been refuted by modern scholarship.30 Since
imprisoning an envoy for fifteen years only draws attention to the prisoner
and the circumstances surrounding his detention, it would have been far easier
simply to refuse him entry at the border on technical grounds, such as the use
of improper documents or incorrect protocol. Other reasons for imprisonment
were available as well. Sources suggest that Hao Ching had assisted northern
30
Sung et al., Yüan shih 157, p. 3708; HTC (1958) 176, pp. 4796, 4802; Franke, “Chia Ssu-tao (1213–
1275),” pp. 226–9; Hu et al., Sung Meng (Yüan) kuan-hsi shih, pp. 260–5; Davis, Wind against the
mountain, pp. 30, 104–5.
the reign of tu-tsung and his successors to 1279
927
rulers in drafting maps of the south for use by military strategists, so the
Sung could have held him as a spy. Although Khubilai inquired repeatedly
about Hao Ching’s whereabouts, he did not press aggressively for his return.
His formal declaration of war against the Sung in 1274 alluded to the envoy’s
capture, but the two actions were separated by fifteen years and Mongol designs
on the Sung did not require a provocation. The detention of Hao Ching in
effect served to impede further peace talks. Chia Ssu-tao’s motive may have
been the naive hope that Hao Ching would be a bargaining chip in some future
negotiations between the two sides, but by initiating no new negotiations, he
gained nothing with the envoy’s prolonged detention. All the while, Chia’s
standing at home declined, for the action appeared senseless to contemporaries
as well.31
Although Chia Ssu-tao is portrayed by later writers as abjectly interested in
peace, under his leadership diplomatic activity was at its lowest since war with
the Mongols began in the 1230s. The two sides, locked in conflict, concentrated
instead on building up their arsenals. Khubilai was generally uninterested in
peace, although he proclaimed to Sung residents in the summer of 1269 that
he desired to avoid further warfare.32 This proclamation coincided, however,
with increasing pressure applied by his armies to the Han River valley and
the declaration was most likely used as a ploy to undermine Sung resolve.
Khubilai was consciously enhancing his political image by appearing less
martial, as evidenced by his elaborate renovations of Confucian temples at
Ch’ü-fu (in Shantung) and Shang-tu (in Ch’ang-an), so his overtures of peace
may have grown out of efforts to present himself as transcending his warrior
origins. At the end of 1272, when the military commissioner for the Ching-hu
circuit, Li T’ing-chih, dispatched his own emissary to Mongol territory, the
envoy was politely but promptly returned. Yüan sources allude to negotiations
about border trade, but these did not abate the heightened level of hostilities.33
During the prolonged siege of Hsiang-yang, a negotiated settlement of some
sort to maintain the autonomy of the south may have been on the Sung agenda,
but it held no appeal to Khubilai.
Failure either to repulse the Mongols at Hsiang-yang or to entice them into
a peace treaty could have been enough to topple Chia Ssu-tao’s administration,
but Tu-tsung’s confidence in Chia seemed unshakable. However, in 1274 the
convergence of several disasters finally toppled Chia Ssu-tao. The first of these
setbacks was the escalation of Mongol attacks. Early in the year, Khubilai had
approved the mobilization of an additional one hundred thousand men for a
31
32
33
HTC (1958) 180, pp. 4927–8.
HTC (1958) 179, p. 4868.
Sung et al., Yüan shih 7, pp. 143, 144; Hu et al., Sung Meng (Yüan) kuan-hsi shih, pp. 266–9.
928
richard l. davis
new campaign against the Sung. Once his forces had captured Hsiang-yang,
he decided to exploit the Sung’s vulnerability.34 A planned campaign against
Japan was postponed, and this freed more resources for the southern offensive
against the Sung. The declaration of full-scale war came in the sixth lunar
month, and the principal thrust of the attacks, initiated three months later,
was down the Han River valley. A-chu and Bayan of the Barin tribe, Khubilai’s
chief commanders, led the campaign.35 Their first target was Ying-chou3, a
sizable city roughly sixty miles down the Han River from Hsiang-yang. Sung
military investment in the area had been substantial, and the Mongol armies
faced formidable resistance. The old city, north of the river, had walls made of
stone and the new city, on the southern bank, was heavily fortified.36 Mongol
armies attacked Ying-chou3 from the north by water and from the south by
land. Chang Shih-chieh, one of the three prized commanders sent to defend the
region, offered stiff resistance, forcing Mongol troops to move farther down
the Han River to storm Hsin-ch’eng, Fu-chou3, the sister cities Han-k’ou and
Han-yang, and then O-chou (modern Wu-ch’ang). All five cities fell by the
end of the lunar year, early 1275, followed soon thereafter by Huang-chou and
Ch’i-chou2. This victory gave the Mongols their long-awaited access to the
Yangtze. Their horses were now able to cross the river by boat, and they were
positioned to move east toward the Sung capital, only some three hundred and
fifty miles away. Unfortunately for the Sung, the advancing Mongol army was
not its only problem.
A second crisis had struck in the summer of 1274, scarcely a month after
Khubilai announced his new campaign. The thirty-four-year-old Tu-tsung
fell victim to a chronic infection and died. Historical records reveal nothing
about the nature of his illness, nor is there any indication of a recent decline in
health. It apparently caught everyone by surprise. The immediate banishment
of his doctor under a cloud of controversy suggests that the malady grew
out of control only because of ill-advised medical care.37 Tu-tsung’s second
son, Chao Hsien, the only male born to him and Empress Ch’üan, succeeded
him on the ninth day of the seventh lunar month in 1274. The new emperor
was not yet four years old, prompting requests that Dowager Empress Hsieh,
the widow of Li-tsung, assist in governing from behind the bamboo screen.
Only once during the Northern Sung, under Che-tsung (r. 1085–1100), had a
34
35
36
37
Sung et al., Yüan shih 8, p. 153; 128, pp. 3120–1.
For a brief explanation of the Barin tribe, see Hsiao Ch’i-ch’ing, “Bayan,” in In the service of the Khan:
Eminent personalities of the early Mongol-Yüan period (1200–1300), ed. Igor de Rachewiltz et al. (Wiesbaden,
1993), p. 584.
Sung et al., Yüan shih 127, p. 3100; HTC (1958) 180, pp. 4929–35; Li et al., Sung Yüan chan-shih,
pp. 1135–63; Li, Chung-kuo li-tai chan-cheng shih (1968), vol. 11, pp. 426–9.
SS 46, p. 918; K’o, Sung-shih hsin-pien 14, pp. 3a–b.
the reign of tu-tsung and his successors to 1279
929
young child inherited the throne. The power vacuum this created had proved
highly destabilizing even then, at a time of relative peace. This time, with the
Southern Sung dynasty facing a major invasion from the west, the succession
of a powerless child had graver consequences. If Tu-tsung either had been
childless or had his sickness lasted longer, he and his advisors could have
selected a more competent heir through adoption, but this did not happen.
Political instability at the apex of Sung power was certain to undermine an
already weak decision-making process and exacerbate lethal tensions among
rival civil servants, men who did not, in the end, rise above their own partisan
interests for the sake of the empire.
a dynasty in retreat
The reign of Chao Hsien (1274–1276)
Tu-tsung was survived by three infant sons: Chao Shih (1269–78), born to
Consort Yang (1244–79); Chao Hsien (1271–unknown), born to Empress
Ch’üan (1241–1309); and Chao Ping (1272–9), born to Consort Yü.38 Prior
to Tu-tsung’s death, the emperor had not formally installed any one of them
as heir. According to the Sung dynastic history, the middle son succeeded “in
accordance with Tu-tsung’s last testament.” Secondary sources from the Ming
and Ch’ing dynasties generally insist that the accession of Chao Hsien was fixed
only after the death of Tu-tsung and that most court officials preferred the older
son, Chao Shih. But Chia Ssu-tao supported Chao Hsien, and Chia’s candidate
prevailed.39 The imperial testament (i-chao) was, in all likelihood, drafted by
both Grand Dowager Empress Hsieh and Empress Ch’üan in consultation with
chief councilors, including Chia Ssu-tao, soon after the emperor’s unexpected
death. The elevation of Chao Hsien was all but inevitable as he was the only son
born to the emperor’s primary wife, Empress Ch’üan. To vilify Chia Ssu-tao, as
traditional historians do, for favoring the second son merely to ensure his own
continued dominance, borders on the absurd. Chia could have just as easily
dominated Tu-tsung’s eldest son, Chao Shih, who was only five years old at
the time. This is not to say that Chia Ssu-tao acted altogether selflessly, for
support for Chao Hsien could have been used as a means to consolidate his
relationship with the young Dowager Empress Ch’üan. The senior dowager
38
39
SS 243, pp. 8658–62; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 7, pp. 6b–8b; Chao, Chao shih tsu-p’u 1, pp. 69a–70a.
According to SS 46, p. 901, Tu-tsung had two other sons, both born in 1268, and both of whom
apparently died early. A genealogy for the Chao clan (Chao shih tsu-p’u) makes no reference to them, and
the naming pattern for the two is inconsistent with that for the other sons.
SS 417, p. 921; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 6, p. 12a; K’o, Sung shih hsin-pien 14, p. 7a; HTC (1958) 180,
pp. 4926–7.
930
richard l. davis
empress, Hsieh Ch’iao, being nearly seventy and in ill health, could not be
expected to hold onto her regency for long and the now Dowager Empress
Ch’üan was her inevitable successor. A timely alliance with Dowager Empress
Ch’üan certainly had its political utility, and the sixty-one-year-old Chia Ssutao, with his long history of close ties to palace women, probably understood
this better than most court officials.
Dowager Empress Hsieh (1210–83), the empress of Li-tsung since 1230,
was daughter of Hsieh Shen-fu, a chief councilor during the early reign of
Ning-tsung.40 Despite a forty-year marriage, she had the misfortune, like
many Sung empresses before her, of never enjoying her husband’s affection.
Li-tsung had initially favored Consort Chia, and later Consort Yen, and had partaken in many less orthodox affairs. Li-tsung appears largely to have neglected
his primary wife, whose betrothal had been arranged by his adoptive mother,
Dowager Empress Yang2. Dowager Empress Hsieh, although from an accomplished scholar-official family, had meticulously avoided involvement in political matters during her husband’s long reign, with the notable exception of
voicing opposition to the 1259 proposal to relocate the capital along the coast.
Tu-tsung’s death and the accession of Chao Hsien had thrust her, as senior
dowager empress, into the political arena, although she reportedly accepted
her new prominence with great reluctance. Over the last few years of the
dynasty, Grand Dowager Empress Hsieh became a moderating force at court.
Far more responsible than either her husband or son, she cooperated with
the civil service and shunned extreme political positions. Assertive when the
need arose, she accepted counsel only after critical assessment, without alienating officials through arbitrary decisions. Not given to political vendettas,
she could even be, much like her husband, magnanimous. For example, Chia
Ssu-tao was the brother of the woman whose favor had denied the dowager empress Li-tsung’s affections, but Dowager Empress Hsieh bore him no
grudge. On the contrary, as regent she chose to retain Chia Ssu-tao and often
proved his most loyal supporter before critics. Her chief concern was continuity and stability, and she showed little interest in replacing councilor-level
officers.
Changes in bureaucratic leadership were nonetheless underway in 1274,
even before Dowager Empress Hsieh’s regency. The rising star of the era was
Ch’en I-chung, the one-time university student with a reputation for uninhibited candor. From vice-minister of personnel, he rose to Bureau of Military Affairs executive in 1273. Late that year he became assistant councilor
with concurrent authority over the Bureau of Military Affairs. Writers of the
40
SS 243, pp. 8658–60; Chao, Chao shih tsu-p’u 1, p. 69a. For greater detail on the dowager empress’s
regency, see Davis, Wind against the mountain, pp. 32–42.
the reign of tu-tsung and his successors to 1279
931
Sung dynastic history tried to portray Ch’en as a secret ally of Chia Ssu-tao
and, despite Ch’en’s militant rhetoric, as an utterly spineless character.41 This
characterization seems far-fetched. In 1273, while still with the Ministry of
Personnel, Ch’en I-chung challenged the wisdom of Chia Ssu-tao’s pardon of
Fan Wen-hu, the commander who deserted at Hsiang-yang, and demanded
Fan’s execution.42 Ch’en’s actions, both then and later, confirmed that Ch’en
I-chung considered the empire’s inability to repel Mongol forces to be related
to the inadequate discipline of commanders, a problem that Chen blamed on
Chia Ssu-tao’s tendency to compromise. Ch’en I-chung may have been unable
to live up to the high standard he set for others, he may have lacked the courage
to be the militant that he aspired to be, but this hardly makes him a Chia
Ssu-tao partisan. Not only did Ch’en I-chung believe his own rhetoric, contemporaries apparently did as well. Wang Yüeh, for example, who had risen
in late 1274 to become chief councilor of the left, generally sympathized with
Ch’en I-chung despite their personal differences. The new councilor of the
right, Chang Chien2, was more nondescript in character. A former subordinate of Wang Yüeh at the military bureau, he probably owed his promotion to
Wang Yüeh’s ascent.43 Such promotions, made by the empress but probably
with input from Chia Ssu-tao, suggest that the court, despite the handicaps of
a heldover special councilor and a boy emperor, continued to attract politically
diverse talent. Grand Dowager Empress Hsieh was at least as successful as
her stepson, Tu-tsung, at diversifying the civil service at the top, and instilling in politically alienated officials some hope for change. This was no mean
accomplishment in such difficult times.
Dowager Empress Hsieh, while recognizing the dynasty’s great needs, saw
no reason to abandon Chia Ssu-tao. Her support left only one person capable of
bringing down the special councilor, the special councilor himself. The catalyst
for this event was a succession of military setbacks in 1274–5. As military
coordinator, Chia Ssu-tao’s judgment had come into question some years earlier
when he had reassigned his brother-in-law Fan Wen-hu, a commander for the
lower Huai, to the Ching-hu region to bolster the forces at Hsiang-yang.44
Leading an army of reportedly a hundred thousand men, Fan had been defeated
by the Mongol commander A-chu in the summer of 1271. Hsiang-yang held
out, but eventually fell in 1273. Most of Fan’s soldiers had perished, and he
came perilously close to meeting the same fate himself. The Sung court decided,
41
42
43
44
SS 418, p. 12530.
HTC (1958) 180, p. 4919.
SS 418, pp. 12528–9.
HTC (1958) 179, p. 4903; Li et al., Sung Yüan chan-shih, pp. 986–8, 1179–82; Li et al., Chung-kuo li-tai
chan-cheng shih (1968), vol. 11, p. 419.
932
richard l. davis
despite the magnitude of the defeat, on a demotion of only one rank, and Fan
was reassigned as prefect of An-ch’ing, a strategic city east of Hsiang-yang
on the Yangtze River. The lax discipline and the implicit nepotism in Chia’s
handling of Fan’s dismissal enraged Ch’en I-chung and others. Chia Ssu-tao’s
credibility suffered further in early 1275 when the same Fan Wen-hu, offering
no resistance, surrendered An-ch’ing to the Mongols.45 Less than two weeks
later came the most paralyzing defeat of the entire Southern Sung.
The military setbacks of late 1274 had so undermined morale in the south
that something dramatic needed to be done to stem the enemy’s tide of victory,
and to restore confidence in the dynasty and its armies. Chia Ssu-tao, despite
his sixty-one years, decided to direct personally a vast and desperate campaign
aimed at driving the Mongols back across the Yangtze and Han rivers.46
Chia chose to focus his main counterattack on Chiang-chou, a city along the
northwestern tip of P’o-yang Lake that had recently fallen to the Mongols.
Clearly designed as a show of Sung strength, the plan involved spending some
100,000 ounces of gold, 500,000 ounces of silver, and 10 million strings of cash
on the counteroffensive. To further intimidate the Mongol troops, the court
reportedly placed under the general command of Chia Ssu-tao a million men,
mostly naval forces. Intimidation of the enemy entailed some exaggeration
of troop levels, so the boast of a million men cannot be taken at face value.
Other sources inform us that the entire Sung army contained no more than
700,000 regulars, and surely the Sung court did not commit its whole army in
a single campaign. Yüan sources suggest the Sung invested 130,000 men in
the battle, probably a more accurate estimate.47 Even so, 130,000 represented
nearly one-fifth of the Sung army, an indication of the importance attached
to this particular campaign. Most of the troops were placed under the direct
command of Sun Hu-ch’en (d. 1276), who quickly came under attack from the
combined forces of Bayan and A-chu along the Yangtze River near Ting-chiachou downstream from Ch’ih-chou (modern Kuei-ch’ih, in Anhwei). Sun’s men
bore the brunt of the Mongol counterattack, and when they were defeated the
entire campaign was doomed. Chia Ssu-tao, himself only twenty-five miles to
the east of Wu-hu on the Yangtze River, responded by fleeing downstream
to Yang-chou. With the defeat so decisive, Chia Ssu-tao was more than just
personally humiliated; the prospect of Mongol armies pressing east toward
the Sung capital seemed imminent. Chia proposed, apparently in an urgent
45
46
47
HTC (1958) 181, p. 4939. Davis, Wind against the mountain, pp. 53–4, 76–7.
On the campaign, see Sung et al., Yüan shih 8, p. 162; 127, pp. 3104–5; 128, p. 3122; HTC (1958)
180, pp. 4934–5; 181, pp. 4942–3; Liu Min-chung, P’ing Sung lu [Shou-shan ko ts’ung-shu 1922 ed.]
(1304; Taipei, 1968) 1, pp. 8b–9a; Hu et al., Sung Meng (Yüan) kuan-hsi shih, pp. 368–74; Li, Sung Yüan
chan-shih, pp. 1182–9; Li, Chung-kuo li-tai chan-cheng shih (1968), vol. 11, pp. 429–31.
Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 59, p. 7b; Sung et al., Yüan shih 127, p. 3104.
the reign of tu-tsung and his successors to 1279
933
letter sent from Yang-chou, that the court be moved to some more defensible
location.48
The option of relocating the capital had already been considered intermittently for many years, indeed since the outset of the Southern Sung period.
A coastal location such as Ming-chou (modern Ning-po) seemed preferable to
many because it was farther east and afforded easy access to the ocean, should
flight become necessary. With the Mongols now having invaded the Chiangnan East circuit, they were within striking distance of Lin-an via Wu-hu. Chia
Ssu-tao’s proposal sparked heated debate. Chief Councilor Wang Yüeh offered
his vigorous opposition, but Assistant Councilor Ch’en I-chung was so outraged that he demanded death for Chia Ssu-tao,49 who appears not yet to have
returned to Lin-an. Dowager Empress Hsieh did not endorse relocation of the
capital for fear of “disturbing the people.” With Chia Ssu-tao not on hand to
make his case, the idea went no further. A forgiving dowager empress firmly
rejected calls for Chia’s execution. Noting his years of meritorious service,
she ordered his dismissal in the second lunar month of 1275. The purge of
an unpopular Chia Ssu-tao was hardly sufficient to restore the civil service’s
confidence in the dynasty.
In the early months of 1275 the important Yangtze cities of O-chou,
Huang-chou, Ch’i-chou2, Chiang-chou, and An-ch’ing had been captured
by the Mongols. A few months after this, the defeat of Chia Ssu-tao’s forces at
Wu-hu touched off the surrenders of over a dozen more major prefectures in
central and eastern Sung territory.50 These included Jao-chou, Lung-hsing2,
Lin-chiang, Wu-wei, T’an-chou, and most of the important cities along the
lower reaches of the Huai River and the stretch of the Yangtze River around
P’o-yang Lake. The Mongols concentrated on capturing larger cities, and by
late spring, they began to seize strategically vital cities in the east as well,
including Ch’u-chou, Chien-k’ang (Nan-ching), Chen-chiang, Ch’ang-chou,
Wu-hsi, and P’ing-chiang (Su-chou). The Sung also suffered defeats at the
Ning-kuo and Kuang-te commanderies, roughly sixty miles northwest of Linan. Most of these cities fell without offering any significant resistance. They
were relinquished by civilian or military officers who, when not surrendering
to the Mongols, had simply fled their posts. Desertion was not confined to the
regional level; it infected the capital as well.
Earlier in 1275, when defeat at O-chou had posed a direct threat to the capital, the government issued a crisis call to regional officials and military commanders. The call to “rally on behalf the emperor” (ch’in-wang) drew responses
48
49
50
SS 47, p. 926; 474, p. 13786; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 6, p. 7a.
SS 474, p. 13786; HTC (1958) 181, pp. 4944, 4946; chapter 3 of Davis, Wind against the mountain.
Li, Sung Yüan chan-shih, pp. 1178–80, 1189–96.
934
richard l. davis
from only a few, among them Wen T’ien-hsiang, then prefect of Kan-chou
(in southern Kiangsi); Li T’ing-chih, commissioner for the Huai region; and
Chang Shih-chieh, a leading commander for the Ching-hu North frontier.51
The court’s agonizing sense of abandonment grew all the more acute a few
months later, when leading metropolitan officials began to flee. Councilor of
the Right Chang Chien2, nervous about the Mongol advance and nettled by
persistent squabbles between Wang Yüeh and Ch’en I-chung, abandoned his
office and fled the capital. Following his lead were three high-level executives
at the Bureau of Military Affairs, a ranking censorial official, and numerous
circuit-level chief administrators.52
These internal and external pressures aggravated tensions at court. Once
again a call to relocate the capital was made, this time by Han Chen2, chief
commander of the Palace Guard and an alleged ally of Chia Ssu-tao. An irascible, seemingly crazed Ch’en I-chung responded by secretly ordering Han
Chen2’s death by bludgeoning.53 Later it was charged that Han Chen2 had
intended to press the relocation issue by force of arms, in effect, making the
court the hostage of its generals. This charge against Han Chen2 was apparently intended to justify the actions of Ch’en I-chung, who was new to power
and zealous at guarding it. Ch’en I-chung may have intended to put an end
to defeatism at the capital, but his methods invited more instability. Apart
from aggravating an already ill-humored Wang Yüeh, the incident touched
off a nighttime mutiny in the Palace Guard. Furious subordinates of Han
Chen2 marched in protest on the southern gate of the imperial city and pelted
the palaces inside the walls with incendiary devices. The mutiny was quelled
by the next morning, but at the cost of a sizable number of guardsmen who
defected to the Mongols.
Dowager Empress Hsieh’s frustration was captured rather succinctly in
a palace notice posted on her orders. It read: “Our dynasty for over three
hundred years has treated scholar-officials with propriety (li3). While the new
successor [Chao Hsien] and I have met with assorted family hardships, you
subjects both high and low have offered no proposals whatsoever for saving
the empire. Within [the capital], officials forsake their commissions and vacate
posts. Away [from the capital], responsible officers relinquish their seals and
abandon cities. Censorial officers are incapable of investigating and indicting
for me, and the two or three at the councilor level cannot lead and direct the
51
52
53
SS 47, p. 924; 418, p. 12534; 421, p. 12601; 451, p. 13272; Li, Sung Yüan chan-shih, pp. 1222–3;
chapter 3 of Davis, Wind against the mountain.
SS 47, p. 928.
SS 47, pp. 927, 931; 418, p. 12530; Sung et al., Yüan shih 8, p. 163; HTC (1958) 181, p. 4947; Davis,
Wind against the mountain, pp. 72–5.
the reign of tu-tsung and his successors to 1279
935
efforts of the whole. Superficially, they cooperate [with me], but one after the
other they flee by night.”54 Her biting rebuke reads as a sad commentary on
the breakdown between the beleaguered regent and child-emperor and his
court officials.
Desperately trying to restore order in the capital, Dowager Empress Hsieh
moved quickly to fill the vacancies created by recent desertions. Chang Chien2,
who had fled Lin-an shortly after Chia Ssu-tao’s dismissal and who had refused
repeated orders to return, fell under the indictment of Censor Wang Yinglin. Ch’en I-chung replaced him as councilor of the right. The special post
of military councilor, formerly held by Chia Ssu-tao, was not for the moment
revived. The dowager empress had decided instead to entrust direction of the
armed forces to her two chief councilors, Ch’en I-chung and Wang Yüeh. But,
Ch’en I-chung had already emerged as the dowager empress’s premier court
advisor, if only by default. Wang Yüeh may have been the senior statesman,
but he had long sought to retire, ostensibly for reasons of health. The court
was adamant in refusing the request, in part because it desperately needed
continuity at the top of the bureaucracy, and in part because of the negative
effect on morale that another executive’s departure would have. Only by quietly
leaving the capital for his native Shao-hsing did Wang manage, in spring
1275, to negotiate his reassignment as distinguished pacification and banditsuppressing commissioner for Che-hsi and Chiang-nan East, the metropolitan
circuit.55 Wang’s departure, at the height of Lin-an’s military crisis, created
a political vacuum that was filled by Ch’en I-chung. Wang Yüeh did not
disappear altogether, however. In summer 1275, he served briefly as councilor
of the left and special military councilor in succession to Chia Ssu-tao. But
he and Ch’en I-chung seemed perennially at odds, often belaboring the most
trivial of matters, prompting the dowager empress, in July, to dismiss them
both. By November, she had recalled Ch’en I-chung as chief councilor. Wang
Yüeh died early the next year.
Perhaps under other leadership, the life-or-death struggle might have
united Sung officials against the Mongol invasion. But morale continued to
sink as Sung officials turned on one another. Ch’en I-chung, in assassinating
Han Chen2, had contributed much to the vindictive and murderous climate
of the day.56 Ch’en I-chung had expressed the desire of many in the capital
in demanding Chia Ssu-tao’s execution, following his fall from power. Wang
Ying-lin and Wang Yüeh made similar pleas, and were soon joined by students at Lin-an’s three universities, very likely at Wang Yüeh’s inspiration.
54
55
56
HTC (1958) 181, p. 4950; Davis, Wind against the mountain, p. 75.
SS 418, p. 12527.
SS 474, pp. 13786–7; HTC (1958) 181, pp. 4945–6, 4948, 4958–9; 182, pp. 4964, 4970.
936
richard l. davis
The court wasted much valuable time and energy debating Chia Ssu-tao’s fate.
In principle, Dowager Empress Hsieh opposed punishment of any sort, but
under mounting pressure she acceded to progressively more severe forms of
banishment and the confiscation of Chia family property. Despite her preference for leniency, Chia Ssu-tao was assassinated in October 1275 at Chang-chou
(Fu-chien) by the court-designated sheriff charged with his custody. Responsibility for the order remains unclear, although explicit palace authorization for
it appears unlikely. The murder contravened Dowager Empress Hsieh’s earlier amnesty, and the two councilors who most despised Chia Ssu-tao, Wang
Yüeh and Ch’en I-chung, were both temporarily out of office. Later, the court
ordered the arrest and imprisonment of the sheriff responsible for the death.
The arrest was made personally by Ch’en I-chung, who happened to be visiting the region. Writers of the Sung dynastic history implicate Tu-tsung’s father,
Chao Yü-jui, in Chia’s assassination because he had held Chia Ssu-tao personally responsible for his son’s poor medical care and untimely death and had
decided to exact revenge.57 Unauthorized and unwarranted, perhaps, but the
assassination of Chia Ssu-tao disturbed few bureaucrats. Like Han T’o-chou
seven decades earlier, Chia Ssu-tao had become a convenient scapegoat for a
time without hope.
More agonizing and potentially destructive than this preoccupation with
vendetta, was the inability of Dowager Empress Hsieh’s executive officials to
cooperate with each other. One possible solution open to the dowager empress
was to replace the councilors, but the times were ill suited for overhauling
the bureaucracy and the pool of candidates diminished daily as official ranks
thinned out. She had ultimately decided to sacrifice the aged Wang Yüeh, at
which point Ch’en I-chung was summoned to return to the capital. Ch’en’s
whereabouts for most of that summer of 1275 are uncertain, as are his motives
for staying away. A student at the Metropolitan Academy, purportedly at Wang
Yüeh’s prompting, launched a caustic assault on Ch’en I-chung’s official record,
accusing him of being no better than Chia Ssu-tao. In support of Ch’en I-chung,
the dowager empress ordered the student arrested.58 Ch’en’s period of withdrawal may have afforded him an opportunity to brood, while demonstrating
his value to the empire. Ch’en I-chung lingered in his native Wen-chou and
then was in Fu-chou, perhaps working unofficially with coastal defense forces.
He returned to Lin-an in the tenth lunar month as councilor of the right.
In his absence, Liu Meng-yen had served as chief councilor, but allegations
of nepotism drew the censure of Wang Ying-lin and forced Liu into retirement.59 This left Wang Ying-lin, whose previous indictments of Councilors
57
58
59
SS 474, p. 13787; Chaffee, Branches of heaven, p. 243.
HTC (1958) 181, pp. 4960–1.
SS 438, p. 12991.
the reign of tu-tsung and his successors to 1279
937
Chia Ssu-tao, Chang Chien2, and Wang Yüeh had drawn much court attention, as a rising star in Lin-an. Nothing could have pleased Ch’en I-chung
more, for Wang Ying-lin had supported him earlier over the controversial
execution of Han Chen2, and it appeared that Wang and Ch’en shared many
other views. Ch’en I-chung must have also taken heart in the advancement
to assistant councilor of another articulate critic of Chia Ssu-tao’s leadership,
Ch’en Wen-lung. Ch’en I-chung thus returned to the capital with a generally supportive body of subordinates and the full confidence of the dowager
empress.
The fall of Lin-an
The summer months of 1275 had brought something of a respite to the Sung
court. Mongol armies, unaccustomed to the humid summers of the south and
taking stock of their recent victories, withdrew from many of the cities recently
conquered in the Sung interior. In early summer, Khubilai had summoned
Bayan north for consultations to Peking and later to Shang-tu. This respite
enabled the Sung to stage something of a rally.
In the strategically vital region of the lower Yangtze River, the Sung recaptured, in whole or in part, Yang-chou, Ch’ang-chou, P’ing-chiang, and Kuangte. In central Sung territory, they recovered Jao-chou, O-chou, and many
subprefectures near heavily contested cities.60 Mongol control in the south
was still firm and extensive, especially in central Sung territory, but Sung
defenders did not remain inactive while the Mongol forces consolidated their
positions. Initially, the Sung court offered a general amnesty to high-level
regional officials who had recently deserted their posts, but when this was
ordered in April and May, the policy yielded unimpressive results. The court
subsequently threatened capital punishment for all deserters,61 but this proved
equally futile. Having failed to substantially reclaim lost men and territory,
the court decided to cling to what territory remained and stave off the Mongol
armies when they attempted to drive east. Crucial to this strategy was the
city of Yang-chou, sitting to the north of the Yangtze River opposite Chenchiang. The Sung assigned its two prized commanders, Chang Shih-chieh and
Li T’ing-chih, to the defense of Yang-chou, which had fallen briefly to Mongol
armies in the spring but was recovered soon after.
A further disaster occurred on the Yangtze in the seventh lunar month of
1275. Sung forces under Chang Shih-chieh attempted to blockade the river at
Chiao-shan below Chen-chiang to deny the Mongol naval forces access to the
sea. The Sung moored a huge fleet of big ships across the river, anchored and
60
61
Li, Sung Yüan chan-shih, pp. 1210–7.
SS 47, pp. 927–8, 930.
938
richard l. davis
chained together, and heavily protected. From their shore base at Chiao-shan
the much smaller Mongol fleet attacked them with fire ships and incendiary
arrows. Many of the immobilized ships burned, and at the same time Mongol
land forces attacked the shore installations. The Mongols won an overwhelming
victory, and captured seven hundred seagoing ships, which they could now
deploy on the open sea. The Sung lost sixteen thousand men, and as many
were taken captive.62
The Mongols pressed Yang-chou for much of the summer, and launched an
all-out campaign in the autumn of 1275, all to no avail. Yang-chou would,
in the end, hold out even after the capital Lin-an had fallen.63 The same was
true for neighboring Chen-chou2, which resisted repeated assaults. The Sung
also hoped to strengthen defenses in the lower Yangtze River that autumn by
appointing the increasingly prominent Wen T’ien-hsiang as prefect of P’ingchiang (Su-chou), which had only recently been recaptured. A former minister
of war, Wen T’ien-hsiang had gained notable success in recruiting local men
for regional armies in other parts of the empire. He seemed to possess the
organizational skills and the strength of character needed to keep the enemy
at bay, a mission vital to the security of the capital. But despite such positive
actions by the Sung court, previous Mongol attacks had already decimated too
many units and left too many gaps in defenses for the efforts of one summer
to restore Sung military effectiveness.
During the summer, Bayan, now chief minister, met with Khubilai to formulate their strategy to finish the campaign against the Sung. They decided to
press ahead with a devastating three-pronged assault originating from Chienk’ang (Nanking), on the south bank of the Yangtze River and ultimately
directed against Lin-an.64 Upon returning to the Yangtze front in December
1275, Bayan personally joined the siege of Ch’ang-chou, while A-chu augmented Mongol forces attacking Yang-chou. A-tz’u-han led the advance from
west of Lin-an with an assault on Kuang-te commandery. Ch’ang-chou fell
late in the year, following many months of stiff resistance, and Bayan ordered
a general massacre of its populace. It was a tactic employed by the Mongols
to intimidate neighboring cities by threatening the same for any other holdouts. News of the massacre created a serious rift between Sung commanders
determined to resist and city dwellers desperate to survive. As the campaign
continued in the Yangtze delta, Chiang-yin commandery, about a hundred
miles northeast of Lin-an, surrendered to the armies of Tung Wen-ping. The
62
63
64
HTC (1958) 181, p. 4958; Davis, Wind against the mountain, pp. 80–2.
Li, Sung Yüan chan-shih, pp. 1294–1305; Davis, Wind against the mountain, pp. 101–3.
Sung et al., Yüan shih 8, p. 169; Li, Sung Yüan chan-shih, pp. 1240–53; Li et al., Chung-kuo li-tai chan-cheng
shih (1968), vol. 11, pp. 435–9, 449–50.
the reign of tu-tsung and his successors to 1279
939
main force advanced along the line of the Grand Canal; Wu-hsi and P’ingchiang (Su-chou) fell to Bayan after the Sung court had summoned Wen T’ienhsiang back to the capital. The city of Hu-chou and Tu-sung Pass, the strategic
pass roughly forty miles west of the capital, fell to the armies of A-tz’u-han.
These gains were strategically invaluable to the Mongols. Chiang-yin lay at
the mouth of the Yangtze, and its capitulation gave the Mongols unobstructed
access to the Yellow Sea and Hang-chou Bay. The Mongols, their fleet increased
by the seven hundred ships captured at Chiao-shan, could now approach the
Sung capital by sea. The capture of P’ing-chiang and Hu-chou consolidated
the Mongol hold on the area around Lake T’ai, north of the capital. Control
of Tu-sung Pass secured the Mongol western flank. As the year (1275) came
to an end, the enemy converged on Lin-an. The remaining Sung leadership in
Lin-an had to decide whether to retreat farther south or to stand firm. With
a minimum of from thirty thousand to forty thousand troops available and
irregulars numbering several times that, defeat was far from inevitable.65 The
alternative was to negotiate by making some irrefusably generous offer and
stall for time.
It was only during Chia Ssu-tao’s last month in power in early 1275, following his defeat at Wu-hu, that a peace envoy, Sung Ching, was dispatched to the
camp of Bayan.66 On the eve of Chia Ssu-tao’s formal dismissal from office, the
northern envoy Hao Ching, whom the Sung had continued to hold captive,
was released and allowed to return home. The commissioning of Sung Ching
is portrayed in the Sung dynastic history as the work of Chia Ssu-tao, and the
release of Hao Ching as an independent gesture by the court. In fact, both acts
took place during Chia Ssu-tao’s absence from the capital, which leaves Wang
Yüeh and Ch’en I-chung as the likely initiators of peace overtures. Unfortunately, their timidity doomed the mission. Despite the fact that Bayan’s armies
had by then already reached Ch’ih-chou, some one hundred and sixty miles
from Lin-an, the Sung offered only a modest payment of tribute in exchange
for unconditional withdrawal. The Mongols rejected the offer, but Khubilai
appears to have dispatched an envoy a month later. The message he carried
will never be known, for Sung officers assassinated him at the border. The
Sung court, apologizing for the unauthorized act, approached Bayan in May
with new peace proposals, but Bayan’s return envoy was also assassinated. The
Sung apparently made no special effort to protect emissaries from the north,
having concluded that the Mongols were not acting in good faith. As a rule,
the Sung court turned to negotiation only under severe military pressure from
65
66
HTC (1958) 182, p. 4969.
On peace talks, see SS 47, pp. 926, 936–7; Sung et al., Yüan shih 8, pp. 161, 165, 171; 9, pp. 175–6;
126, p. 3097; 127, pp. 3104–9; HTC (1958) 181, pp. 4944, 4953–4; 182, pp. 4970, 4975–6.
940
richard l. davis
the Mongols, and then only as a delaying tactic. The militant Ch’en I-chung
and Wang Ying-lin could scarcely countenance the kind of compromises that a
peace treaty, negotiated from a position of weakness, would have entailed. The
Sung court delayed reopening talks until year’s end, when Bayan’s campaign
directed against Lin-an was already underway. In the twelfth lunar month (early
1276) there was a great flurry of diplomatic activity. The Mongols demanded
outright surrender. The Sung made concessions on issues of protocol but little else. With the Mongols having a clear military advantage and the Sung
attempting to preserve whatever autonomy it could, diplomacy did not work.
The position of the Sung empire deteriorated rapidly in early 1276.67 In a
three-pronged attack, Bayan’s troops closed in on the capital with the conquests
of Chia-hsing, An-chi (Wu-hsing), and Ch’ang-an Garrison (Lin-an’s northern
suburbs), while the enemy troops of Tung Wen-ping made an amphibious
landing on the coast north of Lin-an, and approached the capital from the
northeast via Hang-chou Bay. On the third prong, A-tz’u-han’s troops closed
in from the west. By the middle of the first lunar month, all three armies
converged at Kao-t’ing Mountain in the suburbs of Lin-an. Sung forces had
meanwhile suffered setbacks in the heart of modern Hunan and in northern
Kwangsi province. Defeat at T’an-chou (Ch’ang-sha), a city that had fought off
attacking armies for five months and endured tremendous losses, was quickly
followed by the fall of Yung-chou2, Ch’üan-chou2, and Kuei-yang (Kuei-lin),
and other cities in central and southern Sung territory. Mongol armies now
had secured control of the Yangtze valley, and were positioned for the final
assault on Lin-an.
News of the recent defeats touched off a new wave of desertions by leading
civil servants at the Sung court.68 Chief Councilor of the Left Liu Meng-yen and
Minister of Rites Wang Ying-lin fled at the close of 1275. Their resignations
having been rejected, they did not respond to court messengers appealing for
their return. Less than two months later, after the fall of Chia-hsing, Assistant
Councilors Ch’en Wen-lung and Ch’ang Mao (d. 1282), Bureau of Military
Affairs officers Huang Yung and Hsia Shih-lin, various censorial officials, and
many others joined the long list of high-ranking deserters. The situation
became so acute that by early February court attendance had fallen to fewer
than ten civilian officials. There were also military desertions in and around
the capital. News of Mongol atrocities at nearby Ch’ang-chou panicked Linan’s scholar-officials. Anticipating a protracted battle over the capital, some
fled because they wished to be spared the pain of either violent death or
67
68
HTC (1958) 182, pp. 4962–75; Hu et al., Sung Meng (Yüan) kuan-hsi shih, pp. 404–9; Li, Sung Yüan
chan-shih, pp. 1247–53.
SS 47, pp. 935–7; K’o, Sung-shih hsin-pien 175, p. 8b.
the reign of tu-tsung and his successors to 1279
941
humiliating captivity. Others left out of frustration with the leadership of
Ch’en I-chung, and his inability to devise an effective military response to the
Mongol advance and refusal to devise a strategy for retreat should Sung armies
be unable to hold Lin-an. Wen T’ien-hsiang and Chang Shih-chieh, the court’s
leading commanders by early 1276, proposed that the royal family prepare
to board ships in anticipation of a tactical retreat.69 Ch’en I-chung opposed
the move, purportedly because he still hoped a negotiated settlement could
be worked out, but perhaps because he could not accept the notion of retreat.
Even at the very end, Ch’en could only think of offering the Mongols meager
concessions. Only after Lu Hsiu-fu (1238–79), vice-minister at the Court of
the Imperial Clan, headed what turned out to be the final mission to the camp
of Bayan, producing no tangible results for a settlement, did Ch’en I-chung
finally endorse the withdrawal from Lin-an. Dowager Empress Hsieh at first
rejected the idea, as she had previously, but after a day’s reconsideration she
agreed. The night before, on 4 February, Ch’en I-chung had fled to his native
Wen-chou. The envoy, Lu Hsiu-fu, had already arranged a personal meeting the
next day between the chief councilor Ch’en and Bayan at Ch’ang-an Garrison
to discuss terms of surrender. The mission must have terrified Ch’en I-chung,
and understandably so in light of the high mortality among recent envoys.
Ch’en’s departure forced the court to nominate someone else for this dangerous
task.
Having lost most of her civil service, Dowager Empress Hsieh had no great
pool of candidates from which to select a new chief councilor and head negotiator. Among the more accomplished of those available was Wen T’ien-hsiang.
He became chief councilor and general commander of Sung armies on 5 February 1276. A day later, Wu Chien, councilor of the left since mid-January, and
Chia Yü-ch’ing (d. 1276), the recently named prefect of Lin-an, accompanied
Wen T’ien-hsiang to meet Bayan at his camp just north of Lin-an.70 At this
point, the Mongols had largely cut off Lin-an from the remaining Sung empire
and were ready to take the city, yet the Sung mediators offered nothing new
and were clearly only stalling for time. Bayan promptly sent the delegation
home. He chose to retain Wen T’ien-hsiang, after having had a verbal confrontation with him that left Bayan angered and suspicious. Wen remained
his captive for over a month. In the interim, on 22 February, the Sung court
recommissioned the former envoys, Chia Yü-ch’ing, who now replaced Wen
T’ien-hsiang as councilor of the right, and Wu Chien, to negotiate surrender.
With Mongol armies already positioned along the Ch’ien-t’ang River, facing
69
70
SS 451, p. 13273; HTC (1958) 182, p. 4976.
On the mission, see HTC (1958) 182, p. 4977; Wen, Wen T’ien-hsiang ch’üan-chi 17,
pp. 453–4; 19, pp. 498–9; Li, Sung Yüan chan-shih, pp. 1257–60.
942
richard l. davis
the capital, nothing but unconditional surrender was acceptable. On 22 March,
the twelfth day of the third lunar month, Bayan himself entered Lin-an to direct
the occupation. The million or so inhabitants of the Sung capital had been
spared a violent and destructive assault.71
The campaign against Lin-an was among the most carefully devised and
least violent conquests in Mongol history. Not only did Bayan coordinate the
movements of the three separate armies to ensure their convergence on the Kaot’ing Mountains, he enforced a high degree of discipline on those armies.72 On
5 February, he had issued orders strictly forbidding soldiers from entering Linan and threatening severe punishment for all transgressors. Twelve days later,
after the Sung court issued its surrender decree, Bayan dispatched commanders
of two lesser armies, Meng-ku-tai and Fan Wen-hu, a Mongol and a Sung
deserter, to enter the capital and prepare for an orderly transition of power.
He intentionally kept back the more powerful generals A-tz’u-han and Tung
Wen-ping. In another week and a half, Sung eunuchs were instructed to begin
collecting palace valuables and imperial paraphernalia. On the 28th of March,
nearly two months after his arrival in the city’s suburbs, Bayan paraded through
the gates of Lin-an as conqueror of the once great Sung dynasty. Such restraint
may not have been expected of a warrior famed for depopulating entire cities,
but the circumstances of the occupation of the Sung capital made it expedient.
There are reports that mass killings had taken place in the vicinity of Lin-an as
the Mongol armies closed in. Bayan may have sought to forestall more violence,
by delaying the takeover.73 In addition, some sources suggest that as troops
approached Lin-an they began to quarrel over the spoils that awaited them.
Bayan may have acted to stem further problems within his own ranks while
protecting the palaces from pillaging. Palace valuables were important to him,
for he collected the treasures and dutifully forwarded them all to Khubilai.
The valuables were later distributed among Mongol princes like any other
booty.
At their Shang-tu meeting in the summer of 1276, Bayan and Khubilai had
apparently decided on the fate of the Chao imperial family. The position had
been articulated early on in the negotiations of 1275–6. In exchange for the
Sung surrender, there would be no destruction of the state altars – “gods of soil
and grain” (she-chi). The Chao ancestor cult would not be destroyed, and the
imperial family would be spared in accordance with Chinese tradition to enable
imperial descendants to continue offering sacrifices to the ancestral emperors.
71
72
73
For details about the surrender, occupation, and treatment of conquered Sung adherents, see Hsiao,
“Bayan,” pp. 595–6.
Sung et al., Yüan shih 127, p. 3109; HTC (1958) 182, pp. 4975–81.
Sung et al., Yüan shih 9, p. 177; HTC (1958) 182, p. 4977.
the reign of tu-tsung and his successors to 1279
943
EASTERN ARMY
LIU CHENG’S
ARMY
BAYAN’S MAIN
ARMY
Kao-yü
H u ai R.
Yang-chou
Chien-k’ang
Hsiang-yang
N an
Fall to the Mongolian Army
after 5-year seige (1273)
Chen-chiang
Ch’angchou
Wu-hu
Su-chou
R.
Han-yang
An-ch’ing
Ch’in-chou
tze
Chiang-ling
LIN-AN
ng
Ochou
Ya
(March 1276)
Wu-chou
Yüeh- chou
Lung-hsing fu
T’an- chou
Chien-chou
Fu-chou
Ch’üan-chou
Ch’ao-chou
Wu- chou
Kuang-chou
N
Chao Ping, the last Sung Emperor
dies at Yai-shan, March 1279
Advance of Yüan Armies
0
0
300 km
200 miles
Flight of the loyalist
Sung court, 1276–1279
Map 32. The conquest of the Southern Sung.
944
richard l. davis
To a child-emperor and an aging dowager empress, for whom political power
mattered little anyway, this must have been an important factor in the decision
to submit without resistance. Not all palace residents took consolation in such
promises. Reportedly a hundred palace women, in fear of being raped and
enslaved, committed suicide on the eve of Bayan’s triumphal entry into Linan.74 The incident may also be related to their learning that exile to the north
was the fate awaiting them and other palace residents. All the eunuchs were
roped together and placed under armed guard, so that they could ensure the
safety of the women during the journey of over six hundred miles from Linan to Peking and beyond. Many palace women chose suicide en route. Other
palace women committed suicide after they arrived in Peking out of fidelity
to spouses long deceased. Most palace attendants accepted Mongol bondage,
and Bayan spared members of the imperial family the humiliation of chains as
they journeyed north.75
Forced removal of palace residents had previously occurred when a new
dynasty came to power. To ward off a political or military challenge, new
rulers had uprooted the elderly and powerful from their former political base
and sent them to isolated places where they could be monitored.76 In earlier
times, forced migration had sometimes involved hundreds of thousands of
persons. The Mongol action, which involved no more than a thousand captives, is noteworthy in one regard. Up to a hundred students at the three
universities – only a fraction of the total student population, which stood at
three thousand to four thousand – accompanied the imperial entourage on
its trek north.77 Their trip was voluntary for some, involuntary for others,
but in the face of wholesale abandonment of the court by its most eminent
officials, students seemed intent on making a strong statement of their commitment to the principle of loyalty. They likely drew inspiration from the
chancellor of the university system, Yang Wen-chung (chin-shih 1253), and a
former university official, Kao Ying-sun, two of only a handful of officials still
in attendance at court during its last days.78 Most of the students, like most
lesser palace consorts and female servants, were eventually permitted to return
south, while the prominent individuals were encouraged to remain in the
north. Kao Ying-sun was not be among the returnees; he committed suicide
74
75
76
77
78
K’o, Sung-shih hsin-pien 14, p. 6b; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 7, p. 6b; HTC (1958) 183, p. 4985; Davis, Wind
against the mountain, pp. 115–19.
Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 59, p. 2a.
Richard L. Davis, Court and family in Sung China, 960–1279: Bureaucratic success and kinship fortunes for the
Shih of Ming-chou (Durham, N.C., 1986), pp. 2–3; Ou-yang Hsiu, Historical records of the Five Dynasties,
trans. Richard L. Davis (New York, 2004), pp. 165–7.
SS 421, p. 12598; 451, p. 13277; K’o, Sung shih hsin-pien 175, pp. 8b–9a; Sung et al., Yüan shih 9,
pp. 180, 182.
SS 425, p. 12687; 454, p. 13347; HTC (1958) 183, p. 4985.
the reign of tu-tsung and his successors to 1279
945
by starvation soon after securing safe passage north for the imperial entourage.
Many suicides that went unreported occurred both in Lin-an and in the north.
At least one university student, Hsü Ying-piao, refused to join the move to
Peking; he and his family committed suicide in Lin-an. A minor metropolitan
official, Ko T’ien-ssu, opted to strangle himself rather than submit to the conquerors. Kung Chi, an executive of the agricultural bureau who accompanied
the imperial entourage north, starved himself before reaching Peking.79 The
list of martyrs is far longer than existing documentation suggests, particularly
documentation pertaining to events in the capital during the weeks directly
preceding and following the Yüan occupation.
The lives of members of the Sung imperial family in the north passed
without serious incident.80 Chao Hsien, referred to in the official history as
Ying-kuo kung, which was the Yüan court’s official designation for him, and
by Sung loyalists in the south as Kung-ti or Kung-tsung, stayed in Peking
and Shang-tu only briefly. Later, he took up residence at a Buddhist monastery
somewhere in the vicinity of Tun-huang, where he raised a family prior to
becoming a monk. The sources suggest that his years as a former emperor were
passed in relative comfort. Exiled to the north along with Chao Hsien was
his great uncle, Chao Yü-jui, the father of Tu-tsung. At the time of Lin-an’s
surrender, he had voluntarily returned to the capital upon receiving an urgent
summons from Dowager Empress Hsieh, presumably acting on instructions
from Bayan. The subsequent fate of this senior member of the imperial family,
a man probably in his sixties or seventies, is not known. The seventy-year-old
dowager empress, seriously ill at the time of Bayan’s occupation, was permitted
to delay the trek north for five months. Sent to Peking that summer under
special escort, she passed her final years in solitude at a nunnery in the area,
before dying in 1283. Dowager Empress Ch’üan, the empress of Tu-tsung and
Chao Hsien’s mother, may have been in her mid-thirties during the conquest,
but she was now the senior palace figure in the entourage that headed north
in late March, stopping briefly in Peking, and arriving at Shang-tu in midJune. She reportedly became absorbed in Buddhism in later years, perhaps
explaining her son’s subsequent devotion to the religion. When death came
in 1309, she was buried somewhere near Peking alongside Dowager Empress
Hsieh. She was survived by her son and apparently a grandson. Khubilai had
kept his promise to cause them no harm.
79
80
On these individuals, see SS 451, p. 13276; Sung et al., Yüan shih 9, p. 180; Feng Kuei-fen and Li
Ming-wan, Su-chou fu-chih (1883; Taipei, 1970) 71, p. 19a; Li Jung et al., Hang-chou fu-chih (1888;
Taipei, 1974) 130, pp. 9a–b; Davis, Wind against the mountain, pp. 124–6.
On the whereabouts of the royal family, see SS 418, p. 12539; K’o, Sung-shih hsin-pien 14, p. 6b; Ch’ien,
Nan Sung shu 6, p. 12a; 7, pp. 6b, 8b; Chao, Chao shih tsu-p’u 1, pp. 69a–70a, 71b; Davis, Wind against
the mountain, pp. 120–1.
946
richard l. davis
the fugitive court
Chao Shih (Tuan-tsung, r. 1276–1278)
The Mongol occupation of Lin-an sealed off the city, and most of the Sung
imperial family were now captive, but a few prominent members had managed
to escape and establish a court in exile in the far south. This government-inexile still represented a challenge to the legitimacy of the Yüan dynasty. The
court in exile gave Sung loyalists a symbol to rally around and a means of
pressing their opposition to Mongol rule. Their victories in the lower Yangtze
River notwithstanding, the Mongols required several more years to consolidate
their control over all of the Southern Sung domain.
Dowager Empress Hsieh and Ch’en I-chung had initially rejected proposals to abandon Lin-an in search of safety farther south. They reasoned that
the court’s composure and confidence would strengthen the resolve of troops
defending the city, should a confrontation occur. In time, Ch’en I-chung himself fled and by early February 1276, following the loss of Chia-hsing and Lu
Hsiu-fu’s abortive peace mission, the Sung court quietly appointed Tu-tsung’s
two remaining sons, Chao Shih and Chao Ping, to regional posts in the far
south.81 The decision was allegedly reached at the recommendation of Wen
T’ien-hsiang and under pressure from members of the imperial clan, who were
increasingly concerned about the safety of the emperor’s two brothers, possible
heirs to the throne. The two children departed Lin-an around 8 February, and
in the nick of time, for within a matter of days the Mongol armies sealed off
the city. Dowager Empress Hsieh may have authorized the boys’ assignments
to regional posts, but she clearly had not authorized their departure, for she
dispatched messengers demanding the convoy’s return. In all probability, the
move was carried out by an alliance between prominent members of the imperial clan and operatives in the palace. At any rate, the two boys apparently left
Lin-an under the cover of darkness and in the company of their mothers, a few
close relatives, and a Palace Guard contingent.82
Leading the group was Yang Chen, sheriff of Lin-an and father of Tu-tsung’s
consort Yang. Mongol armies already controlled the northern portion of the
Ch’ien-t’ang River leading to Hang-chou Bay and the ocean. The Mongols
were determined to seal off the chief escape route – the ocean – and prevent
repetition of a mistake made four decades earlier, when valuable energies were
81
82
SS 47, p. 939; HTC (1958) 182, pp. 4975–6, 4980; Wen, Wen T’ien-hsiang ch’üan-chi 17, p. 453; Li,
Sung Yüan chan-shih, pp. 1255–7; Chaffee, Branches of heaven, pp. 244–6.
Chien Yu-wen, Sung-mo erh-ti nan-ch’ien nien-lu k’ao (Hong Kong, 1957), pp. 5–8; Davis, Wind against
the mountain, pp. 113, 123, 166–7.
the reign of tu-tsung and his successors to 1279
947
squandered in the prolonged pursuit of Chin rulers who, through Mongol
carelessness, were allowed to flee their besieged capitals and continue resistance to the Mongol conquest. The Mongol position still left the Sung convoy
with an alternative route to safety, sailing up the Ch’ien-t’ang River to Wuchou4 (modern Chin-hua) and then traveling by land to sanctuary. It was a
hazardous escape, and Mongol pursuit forced the fugitives into the mountains for a week, but their evasive tactics succeeded and they reached the
coastal city of Wen-chou in southern Chekiang province. There, the group
rested, replenished their military and naval forces, and set sail for Fu-chou.
Mongol pursuers came perilously close to overtaking the convoy, and the messengers of Dowager Empress Hsieh did not convince them to return to the
capital.
A frenzy of activity followed as the guardians of the two imperial princes
tried to rally support among civilian and military officials. Former peace envoy
Lu Hsiu-fu was enlisted early on, followed by commander Chang Shih-chieh.
Also joining the group at Wen-chou was Wen T’ien-hsiang. The former councilor had been forcibly detained since early February by Bayan, who saw that
Wen’s strident loyalism was too great a threat to the current negotiations.
Following the fall of Lin-an, Bayan prepared to have Wen T’ien-hsiang incarcerated in the north along with two other former councilors who had been
peace envoys, Wu Chien and Chia Yü-ch’ing. The guards took too few precautions while transporting the men to Peking, with the result that Wen
T’ien-hsiang managed to escape in the vicinity of Chen-chiang, recross the
Yangtze, and flee to Chen-chou2. No sooner was he free than he found himself
in mid-March the object of a murder conspiracy.83 Military commissioner Li
T’ing-chih, incensed by the uncontested surrender of Lin-an in the face of his
own marathon defense of Yang-chou, blamed the surrender on the defeatist
envoys who negotiated the truce. Presuming Wen T’ien-hsiang to have been
party to the treachery, Li planned Wen’s assassination as retribution. It was
impossible for Li to know that the former councilor, held prisoner during the
second round of negotiations, had voiced strong opposition to concessions.
Wen T’ien-hsiang proved resourceful enough to convince the would-be assassins of his genuine loyalty to the Sung cause. His life was spared. His spirits
buoyed by news of the imperial fugitives, he headed south to join them at
Fu-chou, arriving in mid-May.
News of the presence of Tu-tsung’s two surviving sons in the south, out of
reach of the Mongols, inspired other acts of Sung loyalism. An attempt was
made to rescue the imperial entourage, including deposed emperor Kung-ti,
83
SS 421, p. 12602; Wen, Wen T’ien-hsiang ch’üan-chi 17, pp. 453–5; K’o, Sung shih hsin-pien 175, p. 5a;
HTC (1958) 183, p. 4982.
948
richard l. davis
as they passed along the Grand Canal en route to Peking.84 The incident in
April at Kua-chou (on the Yangtze River halfway between Chen-chou2 and
Yang-chou) was yet another trap sprung by Commissioner Li T’ing-chih, aided
by a reputed forty thousand men. But Dowager Empress Ch’üan refused to
support the loyalists, and their rescue effort failed after a brief encounter with
Yüan guards. Such a chilly response to rallying Sung loyalists was not universal.
Quite the contrary, popular uprisings erupted in support of the Sung, especially
in Fu-chien and Kuang-nan. Regional commanders and officials, once prepared
to surrender to the Mongols, now renewed their resolve to stand fast.85 Mongol
strategists must have counted on the collapse of Sung resistance after Lin-an’s
surrender, and had not prepared a detailed plan for a major drive against the
south comparable to their recent Yangtze campaign. They had not succeeded
in sealing off Lin-an from the south as well as the north.
Meanwhile, Sung loyalists in the south moved to consolidate their position.
Seven-year-old Chao Shih, eldest son of Tu-tsung and born to Consort Yang,
had been elevated to emperor on the first day of the fifth lunar month, 14
June 1276. The fugitive court, then safely in Fu-chou, occupied the offices
of the prefectural government and began appointing officials. Ch’en I-chung
had resurfaced from his Wen-chou home to join Sung supporters at Fu-chou,
where he was given the post of councilor of the left and quickly asserted his
dominance. Li T’ing-chih, in recognition of his sacrifices at Yang-chou, became
councilor of the right in absentia. He never took up his post or wielded any
political power, for the Mongols captured and executed him later that summer.
Another nominal councilor, appointed to the post in early summer, was Wen
T’ien-hsiang. Conflicts with Ch’en I-chung prompted Wen to resign. He went
home and devoted his energies to military mobilization in his native Kiangsi.
Chang Shih-chieh, a critical figure in the installation of Chao Shih, became
assisting executive in the Bureau of Military Affairs. He spent considerable
time away from Fu-chou, leading armies in battle. So did Fu-chou native
Ch’en Wen-lung, formerly an assistant councilor in Lin-an who had been
reappointed to that post in early summer. Ch’en Wen-lung concentrated on
solidifying Sung control over Fu-chien. The only individual to share power
with Ch’en I-chung over a significant span of time was Lu Hsiu-fu, a peace
emissary with extensive military experience. He became signatory official at
the Bureau of Military Affairs.
It seems curious that the court of Chao Shih should choose to retain the
services of Ch’en I-chung. He had already been exposed as incompetent at
84
85
SS 421, p. 12602; 451, p. 13268; K’o, Sung shih hsin-pien 175, p. 2b; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 59,
pp. 4a–6b; HTC (1958) 182, p. 4982; Li, Sung Yüan chan-shih, pp. 1299–1300.
Sung et al., Yüan shih 128, p. 3128; Wen, Wen T’ien-hsiang ch’üan-chi 17, p. 456; Yang Te-en, Wen
T’ien-hsiang nien-p’u, 2nd ed. (1937; Shanghai, 1947), pp. 247–8.
the reign of tu-tsung and his successors to 1279
949
managing the Mongol menace, which revealed his political inflexibility, his
ineffectiveness at managing the bureaucracy, and his cowardliness, having fled
Lin-an and the Sung court at its time of greatest need. Ch’en I-chung may
have argued, as did others who fled the besieged capital, that his sudden
departure was motivated by the decision, in the face of overwhelming odds, to
retreat strategically farther south and organize new armies. Even if extenuating
circumstances explain his departure in terms other than of cowardice, he was
still the least desirable candidate for chief councilor relative to others. Perhaps
the insecure court, with Dowager Consort Yang serving as regent, considered
that it enhanced its legitimacy by retaining the services of the last major
councilor from the former capital. Perhaps Ch’en I-chung, as bureaucratic
chief in Lin-an, had established a special liaison with Consort Yang’s father,
a one-time metropolitan sheriff, who must have wielded a large measure of
influence at the Fu-chou court-in-exile because of his daughter. But the court
seems to have had few alternatives to former deserters, for it also reappointed
Ch’en Wen-lung to high office despite his earlier desertion. Whatever the
reasons for the retention of Ch’en I-chung, this decision, more than any other
made on the behalf of the child-emperor, weakened the loyalist cause from the
outset.
There were other reasons why the Sung horizon of 1276 looked bleak. Under
the direction of Chang Shih-chieh and Wen T’ien-hsiang, Sung armies had
scored modest gains. In Che-tung, they had regained all or parts of Ch’üchou, Wu-chou4, and Ming-chou. They had recovered a significant part of
central Kiangsi province. The battles for Fu-chien and Kuang-nan had been
ferocious, with the Sung making significant gains, including the recovery of
Shao-chou2 and Kuang-chou (Canton). Yet most of these recoveries were only
temporary, and late summer brought bad news. Yang-chou and Chen-chou2,
the strategic cites giving control of the mouth of the Yangtze River and also
the two major Sung holdouts north of Lin-an, had finally collapsed after nearly
a year of relentless siege. Captured during the takeover was Commissioner Li
T’ing-chih, who attempted suicide and when this failed was executed. Having
reconsolidated their control of the lower Yangtze, the Mongols pressured the
south with a large autumn offensive. The armies of A-tz’u-han and Tung
Wen-ping moved directly from the north, in a combined land and sea operation
originating at Chen-chiang, while Lü Shih-k’uei and Li Heng advanced further
west through Kiangsi, squeezing the Sung from two directions. When these
armies converged on Chien-ning, northern Fu-chien, late in the year, the Sung
court decided to abandon Fu-chou for safety still farther south. Protected by
an army of reportedly a half million, a doubtfully large number, the court
boarded ships headed for Ch’üan-chou, Fu-chien, and subsequently moved
south to Ch’ao-chou, Hui-chou2, and then the greater Kuang-chou area, all
950
richard l. davis
in Kuang-nan East. Fu-chou fell to the Mongol advance at the end of the
year, early in 1277. One-time Assistant Councilor Ch’en Wen-lung was taken
captive there and sent north. Before reaching Lin-an, he starved himself to
death.
More reversals for the Sung came in 1277, and the search for a safe haven
continued to elude the fugitive court. Unlike the half year’s respite at Fuchou, which afforded Sung strategists precious time to regroup and reassess,
subsequent lodgments proved brief. For a year and a half, from early 1277
to mid-1278, the ship-bound court meandered off the coast of Kuang-nan,
disembarking at countless towns and outposts in the vicinity of Kuang-chou.
Under constant enemy pressure, it spent no more than a month or two at each
stop. For all their effort, the Sung forces rarely held onto territory recovered
from the Mongols. Even in the coastal cities of the far south, the Sung hold
was never firm. Kuang-chou changed hands at least five times before being
permanently secured by the Mongols in late 1278. But by mooring for so
long off the Kuang-nan coast the Sung emperor and his armies demonstrated
a commitment to holding the area. Kuang-chou was, after all, the most economically prosperous and culturally developed city along the empire’s southern
rim, the indispensable base for any viable restoration movement. The Mongols
understood this and directed their forces appropriately against Kuang-chou.
Apart from the contest over Kuang-chou, the Mongols’ attention also turned
to the interior. Mongol military commander Li Heng continued his attack
into Kiangsi, where he captured most of Wen T’ien-hsiang’s family. From the
heart of Kiangsi, Li Heng advanced into northern Kuang-nan. In late 1277
and early 1278, Li used the terror tactic of ordering a general massacre of Sung
holdouts in Hsing-hua, Fu-chien, and in Ch’ao-chou, Kuang-nan East. This
tactic further inhibited regional support for the Sung, as did local conditions
and conflicts.
The Sung armies had not always tried to appease local populations. In late
1276, at the great port city of Ch’üan-chou, for example, Chang Shih-chieh
had needlessly created a major incident by commandeering available ships and
provisions.86 This so incensed the powerful local trade and military commissioner, P’u Shou-keng, that prior to his surrender to the Mongols he responded
by indiscriminately executing Chao imperial clansmen, many of whom resided
in the area; Sung officials; and loyalist troops from the Yangtze region. During
86
On these various incidents, see SS 47, p. 942; HTC (1958) 183, pp. 4995, 5000; Wen, Wen T’ien-hsiang
ch’üan-chi 17, pp. 456–7; Li An, Sung Wen ch’eng-hsiang T’ien-hsiang nien-p’u (Taipei, 1980), pp. 72–81;
Li, Sung Yüan chan-shih, pp. 1390–4; Brown, Wen T’ien-hsiang, pp. 212–14; Huber, “Wen T’ien-hsiang,
1236–1283,” pp. 192–212; Jay, A change in dynasties, pp. 49–55; Davis, Wind against the mountain,
pp. 168–9.
the reign of tu-tsung and his successors to 1279
951
this unsettled time other regional contenders for power were emerging. There
is record of an execution in Fu-chou in mid-1277 by Wen T’ien-hsiang of a
bogus imperial claimant from T’ing-chou. The suspect, Huang Ts’ung, was
apparently involved in a popular uprising in the interior of Fu-chien directed
against the Sung government. Documents allude to an administrator at T’ingchou having “seditious designs” of some sort, the details of which are now lost.
Such incidents serve to demonstrate that Sung armies, while enjoying popular
support in certain quarters, were not necessarily welcomed throughout the
southeast, a situation that benefited no one more than the Mongol conquerors.
Tensions generated by a seemingly hopeless military conflict eventually
took its toll on Sung loyalists. Lu Hsiu-fu reportedly suffered from such acute
depression that while standing in place at court, he could frequently be seen
in tears, having apparently recognized the futility of the cause.87 Defeatism
afflicted others as well. In late 1277, after an epidemic killed vast numbers
of soldiers, Kuang-chou reverted once again to Mongol control, and in the
eleventh lunar month the Sung court fled still farther south to Ching-ao, an
island near modern Macao. This was its eighth stop in less than a year.88 At
that point, Ch’en I-chung must have come into conflict with others and, as
usual for him in such tense settings, took flight. Sailing beyond Hainan Island,
he sought sanctuary in modern Vietnam and later in Laos. References to the
court’s awaiting his return suggests that he had not been formally relieved
of his duties. A palace guardsman was even dispatched to fetch him, which
suggests that he had deserted, and was not lost at sea, as some have concluded.
The court considered taking refuge in Vietnam, possibly at Ch’en I-chung’s
counsel. The decision against the move reflected the waxing influence of a more
realistic and courageous Lu Hsiu-fu.89 To make matters worse, child-emperor
Chao Shih nearly died when his ship sank near Ching-ao. The incident occurred
only a month after Ch’en I-chung’s desertion and coincided with fresh Mongol
advances. The imperial entourage had little alternative but to seek refuge
still farther west. A new island sanctuary, Kang-chou, was near the southern
tip of Kuang-nan West, not far from Hainan Island.90 The emperor, though
snatched from the sinking ship and spared a violent death, never recovered
from the illness that followed the incident. He died on 9 May 1278, not yet ten
years old, at the mountainous Kang-chou hideout. Given the temple name of
87
88
89
90
SS 451, p. 13276.
On the route taken, see Ch’eng Kuang-yü et al., Chung-kuo li-shih ti-t’u (Taipei, 1984), vol 2, p. 107.
SS 418, p. 12532; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 6, p. 15a; 61, p. 7b; Li et al., Chung-kuo li-tai chan-cheng shih
(1968), vol. 11, pp. 422–43.
Some discrepancy exists about the location of Kang-chou; see Chien, Sung-mo erh-ti nan-ch’ien, pp. 77–89;
Li Sung Yüan chan-shih, p. 1439; Li et al., Chung-kuo li-tai chan-cheng shih (1968), vol. 11, p. 442.
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richard l. davis
Tuan-tsung, he was eventually interred at the court’s final sanctuary, an island
known as Yai-shan.
Chao Ping (r. 1278–1279)
The third surviving son of Tu-tsung, Chao Ping, was not yet six years old
when his half-brother died.91 He had accompanied the court of Tuan-tsung
throughout its hazardous trek from Lin-an to Kang-chou, attended by Consort
Yü, his mother, plus his grandfather and close relatives. The regents of Tuantsung had never officially designated Chao Ping as heir, the transfer of power
between brothers being generally thought undesirable. The seated emperor
being young and of sound health, to name an heir for him would have appeared
inauspicious. Consequently, when Tuan-tsung died, many officials considered
disbanding the court. Under the influence of Lu Hsiu-fu, the resilient chief
councilor, they endorsed elevation of Chao Ping to the throne. The prospect
of the throne passing to yet another child must have been disheartening, but
attrition had thinned the ranks of civilian officers, and this may explain Lu
Hsiu-fu’s ability to prevail. Military support for the action was crucial, and
Chang Shih-chieh was predictably enthusiastic. Two days after his brother’s
death, Chao Ping became emperor. He reigned for the next year and a half at
a court dominated by Lu Hsiu-fu as councilor, Chang Shih-chieh as assistant
chief of the military bureau, and the child’s stepmother, Dowager Consort
Yang, whose two-year regency continued. No mention is made of Chao Ping’s
mother, Consort Yü, who if alive would certainly have played some role under
the new regime. Wen T’ien-hsiang continued his military campaign on the
mainland east of Kuang-chou, the metropolis north of the island capital, but
he was isolated from court politics at Yai-shan. After the death of Ch’en Wenlung and the desertion of Ch’en I-chung, Wen T’ien-hsiang may have been
the most highly qualified civilian officer still serving the fugitive court, yet
rarely, if ever, was he summoned to the island retreat for consultation.
Yai-shan was to be the Sung dynasty’s last stand. The remaining leadership
appears to have assumed from early on that the aimless itinerancy needed to end.
The island, located just off the coast about twenty-five miles west of modern
Macao, was part of Hsin-hui county and about sixty miles south of Kuang-chou
(Canton).92 Largely mountainous, Yai-shan contained a stretch of relatively
flat or moderately hilly land. It was protected to the east and west by large
91
92
SS 47, pp. 994–6; K’o, Sung-shih hsin-pien 15, pp. 7a–9b; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 6, pp. 15a–17a; Chao,
Chao-shih tsu-p’u 1, pp. 74b–75a.
Photographs contained in Chao, Chao-shih tsu-p’u 1, p. 74b; Chien Yu-wen, ed., Sung huang-t’ai chi-nienchi (Hong Kong, 1960), pp. 1–22; Davis, Wind against the mountain, pp. 172–4.
the reign of tu-tsung and his successors to 1279
953
precipitous islands, from which the name Yai-shan “Cliff Hills” derives. These
tiny islets served as surveillance posts and obstructed passage for intruding
vessels, while shallow waters inhibited any large-scale amphibious approach
from the north. Another strategic advantage was the island’s proximity to the
coast, which facilitated immediate communication between the court and its
remnant armies on the mainland.
Perhaps more telling in terms of dynastic intentions is the size of the
Yai-shan stronghold. Sources vary somewhat, but the consensus appears to be
that Sung settlers, importing craftsmen from coastal Kuang-nan, rapidly built
some thirty palaces and three thousand other units to house the remaining two
hundred thousand soldiers who had been compelled to live on ships for the past
two years.93 The Sung imperial entourage, even at this late stage, must have
been larger than the small group that fled Lin-an two years earlier, even though
the boast of two hundred thousand militia contradicts references to an army of
“several tens of thousands,” attributed to Lu Hsiu-fu shortly before the flight
to Yai-shan.94 Having suffered defeats on the mainland and repeated retreats
along the coast, the fugitive Sung court is unlikely to have retained command of
several hundred thousand men, however diligent it may have been in recruiting
militia from the larger Kuang-nan region. The community on Yai-shan may
have been only one-fourth its reported size, but a force approaching even fifty
thousand represented a threat to Mongol hegemony.
The geographic scope of Sung resistance shrank substantially in 1278, just
as the court was entrenching itself at Yai-shan in anticipation of a protracted
war. The Szechwan region, if sufficiently free of enemy occupation, might have
offered future sanctuary for imperial fugitives. Previously in 1258, the Mongols
had gained a foothold in Szechwan when they captured Ch’eng-tu, neighboring
cities, and counties to the north. The Sung had regained much of the territory
lost that year, but not the strategically vital city of Ch’eng-tu, which except
for a brief spell in early 1273, had remained firmly in Mongol hands and
later became an administrative center for their western front. For most of Tutsung’s reign, the Sung and Mongol armies had concentrated their attentions
and resources on Hsiang-yang and central Sung territory. This strategy did
not entirely neglect the Szechwan theater, and the Sung had made at least two
unsuccessful attempts to regain Ch’eng-tu, in 1270, and in 1273.
Sung forces had more success in Ch’ung-ch’ing, the riverine hub that was
critical to holding the western stretches of the Yangtze River. The city had
come under repeated assault by Mongol forces between 1270 and 1272, but
93
94
Chien, Sung-mo erh-ti nan-ch’ien, p. 90; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 6, p. 15b; HTC (1958) 184, p. 5015; Chao,
Chao-shih tsu-p’u 1, p. 74b.
HTC (1958) 183, p. 5012.
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richard l. davis
it had held its ground. Another important city on the upper Yangtze River,
Lu-chou3, southwest of Ch’ung-ch’ing, had fallen to the Mongols twice in the
early 1260s, but had been recovered both times and had remained part of Sung
territory for the duration of the Tu-tsung reign. Ho-chou4 was an impenetrable
Sung enclave located about sixty miles north of Ch’ung-ch’ing, where the Fu,
Chia-ling, and Ch’ü rivers all converge as they turn south toward Ch’ungch’ing. Ho-chou4 is famed as the place where Möngke, the Mongol ruler,
had died during a lengthy assault on the city in 1259. Frequently harassed
by the enemy in the early 1270s, Ho-chou4 had remained firmly in Sung
hands.95 Sung control over these areas, by denying the Mongols access to the
Yangtze River from the west, prevented the Mongols from using the river
to launch large-scale naval offensives against cities downstream in eastern
Szechwan and western Hupei. Over two-thirds of Szechwan had already been
conquered by the Mongols by the Tu-tsung era. The Sung leadership and their
agents in the west appear to have invested in the defense of major cities of
Szechwan at the expense of smaller towns. This tactic preserved a facade of
control but a vulnerable facade that mitigated against dynastic interests in the
long term.
Khubilai had adopted an east-first strategy for conquering the Sung, and
the fall of Lin-an enabled his armies to turn their attention once more to
conquering Szechwan. In 1277 there were major assaults against Ch’ungch’ing, Ho-chou4, and Fu-chou6, all major centers in the western Sung empire.
Results from these attacks were initially unimpressive, perhaps because conflict
in the east prevented the Mongols from committing more than ten thousand
or twenty thousand men in any one western campaign. However, perseverance
by the Mongols paid off in 1278. Ch’ung-ch’ing and Lu-chou3 in the west fell
early in the year, roughly coinciding with Mongol acquisition of Nan-p’ing,
Po-chou2, and Shih-chou2, south of the Yangtze, and to the north, K’ueichou2, capital of K’uei-chou circuit, and Wan-chou in the Yangtze gorges. This
campaign completed Mongol command of the Yangtze River from the western
fringes of Szechwan to the ocean. Among the last Szechwan cities to hold out
was Ho-chou4. With a population of roughly eighty thousand households and
no contact with the outside for several years, it staved off the enemy until early
1279. The reasons for prolonged resistance in the west, in some cases three
years after the dynasty’s formal surrender at Lin-an, are not easy to discern.
Many Szechwan cities capitulated only in the aftermath of extended periods
of drought and famine, which made further defense virtually impossible. The
holdouts must have heard that the Sung court was in the far south following
95
On the conflict in these areas, see Hu et al., Sung-mo Ssu-ch’uan, pp. 138, 168, 259, 514–18, 547–51;
Li, Sung Yüan chan-shih, pp. 1318–26.
the reign of tu-tsung and his successors to 1279
955
the fall of Lin-an, but in the absence of official communications from the Sung
court, and there had been none since its loss of Lin-an, they continued to defend
Szechwan in the dynasty’s name.96 In contrast to the massive desertions in the
east, the stubborn resistance in Szechwan could only have heartened the Sung
court-in-exile. When the Mongols finally took Szechwan in 1278–9, the Sung
court had very few outposts remaining of its once great empire.
With most of Hunan, Kwangsi, and Szechwan in hostile hands, the only
hope for Sung resisters lay in retaining control of the southern Kiangsi and
northern Kuang-nan regions where Wen T’ien-hsiang was currently fighting,
and his prospects were bleak. Khubilai had reaffirmed his determination to
conquer all of the Southern Sung realm with a new series of campaigns. In
addition to a Kwangsi offensive launched in 1277 and a Yunnan offensive
begun in the spring of 1278, Khubilai inaugurated a third and final sweep of
the southeast coastal region in mid-1278.97 Li Heng, a Tangut in the service
of the Yüan, had already seized much of Kiangsi during the previous year,
forcing Wen T’ien-hsiang to retreat from the interior to coastal Kuang-nan.
The Mongol coastal offensive of 1278, intended to complement Li Heng’s
efforts, was amphibious. Deploying some twenty thousand men, the Mongols
sought to consolidate control over the long-contested coastal cities of Fu-chien
and Kuang-nan. Chang Hung-fan (d. 1280) was commissioned to supervise
the naval force. This was a noteworthy selection because Chang Hung-fan was
a Chinese commander and had blood ties to Chang Shih-chieh, his nephew
serving the Sung as their general commander. The assignment underscored
the increased isolation of the Southern Sung loyalists and the extent to which
they had sacrificed home and family by refusing to submit. By the end of
1278, loyalist armies had lost the coastal prefectures of Chang-chou, Ch’aochou, and Hui-chou2, in effect, all of the remaining Sung holdings in coastal
Fu-chien and Kuang-nan East. This left Wen T’ien-hsiang trapped inland
at Wu-p’o-ling, a mountain range roughly fifty miles east of Hui-chou2 at
Hai-feng in central Kuang-nan East. He and his army were overrun there on
2 February 1279 by a surprise attack led by Chang Hung-fan.98 Attempting
suicide, Wen was taken captive. Chang Hung-fan then joined forces with Li
Heng at Kuang-chou, a city only recently retaken by Mongol armies. There
they prepared for a naval assault on Yai-shan.
As the Mongol fleet made their approach to the Sung citadel at the end
of February 1279, Chang Shih-chieh had already learned, no doubt from
96
97
98
Hu et al., Sung-mo Ssu-ch’uan, p. 475.
Sung et al., Yüan shih 129, pp. 3157–8; HTC (1958) 184, pp. 5016, 5020–1; Wen, Wen T’ien-hsiang
ch’üan-chi 17, pp. 458–64.
Davis, Wind against the mountain, p. 174.
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informants, of their movements and was preparing for the attack.99 Reports
claim that in the harbor opening to Yai-shan, he formed a line of a thousand
oceangoing boats and ships. Once they were anchored, maneuvered by his
crack troops, and protected against arrows and incendiary missiles by matting
along their sides, the Sung emperor and his court went on board a large vessel
in the center of the line. The imperial presence was intended to strengthen
the resolve of war-weary and homesick soldiers, but it may also have been
designed to facilitate the court’s swift flight should the need arise. Anticipating this, the Mongols first moved to seal off escape routes to the north
and west, and then began harassing the Sung flotilla from the south. Chang
Hung-fan pressed Wen T’ien-hsiang, held captive on board a Mongol ship,
to plead with Chang Shih-chieh to surrender. Wen T’ien-hsiang adamantly
refused, perhaps confident in the superiority of Sung naval strength. Chang
Hung-fan then tried to set fire to the Sung ships, using incendiary rafts as
had been done on the Yangtze at Chiao-shan. This also failed. Mongol forces
appeared leery of risking an all-out assault, so they blockaded the Sung fleet,
and maintained their pressure for over a half month.
The tension accompanying this confrontation with the Mongols weakened
Sung patience and resolve, but other problems also took their toll. Although
the Sung fleet had prepared for a battle, they were not ready for what amounted
to a siege. Their supplies of fresh water were depleted, and some of those aboard
the Sung ships drank seawater and became sick. Weapons too were in short
supply, and probably food as well. On 19 March 1279 the Mongols exploited
the changing tides to attack the anchored Sung ships from both north and
south. The Sung losses were staggering. The next morning brought rain and
dense fog, but this did not veil from Chang Shih-chieh and Lu Hsiu-fu the
sad truth: they had lost the bulk of their navy, and this time there was no
escape. Wishing to spare the six-year-old emperor the humiliation of captivity,
Councilor Lu Hsiu-fu firmly clutched the child, dressed in his imperial robes
and carrying the imperial seals, and plunged into the sea. Only a hundred or
so military and civilian officers chose to surrender. According to most sources,
including both the Sung and Yüan dynastic histories (Sung shih and Yüan
shih), some one hundred thousand soldiers followed the emperor in suicidal
drowning.100 Chang Shih-chieh managed to escape with a dozen or so smaller
ships. He returned before long to assess the situation and came upon Dowager
Consort Yang, who was still within the Yai-shan stronghold. Mongol leaders
99
100
On the Yai-shan debacle, see Chiang I-hsüeh, Lu Hsiu-fu nien-p’u (Taipei, 1977), pp. 23–7; HTC (1958)
184, pp. 5024–8; Li, Sung Yüan chan-shih, pp. 1477–82; Li et al., Chung-kuo li-tai chan-cheng shih (1968),
vol. 11, pp. 442–5; Davis, Wind against the mountain, pp. 1–5; Jay, A change of dynasties, pp. 56–9.
SS 47, p. 945; Sung et al., Yüan shih 129, p. 3158; Ch’ien, Nan Sung shu 6, p. 16b; 7, p. 7a; 61, p. 7b;
HTC (1958) 184, p. 5027; Li et al., Chung-kuo li-tai chan-cheng shih (1968), vol. 11, pp. 444–5; Davis,
Wind against the mountain, pp. 1–5.
the reign of tu-tsung and his successors to 1279
957
apparently decided, after their sea victory, not to bother with occupation of the
island. On learning of her stepson’s death, the dowager threw herself into the
sea. She was buried on the beach by Chang Shih-chieh, who then himself died
by drowning, whether by accident or suicide is not known. His navy, reduced
to about ten ships, disbanded.
Accounts of the last months of the Sung dynasty at Yai-shan must be viewed
skeptically. Eyewitness accounts of the affair are few. Lu Hsiu-fu’s personal
diary, intended as a history of those crucial years, was lost. Mongol records,
based most likely upon reports from military officers, are terse.101 The only
Sung survivor to bear personal witness to the Yai-shan defeat and commit it
to written record was Wen T’ien-hsiang, a man too politically passionate to
be wholly credible as a historical source, and the number of people he reports
as dying at Yai-shan is clearly exaggerated. It is hardly credible that the Sung
court during its last desperate days possessed either a thousand warships or
a hundred thousand soldiers. The many thousands of bodies found floating
on the sea may represent war casualties, not suicide victims. Combat into
the late night and dense fog at the next dawn were also sources of confusion.
However, the Mongol delay in attacking at Yai-shan until Sung forces were
beset with shortages of food and water suggests that the Sung navy was far
from small. The Mongol forces apparently stood at roughly thirty thousand
to forty thousand, so a Sung force of fifty thousand or sixty thousand men
is not unwarranted. As for mass suicide, while the numbers may be inflated,
the incident undeniably occurred. Substantial documentation exists for other
cases of mass suicide among Sung loyalists shortly before or after capitulation
to the enemy. Perhaps the most notable was at T’an-chou (Ch’ang-sha) in 1275,
where thousands took their own lives.102 The question to be asked, therefore, is
not whether tens of thousands committed suicide at Yai-shan, for the numbers
are not as pertinent as the issue of why.
The siege of Lin-an had induced a cowardly response, with civilian and
military officials deserting on a massive scale. The contrast with Yai-shan,
just three years later, is confounding. Among traditional historians, a common explanation holds that the earlier ambivalence was a response to inept
political leadership, which alienated many of those who were conscientious
and loyal. Certainly, child-emperors occupied the throne in both Lin-an and
Yai-shan, and the councilor Ch’en I-chung offered the same lackluster leadership at both courts. It may be that Dowager Empress Hsieh’s decision, at
Ch’en I-chung’s prompting, to surrender Lin-an without a fight effectively
demoralized court supporters and undermined much loyalist sentiment. The
decision by Chang Shih-chieh and Lu Hsiu-fu to stand firm at Yai-shan was in
101
102
SS 451, pp. 13276–7.
SS 450, pp. 13253–6; Davis, Wind against the mountain, p. 110–12.
richard l. davis
958
striking contrast. If standing firm was critical, then Dowager Empress Hsieh’s
initial decision to confront the enemy without moving the capital should have
similarly inspired loyalists to resist militarily, if not to attack Lin-an to break
the enemy encirclement, but this did not happen.
Another explanation of the contrast between 1276 and 1279 lies in the
composition of the court. Those who followed the court all the way to Yaishan were a small select group, more cohesive and steadfast in their loyalist
convictions than the diverse body of officials serving in Lin-an. But there were
some men, such as Ch’en Wen-lung, who fled Lin-an in 1276, but chose suicide
over submission to the enemy in 1279. A factor that cannot be overlooked in
the defeat at Yai-shan is sheer desperation. When the Mongols descended
upon Lin-an, the Sung court could still claim control over a good deal of the
far south, roughly half of the domain. For loyalists hoping to revive the dynasty,
other places remained as alternative locations to carry on the resistance, while
surrendering the city would avoid the slaughter of its million people. Yai-shan,
on the contrary, represented the edge of the Sung world, and its collapse was
the end of the Sung cause. There was no refuge left. Perhaps holdouts there,
having learned of the brutal Mongol slaughter at Ch’ao-chou only a year earlier,
assumed that a similar fate awaited them and chose suicide over execution.
Circumstantial factors aside, I suspect that the spirit of loyalism did not
suddenly materialize at Yai-shan. It was always present, a product of the Sung
dynasty’s unique cultural traditions and a testimony to the government’s effectiveness in using education to mold culture. Whatever the motives of the men
and women at Yai-shan, the Sung court, and especially in the final weeks when
confronted with the grim prospect of Mongol domination, was able to generate
a high degree of loyalist fervor. To the Sung dynasty’s great misfortune, the
sense of common purpose that unified tens of thousands at Yai-shan did not
surface sooner, during the 1250s and 1260s for example, when the Mongol
pressure was relieved by their own civil warfare but most Sung civil servants
allowed partisan interests to prevail at the expense of a shared commitment to
the dynasty.
Legacy under assault
After the fall of Yai-shan, the body of Chao Ping, the child-emperor, was
reportedly retrieved from the ocean and buried in the vicinity of modern
Hong Kong, and a small temple was erected on the site.103 Dowager Consort
Yang and Lu Hsiu-fu were both buried, in unfitting simplicity, near Yai-shan.
In the late fifteenth century, during Ming-dynasty China, a series of temples,
103
HTC (1958) 184, p. 5026; Chao, Chao-shih tsu-p’u 1, p. 75a.
the reign of tu-tsung and his successors to 1279
959
some of them impressive in grandeur, were built at Yai-shan in honor of those
who perished there.104 As for members of the imperial family who died in
captivity, they were afforded honorable burials in the north.
With the exception of the last three child-emperors, most Southern Sung
rulers and their empresses were buried in the western suburbs of Shao-hsing,
not far from the eastern stretches of Hsiao-shan county about sixty miles east of
Lin-an. The site was then known as Pao-shan, “Precious Mountain.” Endowed
with an abundance of level land relieved by rolling hills, the spot reflected the
majesty of its imperial residents, yet it was sufficiently isolated to provide the
dead with a relatively secure sanctuary. The Sung imperial tombs were scattered
over a large area. Kao-tsung and Hsiao-tsung, along with their spouses, had
been interred not far from one another, but a handsome distance separated
Kuang-tsung and Ning-tsung from preceding emperors and from one another.
The Li-tsung and Tu-tsung graves, probably reasonably close to each other,
were similarly distanced from the others. Precious Mountain also contained the
graves of the Northern Sung emperors Hui-tsung and Ch’in-tsung, who had
died in Jurchen captivity. The bodies of Hui-tsung and his empress Wei had
been transported south and interred at Precious Mountain, but Ch’in-tsung
had been buried near Peking, probably alongside his wife, so his “tomb” at
Precious Mountain was more a memorial shrine than an actual grave.
In light of Khubilai’s beneficence toward the Chao imperial clan held captive by him, there was little reason to think that the Yüan would set out to
desecrate the Sung imperial tombs. Yet sometime in early January 1279, as
the Sung court-in-exile prepared for its final showdown at a distant Yai-shan,
the Sung tombs at Precious Mountain were being unearthed and pillaged.105
The chief instigator was Yang-lien Chen-chia, a Tangut monk prominent in
the Yangtze region and politically well connected. His alleged motive was
retribution for the Sung’s one-time desecration of Buddhist temples. In constructing both the Ning-tsung tomb at Precious Mountain and a ritual altar
by the Ch’ien-t’ang River in Lin-an, the Sung government had destroyed
several well-known Buddhist temples. These actions apparently appeared to
many, and especially to an angry Buddhist clergy, as an imperial assault on
religious institutions that should not go unpunished. Yet the pillaging of precious funerary relics leaves little doubt that religious retribution was less an
objective than simple theft. Without Khubilai’s approval, Yang-lien Chenchia chased away custodial guards and unearthed, first, the massive tombs of
104
105
Chao, Chao-shih tsu-p’u 1, p. 80b.
On the incident, see Wan Ssu-t’ung, comp., Nan Sung liu-ling i-shih [1821–50 ed.] (Taipei, 1968),
pp. 1a–13b; HTC (1958) 184, pp. 5021–4; Chao, Chao-shih tsu-p’u 1, pp. 78b–80a; Ting Ch’uanching, Sung-jen i-shih hui-pien (Shanghai, 1935) I, pp. 98–101; Rossabi, Khubilai khan, pp. 195–9.
richard l. davis
960
Ning-tsung and Ning-tsung’s empress Yang2, then the magnificently
appointed tombs of Li-tsung and Tu-tsung, followed before long by the crypts
of other former emperors and empresses. In the process of plundering, the
intruders crudely tore burial garments from bodies only partly decomposed.
The head of Li-tsung, ripped from the body, was played with like a toy. The
looters left corpses strewn about as well, with no apparent concern for either
etiquette or hygiene, while destroying a sizable portion, if not all, of the magnificent funeral statuary surrounding the graves. Yang-lien Chen-chia’s plan
was to devote some of the wealth to building a Buddhist pagoda on the banks
of Hang-chou’s Ch’ien-t’ang River – indeed, on the very grounds of the Sung
imperial palaces – while burying the bones of Sung emperors underneath,
thereby achieving the dual insult of desecrating the former residences of these
Sung emperors and forcing them to bear posthumous witness to it all.
Precisely what happened to the exhumed imperial bodies is the source of
some debate. The consensus among later writers is that two heroic locals,
T’ang Yü and Lin Te-yang, learned in advance of the intended unearthing and
removed nearly all of the bodies beforehand. They subsequently reburied the
remains elsewhere, some being interred as far away as Chia-hsing. Only the
body of Li-tsung appears genuinely to have fallen into the looters’ hands. This
contradicts significantly the earliest known account of the incident, written by
the eminent late Sung anecdotist Chou Mi (1239–98), who insisted that the
graves had all, in fact, been desecrated by pillagers. Later writers dismiss this
as erroneous. With tombs being so scattered, they note, disentombment would
have demanded several months of effort, so the removal of bodies beforehand
might have occurred. Advance removal is the only explanation for Chou Mi’s
reported astonishment at learning that the vaults of Hui-tsung, Kao-tsung,
and Hsiao-tsung were totally empty, free even of bones.106 This revisionist
interpretation has its flaws. How did T’ang Yü and Lin Te-yang evade guards
responsible for protecting Precious Mountain, guards whom Yang-lien Chenchia overcame only with considerable force? How could two men, with no more
than the help of a few friends, complete a massive unearthing and reburial on
short order when tombs were large, well sealed, and scattered over an extensive
area? I suspect both interpretations are partially correct. Disentombment by
northern pillagers probably did occur, although they may well not have completed things before encountering some local reaction, namely, the intervention of our two heroes. In the case of Hui-tsung, Kao-tsung, and Hsiao-tsung,
where pillaging occurred last, there may have been time for locals to remove
the bodies in advance; otherwise, T’ang Yü and friends merely retrieved bodies
already exhumed and abandoned near the vaults. In any event, the sprawling
106
Wan, Nan Sung liu-ling i-shih, pp. 12b–13b.
the reign of tu-tsung and his successors to 1279
961
burial preserve at Precious Mountain was gutted.107 Palaces at Lin-an were
not spared either. Some were demolished by Yang-lien Chen-chia to build his
White Tower pagoda, while others were converted into monasteries.
According to contemporaries, Yang-lien Chen-chia confiscated precious
objects from over a hundred tombs in the lower Yangtze and seized countless
parcels of land.108 Admittedly, the Yüan court did not authorize these actions
and eventually intervened to stop them, yet vengeful malice of this sort should
not be attributed to the eccentricity of a few religious fanatics. Mongol conquerors, by stripping Sung palaces of valuables and then distributing these
among various princes, had set a precedent of cultural desecration that others
with privilege learned to exploit aggressively.
Malice and greed are understandable, but the desecration helped reinforce
loyalist sentiment among Han Chinese. Wen T’ien-hsiang was the most eminent personification of that spirit. The one-time Sung councilor, taken captive in Kuang-nan, remained in captivity in Peking for four years, 1279–83.
Khubilai reportedly admired his fortitude and hoped to win him over. Wen
T’ien-hsiang could not be swayed, and his execution in early 1283 further
reinforced anti-Mongol sentiment in the south. This sentiment went along
with the trend among a majority of educated men of the early Yüan, particularly southerners, to boycott the regime’s civil service as they pursued other
professional alternatives, even at economic and political sacrifice.109
The death in 1279 of the last established Sung emperor, and the loss of
his imperial regalia, prompted a self-serving observation by the great Mongol
military leader, Bayan. Alluding to Sung T’ai-tsu’s dethronement in 959 of
the six-year-old emperor Chou Kung-ti (r. 959), the last emperor of the Later
Chou dynasty (951–9), Bayan observed that T’ai-tsu had taken the empire
over from a child, and that the last of the Sung emperors was also a child.
107
108
109
Ann Paludan notes: “For the second half of the Song dynasty, there were no spirit roads. Determined
to regain the northern half of the country the Southern Song regarded their sojourn in Hangzhou as
temporary. Burials were provisional, awaiting return to the dynastic graveyard at Gongxian. Their tombs
were given the official name ‘temporary sepulchres’ (cuan gong) rather than mausoleum (ling), [and] the
scale was very small, tumuli being only two metres high and a bare five metres in circumference”; see
Ann Paludan, The Chinese spirit road: The classical tradition of stone tomb statuary (New Haven, Conn.,
1991), p. 148.
Wan, Nan Sung liu-ling i-shih, pp. 6a–b.
Frederick W. Mote, “Confucian eremitism in the Yüan period,” in The Confucian persuasion, ed. Arthur F.
Wright (Stanford, Calif., 1960), pp. 202–43; Davis, Court and family in Sung China, pp. 164–5, 180–1.
For contrasting views of the extent and significance of eremitism in the early Yüan, see Jay, A change in
dynasties, and Paul J. Smith, “Fear of gynarchy in an age of chaos: Kong Qi’s reflections on life in south
China under Mongol rule,” Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient 41 No. 1 (1998), pp. 1–95.
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GLOSSARY–INDEX
A-chu
, 928, 931, 932, 938
See Wan-yen A-ku-ta
A-ku-ta.
(Ch’in T’ai-tsu, r. 1115–23)
(Liao T’ai-tsu,
A-pao-chi
916–26), 60, 61, 64, 72, 80
, 938, 939, 940, 942,
A-tz’u-han
949
abdication (shan-jang; nei-ch’an,
abdicate), 57, 329, 752–754
Hsiao-tsung’s, 754, 757
Kao-tsung’s, 707
Kuang-tsung’s, 754, 771, 772
absolutism
defined, 14
Hsiao-tsung’s, 737–747, 755
imperial, 229–233, 237
imperial and ministerial, 13–14, 341
ministerial, 540
Sung mode of, 229
T’ai-tsung’s, 246–247
Academy of Worthies (Chi-hsien yüan),
361
Accounting Bureau (Tu-chih ssu), 458
activism (yu-wei), 24, 28, 353, 360,
455
statecraft (ta yu-wei chih cheng), 383
flaws of (ta yu-wei chih pi), 420
student, 897–898
under Hui-tsung, 906
under Li-tsung, 898–899
acts of grace (ta-she), 283
adjutant (hsing-chün ssu-ma), 154
administration, financial, Southern
Sung, 33. See also specific ruler or
administrator
Administrative Reform Commission
(Hsiang-ting kuan-chih so),
460
Administrator for Public Order (ssu-k’ou
ts’an-chün), 231
adopted son, nephew, or relative. See
adoption
adoption, 45, 50, 58, 113, 148, 159,
207, 691, 872, 913–915. See also
heir apparent (t’ai-tzu); “sons,”
imperial (huang-tzu)
Chao Ch’i’s, 912
Chao Hsün’s, 834
Chao Hung’s, 835
Chao Yen-shou’s, 88
Chao Yüan’s, 707
Chi’in Hsi’s, 690
Chu Yu-jang’s, 166
Chu Yu-wen’s, 61
Hsü Chih-kao’s, 161, 166
Kuo Jung’s, 118
Kuo Wei’s, 111
Li Jung’s, 148
and Li Ssu-yüan
, 76, 85
Li Ssu-yüan’s, 72
Li T’an’s, 851, 872, 896
and Li Ts’un-hsü
, 67, 70
by Li-tsung, 914–915
Li Ts’ung-k’o’s, 85
1012
glossary–index
adoption (cont.)
Liu Yün’s
, 111
Shih Ching-t’ang’s, 87
and the Sung emperors, 835
Tu-tsung’s, 873
Ying-tsung’s, 340, 342
“advance and fortify” (chin-chu) strategy,
548, 549, 551, 616, 619
adventurers, outlaw, and southern
state-building, 5–10. See also
specific actor
advice, soliciting public, 324–325
Advisory Office (Chiang-i ssu), 589–590,
593, 597, 600
affection, fraternal, 842
agrarian projects, 10. See also agricultural
lands and water conservancy
policy (nung-t’ien shui-li fa);
agriculture
Agricultural Colony Offices, 312
agricultural lands and water conservancy
policy (nung-t’ien shui-li fa), 370,
379. See also agrarian projects
agriculture, 128, 171–177, 193, 318
, 51, 52
Ai-ti
Ai-tsung
(r. 1223–34), 856, 858
alcohol. See wine
“all-under-Heaven” (t’ien-hsia), 99, 243
allegiance, 5, 11, 39–132. See also loyalty
dependence on, 64
A-pao-chi’s
dependence
An Ch’ung-jung’s
on, 96 on
with autonomy, 112
Chu Wen’s
dependence on, 48,
49, 50, 51, 53, 54–55, 58, 62
Chu Yu-chen’s
dependence on,
66
change of, 65
Chu Yu-ch’ien’s
gubernatorial, 112
Kuang-tsung’s dependence on, 107
Kuo Jung’s dependence on, 120, 121,
123
dependence on, 109,
Kuo Wei’s
117
dependence on,
Li Ssu-yüan’s
74–86
Li Ts’un-hsu’s dependence on, 58,
62–63, 64, 65
Li Ts’ung-k’o’s
dependence on,
84, 89
Liu Ch’eng-yu’s
dependence
on, 110
dependence on, 113
Liu Ch’ung’s
and military strength, 44, 111, 123
dependence
Shih Ch’ung-kuei’s
on, 102
significance of, 44
Southern T’ang dependence on, 104
and Sun Fang-chien
, 101
and the Sung dynasty, 131
in the tenth century T’ang empire, 38
alliances
through adoption. See adoption
against Chu Wen
, 146
“classic,” 78
fraternal, 50
governors, 108
of Kuan-chung
Kuo Jung-Wu-Yüeh, 124
Later Shu-Northern Han-Southern
T’ang, 124
Liao-Later Chin (936–42), 87–97
marriage, 45, 50, 195, 196, 217, 230,
451, 583
Chang Yüeh’s
, 764
, 346
Chao Hsü’s
Chao Hung’s
, 835
, 773
Chao K’uo’s
, 672
Ch’in Kuei’s
, 59
Chu Wen’s
Ch’ung-tsung’s, 619
Empress Liu’s, 277
Han Ch’eng’s
, 762
, 217
Han Ch’ung-yün’s
, 772, 782
Han T’o-chou’s
, 95
Huang-fu Yü’s
, 252
Li Chi-ch’ien’s
Li Ch’ung-chü’s
, 236
Liu Ch’ien’s, 153–154
glossary–index
, 824
Li Ch’üan’s
Li Ssu-yüan’s
, 76
, 183
Liu Yen’s
, 154
Liu Yin’s
, 406
Lü Chia-wen’s
, 165
Meng Chih-hsiang’s
Wang Chi-chung’s, 266
Wei Chou’s, 154
Yang Hsing-mi’s
, 50
, 91
Yang Kuang-yüan’s
and Li
Yang Miao-chen
, 824
Ch’üan’s
northern, 59–60
Southern T’ang, 189
Southern T’ang-Liao, 131
allies. See adoption; allegiance; alliances;
loyalty; specific actors, countries,
dynasties, or groups
amnesty, 100, 116, 126, 228, 318, 528,
579, 580, 937
An-chi
(Wu-hsing), 940
(Security and Relief
An-chi fang
Clinics), 597
, 548, 551
An-chiang
, 932, 933
An-ch’ing
An Ch’ung-hui
, 76
, 95–96
An Ch’ung-jung
. See Pacification
an-fu ta-shih
Commissioner-in-chief
, 329
An-hua county
. See Chao Yün-jang (Prince of
An-i
P’u, 995–1059)
An Lu-shan
, 39
rebellions (755–63), 38, 43, 134,
607
An Ping
(d. 1221), 801, 802, 803,
804–805, 822, 828–829
An T’ao, 507, 533
An-te, 331
, 95, 96
An Ts’ung-chin
An Tun, 540–541, 542
An-yan, 307
, 514, 815, 902
Analects
ancestral temples. See specific instances
1013
Anhwei modern province, 49, 138
(An-nam, Annan, An-nan),
Annam
170–171, 247, 468–469
annual payments and taxes. See
payments, annual (sui-pi)
Anthology of literature (Wen-hsüan), 255
anti-reform. See conservatives;
factionalism; Hsüan-jen (r.
1085–93); Hui-tsung
(1082–1135, r. 1100–26);
Ssu-ma Kuang (1019–86); Ts’ai
Ching (1047–1126)
appeasement. See specific actor
archery, 312, 413, 689, 740
Arigh Böke, 872
aristocrat. See privilege, hereditary (yin2)
armed forces, 190. See also archery; army;
cavalry (jen-hsia); crossbow;
horses; infantry; navy; ships
armor, 117
army. See military
Army of Eight Characters (pa-tzu chün),
663
“Army of the Wu House,” 798
aromatics, 186
asafoetida, 184
“Ascending the Carriage Canopy
Pavilion in Summer,” 522
assassination, 207, 210, 808–810, 855
of Chang Ching-ta
, 88
, 936
of Chia Ssu-tao
of Chu Wen
, 61, 206
, 61
of Chu Yu-kuei
of Chung Hsiang, 665
, 171
of Duong Dinh Nghe
of Fan Ju-wei
, 665
, 934, 935
of Han Chen2
of Ho-she-li Chih-chung
(d. 1213), 819
of Khubilai’s peace envoys, 939
, 71–72
of Kuo Ch’ung-t’ao
, 110
of Liu Ch’eng-yu
of Liu Chien-feng
, 150
, 112
of Liu Yün
1014
glossary–index
assassination (cont.)
of Lo Shih-ch’uan
, 832
, 149
of Min Hsü
, 819
of Prince Wei
, 826
of Shih Kuei
of T’ai-tsu, 242
of Wang Yen-hsi
, 168
assembly, elected (khuriltai). See
klaghan
assignment, duty (ch’ai-ch’ien), 233,
237, 238–240
astrology. See portents, astronomical;
portents, cosmological
Attendent Censor (shih yü-shih), 540
attendants
“close” (chin-hsi), 726–728, 744–746
palace, 726, 727, 760, 944
authority
to appoint and dismiss (yü-tuo chih
ch’üan), 365
central, 122
centralization of military, 668
imperial, and Hsiao-tsung, 711–712
ministerial
curtailed, 721–723
under Hsiao-tsung, 721
and tenure, 721
restoration of central government’s,
653
autocracy, 31
from 1127- c.1260, 28–33
autonomy, 188–189
gubernatorial, 39–40, 112, 130
regional, 44, 229
auxiliaries to the local guards (chiu-chin
fu-pao), 408
Bandit Wang Eight (Tsei Wang Ba), 156.
See also Wang Chien
banditry, 412, 495, 791, 823, 881,
910–912
by army deserters, 662
and the depletion of cattle, 116
and famine, 100
along Huai River border, 822
and Jen-tsung, 325, 326
under Kao-tsung, 662–666
and the pao-chia, 351, 407, 446
in rebel provinces, 39
and “Righteous Armies,” 663
and southern rebels, 664–666
and Wang Chien and Chin Hui, 156
, 145
and Yang Hsing-mi
bandits, 104–105, 134–135, 137, 158,
160, 235, 328, 388, 818
army, 149
chieftains. See banditry; outlaw
adventurers. See also specific actor
from the gang of Fang La, 624
“leader” (tsei-shuai), 137, 207
banishment (an-chih), 521–525, 532,
537–538, 539, 542–543, 566,
571, 574, 576–577, 639, 889
of Chang Tun
, 565
, 543
of Chia I
of Ch’in Kuan, 543
of Han Kung , 811
of Hu Chüan, 680
of Li Ju-i, 806
of Lu To-hsün
, 259
, 789
of Lü Tsu-chien
, 536
of Ts’ai Ch’üeh
, 806
of Wang Ta-chieh
bankruptcy. See debt
“barbarians,” 95, 103, 195, 251–254,
267, 465, 628
Barin tribe, 928
battles. See specific location
Batu, 868
Bayan
, 928, 932, 937, 938,
939–940, 941–944, 945, 947,
961
belles lettres, 319
belvedere (kuan), 271
blacklist, partisan (tang-chi), 541, 566,
575–577, 578, 580. See also
factionalism; proscriptions;
purges
glossary–index
Board of Personnel, 460
Bureau of Executory Personnel
(Liu-nei ch’üan), 460
boats. See ships
bodyguard, personal, 114, 121, 234
Bol, Peter, 583, 585
bonds, familial, 49
Book of documents (Shu-ching), 286, 294,
689
Book of filial piety (Hsiao-ching), 697
Book of poetry (Shih-ching), 360, 520
Book of rites (Li-chi), 678
bookkeepers (tien-li), 398, 403. See also
scribes
books, forbidden. See censorship
border, 343
Chin reinforcement of Sung, 792
conflicts, 308
general, 246–247
markets, 684
policies of Hsüan-jen regency, 549
security, 359, 855–856, 917–923
situation, ban on discussion of, 890
trade, 927
bowmen (kung-shou), 425, 427, 437. See
also conscripts
bribery, 84, 85, 100, 180–181, 277, 591
brocade, 256
brotherhood, sworn, 207, 219
Buddhism, 612–613, 787
Indian texts of, 253
temples and monastaries of (ssu2,
yüan), 613
Buddhist Canon, 301
bureau. See specific entity
Bureau for the Interpretation of the
Classics (Ching-i chü), 364
Bureau of Astronomy, 581
Bureau of Military Affairs (Shu-mi yüan),
460
abolished by Shih Ching-t’ang, 92,
99, 313
and administrative control, 235–237,
239
1015
, 76
and An Ch’ung-hui
and Chen-tsung
, 261
, 56,
and Ch’ung-cheng Hall
68
concurrent appointments in the, 722
and the Council of State, 368
and Court of Agricultural Supervision
(Ssu-nung ssu), 413
by eighth century, 457
and Feng-chi, 110
and Hsiao-tsung, 716
and imperial orders of Hsiao-tsung,
723
and Jen-tsung, 306
and Kuo Ch’ung-t’ao
, 69
and military administration, 218
and Ministry of War, 461
, 409
and pao-chia
and the Secretariat-Chancellery, 240,
264, 275, 276
after Shan-yüan
, 21
and T’ai-tsu, 12, 241, 246, 250
and T’ai-tsung, 246
Bureau of Monopoly Goods (Ch’üeh-huo
wu), 405, 430
Bureau of Personnel Evaluation
(Shen-kuan yüan), 240, 352,
460
Bureau of State Expenditure (Kuo-yung
fang), 730
bureaucracy, 55–58, 115, 122,
190–191, 254, 290, 345–346,
360. See also specific agency, bureau,
commission, kingdom, office, reign
difference between the 1250’s
Northern and Southern Sung,
908
after the Shan-yüan settlement, 20–21
two administrative systems of the
Sung, 457–459
burial. See specific actor or location
cadastral survey. See survey, cadastral
caitiff, 268. See also “barbarians”
1016
glossary–index
Calamity of Ching-k’ang (ching-k’ang
chih-nan), 559, 607, 642, 646
calendar, 188, 227
, 64
A-pao-chi’s
, 126
Kuo Jung’s
, 127
Li Ching’s
Li Ssu-yüan’s
, 75
T’ang dynasty’s, 59
, 55
Wang Chien’s
calligraphy, 254, 283, 287, 575, 689
Cambridge History of China. Volume 6:
Alien regimes and border states,
907–1368, 1
camphor, 184
canal. See specific entity. See also waterways
cannibalism, 855, 858, 881, 902. See also
famine
canton (hsiang), 407
Canton
(Kuang-chou), xi
canton scribe (hsiang shu-shou), 397
capital, 106, 155. See also specific location
and Kao-tsung, 661–662, 696–697
location of, 933, 934, 958
temporary (hsing-tsai), 661, 662
Capital Security Office (Huang-ch’eng
ssu), 219, 234
sustenance (hsin-ts’ai ch’ien), 410
catchment basins. See dikes (yen). See also
specific waterway.
catties, 179
cattle, 116, 684
cavalry, 195, 218, 253, 308, 477, 819,
920. See also horses
Celestial Heart (T’ien-hsin), 611
censor (yü-shih), 21, 30, 32, 288, 567
Censorate (Yü-shih t’ai), 25, 274,
373–376, 490, 513, 747. See also
Census Bureau (Hu-pu ssu)
censorship, 277, 692
Census Bureau (Hu-pu ssu), 261, 458
Central Collateralized Loan Bureau
(Ti-tang so), 430, 432–433
Central Commercial Tax Bureau (Tu
shang-shui yüan), 430
central government. See centralization
“Central Kingdom,” 181
Central Plains (chung-yüan), 4, 30, 53,
104, 106, 714
Liao invasion of (1004), 20
Liao occupation of (947), 102–103
revolts across, 105
centralization, ceramics, 176–177, 184
certificate of verification (t’ieh-she), 284
(memoranda), 246
cha-tzu
. See commissioners,
ch’a-fang shih
investigative
, Hsi Hsia prince, 621
Ch’a-ko
Ch’a-p’u
. See Monograph on tea
(tea certificates), 594
ch’a-yin
Chaffee, John W., 585, 597, 602
(1073–1133), 664
Chai Hsing
Chai Ssu, 535
Chai Ts’ung
, 664
. See duty assignment
ch’ai-ch’ien
. See drafted service
ch’ai-i
. See Drafted Service
ch’ai-i fa
policy
(Chou Shih-tsung, r.
Ch’ai Jung
954–59), 5, 11, 197, 208–211,
220, 244. See also Kuo Jung
contributions of, in strengthening
bureaucratic governance, 11
recentralization of military authority
by, 5
Chancellery (Men-hsia sheng), 462,
652
imperial recorder of, 724
Chang, Lady (Wen-ch’eng Empress),
292, 335
Chang An-kuo
, 376
, 66
Chang Ch’eng-yeh
, 282, 290
Chang Chi
, 549
Chang Chieh
, 670
Chang Chieh2
, 374, 375
Chang Chien
, 931, 935
Chang Chien2
Chang Chih-pai
(?-1028), 277
(?-1028), 281
Chang Chih-po
glossary–index
, 86, 88
Chang Ching-ta
Chang-chou
, 133, 151, 169, 910
Chang Ch’u-wei, 690
, 14, 133, 204, 220,
Chang-Ch’üan
223, 228, 248
, 633, 634
Chang Chüeh
Chang Chün
(1097–1164), 651,
659–660, 670, 671, 680, 682,
703, 713, 714, 715, 716–717,
718–719, 899
(1086–1154), xi,
Chang Chün2
651, 669
(1007–91),
Chang Fang-p’ing
299, 313, 323, 345, 346, 387
on deflation, 441
on hired-service, 421
and prefecture schools, 318
and service-exemption fees, 439
and Shen-tsung, 355
on Ying-t’ien-fu, 421, 438
Chang Fu
(d. 1219), 832
Chang Hsüan, 183
(d. 1280),
Chang Hung-fan
955–956
, 664
Chang Jung
Chang K’o-kung, 581
Chang Kuan
, 294, 299, 300, 307
, 172
Chang Lin
, 826, 830, 850
Chang Lin2
, 217
Chang Ling-to
, 185
Chang Mu
Chang Pang-ch’ang
(1081–1127),
637, 638, 639, 640, 643, 645,
646–647, 649
, 754
Chang P’u
Chang Shang-ying (1043–1122), 535,
538, 582, 598
Chang Shao (1096–1156), 687
Chang Sheng
, 323, 337
(1133–80), 728
Chang Shih
, 899
Chang Shih2
(d. 1279), 922,
Chang Shih-chieh
934, 937, 941, 947, 948, 949,
950, 952, 955, 956, 957
1017
(964–1049),
Chang Shih-hsün
281, 284, 285, 290, 291–292,
300, 928
Chang Shu-yeh
, 627
, 517–518
Chang Shun-min
Chang So, 648, 649
Chang T’ang-ying
(1029–71),
156
, 681
Chang T’ao
, 300, 313, 318
Chang Te-hsiang
, 830
Chang T’ien-i
, 374, 877, 902
Chang Tsai
(r. 1189–1208), 792
Chang-tsung
Chang Tun
(1094–1100), 26, 30,
453, 478, 481, 491, 521, 528
and the abolition of the Yüan-feng
reforms, 544
“advance and fortify” strategy of,
548–549
and censorial post nominees, 493–494
and crimes against the state, 565
and elimination of New Policies, 496
and the hired service exemption,
501–502
and Hui-tsung, 565
and Lü Ta-fang
, 538
opposition to amnesty for Lü Ta-fang
, 539
, 486
plot to depose Chao Hsü2
and Prince of Chien, 553–554
stripped of honorary rank, 566
and Su Ch’e
, 499
, 562–566
supporting Chao Ssu
, 577
and Ts’ai Ching
and Tseng Pu, 553
Chang Tzu-yen
, 739
, 60, 64
Chang Wan-chin
Chang Wen Piao, 224
, 335
Chang Yao-tso
, 793, 806
Chang Yen
, 77, 84
Chang Yen-lang
Chang Yen-te (927–1000), 102, 210
Chang Yung
(946–1015), 272
Chang Yü, 297
1018
glossary–index
, 62
Chang Yüan-te
Chang Yüeh
(d.1180), 727–728,
764, 765
ch’ang . See tax stations
Ch’ang-an
and the An Lu-shan
rebellion,
38
assaulted by Huang Ch’ao
, 146
, 47, 48
and Chao-tsung
, 43, 47, 48
and Chu Wen
as cultural center, 134
demoted to a province, 52
by 895, 42–43
Garrison, 940
and Huang Ch’ao
, 39, 42, 66
, 107
under Liu Ch’eng-yu
and the rebellion of Wang Hsien-chih
and Huang Ch’ao, 138
as T’ang capital, 207, 222
Ch’ang An-min, 539
Ch’ang-chih
, 47
, 140, 933, 937, 938,
Ch’ang-chou
940
ch’ang chün-tzu, hsiao hsiao-jen
(“strengthening the
superior men and illuminating
the petty ones”), 363
Ch’ang Mao
(d. 1282), 940
. See supply
ch’ang-ming ya-ch’ien
masters, volunteer
. See
Ch’ang-p’ing shih-i ssu
Ever-normal state trade agency
Ch’ang-p’ing ts’ang
. See
Ever-normal Graneries
, 148
Ch’ang-sha
Ch’ang-sheng kuo, 331
Ch’ang-sheng ta-ti. See Great Emperor of
Everlasting Life
Chao , 65
(958–1018), 276
Chao An-jen
, 341–343
Chao Chan
(Jen-tsung, 1010–63,
Chao Chen
r. 1022–63), 279. See also
Jen-tsung
, 290
Chao Chen2
Chao Chi
(Hui-tsung, 1082–1135,
r. 1100–26). 553, 562. See also
Hui-tsung; T’ai-tsung
(Tu-tsung, 1240–74,
Chao Ch’i
r. 1264–74), 912, 914, 916. See
also Tu-tsung
Chao-chou
, 59, 60
(Chao Hsü,
Chao Chung-chen
1048–85), 338. See also P’u,
Prince of; Sung Shen-tsung
, 848, 850, 882
Chao Fan
(d. 1221), 805, 823,
Chao Fang
827, 828, 848, 860
Chao Fu, 653
Chao Hao
, 486
(Chen-tsung,
Chao Heng
968–1022, r. 997–1022), 259.
See also Chen-tsung
(r. 977–1022); Chen-tsung
(r. 997–1022)
Chao Hsieh
, 477
(Ying-kuo kung,
Chao Hsien
Kung-ti, Kung-tsung,
1271–1323, r.1274–76), 928,
929–930, 945
Chao Hsiung
, 736
(Chao Chung-chen,
Chao Hsü
Shen-tsung, 1064–85,
r. 1067–85), 346, 347, 351. See
also Chao Chung-chen;
Shen-tsung
Chao Hsü2
(Che-tsung,
1077–1100, r. 1085–1100),
480, 486. See also Che-tsung
(Chao Hsü2, 1077–1100,
r. 1085–1100)
plot to depose, 486
Chao Hsün
(1192–1220), 809, 811,
813, 834–835
(Ch’in-tsung, 1100–61,
Chao Huan
r. 1126–27), 637. See also
Ch’in-tsung (1100–61,
r. 1126–27))
glossary–index
(d. 1225), 834–835,
Chao Hung
836, 839–844, 861, 875, 876,
915
Chao Hung-yin
, 210
(1140–96), 32, 761,
Chao Ju-yü
764–766, 768, 770, 773,
775–782, 783, 787, 788, 793,
814, 877, 897, 914–915
and the accession of Ning-tsung, 774
calls for dismissal of, 781
and filial obligations, 770
and Kuang-tsung’s abdication,
771–772
P’eng Kuei-nien
(1142–1206),
798
reinstated, 790
and Tao-hsüeh, 781
, 323, 337, 345, 346
Chao Kai
Chao K’ai2
(1146–80), 758
(Kao-tsung, 1107–87,
Chao Kou
r. 1127–62), 641, 643, 644,
645, 647. See also Kao-tsung
(Chao Kou, 1107–87, r.
1127–62)
(T’ai-tsung,
Chao K’uang-i
939–97, r. 977–97), 11,
131–132, 212, 228. See also
T’ai-tsung
Chao K’uang-ning
, 50–51
, 107
Chao K’uang-tsan
(T’ai-tsu,
Chao K’uang-yin
927–76, r. 960–76), 1, 5,
11–12, 126, 131, 132, 197, 201,
210–213, 457. See also T’ai-tsu
Chao K’uei
(1186–1266), 848, 850,
860–861, 862, 882, 891, 904
Chao Kuo. See K’ang, Prince
Chao K’uo
(Ning-tsung,
1168–1224, r. 1194–1224),
762, 771, 773. See also Chia,
Prince
, 659
Chao Li
Chao Liang-ssu
, 628, 629. See also
Ma Chih
1019
Chao-ming, Prince. See Hsiao T’ung
(Prince of Shen), 562
Chao Pi
, 369, 372, 374
Chao Pien
(Ti-ping, 1272–79,
Chao Ping
r. 1278–79), 929, 946, 952,
956
Chao Po-chiu
, 708
(Prince of P’u-an,
Chao Po-ts’ung
Hsiao-tsung, 1127–94,
r. 1162-), 708–709. See also Chao
Shen (Hsiao-tsung, 1127–94,
r. 1162–69); Chao Yüan;
Hsiao-tsung (1127–94, r.
1162–89)
, 730
Chao Pu-ti
(924–92), 220–221, 229,
Chao P’u
236, 243–244, 245, 254, 258
, 860
Chao Shan-hsiang
Chao Shen
(Hsiao-tsung, 1127–94,
r. 1162–69). See Hsiao-tsung
(1127–94, r. 1162–89)
(Tuan-tsung, c.
Chao Shih
1268–78, r. 1276–78),
929–930, 946, 948. See also
Tuan-tsung
Chao Shu
(Ying-tsung, 1032–67,
r. 1063–67), 351. See also
Ying-tsung (1032–67,
r. 1063–67)
, Prince of Chien, 562
Chao Ssu
(950–79), 242,
Chao Te-chao
245, 914
Chao Te-chün
, 85, 88, 98
(959–81), 242, 914
Chao Te-fang
Chao Ting (1085–1147), 674, 675–676,
677, 680, 693, 703
Chao Ting2, 341
Chao T’ing-chih
, 520, 579, 580
(947–84),
Chao T’ing-mei
257–259
, 72
Chao Tsai-li
(Ying-tsung,
Chao Tsung-shih
r. 1063–67), 335–346. See also
Ying-tsung
1020
glossary–index
Chao Ts’ung-ku, 336
Chao Tun
(Kuang-tsung,
1147–1200, r. 1189–94), 753,
756–758, 765
, 408
Chao Tzu-chi
, 539
Chao Yen-jo
Chao Yen-na
, 879
, 88, 98, 101–102,
Chao Yen-shou
103
, 936, 945
Chao Yü-jui
chao-yü shih. See envoy, investiture
. See also Chao Po-ts’ung;
Chao Yüan
Hsiao-tsung (1127–94,
r. 1162–89)
Chao Yüan-fen
, 297, 336
Chao Yüan-tso, 764
(Prince of Ching),
Chao Yüan-yen
289
Chao Yün
(Li-tsung, 1205–64,
r. 1224–64), 836–837
(Prince of P’u,
Chao Yün-jang
995–1059), 297, 335, 336
Chao Yün-pi, 336
. See court
ch’ao-t’ing
(T’ang province), 143
Che-hsi
Che-tsung
(Chao Hsü2,
1077–1100, r. 1085–1100),
25–553, 560, 928
political culture of, 535
reformist takeover of 1094, under,
533
Che-tung (T’ang province, modern
Chekiang), 136
, 177
Chekiang
chen. See constellation
Chen-chiang
, 933
, 44, 47, 59, 65, 66, 102,
Chen-chou
106, 211
, 865, 938, 949
Chen-chou2
. See commissioners,
chen-fu shih
military
, 308
Chen-jung chün
Chen Te-hsiu
(1178–1235), 34,
812, 816–817, 820, 825, 835,
837, 842, 843, 852, 854, 876,
898, 901
Chen-ting, 636
, 310, 641
Chen-ting fu
(Chao Heng,
Chen-tsung
968–1022, r. 997–1022), 31,
279, 285, 291, 609. See also
Chao Heng (Chen-tsung,
968–1022, r. 997–1022)
tomb of, 280–281
Ch’en Tz’u-sheng
, 567
, 621, 622
Chen-wu
ch’en . See subject
Ch’en, Lady, 293
Ch’en Ch’ao-lao, 581
Ch’en-ch’iao
, 210–213, 244
, 375
Ch’en Chien
, 300, 307
Ch’en Chih-chung
Ch’en Ching-hsüan
, 155
Ch’en Chiu (Ch’en Sheng-chih), 323,
344. See also Ch’en Sheng-chih
(1113–86),
Ch’en Chün-ch’ing
723, 725, 726–727, 728,
735
Ch’en Embankment, 173
Ch’en Fu-liang
(1137–1203),
429, 770, 777, 780, 788, 790
, 372
Ch’en Hsiang
, 848
Ch’en Hsün
Ch’en Hua, 883, 910–911
(914–85,
Ch’en Hung-chin
r. 964–78), 173, 205, 228
Ch’en I-chung
, 905, 924, 926,
930–931, 934, 935–937, 940,
941, 946, 948–949, 957
Ch’en K’ang-po
(1097–1165),
715, 716
(1057–1122), 554,
Ch’en Kuan
564, 616
(1183–1234),
Ch’en Kuei-i
859
(1128–1203), 781
Ch’en K’uei
Ch’en Liang
, 899
, 730, 734
Ch’en Liang-yu
glossary–index
(961–1017),
Ch’en P’eng-nien
272, 274, 275
Ch’en san-ch’iang
. See
“Three-Spear” Ch’en
, 743
Ch’en She
, 370, 371, 372,
Ch’en Sheng-chih
374, 447. See Ch’en Chiu
Ch’en Shu
, 332, 333
Ch’en Ssu-kung, 655
, 638, 645, 649, 651
Ch’en Tung
, 782, 811
Ch’en Tzu-ch’iang
(1232–77), 925,
Ch’en Wen-lung
940, 948, 949, 950, 958
Ch’en Yao-tso
, 290, 298,
299–300
, 150, 151
Ch’en Yen
, 722
Ch’en Yen-hsiao
, 760–761, 765
Ch’en Yüan
Cheng Ch’ing-chih
(1176–1251),
836, 850, 854, 858–859, 876,
877, 878, 884, 898, 901, 904
greatest shortcoming of, 885–886,
910
successors, 886
Cheng Chü-cheng, 580, 582
Cheng-ho (1111–18), 583
Cheng-ho wan-shou Tao-tsang. See Taoist
canon of the longevity of the
Cheng-ho Reign
(1040–1119), 387,
Cheng Hsia
435, 444, 448–449, 450
Cheng I-nien
, 681, 690
, 122
Cheng Jen-hui
. See titles,
cheng kuan-ming
rectification of office
Cheng Ts’ai
(d. 1249), 885
Cheng Yung, 528–529
, 179–180
Cheng Yüan-pi
, 902. See also
Ch’eng brothers
Ch’eng Hao; Ch’eng I
, 830
Ch’eng Chien
(T’ung-ku), 660
Ch’eng-chou
Ch’eng Fang
, 366, 393
. See messengers, office
ch’eng-fu
1021
, 379, 454, 479, 481,
Ch’eng Hao
487, 877. See also Ch’eng
brothers
ch’eng-hsiang
. See counselor, chief
(1033–1107), 510–511,
Ch’eng I
512–513, 518, 519–520, 521,
530, 575, 693, 877. See also
Ch’eng brothers
banishment of, 543
on the factionalism of the Hsüan-jen
regency, 530
as imperial tutor, 516
rehabilitation of, 564
and Su Shih
, 514
, 147–148
Ch’eng Ju
, 299
Ch’eng K’an
, 904
Ch’eng Kuang-hsü
(988–1056), 285–289
Ch’eng Lin
Ch’eng-p’ing-chai, 305
Ch’eng Sung
, 793, 794, 799–800,
801–802
, 44
Ch’eng-te
. See messenger
ch’eng-t’ieh jen
, 72, 134, 157, 195, 223,
Ch’eng-tu
798, 869, 920, 953
Ch’eng Yüan-feng
, 889–890,
892
(ad hoc agency to
Chi-chih ssu
audit and adjust spending), 284
, 87, 632
Chi-chou
, 122
Chi-chou2
Chi-chou3
, 925
, 444
Chi Feng
(d. 1220), 826, 827
Chi Hsien
. See offices, stipendiary
chi-lu kuan
chi-shih-chung
. See Supervising
Secretary
. See Office for
Chi-su fang
Emergencies
. See horses, land
chi-t’ien mu-ma
in return for
ch’i (life force), 844
Ch’i (proxy state, 1130–37), 29,
708
1022
glossary–index
, 627
Ch’i-chou
Ch’i-chou2
, 928, 933
. See elder
ch’i-chang
. See Court Diary of
Ch’i-chü chu
Activity and Repose
, 727
Ch’i Fang
Ch’i-kou Pass
, 250
Ch’i-li era (Annunciatory Calendar), 331
. See Khitan
Ch’i-tan
Ch’i-ying, 182
Chia, Consort (d. 1247), 874, 891, 892,
913–914, 930
Chia, Prince, 759, 760, 767. See also
Chao K’uo (Ning-tsung, r.
1194–1224)
and Hsiao-tsung, 768
and Kuang-tsung, 768
, 294, 318,
Chia Ch’ang-ch’ao
323
and Shih Chieh
, 321
. See household regulations
chia-fa
, 940
Chia-hsing
, 510–511, 515, 518, 519
Chia I
, 548, 551
Chia-lu
(d. 1223), 825, 826,
Chia She
847–848, 874, 891, 896
Chia Ssu-tao
(1213–75,
1259–75), 26, 31, 33, 890–892,
905, 912, 915
and foreign policy, 895
lack of good judgment by, 926–927
chia-tou
. See tax-pressing
(d. 1276), 941
Chia Yü-ch’ing
chiang. See military, mixed battalion
, 932, 933
Chiang-chou
Chiang Fei
, 724
, 51
Chiang Hsüan-hui
, 4, 133, 143, 160,
Chiang-Huai
163, 165–167, 200
. See Advisory Office
Chiang-i ssu
, 147, 196
Chiang-ling
Chiang-ling fu, 10
Chiang-nan, 28, 144, 152
East, 624, 626
(Nanking), 652. See
Chiang-ning
also Chien-k’ang; Chin-ling;
Nanking
Chiang-ning fu (Nanking), 358
Chiang-pei
, 123
, 763, 764, 768–769
Chiang T’e-li
Chiang-tung
, 178
(1188–1275),
Chiang Wan-li
923
, 939
Chiang-yin
. See
ch’iang-kan jo-chih
strengthening the tree trunk and
weakening the branches
Chiao-chih
, 468. See also Ly dynasty
. See Imperial Bureau of
Chiao-fang
Music
Chiao-shan, 937, 939
(drill chiefs), 413
chiao-t’ou
chiao-yin
. See vouchers, exchange
. See military drill and
chiao-yüeh
review
(1156–1241),
Ch’iao Hsing-chien
821, 843, 848, 859, 877, 880
chief
drill (chiao-t’ou), 413
household (hu-ma), 397, 427
small guard (pao-chang), 408
Chief Deployment Commands (tu-pu
shu), 247
Chief Office of Imperial Clan Affairs (Ta
tsung-cheng ssu), 297
chieftain, hereditary, 153
Chieh-chou
, 660, 853
. See titles, prestige
chieh-kuan
. See governors,
chieh-tu shih
military
Chien, Prince of, 553. See also Chao Ssu
chien-ch’a yü-shih
. See
Investigating Censor
. See “treacherous minister”
chien-ch’en
chien-cheng chung-shu wu-fang kung-shih
. See Secretariat
examiners
Chien-chou
. See Chien-ning
glossary–index
, 10–11, 168, 169
Chien-chou
Chien-chou2,
, 803
. See
Chien-chung ching-kuo
Establishing Centrality and
Balancing the State, 1101–02
. See remonstrance,
chien-i ta-fu
grand master of
Chien-k’ang
(Nan-ching), 652,
696, 933, 938. See also
Chiang-ning (Nanking);
Nanking
. See critics, policy
chien-kuan
. See regent
chien-kuo
Chien-men Pass
, 226
. See Chien-chou
Chien-ning
. See state
chien pang-chia
. See
chien-pi ch’ing yeh
“strengthening the walls and
clearing out the countryside”
chien-ping
. See “engrossers”
. See
chien-ping chih chia
“monopolists”
. See intendants, circuit
chien-ssu
Chien-yen (1127–31), 652
. See Remonstrance
Chien-yüan
Bureau
Ch’ien-chou, 147, 178. See also Kan-chou
Ch’ien Ch’u
(r. 947–78), 228
. See
ch’ien-chung huo-ch’ing
“money became dear and goods
cheap”
ch’ien-hsia
. See commander, zone
, 808, 811,
Ch’ien Hsiang-tsu
812, 813, 814, 816
. See famine, cash
ch’ien-huang
Ch’ien Hung-tsou
, 169
, 374
Ch’ien I
(r. 907–31)
Ch’ien Liu
illegal behavior of, 145
and the Khitan court, 185
as King of Wu-Yanü, 157
as King of Yüeh, 157
loyalty of, to T’ang, 188
reign period of, 188
1023
tribute to, 179
, 140–143
and Tung Ch’ang
, 146
and Yang Hsing-mi
, 142
and Yüeh-chou
, 155
Ch’ien Neng
Ch’ien Shu (r. 948–78), 182, 186,
205
Ch’ien-tao
era (Supernal Way,
1165–74), 712, 720–737
(962–1034), 277
Ch’ien Wei-yen
, 571
Ch’ien Yü
. See local defense,
chih-chiang fa
training command system
Chih-chien, 153
chih-chih-kao
. See officials, drafting
Chih-chih san-ssu t’iao-li ssu
. See Finance
Planning Commission
chih chün-fu shih
. See Military
and Civil Affairs, Director of
. See military command
chih-hui
Chih-k’ao, 166
. See controller
chih kuo-yung shih
of national finance
(Ordered Tranquility,
Chih-p’ing
1064–68), 338
chih shu-mi yüan shih
. See
Bureau of Military Affairs,
administrator of
. See grain, direct
chih-ta wang
networking
chih-ts’ai
. See finance, public
, 939
Ch’ih-chou
ch’ih-hsin pao-kuo, shih-sha Chin tsei
,
. See “Serve the
country with passion; swear to
kill the Chin bandits”
Child Benevolence Service (Tz’u-yu chü
), 872
Chin (1115–1234), 16–17, 29, 33,
34–35, 250, 615, 622, 818
invasion on the Khitan frontier,
27–30
rebellion, 628–643
1024
glossary–index
Chin, Prince of, 43
Chin-an-chai
, 88
Chin-cheng pass, 551
, 113
Chin-chou
. See advance and fortify
chin-chu
. See army, imperial
chin-chün
Chin Chün-ch’ing, 424
Chin dynastic history (chin shih), 706
Chin dynasty (1115–1234), 628–643,
644, 818–830. See also Jurchen
chin-hsi
. See attendants, “close”
Hsia peace treaty (1124),
Chin-Hsi
634
chin-hsing
. See Venus
(r. 1213–23),
Chin Hsüan-tsung
819, 822, 829
Chin Hui, 156, 158
(r. 936–42), 179.
Chin Kao-tsu
See Shih Ching-t’ang
(Chin Kao-tsu
, r. 936–42)
(Nanking), 124, 166,
Chin-ling
167, 220. See also Chiang-ning
chin-lu chiao. See Rites of the Golden
Register
Chin-ming, 306, 307
Chin Shao-ti
(r. 942–47). See Shih
Ch’ung-kuei
chin-shih
degree and degree holders,
115, 122, 137, 161–162, 190,
238, 254, 300, 358, 586, 587,
672, 691, 695–696, 757, 765,
767, 778, 783, 803, 816, 831,
842, 844, 858, 859, 860, 864,
879, 880, 882, 883, 884, 885,
886, 888, 889, 891, 893, 897,
903, 904, 905, 911, 924, 925,
944
Chin Shih-tsung
(r. 1161–89). See
Wan-yen; Wan-yen Wu-lu
(Emperor Chin Shih-tsung
, r. 1161–89); Wu-lu
(r. 1115–23). See
Chin T’ai-tsu
A-ku-ta (Chin T’ai-tsu
,
r. 1115–23); Wan-yen A-ku-ta
(Ch’in T’ai-tsu, r. 1115–23)
(1075–1135,
Chin T’ai-tsung
r. 1123–35), 633, 675. See also
Wan-yen; Wu-chi-mai;
Wu-ch’i-mai (Chin T’ai-tsungin,
1075–1135, r. 1123–)
Chin Yüan, 903
ch’in . See parent
Ch’in , 43
Ch’in , Prince of. See Li Shou-chen
(Prince of Ch’in )
, Dowager Empress
Ch’in-ai
(huang t’ai-hou
,
r. 1032–39), 288
, 104, 123–124, 312,
Ch’in-chou
800, 828
Ch’in dynasty (221–06 bce), 134
Ch’in Erh-shih huang-ti (r. 210–207
bce), 743
Ch’in-feng, 23, 312, 314, 393, 549,
619
Ch’in Hsi (d. 1161), 690, 691, 703
Ch’in Kuei
(1090–1155, 1128–55),
26, 30, 32, 672–673, 676, 677,
679, 680, 703, 721, 786, 793
death of, 703
and the monopoly of power, 690–693
tampering with the dynastic record,
691–693
and Treaty of 1141, 711
Ch’in-ling Mountains
, 4, 10, 23
, Dowager Empress
Ch’in-sheng
, r.
(huang t’ai-hou
1045–1101), 553–554, 561,
616. See also Ch’in-sheng
Regency
and the anti-reform policies of
Hsüan-jen, 562
and the New Policies, 561
rehabilitating anti-reformists, 563
Ch’in-sheng Regency. See Dowager
Empress Ch’in-sheng
glossary–index
(Chao Huan, 1100–61,
Ch’in-tsung
r. 1126–27), 29, 615, 637, 644,
645. See also Chao Huan (Sung
Ch’in-tsung, 1100–61, r.
1126–27)
death of, in captivity, 643
stripped of imperial status, 642
used as political leverage by Chin, 687
Ch’in Tsung-ch’üan
, 43, 55, 135,
145, 146, 149, 151, 156
. See “rally on behalf of
ch’in-wang
the emperor”
, 951–69),
Ching (Liao Mu-tsung
113
Ching, Prince of, 335
Ching-ch’ao fu
. See Hsi-an
ching-ch’ao kuan
. See civil service,
senior, or the administrative
civil service division
ching-chieh fa
. See land survey
policy
, 180, 918
Ching-chou2
, 632
Ching-chou3
Ching-hsi, 307
Ching-hsia, 621
Ching Hsiang
, 56
Ching-hu circuits
North, 329
South, 328–329
(1126–27), 637
Ching-k’ang
. See Calamity of
ching-k’ang chih-nan
Ching-k’ang
ching-lüeh an-fu shih
(military
commissioner, pacification
commissioner)
ching-lüeh-ssu. See military affairs
commission
Ching-nan
, 10, 158. See also
Nan-p’ing
campaign, 50–51
, 50, 195–196
and Chu Wen
diplomatic skill in, 133
importance of, 147–148
1025
, 173
and Kao Chi-ch’ang
and Li Shou-chen
, 109
as part of Min kingdom, 220
, 14, 224
and T’ai-tsu
trade revenues of, 181
tribute relation to north, 179
Ching T’ang
(1138–1200), 778,
781, 782, 789, 807
“Ching-tung rebel” (Sung Chiang),
588
. See Imperial Seminar
ching-yen
, 91, 97–99,
Ching Yen-kuang
101, 102
Ching-yüan
, 23, 307, 312, 314
Ch’ing-ch’i county, 624, 626
, 627
Ch’ing-chou
, 300, 312, 470
Ch’ing-chou2
Ch’ing dynasty (1644–1911), 754
Ch’ing-hai (Kokonor) Lake, 252, 352
Ch’ing-i lu, 182
Ch’ing-li
era (Felicitous
Chronometry, 1041–49), 312
reform movement
Ch’ing-li
(1043–45), 22, 25, 316–334,
350
ch’ing-miao
. See Green Sprouts
. See Green
ch’ing-miao ch’ien
Sprouts cash
. See Green Sprouts
ch’ing-miao fa
rural credit act
, 26, 616, 617–619
Ch’ing-t’ang
Ch’ing-yüan
(1195–1201), 169
Chinggis khan (Temüjin, r. 1206–27),
818, 845, 853
. See auxiliaries
chiu-chin fu-pao
to the local guards
Chiu-lung River
, 173
, 145, 183,
Chiu Wu-tai shih
184
(1135–1208), 793,
Ch’iu Ch’ung
794, 805, 806
on Wu family influence in Szechwan,
798
1026
glossary–index
, 136–137, 153
Ch’iu Fu
Ch’iu Yüeh
, 865
), 141–142,
chivalry (jen-hsia
144
, 87, 632
Cho-chou
Chou , Duke of, 608
Chou-ch’en Princess
(Supreme Princess of
Chou-ch’en), 334
Chou Chih, 535, 538
Chou Hang, 334
, 201
Chou Hsing-feng
. See schools, prefectural
chou-hsüeh
Chou Huai-cheng
(?–1020),
277
Chou Kou (Prince K’ang), 643
, 729
Chou K’uei
(r. 956), 961. See
Chou Kung-ti
also Kuo Tsung-hsün
Chou-li
. See Rites of Chou
(1239–98), 810,
Chou Mi
960
, 201
Chou Pao-ch’üan
(1126–1204), 754,
Chou Pi-ta
757, 764, 766, 769, 787, 788,
790, 793
Chou Shih-tsung
(r. 954–59),
201, 202–203. See also Ch’ai
Jung; Kuo Jung
. See Kuo Wei
Chou T’ai-tsu
(Chou T’ai-tsu
, r. 951–54)
Chou Te-wei
, 61, 64
, 877, 902
Chou Tun-i
Chou Wei-te, 301
, 429
Chou Yin
Chu, Lady, 335
Chu Chen, 49
Chu Ch’ung, 604
Chu Ch’üan-chung
. See Chu Wen
(r. 907–12)
, 52
Chu Ch’üan-yü
Chu-ho-lo Kuo-le-ch’i
(d. 1219), 822–823
(1130–1200), 28, 31, 353,
Chu Hsi
455, 745, 746, 758, 769, 775,
777, 783, 784, 785, 788, 789,
790, 814, 815, 877, 899
commentaries of, 902
Chu Hsüan
, 50
chu-hu
. See household, resident
, 82
Chu Hung-chao
. See service-assistance
chu-i ch’ien
fee
, 493, 510–511,
Chu Kuang-t’ing
515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 528,
543
Chu Mien (1075–1126), 604, 605, 624,
638
Chu Ming-chih
, 451
(1082–1144), 651,
Chu Sheng-fei
673
Chu Shou-yin
, 75
(Liang T’ai-tsu
,
Chu Wen
r. 907–12), 4–5. See also Chu
; Liang
Ch’üan-chung
T’ai-tsu
and Chao-tsung
, 188
, 147–148
and Ch’eng Ju
and Ch’in Tsung-chüan, 151
and Chu Yu-jang, 148
claims to imperial authority of,
188
conquests of (by 901), 49
financial administration under, 57
and Huang Ch’ao
, 43, 206
and the Later Liang dynasty, 52–61
rise to dominance through military
expansion (c. 895–907), 45–61
and Sun Ju
, 146–147
, 168
Chu Wen-chin
(Liang Mo-ti
,
Chu Yu-chen
913–23), 61, 67
, 65
Chu Yu-ch’ien
Chu Yu-jang, 148
(r. 912–13), 61
Chu Yu-kuei
Chu Yu-wen
, 61
glossary–index
, 109, 133, 148–150, 173,
174–175, 179, 193, 195–196,
223, 224
Ch’u , King of (Ch’u wang
), 158,
197
Ch’u , Prince of, 54
Ch’u-chou
, 126, 625, 795,
933
. See Ch’u , King of
Ch’u wang
. See learning,
chuan-men hsüeh
specialist
. See
chuan yung hsiao-jen
“employing mean and petty
men”
chuan-yün shih
. See intendents,
fiscal
. See
ch’uan-fa sha-men
Propagating Abbot
chuang-t’ien
. See estates, manorial
. See stalwart
chuang-ting
. See estates, large
chuang-yüan
. See Spring and Autumn
Ch’un-ch’iu
annals
era (Pure Serenity,
Ch’un-hsi
1174–89), 712, 737–755
Chung Ch’i
, 142
Chung Chuan, 147
Chung Hsiang, 665
. See army, “loyal and
chung-i-chün
righteous”
, 636, 637, 641
Chung-shan
Ch’ung Shih-tao
, 638, 640
. See Secretariat,
Chung-shu ling
Director of
. See
Chung-shu men-hsia
Secretariat-Chancellery
Chung-shu sheng
. See Secretariat
, 818, 819
Chung-tu
, army , 157, 158
Chung-wu
. See Central Plains
chung-yüan
, 815, 902
Chung-yung
. See Hall for
Ch’ung-cheng Hall
the Veneration of Governance
Ch’u
1027
. See Hall for the
Ch’ung-cheng tien
Veneration of Governance
Ch’ung-ch’ing, 954
Ch’ung-hua Palace, 754, 757, 761, 767,
785
chung-i-chün
. See army, loyal and
righteous
Ch’ung-hui
, 78
era (Revering the
Ch’ung-ning
Hsi-ning era, 1102–07), 554,
569
, 23, 354, 469, 470,
Ch’ung O
473–476
ch’ung-san tie-ssu
. See offices,
redundant
Ch’ung-tsung, Emperor (Wei-ming
Ch’ien-shun), 619, 620
. See
ch’ung-wen ch’ing-wu
emphasizing the civil and
de-emphasizing the military
chü . See purchase station
. See fiscalism
chü-lien
. See Poorhouse policy
chü-yang fa
, 625, 949
Ch’ü-chou
, 927
Ch’ü-fu
Ch’ü-pu-fan
, 329
, 659, 660
Ch’ü Tuan
Ch’üan, Dowager Empress (huang
), 945. See also
t’ai-hou
Ch’üan, Empress
Ch’üan, Empress (1241–1309), 928,
929. See also Ch’üan, Dowager
Empress (huang t’ai-hou
)
, 133, 151–152, 163,
Ch’üan-chou
168, 169, 177, 184–185, 950
Ch’üan-chou2
, 940
Ch’üan Han-sheng, 908
Ch’üan Sung wen, xi
, 860, 861, 864
Ch’üan Tzu-ts’ai
. See Trade Monopoly
Chüeh-i yüan
Office
Ch’üeh-huo wu. See Bureau of Monopoly
Goods
1028
glossary–index
. See militia, officials
chün-chiang
chün-shu fa
. See tribute, “equalized
tribute measure”; Tribute
Transport and Distribution
measure
, 250
Chün-tzu Pass
circuit, regional (lu), 231–233, 748. See
also specific circuit
cities, frontier, 20. See also border
civil councilor, assistant (chih-cheng
),
368
civil service, 35, 237–241. See also
bureaucracy; military families,
hereditary
administrative level (ching-ch’ao kuan
), 349, 460, 461
examinations, 324, 787
,
abolished by Ts’ai Ching
585
consequences of, 22
and Hsü Wen
, 161
, 121
and Kuo Jung
in the Later Chou, 236
, 200
and Li Ching
reform of, proposed by Fan
Chung-yen
and Fu Pi
, 318–319
replaced by state educational
system, 571
restoration of, under Kao-tsung
, 660
in the Sung dynasty, 295
and T’ai-tsu, 13, 237–238
and T’ai-tsung
, 246, 254
, 364
and Wang An-shih
and Wu-Yüeh
, 190
and Ying-tsung, 345, 346
), 349,
executory level (hsüan-jen
460, 461
military servitors, 460
titular offices in, 458
clansmen, imperial, 296, 776, 781
Clark, Hugh R., 5, 10
Classics Mat, 126, 377
clerics (li2), 241
clinics, charitable, 596
clique (ssu tang), 258, 261, 451. See also
factionalism
cloth, 223
coinage. See currency, coinage
comet, 579, 580, 581. See also portents,
cosmological
command, garrison (tu-t’ung ssu), 29
commandant (liu-hou), 146, 147
supreme (k’ai-fu i-t’ung san-ssu
), 782
commander
district (tu-chien
), 301
), 305, 312
military ( pu-shu
), 302
zone (ch’ien-hsia
), 667,
Commander-in-chief (Tu-tu
669
Commander of the Eight Encampments
of Infantry and Cavalry, 145
Commander of the Palace Army, 11
commission, functional (ch’ai-ch’ien) or
office (chih), 458
Commission for State Revenue, 70
commissioner, 68–69
for the consideration of benefit and
harm (hsiang-tuli-hai kuan),
379
defense, grand (shou-yü shih
),
646
). See
finance (san-ssu shih
Finance Commission
investigative (ch’a-fang shih
),
382
military (chieh-tu-shih), 669
palace, 56, 92, 97
regional (chieh-tu shih
), 230,
233, 782
regional surveillance (kuan-ch’a shih
), 782
),
surveillance (kuan-ch’a shih
150, 321
of waterways and agriculture (tu-shih
ying-t’ien shih),
glossary–index
Commissioner for State Revenue
(tsu-yung shih
), 69, 76
Commissioner of Military Affairs, 666,
671
Commissioner of the Imperial
Encampment (yü-ying shih
), 648, 653, 666
commodities. See specific commodity
community defense system. See mutual
)
security system (pao-chia
Compendium of rituals and paraphernalia
of the Dowager Empress
(Huang-t’ai-hou i-chih
), 288
Compendium of the institutions of the
), 256
dynasty (hui-yao
Comprehensive mirror to aid in government
,
(Tzu-chih t’ung-chien
1067–84), 80, 158, 182, 256,
487, 900
conciliation (t’iao-t’ing), 526, 527
Confucian
Classics, 237
ideals, 873
values. See affection, fraternal; duty,
filial; virtue
Confucianism (Ju-hsüeh
), 783, 787.
See also Neo-Confucianism;
Tao-hsüeh
conscripts, 223, 333, 400, 475, 605,
866, 911
bowmen (kung-shou
), 407
labor, 743
military, 743
conservatives, 487–514. See also
memorials; Shen-tsung (Chao
Hsü
, 1048–85, r.
1067–85); Ssu-ma Kuang
(1019–86); Wu Ch’ung
Conspectus of border region defense
preparedness (Pei-pien yao-lan
), 307
constellation (chen). See portents,
cosmological
1029
),
controller-general (t’ung-p’an
231
Controller of National Finance (chih
kuo-yung shih
), 722
conventionalists (liu-su ch’un-tang
), 365, 371
conventionality, slavish (yin-hsün mo-su
chih-pi
), 362
copper, 122, 223, 225, 441,
608
coral, 186
corruption, 113, 116, 121, 208, 245,
588, 590, 591, 592, 598, 599,
600, 910
corvée labor
amnesty from, under T’ai-tsu, 228
demands for
, 121
under Kuo Jung
under Liu Ch’ung
, 113
and fiscal intendants, 232
, 318
and Han Ch’i
, 283
and Hua-chou2
and Jen-tsung, 291
and prefectural armies, 235
cosmology, correlative, 608, 609. See also
portents, cosmological
cotton, 684
), 21, 25,
Council of State (tu-t’ang
368–373, 513
Councilor of State
Assistant (ts’an-chih cheng-shih
), 246, 281
Chief (ch’eng-hsiang; tsai-hsiang), 26,
236, 237, 368, 462, 725
de facto, 462
counterfeiting, 327
county (hsien), 230. See specific county
coup, xi fn1
court (ch’ao-t’ing)
inner (nei), 887
), 188
outlaw (wei-t’ing
Court calendar (chü-ch’i lu), 339
Court Diary of Activity and Repose
(Ch’i-chü chu), 691
1030
glossary–index
), 713
Court Mentor (shao-fu
Court of Agricultural Supervision
(Ssu-nung ssu
), 381–382,
393, 401, 409, 413, 434, 460,
463
Court of Judicial Review (Ta-li ssu
), 456
Court of Palace Attendants (Hsüan-hui
), 56–57
yüan
Court of State Ceremonial (Hung-lu ssu
), 269
Court of the Imperial Clan (Tsung-cheng
ssu), 297
Court of the Imperial Treasury (T’ai-fu
ssu), 405
courtier. See specific actor
cowhides, 117
credit. See debt
criminals. See bandits
critics, policy (chien-kuan), 21, 288.
See also memorials; remonstrance
crop failures, 879
crossbow, 413
cult. See specific cult
cultivation, ritual grain-, 729
culture, refinements of (wen), 513, 556
currency, 186, 388. See also money;
taxation, taxes
coinage, 92, 127, 130, 177, 208,
224–229, 684
copper, 187, 327, 441, 749, 908
iron, 187, 202, 312, 327
iron and tin, 77
lead, 187
of lead and iron, 181
tin, 187
hui-tzu (paper currency), 749
paper money, 327, 748–749,
908–909
Sung new issue, 909
“current funds” (hsien-tsai), 426
Daily Calendar (jih-li), 691
daughters, imperial (huang-nü), 258
Davis, Richard L., 31, 32, 33, 34, 36
death sentence, 543
debate, suppression of, 1070s–1207, 32
debt, 395, 416, 431
“deceased father,” imperial (huang-k’ao),
342
“deceased imperial paternal uncle”
(huang-po), 342
decrees, imperial (yü-pi), 285, 723
defection. See individual actors
defendants (yü-hou), 398
defense, local
community arms (or mutual
security) system of (pao chia),
218
training command system
(chih-chiang fa) of, 218
deferrals, payment (i-ko), 416
demotion. See specific actor
Department of Ministries
Left and Right Councilors (tso-yu
ch’eng-hsiang) of the, 725
Left and Right Executives (shang-shu
tso-yu p’u-yeh) of the, 725
Department of State Affairs (Shang-shu
sheng), 65, 462, 652
Assistant Director of the Left
(shang-shu tso-ch’eng), 481, 491
Assistant Director of the Right,
553
assisting civil councilor (ts’an-chih
) of the,
cheng-shih
463
chief councilor of the left,
vice-director of (Shang-shu
tso-p’u-yeh t’ung chung-shu
men-hsia p’ing-chang-shih), 652
chief councilor of the right,
vice-director of (Shang-shu
yu-p’u-yeh t’ung chung-shu
men-hsia p’ing-chang-shih), 652
Director of, 59, 65
glossary–index
Left Co-director of (shang-shu tso
p’u-yeh) of the, 463
Right Co-director (yu p’u-yeh) of the,
463
detached service (shang-fan), 410–412
Di Cosmo, Nicola, 15–16, 17, 33
dikes (yen), 862. See also irrigation;
specific location; water
conservancy networks;
waterways
diplomacy. See specific actor
directives, council (t’ang-t’ien), 246
Directorate of Armaments, 471,
472
Directorate of Education (Kuo-tzu chien),
364, 588, 924
Directorate of Waterways (tu-shui chien),
393
Disasters, natural, 39, 820, 830, 844,
874, 881, 902
and economic stability, 830
under Li-tsung, 906–907
“discourteous wrangling,” 277
disease. See epidemics
distribution, 171
Divine Empyrean (Shen-hsiao). See
Taoism, Divine Empyrean sect of
“Divine Protector” (hu-fa shan-shen
, Tseng Pu
), 450
division (fang), 382
divorce, 292. See also specific actors
documents (shu), 41
“Documents from Heaven,” 270–273
Dowager Consort (huang t’ai-fei),
280
Dowager Empress (huang t’ai-hou
), 280. See also specific actors
drafted service policy or system
(ch’ai-i fa), 397, 500, 544, 545,
592
drill measure (t’uan chiao-fa), team, 413,
495
drill “teams” (t’uan), 413
1031
drought, 84, 100, 118, 174, 291, 325,
447, 452, 470, 818, 830, 868,
872, 906
drugs, 684. See also medicinals; medicine
dual administration empires, 16
dual appointments, 458–459
Duke of State (kuo-kung), 708
Duong Dinh Nghe, 170–171
duty, filial, 340–343, 764
dynasty-building, 711
founding (ch’uang-yeh), 711
preserving (shou-ch’eng), 711
reviving (chung-hsing), 711
Earth Deity, 271
earthquakes, 298, 325, 844, 907
Eastern Capital, 52
Eastern Han dynasty (25–220), 648
eclipse, solar. See portents, cosmological
economy. See specific actor measure, actor,
event, reform
edicts. See specific edict
imperial, 780
education
reform, 318–319
,
by Sung Jen-tsung
294–296
, 585, 586–587,
by Ts’ai Ching
589
state support for, 694–695
Eight Battalions of Hang-chou
(Hang-chou pa-tu
), 140,
142
) policy,
Eight Conduct (pa-hsing
580, 587, 611
eight punishments (pa-hsing2
),
587
Eight Tombs, 861
“eight treasures” or “eight imperial
), 697
seals” (pa-pao
), 397, 407, 427
elder (ch’i-chang
elder/stalwart township plan (ti-fen
ch’i-chuang lin-li), local, 408
1032
glossary–index
elephant, war, 227
elite
literocentric political, 13–14, 37
and court factionalism, 575
exam-based, 14
and separation from the state,
35–36
scholarly (shih-ta-fu
), 13, 21,
28, 253, 256, 350, 360, 419,
450, 458, 729
emissary. See specific actor
emoluments. See specific emolument
emperor (huang, huang-ti), 143,
342
Emperor Emeritus (t’ai-shang huang-ti
), 637
emphasizing the civil and
de-emphasizing the military
(ch’ung-wen ch’ing-wu
),
12
“employing mean and petty men” (chuan
), 376
yung hsiao-jen
empress (hou), 342
, (benevolenced promotion),
en-shih
412
Encyclopedia of the Yung-lo
era
, 1408),
(Yung-lo ta-tien
255
), 389–393,
“engrossers” (chien-ping
396, 397, 401, 406, 417, 419,
442, 496, 590, 703
anti-, 404–406
early Southern Sung, 700
government acting like, 443
Shao-sheng restraint of, 547
“smashing the” (ts’ui chien-ping
), 392
and state trade act, 444
“enriching the nation and strengthening
its military power” (fu-kuo
ch’iang-ping), 384
envoy, 763. See specific actor
epidemics, 316, 907, 951
equilibrium, geopolitical, in the post
era (1005–67),
Shan-yüan
20–24
), 875
“era of change” (keng-hua
. See Two Administrations
erh-fu
erudite literatus (po-hsüeh hung-tz’u
), 757, 816, 924
Essential regulations of the Sung (Sung
), 414, 557, 558
hui-yao
Essentials of the military classics (Wu-ching
), 307
tsung-yao
Establishing Centrality and Balancing
the State era (1101–02,
Chien-chung ching-kuo
),
554, 566, 567
estates
), 191
large (chuang-yüan
large, owned by temples, 700
manorial (chuang-t’ien
), 121, 326
ethnic group. See specific ethnic group
eunuchs
as army supervisors, 72, 76, 307, 473
and the Capital Security Office
), 234
(Huang-ch’eng ssu
, 48, 56
under Chu Wen
and consorts, 772
controlling agencies, 591
and Dowager Empress Liu, 282
end of domination of inner court by,
639
, 944
after fall of Lin-an
and Jen-tsung, 290, 313
and Kuang-tsung
, 760
, 71
and Kuo Ch’ung-t’ao
in the Later Liang, 69
under Li Mao-chen
, 42
, 70
and Li Ts’un-hsü
and Li-tsung, 887–888
under Liu Ch’ang, 227
prohibition against, meddling in
court affairs, 652
residing in inner palace, 56
, 33
after Shih Mi-yüan
glossary–index
, 47
and Ts’ui Yin
and Wu-yü
, 105
evaluation, reports, annual, 748
Ever-normal Graneries (ch’ang-p’ing
), 380, 396, 418,
ts’ang
426
restoration of, 579
Ever-normal State Trade Agency
(Ch’ang-p’ing shih-i ssu
), 405
Ever Victorious Army (Wen-sheng chün),
309
examination
metropolitan, 238
palace, 238
preliminary, 238
examiner, chief (tu chien-cheng
),
382
exchange
“provisioning” (ju-chung) method of
grain, 284
ratios of (ch’ing-chung
), 390
execution, 67, 83, 102, 107, 108, 110,
111, 926
)
exile. See banishment (an-chih
expansionism
between 951–54, 112–119
between 954–58, 119–132
10th century, in the north, 4–10
Extensive records of the T’ai-p’ing hsing-kuo
era (T’ai-p’ing kuang-chi
), 175, 185, 255
),
Fabrication Bureaus (Tsao-tso chü
603
factionalism, 543, 747, 770, 783. See
also factions (p’eng-tang
)
and Che-tsung, 26–27
and the conservative coalition, 574
,
détente, under Liu Chih
526–529
and elite orientation, 575
and “factional treachery,” 528, 537
1033
, 297
and Fan Chung-yen
and Hsia Sung
, 321–323
, 721
and Hsiao-tsung
of the Hsüan-jen regency, 530
in the late eleventh century, 35
era, 510–511,
Lo, in Yüan-yu
518–521
after Shan-yüan
, 21
and Shen-tsung, 28, 365
era, 510,
Shu , in Yüan-yu
511, 518–521
era, 510
Shuo, in Yüan-yu
, 554
and Tseng Pu
and Wang An-shih
, 376
and Ying-tsung, 324, 340, 351
era (1086–93),
Yüan-yu
509–514
), 297, 299, 512,
factions (p’eng-tang
680. See also factionalism
Lo, 509–514, 518–521
reform, 485
Shu , 509–514, 516, 518
Shuo, 509–514, 516
Szechwanese, 520
, 552–553, 573, 578,
Yüan-yu
582
“factions (tang) and cliques (p’eng-tang
)”, 511–512
families of great officials (i-kuan chih
), 162
tsu
famine, 99, 100, 299, 307, 308, 316,
324, 325, 452, 818, 855, 881,
907. See also cannibalism
cash (ch’ien-huang
), 441, 442
, 341, 373, 387
Fan Chen
Fan-ch’eng
, 922–923
(1126–93), 728,
Fan Ch’eng-ta
735
, 115
Fan Chih
Fan Ch’iung, 663
(1027–1101), 479,
Fan Ch’un-jen
491, 493, 512, 523, 524–525,
529, 536, 563
1034
glossary–index
(cont.)
Fan Ch’un-jen
banishment of, 543
and Dowager Empress Ch’in-sheng
, 563
on drafted service, 503
on hired service, 545
pleading clemency for anti-reform
coalition, 539
rehabilitated by Tseng Pu
, 554
and Ying-tsung, 341–342
, 883, 884
Fan Chung
(989–1052), 23,
Fan Chung-yen
205, 316, 505, 563
on adult male salt cash, 194
on agriculture, 174
and the Ch’ing-li
reforms
(1043–45), 317–318, 321, 350
on compulsory drill, 445
and Jen-tsung, 290, 291, 292, 299,
306, 308, 309, 314
and Li Yüan-hao
, 311, 312
, 297–298
and Lü I-chien
memorials, 287
and prefecture schools, 318
and Shih Chieh, 321
on the Treaty of Shan-yüan
, 267
and tribute grain, 320–323
, 292
Fan Feng
, 665
Fan Ju-wei
. See army of frontier tribal
fan-ping
troops
Fan T’ang (1097–1134), 671
Fan Tsu-yü
, 491, 492, 493, 512,
523, 530, 536, 539, 542, 575
banishment of, 543
on reformists, 532
Fan Tsung-yin
(1098–1136),
653, 664, 667, 669, 672,
673
, 922, 931, 942
Fan Wen-hu
, 89, 90–92
Fan Yen-kuang
, 286, 290, 303, 306
Fan Yung
fang. See division (fang); offices, staff
fang2. See ward
. See headman,
fang-cheng
neighborhood
Fang Hsin-ju
(1177–1222),
806
Fang La, rebellions (1120), 605, 615,
622–626, 636
Fang-shan Plain
, 800
Fang-shan yüan, 660
. See occult master
fang-shih
. See survey, square-fields
fang-t’ien
land
. See Land
fang-t’ien chün-shui fa
Survey and Equitable Tax policy
farmer-soldiers (fu-ping
), 318
farmers, 124. See also agriculture; mutual
);
security system (pao-chia
schools, land for
farming. See agriculture
favorites
Ming-chou
, 875–886
palace, 31, 33, 72, 744–746, 769,
788, 888
Felicitous Chronometry. See Ch’ing-li
era
“felonious ministers,” 557. See also Six
Felons (liu tsei
)
, 281, 282
Feng Cheng
(d. 1152), 679
Feng Chi
, 373, 377, 430
Feng Ching
(Liang-ch’uan), 124,
Feng-chou
660, 853
Feng-chou2
, 153, 154, 332
. See Sealed
Feng-chuang k’u
Treasury (Storehouse for the
Reserves of the State Treasury)
Feng Chüan
, 161–162
, 48, 53, 54, 107, 108,
Feng-hsiang
800, 852
by 895, 42
, 55
Feng Hsing-hsi
feng-shan. See sacrifices
, 161
Feng Su
Feng Tao
, 61, 77, 83–86, 92, 97,
99, 115
glossary–index
, 291
Feng-tz’u Temple
Feng Yü
, 100
(975–1037), 282
Feng Yüan
), government,
ferry crossings (ho-tu
398, 423
), 684
fiefdom, insignificant (pi-i
“Filial Ancestor” (Hsiao-tsung
),
754
filial piety, 291, 336
finance. See also Finance Commission
); Finance Planning
(San-ssu
Commission (Chih-chih san-ssu
); Wang
t’iaoli ssu
An-shih
(1021–86)
men skilled at (shan li-ts’ai che
), 25, 77, 389
), 388
finance, public (chih-ts’ai
), 21,
Finance Commission (San-ssu
77, 239, 241, 261, 274, 457,
463
Finance Planning Commission
(Chih-chih san-ssu t’iaoli ssu),
369, 378–381, 390, 392, 393,
397, 400, 459, 464, 589
and Court of Agricultural
Supervision, 401
Finest blossoms from the garden of elegant
writing (Wen-yüan ying-hua
), 255
fires, 831, 844, 906
), 419
fiscalism (chü-lien
fish, 225
“Fish-head Minister.” See Lu Tsung-tao
(966–1029)
five circles of mourning (wu-fu),
600–602
“Five Devils,” 272, 274
Five Dynasties (907–60), 1, 4, 5, 206,
213
Flessel, Klaus, 326
flogging, 790, 792, 810
flooding, 99, 100, 118, 173, 174, 226,
283, 325, 326, 830, 844, 879,
906
1035
“flower and rock network” (hua-shih
), 604–606, 622,
wang
625, 626, 636
forbidden books. See censorship
foreclosures. See credit, rural; debt;
Green Sprouts; loans, forced
(i-p’ei
)
foreign policy and foreign relations.
See specific actor, issue, or
location
Former Shu dynasty (907–33), 10, 53,
54, 55, 134, 155–158, 160,
163–167
fort. See specific location
fortifications, defensive, 121. See also
specific location
foundation, dynastic, 57
Four Books, 815
Four Circuit Supervisorates, 231
four garrisons (of the early Southern
Sung), 669
Four great compendia of the Sung dynasty
),
(Sung ssu ta shu
254
“four great generals,” 29
“four perils,” 500
franchise, 400
Franke, Herbert, 891, 896
frankincense, 184, 186
frontier. See also border
northern, 253
region, in ninth century north China,
41
southern, 328–334
frugality. See specific actor
fruit, 182, 431
Fu-ch’a-chen
, 795
. See prosperous and
fu-ch’iang
strong
Fu-chien, xi, 955
in the Ch’ing-li period, 328
controlled by the Min kingdom,
133
, 150–152
and Huang Ch’ao
1036
glossary–index
Fu-chien (cont.)
and Li Ching
, 200
after the Min kingdom collapse, 163,
168–170
on an overland trade route, 182
population movement to, 134
population of (978), 135
as a Shu state, 196
tea growing in, 175
and the Wang family, 190
water projects in, 173
, 10, 138, 151–152, 168,
Fu-chou
177, 184, 950
Fu-chou2
, 120, 122, 300, 309
, 180, 928
Fu-chou3
, 55, 954
Fu-chou4
, 358
Fu-chou5
. See service, labor
fu-i
fu-jen
. See specific consort
. See rich men and
fu-jen ta-hsing
great families
. See enriching
fu-kuo ch’iang-ping
the nation and strengthening
its military power
, 717, 754, 755
Fu-li
Fu Liang, 648
fu pao-cheng
(assistant pao-chia
leader), 408
(1004–83)
Fu Pi
reforms
and the Ch’ing-li
(1043–45), 316, 317–318, 321
and Han Ch’i
, 339–340
, 310–311
and Hsiao T’e-mo
after Jen-tsung, 337
and Jen-tsung, 291, 350
and the reorganzation of military
affairs reform, 313
and Shen-tsung, 353, 356, 465
and Shih Chieh
, 321–323
, 368, 369,
and Wang An-shih
373, 378
. See farmer-soldiers
fu-ping
Fu-t’u
, 548
Fu Yao-yü, 341–343, 515, 517–518
Fu-yen, 23, 307, 312, 314, 551
Fukien modern province, xi, 5, 133
funeral. See specific actor
gardens, pleasure, 604
garrison. See specific location
Gate of Rectified Ritual, 576
general. See specific actor
General Sales and General Purchase
Markets (Tsa-mai ch’ang,
Tsa-mai wu), 430
gentleman (lang), 460
), 514
true (chün-tzu
gift, annual, 314
ginseng, 684
Glorifying the tradition of Yao (kuang
Yao), 709
“gods of soil and grain” (she-chi
),
942
gold, 87, 280
Gong Wei Ai, 31
governance, good, 121
), 724
“the way of” (chih-tao
governors. See also specific actors
civil (kuan-ch’a shih
), 40
), 110
guard (ya-chün
), 667
military (chieh-tu shih
after the An Lu-shan
rebellions, 39
appointed initially by their armies,
207
as honorifics, 303
and Kao-tsung
, 29
after the Khitan invasion, 215
under Kuo Wei
, 115
and the Metropolitan Command,
217
in north China, 40
provincial, 109
regional, 229
replaced by fiscal intendants, 232
separatist regional, 206–207
glossary–index
, 12–13,
and T’ai-tsu
216–217, 229–230, 233, 241
and T’ai-tsung
, 246
T’ang , 4–5, 13, 39–41
grace, special, 318, 325
grain, 43, 57, 118, 222, 223, 252, 284,
302, 325, 326, 334
direct networking (chih-ta wang
) transport system, 593
and the Huai-nan campaign,
granary, 222, 326, 881
prefectural, 126
state, 92
Granary System (ts’ang-fa), 383
Grand Canal, 178, 222
), 460
grandee (ta-fu
grave. See specific actor or location
Great Centrality and Auspicious
Talisman (Ta-chung hsiang-fu
, 1008–17), 271
Great Emperor of Everlasting Life
(Ch’ang-sheng ta-ti), 612
Great Heavenly Sage and King of Ch’u,
665
Great Hsia empire, 21
Great Liao (Ta Liao), 343
Great Yen dynasty, 60
Great Yin, 168
, 23
Greater Shan-hsi circuit
Green Sprouts. See also rural credit
)
(ch’ing-miao
cash (ch’ing-miao ch’ien
), 395
disruptive effect of, 436
policy (ch’ing-miao ch’ing-miao fa),
414–418
revival under the Shao-sheng
,
546
),
rural credit act (ch’ing-miao fa
370, 371–372, 374, 379,
394–397, 400, 441–442, 449,
468, 471, 491, 504–505
guard
), 408
large (ta-pao
1037
large guard chiefs (ta-pao-chang
), 408, 410, 413, 428
personal. See retainers, personal
). See also
military (pu-ch’ü
bodyguard
),
guardsmen, stalwart (chuang-ting
397
guardsmen (pao-ting
), 408
guardsmen, property-owning (chu-hu
), 410
guild-exemption fee (mien-hang ch’ien
), 430, 443, 449
,
revival of, under the Shao-sheng
547
Güyük
(r. 1246–48), 868
, 627, 713, 714, 718
Hai-chou
, Prince (r. 1150–61), 31,
Hai-ling
709. See also Wan-yen Liang
and battle of Ts’ai-shih, 706
1161 war of, 32
. See ships,
hai-po hsiang-yao
overseas trade
Hall for the Veneration of Governance
(Ch’ung-cheng tien
), 56,
68, 377
Hall of Enlightenment (Ming-t’ang
), 609, 696
rituals, 874, 916
Halls of Extended Clanship (Tun-tsung
yüan), 601–602
Han , Empress (d. 1200), 779, 783,
809
Han , Lady, 773
Han Chao-yin
, 84
, 493
Han Chen
, 934, 935
Han Chen2
, 762, 764
Han Ch’eng
(1008–75), 23, 323, 345,
Han Ch’i
353, 564, 762, 805
and annual tribute, 344–346
and Chao Tsung-chih, 337–339
1038
glossary–index
(cont.)
Han Ch’i
and the Ch’ing-li
reforms
(1043–45), 316, 317–318,
321
denouncing the Green Sprouts policy,
370
on the “engrossers,” 417–418
and government usury, 414
and Jen-tsung, 299, 307, 350
, 315
and Li Yüan-hao
, 299
and Lü I-chien
and Shan-hsi, 311–312
and Shen-tsung, 353, 357, 361
and Shih Chieh
, 321
, 298
and Ts’ai Hsiang
, 308
and Wei-chou4
and Ying-tsung, 323, 341
(1012–88), 372, 373,
Han Chiang
374, 375, 378–379, 386, 399,
450, 453, 469–470
Han Chien
, 47
Han Chinese, 5, 823
(1038–1109),
Han Chung-yen
554, 563–564, 569, 570
(960–1001),
Han Ch’ung-yeh
217
Han Ch’ung-yün
(?–974),
217
. See Liu
Han Hsiao-ho-ti
(Han
Ch’eng-chün
, 955–68)
Hsiao-ho-ti
Han I
, 299
(r. 947–48). See Liu
Han Kao-tsu
Chih-yüan
Han-k’ou
, 928
Han Kuang-wu-ti
(r. 25–57),
647, 689
Han Kung , 811
Han-lin
Academedian (Han-lin hsüeh-shih
), 340, 341, 343, 371,
515, 527, 669, 757
Academy, 361, 520
. See Han-lin
Han-lin hsüeh-shih
Academedian
Han Ling-k’un
(923–68), 214,
216
, 4, 10, 29, 33, 922–923,
Han River
928
Han Shih-chung
(1089–1151),
651, 654, 659, 665, 666, 669,
671, 675, 679, 682–684, 686
(r. 951–95). See Liu
Han Shih-tsu
Ch’ung
Han Shih-tsung, 678
(1152–1207,
Han T’o-chou
1194–1207), 26, 31–32,
762–764, 772, 773, 776–777,
778, 793, 844, 897, 905
as antithesis of Sung civil servant
ideal, 783
assassination of, 808–810, 836
Chin demand for the head of, 806,
811–812
and foreign policy, 790–795
Han T’ung
(?–960), 211, 212
(1017–98), 355, 361,
Han Wei
365, 424, 448, 449, 493, 520
and Shen-tsung, 454
Han Wen-ti, 690
Han Wo
, 162
(r. 141–87 bce), 731,
Han Wu-ti
740
, 928. See also Wu-han
Han-yang
Han Yin-ti
(r. 948–50). See Liu
Ch’eng-yu
Han Yüan-ching
, 805
handicraft, 174. See also specific craft
Hang-chou
, 28, 29, 140, 142, 173,
182, 625, 654, 696. See also
Lin-an
Hang-chou pa-tu
. See Eight
Battalions of Hang-chou
, 870, 895–896,
Hao Ching
926–927, 939
glossary–index
, 126, 146, 813
Hao-chou
Hao Ch’u-chün
, 522–523
, 308–309, 420,
Hao-shui-ch’uan
550
) levy, 893,
Harmonious Grain (ho-ti
895
Hartwell, Robert M., 33, 35,
589
headman, neighborhood (fang-cheng
), 427
Heavenly Texts, 271, 273, 275, 277,
279
heaven’s mandate. See Mandate of
Heaven
heir and heir apparent (t’ai-tzu
),
279, 336, 338, 753–754, 760,
767, 771, 811, 834, 835, 836,
915. See also adoption; “sons,”
imperial (huang-tzu
)
, 331
Heng-chou2
, 475, 620
Heng-shan
, 331
Heng-shan Fort
hides, 684
Highest Purity sect (Shang-ch’ing), 610,
611
Hino Kaisaburō, 178, 187
hired service (service exemption, mu-i
fu), 419–429, 437, 500–504
). See service-exemption
fees (mu-i
fees (mein-i ch’ien)
), 591–593. See also
policy (mu-i
service-exemption policy (mien-i
fa
)
revived, 544–546
historian. See specific actor
histories (shih), 41
dynastic, 41, 793
private writing of, 692
Historiography Institute (kuo-shih kuan
), 254, 276, 538
(946–1006),
Ho Ch’eng-chü
263
Ho-chi chü
. See Public Pharmacies
1039
, 637, 641
Ho-chien
Ho Chih-chung, 582
Ho-chou
, xi
, xi
Ho-chou2
, 706
Ho-chou3
, 869–870, 918, 920,
Ho-chou4
954
Ho-chung
, 47, 61, 65, 108
, 677
Ho Hsien
Ho-huang, 23
Ho-pei
) in,
drill and review (chiao-yüeh
412
emergency spending in, during Liao
threat, 311
independent governors of, 39, 43–44,
59
invaded by the Liao army, 262
Investigation Commissioner, 60
and Kuo Jung
, 122
land tax remission in, 250
, 70
and Li Ts’un-hsü
and Liao cavalry, 222, 249
, 220
and Liao Mu-tsung
redistributive reform in, 393
in the second Sung-Chin war, 642,
643
service-exemption policy in,
Sung concern with, 315
Sung defense of, 309–310
Ho-shan yüan, 660
Ho-shang Plain (Ho-shang yüan), 795,
800
Ho-she-li Chih-chung
(d. 1213), 795, 819
Ho-shih-lieh Chih-ning
, 716,
717, 718
, 766, 778
Ho Tan
, 62
Ho Te-lun
. See Harmonious Grain levy
ho-ti
. See ferry crossings,
ho-tu
government
Ho-t’u
. See Yellow River chart
1040
glossary–index
Ho-tung
army defeated by Later Liang, 59
, 48, 51, 53
and Chu Wen
) in,
drill and review (chiao-yüeh
412
, 61
and Feng Tao
fortified, 551
and Han Ch’i
, 307
independent governors of, 44
, 53–54
and Li K’o-ning
, 39
and Li K’o-yung
, 109
and Li Shou-chen
, 58, 70
and Li Ts’un-hsü
and Liu Chih-yüan
, 104
, 112–114
and Liu Ch’ung
, 47
and Liu Jen-kung
, 60
and Liu Shou-kuang
North, 818
plundered by A-pao-chi
, 64
recovered, 551
redistributive reform in, 393
in the second Sung-Chin war, 640,
642
strategic importance of, 42–43
Sung concern with, 315
Ho-tung circuit
, 11, 14
holiday, national, 282
, 34, 42, 43, 46, 47, 60, 63,
Honan
66
, 48, 284
Hopei
horses and horsemen, 77, 95, 221, 251,
252, 253, 351, 471, 684, 792,
862, 864, 928. See also cavalry
household (hu-ma
), 471
land in return for (chi-t’ien
mu-ma
), 471
, 471
pao-chia
(mutual security horse
pao-ma
pasturage), 471, 494
procuring, 27
hospital network, state-funded, 597
hostages. See specific actor
Hostel for Imperial Clansmen (Mu-ch’in
), 296
chai
hou (empress). See specific actor
, 393
Hou Shu-hsien
household, 227, 232, 409
),
on duty (ying-tang men-hu
437
grading system, 402, 416, 419–421,
500, 544–545, 546. See also
service-exemption fees (mein-i
ch’ien)
self-registration (shou-shih
), 452
fa
), 394
guest (k’o-hu
), 501
lower-grade (hsia-hu
regulations (chia-fa), 461
resident (chu-hu
), 394
tenant (tien-hu), 191, 192
), 501
upper-grade (shang-hu
, 47, 551. See also
Hsi-an
Ching-ch’ao fu
Hsi-ch’eng so
. See Western Wall
Bureau
(net returns), 433
hsi-ch’ien
, 818
Hsi-ching
(Hui-chou
), 61,
Hsi-chou
625
Hsi-ho
, 23, 468, 549
, 795, 853. See also
Hsi-ho-chou
Min-chou
, 4, 16, 17, 22, 27, 33,
Hsi Hsia
206, 251–254, 268, 272, 352,
354–355, 818
Duke of, 251
Hui-tsung’s campaigns against,
614
rapproachment with, 505–508
Shao-sheng
offensives against,
548–551
1081–83 war with, 505
war with, 300–316, 348
, Tsinghai province, 26,
Hsi-ning2
466
Hsi-p’ing, Prince of, 251
(r. 1135–49), 677, 682,
Hsi-tsung
688, 704
glossary–index
Hsia
Emperor of the Great (Ta Hsia
huang-ti
), 302
King of, 251
, 808, 836, 922
Hsia Chen
, 251, 473
Hsia-chou
rebellion at (910), 54
Hsia-hsi-chou
, 329
(r. 1068–86). See
Hsia Hui-tsung
Wei-ming Ping-ch’ang
Hsia Shih-lin
, 940
(985–1051), 282, 285,
Hsia Sung
290, 303, 321
hsiang. See canton
Hsiang-chou
, 54, 95, 180, 268, 298
, 104–105
Hsiang-chou2
. See army, prefectual
hsiang-chün
troops
hsiang-hu ya-ch’ien
. See supply
master posts
, 346
Hsiang Min-chung
. See militia, local
hsiang-ping
, 5, 178
Hsiang River
, on an overland trade
Hsiang-shan
route, 182
hsiang shu-shou
. See canton scribe
, 674, 795, 827, 865,
Hsiang-yang
866, 918, 920, 921, 922–923,
927, 928
Hsiao, Dowager Empress (huang t’ai-hou
), 249, 262–266, 270
Hsiao-ching
. See Book of filial piety
, 103, 105
Hsiao Han
. See names, small
hsiao-hsing
(?-1004), 266. See
Hsiao T’a-lan
also Hsiao, Dowager Empress
Hsiao T’e-mo
, 310
(Chao Shen, 1127–94,
Hsiao-tsung
r. 1162–89), 31, 708, 913. See
also Chao Po-ts’ung; Chao Shen
, 1127–94,
(Hsiao-tsung
r. 1162–69); Chao Yüan-fen
abdication of, 737
accomplishments of, 710, 754–755
1041
administrative and financial control
of, 747
ambition to secure former territory,
736
crisis over burial site for, 775–776
and defensive foreign policy, 732–737
devotion to his father, 752
on,
effect of death of Kao-tsung
756
1163 campaign of, 32
favorites of, 726–728
financial administration of, 728–731,
748–752
and financial reform, 730–731
and foreign relations after 1174,
738–755
frugality of, 712, 730–731, 749
inner court of, 726–728
and his ministers, 721–725
and Kao-tsung
after abdication,
711
(Prince Chao-ming
Hsiao T’ung
, 501–53), 255. See also
Prince Chao-ming
Hsieh, Dowager Empress (huang t’ai-hou
), 928, 929–930,
934–936, 941, 945, 946, 957.
See also Hsieh Ch’iao
Hsieh, Empress, 771. See also Hsieh
; Hsieh, Dowager
Ch’iao
)
Empress (huang t’ai-hou
Hsieh2, Dowager Empress (huang
t’ai-hou
), 809
, Empress (1210–83),
Hsieh Ch’iao
873. See also Hsieh, Dowager
Empress (huang t’ai-hou
);
Hsieh, Empress
, 371, 377
Hsieh Ching-wen
, 880, 886–887,
Hsieh Fang-shu
888, 892, 893, 904
, 742
Hsieh Kuo-jan
, 659
Hsieh Liang
Hsieh Shen-fu
, 778, 781, 789,
930
1042
glossary–index
hsien . See county
Hsien-jen, Dowager Empress (huang
t’ai-hou
), 687, 688,
708
era (860–73), 153
Hsien-t’ung
Hsin, Prince (d. 1140), 663
Hsin-ch’eng, 928
Hsin Ch’i-chi
(1140–1207), 792,
793, 899
, 87
Hsin-chou
, 625
Hsin-chou2
, 298, 299
Hsin-chou3
. See New Policies
hsin-fa
Hsin-hsiang
, 63
(New T’ang
Hsin T’ang-shu
documents), 153
. See cash,
hsin-ts’ai ch’ien
sustenance
Hsing, Empress, 687
Hsing-ch’ing, 551
Hsing-chou
, 72
, 473
Hsing-chou2
, 803
Hsing-chou3
. See adjutant
hsing-chün ssu-ma
Hsing-mi, 147–148
Hsing Shu
, 377, 479–480, 565
and alleged plot to depose Che-tsung,
542
, 486
plot to depose Chao Hsü2
, 157
Hsing-yüan
(Chia-hsing
),
Hsiu-chou
626
Hsiung Pen
, 456
(d. 1201), 778
Hsü Chi-chih
, 166
Hsü Chih-hsün
Hsü Chih-kao
, 161, 163,
166–167, 189, 200. See also
Li Pien
, 167
Hsü Ching-t’ung
, 795
Hsü-chou
, 55
Hsü-chou2
, 476–477
Hsü Hsi
Hsü Huai-te
, 305
(1170–1219), 803, 811,
817
Hsü Kuo
(d. 1225), 826, 847–848
(1126–1207),
Hsü Meng-hsin
558
Hsü Pu , 833
Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien ch’ang-pien
, 526, 558
, 66, 161, 165–167
Hsü Wen
Hsü Wen2, 666
, 911
Hsü Ying-lung
, 945
Hsü Ying-piao
, 883
Hsü Yüan-chieh
Hsüan-chou
, 138
. See Pacification
hsüan-fu shih
Commissioner (ching-lüeh an-fu
)
shih
. See Court of
Hsüan-hui yüan
Palace Attendants
Hsüan-jen
, Dowager Empress
, r.
(huang t’ai-hou
1085–93), 25, 480–482, 519,
522–524. See also Kao, Empress;
Kao, Lady
opposition to reforms, 484
and the New Policies, 561
regency (1085–93),
Hsüan-jen
484–531
Hsüan-te Gate incident (1073), 455
, 898
Hsüan Tseng
Hsüeh Ch’ing, 664
Hsüeh Hsiang
(1016–81), 354,
377, 403, 449
, 84
Hsüeh Wen-yü
. See inspector, military
hsün-chien
Hsün-tzu
(fl. 298–238 bce),
389
. See household chief
hu-chang
(d. 1193), 766
Hu Chin-ch’en
, 939
Hu-chou
Chao Hung’s exile to, 839
1225 rebellion at, 840–843
Hu Ch’üan, 679, 680
Hsü I
glossary–index
Hu Ch’ün, 713
hu-fa shan-shen
. See “Divine
Protector”
, 784
Hu Hung
. See horses, household
hu-ma
, 843
Hu Meng-yü
Hu-pu
. See Ministry of Finance
. See Census Bureau
Hu-pu ssu
, 182, 196
Hu San-hsing
(1083–1143), 446
Hu Shun-chih
, after Jen-tsung, 337
Hu Su
(chin shih 978), 260
Hu Tan
, 827, 829
Hu Tsai-hsing
Hu Tsung-yu
(1029–94), 375
, 47
Hua-chou
, 66, 91, 283
Hua-chou2
, 542
Hua-chou3
Hua-hsüeh. See School of Painting
Hua-shih wang
. See “flower and
rock network”
and defense
Huai , Chia Ssu-tao
of, 918
. See “way of softness”
huai-jou
Huai-nan
campaign, 127–128
and Chao K’uang-ning
, 50
, 201
and Chou Shih-tsung
drought in, 118
, 125
and Kuo Jung
and the Later Shu, 124
local emperors in, 53
on an overland trade route, 182
and P’ang Hsün
, 137
, 143
part of Chiang-Huai
, 149
and Sun Ju
and Yang Hsing-mi
, 43, 48,
50, 53, 134, 146–147, 178
, 4, 10, 29, 43, 124,
Huai River
222
, 126
Huai-te Army
Huai-yüan, 308
Huan-ch’ing, 23, 301, 312, 314, 469,
551
1043
, 87
Huan-chou
Huan-sh’ing, 549
Huang Ch’ao
, 134–135, 138–140,
147, 148, 150, 156–157, 172
, 42, 66
and Ch’ang-an
in Ch’ang-n, 39
and Ch’in Tsung-chüan, 43
and Chu Wen
, 43, 49, 55
, 39
defeated by Li K’o-yung
and the Eight Battalions, 142
, 144
and Kao P’ien
rebellion (875–84), 40, 146, 206,
251
and the Southern Han, 153
and Szechwan, 155
Huang-ch’eng ssu
. See Capital
Security Office
(d. 1129),
Huang Ch’ien-shan
649
huang-chih
(imperial nephews). See
adoption
, 928, 933
Huang-chou
, 617
Huang-chou2
, 806
Huang-fu Pin
, 95
Huang-fu Yü
Huang Hsia-fu (?-c. 1006), 183
huang-k’ao
. See “imperial deceased
father”
Huang K’uang-chung, 11, 12, 13
, 463, 537
Huang Lü
(imperial daughters). See
huang-nü
specific actor
huang-po
. See “deceased imperial
paternal uncle”
(1146–94), 761, 774,
Huang Shang
777, 779
Huang Shih-mi
, 331
, 882
Huang Shih-yung
Huang-shui Valley
huang t’ai-fei
(imperial mother,
dowager consort). See specific actor
(dowager empress).
huang t’ai-hou
See specific actor
1044
glossary–index
. See
Huang-t’ai-hou i-chih
Compendium of rituals and
paraphernalia of the Dowager
Empress
Huang Ti, 798
Huang T’ing-chien
, 575
Huang Ts’ung
, 951
(1138–1213), 777, 780,
Huang Tu
812
. See “sons,” imperial
huang-tzu
, 331
Huang Wei
, 940
Huang Yung
(recovery or reconquest of
hui-fu
lost territory). See irredentism
Hui-ling, Prince, 704–706. See also
Wan-yen Liang
(Prince
, r. 1149–61)
Hai-ling
(Chao Chi
,
Hui-tsung
1082–1135, r. 1100–26), 26,
27, 29, 30, 551, 575, 644, 677.
See also Chao Chi
(Hui-tsung, 1282–1135, r.
1100–1126)
abdication of, 636
death of, in captivity, 643
enthronement controversy of,
561–562
expansionist border policies of, 617
extravagance of, 602–606
historiographic issues surrounding,
556–637
popular uprisings during the reign of,
622–627
promoting Taoist religion and ritual,
583, 606–614
stripped of imperial status, 642
and Taoism, 602
traditional historiography of, 602
hui-tzu
. See currency, paper
. See Compendium of the
hui-yao
institutions of the dynasty
, 10, 133, 148, 150, 154,
Hunan
178, 180, 199–200, 227, 466
migration to, 700
. See Red-jacket
Hung-ao tsei
bandits
Hung-chin
. See Red Turbans
, 130, 147
Hung-chou
. See Court of State
Hung-lu ssu
Ceremonial
Hung Mai
(1123–1202), 723
Hung-shou2, 549
, 888, 904,
Hung T’ien-hsi
905
, migration to, 700
Hupei
Hupei modern province, 10, 48, 54
Hymes, Robert P., 35, 589, 612
I-chin-kuan
, 129
, 632
I-chou
, 223, 257
I-chou2
, 329
I-chou3
i-chün
. See army, “Righteous”
. See School of Medicine
I-hsüeh
. See playing barbarians
i-i chih-i
off against each other
. See deferrals, payment
i-ko
. See families of
i-kuan chih tsu
great officials
i-p’ei
. See loans, forced
. See Policy
I-shih t’ang
Deliberation Hall
I-Ting, 47, 59, 60, 65
independent governors of, 44
, 848
I-tu
i-yung
. See army, of righteous braves
illness. See specific actor or malady
impeachment. See specific actor
Imperial Ancestral Temple (T’ai-miao
), 697, 887
Imperial Bodyguard (shih-wei ch’in-chün
), 75, 82
Imperial Bureau of Music (Chiao-fang
), 697
Imperial Clan, expanding institutions of
the, 600–602
Imperial Clan Academy (Tsung-hsüeh
), 883, 889
glossary–index
), 234
Imperial Elite (Pan-chih
Imperial encyclopedia of the T’ai-p’ing
hsing-kuo
era (T’ai-ping
yü-lan), 254–255
“imperial father,” 94. See also adoption
Imperial Guard
and Ching Yen-kuang
, 97
, 90
and Fan Yen-kuang
and Kao Wei, 114
, 120–121
and Kuo Jung
, 118
and Kuo Wei
, 87
and Li Ssu-chao
, 107
and Liu Ch’eng-yu
and Liu Chih-yüan
, 107
, 75
and Li Ssu-yüan
, 91,
and Shih Ching-t’ang
92
, 102, 104
and Te-kuang
and Tu Ch’ung-wei
and Li
, 101
Shou-chen
Imperial Library, 254, 294
Imperial Provisioning Bureau (Ying-feng
chü), 604, 624, 625, 626
),
Imperial Seminar (ching-yen
282
Imperial Tomb, commissioner of the,
280
Imperial Treasury, 749
Imperial Treasury of Awards (yü-ch’ien
chuang-kuan chi-shang k’u
), 751
Imperial University (T’ai-hsüeh
),
319, 694
curricula under Northern and
Southern Sung, 901
demonstration at, protesting Chao Ju
Yü’s dismissal, 781
pacificism among students at, 829
student demands for Ch’iao
Hsing-chien’s execution, 821
, 897–906
and Tao-hsüeh
and Ting Ta-ch’üan, 889
Imperially approved synthesis of books and
illustrations past and present
1045
(Ch’in-ting ku-chin yu-shu
chi-cheng, 1726–28), 255
impiety, filial, 784
imports. See specific commodity
incense, commercial permits for sale of,
430
infantry, 218
infidelity. See specific actor
informants, 219
Inner Asia
marker of state formation in, 16
state building in, 10th to 13th
centuries, 15–19
insanity. See specific actor
insignia, T’ang imperial dynasty, 65
), prefectural
inspector (hsün-chien
military, 410
Institute for the Veneration of Literature
(Ch’ung-wen yüan
), 376
insurrections. See rebellions. See also
specific incident, instigator, or
location
integrity. See specific actor
intendants
), 383, 748
circuit (chien-ssu
fiscal (chuan-yün shih
),
231–233, 312, 379, 424
judicial (t’i tien hsing-yü), 380
), 232, 748,
military (shuai-ch’en
752
for military drill and review (t’i-chü
chiao-yüeh-shih), 413
interest, 396, 432, 497, 504. See also
Green Sprouts
Green Sprouts, 546
and the guild exemption fees, 547
hired service, 592
on State Trade loans, 547
surplus emergency fee surtax
(k’uan-sheng ch’ien
),
592
interregnum. See specific actor or event
Investigating Censor (chien-ch’a yü-shih
), 495, 517, 680
1046
glossary–index
Investigation and Prosecution Bureau
(Su-li so), 540–541. See also
Su-li so
iron, 202, 225
Iron Hawks (t’ie-yao), 477
irredentism, 23, 24–25, 26, 28, 263,
353, 457, 464, 549, 858
irrigation, 172–174, 208, 729. See also
water control
ivory, 184, 186
, 920, 933, 937
Jao-chou
Japan, 253
jen-chu chih ch’üan
. See imperial
perogative
, 308–309
Jen Fu
. See chivalry
jen-hsia
, 73, 75, 77, 78
Jen Huan
Jen-to-ch’üan
, 621
(Chao Shou-i, Chao Chen
Jen-tsung
, 1010–63, r. 1022–3), 25,
31, 279, 338, 342, 347,
350–351, 354, 689
administration problems during reign
of, 326–328
imperial women of, 334–335
southern conflicts during the reign of,
329
. See Jen-tsung
Jen-tsung shih-lu
veritable record
Jen-tsung veritable record (Jen-tsung shih-lu
), 339
jewels, 303
. See Daily Calendar
jih-li
, 87
Ju-chou
ju-chung fa
. 302. See also exchange
“provisioning,” grain
. See Confucianism
Ju-hsüeh
Judicial Control Office (Shen-hsing yüan
), 240
jujube, 440
, 328
Jung-chou
jung-kuan
. See officials,
supernumerary
Jurchen Chin. See Chin (1115–1234)
K’ai feng, 30, 55, 90, 105, 264, 682,
820, 852, 855, 858, 862, 879.
See also Pien-chou
as capital, 94
and the Chin, 646
drought in, as portent, 499
by 895, 42
fall of (1127), 28
during the Five Dynasties, 38
fortifications of, 234
, 307
and Han Ch’i
hired service policy in, 440
and the Khitan
, 20
, 121
and Kuo Jung
, 110, 118
and Kuo Wei
as Later Chou capital, 209
and Li Shou-chen
, 108
, 65, 67
and Li Ts’un-hsü
, 107
and Liu Ch’eng-yu
and the Mongols, 34
mutiny at (c. 916), 63
regulations for,
pao-chia
408–414
and Pien-chou
, 52
, 615
sacked by Jurchen
in the second Sung-Chin war, 641
seige of, 637
service-exemption policy in, 402
state trade bureau in, 430–431
state trade in, 405, 406
as the Sung capital, 203
surrendered by Chin, 677
and T’ai-tsu
, 219
as T’ai-tsu’s capital, 222
and Te-kuang
, 102, 104
, 66
and Wang Yen-chang
water control in, 283
war (1206–07), 32,
K’ai-hsi
789–795, 824, 852, 908
. See remonstrance,
k’ai yen-lu
“opening channels of
K’ai-yüan ssu-pu lu, 294
glossary–index
Kan-chou
, 147. See also Ch’ien-chou
Kan-chou2
, 300
Kan River , 5, 178
, 951
Kang-chou
K’ang, Prince, 29, 637, 639. See also
Chao Kou; Chou Kou (Prince
K’ang); Sung Kao-tsung
K’ang-chou
, 332
, 82, 83
K’ang I-ch’eng
K’ang Lü, 651
Kansu Corridor, 17, 22, 301
Kansu modern province, xi, 79, 252,
300, 352, 354, 466
Kansu-Tsinghai Highlands, 22
Kao, Empress, 480. See also Hsüan-jen
Kao, Lady, 338. See also Hsüan-jen
Kao Chi-ch’ang
, 148, 173, 181,
183, 198
Kao Chi-chung
(r. 948–60), 202
(Kao Chi-ch’ang
Kao Chi-hsing
, Prince of Nan-p’ing
),
67, 79
(d. 1220), 830
Kao Ch’i
Kao Huai-cheng, 331
Kao Huai-te
, 217
, 323
Kao Jo-na
, 248
Kao-liang River
, 144, 145, 170
Kao P’ien
, 120, 208, 211, 220–221
Kao-p’ing
Khitan-Northern Han invasions of
(954 and 960), 11
Kao-t’ing Mountain
, 940
Kao Ts’un-yü, 473–476
(Chao Kou, 1107–87,
Kao-tsung
r. 1127–62), 29–30, 644–709,
762. See also K’ang, Prince
abdication of, 707, 708
admiration of past emperors, 689–690
and court ceremonies, 697
effect of death on Hsiao-tsung
, 752
and his councilors, 672
and medicine, 707
restoration of (1129), 652
1047
, 104, 106
Kao Ts’ung-hui
Kao Ts’ung-mei
(r. 929–48), 183,
196
, 944
Kao Ying-sun
, 174, 176, 180, 181
Kao Yü
k’ao . See “deceased father”
kei-t’ien mu-jen
. See land, in
return for service
. See Northeast
Ken-yüeh
Marchmount
. See system, rotation
keng-hsü fa
Keng Nan-chung, 641
khagden. See khan
khan, 15
Khitan
(Ch’i-tan), 4, 10, 20,
27–28, 44, 60, 61, 103, 206,
209, 221, 226, 354, 465
Khitan Liao empire, 12, 14, 16
Hui-tsung’s campaigns against, 615
Khubilai khan
(Hu-pi-lieh, r.
126–94), 17, 869, 870, 872,
895, 896, 897, 920, 927–928,
937, 938, 939, 942, 954, 955
Kiangsi modern province, 130, 143,
149, 178
Kiangsu modern province, xi, 34
king
),
commandery (chün-wang
158
), 158, 189
nation (kuo-wang
kinsman. See clansmen
klaghan, 870
Ko Huai-min
, 314
. See Office of Audience
Ko-men ssu
Ceremonies
Ko Pi
, 766
. See household, guest
k’o-hu
, 945
Ko T’ien-ssu
Kokonor Lake. See Ch’ing-hai (Kokonor)
Lake
Korea, 33
Korean Relations Institute (T’ung-wen
), 541–543
kuan
Kory (Korea), 863, 866
1048
glossary–index
Koryo, 250, 253
Kou-lung Ju-yüan
(1093–1154), 679, 680, 681
(961–1023), 264, 269,
K’ou Chun
270, 277, 278, 280
, 863–864
Köchü
Köten
(K’u-tuan), 863–864
Kracke, Edward A., Jr., 374
Ku Fan, 420
. See mu-i
ku-i-fa
Ku-ku-lung, 620
, 516
Ku Lin
(997–1065), 300, 303
Ku-ssu-lo
ku-wen
(ancient style of writing),
319
, 157
Ku Yen-hui
, 948
Kua-chou
. See Shao-hsing
K’uai-chi
kuan-ch’a shih
. See governors, civil;
surveillance commissioner
, 47, 50, 54, 107, 108
Kuan-chung
. See scholars in
kuan-k’o shih
residence
Kuan Li , 772
(south of the passes),
Kuan-nan
263, 266, 267, 268
Kuan Yü, 686
k’uan-sheng ch’ien
. See surplus
emergency fee surtax
. See Hostel for
Kuang-ch’in chai
Imperial Clansmen
Kuang-chou
, 134, 153, 154, 177,
184, 185, 227, 332. See also
Canton; Canton (Kuang-chou
)
Kuang-chou
(modern Canton), 949,
950, 951
, 124, 448
Kuang-chou2
, 795
Kuang-hua
. See Universal
kuang-hui ts’ang
Charity Graneries
(T’ai-tsung
), 242–260
Kuang-i
Kuang-ling
, 165–166. See also
Yang-chou
Kuang-nan circuits
, 955
East, 5, 328–329
West, 5, 328, 329, 331
Kuang-te
, 933, 937
(Chao Tun,
Kuang-tsung
1147–1200, r. 1189–94), 31,
913. See also Chao Tun
abdication of, 772
and Hsiao-tsung
, 760, 767–768,
785
and medications, 759
reasons for opposition to, 769–771
reign of, 757–772
Kuang-tung, xi
, 331
Kuang-yüan-chou
kuei-ching jen. See refugees
, 10, 147
Kuei-chou
, 87
Kuei-chou2
Kuei-chou3
(Kuei-lin
), 153,
332
, 153. See also Kuei-yang
Kuei-lin
Kuei-yang
, 940. See also Kuei-lin
Kuei-yang chien
, 329
K’uei-chou, 147, 328
K’uei-chou2
, 954
, 333
K’un-lun Pass
kung2 . See tribute, annual
kung3 . See Taoism, temples and
monastaries of
Kung-chou
, 331
, 564, 565
Kung Kuai
, 741–742
Kung Mao-liang
. See yamen police for the
kung-shou
arrest of thieves
Kung-ti
, 947. See Chao Hsien
(1271–1323)
. See Public Fields measure
kung-t’ien
. See Public Lands
Kung-t’ien so
Bureau
(Chao Hsien
,
Kung-tsung
1271–1323, r. 1274–76). See
Chao Hsien
(Ying-kuo
glossary–index
,
kung, Kung-ti
Kung-tsung, 1271–1323,
r.1274–76)
kung-wu ssu-shang
. See “tributary
goods and private merchandise”
, 69, 70, 76
K’ung Ch’ien
K’ung Tao-fu
, 292
(1038–88),
K’ung Wen-chung
365, 511, 519
banishment of, 543
K’ung Wu-chung, 365
K’ung Yen-chih, 365
(1107–61),
K’ung Yen-chou
665
Kuo, Empress, 289, 294, 334
Kuo2, Empress (1126–56), 758, 759
Kuo, Lady, 292–293
Kuo, Pure Consort, 293
Kuo Chih-chang, 549
Kuo Ch’ung
(908–65), 214,
215
, 69, 71–72
Kuo Ch’ung-t’ao
(Ch’ai Jung
, Chou
Kuo Jung
, 954–59),
Shih-tsung
118. See also Ch’ai Jung
Kuo Kao
(d. 1200), 798
, 345
Kuo K’uei
. See Duke of State
kuo-kung
Kuo-le-chi (d. 1219), 822
. See state history, dynastic
kuo-shih
history
Kuo-shih kuan
. See Historiography
Institute
(Chou Kung-ti
Kuo Tsung-hsün
, 959), 130, 211. See also
Chou Kung-ti
(r. 956)
. See Directorate of
Kuo-tzu chien
Education
, 69
Kuo Tzu-i
. See king, nation; nation
kuo-wang
king, prince of the state; prince
of state
(Chou T’ai-tsu
,
Kuo Wei
r. 951–54), 5, 109–112, 119,
1049
197, 200, 207, 210–211. See also
(r. 951–54)
Chou T’ai-tsu
ancestral shrine of, 118
contributions of, in strengthening
bureaucratic governance, 11
, 636
Kuo Yao-shih
Kuo-yung fang
. See Bureau of State
Expenditure
Kwangtung modern province, 5, 133,
209, 224, 226
Kweichow modern province, 226
), 393
labor service (fu-i
lady, palace. See women, palace
Lai-chou
, 178
on an overland trade route, 182
, 174
Lake T’ai
, 473
Lan-chou
land, 136, 208. See also “engrossers” and
engrossment (chien-ping
)
accumulation, by the wealthy, 892
development and irrigation. See
agricultural lands and water
conservancy policy (nung-t’ien
)
shui-li fa
distribution, 128
government (kuan-t’ien), 601,
699
government, fiscal rights to, 424
government-leased (ying-t’ien
),
798
grants of, 699
“in return for service” policy (kai-t’ien
mu-jen), 423, 451
increasing arable, 699–701
management (ying-t’ien
), 699
owned by government schools,
700
), 627
public (kung-t’ien
reclamation, 318
), 720
recovery of lost (hui-fu
),
state-run farms (t’un-t’ien
699
survey, 128, 893
1050
glossary–index
land (cont.)
“survey measure” (ching-chieh
), 701
fa
tax. See tax, land
Land of Heavenly Abundance, 223
Land Survey and Equitable Tax policy
(fang-t’ien chün-shui fa
), 393, 496–497
abolition of, 579, 582
,
restoration of, under Ts’ai Ching
590–591
, 271
Lao Tzu
Later Chin dynasty (936–47), 4, 38
Later Chou dynasty (951–59), 4–5, 38,
112, 207
armies of the, 219
assault on the north (958–59),
129–132
increase in prefectures of, 12
and Northern Han (951–54),
112–119
Later Han dynasty (947–50), 38,
689
Later Liang dynasty (907–23), 5, 38,
188, 206
between 907–15, 52–61
Later Shu dynasty (934–65), 10, 123,
134, 160, 163, 209, 220
965 campaign against, 14
prefectures in, 12
Later T’ang dynasty (923–36), 38, 66,
164
establishment of, 67–74
first challenge to authority of, 79
Lau Nap-yin, 11, 12, 13
law. See specific law or measure
law codes, 57, 128
of Chu Wen
(910), 68
of the T’ang dynasty, of Chu Wen
(910), 68
Law Codes of the Great Chou (Ta Chou
), 126
hsing-t’ung
leaders, patrol (hsün-chien
), 301
learning, Szechwanese, 512
).
“Learning of the Way” (Tao-hsüeh
See Tao-hsüeh
leather, 117
legal system, 116, 123. See also law codes
legitimacy, 52–55, 64, 81, 189,
900–901, 949
and Chao Yün, 837
dynastic, 772
and the Hsi Hsia
, 619
regency, 523
of the Hsüan-jen
importance of
, 647
to Chang Pang-ch’ang
, 914–915
to Chao Ch’i
to Chu Wan, 52–55, 188
to Kao-tsung
, 650, 687
, 243–244
to Kuang-i
, 213
to T’ai-tsu
, 89–92
and Shih Ching-t’ang
symbolic, 57, 65–66, 116, 128
Lei Yün-kung
(?–1022),
280–281
letters of state, Chin, 738, 739
Levine, Ari D., 24
Li , Dowager Empress (huang
), 291
t’ai-hou
Li , Empress (960–1004), 260
Li2 , Empress (1145–1200), 759–760,
761–762, 767, 771, 772, 773
Li , Lady, 279, 289
, 434
Li Ch’ang
(937–1008), 260
Li Ch’ang-ling
Li Chen
, 48, 57
, 665–666, 674
Li Ch’eng
. See Book of rites
Li-chi
, 452, 475, 477
Li Chi
Li Chi-chi
, 71, 73
(?-1004), 252
Li Chi-ch’ien
, 251–252
Li Chi-p’eng
. See Department of
Li-chih chü
State Affairs, Ritual Regulations
Office
, 95
Li Chin-ch’üan
Li Ching
(r. 943–61), 124–125,
127, 198–200, 201
glossary–index
Li Ch’ing-ch’en, 533
and palace examination, 533
Li Ch’ing-ling, 260
Li Ch’iung
, 670, 676, 677
, 157
Li-chou2
, 833
Li-chou3
Li-chou4
, 657
(d. 1159), 701
Li Ch’un-nien
(?–960), 114,
Li Ch’ung-chin
118, 124, 131, 214–215, 216,
229, 245
, 236
Li Ch’ung-chü
(d. 1231), 34–35,
Li Ch’üan
824–827, 829, 840, 841,
847–852, 853, 872, 896
and Mongols, 848–849
Li Fu2
, 827, 849
(d. 1207), 802, 803
Li Hao-i
Li Heng , 949, 950, 955
, 897
Li Hsiang
, 473–476, 507
Li Hsien
, 717
Li Hsien-chung
(1167–1244),
Li Hsin-ch’uan
664, 810, 883
, 298
Li Hung
Li I-ch’ao
, 81
Li I-yin (King of Hsia, r. 935–67),
251
, 148
Li Jang
, 54
Li Jen-fu
Li Jen-ta, 169
Li Jo-ku
, 300
Li Ju-i, 806
(1083–1140), 637, 638,
Li Kang
639, 640, 645, 646, 648–649,
663, 666, 667
Li K’o-jui
(d. 978), 251
, 53
Li K’o-ning
(Prince of Chin,
Li K’o-yung
895–908), 58, 72, 165
, 43
and Ch’ang-an
, 46–48, 49, 51,
and Chu Wen
52, 53
defeated Huang Ch’ao
, 39
1051
, 54
and Li Mao-chen
and Liu Jen-kung
, 43
, 53
and Lu-chou
, 146
and Yang Hsing-mi
Li Ku, 115, 124
(1077–1155), 680–681,
Li Kuang
693
Li Kuei
, 802
(r. 1048–67), 22
Li Liang-tso
, 42, 46–47, 48, 53,
Li Mao-chen
54, 67, 157, 164
, 882, 903
Li Ming-fu
, 781
Li Mu
Li O-tu, 620
Li Pang-yen, 637, 638, 640
Li Pi
(1159–1222), 792, 808, 811,
814
(r. 937–42). See Hsü
Li Pien
Chih-kao
Li Shao-jung
, 73
Li Shih-ning, 451
(Prince of Ch’in),
Li Shou-chen
101, 108–109
, 806
Li Shuang
(?-c. 994), 257
Li Shun
Li Shun-ch’en, 72
Li Shun-chü
, 477
, 54, 58, 65, 67
Li Ssu-chao
(T’ang Ming-tsung
Li Ssu-yüan
, 926–33), 71, 72–82, 87,
165
Li Sung
, 97, 100, 108
(r. 1028–54), 333
Li T’ai-tsung
, 851, 872, 896–897
Li T’an
, 759
Li Tao
Li Tao-ch’uan
, 893
(1115–84), 526, 558
Li T’ao
, 300
Li Te-ming
, 280, 290
Li Ti
(1028–87), 365, 375
Li Ting
(d. 1276), 922,
Li T’ing-chih
927, 934, 937, 947, 948, 949
li-ts’ai
. See resources, management
of
1052
glossary–index
, 395
Li Ts’an
Li Ts’un-hsü
(T’ang
, r.
Chuang-tsung
923–26), 53–54, 58, 59, 62–74,
164, 165
military reorganization of (908), 70
southern offensive of (918–19), 64
Li-tsung
(Chao Yün, 1205–64, r.
1224–64), 33, 34, 905. See also
Chao Yün (Li-tsung, 1205–64,
r. 1224–64)
, 916
and Chia Ssu-tao
compassionate endeavors of, 872
and Confucian ideals, 873
and domestic concerns, 906
and public opinion, 872
sexual intemperance of, 874,
913
and Tao-hsüeh
, 874
, 859, 865, 880
Li Tsung-mien
(964–1012), 276
Li Tsung-o
, 84
Li Ts’ung-chang
(T’ang Min-ti
Li Ts’ung-hou
, 933–34), 82, 83
(Han Kao-tsu
,
Li Ts’ung-i
r. 947–48), 105
Li Ts’ung-k’o
(T’ang Fei-ti
,
934–36), 82
, 84
Li Ts’ung-min
(d. 1036), 284, 290
Li Tzu
, 334
Li Wei
Li-yang
, 63
Li Yen, 591, 627, 638
, 162
Li Yin-heng
Li Yung-ho, 289
Li Yü
(r. 960–75), 204–205,
227
(r. 1032–48), 21, 22,
Li Yüan-hao
300, 314–315, 352
(d. 1210), 831–832
Li Yüan-li
(?–960), 214, 215, 229,
Li Yün
245
Liang, Dowager Empress (huang
t’ai-hou)
, 472, 475, 551
, 133, 143, 419,
Liang-che circuit
421, 622–626
East, 143
West, 143
Liang-chou
, 79, 300
. See “two authorities”
liang fu
Liang Keng-yao
, 444
. See merchants, worthy
liang-ku
(r. 913–23), 179. See
Liang Mo-ti
also Chu Yu-chen
Liang Shih
, 311, 313
(d. 1126), 605,
Liang Shih-ch’eng
638
liang-shui
. See tax, double
(r. 907–12). See
Liang T’ai-tsu
Chu Wen
Liang T’ao
, 510, 516, 518,
537
and alleged plot to depose Che-tsung,
542
banishment of, 542
and Chang Shun-min
, 517
and Teng Wen-po, 527
Liang-tso (1046–67), 4, 343, 352–353,
354
Liao , 20, 22, 23, 27–28, 221–222,
247, 262, 627
imperial cavalry of, 221, 222
, 103,
Liao dynastic history (Liao shih)
242, 249
Liao dynasty (907–1125), 131
Liao Hsing-tsung
(r. 1031–55),
311. See Tsung-chen
Liao Kang
(1071–1143), 670
Liao-Later Chin alliances (936–42),
87–97
Liao-Later Chin war (c. 943–47), 97,
103
Liao Mu-tsung
(r. 951–69), 220.
See also Ching
(r. 982–1031),
Liao Sheng-tsung
249, 288
Liao Shih-tsung
(r. 947–51). See
Wu-yü
glossary–index
),
Liao Southern Capital (Yu-chou
98, 99, 129
Liao T’ai-tsu
(r. 916–26). See
A-pao-chi
Liao T’ai-tsung
(r. 926–47).
See Te-kuang
Liao T’ien-tso
(r. 1101–25), 630,
634
, 628
Liao-yang
, 151
Liao Yen-jou
library. See specific library
, on an overland trade
Lieh Harbor
route, 182
lieh-hsiao. See military officer
Lien Chung-yü
, 168
, 453–454
Lien Heng-fu
, 28, 643, 654, 937–942,
Lin-an
946, 948. See also Hang-chou
coup in, 805–812
, 933
Lin-chiang
, 309
Lin-chou
. See mutual
lin-chü-hsiang-pao
guarantee group, neighorhood
, 536
Lin Hsi
Lin Hsien-k’o
, 287, 290
, 629
Lin-huang
, 611–612, 613
Lin Ling-su
(1131–1208), 761,
Lin Ta-chung
777, 780, 788, 814, 815
, 960
Lin Te-yang
Lin T’e
, 272
, 183
Lin Yen-yü
, 473, 475, 477
Ling-chou
, 5, 10, 152, 153, 155,
Ling-nan
170, 182, 189
Ling-pao. See Taoism
, Ling-pao
(sect), 611, 1080
Ling-p’ing, 551
liquor, Southern Sung tax on, 698
literati (shih), 13
Liu, Dowager Empress (huang t’ai-hou
, 969–1033), 285–291,
292. See also Liu, Empress
1053
Liu, Empress (969–1033), 277, 279. See
also Liu, Dowager Empress
(huang t’ai-hou)
Liu, James T. C. (Liu Tzu-chien), 784,
902
(1048–1125), 350,
Liu An-shih
510, 521, 523, 537
banishment of, 542
rehabilitation of, 564
and Teng Wen-po, 527
Liu ancestral temple, 111
Liu Ch’ang
(r. 958–71), 203–204,
227
Liu Ch’ang-kuo
, 803
, 162
Liu Ch’ang-lu
, 473–476
Liu Ch’ang-tso
(1129–1206), 754, 757,
Liu Cheng
762, 765, 766–776, 787, 788,
790, 897
and Kuang-tsung’s abdication,
771
140-day protest of, 767, 769, 770
and Tao-hsüeh
, 770
Liu Cheng2, 535
Liu Cheng-fu, 580
Liu Cheng-yen
, 650–651
(Han
Liu Ch’eng-chün
, 955–68),
Hsiao-ho-ti
129
, 272
Liu Ch’eng-kuei
(Han Yin-ti,
Liu Ch’eng-yu
948–50), 107, 110, 210. See also
Han Yin-ti
(r. 948–50)
, 374
Liu Ch’i
, 682
Liu Ch’i2
Liu Chien-feng
, 149–150
Liu Ch’ien (Chih-chien), 153–154, 210,
320
, 376, 420, 440, 491, 493,
Liu Chih
510, 515, 524, 525–526, 538
accused of factional treachery,
528–529
and alleged plot to depose Che-tsung
, 542
1054
glossary–index
(cont.)
Liu Chih
and amnesty for Ts’ai Ch’üeh
,
528
banishment of, 542
censoral indictments of, 537
, 529
and Chang Tun
on drafted service, 503
and “engrossers,” 442
on fifth column, 522
on hired-service, 437
and Hsing Shu
, 529
, 518
and Liang T’ao
stripped of prestige titles, 574
and Ts’ai Ch’üeh
, 499
,
and Tseng Pu
, 91, 96, 101, 112.
Liu Chih-yüan
See also Han Kao-tsu
(r. 947–48)
and the Later Han
(947–50),
103–112
Liu Cho (d. 1227), 849
, 91
Liu Ch’u-jang
, 620, 621
Liu Chung-wu
(Han Shih-tsu
,
Liu Ch’ung
r. 951–95), 112–113, 120, 129
Liu Chün
, 162
Liu clan, ancestral temples for, 286
, 620, 621
Liu Fa
(b. 1217), 310, 905
Liu Fu
, 142
Liu Han-hung
(d. 1244), 883, 884
Liu Han-pi
Liu-ho
, 125
. See commandant
liu-hou
Liu Hun-k’ang (1035–1108), 610
, 421, 438
Liu I
Liu Jen-kung
, 43–44, 47, 48, 51,
61
(1142–1222),
Liu Kuang-shih
654, 669, 676, 777, 780
, 785, 786, 788,
Liu Kuang-tsu
790, 794, 814, 820–821
Liu K’uei, 580
(1122–78), 727, 728,
Liu Kung
734
, 936, 940
Liu Meng-yen
Liu-nei chüan. See Bureau of Executory
Personel
Liu P’ing
, 301
. See six ministries
liu-pu
, 92
Liu Shen-chiao
liu-shen chin-shou. See conferences, illicit
private
liu-shou
. See Resident Defender
(regent). See specific actor
liu-shou
(r. 911–13),
Liu Shou-kuang
59–61, 65
, 374
Liu Shu
liu-su chiao-hsing chih jen
. See
opportunist, vulgar
. See
liu-su ch’un-tang
conventionalists, party of
Liu Sui, 287
Liu Te-hsiu
, 793
, 51
Liu Ts’an
. See Six Felons
liu tsei
, 169–170,
Liu Ts’ung-hsiao
757
, 288
Liu Ts’ung-te
(r. 917–42), 155, 183, 185,
Liu Yen
188, 195, 203
Liu Yin
, 153, 154–155, 170, 203
, 882
Liu Ying-ch’i
(1073–1143), 657–658,
Liu Yü
674
, 287
Liu Yüeh
Liu Yüeh2
(1144–1216), 788
, 111
Liu Yün
livestock. See cattle
, 161
Lo Chih-hsiang
Lo Ch’ung-hsün
, 290
Lo faction . See factionalism; factions
, 47
Lo Hung-hsin
(d. 1209), 832–833
Lo Jih-yüan
, 270
Lo River text (Lo-shu)
, 47, 51, 57
Lo Shao-wei
(d. 1211),
Lo Shih-ch’uan
831–832
Lo Tien
, 774, 779
glossary–index
, 30, 34, 38, 43, 48, 52, 73,
Lo-yang
90–91, 105, 138, 207, 245,
641, 858, 862
Lo Yen-kuei
, 217
, 708
Lo Yu
loans. See also credit
basic capitalization (pen-ch’ien)
,
396
, 396, 416
forced (i-p’ei)
localism, 35
locusts, 272, 279, 291, 324, 830, 872
fruit, 182
longan (lung-yen)
looting, 213, 220, 226. See also pillage
Lou Chao
(1088–1160), 681
. See Pauper’s
Lou-tse yüan
Cemetery
, 653
Lou Yin-liang
(1137–1213), 770, 777,
Lou Yüeh
780, 788, 790, 812, 814, 815
loyalist. See specific actor
loyalty, 45, 50, 66, 141–142, 207, 211,
246, 290, 303, 317, 643, 944,
947–948, 951, 955–961. See also
allegiance
lu . See regional circuit
Lu Chih, 676
Lu Chiu-yüan
(Lu Hsiang-shan,
1139–93), 788, 815. See also Lu
Hsiang-shan
, 47, 49, 53–54, 58, 59,
Lu-chou
105, 120
909 campaign, 54
Lu-chou2
, 145
, 328, 329, 897, 920, 954
Lu-chou3
Lu Hsia-fu (1238–79), 941, 946, 947,
948, 951
Lu Hsiang-shan. See Lu Chiu-yüan
(Lu Hsiang-shan, 1139–93)
, 951, 952, 956, 957,
Lu Hsiu-fu
958
, 147, 154,
Lu Kuang-ch’ou
178
Lu Shou-ch’in
, 305, 307
, 376
Lu Tien
1055
(934–85), 258–259
Lu To-hsün
Lu Tsung-tao
(966–1029), 280,
281, 284, 285–286, 288
, 80
Lu Wen-chin
, 156–157
Lu Yen-hung
, 887, 888
Lu Yün-sheng
Lü, Empress, 762
Lü Chia-wen
, 406, 430, 431, 443,
449, 453, 497, 498
Lü Chung, 514
Lü Ho-ch’ing, 451
(1014–71), 341–342, 369,
Lü Hui
373
Lü Hui-ch’ing
(1032–1110), 367,
374, 375, 376, 378, 379, 381,
382, 396, 401–402, 423,
450–452, 453
(978–1044), 316–317
Lü I-chien
and the Chi-chih ssu
, 284
and Dowager Empress Lei, 281
, 292–293
and Empress Kuo
, 297–299,
and Fan Chung-yen
322
, 310–311
and Hsiao T’e-mo
and Jen-tsung, 287, 289, 290, 292,
299–300, 307, 313
and Lady Ch’en, 293
and Lei Yün-kung
, 280
and monopoly reforms, 285
, 321
and Shih Chieh
and Sun Mien, 294
and the T’ien-sheng recension, 285
and the Yü-ch’ing chao-ying Palace
, 286
(1091–1139), 651, 652,
Lü I-hao
653, 673, 680, 688
as Commander-in-chief (Tu-tu)
,
667
(1018–81), 357,
Lü Kung-chu
375, 377, 378–379, 380, 464,
476, 477, 479, 481, 491, 493,
517, 519
alleged treachery of, 541
censoral indictments of, 537
1056
glossary–index
(cont.)
Lü Kung-chu
and Chang Tun
, 493
on drafted service, 503
opposition to Green Sprouts,
490–491
posthumous honors recinded, 538
and Shen-tsung, 454
stripped of prestige titles, 541, 574
(1007–73), 344,
Lü Kung-pi
406
, 376, 451
Lü Sheng-ch’ing
, 949
Lü Shih-k’uei
, 341, 507, 512, 524,
Lü Ta-fang
525–526, 533, 537
and amnesty for Ts’ai Ch’üeh
,
528
banishment of, recommended, 538
, 539
and Chang Tun
deprived of prestige titles, 538
stripped of prestige titles, 574
and Tseng Pu
,
, 423, 442, 495, 504,
Lü T’ao
511
, 517
and Chang Shun-min
, 519
and Ch’eng I
and Han Wei
, 520
on reformists, 532
rehabilitation of, 564
return to court, 521
, 515
and Su Shih
(d. 1196), 79, 788,
Lü Tsu-chien
789
Lü Tsu-t’ai
, 789–790, 814
(935–1000), 260, 261
Lü Tuan
Lü Wei-ch’ing, 423, 451
Lüan-chou
, 629
, 933
Lung-hsing2
era (Eminent
Lung-hsing
Ascendancy, 1163–65), 720
, 726–727
Lung Ta-yüan
Lung-yu, Dowager Empress (huang
, 662. See also
t’ai-hou)
Yüan-yu
, Dowager Empress
, 470
Luo-wu-ch’eng
luxuries, 186
Ly (Chiao-chih)
dynasty, 329
), 628
Ma Chih (Chao Liang-ssu
, 276–277
Ma Chih-chieh
, 198–199
Ma Hsi-ch’ung
Ma Hsi-fan
(r. 932–46), 197
(r. 947–49), 198
Ma Hsi-kuang
(r. 950–1), 198
Ma Hsi-o
, 663
Ma K’uo
, 161
Ma Ling
, 106
Ma-ta
(c. 1254–1323), 207
Ma Tuan-lin
Ma Yin
(King of Ch’u), 54, 135,
148, 149–150, 154, 158, 180,
181, 196
, 350
Ma Yung-ch’ing
, 785
“Madame” (fu-jen)
magistrates, 230. See also specific actor
male, taxable (ting2), 401
Man (non-Chinese southwest ethnic
groups), 833
manager of affairs, joint (t’ung
p’ing-chang shih)
, 157
Manager of National Security
(p’ing-chang chün-kuo shih)
, 791, 793
Mandate of Heaven, 45, 65, 66, 67, 76,
84, 120, 213–214, 271, 835
manufacturing. See specific commodity
Mao Chu, 581
Mao-t’ing k’o-hua
, 176
Mao Wen-hsi, 175
market usage surtax (shih-li ch’ien)
, 430, 441, 443, 449
marriage. See alliances, marriage
marshal, grand (ta yüan-shuai), 651
Marshal of the Various Circuits, 51
Masters of Imperial Interment (shan-ling
shih), 480, 493
McGrath, Michael C., 21, 22
“mean and petty men,” 25, 376
Medical Service (Yao chü)
, 872
medicinals, 185, 186, 430
glossary–index
medicines, 184
mediocrities (yung-jen)
, 363
, and prefecture schools,
Mei Chih
318
, 172
Mei-chou
Mei-lo-tu-pu, 551
memoranda (cha-tzu)
, 246. See also
memorials
Memorial Forwarding Office (T’ung-chin
yin-t’ai ssu), 342, 365
memorials. See also “Myriad word
memorial”; remonstrance
on the abolition of the New Policies,
488
An Tun’s, on Investigation and
Presecution Bureau, 540,
541
Chang Fang-p’ing’s, on Shen-tsung,
452
Chang K’o-kung’s, on Ts’ai Ching
, 581
Chang Shang-ying’s, critiquing
Hsüan-jen, 535
,
Chang Shih’s, on Chang Yüeh
728
against Chang Tun
, 616
Chang Tun’s, on the hired service
system, 501
Chang Yung’s, on the Five Devils,
272
on Chao Hung’s death, 842
to Chen-tsung, 273, 274
Ch’en Ch’ao-lao’s, on Ts’ai Ching
, 581
Ch’en Chün-ch’ing’s self-impeaching,
724
Ch’en Kuan’s, on Chang Tun
,
564
Ch’en Tung’s
demanding execution of Hui-tsung
ministers, 638
, 639
on Li Kang
Cheng Chü-cheng and Liu Cheng-fu’s,
on Ts’ai Ching
, 580
1057
Cheng Hsia’s, on Wang An-Shih
, 449
Chou K’uei’s, on auditing the
Ministry of Finance, 728
Chu Hsi’s
on declining authority of chief
councilors, 746
on Hsiao-tsung’s reliance on
personal associates, 745, 746,
784
Chu Kuang-t’ing’s, on Su Shi, 515
, 287
to Dowager Empress Liu
on establishing an “acting” heir
apparent, 708
Fan Ch’eng-ta’s, on receiving Chin
letters of state, 735
on Fan Ch’un-jen
and Wang
Ts’un, 525
Fan Chungyen and Fu Pi’s, on reform
agenda, 318
on heir apparent, 298
on Jen-tsung, 287
on ritual, 287
on filial obligations, 341
Fu Pi’s
on circuit intendants, 318
on Shen-tsung, 452
on Green Sprouts revival, 546
Han Ch’i
and P’ang Chi’s, on
portents, 299
Han Ch’i’s, 317
Han Shih-tsung’s, on unreliability of
Chin, 678
Han Wei’s, on role of monarch, 355
Hu Ch’üan’s, on Chin peace
settlement, 679
Hu Meng-yü’s, on death of Chao
Hung, 843
of impeachment against Ts’ai Ch’üeh
and Chang Tun
, 493
from Imperial University against Shih
, 883
Sung-chih
of the interregnum, investigated for
sedition, 573–574
1058
glossary–index
memorials (cont.)
interruption of, under Wang An-shih
, 449
justifying blacklists, 576
and Kao-tsung, 689
on Liang-tso raids, 344
Liu An-shih’s, on reformist comeback,
522
Liu Kuang-tsu’s, against Han
, 786
T’o-chou
Lou Yin-liang’s, on imperial clan sons,
653
Lü Kung-chu’s
on jurisdictional limits, 492
on need for unified council, 464
on Shen-tsung, 452
Lü Tsu-t’ai’s, denouncing Han
T’o-chou, 789
on the Mongols
, 859
Ou-yang Hsiu’s, on factions, 322
P’eng Kuei-nien’s, on visit of
compassion, 768
on Poorhouse policy, 598
against the Shen-tsung reforms, 492
on Shen-tsung’s accession, 398
Shih Hao’s
against a large-scale military
campaign, 716
on palace favorites, 744
Shih Mi-yüan’s, on war policy, 807
Shih Sung-chih’s, 880
against Shih Sung-chih’s mourning
waiver, 882
Ssu-ma Kuang’s
critique of activist government,
482
on drafted service, 501
on hired service, 489, 501
on military drill, 495
on monetizing the rural economy,
500
on mutual security, 489
on remonstrance, 481, 488
on Wang An-shih
, 488–489
,
student, critizing Ts’ai Ching
572
student, to be scrutinized, 905
Su Shih’s
on Green Sprouts, 505
on political conformity, 520
on surplus emergency fund, 504
Sun O’s, on hired service, 545
Sun Shih’s, on the Five Devils, 272
T’ang Chiung’s, condemning reform,
447
Teng Jo-shui’s, requesting execution
of Shih-Mi-yüan, 842
Teng Jun-fu’s, on bowmen, 437
against the “three traitors,” 493
Ts’ai Ching’s
accompanying art objects, 570
on anti-reform, 573
on clan issues, 601
on the extension of Sung
hegemony, 632
on factionalism of anti-reformists,
573
on Green Sprouts revival, 546
on the salt monopoly, 594
on Ts’ai Ching’s dismissal, 581
Ts’ai Wei’s, on plot to depose
Che-tsung, 542
Tsung Tse’s, on defense against Chin,
650
Tu Fan’s, on domestic problems, 881
urging investigation of Yüan-yu
,
540
urging termination of state trade
policy, 497
on verification of imperial orders,
723
Wang An-shih’s
on a finance planning commission,
403
against land service, 452
Wang P’u’s, on Tao, 123
Wang Shu2’s, against Sung-Chin
peace settlement, 679
glossary–index
Wang Yen-sou’s
on government loansharking, 505
on Ssu-ma Kuang
, 508
Wei Chi-tsung’s, on trade crisis,
405–406
Wei Liao-weng’s, on Shih Mi-yüan’s
“eight failures,” 854
Wu Ch’u-hou’s, on Ts’ai Ch’üeh
,
522
, 454
on Wu Ch’ung
Wu Yung’s, on Mongol alliance, 858
Yang Wan-li’s, on exercising imperial
authority, 746
Men-hsia sheng
. See Chancellery
. See
men-hsia shih-lang
Chancellery, vice director of
, 815, 902
Mencius
Meng, Lady, 530
Meng Ch’ang
(r. 934–65),
202–203, 225
, 79, 163,
Meng Chih-hsiang
164–165, 202
, 73
Meng-chou
rebellion at, 91
, 78, 82,
Meng Han-ch’iung
83
Meng-ku-tai
, 942
, 855, 856–858, 860,
Meng Kung
865, 868, 870
, 827
Meng Tsung-cheng
, 409
mercenaries (mu-ping)
merchants, 98. See also Collateralized
Loan Stations; “engrossers”
(chien-ping)
; Metropolitan
State Trade Bureau;
“provisioning” (ju-chung)
method of; specific commodities;
specific monopolies; state trade
policy (shih-i fa)
; trade;
verification, certificate of
, 405
worthy (liang-ku)
merit-evaluation system, 748
messengers (ch’eng-t’ieh jen)
, 428
, 398
office (ch’eng-fu)
1059
metal-ware, 177, 184
meteor. See portents, cosmological
Metropolitan Command (Shih-wei-ssu),
5, 208–209, 216, 217, 218, 234
Metropolitan State Trade Bureau, 406
Mi-chih, 473, 548
. See orders, “confidential”
mi-pai
Miao, Lady, 32, 334, 335
Miao Fu, 650–651
Miao-Liu mutiny (1129), 671
Middle Yangtze region, 14
, 795, 853, 864
Mien-chou
. See
mien-hang ch’ien
guild-exemption fee
mien-i ch’ien
. See service
exemption, hired service
. See service-exemption
mien-i fa
measure
migration, 160, 190, 191
in the 1120s and 1130s, 699
north-south, 135–136
militarization, and political authority,
15
military
ability of, to choose own leaders,
44–45
affairs commission (ching-lüeh-ssu), 23
-agricultural outposts (ying-t’ien)
,
116–117, 125
arts, and Hsiao-tsung, 734
branding soldiers, 471. See also tattoo
“cohesive squad” measures (chieh-tui
fa), 471
colony system (t’un-t’ien)
, 733
combined battalion (ching-ping), 471
command (chih-hui)
, 471
company (pu), 471
control of
under Kao-tsung, 667–671
under T’ai-tsu, 215–220
, 27,
drill and review (chiao-yüeh)
410, 412–413, 445, 495
exercises, 740. See also military drill
and review (chiao-yüeh)
1060
glossary–index
military (cont.)
expansion, under Chu Wen
(895–907), 45–61
families, hereditary, 22
forces, administration and
deployment of, 233–237
of frontier tribal troops (fan-ping)
, 235
garrison fields, 208, 219
generals, 4, 676, 686, 744
control of, 49, 669–671
and hereditary control over regional
armies, 798
and imperial armies (chin-chün)
,
233–235, 310, 348
unfit soldiers from, 235, 733
, 407
inspector (hsün-chien)
local troops (ping-shih), 407
“loyal and righteous” (chung-i-chün)
, 823–827
, 733, 793, 804,
loyalist (i-shih)
823–827, 828, 832, 896
mixed battalion (chiang), 471
officer (lieh-hsiao), 158
corps revitalization, 27
palace. See Palace Army
, 328
patrol units (hsün-chien)
, 409
people’s army (min-ping)
,
prefectural troops (hsiang-chün)
234
private army, 150, 219, 666, 668, 671
power, separated from civil, 236–237
recruitment, 732
reform, 470–472
under Shen-tsung and Wang
An-shih
, 27–28
and weak frontiers, 27
,
reorganization, of Li Ts’un-hsü
70
, 49
retainers (pu-ch’ü)
,
“Righteous army” (i-chün)
663–664
of “righteous braves” (i-shih, i-yung),
311, 413
, 413
servitor (shih-ch’en)
squad (tui), 471
structure (tui-fa)
, 413
supervisor, 72, 76
, 91
troops, regional (ya-chün)
, 27,
Military Academy (Wu-hsüeh)
470
Military Affairs Commissioner, 109,
110, 115, 122
Military and Civil Affairs (chih chün-fu
shih)
, Director of, 142,
152
military families, hereditary. See
bureaucracy; civil service
militia (min-ping)
, 312, 325, 881,
921
, 403. See
“bowmen” (kung-shou)
also archers
i-yung
system, 413, 495
, 234
local (hsiang-ping)
, 145
officials (chün-chiang)
, 140
popular (t’u-t’uan)
“militocracy,” tenth century, 11
Min, 5, 10, 150–152
King of (Min wang), 158
local emperors in, 53
Ruler of (Min chu)
, 168
, 660
Min-chou
. See Min, Ruler of
Min chu
, 148–149
Min Hsü
Min K’ang-tsung, 179
Min kingdom (909–45), 133, 159, 168,
179, 195, 196–197, 220, 223
min-ping
. See army, people’s
(Ning-po
), 182,
Ming-chou
184, 949. See also Ching-yüan
Ming dynasty (1368–1644), 754
Ming-shou
era (1129), 651
. See Hall of Brightness,
Ming-t’ang
Hall of Enlightenment Ritual
Mingshan, 354
mining, 177
Minister of Revenue (hu-pu shang-shu),
545
glossary–index
, 458,
Ministry of Finance (Hu-pu)
459, 729, 750
Left Section (tso-ts-ao), 460
Right Section (yu-ts’ao)
, 460
Ministry of Justice, 239–240
Ministry of Personnel, 239–240, 460
Ministry of Revenue, 116, 239
Ministry of Rites, 239–240
Ministry of War, 239, 461
Ministry of Works, 239
mint. See specific treasury
, 721
Mo Chi
, 679
Mo Chiang
Mo Chien
(d. 1219), 832
, 4, 60, 87, 209
Mo-chou
monastery, 191, 208
monetary policy. See specific policy
money, 392, 438. See also currency
“money became dear and goods cheap”
(ch’ien-chung huo-ch’ing)
,
441
(Mong-k’o, Meng Ko,
Möngke
r. 1251–59), 868, 869, 870,
889, 920, 954
Mongol Yüan (1271–1368), 17
Mongols
, 17, 31, 32, 33, 34–35,
704
assault on Szechwan, 889
and Chin dynasty, 791
, 845
and Hsi Hsia
and the Southern Sung dynasty,
36–37
1274 escalation of attacks on Sung by,
927
monks. See specific actors
Monograph on tea (Ch’a-p’u)
, 175
“monopolists” (chien-ping chih chia)
, 893
monopoly. See also specific commodity
iron, 77
liquor, 192
salt, 77, 201, 327, 348, 351, 590,
593–594, 698, 907
tea, 284, 348, 351, 382
1061
Monopoly Tax Bureau (Chüeh-huo wu)
, 185
morality, unifying (i tao-te i pien feng-su)
, 364
Mote, Frederick W., 15, 17
Mou Tzu-ts-ai, 888
Mount T’ai
, 271
Mu-cheng, 468
. See Hostel for
Mu-ch’in chai
Imperial Clansmen
, 623–625. See also
Mu-chou
Yen-chou4
mu-i
. See hired service
Mu-jung Yen-ch’ao
(913–63),
113–114, 214, 216
. See mercenaries
mu-ping
Mu-tsung, 123
mulberry, 58, 175–176
murder. See assassination
music and musicians, 128, 608
mutiny. See rebellions
mutual guarantee group, neighborhood
(lin-chü-hsiang-pao)
, 408
,
mutual security system (pao-chia)
27, 351, 407–414, 419–429,
443, 449, 470, 471, 908, 911
abolition of, 494–496
abuse of guardsmen in, 445–446
civilian administrator (kan-tang
kung-shih)
, 446
, 446
lieutenant (chih-hui shih)
negative outcomes of, 445–446
sergeant (chih-shih), 446
“Myriad Word Memorial,” 24, 350,
358–361, 366, 384. See also
memorials
Myriad Years Mountain (Wan-sui shan)
, 605
names
, 444, 445
great (ta-hsing)
rectification of, 613
small (hsiao-hsing)
, 445
, 130, 147, 220
Nan-ch’ang
1062
glossary–index
, 170, 257
Nan-chao
Nan-p’ing
, 10, 954. See also
Ching-nan
King of (Nan-p’ing wang)
, 158
. See Nan-p’ing
Nan-p’ing wang
, King of
Nan-t’ien kuo
(Nan-t’ien
kingdom), 331
, 166. See also Chiang-ning;
Nanking
Chien-k’ang; Chin-ling
natural disaster. See specific disaster
navy, 125, 126, 219, 227. See also
waterways
Mongol, 920–921, 937
Sung, 706, 707, 932, 957
negotiation. See specific actor or issue
, 111
Nei-ch’iu
. See orders, imperial
nei-p’i
Nei-tsang k’u
. See Palace Treasury
Neo-Confucianism, 28, 36. See also
Tao-hsüeh
nephews, imperial (huang-chih)
,
259. See also adoption
nepotism, 237, 313, 369, 693, 816,
876, 936
network. See specific network
New Meaning of the Three Canons
(San-ching hsin-i), 364
, 24–27, 32,
New Policies (hsin-fa)
231, 327
components of, 384
fiscalization of, 394
institutional perspective on, 24
political perspective on, 24
predicates of success of, 367–378, 405
profitability of, 433–435
restoration of, under Ts’ai Ching
,
590–596
revanchist underpinnings of, 27
revival of, and revenue for
re-armament, 549
revival of, 543, 547
Shao-sheng
social impact of, 435–447
and Wang An-shih
, 24
, 171
Ngo Quyen
Ni Ssu
(1147–1220), 762, 812,
816
Nine Classics, 116, 295, 319
Nine Gifts, 51
nine kingdoms of the south, 206
Ning-kuo
, 933
. See also Ch’ing-yüan;
Ning-po
Ming-chou
(Chao K’uo
,
Ning-tsung
1168–1224, r. 1194–1224), 33,
773, 810–811, 882, 915. See also
(Ning-tsung,
Chao K’uo
1168–1224, r. 1194–1224)
final edict of, 836
and Hsiao-tsung, 785
personality of, 774–775
Ningsia modern province, 79, 252
Nishikawa Masao
, 200
. See rice, glutinous
no-mi
non-action, principle of (wu wei), 689
non-Chinese. See specific ethnic group
North China
consequences of Jurchen conquest of
(1127), 29
Khitan raids in (902–26), 64
in the late ninth century, 41
North China Plain, 222–223, 307, 615
,
Northeast Marchmount (Ken-yüeh)
605–606
Northern Capital, 305
Northern Han dynasty (952–79), 112,
124, 133, 206, 209, 248
and Later Chou
(951–54),
112–119
939 campaign against, 14
979 campaign against, 14
Northern Sung dynasty (960–1127)
fall of (1127), 614–643
financial resources of, 698–699
salt and tea monopolies of, 698
notice, palace, 934
Nung Chih-kao
(Jen-hui),
331–334
glossary–index
. See
nung-t’ien shui-li fa
agricultural lands and irregation
policy
Nung Tsun-fu (Nùng T{aa}n Phúa),
331
Nung Tsung-tan
, 334
nuns
Buddhist, 913
Taoist
, 292, 874
nurse. See specific actor
147, 928, 933, 937
O-chou,
obligation. See allegiance, alliance, filial
piety
occult master (fang-shih)
, 606, 608,
609
Office for Emergencies (Chi-su fang)
, 667
Office of Audience Ceremonies (Ko-men
ssu)
, 726, 763–764, 765,
768
Office of Diplomatic Correspondence
,
(Wang-lai kuo-hsin so)
269
Office of Economizing (Ts’ai-chien chü)
, 355
Office of the Trade Superintendent
, 185
(Shih-po ssu)
Office of Transmission (Yin-t’ai ssu)
, 449
offices
redundant (ch’ung-san tie-ssu)
,
458
sale of, 192
staff (fang), 462
stipendiary (chi-lu kuan)
,
238–239, 349, 458
“official families and families of
substance” (kuan-hu
,
hsing-shih-hu)
393
officials
, 376
drafting (chih-chih-kao)
finance, 109
1063
, 76,
supernumerary (jung-kuan)
349, 352, 459
Ögödei (r. 1229–41), 853, 863, 867
succession following death of,
867–868
omen. See portents
orders
“confidential” (mi-pai)
, 723
imperial (chih2) , 285, 340, 742
imperial or “palace” (nei-p’i, yü-pi),
723
religious, 121
secret, 723
Ordos Desert, 4, 17, 21, 23, 251, 252,
300, 354
orphan. See adoption
, 676
Ou-t’ang
, 649
Ou-yang Ch’e
Ou-yang Hsiu
(1007–72)
reforms
and the Ch’ing-li
(1043–45), 316, 317, 321,
364
and civil service reform, 352
on factionalism, 783
and Fan Chung-yen, 298
and government usury, 414–416
and the imperial libraries, 294
after Jen-tsung, 337
and Jen-tsung, 299, 323
and Li Yüan-hao, 315
and Liu Yen, 185, 352
and prefecture schools, 318
and Shih Chieh, 321–322
and Su Hsün, 345–346
and surveillance commissioners,
320
and Wang An-shih, 373
and Ying-tsung, 341, 345
Outline and details of the comprehensive
mirror (Tzu-chih t’ung-chien
kang-mu), 900
Outstanding models from the storehouse of
literature (Ts’e-fu yüan-kuei,
1005–13), 255–256
1064
glossary–index
. See Eight Conduct policy
(pa-hsing)
pa-hsing2
. See eight punishments
(pa-hsing2)
. See “eight treasures” or
pa-pao
“eight imperial seals”
pa-tzu chün
. See Army of Eight
Characters
Pacification Commission (an-fu-ssu), 23
Pacification Commissioner (ching-lüeh
an-fu shih), 619, 625, 667
Pacification Commissioner-in-chief
(an-fu ta-shih), 669
pacifist. See specific actor
“pacifying the Four Quarters and
intimidating the barbarians,”
270
Pai Shih-chung, 584, 637, 638
palace, temporary (hsing-kung), 652
Palace Army, 118, 120–121, 131
Palace Censor (tien-chung shih yü-shih),
495
Palace Command (Tien-ch’ien ssu), 5,
208–209, 216, 218, 219, 234,
313
Palace Guard, 743
Palace Library (Pi-shu sheng), 691, 692
Palace of Extended Blessings (Yen-fu
kung), 603
Palace of Nine Movements (Chiu-ch’eng
kung), 609
Palace Treasury (Nei-tsang k’u), 224,
291, 302, 749–750
Pan-chih. See Imperial Elite
P’an Fu, 840–841
P’an Jen, 840, 848
P’an Ping, 840–841
P’ang Chi
, 299, 311, 323
reforms
and the Ch’ing-li
(1043–45), 317, 321
, 162
P’ang Chü-chao
, 153
P’ang Hsün
revolt (860s), 137–138
pa-hsing
, 305, 306
Pao-an chün
pao-chang
. See small-guard chief
. See superior guard leader
pao-cheng
. See mutual security system
pao-chia
. See horses, (mutual security
pao-ma
horse pasturage)
Pao-shan
. See “Precious Mountain”
. See guardsmen
pao-ting
parent (ch’in) , 342, 678
Parhae. See Po-hei
“party system,” 25
pasture. See agriculture
Pauper’s Cemetery (Lou-tse yüan), 596,
599, 600
pavilions, pleasure, 887
pawn shops, 444
), 267, 268,
payments, annual (sui-pi
718, 719. See also tribute, annual
peace settlement of 1164–65, 713–715.
See also specific peace settlement
Pearl Pavilion of the Jade Hall
,
185
,5
Pearl River
pearls, 227, 280, 303, 684
peasantry, militarizing the, 409
Pei-ching, xi, 818
Pei-chou
, 62
. See Conspectus of
Pei-pien yao-lan
border region defense preparedness
, xi, 14, 43
Peking
. See loans, basic
pen-ch’ien
capitalization
P’eng I-pin
(d. 1225), 847, 848,
850–851
(1142–1206),
P’eng Kuei-nien
758, 761, 767, 770, 777, 778,
779, 780, 781, 783, 790, 814
P’eng Shih-hsi
, 329
, 343
P’eng Ssu-yung
. See “factions (tang) and
p’eng-tang
cliques”
pepper, 184
Peterson, Charles A., 34
glossary–index
philosopher and philosophy. See specific
actor or movement
physician. See specific doctor or patient
physiographical barriers, national, and
political boundaries in the
south, 10–11
Pi Chung-yu
, 435, 482
. See fiefdom, insignificant
pi-i
. See Imperial Library,
Pi-shu sheng
Palace Library
, 794, 795, 805
Pi Tsai-yü
, 162
P’i Jih-hsiu
(d. 1253), 885
Pieh Chih-chieh
Pien Canal
, 222
, 43, 48, 51–52, 180.
Pien-chou
See also K’ai feng
by 895, 42
pien-hsiu chung-shu t’iao-li-ssu
. See Sub-council
for the Compilation of
Secretariat Regulations
. See K’ai feng
Pien-liang
, 124
Pien River
piety, filial, 678, 768, 902
pillage, 207, 210, 942, 959–961
Pin-chou
, 50
. See Wei-ming
Ping-ch’ang
Ping-ch’ang
Ping-chou
, 298, 299. See also
T’ai-yüan
ping-shih. See military, local troops
P’ing Chi, 334
P’ing-chiang
, 933, 937, 939. See
also Su-chou
P’ing-chou
, 629
P’ing-hsia
, 551, 616
pinyin, xi
pirate. See specific actor or engagement
plague, 99
playing barbarians off against each other
), 247
(i-i chih-i
pneumonia. See specific actor
Po-chou
, 271
1065
, 954
Po-chou2
Po-hai
(Parhae), on 16
, 59
Po-hsiang
. See erudite
po-hsüeh hung-tz’u
literatus
. See trading agencies
po-i-wu
P’o-yang Lake
, 5, 134
poem, poet, and poetry. See specific entries
policy
criticism. See memoranda, memorials
foreign. See specific ruler or councilor
frontier
Shih Ching-t’ang’s, 94–95
, 34–35
Southern Sung
Policy Deliberation Hall (I-shih t’ang
), 753
Poorhouse policy (chü-yang fa), 598
poorhouses (chü-yang yüan), 596,
597–599
population. See also specific location
registers, 77
southern, 134
urban, growth of, 701–703
portents
astronomical, 498–499
cosmological, 452, 535, 578, 579,
605, 902. See also comet; eclipse,
solar
meteorological, 761
supernatural, 53
poverty. See debt
power, division of, 240–241
preceptor, grand, 791
“Precious Mountain” (Pao-shan
),
959–961
prefect (tz’u-shih
), 151, 231
prefectures (chou , chün ), 231
administration of, 748
administrator (chih chou), 748
Chu Wen’s allegiance to the, 49, 55
and the Early T’ang , 40
prerogative, imperial (jen-chu chih ch’üan
), 364–367
1066
glossary–index
), 127
prince of state (kuo-wang
prison. See specific location
privilege
gubernatorial, Li Ts’un-hsü’s
reduction of, 70
hereditary (yin2 ), 158, 763, 782
production, industrial, 174
professor. See specific actor
“Propagating Abbot (ch’uan-fa sha-men
, Han Chiang
), 451
propriety (li3), 934
proscriptions. See also blacklist
factional (1102–04), 572–578
intent of, 575–578
prosperous and strong (fu-ch’iang
),
24
prostitutes, 874, 887, 914
protection privileges (yin2 ), 238,
318
hereditary, 324, 325
protégé. See adoption; “sons,” imperial
protest. See specific cause, instigator, or
location
provinces (tao), 40
after An Lu-shan’s rebellion, 40
Provisioning Bureaus, 605
pu-ch’ü
. See retainers, personal
military
(d. 1221),
Pu-sa An-chen
830
(P’u-san K’uei
,
Pu-sa K’uei
d. 1207), 805
P’u, Prince of. See Chao Tsung-shih
(Sung Ying-tsung
,
r. 1063–67); Chao Yün-jang
(995–1059)
controversy over the ritual status of,
340–343
P’u-an, Prince, 522, 708. See also Chao
(1127–94);
Po-ts’ung
(Chao Po-tsung,
Chao Yüan
Prince P’u-an, Emperor
Hsiao-tsung)
P’u-chou
, 627
P’u-san K’uei
. See Pu-sa K’uei
P’u Shou-keng
, 950
, 451
P’u-t’ien Fang
, 382, 478
P’u Tsung-meng
, 725
p’u-yeh
Public Fields (kung-t’ien) measure,
“disturbed the people” (jao-min
),
894
public fields, public lands. See Public
Fields measure (kung-t’ien fa
)
Public Lands Bureau (Kung-t’ien so
), 134, 370, 591
public opinion. See memoranda;
memorials
Public Pharmacies (Ho-chi chü), 597
purchase station (chü ), 432
purge, factional, and Six Felons, 557
rain. See flooding
“rally on behalf of the emperor”
(ch’in-wang
), 933
rape, 226
rating system, merit, 318
“ravage the people and injure the state”
(ping-min shang-kuo
),
488
rebellion, 96, 934. See also Red Turban
) uprising
(Hung-chin
, 96
of An Ch’ung-jung
of An Lu-shan
, 38, 43, 134,
607
across the Central Plain, 105
, 169
in Chang-chou
of Chang Fu and Mo Chien, 832
at Ch’en-ch’iao
, 210–213
, 831
at Ch’en-chou2
Ch’iu Fu’s, 137
of Chung Hsiang, 665
, 90–91
of Fan Yen-kuang
in Fu-chien, 948
at Hsia-chou
, 54
at Hsü-chou, 833
glossary–index
of Hsü Pu , 833
in Kuang-nan, 948
of Li Ch’ung-chin
, 215
, 81
of Li I-ch’ao
, 831
of Li Yüan-li
, 832–833
of Lo Jih-yüan
of Lo Shih-ch’uan
, 831
, 73
in Lo-yang
, 91
at Meng-chou
, 329–334
of Nung Chih-kao
by the Palace Guard, 937–946
, 137–138
of P’ang Hsün
in reaction to Kuo Ch’ung-t’ao’s
murder, 72–73
by Shantung loyalists, 845–852,
896
in Shuo-feng, 79
Southern, under Kao-tsung, 664–666
of Wang Hsiao-po
, 257
and
of Wang Hsien-chih
, 138–140
Huang Ch’ao
, 833
at Ya-chou
of Yang Yao, 665
rebels. See rebellion
recentralization
and Ch’ai Jung
,5
,5
and Chu Wen
reclamation and reconstruction,
172–174
Record by the Su River (Su-shui chi-wen
), 693
Records of the historian (Shih-chi
),
689
). See
recovery of lost land (hui-fu
irredentism
“red banner” (ch’ih chih
), 370
),
Red-jacket bandits (Hung-ao tsei
824
, 170–171, 189
Red River
) uprising,
Red Turban (Hung-chin
832
refugees (kuei-ching jen), 118, 121, 128,
137, 191, 200, 448, 701, 714,
715, 718, 821, 866, 881, 907
1067
regency. See specific actor or regency
), 107, 110, 111
regent (chien-kuo
, 99
Regent of Lo-yang
Regent of the Eastern Capital, 61
regicide. See specific actors
regimes, 42
hereditary, 40
Register of Public Revenue (Tu-chih
tu-chi
), 730
relations, foreign. See specific ruler or
councilor
relationship, fictive, 658, 719. See also
adoption
relief, 128
religion. See specific religion
remonstrance, 517–518. See also
memorials
grand master of (chien-i ta-fu
), 519
offices, 373–378. See also Censorate
);
(Yü-shih t’ai
Remonstrance Bureau
)
(Chien-yüan
“opening channels of” (k’ai yen-lu
), 324, 367, 448, 455, 480
“roads of” (yen-lu
), 25, 532,
554, 564, 573, 578
controlled by reformists, 490
unobstructed by Hui-tsung, 579
),
Remonstrance Bureau (Chien-yüan
274, 313, 373
renegades. See bandits; deserters
rent, 627. See also household, tenant
reorganization, gubernatorial, 82
reports. See specific reports
“Request for a Finance Planning
Commission,” 403
reserves, unspent (hsien-tsai ch’ien
), 434
), 245
Resident Defender (liu-shou
resources
economic, state appropriation of, 15
), 384
management of (li-ts’ai
Restoration, second (883), 40, 42
1068
glossary–index
Restoration reign (1086–94),
irredentism and state activism
under, 25. See also Yüan-yu
partisans (Yüan-yu tang
)
restraint, administrative (an-chih
), 479
retainers and retinues. See specific actors
retreat. See specific event or location
revanchism, 27, 267, 791, 793
revenue, and expenditure, 319
rhinoceros horn, 184, 185, 186
rice, 172–174, 222, 225, 684
Champa, 136
glutinous (no-mi
), 443
uncooked, 475
rich men and great families (fu-jen
) 405
ta-hsing
riot. See rebellion
rites, 128
mourning, 753, 756, 764, 768, 776,
785, 786, 789, 815, 882
Rites of Chou
(Chou-li
), 415
Rites of the Golden Register (chin-lu
chiao), 610
ritual, 340–343
controversy. See Chao Shu
(Ying-tsung, 1032–67,
r. 1063–67)
court, and Hui-tsung, 608–609
Ritual Plowing, 291
robes, imperial, 289, 337, 646, 774,
840, 956
routes, 178–179
of communication, 866
major inland, 178
north-south, 222
supply
Later Chou
, 125
Southern T’ang, 125
Rule, personal (ch’in-cheng)
of Che-tsung, 531, 533, 535, 539,
540, 547
of Hui-tsung, 554
), 157
“rural bandit” (ts’ao-tsei
rural credit (ch’ing-miao
), 394–403,
414–419. See also Green Sprouts
sacrifices
feng-shan, 270, 273
twin, 271
“Sagely Lord” (sheng-kung
), 624
Sai-men, 307
salt
), 594
certificates (yen-ch’ao
, 141
and Ch’ien Liu
commercial permits for sale of, 430
and Fan Chung-yen
, 194
as government payment for grain, 284
in Huai-nan, 127–128
permits, 432
, 93
and Sang Wei-han
sea, 593
Southern Sung tax on, 698
in Szechwan
, 165, 256, 278, 698
, 251, 252
and the Tangut
, 432
and Tseng Pu
, 156
and Wang Chien
, 145
and Yang Hsing-mi
Salt and Iron Commissioner, 144
Salt and Iron Monopoly Bureau, 261
San-chao pei-meng hui-pien
,
559
. See “three traitors”
san-chien
San-ching hsin-i. See New Meaning of the
Three Canons
San-ch’uan
, 307
. See “three worthies”
san-hsien
. See Three Institutes of
San-kuan
History, Literature, and
Worthies
San-men-hsia
, 83
San-pai, 302
. See Three Departments
san-sheng
. See Finance Commission
San-ssu
. See finance
san-ssu shih
commissioner
glossary–index
. See “three obediences”
san-ts’ung
san-ts’ung kuan
. See servants
. See Three Military Bureaus
san-ya
sandalwood, 184
, 664
Sang Chung
, 308–309
Sang I
Sang Wei-han
, 93, 94, 96, 97,
98, 100, 102
sapanwood, 184
Sariti, Anthony, 356
“scholars of this decadent age” (mo-shih
),
hsüeh-shih tai-fu
361
scholarship, 161
School of Calligraphy (Shu-hsüeh2),
School of Mathematics (Suan-hsüeh), 588
School of Medicine (I-hsüeh), 588
School of Painting (Hua-hsüeh), 588
schools
county (hsien-hsüeh
), 586
grades or “halls” in, 586
county and prefectural, 295, 318,
325, 585, 586, 587
and farmland, 587
, 318
and Liu Shih
and government land (kuan-t’ien),
295, 319, 700
land (hsüeh-t’ien
), 694–695
process of instruction in, 359
public, 695
state-funded, 586
technical and specialty, 588
Scogin, Hugh, 599
scribes (shu-piao shih
), 398. See
also bookkeepers
Sealed Treasury (Storehouse for the
Reserves of the State Treasury,
Tso-tsang feng-chuang k’u
), 751–752
seals, imperial, 956
“second Yao or Shun” (Chin Shih-tsung
), 790
Secretariat (Chung-shu sheng
), 462
1069
),
Director of (chung-shu ling
462
Examiners for (chien-cheng chung-shu
wu-fang kung-shih
), 382
secretariat, executive (chih-chih-ssu
chien-hsiang en-tzu), 379
Secretariat-Chancellery (Chung-shu
men-hsia
), 21, 236, 239,
240, 241, 250, 261, 264, 275,
276, 368, 460, 462–463
Chief Executive of the (t’ung chung-shu
men-hsia p’ing-chang shih), 463
Security and Relief Clinics (An-chi fang),
597
“self-criticism rooms” (tzu-sung chai
), 587
Senior Preceptor (t’ai-shih), 688
sericulture, 175–176, 729
servants (san-ts’ung kuan
), 398
“Serve the country with passion; swear
to kill the Chin bandits,” 663.
See also Army of Eight Characters
)
(pa-tzu chün
), 398
service, government (chih-i
service-assistance fees (chu-i ch’ien
), 400, 420
service-exemption fees (mien-i ch’ien
, mu-i fu), 351, 376,
394–403, 420, 439, 441–442,
449, 468, 471, 500–501, 591
service-exemption policy (mien-i fa
), 400, 591–593. See also
hired service policy (mu-i, ku-i
fa)
Sha-men Island
, 285
, 10
Sha-shih
(political and cultural group
Sha-t’o
from Central Asia), 4, 5, 41,
164, 206
, 111, 310
Shan-chou
, 83
Shan-chou2
Shan-chou3
, 617
1070
glossary–index
, 23, 309, 312
Shan-hsi
drill and review (chiao-yüeh
) in,
412
Sung concern with, 315
. See abdication; abdication
shan-jang
. See finance, men
shan li-ts’ai che
skilled at
shan-ling shih
. See Imperial
Internment, Master of
, 302
Shan-yü Wei-liang
treaty (1005), 20, 21,
Shan-yüan
264
geopolitical equilibrium after,
1005–67, 20–24
provisions of, 262–267, 270
Shang , Lady, 292, 293, 294
Shang-ch’ing. See Highest Purity sect
, 852
Shang-chou
shang-fan
. See detached service
(ancient honorific title), 59
Shang Fu
(1038–1115),
Shang-kuan Chün
436, 456, 535
, 429
Shang-kuan Kung-ying
Shang-kuan Wu, 657
. See state, superior
shang-kuo
Shang-lin Lake
, 177
. See Imperial University
shang-she
), Superior
(T’ai-hsüeh
College of the
. See Department of
Shang-shu sheng
State Affairs
shang ssu-chün
. See Upper Four
Armies
, 927
Shang-tu
Shansi modern province, 4, 11, 14, 39,
42–47, 83, 133, 206, 284
Shantung
, 34, 48, 66, 137, 182,
845–852
, 154
Shao-chou
, 949
Shao-chou2
. See Court Mentor
shao-fu
(1131–63), 660. See also
Shao-hsing
K’uai-chi; Yüeh-chou
, 717
Shao Hung-yüan
Shao Lang-tso
, 314
(1057–1134), 675
Shao Po-wen
era (Continued Sagacity,
Shao-sheng
1094–97), 25, 535
internal rivalries of the, 553
triumphs of the coalition of the,
551
“share one mind and one morality”
(t’ung-hsin t’ung-te
),
363
. See swamp fever
she-chang
. See “gods of soil and grain”
she-chi
sheep. See agriculture
Shen, Prince of. See Chao Pi
Shen Chi-chang
, 451
, 182
Shen Chia
Shen-chih, 178
Shen-chou
, 122
, Divine
Shen-hsiao. See Taoism
Empyrean sect of (Shen-hsiao)
. See Judicial
Shen-hsing yüan
Control Office
. See Bureau of
Shen-kuan yüan
Personnel Evaluation
Shen K’uo
, 456, 472, 473, 476
Shen Sung, 162
. See tax, adult male
shen-ting ch’ien
cash
, 157
Shen-ts’e Army
(Chao Hsü
,
Shen-tsung
1048–85, r. 1067–85), 28, 347,
762
as an activist ruler, 455
campaign against Tangut Hsi Hsia,
464–478
core of administrative reforms of, 459,
464
end of irrendentist ambitions of, 477
irredentism and state activism under,
24–25, 28
irredentism of, 23
and military reform, 27–28
glossary–index
, 539
Shen-tsung shih-lu
Sheng-ch’ing, 453
Sheng-hsing yüan. See Judicial Control
Office
sheng-kung
. See “Sagely Lord”
, Emperor, 262
Sheng-tsung
Sheng Tu
, 294
Shensi modern province, 54, 284
sheriff (wei ), 407
shih. See histories (shih)
(1205–49),
Shih Chai-chih
884–885, 904
. See military servitors
shih-ch’en
Shih Chieh
, 321
reforms
and the Ch’ing-li
(1043–45), 321
. See Book of poetry
Shih-ching
, 884
Shih Ching-ch’ing
Shih-ching Garrison
, 140
(Chin Kao-tsu
Shih Ching-t’ang
, r. 936–42), 81, 83,
85–98, 213. See also Chin
(r.936–42)
Kao-tsu
(d. 1227), 849
Shih Ch’ing
, 473
Shih-chou
Shih-chou2
, 954
, 299
Shih Chung-li
, 97
Shih Ch’ung-jui
(Chin Shao-ti
Shih Ch’ung-kuei
, 942–47), 97–102,
107
Liao revenge against, 99–103
Shih Hao
(1106–94), 714,
715–717, 720, 725, 743–744
, 814
and Tao-hsüeh
Shih Hung-chao
, 108, 109–110
. See state trade
shih-i
. See State Trade policy
shih-i fa
. See State Trade Agency
Shih-i ssu
. See State Trade Bureau
Shih-i wu
shih ideal, 360
, 103
Shih K’uang-wei
Shih Kuei
(d. 1220), 826, 827
1071
Shih Kung-pi, 581
, 182
Shih-kuo ch’un-ch’iu
. See market usage
shih-li ch’ien
surtax
(veritable record, reign
shih-lu
chronicle). See Veritable Record
Shih Mi-chien
(1164–1232),
831
, 910
Shih Mi-chung
, 844
Shih Mi-kung
(1164–1233,
Shih Mi-yüan
1208–33), 26, 32–33, 672, 775,
807–808, 809, 810, 811, 812,
875, 896, 914, 915
and accession of Chao Yün, 836
and Empress Yang2
, 813
and foreign policy, 817–823, 852
and loyalist armies, 823–827
and Lu Chiu-yüan
, 815
and succession after Ning-tsung,
834–838
, 814
and Tao-hsüeh
(954–1010), 217
Shih Pao-chi
. See Office of the Trade
Shih-po ssu
Superintendent
Shih Shou-hsin
, 217
(1189–1257),
Shih Sung-chih
855, 856–858, 862, 865, 866,
879–882, 884, 891, 896
. See elite, scholarly
shih-ta-fu
Shih T’ing-ch’en, 680, 681
Shih-tsung (r. 1161–89), 707, 790
shih-wei ch’in-chün
. See Imperial
Bodyguard
. See Metropolitan
Shih-wei-ssu
Command
Shih Yen-chih
(1217–60), 892
. See Attendent Censor
shih yü-shih
ships, 706, 928, 939, 941, 956
overseas trade (hai-po hsiang-yao
), 185
(Shansi
), 124, 125,
Shou-chou
126, 145, 634, 856–858
1072
glossary–index
. See household,
shou-shih fa
grading system, self-registration
shou-yü shih
. See commissioner,
defense, grand
shrine. See specific shrine
Shu , 176. See also factions
Shu , Prince of (Wu Hsi
),
801
, 129
Shu-ch’eng
(younger uncle and
shu-chih
nephew). See Hsiao-ts’ung,
relationship between Chin and
Southern Sung during reign of
Shu-ching
. See Book of documents
. See learning, Szechwanese
Shu-hsüeh
Shu-hsüeh2. See School of Calligraphy
. See Bureau of
Shu-mi yüan
Military Affairs
shu-piao shih
. See scribes
, 156
Shu t’ao-wu
. See Shu , King of
Shu wang
. See intendents, military
shuai-ch’en
. See Water Margin
Shui-hu chuan
, 87, 632
Shun-chou
, 79, 621
Shuo-fang
siege. See specific location
silk, 684, 909
and the defensive works in Ho-tung,
302
and Ho-pei, 310, 311
and the Huai-nan campaign, 127
and the Later Chou
, 223
, 73
and Li Ssu-yüan
, 314
and Li Yüan-hao
and the Liao , 271, 311
in multistate trade, 268
production, 43
and Shan-hsi, 302
and Shih Ching-t’ang
, 87
in the South Seas trade, 184
Southern Sung tax on, 698
, 432
and Tseng Pu
Silk Road, 93
silkworm, 175–176
silver, 127, 225, 267, 268, 280, 302,
749, 909
, 223
and the Later Chou
and the Liao , 271, 311
Sino-Steppe relations, 20
Sino-Tangut war, first (1038–42), 22,
348
Six Felons (liu tsei)
, 557, 604, 605,
624, 625, 627, 638–639
Six Imperial Armies, 48, 75, 81, 82
Sixteen Prefectures of Yen-Yün (Yen-Yün
), 615, 627,
shi-liu chou
633
and Chao K’uang-yin
, 12
enumerated, 87
and Hui-tsung, 28
and Kao Jung, 129
, 206, 354
and the Khitan
and the Later Chou
, 4, 209
and the Liao , 16
location of, 4
second invasion of (986), 14
, 87
and Shih Ching-t’ang
and the Sung , 247, 249
and T’ai-tsu, 20, 221
T’ai-tsung’s campaign against, 248
Sixth Platoon Bridge, 808
“smashing the pasture and grain” (ta
ts’ao-yü), 103
Smith, Paul J., 24, 619
, 348, 446,
Sogabe Shizuo
907
soil. See agriculture; flooding
Somers, Robert, 136–137
Son of Heaven, 820, 854
“sons,” imperial (huang-tzu
), 94,
258, 914. See also adoption; heir
)
apparent (t’ai-tzu
“South before North” strategy, 209
south of the passes. See Kuan-nan
South Seas, 184–186
Southeast Asia, 253
Southern Capital (Yu-chou
),
310
glossary–index
Southern Han dynasty (917–79), 5, 133,
153–155, 170, 195, 203–204,
209, 220, 224, 227
local emperors in, 53
and T’ai-tsu, 14
Southern Kingdoms (891–79), 4, 43,
206
bureaucratic governance in the,
189–191
components to collapse of, 197–205
early political recruitment in,
158–163
interstate mutations in the, 194,
197
10th century importance of, 135
Southern Sung dynasty (1127–1297),
644
financial administration of, 697
Mongol conquest of the (1279), 1
salt and tea monopolies of, 698
trends in the fall of, 36–37
weakness of later, 913
wealth in, 907
Southern T’ang
dynasty (937–75)
, 10
and Chien-chou
demographics of, 227–228
and Hsü Chih-kao
, 163
, 131
and the Later Chou
, 124–127
and the Later Shu
(Hsü Chih-kao
and Li Pien
), 167
around 951, 10–11
and T’ai-tsu, 14
and the traditional elite, 160
along the Yangtze River
,
195
and the Wu , 5
sovereigns and sovereignities. See specific
actors and reigns
“specialist learning” (chuan-men hsüeh
), 693
“specialized and obscure learning”
(chuan-men ch’ü-hsüeh
),
ban against, 786
1073
spices, 184, 185, 186, 684
Spring and Autumn Annals (Ch’un-ch’iu
), 689
“spurious learning.” See Tao-hsüeh
(Learning of the Way)
spy. See specific actor
ssu2 . See Buddhism, temples and
monastaries of
, 126, 713, 714, 718, 794
Ssu-chou
. See
ssu-k’ou ts’an-chün
Administrator for Public Order
Ssu-k’u ch’üan-shu, xi
Ssu-ma K’ang, 479
Ssu-ma Kuang
(1019–86), 493,
693
on administrative reorganization, 464
and alleged plot to depose Che-tsung,
542
alleged treachery of, 541
on border policy, 489
on bureaucratic decision-making,
356–357
on catchment basins in Wu-Yüeh
, 173
censoral indictments of, 537
and Chang Tun
, 493
and the Chen-tsung conspiracy, 261
on Chih-kao, 167
reforms
and the Ch’ing-li
(1043–45), 364
, 137
and Ch’iu Fu
on commercial importance of tribute,
179
on compulsory drill, 445
criticized for Hsi Hsia
accommodation, 537
and Dowager Empress Hsüan-jen
, 487–509
on economics, 387
, 338
and Empress Kao
and “engrossers,” 442
on the Finance Planning Commission,
380
on fiscal expenditures, 355
1074
glossary–index
(1019–86) (cont.)
Ssu-ma Kuang
funeral of, 514
and government usury, 414
and Green Sprouts policies, 417
on hired-service, 437
and Hsing Shu
, 479
later years of, 480–483
on legitimacy, 52, 85
on Li Ching
, 199
, 350
and Liu An-shih
, 113
and Liu Ch’ung
, 169
on Liu Ts’ung-hsiao
on militarization of the peasantry,
494
on mutual aid, 435
and the New Policies, 25, 448
on open-sea trade, 178
opposed to service-exemption policy,
400
on place of money in the economy,
438
political agenda of his anti-reform
coalition of, 494–505
posthumous honors recinded, 538
on sericulture in Hunan
, 176
and Shen-tsung, 354–355, 361, 454,
465, 478–479
and Shih Ching-t’ang
, 94
stripped of prestige titles, 541,
574
, 345
and Su Ch’e
on Sui-te
, 23
(Ch’ang-sha
),
on T’an-chou
198
on Tangut threat, 478
on taxation, 172
and Te-kuang
, 102
in 1085, 498
, 491
and Ts’ai Ch’üeh
, 370–371,
and Wang An-shih
373, 377, 383, 453, 490
, 159, 162, 180,
on Wang Chien
195
, 137
and Wang Lu
and Wang Yüan-chieh, 164
on Yang Hsing-mi
, 145
on Yin Fan-cheng, 202
and Ying-tsung, 340, 341–343
. See Court of
Ssu-nung ssu
Agricultural Supervision
ssu-tang
. See clique
stages, ritual, 609
), 407, 420,
stalwart (chuang-ting
427
standards, Confucian, 777
Standon, Naomi, 5
stars, falling, 844
starvation. See famine
state (chien pang-chia)
, 302
budget, 77
building
in Inner Asia, 15–17
in the north and south, 1–11
on the Steppe, 15–19
finances, under Li Ssu-yüan
,
77–78
), 684
superior (shang-kuo
vassal, 718, 805
State Council. See Council of State
State History (kuo-shih
), 558
,
State Meeting Hall (Tu-t’ang)
240
), 429–435,
State Trade (shih-i
443
policy (shih-i fa)
, 404,
449–450, 497–498
,
revival of, under the Shao-sheng
546–548
State Trade Agency (Shih-i ssu)
,
449, 497, 498
),
State Trade Bureau (Shih-i wu
406, 429–431, 443
,
revival of, under the Shao-sheng
547
revival of branches of, under the
, 547
Shao-sheng
glossary–index
State Treasury (Tao-tsang k’u), Southern
Storehouse of the (Tso-tsung
nan-k’u), 751–752
statecraft, “technology of,” 17
status, hereditary, 238–240
stele, 697
blacklist, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579,
580
Steppe, state building on the, 15–19
storehouse, prefectural public
(kung-shih-k’u
), 425
Storehouse for the Reserves of the State
Treasury (Tso-tsang feng-chuang
k’u
), 751. See also
Sealed Treasury
storms. See disasters, flooding, portents
“strengthening the superior men and
illuminating the petty ones”
(ch’ang chün-tzu, hsiao hsiao-jen
), 363
“strengthening the trunk and weakening
the branches” (ch’iang-kan jo-chih
), 670
“strengthening the walls and clearing
out the countryside” (chien-pi
ch’ing yeh
), 469, 475
Strickmann, Michel, 610, 613
“strong trunk and weak branches”
policy, 269
student. See Imperial University
)
(T’ai-hsüeh
Su, Prince, 647
Su Ch’e
(1039–1112), 175, 345,
370, 379, 380, 387, 395, 442,
478, 491, 493, 503, 504, 507,
511, 538
and amnesty for Ts’ai Ch’üeh
,
528
banishment of, 542
on drafted service, 503
opposition to reformist revival,
534
and Teng Wen-po, 527
1075
and Chang Tan,
on Ts’ai Ch’üeh
499
Su-chou
, 140, 146, 181–182. See
also P’ing-chiang
Ts’ai Ching’s Buddhist temple in, 604
, 49, 717, 795
Su-chou2
Su Feng-chi
, 107, 108, 109–110
(1009–66), 345, 387
Su Hsün
Su Hsün-ch’in, 299
. See Investigation and
Su-li so
Prosecution Bureau
, 299, 305
Su Shen
(1037–1101), 345, 370,
Su Shih
372, 380, 421, 478, 481, 491,
503–504, 507, 511, 512–513,
516, 521, 538, 575
banishment of, 542
and Ch’eng I
, 514
exonerated by Hsüan-jen, 516
on political conformity, 520–521
rehabilitation of, 564
and Ts’ai Ch’üeh
, 523
(d. 1207), 791, 807
Su Shih-tan
Chin demand for the head of,
811–812
Su-shui chi-wen
. See Record by the
Su River
, 323
Su Shun-ch’in
Su Sung
and “factional treachery,” 529
and Shen-tsung, 454
Su Yao-ch’in, 298
Suan-hsüeh
. See School of Mathematics
Sub-council for the Compilation of
Secretariat Regulations (pien-hsiu
chung-shu t’iao-li-ssu
), 381
subject (ch’en ), 94, 124, 303, 315, 682
subordination, 112
succession, lack of patrilinear, 913–915
“Succession to the Way” (tao-t’ung), 900
(Shan-hsi, later Sui-te
Sui-chou
chün), 23, 251, 354, 469
1076
glossary–index
, 827
Sui-chou2
sui-kung
. See tribute, annual
. See payments, annual
sui-pi
Sui-te chün, 23, 469, 470. See also
Sui-chou
suicide, 944–945, 956, 957, 958
Sun Chin
, 679, 680
, 101, 106, 113
Sun Fang-chien
, and prefecture schools, 318
Sun Fu
Sun Hu-ch’en (d. 1276), 932
, 135, 146–147, 149
Sun Ju
, 851
Sun K’o-k’uan
Sun Mien, 294, 317, 332–333
Sun O
, 545
(962–1033), 272, 282,
Sun Shih
284, 294
, 287
Sun Tsu-te
Sung , Empress (951–95), 242
Sung Che-tsung
(r. 1085–1100),
24. See also Chao Hsü2
Sung Chen-tsung
(r. 997–1022),
20. See also Chao heng
Sung Ch’i
, 299, 318, 319, 323
, 161, 176,
Sung Ch’i-ch’iu
193
Sung Chiang
, 588, 626–627
Sung-Chin Alliance (1115–23),
627–633
Sung-Chin campaign of 1163, 715
Sung-Chin peace
arguments against, 678–679
arguments in favor of, 679
treaty (1138), 682
treaty (1141), 684
Sung-Chin war
first (1123–26), 633–639, 827–830
loyalist armies in, 827, 828
second (1156–57), 639–643
1217 conflict, 822
(r. 1126–27),
Sung Ch’in-tsung
28
, 939
Sung Ching
Sung dynastic history (Sung shih
),
259, 273, 376, 557, 594, 809,
810, 851, 860, 863, 901, 916,
918, 929, 939
Sung dynasty (960–1279), 1, 247
administrative systems of, 457–459
conservatism in later, 712
1129 reform of central government
of, 652
founding and consolidation of the
(960–1000), 11–14
“golden age” of, 538
imperial tombs, 959. See also
“Precious Mountain” (Pao-shan
)
and the Mongols
, 850–852
and multistate system, 20–24
name derivation of, 11
organization of territorial
administration uder the,
231–232
political culture of, 498
reconstruction of, under Hsiao-tsung
(1165–73), 720–737
social turmoil before the
establishment of the, 1
1234 campaign against the Chin,
861–863
Sung Ho-tung circuit, 4
Sung Hsi-ho circuit, xi
Sung-Hsi Hsia peace treaty, 507–508
terms of, 506
, 323
Sung Hsiang
Sung Hsiao-tsung
(r. 1162–89),
13. See also Chao Po-ts’ung; Chao
Yüan
(r. 1100–26), 24.
Sung Hui-tsung
See also Chao Chi
; Prince of
Tuan
Sung hui-yao
. See Essential
regulations of the Sung (Sung
hui–yao)
(1010–63,
Sung Jen-tsung
r. 1022–63), 20, 300. See also
Chao Chen
(Sung Jen-tsung
, 1010–63, r. 1022–63)
glossary–index
(r. 1127–62), 28.
Sung Kao-tsung
See also Chao Kou
; Prince
K’ang
Sung Kuang-nan East circuit, xi
(r. 1274–76).
Sung Kung-tsung
(r. 1224–64). See
Sung Li-tsung
Chao Yün
Sung-Liao relations, 248–260, 343–344
Sung-Mongol campaign (1235), 864
Sung Ning-tsung
(r. 1194–1224),
32. See also Chao K’uo
Sung Shen-tsung
(r. 1067–85),
22. See also Chao Hsü
Sung shih
. See Sung dynastic history
, 287, 290, 293, 301, 307
Sung Shou
. See Four great
Sung ssu ta shu
compendia of the Sung dynasty
(Chao K’uang-yin
Sung T’ai-tsu
, 927–76, r. 960–76), 11,
202, 203–205. See also Chao
K’uang-yin
Sung T’ai-tsung
(Prince K’ang, r.
976–97), 11. See Chao K’uang-i
; Chao Kuang-i
Sung-Tangut conflict (1101–19),
615–616
Sung Ti-ping. See Chao Ping
Sung Tu-tsung
(r. 1264–74). See
; Chao Kuang-i
Chao Ch’i
Sung Tuan-tsung
(r. 1276–78).
See also Chao Shih
Sung Ying-tsung
(r. 1063–67),
; Chao
20. See also Chao Shu
Tsung-shih
Superintendancy for State Trade (tu
),
t’i-chü shih-i-ssu
382, 431
Superintendancy for Tea and Horses
(tu-ta t’i-chü ch’a-ma-ssu
), 382, 431
), 408
Superior Guard (tu-pao
Superior Guard Leader (pao-cheng
),
408
1077
superior or deputy superior guard leader
), 410,
(tu-fu pao-cheng
428
), 684
superior state (shang-kuo
Supervising Secretary (chi-shih-chung
), 516
Supervisor of the Finance Commission
(san-ssu shih
), 115. See also
finance commissioner
supply lines, 475, 551
, 351,
supply master (ya-ch’ien)
398–399, 403
conscription, 399
replacing, 424–425
volunteer (ch’ang-ming ya-ch’ien
), 399
Supreme Capital. See capital
surplus emergency fee surtax
(k’uan-sheng ch’ien
), 401,
422, 441–442, 546, 592
surrender. See specific actor, event, or location
surtax, 430
, 422
head (t’ou-tzu)
survey
cadastral, 496, 590
“square-fields” (fang-t’ien
)
cadastral, 449
suzerainty, tributary, 204
),
swamp fever (she-chang
), 584
sycophant (ning-hsing
,
system, rotation (keng-hsü fa)
218
Szechwan
, 868, 869
Basin, 10
and defense of,
Chia Ssu-tao
918
division of, 164
financial independence of, 697–699
and the Later Shu
, 223
Mongol assaults on, 33, 35, 889
peasant rebellion in (993), 256–257
physical isolation of, 196
population movement to, 134
revenues from, 908
1078
glossary–index
(cont.)
Szechwan
salt and tea production in, 698
service-exemption policy in, 402, 423
and Shen-tsung, 466
silk production in, 175
and state trade bureaus, 431
strategic importance of, 659
and the Sung, 27, 202–203, 328–329
tea cultivation in, 175
tea monopoly in, 439, 455, 471
1207 insurrection in, 795–812
Wang Chien in, 43, 48, 50, 53,
135
and the Wang family, 155–157
and Wang P’u
, 209
Szechwan-Shan-hsi Tea and Horse
Agency, 471
Ta Ch’i, 674–677
Ta-ch’ing Pavilion
, 299, 346
. See Law
Ta Chou hsing-t’ung
Codes of the Great Chou
(Greater Ch’u), 643,
Ta Ch’u
646–647, 649, 657–659
. See Great
Ta-chung hsiang-fu
Centrality and Auspicious
Talisman
ta-fu
. See grandee
. See Emperor of
Ta Hsia huang-ti
the Great Hsia
. See names. great
ta-hsing
, 815, 902
Ta-hsüeh
Ta-li
(Ta-li kuo), 33, 331, 869
. See Court of Judicial
Ta-li ssu
Review
, 311, 641
Ta-ming
Ta-ming fu
, 311
, 10
Ta-pa Mountains
. See large guard
ta-pao
. See large guard chiefs
ta-pao-chang
Ta-p’eng, King of (Ta-p’eng wang
), 158
. See Ta-p’eng, King
Ta-p’eng wang
of
Ta-san Pass
, 813
. See acts of grace, grand
ta-she
ta-sheng
(great brightness musical
intervals), 608
, 257
Ta Shu
, 630
Ta-ting
. See Chief
Ta tsung-cheng ssu
Office of Imperial Clan Affairs
Ta-t’ung
, 42, 81, 629. See also
Yün-chou2
ta yüan-shuai
. See marshal, grand
, 253
Ta Yüeh
, 143
Ta-Yüeh Lo-p’ing
Ta’an, 864
taboo, 282, 291, 342
Tai-chou
, 298, 299
, 625
T’ai-chou
on an overland trade route, 182, 210
. See Court of the
T’ai-fu ssu
Imperial Treasury
T’ai-hang Mountains
, 42
. See Imperial University
T’ai-hsüeh
. See Imperial Ancestral
T’ai-miao
Temple
T’ai-p’ing hsing-kuo era
(Ascendent State in Grand
Tranquility, 976–84), 242
T’ai-p’ing kuang-chi
. See
Extensive records of the T’ai-p’ing
era
hsing-kuo
. See Imperial
T’ai-p’ing yü-lan
encyclopedia of the T’ai-p’ing
hsing-kuo
era
. See Emperor
t’ai-shang huang-ti
Emeritus
. See Senior Preceptor
t’ai-shih
T’ai-tsu (Chao K’uang-yin
,
927–76, r. 960–76), 206, 242,
244, 247, 248, 653, 659, 709,
843, 914, 961
efforts at unification, 224–229
and the subordination of the military
to bureaucratic control, 12–14
,
T’ai-tsung (Chao K’uang-i
939–97, r. 976–97, 13–14, 20,
glossary–index
238, 285, 336, 354, 609, 653,
709, 843. See T’ang T’ai-tsung
(r. 626–49)
literary pursuits of, 254–256
war under, 242–260
. See heir apparent
t’ai-tzu
T’ai-yüan
(Shansi
), 4, 47, 49,
62, 66, 85, 112, 120, 226, 228,
248, 637, 640–641, 644. See also
Ping-chou
by 895, 42
fall of (1127), 646
seige of, 86
T’an Ch’i-hsiang, xi
T’an-chou
(Ch’ang-sha
), 148,
149, 198, 224, 627, 933, 940,
957
, 87, 632
T’an-chou2
tang . See chiu-tang;
factionalism;
“factions (tang ) and cliques”
); hsin-tang;
(p’eng-tang
p’eng-tang;
ssu-tang
tang-chi
. See blacklist, partisan
Tang-yu, 331
(r. 904–7), 48
T’ang Ai-ti
T’ang Chao-tsung
(r. 888–904),
42, 188
T’ang Chieh (1010–69), 363, 369
T’ang Chiung, 447
, 180, 713, 714, 718,
T’ang-chou
795, 828, 856–858, 864
T’ang Chuang-tsung
(r. 923–26).
See also Li Ts’un-hsü
T’ang dynasty (618–907), 1,
204
code, 57
consequences of the collapse of power
in the, 1–4
early tenth century political control
in, 38–132
state building in the north and south,
1–11
T’ang Fei-ti
(r. 934–36). See Li
Ts’ung-k’o
1079
T’ang Hsi-tsung
(r. 873–88),
155
T’ang Hsien-tsung
(r. 805–820),
39
(r. 712–56),
T’ang Hsüan-tsung
607, 874
T’ang Kao-tsung, 522
T’ang K’o, 641
T’ang mandate, 167, 189
(r. 933–34). See Li
T’ang Min-ti
Ts’ung-hou
T’ang Ming-tsung
(r. 926–33). See
Li Ssu-yüan
T’ang Mu-tsung
(r. 820–24), 39
T’ang Pang-yen, 739
(r. 626–49), 59,
T’ang T’ai-tsung
361, 689
(r. 779–805),
T’ang Te-tsung
39
T’ang Yü, 960
Tangut Hsi Hsia. See Hsi Hsia
Tao (the Way), 123
(Learning of the Way),
Tao-hsüeh
28, 31, 35–36, 487, 510–511,
512, 607, 692, 693, 769–770,
777, 781, 844, 876–877. See also
Neo-Confucianism
ban against, 32, 783, 787–789
political nature of, 788
denounced as “spurious teachings”
(wei-hsüeh
), 32, 787
and frugality, 784
and Han T’o-chou
, 813
and Imperial University, 877,
897–906
and Kuang-tsung, 785, 813
and Li-tsung, 874
and Ning-tsung, 785
revanchist orientation of, 791
second ban against, 786
Tao Jing-shen, 29–30
. See Taoism
, clergy of
tao-shih
tao-te
(moral power). See virtue
Tao-tsang. Taoist Canon, 222, 225
1080
glossary–index
Tao-tsang k’u. See State Treasury
Tao-tsang feng-chuang k’u
. See
Sealed Treasury (Storehouse for
the Reserves of the State
Treasury
tao-t’ung. See “Succession to the Way”
T’ao, Dowager Empress, 342
T’ao Chieh-fu
, 619–620
(Lin-t’an), 660
T’ao-chou
T’ao River, 23, 466
, 144
T’ao Ya
, 787
Taoism
Canon of (Tao-tsung), 610
clergy of (tao-shih), 613
Divine Empyrean (Shen-hsiao) sect of,
602, 607, 611, 612
Hui-tsung’s promotion of, 602,
606–614
Ling-pao (sect), 611
temples and monastaries of (kung3,
kuan2), 613
Taoist canon of the longevity of the Cheng-ho
reign (Cheng-ho wan-shou
Tao-tsung), 611
tattoo, 49, 60, 223, 332, 410, 413
tax, 94, 99, 117, 161, 201, 203, 257,
283, 313
acreage and fermentation, 77
adult male cash (shen-ting ch’ien)
, 194
adult male salt cash (ting-k’ou yen
ch’ien), 194
agricultural, 593, 699
autumn, 77, 299
collected, 326–328, 344
in cash, 193, 327
in grain, 193, 222, 327
in rice, 193
in silk, 193
in textiles, 176, 193
commercial,
government income from, 731
increase in, under Kao-tsung, 701
), 191
double (liang-shui
head (t’ou-tzu
), 192–194. See also
ting-k’ou ch’ien
levied in rice, 194
increase, from fees, 439
land, 77, 128, 192, 205, 250, 327
levies on the wealthy,
monetary head (ting-k’ou ch’ien
),
193
), 427, 428
-pressing (chia-tou
reductions, 291
remission of, 283, 660, 731
under Southern Sung, 907
stations (ch’ang ), 189
supplementary, 731
Tax Bureau, 261
taxation, 126
agricultural, 191
after the An Lu-shan
rebellions,
39, 40
causes of excessive, 319
, 387
and Chang Fang-p’ing
and the Ch’iu Fu revolt, 136
and concealed landholdings, 208
direct, 16, 17
effect of Hsi Hsia war on, 348
and fiscal intendants, 232
indirect, 181
, 308, 319
and Jen-tsung
, 208
and the Later Chou
, 58
and Li Ssu-chao
and Li Ssu-yüan
, 75
, 113
and Liu Ch’ung
remission of, 327
, 100
and Sang Wei-han
in the Southern Kingdoms, 191–194
and southern state-building, 10
and T’ai-tsu
, 228
unequal, 326
, 24
and Wang An-shih
and Wang P’u’s memorial, 123
Te-an, 795
, 62, 123
Te-chou
glossary–index
(Liao T’ai-tsung
,
Te-kuang
926–47), 81, 87–90, 97–98,
100, 102–105
Te-sheng
, 66, 94
Te-shou Palace, 754
tea, 174–175, 180, 225, 284, 314, 684
certificates (ch’a-yin
), 594
commercial permits for sale of, 430
government, 284–285
campaign, 127
and the Huai-nan
, 223
and the Later Chou
merchants guild (hang), 407
monopoly, 175, 327, 348, 351, 590,
593, 594–595, 698
Southern Sung tax on, 698
in Szechwan, 698
and Tseng Pu
, 432
technologies of resource appropriation,
secular development of, 16
Temple of Confucius, 815, 902
temples, ancestral. See specific dynasty,
lineage, or ruler
Temüjin (r. 1206–27). See Chinggis
khan (Temüjin, r. 1206–27)
“ten brothers,” 240–241
Ten Kingdoms (c. 907–79), 1, 133
tenant-farmers, 699
Teng-chou
, 178
on an overland trade route, 182
, 713, 714, 718, 828
Teng-chou2
, 149, 150
Teng Ch’u-na
Teng Jo-shui, 842, 843
Teng Jun-fu
(1027–94), 425,
437, 456. See also Teng Wen-po
Teng Tsung-liang, 287
Teng Wan (1028–86), 382, 438, 451
Teng Wen-po
(Teng Jun-fu
), 526
Teng Yu-lung, 792, 806
, 331
T’eng-chou
territorial consolidation, and centralized
political authority in the north, 4
terrorism, economic, 171
1081
testament, imperial (i-shu), 836
textiles, 136, 176, 223
),
thanks for punishment (men-hsieh
463
),
Three Departments (san-sheng
461–463, 716, 723, 725
of state (shang-shu sheng
), 462
Three Echelons (san-pan yüan), 460
Three Gorges, 10
),
Three Halls policy (san-she fa
585, 586, 588
Three Institutes of History, Literature,
),
and Worthies (San-kuan
352
Three Military Bureaus (san-ya
),
218, 235
), 286
“three obediences” (san-ts’ung
“Three-Spear” Ch’en (Ch’en san-ch’iang
), 911
Three Teachings, 787
), 493
“three traitors” (san-chien
“three worthies” (san-hsien), 493
Thunder Rites (lei-fa), 611
Ti, Lady, 530
Ti Ch’ing, 305, 332, 333–334
ti-fen ch’i-chuang lin-li
. See
local elder/stalwart township
plan
, 1272–79,
Ti-ping (Chao Ping
r. 1278–79). See Chao Ping
(Ti-ping, 1272–79, r. 1278–79)
Ti-tang so
. See Central
Collateralized Loan Bureau
. See
t’i-chü chiao-yüeh-shih
intendants for military drill and
review
t’i tien hsing-yü
. See intendents,
judicial
Tibet, 26, 27, 33
as warlord state, 206, 354
. See certificate of verification
t’ieh-she
. See Palace
Tien-ch’ien ssu
Command
1082
glossary–index
. See
tien-chung shih yü-shih
Palace Censor
tien-hu
. See household, tenant
tien-li. See bookkeepers
, 144
T’ien Chün
. See “all-under-heaven”
t’ien-hsia
T’ien-hsin. See Celestial Heart
T’ien Ling-tzu
, 155, 157
, on an
T’ien-men Mountain
overland trade route, 182
(Celestial Sageness,
T’ien-sheng
1023–32), 282
T’ien-shui, 795
T’ien-tu range, 551
“time for doing great deeds is right
now” (ta yu-wei chih shih
), 24, 362
tin, 225
ting. See tripods, ritual (ting)
Ting-chou
, 79, 99, 101, 106, 211,
264, 298, 310
, 309, 314, 317,
Ting-ch’uan-chai
321
, 51–52
Ting Hui
. See tax, monetary
ting-k’ou ch’ien
ting-k’ou yen ch’ien. See tax, adult male
salt cash
Ting-nan
, 4, 54, 130, 251
Ting Ta-ch’üan, 888–890, 892, 896,
904, 905, 906, 925
Ting Tu, 307, 313
Ting Wei
(966–1037), 272,
274–275, 276, 277, 280–281,
525
, 151, 168, 169, 702,
T’ing-chou
911
T’ing-mei
(947–84), 843
titles
), 460,
prestige (chieh-kuan
538
rectification of office (cheng kuan-ming
), 459
T’o-pa
,4
tombs, imperial, 739
Topically-arranged history of the Sung
(Sung-shih chi-shih pen-mo
), 754
tortoise shell, 184
torture. See specific actor or torture
Tou-lu Ko
, 73
fees, 441
t’ou-tzu
trade
coastal interkingdom, 181–182
direct, 177–183
east-west, 183
inland interkingdom, 182–183
internal, 177
interregional, 177
kinds of, 177
maritime, 253
networks, 174
north-south, 183
private, 180
Sino-Tibetan, 404
), 403–407
state (shih-i
transshipment, 177, 184–186
Trade Monopoly Office (Chüeh-i yüan
), 185
trading agencies, 180, 183
transit charges, 181
“treacherous ministers” (chien-ch’en
),
557, 638–639
treason, 693. See also allegiance; loyalty
treasuries, types of, during Sung dynasty,
750–752. See also specific treasury
Treaty of 1005 (Shan-yüan
), 20–24
Treaty of 1044, 22
Treaty of 1141 (Chin Sung Treaty),
30–31, 716, 735
Treaty of 1165, 704, 715–720, 735
tribal troops (fan-ping
), frontier. See
army, frontier tribal troops
tribe. See specific group
“tributary goods and private
merchandise” (kung-wu ssu-shang
), 179
glossary–index
tribute
annual (sui-kung
), 223, 303, 344,
549, 645, 675, 684, 719. See also
payments, annual
), 805, 806, 811,
annual (sui-pi
865
biannual, 819
ceramics in, 177
Ch’ien Ch’u
, to T’ai-tsu
, 228
, to the Later Liang,
Ch’ien Liu
178
Ching-nan’s seizure of, 181
“equalized tribute measure” (chün-shu
fa
), 403
, 127
and Kuo Jung
, 115
and Kuo Wei
, 67
Later Liang
, 77
and Li Ssu-yüan
Liu Chih-yüan
, to Te-kuang
, 104
metal-ware in, 177
peace payment, 821
, to northern dynasties,
Shen-chih
178
and Wu-Yüeh
Southern Han
, to K’ai-feng
, 220
, to Later Chou
Southern T’ang
, 127
on importance
Ssu-ma Kuang
of, 179
Sung , to the Chin, 30
Sung , to Liao , 268, 311
from the Sung to the Chin, 629, 630,
632, 634
, to the T’ang , 143
Tung Ch’ang
Wang Jung
, to Chu Wen
, 59
tribute, 310
grain, 320
Inner Asian state dependence on, 16
Tribute Transport and Distribution
),
measure (chün-shu fa
378, 392
tripods, ritual (ting), 608
1083
(General Sales
Tsa-mai ch’ang
Market). See General Sales and
General Purchase Markets
Tsa-mai wu
(General Purchase
Market). See General Sales and
General Purchase Markets
tsai-hsiang
. See counselor, chief
Ts’ai Ch’eng-hsi, 453, 455
Ts’ai Ch’i, 285, 290, 293
Ts’ai-chien chü. See Office of Economizing
(1047–1126), 26, 30,
Ts’ai Ching
32, 464, 478, 536, 565, 638,
639, 693, 786, 787
and alleged plot to depose Che-tsung,
542
ancestral graves of, 625
and drafted service, 545
educational reforms of, 585,
586–587, 589
fiscal policies and revenue extraction,
589–596
on Green Sprouts revival, 546
and the hired service exemption, 544
and Hui-tsung, 556
manipulation of Hui-tsung, 570
ministry of, under Hui-tsung,
570–639
plot to depose Chao Hsü2, 486
proscriptions against the Yüan-yu
anti-reformers, 554, 786
and the restoration of the New
Policies, 590–596, 599–600
and social welfare, 596–600
as a “traitorous monster,” 570
as a “treacherous minister”
(chien-ch’en), 560
and Tseng Pu
, 554
, 43, 794, 856–858
Ts’ai-chou
(1037–93), 25, 30,
Ts’ai Ch’üeh
455–457, 462, 472, 478,
479–480, 481, 491
and alleged plot to depose Che-tsung,
542
1084
glossary–index
(1037–93) (cont.)
Ts’ai Ch’üeh
amnesty for, 528
anti-reform hostility towards,
493–494
banishment of, 521–525, 543
plot to depose Chao Hsü2
, 486
and Ssu-ma Kuang
, 488
, 499
and Su Ch’e
,
and Wang Kuei
, 298, 320, 463
Ts’ai Hsiang
, 321
and Shih Chieh
, 536, 553, 565
Ts’ai Pien
, Prince of Tuan,
and Chao Chi
553
and Tseng Pu
, 553, 554
Ts’ai-shih, battle of (1162), 704–707,
709, 713
Ts’ai T’ao, 584
Ts’ai Wei, 542
Ts’ai Yu (1077–1126), 632
Ts’ai Yu-hsüeh
(1154–1217),
788, 790, 817
. See assistant
ts’an-chih cheng-shih
councilors of state
, 182
Tsang Hsün
Tsang-ti-ho
, 620
, 47, 51–52, 60, 62, 63,
Ts’ang-chou
72
ts’ang-fa. See Granary System
. See Fabrication
Tsao-tso chü
Bureaus
Tsao-yang, 795, 827
Ts’ao, Dowager Empress (huang t’ai-hou)
336, 340–341. See also Ts’ao,
Empress
Ts’ao, Empress, 293, 334, 337. See also
Ts’ao, Dowager Empress
Ts’ao, Lady, 293, 809
Ts’ao Ch’eng, 666
Ts’ao Han
(924–92), 221
(?–1029), 266,
Ts’ao Li-yung
281
Ts’ao Pin
(931–99), 226, 293
. See bandit, rural
ts’ao-tsei
Ts’ao Yu-wen, 864
, 11, 47, 49, 66, 105
Tse-chou
. See bandit “leader”
tsei-shuai
. See Bandit Wang
Tsei Wang Pa
Eight
, 182
Ts’en-chiang
Tseng K’ai
, 680, 681
Tseng Kung (1019–83), 351, 400
(998–1078),
Tseng Kung-liang
324, 337, 338, 342, 345, 346,
357, 361, 363, 368, 369, 371,
372–373, 374, 378
and prefecture schools, 318
and Wang An-shih
, 447
(1036–1107), 377, 381,
Tseng Pu
382, 402, 407, 420, 432, 449,
450, 536, 566–571
centralist politics of, 566–567, 568,
569
and Chang Tun
, 561–562
, Prince of Tuan,
and Chao Chi
553–554
regulations of, 408
pao-chia
principled stances of, 553
on the State Trade Agency, 443–445
and T’ang Chiung, 447
and Ts’ai Ching
, 577
Tseng Ti, 726–727, 741–742, 744
Tseng Ts’ung-lung, 859
, 466
Tsinghai
Tso tradition (Tso-chuan), 689
Tso-tsang feng-chuang k’u
. See
Storehouse for the Reserves of
the State Treasury
. See State
Tso-tsang nan-k’u
Treasury, Southern Storehouse of
the
Tsou Hao
(1060–1111), 564,
568
. See Commissioner
tsu-yung shih
for State Revenue
(tax system), 134
tsu-yung-tiao
ts’ui chien-ping
. See “engrossers”
(chien-ping), smashing the
glossary–index
, 47, 48
Ts’ui Yin
Ts’ui Yü-chih
(1158–1239), 865,
878
(Liao Hsing-tsung,
Tsung-chen
r. 1031–55), 288. See also Liao
Hsing-tsung (r. 1031–55)
Tsung-cheng ssu
. See Court of the
Imperial Clan
Tsung-han, 640. See also Wan-yen
Nien-han
. See Imperial Clan
Tsung-hsüeh
Academy
(1059–1128), 648,
Tsung Tse
649–650, 663
and the defense of the Central Plain,
653
Tsung-wan. See Wan-yen Wo-li-pu
(Tsung-wan, d. 1127)
Tsung-wang, Prince, 638, 640–641
Ts’ung-jung
, 81
Tu, Dowager Empress (huang t’ai-hou,
901–61), 243, 259
. See commander, district
tu-chien
. See examiner, chief
tu chien-cheng
. See Accounting Bureau
Tu-chih ssu
Tu-chih tu-chi
. See Register of
Public Revenue
Tu Ch’ung (d. 1140), 650, 654,
663
, 99, 100,
Tu Ch’ung-wei
101–102, 106, 107
Tu Fan
(1181–1244), 859, 878,
881, 882, 883, 902, 903
, 147
Tu Hung
, 860
Tu Kao
tu-pao
. See Superior Guard
. See chief deployment
tu-pu shu
commands
. See Central
Tu shang-shui yüan
Commercial Tax Bureau
tu-shih ying-t’ien shih. See commissioner
of waterways and agriculture
. See Directorate of
tu-shui chien
waterways
1085
, 939
Tu-sung Pass
tu-ta t’i-chü ch’a-ma-ssu
.
See Superintendancy for Tea and
Horses
. See Council of State
tu-t’ang
(Chao Ch’i
,
Tu-tsung
1240–1274, r. 1264–74), 873,
913, 916–917, 928. See also
Chao Ch’i (Tu-tsung, 1240–74,
r. 1264–74)
extravagance of, 916
and indiscriminate advancement of
kinsmen, 916
and Mongols, 917
Tu-tu
. See commander-in-chief
, 318, 321, 323
Tu Yen
, 321
and Shih Chieh
. See militia, popular
t’u-t’uan
T’u-yü-hun
, 101
Tuan, Prince of, 553. See also Chao Chi;
Chao Chi (Hui-tsung,
1282–1135, r. 1100–1126);
Sung Hui-tsung
, 332
Tuan-chou
, 575
Tuan-li Gate
Tuan-ming Academician
, 77
, 67
Tuan Ning
(Chao Shih
,
Tuan-tsung
1268–78, r. 1276–78), 952. See
also Chao Shih (Tuan-tsung, c.
1268–78, r. 1276–78)
t’uan. See drill “teams”
t’uan chiao-fa
. See team drill
measure
. See army, squad structure
tui-fa
t’un-t’ien
. See military colony system
(r. 895–96), 79,
Tung Ch’ang
140–143, 164, 165
Tung Chü-i, 828
, 888–889, 892, 901,
Tung Huai
905
Tung-ming Affair, 419
, 887, 888, 896,
Tung Sung-ch’en
904, 905, 906, 925
1086
glossary–index
, 10, 134, 202
Tung-t’ing Lake
Tung-t’ing rebels, 675–676
Tung Wen-ping
, 940, 942, 949
T’ung-an, 621, 622
, 172
T’ung-chi Dike
. See
T’ung-chin yin-t’ai ssu
Memorial Forwarding Office
T’ung-chou
, 55, 65
, 657, 868
T’ung-chou2
T’ung-ch’uan, 920
t’ung chung-shu men-hsia p’ing-chang-shih
. See
Secretariat-Chancellery, Chief
Executive of the
T’ung Kuan
(1054–1126), 27, 28,
478, 570, 584, 603, 605,
617–619, 620–622, 625, 626,
628, 630, 632, 638, 639, 652
t’ung-p’an
. See controller-general;
vice-prefect
. See Korean
T’ung-wen kuan
Relations Institute
tutor. See specific actor
Twitchett, Denis C., 187
Two Administrations (erh-fu), 236, 462.
See also liang-fu
“two authorities” (liang fu), 368
two-councilor system, 877
councilor of the left, 877
councilor of the right, 877
. See
Tzu-chih t’ung-chien
Comprehensive mirror to aid in
government (Tzu-chih t’ung-chien,
1067–84)
Tzu-chih t’ung-chien ch’ang-pien chi-shih
pen-mo
,
391, 558
.
Tzu-chih t’ung-chien kang-mu
See Outline and details of the
comprehensive mirror
Tzu-chou, 328, 329
, 10
Tzu-kuei county
tz’u-shih
. See prefect
Tz’u-yu chü
Service
. See Child Benevolence
Uighur warlord state, 206, 354
unification, partial, under T’ai-tsu,
215–220
“units of account” or “mixed accounting
units,” 698
Universal Charity Graneries (kuang-hui
ts’ang), 396
Upper Four Armies (shang ssu-chün), 234
uprising. See rebellion
“use of the outside to govern the inside,”
110
“using barbarians to control barbarians”
(i-i chih-i), 628
vassal (ch’en), 354
“venerables” (yüan-lao), 353
Venus (chin-hsing), 844
Veritable Records (shih-lu), 242, 244, 538,
558, 691
vessels, sacrificial, 608
Vice-Commissioner for Military Affairs,
115
vice-prefect (t’ung-p’an), 287, 358
Vietnam, 148, 170, 951. See also Annam
villains, “outright” (chien-jen), 363
virtue, 58, 117, 126, 130, 167, 168,
362, 587, 785, 843
clergy of (te-shih), 613
Confucian, 117, 720
vouchers, exchange (chiao-yin), 284
“vulgar opportunist” (liu-si chiao-hsing
chih jen), 360
Wa-ch’iao Pass
, 60, 129, 249
Wade-Giles system, xi
, 954
Wan-chou
. See Ever
Wan-sheng chün
Victorious Army
. See Myriad Years
Wan-sui shan
Mountain
glossary–index
Wan-yen A-ku-ta (Ch’in T’ai-tsu,
r. 1115–23), 16, 628, 629–632,
633. See also Chin Shih-tsung
(r. 1161–89); Chin T’ai-tsung
(r. 1123–35); Wu-chi-mai;
Wu-lu
Wan-yen A-lu-tai
, 792
, 738
Wan-yen Chang
, 795
Wan-yen K’uang
(Prince Hai-ling
Wan-yen Liang
, r. 1149–61), 704, 713.
See also Hai-ling, Prince
Wan-yen Nien-han. See Tsung-han;
Wan-yen Tsung-han
Wan-yen Ta-lan
, 657, 673,
675, 677, 682
Wan-yen Tsung-han (1079–1136), 636,
640, 642, 644. See also Wan-yen
Nien-han
Wan-yen Tsung-wang, 636, 642
Wan-yen Wang-hsi
, 800
Wan-yen Wo-li-pu
(Tsung-wan, d. 1127), 644, 648
Wan-yen Wu-chi-mai. See Chin
T’ai-tsung (r. 1123–35)
Wan-yen Wu-chu
(d. 1148),
654–655, 660, 677, 686
(Emperor Chin
Wan-yen Wu-lu
, r. 1161–89),
Shih-tsung
706. See also Chin Shih-tsung
(r. 1161–89)
wang . See king, nation (kuo wang)
Wang, Consort, 78
, 448
Wang An-kuo
, 452, 477
Wang An-li
Wang An-shih
(1021–86,
r. 1069–76), 205, 356, 693. See
also Wang Ching-kung
and civil service examinations, 364
and consolidation of executive power,
economic reform under, 383–447
economic thought of, 384–392
, 338
and Empress Kao
1087
foreign policy under, 464–469
, 479
and Hsing Shu
and military reform, 27–28
“Myriad Word Memorial” of, 24–25,
350
negative outcomes of policies of,
439–447
and the New Policies, 327, 544
regulations of, 408–412
pao-chia
and pre-harvest loans, 351
and quest for ideological uniformity,
364
second term as chief minister,
452–454
and Shen-tsung, 357–396, 463
and the state education system,
585–586
and state trade policies, 406–407
tactics of, 30
Wang Chang
, 110
, 168
Wang Ch’ang
, 226
Wang Chao-yüan
, 151–152, 159–160
Wang Ch’ao
Wang Chen. See Tsei Wang Pa
Wang Ch’eng-yen (951–1003), 217
Wang Chi
(d. 1243), 856, 863,
867
(?–1023), 263,
Wang Chi-chung
266, 267, 268
, 732
Wang Chi-chung2
(1098–1181),
Wang Chi-hsien
690, 703, 707
Wang Chien
, 43, 48, 50, 53, 54, 55,
134–135, 155–157, 158–159,
161–162, 164, 188–189, 195
Wang Chien2
(d. 1259), 870
(?-999), 257,
Wang Chi-en
260–261
, 298
Wang Chih
(962–1025), 270,
Wang Ch’in-jo
272, 274–277, 282
. See Wang
Wang Ching-kung
An-shih
1088
glossary–index
, and the imperial
Wang Chu
libraries, 294
Wang Ch’u-chih
, 59, 60
, 44
Wang Ch’u-ts’un
, 473–475
Wang Chung-cheng
, 690
Wang Chung-i
Wang Chung-shan
, 690
, 831
Wang Chü-an
, 115
Wang Chün
Wang Fu (1079–1126), 584, 625, 626,
638
(1619–92), 754,
Wang Fu-chih
755
Wang Gungwu, 215
Wang Hou
, 617–619, 620
, 803–804
Wang Hsi
(?–993),
Wang Hsiao-po
257
Wang Hsien-chih
, 138
, 151
Wang Hsü
(1127–90), 740,
Wang Huai
746
, 196
Wang Huan
Wang Huan2, 690
, 690
Wang Hui
Wang I
(993–1039), 358
, 307, 323
Wang I-yung
, 44, 59
Wang Jung
, 395
Wang Kuang-lien
(1019–85), 339, 457,
Wang Kuei
463, 472, 478, 480, 481, 485,
672
and Su Hsün
, 345
, 485
and Ts’ai Ch’üeh
and Ying-tsung, 341–342
Wang Kung-ch’en
, 323
on compulsory drill, 445
and prefecture schools, 318
. See Office
Wang-lai kuo-hsin so
of Diplomatic Correspondence
Wang Lao-chih, 611
, 754
Wang Lin
Wang Ling-mou
, 161
, 137
Wang Lu
(1084–1144), 673, 677,
Wang Lun
679, 682, 690, 811
Wang Mang
(r. 9–23), 297, 894
Wang Nan (1158–1213), 811, 812
, 451, 453–454
Wang P’ang
(d. 1184), 739, 743,
Wang Pien
744, 763, 765
Wang Ping, 636, 640
Wang Po-wen, 300, 649
Wang P’u
(?–957), 122, 123–124,
209
, 404, 466–468
Wang Shao
(r. 909–25), 217
Wang Shen-ch’i
Wang Shen-chih
, 151–152, 158,
168, 184, 196
, 151–152
Wang Shen-kuei
, 286, 292
Wang Shu
and prefecture schools, 318
Wang Shu2
, 670, 677, 679, 680
, 321
Wang Su
, 290, 298, 299–300
Wang Sui
, 880
Wang Sui2
, 799, 806
Wang Ta-chieh
(957–1017), 271, 272,
Wang Tan
275–277
Wang Tao, 373
Wang T’ao
(1020–80), 357
Wang Te (1087–1154), 676
, 290, 311
Wang Te-yung
Wang Ti, banishment of, 543
(1079–1154), 669–670
Wang Tsao
Wang Tse
, rebellion, 325
(978–1038), 277, 280,
Wang Tseng
281, 282, 283, 285, 286–287,
288, 298
Wang Ts’un, 507, 524–525
Wang Tsung
, 300, 307
, 164
Wang Tsung-chieh
Wang Tsung-k’an, 159
Wang Tsung-lu, 164
, 71, 159
Wang Tsung-pi
, 79
Wang Tu
Wang Tzu-hsi, 611
Wang Wan
, 880
glossary–index
Wang Wen-ch’ing (1093–1153), 613
Wang Yao-ch’en
, 308, 319
and the imperial libraries, 294
, 880
Wang Yeh
(r. 918–25), 71,
Wang Yen
163–164
Wang Yen2
(1090–1139), 650,
660, 663
, 66
Wang Yen-chang
(r. 943–45),
Wang Yen-cheng
168–169
(r. 927–35),
Wang Yen-chün
183
Wang Yen-hsi
(r. 939–44), 168
Wang Yen-pin, 184
(1043–93), 436,
Wang Yen-sou
440, 491, 492, 495, 502, 510,
515, 523, 525
and alleged plot to depose Che-tsung,
542
and Chang Shun-min
,
517–518
, 493
and Chang Tun
on compulsory drill, 445
on drafted service, 503
and “engrossers,” 442
and Fan Ch’un-jen
, 505
and the hired service exemption, 500
, 446
on pao-chia
stripped of prestige titles, 541
, 515
and Su Shih
and Teng Wen-po, 527
Wang-yen Wu-chu, 682
Wang Yin
, 111, 114
, 140
Wang Ying
Wang Ying-lin
(1223–96), 923,
924, 935, 936, 940
, 651
Wang Yüan
, 164
Wang Yüan-yung
(d. 1277), 923, 931,
Wang Yüeh
934, 935, 936
war. See specific conflict. See also rebellions
arts of (wu), 556
games, 141, 144–146
1089
Warding off the Sea Catchment Basin
(Han-hai t’ang), 173
warfare, mounted, 306, 315
Warring States period (476–221 bce),
134
water
conservancy networks. See irrigation
control, 10, 326. See also irrigation
sellers (t’i p’ing-che), 430
Water Margin, The (Shui-hu chuan), 626
waterways, 20, 126, 128, 129, 130, 222
“way of softness” (jou-tao, huai-jou), 354,
466, 689, 690
“Weak first, strong later” strategy,
220–229
wealth, 388–392
financing armies with private, 85
“managing,” 381
public (kung) and private (ssu), 276
weapon. See specific weapon type
weather. See portents
Wei, Prince (Wei Chao Wang,
r. 1208–13), 818, 819
Wei, Princess of, 293
, 405–406, 443,
Wei Chi-tsung
450
Wei Ch’i
, 719
Wei Chou, 153–154
, 44, 51, 62, 66, 72–73,
Wei-chou
106–107
mutiny of Imperial Guard units at,
85, 87
Wei-chou2
, 63
rebellion at, 91
. See Wei-chou6
Wei-chou3
Wei-chou4
, 308, 312, 314
, 824
Wei-chou5
, 886
Wei-chou6
, 161–162
Wei Chuang
, 608
Wei Han-chin
, 122
Wei Jen-p’u
Wei Kuei-fei, 678
Wei Liao-weng
, 816–817, 828,
854, 876, 877, 901
1090
glossary–index
Wei-ming A-mai, 551
Wei-ming Ping-ch’ang
(Emperor Hsia Hui-tsung,
r. 1068–86), 506. See also Hsia
Hui-tsung (r. 1068–86)
Wei-ming Shan, 354
Wei-Po, 44, 46, 51, 53, 57, 62, 72
Wei River
, 4, 47, 302
(c. 1050–1110), 377,
Wei T’ai
451
. See outlaw court
wei-t’ing
welfare, state, 596–600
wen . See culture, refinements of
Wen, King of Chou (r. 11c. bce), 59
Wen-ch’eng huang-hou (Empress Lady
Chang), 335
Wen Chi-fu
, 456
and alleged plot to depose Che-tsung,
542
Wen-chou
, 140, 947
, 864
Wen-chou2
. See Anthology of literature
Wen-hsüan
Wen-sheng chün. See Ever Victorious Army
Wen-ti (r. 180–57 bce), 689
(1236–83),
Wen T’ien-hsiang
925, 926, 934, 938, 939, 941,
946, 947, 948, 949, 951, 952,
955, 957, 961
Wen Yen-po
(1006–97), 339,
344, 353, 373, 378, 491, 500,
517, 519, 524, 525, 542
criticized for Hsi Hsia
accommodation, 537
Wen-yüan ying-hua
. See Finest
blossoms from the garden of elegant
writing
Western Capital, 52
Western Wall Bureau (Hsi-ch’eng so),
591
widow. See specific actor
wife. See specific actor
wine, 327
-mash franchises (fang-ch’ang), 398
monopoly, 400, 907
wineries, 443
women, palace, 293, 305, 335, 764,
772, 944
wonder-worker. See occult master
(fang-shih)
Worthy, Edmund H., Jr., 11
Wright, Hope, xi
Wu, 5, 178, 195–197
King of (Wu wang), 157
Wu, Dowager Empress (huang t’ai-hou,
1115–97), 31, 757, 762–763,
764, 768, 771, 772, 773, 786,
787, 809, 875
Wu, Princess, 835
, 456
Wu An-ch’ih
Wu An-shih, 523
Wu Ch’eng, 162
(Chin T’ai-tsung,
Wu-ch’i-mai
1075–1135, r. 1123-), 633–634.
See also Chin T’ai-tsung
(r. 1123–35)
Wu Chieh
(1093–1139), 660, 797
(1093–1139), 763, 887,
Wu Chien
941
, 859, 886–887, 890,
Wu Ch’ien
904, 905, 915
Wu-ching tsung-yao
. See Essentials
of the military classics
, 87
Wu-chou
, 332
Wu-chou2
, 634
Wu-chou3
Wu-chou4
, 947, 949
, 522
Wu Ch’u-hou
, 373, 454, 456–457,
Wu Ch’ung
472, 479
Wu Chü
, 762
wu-fu. See five circles of mourning
. See Han-yang
Wu-han
(d. 1207), 791, 797, 801,
Wu Hsi
802, 811, 933, 939
beheaded, 802
(d. 1234), 856
Wu Hsien
Wu-hsing
. See An-chi
Wu-hsüeh
. See Military Academy
glossary–index
, 933
Wu-hu
Wu I
(1124–71), 762
Wu-i Mountains, 10
Wu Kai (1125–66), 762
Wu kingdom (902–37), 134, 143–147,
160–161
Wu Kuang
, 743
(1010–67), 337, 357
Wu K’uei
, 176, 184
Wu-kuo ku-shih
wu-lai, 141
(1102–67), 660, 669, 713,
Wu Lin
732, 763, 797, 799
Wu-lu. See Chin Shih-tsung
(r. 1161–89); Wan-yen
Wu Min, 640
(Supplement to
Wu-tai shih pu
the History of the Five Dynasties),
182
Wu T’ing
(d. 1193), 797, 798,
801
, Empress
Wu Tse-t’ien
(r. 690–705), 286, 289, 522
. See Wu, king of
Wu wang
Wu-wei, 933
, 476
Wu-yen-ch’eng
Wu Yung
, 858
(Yüan, Liao Shih-tsung,
Wu-yü
947–51), 105, 106, 113.
See also Liao Shih-tsung
(r. 947–51)
, 109, 133, 163, 195. See
Wu-Yüeh
also Wu-Yüeh wang
army, 200
and Fu-chou
, 194
importance of ceramics to, 177
as an independent state, 5
and K’ai-Feng
, 220
King of (Wu Yüeh wang), 157
, 124
and Kuo Jung
, 127
and the Later Chou
and Li Jen-ta, 169
, 227
and Southern T’ang
state formation in, 140–143
and the Sung , 204, 248
1091
and T’ai-tsu, 14, 227
and trade with the north, 179,
180–181
and the traditional elite, 160
and the Wang family, 10
, 197
and Wang Shen-chih
water control in, 173–174
and Wu, 195
ya-chiang
. See militia leader
. See supply master
ya-ch’ien
. See army, regional troops
ya-chün
Yai-shan (Cliff Hill), 952–953, 955–958
yamen police for the arrest of thieves
(kung-shou), 398
yang, 761
Yang, Consort (1244–79), 809, 929,
948, 949, 952, 956, 958
Yang, Dowager Consort (huang t’ai-fei),
289
Yang, Dowager Empress (huang
t’ai-hou), 289
Yang2, Dowager Empress (huang
t’ai-hou), 875, 930. See also
Yang2, Empress; Yang Mei-tzu
Yang2, Empress (Yang Mei-tzu,
1162–1232), 809–810, 813,
834, 835, 836. See also Yang2,
Dowager Empress; Yang Mei-tzu
Yang, Lady, 292, 293, 294
Yang, Prince of, 335
Yang, Pure Consort (Yang Shu-fei,
984–1036), 279, 280, 291
Yang An-erh
(Yang An-kuo
, d. 1214), 824–825. See
also Yang An-kuo
Yang An-kuo
. See Yang An-erh
(Yang An-kuo, d. 1214)
, 946
Yang Chen
(propagating essence), 364
yang-ch’i
(1102–66), 666,
Yang Ch’i-chung
676, 682
Yang Chien
(1140–1226), 781,
788, 814, 815, 897
1092
glossary–index
, 591
Yang Chien2
Yang-chou
, 126, 144, 145, 146,
165, 177, 178, 850, 937, 938,
949. See also Kuang-chou;
Kuang-ling
, 558
Yang Chung-liang
Yang Ch’ung-hsün
, 292
, 50
Yang Ch’ung-pen
, 157, 158
Yang Fu-kuang
(d. 905), 163,
Yang Hsing-mi
165, 188
background of, 144–147
, 50
and Chao K’uang-ning
and Ch’ien Liu
, 142
, 48, 53
and Chu Wen
in Huai-nan, 43, 178
, 134, 135
and Huang Ch’ao
as King of Wu, 157
and the Wu state, 160
and Yang Hsing-mi
, 143
, 382, 419, 420
Yang Hui
on hired-service, 437
, 162
Yang I-feng
, 88, 91, 98, 99
Yang Kuang-yüan
, 874
Yang Kuei-fei
Yang-lien Chen-chia
, 959–960,
961
, 66
Yang-liu
(r. 908–18), 166,
Yang Lung-yen
188, 194, 196
. See Yang2,
Yang Mei-tzu
Empress (Yang Mei-tzu,
1162–1232)
Yang Meng, 166
Yang Miao-chen
, 824, 849, 896
Yang Pin
, 108, 110
(r. 921–37), 163, 166,
Yang P’u
167, 189
Yang Shih (1053–1135), 434
, 54, 62
Yang Shih-hou
Yang Shu-fei. See Yang, Pure Consort
(Yang Shu-fei, 984–1036)
, 332
Yang T’ien
(1139–1219),
Yang Tz’u-shan
764, 810, 811, 817
Yang Wan-li
(1127–1206), 746,
756
Yang Wei, 533
, 944
Yang Wen-chung
Yang Wo
(r. 905–8), 188
Yang Yao, 665, 674
(?-986), 250
Yang Yeh
Yangtze Delta, 5
, 10, 195–196,
Yangtze River
928, 937, 954
and battle of Ts’ai-shih, 706
and Chu Wen
, 48
east-west trade along the, 183
independent governors along the, 5
, 124
and Kuo Jung
,4
and the Later Chou
lower, 28
Mongols along the, 33
north-south trde along the, 222
population movement along the, 134
resources along the, 225
rice cultivation along the, 172
warlords along the, 29
and Yang Hsing-mi
, 43
Yao, King, 709
(the Yao people), 329
Yao2
(d. 1227), 849
Yao Ch’ung
. See Medical Service (Yao chü)
Yao chü
Yao P’ing-chung (1099–?), 638, 645,
648
Yeh Ch’ing-ch’en
, 299
Yeh-lü Ch’ün, 630
(?–999),
Yeh-lü Hsieh-chen
249
Yeh-lü Hsiu-ko
(953–1009),
249, 262
, 311
Yeh-lü Jen-hsien
(1150–1223), 770, 788,
Yeh Shih
790, 794, 814, 899, 911
, 844
Yeh Wei-tao
Yellow Emperor, 608
glossary–index
Yellow River, 38, 60, 61, 222, 641. See
also Huang-ho
dominated by Ho-tung, 42–43
in early tenth century China, 4
and the Greater Shan-hsi circuit, 23
during Later Liang–Ho-tung conflict,
64–65
and Li Ts’un-hsü
, 62
neglected dikes on the, 283
, 94
and Shih Ching-t’ang
, 21
after the Treaty of Shan-yüan
Yellow River chart (Ho-t’u), 270
yen . See dikes (yen). See also specific
municipality or waterway
Yen, Consort (d. 1260), 874, 888, 913,
930
Yen, Prince of, 59
Yen-an fu
, 306, 312. See also
Yen-chou2
yen-ch’ao
. See salt certificates
(yen-ch’ao)
, 630, 632
Yen-ching
, 114
Yen-chou
, 475. See also Yen-an fu
Yen-chou2
, 549
Yen-chou3
Yen-chou4
. See Mu-chou
Yen-ch’uan garrison, 800
. See Palace of
Yen-fu kung
Extended Blessings
yen-lu. See remonstrance, “roads of”
, 830
Yen Shih
Yen Shu
, 282, 287, 290, 307, 313,
318
, 321
and Shih Chieh
, 681
Yen Tun-fu
Yen Wen-ying
, 292, 293, 294,
296
Yen-Yün region, 14, 20, 28, 263, 267,
634
yin , 761
yin2 . See privilege, hereditary
, 619
Yin-chou
Yin Fan-cheng, 202
1093
. See
yin-hsün mo-su chih-pi
conventionality, slavish
Yin Shu
and the Ch’ing-li reforms (1043–45),
321
and Fan Chung-yen
, 298
Yin-t’ai ssu
. See Office of
Transmission
, 4, 87, 209, 251,
Ying-chou
266
, 87
Ying-chou2
, 180, 928
Ying-chou3
, 629, 634
Ying-chou6
Ying Ch’un-chih
, 825
Ying-kuo-kung. See Chao Hsien
(1271–1323)
. See military-agricultural
ying-t’ien
outposts
Ying-t’ien, 858
Ying-t’ien-fu
, 438, 637, 643
(Chao Shu
,
Ying-tsung
1032–67, r. 1063–67), 22, 323,
324, 342, 347
fiscal problems during the reign of,
344–345
Ying-tsung shih-lu
. See Ying-tsung
veritable record
Ying-tsung veritable record (Ying-tsung
, 339
shih-lu)
Ying Yao , 885, 898, 904
“younger uncle and nephew” (shu-chih)
relationship, 719. See also
adoption
Yu-chou
, 551
in, 61–62, 64
Chou Te-wei
consequences of the conquest of, 62
defensive measures in, 81
independent governors of, 43, 44
Liu Jen-kung
in, 47, 48, 51
in, 59, 60
Liu Shou-kuang
neutralized by ChuWen, 55
, 87
and Shih Ching-t’ang
as Southern Liao capital, 209
1094
glossary–index
(cont.)
Yu-chou
T’ai-tsung’s campaign against, 248
T’ai-tsung’s defeat near, 14
Yu-chou2
, 251
, 884
Yu Ssu
Yung, Prince of, 335
Yung-chia School, 788
Yung-chou2
, 329–331, 940
Yung-hsing-chün, 23, 393, 551
, 464, 476–477,
Yung-lo ch’eng
489, 506, 549, 616
era (Everlasting Joy,
Yung-lo
1120–23), 624
Yung-lo ta-tien
. See Encyclopedia
of the Yung-lo era (Yung-lo ta-tien,
1408)
Yung-p’ing, 307
Yü, Consort, 929, 952
Yü, Lady, 335
Yü Chieh
(d. 1253), 868, 870
yü-ch’ien chuang-kuan chi-shang k’u
. See Imperial
Treasury of Awards
, 332, 333
Yü Ching
, 298
and Fan Chung-yen
and Jen-tsung, 299
and Shih Chieh
, 321
, 329
Yü-ching chien
,
Yü-ch’ing chao-ying Palace
286
, 81, 87
Yü-chou
yü-hou. See defendants
Yü Hsien-ch’ing, 284
Yü-k’ou Pass
, 129
, 470
Yü-lin
yü-pi
. See decrees, imperial
yü-shih. See censors
. See vice
yü-shih chung-ch’eng
censor-in-chief
. See Censor-in-chief
yü-shih ta-fu
. See Censorate; Census
Yü-shih t’ai
Bureau
Yü T’ien-hsi
, 836, 880
Yü Tuan-li (1135–1201), 781, 782
Yü-wen Hsü-chung, 636
, 177
Yü-yao
. See Commissioner of
yü-ying shih
Imperial Encampment
(1110–74), 724,
Yü Yün-wen
728, 732, 735, 736–737,
739
and battle of Ts’ai-shih, 706
departure with honors of, 736
diverting revenues, 750
at Ts’ai-shih, 706
Yüan dynastic history (Yüan shih), 920
Yüan-feng
era (1078–85), 455
administrative reforms, 457–464
. See Yüan-feng
Yüan-feng k’u
Treasury
Treasury (Yüan-feng k’u),
Yüan-feng
418
Yüan Hsieh
(1144–1224), 777,
788, 814, 815, 817, 820, 898
, 10
Yüan River
Yüan state, 36
(907–73), 214, 215,
Yüan Yen
498
Yüan-yu
partisans (Yüan-yu tang
), 25,
572, 573, 578. See also
Restoration reign (1086–94)
party, proscription of all members of
(1102–04), 26
Yüan-yu
, Dowager Empress (huang
t’ai-hou, 1077–1135), 647, 650,
651, 653, 662. See also Lung-yu,
Dowager Empress (huang
t’ai-hou)
and Kao-tsung’s heir apparent,
Yüan-yu
era (1086–93)
factionalism during, 509–514
Li Ch’ing-ch’en’s indictment of, 534
, 143,
Yüeh, King of (Yüeh wang)
157
Yüeh-chou
, 654. See also Shao-hsing
glossary–index
(1103–41), 29, 30, 644,
Yüeh Fei
649, 654, 655, 659, 666, 669,
674, 675, 677, 679, 682, 793
and Chao Po-ts’ung
, 708
execution of, 684–686
1095
posthumous rehabiliation of, 703,
714
Yüeh wang
. See Yüeh, King of
, 50, 66
Yün-chou
(Ta-t’ung), 81, 87, 90
Yün-chou2