THE COWHERDS
THE COWHERDS
Moonshadows: Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy.
New York: Oxford University Press,
Madhyamaka has often attracted comparisons with Western philosophy. Some scholars have pointed out similarities between Śunyavāda and Westerns thinkers, animated by the idea that despite cultural differences all attempts to investigate reality spring from the same human philosophical attitude (e.g. Burton, Thurman). Others have interpreted Nāgārjuna through various European philosophical systems or have rephrased his arguments in Western logical language (e.g. Murti, Tachikawa). They all purportedly deployed comparison to clarify Madhyamaka thought.
The book under review aspires to a different goal. The Cowherds, a team of
philosophically-oriented Buddhologists including Dreyfus, Finnigan, Garfield, Newland, Priest,
Siderits, Tanaka, Thakchöe, Tillemans and Westerhoff, set out on a philosophical quest for the
meaning of conventional truth inspired by the Madhyamaka concept of saṃvṛtisatya.
Moonshadows, they state, “is not a history of the concept of conventional truth in Buddhist philosophy; it is not a philological study of Buddhists texts or doctrine on conventional truth; is
not an attempt to present a ‘fair and balanced’ representation of Buddhist accounts of
conventional truth. Instead it is an exploration […] of a set of questions about conventional truth that arise from the way the idea of conventional truth is deployed in certain corners of
Buddhist philosophy. […] In addressing these questions we may do philosophy with
Candrakīrti, but we are beholden neither to him nor to anyone else when we answer those
questions. We are after truth […], not just understanding of antique positions” (pp. vi–vii).
Whether such enterprise is useful and whether it is carried out satisfactorily is debatable. It
ultimately depends on the expectations and competence of the reader.
Moonshadows fails to address a precise audience. Its light critical apparatus and
colloquial style may appeal more to the general public than academics. So do the first couple of
essays, too. Garfield, for instance, provides an excellent introduction to the two truths in
Candrakīrti and Tsongkhapa. He also devises an insightful example to illustrate why
enlightened beings need to perceive conventional reality in order to rescue ordinary people
(see pp. 29–30, 36–37). The uninitiated reader, however, is not going to enjoy the next chapter.
Only experts of Madhyamaka literature can follow Thakchöe’s intricate and elliptical
condensation of Prāsaṅgika epistemology. For instance, his interpretations of textual quotations,
although correct, appear often cryptic for lack of explanation (see, for instance, pp. 44–45, 51
and 48 note 16). Buddhologists, on the other hand, will be disappointed with the absence of
ground-breaking evidence and conclusions. With the exception of Dreyfus’ article on Patsab,
most of the materials discussed in Moonshadows have already been the subject of numerous
academic publications – some of which by members of the Cowherds (e.g. Newland, Two Truths in Mādhyamika Philosophy of the Ge-luk-ba Order (New York, 1992), Thakchöe, The
Two Truths Debate (Boston, 2007)). The ambiguous methodology in the use of the sources is
also likely to dissatisfy scholars of the field. The Cowherds assert that philological accuracy is
not their goal and consistently minimize referencing and text-criticism (pp. vi, 163, 213, 220).
Yet, they base most arguments on Buddhist treatises. Two unpleasant consequences derive
from this incongruence. First, the reader is often unable to fully engage with the Cowherds’
reasonings. The Cowherds construct their philosophical elaborations on textual interpretations
that are unverifiable because no reference is given to the passages in question. It is the case of
Chapter 8, where they attribute specific opinions to ‘Ābhidharmikas’ without providing any
actual reference to Abhidharma works (e.g. pp. 137 ll. 17–19 and 140 ll. 10–11). Second, the
meaningfulness of some contributions is compromised. In Chapter 13, Priest formulates an
interesting twofold model that captures the shifting interpretations of the two truths in Indo-
Tibetan and Chinese Buddhism. He affirms that the first model is historically more ancient and
develops with Candrakīrti; the second one arises later and finds its main expression in Fazang.
However, Priest immediately reminds his audience that text-criticism is beyond the scope of his
essay and he does not wish to investigate whether such understanding of both Candrakīrti and
Fazang is correct (pp. 215 ll. 32–34 and 218 ll. 3–4). Priest justifies this approach on the
grounds of the impossibility of unbiased hermeneutics: “[I]nterpretation of texts is essential to
serious Buddhist scholarship. But interpretation is always interpretation from somewhere. Here,
we have taken a step back from the texts themselves to provide a point of perspective from
which to see them.” It remains unclear, though, how a model that is purportedly derived from
the works of Candrakīrti and Fazang could constitute a vantage point detached from those texts.
Philosophers may find many essays enriching. Chapters 5 and 8, for instance, contribute to the
theoretical debate on the nature of truth with insights derived from reflections on Buddhist
treatises. The reader, however, needs to be well acquainted with with Indo-Tibetan
Madhyamaka to fully appreciate the arguments. Only Chapter 12, perhaps, is fully
understandable for philosophers unfamiliar with the Buddhist tradition. Here, Westerhoff
avoids technical terminology and explains the Madhyamaka perspective on conventions lucidly.
This essay also stands out for its clear methodological considerations (pp. 207–208) and critical
apparatus.
Finally, two features of Moonshadows are going to displease readers of all backgrounds. The publication is ridden with typographical errors, starting from the very incipit, where lokasaṃvṛtisatyaṃ is misspelled (p. 3 l. 2). In Tibetan quotations, the a-chung is systematically misprinted as <‘> instead of <’>. Second, the book is repetitive. Many chapters provide different perspective on a single topic. It would have been more effective to outline the topic only once and then focus solely on the differences, instead of reiterating basic notions and quotations each time (e.g. pp. 36, 54 and 91–92, where the mutual dependence of pramāṇa and prameya is explained in three different chapters).
Ligeia Lugli
