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Tense relations between logic and debate: Śāntarakṣita’s solution of contradiction in the Vādanyāy

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1. Introduction


Through the history of Indian thought, debate activities, including formulation of one's own argument and objection of an opponent's statement, were closely linked to logic, and logic was gradually systematized by Indian religious or philosophical sects over time. In fact, terms of logic, such as logical reason (hetu), are found in various texts dealing with debate (vada, vigraha) as an object of study. Therefore, to have a profound understanding of the system of debate, we should examine the logic adopted by ancient scholars who systematize the rules and technical terms of debate. Conversely, we can see what kind of logic ancient scholars want to apply through studies on rules and technical terms of debate.


This insight is applicable to the Vadanyaya (VN), which is Dharmakirti’s work on the concept of “the condition of defeat” (nigrahasthana), or the rules that determine victory or defeat between a proponent and an opponent. Although the traditional condition of defeat was arranged systematically by Naiyayikas, Dharmakirti defines the same concept completely differently. To him, the condition of defeat is divided into two types: asadhanangavacana (the condition of defeat for a proponent) and adosodbhavana (the condition of defeat for an opponent). Research on these terms is also helpful for clarifying his comprehension of Buddhist logic.


Assuming that it is reasonable to presuppose that the system of debate depends on logic, it follows that philosophers who have different types of logic would set out different systems of debate. That idea also applies philosophers in the same religious sects, such as Dharmakirti and Santaraksita, both of whom are Buddhist. In fact, Santaraksita sometimes reinterpreted Dharmakirti's idea in the Vadanyayatika-vipancitartha (VA), one of the most significant commentaries on VN. However, little attention has been given to this point. Therefore, this paper serves as a comparative analysis of Dharamkiriti's and Santaraksita's views on debatology and Buddhist logic.


2. Contradiction between the second and third interpretations of asadh an angavacan a

As the first step in the analysis, this paper will focus on the concept of asadhanangavacana, i.e., the condition of defeat for a proponent. Asadhanangavacana is the first type of the two conditions of defeat and is further divided into five types in VN. Among the five interpretations of asadhanangavacana, the second and third interpretations appears to be inconsistent. Dharmakirti describes the second interpretations as follows: VN 17,4-8: athava sadhyate tena paresam apratito 'rtha iti sadhanam trirupahetuvacanasamudayah. tasyangam paksadharmadivacanam. tasyaikasyapy avacanam asadhanangavacanam. tad api vadino nigrahasthanam, tadavacane heturupasyaivavacanena siddher abhavat.

Alternatively, a means of proof (sadhana) is what proves a thing that is not known by others, [namely,] the set of statements expressing a logical mark satisfying the three characteristics. The element (anga) of it (i.e., a means of proof) is a statement expressing the property of a subject and so forth. Not stating any one of them (i.e., elements) is “not stating the element of a means of proof’ (asadhanangavacana). This is also a condition of defeat for a proponent. The reason is that when it (i.e., an element of a means of proof) is not stated, there is no establishment because the very characteristic of logical reason is not stated.

In this case, he notes that “not stating any one of three elements” is the condition of defeat for a proponent. In this second interpretation of asadhanangavacana, Dharmakirti asserts that a proponent should state all three characteristics (trirupa) of a logical reason—paksadharmata (the first characteristic), sapakse sattvam (the second characteristic), and vipakse 'sattvam (the third characteristic)—when he intends to prove a thesis (pratijna). However, in the third interpretation of asadhanangavacana, he seems to offer a contrasting perspective: VN 17, 9-15: athava tasyaiva sadhanasya yan nangam pratijnopanayanigamanadi,

tasyasadhanangasya sadhanavakya upadanam vadino nigrahasthanam, vyarthabhidhanat. anvaya- vyatirekayor va sadharmyavati vaidharmyavati ca sadhanaprayoga ekasyaivabhidhanena siddher bhavat, dvitiyasyasamarthyam iti tasyapy asadhanangasyabhidhanam nigrahasthanam, vyartha- bhidhanad eva.

Alternatively, a thesis, an application, a conclusion, and so forth are not elements of the means of proof [that is to say, not elements of the set of statements expressing a logical mark satisfying the three characteristics]. Making mention of “what is not an element of a means of proof” (asadhananga) in the inferential statement is a condition of defeat for a proponent because [it is] a useless reference. Instead [of this interpretation, another

explanation is shown as follows], the second [reference] has no ability [to establish what is to be proven] because the reference to only one of [the two concomitances, i.e.,] the positive concomitance (anvaya) or the negative concomitance (vyatireka) establishes [what is to be proven] in the formulation of proof that has similarity or dissimilarity. Therefore, even stating this also, that is, what is not the element of a means of proof (asadhananga), is a condition of defeat because [it is] merely a useless reference.


The third interpretation of asadhanangavacana, that is, “stating what is not the element of a means of proof,” implies that a proponent should not state excess components of a logical argument syllogism—such as a thesis (pratijna), an application (upanaya), a conclusion (nigamana), and so forth —or state excess logical concomitance—such as a second positive concomitance or a second negative concomitance. According to Dharmakirti's explanation, if a person refers to these excess components when he intends to prove a thesis, he is judged to be defeated.


Regarding this third interpretation, we must look more carefully into the point that a proponent who states a second positive concomitance or a second negative concomitance is to be defeated. The second positive or negative concomitance no longer has the ability to establish what is to be proven (sadhya) because the first has already established it. This point makes clear that the positive concomitance and the negative concomitance are considered logically equivalent in this case.

We encounter difficulties when we try to interpret the second and third interpretations of asadhanangavacana at the same time. We must consider the contradiction between these two interpretations because a proponent needs to state both the second and third characteristics of a logical reason in the context of the second interpretations, but he should not state the two characteristics of a logical reason in the context of the third interpretations if we regard the concepts of anvaya and vyatireka in the second interpretation as the second and third characteristics, respectively. Santaraksita recognizes this contradiction between the two interpretations. His solution in VA will be examined later. The following section discusses how the problem can be solved in Dharmakirti's system of Buddhist logic.


3. Dharmakirti's thoughts on the second and third characteristics of logical reason


Dharmakirti derives his interpretation of nigrahasthana from his own system of Buddhist logic, just as Naiyayikas' definition is based on their own logic. In Dharmakirti's texts, the three characteristics of logical reason figures prominently in the thought of inference (anumana). In the second interpretation of asadhanangavacana, “not stating any one of the elements (i.e., the three characteristics of logical reason)” (tasyaikasyapy avacanam) is the condition of defeat for a proponent. Here we must draw attention to Dharmakirti's expression “any one of.” Similar expressions can be seen in his other works. This expression suggests that a proponent who attempts to make a proof has to state all three characteristics of logical reason. In this case, however, the second and third characteristics should not be restricted by the particle eva. If these two characteristics were restricted by eva, the second characteristic restricted by eva and the third characteristic restricted by eva would become logically equivalent so that, according to Dharmakirti, as in the case of the third interpretation of asadhanangavacana, only one of the two characteristics should be stated, and the second one should not be stated because

it is useless. Dharmakirti explains his notion in the Pramanavarttikasvavrtti (PVSV):

PVSV 18,15-19 ad k.28:

tenaiva jnatasambandhe dvayor anyataroktitah /

arthapattya dvitiye 'pi smrtih samupajayate //28//

yad aha arthapattya vanyatarenobhayapradarsanad iti. tatrapi drstantena tadbhavahetubhava- pradarsanam manyamano 'rthapattyaikavacanena dvitiyasiddhim aha. Because of the very reason [that the relationship between probans and probandum is clarified by either a homologous example or a heterologous example], when the relationship is already known [in either one of the two examples], the second [example] is also reminded through implication (arthapatti) based on the statement of either one of the two (i.e., the homologous example and the heterologous example).


[In the Nyayamukhal\ Dignaga] says, “Or again, both [of the two examples] are shown by either one of the two [examples] through implication.” Here also (i.e., in the Nyayamukha), [Dignaga], who considers that the relation of being something (tadbhava) or the relation of being a cause (hetubhava) is shown by an example, says that the second (i.e., the other) [example] is established by stating either one [of the two examples] through implication. Referring to Dignaga's thought, DharmakTrti asserts that the second illustration of a similar example and a dissimilar example is unnecessary because it is implied by the first example. That is to say, he suggests that either one of the second or third characteristics is sufficient for the comprehension of the relationship between probans and probandum.

However, Dharmakirti would probably claim that they have their own roles in a different context, as Katsura [1983: 540] explains: “It (i.e., anvaya-vyatireka) expresses an inductive process of discovering proper evidence and establishing a logical nexus. For this purpose, the restriction by eva is not necessary. Anvaya and vyatireka have their own raison d'etre and are not logically equivalent.” Dharmakirti further explains his intention in the Hetubindu:

HB 34*,12-35*,1: anvayavyatirekayor api tarhi na prthaktvam, ekasya prayogad ubhayagater iti cet, na, hetoh sapaksasapaksayor bhavabhavayor aparasparaksepat; ekam vakyam ubhayam gamayatTty ucyate, naiko 'rtho dvitTyasya. nanu tatraiva bhavo tadabhave(1) cabhava iti vakye parasparaksepa iti cet, vacanam etad ekasyapi niyamakhyapakasya dvitTyaksepanantarTyakatvat samarthyad ubhayam aksipati. na punah kevalau bhavabhavav aksipatah; niyamavantau ca na kevalau, niyamasyobhayarupatvat. tasmat tatraiva bhava iti na bhava evocyate, itarenapi nabhava eva, yena bhavo 'bhavo va dvitTyam aksipet.


(1) tadabhave em.: 'tadabhave HB.


(Objection) In this case, positive concomitance and negative concomitance are not separated. Both [of the two concomitances] are understood through the employment of either one [concomitance]. (Answer) No, [that is not correct]. Logical reason's existence and non-existence in similar things and dissimilar things do not imply each other. [We] say, “one sentence [of the two sentences, i.e., logical reason's existence and non-existence in similar things and

dissimilar things] makes [a person] understand both [sentences],” [but] the meaning of one side is not [the same as the meaning of] the second (i.e., the other side). (Objection) Do not the two sentences, that is, “[logical reason] exists only there (i.e., where similar things exist)” and “[logical reason]

does not exist where they (i.e., similar things) do not exist” imply each other? (Answer) Because only one [of the two sentences] that declares restriction (niyama) indispensably implies the second (i.e., the other side), so this statement, [that is, either one of the two sentences mentioned above] indirectly implies both [the two sentences]. However, mere existence and non-existence (i.e., the sentences that do not declare restriction) do not imply [each

other]. Moreover, [existence and non-existence], which are restricted is not [the same as] mere [existence and non-existence] because restriction is the nature of both [of existence and non-existence, which have restrictions]. Therefore, mere “existence” is not stated [even though] “[logical reason] exists only there” [is stated], [and] mere “non-existence” is not [stated], even though the other side, [i.e.,] “logical reason definitely does not exist there,” [is stated]. If [mere existence and non-existence were stated in those cases], existence or non-existence would imply the second [that is, mere non-existence or existence, respectively].


Identifying anvaya and vyatireka with the second and third characteristics of logical reason, DharmakTrti distinguishes “anvaya restricted by eva” from “anvaya without the restriction of eva.” The same is true for vyatireka. He proposes that a person who uses anvaya with the eva restriction in the formulation does not have to employ vyatireka (with the eva restriction) and vice versa, but both anvaya without the eva restriction and vyatireka without the eva restriction should be used in the formulation because they are not logically equivalent. These anvaya and vyatireka are arranged in Table 1.


Table 1. anvaya-vyatireka with or without eva|

anvaya with eva-restriction “Logical reason exists only in similar examples.”

anvaya without eva-restriction “Logical reason exists in similar examples.”

vyatireka with eva-restriction “Logical reason definitely does not exist in dissimilar examples.”

vyatireka without eva-restriction “Logical reason does not exist in dissimilar examples.”


In DharmakTrti's system of logic, contradiction between the second and third interpretations of asadhanangavacana can be solved by distinction of anvaya and vyatireka with eva-restriction and anvaya and vyatireka without eva-restriction. If it is assumed that anvaya and vyatireka with eva-restriction are used in the context of the third interpretation of asadhanangavacana, we can be satisfied with Dharmakirti's explanation that the reference of the second anvaya or vyatireka is useless. At the same time, if we assume that anvaya and vyatireka without eva-restriction are taken into consideration when the second interpretation of asadhanangavacana is explained, we can be satisfied that Dharmakirti asserts that a proponent has to state both the second and third characteristics of logical reason.

Thus we tentatively explain the problem of the definition of nigrahasthana in Dharmakirti's system. However, Santaraksita's solution is more drastic and sophisticated in some regards.

4. Santaraksita's reinterpretation of the second interpretation ofasadh an angavacan a Santaraksita recognizes the contradiction between the second and third interpretations of asadhanangavacana and presents a different solution than DharmakTrti. In the Vipancitartha, the commentary on the Vadanyaya, Santaraksita reinterprets DharmakTrti's idea of the second interpretation of asadhanangavacana as follows:


VA 61,10-15 ad VN 17,4-8: tat katham tasyaikasyapy avacanam asadhanangavacanam ity etam na vaksyamane vyahatam iti. etac ca naivam eva hi vyakhyayate. trirupo hetur arthatmakah paramarthato 'vasthitah, tasya vacane ye prakasake paksadharmavacanasapaksasattvavacane paksadharmavacanavipaksasattvavacane(1) va, tayos samudayah. tasya vacanadvayasamudayasya- ngam paksadharmadivacanam iti. paksadharmavacanam(2) tavad avicalam, itarayos(3) tv anyatara- nyatarat kadacitkam.

(1) paksadharmavacanasapaksasattvavacane paksadharmavacanavipaksasattvavacane VAMS em. [Pi 75a7-8, P2 123a7-8, D 99a1: gsal bar byed pa phyogs kyi chos brjod pa dang mthun pa'i phyogs la yod par brjod pa 'am / phyogs kyi chos brjod pa dang / mi mthun pa'i phyogs la med par brjod pa nyid do //] : paksadharmavacanam sapaksasatvavacane paksadharmavacanam vipaksasatvavacane VA. (2) °vacanam VAMS em. [P1 75a8, P2 123a8, D 99a2: tshig ni] : °vadanan VA. (3) itarayos VAMS em.: itarayoh VA.

(Objection) Why is it not contradictory to what will be said [later] (i.e., the third interpretation of asadhanangavacana) that not stating any one of them (i.e., elements) is “not stating the element of a means of proof” (asadhanangavacana)? (Answer) [There is no contradiction] because it is explained in detail [here] that it (i.e., the interpretation that not stating any one of elements is “not stating the element of a means of proof”) is never so (i.e., contradictory to what will be said later). It is truly established that logical reason that fulfills the three characteristics [for the correct reason] has as an essential property a fact [that has not yet been known by other people and remains to be proven]. The two [types of] statements, that is, the explanation of it (i.e., the logical reason that fulfills the three characteristics for the correct reason) are as follows: (1) the statement of [the characteristic that the logical reason is] the property of the topic (i.e., the first characteristic


treats pseudo-lingas in the same way as Dignaga, which suggests that DharmakTrti has not completely expelled the inductive character from his system of logic.” That is to say, according to Katsura, DharmakTrti “consider[s] the case when linga has the second rupa, but not the third, and vice versa” even though anvaya and vyatireka are restricted by the particle eva and regarded as logically equivalent as well as Dignaga considers so. Given that DharmakTrti is just confused about his own system of logic, the contradiction between the second and third interpretation of asadhanangavacana cannot be solved. of the

three characteristics) and the statement of [the characteristics that the logical reason] exists in similar instances (i.e., the second characteristic of the three characteristics), or (2) the statement of [the characteristic that the logical reason is] the property of the topic (i.e., the first characteristic of the three characteristics) and the statement of [the characteristic that the logical reason] does not exist in dissimilar instances

(i.e., the third characteristic of the three characteristics). The “set” (samudaya) [means the set] of these two [statements]. The elements (anga) of this set of the two statements are statements such as “[the logical reason is] the property of the topic” and so on. First, the statement of [the characteristic that the logical reason is] the property of the topic (i.e., the first characteristic of the three characteristics) is immovable. However, [either] one or the other of the other two characteristics (i.e., the second and third characteristics of the three characteristics) are occasionally [used as necessary].


Santaraksita apparently regards the second and third characteristics as logically equivalent, thinks that a proponent need not state both characteristics in the formulation, and therefore considers Dharmakirti's understanding of the second interpretation of asadhanangavacana problematic. Contrary to Dharmakirti's perspective, Santaraksita reinterprets the concept of sadhana, i.e., samudaya, in the second interpretation of asadhanangavacana

to avoid the above-mentioned contradiction. Although Dharmakirti rephrases sadhana as trirupahetuvacanasamudaya and then interprets samudaya as the set of the three characteristics of logical reason, Santaraksita gives the concept of samudaya a whole new meaning: the set of the first and second characteristics of logical reason or the set of the first and third characteristics of logical reason. It follows from Santaraksita's reinterpretation of the concept of samudaya that a proponent need not state all of the three characteristics of a logical reason but has to state both the first and second characteristics or both the first and third characteristics, although Dharmakirti takes the position that a proponent should state all three characteristics.

Santaraksita's interpretation resolves inconsistencies in the third interpretation of asadhananga- vacana which needs a proponent to state all three characteristics. We can also remark that Santaraksita shifts the second and third characteristics without eva to the second and third characteristics with the restriction of eva in the context of the second interpretation of asadhanangavacana. The differences between Dharmakirti's and Santaraksita's views on the second interpretation of asadhanangavacana are shown in Table 2.

2. Dharmakirti's and Santaraksita's views on the second interpretation of Dharmakirti's original idea Santaraksita's reinterpretation

sadhana = set of the following elements: paksadharmata (the first characteristic) sapakse sattvam (the second characteristic) vipakse ’sattvam (the third characteristic) = set (1) of the following elements: paksadharmata (the first characteristic) sapaksa eva sattvam (the second characteristic)

= set (2) of the following elements: paksadharmata (the first characteristic) vipakse ’sattvam eva (the third characteristic) anga = an element of the above set = an element of set (1) or set (2)


5. Concluding remarks


In Dharmakirti's second interpretation of asadhanangavacana, the second characteristic of logical reason should not be identified with the third characteristic. If he thought that they were logically equivalent, the second interpretation of asadhanangavacana would have overlapped with the third interpretation of asadhanangavacana. However, in the latter half of VN (pp. 25-68), Dharmakirti criticizes the overlapping of different nigrahasthana which

Naiyayikas defined. Hence, in this context, he could not have identified the second characteristic of logical reason with the third characteristic. Santaraksita reconsiders Dharmakirti's definition of the second interpretation of asadhananga- vacana. He reinterprets the concept of sadhana, i.e., samudaya, in order to make Dharmakirti's original text consistent with the idea of identifying the second characteristic of logical reason with the third characteristic of logical reason because he regards Dharmakirti's logical differentiation between the second and third characteristics as problematic.


Santaraksita's interpretation is sophisticated, but Dharmakirti's original view can be consistent and significant in its own right. We can grasp here the tense relationship between logic and debate through examining their thoughts. According to the different types of logic, concepts in the theory of debate are variously defined, such as by Dharmakirti and Santaraksita.


Abbreviations and Bibliography


1. Primary Sources

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ed. Vaidya Jadavaji Trikamji Acharya, Carakasamhitä of Agnivesa,

elaborated by Caraka and Drdhabala, with the Ayurveda-Dipikä Commentary by Cakrapänidatta, Chaukhamba Surbharati Prakashan, Varanasi, 2008.
D Derge edition of Tibetan Tripitaka: eds. J. Takasaki, Z. Yamaguchi and Y. Ejima, Sde Dge


Tibetan Tripitaka Bstan Hgyur, preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo, Sekai-Seiten-Kankö-Kyökai, Tokyo, 1977-1989.
HB Hetubindu (Dharmakirti): ed. Ernst Steinkellner, Dharmakirti 's Hetubinduh, Teil I, tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historischen Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, 252. Band, 1. Abhandlung, Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Süd- und Ostasiens, Heft 4, Herman Böhlaus Nachf., Wien, 1967.


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P Peking edition of Tibetan Tripitaka: ed. Daisetz T. Suzuki, The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking
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PV IV The fourth chapter of the Pramänavärttika (Dharmakirti): ed. Rahula Sankrtyayana, Acärya-Dharmakirteh Pramänavärttikam äcärya-Manorathanandikrtayä vrttyä samvalitam (Dharmakirti's Pramänavärttika with a commentary by Manorathanandin), Appendix to J.B.O.R.S. Vols. 24-26, Bihar and Orissa Research Society, Patna, 1938-1940.


PVin III The third chapter of the Pramänaviniscaya (Dharmakirti): eds. Pascale Hugon and Toru Tomabechi, Dharmakirti's Pramänaviniscaya, chapter 3, China Tibetology Publishing House and Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, Beijing - Vienna, 2011.

PVSV Pramänavärttikasvavrtti (Dharmakirti): ed. Raniero Gnoli, The Pramänavärttikam of
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VA Vipancitärthä (Santaraksita): ed. Rahula Sankrtyayana, Dharmakirti's Vädanyäya with the
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VAD Vipancitärthä (Santaraksita): ed. Svami Dvarikadas SastrT, Vädanyäyaprakarana of Ächärya
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VAMS Vipancitärthä (Santaraksita): Photostat copy of the Sanskrit manuscript in the library of
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen —The color photostat copies of the same manuscript: 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a, 6a is included in 2011).
VN Vädanyäya (DharmakTrti): ed. Michael Torsten Much, DharmakTrtis Vädanyäyah, Teil I,
Sanskrit-Text, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historischen Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, 581. Band, Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Südasiens Nr. 25, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien, 1991.
VND Vädanyäya (DharmakTrti): See VAD.

VNMS Vädanyäya (DharmakTrti): Photostat copy of the Sanskrit manuscript in the National Archives
of Nepal.

VNR Vädanyäya (DharmakTrti): See VA.


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[2013b] “Nigrahasthäna in the Vädanyäya: Controversy between Dharmakirti and the Nyaya School,”Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies Vol. 61, No. 3, pp. 178-182.

[2014a] Vädanyäya =

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[2014b] “Acceptance and interpretation of Dharmakirti's theory of nigrahasthäna in the Nyäyamanjari” Kuwon: Rsearchpapers. Vol. 5. pp. 40-62.
Steinkellner. Ernst

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Watanabe. Toshikazu


[2003] r— (“Dharmakirti suiriron

no kenkyu.” dissertation at Hiroshima Univeristy.)

(SASAKI Ryö - Lecturer. Waseda University. Ph.D.)
 

Summary


Vadanyaya nigrahasthana)

asadhanangavacana adosodbhavana —asadhanangavacana

asadhanangavacana ft,

asadhanangavacana

Hetubindu

eva
Hft, asadhanangavacana

asadhanangavacana — samudaya)Offi^^3


 


KUWON


Edited by
YOUNG BUDDHIST ASSOCIATION OF WASEDA UNIVERSITY

(WASEDA-DAÏGAKU-BUKKYÔ-SEÏNEN-KAÏ)
E-508 Student Union Bldg., 1-24-1 Toyama,
Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, 162-8644
Japan

March 2016

—upalabdhilaksanaprapti) J <Z)^^!tOVX Tense relations between logic and debate: Santaraksita's solution
4.of contradiction in the Vadanyaya



••• 1
••• •••• 20
SASAKI : Ryo •••• •••• 34
••• •••• 48
••• • ••• 49
TU •••• 50

 
CONTENTS


1. TOBITA Yasuhiro

The Significance of the Second Reduction to Absurdity in Mahavibhasa Criticizing the Self-cognition Theory of Mahasanghika

2. MICHIMOTO Daisei

Arcata's interpretation of the attainment of characteristics for a cognition (upalabdhilaksanaprapti) 20

3. SASAKI Ryo

Tense relations between logic and debate: Santaraksita's solution of contradiction in the Vadanyaya 34

4. TOBITA Yasuhiro

English summary 48

5. MICHIMOTO Daisei

English summary 49

6. SASAKI Ryo

Japanese summary 50


Source