The Four Nobles' Truths and Their 16 Aspects: On the Dogmatic and Soteriological Presuppositions of the Buddhist Epistemologists’ Views on Niscaya

by Vincent Eltschinger Published online: 21 September 2013

Abstract

Most Buddhists would admit that every Buddhist practice and theore¬tical construct can be traced to or at least subsumed under one or more among the four nobles' truths. It is hardly surprising, then, that listening to these truths and pondering upon them were considered the cornerstones of the Buddhist soteric endeavour. Learning them from a competent teacher and subjecting them to rational analysis are generally regarded as taking place at the very beginning of the religious career or, to put it otherwise, still as an ordinary person along the preparatory path. At this stage, the discursive nature of the four nobles' truths fits well the didactic and intellectual requirements of early religious practice. But how about the sub¬sequent, more distinctively intuitive/non-conceptual stages of a mystic's career? How to interpret, for instance, our sources' strong emphasis on the four nobles' truths as forming the content of the first pivotal event on the path, the so-called path of vision? And how to understand a philosopher's claim that the yogic path exhausts itself in one's learning, rationally analyzing and mentally cultivating the four nobles' truths? In order to understand this, one has to turn to Abhidharmic inter¬pretations of the four truths as embodying the ultimately true aspects of reality itself. Here, the truths are not regarded as a didactic device encapsulating the entire Buddhist law, but as the basic sixteenfold structure of the real. It is, of course, these ultimately true aspects that the path of cultivation is supposed to make directly perceptible to the yogin, thus enabling him to get rid of ignorance.

Keywords Four Nobles' Truths (16 Aspects of the) • Buddhist Path • Perceptual Ascertainment (niscaya) • Abhidharma • Dharmakirti

Introduction

Dharmakirti (fl. c. 550?) is widely acknowledged as one of the most significant Indian Buddhist philosophers. While Stcherbatsky regarded him as an Aufklärer, an Indian Kant with a transcendentalist programme, Frauwallner interpreted his system as the highest achievement of an axiologically neutral, hence “aryan” period of Indian philosophy. Since the late seventies, two generations of scholars trained in Anglo-American philosophy have endeavoured to portray Dharmakirti as a proto-analytic philosopher concerned with issues of logical quantification, language, universals and cognition. Dharmakirti's fame as a “free thinker” (Stcherbatsky) proved not to be without danger, however, for it is at least in

part responsible for the broader academic community's lack of interest in his notoriously dry and suspiciously unbuddhistic writings. To be sure, other areas of Dharmakirti's work have received scholarly attention in the last thirty years, a period that testifies to a growing interest in this philosopher's Buddhology, his treatment of yogic perception and his provocative way of tackling scriptural authority. But if Dharmakirti is now gradually recognized as paying more than just lip-service to Buddhism, the logico-epistemological parts of his work are still generally treated separately from its “religious” components, as if Buddhology and soteriology could be considered mere appendices to the system. Now

in my opinion, Dharmakiirti's Buddhist persuasion is not to be seen at work only in those parts of his works that can be, conveniently though questionably, isolated as “religious.” Nor is it enough to depict (as I have been inclined to do) his philosophy as motivated by apologetic concerns mirroring the historical matrix of “early medieval India.” I do believe that the core of the system is permeated and even structured by dogmatic considerations. It is, first and foremost, to the task of uncovering one aspect of Dharmakiirti's adjustment of epistemology to traditional Buddhist dogmatics and soteriology that the present paper is devoted. As is well known, Dharmakiirti developed original

views on perceptual ascertainment (niscaya). Be it in his own writings, in indigenous interpretive traditions or in present-day scholarship, the issue of niscaya has quite often been connected with Buddhist yoga and yogic achievements, but, to the best of my knowledge, no systematic account of niscaya in soteriological perspective has ever been attempted. While undertaking it, I would also like to dispel a widespread misunderstanding regarding Dharmakiirti's account of soteriology, i.e., the view that a Buddhist yogin would devote his nearly endless career to pondering over and contemplating the four nobles' truths as mere scriptural statements.

While dealing with yogic perception, Dharmakiirti and his commentators repeatedly make clear that the only objects for meditative cultivation that meet the epistemic requirements of perception as a means of valid cognition are the four nobles' truths. To put it briefly, one of the conditions of a yogic cognition's reliability lies in its bearing on an object that has proved to stand critical analysis by means of pramanas. In other words, this object must have been submitted to reason/reasoning (yukti), “purified” ([pari] suddha) or ascertained as congruent (samvadin) by the means of valid cognition, especially by inference (anumana). This is tantamount to saying that the object of a yogin's cognition is one that has been reflected upon (Veint), examined (viVear) or ascertained (nisVei, vyav- aVsthacaus, nirVm) by the so-called eintamayi prajna (“insight born of

[[[rational]]] reflection”). Now this object can only consist of the four nobles' truths. While commenting on Dharmakirti's statement to the effect that yogic cognition has already been treated, all commentators add that it has been explained “as bearing on the (four nobles') truths” ([eaturarya]satyavisaya), and this in the satyavieara- einta section of PV 2. In other words, as Devendrabuddhi has it, “not all cognitions of yogins are perception (pratyaksa), but [only] the one that has been stated before, i.e., the one that has been stated before as bearing upon the four nobles' truths.” According to Dharmottara, “the cognition that perceives (darsana) these [four nobles' truths], i.e., realizes (saksat-/pratyaksi-karana) [them], is perception.” And according to the same author, Dharmakirti in his PV has explained “how the four nobles' truths are ‘purified' by pramanas

and how they are to be cultivated (bhavaniya) according to aspects such as ‘impermanent' (anityadi).” But the only way in which the four nobles' truths as verbal statements could be an object of perception would be in the quality of mere sounds (sabda) generating auditory awarenesses (srotravijnana), which of course makes no sense in the present context. It is easy to demonstrate that the nobles' truths that are the object or, rather, the object-support (alambana) of a yogin's cultivation are nothing but structural features of reality that the yogin is supposed to aseertain according to 16 aspects or modes of apprehension. In short, and as was to be expected, the Buddhist path does not consist in the yogin's nearly endless clarification of scriptural statements, but in a gradual encounter with reality.

1. Reality, Perception and (Perceptual) Ascertainment

1.1. Let me start with a few words on Dharmakirti's doctrine of perceptual ascertainment. According to this philosopher, real things are momentary (ksanika), undivided (eka, niramsa, nirbhaga, etc.) and causally/pragmatically efficient (artha- kriyakarin, etc.). An important aspect of their causal/pragmatic efficiency consists in their capacity to cast or project (arpana) their own aspects (akara) onto consciousness, i.e., to bring about a bare perceptual awareness (pratyaksa, vijñana, anubhava, etc.) by creating a mental image or representation (pratibhasa) of themselves. Now while these real things may well be undivided, still they are, so to speak, multifaceted, so that they cast all their

aspects at one time onto consciousness. In other words, a single instance of perception grasps its object in all its aspects (sarvakarena, sarvatmana), leaving nothing of it unapprehended. As a consequence, no other means of valid cognition beyond perception is needed in order to cognize the object in a positive way (vidhina). Of decisive importance is the fact that real things produce perceptual cognitions according to their truly existing nature (vidyamanatmana). Now, this truly existing nature consists in their being, among other things, momentary, selfless (anatmaka, niratmaka), empty (sunya), and painful (duhkha). These features are often referred to as vastudharmas, “[fundamental] properties of [real] things.” Dharmakirti and his followers consequently admit that these features are perceived along with all other facets in a single instance of perception. The core of the problem is that, although these vastudharmas are grasped by perception, they generally remain unascertained or unidentified. What does this mean?

1.2. Under ordinary circumstances, human beings are able to identify things and properties, i.e., to recognize, classify and name bottles, tables and persons (this is the function traditionally ascribed to the sañjñaskandha). This identification is variously referred to as perceptual ascertainment/judgement (niscaya), ascer¬taining cognition (niscayajñana), determination (adhyavasaya), and recognition (pratyabhijñana). Contrary to perception itself, which is pre- or non-conceptual (kalpanapodha, nirvikalpa[ka]), perceptual ascertainment is of a conceptual character (vikalpaka). How does it come into existence? As we have seen, real things have the capacity to project their own aspects

into consciousness, thus producing an immediate perceptual awareness. But they also have the capacity to bring about a judgement ([eka]pratyavamarsa), and this in a mediate way. This they do as follows: they first engender the above-mentioned immediate perceptual awareness, which in turn actualizes or awakens (prabodha) a hitherto latent imprint (vasana) left by homologous cognitive experiences in the past. The actualization or awakening of this imprint gives rise to a conceptual cognition, and it is this conceptual cognition that is known as perceptual ascertainment in spite of its purely conceptual character. The rise of this ascertainment is due to various conditions (pratyaya). Among them, Dharmakirti refers explicitly to cognitive acuity/sharpness (buddhipatava), conceptual habituation (vikalpabhyasa) and (pragmatic) situation¬context (prakarana), to which his commentators add interest (arthitva) and suitability (samarthya). As shown by Kellner, conceptual habituation plays by far the most decisive role in the process.

1.3. But how is it that we sometimes fail to identify things, either by misidentifying (bhranti, samaropa) them, or by being in doubt (samsaya) about them? How do these two “deficient mental events,” according to Kellner's (2004, p. 8 and passim) felicitous expression, come about? How is it, especially, that average human beings are not in a position to ascertain momentariness, painfulness, emptiness and selflessness merely upon perceiving them (darsanamatrena)? Two kinds of situations are responsible for the rise of error: the presence of a cause of error (bhrantinimitta) and the absence of the causal conditions needed for ascertainment (niscayapratyayavaikalya). The latter expectedly consists in a lack of conceptual habituation, hence in the dullness of the cognition. But Dharmakirti's commentators also point to two types of other factors, i.e., external (bahya) and internal (antara). External conditions are typically at work when we fail to ascertain momentariness due to the fact that the successive (parapara, purvapara, etc.) similar

(sadrsa) moments (ksana) of an entity occur too swiftly (needless to say, the lack of conceptual habituation and cognitive sharpness are also involved in this type of failure). As for the internal factors, they mainly consist in the imprints of erroneous conceptual constructs (vitathavikalpavasana). Here, we ought to under-stand that we are, since all eternity, accustomed to misidentify selfless things as being endowed with a self (atman; satmaka), momentary things as being enduring (sthira) or permanent (nitya), painful things

as being pleasurable (sukha, aduhkha), etc. This is what Buddhist dogmatics generally refers to as (the four) wrong notions or misconceptions (viparyasa), which, at least in Dharmakiirti's analysis, are the products of the false view of the self (atmadrsti) or personalistic belief (satkayadrsti), i.e., ignorance (avidya, ajnana, moha). Be they internal or external, the causes of error impede or prevent perceptual ascertainment (niscayapratirodhin, niscayavibandhaka). And whereas failing to ascertain a bottle may make me thirsty, failing to ascertain the vastudharmas makes salvation impossible. Indeed, the superimposition of a self is responsible for the rise of defilements and unwholesome actions which in turn enslave us to suffering in samsara. A significant part of the Buddhist path to salvation is consequently aimed at gradually implementing the ascertainment of these vastudharmas.

2. The Four Nobles' Truths and Their 16 Aspects

2.1. Dharmakirti's vastudharmas coincide with the four aspects (akara) of the truth of suffering (duhkhasatya) and are part of a broader dogmatic framework focusing on the so-called 16 aspects (sodasakara) of the nobles' truths. Needless to say, Dharmakirti was perfectly aware of this identity. According to Abhidharma scholasticism, each of the four truths entails four aspects: impermanent (anitya), painful (duhkha), empty (sunya) and selfless (anatman) for the truth of suffering; origin (samudaya), cause (hetu), source (prabhava) and condition (pratyaya) for the truth of the origin (samudayasatya) of suffering; cessation (nirodha), peaceful (santa), excellent (prantta) and escape (nihsarana) for the truth of the cessation (nirodhasatya) of suffering; path (marga), right way (nyaya), access (pratipad) and salvational (nairyanika) for the truth of the path (margasatya) leading to the cessation of suffering. Vasubandhu's AKBh provides no less than four alternative explanations of each item, out of which two represent Vaibhaisika (AKVy 626,10) accounts while the remaining two are likely to reflect Vasubandhu's own views on the subject. Of decisive importance in this connection is the fact that the nobles'

(1) AKBh 400,2-8:pratyayadhrnatvad anityam /piddtmakatvdd duhkham / dtmiyadrstivipaksena sunyam / dtmadrstivipaksendndtma / hetur bijadharmayogena / samudayah prddurbhdvayogena1 / prabhavah prabandhayogena / abhinispddandrthena pratyayah / tadyathd mrtpindadandacakrasutrodakasamavdydd ghatdbhinispattir bhavati tadvad iti / skandhoparamatvdn nirodhah / agni2nirvdpandc chdntah / nirupadravatvdt pranitah / sarvdpaksdlavimuktatvdn nihsaranam iti / gamandrthena mdrgah / yogayuk- tatvdn nydyah / samyakpratipddandrthena pratipat / atyantasamatikramandn nairydnika iti /. 1Note AKBhTib D48b7 'byuh ba 'i chos kyi tshul gyis (*prddurbhdvadharmayogena7) for prddurbhdvayogena (AKBh, AKVy 526, 16-17). 2Note AKBhTib D49a1 me gsum ( *agnitraya ?) for agni°. “It is impermanent because it depends on conditions; painful, because it consists of affliction; empty, because it counteracts the

false view of what belongs to the self; selfless, because it counteracts the false view of the self; [remote] cause, inthe way (yogena, Tib. tshulgyis, AKVy 526, 1 6yogasabdo 'tra nydydrthah) that is characteristic ofa seed; [proximate] origin, in the way [that is characteristic] of[sudden] manifestation; source, in the way [that is characteristic] of a series; [joint] condition, in the sense of [co-]production, as a pot is produced due to the concourse ofa lump ofclay, arod, a wheel, a thread, and water; cessation, because it is the end of the [[[defiled]]] skandhas; peaceful, because of the extinction of the [three] fires [of desire, hostility and delusion]; excellent, because it is without calamity; escape, because it is free from all evils; path, in the sense of leading [to nirvdna]; right way, because it is provided with means(/arguments) (AKVy 626,24-25: yogayuktatvdd ity

upapattiyuktatvdd updyayuktatvdd vd /); access, in the sense of proper attainment; salvational, because one gets definitely beyond [samsdra through it].” See La Vallee Poussin (1980, V.30-32). (2) AKBh 400,9-14: athavdndtyantikatvdd anityam / abhinydsabhutatvdd duhkham / antahpurusa1 rahitatvdc chunyam / akdmakdritvdd andtma / hetur dgamanayogena / samudaya unmajjanayogena / prabhavah prasaranayo- gena / pratisarandrthena pratyaya iti / asambandhah sambandhoparamatvdn nirodhah / trisamskrtalaksanavimuktatvdc chdntah / kusalatvdt pranitah / paramdsvdsatvdn nihsaranam iti / kumdrgavipaksena mdrgah / anydyavipaksena nydyah / nirvdnapurdvirodhandrthena pratipat / sarvabh- avapratipaksatvdn nairydnikah /. 1 antahpurusa° em. (AKBhTib D49a3 nah gi skyes bu):

antarvydpdrapurusa° Ed. “Or, it is impermanent because it is ephemeral; painful, because it is (comparable to ?) a burden (AKVy 626,28-29: abhinydsabhutatvdd iti bhdrabhutatvdd ity arthah / dkramyata ity arthah /); empty,becauseitisdevoidof[any]internalperson;selfless,becauseitdoesnotobeyone'swill;cause,inthe way[thatischaracteristic]ofsettinginmotion(AKVy627,1:higatau[=Dhdtupdtha5.11]hinotyasmdditi

hetuh);origin,intheway[thatischaracteristic]ofemerging[,asitwere,fromthefuture];source,intheway [that is characteristic] of streaming forth; condition, in the sense [that is characteristic] of streaming back; cessationisnon-relation[tofuturesuffering],becauseitistheendoftherelation[topastsuffering];peaceful, because it is free from the three characteristics ofconditioned [things, viz. arising, destruction and duration]; excellent, because it is wholesome; escape, because it is the supreme consolation; path, because it counteracts (the) wrong path(s); right way, because it counteracts the wrong way (anydya); access, in the sense that it does not obstruct the city of nirvdna; salvational, because

it is the antidote of all [sorts of] existence.” See La Vallee Poussin (1980, V.32-33). (3) AKBh 400,15-401,11: esdm vydkhydndm anekaparydyah / yathdbhipretam pravaksydmah / udayavyayatvdd anityam / pratikulabhdvdd duhkham / dtmarahitatvdc chunyam / svayam andtmatvdd andtma / hetusamudayaprabhavapratyayatvam tu yad eva sutra uktam / ime pahcopdddnaskandhds chandamulakds chandasamudayds chandajdtiyds chandaprab- havd iti / [...] pravrttyuparamatvdn nirodhah / nirduhkhatvdc chdnta iti hi bhiksavo duhkhdh samskdrdh sdntamnirvdnamitivacandt/niruttaratvdtpranitah/apunardvrttitvdnnihsaranam/pathibhutatvdnmdrgah /yathdbhutapravrttatvdn nydyah /pratiniyatatvdtpratipadyathoktam - esa mdrgo hi ndsty anyo darsanasya visuddhaya iti / atyantanirydndn nairydnikah /. “The explanation of these [16 aspects being] manifold, we shall [explain them] as [they are] intended [here].

Impermanent, because it arises and perishes; painful, because it is adverse; empty, because it is devoid of a self; selfless, because it is itself not a self; as for [its] beingcause,origin,sourceandcondition,[it] simply [corresponds to] whatisstatedinthesutra: ‘Thesefive aggregates to which one clings (updddnaskandha) have desire (chanda; AKVy 627,11: trsndparydya iha chandah) for their root[-cause], desire for their origin, desire for their birth (AKBhTib D49a7: 'dun pa dah 'dra ba; AKVy 627, 1 2-1 3 : chandajdtiyd iti chandapratyayd ity arthah), [and] desire for their source' (cf. MN III. 16 and SN III. 100, chandamulaka). Cessation, because it is the end of [retributive] activity (AK 2.6a

pravrtteh explained AKVy 98,16 samsdrasya); peaceful, because it is without pain, for it has been said: ‘Thus, O monks, painful are the conditioning factors, peaceful is nirvdna.' Excellent, because it is supreme; escape, because it is without return; path, because it is (comparable to?) a road (AKBhTib D50a2: lam lta bur gyur pa); right way, because it proceeds in accordance with the truth; access, because it is exclusive truths do not, in the present context, consist of a set of statements, but of structural features of reality itself.* Let it be recalled here that in the traditional formula: “Everything is suffering“ (sarvam duhkham), “everything” is co-extensive with the five aggregates to which one

clings (updddnaskandha), which exhaust psychophys¬ical reality (the Vaibhasikas' two pratisankhyds and dkasa do not belong to psychophysical reality proper). Here, “suffering” refers to the five upadanaskandhas as results (phalabhita), while “origin” refers to the very same upadanaskandhas as causes (hetubhita). In the vast majority of the sources to be dealt with here, duhkhasatya means nothing but duhkha, and the same holds true of samudaya (satya), nirodha(satya) and marga(satya). Needless to say, reality itself does not, strictly speaking and in spite of our sources' usage (including Dharmakirti's), consist of aspects, a point that Vasubandhu makes clear in the following (Sautraintika, AKVy 629,6) statement: “The mode according to which all the mind-and-mental-factors grasp [their] object-support is [their] aspect.” According to Yasomitra, Vasubandhu's explanation is

etymological (nairukta vidhih, AKVy 629,7): “Taking the phoneme a from the word alambana and the word kara from the word prakara, and dropping the remaining phonemes [i.e, °lambanagrahanapra°], one obtains the form akara.” In other words, the 16 aspects consist in the modes according to which insight (prajna) grasps the nobles' truths, i.e., the five upadanaskandhas, nirvana and the path, i.e., all existing things. And this is tantamount to claiming that insight is possessed with aspect(s) (sakara), a point made explicitly by Vasubandhu and Yasomitra.

2.2. An important statement by Vasubandhu sheds more light on the nature of the truths as well as the reason why they are claimed to belong to the noble ones only: “[These truths] are called aryasatyas in the sutra. What is the meaning of this? These are the truths of the noble ones, [and] this is the reason why it is said aryasatyas in the sutra.—Is it that they are untrue (mrsa) for the other ones [i.e., for the non-noble ones]?—Since they are not false (aviparita) [i.e., since suffering is suffering for everybody], these are truths for all of them[, noble as well as non¬noble]. Nevertheless, [only] the noble ones see them as they [really] are, not the other ones. Therefore, they are said to be the

truths of the noble ones, but not of the non-noble ones, because the latter see the contrary (viparita). A stanza [indeed says]: ‘What the noble ones claim to be pleasurable, the other ones regard as painful; what others claim to be pleasurable, the noble ones consider as painful.'” As we can see, Vasubandhu draws a sharp distinction between aryas and anaryas. But what does this distinction amount to? In a previous passage of his AKBh, Vasubandhu defines noble persons as follows: “Which ones are the noble ones? [The noble ones are those] in whom the pure path has arisen. [They are called] aryas because they have gone far (arad yatah, i.e., ar[ad]ya[ta]h) from the evil factors. For they have obtained the possession of a definitive disconnection [from these factors].” Since the anasravamarga, precisely because it is pure, is or presupposes the path of vision (darsanamarga), we can

safely conclude that the noble ones are those Buddhist yogins who have entered or completed the comprehension of the truths (satyabhisamaya). As for the non-noble persons, they are those who, whatever the amount of defilements (klesa) they have abandoned through the mundane path (laukikamarga), are traditionally referred to as prthagjanas, “ordinary beings.” Now in the above-mentioned passage, Vasubandhu claims that the noble ones see the truths as they really are, which Yasomitra explains as follows: “[Only] the noble ones see these truths as they [really] are, viz. the truth of suffering as suffering, impermanent, empty and selfless, and this up to (evam yavat) [the truth of] the path as path, right way, access and salvational.” In other words, to see the truths according to their 16 aspects is the privilege of the aryas. As a consequence, the prthagjanas or anaryas

are those who do not see the truths according to their 16 aspects or, rather, those who see them under contrary aspects, as Yasomitra again makes clear: “They are said to be the truths of the noble ones, but they are not said to be (the) truths of/for the non-noble ones—Why?—Because the latter see the contrary. [And] indeed, the [non-noble ones] see suffering as non-painful, etc. (duhkhata aduhkhata ityevamadibhir akaraih); [they see] the origin [of suffering] as non-origin, etc.; [they see] the cessation [of suffering] as non-cessation, etc.; [they see] the path [leading to the cessation of suffering] as non-path, etc.”

2.3. Now if I am not mistaken, this is precisely what Dharmakirti claims in PV 2.270: “Having[, due to ignorance,] superimposed 16 unreal aspects, viz. ‘enduring', ‘pleasurable', ‘mine', ‘I', etc., on the four [[[nobles]]'] truths, one experiences craving [for what is supposedly pleasurable to the self].” Read against the background of Buddhist dogmatics, this stanza can only point to the cognitive experience of prthagjanas who, due to ignorance and especially the false view of the self, superimpose contrary aspects on the four nobles' truths, or, equivalently, fail to ascertain reality's most genuine features. Considering that the topos of the 16 aspects permeates the whole of his ontology and that the distinction between prthagjanas and aryas is at the very basis of his gnoseology, we can appreciate the extent to which Abhidharma and nearly naturalized Buddhist thought-reflexes shaped Dharmakirti's religio-philosophical system.

2.4. Our next task it to inquire into the conditions that make the ascertainment of the vastudharmas or sodasakaras possible. Unfortunately, none of Dharmakirti's numerous allusions to the topic sheds sufficient light on the issue of niscaya in a soteriological context. And if he connects (albeit to a lesser extent than his commentators ) the themes of yogic cognition and ascertainment, Dharmakirti limits himself to descriptive rather than explanatory statements. Fortunately, a close scrutiny of Vasubandhu's AKBh supplies enough material to answer our question in a satisfactory way. This is what the rest of the present paper is about.

3. Path, Vision and Ascertainment

3.1. Here I would like to provide a brief outline of the path as it is described by the Vaibhaisikas and discussed by the Sautraintika(/Yogaicaira) Vasubandhu. Note that this sketchy presentation is not concerned primarily with epistemological issues (to which I shall briefly come back in §3.7): my presentation of the path, however, will mostly focus on those stages and aspects of the path that exhibit a strong concern with the four truths, their 16 aspects and the transition from “ordinariness” (prthagjanatva) to “nobility” (arya[[[pudgala]]]tva), as well as on issues of doubt and ascertainment/certainty.

3.2. The remote preparatory conditions of the path can be labeled as “behavioural.” Those who wish to see the truths (satyani drastukamah) are supposed to abide in good behaviour (vrttastha) from the outset (adita eva), i.e., to observe (palden) morality (sila) in order to ward themselves against attachment (vyasanga) and mental distraction (viksepa) as well as to develop proper conduct (acara). The central role of good behaviour can be observed in yet another set of pre-conditions commonly referred to as the four attitudes of the noble ones (aryavamsa), of which only the first three are relevant in the present context. As antidotes to the rise of craving (trsnotpadavipaksa), these attitudes are designed to calm (santi) in a provisional or definitive way one's desire for the gross environmental objects of the notions of mine and I (mamahankaravastviccha).

Since craving can be caused by one's longing for better garments (civara), food (pindapata), and seat-and-bed (sayanasana, sayya- sana), the first three attitudes consist of contentment (santusti) with garments, food and seat-and-bed, and are connected to the monastic mode of life (vrtti). And indeed, these aryavamsas are of the nature of satisfaction or contentment (tustyatmaka, santustisvabhava). They allow one to achieve moderation (alpecchata) and content¬ment, i.e., the absence of greed (alobha), and thus to promote the two kinds of withdrawals or “retreats” (vyapakarsa) that are instrumental in the success (sampadana) of cultivation: first, withdrawal with regard to the body (kaya), by setting aside promiscuity (samsarga), and second, withdrawal with regard to the mind (citta), by dismissing unwholesome or defiled deliberations (akusalavitarka, klistavi- tarka). The acquisition of the aryavamsas makes one a suitable “vase” (patribhuta) for subsequent cultivation. A third set of (mainly) behavioural pre-conditions consists of the factors that are conducive to liberation (moksabhagiya). Although this refers primarily (pradhanyena) to mental actions (manaskarman) or volitions (cetana), it also ranges over corporeal and verbal actions (kayavakkarman) such as alms-giving

(bhiksa) and verbally assenting to the moral/monastic rule (siksa), provided these rely on a strong mental resolution (pranidhana, which is nothing but a specific volition, a cetanavisesa) towards salvation. It is to be noted that the descriptions of the moksabhagïyas exhibit a strong religious pedagogical concern, for one of the tokens of these factors is one's thrill (romaharsa) and/or tears (asrupata) upon listening to a teaching (katha) revealing the evils (admava) of samsara and the qualities of selflessness and nirvana (samsârâdïnavanairâtmyanirvânagunadyotika')?3 These three behavioural patterns, which strongly presuppose monastic ordination, are concerned with preliminary requirements of an ethical sïla, acara, kayavakkar-man, bhiksa, etc.), psychological aviksepa, avyasanga, alobha, santusti, alpecchata, santi, vyapakarsa, pranidhana, etc.), intellectual vitarka), disciplinary cïvara, pindapata, sayanasana, siksa) and even social asamsarga) character.

They exhibit no connection whatsoever with the truths and their aspects, and even less so with their ascertainment which, as we shall see, requires psychic concentration (samadhi, AKBh 341,7) and analytic discrimination (vipasyan a, AKBh 341,9).

3.3. Before proceeding any further, attention should be paid to the complex of the three types of insight, the sketchy treatment of which follows directly upon the behavioural requirements of the path. Interestingly enough, Vasubandhu's (AKVy 525,6-7) explanation strongly departs from Vaibhasika orthodoxy while accounting for the three prajnas in that it emphasizes ascertainment/certainty. According to him, the insight born of listening consists in an ascertainment/certainty that arises from the authority of a credible person's statements (aptavacanapramanyajata). The insight born of reflection is an ascertainment/certainty that arises from rational examination (yuktinidhyanaja). Needless to say, this rational examination exhausts itself in the yogin's use of the three means of valid cognition in a way that closely matches the Yogaacaaras' third type of

reason/reasoning (yukti), i.e., reason/reasoning that proves by means of arguments (upapattisadhanayukti). Finally, the insight born of cultivation amounts to an ascertainment/certainty that arises from psychic concentration (samadhija). It is to be noted that these insights are types rather than stages and thus do not, strictly speaking and as far as the Abhidharmic accounts are concerned, represent successive and increasingly higher modalities of understanding (though the srutamayi admittedly ranks lower than the other two, and notwithstanding the fact that the list, as a standard schematic description of the path, is certainly to be understood in a hierarchic way). Let it be simply

emphasized that prajna is defined as niscaya, and that its “rational/ reflecting” modality originates from an examination (nidhyana, nitirana) that still entails doubt. As we shall see, this dialectic of doubt and ascertainment/certainty, which characterized Dharmakirti's gnoseological account, plays a decisive role in the comprehension of the truths or path of vision (see below, §3.6).

3.4. The remote steps to the path proper also entail meditational and intellectual components. The Buddhist yogin is requested to achieve psychic concentration, otherwise known as calm (samatha, AK 6.14a), and insight, i.e., analytic discrimination. Once the yogin has taken possession of the aryavamsas, hence become a vase for cultivation, (s)he is offered two alternative entrance doors (avataramukha) to mental concentration or calm: the (cultivation of the) loathsome/ horrible (asubha) if (s)he is dominated by desire (adhiraga), and mindfulness towards breathing in and out (anapanasmrti) if (s)he is dominated by (discursive) deliberation (adhivitarka). These two meditational practices being well docu-mented, I shall refrain from entering into any detail here. Suffice it to say that, even though the anapanasmrti does consist in insight, these two practices bear no

explicit relationship with the truths or their aspects. As Vasubandhu insists, the asubha has the loathsome/horrible for its aspect (asubhakara, AKBh 339,1), but not impermanence, etc. Now in possession of mental concentration, the yogin is in a position to succeed in analytic discrimination, which (s)he will achieve by cultivating (bhdvand) the four applications of mindfulness (smrtyupasthdna). These applications of mindfulness, described also in terms of vision (darsana) and observation (anupasyand), are an insight bearing successively on the body (kdya), affective sensation (vid, vedand), the mind (citta) and the factors (dharma), which they examine (pariksana, pariksd) as to their particular and generic characteristics (svalaksana and sdmdnyalaksana), i.e., impermanence, painfulness, emptiness and selflessness. In the Vaibhaasika analysis, then, the main purpose of the

four applications of mindfulness is not simply to provide a “close and continuous observational analysis of every process that goes to make up the psychophysical life of a practitioner,” but to implement a preliminary insight into the ontological features of these processes and factors. The four applications of mindfulness (and especially the fourth) bring the yogin to the threshold of the truths and their first four aspects by having him/her examine all the factors that are constitutive of existence and experience, a scope that is co-extensive with the five updddnaskandhas. Note that, to the best of my knowledge, ascertainment/certainty does not yet come into play at this stage, a fact that can be accounted for granting that the smrtyupasthanas consist of pariksas, which per definitionem entail doubt according to Abhidharmic analysis. Note also that according to the Vaibhaisikas, “the application of mindfulness to the body is realized for the one who, being concentrated, sees the body in [its constitutive] atoms and as [purely] momentary.”

3.5. Such is the yogin's situation towards the end of the early preliminary path, at the threshold of the preliminary path (prayogamarga) proper: “While abiding in the application of mindfulness [that bears] on the factors, [an application] whose object¬support is universal, the [[[yogin]]] discriminates these [things, viz. the body, affective sensation, the mind and the factors], as impermanent, painful, empty and selfless.” At this stage, the applications of mindfulness give rise to a new set of four factors that are known as “aids (or [factors] conducive) to [[[intellectual]]] penetration” (nirvedhabhagiya) and form the preliminary path proper. These four wholesome roots, being but applications of mindfulness (smrtyupasthanasvabhava) of a higher level or greater intensity, are an insight (prajnatmaka).4,8 But contrary to the four applications of mindfulness, which culminate in the vision of the first four aspects of the truths, those associated with suffering, the nirvedhabhagiyas provide the yogin with a first encounter with the four truths in all their 16 aspects. It is to be noted that this stage of the path also entails a strong intellectual and inquisitive component (vyavacarana, pariksa), as the following passage makes clear: “As for the [[[nobles]]'] truths, their presentation (desana) conforms to [the order of] the comprehension.— But why [does] the comprehension of these truths [proceed] like this?—Because first, in the stage of [[[intellectual]]] inquiry [i.e., with the four aids to penetration], one examines that to which one is attached, that by which one is oppressed and that from which one seeks liberation [i.e.,] the truth of suffering; and then [one examines] the truth of origin by wondering about the origin of [[[suffering]]],

the truth of cessation by wondering about the cessation of [[[suffering]]], the truth of the path by wondering about the path [leading to the cessation] of [[[suffering]]], because after one has noticed an illness, one investigates its cause, its destruction and the [appropriate] medicine [...] And [in the same order] as one examines the [four] truths in the stage of [[[intellectual]]] inquiry, one comprehends [the] truths in the stage of comprehen¬sion, because [[[comprehension]]] is made possible by the preceding [inquiry], as a horse gallops freely in a field that is [already] known [to it].” The first among the four aids to intellectual penetration, “heat” (usmagata), bears upon the four nobles' truths (catuhsatyagocara, catuhsatyalambana) and possesses the 16 aspects (sodasakara). The second aid to intellectual penetration, the “summits” (murdhanah) , also has the four nobles' truths for its object-support and 16 aspects, but bears another name because it is more intense (utkrstatara) than heat. The importance of the first two aids to intellectual

penetration cannot be overestimated in the context of the 16 aspects, for it is at this stage that the aspects are first (prathamatas) applied (akarana) or directed (vinyasana) to the truths. Due to the application of mindfulness bearing on the factors, the yogin is now in a position to “imprint” (La Vallee Poussin) aspects 1-4 on the upadanaskandhas as effects (= truth of suffering), aspects 5-8 on the upadanaskandhas as causes (= truth of origin), aspects 9-12 on destruction (= truth of cessation), and aspects 13-16 on the path. The distribution of the 16 aspects onto the four truths is brought further with the third and fourth aids to penetration, called ksanti (“patience” [[[Wikipedia:Louis de La Vallée-Poussin|La Vallee Poussin]], Hurvitz], “acquiescence” [[[Wikipedia:Louis de La Vallée-Poussin|La Vallee Poussin]], Hurvitz], or “delight” ) and laukikdgradharmas (“supreme mundane factors” ). As we have seen above, the nirvedhabhdgiyas entail a strong inquisitive and intellectual component and form the yogin's first intuition of the four truths, to which (s)he applies the 16 aspects. Now, the Abhidharmikas did not fail

to discuss the nirvedhabhdgtyas in terms of doubt and ascertainment/certainty, as Vasubandhu's and Yasomitra's etymologies of the term make clear: “What is the meaning [of the expression] nirvedhabhdgiyas? [The verbal root] vidh [i.e., vyadh] is [used] here in the meaning of distinction (vibhdga). An intuition (vedha), [inasmuch as it is] ascertained/certain, is an [[[intellectual]]] penetration, [and such is] the nobles' path, because it enables [one] to abandon doubt and to distinguish/distribute (vibhajana) the truths [in the form]: ‘This consists of suffering', and so on until ‘This is the path'. The part of the [[[nobles]]' path that is alluded to here] is the part consisting in the path of vision. Because they are favourable to this [[[path of vision]]] in that they bring [i.e., attract] it, [they are called] nirvedhabhdgiyas.” In other words, the nirvedhabhdgiyas are those factors that prompt nirvedha, “(intellectual) penetration,” which is synony¬mous with satydbhisamaya = darsanamdrga. In nirvedha, the preverb nih has the meaning of

“ascertained,” so that nirvedha means “ascertained intuition.” If the nirvedhabhdgiyas still entail doubt as to the truths and their aspects, they immediately precede and prompt (dvdhaka, dkarsaka) that part of the path that brings about ascertainment/certainty. Considering that the nirvedhabhdgiyas constitute the last stage arrived at by an ordinary person and that entering the stage of intellectual penetration, i.e., the comprehension of the truths or path of vision, makes one a noble person, we can safely conclude that doubt with regard to the truths and their 16 aspects characterizes prthagjanas while their ascertainment is a privilege of the dryas. And this perfectly matches the hypothesis arrived at above while comparing Vasubandhu's, Yasomitra's and Dharmakirti's statements on the nobles' truths and their 16 aspects.

3.6. With this in mind, let us conclude this survey with a short note on the nobles' path (dryamdrga) properly speaking, the darsanamdrga or “path of vision.” Of its nature, the path of vision is satyabhisamaya, “comprehension of the truths” by an immaculate insight whose object-support consists of the four truths. The compre-hension of the truths is generally presented as entailing 16 “thoughts” (sodasacitta [ka]) successively bearing on suffering (1-4), its origin (5-8), its cessation (9-12) and the path (13-16). It is to be emphasized that the standard descriptions of the abhisamaya do not analyse the 16 successive thoughts into four truths comprised each of four aspects, but divide the comprehension of each truth in a “cosmo- meditational” way (according to the object-support of each thought; each thought envisions a certain truth in relation to a certain stage of being corresponding itself to a stage of meditation) and a “purgative-cognitional” way (according to the nature of each thought; besides being a cognition of a certain type,

each of these thoughts frees the yogin of a certain defilement). Considered as to their nature, these thoughts can be either ksantis (“presentiment,” Cox) or jnanas (“knowledge”). A ksanti consists in an “irresistible” (La Vallee Poussin) or “immediately preceding” (Cox) path (anantaryamarga) that amounts to the unopposable expulsion of defilements; as for jnana, it consists in a path of liberation (vimuktimarga) in the sense that the yogin is now entirely freed from the corresponding defilements. To use an analogy, whereas the ksanti can be compared with the expulsion of a robber, jnana corresponds to one's shutting and locking the door after the robber's expulsion. From a gnoseological point of view, a presentiment is a consideration (darsana, drsti), i.e., a judgement (santirana, BHSD, Dhammajoti 2007b, pp. 57, 59, 70 and especially pp. 104-105) or reflection (upanidhyana,

BHSD), hence still accompa¬nied with the propensity for/contaminant of doubt (vicikitsanusaya) or, to put it equivalently, lacking ascertainment. On the contrary, knowledge consists in ascertainment (niscaya). Considered in terms of their object-supports, these thoughts envision each of the four truths first within the realm of desire (kamadhatu) and then, but in a unitary way, within the superior realms of form (rupadhatu) and formlessness (arupyadhatu), so that a total of eight alambanas are envisioned: suffering (i.e., the five upadanaskandhas) pertaining to the realm of desire, suffering pertaining to the realms of form and formlessness, origin pertaining to the realm of desire, origin pertaining to the realms of form and formlessness, etc. Each of these eight alambanas is envisioned first by a presentiment and then by a knowledge, resulting in a total of 16 thoughts. In this 16-fold process, the yogin gains first a presentiment/vision of suffering in the realm of desire (technically called duhkhe dharmajnanaksantih); second, a

knowledge/ascertainment of suffering in the realm of desire (duhkhe dharmajnanam); third, a presentiment/vision of suffering in the realms of form and formlessness (duhkhe 'nvayajnanaksantih); fourth, a knowledge/ ascertainment of suffering in the realms of form and formlessness (duhkhe 'nvayajnanam), etc. As noted above, the 16 thoughts or moments (ksana) of the satyabhisamaya are not correlated to the 16 aspects in a systematic way. Ai bhidharmikas, however, did not neglect the 16 aspects in their treatment of the path of vision. And indeed, the 16th moment of comprehension, which is reported to form the first moment of the (final part of the) path of cultivation, is said to coincide with the fully ascertained possession of the 16 aspects of the truths. And this is repeated in the context of the three types of persons (pudgala) that are “born” of the satyabhisamaya, viz. the “stream-enterer” (srotaapanna), the “once-returner” (sakrdagamin) and the “non-returner” (anagamin). According to the amount of defilements that they have previously abandoned

by means of the (mundane) path of cultivation (bhavanamarga), ordinary persons—either those who have been following faith (sraddhanusarin) or those who have been following the doctrine (dharmanusarin)—are, upon entering the path of vision, “candidates” (pratipan- naka) to a (religious) fruit ([sramanya]phala) that they will take possession of (hence becoming phalastha) at the completion of the path of vision, i.e., at the 16th thought/moment. Now according to Vasubandhu, “[every] fruit comprises [the following elements]: rejection of the previous [[[path]], that of the candidate], attainment of a new (anya = apurva) path[, that of the fruit], collection of the destructions (ksaya = prahana), attainment of eight knowledges [i.e., the four dharmajnanas and the four anvayajnanas], and acquisition (bhavana, Tib. thob pa) of the 16 aspects [of the four truths, such as impermanence, etc.].”

3.7. As stated above, the Buddhist epistemologists were well aware of the fact that (Buddhist) yogins alone can ascertain the structural aspects of reality merely upon perceiving things, a capacity they owe to the cognitive acuity developed along the path. In other words, the yogins have rid themselves of the two “deficient mental events” of doubt and error/misidentification concerning the vastudharmas. Unfor¬tunately, Dharmakirti's commentators rarely go beyond very general statements and thus fail to inform us about the praxes thanks to which and the stage(s) in which a yogin reaches complete certainty as regards the 16 aspects of the truths. As we have seen, Abhidharmic materials allow us to draw a coherent picture of the process. The four (and especially the fourth) applications ofmindfulness (smrtyupasthana) provide the yogin (still a prthagjana strictly speaking) with a first insight (prajna) into the first four aspects. This insight gets both sharper in intensity and broader in scope with the four aids to intellectual penetration

(nirvedhabhagiya), which all bear upon the four nobles' truths and their 16 aspects: thanks to the heat (usmagata), summits (murdhan), acquiescence (ksanti) and supreme mundane factors (laukikagradharma), the yogin “applies,” “directs,” “imprints” or “distributes” (akarana, vinyasana, vibhajana) the 16 aspects onto the four nobles' truths. Both the applications of mindfulness and the aids to intellectual penetration consist in examination/judgement (vyavacarana, pariksa, santirana, upanidhyana, etc.) and hence still entail doubt. But as their name allegedly indicates, the nirvedhabhagiyas trigger the ascertaining penetration (nirvedha = niscito vedhah) seen at work in the path of vision (darsanamarga) or comprehension of the truths (satyabhisamaya) that make the yogin a noble one, and where each of eight successive presentiments (ksanti) still entailing the

contaminant of/propensity for doubt (vieikitsanusaya) is followed by an ascertaining/certain knowledge (jnana). At the 16th moment of the darsanamarga (corresponding to the eighth and final knowledge), every candidate (pratipannaka) obtains a fruit (phala) that necessarily comprises the fully ascertained possession of the 16 aspects. I am aware of only one “logico-epistemological” allusion to some of these stages. It occurs in Vinitadeva's commentary on NB 1.11 (Dharmakirti's definition of yogijnana ): “‘Real [[[object]]' means] correct (aviparyasta?) object, i.e., the four nobles' truths. Their cultivation is the cultivation of a real object. ‘Cultivation' means repeated practice (abhyasa). Its development is the development of the cultivation of a real object, i.e., the stages (avastha) [known as] smrtyupasthana, usmagata, murdhan and ksanti. Their conclusion [refers to] the

agradharmas. ‘That arises from this' [means] born from the conclusion of the development of the cultivation of a real object. ‘Yoga' refers to concentration (samadhi). Those who possess this are yogins. [And] their cognition is the yogins' cognition.” Taking Vinitadeva and the ablativeparyantat seriously (i.e., beyond the conclusive stage of the cultivation), Dharmakirti's yogins are those trainees who get out of the nirvedhabhagiyas (the last stage of which consists of the laukikagra- dharmas) and go through the path of vision. Unfortunately, Vinitadeva does not associate this complex with the topic of (perceptual) ascertainment.

4. Conclusion

Dharmakirti's ontology and gnoseology are strongly indebted to Abhidharmic accounts of the nobles' truths and their 16 aspects understood as structural features of reality, the ascertainment of which constitutes one of the most decisive stages of the Buddhist path. According to Dharmakirti, human beings perceive real things in all their aspects including momentariness and selflessness but they fail to identify them as such due to internal and external causes of error. To put it otherwise, they misidentify reality by superimposing aspects that are contrary to the real ones. A comparison with remarks by Vasubandhu and Yasomitra allows us to hypothesize that the overall situation described by Dharmakirti corresponds to the condition of the prthagjanas as opposed to the aryas, who perceive and ascertain the four truths according to their 16 aspects. Further analysis of the

Abhidharmic materials fully validates this hypothesis and provides a coherent picture of the various stages that lead the Buddhist yogin to the salvific ascertainment of reality's most intimate features. As we can see, traditional dogmatics do not only provide useful complements to our understanding of Dharmakirti’s system. They also bring us to its heart, to the very point where Dignaagan epistemology, Abhidharmic dogmatics and soteriological patterns indissolubly merge into one another. This does not make Dharmakirti’s enterprise any less philosophical. It is, rather, one more piece of evidence that Dharmakirti was, strictly speaking, a Buddhist philosopher. Acknowledgments Most sincere thanks are due to Isabelle Ratie and Ernst Steinkellner for their very careful reading of the present essay.

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