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The Indian Yogācāra Master Sthiramati and His Views on

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Abstract

The paper deals with Sthiramati, a famous sixth-century commentator and master of the classical Indian Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda school of Mahāyāna thought, in the first introductory part, and with his views on the ālayavijñāna concept in the longer second part. Two of Sthiramati’s Yogācāra works have already been available in their original language long ago. In recent years, various old Sanskrit manuscripts of further works ascribed to him have been found so that now there are three original works of Sthiramati available that deal at length with the ālayavijñāna concept and other classical Yogācāra views. These are

invaluable resources, which have to be studied much more carefully than up till now. At the same time, unsolved problems about Sthiramati’s identity, the works that can be safely ascribed to him, and his commentarial style have to be addressed. The second part of the article deals with his views on the ālayavijñāna concept on the basis of the three extant Sanskrit text mentioned above, namely the two commentaries Triṃśikābhāṣya and Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā and the supercommentary Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā. This part is intended to be just

an introductory comparative study of the pertinent sections of these texts. Therefore, special emphasis is laid on an accessible presentation of the problems involved, on referring to and summarizing earlier pertinent research, on a discussion of select terminological and doctrinal issues deemed to be particularly important, for instance, the relation to the other forms of mind, the subliminal character and objects of the ālayavijñāna and its combination with an idealistic philosophy.

Key words: C lassical Indian Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda, Sthiramati, Triṃśikābhāṣya, Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā, Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā, ālayavijñāna

Introduction and General Remarks on the Man and His Works

In Indian Buddhism, the Yogācāra or Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda school was one of the two great schools of Mahāyāna philosophy (the other being, as is wellknown, the Madhyamaka school). In historical perspective, its beginnings are not easy to uncover. However, nowadays most specialists generally agree that the bulky Yogācārabhūmiśāstra and the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra (probably, both of them originated in roughly the fourth century of the common era) are those texts in which some of the most characteristic views of the Yogācara school made their first appearance. In particular, the idealist philosophy, which attaches at least a

higher ontological status to mind and mental processes than to matter or external sense objects, and the development of a complex psychology by means of the establishment of a basic and subliminal “store mind” (ālayavijñāna)1 may be singled out here.2 In several pertinent and extremely influential publications, the German scholar Lambert Schmithausen developed his

hypothesis that these two core elements both took shape in the two texts mentioned above, but largely independently from each other.3 Some years ago, Hartmut Buescher (2008) challenged this view and instead tried to show that these central elements of Yogācāra philosophy rather originated simultaneously as a conceptual whole. In my view, Schmithausen has convincingly refuted this criticism in a very voluminous recent

monograph (Schmithausen 2014).4 Be this as it may, one can hardly deny that Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda as a full-fledged and consistent philosophical system enters the stage somewhat later. Arguably, the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha of Asaṅga and especially Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikā are those texts in which the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda philosophy gradually came of age. In the following pages, the focus will be on one of the great masters of the classical period of Indian Yogācāra thought,

namely on Sthiramati, 5 who is generally supposed to have lived in the 6th century of the common era,6 and on his views on ālayavijñāna. Sthiramati’s works are at least for two reasons especially interesting, if one wants to deal with the classical Yogācāra views on ālayavijñāna: Unlike Vasubandhu, he deals with this concept in several places in great detail, and unlike Asaṅga’s Mahāyāna-saṃgraha — which is a relatively early work but contains already a long systematical treatment of the ālayavijñāna concept — and its commentarial literature, several of Sthiramati’s works are extant in the Sanskrit original. It is true that the pertinent Tibetan and Chinese

translations — the latter, if they have been made by the great Chinese Yogācāra master, pilgrim and translator Xuanzang7 — are of fairly good or even excellent quality and more or less faithful to the original (including sets of fixed equivalents for central technical terms). However, the advantage of studying the Indian Buddhist philosophy in its original documents and language is certainly undeniable. One

important and very long Yogācara text ascribed to Sthiramati, of which the Sanskrit title is usually, though not particularly convincingly, reconstructed as *Sūtrālaṃkāravṛttibhāṣya,8 is still only available in Tibetan translation. It will not be taken into consideration in this article; recently, doubts have also been raised whether this work has been written by Sthiramati or, at any rate, by the same Sthiramati as the other texts.9

Two of Sthiramati’s original Sanskrit works have been available since long ago, namely the commentary on Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikā (Triṃśikābhāṣya) and the relatively bulky supercommentary on the Madhyāntavibhāga

(Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā). The latter text is preserved in a fairly old, but unique palm-leaf manuscript. Unfortunately, about one third of the text is lost, which is mainly due to the fact that most folios are more or less severely damaged. Yamaguchi’s (1934) editio princeps of the complete text (with reconstructions of missing text from the Tibetan version) has never been superseded, but a new critical edition is for various reasons certainly a desideratum.10 Among others, it should be noted that Yamaguchi’s edition was based on a hand-written copy of the original palm-leaf manuscript,

whereas nowadays photographic reproductions of the latter are available.11 Moreover, Jñānaśrīmitra, a Yogācāra scholar active at the monastery of Vikramaśīla in the tenth to eleventh century of the common era, refers quite often to the Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā,12 and a “Gloss on Some Words of the Madhyāntavibhāga” (Madhyāntavibhāgakatipayapadavivṛti) by Vairocanarakṣita (11th or 12th century) is preserved in Sanskrit and refers to Sthiramati’s supercommentary as well.13 In addition to other materials already mentioned or/and used in older philological publications on the text, these two testimonies will also probably be helpful for a new text-critical edition.

Simultaneously, they testify to the relevance of Sthiramati’s work in late Indian Buddhism.

The same importance for the later Indian Buddhist tradition can also be recognized in the case of some other works of Sthiramati, in particular, if one takes into consideration several recent manuscript finds to which I would like to turn my attention now. There are two new manuscripts of the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, one of them being almost complete and stemming according to the colophon from 12th century Eastern India. 14 It is not entirely certain that Sthiramati is the author/compiler of this commentary, but generally regarded as more or less likely in modern scholarship.15 However, for the most

part this text is a compilation of the Abhidharmasamuccaya and its earlier commentary, the Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya. Original text passages are not missing in the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā; 16 yet they are relatively few in number. For the very modest present purposes (for which see below) and at the present state of the editorial process, this text can be disregarded. Moreover, the original Sanskrit text of Sthiramati’s extensive supercommentary on Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa has recently been found but not yet edited, and the manuscript is not available to the public. Although Sthiramati’s Tattvārthā Kośaṭīkā is, of

course, no Yogācāra work proper, the exploration of this — unfortunately incompletely preserved — manuscript will certainly prove very worthwhile for understanding Sthiramati’s thought as a whole.17 Very important for our present purposes is the discovery of a 12th century East Indian palm-leaf manuscript of the Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā, Sthiramati’s commentary on Vasubandhu’s brief Abhidharma manual Pañcaskandhaka. The text is already available in a critical edition (Kramer 2013).

The Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā and the Triṃśikābhāṣya contain a fairly systematic treatment of the most basic characteristics of the ālayavijñāna, its name, its functions, and the proofs of its existence. It is conspicuous that in addition to pertinent textual passages only contained in one of the two texts, there are also many shorter textual passages which agree more or less literally. The latter feature seems to be far less pronounced in the Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā.

The Triṃśikābhāṣya and the Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā contain, for instance, after one explanation of the word ālaya (as occurring in the compound ālayavijñāna) that is nearly identical, a second one that is even in perfect literal agreement: “Alternatively, ālaya means that all dharmas stick, that is to say, are tied to it (= the ālayavijñāna) as [its] effects, or that it (= the ālayavijñāna) sticks, that is to say, is tied to all dharmas as [their] cause.”18 That the Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā does not have the first explanation of the word is probably simply due to the

different context. However, the second explanation, which is also to be found in this text (and derives, by the way, ultimately from the Mahāyānasaṃgraha), expresses, as it seems, almost the same sense as the other two works in partly different words.19 It may in this context also be mentioned that only the Triṃśikābhāṣya and the Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā are linked to each other in explicit terms, namely by a cross-reference in the before-mentioned text to a much more detailed discussion of the same topic in the latter work. 20 It may be noted that although Sthiramati does not disappoint his readers with this reference, there are also in this case many passages that agree more or less literally in both works.

The Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā also differs somewhat from the other two texts in the way it refers to the ālayavijñāna. Various relatively short references are scattered over the whole commentary. This may simply be due to the fact that the Madhyāntavibhāga does not mention the ālayavijñāna at all — at least not explicitly — and that Vasubandhu’s direct commentary on it (which, in turn, is the basis of Sthiramati’s supercommentary), the Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya, also explicitly refers to it only in two places.

Sthiramati’s work can be characterized very much as a work of reception. On the one hand, he often takes over passages or phrases from earlier works like the Yogācārabhūmi or the Mahāyānasaṃgraha more or less literally. Moreover, he writes commentaries on many other Yogācāra and non-Yogācāra works. Sthiramati’ s transmitted oeuvre even consists only of commentaries. The latter fact makes it at times hard to pinpoint his own

view on a certain doctrinal detail.21 And at least in the Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā, he sometimes simply juxtaposes explanations on central matters of doctrinal dispute without mentioning more than the mere fact that these are rivalling views,22 for instance when he gives three different definitions of the dharmakāya of the Buddhas.23

The following pages contain a discussion of some of Sthiramati’s views on the ālayavijñāna as expressed in the three Sanskrit works Triṃśikābhāṣya, Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā and Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā. Much of what is presented here is not original. Rather, it is indebted to the work of other scholars, especially Lambert Schmithausen. However, in view of the very complex nature of both the original Yogācāra texts and (most of) the best pieces of secondary literature on them, it seems to be not entirely useless to try to give a somewhat more general and accessible introduction to the topic,24 and to make some modest original remarks here and there.

Sthiramati’s views on the ālayavijñāna

At least in this classical period of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda thought, it makes hardly any sense to talk about the ālayavijñāna without referring to other forms of mind supposed to exist in this philosophy. They all interact with each other. Therefore, it may be useful to begin with an overview of the whole mind complex (table 1); Sthiramati refers to this scheme more or less explicitly in several places.

Table 1 8 forms of mind 3 kinds/ layers of mind (old synonyms for mind)

1. visual awareness (cakṣurvijñāna) = A ‘forthcoming’/ manifest forms of mind (pravṛttivijñāna) (vijñāna)

2. auditory awareness (śrotravijñāna)

3. olfactory awareness (ghrāṇavijñāna)

4. gustatory awareness (jihvāvijñāna)

5. tactile awareness (kāyavijñāna)

6. (non-sensory) cognitive awareness (manovijñāna)

7. defiled mind

(kliṣṭam manas) = B kliṣṭam manas (manas)

8. store mind/fundamental mind (ālayavijñāna) = C ālayavijñāna (citta)

In the first column eight forms of mind (1–8) are given rather than the six forms (1–6) that had been supposed to exist in Buddhism since ancient times. The eight forms are usually grouped into three kinds or layers (A, B, and C) as presented in the second column, although the order of the three kinds may vary (and consequently, also the order of the eight kinds). The third column is perhaps slightly less important. Not only Abhidharma

schools like the Sarvāstivādins but also the earliest Yogācāras regarded the Sanskrit terms vijñāna, manas, and citta as synonyms, because there was no real difference of function between these forms of mind anymore. However, after the Yogācāras had introduced their new tripartite mind complex, they took the opportunity to differentiate their three kinds of mind with the help of the old synonyms.

The three kinds of mind in the second column can at least for two reasons very well be called “layers.” To begin with, A and C are distinguished by being manifest actual perceptions or cognitions and by being subliminal, respectively. The matter is a little bit more complicated with the “defiled mind” (B). It is responsible for a continuous notion of “I.” In the Yogācāra system this erroneous notion takes the subliminal ālayavijñāna as an object. Therefore, it can be

regarded as being more or less subliminal in itself.25 As a matter of fact, the notion of “I” or a “view of self” (satkāyadṛṣṭi) is already according to several explicit remarks in the Yogācārabhūmi not exclusively speculative, but can also be innate (sahaja) and spontaneous,26 and it seems to be the continuous production of this more subtle erroneous notion of a self that is the main function of the kliṣṭaṃ manas. Therefore, it has to be regarded as being subtler than the actual perceptions and cognitions (i.e. A). Another reason why the expression “layer” for these three kinds seems to be fitting is the fact that at

most times in the life of a sentient being, all three layers are operating simultaneously, although both B and C can be inactive in certain well-defined circumstances. This multilayered consciousness is, as is well-known, one of the most conspicuous peculiarities of the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda school. As already mentioned, Shiramati presupposes this scheme of eight forms of consciousness that can be grouped in three layers as shown above quite consistently. This is at least true for two of his three texts under consideration here, namely the Triṃśikābhāṣya 27 and the Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā. In one place, the latter

text is particularly explicit: “The personality constituent consciousness [consists of] the eight forms of consciousness: the six manifest forms of mind, the ālayavijñāna and the defiled mind” (aṣṭau vijñānāni vijñānaskandhaḥ: ṣaṭ pravṛttivijñānāni, ālayavijñānaṃ, kliṣṭaṃ ca manaḥ.).28 In the Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā, however, it is somewhat unclear whether there are six manifest forms of mind or seven. In one text passage, Sthiramati says that the ālayavijñāna is called pratyayavijñāna in the Madhyāntavibhāga and Vasubandhu’s commentary, because it is the primary cause (hetupratyaya) of the seven other forms of consciousness.

However, later on he seems to use the expression “seven-fold pravṛttivijñāna”: tat punaḥ saptavidhaṃ pravṛttivijñānam upabhogaprayojanatvād aupabhogikaṃ | In my view, it is most natural to understand this as meaning: “This sevenfold manifest form of consciousness (pravṛttivijñāna) is called ‘connected with enjoyment’ [in the verse of the Madhyāntavibhāga], because it has enjoyment as its purpose.”

However, the Tibetan rendering offers another understanding of this text passage: “This (i.e. the consciousness connected with enjoyment mentioned before) is seven-fold. It is [called] ‘connected with enjoyment’, because enjoyment is the purpose of the manifest forms of consciousness” (de yang rnam pa bdun no || nye bar spyod pa ni ’jug pa’i rnam par shes pa’i dgos pa yin pas nye bar spyod pa can no ||).31 The division of the Sanskrit text into two sentences is very well possible. It is true that the punctuation of the Sanskrit manuscript suggests an interpretation as one sentence; however, the use of punctuation marks in

transmitted Sanskrit manuscripts is rarely, if ever, a reliable indicator of the way in which the original text has to understood in terms of syntactical units. Also apart from the division into two sentences the Tibetan translation deviates slightly from the Sanskrit text, but this is probably only a case of a relatively free rendering. However, if we would really have a sentence in the Sanskrit text that simply says: “This is seven-

fold,” we would expect that it offers a new information, but this is not the case. Sthiramati has already mentioned before that there are seven forms of mind that arise in dependence of the ālayavijñāna. Therefore, one wonders whether the Tibetan interpretation of the Sanskrit text is not rather an attempt to avoid the assumption that Sthiramati here maintains that there are seven rather than six “forthcoming” forms of mind (pravṛttivijñāna).

If, however, we accept this somewhat surprising statement, we have to recognize that the Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā does, in terms of terminological usage, not fit very well to the Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā and the Triṃśikābhāṣya. It should, however, be noted that Sthiramati in one place of his ṭīkā at least confirms the basic model of three kinds of mind consisting of pravṛttivijñānas plus kliṣṭaṃ manas plus ālayavijñana.32 It seems that Sthiramati is in this text passage

rather led to the surprising statement by Vasubandhu, the author of the Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya. It is true that Vasubandhu in his bhāṣya commentary only mentions the pravṛttivijñānas without giving their exact number. However, the absence of the kliṣṭaṃ manas in this place of the bhāṣya can very well be understood in such a way that Vasubandhu wants to understand the kliṣṭam manas as a seventh pravṛttivijñāna. Another passage of his bhāṣya commentary is more

explicit in this regard and confirms the assumption that the author of this text has no problem — or even prefers — to subsume the defiled mind under the pravṛttivijñānas,33 although he does make a distinction between the kliṣṭaṃ manas on the one hand and a group of six forms of consciousness on the other hand in yet another passage of his commentary.34 Therefore, we are perhaps dealing with a mere peculiarity of Vasubandhu’s terminological usage. It seems not to be completely impossible that this way to use the term pravṛttivijñāna may serve as an argument to strengthen (or weaken) the old but seemingly not very popular hypothesis that there were two masters called Vasubandhu, one of them writing, among others, the Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya and the other the Triṃśikābhāṣya and

Pañcaskandhaka. However, I have not done any further research regarding the usage or understanding of the term or concept pravṛttivijñāna in works attributed to Vasubandhu. At any rate, Sthiramati seems to be influenced here by the author of the Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya, and it is possible that he had no big problems with such a terminological usage, because the idea that there are seven pravṛttivijñānas can already be found in the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra.35 It is very obvious that for Sthiramati this work was an extremely important and authoritative source of inspiration. However, at the time of the Yogācārabhūmi, the new multi-layered model of consciousness was still in the making.

To return to the subliminal ālayavijñāna, Sthiramati designates it relatively often as “root mind” (mūlavijñāna) or “causal mind” (pratyayavijñāna). Both designations are not his own invention. However, the use of these two terms already shows the central importance of the ālayavijñāna and its function as a basic, fundamental form of mind in the Yogācāra psychology.

In the Triṃśikābhāṣya, Sthiramati explains the expression “root consciousness” in this way: “The ālayavijñāna is called ‘root mind’ because [firstly] the five sensory awarenesses visual awareness and so on arise from it thanks to the fact that [the ālayavijñāna] is the basis/receptable of their seeds and [secondly] because [it is the ālayavijñāna] that takes rebirth in the various forms of existence” ( pañcānāṃ cakṣurādivijñānānāṃ bījāśrayatvāt tadutpatter gatiṣu janmopādānāc cālayavijñānaṃ mūlavijñānam ity ucyate |).36

Similarly, the ālayavijñāna is called the causal mind (pratyayavijñāna) because it is the primary cause (hetupratyaya) of the seven other forms of mind and of all contaminated (sāsrava) existents (dharma) in general.37 In the definition of the “root mind” above, the first five forms of mind rather than all other forms of mind have been mentioned, but this may be due to the context of the Triṃśikā verse on which

Sthiramati comments. There, only the five sensory perceptions are mentioned. Sthiramati has at least added in the sentence immediately preceding his definition that the non-sensory cognitions (manovijñāna) are also implied in the verse. The “defiled mind” remains completely unmentioned here, but its arising from the ālayavijñāna is described elsewhere in the Triṃśikābhāṣya in a very similar way.38 Sthiramati’s explanations of the terms mūlavijñāna and pratyayavijñāna seemingly already mention two further important functions of the ālayavijñāna. To begin with, the term “takes

or grasps (re)birth” (janmopādāna) refers, if I am not mistaken, to the fact that the ālayavijñāna is the subject of transmigration from existence to existence and grasps five new branches or constituents of the personality (skandha) at the moment of “linking up” (pratisandhi) to the new existence. Moreover, the fact is mentioned that the ālayavijñāna is a container of seeds, i.e. of latent dispositions.

Already since the times of the Yogācārabhūmi the ālayavijñāna is said to contain or comprise all seeds. Sthiramati generally, though not always, rather mentions in this connection all contaminated (sāsrava) or pollutional (sāṃkleśika) dharmas.39 Sthiramati has inherited this — in terms of entanglement into the saṃsāra and the potential for liberation from it — negative character of ālayavijñāna directly or indirectly from certain text passages in the Yogācārabhūmi.40 The question of how liberation becomes possible, when the ālayavijñāna does not contain seeds of

supramundane dharmas, has also been dealt with quite early in the Yogācāra tradition.41 Sthiramati’s views on this topic certainly would deserve a detailed investigation. Suffice it to mention on the present occasion that certain remarks in the Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā suggest that he was mainly inspired by the Mahāyānasaṃgraha for the solution of this problem.42 At any rate, Sthiramati has to solve it, because he, of

course, believes in the possibility of liberation.43 He even uses its impossibility, if there would be no ālayavijñāna, as one of his proofs of its existence.44 He opines that only in a multilayered consciousness, the seeds of defilement and the respective antidotes that destroy them can be present at the same time, and this is the only way how the act of destruction can come about.45

However, Sthiramati’s identification of the ālayavijñāna as being basically pollutional has at least the consequence that the ālayavijñāna only exists as long as the saṃsāra continues. At least in the Triṃśikābhāṣya this becomes very clear by his commentary on Triṃśikā 5a,46 where Vasubandhu already teaches the cessation of the ālayavijñāna at the attainment of liberation.47 Similarly, in the Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā Sthiramati seems to explain that after the attainment of the dharmakāya, the Buddhas are liberated from the ālayavijñāna (anālaya) as well, but he mentions this only in his first definition of the dharmakāya, which is followed by two alternative and simply juxtaposed interpretations of this concept.48

Before liberation, however, ālayavijñāna, is, in contrast to the manifest forms of mind (pravṛttivijñāna) but also in contrast to the defiled mind or subtle notion of “I” (kliṣṭaṃ manas), present in every moment of saṃsāra. It is well-known that even the Yogācāras themselves were aware of the fact that the ālayavijñāna could be mistaken as an eternal soul or self (ātman) by Buddhist believers, a concept which they regarded as heretical, like most Buddhists did. Even more: As already mentioned above, the wrong and subtle notion of an

“I” that is continuously produced by the “defiled mind” (kliṣṭaṃ manas), persists according to the Yogācāra view, because this “defiled mind” steadily mistakes the ālayavijñāna as being such an eternal self. However, it would be unfair to accuse the Yogācāras of introducing such an ātman through the back-door. The ālayavijñāna only exists in the form of a continuum (saṃtāna) or stream (srotas),

because, as Sthiramati says, it is momentary. The fact that the ālayavijñāna is constantly changing — or rather, in view of the momentariness, is constantly replaced by a new very similar49 ālayavijñāna — from moment to moment, sets it clearly apart from the view of an eternal ātman. However, exactly the extreme anti-substantialism of many early Abhidharma schools and the doctrinal problems that arise from such a denial of

a fixed core of the personality, were without doubt instrumental in the invention of this peculiar form of mind. Moreover, the idea that the sentient beings enmeshed in saṃsāra continuously mistake the ālayavijñāna as a self serves as a good explanation of how there can be such a deep-rooted conscious and even unconscious notion of an “I,” if there is in reality no such thing.

Next, I would like to cite here a passage from the Triṃśikābhāṣya that gives a good idea of how exactly Sthiramati conceives of the interaction of the different forms of mind and their manifestation from seeds in the ālayavijñāna. Instead of the term “seed” (bīja), here the closely related term “impregnation” or “imprint” (vāsanā; lit. “scenting” or “perfume”) is used. To a certain extent, the two terms simply designate the same phenomenon viewed from two different angles.

…the transformation [of the mind] in the sense of cause is the nourishing/ strengthening of the impregnations of karmic maturation and of the “outflow”/ homogeneous impregnations in the ālayavijñāna. The transformation [of the mind] in the sense of result is [also of two kinds, namely:] the coming about of the ālayavijñāna in other communities [of sentient beings], when [the existence that] has been projected by former karma comes to an end, [and this new rebirth happens] because of the actualization/becoming effective of the impregnations of karmic maturation. And the actualization of the homogeneous impregnations results in the coming about of the manifest forms of mind and the defiled mind from the ālayavijñāna[; this is the second kind.]

A manifest mind stores — provided it is either wholesome or unwholesome — an impregnation of karmic maturation and a homogeneous impregnation in the ālayavijñāna. A neutral [[[manifest]] mind] and the defiled mind only [store] a homogeneous impregnation [in the ālayavijñāna].

…hetupariṇāmo yālayavijñāne vipākaniṣyandavāsanāparipuṣṭiḥ | phalapariṇāmaḥ punar vipākavāsanāvṛttilābhād ālayavijñānasya pūrvakarmākṣepaparisamāptau yā nikāyasabhāgāntareṣv abhinirvṛttiḥ | niṣyandavāsanāvṛttilābhāc ca yā pravṛttivijñānānāṃ kliṣṭasya ca manasa ālayavijñānād abhinirvṛttiḥ | tatra pravṛttivijñānaṃ kuśalākuśalam ālayavijñāne vipākavāsanāṃ niṣyandavāsanāñ cādhatte | avyākṛtaṃ kliṣṭañ ca mano niṣyandavāsanām eva |50

Two very important and very different kinds of imprint or seeds are distinguished in this passage. The “impregnation of karmic maturation” (vipākavāsanā; sometimes seemingly called karmavāsanā) serves as the link between a good or bad deed committed and its heterogenous retribution in the form of pleasant or unpleasant experiences. The homogeneous (literally: “outflow”) impregnation, however, links a good, bad or neutral state of mind with another, very similar (tajjātīya = of the same kind, as Sthiramati says in the

Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā)51 state of mind occurring later. As depicted by Sthiramati such a succession of similar states of mind can seemingly occur at any time. The great advantage is that they do not have to follow each other in momentary succession. Without an ālayavijñāna, the problem would arise, how such similar states of mind or similar experiences can occur after the intervention of states of mind of a completely different character. The “impregnation of karmic maturation” is according to Sthiramati mainly responsible for determining and shaping a new form of existence after death in accordance with the sum of one’s good and bad deeds.

As can be seen, the manifest forms of mind themselves continuously plant imprints into the ālayavijñāna. Therefore, one may wonder whether it is appropriate to designate only the ālayavijñāna as a causal mind (pratyayavijñāna). In the Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā this objection is indeed raised. However, Sthiramati replies, that only the ālayavijñāna acts as a main cause or primary cause (hetupratyaya), while the manifest forms of mind place their imprints in the ālayavijñāna as “influencing/directing conditions” (adhipatipratyaya), i.e. as certain secondary conditions. 52

The ālayavijñāna has become the new center of saṃsāric existence and shapes the new rebirth of sentient beings. Consequently, it is — in spite of the fact that manifest forms of mind arise continuously from it — pure karmic maturation (vipāka). Therefore, it is neither morally good nor bad but always “not explained [as being good or bad]”, i.e. neutral (avyākṛta). In all three texts by Sthiramati discussed here, this is explicitly stated.53

Up till here, only the latent or seed character of ālayavijñāna and its function as appropriator of a new existence has been dealt with. However, already in the Yogācārabhūmi certain further inevitable consequences arise from the introduction of this new kind of vijñāna.54 There are fixed conditions which must be fulfilled in order to style something as a consciousness (vijñāna). One of these conditions is that as a mind

(citta) it must be accompanied by certain mind concomitants (Sanskrit caitta/caitasa, besides further synonyms). During the time of Vasubandhu and Sthiramati it is explicitly admitted that the ālayavijñāna does have such mental factors, namely the five mind associates that are according to the Yogācāras omnipresent (sarvatraga), i.e. present in every conceivable state of mind. The omnipresent mind associate feeling

(vedanā), for instance, is in the ālayavijñāna there, but always pure indifference (upekṣā), i.e. neutral, or neither painful nor pleasant (as taught in Triṃśikā 4ab and

Sthiramati’s bhāṣya). Moreover, Sthiramati says in his ṭīkā that this feeling is also “difficult to observe/apprehend” (durupalakṣya).55 The somewhat problematic tension between the subliminal character of the ālayavijñāna and its character of being a “consciousness” comes even clearer to the fore, when one considers that a vijñāna can, in view of old canonical teachings, also never be without an objective support (ālambana). How does one have to conceive of

objects and their perception or cognition in a form of mind that is subliminal and filled with latent seeds? Sthiramati grants that the objective support (ālambana) and the mode of its apprehension (ākāra) are somehow indistinct,56 but mentions cognized objects of the ālayavijñāna in all three works under consideration here. It seems that Sthiramati’s different works are not in agreement regarding what exactly are the cognized objects, but at least the world surrounding the [[sentient

beings]], the so-called ‘container world’ (bhājanaloka) appears virtually everywhere as object of the ālayavijñāna.57 In the Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā, Sthiramati consistently says that in such cognitions the ālayavijñāna appears firstly, as the surrounding world or objects/things of the surrounding world (artha) and secondly, as the sentient being(s) (sattva) defined as the five sensefaculties (indriya) — together with their base, that is to

say, the body, as it is at least at some places explicitly said.58 The surrounding world (bhājanaloka) and the sense-faculties are in more traditional Buddhist scholasticism defined as the material surrounding world and as subtle or pellucid corporal matter (rūpaprasāda), respectively. However, at least in his ṭīkā Sthiramati writes only about cognitions in the form of mental appearances of these two things, 59 there is no trace of a really existing material world, at least as far as external matter is concerned. Regarding the

material sense-faculties, the situation in Yogācāra sources in general is somewhat complicated due to the fact that many masters continued to maintain that the ālayavijñāna appropriates, similar to the mind taught by more traditional schools, corporeal matter in one or the other form, when it enters a new existence.60 Be that as it may, we can already see here that it is especially the question of the objects

of ālayavijñāna where the idealist aspect of this form of mind in classical Yogācāra fully enters the scene in Sthiramati’s thought. In another place of the Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā, this becomes even more obvious: There it is said that the objects common [to the sentient beings, thun mong gi don = *sādhāraṇārtha], i.e. the surrounding world, are appearing in the ālayavijñāna, and these

cognitions are a directing condition (adhipatipratyaya) for the manifest forms of mind appearing as a certain object.61 In this place, a problem that is crucial for the idealist philosophy is already touched upon, though not in very explicit terms: Why do sentient beings having a similar karman — and therefore a similar existence and similarly structured ālayavijñāna — are very often, though not always, in agreement regarding the objects of their surrounding world, although there is no surrounding world outside of the plurality of sentient beings that are mere mental continua?62

Conclusion

In Sthiramati’s works Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā, Triṃśikābhāṣya and Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā the teaching on the Yogācāra mind-complex based on the ālayavijñāna appears already in a very developed form. Many basic features are mentioned or presupposed in all three of these works; at times, there seem to be differences in details. As a very preliminary working hypothesis one can say that the last-mentioned work stands in some respects somewhat

apart from the other two works. The Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā seemingly also offers the best insights in the working of the ālayavijñāna in the idealist Yogācāra philosophy. Sthiramati’s Sanskrit works are, at any rate, certainly the richest extant Sanskrit sources on the fully developed Yogācāra philosophy and should be studied in greater detail. In particular, in the case of the Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā much more basic philological work — but also a study of Sthiramati’s commentarial style and strategies — remains to be done.

Notes

1 In view of the many functions of the ālayavijñāna and different interpretations in the Buddhist tradition itself, there are many other possible English translations of this term. A frequent Chinese translation (zangshi 藏識) interprets the term as “storehouse consciousness;” the usual Tibetan rendering (kun gzhi rnam par shes pa) can perhaps best be understood as “fundamental mind” (cf. Schmithausen 1987:1).

2 In my view, the Yogācāra school proper is also characterized by a third very peculiar theory, namely their doctrine on the innate soteriological dispositions (gotra). Yogācāra texts proper usually assert that sentient beings differ since beginningless time in their potential for awakening (bodhi) and that there are even sentient beings who are because of their lack of such a gotra destined to remain in saṃsāra forever. See also n. 43.

3 See Schmithausen 1973, 1976, and 1984 for his viewpoint on the origin of idealism or the concept of “representation only” (vijñaptimātra), and Schmithausen 1987 for his hypothesis on the origin and early development of the ālayavijñāna. For both topics, Schmithausen 2014 should also be consulted (cf. n. 4).

4 In the same publication, Schmithausen also defended his views on the origination of the two central characteristics of Yogācāra philosophy against other critics.

5 Cf. May (1971: 265 and 297), who opines that Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikā marked the beginning of “Vijñānavāda classique” and singles out Sthiramati, Dharmapāla and Xuanzang as further great figures belonging to this classical period of Yogācāra thought (ibid.: 265 and 297–299). 6 If Sakuma’s hypothesis (for which see n. 9) is correct, it would be more precise to designate this master as Sthiramati I. 7 For the quality of Xuanzang’s translations, see e.g. Delhey 2016. 8 Schmithausen 2014: 651.

9 Schmithausen (ibid.) refers to an article by Ueno for recent doubts about Sthiramati’s authorship. Sakuma 2013 first presents Tsukamoto’s view that the two inscriptional references to Sthiramati at Valabhī, which date from the 6th and 7th century, respectively, refer to two different Buddhist masters of this name. Then Sakuma proceeds to argue that the Sūtrālaṃkāra commentary would — unlike the Triṃśikābhāṣya and Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā — fit to the 7th century teacher of this name rather than to the well-known 6th century master.

10 See de Jong 1979, Stanley 1988: XIII–XVII and Kim 2006 for these and many further details regarding the history of editorial work on the text and the need for a critical edition.

11 National Archives, Kathmandu, no. 5–233 (subject no.: bauddhadarśana 66); microfilmed by the Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project with the reel no. A 38/10. In an unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Stanley (1988) has made use of this material for corrections of the Sanskrit text entered in notes to his English translation of the Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā. 12 E.g. Jñanaśrīmitranibandhāvali (ed. Thakur 1987) 494,19–20 (cf. Schmithausen 2014: 538 n. 2232), 495,10–12, 504,14–16, 508,19–20, 543,22–23.

13 See now Kanō 2008 for these and further details on this text. 14 Li 2013: 241 n. 1. One of these manuscripts is complete except for the first folio. The first extant folios of the almost complete manuscript have already been edited (Li 2012, Li 2015, Li 2016). 15 See Kritzer 2002: 465f. for a very brief summary of the discussion and references to the most important relevant research contributions. Bayer (2010: 42–44) deals with the problems and possible solutions again and in some more detail. According to Li 2012: 3 (cf. ibid.: 6), the matter cannot be decided from the newly available materials, either. Nevertheless, Li regards Sthiramati’s authorship as very likely.

16 See Kritzer 2002 on this matter. Among others, the very beginning of the Abhidharmasamuccyavyākhyā contains such an original textual passage (for which Li 2012 can now be consulted). 17 See Matsuda 2013 for all further details. 18 atha vālīyante upanibadhyante ’smin sarvadharmāḥ kāryabhāvena tad vālīyate upanibadhyate kāraṇabhāvena sarvadharmeṣv ity ālayaḥ | TrBh *7,15 –17 = PSkV105,15f. My translation is adapted from Schmithausen 2014: 140; my own contribution to it merely consists of insubstantial modifications and a simplified presentation.

19 MAV Ṭ 33,8f.: ālīyante sarve sāsravā dharmās tatra phalabhāvena tac ca teṣu hetubhāvenetyālayaḥ | For a full discussion of this sentence and all available parallel sentences, see now Schmithausen 2014: 136–152. 20 TrBh *42,20. Sthiramati refers here to PSkV 93,17–105,8, where his four extensive proofs for the existence of the ālayavijñāna are given, which are only very briefly indicated in Vasubandhu’s Pañcaskandhaka. Kramer 2014: 283 stresses their importance by referring to the fact that these proofs are not identical with those given in older Yogācara literature.

21 Cf. Schmithausen 1987: 107, where regarding Sthiramati’s view on the objects of ālayavijñāna, it is stated that it “seems to vary in accordance with the (exegetical traditions of the) texts commented upon.” 22 Frauwallner (1982: 647f.) already mentioned the tendency of the Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā to give more than one possible interpretation regarding important doctrinal matters (though without referring to the fact that often Sthiramati does not even disclose his own judgement regarding these alternatives.) As an explanation, Frauwallner pointed to the fact that Sthiramati as a commentator on the Madhyāntavibhāga had quite a few predecessors, whose works are, unfortunately, not extant.

23 This instance will briefly be dealt with below. 24 For an easily digestible and thoughtful overview over the vijñāna section of the Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā (and hence also over its ālayavijñāna part), the reader may be referred to Kramer 2014. For broader accessible introductions into classical Yogācāra thought on ālayavijñāna written in Western languages by Indologists, one may turn to Schmithausen 1976: 237f. (succinct and authoritative, yet very brief, characterization of the idealist Yogācāra philosophy), de La Vallée Poussin 1934–35 (a superb and in my view still extremely useful introductory essay on the ālayavijñāna), and perhaps Waldron 2003 (the book is, however, rather concerned with pre-classical times). 25 Schmithausen 1987: 151.

26 See e.g. Schmithausen 1987: 148, cf. ibid. 151. As a matter of fact, Schmithausen even adduces the facts that the subliminal ālayavijñāna became the fundamental layer of personality and consequently also the new object of a view of self in early Yogācāra materials and that the existence of a subtle notion of “I” was asserted in these sources as possible reasons for the introduction of the “defiled mind” as yet another form of consciousness. In his view, the first reason is more crucial than the first one (ibid.: 151).

27 E.g. TrBh *7,4–8 (where the term vipāka is used instead of ālayavijñāna; the former term is, however, afterwards explained as designating the ālayavijñāna) TrBh *18,8f., etc. The three layers occupy, of course, a central role in Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikā anyway, since they constitute the three transformations of consciousness (vijñānapariṇāma).

28 PSkV 112,3–5 (Punctuation of the edition slightly adapted). 29 MAVṬ 32,19–21. 30 MAVṬ 33,2f. = MS folio 9b, line 5. 31 Ōtani no. 5534, tshi 38b2.

32 MAVṬ 131,14f.: tatra ni [mittam ālayavijñānaṃ kliṣṭa(ṃ m)anaḥ pravṛttivijñānāni ca | ] The greater part of the Sanskrit sentence is lost; except for my correction marked with round brackets, I have adopted Yamaguchi’s reconstruction, which seems to be confirmed by the Tibetan translation (Ōtani no. 5534, tshi 95a8f.: … de la rgyu mtshan ni kun gzhi rnam par shes pa dang | nyong mongs pa can gyi yid dang | ’jug pa’i rnam par shes pa rnams te | ) I assume that the fact that this sentence belongs to a longer section ascribed to “some” (iti kecit in MAVṬ 132,1, cf. Ōtani no.

5534, tshi 95a8: kha cig na re …) by Sthiramati is not decisive for our present purpose. In the following section, which is ascribed to “others” by Sthiramati, the term nimitta is defined in another way, and Sthiramati does, as it is often the case in this text, not inform the reader which interpretation he prefers. However, decisive for our context is the question of how Shiramati refers to the different forms of mind rather than the question whether this definition of the term nimitta is preferable to completely other definitions.

33 MAVBh 48,8–13: hetur bīja-saṃgṛhītam ālaya-vijñānaṃ | nimittaṃ … pravṛttivijñānasaṃgṛhītāḥ … mana-udgraha-vikalpaḥ | … | tatra mano yan nityaṃ manyanākāraṃ | udgrahaḥ pañcavijñānakāyāḥ | vikalpo mano-vijñānam … | . Vasubandhu here obviously subsumes manas together with the manifest perceptions and cognitions under the concept pravṛttivijñāna, and his definition of manas makes it explicit that the defiled mind“ (kliṣṭaṃ manas) is meant here. 34 MAVBh 18, 24–26: ātma-pratibhāsaṃ kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ | … | vijñapti-pratibhāsaṃ ṣaḍ vijñānāni | 35 See Schmithausen 1987: 326 n. 357. 36 TrBh *33,12f. 37 MAVṬ 32f.

38 TrBh *13,9–11. 39 In the Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā, Sthiramati remarks on Vasubandhu’s explanation that the ālayavijñāna is often called citta because it is “filled with the seeds of all conditioned factors” (citaṃ sarvasaṃskārabījaiḥ) that the term saṃskāra here refers to uncontaminated dharmas (saṃskāro ’tra sāsravā dharmā abhipretāḥ; PSkV 90,10f.) Similarly, he glosses the expression “all seeds (sarvabīja°)” with “the seeds of all pollutional dharmas (sarvasāmkleśikadharmabīja; PSkV 105,13f.).

40 For the situation and developments mainly in the early Yogācāra sources regarding the negative aspects of the ālayavijñāna, see Schmithausen 1987: 66–84 (= §4). 41 See Schmithausen 1987: 77–81 (= § 4.8). 42 See Schmithausen 1987: 79f. for a depiction of the viewpoint of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and ibid.: 370 nn. 577–579 for some references to the Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā.

43 However, as a typical and orthodox adherent of the Yogācāra school, Sthiramati seems to believe that a certain type of sentient beings, namely the so-called agotrasthas or aparinirvāṇadharmakas, are destined to remain bound to saṃsāra forever, although he also mentions the opposite view according to which all sentient beings have the disposition for buddhahood. I intend to present an analysis and interpretation of the pertinent textual passages in the Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā in a separate article. 44 TrBh *41,19–*42,16, PSkV 103,16–105,6. 45 Kramer 2014: 282f.

46 TrBh *12,19–24; cf. Sthiramati’s expression in the same text that the ālayavijñāna continues “as long as sāṃsāra” continues (āsaṃsāram TrBh *12,9 and 17). This should exclude at least the continuation of ālayavijñāna in the case of liberated śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. 47 See also Schmithausen 1987: 83. As Schmithausen explains, this view is liable to cause systematical problems in the case of the liberated person, who is still continuing his last existence (ibid.: 81–83).

48 MAVṬ 191,3–10; cf. Frauwallner 1982: 648. As Frauwallner (ibid.: passim) reports, traditionally one would ascribe this first definition to the school of thought represented by Asaṅga, Dharmapāla, and Xuanzang and not to the rival position of Maireya(nātha) and Sthiramati, which rather fits to the second definition. However, Frauwallner himself also adduces arguments for treating this traditional classification of Sthiramati’s thought with caution (ibid.: 647). The situation seems to be complicated indeed; see now also Sakuma 2008 on this matter; cf. also the problems regarding Sthiramati’s identity mentioned in the first part of this paper.

49 The similarity is at least given during a single life-time. In the moment in which the ālayavijñāna enters a new existence, the changes should be much greater. 50 TrBh *6,16–22. 51 MAVṬ 33,16 and 18. 52 MAVṬ 34. 53 TrBh *11,15f. (vipākatvād vipākaṃ prati kuśalākuśalatvenāvyākaraṇād avyākṛtam |); MAVṬ 33,10 (tac caikāntavipākatvād avyākṛta[ṃ |]); PSkV 93,4–6 (ālayavijñānaṃ sasamprayogaṃ pūrvakarmasaṃskārahetukatvād ekāntena vipāka evety avyākṛtajātīyam eva |). In the Triṃśikā and accordingly also in Sthiramati’s commentary the full specification is “not obscured [by defilements] and not explained [as being good or bad]” (anivṛtāvyākṛta; TrBh *11,13–16). 54 See Schmithausen 1987: 85–108 (=§ 5).

55 MAVṬ 34,3f.; cf. the Tibetan rendering shes par dka’ ba; Ōtani no. 5534, tshi 39a4. 56 This is, by the way, according to the Triṃśikābhāṣya also one of the reasons why the ālayavijñāna is always accompanied by neutral feelings (TrBh *11,9–11). 57 For an overview regarding the objects of the ālayavijñāna in Sthiramati’s works and a discussion of the differences, see Schmithausen 1987: 104–107 (= § 5.15).

58 The references are collected and discussed in Schmithausen 1987: 414 n. 763. Nevertheless, it may be useful to cite here at least one of these passages. Moreover, I can use this opportunity to communicate an admittedly very minor correction of the edited Sanskrit text: “[The ālayavijñāna is called a] consciousness, because it makes known the sentient being(s) (less probably: the world of sentient beings) and the surrounding world by appearing as these” (sattvabhājanalokavijñapanāt tannirbhāsatayā vijñānaṃ |). Yamaguchi’s edition (MAVṬ 33,9f.) has °vijñāpanāt instead of the manuscript reading °vijñapanāt (folio 9b, line 6). At least in Buddhist texts, the latter word-form is a fairly common variant of the before-mentioned one. 59 See the example in the preceding note and Schmithausen 1987: 107 (§ 5.1.5.3.3).

60 Already the eminent Belgian specialist on Indian Buddhism Louis de La Vallée Poussin (1934–1935: 164–167) has addressed this problem and noted that it does not fit very well to the Yogācāras’ general idealist stance. According to Schmithausen (1987: 104f.), we are faced with this problem in particular in the case of Sthiramati’s Triṃśikābhāsya (see Schmithausen 1987: 104f.), but this can hardly be taken as an argument against the view that classical Yogācāra doctrine maintains a denial of the existence of external objects (cf. ibid: 222 and de La Vallée Poussin 1934–1935: 167).

61 See Schmithausen 2005: 44. 62 Cf. de La Vallée Poussin 1934–1935: 163f. Abbreviations MAVBh Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya (see Nagao 1964). MAVṬ Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā (see Yamaguchi 1934). PSkV Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā (see Kramer 2013). TrBh Triṃśikābhāṣya (see Buescher 2007).


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