DOI: 10.46586/er.11.2020.8694
License: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
Entangled Religions 11.4 (2020)
er.ceres.rub.de
The Yogi and the Scholar
Rhetorical Polemics as Literary Frames and Conceptual
Framework in Tibetan Buddhist Discourse
Markus Viehbeck
Department of South Asian, Tibetan and Buddhist Studies, University of Vienna
ଈ୪ഌഝଈഝ Tibetan polemical literature is especially known and enjoyed for its harsh
language and offensive comparisons, which stand in marked contrast to the philosophical and doctrinal matters that works of the genre commonly discuss. Drawing from a
detailed literary analysis of a particular polemical exchange between Ju Mipam (1846–
1912) and Pari Rapsel (1840–1912), this article calls for a distinction between what might
be called “rhetorical polemics” and “formal argumentation,” and argues that the former
is used to exercise framing functions towards the latter, in both structural and conceptual
terms. With regard to conceptual considerations, polemical comparisons play an important
role. Through frequent allusions to a stereotypical divide of Buddhist experts in practiceoriented yogis and logic-oriented scholars, these discourses connect to a larger narrative
framework about the correct or incorrect transmission of Buddhism on the Tibetan plateau,
which individual agents use to characterize their opponents. In so doing, they contribute
to the further solidification and promotion of the master narrative that this framework
entails.
ౖ൰ൠಧஐഌ
Buddhism
Polemics, discourse analysis, rhetoric, stereotypes, historiography, Tibet,
Introduction
Polemics, in a broad sense of the term,1 appear as a central force in the development of
Buddhist scholastic traditions. The delimitation and definition of a certain position or group
requires “boundary work,” a distinction from what is the “Other”—often conceived to be
1
As exemplified in Steckel’s (2018, 11–32) polythetical listing of the central constituents of polemics, discourses described as polemical entail a range of different phenomena. In particular, there seems to be a
sliding scale between openly aggressive rhetoric as one extreme and more neutral discourses of religious
encounter as the other. As will be shown below, the underlying tension pertains also to central features of
Tibetan polemical literature.
[1]
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not just different, but wrong. As such, polemic was an accepted and vital principle of scriptural exposition in Buddhist India (laid out, for example, in Vasubandhu’s classic treatise
Vyākhyāyukti).2 Furthermore, the co-existence of different strands of thought and practice between Buddhism and other religious and intellectual traditions as well as within Buddhism
itself led to questions of superiority, a problem whose solution is often narrated as a personal
encounter between proponents of the respective traditions in formalized debate or another
kind of contest.3 This propensity for polemics was one of the features that was inherited when
Buddhism began to spread over the Tibetan plateau. Even the constitutional decision about
which form of Buddhism was to be established and supported by royal decree is said to have
been based on the outcome of a formal debate. While the historical details are unclear, this
event is remembered as a debate between two factions:4 the Indian Buddhist tradition, as represented by Kamalaśīla, who favoured a gradual soteriological path with a focus on rational
analysis; and, on the other side, Héshang Móhēyǎn / Hashang (hwa shang) Mahāyāna,5 as a
proponent of a Chinese subitist approach, which stressed the elimination of all conceptual
thinking. According to the common narrative, which solidified with the passage of time and
continues to regulate scholastic discourses until the present day, the Tibetan ruler favoured
the Indian side and expelled the Chinese Buddhists, thereby establishing the fundamental cultural affiliations and demarcations of Tibetan Buddhism.6 While this debate, which allegedly
took place in Tibet’s first monastery Samyé (bsam yas) at the end of the eighth century, is
particularly widely known, Tibet’s scholastic history offers plenty of accounts of polemical
encounters. With larger monastic institutions taking shape in the eleventh century,7 it was
not uncommon that scholastic adepts would prove their intellectual abilities in a “testing tour”
(grwa skor), where they would leave their home institution and debate against scholars from
other monasteries (see Dreyfus 2005, 294–95; Tarab Tulku 2000, 12).8 The institutionalization of Buddhist learning also provided the context for employing specific forms of debate as
a tool for monastic education. So-called “debating institutions” (rtsod grwa) began to emerge
in the fifteenth century and would dominate the intellectual and educational landscape for
centuries to come (see Dreyfus 2005, 293). Adherents of different Tibetan Buddhist schools,
in particular, used texts as a means to communicate and negotiate disputes, which enabled
opponents to cover larger geographical distances or to link back to debates in the near or
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
There, a commentary is said to require five principal elements, the last of which entails polemical discourse:
purpose (dgos pa), condensed meaning (bsdus pa’i don), literal meaning (tshig gi don), connections [to other
passages or topics] (mtshams sbyar ba), and objections and responses (brgal ba dang lan). See Lee (2001,
6–249) for an edition of the Tibetan text, and Nance (2012, 129–52) for excerpts of a translation.
See Cabezón (2008) for a review of important debate narratives of Buddhist India, drawn from Chinese
and Tibetan sources. Such narratives of debates exhibit a considerable spectrum in which the exchange of
arguments as well as combat in magical powers are given equal importance.
See Bretfeld (2004) for a discussion of the narratives that evolved around this controversy.
In Tibetan, the Chinese name is commonly rendered as Hashang (spelled as hwa shang or ha shang)
Mahāyāna, which is also used in the following. For a brief summary on Móhēyǎn’s activities and doctrinal stance, see van Schaik (2015, in particular 131–146). As a general convention, Tibetan words are
given in Wylie transliteration, in parentheses at their first occurrence, and in a phonetic rendering according to the system of The Tibetan & Himalayan Library (THLIB): https://www.thlib.org/reference/translit
eration/phconverter.php, accessed February 5, 2020. In cases where a different phonetic rendering is more
commonly known, we also use this.
This is also related to the common view of Tibetans being the righteous continuators of Indian Buddhism.
On this notion in historiographic literature, see Schwieger (2000).
The prime example and most influential model of such an institution is the monastery of Sangpu Neutok
(gsang phu ne’u thog), see, e.g. Hugon (2016).
For a new perspective on such tours, see a forthcoming article by Jonathan Samuels, entitled “Tours,
titles, and tests: issues of standardisation in medieval Tibetan monastic education,” from which the current
translation of the term is borrowed.
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Entangled Religions 11.4 (2020)
distant past. Eventually, this came to form a distinct literary genre, which is commonly denoted as “polemical literature”9 and pertains to two principal settings: works that criticise
adherents of other positions (rtsod yig, dgag yig, etc.) and thereby initiate debates (rtsod pa)
in the first place; and works that respond to such accusations (rtsod lan, dgag lan) and hence
provide an answer (lan) to the former. While the identification of responsive works is relatively straightforward, the category of works that initiate debate is ambiguous and depends
on later reactions as well—that is, whether a given work actually sparked a controversy.10
Even though comparatively few in number, works of this genre enjoy a particular prominence among Tibetan scholars for at least three reasons: polemical treatises are the prime
medium to formulate and negotiate doctrinal differences; therefore, they are also important
for identity formation, for delineating the borders of one scholastic tradition11 against another;
and lastly, polemical treatises are enjoyed for their rich literary features, the prominence of
verbal insult and use of different stylistic devices, such as wit and irony, scathing metaphors,
and also polemical comparisons, which turn texts of this genre into a spectacle.12 While many
polemical treatises emerge from personal disputes, they speak to a larger yet specialised scholarly audience. Similar to how reputation is gained on the debate yard, the expertise in Buddhist theory and sophistication in invective rhetorics demonstrated in polemical treatises is
noted and will contribute to a scholar’s fame among his peers as well as rivals.
In fact, when reading polemical texts, one is often struck by sudden shifts in language and
tone, and we find passages of rather dry and technical discussions of doctrinal matters juxtaposed directly alongside flowery and often highly insulting passages of a much different nature. Given the polemical character of the latter that is developed in combination with a skill
in the domain of rhetorics, we suggest referring to such passages as “rhetorical polemics.” The
former, in contrast, are focused on the subject matter at stake, which they explore according
to fixed argumentative procedures. They are hence denoted as “problem-focused discussion”
or “formal argumentation.”13 The main aim of this paper is to investigate how these two divergent aspects of polemical literature can be related in a meaningful way. This will entail two
basic considerations. Through a close reading and contextualized analysis of textual samples,
I will first of all show how passages of rhetorical polemics act as a structuring device and
hence provide a literal frame for formal argumentation. Furthermore, I will argue that the repeated use of comparisons, allusions, or analogies documented in those passages of rhetorical
polemics contributes to the construction of a conceptual framework, which facilitates locating
opponents in a larger narrative about the correct and incorrect transmission of Buddhism on
the Tibetan plateau.
9
10
11
12
13
For a brief description of the genre of polemical literature, see Lopez (1996); its specific features are
discussed more extensively in the introduction of Cabezón and Dargyay (2007, 2–57), followed by an
overview of its historical development.
See Viehbeck (2014, 40–42) for addressing these ambiguities in defining polemical literature.
There is, of course, a considerable range in scale of what constitutes a scholastic tradition, and this could
pertain to anything from rather fine-grained nuances in the interpretation of specific doctrinal matters, to
more fundamental differences that are also tied to larger religious affiliations.
See Cabezón and Dargyay (2007, 2–10) for a discussion of these important features of polemical literature.
Naturally, the prominence of what I call “rhetorical polemics” varies, and with it the polemical character
of any given text. Thus, the presence of rhetorical polemics might perhaps also be employed as a marker
to distinguish polemical treatises from other dialectical works.
[2]
[3]
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The Encounter of the Tiger and Lion of the Old and New
Traditions
The prime textual material for investigating the relationship between rhetorically and argumentatively inclined passages is drawn from a particular debate that evolved in the latter
part of the nineteenth century. The catalyst for this controversy was the interpretation of the
ninth chapter (the “Wisdom Chapter”) of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, a renowned Indian Buddhist
classic, crucial for—among other aspects—formulating fundamental ideas of Madhyamaka,
the commonly accepted supreme philosophical system in Tibet. When Ju Mipam (’ju mi pham,
1846–1912), the emerging philosophical spearhead of the Nyingma (rnying ma) tradition, composed his commentary on this text in 1878,14 he formulated his ideas in stark contrast to, and
sometimes as an explicit criticism of, the mainstream interpretation within the intellectually
dominant Géluk (dge lugs) tradition. He was therefore confronted with several critical treatises from three Géluk scholars, writing from the huge monastic institutions of Drépung (’bras
spung) and Kumbum (sku ’bum) in central and northeastern Tibet.15 This debate was therefore conceived of as a controversy not only between concrete individual opponents, but also
as a critical exchange between the larger traditions of the Nyingma and Géluk schools. Put
in this perspective, the issue is not only about different scholastic approaches and areas of
expertise, with the Géluk dominating discourses of non-tantric Tibetan philosophical systems
contrasting with the Nyingma’s focus on tantrism, but also one of institutional and regional
power asymmetries. While the Géluk tradition established itself in often enormous monastic
institutions that were also part of the political rule that reached out from the central Tibetan
government, the Nyingma tradition was organized much more loosely. The latter saw a significant shift towards monasticism and a more systematic organisation of its doctrines only in
the nineteenth century,16 in particular in Kham (khams) in eastern Tibet, where the influence
of the Géluk was weaker.
Amongst the different individual controversies, the debate between Mipam and Pari Rapsel
(dpa’ ris rab gsal, 1840–1912), a scholar of Kumbum Monastery, was particularly productive.
Their extended exchange produced six treatises in total. While most of these took the form
of personal responses, and in fact were at first circulated as individual documents, they were
clearly aimed to include a larger audience in their attempts to establish and defend their
scholastic traditions. This second aspect is corroborated by the fact that all of the treatises
were included and preserved in their authors’ respective collected works, where they provide
a rich testimony to the argumentative as well as rhetorical features of Tibetan polemical literature.17 Among Tibetan scholars, this debate is remembered as “the encounter of the tiger
and lion of the old and new traditions.”18 This metaphorical description points to the acumen
of the two opponents, as well as their roles as proponents of broader traditions, with Mipam
14
15
16
17
18
For an English translation of this text, called Nor bu ke ta ka, see Padmakara Translation Group (2017). A
French translation was produced by Stéphane Arguillère (2004).
For details on the historical development of the debates, see Viehbeck (2014, 29–38).
This “homogenization” of Nyingma doctrines along with the foundation of monastic structures is discussed
in Dalton (2016, 115–20), among others.
For an overview of the texts instigated by this controversy and their geographical location, see Viehbeck
(2014, 37). Revealing historical details about the dissemination practices of these treatises are often documented in their introductory passages. Mipam, for example, reported that his initial treatise was intended
primarily for his own peers, but as it spread more widely, others regarded it as criticism (see Rab lan
458.1–3). This also pertains to the story that as a reaction to this critical treatise, monks of the major Géluk
monasteries allegedly gathered to counter Mipam through harmful rituals (see Phuntsho 2007, 192).
Tib.: gsar rnying gi stag seng gdong thug (Khu byug 2004, 374).
[4]
[5]
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representing the Nyingma—literally, the “old” tradition—and Rapsel the “new” traditions,
Sarma (gsar ma), of which the Géluk is a part.19 Several details in the individual treatises
inform us about the socio-historical context of their authors and thereby contribute to stabilizing common images of the Nyingma and Géluk schools, with the former being perceived
as less concerned with monastic structures and more drawn to practical applications of Buddhism than the latter with its focus on institutionalized scholarship. In the colophon of one
of Mipam’s texts, for example, we find the following note:20
This [treatise] too [was composed] by a Nyingma monk called Mipam Namgyel (mi
pham rnam rgyal) who had “slept” a few years in the midst of solitary mountains.
At that time, he was residing at a mountain that was white in all directions and
his ragged hair had grown long.
[6]
Obviously, sleeping is used as a synonym here for being immersed in meditation, and Mipam, perhaps in a self-humbling gesture, is referring to a period of extended retreat. He spent
this time of intensive religious practice in solitude in a complex of caves near Dzongsar (rdzong
gsar) in Kham, where he stayed most of the time during the years 1881–1893 (see Schuh 1973,
XXXII). Rapsel, by contrast, was based at the debate college of Kumbum Monastery, a bustling
monastic institution of several thousand monks in northeastern Tibet. He confidently refers
to himself as a “logician” (rtog ge ba) who resides at “the great Dharma centre of Kumbum
Jampaling, which rules over all directions.”21 Such markers of the different socio-historical settings of the two masters—one being described as a practice-oriented, solitary yogi, the other
as a dialectically-trained scholar among other scholars—abound in their polemical treatises.
Beyond their historical grounding, these allusions develop a life of their own and illustrate
important features of the rhetorical repertoire of such texts.
[7]
Rhetorical Polemics versus Formal Argumentation
While in the past Tibetan scholastic literature, including polemical works, has been studied
mostly with an eye to its philosophical and doctrinal contents as well as to the theory of
argumentation, more recently other elements—such as rhetorical features and the practice of
argumentation—have also caught the attention of scholars.22 As emphasized by José Cabezón
and others, stylistic features are an important part of polemical literature and its popularity
as a genre:
[8]
In the final analysis it may be style more than anything else that explains the
[9]
19
20
21
22
This equation of Rapsel with the Sarma traditions it not unproblematic either. Most commonly, the label of
Sarma is used to refer to the three schools of Kagyü (bka’ brgyud), Sakya (sa skya), and Géluk. With regard
to doctrinal issues as well as personal networks, the first two are rather closely related to the Nyingma,
and in the context of the nineteenth century, in particular, a larger divide emerges between the Géluk and
the non-Géluk traditions.
Brgal lan nyin snang 188.4–5: ’di yang rnying ban mi pham rnam rgyal zhes bya ba lo shas dben pa’i ri sul na
nyal zhing | skabs ’dir phyogs kyi mtha’ gru dkar ba’i ri la gnas shing ral pa’i zar bu ring po dang ldan par gyur
pa. All translations by the author unless indicated otherwise.
See ’Ju lan 421.2: phyogs las rnam par rgyal ba’i chos sde chen po sku ’bum byams pa gling. An early Western
account of this monastery is provided by Filchner (1906), who visited it at a time (1904) when Rapsel was
active there.
For examples regarding the latter see, e.g. Cabezón and Dargyay (2007, 2–10), Dreyfus (2008), also Lempert
(2012), and Liberman (2004).
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disproportionate appeal of such works. Polemical literature has glitz. It is to philosophy what action movies are to the film industry. A polemical work entices by
titillating. It uses caricature, exaggerating the boundary between good and evil.
It employs invective, insult, and at times even overtly violent language. (Cabezón
and Dargyay 2007, 8)
Abusive language, ad hominem attacks, a rich repertoire of stylistic devices such as sarcasm [10]
and irony, and the frequent use of strong metaphors and insulting comparisons are fundamental to polemical literature, and appear at times in marked contrast to the technical discussions
about philosophical and doctrinal matters that works of this genre commonly address. These
stylistic features are often already in place in the titles of polemical works, which usually, as
titles of Tibetan texts typically do, contain two parts: a more descriptive one that indicates
genre or content, and a more ornamental one that provides a poetic label for the text.23 One
episode from the controversy in question may suffice to illustrate this point. When Mipam responded to Drakkar Trülku (brag dkar sprul sku, 1866–1928), one of the critics from Drépung,
he called his work Illumination of the Sun: An Answer to an Objection,24 thus clearly ascribing
it to the genre of polemical literature and providing a poetic name for it. Following the same
conventions, Drakkar Trülku responded with a much more graphic title: Emetic that Brings out
the Inner Blood of Wrong Views: A Further Answer to the Objections of Mipam Namgyel.25 While
such strong language is not uncommon in Tibetan polemical titles, there is a considerable
range in ways of addressing opponents, from more respectfully and politely to openly offensive. The exchange between Mipam and Rapsel, for example, seems to have been nurtured by
mutual appreciation, as is reflected in the generally amicable tone of their conversations, as
well as the mutual exchange of gifts (see Viehbeck 2014, 35; further also Smith 2001, 233).
That said, their letters and treatises are not limited to sober discussions about the doctrinal
and interpretational issues at stake, but also contain polemical comparisons, side blows, and
ironic remarks. However, it seems that within any given text these two types of discourses—
what I call rhetorical polemics, on the one hand, and formal argumentation, on the other—are
clearly distinguished and treated quite differently.
Within passages of formal problem-focused discussion, the issues at stake are disputed ac- [11]
cording to a rather strict protocol: each accusation must be not only concrete and specific,
but also backed up by proper argumentation or reference to authoritative scriptures. Individual lines of reasoning are formulated according to accepted logical principles and fixed
argumentative procedures. This is also evident in the responses, which often discuss matters
in a strictly chronological way, thus ensuring that the development of the discussion from
one text to another is understood. The resulting dialogue is very much technical in character,
which is also reflected on the linguistic level.
Passages of rhetorical polemics, by contrast, involve an entirely different register of speech, [12]
which has, for example, a much more colloquial, often more local, and much more poetic
flavour to it. Here, accusations are made in a seemingly random and general way, often
phrased as personal assaults. Obviously, these act as stylistic devices, and in this way do
not call for any argumentative backup (e.g. when the opponent is called a drunkard). But
on the level of rhetorical polemics, as well, individual phrases and accusations, invective
labels, and comparisons are picked up and paid back to the attacker in the response. This is
23
24
25
These two parts of Tibetan text titles are analysed in Almogi (2005).
Tib.: Brgal lan nyin byed snang ba (see Brgal lan nyin snang).
Tib.: Mi pham rnam rgyal gyis rtsod pa’i yang lan log lta’i khong khrag ’don pa’i skyug sman (see Skyug sman).
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done, however, not in a systematic and chronological way, as it is in formal argumentation,
but rather, the rhetorical elements are sprinkled here and there, as seems fitting in stylistic
terms.26 Both types of discourses therefore evolve as a kind of ping-pong play, but while one
draws on expertise in logic and Buddhist theory, the other draws on mastery of rhetoric.27
Besides the obvious stylistic function of rhetorical polemics, when the relationship between
rhetorical elements and formal argumentation is investigated more closely, other functions
can be detected. In terms of their mutual placement within the respective treatises, it can be
argued that rhetorical elements act as a frame and structuring device for problem-focused
discussion. But they are not completely unrelated to argumentative issues either, as the comparisons and allusions used as rhetorical elements can also contribute to constructing a larger
conceptual framework for the debate as a whole. Both of these functions often collide in the
beginning parts of polemical treatises.
[13]
Framing Debates: Rhetorical Polemics as Paratextual Elements
The introductory sections of polemical texts are especially prone to containing rhetorical
elements,28 and in the exchange between Mipam and Rapsel, as well, passages of invective
language and personal insult are placed at the beginnings of their texts. Rapsel, for example,
introduces his first criticism of Mipam in the following way:29
[14]
In these days, I have seen a Commentary on the Wisdom Chapter (sher Tika) by
Ju Mipam. He has a biased view and is short-tempered; he blindly criticises any
scriptures of his own or of others’ [tradition]. In particular, he is not familiar with
the path of reasoning and hence he is tormented by the weight of contradictions
between the explicit and implicit [meaning] of his own words and between earlier
and later [statements]. While he mixes earlier and later traditions, thus akin to
the tsampa of a beggar, he is drunk on the poisonous water of pretending to shout
out the melody of the clouds of the beneficial scriptures. [His commentary] lacks
essence and is an unclear compilation of the sayings of many earlier [scholars].
[15]
This cluster of personal polemics and insulting comparisons illustrates well the tone of such
passages. Several grave flaws are ascribed to Mipam, without providing any real argumentative backup for these accusations. Clearly, there is a stylistic element to these paratextual
[16]
26
27
28
29
In this regard, as pointed out in Dreyfus (2008), there are important parallels between written polemical
exchanges and oral debates that also contain many performative and rhetorical elements that seem to be
in contradiction with a normative model of debate.
Tibetan scholastic culture indeed delineates and values different areas of learning. A common list of five
major fields of knowledge (rig gnas che ba lnga) includes logic (gtan tshigs kyi rig pa), medicine (gso ba’i rig
pa), arts and crafts (bzo gnas rig pa), and grammar (sgra’i rig pa), along with expertise in Buddhism, or “inner
knowledge” (nang gyi rig pa). A secondary list of five additional, minor fields shows a heavy emphasis on
linguistic and rhetorical aspects: poetics (snyan ngag), composition (sde sbyor), study of synonyms (mngon
brjod), drama (zlos gar), and astrology (skar rtsis). For an orientation, see Townsend (2016). These fields of
learning are also explored in monastic education; see Dreyfus (2003, 101–6).
It is no accident that the beginning section of a polemical treatise is quoted to exemplify typical features
of the genre in Lopez (1996, 217).
’Ju lan 371.1–3: dus ’dir phyogs re’i mig can blo sna thung zhing gya tshom du rang gzhan gyi gzhung gang la’ang
skyon brjod cing | khyad par rigs pa’i lam la rgyus med pas rang tshig dngos shugs dang snga phyi ’gal ba’i lcid
kyis gzir te phyogs snga phyi’i lugs bsres te mu to’i phye lta bu la mngon rlom gyis gzhung bzang sprin gyi dbyangs
su sgrogs pa’i dug chus myos pa ’ju mi pham bya ba’i sher Tika zhig mthong la| snying po med cing sngon ma
mang po’i zer sgros nyog por bris pa.
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introductory passages: their strong language entices the audience, and they invite the reader
to continue into the main part of the treatise, which would then also have the duty to provide
more argumentative substance to the earlier rhetorical accusations.30
On the conceptual level, the idea of lineage or tradition is important. Here, Mipam’s writing
is compared to the tsampa of a beggar. While tsampa, a special kind of roasted barley flour, is
enjoyed by all Tibetans, the tsampa of a beggar is far less scrumptious; as it is gathered from
different, unreliable sources, it is bound to be impure. The aim of this comparison is obvious.
Mipam is accused of pretending to profess authentic scriptures, while in reality, these lack an
authentic line of transmission and are merely a diverse conglomeration of statements of earlier scholars. Especially in Tibetan scholastic culture, which focuses heavily on identification
with a specific lineage of transmission, this is a grave accusation,31 and it is hence not surprising that similar claims are also found in other treatises. In all of the treatises involved in the
controversy, we find attempts to either legitimate a scholar’s belonging to a larger tradition
or to question it. These commonly involve a listing of earlier masters of a particular tradition
that traces its origins to Buddhist India. On the other hand, earlier detractors of the Buddhist
teaching in Tibet are also mentioned, and hence a lineage of corruption is delineated as a contrast. With regard to such threats to the proper transmission, the figure of Hashang Mahāyāna
figures prominently as the proponent of a corrupt form of Buddhism par excellence.32
The introductory passages thus frame the main text not only in structural terms, but also
conceptually. Both of these paratextual functions are witnessed also within the main text
itself. Here, passages of rhetorical polemics and formal argumentation alternate, with the
earlier displaying paratextual functions towards the latter.
[17]
[18]
Rhetorical Polemics as Structuring Devices: A Sample Passage
In order to understand how rhetorical polemics frame formal argumentation in structural
terms, and also to get a better grasp of the flavour of rhetorical polemics, it will be useful to
take a look at a more extensive exemplary passage, which in itself contains the discussion of
one single problem. The philosophical context of this passage is a discussion of the doctrine
of emptiness and addresses possible objections against this doctrine. Here, an opponent objects to the teaching of emptiness by arguing that an understanding of the non-existence of a
personal self is enough to be liberated from saṃsāra. Rapsel and Mipam, however, disagree
in their interpretation of the characterisation of this opponent. The details of their arguments
are complex but can be put aside for the present purpose. We are interested in the structural
setup of the texts, rather than contents.
Passages of problem-focused argumentation usually contain three basic elements: 1) a statement of the opponent’s position, often found towards the beginning of a particular discussion;
2) arguments against this position that point out specific faults within that position and also
provide a concrete reason for this conclusion; and 3) a statement in which the attacker pro30
31
32
Enticement is of course among the functions ascribed to paratextual elements in Gérard Genette’s classic
Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation (1997).
See e.g. Cabezón (1998, 4–5), who describes the association with tradition as one of the central features of
scholasticism. As a means to question this affiliation, Tibetan scholars often accuse each other of having
professed a merely “self-made” (rang bzo) interpretation. On this concept, see Seyfort Ruegg (2004, 329–35)
and Kapstein (2000, 205).
For a more detailed discussion of some of these professed lineages, see Viehbeck (2019, 209–11) and
Viehbeck (2014, 50–57). The idea of a pure lineage of transmission is also related to a notion of Tibetans
as guardians of authentic Indian Buddhism. On this latter notion, see Schwieger (2000).
[19]
[20]
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poses a contrasting position of his own. This last element is likely to be present, but it is not
obligatory. Passages of rhetorical polemics are found at the margins of all of these elements
of formal discussion. They may introduce any of these three elements, as is sometimes the
case, or they may appear at the conclusions of any of these elements, which happens more
frequently. When placed before a problem-focused element, rhetorical polemics may anticipate the outcome of the later discussion, for example, by ridiculing an opponent before even
stating his position or making an argument against it. When placed after a problem-focused
element, rhetorical polemics tend to exaggerate and celebrate the outcome of a previously
made argument. Often, verses containing rhetorical polemics are used to mark the end of a
particular discussion, and in this context also act as a structuring device to separate one topic
from another, which is extremely useful—or even necessary—as the texts often contain no
detailed formal topical outline. This function is also reflected in the label of such verses as “intermediate verses” or “transitional verses” (Tib. bar skabs kyi tshigs bcad; Skt. antaraśloka),33
as they are termed by the authors themselves.
The sample passage is taken from Rapsel’s first criticism, and starts with a statement of
the opponent’s position. In this case, this is provided not by way of a short paraphrase of the
opponent’s positions, but through a literal quotation from Mipam’s commentary:34
[21]
[Stating the opponent’s position:] Further, you said in the Commentary (Ṭikka): “Although one understands that there is nothing like a permanent, indivisible, and
independent [self], subtle self-grasping is not abandoned through this [understanding].”
[22]
This statement is followed by the first argument, which again contains two elements: first,
an unwanted consequence is pointed out, and, second, the reason why this consequence will
occur is declared:35
[23]
[Argument (1):] It follows that [this statement] is unrelated [to the original issue],
since the opponent [in the original text] accepts that self-grasping is abandoned by
the path [practiced by him], but he does not accept that it is abandoned, dividing
it into subtle and coarse.
[24]
At this point, the first argument is already completed. Before turning to the next issue,
however, the attacker celebrates his triumph in the form of a lively expression of insult:36
[25]
Defeat! As [it is expressed] in the statement “This is a vajra rock mountain!” you
have no answer and it is truly as it has been said: “[Your] mouth has been shut
and sealed!”
[26]
This passage also illustrates the significant shift in linguistic terms. While in the argumentative part, the language is technical, terse, and to-the-point, rhetorical polemics make use
[27]
33
34
35
36
On the function of such verses, see Mimaki (1980), who points to their popular usage in Tibetan literature.
’Ju lan 386.3: yang khyod kyis Tik+kar| rtag gcig rang dbang ba de ’dra med par shes kyang des ngar ’dzin phra
mo mi spong ste zhes smras pa.
’Ju lan 386.3: ’brel med du thal| pha rol pos lam des ngar ’dzin spong bar ’dod kyi phra rags phye nas spong bar
mi ’dod pa’i phyir|.
’Ju lan 386.3–4: ’khor gsum| ’di ni rdo rje brag ri yin| |zhes gsungs pa ltar lan med cing | kha la smra bcad rgya
yang byin| |zhes gsungs par nges so|.
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of a wide range of often regionally specific expressions and are more closely related to the
spoken language. This again adds to the performative character of these passages.37
The next argument shows the same structure as the first one. A reason is stated due to which
the opponent has to accept an unwanted consequence:38
[Argument (2):] Consequently, through those words [quoted earlier] you as well
accept that subtle [self-grasping] is not abandoned, even though manifest coarse
afflictions are abandoned through meditating on coarse selflessness.
After the point is made, a highly polemical passage emphasises the defeat of the opponent:39
[28]
[29]
[30]
You do not know which way of reasoning to take for yourself, yet again you go after
the realisation of the masters of the Sar[ma], Nying[ma], Kar[ma] and Druk[pa]
traditions. You are a great drunk, and [you] should take a leave from the work of
refutation and affirmation!
[31]
As was noted also in the introductory passages of the treatises, a personal criticism of the
logical acumen or even moral character of the opponent, as well as the questioning of his
legitimate place within the different religious traditions of Tibetan Buddhism, are common
topics of rhetorical polemics. These insults then also mark the transition to the next argumentative element, that is, a statement where the offender provides an alternative interpretation
of the issue at stake. This is introduced with a short polemical side blow, after which follows
the actual statement of the offender’s position:40
[32]
In short: [You] should really let go of [your] recollection of the description of subtle and coarse self-grasping!
[Proposing a contrasting position]: It is, however, correct to understand [the passage] in the following way: Because of the example [used in the original text], a
specification like “coarse” or “as explained in the Abhidharma” must be applied
to the expressions “having abandoned or not having abandoned afflictions” [and]
“being endowed or not being endowed with afflictions.”
[33]
This ends the argumentative part of this particular discussion and gives way to more polemical mockery:41
[34]
Should it be otherwise, then the following advice by the fifth Yapjé Gyelwé
Wangpo (yab rje rgyal ba’i dbang po; that is, the fifth Dalai Lama) should be seen
as the most profound instruction: “When, at the times of listening and reflecting,
[35]
37
38
39
40
41
A full-throated exclamation of “khorsum” (’khor gsum)—here translated loosely as “Defeat!”—for example,
is a common way to declare the argumentative loss of the opponent in oral debates, as practised in Tibetan
monasteries on a daily basis. On the performative aspect of this expression, see Dreyfus (2008, 50).
’Ju lan 386.4: des na tshig des bdag med rags pa bsgoms pas nyon mongs rags pa mngon gyur pa spong yang |
phra mo mi spong bar khyod kyis kyang khas blangs mod|.
’Ju lan 386.4–5: rang nyid rigs pa’i lam ci ’drar ’gro rang gis kyang mi shes par da dung gsar rnying kar ’brug gi
mkhas pa dag gi drod tshol ba khyod ni ra ro ba chen po ste dgag sgrub kyi las su gnang ba khrol lo|.
’Ju lan 386.5–6: mdor na ngar ’dzin phra rags smos pa’i dran pa mngon du zhog la| dpe des ’dir nyon mongs
spong mi spong nyon mongs can yin min gsungs pa rnams la rags pa’am mngon pa nas bshad pa lta bu’i khyad
par sbyor dgos pa shes par rigs te|.
’Ju lan 386.6–387.1: gzhan du na| yab rje rgyal ba’i dbang po lnga pas| thos bsam gyi tshe dper brjod res mi
dgrol na re dogs ’dzub rtsis kyi g.yeng ba bshol nas bem po zhal ’gril |gyi ting ’dzin la mnyam par ’jog par zhu|
zhes gdams pa man ngag zab shos su mthong ste|.
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one cannot untie [the meaning of] the examples mentioned, then one should postpone the distractions of counting hopes and fears with the fingers and rest in the
meditation of pretending to know [the meaning].”
This reference to a saying by the fifth Dalai Lama is, of course, bitter irony. As Rapsel
clarifies in the next polemical insult, for him, only the practice of debate and reasoning leads
to a proper understanding of Buddhism, and any meditative practice that lacks this logical
basis must be seen as pointless:
[36]
And since I am [your] Dharma friend, arguing in the bazaar of disputation of the
best scholars of the world, I also offer a gift of a heartfelt advice.42
[37]
His actual advice then takes the form of poetic stanzas that are employed to mark the end
of the discussion of this particular issue, as such intermediate or transitional verses commonly
do:43
[38]
Haha!
Arise! Leave from the bed of the scholars’ meditation!
Look! The lion of reasoning glides through the snow;
He measures the circumference of the snowy Mount Meru in an instant.
Where to will the asura flee who thought he was confident?
Hehe!
Drown in the depths of the ocean of fear of nihilism and eternalism,
Bound by the magical leash of various kinds of reasoning,
Suppressed by a Mount Meru of 1000 steps of stubbornness and confusion,
Sealed by the vajra of eternal changelessness.
These stanzas display a lively, colloquial format, as illustrated most pointedly by the opening interjections of loud laughter. As is common in such passages, they make heavy use of
various metaphors and comparisons. The lion of reasoning is of course Rapsel, a logician
amongst other logicians in “the bazaar of disputation of the best scholars of the world.” Mipam, by contrast, is likened to an asura, or “demigod”—that is, beings that inhabit the lower
part of Mount Meru, the centre of the Buddhist universe, and which, despite their special qualities, are weaker than the gods, with whom they are engaged in an eternal fight. According
to Rapsel, it is his “personal Mount Meru” of ignorance, sustained in the bed of meditation,
which keeps Mipam suppressed and makes him succumb to the mighty lion of reasoning.
Particularly striking is the extent of rhetorical polemics. While of seemingly minor importance for the argumentative contents, they have a prominent place in polemical treatises,
where in terms of relative proportions they sometimes exceed the formal discussions that are
their counterparts. That said, it should be conceded that the clarity of the distinction between
these two types of discourses may vary. Sometimes there are clear linguistic markers that
separate rhetorical polemics from content discussion; at other times, these elements are tied
more closely together. From a structural as well as a stylistic perspective, it can be argued
42
43
’Ju lan 387.1: ’dzam gling mkhas pa yongs kyi rtsod pa’i tshong brdal du bgro ba bgyid pa’i chos mthun gyi mdza’
bo lags pas snying gtam gyi bslab pa’i skyes bstab pa’ang yin no|.
’Ju lan 387.1: ha ha| bzhengs shig mkhas rnams ting ’dzin mal las spyon| |gzigs shig rigs pa’i seng chen gangs la
’phyo| |gangs dkar lhun po’i khor yug yul tsam ’jal| |gdeng drod rtog pa’i sbyin skyes gang du bros| |he he| rtag
chad nyam nga’i chu gter klong du bying | |rnam mang rigs pa’i ’phrul gyi zhags pas bcings| |’gal ’khrul rim pa
stong gi lhun pos mnan| |mi ’gyur g.yung drung rdo rje’i rgya yis btab| |zhes kyang smras so|.
[39]
[40]
[41]
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that passages of rhetorical polemics act as a frame for formal discussion: structurally, as a
marker and mount of the various argumentative elements; and stylistically, as a linguistically
rich and lively contrast to the dry language of technical discussion which it encloses. Another
form of frame emerges when considering the relationship between rhetorical polemics and
formal argumentation in conceptual terms.
Rhetorical Polemics as Conceptual Framework: The Yogi and the
Scholar—and the Hashang
Rhetorical polemics commonly draw from a rich repertoire of mostly Indian imagery, making
full use of various kinds of metaphors, allusions, and comparisons, as illustrated above. In the
controversy between Mipam and Rapsel, there is a particular focus on using poetic expressions
to align the two opponents with a typology that bifurcates experts of Buddhism into being
more practice-oriented or more theory-oriented. In this scheme, Mipam is portrayed as the
yogi par excellence: a religious practitioner who engages in meditation in solitary places, far
removed from the bustling, larger monastic institutions. These institutions, in turn, are seen
as the homes of scholars like Rapsel. Rather than train in meditation, these logicians must
train themselves in the practice of reasoning as it is commonly fostered in the debate-focused
education of the monastic institutions of the Géluk school.
This allusion to the two roles of yogi and scholar, of course, has a certain grounding in
the living conditions of the two opponents. After all, Mipam spent larger periods of his life
in solitary retreat, and Rapsel became famous for his achievements as a teacher at the debate college (grwa tshang) of Kumbum Monastery. Rhetorical polemics, however, exaggerate
and simplify these roles to stereotypes. Mipam, in particular, was not just a yogi but also a
formidable scholar. In his own tradition, he is remembered most importantly as a prolific
writer of scholarly treatises, and during a sojourn to central Tibet he even spent some time at
a philosophical college of Ganden (dga’ ldan) Monastery, one of the main institutions of the
rival Géluk school.44
However, rhetorical polemics clearly do not aim at a historically faithful and nuanced rendering; rather, they are set so as to caricature their characters. A couple of examples may
provide a better understanding of the nature of such portrayals. Again, in passages that are
clearly part of rhetorical polemics, Rapsel refers to Mipam in the following way, in his second
critical treatise:45
[42]
Understanding could come forth if you were able to hold a thesis at the great
centres of learning. But even though you may compose many letters in solitude,
this is simply a [useless] hardship!
[45]
A similar description is found in his first criticism:46
This profound roar, a melody of a thousand strings of good explanations, is known
44
45
46
This was reported by one of his biographers, Khenpo Künpel (mkhan po kun dpal). See Pettit (1999, 24) for
a translation of the respective passage.
Ga bur chu rgyun 439.1–2: bshad grwa chen mo rnams su dam bca’ ’jog thub na go ba skye rgyu yod la| |dben
pa zhig tu yi ge mang po srel kyang ngal ba tsam mo|.
’Ju lan 408.2–3: gzhung lugs rab ’byams smra ba’i dkyil ’khor du grags pa legs par bshad pa’i rgyud stong dbyangs
kyi nga ro zab mo ste| dben pa’i ri sul kun tu grags pa’i gtam ni ma yin no|.
[43]
[44]
[46]
[47]
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in the maṇḍala of those who proclaim countless scriptural systems, [but] it is not
advice known in every secluded mountain valley!
Not only is the uniform nature of these depictions striking, but also their frequency. While
other metaphors and comparisons are used, references to the yogi-versus-scholar theme outnumber these other allusions by far. As most of these comparisons come from Rapsel’s side,
one could argue for an immediate purpose of these simplified depictions: the denigration of
his opponent Mipam as a merely practice-focused yogi and, at the same time, the enhancement of Rapsel’s own status as a scholar among scholars, as is suggested in the following
stanzas:47
Untrained in the path of reasoning, the retreatant Mipam
Is not grasped by the wind that kindles the fire of reasoning.
Hence, setting up [a line of] reasoning he refutes himself,
And is ridiculed by the assembly of logicians.
[48]
[49]
However, despite the harsh tone of rhetorical polemics, one has to consider the playful
nature of such passages, which use both poetic denigration and praise as stylistic devices.
The following passage, for example, also makes use of the yogi-versus-scholar scheme, but it
depicts both as legitimate roles that constitute their own domain as different approaches to
the same ultimate aim of the Buddhist teaching:48
[50]
The unequalled bliss of meditation is possible in solitude,
The secret words that emanate from the path of reasoning [befit] the Dharma
centres.
Everybody has his own share of karma, they will not cross [each other];
[But] this does not mean that the wealth of great meaning is lacking [in either].
[51]
Even though rather harsh rhetorical manoeuvres dominate, passages such as these reflect
the generally more amicable tone of the exchange between Mipam and Rapsel. How these are
interpreted also depends, of course, on the audience. The two opponents themselves often
refer to these polemical side blows as mere “teasers” (nyams mtshar)—a term that hints at the
playful nature of rhetorical polemics.
That said, their play on the yogi-versus-scholar scheme also has a broader conceptual dimension. The frequent allusions to this divide and the caricatured picture that is painted
contribute to stabilizing a simplistic notion of these roles, which would resonate with a larger
audience. In fact, stereotyping along a divide between yogis and scholars is a rather common
theme in Tibetan intellectual history, as is the mockery that is associated with such typologies.
The valuation of these roles varies according to context. In the popular life stories of so-called
“holy madmen” (smyon pa)—yogis like Milarépa (mi la ras pa) or Drukpa Künlek (’brug pa kun
legs)—criticism of overly-scholarly scholars is a typical element. However, in the more specialized scholastic discourses of which the majority of polemical literature is a part, the role
of the yogi might easily be seen as the more problematic one. As the argumentative core of
these texts is constituted by an expertise in the textual heritage of Buddhism and its accepted
[52]
47
48
Ga bur chu rgyun 436.5: rigs lam ma sbyangs mi pham dgon pa ba| |rigs pa’i me grogs rlung gis ma zin pas| |rigs
pa bkod de rang gis sun phyung ba| |rigs pa smra ba’i tshogs kyis ga zhar mdzod|.
Ga bur chu rgyun 460.1–2: mi mnyam bsam gtan bde ba dben par ’os| |rigs lam ’phrul gyi gsang tshig chos kyi
grwar| |rang rang las kyi bgo skal mi bsnol ba| |de ni don chen nor gyis dbul ma yin|.
[53]
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logical principles, qualities typical of a scholar are favoured. This is, for example, also obvious
in the way that pure and corrupt lineages of the transmission of Buddhism are professed in
the introductory parts of such treatises, as discussed earlier (see also Viehbeck 2019, 207–12,
2014, 50–57).
A central element in the narrative construction of a threat to the proper transmission of
Buddhism is the figure of Hashang. In later references in scholastic literature, both of the
opponents in the Samyé debate, as well as their respective positions, are depicted in rather
uniform ways, with the Indian Kamalaśīla representing the superior rational approach to the
Buddhist teaching, and the Chinese Hashang representing the inferior focus on meditative
practices. In this way, these opponents also stand for more general stereotypical roles, as
José Cabezón explains: “It is to say that just as Hwa shang becomes the paradigmatic ‘other,’
Kamalaśīla becomes in some ways the paradigmatic defender of the faith, especially when
the issue has to do, as it often does, with the question of quietism” (Cabezón and Dargyay
2007, 21). In this conception, Hashang’s position is depicted not only as antirational, as it
would go against fundamental principles of authentic Indian Buddhism in its preference for
meditative experience over rational reflection, but also as embodying a distorted approach to
proper meditative procedure. Thus, Hashang is perceived as a particularly dangerous figure
not because he is attacking Buddhism from an external, non-Buddhist perspective, but from
a misguided understanding of Buddhism itself. And while he is perceived as a threat, the
narratives also emphasize his defeat, and he emerges as a stereotypical erring, but ultimately
losing, opponent.
In light of the generally different approaches to Buddhism with which Hashang and Kamalaśīla are associated, as well as with regard to numerous smaller details in the narrations
about these figures, it seems feasible to argue for a striking parallelism to the way the notions
of the yogi and the scholar are developed in the nineteenth-century debates analysed here.
Luckily, Rapsel spares us an elaborate argument for a close relationship between yogi and
Hashang rhetorics, as such a connection is established in a much more direct way. The very
same passages of rhetorical polemics that draw on the stereotyped yogi-versus-scholar scheme
also make particularly telling use of comparisons and analogies to the figure of Hashang. Two
examples from Rapsel’s first criticism may suffice to illustrate this point. Again, in a passage
that is structurally and rhetorically not part of formal argumentation, Rapsel jokingly suggests that Mipam’s appearance as an ordinary monk is only a disguise. At heart, and in his
philosophical position, he should be seen as the Chinese Hashang:49
[54]
[55]
Despite [your] great hypocrisy of pretending to belittle the Hashang view, […]
there is no doubt that you have arrived from China, in the guise of a monk of the
present age.
[56]
This comparison is also drawn in another ironic passage, which directly relates Mipam to
the standard narrative about Hashang’s defeat. In this narrative, it is said that when Hashang
was defeated, he lost one of his boots when leaving the debate yard. This, in turn, was seen as
an omen that his views would be left behind and still be present, as a possible threat, among
[57]
49
’Ju lan 404.2–3: hwa shang gi lta bar smad khul gyi zob che na yang | […] khyed rgya nag nas da lta rab byung
gi gzugs kyis byon pa gor ma chag go.
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later Tibetan Buddhists.50 In a very straightforward way, Mipam is depicted to be one of them,
in having gained Hashang’s boot as a reward:51
There is no doubt that you follow Hashang Mahāyāna, but as you obtained [his]
lost boot as your allotted share, you are not even to blame!
[58]
Clearly, this is an accusation that cannot be left uncommented upon, and Mipam felt compelled to respond both in content-related as well as rhetorical terms. In his answer, he argues,
as he also does in similar cases, that his position is not a personal innovation, but part of a longstanding tradition. This is commonly done by pointing to relevant quotations from Buddhist
scriptures that his opponent also has to accept as authentic. The extent of these references,
however, is remarkable. In order to prove the legitimacy of his own position, in this particular
case, Mipam lists quotations from over one hundred and sixty passages contained in various
Indian scriptures (in their Tibetan translations), and thereby also illustrates the scope of his
scholarship.52 Beyond the engagement in serious argumentation, his response also functions
on the level of rhetorical polemics, as his plays on words and various side blows at the very
the end of this particular discussion demonstrate:53
[59]
Thus, these explanations that draw from the path of reasoning and are in accordance with the above[-mentioned] scriptures and their meaning establish those
who propose the so-called “Great Madhyamaka, free from extremes” as the unsurpassable, long-standing tradition of the Conqueror (i.e., the Buddha). Hence,
it is not the case that all those holding this tradition are merely people who take
their share of Hashang’s lost boot. Rather, the sūtras and tantras, together with
the commentaries on their intention, had come down as the rain of the Dharma of
the Conqueror, the Lion of the Śākya [clan], prior to the appearance of Hashang.
These were then brought [to Tibet] by the earlier kings, ministers, and bodhisattvas
so that the people of the Snow Land can enjoy them. The stainless nectar of these
[scriptures] is their very lot. Accepting this in a way that one does not exclude
oneself, one certainly is exclusively someone with a good fortune!
[60]
While Mipam often calls for more cautiousness in attributing certain philosophic viewpoints
to the tradition of Hashang—clearly also as a manoeuvre to avoid such an association for
himself—he knows and enjoys the ping-pong play of rhetorical polemics and their comparisons. In so doing, he also reproduces and reinforces the stereotypes that developed around
the figure of Hashang in the larger perspective that the standard narrative of the historical
development of Buddhism on the Tibetan plateau provides.
[61]
50
51
52
53
Regarding the symbolic meaning associated with Hashang’s shoe, see Lopez (1996, 223), further also
Cabezón and Dargyay (2007, 19–21).
’Ju lan 398.1: ha shang ma hA ya na’i rjes su song ba la the tshom med de| lham lus pa bgo skal du thob pa’i
phyir le lan bda’ ba’ang med do|.
See Rab lan 257–292. For a discussion of the principle of scriptural authority in this context, see Viehbeck
(2019, 17–21).
Rab lan 302.2–5: de ltar gong du lung dang de’i don bzhin rigs pa’i lam nas go bar bshad pa ’di dag gis mtha’
bral dbu ma chen po zhes gang smras pa de dag rgyal ba’i ring lugs bla na med par grub pas na| ’di ‘dzin pa po
thams cad ha shang gi lhwam lus pa’i bgo skal len pa sha stag ma yin te| ha shang ma byung ba’i sngon du rgyal
ba shAkya seng ge’i chos kyi char phab pa’i mdo rgyud rnams dang de’i dgongs ’grel dang bcas pa sngon gyi rgyal
blon byang sems chen po rnams kyis gangs can pas longs spyad byar drangs pa rnams kyi bdud rtsi dri ma med
pa’i bgo skal nyid rang gis rang la bcad par ma gyur par tshul bzhin len pa skal pa bzang po can ’ba’ zhig tu nges
so||.
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Concluding Remarks
This paper aimed to explore crucial features of polemical comparisons in Tibetan Buddhist [62]
discourses, drawing from a set of treatises that were exchanged between Ju Mipam and Pari
Rapsel, two eminent scholars of the late nineteenth century. While set in their specific historical context and determined by their authors’ concerns as well as literary style, a close reading
and contextualised analysis of their respective works exhibited issues of a larger concern—
with regard to literary conventions of Tibetan polemics in more specific terms and issues of
identity construction in scholastic cultures more generally.
Based primarily on stylistic and structural observations, it has been argued that the investi- [63]
gated treatises are constituted by two distinct discourses, termed as formal argumentation and
rhetorical polemics. While earlier research on Tibetan scholastic literature has often focussed
on the doctrinal contents negotiated in passages of formal argumentation, the consideration
of rhetorical features addressed in this article shows how these two discourses can be related. As shown through textual analysis, passages of rhetorical polemics act as a structural
and stylistic device: they delineate and frame different argumentative elements in structural
terms, and add to the literary richness and quality of polemical works through their frequent
employment of polemical comparisons, invective language, and other stylistic means. The
consideration of polemical comparisons, in particular, also revealed a conceptual dimension
of rhetorical polemics. By drawing on an imaginary in which the two opponents are equated
to stereotypical images of Tibetan religious specialists—which are here depicted as following either a yogic or a scholarly approach—rhetorical polemics also formulate a conceptual
framework.
This framework and the stereotyped comparisons it entails make it possible, I argue, to [64]
connect to a larger vision of identity construction among Tibetan Buddhist scholars. In a simplified and increasingly solidified master narrative of the introduction and development of
Buddhism on the Tibetan plateau, Tibetan Buddhists are depicted as the righteous keepers of
the flame of authentic Indian Buddhism. In this vision, the authentic transmission of Buddhism
is always under threat, and its contours must be guarded against possible dangers. This pertains to non-Buddhists, like proponents of the Bon religion in Tibet, but more importantly to
threats from the inside, from people with a misguided understanding of Buddhism. In this setting, the figure of Hashang Mahāyāna is depicted as being responsible for a faulty transmission
of Buddhism in the first place, and he is developed as the stereotypical “Other,” against which
all proper Tibetan Buddhists must distinguish themselves. The rhetorical polemics, analogies,
and comparisons endorsed by our nineteenth-century opponents connect to this grand narrative, and, at least from the side of Rapsel, suggest a close connection between yogic and
Hashang rhetorics. Such comparisons thus allow Tibetan scholars to locate their opponents
as well as themselves in a larger conception of the development of Buddhism on the Tibetan
plateau. While articulated in the context of playful rhetorics, the pervasive character of this
narrative resonates with a wider audience and hence also has an effect on the general perception of the two opponents. At the same time, by using and supporting this master narrative,
our nineteenth-century opponents contribute to its further solidification, as numerous Tibetan
scholars had done, in various ways, before the polemical exchange of Mipam and Rapsel.
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Christina Brauner and Sita Steckel for their valuable feedback on this article and for kindly organizing copy-editing services, conducted by Cory Hitt. Jonathan Samuels
read an earlier draft of this text and I am grateful for his considerations. After submission, the
two anonymous reviewers provided numerous helpful suggestions, which I acknowledge with
much appreciation.
Tibetan primary sources
BKSB Brag dkar Sprul sku Blo bzang dpal ldan bstan ’dzin snyan grags, Rje btsun bla ma dam
pa mkhas shing grub pa’i dbang phyug brag dkar rdo rje ’chang blo bzang dpal ldan bstan
’dzin snyan grags dpal bzang po’i gsung ’bum. 19 vols., plus dkar chag. Khreng tu’u: Dmangs
khrod dpe dkon sdud sgrig khang, 2001 (TBRC W23608).
Brgal lan nyin snang ’Ju Mi pham rnam rgyal rgya mtsho, Brgal lan nyin byed snang ba. In
MPSB: vol. 14 (ca), 97–189.
Ga bur chu rgyun Dpa’ ris Blo bzang rab gsal, Shes ldan yid kyi gdung sel rigs lam ga bur chu
rgyun. In RSSB: 423–470.
’Ju lan Dpa’ ris Blo bzang rab gsal, ’Jam dpal dbyangs kyi dgongs rgyan rigs pa’i gzi ’bar gdong
lnga’i sgra dbyangs. In RSSB: 367–421.
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