The proof of impermanence in the dGe lugs pa’s pramāṇa theory

The proof of impermanence in the dGe lugs pa'spramana theory

Hiroshi Nemoto, Hiroshima

1. Introduction

Tsong kha pa (1357-1419), the founder of the dGe lugs pa, and his followers accepted the pramana theory of Dharmakrrti as indispensable for the pursuit of liberation, and made an ef¬fort to demonstrate how the pramana theory leads one to the fulfillment of such a religious purpose. According to them, in his Pramanavarttika Dharmakrrti teaches the path to liberation on the basis of the doctrine of selflessness (bdag med). The dGe lugs pa scholars, however, are fully aware that Dharmakrrti did not give a detailed account of selflessness. This being the case, they set themselves the task of elaborating the theory so as to establish the pramana-soteriology.

But, in order to say that such pramana exegesis of the dGe lugs pa really finds support in the Pramanavarttika, one has to say that the selflessness is taught in the Pramanavarttika. And, for the dGe lugs pa scholars, there is no question that it is taught by Dharmakrrti there because he explains in detail the proof of impermanence, which entails the determination of selfless¬ness.

The aim of this paper is, therefore, to examine the theoretical background of the dGe lugs pa's pramana-soteriology by paying special attention to its proof of impermanence. No studies have so far been made of the proof of impermanence the dGe lugs pa scholars carry out. A close study of the structure of this proof, however, is not necessary for our purpose. So, only some of the points the dGe lugs pa scholars make about the proof of impermanence shall be considered. The materials in this paper is derived largely from the Tshad ma'i brjed byang chen mo, i.e. rGyal tshab rje's (1364-1432) notes of Tsong kha pa's lectures on pramana, the sDe bdun rgyan of mKhas grub rje (1385-1438), and the Rigs rgyan of dGe 'dun grub (1391¬1474).

2. The selflessness and impermanence

As is stated in the Pramanavarttika, it is due to the belief in the self that one transmigrates from one birth to another in samsara; as long as one has bondage to the self, one naturally has a craving for pleasure and, thereby, accumulates karma. Hence, if one seeks to attain libera¬tion, one has to get rid of the belief in the self and to understand the reality of selflessness.

The dGe lugs pa scholars hold that two sorts of selflessness are taught in the Pramanavart- tika: the selflessness of a person (gang zag gi bdag med), in the Pramanasiddhi chapter, and that of a phenomenon (chos kyi bdag med), in the Pratyaksa chapter. Of these two treatments of selflessness, I am concerned here with that of a person, and not with that of a phenomenon, which they consider is proved by applying the probans of ‘the necessity of being perceived to¬gether' (lhan cig dmigs nges kyi rtags).

The dGe lugs pa scholars recognize that the doctrine of selflessness is not exhaustively dis¬cussed in the Pramanavarttika, even if it is explicitly mentioned several times in the Pramana- siddhi chapter. Instead of seeking textual evidence, they tried to elaborate a theory of the self¬lessness on the assumption that, in the Pramanavarttika, the proof of the selflessness is re¬placed by that of the impermanence of the conditioned ('dus byas mi rtag pa). Consider the following passages from the Tshad ma'i brjed byang chen mo:

In this treatise of reasoning, [i.e. in the Pramanavarttika], only the reasoning to prove impermanence is dis¬cussed in detail, but the reasoning to prove selflessness is not [discussed] in detail. [This is] because it is the determination of the impermanence of the conditioned that serves as the most excellent method of fully puri¬fying the continuum [of mind] by which selflessness is determined; and because the mere negation of perma¬nent entities leaves no room for admitting the self postulated by other schools, since [they] admit that the [[[self]]] is necessarily a permanent entity. Two points are made here. The first is that the proof of impermanence bears great importance as to what serves to demonstrate selflessness. And the second is that the determination of self¬lessness is implicitly involved in that of the impermanence of the conditioned. According to the dGe lugs pa scholars, these two points show that the above-mentioned assumption has to be ac¬cepted; that is, the proof of selflessness is replaced by that of the impermanence of the condi¬tioned in the Pramanavarttika.

Before turning to the first point, we must draw attention to the second point. According to the dGe lugs pa scholars, the self (bdag) as is conceived by non-Buddhist schools is necessarily a permanent entity (rtag dngos). It is important that what they mean by ‘permanent entity' is something not only that is permanent (rtag pa) but also that is characterized as an entity (dngos po) which is capable of producing effects (don byed nus pa); consequently, once such a perma¬nent entity is negated through the proof of the impermanence (mi rtag pa) of all entities (dngos po), that is, the impermanence of all that is conditioned, the self will also be necessarily ne¬gated. This is the way the dGe lugs pa scholars consider the proof of impermanence to imply the determination of selflessness.

Turning now to the first point, we have to inquire into a series of proofs, all presented in the form of argument (sbyor ba). The dGe lugs pa scholars start with the proof which directly es¬tablishes the selflessness of a person and go on to present a series of arguments to demonstrate the paksadharmata - the presence of the probans in the subject - of this proof. Of the proofs given, that of impermanence comes last. In short, the dGe lugs pa scholars arrange a series of proofs in such a way that first the proof of the selflessness of a person comes; then the proof to establish the paksadharmata condition of the first proof; finally the proof of impermanence. The reason for this arrangement is clear from the following remark in the Tshad ma'i brjed byang chen mo:

This being the case, [[[Dharmakirti]] says,] “Therefore [the Buddha] told of suffering after [telling of] imperma¬nence, and of selflessness after [telling of] suffering,” showing that, in order to determine the selflessness of the [five] aggregates, one should determine impermanence and suffering prior to the [[[determination]] of self¬lessness]. [This] indicates that, as explained earlier, [the determination of impermanence] becomes a factor in the demonstration of the paksadharmata of [the proof which is applied to] determine selflessness.

What is noticed is that Tsong kha pa and rGyal tshab rje cite the verses from the Pramanavart- tika with the intention of attributing to Dharmakirti the view that the determination of imper¬manence is essential to that of the selflessness of a person. It is most probable that they also intend to attribute this view to the Buddha himself, for they consider Dharmakirti here to be an advocate for the Buddha's teaching of the truth of suffering: Among the aspects (rnam pa) of the truth of suffering, the Buddha first told of impermanence, then of suffering, and finally of selflessness. This order, according to the dGe lugs pa scholars, suggests that the determination of impermanence serves to demonstrate the paksadharmata of the proof of selflessness, and that the determination of impermanence must precede that of selflessness.

3. The demonstration of selflessness

3.1. The argument to establish selflessness

Let us now look into the set of arguments which is made for demonstrating the selflessness of a person. The arguments the early dGe lugs pa scholars present are almost the same. In this pa¬per, the formulations shall be given mainly on the basis of the Tshad ma'i brjed byang chen mo with some modifications by the present writer. To begin with, the following is the argument meant for directly establishing the selflessness of a person: [Formulation 1]

phung po'i tshogs pa dang rgyun gang la'ang btags pa tsam ma yin pa'i gang zag rang rkya ba chos can / rang bzhin med de / phung po lnga dang rang bzhin gcig dang tha dad gang du'ang med pa'i phyir /

A self-sufficient person, who is not [a nominal existent which consists in being] a mere designation of either an assemblage or a continuum of the aggregates, is devoid of an intrinsic nature, because [such a person] is neither of the same nature as the five aggregates nor of a different nature from [the five aggregates]. In the present context, the self of a person (gang zag gi bdag) is referred to as a ‘self-sufficient person' (gang zag rang rkya ba). The self-sufficient person is regarded as a substantial being which is not a mere nominal existent, so that it is not what one names either an assemblage or a continuum of the five aggregates. The self-sufficient person has to be distinguished from a ‘mere person' (gang zag tsam), a conventionally existent person. The mere person is charac¬terized as follows: First, it is an observed object (dmigs yul), on which our ordinary mind has an innate tendency to superimpose the image (rnam pa) of a self-sufficient being. Second, it is an agent who accumulates karma and enjoys its result, enabling one to give an account of kar¬mic retribution. Accordingly, it follows that what is to be negated in the determination of self¬lessness is not a ‘mere person' but a ‘self-sufficient person.'

The determination of selflessness is none other than the negation of an intrinsic nature (rang bzhin) of a self-sufficient person. If a self-sufficient person were to have an intrinsic nature, it would be either of the same nature (rang bzhin gcig) as the five aggregates, or of a different nature (rang bzhin tha dad) from the aggregates. There is no other possibility. Therefore, when a self-sufficient person is defined as being neither of the same nature as the five aggregates nor of a different nature from the aggregates, we have to say that it is devoid of an intrinsic nature.

It must be noticed that this argument, which is made by taking into consideration the rela¬tionship between the self and the aggregates, can hardly be traced back in the Indian pramana tradition. Rather, this type of argument, interestingly enough, appears frequently in the Madhyamika texts. For example, Nagarjuna's fivefold argument and Candrakirti's sevenfold argument include the same type of argument. And besides, it is also noticeable that the argu¬ment in question may be classed as what is called ‘neither one nor many' (gcig du bral) argu¬ment. The ‘neither one nor many' argument, which is used by Santaraksita in his Madhyama- kalamkara, is known to Dharmakirti, who employs it in the Pramanavarttika III 360. But it has to be noted that he does not use it for the purpose of making the proof of the selflessness of a person. We may assume that the dGe lugs pa scholars tried to integrate the Madhyamika’s argument into the pramana system.

3.2. The demonstration of paksadharmata

The next step is to consider the proofs demonstrating the paksadharmata of the above-men¬tioned proof. First of all, it should be established that the five aggregates are not of a different nature from a self-sufficient person. It is to be noted in passing that, according to the dGe lugs pa scholars, while one who has a dull intellect (dbang brtul) has to resort to an inference in or¬der to prove this thesis, one who has a sharp intellect (dbang rnon) has only to resort to per¬ception in order to do this. Now, according to the Rigs rgyan, the argument meant for proving the given thesis is as follows:

[Formulation 2]

phung po lnga chos can / gang zag rang rkya ba dang rang bzhin tha dad du med de / yod na so sor dmigs dgos pa las ma dmigs pa'i phyir / The five aggregates are not of a different nature from a self-sufficient person, because, if [the aggregates] were [of a different nature from a self-sufficient person], [the aggregates and the self-sufficient person] must be sep¬arately cognized; but [these] are not [separately] cognized. If it were the case that the five aggregates are of a different nature from a self-sufficient per¬son, then one would be lead to accept the undesirable consequence that the aggregates and that person are separately cognized, which runs counter to common experience. Experience tells us that a self-sufficient person always appears to the mind as something different from the five aggregates. Thus, it can be concluded that the aggregates and the self-sufficient person are not of a different nature.

What should be established next is that the five aggregates are not of the same nature as a self-sufficient person. The argument to prove this thesis is as follows:

[Formulation 3]

phung po lnga chos can / gang zag rang rkya ba dang rang bzhin gcig tu med de / mi rtag cing gzhan dbang can yin pa'i phyir / The five aggregates are not of the same nature as a self-sufficient person, because [the aggregates] are imper¬manent and dependent on others. Being a self-sufficient person consists, by definition, in being permanent and independent of others. The five aggregates, on the other hand, are impermanent and dependent on others. There is a fundamental contradiction involved in saying that these two are of the same nature. Hence it is proper to say that the five aggregates and the self-sufficient person are not of the same nature.

But how is it possible to say that the five aggregates are impermanent and dependent on oth¬ers? Concerning the probans used in the present argument, it has to be established in two ways. First, it has to be proved that the five aggregates are impermanent; and second, it has to be proved that they are dependent on others. The argument to prove the second is as follows:

[Formulation 4]

phung po lnga chos can / gzhan dbang can yin te / las nyon gyis 'dus byas pa'i phyir / The five aggregates are dependent on others, because [they] are conditioned by karma and afflictions. The point is that the five aggregates are what are dependent on others precisely because they are causally conditioned. It is said that the five aggregates of ordinary people are conditioned by karma and afflictions. In order to show this, the dGe lugs pa scholars cite the Pramanavart- tika II 217c (see footnote 2) in which Dharmakirti refers to the Buddhist theory of the Four No¬ble Truths. According to this theory, the five aggregates are said to be ‘suffering' (sdug bsngal); and the suffering is caused by karma and afflictions, which are said to be the ‘origin' (kun 'byung) of the suffering.

Now the first thesis, namely that the five aggregates are impermanent, is proved by the fol¬lowing argument:

[Formulation 5]

phung po lnga chos can / mi rtag ste / byas pa'i phyir /

The five aggregates are impermanent, because [they] are produced. This is precisely what we call the proof of impermanence. The probans ‘being produced' (byas pa) is the most standard one for the proof of impermanence that is adopted by the dGe lugs pa scholars who do not accept what is called ‘sattvanumana.'

To explain: According to the dGe lugs pa scholars, ‘existence' (yod pa) includes both the permanent (rtag pa) and the impermanent (mi rtag pa); the former is equivalent to ‘non-entity' (dngos med) and the latter to ‘entity' (dngos po). Under this assumption, it is natural that the probans ‘being existent' has the fallacy of inconclusiveness (ma nges pa), for what is existent is not necessarily impermanent. This is why the dGe lugs pa scholars use the probans ‘being produced' instead of the probans ‘being existent' to prove impermanence. According to them, the probans ‘being produced' or the probans ‘being an entity' conclusively prove the aggre¬gates to be impermanent, but not the probans ‘being existent.'

4. The validation of the proof of impermanence

We can recognize from all these things how the proof of impermanence is linked with that of selflessness. It has been shown that, in order to determine the selflessness of a person, one has to prove the thesis that the self-sufficient person and the aggregates are not of the same nature, and that, in order to prove this thesis, one has to resort to the proof of impermanence.

Let us now consider briefly how the validity of the proof of impermanence is ascertained. The validity of this proof is established when the probans used here meets all the three condi¬tions (tshul gsum): the paksadharmata and both the positive and negative concomitances.

4.1. The determination of paksadharmata

The probans ‘being produced' fulfills the condition paksadharmata if and only if it is estab¬lished that the five aggregates are what are produced. According to the dGe lugs pa scholars, although one who has a sharp intellect, perceiving the increase and decrease ('phel 'grib) of the aggregates, knows that they are what are produced by certain causes, one who has a dull intel¬lect has to resort to inference. According to the Rigs rgyan, the inference to establish the given thesis is formulated as follows:

[Formulation 6]

phung po lnga chos can / byas pa yin te / rgyu rkyen las skyes pa'i phyir / The five aggregates are what are produced, because [they] are born from causes and conditions. The probans used here, ‘being born from causes and conditions,' is a probans of the type that establishes a mere denotation (tha snyad 'ba' zhig sgrub pa). That is, it establishes that what¬ever is born from causes and conditions is referred to by the word ‘being produced.' From the given inference, it is known that they are what are produced from the viewpoint of how they are spoken of. That is why this type of inference is said to be effective only for those who do not know how to use the word ‘being produced.' 

4.2. The determination of concomitance

The invariable concomitance between the probans ‘being produced' and the probandum ‘being impermanent' in the poof of impermanence is determined by means of two kinds of proof: a proof in which ‘non-dependence' is applied as a probans, and the other which forms the nega¬tive proof with reference to the contradictory to the probandum. The former proof corresponds to what is called ‘vinasitvanumana,' and the latter to what is called ‘sadhyaviparyaye badhaka- pramana.' Following the terminology accepted by most Tibetan scholars, I will use the terms ‘the probans of non-dependence' (ltos med kyi rtags) and ‘the negative probans' (gnod pa can gyi rtags) to refer to the two kinds of probans applied in the first and the second proofs, re¬spectively.

Before the arrival of the dGe lugs pa, the purpose of applying the two kinds of probans had been a subject of controversy. gTsang nag pa (12th cent.) asserted that the probans of non-de- pendence functions as a supporter (lam sbyong) of the negative probans.24 In his view, the negative probans establishes the concomitance in question by itself, while the probans of non¬dependence serves to ensure the validity of the negative proof. His view, however, invited the criticism by Sa skya pandita (1182-1251). Sa skya pandita, although not mentioning gTsang nag pa by name, criticized his view, saying that it is not shared by Dharmakrrti and that the two kinds of probans are to be applied respectively for the purpose of eliminating two kinds of misunderstanding.25 But rGyal tshab rje, one of the early dGe lugs pa scholars, who entered the arena of discussion after Sa skya pandita, adopted gTsang nag pa's view and rejected Sa skya pandita's view. rGyal tshab rje, in his commentary on the Pramanaviniscaya, argued that it is simply gTsang nag pa's view that is shared by Dharmottara.26

It is important to note that, while rGyal tshab rje makes an attempt to corroborate gTsang nag pa's view, the early dGe lugs pa scholars, including rGyal tshab rje, give another explana¬tion of the roles for the two probans in question to play. They hold that the two kinds of pro¬bans are respectively applied for the purpose of establishing the positive and negative concom¬itances between the probans and probandum in question.27 According to them, in order to establish the positive concomitance in question, one has to determine that whatever is produced is impermanent; this determination is to be made by applying the probans of non-dependence. And, in order to establish the negative concomitance in question, one has to determine that

whatever is permanent is never what is produced; this determination is to be made by applying the negative probans.

4.3. The probans of non-dependence

Let us now take up the proof in which the probans of non-dependence in applied. According to the sDe bdun rgyan, it is formulated as follows: [Formulation 7] byas pa chos can / khyod rang grub tsam nas 'jig pa'i ngo bo yin te / khyod 'jig par 'gyur ba rang las phyis 'byung ba'i rgyu sogs la ltos pa med par rang rgyu las 'jig par skyes pa'i phyir / dper na / glog bzhin /

What is produced is what has the essential nature of being subject to destruction as soon as it has come into existence. Because its destruction does not depend on causes, such as [a thing that] arises after it [is produced], so that [it] arises from its causes as something subject to destruction, just as a flash of lightening.

Needless to say, this proof can be traced back to Dharmakirti's pramana works. In his sys¬tem, the destruction ('jig pa) of a thing is not distinct from the thing itself; a thing and the de¬struction of it are born together from the same cause. That is, if a certain thing is produced by the cause x, then the same cause x produces the destruction of the thing. What follows from this is that the destruction of a thing is not brought about by other causes which may occur af¬ter the thing has come into existence. Thus, we can establish that the probans of the given proof meets the condition of paksadharmata: What is produced is destroyed without depending on a separate cause for destruction.

The concomitance between the probans and probandum in question is established by taking into consideration the exemplification. It is seen that a flash of lightening arises from its cause and disappears without depending on any other cause. This will lead to the determination that the flash of lightening has the essence of being subject to destruction as soon as it comes into existence. Therefore, it may be said that whatever is destroyed without depending on a separate cause for destruction has the essential nature of being subject to destruction.

We are now in a position to say that what is produced is what has the essential nature of being subject to destruction, which means that whatever is produced is impermanent. In rela¬tion to the proof of impermanence, it is thus clear that the probans ‘being produced' is present only in the domain of sapaksa, i.e. the impermanent.

4.4. The negative probans

Finally, let us look at the proof in which the negative probans is applied. According to the Tshad ma'i brjed byang chen mo, the proof is formulated as follows:

[Formulation 8]

rtag pa chos can / byas pas stong ste / rim dang cig car gyi don byed pas stong pa'i phyir / dper na 'dus ma byas kyi nam mkha' bzhin no / The permanent is empty of [the property of] being produced, because [it is] empty of causal efficiency either in succession or in simultaneity, just as space which is uncreated.

This argument to prove that the permanent is empty of the property of being produced is clearly a modification of the argument which was originally made by Dharmakirti in his Pra- manaviniscaya. His original argument is this: whatever is not momentary is non-existent be¬cause it is devoid of causal efficiency either in succession or in simultaneity.

Let us examine the argument given here. According to the dGe lugs pa scholars, causal effi¬ciency, which is a characteristic of what is produced, must happen either in succession or in simultaneity. There is no other mode of causal efficiency happening than these. Therefore, for them, if a certain thing is said to be empty of causal efficiency either in succession or in sim¬ultaneity, it must be said that the thing can never be what is produced. The question remains, however, whether it can be established that the permanent is empty of causal efficiency either in succession or in simultaneity. To this question we may answer as follows. If one said that the permanent brings about all things in simultaneity, this would be contradicted by the fact that some things are produced in succession. On the contrary, if one said that the permanent brings about its effects in succession, there must be the arising in suc¬cession of plural causes to bring about plural effects in succession. In consequence of this, one would have to admit that such causes are not permanent but impermanent. This is how it should be argued that the permanent is empty of causal efficiency both in succession and in si- multaneity. In view of these things, we can conclude that the permanent can never be what is produced. With regard to the proof of impermanence, it is thus clear that the probans ‘being produced' is never present in the domain of vipaksa, i.e. the permanent.

5. Conclusion

We have seen how the theory of selflessness is vividly reconstructed so as to establish the pra- mana-soteriology in the dGe lugs pa's pramana exegesis. The first important point is that the dGe lugs pa scholars presented the set of proofs, beginning with the proof of the selflessness of a person and ending with the proof of impermanence, in order to give a lucid explanation of the theory of selflessness. Even more important is that the dGe lugs pa scholars skillfully made use of the proof of impermanence, trying to ensure that their exegesis is firmly based on Dhar- makirti’s original intention. According to them, Dharmakirti had the intention of establishing the theory of selflessness, though unexpressed, when he advanced the proof of impermanence. For the dGe lugs pa scholars, it is the proof of impermanence that not only plays the central role in establishing the pramana-soteriology, but also makes it possible for their exegesis to find support in the Pramanavarttika.

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