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The rÑiṅ-ma Interpretations of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory

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Dorji Wangchuk


The rNin-ma Interpretations of the Tathagatagarbha Theory*


1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS


The theory of “Buddha Nature” or tathagatagarbha (henceforth TG)* 1 formed an important school of thought in Mahayana Buddhism and continues to enjoy popularity in some circles even today, although it has been dismissed by some scholars as non-Buddhist.2 It has drawn the attention of several scholars. On the Tibetan front, David Seyfort Ruegg has through a series of publications greatly contributed to the understanding of the TG theory, particularly that of the dGe-lugs-pa tradition. A number of studies devoted to the TG theory from the perspective of the exponents of the gzan ston (“extrinsic emptiness”)3



I am, of course, solely responsible for the content of the article. 1 See Michael Zimmermann's recent study of the Tathagatagarbhasutra, the earliest exposition on Buddha Nature in India, where he presents a detailed discussion of the term tathagatagarbha (Zimmermann 2002: 39-50). Note that I use Tathagatagarbhasutra as a proper noun referring to this particular sutra and TG sutra as a common noun referring to a sutra which deals primarily with the tathagatagarbha doctrine.

2 Some modern Japanese scholars have openly dismissed the TG theory as non-Buddhist, an issue which lies outside my present topic. For some details, see Zimmermann 2002: 82-84.

3 A tradition may for polemical reasons label a rival tradition as a proponent of gzan ston (“extrinsic emptiness”) or ran ston (“intrinsic emptiness”). However, as suggested in Kapstein 2000: 121, it would be, from a methodological point of view, sensible to refrain from using labels such as gzan ston and ran ston unless a Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sudasiens / Vienna Journal of South Asian Studies, Bd. XLVIII/2004, 171-213 © 2005 by Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien

theory have also appeared in recent years.4 However, much remains to be explored in the works of various Tibetan authors of different traditions and periods.

given tradition prefers to use one of these terms to describe its own conception of emptiness. Furthermore, since we tend to be too generous with the use of the terms ran ston and gzan ston, I would like to make clear from the very outset how rNin-ma scholars understand these terms. For them, a given “x” (no matter what) is said to be ran ston if it cannot withstand (bzod pa) the logical analysis of Madhya-maka reasoning. A given “x” that can withstand such a scrutiny, which is for them an impossibility, would imply its “true or hypostatic existence” (bden par grub pa). Please note that my translation of the technical term bden par grub pa or bden grub is based on Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 37 where it is

explained as “a permanent substantial entity established ‘in truth', i.e., hypostatically (bden par grub pa).” See also Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 320 and Seyfort Ruegg 2002: 296, Indices, s.v. bden grub. Hence, if the logical analysis of Madhyamaka reasoning is applied, for example, on a cow or TG, neither of them will be able to withstand the force of logical analysis. A single case of “hypostatic existence” would be sufficient to cause the collapse of the entire Madhyamaka system. Thus, from the perspective of such a scrutiny, a given “x” is always ran ston. Further, if a given “x” is empty of a numerically different given “y,” then “x” is said to be gzan ston. In this sense, a given “x” is always empty of “y” and hence always gzan ston. For example, a cow is always empty of a bull and so is TG empty of adventitious impure phenomena of samsara. Thus, from this viewpoint, a given “x” can be both ran ston and gzan ston. On the other hand, for Dol-po-pa Ses-rab-rgyal-mtshan (1292-1361), the initiator of the gzan ston theory, whether or not “x” is ran ston or gzan ston would depend on whether “x” is a conventional phenomenon or absolute reality. If “x” is a conventional phenomenon, it is ran ston, and if it is absolute reality, it is gzan ston. Hence, Dol-po-pa uses the expressions kun rdzob ran ston or kun rdzob ston nid and don dam gzan ston or don dam ston nid (Ri chos, p. 305.8) and states that the banal (tha sal) emptiness (i.e., itaretarasunyata) belittled in the Lankavatarasutra is neither of the two (ibid., p. 154.15-155.15). In principle, Dol-po-pa could have described this itaretarasunyata (“emptiness of reciprocity”) as kun rdzob gzan ston in opposition to what he called kun rdzob ran ston and don dam gzan ston but has apparently, for strategic reasons, refrained from doing so. Designating itareta-rasunyata as kun rdzob gzan ston would have been self-defeating because then he would have been forced to concede that there is at least one kind of gzan ston which is unacceptable even by his own standard. Thus, he could consolidate his gzan ston theory by insisting that only the absolute can be gzan ston and only gzan ston can be absolute (ibid., p. 308.12-15).


4 See, e.g., Seyfort Ruegg 1963; Broido 1989; Hookham 1991 and 1992; Stearns 1999; Mathes 1998, 2000 and 2002. Note, however, that one may have to be careful not to anachronistically presuppose that one homogenous gzan ston theory existed at every place and time in Tibet (e.g., see the Si tu'i ran rnam, p. 266.7-267.2; Smith 2001: 265). In fact, the comparing and contrasting of the various gzan ston interpretations would shed important light on the history of the concept and might The rNin-ma Interpretations of the Tathagatagarbha Theory


One important Tibetan interpretation of TG that has been ignored so far is that of the rNin-ma school. The little attention it has received is in the context of studies pertaining to the Tibetan Madhyamaka and rDzogs-chen doctrines.* 5 Can one, however, speak of a single rNin-ma interpretation of TG without the risk of oversimplification? Admittedly, not all rNin-ma scholars interpreted TG in the same way. They may differ in their erudition, style of interpretation and emphasis according to the particular time and place in which they lived. Even one and the same scholar may interpret it differently in different works, or even in different passages of the same work. Nevertheless, despite the differences in details within the various schools of Tibetan Buddhism, each of them, including the rNin-ma school, has, in my opinion, its own few archetypical intellectual figures who shape, lead and represent their respective traditions, and whose positions agree at least in substance if not always in every detail. And thus later rNin-ma-pas consider Ron-zom-pa (eleventh century), Klon-chen-pa (1308-1363) and Mi-pham (1846-1912) as their three archetypical intellectual models, and their interpretations of a given doctrine as the “official” rNin-ma position.6 Before examining their views, I would like to briefly discuss how some of the leading rNin-ma scholars — whose interpretations of the TG contribute to a better understanding of the evolution, continuation and reception of such concepts.


5 Klon-chen-pa's discussion of TG occurring in the seventh chapter of his Tshig don mdzod is assessed in Germano 1992: 77-82. John Pettit published a translation of Mi-pham's Nes ses sgron me and its commentary by 'Khro-chu 'Jam-dpal-rdo-rje (Pettit 1999a) and also included a translation of Mi-pham's gZan ston sen ge'i na ro, p. 359-378.4. See “The Lion's Roar Proclaiming Extrinsic Emptiness,” in Pettit 1999a: 415-427. The recent doctoral dissertation by Karma Phuntsho also discusses Mi-pham's stance on the TG theory (Phuntsho 2003). 6 One might ask just how authoritative and representative Ron-zom-pa, Klon-chen-pa and Mi-pham were and are for the rNin-ma school. Mi-pham himself considered Ron-zom-pa and Klon-chen-pa as the most authoritative interpreters of the rNin-ma doctrine and he saw himself as the follower of the two. See the Dam chos dogs sel, p. 378.5-379.2, the dBu ma rgyan 'grel, p. 42.5, the Nes ses sgron me, p. 121.1-2. See also the colophon to his Ron zom bla rnal, p. 61.6: mtshuns med ma ha pandi ta chen po’i rjes su ’jug par khas ’che ba mi pham rnam par rgyal bas zla tshe bzan po la bris pa dge'o |. The fact that Mi-pham is responsible for the latest systematisation of the rNin-ma doctrine and that he did so primarily by relying on Ron-zom-pa and Klon-chen-pa, is, in my view, sufficient for considering the three as respresentative and authoritative, as they are indeed perceived by the rNin-ma tradition today. See also Smith 2001: 16.

doctrine are considered authoritative for the rNin-ma school — are portrayed in some secondary literature. Of the major rNin-ma scholars, Ron-zom-pa has been presented as clearly preferring Yogacara-Madh-yamaka by Georges Dreyfus,7 apparently following John Pettit who merely states that Ron-zom-pa in his Grub mtha'i brjed byan suggests that the Yogacara—Madhyamaka is “more important” (don che ba).8 What the closing phrase of the pertinent statement by Ron-zom-pa actually says is: “The treatise [or position] of Yogacara—Madhyamaka appears (snan) to be more significant.”9 The statement gives Ron-zom-pa's personal opinion about the then prevalent two Madhyamaka systems (i.e., Sautrantika-Madhyamaka and Yogacara—Madhyamaka) and not his doctrinal affiliation.10 Klon-chen-pa and Mi-pham have been portrayed as exponents of the gzan ston theory. For example, according to Samten Karmay, Klon-chen-pa's stance on the TG theory is identical to that of Dol-po-pa's.11 Similarly, David Germano (apparently following S.K. Hookham) describes Klon-chen-pa's comments regarding the doctrine of emptiness and TG as “fairly typical” of the gzan ston concepts in Tibet.12 These scholars' impressions are not altogether unjustified because Klon-chen-pa's evaluation of TG prima facie looks so 7 See Dreyfus 2003: 331. 8 Pettit 1999a: 90-91, 485, n. 315. 9 lTa ba'i brjed byan, p. 11.11-14: dbu ma rnam gnis kun rdzob kyi tshul mi mthun pa la | lun dan rigs pa gan che ba ni rgyud dan mdo sde spyi'i gzun dan | rigs pa spyi'i tshul dan | dbu ma'i mkhan po gzun phyi mo mdzad pa'i slob dpon klu sgrub dan | arya de ba’i gzun Itar na yan | rnal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma'i gzun don che bar snan no |.

10 If one wishes to speak about Ron-zom-pa's doctrinal affiliation, then one can safely state that he was, in the first place, affiliated with rDzogs-chen doctrines, and that his method of establishing emptiness is closer to that of the Prasangika-Madhyamaka than to any other Buddhist system, regardless of whether or how much access he had to Prasangika texts. This becomes particularly evident in his Theg chen tshul 'jug and was also the impression of some traditional Tibetan scholars such as Mi-pham (see, for example, the Nes ses sgron me, p. 75.3-4, the dBu ma rgyan 'grel, p. 309.6-310.1 and the Dam chos dogs sel, p. 378.6) and Blo-bzan-mdo-snags Chos-kyi-rgya-mtsho (1903-1957), a dGe-lugs-cum-rNin-ma scholar from Khams, who even went on to prove that Ron-zom-pa's view is a Prasangika view (see the lTa ba'i dris lan, p. 70-71). Whether the Prasangika-Madhyamaka view was in some form present during the early propagation of Buddhism in Tibet may depend, among other things, on whether Santideva was indeed a Prasangika-Madhyamika as the Tibetan tradition has perceived him to be. 11 See Karmay 1988: 184-185; cf. Kapstein 1992: 23, n. 1. 12 See Germano 1992: 78. See also Hookham 1991: 136, 150. The rNin-ma Interpretations of the Tathagatagarbha Theory


positive that one might assume it to be identical with that of Dol-po-pa's. Even amongst the traditional Tibetan scholars there were figures like Kon-sprul who preferred to place Klon-chen-pa and Karma-pa Ran-byun-rdo-rje (1284-1339) in the group of gzan ston exponents.13 This doctrinal agenda is still continued by living Tibetan exponents of the gzan ston doctrine. A few modern scholars have designated Mi-pham as an exponent of the gzan ston theory as well. However, a closer look reveals that in most cases, it is the terminology that has led to this determination; that is, the term gzan ston has not necessarily been used by these scholars in a strict technical sense. One author who seems to consciously seek to prove Mi-pham a gzan ston exponent is Paul Wil-liams.14 Leading rNin-ma teachers of more recent times have also been 13 Ses bya rgya mtsho, p. 567.8-10; Smith 2001: 338, n. 888.

14 See Williams 1998 (particularly, p. 199-216). For reviews of Williams 1998, see Kapstein 2000, Tatz 2001: 78-79. A few words should be said here regarding Paul Williams' study of “auto-perception” (ran rig: svasamvedana/svasamvitti) and his attempt to connect it with the controversial issue of gzan ston. To agree with Mi-pham's understanding or interpretation of “auto-perception” is one thing and to understand his position accurately is yet another matter. In my view, Williams seems to have missed the point regarding the controversial issue of “auto-perception,” particularly in regard to Mi-pham's stance on this issue. If he had studied Mi-pham's interpretation of “means of valid cognition” (pramana), he would have seen why the theory of “auto-perception” was crucial for Mi-pham. According to him, the whole theoretical structure of perception and inference developed by Dignaga and Dharmakirti would collapse without the theory of “auto-perception.” Mi-pham insists that as long as one accepts conventional valid cognition (tha snad tshad ma), one must accept “auto-perception,” at least on the conventional level, just as one accepts “perception of others” (gzan rig). Thus, without a clear concept of Mi-pham's background and his view on pramana, any study of Mi-pham's view on “auto-perception” is destined to be less than successful. A proper assessment of Mi-pham's understanding of Madhyamaka would have revealed that for Mi-pham, there is no phenomenon that can withstand (bzod) the Madhyamaka logical analysis, and this includes “auto-perception.” The Prasangika-Madhyamikas (such as Candrakirti and Santideva) do refute the Yogacara notion of “auto-perception” but, for Mi-pham, this is done so in the context of establishing absolute reality or “that which is free from manifoldness” (nisprapanca). However, even Prasangika-Madhyamikas should, according to Mi-pham, have no problem in accepting “autoperception” on the conventional level, just as they have no problem accepting “perception of others.” For Mi-pham, anything that can be attested by means of conventional valid cognition is acceptable on the conventional level. If a thing is impossible even on the conventional level, then it should be something like a “permanent sound” (sgra rtag pa) or a “rabbit's horn” (ri bon gi rwa). But, for him, neither is “auto-perception” like a “permanent sound” nor did Candrakirti and Santideva consider it to be so. However, Tson-kha-pa believed that Candrakirti and

presented as proponents of the gzan ston theory. Cyrus Stearns' The Buddha from Dolpo, which greatly contributes to the understanding of Dol-po-pa's life and thoughts, tends to oversimplify the rNin-ma explanation of the TG theory. For instance, Stearns, relying on verbal communication with sDe-gzung Rin-po-che (1906-1987), maintains that rNin-ma teachers such as bDud-'joms Rin-po-che (1904-1987) and Dil-mgo mKhyen-brtse (1910-1991) were proponents of the gzan ston doc-trine.15 I am not aware of any textual evidence that would suggest that these teachers were proponents of the gzan ston doctrine, at least not in Dol-po-pa's sense. Both bDud-'joms Rin-po-che and Dil-mgo mKhyen-brtse, in fact, speak about the oneness of emptiness and appearance or the compatibility of the Middle and Last Cycles of Buddha's teach-ings.16

Santideva held “auto-perception” to be impossible even on the conventional level. This is the point of departure of the actual issue and the controversy took place within the contextual framework of Pramana and Madhyamaka, which were seen by Mi-pham as complementing and strengthening rather than as excluding or nullifying each other. Hence, bringing in rDzogs-chen and gzan ston issues in this context is unwarranted. If Williams had studied rDzogs-chen or the rNin-ma interpretation of TG, he would have realised that for the rNin-ma-pas (including Mi-pham), there is a strict distinction between mind (sems) and gnosis (ye ses). The expression so sor ran gis rig par bya ba (pratyatmavedaniya) which actually means “accessible to personal experience only” or “to be known directly and introspec-tively,” an idea also acceptable to Candrakirti or Santideva, has also been taken out of context by Williams. Unless we understand the methods of interpretation systematized by Mi-pham, we will never fully comprehend the way he conceives Pramana, Madhyamaka, TG and rDzogs-chen or his conception of their intricate relationship with one another. And unless we have a clear picture of how Mi-pham understood ran rig in these systems, we shall only have a fragmentary and distorted idea of Mi-pham's stance on ran rig.

15 See Stearns 1999: 215, n. 137-138. 16 bDud-'joms Rin-po-che explicitly states: “Thus, by clinging to and postulating one of the positions of appearance and emptiness, one would not be able to avert the erroneous (lit. “bad”) views that hold on to the extremes. Therefore, it is necessary to properly establish the sphere of reality (dharmadhatu), the union of appearance and emptiness [or] the ultimate [and] actual absolute truth, as the equality of [[[samsaric]]] existence and [[[nirvanic]]] calmness” (bsTan pa'i rnam gzag, fol. 109b2-4: des na snan ston gan run re'i phyogs su zen cin bzun bas ni mthar 'dzin gyi lta ba nan pa bzlog mi nus pas | chos dbyins snan ston zun 'jug mthar thug rnam grans ma yin pa'i don dam srid zi mnam nid du legs par gtan la ’bebs dgos sin |). Dil-mgo mKhyen-brtse likewise considers the Middle and Last Cycles as complementary, for he explains absolute reality as “the ultimate of what is to be established in a way that the purports of the Middle and the Last Promulgations become The rNin-ma Interpretations of the Tathagatagarbha Theory

One notices a general tendency among modern scholars to associate, in addition to the above-mentioned rNin-ma teachers, rNin-ma doctrines with gzan ston teachings.17 These scholars can be grouped into three: (a) those who are obviously predisposed to the gzan ston theory, (b) those who are opposed to the gzan ston doctrine and (c) those who are too generous with the use of the term gzan ston.18 One of the reasons why the rNin-ma position on TG has remained somewhat elusive appears to entwined as one and is the finale of the ocean-like systems of sutra and tantra” (bDud rtsi'i snan ba, fol. 71a6: 'khor lo bar mtha' dgons pa gcig dril gyis gtan la dbab bya mthar thug pa mdo snags grub mtha' rgya mtsho'i skyel so yin la). See also the Zil gnon dgons gsal (fol. 178a6-b2) where Dil-mgo mKhyen-brtse speaks about the union (zun 'jug) of the “primordial purity” (ka dag), which is equated with “freedom from the eight extremes of manifoldness” (spros pa'i mtha' brgyad las 'das pa), and the “immanently present” (lhun grub) Buddha bodies (sku) and gnosis (ye ses) constituting the TG, and his 'Jam dpal dgons rgyan (fol. 239a2-b5), where TG (among several other terms) is indicated as a synonym of the emptiness of the Middle Promulgation. See also his rDo rje mdud grol (fol. 136a5-b4 & 150a3-4) where he explains the view of Prasangika-Madhyamaka in the same way Mi-pham does.

17 According to Karmay, who relied on the Italian edition (1973) of The Religions of Tibet, Tucci maintains that the doctrines of rDzogs-chen and of the Jo-nan-pas were developed from the Hva-san's doctrine of TG (see Karmay 1988: 87). This claim, however, does not appear in the later English translation of the book. S.K. Hookham describes rDzogs-chen as typically gzan ston-type teachings and claims that giving it a ran ston gloss is the attempt of the present Dalai Lama “to abate the long standing hostility” towards rDzogs-chen and to protect it “from the ravages of the ‘exclusive Rangtongpa'” (Hookham 1991: 16; see also Hookham 1992: 151-152, n. 4). For reviews of Hookham 1991, see Ehrhard 1993 and Griffiths 1993. See also Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 87.

18 See, for example, Smith 2001: 231, where it is stated that “Mi pham's open advocacy of the Gzhan stong was another red cape, and the bulls were not slow to charge,” and ibid., p. 327, n. 788 where both the sTon thun sen ge'i na ro (p. 563606.5) and the gZan ston sen ge'i na ro (p. 359-378.4) are said to be works on the gzan ston theory. It is of course true that Mi-pham wrote on the gzan ston theory and even defended it and can be thus called a “gzan ston sympathiser.” He, however, did not consider himself a gzan ston pa (Dam chos dogs sel, p. 378.5-379.1: nams mtshar tsam du bris pa yin na yan || ran bzos bde gsegs dam chos bslad mi run || 'chal nag son na rgyal ba rnams la bsags | ran bzos bsad na ci yan zad mtha' med || bdag la gzan ston sgrub pa'i khur kyan med || ron klon rnam gnis klu sgrub gzun dan mthun | dman pa bdag kyan rtse gcig der 'dun kyan | ma bris dban med pha rol tshig gis bskul ||). Surprisingly, although the Nes ses sgron me is the locus classicus for the rNin-ma position regarding the issue of ran ston and gzan ston, John Pettit, in his study of this work, seems to be uncertain about Mi-pham's position (Pettit 1999a: 114-124). However, cf. Pettit 1999b.

be the complexity of the matter itself which forbids a simplistic expression of it in terms of ran ston or gian ston. In the following passages, I shall present (a) the early Tibetan background of the TG theory, (b) a brief historical sketch and (c) a general profile of the rNin-ma interpretation of the TG doctrine, and (d) finally my assessment of the rNin-ma stance on the TG theory in India and Tibet,19 and thereby demonstrate how complex and distinctive the rNin-ma interpretation of TG actually is. Nonetheless, although I shall strive to describe their interpretation accurately, some of my observations will remain tentative. It is, however, not my intention to discuss here whether the rNin-ma interpretation is in keeping with the TG theory as originally conceived in India.


2. EARLY TIBETAN BACKGROUND OF THE TG THEORY


Although some of the important Indian sources, particularly treatises (sastra) such as the Ratnagotravibhaga (or Uttaratantra), were translated only in the eleventh century during the early gSar-ma era, the sutras dealing with the TG doctrine were translated during the first period of translation.20 The TG doctrine was thus known to Tibetans from the early stages of the propagation of Buddhism in Tibet. Furthermore, the term TG or its semantic equivalent *sugatagarbha21 can

19 Given the space limitations for this article, I have refrained from translating all my citations. Also note that I have not aimed at being exhaustive as regards the indication of primary and secondary sources. 20 See Seyfort Ruegg 1973: 23-26, where the titles of Indian sources on the TG doctrine are listed, almost all of which are recorded in the lDan dkar ma catalogue.


21 The term *sugatagarbha is said not to be attested in Sanskrit (Seyfort Ruegg 1973: 6, n. 2; Karmay 1988: 184, n. 47). However, the term bde gsegs snin po does occur in the Tibetan translations of the Angulimaliyasutra (P fol. 174a5; D fol. 166b2: bde gsegs sninpo thegpa che las skyes |) and Ghanavyuhasutra (P fol. 62b1; D fol. 55b1: bde gsegs sninpo dge ba’an de ||; cf., however, Taisho 747a7) for which the Sanskrit is not extant. (I thank Kazuo Kano for these references.) This may represent a “correction” that was made in the course of the text's transmission. Given that the terms bde bar gsegs pa and de biin gsegs pa are susceptible to confusion, particularly when they are contracted to bde gsegs and de gsegs, respectively, it is easy to imagine that the latter might have been corrected to the former in these texts. On the other hand, it is also possible that sugata was indeed in the orginal reading, used metri causa for tathagata, because the Chinese translation of the Angulimaliyasutra (Taisho 531a7) presents the character for Buddha (i.e., fo) instead of the usual characters for tathagata (i.e., jou lai). The rNin-ma Interpretations of the Tathagatagarbha Theory

be found in several rNin-ma tantras belonging to the Mahayoga,22 the Anuyoga23 and the Atiyoga24 classes, although the number of occurrences is relatively small. It also appears in some of the earliest indigenous Tibetan works such as the lTa ba'i khyad par by Ye-ses-sde,25 the Thabs ses sgron ma by dPal-dbyans26 and the bSam gtan mig sgron by gNubs-chen Sans-rgyas-ye-ses.27 Yet even though the TG theory has certainly been present from early times in the rNin-ma literature, it seems to have played quite an insignificant role and never gained prominence or an independent status, in the way it was conceived, for instance, in the Tathagatagarbhasutra. Rather, the rNin-ma-pas incorporated it into the system of Madhyamaka, which was portrayed as the predominant system in Tibet already during the imperial period, for

22 For examples, see the *Guhyagarbha, p. 159.1; 348.4: e ma’o bde gsegs snin po las | ran gi rnam rtog las kyis sprul ||. See also the Glan chen rab 'bog, p. 257.45; 260.1-6; 283.7-284.5. 23 The Kun 'dus which belongs to the Anuyoga class also mentions the term *sugatagarbha (p. 31.1-2): skye med ye ses nid kyi dbyins | gdod nas bder gsegs snin po las | rnam rtog glo bur las kyis bsgribs || de nid 'gro mgon skyabs chen yin |. See also ibid., p. 146.1-2. 24 The term TG or *sugatagarbha also occurs in Atiyoga or rDzogs-chen tantras such as the rDor sems me lon (p. 207.1-2) which states: 'jig rten gyi khams kyi sems can thams cad la | de bzin gsegs pa'i snin po ran chas su til 'bru la mar gyis khyab pa bzin du gnas so ||. See also the Srog gi 'khor lo, p. 599.2-3 (also cited in the bSam gtan mig sgron, p. 292); bDe ba'i myu gu, p. 630.6-7; Ye ses gsan rgyud, p. 760.2. 25 lTa ba'i khyad par (P fol. 258a7-b3; D fol. 218b4-7): 'phags pa [= 'phags P] dun phren gi mdo las kyan | de bzin gsegs pa'i snin po gsal bar ma gyur pa'i [= ba'i P] tshe ni kun gzi zes bya'o | gsal bar [= par P] gyur pa de'i tshe ni chos sku zes bya ba gsuns so | ... don bsdus pa zes bya’i bstan bcos las kyan chos sku zes bya ba la | chos ni thog ma med pa nas rigs su gyur pa de bzin gsegs pa'i snin po la bya ste | sems can thams cad kyi ran bzin no | de ni yan dag pa ma yin pas bsgribs pas dri ma can du gyur te | gan gi tshe sbyor ba snon du btan nas 'khrul pa dan bral ba de'i tshe ran bzin du 'gyur ro | ran bzin du gyur pa de ni chos kyi sku zes bsad do ||.

26 Thabs ses sgron ma (P fol. 286b8-287a1; D fol. 385a1): bde gsegs snin po sems kyi ran bzin la | yun rin dus nas rmons pa'i sems can rnams | bdag tu 'dzin pa'i sems rgyud so sor snan | ran bzin nid ni rgyal ba'i chos skur gcig ||. 27 See the bSam gtan mig sgron, p. 292. However, as already discussed in Kar-may 1988: 184, the term bde gsegs snin po occurs only within a citation from the Srog gi 'khor lo. It should be noted that the bSam gtan mig sgron (p. 137) also cites a passage from the Tathagatagarbhasutra, which, however, does not include the term TG. Note also that the term TG is recorded in the Mahavyutpatti (no. 699), but only as the name of a Bodhisattva. However, the five kinds of spiritual disposition (pancagotra), related to the TG theory, are recorded there (Mahavyutpatti, no. 1261-1265).

example, in the report about the royal decree according to which only Nagarjuna’s view, propagated mainly by Santaraksita and Kamalasila, was to be followed.28 Nevertheless, while the acceptance of the Madhya-maka notion of being “free of manifoldness” (nisprapanca) never waned in the rNin-ma philosophical system, the TG theory gradually gained importance over the centuries and thus had an ever increasing impact on the thoughts of the school. The increase in popularity of the Ratna-gotravibhaga must have contributed to this shift in the importance of the TG theory in the rNin-ma tradition.


3. A BRIEF HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE TG THEORY


in the rNin-ma School

I shall attempt here to give a brief outline of rNin-ma authors whose works may shed light on the way the TG teaching was perceived in each period of time in the rNin-ma history. It is the allusions to the TG theory by Ye-ses-sde, dPal-dbyans and gNubs-chen Sans-rgyas-ye-ses that give us some idea as to how it was received during the imperial period. The Theg pa chen po rnal 'byor gyi tshul la 'jug pa by A-ro Ye-ses-'byun-gnas (tenth century?), which is at present only available embedded in a recent commentary (written ca. 1934), does not mention the term TG. However, A-ro's view of emptiness or absolute truth seems to be similar, if not identical, to that of Ron-zom-pa's. Noteworthy is his notion of the equality of samsara and nirvana29 and the way he establishes “freedom from manifoldness” by negating all extremes,

28 See the dBa’ bzed, p. 88; the Nan ral chos ’byun, p. 407.1-3; Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 2-3, n. 2. Some Tun-huang materials (Tun hon sog dril, p. 200, Pelliot Tibetain 112.1) also state that Madhyamaka views are regarded to be of definitive meaning (nitartha). It should be noted that the Madhyamaka system as such has, however, never been given hierarchic precedence over tantric systems or Atiyoga (or rDzogs-chen) in the rNin-ma doxographical literature nor has rDzogs-chen been considered a substitute for the Indian Madhyamaka. It is interesting to note that dPal-man dKon-mchog-rgyal-mtshan (1764-1853) stated that Padmasambhava “without doubt” maintained the view of Prasangika-Madhyamaka (Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 22-23, n. 41). The Man nag lta phren, attributed to Padmasambhava, is designated a text of “Mantra-Madhyamaka” (snags kyi dbu ma) by Sakya-mchog-ldan (Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 55-56, n. 117). I have not been able, however, to find such a designation in the rNin-ma literature. 29 Theg rnal 'grel pa, p. 133.3-134.5; 156.3-159.2. The rNin-ma Interpretations of the Tathagatagarbha Theory

including even the “middle” position.30 Ron-zom-pa's extant writings give us a glimpse of how the TG theory was perceived by a rNin-ma scholar of the eleventh century. The writings of Nan-ral Ni-ma-'od-zer (1136-1204) may be able to tell us how the idea of TG was perceived by himself or his contemporaries. His Chos 'byun, however, does not disclose much. It simply states that nine hundred years after the Buddha's passing away (parinirvana), Asanga and his brother (i.e., Vasubandhu) came to interpret the teachings of the Last Cycle as having a definitive meaning.31 However, his notion of absolute and conventional truth revealed in a verse of obeisance indicates that his view was in tune with the Madhyamaka concept of “freedom from manifoldness.”32 The twelfth-century work Theg pa spyi bcins by Kah-thog Dam-pa-bde-gsegs (1122-1192) does not mention the term TG, but uses terms such as “genuine [or] actual universal ground” (rnal ma don gyi kun gzi), Prajnaparamita33 and the “indivisibility of the [two] truths” (bden pa dbyer med) with no qualitative differentiation.34 In the twelfth/thirteenth century, we have the doxographical work bsTan pa'i sgron me35 by Rog Ses-rab-'od (1166-1244), in which the TG theory is brought in connection with the rDzogs-chen doctrine.36 Rog clearly connects the Last Cycle of the Buddha's teachings (usually those dealing with the TG doctrine) with Yogacara doctrines and the Middle Cycle of Buddha's teachings (dealing with the Prajnaparamita) with the teaching of “freedom from manifoldness.”37 Further, mKhas-pa lDe'u, who postdates 1261, makes *sugatagarbha an object of his reverence.38 He also describes TG as “ [characterised by] nonduality of clarity and emptiness” (gsal ston gnis med).39

30 Theg rnal 'grel pa, p. 135.1-140.4.
31 Nan ral chos 'byun, p. 87.3-5.
32 Nan ral chos 'byun, p. 1.9-10: don dam spros bral mkha' ltar dag pa la | kun rdzob rten 'byun tshogs snan sgyu ma ltar |.
33 Theg pa spyi bcins, p. 27.12.
34 Theg pa spyi bcins, p. 29.4-7: bden gnis dbyer med ces kyan bya | byan sems dbyer med ces kyan bya | dbyer med lhun grub ces kyan bya || zun 'jug chen po ces kyan bya | mnam rdzogs chen po ces kyan bya |.
35 The bsTan pa'i sgron me is described in Martin 1997: 38, no. 40.
36 bsTan pa'i sgron me, p. 226.6-227.6; Karmay 1988: 184, n. 49.
37 bsTan pa'i sgron me, p. 18.3-19.1.
38 lDe'u chos 'byun, p. 182.3-4. For a description of the lDe'u chos 'byun, see Martin 1997: 44, no. 55.
39 lDe'u chos 'byun, p. 182.12-13: sans rgyas 'byun ba'i ran gi sems bde bar gsegs pa'i snin po can |; p. 183.8-10: bde gsegs snin po skad pa | ran gi sems sans rgyas


In the fourteenth century, Klon-chen-pa offered one of the most sophisticated interpretations of the TG theory in Tibet, and it has since served as the standard for the later rNin-ma interpretations. Although he assessed TG quite positively, he did not deviate from the rDzogs-chen concept of emptiness beyond all extremes. Of the rNin-ma scholars after Klon-chen-pa, some tended to lean more towards the Last Cycle of the Buddha's teachings (dealing with TG) whereas others attempted to balance the Middle and Last Cycles. However, to the best of my knowledge, no rNin-ma scholar has ever considered only one of these two Cycles as purely definitive by dismissing the other as purely provisional. The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century rNin-ma interpretations of TG can be found in the writings of scholars such as Lochen Dharma-sri (1654-1717), particularly in his dPag bsam sne ma (composed in 1708), Kah-thog Tshe-dban-nor-bu (1698-1755) and 'Jigs-med-glin-pa (1730-1798). The rNin-ma understanding of TG in the nineteenth century is documented in the works of dPal-sprul Rin-po-che (1808-1887), rGyal-sras gZan-phan-mtha'-yas (b. 1800) and rDzogs-chen mKhan-po Padma-badzra (1806?-1884).40

The interpretation of TG by Mi-pham is a landmark in the rNin-ma history. Mi-pham's line of interpretation was continued by his direct and indirect disciples, notably, mKhan-po Kun-bzan-dpal-ldan or Kun-dpal (1872-1943), Ze-chen-rgyal-tshab 'Gyur-med Padma-rnam-rgyal (1871-1926), Kah-thog mKhan-po Nus-ldan-mkhyen-btse'i-blo-gros,41 Bod-sprul mDo-snags-bstan-pa'i-ni-ma (1900/1907-1959) and Glag-bla bSod-nams-chos-'grub (1862-1944). The most recent rNin-ma interpretations of TG can be found in writings such as the bsTan pa'i rnam gzag by bDud-'joms 'Jigs-bral-ye-ses-rdo-rje and in several works by Dil-mgo mKhyen-brtse.

4. The Contour of the rNin-ma Interpretations of TG Doctrine There may be indeed anomalous interpretations of the TG theory within the rNin-ma school that need to be studied closely. In this regard, the interpretation of TG doctrine by rNin-ma scholars such as su rtogs pa la bya'o | gsal ston gnis med dam | bde ba gsal ba mi rtogs [= rtog] pa gsum du ses pa de | bde bar gsegs pa'i snin po'o |. 40 The dates for mKhan-po Padma-badzra are in accord with those given in the rNam thar nun nu (p. 8.17-13.8) composed by dBan-chen-dar-rgyas.


41 Kah thog lo rgyus, p. 151.1-20; cf. Legs-bsad-'byor-ldan, ibid., p. 149.19150.21. The rNin-ma Interpretations of the Tathagatagarbha Theory


Kah-thog Rig-'dzin Tshe-dban-nor-bu (1698-1755) — who was responsible for revitalising the gzan ston doctrine42 and for converting Si-tu Chos-kyi-'byun-gnas (1699-1776)43 into a gzan ston proponent - and Lochen Dharma-sri (1654-1717) can be of particular interest. I have not been able to study Tshe-dban-nor-bu's stance on the issue.44 As for Dharma-sri's evalution of TG, it is so positive that it might even seem to convey the impression that he was a gzan ston exponent.45 In general, the understanding of emptiness (or “freedom from manifoldness”) seems to directly affect the way in which TG is understood. For example, I have come to see that even amongst rNin-ma authors, those who understand the “freedom from manifoldness” of the Middle Cycle as the “indivisibility of the two truths” have a balanced approach towards the Last and Middle Cycles whereas those who understand the “emptiness” of the Middle Cycle as “mere emptiness” tend to tilt con

42 See Smith 2001: 20-21. 43 Si tu'i ran rnam, p. 266.7-267.2; 'Das rjes rnam thar, p. 726.7-727.2; Smith 2001: 20, 90. However, compare Si-tu's bKa' 'gyur dkar chag (p. 68.8-75.2) where he discusses the issue of definitive and provisional meaning. 44 Cf., however, Smith 2001: 265, where Kon-sprul's view of gzan ston doctrine is contrasted with that of Kah-thog Tshe-dban-nor-bu. Whether Tshe-dban-nor-bu's interpretation of TG theory is identical with that of Dol-po-pa is yet to be seen. 45 However, unlike Dol-po-pa, Lo-chen Dharma-sri considered the Middle Cycle to be of definitive meaning even though “a mixture of definitive and provisional meaning” or “of temporary definitive meaning” and the Last Cycle to be of definitive meaning (dPag bsam sne ma, fol. 138a4-6: bar tha gnis dran nes gan yin la bzed pa mi mthun pa man yan | bar pa nes don dan phyi ma dran don du gsal bar ston pa'i mdo sde'i lun med cin | nad pa'i sman dan yi ge slob pa'i dpe'i dgons don dan yan 'gal bas | ran lugs ni bar pa dran nes phyed ma'am gnas skabs pa'i nes don dan | tha ma nid nes don du 'dod de |). Particularly noteworthy is his attempt to resolve the apparent tension between Klon-chen-pa's description of Prasangika-Madhyamaka as the pinnacle of the non-tantric systems on the one hand and his positive evaluation and emphasis of the TG doctrine of the Last Cycle on the other, by explaining them to be of two different cases, namely, (a) “the case of identifying by means of study, [the view that] has to be ascertained” (thos pas gtan la dbab bya nos 'dzin pa'i skabs) and (b) “the case of [actually] ascertaining [it] by means of practice [and] experience” (sgom pa nams myon gis gtan la 'bebs pa'i skabs), respectively (dPag bsam sne ma, fol. 184b2-185a2). Some later rNin-ma scholars such as Bod-sprul who preferred Mi-pham's balanced approach were apparently certainly ill at ease with those rNin-ma interpretations that came dangerously close (from the perspective of the ran ston exponents) to that of Dol-po-pa's ('Jam dbyans dgons rgyan, p. 93.4-7).


siderably towards the Last Cycle and thus appear to come precariously close to Dol-po-pa's interpretation. Hence, the prominence rNin-ma scholars give to the Middle and Last Cycles seems to depend on how they understand emptiness. Mi-pham seems to be one of those scholars who made great effort to counterbalance the tendentially increasing weight given to the Last Cycle, by emphasising the “indivisibility of the two truths,” which according to him is also accentuated by Prasangika-Madhyamikas. One may say that in general the rNin-ma-pas throughout their history seem to have had either a balanced approach to the Middle and Last Cycles or tended to tilt towards the Last Cycle, though hardly ever to the degree Dol-po-pa does. The weight was also seldom concentrated only on the Middle Cycle by a total removal of weight from the Last Cycle. However, in spite of the increasing tendency to evaluate TG positively, the main-stream rNin-ma-pas generally never went so far as to interpret it as a “hypostatic existence” (bden par grub pa). Their interpretation of the TG teaching has been consistent with the following ideas expressed in the Man nag lta phren attributed to Padmasambhava, which probably presents a collection of extracts from various Mahayana scriptures:46

All phenomena are intrinsically empty (svabhavasunya).
All phenomena are primordially pure.
All phenomena are completely luminous.
All phenomena are by nature [characterised by] nirvana.
All phenomena are perfectly awakened from the beginning.47

This synthesis of ideas seems to have guided the rNin-ma scholars, particularly Klon-chen-pa and Mi-pham, to accept the positive theory of the TG even as the Prasangika-Madhyamaka came to be regarded by them as the pinnacle of the sutra systems,48 and the notion of “free 46 These do not seem to be exact quotes, but rather paraphrases. Ron-zom-pa (lTa phren 'grel pa, p. 340.6) explains these lines as “occurring in miscellaneous scriptural authorities” (lun thor bu rnams nas 'byun ba). 47 Man nag lta phren, fol. 416a8-417a2: chos thams cad ni no bo nid kyis ston pa'o | chos thams cad ni gzod ma nas rnam par dag pa'o | chos thams cad ni yons kyis 'od gsal ba'o | chos thams cad ni ran bzin gyis mya nan las 'das pa'o | chos thams cad ni ye nas mnon par rdzogs par sans rgyas pa'o zes gsuns so |. Cf. also the Theg chen tshul 'jug, p. 450.11-13. 48 See the Yid bzin mdzod, p. 55.3; Yid bzin mdzod 'grel, Vol. warn, p. 643.2-4; Theg mchog mdzod, vol. e, fol. 64b1-2 & 64b4-5 and Grub mtha' mdzod, p. 108.45. Mi-pham too saw the view of Prasangika-Madhyamaka as the highest in the sutra system (bKa' brgyad rnam bsad, p. 35.4-5; Yid bzin grub bsdus, p. 483.3). The rNin-ma Interpretations of the Tathagatagarbha Theory


dom from manifoldness” as identical with the rDzogs-chen notion of “primordial purity” (ka dag).49 According to Ron-zom-pa, the Madhya-maka notion of “absolute reality” is also shared by the Vajrayana system. He states:50 As for the Madhyamikas, [they] maintain that even mind is in reality no real entity and that from the highest perspective, all phenomena are primordially unborn, without essential nature and are characterised by the pacification of all [extremes of] manifoldness. Also the position of the tantric treatises [regarding] the characteristics of absolute reality is similar to that [of the Madhyamaka system].51

49 According to Klon-chen-pa, the rDzogs-chen approach of establishing “freedom from extremes” is to a great extent similar to that of the Prasangika-Madh-yamaka (Chos dbyins mdzod 'grel, fol. 76b1-2: ran bzin rdzogs pa chen po 'di'i lugs kyis mtha' bral la sogs pa'i mjal tshul phal cher dbu ma thal 'gyur dan mtshuns pa las | dbu mar ston ston po nam mkha' 'dra ba rtsis gzir byed pa ste | 'dir ni rig pa ka nas dag pa rjen zan ne ba ma grub la mi 'gag pa tsam de la gzir byas nas | de dan de'i nan las sar ba'i chos rnams mtha' grol nam mkha' ltar 'jal ba ste |). Likewise, Mi-pham does not distinguish between the “freedom from manifoldness” established by Prasangika-Madhyamaka and the “primordial purity” established by the rDzogs-chen system (see the Nes ses sgron me, p. 88.6-89.1: ka dag bdar sa chod pa la | thal 'gyur lta ba mthar phyin dgos | spros bral tsam gyi cha nas ni || de gnis khyad par med do gsun |; the dBu ma rgyan 'grel, p. 46.3-4). Cf. also the Nes ses sgron me, p. 119.6: spros bral dbu ma chen po dan | 'od gsal rdzogs pa chen po gnis || don gcig min gi rnam grans te | de las lhag pa'i lta ba med | (cf. the English translation of this verse in Pettit 1999a: 237). See also the Nes ses sgron me, p. 84.6: rdzogs chen yod min med min ni | mtha' bzi'i spros dan bral ba yin | (Pettit 1999a: 205).

50 lTa ba'i brjed byan, p. 9.21-24: dbu ma pa ni yid kyan don dam par rdzas su med de yan dag par na chos thams cad gdod ma nas ma skyes pa no bo nid med pa | spros pa thams cad ne bar zi ba'i mtshan nid du 'dod do | gsan snags kyi gzun yan don dam pa'i mtshan nid de dan mthun par 'dod de |. See also the lTa ba'i brjed byan, p. 20.22-21.2 and lTa phren 'grel pa, p. 321.7-9: dbu ma pas rten cin 'brel te 'byun ba'i tshul rtogs pas ni | ran rig pa' de nid kyan | rgyu dan 'bras bu'i dnos po'i bdag nid thob pa' myed par rtogs te | spros pa thams cad las yons su 'das par rtogs so ||. See also ibid., p. 20.16-18. 51 Ron-zom-pa, however, sees the Madhyamaka notion of “freedom from manifoldness” as a strength but its inability to dispense with the concept of “true conventionalreality (tathyasamvrti) as a weakness which hinders its proponents from establishing the equality (mnam pa nid) of all phenomena (Theg chen tshul 'jug, p. 476.17-21).


5. TG iN THE WRiTiNGS oF Ron-ZoM-PA, KLon-CHEN-PA AND Mi-PHAM Before we evaluate the rNin-ma stance on the TG doctrine in India and Tibet, let us briefly look at how much the three scholars upon whom I rely were themselves concerned with the theory. The term TG does not appear in any of the titles of works attributed to Ron-zom-pa.52 Nevertheless, he discusses the term and concept of TG in several of his extant writings such as the dKon mchog 'grel, Dam tshig mdo rgyas and Theg chen tshul 'jug.53 In the dKon mchog 'grel, he explains the term *sugatagarbha (= TG) in the following manner:54 [Being endowed with] *sugatagarbha is, as commonly known, maintained to be the sentient beings' possessing of the cause for awakening [or their] possessing of the seed of non-tainted [[[phenomena]]]. According to the profound [system], the very nature of the mind being awakened, it is [called] the Awakened [= Buddha] Nature.55

In particular, Ron-zom-pa's Ran byun ye ses seems to be, at least in content, a treatise on the TG theory from a tantric perspective.56 Just as the Ratnagotravibhaga seeks to establish that all sentient beings possess TG, the Ran byun ye ses seeks to “show that the ordinary minds of worldly sentient beings (prthagjana) possess ‘self-occurring gnosis'” (so so skye bo'i tha mal pa'i ses pa ran byun gi ye ses can du ston pa).57 52 See Ron-pa Me-dpun's list of Ron-zom-pa's writings in Almogi 1997: 242-248 (Appendix A); Almogi 2002: 75-80.

53 The term TG or rather its semantically equivalent terms can be found explicitly mentioned in several of Ron-zom-pa's writings. For examples, see the dKon mchog 'grel, p. 81.17-18 (sems can gyi sems ran byun gi ye ses kyi snin po can yin pa); ibid., p. 127.13 (bde bar gsegs pa'i snin po); Dam tshig mdo rgyas, p. 370.10 (de bzin gsegs pa'i snin po can); ibid., p. 382.12 (byan chub kyi snin po can); gSun thor bu, p. 107.1 (sems can thams cad byan chub kyi snin po can); ibid., p. 111.22-23 (so so skye bo'i tha mal pa'i ses pa ran byun gi ye ses can du ston pa); Grub mtha'i brjed byan, p. 220.8 (ye nas byan chub kyi snin po can); Theg chen tshul 'jug, p. 545.1-14; and Rab gnas cho ga, p. 181.19-20 ('gro ba ris drug tha mal pa thams cad ni | byan chub kyi snin po can gyi ran bzin yin la |). 54 dKon mchog 'grel, p. 127.13-15: de la bde bar gsegs pa'i snin po zes bya ni | thun mon du grags pa sems can rnams byan chub kyi rgyu can zag med kyi sa bon dan ldan pa'o | zes 'dod do | zab mo ltar na sems kyi ran bzin nid byan chub yin pas byan chub kyi snin po'o |. 55 A similar explanation is also given in the Theg chen tshul 'jug, p. 545.1-14, where the term kun gzi (alaya) is explained according to both the common and uncommon Mahayana systems (Karmay 1988: 179; Schmithausen 1995: 335f.).

56 See the gSun thor bu, p. 111.21-130.6. 57 gSun thor bu, p. 111.22-23, 113.13. The rNin-ma Interpretations of the Tathagatagarbha Theory


Ron-zom-pa also states that he wrote this treatise specifically “so that [[[people]] can] grasp [this teaching on ‘self-occurring gnosis'] as being of definitive meaning” (nes pa'i don du bzun bar bya ba'i phyir).58 As already mentioned (cf. p. 178f.), the term *sugatagarbha (= TG) does occur in the rNin-ma tantras belonging to the Mahayoga, Anuyoga and Ati-yoga classes, if rather infrequently. Yet other terms such as “self-occurring gnosis” (ran byun gi ye ses: svayambhujnana) or bodhicitta (i.e., in its most absolute sense) are more prevalent or preferred in the early rNin-ma literature. One notices, however, that Ron-zom-pa's interests rest primarily on the tantric and particularly rDzogs-chen idea of “selfoccurring gnosis” and not directly on TG as such. For example, if Ron-zom-pa at all cites a TG sutra, he seems to do so only because it contains the term or idea of “self-occurring gnosis” and not because it propagates the TG theory. This may explain why he hardly cites TG sutras or passages containing the term TG. Thus, my impression is that he sought to interpret the TG theory in the light of “self-occurring gnosis” and not vice versa as was apparently the case with Dol-po-pa.

Klon-chen-pa is supposed to have written one general commentary on all five works of Maitreya, called the Rin chen them skas (including root-verses and auto-commentary), which unfortunately is lost.59 No commentary on the Ratnagotravibhaga is listed in the catalogues to Klon-chen-pa's works. However, a commentary on the Ratnagotravibha-ga has recently been discovered; it was authored by a certain Blo-gros-mtshuns-med and has the title Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i bstan bcos kyi nes don gsal bar byed pa'i rin po che'i sgron me (= Rin chen sgron me). Some Tibetan scholars have, since the appearance of the commentary, assumed Blo-gros-mtshuns-med to be Klon-chen-pa. I have not yet seen any argumentation supporting the attribution of the Rin chen sgron me to Klon-chen-pa or for considering this Blo-gros-mtshuns-med (there is said to have been more than one author at around this time with the same name) and Klon-chen-pa to be one and the same person. The Rin chen sgron me is probably not penned by Klon-chen-pa.60 Nevertheless, Klon-chen-pa's presentation of the TG

58 See ibid., p. 119.6-8, 129.8-9. 59 See the Dad gsum 'jug nogs, p. 101.18-20 and the mThon ba don ldan, p. 214.7-9. 60 It seems that this attribution is based on the following faint similarities. (1) Doctrinally, like Klon-chen-pa, Blo-gros-mtshuns-med (the author of the commentary) explicitly interprets TG as having a definitive meaning. This is evident also from the title and the following remarks in the author's colophon: “Thus I


doctrine can be found in varying detail in his existing works, particularly in the Grub mtha' mdzod,61 Sin rta chen po,62 Yid bzin mdzod have taken this trouble to explain this treatise [i.e., the Ratnagotravibhaga] according to the scriptures containing a definitive meaning” (Rin chen sgron me, p. 678.12: de slad giun ’di nes don gsun rab biin || rnam par bkrol ba’i nal ba ’di byas so |). (2) Chronologically Klon-chen-pa and Blo-gros-mtshuns-med can be designated to the same period. If Bu-ston's discussion with this Blo-gros-mtshuns-med led him to write his De bzin gsegs pa'i snin po gsal zin mdzes par byed pa'i rgyan in 1359 (Seyfort Ruegg 1966: 152; 1973: 4-5, n. 3, 149, n. 2) and if Klon-chen-pa and Blo-gros-mtshuns-med were one and the same person, it would pose no chronological problems, for Klon-chen-pa (1308-1363) too was a contemporary of Bu-ston (12901364). (3) There is a vague similarity in the titles of the commentary by Blo-gros-mtshuns-med, the Rin po che'i sgron me, and Klon-chen-pa's lost general commentary (spyi don) on the so-called “Five Works of Maitreya” (byams chos sde lna) called Rin po che'i them skas. (4) There is also a certain similarity betweeen the personal names Blo-gros-mtshuns-med and Tshul-khrims-blo-gros (one of the several names of Klon-chen-pa). (5) Both Blo-gros-mtshuns-med and Klon-chen-pa studied in gSan-phu Ne'u-thog seminary. Thus, the above factors, coupled with the earnest desire to find lost works of Klon-chen-pa, may have caused the attribution of the commentary on the Ratnagotravibhaga to Klon-chen-pa. On the other hand, several factors indicate why Blo-gros-mtshuns-med and Klon-chen-pa could not have been one and the same person. (1) Klon-chen-pa referred to himself by way of different names in different works and his multiple names have all been recorded in his biography (Dad gsum 'jug nogs, p. 110.5-21). He personally mentioned his multiple names and gave reasons as to why a certain name was used in a certain context (Chos dbyins mdzod 'grel, fol. 209b1-6). If Blo-gros-mtshuns-med had indeed been one of Klon-chen-pa's names, one would expect to find it at least in one of these records. This, however, is not the case. It is of course possible that not all of his names were recorded. (2) Klon-chen-pa's lost Rin chen them skas is explicitly stated to be a general commentary to the “Five Works of Maitreya” whereas Blo-gros-mtshuns-med's Rin chen sgron me is said to elucidate the definitive meaning of the Ratnagotravibhaga only. A commentary on the Ratnagotravibhaga is not mentioned in the catalogues of Klon-chen-pa's writings. One cannot of course rule out the possibility that some of his works were not listed in the catalogue. (3) I am unable to detect any striking stylistic or terminological pecularity of Klon-chen-pa's in Blo-gros-mtshuns-med's Rin chen sgron me. Of course an author's style of writing does not always remain static, and we lack an indisputable commentary by Klon-chen-pa on a major Indian sastra with which we could compare the style and terminology of Blo-gros-mtshuns-med's commentary. (4) The commentary does not provide the names of any Tibetan teacher or work in the verses of obeisance (mchod brjod), the concluding verses (mjug rtsom) or the body of the work that might give us some hints regarding the author's rNin-ma affiliation. Although a conclusive statement cannot be made at this stage, my impression is that the commentary was most probably not written by Klon-chen-pa.

61 See the Grub mtha' mdzod, p. 161.3-190.2.

62 Sin rta chen po, Vol. na, p. 310.3-350.2.

The rNin-ma Interpretations of the Tathagatagarbha Theory


'grel,63 Sems ye brtag pa and Tshig don mdzod.64 References to TG or *sugatagarbha and closely associated ideas can also be found in several of his other writings.65 The most important works on the topic by Mi-pham are his annotated commentary to the Ratnagotravibhaga66 as well as his sTon thun sen ge’i na ro, gZan ston sen ge’i na ro and Nes ses sgron me. Mi-pham’s sTon thun sen ge'i na ro is actually a discourse on Ratnagotravibhaga 1.28, which presents the three logical arguments that seek to prove that all sentients beings possess Buddha Nature. The “official position” of the rNin-ma school on TG may be said to be spelled out in this work.67 The gZan ston sen ge’i na ro68 is a brief excursus on the doctrine of extrinsic emptiness. It seems to be merely the cornerstone for a larger work that Mi-pham had envisioned but did not develop on paper beyond 63 Yid bzin mdzod ’grel, Vol. e, p. 9.1-23.2 (chapter one), Vol. wam, fol. 151b1-155b5 (chapter eighteen). See also Yid bzin mdzod, p. 3.2-5.6, 70.5-75.1.

64 Tshig don mdzod, chapter two (sans rgyas kyi snin pos khyab tshul), fol. 40a6-45a3. Cf. Germano 1992: x & 78. 65 For examples, see his Phyogs bcu’i mun sel (fol. 57b5-58b2 & 316b3-318a6); Sin rta bzan po (particularly, p. 50.4-54.2); Chos dbyins mdzod ’grel, sGyu ma nal gso and Ran byun rdo rjer dri ba. 66 An annotated commentary (mchan 'grel), does not normally go into the details of doctrinal positions. Yet mKhan-po Kun-bzan-dpal-ldan, one of Mi-pham’s important students, who prepared the rGyud bla’i mchan ’grel for printing after his teacher’s death (colophon, p. 556.6-557.1), notes that Mi-pham’s rGyud bla’i mchan ’grel clearly presents his own position without falling into either of the extremes of “appearance” or “emptiness,” although he had used the Indian commentary on the Ratnagotravibhaga (attributed to Asanga) and Tibetan commentaries (on the same work) by Dol-po-pa (1292-1361), Thogs-med-bzan-po (12951369), Red-mda’-ba (1349-1412) and Ron-ston (1367-1449). See the compiler’s colophon, p. 554.5-555.3: de la spyir phyag mchan yod rigs rnams gan la gzigs pa'i rgya bod kyi 'grel pa rnams ran ran gi mjug tu gsal ba las 'dir yan | 'phags pa thogs med dan | dol po | rgyal sras thogs med | red mda' ba | ron ston rnams kyi 'grel pa phyag mchan du gsal na yan | dnos don du ran gar thad ka'i 'grel bar [= par] gan yod mchan du btab pa lta bu ma yin par rgyal tshab chen po nid kyi dgons par gan 'byor gyis | gnad don snin po snan ston phyogs su ma lhun ba'i ran lugs gsal por bkod 'dug par gzur gnas dpyod ldan rnams kyis 'grel pa de dag la zib par gzigs rtog mdzod dan gsal par [= bar] rtogs nes yod pa lags so |. 67 sTon thun sen ge’i na ro, p. 563-606.5. Unlike some of Mi-pham’s other works, the sTon thun sen ge’i na ro was revised by the author himself; he did this in 1891 (lcags [mo] yos), twenty-four years (lo skor tshar gnis) after it was first composed (see author’s colophon, sTon thun sen ge’i na ro, p. 606.1-5). 68 gZan ston sen ge’i na ro, p. 359-378.4.


some preparatory notes. There is neither an author's colophon nor mention of the date of composition. The verses of introduction and conclusion (thog tha'i tshigs su bcad pa rnams) were composed and inserted by Ze-chen-rgyal-tshab (1871-1926).69 Nothing is said about the title but it is probable that the title gZan ston khas len sen ge'i na ro too was assigned by him and not by Mi-pham.70 Although Mi-pham did not recognise the gzan ston view as such, he went on to defend it in his Dam chos dogs sel.71 One can find further references on the TG in Mi-pham's writings on Madhyamaka, Prajhaparamita and rDzogs-chen. His Nes ses sgron me is a rNin-ma classic in which the key doctrinal positions on the theory and praxis of the rNin-ma school including the issue of ran ston and gzan ston are clearly presented.72

69 'Jam-dbyans Blo-gros-rgya-mtsho alias Ze-chen-rgyal-tshab Padma-rnam-rgyal (1871-1926), who was largely responsible for the compilation of Mi-pham's works, reports (gZan ston sen ge'i na ro, colophon, p. 378.2): “[It is evident that Mi-pham] had prepared a brief [draft] merely as a seed [or] basis for [the actual] composition” (rtsom gzi'i sa bon tsam mdor bsdus gnan 'dug pa). Cf. Pettit 1999a: 427. 70 This work has already been translated into English. See Pettit 1999a: 415427. 71 See the Dam chos dogs sel, p. 369.3-375.2.

72 Nes ses sgron me, p. 71.1-123.5. The importance of the Nes ses sgron me is demonstrated by the number of commentaries written on it thus far. (1) The earliest commentary of the Nes ses sgron me is perhaps the Blo snan sgo 'byed (see bibliography) by mKhan-po Kun-bzan-dpal-ldan (1872-1943). Cf. Pettit 1999a: 462, n. 12. (2) The second commentary is by Kah-thog-mkhan-po Nus-ldan-mkhy-en-brtse'i-blo-gros (Kah thog lo rgyus, p. 151.15; Pettit 1999a: 8), which I have unfortunately not seen. (3) The third commentary called Nes ses rin po che'i sgron me'i rnam bsad 'od zer dri med is by Khro-chu 'Jam-dpal-rdo-rje (or simply 'Jam-rdor). The text was published by rNam-grol-glin Monastery, Mysore; a translation can be found in Pettit 1999a: 241-413. (4) The fourth commentary is by Khan-dmar Rin-chen-rdo-rje who served as the sixth abbot (between 1940 and 1943) of Khams-bye bSad-grwa at rDzon-gsar (rDzon gsar lo rgyus, p. 199.2): ljags rtsom | tshad ma rigs gter gsal byed dan mi pham nes ses sgron me'i 'grel pa sogs yod do |). I have not seen this work either. (5) The fifth and most recent commentary is by Slob-dpon Theg-mchog, a Bhutanese scholar currently based at rDo-grub Monastery in Gangtok. This commentary entitled Nes sgron san sbyar lha rna'i sgra (Pettit 1999a: 8, 462, n. 11), contains mainly citations from authoritative scriptures (lun) rather than logical argumentations (rigs pa). The rNin-ma Interpretations of the Tathagatagarbha Theory


6. Assessment of the rNin-ma Standpoint on the TG Theory


Louis de La Vallee Poussin seems to have been the first Western scholar to show that already in the Pali sources “rationalist” and “mystic” positions existed. Not only did the adherents of the two positions debate, but some sources also attempted to reconcile the two.73 Lambert Schmithausen has similarly distinguished two conceptions of liberation and awakening in early Buddhist canonical sources, designating them “positive-mystical” and “negative-intellectualist.”74 In the Tibetan context, Seyfort Ruegg has often used the terms “apophatic and negative” on the one hand and “cataphatic and positive” on the other to describe the ran ston and gzan ston theories, respectively.75 Thus, following Schmithausen's terminology, Indian Mahayana scriptures such as the Prajnaparamita and the Madhyamakascholastic corpus” (rigs tshogs) of Nagarjuna, said to belong to the Middle Cycle according to the Tibetan tradition, are “negative-intellectualist,” whereas the TG sutras and the “hymnic corpus” (bstod tshogs) attributed by the Tibetans to the same Nagarjuna are “positive-mystical.” But how do the Tibetans perceive these two trends in the Indian scriptures? Do they see them as incompatible and mutually exclusive, and thus opt for one by rejecting the other? Or do they choose one, not by rejecting but by allotting the other to a subordinate position, in the sense of Paul Hacker's “in-clusivism” as defined by Schmithausen?76 Or, do they reconcile and harmonise the two trends by considering them complementary?77


73 See de La Vallee Poussin 1936-37: 189ff. and Schmithausen 1981: 214. 74 Schmithausen 1981: 223-224, 247; Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 8-9, n. 6 & 9. 75 See, for instance, Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 10. 76 Whenever I speak of Paul Hacker's “inclusivism” I mean his theory of “inclusivism” as defined by Schmithausen, that is, as “a method of intellectual debate in which the competing doctrine, or essential elements of it, are admitted but relegated to a subordinate position, or given a suitable reinterpretation, and which aims not so much at reconciliation but at prevailing over the other doctrines or its propounders” (Schmithausen 1981: 223). This definition is also cited in Sey-fort Ruegg 1989: 9, n. 9. For more details on “inclusivism,” see Oberhammer 1983 and Halbfass 1995: 10-12.


77 Following Paul Hacker's theory of “inclusivism” as defined by Schmit-hausen, I distinguish the “inclusivistic” approach from the “reconciliatory” or “harmonising” approach and consider them to be diametrically opposed to each other. Thus, a tradition that attempts to reconcile ran ston and gzan ston doctrines by treating them as equal and complementary is said to follow a “reconciliatory” or “harmonising” approach whereas a tradition that subordinates either one by interpreting it to have only a provisional sense, is said to follow an “inclusivistic” approach.


One may say that the Jo-nan-pas have followed the “positive-mystical” trend and the main-stream Sa-skya-pas the “negative-intellectualist” one, and that both of them have taken an “inclusivistic” approach in Paul Hacker's sense. That is, the teachings of “intrinsic emptiness” of the Middle Cycle are admitted by the Jo-nan-pas but are relegated to a subordinate position in being considered to be of provisional mean-ing,78 and similarly, the teaching of TG of the Last Cycle is admitted by the main-stream Sa-skya-pas but relegated to a subordinate position in being considered to be of provisional meaning, at least in the context of establishing the view according to the sutra system.79 Furthermore, it could appear that mKhas-grub-rje, who speaks for the main-stream dGe-lugs-pas, attempts to reconcile and harmonise these two currents. But what he

actually attempted was to offer a reductionistic reinterpretation of the teaching of TG by emptying it of its contents such as the attributed inherent excellent Buddha qualities and refilling it with the mere absence of a “hypostatic existence” (bden par grub pa) of the mind, while still retaining the term TG. It is true that mKhas-grub-rje did not denounce or downgrade the doctrine of TG. He even considered Mahayana scriptures such as the Tathagatagarbhasutra to be similar to or consistent (phyogs mthun) with the scriptures of the Middle Cycle (such as the Prajnaparamita sutras) and as containing a definitive meaning. The purport of the Ratnagotravibhaga - which is said to mainly explain the purport of Mahayana sutras such as the Tathagata-garbhasutra - is considered by him to be or “exist as a prasangika

78 Dol-po-pa subordinates the ran ston teaching of the Middle Cycle in two ways: (a) The impermanent conventional phenomena (including even those belonging to the path) taught as ran ston in the Middle Cycle are factual (don la gnas). But this ran ston is, according to him (Ri chos, p. 155.10-12), kun rdzob ran ston (or kun rdzob ston nid) and does not meet the standards of what he calls don dam gzan ston (or don dam ston nid), because only what is absolute can be gzan ston and only what is gzan ston can be absolute (ibid., p. 308.12-15). (b) Permanent and absolute phenomena are actually gzan ston and hence of definitive meaning. Hence, teachings of the Middle Cycle such as “dharmadhatu is empty of dharmadhatu” (chos kyi dbyins ni chos kyi dbyins kyis ston) should be interpreted in a provisional sense (Ri chos, p. 279.6-9: 'khor lo bar ba'i [= pa'i] gzun gzan dan gzan du yan | ran ston ma yin pa la ran ston du gsuns pa thams cad dran don dgons pa can nid du khon du chud par bya ste | legs par rnam par phye ba'i man nag thun mon ma yin pa'i sgron me la brten nas so |). See also ibid., p. 284.9-16. Cf. Stearns 1999: 3. 79 sDom gsum rab dbye, verses 1.138-142 in Rhoton 2002: 58 (translation), 285 (text). See also Stearns 1999: 269-270, n. 129 and Jackson 1987: 267, 336.


The rNin-ma Interpretations of the Tathagatagarbha Theory


purport” (dgons pa thal 'gyur du gnas).80 However, it turns out that for him TG is nothing but a specific cause (rgyu) of Buddhahood which he interprets as “the emptiness [of the mind], that is, the mind’s being empty of hypostatic existence” (sems bden par grub pas ston pa'i ston nid).81 Therefore, unlike Seyfort Ruegg who views this as a harmonisation of the two trends,82 I believe mKhas-grub-rje’s approach fulfils the definition of “inclusivism,” since, although he does not, at least in letter, subordinate the doctrine of TG, in spirit he has reduced it to the mere absence of “hypostatic existence” of the mind. Thus, in fact, all three - the main-stream Sa-skya-pas, the Jo-nan-pas and the mainstream dGe-lugs-pas - have sought to resolve the apparent tension between the “positive-mystical” and “negative-intellectualist” antitheses in Indian Buddhism by adopting an inclusivistic approach, but each has done so in a quite distinct manner.


How do the rNin-ma-pas deal with the Indian “positive-mystical” and “negative-intellectualist” currents, and with the ran ston and gzan ston issues in Tibet? They do so in two different manners, the first relating to the “positive-mystical” and “negative-intellectualist” currents, the second to the ran ston and gzan ston issues. In the former case, they attempt to reconcile and harmonise the “negative-intellectualist” current in India as represented by the Prajnaparamita literature and the Ma-dhyamaka “scholastic corpus” with the “positive-mystical” current as represented in the TG sutras, the “hymnic corpus” and in works such as the Ratnagotravibhaga and the Ratnagotravibhagavyakhya belonging to the Maitreya-Asanga complex. The contents of these two currents of Indian Buddhist teachings are not re-interpreted by them, nor is the content of one given a subordinate position by designating it as of provisional meaning. The excellent qualities attributed to the TG are also not reduced to mere absence of “hypostatic existence” but their teachings are accepted literally. For them, the difference between the 80 rGyud sde spyi rnam, p. 96.13-23: rgyud bla ma ... ran lugs la rje rin po che’i bzed pas | bka’ bar pa’i phyogs mthun gyi mdo | bde gsegs snin po’i mdo ... la sogs pa'i dgons pa gtso bor 'grel la | dgons pa thal 'gyur du gnas sin | 'phags pa thogs med kyis kyan thal ’gyur du bkral bar bzed ... |.


81 rGyud sde spyi rnam, p. 52.1-8: bde bar gsegs pa’i snin po ni | ... sems bden par grub pas ston pa’i ston nid de la sems kyi chos nid ran bzin rnam dag ces bya ste | de yan glo bur gyi dri ma dan ma bral ba’i gnas skabs kyi sems kyi chos nid ran bzin rnam dag de la bde bar gsegs pa’i snin po’am | ran bzin du gnas pa’i rigs | zes bya’o |. 82 See Seyfort Ruegg 1968: 506; Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 81.

two currents lies in the degree of emphasis. That is, the “negative-intel-lectualist” current emphasises the aspects of emptiness (ston pa'i cha), whereas the “positive-mystical” its aspect of luminosity (gsal ba'i cha). The teachings of emptiness and luminosity, being the two aspects of one reality,83 are both of definitive meaning.84 For example, Ron-zom-pa, while commenting on the terms gsan ba snin po, de kho na nid and nes pa contained in the longer title of the *Guhyagarbha, explains “reality” (de kho na nid) from both an ontological and epistemological point of view and considers both the ontological and epistemologicalreality” to be “definitive,” which he regards as “definitive meaning.”85


83 The theories of one universal ground (gzi), one vehicle or way (lam) and one goal ('bras bu) all seem to be based on the theory of one absolute reality, a doctrinal premise also accepted by the rNin-ma-pas. They therefore cannot and do not apply numerical or qualitative distinctions to absolute reality taught in the various systems of Mahayana (be it the TG School, Prasangika-Madhyamaka or the rDzogs-chen system) that explicate or presuppose the “indivisibility of the two truths.” Thus from the ontological perspective, the actual mtartha of the special Mahayana teachings is the “indivisibility of the two truths” regardless of what terminology (be it “TG” or “freedom from manifoldness”) one may employ to designate it. The “indivisibility of the two truths” is obviously equated by Ron-zom-pa with TG (gSun thor bu, p. 30.5-7): “Thus the mode of the indivisibility of the two truths or even the mode of the two truths accepted [by some] which is the pureness sphere of reality (dharmadhatuvisuddhi) should be considered to be the nature of all phenomena, namely TG” (de bas na bden pa gnis dbyer med pa'i tshul dan | bden pa gnis su 'dod pa'i tshul nid kyan | chos kyi dbyins rnam par dag pa gan yin pa de nid | de bzin gsegs pa'i snin po chos thams cad kyi ran bzin yin par gzun dgos so |). Klon-chen-pa (Yid bzin mdzod, p. 74.1-3) considered both “TG” and the “freedom from manifoldness” of the Prajnaparamita and Madhyamaka to be synonymous (min gi rnam grans). Similarly, Mi-pham explicitly equated TG with the indivisibility of the two truths in his Ketaka, p. 30.4: don du khams bde gsegs snin po'am yan dag pa'i mtha' chos kyi dbyins snan ston zun du 'jug pa'i de bzin nid. According to Mi-pham, the uniqueness of the Prasangika approach is that it seeks to establish the indivisibility of the two truths from the very outset (dKa' gnad ci rigs, p. 550.3: thal 'gyur bas bden gnis dbyer med kyi chos dbyins tha snad kun bral nid dan po nas gtan la 'beb par byed do |).


84 For Klon-chen-pa's statements, see the Sin rta chen po, Vol. na, p. 685.6-688.2. Mi-pham's theory of “conventional valid cognition based on pure perception” (dag pa'i gzigs pa la brten pa'i kun tu tha snad pa'i tshad ma), which can be traced back to certain ingenious ideas of Ron-zom-pa, is indispensable for resolving problems such as the apparent tension between the Middle and Last Cycles, and the difficulty in considering the epistemic gnosis to be of definitive meaning. However, these issue are beyond the scope of this article. 85 dKon mchog 'grel, p. 57.5-8: chos thams cad kyi de bzin nid ni rtag tu ji ltar [= lta] ba bzin nid de | 'di la 'gyur ba med pas de kho na nid ces bya'o | de rtogs pa'i The rNin-ma Interpretations of the Tathagatagarbha Theory

In addition, absolute reality, often referred to as “self-occurring gnosis,” is also considered to be of definitive meaning.86 The two currents are hence viewed as complementary.87 Nonetheless, in spite of this approach which may be seen as characteristic for the rNin-ma position as a whole, my impression is that Ron-zom-pa inclines more towards the ye ses kyan don mthun par skye ste | 'di la bslu ba med pas de kho na nid ces bya'o ||; ibid., p. 57.21-24: nes pa zes bya nes pa'i don te | 'di ltar rgyal ba rnams kyi dgons pa brgyud de dran ba'i tshul gyis 'gro ba chud mi gson pa'i thabs su gsuns pa lta bu tsam ma yin gyi | nid kyis ji ltar thugs su chud pa'i don skal ba ldan pa rnams la tshig gzugs por bstan pa yin pas nes pa zes bya'o |.


86 See the gSun thor bu, p. 119.5-7, which states: “Thus, even the mind (sems) of ordinary sentient beings possesses “self-occurring gnosis” (svayambhujnana). As for this teaching, [it] is not [an indirect] statement of intention (abhipraya) [i.e., of provisional meaning] but [is] taught in a straightforward manner and hence the purport too should be known to be definitive” (de ltar na so so skye bo tha mal pa'i ses pa'an ran byun gi ye ses can no | zes gsuns pa 'di'an dgons pa'i tshig ma yin te | gzugs por gsuns pa nid yin pas | don 'di yan mtshan nid pa yin par ses par bya'o ||). See also, ibid., p. 123.21-124.3.


87 Mi-pham often attempts to strike a balance between the views expressed in Nagarjuna's treatises and those of the Maitreya-Asanga complex. Nagarjuna is seen as the elucidator of the profound aspect (zab pa'i cha) and Asanga as the elucidator of the aspect of vastness (rgya che ba'i cha) of the Buddha's teachings. See the dBu ma rgyan 'grel, p. 13.6-14.1, 48.3-4; Nes ses sgron me, p. 82.5: klu sgrub lugs dan byams pa'i gzun | phan tshun bu ram sbran rtsi bzin |. See also the sTon thun sen ge'i na ro, p. 564.4-565.3: de yan ston pa bde bar gsegs pas gsun gi skabs la lar ston pa nid bstan pa'i sgo nas bde gsegs snin po'i no bo gsal bar mdzad | la lar stobs sogs kyi yon tan ye ldan du bstan pa'i cha nas bde bsegs snin po'i ran bzin gsal bar mdzad de | de gnis 'gal med zun du 'jug pa dgos kyan | bden gnis dbyer med pa'i gnad zab pa las sin tu zab pa la yid ches rned pa'i dban gis la las bde gsegs snin po no bos mi ston pa'i rtag par blta | la las ni ston rkyan tsam la bzun nas sku dan ye ses kyi yon tan 'bral med ye ldan du bzag tu med pa'i chad lta skur 'debs kyi phyogs la gnas par gyur .... |. And also ibid., p. 586.2-6: des na ’Ichor lo bar par bstan pa'i ston pa nid dan | tha mar bstan pa'i sku dan ye ses dag snan ston zun du chud par bya dgos pas | 'khor lo bar pa dan tha ma'i nes don gyi skor rnams dbye gsal [= bsal] med par gnis ka nes don du kun mkhyen klon chen rab 'byams kyis bzed pa 'di kho na ltar gzun bar bya ste | de gnis gcig nes don byas na gcig dran don bya dgos pa'i 'gal ba med pa ma zad | zun du tshogs par byas nas bde gsegs snin po de lta bu la rgyu rgyud kyi don du byas nas rdo rje theg pa'i man nag gi gnad 'byun bas sans rgyas kyi bstan pa de dag gnad gcig tu 'bab par ses par bya dgos sin | mthar thug gi don 'di la klu thogs rnam gnis sogs 'phags pa rnams dgons pa gcig ste chos dbyins bstod pa dan sems 'grel la sogs pa dan | rgyud bla ma'i 'grel pa sogs kyis gsal bar rtogs pa'i phyir ro ||. Further see the rGyud bla'i mchan 'grel, p. 371.5-372.4, 381.2-382.5; Tshig bdun rnam bsad, p. 321.6-323.5.

“negative-intellectualist” trend,88 Klon-chen-pa more towards the “positive-mystical” one,89 and Mi-pham towards reconciliation and harmonisation by striving to balance not only the two trends found in Indian Buddhist literature but also the views of Ron-zom-pa and Klon-chen-pa.90 The approach of the rNin-ma-pas to the issue of ran ston and gzan ston in Tibet, however, is for the most part “inclusivistic” (in Paul Hacker's sense). Both the position that views the TG as “hypostatically existent” or not essentially empty (no bo mi ston pa) and the position that views the TG as nihilistically empty (ston pa phyan chad) or denies its qualities are seen as untenable.91 For these scholars, it is of course true that a horse is empty of a cow and TG empty of adventitious impur


88 While Ron-zom-pa explicitly seeks to prove that even the ordinary mind of sentient beings is already characterised by the presence of “self-occurring gnosis” and while the philosophical and doctrinal features central to the TG theory are conspicuous in his writings on rDzogs-chen, he hardly mentions the excellent qualities spontaneously present at the level of the universal ground. However, since the “self-occurring gnosis” equated by him with TG or bodhicitta in the rDzogs-chen sense is said to undergo no change at the level of the universal ground (gzi), the path (lam) and the result ('bras bu), the knowledge we gain about his notion of the ultimate result, for which there exist sufficient materials, will help us understand his notion of TG too. In this regard, the study on the position of Ron-zom-pa (and other major early scholars) on whether gnosis exists at the stage of Bud-dhahood being currently conducted by Orna Almogi (University of Hamburg) will be of great interest.


89 Klon-chen-pa's interpretation of TG is by and large very positive and suggests that he was mainly combating a reductionistic interpretation of TG. His inclination towards the “positive-mystical” current seems to be the reason why he is often put in a line with Dol-po-pa (see above, n. 8).


90 Regarding the understanding of the stage of the Buddha (sans rgyas kyi sa), it is also the view of Rag-mgo-mchog-sprul, the current and twelfth throne-holder of Rag-mgo Monastery in Go-'jo in Khams, that Mi-pham harmonises Ron-zom-pa's notion of essence (no bo) “free from manifoldness” with Klon-chen-pa's notion of the aspect of luminous nature (ran bzin). See the Lun gi rgya mtsho, p. 376.4-6, which states: ran [= ron] zom chos kyi bzan pos no bo spros bral ka dag gi gnad bsad pa dan | kun mkhyen chen pos ran bzin 'od gsal lhun grub kyi gnad bsad pa dan | mi pham 'jam dpal dbyans kyis de gnis kyi gdons gnad gcig tu dril te 'chad tshul lo |.


91 sTon thun sen ge'i na ro, p. 567.2-4: bde bsegs snin po no bo mi ston pa'i bden grub brtag [= rtag?] pa dan | yon tan med pa'i ston pa phyan chad du 'dod pa gnis ka sgrub byed med la gnod byed mthon zin | no bo ston pa dan ran bzin yon tan ye ldan gyi snin po 'gro ba'i khams na yod pa la | gnod byed med cin sgrub byed yan dag yod par mthon no |. The rNin-ma Interpretations of the Tathagatagarbha Theory

ities and hence both “empty of other” (gzan ston), but this concept of emptiness is so obvious and banal that it has little to do with the Prajnaparamita or Madhyamaka notion of “freedom from manifoldness.” Thus, according to them, this notion of gzan ston does not fulfil the criterion of emptiness (ston go mi chod), that is, the Madhyamaka notion of emptiness, and realisation of such an emptiness is of no so-teriological relevance or value.92 For example, Ron-zom-pa, explaining the expression “by nature utterly mysterious” (no bo nid kyis rab tu gsan

ba) appearing in the *Guhyagarbha, states that all phenomena are by nature empty (no bo nid kyis ston pa) but this fact remains a mystery as a result of one mistaking them to be empty of other (gzan gyis ston pa). Although Ron-zom-pa's expression gzan gyis ston pa is not terminological, it does suggest that the concept of such an emptiness was considered by him to be deficient or erroneous.93 Likewise, ran ston in the sense of “absence of hypostatic existence” is for the rNin-ma-pas a mere emptiness (ston rkyan), and thus can neither be the kind of ultimate emptiness established by the Madhyamikas94 nor be equate

92 However, it is also important to look at this issue from Dol-po-pa's perspective. According to him, ran ston does not meet the standards of the actual emptiness (Ri chos, p. 155.10-12), just as gzan ston (for his opponents) does not meet the standards of the actual emptiness. 93 dKon mchog 'grel, p. 127.5-7: chos thams cad no bo nid kyis ston pa yin pa la | gzan gyis ston par mthon nas ji ltar snan ba ran gi no bo nid kyis stons par ma rtogs pas no bo nid kyis rab tu gsan no |. See the Nes ses sgron me, p. 77.1: spyir na gzan gyis ston pa de | ston go nes par mi chod de | rta la ba lan ma grub kyan | rta de ston bar [= par] ga la nes | (see also Pettit 1999a: 197-198). See also sTon thun sen ge'i na ro, p. 590.3: ran gi no bo ma ston na chos gzan gyis ston pa yod kyan ston go mi chod de |. For details, see ibid., p. 589.4-591.4 and gSun sgros, p. 437.6-438.1: chos ran nos nas ma ston pa chos gzan gyis ston pa ni 'jig rten pa'i ston tshul yin gyi don dam rnal 'byor pa'i spyod yul ga la yin ste | bum pa yod pa dan | de la snam bu med pa | gnag gi rwa yod dan | de sten ri bon gi rwa med pa lta bus | kun rdzob tu yod pa'i chos rnams ston pa'i go ga la chod |.

94 According to Mi-pham, what a Prasangika-Madhyamika like Candrakirti seeks to establish is “freedom from manifoldness” or the “indivisibility of the two truths,” and he does this by eliminating the last shreds of clinging to the duality or separateness of the two truths (dBu ma rgyan 'grel, p. 62.6). Mistaking the mere absence of “hypostatic existence” for the ultimate emptiness is, according to Mi-pham, like mistaking apes in the forest for celestial beings (sTon thun sen ge'i na ro, p. 570.5-571.2). Klon-chen-pa as well does not recognise the mere emptiness or absence of self as the final emptiness (Sin rta chen po, Vol. na, p. 330.6-331.1: khyed kyi bdag med pa dan | ston pa nid la zen pa'an bdag dan mi ston pa'i gnen po tsam yin gyi | nes pa'i don ni ma yin te |; ibid., p. 332.6-333.2: 'di ltar ston pa nid kyan snan ba'i chos can snan dus nid nas gcig dan du mar 'dzin pa'i spros pas ston pa dan |


with TG.95 For them, the notions of ran ston and gian ston are in the first place merely indicative of two different modes of enquiry, namely, “non-implicative negation” (med dgag) and “implicative negation” (ma yin dgag), or “negation and assertion” (dgag sgrub), which are possible and relevant only in the domain of conceptual thought. Primordial reality as such is, for them, beyond the notions of ran ston and gian ston, beyond “exclusion” and “inclusion,” beyond negation and assertion, beyond elimination and establishment (bsal giag).96 In this way, the rNin-ma-pas relegate the notions of both ran ston and gian ston to a subordinate position. Therefore, from this perspective, they can neither be designated as exponents of the position of gian ston nor as exponents of that of ran ston. Yet as a method of enquiry, the rNin-ma-pas, according to Mi-pham, prefer the method of “non-implicative negation” which is indicative of ran ston, and thus, from the viewpoint of methodology, they are exponents of the position of ran ston.97


ran ran gi no bos ston pa me lon gi gzugs brnan lta bu la brjod kyi | mthar thams cad ci yan med pa dan dan po dan da lta med pa nid ’khrul par snan ba ltar ma yin te |).

95 sTon thun sen ge'i na ro, p. 567.5-572.2, 591.4-593.4. Moreover, for Mi-pham the notion of an impermanent or conditioned TG is unacceptable. See ibid., p. 593.4600.3. 96 See the Nes ses sgron me, p. 75.2-3: de gnis blo yis brtag [= btags?] pa tsam | don la gnis kar [= ka?] khas mi len | dgag sgrub gnis dan bral ba yi | blo ’das gdod ma’i chos nid yin |, and also ibid., p. 119.2: med dgag ma yin dgag sogs dan | tha dad dan ni snan ston sogs | ris su chad pa med pa ste |. Cf. ibid., p. 111.3-4: dgag sgrub spros kun bral bas na | gnas lugs don biin chos kun kyan | khas blan rigs pas min [= mi?] grub phyir | gan du khas ni len mi byed | (Pettit 1999a: 196); dBu ma rgyan 'grel, p. 271.2-3.


97 Ron-zom-pa (Theg chen tshul 'jug, p. 458.19ff.), when discussing the rDzogs-chen perception of “deceptive appearances” (’khrul snan), explains that the rD-zogs-chen system neither denies the “appearance” (snan ba) as such nor does it hold that it possesses any defining characteristic (mtshan nid). Nobody, according to him, would dispute about the obviousness of “appearance” and hence it is not an issue of philosophical debates (ibid., p. 459.1-2: thun mon gi dban po’i mthun snan ’di la snan mi snan ni su’an mi rtsod do). The philosophical debate is about whether there is anything behind the facade of “appearance” and if so what. In other words, the philosophical debate is about the “being” (yin pa) and “existence” (yod pa) of the “characteristics” of “appearance” (ibid., p. 461.2: de’i mtshan nid ji ltar yin pa dan ji ltar yod pa la rtsod do). He then explains how various philosophical systems use the “mode of four [kinds of] negation and assertion” (dgag sgrub bii’i tshul) to establish one's own philosophical position and refute the philosophical positions of others. When discussing the Madhyamaka approach of “establishment” and “elimination,” he states that the Madhyamikas do not propose an implicative negation (ma yin dgag pa). See ibid., p. 465.2-5: de la dbu ma’i tshul The rNin-ma Interpretations of the Tathagatagarbha Theory


Yet the approach of the rNin-ma-pas to the Tibetan issue of ran ston and gzan ston is not always “inclusivistic.” It may be regarded to a limited degree as reconciliatory as well. Klon-chen-pa often speaks about the harmony among the various Tibetan traditions98 as does Mi-pham. Even though Mi-pham obviously found the position of the Jo-nan-pas as well as that of the dGe-lugs-pas rather radical, he attempted to reconcile these seemingly irreconcilable positions.99 According to him, it is only in their approaches, and not in their intended goal that the Jo-nan-pas and the dGe-lugs-pas differ. Mi-pham viewed the difference between the Jo-nan emphasis on the positive aspect and the dGe-lugs stress on the negative aspect as a difference in the strategies (thabs: upaya) employed to argumentatively establish (sgrub) nirvana and eliminate (joms) samsara, respectively.100 Modern scholars such as Schmithausen and Seyfort Ruegg would designate these approaches via eminentiae and via negationis, respectively, both to be traced already in


las | ji ltar rnal 'byor spyod pa rnams kyis don dam pa'i mtshan nid du yod pa dan yin par lta ba de dag ni | kun du [= tu] brtags [= btags?] pa ste gtan myed do zes myed par 'gegs par byed | ma yin par dgag par [= pa?] bsgrub par bya ba'i don dam pa ni dbu ma pa mi sgrub bo | and also the Nes ses sgron me, p. 75.3: ston tshul kho nar bsams nas ni | dri na med dgag nid yin te | (for the English translation, see Pettit 1999a: 196).

98 Hookham 1991: 136. 99 Mi-pham's attempt to reconcile the two positions that appear to be diametrically opposed has also been correctly noted in Dreyfus 2003: 321.

100 dBu ma rgyan 'grel, p. 72.2-4: 'on kyan med pa dan yod pa'i phyogs re re rtsal du bton pa'i gzun rnams kyan kun non phyogs 'joms pa dan | rnam byan phyogs sgrub pa'i thabs mkhas khyad par ba yin kyan | mthar thug gi gnas lugs la de kho na ltar sgrub pa ni ma yin te | dper na | srid pa'i sdug bsnal la 'jigs pa'i yid dan | zi ba la dga' ba'i yid gnis | las dan po pas bskyed dgos pa yin kyan | byan sems bdag nid chen po rnams kyis srid zi mnam pa nid du gzigs pa'i skabs na | 'khor 'das la 'jigs sred kyan span dgos pa bzin no ||. Cf. Schmithausen 1981: 214, for the following observation on an attempt made in early Buddhism to establish a psychologically plausible relation between the content of

liberating insight and its effect: “For it is clear that in principle there are two possibilities (admitting of course of the possibility of the two being combined): in a psychologically plausible process, the cessation of Craving could be achieved either by realizing the negative, disgusting character of mundane existence (i.e., by realizing duhkhasatya), or by realizing the positive, peaceful or blissful character of the cessation of mundane existence (i.e., Nirvana, which could easily, and in fact has, become the meaning of ‘ni-rodhasatya'). In fact we can find, in the canonical texts, two further types of descriptions or theories of Liberating Insight, each exactly corresponding to one of these two possibilities.”


Indian Mahayana Buddhism.101 I do not think that Mi-pham's harmonising attempt was merely a tactful strategy intended to obscure or erase the existing differences. Although often ignored by both the parties, Mi-pham indeed saw a common element upon which they could agree. According to him, Dol-po-pa had accepted the idea that reality as experienced in meditative equipoise is free from manifoldness.102 Hence, if what one experiences in meditative equipoise is indeed ultimate reality, then even for Dol-po-pa, the highest reality is “freedom from manifoldness.”

Dol-po-pa indeed explicitly states that in the meditative state (mnam bzag) one abides in the state of “freedom from manifoldness” in accordance with the Middle Cycle and then in the post-meditative state (rjes thob) distinctions are made according to the Last Cycle and Vajrayana.103 Similarly, according to Tson-kha-pa, so long as one holds the “appearances [of phenomena characterised by] dependent origination” (snan ba rten 'byun) and their emptiness (ston pa) apart, one has not yet perfected one's view. One's view becomes only then perfect when the “appearances” [of phenomena] and their “emptiness” are perceived simultaneously. This idea of Tson-kha-pa's was used by Mi-pham to argue that also Tson-kha-pa understood ultimate reality to be characterised by the “union of appearance and emptiness” (snan ston zun 'jug) and not by mere absence of “hypostatic existence” as emphasised by most of Tson-kha-pa's interpreters.104 This “union of 101 See Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 42-43.

102 dBu ma rgyan 'grel, p. 71.5-6: rtogs pa'i dban phyug dol po pas kyan | rjes thob san 'byed pa'i ses rab kyis dpyad tshe | mthar 'bras sku dan ye ses kyi ran bzin bde gsegs snin po nid rtag brtan zi ba g.yun drun gi bdag nid mi bslu ba'i bden pa dam pa yin cin | mnam gzag [= bzag?] la zlo ba'i tshe na spros pa kun bral bsgom par gsuns pa'an sin tu gnad zab cin |.


103 Ri chos, p. 138.20-139.1: de'i phyir 'khor lo tha ma gnis dan | rdo rje theg pa'i don gcig mod kyi nams su len pa na | la zlo ba chos nid zab mo la 'khor lo bar ba [= pa] dan mthun par rtog med spros bral du mnam par bzag nas | rjes thob san 'byed pa'i tshe chos rnams la yan dag par so sor rtog pa na 'khor lo tha ma dan rdo rje theg pa las gsuns pa bzin du legs par rnam par phye ste no sprad na theg pa chen po'i gsun rab thams cad kyi don zab mo nams su len pa tshan [= tshan la] ma nor zin yons su dag pa nid du 'gyur ro |. See also ibid., p. 255.8-13, 259.20-261.21, 337.21-24. 104 Mi-pham's attitude toward Tson-kha-pa was a mixture of ambivalence and conciliatoriness. Mi-pham often argued that Tson-kha-pa's ultimate view was that of “freedom from manifoldness” or the “union of emptiness and appearance of dependent origination (praMtyasamutpada).” See the Rab gsal brgal lan, p. 289.6290.1, 416.5-418.6, 420.2-421.4. However, it should also be noted that Mi-pham is somehow more conciliatory toward Tson-kha-pa's views than towards those of most dGe-lugs interpreters, with few exceptions such as lCan-skya Rol-pa'i-rdo-rje The rNin-ma Interpretations of the Tathagatagarbha Theory 201


appearance and emptiness” is, for Mi-pham, identical with “freedom from manifoldness.” Thus, according to him, both Dol-po-pa and Tson-kha-pa, like many other Indian and Tibetan scholars and sages, were referring to one and the same absolute truth upon which, ironically, both vehement disputes and reconciliation hinged.105


7. CoNCLUSioN


To conclude, let me summarise in a few sentences the rNin-ma position on the doctrine of TG by pointing out its similarities and dissimilarities with other Tibetan interpretations. The rNin-ma-pas seem to agree fully with the Sa-skya-pas in their understanding of “freedom from manifoldness,”106 and in their consideration of the teachings of excellent qualities of TG to be of definitive meaning, they very much agree with the Jo-nan-pas.107 In their approval of the teachings of both intrinsic emptiness and the TG to be of definitive meaning,108 they resemble the dGe-lugs-pas. However, although in letter the rNin-ma position regarding the interpretation of the TG theory is akin to that of the main-stream dGe-lugs-pas, in spirit it is what may seem a combination of the position of main-stream Sa-skya-pas and that of the Jo-nan-pas. (1717-1786). See the lTa mgur ’grel pa, p. 838.6-849.5; gSun sgros, p. 541.3-4: dgag pa ’di dag rje bla ma la brjod do snam du bsam par mi bya ste | de’i dgons pa zab pas ned cag gi yan bla mar ’dzin pa’i phyir ro |. See also ibid., p. 546.3-547.2. The locus classicus of Tson-kha-pa’s idea of the “union of emptiness and appearance of dependent origination” is his Lam gtso rnam gsum, often cited by Mi-pham. See, for example, Mi-pham’s dBu ma rgyan ’grel, p. 71.2-4.

105 Ron-zom-pa also speaks about the single taste of the Buddha’s teachings; see Wangchuk 2002: 287-288 and Pettit 1999a: 90. The trend can be also found in certain of Klon-chen-pa’s writings such the bSam gtan nal gso, p. 23.6-24.1, and its commentary, the Sin rta rnam dag, p. 119.3-5, where Prajnaparamita, Madhya-maka, Zi-byed, Mahamudra and rDzogs-chen are equated. See also the Yid bzin mdzod ’grel, Vol. wam, p. 840.2-3. Further see Mi-pham’s dBu ma rgyan ’grel, p. 69.5-72.2 and Nes ses sgron me, p. 93.1-5. Particularly noteworthy in the context of “reconciliation” is Mi-pham’s use of the expression sans rgyas dan grub thob dgons pa gcig which can be traced back to Sa-pan’s Thub pa dgons gsal, fol. 59a5. Cf. the lTa mgur ’grel pa, p. 851.4-854.1.


106 For example, compare Sa-pan’s statement in his sDom gsum rab dbye, verse 3.255: pha rol phyin pa’i spro bral las | lhag pa’i lta ba yod na ni | lta de spros pa can du ’gyur | spros bral yin na khyad par med | (Rhoton 2002: 129 & 308) and Mi-pham’s similar statements in his Nes ses sgron me (p. 88.6-89.1). 107 Ri chos, p. 157.20-158.1; Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 503. 108 Seyfort Ruegg 1968: 506.


Yet, unlike the Sa-skya-pas, they do not consider the teachings of TG to be of provisional meaning, and unlike the Jo-nan-pas, they neither consider the Middle Cycle to be of provisional meaning nor consider TG to be an entity or reality that is “hypostatically existent.”109 Unlike the dGe-lugs-pas, they do not consider TG to be merely the absence of “hypostatic existence” of the mind. Although methodologically they favour the ran ston approach and hence prefer to designate themselves as exponents of ran ston, TG - which is equated by them with the “self- 109 We have seen that Ron-zom-pa accepts the teachings of TG or “self-occurring gnosis” or the “indivisibility of the two truths” as being of definitive meaning. However, if one were to bring TG or even “freedom from manifoldness” under the lens of Madhyamaka analysis, as apparently done by Ron-zom-pa, even they would not withstand the “force of logical analysis” (rigs pa'i dpun). See the gSun thor bu, p. 124.6-7: ye ses

de'an ran 'byun [= byun] yin la | ran 'byun [= byun] gi ye ses de nid kyan yan dag par ma grub na | 'di'i rol pa'i dkyil 'khor lta ga la grub | ces kyan rtogs sin goms par byas nas |; Theg chen tshul 'jug, p. 521.8-10: spros pa ne bar zig bsgrub du [= tu]'an myed pas | myed pa'i myed pa'an myed ces smos so | de ltar mtha' myed na dbus kyan mi 'grub la dbus la gnas pa'an mi 'grub bo ||. It is not yet clear to me whether the Jo-nan-pas themselves designate TG as an entity or reality that is “hypostatically existent” (bden par grub pa) or whether this is an “(illogical) consequence” (thal ba) imputed to them by their opponents. This point, in my view, is decisive for our understanding of the position of the Jo-nan-pas. If it is an “(illogical) consequence” that entails from their acceptance of TG as being characterised as permanent (nitya), immutable (dhruva), blissful (siva), and eternal (sasvata) and even atman, then we shall have to carefully study the Jo-nan-pas'

explanations. In my view, Dol-po-pa's acceptance of the indestructibility of TG and his assertion that “TG is not empty of its qualities” would not automatically mean that for him TG is a “hypostatic existence.” If Dol-po-pa's acceptance of the indestructibility of TG indeed implies his acceptance of the “hypostatic existence” of TG, then there is no reason why anyone else's acceptance of the “indestructibility” of true reality (dharmata) would not also imply the acceptance of the “hypostatic existence” of true reality. For example, even mKhas-grub-rje accepts the immutability of TG (rGyud sde spyi rnam, p. 52.16-18: ran lugs la yan bde gsegs snin po dan no bo nid sku'i rnam grans de dag | 'dus ma byas sin dnos po med pa | rtag brtan ther zug yin gyi | bden par grub pa ni ma yin no |). Similarly, Dol-po-pa's assertion that “TG is not empty of its qualities” does not seem to imply his assertion of the “hypostatic existence” of TG because the wordempty” (sunya) is obviously understood by him as simply “devoid” and not in a Madhya-maka technical sense. In other words, what he seems to be making a case for is only the “presence of the qualities attributed to TG” and not necessarily its “hypostatic existence.” My impression is that Dol-po-pa's acceptance of “freedom from manifoldness in meditative equipoise” rather suggests that Dol-po-pa did not consider TG to be an entity or reality that is “hypostatically existent.” This matter, however, needs to be studied more closely. The rNin-ma Interpretations of the Tathagatagarbha Theory 203

occurring gnosis” or universal ground (gzi) in the rDzogs-chen sense — is conceived by them as transcending the notions of both ran ston and gzan ston, that is, as being intrinsically empty (no bo stonpa), luminous in nature (ran bzin gsal ba) and spontaneously present together with all-embracing compassion (thugs rje kun khyab).110


Abbreviations and Bibliography

ABBREVIATIONS



D The Nyingma Edition of the sDe-dge bKa'-'gyur and bsTan-'gyur. Oakland: Dharma Publication, 1981.
DK The Collected Writings (bka' bum) of Dil-mgo mKhyen-brtse. Delhi: She chen Publications, 1994 [cited by number of folios in Arabic numerals].
DzD mDzod-bdun by Klon-chen-pa. Gangtok, Sikkim: Dodrup Chen Rinpoche (repr. Thimphu: National Library of Bhutan).
MK NG NK Mi-pham bKa'-'bum. sDe-dge edition. rNin-ma rGyud-'bum. mTshams-brag edition. Nal-gso-skor-gsum by Klon-chen-pa. Gangtok, Sikkim: Do-drup Chen Rinpoche (repr. Thimphu: National Library of Bhutan).
P Daisetz T. Suzuki (ed.), The Tibetan Tripitaka (Peking edition). Tokyo - Kyoto: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute, 1955-1961.
RS Ron-zom-chos-bzan-gi-gsun-'bum, Vol. 1-2. Sichuan: Si-khron Mi-rigs-dpe-skrun-khan, 1999.
Taisho Paul Demieville et al. (ed.), Repertoire du Canon Boud-dhique Sino-Japonais. Edition de Taisho (Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo). Fascicule Annexe du Hobogirin. Paris - Tokyo: Librairie d'Amerique et d'Orient Adrien-Maisonnneuve -Maison Franco-Japonaise, 1978.
110 For example, see Klon-chen-pa's Sin rta chen po, Vol. na, p. 342.1-4: gdod ma'i sems nid 'od gsal ba ston gsal ran byun ye ses no bo ston pa nam mkhalta bu | ran bzin gsal ba ni zla lta bu | thugs rje'i mdans 'char tshul ma 'gags pa me lon g.ya' dag pa'i nos lta bu | chos sku lons sku sprul gsum gyi ran bzin | bde bar gsegs pa'i snin po 'khor 'das gan du'an rgya chad dan phyogs lhun med pa'i nan nas | no bos ston pas 'char sgo phye | ran bzin gsal bas ran byun gi 'od lna yul du snan | thugs rje rig pa ye ses dpyod byed ses par skyes pa las 'khrul par 'dod de | gsan snin las | e ma'o bde bsegs snin po las | ran gi rnam rtog las kyis 'khrul | zes so |.


Angulimaliyasutra
bDe ba'i myu gu
bDud rtsi'i snan ba
bKa' brgyad rnam bsad
bKa' 'gyur dkar chag
Blo snan sgo 'byed
bSam gtan mig sgron
bSam gtan nal gso
bsTan pa'i rnam gzag
bsTan pa'i sgron me
Chos dbyins mdzod 'grel
Dad gsum 'jug nogs
Dam chos dogs sel


PRIMARY SOURCES


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Dam tshig mdo rgyas
'Das rjes rnam thar
dBa' bzed
dBu ma rgyan 'grel dKa' gnad ci rigs dKon mchog 'grel dPag bsam sne ma
Ghanavyuhasutra
Glan chen rab 'bog
Grub mtha' mdzod
Grub mtha'i brjed
byan
gSun sgros
gSun thor bu

gZan ston sen ge'i
na ro
'Jam dbyans dgons
rgyan
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