Yogacara - Madhyamaka disputes from Nagarjuna TO ROL PA’I RDO RJE LCANG SKYA II

I wrote this twenty years ago, and when a school wished demonstration of publication, I felt it was long past time to share! I lost all my diacritics fonts since that long ago Windows 95 day. I hope corrected everything, but perhaps any reader will be so kind as to point out any errors of both omission and commission. I help this paper will enable a practitioner or beginning scholar in this field, to understand the major conundrum facing these two schools viz. consciousness, a tricky matter even for scientists today. This piece will outline some of the major issues that create for a debate between the Madhyamaka (“Middle Way”) and Yog?c?ra praxis Mah?y?na Schools of thought. So do please feel most encouraged to comment that I may learn more about my own topic!

These two systems are perfectly in accordance with the noble doctrine. Can we then say which of the two is right? Both equally conform to truth and lead us to Nirv??a. Nor can we find out which is true or false? Both aim at the destruction of passion (kle?a) and the salvation of all beings. We must not, in trying to settle the comparative merits of these two, create great confusion and fall further into perplexity. For, if we act conformably with any of these doctrines, we are enabled to attain the Other Shore (Nirv??a), and if we turn away from them, we remain drowned, as it were, in the ocean of transmigration. The two systems are, in like manner, taught in India, for in essential points they do not differ from each other. - I-tsing

Commencement of the disputes. There can be no doubt that by the time of I-tsing at the latest, Mah?y?na was fragmented into two specific schools: The Madhyamaka and the Yog?c?ra. It will be one major aim of this study to investigate the origins of this cleavage. We will be examining Tibetan claims of a very early date and we will be examining the severity of the disagreements.

Certain works tend to highly under-exaggerate the discrepancies, while other, especially early occidental works, and tend to over-exaggerate the differences between Madhyamaka and Yog?c?ra systems, often in the framework of “nihilism” versus “Idealism,” respectively. Having reflected on this issue for some years, and while by no means having at all fully resolved it, it is our contention that truth lies in both the under- and over- exaggerated positions mentioned above - and yet, neither. We will be demonstrating both the perspectives shared by the two schools, especially relative to the ?r?vakay?na Schools. By implication more than explicitly, we will unveil the common ground of all these Buddhist schools share relative to non-Buddhist schools. The multivalent aspects of this study. As evinced from the title of this study, we will be primarily concerned with the “Great Debate” engaged by the two schools over the course of some centuries, as recorded in the work of lCang skya Rol pa’i rdo rje (whose biography we will relate below). In chapters three, four and five, the heart of this work, is the translation and sub-commentary of lCang skya II’s opus magnum, A Beautiful Ornament for Mt. Meru of the Adept [[[Buddha’s]]] Teaching, a Clear Exposition Presenting the Limits of Proofs.

There are four textual layers employed in this study. Doubly indented are textual citations lCang skya himself employs to make his arguments. The translation of his own work immediately surrounds those citations of earlier works he cites.

Below the translation is a sub-commentary that is an elaboration of obscure points in his work. This sub-commentary in a descriptive manner sets out the meaning of the text from the standpoint of authoritative Gelukpa interpretation from two years’ work on it with Geshe Lhundhup Sopa.

A translator can only hope to eliminate obscurity in his/her translation to as great an extent possible. To help ensure clarity we have included this extensive sub-commentary partly as a control, for sometimes we are merely repeating the translation to affirm that what it states need be interpreted no further. At other times we have included additional information without which the text, abbreviated as it often is, would be incomprehensible. Without the insights of Geshe Sopa’s tradition of scholarship to help flesh out the meaning of the root text, I would have been stymied in my efforts to translate at all accurately or fully. Finally, the footnotes in this study contain not only additional information from secondary sources and other primary sources. It is in this format that we have presented views of certain modern scholars relevant to this study. These may be the insights of others that may conflict with the primary text of this study. The two schools: essentially identical or essentially different? It is a pan-Mah?y?nist philosophical standpoint to reject notions of “self-identity.” To say, for example, the two Mah?y?na Schools are identical would be to violate one of their own basic principles in defining them. In N?g?rjunan analysis, something strictly identical to another thing could not be ipso facto, differentiated at all, in thought, name or experiential reality.

To assert the identity of or even to say that they are “virtually” identical is to negate another vital aspect of Mah?y?na and all Buddhist doctrine, the doctrine of up?ya: the “approach” or “method” a Buddha or any teacher employs to gradually train disciples. The manifold variety of approaches are all part of Buddha’s enticements into the dharma, all valid to varying degrees and intended for sentient beings who are also manifold and variegated. The final aim of the Buddha’s teaching is nirv??a itself, and this is inconceivable. All the schools are hence “interpretable” and “provisional.” The nature of consciousness: the pivot around which the great debates unfold. The nature of consciousness is the primary subject of the great issues which distinguish a Madhyamaka stance from that of a Yog?c?rin. Does the Yog?c?rin possess an outlook that is svacitta - “mind-in-itself?” This is what [pseudo?] N?g?rjuna claims.

Is this school “Idealist?” The Yogac?rin position hinges on its discusion of the self-awareness (rang rig), which is the subject of chapter four. Is this notion of a “self-aware” consciousness constitutive of some type of idealism? We offer arguments in our chapter on methodology as to why this occidental term is inaccurate. As we shall see, perhaps “Consciousnessism,” (Vijñ?nav?da), “Mentalism” or “Mentationism” (Yog?c?ra), or “Cognitionism” (Vijñ?ptim?trav?da) are more accurate, though some will contend that we are quibbling. The implications of the two schools’ contentions over the greater or lesser importance accorded mentation in the role of attaining liberation is central to this study. Connected with that is the relative emphasis on either theory or practice.

There exist major difficulties viewing either of the two schools strictly objectively. One always has an initial reference point. In the case of Gadjin Nagao, that reference point was that of the Yog?c?ra School. He admits that his study of that school was heavily influenced by his prior knowledge of Yoga-praxis positions.

No scholar of any tradition, to our knowledge, maintains that the two schools are either exactly the same or that they are utterly to be differentiated. Relatively speaking, assertions of the gulf cleaving the two schools however, diverge widely.

There are definitive and interpretable doctrines. The Buddhist schools never in theory simply condemn the doctrines of other schools, however, they do rank them according to relative depth of insight, etc. In the case of these disputes, each claims the other’s doctrine “needs further elucidation” to hit the mark of the Buddha’s intention.

David Seyfort Ruegg, standing outside a particular Buddhist tradition, terms the disputes as between a positive or mystical current (cataphatic) and a negative theory (apophatic) theory concerning these issues. The notion that some texts and ideas are “interpretable,” having a different intention (abhipr?ya) than the apparent meaning, rather than “definitive” meaning must be used with care. He states,

“...so powerful a hermeneutical instrument as the idea of an intentionally motivated ‘surface’ teaching of provisional or non-definitive meaning requiring interpretation in a sense other than the obvious surface one, and opposed to a ‘deep’ teaching of final and definitive meaning, had to be handled with care and restraint - and no doubt also as sparingly as possible - in order not to be tainted with arbitrariness and disregard for a canonical corpus.”

Finally, as Geshe Lhundhup Sopa has put it, all of the schools whose doctrines are included among the three cycles (which we will discuss below) have arguments as to the reasons and methods by which they avoid falling into the classical chasm of either nihilism or substantialism, anni?iliationism or “permanence” thinking.

The Mah?y?na Sa?gr?ha: Counteracting the extremes of positivism and repudiation. We have consulted Etienne Lamotte’s work to help “enflesh” our understanding of certain issues as evinced in the Sa?gr?ha. The Sanskrit originals of these three works have been lost, leaving readers to rely on the Chinese and Tibetan translations. The Mah?y?na Sa?gr?ha and the Bodhisattvabh?mi are the two most often quoted textual sources for lCang skya.

Three cycles of doctrine: the Sa?dhinirmocanas?tra. This issue of the Three Cycles of the Wheel of Dharma (dharmacakrapravartana) defines the entirety of Buddhist doctrines - from the Mah?y?na perspective. This systematization of Buddhist schools is famously elucidated in the Sa?dhinirmocanas?tra. The Sanskrit edition was lost most likely already by the thirteenth century. Numerous Tibetan (at least ten) and Chinese editions (at least three) exist, attesting to this s?tra’s widespread influence and authority.

Legendary origin of the three cycles. Why are the doctrines of the three major divisions of Buddhist schools - according to the Mah?y?na Schools - called “cycles” or “wheels?”

“If [one asks] ‘[Why] is it a “wheel”?’ it is because it is a wheel of all the teachings of complete realization and scriptural teachings for the purpose of cutting off unharmonious [[[elements]]] in the mental continuum of the disciple by the Bh?gavan. It is like the precious wheel of the cakravartin kings that travelled gradually from one region to another, conquering unharmonious elements through its power. Therefore, the [[[Buddhadharma]]] is similar to that wheel, since it conquers unharmonious elements such as attachment, etc., travelling gradually to the mental continua of disciples.”

Definitive versus provisional doctrines. The first cycle of doctrine: the ?r?vakay?na . Needless to say, representatives of what the Mah?y?na Schools term the so-called H?nay?na (“Lesser” or even “Inferior” Vehicle) do not accept this elucidation of the Buddha’s teaching in the form of “three cycles of the wheel of Dharma.” The only remaining school among the eighteen original schools included under this designation “H?nay?na” are the various Therav?da traditions found in Wri Lavka and most of Southeast Asia. They accept only the teachings of the Buddha as found in the three baskets of the Pali canon as authoritative and view what they deem later Mah?y?na developments as imaginative fictions. On the other hand, certain scholars find ??nyat? and numerous other doctrines in the Pali canon itself.

Scholars of Mah?y?na traditions have viewed the H?nay?na as a teaching for ?r?vakas and pratyekabuddhas. These aspirants to Buddhist awakening have a self-serving agenda. They pursue only their own awakening to the selflessness of the individual among the skandhas, without regard to the suffering of fellow sentient beings. This system of the three cycles involves elements controversial to all forms of Buddhism. The section of the s?tra elucidating the three turnings of the wheel (tricakra, khor lo gsum) appears in chapter seven, the questions of Bodhisattva Param?rthasamudgata to the Buddha. Param?rthasamudgata begins his inquiry of the Buddha by noting,

“Bh?gavan, when I was in seclusion there arose this thought: ‘The Bh?gavan has spoken in many ways of the own-character of the aggregates and further spoken of their character of production, their character of disintegration, and their abandonment and realization. Just as he has spoken of the aggregates, he has also spoken of the sense spheres….[etc.]’”

Param?rthasamudgata continue, listing features of sentient consciousness the Buddha taught as having their “own characteristics” (svalaksana, rang gi mtshan nyid). Continuing, he refers to the Buddha’s teaching concerning the “own-characteristics” of the Buddhist Noble Eight-fold Path etc. Interpretable nature of the first cycle. Here is a reference to what the s?tra exposes as the first turning of the Cycle of Dharma. All Mah?y?na traditions view doctrines contained within this wheel as “provisional” or “interpretable” - “requiring further elucidation” (neyartha). The reason for this is the realism concerning dharma theory found in the Abhidhammapitaka. In the Abhidharmako?a, a commentary on and compendium of theories from the pi?aka, dharmas (phenomena) are said to be the fundamental constituents of time/space reality.

A selection from the Abhidharmakosabh??yam by Vasubandhu depicting a dispute between two now non-existent so-called (by the Mah?y?na) “H?nay?na” or “inferior” schools, the Vaibh??ikas and Sautr?ntika (with the former we can class the modern Therav?da tradition), illustrates the “realism” of dharma theory which served as one of many targets for the criticism of later Mah?y?na thinkers.

“[The Vaibh??ikas say: the S?tra teaches that] all rupa...is, individually, called skandha...thus each ‘real’ (atomic) element of past rupa...present...and future...receives the name of skandha. Thus the skandhas have real existence and not merely nominal existence.

[The Sautr?ntika:] If this is the case, then the material ?yatanas...have only a nominal existence, for the quality of being a ‘gate of arising of the mind...’ does not belong to atoms taken one by one, which are solely real, but to collections of atoms which constitute an organ of sight, a visible object, etc.”

Though both schools may disagree about the true reality or nominally reality of composite phenomena, both adhere to the teaching that dharmas (“atoms” in the translation) are the fundamental time/space constituents of reality. The view was demolished later by Vasubandhu by means of his critique of this “atom/dharma” theory. Nirv??a as ‘unconditioned’ phenomenon. Further, nirv??a in the conception of the H?nay?na School, was asserted to be an unconditioned state, an assertion rejected by N?g?rjuna in his M?lamadhyamakak?rik?? in chapter 25 (the “nirv??ap?r?ks?”). This notion of nirvana as “unconditioned” (asa?sk?ta) was rejected as violating the notion of prat?tyasamutp?da; nirv??a and sa?s?ra are co-arising and mutually interdependent, according to Madhyamaka view.

Entical nature of First Cycle doctrines. Therefore, the Buddha promulgated this Turning of the Wheel for ?r?vaka disciples who adhered to “entical” or “essentialist” thinking, unprepared for the deeper truths of the Buddhadharma concerned with ??nyat?. In the seventh chapter, the Buddha explains to Param?rthasamudgata the reason for not explaining the lack of self-nature (“own being” in the translation) to certain types of beings:

“Param?rthasamudgata, I do not designate the three types of lack of own being because sentient beings in the realm of sentient beings...because of being bound to conventional designations or due to predispositions toward conventional designations, they strongly adhere to the character of the own-being of the imputational as the own-being of the other-dependent and the thoroughly established.”

He elucidates the view that sentient beings experience the world as having “inherent existence” or “self-nature” (svabh?va). They attach true existence to that which is merely conceptualized (parikalpita) and perceive “entities” where there are none. This is the “conceptualization” or “imagination” of the “unreal” (abhutaparikalpa). They equate this level of comprehension with the deeper “own being” or “self-entity” of the interwoven-with-other. To teach the lack of self-nature (ni?svabh?va) to such sentient beings would be to generate within them further afflictions for which they are unprepared to cope.

The Second Cyle of doctrine: Madhyamaka. The Second Turning of the Wheel refers to the rise of systems of thought associated with the Prajñ?p?ramit? literature. Within this corpus, ideas appear which seem to contradict teachings in the corpus of literature associated with the first Turning. Among the various Prajñ?p?ramit? s?tras, we read that the paths to awakening do not arise, that nirv??a, rather than being an unconditioned realm is directly accessible, and in fact, all phenomena are “quiescent from the beginning.”

Nihilism in the Second Cycle? The doctrine of ??nyat? is that which stands as the foremost teaching among these systems of thought. This doctrine seems like “nihilism” to both H?nay?na Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike. To Mah?y?nist proponents of Madhyamaka doctrines, this is an extension of the Buddha’s teaching of anatta - the lack of an individual self among the skandhas - to the lack of selfhood for all phenomena (sarvadharmanair?tmya) as well. The Buddha responds to Param?rtha’s confusion as to why he would teach such doctrines that seem so to contradict his earlier teachings. The Buddha replies as follows:

“Param?rthasamudgata, I initially teach doctrines starting with the lack of own-being in terms of production to those beings who have not generated roots of virtue, who have not purified obstructions, who have not ripened their continuums.... They know [[[phenomena]]] as being impermanent...unstable, unworthy of confidence...whereupon they develope aversion and antipathy toward all compounded phenomena...their understanding is not infused with conventional designations.”

The Second Cycle: for the prideful who ‘lack roots of virtue. Therefore, while it is said that sentient beings who were unripe to receive teaching concerning ??nyat?. These disciples of the Second Turning are said to be those who lack “roots of virtue” etc. and develop an understanding of language and sense-perception as “conventional designation only” (Sa?v?tim?tra). Their basis of understanding of reality needs to be demolished, and these doctrines are useful for reducing the pride of those too prone to adhere to the obstructions of entical views.

The doctrines associated with the Second Wheel, as that of the First Wheel, are said to be “interpretable,” “needing elucidation” (ney?rtha), as the Buddha states in the following:

“With respect to this well-taught doctrine, degrees of conviction appear among sentient beings. Param?rthasamudgata, thinking of just these three types of lack of own-being, through the teachings that are S?tras of interpretable meaning, the Tath?gata taught such doctrines as: “All phenomena lack own-being; all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally in a state of nirvana.”

The danger with the Buddha’s doctrines connected with the Second Turning is that

“[[[Disciples]]] believe in the doctrine, they strongly adhere just to the literal meaning of the doctrine, [[[thinking]]], ‘All phenomena just lack own-being; all phenomena are just unproduced, just unceasing, just quiescent from the start, just naturally in a state of nirvana.’ Based on this, they adopt the view that all phenomena do not exist...they perceive what is not the meaning to be the meaning....”

Therefore, the meaning of these doctrines needs to be interpreted lest “undeveloped” mental continua misinterprete “sarvam ??nyam” (all is empty) as a nihilismistic doctrine.

Two wrong attitudes with regard to the Second Cycle doctrines.  The Buddha in these passages also chides those who reject this doctrine as a doctrine taught not by the Buddha, but by M?ra.    So there are two wrong attitudes to Second Wheel doctrines: 1] to accept them, but in a nihilismistic manner, and 2] to reject them as not taught by the Buddha and view as enemies those who propound these views.

The Third Cycle of doctrine: Yog?c?ra. The Bodhisattva Param?rthasamudgata comprehended the Buddha’s teachings in the following way:

Initially, in the Varan?si area, in the Deer Park...the Bh?gavan taught the aspects of the four truths of the ?ryas for those who were genuinely engaged in the ?r?vaka vehicle. The wheel of doctrine you turned at first is wondrous...however, this wheel of doctrine that the Bh?gavan turned is surpassable, provides an opportunity [for refutation], is of interpretable meaning, and serves as a basis for dispute.

Then the Bh?gavan turned a second wheel of doctrine which is more wondrous still for those who are genuinely engaged in the Great Vehicle, because of the aspect of teaching emptiness...however this wheel of doctrine...is surpassable....[etc.]”

So the third wheel, from the standpoint of the Yog?c?ra School, is definitive (nit?rtha) because it distinguishes the boundary between the first and second wheels, encapsulating all their doctrines. How is this done?

The whole of Buddhist teaching is encapsulated by the doctrine of the three natures. From the Yog?c?ra standpoint, the whole of Buddhist teaching is reinterpreted by means of the three natures (trisvabh?va) theory. They take the notion of “non-self-nature” (ni?svabh?va) elaborated in N?g?rjuna’s works (foremost among them, the M?laMadhyamakak?rik??s) and apply it in a three-fold way.

The first of the three natures: conceptualization. The first of these three natures is the “conceptualized nature” (parikalpitasvabh?va). It involves the imputation of conceptual constructs creating “enticalized” objects. In fact, they do not exist of their own accord or concretely. This is the “conceptualization or imagination of the unreal.’ This is the Yog?c?ra evolution of the sa?v?tisatya notion of the schools of the Second Turning (i.e. the various Madhyamaka Schools).

The second of the three natures: the other-dependent. The coining of the term paratantra was its expression of N?g?rjunan ??nyat?, expressing the idea elucidated logically by N?g?rjuna that entities exist only as “mutually dependent” (paraspar?pek??), not as independent entities. “Interwoven-with-other” sums up the notion of ni?svabh?va, in their view, because the implication of this notions is that no “entity” is self-existent though they are falsely imputed as being so; in reality, they are radically interwoven with what is mentated as “other” to itself. Hence they subsume the idea of the selflessness of the individual and phenomena (?tmadhrmanair?tmya) under this notion.

 The third of the three natures: the “perfected.” The Yog?c?ra assert their definitiveness as Mah?y?na teaching further by the term “parini?pannasvabh?va.”  The term implies perfection of practice - the actualization of the awareness of paratantra through practice in meditation.  Further it has been said that the Yog?c?ra School is a continuation of the Abhidhamma period having gone through the filter of Mah?y?na logic, etc. and by means of this, a “de-enticalization” of the Abhidhamma system occurred.

Yog?c?ra: school of definitive interpretation. They are a school of definitive interpretation, it is said, because they incorporate the Abhidhamma. If we accept the story as given by the tradition, the same Vasubandhu began his career as the great scholar of the Abhidharmakosa fame, who converted to the Mah?y?na upon learning of his half brother’s doctrine brought back from the Tusita realm. If this is true pre-Mah?y?na Abhidhamma thought is directly connected with Yog?c?ra thought in the works of one of its central thinkers.

One Vasubandhu. Frauwallner’s arguments to the contrary, it is not at all philosophically improbable that the author of the Ko?a is one and the same person as who wrote the Tri?sika, et. al.. Differences in style can be accounted for by the fact that different issues rose to concern. Specifically, how does one integrate the three-nature theory and the compelling standpoint of ??nyat? with abhidhamma categories? How does one then account for different meditative states and the various levels of consciousness realized through them?

Yog?c?ra critique of Madhyamaka. Rebirth: without the ?laya consciousness, how does one account for that psychic reality which is reborn? Vasubandhu’s thought enabled the new Mah?y?nist synthesis of classical doctrines such as the twelve-fold chain of causation (dv?da?a?gaprat?tyasamutp?da). Further, from the Yog?c?ra standpoint, the Madhyamaka system is explanatorily weak. It illuminates the distinction between the conventional and ultimate relative to ??nyat?, but cannot incorpate all the teachings of the Buddha as the s?tra states. Finally, the ??nya doctrine is positively dangerous for those mental continuum is immature and for whom it would be “poisonous.’

M?dhyamika response to Yog?c?ra critique. The Pr?sa?gika Madhyamaka can agree that the Madhyamaka doctrine is not for all trainees in the Mah?y?na system. Employing a type of “snob appeal,” They can indicate that Pr?sa?gika Madhyamaka can indeed lead to a nihilismistic view for some mental continua (see Tsong kha pa’s view just below). Therefore, they may assent to the notion that the Yog?c?ra elucidates an “extensive method” and venerate Asavga whom they see as of the lineage of Maitreya as on a par with N?g?rjuna, of the lineage of Mañjuwri. However, in their view, Asavga held as his ultimate view, the standpoint of M?dhyamika ??nyat?

The third cycle is taught to forestall falling into the ‘Great Nihilism.’ Tsong kha pa himself states:

“Finally, [in the third wheel], the statements of the lack of intrinsic identifiability of the first nature and of the intrinsically identifiable existence of the latter two natures [are interpretable in meaning]. [They are] taught for those [[[disciples]]] of the Mah?y?na who would find no ground to establish cause-effect...in the intrinsic realitylessness that is emptiness with respect to intrinsically identifiable status, in order to forestall their falling into the great nihilism ....”

The Sa?dhinirmocanas?tra as definitive Madhyamaka text. Some M?dhyamika have held that the Sa?dhinirmocanas?tra is a definitive text because it basically assents to the notion that the Second Turning is definitive, though too hard to comprehend for the trainee of less than superb faculties. In the end, even all holders of Vijñ?nav?da lineage will come to the profound view (of ??nyat?) in the end, when their mental continua are matured. Here, our investigation requires some preferatory remarks. At times in past and present one finds sometimes a tendency to draw rather simple comparisons among schools. It has been and is in many circles still common to refer to the Yog?c?ra School as a form of “Idealism” because of its emphasis on the doctrine of “cognition-only” Vijñ?pti- or vijñ?nam?tra.

Variously called “Mind-only” (Yog?c?ra), “consciousness-only” (vijñ?nam?tra) and more generically perhaps, the “Yoga-praxis” (Yog?c?ra) school, this philosophical system has received diverse tre?tment at the hands of occidental scholars struggling to find footholds of meaning in the craggy edifice of its centuries-long development textually.

Complicating matters further is the fact that one’s definition of the school’s doctrines will depend greatly upon whether one is employing Central or East Asian sources for one’s interpretation. In the hands of Gelukpa Pr?sa?gika M?dhyamika scholars of Tibet and Mongolia, the Yog?c?ra seems more greatly to resemble occidental “Idealisms” (of necessity generally defined). The interpretation differs from the interpretations one is likely to find among the investigation of the original Indian Yog?c?ra systems to be found among Japanese scholars of the twentieth century.

Texts and authors. N?g?rjuna’s Bodhicittaviv?ra?a. In this work we have an early and biting critique of Cittam?trin thinking. Whether this work is pseudepigraphal or not remains to be determined. Christian Lindtner holds that it is not. He notes that the Bodhicittaviv?ra?a is referred to neither by Buddhap?lita nor Candrak?rti, yet it serves as a basic authority for Bhavya “in his most mature work, the Ratnaprad?pa.” He neglects quoting it in his earlier works, the Tarkajv?la, Prajñ?prad?pa, however Asvabh?va and ??ntarak?ita both refer to this text.

It is Lindtner’s opinion that the Yukti??stika, the Catu??atakastava and the Bodhicittaviv?ra?a “are the most frequently quoted among all works ascribed to N?g?rjuna in later Indian literature.” Lindtner holds that the consciousness-only doctrines N?g?rjuna refutes are likely derived from those extant in the La?k?vataras?tra. On this point he states,

“Having seen how vehemently N?g?rjuna attacks any kind of acceptance of svabh?va one would also expect him to have criticized those who might have thought themselves justified in maintaining the absolute existence of vijñ?na (citta). But in the texts dealt with hitherto this has only happened incidentally. Here Bodhicittaviv?ra?a provides us with the missing link.”

For evidence that N?g?rjuna was indeed familiar with the doctrines of the La?k?vataras?tra, Lindtner cites the following parallels:

The allusions to Vijñ?nav?da - or more precisely to the Vijñ?nav?da of the La?k?vataras?tra...generally held to be posterior to N?g?rjuna - are quite consistent with the fact that N?g?rjuna also refers to this s?tra elsewhere.”

However, Lindtner’ comments are dubious, given that some will assert that holding Bhavya as genuine author of the Ratnaprad?pa is itself open to question. Furthermore, Ruegg however holds that this text is the product of the so-called “tantric N?g?rjuna.” This N?g?rjuna seems to have lived in the seventh (or at the latest in the eighth) century. The Bodhicittavivarana may well be his composition....”

He makes mention of the fact that Indian and Tibetan records identify the writers of Tantric works with the writers of wastras with the same name living centuries earlier. The traditions hold that N?g?rjuna, Candrak?rti, etc., lived enormously long lives, even for several centuries. These records do sharply differentiate between the philosophical and tantric corpi associated with these writers however.

The issues involved are a bit like those associated with the “two Vasubandhus” theory, or the elusive “search for the historical Maitreya.” As discussed above, Frauwallner analyzed differences in the style of writing as found in the works of Vasubandhu the author of the Abhidharmako?a versus that of the Cittam?trin master of the same name. But perhaps there were also two Beethovens, one pre and one post Eroica; perhaps there were two Kants, one pre and one post Hume. If we compare a Beethoven Sonata with a symphony, again one could conclude that there were two Beethovens, even though the pieces may have been written contemporaneously.

The same may be said for a great number of authors whose views shifted during the course of their careers. In the case of the tantric N?g?rjuna versus the philosopher original, the issue is concerned with divergent materials and genres. If the Bodhicittaviv?ra?a fits in with “N?g?rjuna.” The Pr?sa?gika Madhayamika renders more or less the same critique of a number of East Asian Buddhist schools influenced heavily by Yog?c?ra thought of the same kind of relatively substantialist “entity”-view. The problems with notions such as hongaku and Buddha Nature as seen in many of these schools are problems similar to that Gelukpa have with gZhan stong (or “zeroness of other”). Thinking in their own culture. It leads to a form of nihilism in the declaration of a pure nature which is empty - not inherently - but empty of defilements (kle?a).

How does this seemingly more positive doctrine lead to nihilism? Conceptualizing the Dharmak?ya and the Buddha Nature within as the only real truth, concomitant with the notion of the non-existence of external objects lead to a devaluation of this world’s reality in declaring it all illusion and leads to a nihilism in the sense that language, observed phenomena are viewed as simply false. Such a view loses the notion of two truths. Sa?v?ti is a form of truth, albeit conventional. With regard to the authenticity of the Bodhicittaviv?ra?a and its professed N?g?rjunan authorship, with its grave opposition to Cittam?trin notions is a subject of dispute.

Ruegg notes that this work was familiar to Haribhadra who lived in the ninth century. This tantric N?g?rjuna he asserts, lived in the seventh century or eighth century at the latest. This means that in a span of no more than two centuries, the existence of this second N?g?rjuna would have been gone from memory and works of his authorship conflated with that of the original. The theories about all sorts of “multiple-personalitied” Masters is overly-involved. Ruegg himself cites the existence of a tantric Candrak?rti, a tantric ?ryadeva, and so on.

One must note that it is odd that such a severe critique of the Yog?c?ra School, if known to Buddhap?lita and Candrak?rti, would not receive reference from them, especially in the passages ascribed by Tibetan tradition as critiques of Yog?c?ra by Candrak?rti, i.e., the sixth chapter of the Madhyamak?vatara. But then, one must posit the existence of a tantric Bh?vaviveka to escape the reference to the Bodhicittaviv?ra?a in his Ratnaprad?pa. The history and lineages of the Siddhas and Tantrin masters remains very obscure for us, and our sources sometimes give quite divergent accounts of them so that it is not yet possible to fit them coherently into the history of Indian and Buddhist thought.

While the major focus of our work here does not entail detailed redaction-critical work, it is important to make inquiry into whether this text is authentically N?g?rjunan because of the role it will play in our study. This brief text does set the themes for works which later appear on this topic and if we are to engage in historical investigation of these disputes, it is surely important to get our chronological ordering correct. While some will criticize us for dodging the issue, we accept Thurman’s arguments with regard to the tantric versus sastric Buddhist masters.

Thurman however puts this whole type of controversy into a post-modernesque framework which we find intellectually satisfying. He notes that with numerous authors of sastras, it has been fashionable to assert the existence of corollary “tantric” counterparts who are considered specious or pseudonymous of these given tantric texts. For example, while N?g?rjuna, Bh?vaviveka, et. al. are accepted as the genuine authors of certain treatises, so-called “tantric N?g?rjuna ” and “tantric Bh?vaviveka” are seen as later, pseudepigraphical authors.

He notes that since tantric traditions were oral for centuries and only entered written form near the close of the first millenium of the Common Era, it may be reasonable to hold that these later texts were the orally passed down teachings of the great Masters, the words of whom were written down only centuries later. It is our aim to clarify this issues and others through the course of this study. For our purposes though, we find it highly aesthetically pleasing to accept the tradition at its word for now, and will examine the Bodhicittavivarana as an acceptable first manifestation of a Madhyamaka critique of key Yog?c?ra notions. We will prescind from making a judgment on this issue until the conclusion of our study.

Interpreting Candrak?rti’s ‘Abhimukhi’ Chapter: directed to ‘outsiders’ or ‘insiders?’ Candrak?rti: Madhyamak?vatara and its Bh??ya

While Candrak?rtiand Bh?vaviveka were by no means in full agreement on a number of issues, both nevertheless accounted themselves M?dhyamika scholars and held N?g?rjuna in highest esteem as an authority. Equally, they wrote critiques of Cittam?trin notions and are more or less in agreement concerning what they felt were problems with Yog?c?ra systems.

We have seen the initial stages of the disputes which are the subject of this investigation took place perhaps in the writings of N?g?rjuna himself. A short period of time later, critiques of “Mind-only” systems were written in more extensive fashion, by two of the most famous earlier disciples of N?g?rjuna, Bh?vaviveka and Candrak?rti. Later Tibetan tradition styles the first scholar “Svatantrika-M?dhyamika” and the latter, “Pr?sa?gika-M?dhyamika,” but in their own day relative to the adherents of “Cognition-only,” they were of like-mind.

There are three major aspects of Candrak?rti’s disagreement with Yog?c?rins with regard to the other-dependent nature. That it is manifest apart from apprehended external objects, that is exists in actuality and that its own inherent reality is lies beyond conceptual analysis. Bh?vaviveka. In Bh?vaviveka’s commentary on N?g?rjuna’s Stanzas [Concerning] the Root of the Middle Way, he “castigates the followers of Mind Only as introducing the heretical notion of a ‘self’ (?tman) under another name.”

“If you say that tathat? (Suchness), although beyond words, is a real thing, then this is the ?tman of the heretics which you designate with the different name of tathat?. Your tathat? is a real thing, and yet from the viewpoint of absolute truth it does not belong to the categories of being or nonbeing; but such is the ?tman. The heretics also believe that the ?tman, a real thing, is omnipresent, eternal, acting, feeling, and yet beyond all categories and concepts (nirvikalpa). Because it does not pertain to the sphere of words, because it presents no object ot the discursive intellect (vikalpa-buddhi), it is said to be beyond categories. The teaching of the heretics says: ‘Words do not reach there; thought (manas-citta) does not present itself; this is why it is called ?tman.”

“Although such is the character of the ?tman, you say non the less; ‘Knowledge that relies on the ?tman does not.’ But what is the difference between your tathat? and the ?tman, since both of them are ineffable and yet possess real self-nature? It is only out of a partisan spirit that you speak as you do. Therefore I cannot accept this tathat?, the same as the ?tman, real yet nonexisting.”

Snellgrove feels that Bh?vaviveka’s “argument can only be pressed by taking ?tman in a purified Vedanta sense and dissociating it from all notion of a personal sense.” He credits the “Mind Only” School with attempting to solve the problem of continuity over successive births, a basic Buddhist doctrine seemingly at odds with the doctrine of an?tman. He notes that the issue of personality for the Cittam?trin is resolved at the level of the conceptualized nature (parikalpitasvabh?va).

At this relatively superficial level, an imaginary or imputed self-identity does indeed exist. At the next stage, the “interwoven-with-other” nature, the problem of individual personality dissolves, the second nature’s emphasis on all entities’ being dependent on what is “other” to themselves for their existence. Here, “the problem of differentiating individual streams of consciousness from the universal stream need not arise.” With regard to the nature of the ?laya consciousness, he cites the passage of the Samdhinirmocana s?tra wherein it is discussed.

“This consciousness is known as the ‘apprehending consciousness’ in that it grasps at and comprehends this bodily form. It is also called “basic consciousness” in that it adheres and clings to this bodily form with a single sense of security. It is also called ‘mind’ in that it is an acucmulation and aggregation of appearances, sounds, smells, tastes, sensations of touch and of thoughts.”

He cites Scherbatsky’s reading of the ?laya as “one of the best descriptions” of the “basic consciousness” to be found among European works. While many will wish to contest this view given Scherbatsky’s “datedness,” nevertheless, he expresses features of the ?laya which serve as objects of M?dhyamika refutation. He calls it

“...a step towards the reintroduction of the dethroned Soul. Uddyotakara and Vacaspatimishra reject it as a poor substitute for their substitute for their Substantial Soul. ...This sacrifice Buddhism could not make. The an?tma-v?da could not become ?tma-v?da.

Buddhism continued to be a pluralistic dharma theory, but a monistic subway was added to it...[the ?laya] replaces both the external (nimitta-bh?ga) and the internal (dar?ana-bh?ga) worlds. But it is not a substance; it is a process; it runs underground of actual experience.”

He goes on to differentiate it from the Greek psyche, the Ved?ntic ?tman, etc., but nevertheless concludes “that it is a substitute for an individual’s surviving Soul is clear from the words of Uddyotakara and Vacaspati.”

We would personally refrain from employing the views of Vedic scholars to interpret a Buddhist term as complex as that of the basal consciousness, but as we shall have seen from the critiques of this notion rendered by M?dhyamika scholars, this is more or less their own problem with it: it is an idea promulgated for the purpose of attracting those afraid of relinquishing the ?tman to Buddhist doctrine of a relatively less profound view than that outlined in the Prajñ?p?ramit? literature and upon which M?dhyamika scholars wrote extensive commentaries.

Having investigated Bh?vaviveka’s discussion of basic Cittam?trin notions, we turn to Candrak?rti on the same theme. Living approximately one century after Bh?vya, Candrak?rti’s critique of Cittam?trin notions is more extensive than that of Bh?vaviveka.

When these disputes became issues of concern is not easily or uncontroversially to be determined. Whether pseudepigraphal or not, we do have in hand a work by N?g?rjuna containing within it a hard-handed critique of basic Yog?c?ra notions. Indeed, whether spurious or authentically N?g?rjunan, the work at the very least indicates the seriousness with which the disciples of N?g?rjuna who attributed the work to him took Yog?c?ra doctrines. Like other great Tibetan Madhyamaka texts, lCang skya’s work is it should be kept in mind that the Beautiful Ornament is in large part apologetical. All the sections of the text culminate in the exposition of the definitive truth, which in lCang skya’s Gelukpa tradition is that established first by N?g?rjuna, descending through Buddhap?lita and Candrak?rti through Tsong kha pa and his heirs.