Thinking of Foundations and Justifi cation of Buddhist Ethics

by Asanga Tilakaratne

Introduction

Studies in Buddhist ethics is growing in popularity among Buddhist scholars. A survey in more recent literature shows some new trends in the fi eld. Traditionally studies in Buddhist ethics has been focused on the Pāli canon. An early instance of using the term ‘ethics’ in relation to the Pāli canon is

the translation of Dhammasaṅgaṇī in 1900 by Mrs C.A.F. Rhys Davids into English as A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics. Among those who pioneered studies in Buddhist ethics as a full fl edged subject are scholars such as S. Tachibana, O.H de A. Wijesekera, K.N. Jayatilleke, and H. Saddhātissa. While Tachibana and Saddhātissa were more interested in developing the basic principles and categories of Buddhist ethics, the other two scholars, in particular, Jayatilleke,

1 A keynote speech delivered at the IABU Conference on Buddhism and Ethics at Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University Main Campus, Wang Noi, Ayutthaya, Thailand in September 2008. 2 Asanga Tilakaratne, PhD. (Hawaii), was Director of the Postgraduate Institute of Pāli and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya & is currently Senior Professor at the Department of Pāli and Buddhist Studies, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka..

was interested in clarifying the meta-ethical issues. More recently D.J. Kalupahana, Winston L. King and P.D. Premasiri have continued with the Pāli tradition as their focus. G.S.P. Misra, Gunapala Dharmasiri, Dameon Keown, Peter Harvey, Charles Prebish, Mark Tatz and several others have gone beyond the limits of Theravāda tradition and incorporated Mahāyāna Buddhist ethics and have tried to see the fi eld as a comprehensive whole. Moving somewhat away from the descriptive approach to the subject, these scholars during the last two decades have combined their meta-ethical interests with normative approaches to social, political and bio-ethical issues.

Although reviewing this rich store of literature is a rewarding exercise I am not proposing to do that here. What I would be looking at is some specifi c issues connected to the foundations of Buddhist ethics and the nature of justifi cation of ethics in Buddhism. The two areas themselves are not totally new

for almost all scholars who have dealt with Buddhist ethics also have discussed the basic assumptions and philosophical bases of it. In spite of such efforts by scholars still there are some issues needing more refl ection. For example, the relation between puñña/kusala on the one hand and sīla on the

other seem to require more sharply defi ned. With the sīla itself there is lack of clarity regarding the nature of monastic sīla and lay sīla. The paper begins with some exercise in conceptual clarifi cation and will be concluded with some observations on foundations and justifi cation of Buddhist ethics. Buddhist Ethics or Buddhism as Ethics? A primary matter to be clarifi ed is a problem connected to determining the proper location of ethics in the fi eld of

Buddhist studies. In western philosophy ethics is one area of study studied on its own, as an independent and dissociated subject. Discussions on Buddhist ethics as a separate area of study are clearly owing to this adherence to western philosophical categories. Consequent studies in ethics in Buddhism too

appear to be done as a separate subject. While such a study within limits may be justifi able this fragmentary approach can pose diffi culties in understanding the overall nature of the teaching of the Buddha. There is a wealth of material in the teaching of the Buddha dealing with what we consider today meta-ethical issues. It would, however, be a serious misrepresentation

Thinking of Foundations and Justifi cation of Buddhist Ethics

if we consider Buddhism solely as a meta-ethical system. The primary emphasis of the teaching is the practice. The analysis is there only in so far it facilitates practice. Once we place the whole soteriological enterprise of the Buddha in its proper context this matter becomes clear.

The fundamental problematique, which the Buddha set upon fi nding a solution for was human suffering understood in a very deep sense. In a traditional Theravāda story we are told that the Prince Siddhartha saw an old man, a sick man and deceased body in three consecutive trips to his pleasure garden before he fi nally saw a religious person which suggested to him the way out of the human suffering he witnessed in its very concrete form. A more philosophical representation of what he witnessed is described in the following words by the Buddha:

Bhikkhus, before my enlightenment, while I was still a bodhisattva, not yet fully enlightened, it occurred to me: Alas, this world has fallen into trouble, in that it is born, ages, and dies, it passes away and is reborn, yet it does not understand the escape from this suffering [headed by] ageing and death. When now will an escape be discerned from this suffering [headed by] ageing and death?3

It is by seeing this deep rooted suffering that Prince Siddhartha decided to search for a solution for it. An understanding of human situation as characterized by unsatisfactoriness is behind this soteriological quest. In the Ariyapariyesana-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya the Buddha describes the

purpose of his renunciation of worldly life as “kiṃ kusalagavesī anuttaraṃ santivarapadaṃ pariyesamāno” (“in search of what is wholesome, seeking the supreme state of sublime peace”)4 . The emphasis is on what is wholesome and what is peaceful as goals. The term ‘kusala’ as we will see in the subsequent discussion is a key term in the teaching of the Buddha. It is given as both a means and an end. “The supreme state of sublime peace’ referred to here articulates the ultimate goal in value-laden terms. The life in kusala is prescribed as leading to the highest state of peace 3 Saṃyutta-nikāya (tr. Bhikkhu Bodhi 2000 p.601). 4 Majjhima-nikāya I p.163.

which is better known as nirvana, or the termination of suffering. This nirvana-orientedness of the entire teaching is often highlighted by the Buddha in the following words: Bhikkhus, before and even now I teach only suffering and its cessation.5 Furthermore, the entire teaching has been described as having only one taste, namely the taste of liberation (vimutti-rasa), which is the cessation of suffering. The following statement occurring in the Dhammapada (183) is meant to capture the essence of the teaching of the Buddha: Not doing any pāpa, practice of kusala, and purifi cation of one’s mind –this is the message of the Buddhas.

All three aspects of behaviour mentioned here are the domain of ethics. They constitute the normative ethics taught in Buddhism. The meta-ethical discussions available in the discourses are to elucidate the theoretical issues involving normative ethics. Simple elucidations and descriptions of ethics constitute a signifi cant segment of the discourses of the Buddha. This explains why it is not altogether right to discuss ethics as standing out on its own independently of the system. In fact the entire system can more accurately be described as a system of ethics. Understanding key concepts

With this broad context in mind we may now turn to what is usually being discussed as Buddhist ethics. Two key concepts pāpa or evil (deeds) and kusala or wholesome deeds were referred to in the Dhammapada stanza quoted above. The pair of puñña (punya: Sanskrit) and pāpa are pre-Buddhist concepts that basically refer to religious activities believed to produce good results in the life after death. These ideas have been absorbed to Buddhism, and lay people, in particular, were encouraged to abstain from pāpa and engage in ‘meritorious’ activities, and such behaviour was expected to make the samsaric journey smooth. The concept of kusala and its opposite akusala do not seem to have been known before the Buddha. The concepts of kusala and akusala seem to be the unique contribution of Buddhism to the ethical discourse. What is meant by the concept is wholesome behaviour which is devoid of attachment, aversion and delusion (lobha/rāga, dosa and moha). The distinction between

5 Saṃyutta-nikāya IV p.384; Majjhima-nikāya, I. p.140.

the two sets of concepts, puñña/pāpa and kusala/akusala has been comprehensively studied initially by P.D. Premasiri (1976 and 1990) and subsequently by scholars like Damien Kweon (1992), and hence I am not going to discuss this matter in detail here except for making a few comments. What may have been

clearly defi ned at the early stage of Buddhism seems to have got intermingled subsequently. Gradually the distinction seems to have got blurred. Consequently the two pairs of concepts were sometimes used interchangeably. Initially at least while puñña/pāpa seems to have represented the samsaric

dimension kusala/akusala may have represented the nirvanic dimension. Initially there seems to have been a clear distinction between sīla and puñña. Subsequently however the former was included within the latter as the second aspect along with dāna and bhāvana in ‘three meritorious deeds’. The signifi

cance of this inclusion is that sīla was primarily seen as a kind of puñña-kamma (meritorious act). The three-fold meritorious action in the Theravāda tradition includes dāna, sīla and bhāvana. When sīla was included within puñña the emphasis is on observing sīla as a means of acquiring merits. It is the

same with bhāvana. Both these aspects were originally meant to constitute the ‘three tarinings’ (tisso sikkhā), namely, sīla, samādhi, and paññā. The last two are to be achieved by means of bhāvana which is divided into two as samatha-bhāvana (calmmeditation) and vipassanā-bhāvana (insight-meditation) producing respectively samādhi (serenity) and paññā (understanding). Under the puñña category, however, both sīla and bhāvana were taken out of their

original soteriological context and were made puñña-generating activities which have direct relevance for one’s samsaric existence. The much discussed distinction of kammatic and nirvanic Buddhism, I believe, is not irrelevant. At least in the early form of Buddhism the practice characterized by the three meritorious deeds was meant for the householders whose main function was to provide the saṅgha with requisites (dāna) .6 Their sīla constituted in addition to the fi ve basic precepts, observing higher sīla on uposatha days. Bhāvana for them also seems to have meant something done occasionally. In the Kandaraka-sutta (Majjhima-nikāya 51) we have Pessa’s evidence

In the later Buddhist tradition we have inscriptional evidence of monks at times serving as dayakas.

that they too were engaged in higher religious activities from time to time (kālena kālam…). Thus practicing dāna, sīla and bhāvana as puñña was basically meant for the householders. The opposite category of pāpa too was applicable for the laity. Technically this cannot have been applicable to monks and nuns who were supposed to be away from pāpa behaviour by the very nature of their life. According to the Siṅgālovada-sutta (Dīgha-nikāya 31), it was one of the

functions of the religious people to keep laity away from pāpa (pāpa nivārenti). Sikkhā is a broad term which includes the entire process of training in the Path leading to nirvana. In the concept of ‘tisso sikkhā’ we know that all three aspects of the Path, sīla, samādhi and paññā are included, thus allowing a very broad spectrum for the concept. In the discourses, sikkhā has been given as synonymous with kiriyā and paṭipadā ( anupubba-sikkhā, anupubba-kiriyā, anupubba-paṭipadā…7 ), terms indicative of ways of behaviour and action. The trem ‘sikkhāpada’ refers to the specifi c articles of behaviour understood as rules regulating the ethical behaviour. The fi ve precepts (pañca-sīla) of the lay people and the rules of Patimokkha are examples for sikkhā-padas. Thus sīla is subsumed under sikkhā and understood as specifi c ways of physical and verbal behaviour characterized by abstinence from evil

acts and practice of virtues.8 The sīla as the basis or the beginning point of the Path refers primarily to the behaviour that is conducive for the fi nal goal. It is the basic rationality that one behaves in such a way that it would promote his fi nal goal and will not be detrimental to it. In this sense we can talk about validity of sīla without referring much its ethical value. What I am talking here is very similar to the validity we know in the context of

an argument. We say that an argument is valid only insofar as it follows logical rules and the conclusion is derived from its premises. In the same manner we can talk about the validity of sīla if it is conducive for attainment of the fi nal goal and the nature of the fi nal goal may be deduced from the overall character of the sīla. We know that a logically valid argument does not necessarily mean that it is also a sound argument. The soundness of an argument 7 A ṅguttara-nikāya IV p.201. 8 An excellent discussion of sīla, sikkhā and sikkhā-pada is available in J.D. Dhirasekera (1982) which unfortunately does not seem to have got its due attention.

depends on extra logical factors, and if the premises are true the conclusion drawn too has to be true and we take such an argument to be sound. The truth value of a premiss is a very complex issue involving theories of truth and the very defi nition of what it means to be true. Those who hold that ethical

statements are mere expressions of emotions of the speaker (emotivists) would not even grant meaningfulness to such statements, let along truth-value. Although there may be an emotive element in ethical statements, the type of hard-core emotivism being not fashionable any longer, we need not worry about it. Nevertheless, the question still remains: are there any true grounds for ethical statements? When we examine, for instance, statements of the nature

“it is good/bad…”, or “thou shalt not…” or “I undertake to observe…” it is obvious that inquiring about their truth-value is out of place. Nevertheless, we need some kind of justifi cation for these statements. Is this justifi cation with reference to some true state of affairs? Or is the justifi cation coming only from some internal consistency of the system? What I mean here is coherence of a particular statement with the totality of statements within the

system. But the problem is that coherence does not say much about a state of affairs as truly existing out there. The sīla appears to be in need of some objective basis for its justifi cation. We will come to this issue toward the end of this discussion. Going back to sīla as the basis of the Path (in tisso sikkhā) what is meant by sīla in this context is what has been described as cūlla-sīla, majjhima-sīla and mahā-sīla (minor, medium and great morality) in the key discourses such as Brahmajāla, Samaññaphala etc. of the Dīgha-nikāya and many other discourses. The focus of this sīla is the monastic life. In the context of the monastic life the sīla has been organized into the four divisions known as ‘the four purifi catory virtue’ (catu-pārisuddhi-sīla). The four kinds of sīla included under this category are: i. Sīla of restraining according to the Patimokkha rules (pātimokkha-saṃvara-sīla); ii. Sīla of restraining

faculties (indriya-saṃvara-sīla); iii. Sīla of purifi cation of livelihood (ājīva pārisuddhi-sīla); and iv. Sīla associated with acquisition and use of requisites (paccaya-sannissita-sīla). The fi rst contains the basic set of rules to be observed by a fully-admitted (upasampanna) monk or a nun, 220 for the former and 304 for the latter (excluding 7 adhikaraṇa-samathas). This provides the basic

system of rules (abhi-samācarika-sīla) to be observed, starting from the most serious category of defeats (pārājika) to sekhiyas involving minor matters of behaviour. Violation of these rules involves punishment. The rest of the three sīlas do not have rules the violation of which involves punishment in the

organizational or legal sense, but are directly related to the proper way of living a goal-oriented monastic life. Why should one follow these rules or observe this sīla? The answer is provided in the discourses. For example, the story of Raṭṭhapāla (occurring in the Raṭṭhapāla-sutta of the Majjhimanikāya), says that when the young and rich householder listened to the Buddha’s teaching highlighting that life is characterized by suffering caused by craving for pleasures and that one must get rid of this craving in order to achieve a life of happiness and freedom from suffering he becomes convinced; and decides that in order to realize this goal the monastic life is the most conducive. This is how he becomes a bhikkhu who by the very cat of becoming a bhikkhu is committed to observing the sīla discussed above. The question one can raise on this sīla is whether or not this particular behaviour

is consistent with the goal of freedom from suffering through freedom from craving, or whether or not it leads to such a goal?. If the answer is ‘yes’ then it is rational for one to adopt a way of life characterized by the fourfold sīla mentioned above. The criterion against which one has to test this sīla is the ultimate goal. By analyzing the content of the Pātimokkha-saṃvara-sīla this point may be made clearer. The most serious category of violations called

‘defeat’ comprises sexual intercourse, killing a human being, stealing, and pretending nonexistent spiritual attainments. Of these four rules we can understand without much refl ection why killing a human being has been counted among the most serious violations. Causing death is the most serious offence one can commit against another human being for the point of life is nothing other than living itself. To deprive a fellow human being of this basic

possession is surely abominable. Stealing too can be understood in a manner similar to the above. But what about having sex? How can it be such a serious offence as causing loss of one’s membership with the Saṅgha (the community of monks/nuns)? If we look at the act of having sex

from a neutral point of view we can see that there is nothing right or wrong about it. Only how one does it could make it socially acceptable or not or a crime or otherwise. In the Buddhist monastic discipline the sexual act has been taken as one of the most serious offences. The seriousness has been

determined with reference to its stake on the fi nal goal. When getting rid of all the desires is a crucial aspect of the means of achieving the goal one can understand why sexual behaviour forms one of the most serious offences. The rule has to be understood with reference to consistency to and coherence with the path.

It is useful to examine the relationship between violation of a monastic vinaya rule and pāpa/akusala. Of the four pārājikas, killing any living being which forms the fi rst of the physical pāpa acts is clearly a pāpa. Killing a human being is both a pāpa and a vinaya violation of the highest degree.

Killing anyone other than a human being is a lesser vinaya offence for a fully admitted monk. Stealing and pretending which is a form of lying too are pāpa. The case with the fi rst pārājika is different. Although having sex is an offence of the highest degree it has not been described as a pāpa. Having violated the fi rst rule if a monk or a nun were to continue to pretend to be a monk or a nun they can be guilty of pāpa behaviours of different sort. But

having committed the fi rst pārājika if the particular person were to vacate the Saṅgha he is only guilty of being week and ineffi cient but he is not guilty of committing a pāpa. One could say that although having sex is not a pāpa it could be an akusala for any act done with lobha, dosa and moha is akusala. While this is true we have also to remember that almost all forms of behaviour of ordinary unenlightened people come under this category.

The tradition, however, makes a distinction between lobha and abhijjhā and dosa and vyāpāda. What is considered to be pāpa is acts motivated by abhijjhā and vyāpāda, severe forms of lobha and dosa. Having lobha and dosa accompanied by moha is considered to be the ordinary human nature. The samsaric behaviour in general is taken as motivated by these three factors. Although they are akusala in the broad sense the ordinary life driven by these characteristics is not considered a life of pāpa although as a whole such a life is samsaric and not nirvanic; and does not lead to nirvana. In other words,

all akusala is not pāpa although all pāpa invariably qualifi es to be akusala for both categories are driven by lobha, dosa and moha. A puñña act performed with desire to be born in a divine abode is one basically driven by lobha and moha, and hence it cannot be a kusala. On the other hand, although driven by lobha and moha the act itself requires even temporarily a state devoid of lobha, dosa, and moha, thus making the particular act to be qualifi ed as a kusala act. Vipassanā meditation is a candidate for a kusala act which is not a puñña in the sense of being relevant to samsaric existence. With this admixture of both kusala and akusala elements a puñña act at best is a mixed act. Thus we are led to conclude that although all kusala acts are not puñña acts all puñña acts have an element of kusala in them.

Going back to our discussion on the vinaya rules we can see that certain offences considered most severe are not really pāpa. Such rules need to be understood only within the soteriological goal of the monastic life. In this context it is useful to introduce a broad distinction available in the Theravāda tradition. According to this distinction offences or forms of wrong behaviour are classifi ed as wrong by their very nature (pakati-vajja) and

wrong because the Buddha has established so (paṇṇatti-vajja). The fi rst category of behaviour is also called ‘loka-vajja’ or behaviour so considered in the world. Under the fi rst category acts such as killing, stealing etc. are included. It is under the second category that most of the monastic vinaya offences come. Discussing this distinction in the context of ten precepts (dasa-sīla) (usually observed by sāmaṇeras), the commentary to the Khuddaka-pātha

describes the fi rst fi ve as ‘arisen from defi nite akusala thoughts’ (ekanta-akusalacitta-samuṭṭhānattā…), and thereby allow us to have some idea as to why certain forms of behaviour were considered ‘wrong by nature’. Killing, stealing etc. are treated under this category for they originate from lobha, dosa and moha. The last fi ve of the ten precepts such as using high and valuable seats, taking meals at improper time etc have been described as paṇṇatti-vajja

for they are considered wrong because the Buddha has established them as so.9 Discussing this division in connection with vinaya rules the same commentator calls them ‘loka-vajja’ and says that it is these rules that the Buddha meant when he said that his disciples would 9 The Khuddaka-pātha (PTS) p.24.

not violate them even if they were to lose their life. Then he refers to rules involving sharing the same bed by two monks, and building monasteries etc., calls them paṇṇatti-vajja and indicates that the violation of such rules is less serious10 . In the Samantapasādikā, the commentary to the vinaya-pitaka, Budhaghosa describes the loka-vajja offences as ‘harmful’ (antarāyika) for both heaven and nibbāna, and paṇṇatti-vajja violation as not harmful in either

manner (anantarāyika = na+anatarāyika) 11. The above commentarial analysis in general goes along the line of pāpa and akusala discussed above. There is, however, some difference. In the above-analysis the Khuddaka-pātha commentator seems to include sexual behaviour and taking intoxicating liquor among the pakati-vajja offences. Even if we set

aside the dubious case of taking liquor the inclusion of sexual behaviour (not sexual misbehaviour as in the case of the usual fi ve precepts –pañca-sīla- meant for lay people) within this category is problematic. If this is correct then layman’s life amounts to something ‘defi nitely motivated by akusala’. This goes against the social values articulated by the Buddha in clear terms in discourses such as Siṅgalovada. Therefore I tend to differ from the

commentator in maintaining that sexual behaviour, involving violation of a defeat, should be included among the paṇṇatti-vajja and not among pakati-vajja. (The commentator in fact does not specify the kind of vajja involved in the fi rst pārājika.) Violation of such rules is not considered as pāpa per se. But they could amount to pāpa depending on one’s subsequent attitude and bahaviour toward them. But the pakati (loka)- vajja offences are considered to be pāpa

without any doubt. The most familiar classifi cation of such behaviour outside monastic vinaya is the ‘ten akusala acts’ comprising killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, telling lies, engaging in malicious gossip, harsh words, and empty talk, severe craving, severe anger and wrong views. The distinction between pakati (loka)-vajja and paṇṇatti-vajja offences looks similar to the distinction we make between morality as virtuous conduct and ethics as specifi ed conduct. The concept of

10 Ibid. p.190. 11 Samantapāsādikā , Vol.VII. p.1319.

professional ethics has been there in many societies for a long time12 . Certain ‘do’s and ‘don’t’s count only insofar as one is within a certain professional group. Once he is out of that profession one is not bound by such ethics. This concept of professional ethics is quite similar to the concept

of paṇṇatti-vajja as discussed above. A good number of vinaya rules come within the purview of ethics simply because they have been prescribed by the Buddha for those who enter the saṅgha. When one makes the choice to enter the Organization one becomes bound by these rules. They make sense basically

within the system, not barring the fact that some of these rules may become valid even in more general social contexts too. Thus the paṇṇatti-vajja aspect of the vianya can be described as monastic ‘professional’ ethics. The other category, namely, pakati (loka)-vajja, is considered as valid in general, thus providing an example for universally valid moral behaviour.

Foundations of Buddhist ethics

If we think along the lines of pakati (loka)-vajja and paṇṇatti-vajja, we can see that the latter classifi cation fi nds it meaning and signifi cance within the Buddhist monasticism. The specifi c mode of conduct exemplifi ed by paṇṇatti-vajja category is conducive to the nirvanic goal. Once one justifi es the desirability of the goal, the relevant behaviour insofar it is consistent with the goal, does not require any further justifi cation. What one needs to

justify is the goal. Once it is done only matter to be settled about behaviour is whether or not it is consistent with the goal. But there are some preliminary matters to be settled. For instance, in order to accept the Buddhist soteriology one has to be convinced that the world/reality is such that to adopt this way of life is the most rational thing to do. How does one get convinced of this-is it simply a matter of accepting what the Buddha says, or does it require anything further?

It is clear that one needs to have accepted certain basic propositions for him to opt for following the Buddha. For example if one is not convinced about the basic unsatisfactory character of human existence, or in other words, if one does not see the point of 12 The Kurudhamma-jātaka (# 275) refers to a prostitute who won the praise of others for her keenness on observing ethics of her profession despite the fact the moral status of the profession itself was questionable.

the fi rst two noble truths, namely, suffering and how it arises, one is not likely to become a follower of the Buddha. This has to be seen by oneself and it cannot be forced on anyone. Except for a very small number of people who entered the saṅgha at a very early age of their life or for some exceptional cases such as Nanda who could not say ‘no’ to the Buddha, all the others can be reasonably judged to have entered the saṅgha preceded by this

understanding. However, once they became the followers of the Buddha it seems that at least some of them had a tendency to develop a mentality of dependence on the Buddha characterizing unconditional willingness to accept what he said. For instance, the following occurs in a number of suttas: when the Buddha inquires from his disciples on certain matter they would respond to him with these words:

Venerable Sir, we have the Fortunate One as the root of the dhammas, (we are) to be guided by the Fortunate One, we have the Fortunate One as the refuge; therefore let the Fortunate One himself comprehend this; having listened from the Fortunate One the bhikkhus will learn 13. The instances of this nature betray a mentality of total dependence on the Buddha. But, on the other hand, as the Kīṭāgiri-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya

reveals, the following attitude, namely, “The Fortunate One is the guide, and I am the follower; the Fortunate One knows and I don’t14 ” marks a salutary stage which has to be passed on the way to realization. Based on this one can still claim that this dependence is only for providing guidance for the Path and not for the basic conviction that saṃsārā is suffering and that one must follow the Path in order to overcome this suffering. In the well-known Kālāma-sutta, the Buddha advises Kālāmas who were some sort of skeptics, to not accept anything unless they are convinced that it is morally good, or that what is

said does not generate lobha, dosa or moha. But the Kālāmas were clearly not an immediate group of disciples. The Vīmaṃsaka-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya (47) provides us with a different example. In 13 Bhagavaṃmūlakā no bhante dhammā bhagavaṃnettikā, bhagavaṃpaṭisaranā. Sadhu vata bhante bhagavantaññeva paṭibhātu etassa bhāsitassa attho. Bhagavato sutvā bhikkhū dhāressantīti. Aṅguttara-nikāya IV p. 158 14 Satthā bhagavā, sāvako’ham smi; jānāti bhagavā, nāhaṃ janāmi. Majjhima-nikāya I p.480.

this sutta which was addressed to his immediate monastic disciples the Buddha says that anyone who cannot read other’s mind15 must investigate the Buddha to make sure whether or not the Buddha is fully enlightened. In the like manner the Cūḷahatthipadopama-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya (27) emphasizes that one must not rest assured till one has direct personal experience on what one tries to establish. These instances should show that acceptance of the Path

and the resultant goal is not a matter of course. Such understanding/ conviction has to be based on evidence. However, once one is convinced about the Path and the goal that provides suffi cient basis and justifi cation for accepting and following the vinaya rules relevant to paṇṇatti-vajja. The concept of pakati-vajja seems to pose some interesting questions regarding the overall nature of Buddhist ethics. If some act is wrong by its very

nature, or if some behaviour is ‘intrinsically’ wrong then one does not need any extra justifi cation to accept it as so. The term pakati, the Sanskrit form of which is ‘prakrti’, is well known in Indian philosophy, and in the Samkya system, means the fundamental universal reality from which ‘purusha’ or individual atma originates. Although the commentator uses this metaphysically laden term he gives a psychological interpretation to it. As we saw in the

above discussion why certain offences were called pakati-vajja is because they originate from unmistakable akusala (ekanta-akusala -samuṭṭhānā). This connection of pakati to familiar akusala-mūla makes it unnecessary for us to go into search for metaphysical nuances of it. The very term ‘loka-vajja’ highlights the fact that what is considered as immoral or unethical is what is accepted to be so in the world, i.e. in the

society in general. This weight put on the world/ society poses the problem of relativity of ethics versus some kind of absolute set of ethics. If the criterion of good and bad is the world or the society this effectively means that it is the people in a particular society, their history and their tradition and conventions that serves as the foundation of ethics. Societies differ in their ways of thinking and ‘world making’, thus making a case for multiplicity of ethics in

15 I translate “parassa cetopariyam ajānantena” (M I 318) as “anyone who cannot read other’s mind” which contradicts the usual translation as referring to one who can read other’s mind. Although the long ‘a’ in ‘aajanantena’ does not support my translation the opposite is not supported by the context.

Thinking of Foundations and Justifi cation of Buddhist Ethics which it is quite possible that there are two mutually contradictory systems of ethics simultaneously at two different places. But then the use of such a strong term as ‘pakati-vajja’ seems to indicate quite the opposite. The commentators do not seem to have analysed these usages thoroughly. It seems that

they held a view to the effect that what is wrong by its very nature is so accepted by the world, and hence their equation of the two terms pakati and loka. The division of pakati and paṇṇatti-vajja, nevertheless, is a useful one. It is also useful in understanding the Buddha’s attitude to his own vinaya rules. Was the Buddha uncompromising about his own vinaya rules? The vinaya literature makes it very clear that the Buddha was not hesitant to change and

modify certain vinaya rules depending on the context. But rules revised by the Buddha exclusively belong to the category of paṇṇatti-vajja. Even in this category it is clear that he did not make modifi cations in what was considered to be the most serious. All the currently available Vinaya traditions belonging to eight different schools testify to the fact that the four pārājikas and thirteen saṅghadisesas remain unchanged16 . This, to all probability, is valid across all the Buddhist traditions, known and unknown. But the fact that some rules were revised is signifi cant. It is recorded in the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta (of the Dīgha-nikāya) that the Buddha on his death-bed gave permission to the saṅgha to change minor rules. This suggests that the Master was not absolutist regarding the proper monastic behaviour. But when we examine the actual instances of revision made by the Buddha for the vinaya

rules what we really see is that he was concerned about the practicality of what he prescribed. When what is related to paṇṇatti-vajja does not involve any akusala per se what the Buddha had to consider was the issues of practicality. When he found, for instance, that not wearing foot-ware was not convenient in remote areas he was not hesitant to revise the rule barring wearing foot-ware. To present this as an issue of relativism versus absolutism is to

misconstrue it. The real issue was whether any rule was practical or not. It is relevant in this context to remember that the Buddha 16 Mahisāsaka, Mahāsaṅghika, Dharmaguptika, Sarvastivada, Mulasarvastivada, Kashayapiya, Sammitiya, and Theravada-all these traditions are one in having 4 pārājikas and 13 saṅghādisesas for the bhikkhus.

while appreciating sīla rejected irrational adherence to such rules and practices (sīlabbata-parāmāsa). What we need to keep in mind is that these modifi cations were done with regard to paṇṇatti-vajja offences and not with regard to pakati (loka)-vajja offences.

It is clear that the vinaya rules involving latter kind of offences that amount to pāpa have been treated differently: there was no bargaining on the basis of practicality. Coming out from the context of vinaya rules and positioning ourselves on the larger territory of morality with puñña-pāpa dimension we see the same attitude of the Buddha. Pakati-vajja originating from akusala-mūla has to be wrong under any circumstance.

Now pakati-vajja is based on the familiar psychological explanation which is quite well known. Looking at the Buddhist ethics as a broad system, not merely as a set of vinaya rules, we need to inquire whether there is any broader ‘universal’ basis for its ethics assumed in the teaching of the Buddha. A prominent candidate for such a basis is viññu-purisa. When determining what is good and bad the Buddha very often put considerable weight on ‘[the view of] wise people’ – viññu purisa. The well-known Mettā-sutta says that one should not do even a small thing censured by the wise (na ca khuddaṃ samācare kiñci yena viññu pare upvadeyyuṃ). Acts are judged on whether they are censured (viññu-garahita) or praised (viññu-pasattha) by the wise. His teaching is to be understood by such people individually (paccattaṃ veditabbo viññuhi).Viññu seems to refer to knowledgeable, intelligent and wise people noted for their

integrity among their fellow members of society. On who viññu is K.N. Jayatilleke says the following: The viññu represented for the Buddha the impartial critic at the level of intelligent common sense and the Buddha and his disciples sometimes introduce the ‘viññu puriso’ or the hypothetical rational critic when it seems necessary to make an impartial and intelligent assessment of relative worth of confl icting theories (v. [see] M I 430ff., 515ff.17 )

But at the same time it is clear that there is no exact objective criterion to determine whether or not one is counted as viññu-purisa. 17 Jayatilleke (1963/2004) pp.229-230.

There can also be differences of opinion among different viññu-purisas. In particular when we think of various religious teachers lived during the time of the Buddha and also about the presence of various sramana and brahmana groups with divergent views determining who the viññu-purisa could have been a

pretty complex issue. Nevertheless the fact that viññu purisa is referred to often as the basis of determining right and wrong conduct suggests that there was a general consensus among the learned and the intelligent during the time of the Buddha on social morality in spite of their ideological differences.

The reference to viññu-purisa mentioned above is certainly not given as the sole criterion. Since application and utility of morality assumes a society of people, the Buddhist morality seems to derive its justifi cation mainly from certain fundamental commonalities shared by all living beings, not merely human beings. These commonalities are established based on certain considerations which are empirical in character. For example, the fi rst precept in the pañca-sīla, namely, refraining from killing, is justifi ed on the love all beings have for their life. This universal nature is described in the Dhammapada

in the following manner: Sabbe tasanti daṇḍassa sabbe bhāyanti maccuno Attānaṃ upamaṃ katvā na haneyya na ghātaye Sabbe tasanti daṇḍassa sabbesam jīvitaṃ piyaṃ Attānaṃ upamaṃ katvā na haneyya na ghātaye (Dhammapada 129-130) “All fear punishment; all fear death. Comparing with oneself, one should neither harm nor kill.

All fear punishment; life is dear to all. Comparing with oneself, one should neither harm nor kill.” The fi rst couplets of the two stanzas articulate the premise, namely the self-protective tendency all beings have for their life. The conclusion we derive from this premises is that we should neither harm nor kill any being. The same argument has been presented by the Buddha in commenting on a conversation King Kosala had with his queen, Mallikā. The King asked the Queen whether she had anyone she would love more than she would love herself. To this

question the Queen answered in the negative. On being asked by the Queen the King too gave the same answer. Later when the King reported this conversation to the Buddha he said the following:

Even if one were to survey all directions by mind one would not discover anyone dearer than oneself. In this manner for each person oneself is dearer. Therefore one who loves oneself should not harm others18. The conclusion drawn from self-love (atta-kāmā) is that one should not harm another who has a similar self-love (tasmā na himse param attakāmo). Similarly that beings love happiness (sukha-kāmāni bhūtāni…)19 and that they love happiness and despise pain (sukhakāmā dukkha-paṭikkūlā…)20 have been mentioned as a common characteristic of all beings. This too may be understood as supporting the same universal tendency.

In addition to this self-love existing in all beings, the discourses of the Buddha refer to some other characteristics of human nature which could be interpreted as proving the commonality of all beings. For instance, intimately connected with the self-protective tendency of all beings is their need for food or nutriment (āhāra). The Buddha says that “all beings subsist on nutriment” (sabbe sattā āhāraṭṭhitika21 ), and makes a comprehensive analysis of nutriment on which beings subsist. According to the Buddha there are four kinds of nutriment, namely, edible food (kabaḷīkāra-āhāra), contact (phassa-āhāra), mental volition (mano-sañcetanā-āhāra) and consciousness (viññāṇā-āhāra). A glance at this classifi cation shows that beings do not live by ‘bread’

alone. They need contacts for their senses, namely, for eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind they need forms, sounds, smells, tastes, tangible objects and mental phenomena (concepts). Mental volition is what lies behind human action for without volition (cetanā) there is no action. The last is consciousness

which again arises based on the fi ve sensory faculties plus mind as the mental faculty. While we consume edible foods for the sustenance of our physical body we consume all the time without stop food for our emotional and intellectual satisfaction. 18 Saṃyutta-nikāya I p.75. 19 Dhammapada 131 20 Majjhima-nikāya I p.341. 21 Khuddaka-pātha p.?

Going further deep the Buddha explains:

Monks, these four kinds of nutriment have what as their source, what is their origin, from what are they born and produced? These four kinds of nutriment have craving as their source, craving as their origin, they are born and produced by craving22 .

In this analysis beings consume food because they are driven by craving which, in turn, is the main cause of suffering. All (unenlightened) beings are one is undergoing suffering. And in their desire to end suffering and attain happiness too ultimately all beings and all human beings in particular share an identical emotional universe, confi rming thereby the universally shared nature of all beings.

Based on these universal characteristics of all beings in general and human beings in particular we can derive the fi ve precepts (pañca-sīla), the most basic and fundamental of moral life. Refraining from taking life (and any other lesser harm) can be directly derived from the emotion of self-love present in all beings. Stealing always involves something that belongs to someone other than oneself. Sexual misconduct has been defi ned as illicit relationship with someone else’s husband or wife or a woman who is under protection. Lying is to cheat someone else. In this manner all the vices associated with the fi rst four precepts can be established as so on the assumed universal commonalities of all beings including their self-love. The fi fth precept, one involving

taking intoxicating drinks, is considered unacceptable presumably not because it is wrong in itself but because it plays a crucial role in causing the rest of the four vices. These fi ve precepts are given as mandatory sīla for anyone becoming a follower of the Buddha. One moves to higher sīlas only subsequently. The Raṭṭhapāla-sutta of the Majjima-nikāya (82) lists four observations of reality and human nature understanding of which is believed to result in more radical forms of renunciation. When young and wealthy Raṭṭhapāla leaves behind all his wealth and opts to become a monastic follower of the Buddha the ruler of the area

22 Saṃyutta-nikāya II pp.11-12 [tr. Bhikkhu Bodhi, 2000. p.540].

becomes puzzled. Questioned by him Raṭṭhapāla says that he made his decision having seen four things taught by the Buddha about the world. They are: The world is unstable, it is swept away (upaniyyati loko addhuvo), the world is without protection, and without Over Lord (attano loko anabhissaro), the world

has nothing of its own, everything has to be left behind (assako loko sabbaṃ pahāya gamaniyaṃ), and the world is incomplete, insatiate, and slave to craving (ūno loko atitto taṇhā-dāso). The fi rst statement asserts that nothing in human life is certain or permanent. This is to affi rm impermanence, the

fi rst characteristic of reality in the teaching of three signata (ti-lakkhana). The second asserts that there is no God to protect anyone in the world and that in this sense no beings have any real protection (from outside). The third is a corollary of the fi rst, and says that one has to leave behind everything and has to depart from this life fi nally. The last most importantly asserts the incomplete –ness of all human beings which is the direct result of craving or ‘thirst’ (taṇhā). When further questioned by the King, Raṭṭhapāla establishes the validity of these claims with reference to King’s own life. He gets the King to see that each of these assertions is true and valid with reference to his own life. Therefore the assertions are not meant to be accepted as dogmatic truths. The verifi cation of these assertions is one’s life itself which, in other words, means one’s own personal experience. What the

King sees as valid for his own life is presented in the discourse not as individual-based truths but as truths to be applicable to all living beings. What is applicable to one person, or what seems to be applicable to all the known living beings at any given moment is considered to be applicable to all. In this sense we may take these assertions as inductive generalizations confi rmed by experience. For Raṭṭhapāla seeing these four realities was behind his

decision to renounce his worldly life and assume a life of a mendicant working for freedom from samsaric suffering. Whether everyone who listened to the Buddha would have made the same decision is not a matter of logical necessity. The conclusion does not derive from the premises as a logical necessity. In fact one could even draw a conclusion totally opposite to that of Raṭṭhapāla from these premises. But the premises have been presented as universally available. The rationality of the choice depends on the overall attitude

to life one has developed. Speaking from a Buddhist point of view we may say that such a decision as that of Raṭṭhapāla comes from the maturity in spiritual preparation in the saṃsārā and it seems natural, given the raw character of ordinary puthujjanas, that only Raṭṭhapāla made this choice at this particular occasion. Raṭṭhapāla’s decision was quite radical in terms of things he had to sacrifi ce and the changes he had to make in his own life as well as disruption it caused in the lives of others who associated with him. There may have been many others who were equally convinced of the truthfulness of this state of affairs of the samsaric life but were not able to make a similar decision. Yet, consequent to this understanding, they must have made adjustments of lesser degree in their ways of thinking and modes of life. Whether one were to follow the Path as a bhikkhu or as a householder, or not

follow the Path at all, seems to have depended not necessarily on understanding but also on factors such as social circumstances, level of their own spiritual maturity and the like. Whatever these peripheral states of affairs the morality itself, as revealed in the above discussion seems to be based on certain shared characteristics of reality. Such characteristics are understood as subsumed in the ‘three universal characteristics of reality’, namely,

impermanence, unsatisfactoriness, and no-soulness. Although the Buddhist morality may not be absolutist in theistic sense it is clear that within the conceptual universe governed by the understanding of three characteristics (ti-lakkhana) Raṭṭhapāla’s decision has been given as undoubtedly correct. The foundations of morality were thus expected to be seen by oneself in relation to one’s own life and the nature of life in general. It is clear that the

ethics/morality advocated by the Buddha did not come as inviolable injunctions similar to those in a theistic religious system. The general attitude of Buddhism to authority, personal or non-personal, and the attitude of the disciples toward the Buddha himself have been discussed in detail by scholars23 . What has been discussed mainly in the context of epistemology seems relevant in ethics. Thus one who follows the Path is expected to do so not because one has special obligation for the Buddha, or because one is scared of violating a rule prescribed by the Buddha. The function of karma as taught by the Buddha has nothing to do with the Buddha

23 K.N. Jayatilleke (1963): see chapters iv and viii.

or any other person for that matter 24. It works subject to the law of dependent co-origination (paticca-saṃmuppāda). Following the Path as a bhikkhu by observing the pāṭimokkha rules or living the life of a householder observing the fi ve precepts is understood as a voluntary act. The Buddha does not come to the picture either as infl ictor of punishment or a dispenser of rewards. In other words, there is no such a thing as ‘sinning against the Buddha’ in the

Buddhist tradition. By violating a moral precept of the nature of the pañca-sīla one is only violating a promise given to oneself and it is a moral act the consequence of which one has to bear by oneself alone. Violation of vinaya rules by bhikkhus and bhikkhunis is dealt with by the Saṅgha as a matter of

vinaya. The function of karma has no connection to this ‘legal’ procedure. Does this seemingly ultra-rational attitude prevail all the time? Does Buddhism reject the need for an authority altogether in one’s moral life? The answer

does not seem to be a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’. The emotion of fear (ottappa or bhaya) is known to play a role in religious life. It does not seem to be different in Buddhism too. The idea of ‘fear for the saṃsārā’ (saṃsārā-bhaya) is an emotion valued in the tradition. saṃsārā includes various types of dangers one will have to undergo in the samsaric journey including being born in where there is no happiness (apāya/niraya =hell [apa+aya/ nir+aya = place without income]). The discourses refer to four kinds of fear relevant for this context 25. They are the fear of being censured by oneself (attanuvada-

bhaya), the fear of being censured by others (parānuvāda-bhaya), fear of punishment (daṇḍa-bhaya) and the fear of bad destiny (duggati-bhaya). All these four fears are described as sentiments that help one to stay focused in one’s spiritual life. It is interesting to note that the commentarial tradition defi nes the term ‘bhikkhu’ with reference to the fear for the saṃsārā 26. It is this fear that motivates one to follow the Path properly as 24 The concept of Yama as the king of the hell responsible for punishing the wrong-doers has been accommodated in the discourses with some unease for the

presence of someone over and above the karma causation does not go well with the Buddhist karma theory. The Devaduta-sutta (Majjhima-nikāya: 130) makes a good compromise by maintaining that Yama, by being himself condemned to condemn others, is undergoing the result of a bad karma committed by himself. See Tilakaratne (2003) for a detailed discussion. 25 A ṅguttara-nikāya II pp.121-3. 26 Saṃsāre bhayaṃ ikkhatiti bhikkhu: A bhikkhu is one who perceives fear in the saṃsārā. Visuddhimagga p.3.

a bhikkhu/bhikkhunī, or live a simple religious life as a householder. The difference in this emotion of fear and that of God or any other supernatural being is whereas the former has no reference to a person, the latter is centred on a person. Along with fear is mentioned moral scruple (hirī or

lajja=sense of shame), and the two have been described as ‘divine qualities’ (deva-dhamma) for their crucial role is one’s moral life. The concept of superiority (adhipateyya) plays a similar role in the fi eld of morality. In a way this concept answers the question: why should one lead a moral life? The moral life in this context is not exclusively that of a bhikkhu, but the moral life in general. The Dhamma gives three reasons, namely, the

superiority of oneself (atta-adhipateyya), the superiority of the world (loka-adhipateyya), and the superiority of the Dhamma (dhamma-adhipateyya)27. In the absence of any superior divine power from where laws originate one is at one’s own initiative to lead a moral life. But there are forces to be recognized as providing safeguards for one’s moral life. The fi rst is to refl ect on one’s own status as one who has dedicated one’s life for the practice

of the Path and make a resolution to stay focused on the Path. One’s own conscience which blames one when one behaves wrongly too has been mentioned in the discourses as a moral safeguard. The second is the religious people with developed faculties and powerful divine beings who are capable of penetrating one’s mind. In a broad sense this refers to the external world which observes one’s behaviour. For example, for a bhikkhu this could be one’s own community

of fellow bhikkhus or the lay society that supports him. The viññu-purisas of the society too may be included in this category. Of the fears mentioned above the fi rst and the second, namely, fear of being censured by oneself and others seem to correspond to these two kinds of superiority. The last is the Dhamma taught by the Buddha. This could also mean what is right and good in a universal sense. When taken from this broad sense, it has been said that one should rather lose one’s life than violating the Dhamma28 . This last seems to provide the ultimate basis for the moral life. 27 A ṅguttara-nikāya I pp 147-150. 28 Dhanaṃ caje aṅgavarassa hetu – aṅgaṃ caje jīvitaṃ rakkhamāno Aṅgaṃ dhanaṃ jīvitaṃcāpi sabbaṃ – caje naro dhammamanussaranto (Visuddhimagga, p.47) (let one leave wealth for the sake of physical limbs. Let one leave physical limbs for the sake of life. Let one leave everything, wealth, physical limbs and life, for the sake of Dhamma.)

The former two also seem to rest on the last for the basis on which one’s own self or the world blames someone is the Dhamma.

The signifi cance of this classifi cation is that it shows that Buddhism does not reject the idea of superiority or the need to have a sense of being subordinate to some higher authority in one’s moral life. According to this analysis one needs to obey some authority as providing check on one’s moral life. But this authority is not any particular person, nor is it a god capable of infl icting punishment on those who violate such rules.

Conclusion

In a theistic system the sense of fear toward the creator God and his possible punishment work as a deterrent against violating rules. At the same time possibility of reward from the same source works as an incentive for good behaviour. It is clear that these concepts do not operate in the same manner in

Buddhism. But the concepts of superiority and fear mentioned above appear to be playing a similar role in the moral life of one who follows the Path. For example, being born in a duggati is the ‘punishment’ one receives for being immoral. The karmic causation however is a natural process for which personal intervention is not needed. This way of understanding shows that for the Buddha mere observance of morality without right view (sammā-diṭṭhi) is of not much use. As our preceding discussion showed sīla as ethics is an integral aspect of the path leading to nirvana. When one moves higher in the Path one takes it along and does not leave it behind. The completion of the Path is the culmination of kusala by shedding all akusala. Any form of existence or bhava, be it the bhava of pleasure, fi ne materiality or immateriality it is a result of lobha which is a root of akusala. The ultimate goal is to be free

from all forms of existence. During the time of the Buddha it seems that all or majority of those entered the saṅgha strived to achieve the fi nal goal in their very life itself. Consequently to be born in a pleasant destiny (sugati) was not an option for them. Hence they were not interested in practicing meritorious deeds such as dāna, sīla and bhāvana or to put it more accurately, they did not practice these three as meritorious deeds. There is evidence in the discourses to the effect that those who lived the holy life for the sake of worldly pleasures were laughed at by

their fellow practitioners. The case of the householders was different. For them the goal was to live a good life here in this world and hope for a good destiny after death. (According to the Sigalovada-sutta, one of the ‘duties’ of the religious people toward the householders, who supply them with requisites, is to teach the way to heaven.) The distinction of puñña/pāpa was more meaningful with this way of life. The co-existence between nirvana as the immediate goal and the lay life were not considered to be an easy task. The best form of life for one who is intent on nirvana was to leave home and move into homelessness. In the story of Raṭṭhapāla discussed above his parents remind him that he can both live a good life (life of pleasures) and engage in meritorious deeds with his vast fortune. His wives inquire about the divine damsels for the sake whom, they presume, Raṭṭhapāla was to leave them behind. The attitude of parents and wives represent the samsaric dimension of observing morality. But for Raṭṭhapāla saṃsāra was not an option. Hence he

was not interested in puñña; nor was he interested in divine damsels he was to get in return for his puñña. Nevertheless, a person who is devoted to a life of puñña is undoubtedly an ethical/moral person. Likewise a person who observes the basic fi ve precepts also is an ethical/moral person. But kusala captures a different dimension. This is purely the nirvanic dimension, and if our present ethical discourse cannot adequately capture it the problem is not with this radically different ethical category. It is true that the path of the Buddha in its proper sense is one leading directly to nirvana. But the

practical reality starting from the time of the Buddha himself was that there grew up a group of lay people who, while ideally participated in the ideal of nirvana, had to strive to have it both ways. What we fi nd mostly in the traditional Buddhist societies today, among both the lay people and the monks and nuns, is the practice of puñña with the wish that it will bring about the fi nal goal nirvana, of course as the very fi nal thing after enjoying all the imaginable pleasures both human and divine!

Selected Bibliography Otherwise specifi ed, all Pāli works are the PTS versions.

Bodhi, Bhikkhu., 1995/2001, The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, USA, Wisdom Publications.
________., 2000, The Connected Discourses of the Buddha, USA, Wisdom Publications. Dhamasīri, G., 1986, Fundamentals of Buddhist Ethics, Singapore, The Buddhist Research Society.

Dhirasekera, Jotiya., 1982, Buddhist Monastic Discipline, Colombo, Ministry of Higher Education Research Publication Series.
Harvey, Peter., 2000, An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Jayatilleke, K. N., 1963/2004, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, New Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass.
________., 1972/1984, Ethics in Buddhist Perspective, Kandy, Buddhist Publications Society.


Kalupahana, D. J., 1995, Ethics in Early Buddhism, Honolulu, Hawaii, University of Hawaii Press.
Keown, Damien., 1992, The Nature of Buddhist Ethics, London, Macmillan. King, Winston L., 1964, In the Hope of Nibbāna, La sale, Open Court.
Misra, G. S. P., 1984, Development of Buddhist Ethics, Delhi, Munshiram Manoharlal.

Prebish, Charles., 2000, “From Monastic Ethics to Modern Society” Contemporary Buddhist Ethics, ed., Damien Keown., 2000, London, Rutledge, Pp.37-56.
Premasiri, P. D., 1976, “Interpretation of Two Principle Ethical Terms in Early Buddhism” Sri Lanka Journal of the Humanities, June, pp.63-74.


________., 1990, “Ethics” Encyclopaedia of Buddhism Vol. V, Colombo, The Government of Sri Lanka. Saddhātissa, H., 1970/2003, Buddhist Ethics, Boston, Wisdom Publications.
Spiro, M. E., 1982, Buddhism and Society: A Great Tradition and its Burmese Vicissitudes, Berkeley, University of California Press. (2nd expanded edition)


Tachibana, S., 1926/1986, The Ethics of Buddhism, New Delhi, Cosmo Publications.
Tatz, Mark., 1986, Asanga’s Chapter on Ethics with the Commentary of Tsong-Kha-pa, The Basic path to Awakening, The Complete Bodhisatva. Studies in Asian Thought and Religion, Vol.4., New York, Lewiston.
Tilakaratne, Asanga., 2003, “Buddhist non-theism: Theory and Practice”, Approaching the Dhamma: Buddhist Texts and Practices in South and Southeast Asia, ed., Ann Blackburn and Jeffrey Samuels, Seattle, USA, Pariyatti Publishers. Pp.125-149.
 

Wijesekera, O. H. de A., Buddhist Ethics, Knowledge and Conduct: Buddhist Contributions to Philosophy and Ethics, Kandy, Buddhist Publications Society, pp.1-24.