‘DEVELOPMENTAL’ VERSUS ‘REVELATORY’ SOTERIOLOGY IN THE KĀLACAKRA TANTRA

‘DEVELOPMENTAL’ VERSUS ‘REVELATORY’ SOTERIOLOGY IN THE KĀLACAKRA TANTRA

JOHN NEWMAN

“Sentient beings are Buddhas…” Śrī!Kālacakra

Introduction

In what sense, if any, does buddhahood pre-exist in sentient beings? Traditional Tibetan Buddhist scholars and contemporary Buddhologists both consider this a key doctrinal issue in their reconstructions of late Indian Buddhism. One line of interpretation – which I designate as the ‘revelatory model’ – holds that buddhahood is innate to sentient beings, and the path is primarily a process of removing impediments to the full manifestation of a primordially awakened condition. Another school of thought – advocating a ‘developmental model’ – believes that sentient beings have a natural capacity to achieve buddhahood, but buddhahood

1 Śrī!Kālacakra!5.66a (U 3.37.28): sattvā!buddhā… This verse of the tantra!is also quoted and discussed at Vimalaprabhā!5.3.127 (U 3.90.15–26). The words sattvā!buddhā! are also found at Hevajra!2.4.69a, 64ab. Compare Hevajra!2.4.64, 69–75; Śrī!Kālacakra!

5.66–67; Vimalaprabhā!5.3.127 (U 3.90.15–26); Bodhicāryāvatāra!6.112 ff. Śrī![Kālacakra]]! 5.67c appears to be modelled after Bodhicaryāvatāra!1.16ab and 1.15ab. Cf. Ri!chos!nges! don!rgya!mtsho!(1) 96.4 ff., (2) 58.1 ff.

itself is largely newly created, and the path centers on the purification and transformation of an ordinary person’s constituents into a perfected state.3 To state the obvious, Tibetan masters developed an entire spectrum of views on this issue. This diversity certainly reflects – to an as yet undetermined extent – the range of ideas that existed in the late Indian Buddhist tradition.

This paper briefly examines the Kālacakra tantra’s position on this issue. The Kālacakra appeared in northern India during the early decades of the 11th century, and it was promoted by Piṇḍo (10th–11th cent.), Nāropāda (died ca. 1040 CE) and other Vajrayāna ācāryas of this period. Because from its very origin the Kālacakra engendered controversy within the Vajrayāna tradition, investigation of its doctrines sheds light on the interests and ideas of some of the Vajrayāna’s leading figures.

As is the case throughout the Mahāyāna, the Kālacakra’s doctrines regarding buddhahood are embedded in an intricate tapestry of ideas on philosophy and soteriology. This essay is a small part of a much larger project on the relationship between philosophy and mysticism in the Kālacakra. Here we will only touch upon issues that call for extensive explication.

3 See, e.g., Makransky 2004: 78: “In Indian Yogācāra and later Madhyamaka treatises, the three kāya!doctrine was associated with a developmental model of path: Buddhahood is to be attained by the radical transformation of all aspects of a person’s defiled consciousness into Buddha kāyas!and wisdoms. Mahāyāna texts whose central teaching was Buddha nature (tathāgatagarbha), on the other hand, emphasized a discovery model of path: Buddha kāyas!manifest automatically as the mind is purified, for the very essence of mind (Buddha nature) is already replete with their qualities.” I employ the nomenclature revelatory!instead of discovery!because it seems to me that innate buddhahood is ‘revealed’ to disciples rather than being independently ‘discovered’ by them.

Philosophical view

In order to understand the Kālacakra’s buddhology – its doctrine of buddhahood – one must first understand its philosophical view. In agreement with masters such as Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, the Kālacakra advocates Madhyamaka (see Newman 1992). In the Kālacakra’s presentation of Madhyamaka, things exist dependently, and they are devoid of intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva). Whereas the Vijñānavādin or Yogācāra position holds that consciousness free from falsely imagined object-subject duality is ultimately existent (paramārthasat), the Mādhyamika counters that such a putative ultimately existent consciousness is as nonexistent as a lotus born from the sky, because it is devoid of any sort of intrinsic nature (Newman 1992: 231). Nothing is ultimately existent (paramārthasattābhāvāt) (Vimalaprabhā!1.5.1d [U 1.44.23]; Newman 2000: 594).

The Kālacakra strongly emphasizes that the ultimate nature of things is their lack of intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva). Nāropāda, citing the Vimalaprabhā, says: “Due to the nonexistence of intrinsic nature [things are] ‘empty.’ The existence of that ‘empty’ is emptiness” (SUṬ 69.18: svabhāvābhāvataḥ!śūnyam!/ tasya!śūnyasya!bhāvaḥ!śūnyatā). Again, the Vimalaprabhā!says: “The Tathāgata gnosis is indeed awakened to the lack of intrinsic nature of all phenomena”

(Vimalaprabhā!5.3.127 [B 195a1; U 3.77.26–27]: tāthāgataṃ!jñānaṃ!sarvadharmāṇāṃ!niḥsvabhāvatāvabodhanaṃ!nāma). In the Kālacakra’s ontology, the universe’s lack of intrinsic nature is its ultimate reality (paramārthasatya), whereas its phenomenal, relational functionality is its phenomenal reality (saṃvṛtisatya). Thus, everything bears a two-fold character: from the phenomenal perspective, things originate, exist, and disappear, but because they are devoid of intrinsic nature, they are like magical illusions (see Sekoddeśa! 97cd–98 with the comments of Nāropāda, SUṬ 178.6–15; and Sādhuputra Śrīdharānanda,

Sekoddeśaṭippaṇī!135). The mutually dependent relationship of these two dimensions of reality is expressed in the following formula found in the Vimalaprabhā: “The phenomenal is embodied in emptiness; emptiness is embodied in the phenomenal” (Vimalaprabhā! 1.5.1d [U 1.43.26]: saṃvṛtiḥ!śūnyatārūpiṇī!śūnyatā!saṃvṛtirūpiṇī; Newman 2000: 593).

Buddhology

With this sketch of the Kālacakra philosophical view in place, we can turn our attention to the Kālacakra buddhology. The Kālacakra adopted the four-kāya!model of buddhahood following Haribhadra’s Madhyamaka interpretation of the Abhisamayālaṅkāra!(see n. 8 below). As John Makransky has shown, in place of earlier Mahāyāna three-kāya!models of buddhahood, Haribhadra put forth the view that one must differentiate the uncreated (asaṃskṛta) from the created (saṃskṛta) elements that make up a Buddha. While it is apparent that the sambhogakāya! and the nirmāṇakāya!are created because they are phenomenal and active, the dharmakāya!is more problematic – it seems to contain both created and uncreated components. To resolve this issue, Haribhadra identifies the uncreated emptiness of a Buddha as its svābhāvikakāya, and retains the term dharmakāya!to indicate the collection of special gnoses, powers, faculties and so forth that are created and attained through the practice of the path (Makransky 1997: 216–218 et seq.).

The differentiation of svābhāvikakāya!from dharmakāya!forms the background to a key passage in Nāropāda’s Sekoddeśaṭīkā!(SUṬ) that lies at the heart of this paper. In this passage Nāropāda explains the relationship between mahāmudrā!and buddhahood. It is worth noting that while more than half of the Sekoddeśaṭīkā!is a pastiche of quotations (see Sferra, SUṬ 21), this section of the text seems to present Nāropāda’s own words. Because of its importance to the issue at hand, I present a translation of the entire passage, and then attempt to explicate some of its major points. [For the Sanskrit see the Appendix; cf. Gnoli and Orofino 1994:

Because it is great and because it is a seal, it is the mahāmudrā!(“great seal”). Again, its greatness is its quality of being [[[emptiness]]] endowed with the best of the totality, its not being limited. It is a seal because it is stamped by adamantine awakening mind… The resultant mahāmudrā!is a mudrā! because it gives (rāti) – constantly bestows – the delight (mudam) that is the characteristic of the gnosis of supreme imperishable bliss, due to their unwavering union in the state of completion. And its greatness is due to the greatness of its abandonment and the greatness of its attainment. Among those two, the greatness of its abandonment is its characteristic of actualizing the luminosity called “natural” (svābhāvika) that has as its characteristic the abandonment of all obscurations together with their propensities. The greatness of its attainment, on the other hand, is its nature of actualizing the completely purified kāya!called “integration” (yuganaddha) that consists of all the Buddha qualities.

It is declared: “That very actualization of the luminosity that is homogenized (ekarasa) with emptiness – which is like the sky from which all the defilement of darkness, mist and so forth has vanished – is the attainment of all the Buddha qualities (buddhadharma), because all Buddha qualities are present in that due to the nature of its power to effect all aims without exception. For this very reason, the kāya!that is the basis of the qualities is the dharmakāya.” With regard to that, if one holds the position that [the Buddha qualities] are attained even when they are not appearing, it would be difficult to avoid the absurd consequence that one would find a cloth and so forth in the appearance of a pot. Moreover, there would be no refutation at all for the Sāṃkhya view.

Also, the authentic vision of the entirety of the aggregates, elements, cognitive spheres, and so forth – which is like a magical illusion, a dream, a city of the gandharvas, a divination, etc. – is called the vision of phenomenal reality and the self-empowerment. And just that phenomenal reality completely purified by the luminosity that is of the nature of ultimate reality is the host of deities that are the inhabitants – Vairocana, etc., whose natures are the mirror

gnosis, etc. – and the habitat mandala of the mansion and so forth. That very [[[mandala]] of purified phenomenal reality] is extolled in all Kings of Tantra as the transcendental mandala and as the one whose nature is all the Buddha qualities. And just this is said to be “the one called integration” (yuganaddha) whose basic nature is a cognition of the nonduality of the two realities. Therefore, a yogi should personally know that the yuganaddhakāya!itself is the dharmakāya!that is different from the sāmbhogika- and svābhāvika[[[kāyas]]].

It hardly needs stating that this passage references a multitude of topics that cannot be addressed here. With respect to the subject under discussion, my understanding of Nāropāda’s position is as follows: The Kālacakra presupposes the general Mahāyāna view that mind is naturally luminous, and the affective and cognitive defilements are adventitious. (See, e.g., Pramāṇavārttika!Pramāṇasiddhi!210cd: prabhāsvaram!idaṃ! cittaṃ!prakṛtyāgantavo!malāḥ.) When, at the culmination of the path (pūrṇāvasthā), all defilements have been definitively, permanently extinguished and the mind cognizes the absence of intrinsic nature of the entire universe, the mind’s luminosity is designated as the svābhāvika- or “natural” kāya. In this cognition emptiness and luminosity are blended in a

homogenized state such that the ultimate reality of absence of intrinsic nature and the mind’s natural luminosity are experientially indistinguishable. The dharmakāya! is designated here as the yuganaddhakāya, “the Embodiment of Integration.” It is the phenomenal components of the person – the aggregates and so forth – when they have been purified and transformed through an “authentic” (akalpita) – i.e., nonconceptual – cognition of both their phenomenal reality and their ultimate reality, their lack of intrinsic nature. In the Vajrayāna approach, these components of the person and the world are represented in the form of the five Jinas and other parts of the mandala.

Nāropāda takes pains to distinguish the svābhāvika- and dharmakāyas because, like Haribhadra, he is determined to prevent conflation of the two realities, a distinction that lies at the heart of the Madhyamaka view. The experiential content of svābhāvikakāya!is strictly ultimate reality, such that phenomenal things – including the phenomenal properties of the Buddha – do not appear to it. Thus, svābhāvikakāya!cannot be understood as another name for dharmakāya – as is the case in the three-kāya! model – because this would incoherently entail that phenomenal properties would appear within that which is exclusively ultimate, analogous to finding a cloth in a place occupied by a pot.

Likewise, during the path phase nonconceptual, nondual realization of emptiness – the gnosis that eventually develops into the svābhāvikakāya – functions to purify the aggregates, etc., so as to transform them into the Buddha gnoses and other Buddha qualities of the dharmakāya. Thus, dharmakāya!cannot be identical with svābhāvikakāya, or else one falls into the Sāṃkhya view of satkāryavāda – that the effect!(the collection of purified phenomenal things [[[saṃvṛtisatya]]] that constitutes the dharmakāya) pre-exists in its cause!(luminosity homogenized with emptiness [śūnyataikarasaprabhāsvara], which is of the nature of ultimate reality [paramārthasatyātmakaprabhāsvara]) (cf. Gnoli and Orofino 1994: 315, n. 1).

Pre-existent versus developed buddhahood

Thus far we have approached our issue from the perspective of the culmination of the path – buddhahood. When looked at from the other end, the Vimalaprabhā!is clear that buddhahood does not somehow pre-exist in sentient beings. Discussing the significance of the Buddha’s conquest of Māra, Kalkin Puṇḍarīka says: Regarding [the Buddha’s defeat of Māra], if there was not first buddhahood (ādau!buddhatvābhāve), no one among gods, demi-gods and humans could defeat Māra. Also, one who is primordially fully awakened cannot do it (ādyabhisambuddho!’pi!na!karoti), because [the condition of being fully awakened] is the absence of all obscuration. And one does not [defeat Māra and become fully awakened] simultaneously: at the moment there is Māra, there is no buddhahood, because the mind is obscured. At the moment there is buddhahood, there is no Māra, because the mind is without obscuration… The so-called ‘Māra’ is sentient beings’ samsaric mind defiled by propensities. The so-called ‘buddhahood’ is mind that is separate from samsaric propensities. And thus the Bhagavān said in the [[[Aṣṭasāhasrikā]]-]Prajñāpāramitā: “The mind which is non-mind, that mind exists.” That very natural luminosity is devoid of samsaric propensities. Thus, Māra is defiled mind; Buddha is mind whose defilement has disappeared.

A parallel passage from the fifth chapter of the Vimalaprabhā!restates this:

Here, if buddhahood was prior and the defeat of Māra later, then a Buddha would not be without obscuration because [after buddhahood one would still] be attacked by Māra. But if the defeat of Māra was prior and buddhahood later, then other samsaric persons would defeat Māra without buddhahood. And likewise, if [you say] the defeat of Māra is simultaneous [with buddhahood], then [we say] the defeat of Māra could not be accomplished simultaneously: At the moment there is Māra there cannot be buddhahood because the mind has obscuration; at the moment there is buddhahood there is no Māra because [[[buddhahood]]] is the extinction of all obscuration.

To restate this as we understand it: If buddhahood did not exist – i.e., if there were no Buddhas to teach the path – then sentient beings could not independently ‘defeat Māra’ and actualize buddhahood. However, buddhahood does not primordially exist within sentient beings’ defiled minds because by definition it is mind free from the obscuration of samsaric propensities. Thus, the removal of obscuration (the ‘defeat of Māra’) and the actualization of buddhahood are sequential.

These passages are conclusive evidence that the Kālacakra does not subscribe to the notion of pre-existent buddhahood. Instead, in keeping with ‘mainstream’ Indian Mahāyāna thought, buddhahood is developed through the gradual elimination of the affective and cognitive defilements that obscure the essenceless, luminous nature of the mind. This process of purification effects a transformation of the mental and physical components that constitute a person, transmuting them from a defiled, samsaric state into a purified, perfected, fully awakened state.

Conclusion

We conclude with some observations on the reception of the Kālacakra in India and Tibet. Legends recounting the ‘introduction’ of the Kālacakra in India suggest that it first gained academic acceptance at Nālandā early in the 11th century, during the period the Śrī!Kālacakra!and the Vimalaprabhā – the principal texts of the system – were completed.

According to Abhayākaragupta (flourished late 11th–early 12th cent.),

“some learned persons” – unnamed – rejected the Kālacakra and “The Trilogy Corpus of Bodhisattva Commentaries” (see below) for teaching non-Buddhist doctrines. Commenting on this remarkable statement, the Tibetan scholar mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang (1385–1438) says it is “well known” that these critics included the famous master Shanti (i.e., Ratnākaraśānti; 10th–11th cent.) “and many other Indians” (Newman 1987: 107–110). As John Makransky has demonstrated, Ratnākaraśānti subscribed to the three-kāya!model of buddhahood, and rejected Haribhadra’s four-kāya!model discussed above (Makransky 1997: 269–279). Clarification of this issue awaits a study of Ratnākaraśānti’s ideas in comparison with those of the Kālacakra. Since the advent of the Kālacakra and the careers of Nāropāda and Ratnākaraśānti were all contemporaneous, such a study is likely to shed light on an important period in the intellectual history of Vajrayāna Buddhism.

Turning to Tibet, the Kālacakra is perhaps most famous for the central position it occupies in the Jo nang master Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal msthan’s (1292–1361) formulation of the gzhan! stong! view (Stearns 1999: 1 ff.). In his epoch-making, seminal work Ri!chos!nges!don!rgya! mtsho, Dol po pa repeatedly states that his absolutistic, innatist, revelatory model of buddhahood is founded on his understanding of the Kālacakra literature and the associated works of “The Trilogy Corpus of Bodhisattva Commentaries” (Sems! ’grel! skor! gsum).16 David Seyfort Ruegg has suggested: “…the Jo naṅ pa theory was inspired to a great extent by the Tantric notion of the immanence of buddhahood, and in particular by the Kālacakra system; and the Jo naṅ pas would appear to have extrapolated when they applied to the original tathāgatagarbha!doctrine certain concepts of this Tantric system. This point is in need of further investigation” (Ruegg 1989: 42; see also Hookham 1991:

159–160).

I posit a contrary hypothesis. I believe Dol po pa derived an absolutistic, revelatory model of buddhahood from a literalist interpretation of portions of the Indic tathāgatagarbha!sūtra!literature, and superimposed it on the Kālacakra. Dol po pa’s dazzling exegesis of a vast array of Indic Mahāyāna sūtra!and tantra!sources ultimately depends upon his assertion that the real, eternal, uncreated, unchanging Absolute (don!dam! pa; paramārtha) is radically isolated from all unreal, obscurational, phenomenal things (kun!rdzob; saṃvṛti). The Kālacakra texts examined

16 See, e.g., Ri!chos!nges!don!rgya!mtsho!(1) 121.5, 159.1, 239.5, 249.5, 254.5, 594.1; also, Stearns 1999: 45–46. On the “Trilogy Corpus of Bodhisattva Commentaries,” see Newman 1985: 66–71, 73; Newman 1987: 77, n. 9 et seq.; Cicuzza and Sferra 1997; Cicuzza 2001; Sferra 2005. above – and many others could be offered – make it difficult for me to see how this position can be sustained within the Kālacakra system. In particular, the idea that the dharmakāya!is utterly devoid of saṃvṛti! seems impossible to square with Nāropāda’s discussion of the phenomenal reality of the Buddha qualities, as well as his statement that dharmakāya!has as its basic nature “cognition of the nonduality of the two realities”

(satyadvayādvaidhībhāva!svabhāvam). Likewise, Dol po pa’s assertion that “within the Absolute kāya!there is no need to differentiate svābhāvikakāya!and dharmakāya,” and his view that “because it is taught that in Absolute Real Nature (don!dam!chos!nyid) all the good qualities of the dharmakāya!are primordially, intrinsically, spontaneously established and indivisibly complete, those very good qualities are not other than Absolute Reality

(don!dam!pa’i!bden!pa) itself,” appear to be impossible to reconcile with Nāropāda’s treatment of the subject. Perhaps most fundamentally, Dol po pa’s claim that “the measureless good qualities and features of the naturally existing Buddha dharmakāya! exist in their entirety in all sentient beings” is incompatible with Kalkin Puṇḍarīka’s statement in the Vimalaprabhā!that buddhahood does not coexist with the ‘Māra’ of sentient beings’ obscured, defiled, samsaric mind. All of this being said, I agree wholeheartedly with Professor Ruegg that “this point is in need of further investigation.” Among the issues that call for study and clarification is the employment of imaginative imitation of the result within the Vajrayāna path (dus!gsum!lam!’khyer, etc.) – especially in abhiṣeka!and in utpattikrama!sādhana – and the consequent rhetoric of ‘pre-existent,’ ‘immanent’ buddhahood in which the cause is designated with the name of its effect

(rgyu!la!’bras!bus!btags!pa). At a somewhat deeper level, the ontological status of prakṛtiprabhāsvara! (saṃskṛta!versus asaṃskṛta, saṃvṛti!versus paramārtha, etc.) and its relationship with niḥsvabhāva/śūnyatā!and svābhāvika-kāya!need to be explored. Study of both of these topics will require careful consideration of the Vajrayāna’s non-tantric Mahāyāna context, its oftentimes deliberately ambiguous use of language, as well as the specific features of the bewildering plethora of traditions and systems of mysticism that have come down to us. In any case, we can be certain that such an investigation will reveal new perspectives on the rich intellectual and spiritual life of Indian and Tibetan Buddhism. Dedicated!to!the!memory!of!my!teacher,!Professor!Geshe!Lhundub!Sopa!

(1923–2014)

Appendix: Sanskrit Texts

Nāropāda, Sekoddeśaṭīkā!(SUṬ 169.9–10…169.12–170.13); part of the comment on Sekoddeśa!93cd: “imperishable [[[bliss]]] increases through fusion with mahāmudrā” (mahāmudraikayogena! vṛddhiṃ! yāti! tad! akṣaram).

mahatī!cāsau!mudrā!ca!mahāmudrā!/ mahattvaṃ!punar!asyāḥ!sarvākāravaropetatvaṃ! na! prādeśikatvam! / mudryate! ’nena! bodhicittavajreṇeti! mudrlakṣaāṇa! ṃ!/ … rātiphalar! sarvakūpā! mahāmudr ā!pūmudarṇāvasthṃ! paramāyām āk ṣacalanayogenetiarasukhajñāna-! ālam! ādatte mudrā!/ mahattvaṃ!cāsyāḥ!prahāṇamahattvenādhigamamahattvena!ca!/ tatra! prahāṇamahattvaṃ! savāsanasarvāvaraṇaprahāṇalakṣanasvābhāvikākhyaprabhāsvarasākṣātkaraṇalakṣaṇam!/ adhigamamahattvaṃ!tu!pariśuddhasarvabuddhadharmātmaka yuganaddhākhyakāyasākṣātkāra-! s!vabhāvam!/ yat!punas!tamastuhinādyakhilamalāpagatagaganasannibha!śūnyataikarasa prabhāsvarasākṣātkāra!eva!sakalabuddhadharmādhigamaḥ!/ aśeṣaviśvārthasampādanaśaktirūpeṇa! tatra! sarvabuddhadharm! āṇāṃ! vidyamācakṣateā!natv/ tatraāt!!/ cāatapratibh! evaā!sanedharm!’pyāṇā!adhigamavyavasthm! āśrayaḥ! kāyo! dharmak ghaāṭaprati-ya! ity! āyāṃ

bhāse!paṭādyadhigamaprasaṅgo!durnivāraḥ!/ kiṃ!ca!sāṃkhyadarśanamadūṣaṇam! eva aś!esyṣaskandhadhāt! / api! caā!tvmāāyatanyāsvapnagandharvapurapratisenādidarśanaṃ!saṃvṛtisatyadarādivada-śanaṃ! kalpitam svādhiṣṭhānaṃ!cocyate!/ saṃvṛtisatyam!eva!ca!paramārthasatyātmakaprabhāsvarapariśuddham!ādarśajñānādirūpavairocanādyādheyadevatāvṛndaṃ! kūṭāgārādyādhāramaṇḍalaṃ!ca!tad!eva!lokottaramaṇḍalatayā!sarvatantrarājeṣu!gīyate!samastabuddhadharmasvabhāvatayā!ca!/ etad!eva!ca!satyadvayādvaidhībhāvasvabhāvaṃ!yuganaddhākhyam!ucyate!/ tasmād!yuganaddhakāya!eva!dharmakāyaḥ!sāmbhogikasvābhāvikābhyāṃ!pṛthagbhūto! yogipratyātmavedyaḥ!/

Kalkin Puṇḍarīka, Vimalaprabhā!1.3 (B 9a2–3; U 1.23.5–9…11–14).

ihādau! buddhatvābhāve! na! ko! ’pi! mārabhaṅgaṃ! karoti! devāsuramanuṣyāṇāṃ! madhye! / ādyabhisambuddho! ’pi! na! karoti! sarvāvaraṇābhāvāt!/ yugapac!ca!na!karoti!yasmin!kṣaṇe!māras!tasmin!kṣaṇe!buddhatva! ṃ! na!syāt!sāvaraṇacittāt!/ yasmin!kṣaṇe!buddhatvaṃ!tasmin!kṣaṇe!māro!nāsti! nirāvaraṇacittād! iti! / … tasmān! māro! nāma! sattvānāṃ! saṃsāracittaṃ! vāsanāmalaḥ![/] buddhatvaṃ!nāma!saṃsāravāsanārahitaṃ!cittam!/ tathā! ca!bhagavān!āha!prajñāpāramitāyām!asti!tac!cittaṃ!yac!cittam!acittam!iti!/ prakṛtiprabhāsvaraṃ!tad!eva!saṃsāravāsanārahitam!/ ato!māraḥ!samalaṃ! cittam!buddho!vigatamalaṃ!cittam!/

Vimalaprabhā!5.3.127 (B 205a1–2; U 3.99.2–7)

iha! yadi! prāg! buddhatvaṃ! paścān! mārabhaṅgas! tadā! buddhasya! nirāvaraṇatā!nāsti!māropadravāt!/ atha!prāg!mārabhaṅgaḥ!paścād!buddhatvaṃ! tadānye! ’pi saṃsāriṇo! mārabhaṅgaṃ! kurvanti buddhatvaṃ! vinā!/ atha!yugapac!ca!mārabhaṅgo!bhavati!tathā!yugapac!ca!mārabhaṅgo! na! kṛtaḥ! [/] yasmin! kṣaṇe! māras! tasmin! kṣaṇe! buddhatvaṃ! na! syāt! sāvaraṇacittāt! / yasmin! kṣaṇe! buddhatvaṃ! tasmin! kṣaṇe! māro! nāsti! sarvāvaraṇakṣayāt!/

Abbreviations and Primary Sources

Aṣṭasāhasrikā. See Vaidya 1960.

Bodhicaryāvatāra, Śāntideva. See Bhattacharya 1960.

Hevajra. See Snellgrove [1959] 1980.

Pramāṇavārttika, Dharmakīrti. See Shastri 1984.

Ri!chos!nges!don!rgya!mtsho, Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan. See Senghe 1984 and Ngag dbang kun dga’ ’jam dbyangs blo gros 2007.

Sekoddeśaṭippaṇī, Sādhuputra Śrīdharānanda. See Gnoli 1997.

SUṬ = Sekoddeśaṭīkā, Nāropāda. See Sferra 2006.

Śrī!Kālacakra, Kalkin Yaśas. (U) Vol. 1 see Jagannātha Upādhyāyaḥ 1986; Vols. 2 and 3 see Dwivedī and Bahulkar 1994. Vimalaprabhā, Kalkin Puṇḍarīka. (B) Asiatic Society of Bengal, Kolkata [[[Calcutta]]], MS. no. G.10766; (U) see Śrī!Kālacakra, Kalkin Yaśas.

References

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Brunnhölzl, Karl. 2011. Prajñāpāramitā,!Indian!“gzhan stong pas,” And!the! Beginning!of!Tibetan!gzhan stong. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, Heft 74. Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien. Cicuzza, Claudio and Francesco Sferra. 1997. “Brief Notes on the Beginning of the Kālacakra Literature.” Dhiḥ!23: 113–126. Cicuzza, Claudio. 2001. The!Laghutantraṭīkā!by!Vajrapāṇi,!Critical!Edition!and! Translation. Serie Orientale Roma, LXXXVI. Roma: Istituto Italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente.

Dwivedī, Vrajavallabh and S.S. Bahulkar, eds. 1994. Śrīlaghukālacakratantrarājasya!kalkinā!śrīpuṇḍarīkeṇa!viracitā!ṭīkā!vimalaprabhā.Vols. 2 and 3. Durlabh Bauddh Granthamālā 12–13. Sāranāth, Vārāṇasī: Kendrīya Ucca Tibbatī-Śikṣā-Saṃsthāna. Gnoli, Raniero, ed. 1997. “La Sekoddeśaṭippaṇī di Sādhuputra Śrīdharānanda. Il testo sanscrito.” Rivista degli Studi Orientali 70: 115–146. Gnoli, Raniero and Giacomella Orofino. 1994. Nāropā!–!Iniziazione!Kālacakra. Biblioteca Orientale, 1. Milano: Adelphi Edizioni.

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die!Kunde!Südasiens!36: 227–234. — 1998. “The Epoch of the Kālacakra Tantra.” Indo-Iranian! Journal! 41: 319–349. — 2000. “Vajrayoga in the Kālacakra Tantra.” In David Gordon White, ed., Tantra!in!Practice. Princeton Readings in Religions. Princeton: Princeton University Press: 587–594.

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Shastri, Dwarikadas, ed. 1984. Pramānavārttika!of!Acharya!Dharmakirtti!with! the!Commentary!‘Vritti’!of!Acharya!Manorathanandin![sic]. Dharmakirtti Nibandhawali, 1. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati.

Snellgrove, D.L., ed. [1959] 1980. The!Hevajra!Tantra:!A!Critical!Study,!Part! 2,!Sanskrit!and!Tibetan!Texts. London Oriental Series, Volume 6, Part 2. London: Oxford University Press.

Stearns, Cyrus. 1999. The!Buddha!from!Dolpo:!A!Study!of!the!Life!and!Thought! of!the!Tibetan!Master!Dolpopa!Sherab!Gyaltsen. SUNY Series in Buddhist Studies. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Vaidya, P.L. ed. 1960. Aṣṭasāhasrikā!Prajñāpāramitā. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts Series, no. 4. Darbhanga: Mithila Institute. ABSTRACT

Does buddhahood pre-exist in sentient beings? Both traditional Tibetan Buddhist scholars and contemporary Buddhologists recognize this to be a key issue in any reconstruction of late Indian Buddhism. In India and Tibet we find ‘revelatory’ and ‘developmental’ models: the former advocate the view that buddhahood in some sense pre-exists in sentient beings, and it is simply revealed through the practice of the path; the latter assert that sentient beings possess the potential for buddhahood, but buddhahood as such is developed, and only occurs at the culmination of the path. This paper presents evidence that the Kālacakra tantra presupposes a developmental model, in opposition to the revelatory model interpretation of the Kālacakra promoted by Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan.