A HUAYAN PARADIGM FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF MAHĀYĀNA TEACHINGS: THE ORIGIN AND MEANING OF FAXIANGZONG AND FAXINGZONG ∗
Dan Lusthaus finds the origin of the paradigm xing
in the Cheng weishi lun
and concludes: Ironically, this very distinction became one of the major rhetorical weapons used by Fatsang against Hsüan-tsang’s school, calling them ‘[the mere] fa-hsiang’ (Dharma-Characteristics) school against his own Sinitic ‘fa-hsing’ (Dharma-Nature) school. This distinction became so important that every Buddhist school originating in East Asia, including all forms of Sinitic Mahāyāna, viz. T’ien-t’ai, Hua-yen, Ch’an, and Pure Land, came to be considered Dharma-nature schools.1 Whalen Lai also attributes the establishment of this paradigm to Fazang, referring to Zhili
“The name ‘Fa-hsiang’ was, however, attributed to it by its critics; it is a derogative term alleging that the school did not know thoroughly the deeper Fa-hsing (Dharma-essence). The contrast was intended to bring out the ‘Hīnayānist phenomenalism’ [sic] inherent in the Wei-shih school and to highlight the ‘Mahāyāna essentialism’ of its critic. As recalled by Sung T’ien-t’ai master Ssuming Chih-li (959–1028), the distinction arose at the time of Fa-tsang’s (643–712) attack on the Wei-shih school: At the time [of Hua-yen (Avatamsaka) patriarch, Fa-tsang,] there was widely held the theory of chen-ju sui-yüan (Suchness or tathatā accompanying the conditions [the pratyaya that brought samsāra into being]) and the theory of a (passive) Suchness that would not create (‘let rise’) the various existents (dharmas). From that is derived the distinction between a hsing-tsung ([[[Dharma]]] essence school] and a hsiang-tsung ([[[Dharma]]] characteristic school). This distinction was made by Fa-tsang and was unknown to our [[[T’ien-t’ai]]] master Chih-i.2 They are right in that Fazang
introduced the term faxiangzong
the Yogācāra teachings of Xuanzang
(600–664), and later this designation became widespread in East Asian Buddhism. In Japan, the Hossō
sented the most outstanding of the six schools (Sanron
, Hossō, Jōjitsu
) of the Nara period (710–784).3 However, attributing the invention of the term faxingzong
to Fazang is rather dubious, as it
cannot be found in his works. The faxing
is the Chinese equivalent of the Sanskrit dharmatā,4 which means ‘essence’ or ‘inherent nature.’5 I will not delve into this frequently used term in Indian and Chinese Buddhism here as this would go beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that the founder of the Tiantai
(538–597), identified dharma-nature with Buddhanature by saying: “Buddha-nature is dharma-nature
.”6 He thus attributes Buddha-nature not only to the sentient beings but also to the non-sentient beings.7 Lusthaus’ other claim that Huayan “came to be considered Dharma-nature school” can also be called into question. In order to provide an answer as to whether Huayan belongs to the dharma-nature school, I shall examine the origin and meaning of these two important terms in the history of Chinese Buddhist thought: the zong of dharma-characteristics (faxiangzong
) and the zong of dharma-nature
Faxiangzong as Yogācāra in Fazang’s works
In his commentary on the Buddhāvataṃsaka-sūtra (Huayan jing tanxuan ji
), Fazang relates the story of how he met a Central Indian monk, Divākara8 (Dipoheluo
, or Rizhao
613–688),9 in the Taiyuan
monastery10 of Chang’an in 684, and asked him whether Indian monks distinguish between provisional and actual (quanshi
) teachings.11 In his reply, Divākara said that there were two famous Indian masters of the Nālandā monastery: Śīlabhadra (Jiexian
529–645)12 and Jñānaprabha (Zhiguang
).13 He interprets their views on the different levels of Buddhist teachings in the following way.
13 Tamura 2000: 46. 14 Soothill 1937: 269, Nakamura 1975: 1252d–1253a. 15 Monier-Williams 1899: 511. 16 Weimo jing lüeshu
, T 17783: 8.681a26.
17 Ng 2003: 78. 18 On Divākara, see Forte 1974. 19 Divākara is said to have translated 18 works between 676 and 687. Kaiyuan shijiaolu
, T 2154: 55.564a12–17. With the assistance of Fazang, he translated the Ghanavyūhasūtra (Dasheng miyan jing 大乘密嚴經 , T 681), on which Fazang wrote a commentary (Dasheng miyan jing shu
, XZJ vol. 34). In addition, they worked together on the translation of the parts of the last chapter of the Buddhāvataṃsaka-sūtra, the Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra, that were missing from Buddhabhadra’s translation. See Liu 1979: 8–9. 10 Empress Wu established this monastery by converting her mother’s residence after she passed away. She appointed Fazang as the first abbot. See Liu 1979: 8. 11 T 1733: 35.111c8–112a22. 12 Śīlabhadra was Xuanzang’s
(600–664) teacher at Nālandā, and is mentioned in his fa
mous record of his travels, Xiyuji
T 2087. See Lusthaus 2002: 395–397.
13 Mochizuki 3571.
Śīlabhadra, a disciple of Dharmapāla (Hufa
530–561), who belongs to the
lineage of Maitreya (Mile
) and Asaṅga (Wuzhu
310–390?),14 establishes three levels of teachings on the basis of Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra and Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra.15 In the first period, Hīnayāna teaches the emptiness of living beings (shengkong
), but fails to realise the true principle (zhenli
) of the empti
ness of dharmas (fakong
). In the second period, the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras advocate the emptiness of dharmas. The correct principle (zhengli
) of Mahāyāna is revealed only in the third period, when the tenets of Yogācāra, i.e. three natures and three non-natures, are taught. In addition, these three levels of teaching are explained in terms of the capacity of the audience, the teaching, and the revelation of principle. In the first period, only śrāvakas are taught exclusively Hīnayāna teachings that reveal the principle of emptiness of the person. In the second period, only bodhisattvas are taught exclusively Mahāyāna teachings that show the emptiness of both the person and dharmas. In the third period, beings of various capacities are instructed in all vehicles that expose both emptiness and existence (kongyou
). As the third period comprises all capacities, teachings and principles, it represents the level of explicit statement (nītārtha, liaoyi
). Jñānaprabha, who belongs to the lineage of Mañjuśrī (Wenshu
) and Nāgār
ca. 150–250), follows in the footsteps of Āryadeva (Tipo
170–270) and Bhāvaviveka (Qingbian
500–570). He distinguishes three levels of teaching on the basis of the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras and Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. In the first period, Buddha instructed people of small capacity in the Hīnayāna teaching, according to which both mind and objects exist (xinjing juyou
In the second period, the faxiang of Mahāyāna (faxiang dasheng
) is taught to people of mediocre capacity. It explains that objects are empty, while the mind is existent (jingkong xinyou
), which is the principle of consciousness-only. However, these people cannot understand the equality of true emptiness (pingdeng zhenkong
). In the third period, the wuxiang of Mahāyāna (wu
) is taught to people of superb capacity. It argues that the equal emptiness of both objects and the mind is the level of true explicit statement (zhen liaoyi
). In the first period, the audience consisted of the two vehicles which must refer to śrāvaka-yāna and pratyekabuddha-yāna; in the second, it was made up of the followers of both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, and in the third, it was only bodhisattvas. In terms of teaching, the first period is the teaching of Hīnayāna, the second is that of three vehicles (sansheng
), and the last period is that of one
14 According to the legend, Maireya took Asaṅga to the Tuṣita where Yogācāra works were given to him. Some scholars suspect that Maitreya could be a historical person, Asaṅga’s teacher, who is referred to as Maitreyanātha. See Williams 1989: 80–81. 15 It is interesting to note that Xuanzang’s biography (Da Tang Daciensi sanzang fashi zhuan
, T 2053) by Huili
cites a letter by Xuanzang where Śīlabhadra is said to be the successor to both Āryadeva and Nāgārjuna. This contradicts Divākara’s alleged account that associates Śīlabhadra exclusively with Āryadeva and the Yogācāra. See Li 1995: 231.
). As regards the revelation of principle, the heretical view of
) is refuted in the first period, clinging to the essential being of those things that dependently arise is refuted gradually in the second, and the apparent existence still retained in the second period is refuted in the third. The classification of the two Indian masters can be summarised in two tables:
period audience teaching principle 1. Hīnayāna śrāvaka H īnayāna emptiness of person 2. Wuxiang bodhisattva Mahāyāna emptiness of person and dharmas 3. Faxiang all all emptiness and existence (Classification by Śīlabhadra)
period audience teaching principle 1. Hīnayāna two vehicles Hīnayāna refutation of the heretical view of self-nature 2. Faxiang both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna three vehicles refutation of essential being 3. Wuxiang bodhisattva one-vehicle refutation of apparent being (Classification by Jñānaprabha) Śīlabhadra’s classification is quite well-known from the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra as the three turnings of the Dharma-wheel. According to this scripture,
Buddha’s teaching can be divided into three successive periods. The first period is the Hīnayāna when the emptiness of self was preached. In the second period, the emptiness of all dharmas was proclaimed in the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras. However, the hidden meaning of these sūtras was revealed only in the third period, which is the teaching of the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra. This is the explicit meaning of the teachings that require no further explanation.16 By the time Bhāvaviveka lived, doctrinal disagreements between the followers of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka had come to the fore. Though he was willing to borrow some methods from his opponents, he was critical of Yogācāra, and maintained the basic Madhyamaka principle of the emptiness of all dharmas, including consciousness.17 Fazang introduced two names: Faxiang
(characteristics of dharmas) and
(without characteristics). He applied the first name to the Yogācāra, and though it was a rather pejorative designation, suggesting that it was a kind of
16 T 676: 16.697a23–b9; Lamotte 1935: 206–207; Keenan 2000: 49. 17 Ruegg 1981: 65–66.
Hīnayāna school dealing only with the characteristics of dharmas, it became the traditional name for this Indian school of Buddhist thought in East Asian Buddhism. He applied the term Wuxiang to the Madhyamaka school of thought, as it denied the existence of characteristics. Divākara’s account of the Indian classification of Buddhist teaching must have exercised a great influence on Fazang, because he refers to it in his other works as well.18 This small episode in the history of Chinese Buddhism sheds light on the process usually referred to as the ‘sinification of Buddhism’. Fazang’s encounter with Divākara shows that there was an active dialogue between Chinese and foreign monks during the transmission of Buddhism.19 In his commentary on the Awakening of Faith and on the Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun 大乘法界無差別論 , in which he discussed the Indian Buddhist teachings, Fazang distinguishes four cardinal principles (zong 宗 ): (1) clinging to the [[[existence]]] of dharmas through their characteristics (suixiang fazhi zong
); (2) real emp
tiness without characteristics (zhenkong wuxiang zong
); (3) consciousness-only [established by] the characteristics of dharmas (weishi faxiang zong
); and (4) the dependent arising of the tathāgatagarbha (rulaizang yuanqi
).20 These four cardinal principles refer to the teachings of Hīnayāna, Madhyamaka, Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha, respectively. He defines these lineages with the help of the basic Huayan paradigm: phenomena (shi
).21 H īnayāna clings to the characteristics of phenomena. Madhyamaka reveals the principle by the coalascence with phenomena. Yogācāra provides a description of various aspects of phenomena that arise on the basis of principle. The Tathāgatagarbha discusses the interpenetration and non-obstruction of principle and phenomena. In addition, in his commentary on the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, he again furnishes these four kinds of cardinal principles, though with their names slightly changed: (1) existence of characteristics (youxiang zong 有相宗 ); (2) non-existence of characteristics (wuxiang zong
); (3) characteristics of dharmas (faxiang
法相宗 ); and (4) ultimate truth (shixiang zong
).22 Fazang discusses these four categories in terms of dharmas, consciousness, dependent arising, turning to
18 Shiermen lun zongzhi yiji
, T 1826: 42.213a5–c23; Dasheng qixin lun yiji
, T 1846: 44.242a29–b21. 19 Robert Sharf has a different view, arguing that “whatever ‘dialogue’ transpired took place among the Chinese themselves”. See Sharf 2002: 19. 20 T 1846: 44.242b23–c7; T 1838: 44.61c9–13. 21 The first patriarch of the Huayan lineage, Du Shun
(557–640), introduced these terms when he changed the terms form for phenomena and emptiness for principle. For a translation of his important work, Discernments of Dharmadhātu (Fajie guanmen
), see Gimello 1976: 454–510, and for another which includes Chengguan’s commentary, see Cleary 1983: 69–124. For a summary of arguments in this work, see Ziporyn 2000: 171–174. 22 Ru Lengqie xinxuanyi
, T 1790: 39.426b29–427a2.
names in the commentary on the Awakening of Faith
clinging to the [[[existence]]] of dharmas through their characteristics
real emptiness without characteristics
consciousness only [established by] the characteristics of dharmas
the dependent arising of the Tathāgatagarbha
names in the commentary on the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra
existence of characteristics
non-existence of characteristics
characteristics of dharmasreal characteristics
scriptures Four Āgamas, Vibhāṣā
Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, Ghanavyūha-sūtra, Ratnagotravibhāga-śāstra, Mahāyāna-śradhotpādaśāstra
masters Dharmatrāta23 N āgārjuna, Āryadeva Asaṅga, Vasubandhu Aśvaghoṣa, Sāramati24 dharmas 75 dharmas emptiness of dharmas three natures, three nonnatures, 100 dharmas based on consciousness all dharmas arise in dependence on tathāgatagarbha consciousness six consciousnesses emptiness of the six consciousnesses eight impure consciousnesses the eighth consciousness is established by the tathāgatagarbha dependent arising
23 A master of the Sarvāstivāda school. See Mochizuki 3543. 24 He is the author of Dasheng fajie wu chabie lun
, T 1626: 31.1627. Fazang wrote a commentary on it titled Dasheng fajie wu
chabie lun bingxu
, T 1838. See Mochizuki 925–926.
212 IMRE HAMAR
dharmas that dependently arise
existent empty both existent and empty neither existent nor empty, fusion of phenomena and principle
turning to Mahāyāna from Hīnayāna
followers of two vehicles do not become Buddha
beings of determinate nature of two vehicles do not become Buddha, some of the beings of indeterminate nature turn to Bodhisattva path
beings of determinate nature of two vehicles do not become Buddha, beings of indeterminate nature turn to Mahāyāna
both beings of determinate nature and beings of indeterminate nature turn to Mahāyāna
vehicles (a) only three vehicles both three vehicles and one-vehicle: three vehicles are revealed, one-vehicle is hidden
three vehicles only one-vehicle
vehicles (b) lesser vehicle three vehicles three vehicles one-vehicle five teachings lesser vehicle elementary teaching of Mahāyāna elementary teaching of Mahāyāna advanced teaching of Mahāyāna
214 IMRE HAMAR
Mahāyāna from Hīnayāna and vehicles.25 In Fazang’s classification of teachings these four lineages can be realated to the first three of the five teachings.26 Hīnayāna represents the lesser vehicle, Madhyamaka and Yogācāra the elementary teachings of Mahāyāna, and Tathāgatagarbha the advanced teaching of Mahāyāna.
The interfusion of xing and xiang in Fazang’s works
While Fazang’s Huayan master Zhiyan mainly applied various tenets of Yogācāra philosophy, Fazang often referred to Madhyamaka in his works. As KAMATA Shigeo demonstrated, the great master of the Sanlun
(549–623),27 had a considerable impact on Fazang’s philosophy.28 Fazang intended to transcend the scope of Yogācāra by incorporating elements of Madhyamaka. In his commentary on the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, in which he discussed the nature of dependent arising (yuanqi xing
), he argued that it is actually both existent and empty, that these two concepts complement one another and form one unity. Nāgārjuna explained that existence does not differ from emptiness (you bu yi kong
), as Asaṅga made clear that emptiness does not differ from existence (kong bu yi you 空
). However, The later generation of philosophers lived in a degenerate age and their wisdom was slight. If they heard about the emptiness [of dependent arising], they said that [this concept] interrupts causality. If they heard about the existence [of dependent arising], they said that [this concept] obstructs real emptiness (zhenkong
). Therefore, Bhāvaviveka refuted the existence that is in contradiction with emptiness. Making this extreme view return to emptiness is the only way to show the existence that is identical with emptiness (jikong zhi you
). Thus, causality is not lost. Dharmapāla and others refuted the emptiness that extinguishes existence. To establish causality is the only way to reveal the emptiness that is identical with existence (jiyou zhi kong
). Thus, real nature (zhenxing
) is not hidden. Each of these two masters refuted one extreme; thus, they show the middle path together. Their views mutually become complete, and are not contradictory.
後 代 論 師 為 時 澆 慧 薄 。 聞 空 謂 斷 因 果 。 聞 有 謂 隔 真 空 。
是 以 清 辨 破 違 空 之 有
25 He expounds only on the aspects of dharmas, consciousness and vehicles in his commemtary on the Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun. Here the explanation of the vehicles is slightly different. I refer to it with a (b) in the table. See T 1838: 44.61c13–c28. 26 The system of the five teachings (lesser vehicle, elementary teaching of Mahāyāna, advanced teaching of Mahāyāna, sudden and perfect) was first established by Zhiyan, but it was Fazang who used this scheme in his works exclusively. For detailed studies of the formulation and content of the five teachings, see Cook 1970, Liu 1981, Gregory 1991: 116–135. 27 For an introduction to Jizang’s philosophy, see Liu 1994: 82–187. 28 Kamata 1965: 134–143, 325–331. 29 T 1790: 39.430c16–22. A slightly different version of this passage appears in Huayan yisheng jiaoyi fenqizhang
T 1886: 45.501a16–25. For a translation of this ver
sion, see Liu 1979: 379–380.
This passage can be regarded as a Huayan contribution and solution to the wellknown debate between the followers of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka on the theory of the three natures advocated by the Yogācārins.30 Yogācārins held that though the imaginary nature is empty the dependent nature and the perfect nature have both empty and real aspects. Those things that arise out of the seeds contained in ālaya are empty, but the ālaya and the seeds are real. The perfect nature is presented as the pure ālaya in the Cheng weishi lun; it must therefore be the ultimate reality, and cannot be empty.31 Being advocates of the emptiness of all dharmas, the Mādhyamikas refuted the existence of these two natures as well. In order to harmonize these two views, Fazang formulated a Huayan interpretation of the doctrine of three natures. He wrote that each of the three natures has an empty and an existent aspect:32 Each of the three natures has two aspects. The two aspects of the perfect [[[nature]]] are changlessness and responding to condition. The two aspects of the dependent [[[nature]]] are semblance of existence and being without self-nature. The two aspects of the imaginary nature appear to have being to the ordinary senses and have non-existence in reality.
EMPTINESS BEING perfect nature changelessness responding to condition dependent nature without self-nature semblance of existence imaginary nature non-existent in reality appearing to have being to common sense REAL FALSE NATURE CHARACTERISTICS
As the empty aspects of the three natures are identical, and the existent aspects are also identical, the identity of the three natures is established. The former aspects are designated as “the eternal origin without destroying derivative
and the latter aspects as “the eternal derivative without moving origin
.” With these designations he places the question into the context of Chinese philosophy. On the other hand, the empty aspects are not identical with the existent aspects; hence, the difference between the three natures is established as well. Fazang concludes with the typical Huayan statement that “reality includes the false derivative and falsehood penetrates the source of reality; it is the interfusion and nonobstruction of nature and characteristics
30 Bhāvaviveka criticised the doctrine of three natures in chapter five of Madhyamaka-hṛdaya śāstra and in Prajñāpradīpa. See Ruegg 1981: 65. 31 Liu 1979: 377–379. 32 I used Liu’s translation of these terms. See Liu 1979: 365. For a further explanation of this Huayan doctrine, see Cook 1970: 30–53; 1977: 59–61. 33 T 1886: 45.499a13–15.
216 IMRE HAMAR
Various versions of “interfusion of nature and characteristics,” such as interpenetration of nature and characteristics (xingxiang jiaoche
) and perfect interfu
sion of nature and characteristics (xingxiang yuanrong
), are found throughout Fazang’s works.34 Terms such as real-false and origin-derivative frequently occur in the Chinese Buddhist texts, but the paradigm of xingxiang seems to be a novelty. Where does it originate? Lusthaus attributes this invention to Xuanzang, who was a prominent figure of his day and Fazang’s contemporary. In verses 5 and 7 of his translation of Triṃśikā he – supposedly deliberately – altered the original Sanskrit text through the interpolation of xingxiang, though he is famous for the accuracy of his translations. In the definitions of mano-vijñāna and the five consiousnesses we read that “discerning perceptual-objects is its nature and characteristic” and “willing-deliberating is its nature and characteristic”, respectively.35 In the Cheng weishi lun, Xuanzang explains xing and xiang as self-nature (svabhāva, zixing
) and activity-characteristic
), respectively. In the case of the five consiousnesses, discerning perceptual-objects is their self-nature, and the functioning (yong
) of this nature is their activity-characteristic. In the same way, the willing-deliberating is the self-nature of the mano-vijñāna, and the functioning of this nature is its activitycharacteristic. The text goes on to say that these natures and functions define each consciousness. This is to say that the self-natures of the consciousnesses are none other than their activities. As Xuanzang’s usage of xing versus xiang is confined to a rather technical discussion of Yogācāra, other considerations should be taken into account in tracing Fazang’s application of xing. First, it can be explained as emptiness of self-nature (zixing kong
) because the ultimate nature of dharmas is emptiness. There is no doubt that this is the stance of Madhyamaka in this discussion. Thus, the interfusion of nature and characteristics is another sinitic explanation of the famous Mahāyāna formula, “emptiness is form and form is emptiness” just like “principle is phenomena”, advocated by the first patriarch of the Huayan lineage, Du Shun
(557–640). With the introduction of this short expression, interfusion of nature and characteristics, Fazang managed to achieve the same goal as with the discussion of the three natures: to harmonize Yogācāra and Madhyamaka. Second, xing can refer to tathāgatagarbha, or Buddha-nature that leads to another explication on the basis of the Chinese transmission of Yogācāra that includes Tathāgatagarbha teachings. One of the important tenets of Huayan Buddhism is the theory of nature-origination (xingqi
), which clarifies how the world evolves out of a pure mind.36 Thus, xing means the nature out of which the world evolves, and xiang represents the
34 Yoshizu 1983. 35 For a discussion of xingxiang in Xuanzang’s translation, see Lusthaus 2002: 371–373. 36 This name originates from the title of Chapter 32 of the sixty-fascicle Huayan jing, Baowang rulai xingqi pin
. The version of the eighty-fascicle Huayan jing will be dis
A HUAYAN PARADIGM FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF MAHĀYĀNA TEACHINGS 217
characteristics of the outer world evolved from nature. However, this Yogācāra is not the elementary teaching of Mahāyāna represented by the teachings of Xuanzang, but rather the advanced teaching of Mahāyāna, that is Tathāgatagarbha. Nonetheless, this deeper level of interfusion apropos of xing and xiang would later be discovered and discussed by the fourth patriarch of the Huayan lineage, Chengguan
839),37 who was the most loyal disciple of Fazang, though they never met.
Ten Differences between Faxingzong and Faxiangzong
Fazang’s disciple, Huiyuan
(673–743), did not discuss the teachings of the two Indian masters elaborated in great detail by Fazang, putatively because the tenet of dependent arising did not play a central role in his philosophy.38 Chengguan, however, took up this topic again in his commentary on the Huayan jing. At the beginning of his account of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka, he recapitulates the two versions of three periods summarised by the third patriarch.39 He uses the names faxiang dasheng and wuxiang dasheng introduced by Fazang, but he often refers to them as two zongs
. Like Fazang, he arrives at the conclusion that these two zongs complement one another; neither of them can stand alone, and they must be combined. It is important to note that at the end of this section in his Subcommentary on the Buddhāvataṃsaka-sūtra (Dafangguang fo huayan jing suishu yanyi chao
), Chengguan identifies Madhyamaka as faxingzong: From the aspect of the first school, the faxiangzong is the ultimate [meaning of the teaching] and faxingzong is not ultimate. From the aspect of the second school, the faxingzong is the ultimate, and the faxiangzong is not ultimate. Therefore, they are both ultimate and not ultimate, and equally share the principle.
齊。 40 As Chengguan continues, in order to combine these two lineages first the differences between them should be known. He lists ten differences:41 (1) one-vehicle or three vehicles
(2) one nature or five natures
(3) consciousness is only real or false
37 For his biography, see Hamar 2002. For his philosophy, see Hamar 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2003a, 2003b, 2004. 38 Yoshizu 1983: 308–309. For a recent study on Huiyuan’s philosophy, see Li 2000. 39 T 1735: 35.510b23–c22. T 1736: 36.52c7–53b27. Xinxiu huayan jing shuchao
, vol. 1. 547–564. 40 T 1736: 36.53c18–20. 41 T 1735: 35.511a2–6.
218 IMRE HAMAR
(4) the tathatā is dependent arising or immovable
(5) the emptiness and existence related to the three natures are identical or different
(6) the number of living beings and buddhas is not increasing or not decreasing
(7) the two truths are identical or different, as well emptiness and existence are identical or different
(8) the four characteristics are simultaneous or successive
(9) the subject and the object of enlightenment are identical or different
(10) the body of buddha is unconditioned or conditioned
In each of the ten statements, the first part is the tenet of the faxingzong whereas the second is that of the faxiangzong. For example, one nature and one-vehicle form part of the doctrines of faxingzong, and the three vehicles and five natures are proclaimed by faxiangzong. The first two differences are lumped together as the one-vehicle, and three vehicles are closely associated with one nature and three natures, respectively.42 If the doctrine of five natures is regarded as the ultimate teaching, then the doctrine of three vehicles is evident. Those who have the śrāvaka-nature belong to the śrāvakavehicle, those who have the pratyekabuddha-nature belong to the pratyekabuddhavehicle, those who have the bodhisattva-nature belong to the bodhisattva-vehicle. Those who do not have a determinate nature can belong to any of the three vehicles, while those who do not have an untainted nature do not belong to any of the three vehicles but to the vehicle of men and gods. Thus, the five vehicles are established. In contrast to this stance, the faxingzong accepts the doctrine of one nature, i.e. universal salvation, as the ultimate teaching; it therefore proclaims the one-vehicle. In fact, the question of Buddha-nature is a long debated topic in East Asian Buddhism. It is a well-known story in the history of Chinese Buddhism that Daosheng
(ca. 360–434) was bold enough to argue against the so-called southern translation of the Nirvāṇa-sūtra which says that icchantikas can never become Buddha.43 After the northern translation of this sūtra supported Daosheng’s claim, the view of
42 This is discussed in great detail in the Commentary and Subcommentary. See T 1735: 35.511a6– 512b13. T 1736: 36.54a25–61b10. Xinxiu huayan jing shuchao
, vol. 1. 566–
642. 43 For Daoan’s view on icchantikas, see Kim 1990: 34–38. The Fo shuo daban nihuan jing
(T 376) translated by Faxian
and Buddhabhadra was called the southern text,
while the Daban nieban jing
(T 374) translated by Dharmakṣema was known as the northern text. See Ch’en 1964: 113–114. For a study on the Buddha-nature in the Nirvāṇasūtra, see Liu 1982.
A HUAYAN PARADIGM FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF MAHĀYĀNA TEACHINGS 219
universal liberation became widespread in China. However, Xuanzang took up the orthodox Yogācāra position and excluded icchantikas from salvation. But even some of his disciples did not share the opinion of their teacher. His most talented student, Fabao
(early 8th c.), claimed in Yisheng foxing jiujing lun
that one-vehicle was the actual teaching (shijiao
) and the three vehicles were only provisional teachings.44 His other disciple Huizhao
futed Fabao’s views in his Nengxian zhongbian huiri lun
.45 Approximately during Chengguan’s lifetime, a long debate on this problem raged in Japan between the Hossō
(780?–842?), and the founder
of the Tendai
(767–822), resulting in several works by
these two eminent scholars.46 The next eight differences are discussed under the rubrics of the elementary and advanced teachings of Mahāyāna.47 On the level of the elementary teaching, mostly the characteristics are elaborated, the nature of dharmas, i.e. their absolute aspect, appears only as one of the hundred dharmas.48 On the other hand, the advanced teaching mainly expounds on the nature of dharmas, and the way in which characteristics can revert to nature. This is to say that the dharmas, like skandhas, are empty, and their emptiness is their nature. The faxingzong also teaches about the characteristics, but its main purport is to reveal nature as the enigmatic subtlety (xuanmiao
). This explanation seems to be in accord with the tenets of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka, as Yogācāra teaches the doctrine of a hundred dharmas, and Madhyamaka emphasises emptiness as the ultimate reality of dharmas. The third and fourth differences touch upon the nature of the ālayavijñāna, which is a key issue in the Chinese transmision of Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha philosophies.49 According to the faxiangzong, the eighth consciousness, the ālayavijñāna, possesses only the aspect of saṃsāra and is only tainted; Chengguan therefore depicts it as “false”. This impure consciousness is the cause of both rebirth in saṃsāra and attaining nirvāṇa. He cites Xuanzang’s translation of Mahāyānasaṃgraha as a source for this statement.50 In contrast to this, the faxingzong argues that this consciousness also has an aspect of the absolute mind (zhenxin
) due to the untainted tathāga-
44 Groner 2000: 103–104. 45 T 1863. 46 In this debate, Saichō often referred to the arguments of Fabao. See Groner 2000: 91–106. 47 T 1735: 35.512c12–513a13; T 1736: 36.62c27–67b28; Xinxiu huayan jing shuchao 658–702. 48 The tathatā is one of the unconditioned dharmas (asaṃskṛta-dharmas). See Lusthaus 2002: 553. 49 Paramārtha (499–569) played a crucial role in spreading Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha philosophies in China, although these teachings had been known to the Dilun
masters before his arrival in China. For the process of the transmission of Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha teachings, see Paul 1984 and Gimello 1976: 212–337. 50 She dasheng lunben
, T 1594: 31.133b15–16. For a detailed study on the concept of ālayavijñāna in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, see Waldron 2003: 128–170.
220 IMRE HAMAR
tagarbha. He refers to the famous statement from the Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna (Dasheng qixin lun
) according to which the saṃsāra and that which is beyond saṃsāra are fused in ālayavijñāna.51 The issue at stake is the relationship between the Absolute and phenomena.52 Is the tathatā, the Absolute, dependent arising, or is it immovable? Does the Absolute have anything to do with the phenomenal world? According to the interpretation of the final teaching of Mahāyāna (i.e. faxingzong), the Absolute and phenomena can be described with the ‘water and wave’ metaphor. Due to the wind of ignorance, waves of phenomena rise and fall, yet they are not different in essence from the water of the Absolute. In contrast with this explanation, the elementary teaching of Mahāyāna (i.e. faxiangzong) can be presented by the metaphor of ‘house and ground’. The ground supports the house but is different from it.53 Referring to the same scriptural sources as Fazang does, Chengguan claims that the dependent arising of tathatā is taught on the level of advanced teaching. However, he also emphasises that tathatā not only has a dependent arising aspect, but also an immovable one. It can be immovable because it is dependent arising, and it is dependent arising because it is immovable. If the water were to be deprived of its nature of moisture, how could it create waves under the influence of wind? Phenomena can be established by retaining the self-nature of the Absolute. On the other hand, if tathatā is not dependent arising, its essence cannot penetrate conditions (bianyuan
). If its essence can
not be found in conditions, how can it be unchanged (bubian
)? These two as
pects are not contradictory, but complement one another. The next topic touches upon the question of differing opinions between the followers of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka on the status of the three natures. Chengguan seems to be quite aware of the dispute on this matter in Indian Buddhism. As we saw above, Yogācāra attributed emptiness only to the imaginary nature, retaining some kind of existence of the other two natures. Chengguan explains that according to faxiangzong the dependent nature has a resembling existence and is therefore not nonexistent (siyou buwu
). Thus, it cannot be identical with the perfect nature that is revealed through the absence of self-nature. However, according to the faxingzong, the absence of self-nature in the dependent nature is identical with the perfect nature, and as absence of self-nature is emptiness, thus the perfect nature is iden tical with emptiness. This way, faxingzong demonstrates that the perfect nature is empty, just like the imaginary nature. The dependent arising (yinyuan
) includes all three aspects, being identical with both emptiness and existence; hence, these are not separate. The sixth difference is related to the first and second differences. According to the five natures of faxiangzong, beings of the fifth nature divested themselves of
51 T 1666: 32.576b8–9. Hakeda 36, Girard 2004: 28–29. 52 Whalen Lai translated and analysed the relevent part of the Huayan yisheng jiaoyi fenqi zhang
. See Lai 1986.
53 Ibid., 2–3.
A HUAYAN PARADIGM FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF MAHĀYĀNA TEACHINGS 221
Buddha-nature forever and can never become Buddha. Consequently, they can never leave the realm of living beings; they are sentenced to maintain this world. Thus, this realm cannot decrease. The faxingzong teaches that the one principle is ubiquitous (yili qiping
), that is to say the potency of becoming Buddha is inherent in all living beings including icchantikas. The realm of living beings cannot decrease, while the realm of Buddha cannot increase. Why? Because both living beings and buddhas have already been in the domain of faxing, and faxing cannot increase faxing. This is similar to how the Eastern space cannot add anything to the Western space, i.e. the Western space cannot increase with the decrease of the Eastern space. In other words, Buddha and sentient beings share the same absolute nature; there is therefore nothing to increase or decrease. In the next topic, two questions are discussed: first, the identity or difference of two truths; then, the identity or difference of emptiness and existence. These are closely related as emptiness and existence are regarded, especially by Madhyamaka, as absolute truth and mundane truth, respectively. According to faxiangzong, the mundane truth and the absolute truth are different, while according to faxingzong they are in fact identical, and as the Nirvāṇa-sūtra states it is only an upāya that there are two truths.54 The Absolute is not beyond the mundane, it is Absolute if it is identical with the mundane. The former concentrates on discriminating the two truths, while the latter tends to fuse them. Chengguan warns against clinging to any of these positions one-sidedly. The faxiangzong argues that the cause ceases when the fruit is produced (guosheng yinmie
). This way, the extremes of nihilism and eternalism are avoided, as existence is not eternal due to the cessation of cause, and is not interrupted due to the production of fruit. The way in which the faxingzong avoids the two extremes is to underline that emptiness is the emptiness that is identical with existence (jiyou zhi kong
), and existence is the existence
that is identical with emptiness (jikong zhi you
). It is therefore empty but not interrupted, and existent but not eternal. Non-existence and existence are neither identical, nor different. This is how the middle way is achieved. If they were identical, then the meaning of existence and non-existence would be abolished. If they were different, then it would lead to the extremes of nihilism and eternalism. As is quite obvious, the differing views of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka on the absolute truth are found here. As we discussed above, Yogācāra does not accept the emptiness of absolute nature that is the absolute truth, while Madhyamaka strongly argued for it. The faxiangzong propounds the successiveness of the four characteristics (birth, duration, differentiation, cessation),55 which is to say that something that was not existent is born due to various conditions. It then endures and in this duration it changes,
54 For the relevant passage cited by Chengguan, see T 374: 12.443a7–19. 55 For the relevant passage from Cheng weishi lun cited by Chengguan, see T 1585: 31.6a8–17. For the English translation, see Cook 1999: 34–35.
222 IMRE HAMAR
and finally it reverts to non-existence. According to the faxingzong, the past, present and future are all empty; their essential natures are therefore extinct, and this is what Chengguan calls returning to nature through coalescence with characteristics (huixiang guixing
). In this way, faxingzong establishes that the four characteristics are simultaneous. The ninth difference concerns the result of religious practice. The faxiangzong states that the object and subject of enlightenment are different. It says that there are two aspects of wisdom: wisdom that eliminates delusion (duanhuo
) and wis
dom that realises principle (zhengli
). According to one of the interpretations, the fundamental nondiscriminating wisdom (genben zhi
), i.e. Buddha’s ab
solute wisdom, is able to eliminate the propensities (suimian
) of delusions concerning both principle and phenomena, while the subsequently acquired wisdom (houde zhi
), i.e. wisdom related to the ordinary world, cannot. The other opinion is that this latter wisdom can eliminate only the propensities of delusions concerning phenomena.56 Consequently, the fundamental wisdom and the subsequently acquired wisdom are different. Regarding the wisdom that realises the principle, it says that wisdom that is the subject of enlightenment is conditioned (youwei
), but the principle that is realised by this wisdom is unconditioned (wuwei
). Thus, the subject and object of enlightenment are not identical. The faxingzong also discusses two aspects of wisdom. It shows that in both cases wisdom and the object of wisdom are not different. The wisdom that eliminates the delusion (huo
) and the delusion that is eliminated, in fact, share the same substance. If we search for the origin of delusion, it cannot be found anywhere; it is thus has a nonabiding origin (wuzhu ben
). Therefore, the origin of delusion is nonabiding; that is to say, it does not have an origin (wuben
). Next, this nonabiding origin is nothing more than a different name for the ultimate truth (shixiang
). Thus, the origin of the delusion is the essence of wisdom, and consequently their essences are not different. Regarding wisdom that realises the principle, Chengguan argues that the essence of wisdom is being without thought (wunian
), and it can be defined only with the help of delusion; thus, wisdom does not have a self-nature (zixing
). This absence of self-nature is also the essence of tathatā that is realised in the process of enlightenment. As wisdom, subject, and the tathatā, object, have the same essence, i.e. not having self-nature, the identity of subject and object is established. The last topic revolves around the conditioned or unconditioned nature of the body of Buddha. The main divergence lies in what the two lineages regard as the support of the transcendental wisdom. According to the faxiangzong, it is the seeds of the saṃsāric consciousness (shengmie shizhong
), while according to the faxingzong it is the tathāgatagarbha. The Cheng weishi lun clearly states that the
56 This is discussed in Cheng weishi lun, which is cited by Chengguan. See T 1585: 31.54c29– 55a6. For the English translation, see Cook 1999: 337–338.
A HUAYAN PARADIGM FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF MAHĀYĀNA TEACHINGS 223
four kinds of wisdom include all conditioned qualities of the stage of Buddha.57 As the four kinds of wisdom are born of seeds, they must therefore be conditioned. In addition, if the consciousness that gives birth to wisdom has a nature of saṃsāra, wisdom that is born out of it must be conditioned. The four kinds of wisdom are included in the three bodies of Buddha. Moreover, one of these four kinds of wisdom, the great perfect mirror wisdom (mahādarśana-jñāna, dayuanjing zhi
creates what a Buddha receives for his own use or enjoyment (zi shouyong
therefore, the body of retribution (saṃbhogakāya, baoshen
) is conditioned and
untainted (youwei wulou
). However, the tathāgatagrabha, the supporter of wisdom is eternal, thus, that which is supported, i.e. wisdom, must also be eternal. The Awakening of Faith distinguishes between two kinds of enlightenment: one is that which beings originally possess (benjue
), the other is that which is attained
through cultivation (shijue
).58 Consequently, the former is eternal as it exists as
a principle (liyou
), whereas the latter is not because it requires conditions in order to be generated. Chengguan abolishes the distinction between these two kinds of enlightenment, stating that they are both eternal. On the one hand, enlightenment attained through cultivation from the aspect that it is generated it must be regarded as conditioned. On the other hand, it is identical with the nature of tathāgatagarbha, and thus is unconditioned. Even the nirmāṇakāya of the three bodies of Buddha is therefore eternal. If this is eternal, then the more subtle saṃbhogakāya must be eternal as well. Chengguan adds that wisdom must be identical with essence because if it existed outside essence then it would not be eternal. In order to evaluate the content of these differences it is worth examining the scriptural sources that Chengguan quotes to substantiate his statements.59 As we might expect, Chengguan often refers to the Cheng weishi lun and other Yogācāra works in discussing the teaching of faxiangzong, and cites Madhyamaka and Tathāgatagarbha scriptures to demonstrate the arguments of faxingzong. However, we also find Yogācāra works (Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, Vasubandhu’s commentary on the Daśabhūmika-sūtra) and Mahāyāna sūtras (Lotus Sūtra, Nirvāṇa-sūtra, Vimalakīrti-sūtra) under the rubric of faxingzong. It is important to note that the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra and Prajñāpāramitā scriptures are cited by both faxiangzong and faxingzong.
57 T 1585: 31.56b1–2. Cook 1999: 348. 58 Hakeda 38–42, Girard 2004: 30–37. 59 These references are included in Xinxiu huayan jing shuchao. Some of the scriptures listed here are well-known Indian ones, others have survived only in Tibetan and Chinese translations, and we also find works that were presumably written in China. I use the Sanskrit titles whenever they are available or have reconstructed versions. For the reconstructed titles, I am indebted to Demiéville 1978 and Conze 1982.
faxiangzong faxingzong 1. one-vehicle or three vehicles 2. one nature or five natures
Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra T 676: 16.695a19–20, 22–25; 697b5. Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra T 220: 7.1066a28–b6. Daśacakrakṣitigarbha-sūtra* T 411: 13.769c4–27. Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra T 671: 16.526c8–11. Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāravyākhya T 1604: 31.594b1–17. Yogācārabhūmiśāstra T 1579: 30.478b13–c15; 720c23–26. T 1581: 30.888a20–21, b4–5; 900a16–17. Mahāyānasaṃgraha-upanibandhana T 1598: 31.447a25–b10. Saddharmapuṇḍarika-sūtra T 262: 9.7c5; 8a17–19; 9a6–11; 11b14– 15; 13c10–14; 15a18–19, a29–b3, b9c1–5; 17b7–10, 13–15; 18c14–15; 25c12–20; 30a15, a19–b1; 31b16–21; 50c20–51a1. Saddharmapuṇḍarikopadeśa* T 1519: 26.8b15–17; 8c25–9a3; 9a12– 20; 18a4–5 Buddhāvataṃsaka-sūtra T 279: 10.275a19–21, 25–26; 444a10–11. Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra T 374: 12.365c6–7; 419b1–7; 420a23– 25; 493b17–18; 522c23–24; 523c1–2; 524b8, c8–9, 11–16, 559a21–23; 574b11–28, c5–6 Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra T 1509: 25.369c13; 714a9–21. Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra T 671: 16.525c12–19; 527b2–20; 540a9– 10; 541a11–12; 555a9–10. Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanāda-sūtra T 353: 12.219c5–18; 220c21; 223b8–9. 224 IMRE HAMAR
Anuttarāśaya-sūtra T 669: 16.470b3–6; 472a24 Ratnagotravibhāga T 1611: 31.830b8–11; 831b6–9. Buddhatvaśāstra* T 1610: 31.788c19–23; 799a6–7. Ghanavyūha–sūtra T 682: 16. 774a13–16. Mahāyānasaṃgraha T 1594: 31.151b17–18. 1595: 31.212b17.
T 276: 9.386a10–12.
T 209: 4.548a22–23.
3. consciousness only is real or false
Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra T 1579: 30.478c12–16. Āryaśāsanaprakaraṇa* T 1602: 31.581a2–3. Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi T 1585: 31.14a17. Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Xuanzang’s version) T 1594: 31.133b15–16.
Mahāyānaśraddhotpāda-śāstra* T 1666: 32. 576b8–9. Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra T 672: 16.594c11–14.
A HUAYAN PARADIGM FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF MAHĀYĀNA TEACHINGS 225
4. the tathatā is dependent arising or is immovable
Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi T 1585: 31.48a23–24.
Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanāda-sūtra T 353: 12.222c4–5. Mahāyānaśraddhotpāda-śāstra* T 1666: 32.576c13–14. Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra T 670: 16.510b4–8, 512b16–17.
5. the emptiness and existence related to the three natures are identical or different 6. the number of living beings and buddhas is not increasing or not decreasing
Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi T 1585: 31.45c8–11; 46b5–18.
Madhyamaka-śāstra T 1564: 30.33b11–12. Ghanavyūha-sūtra T 681: 16.746c10–11.
7. the emptiness and existence are identical or different, two truths are identical or different
Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi T 1585: 31.7c19–20; 12c4; 48a19–21. Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra T 1579: 30.653c27–654a6.
Madhyamaka-śāstra T 1564: 30.20b17–18. Nirvāṇa-sūtra T 374: 12.443a7–19. Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Paramārtha’s version) T 1595: 31.53c5. Kāruṇikā-rājā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra* T 245: 8.829a4–8, 9–13,16–17, 20.
226 IMRE HAMAR
18. the four characteristics are simultaneous or successive
Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi T 1585: 31.6a8–17.
Mahāyānaśraddhotpāda-śāstra* T 1666: 32.576c1–4. Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra T 475: 14.542b3–6. Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra T 670: 16.512c18–19.
19. the subject and the object of enlightenment are identical or different
Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi T 1585: 31.54c29–55a6.
Buddhāvataṃsaka-sūtra T 279: 10.134b5–6, 24–25. Nirvāṇa-sūtra T 374: 12.410c21, 27–28. Daśabhūmivyākhyāna T 1522: 26.133a10, 28–b2.
10. the body of Buddha is unconditioned or conditioned
Buddhabhūmyupadeśa T 1530: 26.301c1–8. Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi T 1585: 31.55b2–3; 56a7–11; 56b1–2.
Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra T 374: 12.374a21–23, a19–b2, b10–14; 388b26–27. Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra T 475: 14.542a17–18.
A HUAYAN PARADIGM FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF MAHĀYĀNA TEACHINGS 227
228 IMRE HAMAR
One-vehicle of faxing
Fazang’s classification of teachings was at variance with that of his master Zhiyan
(602–668) in that he exclusively identified the Huayan jing
with the perfect teaching while his master related it to the sudden teaching as well. In addition, they both regarded the Huayan jing as the separate teaching, and the Lotus Sūtra as the common teaching, but Fazang degraded the Lotus Sūtra to the level of the advanced teaching of the Mahāyāna.60 He thus established the superior position of Huayan, and his awareness of it was certainly enhanced by the lavish support that he received from Empress Wu
(r. 684–705). Fazang was eager to demonstrate that the one-vehicle of Huayan is different from the one-vehicle of Lotus Sūtra and from the one-vehicle of Nirvāṇa-sūtra, proclaiming that the one-vehicle of Huayan is the basic one-vehicle (genben yisheng
). Chengguan, however, identifies all one-vehicles as faxing, accepting them as his own tradition.61 On the other hand, though he, unlike Fazang, does not draw a sharp distinction between separate and common teaching, he retains the superiority of Huayan: The ocean of this teaching is vast and profound; there is nothing that it does not include. Form and emptiness exchange their brightness, merit and function interpenetrate. Concerning its content, it contains the five teachings in their entirety. It comprises all teachings as far as the teaching of men and gods. This is the only way to reveal its profundity and broadness. It is similar to how rivers do not include the ocean, but the ocean must include rivers. Though it includes all rivers, it tastes salty everywhere. Therefore, every drop of the ocean is different from rivers. The previous four teachings do not include the perfect teaching, but the perfect teaching must include those four teachings. Although the perfect teaching includes the four teachings, it goes beyond them. Thus, ten virtues and five prohibitions can also be found in the perfect teaching, but they are not those of the third and the fourth teachings, not to speak about those of the first and the second teachings. [These four teachings] have teachings in common [with the perfect teaching], but they do not hold the same position. As this perfect teaching is described as broad, it is named immeasurable vehicles. It is said to be profound because this teaching reveals the one-vehicle. There are two kinds of one-vehicle. The first is the one-vehicle of common teaching that is common in the sudden and real [final] teachings. The second is the one-vehicle of separate teaching that perfectly comprises all merits. The separate teaching includes the common teaching, and the perfect teaching comprises all teachings.62
60 Gregory 1991: 128–129; in his comprehensive book, Yoshizu Yoshihide discusses the seperate teaching of one-vehicle as a central concept of Fazang’s teachings. He demonstrates the distinction between seperate and common teachings in Zhiyan’s writings; then he treats various aspects of this question in Fazang’s works. See Yoshizu 1991. 61 Yoshizu 1991: 470–477. 62 For a Japanese translation of this passage, see Yoshizu 1991: 473–474.
A HUAYAN PARADIGM FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF MAHĀYĀNA TEACHINGS 229
Conclusion: is Huayan faxingzong?
It is quite clear from the discussion above that it was Chengguan who introduced the term faxingzong, and started to use the paradigm of faxiangzong versus faxingzong. In doing so, he had recourse to philosophical frameworks established by Fazang. First, in treating Divākara’s classification of Indian Mahāyāna philosophies, Chengguan identified Madhyamaka with faxingzong. Second, on the basis of the paradigm of xing versus xiang propounded by Fazang, Tathāgatagarbha teachings also came to be included in faxingzong. Thus explaining the ten differences between faxiangzong and faxingzong, the stance of faxingzong is described by the teachings of Madhyamaka and/or Tathāgatagarbha. In terms of scriptures that represent faxiangzong and faxingzong, we have seen that some scriptures belong to both categories. The paradigm of faxiangzong versus faxingzong is thus a hermeneutical, ‘transscriptural’ device for the classification of Mahāyāna teachings. It is more flexible than the classical Huayan classification of five teachings advocated by Fazang, which simply qualifies Yogācāra and Madhyamaka as elementary teachings of Mahāyāna, and Tathāgatagarbha as the final teaching of Mahāyāna. This paradigm attempts to sort out some principles in the giant corpus of Mahāyāna literature, and one group of principles or guidelines is called faxiangzong while the other is referred to as faxingzong. Consequently, the term zong
should be rendered as a principle or guideline and defi
nitely not as a ‘school’. When Chengguan elaborates on the ten differences, he says that faxiangzong is the elementary teaching of Mahāyāna while faxingzong is the final teaching of Mahāyāna. If faxingzong is the final teaching, it cannot be identified with Huayan, which represents the perfect teaching, the highest of all teachings. The final teaching claims that the tathāgatagarbha is not isolated from the world of life and death; it is thus described as the non-obstruction of principle and phenomena (lishi wu’ai
) using the Huayan terminology. The perfect teaching also includes this important tenet, but it goes one step further. It advocates the notion that on the basis of the non-obstruction of principle and phenomena, the interrelatedness of phenomena becomes established. This interrelatedness is depicted as the non-obstruction of phenomena (shishi wu’ai
).64 As we have seen above, the perfect teaching includes the set of advanced principles called faxingzong, but they are not identical: “although the ocean includes all rivers, it tastes salty everywhere.”
63 T 1735: 35.514a6–16. 64 Shih 1992: 138.
230 IMRE HAMAR
Ch’en, Kenneth K.S: Buddhism in China: A Historical Survey. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. Cleary, Thomas.: Entry Into the Inconceivable: An Introduction to Hua-yen Buddhism. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983. Conze, Edward: Buddhist Scriptures: a Bibliography, edited and revised by Lewis Lancaster. New York and London: Garland Publishing, INC, 1982. Cook, Francis H.: “Fa-tsang’s Treatise on the Five Doctrines: An Annotated Translation.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1970. Cook, Francis H., trans.: Three Texts on Consciousness Only. Berkeley: Numata Center, 1999. (BDK English Tripitaka 60–I, II, III.) Demiéville, Paul, ed.: Répertoire du Canon Bouddhique Sino-Japonais. Tokyo: Maison Franco-Japonaise, 1978. Gimello, Robert M.: “Chih-yen and the Foundation of Hua-yen Buddhism.” Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1976. Gregory, Peter N.: Tsung-mi and the Sinification of Buddhism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991. Forte, Antonino: “Divākara (613–688), un monaco indiano nella Cina dei Tang.” Annali della Facoltà di lingue e letterature straniere di Ca’ Foscari, Ser. Or. 5. (1974) 13: pp. 135 – 164. Girard, Frédéric, trans.: Traité sur l’acte de foi dans le Grand Véhicule. Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2004. (The Izutsu Library Series on Oriental Philosophy 2.) Groner, Paul: Saichō: The Establishment of the Japanese Tendai School. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2000. Hamar Imre: “The Doctrines of Perfect Teaching in Ch’eng-kuan’s Introduction to his Commentary on the Hua-yen-ching.” Journal of The Center for Buddhist Studies (1988a) 3: pp. 331 – 349. Hakeda, Yoshito S.: The Awakening of Faith Attributed to Aśvaghosha. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. Hamar Imre: “Chengguan’s Theory of Four Dharma-dhātus.” Acta Orientalia Hung. (1998b) 51,1– 2: pp. 1–19. Hamar Imre: “Buddhism and The Dao in Tang China: The Impact of Confucianism and Daoism on the Philosophy of Chengguan.” Acta Orientalia Hung. (1999) 52,3–4: pp. 283–292. Hamar Imre: A Religious Leader in the Tang: Chengguan’s Biography. Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies of The International College for Advanced Buddhist Studies, 2002. (Studia Philologica Buddhica Occasional Paper Series XII.) Hamar Imre: “Practice and Enlightenment in Chengguan’s Philosophy” in Enlightenment and its Cultural Aspects in the modern Perspective. Seoul, 2003a, pp. 277–286. Hamar Imre: “The Existence or Nonexistence of the Mind of Buddha: A Debate between Faxingzong and Faxiangzong in Chengguan’s Interpretation.” Acta Orientalia Hung. (2003b) 56,2–4: pp. 339–367. Hamar Imre: “Hermeneutical Methods in Chengguan’s Commentary to the Avataṃsaka-sūtra.” Ars Decorativa (2004) 23: pp. 9–16. Kamata Shigeo
Chūgoku kegon shisōshi no kenkyū
[A study of
Chinese Huayan Buddhism]. Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1965. Keenan, John P., trans.: The Summary of the Great Vehicle. Berkeley, Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, 1992. (BDK English Tripitaka 46–III.)
A HUAYAN PARADIGM FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF MAHĀYĀNA TEACHINGS 231
Kim, Young-ho: Tao-sheng’s Commentary on the Lotus Sūtra: A Study and Translation. New York, State University of New York Press, 1990. (Bibliotheca-Indo-Buddhica No. 101.) Lai, Whalen: “The Defeat of Vijñāptimatratā in China: Fa-tsang on Fa-hsing and Fa-hsiang.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy (1986) 13: pp. 1–19. Lamotte, Etienne, trans.: Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra. Louvain and Paris: Université de Louvain & Adrien Maisonneuve, 1935. Li Huiying
Eon sen ‘Zoku kegon ryakusho kanjō ki’ no kisoteki kenkyū
[A basic study of Huiyuan’s Xu huayan lüeshu kandingji]. To
kyo: Dōhōsha, 2000. Li Rongxi, trans.: A Biography of the Tripiṭaka Master of the Great Ci’en Monastery of the Great Tang Dynasty, translated from the Chinese of Śramaṇa Huili and Shi Yancong. Berkeley: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, 1995. (BDK English Tripiṭaka 77.) Liu, Ming-Wood: “The Teaching of Fa-tsang: An Examination of Buddhist Metaphysics.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 1979. Liu, Ming-Wood: “The P’an-chiao System of the Hua-yen School in Chinese Buddhism.” T’oung Pao (1981) 67,1–2: pp. 10–47. Liu, Ming-Wood: “The Doctrine of the Buddha-nature in the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa-Sūtra.” Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies (1982) 5,2: pp. 63–94. Liu, Ming-Wood: Madhyamaka Thought in China. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994. Lusthaus, Dan: Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogācāra Buddhism and the Ch’eng Wei-shih lun. London: Routledge Curzon, 2002. Mochizuki Shinkō
[Great dictionary of Buddhism]. 10
vols. Tokyo: Sekai seiten kankō kyōkai, 1958–1963. Monier-Williams, Monier: A Sanskrit-English Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1899. Nakamura Hajime
[Great dictionary of Buddhist terms].
3 vols. Tokyo: Tōkyō shoseki, 1975. Ng, Yu-Kwan: T’ian-t’ai Buddhism and Early Mādhyamika. Honolulu: Tendai Institute of Hawaii Buddhist Studies Program of University of Hawaii, 1993. Paul, Diana Y.: Philosophy of Mind in Sixth-Century China. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984. Ruegg, David S.: The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981. Sharf, Robert H.: Coming to Terms with Chinese Buddhism: A Reading of the Treasure Store Treatise. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2002. (Kuroda Institute Studies in East Asian Buddhism 14.) Shih, Heng-ching: The Syncretism of Ch’an and Pure Land Buddhism. New York: Peter Lang, 1992. Soothill, William E., Hodous, Lewis: A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms. London, 1937. Tamura, Yoshiro: Japanese Buddhism: A Cultural History. Tokyo: Kosei Publishing Co., 2000. Waldron, William S.: The Buddhist Unconscious: The Ālayavijñāna in the Context of Indian Buddhist Thought. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. Williams, Paul: Mahāyāna Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundation. London: Routledge, 1989. Xinxiu huayan jing shuchao 新修華嚴經疏鈔 . (ed.) Chengyi
, Taibei: Huayan lianshe, 2001.
“Shōsō yūkai ni tsuite”
[Concerning the interfusion of nature and characteristic]. Komazawa daigaku bukkyō gakubu kenkyū kiyō
(1983) 41: pp. 300–321.
232 IMRE HAMAR
Kegon ichijō shisō no kenkyū
[A study of the
ekayāna thought in the Huayan]. Tokyo: Daitō shuppansha, 1991. Ziporyn, Brook: Evil and/or/as The Good: Omnicentrism, Intersubjectivity, and Value Paradox in Tiantai Buddhist Thought. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center for the Harvard-Yenching Institute, 2000.