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Metaphysics and epistemology

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Both the Bhatta (the name for Kumarila’s school) and Prabhakara schools, in their metaphysics, were realists; both undertook to refute Buddhist idealism and nihilism. The Bhatta ontology recognized five types of entities: substance (dravya), quality (guna), action (karma), universals (samanya), and negation (abhava). Of these, substance was held to be of 10 kinds: the nine substances

recognized by the Vaisheshikas and the additional substancedarkness.” The Prabhakara ontology recognized eight types of entities; from the Bhatta list, negation was rejected, and four more were added: power (shakti), resemblance (sadrisa), inherence-relation (samavaya), and number (samkhya). Under the type “substance,” the claim of “darkness” was rejected on the ground that it is nothing

but absence of perception of colour; the resulting list of nine substances is the same as that of the Vaisheshikas. Though both schools admitted the reality of the universals, their views on this point differed considerably. The Prabhakaras admitted only such universals as inhere in perceptible instances and insisted that true universals themselves must be perceivable. Thus, they rejected

abstract universals, such as “existence,” and merely postulated universals, such as “Brahmanhood” (which cannot be perceptually recognized in a person).


The epistemologies of the two schools differ as much as their ontologies. As ways of valid knowing, the Bhattas recognized perception, inference, verbal testimony (shabda), comparison (upamana), presumption or postulation (arthapatti), and nonperception (anupalabdhi). The last is regarded as the way that human beings validly, and directly, apprehend an absence; this was in conformity

with Shabara’s statement that abhava (nonexistence) itself is a pramana (way of true knowledge). Postulation is viewed as the sort of process by which one may come to know for certain the truth of a certain proposition, and yet the Bhattas refused to include such cases under inference on the grounds that in such cases one does not say to himself “I am inferring” but rather says “I am

postulating.” “Comparison” is the name given to the perception of resemblance with a perceived thing of another thing that is not present at that moment. It is supposed that because the latter thing is not itself being perceived, the resemblance belonging to it could not have been perceived; thus, it is not a case of perception when one says “My cow at home is similar to this animal.”

The Prabhakaras rejected nonperception as a way of knowing and were left with a list of five concerning definitions of perception. The Bhattas, following the sutra, define perception in terms of sensory contact with the object, whereas the Prabhakaras define it in terms of immediacy of the apprehension.


Ethics


As pointed out earlier, Kumarila supported the thesis that all moral injunctions are meant to bring about a desired benefit and that knowledge of such benefit and of the efficacy of the recommended course of action to bring it about is necessary for instigating a

person to act. Prabhakara defended the ethical theory of duty for its own sake, the sense of duty alone being the proper incentive. The Bhattas recognize apurva, the supersensible efficacy of actions to produce remote effects, as a supersensible link connecting the

moral action performed in this life and the supersensible effect (such as going to heaven) to be realized afterward. Prabhakara understood by apurva only the action that ought to be done.


Source

[[Category:Buddhist Philosophy


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