Difference between revisions of "Meditation and the Cohesive Self"
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− | Judith Blackstone, Ph.D. | + | Judith Blackstone, [[Ph.D.]] |
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− | In this paper, I look at the dialogue between some relational and intra-psychic | + | In this paper, I look at the {{Wiki|dialogue}} between some relational and intra-psychic |
− | models of psychoanalysis, regarding the autonomy of the self. I also describe how | + | models of {{Wiki|psychoanalysis}}, regarding the autonomy of the [[self]]. I also describe how |
− | certain types of meditation, in particular, Realization Process, can facilitate both the | + | certain types of [[meditation]], in particular, [[Realization]] Process, can facilitate both the |
− | experience of internal cohesion, the sense of oneself as a separate being, and the | + | [[experience]] of internal cohesion, the [[sense]] of oneself as a separate being, and the |
− | experience of participating in a fluidly reciprocal self/world matrix. I discuss how the | + | [[experience]] of participating in a fluidly reciprocal self/world [[matrix]]. I discuss how the |
− | experience of interiority that can be cultivated through meditation leads to the emergence | + | [[experience]] of interiority that can be cultivated through [[meditation]] leads to the [[emergence]] |
− | of a subtle, qualitative sense of self and other, enables creativity, and increases one’s | + | of a {{Wiki|subtle}}, qualitative [[sense]] of [[self]] and other, enables {{Wiki|creativity}}, and increases one’s |
− | openness to other people. | + | [[openness]] to other [[people]]. |
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− | Meditation and the Cohesive Self | + | [[Meditation]] and the Cohesive [[Self]] |
− | Judith Blackstone, Ph.D. | + | Judith Blackstone, [[Ph.D.]] |
Introduction | Introduction | ||
− | In this paper, I look at the dialogue between some relational and intra-psychic | + | In this paper, I look at the {{Wiki|dialogue}} between some relational and intra-psychic |
− | models of psychoanalysis, regarding the experience of autonomy. I also show how | + | models of {{Wiki|psychoanalysis}}, regarding the [[experience]] of autonomy. I also show how |
− | certain types of meditation, in particular, Realization Process1, can facilitate both the | + | certain types of [[meditation]], in particular, [[Realization]] Process1, can facilitate both the |
− | experience of internal cohesion, the sense of oneself as a separate being, and the | + | [[experience]] of internal cohesion, the [[sense]] of oneself as a separate being, and the |
− | experience of participating in a fluidly reciprocal self/world matrix. I discuss how the | + | [[experience]] of participating in a fluidly reciprocal self/world [[matrix]]. I discuss how the |
− | experience of interiority that can be cultivated through meditation leads to the emergence | + | [[experience]] of interiority that can be cultivated through [[meditation]] leads to the [[emergence]] |
− | of a subtle, qualitative sense of self and other. I make three main points throughout the | + | of a {{Wiki|subtle}}, qualitative [[sense]] of [[self]] and other. I make three main points throughout the |
− | paper: 1) the current psychoanalytic literature, with its specific interest in the relational | + | paper: 1) the current psychoanalytic {{Wiki|literature}}, with its specific [[interest]] in the relational |
− | dyad, sometimes ignores or de-emphasizes the sense of existing as a separate being; 2) | + | dyad, sometimes ignores or de-emphasizes the [[sense]] of [[existing]] as a separate being; 2) |
the capacity for fluid, flexible participation in relationships can be enhanced through | the capacity for fluid, flexible participation in relationships can be enhanced through | ||
− | cultivating the sense of separateness or aloneness; and 3) meditation practices can | + | [[cultivating]] the [[sense]] of separateness or aloneness; and 3) [[meditation practices]] can |
− | contribute to both the theoretical understanding and experience of how a developed sense | + | contribute to both the {{Wiki|theoretical}} [[understanding]] and [[experience]] of how a developed [[sense]] |
− | of one’s own being facilitates one’s openness to other people. | + | of one’s [[own]] being facilitates one’s [[openness]] to other [[people]]. |
− | I know that using the phrases “one’s own being” or “inward contact with oneself” | + | I know that using the phrases “one’s [[own]] being” or “inward [[contact]] with oneself” |
as I do in this paper, may put me on shaky ground with some readers. In this context the | as I do in this paper, may put me on shaky ground with some readers. In this context the | ||
− | 1 Realization Process is a series of meditative exercises, developed by the author, for realizing nondual consciousness through internal contact with the body, and for applying nondual consciousness to psychological healing. This work has been shown to reduce symptoms of PTSD in a pilot study at NYU Medical School (The Child Study Center). For more information on this method, see The Empathic Ground (Blackstone, 2007). | + | 1 [[Realization]] Process is a series of [[meditative]] exercises, developed by the author, for [[realizing]] [[nondual]] [[consciousness]] through internal [[contact]] with the [[body]], and for applying [[nondual]] [[consciousness]] to [[psychological]] [[healing]]. This work has been shown to reduce symptoms of PTSD in a pilot study at NYU {{Wiki|Medical}} School (The Child Study [[Center]]). For more [[information]] on this method, see The Empathic Ground (Blackstone, 2007). |
− | terms “being” and | + | terms “being” and “[[self]]” refer to the organismic {{Wiki|individual}} associated with the [[body]], |
− | similar to what Damasio (1999) terms the “core self.” Damasio writes: | + | similar to what Damasio (1999) terms the “core [[self]].” Damasio writes: |
− | One key to understanding living organisms, from those that are made up | + | One key to [[understanding]] living {{Wiki|organisms}}, from those that are made up |
− | of one cell to those that are made up of billions of cells, is the definition of | + | of one cell to those that are made up of billions of {{Wiki|cells}}, is the [[definition]] of |
their boundary, the separation between what is in and what is out. The | their boundary, the separation between what is in and what is out. The | ||
− | structure of the organism is inside the boundary and the life of the | + | {{Wiki|structure}} of the {{Wiki|organism}} is inside the boundary and the [[life]] of the |
− | organism is defined by the maintenance of internal states within the | + | {{Wiki|organism}} is defined by the maintenance of internal states within the |
− | boundary. Singular individuality depends on the boundary. (p. 135-136) | + | boundary. Singular [[individuality]] depends on the boundary. (p. 135-136) |
− | Thus terms like “inward” and “interiority” are not metaphors here, but refer to the | + | Thus terms like “inward” and “interiority” are not {{Wiki|metaphors}} here, but refer to the |
− | spatial direction of one’s awareness, or self-contact. Damasio says that we are aware of | + | spatial [[direction]] of one’s [[awareness]], or self-contact. Damasio says that we are {{Wiki|aware}} of |
− | the core self whenever the underlying unconscious “proto | + | the core [[self]] whenever the underlying [[unconscious]] “proto [[self]]” is modified (p. 174) |
− | However, in meditation practice, we can develop a stable quality-rich consciousness of | + | However, in [[meditation practice]], we can develop a {{Wiki|stable}} quality-rich [[consciousness]] of |
− | the internal space of the whole body. As contemporary philosopher Yuasa (1987) writes, | + | the internal [[space]] of the whole [[body]]. As contemporary [[philosopher]] Yuasa (1987) writes, |
− | “The | + | “The ‘[[mind]]’ here is not surface [[consciousness]], but is the ‘[[mind]]’ that penetrates into the |
− | body and deeply subjectivizes it” (p. 105). As I will explain, this body-subjectivity is | + | [[body]] and deeply subjectivizes it” (p. 105). As I will explain, this body-subjectivity is |
both coherent within itself and entirely permeable and open to its surroundings. Because | both coherent within itself and entirely permeable and open to its surroundings. Because | ||
− | of this dual property of self-cohesion and connectedness, I believe that meditation | + | of this dual property of self-cohesion and connectedness, I believe that [[meditation]] |
− | experience has a place in our contemporary exploration of the complex relationship | + | [[experience]] has a place in our contemporary exploration of the complex relationship |
− | between subjectivity and intersubjectivity. | + | between [[subjectivity]] and intersubjectivity. |
As we will see in the following section, many contemporary analytic writers | As we will see in the following section, many contemporary analytic writers | ||
− | advocate a post-modern philosophy that attempts to eradicate the Cartesian notion of a | + | advocate a post-modern [[philosophy]] that attempts to eradicate the [[Cartesian]] notion of a |
− | reified, ontologically separate, self and other. Yet, as clinicians we know that the | + | reified, [[ontologically]] separate, [[self]] and other. Yet, as clinicians we know that the |
− | everyday problems of self and other often involve the experience of being either too | + | everyday problems of [[self]] and other often involve the [[experience]] of being either too |
− | separate or not separate enough from other people. In order to address these clinical | + | separate or not separate enough from other [[people]]. In order to address these clinical |
− | issues within a relational model, contemporary theorists have produced a rich body of | + | issues within a relational model, contemporary theorists have produced a rich [[body]] of |
− | writing on how relationships can facilitate a healthy sense of self, and also how a healthy | + | [[writing]] on how relationships can facilitate a healthy [[sense]] of [[self]], and also how a healthy |
− | sense of self affects relationships. In the last section of the paper, I describe how | + | [[sense]] of [[self]] affects relationships. In the last section of the paper, I describe how |
− | meditation can contribute to our understanding and facilitating the lived experience of | + | [[meditation]] can contribute to our [[understanding]] and facilitating the lived [[experience]] of |
− | this equation. Specifically, I look at how meditation practice can give us a way to | + | this equation. Specifically, I look at how [[meditation practice]] can give us a way to |
understand autonomy, without leaving a relational or systems model, and without | understand autonomy, without leaving a relational or systems model, and without | ||
− | recourse to abstractions such as psychological structure. | + | recourse to {{Wiki|abstractions}} such as [[psychological]] {{Wiki|structure}}. |
− | I want to make clear from the outset that I do not mean that meditation can or | + | I want to make clear from the outset that I do not mean that [[meditation]] can or |
− | should replace analysis, or that the subtle dimensions of experience that are gained | + | should replace analysis, or that the {{Wiki|subtle}} {{Wiki|dimensions}} of [[experience]] that are gained |
− | through meditation are in some way superior to the outcomes achieved through analysis. | + | through [[meditation]] are in some way {{Wiki|superior}} to the outcomes achieved through analysis. |
− | Increasingly, as meditation makes its way into the analytic arena (Epstein, 1995, 1998; | + | Increasingly, as [[meditation]] makes its way into the analytic arena (Epstein, 1995, 1998; |
Rubin, 1996; Safran, 2003, Suler, (1993), among others), and especially as | Rubin, 1996; Safran, 2003, Suler, (1993), among others), and especially as | ||
− | psychoanalysis expands its focus to include relational abilities such as openness, | + | {{Wiki|psychoanalysis}} expands its focus to include relational {{Wiki|abilities}} such as [[openness]], |
− | flexibility, empathic resonance, and spontaneity, the goals of meditation and analysis are | + | [[flexibility]], empathic resonance, and spontaneity, the goals of [[meditation]] and analysis are |
− | seen to be compatible, and in some ways, identical. I also believe that the methods of | + | seen to be compatible, and in some ways, [[identical]]. I also believe that the [[methods]] of |
− | meditation and analysis are synergistic; both modalities may be more effective when | + | [[meditation]] and analysis are synergistic; both modalities may be more effective when |
− | practiced in concert. Thus, meditation is presented in this paper as a potentially useful | + | practiced in concert. Thus, [[meditation]] is presented in this paper as a potentially useful |
supplement to the analytic process. | supplement to the analytic process. | ||
− | The Analytic Literature | + | The Analytic {{Wiki|Literature}} |
− | In contemporary theories of psychoanalysis, the notion of the self has come under | + | In contemporary theories of {{Wiki|psychoanalysis}}, the notion of the [[self]] has come under |
− | increasingly skeptical scrutiny. Kohut stated clearly that by self, he did not mean an | + | increasingly skeptical {{Wiki|scrutiny}}. Kohut stated clearly that by [[self]], he did not mean an |
− | objective entity. He wrote that the self was only knowable through sense data and | + | [[objective]] [[entity]]. He wrote that the [[self]] was only knowable through [[sense]] {{Wiki|data}} and |
− | introspection, not in its essence (1977, p. 311). Stolorow and Atwood specifically | + | {{Wiki|introspection}}, not in its [[essence]] (1977, p. 311). Stolorow and Atwood specifically |
− | criticize the idea of the self as an independent entity. They write, “This we contrast with | + | criticize the [[idea]] of the [[self]] as an {{Wiki|independent}} [[entity]]. They write, “This we contrast with |
− | the experience of psychological distinctness, a structuralization of self-awareness that is | + | the [[experience]] of [[psychological]] distinctness, a structuralization of [[self-awareness]] that is |
wholly embedded in formative and sustaining intersubjective contexts” (1992, p. 10). In | wholly embedded in formative and sustaining intersubjective contexts” (1992, p. 10). In | ||
− | response to this new understanding of individual subjectivity as relatively fluid and | + | response to this new [[understanding]] of {{Wiki|individual}} [[subjectivity]] as relatively fluid and |
context-dependent, many clinicians have shifted their focus from the patient’s | context-dependent, many clinicians have shifted their focus from the patient’s | ||
− | intrapsychic life to the therapeutic relationship itself. | + | intrapsychic [[life]] to the {{Wiki|therapeutic}} relationship itself. |
The view that the patient-therapist relationship is the curative factor in | The view that the patient-therapist relationship is the curative factor in | ||
− | psychoanalysis has led, in turn, to a new conception of psychological health. Although | + | {{Wiki|psychoanalysis}} has led, in turn, to a new {{Wiki|conception}} of [[psychological]] [[health]]. Although |
− | Stolorow and his collaborators describe psychological healing as an emergent, open | + | Stolorow and his collaborators describe [[psychological]] [[healing]] as an emergent, open |
− | ended outcome of the analytic process, their emphasis is on the patient’s achievement of | + | ended outcome of the analytic process, their {{Wiki|emphasis}} is on the patient’s [[achievement]] of |
new relational patterns through their relationship with the analyst (1992, p. 25). They | new relational patterns through their relationship with the analyst (1992, p. 25). They | ||
− | argue that concern with such facets of intrapsychic health as autonomy and individuation | + | argue that [[concern]] with such facets of intrapsychic [[health]] as autonomy and individuation |
− | are a throwback to the illusion of the separate, | + | are a throwback to the [[illusion]] of the separate, “[[Cartesian]]” [[self]] and what they call the |
− | + | “[[idolatry]] of the autonomous [[mind]]” (1992, p.13). They criticize Kohut for his notion of | |
− | psychological health as the realization of a pre-existing potential inherent in the | + | [[psychological]] [[health]] as the [[realization]] of a pre-existing potential [[inherent]] in the |
− | individual. They write, “Such an idea contrasts sharply with our view that the trajectory | + | {{Wiki|individual}}. They write, “Such an [[idea]] contrasts sharply with our view that the trajectory |
− | of self-experience is shaped at every point in development by the intersubjective system | + | of self-experience is shaped at every point in [[development]] by the intersubjective system |
in which it crystallizes” (pp. 17-18). But Kohut also believed that the “child’s innate | in which it crystallizes” (pp. 17-18). But Kohut also believed that the “child’s innate | ||
potentialities are selectively nourished and thwarted…by the deeply anchored | potentialities are selectively nourished and thwarted…by the deeply anchored | ||
− | responsiveness of the self-objects, which, in the last analysis, is a function of the self | + | [[responsiveness]] of the self-objects, which, in the last analysis, is a function of the [[self]] |
− | + | [[objects]]’ [[own]] nuclear selves” (1977, p. 100). | |
− | Aron (1996) points out that the relational turn in psychoanalysis occurred as a | + | Aron (1996) points out that the relational turn in {{Wiki|psychoanalysis}} occurred as a |
− | reaction to the ignorance of traditional psychoanalysis with regard to both the co | + | {{Wiki|reaction}} to the [[ignorance]] of [[traditional]] {{Wiki|psychoanalysis}} with regard to both the co |
contruction of the psychoanalytic process, and the ongoing formative power of | contruction of the psychoanalytic process, and the ongoing formative power of | ||
− | relationships in the patient’s life. Aron (1996) writes, “I prefer a model of mind that is | + | relationships in the patient’s [[life]]. Aron (1996) writes, “I prefer a model of [[mind]] that is |
− | less individualistic, more relational, and in which mind exists only in relation to others, | + | less individualistic, more relational, and in which [[mind]] [[exists]] only in [[relation]] to others, |
− | always dependent to a degree and never fully autonomous” (p. 227). | + | always dependent to a [[degree]] and never fully autonomous” (p. 227). |
− | However, in emphasizing the interdependence of self and other, relational writers | + | However, in {{Wiki|emphasizing}} the [[interdependence]] of [[self]] and other, relational writers |
sometimes seem to minimize those aspects of self-experience that occur in and even | sometimes seem to minimize those aspects of self-experience that occur in and even | ||
− | require solitude, such as creativity. They also tend to minimize the self-organizing | + | require [[solitude]], such as {{Wiki|creativity}}. They also tend to minimize the self-organizing |
− | capacity of the individual (see Shore, 2003), and the potential of the individual to deepen, | + | capacity of the {{Wiki|individual}} (see Shore, 2003), and the potential of the {{Wiki|individual}} to deepen, |
− | with health and maturity, in the qualitative experience of his or her own being. Beebe | + | with [[health]] and maturity, in the qualitative [[experience]] of his or her [[own]] being. Beebe |
and Lachmann (2003) make the point that “too great a tilt toward an interactive view of | and Lachmann (2003) make the point that “too great a tilt toward an interactive view of | ||
− | the organization of experience neglects the development of a sense of individuality, | + | the [[organization]] of [[experience]] neglects the [[development]] of a [[sense of individuality]], |
− | agency, and one’s own self, as distinct from the dyad; too great a tilt toward an | + | agency, and one’s [[own]] [[self]], as {{Wiki|distinct}} from the dyad; too great a tilt toward an |
− | intrapsychic view of the organization of experience under-estimates the contributions of | + | intrapsychic view of the [[organization]] of [[experience]] under-estimates the contributions of |
− | the partner and the | + | the partner and the {{Wiki|environment}}…” (p. 380). |
− | To redress imbalance in either direction, many clinicians attempt to integrate an | + | To redress imbalance in either [[direction]], many clinicians attempt to integrate an |
− | intrapsychic approach with interpersonal analysis. This has spawned discussions about | + | intrapsychic approach with {{Wiki|interpersonal}} analysis. This has spawned discussions about |
− | the integration of “one-person” and “two-person” psychologies. In response to these | + | the {{Wiki|integration}} of “one-person” and “two-person” psychologies. In response to these |
discussions, Mitchell (2000) writes, “ The argument for a hybrid model that combines | discussions, Mitchell (2000) writes, “ The argument for a hybrid model that combines | ||
− | one- and two-person perspectives represents a confusion of conceptual levels. It empties | + | one- and two-person perspectives represents a [[confusion]] of {{Wiki|conceptual}} levels. It empties |
− | out the individual persons from the two-person model and then claims that we need a | + | out the {{Wiki|individual}} persons from the two-person model and then claims that we need a |
− | one-person-two-person hybrid to bring them back. But the individuals were accounted | + | one-person-two-person hybrid to bring them back. But the {{Wiki|individuals}} were accounted |
for in the two-person model all along—how could they not be? What would it mean to | for in the two-person model all along—how could they not be? What would it mean to | ||
− | have a two-person model without individual persons?—a model describing the events | + | have a two-person model without {{Wiki|individual}} persons?—a model describing the events |
− | between people but not the people themselves?” (pp. 1-7-108). Stolorow, Atwood and | + | between [[people]] but not the [[people]] themselves?” (pp. 1-7-108). Stolorow, Atwood and |
− | Orange (2002) write, “The very phrase two-person psychology continues to embody an | + | [[Orange]] (2002) write, “The very [[phrase]] two-person {{Wiki|psychology}} continues to embody an |
− | atomistic, isolated-mind philosophy in that two separated mental entities, two thinking | + | atomistic, isolated-mind [[philosophy]] in that two separated [[mental]] entities, two [[thinking]] |
things, are seen to bump into each other. We ought to speak instead of a contextual | things, are seen to bump into each other. We ought to speak instead of a contextual | ||
− | psychology, in which experiential worlds and intersubjective fields are seen as | + | {{Wiki|psychology}}, in which experiential [[worlds]] and intersubjective fields are seen as |
equiprimordial, mutually constituting one another in circular fashion” (pp. 95-96). How | equiprimordial, mutually constituting one another in circular fashion” (pp. 95-96). How | ||
− | could there be intersubjective fields without individual persons, just as how could there | + | could there be intersubjective fields without {{Wiki|individual}} persons, just as how could there |
− | be individual persons without intersubjective fields? | + | be {{Wiki|individual}} persons without intersubjective fields? |
− | Stolorow and his collaborators speak eloquently of how the “loss of affirming, | + | Stolorow and his collaborators speak eloquently of how the “loss of [[affirming]], |
− | validating connections to others” results in “undermining one’s sense of existing and of | + | validating connections to others” results in “undermining one’s [[sense]] of [[existing]] and of |
− | being real in its most basis aspects, including the experience of oneself as an active agent | + | being real in its most basis aspects, [[including]] the [[experience]] of oneself as an active agent |
− | and subject, as possessing an identity that is coherent and felt as authentically one’s own, | + | and [[subject]], as possessing an [[Wikipedia:Identity (social science)|identity]] that is coherent and felt as authentically one’s [[own]], |
− | as having a boundary delineating and delimiting I and not-I, and as being continuous in | + | as having a boundary [[delineating]] and [[delimiting]] I and not-I, and as being continuous in |
time and over history” (pp. 149-150). In this quote, “intersubjective contexts” appear to | time and over history” (pp. 149-150). In this quote, “intersubjective contexts” appear to | ||
− | sustain an ongoing and relatively autonomous, or at least delineated experience of one’s | + | sustain an ongoing and relatively autonomous, or at least delineated [[experience]] of one’s |
− | own individual existence. It seems clear that we do grow in the context of relationships, | + | [[own]] {{Wiki|individual}} [[existence]]. It seems clear that we do grow in the context of relationships, |
− | and certainly, that mal-attuned or destructive relationships, both in childhood and in | + | and certainly, that mal-attuned or {{Wiki|destructive}} relationships, both in childhood and in |
− | therapy, produce rigid, defensive or otherwise limiting organizations of experience. But | + | therapy, produce rigid, defensive or otherwise limiting organizations of [[experience]]. But |
does that mean that we are entirely “constituted” by our relationships? | does that mean that we are entirely “constituted” by our relationships? | ||
Many writers have approached this problem. Beebe and Lachmann (2003), for | Many writers have approached this problem. Beebe and Lachmann (2003), for | ||
− | example, write, “If we do not privilege inner or relational, and instead emphasize their | + | example, write, “If we do not privilege inner or relational, and instead {{Wiki|emphasize}} their |
− | reciprocal co-construction, psychoanalysts will be in a stronger position to examine how | + | reciprocal co-construction, {{Wiki|psychoanalysts}} will be in a stronger position to examine how |
dyadic process may (re-) organize both inner and relational process, and reciprocally, | dyadic process may (re-) organize both inner and relational process, and reciprocally, | ||
how changes in self-regulation in either partner may alter the interactive process (Beebe | how changes in self-regulation in either partner may alter the interactive process (Beebe | ||
& Lachmann, 1998)” (p. 380). | & Lachmann, 1998)” (p. 380). | ||
− | Nonlinear dynamic systems theory has also given analytic writers a way to | + | Nonlinear dynamic systems {{Wiki|theory}} has also given analytic writers a way to |
− | conceptualize the interplay between individual identity and interaction, describing the | + | conceptualize the interplay between {{Wiki|individual}} [[Wikipedia:Identity (social science)|identity]] and interaction, describing the |
− | individual as a “system within a larger system” (Sander, quoted in Seligman, 2002, p. 5). | + | {{Wiki|individual}} as a “system within a larger system” (Sander, quoted in Seligman, 2002, p. 5). |
− | In his discussion of Sander’s application of systems theory to analysis, Seligman writes, | + | In his [[discussion]] of Sander’s application of systems {{Wiki|theory}} to analysis, Seligman writes, |
− | “Sander thus construes psychic structure as a matter of the individual organism’s capacity | + | “Sander thus construes [[psychic]] {{Wiki|structure}} as a {{Wiki|matter}} of the {{Wiki|individual}} organism’s capacity |
to coordinate its needs and interests with the environment’s responses, all taking on | to coordinate its needs and interests with the environment’s responses, all taking on | ||
− | particular rhythms in time and space, full of affect and growing layers of meaning” (p. 4). | + | particular rhythms in [[time and space]], full of affect and growing layers of meaning” (p. 4). |
− | Aron (1996) qualifies his relational emphasis, saying that “relationships determine | + | Aron (1996) qualifies his relational {{Wiki|emphasis}}, saying that “relationships determine |
− | individuals and that individuals determine relationships” (p. 158). Discussing the work | + | {{Wiki|individuals}} and that {{Wiki|individuals}} determine relationships” (p. 158). Discussing the work |
− | of Evelyn Fox Keller, Aron writes, “Keller (1985) introduced the notion of “dynamic | + | of Evelyn {{Wiki|Fox}} Keller, Aron writes, “Keller (1985) introduced the notion of “dynamic |
autonomy” (p. 95) as a way of dealing with the problem that autonomy so often connotes | autonomy” (p. 95) as a way of dealing with the problem that autonomy so often connotes | ||
− | a radical separation and independence from others. By contrast, dynamic autonomy is | + | a radical separation and {{Wiki|independence}} from others. By contrast, dynamic autonomy is |
seen as a product of relatedness with others as well as of separation from them…The | seen as a product of relatedness with others as well as of separation from them…The | ||
− | notion of dynamic autonomy is an attempt to deconstruct the misleading opposition | + | notion of dynamic autonomy is an attempt to deconstruct the misleading [[opposition]] |
− | between autonomy and connection to others that so pervades our | + | between autonomy and [[connection]] to others that so pervades our {{Wiki|culture}}” (p. 151). |
− | Here we see that relational psychoanalysis actually sharpens our focus on the | + | Here we see that relational {{Wiki|psychoanalysis}} actually sharpens our focus on the |
− | problem of the self; it calls us to account for that particular “structuralization of | + | problem of the [[self]]; it calls us to account for that particular “structuralization of |
− | + | [[awareness]]” that is [[experienced]] as the separate [[self]], even though it is embedded in its | |
− | relationships and environment. For we do seem to have the experience of self, and, as | + | relationships and {{Wiki|environment}}. For we do seem to have the [[experience]] of [[self]], and, as |
− | intersubjective systems theory implies, the more “healthy” we are, or the less rigid our | + | intersubjective systems {{Wiki|theory}} implies, the more “healthy” we are, or the less rigid our |
− | subjective organizations of experience, the more access we have to something that feels | + | [[subjective]] organizations of [[experience]], the more access we have to something that [[feels]] |
− | like our own private existence. | + | like our [[own]] private [[existence]]. |
− | As I wrote this paper, my desk was full of the books of other writers, just as my | + | As I wrote this paper, my desk was full of the [[books]] of other writers, just as my |
− | mind was full of the education that I have gained from them. But, although these writers | + | [[mind]] was full of the [[education]] that I have gained from them. But, although these writers |
have often persuaded me, some of what they say seems true or important to me, and some | have often persuaded me, some of what they say seems true or important to me, and some | ||
− | does not. I am motivated to write by the prodding of my own response, by ideas or | + | does not. I am motivated to write by the prodding of my [[own]] response, by [[ideas]] or |
− | insights that have somehow formed within the privacy of my own subjectivity. It is my | + | [[insights]] that have somehow formed within the privacy of my [[own]] [[subjectivity]]. It is my |
− | own response that stimulates me until I finally articulate it. But in order to articulate it, I | + | [[own]] response that stimulates me until I finally articulate it. But in order to articulate it, I |
− | must empty my mind, I must “clear the boards,” so to speak, and be alone with myself, | + | must [[empty]] my [[mind]], I must “clear the boards,” so to speak, and be alone with myself, |
− | and wait for my own understanding to come clearly into view so that I can put it into | + | and wait for my [[own]] [[understanding]] to come clearly into view so that I can put it into |
words. | words. | ||
− | From an aerial view, my writing in response to these other writers can be seen as | + | From an aerial view, my [[writing]] in response to these other writers can be seen as |
the circular constituting event described by Stolorow et al. But this is not my personal | the circular constituting event described by Stolorow et al. But this is not my personal | ||
− | experience. My experience is that my response to these other writers emerges from the | + | [[experience]]. My [[experience]] is that my response to these other writers emerges from the |
− | depths of my individual being. I experience this as a self-organizing creative process, | + | depths of my {{Wiki|individual}} being. I [[experience]] this as a self-organizing creative process, |
− | requiring internal, silent contact with myself. | + | requiring internal, [[silent]] [[contact]] with myself. |
The point I want to make with this illustration is two-fold: one, that the ability to | The point I want to make with this illustration is two-fold: one, that the ability to | ||
− | play my part in the circular dance requires that I possess a degree of autonomy, or inward | + | play my part in the circular [[dance]] requires that I possess a [[degree]] of autonomy, or inward |
− | contact with myself (the ability to hear my own thoughts) and two, that my part in the | + | [[contact]] with myself (the ability to hear my [[own]] [[thoughts]]) and two, that my part in the |
− | dance has not been entirely produced by the other, but also by a function of my own | + | [[dance]] has not been entirely produced by the other, but also by a function of my [[own]] |
being, a function that needs to be nurtured and developed. | being, a function that needs to be nurtured and developed. | ||
− | The reason this seems important to me as a clinician, is that years ago I was less | + | The [[reason]] this seems important to me as a clinician, is that years ago I was less |
− | capable than I am now of experiencing my own responses. I remember sitting at my | + | capable than I am now of experiencing my [[own]] responses. I remember sitting at my |
− | typewriter, and, just as many of my patients describe, not being able to experience the | + | typewriter, and, just as many of my patients describe, not being able to [[experience]] the |
− | flow of creativity. I was unable to extricate myself not only from non-affirming | + | flow of {{Wiki|creativity}}. I was unable to extricate myself not only from non-affirming |
− | relationships, but also from the benevolent influence of other writers. I could not be | + | relationships, but also from the {{Wiki|benevolent}} influence of other writers. I could not be |
− | alone with myself, to find the silence out of which my own voice might emerge. | + | alone with myself, to find the [[silence]] out of which my [[own]] {{Wiki|voice}} might emerge. |
− | The Boston Change Process Study Group (2002) writes, “The integrity of the self | + | The [[Boston]] Change Process Study Group (2002) writes, “The [[integrity]] of the [[self]] |
− | as a unit, its self-organising imperative, requires continual action/reaction/interaction” | + | as a unit, its self-organising {{Wiki|imperative}}, requires continual action/reaction/interaction” |
− | (Nahum et al, p. 1054). I would only argue with the word “continual.” I suggest that the | + | (Nahum et al, p. 1054). I would only argue with the [[word]] “continual.” I suggest that the |
− | integrity and self-organizing capacity of the self, or self-experience, also requires the | + | [[integrity]] and self-organizing capacity of the [[self]], or self-experience, also requires the |
− | pulling back from interaction, periods of silence and aloneness, of relationship with | + | pulling back from interaction, periods of [[silence]] and aloneness, of relationship with |
oneself. | oneself. | ||
− | Periods of solitude can cultivate an ongoing experience of self-contact (even | + | Periods of [[solitude]] can cultivate an ongoing [[experience]] of self-contact (even |
− | when in relationship with others) that clarifies our awareness of our thoughts, emotions, | + | when in relationship with others) that clarifies our [[awareness]] of our [[thoughts]], [[emotions]], |
− | sensations and perceptions. The postmodern perspective that underlies intersubjective | + | [[sensations]] and [[perceptions]]. The postmodern {{Wiki|perspective}} that underlies intersubjective |
− | systems theory emphasizes just this personal, individual nature of experience. If we each | + | systems {{Wiki|theory}} emphasizes just this personal, {{Wiki|individual}} [[nature]] of [[experience]]. If we each |
− | regard a room full of people, for example, we will each see something slightly different, | + | regard a room full of [[people]], for example, we will each see something slightly different, |
something unique. I am using the term autonomy in this paper to denote the ability to | something unique. I am using the term autonomy in this paper to denote the ability to | ||
− | experience and enjoy one’s unique perspective. It means that we can receive and respond | + | [[experience]] and enjoy one’s unique {{Wiki|perspective}}. It means that we can receive and respond |
− | to the world with relatively less unconscious influence from the values, beliefs and | + | to the [[world]] with relatively less [[unconscious]] influence from the values, [[beliefs]] and |
− | images of our family and culture: we can think our own thoughts, see with our own eyes. | + | images of our [[family]] and {{Wiki|culture}}: we can think our [[own]] [[thoughts]], see with our [[own]] [[eyes]]. |
− | This allows us to see the world anew, to be inspired. For most of us, this ability must be | + | This allows us to see the [[world]] anew, to be inspired. For most of us, this ability must be |
− | cultivated, or at least resuscitated; I believe that it is one marker of psychological health | + | cultivated, or at least resuscitated; I believe that it is one marker of [[psychological]] [[health]] |
− | or maturity. In the Asian spiritual literature, the process of achieving more direct access | + | or maturity. In the {{Wiki|Asian}} [[spiritual]] {{Wiki|literature}}, the process of achieving more direct access |
− | to our perceptions and freeing one’s own responses from the thrall of “group think” is | + | to our [[perceptions]] and freeing one’s [[own]] responses from the thrall of “group think” is |
− | likened to awakening from a dream. | + | likened to [[awakening]] from a [[dream]]. |
− | What does it mean to be alone with oneself, to experience oneself as distinct from | + | What does it mean to be alone with oneself, to [[experience]] oneself as {{Wiki|distinct}} from |
− | any dyad? Many analytic writers address the psychological aloneness of the individual, | + | any dyad? Many analytic writers address the [[psychological]] aloneness of the {{Wiki|individual}}, |
− | but they often describe aloneness as a state of being closed off from, or unconscious of | + | but they often describe aloneness as a [[state of being]] closed off from, or [[unconscious]] of |
− | the environment. For example, Aron (1996) writes, “There seem to be natural pulls in | + | the {{Wiki|environment}}. For example, Aron (1996) writes, “There seem to be natural pulls in |
− | both directions, toward and away from others” (p. 234). But he suggests that the pull | + | both [[directions]], toward and away from others” (p. 234). But he suggests that the pull |
− | away from people is defensive, describing it as “the wish to hide, to protect oneself by | + | away from [[people]] is defensive, describing it as “the wish to hide, to {{Wiki|protect}} oneself by |
not being revealed to the other” (p. 234). Ogden (1994) posits an “autistic-contiguous” | not being revealed to the other” (p. 234). Ogden (1994) posits an “autistic-contiguous” | ||
position, as an addition to Klein’s paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions. He sees | position, as an addition to Klein’s paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions. He sees | ||
this position not as isolation, but as a primitive type of object-relatedness “in which the | this position not as isolation, but as a primitive type of object-relatedness “in which the | ||
− | object is a sensation experience (particularly at the skin surface)” (p. 174). Ogden claims | + | [[object]] is a [[sensation]] [[experience]] (particularly at the {{Wiki|skin}} surface)” (p. 174). Ogden claims |
− | that the autistic-contiguous position is part of psychological health throughout one’s life; | + | that the autistic-contiguous position is part of [[psychological]] [[health]] throughout one’s [[life]]; |
− | that this sensory experience “creates a palpable sensory edge” that helps provide a sense | + | that this [[sensory experience]] “creates a palpable sensory edge” that helps provide a [[sense]] |
− | of “boundedness of | + | of “boundedness of [[self]]” (p. 175). But he also describes this position as a “[[state]] in which |
− | the individual feels fully engrossed” and “in which one can immerse oneself” (p. 175). | + | the {{Wiki|individual}} [[feels]] fully engrossed” and “in which one can immerse oneself” (p. 175). |
− | He writes, “I am proposing that from the beginning of psychological life (and continuing | + | He writes, “I am proposing that from the beginning of [[psychological]] [[life]] (and continuing |
− | throughout life), there exists a form of experience in which the mother as psychological | + | throughout [[life]]), there [[exists]] a [[form]] of [[experience]] in which the mother as [[psychological]] |
− | matrix is replaced by an autonomous sensory matrix. In replacing the environmental | + | [[matrix]] is replaced by an autonomous sensory [[matrix]]. In replacing the {{Wiki|environmental}} |
− | mother with an autonomous sensation matrix, the infant creates an essential respite from | + | mother with an autonomous [[sensation]] [[matrix]], the {{Wiki|infant}} creates an [[essential]] respite from |
− | the strain (and intermittent terror) inherent in the process of coming to life in the realm of | + | the strain (and intermittent {{Wiki|terror}}) [[inherent]] in the process of coming to [[life]] in the [[realm]] of |
− | living human | + | living [[human beings]]” (p. 177). |
− | Here Ogden says that aloneness is part of healthy life, and yet he also describes it | + | Here Ogden says that aloneness is part of healthy [[life]], and yet he also describes it |
− | as a defensive reaction to the | + | as a defensive {{Wiki|reaction}} to the “{{Wiki|terror}}” of the [[human]] {{Wiki|environment}}. Furthermore, he does |
− | not describe the individual as alone with his or her thoughts or feelings, but only with | + | not describe the {{Wiki|individual}} as alone with his or her [[thoughts]] or [[feelings]], but only with |
− | sensations. This aloneness is, in Ogden’s words, an “auto-sensuous | + | [[sensations]]. This aloneness is, in Ogden’s words, an “auto-sensuous [[sanctuary]]” and “a |
− | realm of impenetrable, uninterrupted non- | + | [[realm]] of impenetrable, uninterrupted [[non-being]]” (p. 180). |
Winnicott (1958) expressed what seems a more positive view of aloneness. He | Winnicott (1958) expressed what seems a more positive view of aloneness. He | ||
− | believed that the adult’s capacity to be alone was “one of the most important signs of | + | believed that the adult’s capacity to be alone was “one of the most important [[signs]] of |
− | maturity in emotional | + | maturity in [[emotional development]]” (p. 416). He wrote, “The pathological alternative is |
− | a false life built on reactions to external | + | a false [[life]] built on reactions to external {{Wiki|stimuli}}” (p. 418). He [[thought]] that the capacity to |
− | be alone was based on an infantile state of “unintegration” or at-one-ness with the | + | be alone was based on an {{Wiki|infantile}} [[state]] of “unintegration” or at-one-ness with the |
mother/environment. Interestingly, he also believed that this capacity to be alone | mother/environment. Interestingly, he also believed that this capacity to be alone | ||
− | developed within, and in a sense, because of, the reliable presence of the mother. He | + | developed within, and in a [[sense]], because of, the reliable presence of the mother. He |
− | writes, “The individual who has developed the capacity to be alone is constantly able to | + | writes, “The {{Wiki|individual}} who has developed the capacity to be alone is constantly able to |
− | rediscover the personal impulse, and the personal impulse is not wasted because the state | + | rediscover the personal impulse, and the personal impulse is not wasted because the [[state of being]] alone is something which (though {{Wiki|paradoxically}}) always implies that someone |
− | of being alone is something which (though paradoxically) always implies that someone | ||
else is there” (p. 419). | else is there” (p. 419). | ||
Although this capacity for aloneness develops in the presence of the reliable | Although this capacity for aloneness develops in the presence of the reliable | ||
mother—in other words, within a nurturing intersubjective context—Winnicott wrote of | mother—in other words, within a nurturing intersubjective context—Winnicott wrote of | ||
− | the personal self as something discovered rather than created. He posited an “innate | + | the personal [[self]] as something discovered rather than created. He posited an “innate |
− | primary | + | primary {{Wiki|creativity}}” (1947, In Winnicott, 1957) and wrote, “It is in playing and only in |
− | playing that the child or adult is able to be creative and use the whole personality, and it | + | playing that the child or adult is able to be creative and use the whole [[personality]], and it |
− | is only in being creative that the individual discovers the | + | is only in being creative that the {{Wiki|individual}} discovers the [[self]]” (1968, In Winnicott, 1971, |
− | p. 54). Wallbridge & Davis write that he “regarded ‘the Real’ as emanating primarily | + | p. 54). Wallbridge & Davis write that he “regarded ‘the Real’ as [[emanating]] primarily |
− | from the inner reality, fantasy being ‘more primary’ than shared | + | from the inner [[reality]], [[fantasy]] being ‘more primary’ than shared [[reality]]” (p. 55). In |
− | Winnicott’s (1958) view, the solitary self can be full of life, while the capacity to be | + | Winnicott’s (1958) view, the {{Wiki|solitary}} [[self]] can be full of [[life]], while the capacity to be |
− | alone while in relation to others is necessary for | + | alone while in [[relation]] to others is necessary for “[[ego]] relatedness.” |
− | Winnicott’s perspective is particularly interesting to me in light of the meditation | + | Winnicott’s {{Wiki|perspective}} is particularly [[interesting]] to me in {{Wiki|light}} of the [[meditation]] |
− | experience that I will describe shortly. The aloneness of the self—that is, the experience | + | [[experience]] that I will describe shortly. The aloneness of the self—that is, the [[experience]] |
− | of separateness—is necessary for genuine connection with other people. Many writers | + | of separateness—is necessary for genuine [[connection]] with other [[people]]. Many writers |
− | have presented some version of this idea. For example, Aron (1996) writes that | + | have presented some version of this [[idea]]. For example, Aron (1996) writes that |
− | “intimacy requires both autonomy and | + | “intimacy requires both autonomy and [[connection]]” (p. 232). Kohut (1984) maintained |
− | that self-love develops concurrently with the capacity for object love. He wrote, “This | + | that [[self-love]] develops concurrently with the capacity for [[object]] [[love]]. He wrote, “This |
− | means that narcissism, like object love, evolves from archaic to mature forms…the | + | means that {{Wiki|narcissism}}, like [[object]] [[love]], evolves from {{Wiki|archaic}} to mature forms…the |
− | formulation that narcissism is replaced by object love—that narcissism is archaic and | + | formulation that {{Wiki|narcissism}} is replaced by [[object]] love—that {{Wiki|narcissism}} is {{Wiki|archaic}} and |
− | object love mature—is in error (see Kohut 1978b, 2:757—70)” (p. 185). | + | [[object]] [[love]] mature—is in error (see Kohut 1978b, 2:757—70)” (p. 185). |
− | Stolorow et al. (2002) particularly emphasize the interdependence of the | + | Stolorow et al. (2002) particularly {{Wiki|emphasize}} the [[interdependence]] of the |
− | experience of oneself and experience of the other, even though they sometimes appear to | + | [[experience]] of oneself and [[experience]] of the other, even though they sometimes appear to |
− | minimize the direction of growth towards autonomy. They write, | + | minimize the [[direction]] of growth towards autonomy. They write, “[[Experiences]] of |
− | selfhood and worldhood are inextricably bound up with one another, in that any dramatic | + | [[selfhood]] and worldhood are inextricably [[bound]] up with one another, in that any dramatic |
− | change in the one necessarily entails corresponding changes in the other….The | + | change in the one necessarily entails [[corresponding]] changes in the other….The |
− | dissolution of one’s selfhood thus produces an inevitable disintegrating effect on the | + | dissolution of one’s [[selfhood]] thus produces an inevitable disintegrating effect on the |
− | person’s experience in general and results ultimately in the loss of coherence of the world | + | person’s [[experience]] in general and results ultimately in the loss of coherence of the [[world]] |
− | itself. Likewise, the breakup of the unity of the world means the loss of a stable reality in | + | itself. Likewise, the breakup of the {{Wiki|unity}} of the [[world]] means the loss of a {{Wiki|stable}} [[reality]] in |
− | relation to which the sense of self is defined and sustained, and an experience of self | + | [[relation]] to which the [[sense]] of [[self]] is defined and sustained, and an [[experience]] of [[self]] |
fragmentation inevitably follows in its wake” (p. 145). | fragmentation inevitably follows in its wake” (p. 145). | ||
− | Meditation | + | [[Meditation]] |
− | As I said at the beginning of the paper, meditation practices can facilitate our | + | As I said at the beginning of the paper, [[meditation practices]] can facilitate our |
ability both to be alone, and to be intimate with others. It can therefore be used as an | ability both to be alone, and to be intimate with others. It can therefore be used as an | ||
effective auxiliary to our work with clients as they negotiate these inextricably inter | effective auxiliary to our work with clients as they negotiate these inextricably inter | ||
− | related domains of human experience. There are many different types of meditation | + | related domains of [[human experience]]. There are many different types of [[meditation practice]], producing somewhat different effects. I am concerned here with practices, such |
− | practice, producing somewhat different effects. I am concerned here with practices, such | + | as [[Realization]] Process, mentioned earlier, that help us attune or open to a {{Wiki|subtle}}, unified |
− | as Realization Process, mentioned earlier, that help us attune or open to a subtle, unified | + | [[dimension]] of [[consciousness]]. This is an [[experience]] of vibrant [[spaciousness]] pervading |
− | dimension of consciousness. This is an experience of vibrant spaciousness pervading | + | both the internal [[space]] of one’s [[body]] and one’s {{Wiki|environment}} at the same time. Because |
− | both the internal space of one’s body and one’s environment at the same time. Because | + | we [[experience]] this expanse of [[subtle consciousness]] pervading our [[body]], it [[feels]] as if we |
− | we experience this expanse of subtle consciousness pervading our body, it feels as if we | ||
− | are inside, inhabiting, our whole body at once. Because we experience it pervading our | + | are inside, inhabiting, our whole [[body]] at once. Because we [[experience]] it pervading our |
− | body and environment at the same time, it provides an experience of self/other oneness. | + | [[body]] and {{Wiki|environment}} at the same time, it provides an [[experience]] of self/other [[oneness]]. |
− | There are many references to this pervasive, unified (or nondual) consciousness, | + | There are many references to this {{Wiki|pervasive}}, unified (or [[nondual]]) [[consciousness]], |
− | particularly in the spiritual literature of India and Tibet. For example, a Tibetan Buddhist | + | particularly in the [[spiritual]] {{Wiki|literature}} of [[India]] and [[Tibet]]. For example, a [[Tibetan Buddhist]] |
− | text says, “This vast expanse, unwavering, indescribable, and equal to space, is timelessly | + | text says, “This vast expanse, unwavering, [[indescribable]], and {{Wiki|equal}} to [[space]], is timelessly |
− | and innately present in all | + | and innately {{Wiki|present}} in all [[beings]]” ([[Rabjam]], 2001, p. 83). |
− | A scholar of the Kashmir Shaivism (Hindu) philosophy, Muller-Ortega (1989), | + | A [[scholar]] of the [[Kashmir Shaivism]] ([[Hindu]]) [[philosophy]], Muller-Ortega (1989), |
− | writes, “No longer do finite objects appear as separate and limited structures; rather, the | + | writes, “No longer do finite [[objects]] appear as separate and limited structures; rather, the |
− | silent and translucent consciousness out of which all things are composed surfaces and | + | [[silent]] and [[translucent]] [[consciousness]] out of which all things are composed surfaces and |
− | becomes visible as the true reality of perceived | + | becomes [[visible]] as the [[true reality]] of [[perceived]] [[objects]]” (p. 182). |
− | Some Buddhist traditions (Dzog-chen and Mahamudra) call this subtle, pervasive | + | Some [[Buddhist traditions]] ([[Dzog-chen]] and [[Mahamudra]]) call this {{Wiki|subtle}}, {{Wiki|pervasive}} |
− | consciousness | + | [[consciousness]] “[[self-knowing]]” or self-reflecting” (see Traleg, 1999, [[Rabjam]], 1998). It |
− | experiences itself as the unchanging, unified ground of our being, within which our | + | [[experiences]] itself as the [[unchanging]], unified ground of our being, within which our |
− | specific thoughts, emotions, sensations and perceptions occur. The more access we have | + | specific [[thoughts]], [[emotions]], [[sensations]] and [[perceptions]] occur. The more access we have |
− | to this subtle ground-consciousness, the more we can let go of repetitive organizations of | + | to this {{Wiki|subtle}} ground-consciousness, the more we can let go of repetitive organizations of |
− | experience that obstruct the fluidly and spontaneity of our thoughts, emotions, sensations | + | [[experience]] that obstruct the fluidly and spontaneity of our [[thoughts]], [[emotions]], [[sensations]] |
− | and perceptions. It is this fluidity and spontaneity of responsiveness that gives rise to the | + | and [[perceptions]]. It is this [[fluidity]] and spontaneity of [[responsiveness]] that gives rise to the |
− | experience of “nowness” that has been popularized by contemporary spiritual teachers | + | [[experience]] of “nowness” that has been popularized by contemporary [[spiritual teachers]] |
− | such as Eckhart Tolle (1999). | + | such as [[Wikipedia: Meister Eckhart|Eckhart]] Tolle (1999). |
− | Whereas up to now in this paper, I have presented views from the psychoanalytic | + | Whereas up to now in this paper, I have presented [[views]] from the psychoanalytic |
− | literature that offer both experiential and theoretical or explanatory modes of discourse, I | + | {{Wiki|literature}} that offer both experiential and {{Wiki|theoretical}} or explanatory modes of [[discourse]], I |
− | wish to alert the reader that in my discussion of meditation and its clinical applications, I | + | wish to alert the reader that in my [[discussion]] of [[meditation]] and its clinical applications, I |
− | will be speaking entirely from the standpoint of experience. However, my claims are | + | will be {{Wiki|speaking}} entirely from the standpoint of [[experience]]. However, my claims are |
− | based on two decades of clinical experience in which I have used Realization Process to | + | based on two decades of clinical [[experience]] in which I have used [[Realization]] Process to |
− | help people inhabit their bodies, attune to the qualities of their being, and experience (or | + | help [[people]] inhabit their [[bodies]], attune to the qualities of their being, and [[experience]] (or |
− | uncover) a unified field of subtle consciousness pervading their bodies and their | + | uncover) a unified field of [[subtle consciousness]] pervading their [[bodies]] and their |
− | surroundings. This work includes exercises that two people can practice together to | + | surroundings. This work includes exercises that two [[people]] can practice together to |
− | experience the simultaneity of internal cohesion and self/other oneness (see Blackstone, | + | [[experience]] the simultaneity of internal cohesion and self/other [[oneness]] (see Blackstone, |
2007). | 2007). | ||
− | Meditation cultivates an experience of self, or subjectivity, that is not narrative or | + | [[Meditation]] cultivates an [[experience]] of [[self]], or [[subjectivity]], that is not {{Wiki|narrative}} or |
− | representational. It is the experienced quality of one’s existence, rather than one’s beliefs | + | representational. It is the [[experienced]] [[quality]] of one’s [[existence]], rather than one’s [[beliefs]] |
− | or behaviors, or one’s reflective self-consciousness in reaction to objects. Twentieth | + | or behaviors, or one’s reflective [[self-consciousness]] in {{Wiki|reaction}} to [[objects]]. Twentieth |
− | century Japanese philosopher Nishitani (1982) writes, “…we stand more to the near side | + | century [[Japanese]] [[philosopher]] Nishitani (1982) writes, “…we stand more to the near side |
− | of ourselves in emptiness than we do in self- | + | of ourselves in [[emptiness]] than we do in [[self-consciousness]]” (p. 98). This may be what |
− | Winnicott meant by the experience of “being.” Winnicott (1970) wrote, “After being, | + | Winnicott meant by the [[experience]] of “being.” Winnicott (1970) wrote, “After being, |
− | doing and being done to. But first, being” (In 1971, p. 86). This is a nearness to | + | doing and being done to. But first, being” (In 1971, p. 86). This is a [[nearness]] to |
− | ourselves that is more subtle than verbal constructions. | + | ourselves that is more {{Wiki|subtle}} than [[verbal]] constructions. |
− | It may also be akin to Damasio’s (1999) “core | + | It may also be akin to Damasio’s (1999) “core [[consciousness]]” which he describes |
− | as the “mysterious source of our mental first-person | + | as the “mysterious source of our [[mental]] first-person {{Wiki|perspective}}” (p. 312). He writes, |
− | “…a theory of consciousness should account for the simpler, foundational kind of the | + | “…a {{Wiki|theory}} of [[consciousness]] should account for the simpler, foundational kind of the |
− | phenomenon which occurs close to the nonconscious representation of the organism for | + | [[phenomenon]] which occurs close to the nonconscious [[representation]] of the {{Wiki|organism}} for |
− | whose sake the entire show is put together and which can support the later developments | + | whose [[sake]] the entire show is put together and which can support the later developments |
− | of identity and | + | of [[Wikipedia:Identity (social science)|identity]] and [[person]]” (p. 18). Interestingly, Damasio is concerned with the “[[feeling]]” of |
− | consciousness. He writes, | + | [[consciousness]]. He writes, “[[consciousness]] [[feels]] like a [[feeling]]” (p. 312). |
− | Damasio describes consciousness as a | + | Damasio describes [[consciousness]] as a “[[feeling]] of [[knowing]]” (p. 313), but the |
− | subtle consciousness cultivated through meditation is made up of many different | + | [[subtle consciousness]] cultivated through [[meditation]] is made up of many different |
− | qualities. For example, love has a quality to it, power has a quality to it, gender and | + | qualities. For example, [[love]] has a [[quality]] to it, power has a [[quality]] to it, [[gender]] and |
− | sexuality are qualitative experiences, not just abstract self-representations or behaviors. | + | {{Wiki|sexuality}} are qualitative [[experiences]], not just abstract self-representations or behaviors. |
− | Our intelligence also has a quality to it; it is not just a function. As Damasio seems to | + | Our [[intelligence]] also has a [[quality]] to it; it is not just a function. As Damasio seems to |
− | suggest, we can feel the quality of our intelligence. If the reader would like to test this, | + | suggest, we can [[feel]] the [[quality]] of our [[intelligence]]. If the reader would like to test this, |
− | you can remember a time when you were writing something and paused to think of the | + | you can remember a time when you were [[writing]] something and paused to think of the |
− | right word to convey your idea. The memory of waiting for the word to emerge may give | + | right [[word]] to convey your [[idea]]. The [[memory]] of waiting for the [[word]] to emerge may give |
− | you a “felt | + | you a “felt [[sense]]” of your [[intelligence]]. |
− | Kohut (1984) suggested the potential to experience one’s own being when he | + | Kohut (1984) suggested the potential to [[experience]] one’s [[own]] being when he |
− | referred to, “such introspectively accessible features of self experience as the self’s | + | referred to, “such introspectively accessible features of [[self]] [[experience]] as the self’s |
− | cohesion, firmness, vigor, vitality, and harmoniousness” (p. 65, italics mine). Meditation | + | cohesion, {{Wiki|firmness}}, [[vigor]], [[vitality]], and harmoniousness” (p. 65, italics mine). [[Meditation practices]], particularly those mentioned above, can facilitate the [[experience]] of oneself as |
− | practices, particularly those mentioned above, can facilitate the experience of oneself as | ||
cohesive and harmonious. Many analytic writers today maintain that we have “multiple | cohesive and harmonious. Many analytic writers today maintain that we have “multiple | ||
selves” (Bromberg, 1998; Mitchell, 1993), meaning that we constantly reconfigure | selves” (Bromberg, 1998; Mitchell, 1993), meaning that we constantly reconfigure | ||
− | ourselves in relation to our changing circumstances. Although I believe that this is true, | + | ourselves in [[relation]] to our changing circumstances. Although I believe that this is true, |
− | meditation practice helps reveal an underlying, ongoing experience of cohesion, or | + | [[meditation practice]] helps reveal an underlying, ongoing [[experience]] of cohesion, or |
− | wholeness. This may be the | + | [[wholeness]]. This may be the “[[sense]] of [[self]]” that Lichtenberg, Lachmann and Fosshage |
− | (2002) refer to when they write, “we have supported Kohut’s claim for the essential | + | (2002) refer to when they write, “we have supported Kohut’s claim for the [[essential]] |
− | sameness in most instances of a sense of self (not a | + | [[sameness]] in most instances of a [[sense]] of [[self]] (not a ‘{{Wiki|structure}}’ of [[self]])” (p. 184). (See |
− | Rubin, 1996, for a discussion of Buddhist and psychoanalytic conceptions of self). | + | Rubin, 1996, for a [[discussion]] of [[Buddhist]] and psychoanalytic conceptions of [[self]]). |
− | Meditation helps us experience wholeness and cohesion in several ways. One is | + | [[Meditation]] helps us [[experience]] [[wholeness]] and cohesion in several ways. One is |
− | by cultivating access to the vertical core of one’s body. Asian traditions (see Motoyama, | + | by [[cultivating]] access to the vertical core of one’s [[body]]. {{Wiki|Asian}} [[traditions]] (see Motoyama, |
− | 1981) describe a subtle energy channel that runs through the vertical core of the body | + | 1981) describe a [[subtle energy]] [[channel]] that runs through the vertical core of the [[body]] |
from the base of the spine to the center of the top of the head. They teach that there are | from the base of the spine to the center of the top of the head. They teach that there are | ||
− | points (chakras) along this channel associated with particular qualities and capacities of | + | points ([[chakras]]) along this [[channel]] associated with particular qualities and capacities of |
− | our being, such as intelligence, love, power and sexuality. As we contact the vertical | + | our being, such as [[intelligence]], [[love]], power and {{Wiki|sexuality}}. As we [[contact]] the vertical |
− | core of ourselves, we are able to experience the various aspects of our being | + | core of ourselves, we are able to [[experience]] the various aspects of our being |
− | simultaneously. This means, for example, that we can think, feel and sense at the same | + | simultaneously. This means, for example, that we can think, [[feel]] and [[sense]] at the same |
− | time. We can experience love and power, at the same time. We experience our being as | + | time. We can [[experience]] [[love]] and power, at the same time. We [[experience]] our being as |
an integrated whole. | an integrated whole. | ||
− | Through this same inward self-contact, meditation practices also cultivate | + | Through this same inward self-contact, [[meditation practices]] also cultivate |
− | mind/body integration. This means that we do not experience ourselves as having a mind | + | mind/body {{Wiki|integration}}. This means that we do not [[experience]] ourselves as having a [[mind]] |
− | and a body, or a self and a body, but rather that our mind is in our whole body. We | + | and a [[body]], or a [[self]] and a [[body]], but rather that our [[mind]] is in our whole [[body]]. We |
− | inhabit our whole body all at once. Shunryu Suzuki, a 20th century Zen master, wrote, | + | inhabit our whole [[body]] all at once. [[Shunryu Suzuki]], a 20th century [[Zen master]], wrote, |
− | “To stop your mind does not mean to stop the activities of mind. It means your mind | + | “To stop your [[mind]] does not mean to stop the [[activities]] of [[mind]]. It means your [[mind]] |
− | pervades your whole | + | pervades your whole [[body]]” (Suzuki, 1980, p. 41). Through [[meditation]], we can |
− | experience this subtle, pervasive ground of our being pervading the changing occurrences | + | [[experience]] this {{Wiki|subtle}}, {{Wiki|pervasive}} ground of our being pervading the changing occurrences |
− | of our various configurations. Yuasa (1987) writes, “…the oneness of the body-mind is | + | of our various configurations. Yuasa (1987) writes, “…the [[oneness]] of the [[body-mind]] is |
− | an ideal for inward meditation as well as for outward | + | an {{Wiki|ideal}} for inward [[meditation]] as well as for outward [[activities]]” (p. 24). |
− | Winnicott described an aspect of development called “personalization.” Davis & | + | Winnicott described an aspect of [[development]] called “personalization.” Davis & |
− | Wallbridge (1981) write, “A particularly important aspect of integration was referred to | + | Wallbridge (1981) write, “A particularly important aspect of {{Wiki|integration}} was referred to |
− | by Winnicott as ‘personalization,’ by which he meant the acquisition of a personal body | + | by Winnicott as ‘personalization,’ by which he meant the acquisition of a personal [[body]] |
− | scheme with the | + | scheme with the ‘[[Wikipedia:Psyche (psychology)|psyche]] indwelling in the soma.’…Personalization means not only that |
− | the psyche is placed in the body, but also that eventually, as cortical control extends, the | + | the [[Wikipedia:Psyche (psychology)|psyche]] is placed in the [[body]], but also that eventually, as cortical control extends, the |
− | whole of the body becomes the dwelling place of the | + | whole of the [[body]] becomes the dwelling place of the [[self]]” (pp. 37-38). Winnicott felt |
− | that this occurred sometime in infancy. However, our repetitive subjective organizations | + | that this occurred sometime in infancy. However, our repetitive [[subjective]] organizations |
− | and abstract self-representations obstruct our inward contact with ourselves and fragment | + | and abstract self-representations obstruct our inward [[contact]] with ourselves and fragment |
− | our mind/body integration. For this reason, for the whole of the body to be experienced | + | our mind/body {{Wiki|integration}}. For this [[reason]], for the whole of the [[body]] to be [[experienced]] |
− | as the dwelling place of the self is considered by some spiritual traditions to be an ideal | + | as the dwelling place of the [[self]] is considered by some [[spiritual traditions]] to be an {{Wiki|ideal}} |
− | that can be approached through meditation. | + | that can be approached through [[meditation]]. |
− | Meditation practice also cultivates a sense of the substantiality of one’s individual | + | [[Meditation practice]] also cultivates a [[sense]] of the substantiality of one’s {{Wiki|individual}} |
− | being. The qualitative experience of being is not abstract; it is palpable. As we inhabit | + | being. The qualitative [[experience]] of being is not abstract; it is palpable. As we inhabit |
− | the internal space of our body, we experience ourselves as taking up space. We have | + | the internal [[space]] of our [[body]], we [[experience]] ourselves as [[taking up]] [[space]]. We have |
− | internal depth and volume. This in-depth contact with the internal space of our body can | + | internal depth and volume. This in-depth [[contact]] with the internal [[space]] of our [[body]] can |
− | provide a sense of being alone within our own skin, of being immersed in our own being. | + | provide a [[sense]] of being alone within our [[own]] {{Wiki|skin}}, of being immersed in our [[own]] being. |
− | Inward contact, or immersion in our own body and being, is also the basis of | + | Inward [[contact]], or immersion in our [[own]] [[body]] and being, is also the basis of |
− | openness and fluidity. Wherever we inhabit our own body, we are open to the | + | [[openness]] and [[fluidity]]. Wherever we inhabit our [[own]] [[body]], we are open to the |
− | environment. If we inhabit the internal space of our chest, for example, we will | + | {{Wiki|environment}}. If we inhabit the internal [[space]] of our {{Wiki|chest}}, for example, we will |
− | experience the quality of love within our chest, as the quality and substance of our own | + | [[experience]] the [[quality]] of [[love]] within our {{Wiki|chest}}, as the [[quality]] and [[substance]] of our [[own]] |
− | being. But we will also respond to the environment from that depth of ourselves. The | + | being. But we will also respond to the {{Wiki|environment}} from that depth of ourselves. The |
− | more deeply we inhabit our chest, the more deeply we will experience emotional | + | more deeply we inhabit our {{Wiki|chest}}, the more deeply we will [[experience]] [[emotional]] |
− | responsiveness towards the world around us. And if someone puts a hand on our chest, | + | [[responsiveness]] towards the [[world]] around us. And if someone puts a hand on our {{Wiki|chest}}, |
− | we will be able to feel the warmth and the quality of that person’s touch all the way | + | we will be able to [[feel]] the warmth and the [[quality]] of that person’s {{Wiki|touch}} all the way |
− | through the internal depth of our chest. | + | through the internal depth of our {{Wiki|chest}}. |
− | Here is an example of the use of Realization Process from a recent session with | + | Here is an example of the use of [[Realization]] Process from a recent session with |
Sam, a warm, empathic man in his late forties. Sam came to work with me when his | Sam, a warm, empathic man in his late forties. Sam came to work with me when his | ||
− | twenty-five year marriage ended. He had suddenly recognized that he had been living | + | twenty-five year [[marriage]] ended. He had suddenly [[recognized]] that he had been living |
− | vicariously through his wife instead of forming his own friendships and interests. In our | + | vicariously through his wife instead of forming his [[own]] friendships and interests. In our |
− | interactions, I often felt a lively emotional engagement with him, and an ongoing sense of | + | interactions, I often felt a lively [[emotional]] engagement with him, and an ongoing [[sense]] of |
− | emotional contact or resonance between us. Because of this emotional connection, I | + | [[emotional]] [[contact]] or resonance between us. Because of this [[emotional]] [[connection]], I |
− | enjoyed his company and I was often caught by surprise when he complained of social | + | enjoyed his company and I was often caught by surprise when he complained of {{Wiki|social}} |
− | inadequacy and an internal feeling of deadness. After several months, it became clear | + | inadequacy and an [[internal feeling]] of deadness. After several months, it became clear |
− | that these feelings were based on his doubts about his intelligence. He described his | + | that these [[feelings]] were based on his [[doubts]] about his [[intelligence]]. He described his |
father as “brilliant” but his mother, with whom he had been much closer, was a “simple, | father as “brilliant” but his mother, with whom he had been much closer, was a “simple, | ||
generous woman.” He felt that his wife had been more like his father in this regard; she | generous woman.” He felt that his wife had been more like his father in this regard; she | ||
− | worked as a freelance magazine writer and had a wealth of knowledge and strong | + | worked as a freelance magazine writer and had a [[wealth]] of [[knowledge]] and strong |
− | opinions on a wide variety of subjects. Sam said that he felt “constantly entertained” by | + | opinions on a wide variety of [[subjects]]. Sam said that he felt “constantly entertained” by |
her, and without her, he felt dull and boring. | her, and without her, he felt dull and boring. | ||
He had a way of ducking his head when he talked about these things and I | He had a way of ducking his head when he talked about these things and I | ||
− | recognized this gesture as larger version of a very subtle movement he made whenever I | + | [[recognized]] this gesture as larger version of a very {{Wiki|subtle}} {{Wiki|movement}} he made whenever I |
− | offered my point of view on whatever we were discussing. In addition to exploring this | + | [[offered]] my point of view on whatever we were discussing. In addition to exploring this |
− | aspect of our relationship, and how it related to his previous relationships, I taught him | + | aspect of our relationship, and how it related to his previous relationships, I [[taught]] him |
− | the following exercise from Realization Process. First he inhabited his own brain (not | + | the following exercise from [[Realization]] Process. First he inhabited his [[own]] {{Wiki|brain}} (not |
− | just the frontal lobes, but his whole brain). This is an experience of actually being inside | + | just the frontal lobes, but his whole {{Wiki|brain}}). This is an [[experience]] of actually being inside |
− | the internal space of one’s head. It is not just awareness of the internal space of the head, | + | the internal [[space]] of one’s head. It is not just [[awareness]] of the internal [[space]] of the head, |
− | but a sense that one actually is that internal space. I have found that everyone can do this, | + | but a [[sense]] that one actually is that internal [[space]]. I have found that everyone can do this, |
to some extent. If someone has difficulty with this, they can put a hand lightly on either | to some extent. If someone has difficulty with this, they can put a hand lightly on either | ||
− | side of their head and feel that they inhabit the space between their hands. | + | side of their head and [[feel]] that they inhabit the [[space]] between their hands. |
− | He then attuned to the quality of his understanding (I suggest attuning to the | + | He then attuned to the [[quality]] of his [[understanding]] (I suggest attuning to the |
− | quality of understanding rather than intelligence because I have found that people will | + | [[quality]] of [[understanding]] rather than [[intelligence]] because I have found that [[people]] will |
− | inhabit more of their head in this attunement; the cue to attune to the quality of | + | inhabit more of their head in this [[attunement]]; the cue to attune to the [[quality]] of |
− | intelligence generally evokes engagement of just the forehead). Sam was surprised but | + | [[intelligence]] generally evokes engagement of just the {{Wiki|forehead}}). Sam was surprised but |
− | very pleased that he could actually experience the quality of his understanding. He said it | + | very [[pleased]] that he could actually [[experience]] the [[quality]] of his [[understanding]]. He said it |
− | was the first time that he was aware of | + | was the first time that he was {{Wiki|aware}} of “[[life]] in his head.” |
− | We then both attuned to the quality of understanding within our own brain while, | + | We then both attuned to the [[quality]] of [[understanding]] within our [[own]] {{Wiki|brain}} while, |
− | at the same time, we attuned to the quality of understanding within each other’s brain. | + | at the same time, we attuned to the [[quality]] of [[understanding]] within each other’s {{Wiki|brain}}. |
− | Although many people are puzzled when they first hear this instruction, everyone I have | + | Although many [[people]] are puzzled when they first hear this instruction, everyone I have |
− | worked with has found that they are capable of this attunement to self and other. The | + | worked with has found that they are capable of this [[attunement]] to [[self]] and other. The |
− | qualitative level of our being has the capacity to experience the qualitative level of other | + | qualitative level of our being has the capacity to [[experience]] the qualitative level of other |
− | people. | + | [[people]]. |
− | This exercise evoked an experience of resonance between us—not a merging of | + | This exercise evoked an [[experience]] of resonance between us—not a merging of |
− | our understanding, for we were each still inhabiting our own head, but a vivid sense of | + | our [[understanding]], for we were each still inhabiting our [[own]] head, but a vivid [[sense]] of |
− | connection across the distance between us. Sam was delighted at this “meeting of | + | [[connection]] across the distance between us. Sam was [[delighted]] at this “meeting of |
− | minds.” He felt an actual sense of equality with me, a sense that there was room for his | + | [[minds]].” He felt an actual [[sense]] of equality with me, a [[sense]] that there was room for his |
− | own mind, and that his experience of his own mind enriched our connection with each | + | [[own mind]], and that his [[experience]] of his [[own mind]] enriched our [[connection]] with each |
other. | other. | ||
− | There is recognition in the analytic literature of the subtler ranges of the | + | There is {{Wiki|recognition}} in the analytic {{Wiki|literature}} of the subtler ranges of the |
− | concurrence of self-connection and connection with others. Coburn (2001) writes, “it is | + | concurrence of self-connection and [[connection]] with others. Coburn (2001) writes, “it is |
− | paradoxically exactly our embeddedness in our subjectivity that, far from acting as an | + | {{Wiki|paradoxically}} exactly our embeddedness in our [[subjectivity]] that, far from acting as an |
− | encumbrance, enables and facilitates the reciprocal and mutual processes of emotional | + | encumbrance, enables and facilitates the reciprocal and mutual {{Wiki|processes}} of [[emotional]] |
− | + | [[attunement]]” (p. 304). Self-contact is very different than isolation or estrangement, in | |
− | which our troubled relations with others cause us to wall ourselves off from the world. | + | which our troubled relations with others [[cause]] us to wall ourselves off from the [[world]]. |
Self-contact is permeability, a transparency to our surroundings, in which we gain an | Self-contact is permeability, a transparency to our surroundings, in which we gain an | ||
− | increasingly full awareness of and participation in the larger system of which we are a | + | increasingly [[full awareness]] of and participation in the larger system of which we are a |
part. | part. | ||
− | As our attunement to the subtle, unified consciousness pervading our own body | + | As our [[attunement]] to the {{Wiki|subtle}}, unified [[consciousness]] pervading our [[own]] [[body]] |
− | progresses, we can also experience this subtle consciousness pervading everything | + | progresses, we can also [[experience]] this [[subtle consciousness]] pervading everything |
around us. Yuasa (1987) writes, “Every being is changed to a perfectly coherent | around us. Yuasa (1987) writes, “Every being is changed to a perfectly coherent | ||
− | radiance, made transparent through the illumination of the | + | radiance, made transparent through the [[illumination]] of the [[transcendent]]” (p. 156). As we |
− | cultivate, or uncover, the subtle ground of our being, we experience this subtle dimension | + | cultivate, or uncover, the {{Wiki|subtle}} ground of our being, we [[experience]] this {{Wiki|subtle}} [[dimension]] |
− | of consciousness pervading our own body and everything around us at the same time. | + | of [[consciousness]] pervading our [[own]] [[body]] and everything around us at the same time. |
− | This is experienced as a mutual permeability or mutual transparency of self and other. It | + | This is [[experienced]] as a mutual permeability or mutual transparency of [[self]] and other. It |
− | is the basis of a sense of oneness with our surroundings. It is also the basis of an | + | is the basis of a [[sense]] of [[oneness]] with our surroundings. It is also the basis of an |
− | experience of sameness between ourselves and others. Coburn (2001) writes, “it is our | + | [[experience]] of [[sameness]] between ourselves and others. Coburn (2001) writes, “it is our |
− | human sameness and its high degree of specificity that allow us the potential for | + | [[human]] [[sameness]] and its high [[degree]] of specificity that allow us the potential for |
− | resonating with the unique, affective experiences of another” (306). The cultivation of | + | resonating with the unique, affective [[experiences]] of another” (306). The [[cultivation]] of |
− | our subtle, pervasive consciousness can facilitate what Coburn calls “affective | + | our {{Wiki|subtle}}, {{Wiki|pervasive}} [[consciousness]] can facilitate what Coburn calls “affective |
resonance,” as well as resonance in all other qualitative aspects of our being. | resonance,” as well as resonance in all other qualitative aspects of our being. | ||
− | Some Asian spiritual teachings do suggest that we lose complete sense of our | + | Some {{Wiki|Asian}} [[spiritual]] teachings do suggest that we lose complete [[sense]] of our |
− | individual being as we identify ourselves with the nondual dimension of consciousness. I | + | {{Wiki|individual}} being as we identify ourselves with the [[nondual]] [[dimension]] of [[consciousness]]. I |
− | believe this view may have originally been meant as pedagogy, a means of helping | + | believe this view may have originally been meant as {{Wiki|pedagogy}}, a means of helping |
− | people relinquish the rigid self-representations that obscure the qualitative dimension. In | + | [[people]] relinquish the rigid self-representations that obscure the qualitative [[dimension]]. In |
− | any case, it disregards the changes that occur in the qualitative experience of our own | + | any case, it disregards the changes that occur in the qualitative [[experience]] of our [[own]] |
− | being—the aliveness within our skin—that occurs as we become open to the field of self | + | being—the aliveness within our skin—that occurs as we become open to the field of [[self]] |
− | other oneness. Nishitani (1982) writes, “It is the field in which each and every thing—as | + | other [[oneness]]. Nishitani (1982) writes, “It is the field in which each and every thing—as |
− | an absolute center, possessed of an absolutely unique individuality—becomes manifest as | + | an [[absolute]] center, possessed of an absolutely unique individuality—becomes [[manifest]] as |
it is in itself” (p. 164). | it is in itself” (p. 164). | ||
− | We discover the qualitative experience of being as we make inward contact with | + | We discover the qualitative [[experience]] of being as we make inward [[contact]] with |
− | ourselves. The Asian literature calls it | + | ourselves. The {{Wiki|Asian}} {{Wiki|literature}} calls it “[[self-arising]];” it is not something that we have [[to construct]] or hold. All [[meditation practices]] help us let go of our [[grip]] on ourselves. |
− | construct or hold. All meditation practices help us let go of our grip on ourselves. | + | Whatever their method, they are all about [[letting go]], so that we can discover this |
− | Whatever their method, they are all about letting go, so that we can discover this | + | integrated, qualitative, open [[dimension]] of ourselves. As we let go of our protective [[grip]] |
− | integrated, qualitative, open dimension of ourselves. As we let go of our protective grip | + | on ourselves, the resulting [[experience]] of internal cohesion strengthens our [[sense]] of [[self]] |
− | on ourselves, the resulting experience of internal cohesion strengthens our sense of self | ||
possession. But it also enables us to respond more spontaneously. It allows us to be | possession. But it also enables us to respond more spontaneously. It allows us to be | ||
− | more deeply moved and transformed by life, to surrender ourselves, with less fear of | + | more deeply moved and [[transformed]] by [[life]], to surrender ourselves, with less {{Wiki|fear}} of |
− | annihilation, to the moment-by-moment flow of circumstances, and the mutual impact of | + | {{Wiki|annihilation}}, to the moment-by-moment flow of circumstances, and the mutual impact of |
relationships. | relationships. | ||
Line 579: | Line 575: | ||
− | In this paper I have tried to show how some meditation techniques can contribute, | + | In this paper I have tried to show how some [[meditation techniques]] can contribute, |
− | both theoretically and clinically, to a subject that is at the forefront of analytic discourse: | + | both theoretically and clinically, to a [[subject]] that is at the forefront of analytic [[discourse]]: |
− | the relationship of individual self-experience to self-other interdependence. I have | + | the relationship of {{Wiki|individual}} self-experience to self-other [[interdependence]]. I have |
− | discussed how meditation, in particular, Realization Process, can uncover a qualitative | + | discussed how [[meditation]], in particular, [[Realization]] Process, can uncover a qualitative |
− | level of experience, and facilitate both deepened self-contact and openness to others. The | + | level of [[experience]], and facilitate both deepened self-contact and [[openness]] to others. The |
− | more inward contact we have with our separate form, the more the experienced boundary | + | more inward [[contact]] we have with our separate [[form]], the more the [[experienced]] boundary |
− | between our own form and our environment dissolves. I have also suggested that if the | + | between our [[own]] [[form]] and our {{Wiki|environment}} dissolves. I have also suggested that if the |
− | focus of analytic practice shifts too exclusively towards its relational aspect, we risk | + | focus of analytic practice shifts too exclusively towards its relational aspect, we [[risk]] |
− | minimizing our understanding and nurturance of the inward direction of human | + | minimizing our [[understanding]] and nurturance of the inward [[direction]] of [[human]] |
− | development, with its creative and qualitative potentials. | + | [[development]], with its creative and qualitative potentials. |
Line 597: | Line 593: | ||
<poem> | <poem> | ||
− | Aron, L. (1996). A meeting of minds: Mutuality in psychoanalysis.. Hillsdale, N.J.: The | + | Aron, L. (1996). A meeting of [[minds]]: Mutuality in {{Wiki|psychoanalysis}}.. Hillsdale, N.J.: The |
Analytic Press. | Analytic Press. | ||
− | Beebe, B. & Lachmann, F. (2003, July). The relational turn in psychoanalysis: A dyadic | + | Beebe, B. & Lachmann, F. (2003, July). The relational turn in {{Wiki|psychoanalysis}}: A dyadic |
− | systems view from infant research. Contemporary Psychoanalysis, 39 (3), 379 | + | systems view from {{Wiki|infant}} research. Contemporary {{Wiki|Psychoanalysis}}, 39 (3), 379 |
410. | 410. | ||
− | Beebe, B. & Lachmann, F. (1998). Co-constructing inner and relational processes: Self | + | Beebe, B. & Lachmann, F. (1998). Co-constructing inner and relational {{Wiki|processes}}: [[Self]] |
− | and mutual regulation in infant research and adult treatment. Psychoanalytic | + | and mutual regulation in {{Wiki|infant}} research and adult treatment. Psychoanalytic |
− | Psychology, 15:1-37. | + | {{Wiki|Psychology}}, 15:1-37. |
− | Blackstone, J. (2007). The empathic ground: Intersubjectivity and nonduality in the | + | Blackstone, J. (2007). The empathic ground: Intersubjectivity and [[nonduality]] in the |
− | psychotherapeutic process. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. | + | {{Wiki|psychotherapeutic}} process. [[Albany]], NY: [[State University of New York Press]]. |
− | Bromberg, P. (1998). Standing in the spaces. Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic Press. | + | Bromberg, P. (1998). [[Standing]] in the spaces. Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic Press. |
− | Coburn, W. J. (2001). Subjectivity, emotional resonance, and the sense of the real. | + | Coburn, W. J. (2001). [[Subjectivity]], [[emotional]] resonance, and the [[sense]] of the real. |
− | Psychoanalytic Psychology, 18:303-319 | + | Psychoanalytic {{Wiki|Psychology}}, 18:303-319 |
− | Davis, M., Wallbridge, D. (1981). Boundary and space: An introduction to the work of | + | Davis, M., Wallbridge, D. (1981). Boundary and [[space]]: An introduction to the work of |
D.W. Winnicott. New York/London: Brunner-Routledge. | D.W. Winnicott. New York/London: Brunner-Routledge. | ||
− | Damasio, A. (1999). The feeling of what happens. San Diego, New York and London: | + | Damasio, A. (1999). The [[feeling]] of what happens. {{Wiki|San Diego}}, [[New York]] and [[London]]: |
Harcourt, Inc. | Harcourt, Inc. | ||
− | Epstein, M. D. (1998). Going to pieces without falling apart. NY: Broadway Books. | + | Epstein, M. D. (1998). Going to pieces without falling apart. NY: Broadway [[Books]]. |
− | Epstein, M. D. (1995). Thoughts without a thinker. NY: Basic Books. | + | Epstein, M. D. (1995). [[Thoughts]] without a thinker. NY: Basic [[Books]]. |
− | Kohut, H. (1984). How does analysis cure? Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, | + | Kohut, H. (1984). How does analysis cure? {{Wiki|Chicago}}: The [[University of Chicago Press]], |
Inc. | Inc. | ||
− | Kohut, H. (1977). The restoration of the self. NY: International Universities Press. | + | Kohut, H. (1977). The restoration of the [[self]]. NY: International [[Universities]] Press. |
− | Lichtenberg, J. D., Lachmann, F. M., Fosshage, J. L. (2002). A spirit of inquiry: | + | Lichtenberg, J. D., Lachmann, F. M., Fosshage, J. L. (2002). A [[spirit]] of inquiry: |
− | Communication in psychoanalysis. Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic Press. | + | [[Communication]] in {{Wiki|psychoanalysis}}. Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic Press. |
Mitchell, S. A. (2000). Relationality. Hillsdale, N.J.: The Analytic Press. | Mitchell, S. A. (2000). Relationality. Hillsdale, N.J.: The Analytic Press. | ||
− | (1993). Hope and dread in psychoanalysis. New York: Basic Books. | + | (1993). {{Wiki|Hope}} and dread in {{Wiki|psychoanalysis}}. [[New York]]: Basic [[Books]]. |
− | Motoyama, H. (1981). Theories of the chakras. Wheaton, IL: Quest Books. | + | Motoyama, H. (1981). Theories of the [[chakras]]. Wheaton, IL: Quest [[Books]]. |
− | Muller-Ortega, P. E. (1989). The triadic heart of Shiva. New York: State University of | + | Muller-Ortega, P. E. (1989). The triadic [[heart]] of [[Shiva]]. [[New York]]: [[State University of New York Press]]. |
− | New York Press. | ||
Nahum, J. et al. (2002). Explicating the implicit: The local level and the microprocess of | Nahum, J. et al. (2002). Explicating the implicit: The local level and the microprocess of | ||
− | change in the analytic situation. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 83, | + | change in the analytic situation. International Journal of {{Wiki|Psychoanalysis}}, 83, |
1051-1062. | 1051-1062. | ||
− | Nishitani, K. (1982). Religion and nothingness. Berkeley & Los Angeles, CA: University | + | Nishitani, K. (1982). [[Religion]] and [[nothingness]]. [[Berkeley]] & [[Los Angeles]], CA: {{Wiki|University of California Press}}. |
− | of California Press. | + | Ogden, T. (1994). [[Subjects]] of analysis. Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson Inc. |
− | Ogden, T. (1994). Subjects of analysis. Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson Inc. | + | [[Rabjam]], L. (2001). The [[precious treasury of the basic space of phenomena]] (R. |
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</poem> | </poem> | ||
Latest revision as of 22:38, 2 February 2020
Judith Blackstone, Ph.D.
Abstract
In this paper, I look at the dialogue between some relational and intra-psychic
models of psychoanalysis, regarding the autonomy of the self. I also describe how
certain types of meditation, in particular, Realization Process, can facilitate both the
experience of internal cohesion, the sense of oneself as a separate being, and the
experience of participating in a fluidly reciprocal self/world matrix. I discuss how the
experience of interiority that can be cultivated through meditation leads to the emergence
of a subtle, qualitative sense of self and other, enables creativity, and increases one’s
openness to other people.
Meditation and the Cohesive Self
Judith Blackstone, Ph.D.
Introduction
In this paper, I look at the dialogue between some relational and intra-psychic
models of psychoanalysis, regarding the experience of autonomy. I also show how
certain types of meditation, in particular, Realization Process1, can facilitate both the
experience of internal cohesion, the sense of oneself as a separate being, and the
experience of participating in a fluidly reciprocal self/world matrix. I discuss how the
experience of interiority that can be cultivated through meditation leads to the emergence
of a subtle, qualitative sense of self and other. I make three main points throughout the
paper: 1) the current psychoanalytic literature, with its specific interest in the relational
dyad, sometimes ignores or de-emphasizes the sense of existing as a separate being; 2)
the capacity for fluid, flexible participation in relationships can be enhanced through
cultivating the sense of separateness or aloneness; and 3) meditation practices can
contribute to both the theoretical understanding and experience of how a developed sense
of one’s own being facilitates one’s openness to other people.
I know that using the phrases “one’s own being” or “inward contact with oneself” as I do in this paper, may put me on shaky ground with some readers. In this context the
1 Realization Process is a series of meditative exercises, developed by the author, for realizing nondual consciousness through internal contact with the body, and for applying nondual consciousness to psychological healing. This work has been shown to reduce symptoms of PTSD in a pilot study at NYU Medical School (The Child Study Center). For more information on this method, see The Empathic Ground (Blackstone, 2007).
terms “being” and “self” refer to the organismic individual associated with the body, similar to what Damasio (1999) terms the “core self.” Damasio writes: One key to understanding living organisms, from those that are made up of one cell to those that are made up of billions of cells, is the definition of their boundary, the separation between what is in and what is out. The structure of the organism is inside the boundary and the life of the organism is defined by the maintenance of internal states within the boundary. Singular individuality depends on the boundary. (p. 135-136)
Thus terms like “inward” and “interiority” are not metaphors here, but refer to the spatial direction of one’s awareness, or self-contact. Damasio says that we are aware of the core self whenever the underlying unconscious “proto self” is modified (p. 174) However, in meditation practice, we can develop a stable quality-rich consciousness of the internal space of the whole body. As contemporary philosopher Yuasa (1987) writes, “The ‘mind’ here is not surface consciousness, but is the ‘mind’ that penetrates into the body and deeply subjectivizes it” (p. 105). As I will explain, this body-subjectivity is both coherent within itself and entirely permeable and open to its surroundings. Because of this dual property of self-cohesion and connectedness, I believe that meditation experience has a place in our contemporary exploration of the complex relationship between subjectivity and intersubjectivity. As we will see in the following section, many contemporary analytic writers advocate a post-modern philosophy that attempts to eradicate the Cartesian notion of a reified, ontologically separate, self and other. Yet, as clinicians we know that the
everyday problems of self and other often involve the experience of being either too
separate or not separate enough from other people. In order to address these clinical
issues within a relational model, contemporary theorists have produced a rich body of
writing on how relationships can facilitate a healthy sense of self, and also how a healthy
sense of self affects relationships. In the last section of the paper, I describe how
meditation can contribute to our understanding and facilitating the lived experience of
this equation. Specifically, I look at how meditation practice can give us a way to
understand autonomy, without leaving a relational or systems model, and without
recourse to abstractions such as psychological structure.
I want to make clear from the outset that I do not mean that meditation can or should replace analysis, or that the subtle dimensions of experience that are gained through meditation are in some way superior to the outcomes achieved through analysis. Increasingly, as meditation makes its way into the analytic arena (Epstein, 1995, 1998; Rubin, 1996; Safran, 2003, Suler, (1993), among others), and especially as psychoanalysis expands its focus to include relational abilities such as openness, flexibility, empathic resonance, and spontaneity, the goals of meditation and analysis are seen to be compatible, and in some ways, identical. I also believe that the methods of meditation and analysis are synergistic; both modalities may be more effective when practiced in concert. Thus, meditation is presented in this paper as a potentially useful supplement to the analytic process.
The Analytic Literature
In contemporary theories of psychoanalysis, the notion of the self has come under
increasingly skeptical scrutiny. Kohut stated clearly that by self, he did not mean an
objective entity. He wrote that the self was only knowable through sense data and
introspection, not in its essence (1977, p. 311). Stolorow and Atwood specifically
criticize the idea of the self as an independent entity. They write, “This we contrast with
the experience of psychological distinctness, a structuralization of self-awareness that is
wholly embedded in formative and sustaining intersubjective contexts” (1992, p. 10). In
response to this new understanding of individual subjectivity as relatively fluid and
context-dependent, many clinicians have shifted their focus from the patient’s
intrapsychic life to the therapeutic relationship itself.
The view that the patient-therapist relationship is the curative factor in psychoanalysis has led, in turn, to a new conception of psychological health. Although Stolorow and his collaborators describe psychological healing as an emergent, open ended outcome of the analytic process, their emphasis is on the patient’s achievement of new relational patterns through their relationship with the analyst (1992, p. 25). They argue that concern with such facets of intrapsychic health as autonomy and individuation are a throwback to the illusion of the separate, “Cartesian” self and what they call the “idolatry of the autonomous mind” (1992, p.13). They criticize Kohut for his notion of psychological health as the realization of a pre-existing potential inherent in the individual. They write, “Such an idea contrasts sharply with our view that the trajectory of self-experience is shaped at every point in development by the intersubjective system in which it crystallizes” (pp. 17-18). But Kohut also believed that the “child’s innate
potentialities are selectively nourished and thwarted…by the deeply anchored
responsiveness of the self-objects, which, in the last analysis, is a function of the self
objects’ own nuclear selves” (1977, p. 100).
Aron (1996) points out that the relational turn in psychoanalysis occurred as a reaction to the ignorance of traditional psychoanalysis with regard to both the co contruction of the psychoanalytic process, and the ongoing formative power of relationships in the patient’s life. Aron (1996) writes, “I prefer a model of mind that is less individualistic, more relational, and in which mind exists only in relation to others, always dependent to a degree and never fully autonomous” (p. 227).
However, in emphasizing the interdependence of self and other, relational writers sometimes seem to minimize those aspects of self-experience that occur in and even require solitude, such as creativity. They also tend to minimize the self-organizing capacity of the individual (see Shore, 2003), and the potential of the individual to deepen, with health and maturity, in the qualitative experience of his or her own being. Beebe and Lachmann (2003) make the point that “too great a tilt toward an interactive view of the organization of experience neglects the development of a sense of individuality, agency, and one’s own self, as distinct from the dyad; too great a tilt toward an intrapsychic view of the organization of experience under-estimates the contributions of the partner and the environment…” (p. 380).
To redress imbalance in either direction, many clinicians attempt to integrate an intrapsychic approach with interpersonal analysis. This has spawned discussions about the integration of “one-person” and “two-person” psychologies. In response to these
discussions, Mitchell (2000) writes, “ The argument for a hybrid model that combines one- and two-person perspectives represents a confusion of conceptual levels. It empties out the individual persons from the two-person model and then claims that we need a one-person-two-person hybrid to bring them back. But the individuals were accounted for in the two-person model all along—how could they not be? What would it mean to have a two-person model without individual persons?—a model describing the events between people but not the people themselves?” (pp. 1-7-108). Stolorow, Atwood and
Orange (2002) write, “The very phrase two-person psychology continues to embody an atomistic, isolated-mind philosophy in that two separated mental entities, two thinking things, are seen to bump into each other. We ought to speak instead of a contextual psychology, in which experiential worlds and intersubjective fields are seen as equiprimordial, mutually constituting one another in circular fashion” (pp. 95-96). How could there be intersubjective fields without individual persons, just as how could there be individual persons without intersubjective fields?
Stolorow and his collaborators speak eloquently of how the “loss of affirming, validating connections to others” results in “undermining one’s sense of existing and of being real in its most basis aspects, including the experience of oneself as an active agent and subject, as possessing an identity that is coherent and felt as authentically one’s own, as having a boundary delineating and delimiting I and not-I, and as being continuous in time and over history” (pp. 149-150). In this quote, “intersubjective contexts” appear to sustain an ongoing and relatively autonomous, or at least delineated experience of one’s own individual existence. It seems clear that we do grow in the context of relationships,
and certainly, that mal-attuned or destructive relationships, both in childhood and in
therapy, produce rigid, defensive or otherwise limiting organizations of experience. But
does that mean that we are entirely “constituted” by our relationships?
Many writers have approached this problem. Beebe and Lachmann (2003), for
example, write, “If we do not privilege inner or relational, and instead emphasize their
reciprocal co-construction, psychoanalysts will be in a stronger position to examine how
dyadic process may (re-) organize both inner and relational process, and reciprocally,
how changes in self-regulation in either partner may alter the interactive process (Beebe
& Lachmann, 1998)” (p. 380).
Nonlinear dynamic systems theory has also given analytic writers a way to conceptualize the interplay between individual identity and interaction, describing the individual as a “system within a larger system” (Sander, quoted in Seligman, 2002, p. 5). In his discussion of Sander’s application of systems theory to analysis, Seligman writes, “Sander thus construes psychic structure as a matter of the individual organism’s capacity to coordinate its needs and interests with the environment’s responses, all taking on particular rhythms in time and space, full of affect and growing layers of meaning” (p. 4). Aron (1996) qualifies his relational emphasis, saying that “relationships determine individuals and that individuals determine relationships” (p. 158). Discussing the work of Evelyn Fox Keller, Aron writes, “Keller (1985) introduced the notion of “dynamic autonomy” (p. 95) as a way of dealing with the problem that autonomy so often connotes a radical separation and independence from others. By contrast, dynamic autonomy is seen as a product of relatedness with others as well as of separation from them…The
notion of dynamic autonomy is an attempt to deconstruct the misleading opposition
between autonomy and connection to others that so pervades our culture” (p. 151).
Here we see that relational psychoanalysis actually sharpens our focus on the
problem of the self; it calls us to account for that particular “structuralization of
awareness” that is experienced as the separate self, even though it is embedded in its
relationships and environment. For we do seem to have the experience of self, and, as
intersubjective systems theory implies, the more “healthy” we are, or the less rigid our
subjective organizations of experience, the more access we have to something that feels
like our own private existence.
As I wrote this paper, my desk was full of the books of other writers, just as my
mind was full of the education that I have gained from them. But, although these writers
have often persuaded me, some of what they say seems true or important to me, and some
does not. I am motivated to write by the prodding of my own response, by ideas or
insights that have somehow formed within the privacy of my own subjectivity. It is my
own response that stimulates me until I finally articulate it. But in order to articulate it, I
must empty my mind, I must “clear the boards,” so to speak, and be alone with myself,
and wait for my own understanding to come clearly into view so that I can put it into
words.
From an aerial view, my writing in response to these other writers can be seen as the circular constituting event described by Stolorow et al. But this is not my personal experience. My experience is that my response to these other writers emerges from the
depths of my individual being. I experience this as a self-organizing creative process,
requiring internal, silent contact with myself.
The point I want to make with this illustration is two-fold: one, that the ability to
play my part in the circular dance requires that I possess a degree of autonomy, or inward
contact with myself (the ability to hear my own thoughts) and two, that my part in the
dance has not been entirely produced by the other, but also by a function of my own
being, a function that needs to be nurtured and developed.
The reason this seems important to me as a clinician, is that years ago I was less capable than I am now of experiencing my own responses. I remember sitting at my typewriter, and, just as many of my patients describe, not being able to experience the flow of creativity. I was unable to extricate myself not only from non-affirming relationships, but also from the benevolent influence of other writers. I could not be alone with myself, to find the silence out of which my own voice might emerge. The Boston Change Process Study Group (2002) writes, “The integrity of the self as a unit, its self-organising imperative, requires continual action/reaction/interaction” (Nahum et al, p. 1054). I would only argue with the word “continual.” I suggest that the integrity and self-organizing capacity of the self, or self-experience, also requires the pulling back from interaction, periods of silence and aloneness, of relationship with oneself.
Periods of solitude can cultivate an ongoing experience of self-contact (even when in relationship with others) that clarifies our awareness of our thoughts, emotions, sensations and perceptions. The postmodern perspective that underlies intersubjective
systems theory emphasizes just this personal, individual nature of experience. If we each
regard a room full of people, for example, we will each see something slightly different,
something unique. I am using the term autonomy in this paper to denote the ability to
experience and enjoy one’s unique perspective. It means that we can receive and respond
to the world with relatively less unconscious influence from the values, beliefs and
images of our family and culture: we can think our own thoughts, see with our own eyes.
This allows us to see the world anew, to be inspired. For most of us, this ability must be
cultivated, or at least resuscitated; I believe that it is one marker of psychological health
or maturity. In the Asian spiritual literature, the process of achieving more direct access
to our perceptions and freeing one’s own responses from the thrall of “group think” is
likened to awakening from a dream.
What does it mean to be alone with oneself, to experience oneself as distinct from any dyad? Many analytic writers address the psychological aloneness of the individual, but they often describe aloneness as a state of being closed off from, or unconscious of the environment. For example, Aron (1996) writes, “There seem to be natural pulls in both directions, toward and away from others” (p. 234). But he suggests that the pull away from people is defensive, describing it as “the wish to hide, to protect oneself by not being revealed to the other” (p. 234). Ogden (1994) posits an “autistic-contiguous” position, as an addition to Klein’s paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions. He sees this position not as isolation, but as a primitive type of object-relatedness “in which the object is a sensation experience (particularly at the skin surface)” (p. 174). Ogden claims that the autistic-contiguous position is part of psychological health throughout one’s life;
that this sensory experience “creates a palpable sensory edge” that helps provide a sense
of “boundedness of self” (p. 175). But he also describes this position as a “state in which
the individual feels fully engrossed” and “in which one can immerse oneself” (p. 175).
He writes, “I am proposing that from the beginning of psychological life (and continuing
throughout life), there exists a form of experience in which the mother as psychological
matrix is replaced by an autonomous sensory matrix. In replacing the environmental
mother with an autonomous sensation matrix, the infant creates an essential respite from
the strain (and intermittent terror) inherent in the process of coming to life in the realm of
living human beings” (p. 177).
Here Ogden says that aloneness is part of healthy life, and yet he also describes it as a defensive reaction to the “terror” of the human environment. Furthermore, he does not describe the individual as alone with his or her thoughts or feelings, but only with sensations. This aloneness is, in Ogden’s words, an “auto-sensuous sanctuary” and “a realm of impenetrable, uninterrupted non-being” (p. 180).
Winnicott (1958) expressed what seems a more positive view of aloneness. He believed that the adult’s capacity to be alone was “one of the most important signs of maturity in emotional development” (p. 416). He wrote, “The pathological alternative is a false life built on reactions to external stimuli” (p. 418). He thought that the capacity to be alone was based on an infantile state of “unintegration” or at-one-ness with the mother/environment. Interestingly, he also believed that this capacity to be alone developed within, and in a sense, because of, the reliable presence of the mother. He writes, “The individual who has developed the capacity to be alone is constantly able to
rediscover the personal impulse, and the personal impulse is not wasted because the state of being alone is something which (though paradoxically) always implies that someone
else is there” (p. 419).
Although this capacity for aloneness develops in the presence of the reliable mother—in other words, within a nurturing intersubjective context—Winnicott wrote of the personal self as something discovered rather than created. He posited an “innate primary creativity” (1947, In Winnicott, 1957) and wrote, “It is in playing and only in playing that the child or adult is able to be creative and use the whole personality, and it is only in being creative that the individual discovers the self” (1968, In Winnicott, 1971, p. 54). Wallbridge & Davis write that he “regarded ‘the Real’ as emanating primarily from the inner reality, fantasy being ‘more primary’ than shared reality” (p. 55). In Winnicott’s (1958) view, the solitary self can be full of life, while the capacity to be alone while in relation to others is necessary for “ego relatedness.” Winnicott’s perspective is particularly interesting to me in light of the meditation experience that I will describe shortly. The aloneness of the self—that is, the experience of separateness—is necessary for genuine connection with other people. Many writers have presented some version of this idea. For example, Aron (1996) writes that “intimacy requires both autonomy and connection” (p. 232). Kohut (1984) maintained that self-love develops concurrently with the capacity for object love. He wrote, “This means that narcissism, like object love, evolves from archaic to mature forms…the formulation that narcissism is replaced by object love—that narcissism is archaic and object love mature—is in error (see Kohut 1978b, 2:757—70)” (p. 185).
Stolorow et al. (2002) particularly emphasize the interdependence of the
experience of oneself and experience of the other, even though they sometimes appear to
minimize the direction of growth towards autonomy. They write, “Experiences of
selfhood and worldhood are inextricably bound up with one another, in that any dramatic
change in the one necessarily entails corresponding changes in the other….The
dissolution of one’s selfhood thus produces an inevitable disintegrating effect on the
person’s experience in general and results ultimately in the loss of coherence of the world
itself. Likewise, the breakup of the unity of the world means the loss of a stable reality in
relation to which the sense of self is defined and sustained, and an experience of self
fragmentation inevitably follows in its wake” (p. 145).
As I said at the beginning of the paper, meditation practices can facilitate our
ability both to be alone, and to be intimate with others. It can therefore be used as an
effective auxiliary to our work with clients as they negotiate these inextricably inter
related domains of human experience. There are many different types of meditation practice, producing somewhat different effects. I am concerned here with practices, such
as Realization Process, mentioned earlier, that help us attune or open to a subtle, unified
dimension of consciousness. This is an experience of vibrant spaciousness pervading
both the internal space of one’s body and one’s environment at the same time. Because
we experience this expanse of subtle consciousness pervading our body, it feels as if we
are inside, inhabiting, our whole body at once. Because we experience it pervading our
body and environment at the same time, it provides an experience of self/other oneness.
There are many references to this pervasive, unified (or nondual) consciousness,
particularly in the spiritual literature of India and Tibet. For example, a Tibetan Buddhist
text says, “This vast expanse, unwavering, indescribable, and equal to space, is timelessly
and innately present in all beings” (Rabjam, 2001, p. 83).
A scholar of the Kashmir Shaivism (Hindu) philosophy, Muller-Ortega (1989), writes, “No longer do finite objects appear as separate and limited structures; rather, the silent and translucent consciousness out of which all things are composed surfaces and becomes visible as the true reality of perceived objects” (p. 182). Some Buddhist traditions (Dzog-chen and Mahamudra) call this subtle, pervasive consciousness “self-knowing” or self-reflecting” (see Traleg, 1999, Rabjam, 1998). It experiences itself as the unchanging, unified ground of our being, within which our specific thoughts, emotions, sensations and perceptions occur. The more access we have to this subtle ground-consciousness, the more we can let go of repetitive organizations of experience that obstruct the fluidly and spontaneity of our thoughts, emotions, sensations and perceptions. It is this fluidity and spontaneity of responsiveness that gives rise to the experience of “nowness” that has been popularized by contemporary spiritual teachers such as Eckhart Tolle (1999).
Whereas up to now in this paper, I have presented views from the psychoanalytic literature that offer both experiential and theoretical or explanatory modes of discourse, I wish to alert the reader that in my discussion of meditation and its clinical applications, I
will be speaking entirely from the standpoint of experience. However, my claims are
based on two decades of clinical experience in which I have used Realization Process to
help people inhabit their bodies, attune to the qualities of their being, and experience (or
uncover) a unified field of subtle consciousness pervading their bodies and their
surroundings. This work includes exercises that two people can practice together to
experience the simultaneity of internal cohesion and self/other oneness (see Blackstone,
2007).
Meditation cultivates an experience of self, or subjectivity, that is not narrative or representational. It is the experienced quality of one’s existence, rather than one’s beliefs or behaviors, or one’s reflective self-consciousness in reaction to objects. Twentieth century Japanese philosopher Nishitani (1982) writes, “…we stand more to the near side of ourselves in emptiness than we do in self-consciousness” (p. 98). This may be what Winnicott meant by the experience of “being.” Winnicott (1970) wrote, “After being, doing and being done to. But first, being” (In 1971, p. 86). This is a nearness to ourselves that is more subtle than verbal constructions.
It may also be akin to Damasio’s (1999) “core consciousness” which he describes as the “mysterious source of our mental first-person perspective” (p. 312). He writes, “…a theory of consciousness should account for the simpler, foundational kind of the phenomenon which occurs close to the nonconscious representation of the organism for whose sake the entire show is put together and which can support the later developments of identity and person” (p. 18). Interestingly, Damasio is concerned with the “feeling” of consciousness. He writes, “consciousness feels like a feeling” (p. 312).
Damasio describes consciousness as a “feeling of knowing” (p. 313), but the subtle consciousness cultivated through meditation is made up of many different qualities. For example, love has a quality to it, power has a quality to it, gender and sexuality are qualitative experiences, not just abstract self-representations or behaviors. Our intelligence also has a quality to it; it is not just a function. As Damasio seems to suggest, we can feel the quality of our intelligence. If the reader would like to test this, you can remember a time when you were writing something and paused to think of the right word to convey your idea. The memory of waiting for the word to emerge may give you a “felt sense” of your intelligence. Kohut (1984) suggested the potential to experience one’s own being when he referred to, “such introspectively accessible features of self experience as the self’s cohesion, firmness, vigor, vitality, and harmoniousness” (p. 65, italics mine). Meditation practices, particularly those mentioned above, can facilitate the experience of oneself as cohesive and harmonious. Many analytic writers today maintain that we have “multiple selves” (Bromberg, 1998; Mitchell, 1993), meaning that we constantly reconfigure ourselves in relation to our changing circumstances. Although I believe that this is true, meditation practice helps reveal an underlying, ongoing experience of cohesion, or wholeness. This may be the “sense of self” that Lichtenberg, Lachmann and Fosshage (2002) refer to when they write, “we have supported Kohut’s claim for the essential sameness in most instances of a sense of self (not a ‘structure’ of self)” (p. 184). (See Rubin, 1996, for a discussion of Buddhist and psychoanalytic conceptions of self).
Meditation helps us experience wholeness and cohesion in several ways. One is by cultivating access to the vertical core of one’s body. Asian traditions (see Motoyama, 1981) describe a subtle energy channel that runs through the vertical core of the body from the base of the spine to the center of the top of the head. They teach that there are points (chakras) along this channel associated with particular qualities and capacities of our being, such as intelligence, love, power and sexuality. As we contact the vertical core of ourselves, we are able to experience the various aspects of our being simultaneously. This means, for example, that we can think, feel and sense at the same time. We can experience love and power, at the same time. We experience our being as an integrated whole.
Through this same inward self-contact, meditation practices also cultivate mind/body integration. This means that we do not experience ourselves as having a mind and a body, or a self and a body, but rather that our mind is in our whole body. We inhabit our whole body all at once. Shunryu Suzuki, a 20th century Zen master, wrote, “To stop your mind does not mean to stop the activities of mind. It means your mind pervades your whole body” (Suzuki, 1980, p. 41). Through meditation, we can experience this subtle, pervasive ground of our being pervading the changing occurrences of our various configurations. Yuasa (1987) writes, “…the oneness of the body-mind is an ideal for inward meditation as well as for outward activities” (p. 24). Winnicott described an aspect of development called “personalization.” Davis & Wallbridge (1981) write, “A particularly important aspect of integration was referred to by Winnicott as ‘personalization,’ by which he meant the acquisition of a personal body
scheme with the ‘psyche indwelling in the soma.’…Personalization means not only that
the psyche is placed in the body, but also that eventually, as cortical control extends, the
whole of the body becomes the dwelling place of the self” (pp. 37-38). Winnicott felt
that this occurred sometime in infancy. However, our repetitive subjective organizations
and abstract self-representations obstruct our inward contact with ourselves and fragment
our mind/body integration. For this reason, for the whole of the body to be experienced
as the dwelling place of the self is considered by some spiritual traditions to be an ideal
that can be approached through meditation.
Meditation practice also cultivates a sense of the substantiality of one’s individual
being. The qualitative experience of being is not abstract; it is palpable. As we inhabit
the internal space of our body, we experience ourselves as taking up space. We have
internal depth and volume. This in-depth contact with the internal space of our body can
provide a sense of being alone within our own skin, of being immersed in our own being.
Inward contact, or immersion in our own body and being, is also the basis of
openness and fluidity. Wherever we inhabit our own body, we are open to the
environment. If we inhabit the internal space of our chest, for example, we will
experience the quality of love within our chest, as the quality and substance of our own
being. But we will also respond to the environment from that depth of ourselves. The
more deeply we inhabit our chest, the more deeply we will experience emotional
responsiveness towards the world around us. And if someone puts a hand on our chest,
we will be able to feel the warmth and the quality of that person’s touch all the way
through the internal depth of our chest.
Here is an example of the use of Realization Process from a recent session with
Sam, a warm, empathic man in his late forties. Sam came to work with me when his
twenty-five year marriage ended. He had suddenly recognized that he had been living
vicariously through his wife instead of forming his own friendships and interests. In our
interactions, I often felt a lively emotional engagement with him, and an ongoing sense of
emotional contact or resonance between us. Because of this emotional connection, I
enjoyed his company and I was often caught by surprise when he complained of social
inadequacy and an internal feeling of deadness. After several months, it became clear
that these feelings were based on his doubts about his intelligence. He described his
father as “brilliant” but his mother, with whom he had been much closer, was a “simple,
generous woman.” He felt that his wife had been more like his father in this regard; she
worked as a freelance magazine writer and had a wealth of knowledge and strong
opinions on a wide variety of subjects. Sam said that he felt “constantly entertained” by
her, and without her, he felt dull and boring.
He had a way of ducking his head when he talked about these things and I
recognized this gesture as larger version of a very subtle movement he made whenever I
offered my point of view on whatever we were discussing. In addition to exploring this
aspect of our relationship, and how it related to his previous relationships, I taught him
the following exercise from Realization Process. First he inhabited his own brain (not
just the frontal lobes, but his whole brain). This is an experience of actually being inside
the internal space of one’s head. It is not just awareness of the internal space of the head,
but a sense that one actually is that internal space. I have found that everyone can do this,
to some extent. If someone has difficulty with this, they can put a hand lightly on either
side of their head and feel that they inhabit the space between their hands.
He then attuned to the quality of his understanding (I suggest attuning to the
quality of understanding rather than intelligence because I have found that people will
inhabit more of their head in this attunement; the cue to attune to the quality of
intelligence generally evokes engagement of just the forehead). Sam was surprised but
very pleased that he could actually experience the quality of his understanding. He said it
was the first time that he was aware of “life in his head.”
We then both attuned to the quality of understanding within our own brain while,
at the same time, we attuned to the quality of understanding within each other’s brain.
Although many people are puzzled when they first hear this instruction, everyone I have
worked with has found that they are capable of this attunement to self and other. The
qualitative level of our being has the capacity to experience the qualitative level of other
people.
This exercise evoked an experience of resonance between us—not a merging of
our understanding, for we were each still inhabiting our own head, but a vivid sense of
connection across the distance between us. Sam was delighted at this “meeting of
minds.” He felt an actual sense of equality with me, a sense that there was room for his
own mind, and that his experience of his own mind enriched our connection with each
other.
There is recognition in the analytic literature of the subtler ranges of the concurrence of self-connection and connection with others. Coburn (2001) writes, “it is
paradoxically exactly our embeddedness in our subjectivity that, far from acting as an
encumbrance, enables and facilitates the reciprocal and mutual processes of emotional
attunement” (p. 304). Self-contact is very different than isolation or estrangement, in
which our troubled relations with others cause us to wall ourselves off from the world.
Self-contact is permeability, a transparency to our surroundings, in which we gain an
increasingly full awareness of and participation in the larger system of which we are a
part.
As our attunement to the subtle, unified consciousness pervading our own body
progresses, we can also experience this subtle consciousness pervading everything
around us. Yuasa (1987) writes, “Every being is changed to a perfectly coherent
radiance, made transparent through the illumination of the transcendent” (p. 156). As we
cultivate, or uncover, the subtle ground of our being, we experience this subtle dimension
of consciousness pervading our own body and everything around us at the same time.
This is experienced as a mutual permeability or mutual transparency of self and other. It
is the basis of a sense of oneness with our surroundings. It is also the basis of an
experience of sameness between ourselves and others. Coburn (2001) writes, “it is our
human sameness and its high degree of specificity that allow us the potential for
resonating with the unique, affective experiences of another” (306). The cultivation of
our subtle, pervasive consciousness can facilitate what Coburn calls “affective
resonance,” as well as resonance in all other qualitative aspects of our being.
Some Asian spiritual teachings do suggest that we lose complete sense of our
individual being as we identify ourselves with the nondual dimension of consciousness. I
believe this view may have originally been meant as pedagogy, a means of helping
people relinquish the rigid self-representations that obscure the qualitative dimension. In
any case, it disregards the changes that occur in the qualitative experience of our own
being—the aliveness within our skin—that occurs as we become open to the field of self
other oneness. Nishitani (1982) writes, “It is the field in which each and every thing—as
an absolute center, possessed of an absolutely unique individuality—becomes manifest as
it is in itself” (p. 164).
We discover the qualitative experience of being as we make inward contact with ourselves. The Asian literature calls it “self-arising;” it is not something that we have to construct or hold. All meditation practices help us let go of our grip on ourselves. Whatever their method, they are all about letting go, so that we can discover this integrated, qualitative, open dimension of ourselves. As we let go of our protective grip on ourselves, the resulting experience of internal cohesion strengthens our sense of self possession. But it also enables us to respond more spontaneously. It allows us to be more deeply moved and transformed by life, to surrender ourselves, with less fear of annihilation, to the moment-by-moment flow of circumstances, and the mutual impact of relationships.
Conclusion
In this paper I have tried to show how some meditation techniques can contribute,
both theoretically and clinically, to a subject that is at the forefront of analytic discourse:
the relationship of individual self-experience to self-other interdependence. I have
discussed how meditation, in particular, Realization Process, can uncover a qualitative
level of experience, and facilitate both deepened self-contact and openness to others. The
more inward contact we have with our separate form, the more the experienced boundary
between our own form and our environment dissolves. I have also suggested that if the
focus of analytic practice shifts too exclusively towards its relational aspect, we risk
minimizing our understanding and nurturance of the inward direction of human
development, with its creative and qualitative potentials.
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