2) III. Some Further Reflections on Meditation as a Concept

III. Some Further Reflections on Meditation as a Concept

We are all familiar with the danger of assuming that a category of experience fundamental to our own culture must be, by virtue of its apparently "universal" stature, present in all other cultures, or at least in any other comparably developed culture. And we have become, as a consequence, more careful in our efforts to interpret an alien culture not to assume (or to require), for example, some concept of an anthropomorphic, creator god or some progressive, teleological conception of history. Indeed, the naivete of such assumptions in earlier scholarship often strike us now as surprisingly blatant. There is, however, another, perhaps more insidious form of mismapping to which we are all still quite prone. Even if, in our interpretive mapping, we avoid the pitfall of "finding" the necessary and expected analog to every concept taken as essential and universal in our own cultural framework, we run the risk of not recognizing that any effort of interpretation, of mapping in this sense, must be a two-way street. Where we do succeed in establishing some appropriate conceptual link between two cultures, where our mapping activity has yielded some understanding, we must still recognize that both sides of the equation are involved in the understanding. If the analog in the alien culture is mapped onto our own experience in a way that yields true understanding, then both are being transformed, in a sense. The alien concept is being interpreted or translated, certainly, and at the same time our own concept must also undergo a transformation, must be both expanded and refined. Otherwise, the product is not understanding but simply reduction in the most negative sense-a reduction that actually restricts our access to the alien culture. Specifically, we must be careful in our interpretive mapping not to allow the semantic restrictions of our own concept to limit our view of the data we are assigning to that concept.

What does this mean in the context of the present examination of Meditation in Fa-hsiang Buddhism

Chinese Buddhist meditation practice? Given some success in recognizing the priority of "meditation" in the Buddhist perspective of religious practice, we must be all the more careful to ensure that we are not working with an inappropriately restricted conception of what "meditation" involves and includes. We can acknowledge the interpretive value of employing our category of meditation in the study of Buddhist praxis, but we must do so in a way that allows that concept to be informed and transformed by the subject of our interpretation. We can, indeed, learn something about another culture, even one so doubly distanced in time and culture, but that understanding comes only to the extent that we are open to an expansion of our own framework-something perhaps not so difficult to see in principle, but more difficult to put into practice than we often realize. In seeking to understand better the Chinese Buddhist perspective on religious practice, we are exploring what elements of that Buddhist experience might best be mapped onto our concept of meditation. In doing so we hope to discover what that interpretation will reveal about Buddhist culture and what it might teach us about our own. The material I have presented in this chapter provides us with two instances in which this dual objective might be seriously undermined if we are not attentive to the problems raised in the opening section. With an overly narrow, unexamined conception of meditation, we might be tempted to exclude from our consideration of "Chinese meditation traditions" both of the examples I have outlined earlier.

W ith too narrow a notion of the range of meditative practice within Buddhism, we might take Hsiian-tsang's Maitreya visualization to be simply a case of "devotional cult practice;' rather than "meditation" proper-perhaps without even stopping to consider the validity of the dichotomy asserted in such a distinction. Indeed, scholars of East Asian Buddhism might be especially prone to this pitfall. Working with a conception of meditation informed by later sectarian debates between Japanese Pure Land and Zen, the Buddhist scholar might begin with an overly narrow conception of Buddhist meditation and then look back on the earlier history of East Asian Buddhism for only those forms of practice that resemble zazen, a highly specific technique of meditation that would have analogs in only a few of the practices available to Hsiiantsang and his contemporaries. Of course, the historical development of zazen practice is an important line to trace back historically; but this should not be done in a way that overlooks the diversity of other practices characteristic of medieval Chinese Buddhism. Certainly we must be aware of the differences between zazen and Hsiian-tsang's Maitreya visualization. At the same time, we must also note what, in terms of the Buddhist conception of dhyana as bhavana, they have in common. We must recognize the sense in which the tradition considered both Maitreya visualization and zazen to be instances of meditative practice. Any conception of meditation that cannot readily accommodate both of these techniques, no matter how apparent and how important their differences, would be likely to distort, rather than inform, our understanding of religious practice in Buddhism, simply because what relates these two activities in the minds of many Buddhists is still more significant than what distinguishes them. Therefore, I would argue, we must include forms of "devotional cult practice" in our discussion of meditation traditions.

But what of K'uei-chi's fivefold discernment of vijnaptimturatii, which appears not even to be a "practice" in the strictest sense? Must we expand our conception of meditation to include this as well? Certainly there is value in noting the significant differences between the two aspects of Buddhist praxis I have presented here. And one might well argue that the term "meditation" should be employed in the narrowest possible sense, that its semantic range should be limited to the various practical procedures Buddhists employ to attain enlightenment, in contrast to the more abstract and theoretical paradigms employed to speculate about the nature of enlightenment. That would still allow us to include a wide range of practices, devotional activities, and visualization techniques as well as the more traditional dhyana cultivation. However, it would require another category or level of discourse for the type of enlightenment paradigm we find in K'uei-chi's five-level discernment. Pursuing that line of argument for the moment, one could point out that the second type of activity is, in fact, the product of the first: that practices like dhyana cultivation, visualization, and the various samadhis, etc., are what we should call "meditation," whereas the resulting insight is better understood as the fruit of that practice, the enlightenment toward which the practice is directed. That would allow us a neat conceptual distinction between the two senses of kuan found in the material we have examined here, kuan as "visualization" and kuan as "discerning" or gaining insight into reality. A useful distinction, perhaps, but again one that is likely to distort our understanding of the Buddhist notion of praxis. To force a distinction between meditative practices and their "resulting insight" would be to overlook a fundamental Buddhist insight into the nature of religious practice. It is crucial to any understanding of Buddhist soteriology, certainly in a Mahayana context, to recognize that no meaningful distinction can be drawn between practice and result. We are familiar with this theme in later Ch'an and Zen, but actually it expresses a tension that runs throughout the history of Buddhist thought, one that can be seen already in the earliest Buddhist speculation on the necessary relationship between samatha and vipasyana, the psychophysical exercises of "calming" or centering and the transformative vision or "insight" characteristic of the liberated or enlightened individual. Certainly this theme was an issue in K'uei-chi's mind-one reason, no doubt, why

he formulated his paradigm of enlightenment under the rubric of "kuan," the term used to render "vipasyana" and, perhaps even more significantly, a verb indicating an ongoing, transitive activity, rather than the apparently static state implied, for example, by the Chinese term "chih" ("wisdom"), which was often employed for enlightenment in the sense of understanding. In this light, the five-level discernment should not be seen simply as a result, it should be seen as itself praxis, as dhyana in the sense of vipasyana-bhavana, because for K'uei-chi enlightenment can only be a dynamic activity, not a passive, quiescent state. Enlightenment is something one does, an active way of viewing the world that matures over a period of time, gradually perfected by the whole range of practices that make up the Buddhist religious life. In sum, then, I feel that it is appropriate to begin our examination of Chinese Buddhist meditation traditions with these two examples from Fa-hsiang circles and also with a caveat regarding our understanding of "meditation." I think we must employ "meditation" in the broadest possible sense-in the same sense that we find Buddhists using the term "dhyana" to include both samatha-bhavana and vipasyana-bhavana. There are two reasons for doing this-both important, and both inextricably interrelated. First, we must recognize that such an inclusive conception of meditation is necessary if we are not to obscure what is most distinctive and characteristic about the Buddhist perspective on religious practice. Second, only by coming to terms with what is distinctive and characteristic in Buddhist culture can we gain a better understanding of ourselves. Our goal is not just to gain the ability to make sense of (and to manipulate) what is separated by both time and culture. The understanding we seek should not only inform our perception of the alien culture; it should also transform our own experience, the understanding of our own culture. The true value of any cross-cultural exploration, after all, lies not in how successful we are in reducing the alien culture to the terms of our own experience. True understanding, rather, is born only when we must expand our own perspective to accommodate what initially appears to be alien.

Notes

I. The best modern study of the canonical tradition of Buddhist meditation is the Mahathera Paravahera Vajirafial)a's Buddhist Meditation, In Theory and Practice (Colombo: Gunasena, 1962), a careful survey of material from the Nikayas and the Theravada Abhidhamma along with some reference to the Sanskrit Abhidharma as well. See also Friedrich Heiler's study Die Buddhistische Versenkung (Munich: E. Reinhardt, 1918), Edward Conze's Buddhist Meditation (London: Allen & Unwin, 1956), and the articles by Stephen Beyer cited below in note 20. For a valuable discussion of the relationship between Buddhist meditation and the general category of mysticism see Robert M. Gimello's excellent article "Mysticism and Meditation" in Steven T. Katz, ed., Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 170-199.

2. VajiraiHil)a, Budddhist Meditation, pp. 23-25 and 35. There is a tradition that derivesjhana also from the homonymicjhayati, "to burn," in the causative sense of burning away opposition and obstruction. Although probably more an exegetical device than a historical etymology, this derivation does underscore further the close relationship between Buddhist meditation and the tapas-oriented ascetic traditions of South Asia.

3. VajiraiHil)a discusses this narrower sense of dhyana also; see Buddhist Meditation, pp. 37-43.

4. Walpola Rahula, "Psychology of Buddhist Meditation," in lndianisme et Bouddhisme: Melanges offerts a Mgr Etienne Lamotte (Lou vain: Universite Catholique de Louv ain, lnstitut Orientaliste, 1980). Rahula, a prominent figure among the reform-minded, Western-educated Theravada intelligentsia, makes this point in order to argue the view that attainment of the traditional rilpa- and arupa-jhanas is "not a sine qua non, not a must for the realization of Nirvli!Ja," a position that has some scriptural foundation but must be seen also in the historical and social context of the contemporary movement to emphasize vipassana over samatha in certain Theravada circles.

5. For further research on this topic drawing on other sixth-century Chinese sources, see my article "W6nhyo on Visualization: Maitreya Cult Practice in Early China and Korea" in Alan Sponberg and Helen Hardacre, eds., Maitreya, the Future Buddha (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). 6. Alexander Soper and others have made very convincing attempts to trace this tradition back to the frontier regions of Indian culture, especially Kashmir and Gandhara. See his Literary Evidence for Early Buddhist Art in China (Ascona, Switzerland: Artibus Asiae, 1959), pp. 144, 184, 215, and 222.

7. Hsiian-tsang's own account of his travels is found in his Ta-t 'ang hsi-yii chi (T#2087), available in the rather dated translation of Samuel Beal, Si-yu-ki, Buddhist Records of the Western World (London, 1884; rpt. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981) . The most detailed biography is the Ta-t 'ang ta-tz 'u-enssu san-tsang-fa-shih chuan (T#2053), written by his contemporary Hui-li and edited by Yen-tsung. Though still including frequent ellipses, the best and most complete translation of this biography is that of Li Yung-hsi, T he Life of Hsuan-tsang (Peking: The Chinese Buddhist Association, 1959).

8. On Maitreya, Avalokitesvara, and Mafijusrf as a triad, note also the account of the three appearing together in a dream to Sflabhadra, the great Yogacara master of Nalanda in the seventh century, a story recorded by Hui-li in Hsiian-tsang's biography, T50.236c4-237a1 4.

9. See, for example, Hsiian-tsang's account of his visit to the colossal Maitreya statue at Dare) recorded in the Ta-t 'ang hsi-yii chi, T51.884b.

10. Ta-t 'ang ta-tz 'u-en-ssu san-tsang-fa-shih chuan, T50.276c2-277b 10, especially 277a2-3. For Tao-hsiian's report of Hsiian-tsang's final words, see T50.458b3-4.

II. T50.277b4-6; for additional reports of Hsiian-tsang's aspiration to be reborn in Tuita, written by Tao-hsiian, K'uei-chi, and other eminent contemporaries, see T50.458a-b, D8.277c, T54.6c-7a, T50.219a and c, and T47.106c.

12. See, for example, Demieville's "La Yogacarabhumi de Sangharaka," Bulletin de /'Ecole Franr;aise d'Extreme-orient, vol. 44, no. 2 (1954), p. 338. Meditation in Fa-hsiang Buddhism

13. T50.233c21-234a21; truncated versions of this story can be found in Samuel Beal, The Life of Hsiian-tsang by Hwuy-Le (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1911), pp. 86-90, and in Li Yung-hsi, The Life of Hsiian-tsang, pp. 85-88.

14. See note 12 above.

15. It is useful to remember here that several early meditation texts in China took the Buddhas of the Ten Directions as their focus; see Soper, Literary Evidence, p. 143.

16. On the use of lilambana/tiramma(la as a technical term in discussions of meditation in the early Indian literature, see Paravahera Vajiraiiana's Bud­ dhist Meditation, pp. 30-31.

17. Cf. K'uei-chi's commentary on the Maitreya siitras (T#I772) as well as that of Wonhyo, which is quite detailed (T#I773; especially D8.299cl-24 and 300bl2-22). The relevant portions of the latter work have been translated and discussed in the article cited in note 5.

18. Some accounts of Sakyamuni 's biography relate his progression through the four dhylinas at the time of his enlightenment and again just prior to his death. For canonical references to the dhyanas and the samtipattis, see Paravahera Vajiraiial)a, Buddhist Meditation, especially chapters 4 and 34.

19. The sixth-century Korean exegete Wonhyo affirms this observation in an extended discussion of Maitreya visualization. He notes that the exercise produces samadhi, but a samadhi of a relatively low degree as it is without prasrabdhi, the functional integration of mind and body that is a prerequisite of the advanced dhyanic attainments. See Sponberg, "Wonhyo on Visualization."

20. Stephen Beyer (following Heinrich Zimmer) has explored this enstatic/ ecstatic distinction as it characterizes two fundamentally opposed soteric orientations or postures present in Indian culture during the Upaniadic period. See Beyer's articles "The Background to Buddhism," "The Doctrine of Meditation in the Hfnayana," and "The Doctrine of Meditation in the Mahayana," all found in Charles S. Prebish, ed., Buddhism, a Modern Perspective (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975), pp. 3-9 and 137-158. To consider the history of Buddhist meditative practice as an attempt to mediate or reconcile the tension between an enstatic and an ecstatic ideal is a theme worthy of further exploration. 21. Antecedents for this type of visualization exercise are most likely to be found in anusmrti rather than in kasi(la techniques. 22. See note II above. Although Hui-li's account of Hsiian-tsang's death includes no elaborate description of any Maitreya visualization technique, it does say that Hsiian-tsang, after bidding his attendants farewell, entered samyaksmrti (cheng-nien). 23. That question is, in turn, related to another, more difficult, and perhaps also more tantalizing question: Where did Hsiian-tsang learn these visualization techniques? Was he familiar with them already before leaving China? Or did he learn them during his travels? We have already seen that a visualization tradition was well established in China prior to Hsiian-tsang's departure. At the same time, however, it is probably no coincidence that the most detailed description of visualization in all of the Hsiian-tsang material comes at the point in his biography just shortly after his sojourn in Kashmir and immediately after he visited Asanga's old monastery with its stories of meditative transport Heaven.

24. Ta-t'ang ta-tz'u-en-ssufa-shih-chi-kung pei, which can be found in a collection of K'uei-chi's biographical materials, "Jion daishi denki monjo;• pub­ lished in ShOso, vol. 9 (1940), pp. 4I- 48; see 45ai 3. 25. For a study of the primary sources for K'uei-chi's biography, including an excellent critique of Tsan-ning's account, see Stanley Weinstein's "A Biographical Study of Tz'u-en," Monumenta Nipponica, vol. I 5, nos. I and 2 (1953), pp. 119-149. 26. T38.277c24-278a3. 27. Ibid., 277a-c. 28. In this context, kuan might also render abhisamaya, a frequently occuring Abhidharma term of great soteriological importance referring to the liberating comprehension produced by meditative practice, as satya-abhisamliya, the comprehension of the four noble truths. While abhisamliya would be quite plausible in this context, it is a term that Hsiian-tsang and K'uei-chi normally render more precisely with the expression hsien-kuan. Of course vipasyanli and abhisamliya are not unrelated in meaning, and certainly most Chinese Buddhists, not knowing any Sanskrit, would have used kuan without distinguishing clearly between the various Sanskrit terms it rendered in Buddhist Chinese. 29. The Po-jo po-/o-mi-to hsin ching yu-tsan, T#l7 10, see specifically T33.526cl6-527bl0; and the Wei-shih chang, a long essay found as part of Kuei-chi's encyclopedic compendium the Ta-sheng ja-yiian i-lin chang, T# I86I, see specifically T45.258b2I -259a27. 30. I plan to discuss this five-level discernment doctrine more fully in a monograph on early Fa-hsiang Buddhism. K'uei-chi's "Essay on Vijfiaptim<ltrata" was translated in my Ph.D. dissertation, "The Vijfiaptimatrata Philosophy of the Chinese Buddhist Monk K'uei-chi (A.D. 632-682)" (University of British Columbia, 1979). Some of the ideas in this chapter were presented as part of an unpublished paper read at the Association of Asian Studies annual meeting, 1979.

31. There is nothing to correspond to the kuan in the Tibetan versions of the Samgraha, and it was dropped in Hsiian-tsang's later and more literal translation. Cf. all four Chinese versions of the passage in Sasaki Gessho's Kanyaku shihon taishO ShOdaijoron (Tokyo: Hobunsha, I9 38), p. 56b and c. 32. Chih-i discusses two different versions of the wu t'ing-hsin kuan, one in his Ssu-chiao-i (T46. 732c) and the other in both the Fa-hua-ching-hsiian-i (T33.707c) and the Mo-ho chih-kuan (T46.92c-93a). Chih-yen's discussion is found in his Hua-yen-ching k'ung-mu-chang (T45.552b). For references to the five discernments in earlier Chinese works, those of Kumarajrva and Ching-ying Hui-yiian, see Sakurabe Hajime's brief but informative article "On the wu-t 'ing-hsin-kuan," in lndianisme et bouddhisme, pp. 307-312. 33. For references see Sakurabe, op. cit., p. 307. 34. Included in Ch'en-kuan's Hua-yen fa-chieh hsiian-ching, T#l883. For an excellent study of this work and a very useful summary of current scholarship on the early history of Hua-yen Buddhism, see Robert M. Gimello's "Chih-yen and the Foundations of Buddhism" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, I 976). 35. The relationship of K'uei-chi's thought to that of the early Hua-yen masters is a fascinating and highly complex topic that I plan to examine more fully elsewhere. 36. For a fuller discussion of K'uei-chi's understanding of this key Yogacara Meditation in Fa-hsiang Buddhism notion, see my article, "The Trisvabhliva Doctrine in India and China," in the Ryukoku daigaku bukkyo bunka kenkyujo kiyo, vol. 21 (1982), pp. 97- 1 I 9. 37. At the end of his discussion of the fifth level, K'uei-chi concludes with the observation: "At the stage that one realizes the contemplation of thusness (chen-Uu] kuan), conventional phenomena (su-shih) are made evident by understanding the ultimate universal Principle (chen-li). Once the universal Principle (li) and phenomenal existence (shih) have become evident, [the deluded notions of] 'selr and 'things' cease to exist. It is precisely this that is the substance, the essential structure (t 'i), of what was contemplated at the first level" (T45.259a25-27). 38. Cf. Mahliylinasa1J1graha, 11.2.4 and 11.25; Etienne Lamotte, La somme de Ia grade vehicule d'Asatiga, vol. 2 (Louvain: Universite de Louvain, Institut Orientaliste, 1938), pp. 90-91 and 120.